<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxi

Page

Grant v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  872,927,1037,1059

941

Grant v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1157

Gravely v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Graves v. Rozum
902

Graves v. Texas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930

Gray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
860

Grayer; Martin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Grayless; Snider v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Grayson v. Stevenson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
884

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Green v. Hornbreak
874

Green v. Jefferson County Comm’n
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Green v. Pollard  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Green v. Rock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937

882

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Green v. Thaler
Green v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  879,887,910,912,959,975

Greene v. Finger Lakes Developmental Disabilities Service . . .  886,1066

Greene v. Hanover Direct, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1019,1141

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  893,1039

Greene v. McNeil
910

Greene v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

Greene Archives, Inc. v. BPI Communications, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . .
929

Greenstein v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greenwell v. Parsley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Greenwood v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  929,1102

834

Greer v. Berghuis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gregory v. Dillard’s Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Gregory; Streater v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

922

Gregory v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

Greif, Inc.; Butler v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Grenada Stamping & Assembly v.  National Labor Relations Bd.
1035

Gresham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

Grider v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
808

Grievance Committee of Seventh Judicial Dist.; Sibley v.  . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  954,1086

Grifﬁn v. Ortiz
Grifﬁn v. Samuels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Grifﬁn v. Sebuliba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  903,1066

891

Grifﬁn v. Tennessee  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
853

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grifﬁn v. United States
1084

Griggs v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grijalva v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

Grimes v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  929,1102

988

Grinker, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113

Grisham v. Brooks
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1107

Grondolsky; Millhouse v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Grontkowski v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

25

Opinion of the Court

Trump’s communications with the Justice Department and
the  Vice  President,  these  remaining  allegations  involve
Trump’s  interactions  with  persons  outside  the  Executive
Branch: state officials, private parties, and the general pub-
lic.  Many of the remaining allegations, for instance, cover
at great length events arising out of communications that
Trump and his co-conspirators initiated with state legisla-
tors  and  election  officials  in  Arizona,  Georgia,  Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin regarding those States’ certi-
fication  of  electors.  See  App.  192–207,  Indictment  ¶¶13–
52.

Specifically,  the  indictment  alleges  that  Trump  and  his
co-conspirators  attempted  to  convince  those  officials  that
election fraud had tainted the popular vote count in their
States,  and  thus  electoral  votes  for  Trump’s  opponent
needed to be changed to electoral votes for Trump.  See id.,
at  185–186,  ¶10(a).    After  Trump  failed  to  convince  those
officials to alter their state processes, he and his co-conspirators
allegedly  developed  a  plan  “to  marshal  individuals  who
would  have  served  as  [Trump’s]  electors,  had  he  won  the
popular vote” in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, “and cause those in-
dividuals to make and send to the Vice President and Con-
gress false certifications that they were legitimate electors.”
Id.,  at  208,  ¶53.    If  the  plan  worked,  “the  submission  of
these fraudulent slates” would position the Vice President
to “open and count the fraudulent votes” at the certification
proceeding and set up “a fake controversy that would derail
the proper certification of Biden as president-elect.”  Id., at
208–209, ¶¶53, 54(b).  According to the indictment, Trump
used his campaign staff to effectuate the plan.  See, e.g., id.,
at 210, 212–213, ¶¶55, 63.  On the same day that the legit-
imate electors met in their respective jurisdictions to cast
their  votes,  the  indictment  alleges  that  Trump’s  “fraudu-
lent electors convened sham proceedings in the seven tar-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing allegations against Trump related to the 2020 election. It provides details about the charges and the alleged actions of Trump and his co-conspirators.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.

with the government-debt exception, is content-based.  The
answer is yes.
  As relevant here, a law is content-based if “a regulation
of speech ‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the mes-
sage a speaker conveys.”  Reed, 576 U. S., at 163.  That de-
scription applies to a law that “singles out specific subject
matter for differential treatment.”  Id., at 169.  For exam-
ple,  “a  law  banning  the  use  of  sound  trucks  for  political
speech—and  only  political  speech—would  be  a  content-
based regulation, even if it imposed no limits on the politi-
cal viewpoints that could be expressed.”  Ibid.; see, e.g., Si-
mon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Vic-
tims  Bd.,  502  U. S.  105,  116  (1991);  Arkansas  Writers’
Project,  Inc.  v.  Ragland,  481  U. S.  221,  229–230  (1987);
Widmar  v.  Vincent,  454  U. S.  263,  265,  276–277  (1981);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 459–463 (1980); Erznoznik
v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 211–212 (1975); Mosley, 408
U. S., at 95–96.
  Under §227(b)(1)(A)(iii), the legality of a robocall turns on
whether it is “made solely to collect a debt owed to or guar-
anteed by the United States.”  A robocall that says, “Please
pay your government debt” is legal.  A robocall that says,
“Please donate to our political campaign” is illegal.  That is
about as content-based as it gets.  Because the law favors
speech  made  for  collecting  government  debt  over  political
and other speech, the law is a content-based restriction on
speech.
  The  Government  advances  three  main  arguments  for
deeming  the  statute  content-neutral,  but  none  is  persua-
sive.
  First,  the  Government  suggests  that  §227(b)(1)(A)(iii)
draws distinctions based on speakers (authorized debt col-
lectors),  not  based  on  content.    But  that  is  not  the  law  in
front  of  us.    This  statute  singles out  calls  “made  solely  to
collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States,”
not all calls from authorized debt collectors.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the content-based nature of a law regarding robocalls. It analyzes the law's language and provides examples to demonstrate how it differentiates between types of speech based on their content (debt collection vs. political speech).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

ALITO, J., dissenting

II

The  overbreadth  doctrine  “strike[s]  a  balance  between
competing  social  costs.”  Williams,  553  U. S.,  at  292.
Specifically,  the  doctrine  seeks  to  balance  the  “harmful
effects”  of  “invalidating  a  law  that  in  some  of  its  applica-
tions  is  perfectly  constitutional”  against  the  possibility
that “the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law [will]
dete[r]  people  from  engaging  in  constitutionally  protected
speech.”  Ibid.   “In  order  to  maintain  an  appropriate  bal-
ance, we have vigorously enforced the requirement that a
statute’s  overbreadth  be  substantial,  not  only  in  an  abso-
lute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legiti-
mate sweep.”  Ibid.

In  determining  whether  a  statute’s  overbreadth  is  sub-
stantial,  we  consider  a  statute’s  application  to  real-world
conduct,  not  fanciful  hypotheticals.    See,  e.g.,  id.,  at  301–
302;  see  also  Ferber,  supra,  at  773;  Houston  v.  Hill,  482
U. S.  451,  466–467  (1987).  Accordingly,  we  have  repeat-
edly  emphasized  that  an  overbreadth  claimant  bears  the
burden  of  demonstrating,  “from  the  text  of  [the  law]  and
from  actual  fact,”  that  substantial  overbreadth  exists.
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U. S. 113, 122 (2003) (quoting New
York  State  Club  Assn.,  supra,  at  14;  emphasis  added;
internal  quotation  marks  omitted;  alteration  in  original).
Similarly, “there must be a realistic danger that the stat-
ute  itself  will  significantly  compromise  recognized  First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for
it  to  be  facially  challenged  on  overbreadth  grounds.”
Members  of  City  Council  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Taxpayers  for
Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 801 (1984) (emphasis added).

III
In  holding  that  §48  violates  the  overbreadth  rule,  the
Court  declines  to  decide  whether,  as  the  Government
maintains,  §48  is  constitutional  as  applied  to  two  broad
categories of depictions that exist in the real world: crush
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the overbreadth doctrine and its application to a specific statute. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

HOLT v. HOBBS

officials on matters of security.

Syllabus

Held: The Department’s grooming policy violates RLUIPA insofar as it
prevents  petitioner  from  growing a  ½-inch  beard  in  accordance  with
his religious beliefs.  Pp. 6–16.

