<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MILLER v. ALABAMA

Syllabus

against a sentence for a particular class of offenders.  But where, as
here, this Court does not categorically bar a penalty, but instead re-
quires  only  that  a  sentencer  follow  a  certain  process,  this  Court  has
not  scrutinized  or  relied  on  legislative  enactments  in  the  same  way.
See, e.g., Sumner v. Schuman, 483 U. S. 66.

In any event, the “objective indicia of society’s standards,” Graham,
560 U. S., at ___, that the States offer do not distinguish these cases
from  others  holding  that  a  sentencing  practice  violates  the  Eighth
Amendment.  Fewer  States  impose  mandatory  life-without-parole
sentences on juvenile homicide offenders than authorized the penalty
(life-without-parole for nonhomicide offenders) that this Court invali-
dated in Graham.  And as Graham and Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U. S.  815,  explain,  simply  counting  legislative  enactments  can  pre-
sent  a  distorted  view.  In  those  cases,  as  here,  the  relevant  penalty
applied  to  juveniles  based  on  two  separate  provisions:  One  allowed
the transfer of certain juvenile offenders to adult court, while another
set out penalties for any and all individuals tried there.  In those cir-
cumstances, this Court reasoned, it was impossible to say whether a
legislature had endorsed a given penalty for children (or would do so
if presented with the choice).  The same is true here. Pp. 18–25.

(2) The  States  next  argue  that  courts  and  prosecutors  suffi-
ciently consider a juvenile defendant’s age, as well as his background
and the circumstances of his crime, when deciding whether to try him
as an adult.  But this argument ignores that many States use manda-
tory  transfer  systems.    In  addition,  some  lodge  the  decision  in  the
hands of the prosecutors, rather than courts.  And even where judges
have transfer-stage discretion, it has limited utility, because the deci-
sionmaker typically will have only partial information about the child
or  the  circumstances  of  his  offense.    Finally,  because  of  the  limited
sentencing options in some juvenile courts, the transfer decision may
present a choice between a light sentence as a juvenile and standard
sentencing  as  an  adult.    It  cannot  substitute  for  discretion  at  post-
trial sentencing.  Pp. 25−27.

No. 10−9646, 63 So. 3d 676, and No. 10−9647, 2011 Ark. 49, ___ S. W.

3d ___, reversed and remanded.

KAGAN,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  KENNEDY,
GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.  BREYER, J., filed a con-
curring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed a
dissenting  opinion,  in  which  SCALIA,  THOMAS,  and  ALITO,  JJ.,  joined.
THOMAS,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  SCALIA,  J.,  joined.
ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of the Supreme Court.  It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a summary of the legal issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U74

[09-06-00 17:54:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 51 (1998)

61

Opinion of the Court

III

It is a general principle of corporate law deeply “ingrained
in our economic and legal systems” that a parent corporation
(so-called because of control through ownership of another
corporation’s stock) is not liable for the acts of its subsidiar-
ies. Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale L. J. 193 (1929) (hereinafter
Douglas); see also, e. g., Buechner v. Farbenfabriken Bayer
Aktiengesellschaft, 38 Del. Ch. 490, 494, 154 A. 2d 684, 687
(1959); Berkey v. Third Ave. R. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 85, 155 N. E.
58 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); 1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Law of
Private Corporations § 33, p. 568 (rev. ed. 1990) (“Neither
does the mere fact that there exists a parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship between two corporations make the one liable for
the torts of its afﬁliate”); Horton, Liability of Corporation for
Torts of Subsidiary, 7 A. L. R. 3d 1343, 1349 (1966) (“Ordi-
narily, a corporation which chooses to facilitate the operation
of its business by employment of another corporation as a
subsidiary will not be penalized by a judicial determination
of liability for the legal obligations of the subsidiary”); cf.
Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U. S. 349, 362 (1944) (“Limited liabil-
ity is the rule, not the exception”); Burnet v. Clark, 287 U. S.
410, 415 (1932) (“A corporation and its stockholders are gen-
erally to be treated as separate entities”). Thus it is horn-
book law that “the exercise of the ‘control’ which stock own-
ership gives to the stockholders . . . will not create liability

(CA1 1990) (parent actively involved in the affairs of its subsidiary may
be held directly liable as an operator of the facility, regardless of whether
the corporate veil can be pierced), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 1084 (1991),
Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F. 3d 248, 254–255 (CA2 1996) (same), Lansford-
Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F. 3d 1209, 1220–1225 (CA3
1993) (same), Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F. 2d 1107,
1110 (CA11 1993) (same), and Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons
Co., 966 F. 2d 837, 842 (CA4) (parent having authority to control subsidiary
is liable as an operator, even if it did not exercise that authority), cert.
denied, 506 U. S. 940 (1992).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the liability of parent corporations for the acts of their subsidiaries. It contains legal citations and arguments, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

question about fraud.  To provide an incomplete answer to
the question presented disserves the public and our fellow
judges.    The  Court  does  not  decide  the  question  that  has
split the Courts of Appeals, but instead decides a question
that no court has addressed.  And by granting review of one
question but answering another, we encourage litigants “to
seek  review  of  a  circuit  conflict  only  then  to  change  the
question to one that seems more favorable.”  Czyzewski v.
Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (THOMAS, J.,
dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  2);  see  also  Yee,  503  U. S.,  at  536
(parties would be “encouraged to fill their limited briefing
space  and  argument  time  with  discussion  of  issues  other
than the one on which certiorari was granted”).  The result
is  muddled  briefing  on  questions  we  did  not  agree  to  re-
solve,  and  a  ruling  that  bypasses  the  ordinary  process  of
appellate review.

II
  In  this  case,  the  Court’s  misstep  comes  at  considerable
cost.  A requirement to know the law is ordinarily satisfied
by constructive knowledge, cf. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L. P. A., 559 U. S. 573, 584 (2010),
because “actual knowledge of illegality” can be “difficult or
impossible”  to  prove,  Ratzlaf  v.  United  States,  510  U. S.
135,  162  (1994)  (Blackmun,  J.,  dissenting).    Yet  here,  the
Court imposes an actual-knowledge-of-law standard that is
virtually  unprecedented  except  in  criminal  tax  enforce-
ment.  See Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 201–203
(1991).  And while the Court claims the word “knowledge”
in §411(b)(1)(A) compels this conclusion, see ante, at 5, that
result is far from certain.  In Cheek, this Court required ac-
tual  knowledge  of  law  in  light  of  a  “willfulness”  require-
ment.  498 U. S., at 201–202.  A “knowledge” requirement,
by  contrast,  often  encompasses  actual  and  constructive
knowledge.    See  Intel  Corp.  Investment  Policy  Comm.  v.
Sulyma,  589  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2020)  (slip  op.,  at  6–7).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Opinion of the Court

court.  The  District  Courts  for  the  Districts  of  Maryland
and  Hawaii  entered  nationwide  preliminary  injunctions
barring  enforcement  of  the  entry  suspension,  and  the
respective  Courts  of  Appeals  upheld  those  injunctions,
albeit  on  different  grounds.    International  Refugee  Assis-
tance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 857 F. 3d 554 (CA4 2017);
Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F. 3d 741 (CA9 2017) (per curiam).
This Court granted certiorari and stayed the injunctions—
allowing  the  entry  suspension  to  go  into  effect—with
respect to foreign nationals who lacked a “credible claim of
a  bona  fide  relationship”  with  a  person  or  entity  in  the
United  States.  Trump  v.  IRAP,  582  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2017)
(per  curiam)  (slip  op.,  at  12).    The  temporary  restrictions
in EO–2 expired before this Court took any action, and we
vacated  the  lower  court  decisions  as  moot.    Trump  v.
IRAP,  583  U. S.  ___  (2017);  Trump  v.  Hawaii,  583  U. S.
___ (2017).

On  September  24,  2017,  after  completion  of  the  world-
wide review, the President issued the Proclamation before
us—Proclamation  No.  9645,  Enhancing  Vetting  Capabili-
ties and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the
United  States  by  Terrorists  or  Other  Public-Safety
Threats.  82  Fed.  Reg.  45161.    The  Proclamation  (as  its
title  indicates)  sought  to  improve  vetting  procedures  by
identifying ongoing deficiencies in the information needed
to assess whether nationals of particular countries present
“public safety threats.”  §1(a).  To further that purpose, the
Proclamation placed entry restrictions on the nationals of
eight  foreign  states  whose  systems  for  managing  and
sharing  information  about  their  nationals  the  President
deemed inadequate.

The  Proclamation  described  how  foreign  states  were
selected  for  inclusion  based  on  the  review  undertaken
pursuant to EO–2.  As part of that review, the Department
of  Homeland  Security  (DHS),  in  consultation  with  the
State  Department  and  several  intelligence  agencies,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and outlines the background of a legal challenge to a presidential proclamation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

the couple joined this lawsuit did the Tribe agree to a set-
tlement that would permit the couple to finalize the adop-
tion.

