<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

BARRETT, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 22–277 and 22–555
_________________

ASHLEY MOODY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
FLORIDA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
NETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL.

22–277

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

22–555

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2024]

 JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, which correctly articulates and
applies  our  First  Amendment  precedent.    In  this  respect,
the Eleventh Circuit’s understanding of the First Amend-
ment’s protection of editorial discretion was generally cor-
rect; the Fifth Circuit’s was not.

But for the reasons the Court gives, these cases illustrate
the dangers of bringing a facial challenge.  If NetChoice’s
members are concerned about preserving their editorial dis-
cretion with respect to the services on which they have fo-
cused throughout this litigation—e.g., Facebook’s Newsfeed
and YouTube’s homepage—they would be better served by
bringing a First Amendment challenge as applied to those
functions.  Analyzing  how the First Amendment bears on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Barrett. It includes citation information, case names, and the introduction to her reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 139 (2010)

159

Opinion of Stevens, J.

punishment  but  not  receive  the  death  penalty.  Id.,  at  642.
We concluded that the false choice before the jury—death or
acquit—“introduce[d] a level of uncertainty and unreliability
into the factﬁnding process that cannot be tolerated in a capi
tal case.”  Id., at 643.  In other words,

“the difﬁculty with the Alabama statute is that it inter
jects irrelevant considerations into the factﬁnding proc
ess, diverting the jury’s attention from the central issue
of whether the State has satisﬁed its burden of proving
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant  is  guilty
of  a  capital  crime.  Thus,  on  the  one  hand,  the  unavail
ability  of  the  third  option  of  convicting  on  a  lesser  in
cluded offense may encourage the jury to convict for an
impermissible  reason—its  belief  that  the  defendant  is
guilty  of  some  serious  crime  and  should  be  punished.
On  the  other  hand,  the  apparently  mandatory  nature  of
the  death  penalty  may  encourage  it  to  acquit  for  an
equally impermissible reason—that, whatever his crime,
the defendant does not deserve death.”  Id., at 642–643.

Although  Beck  dealt  with  guilt-phase  instructions,  the
reach of its holding is not so limited.  The “third option” we
discussed  in  Beck  was,  plainly,  a  life  sentence.  Moreover,
the  unusual  features  of  the  Alabama  capital  sentencing
scheme  collapsed  the  guilt  and  penalty  phases  before  the
jury  (but  not  before  the  judge).  Our  concern  in  Beck  was
that presenting the jury with only two options—death or no
punishment—introduced  a  risk  of  arbitrariness  and  error
into the deliberative process that the Constitution could not
abide  in  the  capital  context.  See  Spaziano  v.  Florida,  468
U. S.  447,  455  (1984)  (“The  goal  of  the  Beck  rule,  in  other
words, is to eliminate the distortion of the factﬁnding process
that is created when the jury is forced into an all-or-nothing
choice  between  capital  murder  and  innocence”).  We  held,
therefore, that the jury must be given a meaningful opportu
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal precedent set by the Beck case and its implications for capital sentencing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xix

Page

1096

Belleque; Knight v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Belleque; Wilson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15,1138

Belmontes; Wong v.
889

Beltran v. Dexter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1061

Beltran-Garcia v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Beltran Lozano v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1051

Benally v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963

Bender v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  856,1139

Benham v. United States
809

Benitez v. Sodexho Marriott Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925

Benitez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960

Benitez-Avila v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bennett, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,1046

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
832

Bennett v. California
943

Bennett; Carbin v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Bennett; Hardy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947

Bennett v. Hendrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
863

Bennett v. Hulick  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  831,883

Bennett v. United States
1007

Bennett v. Verizon Wireless  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Benson v. Luttrell
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1050

Benson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bentley v. United States
846

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Benton; Jackson v.
Benton v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1063

Beras v. Carvlin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1022,1109

1100

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beretta U. S. A. Corp.; Adames v.
1114

Bergen County; El-Hewie v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Berger v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Bergeron; Ewing v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

Bergh; Fuller v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
855

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bergh; Kinney v.
834

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Berghuis; Greer v.
951

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Berghuis; Shannon v.
1063

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Berkefelt v. United States
1025

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Berkeley; U-Haul Co. of Cal. v.
843

Berkley v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044

Berman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958

Bermea-Boone v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

Bermudez v. Fischer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bernal-Jimenez v. United States
997

Bernard v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011

Berrier; Simplicity Mfg., Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1135

Berro v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

793

Stevens, J., dissenting

breadth of the “claims” to which the FCA applies 3 only
conﬁrms the notion that the law was intended to cover the
full range of fraudulent acts, including those perpetrated
by States.4

The legislative history of the 1986 amendments discloses
that both federal and state ofﬁcials understood that States
were “persons” within the meaning of the statute. Thus, in
a section of the 1986 Senate Report describing the history
of the Act, the committee unequivocally stated that the Act
reaches all parties who may submit false claims and that
“[t]he term ‘person’ is used in its broad sense to include
partnerships, associations, and corporations . . . as well as
States and political subdivisions thereof.” S. Rep. No. 99–
345, pp. 8–9.5

3 Title 31 U. S. C. § 3729(c) reads: “For purposes of this section, ‘claim’
includes any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise,
for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other
recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the
money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government
will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion
of the money or property which is requested or demanded.”

4 When Congress amended the FCA in 1986, it noted that “[e]vidence
of fraud in Government programs and procurement is on a steady rise.”
H. R. Rep. No. 99–660, at 18. And at that time, federal grants to state
and local governments had totaled over $108 billion. See U. S. Dept. of
Commerce National Data Book and Guide to Sources, Statistical Abstract
of the United States 301 (108th ed. 1988) (compiling data from 1986).
It
is therefore difﬁcult to believe, as the Court contends, that Congress
intended “to cover all types of fraud, [but not] all types of fraudsters,”
ante, at 781, n. 10, a conclusion that would exclude from coverage such a
large share of potential fraud.

5 Petitioner argues that the Senate Report’s statement was simply in-
accurate, because the three cases to which the Report cited for support
did not interpret the meaning of the word “person” in the FCA. Brief
for Petitioner 25–26. The cases stand for the proposition that the statu-
tory term “person” may include States and local governments—exactly
the proposition I have discussed above. See supra, at 790. Petitioner’s
observation that none of the cases cited is directly on point only indicates
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens in the case 529 U.S. 765 (2000).  It contains legal arguments and citations, which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

BARRETT, J., dissenting

(c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1).”  Ante, at 10.  As the
Court sees it, interpreting (c)(2) according to its plain text
would  render  other  obstruction  provisions,  within  §1512
and throughout Chapter 73, superfluous.  Ante, at 10–12.
The Court exaggerates.  Subsection (c)(2) applies only to
conduct that obstructs an “official proceeding.”  The Court
highlights  several  provisions  that  cover  obstruction  of  in-
vestigations.  See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §§1510(a), 1511(a), 1516,
1517, 1518, 1519.  The circuits have held that criminal in-
vestigations  do  not  qualify  as  “official  proceedings.”    See,
e.g., United States v. Ermoian, 752 F. 3d 1165, 1172 (CA9
2013);  United  States  v.  Ramos,  537  F. 3d  439,  463  (CA5
2008).  Likewise, not every provision in §1512 relates to an
official  proceeding;  instead,  several  target  the  obstruction
of communications to judges and law enforcement about the
commission of federal offenses.  18 U. S. C. §§1512(a)(1)(C),
(a)(2)(C), (b)(3), (d)(1)(2).

