<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

13

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

ing them conflict with the Constitution.”  Id., at 75–76.

In  the  decades  after  Lochner,  the  Court  struck  down
nearly  200  laws  as  violations  of  individual  liberty,  often
over  strong  dissents  contending  that  “[t]he  criterion  of
constitutionality  is  not  whether  we  believe  the  law  to  be
for  the  public  good.”  Adkins  v.  Children’s  Hospital  of
D. C., 261 U. S. 525, 570 (1923) (opinion of Holmes, J.).  By
empowering  judges  to  elevate  their  own  policy  judgments
to  the  status  of  constitutionally  protected  “liberty,”  the
Lochner  line  of  cases  left  “no  alternative  to  regarding  the
court  as  a  . . .  legislative  chamber.”    L.  Hand,  The  Bill  of
Rights 42 (1958).

Eventually,  the  Court  recognized  its  error  and  vowed
not to repeat it.  “The doctrine that . . . due process author-
izes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe
the  legislature  has  acted  unwisely,”  we  later  explained,
“has  long  since  been  discarded.    We  have  returned  to  the
original  constitutional  proposition  that  courts  do  not
substitute  their  social  and  economic  beliefs  for  the  judg-
ment  of  legislative  bodies,  who  are  elected  to  pass  laws.”
Ferguson  v.  Skrupa,  372  U. S.  726,  730  (1963);  see  Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 (1952)
(“we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom
of legislation”).  Thus, it has become an accepted rule that
the  Court  will  not  hold  laws  unconstitutional  simply  be-
cause  we  find  them  “unwise,  improvident,  or  out  of  har-
mony with a particular school of thought.”  Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955).

Rejecting  Lochner  does  not  require  disavowing  the
doctrine of implied fundamental rights, and this Court has
not  done  so.  But  to  avoid  repeating  Lochner’s  error  of
converting  personal  preferences  into  constitutional  man-
dates,  our  modern  substantive  due  process  cases  have
stressed  the  need  for  “judicial  self-restraint.”  Collins  v.
Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992).  Our precedents
have  required  that  implied  fundamental  rights  be  “objec-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Lochner era and the Court's subsequent shift away from striking down laws based on economic policy judgments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

908

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 1, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–8562. Darne v. Juntunen. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 215 Wis. 2d 428, 576 N. W. 2d 283.

No. 97–8573. Thompson v. Hopkins, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8574. Turkowski v. Clinton, President of the

United States, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8602. Kimble v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8611. Wilson v. Lane, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 438.

No. 97–8624. Depree v. Library of Congress et al. C. A.

D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159 F. 3d 636.

No. 97–8627. Cale v. State Retirement and Pension Sys-
tem of Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 116 Md. App. 733.

No. 97–8648. Strachan v. Tillery. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 127 F. 3d 1109.

No. 97–8666. Ricketts v. Department of the Air Force.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 152 F. 3d
942.

No. 97–8673. Wegner v. Lewis, Inspector General, De-
partment of the Interior. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8675. Eggena v. Social Security Administration
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131
F. 3d 146.

No. 97–8676. Darden v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 51.

No. 97–8688. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 1266.

No. 97–8698.

Ignacio v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 775.

No. 97–8700.
Certiorari denied.

Jacobs v. Morgan, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a section of a legal document like a court docket or reporter.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION

Opinion of the Court

found  this  scheme  sufficient  to  provide  incentive  for  the
individual  prosecution  of  meritorious  claims  that  are  not
immediately  settled,  and  the  Ninth  Circuit  admitted  that
aggrieved  customers  who  filed  claims  would  be  “essen-
tially guarantee[d]” to be made whole, 584 F. 3d, at 856, n.
9.  Indeed,  the  District  Court  concluded  that  the  Concep-
cions  were  better  off  under  their  arbitration  agreement
with AT&T than they would have been as participants in
a  class  action,  which  “could  take  months,  if  not  years,
and  which  may  merely  yield  an  opportunity  to  submit  a
claim for recovery of a small percentage of a few dollars.”
Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *12.

*

*

*
Because it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and  execution  of  the  full  purposes  and  objectives  of  Con-
gress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941), Cali-
fornia’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.  The
judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is
remanded  for  further  proceedings  consistent  with  this
opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the concluding section. It discusses the preemption of a state law by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U74

[09-06-00 17:54:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

56

UNITED STATES v. BESTFOODS

Opinion of the Court

sons [may be tagged with] the cost of their actions,” S. Rep.
No. 96–848, p. 13 (1980).1 The term “person” is deﬁned in
CERCLA to include corporations and other business organi-
zations, see 42 U. S. C. § 9601(21), and the term “facility” en-
joys a broad and detailed deﬁnition as well, see § 9601(9).2
The phrase “owner or operator” is deﬁned only by tautology,
however, as “any person owning or operating” a facility,
§ 9601(20)(A)(ii), and it is this bit of circularity that prompts
our review. Cf. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, supra, at 363
(CERCLA, “unfortunately,
legislative
draftsmanship”).

is not a model of

II

In 1957, Ott Chemical Co. (Ott I) began manufacturing
chemicals at a plant near Muskegon, Michigan, and its inten-
tional and unintentional dumping of hazardous substances
signiﬁcantly polluted the soil and ground water at the site.
In 1965, respondent CPC International Inc.3 incorporated a
wholly owned subsidiary to buy Ott I’s assets in exchange
for CPC stock. The new company, also dubbed Ott Chemi-
cal Co. (Ott II), continued chemical manufacturing at the site,
and continued to pollute its surroundings. CPC kept the

1 “CERCLA . . . imposes the costs of the cleanup on those responsible
for the contamination.” Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1, 7
(1989).
“The remedy that Congress felt it needed in CERCLA is sweep-
ing: everyone who is potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contami-
nation may be forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup.”
Id., at 21
(plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).

2 “The term ‘facility’ means (A) any building, structure, installation,
equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly
owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, land-
ﬁll, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any
site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, dis-
posed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include
any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.”

3 CPC has recently changed its name to Bestfoods. Consistently with

the briefs and the opinions below, we use the name CPC herein.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case United States v. Bestfoods. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific legislation (CERCLA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–534
_________________

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF DENTAL

EXAMINERS, PETITIONER v. FEDERAL

TRADE COMMISSION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[February 25, 2015]

 JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE

THOMAS join, dissenting.

The  Court’s  decision  in  this  case  is  based  on  a  serious
misunderstanding of the doctrine of state-action antitrust
immunity  that  this  Court  recognized  more  than  60  years
ago  in  Parker  v.  Brown,  317  U. S.  341  (1943).  In  Parker,
the Court held that the Sherman Act does not prevent the
States  from  continuing  their  age-old  practice  of  enacting
measures,  such  as  licensing  requirements,  that  are  de-
signed  to  protect  the  public  health  and  welfare.  Id.,  at
352.  The case now before us involves precisely this type of
state  regulation—North  Carolina’s  laws  governing  the
practice of dentistry, which are administered by the North
Carolina Board of Dental Examiners (Board).

Today, however, the Court takes the unprecedented step
of  holding  that  Parker  does  not  apply  to  the  North  Caro-
lina  Board  because  the  Board  is  not  structured  in  a  way
that merits a good-government seal of approval; that is, it
is  made  up  of  practicing  dentists  who  have  a  financial
incentive to use the licensing laws to further the financial
interests  of  the  State’s  dentists.    There  is  nothing  new
about  the  structure  of  the  North  Carolina  Board.    When
the  States  first  created  medical  and  dental  boards,  well
before  the  Sherman  Act  was  enacted,  they  began  to  staff
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It includes citations, case names, and the name of the justice writing the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the legal reasoning and arguments within a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 728 (2000)

733

Opinion of the Court

obtained control of great areas of the public land . . . who
object . . . because it will break the control that these few
big men now have over the lands which they do not actually
own.”
Ibid. Whatever the opposition’s source, bills re-
ﬂecting Powell’s approach did not become law until 1934.

By the 1930’s, opposition to federal regulation of the fed-
eral range had signiﬁcantly diminished. Population growth,
forage competition, and inadequate range control all began
to have consequences both serious and apparent. With a
horrifying drought came ‘dawns without day’ as dust storms
swept the range. The devastating storms of the Dust Bowl
were in the words of one Senator “the most tragic, the most
impressive lobbyist, that ha[s] ever come to this Capitol.”
79 Cong. Rec. 6013 (1935). Congress acted; and on June 28,
1934, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Taylor Graz-
ing Act into law.