After nearly two years moving between foster-care place-
ments, Child P., whose maternal grandmother is a member
of  an  Indian  Tribe,  was  placed  with  a  non-Indian  couple
who provided her a stable home.  After the placement, the
Tribe,  which  had  told  the  state  court  years  earlier  that
Child P. was not eligible for tribal membership, reversed its
position without explanation and enrolled her as a member.
The Tribe then objected to the couple’s efforts to adopt Child
P., even though her court-appointed guardian believed that
the  adoption  was  in  Child  P.’s  best  interest.  “To  comply
with the ICWA,” the state court removed Child P. from the
couple’s custody and placed her with her maternal grand-
mother, “who had lost her foster license due to a criminal
conviction.”  Ante, at 8 (majority opinion).

Does  the  Constitution  give  Congress  the  authority  to
bring  about  such  results?  I  would  hold  that  it  does  not.
Whatever  authority  Congress  possesses  in  the  area  of  In-
dian affairs, it does not have the power to sacrifice the best
interests of vulnerable children to promote the interests of
tribes in maintaining membership.  Nor does Congress have
the power to force state judges to disserve the best interests
of children or the power to delegate to tribes the authority
to force those judges to abide by the tribes’ priorities regard-
ing adoption and foster-care placement.

I
The  Court  makes  a  valiant  effort  to  bring  coherence  to
what has been said in past cases about Congress’s power in
this area, but its attempt falls short.  At the end of a lengthy
discussion, the majority distills only this nugget: Congress’s
power  over  Indian  affairs  is  “plenary”  but  not  “absolute.”
Ante, at 13–14.  The majority in today’s cases did not coin
this formulation; it merely repeats what earlier cases have
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It delves into the constitutional authority of Congress regarding Indian affairs, particularly concerning adoption and foster care placement.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007)

15

Opinion of the Court

prove  that  if  he  had  received  the  procedure  the  substan-
tive result would have been altered.  All that is necessary
is  to  show  that  the  procedural  step  was  connected  to  the
substantive result”).

Only  one  of  the  petitioners  needs  to  have  standing  to
permit us to consider the petition for review.  See Rumsfeld
v.  Forum  for  Academic  and  Institutional  Rights,  Inc.,  547
U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (2006).  We stress here, as did Judge Tatel
below,  the  special  position  and  interest  of  Massachusetts.
It  is  of  considerable  relevance  that  the  party  seeking  re-
view here is a sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan,
a private individual.

Well  before  the  creation  of  the  modern  administrative
state,  we  recognized  that  States  are  not  normal  litigants
for  the  purposes  of  invoking  federal  jurisdiction.    As  Jus-
tice Holmes explained in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U. S. 230, 237 (1907), a case in which Georgia sought
to protect its citizens from air pollution originating outside
its borders:

“The case has been argued largely as if it were one
between  two  private  parties;  but  it  is  not.    The  very
elements that would be relied upon in a suit between
fellow-citizens  as  a  ground  for  equitable  relief  are
wanting here.  The State owns very little of the terri-
tory alleged to be affected, and the damage to it capa-
ble  of  estimate  in  money,  possibly,  at  least,  is  small.
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capac-
ity of quasi-sovereign.  In that capacity the State has
an interest independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.  It
has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
stripped  of  their  forests  and  its  inhabitants  shall
breathe pure air.”

Just as Georgia’s “independent interest . . . in all the earth
and air within its domain” supported federal jurisdiction a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1102

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 14, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–5061.  Hakim  v.  Thomas,  Superintendent,  Lumber-

ton  Correctional  Institution,  ante,  p.  885;

No.  09–5064.  Toriola  v.  Appellate  Division,  Supreme
Court  of  New  York,  Second  Judicial  Department,  et  al.,
ante,  p.  885;

No.  09–5180.  Floyd  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  891;
No.  09–5229.  Hailey  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion,  ante,  p.  893;

No. 09–5353.  Del Castello v.  Superior Court of Califor

nia,  Alameda  County,  ante,  p.  899;

No.  09–5405.  Velazquez  v.  Lape,  Superintendent,  Cox

sackie  Correctional  Facility,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  902;

No.  09–5443.
No.  09–5507.
No.  09–5520.
No.  09–5549.
No.  09–5620.
No.  09–5787.
No.  09–5835.
No.  09–5907.
No.  09–5926.
No.  09–6104.
No.  09–6129.

ante,  p.  929;

Tucker  v.  Chipla  College,  ante,  p.  904;

Meizlik  v.  Florida,  ante,  p.  907;

Trobee  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  907;

Johnson  v.  Kelly,  Warden,  ante,  p.  909;

Jones  v.  Florida,  ante,  p.  913;

Ford  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  918;

Dean  v.  Blaisdell,  Warden,  ante,  p.  953;

In  re  York,  ante,  p.  813;

Reed  v.  Cirtin,  ante,  p.  971;

Anderson  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  928;

Greenwood,  aka  Grimes  v.  United  States,

No.  09–6181.

Balko  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De

partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  974;

No.  09–6258.  Graham  v.  Missouri,  ante,  p.  998;
No.  09–6434.  In  re  Telfair,  ante,  p.  988;
No.  09–6435.  In  re  Telfair,  ante,  p.  989;
No.  09–6468.  Telfair  v.  Tandy,  Administrator,  Drug  En

forcement  Agency,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  1028;

No. 09–6524.  White v.  Gates, Secretary of Defense, ante,

p.  976;

No.  09–6529.  In  re  Ndoromo,  ante,  p.  944;  and
No.  09–6581.  Corral  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  1000.  Peti

tions  for  rehearing  denied.

No.  09–5183.  Howard  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  939;

No.  09–5322.  Mason  v.  Guzdek  et  al.,  ante,  p.  940;  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case citations from a legal document, likely a Supreme Court docket. It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 624 (1998)

641

Opinion of the Court

1630, App., p. 351 (1997)). We need not resolve this dispute
It cannot be said as
in order to decide this case, however.
a matter of law that an 8% risk of transmitting a dread and
fatal disease to one’s child does not represent a substantial
limitation on reproduction.

The Act addresses substantial limitations on major life ac-
tivities, not utter inabilities. Conception and childbirth are
not impossible for an HIV victim but, without doubt, are
dangerous to the public health. This meets the deﬁnition of
a substantial limitation. The decision to reproduce carries
economic and legal consequences as well. There are added
costs for antiretroviral therapy, supplemental insurance, and
long-term health care for the child who must be examined
and, tragic to think, treated for the infection. The laws of
some States, moreover, forbid persons infected with HIV to
have sex with others, regardless of consent.
Iowa Code
§§ 139.1, 139.31 (1997); Md. Health Code Ann. § 18–601.1(a)
(1994); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 50–18–101, 50–18–112 (1997);
Utah Code Ann. § 26–6–3.5(3) (Supp. 1997); id., § 26–6–5
(1995); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.011(1)(b) (Supp. 1998); see
also N. D. Cent. Code § 12.1–20–17 (1997).

In the end, the disability deﬁnition does not turn on per-
sonal choice. When signiﬁcant limitations result from the
impairment, the deﬁnition is met even if the difﬁculties are
not insurmountable. For the statistical and other reasons
we have cited, of course, the limitations on reproduction may
be insurmountable here. Testimony from the respondent
that her HIV infection controlled her decision not to have a
child is unchallenged. App. 14; 912 F. Supp., at 587; 107
F. 3d, at 942.
In the context of reviewing summary judg-
ment, we must take it to be true. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e).
We agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals
that no triable issue of fact impedes a ruling on the question
of statutory coverage. Respondent’s HIV infection is a
physical impairment which substantially limits a major life
In view of our holding, we
activity, as the ADA deﬁnes it.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its application to HIV/AIDS. It delves into the definition of "substantial limitation" in the context of major life activities, using reproduction as a case example.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Opinion of the Court

bucks  under  my  pillow  every  time  I  score  a  touchdown.
Hell, I can’t afford to graduate.’ ”  Id., at 211, n. 17.  In 1946,
a commentator offered this view:  “[W]hen it comes to chi-
canery,  double-dealing,  and  general  undercover  work  be-
hind the scenes, big-time college football is in a class by it-
self.”  Woodward, Is College Football on the Level?, Sport,
Nov. 1946, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 35.

