<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH ET AL. v. HETRONIC
INTERNATIONAL, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–1043.  Argued March 21, 2023—Decided June 29, 2023

This  case  requires  the  Court  to  decide  the  foreign  reach  of  15  U. S. C.
§1114(1)(a)  and  §1125(a)(1),  two  provisions  of  the  Lanham  Act  that
prohibit trademark infringement.  The case concerns a trademark dis-
pute between Hetronic (a U. S. company) and six foreign parties (col-
lectively  Abitron).    Hetronic  manufactures  remote  controls  for  con-
struction equipment.  Abitron, once a licensed distributor for Hetronic,
claimed ownership of the rights to much of Hetronic’s intellectual prop-
erty and began employing Hetronic’s marks on products it sold.

Hetronic  sued  Abitron  in  the  Western  District  of  Oklahoma  for
trademark violations under two related provisions of the Lanham Act,
both of which prohibit the unauthorized use in commerce of protected
marks  when,  inter  alia,  that  use  is  likely  to  cause  confusion.    See
§§1114(1)(a),  1125(a)(1).    Hetronic  sought  damages  for  Abitron’s  in-
fringing acts worldwide.  Abitron argued that Hetronic sought an im-
permissible extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.  The Dis-
trict  Court  rejected  Abitron’s  argument,  and  a  jury  later  awarded
Hetronic  approximately  $96  million  in  damages  related  to  Abitron’s
global  employment  of  Hetronic’s  marks.  The  District  Court  also  en-
tered  a  permanent  injunction  preventing  Abitron  from  using
Hetronic’s marks anywhere in the world.  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
narrowed  the  injunction,  but  otherwise  affirmed  the  judgment,  con-
cluding that the Lanham Act extended to “all of [Abitron’s] foreign in-
fringing conduct.”

Held: Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, §1114(1)(a)
and §1125(a)(1) of the Lanham Act are not extraterritorial and extend
only  to  claims  where  the  infringing  use  in  commerce  is  domestic.
Pp. 3–15.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

11

Opinion of the Court

ciently specific meaning to be helpful for present purposes.
Petitioner is certainly right that the term is often used to
refer to a person who has the authority to direct another’s
work.  See, e.g., 17 Oxford English Dictionary 245 (2d ed.
1989) (defining the term as applying to “one who inspects
and  directs  the  work  of  others”).    But  the  term  is  also
often  closely  tied  to  the  authority  to  take  what  Ellerth
and Faragher referred to as a “tangible employment action.”
See,  e.g.,  Webster’s  Third  New  International  Dictionary
2296,  def.  1(a)  (1976)  (“a  person  having  authority  dele-
gated  by  an  employer  to  hire,  transfer,  suspend,  recall,
promote,  assign,  or  discharge  another  employee  or  to  rec-
ommend such action”).

A  comparison  of  the  definitions  provided  by  two  collo
quial  business  authorities  illustrates  the  term’s  impreci
sion  in  general  usage.  One  says  that  “[s]upervisors  are
usually  authorized  to  recommend  and/or  effect  hiring,
disciplining,  promoting,  punishing,  rewarding,  and  other
associated  activities  regarding  the  employees  in  their
departments.”5   Another  says  exactly  the  opposite:  “A
supervisor  generally  does  not  have  the  power  to  hire  or
fire  employees  or  to  promote  them.”6    Compare  Ellerth,
524 U. S., at 762 (“Tangible employment actions fall with
in the special province of the supervisor”).

If  we  look  beyond  general  usage  to  the  meaning  of  the
term in other legal contexts, we find much the same situa
tion.  Sometimes  the  term  is  reserved  for  those  in  the
upper echelons of the management hierarchy.  See, e.g., 25
U. S. C.  §2021(18)  (defining  the  “supervisor”  of  a  school
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Bureau  of  Indian  Affairs  as

——————

5 http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/supervisor.html  (all  In-
ternet  materials  as  visited  June  21,  2013,  and  available  in  Clerk  of
Court’s case file).

6 http://management.about.com/od/policiesandprocedures/g/

supervisor1.html
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the definition of the term "supervisor" in a legal context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

11

Opinion of the Court

between  a  misrepresentation  and  the  price  paid  by  the
plaintiff—and  a  defendant’s  mere  production  of  some  evi-
dence relevant to price impact would rarely accomplish that
feat.4

Accepting  Goldman  and  the  dissent’s  argument  would
also effectively negate Halliburton II’s holding that plain-
tiffs need not directly prove price impact in order to invoke
the Basic presumption.  573 U. S., at 278–279.  If, as they
urge, the defendant could defeat Basic’s presumption by in-
troducing  any  competent  evidence  of  a  lack  of  price  im-
pact—including, for example, the generic nature of the al-
leged misrepresentations—then the plaintiff would end up
with the burden of directly proving price impact in almost
every  case.   And  that  would  be  nearly  indistinguishable
from the regime that Halliburton II rejected.

Thus, the best reading of our precedents—as the Courts
of Appeals to have considered the issue have recognized—
is  that  the  defendant  bears  the  burden  of  persuasion  to
prove  a  lack  of  price  impact.    See  Waggoner  v.  Barclays
PLC, 875 F. 3d 79, 99–104 (CA2 2017) (“the phrase ‘[a]ny
showing that severs the link’ aligns more logically with im-
posing a burden of persuasion rather than a burden of pro-
duction”); In re Allstate, 966 F. 3d, at 610–611 (“Basic said
that ‘[a]ny showing that severs the link’ would be sufficient
to rebut the presumption, not that mere production of evi-
dence  would  defeat  the  presumption”  (citation  omitted)).
We likewise agree with the Courts of Appeals that the de-
fendant must carry that burden by a preponderance of the
evidence.  See Waggoner, 875 F. 3d, at 99; In re Allstate, 966
F. 3d, at 610.

Although the defendant bears the burden of persuasion,

——————

4 The dissent points out that, as a general rule, presumptions shift only
the burden of production.  Post, at 2–4.  We don’t disagree, but we read
Basic and Halliburton II as a clear departure from that general rule.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the burden of proof regarding price impact in securities fraud cases. It cites previous legal precedents and analyzes their implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U91

[09-06-00 17:16:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

392 WISCONSIN DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS v. SCHACHT

Opinion of the Court

because we do not read the statute in this way. An ordinary
reading of the language indicates that the statute refers to
an instance in which a federal court “lacks subject matter
jurisdiction” over a “case,” and not simply over one claim
within a case. Cf. § 1441(c) (permitting “the entire case” to
be removed or remanded, when one or more “non-removable
claims or causes of action” is joined with a federal question
“claim or cause of action”). Conceivably, one might also
read the statute’s reference to “case” to include a claim
within a case as well as the entire case. But neither reading
helps Schacht. The former reading would make the provi-
sion inapplicable here; the latter would make it applicable,
but requires remand only of the relevant claims, and not the
entire case as Schacht contends.

Nor does the statute’s purpose favor Schacht’s interpreta-
tion. The statutory section that contains the provision
deals, not with the question of what is removable, but with
the procedures that a federal court is to follow after removal
It is entitled: “Procedure after removal generally.”
occurs.
§ 1447.
In substance, the section differentiates between re-
movals that are defective because of lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and removals that are defective for some other
reason, e. g., because the removal took place after relevant
time limits had expired. For the latter kind of case, there
must be a motion to remand ﬁled no later than 30 days after
the ﬁling of the removal notice.
§ 1447(c). For the former
kind of case, remand may take place without such a motion
Ibid. The provision, then, helps to specify
and at any time.
a procedural difference that ﬂows from a difference in the
kinds of reasons that could lead to a remand. That objective
is irrelevant to the kind of problem presented in this case.
We repeat our conclusion: A State’s proper assertion of an
Eleventh Amendment bar after removal means that the fed-
eral court cannot hear the barred claim. But that circum-
stance does not destroy removal jurisdiction over the re-
maining claims in the case before us. A federal court can
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it's part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary or structural element.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

7

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

gets  to  pontificate  upon  a  matter  that  is  none  of  its
business:  the  appropriate  balance  between  security  and
privacy.    If  I  am  correct  that  there  exists  no  right  to  in-
formational  privacy,  all  that  discussion  is  an  exercise  in
judicial  maximalism.    Better  simply  to  state  and  apply
the  law  forthrightly  than  to  hold  our  view  of  the  law  in
pectore,  so  that  we  can  inquire  into  matters  beyond  our
charter, and probably beyond our ken.

