<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Opinion of the Court

it was intended to remedy the State’s tax losses, not to pun-
ish  delinquent  property  owners.  Id.,  at  794  (citing  505
F. Supp. 3d, at 895–899).

We granted certiorari.  598 U. S. ___ (2023).

II
The County asserts that Tyler does not have standing to
bring  her  takings  claim.  To  bring  suit,  a  plaintiff  must
plead an injury in fact attributable to the defendant’s con-
duct  and  redressable  by  the  court.  Lujan  v.  Defenders  of
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992).  This case comes to
us on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  At
this initial stage, we take the facts in the complaint as true.
Warth  v.  Seldin,  422  U. S.  490,  501  (1975).    Tyler  claims
that the County has illegally appropriated the $25,000 sur-
plus beyond her $15,000 tax debt.  App. 5.  This is a classic
pocketbook injury sufficient to give her standing.  TransUn-
ion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 9).
The County objects that Tyler does not have standing be-
cause  she  did  not  affirmatively  “disclaim  the  existence  of
other debts or encumbrances” on her home worth more than
the $25,000 surplus.  Brief for Respondents 12–13, and n.
5.  According to the County, public records suggest that the
condo may be subject to a $49,000 mortgage and a $12,000
lien  for  unpaid  homeowners’  association  fees.    See  ibid.
The County argues that these potential encumbrances ex-
ceed the value of any interest Tyler has in the home above
her $15,000 tax debt, and that she therefore ultimately suf-
fered no financial harm from the sale of her home.  Without
such harm she would have no standing.

But  the  County  never  entered  these  records  below,  nor
has  it  submitted  them  to  this  Court.    Even  if  there  were
encumbrances on the home worth more than the surplus,
Tyler still plausibly alleges a financial harm: The County
has kept $25,000 that belongs to her.  In Minnesota, a tax
sale extinguishes all other liens on a property.  See Minn.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the plaintiff's standing in a takings claim. It presents legal arguments and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

395

Opinion of the Court

The trial judge analyzed the ineffective-assistance claim
under the correct standard; the Virginia Supreme Court
did not.

We are likewise persuaded that the Virginia trial judge
correctly applied both components of that standard to Wil-
ineffectiveness claim. Although he concluded that
liams’
counsel competently handled the guilt phase of the trial, he
found that their representation during the sentencing phase
fell short of professional standards—a judgment barely dis-
puted by the State in its brief to this Court. The record
establishes that counsel did not begin to prepare for that
phase of the proceeding until a week before the trial.
Id.,
at 207, 227. They failed to conduct an investigation that
would have uncovered extensive records graphically describ-
ing Williams’ nightmarish childhood, not because of any stra-
tegic calculation but because they incorrectly thought that
state law barred access to such records. Had they done so,
the jury would have learned that Williams’ parents had been
imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and his sib-
lings,19 that Williams had been severely and repeatedly
beaten by his father, that he had been committed to the cus-
tody of the social services bureau for two years during his
parents’ incarceration (including one stint in an abusive fos-
ter home), and then, after his parents were released from
prison, had been returned to his parents’ custody.

19 Juvenile records contained the following description of his home:
“The home was a complete wreck. . . . There were several places on the
ﬂoor where someone had had a bowel movement. Urine was standing in
several places in the bedrooms. There were dirty dishes scattered over
the kitchen, and it was impossible to step any place on the kitchen ﬂoor
where there was no trash. . . . The children were all dirty and none of
them had on under-pants. Noah and Lula were so intoxicated, they could
not ﬁnd any clothes for the children, nor were they able to put the clothes
on them. . . . The children had to be put in Winslow Hospital, as four
of them, by that time, were deﬁnitely under the inﬂuence of whiskey.”
App. 528–529.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:40] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

563

Breyer, J., dissenting

7–8, App. (CA1) 975–976; 1960 W&R Fund Annual Report 9,
App. (CA1) 1018; 1961 W&R Fund Annual Report 16–17,
App. (CA1) 1058–1059; 1962 W&R Fund Annual Report 15–
16, App. (CA1) 1090–1091; 1963 W&R Fund Annual Report
15–16, App. (CA1) 1123–1124; 1964 W&R Fund Annual Re-
port 22–23, App. (CA1) 1160–1161; 1965 W&R Fund Annual
Report 14, App. (CA1) 1187. See also Hearings on Health
Beneﬁts, at 36 (suggesting retirees eligible “ ‘from the incep-
tion of bargained beneﬁts’ ”).

The only signiﬁcant difference between the coverage pro-
vided before 1974 and after 1974 consists of greater gener-
osity after 1974 with respect to widows, for the earlier 12-
month limitation was repealed and health beneﬁts extended
to widows’ remarriage or death. See 1974 NBCWA 105,
App. (CA1) 758.

(4) In return for what the miners thought was an assur-
ance (though not a contractual obligation) from management
of continued pension and health care beneﬁts, the Union
agreed to accept mechanization of mining, a concession that
meant signiﬁcant layoffs and a smaller future work force.
Coal Comm’n Report 11–14, App. (CA1) 1342–1345 (75% de-
cline in employment from 1950 to 1969); Krajcinovic 4, 43–44;
Seltzer, supra, at 36; see also C. Perry, Collective Bargaining
and the Decline of the United Mine Workers 43 (1984) (detail-
ing beneﬁts of mechanization for coal operators). The presi-
dent of the Southern Coal Operators’ Association said in 1953
that the miners “have been promised and grown accustomed
to” health beneﬁts. App. (CA1) 2000. Those beneﬁts, the
management’s W&R Fund trustee said in 1951, covered
“mine worker[s], including pensioners, and dependents . . .
without limit as to duration.”
Id., at 1972. This Court, too,
has said that the UMWA “agreed not to oppose the rapid
mechanization of the mines” in exchange for “increased
wages” and “payments into the welfare fund.” Mine Work-
ers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 660 (1965); see also id., at
698 (Goldberg, J., concurring in judgment) (improved wages,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It contains legal citations, references to previous court cases, and discusses the details of a labor dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

15

Opinion of the Court

ment  which  ought  to  be  dependent  on  the  people  alone.”
The Federalist No. 52, at 326 (J. Madison).

Since  the  power  to  establish  voting  requirements  is  of
little  value  without  the  power  to  enforce  those  require-
ments,  Arizona  is  correct  that  it  would  raise  serious  con-
stitutional  doubts  if  a  federal  statute  precluded  a  State
from  obtaining  the  information  necessary  to  enforce  its
voter qualifications.9  If, but for Arizona’s interpretation of
the  “accept  and  use”  provision,  the  State  would  be  pre-
cluded  from  obtaining  information  necessary  for  enforce-
ment,  we  would  have  to  determine  whether  Arizona’s
interpretation,  though  plainly  not  the  best  reading,  is  at
least  a  possible  one.  Cf.  Crowell  v.  Benson,  285  U. S.  22,
62 (1932) (the Court will “ascertain whether a construction
of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional]
question  may  be  avoided”  (emphasis  added)).    Happily,
we  are  spared  that  necessity,  since  the  statute  provides
another  means  by  which  Arizona  may  obtain  information
needed for enforcement.

Section  1973gg–7(b)(1)  of  the  Act  provides  that  the
Federal  Form  “may  require  only  such  identifying  infor-
mation  (including  the  signature  of  the  applicant)  and
other  information  (including  data  relating  to  previous
registration  by  the  applicant),  as  is  necessary  to  enable
the appropriate State election official to assess the eligibil-
ity  of  the  applicant  and  to  administer  voter  registration
and other parts of the election process.”  At oral argument,

——————

9 In their reply brief, petitioners suggest for the first time that “regis-
tration is itself a qualification to vote.”  Reply Brief for State Petition-
ers 24 (emphasis deleted); see also post, at 1, 16 (opinion of THOMAS, J.);
cf. Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F. 3d 1411, 1413, and n. 1 (CA9
1995),  cert.  denied,  516  U. S.  1093  (1996);  Association  of  Community
Organizations  for  Reform  Now  (ACORN)  v.  Edgar,  56  F. 3d  791,  793
(CA7 1995).  We resolve this case on the theory on which it has hitherto
been  litigated:  that  citizenship  (not  registration)  is  the  voter  qualifica-
tion Arizona seeks to enforce.  See Brief for State Petitioners 50.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of a federal statute related to voter registration.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
2

GILL v. WHITFORD

Opinion of the Court

Certain  of  the  plaintiffs  before  us  alleged  that  they  had
such  a  personal  stake  in  this  case,  but  never  followed  up
with  the  requisite  proof.    The  District  Court  and  this
Court therefore lack the power to resolve their claims.  We
vacate  the  judgment  and  remand  the  case  for  further
proceedings,  in  the  course  of  which  those  plaintiffs  may
attempt to demonstrate standing in accord with the analy
sis in this opinion.

