<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–108.  Argued April 15, 2024—Decided June 26, 2024

Federal  and  state  law  distinguish  between  two  kinds  of  payments  to
public officials—bribes and gratuities.  Bribes are typically payments
made or agreed to before an official act in order to influence the public
official with respect to that future official act.  Gratuities are typically
payments made to a public official after an official act as a reward or
token of appreciation.  While American law generally treats bribes as
inherently corrupt and unlawful, the law’s treatment of gratuities is
more nuanced.  Some gratuities might be innocuous, and others may
raise  ethical  and  appearance  concerns.    Federal,  state,  and  local
governments have drawn different lines on which gratuities and gifts
are acceptable and which are not.

For example, Congress has established comprehensive prohibitions
on both bribes and gratuities to federal officials.  If a federal official
accepts a bribe for an official act, federal bribery law provides for a 15-
year maximum prison sentence.  See 18 U. S. C. §201(b).  By contrast,
if a federal official accepts a prohibited gratuity, federal gratuities law
sets a 2-year maximum prison sentence.  See §201(c).

In 1984, Congress passed and President Reagan signed a law now
codified  at  18  U. S. C.  §666  that,  as  relevant  here,  extended  the
gratuities  prohibition  in  §201(c)  to  most  state  and  local  officials.
Congress reversed course after two years and amended §666 to avoid
the law’s “possible application to acceptable commercial and business
practices.”  H. R. Rep. No. 99–797, p. 30 (1986).  As amended, the text
of §666 now closely resembles the bribery provision for federal officials,
§201(b),  and  makes  it  a  crime  for  most  state  and  local  officials  to
“corruptly”  solicit,  accept,  or  agree  to  accept  “anything  of  value”
“intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with” any official
business  or  transaction  worth  $5,000  or  more.    §§666(a)(1)(B),  (b).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

erations outlined by the Court can be properly satisfied un-
less the House is required to show more than it has put for-
ward to date.

Specifically, the House should provide a description of the
type of legislation being considered, and while great speci-
ficity is not necessary, the description should be sufficient
to permit a court to assess whether the particular records
sought  are  of  any  special  importance.    The  House  should
also spell out its constitutional authority to enact the type
of legislation that it is contemplating, and it should justify
the scope of the subpoenas in relation to the articulated leg-
islative needs.  In addition, it should explain why the sub-
poenaed  information,  as  opposed  to  information  available
from other sources, is needed.  Unless the House is required
to make a showing along these lines, I would hold that en-
forcement of the subpoenas cannot be ordered.  Because I
find the terms of the Court’s remand inadequate, I must re-
spectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it unsuitable for indexing as it is not general readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 18–956.  Argued October 7, 2020—Decided  April 5, 2021

Oracle America, Inc., owns a copyright in Java SE, a computer platform
that uses the popular Java computer programming language.  In 2005,
Google acquired Android and sought to build a new software platform
for mobile devices.  To allow the millions of programmers familiar with
the  Java  programming  language  to  work with  its  new  Android  plat-
form, Google copied roughly 11,500 lines of code from the Java SE pro-
gram.  The  copied  lines  are  part  of  a  tool  called  an  Application  Pro-
gramming Interface (API).  An API allows programmers to call upon
prewritten computing tasks for use in their own programs.  Over the
course  of  protracted  litigation,  the  lower  courts  have  considered  (1)
whether  Java  SE’s  owner  could  copyright  the  copied  lines  from  the
API, and (2) if so, whether Google’s copying constituted a permissible
“fair use” of that material freeing Google from copyright liability.  In
the proceedings below, the Federal Circuit held that the copied lines
are copyrightable.  After a jury then found for Google on fair use, the
Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that Google’s copying was not a
fair use as a matter of law.  Prior to remand for a trial on damages, the
Court agreed to review the Federal Circuit’s determinations as to both
copyrightability and fair use.

Held: Google’s  copying  of  the  Java  SE  API,  which  included  only  those
lines of code that were needed to allow programmers to put their ac-
crued talents to work in a new and transformative program, was a fair
use of that material as a matter of law.  Pp. 11–36.

(a) Copyright and patents, the Constitution says, serve to “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries.”  Art. I, §8, cl. 8.  Copyright encourages the pro-
duction of works that others might cheaply reproduce by granting the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP

Opinion of the Court

In 1995, a Senate committee subpoenaed notes taken by
a White House attorney at a meeting with President Clin-
ton’s  personal  lawyers  concerning  the  Whitewater  contro-
versy.  The President resisted the subpoena on the ground
that the notes were protected by attorney-client privilege,
leading to “long and protracted” negotiations and a Senate
threat to seek judicial enforcement of the subpoena.  S. Rep.
No.  104–204,  pp.  16–17  (1996).  Eventually  the  parties
reached an agreement, whereby President Clinton avoided
the threatened suit, agreed to turn over the notes, and ob-
tained the Senate’s concession that he had not waived any
privileges.  Ibid.;  see  L.  Fisher,  Congressional  Research
Service, Congressional Investigations: Subpoenas and Con-
tempt Power 16–18 (2003).

Congress and the President maintained this tradition of
negotiation  and  compromise—without  the  involvement  of
this Court—until the present dispute.  Indeed, from Presi-
dent Washington until now, we have never considered a dis-
pute over a congressional subpoena for the President’s rec-
ords.  And,  according  to  the  parties,  the  appellate  courts
have addressed such a subpoena only once, when a Senate
committee  subpoenaed  President  Nixon  during  the  Wa-
tergate scandal.  See infra, at 13 (discussing Senate Select
Committee  on  Presidential  Campaign  Activities  v.  Nixon,
498  F. 2d  725  (CADC  1974)  (en  banc)).    In  that  case,  the
court refused to enforce the subpoena, and the Senate did
not seek review by this Court.

This dispute therefore represents a significant departure
from  historical  practice.    Although  the  parties  agree  that
this particular controversy is justiciable, we recognize that
it is the first of its kind to reach this Court; that disputes of
this sort can raise important issues concerning relations be-
tween  the  branches;  that  related  disputes  involving  con-
gressional  efforts  to  seek  official  Executive  Branch  infor-
mation recur on a regular basis, including in the context of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion discussing a case involving a congressional subpoena for presidential records. It sets the historical context and introduces the significance of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Case Background</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

THOMAS, J., dissenting

(2014);  id.,  at  893–894  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  judg-
ment) (the Treaty Power supports treaties only on matters
of international intercourse); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S.
416,  433–435  (1920).  It  does  not  confer  a  free-floating
power over matters that might involve a party to a treaty.

2
Second, the Commerce Clause confers only the authority
“[t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”  Art. I,
§8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).  “At the time the original Consti-
tution was ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying,
and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”
United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 585 (1995) (THOMAS,
J., concurring); see also 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the
English Language 361 (4th rev. ed. 1773) (reprint 1978) (de-
fining commerce as “Intercourse; exchange of one thing for
another;  interchange  of  any  thing;  trade;  traffick”).    And
even  under  our  most  expansive  Commerce  Clause  prece-
dents,  the  Clause  permits  Congress  to  regulate  only  “eco-
nomic activity” like producing materials that will be sold or
exchanged as a matter of commerce.  See Lopez, 514 U. S.,
at 560; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 22 (2005).6

The  majority,  however,  suggests  that  the  Commerce
Clause could have a broader application with respect to In-
dian tribes than for commerce between States or with for-
eign nations.  See ante, at 11, 16.  That makes little textual
sense.  The Commerce Clause confers the power to regulate

——————

6 Though  the  Court  has  only  passingly  discussed  the  Commerce
Clause’s  application  to  commerce  with  foreign  nations,  see  Baston  v.
United States, 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari) (slip op., at 3), it has still described that application in
terms of economic measures like embargoes, see Atlantic Cleaners & Dy-
ers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 434 (1932); Buttfield v. Strana-
han, 192 U. S. 470, 493 (1904).  See also R. Barnett, The Original Mean-
ing of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101, 113–116, 128 (2001)
(collecting  Founding-era  sources  that  equate  foreign  commerce  with
trade).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It cites legal precedents and analyzes the Commerce Clause and Treaty Power.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

THOMAS, J., dissenting

dent  for  issuing  legislative  subpoenas  for  private  docu-
ments from 18th-century colonial or state practice. And it
identifies no founding-era legislative subpoenas for private
documents.6
  Since McGrain, the Court has pared back Congress’ au-
thority  to  compel  testimony  and  documents.  It  has  held
that certain convictions of witnesses for contempt of Con-
gress violated the Fifth Amendment.  See Watkins v. United
States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957) (Due Process Clause); Quinn v.
United  States,  349  U. S.  155  (1955)  (Self-Incrimination
Clause); see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109,
153–154 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).  It has also affirmed
the reversal of a conviction on the ground that the Commit-
tee  lacked  authority  to  issue  the  subpoena.   See  United
States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953).  And today, it creates
a new four-part, nonexhaustive test for cases involving the
President.  Ante, at 18–20.  Rather than continue our trend
of trying to compensate for McGrain, I would simply decline
to apply it in these cases because it is readily apparent that
the  Committees  have  no  constitutional  authority  to  sub-
poena private, nonofficial documents.

