<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1155

558 U. S.

January 19, 2010

No. 09–7619.  Van Swait v.  Evans, Warden (four judgments).

C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7625.  Singleton  v.  Johnson  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  783.

No.  09–7651.  Nall  v.  McCall,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  101.

No.  09–7655.  Evans  v.  Mercy  Medical  Center.  Ct.  App.

Cal.,  5th  App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7694.  Charles v.  Michigan.  Ct. App. Mich.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7696.  Saquic-Sacche  v.  Holder,  Attorney  Gen

eral.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7701.  Golden  v.  Hubbell  Inc.  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  226.

No.  09–7761.  Laskey  v.  Vision  Infosoft.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7790.  White  v.  Florida  Department  of  Highway
Safety  and  Motor  Vehicles.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  532.

No. 09–7830.  Watts v.  Wilson et al.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7866.  Restituto  Embuscado  v.  DC  Comics  et  al.
C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  347  Fed.
Appx.  700.

No. 09–7873.  Foster v. Alabama.  Ct. Crim. App. Ala.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  57  So.  3d  207.

No.  09–7893.  Johnson  v.  Cook  Inc.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  661.

No.  09–7921.  Blount  v.  Hardy,  Correctional  Administra
tor,  Nash  Correctional  Institution.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  271.

No.  09–7985.  Cresswell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

Taylor,  on  the  other  hand,  is  eligible  for  loan  for-
giveness—but  only  $10,000,  rather  than  the  maximum
$20,000.  That  is  because,  despite  now  having  an  annual
income of less than $25,000, he never received a Pell Grant.
See App. 183, Complaint ¶61.  Thus, individuals with an-
nual income up to five times greater than his are eligible for
twice as much loan forgiveness as he is if they ever received
a Pell Grant.

Accordingly, both Brown and Taylor object to certain ele-
ments of the Plan—Brown to its limitation to federally held
loans, and Taylor to the additional relief it doles out based
on prior Pell Grants, with no regard for current income.  Be-
cause  the  Department  did  not  engage  in  negotiated  rule-
making or notice and comment, however, Brown and Taylor
had no formal opportunity to voice their views on the Plan
prior to its adoption.

Alleging  that  the  law  entitles  them  to  such  an  oppor-
tunity, Brown and Taylor brought this action in the U. S.
District  Court  for  the  Northern  District  of  Texas.    Their
one-count  complaint  claims  that  the  Plan  is  unlawful  be-
cause  the  Department  promulgated  it  without  observing
the requirements of negotiated rulemaking and notice and
comment.  As a result, they claim, we should “[v]acate and
set aside the” Plan under 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(D).  App. 186.

Brown and Taylor recognize that the HEROES Act sup-
plies  exemptions  from  these  procedural  requirements.
They argue, however, that an action of the Secretary falls
within these exemptions only if it is substantively author-
ized by the Act; the Secretary, in their view, cannot merely
invoke the “HEROES Act” to bypass negotiated rulemaking
and notice and comment.  According to Brown and Taylor,
the Act does not substantively authorize the Plan, and so
the Secretary was required to follow these procedures.

The  District  Court  agreed  with  Brown  and  Taylor—in
part.  It rebuffed their central argument that the HEROES
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the arguments made by plaintiffs Brown and Taylor regarding the legality of a loan forgiveness plan.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MILLER v. ALABAMA

Opinion of the Court

fenses involving a juvenile.”  Id., at 5, ___ S. W. 3d, at ___.
Two justices dissented.  They noted that Jackson was not
the  shooter  and  that  “any  evidence  of  intent  to  kill  was
severely  lacking.”
Id.,  at  10,  ___  S. W.  3d,  at  ___
(Danielson,  J.,  dissenting).    And  they  argued  that  Jack-
son’s  mandatory  sentence  ran  afoul  of  Graham’s  admoni-
tion  that  “ ‘[a]n  offender’s  age  is  relevant  to  the  Eighth
Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take
defendants’  youthfulness  into  account  at  all  would  be
flawed.’ ”  Id., at 10–11, ___ S. W. 3d, at ___ (quoting Gra-
ham, 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 25)).2

