<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

PATEL v. GARLAND

Syllabus

determinations of which Patel sought review—whether he had testi-
fied credibly and whether he had subjectively intended to misrepresent
himself as a citizen—each qualified as an unreviewable judgment.  On
rehearing,  the  en  banc  court  agreed  with  the  panel.    This  Court
granted  certiorari  to  resolve  a  Circuit  conflict  as  to  the  scope  of
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i).

Held: Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of dis-
cretionary-relief  proceedings  under  §1255  and  the  other  provisions
enumerated in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  Pp. 6–17.

(a) This case largely turns on the scope of the word “judgment” as
used  in  §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).    In  support  of  the  judgment  below,  Court-
appointed amicus defines it as any authoritative decision—encompass-
ing any and all decisions relating to the granting or denying of discre-
tionary relief.  By contrast, the Government argues that it refers ex-
clusively to a decision requiring the use of discretion, which the factual
findings in this case are not.  Patel agrees that “judgment” implies an
exercise of discretion but interprets the qualifying phrase “regarding
the  granting  of  relief”  as  focusing  the  jurisdictional  bar  on  only  the
Immigration Judge’s ultimate decision whether to grant relief.  Every-
thing else, he says, is reviewable.  Pp. 6–14.

(1) Only  amicus’  definition

fits  the  text  and  context  of
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  “ [T]he word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning.”  Babb
v. Wilkie, 589 U. S. ___, ___, n. 2 (some internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  As applied here, “any” means a judgment “ ‘of whatever kind’ ”
under §1255 and the other enumerated provisions.  United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5.  The word “regarding” has a similarly “broad-
ening effect.”  Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U. S. ___,
___.  Thus, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) encompasses not just “the granting of re-
lief” but also any judgment relating to the granting of relief.  Amicus’
reading  is  reinforced  by  Congress’  later  addition  of  §1252(a)(2)(D),
which  preserves  review  of  legal  and  constitutional  questions  but
makes no mention of preserving review of questions of fact.  Moreover,
this Court has already relied on subparagraph (D) to all but settle that
judicial review of factfinding is unavailable.  See Guerrero-Lasprilla v.
Barr, 589 U. S. ___; Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ___ (2020).  Pp. 8–10.
(2) The Government’s and Patel’s interpretations read like elabo-
rate efforts to avoid the text’s most natural meaning.  The Government
cites dictionary definitions such as “the mental or intellectual process
of forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing” as
indicating that “judgment” refers exclusively to a discretionary deci-
sion, which it describes as one that is “subjective or evaluative.”  Brief
for Respondent 12.  The factual findings in this case, it says, do not fit
that description.  The Government is wrong about both text and con-
text.    A  “judgment”  does  not  necessarily  involve  discretion,  nor  does
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the case summary, the issues at hand, and the Court's holding. It is not the actual content of the legal argument or the story being presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

835

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10247.  Armann  v.  Quintanais,  Warden.  C.  A.  3d

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  549  F.  3d  279.

No.  08–10248.  Ardley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  203.

No.  08–10255.  Helton  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  2  So.  3d  981.

No.  08–10257.  Hawkins  v.  Hamlet,  Ltd.,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  296  Fed.  Appx.  918.

No.  08–10259.  Hughes  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10261.  McKinney  v.  Ray,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  289  Fed.  Appx.  604.

No.  08–10262.  Young  v.  Oklahoma.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Okla.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10265.  Gonzalez  v.  Sullivan,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10267.  Isaac  v.  Lafler,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10268.  Colleen  F.  v.  Riverside  County  Depart
ment  of  Public  Social  Services.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.
Dist.,  Div.  2.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10269.  Pace  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  189.

No.  08–10270.  Quintero  v.  Tennessee.  Ct.  Crim.  App.

Tenn.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10273.  Collins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  290.

No. 08–10278.  Kelly v.  United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  1.

No.  08–10282.  Bond  v.  Beard,  Secretary,  Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, et al.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  539  F.  3d  256.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's case summary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 624 (1998)

645

Opinion of the Court

the new statute should be construed in light of this unwaver-
ing line of administrative and judicial interpretation. All in-
dications are that Congress was well aware of the position
taken by OLC when enacting the ADA and intended to give
that position its active endorsement. H. R. Rep. No. 101–
485, pt. 2, p. 52 (1990) (endorsing the analysis and conclusion
of the OLC opinion); id., pt. 3, at 28, n. 18 (same); S. Rep. No.
101–116, pp. 21, 22 (1989) (same). As noted earlier, Congress
also incorporated the same deﬁnition into the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988. See 42 U. S. C. § 3602(h)(1). We
ﬁnd it signiﬁcant that the implementing regulations issued
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) construed the deﬁnition to include infection with
HIV.
54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3245 (1989) (codiﬁed at 24 CFR
§ 100.201 (1997)); see also In re Williams, 2A P–H Fair
Housing-Fair Lending ¶ 25,007, pp. 25,111–25,113 (HUD Off.
Admin. Law Judges, Mar. 22, 1991) (adhering to this inter-
pretation); In re Elroy R. and Dorothy Burns Trust, 2A
P–H Fair Housing-Fair Lending ¶ 25,073, p. 25,678 (HUD Off.
Admin. Law Judges, June 17, 1994) (same). Again the legis-
lative record indicates that Congress intended to ratify
HUD’s interpretation when it reiterated the same deﬁnition
in the ADA. H. R. Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, at 50; id., pt. 3,
at 27; id., pt. 4, at 36; S. Rep. No. 101–116, at 21.

We ﬁnd the uniformity of the administrative and judicial
precedent construing the deﬁnition signiﬁcant. When ad-
ministrative and judicial
interpretations have settled the
meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the
same language in a new statute indicates, as a general mat-
ter, the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial
interpretations as well. See, e. g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U. S. 575, 580–581 (1978). The uniform body of administra-
tive and judicial precedent conﬁrms the conclusion we reach
today as the most faithful way to effect the congressional
design.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 624 (1998). It discusses the interpretation of a statutory definition related to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

Nearly  50  years  later,  they  are  still  in  effect;  indeed,
they have been made more stringent, and are now sched-
uled to last until 2031.  There is no denying, however, that
the  conditions  that  originally  justified  these  measures  no
longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.  By
2009,  “the  racial  gap  in  voter  registration  and  turnout
[was]  lower  in  the  States  originally  covered  by  §5  than  it
[was] nationwide.”  Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist.
No.  One  v.  Holder,  557  U. S.  193,  203–204  (2009).    Since
that  time,  Census  Bureau  data  indicate  that  African-
American  voter  turnout  has  come  to  exceed  white  voter
turnout  in  five  of  the  six  States  originally  covered  by  §5,
with  a  gap  in  the  sixth  State  of  less  than  one  half  of  one
percent.  See  Dept.  of  Commerce,  Census  Bureau,  Re-
ported  Voting  and  Registration,  by  Sex,  Race  and  His-
panic Origin, for States (Nov. 2012) (Table 4b).

At  the  same  time,  voting  discrimination  still  exists;  no
one  doubts  that.    The  question  is  whether  the  Act’s  ex-
traordinary measures, including its disparate treatment of
the States, continue to satisfy constitutional requirements.
As  we  put  it  a  short  time  ago,  “the  Act  imposes  current
burdens  and  must  be  justified  by  current  needs.”    North-
west Austin, 557 U. S., at 203.

I

A

The  Fifteenth  Amendment  was  ratified  in  1870,  in  the
wake  of  the  Civil  War.  It  provides  that  “[t]he  right  of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of  race,  color,  or  previous  condition  of  servitude,”  and  it
gives Congress the “power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation.”