III
If the Committees wish to investigate alleged wrongdoing
by the President and obtain documents from him, the Con-
stitution  provides  Congress  with  a  special  mechanism  for

——————

6 The  Court  further  observed  that  Congress  has  long  exercised  the
power to hold nonmembers in contempt for reasons other than failure to
comply with a legislative subpoena.  McGrain, supra, at 168–169.  The
earliest case it cited, Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (1821), relied on
arguments  about  Congress’  power  of  self-protection,  id.,  at  226–227.
Members of Congress defending the use of contempt for these other pur-
poses made similar arguments about self-protection.  5 Annals of Cong.
181–182 (1795) (Rep. W. Smith); id., at 189 (Rep. I. Smith).  But the fail-
ure to respond to a subpoena does not pose a fundamental threat to Con-
gress’ ability to exercise its powers.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the history of congressional subpoena power and argues against the majority's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
Opinion of the Court

its  target  to  Hastings’  policy  as  written.    This  opinion,
therefore, considers only whether conditioning access to a
student-organization  forum  on  compliance  with  an  all
comers policy violates the Constitution.10

III

A

In  support  of  the  argument  that  Hastings’  all-comers
policy treads on its First Amendment rights to free speech
and  expressive  association,  CLS  draws  on  two  lines  of
decisions.  First, in a progression of cases, this Court has
employed forum analysis to determine when a governmen
tal entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place
limitations  on  speech.11    Recognizing  a  State’s  right  “to
preserve  the  property  under  its  control  for  the  use  to
which it is lawfully dedicated,” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800 (1985) (inter

——————

10 The  dissent,  in  contrast,  devotes  considerable  attention  to  CLS’s
arguments about the Nondiscrimination Policy as written.  Post, at 2, 3,
5, 18–23.  We decline to address these arguments, not because we agree
with  the  dissent  that  the  Nondiscrimination  Policy  is  “plainly”  uncon
stitutional,  post,  at  18,  but  because,  as  noted,  supra,  at  8–12,  that
constitutional question is not properly presented.

11 In  conducting  forum  analysis,  our  decisions  have  sorted  govern
ment property into three categories.  First, in traditional public forums,
such as public streets and parks, “any restriction based on the content
of  . . .  speech  must  satisfy  strict  scrutiny,  that  is,  the  restriction  must
be  narrowly  tailored  to  serve  a  compelling  government  interest.”
Pleasant  Grove  City  v.  Summum,  555  U. S.  ___  (2009)  (slip  op.,  at  6).
Second,  governmental  entities  create  designated  public  forums  when
“government  property  that  has  not  traditionally  been  regarded  as  a
public  forum  is  intentionally  opened  up  for  that  purpose”;  speech
restrictions in such a forum “are subject to the same strict scrutiny as
restrictions  in  a  traditional  public  forum.”    Id.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  7).
Third, governmental entities establish limited public forums by opening
property  “limited  to  use  by  certain  groups  or  dedicated  solely  to  the
discussion  of  certain  subjects.”  Ibid.    As  noted  in  text,  “[i]n  such  a
forum,  a  governmental  entity  may  impose  restrictions  on  speech  that
are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez*. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a university's all-comers policy for student organizations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

OBERGEFELL ET AL. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 14–556.  Argued April 28, 2015—Decided June 26, 2015*

Michigan,  Kentucky,  Ohio,  and  Tennessee  define  marriage  as  a  union
between one man and one woman.  The petitioners, 14 same-sex cou-
ples  and  two  men  whose  same-sex  partners  are  deceased,  filed  suits
in  Federal  District  Courts  in  their  home  States,  claiming  that  re-
spondent  state  officials  violate  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  by  deny-
ing them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed
in another State given full recognition.  Each District Court ruled in
petitioners’  favor,  but  the  Sixth  Circuit  consolidated  the  cases  and
reversed.

Held: The  Fourteenth  Amendment  requires  a  State  to  license  a  mar-
riage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage
between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawful-
ly licensed and performed out-of-State.  Pp. 3–28.

(a) Before turning to the governing principles and precedents, it is
appropriate  to  note  the  history  of  the  subject  now  before  the  Court.
Pp. 3–10.

(1) The  history  of  marriage  as  a  union  between  two  persons  of
the opposite sex marks the beginning of these cases.  To the respond-
ents, it would demean a timeless institution if marriage were extend-
ed  to  same-sex  couples.    But  the  petitioners,  far  from  seeking  to  de-
value marriage, seek it for themselves because of their respect—and
need—for its privileges and responsibilities, as illustrated by the pe-

——————

* Together with No. 14–562, Tanco et al. v. Haslam, Governor of Ten-
nessee, et al., No. 14–571, DeBoer et al. v. Snyder, Governor of Michigan,
et al.,  and  No.  14–574,  Bourke  et al.  v.  Beshear,  Governor  of  Kentucky,
also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a Supreme Court syllabus, which provides a summary of the case and the Court's holding. It is not the actual content of the legal opinion and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11–345.  Argued October 10, 2012—Decided June 24, 2013

The University of Texas at Austin considers race as one of various fac-
tors in its undergraduate admissions process.  The University, which
is  committed  to  increasing  racial  minority  enrollment,  adopted  its
current  program  after  this  Court  decided  Grutter  v.  Bollinger,  539
U. S. 306, upholding the use of race as one of many “plus factors” in
an admissions program that considered the overall individual contri-
bution  of  each  candidate,  and  decided  Gratz  v.  Bollinger,  539  U. S.
244, holding unconstitutional an admissions program that automati-
cally awarded points to applicants from certain racial minorities.

Petitioner,  who  is  Caucasian,  was  rejected  for  admission  to  the
University’s 2008 entering class.  She sued the University and school
officials, alleging that the University’s consideration of race in admis-
sions  violated  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.    The  District  Court
granted  summary  judgment  to  the  University.    Affirming,  the  Fifth
Circuit  held  that  Grutter  required  courts  to  give  substantial  defer-
ence to the University, both in the definition of the compelling inter-
est  in  diversity’s  benefits  and  in  deciding  whether  its  specific  plan
was  narrowly  tailored  to  achieve  its  stated  goal.    Applying  that
standard, the court upheld the University’s admissions plan.

Held: Because  the  Fifth  Circuit  did  not  hold  the  University  to  the  de-
manding burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter and Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, its decision affirming the Dis-
trict Court’s grant of summary judgment to the University was incor-
rect.  Pp. 5–13.

(a) Bakke,  Gratz,  and  Grutter,  which directly  address  the  question
considered here, are taken as given for purposes of deciding this case.
In  Bakke’s  principal  opinion,  Justice  Powell  recognized  that  state
university “decisions based on race or ethnic origin . . . are reviewable
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.

Opinion of the Court

he  could  not  have  been  penalized  simply  because  govern-
ment  officials  considered  his  language  to  be  inappropri-
ate”).

B. L. spoke under circumstances where the school did not
stand  in  loco  parentis.   And  there  is  no  reason  to  believe
B. L.’s  parents  had  delegated  to  school  officials  their  own
control of B. L.’s behavior at the Cocoa Hut.  Moreover, the
vulgarity  in  B. L.’s  posts  encompassed  a  message,  an  ex-
pression  of  B.  L.’s  irritation  with,  and  criticism  of,  the
school and cheerleading communities.  Further, the school
has presented no evidence of any general effort to prevent
students  from  using  vulgarity  outside  the  classroom.  To-
gether, these facts convince us that the school’s interest in
teaching  good  manners  is  not  sufficient,  in  this  case,  to
overcome B. L.’s interest in free expression.