If, on the other hand, the Court believes that there is a
constitutional right to informational privacy, then I fail to
see the minimalist virtues in delivering a lengthy opinion
analyzing  that  right  while  coyly  noting  that  the  right  is
“assumed” rather than “decided.”  Thirty-three years have
passed since the Court first suggested that the right may,
or may not, exist.  It is past time for the Court to abandon
this Alfred Hitchcock line of our jurisprudence.

2. It harms our image, if not our self-respect, because it
makes no sense.  The Court decides that the Government
did  not  violate  the  right  to  informational  privacy  without
deciding whether there is a right to informational privacy,
and  without  even  describing  what  hypothetical  standard
should  be  used  to  assess  whether  the  hypothetical  right
has been violated.  As I explained last Term in objecting to
another of the Court’s never-say-never dispositions:

“[The  Court]  cannot  decide  that  [respondents’]  claim
fails  without  first  deciding  what  a  valid  claim  would
consist  of. . . .  [A]greeing  to  or  crafting  a  hypothetical
standard for a hypothetical constitutional right is suf-
ficiently  unappealing  . . .  that  [the  Court]  might  as
well acknowledge the right as well.  Or [it] could avoid
the  need  to  agree  with  or  craft  a  hypothetical  stan-
dard by denying the right.  But embracing a standard
while  being  coy  about  the  right  is,  well,  odd;  and  de-
ciding this case while addressing neither the standard
nor the right is quite impossible.”  Stop the Beach Re-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a right to informational privacy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

impair the “integrity or availability” of data, nor did it oth-
erwise harm the database system itself.

C
Pivoting from text and structure, the Government claims
that precedent and statutory history support its interpreta-
tion.  These arguments are easily dispatched.

As  for  precedent,  the  Government  asserts  that  this
Court’s  decision  in  Musacchio  v.  United  States,  577  U. S.
237  (2016),  bolsters  its  reading.    There,  in  addressing  a
question about the standard of review for instructional er-
ror, the Court described §1030(a)(2) as prohibiting “(1) ob-
taining access without authorization; and (2) obtaining ac-
cess  with  authorization  but  then  using  that  access
improperly.”  Id.,  at  240.  This  paraphrase  of  the  statute
does not do much for the Government.  As an initial matter,
Musacchio did not address—much less resolve in the Gov-
ernment’s favor—the “point now at issue,” and we thus “are
not bound to follow” any dicta in the case.  Central Va. Com-
munity College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356, 363 (2006).  But in
any  event,  Van  Buren’s  interpretation,  no  less  than  the
Government’s,  involves  “using  [one’s]  access  improperly.”
It is plainly “improper” for one to use the opportunity his
computer access provides to obtain prohibited information
from within the computer.

As for statutory history, the Government claims that the
original 1984 Act supports its interpretation of the current
version.  In a precursor to the “exceeds authorized access”
clause,  the 1984  Act  covered  any  person  who,  “having  ac-
cessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity
such access provides for purposes to which such authoriza-
tion does not extend,” and thus expressly alluded to the pur-
pose of an insider’s computer access.  18 U. S. C. §1030(a)(2)
(1982 ed. Supp. III).  According to the Government, this con-
firms that the amended CFAA—which makes no mention
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case Van Buren v. United States. It delves into the interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ZF AUTOMOTIVE US, INC., ET AL. v. LUXSHARE, LTD.

CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–401.  Argued March 23, 2022—Decided June 13, 2022*

These  consolidated  cases  involve  arbitration  proceedings  abroad  for
which  a  party  sought  discovery  in  the  United  States  pursuant  to  28
U. S. C. §1782(a)—a provision authorizing a district court to order the
production of evidence “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or interna-
tional tribunal.”  In the first case, Luxshare, Ltd., a Hong Kong-based
company, alleges fraud in a sales transaction with ZF Automotive US,
Inc., a Michigan-based automotive parts manufacturer and subsidiary
of a German corporation.  The sales contract signed by the parties pro-
vided  that  all  disputes  would  be  resolved by  three  arbitrators  under
the  Arbitration  Rules  of  the  German  Institution  of  Arbitration  e.V.
(DIS),  a  private  dispute-resolution  organization  based  in  Berlin.  To
prepare for a DIS arbitration against ZF, Luxshare filed an application
under §1782 in federal court, seeking information from ZF and its of-
ficers.  The District Court granted the request, and ZF moved to quash,
arguing that the DIS panel was not a “foreign or international tribu-
nal” under §1782.  The District Court denied ZF’s motion.  The Sixth
Circuit denied a stay.

The  second  case  involves  AB  bankas  SNORAS  (Snoras),  a  failed
Lithuanian  bank  declared  insolvent  and  nationalized  by  Lithuanian
authorities.  The Fund for Protection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign
States—a Russian corporation assigned the rights of a Russian inves-
tor in Snoras—initiated a proceeding against Lithuania under a bilat-
eral investment treaty between Lithuania and Russia, claiming that

——————

* Together with No. 21–518, AlixPartners, LLP, et al. v. Fund for Pro-
tection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign States, on certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

EGBERT v. BOULE

Syllabus

merit is Boule’s claim that this Court identified a Bivens cause of ac-
tion under allegedly similar circumstances in Passman.  Even assum-
ing factual parallels, Passman carries little weight because it predates
the Court’s current approach to implied causes of action.  A plaintiff
cannot  justify  a  Bivens  extension  based  on  “parallel  circumstances”
with Bivens, Passman, or Carlson—the three cases in which the Court
has implied a damages action—unless the plaintiff also satisfies the
prevailing “analytic framework” prescribed by the last four decades of
intervening case law.  Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___–___.  Pp. 13–16.

998 F. 3d 370, reversed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  GORSUCH, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER
and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision and the reasoning behind it.  It is not the main body of the legal text and likely not suitable for indexing as it is.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

JACKSON, J., dissenting

of counsel, and the right to confront the witnesses against
him.  Amdt. 6.  The defendant also has at his disposal many
means to defend himself against the criminal charge.  He
can, of course, seek to hold the Government to its burden of
proof at trial.  And even before trial, in a motion to dismiss
the indictment, he might make any number of legal argu-
ments; he can assert, for example, that the Government’s
charging  document  does  not  give  adequate  notice  of  the
charge against him or that the law he has been accused of
violating  is  unconstitutionally  vague.  See  Hamling  v.
United States, 418 U. S. 87, 117 (1974); United States v. Da-
vis, 588 U. S. 445, 451 (2019).  He might further claim that
the law is unconstitutional as applied to his particular con-
duct.  See  United  States  v.  O’Brien,  391  U. S.  367,  376
(1968).  And  he  might  maintain  that  his  conduct,  even  if
proved, does not violate the law at issue.  See, e.g., Fischer
v. United States, 603 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (slip op., at 2).

The defendant may also raise, and attempt to prove, af-
firmative defenses that “excuse conduct that would other-
wise be punishable.”  Dixon v. United States, 548 U. S. 1, 6
(2006).  Generally speaking, affirmative defenses are deter-
minations  (often  adopted  by  legislation)  that  certain  con-
duct otherwise punishable by law is justified.  This might
be the case, for example, when the Legislature determines
that, under specified circumstances, the societal harm par-
ticular conduct causes “is outweighed by the need to avoid
an even greater harm.”  1 P. Robinson, Criminal Law De-
fenses §24(a) (1984) (Robinson).

