<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

Opinion of the Court

gratuities.  That argument is misconceived.

In  isolation,  the  word  “rewarded”  could  be  part  of  a
gratuities statute or a bribery statute—either (i) a reward
given after the act with no agreement beforehand (gratuity)
or  (ii)  a  reward  given  after  the  act  pursuant  to  an
agreement  beforehand  (bribe).  But  as  noted  above,  the
word “corruptly” in the text of §666 helps resolve the issue
here.  The bribery statute for federal officials, §201(b), uses
the term “corruptly.”  But the gratuities statute for federal
officials, §201(c), does not.  The term “corruptly” therefore
signals  that  §666  is  a  bribery  statute.    And  statutory
history,  statutory  structure,  statutory  punishments,
federalism,  and  fair  notice  strongly  reinforce  that  textual
signal and together establish that §666 is a bribery statute.
Contrary to the premise of the Government’s argument,
moreover,  bribery  statutes  sometimes  use  the  term
“reward.”  See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §600; 33 U. S. C. §447.  The
term “rewarded” closes off certain defenses that otherwise
might be raised in bribery cases.  Consider a bribe where
the  agreement  was  made  before  the  act  but  the  payment
was  made  after  the  act.  An  official  might  try  to  defend
against the bribery charge by saying that the payment was
received only after the official act and therefore could not
have  “influenced”  the  act.
  By  including  the  term
“rewarded,”  Congress  made  clear  that  the  timing  of  the
agreement is the key, not the timing of the payment, and
thereby precluded such a potential defense.
  And think about the official who took a bribe before the
official  act  but  asserts  as  a  defense  that  he  would  have
taken  the  same  act  anyway  and  therefore  was  not
“influenced”  by  the  payment.  To  shut  the  door  on  that
potential  defense  to  a  §666  bribery  charge,  Congress
sensibly added the term “rewarded.”

So  even  if  “influenced”  alone  might  have  covered  the
waterfront of bribes, adding “rewarded” made good sense to
avoid  potential  ambiguities,  gaps,  or  loopholes.  Congress
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

477

Breyer, J., dissenting

ﬁrst time that Congress has delegated to the President or to
others this kind of power—a contingent power to deny effect
to certain statutory language. See, e. g., Pub. L. 95–384,
§ 13(a), 92 Stat. 737 (“Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961 shall be of no further force and effect upon
the President’s determination and certiﬁcation to the Con-
gress that the resumption of full military cooperation with
Turkey is in the national
interest of the United States
and [other criteria]”) (emphasis added); 28 U. S. C. § 2072
(Supreme Court is authorized to promulgate rules of prac-
tice and procedure in federal courts, and “[a]ll
laws in
conﬂict with such rules shall be of no further force and
effect”) (emphasis added); 41 U. S. C. § 405b (subsection (a)
requires the Ofﬁce of Federal Procurement Policy to issue
“[g]overnment-wide regulations” setting forth a variety of
conﬂict of interest standards, but subsection (e) says that “if
the President determine[s]” that the regulations “would have
a signiﬁcantly adverse effect on the accomplishment of the
mission” of Government agencies, “the requirement [to pro-
mulgate] the regulations . . . shall be null and void”) (empha-
sis added); Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, § 252(a)(4), 99 Stat.
1074 (authorizing the President to issue a “ﬁnal order” that
has the effect of “permanently cancell[ing]” sequestered
amounts in spending statutes in order to achieve budget
compliance) (emphasis added); Pub. L. 104–208, 110 Stat.
3009-695 (“Public Law 89–732 [dealing with immigration
from Cuba] is repealed . . . upon a determination by the Pres-
ident . . . that a democratically elected government in Cuba
is in power”) (emphasis added); Pub. L. 99–498, § 701, 100
Stat. 1532 (amending § 758 of the Higher Education Act of
1965) (Secretary of Education “may” sell common stock in an
educational loan corporation; if the Secretary decides to sell
stock, and “if the Student Loan Marketing Association ac-
quires from the Secretary” over 50 percent of the voting
stock, “section 754 [governing composition of the Board of
Directors] shall be of no further force or effect”) (emphasis
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis, all characteristic of the body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

state  tort  liability.  In  §22(b)(2),  Congress  created  a  pre-
sumption  that,  for  purposes  of  §22(b)(1),  “a  vaccine  shall
be  presumed  to  be  accompanied  by  proper  directions  and
warnings  if  the  vaccine  manufacturer  shows  that  it  com-
plied  in  all  material  respects  with”  federal  labeling  re-
quirements.    42  U. S. C.  §300aa–22(b)(2).    Similarly,  in
§23(d)(2),  Congress  created  an  exemption  from  punitive
damages “[i]f . . . the manufacturer shows that it complied,
in  all  material  respects,”  with  applicable  federal  laws,
unless  it  engages  in  “fraud,”  “intentional  and  wrongful
withholding  of  information”  from  federal  regulators,  or
“other  criminal  or  illegal  activity.”    §300aa–23(d)(2).  It
would  be  highly  anomalous  for  Congress  to  use  a  condi-
tional  “if ”  clause  in  §§22(b)(2)  and  23(d)(2)  to  require  a
specific  inquiry  in  each  case  while  using  the  same  condi-
tional  “if ”  clause  in  §22(b)(1)  to  denote  a  categorical  ex-
emption  from  liability.  Cf.  Erlenbaugh  v.  United  States,
409  U. S.  239,  243  (1972)  (“[A]  legislative  body  generally
uses  a  particular  word  with  a  consistent  meaning  in  a
given context”).

Indeed,  when  Congress  intends  to  pre-empt  design
defect  claims  categorically,  it  does  so  using  categorical
(e.g.,  “all”)  and/or  declarative  language  (e.g.,  “shall”),
rather  than  a  conditional  term  (“if ”).    For  example,  in
a  related  context,  Congress  has  authorized  the  Secretary
of  Health  and  Human  Services  to  designate  a  vaccine
designed to prevent a pandemic or epidemic as a “covered
countermeasure.”
(i)(1),
(i)(7)(A)(i).  With  respect  to  such  “covered  countermea-
sure[s],”  Congress  provided  that  subject  to  certain  excep-
tions,  “a  covered  person  shall  be  immune  from  suit  and
liability  under  Federal  and  State  law  with  respect  to  all
claims  for  loss  caused  by,  arising  out  of,  relating  to,  or
resulting  from  the  administration  to  or  the  use  by  an
individual  of  a  covered  countermeasure,”  §247d–6d(a)(1)
(emphasis added), including specifically claims relating to

42  U. S. C.  §§247d–6d(b),
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal arguments related to vaccine liability and preemption.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

OHIO v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

Here, the federal government announced its intention to re-
ject over 20 States’ plans for controlling ozone pollution.  In
their place, the government sought to impose a single, uni-
form  federal  plan.    This  litigation    concerns  whether,  in
adopting that plan, the federal government complied with
the terms of the Act.

I
A
  “The  Clean  Air  Act  regulates  air  quality  through  a
federal-state collaboration.”  EME Homer City Generation,
L.P. v. EPA, 795 F. 3d 118, 124 (CADC 2015).  Periodically,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets standards
for common air pollutants, as necessary to “protect the pub-
lic  health.”    §§7409(a)(1),  (b)(1).    Once  EPA  sets  a  new
standard, the clock starts ticking:  States have three years
to  design  and  submit  a  plan—called  a  State  Implementa-
tion  Plan,  or  SIP—providing  for  the  “implementation,
maintenance, and enforcement” of that standard in their ju-
risdictions.  §7410(a)(1); see EPA v. EME Homer City Gen-
eration,  L.  P.,  572  U. S.  489,  498  (2014).    Under  the  Act,
States  decide  how  to  measure  ambient  air  quality.
§7410(a)(2)(B).  States pick “emission limitations and other
control measures.”  §7410(a)(2)(A).  And States provide for
prescribed  measures.
their
the
§7410(a)(2)(C).
  At  the  same  time,  States  must  design  these  plans  with
their  neighbors  in  mind.    Because  air  currents  can  carry
pollution across state borders, emissions in upwind States
sometimes affect air quality in downwind States.  See EME
Homer, 572 U. S., at 496.  To address that externality prob-
lem, under the Act’s “Good Neighbor Provision,” state plans
must prohibit emissions “in amounts which will . . . contrib-
ute  significantly  to  nonattainment  in,  or  interfere  with
maintenance by, any other State” of the relevant air-quality
standard.  §7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).

enforcement

of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the "Opinion of the Court" in a case titled "OHIO v. EPA". It sets the context for the case and explains the relevant legal framework.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES ET AL. v.
BETHUNE-HILL ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

No. 18–281.  Argued March 18, 2019—Decided June 17, 2019

After  the  2010  census,  Virginia  redrew  legislative  districts  for  the
State’s Senate and House of Delegates.  Voters in 12 impacted House
districts sued two state agencies and four election officials (collective-
ly,  State  Defendants),  charging  that  the  redrawn  districts  were  ra-
cially  gerrymandered  in  violation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s
Equal  Protection  Clause.    The  House  of  Delegates  and  its  Speaker
(collectively,  the  House)  intervened  as  defendants,  participating  in
the bench trial, on appeal to this Court, and at a second bench trial,
where a three-judge District Court held that 11 of the districts were
unconstitutionally  drawn,  enjoined  Virginia  from  conducting  elec-
tions  for  those  districts  before  adoption  of a  new  plan, and  gave  the
General Assembly several months to adopt that plan.  Virginia’s At-
torney General announced that the State would not pursue an appeal
to this Court.  The House, however, did file an appeal.

