<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op.,
at 4) (“a court cannot, consistent with separation of powers,
enjoin  enforcement  of a  statute  where  enforcement  would
be lawful”).  And the principle that application of a law is
always  unlawful  if  “ ‘a  substantial  number  of  its  applica-
tions are unconstitutional’ ” “lacks any basis in the Consti-
tution’s text” and “contravenes traditional standing princi-
ples.”  Sineneng-Smith,  590  U. S.,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 1).

Third, and relatedly, this Court also lacks the power “to
‘pronounce that the statute is unconstitutional in all appli-
cations,’ ” even if the Court suspects that the law will likely
be unconstitutional in every future application as opposed
to  just  a  substantial  number  of  its  applications.    Borden,
593  U. S.,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  3)
(quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S 41, 77 (1999) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).  A declaration that the law is “facially” un-
constitutional “seems to me no more than an advisory opin-
ion—which a federal court should never issue at all.”  593
U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3).  Courts
cannot  “strike  down  statutory  text”  or  resolve  the  legal
rights of litigants not before them.  Ibid. (brackets and in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).

Despite the Court’s use of the term “facially unconstitu-
tional,” I join Part III–A, which finds that California’s law
fails exacting scrutiny, because the Court does not say that
it  is  “provid[ing]  relief  beyond  the  parties  to  the  case.”
Trump  v.  Hawaii,  585  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2018)  (THOMAS,  J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 6).  The Court simply (and correctly)
holds that the District Court properly enjoined the law as
applied to petitioners.  Ante, at 19.  The Court’s judgment
is  also  not  dependent  on  its  overbreadth  determination.
Ante, at 12–15.  One can understand the Court’s reasoning
as based on the fundamental legal problems with the law
(that are obvious in light of the facts of this suit) that will,
in  practice,  prevent  California  from  lawfully  applying  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It cites other legal cases and discusses legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

302

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

means analysis is not required. See Ward, 491 U. S., at 798–
799, n. 6.

We hold, therefore, that Erie’s ordinance is a content-
neutral regulation that is valid under O’Brien. Accordingly,
the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins,

concurring in the judgment.

I

In my view, the case before us here is moot. The Court
concludes that it is not because respondent could resume its
nude dancing operations in the future, and because petition-
ers have suffered an ongoing, redressable harm consisting of
the state court’s invalidation of their public nudity ordinance.
As to the ﬁrst point: Petitioners do not dispute that Kan-
dyland no longer exists; the building in which it was located
has been sold to a real estate developer, and the premises
are currently being used as a comedy club. We have a
sworn afﬁdavit from respondent’s sole shareholder, Nick
Panos, to the effect that Pap’s “operates no active business,”
and is “a ‘shell’ corporation.” More to the point, Panos
swears that neither Pap’s nor Panos “employ[s] any individu-
als involved in the nude dancing business,” “maintain[s] any
contacts in the adult entertainment business,” “has any cur-
rent interest in any establishment providing nude dancing,”
or “has any intention to own or operate a nude dancing
establishment in the future.” 1 App. to Reply to Brief in
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 7–8.

1 Curiously, the Court makes no mention of Panos’ averment of no inten-
tion to operate a nude dancing establishment in the future, but discusses
the issue as though the only factor suggesting mootness is the closing
I see no basis for ignoring this aver-
of Kandyland. Ante, at 287–288.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia in the case Erie v. Pap's A.M.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
844

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10560.  Scotti  v.  Corriveau  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10561.  Evans  v.  O’Brien,  Superintendent,  Old
Colony  Correctional  Center.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No. 08–10563.  Smith v.  Pepsi Bottling Group et al.  C.  A.
4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 310 Fed. Appx. 567.

No.  08–10565.  Burwell  v.  City  of  Las  Vegas,  Nevada.

Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10569.  Kendall  v.  State  Bar  of  Michigan  et  al.

Ct.  App.  Mich.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10571.  Kamps  v.  Miller-Stout,  Superintendent,
Airway  Heights  Correctional  Center.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No. 08–10572.  Panton v. Nash, Warden.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  257.

No.  08–10575.  Dinkins  v.  Sebelius,  Secretary  of  Health
and Human Services.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Re
ported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  171.

No.  08–10576.  Young  v.  Presley  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10577.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  544  F.  3d  683.

No.  08–10582.  Whittington  v.  Owens-Illinois,  Inc.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 308 Fed. Appx. 185.

No.  08–10583.  McGuigan  v.  Hall,  Superintendent,  Two
Rivers  Correctional  Institution.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  986.

No. 08–10585.  Wright v.  Thaler, Director, Texas Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10586.  Thorne  v.  Larkins,  Warden.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN

878

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Opinion of the Court

to add new requirements, test procedures, and injury criteria
to ensure that “future air bags be designed to create less
risk of serious airbag-induced injuries than current air bags,
particularly for small women and young children”); U. S.
Dept. of Transportation, National Highway Trafﬁc Safety
Administration, National Accident Sampling System Crash-
worthiness Data System 1991–1993, p. viii (Aug. 1995) (ﬁnd-
ing that airbags caused approximately 54,000 injuries be-
tween 1991 and 1993).

Sixth, airbags were expected to be signiﬁcantly more
expensive than other passive restraint devices, raising the
average cost of a vehicle price $320 for full frontal airbags
over the cost of a car with manual lap and shoulder seatbelts
(and potentially much more if production volumes were low).
49 Fed. Reg. 28990 (1984). And the agency worried that the
high replacement cost—estimated to be $800—could lead car
Id., at
owners to refuse to replace them after deployment.
28990, 29000–29001; see also id., at 28990 (estimating total
investment costs for mandatory airbag requirement at $1.3
billion compared to $500 million for automatic seatbelts).
Seventh, the public, for reasons of cost, fear, or physical in-
trusiveness, might resist installation or use of any of the
then-available passive restraint devices,
id., at 28987–
28989—a particular concern with respect to airbags, id., at
29001 (noting that “[a]irbags engendered the largest quantity
of, and most vociferously worded, comments”).

FMVSS 208 reﬂected these considerations in several ways.
Most importantly, that standard deliberately sought vari-
ety—a mix of several different passive restraint systems.
It did so by setting a performance requirement for passive
restraint devices and allowing manufacturers to choose
among different passive restraint mechanisms, such as air-
bags, automatic belts, or other passive restraint technologies
to satisfy that requirement.
Id., at 28996. And DOT ex-
plained why FMVSS 208 sought the mix of devices that
Id., at
it expected its performance standard to produce.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document excerpt, specifically an opinion from a court case. It contains legal jargon, citations, and discusses regulations related to airbags in vehicles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DANVILLE CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, INC. v. BESHEAR

ALITO, J., dissenting

tral,  generally  applicable  law  to  religiously  motivated  ac-
tion” also implicates “the right of parents” “to direct the ed-
ucation of their children.”  Id., at 881 (citing Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S.  205  (1972)).    The  applicants  did  not  squarely  raise
that alternative Smith argument in the District Court, the
Sixth Circuit, or this Court.
  Under all of the circumstances, especially the timing and
the impending expiration of the Order, we deny the appli-
cation without prejudice to the applicants or other parties
seeking a new preliminary injunction if the Governor issues
a school-closing order that applies in the new year.
  JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dis-
senting from the denial of application to vacate stay.
  For the reasons explained in JUSTICE GORSUCH’s dissent,
post, at ___, I would vacate the Sixth Circuit’s stay of the
preliminary injunction issued by the District Court and re-
mand for further consideration in light of the proper legal
standards.  While I do not agree with the Court’s denial of
the applicants’ request for emergency relief, no one should
misinterpret that denial as signifying approval of the Sixth
Circuit’s decision.  As I understand this Court’s order, it is
based primarily on timing.  At this point, just a few school
days remain before the beginning of many schools’ holiday
break, and the executive order in question will expire before
classes would normally begin next year.  The Court is there-
fore reluctant to grant relief that, at this point, would have
little practical effect.
  I  understand  that reluctance,  but  in  my  judgment,  it  is
unfair to deny relief on this ground since this timing is in
no way the applicants’ fault.  They filed this action on No-
vember  20,  2020,  just  two  days  after  the  issuance  of  the
Governor’s  executive  order.    And  when,  on  November  29,
the  Sixth  Circuit  granted  a  stay  of  the  order  that  would
have allowed classes to resume, the applicants sought relief
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U53

