<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

OHIO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.

BREYER, J., dissenting

that  argument,  the  Government  pointed  out,  and  the
District  Court  had  held,  that  the  newspaper  dominated
the market for the sales of newspapers to readers in New
Orleans,  where  it  was  the  sole  morning  daily  newspaper.
Ibid.    But  this  Court  reversed.    We  explained  that  “every
newspaper  is  a  dual  trader  in  separate  though  interde
pendent markets; it sells the paper’s news and advertising
content  to  its  readers;  in  effect  that  readership  is  in  turn
sold  to  the  buyers  of  advertising  space.”    Ibid.    We  then
added:

“This case concerns solely one of those markets.  The
Publishing Company stands accused not of tying sales
to its readers but only to buyers of general and classi
fied space in its papers.  For this reason, dominance in
the advertising market, not in readership, must be de
cisive  in  gauging  the  legality  of  the  Company’s  unit
plan.”  Ibid.

Here, American Express stands accused not of limiting or
harming competition for shopper-related card services, but
only  of  merchant-related  card  services,  because  the  chal
lenged  contract  provisions  appear  only  in  American  Ex
press’ contracts with merchants.  That is why the District
Court  was  correct  in  considering,  at  step  1,  simply
whether  the  agreement  had  diminished  competition  in
merchant-related services.

B
The  District  Court  did  refer  to  market  definition,  and

the majority does the same.  Ante, at 11–15.  And I recog
nize  that  properly  defining  a  market  is  often  a  complex
business.  Once  a  court  has  identified  the  good  or  service
directly  restrained,  as  Times-Picayune  Publishing  Co.
requires,  it  will  sometimes  add  to  the  relevant  market
what economists call “substitutes”: other goods or services
that are reasonably substitutable for that good or service.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses market definition and competition in the context of a business practice.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–1392
_________________

THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2022]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Amer-
icans hold sharply conflicting views.  Some believe fervently
that  a  human  person  comes  into  being  at  conception  and
that  abortion  ends  an  innocent  life.    Others  feel  just  as
strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman’s
right  to  control  her  own  body  and  prevents  women  from
achieving full equality.  Still others in a third group think
that abortion should be allowed under some but not all cir-
cumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of
views about the particular restrictions that should be im-
posed.

For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, each State was permitted to address this issue in ac-
cordance with the views of its citizens.  Then, in 1973, this
Court decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113.  Even though the
Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held
that it confers a broad right to obtain one.  It did not claim
that American law or the common law had ever recognized
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

Opinion of the Court

own.  And that activity results in a distinctive expressive
product.  When the government interferes with such edito-
rial choices—say, by ordering the excluded to be included—
it alters the content of the compilation.  (It creates a differ-
ent  opinion  page  or  parade,  bearing  a  different  message.)
And in so doing—in overriding a private party’s expressive
choices—the government confronts the First Amendment.4
Second, none of that changes just because a compiler in-
cludes most items and excludes just a few.  That was the
situation in Hurley.  The St. Patrick’s Day parade at issue
there was “eclectic”: It included a “wide variety of patriotic,
commercial,  political,  moral,  artistic,  religious,  athletic,
public  service,  trade  union,  and  eleemosynary  themes,  as
well as conflicting messages.”  515 U. S., at 562.  Or other-
wise said, the organizers were “rather lenient in admitting
participants.”  Id., at 569.  No matter.  A “narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional pro-
tection.”  Ibid.  It “is enough” for a compiler to exclude the
handful of messages it most “disfavor[s].”  Id., at 574.  Sup-
pose,  for  example,  that  the  newspaper  in  Tornillo  had
granted a right of reply to all but one candidate.  It would
have made no difference; the Florida statute still could not
have altered the paper’s policy.  Indeed, that kind of focused
editorial  choice  packs  a  peculiarly  powerful  expressive
punch.

Third, the government cannot get its way just by assert-
ing an interest in improving, or better balancing, the mar-
ketplace  of  ideas.    Of  course,  it  is  critically  important  to
have a well-functioning sphere of expression, in which citi-
zens have access to information from many sources.  That

——————

4 Of course, an entity engaged in expressive activity when performing
one function may not be when carrying out another.  That is one lesson
of FAIR.  The Court ruled as it did because the law schools’ recruiting
services  were  not  engaged  in  expression.    See  547  U. S.  47,  64  (2006).
The case could not have been resolved on that ground if the regulation
had affected what happened in law school classes instead.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It delves into First Amendment arguments related to editorial choices and content curation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
880

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No. 09–138.  Graber et al. v.  Fuqua.  Sup. Ct. Tex.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  279  S. W.  3d  608.

No.  09–143.  Hudson  Area  Schools  v.  Patterson  et  ux.
C. A. 6th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 551 F. 3d 438.

No.  09–147.  Estate  of  Martin  v.  California  Department
of Veterans Affairs et al.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.
Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  1042.

No.  09–148.  MSEJ,  LLC  v.  Transit  Casualty  Company
in  Receivership.  Sup.  Ct.  Mo.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  280  S. W.  3d  621.

No.  09–151.  Phillips  et  al.  v.  Gates,  Secretary  of  De
fense.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329
Fed.  Appx.  577.

No.  09–153.  Taylor  Acquisitions,  LLC  v.  City  of  Taylor,
Michigan,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  826.

No.  09–154.  Florida  Association  of  Professional  Lobby
ists,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  Division  of  Legislative  Information
Services  of  the  Florida  Office  of  Legislative  Services
et al.  C.  A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported  below: 566
F.  3d  1281.

No. 09–155.  Martini et ux. v. Holder, Attorney General.

C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–156.  Appleby  v.  Geren,  Secretary  of  the  Army.
C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.
Appx.  196.

No. 09–159.  Garland v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  636.

No.  09–169.  Arensdorf  v.  Geithner,  Secretary  of  the
Treasury.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
329  Fed.  Appx.  514.

No.  09–170.  United  States  ex  rel.  Grynberg  v.  Pacific
Gas  &  Electric  Co.  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  1032.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, courts, and citations to lower court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BROWN v. PLATA

ALITO, J., dissenting

of  past  violations  will  not  do;  nor  is  it  sufficient  simply
to  establish  that  some  violations  continue.  The  scope  of
permissible  relief  depends  on  the  scope  of  any  continuing
violations,  and  therefore  it  was  essential  for  the  three-
judge court to make a reliable determination of the extent
of  any  violations  as  of  the  time  its  release  order  was  is-
sued.  Particularly  in  light  of  the  radical  nature  of  its
chosen  remedy,  nothing  less  than  an  up-to-date  assess-
ment was tolerable.

The  three-judge  court,  however,  relied  heavily  on  out-
dated  information  and  findings  and  refused  to  permit
California to introduce new evidence.  Despite evidence of
improvement,1 the three-judge court relied on old findings
made by the single-judge courts, see Juris. App. 76a–77a,
including a finding made 14 years earlier, see id., at 170a
(citing  Coleman  v.  Wilson,  912  F. Supp.  1282,  1316,  1319
(ED Cal. 1995)).  The three-judge court highlighted death
statistics from 2005, see Juris. App. 9a, while ignoring the
“significant and continuous decline since 2006,” California
Prison Health Care Receivership Corp., K. Imai, Analysis
of  Year  2008  Death  Reviews  31  (Dec.  2009)  (hereinafter
2008 Death Reviews).  And the court dwelled on conditions
at a facility that has since been replaced.  See Juris. App.
19a–20a, 24a, 89a–90a, 94a, 107a, 111a.

Prohibiting  the  State  from  introducing  evidence  about
conditions  as  of  the  date  when  the  prisoner  release  order
was  under  consideration,  id.,  at  76a–78a,  and  n. 42,  the
three-judge court explicitly stated that it would not “evalu-
ate the state’s continuing constitutional violations.”  Id., at

——————

1 Before  requesting  the  appointment  of  a  three-judge  court,  the  Dis-
trict  Court  in  Coleman  recognized  “commendable  progress”  in  the
State’s effort to provide adequate mental health care, Juris. App. 294a,
and  the  District  Court  in  Plata  acknowledged  that  “the  Receiver  has
made much progress since his appointment,” id., at 280a.  The report of
the Special Master to which the Court refers, ante, at 18–19, identifies
a “generally positive trend.”  App. 803.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the court's reliance on outdated information and its refusal to consider new evidence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–603
_________________

LE ROY TORRES, PETITIONER v. TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
TEXAS, THIRTEENTH DISTRICT

[June 29, 2022]

JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO,  JUSTICE

GORSUCH, and JUSTICE BARRETT join, dissenting.