Held: The  House  lacks  standing,  either  to  represent  the  State’s  inter-

ests or in its own right.  Pp. 3–12.

(a) To cross the standing threshold, a litigant must show (1) a con-
crete and particularized injury, that (2) is fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable deci-
sion.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 704.  Standing must be
met  at  every  stage of  the litigation, including  on  appeal.    Arizonans
for  Official  English  v.  Arizona,  520  U. S.  43,  64.    And  as  a  jurisdic-
tional  requirement,  standing  cannot  be  waived  or  forfeited.    To  ap-
peal a decision that the primary party does not challenge, an interve-
nor  must
  Wittman  v.
Personhuballah, 578 U. S. ___, ___.  Pp. 3–4.

independently  demonstrate  standing.

(b) The  House  lacks  standing  to  represent  the  State’s  interests.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the core content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 742 (1998)

747

Opinion of the Court

seq., an employee who refuses the unwelcome and threaten-
ing sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse,
tangible job consequences, can recover against the employer
without showing the employer is negligent or otherwise at
fault for the supervisor’s actions.

I

Summary judgment was granted for the employer, so we
must take the facts alleged by the employee to be true.
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962) (per
curiam). The employer is Burlington Industries, the peti-
tioner. The employee is Kimberly Ellerth, the respondent.
From March 1993 until May 1994, Ellerth worked as a sales-
person in one of Burlington’s divisions in Chicago, Illinois.
During her employment, she alleges, she was subjected
to constant sexual harassment by her supervisor, one Ted
Slowik.

In the hierarchy of Burlington’s management structure,
Slowik was a midlevel manager. Burlington has eight divi-
sions, employing more than 22,000 people in some 50 plants
around the United States. Slowik was a vice president in
one of ﬁve business units within one of the divisions. He
had authority to make hiring and promotion decisions
subject to the approval of his supervisor, who signed the pa-
perwork. See 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1119, n. 14 (ND Ill. 1996).
According to Slowik’s supervisor, his position was “not
considered an upper-level management position,” and he was
“not amongst the decision-making or policy-making hierar-
chy.”
Ibid. Slowik was not Ellerth’s immediate supervi-
sor. Ellerth worked in a two-person ofﬁce in Chicago, and
she answered to her ofﬁce colleague, who in turn answered
to Slowik in New York.

Against a background of repeated boorish and offensive
remarks and gestures which Slowik allegedly made, Ellerth
places particular emphasis on three alleged incidents where
Slowik’s comments could be construed as threats to deny her
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" section. It sets the stage for the case by outlining the legal issue and summarizing the facts alleged by the employee.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

7

Opinion of the Court

But isolation is necessary to conduct genetic testing, and
Myriad was not the only entity to offer BRCA testing after
it discovered the genes.  The University of Pennsylvania’s
Genetic Diagnostic Laboratory (GDL) and others provided
genetic  testing  services  to  women.    Petitioner  Dr.  Harry
Ostrer,  then  a  researcher  at  New  York  University  School
of  Medicine,  routinely  sent  his  patients’  DNA  samples  to
GDL  for  testing.    After  learning  of  GDL’s  testing  and
Ostrer’s  activities,  Myriad  sent  letters  to  them  asserting
that  the  genetic  testing  infringed  Myriad’s  patents.    App.
94–95  (Ostrer  letter).  In  response,  GDL  agreed  to  stop
testing and informed Ostrer that it would no longer accept
patient  samples.  Myriad  also  filed  patent  infringement
suits against other entities that performed BRCA testing,
resulting in settlements in which the defendants agreed to
cease all allegedly infringing activity.  689 F. 3d, at 1315.
Myriad,  thus,  solidified  its  position  as  the  only  entity
providing BRCA testing.

Some  years  later,  petitioner  Ostrer,  along  with  medical
patients,  advocacy  groups,  and  other  doctors,  filed  this
lawsuit  seeking  a  declaration  that  Myriad’s  patents  are
invalid  under  35  U. S. C.  §101.    702  F. Supp.  2d,  at  186.
Citing this Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genen-
tech,  Inc.,  549  U. S.  118  (2007),  the  District  Court  denied
Myriad’s  motion  to  dismiss  for  lack  of  standing.    Associa-
tion  for  Molecular  Pathology  v.  United  States  Patent  and
Trademark  Office,  669  F. Supp.  2d  365,  385–392  (SDNY
2009).  The  District  Court  then  granted  summary  judg-
ment  to  petitioners  on  the  composition  claims  at  issue  in
this  case  based  on  its  conclusion  that  Myriad’s  claims,
including  claims  related  to  cDNA,  were  invalid  because
they covered products of nature.  702 F. Supp. 2d, at 220–
237.  The Federal Circuit reversed, Association for Molecu-
lar  Pathology  v.  United  States  Patent  and  Trademark
Office,  653  F. 3d  1329  (2011),  and  this  Court  granted
the  petition  for  certiorari,  vacated  the  judgment,  and  re-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.* It provides context about the case, including Myriad's actions to monopolize BRCA testing and the subsequent lawsuit challenging the validity of their patents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. HIGGS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

of Justice’s (DOJ) announcement of a new execution proto-
col (the 2019 Protocol).  Whereas the previous protocol pre-
scribed a three-drug cocktail for use in executions, the 2019
Protocol calls for a single drug: pentobarbital.  Difficulty in
obtaining  the  required  drugs  had  contributed  to  the  Gov-
ernment’s nearly two-decade hiatus in carrying out execu-
tions.  The  Government  surely  knew  the  2019  Protocol
would face further litigation.

Against this backdrop of deep legal uncertainty, the DOJ
did not tread carefully.  Simultaneous with the announce-
ment  of  the  2019  Protocol,  it  scheduled  five  executions;
eight would follow in the months to come.  This rapid pace
required those facing execution to fast-track challenges to
their sentences.  Rather than permit an orderly resolution
of these suits, the Government consistently refused to post-
pone executions and sought emergency relief to proceed be-
fore  courts  had  meaningful  opportunities  to  determine  if
the executions were legal.

Throughout this expedited spree of executions, this Court
has consistently rejected inmates’ credible claims for relief.
The Court has even intervened to lift stays of execution that
lower courts put in place, thereby ensuring those prisoners’
challenges  would  never  receive  a  meaningful  airing.  The
Court  made  these  weighty  decisions  in  response  to  emer-
gency applications, with little opportunity for proper brief-
ing and consideration, often in just a few short days or even
hours.  Very few of these decisions offered any public expla-
nation for their rationale.

This is not justice.  After waiting almost two decades to
resume  federal  executions,  the  Government  should  have
proceeded with some measure of restraint to ensure it did
so lawfully.  When it did not, this Court should have.  It has
not.  Because the Court continues this pattern today, I dis-
sent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal record and provide valuable context for understanding legal decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

407

Opinion of the Court

Justice Stevens would instead construe § 2254(d)(1)’s
“contrary to” clause to encompass such a routine state-court
decision. That construction, however, saps the “unreason-
able application” clause of any meaning.
If a federal habeas
court can, under the “contrary to” clause, issue the writ
whenever it concludes that the state court’s application of
clearly established federal law was incorrect, the “unreason-
able application” clause becomes a nullity. We must, how-
ever, if possible, give meaning to every clause of the statute.
Justice Stevens not only makes no attempt to do so, but
also construes the “contrary to” clause in a manner that en-
sures that the “unreasonable application” clause will have no
independent meaning. See ante, at 385–386, 388–390. We
reject that expansive interpretation of the statute. Read-
ing § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause to permit a federal
court to grant relief in cases where a state court’s error is
limited to the manner in which it applies Supreme Court
precedent is suspect given the logical and natural ﬁt of the
neighboring “unreasonable application” clause to such cases.
The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the “unreasonable
application” clause of § 2254(d)(1) is generally correct. That
court held in Green that a state-court decision can involve an
“unreasonable application” of this Court’s clearly established
precedent in two ways. First, a state-court decision in-
volves an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent
if the state court identiﬁes the correct governing legal rule
from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the
facts of the particular state prisoner’s case. Second, a
state-court decision also involves an unreasonable applica-
tion of this Court’s precedent if the state court either unrea-
sonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a
new context where it should not apply or unreasonably re-
fuses to extend that principle to a new context where it
should apply. See 143 F. 3d, at 869–870.