(a) Under  RLUIPA,  the  challenging  party  bears  the  initial  burden
of  proving  that  his  religious  exercise  is  grounded  in  a  sincerely  held
religious  belief,  see  Burwell  v.  Hobby  Lobby  Stores,  Inc.,  573  U. S.
___,  ___,  n.  28,  and  that  the  government’s  action  substantially  bur
dens his religious exercise.  Here, petitioner’s sincerity is not in dis
pute, and he easily satisfies the second obligation.  The Department’s
policy forces him to choose between “engag[ing] in conduct that seri
ously violates [his] religious belie[f],” id., at ___, or contravening the
grooming policy and risking disciplinary action.  In reaching the op
posite conclusion, the District Court misunderstood the analysis that
RLUIPA demands.  First, the District Court erred by concluding that
the  grooming  policy  did  not  substantially  burden  petitioner’s  reli
gious  exercise  because  he  could  practice  his  religion  in  other  ways.
Second, the District Court erroneously suggested that the burden on
petitioner’s  religious  exercise  was  slight  because  petitioner  testified
that his religion would “credit” him for attempting to follow his reli
gious  beliefs,  even  if  that  attempt  proved  unsuccessful.    RLUIPA,
however,  applies  to  religious  exercise  regardless  of  whether  it  is
“compelled.”  §2000cc–5(7)(A).  Finally, the District Court improperly
relied on petitioner’s testimony that not all Muslims believe that men
must  grow  beards.    Even  if  petitioner’s  belief  were  idiosyncratic,
RLUIPA’s guarantees are “not limited to beliefs which are shared by
all of the members of a religious sect.”  Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indi
ana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 715–716.  Pp. 6–8.

(b) Once  the  challenging  party  satisfies  his  burden,  the  burden
shifts to the government to show that substantially burdening the re
ligious  exercise  of  the  “particular  claimant”  is  “the  least  restrictive
means  of  furthering  [a]  compelling  governmental  interest.”    Hobby
Lobby,  supra,  at  ___;  §2000cc–1(a).  The  Department  fails  to  show
that  enforcing  its  beard  prohibition  against  petitioner  furthers  its
compelling interests in preventing prisoners from hiding contraband
and disguising their identities.  Pp. 8–13.

(i) While the Department has a compelling interest in regulating

contraband, its argument that this interest is compromised by allow
ing an inmate to grow a ½-inch beard is unavailing, especially given
the difficulty of hiding contraband in such a short beard and the lack
of  a  corresponding  policy  regulating  the  length  of  hair  on  the  head.
RLUIPA does not permit the unquestioning deference required to ac
cept the Department’s assessment.  See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita
Beneficente  União  do  Vegetal,  546  U. S.  418,  434.    Even  if  the  De
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus section of a Supreme Court decision. It outlines the legal arguments and the court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

11

Opinion of the Court

agencies  are  public  accommodations  and  therefore  forbid-
den from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation
when certifying foster parents.

CSS counters that “foster care has never been treated as
a ‘public accommodation’ in Philadelphia.”  Brief for Peti-
tioners 13.  In any event, CSS adds, the ordinance cannot
qualify as generally applicable because the City allows ex-
ceptions  to  it  for  secular  reasons  despite  denying  one  for
CSS’s  religious  exercise.    But  that  constitutional  issue
arises only if the ordinance applies to CSS in the first place.
We conclude that it does not because foster care agencies do
not  act  as  public  accommodations  in  performing  certifica-
tions.

The  ordinance  defines  a  public  accommodation  in  rele-
vant  part  as  “[a]ny  place,  provider  or  public  conveyance,
whether licensed or not, which solicits or accepts the pat-
ronage or trade of the public or whose goods, services, facil-
ities,  privileges,  advantages  or  accommodations  are  ex-
tended,  offered,  sold,  or  otherwise  made  available  to  the
public.”  §9–1102(1)(w).  Certification is not “made available
to the public” in the usual sense of the words.  To make a
service  “available”  means  to  make  it  “accessible,  obtaina-
ble.”  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 84 (11th ed.
2005);  see  also  1  Oxford  English  Dictionary  812  (2d  ed.
1989)  (“capable  of  being  made  use  of,  at  one’s  disposal,
within one’s reach”).  Related state law illustrates the same
point.  A Pennsylvania antidiscrimination statute similarly
defines a public accommodation as an accommodation that
is “open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of the general
public.”  Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 43, §954(l) (Purdon Cum. Supp.
2009).  It fleshes out that definition with examples like ho-
tels,  restaurants,  drug  stores,  swimming  pools,  barber-
shops, and public conveyances.  Ibid.  The “common theme”
is that a public accommodation must “provide a benefit to
the general public allowing individual members of the gen-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a case involving a foster care agency and a city ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1078

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 17, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8571. Hatala v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 449.

No. 99–8574. Haddad v. Michigan National Corp. et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 245.

No. 99–8575. Dike v. Wyoming. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 990 P. 2d 1012.

No. 99–8578. Peacock v. Davis et ux. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 133 Idaho 637, 991 P. 2d 362.

No. 99–8586. Goodwin v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 230 Wis. 2d 749, 604 N. W. 2d 35.

No. 99–8591. Callicutt v. Panola County Jail et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 200 F. 3d 816.

No. 99–8596. Odom v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 321.

No. 99–8598. Williams v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 886.

No. 99–8600. Castillo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1115.

No. 99–8601. Chaidez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1352.

No. 99–8603. Young v. United States et al. C. A. D. C.

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8607. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8608. Sterling v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 260.

No. 99–8609. Pimentel v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8612. Avila-Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 2d

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1325.

No. 99–8613. Arestigueta v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 429.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CANIGLIA v. STROM

Syllabus

of a person to retreat into his or her home and “there be free from un-
reasonable governmental intrusion.”  Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1,
6.  A recognition of the existence of “community caretaking” tasks, like
rendering aid to motorists in disabled vehicles, is not an open-ended
license to perform them anywhere.  Pp. 3–4.

 953 F. 3d 112, vacated and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  ROBERTS,
C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined.  ALITO, J.,
and KAVANAUGH, J., filed concurring opinions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, which typically summarizes the key points of a court decision.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not meant to be read and understood in its entirety.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO ET AL. v. TEXAS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–493.  Argued February 22, 2022—Decided June 15, 2022

This case represents the latest conflict between Texas gaming officials
and the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Indian Tribe.  In 1968, Congress recog-
nized  the  Ysleta  del  Sur  Pueblo  as  an  Indian  tribe  and  assigned  its
trust  responsibilities  for  the  Tribe  to  Texas.    82  Stat.  93.  In  1983,
Texas  renounced  its  trust  responsibilities  as  inconsistent  with  the
State’s Constitution.  The State also expressed opposition to any new
federal trust legislation that did not permit the State to apply its own
gaming  laws  on  tribal  lands.    Congress  restored  the  Tribe’s  federal
trust status in 1987 when it adopted the Ysleta del Sur and Alabama
and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act. 101 Stat. 666.
The Restoration Act also “prohibited” as a matter of federal law “[a]ll
gaming  activities  which  are  prohibited  by  the  laws  of  the  State  of
Texas.”  Id., at 668.  Shortly thereafter, Congress adopted its own com-
prehensive Indian gaming legislation: the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA).  IGRA established rules for separate classes of games.  As
relevant  here,  IGRA  permitted  Tribes  to  offer  so-called  class  II
games—like bingo—in States that “permi[t] such gaming for any pur-
pose by any person, organization or entity.”  25 U. S. C. §2710(b)(1)(A).
IGRA allowed Tribes to offer class III games—like blackjack and bac-
carat—but  only  pursuant  to  negotiated  tribal/state  compacts.
§2703(8).