[09-26-01 10:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

584

CHRISTENSEN v. HARRIS COUNTY

Opinion of the Court

ployee will receive timely compensation for working over-
time. Section 207(o)(5) guarantees that, at the very mini-
mum, an employee will get to use his compensatory time
(i. e., take time off work with full pay) unless doing so would
disrupt the employer’s operations. And it is precisely this
concern over ensuring that employees can timely “liquidate”
compensatory time that the Secretary of Labor identiﬁed in
her own regulations governing § 207(o)(5):

“Compensatory time cannot be used as a means to
avoid statutory overtime compensation. An employee
has the right to use compensatory time earned and must
not be coerced to accept more compensatory time than
an employer can realistically and in good faith expect to
be able to grant within a reasonable period of his or
her making a request for use of such time.”
29 CFR
§ 553.25(b) (1999).

This reading is conﬁrmed by nearby provisions of the
FLSA that reﬂect a similar concern for ensuring that the
employee receive some timely beneﬁt for overtime work.
For example, § 207(o)(3)(A) provides that workers may not
accrue more than 240 or 480 hours of compensatory time, de-
pending upon the nature of the job. See also § 207(o)(2)(B)
(conditioning the employer’s ability to provide compensatory
time upon the employee not accruing compensatory time in
excess of the § 207(o)(3)(A) limits). Section 207(o)(3)(A) helps
guarantee that employees only accrue amounts of compensa-
tory time that they can reasonably use. After all, an em-
ployer does not need § 207(o)(3)(A)’s protection; it is free
at any time to reduce the number of hours accrued by ex-
changing them for cash payment, § 207(o)(3)(B), or by halt-
ing the accrual of compensatory time by paying cash compen-
sation for overtime work, 29 CFR § 553.26(a) (1999). Thus,
§ 207(o)(3)(A),
like § 207(o)(5), reﬂects a concern that em-
ployees receive some timely beneﬁt in exchange for over-
time work. Moreover, on petitioners’ view, the compensa-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text from a court opinion. It discusses the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and specifically Section 207(o)(5) regarding compensatory time for overtime work.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

discharge  of  his  official  duties.”    Fitzgerald,  457  U. S.,  at  752,  n.  32.
The Constitution does not tolerate such impediments to “the effective
functioning of government.”  Id., at 751.  Pp. 34–37.

(e) This  case  poses  a  question  of  lasting  significance:  When  may  a
former President be prosecuted for official acts taken during his Pres-
idency?  In answering that question, unlike the political branches and
the  public  at  large,  the  Court  cannot  afford  to  fixate  exclusively,  or
even primarily, on present exigencies.  Enduring separation of powers
principles guide our decision in this case.  The President enjoys no im-
munity for his unofficial acts, and not everything the President does is
official.  The President is not above the law.  But under our system of
separated powers, the President may not be prosecuted for exercising
his core constitutional powers, and he is entitled to at least presump-
tive immunity from prosecution for his official acts.  That immunity
applies equally to all occupants of the Oval Office.  Pp. 41–43.

91 F. 4th 1173, vacated and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined in full, and in which BAR-
RETT, J., joined except as to Part III–C.  THOMAS, J., filed a concurring
opinion.  BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in part.  SOTOMAYOR,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GALLARDO v. MARSTILLER

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

from  any  third  party,”  §1396k(a)(1)(A),  permits  recovery
from  settlement  funds  compensating  for  all  medical  ex-
penses, past or future.  If this provision were interpreted in
isolation to sweep so broadly, however, its text would place
no temporal limitation on the rights assigned to the State.
For example, if Medicaid were to fund an individual’s med-
ical  care  as  a  teenager,  the  State  would  be  entitled  to  re-
cover the costs of that care from any unrelated future tort
settlement for medical expenses, regardless of whether the
individual  remained  on  Medicaid  or  the  state  plan  fur-
nished any services related to those future injuries.  Such a
nonsensical  “lifetime  assignment,”  Brief  for  Petitioner  32,
would constitute an “unfair” erosion of the anti-lien provi-
sion,  Ahlborn,  547  U. S.,  at  288,  contravening  Congress’
careful  design.  In  contrast,  a  harmonious  reading  of  the
statute,  consistent  with  Ahlborn,  limits  the  funds  from
which a State may recover to those awarded for expenses
paid and therefore presents no such concern.

III
Despite  the  foregoing,  the  Court  reads  the  assignment
provision standing alone to establish, unlike all the other
provisions of the Act at issue, a substantially broader right
to recover from payments for all medical care, whether paid
by the State or not.  The Court commits several errors on
the  path  to  its  holding,  which  departs  from  the  statutory
scheme  as  understood  in  Ahlborn  and  forces  the  Court  to
adopt an implausible workaround in order to mitigate the
absurd  consequence,  discussed  above,  of  its  acontextual
reading.

A

The  Court’s  analysis  starts  off  backward.  The  Court
states first that the Act requires a State to condition Medi-
caid eligibility on assignment of rights, and only then notes
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CANTERO v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A.

Opinion of the Court

whether to obtain a charter from the Federal Government
or from a state government.

Banks  with  federal  charters,  called  national  banks,  are
subject primarily to federal oversight and regulation.  And
banks with state charters, called state banks, are subject to
additional  state  oversight  and  regulation.  Those  two
banking systems co-exist and compete.

The  national  banking  system  began  in  1863  when
Treasury  Secretary  (later  Chief  Justice)  Salmon  Chase
proposed,  Congress  passed,  and  President  Lincoln  signed
the National Bank Act.  12 Stat. 665; 13 Stat. 99.  When a
bank  obtains  a  federal  charter  under  the  National  Bank
Act,  the  national  bank  gains  various  enumerated  and
incidental powers.  12 U. S. C. §24.  The National Bank Act
expressly affords national banks the powers that they need
to organize and operate—for example, the powers to “make
contracts,” to “sue and be sued,” and to “elect or appoint” a
“board  of  directors.”  §24.    The  Act  also  provides  national
banks with banking-specific powers.  As relevant here, the
Act  expressly  supplies  national  banks  with  the  power  to
“make,  arrange,  purchase  or  sell  loans  or  extensions  of
credit secured by liens on interests in real estate”—in other
words, to administer home mortgage loans.  §371(a).  The
Act also expressly authorizes national banks to exercise “all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking.”  §24.

