<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

15

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

(“[T]he  parties  on  remand  should  be  afforded  an  oppor-
tunity to arrive at an approach . . . that accommodates pe-
titioners’ religious exercise while . . . ensuring that women
covered by petitioners’ health plans receive full and equal
health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Wheaton College v. Burwell,
573  U. S.  958,  959  (2014)  (“Nothing  in  this  interim  order
affects the ability of applicant’s employees and students to
obtain, without cost, the full range of [FDA] approved con-
traceptives.”);  Hobby  Lobby,  573 U. S.,  at  692  (“There  are
other ways in which Congress or HHS could equally ensure
that  every  woman  has  cost-free  access  to  . . .  all  [FDA]-
approved contraceptives.  In fact, HHS has already devised
and  implemented  a  system  that  seeks  to  respect  the  reli-
gious  liberty  of  religious  nonprofit  corporations  while  en-
suring that the employees of these entities have precisely
the same access to all FDA-approved contraceptives as em-
ployees of [other] companies.”).

The  assumption  made  in  the  above-cited  cases  rests  on
the basic principle just stated, one on which this dissent re-
lies: While the Government may “accommodate religion be-
yond free exercise requirements,” Cutter, 544 U. S., at 713,
when it does so, it may not benefit religious adherents at
the expense of the rights of third parties.  See, e.g., id., at
722 (“[A]n accommodation must be measured so that it does
not override other significant interests.”); Caldor, 472 U. S.,
at 710 (religious exemption was invalid for its “unyielding
weighting in favor of ” interests of religious adherents “over
all  other  interests”).  Holding  otherwise  would  endorse
“the regulatory equivalent of taxing non-adherents to sup-
port the faithful.”  Brief for Church-State Scholars as Amici
Curiae 3.

The expansive religious exemption at issue here imposes
significant burdens on women employees.  Between 70,500

2
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

HERRERA v. WYOMING

ALITO, J., dissenting

right  to  hunt  at  the  spot  of  his  alleged  offense,  as  the
nearest  settlement  lay  more  than  60-miles  distant,  mak-
ing  the  land  where  he  was  hunting  “unoccupied  lands  of
the United States.”  In re Race Horse, 70 F. 598, 599–600
(Wyo. 1895).

This Court rejected Race Horse’s argument, holding that
the  admission  of  Wyoming  to  the  Union  terminated  the
hunting right.  163 U. S., at 514.  Although the opinion of
the Court is not a model of clarity, this conclusion appears
to rest on two grounds.

First,  the  Court  held  that  Wyoming’s  admission  neces-
sarily  ended  the  Tribe’s  hunting  right  because  otherwise
the  State  would  lack  the  power,  possessed  by  every  other
State, “to regulate the killing of game within [its] borders.”
Ibid.  Limiting  Wyoming’s  power  in  this  way,  the  Court
reasoned,  would  contravene  the  equal-footing  doctrine,
which dictates that all States enter the Union with the full
panoply of powers enjoyed by the original 13 States at the
adoption of the Constitution.  Ibid.  Under this rationale,
the  Act  of  Congress  admitting  Wyoming  could  not  have
preserved  the  hunting  right  even  if  that  had  been  Con-
gress’s wish.

After  providing  this  basis  for  its  holding,  however,  the
Court  quickly  turned  to  a  second  ground,  namely,  that
even  if  Congress  could  have  limited  Wyoming’s  authority
in this way, it had not attempted to do so.  Id., at 515.  The
Court  thought  that  Congress’s  intention  not  to  impose
such  a  restriction  on  the  State  was  “conveyed  by  the  ex-
press terms of the act of admission,” but the Court did not
identify the terms to which it was referring.  Ibid.  It did,
however,  see  support  for  its  decision  in  the  nature  of  the

——————

unoccupied  lands  of  the  United  States,  so  long  as  game  may  be  found
thereon, and so long as peace subsists among the whites and Indians on
the  borders  of  the  hunting  districts.’ ”  Race  Horse,  163  U. S.,  at  507;
Kappler 1020, 1021.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Herrera v. Wyoming. It discusses the legal history of hunting rights on tribal lands and the Court's previous rulings on the matter.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

887

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5091.  Garcia-Gracia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  286.

No.  09–5092.  Green  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5093.  Hawthorne  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.
Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 46 Cal.  4th 67, 205 P. 3d 245.
No.  09–5094.  Godbouldt  v.  Lamarque,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  745.

No.  09–5095.  Fernandez-Rosario  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5097.  Hostetter  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–5100.  King v.  Ryan, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  1133.

No. 09–5101.  Jackson v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  153.

No.  09–5103.  Romero-Facio  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  290.

No.  09–5104.  Ramirez-Rosales  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 318 Fed. Appx. 295.
No.  09–5105.  Rose,  aka  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  324.

No. 09–5107.  Tlatenchi-Enriquez v.  United States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 318 Fed. Appx. 304.
No.  09–5108.  Morales-Morales  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
3d Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported below:  321 Fed.  Appx. 176.
No.  09–5109.  Woods  v.  Social  Security  Administration.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.
Appx.  720.

No.  09–5110.  Davis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  359.

No.  09–5112.  Brewer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  676.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case citations, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

7

BREYER, J., dissenting

clear whether these laws, like the Boston law, would have
prohibited the storage of gunpowder inside a firearm, they
would at the very least have made it difficult to reload the
gun to fire a second shot unless the homeowner happened
to be in the portion of the house where the extra gunpow-
der was required to be kept.  See 7 United States Encyclo-
pedia of History 1297 (P. Oehser ed. 1967) (“Until 1835 all
small  arms  [were]  single-shot  weapons,  requiring  reload-
ing  by  hand  after  every  shot”).  And  Pennsylvania,  like
Massachusetts,  had  at  the  time  one  of  the  self-defense-
guaranteeing state constitutional provisions on which the
majority  relies.  See  ante,  at  28  (citing  Pa.  Declaration  of
Rights, Art. XIII (1776), in 5 Thorpe 3083).

The majority criticizes my citation of these colonial laws.
See  ante,  at  59–62.    But,  as  much  as  it  tries,  it  cannot
ignore their existence.  I suppose it is possible that, as the
majority  suggests,  see  ante,  at  59–61,  they  all  in  practice
contained  self-defense  exceptions.    But  none  of  them  ex-
pressly  provided  one,  and  the  majority’s  assumption  that
such exceptions existed relies largely on the preambles to
these acts—an interpretive methodology that it elsewhere
roundly derides.  Compare ibid. (interpreting 18th-century
statutes in light of their preambles), with ante, at 4–5, and
n.  3  (contending  that  the  operative  language  of  an  18th-
century enactment may extend beyond its preamble).  And
in  any  event,  as  I  have  shown,  the  gunpowder-storage
laws would have burdened armed self-defense, even if they
did not completely prohibit it.

This  historical  evidence  demonstrates  that  a  self-
defense assumption is the beginning, rather than the end,
of  any  constitutional  inquiry.  That  the  District  law  im-
pacts  self-defense  merely  raises  questions  about  the  law’s
constitutionality.  But  to  answer  the  questions  that  are
raised  (that  is,  to  see  whether  the  statute  is  unconstitu-
tional)  requires  us  to  focus  on  practicalities,  the  statute’s
rationale,  the  problems  that  called  it  into  being,  its  rela-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into historical legal precedents and arguments related to gun control laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

II
We first consider the Government’s contention that no pe-

titioner has Article III standing to seek our review.

Although most disputes over standing concern whether a
plaintiff has satisfied the requirement when filing suit, “Ar-
ticle  III  demands  that  an  actual  controversy  persist
throughout all stages of litigation.”  Hollingsworth v. Perry,
570 U. S. 693, 705 (2013) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  The requirement of standing “must be met by persons
seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons
appearing in courts of first instance.”  Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 64 (1997).  In considering
a  litigant’s  standing  to  appeal,  the  question  is  whether  it
has experienced an injury “fairly traceable to the judgment
below.”  Food  Marketing  Institute  v.  Argus  Leader  Media,
588  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  4)  (emphasis  added;
internal quotation marks omitted).  If so, and a “favorable
ruling”  from  the  appellate  court  “would  redress  [that]  in-
jury,” then the appellant has a cognizable Article III stake.
Ibid.