In 1948, the NCAA sought to do more than admonish.  It
adopted  the  “Sanity  Code.”  Colleges  Adopt  the  ‘Sanity
Code’  To  Govern  Sports,  N. Y.  Times,  Jan.  11,  1948,  p. 1,
col. 1.  The code reiterated the NCAA’s opposition to “prom-
ised pay in any form.”  Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Congress, 2d Sess.,
pt.  2,  p.  1094  (1978).  But  for  the  first  time  the  code  also
authorized colleges and universities to pay athletes’ tuition.
Ibid.  And  it  created  a  new  enforcement  mechanism—
providing  for  the  “suspension  or  expulsion”  of  “proven  of-
fenders.”  Colleges  Adopt  ‘Sanity  Code,’  N. Y.  Times,  p. 1,
col. 1.  To some, these changes sought to substitute a con-
sistent,  above-board  compensation  system  for  the  varying
under-the-table schemes that had long proliferated.  To oth-
ers, the code marked “the beginning of the NCAA behaving
as an effective cartel,” by enabling its member schools to set
and enforce “rules that limit the price they have to pay for
their inputs (mainly the ‘student-athletes’).”  Zimbalist 10.
The  rules  regarding  student-athlete  compensation  have
evolved ever since.  In 1956, the NCAA expanded the scope
of allowable payments to include room, board, books, fees,
and “cash for incidental expenses such as laundry.”  In re
National  Collegiate  Athletic  Assn.  Athletic  Grant-in-Aid
Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1063 (ND Cal.
2019) (hereinafter D. Ct. Op.).  In 1974, the NCAA began
permitting paid professionals in one sport to compete on an
amateur basis in another.  Brief for Historians as Amici Cu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court's Opinion of the Court. It discusses the history of NCAA rules regarding student-athlete compensation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8  MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the  Federal  Circuit  ruled  for  the  Government  in  each  ap-
peal.  See 892 F. 3d 1311; 892 F. 3d 1184 (2018); 729 Fed.
Appx. 939 (2018).  As relevant here, the Federal Circuit con-
cluded that §1342 had initially created a Government obli-
gation to pay the full amounts that petitioners sought un-
der  the  statutory  formula.    See  892  F. 3d,  at  1320–1322.
The court also recognized that “it has long been the law that
the government may incur a debt independent of an appro-
priation  to  satisfy  that  debt,  at  least  in  certain  circum-
stances.”  Id., at 1321.

Even so, the court held that Congress’ appropriations rid-
ers impliedly “repealed or suspended” the Government’s ob-
ligation.  Id.,  at  1322.    Although  the  panel  acknowledged
that  “[r]epeals  by  implication  are  generally  disfavored”—
especially  when  the  “alleged  repeal  occurred  in  an  appro-
priations bill”—it found that the riders here “adequately ex-
pressed  Congress’s  intent  to  suspend”  the  Government’s
payments  to  unprofitable  plans  “beyond  the  sum  of  pay-
ments” it collected from profitable plans.  Id., at 1322–1323,
1325.

Judge  Newman  dissented,  observing  that  the  Govern-
ment  had  not  identified  any  “statement  of  abrogation  or
amendment of the statute,” nor any “disclaimer” of the Gov-
ernment’s  “statutory  and  contractual  commitments.”    Id.,
at 1335.  The dissent also reasoned that precedent under-
mined  the  court’s  conclusion  and  that  the  appropriations
riders  could  not  apply  retroactively  because  the  Govern-
ment had used the Risk Corridors program to induce insur-
ers to enter the exchanges.  Id., at 1336–1339.  Emphasizing
the importance of Government credibility in public-private
enterprise, the dissent warned that the majority’s decision
would  “undermin[e]  the  reliability  of  dealings  with  the
government.”  Id., at 1340.

——————
Cl. 1 (2017) (dismissing Maine Community Health’s statutory claims).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Maine Community Health Options v. United States. It delves into the court's reasoning, the dissenting opinion, and relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

emptions are available, but only if they invoke certain pre-
ferred (nonreligious) justifications.  Under Maine law, em-
ployees  can  avoid  the  vaccine  mandate  if  they  produce  a
“written statement” from a doctor or other care provider in-
dicating  that  immunization  “may  be”  medically  inadvisa-
ble.  Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, §802(4–B) (2021).  Nothing
in Maine’s law requires this note to contain an explanation
why vaccination may be medically inadvisable, nor does the
law limit what may qualify as a valid “medical” reason to
avoid inoculation.  So while COVID–19 vaccines have Food
and Drug Administration labels describing certain contra-
indications for their use, individuals in Maine may refuse a
vaccine for other reasons too.  From all this, it seems Maine
will respect even mere trepidation over vaccination as suf-
ficient, but only so long as it is phrased in medical and not
religious terms.  That kind of double standard is enough to
trigger at least a more searching (strict scrutiny) review.

Strict scrutiny applies to Maine’s vaccine mandate for an-
other related reason.  This Court has explained that a law
is not neutral and generally applicable if it treats “any com-
parable secular activity more favorably than religious exer-
cise.”  Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (per cu-
riam) (slip op., at 1); see also Fulton, 593 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 6); Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 542–546.  And again, this
description applies to Maine’s rule.  The State allows those
invoking medical reasons to avoid the vaccine mandate on
the apparent premise that these individuals can take alter-
native measures (such as the use of protective gear and reg-
ular  testing)  to  safeguard  their  patients  and  co-workers.
But the State refuses to allow those invoking religious rea-
sons to do the very same thing.

Unpack this point further.  Maine has offered four justi-

fications for its vaccination mandate:

(1)  Protecting  individual  patients  from  contracting

COVID–19;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a vaccine mandate in Maine, focusing on the application of strict scrutiny and the potential discrimination against religious exemptions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2010

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BRUESEWITZ ET AL. v. WYETH LLC, FKA WYETH, INC.,
ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09–152.  Argued October 12, 2010—Decided February 22, 2011

The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA or Act) cre-
ated  a  no-fault  compensation  program  to  stabilize  a  vaccine  market
adversely  affected  by  an  increase  in  vaccine-related  tort  litigation
and  to  facilitate  compensation  to  claimants  who  found  pursuing  le-
gitimate  vaccine-inflicted  injuries  too  costly  and  difficult.    The  Act
provides that a party alleging a vaccine-related injury may file a peti-
tion  for  compensation  in  the  Court  of  Federal  Claims,  naming  the
Health  and  Human  Services  Secretary  as  the  respondent;  that  the
court  must  resolve  the  case  by  a  specified  deadline;  and  that  the
claimant  can  then  decide  whether  to  accept  the  court’s  judgment  or
reject it and seek tort relief from the vaccine manufacturer.  Awards
are paid out of a fund created by an excise tax on each vaccine dose.
As a quid pro quo, manufacturers enjoy significant tort-liability pro-
tections.  Most importantly, the Act eliminates manufacturer liability
for a vaccine’s unavoidable, adverse side effects.

Hannah Bruesewitz’s parents filed a vaccine-injury petition in the
Court  of  Federal  Claims,  claiming  that  Hannah  became  disabled  af-
ter  receiving  a  diphtheria,  tetanus,  and  pertussis  (DTP)  vaccine
manufactured  by  Lederle  Laboratories  (now  owned  by  respondent
Wyeth).  After that court denied their claim, they elected to reject the
unfavorable  judgment  and  filed  suit  in  Pennsylvania  state  court,  al-
leging,  inter  alia,  that  the  defective  design  of  Lederle’s  DTP  vaccine
caused  Hannah’s  disabilities,  and  that  Lederle  was  subject  to  strict
liability  and  liability  for  negligent  design  under  Pennsylvania  com-
mon law.  Wyeth removed the suit to the  Federal District Court.  It
granted  Wyeth  summary  judgment,  holding  that  the  relevant  Penn-
sylvania  law  was  preempted  by  42  U. S. C.  §300aa–22(b)(1),  which
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
42

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

decision in Worcester: “ ‘[T]hanks be to God, the Court can
wash  [its]  hands  clean  of  the  iniquity  of  oppressing  the
Indians and disregarding their rights.’ ”  Breyer 420.  “ ‘The
Court had done its duty,’ ” even if Georgia refused to do its
own.  Ibid.  Today,  the  tables  turn.  Oklahoma’s  courts
exercised the fortitude to stand athwart their own State’s
lawless  disregard  of  the  Cherokee’s  sovereignty.    Now,  at
the  bidding  of  Oklahoma’s  executive  branch,  this  Court
unravels  those  lower-court  decisions,  defies  Congress’s
statutes requiring tribal consent, offers its own consent in
place of the Tribe’s, and allows Oklahoma to intrude on a
feature of tribal sovereignty recognized since the founding.
One can only hope the political branches and future courts
will do their duty to honor this Nation’s promises even as
we have failed today to do our own.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the start of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal citations and arguments, indicating it is part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary or structural element.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

LUCKY BRAND DUNGAREES, INC., ET AL. v. MARCEL
FASHIONS GROUP, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 18–1086.  Argued January 13, 2020—Decided May 14, 2020