Second,  the  school  argues  that  it  was  trying  to  prevent
disruption,  if  not  within  the  classroom,  then  within  the
bounds of a school-sponsored extracurricular activity.  But
we can find no evidence in the record of the sort of “substan-
tial disruption” of a school activity or a threatened harm to
the  rights  of  others  that  might  justify  the  school’s  action.
Tinker,  393  U. S.,  at  514.  Rather,  the  record  shows  that
discussion of the matter took, at most, 5 to 10 minutes of an
Algebra class “for just a couple of days” and that some mem-
bers of the cheerleading team were “upset” about the con-
tent  of  B.  L.’s  Snapchats.    App.  82–83.    But  when  one  of
B. L.’s coaches was asked directly if she had “any reason to
think  that  this  particular  incident  would  disrupt  class  or
school  activities  other  than  the  fact  that  kids  kept  ask-
ing . . . about it,” she responded simply, “No.”  Id., at 84.  As
we said in Tinker, “for the State in the person of school offi-
cials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opin-
ion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.”  393 U. S., at 509.  The alleged disturbance here
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B. L. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U44

[09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 334 (2000)

339

Breyer, J., dissenting

as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner.
But this is exactly what the agent did here. We therefore
hold that the agent’s physical manipulation of petitioner’s
bag violated the Fourth Amendment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Scalia joins,

dissenting.

Does a traveler who places a soft-sided bag in the shared
overhead storage compartment of a bus have a “reasonable
expectation” that strangers will not push, pull, prod,
squeeze, or otherwise manipulate his luggage? Unlike the
majority, I believe that he does not.

Petitioner argues—and the majority points out—that,
even if bags in overhead bins are subject to general “touch-
ing” and “handling,” this case is special because “Agent
Cantu’s physical manipulation of [petitioner’s] luggage ‘far
exceeded the casual contact [he] could have expected from
other passengers.’ ” Ante, at 338. But the record shows
the contrary. Agent Cantu testiﬁed that border patrol ofﬁ-
cers (who routinely enter buses at designated checkpoints to
run immigration checks) “conduct an inspection of the over-
head luggage by squeezing the bags as we’re going out.”
App. 9. On the occasion at issue here, Agent Cantu “felt a
green bag” which had “a brick-like object in it.”
Id., at 10.
He explained that he felt “the edges of the brick in the bag,”
id., at 12, and that it was a “[b]rick-like object . . . that,
when squeezed, you could feel an outline of something of [a]
different mass inside of it,” id., at 11. Although the agent
acknowledged that his practice was to “squeeze [bags] very
hard,” he testiﬁed that his touch ordinarily was not “[h]ard
enough to break something inside that might be fragile.”
Id., at 15. Petitioner also testiﬁed that Agent Cantu
“reached for my bag, and he shook it a little, and squeezed
it.”

Id., at 18.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal case, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments and analysis, which is suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 16–1436 (16A1190) and 16–1540 (16A1191)
_________________

No. 16–1436 (16A1190)

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL.
v.
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
PROJECT, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL.
v.
HAWAII, ET AL.

No. 16–1540 (16A1191)

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2017]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  and
JUSTICE  GORSUCH join, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.

I agree with the Court that the preliminary injunctions
entered in these cases should be stayed, although I would
stay them in full.  The decision whether to stay the injunc-
tions is committed to our discretion, ante, at 9–10, but our
discretion  must  be  “guided  by  sound  legal  principles,”
Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009) (internal quota-
tion  marks  omitted).  The  two  “most  critical”  factors  we
must  consider  in  deciding  whether  to  grant  a  stay  are
“(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing
that  [it]
likely  to  succeed  on  the  merits”  and
“(2) whether  the  applicant  will  be  irreparably  injured

is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes case citations, the names of the justices, and the procedural history of the case. This type of information is not the main body of the legal argument and is generally not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case citation and procedural information</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

193  (CA10  1964)  (finding  §2255  inadequate  or  ineffective
after Alaska territorial court was dissolved and federal and
state successor courts declined §2255 and state-habeas ju-
risdiction, respectively).  The saving clause might also ap-
ply when “it is not practicable for the prisoner to have his
motion determined in the trial court because of his inability
to be present at the hearing, or for other reasons.”2  Hay-
man,  342  U. S.,  at  215,  n. 23  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).

In addition, the saving clause ensures that §2255(e) does
not displace §2241 when a prisoner challenges “the legality
of his detention” without attacking the validity of his sen-
tence.  To give a few examples, a prisoner might wish to ar-
gue that he is being detained in a place or manner not au-
thorized  by  the  sentence,  that  he  has  unlawfully  been
denied parole or good-time credits, or that an administra-
tive sanction affecting the conditions of his detention is il-
legal.  See generally Samak v. Warden, FCC Coleman–Me-
dium,  766  F. 3d  1271,  1280  (CA11  2014)  (Pryor,  J.,
concurring) (explaining that “[t]he ‘detention’ of a prisoner
encompasses much more than a criminal ‘sentence’ ”).  The
briefs  before  us  debate  whether  these  types  of  challenges

——————

2 It bears mentioning that §2255 was enacted “eight years before Pres-
ident Eisenhower signed legislation funding the Interstate Highway Sys-
tem.”  Brief  for  Court-Appointed  Amicus  Curiae  17.  At  that  time,  it
would  not  be  surprising  if  removing  a  prisoner  from  the  penitentiary,
transporting him to the sentencing court for a hearing, and taking him
back  to  prison  again  sometimes  posed  difficulties  daunting  enough  to
make a §2255 proceeding practically unavailable.  Cf. Stidham v. Swope,
82 F. Supp. 931, 932–933 (ND Cal. 1949) (describing the difficulty and
delay involved in transporting a prisoner “upwards of 1,500 miles” from
the federal penitentiary in Alcatraz to the sentencing court in Missouri,
a journey that “well could be two weeks” by rail).  That this sort of prac-
tical inadequacy would be highly unusual today should not blind us to
the world in which Congress was legislating when it enacted the saving
clause.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the application of a specific legal provision (likely §2255) and cites relevant precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

a volume on the jury trial was in agreement.  See J. Proffatt,
Trial by Jury §77, p. 112 (1877).

*

*

*
Based on this evidence, the Court’s prior interpretation
of  the  Sixth  Amendment’s  guarantee  is  not  demonstrably
erroneous.  It is within the realm of permissible interpreta-
tions to say that “trial . . . by . . . jury” in that Amendment
includes  a  protection  against  nonunanimous  felony  guilty
verdicts.

II
The remaining question is whether that right is protected
against the States.  In my view, the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause provides this protection.  I do not adhere to this
Court’s  decisions  applying  due  process  incorporation,  in-
cluding Apodaca and—it seems—the Court’s opinion in this
case.

The Privileges or Immunities Clause provides that “[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”
Amdt. 14, §1.  At the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification, “the terms ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ had an
established meaning as synonyms of ‘rights.’ ”  McDonald v.
Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 813 (2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).  “[T]he ratifying public
understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect
constitutionally enumerated rights” against abridgment by
the States.  Id., at 837.  The Sixth Amendment right to a
trial  by  jury  is  certainly  a  constitutionally  enumerated
right.  See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 606–608 (1900)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).

The  Court,  however,  has  made  the  Due  Process  Clause
serve the function that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
should  serve.  Although  the  Privileges  or  Immunities
Clause grants “United States citizens a certain collection of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It discusses the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and its applicability to the states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

tions taken in order to facilitate such detours.  But cf. post,
at  2–3  (ALITO,  J.,  dissenting).  Thus,  even  assuming  that
the  imposition  here  was  no  more  intrusive  than  the  exit
order in Mimms, the dog sniff could not be justified on the
same  basis.    Highway  and  officer  safety  are  interests
different  in  kind  from  the  Government’s  endeavor  to  de
tect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular.