When  national  banks  make  home  mortgage  loans,  they
often offer escrow accounts.  Mortgage-escrow accounts are
designed to protect both the bank and the borrower.  When
the  borrower  makes  a  mortgage  payment,  the  borrower
puts money into an escrow account operated by the bank;
the  bank  then  uses  the  funds  in  escrow  to  pay  the
borrower’s  insurance  premium  and  property  taxes  on  the
borrower’s behalf.  That arrangement helps the borrower by
simplifying expenses and budgeting.  Instead of having to
pay  large  lump-sum  insurance  and  tax  payments  once  or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the powers of national banks under the National Bank Act. It provides context and background information relevant to the legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Case Background</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TERRITORY OF GUAM v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 20–382.  Argued April 26, 2021—Decided May 24, 2021

Guam and the United States dispute liability for environmental hazards
at the Ordot Dump, a site constructed on the island by the Navy in the
1940s and into which both parties allegedly have deposited waste over
the decades.  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Guam
entered into a consent decree in 2004 that resolved litigation filed by
the EPA alleging violations of the Clean Water Act.  The decree in rel-
evant  part required Guam  to  pay  a  civil  penalty  and  to take  certain
actions  at  the  dump,  and  also  stated  that  Guam’s  compliance  would
constitute  full  settlement  and  satisfaction  of  the  civil  claims  of  the
United States as alleged in the EPA’s complaint (i.e., claims under the
Clean Water Act).  More than a decade later, Guam sued the United
States under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), alleging that the United
States’ use of  the dump exposed it to two  possible actions under the
Act.  The first was a “cost-recovery” action under §107(a), which allows
recovery of the costs of a “removal or remedial action” from “any person
who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or oper-
ated  any  facility  at  which  such  hazardous  substances  were  disposed
of.”  The second was a “contribution” action under §113(f), which pro-
vides  that  a  party  that  “has  resolved  its  liability  to  the  United
States…for  some  or  all  of  a  response  action  or  for  some  or  all  of  the
costs of such action in [a] settlement may seek contribution from any
person  who  is  not  [already]  party  to  a  [qualifying]  settlement.”
§113(f)(3)(B).    The  D.  C.  Circuit  rejected  Guam’s  CERCLA  claims
against the United States.  The court determined that although Guam
had once possessed a CERCLA contribution claim based on the 2004
consent  decree  that  sufficiently  “resolved  Guam’s  liability”  for  the
dump, that claim was time barred.  The court further held that a party
eligible to pursue a contribution claim under §113(f) cannot assert a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xl

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
956
Texas; Tennard v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Texas; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
Texas; Willingham v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Thanh Le v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 963,970
Theis Research, Inc. v. Octel Communications Corp.
955
Thomas v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Thomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,940
907
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas; Walker v.
Thompson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
964
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,971
Thompson; Blair v.
965
Thompson v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thompson v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
Thompson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,959
915
Thriftway Marketing Corp. v. DeVaney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
Tice v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
Tillery; Strachan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tippy; Love v.
946
Toegemann v. Prochaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
Toledo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Toles v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
Tong v. Hunt
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
Tonia B. v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Toshiba America Electronic Components, Inc.; Nghiem v.
971
. . . . . .
Toth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,970
954
Toth v. Michigan State Housing Development Authority . . . . . . .
932
Tovar-Valencia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Town. See name of town.
964
Transportation Union, Executive Bd.; Ruck v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Treasurer of Conn.; Federation of Conn. Taxpayer Organizations v.
943
Trobaugh v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trostel; American Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v.
931
Troxell v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,977
Tseng; El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tunnicliff v. Moriarty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
Turkowski v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,969
Turner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973
Turner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,921
923
Turpin; Cargill v.
Turtle Wax, Inc.; Richardson v.
918
943
Tutt; Wilkerson v.
203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship; Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Assn. v. . 914,975
Tyler v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919
Union. For labor union, see name of trade.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v. MORRISSEY-
BERRU

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–267.  Argued May 11, 2020—Decided July 8, 2020*

The First Amendment protects the right of religious institutions “to de-
cide  for  themselves,  free  from  state  interference,  matters  of  church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”  Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas  Cathedral  of  Russian  Orthodox  Church  in  North  America,
344 U. S. 94, 116.  Applying this principle, this Court held in Hosanna-
Tabor  Evangelical  Lutheran  Church  and  School  v.  EEOC,  565  U. S.
171,  that  the  First  Amendment  barred  a  court  from  entertaining  an
employment  discrimination  claim  brought  by  an  elementary  school
teacher, Cheryl Perich, against the religious school where she taught.
Adopting  the  so-called  “ministerial  exception”  to  laws  governing  the
employment  relationship  between  a  religious  institution  and  certain
key employees, the Court found relevant Perich’s title as a “Minister
of Religion, Commissioned,” her educational training, and her respon-
sibility to teach religion and participate with students in religious ac-
tivities.  Id., at 190–191.

In these cases, two elementary school teachers at Roman Catholic
schools in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles had teaching responsibilities
similar to Perich’s.  Agnes Morrissey-Berru taught at Our Lady of Gua-
dalupe  School  (OLG),  and  Kristen  Biel  taught  at  St.  James  School.
Both  were  employed  under  nearly  identical  agreements  that  set  out
the  schools’  mission  to  develop  and  promote  a  Catholic  School  faith
community;  imposed  commitments  regarding  religious  instruction,
worship, and personal modeling of the faith; and explained that teach-
ers’  performance  would  be  reviewed  on  those  bases.    Each  was  also

——————

* Together with No. 19–348, St. James School v. Biel, as Personal Rep-

resentative of the Estate of Biel, on certiorari to the same Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

501

Syllabus

beneﬁts for retirees and their dependents. During the years that East-
ern employed miners, such beneﬁts were far less extensive than under
the 1974 NBCWA, were unvested, and were fully subject to alteration
or termination. To the extent that Eastern may be able to seek indem-
niﬁcation from EACC or Peabody under contractual arrangements that
might insure Eastern against liabilities arising out of its former coal
operations, that indemnity is neither enhanced nor supplanted by the
Coal Act and does not affect the availability of the declaratory relief
sought here. Respondents’ argument that the Coal Act moderates and
mitigates the economic impact by allocating some of Eastern’s former
employees to signatories of the 1978 NBCWA is unavailing. That East-
ern is not forced to bear the burden of lifetime beneﬁts for all of its
former employees does not mean that its liability is not a signiﬁcant
economic burden.

For similar reasons, the Coal Act substantially interferes with East-
ern’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.
It operates retroac-
tively, reaching back 30 to 50 years to impose liability based on Eastern’s
activities between 1946 and 1965. Retroactive legislation is generally
disfavored.
It presents problems of unfairness because it can deprive
citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions. Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U. S. 181, 191. The distance into the
past that the Coal Act reaches back to impose liability on Eastern and
the magnitude of that liability raise substantial fairness questions. The
pre-1974 NBCWA’s do not demonstrate that there was an implicit indus-
trywide agreement to fund lifetime health beneﬁts at the time that
Eastern was involved in the coal industry. The 1947 and 1950 W&R
Funds, in which Eastern participated, operated on a pay-as-you-go basis
and the classes of beneﬁciaries were subject to the trustees’ discretion.
Not until 1974, when ERISA forced revisions to the 1950 W&R Fund
and when Eastern was no longer in the industry, could lifetime medical
beneﬁts have been viewed as promised. Thus, the Coal Act’s scheme
for allocating Combined Fund premiums is not calibrated either to East-
ern’s past actions or to any agreement by the company. Nor would the
Federal Government’s pattern of involvement in the coal industry have
given Eastern sufﬁcient notice that lifetime health beneﬁts might be
guaranteed to retirees several decades later. Eastern’s liability for
such beneﬁts also differs from coal operators’ responsibility under the
Black Lung Beneﬁts Act of 1972, which spread the cost of employment-
related disabilities to those who proﬁted from the fruits of the employ-
ees’ labor, Turner Elkhorn, supra, at 18. Finally, the nature of the
governmental action in this case is quite unusual in that Congress’ solu-
tion to the grave funding problem that it identiﬁed singles out certain
employers to bear a substantial burden, based on the employers’ conduct
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal case, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It summarizes the arguments and issues presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment

findings from the same record.  These District Court find-
ings  “entail[ed]  primarily  . . .  factual  work”  and  therefore
are  “review[ed]  only  for  clear  error.”  U. S.  Bank  N. A.  v.
Village  at  Lakeridge,  LLC,  583  U. S.  ___,  ___,  ___  (2018)
(slip op., at 6, 9).  Clear error review follows from a candid
appraisal of the comparative advantages of trial courts and
appellate courts.  “While we review transcripts for a living,
they listen to witnesses for a living.  While we largely read
briefs for a living, they largely assess the credibility of par-
ties and witnesses for a living.”  Taglieri v. Monasky, 907
F. 3d 404, 408 (CA6 2018) (en banc).