Petitioners (collectively Lucky Brand) and respondent (Marcel) both use
the word “Lucky” as part of their marks on jeans and other apparel.
Marcel received a trademark registration for the phrase “Get Lucky,”
and Lucky Brand uses the registered trademark “Lucky Brand” and
other marks with the word “Lucky.”  This has led to nearly 20 years of
litigation,  proceeding  in  three  rounds.    The  first  round  resulted  in  a
2003 settlement agreement in which Lucky Brand agreed to stop using
the  phrase  “Get  Lucky”  and  Marcel  agreed  to  release  any claims  re-
garding Lucky Brand’s use of its own trademarks.  In the second round
(2005 Action), Lucky Brand sued Marcel and its licensee for violating
its  trademarks.    Marcel  filed  several  counterclaims  turning,  as  rele-
vant here, on Lucky Brand’s alleged continued use of “Get Lucky,” but
it  did  not  claim  that  Lucky  Brand’s  use  of  its  own  marks  alone  in-
fringed the “Get Lucky” mark.  In both a motion to dismiss the coun-
terclaims and an answer to them, Lucky Brand argued that the coun-
terclaims  were  barred  by  the  settlement  agreement,  but  it  did  not
invoke  that  defense  later  in  the  proceedings.    The  court  in  the  2005
Action permanently enjoined Lucky Brand from copying or imitating
Marcel’s “Get Lucky” mark, and a jury found against Lucky Brand on
Marcel’s remaining counterclaims.  In the third round (2011 Action),
Marcel sued Lucky Brand for continuing to infringe the “Get Lucky”
mark, but it did not reprise its 2005 allegation about Lucky Brand’s
use  of  the  “Get  Lucky”  phrase.  After  protracted  litigation,  Lucky
Brand moved to dismiss, arguing—for the first time since early in the
2005  Action—that  Marcel  had  released  its  claims  in  the  settlement
agreement.  Marcel countered that Lucky Brand could not invoke the
release defense because it could have pursued that defense in the 2005
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

THOMAS, J., dissenting

residents  in  one  metropolitan  area  (Montgomery)  with
parts of the rural Black Belt and black residents in another
metropolitan area (Mobile); (2) leaving enough of the Black
Belt’s majority-black rural areas for District 7 to maintain
its majority-black status; and (3) reducing District 1 to the
white remainder of the southern third of the State.
  If the State did this, we would call it a racial gerryman-
der, and rightly so.  We would have no difficulty recognizing
race as “the predominant factor motivating [the placement
of] significant number[s] of voters within or without” Dis-
tricts 1, 2, and 7.  Miller, 515 U. S., at 916.  The “stark splits
in the racial composition of populations moved into and out
of ”  Districts  1  and  2  would  make  that  obvious.    Bethune-
Hill, 580 U. S., at 192.  So would the manifest absence of
any  nonracial  justification for  the  new District  1.   And so
would the State’s clear intent to ensure that both Districts
2 and 7 hit their preordained racial targets.  See ibid. (not-
ing that “pursu[it of] a common redistricting policy toward
multiple districts” may show predominance).  That the plan
delivered proportional control for a particular minority—a
statistical  anomaly  that  over  2  million  race-blind  simula-
tions  did  not  yield  and  20,000  race-conscious  simulations
did not even approximate—would be still further confirma-
tion.
  The State could not justify such a plan simply by arguing
that it was less bizarre to the naked eye than other, more
elaborate  racial  gerrymanders  we  have  encountered.    See
ante, at 19–20 (discussing cases).  As we held in Miller, vis-
ual “bizarreness” is not “a necessary element of the consti-
tutional wrong,” only “persuasive circumstantial evidence.”
515 U. S., at 912–913.10

——————

10 Of course, bizarreness is in the eye of the beholder, and, while labels
like “ ‘tentacles’ ” or “ ‘appendages’ ” have no ultimate legal significance,
it  is  far  from  clear  that  they  do  not  apply  here.    See  ante,  at  12.    The
tendrils with which the various versions of illustrative District 2 would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Allen v. Milligan. It discusses the issue of racial gerrymandering and the court's analysis of the redistricting plan.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1114

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 15, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8520. Wilson v. Jones, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8521. Waters v. Hesson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8523. Wright v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 753 So. 2d 211.

No. 99–8524. Quinones v. Greiner, Superintendent, Sing
Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8526. Bitterman v. Harding, Chief Justice, Su-
preme Court of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 184 F. 3d 822.

No. 99–8533.

Johnson v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747 So. 2d 61.

No. 99–8535. Gaskins v. O’Malley, Mayor of the City of

Baltimore. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8538. Bremer v. Housing Authority of New Or-

leans et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8539. McBay v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8540. Nickerson v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 767 So. 2d 419.

No. 99–8543. Allen v. Time Warner Cable et al. C. A.

4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 819.

No. 99–8551. Marchan Moreno v. California. Ct. App.

Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8552. Braun v. Gibson, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 1181.

No. 99–8553. Anderson v. Linahan, Warden. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 264.

No. 99–8554. Brazzell v. Smith, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 440.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–1008.  Argued February 20, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024

Since it opened for business in 2018, petitioner Corner Post, like most
merchants, has accepted debit cards as a form of payment.  Debit card
transactions require merchants to pay an “interchange fee” to the bank
that issued the card.  The fee amount is set by the payment networks
(such as Visa and MasterCard) that process the transaction.  In 2010
Congress tasked the Federal Reserve Board with making sure that in-
terchange fees were “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred
by  the  issuer  with  respect  to  the  transaction.”    15  U. S. C.  §1693o–
2(a)(3)(A).  Discharging this duty, in 2011 the Board published Regu-
lation II, which sets a maximum interchange fee of $0.21 per transac-
tion plus .05% of the transaction’s value.

In 2021, Corner Post joined a suit brought against the Board under
the  Administrative  Procedure  Act  (APA).    The  complaint  challenged
Regulation II on the ground that it allows higher interchange fees than
the  statute  permits.    The  District  Court  dismissed  the  suit  as  time-
barred under 28 U. S. C. §2401(a), the default six-year statute of limi-
tations applicable to suits against the United States.  The Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed.

Held: An  APA  claim  does  not  accrue  for  purposes  of  §2401(a)’s  6-year
statute of limitations until the plaintiff is injured by final agency ac-
tion.  Pp. 4–23.

(a) The APA grants Corner Post a cause of action subject to certain
conditions, see 5 U. S. C. §702 and §704, and 28 U. S. C. §2401(a) de-
lineates  the  time  period  in  which  Corner  Post  may  assert  its  claim.
Section 702 authorizes persons injured by agency action to obtain ju-
dicial review by suing the United States or one of its agencies, officers,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1221

party  unrepresented  by  counsel).  The  certiﬁcate  shall  be
bound with each copy of the petition.  The Clerk will not ﬁle
a  petition  without  a  certiﬁcate.  The  petition  is  not  subject
to oral argument.

3.  The  Clerk  will  not  ﬁle  any  response  to  a  petition  for
rehearing unless the Court requests a response.  In the ab
sence  of  extraordinary  circumstances,  the  Court  will  not
grant  a  petition  for  rehearing  without  ﬁrst  requesting  a
response.

4.  The  Clerk  will  not  ﬁle  consecutive  petitions  and  peti

tions that are out of time under this Rule.

5.  The  Clerk  will  not  ﬁle  any  brief  for  an  amicus  curiae

in support of, or in opposition to, a petition for rehearing.

6.  If  the  Clerk  determines  that  a  petition  for  rehearing
submitted timely and in good faith is in a form that does not
comply with this Rule or with Rule 33 or Rule 34, the Clerk
will return it with a letter indicating the deﬁciency.  A cor
rected  petition  for  rehearing  submitted  in  accordance  with
Rule 29.2 no more than 15 days after the date of the Clerk’s
letter will be deemed timely.

Rule 45.  Process; Mandates

1.  All process of this Court issues in the name of the Presi

dent of the United States.

2.  In  a  case  on  review  from  a  state  court,  the  mandate
issues 25 days after entry of the judgment, unless the Court
or a Justice shortens or extends the time, or unless the par
ties stipulate that it issue sooner.  The ﬁling of a petition for
rehearing stays the mandate until disposition of the petition,
unless the Court orders otherwise.  If the petition is denied,
the mandate issues forthwith.

3.  In a case on review from any court of the United States,
as  deﬁned  by  28  U. S. C.  § 451,  a  formal  mandate  does  not
issue  unless  specially  directed;  instead,  the  Clerk  of  this
Court  will  send  the  clerk  of  the  lower  court  a  copy  of  the
opinion  or  order  of  this  Court  and  a  certiﬁed  copy  of  the
judgment.  The  certiﬁed  copy  of  the  judgment,  prepared
and  signed  by  this  Court’s  Clerk,  will  provide  for  costs  if
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a set of rules from the Supreme Court. It is likely part of a legal document and not the main body of text meant for reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules/Procedures</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES ET AL. v. TEXAS ET AL.

CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–58.  Argued November 29, 2022—Decided June 23, 2023

In 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated new immigra-
tion-enforcement guidelines (Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil
Immigration  Law)  that  prioritize  the  arrest  and  removal  from  the
United States of noncitizens who are suspected terrorists or dangerous
criminals  or who have unlawfully  entered  the  country  only recently,
for example.  The States of Texas and Louisiana claim that the Guide-
lines contravene two federal statutes that they read to require the ar-
rest  of  certain  noncitizens  upon  their  release  from  prison  (8  U. S. C.
§1226(c)) or entry of a final order of removal (§1231(a)(2)).  The District
Court found that the States would incur costs due to the Executive’s
failure to comply with those alleged statutory mandates, and that the
States had standing to sue based on those costs.  On the merits, the
District Court found the Guidelines unlawful and vacated them.  The
Fifth Circuit declined to stay the District Court’s judgment, and this
Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Held: Texas  and  Louisiana  lack  Article  III  standing  to  challenge  the

Guidelines.  Pp. 3–14.

(a) Under  Article  III,  a  plaintiff  must  have  standing  to  sue.  This
bedrock constitutional requirement has its roots in the separation of
powers.  So  the  threshold  question  here  is  whether  the  States  have
standing to maintain this suit.  Based on this Court’s precedents and
longstanding historical practice, the answer is no.

To establish standing, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact caused
by the defendant and redressable by a court order.  The District Court
found  that  the  States  would  incur  additional  costs  due  to  the  chal-
lenged arrest policy.  And monetary costs are an injury.  But this Court
has stressed that the alleged injury must also “be legally and judicially
cognizable.”  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 819.  That requires that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the core content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

SEC v. JARKESY

GORSUCH, J., concurring

Whatever  their  roots,  traditionally  recognized  public
rights have at least one feature in common:  a serious and
unbroken historical pedigree.  See Culley v. Marshall, 601
U. S. 377, 397–398 (2024) (GORSUCH, J., concurring); ante,
at  14–17.  For  good  reason.  If  the  Article  III  “judicial
Power” encompasses “the stuff of the traditional actions at
common  law  tried  by  the  courts  of  Westminster  in  1789,”
ante,  at  14  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  it  follows
that matters traditionally adjudicated outside those courts
might  not  fall  within  Article  III’s  ambit.  See  Stern,  564
U. S.,  at  504–505  (Scalia, J.,  concurring)  (“[A]n  Article  III
judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless there
is a firmly established historical practice to the contrary”).
So too with the Due Process Clause.  If that clause sets cus-
tomary  common-law  practice  as  the  ordinary  procedural
baseline, see Part II–B, supra, clear historical evidence of a
different  practice  might  warrant  a  departure  from  that
baseline, see Murray’s Lessee, 18 How., at 280.  That’s why
this Court has said “ ‘a process of law . . . must be taken to
be due process of law’ if it enjoys ‘the sanction of settled us-
age both in England and in this country.’ ”  Culley, 601 U. S.,
at 397 (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (quoting Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 U. S. 516, 528 (1884)).

With the public rights exception viewed in this light, the
government’s  invocation  of  it  in  this  case  cannot  succeed.
Starting  with  a  “ ‘presumption  . . .  in  favor  of  Article  III
courts’ ” and their usual attendant processes, ante, at 18, we
look for some “deeply rooted” tradition of nonjudicial adju-
dication before permitting a case to be tried in a different
forum under different procedures, Culley, 601 U. S., at 397
(GORSUCH, J., concurring).  We have upheld summary pro-
cedures  for  customs  collection,  for  example,  because  they
were consistent with both “the common and statute law of
England prior to the emigration of our ancestors” and “the
laws of many of the States at the time of the adoption of ”
the  Constitution.  Murray’s  Lessee,  18  How.,  at  280;  see
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case SEC v. JARKESY. It delves into the historical context and legal precedent surrounding public rights and the Due Process Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

BREYER, J., dissenting

that  intended  to  charge  the  merchants  lower  prices.
See  id.,  at  214.    By  doing  so,  American  Express  has  “dis
rupt[ed] the normal price-setting mechanism” in the mar
ket.  Id., at 209.  As a result of the provisions, the District
Court  found,  American  Express  was  able  to  raise  mer
chant  prices  repeatedly  without  any  significant  loss  of
business,  because  merchants  were  unable  to  respond  to
such price increases by encouraging shoppers to pay with
other  cards.  Id.,  at  215.    The  provisions  also  meant  that
competitors like Discover had little incentive to lower their
merchant  prices,  because  doing  so  did  not  lead  to  any
additional  market  share.    Id.,  at  214.  The  provisions
thereby “suppress[ed] [American Express’] . . . competitors’
incentives  to  offer  lower  prices  . . .  resulting  in  higher
profit-maximizing  prices  across  the  network  services
market.”  Id., at 209.  Consumers throughout the economy
paid higher retail prices as a result, and they were denied
the opportunity to accept incentives that merchants might
otherwise have offered to use less-expensive cards.  Id., at
216,  220.  I  should  think  that,  considering  step  1  alone,
there is little more that need be said.

The  majority,  like  the  Court  of  Appeals,  says  that  the
District  Court  should  have  looked  not  only  at  the  market
for the card companies’ merchant-related services but also
at  the  market  for  the  card  companies’  shopper-related
services, and that it should have combined them, treating
them  as  a  single  market.    Ante,  at  14–15;  838  F. 3d,  at
197.  But  I  am  not  aware  of  any  support  for  that  view  in
antitrust law.  	Indeed, this Court has held to the contrary.
In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U. S.  594,  610  (1953),  the  Court  held  that  an  antitrust
court  should  begin  its  definition  of  a  relevant  market  by
focusing  narrowly  on  the  good  or  service  directly  affected
by  a  challenged  restraint.  The  Government  in  that  case
claimed that a newspaper’s advertising policy violated the
Sherman  Act’s  “rule  of  reason.”  See  ibid.    In  support  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal arguments and market analysis related to antitrust law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

BOND v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

III

Section  229  exists  to  implement  the  Convention,  so  we
begin  with  that  international  agreement.    As  explained,
the  Convention’s  drafters  intended  for  it  to  be  a  compre-
hensive  ban  on  chemical  weapons.    But  even  with  its
broadly  worded  definitions,  we  have  doubts  that  a  treaty
about  chemical  weapons  has  anything  to  do  with  Bond’s
conduct.  The Convention, a product of years of worldwide
study,  analysis,  and  multinational  negotiation,  arose  in
response to war crimes and acts of terrorism.  See Kenyon
&  Feakes  6.    There  is  no  reason  to  think  the  sovereign
nations  that  ratified  the  Convention  were  interested  in
anything like Bond’s common law assault.

Even if the treaty does reach that far, nothing prevents
Congress  from  implementing  the  Convention  in  the  same
manner  it  legislates  with  respect  to  innumerable  other
matters—observing  the  Constitution’s  division  of  respon-
sibility between sovereigns and leaving the prosecution of
purely  local  crimes  to  the  States.    The  Convention,  after
all,  is  agnostic  between  enforcement  at  the  state  versus
federal level: It provides that “[e]ach State Party shall, in
accordance  with  its  constitutional  processes,  adopt  the
necessary  measures  to  implement  its  obligations  under
this  Convention.”  Art. VII(1),  1974  U.  N.  T.  S.  331  (em-
phasis added); see also Tabassi, National Implementation:
Article  VII,  in  Kenyon  &  Feakes  205,  207  (“Since  the
creation  of  national  law,  the  enforcement  of  it  and  the
structure and administration of government are all sover-
eign acts reserved exclusively for [State Parties], it is not
surprising that the Convention is so vague on the critical
matter of national implementation.”).

Fortunately,  we  have  no  need  to  interpret  the  scope  of
the  Convention  in  this  case.  Bond  was  prosecuted  under
section  229,  and  the  statute—unlike  the  Convention—
must  be  read  consistent  with  principles  of  federalism
inherent in our constitutional structure.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the applicability of a statute (section 229) to a particular case. It delves into the interpretation of the statute and its relationship to a related international convention.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

THOMAS, J., dissenting

1700–1702, p. 234 (E. Bateson ed. 1937) (Calendar William
III).

At first glance, these laws targeting “dangerous” persons
might appear relevant.  After all, if the Second Amendment
right was historically understood to allow an official to dis-
arm  anyone  he  deemed  “dangerous,”  it  may  follow  that
modern Congresses can do the same.  Yet, historical context
compels the opposite conclusion.  The Second Amendment
stems from English resistance against “dangerous” person
laws.

The sweeping disarmament authority wielded by English
officials during the 1600s, including the Militia Act of 1662,
prompted  the  English  to  enshrine  an  individual  right  to
keep  and  bear  arms.  “[T]he  Stuart  Kings  Charles  II  and
James II succeeded in using select militias loyal to them to
suppress political dissidents, in part by disarming their op-
ponents.”  Heller, 554 U. S., at 592.  Englishmen, as a re-
sult,  grew  “to  be  extremely  wary  of  concentrated  military
forces run by the state and to be jealous of their arms.”  Id.,
at 593.  Following the Glorious Revolution, they “obtained
an  assurance  . . .  in  the  Declaration  of  Right  (which  was
codified  as  the  English  Bill  of  Rights),  that  Protestants
would never be disarmed.”  Ibid.