B

43 U. S. C. § 315.

The Taylor Act seeks to “promote the highest use of the
public lands.”
Its speciﬁc goals are to
“stop injury” to the lands from “overgrazing and soil deterio-
ration,” to “provide for their use, improvement and develop-
ment,” and “to stabilize the livestock industry dependent on
the public range.” 48 Stat. 1269. The Act grants the Sec-
retary of the Interior authority to divide the public range-
lands into grazing districts, to specify the amount of grazing
permitted in each district, to issue leases or permits “to
graze livestock,” and to charge “reasonable fees” for use of
It speciﬁes that
the land.
preference in respect to grazing permits “shall be given . . .
to those within or near” a grazing district “who are landown-
ers engaged in the livestock business, bona ﬁde occupants or
§ 315b. And,
settlers, or owners of water or water rights.”
as particularly relevant here, it adds:

43 U. S. C. §§ 315, 315a, 315b.

“So far as consistent with the purposes and provisions
of this subchapter, grazing privileges recognized and ac-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically an opinion from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 728 (2000). It discusses the history of federal regulation of grazing lands and the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1046

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 30, 2009

558 U. S.

forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  806]  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took
no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  motion.

No.  09–5373.  Melson  v.  Allen,  Commissioner,  Alabama
Department  of  Corrections,  ante,  p.  900.  Respondent  is  re
quested  to  ﬁle  a  response  to  the  petition  for  rehearing  within
30  days.

No.  09–5576.  Smith  v.  Wrigley,  Superintendent,  New
Castle Correctional Facility.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Motion of peti
tioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in
forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  807]  denied.

No.  09–5814.  In  re  Treece.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[ante,  p.  813]  denied.

No. 09–5920.  Farris v.  Whaley et al.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  943]  denied.

No.  09–5945.  In  re  Williams.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  re
consideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pau
peris  [ante,  p.  813]  denied.

No.  09–6035.  Millen  v.  Kansas  City  Star.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  966]  denied.

No. 09–6139.  In  re Traylor.  Motion of petitioner  for recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[ante,  p.  968]  denied.

No. 09–6291.  In re Bennett.  Motion of petitioner for recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[ante,  p.  813]  denied.

No.  09–6636.  Cline  v.  Utah  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Utah;
No.  09–6764.  Royse  v.  Corning  Glass  Works,  Inc.  C.  A.

6th  Cir.;

No. 09–6985.  Rucker v.  Illinois Department of Children

and  Family  Services.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.;  and

No.  09–7326.  Isa  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Motions
of  petitioners  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied.
Petitioners  are  allowed  until  December  21,  2009,  within  which  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their related motions, specifically regarding requests to proceed in forma pauperis. It lacks sequential narrative and is more akin to a legal docket than readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

Opinion of the Court

meaning  of  the  statutory  terms  before  us,  important  con-
textual clues resolve them.  Recall that Congress passed the
Act just six months after this Court handed down Cabazon.
See Part I–B, supra.  In that decision, the Court interpreted
Public Law 280 to mean that only “prohibitory” state gam-
ing laws could be applied on the Indian lands in question,
not  state  “regulatory”  gaming  laws.    The  Court  then  pro-
ceeded to hold that California bingo laws—laws materially
identical  to  the  Texas  bingo  laws  before  us  today—fell  on
the  regulatory  side  of  the  ledger.  Just  like  Texas  today,
California heavily regulated bingo, allowing it only in cer-
tain  circumstances  (usually  for  charity).    Just  like  Texas,
California  criminalized  violations  of  its  rules.  Compare
Cabazon,  480  U. S.,  at  205,  with  Tex.  Occ.  Code  Ann.
§ 2001.551.  Still, because California permitted some forms
of bingo, the Court concluded that meant California did not
prohibit, but only regulated, the game.  Cabazon, 480 U. S.,
at 211.

For us, that clinches the case.  This Court generally as-
sumes that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of
this Court’s relevant precedents.  See Ryan v. Valencia Gon-
zales,  568  U. S.  57,  66  (2013).    And  at  the  time  Congress
adopted the Restoration Act, Cabazon was not only a rele-
vant precedent concerning Indian gaming; it was the prece-
dent.  See Part I–B, supra.  In Cabazon, the Court drew a
sharp  line  between  the  terms  prohibitory  and  regulatory
and held that state bingo laws very much like the ones now
before us qualified as regulatory rather than prohibitory in
nature.  We do not see how we might fairly read the terms
of the Restoration Act except in the same light.  After all,
“[w]hen the words of the Court are used in a later statute
governing the same subject matter, it is respectful of Con-
gress and of the Court’s own processes to give the words the
same meaning in the absence of specific direction to the con-
trary.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 434 (2000).

Even beyond that vital contextual clue lie others.  In the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute (the Restoration Act) in light of a previous Supreme Court case (Cabazon).  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v.
BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–251.  Argued April 26, 2021—Decided July 1, 2021*

Charitable organizations soliciting funds in California must disclose the
identities of their major donors to the state Attorney General’s Office.
Charities generally must register with the Attorney General and re-
new their registrations annually.  The Attorney General requires char-
ities renewing their registrations to file copies of their Internal Reve-
nue  Service  Form  990,  a  form  on  which  tax-exempt  organizations
provide  information  about  their  mission,  leadership,  and  finances.
Schedule B to Form 990—the document that gives rise to the present
dispute—requires organizations to disclose the names and addresses
of their major donors.  The State contends that having this information
readily available furthers its interest in policing misconduct by chari-
ties.

The  petitioners  are  two  tax-exempt  charities  that  solicit  contribu-
tions in California.  Since 2001, each petitioner has renewed its regis-
tration and has filed a copy of its Form 990 with the Attorney General,
as required by Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, §301.  To preserve their donors’
anonymity, however, the petitioners have declined to file unredacted
Schedule  Bs,  and  they  had  until  recently  faced  no  consequences  for
noncompliance.  In 2010, the State increased its enforcement of chari-
ties’ Schedule B disclosure obligations, and the Attorney General ulti-
mately  threatened  the  petitioners  with  suspension  of  their  registra-
tions and fines for noncompliance.  The petitioners each responded by

——————

* Together with No. 19–255, Thomas More Law Center v. Bonta, also

on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are informational in nature and not meant to be indexed as part of the actual legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

LIU v. SEC

Opinion of the Court

wrongdoing, not against multiple wrongdoers under a joint-
and-several  liability  theory.    See  Ambler  v.  Whipple,  20
Wall.  546,  559  (1874)  (ordering  an  accounting  against  a
partner  who  had  “knowingly  connected  himself  with  and
aided in . . . fraud”).  In Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U. S.
126  (1878),  for  example,  a  city  engaged  contractors  to  in-
stall pavement in a manner that infringed a third party’s
patent.  The  patent  holder  brought  a  suit  in  equity  to  re-
cover  profits  from  both  the  city  and  its  contractors.    The
Court  held  that  only  the  contractors  (the  only  parties  to
make  a  profit)  were  responsible,  even  though  the  parties
answered jointly.  Id., at 140; see also ibid. (rejecting liabil-
ity for an individual officer who merely acted as an agent of
the defendant and received a salary for his work).  The rule
against joint-and-several liability for profits that have ac-
crued to another appears throughout equity cases awarding
profits.  See,  e.g.,  Belknap  v.  Schild,  161  U. S.  10,  25–26
(1896) (“The defendants, in any such suit, are therefore lia-
ble to account for such profits only as have accrued to them-
selves from the use of the invention, and not for those which
have accrued to another, and in which they have no partic-
ipation”);  Keystone  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Adams,  151  U. S.  139,  148
(1894) (reversing profits award that was based not on what
defendant had made from infringement but on what third
persons had made from the use of the invention); Jennings
v. Carson, 4 Cranch 2, 21 (1807) (holding that an order re-
quiring restitution could not apply to “those who were not
in possession of the thing to be restored” and “had no power
over  it”)  (citing  Penhallow  v.  Doane’s  Administrators,  3
Dall. 54 (1795) (reversing a restitution award in admiralty
that ordered joint damages in excess of what each defend-
ant received)).