I
Wisconsin’s  Legislature  consists  of  a  State  Assembly
and  a  State  Senate.  Wis.  Const.,  Art.  IV,  §1.    The  99
members of the Assembly are chosen from single districts
that  must  “consist  of  contiguous  territory  and  be  in  as
compact  form  as  practicable.”    §4.  State  senators  are
likewise  chosen  from  single-member  districts,  which  are
laid  on  top  of  the  State  Assembly  districts  so  that  three
Assembly  districts  form  one  Senate district.   See §5; Wis.
Stat. §4.001 (2011).

The  Wisconsin  Constitution  gives  the  legislature  the
responsibility  to  “apportion  and  district  anew  the  mem
bers  of  the  senate  and  assembly”  at  the  first  session  fol
lowing each census.  Art. IV, §3.  In recent decades, how
ever, that responsibility has just as often been taken up by
federal  courts.  Following  the  census  in  1980,  1990,  and
2000,  federal  courts  drew  the  State’s  legislative  districts
when  the  Legislature  and  the  Governor—split  on  party
lines—were unable to agree on new districting plans.  The
Legislature has broken the logjam just twice in the last 40
years.  In  1983,  a  Democratic  Legislature  passed,  and  a
Democratic  Governor  signed,  a  new  districting  plan  that
remained  in  effect  until  the  1990  census.    See  1983  Wis.
Laws ch. 4.  In 2011, a Republican Legislature passed, and
a Republican Governor signed, the districting plan at issue
here, known as Act 43.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 4.009, 4.01–4.99;
2011  Wis.  Laws  ch. 4.    Following  the  passage  of  Act  43,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in the case of GILL v. WHITFORD. It contains legal arguments and analysis, which is suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

33

Opinion of the Court

Clause.  The  first  bill  introduced  in  the  116th  Congress
would  require  States  to  create  15-member  independent
commissions  to  draw  congressional  districts  and  would
establish  certain  redistricting  criteria,  including  protec-
tion  for  communities  of  interest,  and  ban  partisan  gerry-
mandering.  H. R. 1, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., §§2401, 2411
(2019).

Dozens  of  other  bills  have  been  introduced  to  limit
reliance  on  political  considerations  in  redistricting.    In
2010,  H. R.  6250  would  have  required  States  to  follow
standards  of  compactness,  contiguity,  and  respect  for
political  subdivisions  in  redistricting.  It  also  would  have
prohibited  the  establishment  of  congressional  districts
“with the major purpose of diluting the voting strength of
any person, or group, including any political party,” except
when  necessary  to  comply  with  the  Voting  Rights  Act  of
1965.  H. R.  6250,  111th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  §2  (referred  to
committee).

Another  example  is  the  Fairness  and  Independence  in
Redistricting  Act,  which  was  introduced  in  2005  and  has
been  reintroduced  in  every  Congress  since.    That  bill
would  require  every  State  to  establish  an  independent
commission to adopt redistricting plans.  The bill also set
forth criteria for the independent commissions to use, such
as  compactness,  contiguity,  and  population  equality.    It
would  prohibit  consideration  of  voting  history,  political
party affiliation, or incumbent Representative’s residence.
H. R.  2642,  109th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  §4  (referred  to
subcommittee).

We  express  no  view  on  any  of  these  pending  proposals.
We simply note that the avenue for reform established by
the  Framers,  and  used  by  Congress  in  the  past,  remains
open.

No one can accuse this Court of having a crabbed view of

*

*

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing legislative proposals related to redistricting. It cites specific bills and their provisions, indicating a focus on legal and political analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MURTHY v. MISSOURI

Opinion of the Court

post, complained: “[L]ast time we did this dance, it ended in
an  insurrection.”  Id.,  at  698.  Another  official,  unhappy
with  Facebook’s  supposed  lack  of  transparency  about  its
vaccine  misinformation  problems,  wrote:  “Internally  we
have been considering our options on what to do about it.”
Id., at 657.  Publicly, White House communications officials
called  on  the  platforms  to  do  more  to  address  COVID–19
misinformation—and,  perhaps  as  motivation,  raised  the
possibility  of  reforms  aimed  at  the  platforms,  including
changes to the antitrust laws and 47 U. S. C. §230.

Surgeon General.  In July 2021, Surgeon General Vivek
Murthy issued a health advisory on misinformation.  The
advisory encouraged platforms to “[r]edesign recommenda-
tion  algorithms  to  avoid  amplifying  misinformation,”
“[i]mpose  clear  consequences  for  accounts  that  repeatedly
violate platform policies,” and “[p]rovide information from
trusted  and  credible  sources  to  prevent  misconceptions
from taking hold.”  3 Record 662.  At a press conference to
announce  the  advisory,  Surgeon  General  Murthy  argued
that the platforms should “operate with greater transpar-
ency and accountability.”  2 id., at 626.  The following year,
the  Surgeon  General  issued  a  “Request  for  Information,”
seeking,  among  other  things,  reports  on  each  platform’s
“COVID–19  misinformation  policies.”  Impact  of  Health
Misinformation in the Digital Information Environment in
the  United  States  Throughout  the  COVID–19  Pandemic
Request for Information (RFI), 87 Fed. Reg. 12714 (Mar. 7,
2022).

CDC.  Like  the  White  House,  the  CDC  frequently  com-
municated  with  the  platforms  about  COVID–19  misinfor-
mation.  In early 2020, Facebook reached out to the agency,
seeking  authoritative  information  about  the  virus  that  it
could post on the platform.  The following year, the CDC’s
communications  expanded  to  other  platforms,  including
Twitter and YouTube.  The CDC hosted meetings and sent
reports  to  the  platforms,  alerting  them  to  misinformation
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the actions of the White House, Surgeon General, and CDC regarding COVID-19 misinformation on social media platforms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA

Syllabus

filing suit in District Court, alleging that the compelled disclosure re-
quirement  violated  their  First  Amendment  rights  and  the  rights  of
their donors.  Disclosure of their Schedule Bs, the petitioners alleged,
would  make  their  donors  less  likely  to  contribute  and  would  subject
them to the risk of reprisals.  Both organizations challenged the con-
stitutionality of the disclosure requirement on its face and as applied
to them.  In each case, the District Court granted preliminary injunc-
tive  relief  prohibiting  the  Attorney  General  from  collecting  the  peti-
tioners’  Schedule  B  information.    The  Ninth  Circuit  vacated  and  re-
manded,  reasoning  that  Circuit  precedent  required  rejection  of  the
petitioners’  facial  challenge.  Reviewing  the  petitioners’  as-applied
claims under an “exacting scrutiny” standard, the panel narrowed the
District Court’s injunction, and it allowed the Attorney General to col-
lect the petitioners’ Schedule Bs so long as they were not publicly dis-
closed.  On remand, the District Court held bench trials in both cases,
after which it entered judgment for the petitioners and permanently
enjoined the Attorney General from collecting their Schedule Bs.  Ap-
plying  exacting  scrutiny,  the  District  Court  held  that  disclosure  of
Schedule Bs was not narrowly tailored to the State’s interest in inves-
tigating  charitable  misconduct.    The  court  found  little  evidence  that
the  Attorney  General’s  investigators  relied  on  Schedule  Bs  to  detect
charitable  fraud,  and  it  determined  that  the  disclosure  regime  bur-
dened the associational rights of donors.  The District Court also found
that California was unable to ensure the confidentiality of donors’ in-
formation.    The  Ninth  Circuit  again  vacated  the  District  Court’s  in-
junctions, and this time reversed the judgments and remanded for en-
try of judgment in favor of the Attorney General.  The Ninth Circuit
held that the District Court had erred by imposing a narrow tailoring
requirement.  And it reasoned that the disclosure regime satisfied ex-
acting  scrutiny  because  the  up-front  collection  of  charities’  Schedule
Bs promoted investigative efficiency and effectiveness.  The panel also
found that the disclosure of Schedule Bs would not meaningfully bur-
den donors’ associational rights.  The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing
en banc, over a dissent.

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded.