Importantly, a defense is not an immunity, even though
a  defense  can  likewise  result  in  a  person  charged  with  a
crime avoiding liability for his criminal conduct.  Consistent
with our foundational norms, the individual accountability
model adheres to the presumption that the law applies to
all and that everyone must follow it; yet, the model makes
allowances for recognized defenses.  One such defense is the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, likely part of a dissenting opinion in a court case. It discusses the rights of the defendant, including the right to confront witnesses and various legal defenses available to them.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

To be sure, and once more,  a variety of other legal doc-
trines and constitutional provisions work to protect those in
our  criminal  justice  system  from  a  conviction.  Like  some
other jurisdictions, Oregon recognizes a “necessity ” defense
to certain criminal charges.  It may be that defense extends
to charges for illegal camping when it comes to those with
nowhere else to go.  See State v. Barrett, 302 Ore. App. 23,
28, 460 P. 3d 93, 96 (2020) (citing Ore. Rev. Stat. §161.200).
Insanity,  diminished-capacity,  and  duress  defenses  also
may  be  available  in  many  jurisdictions.    See  Powell,  392
U. S., at 536.  States and cities are free as well to add addi-
tional substantive protections.  Since this litigation began,
for example, Oregon itself has adopted a law specifically ad-
dressing  how  far  its  municipalities  may  go  in  regulating
public  camping.  See,  e.g.,  Ore.  Rev.  Stat.  §195.530(2)
(2023).  For  that  matter,  nothing  in  today’s  decision  pre-
vents States, cities, and counties from going a step further
and declining to criminalize public camping altogether.  For
its part, the Constitution provides many additional limits
on  state  prosecutorial  power,  promising  fair  notice  of  the
laws and equal treatment under them, forbidding selective
prosecutions, and much more besides.  See Part II–A, supra;
and n. 5, supra.  All this represents only a small sample of
the  legion  protections  our  society  affords  a  presumptively
free individual from a criminal conviction.  But aside from
Robinson, a case directed to a highly unusual law that con-
demned  status  alone,  this  Court  has  never  invoked  the
Eighth  Amendment’s  Cruel  and  Unusual  Punishments
Clause to perform that function.

D
Not only did Powell decline to extend Robinson to “invol-
untary” acts, it stressed the dangers that would likely at-
tend any attempt to do so.  Were the Court to pursue that
path in the name of the Eighth Amendment, Justice Mar-
shall  warned,  “it  is  difficult  to  see  any  limiting  principle
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing various legal doctrines and constitutional provisions that protect individuals from criminal convictions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES

Syllabus

vision and radio advertising, direct mail, voter registration, voter ed-
ucation,  and  get  out  the  vote  activities  in  our  work  sites  and  in  our
communities across California.”  Nonunion employees were not given
any choice as to whether they would pay into the fund.

Petitioners,  on  behalf  of  nonunion  employees  who  paid  into  the
fund,  brought  a  class  action  against  the  SEIU  alleging  violation  of
their  First  Amendment  rights.    The  Federal  District  Court  granted
petitioners  summary  judgment.    Ruling  that  the  special  assessment
was for entirely political purposes, it ordered the SEIU to send a new
notice  giving  class  members  45  days  to  object  and  to  provide  those
who object a full refund of contributions to the fund.  The Ninth Cir-
cuit  reversed,  concluding  that  Hudson  prescribed  a  balancing  test
under  which  the  proper  inquiry  is  whether  the  SEIU’s  procedures
reasonably  accommodated  the  interests  of  the  union,  the  employer,
and the nonmember employees.

Held:

1. This case is not moot.  Although the SEIU offered a full refund to
all class members after certiorari was granted, a live controversy re-
mains.  The voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordi-
narily render a case moot because that conduct could be resumed as
soon as the case is dismissed.  See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Cas-
tle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283, 289.  Since the SEIU continues to defend the
fund’s legality, it would not necessarily refrain from collecting similar
fees  in  the  future.  Even  if  concerns  about  voluntary  cessation  were
inapplicable because petitioners did not seek prospective relief, there
would still be a live controversy as to the adequacy of the refund no-
tice the SEIU sent pursuant to the District Court’s order.  Pp. 6−8.

2. Under the First Amendment, when a union imposes a special as-
sessment or dues increase levied to meet expenses that were not dis-
closed when the regular assessment was set, it must provide a fresh
notice and may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their
affirmative consent.  Pp. 8−23.

(a) A  close  connection  exists  between  this  Nation’s  commitment
to self-government and the rights protected by the First Amendment,
see,  e.g.,  Brown  v.  Hartlage,  456  U. S.  45,  52−53,  which  creates  “an
open marketplace” in which differing ideas about political, economic,
and  social  issues  can  compete  freely  for  public  acceptance  without
improper government interference, New York State Bd. of Elections v.
Lopez  Torres,  552  U. S  196,  202.    The  government  may  not  prohibit
the  dissemination  of  ideas  it  disfavors,  nor  compel  the  endorsement
of ideas that it approves.  See, e.g., R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377,
382.  And  the  ability  of  like-minded  individuals  to  associate  for  the
purpose  of  expressing  commonly  held  views  may  not  be  curtailed.
See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 623.  Close-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus from the Supreme Court case Knox v. Service Employees International Union.  It outlines the case's background, the legal issues, and the court's holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY ET AL.
v. MYRIAD GENETICS, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 12–398.  Argued April 15, 2013—Decided June 13, 2013

Each  human  gene  is  encoded  as  deoxyribonucleic  acid  (DNA),  which
takes  the  shape  of  a  “double  helix.”    Each  “cross-bar”  in  that  helix
consists of two chemically joined nucleotides.  Sequences of DNA nu-
cleotides contain the information necessary to create strings of amino
acids  used  to  build  proteins  in  the  body.    The  nucleotides  that  code
for amino acids are “exons,” and those that do not are “introns.”  Sci-
entists  can  extract  DNA  from  cells  to  isolate  specific  segments  for
study.    They  can  also  synthetically  create  exons-only  strands  of  nu-
cleotides known as complementary DNA (cDNA).  cDNA contains only the
exons that occur in DNA, omitting the intervening introns.

Respondent  Myriad  Genetics,  Inc.  (Myriad),  obtained  several    pa-
tents  after  discovering  the  precise  location  and  sequence  of  the
BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes,  mutations  of  which  can  dramatically  in-
crease the risk of breast and ovarian cancer.  This knowledge allowed
Myriad to determine the genes’ typical nucleotide sequence, which, in
turn,  enabled  it  to  develop  medical  tests  useful  for  detecting  muta-
tions  in  these  genes  in  a  particular  patient  to  assess  the  patient’s
cancer  risk.    If  valid,  Myriad’s  patents  would  give  it  the  exclusive
right to isolate an individual’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, and would
give Myriad the exclusive right to synthetically create  BRCA cDNA.
Petitioners filed suit, seeking a declaration that Myriad’s patents are
invalid under 35 U. S. C. §101.  As relevant here, the District Court
granted  summary  judgment  to  petitioners,  concluding  that  Myriad’s
claims  were  invalid  because  they  covered  products  of  nature.    The
Federal  Circuit  initially  reversed,  but  on  remand  in  light  of  Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___,
the Circuit found both isolated DNA and cDNA patent eligible.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xlv

Page

Dittrich v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  853,1101

880

Division of Legis. Servs. of Fla.; Fla. Assn. of Prof. Lobbyists v.
869

Dixon v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1064

Dixon v. Grant  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Dixon v. Miami-Dade County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

Dixon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

Doak v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

Doan v. Carter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920

Doble v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914

Dobshinsky v. California
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

Dodds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1022

Doe; Holy See v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Doe; Moore v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  967,1142

Doe v. Reed
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  922,1016,1057

Doe v. United States
1001

Dolamore v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1104

Dolan v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

Domieque-Rodriguez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Donahue; Smith v.
Donley; White v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  864,881,1065

822

Donovan v. Arkansas Sup. Ct. Committee on Prof. Conduct . . . . .
1061

Donovan v. Government of Virgin Islands
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
899

Donzo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
863

Doolin v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Doorbal v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

Dor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
850

951

Dormire; Brooks v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Doroshow v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.
Dorsey v. Coleman  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  841,1064

933

Dorsey; Michigan v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Dortch v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Dotson v. Pﬁzer Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Dotson; Pﬁzer Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058

Dotson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1002

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Doublin v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  876,962

Douglas v. United States
Douglas Elliman, LLC; Legeno v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  937,1087

1098

Dove v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dover v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
976

934

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dow Chemical Co. v. Tanoh
Dowling; Blackshear v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  863,1065

996

Doyle v. Ritter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960

Doyle v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Drachenberg v. United States
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

The Court reaches the right conclusion: The appointment
process for members of the Financial Oversight and Man-
agement Board for Puerto Rico (Board) does not violate the
Appointments  Clause.    I  cannot  agree,  however,  with  the
ill-defined path that the Court takes to reach this result.  I
would  resolve  these  cases  based  on  the  original  public
meaning of the phrase “Officers of the United States” in the
Appointments Clause.

I

The  Appointments  Clause  provides  that  the  President
“shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters  and  Consuls,  Judges  of  the  supreme  Court,  and  all
other  Officers  of  the  United  States,  whose  Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law.”  Art. II, §2, cl. 2.  The Clause also per-
mits Congress to vest the appointment of “inferior Officers”
in “the President alone,” “the Courts of Law,” or “the Heads
of Departments.”  Ibid.