The Government argues that an officer may “incremen
tal[ly]” prolong a stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the
officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related
purpose  of  the  stop,  and  the  overall  duration  of  the  stop
remains  reasonable  in  relation  to  the  duration  of  other
traffic  stops  involving  similar  circumstances.    Brief  for
United  States  36–39.    The  Government’s  argument,  in
effect,  is  that  by  completing  all  traffic-related  tasks  expe
ditiously,  an  officer  can  earn  bonus  time  to  pursue  an
unrelated  criminal  investigation.  See  also  post,  at  2–5
(THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting)  (embracing  the  Government’s
argument).    The  reasonableness  of  a  seizure,  however,
depends  on  what  the  police  in  fact  do.    See  Knowles,  525
In  this  regard,  the  Government
U. S.,  at  115–117.
acknowledges that “an officer always has to be reasonably
diligent.”  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  49.    How  could  diligence  be
gauged other than by noting what the officer actually did
and how he did it?  If an officer can complete traffic-based
inquiries  expeditiously,  then  that  is  the  amount  of  “time
reasonably  required  to  complete  [the  stop’s]  mission.”
Caballes,  543  U.  S.,  at  407.    As  we  said  in  Caballes  and
reiterate  today,  a  traffic  stop  “prolonged  beyond”  that
point  is  “unlawful.”  Ibid.    The  critical  question,  then,  is
not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer
issues  a  ticket,  as  JUSTICE  ALITO  supposes,  post,  at  2–4,
but  whether  conducting  the  sniff  “prolongs”—i.e.,  adds
time to—“the stop,” supra, at 6.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court is analyzing the legality of a dog sniff during a traffic stop.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

JOHNSON v. ARTEAGA-MARTINEZ

Opinion of BREYER, J.

and detai[n an alien] pending a decision on whether the al-
ien is to be removed,” or “may release the alien on . . . bond
. . . or . . . conditional parole.”  Why did this statute not give
the Court the textual leeway needed to permit a bail hear-
ing (given the constitutional problem posed by potentially
indefinite  detention)?  Here  is  the  Court’s  answer  to  that
question in its entirety:

“The Court of Appeals ordered the Government to pro-
vide procedural protections that go well beyond the in-
itial bond hearing established by existing regulations—
namely,  periodic  bond  hearings  every  six  months  in
which  the  Attorney  General  must  prove  by  clear  and
convincing  evidence  that  the  alien’s  continued  deten-
tion  is  necessary.  Nothing  in  §1226(a)’s  text—which
says only that the Attorney General ‘may release’ the
alien ‘on . . . bond’—even remotely supports the impo-
sition  of  either  of  those  requirements.    Nor  does
§1226(a)’s  text  even  hint  that  the  length  of  detention
prior to a bond hearing must specifically be considered
in determining whether the alien should be released.”
Jennings, 583 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 22–23) (em-
phasis added).

The court below did not order periodic bond hearings, but
it did require the Government to satisfy a “clear and con-
vincing evidence” standard.  Ante, at 3.  I agree that Jen-
nings  forecloses  this  latter  requirement.    Otherwise,  I
would find the lower courts’ bail hearing requirements rea-
sonable implementations of the Zadvydas standard, which
is applicable here.

Since  the  Court  remands  this  case  for  further  proceed-
ings, I would add that, in my view, Zadvydas applies (the
Court does not hold to the contrary), and the parties are free
to  argue  about  the  proper  way  to  implement  Zadvydas’
standard in this context, and, if necessary, to consider the
underlying  constitutional  question,  a  matter  that  this
Court has not decided.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the case of Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of statutes and precedents like Zadvydas.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

17

Opinion of the Court

justifying that requirement have dramatically improved.

We  have  also  previously  highlighted  the  concern  that
“the  preclearance  requirements  in  one  State  [might]
be  unconstitutional  in  another.”  Northwest  Austin,  557
U. S.,  at  203;  see  Georgia  v.  Ashcroft,  539  U. S.,  at  491
(KENNEDY,  J.,  concurring)  (“considerations  of  race  that
would  doom  a  redistricting  plan  under  the  Fourteenth
Amendment  or  §2  [of  the  Voting  Rights  Act]  seem  to  be
what  save  it  under  §5”).    Nothing  has  happened  since  to
alleviate this troubling concern about the current applica-
tion of §5.

Respondents  do  not  deny  that  there  have  been  im-
provements  on  the  ground,  but  argue  that  much  of  this
can  be  attributed  to  the  deterrent  effect  of  §5,  which  dis-
suades covered jurisdictions from engaging in discrimina-
tion  that  they  would  resume  should  §5  be  struck  down.
Under  this  theory,  however,  §5  would  be  effectively  im-
mune  from  scrutiny;  no  matter  how  “clean”  the  record
of  covered  jurisdictions,  the  argument  could  always  be
made  that  it  was  deterrence  that  accounted  for  the  good
behavior.

The  provisions  of  §5  apply  only  to  those  jurisdictions
singled out by §4.  We now consider whether that coverage
formula is constitutional in light of current conditions.

III

A

When  upholding  the  constitutionality  of  the  coverage
formula in 1966, we concluded that it was “rational in both
practice and theory.”  Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 330.  The
formula  looked  to  cause  (discriminatory  tests)  and  ef-
fect  (low  voter  registration  and  turnout),  and  tailored  the
remedy  (preclearance)  to  those  jurisdictions  exhibiting
both.

By  2009,  however,  we  concluded  that  the  “coverage
formula raise[d] serious constitutional questions.”  North-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and discusses the constitutionality of a specific section of the Voting Rights Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED
STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 18–1023.  Argued December 10, 2019—Decided April 27, 2020*

The  Patient  Protection  and  Affordable  Care  Act  established  online  ex-
changes  where  insurers  could  sell  their  healthcare  plans.   The  now-
expired “Risk Corridors” program aimed to limit the plans’ profits and
losses during the exchanges’ first three years (2014 through 2016).  See
§1342, 124 Stat. 211.  Section 1342 set out a formula for computing a
plan’s gains or losses at the end of each year, providing that eligible
profitable plans “shall pay” the Secretary of the Department of Health
and  Human  Services  (HHS),  while  the  Secretary  “shall  pay”  eligible
unprofitable  plans.    The  Act  neither  appropriated  funds  for  these
yearly payments nor limited the amounts that the Government might
pay.  Nor was the program required to be budget neutral.  Each year,
the Government owed more money to unprofitable insurers than prof-
itable insurers owed to the Government, resulting in a total deficit of
more than $12 billion.  And at the end of each year, the appropriations
bills  for  the  Centers  for  Medicare  and  Medicaid  Services  (CMS)  in-
cluded a rider preventing CMS from using the funds for Risk Corridors
payments.    Petitioners—four  health-insurance  companies  that  claim
losses under the program—sued the Federal Government for damages
in the Court of Federal Claims.  Invoking the Tucker Act, they alleged
that §1342 obligated the Government to pay the full amount of their

——————

* Together with No. 18–1028, Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States
(see this Court’s Rule 12.4) and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Car-
olina v. United States (see this Court’s Rule 12.4); and No. 18–1038, Land
of Lincoln Mutual Health Insurance Co. v. United States, also on certio-
rari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
l

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

961

Federal Bureau of Prisons; Jordan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958

Federal Correctional Institution, Memphis; Todd v.  . . . . . . . . . . .
310

Federal Election Comm’n; Citizens United v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency; Columbia Venture, LLC v.  . .
1110

FERC; Connecticut Dept. of Public Utility Control v.  . . . . . . . . .
1011

Federal Express Corp. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n
. . . .
1151

Federal Ins. Co.; Ray v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
981

Federal Way; Kim v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Feigenbaum v. Merrill Lynch & Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943

Feinman, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917

Fekos v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1062

Felan v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

Felder v. Fischer
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Felix v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

Felix v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Felker; Garcia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Felker; Hunt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950

Felker; Kor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  845,1101

848

Felleke; Shumye v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
805

Fenlon v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ferebee v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
891

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  884,910,917

Ferguson v. United States
1147

Ferguson v. West Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Fernandez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
882

Fernandez Martinez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887

Fernandez-Rosario v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ferrari v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099

Ferro; Oduok v.
807

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Fessler v.  Kirk Sauer  Community Development  of  Wilkes-Barre
828

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feurtado v. United States
864

FIA Card Services, N. A.; Razvi v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fieger v. Supreme Court of Mich.
1076

Fieger v. Supreme Court of S. C.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Field v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

Fields v. Berry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

Fields v. Kentucky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914

Fields v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
872

Figuereo-Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

Figueroa; Cardenas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941

Figueroa v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figueroa-Cuevas v. United States
1108

Filbrandt v. Michigan Dept. of Human Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1007

Filebark v. Department of Transportation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fine v. State Bar of Cal.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

GORSUCH, J., concurring

tion was praised by many and criticized by some.  Federal-
ists (such as James Madison) applauded the fact that the
new federal government would be “unfettered” by the Arti-
cles’ constraints.  The Federalist No. 42, p. 268 (C. Rossiter
ed.  1961).  Certain  Anti-Federalists  (including  Abraham
Yates Jr.) disfavored the “tota[l] surrender into the hands
of Congress [of] the management and regulation of the In-
dian affairs.”  Letter to Citizens of New York (June 13–14,
1788), in 20 Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution 1153, 1158 (J. Kaminski et al. eds. 2004) (em-
phasis added).  At bottom, however, no one questioned that
the Constitution took a view about where the power to man-
age Indian affairs would reside in the future.  And no one
doubted  that  it  selected  the  federal  government,  not  the
States.