Finally,  courts  limited  awards  to  the  net  profits  from
wrongdoing, that is, “the gain made upon any business or
investment,  when  both  the  receipts  and  payments  are
taken into the account.”  Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt discussing the concept of joint-and-several liability in the context of profits earned from wrongdoing. It provides historical examples and legal precedents to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

BREYER, J., dissenting

Review, and Claims of Fairness (with Lessons from Wash
ington State), 79 Wash. L. Rev. 775, 791–792 (2004) (after
Pulley,  many  States  repealed  their  statutes  requiring
comparative  proportionality  review,  and  most  state  high
courts  “reduced  proportionality  review  to  a  perfunctory
exercise” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The studies bear out my own view, reached after consid
ering  thousands  of  death  penalty  cases  and  last-minute
petitions  over  the  course  of  more  than  20  years.    I  see
discrepancies  for  which  I  can  find  no  rational  explana
tions.  Cf.  Godfrey,  446  U. S.,  at  433  (plurality  opinion)
(“There  is  no  principled  way  to  distinguish  this  case,  in
which  the  death  penalty  was  imposed,  from  the  many
cases in which it was not”).  Why does one defendant who
committed  a  single-victim  murder  receive  the  death  pen
alty (due to aggravators of a prior felony conviction and an
after-the-fact  robbery),  while  another  defendant  does  not,
despite  having  kidnapped,  raped,  and  murdered  a  young
mother while leaving her infant baby to die at the scene of
the  crime.  Compare  State  v.  Badgett,  361  N. C.  234,  644
S. E. 2d 206 (2007), and Pet. for Cert. in Badgett v. North
Carolina,  O. T.  2006,  No.  07–6156,  with  Charbonneau,
Andre Edwards Sentenced to Life in Prison for 2001 Mur
der,  WRAL,  Mar.  26,  2004,  online  at  http://www.wral.
com/news/local/story/109648.  Why does one  defendant  who
committed  a  single-victim  murder  receive  the  death  pen
alty  (due  to  aggravators  of  a  prior  felony  conviction  and
acting  recklessly  with  a  gun),  while  another  defendant
does  not,  despite  having  committed  a  “triple  murder”  by
killing  a  young  man  and  his  pregnant  wife?  Compare
Commonwealth  v.  Boxley,  596  Pa.  620,  948  A.  2d  742
(2008),  and  Pet.  for  Cert.,  O. T.  2008,  No.  08–6172,  with
Shea,  Judge  Gives  Consecutive  Life  Sentences  for  Triple
Murder, Philadelphia Inquirer, June 29, 2004, p. B5.  For
that matter, why does one defendant who participated in a
single-victim  murder-for-hire  scheme  (plus  an  after-the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It cites legal cases and studies to support his argument against the death penalty.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1136

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–7973.  Bell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7974.  Allen  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  844.

No.  09–7975.  Rosenbaum  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  585  F.  3d  259.

No. 09–7980.  Taylor v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  582  F.  3d  558.

No.  09–7983.  Trogdon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d  762.

No.  09–264.  Centauri  Shipping  Ltd.  v.  Western  Bulk
Carriers KS et al.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Justice
Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this
petition.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  36.

No.  09–272.  Athens  Disposal  Co.,  Inc.,  dba  Athens  Serv
ices  v.  Franco.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d  App.  Dist.  Motion  of  Paciﬁc
Legal  Foundation  et  al.  for  leave  to  ﬁle  a  brief  as  amici  curiae
granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  171  Cal.  App.  4th
1277,  90  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  539.

No.  09–288.  Puget  Sound  Energy,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  Califor
nia  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Motion  of  Law  Professors  for  leave
to  ﬁle  a  brief  as  amici  curiae  granted.  Certiorari  denied.  The
Chief  Justice  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of
this  motion  and  this  petition.  Reported  below:  499  F.  3d  1016.
No.  09–335.  Astellas  Pharma,  Inc.  v.  Lupin  Ltd.  et  al.
C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Breyer  took  no
part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported
below:  566  F.  3d  1282.

No.  09–458.  Weinstock  v.  Walker.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.
Appx.  101.

No. 09–471.  Falchenberg v. New York State Department
of  Education  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Jus
tice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of
this  petition.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  11.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 624 (1998)

635

Opinion of the Court

AIDS 19, 24. Osmond, Classiﬁcation and Staging of HIV
Disease, in AIDS Knowledge Base 1.1–8; Saag, Clinical Spec-
trum of Human Immunodeﬁciency Virus Diseases, in AIDS:
Etiology 204.

The initial stage of HIV infection is known as acute
In a typical case, this stage
or primary HIV infection.
lasts three months. The virus concentrates in the blood.
The assault on the immune system is immediate. The vic-
tim suffers from a sudden and serious decline in the num-
ber of white blood cells. There is no latency period.
Mononucleosis-like symptoms often emerge between six days
and six weeks after infection, at times accompanied by fever,
headache, enlargement of the lymph nodes (lymphadenopa-
thy), muscle pain (myalgia), rash, lethargy, gastrointestinal
disorders, and neurological disorders. Usually these symp-
toms abate within 14 to 21 days. HIV antibodies appear
in the bloodstream within 3 weeks; circulating HIV can be
detected within 10 weeks. Carr & Cooper, Primary HIV
Infection, in Medical Management of AIDS 89–91; Cohen &
Volberding, Clinical Spectrum of HIV Disease,
in AIDS
Knowledge Base 4.1–7; Crowe & McGrath, Acute HIV Infec-
tion, in AIDS Knowledge Base 4.2–1 to 4.2–4; Saag, AIDS:
Etiology 204–205.

After the symptoms associated with the initial stage sub-
side, the disease enters what is referred to sometimes as its
asymptomatic phase. The term is a misnomer, in some re-
spects, for clinical features persist throughout,
including
lymphadenopathy, dermatological disorders, oral lesions, and
bacterial infections. Although it varies with each individ-
ual, in most instances this stage lasts from 7 to 11 years.
The virus now tends to concentrate in the lymph nodes,
though low levels of the virus continue to appear in the
blood. Cohen & Volberding, AIDS Knowledge Base 4.1–4,
4.1–8; Saag, AIDS: Etiology 205–206; Staprans & Feinberg,
Natural History and Immunopathogenesis of HIV–1 Disease,
It was once
in Medical Management of AIDS 29, 38.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically the opinion of the court in a case. It cites sources and discusses the stages of HIV infection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:26] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1040

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 27, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–7879. Carter v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–7885. Grant v. Rivers. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–7894. Davis v. Missouri et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 249.

No. 99–7898. Barnett v. Oklahoma et al. Ct. Crim. App.

Okla. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7900. Aguirre v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th

App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7901. Brattain v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7912.
Certiorari denied.

Jensen v. Lawseth et al. C. A. 9th Cir.

No. 99–7914. Lee v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7927. McKire v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 131.

No. 99–7928. Williams v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 743 So. 2d 511.

No. 99–7935. Coates v. United States District Court
for the Northern District of California. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7939. Mitchell v. Mantello, Superintendent,
Coxsackie Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–7940. Yahweh v. Suthers, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Corrections. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 520.

No. 99–7951. Kemnitz v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. C. A.

2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 165 F. 3d 14.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1123

529 U. S.

May 15, 2000

No. 99–9080. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9083.

Johnson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1348.

No. 99–9086. Namey et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1330.

No. 99–9088. Adams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 661.

No. 99–9089. Castaneda-Ceja v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9090. Bustamante v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 659.

No. 99–9101. Nathan v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 230.

No. 99–9102.
Certiorari denied.

Jackson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

No. 99–9103. Mungal v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9111. Martin v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 836.

No. 99–9120. Villagran v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 208 F. 3d 207.

No. 99–9178. Conway v. Gamble, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9194.

Jones v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 990 P. 2d 1098.

No. 99–1176. MCI Communications Corp. and Subsidiaries
et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision
of this petition. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 1068.

No. 99–1478. Labora v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.
Justice O’Connor took no

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their outcomes (certiorari denied). It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document, not typical readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$71P 02-16-99 22:29:48 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 524 U. S. 1 (1998)

9

Opinion of the Court

In re Palliser concerned a man who sent letters from New
York to postmasters in Connecticut, attempting to gain post-
age on credit, in violation of then-applicable law. The Court
held that the defendant could be prosecuted in Connecticut,
where the mail he addressed and dispatched was received.
136 U. S., at 266–268. The Palliser opinion simply recog-
nizes that a mailing to Connecticut is properly ranked as an
act completed in that State. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 3237(a) (“Any
offense involving the use of the mails . . . is a continuing
offense and . . . may be . . . prosecuted in any district from,
through, or into which such . . . mail matter . . . moves.”);
United States v. Johnson, 323 U. S. 273, 275 (1944) (consistent
with the Constitution “an illegal use of the mails . . . may
subject the user to prosecution in the district where he sent
the goods, or in the district of their arrival, or in any inter-
vening district”). Cabrales, however, dispatched no missive
from one State into another. The counts before us portray
her and the money she deposited and withdrew as moving
inside Florida only.