We accordingly will not disturb the factual conclusions of
the trial court unless we are “left with the definite and firm
conviction  that  a  mistake  has  been  committed.”  United
States  v.  United  States  Gypsum  Co.,  333  U. S.  364,  395
(1948).  In  my  view,  the  District  Court’s  work  reveals  no
such  clear  error,  for  the  reasons  the  plurality  explains.
Ante, at 19–35.  The District Court findings therefore bind
us in this case.

*

*

*
Stare  decisis  instructs  us  to  treat  like  cases  alike.    The
result in this case is controlled by our decision four years
ago invalidating a nearly identical Texas law.  The Louisi-
ana  law  burdens  women  seeking  previability  abortions  to
the same extent as the Texas law, according to factual find-
ings that are not clearly erroneous.  For that reason, I con-
cur in the judgment of the Court that the Louisiana law is
unconstitutional.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Chief Justice. It delves into legal reasoning, citing precedents and applying them to the case at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Per Curiam

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1775
_________________

ARIZONA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY AND COUNTY
OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 15, 2022]

PER CURIAM.
The  writ  of  certiorari  is  dismissed  as  improvidently

granted.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion.  It includes the case name, citation information, and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Supreme Court Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

PATEL v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

outside the jurisdictional bar.2

Patel  agrees  with  the  Government  that  “judgment”  im-
plies an exercise of discretion, but unlike the Government,
he would not sift through eligibility determinations to clas-
sify them as discretionary or nondiscretionary.  Instead, Pa-
tel reads the phrase “regarding the granting of relief ” to fo-
cus the jurisdictional bar narrowly on a single discretionary
judgment:  the  immigration  judge’s  decision  whether  to
grant relief to an applicant eligible to receive it.  Everything
else,  Patel  says,  is  reviewable.    JUSTICE  GORSUCH  adopts
Patel’s approach, rejecting the Government’s interpretation
as well as amicus’.  See post, at 8 (dissenting opinion).

A
is  the  only  one  that

Amicus’

interpretation

fits
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s text and context.  The provision does not
restrict itself to certain kinds of decisions.  Rather, it pro-
hibits review of any judgment regarding the granting of re-
lief under §1255 and the other enumerated provisions.  As
this Court has “repeatedly explained,” “ ‘ “the word ‘any’ has
an  expansive  meaning.” ’ ”  Babb  v.  Wilkie,  589  U. S.  ___,
___, n. 2 (2020) (slip op., at 5, n. 2); see also Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary, at 97 (defining “any” as “one
or  some  indiscriminately  of  whatever  kind”).    Here,  “any”
means  that  the  provision  applies  to  judgments  “ ‘of  what-
ever kind’ ” under §1255, not just discretionary judgments
or the last-in-time judgment.  See United States v. Gonza-
les, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997).  Similarly, the use of “regarding”

——————

2 Prior to 2001, the Government took the position that amicus now de-
fends.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 52–53.  It adopted its current understanding as a
matter of constitutional avoidance following this Court’s decision in INS
v.  St.  Cyr,  533  U. S.  289  (2001).    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  53–54.  Though  the
Government says that Congress’ subsequent amendments to other parts
of §1252, see infra, at 9, “ameliorat[ed]  the constitutional concerns,” it
has not reverted to its original interpretation of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i), Tr. of
Oral Arg. 54.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in the case Patel v. Garland. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U50

[09-26-01 10:29:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 473 (2000)

491

Opinion of Scalia, J.

(Scalia, J., dissenting), a distortion of the natural meaning
of the term “second or successive.”

The opinion relies on Martinez-Villareal, together with
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982), to conclude that a pris-
oner whose federal petition is dismissed to allow exhaustion
may return to federal court without having his later petition
treated as second or successive, regardless of what claims it
contains. Neither the holdings nor even the language of
those opinions suggest that proposition. As for holdings:
Martinez-Villareal did not even involve the issue of exhaus-
tion, and so has no bearing upon the present case. The nar-
row holding of Rose v. Lundy was that a habeas petition
containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims must be
dismissed, but it can be fairly said to have embraced the
proposition that the petitioner could return with the same
claims after they all had been exhausted. This latter propo-
sition could be thought to rest upon the theory that a petition
dismissed for lack of exhaustion is a petition that never ex-
isted, so that any other later petition would not be second
or successive. Or it could be thought to rest upon the the-
ory that the later reﬁling of the original claims, all of them
now exhausted, is just a renewal of the ﬁrst petition, implic-
itly authorized by the dismissal to permit exhaustion. The
former theory is counterfactual; the latter is quite plausible.
The language the Court quotes from Rose and Martinez-
Villareal also does not justify the Court’s mixed-petitions-
don’t-count theory. The quotation from Rose says only that
“ ‘prisoners who . . . submit mixed petitions . . . are entitled
to . . . exhaust the remainder of their claims.’ ” Ante, at
486 (quoting Rose, supra, at 520 (emphasis added)). This
does not suggest that they are entitled to add new claims, or
to return, once again, without accomplishing the exhaustion
that the court dismissed the petition to allow. And the quo-
tation from Martinez-Villareal indicates only that when
a prisoner whose habeas petition was dismissed for failure
to exhaust state remedies “ ‘then did exhaust those reme-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia.  It discusses legal precedent and argues against the majority opinion's interpretation of certain legal terms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

stitutions for preferential treatment in comparison to secu-
lar gatherings, not because it discriminates against them.
Surely  the  Diocese  cannot  demand  laxer  restrictions  by
pointing  out  that  it  is  already  being  treated  better  than
comparable secular institutions.2

Finally, the Diocese points to certain statements by Gov-
ernor Cuomo as evidence that New York’s regulation is im-
permissibly  targeted  at  religious  activity—specifically,  at
combatting  heightened  rates  of  positive  COVID–19  cases
among New York’s Orthodox Jewish community.  Applica-
tion 24.  The Diocese suggests that these comments supply
“an independent basis for the application of strict scrutiny.”
Reply Brief in No. 20A87, p. 9.  I do not see how.  The Gov-
ernor’s comments simply do not warrant an application of
strict  scrutiny  under  this  Court’s  precedents.  Just  a  few
Terms ago, this Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny
to  a  Presidential  Proclamation  limiting  immigration  from
Muslim-majority countries, even though President Trump
had described the Proclamation as a “Muslim Ban,” origi-
nally  conceived  of  as  a  “ ‘total  and  complete  shutdown  of
Muslims entering the United States until our country’s rep-
resentatives  can  figure  out  what  is  going  on.’ ”  Trump  v.
Hawaii,  585  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2018)  (slip  op.,  at  27).    If  the
——————

2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH cites Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hia-
leah, 508 U. S. 520, 537–538 (1993), and Employment Div., Dept. of Hu-
man Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 884 (1990), for the propo-
sition  that  states  must  justify  treating  even  noncomparable  secular
institutions more favorably than houses of worship.  Ante, at 2 (concur-
ring opinion).  But those cases created no such rule.  Lukumi struck down
a law that allowed animals to be killed for almost any purpose other than
animal sacrifice, on the ground that the law was a “ ‘religious gerryman-
der’ ”  targeted  at  the  Santeria  faith.    508  U. S.,  at  535.  Smith is  even
farther afield, standing for the entirely inapposite proposition that “the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply  with  a  valid  and  neutral  law  of  general  applicability  on  the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).”  494 U. S., at 879 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the case and cites relevant precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

29

JACKSON, J., dissenting

The Court has come to rest on the bottom-line conclusion
that racial diversity in higher education is only worth po-
tentially preserving insofar as it might be needed to prepare
Black  Americans  and  other  underrepresented  minorities
for success in the bunker, not the boardroom (a particularly
awkward place to land, in light of the history the majority
opts  to  ignore).106  It  would  be  deeply  unfortunate  if  the
Equal Protection Clause actually demanded this perverse,
ahistorical, and counterproductive outcome.  To impose this
result in that Clause’s name when it requires no such thing,
and to thereby obstruct our collective progress toward the
full realization of the Clause’s promise, is truly a tragedy
for us all.