Pursuant  to  IGRA,  the  Tribe  sought  to  negotiate  a  compact  with
Texas to offer class III games.  Texas refused, arguing that the Resto-
ration Act displaced IGRA and required the Tribe to follow all of the
State’s gaming laws on tribal lands.  In subsequent federal litigation,
the District Court held that Texas violated IGRA by failing to negoti-
ate in good faith.  The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Resto-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
Opinion of the Court

IV
The  Court  today  affirms  what  the  Federal  Government
has maintained for almost half a century: ANCs are Indian
tribes under ISDA.  For that reason, they are Indian tribes
under the CARES Act and eligible for Title V funding.  The
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit is reversed, and the cases are remanded for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the conclusion and order of the court. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
376  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Roberts, C. J., concurring

claim—the  Act  violates  the  First  Amendment,  because  it
prohibits political speech.  The Government has a defense—
the  Act  may  be  enforced,  consistent  with  the  First  Amend
ment,  against  corporations.  Whether  the  claim  or  the  de
fense prevails is the question before us.

Given  the  nature  of  that  claim  and  defense,  it  makes  no
difference of any substance whether this case is resolved by
invalidating the statute on its face or only as applied to Citi
zens United.  Even if considered in as-applied terms, a hold
ing  in  this  case  that  the  Act  may  not  be  applied  to  Citizens
United—because  corporations  as  well  as  individuals  enjoy
the  pertinent  First  Amendment  rights—would  mean  that
any other corporation raising the same challenge would also
win.  Likewise,  a  conclusion  that  the  Act  may  be  applied
to  Citizens  United—because  it  is  constitutional  to  prohibit
corporate  political  speech—would  similarly  govern  future
cases.  Regardless whether we label Citizens United’s claim
a  “facial”  or  “as-applied”  challenge,  the  consequences  of  the
Court’s decision are the same.1

II

The text and purpose of the First Amendment point in the
same  direction:  Congress  may  not  prohibit  political  speech,
even  if  the  speaker  is  a  corporation  or  union.  What  makes
this  case  difﬁcult  is  the  need  to  confront  our  prior  decision
in Austin.

This is the ﬁrst case in which we have been asked to over
rule  Austin,  and  thus  it  is  also  the  ﬁrst  in  which  we  have
had reason to consider how much weight to give stare decisis
in assessing its continued validity.  The dissent erroneously

1 The  dissent suggests  that  I am  “much  too quick”  to  reach this  conclu
sion  because  I  “ignore”  Citizens  United’s  narrower  arguments.  Post,  at
405,  n. 12.  But  in  fact I  do  not  ignore those  arguments;  on the  contrary,
I  (and  my  colleagues  in  the  majority)  appropriately  consider  and  reject
them on their  merits, before addressing Citizens  United’s broader claims.
Supra, at 373–375; ante, at 322–329.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the First Amendment and corporate political speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

21

JACKSON, J., dissenting

holistic  process;  it  is  evidence  that,  both  in  theory  and  in
practice, UNC recognizes that race—like any other aspect
of a person—may bear on where both John and James start
the admissions relay, but will not fully determine whether
either eventually crosses the finish line.

III
A
The  majority  seems  to  think  that  race  blindness  solves
the problem of race-based disadvantage.  But the irony is
that requiring colleges to ignore the initial race-linked op-
portunity gap between applicants like John and James will
inevitably widen that gap, not narrow it.  It will delay the
day  that  every  American  has  an  equal  opportunity  to
thrive, regardless of race.

SFFA  similarly  asks  us  to  consider  how  much  longer
UNC  will  be  able  to  justify  considering  race  in  its  admis-
sions process.  Whatever the answer to that question was
yesterday, today’s decision will undoubtedly extend the du-
ration of our country’s need for such race consciousness, be-
cause  the  justification  for  admissions  programs  that  ac-
count for race is inseparable from the race-linked gaps in
health, wealth, and well-being that still exist in our society
(the closure of which today’s decision will forestall).

To be sure, while the gaps are stubborn and pernicious,
Black people, and other minorities, have generally been do-
ing better.95  But those improvements have only been made
possible because institutions like UNC have been willing to
grapple  forthrightly  with  the  burdens  of  history.    SFFA’s
complaint  about  the  “indefinite”  use  of  race-conscious  ad-
missions  programs,  then,  is  a  non  sequitur.    These  pro-
grams respond to deep-rooted, objectively measurable prob-
lems; their definite end will be when we succeed, together,
in solving those problems.

——————

95 See Bollinger & Stone 86, 103.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's stance on race-conscious admissions policies.  The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

ing foreign defendants.4
  Any consideration of Sosa’s discretion must also account
for  proper  limits  on  the  judicial  function.    As  discussed
above,  federal  courts  generally  lack  the  institutional  ex-
pertise  and  constitutional  authority  to  oversee  foreign
policy and national security, and should be wary of stray-
ing  where  they  do  not  belong.    See  supra,  at  4–5.  Yet
there are degrees of institutional incompetence and consti-
tutional evil.  It is one thing for courts to assume the task
of  creating  new  causes  of  action  to  ensure  our  citizens
abide  by  the  law  of  nations  and  avoid  reprisals  against
this  country.  It  is  altogether  another  thing  for  courts  to
punish  foreign  parties  for  conduct  that  could  not  be  at-
tributed  to  the  United  States  and  thereby  risk  reprisals
against  this  country.  If  a  foreign  state  or  citizen  violates
an  “international  norm”  in  a  way  that  offends  another
foreign  state  or  citizen,  the  Constitution  arms  the  Presi-
dent and Congress with ample means to address it.  Or, if
they think best, the political branches may choose to look
the  other  way.  But  in  all  events,  the  decision  to  impose
sanctions in disputes between foreigners over international

——————

4 The  dissent  is  wrong  to  suggest,  post,  at  17,  that  Sosa  “forecloses”
the  possibility  of  recognizing  a  U. S.-defendant  requirement  in  ATS
cases.  Sosa  said  nothing  about  the  subject.    And  were  Sosa  taken  to
preclude any future limits on ATS suits it did not itself anticipate, then
Kiobel  must  have  been  wrong  to  apply  the  canon  against  extraterrito-
rial  application  to  that  statute.    But  that  is  not  so.    The  dissent  also
observes that Sosa “involved an ATS suit brought by a citizen of Mexico
against a citizen of Mexico,” and that certain amici in Sosa filed briefs
arguing  that  the  Court  lacked  authority  over  the  ATS  claims  for  that
reason.  See  post,  at  17.    But  Sosa  did  not  address  those  arguments;
questions  that  “merely  lurk  in  the  record  are  not  resolved,  and  no
resolution of them may be inferred.”  Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Social-
ist  Workers  Party,  440  U. S.  173,  183  (1979)  (citations  and  internal
quotation  marks  omitted);  accord,  RJR  Nabisco,  Inc.  v.  European
Community, 579 U. S. ___, ___, n. 10 (2016) (slip op., at 23, n. 10) (issue
present  but  unaddressed  by  the  Court  in  a  previous  case  was  not
implicitly decided).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal citations, discusses legal precedent, and uses legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

939

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

nied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or
decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–5083.  Mejia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.
Appx.  82.

No. 09–5114.  Drachenberg v.  United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–5159.  Martinez  v.  Artus,  Superintendent,  Clin
ton  Correctional  Facility,  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–5162.  Maxwell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  318
Fed.  Appx.  23.

No. 09–5183.  Howard v. United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.
Appx.  344.

No.  09–5216.  Spinelli  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  551  F.
3d  159.

No.  09–5222.  Miloro,  aka  Rizzo,  aka  DeAngelo  v.  United
States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.  Re
ported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  384.

No. 09–5247.  Marino  v.  United States.  C. A.  2d Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.
Appx.  523.

No.  09–5283.  Monsif  v.  Commissioner  of  Internal  Reve
nue.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, not the main body of a document. It contains case numbers, citations, and mentions of justices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

851

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10736.  Anderson  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10737.  Perritte  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  5th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  4  So.  3d  1243.

No. 08–10738.  Olivier v.  California.  Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10739.  Bradley  v.  Mississippi.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10740.  Brown  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  596.