A state-court decision that correctly identiﬁes the govern-
ing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 362 (2000). It discusses the interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) of the U.S. Code, which pertains to federal habeas corpus review of state court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MOYLE v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

B
For those who find it appropriate to look beyond the stat-
utory text, the context in which EMTALA was enacted re-
inforces  what  the  text  makes  clear.    Congress  designed
EMTALA to solve a particular problem—preventing private
hospitals from turning away patients who are unable to pay
for  medical  care.  H. R.  Rep.  No.  99–241(I),  pt.  1,  p.  27
(1985); K. Treiger, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpen-
ing  the  COBRA’s  Fangs,  61  N. Y.  U.  L.  Rev.  1186,  1188
(1986).  And none of many briefs submitted in this suit has
found  any  suggestion  in  the  proceedings  leading  up  to
EMTALA’s passage that the Act might also use the carrot
of federal funds to entice hospitals to perform abortions.  To
the  contrary,  EMTALA  garnered  broad  support  in  both
Houses of Congress, including the support of Members such
as Representative Henry Hyde who adamantly opposed the
use of federal funds to abet abortion.11

It is also telling that the Congress that initially enacted
EMTALA in 1986 and the one that amended it in 1989 also
passed appropriations riders under what is now known as
the Hyde Amendment (named after Representative Hyde)
to prevent federal funds from facilitating abortions, except
in limited circumstances.  See Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S.
297, 302 (1980).  Between 1981 and 1993—the very period
when  EMTALA  was  enacted  and  amended—the  Hyde
Amendment  contained  only  one  exception:  for  abortions
necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.  Congres-
sional  Research  Service,  E.  Liu  &  W.  Shen,  The  Hyde
Amendment: An Overview 1 (2022); see §204, 99 Stat. 1119
(1986 Hyde Amendment).  The Hyde Amendment thus pro-
hibited  federal  funds  from  paying  for  the  health-related

——————

11 See House Vote #499 in 1986 (99th Cong.), GovTrack.US (Mar. 20,
1986),  https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/99-1986/h499;  Senate
Vote  #379  in  1985  (99th  Cong.),  GovTrack.US  (Dec.  19,  1985),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/99-1985/s379.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Moyle v. United States. It delves into the legislative history and intent behind the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

5

Opinion of the Court

II
  Ratified  in  1791,  the  First  Amendment  provides  in
relevant part that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridg-
ing  the  freedom  of  speech.”    Ratified  in  1868,  the  Four-
teenth  Amendment  makes  the  First  Amendment’s  Free
Speech  Clause  applicable  against  the  States:  “No  State
shall  make  or  enforce  any  law  which  shall  abridge  the
privileges  or  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States;
nor  shall  any  State  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or
property,  without  due  process  of  law  . . . .”    §1.    The  text
and  original  meaning  of  those  Amendments,  as  well  as
this  Court’s  longstanding  precedents,  establish  that  the
Free  Speech  Clause  prohibits  only  governmental  abridg-
ment of speech.  The Free Speech Clause does not prohibit
private  abridgment  of  speech.    See,  e.g.,  Denver  Area  Ed.
Telecommunications  Consortium,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  518  U. S.
727,  737  (1996)  (plurality  opinion);  Hurley  v.  Irish-
American  Gay,  Lesbian  and  Bisexual  Group  of  Boston,
Inc.,  515  U. S.  557,  566  (1995);  Hudgens  v.  NLRB,  424
U. S.  507,  513  (1976);  cf.  Miami Herald  Publishing  Co.  v.
Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 256 (1974).
  In  accord  with  the  text  and  structure  of  the  Constitu-
tion,  this  Court’s  state-action  doctrine  distinguishes  the
government  from  individuals  and  private  entities.    See
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Assn.,  531  U. S.  288,  295–296  (2001).    By  enforcing  that
constitutional  boundary  between  the  governmental  and
the  private,  the  state-action  doctrine  protects  a  robust
sphere of individual liberty.
  Here,  the  producers  claim  that  MNN,  a  private  entity,
restricted  their  access  to  MNN’s  public  access  channels
because of the content of the producers’ film.  The produc-
ers  have  advanced  a  First  Amendment  claim  against
MNN.  The threshold problem with that First Amendment
claim is a fundamental one: MNN is a private entity.
  Relying  on  this  Court’s  state-action  precedents,  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites relevant amendments and precedents, indicating it's part of the core legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

11

Opinion of the Court

the  pre-empted  field  as  defined  by  our  precedents.    See
Panhandle Eastern, supra, at 516–518; Interstate Natural
Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U. S. 682, 689–693 (1947).

Those precedents emphasize the importance of consider
ing the target at which the state law aims in determining
whether that law is pre-empted.  For example, in Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm’n of Kan., 372
U. S.  84  (1963),  the  Court  said  that  it  had  “consistently
recognized”  that  the  “significant  distinction”  for  purposes
of pre-emption in the natural-gas context is the distinction
between “measures aimed directly at interstate purchasers
and wholesales for resale, and those aimed at” subjects left
to  the  States  to  regulate.    Id.,  at  94  (emphasis  added).
And, in Northwest Central, the Court found that the Natu
ral Gas Act did not pre-empt a state regulation concerning
the  timing  of  gas  production  from  a  gas  field  within  the
State, even though the regulation might have affected the
costs  of  and  the  prices  of  interstate  wholesale  sales,  i.e.,
jurisdictional  sales.    489  U. S.,  at  514.    In  reaching  this
conclusion,  the  Court  explained  that  the  state  regulation
aimed  primarily  at  “protect[ing]  producers’  . . .  rights—a
matter  firmly  on  the  States’  side  of  that  dividing  line.”
Ibid.  The Court contrasted this state regulation with the
state  orders  at  issue  in  Northern  Natural,  which  “ ‘inva-
lidly invade[d] the federal agency’s exclusive domain’ pre-
cisely because” they were “‘unmistakably and unambiguously
directed  at  purchasers.’ ”    Id.,  at  513  (quoting  Northern
Natural,  supra,  at  92;  emphasis  added).    Here,  too,  the
lawsuits  are  directed  at  practices  affecting  retail  rates–
which are “firmly on the States’ side of that dividing line.”

Petitioners  argue  that  Schneidewind  constitutes  con-
trary authority.  In that case, the Court found pre-empted a
state law that required public utilities, such as interstate
pipelines  crossing  the  State,  to  obtain  state  approval
before issuing long-term securities.  485 U. S., at 306–309.
But  the  Court  there  thought  that  the  State’s  securities
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the concept of preemption in the context of state and federal law, specifically regarding the regulation of natural gas.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xiii

Page
1097
Brokamp v. Mercy Hospital Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039
Brooks v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1069
Brost v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Broward Community College; Arrington v.
1145
Broward Community College, South Campus; Arrington v.
. . . . .
1083
Brown v. Carey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1060
Brown v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004
Brown; C. Volante Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1067
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. New York City Police Dept.
1011,1018,1032,1055,1069
Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1045
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Browne v. United States
1129
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Browner v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.
1098
. . . . . . . . . .
Browning-Ferris Industries of Ill., Inc.; Ter Maat v.
120
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; FDA v.
1100
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Kessler v.
1073
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Thomas v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112
Bruce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1043
Brumett v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120
Bryant v. Irvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080
Bryant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126
Bryon L. Rosquist, D. C., P. C. v. McCann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bryson v. Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058
Brzonkala v. Morrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 598,1063
1100
B. T. Ofﬁce Products; Liggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126
Buchanan v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093
Buchanan v. Tate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137
Buckley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1019
Buckwalter v. Clark County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1086
Bui v. DiPaolo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119
Buitrago v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128
Buitrago Hospital; Huertas Barbosa v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037
Bulgarian-American Enterprise Fund; Novecon, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . .
1066
Bullock v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027
Bumgardner v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058
Bunney v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099
Burgess v. Pelkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032
Burgess v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058
Burk v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1082
Burkhalter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054
Burkhart v. Quilici
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110
. .
Burlington Northern R. Co.; Red Wolf and Bull Tail Estates v.
1098
Burlington N. S. F. R. Co.; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1073
Burns; Bargas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131
Burton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases included in the report and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ

THOMAS, J., dissenting

avoid  FCRA  liability  “by  simply  contracting  with  a  third
party  to  store  and  maintain  information”).    Respondent
adds to this by pointing out that TransUnion published this
information to vendors that printed and sent the mailings.
See Brief for Respondent 16; see also App. 161 (deposition
testimony explaining that “a printed credit report . . . would
have been sent through our print vendor through the mail
and  delivered  to  the  consumer  requesting  the  file  disclo-
sure); id., at 545 (trial testimony identifying three different
print-vendor companies that worked with TransUnion dur-
ing the relevant time period).  In the historical context of
libel,  publication  to  even  a  single  other  party  could  be
enough to give rise to suit.  This was true, even where the
third  party  was  a  telegraph  company,6  an  attorney,7  or  a
stenographer  who  merely  writes  the  information  down.8

——————

6 Munson v. Lathrop, 96 Wis. 386, 389, 71 N. W. 596, 597 (1897) (“The
writing of the message, and the delivery of it by him to the [telegraph]
company for transmission, as mentioned, was a publication of the same”).
7 Hedgepeth  v.  Coleman,  183  N. C.  309,  312–313,  111  S. E.  517,  519
(1922) (“[I]t has been held that the publication was sufficient where the
defendant  had  communicated  the  defamatory  matter  to  the  plaintiff ’s
agent, or attorney; or had read it to a friend before posting it to the plain-
tiff; or had procured it to be copied, or sealed in the form of a letter ad-
dressed to the plaintiff and  left in the house of a neighbor by whom it
was read; or had caused it to be delivered to and read by a member of the
plaintiff ’s family”).