Finally, the Government urges the efﬁciency of trying
Cabrales in Missouri, because evidence in that State, and not
in Florida, shows that the money Cabrales allegedly laun-
dered derived from unlawful activity. Although recognizing
that the venue requirement is principally a protection for the
defendant, Reply Brief 10, the Government further main-
tains that its convenience, and the interests of the commu-
nity victimized by drug dealers, merit consideration.

But if Cabrales is in fact linked to the drug-trafﬁcking
activity, the Government is not disarmed from showing that
is the case. She can be, and indeed has been, charged with
conspiring with the drug dealers in Missouri.
If the Gov-
ernment can prove the agreement it has alleged, Cabrales
can be prosecuted in Missouri for that confederacy, and her
money laundering in Florida could be shown as overt acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy. See 18 U. S. C. § 371 (requir-
ing proof of an “act to effect the object of the conspiracy”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the case of Cabrales and the issue of venue in money laundering charges.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

BREYER, J., dissenting

actually  support  the  existence  of  an  intent-to-terrify  re-
quirement.  Start with Sir John Knight’s Case, which, ac-
cording to the Court, considered Knight’s arrest for walking
“ ‘about the streets’ ” and into a church “ ‘armed with guns.’ ”
Ante, at 34 (quoting Sir John Knight’s Case, 3 Mod. 117, 87
Eng. Rep., at 76).  The Court thinks that Knight’s acquittal
by  a  jury  demonstrates  that  the  Statute  of  Northampton
only prohibited public carriage of firearms with an intent to
terrify.  Ante, at 34–35.  But by now the legal significance
of Knight’s acquittal is impossible to reconstruct.  Brief for
Patrick J. Charles as Amicus Curiae 23, n. 9.  The primary
source describing the case (the English Reports) was noto-
riously incomplete at the time Sir John Knight’s Case was
decided.  Id., at 24–25.  And the facts that historians can
reconstruct do not uniformly support the Court’s interpre-
tation.  The King’s Bench required Knight to pay a surety
to  guarantee  his  future  good  behavior,  so  it  may  be  more
accurate to think of the case as having ended in “a condi-
tional pardon” than acquittal.  Young, 992 F. 3d, at 791; see
also Rex v. Sir John Knight, 1 Comb. 40, 90 Eng. Rep. 331
(K. B. 1686).  And, notably, it appears that Knight based his
defense on his loyalty to the Crown, not a lack of intent to
terrify.  3 The Entring Book of Roger Morrice 1677–1691:
The Reign of James II, 1685–1687, pp. 307–308 (T. Harris
ed. 2007).

Similarly,  the  passage  from  the  Hawkins  treatise  on
which the Court relies states that the Statute of Northamp-
ton’s prohibition on the public carriage of weapons did not
apply to the “wearing of Arms . . . unless it be accompanied
with such Circumstances as are apt to terrify the People.”
Hawkins  136.  But  Hawkins  goes  on  to  enumerate  rela-
tively narrow circumstances where this exception applied:
when “Persons of Quality . . . wea[r] common Weapons, or
hav[e]  their  usual  Number  of  Attendants  with  them,  for
their Ornament or Defence, in such Places, and upon such
Occasions, in which it is the common Fashion to make use
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedents and analyzes their application to the case at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 624 (1998)

629

Opinion of the Court

patient registration form. Petitioner completed a dental
examination, discovered a cavity, and informed respondent
of his policy against ﬁlling cavities of HIV-infected patients.
He offered to perform the work at a hospital with no added
fee for his services, though respondent would be responsible
for the cost of using the hospital’s facilities. Respondent
declined.

Respondent sued petitioner under state law and § 302 of
the ADA, 104 Stat. 355, 42 U. S. C. § 12182, alleging discrimi-
nation on the basis of her disability. The state-law claims
are not before us. Section 302 of the ADA provides:

“No individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who . . . operates a place of public accommo-
dation.”

§ 12182(a).

The term “public accommodation” is deﬁned to include the
§ 12181(7)(F).
“professional ofﬁce of a health care provider.”
A later subsection qualiﬁes the mandate not to discrimi-

nate.

It provides:

“Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to
permit an individual to participate in or beneﬁt from the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and
accommodations of such entity where such individual
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.”
§ 12182(b)(3).

The United States and the Maine Human Rights Commis-
sion intervened as plaintiffs. After discovery, the parties
ﬁled cross-motions for summary judgment. The District
Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that respond-
ent’s HIV infection satisﬁed the ADA’s deﬁnition of disabil-
ity.
912 F. Supp. 580, 585–587 (Me. 1995). The court held
further that petitioner raised no genuine issue of material
fact as to whether respondent’s HIV infection would have
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 624 (1998).  It discusses the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its application to a dentist refusing to treat an HIV-positive patient.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

7–8 (citing EPA, Fifth Five-Year Review Report: Anaconda
Smelter  Superfund  Site,  Anaconda-Deer  Lodge  County,
Montana, Table 10–1 (Sept. 25, 2015), https://semspub.epa.
gov/work/08/1549381.pdf ).    EPA  projects  that  remedial
work  will  continue  through  2025.  Id.,  Table  10–7;  Tr.  of
Oral Arg. 30.

C
In 2008, a group of 98 owners of property within the Su-
perfund site filed this lawsuit against Atlantic Richfield in
Montana  state  court,  asserting  trespass,  nuisance,  and
strict liability claims under state common law.  The land-
owners sought restoration damages, among other forms of
relief.

Under  Montana  law,  property  damages  are  generally
measured by the “difference between the value of the prop-
erty before and after the injury, or the diminution in value.”
Sunburst School Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 338 Mont. 259,
269, 165 P. 3d 1079, 1086 (2007).  But “when the damaged
property serves as a private residence and the plaintiff has
an interest in having the property restored, diminution in
value will not return  the plaintiff to the same position as
before  the  tort.”  Id.,  at  270,  165  P. 3d,  at  1087.    In  that
circumstance, the plaintiff may seek restoration damages,
even  if  they  exceed  the  property’s  diminution  in  value.
See  ibid.;  Restatement  (Second)  of  Torts  §929,  and
Comment b (1977).

To collect restoration damages, a plaintiff must demon-
strate that he has “reasons personal” for restoring the prop-
erty and that his injury is temporary and abatable, mean-
ing “[t]he ability to repair [the] injury must be more than a
theoretical  possibility.”  Sunburst  School  Dist.  No.  2,  338
Mont., at 269, 165 P. 3d, at 1086–1087.  The injured party
must “establish that the award actually will be used for res-
toration.”  Lampi v. Speed, 362 Mont. 122, 130, 261 P. 3d
1000, 1006 (2011).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of restoration damages in the context of property damage under Montana law. It cites relevant case law and legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

function, they do so in a materially different way.  Id., at
207.  More  specifically,  Dr.  Lubarsky  explained  that  both
barbiturates  and  benzodiazepines  initially  cause  sedation
by facilitating the binding of a naturally occurring chemi
cal  called  gamma-aminobutyric  acid  (GABA)  with  GABA
receptors,  which  then  impedes  the  flow  of  electrical  im
pulses through the neurons in the central nervous system.
Id., at 206.  But at higher doses, barbiturates also act as a
GABA  substitute  and  mimic  its  neuron-suppressing  ef
fects.  Ibid.  By  contrast,  benzodiazepines  lack  this  mim
icking  function,  which  means  their  effect  is  capped  at  a
lower  level  of  sedation.  Ibid.    Critically,  according  to  Dr.
Lubarsky,  this  ceiling  on  midazolam’s  sedative  effect  is
reached  before  full  anesthesia  can  be  achieved.    Ibid.
Thus,  in  his  view,  while  “midazolam  unconsciousness  is
. . . sufficient” for “minor procedure[s],” Tr. of Preliminary
Injunction  Hearing  132–133  (Tr.),  it  is  incapable  of  keep
ing someone “insensate and immobile in the face of [more]
noxious  stimuli,”  including  the  extreme  pain  and  discom
fort associated with administration of the second and third
drugs  in  Oklahoma’s  lethal  injection  protocol,  App.  218.
Dr.  Sasich  endorsed  Dr.  Lubarsky’s  description  of  the
ceiling effect, and offered similar reasons for reaching the
same conclusion.  See id., at 243, 248, 262.