More than two decades ago, this Court found it “difficult
to conceive that the Constitution would have been adopted
if  it  had  been  understood  to  strip  the  States  of  immunity
from suit in their own courts and cede to the Federal Gov-
ernment a power to subject nonconsenting States to private
suits  in  these  fora.”  Alden  v.  Maine,  527  U. S.  706,  743
(1999).  Accordingly, we held—without qualification—that
“the  powers  delegated  to  Congress  under  Article  I  of  the
United States Constitution do not include the power to sub-
ject  nonconsenting  States  to  private  suits  for  damages  in
state courts.”  Id., at 712 (emphasis added).

No longer.  Today, by adopting contrived interpretations
of Alden and the recent decision in PennEast Pipeline Co. v.
New  Jersey,  594  U. S.  ___  (2021),  the  Court  holds  that  at
least two (and perhaps more) Article I “war powers” do, in
fact, include “the power to subject nonconsenting States to
private suits for damages in state courts,” Alden, 527 U. S.,
at 712, and that Congress has exercised that power by en-
acting the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemploy-
ment  Rights  Act  of  1994  (USERRA),  38  U. S. C.  §4301  et
seq.  Alden  should  have  squarely  foreclosed  that  holding.
As  the  Court  there  already  explained,  constitutional  text,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court dissenting opinion. It cites previous cases and legal statutes, indicating it is part of the legal argument and not introductory or supplementary material.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2019)

5

Opinion of the Court

U. S. 409, 418–419 (2005) (quoting Bay Area Laundry and
Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,
522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997)).

Here, the text of §1692k(d) clearly states that an FDCPA
action “may be brought . . . within one year from the date
on which the violation occurs.”  That language unambigu-
ously sets the date of the violation as the event that starts
the one-year limitations period.  At the time of the FDCPA’s
enactment, the term “violation” referred to the “[a]ct or in-
stance  of  violating,  or  state  of  being  violated.”    Webster’s
New International Dictionary 2846 (2d ed. 1949) (Webster’s
Second).  The term “occur” meant “to happen,” and, as Web-
ster’s  Second  explains,  “occur”  described  “that  which  is
thought of as definitely taking place as an event.”  Id., at
1684.  Read together, these dictionary definitions confirm
what is clear from the face of §1692k(d)’s text: The FDCPA
limitations  period  begins  to  run  on  the  date  the  alleged
FDCPA  violation  actually  happened.    We  must  presume
that Congress “says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute what it says there.”  Connecticut Nat. Bank, 503
U. S., at 254.

Rotkiske  does  not  contest  the  plain  meaning  of
§1692k(d)’s  text  or  claim  that  he  brought  suit  within  one
year of the alleged FDCPA violation.  Instead, he suggests
that  we  should  interpret  §1692k(d)  to  include  a  general
“discovery rule” that applies to all FDCPA actions.  In ef-
fect, Rotkiske asks the Court to read in a provision stating
that §1692k(d)’s limitations period begins to run on the date
an alleged FDCPA violation is discovered.

This expansive approach to the discovery rule is a “bad
wine of recent vintage.”  TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19,
37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).  It is a fun-
damental principle of statutory interpretation that “absent
provision[s] cannot be supplied by the courts.”  A. Scalia &
B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
94 (2012).  To do so “ ‘is not a construction of a statute, but,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the interpretation of a statute (FDCPA) and its limitations period.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BIDEN v. MISSOURI

THOMAS, J., dissenting

regulations  applicable  to  “all-inclusive  care”  programs  for
the  elderly,  see  §§1395eee(f )(4),  1396u–4(f )(4),  and  a  re-
quirement that long-term nursing facilities “establish and
maintain an infection control program designed to provide
a  safe,  sanitary,  and  comfortable environment  . . .  to  help
prevent  the  development  and  transmission  of  disease,”
§1395i–3(d)(3).

The Government has not made a strong showing that this
hodgepodge  of  provisions  authorizes  a  nationwide  vaccine
mandate.  We presume that Congress does not hide “funda-
mental details of a regulatory scheme in vague or ancillary
provisions.”  Whitman  v.  American  Trucking  Assns.,  Inc.,
531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001).  Yet here, the Government pro-
poses  to  find  virtually  unlimited  vaccination  power,  over
millions of healthcare workers, in definitional provisions, a
saving  clause, and a provision  regarding long-term  care
facilities’ sanitation procedures.  The Government has not
explained  why  Congress  would  have  used  these  ancillary
provisions  to  house  what  can  only  be  characterized  as  a
“fundamental  detail”  of  the  statutory  scheme.  Had  Con-
gress wanted to grant CMS power to impose a vaccine man-
date across all facility types, it would have done what it has
done elsewhere—specifically authorize one.  See 22 U. S. C.
§2504(e) (authorizing mandate for “such immunization . . .
as necessary and appropriate” for Peace Corps volunteers).
Nonetheless, even if I were to accept that Congress could
have  hidden  vaccine-mandate  power  in  statutory  defini-
tions, the language in these “health and safety” provisions
does not suggest that Congress did so.  Take, for example,
42  U. S. C.  §1395x(e),  which  defines  “hospital”  for  certain
purposes.  Three subsections define hospitals as providers
of  specific  patient  services,  see  §§1395x(e)(1),  (4),  (5),  and
five  describe  administrative  requirements  that  a  facility
must  meet  to  qualify  as  a  covered  hospital,  see
§§1395x(e)(2)–(3),  (6)–(8).    The  final  subsection  then  pro-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the interpretation of specific regulations and their potential to authorize a nationwide vaccine mandate.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–50
_________________

JASCHA CHIAVERINI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. CITY OF NAPOLEON, OHIO, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2024]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves what is often called a Fourth Amend-
ment malicious-prosecution claim under 42 U. S. C. §1983.
To  succeed  on  such  a  claim,  a  plaintiff  must  show  that  a
government  official  charged  him  without  probable  cause,
leading  to  an  unreasonable  seizure  of  his  person.    See
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U. S. 36, 43, and n. 2 (2022).  The
question presented here arises when the official brings mul-
tiple charges, only one of which lacks probable cause.  Do
the valid charges insulate the official from a Fourth Amend-
ment  malicious-prosecution  claim  relating  to  the  invalid
charge?  The answer is no: The valid charges do not create
a categorical bar.  We leave for another day the follow-on
question  of  how  to  determine  in  those  circumstances
whether the baseless charge caused the requisite seizure.

I
This dispute began with a set of peculiar interactions be-
tween a jewelry store owner and police officers in Napoleon,
Ohio.  See generally App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a–7a.  The jew-
eler, Jascha Chiaverini, bought a ring for $45 from a (petty)
jewel thief.  The ring’s rightful owners found out about the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

FDA v. ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE

Opinion of the Court

provided, here is how it violated my conscience, and here is
why the conscience protections were unavailable to me.”  Cf.
App.  153–154  (Dr.  Francis  saw  a  patient  suffering
complications from an abortion drug obtained from India;
no allegation that Dr. Francis helped perform an abortion);
id.,  at  154 (Dr.  Francis  witnessed  another  doctor  perform
an  abortion;  no  allegation  that  the  other  doctor  raised
conscience objections or tried not to participate); id., at 163–
164
suffering
complications  from  abortion  drugs;  no  allegation  that  the
doctors  treating  the  patients  had  or  raised  conscience
objections to the treatment they provided); id., at 173–174
(doctor  treated  a  patient  suffering  from  mifepristone
complications;  no  description  of  what  that  treatment
involved  and  no  statement  that  the  doctor  raised  a
conscience objection to providing that treatment).