“The  first  century  of  congressional  enforcement  of  the
Amendment,  however,  can  only  be  regarded  as  a  failure.”
Id.,  at  197.    In  the  1890s,  Alabama,  Georgia,  Louisiana,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Voting Rights Act. It provides context and legal background, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

KAGAN, J., dissenting

the majority mean when it says that “[a]s a matter of defi-
nitional  possibilities,  generation  shifting  can  be  described
as a ‘system’ ”?  Ante, at 28 (emphasis added; citation and
some internal quotation marks omitted).  Rarely has a stat-
utory term so clearly applied.

Other statutory provisions confirm the point.  The Clean
Air Act’s acid rain provision, for example, describes a cap-
and-trade program as an “emission allocation and transfer
system.”  §7651(b) (emphasis added).  So a “system,” accord-
ing to the statute’s own usage, includes the kind of cap-and-
trade mechanism that the Clean Power Plan relied on.  And
in a somewhat different way, the NAAQS provision shows
that Section 111 encompasses such a regulatory technique.
Under  that  provision,  cap-and-trade  schemes  qualify  as
“control measures, means, or techniques” that state plans
may  use  to  reduce  emissions.    §7410(a)(2)(A).    That  lan-
guage,  of  course,  does  not  use  the  word  “system.”    But  in
specifying  that  cap  and  trade  is  allowable  under  the
NAAQS program, the provision supports the same conclu-
sion here—because Section 111 directs EPA to use “a pro-
cedure  similar  to  that  provided  by  [the  NAAQS].”
§7411(d)(1).  The majority discounts the relevance of both
those provisions on the ground that they contemplate trad-
ing systems only “as a means of complying with an already
established emissions limit.”  Ante, at 29 (emphasis in orig-
inal).  That is a distinction, to be sure.  But to begin, it is
far  less  of  one  than  the  majority  thinks:  In  arguing  that
EPA’s  claim  of  authority  here  would  allow  it  to  take  the
emissions limit as low as it wants, the majority ignores the
varied constraints surrounding the “best system” language.
See supra, at 7.  And still more important for interpretive
purposes,  the  distinction  appears  only  in  the  majority’s
opinion,  not  in  any  statutory  language.    That  text,  to  the
contrary,  says  to  EPA:  Do  as  you  would  do  under  the
NAAQS  and  Acid  Rain  programs—go  ahead  and  use  cap
and trade.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites legal precedents and analyzes statutory language.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

BROWN v. DAVENPORT

Opinion of the Court

With nothing in this holding to help him, Mr. Davenport
again asks us to focus on a carefully curated snippet.  Bor-
rowing language from Fry, Ayala observed that “a prisoner
who seeks federal habeas corpus relief must satisfy Brecht,
and if the state court adjudicated his claim on the merits,
the  Brecht  test  subsumes  the  limitations  imposed  by
AEDPA.”  Ayala, 576 U. S., at 270 (citing Fry, 551 U. S., at
119–120).  Again,  though,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  this  much
might carry the day.  When a federal court determines, as
we  did  in  Ayala,  that  a  petitioner  has  failed  to  carry  his
burden under Brecht, that conclusion subsumes (or perhaps
more  precisely,  obviates  the  need  for)  a  separate  AEDPA
inquiry; relief must be denied.  But none of this resolves the
distinct question we face today—whether a petitioner who
can satisfy Brecht also necessarily secures a victory under
AEDPA.  The Ayala Court had no occasion to address that
question.  And to the extent it spoke to it, it spoke much as
Fry had, taking pains to reject any suggestion “that Brecht
somehow abrogates the limitation on federal habeas relief
that § 2254(d) plainly sets out.”  Ayala, 576 U. S., at 268.5
In  the  end,  Mr.  Davenport’s  appeals  to  Fry  and  Ayala
(echoed by the dissent) rest on a misunderstanding of stare
decisis.  At its best, that doctrine is a call for judicial humil-
ity.  It is a reminder to afford careful consideration to the
work of our forbearers, their experience, and their wisdom.
But respect for past judgments also means respecting their
limits.  This Court has long stressed that “the language of
——————

5 If Fry doesn’t seal a win for Mr. Davenport, the dissent argues, Ayala
does the job on its own.  Post, at 10–12.  But Ayala does no more than
Fry  to  compel  the  dissent’s  Brecht  2.0  approach.    To  the  contrary,  the
Ayala Court reversed a lower court that had overturned a conviction un-
der Brecht “ ‘without regard for the state court’s harmlessness determi-
nation.’ ”  Ayala, 756 F. 3d, at 674.  It issued a stern reminder that “the
highly deferential AEDPA standard applies.”  Ayala, 576 U. S., at 269.
And its harmless-error analysis deferred repeatedly to the state court’s
findings.  Id., at 271–285.  These are not the actions of a Court that saw
Brecht as a stand-alone gateway to habeas relief.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case BROWN v. DAVENPORT. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1138

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 22, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–9241. Stevenson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1326.

No. 99–9242. Godwin v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 969.

No. 99–9243. Dehaney v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1325.

No. 99–9246. Geers v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–9254. Fuller v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 271.

No. 99–9261. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9262. Alexander v. Flowers, Warden. C. A. 10th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 208 F. 3d 225.

No. 99–9270. McSwain v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 472.

No. 99–781. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., et al. v.
Aguilar et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 21 Cal. 4th 121, 980 P. 2d 846.

Justice Thomas, dissenting.
“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional va-
lidity.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 (1963).
The presumption is by no means rebutted here. For one, the
unprecedented injunction entered by the courts below, which bars
petitioner John Lawrence from uttering in the workplace any of
a judicially drawn list of words deemed offensive to Latino em-
ployees, very likely suppresses fully protected speech. But even
if some types of harassing speech in the workplace do not enjoy
First Amendment protection, there has been no showing that a
prior restraint, rather than the less severe remedy of money dam-
ages for any future violations, is necessary to regulate Lawrence’s
speech. Further, the injunction here is not narrowly tailored, as
it applies even to isolated remarks and to remarks outside the
hearing of respondents or any Latino employee. For these rea-
sons, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically the denials of certiorari and a dissenting opinion.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

GORSUCH, J., concurring

632, 98 Eng. Rep. 1277, 1279 (K. B. 1777).  By discarding
aberrational rulings and pursuing instead the mainstream
of past decisions, he observed, the common law tended over
time to “wor[k] itself pure.” Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 22,
33, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch. 1744) (emphasis deleted).  Re-
flecting similar thinking, Edmund Burke offered five prin-
ciples  for  the  evaluation  of  past  judicial  decisions:  “They
ought to be shewn; first, to be numerous and not scattered
here  and  there;—secondly,  concurrent  and  not  contradic-
tory and mutually destructive;—thirdly, to be made in good
and constitutional times;—fourthly, not to be made to serve
an  occasion;—and  fifthly,  to  be  agreeable  to  the  general
tenor of legal principles.”  Speech of Dec. 23, 1790, in 3 The
Speeches  of  the  Right  Honourable  Edmund  Burke  513
(1816).

Not only did different decisions carry different weight, so
did different language within a decision.  An opinion’s hold-
ing  and  the  reasoning  essential  to  it  (the  ratio  decidendi)
merited  careful  attention.  Dicta,  stray  remarks,  and  di-
gressions warranted less weight.  See N. Duxbury, The In-
tricacies  of  Dicta  and  Dissent  19–24  (2021)  (Duxbury).
These were no more than “the vapours and fumes of law.”
F.  Bacon,  The  Lord  Keeper’s  Speech  in  the  Exchequer
(1617), in 2 The Works of Francis Bacon 478 (B. Montagu
ed. 1887) (Bacon).