8 Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N. D. 525, 542 (1946) (“We
hold that the dictating of this letter by the manager to the stenographer
and  her  transcription  of  her  notes  into  the  written  instrument  consti-
tutes publication within the purview of the law of libel: whether the re-
lationship be that of master and servant or of coemployees of a corpora-
tion”); see also Larimore v. Blaylock, 259 Va. 568, 573, 528 S. E. 2d 119,
122 (2000) (rejecting an argument of “absolute protection of the ‘intra-
corporate immunity doctrine’ ” for defamatory statements); but see Swin-
dle  v.  State,  10  Tenn.  581,  582  (1831)  (“ ‘A  personal  libel  is  published
when it arrives to the person against whom it is written, pursuant to the
design of the author, or is made known to any other person, by any means
to which the dissent of the author is not necessarily implied’ ” (emphasis
added)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal dissenting opinion, specifically focusing on the concept of publication in the context of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). It cites legal precedents to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

11

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

large,”  ibid.,  or  purport  to  enjoin  challenged  “laws  them-
selves,” Whole Woman’s Health, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at  1)  (citing  California  v.  Texas,  593  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2021)
(slip op., at 8)).
  Our colleagues offer no persuasive reply to this problem.
THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE  does  not  address  it.    Meanwhile,
JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  offers  a  radical  answer,  suggesting
once more that this Court should cast aside its precedents
requiring  federal  courts  to  abide  by  traditional  equitable
principles.    Post,  at  9,  n. 3.    This  time,  however,  JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR  does  not  claim  to  identify  any  countervailing
authority to support her proposal.  Instead, she says, it is
justified purely by the fact that the State of Texas in S. B. 8
has “delegat[ed] its enforcement authority to the world at
large.”  Ibid.  But somewhat analogous complaints could be
levied  against  private  attorneys  general  acts,  statutes  al-
lowing  for  private  rights  of  action,  tort  law,  federal  anti-
trust law, and even the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  In some
sense all of these laws “delegate” the enforcement of public
policy to private parties and reward those who bring suits
with “bount[ies]” like exemplary or statutory damages and
attorney’s  fees.    Nor  does  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  explain
where her novel plan to overthrow this Court’s precedents
and  expand  the  equitable  powers  of  federal  courts  would
stop—or on what theory it might plausibly happen to reach
just this case or maybe those exactly like it.2

C
  While this Court’s precedents foreclose some of the peti-
tioners’  claims  for  relief,  others  survive.    The  petitioners
——————

2 This  is  not  to  say  that  the  petitioners,  or  other  abortion  providers,
lack  potentially  triable  state-law  claims  that  S. B. 8  improperly  dele-
gates  state law  enforcement  authority.    Nor  do  we  determine  whether
any particular S. B. 8 plaintiff possesses standing to sue under state jus-
ticiability  doctrines.   We  note  only  that  such  arguments do  not  justify
federal courts abandoning traditional limits on their equitable authority
and our precedents enforcing them.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Gorsuch. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to a case concerning Texas Senate Bill 8.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10 MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Creating  and  satisfying  a  Government  obligation,  there-
fore,  typically  involves  four  steps:  (1)  Congress  passes  an
organic statute (like the Affordable Care Act) that creates a
program,  agency,  or  function;  (2)  Congress  passes  an  Act
authorizing appropriations; (3) Congress enacts the appro-
priation,  granting  “budget  authority”  to  incur  obligations
and  make  payments,  and  designating  the  funds  to  be
drawn; and (4) the relevant Government entity begins in-
curring the obligation.  See id., at 2–56; see also Op. Comp.
Gen., B–193573 (Dec. 19, 1979).

But Congress can deviate from this pattern.  It may, for
instance,  authorize  agencies  to  enter  into  contracts  and
“incur  obligations  in  advance  of  appropriations.”    GAO
Redbook 2–4.  In that context, the contracts “constitute ob-
ligations binding on the United States,” such that a “failure
or refusal by Congress to make the necessary appropriation
would  not  defeat  the  obligation,  and  the  party  entitled  to
payment would most likely be able to recover in a lawsuit.”
Id., at 2–5; see also, e.g., Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt,
543 U. S. 631, 636–638 (2005) (rejecting the Government’s
argument that it is legally bound by its contractual promise
to  pay  “if,  and  only  if,  Congress  appropriated  sufficient
funds”); Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U. S. 182,
191  (2012)  (“Although  the  agency  itself  cannot  disburse
funds  beyond  those  appropriated  to  it,  the  Government’s
‘valid  obligations  will  remain  enforceable  in  the  courts’ ”
(quoting 2 GAO Redbook 6–17 (2d ed. 1992)).

Congress can also create an obligation directly by statute,
without also providing details about how it must be satis-
fied.  Consider, for example, United States v. Langston, 118
U. S. 389 (1886).  In that case, Congress had enacted a stat-
ute  fixing  an  official’s  annual  salary  at  “$7,500  from  the
date of the creation of his office.”  Id., at 394.  Years later,
however,  Congress  failed  to  appropriate  enough  funds  to
pay the full amount, prompting the officer to sue for the re-
mainder.  Id.,  at  393.    Understanding  that  Congress  had
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the creation and satisfaction of government obligations. It delves into the process, citing legal precedents and government regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (concurring  opinion)  (slip  op.,  at  2).
There is considerable evidence that the phrase “trial . . . by
. . . jury” in the Sixth Amendment was understood since the
founding  to  require  that  a  felony  guilty  verdict  be  unani-
mous.  Because  our  precedents  are  thus  not  outside  the
realm of permissible interpretation, I will apply them.

1
Blackstone—“the  preeminent  authority  on  English  law
for the founding generation,” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706,
715 (1999)—wrote that no subject can “be affected either in
his  property,  his  liberty,  or  his  person,  but  by  the  unani-
mous consent” of a jury, 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 379 (1772); see also 4 id., at 343.  An-
other influential treatise author, Hale, wrote that “the law
of England hath afforded the best method of trial, that is
possible, . . . namely by a jury . . . all concurring in the same
judgment.”  1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 33 (1736) (em-
phasis deleted).  Such views continued in scholarly works
throughout the early Republic.  See, e.g., 2 J. Story, Com-
mentaries  on  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  §777,
p. 248  (1833);  6  N.  Dane,  Digest  of  American  Law,  ch.
LXXXII, Art. 2, §1, p. 226 (1824); 2 J. Wilson, Works of the
Honourable James Wilson 349–350 (1804).

The  uniform  practice  among  the  States  was  in  accord.
Despite  isolated  17th-century  colonial  practices  allowing
nonunanimous juries, “unanimity became the accepted rule
during the 18th century, as Americans became more famil-
iar  with  the  details  of  English  common  law  and  adopted
those details in their own colonial legal systems.”  Apodaca,
supra, at 408, n. 3 (plurality opinion).  In the founding era,
six States explicitly mentioned unanimity in their constitu-
tions.  See Del. Declaration of Rights §14 (1776); Md. Dec-
laration  of  Rights,  Art. XIX  (1776);  N. C.  Declaration  of
Rights §IX (1776); Pa. Declaration of Rights, Art. IX (1776);
Vt.  Const.,  Art.  XI  (1786);  Va.  Declaration  of  Rights  §8
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites legal precedents and discusses the historical understanding of the Sixth Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
40

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix B to opinion of BREYER, J.

Table 2(b): Circumvention of the $3.6 Million Check

National Party
Committees

State Party
Committees

Candidates
(Senate)

Candidates
(House)

Total Direct
Contributions

Number
(committees/
candidates)

Elec-
tions

Direct
Contribu-
tions to
Candidate
(per
election)

$5,000

$5,000

$2,000

3

50

33

2

2

2

2

$2,000

435

Independent Expendi-
tures (IEs)
(per general election)

Elec-
tions

House
Candidate

Senate
Candidate

Total
Direct
Contribu-
tions (per
2-year
cycle)

$30,0001

$500,000

$132,000

$1,740,000

$2,372,000
Total IEs
(per
general
election)

National Party
Committees

$46,600
(min)2

State Party
Committees

  $46,600
(min)2

$94,100
(min)3

$94,100
(min)3

$46,600–
  $93,100
(min)
$46,600–
$93,100
(min)

1

1

$46,600–
$93,100
(min)

  $46,600
(min)2

$94,100
(min)3

Total IEs
 1 $45,400 for a Senate candidate.  §441a(h); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532.
2If the State has more than one House seat, this figure is $46,600.  If

it has one House seat, this figure is $93,100.  Id., at 8531.

3This  figure  ranges  from  $93,100  (Del.)  to  $2,68  million  (Cal.),

depending on the State’s population.  Ibid.