Early  practice  confirmed  this  understanding.    “The
Washington  Administration  insisted  that  the  federal  gov-
ernment  enjoyed  exclusive  constitutional  authority”  over
managing relationships with the Indian Tribes.  Ablavsky
2015, at 1019.  As President Washington put it, the federal
government “possess[ed] the only authority of regulating an
intercourse  with  [the  Tribes],  and  redressing  their  griev-
ances.”  Letter to T. Mifflin (Sept. 4, 1790), in 6 The Papers
of George Washington: Presidential Series 396 (D. Twohig
ed.  1996)  (emphasis  added).    Even  “many  state  officials
agreed”  with  President  Washington’s  assessment.    Ablav-
sky 2015, at 1019.  South Carolina Governor Charles Pinck-
ney  acknowledged  that  “the  sole  management  of  India[n]
affairs” is “committed” to “the general Government.”  Letter
to  G.  Washington  (Dec.  14,  1789),  in  4  Papers  of  George
Washington: Presidential Series 404 (D. Twohig ed. 1996).
Other leading proponents of States’ rights reluctantly drew
the  same  conclusion.  “[U]nder  the  present  Constitution,”
Thomas Jefferson lamented, States lack any “right to Treat
with the Indians without the consent of the General Gov-
ernment.”  Letter to H. Knox (Aug. 10, 1791), in 22 Papers
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the historical understanding of the Constitution's grant of power over Indian affairs to the federal government.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U84

[09-06-00 20:39:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

232

AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.
v. CENTRAL OFFICE TELEPHONE, INC.
Stevens, J., dissenting

allegation of slamming in respondent’s amended complaint; 1
in the District Court, AT&T’s trial counsel took issue with
respondent’s effort to make slamming “a big part of this
case,” id., at 2170, and said in closing argument that slam-
ming “is the basis for this intentional interference” claim,
id., at 2921; and nothing in the jury instructions remotely
suggested that the tort claim required proof of broken prom-
ises by AT&T to provide additional services. Respondent’s
evidence easily ﬁts within the deﬁnition of intentional inter-
ference set forth in the jury charge:

“COT asserts that AT&T intentionally interfered with
its business relations and expectations of future busi-
ness relations with its customers, the end users of its
SDN service.
In order to prevail on this claim, COT
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, one,
that COT had business relations with the probability of
future economic beneﬁt. Two, that AT&T was aware
of the relationships and expectation of future beneﬁts.
Three, that AT&T intentionally interfered with COT’s
business relations. Four, that AT&T interfered for an
improper motive or by using improper means. And,
ﬁve, that COT suffered economic injury as a result of
the interference.” App. 71.

It may be the fact that the billing disclosures and slam-
ming were the consequence of negligence rather than a delib-
erate plan to take over a network of customers that respond-
ent had developed, but the jury concluded otherwise.
It
found that petitioner acted intentionally and willfully in in-
terfering with respondent’s business relations. See ibid.2
That ﬁnding is doubly signiﬁcant.

1 “[D]espite repeated requests by COT to AT&T, AT&T failed to rectify
incidents of unauthorized changes made in the designated carriers (‘slam-
ming’) of COT’s customers.” App. 28.

2 The jury’s $13 million damages award, reduced by the Magistrate
Judge to $1.154 million, did not differentiate between the contract and
tort claims.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge. It contains legal jargon, citations, and arguments about a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 19–431 and 19–454
_________________

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME, PETITIONER
v.
PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.

19–431

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.

19–454

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[July 8, 2020]

 JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,

concurring.

In  these  cases,  the  Court  of  Appeals  held,  among  other
things, (1) that the Little Sisters of the Poor lacked stand-
ing to appeal, (2) that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) does
not permit any exemptions from the so-called contraceptive
mandate, (3) that the Departments responsible for issuing
the challenged rule1 violated the Administrative Procedure

——————

1 The  Health  Resources  and Services  Administration  (HRSA),  a  divi-
sion of the Department of Health and Human Services, creates the “com-
prehensive guidelines” on “coverage” for “additional preventive care and
screenings”  for  women,  42  U. S. C.  §300gg–13(a)(4),  but  the  statute  is
jointly administered and enforced by the Departments of Health and Hu-
man  Services,  Labor,  and  Treasury  (collectively  Departments),  see
§300gg–92;  29  U. S. C.  §1191c;  26  U. S. C.  §9833.    The  Departments
promulgated the exemptions at issue here, which were subsequently in-
corporated into the guidelines by HRSA.  See 83 Fed. Reg. 57536 (2018);
id., at 57592.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito.  It includes citation information, case names, and the introductory statement of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

the  Rule  unlawfully  rewrites  Title  IX’s  prohibition  on  sex
discrimination to include discrimination based on students’
gender  identity.  Respondents  further  argue  that  §106.2’s
definition of “hostile environment harassment” is unlawful
under  Davis  v.  Monroe  County  Bd.  of  Ed.,  526  U. S.  629
(1999), because it waters down the standard for what con-
stitutes  actionable  sex-based  harassment:  Title  IX  com-
plainants can prevail under the Rule by showing the alleged
harassment  was  severe  or  pervasive  (as  opposed  to  both)
and do not need to prove that the offending conduct denied
them  access  to  educational  benefits.    Respondents  sepa-
rately  assert  that  §106.2’s  definition  of  “hostile  environ-
ment  harassment”  violates  the  First  Amendment  by
chilling or compelling speech, including on issues of gender
identity.

Accordingly, when respondents asked the District Courts
to  preliminarily  enjoin  enforcement  of  the  Rule,  they  fo-
cused  on  the  two  provisions  concerning  gender  identity—
§§106.10 and 106.31(a)(2)—and §106.2’s definition of “hos-
tile  environment  harassment.”  Respondents  alleged  that
those three provisions would cause them irreparable harm
if the Rule went into effect.  Specifically, they asserted that
they  would  incur  unrecoverable  costs  in  complying  with
those provisions (and a loss of Title IX funding if they failed
to do so), that they would lose the right to speak freely on
issues such as gender identity, and that they would be un-
able  to  enforce  existing  state  laws  that  conflict  with  the
Rule’s  prohibition  of  gender  identity  discrimination.    Alt-
hough  respondents’  alleged  irreparable  harm  apparently
traces back to just three of the Rule’s provisions, the Dis-
trict  Courts  preliminarily  enjoined  the  Government  from
enforcing the entire Rule in all the respondent States.
——————
2024 WL 3381901 (ND Tex., July 11, 2024); Arkansas v. United States
Dept.  of  Ed., No.  4:24–CV–636,  (ED  Mo.,  July  24,  2024),  ECF  Doc.  54;
Alabama  v.  Cardona,  No.  7:24–CV–533,  2024  WL  3607492  (ND  Ala.,
July 30, 2024).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion or court document, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It discusses legal arguments related to Title IX and a new rule regarding gender identity discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:26] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1044

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 27, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8371. Olvera-Trejo v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 280.

No. 99–8372. Malgoza v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8377. Graham v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 480.

No. 99–8383. Christmann v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 1023.

No. 99–8386. Green v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 255.

No. 99–8390. Griffin v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 808.

No. 99–8391. Harrison v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 247.

No. 99–8392. Harris v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 870.

No. 99–8398. Miller v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 416.

No. 99–8402. Paschall v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 523.

No. 99–8405. Clark v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 376.

No. 99–8410. Webb v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 879.

No. 99–8415. Rodriguez-Matos v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 1300.

No. 99–8416. Dowell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1342.

No. 99–8417. Ryan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8418. Fiorani v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 504.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal index or docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC.

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

patents  might  yet  raise  due  process  concerns.    Id.,  at  ___
(slip  op.,  at  17).    But  the  Court  refused  to  consider  those
concerns in Oil States because, it said, no one had “raised a
due process challenge.”  Ibid.

It  was  my view  at  the  time  that  the  separation  of  pow-
ers—and its guarantee that cases involving the revocation
of  vested  property  rights  must  be  decided  by  Article  III
courts—is  itself  part  of  the  process  that  is  due  under  our
Constitution.  See Chapman & McConnell, Due Process as
Separation  of  Powers,  121  Yale  L. J.  1672,  1801–1804
(2012).  Any suggestion that the neutrality and independ-
ence the framers guaranteed for courts could be replicated
within  the  Executive  Branch  was  never  more  than  wishful
thinking.  The Court’s decision in Oil States allowing exec-
utive  officials  to  assume  an  historic  judicial  function  was
always destined to invite familiar due process problems—
like  decisions  “favor[ing]  those  with  political  clout,  the
powerful  and  the  popular.”    Thryv,  Inc.  v.  Click-To-Call
Technologies,  LP,  590  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2020)  (GORSUCH,  J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 20).  After all, “[p]owerful interests
are capable of amassing armies of lobbyists and lawyers to
influence  (and  even  capture)  politically  accountable  bu-
reaucracies.”  Oil States, 584 U. S., at ___ (same) (slip op.,
at 3).