Here,  it  is  apparent  that  at  least  one  group  of  petition-
ers—the state petitioners—are injured by the Court of Ap-
peals’ judgment.  That judgment vacated “the ACE rule and
its embedded repeal of the Clean Power Plan,” 985 F. 3d, at
995  (emphasis  added),  and  accordingly  purports  to  bring
the Clean Power Plan back into legal effect.  Thus, to the
extent  the  Clean  Power  Plan  harms  the  States,  the  D. C.
Circuit’s judgment inflicts the same injury.  And there can
be  “little  question”  that  the  rule  does  injure  the  States,
since they are “the object of ” its requirement that they more
stringently  regulate  power  plant  emissions  within  their
borders.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561–
562 (1992).

The  Government  counters  that  “agency  and  judicial  ac-
tions”  subsequent  to  the  court’s  entry  of  judgment  have
“eliminated any . . . possibility” of injury.  Brief for Federal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the issue of standing in the case of West Virginia v. EPA. It delves into the legal requirements for standing and applies them to the specific circumstances of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC.

Opinion of the Court

retailer of home goods and furniture and had net revenues
of over $4.7 billion last year.  Overstock.com, Inc., is one of
the top online retailers in the United States, selling a wide
variety  of  products  from  home  goods  and  furniture  to
clothing and jewelry; and it had net revenues of over $1.7
billion last year.  Newegg, Inc., is a major online retailer of
consumer electronics in the United States.  Each of these
three  companies  ships  its  goods  directly  to  purchasers
throughout  the  United  States,  including  South  Dakota.
Each  easily  meets  the  minimum  sales  or  transactions
requirement  of  the  Act,  but  none  collects  South  Dakota
sales tax.  2017 S. D. 56, ¶¶ 10–11, 901 N. W. 2d 754, 759–
760.

Pursuant to the Act’s provisions for expeditious judicial
review,  South  Dakota  filed  a  declaratory  judgment  action
against  respondents  in  state  court,  seeking  a  declaration
that  the  requirements  of  the  Act  are  valid  and  applicable
to respondents and an injunction requiring respondents to
register for licenses to collect and remit sales tax.  App. 11,
30.  Respondents  moved  for  summary  judgment,  arguing
that  the  Act  is  unconstitutional.    901  N. W.  2d,  at  759–
760.  South  Dakota  conceded  that  the  Act  cannot  survive
under Bellas Hess and Quill but asserted the importance,
indeed the necessity, of asking this Court to review those
earlier decisions in light of current economic realities.  901
N. W.  2d,  at  760;  see  also  S.  B.  106,  §8.    The  trial  court
granted  summary  judgment  to  respondents.    App.  to  Pet.
for Cert. 17a.

The  South  Dakota  Supreme  Court  affirmed.    It  stated:
“However persuasive the State’s arguments on the merits
of revisiting the issue, Quill has not been overruled [and]
remains  the  controlling  precedent  on  the  issue  of  Com
merce  Clause  limitations  on  interstate  collection  of  sales
and use taxes.”  901 N. W. 2d, at 761.  This Court granted
certiorari.  583 U. S. ___ (2018).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the case *South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.* It sets the context for the case, outlining the relevant facts and legal history.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC

Opinion of the Court

208,  212.   The  Court  identified  three  considerations  de-
signed to aid in that inquiry, commonly known now as the
Thunder  Basin  factors.  First,  could  precluding  district
court jurisdiction “foreclose all meaningful judicial review”
of the claim?  Id., at  212–213.  Next, is the claim “wholly
collateral to [the] statute’s review provisions”?  Id., at 212
(internal quotation marks omitted).  And last, is the claim
“outside the agency’s expertise”?  Ibid.  When the answer to
all three questions is yes, “we presume that Congress does
not intend to limit jurisdiction.”  Free Enterprise Fund, 561
U. S., at 489.  But the same conclusion might follow if the
factors point in different directions.  The ultimate question
is  how  best  to  understand  what  Congress  has  done—
whether  the  statutory  review  scheme,  though  exclusive
where it applies, reaches the claim in question.  The  first
Thunder  Basin  factor  recognizes  that  Congress  rarely  al-
lows claims about agency action to escape effective judicial
review.  See,  e.g.,  Bowen  v.  Michigan  Academy  of  Family
Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670 (1986).  The second and third
reflect  in  related  ways  the  point  of  special  review  provi-
sions—to give the agency a heightened role in the matters
it customarily handles, and can apply distinctive knowledge
to.

This Court has twice held specific claims to fit within a
statutory review scheme, based on the Thunder Basin fac-
tors.  In Thunder Basin itself, a coal company subject to the
Mine Act filed suit in district court instead of asserting its
claims—as  a  statutory  scheme  prescribed—before  a  mine
safety commission and then (if needed) a court of appeals.
The crux of the dispute concerned the company’s refusal to
provide employee-designated union officials with access to
the workplace, as the Mine Act apparently required.  The
company claimed a right to exclude the officials under an-
other statute; it also objected on due process grounds to the
agency’s imposing a fine before holding a hearing.  See 510
U. S., at 205; see also Elgin, 567 U. S., at 17, n. 6.  We held
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent and the "Thunder Basin factors" used to determine the scope of statutory review provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

GORSUCH, J., concurring

See, e.g., Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, 215–216 (1903)
(opinion  of  Brown,  J.);  id.,  at  218–219  (White,  J.,  concur-
ring);  Cf.  S.  Laughlin,  The  Burger  Court  and  the  United
States  Territories,  36  U.  Fla.  L.  Rev.  755,  773  (1984)
(“[W]hile Justice White had won the battle over which doc-
trine should nominally prevail, Justice Brown had won the
war”).

Even the right to trial by jury, the Court concluded, was
not fundamental enough to apply in unincorporated Terri-
tories like Puerto Rico.  Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298,
306, 308–310 (1922).  It did not matter to the Court that, by
the  time  it  reached  the  question,  Congress  had  already
granted Puerto Ricans U. S. citizenship.  See Act of Mar. 2,
1917, § 5, 39 Stat. 953.  In the Court’s estimation, the “lo-
cality [was] determinative of the application of the Consti-
tution, . . . not the status of the people who live in it.”  Bal-
zac, 258 U. S., at 309.  And, on the Court’s account, Puerto
Rico’s “localities” included “compact and ancient communi-
ties” that had not yet developed the “impartial attitude” or
“conscious duty of participation” required of citizens by the
“Anglo-Saxon” jury trial.  Id., at 310.

II

The  flaws  in  the  Insular  Cases  are  as  fundamental  as
they are shameful.  Nothing in the Constitution speaks of
“incorporated”  and  “unincorporated”  Territories.    Nothing
in it extends to the latter only certain supposedly “funda-
mental”  constitutional  guarantees.    Nothing  in  it  author-
izes judges to engage in the sordid business of segregating
Territories and the people who live in them on the basis of
race, ethnicity, or religion.

The Insular Cases can claim support in academic work of
the period, ugly racial stereotypes, and the theories of social
Darwinists.  But they have no home in our Constitution or
its original understanding.  In this country, the federal gov-
ernment “deriv[es] its powers directly” from the sovereign
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It cites previous cases and legal scholarship to argue against the Insular Cases, which established a doctrine of limited constitutional rights for U.S. territories.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 100 (2009)

101

Syllabus

particular  value  of  a  high  order.”  Will  v.  Hallock,  546  U. S.  345,  352–
353.  In  making  this  determination,  the  Court  does  not  engage  in  an
“individualized  jurisdictional  inquiry,”  Coopers  &  Lybrand  v.  Livesay,
437  U. S. 463,  473, but  focuses  on “the  entire  category to  which a  claim
belongs,”  Digital  Equipment  Corp.  v.  Desktop  Direct,  Inc.,  511  U. S.
863,  868.  If  the  class  of  claims,  taken  as  a  whole,  can  be  adequately
vindicated by other means, “the chance that the litigation at hand might
be speeded, or a ‘particular injustic[e]’ averted,” does not provide a basis
for § 1291 jurisdiction.  Ibid.  Pp. 106–107.