Source:  See  2  U. S. C.  §§432(e)(3)(B),  441a(a)(2)(A);  11  CFR

§110.3(b); 78 Fed. Reg. 8530–8532.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table, likely presenting data about campaign finance regulations. Tables of contents, lists, and other non-sequential text are generally not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

The  Marietta  Memorial  Hospital  Employee  Health
Benefit Plan is an employer-sponsored group health plan.
The Plan offers the same terms of coverage for outpatient
dialysis to all of its participants.  But under the Plan, out-
patient dialysis services are subject to relatively limited re-
imbursement rates.

In  2018,  DaVita  sued  the  Plan,  arguing  that  the  Plan’s
limited coverage for outpatient dialysis both (i) differenti-
ates between individuals with and without end-stage renal
disease and (ii) takes into account the Medicare eligibility
of  individuals  with  end-stage  renal  disease  in  violation of
the Medicare Secondary Payer statute.  §1395y(b)(1)(C).

The District Court dismissed DaVita’s claims, concluding
that  the  Plan  does  not  violate  the  anti-differentiation  or
take-into-account  provisions  of  the  Medicare  Secondary
Payer statute because the Plan’s terms, including its terms
for  outpatient  dialysis  treatments,  apply  uniformly  to  all
Plan participants.

A divided panel of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed.  See 978 F. 3d 326 (2020).  Among other
things, the Court of Appeals ruled that the statute author-
ized  disparate-impact  liability,  and  the  Court  concluded
that the limited payments for dialysis treatment had a dis-
parate impact on individuals with end-stage renal disease.
Judge Eric Murphy dissented in relevant part.  He rea-
soned that the Plan’s terms do not violate the statute be-
cause the Plan “offers the same benefits to all participants.”
Id., at 358 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).

The  Sixth  Circuit’s  interpretation  of  the  Medicare  Sec-
ondary Payer statute departed from the holdings of district
courts that had considered the question.  See DaVita, Inc.
v. Amy’s Kitchen, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d 960 (ND Cal. 2019);
Dialysis of Des Moines, LLC v. Smithfield Foods Healthcare
Plan,  2019  WL  8892581  (ED  Va.,  Aug.  5,  2019);  National
Renal Alliance, LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of a specific statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of the Court

certain circumstances, but it does not prevent the applica-
tion of domestic laws that are more generous in enforcing
arbitration agreements.  Article II(3) contains no exclusion-
ary language; it does not state that arbitration agreements
shall  be  enforced  only  in  the  identified  circumstances.
Given  that  the  Convention  was  drafted  against  the  back-
drop of domestic law, it would be unnatural to read Article
II(3) to displace domestic doctrines in the absence of exclu-
sionary language.  Cf. Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568
U. S. 371, 380–384 (2013).

This interpretation is especially appropriate in the con-
text of Article II.  Far from displacing domestic law, the pro-
visions  of  Article  II  contemplate  the  use  of  domestic  doc-
trines to fill gaps in the Convention.  For example, Article
II(1)  refers  to  disputes  “capable  of  settlement  by  arbitra-
tion,” but it does not identify what disputes are arbitrable,
leaving  that  matter  to  domestic  law.  Mitsubishi  Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 639,
n. 21 (1985).  Similarly, Article II(3) states that it does not
apply to agreements that are “null and void, inoperative or
incapable  of  being  performed,”  but  it  fails  to  define  those
terms.  Again, the Convention requires courts to rely on do-
mestic law to fill the gaps; it does not set out a comprehen-
sive regime that displaces domestic law.

In  sum,  the  only  provision  of  the  Convention  that  ad-
dresses the enforcement of arbitration agreements is Arti-
cle II(3).  We do not read the nonexclusive language of that
provision  to  set  a  ceiling  that  tacitly  precludes  the  use  of
domestic  law  to  enforce  arbitration  agreements.    Thus,
nothing in the text of the Convention “conflict[s] with” the
application of domestic equitable estoppel doctrines permit-
ted under Chapter 1 of the FAA.  9 U. S. C. §208.

“Because  a  treaty  ratified  by  the  United  States  is  ‘an

B
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of domestic law regarding arbitration agreements in light of the New York Convention.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
42  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

C
  Developments since Abood, both factual and legal, have
also “eroded” the decision’s “underpinnings” and left it an
outlier among our First Amendment cases.  United States
v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 521 (1995).

1

Abood  pinned  its  result  on  the  “unsupported  empirical
assumption” that “the principle of exclusive representation
in  the  public  sector  is  dependent  on  a  union  or  agency
shop.”  Harris,  573  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  20);  Abood,
431  U. S.,  at  220–222.    But,  as  already  noted,  experience
has shown otherwise.  See supra, at 11–12.

It  is  also  significant  that  the  Court  decided  Abood
against  a  very  different  legal  and  economic  backdrop.
Public-sector  unionism  was  a  relatively  new  phenomenon
in 1977.  The first State to permit collective bargaining by
government employees was Wisconsin in 1959, R. Kearney
&  P.  Mareschal,  Labor  Relations  in  the  Public  Sector  64
(5th  ed.  2014),  and  public-sector  union  membership  re
mained relatively low until a “spurt” in the late 1960’s and
early  1970’s,  shortly  before  Abood  was  decided,  Freeman,
Unionism Comes to the Public Sector, 24 J. Econ. Lit. 41,
45  (1986).  Since  then,  public-sector  union  membership
has  come  to  surpass  private-sector  union  membership,
even  though  there  are  nearly  four  times  as  many  total
private-sector  employees  as  public-sector  employees.    B.
Hirsch  &  D.  Macpherson,  Union  Membership  and  Earn
ings Data Book 9–10, 12, 16 (2013 ed.).

This  ascendance  of  public-sector  unions  has  been
marked by a parallel increase in public spending.  In 1970,
total  state  and  local  government  expenditures  amounted
to  $646  per  capita  in  nominal  terms,  or  about  $4,000  per
capita in 2014 dollars.  See Dept. of Commerce, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1972, p. 419; CPI Inflation
Calculator,  BLS,  http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.  By
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees. It discusses the legal precedent set by Abood and argues for its overturning based on changed circumstances and legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON

BREYER, J., dissenting

“[d]ue to Texas’ SB 8 law,” it is “unable to provide abortion
procedures at this time.”  Planned Parenthood South Texas,
https: //www.plannedparenthood.org / planned- parenthood-
south-texas.  And  the  applicants,  with  supporting  affida-
vits,  claim  that  clinics  will  be  unable  to  run  the  financial
and other risks that come from waiting for a private person
to  sue  them  under  the  Texas  law;  they  will  simply  close,
depriving care to more than half the women seeking abor-
tions  in  Texas  clinics.  See,  e.g.,  App.  to  Application  105,
148–150, 178–179.  We have permitted those whom a law
threatens  with  constitutional  harm  to  bring  pre-enforce-
ment challenges to the law where the harm is less serious
and the threat of enforcement less certain than the harm
(and the threat) here.  See Virginia v. American Booksellers
Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383, 392–393 (1988); Babbitt v. Farm
Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298 (1979); see also Susan B. An-
thony  List  v.  Driehaus,  573  U. S.  149,  164  (2014)  (finding
substantial threat of future enforcement where statute per-
mits “ ‘any person’ ” to file a complaint and “the universe of
potential complainants is not restricted”).

I recognize that Texas’s law delegates the State’s power
to  prevent  abortions  not  to  one  person  (such  as  a  district
attorney) or to a few persons (such as a group of government
officials or private citizens) but to any person.  But I do not
see  why  that  fact  should  make  a  critical  legal  difference.
That  delegation  still  threatens  to  invade  a  constitutional
right,  and  the  coming  into  effect  of  that  delegation  still
threatens imminent harm.  Normally, where a legal right is
“ ‘invaded,’ ” the law provides “ ‘a legal remedy by suit or ac-
tion at law.’ ” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803)
(quoting  3  W.  Blackstone  Commentaries  *23).    It  should
prove  possible  to  apply  procedures  adequate  to  that  task
here,  perhaps  by  permitting  lawsuits  against  a  subset  of
delegatees (say, those particularly likely to exercise the del-
egated powers), or perhaps by permitting lawsuits against
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON.  It discusses the legal arguments surrounding Texas's SB 8 law and its impact on abortion access.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Per Curiam

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 21A240 and 21A241
_________________

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, ET AL., APPLICANTS
v.
MISSOURI, ET AL.

21A240

XAVIER BECERRA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL., APPLICANTS
v.
LOUISIANA, ET AL.