The English Bill of Rights “has long been understood to
be  the  predecessor  to  our  Second  Amendment.”  Ibid.  In
fact,  our  Founders  expanded  on  it  and  made  the  Second
Amendment even more protective of individual liberty.  The
English Bill of Rights assured Protestants “Arms for their
Defence,” but only where “suitable to their Conditions and
as allowed by Law.”  1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 2, (1688), in 6 Stat-
utes of the Realm 143.  The Second Amendment, however,
contains  no  such  qualifiers  and  protects  the  right  of  “the
people” generally.  In short, laws targeting “dangerous” per-
sons  led  to  the  Second  Amendment.    It  would  be  passing
strange to permit the Government to resurrect those self-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of United States v. Rahimi. It discusses the historical context of the Second Amendment and argues against laws targeting "dangerous" persons.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 666 (1998)

709

Breyer, J., dissenting

the danger of any such prosecution was speculative or
insubstantial. Cf. Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 330,
121 Eng. Rep. 730, 738 (Q. B. 1861) (“[T]he danger to
be apprehended must be real and appreciable . . . not a
danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character”).

Where is Murphy’s error?

Id., at 104.

2. Murdock thought that earlier American cases re-
quired a “same sovereign” rule, but they did not. To
the contrary: Chief Justice Marshall, in United States v.
Saline Bank of Va., 1 Pet. 100 (1828), wrote that “a
party is not bound to make any discovery which would
Justice Holmes
expose him to penalties.”
later cited this case as authority for the proposition that
the Fifth Amendment privilege “exonerated” a federal
witness “from [making] disclosures which would have
exposed him to the penalties of the state law.” Ball-
mann v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 186, 195 (1906). Lower federal
courts, consistent with the English rule, had held that a
witness could refuse to answer questions based on the
danger of incrimination in another jurisdiction. See,
e. g., In re Hess, 134 F. 109, 112 (ED Pa. 1905); In re
Graham, 10 F. Cas. 913, 914 (No. 5,659) (SDNY 1876).
True, the Court had written in dicta that “[w]e think the
legal immunity is in regard to a prosecution in the same
jurisdiction, and when that is fully given it is enough.”
Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, 382 (1905). But that un-
explained dicta, which a later case linked to a (misunder-
stood) English rule, see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43,
68–69 (1906), provides an insufﬁcient historical basis for
Murdock’s summary conclusion, particularly since the
Court, immediately prior to Murdock, had indicated that
the question remained open. See United States ex rel.
Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103
(1927) (reserving question; citing Saline Bank and Ball-
mann v. Fagin).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It cites legal precedents and discusses legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

informant who would help federal agents identify and ap-
prehend persons engaged in unlawful cross-border activity
on or near his property.  Boule claims that the Government
has paid him upwards of $60,000 for his services.

Ever the entrepreneur, Boule saw his relationship with
Border Patrol as a business opportunity.  Boule would host
persons  who  unlawfully  entered  the  United  States  as
“guests” at the Inn and offer to drive them to Seattle or else-
where.  He  also  would  pick  up  Canada-bound  guests
throughout the State and drive them north to his property
along  the  border.  Either  way,  Boule  would  charge  $100–
$150 per hour for his shuttle service and require guests to
pay for a night of lodging even if they never intended to stay
at the Inn.  Meanwhile, Boule would inform federal law en-
forcement if he was scheduled to lodge or transport persons
of interest.  In short order, Border Patrol agents would ar-
rive  to  arrest  the  guests,  often  within  a  few  blocks  of  the
Inn.  Boule would decline to offer his erstwhile customers a
refund.  In his view, this practice was “nothing any different
than [the] normal policies of any hotel/motel.”  Id., at 120.1
In  light  of  Boule’s  business  model,  local  Border  Patrol
agents,  including  petitioner  Erik  Egbert,  were  well  ac-
quainted with Smuggler’s Inn and the criminal activity that
attended it.  On March 20, 2014, Boule informed Agent Eg-
bert that a Turkish national, arriving in Seattle by way of
New York, had scheduled transportation to Smuggler’s Inn
later that day.  Agent Egbert grew suspicious, as he could
think of “no legitimate reason a person would travel from
Turkey to stay at a rundown bed-and-breakfast on the bor-
der in Blaine.”  Id., at 104.  The photograph below displays
the amenities for which Boule’s Turkish guest would have

——————

1 Notwithstanding his defense of the Inn’s policies, Boule was recently
convicted in Canadian court for engaging in human trafficking.  In De-
cember 2021,  he pleaded guilty to trafficking 11 Afghanis and Syrians
into Canada.  He billed each foreign national between $200 and $700 for
the trip.  See Regina v. Boule, 2021 BCSC 2561, ¶¶7–11.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the part outlining the facts of the case. It is sequential text and provides context for the legal arguments that will follow.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Case Facts</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

its freshman class of 4,200.”  Id., at 595.

Every application the University receives is initially re-
viewed by one of approximately 40 admissions office read-
ers,  each  of  whom  reviews  roughly  five  applications  per
hour.  Id.,  at  596,  598.  Readers  are  required  to  consider
“[r]ace and ethnicity . . . as one factor” in their review.  Id.,
at  597  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Other  factors
include academic performance and rigor, standardized test-
ing results, extracurricular involvement, essay quality, per-
sonal factors, and student background.  Id., at 600.  Readers
are responsible for providing numerical ratings for the aca-
demic,  extracurricular,  personal,  and  essay  categories.
Ibid.    During  the  years  at  issue  in  this  litigation,  un-
derrepresented  minority  students  were  “more  likely  to
score [highly] on their personal ratings than their white and
Asian  American  peers,”  but  were  more  likely  to  be  “rated
lower  by  UNC  readers  on  their  academic  program,  aca-
demic performance, . . . extracurricular activities,” and es-
says.  Id., at 616–617.

After  assessing  an  applicant’s  materials  along  these
lines, the reader “formulates an opinion about whether the
student  should  be  offered  admission”  and  then  “writes  a
comment defending his or her recommended decision.”  Id.,
at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In making that
decision, readers may offer students a “plus” based on their
race, which “may be significant in an individual case.”  Id.,
at 601 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The admissions
decisions made by the first readers are, in most cases, “pro-
visionally final.”  Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Uni-
versity  of  N. C.  at  Chapel  Hill,  No.  1:14–cv–954  (MDNC,
Nov. 9, 2020), ECF Doc. 225, p. 7, ¶52.

Following the first read process, “applications then go to
a process called ‘school group review’ . . . where a committee
composed of experienced staff members reviews every [ini-
tial] decision.”  567 F. Supp. 3d, at 599.  The review com-
mittee  receives  a  report  on  each  student  which  contains,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion discussing the admissions process at Harvard University. It provides details about the initial review process, the factors considered, and the role of race in admissions decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Statement of THOMAS, J.

commentary,  and  then  feature  the  final  product  promi-
nently over other submissions—all while enjoying immun-
ity.  Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC,
755 F. 3d 398, 403, 410, 416 (CA6 2014) (interpreting “de-
velopment”  narrowly  to  “preserv[e]  the  broad  immunity
th[at §230] provides for website operators’ exercise of tradi-
tional  publisher  functions”).  To  say  that  editing  a  state-
ment  and  adding  commentary  in  this  context  does  not
“creat[e]  or  develo[p]”  the  final  product,  even  in  part,  is
dubious.

C

The decisions that broadly interpret §230(c)(1) to protect
traditional  publisher  functions  also  eviscerated  the  nar-
rower liability shield Congress included in the statute.  Sec-
tion  230(c)(2)(A)  encourages  companies  to  create  content
guidelines and protects those companies that “in good faith
. . . restrict access to or availability of material that the pro-
vider  or  user  considers  to  be  obscene,  lewd,  lascivious,
filthy,  excessively  violent,  harassing,  or  otherwise  objec-
tionable.”  Taken together, both provisions in §230(c) most
naturally  read  to  protect  companies  when  they  unknow-
ingly decline to exercise editorial functions to edit or remove
third-party content, §230(c)(1), and when they decide to ex-
ercise those editorial functions in good faith, §230(c)(2)(A).
But  by  construing  §230(c)(1)  to  protect  any  decision  to
edit  or  remove  content,  Barnes  v.  Yahoo!,  Inc.,  570  F.  3d
1096,  1105  (CA9  2009),  courts  have  curtailed  the  limits
Congress placed on decisions to remove content, see e-ven-
tures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 2210029, *3
(MD  Fla.,  Feb.  8,  2017)  (rejecting  the  interpretation  that
§230(c)(1)  protects  removal  decisions  because  it  would
“swallo[w] the more specific immunity in (c)(2)”).  With no
limits on an Internet company’s discretion to take down ma-
terial,  §230  now  apparently  protects  companies  who  ra-
cially discriminate in removing content.  Sikhs for Justice,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or court document, specifically a section of a Justice's statement. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Court Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
958

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 13, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6269.  Dinkens  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6271.  Elmardoudi,  aka  Safieddine,  aka  Labibe,
aka  Tardelli  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  923.