903 F. 3d 1000, reversed and remanded.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to all but Part II–B–1, concluding that California’s disclosure require-
ment is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment
rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government inter-
est.  Pp. 6–7, 9–19.

(a) The  Court  reviews  the  petitioners’  First  Amendment  challenge
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the case summary and procedural history of AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA. It does not contain the actual content of the legal arguments or the Court's decision.
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Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

11

Opinion of the Court

we should read the Lanham Act narrowly because a broad
reading  might  be  unconstitutional.  See,  e.g.,  Brief  for
Respondent  37,  39,  40,  41–42.    The  likely  reason  that
Hargis  has  not  directly  advanced  a  constitutional  argu-
ment is that, at least as to a jury trial right, Hargis did not
even  list  the  Seventh  Amendment  as  an  authority  in  its
appellee  brief  to  the  Eighth  Circuit.    Moreover,  although
Hargis pressed an Article III argument below, in its oppo-
sition  to  certiorari  in  this  Court,  Hargis  seemingly  con-
ceded  that  TTAB  decisions  can  sometimes  ground  issue
preclusion,  though  it  now  protests  otherwise.
See
Supplemental Brief in Opposition 2.  To the extent, if any,
that there could be a meritorious constitutional objection,
it  is  not  before  us.  See  Plaut  v.  Spendthrift  Farm,  Inc.,
514 U. S. 211, 231–232 (1995).

We  reject  Hargis’  statutory  argument  that  we  should
jettison  administrative  preclusion  in  whole  or  in  part  to
avoid potential constitutional concerns.  As to the Seventh
Amendment, for instance, the Court has already held that
the  right  to  a  jury  trial  does  not  negate  the  issue-
preclusive effect of a judgment, even if that judgment was
entered  by  a  juryless  tribunal.  See  Parklane  Hosiery  Co.
v.  Shore,  439  U. S.  322,  337  (1979).    It  would  seem  to
follow  naturally  that  although  the  Seventh  Amendment
creates  a  jury  trial  right  in  suits for  trademark  damages,
see Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469, 477, 479–480
(1962),  TTAB  decisions  still  can  have  preclusive  effect  in
such suits.  Hargis disputes this reasoning even though it
admits  that  in  1791  “ ‘a  party  was  not  entitled  to  have  a
jury  determine  issues  that  had  been  previously  adjudi-
cated by a  chancellor in equity.’ ”  Brief for Respondent 39
(quoting Parklane Hosiery, supra, at 333).  Instead, Hargis
contends  that  issue  preclusion  should  not  apply  to  TTAB
registration  decisions  because  there  were  no  agencies  at
common  law.    But  our  precedent  holds  that  the  Seventh
Amendment  does  not  strip  competent  tribunals  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the issue of issue preclusion in trademark cases. It cites legal precedents and delves into the constitutional implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

5

Opinion of the Court

interest  in  protecting  incumbents  neutrally  explained  the
2016 Plan’s discriminatory effects.  Id., at 896–899.  In the
end,  the  District  Court  held  that  12  of  the  13  districts
constituted partisan gerrymanders that violated the Equal
Protection Clause.  Id., at 923.

The  court  also  agreed  with  the  plaintiffs  that  the  2016
Plan discriminated against them because of their political
speech  and  association,  in  violation  of  the  First  Amend-
ment.  Id., at 935.  Judge Osteen dissented with respect to
that  ruling.  Id.,  at  954–955.    Finally,  the  District  Court
concluded that the 2016 Plan violated the Elections Clause
and  Article  I,  §2.    Id.,  at  935–941.    The  District  Court
enjoined  the  State  from  using  the  2016  Plan  in  any  elec-
tion after the November 2018 general election.  Id., at 942.
The  defendants  again  appealed  to  this  Court,  and  we

postponed jurisdiction.  586 U. S. ___ (2019).

B

The second case before us is Lamone v. Benisek, No. 18–
726.  In  2011,  the  Maryland  Legislature—dominated  by
Democrats—undertook  to  redraw  the  lines  of  that  State’s
eight  congressional  districts.    The  Governor  at  the  time,
Democrat Martin O’Malley, led the process.  He appointed
a  redistricting  committee  to  help  redraw  the  map,  and
asked  Congressman  Steny  Hoyer,  who  has  described
himself as a “serial gerrymanderer,” to advise the commit-
tee.  348  F. Supp.  3d  493,  502  (Md.  2018).    The  Governor
later  testified  that  his  aim  was  to  “use  the  redistricting
process  to  change  the  overall  composition  of  Maryland’s
congressional delegation to 7 Democrats and 1 Republican
by flipping” one district.  Ibid.  “[A] decision was made to
go for the Sixth,” ibid., which had been held by a Republi-
can for nearly two decades.  To achieve the required equal
population  among  districts,  only  about  10,000  residents
needed to be removed from that district.  Id., at 498.  The
2011  Plan  accomplished  that  by  moving  roughly  360,000
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites case names and legal precedents, indicating its suitability for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

480

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Breyer, J., dissenting

cedures for enacting (or repealing) legislation is beside the
point. The Act itself was enacted in accordance with these
procedures, and its failure to require the President to satisfy
those procedures does not make the Act unconstitutional.

IV

Because I disagree with the Court’s holding of literal viola-
tion, I must consider whether the Act nonetheless violates
separation-of-powers principles—principles that arise out of
the Constitution’s vesting of the “executive Power” in “a
President,” U. S. Const., Art. II, § 1, and “[a]ll legislative
Powers” in “a Congress,” Art. I, § 1. There are three rele-
vant separation-of-powers questions here: (1) Has Congress
given the President the wrong kind of power, i. e., “non-
Executive” power? (2) Has Congress given the President the
power to “encroach” upon Congress’ own constitutionally
reserved territory? (3) Has Congress given the President
too much power, violating the doctrine of “nondelegation?”
These three limitations help assure “adequate control by the
citizen’s Representatives in Congress,” upon which Justice
Kennedy properly insists. See ante, at 451 (concurring
opinion). And with respect to this Act, the answer to all
these questions is “no.”

A

Viewed conceptually, the power the Act conveys is the
right kind of power.
It is “executive.” As explained above,
an exercise of that power “executes” the Act. Conceptually
speaking, it closely resembles the kind of delegated author-
ity—to spend or not to spend appropriations, to change or
not to change tariff rates—that Congress has frequently
granted the President, any differences being differences in
degree, not kind. See Part IV–C, infra.

The fact that one could also characterize this kind of power
as “legislative,” say, if Congress itself (by amending the ap-
propriations bill) prevented a provision from taking effect, is
beside the point. This Court has frequently found that the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxvi

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Fargo Forum; Syvertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Farhad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Farley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
Farm Credit Services of Central Ark.; Arkansas v.
Farm Credit Services of Mich. Heartland, PCA; Weldon v. . . .
Farmer; Markay v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Farmer v. Trent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Farooq v. Russell
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Farrell v. Pataki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Faulcon v. Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fausto v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feagin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fears v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Featherstone v. Euﬁnger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Federal Aviation Administration; Haynes v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Waterview Management Co. v.
. . . . .
Federation of Advertising Industry Representatives v. Chicago
Fee v. Borgert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Felder, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Felix-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feliz v. Elo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fergason v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ferrara; Cameron v.
Ferreira v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ferrell v. Cuomo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ferrer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feurtado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fidalgo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fidelity Warranty Services, Inc. v. Kidd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fields v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Files; Perry v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Filler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fink v. Shedler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fiorani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
First Mount Vernon, I. L. A. v. Prince George’s County . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
First National Bank of Md.; Richardson v.
Fischer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fischler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fisher v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fisher v. Varner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fizzano Brothers Concrete Products, Inc. v. Santerian . . . . . . . .
Flanagan v. Arnaiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc. v. Damon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fletcher v. North Carolina Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1050
1023
1107
1036
1021,1125
1076
1134
1079
1091
1093
1074
1038
1039
1072
1115
1003
1066
1006
1064
1031
1074
1099
1043
1038
1066
1043
1102
1118
1069
1090
1071
1082
1117
1044
1087
1131
667
1100
1038
1049
1022
1117
1109
1135
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely found at the beginning of a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

GORSUCH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 21–376, 21–377, 21–378 and 21–380
_________________

DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CHAD EVERET BRACKEEN, ET AL.

21–376

21–377

CHEROKEE NATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CHAD EVERET BRACKEEN, ET AL.

21–378

TEXAS, PETITIONER
v.
DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR, ET AL.

21–380

CHAD EVERET BRACKEEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 15, 2023]

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and

JUSTICE JACKSON join as to Parts I and III, concurring.