(b)  Effective  appellate  review  of  disclosure  orders  adverse  to  the
attorney-client privilege can be had by means other than collateral order
appeal,  including  postjudgment  review.  Appellate  courts  can  remedy
the  improper  disclosure  of  privileged  material  in  the  same  way  they
remedy  a  host  of  other  erroneous  evidentiary  rulings:  by  vacating  an
adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the protected
material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.  Moreover, litigants
confronted  with  a  particularly  injurious  or  novel  privilege  ruling  have
several  potential  avenues  of  immediate  review  apart  from  collateral
order  appeal.  First,  a  party  may  ask  the  district  court  to  certify,
and  the  court  of  appeals  to  accept,  an  interlocutory  appeal  involv
ing  “a  controlling  question  of  law,”  the  prompt  resolution  of  which
“may  materially  advance  the  ultimate  termination  of  the  litigation.”
§ 1292(b).  Second,  in  extraordinary  circumstances  where  a  disclosure
order  works  a  manifest  injustice,  a  party  may  petition  the  court  of  ap
peals for a writ of mandamus.  Cheney v.  United States Dist. Court for
D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 380.  Another option is for a party to defy a disclo
sure  order  and  incur  court-imposed  sanctions  that,  e. g.,  “direc[t]  that
the  matters  embraced  in  the  order  or  other  designated  facts  be  taken
as established,” “prohibi[t] the disobedient party from supporting or op
posing designated claims or defenses,” or “strik[e] pleadings in whole or
in  part.”  Fed.  Rule  Civ.  Proc.  37(b)(2).  Alternatively,  when  the  cir
cumstances warrant, a district court may issue a contempt order against
a  noncomplying  party,  who  can  then  appeal  directly  from  that  ruling,
at  least  when  the  contempt  citation  can  be  characterized  as  a  criminal
punishment.  See, e. g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v.  United States,
506  U. S.  9,  18,  n.  11.  These  established  appellate  review  mechanisms
not  only  provide  assurances  to  clients  and  counsel  about  the  security
of  their  conﬁdential  communications;  they  also  go  a  long  way  toward
addressing  Mohawk’s  concern  that,  absent  collateral  order  appeals  of
adverse attorney-client privilege rulings, some litigants may experience
severe hardship.  The limited beneﬁts of applying “the blunt, categori
cal  instrument  of  § 1291  collateral  order  appeal”  to  privilege-related
disclosure  orders  simply  cannot  justify  the  likely  institutional  costs,
Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 883, including unduly delaying the res
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of the collateral order doctrine to attorney-client privilege disputes. It cites legal precedents and delves into the arguments for and against allowing such appeals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxxiii

Page

1080

Ibarra Perez v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Ibrix, Inc.; Chrin v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910

Idaho; Harrell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Ignacio v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Ihmoud v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ijadimini v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  840,1101

849

Ikbal v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
886

Illinois; Aaron v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Alexander v.
883

Illinois; Banks v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Illinois; Bannister v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Chapman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

1124

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Chatman v.
Illinois; Cornes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  903,1039

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

Illinois; Cox v.
921

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Doak v.
809

Illinois; Eichwedel v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

Illinois; Franklin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Freeman v.
830

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Garcia v.
869

Illinois; Gatewood v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  839,996

Illinois; Harris v.
1120

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Higgins v.
1094

Illinois; Ivy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
882

Illinois; James v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  993,1120

Illinois; Jones v.
1081

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Kirkpatrick v.
867

Illinois; Long v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Mabe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Illinois; Mason v.
1154

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
866

Illinois; McGregory v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Illinois; Medina v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1145

Illinois; Michigan v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1145

Illinois; New York v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Illinois; Norﬂeet v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Illinois; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Rials v.
837

Illinois; Riley v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
869

Illinois; Stamps v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914

Illinois; Steele v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Thomas v.
893

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Travis v.
948

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Velez v.
871

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Wallace v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

23

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

regime, because the text of the Clause confers the power to
do exactly (and only) that.”  Id., at ___, n. 6 (slip op., at 11,
n. 6).  Under the majority’s interpretation of Section 2a(c),
however, Congress has done the opposite of preempting or
displacing state law—it has adopted state law.

Normally,  when  “a  serious  doubt  of  constitutionality  is
raised,  it  is  a  cardinal  principle  that  this  Court  will  first
ascertain  whether  a  construction  of  the  statute  is  fairly
possible  by which  the  question  may  be  avoided.”    Crowell
v.  Benson,  285  U. S.  22,  62  (1932).    The  multiple  serious
constitutional  doubts  raised  by  the  majority’s  interpreta-
tion of Section 2a(c)—in addition to the sheer weakness of
its  reading  as  a  textual  matter—provide  more  than
enough  reason  to  reject  the  majority’s  construction.    Sec-
tion 2a(c) does not apply to this case.

III
Justice Jackson once wrote that the Constitution speaks
in  “majestic  generalities.”  West  Virginia  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.
Barnette,  319  U. S.  624,  639  (1943).    In  many  places  it
does,  and  so  we  have  cases  expounding  on  “freedom  of
speech”  and  “unreasonable  searches  and  seizures.”
Amdts.  1,  4.    Yet  the  Constitution  also  speaks  in  some
places with elegant specificity.  A Member of the House of
Representatives  must  be  25  years  old.  Art. I,  §2,  cl. 2.
Every  State  gets  two  Senators.    Art. I,  §3,  cl. 1.    And  the
times,  places,  and  manner  of  holding  elections  for  those
federal  representatives  “shall  be  prescribed  in  each  State
by the Legislature thereof.”  Art. I, §4, cl. 1.

For the reasons I have explained, there is no real doubt
about what “the Legislature” means.  The Framers of the
Constitution were “practical men, dealing with the facts of
political  life  as  they  understood  them,  putting  into  form
the  government  they  were  creating,  and  prescribing  in
language  clear  and  intelligible  the  powers  that  govern-
ment  was  to  take.”  South  Carolina  v.  United  States,  199
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
48  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

been enacted not to protect fetal life but to further “a Victo-
rian  social  concern”  about  “illicit  sexual  conduct,”  id.,  at
148.

Roe’s failure even to note the overwhelming consensus of
state  laws  in  effect  in  1868  is  striking,  and  what  it  said
about the common law was simply wrong.  Relying on two
discredited articles by an abortion advocate, the Court er-
roneously  suggested—contrary  to  Bracton,  Coke,  Hale,
Blackstone, and a wealth of other authority—that the com-
mon law had probably never really treated post-quickening
abortion  as  a  crime.  See  id.,  at  136  (“[I]t  now  appear[s]
doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a com-
mon-law  crime  even  with  respect  to  the  destruction  of  a
quick  fetus”).    This  erroneous  understanding  appears  to
have played an important part in the Court’s thinking be-
cause the opinion cited “the lenity of the common law” as
one  of  the  four  factors  that  informed  its  decision.  Id.,  at
165.

After  surveying  history,  the  opinion  spent  many  para-
graphs conducting the sort of fact-finding that might be un-
dertaken  by  a  legislative  committee.  This  included  a
lengthy  account  of  the  “position  of  the  American  Medical
Association”  and  “[t]he  position  of  the  American  Public
Health  Association,”  as  well  as  the  vote  by  the  American
Bar Association’s House of Delegates in February 1972 on
proposed abortion legislation.  Id., at 141, 144, 146 (empha-
sis  deleted).    Also  noted  were  a  British  judicial  decision
handed down in 1939 and a new British abortion law  en-
acted in 1967.  Id., at 137–138.  The Court did not explain
why these sources shed light on the meaning of the Consti-
tution, and not one of them adopted or advocated anything
like the scheme that Roe imposed on the country.

Finally, after all this, the Court turned to precedent.  Cit-
ing  a  broad  array  of  cases,  the  Court  found  support  for  a
constitutional “right of personal privacy,” id., at 152, but it
conflated two very different meanings of the term: the right
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. It discusses the Court's reasoning and critiques Roe v. Wade.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

BARRETT, J., dissenting

should not be implemented in just a subset of the original
States.    EPA  denied  these  petitions  on  April  4,  2024.    89
Fed. Reg. 23526.  It thoroughly explained how its “method-
ology for defining” each State’s emissions obligations is “in-
dependent of the number of states included in the Plan” be-
cause  it  “relies  on  a  determination  regarding  what
emissions reductions each type of regulated source can cost-
effectively achieve.”  EPA, Basis for Partial Denial of Peti-
tions  for  Reconsideration  on  Scope  1,  (EPA–HQ–OAR–
2021–0668–1255, Apr. 2024) (Denial).  The “control technol-
ogies  and  cost-effectiveness  figures  the  EPA  consider[ed]
. . . do not depend in any way on the number of states in-
cluded.”  Id., at 2.  So “[s]ources in the remaining upwind
states currently regulated by the Plan . . . would bear the
same  actual  emission  reduction  obligations”  regardless  of
the number of covered States.  Id., at 3–4.