That is not to say those “vapours” were worthless.  Often
dicta  might  provide  the  parties  to  a  particular  dispute  a
“fuller  understanding  of  the  court’s  decisional  path  or  re-
lated areas of concern.”  B. Garner et al., The Law of Judi-
cial Precedent 65 (2016) (Precedent).  Dicta might also pro-
vide  future  courts  with  a  source  of  “thoughtful  advice.”
Ibid.  But future courts had to be careful not to treat every
“hasty expression . . . as a serious and deliberate opinion.”
Steel  v.  Houghton,  1  Bl.  H.  51,  53,  126  Eng.  Rep.  32,  33
(C. P.  1788).  To  do  so  would  work  an  “injustice  to  [the]
memory” of their predecessors who could not expect judicial
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It cites previous legal cases and discusses the principles of legal precedent, including the distinction between *ratio decidendi* and *dicta*.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1232

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964

Appointment of counsel under  ..................................  9, 39
Compensation of counsel for indigent party............  39.7

Rule

CROSS-APPEALS—See Appeals
CROSS-PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI—See

Certiorari

DAMAGES

Frivolous ﬁlings.............................................................  42.2
Stays ................................................................................  23.4

DEATH

Parties .............................................................................  35.1–35.3
Public ofﬁcers.................................................................  35.3
Revivor of case ..............................................................  35.2

DELAY

Stay, damages for delay ...............................................  23.4

DIAGRAMS

Custody of Clerk  ..........................................................  32.1
Removal or other disposition  ....................................  32.2

DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE—See Attorneys
DISMISSAL

Agreement of parties ...................................................  46.1

Appeals before docketing ............................................  18.5

Death of party ...............................................................  35.1

Entry of order................................................................  46.1

Motion by appellee........................................................  18.6, 46.2

Objection to  ...................................................................  46.2

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—See State Courts
DOCKETING CASES

Appeals............................................................................  18.3

Certiﬁed questions .......................................................  19.3

Certiorari  .......................................................................  12.3

Cross-appeals .................................................................  18.4

Cross-petitions for certiorari ......................................  12.5

Extraordinary writs......................................................  20.2

Fees..................................................................................  38(a)

In forma pauperis proceedings .................................  39.4

Original actions .............................................................  17.4

DOCUMENT PREPARATION

Certiﬁcation of compliance with word limits...........  33.1(h)
Electronic submission...................................................  25.9, 37.3(a)
Format and general requirements .............................  33, 34
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a table of contents or an index for a legal document, listing rules and sections with corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

lxxiv

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Wojtaszek v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wolfe v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Womack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woodard v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woodberry v. Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woodford; Rich v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woods v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woods v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woods v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woodstock; Caprotti v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woodward v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woodward v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woolfolk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wordlaw v. Bowles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd.; Mekalonis v.
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd. of Cal.; Miranda v.
. . . . . . .
Worthington v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Worthington Corp. v. Ronsini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wright, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wright v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wright v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wright v. Rowley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wronke v. Steigmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
WuChang v. Redwood City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wyoming; Dike v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wyoming; Jennings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Xue Dan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yahweh v. Suthers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yonkers Bd. of Ed.; New York v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yost v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Young; Seling v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Young v. Smeeks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Young v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
YoungBear, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Young-Bey v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Laney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yukins; Bazzetta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yukins; Crawford v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zahran v. Cleary Building Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zain v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zapata v. Purdy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zeegers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zepeda-Aguirre v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1058
1115
1120
1118
1057
1013
1023
1112
1092
1108
1110
1092
1081
1056
1083
1117
1116
1019
1001
1001
1114
1119
1101
1034
1078
1009
1103
1040
1130
1108
1017
1117
1078,1081
1096
1122
1131
1111
1099
1025
1021
1042
1045
1014
1030
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases reported, with case names and corresponding page numbers. It is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

23

KAGAN, J., dissenting

nothing  insignificant  about  Section  111(d),  which  was  in-
tended to ensure that EPA would limit existing stationary
sources’  emissions  of  otherwise  unregulated  pollutants
(however few or many there were).  See supra, at 6.  And
the  front  half  of  the  argument  doesn’t  work  either.    The
Clean Power Plan was not so big.  It was not so new.  And
to the extent it was either, that should not matter.

As to bigness—well, events have proved the opposite: The
Clean Power Plan, we now know, would have had little or
no impact.  The Trump administration’s repeal of the Plan
created a kind of controlled experiment: The Plan’s “magni-
tude”  (ante,  at  24)  could  be  measured  by  seeing  how  far
short  the  industry  fell  of  the  Plan’s  nationwide  emissions
target.  Except  that  turned  out  to  be  the  wrong  question,
because the industry didn’t fall short of the Plan’s goal; ra-
ther, the industry exceeded that target, all on its own.  See
App. 265 (declaration of EPA official).  And it did so mainly
through  the  generation-shifting  techniques  that  the  Plan
called for.  See ibid.; Brief for United States 47.  In effect,
the Plan predicted market behavior, rather than altered it
(as  regulations  usually  do).    Cf.  Utility  Air,  573  U. S.,  at
321–322  (discussing  the  “calamitous  consequences”  of  the
EPA approach there under review).  And that fact has been
understood for some years.  At the time of the repeal, the
Trump administration explained that “there [was] likely to
be no difference between a world where the [Clean Power
Plan  was]  implemented  and  one  where  it  [was]  not.”    84
Fed. Reg. 32561.6  It is small wonder, then, that the power
——————

6 Even when the Clean Power Plan was first issued, its projected im-
pact was far less than what the majority implies.  The majority states,
for example, that the rule would have “reduce[d] GDP by at least a tril-
lion 2009 dollars by 2040.”  Ante, at 10.  That sounds like a lot, but it is
in fact “equivalent to changes of a few tenths of 1 percent from baseline.”
Dept. of Energy, Analysis of the Impacts of the Clean Power Plan 63–64
(2015).    And  the  “billions  of  dollars  in  compliance  costs”  the  majority
highlights were vastly outweighed by the Plan’s projected benefits.  Ante,
at  10;  see  80  Fed.  Reg.  64679  (anticipating  $5–$8  billion  in  costs  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it unsuitable for indexing as it is not general-purpose readable text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

that neither it nor its executive employees possess the au-
thority to enforce the Texas law either directly or indirectly.
Nor is it clear whether, under existing precedent, this Court
can issue an injunction against state judges asked to decide
a lawsuit under Texas’s law.  See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123, 163 (1908).  Finally, the sole private-citizen respondent
before us has filed an affidavit stating that he has no pre-
sent intention to enforce the law.  In light of such issues, we
cannot say the applicants have met their burden to prevail
in an injunction or stay application.  In reaching this con-
clusion, we stress that we do not purport to resolve defini-
tively any jurisdictional or substantive claim in the appli-
cants’ lawsuit.  In particular, this order is not based on any
conclusion about the constitutionality of Texas’s law, and in
no way limits other procedurally proper challenges to the
Texas law, including in Texas state courts.
  CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER
and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
  The statutory scheme before the Court is not only unu-
sual,  but  unprecedented.    The  legislature  has  imposed  a
prohibition on abortions after roughly six weeks, and then
essentially delegated enforcement of that prohibition to the
populace at large.  The desired consequence appears to be
to insulate the State from responsibility for implementing
and enforcing the regulatory regime.
  The  State  defendants  argue  that  they  cannot  be  re-
strained from enforcing their rules because they do not en-
force them in the first place.  I would grant preliminary re-
lief  to  preserve  the  status  quo  ante—before  the  law  went
into effect—so that the courts may consider whether a state
can avoid responsibility for its laws in such a manner.  De-
fendants argue that existing doctrines preclude judicial in-
tervention,  and  they  may  be  correct.    See  California  v.
Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 8).  But the con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
44  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

vantages” underrepresented minority students “at the ex-
pense of ” other students.  Ante, at 27.

That  is  not  the  role  race  plays  in  holistic  admissions.
Consistent with the Court’s precedents, respondents’ holis-
tic review policies consider race in a very limited way.  Race
is only one factor out of many.  That type of system allows
Harvard and UNC to assemble a diverse class on a multi-
tude of dimensions.  Respondents’ policies allow them to se-
lect students with various unique attributes, including tal-
ented athletes, artists, scientists, and musicians.  They also
allow  respondents  to  assemble  a  class  with  diverse  view-
points, including students who have different political ide-
ologies  and  academic  interests,  who  have  struggled  with
different types of disabilities, who are from various socioec-
onomic backgrounds, who understand different ways of life
in  various  parts  of  the  country,  and—yes—students  who
self-identify with various racial backgrounds and who can
offer different perspectives because of that identity.