No.  08–10741.  Jacobs  v.  Wisconsin.  Ct.  App.  Wis.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  08–10742.  Newell  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  9  So.  3d  615.

No.  08–10743.  Oswald  v.  Thurmer,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10744.  Thomas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  587.

No.  08–10745.  Taylor  v.  North  Carolina.  Sup.  Ct.  N.  C.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  362  N.  C.  514,  669  S.  E.
2d  239.

No.  08–10746.  Watson  v.  City  of  Akron,  Ohio,  et  al.  Ct.

App.  Ohio,  Summit  County.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10747.  Koth  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  66.

No.  08–10748.  Osiname  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  939.

No.  08–10749.  Kamara  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  959.

No.  08–10750.  Escobar  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

33

BREYER, J., dissenting

2.10(a)  (West  Cum.  Supp.  2022).    Or  laws  imposing  addi-
tional  criminal  penalties  for  the  use  of  bullets  capable  of
piercing body armor?  See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §§921(a)(17)(B),
929(a).

The Court’s answer is that judges will simply have to em-
ploy “analogical reasoning.”  Ante, at 19–20.  But, as I ex-
plained above, the Court does not provide clear guidance on
how to apply such reasoning.  Even seemingly straightfor-
ward historical restrictions on firearm use may prove sur-
prisingly difficult to apply to modern circumstances.  The
Court  affirms  Heller’s  recognition  that  States  may  forbid
public carriage in “sensitive places.”  Ante, at 21–22.  But
what, in 21st-century New York City, may properly be con-
sidered a sensitive place?  Presumably “legislative assem-
blies,  polling  places,  and  courthouses,”  which  the  Court
tells  us  were  among  the  “relatively  few”  places  “where
weapons were altogether prohibited” in the 18th and 19th
centuries.  Ante, at 21.  On the other hand, the Court also
tells  us  that  “expanding  the  category  of  ‘sensitive  places’
simply to all places of public congregation that are not iso-
lated from law enforcement defines th[at] category . . . far
too  broadly.”  Ante,  at  22.  So  where  does  that  leave  the
many locations in a modern city with no obvious 18th- or
19th-century analogue?  What about subways, nightclubs,
movie theaters, and sports stadiums?  The Court does not
say.

Although  I  hope—fervently—that  future  courts  will  be
able to identify historical analogues supporting the validity
of regulations that address new technologies, I fear that it
will often prove difficult to identify analogous technological
and social problems from Medieval England, the founding
era, or the time period in which the Fourteenth Amendment
was  ratified.
Laws  addressing  repeating  crossbows,
launcegays, dirks, dagges, skeines, stilladers, and other an-
cient  weapons  will  be  of  little  help  to  courts  confronting
modern  problems.  And  as  technological  progress  pushes
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding firearm regulations and the application of historical precedents to modern contexts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
878

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–99.  Patterson  v.  American  Federation  of  State,
County  and  Municipal  Employees,  AFL–CIO,  #2456.  C.  A.
3d Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported below:  320 Fed.  Appx. 143.
No.  09–100.  Michigan  v.  Davis.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–101.  Smith  et  al. v.  Thomas  Jefferson  University

Hospital  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–105.  Karagiannopoulos  v.  City  of  Lowell,  North
Carolina.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
305  Fed.  Appx.  64.

No.  09–107.  Cordy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  808.

No. 09–110.  HCA,  Inc., et al.  v.  Aon Corp. et  al.  App. Ct.
Ill.,  1st  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  384  Ill.  App.
3d  1081,  973  N.  E.  2d  1084.

No.  09–111.  Ingrum  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  1311.

No.  09–112.  Ruiz  Rivera  et  al.  v.  Department  of  Educa

tion  et  al.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–114.  Kirkland  et  al.  v.  Wayne  County,  Michigan,

et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–116.  Secarea  v.  Regents  of  the  University  of
California  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.  Dist.,  Div.  3.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No.  09–118.  Braquet  v.  Commissioner  of  Internal  Reve
nue.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336
Fed.  Appx.  432.

No.  09–119.  Badura  et  al.  v.  Spahn  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Neb.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–120.  T.  G.  v.  Kentucky  Cabinet  for  Health  and

Family  Services.  Sup.  Ct.  Ky.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–121.  Hoy  v.  Mentor  Township,  Michigan.  Sup.  Ct.
Mich.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  482  Mich.  992,  756
N. W.  2d  64.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

JACKSON, J., dissenting

598 U. S. 115, 138–139 (2023).  But resort to these tools is
questionable  under  certain  circumstances.    See  Milner  v.
Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 574 (2011) (“When pre-
sented, on the one hand, with clear statutory language and,
on  the  other,  with  dueling  committee  reports,  we  must
choose the language”).  In any event, here, the statutory and
legislative history only make matters worse for the major-
ity’s analysis.

Section 666 traces its lineage to 18 U. S. C. §201, though
the  kinship  is  more  attenuated  than  the  majority  lets  on.
Section  201  indeed  “contains  comprehensive  prohibitions
on bribes and gratuities to federal officials.”  Ante, at 4 (dis-
cussing §§201(b)–(c)).  But initially, it was not entirely clear
which officials that federal statute covered.  By its terms,
§201  applies  broadly  to  “public  officials,”  see  §201(a),  and
confusion  arose  among  some  lower  courts  as  to  “whether
state and local employees could be considered ‘public offi-
cials’ ” under the statute.  Salinas, 522 U. S., at 58.  Without
awaiting our resolution of the issue, Congress enacted §666
in 1984.  Ibid.; see also 98 Stat. 2143.

In §666, Congress expressly sought to reach state and lo-
cal  officials  “to  protect  the  integrity  of  the  vast  sums  of
money  distributed  through  Federal  programs.”    S. Rep.
No. 98–225,  p. 370  (1983).    As  originally  enacted,  §666
barred those officials from soliciting, accepting, or agreeing
to accept “anything of value . . . for or because of the recipi-
ent’s conduct,” §666(b) (1982 ed., Supp. II), using language
similar to that in §201(c), the federal-official gratuities pro-
vision.  Crucially, no one disputes that when it was initially
enacted, §666 prohibited both bribes and gratuities.  Ante,
at 4.  Similarly significant (though unmentioned by the ma-
jority), Congress imposed the same 10-year maximum term
of  imprisonment  for  a  violation  then  as  it  does  now.  See
§666(b) (1982 ed., Supp. II); cf. ante, at 14 (describing it as
“unfathomable  that  Congress  would  authorize  a  10-year
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of a specific statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

BILSKI v. KAPPOS

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

Thus,  fields  such  as  business  and  finance  were  not
generally considered part of the “useful arts” in the found-
ing Era.  See, e.g., The Federalist No. 8, p. 69 (C. Rossiter
ed.  1961)  (A.  Hamilton)  (distinguishing  between  “the  arts
of  industry,  and  the  science  of  finance”);  30  The  Writings
of  George  Washington  1745–1799,  p.  186    (J.  Fitzpatrick
ed. 1939) (writing in a letter that “our commerce has been
considerably  curtailed,”  but  “the  useful  arts  have  been
almost  imperceptible  pushed  to  a  considerable  degree  of
perfection”).    Indeed,  the  same  delegate  to  the  Constitu-
tional Convention who gave an address in which he listed
triumphs  in  the  useful  arts  distinguished  between  those
arts and the conduct of business.  He explained that inves-
tors  were  now  attracted  to  the  “manufactures  and  the
useful  arts,”  much  as  they  had  long  invested  in  “com-
merce,  navigation,  stocks,  banks,  and  insurance  compa-
nies.”  T. Coxe, A Statement of the Arts and Manufactures
of the United States of America for the Year 1810, (1814),
in 2 American State Papers, Finance 666, 688 (1832).