II
  To  obtain  emergency  relief,  applicants  must,  at  a  mini-
mum,  show  that  they  are  likely  to  succeed  on  the  merits,
that they will be irreparably injured absent a stay, and that
the  balance  of  the  equities  favors  them.    Nken  v.  Holder,
556 U. S. 418, 425–426 (2009).  Moreover, we should grant
relief only if we would be likely to grant certiorari were the
applicants’ case to come to us in the usual course.  See Does
1–3 v. Mills, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J., concur-
ring  in  denial  of  application  for  injunctive  relief );  Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam).
In my view, the applicants cannot satisfy the stay factors.
Most significantly, they have not shown a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits.
  The Court holds that applicants are likely to succeed on
a claim that the Good Neighbor Plan is “arbitrary” or “ca-
pricious.”    42  U. S. C.  §7607(d)(9).    The  “arbitrary-and-
capricious  standard  requires  that  agency  action”  be  both
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Barrett. It contains legal citations, arguments about the merits of a case, and references to legal standards.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

21

THOMAS, J., dissenting

State; they defined what acts, performed by which constitu-
tional  actors,  constituted  an  “exercise  of  the  lawmaking
power.”  Smiley, 285 U. S., at 364; cf. U. S. Const., Art. I, §7,
cl. 2 (describing the processes upon completion of which a
bill  “become[s]  a  Law”).    In  other  words,  those  cases  ad-
dressed how to identify “the Legislature” of each State.  But,
nothing in their holdings speaks at all to whether the peo-
ple of a State can impose substantive limits on the times,
places, and manners that a procedurally complete exercise
of the lawmaking power may validly prescribe.  These are
simply different questions: “There is a difference between
how and what.”  J. Kirby, Limitations on the Power of State
Legislatures  Over  Presidential  Elections,  27  Law  &  Con-
temp. Prob. 495, 503 (1962).

This is not an arbitrary distinction, but one rooted in the
logic of petitioners’ argument.  No one here contends that
the  Elections  Clause  creates  state  legislatures  or  defines
“the legislative process” in any State.  Smiley, 285 U. S., at
369.  Thus, while the Elections Clause confers a lawmaking
power,  “the  exercise  of  th[at]  authority  must”  follow  “the
method  which  the  State  has  prescribed  for  legislative  en-
actments.”  Id., at 367.  But, if the power in question is not
original to the people of each State and is conferred upon
the constituted legislature of the State, then it follows that
the  people of  the  State  may  not  dictate  what  laws  can  be
enacted under that power—precisely as they may not dic-
tate what constitutional amendments their legislatures can
ratify under Article V.  See Leser, 258 U. S., at 137.11  Ac-

——————

11 The majority states that Smiley “already distinguished” Leser as in-
volving a nonlawmaking function.  Ante, at 21.  But Smiley distinguished
the  “electoral,”  “ratifying,”  and  “consenting”  functions  of  state  legisla-
tures from their “lawmaking” function under the Elections Clause, 285
U. S., at 365–366, only to explain why the last function must be “exer-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL. v.

COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF COLORADO

No. 16–111.  Argued December 5, 2017—Decided June 4, 2018

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., is a Colorado bakery owned and operated
by Jack Phillips, an expert  baker and devout Christian.  In 2012 he
told a same-sex couple that he would not create a cake for their wed-
ding celebration because of his religious opposition to same-sex mar-
riages—marriages that Colorado did not then recognize—but that he
would sell them other baked goods, e.g., birthday cakes.  The couple
filed  a  charge  with  the  Colorado  Civil  Rights  Commission  (Commis-
sion)  pursuant  to  the  Colorado  Anti-Discrimination  Act  (CADA),
which prohibits, as relevant here, discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation in a “place of business engaged in any sales to the public and
any place offering services . . . to the public.”  Under CADA’s admin-
istrative review system, the Colorado Civil Rights Division first found
probable  cause  for  a  violation  and  referred  the  case  to  the  Commis-
sion.  The Commission then referred the case for a formal hearing be-
fore  a  state  Administrative  Law  Judge  (ALJ),  who  ruled  in  the  cou-
ple’s favor.  In so doing, the ALJ rejected Phillips’ First Amendment
claims:  that  requiring  him  to  create  a  cake  for  a  same-sex  wedding
would  violate  his  right  to  free  speech  by  compelling  him  to  exercise
his artistic talents to express a message with which he disagreed and
would  violate  his  right  to  the  free  exercise  of  religion.    Both  the
Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The Commission’s actions in this case violated the Free Exercise

Clause.  Pp. 9–18.

(a) The laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must,
protect  gay  persons  and  gay  couples  in  the  exercise  of  their  civil
rights, but religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are
protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___, ___.  While it is unexceptional
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a Supreme Court syllabus, which provides a summary of the case and the Court's holding. It is not the actual content of the legal argument or the decision itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

Indian (Castro-Huerta) against an Indian (his stepdaugh-
ter).  All agree that the Federal Government has jurisdic-
tion to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against
Indians  in  Indian  country.    The  question  is  whether  the
Federal Government’s jurisdiction is exclusive, or whether
the State also has concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal
Government.

In  the  wake  of  McGirt,  Castro-Huerta  argued  that  the
Federal Government’s jurisdiction to prosecute crimes com-
mitted by a non-Indian against an Indian in Indian country
is exclusive and that the State therefore lacked jurisdiction
to  prosecute  him.    The  Oklahoma  Court  of  Criminal  Ap-
peals agreed with Castro-Huerta.  Relying on an earlier Ok-
lahoma  decision  holding  that  the  federal  General  Crimes
Act grants the Federal Government exclusive jurisdiction,
the court ruled that the State did not have concurrent ju-
risdiction  to  prosecute  crimes  committed  by  non-Indians
against Indians in Indian country.  The court therefore va-
cated Castro-Huerta’s conviction.  No. F–2017–1203 (Apr.
29, 2021); see also Bosse v. State, 2021 OK CR 3, 484 P. 3d
286; Roth v. State, 2021 OK CR 27, 499 P. 3d 23.

While Castro-Huerta’s state appellate proceedings were
ongoing, a federal grand jury in Oklahoma indicted Castro-
Huerta  for  the  same  conduct.    Castro-Huerta  accepted  a
plea agreement for a 7-year sentence followed by removal
from the United States.  (Castro-Huerta is not a U. S. citi-
zen and is unlawfully in the United States.)  In other words,
putting  aside  parole  possibilities,  Castro-Huerta  in  effect
received a 28-year reduction of his sentence as a result of
McGirt.

Castro-Huerta’s case exemplifies a now-familiar pattern
in Oklahoma in the wake of McGirt.  The Oklahoma courts
have reversed numerous state convictions on that same ju-
risdictional ground.  After having their state convictions re-
versed,  some  non-Indian  criminals  have  received  lighter
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the case of Castro-Huerta and the implications of the McGirt decision on state and federal jurisdiction in Indian Country.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
Syllabus

the litigation then continued in the District Court.

In  June  2017,  following  a  change  in  Presidential  administrations,
DHS rescinded the DAPA Memorandum, citing, among other reasons,
the ongoing suit by Texas and new policy priorities.  That September,
the Attorney General advised Acting Secretary of Homeland Security
Elaine C. Duke that DACA shared DAPA’s legal flaws and should also
be rescinded.  The next day, Duke acted on that advice.  Taking into
consideration the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court rulings and the At-
torney General’s letter, Duke decided to terminate the program.  She
explained that DHS would no longer accept new applications, but that
existing DACA recipients whose benefits were set to expire within six
months could apply for a two-year renewal.  For all other DACA recip-
ients,  previously  issued  grants  of  relief  would  expire  on  their  own
terms, with no prospect for renewal.

Several  groups  of  plaintiffs  challenged  Duke’s  decision  to  rescind
DACA, claiming that it was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the
Administrative  Procedure  Act  (APA)  and  infringed  the  equal  protec-
tion guarantee of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  District
Courts in California (Regents, No. 18–587), New York (Batalla Vidal,
No.  18–589),  and  the  District  of  Columbia  (NAACP,  No.  18–588)  all
ruled  for  the plaintiffs.    Each  court  rejected  the  Government’s  argu-
ments that the claims were unreviewable under the APA and that the
INA deprived the courts of jurisdiction.  In Regents and Batalla Vidal,
the District Courts further held that the equal protection claims were
adequately alleged, and they entered coextensive nationwide prelimi-
nary injunctions based on the conclusion that the plaintiffs were likely
to succeed on their APA claims.   The District Court in NAACP took a
different  approach.    It  deferred  ruling  on  the  equal  protection  chal-
lenge but granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their
APA  claim,  finding  that  the  rescission  was  inadequately  explained.
The court then stayed its order for 90 days to permit DHS to reissue a
memorandum rescinding DACA, this time with a fuller explanation of
the  conclusion  that  DACA  was  unlawful.  Two  months  later,  Duke’s
successor, Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen, responded to the court’s or-
der.  She declined to disturb or replace Duke’s rescission decision and
instead  explained  why  she  thought  her  predecessor’s  decision  was
sound.  In addition to reiterating the illegality conclusion, she offered
several new justifications for the rescission.  The Government moved
for the District Court to reconsider in light of this additional explana-
tion, but the court concluded that the new reasoning failed to elaborate
meaningfully on the illegality rationale.