The  Court  responds  by  stressing  that  for  purposes  of
§1512, “an official proceeding need not be pending or about
to be instituted.”  §1512(f )(1); ante, at 13.  Because obstruc-
tion of investigations or communications could end up ob-
structing  the  initiation  of  a  future  official  proceeding,  the
Court reasons that (c)(2) may still swallow those other pro-
visions.  But we have previously construed federal obstruc-
tion offenses similar to §1512(c) to require a tighter link be-
tween the obstructive conduct and the relevant proceeding.
Under  the  “nexus”  requirement,  the  defendant’s  conduct
must have a “relationship in time, causation, or logic” with
the proceeding.  Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 599 (adopting nexus
requirement for §1503’s omnibus clause).  And the defend-
ant must act in “contemplation” of a “particular official pro-
ceeding.”  Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S.
696,  708
for
§1512(b)(2)).  The  circuits  have  unanimously  applied  this
requirement to §1512(c).  See United States v. Young, 916
F. 3d 368, 386 (CA4 2019) (collecting cases).  This element

(adopting  nexus  requirement

(2005)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Barrett. It contains legal arguments, citations to statutes and case law, and a specific legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON

Opinion of the Court

riae 10.  In 2014, the NCAA “announced it would allow ath-
letic  conferences  to  authorize  their  member  schools  to  in-
crease  scholarships  up  to  the  full  cost  of  attendance.”
O’Bannon  v.  National  Collegiate  Athletic  Assn.,  802  F. 3d
1049, 1054–1055 (CA9 2015).  The 80 member schools of the
“Power  Five”  athletic  conferences—the  conferences  with
the highest revenue in Division I—promptly voted to raise
their scholarship limits to an amount that is generally sev-
eral thousand dollars higher than previous limits.  D. Ct.
Op., at 1064.

In recent years, changes have continued.  The NCAA has
created the “Student Assistance Fund” and the “Academic
Enhancement Fund” to “assist student-athletes in meeting
financial  needs,”  “improve  their  welfare  or  academic  sup-
port,”  or  “recognize  academic  achievement.”  Id.,  at  1072.
These  funds  have  supplied  money  to  student-athletes  for
“postgraduate scholarships” and “school supplies,” as well
as “benefits that are not related to education,” such as “loss-
of-value  insurance  premiums,”  “travel  expenses,”  “cloth-
ing,” and “magazine subscriptions.”  Id., at 1072, n. 15.  In
2018,  the  NCAA  made  more  than  $84  million  available
through  the  Student  Activities  Fund  and  more  than  $48
million  available  through  the  Academic  Enhancement
Fund.  Id., at 1072.  Assistance may be provided in cash or
in kind, and there is no limit to the amount any particular
student-athlete may receive.  Id., at 1073.  Since 2015, dis-
bursements  to  individual  students  have  sometimes  been
tens  of  thousands  of  dollars  above  the  full  cost  of  attend-
ance.  Ibid.

The NCAA has also allowed payments “ ‘incidental to ath-
letics participation,’ ” including awards for “participation or
achievement in athletics” (like “qualifying for a bowl game”)
and  certain  “payments  from  outside  entities”  (such  as  for
“performance in the Olympics”).  Id., at 1064, 1071, 1074.
The NCAA permits its member schools to award up to (but
no  more  than)  two  annual  “Senior  Scholar  Awards”  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON. It provides context about changes in NCAA rules regarding athlete compensation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

25

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

App. to Pet. for Cert. 335a; see also Brief for Agricultural
and Resource Economics Professors as Amici Curiae 15, 23
(suggesting negligible effect on out-of-state prices for con-
sumers  not  interested  in  Proposition  12-compliant  pork).
Further experience may yield further facts.  But the facts
pleaded in this complaint merely allege harm to some pro-
ducers’ favored “methods of operation.”   Exxon, 437 U. S.,
at 127.  A substantial harm to interstate commerce remains
nothing more than a speculative possibility.  Ibid.

D
THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s concurrence in part and dissent in
part  (call  it  “the  lead  dissent”)  offers  a  contrasting  view.
Correctly, it begins by rejecting petitioners’ “almost per se”
rule  against  laws  with  extraterritorial  effects.    Post,  at  1.
And  correctly,  it  disapproves  reading  Pike  to  endorse  a
“freewheeling  judicial  weighing  of  benefits  and  burdens.”
Post, at 2.  But for all it gets right, in other respects it goes
astray.  In places, the lead dissent seems to advance a read-
ing of Pike that would permit judges to enjoin the enforce-
ment  of  any  state  law  restricting  the  sale  of  an  ordinary
consumer good if the law threatens an “ ‘excessive’ ” “har[m]
to the interstate market” for that good.  Post, at 4–9.  It is
an  approach  that  would  go  much  further  than  our  prece-
dents  permit.  So  much  further,  in  fact,  that  it  isn’t  clear
what separates the lead dissent’s approach from others it
purports to reject.

Consider an example.  Today, many States prohibit the
sale of horsemeat for human consumption.  See Cavel Int’l,
Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F. 3d 551, 552–555 (CA7 2007).  But
these prohibitions “har[m] the interstate market” for horse-
meat  by  denying  outlets  for  its  sale.    Not  only  that,  they
distort the  market for  animal products more  generally by
pressuring horsemeat manufacturers to transition to differ-
ent products, ones they can lawfully sell nationwide.  Under
the  lead  dissent’s  test,  all  it  would  take  is  one  complaint
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the legal precedent of Pike and its application to a case involving state regulations on pork production. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Per Curiam

by the Executive Order can seat at least 500 people, about
14 can accommodate at least 700, and 2 can seat over 1,000.
Similarly, Agudath Israel of Kew Garden Hills can seat up
to 400.  It is hard to believe that admitting more than 10
people to a 1,000–seat church or 400–seat synagogue would
create a more serious health risk than the many other ac-
tivities that the State allows.
  Irreparable  harm.  There  can  be  no  question  that  the
challenged  restrictions,  if  enforced,  will  cause  irreparable
harm.  “The  loss  of  First  Amendment  freedoms,  for  even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irrep-
arable  injury.”  Elrod  v.  Burns,  427  U. S.  347,  373  (1976)
(plurality opinion).  If only 10 people are admitted to each
service, the great majority of those who wish to attend Mass
on  Sunday  or  services  in  a  synagogue  on  Shabbat  will  be
barred.  And while those who are shut out may in some in-
stances be able to watch services on television, such remote
viewing is not the same as personal attendance.  Catholics
who watch a Mass at home cannot receive communion, and
there  are  important  religious  traditions  in  the  Orthodox
Jewish faith that require personal attendance.  App. to Ap-
plication in No. 20A90, at 26–27.
  Public interest.  Finally, it has not been shown that grant-
ing  the  applications  will  harm  the  public.  As  noted,  the
State  has  not  claimed  that  attendance  at  the  applicants’
services has resulted in the spread of the disease.  And the
State has not shown that public health would be imperiled
if less restrictive measures were imposed.

Members of this Court are not public health experts, and
we should respect the judgment of those with special exper-
tise and responsibility in this area.  But even in a pandemic,
the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.  The re-
strictions  at  issue  here,  by  effectively  barring  many  from
attending religious services, strike at the very heart of the
First  Amendment’s  guarantee  of  religious  liberty.    Before
allowing this to occur, we have a duty to conduct a serious
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the First Amendment rights related to religious gatherings during a pandemic. It delves into legal precedents, harm analysis, and the balance between public health and religious freedom.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

460

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of Scalia, J.

River at any price that Snake River could afford—and the
impossible cannot be made “more difﬁcult.” All we know is
that a potential seller was “interested” in talking about the
subject before the President’s action, and that after the Pres-
ident’s action Snake River itself decided to proceed no fur-
If this establishes a “likelihood” that Snake River
ther.
would have made a bargain purchase but for the President’s
action, or even a “likelihood” that the President’s action
rendered “more difﬁcult” a purchase that was realistically
within Snake River’s grasp, then we must adopt for our
standing jurisprudence a new deﬁnition of likely: “plausible.”
Twice before have we addressed whether plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the Government’s tax treatment of a
third party, and twice before have we held that the specula-
tive nature of a third party’s response to changes in federal
tax laws defeats standing.
In Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights, 426 U. S. 26 (1976), we found it “purely speculative
whether the denials of service . . . fairly can be traced to [the
IRS’s] ‘encouragement’ or instead result from decisions made
by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications.”
Id., at 42–43. We found it “equally speculative whether the
desired exercise of the court’s remedial powers in this suit
would result in the availability to respondents of such serv-
ices.”
In Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 (1984),
we held that parents of black children attending public
schools lacked standing to challenge IRS policies concerning
tax exemptions for private schools. The parents alleged,
inter alia, that “federal tax exemptions to racially discrimi-
natory private schools in their communities impair their abil-
ity to have their public schools desegregated.”
Id., at 752–
753. We concluded that “the injury alleged is not fairly
traceable to the Government conduct . . . challenge[d] as un-
lawful,” id., at 757, and that “it is entirely speculative . . .
whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular
school would lead the school to change its policies,” id., at
758. Likewise, here, it is purely speculative whether a tax

Id., at 43.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt. It contains legal jargon and discusses a case (Clinton v. City of New York).  The text is sequential and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

596

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS v. FINLEY

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

entirely free to e´pater les bourgeois; 2 they are merely de-
prived of the additional satisfaction of having the bourgeoisie
taxed to pay for it.
It is preposterous to equate the denial
of taxpayer subsidy with measures “ ‘ “aimed at the suppres-
sion of dangerous ideas.” ’ ” Regan v. Taxation with Rep-
resentation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 550 (1983) (emphasis
added) (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498,
513 (1959), in turn quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513,
“The reason that denial of participation in a
519 (1958)).
tax exemption or other subsidy scheme does not necessarily
‘infringe’ a fundamental right is that—unlike direct restric-
tion or prohibition—such a denial does not, as a general rule,
have any signiﬁcant coercive effect.” Arkansas Writers’
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).