No. 09–6275.  Norris v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  522.

No.  09–6278.  Fonville  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  673.

No.  09–6279.  Zaldivar  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  839.

No.  09–6284.  Azubike  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  59.

No.  09–6286.  Bermea-Boone  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  621.

No. 09–6287.  Miller v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  288.

No.  09–6288.  Rodriguez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6289.  Rivera  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  194.

No.  09–6290.  Scales,  aka  Simms,  aka  Johnson  v.  United
States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
335  Fed.  Appx.  890.

No.  09–6292.  Gilyard  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6293.  Miggins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  319.

No. 09–6295.  Epps v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  924.

No.  09–6298.  Todd  v.  Federal  Correctional  Institution,

Memphis,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

thoughtful  District  Court  decisions  addressing  same-sex
marriage—and  most  of  them,  too,  have  concluded  same-
sex  couples  must  be  allowed  to  marry.  In  addition  the
highest  courts  of  many  States  have  contributed  to  this
ongoing dialogue in decisions interpreting their own State
Constitutions.  These  state  and  federal  judicial  opinions
are cited in Appendix A, infra.

After  years  of  litigation,  legislation,  referenda,  and  the
discussions that attended these public acts, the States are
now divided on the issue of same-sex marriage.  See Office
of  the  Atty.  Gen.  of  Maryland,  The  State  of  Marriage
Equality in America, State-by-State Supp. (2015).

III

Under  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment,  no  State  shall  “deprive  any  person  of  life,
liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law.”    The
fundamental  liberties  protected  by  this  Clause  include
most  of  the  rights  enumerated  in  the  Bill  of  Rights.  See
Duncan  v.  Louisiana,  391  U. S.  145,  147–149  (1968).    In
addition these liberties extend to certain personal choices
central  to  individual  dignity  and  autonomy,  including
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.
See,  e.g.,  Eisenstadt  v.  Baird,  405  U. S.  438,  453  (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484–486 (1965).

The  identification  and  protection  of  fundamental  rights
is  an  enduring  part  of  the  judicial  duty  to  interpret  the
Constitution.  That responsibility, however, “has not been
reduced  to  any  formula.”  Poe  v.  Ullman,  367  U. S.  497,
542  (1961)  (Harlan,  J.,  dissenting).    Rather,  it  requires
courts  to  exercise  reasoned  judgment  in  identifying  inter-
ests  of  the  person  so  fundamental  that  the  State  must
accord them its respect.  See ibid.  That process is guided
by many of the same considerations relevant to analysis of
other constitutional provisions that set forth broad princi-
ples rather than specific requirements.  History and tradi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its application to same-sex marriage. It cites relevant case law and provides legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Syllabus

that Colorado law can protect gay persons in acquiring products and
services  on  the  same  terms  and  conditions  as  are  offered  to  other
members of the public, the law must be applied in a manner that is
neutral toward religion.  To Phillips, his claim that using his artistic
skills  to  make  an  expressive  statement,  a  wedding  endorsement  in
his  own  voice  and  of  his  own  creation,  has  a  significant  First
Amendment  speech  component  and  implicates  his  deep  and  sincere
religious  beliefs.    His  dilemma  was  understandable  in  2012,  which
was  before  Colorado  recognized  the  validity  of  gay  marriages  per-
formed  in  the  State  and  before  this  Court  issued  United  States  v.
Windsor,  570  U. S.  744,  or  Obergefell.  Given  the  State’s  position  at
the  time,  there  is  some  force  to  Phillips’  argument  that  he  was  not
unreasonable  in  deeming  his  decision  lawful.    State  law  at  the  time
also  afforded  storekeepers  some  latitude  to  decline  to  create  specific
messages  they  considered  offensive.    Indeed,  while  the  instant  en-
forcement proceedings were pending, the State Civil Rights Division
concluded in at least three cases that a baker acted lawfully in declin-
ing  to  create  cakes  with  decorations  that  demeaned  gay  persons  or
gay marriages.  Phillips too  was entitled to a neutral and respectful
consideration  of  his  claims  in  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.
Pp. 9–12.

(b) That consideration was compromised, however, by the Commis-
sion’s  treatment  of  Phillips’  case,  which  showed  elements  of  a  clear
and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs moti-
vating his objection.  As the record shows, some of the commissioners
at  the  Commission’s  formal,  public  hearings  endorsed  the  view  that
religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere
or  commercial  domain,  disparaged  Phillips’  faith  as  despicable  and
characterized it as merely rhetorical, and compared his invocation of
his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Hol-
ocaust.  No commissioners objected to the comments.  Nor were they
mentioned  in  the  later  state-court  ruling  or  disavowed  in  the  briefs
filed here.  The comments thus cast doubt on the fairness and impar-
tiality of the Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case.

Another indication of hostility is the different treatment of Phillips’
case  and  the  cases  of  other  bakers  with  objections  to  anti-gay  mes-
sages who prevailed before  the Commission.  The Commission ruled
against  Phillips  in  part  on  the  theory  that  any  message  on  the  re-
quested wedding cake would be attributed to the customer, not to the
baker.  Yet the Division did not address this point in any of the cases
involving  requests  for  cakes  depicting  anti-gay  marriage  symbolism.
The Division also considered that each bakery was willing to sell oth-
er products to the prospective customers, but the Commission found
Phillips’  willingness  to  do  the  same  irrelevant.    The  State  Court  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the primary content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
GORSUCH, J., dissenting

listed three kinds of Alaskan entities:  Alaska Native Vil-
lages,  Village  Corporations,  and  Regional  Corporations.
And the law did “meaningful work by extending ISDA’s def-
inition  of  Indian  tribes”  to  whichever  among  them  “ulti-
mately were recognized.”  976 F. 3d, at 26.  It is perfectly
plausible to think Congress chose to account for uncertainty
in this way; Congress often adopts statutes whose applica-
tion depends on future contingencies.  E.g., Gundy v. United
States, 588 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (GORSUCH, J., dissent-
ing) (slip op., at 11–12) (citing examples).
  Further  aspects  of  Alaskan  history  confirm  this  under-
standing.    Over  time,  the  vast  majority  of  Alaska  Native
Villages went on to seek—and win—formal federal recogni-
tion as Indian tribes.  See 86 Fed. Reg. 7557–7558 (2021);
Brief for Respondent Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Res-
ervation et al. 23.  (It’s this recognition which makes them
indisputably eligible for CARES Act relief.  See supra, at 2.)
By the time it enacted ISDA, too, Congress had already au-
thorized certain Alaska Native groups to organize based on
“a common bond of occupation, or association, or residence.”
25 U. S. C. §5119.  This standard, which did not require pre-
vious  recognition  as  “bands  or  tribes,”  was  unique  to
Alaska.    See  ibid.    And  at  least  one  such  entity—the
Hydaburg  Cooperative  Association,  organized  around  the
fish industry—also went on to receive federal tribal recog-
nition in the 1990s.  86 Fed. Reg. 7558; see also Brief for
Respondent  Confederated  Tribes  of  Chehalis  Reservation
et al.  35–36.
lived  and  not  a  full
government-to-government political recognition, the Secre-
tary of the Interior at one point even listed ANCs as “ ‘In-
dian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services
From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs,’ ” before
eventually removing them.  Ante, at 15–16.  And in 1996,
Congress considered a bill that would have “deemed” a par-
ticular  ANC—the  Cook  Inlet  Region,  Inc.—“an  Indian
tribal entity for the purpose of federal programs for which

  Though  short
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the history of Alaskan Native entities and their recognition as tribes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 666 (1998)

689

Opinion of the Court

D
Although the Court and Justice Breyer’s dissent differ
on details, including some considerations of policy addressed
in Part IV, infra, our basic disagreement with that dissent
turns on three points. First, we start with what we think
is the most probable reading of the Clause in its Fifth
Amendment context, as limiting its principle to concern with
prosecution by a sovereign that is itself bound by the Clause;
the dissent instead emphasizes the Clause’s facial breadth as
consistent with a broader principle. Second, we rely on the
force of our precedent, notably Murdock, as conﬁrming this
same-sovereign principle, as adapted to reﬂect the post-
Malloy requirement of immunity effective against both sov-
ereigns subject to the one privilege under the National Con-
stitution; the dissent attributes less force to Murdock, giving
weight to its tension with the Saline Bank language, among
other things. Third, we reject Murphy’s restatement of the
common-law background and read none of the common-law
cases as authority inconsistent with our contextual reading
of the Clause, later conﬁrmed by precedent such as Murdock;
the dissent ﬁnds support in the common-law cases for Mur-
phy’s historical reexamination and the broader reading of the
Clause.
In the end, our contextual reading of the Clause,
combined with the Murdock holding, places a burden on any-

formally adopted the rule in Murphy” (footnotes omitted)); Capra, The
Fifth Amendment and the Risk of Foreign Prosecution, N. Y. L. J., Mar.
8, 1991, p. 3 (“[D]espite Justice Goldberg’s assertions in Murphy, it is clear
that there was never a ‘true’ or uniform English rule. . . . [T]o the extent
that the English rule would be pertinent to the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege, it would have had to exist at the time the Fifth Amendment was
adopted. Yet, as even Justice Goldberg admitted in Murphy, the English
cases involving independent sovereigns were decided more than 60 years
after the Fifth Amendment was adopted”); see also Law Reform Commit-
tee, Sixteenth Report, 1967, Cmnd. 3472, ¶11, p. 7 (explaining that English
common law on the question is not “wholly consistent”).