In  support  of  these  assertions,  both  experts  cited  a

variety of evidence.  Dr. Lubarsky emphasized, in particu
lar,  Arizona’s  2014  execution  of  Joseph  Wood,  which  had
been conducted using midazolam and the drug hydromor
phone  rather  than  the  three-drug  cocktail  Oklahoma
intends  to  employ.1  Id.,  at  176.  Despite  being  adminis
tered  750  milligrams  of  midazolam,  Wood  had  continued
breathing  and  moving  for  nearly  two  hours—which,  ac

——————

1 Hydromorphone is a powerful analgesic similar to morphine or hero
in.  See R. Stoelting & S. Hillier, Pharmacology & Physiology in Anes
thetic Practice 87–88 (4th ed. 2006) (Stoelting & Hillier).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the effects of the drug midazolam in lethal injections, citing expert testimony and referencing a specific execution case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
894

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5238.  Hunt  v.  Wolfenbarger,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5239.  Hairston  v.  Haynes,  Superintendent,  War
ren Correctional Institution.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certiorari de
nied.  Reported  below:  297  Fed.  Appx.  273.

No.  09–5240.  Hungate  v.  Mabus,  Secretary  of  the  Navy.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  302  Fed.
Appx.  579.

No.  09–5241.  Walker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  281.

No.  09–5244.  Tensley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  837.

No.  09–5245.  Cho-Ing  Tseng  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  950.

No.  09–5246.  Brooks  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  1284.

No.  09–5249.  Leal  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  704.

No.  09–5250.  Sager  v.  Hall,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5252.  McGee  v.  Higgins,  Warden.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  832.

No.  09–5253.  Bannister  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  256.

No.  09–5254.  Robinson  et  al.  v.  Pennsylvania  Depart
ment  of  Corrections  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  321.

No.  09–5255.  Heinemann  v.  Wilson,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.
10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.
455.

No.  09–5257.  Elliott  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  540.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and the circuit court where the case was heard.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

33

BREYER, J., dissenting

That  they  are  small  and  light  makes  them  easy  to  steal,
see supra, at 19, and concealable, cf. ante, at 54 (opinion of
the  Court)  (suggesting  that  concealed-weapon  bans  are
constitutional).

This  symmetry  suggests  that  any  measure  less  restric-
tive in respect to the use of handguns for self-defense will,
to that same extent, prove less effective in preventing the
use  of  handguns  for  illicit  purposes.    If  a  resident  has  a
handgun in the home that he can use for self-defense, then
he has a handgun in the home that he can use to commit
suicide or engage in acts of domestic violence.  See supra,
at 18 (handguns prevalent in suicides); Brief for National
Network  to  End  Domestic  Violence  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae
27  (handguns  prevalent  in  domestic  violence).    If  it  is
indeed the case, as the District believes, that the number
of  guns  contributes  to  the  number  of  gun-related  crimes,
accidents,  and  deaths,  then,  although  there  may  be  less
restrictive,  less  effective  substitutes  for  an  outright  ban,
there is no less restrictive equivalent of an outright ban.

Licensing  restrictions  would  not  similarly  reduce  the
handgun population, and the District may reasonably fear
that  even  if  guns  are  initially  restricted  to  law-abiding
citizens,  they  might  be  stolen  and  thereby  placed  in  the
hands of criminals.  See  supra, at 19.  Permitting certain
types  of  handguns,  but  not  others,  would  affect  the  com-
mercial  market  for  handguns,  but  not  their  availability.
And  requiring  safety  devices  such  as  trigger  locks,  or
imposing  safe-storage  requirements  would  interfere  with
any  self-defense  interest  while  simultaneously  leaving
operable weapons in the hands of owners (or others capa-
ble  of  acquiring  the  weapon  and  disabling  the  safety  de-
vice)  who  might  use  them  for  domestic  violence  or  other
crimes.

The  absence  of  equally  effective  alternatives  to  a  com-
plete  prohibition  finds  support  in  the  empirical  fact  that
other States and urban centers prohibit particular types of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It argues against the constitutionality of certain handgun restrictions. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring

good, may be hastily and unadvisedly passed,” section III of
the New York Constitution required the two Houses of the
New  York  Legislature  to  present  “all  bills  which  have
passed  the  senate  and  assembly”  to  the  “council  for  their
revisal and consideration.”  Ibid.  The Council’s power “to
revise legislation” meant that, if it “objected to any measure
of a bill, it would return a detailed list of its objections to
the legislature,” which “could change the bill to conform to
those objections, override” them by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, “or simply let the bill die.”  J. Barry, Comment: The
Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power, 56 U.
Chi.  L.  Rev.  235,  245  (1989)  (Barry)  (emphasis  deleted).1
The  grounds  for  the  Council’s  vetoes  “ranged  from  an  act
being ‘inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution’ to an
act being passed without ‘the persons affected thereby hav-
ing an opportunity of being heard’ ” to an act being “ ‘incon-
sistent with the public good.’ ”  Id., at 245–246 (alteration
and footnote omitted).
  At first, the Council was a well-respected institution, and
several  prominent  delegates  to  the  Philadelphia  Conven-
tion sought to replicate it in the Federal Constitution.  Res-
olution 8 of the Virginia Plan proposed a federal council of
revision composed of “the Executive and a convenient num-
ber of the National Judiciary” that would have “authority
to examine [and veto] every act of the National Legislature
before it shall operate.”  1 Records of the Federal Conven-
tion of 1787, §8, p. 21 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (Farrand).  The
Council’s veto would “be final . . . unless the Act of the Na-
tional Legislature be again passed.”  Ibid.; see also J. Mal-
colm, Whatever the Judges Say It Is? The Founders and Ju-
dicial Review, 26 J. L. & Politics 1, 30–33 (2010).
  The proponents of a council were clear that they sought
——————

1 The term “revise” was understood to mean “[t]o review.”  2 S. Johnson,
A Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 1773); N. Bailey, A Uni-
versal Etymological English Dictionary (22 ed. 1770) (“to review, to look
over again”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 599 U.S. ____ (2023). It delves into the historical context of legislative review and cites relevant sources.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION ET AL. v.
BECERRA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 20–1114.  Argued November 30, 2021—Decided June 15, 2022

The Medicare statute lays out a formula that the Department of Health
and  Human  Services  must  employ  annually  to  set  reimbursement
rates for certain outpatient prescription drugs provided by hospitals to
Medicare patients.  42 U. S. C. §1395l(t)(14)(A)(iii).  That formula af-
fords HHS two options.  Option 1 applies if HHS has conducted a sur-
vey  of  hospitals’  acquisition  costs  for  each  covered  outpatient  drug.
Under this option, the agency may set reimbursement rates based on
the hospitals’ “average acquisition cost” for each drug, and may “vary”
the reimbursement rates “by hospital group.”  §1395l(t)(14)(A)(iii)(I).
Absent a survey, option 2 applies, and HHS must set reimbursement
rates based on “the average price” charged by manufacturers for the
the  Secretary.”
drug
§1395l(t)(14)(A)(iii)(II).  Option 2 does not authorize HHS to vary re-
imbursement rates for different hospital groups.  From the time these
provisions took effect in 2006 until 2018, HHS did not conduct surveys
of  hospitals’  acquisition  costs,  relied  on  option  2,  set  the  reimburse-
ment rates at about 106 percent, and did not vary those rates by hos-
pital group.  For 2018, HHS again did not conduct a survey.  But this
time it issued a final rule establishing separate reimbursement rates
for hospitals that serve low-income or rural populations through the
340B program and all other hospitals.  For 2019, HHS set reimburse-
ment rates the same way.

“calculated

adjusted

and

by

as

The  American  Hospital  Association  and  other  interested  parties
challenged the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates in federal court.
In  response,  HHS  first  contended  that  various  statutory  provisions
precluded judicial review of those rates.  The agency also argued that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

an institution of higher education.”  438 U. S., at 311–315.
Race could be considered in the college admissions process
in pursuit of this goal, the plurality explained, if it is one
factor of many in an applicant’s file, and each applicant re-
ceives individualized review as part of a holistic admissions
process.  Id., at 316–318.

Since  Bakke,  the  Court  has  reaffirmed  numerous  times
the  constitutionality  of  limited  race-conscious  college  ad-
missions.  First,  in  Grutter  v.  Bollinger,  539  U. S.  306
(2003), a majority of the Court endorsed the Bakke plural-
ity’s “view that student body diversity is a compelling state
interest that can justify the use of race in university admis-
sions,” 539 U. S., at 325, and held that race may be used in
a narrowly tailored manner to achieve this interest, id., at
333–344;  see  also  Gratz  v.  Bollinger,  539  U. S.  244,  268
(2003) (“for the reasons set forth [the same day] in Grutter,”
rejecting petitioners’ arguments that race can only be con-
sidered in college admissions “to remedy identified discrim-
ination” and that diversity is “ ‘too open-ended, ill-defined,
and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest’ ”).