——————
potential consequences of the [majority’s] approach, as measured against
the Constitution’s objectives . . . provides further reason to believe that
the [majority’s] approach is legally unsound.”  Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 858 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  I fear that the Court’s folly brings our Nation to
the brink of coming “full circle” once again.  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 402 (1978) (opinion of Marshall, J.).

106 Compare ante, at 22, n. 4, with ante, at 22–30, and supra, at 3–4,

and nn. 2–3.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It expresses the judge's disagreement with the majority opinion and provides legal arguments to support their stance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

ALITO, J., dissenting

in  the  Department  of  Defense  Dictionary  of  Military  and
Associated  Terms  (DOD  Dictionary).3    And  as  defined  in
that dictionary, the terms seemingly allow the Navy to do
just about anything it wants short of punishing respondents
and drumming them out of the service.

“Deployment” is defined as “[t]he movement of forces into
and out of an operational area,”4 and an “operational area”
seems  to  mean  any  “geographic  are[a]”  where  the  Navy
might carry out “a strategic, operational, tactical, service,
training, or administrative military mission.”5  Thus, send-
ing a respondent somewhere for training or administrative
purposes may constitute a deployment.

The  term  “assignment”  appears  to  include  detailing  an
individual to perform any duties on something more than a
temporary basis.6  And an “operational decision” apparently
can include the carrying out of any “strategic, operational,
tactical,  service,  training,  or  administrative  military  mis-
sion.”7

Putting all this together, it appears that the Court’s order
allows the Navy to use respondents’ unvaccinated status as
a reason for directing them to perform whatever duties or
functions the Navy wants, including sitting alone in a room

——————

3 See  DOD  Dictionary  (Nov.  2021),  https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/

Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.

4 Id., at 62.
5 Id., at 159.
6 The DOD Dictionary does not define “assignment,” but the term “as-

sign” is given this complex definition:

“1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such place-
ment is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls
and  administers  the  units  or  personnel  for  the  primary  function,  or
greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail in-
dividuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions
are primary and/or relatively permanent.”  Id., at 20.

7 The specific term “operational decision” is not defined, but the defini-
tion of “operation” includes “the carrying out of a strategic, operational,
tactical,  service,  training,  or  administrative  military  mission.”    Id.,  at
159.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It cites legal sources and delves into the interpretation of military terms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

778

FARAGHER v. BOCA RATON

Syllabus

derance of the evidence. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised rea-
sonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer
had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is
not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated
policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be
addressed in any case when litigating the ﬁrst element of the defense.
And while proof that an employee failed to fulﬁll the corresponding obli-
gation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally sufﬁce to satisfy
the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense. No
afﬁrmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s harass-
ment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment. Pp. 801–808.

(d) Under this standard, the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment must be re-
versed. The District Court found that the degree of hostility in the
work environment rose to the actionable level and was attributable to
Silverman and Terry, and it is clear that these supervisors were granted
virtually unchecked authority over their subordinates and that Fara-
gher and her colleagues were completely isolated from the City’s higher
management. While the City would have an opportunity to raise an
afﬁrmative defense if there were any serious prospect of its presenting
one, it appears from the record that any such avenue is closed. The
District Court found that the City had entirely failed to disseminate its
sexual harassment policy among the beach employees and that its ofﬁ-
cials made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of supervisors, and
the record makes clear that the City’s policy did not include any harass-
ing supervisors assurance that could be bypassed in registering com-
plaints. Under such circumstances, the Court holds as a matter of law
that the City could not be found to have exercised reasonable care to
prevent the supervisors’ harassing conduct. Although the record dis-
closes two possible grounds upon which the City might seek to excuse
its failure to distribute its policy and to establish a complaint mecha-
nism, both are contradicted by the record. The City points to nothing
that might justify a conclusion by the District Court on remand that the
City had exercised reasonable care. Nor is there any reason to remand
for consideration of Faragher’s efforts to mitigate her own damages,
since the award to her was solely nominal. Pp. 808–809.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the syllabus section of a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

15

Opinion of the Court

violates the Free Exercise Clause.5

*

*
Nearly  200  years  ago,  a  legislator  urged  the  Maryland
Assembly  to  adopt  a  bill  that  would  end  the  State’s  dis-
qualification of Jews from public office:

*

“If, on account of my religious faith, I am subjected to
disqualifications,  from  which  others  are  free,  . . .  I
cannot  but  consider  myself  a  persecuted  man.  . . .  An
odious  exclusion  from  any  of  the  benefits  common  to
the rest of my fellow-citizens, is a persecution, differ-
ing only in degree, but of a nature equally unjustifia-
ble  with  that,  whose  instruments  are  chains  and  tor-
ture.”  Speech by H. M. Brackenridge, Dec. Sess. 1818,
in  H.  Brackenridge,  W.  Worthington,  &  J.  Tyson,
Speeches  in  the  House  of  Delegates  of  Maryland,  64
(1829).

The Missouri Department of Natural Resources has not
subjected  anyone  to  chains  or  torture  on  account  of  reli-
gion.  And  the  result  of  the  State’s  policy  is  nothing  so
dramatic as the denial of political office.  The consequence
is,  in  all  likelihood,  a  few  extra  scraped  knees.    But  the
exclusion  of  Trinity  Lutheran  from  a  public  benefit  for
which  it  is  otherwise  qualified,  solely  because  it  is  a
church,  is  odious  to  our  Constitution  all  the  same,  and
cannot stand.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the  Eighth  Circuit  is  reversed,  and  the  case  is  remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

5 Based  on  this  holding,  we  need  not  reach  the  Church’s  claim  that

the policy also violates the Equal Protection Clause.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and its application to a case involving a church's exclusion from a public benefit.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U72

[09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

11

Syllabus

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. AKINS et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit

No. 96–1590. Argued January 14, 1998—Decided June 1, 1998

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) seeks to remedy
corruption of the political process. As relevant here, it imposes exten-
sive recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon “political commit-
tee[s],” which include “any committee, club, association or other group
of persons which receives” more than $1,000 in “contributions” or “which
makes” more than $1,000 in “expenditures” in any given year, 2 U. S. C.
§ 431(4)(A) (emphasis added), “for the purpose of inﬂuencing any election
for Federal ofﬁce,” §§ 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). Assistance given to help a
particular candidate will not count toward the $1,000 “expenditure” ceil-
ing if it takes the form of a “communication” by a “membership organi-
zation or corporation” “to its members”—as long as the organization is
not “organized primarily for the purpose of inﬂuencing [any individual’s]
§ 431(9)(B)(iii). Respondents, voters with
nomination . . . or election.”
views often opposed to those of the American Israel Public Affairs Com-
mittee (AIPAC), ﬁled a compliant with petitioner Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC), asking the FEC to ﬁnd that AIPAC had violated FECA
and, among other things, to order AIPAC to make public the information
that FECA demands of political committees.
In dismissing the com-
plaint, the FEC found that AIPAC’s communications fell outside FECA’s
membership communications exception. Nonetheless, it concluded,
AIPAC was not a “political committee” because, as an issue-oriented
lobbying organization, its major purpose was not the nomination or
election of candidates. The District Court granted the FEC summary
judgment when it reviewed the determination, but the en banc Court
of Appeals reversed on the ground that the FEC’s major purpose test
improperly interpreted FECA’s deﬁnition of a political committee. The
case presents this Court with two questions: (1) whether respondents
had standing to challenge the FEC’s decision, and (2) whether an organi-
zation falls outside FECA’s deﬁnition of a “political committee” because
“its major purpose” is not “the nomination or election of candidates.”