One might contend, I suppose, that a threat of rejection
by the only available source of free money would constitute
coercion and hence “abridgment” within the meaning of the
First Amendment. Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455,
465 (1973).
I would not agree with such a contention, which
would make the NEA the mandatory patron of all art too

2 Which they do quite well. The oeuvres d’art for which the four indi-
vidual plaintiffs in this case sought funding have been described as follows:
“Finley’s controversial show, ‘We Keep Our Victims Ready,’ contains
three segments.
In the second segment, Finley visually recounts a sexual
assault by stripping to the waist and smearing chocolate on her breasts
and by using profanity to describe the assault. Holly Hughes’ monologue
‘World Without End’ is a somewhat graphic recollection of the artist’s real-
John
ization of her lesbianism and reminiscence of her mother’s sexuality.
Fleck, in his stage performance ‘Blessed Are All the Little Fishes,’ con-
fronts alcoholism and Catholicism. During the course of the performance,
Fleck appears dressed as a mermaid, urinates on the stage and creates
an altar out of a toilet bowl by putting a photograph of Jesus Christ on
the lid. Tim Miller derives his performance ‘Some Golden States’ from
childhood experiences, from his life as a homosexual, and from the con-
stant threat of AIDS. Miller uses vegetables in his performances to rep-
resent sexual symbols.” Note, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1545, 1546, n. 2
(1991) (citations omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia in the case of National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE

KAGAN, J., dissenting

seats,  and  to  protect  all  Democratic  incumbents.
See id., at 503.

  Using similar technologies and election data as Ho-
feller,  Hawkins  produced  a  map  to  those  specifica-
tions.  Although  new  census  figures  required  re-
moving  only  10,000  residents  from  the  Sixth
District, Hawkins proposed a large-scale population
transfer.  The map moved about 360,000 voters out
of  the  district  and  another  350,000  in.  That  swap
decreased the number of registered Republicans in
the district by over 66,000 and increased the num-
ber of registered Democrats by about 24,000, all to
produce a safe Democratic district.  See id., at 499,
501.

  After the advisory committee adopted the map on a
party-line  vote,  State  Senate  President  Thomas
Miller  briefed  the  General  Assembly’s  Democratic
caucuses about the new map’s aims.  Miller told his
colleagues  that  the  map  would  give  “Democrats  a
real  opportunity  to  pick  up  a  seventh  seat  in  the
delegation”  and  that  “[i]n  the  face  of  Republican
gains  in  redistricting  in  other  states[,]  we  have  a
serious  obligation  to  create  this  opportunity.”  Id.,
at 506 (internal quotation marks omitted).

  The General Assembly adopted the plan on a party-

line vote.  See id., at 506.

Maryland’s  Democrats  proved  no  less  successful  than
North  Carolina’s  Republicans  in  devising  a  voter-proof
map.
In  the  four  elections  that  followed  (from  2012
through 2018), Democrats have never received more than
65%  of  the  statewide  congressional  vote.    Yet  in  each  of
those elections, Democrats have won (you guessed it) 7 of 8
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses a redistricting case (RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE) and provides details about the map drawn in Maryland.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

Meanwhile, our case has nothing to do with the referral—
or  placement—stage  of  the  foster  process.  This  case  con-
cerns the recruitment and certification stages—where fos-
ter agencies like CSS screen and enroll adults who wish to
serve  as  foster  parents.  And  in  those  stages  of  the  foster
process, §15.1 seems to prohibit discrimination absolutely.

That  difficulty  leads  the  majority  to  its  second  step.  It
asks us to ignore §3.21’s title and its limited application to
the  referral  stage.  See  ante,  at  9.  Instead,  the  majority
suggests, we should reconceive §3.21 as authorizing excep-
tions to the City’s nondiscrimination rule at every stage of
the foster process.  Once we do that, the majority stresses,
§3.21’s  reservation  of  discretion  is  irreconcilable  with
§15.1’s  blanket  prohibition  against  discrimination.  See
ante, at 9.

This  sets  up  the  majority’s  final  move—where  the  real
magic happens.  Having conjured a conflict within the con-
tract,  the  majority  devises  its  own  solution.    It  points  to
some state court decisions that, it says, set forth the “rule”
that Pennsylvania courts shouldn’t interpret one provision
in a contract “to annul” another part.  Ibid.  To avoid nulli-
fying §3.21’s reservation of discretion, the majority insists,
it has no choice but to rewrite §15.1.  All so that—voila—
§15.1  now  contains  its  own  parallel  reservation  of  discre-
tion.  See ante, at 9.  As rewritten, the contract contains no
generally applicable rule against discrimination anywhere
in the foster process.

From start to finish, it is a dizzying series of maneuvers.
The  majority  changes  the  terms  of  the  parties’  contract,
adopting an uncharitably broad reading (really revision) of
§3.21.  It asks us to ignore the usual rule that a more spe-
cific  contractual  provision  can  comfortably  coexist  with  a
more  general  one.    And  it  proceeds  to  resolve  a  conflict  it
created by rewriting §15.1.  Once more, too, no party, ami-
cus, or lower court argued for any of this.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of contractual provisions related to foster care and discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

5

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

tional  penalties  for  drivers  who  drive  with  a  “high  BAC,”
often  defined  as  0.15  percent  or  above.    NHTSA,  Digest
of Impaired Driving and Selected Beverage Control Laws,
pp.  vii,  x–xviii  (No.  811673,  Oct.  2012).    BAC  evidence
clearly  matters.  And  when  drivers  refuse  breathalyzers,
as  McNeely  did  here,  a  blood  draw  becomes  necessary  to
obtain that evidence.

The  need  to  prevent  the  imminent  destruction  of  BAC
evidence  is  no  less  compelling  because  the  incriminating
alcohol  dissipates  over  a  limited  period  of  time,  rather
than  all  at  once.    As  noted,  the  concentration  of  alcohol
can  make  a  difference  not  only  between  guilt  and  inno-
cence,  but  between  different  crimes  and  different  degrees
of  punishment.    The  officer  is  unlikely  to  know  precisely
when  the  suspect  consumed  alcohol  or  how  much;  all  he
knows is that critical evidence is being steadily lost.  Fire
can  spread  gradually,  but  that  does  not  lessen  the  need
and  right  of  the  officers  to  respond  immediately.    See
Tyler, supra.

McNeely contends that there is no compelling need for a
warrantless  blood  draw,  because  if  there  is  some  alcohol
left  in  the  blood  by  the  time  a  warrant  is  obtained,  the
State  can  use  math  and  science  to  work  backwards  and
identify  a  defendant’s  BAC  at  the  time  he  was  driving.
See  Brief  for  Respondent  44–46.  But  that’s  not  good
enough.  We  have  indicated  that  exigent  circumstances
justify  warrantless  entry  when  drugs  are  about  to  be
flushed down the toilet.  See, e.g., King, 563 U. S., at ___–
___ (slip op., at 7–8).  We have not said that, because there
could  well  be  drug  paraphernalia  elsewhere  in  the  home,
or  because  a  defendant’s  co-conspirator  might  testify  to
the  amount  of  drugs  involved,  the  drugs  themselves  are
not crucial and there is no compelling need for warrantless
entry.