B
Like Jackson, petitioner Evan Miller was 14 years old at
the time of his crime.  Miller had by then been in and out
of foster care because his mother suffered from alcoholism
and drug addiction and his stepfather abused him.  Miller,
too,  regularly  used  drugs  and  alcohol;  and  he  had  at-
tempted suicide four times, the first when he was six years
old.  See  E.  J.  M.  v.  State,  928  So. 2d  1077,  1081  (Ala.
Crim.  App.  2004)  (Cobb,  J.,  concurring  in  result);  App.  in
No. 10–9646, pp. 26–28 (hereinafter Miller App.).

One  night  in  2003,  Miller  was  at  home  with  a  friend,
Colby  Smith,  when  a  neighbor,  Cole  Cannon,  came  to
make  a  drug  deal  with  Miller’s  mother.    See  6  Record  in
No. 10–9646, p. 1004.  The two boys followed Cannon back
to  his  trailer,  where  all  three  smoked  marijuana  and

——————

2 For  the  first  time  in  this  Court,  Arkansas  contends  that  Jackson’s
sentence  was  not  mandatory.    On  its  view,  state  law  then  in  effect
allowed the trial judge to suspend the life-without-parole sentence and
commit Jackson to the Department of Human Services for a “training-
school  program,”  at  the  end  of  which  he  could  be  placed  on  probation.
Brief  for  Respondent  in  No.  10–9647,  pp.  36–37  (hereinafter  Arkansas
Brief)  (citing  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §12–28–403(b)(2)  (1999)).    But  Arkansas
never  raised  that  objection  in  the  state  courts,  and  they  treated  Jack-
son’s sentence as mandatory.  We abide by that interpretation of state
law.  See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 690–691 (1975).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses a case (Miller v. Alabama) and cites legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U51

[09-26-01 10:31:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

510

BECK v. PRUPIS

Stevens, J., dissenting

Assn., 37 N. J. 507, 516, 181 A. 2d 774, 780 (1962) (“[S]o much
of defendants’ motion as sought a dismissal of the complaint
as being insufﬁcient in law must fail,” but sustaining defend-
ants’ unrelated privilege defense); Halberstam v. Welch, 705
F. 2d 472, 489 (CADC 1983). The cases cited, in short, sim-
ply do not do the work the Court would have them do.4

Furthermore, at least some of the cases cited by the Court
speak generally of harm via any overt act, and not exclu-
sively of tortious acts.5
Indeed, some of the sources cited

4 The Court suggests that three of the cases cited deny recovery because
there was no actionable tort—and not, as I have suggested, because there
was no illegal agreement or because there was no injury. See ante, at
504–505, n. 8. At best, the Court’s reading only demonstrates that in
these cases the question whether the harmful overt act was a tort, on the
one hand, and the question whether there was any illegal agreement or
harm, on the other hand, are questions of overlapping substance. To the
extent that is true, however, the point does not support the Court’s view.
Rather, it only proves that the cases cited do not parse out elements (a),
(b), and (c) as the Court suggests they do. Moreover, as I stated at the
outset, both the Court and I assume that there has been an illegal conspir-
acy in this case.
If the cases the Court cites show that there was no
illegal agreement at all because there was no actionable tort, then the
cases cited by the Court simply contradict the central premise of the pres-
ent case, and are therefore inapposite.