That  type  of  multidimensional  system  benefits  all  stu-
dents.  In fact, racial groups that are not underrepresented
tend to benefit disproportionately from such a system.  Har-
vard’s holistic system, for example, provides points to appli-
cants who qualify as “ALDC,” meaning “athletes, legacy ap-
plicants, applicants on the Dean’s Interest List [primarily
relatives of donors], and children of faculty or staff.”  Har-
vard II, 980 F. 3d, at 171 (noting also that “SFFA does not
challenge the admission of this large group”).  ALDC appli-
cants  are  predominantly  white:  Around  67.8%  are  white,
11.4% are Asian American, 6% are Black, and 5.6% are La-
tino.  Ibid.  By contrast, only 40.3% of non-ALDC applicants
are white, 28.3% are Asian American, 11% are Black, and
12.6% are Latino.  Ibid.  Although “ALDC applicants make
up less than 5% of applicants to Harvard,” they constitute
“around 30% of the applicants admitted each year.”  Ibid.
Similarly, because of achievement gaps that result from en-
trenched racial inequality in K–12 education, see infra, at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–255
_________________

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, PETITIONER v.
B. L., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HER FATHER,
LAWRENCE LEVY AND HER MOTHER,
BETTY LOU LEVY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2021]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
B. L., a high school student, sent a profanity-laced mes-
sage to hundreds of people, including classmates and team-
mates.  The message included a picture of B. L. raising her
middle finger and captioned “F*** school” and “f*** cheer.”
This  message  was  juxtaposed  with  another,  which  ex-
plained  that  B. L.  was  frustrated  that  she  failed  to  make
the varsity cheerleading squad.  The cheerleading coach re-
sponded by disciplining B. L.

The  Court  overrides  that  decision—without  even  men-
tioning the 150 years of history supporting the coach.  Us-
ing broad brushstrokes, the majority outlines the scope of
school authority.  When students are on campus, the major-
ity says, schools have authority in loco parentis—that is, as
substitutes  of  parents—to  discipline  speech  and  conduct.
Off campus, the authority of schools is somewhat less.  At
that level of generality, I agree.  But the majority omits im-
portant detail.  What authority does a school have when it
operates  in  loco  parentis?  How  much  less  authority  do
schools have over off-campus speech and conduct?  And how
does a court decide if speech is on or off campus?

Disregarding these important issues, the majority simply
posits three vague considerations and reaches an outcome.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It provides legal context, outlines the case's background, and critiques the majority opinion's approach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524bv$titl 07-17-00 17:57:50

UNITED STATES REPORTS

VOLUME 524

CASES ADJUDGED

IN

THE SUPREME COURT

AT

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 1 Through September 29, 1998

Together With Opinion of Individual Justice in Chambers

End of Term

FRANK D. WAGNER

reporter of decisions

WASHINGTON : 2000

Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper

For sale by the U. S. Government Printing Ofﬁce
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be metadata and copyright information from a legal publication, not the actual content meant for reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Metadata</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES

Opinion of the Court

provide  victims  with  personally  enforceable  remedies.
Although  the  framers  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  and
the  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1871,  17  Stat.  13  (the  original
source  of  §1983),  did  not  create  a  system  by  which  police
departments are generally held financially accountable for
crimes  that  better  policing  might  have  prevented,  the
people  of  Colorado  are  free  to  craft  such  a  system  under
state law.  Cf. DeShaney, 489 U. S., at 203.15
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

——————

15 In  Colorado,  the  general  statutory  immunity  for  government  em-
ployees does not apply when “the act or omission causing . . . injury was
willful  and  wanton.”    Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §24–10–118(2)(a)  (Lexis  1999).
Respondent’s  complaint  does  allege  that  the  police  officers’  actions
“were taken either willfully, recklessly or with such gross negligence as
to  indicate  wanton  disregard  and  deliberate  indifference  to”  her  civil
rights.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 128a.

The  state  cases  cited  by  the dissent  that  afford  a  cause of  action  for
police failure to enforce restraining orders, post, at 11–12, 14–15, n. 13,
vindicate  state  common-law  or  statutory  tort  claims—not  procedural
due  process  claims  under  the  Federal  Constitution.    See  Donaldson  v.
Seattle,  65  Wash.  App.  661,  881  P. 2d  1098  (1992)  (city  could  be  liable
under  some  circumstances  for  per  se  negligence  in  failing  to  meet
statutory duty to arrest); Matthews v. Pickett County, 996 S. W. 2d 162
(Tenn.  1999)  (county  could  be  liable  under  Tennessee’s  Governmental
Tort  Liability  Act  where  restraining  order  created  a  special  duty);
Campbell v. Campbell, 294 N. J. Super. 18, 682 A. 2d 272 (1996) (reject-
ing  four  specific  defenses  under  the  New  Jersey  Tort  Claims  Act  in
negligence action against individual officers); Sorichetti v. New York, 65
N. Y. 2d 461, 482 N. E. 2d 70 (1985) (city breached duty of care arising
from  special  relationship  between  police  and  victim);  Nearing  v.
Weaver, 295 Ore. 702, 670 P. 2d 137 (1983) (statutory duty to individual
plaintiffs arising independently of tort-law duty of care).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court explains its reasoning and cites relevant cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Syllabus

matter indistinguishable from waters of the United States.”  This re-
quires the party asserting jurisdiction to establish “first, that the ad-
jacent  [body  of  water  constitutes]  . . .  ‘water[s]  of  the  United  States’
(i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional in-
terstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a contin-
uous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to deter-
mine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”  Rapanos, 547
U. S., at 755, 742.  Pp. 18–22.

(c) The EPA asks the Court to defer to its most recent rule providing
that  “adjacent  wetlands  are  covered  by  the  [CWA]  if  they  ‘possess  a
significant nexus to’ traditional navigable waters” and that wetlands
are “adjacent” when they are “neighboring” to covered waters.  Brief
for Respondents 32, 20.  For multiple reasons, the EPA’s position lacks
merit.  Pp. 22–27.

(1) The EPA’s interpretation is inconsistent with the CWA’s text
and structure and clashes with “background principles of construction”
that  apply  to  the  interpretation  of  the  relevant  provisions.    Bond  v.
United States, 572 U. S. 844, 857.  First, “exceedingly clear language”
is required if Congress wishes to alter the federal/state balance or the
Government’s power over private property.  United States Forest Ser-
vice v. Cowpasture River Preservation Assn., 590 U. S. ___, ___.  The
Court has thus required a clear statement from Congress when deter-
mining  the  scope  of  “the  waters  of  the  United  States.”  Second,  the
EPA’s interpretation gives rise to serious vagueness concerns in light
of the CWA’s criminal penalties, thus implicating the due process re-
quirement that penal statutes be defined “ ‘with sufficient definiteness
that  ordinary  people  can  understand  what  conduct  is  prohibited.’ ”
McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576.  Where penal statutes
could sweep broadly enough to render criminal a host of what might
otherwise be considered ordinary activities, the Court has been wary
about going beyond what “Congress certainly intended the statute to
cover.”  Skilling v. United States, 561 U. S. 358, 404.  Under these two
principles,  the  judicial  task  when  interpreting  “the  waters  of  the
United States” is to ascertain whether clear congressional authoriza-
tion exists for the EPA’s claimed power.  Pp. 22–25.