The  same  approach  should  govern  here.    There  is  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal justification for warrantless blood draws from suspected drunk drivers.  The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

MOORE v. HARPER

THOMAS, J., dissenting

some  of  the  most  politically  acrimonious  and  fast-moving
cases that come before them.  In many cases, it is difficult
to imagine what this inquiry could mean in theory, let alone
practice.    For  example,  suppose  that  we  were  reviewing
Harper I under this framework.  Perhaps we could have de-
termined that reading justiciable prohibitions against par-
tisan gerrymandering into the North Carolina Constitution
exceeded  the  bounds  of  ordinary  judicial  review  in  North
Carolina; perhaps not.  If not, then, in order to ensure that
Harper I had not “arrogate[d]” the power of regulating fed-
eral  elections,  ante,  at  29,  we  would  presumably  have
needed to ask next whether it exceeded the bounds of ordi-
nary judicial review in North Carolina to find that the spe-
cific congressional map here violated those prohibitions.  Af-
ter  all,  in  constitutional  judgments  of  this  kind,  it  can  be
difficult to separate the rule from the fact pattern to which
the  rule  is  applied.    We  have  held,  however,  that  federal
courts are not equipped to judge partisan-gerrymandering
questions at all.  Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U. S. ___,
___ (2019) (slip op., at 30).  It would seem to follow, a forti-
ori,  that  they  are  not  equipped  to  judge  whether  a  state
court’s  partisan-gerrymandering  determination  surpassed
“the bounds of ordinary judicial review.”

Even  in  cases  that  do  not  involve  a  justiciability  mis-
match, the majority’s advice invites questions of the most
far-reaching scope.  What are “the bounds of ordinary judi-
cial  review”?  What  methods  of  constitutional  interpreta-
tion do they allow?  Do those methods vary from State to
State?  And what about stare decisis—are federal courts to
review state courts’ treatment of their own precedents for
some sort of abuse of discretion?  The majority’s framework
would seem to require answers to all of these questions and
more.

In the end, I fear that this framework will have the effect
of investing potentially large swaths of state constitutional
law with the character of a federal question not amenable
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a case, analyzing the majority's approach and offering counterpoints. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

their membership in a currently disfavored race.

The Constitution neither commands nor permits such a
result.  “Purchased  at  the  price  of  immeasurable  human
suffering,”  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  recognizes  that
classifications based on race lead to ruinous consequences
for individuals and the Nation.  Adarand Constructors, Inc.,
515 U. S., at 240 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment).  Consequently, “all” racial classifica-
tions  are  “inherently  suspect,”  id.,  at  223–224  (majority
opinion) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit-
ted),  and  must  be  subjected  to  the  searching  inquiry  con-
ducted by the Court, ante, at 21–34.

III
Both experience and logic have vindicated the Constitu-
tion’s  colorblind  rule  and  confirmed  that  the  universities’
new  narrative  cannot  stand.  Despite  the  Court’s  hope  in
Grutter that universities would voluntarily end their race-
conscious programs and further the goal of racial equality,
the opposite appears increasingly true.  Harvard and UNC
now forthrightly state that they racially discriminate when
it comes to admitting students, arguing that such discrimi-
nation is consistent with this Court’s precedents.  And they,
along with today’s dissenters, defend that discrimination as
good.  More broadly, it is becoming increasingly clear that
discrimination on the basis of race—often packaged as “af-
firmative  action”  or  “equity”  programs—are  based  on  the
benighted notion “that it is possible to tell when discrimi-
nation helps, rather than hurts, racial minorities.”  Fisher
I, 570 U. S., at 328 (THOMAS, J., concurring).

We cannot be guided by those who would desire less in
our Constitution, or by those who would desire more.  “The
Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only
because those classifications can harm favored races or are
based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time
the  government  places  citizens  on  racial  registers  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the constitutionality of affirmative action in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U84

[09-06-00 20:39:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 214 (1998)

217

Opinion of the Court

observe certain substantive requirements imposed by that
law. Section 203 of the Act requires that common carriers
ﬁle “schedules” (also known as “tariffs”) containing all their
“charges” for interstate services and all “classiﬁcations, prac-
tices, and regulations affecting such charges.” § 203(a).
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which is
the agency responsible for enforcing the Act, requires carri-
ers to sell long-distance services to resellers such as respond-
ent under the same rates, terms, and conditions as apply to
other customers.

Prior to 1989, petitioner had developed a type of long-
distance service known as Software Deﬁned Network (SDN),
designed to meet the needs of large companies with ofﬁces
in multiple locations. SDN established a “virtual private
network” that allowed employees in different locations to
communicate easily. For example, an employee in Washing-
ton could call a co-worker in Denver simply by dialing a
four-digit extension. SDN customers,
in exchange for a
commitment to purchase large volumes of long-distance com-
munication time, received this service at a rate much below
what it would otherwise cost.

Several changes to SDN in 1989 made the service ex-
tremely attractive to resellers, such as respondent, who ag-
gregate smaller customers. Petitioner developed the capa-
bility to allow customers to use ordinary (“switched access”)
telephone lines to connect locations to their SDN networks.
Previously, locations had to be connected over special “dedi-
cated access” lines, which are direct lines from a location’s
telephone system to petitioner’s long-distance network, by-
passing the switches of the local exchange carrier. Dedi-
cated access involves large ﬁxed costs, so it is cost effective
only when a location originates a large volume of calls.
Switched access, in contrast, does not entail additional high
ﬁxed costs, so it is better suited to small users and hence to
resellers. Petitioner also instituted two pricing promotions
for SDN in 1989: additional discounts from the basic SDN
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 214 (1998). It discusses the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its impact on long-distance service providers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Syllabus

trary arguments fail given §113(f)(3)(B)’s place in CERCLA’s compre-
hensive statutory scheme.  Pp. 3–9.

950 F. 3d 104, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and summary. It is not the main body of text meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

559

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

tion; neither should Texas.”
Id., at 14. The historical de-
velopment of Article 38.07 reveals a progressive alleviation
of restrictions on the competency of victim testimony, not
a legislative emphasis on the quantum of evidence needed
to convict.

The version of Article 38.07 applied at Carmell’s trial was
thus, in both effect and purpose, an evidentiary rule gov-
erning the weight that may be given to the testimony of
sexual assault victims who had attained the age of 14. The
Court’s efforts to paint it as something more than that are
detached from the statute’s moorings and are consequently
unpersuasive.

To begin with, it is beyond doubt that Article 38.07 does
not establish an element of the offense. See Love v. State,
499 S. W. 2d 108, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (“[O]utcry is
not one of the elements of the offense charged.”). To con-
vict a defendant of sexual assault in Texas today as before
1993, the prosecution need not introduce the victim’s testi-
mony at all, much less any corroboration of that testimony.
The Court is therefore less than correct in asserting that
“[u]nder the law in effect at the time the acts were com-
mitted, the prosecution’s case was legally insufﬁcient and
petitioner was entitled to a judgment of acquittal, unless the
State could produce both the victim’s testimony and corrobo-
rative evidence.” Ante, at 530. Under both the old and
new versions of the statute, a conviction could be sustained
on the testimony of a single third-party witness, on purely
circumstantial evidence, or in any number of other ways—so
long as the admissible evidence presented is sufﬁcient to
prove all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.4 And under either version of Article 38.07, of course,

4 Not only is corroborated victim testimony not necessary for a convic-
tion under the former version of Article 38.07, it is not always sufﬁcient.
Under both the old and new versions of the statute, the prosecution’s evi-
dence will not support a conviction unless it is adequate to prove all the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It discusses the interpretation of a Texas statute (Article 38.07) related to sexual assault cases and victim testimony.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TRUMP v. VANCE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

be impeached, tried, and upon conviction of treason, brib-
ery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from
office;  and  would  afterwards  be  liable  to  prosecution  and
punishment in the ordinary course of law.”  The Federalist
No. 69, p. 416 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).  Hamilton did not say
that  the  President  was  temporarily  immune  from  judicial
process.  Moreover, he made this comment to reassure read-
ers that the President was “amenable to personal punish-
ment and disgrace.”  Id., at 422.  For the President, this is
at best ambiguous evidence that cannot overcome the clear
evidence discussed above.

The President further relies on a private letter written by
President  Jefferson.  In  the  letter,  Jefferson  worried  that
the Executive would lose his independence “if he were sub-
ject to the commands of the [judiciary], & to imprisonment
for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from
pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to
south & east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his
constitutional duties.”  10 Works of Thomas Jefferson 404
n. (P. Ford ed. 1905) (emphasis in original).  But President
Jefferson  never  squarely  argued  for  absolute  immunity.
Yoo,  The  First  Claim:  The  Burr  Trial,  United  States  v.
Nixon, and Presidential Power, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1435, 1450
(1999).  And, the concern Jefferson had about demands on
the President’s time is addressed by the standard that Chief
Justice Marshall articulated in Burr.  See infra, at 6–7.