(doctor’s  hospital

treated  women

federal

In  response  to  all  of  that,  the  doctors  still  express  fear
that  another
law,  the  Emergency  Medical
Treatment  and  Labor  Act  or  EMTALA,  might  be
interpreted to override those federal conscience laws and to
require individual emergency room doctors to participate in
emergency  abortions  in  some  circumstances.    See  42
U. S. C. §1395dd.  But the Government has disclaimed that
reading of EMTALA.  And we agree with the Government’s
view of EMTALA on that point.  EMTALA does not require
doctors  to  perform  abortions  or  provide  abortion-related
medical treatment over their conscience objections because
EMTALA does not impose obligations on individual doctors.
See  Brief  for  United  States  23,  n. 3.    As  the  Solicitor
General succinctly and correctly stated, EMTALA does not
“override an individual doctor’s conscience objections.”  Tr.
of Oral Arg. 18; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. in Moyle v. United
States, O. T. 2023, No. 23–726 etc., pp. 88–91 (Moyle Tr.).
We  agree  with  the  Solicitor  General’s  representation  that
federal conscience protections provide “broad coverage” and
will  “shield  a  doctor  who  doesn’t  want  to  provide  care  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the intersection of federal conscience protections and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). It delves into specific case examples and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
clviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

Widner v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  841,1139

974

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wiegand v. Zavares
817

Wiggenhorn v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903

Wiggins v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wilber, In re
1146

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wiley v. Geithner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  948,1086

885

Wilhelm v. Clark
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1129

Wilk v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

Wilkerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132

Wilkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Wilkinson v. Palmetto State Transportation Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Willaman v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Willenbring v. United States
823

Willett v. West Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
William A. Graham Co.; USI MidAtlantic, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991

William Beaumont Hospital; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  870,1065

Williams, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,968,1046,1109

866

Williams v. Beard  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Williams v. Bitner
848

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Williams v. Church’s Chicken  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1045

937

Williams v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
807

Williams; Crutcher v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  853,956

Williams v. Drew
1057

Williams v. Geithner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Williams v. Horel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Williams v. Jabe  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Williams v. Johnson
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1064

Williams v. Jones  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Williams; Larson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

Williams v. McBride  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Williams v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  885,909,994

931

Williams; Michigan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991

Williams; Mohawk Industries, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Williams v. Norris
951

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  954,1140

Williams; Peoples v.
974

Williams v. Quinn  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Williams; Rittner v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000

Williams v. Rozum  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Williams v. Salazar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

Williams; Sirmons v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1150

Williams; Thompson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Williams v. Thurmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. WISCONSIN
STATE LEGISLATURE
KAGAN, J., dissenting

U. S.  428,  434  (1992).    In  fact,  the  court  never  even  ad-
dressed the constitutional issue.
  How  could  that  be?    In  the  appellate  court’s  view,  this
Court’s decision in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006)
(per  curiam),  prohibited  the  district  court  from  modifying
Wisconsin’s election rules so close to (i.e., six weeks before)
Election Day.  See Democratic National Committee v. Bos-
telmann, ___ F. 3d ___, ___–___, 2020 WL 5951359, *1–*2
(CA7,  Oct.  8,  2020)  (per curiam);  see  also  ante,  at  2–4
(KAVANAUGH, J., concurring).  But that is a misunderstand-
ing  of  Purcell’s  message.   In  fixating  on  timing  alone,  the
court of appeals went astray.
  The Court in Purcell considered an appellate decision re-
versing a district court’s refusal to enjoin a voter identifica-
tion law shortly before an election.  We vacated the decision
because  the  court  of  appeals—much  like  the  one  here—
failed to “give deference to [a district court’s] discretion” in
assessing the propriety of injunctive relief.  549 U. S., at 5.
In  doing so, we  briefly addressed  how  to  “weigh” whether
an injunction of an election rule should issue.  Id., at 4.  A
court,  we  counseled,  must  balance  the  “harms  attendant
upon  issuance  or  nonissuance  of  an  injunction,”  together
with “considerations specific to election cases” that may af-
fect “the integrity of our electoral processes.”  Ibid.  Among
those election-specific factors, we continued, was the poten-
tial for a court order, especially close to Election Day, to “re-
sult in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain
away from the polls.”  Id., at 4–5.
  That  statement,  as  the  dissent  below  saw,  “articulated
not  a  rule  but  a  caution.”    ___  F. 3d,  at  ___,  2020  WL
5951359, *4 (Rovner, J., dissenting).  Last-minute changes
to election processes may baffle and discourage voters; and
when  that  is  likely,  a  court  has  strong  reason  to  stay  its
hand.  But not every such change poses that danger.  And a
court  must  also  take  account  of  other  matters—among
them, the  presence  of extraordinary circumstances  (like  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State Legislature. It delves into the legal reasoning behind the decision, referencing previous cases and legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

all, when a State provides exactly the tort claim the plain-
tiff seeks, it provides him with all the process he is due.  See
id.,  at  284;  Cordova,  816  F. 3d,  at  662  (opinion  of  Gor-
such, J.).    And,  consistent  with  the  common  law,  many
States recognize claims for malicious prosecution.  Indeed,
the relevant State here (Ohio) permits such a cause of ac-
tion.  Notably, too, unlike the tort this Court seeks to cobble
together under the aegis of the Fourth Amendment, Ohio’s
tort does not require a plaintiff to prove that he was seized.
Compare Trussell v. General Motors Corp., 53 Ohio St. 3d
142, 145–146, 559 N. E. 2d 732, 735–736 (1990), with ante,
at  1  (majority  opinion).  Of  course,  should  a  State  fail  to
provide a malicious-prosecution claim to secure his proce-
dural  due  process  rights,  or  a  fair  forum  for  entertaining
such a claim, a federal court may need to act to vindicate
§1983 and the promise of procedural due process.  Cordova,
816  F. 3d,  at  665  (opinion  of  Gorsuch, J.).  But  in  many
cases  (this  one  included),  a  State  malicious-prosecution
claim may be both easier for a plaintiff to prove than any-
thing the Court today provides and sufficient to ensure any
process he is due.  Albright, 510 U. S., at 285–286 (opinion
of Kennedy, J.); Cordova, 816 F. 3d, at 662 (opinion of Gor-
such, J.).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

code is much more functional and thus is a “method of op-
eration” outside the scope of protection.

That  argument  fails.   As  the  majority  correctly  recog-
nizes, declaring code and implementing code are “inextrica-
bly  bound”  together.    Ante,  at  22.    Declaring  code  defines
the  scope  of  a  set  of  implementing  code  and  gives  a  pro-
grammer  a  way  to  use  it  by  shortcut.    Because  declaring
code incorporates implementing code, it has no function on
its  own.  Implementing  code  is  similar.    Absent  declaring
code,  developers  would  have  to  write  every  program  from
scratch,  making  complex  programs  prohibitively  time
consuming  to  create.  The  functionality  of  both  declaring
code and implementing code will thus typically rise and fall
together.

Google’s argument also cannot account for Congress’ de-
cision to define protected computer code as “a set of state-
ments or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer  in  order  to  bring  about  a  certain  result.”    §101
(emphasis added).  Hence, Congress rejected any categori-
cal  distinction  between  declaring  and  implementing  code.
Implementing  code  orders  a  computer  operation  directly.
Declaring  code  does  so  indirectly  by  incorporating  imple-
menting code.  When faced with general language barring
protection for “methods of operation” and specific language
protecting  declaring  code,  the  “ ‘specific  governs  the  gen-
eral.’ ”    RadLAX  Gateway  Hotel,  LLC  v.  Amalgamated
Bank, 566 U. S. 639, 645 (2012).

This context makes clear that the phrase “method of op-
eration” in §102(b) does not remove protection from declar-
ing code simply because it is functional.  That interpreta-
tion  does  not,  however,  render  “method  of  operation”
meaningless.  It is “given more precise content by the neigh-
boring words with which it is associated.”  United States v.
Williams,  553  U. S.  285,  294  (2008).    Other  terms  in  the
same  subsection  such  as  “idea,”  “principle,”  and  “concept”
suggest that “method of operation” covers the functions and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the patentability of software code.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–499
_________________

JOSEPH JESNER, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

ARAB BANK, PLC

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[April 24, 2018]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment.