(2) The  EPA  claims  that  Congress  ratified  the  EPA’s  regulatory
definition of “adjacent” when it amended the CWA to include the ref-
erence to “adjacent” wetlands in §1344(g)(1).  This argument fails for
at least three reasons.  First, the text of §§1362(7) and 1344(g) shows
that “adjacent” cannot include wetlands that are merely nearby cov-
ered waters.  Second, EPA’s argument cannot be reconciled with this
Court’s  repeated  recognition  that  §1344(g)(1)  “ ‘does  not  conclusively
determine the construction to be placed on . . . the relevant definition
of “navigable waters.” ’ ”  SWANCC, 531 U. S., at 171.  Third, the EPA
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It outlines the arguments and issues presented in a case concerning the definition of "waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:25:22
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CV

Pagination Table: RULES1

AMENDMENTS TO
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

The following amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 17, 2000,
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2072, and were reported to Congress by The
Chief Justice on the same date. For the letter of transmittal, see post,
p. 1156. The Judicial Conference report referred to in that letter is not
reproduced herein.

Note that under 28 U. S. C. § 2074, such amendments shall take effect
no earlier than December 1 of the year in which they are transmitted to
Congress unless otherwise provided by law.

For earlier publication of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
amendments thereto, see 308 U. S. 645, 308 U. S. 642, 329 U. S. 839, 335
U. S. 919, 341 U. S. 959, 368 U. S. 1009, 374 U. S. 861, 383 U. S. 1029,
389 U. S. 1121, 398 U. S. 977, 401 U. S. 1017, 419 U. S. 1133, 446 U. S.
995, 456 U. S. 1013, 461 U. S. 1095, 471 U. S. 1153, 480 U. S. 953, 485
U. S. 1043, 500 U. S. 963, 507 U. S. 1089, 514 U. S. 1151, 517 U. S. 1279,
520 U. S. 1305, 523 U. S. 1221, and 526 U. S. 1183.

1155
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be an introductory section to a document containing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It provides information about the amendments' origin, effective date, and references to previous publications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Introductory Information/Legal Notice</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
884

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5038.  Solan  v.  Ranck  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  97.

No.  09–5039.  Dillard  v.  Bazzle,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  543.

No.  09–5040.  Robinson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5042.  Ferguson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5044.  Harper  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  2d

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  7  So.  3d  1105.

No.  09–5045.  Hoefert  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–5046.  Haywood  v.  Tribeca  Lending  Corp.  et  al.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.
Appx.  869.

No.  09–5047.  Hogues  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312
Fed.  Appx.  684.

No.  09–5048.  Hearod  v.  Ollison,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5049.  Harris  v.  Jarriel,  Warden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5050.  Green v.  Hornbreak,  Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  915.

No.  09–5051.  Farmer  v.  Maryland.  Ct.  Sp.  App.  Md.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  182  Md.  App.  741.

No.  09–5052.  Hicks  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.  Appx.  246.

No.  09–5053.  Gruff  v.  Wilson,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
46

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting

sex with which they identify, and while the Court does not
define  what  it  means  by  a  transgender  person,  the  term
may apply to individuals who are “gender fluid,” that is, in-
dividuals  whose  gender  identity  is  mixed  or  changes  over
time.45  Thus, a person who has not undertaken any physi-
cal transitioning may claim the right to use the bathroom
or locker room assigned to the sex with which the individual
identifies  at  that  particular  time.    The  Court  provides  no
clue why a transgender person’s claim to such bathroom or
locker room access might not succeed.

A similar issue has arisen under Title IX, which prohibits
sex discrimination by any elementary or secondary school
and any college or university that receives federal financial
assistance.46   In  2016,  a  Department  of  Justice  advisory
warned that barring a student from a bathroom assigned to
individuals of the gender with which the student identifies
constitutes unlawful sex discrimination,47 and some lower
court decisions have agreed.  See Whitaker v. Kenosha Uni-
fied School Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Ed., 858 F. 3d 1034, 1049 (CA7
2017);  G.  G.  v.  Gloucester  Cty.  School  Bd.,  822  F.  3d  709,
715  (CA4  2016),  vacated  and  remanded,  580  U. S.  ___
(2017); Adams v. School Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 318 F. Supp.
3d  1293,  1325  (MD  Fla.  2018);  cf.  Doe  v.  Boyertown  Area

——————

45 See 1 Sadock, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, at 2063 (ex-
plaining that “gender is now often regarded as more fluid” and “[t]hus,
gender identity may be described as masculine, feminine, or somewhere
in between”).

46 Title IX makes it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of sex in ed-
ucation:  “No  person  in  the  United  States  shall,  on  the  basis  of  sex,  be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance.”  20 U. S. C. §1681(a).

47 See Dept. of Justice & Dept. of Education, Dear Colleague Letter on
(Dear  Colleague  Letter),

Transgender  Students,  May  13,  2016
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-
ix-transgender.pdf.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Bostock v. Clayton County. It discusses the legal implications of transgender rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
952

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 13, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–5744.  Barber  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  3d

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  994  So.  2d  376.

No.  09–5748.  Hawkins  v.  Washington.  Sup.  Ct.  Wash.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5750.  Harris  v.  Terry,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–5751.  Gocio v.  Florida.  Sup. Ct. Fla.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  3  So.  3d  316.

No.  09–5756.  Phillips  v.  District  of  Columbia  et  al.
C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.
Appx.  332.

No.  09–5762.  Joseph  v.  Curry,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  982.

No.  09–5765.  O’Diah  v.  New  York.  Ct.  App.  N. Y.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5770.  Antonsson  v.  Kast.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5774.  Chumpia  v.  City  of  Memphis,  Tennessee,

et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5777.  Johnson  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  1st

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  931  So.  2d  906.

No.  09–5794.  Olivarez  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5796.  Gaskins  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–5798.  Rangel  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  10th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5807.  Davis v.  Florida.  Sup. Ct. Fla.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  4  So.  3d  1220.

No. 09–5813.  Thomas et al. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota.
C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.
Appx.  541.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 4 (2009)

11

Per Curiam

experts agreed that Van Hook did not suffer from a “mental
disease  or  defect,”  the  trial  court  learned  that  Van  Hook’s
borderline personality disorder and his consumption of drugs
and  alcohol  the  day  of  the  crime  impaired  “his  ability  to  re
frain from the [crime],” id., at 303a, and that his “explo[sion]”
of  “senseless and  bizarre brutality”  may have  resulted from
what  one  expert  termed  a  “homosexual  panic,”  id.,  at  376a.
Despite  all  the  mitigating  evidence  the  defense  did  pre
sent,  Van  Hook  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  fault  his  counsel
for failing to ﬁnd more.  What  his  counsel  did  discover,  the
argument  goes,  gave  them  “reason  to  suspect  that  much
worse  details  existed,”  and  that  suspicion  should  have
prompted  them  to  interview  other  family  members—his
stepsister,  two  uncles,  and  two  aunts—as  well  as  a  psychia
trist  who  once  treated  his  mother,  all  of  whom  “could  have
helped his counsel narrate the true story of Van Hook’s child
hood  experiences.”  560  F.  3d,  at  528.  But  there  comes  a
point at which evidence from more distant relatives can rea
sonably  be  expected  to  be  only  cumulative,  and  the  search
for  it  distractive  from  more  important  duties.  The  ABA
Standards prevailing at the time called for Van Hook’s coun
sel to cover several broad  categories of mitigating evidence,
see  1  ABA  Standards  4–4.1,  comment.,  at  4–55,  which  they
did.  And given all the evidence they unearthed from those
closest  to  Van  Hook’s  upbringing  and  the  experts  who  re
viewed  his  history,  it  was  not  unreasonable  for  his  counsel
not to identify and interview every other living family mem
ber  or  every  therapist  who  once  treated  his  parents.  This
is not a case in which the defendant’s attorneys failed to act
while  potentially  powerful  mitigating  evidence  stared  them
in the face, cf. Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 525, or would have been
apparent  from  documents  any  reasonable  attorney  would
have obtained, cf. Rompilla v.  Beard, 545 U. S. 374, 389–393
(2005).  It  is  instead  a  case,  like  Strickland  itself,  in  which
defense counsel’s “decision not to seek more” mitigating evi
dence from the defendant’s background “than was already in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case involving Van Hook and his defense counsel's performance.  The content is sequential and provides legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

on  whether  the  arresting  officer  states  the  reason  for  the
detention  and,  if  so,  whether  he  correctly  identifies  a
general  class  of  offense  for  which  probable  cause  exists.”
Devenpeck  v.  Alford,  543  U. S.  146,  154  (2004)  (internal
quotation  marks  and  citation  omitted).    In  Devenpeck,  a
unanimous Court explained: “An arrest made by a knowl-
edgeable, veteran officer would be valid, whereas an arrest
made  by  a  rookie  in  precisely  the  same  circumstances
would  not.  We  see  no  reason  to  ascribe  to  the  Fourth
Amendment such arbitrarily variable protection.”  Ibid.