The  President  also  quotes  the  views  of  Vice  President
John  Adams  and  then-Senator  Oliver  Ellsworth  in  1789.
The record of the conversation we have from a fellow Sena-
tor’s diary is brief.  Adams or Ellsworth (or perhaps both)
stated that “you could only impeach [the President], and no
other process whatever lay against him.”  Journal of Wil-
liam  Maclay  167  (E.  Maclay  ed.  1890).  The  only  reason
given was that it would “stop the whole machine of Govern-
ment.”  Ibid.  Senator Philip Schuyler joined the conversa-
tion and gave his own reason: “ ‘I think the President [is] a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or dissenting judgment, specifically from the case Trump v. Vance. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to historical figures and documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

476

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Breyer, J., dissenting

power to raise tariff rates “was a part of the law itself, as it
left the hands of Congress” (emphasis added)).

Nor can one dismiss this literal compliance as some kind
of formal quibble, as if it were somehow “obvious” that what
the President has done “amounts to,” “comes close to,” or
is “analogous to” the repeal or amendment of a previously
enacted law. That is because the power the Act grants the
President (to render designated appropriations items with-
out “legal force or effect”) also “amounts to,” “comes close
to,” or is “analogous to” a different legal animal, the delega-
tion of a power to choose one legal path as opposed to an-
other, such as a power to appoint.

To take a simple example, a legal document, say, a will or
a trust instrument, might grant a beneﬁciary the power (a)
to appoint property “to Jones for his life, remainder to Smith
for 10 years so long as Smith . . . etc., and then to Brown,”
or (b) to appoint the same property “to Black and the heirs
of his body,” or (c) not to exercise the power of appointment
at all. See, e. g., 5 W. Bowe & D. Parker, Page on Law of
Wills § 45.8 (rev. 3d ed. 1962) (describing power of appoint-
ment). To choose the second or third of these alternatives
prevents from taking effect the legal consequences that ﬂow
from the ﬁrst alternative, which the legal instrument de-
scribes in detail. Any such choice, made in the exercise of
a delegated power, renders that ﬁrst alternative language
without “legal force or effect.” But such a choice does not
“repeal” or “amend” either that language or the document
itself. The will or trust instrument, in delegating the power
of appointment, has not delegated a power to amend or to
repeal the instrument; to the contrary, it requires the dele-
gated power to be exercised in accordance with the instru-
ment’s terms.

Id., § 45.9, pp. 516–518.

The trust example is useful not merely because of its sim-
plicity, but also because it illustrates the logic that must
apply when a power to execute is conferred, not by a private
trust document, but by a federal statute. This is not the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20A34
_________________

FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, ET AL. v.
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS
AND GYNECOLOGISTS, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[January 12, 2021]

  The application for stay presented to THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and by him referred to the Court is granted, and the district
court’s July 13, 2020 order granting a preliminary injunc-
tion  is  stayed  pending  disposition  of  the  appeal  in  the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and
disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ
is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari
be  denied,  this  stay  shall  terminate  automatically.  In  the
event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the stay
shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of
this Court.
  JUSTICE BREYER would deny the application.
  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS,  concurring  in  the  grant  of  ap-
plication for stay.
  The question before us is not whether the requirements
for dispensing mifepristone impose an undue burden on a
woman’s  right  to  an  abortion  as  a  general  matter.    The
question is instead whether the District Court properly or-
dered the Food and Drug Administration to lift those estab-
lished requirements because of the court’s own evaluation
of  the  impact  of the  COVID–19  pandemic.  Here  as  in re-
lated contexts concerning government responses to the pan-
demic, my view is that courts owe significant deference to
the  politically  accountable  entities  with  the  “background,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes case citations, the names of the justices, and the text of a concurring opinion. Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

Opinion of the Court

from  final  judgments  in  cases  but  from  “final  judgments,
orders, and decrees . . . in cases and proceedings.”  §158(a).
The present dispute is about how to define the immedi
ately appealable “proceeding” in the context of the consid
eration of Chapter 13 plans.  Bullard argues for a plan-by
plan approach.  Each time the bankruptcy court reviews a
proposed plan, he says, it conducts a separate proceeding.
On this view, an order denying confirmation and an order
granting confirmation both terminate that proceeding, and
both are therefore final and appealable.

In  the  Bank’s  view  Bullard  is  slicing  the  case  too  thin.
The relevant “proceeding,” it argues, is the entire process
of considering plans, which terminates only when a plan is
confirmed  or—if  the  debtor  fails  to  offer  any  confirmable
plan—when  the  case  is  dismissed.    An  order  denying
confirmation  is  not  final,  so  long  as  it  leaves  the  debtor
free to propose another plan.

We agree with the Bank: The relevant proceeding is the
process  of  attempting  to  arrive  at  an  approved  plan  that
would  allow  the  bankruptcy  to  move  forward.    This  is  so,
first  and  foremost,  because  only  plan  confirmation—or
case  dismissal—alters  the  status  quo  and  fixes  the  rights
and obligations of the parties.  When the bankruptcy court
confirms  a  plan,  its  terms  become  binding  on  debtor  and
creditor  alike.  11  U. S. C.  §1327(a).    Confirmation  has
preclusive  effect,  foreclosing  relitigation  of  “any  issue
actually litigated by the parties and any issue necessarily
determined  by  the  confirmation  order.”
8  Collier
¶1327.02[1][c],  at  1327–6;  see  also  United  Student  Aid
Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U. S. 260, 275 (2010) (finding
a confirmation order “enforceable and binding” on a credi
tor  notwithstanding  legal  error  when  the  creditor  “had
notice  of  the  error  and  failed  to  object  or  timely  appeal”).
Subject to certain exceptions, confirmation “vests all of the
property  of  the  [bankruptcy]  estate  in  the  debtor,”  and
renders that property “free and clear of any claim or inter
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the appealability of bankruptcy court orders. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to relevant statutes and case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC v. FTC

Opinion of the Court

an  order  requiring  the  party  to  cease  and  desist  from  en-
gaging in the unlawful conduct.  Ibid.  The party may then
seek  review  before  the  Commission  and  eventually  in  a
court of appeals, where the “findings of the Commission as
to the facts” (if supported by the evidence) “shall be conclu-
sive.”  §45(c).  If judicial review favors the Commission (or
if  the  time  to  seek  judicial  review  expires),  the  Commis-
sion’s  order  normally  becomes  final  (and  enforceable).
§45(g).

In the 1970s Congress authorized the Commission to seek
additional  remedies  in  court.
In  1973  Congress  added
§13(b), the provision at issue here.  That provision permits
the Commission to proceed directly to court (prior to issuing
a cease and desist order) to obtain a “temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction,” and also allows the Com-
mission,  “in  proper  cases,”  to  obtain  a  court-ordered  “per-
manent injunction.”  15 U. S. C. §53(b).  In the same legis-
lation, Congress also amended §5(l) of the Act to authorize
district courts to award civil penalties against respondents
who  violate  final  cease  and  desist  orders,  and  to  “grant
mandatory injunctions and such other and further equita-
ble  relief  as  they  deem  appropriate  in  the  enforcement  of
such  final  orders  of  the  Commission.”    §45(l).  Two  years
later,  Congress  enacted  §19  of  the  Act,  which  authorizes
district courts to grant “such relief as the court finds neces-
sary to redress injury to consumers,” including through the
“refund of money or return of property.”  §57b(b).  However,
Congress specified that the consumer redress available un-
der §19 could be sought only (as relevant here, and subject
to  various  conditions  and  limitations)  against  those  who
have  “engage[d]  in  any  unfair  or  deceptive  act  or  prac-
tice . . . with respect to which the Commission has issued a
final cease and desist order which is applicable to such per-
son.”  §57b(a)(2).

Beginning in the late 1970s, the Commission began to use
§13(b), and in particular the words “permanent injunction,”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the FTC Act and its amendments. It delves into the legal framework surrounding cease and desist orders and the remedies available to the FTC.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

read in a similar manner to its companions.  See McDon-
nell,  579  U. S.,  at  568–569.    “Uses”  is  quite  amenable  to
such a reading, and not just because of its indeterminacy.
As explained above, “using” another person’s means of iden-
tification to deceive or defraud is a common feature of iden-
tity  theft.    See  Webster’s  xi  (“the  fraudulent  . . .  use”  of  a
means  of  identification  (emphasis  added));  Black’s  894
(when a defendant “uses the information to deceive others”
(emphasis added)).