In  affirming  the  constitutionality  of  the  Indian  Child
Welfare  Act  (ICWA),  the  Court  safeguards  the  ability  of
tribal  members  to  raise  their  children  free  from  interfer-
ence by state authorities and other outside parties.  In the
process, the Court also goes a long way toward restoring the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and the introductory text for a Supreme Court opinion.  It is not the main body of the text and would not be suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation and Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1125

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No.  09–7391.  Gutzmore  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  985.

No.  09–7392.  Hamilton  v.  Florida  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7394.  Diggs  v.  Stevenson,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  282.

No.  09–7399.  Suggs  v.  Lindamood,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7400.  Moore v.  Doe et al.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  393.

No.  09–7402.  Kazoun  v.  Kazoun.  Ct.  App.  Ohio,  Summit

County.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7410.  Hynes  v.  New  Hampshire.  Sup.  Ct.  N.  H.
Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 159 N. H. 187, 978 A. 2d 264.
No.  09–7412.  McGrath  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7413.  Lewis  v.  Burger  King.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  470.

No. 09–7415.  Strong v. Pennsylvania.  Super. Ct. Pa.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  961  A.  2d  1284.

No.  09–7426.  Davis  v.  California  Western  School  of  Law
et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  349
Fed.  Appx.  218.

No. 09–7448.  Pena v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–7456.  Hammond v. Keller, Secretary, North Caro
lina  Department  of  Correction, et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.  Appx.  830.

No.  09–7458.  Garnto  v.  Mekusker  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7468.  DeNoma  v.  Ohio.  Ct.  App.  Ohio,  Hamilton

County.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

CRUZ v. ARIZONA

Barrett, J., dissenting

prisoners  seeking  to  fle  delayed  or  successive  § 2255  mo-
tions.  See  28  U. S. C.  §§ 2255(f),  (h).  The  parallel  breaks
down,  however,  because  the  rules  are  different.  Unlike
§ 2255(h)(2), which requires “a new rule of [federal] constitu-
tional  law,”  and  § 2255(f)(3),  which  requires  a  right  “newly
recognized by the [U. S.] Supreme  Court,” the relevant por-
tion  of  Arizona's  Rule  32.1(g)  simply  requires  “a  signifcant
change in the law.”  As the Arizona Supreme Court has re-
peatedly  interpreted  that  Rule,  Lynch  should  qualify  be-
cause  it  overruled  binding  Arizona  precedent,  creating  a
clear  break  from  the  past  in  Arizona  courts.  The  Arizona
Supreme  Court's  contrary  decision  was  unprecedented  and
unforeseeable.  Only  violations  of  state  rules  that  are
“ `frmly  established  and  regularly  followed'  .  .  .  will  be  ade-
quate to foreclose review of a federal claim.”  Lee, 534 U. S.,
at 376.  That standard is not met here.

*

*

*

In  exceptional  cases  where  a  state-court  judgment  rests
on a novel and unforeseeable state-court procedural decision
lacking  fair  or  substantial  support  in  prior  state  law,  that
decision is not adequate to preclude review of a federal ques-
tion.  The Arizona Supreme Court applied Rule 32.1(g) in a
manner  that  abruptly  departed  from  and  directly  conficted
with its prior interpretations of that Rule.  Accordingly, the
judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Arizona  is  vacated,  and
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Barrett, with whom Justice Thomas, Justice

Alito, and Justice Gorsuch join, dissenting.

The  adequate  and  independent  state  grounds  doctrine  is
the  product  of  two  fundamental  features  of  our  jurisdiction.
First, this Court is powerless to revise a state court's inter-
pretation of its own law.  Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590,

Page Proof Pending Publication
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Barrett in the case of Cruz v. Arizona. It discusses the "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine and its application to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

that by enshrining the traditional definition of marriage in
their  State  Constitutions  through  voter-approved  amend-
ments, the States have put the issue “beyond the reach of
the  normal  democratic  process.”    Brief  for  Petitioners  in
No.  14–562,  p.  54.  But  the  result  petitioners  seek  is  far
less  democratic.  They  ask  nine  judges  on  this  Court  to
enshrine  their  definition  of  marriage  in  the  Federal  Con-
stitution  and  thus  put  it  beyond  the  reach  of  the  normal
democratic  process  for  the  entire  Nation.    That  a  “bare
majority”  of  this  Court,  ante,  at  25,  is  able  to  grant  this
wish, wiping out with a stroke of the keyboard the results
of the political process in over 30 States, based on a provi-
sion  that  guarantees  only  “due  process”  is  but  further
evidence of the danger of substantive due process.1

II
Even  if  the  doctrine  of  substantive  due  process  were
somehow defensible—it is not—petitioners still would not
have a claim.  To invoke the protection of the Due Process
Clause at all—whether under a theory of “substantive” or
“procedural”  due  process—a  party  must  first  identify  a
deprivation  of  “life,  liberty,  or  property.”    The  majority
claims these state laws deprive petitioners of “liberty,” but
the  concept  of  “liberty”  it  conjures  up  bears  no  resem-
blance to any plausible meaning of that word as it is used
in the Due Process Clauses.

——————

1 The  majority  states  that  the  right  it  believes  is  “part  of  the  liberty
promised  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  is  derived,  too,  from  that
Amendment’s  guarantee  of  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.”    Ante,  at
19.  Despite  the  “synergy”  it  finds  “between  th[ese]  two  protections,”
ante, at 20, the majority clearly uses equal protection only to shore up
its  substantive  due  process  analysis,  an  analysis  both  based  on  an
imaginary  constitutional  protection  and  revisionist  view  of  our  history
and tradition.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges. It delves into legal arguments regarding substantive due process and the definition of marriage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

37

ALITO, J., dissenting

Agudath  Israel  of  America  as  Amicus  Curiae  3,  8  (affir-
mance  would  “point  a  judicial  dagger  at  the  heart  of  the
Orthodox  Jewish  community  in  the  United  States”  and
permit that community to be relegated to the status of  “a
second-class  group”);  Brief  for  Union  of  Orthodox  Jewish
Congregations of America as Amicus Curiae 3 (affirmance
“could significantly affect the ability of [affiliated] student
clubs and youth movements . . . to prescribe requirements
for  their  membership  and  leaders  based  on  religious  be-
liefs  and  commitments”).  This  is  where  the  Court’s  deci-
sion leads.

*

*

*
I  do  not  think  it  is  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  today’s
decision  is  a  serious  setback  for  freedom  of  expression  in
this  country.    Our  First  Amendment  reflects  a  “profound
national  commitment  to  the  principle  that  debate  on
public  issues  should  be  uninhibited,  robust,  and  wide-
open.”  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270
(1964).  Even if the United States is the only Nation that
shares  this  commitment  to  the  same  extent,  I  would  not
change  our  law  to  conform  to  the  international  norm.  I
fear  that  the  Court’s  decision  marks  a  turn  in  that  direc-
tion.  Even  those  who  find  CLS’s  views  objectionable
should  be  concerned  about  the  way  the  group  has  been
treated—by Hastings, the Court of Appeals, and now this
Court.  I can only hope that this decision will turn out to
be an aberration.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It expresses the judge's disagreement with the majority decision and argues against its implications for freedom of expression.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

803

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

criminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required
by  Rule  38(a)  is  paid  and  the  petition  is  submitted  in  compliance
with  Rule  33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of
Appeals,  506  U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dis
sents.  See  id.,  at  4,  and  cases  cited  therein.

No.  08–10619.  Asemani v.  Islamic  Republic of  Iran et  al.
C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in
forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this
Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  1.

No.  08–10650.  Dasisa  v.  University  of  Massachusetts
Board  of  Trustees.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for
leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dis
missed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  08–10685.  Asemani  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Re
ported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  211.

No.  08–10783.  Smith  v.  Charleston  County  School  Dis
trict  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed.  See
this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  193.