The  majority’s  logic  would  produce  similarly  arbitrary
results.  Under  its  reasoning,  a  traffic  stop  made  by  a
rookie could be executed in a reasonable manner, whereas
the  same  traffic  stop  made  by  a  knowledgeable,  veteran
officer in precisely the same circumstances might not, if in
fact  his  knowledge  and  experience  made  him  capable  of
completing  the  stop  faster.  We  have  long  rejected  inter-
pretations  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  that  would  produce
such haphazard results, and I see no reason to depart from
our consistent practice today.

B
As if that were not enough, the majority also limits the
duration  of  the  stop  to  the  time  it  takes  the  officer  to
complete  a  narrow  category  of  “traffic-based  inquiries.”
Ante,  at  8.  According  to  the  majority,  these  inquiries
include  those  that  “serve  the  same  objective  as  enforce-
ment of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road
are operated safely and responsibly.”  Ante, at 6.  Inquiries
directed  to  “detecting  evidence  of  ordinary  criminal
wrongdoing”  are  not  traffic-related  inquiries  and  thus
cannot count toward the overall duration of the stop.  Ibid.
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

The  combination  of  that  definition  of  traffic-related
inquiries  with  the  majority’s  officer-specific  durational
limit  produces  a  result  demonstrably  at  odds  with  our
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent and argues against the majority's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

Government  says  that  Congress  would  not  have  added  the  term
“rewarded” to “influenced” in §666 if the statute were meant to cover
only bribes and not also gratuities.  That argument is misconceived.
Contrary  to  the  premise  of  the  Government’s  argument,  bribery
statutes sometimes use the term “reward.”  See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §600;
33 U. S. C. §447.  Moreover, without the term “rewarded” in §666, an
official might try to defend against a bribery charge by saying that the
payment was received only after the official act and therefore could not
have “influenced” the act.  By including the term “rewarded,” Congress
made clear that the timing of the agreement is the key, not the timing
of payment.  Although a gratuity or reward offered and accepted by a
state or local official after the official act may be unethical or illegal
under other federal, state, or local laws, the gratuity does not violate
§666.  Pp. 14–16.

71 F. 4th 555, reversed and remanded.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  GORSUCH,
J., filed a concurring opinion.  JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision and reasoning.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

33

KAGAN, J., dissenting

Republicans  and  3  Democrats.
Is  it  conceivable  that
someday  voters  will  be  able  to  break  out  of  that  prefabri-
cated  box?  Sure.    But  everything  possible  has  been  done
to make that hard.  To create a world in which power does
not flow from the people because they do not choose their
governors.

Of  all  times  to  abandon  the  Court’s  duty  to  declare  the
law,  this  was  not  the  one.  The  practices  challenged  in
these cases imperil our system of government.  Part of the
Court’s  role  in  that  system  is  to  defend  its  foundations.
None is more important than free and fair elections.  With
respect but deep sadness, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice.  It expresses legal arguments and opinions, which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 22–277 and 22–555
_________________

ASHLEY MOODY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
FLORIDA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
NETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL.

22–277

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

22–555

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2024]

 JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.*
Not even thirty years ago, this Court felt the need to ex-
plain to the opinion-reading public that the “Internet is an
international network of interconnected computers.”  Reno
v.  American  Civil  Liberties  Union,  521  U. S.  844,  849
(1997).  Things have changed since then.  At the time, only
40 million people used the internet.  See id., at 850.  Today,
Facebook  and  YouTube  alone  have  over  two  billion  users
each.  See App. in No. 22–555, p. 67a.  And the public likely
no longer needs this Court to define the internet.

——————

*JUSTICE JACKSON joins Parts I, II, and III–A of this opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citation information, the title of the case, the names of the justices, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:47] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

934

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 15, 16, 18, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–954. Hetzel v. Prince William County, Virginia,

et al., 523 U. S. 208; and

No. 97–1361. Bronx Household of Faith et al. v. Board
of Education of the City of New York et al., 523 U. S. 1074.
Motions for leave to ﬁle petitions for rehearing denied.

No. 97–8042. Dias v. Bogins, 523 U. S. 1103. Petition for re-
Justice Souter took no part in the consider-

hearing denied.
ation or decision of this petition.

Certiorari Denied

June 16, 1998

No. 97–9170 (A–928). Eaton v. Angelone, Director, Vir-
ginia Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Applica-
tion for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The
Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Cer-
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would
tiorari denied.
grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 139
F. 3d 990.

Miscellaneous Order

June 18, 1998

No. A–959 (97–9567). Williams v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th
Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre-
sented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court,
granted pending the disposition of the petition for writ of certio-
rari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this
stay shall terminate automatically.
In the event the petition for
writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall continue pending the
sending down of the judgment of this Court.

Certiorari Denied

No. 97–9570 (A–960). Williams v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La.
Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented
to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747 So. 2d 487.

No. 97–9589 (A–962). Williams v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th
Cir. Application for stay of execution of death, presented to Jus-
tice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certio-
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would
rari denied.
grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 143
F. 3d 949.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal case summaries from the Supreme Court of the United States. It lists case numbers, titles, and brief descriptions of actions taken by the court, such as denying petitions for rehearing or granting stays of execution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP

Opinion of the Court

elections.  The President contends that the House lacked a
valid  legislative  aim  and  instead  sought  these  records  to
harass him, expose personal matters, and conduct law en-
forcement activities beyond its authority.  The question pre-
sented is whether the subpoenas exceed the authority of the
House under the Constitution.

We  have  never  addressed  a  congressional  subpoena  for
the President’s information.  Two hundred years ago, it was
established  that  Presidents  may  be  subpoenaed  during  a
federal  criminal  proceeding,  United  States  v.  Burr,  25  F.
Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, Cir. J.), and
earlier today we extended that ruling to state criminal pro-
ceedings, Trump v. Vance, ante, p. ___.  Nearly fifty years
ago,  we  held  that  a  federal  prosecutor  could  obtain  infor-
mation  from  a  President  despite  assertions  of  executive
privilege, United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), and
more recently we ruled that a private litigant could subject
a President to a damages suit and appropriate discovery ob-
ligations  in  federal  court,  Clinton  v.  Jones,  520  U. S.  681
(1997).

This case is different.  Here the President’s information
is sought not by prosecutors or private parties in connection
with a particular judicial proceeding, but by committees of
Congress  that  have  set  forth  broad  legislative  objectives.
Congress and the President—the two political branches es-
tablished  by  the  Constitution—have  an  ongoing  relation-
ship that the Framers intended to feature both rivalry and
reciprocity.  See The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed.
1961) (J. Madison); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer,  343  U. S.  579,  635  (1952)  (Jackson,  J.,  concurring).
That distinctive aspect necessarily informs our analysis of
the question before us.

I
A
Each of the three committees sought overlapping sets of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the case of Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP and the question of whether congressional subpoenas for the President's information exceed the House's authority.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1099

558 U. S.

December 14, 2009

No.  09–7573.  Delgado-Hernandez  v.  United  States.

C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7574.  Emmanuel  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  1324.

No.  09–7578.  Pritchett  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7580.  James  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  846.

No.  09–7581.  Livingstone  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  576  F.  3d  881.