Congress thus employed a trio of verbs that capture var-
ious aspects of “classic identity theft.”  Flores-Figueroa, 556
U. S.,  at  656.    There  is  “the  defendant  [who]  has  gone
through someone else’s trash to find discarded credit card
and bank statements,” ibid., and thus has taken possession
unlawfully.  There is the bank employee who passes along
customer information to an accomplice, and thus transfers
it unlawfully.  Then there is use involving fraud or deceit
about  identity:  “a  defendant  [who]  has  used  another  per-
son’s  identification  information  to  get  access  to  that  per-
son’s bank account.”  Ibid.

Another canon of construction offers a further point in fa-
vor  of  this  narrow  interpretation.    The  Court  “assume[s]
that Congress used [three] terms because it intended each
term to a have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”  Bai-
ley,  516  U. S.,  at  146.  Reading  §1028A(a)(1)’s  operative
verbs as tracking aspects of classic identity theft, each verb
has an independent role to play.  As the definitions reveal,
identity theft covers both when “someone steals personal in-
formation about and belonging to another . . . and uses the
information  to  deceive  others,”  Black’s  894  (emphasis
added), and “fraudulent appropriation and use,” Webster’s
xi (emphasis added).  Identity theft thus intermingles as-
pects of theft and fraud, misappropriation and deceitful use.
Section 1028A(a)(1)’s three verbs capture this complexity.
While “transfer” and “possess” conjure up two steps of theft,
“uses” supplies the deceitful use aspect.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute related to identity theft. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

19

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

have  withdrawn  judicial  review  for  thousands  upon  thou-
sands  of  lawfully  present  persons  annually,  and  done  so
without expressly discussing the question.  Often this Court
rejects as implausible statutory interpretations that seek to
squeeze elephants into mouseholes.  See, e.g., Whitman v.
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001).
Today’s interpretation seeks to cram a veritable legislative
zoo into one clause of one subparagraph of one subsection
of our Nation’s vast immigration laws.

*
The majority concludes that courts are powerless to cor-
rect an agency decision holding an individual ineligible for
relief from removal based on a factual error, no matter how
egregious the error might be.  The majority’s interpretation
has the further consequence of denying any chance to cor-
rect  agency  errors  in  processing  green-card  applications
outside the removal context.  Even the government cannot
bring itself to endorse the majority’s arresting conclusions.
For good reason.  Those conclusions are at war with all the
evidence before us.  They read language out of the statute
and collapse the law’s clear two-step framework.  They dis-
regard  the  lessons  of  neighboring  provisions  and  even  ig-
nore  the  statute’s  very  title.    They  make  no  sense  of  the
statute’s  history.    Altogether,  the  majority’s  novel  expan-
sion of a narrow statutory exception winds up swallowing
the law’s general rule guaranteeing individuals the chance
to seek judicial review to correct obvious bureaucratic mis-
steps.  It is a conclusion that turns an agency once account-
able to the rule of law into an authority unto itself.  Perhaps
some would welcome a world like that.  But it is hardly the
world Congress ordained.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It presents legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
102

MOHAWK  INDUSTRIES,  INC.  v.  CARPENTER

Syllabus

olution  of  district  court  litigation  and  needlessly  burdening  the  courts
of  appeals,  cf.  Cunningham  v.  Hamilton  County,  527  U. S.  198,  209.
Pp. 107–113.

(c)  The  admonition  that  the  class  of  collaterally  appealable  orders
must remain “narrow and selective in its membership,” Will, 546 U. S.,
at 350, has acquired special force in recent years with the enactment of
legislation  designating  rulemaking,  “not  expansion  by  court  decision,”
as the preferred means for determining whether and when prejudgment
orders  should be  immediately appealable,  Swint, 514  U. S., at  48.  Any
further avenue for immediate appeal of adverse attorney-client privilege
rulings  should  be  furnished,  if  at  all,  through  rulemaking,  with  the  op
portunity for full airing it provides.  Pp. 113–114.

541 F. 3d 1048, afﬁrmed.

Sotomayor,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  Roberts,
C.  J.,  and  Stevens,  Scalia,  Kennedy,  Ginsburg,  Breyer,  and  Alito,
JJ.,  joined,  and  in  which  Thomas,  J.,  joined,  as  to  Part  II–C.  Thomas,
J.,  ﬁled  an  opinion  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  the  judgment,
post, p. 114.

Randall  L.  Allen  argued  the  cause  for  petitioner.  With

him on the briefs was Daniel F. Difﬂey.

Judith Resnik argued the cause for respondent.  With her
on the brief were J. Craig Smith, Dennis E. Curtis, Thomas
J.  Munger,  Alan  B.  Morrison,  Deepak  Gupta,  Brian  Wolf-
man, and Sean K. McElligott.

Deputy  Solicitor  General  Kneedler  argued  the  cause  for
the United States as amicus curiae in support of respondent.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Kagan, Assist
ant  Attorney  General  West,  Pratik  A.  Shah,  and  Michael
S. Raab.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the American Bar
Association  by  H.  Thomas  Wells,  Jr.,  and  Paul  Mogin;  for  the  Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America by Paul D. Clement, Jeffrey
S.  Bucholtz,  Robin  S.  Conrad,  and  Amar  D.  Sarwal;  and  for  DRI–The
Voice  of  the  Defense  Bar  by  Constantine  L.  Trela,  Jr.,  and  Quin  M.
Sorenson.

Stephen  I.  Vladeck,  Charles  S.  Sims,  Mark  D.  Harris,  and  Anna  G.
Kaminska ﬁled a brief for Former Article III Judges et al. as amici curiae
urging afﬁrmance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter. Syllabi summarize the legal arguments and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MOORE v. HARPER

Syllabus

defendants’ request to rehear that remedial decision in Harper II.  The
court ultimately withdrew the opinion in Harper II concerning the re-
medial maps and overruled Harper I, repudiating its holding that par-
tisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the North Carolina
Constitution.  The court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims but did not rein-
state the 2021 congressional plans struck down in Harper I under the
State Constitution.  This Court has entertained two rounds of supple-
mental briefing on jurisdictional questions in light of the state court’s
rehearing proceedings.

Held:

1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the North
Carolina  Supreme  Court  in  Harper  I  that  adjudicated  the  Federal
Elections  Clause  issue.   A  corollary  to  this  Court’s  jurisdiction  over
“Cases” and “Controversies” is that there must exist a dispute “at all
stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”  Genesis
HealthCare  Corp.  v.  Symczyk,  569  U. S.  66,  71  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted).    The  North  Carolina  Supreme  Court’s  decision  to
withdraw  Harper  II  and  overrule  Harper  I  does  not  moot  this  case.
Prior to the appeal and rehearing proceedings in Harper II, the court
had already entered the judgment and issued the mandate in Harper
I, and the legislative defendants acknowledged that they would remain
bound by Harper I’s decision enjoining the use of the 2021 plans.  When
the North Carolina Supreme Court “overruled” Harper I as part of the
rehearing proceedings, it repudiated Harper I’s conclusion that parti-
san gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the North Carolina
Constitution.  But the court did not purport to alter or amend the judg-
ment in Harper I enjoining the use of the 2021 maps.  Were this Court
to reverse Harper I, the 2021 plans would again take effect.  Because
the  legislative  defendants’  path  to  complete  relief  runs  through  this
Court, the parties continue to have a “personal stake in the ultimate
disposition of the lawsuit” sufficient to maintain this Court’s jurisdic-
tion.  Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

This Court also has jurisdiction to review the judgment in Harper I
under  28  U. S. C.  §1257(a),  which  provides  that  jurisdiction  in  this
Court extends to “[f]inal judgments . . . rendered by the highest court
of a State in which a decision could be had.”  Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, identified categories of cases in which a deci-
sion  of  a  State’s  highest  court  was  considered  a  final  judgment  for
§1257(a)  purposes  despite  the  anticipation  of  additional  lower  court
proceedings, including “cases . . . in which the federal issue, finally de-
cided by the highest court in the State, will survive and require deci-
sion regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings.”  Id.,
at 480.  Harper I is such a case.  Because subsequent proceedings have
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. It outlines the background of the case, the issues before the court, and the court's holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

removal  order  was  procedurally  flawed  rather  than  sub-
stantively invalid.  There can be no “challenge” to or “collat-
eral attack” on the validity of substantively flawed orders,
he  reasons,  because  such  orders  are  invalid  from  the  mo-
ment  they  are  entered.  Palomar-Santiago’s  position  ig-
nores the plain meaning of both “challenge” and “collateral
attack.”  Arguing that a prior removal order was substan-
tively unlawful is a “challenge” to that order.  See Black’s
Law Dictionary 230 (6th ed. 1990) (“Challenge” means “[t]o
object or except to” or “to put into dispute”). When a chal-
lenge to an order takes place in a separate “proceeding that
has an independent purpose,” such as a later criminal pros-
ecution, it is a “collateral attack.”  Id., at 261.