No.  08–10847.  Simmons  v.  Flecker.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Motion
of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and
certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No. 08–10890.  Swain v. Small, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  08–10899.  Penk  v.  Coffman,  Secretary  of  State  of
Colorado,  et al.  Sup.  Ct.  Colo.  Motion  of petitioner  for  leave
to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.
See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  08–10923.  Shabazz  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As  peti
tioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk  is
directed  not  to  accept  any  further  petitions  in  noncriminal  mat
ters  from  petitioner  unless  the  docketing  fee  required  by  Rule
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

154

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Opinion of the Court

42 U. S. C. § 290aa et seq.), which require the Secretary of
HHS to report to Congress every three years on the “addic-
tive property of tobacco” and to include recommendations for
action that the Secretary may deem appropriate. A year
later, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Smoking Educa-
tion Act, Pub. L. 98–474, 98 Stat. 2200, which amended the
FCLAA by again modifying the prescribed warning. Nota-
bly, during debate on the Senate ﬂoor, Senator Hawkins
argued that the FCLAA was necessary in part because
“[u]nder the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the Congress
exempted tobacco products.” 130 Cong. Rec. 26953 (1984).
And in 1986, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Smoke-
less Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 (CSTHEA), Pub.
L. 99–252, 100 Stat. 30 (codiﬁed at 15 U. S. C. § 4401 et seq.),
which essentially extended the regulatory provisions of the
FCLAA to smokeless tobacco products. Like the FCLAA,
the CSTHEA provided that “[n]o statement relating to the
use of smokeless tobacco products and health, other than the
statements required by [the Act], shall be required by any
Federal agency to appear on any package . . . of a smokeless
tobacco product.” § 7(a), 100 Stat. 34 (codiﬁed at 15 U. S. C.
§ 4406(a)). Thus, as with cigarettes, Congress reserved for
itself an aspect of smokeless tobacco regulation that is partic-
ularly important to the FDCA’s regulatory scheme.

In 1988, the Surgeon General released a report summa-
rizing the abundant scientiﬁc literature demonstrating that
“[c]igarettes and other forms of tobacco are addicting,” and
that “nicotine is psychoactive” and “causes physical depend-
ence characterized by a withdrawal syndrome that usually
accompanies nicotine abstinence.”
1988 Surgeon General’s
Report 14. The report further concluded that the “pharma-
cologic and behavioral processes that determine tobacco ad-
diction are similar to those that determine addiction to drugs
such as heroin and cocaine.”
In the same year,
FDA Commissioner Young stated before Congress that “it
doesn’t look like it is possible to regulate [tobacco] under the

Id., at 15.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the history of tobacco regulation in the United States. It cites legal statutes, congressional debates, and reports from the Surgeon General and FDA Commissioner.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
06-30-99 14:28:21

524US21301

Reporter(cid:146)s Note

The next page is purposely numbered 1301. The numbers between
983 and 1301 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to
publish in-chambers opinions with permanent page numbers, thus making
the ofﬁcial citations available upon publication of the preliminary prints of
the United States Reports.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a note from the reporter explaining a numbering discrepancy in the legal document. It's not part of the main legal text and provides contextual information about the pagination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Reporter's Note</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

905

524 U. S.

June 1, 1998

No. 97–1647. Kucera v. United Nebraska Bank. Ct. App.

Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 5 Neb. App. xxi.

No. 97–1662. Clark v. Roy Anderson Corp. et al. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F. 3d 193.

No. 97–1663. Willoughby v. Fields et al. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 F. 3d 37.

No. 97–1687. Armenis v. Cramer. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 141.

No. 97–1689. Blackburn, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Baby Boy Doe, Deceased
v. Blue Mountain Women(cid:146)s Clinic et al. Sup. Ct. Mont.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 286 Mont. 60, 951 P. 2d 1.

No. 97–1691. Perry v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Southern

Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 954 S. W. 2d 554.

No. 97–1694. Home Savings of America v. Maynard. Ct.

App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–1720. Bower v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 291 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 685 N. E.
2d 393.

No. 97–1737. Hoovler et al. v. Indiana et al. Ct. App.

Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 689 N. E. 2d 738.

No. 97–1758. Carlson v. Nebraska State Bank (two judg-
ments). Ct. App. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 6
Neb. App. lix.

No. 97–5623. Booth et al. v. Maryland et al. C. A. 4th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 112 F. 3d 139.

No. 97–7275. Sanchez-Zubia v. United States. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 607.

No. 97–7630. Miller v. United States; and
No. 97–8083. Arroyo et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 116 F. 3d 641.

No. 97–7644. Chase et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 F. 3d 1100.

No. 97–7772. Padilla-Pena v. United States; and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks sequential narrative and is more akin to a legal docket or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
212

PRESLEY  v.  GEORGIA

Per Curiam

applicable  to  the  States  via  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the
Fourteenth Amendment.  The Sixth Amendment directs, in
relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”  The
Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948), made it clear
that  this  right  extends  to  the  States.  The  Sixth  Amend
ment  right,  as  the  quoted  language  makes  explicit,  is  the
right of the accused.

The  Court  has  further  held  that  the  public  trial  right  ex
tends beyond the accused and can be invoked under the First
Amendment.  Press-Enterprise  Co.  v.  Superior  Court  of
Cal.,  Riverside  Cty.,  464  U. S.  501  (1984)  (Press-Enterprise
I).  This  requirement,  too,  is  binding  on  the  States.  Ibid.
The case now before the Court is brought under the Sixth
Amendment, for it is the accused who invoked his right to a
public  trial.  An  initial  question  is  whether  the  right  to  a
public  trial  in  criminal  cases  extends  to  the  jury  selection
phase  of  trial,  and  in  particular  the  voir  dire  of  prospective
jurors.  In the First Amendment context that question was
answered  in  Press-Enterprise  I.  Id.,  at  510.  The  Court
there  held  that  the  voir  dire  of  prospective  jurors  must  be
open  to  the  public  under  the  First  Amendment.  Later  in
the  same Term  as  Press-Enterprise I,  the Court  considered
a Sixth Amendment case concerning whether the public trial
right  extends  to  a  pretrial  hearing  on  a  motion  to  suppress
certain  evidence.  Waller  v.  Georgia,  467  U. S.  39  (1984).
The Waller Court relied heavily upon Press-Enterprise I in
ﬁnding that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial ex
tends beyond the actual proof at trial.  It ruled that the pre
trial suppression hearing must be open to the public because
“there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment
right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than
the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public.”
467 U. S., at 46.

While Press-Enterprise I was heavily relied upon in Wal
ler,  the  jury  selection  issue  in  the  former  case  was  re
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court decision. It discusses the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and its application to jury selection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

BARRETT, J., concurring

antidelegation interpretation wins even if the agency’s in-
terpretation is better.

While  one  could  walk  away  from  our  major  questions
cases with this impression, I do not read them this way.  No
doubt,  many  of  our  cases  express  an  expectation  of  “clear
congressional  authorization”  to  support  sweeping  agency
action.  See, e.g., West Virginia, 597 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 19); Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302,
324  (2014);  see  also  Alabama  Assn.  of  Realtors  v.  Depart-
ment of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021)
(per curiam) (slip op., at 6).  But none requires “an ‘unequiv-
ocal  declaration’ ”  from  Congress  authorizing  the  precise
agency action under review, as our clear-statement cases do
in their respective domains.  See Financial Oversight and
Management Bd. for P. R. v. Centro De Periodismo Investi-
gativo, Inc., 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (slip op., at 6).  And
none purports to depart from the best interpretation of the
text—the hallmark of a true clear-statement rule.

So  what  work  is  the  major  questions  doctrine  doing  in
these cases?  I will give you the long answer, but here is the
short  one:  The  doctrine  serves  as  an  interpretive  tool  re-
flecting “common sense as to the manner in which Congress
is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and
political magnitude to an administrative agency.”  FDA v.
Brown  &  Williamson  Tobacco  Corp.,  529  U. S.  120,  133
(2000).

II
The  major  questions  doctrine  situates  text  in  context,
which is how textualists, like all interpreters, approach the
task  at  hand.    C.  Nelson,  What  Is  Textualism?  91  Va.
L. Rev.  347,  348  (2005)  (“[N]o  ‘textualist’  favors  isolating
statutory  language  from  its  surrounding  context”);  Scalia
37 (“In textual interpretation, context is everything”).  After
all, the meaning of a word depends on the circumstances in
which it is used.  J. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Barrett. It delves into the interpretation of the "major questions doctrine" in legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

33

KAGAN, J., dissenting

Velázquez, Pope Innocent X,
c. 1650, oil on canvas

Francis Bacon, Study After
Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope
Innocent X, 1953, oil on canvas

To begin with, note the word “after” in Bacon’s title.  Copy-
ing is so deeply rooted in the visual arts that there is a nam-
ing convention for it, with “after” denoting that a painting
is some kind of “imitation of a known work.”  M. Clarke, The
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Art Terms 5 (2d ed. 2010).  Ba-
con  made  frequent  use  of  that  convention.    He  was  espe-
cially taken by Velázquez’s portrait of Innocent X, referring
to it in tens of paintings.  In the one shown above, Bacon
retained  the  subject,  scale,  and  composition  of  the  Veláz-
quez original.  Look at one, look at the other, and you know
Bacon  copied.  But  he  also  transformed.    He  invested  his
portrait  with  new  “expression,  meaning,  [and]  message,”
converting Velázquez’s study of magisterial power into one
of mortal dread.  Campbell, 510 U. S., at 579.