As I have previously explained, the original public mean-
ing  of  the  phrase  “Officers  of  the  United  States”  includes
“all federal civil officials who perform an ongoing, statutory
duty.”  Lucia v. SEC, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (THOMAS, J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 2) (citing Mascott, Who Are “Offic-
ers of the United States”? 70 Stan. L. Rev. 443, 454 (2018)
(Mascott)).  At the founding, the term “officer” referred to
“anyone  who  performed  a  continuous  public  duty.”    585
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3).  And the phrase “of the United
States” limited the Appointments Clause to “federal” offic-
ers.  Ibid.; see Mascott 471–479.

II
Territorial officials performing duties created under Ar-
ticle  IV  of  the  Constitution  are  not  federal officers  within
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in a case involving the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain valuable textual information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

51

Thomas, J., dissenting

ripe, Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 156; Gardner v. Toilet
Goods Assn., supra, at 170; Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner,
supra, at 160–161. See also Reno v. Catholic Social Serv-
ices, Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 56–66 (1993) (similar).
In line with
this mode of analysis, the court below, after concluding
that the Medicare Act does not preclude general federal-
question jurisdiction over a preenforcement challenge to
the Secretary’s regulations, held that respondent’s APA
notice-and-comment challenge was ripe but that its consti-
tutional vagueness claim was not. 143 F. 3d, at 1076–1077.
While I express no view on the proper application of ripe-
ness doctrine to respondent’s claims,14 I am conﬁdent that
this method of analysis enjoys substantially more support
in our cases than does the majority’s approach, which pre-
scribes a case-by-case hardship inquiry at the threshold
stage of determining whether preenforcement review has
been precluded by statute. See ante, at 20 (holding that
§ 1395ii does not incorporate § 405(h) where the aggrieved
party “can obtain no review at all unless it can obtain judicial
review in a § 1331 action”). While the majority’s variation
would be harmless if its hardship test were no more strin-
gent than the hardship prong of ordinary ripeness doctrine,
I presume its test is more exacting—otherwise the majority
opinion is no more than a well-disguised application of ripe-
ness doctrine to the facts of this case.15 At bottom, then,
the majority superimposes a more burdensome hardship test
on ordinary ripeness doctrine for aggrieved persons who

14 The Secretary did not seek review of the Court of Appeals’ hold-
ing that respondent’s APA notice-and-comment challenge is ripe, Pet. for
Cert. I, and this Court denied respondent’s cross-petition for certiorari
seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ holding that respondent’s vague-
ness challenge is not ripe, 526 U. S. 1067 (1999).

15 The majority acknowledges that its hardship test is more burden-
some than the hardship prong of ripeness doctrine in at least one respect.
We are told that the relevant hardship is not that endured by the “individ-
ual plaintiff,” but rather that confronted by the “class” of persons similarly
situated to the individual plaintiff. Ante, at 22–23; see supra, at 42–43.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. The text includes legal citations, case names, and arguments related to ripeness doctrine and constitutional vagueness.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1209

glazed,  white  paper.  The  document  shall  be  stapled  or
bound  at  the  upper  left-hand  corner.  Copies,  if  required,
shall  be  produced  on  the  same  type  of  paper  and  shall  be
legible.  The original of any such document (except a motion
to  dismiss  or  afﬁrm  under  Rule  18.6)  shall  be  signed  by  the
party proceeding pro se or by counsel of record who must be
a member of the Bar of this Court or an attorney appointed
under  the  Criminal  Justice  Act  of  1964,  see  18  U. S. C.
§ 3006A(d)(6),  or  under  any  other  applicable  federal  statute.
Subparagraph 1(g) of this Rule does not apply to documents
prepared under this paragraph.

(b)  Page limits for documents presented on 81⁄2- by 11-inch
paper  are:  40  pages  for  a  petition  for  a  writ  of  certiorari,
jurisdictional  statement,  petition  for  an  extraordinary  writ,
brief  in  opposition,  or  motion  to  dismiss  or  afﬁrm;  and  15
pages  for  a  reply  to  a  brief  in  opposition,  brief  opposing  a
motion  to  dismiss  or  afﬁrm,  supplemental  brief,  or  petition
for rehearing.  The exclusions speciﬁed in subparagraph 1(d)
of this Rule apply.

Rule  34.  Document  Preparation:  General  Requirements

Every  document,  whether  prepared  under  Rule  33.1  or

Rule 33.2, shall comply with the following provisions:

1.  Each document shall bear on its cover, in the order indi

cated, from the top of the page:

(a)  the  docket  number  of  the  case  or,  if  there  is  none,  a

space for one;

(b)  the name of this Court;
(c)  the  caption  of  the  case  as  appropriate  in  this  Court;
(d)  the nature of the proceeding and the name of the court
from which the action is brought (e. g., “On Petition for Writ
of  Certiorari  to  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for
the  Fifth  Circuit”;  or,  for  a  merits  brief,  “On  Writ  of  Cer
tiorari  to  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Fifth
Circuit”);

(e)  the  title  of  the  document  (e. g.,  “Petition  for  Writ  of

Certiorari,” “Brief for Respondent,” “Joint Appendix”);
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a set of rules and formatting guidelines for documents submitted to the Supreme Court. It is not the narrative content of a book and is likely part of a legal document or procedural manual.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules and Formatting Guidelines</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH v. HETRONIC INT’L, INC.

Opinion of the Court

the  way  Congress  described,  with  no  need  for  any  actual
confusion.  Under step two of our extraterritoriality stand-
ard, then, “use in commerce” provides the dividing line be-
tween foreign and domestic applications of these Lanham
Act provisions.

III
Resisting  this  straightforward  application  of  our  prece-
dent,  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR  concludes  that  step  two  of  our
extraterritoriality framework turns solely on whether “the
object  of  the  statute’s  focus  is  found  in,  or  occurs  in,  the
United States.”  Post, at 5 (opinion concurring in judgment).
Applied  to  the  Lanham  Act,  the  upshot  of  this  focus-only
standard  is  that  any  claim  involving  a  likelihood  of  con-
sumer confusion in the United States would be a “domestic”
application of the Act.  This approach is wrong, and it would
give the Lanham Act an untenably broad reach that under-
mines our extraterritoriality framework.

A
To  justify  looking  only  to  a  provision’s  “focus,”  JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR  maintains  that  “an  application  of  a  statute”
can still be domestic “when foreign conduct is implicated.”
Post, at 7.  If this assertion simply means that a permissible
domestic application can occur even when some foreign “ac-
tivity is involved in the case,” Morrison, 561 U. S., at 266,
then it is true but misses the point.  When a claim involves
both domestic and foreign activity, the question is whether
“ ‘the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the
United States.’ ”  Nestlé, 593 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–
4).  If that “ ‘conduct . . . occurred in the United States, then
the case involves a permissible domestic application’ of the
statute ‘even if other conduct occurred abroad.’ ”  Western-
Geco, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).  But “if the conduct
relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the
case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases, which are all relevant to the content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

530

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

House of Lords, and the King gave his assent.
Id., at 214–
225; see also An Act to Attaint Sir John Fenwick Baronet of
High Treason, 8 Will. III, ch. 4 (1696). On January 28, 1697,
Sir John Fenwick was beheaded. 9 Macaulay 226–227.

IV

Article 38.07 is unquestionably a law “that alters the legal
rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony,
than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offence, in order to convict the offender.” Under the law
in effect at the time the acts were committed, the prose-
cution’s case was legally insufﬁcient and petitioner was en-
titled to a judgment of acquittal, unless the State could
produce both the victim’s testimony and corroborative
evidence. The amended law, however, changed the quan-
tum of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction; under the
new law, petitioner could be (and was) convicted on the vic-
tim’s testimony alone, without any corroborating evidence.
Under any commonsense understanding of Calder’s fourth
category, Article 38.07 plainly ﬁts. Requiring only the vic-
tim’s testimony to convict, rather than the victim’s testi-
mony plus other corroborating evidence is surely “less tes-
timony required to convict” in any straightforward sense
of those words.