21A241

ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS

 [January 13, 2022]

 PER CURIAM.
The  Secretary  of  Health  and  Human  Services  adminis-
ters  the  Medicare  and  Medicaid  programs,  which  provide
health insurance for millions of elderly, disabled, and low-
income  Americans.  In  November  2021,  the  Secretary  an-
nounced  that,  in  order  to  receive  Medicare  and  Medicaid
funding,  participating  facilities  must  ensure  that  their
staff—unless exempt for medical or religious reasons—are
vaccinated against COVID–19.  86 Fed. Reg. 61555 (2021).
Two District Courts enjoined enforcement of the rule, and
the  Government  now  asks  us  to  stay  those  injunctions.
Agreeing that it is entitled to such relief, we grant the ap-
plications.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion.  It includes the case name, citation, and introductory information about the case. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Supreme Court Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U49

[10-24-00 10:29:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN

460

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

NELSON v. ADAMS USA, INC., et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit

No. 99–502. Argued March 27, 2000—Decided April 25, 2000

Ohio Cellular Products Corporation (OCP) sued respondent Adams USA,
Inc. (Adams), for patent infringement. The District Court dismissed
OCP’s claim and ordered OCP to pay Adams’ costs and attorney fees.
In awarding costs and fees, the court determined that petitioner Nelson,
president and sole shareholder of OCP, had deceitfully withheld from
the United States Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce prior art that ren-
dered OCP’s patents invalid, and that this behavior constituted inequi-
table conduct chargeable to OCP. Fearing that OCP might be unable
to pay the fee, Adams moved under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to amend its pleading to add Nelson, personally, as a
party from whom fees could be collected. Adams also asked the
court, under Rule 59(e), to amend the judgment to make Nelson im-
mediately liable for the fee award. The District Court granted Adams’
motion in full.
In afﬁrming the judgment entered against Nelson, the
Federal Circuit acknowledged that it was “uncommon” to add a party
after the entry of judgment. Nevertheless, Nelson had not demon-
strated prejudice, the Court of Appeals concluded, because he made no
showing that anything different or additional would have been done to
stave off the judgment had he been a party, in his individual capacity,
from the outset. That court, over a vigorous dissent, was apparently
satisﬁed that the District Court’s simultaneous allowance of the plead-
ing amendment and entry of judgment satisﬁed due process.

Held: The District Court erred in amending the judgment immediately
upon permitting amendment of the pleading. Due process, as reﬂected
in Rule 15 as well as Rule 12, required that Nelson be given an opportu-
nity to respond and contest his personal liability for the fee award after
he was made a party and before the entry of judgment against him.
Pp. 465–472.

(a) Nelson was never afforded a proper opportunity to respond to the
claim against him, but was adjudged liable the very ﬁrst moment his
personal liability was legally at issue. The Federal Circuit observed
that as long as no undue prejudice is shown, due process is met if
Rule 15’s requirements for amended pleadings are met. But the re-
quirements of Rule 15 were not met here, and due process does not
countenance such swift passage from pleading to judgment in the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.  It outlines the case background, the legal issues, and the Court's holding.  While important for legal research, it is not the primary content of the case itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

Department  of  Homeland  Security  sends  out  the  initial
notice  to  appear,  but  the  removal  proceedings  themselves
are  scheduled  by  the  Immigration  Court,  which  is  part  of
the Department of Justice.  See 8 CFR §1003.18(a) (2018).
The Department of Homeland Security cannot dictate the
scheduling  of  a  matter  on  the  docket  of  the  Immigration
Court, and at present, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity generally cannot even access the Immigration Court’s
calendar.  In re  Camarillo,  25  I. & N.  Dec.,  at  648;  Tr.  of
Oral  Arg.  52–53.    The  Department  of  Homeland  Security
may  thus  be  hard  pressed  to  include  on  initial  notices  to
appear a hearing date that is anything more than a rough
estimate  subject  to  considerable  change.    See  §1229(a)(2);
see also ante, at 18 (disclaiming any effect on the Govern-
ment’s ability to change initial hearing dates).

Including  an  estimated  and  changeable  date,  however,
may do much more harm than good.  See Gonzalez-Garcia
v. Holder, 770 F. 3d 431, 434–435 (CA6 2014).  It is likely
to  mislead  many  recipients  and  to  prejudice  those  who
make preparations on the assumption that the initial date
is  firm.  And  it  forces  the  Government  to  go  through  the
pointless  exercise  of  first  including  a  date  that  it  knows
may  very  well  be  altered  and  then  changing  it  once  the
real  date  becomes  clear.  Such  a  system  serves  nobody’s
interests.

Statutory  interpretation  is  meant  to  be  “a  holistic  en-
deavor,”  and  sometimes  language  “that  may  seem  ambig-
uous  in  isolation”  becomes  clear  because  “only  one  of  the
permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is
compatible with the rest of the law.”  United Sav. Assn. of
Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S.
365, 371 (1988).  The real-world effects produced by Perei-
ra’s  interpretation—arbitrary  dates  and  times  that  are
likely  to  confuse  and  confound  all  who  receive  them—
illustrate  starkly  the  merits  of  the  Government’s  alterna-
tive construction.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the interpretation of a statute and its practical implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI

Opinion of the Court

ment  suit  against  a  private  prison  operator,  Malesko,
supra,  at  63;  a  due  process  suit  against  officials  from  the
Bureau of Land Management, Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U. S.
537, 547–548, 562 (2007); and an Eighth Amendment suit
against  prison  guards  at  a  private  prison,  Minneci  v.
Pollard, 565 U. S. 118, 120 (2012).

When a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action
under the Constitution itself, just as when a party seeks to
assert  an  implied  cause  of  action  under  a  federal  statute,
separation-of-powers principles are or should be central to
the analysis.  The question is “who should decide” whether
to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts?
Bush, 462 U. S., at 380.

The answer most often will be Congress.  When an issue
“ ‘involves  a  host  of  considerations  that  must  be  weighed
and  appraised,’ ”  it  should  be  committed  to  “ ‘those  who
write the laws’ ” rather than “ ‘those who interpret them.’ ”
Ibid.  (quoting  United  States  v.  Gilman,  347  U. S.  507,
512–513  (1954)).  In  most  instances,  the  Court’s  prece-
dents  now  instruct,  the  Legislature  is  in  the  better  posi-
tion  to  consider  if  “ ‘the  public  interest  would  be  served’ ”
by imposing a “‘new substantive legal liability.’”  Schweiker,
supra,  at  426–427  (quoting  Bush,  supra,  at  390).    As  a
result,  the  Court  has  urged  “caution”  before  “extending
Bivens remedies into any new context.”  Malesko, supra, at
74.  The Court’s precedents now make clear that a Bivens
remedy  will  not  be  available  if  there  are  “ ‘special  factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action
by  Congress.’ ”    Carlson,  446  U. S.,  at  18  (quoting  Bivens,
403 U. S., at 396).

This  Court  has  not  defined  the  phrase  “special  factors
counselling  hesitation.”   The  necessary  inference,  though,
is that the inquiry must concentrate on whether the Judi-
ciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruc-
tion, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allow-
ing  a  damages  action  to  proceed.    Thus,  to  be  a  “special
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of implied causes of action under the Constitution and the Bivens doctrine. It delves into separation-of-powers principles and the Court's precedents regarding the creation of new legal liabilities.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
Opinion of the Court

status as Indians,” §5304(e), and thus fail ISDA’s recognized-
as-eligible clause.

Respondents’  cross-referencing  argument,  however,  re-
quires the Court to ignore the reason why ANCs are not on
the list.  True to its full name, the Federally Recognized In-
dian Tribe List Act tasks the Secretary with maintaining a
“ ‘list  of  federally  recognized  tribes’ ”  only.    Note  following
§5130, p. 678.  The List Act, moreover, lacks language like
that in ISDA expressly “including” ANCs “established pur-
suant to” ANCSA.  §5304(e).  The obvious inference, then,
is that ANCs are not on the Secretary’s list simply because
they are not federally recognized.

History confirms as much.  In 1979, 15 years before the
List Act was passed, the Secretary began publishing a list
of Indian tribes “that have a government-to-government re-
lationship with the United States.”  44 Fed. Reg. 7235.  In
1988, ANCs were added to the Secretary’s list, which had
been  retitled  “Indian  Entities  Recognized  and  Eligible  To
Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs,”  because  ANCs  are  “specifically  eligible  for  the
funding  and  services  of  the  [Bureau  of  Indian  Affairs]  by
statute” and “should not have to undertake to obtain Fed-
eral Acknowledgement” (i.e., federal recognition).  53 Fed.
Reg. 52829, 52832.  In 1993, the Secretary dropped ANCs
from  the  list,  concluding  that  “the  inclusion  of  ANC[s],
which lack tribal status in a political sense, called into ques-
tion the status” of the other entities on the list.  58 Fed. Reg.
54365.  In  so  doing,  the  Secretary  reaffirmed  that  ANCs
“are  not  governments,  but  they  have  been  designated  as
‘tribes’  for  the  purposes  of  some  Federal  laws,”  including
ISDA.  Id.,  at  54364.  The  List  Act,  passed  the  following
year, “confirmed the Secretary’s authority and responsibil-
ity” to maintain a list of federally recognized tribes.  60 Fed.
Reg. 9251.  Hence, ANCs remained off the list.