Murphy’s reexamination of history also adopted the illegitimate reading

of Saline Bank, rejected supra, at 678–679.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" from a case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U84

[09-06-00 20:39:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

214

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO. v.
CENTRAL OFFICE TELEPHONE, INC.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit

No. 97–679. Argued March 23, 1998—Decided June 15, 1998

§ 203(c). The FCC requires carriers to sell

Respondent purchases “bulk” communications services from long-distance
providers, such as petitioner AT&T, and resells them to its customers.
Petitioner, as a common carrier under the Communications Act of 1934,
must ﬁle with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) “tariffs”
containing all
its “charges” for interstate services and all “classiﬁ-
cations, practices, and regulations affecting such charges,” 47 U. S. C.
§ 203(a). A carrier may not “extend to any person any privileges or
facilities in such communication, or employ or enforce any classiﬁcations,
regulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as speciﬁed
in such [tariff].”
long-
distance services to resellers under the same rates, terms, and condi-
tions as apply to other customers.
In 1989, petitioner agreed to sell
respondent a long-distance service, which, under the parties’ written
subscription agreements, would be governed by the rates, terms, and
conditions in the appropriate AT&T tariffs. Respondent soon experi-
enced problems with the service it received, and withdrew from the
contract before the expiration date. Meanwhile, it had sued petitioner
in Federal District Court, asserting, inter alia, state-law claims for
breach of contract and for tortious interference with contractual rela-
tions (viz., respondent’s contracts with its customers), the latter claim
derivative of the former. Respondent alleged that petitioner had prom-
ised and failed to deliver various service, provisioning, and billing op-
tions in addition to those set forth in the tariff, and that petitioner’s
conduct was willful, so that consequential damages were available under
the tariff. The Magistrate Judge rejected petitioner’s argument that
the claims were pre-empted by § 203’s ﬁled-tariff requirements; he
declined, however, to instruct on punitive damages for the tortious-
interference claim. The jury found for respondent and awarded dam-
ages. The Ninth Circuit afﬁrmed the judgment, but reversed the Mag-
istrate Judge’s failure to instruct on punitive damages and remanded for
a trial on that aspect of the case.

Held: The Communications Act’s ﬁled-tariff requirements pre-empt re-

spondent’s state-law claims. Pp. 221–228.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.  Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a summary of the case rather than the full text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

13

Opinion of the Court

form of equitable discretion that would directly conflict with
the equitable discretion of the Court of Appeals.  See Brief
for Petitioner 20, n. 5 (outlining a wide range of equitable
considerations).  And it invited the District Court to deny
or reduce for equitable reasons the bona fide costs that the
OTCs  had  paid  as  premiums  for  supersedeas  bonds  that
were known and negotiated by San Antonio and were ap-
proved by the District Court without objection under Rule
62.  The lower courts were correct to hold that the District
Court  lacked  the  authority  to  entertain  San  Antonio’s
broad, equitable arguments.

Finally, San Antonio worries that parties will be unable
to obtain review of their objections to Rule 39(e) costs if the
district court cannot provide relief after the matter returns
to that court.  We agree that the current Rules and the rel-
evant statutes could specify more clearly the procedure that
such a party should follow to bring their arguments to the
court  of  appeals,  but  this  does  not  lead  to  the  conclusion
that a district court can reallocate those costs.

Rule  27  sets  forth  a  generally  applicable  procedure  for
seeking relief in a court of appeals, and a simple motion “for
an order” under Rule 27 should suffice to seek an order un-
der Rule 39(a).  Compare Fed. Rule App. Proc. 39(a) (“The
following rules apply unless . . . the court orders otherwise”)
with Rule 27(a) (“An application for an order . . . is made by
motion  unless  these  rules  prescribe  another  form”).    The
OTCs  also  identify  instances  where  parties  have  raised
their arguments through other procedural vehicles, includ-
ing merits briefing, see Rule 28, objections to a bill of costs,
see Rule 39(d)(2), and petitions for rehearing, see Rule 40.
Brief for Respondents 42, nn. 9–11.  We do not foreclose lit-
igants  from  raising  their  arguments  in  any  manner  con-
sistent with the relevant federal and local Rules.

In  short,  we  are  not  persuaded  that  applying  the  plain
text of Rule 39 will create the practical problems that San
Antonio envisions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" portion. It discusses the interpretation and application of a specific rule (Rule 39(e)) within the context of a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)

713

Kennedy, J., concurring in part

provisions suggests that the possibility of supervised release
following imprisonment was meant to be eliminated.13

In sum, from a purely textual perspective, the more plau-
sible reading of § 3583(e)(3) before its amendment and the
addition of subsection (h) leaves open the possibility of su-
pervised release after reincarceration. Pre-Guidelines prac-
tice, linguistic continuity from the old scheme to the current
one, and the obvious thrust of congressional sentencing pol-
icy conﬁrm that, in applying the law as before the enactment
of subsection (h), district courts have the authority to order
terms of supervised release following reimprisonment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit is

Afﬁrmed.

Justice Kennedy, concurring in part.
The Court holds that 18 U. S. C. § 3583(e)(3), as it stood
before the amendment adding what is now subsection (h),
permits a trial court to impose further incarceration followed
by a period of supervised release after revoking an earlier
In
supervised release because the conditions were violated.
my view this is the correct result. The subsection permits
a court to “require [a] person to serve in prison all or part
of the term of supervised release” originally imposed. 18
U. S. C. § 3583(e)(3) (1988 ed., Supp. V). This indicates that
after the right to be on supervised release has been revoked
there is yet an unexpired term of supervised release that can
be allocated, in the court’s discretion, in whole or in part
to conﬁnement and to release on such terms and conditions

13 Nor does our traditional rule of lenity in interpreting criminal statutes
demand a contrary result. Lenity applies only when the equipoise of com-
peting reasons cannot otherwise be resolved (not the case here), and in
any event the rule of lenity would be Delphic in this case. There is simply
no way to tell whether sentencing courts given the option of supervised
release will generally be more or less lenient in ﬁxing the second prison
sentence.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy. It discusses the interpretation of a specific statute (18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)) and its implications for sentencing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

367

Opinion of the Court

tal  interest.  Buckley,  supra,  at  64,  66  (internal  quotation
marks omitted); see McConnell, supra, at 231–232.

In  Buckley,  the  Court  explained  that  disclosure  could  be
justiﬁed based on a governmental interest in “provid[ing] the
electorate  with  information”  about  the  sources  of  election-
related  spending.  424  U. S.,  at  66.  The  McConnell  Court
applied  this  interest  in  rejecting  facial  challenges  to  BCRA
§§ 201  and  311.  540  U. S.,  at  196.  There  was  evidence  in
the  record  that  independent  groups  were  running  election-
related  advertisements  “ ‘while  hiding  behind  dubious  and
misleading  names.’ ”  Id.,  at  197  (quoting  McConnell  I,  251
F.  Supp.  2d,  at  237).  The  Court  therefore  upheld  BCRA
§§ 201  and  311  on  the  ground  that  they  would  help  citizens
“ ‘make informed choices in the political marketplace.’ ”  540
U. S.,  at  197  (quoting  McConnell  I,  supra,  at  237);  see  540
U. S., at 231.

Although  both  provisions  were  facially  upheld,  the  Court
acknowledged  that  as-applied  challenges  would  be  available
if a group could show a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that disclo
sure of its contributors’ names “ ‘will subject them to threats,
harassment,  or  reprisals  from  either  Government  ofﬁcials
or  private  parties.’ ”  Id.,  at  198  (quoting  Buckley,  supra,
at 74).

For  the reasons  stated  below, we  ﬁnd  the  statute valid  as

applied to the ads for the movie and to the movie itself.

B

Citizens United sought to broadcast one 30-second and two
10-second ads to promote Hillary.  Under FEC regulations,
a  communication  that  “[p]roposes  a  commercial  transaction”
was not subject to 2 U. S. C. § 441b’s restrictions on corporate
or union funding of electioneering communications.  11 CFR
§ 114.15(b)(3)(ii).  The  regulations,  however,  do  not  exempt
those communications from the disclaimer and disclosure re
quirements  in  BCRA  §§ 201  and  311.  See  72  Fed.  Reg.
72901 (2007).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Citizens United case and its implications for campaign finance regulations. It cites legal precedents and delves into the rationale behind specific rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>