Indeed, the circumstances of petitioner’s case parallel those
of Fenwick’s case 300 years earlier.
Just as the relevant law
in Fenwick’s case required more than one witness’ testimony
to support a conviction (namely, the testimony of a second
witness), Texas’ old version of Article 38.07 required more
than the victim’s testimony alone to sustain a conviction
(namely, other corroborating evidence).20 And just like Fen-

of the Treason. . . . Then this is a Law; ex post facto, and that hath been
always condemned . . .”).

20 Texas argues that the corroborative evidence required by Article 38.07
“need not be more or different from the victim’s testimony; it may be
entirely cumulative of the victim’s testimony.” Brief for Respondent 19;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing a case called "Carmell v. Texas". It cites legal precedents and analyzes the application of a specific law (Article 38.07).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

GORSUCH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–111
_________________

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

COLORADO

[June 4, 2018]

 JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  joins,

in  many  quarters.

concurring.
  In  Employment  Div.,  Dept.  of  Human  Resources  of  Ore.
v.  Smith,  this  Court  held  that  a  neutral  and  generally
applicable  law  will  usually  survive  a  constitutional  free
exercise challenge.  494 U. S. 872, 878–879 (1990).  Smith
remains  controversial
Compare
McConnell,  The  Origins  and  Historical  Understanding  of
Free  Exercise  of  Religion,  103  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1409  (1990),
with  Hamburger,  A  Constitutional  Right  of  Religious
Exemption:  An  Historical  Perspective,  60  Geo.  Wash.  L.
Rev.  915  (1992).  But  we  know  this  with  certainty:  when
the  government  fails  to  act  neutrally  toward  the  free
exercise of religion, it tends to run into trouble.  Then the
government  can  prevail  only  if  it  satisfies  strict  scrutiny,
showing that its restrictions on religion both serve a com-
pelling  interest  and  are  narrowly  tailored.    Church  of
Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508  U. S.  520,  546
(1993).

Today’s decision respects these principles.  As the Court
explains,  the  Colorado  Civil  Rights  Commission  failed  to
act neutrally toward Jack Phillips’s religious faith.  Maybe
most notably, the Commission allowed three other bakers
to  refuse  a  customer’s  request  that  would  have  required
them to violate their secular commitments.  Yet it denied
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch.  It cites legal precedent and sets up the argument for the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION

Opinion of the Court

corn.

In  “consideration  of  the  advantages  and  benefits
conferred” on the Navajos by the United States in the 1868
treaty,  the  Navajos  pledged  not  to  engage  in  further  war
against  the  United  States  or  other  Indian  tribes.    Id.,  at
669–670.  The Navajos also agreed to “relinquish all right
to occupy any territory outside their reservation”—with the
exception of certain rights to hunt.  Id., at 670.  The Navajos
promised  to  “make  the  reservation”  their  “permanent
home.”  Id., at 671.  In short, the treaty enabled the Navajos
to  live  on  their  original  land.    See  Treaty  Between  the
United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians
With a Record of the Discussions That Led to Its Signing 2,
4, 10–11, 15 (1968).

Under the 1868 treaty, the Navajo Reservation includes
not only the land within the boundaries of the reservation,
but  also  water  rights.    Under  this  Court’s  longstanding
reserved water rights doctrine, sometimes referred to as the
Winters doctrine, the Federal Government’s reservation of
land for an Indian tribe also implicitly reserves the right to
from  various  sources—such  as
use  needed  water
groundwater,  rivers,  streams,  lakes,  and  springs—that
arise on, border, cross, underlie, or are encompassed within
the  reservation.  See  Winters  v.  United  States,  207  U. S.
564, 576–577 (1908); see also Cappaert v. United States, 426
U. S. 128, 138–139, 143 (1976); Arizona v. California, 373
U. S. 546, 598–600 (1963); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal
Indian  Law  §19.03(2)(a),  pp. 1212–1213  (N.  Newton  ed.
Under  the  Winters  doctrine,  the  Federal
2012).
Government  reserves  water  only  “to  the  extent  needed  to
accomplish  the  purpose  of  the  reservation.”  Sturgeon  v.
Frost,  587  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  13)  (internal
quotation marks omitted); United States v. New Mexico, 438
U. S. 696, 700–702 (1978).

The  Navajo  Reservation  lies  almost  entirely  within  the
Colorado River Basin, and three vital rivers—the Colorado,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion discussing the water rights of the Navajo Nation. It cites the 1868 treaty and legal precedents like the Winters doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

11

ALITO, J., dissenting

The  majority’s  insistence  on  the  binding  effect  of  stipu-
lations  contrasts  sharply  with  its  failure  to  recognize  the
binding  effect  of  a  party’s  admissions  in  an  answer.    See
American  Title  Insurance  Co.  v.  Lacelaw  Corp.,  861  F. 2d
224, 226 (CA9 1988) (“Factual assertions in pleadings and
pretrial  orders,  unless  amended,  are  considered  judicial
admissions  conclusively  binding  on  the  party  who  made
them”); Bakersfield Westar Ambulance, Inc. v. Community
First  Bank,  123  F. 3d  1243,  1248  (CA9  1997)  (quoting
Lacelaw, supra).  As noted above, Hastings admitted in its
answer, which was filed prior to the former dean’s deposi-
tion,  that  at  least  as  of  that  time,  the  law  school  did  not
follow  an  accept-all-comers  policy  and  instead  allowed
“political,  social,  and  cultural  student  organizations  to
select  officers  and  members  who  are  dedicated  to  a  par-
ticular set of ideals or beliefs.”  App. 93.

B
The  Court  also  distorts  the  record  with  respect  to  the
effect  on  CLS  of  Hastings’  decision  to  deny  registration.
The  Court  quotes  a  letter  written  by  Hastings’  general
counsel  in  which  she  stated  that  Hastings  “ ‘would  be
pleased  to provide  [CLS]  the  use  of  Hastings  facilities  for
its  meetings  and  activities.’ ”  Ante,  at  6  (quoting  App.
294).  Later in its opinion, the Court reiterates that “Hast-
ings  offered  CLS  access  to  school  facilities  to  conduct
meetings,”  ante,  at  24,  but  the  majority  does  not  mention
that this offer was subject to important qualifications.  As
Hastings’  attorney  put  it  in  the  District  Court,  Hastings
told  CLS:  “ ‘Hastings  allows  community  groups  to  some
degree  to  use  its  facilities,  sometimes  on  a  pay  basis,  I
understand,  if  they’re  available  after  priority  is  given  to
registered organizations’.  We offered that.”  App. 442.

The  Court  also  fails  to  mention  what  happened  when
CLS  attempted  to  take  advantage  of  Hastings’  offer.    On
August 19, 2005, the local CLS president sent an e-mail to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case. It cites legal precedents and discusses the arguments made by the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

KEMP v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Rules 60(b)(1) through (b)(5) are inapplicable.  See Liljeberg
v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 863, n.
11  (1988).  Even  then,  “ ‘extraordinary  circumstances’ ”
must justify reopening.  Ibid.

Rule 60(c) imposes deadlines on Rule 60(b) motions.  All
must be filed “within a reasonable time.”  Rule 60(c)(1).  But
for some, including motions under Rule 60(b)(1), that “rea-
sonable time” may not exceed one year.  Rule 60(c)(1).  Mo-
tions under Rule 60(b)(6) are not subject to this additional
1-year constraint.  Rule 60(c)(1).

Here,  the  parties  dispute  the  extent  to  which  a  judge’s
legal  errors  qualify  as  “mistake[s]”  under  Rule  60(b)(1).
The  Government  contends  that  Rule  60(b)(1)  applies  any
time a party alleges that a judge has made an “obvious” le-
gal  error—e.g.,  the  “failure  to  apply  unambiguous  law  to
record facts.”  Brief for United States 11.  Kemp’s motion,
the Government says, alleged an obvious legal error, so the
Eleventh Circuit was correct to apply Rule 60(b)(1).  Accord-
ing to Kemp, however, Rule 60(b)(1) applies only to factual
errors made by someone other than the judge.  Brief for Pe-
titioner 3.  So, in Kemp’s view, his motion challenging the
District  Court’s  timeliness  ruling  was  cognizable  under
Rule 60(b)(6), and the 1-year limit did not apply.

We  ultimately  disagree  with  Kemp  and  agree  with  the
Government to a point.  As a matter of text, structure, and
history, the Government is correct that a “mistake” under
Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law.  But we see
no reason to limit Rule 60(b)(1) to “obvious” legal mistakes,
as  the  Government  proposes.  We  first  explain  why
Rule 60(b)(1)  covers  all  mistakes  of  law  made  by  a  judge,
and then address why the Government’s and Kemp’s con-
trary interpretations of “mistake” do not persuade us.