I  am  pleased  to  join  the  Court’s  judgment  and  Parts  I,
II–B–1,  and  II–C  of  its  opinion.  Respectfully,  though,  I
believe there are two more fundamental reasons why this
lawsuit  must  be  dismissed.  A  group  of  foreign  plaintiffs
wants  a  federal  court  to  invent  a  new  cause  of  action  so
they  can  sue  another  foreigner  for  allegedly  breaching
international norms.  In any other context, a federal judge
faced with a request like that would know exactly what to
do with it: dismiss it out of hand.  Not because the defend-
ant happens to be a corporation instead of a human being.
But  because  the  job  of  creating  new  causes  of  action  and
navigating  foreign  policy  disputes  belongs  to  the  political
branches.  For  reasons  passing  understanding,  federal
courts have sometimes treated the Alien Tort Statute as a
license to overlook these foundational principles.  I would
end  ATS  exceptionalism.    We should  refuse  invitations  to
create  new  forms  of  legal  liability.    And  we  should  not
meddle  in  disputes  between  foreign  citizens  over  interna-
tional norms.  I write because I am hopeful that courts in
the  future  might  pause  to  consider  both  of  these  reasons
for restraint before taking up cases like this one.  Whatever
powers  courts  may  possess  in  ATS  suits,  they  are  powers
judges should be doubly careful not to abuse.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Alien Tort Statute and its application in a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

ante, at 1–2 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (urging complete def-
erence to a religious institution in determining which em-
ployees are exempt from antidiscrimination laws).  But be-
cause  the  Court’s  new  standard  prizes  a  functional
importance that it appears to deem churches in the best po-
sition  to  explain,  one  cannot  help  but  conclude  that  the
Court has just traded legal analysis for a rubber stamp.3

Indeed,  the  Court  reasons  that  “judges  cannot  be  ex-
pected to have a complete understanding and appreciation”
of the law and facts in ministerial-exception cases, ante, at
22, and all but abandons judicial review.  Although today’s
decision is limited to certain “teachers of religion,” ante, at
22–23, its reasoning risks rendering almost every Catholic
parishioner and parent in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles a
Catholic minister.4  That is, the Court’s apparent deference
here  threatens  to  make  nearly  anyone  whom  the  schools
might hire “ministers” unprotected from discrimination in
the hiring process.  That cannot be right.  Although certain
——————

3 Elsewhere, the Court hints at a comparative inquiry, noting that Biel
and Morrissey-Berru were the school staff “entrusted most directly” with
“educating their students in the faith.”  Ante, at 21.  Setting aside the
Court’s factual assumptions, one must ask: “[M]ost directly” compared to
what (or whom)?  The Court does not say.  Perhaps the Court means to
embrace the predominant circuit approach, which looked at whether a
putative minister “serv[ed] primarily religious roles.”  Hankins v. Lyght,
441 F. 3d 96, 117, 118, n. 13 (CA2 2006) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (iden-
tifying seven Circuits); see also, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon University, 462
F. 3d 294, 304, n. 6, 307 (CA3 2006).  But were that the case, the teachers
would have undoubtedly prevailed here.

4 See, e.g., Archdiocese of Los Angeles, Administrative Handbook §2.3.1
(“[P]arishioners  are  vital  to  parish  life  as  volunteers.  They  partic-
ipate as catechists in religious education, organize youth ministry and
adult  events,  assist  in  charitable  and  social  outreach  activities  in  the
community, and serve as extraordinary ministers of the Eucharist, lec-
tors, altar servers, and ushers, as well as in other supporting ministerial
roles”); Pope Francis, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation on Love in the
Family 13–14 (2015) (“The family is . . . the place where parents become
their  children’s  first  teachers  in  the  faith  . . . .  Parents  have  a  serious
responsibility for this work of education”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

550

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Stevens, J., dissenting

this purpose. Eastern was once in the coal business and
employed many of the beneﬁciaries, but it was not responsi-
ble for their expectation of lifetime health beneﬁts or for the
perilous ﬁnancial condition of the 1950 and 1974 plans which
put the beneﬁts in jeopardy. As the plurality opinion dis-
cusses in detail, the expectation was created by promises and
agreements made long after Eastern left the coal business.
Eastern was not responsible for the resulting chaos in the
funding mechanism caused by other coal companies leav-
ing the framework of the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement. Ante, at 535–536. This case is far outside the
bounds of retroactivity permissible under our law.

Finding a due process violation in this case is consistent
with the principle that “under the deferential standard of
review applied in substantive due process challenges to eco-
nomic legislation there is no need for mathematical precision
in the ﬁt between justiﬁcation and means.” Concrete Pipe,
supra, at 639 (citing Turner Elkhorn, 428 U. S., at 19).
Statutes may be invalidated on due process grounds only
under the most egregious of circumstances. This case rep-
resents one of the rare instances in which even such a per-
missive standard has been violated.

Application of the Coal Act to Eastern would violate the
proper bounds of settled due process principles, and I concur
in the plurality’s conclusion that the judgment of the Court
of Appeals must be reversed.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice

Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

Some appellate judges are better historians than others.
With respect to the central issue resolved by the Coal Act
of 1992, I am persuaded that the consensus among the Cir-
cuit Judges who have appraised the issue is more accurate
than the views of this Court’s majority.1 The uneasy truce

1 See ante, at 535–536 (plurality opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ.); ante, at 539, 549 and this
page (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it is part of the main body of the text and suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

Health and Safety Code, which includes S. B. 8.  See 22 Tex.
Admin. Code §190.8(7) (“the Board shall take appropriate
disciplinary  action  against  a  physician  who  violates  . . .
Chapter 171, Texas Health and Safety Code”); S. B. 8, 87th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (2021) (amending Chapter 171 of the Texas
Health and Safety Code by adding Subchapter H).  Under
Texas law, then, the Attorney General maintains authority
to “take enforcement actions” based on violations of S. B. 8.
Ante,  at  12.    He  accordingly  also  falls  within  the  scope  of
Young’s exception to sovereign immunity.  Ante, at 9–10.
  The same goes for Penny Clarkston, a court clerk.  Court
clerks,  of  course,  do  not  “usually”  enforce  a  State’s  laws.
Ante, at 5.  But by design, the mere threat of even unsuc-
cessful  suits  brought  under  S.  B.  8  chills  constitutionally
protected  conduct,  given  the  peculiar  rules  that  the  State
has imposed.  Under these circumstances, the court clerks
who issue citations and docket S. B. 8 cases are unavoidably
enlisted in the scheme to enforce S. B. 8’s unconstitutional
provisions,  and  thus  are  sufficiently  “connect[ed]”  to  such
enforcement to be proper defendants.  Young, 209 U. S., at
157.  The role that clerks play with respect to S. B. 8 is dis-
tinct  from  that  of  the  judges.    Judges  are  in  no  sense  ad-
verse to the parties subject to the burdens of S. B. 8.  But
as a practical matter clerks are—to the extent they “set[ ] in
motion the machinery” that imposes these burdens on those
sued under S. B. 8.  Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of
Bay View, 395 U. S. 337, 338 (1969).
  The majority contends that this conclusion cannot be rec-
onciled with Young, pointing to language in Young that sug-
gests it would be improper to enjoin courts from exercising
jurisdiction over cases.  Ante, at 7–8; Young, 209 U. S., at
163.  Decisions after Young, however, recognize that suits
to  enjoin  state  court  proceedings  may  be  proper.    See
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 243 (1972); see also Pul-
liam v. Allen, 466 U. S. 522, 525 (1984).  And this conclusion
is consistent with the entire thrust of Young itself.  Just as
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of a specific law (S.B. 8).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
926

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–6018.  Hill  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  969  A.  2d  895.

No.  09–6019.  Horne  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6023.  Stone,  aka  Blaze,  aka  Marshall,  aka  Volt,
aka  Hatchet,  aka  Reese  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  745.

No.  09–6026.  Denson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  872.

No.  09–6029.  Keller  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  395.