But the majority, from all it says, would find the change
immaterial.  Both  paintings,  after  all,  are  “portraits  of
[Pope  Innocent  X]  used  to  depict  [Pope  Innocent  X]”  for
hanging  in  some  interior  space,  ante,  at  12–13;  so  on  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion discussing the concept of copying and transformation in art, using the works of Velázquez and Bacon as examples. It contains analysis, legal citations, and descriptive language, all characteristic of the body of a legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

In such a case, however, the employer may avoid liability
by  showing  that  (1)  it  exercised  reasonable  care  to  pre-
vent  and  promptly  correct  harassing  behavior,  and  (2)
the complainant unreasonably failed to take advantage of
preventative or corrective measures made available to her.
Faragher, 524 U. S., at 807; Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 765.  The
employer bears the burden of establishing this affirmative
defense  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.  Faragher,
524 U. S., at 807; Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 765.

In  contrast,  if  the  harassing  employee  is  a  co-worker,  a
negligence standard applies.  To satisfy that standard, the
complainant must show that the employer knew or should
have  known  of  the  offensive  conduct  but  failed  to  take
appropriate corrective action.  See Faragher, 524 U. S., at
799;  Ellerth,  524  U. S.,  at  758–759.    See  also  29  CFR
§1604.11(d) (2012); EEOC Guidance 405:7652.

B
  The  distinction  Faragher  and  Ellerth  drew  between
supervisors and co-workers corresponds to the realities of
the  workplace.  Exposed  to  a  fellow  employee’s  harass-
ment, one can walk away or tell the offender to “buzz off.”
A  supervisor’s  slings  and  arrows,  however,  are  not  so
easily avoided.  An employee who confronts her harassing
supervisor risks, for example, receiving an undesirable or
unsafe  work  assignment  or  an  unwanted  transfer.  She
may be saddled with an excessive workload or with place-
ment  on  a  shift  spanning  hours  disruptive  of  her  family
life.    And  she  may  be  demoted  or  fired.  Facing  such
dangers,  she  may  be  reluctant  to  blow  the  whistle  on  her
superior,  whose  “power  and  authority  invests  his  or  her
harassing  conduct  with  a  particular  threatening  charac-
ter.”  Ellerth,  524  U. S.,  at  763.  See  also  Faragher,  524
U. S.,  at  803;  Brief  for  Respondent  23  (“The  potential
threat to one’s livelihood or working conditions will make
the  victim  think  twice  before  resisting  harassment  or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal standard for employer liability in cases of sexual harassment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

gency stay of the transfer and filed this lawsuit.  The Nav-
ajo  family  then  withdrew  from  consideration,  and  the
Brackeens finalized their adoption of A. L. M.

The Brackeens now seek to adopt A. L. M.’s biological sis-
ter, Y. R. J., again over the opposition of the Navajo Nation.
And while the Brackeens hope to foster and adopt other In-
dian children in the future, their fraught experience with
A. L. M.’s adoption makes them hesitant to do so.

2
Altagracia  Hernandez  chose  Nick  and  Heather  Libretti
as adoptive parents for her newborn daughter, Baby O.  The
Librettis  took  Baby  O.  home  from  the  hospital  when  she
was three days old, and Hernandez, who lived nearby, vis-
ited Baby O. frequently.  Baby O.’s biological father visited
only once but supported the adoption.

Hernandez is not an Indian.  But Baby O.’s biological fa-
ther  is  descended  from  members  of  the  Ysleta  del  Sur
Pueblo Tribe, and the Tribe enrolled Baby O. as a member.
As  a  result,  the  adoption  proceeding  was  governed  by
ICWA.  The Tribe exercised its right to intervene and ar-
gued,  over  Hernandez’s  objection,  that  Baby  O.  should  be
moved  from  the  Librettis’  home  in  Nevada  to  the  Tribe’s
reservation in El Paso, Texas.  It presented a number of po-
tential placements on the reservation for Baby O., and state
officials began to investigate them.  After Hernandez and
the Librettis joined this lawsuit, however, the Tribe with-
drew its challenge to the adoption, and the Librettis final-
ized their adoption of Baby O.  The Librettis stayed in the
litigation because they planned to foster and possibly adopt
Indian children in the future.

3
Jason and Danielle Clifford, who live in Minnesota, fos-
tered Child P., whose maternal grandmother belongs to the
White Earth Band of Ojibwe Tribe.  When Child P. entered
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It sets the stage for the cases being discussed and introduces the parties involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U88

[09-06-00 16:44:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

312

CARON v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

It ruled Massachusetts law did not forbid petitioner’s pos-
941 F.
session of ﬁrearms because he could possess riﬂes.
Supp. 238, 251–254 (Mass. 1996). Though Massachusetts
restricted petitioner’s right to carry a handgun, the Dis-
trict Court considered the restriction irrelevant because
his case involved riﬂes and shotguns. See ibid. The First
Circuit reversed, counting the convictions because peti-
tioner remained subject to signiﬁcant ﬁrearms restrictions.
We granted certiorari.

522 U. S. 1038 (1998).

II

A federal statute forbids possession of ﬁrearms by those
convicted of serious offenses. An abbreviated version of the
statute is as follows:

“It shall be unlawful for any person—
“(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year;
.

.
“to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce,
or possess in or affecting commerce, any ﬁrearm or am-
munition; or to receive any ﬁrearm or ammunition which
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.”

18 U. S. C. § 922(g).

.

.

.

Three-time violent felons who violate § 922(g) face
imprisonment.
enhanced sentences of at least 15 years’
“Violent felony” is deﬁned to include burglary
§ 924(e)(1).
and other crimes creating a serious risk of physical injury.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). This term includes petitioner’s previous
offenses discussed above.

Not all violent felony convictions, however, count for pur-
poses of § 922(g) or § 924(e). Until 1986, federal law alone
determined whether a state conviction counted, regard-
less of whether the State had expunged the conviction.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the text of a Supreme Court case. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a discussion of relevant statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

OHIO v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

effectiveness” in achieving “downwind ozone air quality im-
provements,” 87 Fed. Reg. 20055, EPA focused on what it
called the “ ‘knee in the curve,’ ” or the point at which more
expenditures  in  the  upwind  States  were  likely  to  produce
“very little” in the way of “additional emissions reductions
and air quality improvement” downwind, id., at 20095 (hy-
phenation omitted).  EPA used this point to select a “uni-
form level” of cost, and so a uniform package of emissions-
reduction tools, for upwind States to adopt.  Id., at 20076.
And EPA performed this analysis on two “parallel tracks”—
one for power plants, one for other industries.  Ibid.  Pursu-
ant  to  the  Clean  Air  Act,  §§7607(d)(1)(B),  (d)(3)–(6),  the
agency published its proposed FIP for notice and comment
in April 2022, 87 Fed. Reg. 20036.
  Immediately, commenters warned of a potential pitfall in
the  agency’s  approach.    EPA  had  determined  which
emissions-control measures were cost effective at address-
ing downwind ozone levels based on an assumption that the
FIP would apply to all covered States.  But what happens if
some or many of those States are not covered?  As the com-
menters portrayed the SIPs, this was not an entirely spec-
ulative  possibility.    Many  believed  EPA’s  disapprovals  of
the SIPs were legally flawed.  See, e.g., Comments of Mis-
souri Dept. of Natural Resources 3 (June 17, 2022) (refer-
encing “all the technical, legal, and procedural issues” with
the proposed SIP disapproval); see also, e.g., Comments of
Louisiana  Dept.  of  Environmental  Quality  1–3  (June  21,
2022);  Comments  of  Texas  Comm’n  on  Environmental
Quality 2–4 (June 21, 2022); EPA, Response to Public Com-
ments on Proposed Rule 9–11 (EPA–HQ–OAR–2021–0668).
They added that EPA’s FIP was “inextricably linked” to the
SIP disapprovals.  E.g., Comments of Missouri Dept. of Nat-
ural Resources, at 4.  Without a SIP disapproval or missing
SIP, after all, EPA could not include a State in its FIP.  See,
e.g., id., at 3; supra, at 3.
  Commenters added that failing to include a State could
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the EPA's approach to setting emissions standards. It provides context and details about the agency's reasoning and the concerns raised by commenters.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES v. PROMETHEUS