Held:

1. Respondents, as voters seeking information to which they believe
FECA entitles them, have standing to challenge the FEC’s decision not
to bring an enforcement action. Pp. 19–26.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they summarize the case rather than containing the full text of the legal arguments and opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

matter less in this context because of “likely” national-secu-
rity  risks.  Ante,  at  11–12.  So  once  more,  we  tote  up  for
ourselves the costs and benefits of a private right of action
in this or that setting and reach a legislative judgment.  To
atone  for  Bivens,  it  seems  we  continue  repeating  its  most
basic mistake.

Of course, the Court’s real messages run deeper than its
case-specific analysis.  If the costs and benefits do not jus-
tify a new Bivens action on facts so analogous to Bivens it-
self, it’s hard to see how they ever could.  And if the only
question is whether a court is “better equipped” than Con-
gress to weigh the value of a new cause of action, surely the
right  answer  will  always  be  no.    Doubtless,  these  are  the
lessons  the  Court  seeks  to  convey.    I  would  only  take  the
next step and acknowledge explicitly what the Court leaves
barely implicit.  Sometimes, it seems, “this Court leaves a
door ajar and holds out the possibility that someone, some-
day  might  walk  through  it”  even  as  it  devises  a  rule  that
ensures  “no  one  . . .  ever  will.”  Edwards  v.  Vannoy,  593
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2021)  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,
at 1).  In fairness to future litigants and our lower court col-
leagues, we should not hold out that kind of false hope, and
in  the  process  invite  still  more  “protracted  litigation  des-
tined to yield nothing.”  Nestlé, 593 U. S., at ___ (GORSUCH,
J., concurring) (slip op., at 7).  Instead, we should exercise
“the truer modesty of ceding an ill-gotten gain,” ibid., and
forthrightly return the power to create new causes of action
to the people’s representatives in Congress.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing as part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

911

524 U. S.

June 1, 1998

No. 97–8909. DesAnges v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 364.

No. 97–8911. Easter v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 429.

No. 97–8916. Victoria v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1155.

No. 97–8917. Brown v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 718.

No. 97–8921. Atkins v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 893.

No. 97–8973. D(cid:146)Amico v. City of New York et al. C. A.

2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 145.

No. 96–1215. Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., dba Mystic Lake
Casino, et al. Sup. Ct. Minn. Motion of Tribal Accountability
Legal Rights Fund, Inc., for leave to ﬁle a brief as amicus curiae
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 555 N. W. 2d 284.

No. 97–1606. Fulcomer, Warden v. Frey. C. A. 3d Cir.
Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 916.

No. 97–8467. Hassan v. AT&T Corp. et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consid-
Certiorari denied.
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 134 F. 3d
363.

Rehearing Denied

No. 97–1285. Shephard v. Provident Life & Accident In-

surance Co., 523 U. S. 1059;

No. 97–1358. Hadji-Elias et al. v. Los Angeles County
Superior Court (Shahbaz et al., Real Parties in Inter-
est), 523 U. S. 1060;

No. 97–1360. Shephard v. Pomona Fairplex et al., 523

U. S. 1060;

No. 97–7884. Valdez et al. v. Fonoimoana et al., 523 U. S.

1080; and

No. 97–8090. Angel v. Texas, 523 U. S. 1098. Petitions for

rehearing denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks the narrative flow of typical book content and is more akin to a legal docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Opinion of the Court

Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 581 U. S.
___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 10) (citing Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §712 (1986)
(Restatement (Third))).

A
Known at the founding as the “law of nations,” what we
now refer to as international law customarily concerns re-
lations  among  sovereign  states,  not  relations  between
states and individuals.  See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U. S. 398, 422 (1964) (“The traditional view of
international law is that it establishes substantive princi-
ples for determining whether one country has wronged an-
other.”).

The  domestic  takings  rule  invoked  by  Germany  derives
from  this  premise.  Historically,  a  sovereign’s  taking  of  a
foreigner’s  property,  like  any  injury  of  a  foreign  national,
implicated  the  international  legal  system  because  it  “con-
stituted  an  injury  to  the  state  of  the  alien’s  nationality.”
Bradley  &  Goldsmith,  Customary  International  Law  as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position,
110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 831, n. 106 (1997); see S. Friedman,
Expropriation  in  International  Law  5,  139  (1953).    Such
mistreatment was an affront to the sovereign, and “there-
fore the alien’s state alone, and not the individual, could in-
voke the remedies of international law.”  Bradley, supra, at
831, n. 106.  A domestic taking by contrast did not interfere
with relations among states.  See E. de Vattel, 3 The Law
of Nations §81, p. 138 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916) (“Even the
property of individuals, taken as a whole, is to be regarded
as  the  property  of  the  Nation  with  respect  to  other  Na-
tions.”);  see  also  United  States  v.  Belmont,  301  U. S.  324,
332 (1937) (“What another country has done in the way of
taking over property of its nationals . . . is not a matter for
judicial consideration here.”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and legal texts, indicating it's part of a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

and the publicity of the misstatement—gives rise to a “pre-
sumption” of reliance.  See id., at 248, and n. 27.  After such
a showing, the Court continued, a defendant may then pro-
ceed to “rebut the presumption.”  Id., at 248.  Nowhere in
any of this did Basic suggest the order of operations govern-
ing its presumption should differ in any way from those gov-
erning  others  commonly  found  in  the  law  and  subject  to
Rule 301.  Nor is there any doubt which party has the bur-
den of persuasion on the question of reliance in securities
fraud cases like ours.  From start to finish, the plaintiff has
the  burden  to  satisfy  that  essential  element  of  its  claim.
Basic’s  presumption  of  reliance  thus  “does  not  shift”  any
burden  of  persuasion—that  always  “remains”  with  the
plaintiff.  Fed.  Rule  Evid.  301;  see  also  St.  Mary’s  Honor
Center, 509 U. S., at 506–508.

Consider  how  all  this  works  in  routine  securities  fraud
cases.  Once  a  plaintiff  proves  the  four  “predicate  facts”
Basic specified, see supra, at 1, a presumption of reliance
attaches.  At that point, the defendant bears the burden of
producing evidence that, if believed, would support a find-
ing that the plaintiff did not actually rely on its alleged mis-
representation.  As we have seen, a defendant might do so
by producing evidence suggesting that its alleged misrepre-
sentation did not have an impact on market price or that
the plaintiff was indifferent to the alleged misrepresenta-
tion.  Upon  such  a  showing,  the  presumption  of  reliance
drops  from  the  case  and  the  trier  of  fact  must  decide  the
question of reliance vel non, cognizant of the fact the plain-
tiff bears the burden of proving reliance like any other es-
sential elements of its claim.  Again, that does not mean the
plaintiff ’s indirect proof disappears.  A court may still infer
from  the  Basic  predicates  that  a  particular  misstatement
was incorporated into the stock price and that the plaintiff
relied on the integrity of that price.  Both sides are free to
present  additional  proof  too.  It’s  simply  that  a  court  no
longer must find reliance.  See St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal precedent of Basic Inc. v. Levinson and its application to securities fraud cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

arose  from  the  violation  she  suffered—and  to  dismiss  her
other PAGA claims.  The trial court denied that motion, and
the California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that cate-
gorical waivers of PAGA standing are contrary to state pol-
icy  and  that  PAGA  claims  cannot  be  split  into  arbitrable
individual  claims  and  nonarbitrable  “representative”
claims.