A
The  ordinary  meaning  of  the  term  “mistake”
in
Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s legal errors.  When the Rule
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of Rule 60(b) in a case. It delves into the interpretation of legal terms and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

829

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–9130.  Jones  v.  Pennsylvania.  Sup.  Ct.  Pa.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  597  Pa.  286,  951  A.  2d  294.

No.  08–9180.  Sklar  et  ux.  v.  Commissioner  of  Internal
Revenue.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
549  F.  3d  1252.

No.  08–9276.  Flores-Perez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  69.

No. 08–9303.  Smith v.  Hawaii et al.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  535.

No.  08–9319.  Brent  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.  Appx.  267.

No.  08–9339.  Armstrong  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  550  F.  3d  382.

No.  08–9481.  Elashi  v.  United  States;

No.  08–9602.  Elashi  v.  United  States;

No.  08–9938.  Elashi  v.  United  States;  and

No. 08–9939.  Elashi v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  554  F.  3d  480.

No.  08–9484.  Franklin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  547  F.  3d  726.

No.  08–9493.  Miller  v.  Beard,  Secretary,  Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, et al.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  39.

No.  08–9531.  Palis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  558.

No.  08–9535.  McFarlin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.  Appx.  342.

No.  08–9543.  Zweigart  v.  Oregon.  Sup.  Ct.  Ore.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Ore.  619,  188  P.  3d  242.

No.  08–9578.  Mohr  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  554  F.  3d  604.

No. 08–9606.  Walker et al. v.  Epps, Commissioner, Missis
sippi  Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It lacks sequential narrative and is more akin to a legal docket or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

973

558 U. S.

October 20, 2009

No.  09–6025.  Carver  v.  Vail,  Secretary,  Washington  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  869.

No.  09–6027.  Dann  v.  Arizona.  Sup.  Ct.  Ariz.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  220  Ariz.  351,  207  P.  3d  604.

No. 09–6030.  Lacey v.  Montana.  Sup. Ct. Mont.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  349  Mont.  371,  204  P.  3d  1192.

No. 09–6033.  Latham v.  United States et al.  C. A. 3d Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.  Appx.  716.

No.  09–6042.  Hon  v.  Cosmos  Jewelry,  Ltd.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6046.  Hampton v. Belleque, Superintendent, Ore
gon  State  Penitentiary.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  601.

No.  09–6048.  Cole  v.  Texas.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.

No. 09–6053.  Kopy v. Ryan, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  666.

No.  09–6057.  Bell  v.  Norwood  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  306.

No.  09–6058.  Higgins  v.  Randall  County  Sheriff’s  Of

fice.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  7th  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6059.  Garcon  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  7  So.  3d  1098.

No.  09– 6061.  Oliphant  v.  Mendoza-Powers,  Warden.

C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6062.  Kristiadi  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.

C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6064.  Fan  v.  Roe.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6079.  Knight  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  2d  Dist.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  6  So.  3d  733.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, court names, and brief descriptions of the orders issued.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

31

Opinion of the Court

expression of ideas, promoting those it favors and suppress-
ing those it does not.  And that is what the First Amend-
ment protects all of us from.

We accordingly vacate the judgments of the Courts of Ap-
peals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and remand the
cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal reasoning and citations, which are typical of suitable content for indexing in a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO

BARRETT, J., dissenting

In  sum,  our  First  Amendment  precedent  does  not  set  a
“baseline ban on an objective standard.”  Ante, at 10.  Prec-
edent  does  more  than  allow  an  objective  test  for  true
threats; on balance, it affirmatively supports one.

B
The Court’s analysis also gives short shrift to how an ob-
jective  test  works  in  practice.    Two  key  features  of  true
threats already guard against the risk of silencing protected
speech.  Thus, there is no need to go further and adopt the
Court’s heightened standard.

First, only a very narrow class of statements satisfies the
definition  of  a  true  threat.  To  make  a  true  threat,  the
speaker must express “an intent to commit an act of unlaw-
ful  violence.”  Black,  538  U. S.,  at  359  (emphasis  added).
Speech that is merely “offensive,” “ ‘poorly chosen,’ ” or “un-
popular”  does  not  qualify.    Brief  for  Petitioner  31,  36,  42.
The statement must also threaten violence “to a particular
individual  or  group  of  individuals”—not  just  in  general.
Black, 538 U. S., at 359.  These tight guardrails distinguish
true  threats  from  public-figure  defamation,  the  model  for
the  Court’s  rule.    While  defamatory  statements  can  cover
an infinite number of topics, true threats target one: unlaw-
ful violence.

Second, the statement must be deemed threatening by a
reasonable listener who is familiar with the “entire factual
context” in which the statement occurs.  State v. Taveras,
342 Conn. 563, 572, 271 A. 3d 123, 129 (2022).  This inquiry
captures (among other things) the speaker’s tone, the audi-
ence, the medium for the communication, and the broader
exchange in which the statement occurs.3  Each considera-
tion helps weed out protected speech from true threats.

——————

3 Colorado’s test provides a good example.  Juries must apply the fol-
lowing nonexhaustive factors to determine whether a statement is a true
threat: “(1) the statement’s role in a broader exchange, if any, including
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Barrett in the case of Counterman v. Colorado. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the definition of a "true threat" and the appropriate standard for evaluating such threats.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
ALITO, J., dissenting

Good  News  Club  v.  Milford  Central  School,  533  U. S.  98,
112,  and  n.  4  (2001).   See  Rosenberger,  supra,  at  831;
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist.,
508  U. S.  384,  393–394  (1993);  Widmar  v.  Vincent,  454
U. S. 263, 277 (1981).

We have applied this analysis in cases in which student
speech  was  restricted  because  of  the  speaker’s  religious
viewpoint,  and  we  have  consistently  concluded  that  such
restrictions  constitute  viewpoint  discrimination.    E.g.,
Rosenberger,  supra,  at  845–846;  Widmar,  supra,  at  267,
n. 5,  269,  277;  see  also  Good  News  Club,  supra,  at  106–
107, 109–110; Lamb’s Chapel, supra, at 392–393, 394.  We
have  also  stressed  that  the  rules  applicable  in  a  limited
public  forum  are  particularly  important  in  the  university
setting,  where  “the  State  acts  against  a  background  of
tradition  of  thought  and  experiment  that  is  at  the  center
of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”  Rosenberger,
supra, at 835.

IV
Analyzed  under  this  framework,  Hastings’  refusal  to
register  CLS  pursuant  to  its  Nondiscrimination  Policy
plainly fails.3  As previously noted, when Hastings refused

——————

3 CLS  sought  a  declaratory  judgment  that  this  policy  is  unconstitu-
tional  and  an  injunction  prohibiting  its  enforcement.    See  App.  80.
Particularly  in  light  of  Hastings’  practice  of  changing  its  announced
policies, these requests are not moot.  It is well settled that the volun-
tary  cessation  of  allegedly  unlawful  conduct  does  not  moot  a  case  in
which the legality of that conduct is challenged.  See City of Mesquite v.
Aladdin’s  Castle,  Inc.,  455  U. S.  283,  289  (1982);  see  also  Allee  v.
Medrano,  416  U. S.  802,  810–811  (1974);  DeFunis  v.  Odegaard,  416
U. S.  312,  318  (1974)  (per  curiam).    If  the  rule  were  otherwise,  the
courts would be compelled to leave “ ‘[t]he defendant . . . free to return
to  his  old  ways.’ ”  United  States  v.  Concentrated  Phosphate  Export
Assn.,  Inc.,  393  U. S.  199,  203  (1968)  (quoting  United  States  v.  W.  T.
Grant  Co.,  345  U. S.  629,  632  (1953)).    Here,  there  is  certainly  a  risk
that  Hastings  will  “return  to  [its]  old  ways,”  and  therefore  CLS’s
requests  for  declaratory  and  injunctive  relief  with  respect  to  the  Non-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

DUPREE v. YOUNGER

Opinion of the Court

of law books, not trial exhibits.)  So what would a repeat-
motion requirement for legal questions typically amount to?
For litigants, a copy and paste of summary-judgment mo-
tions into post-trial format.  For district courts, the tedium
of saying no twice.  There is no reason to force litigants and
district courts to undertake that empty exercise.