To accept respondents’ argument, then, the Court would
need  to  cross-reference  ISDA’s  definition  of  an  “Indian
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the status of Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA).  It delves into the history of ANC recognition and the reasoning behind their exclusion from the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

id.,  at  205–206  (Goldman  agreed  with  a  speaker’s  com
ment  that  §44(a)  “enlarge[d]”  U. S.  copyright  law  by  ex
tending  import  prohibitions  “to  works  legally  produced  in
Europe” and other foreign countries).11

The next step in the copyright revision process was the
introduction  in  Congress  of  a  draft  bill  on  July  20,  1964.
See  Copyright  Law  Revision  Part  5:  1964  Revision  Bill
with Discussions and Comments, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., III
(H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965).  After another round
of public comments, a revised bill was introduced on Feb
ruary  4,  1965.    See  Copyright  Law  Revision  Part  6:  Sup
plementary  Report  of  the  Register  of  Copyrights  on  the
General  Revision  of  the  U. S.  Copyright  Law:  1965  Revi
sion Bill, 89th Cong.,  1st Sess.,  V (H. R. Judiciary Comm.
Print  1965)  (hereinafter  Copyright  Law  Revision  Part  6).
In  language  closely  resembling  the  statutory  text  later
enacted by Congress, §602(a) of the 1965 bill provided:

“Importation  into  the  United  States,  without  the  au
thority  of  the  owner  of  copyright  under  this  title,  of
copies  or  phonorecords  of  a  work  for  the  purpose  of
distribution to the public is an infringement of the ex
clusive  right  to  distribute  copies  or  phonorecords  un
der section 106, actionable under section 501.”  Id., at
292.12

——————

11 As  the  Court  observes,  ante,  at  29,  Irwin  Karp  of  the  Authors
League of America stated at the 1964 panel discussion that §44(a) ran
counter to “the very basic concept of copyright law that, once you’ve sold
a  copy  legally,  you  can’t  restrict  its  resale.”    Copyright  Law  Revision
Part  4,  at  212.    When  asked  if  he  was  “presenting  . . .  an  argument
against” §44(a), however, Karp responded that he was “neutral on th[e]
provision.”  Id., at 211.  There is thus little reason to  believe that  any
changes to the wording of §44(a) before its codification in §602(a) were
made  in  response  to  Karp’s  discussion  of  “the  problem  of  restricting
[the] transfer of . . . lawfully obtained [foreign] copies.”  Ibid.

12 There  is  but  one  difference  between  this  language  from  the  1965
bill and the corresponding language in the current version of §602(a)(1):
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedents and discusses the legislative history of copyright law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

supervisor,  and  reviewed  Ball  State’s  liability  for  her
conduct under a negligence standard.  646 F. 3d 461, 470–
471 (2011); App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a–55a, 59a–60a.  Because
I  would  hold  that  the  Seventh  Circuit  erred  in  restrict-
ing  supervisor  status  to  employees  formally  empowered
to  take  tangible  employment  actions,  I  would  remand
for  application  of  the  proper  standard  to  Vance’s  claim.
On  this  record,  however,  there  is  cause  to  anticipate  that
Davis would not qualify as Vance’s supervisor.8

Supervisor  status  is  based  on  “job  function  rather  than
job  title,”  and  depends  on  “specific  facts”  about  the  work-
ing relationship.  EEOC Guidance 405:7654.  See supra, at
13.  Vance  has  adduced  scant  evidence  that  Davis  con-
trolled  the  conditions  of  her  daily  work.    Vance  stated  in
an  affidavit  that  the  general  manager  of  the  Catering
Division,  Bill  Kimes,  was  charged  with  “overall  supervi-
sion  in  the  kitchen,”  including  “reassign[ing]  people  to
perform  different  tasks,”  and  “control[ling]  the  schedule.”
App.  431.  The  chef,  Shannon  Fultz,  assigned  tasks  by
preparing “prep lists” of daily duties.  Id., at 277–279, 427.
There  is  no  allegation  that  Davis  had  a  hand  in  creating
these  prep  lists,  nor  is  there  any  indication  that,  in  fact,
Davis  otherwise  controlled  the  particulars  of  Vance’s
workday.  Vance  herself  testified  that  she  did  not  know
whether Davis was her supervisor.  Id., at 198.

True,  Davis’  job  description  listed  among  her  responsi-
bilities  “[l]ead[ing]  and  direct[ing]  kitchen  part-time,
substitute,  and  student  employee  helpers  via  demonstra-

——————

8 In addition to concluding that Davis was not Vance’s supervisor, the
District  Court  held  that  the  conduct  Vance  alleged  was  “neither  suffi-
ciently severe nor pervasive to be considered objectively hostile for the
purposes of Title VII.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a.  The Seventh Circuit
declined  to  address  this  issue.    See  646  F. 3d  461,  471  (2011).    If  the
case  were  remanded,  the  Court  of  Appeals  could  resolve  the  hostile
environment issue first, and then, if necessary, Davis’ status as super-
visor or co-worker.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case of Vance v. Ball State Univ. It delves into the legal definition of "supervisor" in the context of workplace harassment claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  601 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

Per Curiam

taking a qualifying oath and then engaging in insurrection
or rebellion—nothing more.  Any congressional legislation
enforcing Section 3 must, like the Enforcement Act of 1870
and  §2383,  reflect  “congruence  and  proportionality”  be-
tween  preventing  or  remedying  that  conduct  “and  the
means adopted to that end.”  City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at
520.  Neither we nor the respondents are aware of any other
legislation by Congress to enforce Section 3.  See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 123.

Any state enforcement of Section 3 against federal office-
holders and candidates, though, would not derive from Sec-
tion 5, which confers power only on “[t]he Congress.”  As a
result,  such  state  enforcement  might  be  argued  to  sweep
more broadly than congressional enforcement could under
our precedents.  But the notion that the Constitution grants
the States freer rein than Congress to decide how Section 3
should be enforced with respect to federal offices is simply
implausible.

Finally, state enforcement of Section 3 with respect to the
Presidency would raise heightened concerns.  “[I]n the con-
text  of  a  Presidential  election,  state-imposed  restrictions
implicate a uniquely important national interest.”  Ander-
son  v.  Celebrezze,  460  U. S.  780,  794–795  (1983)  (footnote
omitted).  But  state-by-state  resolution  of  the  question
whether Section 3 bars a particular candidate for President
from serving would be quite unlikely to yield a uniform an-
swer consistent with the basic principle that “the President
. . .  represent[s]  all  the  voters  in  the  Nation.”    Id.,  at  795
(emphasis added).

Conflicting  state  outcomes  concerning  the  same  candi-
date could result not just from differing views of the merits,
but from variations in state law governing the proceedings
that are necessary to make Section 3 disqualification deter-
minations.  Some States might allow a Section 3 challenge
to succeed based on a preponderance of the evidence, while
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a portion of one, discussing Section 3 of the 14th Amendment and its potential enforcement. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it's not a table of contents, introductory paragraph, or other non-sequential text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
864

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10968.  Nesgoda  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  867.

No.  08–10970.  Gonzales  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  1193.

No.  08–10972.  Norwood  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10973.  Roten  v.  DeLoy,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A. 3d

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10975.  Saunders,  aka  Lucente  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  553  F.  3d  81.

No.  08–10976.  Yauman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  737.

No.  08–10977.  Laskey  v.  Charles  Industries.  Ct.  App.

Cal.,  1st  App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10978.  White  v.  Donley,  Secretary  of  the  Air

Force,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10979.  Lanza  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–10980.  Linniman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  224.

No.  08–10981.  Baziruwiha  v.  Supershuttle  Interna
tional  Corp.  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  286.

No.  08–10983.  Abrams  v.  Department  of  Veterans  Af
fairs.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306
Fed.  Appx.  602.

No. 08–10984.  Ayala v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  636.

No.  08–10985.  Razvi  v.  FIA  Card  Services,  N.  A.,  fka
MBNA  America  Bank,  N.  A.  Super.  Ct.  N.  J.,  App.  Div.  Cer
tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

7

THOMAS, J., dissenting

the rate at which the suspect will metabolize alcohol.
Finally, an officer cannot know how long it will take to
obtain  the  blood  sample  once  the  suspect  is  brought
to the hospital.  Under a totality of the circumstances
test,  an  officer  would  be  called  upon  to  speculate  on
each of these considerations and predict how long the
most  probative  evidence  of  the  defendant’s  blood
alcohol  level  would  continue  to  exist  before  a  blood
sample was no longer reliable.”  State v. Shriner, 751
N. W. 2d 538, 549 (2008) (footnote omitted).

The  Court  should  not  adopt  a  rule  that  requires  police  to
guess whether they will be able to obtain a warrant before
“too  much”  evidence  is  destroyed,  for  the  police  lack  reli-
able information concerning the relevant variables.2

This  case  demonstrates  the  uncertainty  officers  face
with  regard  to  the  delay  caused  by  obtaining  a  warrant.
The arresting officer clearly had probable cause to believe
respondent  was  drunk,  but  there  was  no  way  for  the  of
ficer to quantify the level of intoxication to determine how
quickly  he  needed  to  act  in  order  to  obtain  probative  evi
dence.  Another  officer  testified  at  respondent’s  trial  that
it  typically  took  1  ½  to  2  hours  to  obtain  a  drunk-driving
warrant  at  night  in  Cape  Girardeau  County,  Missouri.
See  App.  53–54.  Respondent  submitted  an  exhibit  sum
marizing  six  late  afternoon  and  nighttime  drunk-driving
search  warrants  that  suggests  the  time  may  be  shorter.