LABORATORIES, INC.
Opinion of the Court

2
Other cases offer further support for the view that simp
ly  appending  conventional  steps,  specified  at  a  high  level
of  generality,  to  laws  of  nature,  natural  phenomena,  and
abstract  ideas  cannot  make  those  laws,  phenomena,  and
ideas  patentable.  This  Court  has  previously  discussed  in
detail  an  English  case,  Neilson,  which  involved  a  patent
claim that posed a legal problem very similar to the prob
lem now before us.  The patent applicant there asserted a
claim

“for the improved application of air to produce heat in
fires, forges, and furnaces, where a blowing apparatus
[The  invention]  was  to  be  applied  as
is  required.
follows:  The  blast  or  current  of  air  produced  by  the
blowing  apparatus  was  to  be  passed  from  it  into
an air-vessel or receptacle made sufficiently strong to
endure  the  blast;  and  through  or  from  that  vessel  or
receptacle  by  means  of  a  tube,  pipe,  or  aperture  into
the fire, the receptacle be kept artificially heated to a
considerable temperature by heat externally applied.”
Morse, 15 How., at 114–115.

The English court  concluded that the claimed process did
more  than  simply  instruct  users  to  use  the  principle  that
hot  air  promotes  ignition  better  than  cold  air,  since  it
explained  how  the  principle  could  be  implemented  in  an
inventive way.  Baron Parke wrote (for the court):

“It  is  very  difficult  to  distinguish  [Neilson’s  claim]
from  the  specification  of  a  patent  for  a  principle,  and
this at first created in the minds of some of the court
much difficulty; but after full consideration, we think
that  the  plaintiff  does  not  merely  claim  a  principle,
but a machine embodying a principle, and a very val
uable one.  We think the case must be considered as if
the principle being well known, the plaintiff had first
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing a patent case. It includes legal citations, case summaries, and quotes from court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

joined by several others, described in painstaking detail the
ways in which, in his view, Martin had thwarted good-faith
attempts by cities across the West, from Phoenix to Sacra-
mento,  to  address  homelessness.  72  F. 4th,  at  934,  940–
943.

Grants Pass filed a petition for certiorari.  A large num-
ber of States, cities, and counties from across the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the country joined Grants Pass in urging the Court
to grant review to assess the Martin experiment.  See Part
I–B, supra.  We agreed to do so.  601 U. S. ___ (2024).3

——————

3 Supporters of Grants Pass’s petition for certiorari included:  The cities
of  Albuquerque,  Anchorage,  Chico,  Chino,  Colorado  Springs,  Fillmore,
Garden Grove, Glendora, Henderson, Honolulu, Huntington Beach, Las
Vegas,  Los  Angeles,  Milwaukee,  Murrieta,  Newport  Beach,  Orange,
Phoenix,  Placentia,  Portland,  Providence,  Redondo  Beach,  Roseville,
Saint  Paul,  San  Clemente,  San  Diego,  San  Francisco,  San  Juan  Ca-
pistrano,  Seattle,  Spokane,  Tacoma,  and  Westminster;  the  National
League  of  Cities,  representing  more  than  19,000  American  cities  and
towns; the League of California Cities, representing 477 California cities;
the League of Oregon Cities, representing Oregon’s 241 cities; the Asso-
ciation of Idaho Cities, representing Idaho’s 199 cities; the League of Ar-
izona Cities and Towns, representing all 91 incorporated Arizona munic-
ipalities; the North Dakota League of Cities, comprising 355 cities; the
Counties of Honolulu, San Bernardino, San Francisco, and Orange; the
National  Association  of  Counties,  which  represents  the  Nation’s  3,069
counties; the California State Association of Counties, representing Cal-
ifornia’s 58 counties; the Special Districts Association of Oregon, repre-
senting all of Oregon’s special districts; the Washington State Associa-
tion  of  Municipal  Attorneys,  a  nonprofit  corporation  comprising
attorneys representing Washington’s 281 cities and towns; the Interna-
tional  Municipal  Lawyers  Association,  the  largest  association  of  attor-
neys  representing  municipalities,  counties,  and  special  districts  across
the country; the District Attorneys of Sacramento and San Diego Coun-
ties,  the  California  State  Sheriffs’  Association,  the  California  Police
Chiefs Association, and the Washington State Association of Sheriffs and
Police  Chiefs;  California  Governor  Gavin  Newsom  and  San  Francisco
Mayor London Breed; and a group of 20 States:  Alabama, Alaska, Ar-
kansas,  Florida,  Idaho,  Indiana,  Kansas,  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  Mis-
souri,  Montana,  Nebraska,  North  Dakota,  Oklahoma,  South  Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the background of a case and the Court's decision to hear it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
6

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

GORSUCH, J., concurring

liberty would not be difficult and rare, but easy and profuse.
See The Federalist No. 47, at 303 (J. Madison); id., No. 62,
at 378 (J. Madison).  Stability would be lost, with vast num-
bers of laws changing with every new presidential admin-
istration.  Rather than embody a wide social consensus and
input from minority voices, laws would more often bear the
support only of the party currently in power.  Powerful spe-
cial interests, which are sometimes “uniquely” able to influ-
ence the agendas of administrative agencies, would flourish
while others would be left to ever-shifting winds.  T. Merrill,
Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 1039, 1043 (1997).  Finally, little would remain to
stop agencies from moving into areas where state authority
has  traditionally  predominated.  See,  e.g.,  Solid  Waste
Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers,
531 U. S. 159, 173–174 (2001) (SWANC).  That would be a
particularly ironic outcome, given that so many States have
robust  nondelegation  doctrines  designed  to  ensure  demo-
cratic  accountability  in  their  state  lawmaking  processes.
See R. May, The Nondelegation Doctrine is Alive and Well
in the States, The Reg. Rev. (Oct. 15, 2020).

B
Much as constitutional rules about retroactive legislation
and  sovereign  immunity  have  their  corollary  clear-state-
ment rules, Article I’s Vesting Clause has its own:  the ma-
jor  questions  doctrine.  See  Gundy,  588  U. S.,  at  ___–___
(GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 20–21).  Some version
of this clear-statement rule can be traced to at least 1897,
when this Court confronted a case involving the Interstate
Commerce  Commission,  the  federal  government’s  “first
modern  regulatory  agency.”    S.  Dudley,  Milestones  in  the
Evolution of the Administrative State 3 (Nov. 2020).  The
ICC argued that Congress had endowed it with the power
to set carriage prices for railroads.  See ICC v. Cincinnati,
N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 499 (1897).  The Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of West Virginia v. EPA. It delves into the concept of nondelegation and its implications for administrative agencies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

THOMAS, J., dissenting

To  nonetheless  find  plan-of-the-Convention  waiver,  as
Torres proposes and the Court accepts, is to hold that a con-
gressional power to pre-empt state law alone demonstrates
a State’s surrender of sovereign immunity.  That line of rea-
soning,  apart  from  being  foreclosed  by  Seminole  Tribe,
proves too much.  The upshot is that the States would have
consented in the plan of the Convention to surrender their
immunity against the exercise of any Article I power.  Be-
cause such a result is a dramatic departure from our prece-
dents, and the power granted to Congress under the Army
and  Navy  Clauses  does  not  displace  state  regulation  any
more  readily  or  completely  than  other  Article  I  powers,
these arguments from constitutional text provide no sound
basis for authorizing private actions against nonconsenting
States.