Rule 56 aside, Younger insists that Rule 50 supports him.
Under this Rule, a district court can grant judgment as a
matter of law if it finds that “a reasonable jury would not
have  a  legally  sufficient  evidentiary  basis  to  find  for  the
party on that issue.”  Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 50(a), (b) (em-
phasis added).  Therefore, Younger says, a Rule 50 motion
is an appropriate vehicle for raising purely legal issues once
a  case  proceeds  to  trial.  Maybe  so,  but  this  argument  is
beside the point: Even if a party can raise legal issues in a
Rule 50 motion, nothing in the Rule requires her to do so.

Finally,  Younger  predicts  that  a  separate  preservation
rule for legal issues will prove unworkable because the line
between  factual  and  legal  questions  can  be  “vexing”  for
courts and litigants.  Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S.
273, 288 (1982).  That’s a fair concern, and it would not be
surprising if “prudent counsel . . . make sure to renew their
arguments in a Rule 50 motion” out of an abundance of cau-
tion.  Feld v. Feld, 688 F. 3d 779, 783 (CADC 2012).  But
Younger  overstates  the  need  for  a  bright-line  rule  in  this
area.  “Courts of appeals have long found it possible to sep-
arate  factual  from  legal  matters.”    Teva  Pharmaceuticals
USA,  Inc.  v.  Sandoz,  Inc.,  574  U. S.  318,  328  (2015).
Though there will be edge cases, the experience of the ma-
jority  of  circuits  demonstrates  that  the  Courts  of  Appeals
are up to the task.  See n. 2, supra.  And for all the virtues
of bright-line rules, Younger’s would come at a steep cost:
the loss of appellate review for unwary litigants who think
it futile to relitigate an already-rejected legal argument.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court is addressing arguments made by one of the parties (Younger).  It delves into the rules of civil procedure (Rule 56 and Rule 50) and their applicability to legal arguments raised during trial.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC.

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Because  we  granted  certiorari  to  decide  only  whether  the
EPA  has  authority  to  conduct  cost-benefit  analysis,  there
is  no  need  to  define  the  universe  of  considerations  upon
which the EPA can properly rely in administering the BTA
standard.  I would leave it to the Agency to decide how to
proceed in the first instance.

III
Because the Court unsettles the scheme Congress estab-

lished, I respectfully dissent.

——————

question at issue,” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842, longstanding yet imper-

missible agency practice cannot ripen into permissible agency practice.
  </content>
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This appears to be a snippet of a legal dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it is part of the actual content meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Snippet</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

35

Opinion of the Court

Here,  the  circumstances  of  AWF’s  2016  licensing  out-
weigh its diminished claim to fairness in copying under the
first  factor.    Like  satire  that  does  not  target  an  original
work,  AWF’s  asserted  commentary  “can  stand  on  its  own
two feet and so requires justification for the very act of bor-
rowing.”  Id., at 581.  Moreover, because AWF’s commercial
use  of  Goldsmith’s  photograph  to  illustrate  a  magazine
about Prince is so similar to the photograph’s typical use, a
particularly  compelling  justification  is  needed.  Yet  AWF
offers  no  independent  justification,  let  alone  a  compelling
one, for copying the photograph, other than to convey a new
meaning  or  message.  As  explained,  that  alone  is  not
enough for the first factor to favor fair use.

Copying might have been helpful to convey a new mean-
ing or message.  It often is.  But that does not suffice under
the first factor.  Nor does it distinguish AWF from a long
list of would-be fair users: a musician who finds it helpful
to  sample  another  artist’s  song  to  make  his  own,  a  play-
wright who finds it helpful to adapt a novel, or a filmmaker
who would prefer to create a sequel or spinoff, to name just
a few.22  As Judge Leval has explained, “[a] secondary au-
thor is not necessarily at liberty to make wholesale takings
of  the  original  author’s  expression  merely  because  of  how
well the original author’s expression would convey the sec-
ondary  author’s  different  message.”  Authors  Guild,  804
F. 3d, at 215.

——————

22 The dissent oddly suggests that under the Court’s opinion, the first
fair use factor favors such uses.  See post, at 12, n. 5.  This ignores, well,
pretty much the entire opinion.  See supra, at 14–17, 22–24, 26–27, 28–
29, 32–33 (degree of difference in purpose and character); supra, at 18,
24 (commercial nature); supra, at 17–19, 27, 30, 34–35 (justification).  In
particular, the Court does not hold that the first factor favors any user
who “wants to reach different buyers, in different markets, consuming
different products.”  Post, at 13, n. 5 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  The dissent
apparently deduces this proposition from its inverse, which is a common
logical fallacy.
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the "fair use" doctrine. It delves into the legal arguments and reasoning behind a particular case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
4

VIDAL v. ELSTER

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

sufficient explanation in part by claiming that, if anything,
the  Court’s  evidence  “does  not  establish  a  historical  ana-
logue for the names clause.”  Ante, at 1 (opinion concurring
in part).  That may well be true.  Yet this back-and-forth
highlights the indeterminacy of the Court’s history-and-tra-
dition inquiry, which one might aptly describe as the equiv-
alent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over
everyone’s heads to find your friends.  Cf. Conroy v. Anis-
koff,  507  U. S.  511,  519  (1993)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in
judgment).  To make matters worse, the five-Justice major-
ity  that  undertakes  this  tradition-as-dispositive  inquiry
found its friends in a crowded party to which it was not in-
vited.  That majority has drawn conclusive inferences from
its  historical  evidence,  all  without  any  guidance  from  the
litigants or the court below.  That stark departure from set-
tled principles of party presentation and adversarial testing
in favor of in-chambers historical research by nonhistorians
raises  more  questions  than  answers.  Cf.  Maslenjak  v.
United  States,  582  U. S.  335,  354  (2017)  (GORSUCH,  J.,
joined by THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (“[T]he crucible of adversarial testing on which
we  usually  depend,  along  with  the  experience  of  our
thoughtful  colleagues  on  the  district  and  circuit  benches,
could  yield  insights  (or  reveal  pitfalls)  we  cannot  muster
guided only by our own lights”).

It  is  not  appropriate,  much  less  necessary,  to  find
common-law analogues to settle the constitutionality of the
names  clause  or  any  other  trademark  registration  provi-
sion.  I agree with JUSTICE BARRETT that, even if the ma-
jority’s historical “evidence were rock solid,” there is no good
reason to believe that “hunting for historical forebears on a
restriction-by-restriction basis is the right way to analyze
the constitutional question.”  Ante, at 1, 13.  The majority
attempts to reassure litigants and the lower courts that a
“history-focused approac[h]” here is sensible and workable,
by  citing  to  New  York  State  Rifle  &  Pistol  Assn.,  Inc.  v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Vidal v. Elster. It delves into the Court's historical analysis and argues against its approach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS v.

OSHA
Per Curiam

linemen face the same regulations as do medics and meat-
packers.  OSHA estimates that 84.2 million employees are
subject to its mandate.  Id., at 61467.

Covered  employers  must  “develop,  implement,  and  en-
force  a  mandatory  COVID–19  vaccination  policy.”    Id.,  at
61402.  The employer must verify the vaccination status of
each employee and maintain proof of it.  Id., at 61552.  The
mandate does contain an “exception” for employers that re-
quire unvaccinated workers to “undergo [weekly] COVID–
19 testing and wear a face covering at work in lieu of vac-
cination.”  Id., at 61402.  But employers are not required to
offer this option, and the emergency regulation purports to
pre-empt state laws to the contrary.  Id., at 61437.  Unvac-
cinated  employees  who  do  not  comply  with  OSHA’s  rule
must be “removed from the workplace.”  Id., at 61532.  And
employers  who  commit  violations  face  hefty  fines:  up  to
$13,653 for a standard violation, and up to $136,532 for a
willful one.  29 CFR §1903.15(d) (2021).

C
OSHA  published  its  vaccine  mandate  on  November  5,
2021.  Scores  of  parties—including  States,  businesses,
trade  groups,  and  nonprofit  organizations—filed  petitions
for  review,  with  at  least  one  petition  arriving  in  each  re-
gional Court of Appeals.  The cases were consolidated in the
Sixth Circuit, which was selected at random pursuant to 28
U. S. C. §2112(a).