——————

2 Because the Court’s position is likely to result in delay in obtaining
BAC  evidence,  it  also  increases  the  likelihood  that  prosecutors  will  be
forced  to  estimate  the  amount  of  alcohol  in  a  defendant’s  bloodstream
using BAC numbers obtained hours later.  In practice, this backwards
extrapolation  is  likely  to  devolve  into  a  battle  of  the  experts,  as  each
side seeks to show that stale evidence supports its position.  There is no
need  for  this  outcome.    Police  facing  inevitable  destruction  situations
need  not  forgo  collecting  the  most  accurate  available  evidence  simply
because they might be able to use an expert witness and less persuasive
evidence to approximate what they lost.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case, specifically focusing on the issue of warrantless blood draws in drunk driving cases. It presents legal arguments and cites precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

tions inconsistent with the statute’s text.

That  use  of  the  word  “under”  perfectly  fits  the  Govern-
ment’s  interpretation  of  the  stop-time  rule.    The  Govern-
ment  served  Pereira  with  a  notice  to  appear  “under”
§1229(a)  in  the  sense  that  the  notice  was  “authorized  by”
that provision, which states that a notice to appear “shall
be given” to an alien in a removal proceeding and outlines
several rules governing such notices.  On that reasonable
reading, the phrase “under section 1229(a)” acts as short-
hand for the type of document governed by §1229(a).

C

That  interpretation  is  bolstered  by  the  stop-time  rule’s
cross-reference to “section 1229(a).”  §1229b(d)(1).  Pereira
interprets  that  cross-reference  as  picking  up  every  sub-
stantive  requirement  that  applies  to  notices  to  appear.
But  those  substantive  requirements  are  found  only  in
§1229(a)(1).  Thus, the cross-reference to “section 1229(a),”
as  opposed  to  “section  1229(a)(1),”  tends  to  undermine
Pereira’s  interpretation,  because  if  Congress  had  meant
for  the  stop-time  rule  to  incorporate  the  substantive  re-
quirements  located  in  §1229(a)(1),  it  presumably  would
have  referred  specifically  to  that  provision  and  not  more
generally to “section 1229(a).”  We normally presume that
“[w]hen  Congress  want[s]  to  refer  only  to  a  particular
subsection  or  paragraph,  it  [says]  so,”  NLRB  v.  SW  Gen-
eral, Inc., 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 9), and it is
instructive  that  neighboring  statutory  provisions  in  this
case  are  absolutely  riddled  with  such  specific  cross-
references.1   In  the  stop-time  rule,  however,  Congress
chose to insert a broader cross-reference, one that refers to
the  general  process  of  serving  notices  to  appear  as  a
——————

1 See,  e.g.,  §1229a(b)(5)(A)  (“paragraph  (1)  . . .  of  section  1229(a)”);
§1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)  (same);  §1229a(b)(7)  (same);  §1229a(b)(5)(B)  (“ad-
dress  required  under  section  1229(a)(1)(F)”);  see  also  §1229a(b)(7)
(referring to §1229(a)(1)(G)(i)’s “time and place” requirement).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It contains legal arguments and citations to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

800

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Stevens, J., dissenting

about the PFCRA rests entirely on the premise that its
deﬁnition of “person” does not include States. That prem-
ise,
in turn, relies upon the fact that § 3801(a)(6) in the
PFCRA deﬁnes a “person” to include “any individual, part-
nership, corporation, association, or private organization,”
inter-
but does not mention States. We have, however,
preted similar deﬁnitions of “person,” which included corpo-
rations, partnerships, and associations, to include States as
well, even though States were not expressly mentioned in
the statutory deﬁnition. See California v. United States,
320 U. S., at 585; Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S., at 160.
(I draw no deﬁnitive conclusions as to whether States are
subject to suit under the PFCRA; I only mean to suggest
that the Court’s premise is not as obvious as it presumes
it to be.)
In any event, the ultimate relevant question is
whether the text and legislative history of the FCA make it
clear that § 3729’s use of the word “person” includes States.
Because they do, nothing in any other piece of legislation
narrows the meaning of that term.

Finally, the Court relies on the fact that the current
version of the FCA includes a treble damages remedy that
is “essentially punitive in nature.” Ante, at 784. Citing
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 262–263 (1981),
the Court invokes the “presumption against imposition of
punitive damages on governmental entities.” Ante, at 785.
But as Newport explains, “courts vie[w] punitive damages
[against governmental bodies] as contrary to sound public
policy, because such awards would burden the very tax-

“person” would be the meaning adopted by the 1863 Congress, not the
1986 Congress. And on that premise, why should it matter what a differ-
ent Congress, in a different century, did in a separate statute? Of course,
as described earlier, see n. 5, supra, I believe it is the 1986 Congress’
understanding of the word “person” that controls, because it is that word
as enacted by the 1986 Congress that we are interpreting in this case.
But on the Court’s premise, it is the 1863 Congress’ understanding that
controls and the PFCRA should be irrelevant.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and citations to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Opinion of the Court

§1255(a).  And  another  provision  says  that  a  person  who
has  worked  without  authorization  in  the  country—as
Sanchez did for several years—may become an LPR only if
his presence in the United States is “pursuant to a lawful
admission.”  §1255(k).  Sanchez has never claimed that he
can, without aid from the TPS provision, satisfy those de-
mands  for  admission.4   A  straightforward  application  of
§1255 thus supports the Government’s decision to deny him
LPR status.

And nothing in the conferral of TPS changes that result.
As noted earlier, a TPS recipient is “considered as being in,
and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant” for the
purpose of becoming an LPR.  §1254a(f )(4); see supra, at 2.
That provision ensures that, in applying for permanent res-
idency, a TPS recipient will be treated as having nonimmi-
grant status—even if, like Sanchez, he really does not.  See
§1101(a)(15) (not including TPS recipients among the des-
ignated  classes  of  “nonimmigrants”).    It  thus  guarantees
that  every  TPS  recipient  has  the  status  traditionally  and
generally needed to invoke §1255’s adjustment process.  See
§1255  (titled  “[a]djustment  of  status  of  nonimmigrant  to
that of person admitted for permanent residence” (boldface
deleted)).  But the provision does not aid the TPS recipient
in  meeting  §1255’s  independent  legal-entry  requirement.
Lawful  status  and  admission,  as  the  court  below  recog-
nized, are distinct concepts in immigration law: Establish-
ing one does not necessarily establish the other.  See supra,
at 3–4.  On the one hand, a foreign national can be admitted
——————

4 The Government notes that Sanchez was treated as “paroled” when
he  returned  from  an  authorized  trip  abroad  after  obtaining  TPS.    See
Brief for Respondents 15, n. 5.  But Sanchez has never claimed that this
treatment  made  him  eligible  to  adjust  to  LPR  status  under  §1255(a).
That  is  probably  because  the  argument  could  not  have  mattered:
§1255(k) stands as an independent prohibition on his invoking the LPR
process.  See supra, at 2, n. 1.  We express no view on whether a parole
of the kind Sanchez received enables a TPS recipient to become an LPR
absent any other bar in §1255.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the eligibility of a person named Sanchez for LPR (lawful permanent resident) status based on their TPS (Temporary Protected Status) status.  It delves into the legal requirements and interpretations of relevant immigration statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

could  not  reasonably  be  expected  to  recur.”  Parents  In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
551 U. S. 701, 719 (2007).  Here the Government “nowhere
suggests that if this litigation is resolved in its favor it will
not”  reimpose  emissions  limits  predicated  on  generation
shifting; indeed, it “vigorously defends” the legality of such
an  approach.  Ibid.  We  do  not  dismiss  a  case  as  moot  in
such circumstances.  See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Cas-
tle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283, 288–289 (1982).  The case thus re-
mains justiciable, and we may turn to the merits.

III
A
In devising emissions limits for power plants, EPA first
“determines” the “best system of emission reduction” that—
taking into account cost, health, and other factors—it finds
“has  been  adequately  demonstrated.”
42  U. S. C.
§7411(a)(1).  The  Agency  then  quantifies  “the  degree  of
emission limitation achievable” if that best system were ap-
plied  to  the  covered  source.  Ibid.;  see  also  80  Fed.  Reg.
64719.  The BSER, therefore, “is the central determination
that  the  EPA  must  make  in  formulating  [its  emission]
guidelines”  under  Section  111.    Id.,  at  64723.  The  issue
here  is  whether  restructuring  the  Nation’s  overall  mix  of
electricity  generation,  to  transition  from  38%  coal  to  27%
coal by 2030, can be the “best system of emission reduction”
within the meaning of Section 111.

“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that
the  words  of  a  statute  must  be  read  in  their  context  and
with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”
Davis  v.  Michigan  Dept.  of  Treasury,  489  U. S.  803,  809
(1989).  Where the statute at issue is one that confers au-
thority upon an administrative agency, that inquiry must
be “shaped, at least in some measure, by the nature of the
question  presented”—whether  Congress  in  fact  meant  to
confer the power the agency has asserted.  FDA v. Brown &
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of the Supreme Court case *West Virginia v. EPA*. It is sequential text and contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>