The  Government  appealed  the  various  District  Court  decisions  to
the Second, Ninth, and D. C. Circuits, respectively.  While those ap-
peals were pending, the Government filed three petitions for certiorari
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. It outlines the background of the case, the arguments made by both sides, and the decisions made by lower courts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

THOMAS, J., dissenting

idea defies both common sense and civil procedure.  A court
simply  does  not  go  on  enforcing  an  interlocutory  injunc-
tion—and imposing contempt sanctions for disobedience—
after reaching a final judgment dismissing every relevant
claim for relief.  Rather, the interlocutory injunction (like
all  interlocutory  orders)  merges  into  the  final  judgment
fully “adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabil-
ities  of  all  the  parties”  to  the  case.    N. C.  Rule  Civ.  Proc.
54(b) (emphasis added).  “With the entry of [Harper III ’s]
final judgment, the life of [Harper I ’s] injunction came to an
end,  and  it  no  longer  ha[s]  a  binding  effect  on  any  one.”
Madison Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. Shavers, 562 F. 2d
141, 144 (CA2 1977).

In any event, the majority’s analysis plainly does not turn
on the belief that any defendant remains liable to potential
contempt  sanctions  and  jail  time.   Instead,  its  animating
idea (uncritically borrowed from petitioners) is that Harper
I ’s “judgment” operated against the 2021 Act as a statute.
The majority describes Harper I ’s “judgment” interchange-
ably as “enjoining the use of the 2021 ma[p]” and “striking
down the 2021 pla[n].”  Ante, at 7, 9.  It then reasons that
reversing that “judgment” would “negate the force of its or-
der  striking  down  the  2021  pla[n],”  thus  “alter[ing]  the
presently  operative  statutes  of  North  Carolina”  such  that
the 2021 Act would “again take effect.”  Ante, at 7–8 (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).  The  majority  regards  this
aspect of Harper I ’s “judgment” as entirely independent of
Harper III ’s final resolution of the claims in this case.  See
ante, at 5–8, 10–11.  And it finds its theory “confirm[ed]” by
a  proviso  in  a  remedial  redistricting  Act,  passed  immedi-
ately after Harper I, stating that the 2021 Act would “again
become effective” if this Court reversed Harper I.  Ante, at
8 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In short, the “case or
controversy” that the majority thinks is still before us has
nothing to do with the parties’ rights and liabilities on the
claims asserted in this action; rather, it is simply whether
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments regarding the interpretation and effect of a previous court ruling (Harper I) on a subsequent law (the 2021 Act).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

Opinion of the Court

case  in  which  a  State’s  initial  attempt  to  execute  a  pris-
oner  by  electrocution  was  unsuccessful.    Louisiana  ex  rel.
Francis  v.  Resweber,  329  U. S.  459,  463–464  (1947)  (plu-
rality  opinion).  Most recently,  in  Baze,  supra,  seven  Jus-
tices  agreed  that  the  three-drug  protocol  just  discussed
does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Our  decisions  in  this  area  have  been  animated  in  part
by  the  recognition  that  because  it  is  settled  that  capital
punishment is constitutional, “[i]t necessarily follows that
there must be a [constitutional] means of carrying it out.”
Id.,  at  47.  And  because  some  risk  of  pain  is  inherent  in
any method of execution, we have held that the Constitu-
tion  does  not  require  the  avoidance  of  all  risk  of  pain.
Ibid.  After all, while most humans wish to die a painless
death, many do not have that good fortune.  Holding that
the Eighth Amendment demands the elimination of essen-
tially  all  risk  of  pain  would  effectively  outlaw  the  death
penalty altogether.

B
Baze  cleared  any  legal  obstacle  to  use  of  the  most  com-
mon  three-drug  protocol  that  had  enabled  States  to  carry
out the death penalty in a quick and painless fashion.  But
a  practical  obstacle  soon  emerged,  as  anti-death-penalty
advocates  pressured  pharmaceutical  companies  to  refuse
to  supply  the  drugs  used  to  carry  out  death  sentences.
The sole American manufacturer of sodium thiopental, the
first  drug  used  in  the  standard  three-drug  protocol,  was
persuaded to cease production of the drug.  After suspend-
ing  domestic  production  in  2009,  the  company  planned  to
resume production in Italy.  Koppel, Execution Drug Halt
Raises  Ire  of  Doctors,  Wall  Street  Journal,  Jan.  25,  2011,
p. A6.  Activists then pressured both the company and the
Italian  Government  to  stop  the  sale  of  sodium  thiopental
for use in lethal injections in this country.  Bonner, Letter
from  Europe:  Drug  Company  in  Cross  Hairs  of  Death
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the constitutionality of certain execution methods and the challenges faced in obtaining necessary drugs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U49

[10-24-00 10:29:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN

466

NELSON v. ADAMS USA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

The propriety of allowing a pleading alteration depends
not only on the state of affairs prior to amendment but also
on what happens afterwards. Accordingly, Rule 15 both
conveys the circumstances under which leave to amend
shall be granted and directs how the litigation will move
forward following an amendment. When a court grants
leave to amend to add an adverse party after the time for
responding to the original pleading has lapsed, the party
so added is given “10 days after service of the amended
pleading” to plead in response. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a).
This opportunity to respond, fundamental to due process,
is the echo of the opportunity to respond to original plead-
ings secured by Rule 12. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(a)(1).
Thus, Rule 15 assumes an amended pleading will be ﬁled and
anticipates service of that pleading on the adverse party.
Nelson was never served with an amended pleading.

In-
deed, no such pleading was ever actually composed and ﬁled
in court. Nor, after the amendment naming him as a party,
was Nelson accorded 10 days to state his defenses against
personal liability for costs and fees.
Instead, judgment was
entered against him the moment permission to amend the
pleading was granted. Appeal after judgment, in the cir-
cumstances this case presents, did not provide an ade-
quate opportunity to defend against the imposition of lia-
bility. Cf. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156
(1932). Adams points to nothing in the record indicating
that Nelson afﬁrmatively relinquished his right to respond
on the merits of the case belatedly stated against him in
his individual capacity. Accordingly, the proceedings did not
comply with Rule 15, and neither did they comport with due
process. See, e. g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950) (“ ‘The fundamental requi-
site of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.’ ”)
(quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914)).

It is true that Nelson knew as soon as Adams moved to
amend the pleading and alter the judgment that he might
liability. One could
ultimately be subjected to personal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the rules of civil procedure regarding amendments to pleadings and due process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 15–1194
_________________

LESTER GERARD PACKINGHAM, PETITIONER v.

NORTH CAROLINA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

NORTH CAROLINA

[June 19, 2017]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
In  2008,  North  Carolina  enacted  a  statute  making  it  a
felony  for  a  registered  sex  offender  to  gain  access  to  a
number  of  websites,  including  commonplace  social  media
websites  like  Facebook  and  Twitter.  The  question  pre-
sented is whether that law is permissible under the First
Amendment’s  Free  Speech  Clause,  applicable  to  the
States  under  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment.

I

A

North  Carolina  law  makes  it  a  felony  for  a  registered
sex  offender  “to  access  a  commercial  social  networking
Web  site  where  the  sex  offender  knows  that  the  site  per-
mits  minor  children  to  become  members  or  to  create  or
maintain  personal  Web  pages.”    N. C.  Gen.  Stat.  Ann.
§§14–202.5(a),  (e)  (2015).    A  “commercial  social  network-
ing Web site” is defined as a website that meets four crite-
ria.  First,  it  “[i]s  operated  by  a  person  who  derives  reve-
nue  from  membership  fees,  advertising,  or  other  sources
related  to  the  operation  of  the  Web  site.”    §14–202.5(b).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1093

558 U. S.

December 14, 2009

No.  09–5767.  Neal  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  1351.

No.  09–5812.  Al-Nashiri  v.  Gates,  Secretary  of  Defense.

C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5830.  Kaufman et ux. v.  United States.  C. A. 10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  546  F.  3d  1242.

No.  09–5924.  Martinez-Valdez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 322 Fed. Appx. 507.
No.  09–5973.  Torain  v.  Ameritech  Advanced  Data  Serv
ices.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319
Fed.  Appx.  433.

No.  09–6038.  Brigham  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  220.

No.  09–6101.  Simpson  v.  Alabama  Department  of  Human
Resources  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  264.