Palomar-Santiago  last  invokes  the  canon  of  constitu-
tional avoidance.4  Courts should indeed construe statutes
“to avoid not only the conclusion that [they are] unconstitu-
tional,  but  also  grave  doubts  upon  that  score.”    United
States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401 (1916).  But this
canon “has no application in the absence of statutory ambi-
guity.”  United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooper-
ative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001).  Here, the text of §1326(d)
unambiguously  forecloses  Palomar-Santiago’s  interpreta-
tion.

*
The Court holds that each of the statutory requirements

*

*

——————

4 Palomar-Santiago argues that “a scheme that permits the results of
an  administrative  proceeding  to  conclusively  establish  a  criminal  of-
fense” raises “due process and separation of powers problems,” which are
“heightened  when  . . .  the  agency  never  had  the  authority  to  issue  the
order in the first instance.”  Brief for Respondent 15.  The parties also
strongly disagree about the sufficiency of the paths available for noncit-
izens  to  obtain  review  of  prior  removal  orders  outside  of  an  illegal-
reentry prosecution.  To the extent Palomar-Santiago raises freestanding
constitutional claims on these bases, they were not raised below and are
outside the scope of the narrow question this Court granted certiorari to
decide.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court addresses and refutes the arguments made by the respondent (Palomar-Santiago).  It delves into legal definitions and interpretations of statutes, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 21A240 and 21A241
_________________

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, ET AL., APPLICANTS
v.
MISSOURI, ET AL.

21A240

XAVIER BECERRA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL., APPLICANTS
v.
LOUISIANA, ET AL.

21A241

ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS

 [January 13, 2022]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO,  JUSTICE

GORSUCH, and JUSTICE BARRETT join, dissenting.

Two months ago, the Department of Health and Human
Services  (HHS),  acting  through  the  Centers  for  Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS), issued an omnibus rule man-
dating  that  medical  facilities  nationwide  order  their  em-
ployees,  volunteers,  contractors,  and  other  workers  to  re-
ceive  a  COVID–19  vaccine.  Covered  employers  must  fire
noncompliant workers or risk fines and termination of their
Medicare and Medicaid provider agreements.  As a result,
the  Government  has  effectively  mandated  vaccination  for
10 million healthcare workers.

Two District Courts preliminarily enjoined enforcement
of the omnibus rule, and the Government now requests an
emergency  stay  of  those  injunctions  pending  appeal.    Be-
cause the Government has not made a strong showing that
it has statutory authority to issue the rule, I too would deny
a stay.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court.  It includes citations, case names, and the names of the justices involved. This type of content is generally not suitable for indexing as it is highly specialized legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

Opinion of the Court

788, 804 (1870); see also Livingston v. Woodworth, 15 How.
546, 559–560 (1854) (restricting an accounting remedy “to
the actual gains and profits . . . during the time” the infring-
ing machine “was in operation and during no other period”
to avoid “convert[ing] a court of equity into an instrument
for  the  punishment  of  simple  torts”);  Seymour  v.  McCor-
mick, 16 How. 480, 490 (1854) (rejecting a blanket rule that
infringing one component of a machine warranted a remedy
measured by the full amounts of the profits earned from the
machine); Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 620, 649 (1872) (va-
cating  an  accounting  that  exceeded  the  profits  from  in-
fringement alone); Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106
U. S. 432, 434–435 (1882) (explaining that an innocent tres-
passer is entitled to deduct labor costs from the gains ob-
tained by wrongfully harvesting lumber).

The Court has carved out an exception when the “entire
profit of a business or undertaking” results from the wrong-
ful  activity.  Root,  105  U. S.,  at  203.    In  such  cases,  the
Court has explained, the defendant “will not be allowed to
diminish the show of profits by putting in unconscionable
claims  for  personal  services  or  other  inequitable  deduc-
tions.”  Ibid.  In Goodyear, for example, the Court affirmed
an accounting order that refused to deduct expenses under
this rule.  The Court there found that materials for which
expenses were claimed were bought for the purposes of the
infringement and “extraordinary salaries” appeared merely
to be “dividends of profit under another name.”  9 Wall., at
803;  see  also  Callaghan  v.  Myers,  128  U. S.  617,  663–664
(1888) (declining to deduct a defendant’s personal and liv-
ing expenses from his profits from copyright violations, but
distinguishing  the  expenses  from  salaries  of  officers  in  a
corporation).

Setting aside that circumstance, however, courts consist-
ently restricted awards to net profits from wrongdoing after
deducting  legitimate  expenses.    Such  remedies,  when  as-
sessed  against  only  culpable  actors  and  for  victims,  fall
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the principles of accounting for damages in copyright infringement cases. It cites previous court cases and legal precedents, making it highly relevant and suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6  SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM

KAGAN, J., dissenting

foray into armchair epidemiology cannot end well.
  And who knows what today’s decision will mean for other
restrictions  challenged  in  other  cases?    The  Court’s  order
exempts churches only from California’s indoor ban, leaving
its capacity restrictions in place (at least for now).  That is
all  to  the  good:  The  injunction  stops  short  of  giving  the
churches all their requested relief.  But the scope of the or-
der  raises  questions.    When  are  such  capacity  limits  per-
missible,  and  when  are  they  not?    And  is  an  indoor  ban
never allowed, or just not in this case?  Most important—do
the answers to those questions or similar ones turn on rec-
ord  evidence  about  epidemiology,  or  on  naked  judicial  in-
stinct?    The  Court’s  decision  leaves  state  policymakers
adrift, in California and elsewhere.  It is difficult enough in
a  predictable  legal  environment  to  craft  COVID  policies
that keep communities safe.  That task becomes harder still
when officials must guess which restrictions this Court will
choose to strike down.  The Court injects uncertainty into
an area where uncertainty has human costs.
  All  this  from  unelected  actors,  “not  accountable  to  the
people.”  South Bay, 590 U. S., at ___ (ROBERTS, C. J., con-
curring)  (slip  op.,  at  2).    I  fervently  hope  that  the  Court’s
intervention  will  not  worsen  the  Nation’s  COVID  crisis.
But if this decision causes suffering, we will not pay.  Our
marble halls are now closed to the public, and our life ten-
ure forever insulates us from responsibility for our errors.
That would seem good reason to avoid disrupting a State’s
pandemic response.  But the Court forges ahead regardless,
insisting that science-based policy yield to judicial edict.  I
respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal record and provide valuable context for understanding legal decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
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2  NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court

allegations” and “reasonable inference[s]” therefrom.  Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–679 (2009).  Unless stated
otherwise, the allegations aver as follows:

The  New  York  Department  of  Financial  Services  (DFS)
oversees insurance companies and financial services insti-
tutions doing business in the State.  See N. Y. Fin. Servs.
Law Ann. §201(a) (West 2012).  DFS can initiate investiga-
tions and civil enforcement actions against regulated enti-
ties,  and  can  refer  potential  criminal  violations  to  the
State’s  attorney  general  for  prosecution.    §§301(b),  (c)(4).
The  DFS-regulated  entities  in  this  case  are  insurers  that
had business relationships with the NRA.

Since  2000,  the  NRA  has  offered  a  variety  of  insurance
programs as a benefit to its members.  The NRA contracted
with affiliates of Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton), to ad-
minister the various policies of these affinity insurance pro-
grams, which Chubb Limited (Chubb) and Lloyd’s of Lon-
don (Lloyd’s) would then underwrite.  In return, the NRA
received a percentage of its members’ premium payments.
One of the NRA’s affinity products, Carry Guard, covered
personal-injury  and  criminal-defense  costs  related  to  li-
censed  firearm  use,  and  “insured  New  York  residents  for
intentional, reckless, and criminally negligent acts with a
firearm  that  injured  or  killed  another  person.”  49  F.  4th
700, 707 (CA2 2022).