Some scholars have remarked, as did Thomas Jefferson,
that  early  patent  statutes  neither  included  nor  reflected
any  serious  debate  about  the  precise  scope  of  patentable
——————

try, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific
knowledge”); In re Waldbaum, 457 F. 2d 997, 1003 (CCPA 1972) (Rich,
J., concurring) (“ ‘The phrase “technological arts,” as we have used it, is
synonymous  with  the  phrase  “useful  arts”  as  it  appears  in  Article  I,
Section  8  of  the  Constitution’ ”);  Paulik  v.  Rizkalla,  760  F. 2d  1270,
1276 (CA Fed. 1985) (explaining that “useful arts” is “the process today
called  technological  innovation”);  Thomas,  The  Post-Industrial  Patent
System,  10  Fordham  Intell.  Prop.  Media  &  Ent.  L. J.  3,  32–55  (1999)
(cataloguing  early  understandings  of  technological  arts).    This  view
may be supported, for example, by an 1814 grant to Harvard University
to  create  a  “Professorship  on  the  Application  of  Science  to  the  Useful
Arts,”  something  that  today  might  be  akin  to  applied  science  or  engi-
neering.  See  M.  James,  Engineering  an  Environment  for  Change:
Bigelow,  Peirce,  and  Early  Nineteenth-Century  Practical  Education  at
Harvard,  in  Science  at  Harvard  University:  Historical  Perspectives  59
(C. Elliott & M. Rossiter eds. 1992).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Stevens in the case of Bilski v. Kappos. It delves into the historical understanding of "useful arts" in the context of patent law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring

late 1850s, the connection was well established.  For exam-
ple, even Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19
How.  393  (1857),  demonstrated  this  connection  when  dis-
cussing why, erroneously in my view, free blacks were “not
intended to be included . . . under the word ‘citizens’ in the
Constitution,” and therefore could “claim none of the rights
and privileges which that instrument provides for and se-
cures to citizens of the United States.”  Id., at 404.  Accord-
ing to Taney, free blacks were at the founding “considered
as a subordinate and inferior class of beings who had been
subjugated  by  the  dominant  race,  and,  whether  emanci-
pated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and
had no rights or privileges but such as those who held power
and the Government might choose to grant them.”  Id., at
404–405.

He  reached  that  conclusion  after  surveying  discrimina-
tory  state  laws  and  finding  it  “hardly  consistent  with  the
respect due to these States, to suppose that they regarded
at that time, as fellow-citizens and members of the sover-
eignty,  a  class  of  beings  whom  they  had  thus  stigmatized
. . . and upon whom they had impressed such deep and en-
during marks of inferiority and degradation.”  Id., at 416.
Under  the  Comity  Clause  of  Article  IV,  moreover,  States
could not place “citizens” of the United States “in an inferior
grade.”  Id.,  at  423.  Because  it  was  long  assumed  that
blacks could be placed in such an “inferior grade,” how then
could they be citizens?  For Taney, then, States’ longstand-
ing  and  widespread  practice  of  denying  free  blacks  equal
civil rights conclusively showed that blacks were not “citi-
zens” entitled to various constitutional protections, such as
the right to sue in federal court.

Senator  Stephen  Douglas,  defending  Dred  Scott  a  few
months later in Springfield, Illinois, expressed the converse
of Taney’s reasoning.  He asked his audience, “What is the
object of making [Dred Scott] a citizen?” and answered, “Of
course to give him the rights, privileges and immunities of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or analysis, specifically discussing the Dred Scott case and Justice Taney's reasoning. It delves into historical context and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

MOORE v. HARPER

THOMAS, J., dissenting

cordingly, if petitioners’ premises hold, then state constitu-
tions may specify who constitute “the Legislature” and pre-
scribe  how  legislative power  is  exercised,  but  they  cannot
control what substantive laws can be made for federal elec-
tions.

The majority indicates that it does not perceive this dis-
tinction between “substantive” and “procedural” rules, see
ante,  at  23–24,12  illustrating  its  doubts  with  a  rhetorical
question: “When a governor vetoes a bill because of a disa-
greement with its policy consequences, has the governor ex-
ercised  a  procedural  or  substantive  restraint  on  lawmak-
ing?”  Ante,  at  24.  The  answer  is  straightforward:  The
power of approving or vetoing bills is “a part of the legisla-
tive  process”  because  it  is  “a  part  in  the  making  of  state
laws.”  Smiley,  285  U. S.,  at  368–369;  see  also  INS  v.
Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 933, 951, 954, 957, n. 22, 958 (1983)
(repeatedly referring to bicameralism and presentment as
——————
cise[d] . . . in accordance with the [State’s] method . . . for legislative en-
actments,” id., at 367, including “the participation of the Governor wher-
ever the state constitution provided for such participation as part of the
process of making laws,” id., at 370.  Nothing in Smiley even hints that
a federally delegated power fails to “transcen[d] limitations sought to be
imposed by the people of a State” simply because it is a lawmaking func-
tion.  Leser, 258 U. S., at 137.

12 This  admission  carries  troubling  implications  for  other  fields,  as
comparable  “distinction[s]  between  procedure  and  substance  [are]  not
unknown  in  the  law.”  United  States  v.  Kras,  409  U. S.  434,  463,  n.  6
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  For example, our habeas corpus juris-
prudence has long distinguished “substantive” constitutional rules from
“procedural” ones.  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 352, 353 (2004).
Our  sentencing  appellate  review  jurisprudence  similarly  recognizes  a
distinction between the “procedura[l] sound[ness]” of a sentencing deci-
sion and “the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.”  Gall
v. United States, 552 U. S. 38, 51 (2007).  And, no less essential a statute
than  the  Rules  Enabling Act  presupposes  a  meaningful  distinction  be-
tween  “rules  of  practice  and  procedure”  and  matters  of  “substantive
right.”  28 U. S. C. §§2072(a) and (b).  Indeed, the constitutionality of the
Act rests upon this very distinction.  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460,
470–472 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 9–10 (1941).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Moore v. Harper.  The text discusses the distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" rules in the context of state control over federal elections.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

Court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents
and permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act, reason-
ing  that  “viability  marks  the  earliest  point  at  which  the
State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to
justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions” and
that 15 weeks’ gestational age is “prior to viability.”  Jack-
son Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 349 F. Supp. 3d 536,
539–540  (SD  Miss.  2019)  (internal  quotation  marks  omit-
ted).  The Fifth Circuit affirmed.  945 F. 3d 265 (2019).

We granted certiorari, 593 U. S. ___ (2021), to resolve the
question whether “all pre-viability prohibitions on elective
abortions are unconstitutional,”  Pet. for Cert. i.  Petition-
ers’ primary defense of the Mississippi Gestational Age Act
is that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and that “the
Act  is  constitutional  because  it  satisfies  rational-basis  re-
view.”  Brief for Petitioners 49.  Respondents answer that
allowing  Mississippi  to  ban  pre-viability  abortions  “would
be  no  different  than  overruling  Casey  and  Roe  entirely.”
Brief  for  Respondents  43.  They  tell  us  that  “no  half-
measures” are available: We must either reaffirm or over-
rule Roe and Casey.  Brief for Respondents 50.

II

We begin by considering the critical question whether the
Constitution, properly understood, confers a right to obtain
an  abortion.    Skipping  over  that  question,  the  controlling
opinion  in  Casey  reaffirmed  Roe’s  “central  holding”  based
solely on the doctrine of stare decisis, but as we will explain,
proper application of stare decisis required an assessment
of the strength of the grounds on which Roe was based.  See
infra, at 45–56.

We therefore turn to the question that the Casey plurality
did  not  consider,  and  we  address  that  question  in  three
steps.  First, we explain the standard that our cases have
used in determining whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s
reference  to  “liberty”  protects  a  particular  right.    Second,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. It sets the stage for the court's analysis of the constitutionality of abortion restrictions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 89 (2000)

93

Counsel

cause for petitioner in No. 98–1706. With him on the briefs
were Timi E. Nickerson and Sean T. Connaughton.