Later, in the Fisher litigation, the Court twice reaffirmed
that a limited use of race in college admissions is constitu-
tionally permissible if it satisfies strict scrutiny.  In Fisher
v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U. S. 297 (2013) (Fisher
I),  seven  Members  of  the  Court  concluded  that  the  use  of
race  in  college  admissions  comports  with  the  Fourteenth
Amendment if it “is narrowly tailored to obtain the educa-
tional benefits of diversity.”  Id., at 314, 337.  Several years
later, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 579 U. S.
365, 376 (2016) (Fisher II), the Court upheld the admissions
program at the University of Texas under this framework.
Id., at 380–388.

Bakke,  Grutter,  and  Fisher  are  an  extension  of  Brown’s
legacy.  Those decisions recognize that “ ‘experience lend[s]
support to the view that the contribution of diversity is sub-
stantial.’ ”    Grutter,  539  U. S.,  at  324  (quoting  Bakke,  438
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It cites previous Supreme Court cases and discusses the legal precedent surrounding affirmative action in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of the Court

United States,” even when those officers exercise power in
or related to Puerto Rico.

III
A
The  more  difficult  question  before  us  is  whether  the
Board members are officers of the United States such that
the Appointments Clause requires Senate confirmation.  If
they are not officers of the United States, but instead are
some  other  type  of  officer,  the  Appointments  Clause  says
nothing about them.  (No one suggests that they are “Am-
bassadors,”  “other  public  Ministers  and  Consuls,”  or
“Judges of the supreme Court.”)  And as we shall see, the
answer to this question turns on whether the Board mem-
bers have primarily local powers and duties.

The language at issue does not offer us much guidance for
understanding  the  key  term  “of  the  United  States.”    The
text  suggests  a  distinction  between  federal  officers—offic-
ers  exercising  power  of  the  National  Government—and
nonfederal officers—officers exercising power of some other
government.  The Constitution envisions a federalist struc-
ture, with the National Government exercising limited fed-
eral  power  and  other,  local  governments—usually  state
governments—exercising  more  expansive  power.    But  the
Constitution recognizes that for certain localities, there will
be  no  state  government  capable  of  exercising  local  power.
Thus, two provisions of the Constitution, Article I, §8, cl. 17,
and Article IV, §3, cl. 2, give Congress the power to legislate
for those localities in ways “that would exceed its powers,
or at least would be very unusual” in other contexts.  Pal-
more  v.  United  States,  411  U. S.  389,  398  (1973).    Using
these powers, Congress has long legislated for entities that
are  not  States—the  District  of  Columbia  and  the  Territo-
ries.  See  District  of  Columbia  v.  John  R.  Thompson  Co.,
346 U. S. 100, 104–106 (1953).  And, in doing so, Congress
has both made local law directly and also created structures
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, which is suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

RITTER v. MIGLIORI

ALITO, J., dissenting

would be silly to think otherwise.  Think of the previously
mentioned  hypothetical  voters  whose  votes  were  not
counted because they did not follow the rules for casting a
vote.  None of the rules they violated—rules setting the date
of  an  election,  the  location  of  the  voter’s  assigned  polling
place, the address to which a mail-in ballot must be sent—
has anything to do with the requirements that must be met
in order to establish eligibility to vote, and it would be ab-
surd to judge the validity of voting rules based on whether
they are material to eligibility.

Under Pennsylvania law, a person is qualified to vote if
he or she is at least 18 years old on the day of the election,
has been a citizen of the State for at least one month, has
lived  in  the  relevant  election  district  for  at  least  30  days,
and is not imprisoned for a felony.  See 25 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§1301 (2002).  Other requirements must be met in order for
a mail-in ballot to be counted.  Among other things, a stat-
ute provides that a voter “shall . . . fill out, date and sign” a
declaration printed on the outer security envelope in which
the actual ballot is sealed.  S. 422, 2020 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Pa.), codified at Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, §3150.16(a)
(emphasis added); see also Migliori v. Lehigh County Bd. of
Elections, No. 5:22–cv–0397 (ED Pa., Mar. 16, 2022), App.
to Application 23a–24a.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has held that the inclusion of the date on which the ballot
was filled out is mandatory and that undated ballots cannot
be counted, see In re Canvass of Absentee and Mail-in Bal-
lots of Nov. 3, 2020 General Election, 241 A. 3d 1058 (Pa.
2020), but the Third Circuit held that this state-law rule is
preempted by 52 U. S. C. §10101(a)(2)(B) because the inclu-
sion of a date is not material to the question whether a per-
son is qualified to vote.

Can  that  possibly  be  correct?    One  may  argue  that  the
inclusion of a date does not serve any strong purpose and
that a voter’s failure to date a ballot should not cause the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses a legal case (Ritter v. Migliori) concerning voting rules and ballot counting in Pennsylvania. The content delves into legal arguments and interpretations of relevant statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC.

Opinion of the Court

are de minimis rather than significantly disproportionate.

*

*

*
We  conclude  that  the  EPA  permissibly  relied  on  cost-
benefit analysis in setting the national performance stan-
dards  and  in  providing  for  cost-benefit  variances  from
those  standards  as  part  of  the  Phase  II  regulations.    The
Court  of  Appeals’  reliance  in  part  on  the  agency’s  use  of
cost-benefit  analysis  in  invalidating  the  site-specific  cost-
benefit variance provision, 475 F. 3d, at 114, was therefore
in  error,  as  was  its  remand  of  the  national  performance
standards for clarification of whether cost-benefit analysis
was  impermissibly  used,  id.,  at  104–105.    We  of  course
express  no  view  on  the  remaining  bases  for  the  Second
Circuit’s remand which did not depend on the permissibil-
ity of cost-benefit analysis.  See id., at 108, 110, 113, 115,
117,  120.8    The  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  is  re-
versed,  and  the  cases  are  remanded  for  further  proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

8 JUSTICE BREYER would remand for the additional reason of what he
regards  as  the  agency’s  inadequate  explanation  of  the  change  in  its
criterion  for  variances—from  a  relationship  of  costs  to  benefits  that  is
“ ‘wholly disproportionate’ ” to one that is “ ‘significantly greater.’ ”  Post,
at 7–8 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).  That ques-
tion  can  have  no  bearing  upon  whether  the  EPA  can  use  cost-benefit
analysis, which is the only question presented here.  It seems to us, in
any case, that the EPA’s explanation was ample.  It explained that the
“wholly  out  of  proportion”  standard  was  inappropriate  for  the  existing
facilities subject to the Phase II rules because those facilities lack “the
greater flexibility available to new facilities for selecting the location of
their  intakes  and  installing  technologies  at  lower  costs  relative  to  the
costs  associated  with  retrofitting  existing  facilities,”  and  because
“economically impracticable impacts on energy prices, production costs,
and  energy  production  . . .  could  occur  if  large  numbers  of  Phase  II
existing  facilities  incurred  costs  that  were  more  than  ‘significantly
greater’ than but not ‘wholly out of proportion’ to the costs in the EPA’s
record.”  68 Fed. Reg. 13541 (2003).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the concluding portion. It discusses the court's decision regarding the EPA's use of cost-benefit analysis in setting performance standards.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

Finally,  common  sense  compels  the  conclusion  that  a
notice that does not specify when and where to appear for
a removal proceeding is not a “notice to appear” that trig-
gers  the  stop-time  rule.  If  the  three  words  “notice  to  ap-
pear” mean anything in this context, they must mean that,
at a minimum, the Government has to provide noncitizens
“notice” of the information, i.e., the “time” and “place,” that
would  enable  them  “to  appear”  at  the  removal  hearing  in
the  first  place.  Conveying  such  time-and-place  infor-
mation to a noncitizen is an essential function of a notice
to  appear,  for  without  it,  the  Government  cannot  reason-
ably  expect  the  noncitizen  to  appear  for  his  removal  pro-
ceedings.  To  hold  otherwise  would  empower  the  Govern-
ment  to  trigger  the  stop-time  rule  merely  by  sending
noncitizens  a  barebones  document  labeled  “Notice  to
Appear,”  with  no  mention  of  the  time  and  place  of  the
removal  proceedings,  even  though  such  documents  would
do  little  if  anything  to  facilitate  appearance  at  those  pro-
ceedings.7  “ ‘We are not willing to impute to Congress . . .