Already  in  the  AIA’s  short  tenure  these  problems  have
started coming home to roost—even with supposedly “inde-
pendent” APJs.  The briefs before us highlight example af-
ter example.  I leave the interested reader to explore others.
See, e.g., Brief for TiVo Corporation as Amicus Curiae 6–13;
Brief  for  39  Aggrieved  Inventors  as  Amici  Curiae  14–23;
Brief for Joshua J. Malone as Amicus Curiae 9–11.  Here
just  consider  the  tale  of  a  patent  attorney  at  one  of  the
world’s largest technology companies who left the company
to become an APJ.  See Brief for US Inventor Inc. as Amicus
Curiae 12.  This private advocate-turned-APJ presided over
dozens  of  IPRs  brought  by  his  former  company.    Ibid.  In
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses due process concerns related to the America Invents Act (AIA) and the role of Administrative Patent Judges (APJs).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR THE VISUAL
ARTS, INC. v. GOLDSMITH ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 21–869.  Argued October 12, 2022—Decided May 18, 2023

In  2016,  petitioner  Andy  Warhol  Foundation  for  the  Visual  Arts,  Inc.
(AWF)  licensed  to  Condé  Nast  for  $10,000  an  image  of  “Orange
Prince”—an orange silkscreen portrait of the musician Prince created
by pop artist Andy Warhol—to appear on the cover of a magazine com-
memorating Prince.  Orange Prince is one of 16 works now known as
the Prince Series that Warhol derived from a copyrighted photograph
taken in 1981 by respondent Lynn Goldsmith, a professional photog-
rapher.  Goldsmith had been commissioned by Newsweek in 1981 to
photograph  a  then  “up  and  coming”  musician  named  Prince  Rogers
Nelson,  after  which  Newsweek  published  one  of  Goldsmith’s  photos
along with an article about Prince.  Years later, Goldsmith granted a
limited license to Vanity Fair for use of one of her Prince photos as an
“artist reference for an illustration.”  The terms of the license included
that the use would be for “one time” only.  Vanity Fair hired Warhol to
create the illustration, and Warhol used Goldsmith’s photo to create a
purple  silkscreen  portrait  of  Prince,  which  appeared  with  an  article
about  Prince  in  Vanity  Fair’s  November  1984  issue.    The  magazine
credited Goldsmith for the “source photograph” and paid her $400.  Af-
ter  Prince  died  in  2016,  Vanity  Fair’s  parent  company  (Condé  Nast)
asked  AWF  about  reusing  the  1984  Vanity  Fair  image  for  a  special
edition magazine that would commemorate Prince.  When Condé Nast
learned about the other Prince Series images, it opted instead to pur-
chase  a  license  from  AWF  to  publish  Orange  Prince.   Goldsmith  did
not  know  about  the  Prince  Series  until  2016,  when  she  saw  Orange
Prince  on  the  cover  of  Condé  Nast’s  magazine.    Goldsmith  notified
AWF of her belief that it had infringed her copyright.  AWF then sued
Goldsmith  for  a  declaratory  judgment  of  noninfringement  or,  in  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
44  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

deadly weapons per se, but only the carrying of such weap-
ons “for the purpose of an affray, and in such manner as to
strike terror to the people.”  O’Neil v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67
(1849).  Therefore, those who sought to carry firearms pub-
licly and peaceably in antebellum America were generally
free to do so.

Statutory Prohibitions.  In the early to mid-19th century,
some States began enacting laws that proscribed the con-
cealed carry of pistols and other small weapons.  As we rec-
ognized in Heller, “the majority of the 19th-century courts
to  consider  the  question  held  that  [these]  prohibitions  on
carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second
Amendment  or  state  analogues.”    554  U. S.,  at  626.    Re-
spondents  unsurprisingly  cite  these  statutes16—and  deci-
sions upholding them17—as evidence that States were his-
torically free to ban public carry.

In  fact,  however,  the  history  reveals  a  consensus  that
States could not ban public carry altogether.  Respondents’
——————

16 Beginning in 1813 with Kentucky, six States (five of which were in
the  South)  enacted  laws  prohibiting  the  concealed  carry  of  pistols  by
1846.  See 1813 Ky. Acts §1, p. 100; 1813 La. Acts p. 172; 1820 Ind. Acts
p. 39; Ark. Rev. Stat. §13, p. 280 (1838); 1838 Va. Acts ch. 101, §1, p. 76;
1839 Ala. Acts no. 77, §1.  During this period, Georgia enacted a law that
appeared to prohibit both concealed and open carry, see 1837 Ga. Acts
§§1, 4, p. 90, but the Georgia Supreme Court later held that the prohibi-
tion could not extend to open carry consistent with the Second Amend-
ment.  See infra, at 45–46.  Between 1846 and 1859, only one other State,
Ohio,  joined  this  group.  1859  Ohio  Laws  §1,  p. 56.    Tennessee,  mean-
while,  enacted  in  1821  a  broader  law  that  prohibited  carrying,  among
other  things,  “belt  or  pocket  pistols,  either  public  or  private,”  except
while traveling.  1821 Tenn. Acts ch. 13, §1, p. 15.  And the Territory of
Florida  prohibited  concealed  carry  during  this  same  timeframe.    See
1835 Terr. of Fla. Laws p. 423.

17 See State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833); State v. Reid, 1 Ala.
612, 616 (1840); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga.
243 (1846); State v. Chandler, 5 La. 489 (1850); State v. Smith, 11 La.
633 (1856); State v. Jumel, 13 La. 399 (1858).  But see Bliss v. Common-
wealth,  12  Ky.  90  (1822).    See  generally  2  J.  Kent,  Commentaries  on
American Law *340, n. b.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the history of gun laws in the United States. It cites legal precedents and historical statutes, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

23

Opinion of the Court

referred to” the “level of control” required as a “best demon-
strated  technology  (BDT)”  standard,  73  Fed.  Reg.  34073,
and consistently applied it as such.  E.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 9907
(declaring “BDT” to be “a well-designed and well-operated
gas collection system and . . . a control device capable of re-
ducing  [harmful  gases]  in  the  collected  gas  by  98  weight-
percent.”).

Indeed, EPA nodded to this history in the Clean Power
Plan itself, describing the sort of “systems of emission re-
duction” it had always before selected—“efficiency improve-
ments,  fuel-switching,”  and  “add-on  controls”—as  “more
traditional  air  pollution  control  measures.”    80  Fed.  Reg.
64784.  The  Agency  noted  that  it  had  “considered”  such
measures  as  potential  systems  of  emission  reduction  for
carbon  dioxide,  ibid.,  including  a  measure  it  ultimately
adopted as a “component” of the BSER, namely, heat rate
improvements.  Id., at 64727.

But, the Agency explained, in order to “control[ ] CO2 from
affected [plants] at levels . . . necessary to mitigate the dan-
gers  presented  by  climate  change,”  it  could  not  base  the
emissions limit on “measures that improve efficiency at the
power  plants.”  Id.,  at 64728.    “The  quantity  of  emissions
reductions  resulting
from  the  application  of  these
measures” would have been “too small.”  Id., at 64727.  In-
stead,  to  attain  the  necessary  “critical  CO2  reductions,”
EPA  adopted  what  it  called  a  “broader,  forward-thinking
approach to the design” of Section 111 regulations.  Id., at
64703.  Rather than focus on improving the performance of
individual sources, it would “improve the overall power sys-
tem by lowering the carbon intensity of power generation.”
Ibid. (emphasis added).  And it would do that by forcing a
shift  throughout  the  power  grid  from  one  type  of  energy
source to another.  In the words of the then-EPA Adminis-
trator, the rule was “not about pollution control” so much
as it was “an investment opportunity” for States, especially
“investments in renewables and clean energy.”  Oversight
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing regulations and discussing the EPA's approach to carbon emissions. It's part of a larger legal document and provides in-depth analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

promised large numbers of animals to the Tribe.  Art. XII,
id., at 670.  Those guarantees take as a given that the Tribe
could access water sufficient to live, tend crops, and raise
animals in perpetuity.