No.  09–6395.  Harrimon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  531.

No.  09–6399.  Clayborn  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  99.

No.  09–6406.  Young  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  283  S. W.  3d  854.

No.  09–6630.  Terrazas  Loya  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6826.  Estep  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6884.  Duquesne  v.  Harrison  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6902.  Davis v.  Florida.  Sup. Ct. Fla.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  13  So.  3d  468.

No.  09–6931.  Cordell  v.  Pacific  Indemnity  Co.  et  al.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.
Appx.  956.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. ITALIAN COLORS
RESTAURANT
Syllabus

470  U. S.  213,  221,  even  for  claims  alleging  a  violation  of  a  federal
statute, unless the FAA’s mandate has been “ ‘overridden by a contra-
ry  congressional  command,’ ”  CompuCredit  Corp.  v.  Greenwood,  565
U. S. ___, ___.  Pp. 3–4.

(b) No  contrary  congressional  command  requires  rejection  of  the
class-arbitration  waiver  here.    The  antitrust  laws  do  not  guarantee
an  affordable  procedural  path  to  the  vindication  of  every  claim,  see
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522, 525–526, or “evince an in-
tention  to  preclude  a  waiver”  of  class-action  procedure,  Mitsubishi
Motors  Corp.  v.  Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth,  Inc.,  473  U. S.  614,  628.
Nor does congressional approval of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
establish  an  entitlement  to  class  proceedings  for  the  vindication  of
statutory rights.  The Rule imposes stringent requirements for certi-
fication that exclude most claims, and this Court has rejected the as-
sertion that the class-notice requirement must be dispensed with be-
cause  the  “prohibitively  high  cost”  of  compliance  would  “frustrate
[plaintiff’s] attempt to vindicate the policies underlying the antitrust”
laws, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 167–168, 175–176.
Pp. 4–5.

(c) The  “effective  vindication”  exception  that  originated  as  dictum
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S.
614, also does not invalidate the instant arbitration agreement.  The
exception  comes  from  a  desire  to  prevent  “prospective  waiver  of  a
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” id., at 637, n. 19; but the
fact  that  it  is  not  worth  the  expense  involved  in proving  a  statutory
remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that
remedy.  Cf.  Gilmer  v.  Interstate/Johnson  Lane  Corp.,  500  U. S.  20,
32;  Vimar  Seguros  y  Reaseguros,  S. A. v. M/V  Sky  Reefer,  515  U. S.
528, 530, 534.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. ___, all
but resolves this case.  There, in finding that a law that conditioned
enforcement of arbitration on the availability of class procedure inter-
fered  with  fundamental  arbitration  attributes,  id.,  at  ___,  the  Court
specifically  rejected  the  argument  that  class  arbitration  was  neces-
sary to prosecute claims “that might otherwise slip through the legal
system,” id., at ___.  Pp. 5–9.

667 F. 3d 204, reversed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a con-
curring  opinion.    KAGAN, J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  GINS-
BURG and BREYER, JJ., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case. It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a condensed overview of the legal arguments and decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

Accordingly, a federal judge in deciding to impose a sentence “may ap-
propriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either
as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which
it may come.”  United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 446.  Pp. 6–8.

(2) The  discretion  federal  judges  hold  at  initial  sentencings  also
characterizes sentencing modification hearings.  The Court in Pepper
v. United States, 562 U. S. 476, found it “clear that when a defendant’s
sentence has been set aside on appeal and his case remanded for re-
sentencing, a district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s re-
habilitation since his prior sentencing.”  Id., at 490.  Accordingly, fed-
eral courts resentencing individuals whose sentences were vacated on
appeal regularly consider evidence of rehabilitation, or evidence of rule
breaking in prison, developed after the initial sentencing.  Where dis-
trict courts must calculate new Guidelines ranges as part of resentenc-
ing proceedings, courts have also exercised their discretion to consider
nonretroactive Guidelines changes.  In some cases, a district court is
prohibited from recalculating a Guidelines range to account for non-
retroactive  Guidelines  amendments,  but  the  court  may  nevertheless
find those amendments to be germane when deciding whether to mod-
ify a sentence at all, and if so, to what extent.  Pp. 8–9.

(3) The only limitations on a court’s discretion to consider relevant
materials  at  an  initial  sentencing  or  in  modifying  that  sentence  are
those set forth by Congress in a statute or by the Constitution.  See
Pepper,  562  U. S.,  at  489,  n. 8;  Mistretta  v.  United  States,  488  U. S.
361, 364.  Congress has placed such limits where it deems them appro-
priate.  See 18 U. S. C. §§3582(a), 3583(c).  Congress has further im-
posed express statutory limitations on one type of sentencing modifi-
cation  proceeding,  expressly  cabining  district  courts’  discretion  by
requiring courts to abide by the Sentencing Commission’s policy state-
ments.  See also §3582(c)(1)(A) (compassionate release).  Pp. 9–11.

(b) Congress in the First Step Act did not contravene well-estab-

lished sentencing practices.  Pp. 11–18.

(1) Nothing  in  the  text  and  structure  of  the  First  Step  Act  ex-
pressly, or even implicitly, overcomes the established tradition of dis-
trict courts’ sentencing discretion.  The text of the First Step Act does
not so much as hint that district courts are prohibited from considering
evidence of rehabilitation, disciplinary infractions, or unrelated Guide-
lines changes.  The only two limitations on district courts’ discretion
appear in §404(c): A district court may not consider a First Step Act
motion if the movant’s sentence was already reduced under the Fair
Sentencing Act or if the court considered and rejected a motion under
the  First  Step  Act.    Neither  limitation  applies  here.    By  its  terms,
§404(c)  does  not  prohibit  district  courts  from  considering  any  argu-
ments in favor of, or against, sentence modification.  In fact, §404(c)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus. The syllabus summarizes the court's reasoning and holdings. It discusses the broad discretion federal judges have in sentencing and modifying sentences, citing relevant case law and statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

922

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 8, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–9035. Tice v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 908.

No. 97–9040. Caminero v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 136.

No. 97–9041. Bowens v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1170.

No. 97–9043. Holt v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 722.

No. 97–9044. Gibson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 1124.

No. 97–9045. Honeycutt v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 1453.

No. 97–9047. Elliott v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 437.

No. 97–9066. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 920.

No. 97–9067. Mullens v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 1331.

No. 97–9072. Beltran v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 1330.

No. 97–9074. Cardenas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–1435. Dong v. Smithsonian Institution, Hirshhorn
Museum and Sculpture Garden. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari
denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 125 F. 3d 877.

No. 97–1632. McDaniel, Warden, et al. v. Gallego. C. A.
9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F.
3d 1065.

No. 97–1650. Champion, Warden, et al. v. Sack. C. A. 10th
Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d
932.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

JONES v. HENDRIX

Opinion of the Court

States,  368  U. S.  424,  427  (1962).    Experience  had  shown
that processing federal prisoners’ collateral attacks on their
sentences  through  habeas  proceedings—and,  therefore,
through the judicial districts in which they were confined—
resulted  in  “serious  administrative  problems.”  Hayman,
342  U. S.,  at  212.    Most  significantly,  a  federal  prisoner’s
district of confinement was often far removed from the rec-
ords of the sentencing court and other sources of needed ev-
idence.  Id., at 212–213.  These difficulties were “greatly ag-
gravated”  by  the  concentration  of  federal  prisoners  in  a
handful  of  judicial  districts,  which  forced  those  District
Courts to process “an inordinate number of habeas corpus
actions.”  Id., at 213–214.

Section 2255 solved these problems by rerouting federal
prisoners’ collateral attacks on their sentences to the courts
that  had  sentenced  them.    To  make  this  change  of  venue
effective, Congress generally barred federal prisoners “au-
thorized  to  apply  for  relief  by  motion  pursuant  to”  §2255
from  applying  “for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus”  under  §2241.
§2255(e).  But, in a provision that has come to be known as
the saving clause, Congress preserved the habeas remedy
in cases where “the remedy by motion is inadequate or in-
effective  to  test  the  legality  of  [a  prisoner’s]  detention.”
Ibid.