This  ruling  was  dictated  by  the  California  Supreme
Court’s decision in Iskanian.  In that case, the court held
that  pre-dispute  agreements  to  waive  the  right  to  bring
“representative”  PAGA  claims  are  invalid  as  a  matter  of
public policy.  What, precisely, this holding means requires
some explanation.  PAGA’s unique features have prompted
the development of an entire vocabulary unique to the stat-
ute, but the details, it seems, are still being worked out.  An
unfortunate feature of this lexicon is that it tends to use the
word  “representative”  in  two  distinct  ways,  and  each  of
those  uses  of  the  term  “representative”  is  connected  with
one  of  Iskanian’s  rules  governing  contractual  waiver  of
PAGA claims.

In the first sense, PAGA actions are “representative” in
that  they  are  brought  by  employees  acting  as  representa-
tives—that  is,  as  agents  or  proxies—of  the  State.    But
PAGA claims are also called “representative” when they are
predicated on code violations sustained by other employees.
In  the  first  sense,  “ ‘every  PAGA  action  is  . . .  representa-
tive’ ”  and  “[t]here  is  no  individual  component  to  a  PAGA
action,” Kim, 9 Cal. 5th, at 87, 459 P. 3d, at 1131 (quoting
Iskanian,  59  Cal.  4th,  at  387,  327  P. 3d,  at  151),  because
every PAGA claim is asserted in a representative capacity.
But when the word “representative” is used in the second
way,  it  makes  sense  to  distinguish  “individual”  PAGA
claims, which are premised on Labor Code violations actu-
ally  sustained  by  the  plaintiff,  from  “representative”  (or
perhaps quasi-representative) PAGA claims arising out of
events  involving  other  employees.   For  purposes  of  this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). It delves into the interpretation of "representative" claims within the context of PAGA and contractual waivers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

II

Before turning to the merits, we must assure ourselves of
our  jurisdiction.  See  Summers  v.  Earth  Island  Institute,
555  U. S.  488,  499  (2009).    UNC  argues  that  SFFA  lacks
standing  to  bring  its  claims  because  it  is  not  a  “genuine”
membership  organization.    Brief  for  University  Respond-
ents in No. 21–707, pp. 23–26.  Every court to have consid-
ered this argument has rejected it, and so do we.  See Stu-
dents  for  Fair  Admissions,  Inc.  v.  University  of  Tex.  at
Austin, 37 F. 4th 1078, 1084–1086, and n. 8 (CA5 2022) (col-
lecting cases).

Article III of the Constitution limits “[t]he judicial power
of the United States” to “cases” or “controversies,” ensuring
that federal courts act only “as a necessity in the determi-
nation  of  real,  earnest  and  vital”  disputes.  Muskrat  v.
United States, 219 U. S. 346, 351, 359 (1911) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  “To state a case or controversy un-
der Article III, a plaintiff must establish standing.”  Arizona
Christian  School  Tuition  Organization  v.  Winn,  563  U. S.
125,  133  (2011).    That,  in  turn,  requires  a  plaintiff  to
demonstrate  that  it  has  “(1)  suffered  an  injury  in  fact,
(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favor-
able  judicial  decision.”  Spokeo,  Inc.  v.  Robins,  578  U. S.
330, 338 (2016).

In cases like these, where the plaintiff is an organization,
the standing requirements of Article III can be satisfied in
two ways.  Either the organization can claim that it suffered
an  injury  in  its  own  right  or,  alternatively,  it  can  assert
“standing  solely  as  the  representative  of  its  members.”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 511 (1975).  The latter ap-
proach  is  known  as  representational  or  organizational
standing.  Ibid.; Summers, 555 U. S., at 497–498.  To invoke
it, an organization must demonstrate that “(a) its members
would  otherwise  have  standing  to  sue  in  their  own  right;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the issue of standing in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxxix

Page

1099

Santos Murillo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

Santoso v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sapp; Muhammad v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Saqib v. Federal Bureau of Investigation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  982,1103

1155

Saquic-Sacche v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

Sareen v. Sareen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965

Sasser; Norris v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Saterstad v. Stover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

Saucedo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saucedo-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  864,1016

Saunders v. United States
883

Savage v. Bonavitacola  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932

Savage; Gibbons v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

Savage v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1008

Savinon v. Khahaifa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960

Savoca v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Savoy v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

Saybolt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

S. B. v. J. L.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

Scaife v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958

Scales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926

Scallon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Scambos v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schery v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
881

Schexnayder v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
849

1151

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schleffer; Sairras v.
813

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schmidt, In re
Schmidt; Missouri Gas Energy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  968,1090

Schmitz v. United States
1115

Schneider v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938

Schoedinger v. United Healthcare of Midwest, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . .
971

Schoﬁeld; Pruitt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

School Dist. of Philadelphia; White v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Schrader v. Turner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Schreiner v. Ewing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
806

Schuetzle; Moore v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1100

Schult; Middleton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

Schultz; Schulze v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

Schulze v. Schultz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
810

Schwab v. Reilly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1143

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schwarzenegger v. Plata
1037

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scivantage; Peters v.
809

Scohy v. Sand River Properties, LLC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Scott v. Curry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ

Opinion of the Court

claim.  The  internal  credit  files  of  the  other  6,332  class
members were not provided to third-party businesses dur-
ing the relevant time period.  We conclude that those 6,332
class members have not demonstrated concrete harm and
thus lack Article III standing to sue on the reasonable-pro-
cedures claim.

In two other claims, all 8,185 class members complained
about formatting defects in certain mailings sent to them
by  TransUnion.  But  the  class  members  other  than  the
named plaintiff Sergio Ramirez have not demonstrated that
the  alleged  formatting  errors  caused  them  any  concrete
harm.  Therefore, except for Ramirez, the class members do
not have standing as to those two claims.

Over  Judge  McKeown’s  dissent,  the  U. S.  Court  of  Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that all 8,185 class mem-
bers have standing as to all three claims.  The Court of Ap-
peals approved a class damages award of about $40 million.
In light of our conclusion that (i) only 1,853 class members
have  standing  for  the  reasonable-procedures  claim  and
(ii) only Ramirez himself has standing for the two format-
ting  claims  relating  to  the  mailings,  we  reverse  the  judg-
ment of the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

In 1970, Congress passed and President Nixon signed the
Fair Credit Reporting Act.  84 Stat. 1127, as amended, 15
U. S. C. §1681 et seq.  The Act seeks to promote “fair and
accurate credit reporting” and to protect consumer privacy.
§1681(a).  To achieve those goals, the Act regulates the con-
sumer  reporting  agencies  that  compile  and  disseminate
personal information about consumers.

The Act “imposes a host of requirements concerning the
creation and use of consumer reports.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Rob-
ins, 578 U. S. 330, 335 (2016).  Three of the Act’s require-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing a case involving TransUnion LLC and Ramirez. It delves into legal arguments regarding standing and class action claims related to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xcv

Page

838

McNeil; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Debose v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

McNeil; Dittrich v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  853,1101

1030

McNeil; Doorbal v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

McNeil; Estep v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

McNeil; Farnsworth v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909

McNeil; Flowers v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910

McNeil; Fortner v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

McNeil; Gaines v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Greene v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  893,1039

1123

McNeil; Grontkowski v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

McNeil; Hagins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917

McNeil; Hall v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

McNeil; Hand v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Hannah v.
997

McNeil; Hannon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

McNeil; Helton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

McNeil; Hermelo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
884

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Hoefert v.
1032

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Jeanlouis v.
833

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Jenkins v.
1004

McNeil; Keen v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Kessler v.
1013

McNeil; Kimbrough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

McNeil; Knight v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928

McNeil; Lacue v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

McNeil; LaFavors v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

McNeil; LaMarca v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
864

McNeil; Lanza v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Lovett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
871

McNeil; Machado v.
1096

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

McNeil; Macias v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

McNeil; Maitre v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

McNeil; Massie v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Miller v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  950,1140

McNeil; Moore v.
851

McNeil; Newell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

McNeil; Owen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

McNeil; Owens v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Pace v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
870

841

McNeil; Philpot v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Ramirez-Ponce v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  924,1066

McNeil; Rich v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

McNeil; Robenson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  994,1119
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

INDEX

1309

CRIMINAL LAW—Continued.
his right to possess some types of ﬁrearms, his prior conviction remains
a conviction for purposes of a federal law forbidding a person convicted
of a serious offense to possess any ﬁrearm, 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), and
requiring an enhanced sentence for a three-time violent felon who vio-
lates § 922(g), § 924(e). Caron v. United States, p. 308.