——————

adequately.    Ibid.    But  nothing  in  our  interpretation  of  the  statute
“force[s]” the Government to guess when and where a hearing will take
place, ibid., nor does our interpretation prevent DHS and the Immigra-
tion  Courts  from  working  together  to  streamline  the  scheduling  of
removal  proceedings,  see  infra,  at  18–19.    Far  from  “lull[ing]”  nonciti-
zens  into  a  false  sense  of  security, post,  at  14,  our  reading  (unlike  the
Government’s  and  the  dissent’s)  still  gives  meaning  to  a  noncitizen’s
“opportunity to secure counsel before the first [removal] hearing date,”
§1229(b)(1),  by  informing  the  noncitizen  that  the  Government  is  com-
mitted  to  moving  forward  with  removal  proceedings  at  a  specific  time
and  place.  Equipped  with  that  knowledge,  a  noncitizen  has  an  incen-
tive to obtain counsel and prepare for his hearing.

7 At  oral  argument,  the  Government  conceded  that  a  blank  piece  of
paper  would  not  suffice  to  trigger  the  stop-time  rule  because  (in  its
view)  such  a  hypothetical  notice  would  fail  to  specify  the  charges
against  the  noncitizen.    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  39–40  (arguing  that  notice  to
appear  must  “tell  the  alien  what  proceedings  he  must  appear  for  and
why  he  must  appear  for  them”).    The  dissent  also  endorses  the  view
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Pereira v. Sessions*.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part

supra, at 16–26; Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 Vand.
L. Rev. 1593, 1620 (2018).7

In light of the racist origins of the non-unanimous jury, it
is no surprise that non-unanimous juries can make a differ-
ence in practice, especially in cases involving black defend-
ants, victims, or jurors.  After all, that was the whole point
of  adopting  the  non-unanimous  jury  requirement  in  the
first place.  And the math has not changed.  Then and now,
non-unanimous juries can silence the voices and negate the
votes of black jurors, especially in cases with black defend-
ants or black victims, and only one or two black jurors.  The
10 jurors “can simply ignore the views of their fellow panel
members of a different race or class.”  Johnson v. Louisiana,
406  U. S.  356,  397  (1972)  (Stewart,  J.,  dissenting).  That
reality—and the resulting perception of unfairness and ra-
cial bias—can undermine confidence in and respect for the
criminal justice system.  The non-unanimous jury operates
much the same as the unfettered peremptory challenge, a
practice  that  for  many  decades  likewise  functioned  as  an
engine of discrimination against black defendants, victims,
and jurors.  In effect, the non-unanimous jury allows back-
door and unreviewable peremptory strikes against up to 2
of the 12 jurors.

In its 1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court rec-
ognized the pervasive racial discrimination woven into the
traditional  system  of  unfettered  peremptory  challenges.
See 476 U. S., at 85–89, 91.  The Court therefore overruled
a prior decision, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965),
that had allowed those challenges.  See generally Flowers

——————

7 Oregon adopted the non-unanimous jury practice in 1934—one man-
ifestation of the extensive 19th- and early 20th-century history of racist
and anti-Semitic sentiment  in that State.  See Kaplan & Saack, Over-
turning  Apodaca  v.  Oregon  Should  Be  Easy:  Nonunanimous  Jury  Ver-
dicts in Criminal Cases Undermine the Credibility of Our Justice Sys-
tem, 95 Ore. L. Rev. 1, 3, 43–51 (2016); Mooney, Remembering 1857, 87
Ore. L. Rev. 731, 778, n. 174 (2008).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the history and implications of non-unanimous juries, particularly in relation to racial bias.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

9

Opinion of the Court

See  Goldfarb,  supra,  at  790;  see  also  1A  P.  Areeda  &  H.
Hovencamp,  Antitrust  Law  ¶226,  p.  180  (4th  ed.  2013)
(Areeda &  Hovencamp).  The question is not whether the
challenged  conduct  is  efficient,  well-functioning,  or  wise.
See Ticor, supra, at 634–635.  Rather, it is “whether anti
competitive  conduct  engaged  in  by  [nonsovereign  actors]
should be deemed state action and thus shielded from the
antitrust  laws.”    Patrick  v.  Burget,  486  U. S.  94,  100
(1988).

To answer this question, the Court applies the two-part
test  set  forth  in  California  Retail  Liquor  Dealers  Assn.  v.
Midcal  Aluminum,  Inc.,  445  U. S.  97,  a  case  arising  from
California’s  delegation  of  price-fixing  authority  to  wine
merchants.  Under  Midcal,  “[a]  state  law  or  regulatory
scheme cannot be the basis for antitrust immunity unless,
first,  the  State  has  articulated  a  clear  policy  to  allow  the
anticompetitive  conduct,  and  second,  the  State  provides
active supervision of [the] anticompetitive conduct.”  Ticor,
supra, at 631 (citing Midcal, supra, at 105).

Midcal’s  clear  articulation  requirement  is  satisfied
“where  the  displacement  of  competition  [is]  the  inherent,
logical,  or  ordinary  result  of  the  exercise  of  authority
delegated  by  the  state  legislature.    In  that  scenario,  the
State  must  have  foreseen  and  implicitly  endorsed  the
anticompetitive effects as consistent with its policy goals.”
Phoebe  Putney,  568  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  11).    The
active  supervision  requirement  demands,  inter  alia,  “that
state officials have and exercise power to review particular
anticompetitive  acts  of  private  parties  and  disapprove
those that fail to accord with state policy.”  Patrick, supra,
U. S., at 101.

The  two  requirements  set  forth  in  Midcal  provide  a

proper analytical framework to resolve the ultimate ques
tion whether an anticompetitive policy is indeed the policy
of  a  State.    The  first  requirement—clear  articulation—
rarely  will  achieve  that  goal  by  itself,  for  a  policy  may
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses antitrust law and the "state action" doctrine, referencing prior cases and legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)

717

Scalia, J., dissenting

As to the ﬁrst: The usual, ordinary-English deﬁnition of
“revoke” is already amply distinguishable from “terminate,”
and does not have to be tortured into Old English (or actu-
ally, transliteration from Old Latin) in order to explain the
choice of words.
“Terminate” connotes completion rather
than cancellation. See American Heritage Dictionary 1852
(3d ed. 1992) (deﬁning “terminate” as “[t]o bring to an end
or a halt” or “[t]o occur at or form the end of; conclude or
ﬁnish”); Webster’s New International Dictionary 2605 (2d ed.
1942) (deﬁning “terminate” as “[t]o put an end to; to make to
cease; to end . . . to form the conclusion of . . .”). Using
“terminate” in subsection (e)(1) and “revoke” (in its ordinary
sense) in subsection (e)(3) is not only not inexplicable; it re-
ﬂects an admirably precise use of language.
In subsection
(e)(1),
the term of supervised release is “terminated”
(“brought to an end”) because termination is warranted “by
the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of jus-
tice.” The supervised release is treated as fulﬁlled, and the
sentence is complete.
In subsection (e)(3), by contrast, the
supervised release term is not merely brought to an end; it
is annulled and treated as though it had never existed, the
defendant receiving no credit for any supervised release
served.
It would be hard to pick two words more clearly
connoting these distinct consequences than “terminate” and
“revoke.” 2

2 The Court is correct, ante, at 705, n. 7, that my suggested explanation
of the difference between “terminate” and “revoke” does not comport with
the use of “terminate” in § 3583(g). But the use of the term in that sub-
section also contradicts the Court’s explanation of the difference between
the two terms—viz., that “terminate,” unlike in its view “revoke,” “con-
clude[s] any possibility of supervised release later,” ante, at 704. For the
Court evidently believes (contrary to the use of “terminate” in § 3583(g))
that further supervised release is available when a supervisee is reimpris-
oned for possession of a controlled substance.
It would be “fundamentally
contrary” to the congressional scheme, the Court asserts, if supervised
release following reimprisonment were not available for “one who has al-
ready tried liberty and failed,” ante, at 709. But the use of “terminate” in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia in the case 529 U.S. 694 (2000).  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  601 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., concurring in judgment

. . . represent[s] all the voters in the Nation.’ ”  Ante, at 11
(quoting Anderson, 460 U. S., at 795).  That is especially so,
the majority adds, because different States can reach “[c]on-
flicting . . . outcomes concerning the same candidate . . . not
just from differing views of the merits, but from variations
in state law governing the proceedings” to enforce Section
3.  Ante, at 11.