William Berggren Collins, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of Washington, argued the cause for respondents in both
cases. With him on the brief for the state respondents were
Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, and Jay D. Geck,
Thomas C. Morrill, and Jerri Lynn Thomas, Assistant At-
torneys General. Jeffrey L. Needle ﬁled a brief for respond-
ent Washington Environmental Council et al. With him on
the brief was John M. MacDonald.†

†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the Government
of Belgium et al. by Alex Blanton and Laurie C. Sahatjian; for the Ameri-
can Waterways Operators by Eldon V. C. Greenberg and Barbara L. Hol-
land; for the Baltic and International Maritime Council et al. by Dennis
L. Bryant, Charles L. Coleman III, Brian D. Starer, and Jovi Tenev; for
the International Chamber of Shipping et al. by William F. Sheehan, John
Townsend Rich, and Heather H. Anderson; for the Maritime Law Asso-
ciation of the United States by Howard M. McCormack, James Patrick
Cooney, and David J. Bederman; for the National Association of Water-
front Employers et al. by F. Edwin Froelich and Charles T. Carroll, Jr.;
for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., et al. by Kenneth S. Gel-
ler, Charles Rothfeld, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Washington Legal
Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and R. Shawn Gunnarson.

Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the State of
California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Richard
M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht and
J. Matthew Rodriquez, Assistant Attorneys General, Dennis M. Eagan
and Michael W. Neville, Deputy Attorneys General, Maya B. Kara, Acting
Attorney General of the Northern Mariana Islands, and by the Attorneys
General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska,
Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida,
Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Richard P. Ieyoub of
Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts,
Mike Moore of Mississippi, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, John J.
Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Michael F. Easley
of North Carolina, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson
of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Is-
land, Charlie Condon of South Carolina, and Jan Graham of Utah; for
San Juan County, Washington, et al. by Randall K. Gaylord and Karen
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal case citations and counsel information. This is not the main body text of a legal document and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Information</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

the  Little  Colorado,  and  the  San  Juan—border  the
reservation.  To  meet  their  water  needs  for  household,
agricultural,  industrial,  and  commercial  purposes,  the
Navajos  obtain  water  from  rivers,  tributaries,  springs,
lakes, and aquifers on the reservation.

Much  of  the  western  United  States  is  arid.  Water  has
long been scarce, and the problem is getting worse.  From
2000  through  2022,  the  region  faced  the  driest  23-year
period in more than a century and one of the driest periods
in  the  last  1,200  years.    And  the  situation  is  expected  to
grow  more  severe  in  future  years.    So  even  though  the
Navajo Reservation encompasses numerous water sources
and the Tribe has the right to use needed water from those
sources, the Navajos face the same water scarcity problem
that many in the western United States face.

Over  the  decades,  the  Federal  Government  has  taken
various steps to assist the people in the western States with
their water needs.  The Solicitor General explains that, for
the Navajo Tribe in particular, the Federal Government has
secured  hundreds  of  thousands  of  acre-feet  of  water  and
authorized billions of dollars for water infrastructure on the
Navajo Reservation.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5; see also, e.g.,
Consolidated  Appropriations  Act,  2021,  Pub.  L.  116–260,
134  Stat.  3227,  3230;  Northwestern  New  Mexico  Rural
Water Projects Act, §§10402, 10609, 10701, 123 Stat. 1372,
1395–1397; Central Arizona Project Settlement Act of 2004,
§104,  118  Stat.  3487;  Colorado  Ute  Settlement  Act
Amendments  of  2000,  114  Stat.  2763A–261,  2763A–263;
Act of June 13, 1962, 76 Stat. 96; Act of Apr. 19, 1950, 64
Stat. 44–45.

In the Navajos’ view, however, those efforts did not fully
satisfy  the  United  States’s  obligations  under  the  1868
treaty.  The Navajos therefore sued the U. S. Department
of  the  Interior,  the  Bureau  of  Indian  Affairs,  and  other
federal  parties.    As  relevant  here,  the  Navajos  asserted  a
breach-of-trust  claim  arising  out  of  the  1868  treaty  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the Navajo Nation's water rights and the federal government's efforts to address their water needs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

KENNEDY, J., dissenting

requires  a  warrant  simply  did  not  occur  when  the  Gov-
ernment  used  court-approved  compulsory  process,  based
on a finding of reasonable necessity, to compel a cell phone
service provider, as owner, to disclose cell-site records.

III
The Court rejects a straightforward application of Miller
and Smith.  It concludes instead that applying those cases
to cell-site records would work a “significant extension” of
the principles underlying them, ante, at 15, and holds that
the  acquisition  of  more  than  six  days  of  cell-site  records
constitutes a search, ante, at 11, n. 3.

In my respectful view the majority opinion misreads this
Court’s  precedents,  old  and  recent,  and  transforms  Miller
and Smith into an unprincipled and unworkable doctrine.
The  Court’s  newly  conceived  constitutional  standard  will
cause confusion; will undermine traditional and important
law enforcement practices; and will allow the cell phone to
become  a  protected  medium  that  dangerous  persons  will
use to commit serious crimes.

A
The  Court  errs  at  the  outset  by  attempting  to  sidestep
Miller and Smith.  The Court frames this case as following
instead from United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983),
and  United  States  v.  Jones,  565  U. S.  400  (2012).    Those
cases, the Court suggests, establish that “individuals have
a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  in  the  whole  of  their
physical movements.”  Ante, at 79, 12.

Knotts held just the opposite: “A person traveling in an
automobile  on  public  thoroughfares  has  no  reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.”  460 U. S., at 281.  True, the Court in Knotts also
suggested  that  “different  constitutional  principles  may  be
applicable”  to  “dragnet-type  law  enforcement  practices.”
Id., at 284.  But by dragnet practices the Court was refer-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kennedy in the case of Carpenter v. United States. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

468

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of Scalia, J.

were for “works of purely private or local interest, in no
sense national,” 4 Cong. Rec. 5628. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt impounded funds appropriated for a ﬂood control
reservoir and levee in Oklahoma. See Act of Aug. 18, 1941,
ch. 377, 55 Stat. 638, 645; Hearings on S. 373 before the Ad
Hoc Subcommittee on Impoundment of Funds of the Com-
mittee on Government Operations and the Subcommittee on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 848–849 (1973). President Tru-
man ordered the impoundment of hundreds of millions of dol-
lars that had been appropriated for military aircraft. See
Act of Oct. 29, 1949, ch. 787, 63 Stat. 987, 1013; Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman,
1949, pp. 538–539 (W. Reid ed. 1964). President Nixon, the
Mahatma Gandhi of all impounders, asserted at a press con-
ference in 1973 that his “constitutional right” to impound
appropriated funds was “absolutely clear.” The President’s
News Conference of Jan. 31, 1973, 9 Weekly Comp. of Pres.
Doc. 109–110 (1973). Our decision two years later in Train
v. City of New York, 420 U. S. 35 (1975), proved him wrong,
but it implicitly conﬁrmed that Congress may confer discre-
tion upon the Executive to withhold appropriated funds,
even funds appropriated for a speciﬁc purpose. The statute
at issue in Train authorized spending “not to exceed” speci-
ﬁed sums for certain projects, and directed that such “[s]ums
authorized to be appropriated . . . shall be allotted” by the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 33
U. S. C. §§ 1285, 1287 (1970 ed., Supp. III). Upon enactment
of this statute, the President directed the Administrator to
allot no more than a certain part of the amount authorized.
420 U. S., at 40. This Court held, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that the statute did not grant the Executive
discretion to withhold the funds, but required allotment of
the full amount authorized.

Id., at 44–47.

The short of the matter is this: Had the Line Item Veto
Act authorized the President to “decline to spend” any item
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the case Clinton v. City of New York. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

interlocked factors place underrepresented minorities mul-
tiple  steps  behind  the  starting  line  in  the  race  for  college
admissions.