5 See Earp v. Detroit, 16 Mich. App. 271, 275, 167 N. W. 2d 841, 845
(1969) (“There is no civil action for conspiracy alone. . . . It must be coupled
with the commission of acts which damaged the plaintiff ”); Lesperance v.
North American Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 336, 345, 31 Cal. Rptr.
873, 878 (1963) (“ ‘It is the wrong done and the damage suffered pursuant
to . . . the conspiracy itself . . . .
[T]he complaint must state facts which
show that a civil wrong was done’ ”); Chapman v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp.
769, 772 (WD Mo. 1957) (“There can be no recovery for the simple exist-
ence of a civil conspiracy. The action is for damages caused by acts com-
mitted pursuant to a formed conspiracy. . . . Unless something is actually
done by the conspirators pursuant to their combination . . . no civil action
lies against anyone”); Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407, 410 (1861) (“[I]t must
be shown that the defendants have done some wrong”); Royster v. Baker,
365 S. W. 2d 496, 499 (Mo. 1963) (“The gist of the action is not the conspir-
acy, but the wrong done by acts in furtherance of the conspiracy”); Halber-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

CRUZ v. ARIZONA

Syllabus

nal  Procedure  32.1(g)  because  Lynch  did  not  result  in  “a  signifcant
change in  the law.”  That  court reasoned that  Lynch was not  a signif-
cant change in the law because it relied on Simmons, which was clearly
established  law  at  the  time  of  Cruz's  trial.  It  so  held  even  though
Lynch overruled binding Arizona precedent foreclosing Simmons relief
for  Arizona  capital  defendants,  and  even  though  the  Arizona  Supreme
Court  had  previously  explained  that  the  “archetype”  of  a  “signifcant
change  in  the  law”  is  the  overruling  of  “previously  binding  case  law.”
State  v.  Shrum,  220  Ariz.  115,  118,  203  P.  3d  1175,  1178.  While  the
court  reasoned  that  a  signifcant  change  in  the  application  of  a  law  is
not the same as a signifcant change in the law itself, Arizona can point
to  no  other  Rule  32.1(g)  decision  supporting  that  distinction.  This  in-
terpretation of Rule 32.1(g) is entirely new and conficts with prior Ari-
zona  case  law.  The  novelty  arises  from  the  way  in  which  the  Arizona
Supreme Court disregarded the effect of Lynch on Arizona law.  Ordi-
narily,  Arizona  courts  applying  Rule  32.1(g)  focus  on  how  a  decision
changes the law that is operative in the State.  Here, however, the Ari-
zona  Supreme  Court  disregarded  the  many  state  precedents  overruled
by Lynch, focusing instead on whether Lynch had wrought a signifcant
change in federal law.  Because the Arizona Supreme Court's interpre-
tation  is  so  novel  and  unforeseeable,  it  cannot  constitute  an  adequate
state procedural ground for the challenged decision.

Arizona's interpretation generates a catch-22 for Cruz and other simi-
larly  situated  capital  defendants  that  only  serves  to  compound  its  nov-
elty.  To  obtain  relief  under  Rule  32.1(g),  a  defendant  must  establish
not just a signifcant change in the law but also that the law in question
applies retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288.  Prior to the
Arizona  Supreme  Court's  decision  below,  it  was  possible  to  show  that
Lynch  both  was  a  “signifcant  change  in  the  law”  and  satisfed  retro-
activity  because  it  merely  applied  Simmons.  On  the  interpretation
adopted below, however, the argument that Lynch applied “settled” fed-
eral  law  for  retroactivity  purposes  also  implies  that  Lynch  does  not
represent  a  “signifcant  change  in  the  law.”  Earlier  Rule  32.1(g)  deci-
sions did not generate this catch-22.  Given the Court's conclusion that
the Arizona  Supreme Court's  application of  Rule 32.1(g)  to Lynch  is so
novel and unfounded that it does not constitute an adequate state proce-
dural ground, it is unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the
decision below is also independent of federal law.  Pp. 25–29.