The  contrary  conclusion  that  a  handful  of  officials  in  a
few States could decide the Nation’s next President would
be especially surprising with respect to Section 3.  The Re-
construction Amendments “were specifically designed as an
expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sover-
eignty.”  City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 179
(1980).  Section  3  marked  the  first  time  the  Constitution
placed  substantive  limits  on  a  State’s  authority  to  choose
its own officials.  Given that context, it would defy logic for
Section 3 to give States new powers to determine who may
hold the Presidency.  Cf. ante, at 8 (“It would be incongru-
ous  to  read  this  particular  Amendment  as  granting  the
States  the  power—silently  no  less—to  disqualify  a  candi-
date for federal office”).

That provides a secure and sufficient basis to resolve this
case.  To allow Colorado to take a presidential candidate off
the  ballot  under  Section  3  would  imperil  the Framers’  vi-
sion  of  “a  Federal  Government  directly  responsible  to  the
people.”  U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 821.  The Court
should have started and ended its opinion with this conclu-
sion.

II

Yet the Court continues on to resolve questions not before
us.  In  a  case  involving  no  federal  action  whatsoever,  the
Court opines on how federal enforcement of Section 3 must
proceed.  Congress, the majority says, must enact legisla-
tion under Section 5 prescribing the procedures to “ ‘ “ascer-
tain[ ] what particular individuals” ’ ” should be disqualified.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Supreme Court Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. It discusses the interpretation of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment and its implications for presidential candidacy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U51

[09-26-01 10:31:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 494 (2000)

511

Stevens, J., dissenting

recognize that, at least in certain instances, the agreement
itself can give rise to liability for civil conspiracy.6 And of
the nine cases cited in which liability is rejected for failure
to state a cause of action, four are the opinions of intermedi-
ate state courts and one is the three-page opinion of a Fed-
eral District Court—hardly strong evidence of the “widely
accepted” premise on which the Court relies. Ante, at 501.
Thus, the cases cited by the Court do not at all place its con-
clusion on any ﬁrm footing.

Nevertheless, based on its understanding of the common
law, the Court concludes that “a RICO conspiracy plaintiff
[must] allege injury from an act that is analogous to an ‘ac[t]
of a tortious character.’ ” Ante, at 505. Even assuming
that statement is correct, though, it is not at all clear to me
why an overt act that “injure[s]” a person “in his business
or property” (as § 1964(c) requires) would not be “analogous
to an ‘ac[t] of a tortious character’ ” simply because the overt
act is not listed in § 1961(1). Nor do I understand why the

stam v. Welch, 705 F. 2d 472, 487 (CADC 1983) (“[A] conspiracy requires:
an agreement to do an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner;
an overt act in furtherance of the agreement by someone participating in
it; and injury caused by the act”).

6 See Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A. 2d 106, 110, n. 4 (Me. 1972) (“We are
aware that in particular extraordinary circumstances there has been rec-
ognized the existence of a separate self-sufﬁcient and independent tort of
‘conspiracy,’ as a substantive basis of civil liability”); Halberstam, 705
F. 2d, at 477, n. 7; W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 46, p. 293 (4th ed. 1971) (“[I]t
now seems generally agreed . . . that there are certain types of conduct,
such as boycotts, in which the element of combination adds such a power
of coercion, undue inﬂuence or restraint of trade, that it makes unlawful
acts which one man alone might legitimately do.
It is perhaps pointless
to debate whether in such a case the combination or conspiracy becomes
itself the tort, or whether it merely gives a tortious character to the acts
done in furtherance of it. On either basis, it is the determining factor in
liability”). See also Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So. 2d
164, 165–167, and n. 1 (Fla. 1958), where the court upheld liability exclu-
sively on precisely that premise.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens in the case 529 U.S. 494 (2000).  It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DAVIS v. ERMOLD

Statement of THOMAS, J.

religious beliefs “as bigots,” id., at 741 (opinion of ALITO, J.).
Those predictions did not take long to become reality.

Kim Davis, a former county clerk in the Commonwealth
of  Kentucky,  was  responsible  for  authorizing  marriage  li-
censes.  Davis is also a devout Christian.  When she began
her tenure as clerk, Davis’ sincerely held religious beliefs—
that  marriage  exists  between  one  man  and  one  woman—
corresponded  with  the  definition  of  marriage  under  Ken-
tucky law.  See Ky. Rev. Stat. §402.005 (1998); Ky. Const.
§233A (2004).  Within weeks of this Court granting certio-
rari in Obergefell, Davis began lobbying for amendments to
Kentucky law that would protect the free exercise rights of
those  who  had  religious  objections  to  same-sex  marriage.
But those efforts were cut short by this Court’s decision in
Obergefell.

As a result of this Court’s alteration of the Constitution,
Davis  found  herself  faced  with  a  choice  between  her  reli-
gious  beliefs  and  her  job.    When  she  chose  to  follow  her
faith, and without any statutory protection of her religious
beliefs, she was sued almost immediately for violating the
constitutional rights of same-sex couples.

Davis  may  have  been  one  of  the  first  victims  of  this
Court’s cavalier treatment of religion in its Obergefell deci-
sion, but she will not be the last.  Due to Obergefell, those
with  sincerely  held  religious  beliefs  concerning  marriage
will  find  it  increasingly  difficult  to  participate  in  society
without running afoul of Obergefell and its effect on other
antidiscrimination laws.  It would be one thing if recogni-
tion for same-sex marriage had been debated and adopted
through  the  democratic  process,  with  the  people  deciding
not to provide statutory protections for religious liberty un-
der  state  law.*  But  it  is  quite  another  when  the  Court

——————

* Under this Court’s precedents, “the right of free exercise does not re-
lieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or pre-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Davis v. Ermold. It argues against the Obergefell decision legalizing same-sex marriage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
986

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

Statement of Stevens, J.

558 U. S.

the  Protection  of  Foreign  Ofﬁcials  and  Ofﬁcial  Guests  of  the
United  States,  Pub.  L.  92–539,  § 201,  86  Stat.  1072,  which  had  the
effect of changing the applicable statute of limitations from § 3281
to  § 3282.

In  this  case,  the  District  Court  held  that  the  1972  repeal  did
not  retroactively  change  the  character  of  a  violation  of  § 1201  as
a capital offense within the meaning of § 3281—and therefore that
the  prosecution  of  Seale  could  go  forward—but  a  panel  of  the
Court  of  Appeals  reversed.  542  F.  3d  1033  (CA5  2008).  In  re
sponse  to  the  Government’s  petition  for  rehearing  en  banc,  the
full  court  vacated  the  panel  decision  and,  by  an  equally  divided
9-to-9  vote, afﬁrmed  the  District Court’s  ruling  on the  limitations
defense.  570  F.  3d  650  (2009)  (per  curiam);  see  also  id.,  at  651
(DeMoss,  J.,  dissenting)  (noting  the  afﬁrmance’s  “nominal”  nature
in  light  of  the  deadlock).  Following  the  procedure  authorized  by
Congress  in  28  U. S. C.  § 1254(2)  and  by  this  Court’s  Rule  19,  a
majority  of  the  members  of  the  en  banc  court  voted  to  certify
this  question  of  law  to  us  for  decision.

The  question  is  narrow,  debatable,  and  important.  I  recognize
that  the  question  reaches  us  in  an  interlocutory  posture,  as  Seale
appealed  his  conviction  on  numerous  grounds,  and  that  “[i]t  is
primarily  the  task  of  a  Court  of  Appeals  to  reconcile  its  internal
difﬁculties,” Wisniewski v.  United States, 353 U. S. 901, 902 (1957)
(per  curiam).  Yet  I  see  no  beneﬁt  and  signiﬁcant  cost  to  post
poning  the  question’s  resolution.  A  prompt  answer  from  this
Court  will  expedite  the  termination  of  this  litigation  and  deter
mine  whether  other  similar  cases  may  be  prosecuted.  In  these
unusual  circumstances,  certiﬁcation  can  serve  the  interests  not
only  of  legal  clarity  but  also  of  prosecutorial  economy  and  “the
proper  administration  and  expedition  of  judicial  business.”  Ibid.
The  certiﬁcation  process  has  all  but  disappeared  in  recent  dec
ades.  The  Court  has  accepted  only  a  handful  of  certiﬁed  cases
since  the  1940’s  and  none  since  1981;  it  is  a  newsworthy  event
these  days  when  a  lower  court  even  tries  for  certiﬁcation.  Sec
tion  1254(2)  and  this  Court’s  Rule  19  remain  part  of  our  law
because the certiﬁcation process serves a valuable, if limited, func
tion.  We  ought  to  avail  ourselves  of  it  in  an  appropriate  case.
In my judgment, this case should be briefed and set for argument.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a portion of one, specifically the statement of Justice Stevens. It contains legal citations, discusses legal precedent, and analyzes a specific legal issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>