No.  09–6031.  Martin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  740.

No.  09–6032.  Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  597.

No. 09–6039.  Baylor v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  294  Fed.  Appx.  765.

No. 09–6040.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6041.  White  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  226.

No.  09–6044.  Scallon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  814.

No.  09–6045.  Moore  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  794.

No.  09–6047.  Dyson  v.  Corbett,  Attorney  General  of

Pennsylvania,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6051.  Santiago  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  566  F.  3d  65.

No.  09–6052.  McKenzie  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  834.

No.  09–6056.  Wirsing  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  437.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It lacks sequential narrative and is more akin to a legal docket than readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8  FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE

KAGAN, J., dissenting

when he has become able to use the power of public office to
the donor’s advantage (the quo).  The heightened threat of
corruption—and, even more, of its appearance—is self-evi-
dent (except, it seems, to observers allergic to all campaign
finance regulation).

In  addressing  that  special  danger,  Section  304  is  any-
thing but a “prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis,” as the majority
labels it.  Ante, at 14.  The idea behind that fancy-sounding
epithet is just that the statute is a needless precaution: The
$2,900  contribution  ceiling,  the  majority  asserts,  already
provides generous protection against the corrupting poten-
tial of donations, so the loan-repayment provision is unnec-
essary.  See ibid.  But that claim ignores that Section 304
targets only a subset of contributions, which raise (as just
described) unique corruption risks.  When an added protec-
tion addresses an added danger, the existence of a basic pro-
tection (however ordinarily ample) fails to show the supple-
ment’s  pointlessness.  Regular  seatbelts  might  suffice  to
protect drivers on the interstate, but special belts—and roll
cages to boot—are essential measures on the racetrack.  So
too, a $2,900 cap might suffice to prevent corruption from
normal campaign contributions—but not from post-election
contributions to repay a candidate’s loan, and thus to enrich
him  personally.  When  Congress,  as  here,  responds  to  a
heightened threat with a heightened safeguard, the major-
ity has no call to “greet” it “with a measure of skepticism.”
Ibid.

Nor does the majority have reason to second-guess Con-
gress’s experience-based judgment about the specially cor-
rupting effects of post-election donations to repay candidate
loans.  The  majority’s  first  attempt  to  counter  that  judg-
ment  is  that  “we  are  only  talking  about  repayment  of  a
loan”: “If the candidate did not have the money to buy a car
before  he  made  a  loan  to  his  campaign,  repayment  of  the
loan would not change that in any way.”  Ante, at 19.  But
that altogether misses the point.  However much money the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan. It delves into the arguments surrounding campaign finance regulations and the specific provision regarding loan repayments. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of judicial opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

416

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.

Court noted the existence of “friends, neighbors and family
of [Williams] who would have testiﬁed that he had redeeming
qualities.”
Id., at 423. Based on its consideration of all of
this evidence, the same trial judge that originally found Wil-
liams’ death sentence “ ‘justiﬁed and warranted,’ ” id., at 155,
concluded that trial counsel’s deﬁcient performance preju-
diced Williams, id., at 424, and accordingly recommended
that Williams be granted a new sentencing hearing, ibid.
The Virginia Supreme Court’s decision reveals an obvious
failure to consider the totality of the omitted mitigation evi-
dence. See 254 Va., at 26, 487 S. E. 2d, at 200 (“At most, this
evidence would have shown that numerous people, mostly
relatives, thought that [Williams] was nonviolent and could
cope very well in a structured environment”). For that rea-
son, and the remaining factors discussed in the Court’s opin-
ion, I believe that the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision “in-
volved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.”

Accordingly, although I disagree with the interpretation of
§ 2254(d)(1) set forth in Part II of Justice Stevens’ opinion,
I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court’s opinion and concur
in the judgment of reversal.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.

I agree with the Court’s interpretation of 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. III), see ante, at 402–413 (opinion
of O’Connor, J.), but disagree with its decision to grant ha-
beas relief in this case.

There is “clearly established Federal law, as determined
by [this Court]” that governs petitioner’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel: Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S.
668 (1984). Thus, we must determine whether the Virginia
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist.  It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MO., INC. v. NEVILS

Opinion of the Court

can then pursue the claim against the third party.  Several
States, however, Missouri among them, bar enforcement of
contractual subrogation and reimbursement provisions.

The  questions  here  presented:  Does  FEHBA’s  express-
preemption  prescription,  §8902(m)(1),  override  state  law
if
prohibiting  subrogation  and  reimbursement;  and
§8902(m)(1)  has  that  effect,  is  the  statutory  prescription
consistent  with  the  Supremacy  Clause,  U. S.  Const.,  Art.
VI, cl. 2?  We hold, contrary to the decision of the Missouri
Supreme  Court,  that  contractual  subrogation  and  reim-
bursement  prescriptions  plainly  “relate  to  . . .  payments
with respect to benefits,” §8902(m)(1); therefore, by statu-
tory  instruction,  they  override  state  law  barring  subroga-
tion and reimbursement.  We further hold, again contrary
to the Missouri Supreme Court, that the regime Congress
enacted is compatible with the Supremacy Clause.  Section
8902(m)(1)  itself,  not  the  contracts  OPM  negotiates,  trig-
gers the federal preemption.  As Congress directed, where
FEHBA contract terms “relate to the nature, provision, or
extent  of  coverage  or  benefits  (including  payments  with
respect to benefits),” §8902(m)(1) ensures that those terms
will  be  uniformly  enforceable  nationwide,  free  from  state
interference.

I

A

FEHBA “establishes a comprehensive program of health
insurance  for  federal  employees.”  Empire  HealthChoice
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U. S. 677, 682 (2006).  As
just  noted,  supra,  at  1,  FEHBA  contains  an  express-
preemption  provision,  §8902(m)(1).    FEHBA  assigns  to
OPM broad administrative and rulemaking authority over
the  program.    See  §§8901–8913.    OPM  contracts  with
private  insurance  carriers  to  offer  a  range  of  healthcare
plans.  §§8902, 8903.

OPM’s contracts with private carriers have long included
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to health insurance and preemption of state law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
296

WOOD  v.  ALLEN

Opinion of the Court

to  the  court,  there  was  “nothing  in  the  record  to  even  re
motely support a ﬁnding that counsel made a strategic deci
sion  not  to  let  the  jury  at  the  penalty  stage  know  about
Wood’s  mental  condition.”  Id.,  at  1242.  Ralph  and  Dozier,
the  court  noted,  had  placed  the  inexperienced  Trotter  in
charge of  the penalty phase.  At  the Rule 32  hearing, Trot
ter testiﬁed that he had seen the references to Wood’s intel
lectual  functioning  in  the  Kirkland  report  but  did  not  recall
considering  whether  to  pursue  that  issue.  Trotter  further
testiﬁed  that  he  had  unsuccessfully  attempted  to  subpoena
Wood’s  school  records  and  that  he  did  not  recall  speaking
to  any  of  Wood’s  teachers.  Trotter  had  also  written  to  an
attorney  at  the  Southern  Poverty  Law  Center  explaining
that  he  was  “ ‘stressed  out  over  this  case  and  [didn’t]  have
anyone  with  whom  to  discuss  the  case,  including  the  other
two  attorneys.’ ”  Id.,  at  1241.  Shortly  before  the  penalty
phase  began,  Trotter  told  the  judge  that  he  would  request
further  psychological  evaluation  before  the  judge’s  sentenc
ing hearing, even though the evaluation would come too late
to  be  considered  by  the  jury.  Id.,  at  1241–1242.  Based  on
this  evidence,  the  District  Court  concluded  that  the  state
court’s  ﬁnding  “that  a  strategic  decision  was  made  not  to
investigate  or  introduce  to  the  sentencing  jury  evidence  of
mental  retardation  [was]  an  unreasonable  determination  of
the  facts  in  light  of  the  clear  and  convincing  evidence  pre
sented in the record.”  Ibid.