As we have seen, “the history of the treaty, the negotia-
tions, and the practical construction adopted by the parties”
may also inform a treaty’s interpretation.  Choctaw Nation,
318 U. S., at 432.  And here history is particularly telling.
Much  of  the  Navajo’s  plight  at  Bosque  Redondo  owed  to
both the lack of water and the poor quality of what water
did exist.  General Sherman appreciated this point and ex-
pressly raised the availability of water in his negotiations
with the Tribe.  Treaty Record 5.  Doubtless, he did so be-
cause everyone had found the water at Bosque Redondo in-
sufficient and because the Navajo’s strong desire to return
home  rested  in  no  small  part  on  the  availability  of  water
there.  Id., at 3, 8.  Because the Treaty of 1868 must be read
as the Navajo “themselves would have understood” it, Mille
Lacs  Band,  526  U. S.,  at  196,  it  is  impossible  to  conclude
that water rights were not included.  Really, few points ap-
pear to have been more central to both parties’ dealings.

What water rights does the Treaty of 1868 secure to the
Tribe?  Remarkably, even today no one knows the answer.
But at least we know the right question to ask:  How much
is required to fulfill the purposes of the reservation that the
Treaty of 1868 established?  See Nevada v. United States,
463 U. S. 110, 116, n. 1 (1983) (citing cases).  We know, too,
that a Tribe’s Winters rights are not necessarily limited to
the water sources found within the corners of their reserva-
tion.  Winters itself involved a challenge to the misappropri-
ation  of  water  by  upstream  landowners  from  a  river  that
ran along the border of tribal lands.  207 U. S., at 576.  And
here the Navajo’s Reservation likewise stands adjacent to a
long stretch of the Colorado River flowing through both its
Upper and Lower Basins.  App. 91.  Finally, we know that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Treaty of 1868 and water rights for the Navajo Nation.  The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON

Opinion of the Court

effects in the relevant market.”  Id., at 1067.  Though mem-
ber schools compete fiercely in recruiting student-athletes,
the NCAA uses its monopsony power to “cap artificially the
compensation offered to recruits.”  Id., at 1097.  In a market
without the challenged restraints, the district court found,
“competition among schools would increase in terms of the
compensation  they  would  offer  to  recruits,  and  student-
athlete compensation would be higher as a result.”  Id., at
1068.  “Student-athletes  would  receive  offers  that  would
more  closely  match  the  value  of  their  athletic  services.”
Ibid.  And notably, the court observed, the NCAA “did not
meaningfully dispute” any of this evidence.  Id., at 1067; see
also Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (“[T]here’s no dispute that the—the
no-pay-for-play rule imposes a significant restraint on a rel-
evant antitrust market”).

The district court next considered the NCAA’s procompet-
itive justifications for its restraints.  The NCAA suggested
that  its  restrictions  help  increase  output  in  college  sports
and maintain a competitive balance among teams.  But the
district  court  rejected  those  justifications,  D.  Ct.  Op.,  at
1070, n. 12, and the NCAA does not pursue them here.  The
NCAA’s only remaining defense was that its rules preserve
amateurism,  which  in  turn  widens  consumer  choice  by
providing a unique product—amateur college sports as dis-
tinct  from  professional  sports.    Admittedly,  this  asserted
benefit accrues to consumers in the NCAA’s seller-side con-
sumer market rather than to student-athletes whose com-
pensation  the  NCAA  fixes  in  its  buyer-side  labor  market.
But, the NCAA argued, the district court needed to assess
its restraints in the labor market in light of their procom-
petitive benefits in the consumer market—and the district
court agreed to do so.  Id., at 1098.

Turning to that task, the court observed that the NCAA’s
conception  of  amateurism  has  changed  steadily  over  the
years.  See id., at 1063–1064, 1072–1073; see also supra, at
3–7.  The court noted that the NCAA “nowhere define[s] the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON. It delves into the economic arguments surrounding the NCAA's restrictions on athlete compensation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

528

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

ity. We ﬁrst rejected the employer’s substantive due proc-
ess challenge based on our decisions in Gray and Turner
Elkhorn, notwithstanding the employer’s argument that the
MPPAA imposed upon it a higher liability than its contract
contemplated.
508 U. S., at 636–641. The claim under the
Takings Clause, meanwhile, was resolved by Connolly. We
explained that, as in that case, the Government had not occu-
pied or destroyed the employer’s property.
508 U. S., at
643–644. As to the severity of the MPPAA’s impact, we
concluded that the employer had not shown that its with-
drawal liability was “ ‘out of proportion to its experience
with the plan’ ”
Id., at 645 (quoting Connolly, supra, at
226). Turning to the employer’s reasonable investment-
backed expectations, we repeated our observation in Con-
nolly that “pension plans had long been subject to federal
regulation.”
508 U. S., at 645. Moreover, although the em-
ployer’s liability under the MPPAA exceeded ERISA’s origi-
nal cap on withdrawal liability, we found that there was “no
reasonable basis to expect that [ERISA’s] legislative ceiling
would never be lifted.”
In sum, as in Connolly,
Id., at 646.
the employer “voluntarily negotiated and maintained a pen-
sion plan which was determined to be within the strictures
of ERISA,” making the burden the MPPAA imposed upon
it neither unfair nor unjust.
508 U. S., at 646–647 (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Our opinions in Turner Elkhorn, Connolly, and Concrete
Pipe make clear that Congress has considerable leeway to
fashion economic legislation, including the power to affect
contractual commitments between private parties. Con-
gress also may impose retroactive liability to some degree,
particularly where it is “conﬁned to short and limited periods
required by the practicalities of producing national legis-
lation.” Gray, 467 U. S., at 731 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Our decisions, however, have left open the pos-
sibility that legislation might be unconstitutional if it im-
poses severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC.

Opinion of the Court

conceded  that  Congress  has  the  authority  to  change  the
physical presence rule, Congress cannot change the consti
tutional  default  rule.  It  is  inconsistent  with  the  Court’s
proper  role  to  ask  Congress  to  address  a  false  constitu
tional  premise  of  this  Court’s  own  creation.    Courts  have
acted as the front line of review in this limited sphere; and
hence it is important that their principles be accurate and
logical,  whether  or  not  Congress  can  or  will  act  in  re
sponse.  It is  currently  the  Court,  and  not  Congress,  that
is limiting the lawful prerogatives of the States.

Further,  the  real  world  implementation  of  Commerce
Clause doctrines now makes it manifest that the physical
presence  rule  as  defined  by  Quill  must  give  way  to  the
“far-reaching  systemic  and  structural  changes  in  the
economy” and “many other societal dimensions” caused by
the  Cyber  Age.    Direct  Marketing,  575  U. S.,  at  ___
(KENNEDY,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  3).    Though  Quill
was wrong on its own terms when it was decided in 1992,
since  then  the  Internet  revolution  has  made  its  earlier
error all the more egregious and harmful.

The Quill Court did not have before it the present reali
ties  of  the  interstate  marketplace.  In  1992,  less  than  2
percent  of  Americans  had  Internet  access.  See  Brief  for
Retail  Litigation  Center,  Inc.,  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  11,
and n. 10.  Today that number is about 89 percent.  Ibid.,
and n. 11.  When it decided Quill, the Court could not have
envisioned  a  world  in  which  the  world’s  largest  retailer
would be a remote seller, S. Li, Amazon Overtakes Wal-Mart
as Biggest Retailer, L. A. Times, July 24, 2015, http://www.
latimes.com/business/la-fi-amazon-walmart-20150724
story.html  (all  Internet  materials  as  last  visited  June  18,
2018).

The  Internet’s  prevalence  and  power  have  changed  the
dynamics  of  the  national  economy.
In  1992,  mail-order
sales in the United States totaled $180 billion.  504 U. S.,
at 329 (opinion of White, J.).  Last year, e-commerce retail
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of the Supreme Court case South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. It discusses the physical presence rule in relation to the Commerce Clause and how the rise of e-commerce has made this rule outdated.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

5

Opinion of the Court

11 other Federal Courts of Appeals with criminal jurisdic-
tion);  State  v.  Patton,  287  Kan.  200,  228–229,  195  P. 3d
753,  771  (2008).    That  an  appeal  waiver  does  not  bar
claims  outside  its  scope  follows  from  the  fact  that,
“[a]lthough the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea
bargains  are  essentially  contracts.”    Puckett  v.  United
States, 556 U. S. 129, 137 (2009).