B

Constitutional  history  and  practice  do  Torres  and  the
Court no better.  To begin, we must view the historical evi-
dence in light of the “presumption that no anomalous and
unheard-of proceedings or suits were intended to be raised
up  by  the  Constitution.”  Hans,  134  U. S.,  at  18;  see  also
Alden, 527 U. S., at 727.  Applying that presumption, the
Court in the past has “attribute[d] great significance” to the
absence of analogous suits “at the time of the founding or
for many years thereafter.”  Federal Maritime Comm’n, 535
U. S., at 755.6  Moreover, the presumption is arguably at its

——————

6 It is true that the Court in PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594
U. S.  ___  (2021),  found  plan-of-the-Convention  waiver  even  in  “the  ab-
sence of a perfect historical analogue” to private condemnation suits by
federal  delegatees  against  States.  Id.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  19).  But
PennEast excused this absence of historically analogous actions because
it refused to “divorce the eminent domain power from the power to bring
condemnation actions,” given that “the eminent domain power is inextri-
cably intertwined with the ability to condemn,” and “the federal eminent
domain power was a means that was ‘known and appropriate’ at the time
of the founding.”  Id., at ___–___, ___ (slip op., at 16–17, 19).  Thus, the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of constitutional provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Opinion of the Court

of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996); Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary  Ed.  Expense  Bd.  v.  College  Savings  Bank,  527
U. S. 627 (1999).  Two Terms ago, we even described Katz’s
analysis as “good for one clause only,” suggesting we would
not find further waivers under Article I.  Allen v. Cooper,
589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 9) (hyphens omitted).
  Last Term, in PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594
U. S. ___, we considered whether Congress could, pursuant
to its eminent domain power, authorize private parties to
sue  States  to  enforce  federally  approved  condemnations
necessary to build interstate pipelines.  We held that “when
the States entered the federal system, they renounced their
right  to  the  ‘highest  dominion  in  the[ir]  lands,’ ”  meaning
they  agreed  their  “eminent  domain  power  would  yield  to
that of the Federal Government.”  Id., at ___–___ (slip op.,
at 15–16) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R.
Co.,  135  U. S.  641,  656  (1890)).    Congress  could  therefore
authorize private actions against States.

PennEast  defined  the  test  for  structural  waiver  as
whether  the  federal  power  at  issue  is  “complete  in  itself,
and the States consented to the exercise of that power—in
its entirety—in the plan of the Convention.”  594 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 22) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).  Where that is so, the States implicitly agreed that
their sovereignty “would yield to that of the Federal Gov-
ernment ‘so far as is necessary to the enjoyment of the pow-
ers conferred upon it by the Constitution.’ ”  Id., at ___ (slip
op., at 16) (quoting Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 372
(1876)).  By committing not to “thwart” or frustrate federal
policy, the States accepted upon ratification that their “con-
sent,” including to suit, could “never be a condition prece-
dent  to”  Congress’  chosen  exercise  of  its  authority.    594
U. S.,  at  ___,  ___  (slip  op.,  at  8,  10)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).  The States simply “have no immunity left
to waive or abrogate.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 22).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the concept of structural waiver in the context of federal power over states. It cites previous cases and analyzes legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

25

Opinion of the Court

when “courts of law supplied a cause of action and an ade-
quate remedy to the litigant”).

Atlas Roofing concluded that Congress could assign the
OSH  Act  adjudications  to  an  agency  because  the  claims
were “unknown to the common law.”  430 U. S., at 461.  The
case  therefore  does  not  control  here,  where  the  statutory
claim is “ ‘in the nature of ’ ” a common law suit.  Id., at 453
(quoting Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S., at 48).  As we have
explained,  Jarkesy  and  Patriot28  were  prosecuted  for
“fraudulent conduct,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a, and the per-
tinent statutory provisions derive from, and are interpreted
in light of, their common law counterparts, see 15 U. S. C.
§§77q(a)(2),  78j(b),  80b–6(4);  17  CFR  §§240.10b–5(b),
275.206(4)–8(a)(1); Basic Inc., 485 U. S., at 253 (opinion of
White, J.).

The  reasoning  of  Atlas  Roofing  cannot  support  any
broader  rule.   The  dissent  chants  “Atlas  Roofing”  like  a
mantra,  but  no  matter  how  many  times  it  repeats  those
words, it cannot give Atlas Roofing substance that it lacks.4

——————

4 Reading the dissent, one might also think that Atlas Roofing is among
this Court’s most celebrated cases.  As the concurrence shows, Atlas Roof-
ing represents a departure from our legal traditions.  See post, at 12–20
(opinion of GORSUCH, J.).

This view is also reflected in the scholarship.  Commentators writing
comprehensively  on  Article  III  and  agency  adjudication  have  often
simply ignored the case.  See, e.g., R. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Ad-
ministrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915 (1988) (no
citation to Atlas Roofing); J. Harrison, Public Rights, Private Privileges,
and Article III, 54 Ga. L. Rev. 143 (2019) (same); W. Baude, Adjudication
Outside Article III, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1511 (2020) (same).

Others  who  have  considered  it  have  offered  nothing  but  a  variety  of
criticisms.    See,  e.g.,  R.  Kirst,  Administrative  Penalties  and  the  Civil
Jury: The Supreme Court’s Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U.
Pa.  L.  Rev.  1281,  1294  (1978)  (through  its  “careless  use  of  precedent,”
Atlas Roofing did “not recognize or [mis]understood” “careful distinctions
developed  by  . . .  earlier  judges”);  G. Young,  Federal  Courts  &  Federal
Rights,  45  Brooklyn  L.  Rev.  1145,  1153  (1979)  (“The  Atlas  Court  . . .
failed to offer an adequate justification for its interpretation of the sev-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the case of *Atlas Roofing* and its relevance to the current case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

585

Opinion of the Court

§ 951(10). The agency expressly takes diversity into ac-
count, giving special consideration to “projects and produc-
tions . . . that reach, or reﬂect the culture of, a minority,
inner city, rural, or tribal community,” § 954(c)(4), as well
as projects that generally emphasize “cultural diversity,”
§ 954(c)(1). Respondents do not contend that the criteria in
§ 954(d)(1) are impermissibly applied when they may be justi-
ﬁed, as the statute contemplates, with respect to a project’s
intended audience.

We recognize, of course, that reference to these permissi-
ble applications would not alone be sufﬁcient to sustain the
statute against respondents’ First Amendment challenge.
But neither are we persuaded that, in other applications, the
language of § 954(d)(1) itself will give rise to the suppression
of protected expression. Any content-based considerations
that may be taken into account in the grant-making process
are a consequence of the nature of arts funding. The NEA
has limited resources, and it must deny the majority of the
grant applications that it receives, including many that pro-
pose “artistically excellent” projects. The agency may de-
cide to fund particular projects for a wide variety of reasons,
“such as the technical proﬁciency of the artist, the creativity
of the work, the anticipated public interest in or appreciation
of the work, the work’s contemporary relevance, its educa-
tional value, its suitability for or appeal to special audiences
(such as children or the disabled), its service to a rural or
isolated community, or even simply that the work could in-
crease public knowledge of an art form.” Brief for Petition-
ers 32. As the dissent below noted, it would be “impossible
to have a highly selective grant program without denying
money to a large amount of constitutionally protected ex-
pression.”
100 F. 3d, at 685 (opinion of Kleinfeld, J.). The
“very assumption” of the NEA is that grants will be awarded
according to the “artistic worth of competing applicants,”
and absolute neutrality is simply “inconceivable.” Advo-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 569 (1998).  It discusses the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and its grant-making process, focusing on whether the NEA's consideration of "cultural diversity" in its funding decisions violates the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TERRY v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

a  sentence  reduction  only  if  the  offender  previously  received  “a  sen-
tence for a covered offense.”  §404(b), 132 Stat. 5222.  The Act defines
“ ‘covered  offense’ ”  as  “a  violation  of  a  Federal  criminal  statute,  the
statutory penalties for which were modified by” certain provisions in
the Fair Sentencing Act.  §404(a), ibid.  The Fair Sentencing Act mod-
ified  the  statutory  penalties  for  offenses  that  triggered  mandatory
minimum penalties because a person charged with the same conduct
today  no  longer  would  face  the  same  statutory  penalties  that  they
would  have  faced  before  2010.    For  example,  a  person  charged  with
knowing or intentional possession with intent to distribute at least 50
grams of crack was subject to a 10-year mandatory minimum before
2010.  Now, he would be subject only to a 5-year mandatory minimum.
But the Fair Sentencing Act did not modify the statutory penalties for
petitioner’s  offense.  Before  2010,  a  person  charged  with  petitioner’s
offense—knowing  or  intentional  possession  with  intent  to  distribute
an unspecified amount of a schedule I or II drug—was subject to stat-
utory penalties of imprisonment of 0-to-20 years and up to a $1 million
fine, or both, and a period of supervised release.  After 2010, a person
charged with this conduct is subject to the exact same statutory pen-
alties.  Petitioner thus is not eligible for a sentence reduction.  Pp. 5–
8.

828 Fed. Appx. 563, affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  BREYER,  ALITO,  KAGAN,  GORSUCH,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,
joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, providing a summary of the case and its legal reasoning.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>