No.  09–7584.  Prophet,  aka  Ferrari  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.
Appx.  250.

No.  09–7585.  Santos  Murillo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  550.

No. 09–7588.  Younge v.  United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  60.

No.  09–7589.  Vazquez-Padilla  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.
883.

No.  09–7590.  Barros  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  509.

No.  09–7595.  Marquez-Mendoza  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 331 Fed. Appx. 308.

No.  09–7598.  Riley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  269.

No.  09–7602.  Amponsah  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7607.  Perez-Oliveros v.  United States.  C. A. 11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7608.  Perez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  262.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and information about the court's decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–111
_________________

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

COLORADO

[June 4, 2018]

 JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
In  2012  a  same-sex  couple  visited  Masterpiece
Cakeshop,  a  bakery  in  Colorado,  to  make  inquiries  about
ordering  a  cake  for  their  wedding  reception.   The  shop’s
owner told the couple that he would not create a cake for
their wedding because of his religious opposition to same-
sex marriages—marriages the State of Colorado itself did
not recognize at that time.  The couple filed a charge with
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission alleging discrimina-
tion  on  the  basis  of  sexual  orientation  in  violation  of  the
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.

The  Commission  determined  that  the  shop’s  actions
violated the Act and ruled in the couple’s favor.  The Colo-
rado  state  courts  affirmed  the  ruling  and  its  enforcement
order, and this Court now must decide whether the Com-
mission’s order violated the Constitution.

The  case  presents  difficult  questions  as  to  the  proper
reconciliation  of  at  least  two  principles.    The  first  is  the
authority  of  a  State  and  its  governmental  entities  to  pro-
tect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish
to be, married but who face discrimination when they seek
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

39

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

422 U. S. 873 (1975), for example, the Court held that it is
unconstitutional for border patrol agents to rely on a per-
son’s skin color as “a single factor” to justify a traffic stop
based on reasonable suspicion, but it remarked that “Mexi-
can appearance” could be “a relevant factor” out of many to
justify such a stop “at the border and its functional equiva-
lents.”  Id., at 884–887; see also id., at 882 (recognizing that
“the border” includes entire metropolitan areas such as San
Diego, El Paso, and the South Texas Rio Grande Valley).31
The  Court  thus  facilitated  racial  profiling  of  Latinos  as  a
law  enforcement  tool  and  did  not  adopt  a  race-blind  rule.
The  Court  later  extended  this  reasoning  to  border  patrol
agents selectively referring motorists for secondary inspec-
tion at a checkpoint, concluding that “even if it be assumed
that such referrals are made largely on the basis of appar-
ent Mexican ancestry, [there is] no constitutional violation.”
United  States  v.  Martinez-Fuerte,  428  U. S.  543,  562–563
(1976) (footnote omitted).

The result of today’s decision is that a person’s skin color
may play a role in assessing individualized suspicion, but it
cannot play a role in assessing that person’s individualized
contributions to a diverse learning environment.  That in-
defensible  reading  of  the  Constitution  is  not  grounded  in
law and subverts the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee
of equal protection.

2
The majority does not dispute that some uses of race are
constitutionally  permissible.  See  ante,  at  15.   Indeed,  it
agrees that a limited use of race is permissible in some col-
lege admissions programs.  In a footnote, the Court exempts
military  academies  from  its  ruling  in  light  of  “the  poten-
tially distinct interests” they may present.  Ante, at 22, n. 4.

——————

31 The Court’s “dictum” that Mexican appearance can be one of many
factors rested on now-outdated quantitative premises.  United States v.
Montero-Camargo, 208 F. 3d 1122, 1132 (CA9 2000).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a section of a legal dissenting opinion, citing previous cases and arguing against the majority's decision. It contains legal analysis and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

gether.  Large changes, involving the deletion, rearrange-
ment,  or  duplication  of  hundreds  or  even  millions  of  nu-
cleotides,  can  result  in  the  elimination,  misplacement,  or
duplication of entire genes.  Some mutations are harmless,
but  others  can  cause  disease  or  increase  the  risk  of  dis-
ease.  As  a  result,  the  study  of  genetics  can  lead  to  valu-
able medical breakthroughs.

B
This case involves patents filed by Myriad after it made
one  such  medical  breakthrough.    Myriad  discovered  the
precise  location  and  sequence  of  what  are  now  known  as
the  BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes.    Mutations  in these  genes
can  dramatically  increase  an  individual’s  risk  of  develop-
ing  breast  and  ovarian  cancer.    The  average  American
woman  has  a  12-  to  13-percent  risk  of  developing  breast
cancer, but for women with certain genetic mutations, the
risk can range between 50 and 80 percent for breast can-
cer  and  between  20  and  50  percent  for  ovarian  cancer.
Before  Myriad’s  discovery  of  the  BRCA1  and  BRCA2
genes, scientists knew that heredity played a role in estab-
lishing  a  woman’s  risk  of  developing  breast  and  ovarian
cancer, but they did not know which genes were associated
with those cancers.

Myriad  identified  the  exact  location  of  the  BRCA1  and
BRCA2  genes  on  chromosomes  17  and  13.  Chromosome
17  has  approximately  80  million  nucleotides,  and  chro-
mosome  13  has  approximately  114  million.  Association
for Molecular Pathology v.  United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office, 689 F. 3d 1303, 1328 (CA Fed. 2012).  Within
those  chromosomes,  the  BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes  are
each  about  80,000  nucleotides  long.    If  just  exons  are
counted,  the  BRCA1  gene  is  only  about  5,500  nucleotides
long;  for  the  BRCA2  gene,  that  number  is  about  10,200.
Ibid.  Knowledge of the location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes allowed Myriad to determine their typical nucleotide
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of an opinion from the Supreme Court case Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. It discusses the importance of genetics and the discovery of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Introductory legal text/Opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

Syllabus

court convictions, like Mellouli’s, in which “[no] controlled substance
(as defined in [§802])” figures as an element of the offense.  Construc-
tion of §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) must be faithful to the text, which limits the
meaning  of  “controlled  substance,”  for  removal  purposes,  to  the  sub-
stances controlled under §802.  Accordingly, to trigger removal under
§1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the Government must connect an element of the al-
ien’s conviction to a drug “defined in [§802].”  Pp. 11–14.

719 F. 3d 995, reversed.

GINSBURG,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  SCALIA,  KENNEDY,  BREYER,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,
joined.  THOMAS,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  ALITO,  J.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision. It is not the main body of the legal text and likely not suitable for indexing as it provides a high-level overview rather than the actual content meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 16–309.  Argued April 26, 2017—Decided June 22, 2017

Petitioner  Divna  Maslenjak  is  an  ethnic  Serb  who  resided  in  Bosnia
during the 1990’s, when a civil war divided the new country.  In 1998,
she  and  her  family  sought  refugee  status  in  the  United  States.    In-
terviewed  under  oath,  Maslenjak  explained  that  the  family  feared
persecution from both sides of the national rift: Muslims would mis-
treat  them  because  of  their  ethnicity,  and  Serbs  would  abuse  them
because Maslenjak’s husband had evaded service in the Bosnian Serb
Army by absconding to Serbia.  Persuaded of the Maslenjaks’ plight,
American officials granted them refugee status.  Years later, Maslen-
jak  applied  for  U. S.  citizenship.    In  the  application  process,  she
swore that she had never given false information to a government of-
ficial while applying for an immigration benefit or lied to an official to
gain entry into the United States.  She was naturalized as a U. S. cit-
izen.  But it soon emerged that her professions of honesty were false:
Maslenjak had known all along that her husband spent the war years
not secreted in Serbia, but serving as an officer in the Bosnian Serb
Army.