As  with  any  type  of  contract,  the  language  of  appeal
waivers can vary widely, with some waiver clauses leaving
many  types  of  claims  unwaived.5   Additionally,  even  a
waived appellate claim can still go forward if the prosecu-
tion  forfeits  or  waives  the  waiver.    E.g.,  United  States  v.
Story,  439  F. 3d  226,  231  (CA5  2006).    Accordingly,  a  de-
fendant  who  has  signed  an  appeal  waiver  does  not,  in
directing  counsel  to  file  a  notice  of  appeal,  necessarily
undertake a quixotic or frivolous quest.

Separately, all jurisdictions appear to treat at least some
claims  as  unwaiveable.    Most  fundamentally,  courts  agree
that defendants retain the right to challenge whether the
waiver itself is valid and enforceable—for example, on the
grounds  that  it  was  unknowing  or  involuntary.6    Conse-

——————

5 See generally Brief for Idaho Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers et al. as Amici Curiae 6–10 (collecting examples of appeal waivers
that  allowed  challenges  to  the  defendant’s  sentence  or  conviction  or
allowed claims based on prosecutorial misconduct or changes in law).

6 See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Brown,  892  F. 3d  385,  394  (CADC  2018)
(“Like  all  other  courts  of  appeals,  our  circuit  holds  that  a  defendant
‘may  waive  his  right  to  appeal  his  sentence  as  long  as  his  decision  is
knowing,  intelligent,  and  voluntary’ ”);  Spann  v.  State,  704  N. W.  2d
486, 491 (Minn. 2005) (“Jurisdictions allowing a defendant to waive his
or  her  right  to  appeal  a  conviction  require  that  the  waiver  be  made
‘intelligently,  voluntarily,  and  with  an  understanding  of  the  conse-
quences’ ”).  Lower courts have also applied exceptions for other kinds of
claims,  including  “claims  that  a  sentence  is  based  on  race  discrimina-
tion,  exceeds  the  statutory  maximum  authorized,  or  is  the  product  of
ineffective assistance of counsel.”  King & O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and
the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 Duke L. J. 209, 224 (2005) (collect-
ing federal cases); see also, e.g., United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the enforceability of appeal waivers. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

meaningfully  change  if  race-based  admissions  were  aban-
doned.  And  they  acknowledge  that  race  is  determinative
for at least some—if not many—of the students they admit.
See,  e.g.,  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  in  No.  20–1199,  at  67;  567
F. Supp. 3d,  at  633.    How  else  but  “negative”  can  race  be
described if, in its absence, members of some racial groups
would be admitted in greater numbers than they otherwise
would have been?  The “[e]qual protection of the laws is not
achieved  through  indiscriminate  imposition  of  inequali-
ties.”  Shelley, 334 U. S., at 22.6

Respondents’ admissions programs are infirm for a sec-
ond  reason  as  well.  We  have  long  held  that  universities
may not operate their admissions programs on the “belief
that  minority  students  always  (or  even  consistently)  ex-
press some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.”
Grutter, 539 U. S., at 333 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  That requirement is found throughout our Equal Pro-
tection  Clause  jurisprudence  more  generally.  See,  e.g.,
Schuette  v.  BAMN,  572  U. S.  291,  308  (2014)  (plurality
opinion) (“In cautioning against ‘impermissible racial stere-
otypes,’ this Court has rejected the assumption that ‘mem-
bers of the same racial group—regardless of their age, edu-
cation,  economic  status,  or  the  community  in  which  they
live—think  alike  . . . .’ ”  (quoting  Shaw  v.  Reno,  509  U. S.

——————

6 JUSTICE JACKSON contends that  race  does  not  play  a  “determinative
role for applicants” to UNC.  Post, at 24.  But even the principal dissent
acknowledges that race—and race alone—explains the admissions deci-
sions for hundreds if not thousands of applicants to UNC each year.  Post,
at 33, n. 28 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); see also Students for Fair Admis-
sions, Inc. v. University of N. C. at Chapel Hill, No. 1:14–cv–954 (MDNC,
Dec. 21, 2020), ECF Doc. 233, at 23–27 (UNC expert testifying that race
explains 1.2% of in state and 5.1% of out of state admissions decisions);
3 App. in No. 21–707, at 1069 (observing that UNC evaluated 57,225 in
state  applicants  and  105,632  out  of  state  applicants  from  2016–2021).
The suggestion by the principal dissent that our analysis relies on extra-
record materials, see post, at 29–30, n. 25 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.), is
simply mistaken.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the arguments against race-based admissions in higher education. It contains legal citations and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

29

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

decisions out of the galaxy of this Court’s Indian law juris-
prudence.  Ante, at 5–6.  But this collection of cases is no
more at fault for the Court’s decision than the last.  Orga-
nized  Village  of  Kake  v.  Egan—which  the  Court  seems  to
think is some magic bullet, see ante, at 5, 14, n. 2, 21, 22–
24—addressed the prosaic question whether Alaska could
apply  its  fishing  laws  on  lands  owned  by  a  native  Alaska
tribal corporation.  369 U. S. 60, 61–63 (1962); see also n. 5,
supra.    Subsequently,  the  Court  cabined  that  case  to  cir-
cumstances  “dealing  with  Indians  who  have  left  or  never
inhabited  reservations  set  aside  for  their  exclusive  use  or
who do not possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-
government.”  McClanahan, 411 U. S., at 167–168.  Mean-
while, New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble allowed New York
to use civil proceedings to eject non-Indian trespassers on
Indian  lands.  21  How.  366,  369–371  (1859).    In  Surplus
Trading Co. v. Cook, the crime at issue did not take place
on  tribal  lands  but  on  a  “supply  station  of  the  United
States”  sold  by  Arkansas  to  the  federal  government.    281
U. S. 647, 649 (1930).  In New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin,
this  Court  merely  reaffirmed  McBratney  and  held  that
States could exercise jurisdiction over crimes involving only
non-Indians.  326 U. S. 496, 499–500 (1946).  Both County
of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Na-
tion and Nevada v. Hicks issued holdings about state civil
jurisdiction, not criminal jurisdiction striking at the heart
of  tribal  sovereignty.  See  502  U. S.  251,  256–258,  270
(1992); 533 U. S. 353, 361, 363, 374 (2001).

In  the  end,  the  Court  cannot  fault  our  predecessors  for
today’s  decision.    The blame  belongs  only  with  this  Court
here and now.  Standing before us is a mountain of statutes
and precedents making plain that Oklahoma possesses no
authority  to  prosecute  crimes  against  tribal  members  on
tribal reservations until it amends its laws and wins tribal
consent.  This Court may choose to ignore Congress’s stat-
utes and the Nation’s treaties, but it has no power to negate
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments to support its position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

JONES v. HENDRIX

JACKSON, J., dissenting

442 U. S. 178, 186–187 (1979); Davis, 417 U. S., at 346–347
(citing Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428–429 (1962)).
In any event, the majority does not cite a single case that
suggests that an Act of Congress that threatens to cut off
access  to  habeas  (or  its  statutory  equivalent)  should  be
treated  any  differently  for  purposes  of  application  of  the
clear-statement rule if a petitioner’s claim has a statutory
basis.

The majority’s most full-throated defense of its jettison-
ing of clear-statement principles lies in its attempt to cast
statutory innocence claims as not “historically or constitu-
tionally grounded.”  Ante, at 24–25.  The first and most ob-
vious problem with this effort is that the historical pedigree
of a claim is irrelevant for clear-statement purposes.  The
clear-statement rule is applicable here because the statute
being interpreted involves access to the writ of habeas cor-
pus—a  significant  constitutional  value  that  we  would  not
assume Congress would discard without careful considera-
tion.  See Manning 121–122; see also Holland, 560 U. S., at
646–649.  And, so triggered, our clear-statement canon of
construction is not rendered inapplicable just because the
particular type of claim that a prisoner seeks to advance in
the context of a habeas or postconviction proceeding (if he
is  afforded  one)  might  not  date  back  to  the  founding  era.
This  must  be  why  the  majority  cites  no  precedent  that
splices the clear-statement rule in this fashion.

Looking  back  to  the  time  of  the  founding  to  determine
whether the clear-statement rule applies to our interpreta-
tion of a statute passed in 1996 also makes no sense.  The
clear-statement question relates to what Congress intended
with respect to the meaning of the statute at the time it was
enacted.  When Congress introduced §2255(h), it codified or
changed  the  law  that  existed  at  that  time  (i.e.,  in  1996).
See, e.g., Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 483 (2000) (not-
ing  that  AEDPA’s  certificate-of-appealability  provisions
codified the prevailing judicial standard).  Thus, when this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of statutes, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>