Traditionally,  courts  have  treated  the  saving  clause  as
covering unusual circumstances in which it is impossible or
impracticable for a prisoner to seek relief from the sentenc-
ing court.  The clearest such circumstance is the sentencing
court’s dissolution; a motion in a court that no longer exists
is  obviously  “inadequate  or  ineffective”  for  any  purpose.
See, e.g., Witham v. United States, 355 F. 3d 501, 504–505
(CA6  2004)  (finding  §2255  inadequate  or  ineffective  after
court-martial  was  dissolved);  Edwards  v.  United  States,
1987 WL 7562, *1 (EDNY, Feb. 9, 1987) (finding §2255 in-
adequate  or  ineffective  after  District  Court  of  the  Canal
Zone was dissolved); cf. Spaulding v. Taylor, 336 F. 2d 192,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Jones v. Hendrix case and the legal framework surrounding habeas corpus petitions for federal prisoners.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment

505 U. S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion)).

I  joined  the  dissent  in  Whole  Woman’s  Health  and  con-
tinue  to  believe  that  the  case  was  wrongly  decided.  The
question  today  however  is  not  whether  Whole  Woman’s
Health was right or wrong, but whether to adhere to it in
deciding  the  present  case.  See  Moore  v.  Texas,  586  U. S.
___, ___ (2019) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring) (slip op., at 1).
Today’s case is a challenge from several abortion clinics
and  providers  to  a  Louisiana  law  nearly  identical  to  the
Texas  law  struck  down  four  years  ago  in  Whole  Woman’s
Health.  Just like the Texas law, the Louisiana law requires
physicians performing abortions to have “active admitting
privileges at a hospital . . . located not further than thirty
miles from the location at which the abortion is performed.”
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (West Cum. Supp.
2020).  Following a six-day bench trial, the District Court
found that Louisiana’s law would “result in a drastic reduc-
tion in the number and geographic distribution of abortion
providers.”  June  Medical  Services  LLC  v.  Kliebert,  250
F. Supp. 3d 27, 87 (MD La. 2017).  The law would reduce
the number of clinics from three to “one, or at most two,”
and the number of physicians providing abortions from five
to  “one,  or  at  most  two,”  and  “therefore  cripple  women’s
ability to have an abortion in Louisiana.”  Id., at 87–88.

The legal doctrine of stare decisis requires us, absent spe-
cial circumstances, to treat like cases alike.  The Louisiana
law imposes a burden on access to abortion just as severe
as  that  imposed  by  the  Texas  law,  for  the  same  reasons.
Therefore  Louisiana’s  law  cannot  stand  under  our  prece-
dents.

I

Stare  decisis  (“to  stand  by  things  decided”)  is  the  legal
term for fidelity to precedent.  Black’s Law Dictionary 1696
(11th  ed.  2019).    It  has  long  been  “an  established  rule  to
abide  by  former  precedents,  where  the  same  points  come
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Roberts in the case of June Medical Services LLC v. Russo. It discusses the legal doctrine of stare decisis and its application to the case at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1015

558 U. S.

November 9, 2009

No.  09–6560.  Eisenhauer  v.  Texas  Department  of  Trans

portation  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  2d  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6575.  Bowman  v.  Tennessee.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tenn.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  S. W.  3d  69.

No.  09– 6603.  Townsend  v.  Minnesota.  Sup.  Ct.  Minn.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  767  N. W.  2d  11.

No.  09–6606.  Moore  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–6624.  Norfleet  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  389  Ill.  App.  3d  1146,  976
N.  E.  2d  1209.

No.  09–6637.  Cummings  v.  Moore  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  162.

No. 09–6648.  Moncion v.  Power, Administrator, East Jer

sey  State  Prison,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6694.  Ross  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–6730.  Cruz  v.  United  States;

No.  09–6821.  Prudente  v.  United  States;  and

No.  09–6912.  Flores  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  1254.

No. 09–6744.  Heffington, Individually and on Behalf of
Heffington,  Deceased  v.  Bush,  Former  President  of  the
United States, et al.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Re
ported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  741.

No.  09–6767.  Norman  v.  Delaware.  Sup.  Ct.  Del.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  976  A.  2d  843.

No.  09–6777.  Herbert  v.  United  States  et  al.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6790.  Holt  v.  Obama,  President  of  the  United
States,  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  5.

No.  09–6801.  Hernandez  v.  Gaetz,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari.  It is not sequential text and does not contain the narrative content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxxv

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1088
Hyland v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015
Iacobucci v. Boulter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039
Ibarra v. True . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112
Iceland S. S. Co., Ltd.-Eimskip v. Department of Army . . . . . . . .
1038
Idaho; Ferreira v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1134
Idaho; Hairston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1010,1145
Ifabiyi v. United States
1093
Illinois; Aytch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133
Illinois; Baptist v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1065
Illinois v. Boyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Brooks v.
1069
Illinois; Brost v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089
Illinois; Buss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088
Illinois; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088
Illinois; DePluzer v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1072
Illinois; Ellis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1043
Illinois; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004
Illinois; Heard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1007
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Jackson v.
1022
Illinois; Kuhn v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113
Illinois; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097
Illinois v. McArthur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1023
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Morgan v.
1089
Illinois; Nielson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077
Illinois; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Rogers v.
1116
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Scott v.
1133
Illinois; Stewart v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121
Illinois; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois Commerce Comm’n; Moenning v.
1087
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.; Shalala v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1,1095
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1051
Illinois Dept. of Revenue; Raleigh v.
1069
Illinois State Retirement Systems, Judges’ Ret. Sys.; Stillo v.
. . .
1066
Immigration and Naturalization Service; Abdullah v. . . . . . . . . . .
1099
. . . . . . . . . .
Immigration and Naturalization Service; Behdani v.
1075
. . . . . .
Immigration and Naturalization Service; Moran Ramos v.
1075
. . . . . . . . . .
Immigration and Naturalization Service; Rajkovic v.
1059
Immigration and Naturalization Service; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . .
1132
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Indiana; Angleton v.
1085
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Indiana; Coleman v.
1088
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Indiana; Harrison v.
1113
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Indiana; Williams v.
1098
Indio Grocery Outlet v. National Labor Relations Bd.
. . . . . . . . .
1020
Inﬁnity Group Co.; Springer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases reported and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

“What a difference five years makes.”  Carson v. Makin,
596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip
op., at 5).  And not just at the Court.  Around the country,
there has been a backlash to the movement for liberty and
equality  for  gender  and  sexual  minorities.  New  forms  of
inclusion have been met with reactionary exclusion.  This
is heartbreaking.  Sadly, it is also familiar.  When the civil
rights  and  women’s  rights  movements  sought  equality  in
public life, some public establishments refused.  Some even
claimed,  based  on  sincere  religious  beliefs,  constitutional
rights to discriminate.  The brave Justices who once sat on
this Court decisively rejected those claims.

Now the Court faces a similar test.  A business open to
the public seeks to deny gay and lesbian customers the full
and  equal  enjoyment  of  its  services  based  on  the  owner’s
religious  belief  that  same-sex  marriages  are  “false.”    The
business  argues,  and  a  majority  of  the  Court agrees,  that
because  the  business  offers  services  that  are  customized
and expressive, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment shields the business from a generally applicable law
that prohibits discrimination in the sale of publicly availa-
ble goods and services.  That is wrong.  Profoundly wrong.
As I will explain, the law in question targets conduct, not
speech,  for  regulation,  and  the  act  of  discrimination  has
never  constituted  protected  expression  under  the  First
Amendment.  Our Constitution contains no right to refuse
service to a disfavored group.  I dissent.

I
A
A “public accommodations law” is a law that guarantees
to  every  person  the  full  and  equal  enjoyment  of  places  of
public accommodation without unjust discrimination.  The
American  people,  through  their  elected  representatives,
have  enacted  such  laws  at  all  levels  of  government:  The
federal  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1964  and  the  Americans  with
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor in the case 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. It argues against the majority opinion's stance on free speech and discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
44

BILSKI v. KAPPOS

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

that  “[p]henomena  of  nature  . . .  ,  mental  processes,  and
abstract  intellectual  concepts  are  not  patentable,  as  they
are  the  basic  tools  of  scientific  and  technological  work,”
409 U.  S., at 67; see also, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,
180  F. 2d,  at  28  (“To  give  appellant  a  monopoly,  through
the issuance of a patent, upon so great an area . . . would
in  our  view  impose  without  warrant  of  law  a  serious  re-
straint upon the advance of science and industry”).  Busi-
ness  methods  are  similarly  often  closer  to  “big  ideas,”  as
they  are  the  basic  tools  of  commercial  work.   They  are
also,  in  many  cases,  the  basic  tools  of  further  business
innovation:  Innovation  in  business  methods  is  often  a
sequential and complementary process in which imitation
may be a “spur to innovation” and patents may “become an
impediment.”  Bessen  &  Maskin,  Sequential  Innovation,
Patents,  and  Imitation,  40  RAND  J.  Econ.  611,  613
(2009).54    “Think  how  the  airline  industry  might  now  be
structured if the first company to offer frequent flyer miles
had enjoyed the sole right to award them.”  Dreyfuss 264.
“[I]mitation  and  refinement  through  imitation  are  both
necessary  to  invention  itself  and  the  very  lifeblood  of  a
competitive economy.”  Bonito Boats, 489 U. S., at 146.