Having  rejected  the  state  court’s  factual  determinations,
the District Court held that counsel’s performance was deﬁ
cient  and  that  counsel’s  deﬁcient  performance  prejudiced
Wood,  concluding  that  the  state  court’s  holdings  to  the  con
trary constituted “an unreasonable application of federal law
under  Strickland.”  Id.,  at  1245.  The  court  granted  the
petition  on  this  claim  and  ordered  the  State  either  to  re-
sentence  Wood  to  life  without  parole  or  to  conduct  a  new
sentencing hearing.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Wood v. Allen. It delves into the arguments regarding the competency of the legal counsel and its impact on the sentencing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

19

BREYER, J., dissenting

tees (PACs).  Campaign finance law prohibits an individual
from contributing (1) more than $5,200 to any candidate in
a federal election cycle, and (2) more than $5,000 to a PAC
in a calendar year.  2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(A), (C); 78 Fed.
Reg. 8532.  It also prohibits (3) any PAC from contributing
more  than  $10,000  to  any  candidate  in  an  election  cycle.
§441(a)(2)(A).  But the law does not prohibit an individual
from  contributing  (within  the  current  $123,200  biannual
aggregate limit) $5,000 to each of an unlimited total num
ber of PACs.  And there, so to speak, lies the rub.

Here is how,  without  any aggregate limits, a party  will
be  able  to  channel  $2  million  from  each  of  ten  Rich  Do-
nors to each of ten Embattled Candidates.  Groups of party
supporters—individuals,  corporations,  or  trade  unions—
create 200 PACs.  Each PAC claims it will use the funds it
raises  to  support  several  candidates  from  the  party,
though  it  will  favor  those  who  are  most  endangered.
(Each PAC qualifies for “multicandidate” status because it
has received contributions from more than 50 persons and
has made contributions to five federal candidates  at some
point previously.  §441a(a)(4); 11 CFR §100.5(e)(3)).  Over
a  2-year  election  cycle,  Rich  Donor  One  gives  $10,000  to
each  PAC  ($5,000  per  year)—yielding  $2  million  total.
Rich  Donor  2  does  the  same.  So,  too,  do  the  other  eight
Rich  Donors.    This  brings  their  total  donations  to  $20
million,  disbursed  among  the  200  PACs.    Each  PAC  will
have  collected  $100,000,  and  each  can  use  its  money  to
write ten  checks of $10,000—to each of the ten most Em
battled  Candidates  in  the  party  (over  two  years).    See
Appendix B, Table 3, infra, at 41.  Every Embattled Can
didate,  receiving  a  $10,000  check  from  200  PACs,  will
have collected $2 million.

The  upshot  is  that  ten  Rich  Donors  will  have  contrib-
uted  $2  million  each,  and  ten  Embattled  Candidates  will
have  collected  $2  million  each.  In  this  example,  unlike
Example  Two,  the  recipient  candidates  may  not  know
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission*. It delves into campaign finance laws and their potential loopholes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

Opinion of the Court

statute  of  limitations  in  fraud  actions,  and  that  he  has
pleaded (or could plead) a claim within the scope of this doc-
trine.  This Court has noted the existence of decisions ap-
plying a discovery rule in “fraud cases” that is distinct from
the  traditional  equitable  tolling  doctrine.  Merck  &  Co.  v.
Reynolds,  559  U. S.  633,  644  (2010);  Gabelli  v.  SEC,  568
U. S.  442,  450  (2013)  (referring  to  the  “fraud  discovery
rule”).  And it has repeatedly characterized these decisions
as  applying  an  equity-based  doctrine.  California  Public
Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., 582
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at 10–11); Lozano v. Mon-
toya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 10–11 (2014); Credit Suisse Secu-
rities  (USA)  LLC  v.  Simmonds,  566  U. S.  221,  226–227
(2012); Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43, 49–50 (2002).
Rotkiske failed to preserve this issue before the Third Cir-
cuit, 890 F. 3d, at 428, and failed to raise this issue in his
petition for certiorari.  Accordingly, Rotkiske cannot rely on
this doctrine to excuse his otherwise untimely filing.3

*
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of

*

*

Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

——————

3 We do not decide whether the text of 15 U. S. C. §1692k(d) permits
the application of equitable doctrines or whether the claim raised in this
case falls within the scope of the doctrine applied in Bailey and its prog-
eny.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It contains legal citations, arguments, and a conclusion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

constitute an establishment of religion.  See Brougher 1–2;
Symbol Cases 91.  The simple truth is that no historically
sensitive  understanding  of  the  Establishment  Clause  can
be reconciled with a rule requiring governments to “roa[m]
the land, tearing down monuments with religious symbol-
ism and scrubbing away any reference to the divine.”  Amer-
ican Legion, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20).  Our Consti-
tution  was  not  designed  to  erase  religion  from  American
life; it was designed to ensure “respect and tolerance.”  Id.,
at ___ (slip op., at 31).

*
To  justify  a  policy  that  discriminated  against  religion,
Boston sought to drag Lemon once more from its grave.  It
was a strategy as risky as it was unsound.  Lemon ignored
the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, it disre-
garded mountains of precedent, and it substituted a serious
constitutional  inquiry  with  a  guessing  game.    This  Court
long ago interred Lemon, and it is past time for local offi-
cials and lower courts to let it lie.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice GorSUCH. It delves into the interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution and critiques the Lemon test.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

computer system,” such as files, folders, or databases.6  It is
thus  consistent  with  that  meaning  to  equate  “exceed[ing]
authorized access” with the act of entering a part of the sys-
tem to which a computer user lacks access privileges.7  The
Government and the dissent’s broader interpretation is nei-
ther the only possible nor even necessarily the most natural
one.

B
While the statute’s language “spells trouble” for the Gov-
ernment’s position, a “wider look at the statute’s structure
gives  us  even  more  reason  for  pause.”    Romag  Fasteners,
Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc., 590 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip
op., at 2–3).

The  interplay  between  the  “without  authorization”  and
“exceeds  authorized  access”  clauses  of  subsection  (a)(2)  is
particularly  probative.   Those  clauses  specify two  distinct

——————

6 1 Oxford English Dictionary 72 (2d ed. 1989) (“[t]o gain access to . . .
data, etc., held in a computer or computer-based system, or the system
itself ”); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 11 (2d ed.
1987) (“Computers. to locate (data) for transfer from one part of a com-
puter system to another . . . ”); see also C. Sippl & R. Sippl, Computer
Dictionary and Handbook 2 (3d ed. 1980) (“[c]oncerns the process of ob-
taining  data  from  or  placing  data  in  storage”);  Barnhart  Dictionary  of
New English 2 (3d ed. 1990) (“to retrieve (data) from a computer storage
unit  or  device  . . .  ”);  Microsoft  Computer  Dictionary  12  (4th  ed.  1999)
(“[t]o gain entry to memory in order to read or write data”); A Dictionary
of Computing 5 (6th ed. 2008) (“[t]o gain entry to data, a computer sys-
tem, etc.”).

7 The dissent makes the odd charge that our interpretation violates the
“ ‘presumption  against’ ”  reading  a  provision  “contrary  to  the  ordinary
meaning of the term it defines.”  Post, at 9.  But when a statute, like this
one, is “addressing a . . . technical subject, a specialized meaning is to be
expected.”  Scalia, Reading Law, at 73.  Consistent with that principle,
our interpretation tracks the specialized meaning of “access” in the com-
puter context.  This reading is far from “ ‘repugnant to’ ” the meaning of
the phrase “exceeds authorized access,” post, at 9—unlike, say, a defini-
tional  provision  directing  that  “ ‘the  word  dog  is  deemed  to  include  all
horses.’ ”  Scalia, supra, at 232, n. 29.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific sections of a statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

interval).  We do not disturb the application of Smith and
Miller  or  call  into  question  conventional  surveillance
techniques and tools, such as security cameras.  Nor do we
address  other  business  records  that  might  incidentally
reveal location information.  Further, our opinion does not
consider  other  collection  techniques  involving  foreign
affairs or national security.  As Justice Frankfurter noted
when considering new innovations in airplanes and radios,
the  Court  must  tread  carefully  in  such  cases,  to  ensure
that  we  do  not  “embarrass  the  future.”    Northwest  Air-
lines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 300 (1944).4

IV
Having  found  that  the  acquisition  of  Carpenter’s  CSLI
was a search, we also conclude that the Government must
generally  obtain  a  warrant  supported  by  probable  cause
before  acquiring  such  records.  Although  the  “ultimate
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search
is  ‘reasonableness,’ ”  our  cases  establish  that  warrantless
searches  are  typically  unreasonable  where  “a  search  is
undertaken  by  law  enforcement  officials  to  discover  evi-
dence of criminal wrongdoing.”  Vernonia School Dist. 47J
v.  Acton,  515  U. S.  646,  652–653  (1995).    Thus,  “[i]n  the
absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls
within  a  specific  exception  to  the  warrant  requirement.”
Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5).