The  Government  charged  Maslenjak  with  knowingly  “procur[ing],
contrary  to  law,  [her]  naturalization,”  in  violation  of  18  U. S. C.
§1425(a).  According to the Government’s theory, Maslenjak violated
§1425(a)  because,  in  the  course  of  procuring  her  naturalization,  she
broke  another  law:  18  U. S. C.  §1015(a),  which  prohibits  knowingly
making a false statement under oath in a naturalization proceeding.
The District Court instructed the jury that, to secure a conviction un-
der  §1425(a),  the  Government  need  not  prove  that  Maslenjak’s  false
statements  were  material  to,  or  influenced,  the  decision  to  approve
her  citizenship  application.    The  Sixth  Circuit  affirmed  the  convic-
tion,  holding  that  if  Maslenjak  made  false  statements  violating
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

GOLAN v. HOLDER

BREYER, J., dissenting

strictions  work  special  harm.    For  one  thing,  the  foreign
location  of  restored  works  means  higher  than  ordinary
administrative  costs.    For  another,  the  statute’s  technical
requirements make it very difficult to establish whether a
work has had its copyright restored by the statute.  Gard,
In the Trenches with §104A: An Evaluation of the Parties’
Arguments in Golan v. Holder as It Heads to the Supreme
Court,  64  Vand.  L. Rev.  En  Banc  199,  216–220  (2011)
(describing  difficulties  encountered  in  compiling  the  in
formation  necessary  to  create  an  online  tool  to  determine
whether the statute applies in any given case).

Worst  of  all,  “restored  copyright”  protection  removes
material from the public domain.  In doing so, it reverses
the  payment  expectations  of  those  who  used,  or  intended
to  use,  works  that  they  thought  belonged  to  them.    Were
Congress  to  act  similarly  with  respect  to  well-established
property rights, the problem would be obvious.  This stat
ute  analogously  restricts,  and  thereby  diminishes,  Ameri
cans’  preexisting  freedom  to  use  formerly  public  domain
material in their expressive activities.

Thus,  while  the  majority  correctly  observes  that  the
dissemination-restricting  harms  of  copyright  normally
present  problems  appropriate  for  legislation  to  resolve,
ante,  at  31–32,  the  question  is  whether  the  Copyright
Clause  permits  Congress  seriously  to  exacerbate  such  a
problem by taking works out of the public domain without
a countervailing benefit.  This question is appropriate for
judicial resolution.  Indeed, unlike Eldred where the Court
had  to  decide  a  complicated  line-drawing  question—when
is  a  copyright  term  too  long?—here  an  easily  administra
ble  standard  is  available—a  standard  that  would  require
works  that  have  already  fallen  into  the  public  domain  to
stay there.

The  several,  just  mentioned  features  of  the  present
statute  are  important,  for  they  distinguish  it  from  other
copyright  laws.  By  removing  material  from  the  public
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Golan v. Holder. It discusses the negative impacts of copyright restoration, particularly regarding administrative costs, difficulty in determining applicability, and the removal of material from the public domain.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

TRUMP v. VANCE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambi-
tion, of faction, and of anarchy. . . . A feeble Executive
implies a feeble execution of the government.  A feeble
execution  is  but  another  phrase  for  a  bad  execution;
and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in
theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.”  The
Federalist No. 70, at 423.

In sum, the demands on the President’s time and the im-
portance of his tasks are extraordinary, and the office of the
President cannot be delegated to subordinates.  A subpoena
imposes both demands on the President’s limited time and
a  mental  burden,  even  when  the  President  is  not  directly
engaged  in  complying.  This  understanding  of  the  Presi-
dency should guide courts in deciding whether to enforce a
subpoena for the President’s documents.

2

Courts must also recognize their own limitations.  When
the President asserts that matters of foreign affairs or na-
tional defense preclude his compliance with a subpoena, the
Judiciary will rarely have a basis for rejecting that asser-
tion.  Judges “simply lack the relevant information and ex-
pertise to second-guess determinations made by the Presi-
dent based on information properly withheld.”  Hamdi, 542
U. S., at 583 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

“[E]ven if the courts could compel the Executive to pro-
duce  the  necessary  information”  to  understand  the  de-
mands  on  his  time,  decisions  about  that  information  “are
simply  not  amenable  to  judicial  determination  because
‘[t]hey are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc.  v.  Waterman  S.  S.  Corp.,  333  U. S.  103,  111  (1948)).
The  President  has  at  his  disposal  enormous  amounts  of
classified intelligence regarding the Government’s concerns
around the globe.  His decisionmaking is further informed
by experience in matters of foreign affairs, national defense,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a section from a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas. It discusses the burdens placed on the President by subpoenas and the limitations of the judiciary in second-guessing presidential decisions related to foreign affairs and national defense.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

91

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered the main body text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by
the full panoply of state power,” the covenants would be un-
enforceable.  Id., at 19.  Here, there is more.  S. B. 8’s for-
midable chilling effect, even before suit, would be nonexist-
ent  if  not  for  the  state-court  officials  who  docket  S.  B.  8
cases with lopsided  procedures  and  limited  defenses.   Be-
cause these state actors are necessary components of that
chilling  effect  and  play  a  clear  role  in  the  enforcement  of
S. B. 8, they are proper defendants.
  These longstanding precedents establish how, and why,
the Court should authorize relief against these officials as
well.  The Court instead hides behind a wooden reading of
Young,  stitching  out-of-context  quotations  into  a  cover  for
its  failure  to  act  decisively.    The  Court  relies  on  dicta  in
Young  stating  that  “the  right  to  enjoin  an  individual  . . .
does not include the power to restrain a court from acting
in  any  case  brought  before  it”  and  that  “an  injunction
against  a  state  court  would  be  a  violation  of  the  whole
scheme  of  our  Government.”    209  U. S.,  at  163.    Modern
cases,  however,  have  recognized  that  suit  may  be  proper
even  against  state-court  judges,  including  to  enjoin  state-
court  proceedings.    See  Mitchum  v.  Foster,  407  U. S.  225,
243  (1972);  see  also  Pulliam  v.  Allen,  466  U. S.  522,  525
(1984).    The  Court  responds  that  these  cases  did  not  ex-
pressly address sovereign immunity or involve court clerks.
Ante, at 8–9.  If language in Young posed an absolute bar to
injunctive  relief  against  state-court  proceedings  and  offi-
cials, however, these decisions would have been purely ad-
visory.
  Moreover, the Court has emphasized that “the principles
undergirding the Ex parte Young doctrine” may “support its
application” to new circumstances, “novelty notwithstand-
ing.”    Stewart,  563  U. S.,  at  261.    No  party  has  identified
any prior circumstance in which a State has delegated an
enforcement  function  to  the  populace,  disclaimed  official
enforcement authority, and skewed state-court procedures
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring and dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to a case, likely involving a law (S.B. 8) and its enforcement.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

CANTERO v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A.

Syllabus

preemption  standard  incorporating  Barnett  Bank.   A  court  applying
that  standard  must  make  a  practical  assessment  of  the  nature  and
degree  of  the  interference  caused  by  a  state  law.    If  the  state  law’s
interference  with  national  bank  powers  is  more  akin  to  the
interference  in  cases  like  Franklin,  Fidelity,  First  National  Bank  of
San Jose, and Barnett Bank, then the state law is preempted.  But if
the state law’s interference with national bank powers is more akin to
the  interference  in  cases  like  Anderson,  National  Bank,  and
McClellan,  then  the  state  law  is  not  preempted.    In  this  case,  the
Second  Circuit  did  not  conduct  the  kind  of  nuanced  comparative
analysis required by Barnett Bank, but instead distilled a categorical
test that would preempt virtually all state laws that regulate national
banks.  Congress  expressly  incorporated  Barnett  Bank  into  Dodd-
Frank, and Barnett Bank did not draw a bright preemption line.  The
Court  of  Appeals  must  conduct  a  preemption  analysis  in  a  manner
consistent with that standard.  Pp. 12–14.

49 F. 4th 121, vacated and remanded.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision and reasoning.  It is not the actual content of the book and is likely not meant to be read and understood in its entirety by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>