If business methods could be patented, then many busi-
ness  decisions,  no  matter  how  small,  could  be  potential
patent violations.  Businesses would either live in constant
fear  of  litigation  or  would  need  to  undertake  the  costs  of
searching through patents that describe methods of doing
business, attempting to decide whether their innovation is
one  that  remains  in  the  public  domain.    See  Long,  Infor-
mation Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 465,

——————

Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 873–878 (1990).

54 See  also  Raskind,  The  State  Street  Bank  Decision,  The  Bad  Busi-
ness of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10
Fordham  Intell.  Prop.  Media  &  Ent.  L. J.  61,  102  (1999)  (“Interactive
emulation more than innovation is the driving force of business method
changes”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case *Bilski v. Kappos*. It delves into the patentability of business methods and the potential negative consequences of allowing such patents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1054

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 3, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1275. Scheidly v. Travelers Insurance Co. C. A.

3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 445.

No. 99–1287. Mitsubishi Electric Corp. v. Ampex Corp.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d
1300.

No. 99–1289. United States ex rel. American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 729.

No. 99–1291.

JF Hotel Management v. Flynn. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 261.

No. 99–1296. Murray v. Smiltneek.
Dickinson County, Mich. Certiorari denied.

95B Jud. Dist. Ct.,

No. 99–1304. Allen-Sesker et al. v. Bell Atlantic
Global Wireless, Inc., t/a Chesapeake Directory Sales
Co., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
201 F. 3d 435.

No. 99–1306. Hershfield v. Board of Zoning Appeals,

King George County. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1309. Chandler v. Chandler et al. Ct. App. Tex.,
8th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 991 S. W. 2d 367.

No. 99–1317. Muka v. Rutherford Institute et al. C. A.

D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 174.

No. 99–1333. Distelrath, Chief of Police, West Covina
Police Department, et al. v. Honey. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 531.

No. 99–1335. Security Finance Corp. et al. v. Clark, Act-
ing Administrator, Oklahoma Department of Consumer
Credit, et al. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 990 P. 2d 845.

No. 99–1337. Douthitt v. May Department Stores, dba
Famous Barr. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 303 Ill. App. 3d 1124, 747 N. E. 2d 1117.

No. 99–1339. Burkhart v. Quilici. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and dates. This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is more suitable for indexing as metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1115

529 U. S.

May 15, 2000

No. 99–8555. Wayne v. Jarvis, Sheriff, DeKalb County,
Georgia, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 197 F. 3d 1098.

No. 99–8564. Coker v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8565. Douglas v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8566. Haynes v. Federal Aviation Administra-
tion. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198
F. 3d 258.

No. 99–8570. Frank v. Nebraska. Ct. App. Neb. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 8 Neb. App. xcvi.

No. 99–8573. Gonzalez v. Askins et al. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 178 F. 3d 1283.

No. 99–8577. Habelman v. Garvey, Administrator, Fed-
eral Aviation Administration. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 537.

No. 99–8579. Roberts v. Langley, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8582. Candelaria v. LeMaster, Warden. C. A.

10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 447.

No. 99–8588. Bates v. Boone, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 447.

No. 99–8589. Alvarez v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8592. Carpenter v. Greiner, Superintendent,
Sing Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–8594. Owens v. Pitcher, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8599. Wolfe v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 So. 2d 1093.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). This type of information is generally not considered the primary content of a document and is more suitable for a legal database or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

ALITO, J., concurring

In 2017, the new administration took up the task of at-
tempting  to  find  a  solution.  After  receiving  more  than
56,000 comments, it issued the rule now before us, which
made the church exemption available to non-governmental
employers who object to the provision of some or all contra-
ceptive  services  based  on  sincerely  held  religious  beliefs.4
45  CFR  §147.132  (2019);  see  83  Fed.  Reg.  57540,  57590.
(The  “religious  exemption.”)  The  Court  of  Appeals,  as
noted, held that RFRA did not require this new rule.

II
A
RFRA broadly prohibits the Federal Government from vi-
olating religious liberty.  See 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(a).  It
applies to every “branch, department, agency, [and] instru-
mentality” of the Federal Government, as well as any “per-
son acting under the color of ” federal law.  §2000bb–2(1).
And this prohibition applies to the “implementation” of fed-
eral  law.  §2000bb–3(a).    Thus,  unless  the  ACA  or  some
other subsequently enacted statute made RFRA inapplica-
ble to the contraceptive mandate, the Departments respon-
sible for administering that mandate are obligated to do so
in a manner that complies with RFRA.

No provision of the ACA abrogates RFRA, and our deci-
sion in Hobby Lobby, 573 U. S., at 736, established that ap-
plication  of  the  contraceptive  mandate  must  conform  to
RFRA’s demands.  Thus, it was incumbent on the Depart-
ments to ensure that the rules implementing the mandate
were consistent with RFRA, as interpreted in our decision.

B
Under RFRA, the Federal Government may not “substan-
tially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the bur-
den results from a rule of general applicability,” unless it

——————

4 A  similar  exemption  was  provided  for  employers  with  moral  objec-

tions.  See 45 CFR §147.33.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 591 U.S. ____ (2020).  It delves into the interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and its application to the contraceptive mandate.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

should  set  an  example  of  rational  and  civil  discourse  in-
stead of contributing to the worst current trends.

Now to what matters.

II

A
I begin with the question whether Apodaca was a prece-
dent  at  all.  It  is  remarkable  that  it  is  even  necessary  to
address  this  question,  but  in  Part  IV–A  of  the  principal
opinion, three Justices take the position that Apodaca was
never a precedent.  The only truly fitting response to this
argument is: “Really?”

Consider  what  it  would  mean  if  Apodaca  was  never  a
precedent.  It would mean that the entire legal profession
was fooled for the past 48 years.  Believing that Apodaca
was a precedent, the courts of Louisiana and Oregon tried
thousands of cases under rules allowing conviction by a vote
of 11 to 1 or 10 to 2, and appellate courts in those States
upheld these convictions based on Apodaca.9  But according

——————
adopted to serve?”  Ante, at 14, n. 44.  But three sentences later it an-
swers its own question when it observes that “a jurisdiction adopting a
nonunanimous jury rule for benign reasons today would still violate the
Sixth Amendment.”  Ibid.

JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH’s defense,  see  ante,  at  13–15  (opinion  concur-
ring  in  part), is  essentially  the  same.    After  reiterating the  history re-
counted by the majority, he eventually acknowledges that there are “neu-
tral  and  legitimate”  reasons  for  allowing  non-unanimous  verdicts  and
that  Louisiana  may  have  retained  a  version  of  its  old  rule  for  such
reasons.    He  also  agrees  with  the  majority  that  a  rule  allowing  non-
unanimous  verdicts  would  be  unconstitutional  no  matter  what  the
State’s reasons.  So what is the relevance of the original motivations for
the  Louisiana  and  Oregon  rules?   He  offers  no  explanation.    He  does
opine that allowing such verdicts works to the disadvantage of African-
American  defendants,  but  the  effect  of  various  jury  decision  rules  is  a
complex  question  that  has  been  the  subject  of  much  social-science  re-
search, none of which the opinion even acknowledges.

9 For  Oregon,  see,  e.g.,  State  v.  Bowen,  215  Ore.  App.  199,  168  P. 3d
  </content>
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  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of ALITO, J.

Third, the Court suggests that the grant of review, brief-
ing, and argument on §113 may warrant resolving the ques-
tion of state-court jurisdiction.  Ibid.  But that presentation
has not cleared up serious issues surrounding §§113(b) and
(h).  And  sunk  costs  cannot  justify  a  departure  from  our
usual practice of “deciding only what is necessary to the dis-
position of the immediate case.”  Whitehouse v. Illinois Cen-
tral R. Co., 349 U. S. 366, 373 (1955).

*

*

*
Section 113 may simply be a piece of very bad draftsman-
ship, with pieces that cannot be made to fit together.  Or it
may be a puzzle with a solution that neither the parties, the
Court, nor I have been able to solve.  In a later case, briefing
and  argument  may  provide  answers  that  have  thus  far
eluded us.  Since we are not required to attempt an answer
in this case, the prudent course is to hold back.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. While it discusses legal issues and interpretations, it's part of a larger legal argument and not a standalone piece of information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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