In  September  2017,  a  gun-control  advocacy  group  con-
tacted the New York County District Attorney’s office to tip
them off to “compliance infirmities in Carry Guard.”  App.
to Pet. for Cert. 206, Second Amended Complaint ¶34.  That
office  then  passed  on  the  allegations  to  DFS.    The  next
month,  then-Superintendent  of  DFS  Vullo  began  investi-
gating Carry Guard, focusing on Chubb and Lockton.  The
investigation  revealed  at  least  two  kinds  of  violations  of
New York law: that Carry Guard insured intentional crim-
inal acts, and the NRA promoted Carry Guard without an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo. It sets the context of the case and outlines the allegations against the NRA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

11

Opinion of the Court

35 U. S. C. §101.

We  have  “long  held  that  this  provision  contains  an  im-
portant  implicit  exception[:]  Laws  of  nature,  natural  phe-
nomena,  and  abstract  ideas  are  not  patentable.”    Mayo,
566 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted).  Rather, “ ‘they are the basic tools of
scientific  and  technological  work’ ”  that  lie  beyond  the
domain of patent protection.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2).  As
the  Court  has  explained,  without  this  exception,  there
would  be  considerable  danger  that  the  grant  of  patents
would  “tie  up”  the  use  of  such  tools  and  thereby  “inhibit
future  innovation  premised  upon  them.”    Id.,  at  ___  (slip
op.,  at  17).    This  would  be  at  odds  with  the  very  point
of  patents,  which  exist  to  promote  creation.  Diamond  v.
Chakrabarty,  447  U. S.  303,  309  (1980)  (Products  of  na-
ture  are  not  created,  and  “ ‘manifestations  . . .  of  nature
[are] free to all men and reserved exclusively to none’ ”).

The  rule  against  patents  on  naturally  occurring  things
is not without limits, however, for “all inventions at some
level  embody,  use,  reflect,  rest  upon,  or  apply  laws  of
nature,  natural  phenomena,  or  abstract  ideas,”  and  “too
broad  an  interpretation  of  this  exclusionary  principle
could eviscerate patent law.”  566 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
2).  As we have recognized before, patent protection strikes
a  delicate  balance  between  creating  “incentives  that  lead
to creation, invention, and discovery” and “imped[ing] the
flow  of  information  that  might  permit,  indeed  spur,  in-
vention.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 23).  We must apply this
well-established  standard  to  determine  whether  Myr-
iad’s  patents  claim  any  “new  and  useful  . . .  composition
of  matter,”  §101,  or  instead  claim  naturally  occurring
phenomena.

B
It is undisputed that Myriad did not create or alter any
of  the  genetic  information  encoded  in  the  BRCA1  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.* It discusses the patentability of isolated DNA sequences.
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  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
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Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

19

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

House, then-Representative Charles Schumer introduced a
bill that made a version of that test applicable to all actions
taken by the Federal Government or the States.  H. R. 1308,
103d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  (1993).  This  bill,  which  eventually
became  the  Religious  Freedom  Restoration  Act  (RFRA),
passed in the House without dissent, was approved in the
Senate by a vote of 97 to 3, and was enthusiastically signed
into law by President Clinton.  139 Cong. Rec. 27239–27341
(1993)  (House  voice  vote);  id.,  at  26416  (Senate  vote);  Re-
marks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993,  29  Weekly  Comp.  of  Pres.  Doc.  2377  (1993).  And
when this Court later held in City of Boerne, 521 U. S. 507,
that Congress lacked the power under the 14th Amendment
to impose these rules on the States, Congress responded by
enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act (RLUIPA) under its spending power and its power
to regulate interstate commerce.  See 114 Stat. 803.  Intro-
duced in the Senate by Sen. Orrin Hatch and cosponsored
by Sen. Edward Kennedy, RLUIPA imposed the same rules
as RFRA on land use and prison regulations.  S. 2869, 106th
Cong., 2d Sess. (2000); 42 U. S. C. §2000cc et seq; 146 Cong.
Rec.  16698  (2000).  RLUIPA  passed  both  Houses  of  Con-
gress  without  a  single negative  vote  and,  like  RFRA,  was
signed  by  President  Clinton.  Id.,  at  16703,  16623;  State-
ment on Signing the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized  Persons  Act  of  2000,  36  Weekly  Comp.  of  Pres.  Doc.

——————
from entering the afterlife.  See Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 560
(RI  1990);  see  also  139  Cong.  Rec.  9681  (1993)  (remarks  of  Rep.  Ed-
wards).  Members of Congress were also informed that veterans’ ceme-
teries had refused to allow burial on weekends even when that was re-
quired by the deceased’s religion, id., at 9687 (remarks of Rep. Cardin),
and  that  churches  were  prohibited  from  conducting  services  in  areas
zoned for commercial and industrial uses, id., at 9684 (remarks of Rep.
Schumer).  In just the first three years after Smith, more than 50 cases
were decided against religious claimants.  139 Cong. Rec., at 9685 (re-
marks of Rep. Hoyer); see also id., at 9684 (remarks of Rep. Schumer)
(“Smith was a devastating blow to religious freedom”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case. It discusses the history and context of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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2

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

against  federal  parties  lack  standing  to  raise  the  equal
protection  issue.  So  the  equal  protection  issue  remains
undecided.

In my view, the equal protection issue is serious.  Under
the Act, a child in foster care or adoption proceedings may
in some cases be denied a particular placement because of
the  child’s  race—even  if  the  placement  is  otherwise
determined  to  be  in  the  child’s  best  interests.    And  a
prospective foster or adoptive parent may in some cases be
denied the opportunity to foster or adopt a child because of
the  prospective  parent’s  race.    Those  scenarios  raise
significant  questions  under  bedrock  equal  protection
principles  and  this  Court’s  precedents.  See  Palmore  v.
Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429 (1984).  Courts, including ultimately
this Court, will be able to address the equal protection issue
when it is properly raised by a plaintiff with standing—for
example, by a prospective foster or adoptive parent or child
in a case arising out of a state-court foster care or adoption
proceeding.  See ante, at 29, 32, n. 10.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the equal protection issue in the context of foster care and adoption proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

17

Opinion of the Court

members of the respective Boards, whose decisions are ap-
pealable to the Federal Circuit.  See 41 U. S. C. §§7105(b),
(d), (e), 7107(a).  Congress established both entities in 2006
and  gave  them  jurisdiction  over  disputes  involving  public
contractors.  119 Stat. 3391–3394.  Whatever distinct issues
that  scheme  might  present,  the  Boards  of  Contract  Ap-
peals—both young entrants to the regulatory landscape—
provide  the  PTAB  no  “foothold  in  history  or  tradition”
across the Executive Branch.  Seila Law, 591 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 21).

When it comes to the patent system in particular, adjudi-
cation has followed the traditional rule that a principal of-
ficer, if not the President himself, makes the final decision
on how to exercise executive power.  Recall that officers in
President  Washington’s  Cabinet  formed  the  first  Patent
Board in 1790.  1 Stat. 109–110.  The initial determination
of  patentability  was  then  relegated  to  the  courts  in  1793,
but  when  the  Executive  Branch  reassumed  authority  in
1836,  it  was  the  Commissioner  of  Patents—appointed  by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate—
who exercised control over the issuance of a patent.  5 Stat.
117, 119.  The patent system, for nearly the next hundred
years, remained accountable to the President through the
Commissioner,  who  directed  the  work  of  his  subordinates
by, for example, hearing appeals from decisions by examin-
ers-in-chief,  the  forebears  of  today’s  APJs.    12  Stat.  246–
247.

The Government and Smith & Nephew find support for
the structure of the PTAB in the predecessor Board of Ap-
peals established in 1927.  44 Stat. 1335–1336.  Simplified
somewhat, the Board of Appeals decided the patentability
of  inventions  in  panels  composed  of  examiners-in-chief
without an appeal to the Commissioner.  But decisions by
examiners-in-chief could be reviewed by the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals (CCPA), an entity within the Ex-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history and structure of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and its relationship to the Executive Branch.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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