3. Mandatory prison term—Carrying a ﬁrearm during a drug of-
fense.—“[C]arries a ﬁrearm,” as it is used in 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1)—
which imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who
“uses or carries a ﬁrearm” “during and in relation to” a “drug trafﬁck-
ing crime”—applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys
ﬁrearms in a vehicle, including in locked glove compartment or trunk.
Muscarello v. United States, p. 125.

4. Proper venue—Federal money-laundering charges.—A Missouri
District Court is not proper venue for respondent’s trial on money-
laundering charges where laundering alleged in indictment occurred
entirely in Florida. United States v. Cabrales, p. 1.

CURRENCY TRANSPORT OUT OF UNITED STATES. See Constitu-

tional Law, III.

DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT. See Maritime Law.

DECENCY STANDARDS IN NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE

ARTS GRANTS. See Constitutional Law, V.

DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE LIABILITY STANDARD. See Educa-

tion Amendments of 1972.

DISABILITY BENEFITS. See Social Security Act.

DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION. See Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990.

DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT. See Civil Rights Act of

1964.

DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF DISABILITY. See Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990.

DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF SEX. See Civil Rights Act of

1964; Education Amendments of 1972.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY. See Constitutional Law, I.

DRUG TRAFFICKING CRIMES. See Criminal Law, 3.

DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, II.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document. It lists topics and corresponding page numbers.  Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and are not the primary content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ET AL. v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY

INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 12–10.  Argued April 22, 2013—Decided June 20, 2013

In the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act), 22 U. S. C. §7601 et seq., Con-
gress  has  authorized  the  appropriation  of  billions  of  dollars  to  fund
efforts  by  nongovernmental  organizations  to  combat  HIV/AIDS
worldwide.  The  Act  imposes  two  related  conditions:  (1)  No  funds
“may  be  used  to  promote  or  advocate  the  legalization  or  practice  of
prostitution,” §7631(e); and (2) no funds may be used by an organiza-
tion  “that  does  not  have  a  policy  explicitly  opposing  prostitution,”
§7631(f).  To  enforce  the  second  condition,  known  as  the  Policy  Re-
quirement,  the  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services  (HHS)
and  the  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development
(USAID)  require  funding  recipients  to  agree  in  their  award  docu-
ments that they oppose prostitution.
  Respondents,  recipients  of  Leadership  Act  funds  who  wish  to  re-
main neutral on prostitution, sought a declaratory judgment that the
Policy Requirement violates their First Amendment rights.  The Dis-
trict Court issued a preliminary injunction, barring the Government
from cutting off respondents’ Leadership Act funding during the liti-
gation or from otherwise taking action based on their privately funded
speech.  The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Policy Re-
quirement,  as  implemented  by  the  agencies,  violated  respondents’
freedom of speech.

Held: The  Policy  Requirement  violates  the  First  Amendment  by  com-
pelling  as  a  condition  of  federal  funding  the  affirmation  of  a  belief
that  by  its  nature  cannot  be  confined  within  the  scope  of  the  Gov-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are informational in nature and not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the core content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–1161
_________________

BEVERLY R. GILL, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.

WILLIAM WHITFORD, ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

[June 18, 2018]

CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the

Court.

The State of Wisconsin, like most other States, entrusts

to its legislature the periodic task of redrawing the bound
aries  of  the  State’s  legislative  districts.    A  group  of  Wis
consin  Democratic  voters  filed  a  complaint  in  the  District
Court,  alleging  that  the  legislature  carried  out  this  task
with an eye to diminishing the ability of Wisconsin Demo
crats to convert Democratic votes into Democratic seats in
the  legislature.    The  plaintiffs  asserted  that,  in  so  doing,
the  legislature  had  infringed  their  rights  under  the  First
and Fourteenth Amendments.

But  a  plaintiff  seeking  relief  in  federal  court  must  first
demonstrate that he has standing to do so, including that
he  has  “a  personal  stake  in  the  outcome,”  Baker  v.  Carr,
369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962), distinct from a “generally avail
able grievance about government,” Lance v. Coffman, 549
U. S.  437,  439  (2007)  (per  curiam).  That  threshold  re
quirement  “ensures  that  we  act  as  judges,  and  do  not
engage in policymaking properly left to elected representa
tives.”  Hollingsworth  v.  Perry,  570  U. S.  693,  700  (2013).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes the case citation, the title of the opinion, and the introductory paragraphs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP

Syllabus

(a) The heirs contend that their claims fall within the FSIA’s excep-
tion  for  cases  involving  “property  taken  in  violation  of  international
law,” §1605(a)(3)—a provision known as the expropriation exception—
because the forced sale of the Welfenschatz constituted an act of geno-
cide,  and  genocide  is  a  violation  of  international  human  rights  law.
Germany argues that the relevant international law is not the law of
genocide but the international law of expropriation, under which a for-
eign sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property remains a domes-
tic affair.  Pp. 4–13.

(1) The “domestic takings rule” invoked by Germany derives from
the  premise  that  international  law  customarily  concerns  relations
among states, not between states and individuals.  Historically, a sov-
ereign’s  taking  of  a  foreign  national’s  property  implicated  interna-
tional law because it constituted an injury to the state of the alien’s
nationality.  A domestic taking, by contrast, did not interfere with re-
lations among states.  This domestic takings rule endured even as a
growing body of human rights law made states’ treatment of individual
human beings a matter of international concern.  And those who criti-
cized the treatment of property rights under international law did so
on  the  ground  that  all  sovereign  takings,  not  just  domestic  takings,
were outside the scope of that law.  This dispute over the existence of
international law constraints on sovereign takings eventually reached
the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 436.
Hesitant to delve into this controversy, the Court instead invoked the
act of state doctrine.  In response, Congress passed the Second Hick-
enlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, which pro-
hibits  United  States  courts  from  applying  the  act  of  state  doctrine
where a “right[ ] to property is asserted” based upon a “taking . . . by
an act of that state in violation of . . . international law.”  22 U. S. C.
§2370(e)(2).  Courts and commentators understood the Amendment to
permit  adjudication  of  claims  Sabbatino  had  avoided  deciding,  i.e.,
claims  against  other  countries  for  expropriation  of  American-owned
property.  But nothing in the Amendment purported to alter any rule
of  international  law,  including  the  domestic  takings  rule.    Congress
used nearly identical language when it crafted the FSIA’s expropria-
tion exception twelve years later.  Based on this historical and legal
background, courts reached a “consensus”  that the expropriation ex-
ception’s  “reference  to  ‘violation  of  international  law’  does  not  cover
expropriations of property belonging to a country’s own nationals.”  Re-
public of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 713 (BREYER, J., concur-
ring).  Pp. 5–8.

(2) The heirs concede that the international law of expropriation
retained the domestic takings rule at the time of the FSIA’s enactment,
but  they  read  “rights  in  property  taken  in  violation  of  international
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the arguments and legal precedents surrounding a case. It is not the actual content meant to be read and understood by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>