The Government acquired the cell-site records pursuant
to a court order issued under the Stored Communications
Act,  which  required  the  Government  to  show  “reasonable
grounds” for believing that the records were “relevant and

——————

4 JUSTICE  GORSUCH  faults  us  for  not  promulgating  a  complete  code
addressing the manifold situations that  may be presented by this new
technology—under  a  constitutional  provision  turning  on  what  is  “rea-
sonable,”  no  less.  Post,  at  10–12.    Like  JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  we  “do  not
begin to claim all the answers today,” post, at 13, and therefore decide
no more than the case before us.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case Carpenter v. United States. It discusses the legal implications of accessing cell-site location information (CSLI) and the warrant requirement.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

Opinion of the Court

This  prohibition  prevented  Davey  from  using  his  scholar-
ship to obtain a degree that would have enabled him to be-
come a pastor.  We held that Washington had not violated
the Free Exercise Clause.

Locke differs from this case in two critical ways.  First,
Locke  explained  that  Washington  had  “merely  chosen  not
to fund a distinct category of instruction”: the “essentially
religious endeavor” of training a minister “to lead a congre-
gation.”  Id., at 721.  Thus, Davey “was denied a scholarship
because  of what  he  proposed  to  do—use  the  funds  to  pre-
pare for the ministry.”  Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 12).  Apart from that narrow restriction, Wash-
ington’s program allowed scholarships to be used at “perva-
sively religious schools” that incorporated religious instruc-
tion throughout their classes.  Locke, 540 U. S., at 724–725.
By contrast, Montana’s Constitution does not zero in on any
particular “essentially religious” course of instruction at a
religious school.  Rather, as we have explained, the no-aid
provision bars all aid to a religious school “simply because
of what it is,” putting the school to a choice between being
religious  or  receiving  government  benefits.  Trinity  Lu-
theran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12).  At the same time,
the  provision  puts  families  to  a  choice  between  sending
their children to a religious school or receiving such bene-
fits.

Second, Locke invoked a “historic and substantial” state
interest in not funding the training of clergy, 540 U. S., at
725, explaining that “opposition to . . . funding ‘to support
church  leaders’  lay  at  the  historic  core  of  the  Religion
Clauses,” Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13)
(quoting Locke, 540 U. S., at 722).  As evidence of that tra-
dition, the Court in Locke emphasized that the propriety of
state-supported clergy was a central subject of founding-era
debates,  and  that  most  state  constitutions  from  that  era
prohibited  the  expenditure  of  tax  dollars  to  support  the
clergy.  See id., at 722–723.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of *Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue*. It delves into the legal reasoning and distinctions made between this case and a previous one, *Locke v. Davey*.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

pick out from the API’s task library a particular task with-
out having to learn anything more than a simple command.
For example, a programmer building a new application for
personal banking may wish to use various tasks to, say, cal-
culate a user’s balance or authenticate a password.  To do
so,  she  need  only  learn  the  method  calls  associated  with
those tasks.  In this way, the declaring code’s shortcut func-
tion is similar to a gas pedal in a car that tells the car to
move faster or the QWERTY keyboard on a typewriter that
calls up a certain letter when you press a particular key.  As
those analogies demonstrate, one can think of the declaring
code  as  part  of  an  interface  between  human  beings  and  a
machine.

The second, less obvious, function is to reflect the way in
which  Java’s  creators  have  divided  the  potential  world  of
different tasks into an actual world, i.e., precisely which set
of  potentially  millions  of  different  tasks  we  want  to  have
our  Java-based  computer  systems  perform  and  how  we
want those tasks arranged and grouped.  In this sense, the
declaring code performs an organizational function.  It de-
termines the structure of the task library that Java’s crea-
tors  have  decided  to  build.  To  understand  this  organiza-
tional  system,  think  of  the  Dewey  Decimal  System  that
categorizes books into an accessible system or a travel guide
that arranges a city’s attractions into different categories.
Language itself provides a rough analogy to the declaring
code’s  organizational  feature,  for  language  itself  divides
into sets of concepts a world that in certain respects other
languages might have divided differently.  The developers
of Java, for example, decided to place a method called “draw
image” inside of a class called “graphics.”

Consider  a  comprehensive,  albeit  farfetched,  analogy
that illustrates how the API is actually used by a program-
mer.  Imagine that you can, via certain keystrokes, instruct
a robot to move to a particular file cabinet, to open a certain
drawer, and to pick out a specific recipe.  With the proper
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion discussing the concept of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). It delves into the functionality and organizational structure of APIs, using analogies to explain complex ideas.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis/Explanation</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1023

558 U. S.

November 16, 2009

by  Rule  38(a)  and  to  submit  petitions  in  compliance  with  Rule
33.1  of  the  Rules  of  this  Court.

No.  09–7103.  In  re  Caldwell;  and
No. 09–7202.  In re Medel.  Petitions for writs of habeas cor

pus  denied.

No.  09–6467.  In  re  Minix;  and
No.  09–7030.  In  re  Maxwell.  Petitions  for  writs  of  manda

mus  denied.

No.  09–6501.  In  re  Woerth;
No.  09–6538.  In  re  Van  Broughton;  and
No. 09–7006.  In re Minneman.  Petitions for writs of manda

mus  and/or  prohibition  denied.

No.  09–6412.  In  re  Alpine;  and
No.  09–6528.  In  re  Alpine.  Motions  of  petitioner  for  leave
to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  petitions  for  writs  of
mandamus  and/or  prohibition  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.

Certiorari  Granted

No.  09–158.  Magwood  v.  Patterson,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.
11th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted  limited  to  Question  1  presented  by
the  petition.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  968.

Certiorari  Denied

No.  08–1378.  CHF  Industries,  Inc.  v.  Park  B.  Smith,  Inc.
C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.
Appx.  411.

No.  08–1564.  American  Civil  Liberties  Union  of  Florida
et  al.  v.  Miami-Dade  County  School  Board  et  al.  C.  A.
11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  1177.

No.  08–1566.  McComb  et  al.  v.  Crehan  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  507.

No.  08–10440.  Ford  v.  Christiana  Care  Health  Systems

et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10625.  GwanJun  Kim  v.  Department  of  Labor

et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:25:22
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CV

Pagination Table: RULES1

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

1163

things that are in the possession, custody, or control
of the party and that the disclosing party may use
to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment;

(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed
by the disclosing party, making available for inspection
and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other
evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from
disclosure, on which such computation is based, includ-
ing materials bearing on the nature and extent of inju-
ries suffered; and

(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any
insurance agreement under which any person carrying
on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or
all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or
to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy
the judgment.

(E) The following categories of proceedings are ex-

empt from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1):

(i) an action for review on an administrative

record;

(ii) a petition for habeas corpus or other proceed-
ing to challenge a criminal conviction or sentence;
(iii) an action brought without counsel by a per-
son in custody of the United States, a state, or a
state subdivision;

(iv) an action to enforce or quash an administra-

tive summons or subpoena;

(v) an action by the United States to recover ben-

eﬁt payments;

(vi) an action by the United States to collect on a

student loan guaranteed by the United States;

(vii) a proceeding ancillary to proceedings in

other courts; and

(viii) an action to enforce an arbitration award.
These disclosures must be made at or within 14 days
after the Rule 26(f) conference unless a different time is
set by stipulation or court order, or unless a party ob-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically regarding initial disclosures in civil procedure. It outlines what information must be disclosed and exceptions to this rule.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules/Procedural Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

31

Opinion of the Court

can  address  the  problem  of  partisan  gerrymandering
because it must.”  585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12).  That is
not  the  test  of  our  authority  under  the  Constitution;  that
document instead “confines the federal courts to a properly
judicial role.”  Town of  Chester  v.  Laroe Estates, Inc., 581
U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 4).