In North Carolina, the home of UNC, racial inequality is
deeply  entrenched  in  K–12  education.    State  courts  have
consistently  found  that  the  State  does  not  provide  un-
derrepresented  racial  minorities  equal  access  to  educa-
tional  opportunities,  and  that  racial  disparities  in  public
schooling have increased in recent years, in violation of the
State Constitution.  See, e.g., Hoke Cty. Bd. of Ed. v. State,
2020  WL  13310241,  *6,  *13  (N. C.  Super.  Ct.,  Jan.  21,
2020); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Ed. v. State, 382 N. C. 386, 388–390,
879 S. E. 2d 193, 197–198 (2022).

These  opportunity  gaps  “result  in  fewer  students  from
underrepresented  backgrounds  even  applying  to”  college,
particularly elite universities.  Brief for Massachusetts In-
stitute  of  Technology  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae 32.  “Because
talent lives everywhere, but opportunity does not, there are
undoubtedly talented students with great academic poten-
tial who have simply not had the opportunity to attain the
traditional indicia of merit that provide a competitive edge
in the admissions process.”  Brief for Harvard Student and
Alumni Organizations as Amici Curiae 16.  Consistent with
this reality, Latino and Black students are less likely to en-
roll  in  institutions  of  higher  education  than  their  white
peers.14

Given  the  central  role that  education  plays  in  breaking
the cycle of racial inequality, these structural barriers rein-
force other forms of inequality in communities of color.  See
E.  Wilson,  Monopolizing  Whiteness,  134  Harv.  L. Rev.

——————
Developmental Psychology 11 (2016); A. Kenly & A. Klein, Early Child-
hood Experiences of Black Children in a Diverse Midwestern Suburb, 24
J. African American Studies 130, 136 (2020).

14 Dept. of Education, National Center for Education, Institute of Edu-
cational Science, The Condition of Education 2022, p. 24 (2020) (fig. 16).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the issue of racial inequality in education and its impact on college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

tions,” such as ruling on the admissibility of evidence and
hearing  and  examining  witnesses.  501  U. S., at  881–882.
That part of the opinion, however, was unnecessary to the
result.  The  Court  went  on  to  conclude  that  even  if  the
STJs’ duties in such cases were “not as significant as [the
Court]  found  them  to  be,”  its  conclusion  “would  be  un-
changed.”  Id.,  at  882.    The  Court  noted  that  STJs  could
enter final decisions in certain types of cases, and that the
Government had conceded that the STJs acted as officers
with  respect  to  those  proceedings.    Ibid.   Because  STJs
could  not  be  “officers  for  purposes  of  some  of  their  duties
. . .  ,  but  mere  employees  with  respect  to  other[s],”  the
Court held they were officers in all respects.  Ibid.  Freytag
is,  therefore,  consistent  with  a  rule  that  a  prerequisite  to
officer  status  is  the  authority,  in  at  least  some  instances,
to issue final decisions that bind the Government or third
parties.*

Because I would conclude that Commission ALJs are not
officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause, it is not
necessary  to  reach  the  constitutionality  of  their  removal
protections.  See  ante,  at  1  (BREYER,  J.,  concurring  in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).  In any event, for
at  least  the  reasons  stated  in  JUSTICE  BREYER’s  opinion,
Free  Enterprise  Fund  is  readily  distinguishable  from  the
circumstances at play here.  See ante, at 3–9.

As a final matter, although I would conclude that Com-
mission  ALJs  are  not  officers,  I  share  JUSTICE  BREYER’s
concerns regarding the Court’s choice of remedy, and so I
join Part III of his opinion.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

——————

* Even  the  majority  opinion  is  not  inconsistent  with  such  a  rule,  in
that it appears to conclude, wrongly in my view, that Commission ALJs
can at times render final decisions.  See ante, at 10.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GEORGIA v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

judicial opinion-drafting process in its entirety—including
the drafting of headnotes and syllabi, in jurisdictions where
that is done by judges—falls outside the reach of copyright
protection.

One might ask: If a judge’s annotations are not copyright-
able, why are those created by legislators?  The answer lies
in the difference between the role of a judge and the role of
a legislator.  “[T]o the judiciary” we assign “the duty of in-
terpreting and applying” the law, Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923), and sometimes making the appli-
cable law, see Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 383 (1964).  See
also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (“It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is.”).  In contrast, the role of the
legislature encompasses the process of “making laws”—not
construing  statutes  after  their  enactment.    Mellon,  262
U. S., at 488; see Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018)
(plurality opinion) (slip op., at 5) (“[T]he legislative power is
the power to make law.”).  The OCGA annotations, in my
appraisal, do not rank as part of the Georgia Legislature’s
lawmaking process for three reasons.

First, the annotations are not created contemporaneously
with the statutes to which they pertain; instead, the anno-
tations  comment  on  statutes  already  enacted.    See,  e.g.,
App. 268–269 (text of enacted laws are transmitted to the
publisher for the addition of commentary); id., at 403–404
(publisher adds new case notes on a rolling basis as courts
construe  existing  statutes).1    In  short,  annotating  begins

——————

1 For example, OCGA §11–2A–213 was enacted, in its current form, in
1993.  See 1993 Ga. Laws p. 633.  The case notes contained in the OCGA
summarize  judicial  decisions  construing  the  statute  years  later.   See
§11–2A–213 (2002) (citing Griffith v. Medical Rental Supply of Albany,
Ga.,  Inc.,  244  Ga.  App.  120,  534  S. E.  2d  859  (2000);  Bailey  v.  Tucker
Equip. Sales, Inc., 236 Ga. App. 289, 510 S. E. 2d 904 (1999)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a judicial opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It discusses the copyright implications of judicial annotations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Judicial Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

17

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

APPENDIX

Motion for Summary Judgt., Exh. A, in No. 3:17–cv–179 (WD Tex., Nov.
11, 2018), ECF Doc. 146–1, p. 1.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and an excerpt from a court document. It is likely not the main body of text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation/Court Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

27

THOMAS, J., dissenting

travel between States or outside a tribe, are subject to reg-
ulation by a sovereign other than the Federal Government
(a State or tribe).”  Ante, at 13.

But the Court’s proposed distinction makes no sense.  For
one, it conflicts with the Court’s longstanding characteriza-
tion of Congress’ commerce power as plenary.  See, e.g., Ar-
mour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 1, 6 (1918).  As long as the
goods mentioned by the Court are in fact part of “interstate
commerce,” then Congress has authority to regulate their
travel at all times.  For another, it does nothing to distin-
guish  Congress’  commerce  power  from  its  power  to  raise
and maintain a military.  Following the Court’s logic, one
could  just  as  easily  say  that  Congress’  power  under  the
Army  and  Navy  Clauses  is  “less  than  complete”  because
“federal  regulation  of  soldiers  involves  men  and  women
who, before they join the military, are subject to regulation
by  a  sovereign  other  than  the  Federal  Government.”  De-
spite the Court’s efforts, its “completeness” analysis simply
fails to distinguish the Army and Navy Clauses from other
Article  I  powers  delegated  to  Congress  in  the  plan  of  the
Convention.12

——————

12 The Court also makes what appears to be an alternative argument.
Invoking  Hamilton’s  discussion  of  state  sovereignty  in  The  Federalist,
the Court says that States surrendered their sovereign immunity where
the Constitution “ ‘granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and
repugnant.’ ”  Ante,  at  4–5  (quoting  The  Federalist  No.  32,  p.  200  (J.
Cooke ed. 1961)).  The Court then remarks, seemingly in dicta, that “an
assertion  of  state  sovereignty  to  frustrate  federal  prerogatives  to  raise
and maintain military forces would be strongly ‘contradictory and repug-
nant’  to  the  constitutional  order.”  Ante, at  13  (quoting  The  Federalist
No. 32, at 200).  But that reasoning is hardly different from the argument
made by Justice Souter when he dissented in Seminole Tribe with respect
to the Indian Commerce Clause and Congress’ exclusive authority in that
area.  See 517 U. S., at 148 (“[S]ince the States have no sovereignty in
the regulation of commerce with the tribes, on Hamilton’s view there is
no  source  of  sovereign  immunity  to  assert  in  a  suit  based  on  congres-
sional regulation of that commerce”).  Similarly, the Court has often held
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's interpretation of Congress's commerce power.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

977

558 U. S.

October 20, 2009

No.  09–6588.  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  254.