Prior to consolidation, however, the Fifth Circuit stayed
OSHA’s  rule  pending  further  judicial  review.    BST  Hold-
ings,  17  F. 4th  604.    It  held  that  the  mandate  likely  ex-
ceeded  OSHA’s  statutory  authority,  raised  separation-of-
powers concerns in the absence of a clear delegation from
Congress, and was not properly tailored to the risks facing
different types of workers and workplaces.

When the consolidated cases arrived at the Sixth Circuit,
two  things  happened.    First,  many  of  the  petitioners—
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court decision. It discusses the OSHA vaccine mandate, legal challenges, and different court rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

Opinion of the Court

the  extent  necessary  to  decision  and  when  presented,  the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret  constitutional  and  statutory  provisions,  and  de-
termine  the  meaning  or  applicability  of  the  terms  of  an
agency action.”  5 U. S. C. §706.  It further requires courts
to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions  found  to  be  . . .  not  in  accordance  with  law.”
§706(2)(A).

The APA thus codifies for agency cases the unremarka-
ble, yet elemental proposition reflected by judicial practice
dating back to Marbury: that courts decide legal questions
by  applying  their  own  judgment.  It  specifies  that  courts,
not agencies, will decide “all relevant questions of law” aris-
ing  on  review  of  agency  action,  §706  (emphasis  added)—
even  those  involving  ambiguous  laws—and  set  aside  any
such action inconsistent with the law as they interpret it.
And it prescribes no deferential standard for courts to em-
ploy in answering those legal questions.  That omission is
telling, because Section 706 does mandate that judicial re-
view of agency policymaking and factfinding be deferential.
See §706(2)(A) (agency action to be set aside if “arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion”); §706(2)(E) (agency
factfinding in formal proceedings to be set aside if “unsup-
ported by substantial evidence”).

In a statute designed to “serve as the fundamental char-
ter of the administrative state,” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S.
558,  580  (2019)  (plurality  opinion)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted), Congress surely would have articulated a
similarly  deferential  standard  applicable  to  questions  of
law had it intended to depart from the settled pre-APA un-
derstanding that deciding such questions was “exclusively
a  judicial  function,”  American  Trucking  Assns.,  310  U. S.,
at 544.  But nothing in the APA hints at such a dramatic
departure.  On the contrary, by directing courts to “inter-
pret constitutional and statutory provisions” without differ-
entiating  between  the  two,  Section  706  makes  clear  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and its implications for judicial review of agency action.  It delves into the legal interpretation of the APA and its relationship to established judicial practices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

VEGA v. TEKOH

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–499.  Argued April 20, 2022—Decided June 23, 2022

The case arose out of the interrogation of respondent, Terence Tekoh, by
petitioner, Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Deputy Carlos Vega.  Deputy
Vega questioned Tekoh at the medical center where Tekoh worked re-
garding the reported sexual assault of a patient.  Vega did not inform
Tekoh of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436.  Tekoh
eventually  provided  a  written  statement  apologizing  for  inappropri-
ately touching the patient’s genitals.  Tekoh was prosecuted for unlaw-
ful sexual penetration.  His written statement was admitted against
him at trial.  After the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, Tekoh sued
Vega under 42 U. S. C. §1983, seeking damages for alleged violations
of his constitutional rights.  The Ninth Circuit held that the use of an
un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing  violates  the  Fifth  Amendment  and  may  support  a  §1983  claim
against the officer who obtained the statement.

Held: A  violation  of  the  Miranda  rules  does  not  provide  a  basis  for  a

§1983 claim.  Pp. 4–16.

(a) Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person acting
under color of state law who “subjects” a person “to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.”  Tekoh argues that a violation of Miranda constitutes a violation
of  the  Fifth  Amendment  right  against  compelled  self-incrimination.
That is wrong.  Pp. 4–13.

(1) In Miranda, the Court concluded that additional procedural pro-
tections were necessary to prevent the violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination when suspects who are in cus-
tody  are  interrogated  by  the  police.    Miranda  imposed  a  set  of
prophylactic rules requiring that custodial interrogation be preceded
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a Supreme Court slip opinion, which includes the syllabus, the case name, the citation, and the Court's opinion.  It is not the actual content of the case being decided, but rather information about the case and the Court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

9

THOMAS, J., dissenting

The  majority  casually  tosses  this  distinction  aside.    It
asserts that the traffic stop in this case, which was undis-
putedly  initiated  on  the  basis  of  probable  cause,  can  last
no  longer  than  is  in  fact  necessary  to  effectuate  the  mis-
sion  of  the  stop.    Ante,  at  8.  And,  it  assumes  that  the
mission  of  the  stop  was  merely  to  write  a  traffic  ticket,
rather  than  to  consider  making  a  custodial  arrest.    Ante,
at  5.  In  support  of  that  durational  requirement,  it  relies
primarily on cases involving Terry stops.  See ante, at 5–7
(citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S. 323 (2009) (analyzing
“stop  and  frisk”  of  passenger  in  a  vehicle  temporarily
seized for a traffic violation); United States v. Sharpe, 470
U. S. 675 (1985) (analyzing seizure of individuals based on
suspicion  of  marijuana  trafficking);  Florida  v.  Royer,  460
U. S.  491  (1983)  (plurality  opinion)  (analyzing  seizure  of
man  walking  through  airport  on  suspicion  of  narcotics
activity)).

The only case involving a traffic stop based on probable
cause that the majority cites for its rule is Caballes.  But,
that decision provides no support for today’s restructuring
of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  In Caballes, the
Court  made  clear  that,  in  the  context  of  a  traffic  stop
supported by probable cause, “a dog sniff would not change
the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception
and  otherwise  executed  in  a  reasonable  manner.”    543
U. S.,  at  408.    To  be  sure,  the  dissent  in  Caballes  would
have  “appl[ied]  Terry’s  reasonable-relation  test  . . .  to
determine  whether  the  canine  sniff  impermissibly  ex-
panded the scope of the initially valid seizure of Caballes.”
Id., at 420 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting).  But even it conceded
that  the  Caballes  majority  had  “implicitly  [rejected]  the
application  of  Terry  to  a  traffic  stop  converted,  by  calling
in a dog, to a drug search.”  Id., at 421.

By strictly limiting the tasks that define the durational
scope  of  the  traffic  stop,  the  majority  accomplishes  today
what  the  Caballes  dissent  could  not:  strictly  limiting  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal reasoning behind the majority opinion and argues against it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

KAGAN, J., dissenting

the contract to the University is an injury to Arkansas”: The
State  was  the  principal  beneficiary  of  the  contract  to  im-
prove its own property.  Ibid.  So Arkansas had the sort of
direct  financial  interest  not  present  here.  And  there  is
more: The University, the Court thought, could not sue on
its own.  See ibid.  The majority suggests otherwise, citing
a  state-court  decision  holding  that  corporations  usually
have the power to bring and defend legal actions.  See ante,
at  11–12.  But  the  Arkansas  Court  referenced  a  different
state-court decision—one holding that another state school
was “not authorized” to “sue and be sued.”  Allen Eng. Co.
v. Kays, 106 Ark. 174, 177, 152 S. W. 992, 993 (1913); see
Arkansas, 346 U. S., at 370, and n. 9.  That decision led this
Court to conclude that Arkansas law treated “a suit against
the University” as “a suit against  the State.”  Id., at 370.
But if state law had not done so—as it does not in Missouri
for  MOHELA?    See  supra,  at  6–7.  The  Court  made  clear
that a State cannot stand in for an independent entity.  The
State, the Court said, “must, of course, represent an inter-
est of her own and not merely that of her citizens or corpo-
rations.”  Ibid.

The majority’s second case—Lebron v. National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374 (1995)—is yet further
afield.  The issue there was whether Amtrak, a public cor-
poration similar to MOHELA, had to comply with the First
Amendment.  The Court held that it did, labeling Amtrak a
state actor for that purpose.  On the opposite view, we rea-
soned, a government could “evade the most solemn obliga-
tions imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the
corporate  form.”  Id.,  at  397;  see  ibid.  (noting  that  Plessy
could then be “resurrected by the simple device” of creating
a public corporation to run trains).  But that did not mean
Amtrak was equivalent to the Government for all purposes.
Over and over, we cabined our holding that Amtrak was a
state actor by adding a phrase like “for purposes of the First
Amendment” or other constitutional rights.  Id., at 400; see
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Biden v. Nebraska. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>