What the appellees and dissent seek is an unprecedented
expansion of judicial power.  We have never struck down a
partisan  gerrymander  as  unconstitutional—despite  vari-
ous  requests  over  the  past  45  years.  The  expansion  of
judicial  authority  would  not  be  into  just  any  area  of  con-
troversy,  but  into  one  of  the  most  intensely  partisan  as-
pects  of  American  political  life.  That  intervention  would
be  unlimited  in  scope  and  duration—it  would  recur  over
and over again around the country with each new round of
districting,  for  state  as  well  as  federal  representatives.
Consideration of the impact of today’s ruling on democratic
principles  cannot  ignore  the  effect  of  the  unelected  and
politically  unaccountable  branch  of  the  Federal  Govern-
ment assuming such an extraordinary and unprecedented
role.  See post, at 32–33.

Our  conclusion  does  not  condone  excessive  partisan
gerrymandering.  Nor  does  our  conclusion  condemn  com-
plaints  about  districting  to  echo  into  a  void.    The  States,
for example, are actively addressing the issue on a number
of  fronts.  In  2015,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Florida  struck
down that State’s congressional districting plan as a viola-
tion  of  the  Fair  Districts  Amendment  to  the  Florida  Con-
stitution.  League  of  Women  Voters  of  Florida  v.  Detzner,
172 So. 3d 363 (2015).  The dissent wonders why we can’t
do the same.  See post, at 31.  The answer is that there is
no  “Fair  Districts  Amendment”  to  the  Federal  Constitu-
tion.  Provisions  in  state  statutes  and  state  constitutions
can  provide  standards  and  guidance  for  state  courts  to
apply.  (We do not understand how the dissent can main-
tain that a provision saying that no districting plan “shall
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the issue of partisan gerrymandering and the Court's decision not to intervene.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Opinion of the Court

II
The  Ninth  Circuit’s  interpretation  is  incompatible  with
the text of §1326(d).  That section provides that defendants
charged  with  unlawful  reentry  “may  not”  challenge  their
underlying  removal  orders  “unless”  they  “demonstrat[e]”
that three conditions are met: (1) they have “exhausted any
administrative remedies,” (2) they were “deprived . . . of the
opportunity  for  judicial  review,”  and  (3)  “the  entry  of  the
order was fundamentally unfair.”  8 U. S. C. §1326(d).  The
requirements  are  connected  by  the  conjunctive  “and,”
meaning defendants must meet all three.  When Congress
uses  “mandatory  language”  in  an  administrative  exhaus-
tion provision, “a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust.”
Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 632, 639 (2016).  Yet that is what
the Ninth Circuit’s rule does.

Without the benefit of the Ninth Circuit’s extrastatutory
exception, §1326(d)’s first two procedural requirements are
not satisfied just because a noncitizen was removed for an
offense that did not in fact render him removable.  Indeed,
the  substantive  validity  of  the  removal  order  is  quite  dis-
tinct from whether the noncitizen exhausted his adminis-
trative remedies (by appealing the immigration judge’s de-
cision  to  the  BIA)  or  was  deprived  of  the  opportunity  for
judicial review (by filing a petition for review of a BIA deci-
sion with a Federal Court of Appeals).

III
Palomar-Santiago raises two counterarguments based on
the text of §1326(d).2  Neither is persuasive.  First, he con-
tends that further administrative review of a removal order

——————

2 Palomar-Santiago  separately  argues  that  the  offense  defined  by
§1326(a) includes as an element the defendant’s previous lawful removal
such that unlawful removals cannot support a conviction.  United States
v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U. S. 828, 834–835 (1987), rejected a similar ar-
gument  with respect  to  the  pre-AEDPA  version  of  §1326(a).    Palomar-
Santiago  now  presses  various  distinctions  between  that  case  and  this,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites a specific section of the U.S. Code and discusses legal precedent.  The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is not a table of contents, introductory paragraph, or other non-sequential text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.

v. GOLDSMITH
KAGAN, J., dissenting

not have been more different.

A thought experiment may pound the point home.  Sup-
pose you were the editor of Vanity Fair or Condé Nast, pub-
lishing an article about Prince.  You need, of course, some
kind of picture.  An employee comes to you with two options:
the Goldsmith photo, the Warhol portrait.  Would you say
that you don’t really care?  That the employee is free to flip
a coin?  In the majority’s view, you apparently would.  Its
opinion, as further discussed below, is built on the idea that
both are just “portraits of Prince” that may equivalently be
“used  to  depict  Prince  in  magazine  stories  about  Prince.”
Ante, at 12–13; see ante, at 22–23, and n. 11, 27, n. 15, 33,
35.  All I can say is that it’s a good thing the majority isn’t
in the magazine business.  Of course you would care!  You
would be drawn aesthetically to one, or instead to the other.
You would want to convey the message of one, or instead of
the other.  The point here is not that one is better and the
other worse.  The point is that they are fundamentally dif-
ferent.  You would see them not as “substitute[s],” but as
divergent  ways  to  (in  the  majority’s  mantra)  “illustrate  a
magazine about Prince with a portrait of Prince.”  Ante, at
15, 33; see ante, at 22–23, and n. 11, 27, n. 15, 35.  Or else
you (like the majority) would not have much of a future in
magazine publishing.

In any event, the editors of Vanity Fair and Condé Nast
understood the difference—the gulf in both aesthetics and
meaning—between  the  Goldsmith  photo  and  the  Warhol
portrait.  They knew about the photo; but they wanted the
portrait.  They saw that as between the two works, Warhol
had effected a transformation.

B
The question in this case is whether that transformation
should matter in assessing whether Warhol made “fair use”
of  Goldsmith’s  copyrighted  photo.    The  answer  is  yes—it
should push toward (although not dictate) a finding of fair
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It argues that the aesthetic and meaning differences between two portraits of Prince should be considered in a fair use analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

domestic  sale  of  the  copy.  A  publisher  such  as  Wiley
would  be  free  to  print  its  books  abroad,  allow  their  im-
portation  and  sale  within  the  United  States,  but  prohibit
students  from  later  selling  their  used  texts  at  a  campus
bookstore.  We see no way, however, to reconcile this half
geographical/half-nongeographical  interpretation  with  the
language  of  the  phrase,  “lawfully  made  under  this  title.”
As  a  matter  of  English,  it  would  seem  that  those  five
words either do cover copies lawfully made abroad or they
do not.

In  sum,  we  believe  that  geographical  interpretations
create  more  linguistic  problems  than  they  resolve.    And
considerations  of  simplicity  and  coherence  tip  the  purely
linguistic balance in Kirtsaeng’s, nongeographical, favor.

B
Both  historical  and  contemporary  statutory  context  in
dicate that Congress, when writing the present version of
§109(a),  did  not  have  geography  in  mind.  In  respect  to
history,  we  compare  §109(a)’s  present  language  with  the
language  of  its  immediate  predecessor.    That  predecessor
said:

“[N]othing  in  this  Act  shall  be  deemed  to  forbid,  pre
vent,  or  restrict  the  transfer  of  any  copy  of  a  copy
righted work the possession of which has been lawfully
obtained.”  Copyright  Act  of  1909,  §41,  35  Stat.  1084
(emphasis added).

See  also  Copyright  Act  of  1947,  §27,  61  Stat.  660.    The
predecessor says nothing about geography (and Wiley does
not  argue  that  it  does).    So  we  ask  whether  Congress,  in
changing  its  language  implicitly  introduced  a  geograph-
ical limitation that previously was lacking.  See also Part
II–C,  infra  (discussing  1909  codification  of  common-law
principle).

A comparison of language indicates that it did not.  The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of copyright law related to the sale of used textbooks. It's part of a larger legal argument and contains legal reasoning and citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>