No.  09–6589.  Robinson,  aka  Mathurin  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.
Appx.  876.

No. 09–6593.  Smith v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6596.  Soto-Maciel,  aka  Macias  v.  United  States.

C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6597.  Garza  Gallego  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  115.

No. 09–6611.  Jones v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  279.

No.  09–6612.  Lamere  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  669.

No.  09–6613.  Manzo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  642.

No.  09–6614.  Jones  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  367.

No.  09–6615.  Muniz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  524.

No.  09–6616.  Overton  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  573  F.  3d  679.

No.  09–6618.  O’Connor  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  395.

No.  09–6620.  Mohamed  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  Armed

Forces.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  68  M.  J.  150.

No.  09–6625.  Niblock  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  165.

No.  09–6628.  DeBerry  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  151.

No.  09–6629.  Espinosa  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  889.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks narrative flow and is primarily legal citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
836

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10288.  Moore  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10291.  Ramey  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10296.  Updike  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  303  Fed.  Appx.  152.

No.  08–10304.  Moorer  v.  Jackson,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10309.  Payne v.  Texas.  Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10312.  Szanto  v.  Szanto.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.

Dist.,  Div.  3.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10315.  Archer  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10319.  Bethany  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10321.  Bishop  v.  Terry,  Warden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10323.  Setts  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  1st

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  996  So.  2d  219.

No.  08–10326.  Gonzalez-Zotelo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  736.

No.  08–10336.  Batista  v.  New  York.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.

N. Y.,  1st  Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10338.  Brown  v.  South  Carolina.  Sup.  Ct.  S.  C.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10341.  Cunniff  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  2d

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  995  So.  2d  962.

No.  08–10343.  Hawkins  v.  Pennsylvania.  Sup.  Ct.  Pa.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  598  Pa.  85,  953  A.  2d  1248.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

clxi

Page

Wright v. Zoeller
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  845,1038

Wrigley; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  807,1046

1024

Wrinn v. Johnson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wu v. Holder
1008

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wubayeh v. New York City
815

Wuterich v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

WW, LLC; Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034

Wylie v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

Wynn Las Vegas, LLC; Jafari v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Wyoming; Montana v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  846,1086

Wyoming Dept. of Corrections; Kenyon v.
879

Wyoming Medical Center; Ripley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1019

Xin Ye v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Y. v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Society
971

Yaitsky v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947

Yakin; Tyler Hill Corp. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
966

Yalincak v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044

Yancey v. Ludwig  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919

Yann v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Yara; Flynn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923

Yarborough; Burt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Yarborough; Garcia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
899

Yarborough; Pelch v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1085

Yarbrough v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yates; Jones v.
982

Yates; Ruezga v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yates v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  913,1002

864

Yauman v. United States
1019

Ye v. United States
Yeager v. San Diego  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1013,1140

897

Yearby v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Yeboah-Sefah v. Russo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Yenglee v. DiGuglielmo
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
881

Yen  Hou  v.  New  York  City  Dept.  of  Environmental  Protection
1076

YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago v. U. S. Bank  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yoder v. Brewer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1140

York, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,1102

1110

York v. Robinson
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Yost v. West Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Young v. Bodison
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
805

Young v. Department of Justice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Young v. Holderness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

Young v. Oklahoma  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Young v. Presley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  844,1038

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

3

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

the  copyright  owner’s  exclusive  right  under  §106(3)  to
control  the  distribution  of  a  particular  copy  is  exhausted,
and  from  that  point  forward,  the  copy  can  be  resold  or
otherwise  redistributed  without  the  copyright  owner’s
authorization.

Section  602(a)(1)  (2006  ed.,  Supp.  V)1—last,  but  most
critical,  of  the  three  copyright  provisions  bearing  on  this
case—is an importation ban.  It reads:

“Importation  into  the  United  States,  without  the
authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of
copies  or  phonorecords  of  a  work  that  have  been
acquired  outside  the  United  States  is  an  infringe-
ment  of  the  exclusive  right  to  distribute  copies  or
phonorecords under section 106, actionable under sec
tion 501.”

In  Quality  King  Distributors,  Inc.  v.  L’anza  Research
Int’l,  Inc.,  523  U. S.  135,  143–154  (1998),  the  Court  held
that a copyright owner’s right to control importation under
§602(a)(1) is a component of the distribution right set forth
in §106(3) and is therefore subject to §109(a)’s codification
of  the  first  sale  doctrine.  Quality  King  thus  held  that
the  importation  of  copies  made  in  the  United  States  but
sold  abroad  did  not  rank  as  copyright  infringement
under  §602(a)(1).  Id.,  at  143–154.    See  also  id.,  at  154
(GINSBURG,  J.,  concurring)  (Quality  King  “involve[d]  a
‘round  trip’  journey,  travel  of  the  copies  in  question  from
the  United  States  to  places  abroad,  then  back  again”).2
——————

1 In  2008,  Congress  renumbered  what  was  previously  §602(a)  as
§602(a)(1).  See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual
Property  Act  of  2008  (PROIPA),  §105(b)(2),  122  Stat.  4259.    Like  the
Court, I refer to the provision by its current numbering.

2 Although  JUSTICE  KAGAN’s  concurrence  suggests  that  Quality  King
erred in “holding that §109(a) limits §602(a)(1),” ante, at 2, that recent,
unanimous  holding  must  be  taken  as  a  given.    See  John  R.  Sand  &
Gravel  Co.  v.  United  States,  552  U. S.  130,  139  (2008)  (“[S]tare  decisis
in  respect  to  statutory  interpretation  has  ‘special  force,’  for  ‘Congress
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and discusses copyright law.  The content is sequential and appears to be part of a larger legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

513

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

Carl J. Schramm, Arlene Holen, Richard M. Holsten); see also
id., at 81–82, App. (CA1) 1410–1411 (statement of Commis-
sioner Richard M. Holsten).

After the Coal Commission issued its report, Congress
considered several proposals to fund health beneﬁts for
UMWA retirees. At a 1991 hearing, a Senate subcommittee
was advised that more than 120,000 retirees might not re-
ceive “the beneﬁts they were promised.” Coal Commission
Report on Health Beneﬁts of Retired Coal Miners: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Medicare and Long-Term Care
of the Senate Committee on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
45 (1991) (statement of BCOA Chairman Michael K. Reilly).
The Coal Commission’s Chairman submitted a statement
urging that Congress’ assistance was needed “to fulﬁll the
promises that began in the collective bargaining process
nearly 50 years ago . . . .”
Id., at 306 (prepared statement
of W. J. Usery, Jr.). Some Senators expressed similar con-
cerns that retired miners might not receive the beneﬁts
promised to them. See id., at 16 (statement of Sen. Dave
Durenberger) (describing issue as involving “a whole bunch
of promises made to a whole lot of people back in the 1940s
and 1950s when the cost consequences of those problems
were totally unknown”); id., at 59 (prepared statement of
Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (stating that “miners and their families
. . . were led to believe by their own union leaders and the
companies for which they worked that they were guaranteed
lifetime [health] beneﬁts”).

In 1992, as part of a larger bill, both Houses passed legisla-
tion based on the Coal Commission’s ﬁrst proposal, which
required signatories to the 1978 or any subsequent NBCWA
to fund their own retirees’ health care costs and provided for
orphan retirees’ beneﬁts through a tax on future coal produc-
tion. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 102–461, pp. 268–295 (1992).
President Bush, however, vetoed the entire bill. See H. R.
Doc. No. 102–206, p. 1 (1992).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses legislative history.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>