(b)  Counterarguments  presented  in  this  case  offer  various  reformul-
ations of  the argument that Lynch  was not a “signifcant  change in the
law”  for  Rule  32.1(g)  purposes,  but  they  fail  to  grapple  with  the  basic
point  that  Lynch  reversed  previously  binding  Arizona  Supreme  Court
precedent.  The fact that Lynch was a summary reversal did not justify

Page Proof Pending Publication
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal brief or argument, specifically focusing on the case of Cruz v. Arizona. It delves into the interpretation of a legal rule (Rule 32.1(g)) and its application to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1177

(iii)  any  order  on  rehearing,  including  the  caption
showing  the  name  of  the  issuing  court,  the  title  and
number of the case, and the date of entry;

(iv)  the  judgment  sought  to  be  reviewed  if  the  date
of  its  entry  is  different  from  the  date  of  the  opinion
or  order  required  in  sub-subparagraph  (i)  of  this
subparagraph;

(v)  material  required  by  subparagraphs  1(f )  or

1(g)(i); and

(vi)  any  other  material  the  petitioner  believes  essen

tial to understand the petition.

If the material required by this subparagraph is voluminous,
it  may  be  presented  in  a  separate  volume  or  volumes  with
appropriate covers.

2.  All  contentions  in  support  of  a  petition  for  a  writ  of
certiorari shall be set out in the body of the petition, as pro
vided  in  subparagraph  1(h)  of  this  Rule.  No  separate  brief
in  support of  a petition  for  a writ  of certiorari  may be  ﬁled,
and the Clerk will not ﬁle any petition for a writ of certiorari
to which any supporting brief is annexed or appended.

3.  A  petition  for  a  writ  of  certiorari  should  be  stated
brieﬂy  and  in  plain  terms  and  may  not  exceed  the  word  or
page limitations speciﬁed in Rule 33.

4.  The  failure  of  a  petitioner  to  present  with  accuracy,
brevity,  and  clarity  whatever  is  essential  to  ready  and  ade
quate understanding of the points requiring consideration is
sufﬁcient reason for the Court to deny a petition.

5.  If the Clerk determines that a petition submitted timely
and in good faith is in a form that does not comply with this
Rule  or  with  Rule  33  or  Rule  34,  the  Clerk  will  return  it
with a letter indicating the deﬁciency.  A corrected petition
submitted in accordance with Rule 29.2 no more than 60 days
after  the  date  of  the  Clerk’s  letter  will  be  deemed  timely.

Rule 15.	  Briefs in Opposition; Reply Briefs;

Supplemental Briefs

1.  A brief in opposition to a petition for a writ of certiorari
may be ﬁled by the respondent in any case, but is not manda
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a set of rules, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court regarding petitions for a writ of certiorari.  It outlines the requirements for formatting and content of such petitions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Rules and Regulations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

LUCKY BRAND DUNGAREES, INC. v.
MARCEL FASHIONS GROUP, INC.
Syllabus

Action but did not.  The District Court granted Lucky Brand’s motion
to dismiss.  The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that
“defense  preclusion”  prohibited  Lucky  Brand  from  raising  an  unliti-
gated defense that it should have raised earlier.

Held: Because  Marcel’s  2011  Action  challenged  different  conduct—and
raised different claims—from the 2005 Action, Marcel cannot preclude
Lucky Brand from raising new defenses.  Pp. 6–12.

(a) This case asks whether so-called “defense preclusion” is a valid
application of res judicata: a term comprising the doctrine of issue pre-
clusion, which precludes a party from relitigating an issue actually de-
cided in a prior action and necessary to the judgment, and the doctrine
of  claim  preclusion,  which  prevents  parties  from  raising  issues  that
could have been raised and decided in a prior action.  Any preclusion
of defenses must, at a minimum, satisfy the strictures of issue preclu-
sion or claim preclusion.  See, e.g., Davis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 423, 428.
Here,  issue  preclusion  does  not  apply,  so  the  causes  of  action  must
share a “common nucleus of operative fact[s]” for claim preclusion to
apply,  Restatement  (Second)  of  Judgments  §24,  Comment  b,  p.  199.
Pp. 6–8.

(b) Because the two suits here involved different marks and differ-
ent conduct occurring at different times, they did not share a “common
nucleus  of  operative  facts.”    The  2005  claims  depended  on  Lucky
Brand’s  alleged  use  of  “Get  Lucky.”    But  in  the  2011  Action,  Marcel
alleged that the infringement was Lucky Brand’s use of its other marks
containing the word “Lucky,” not any use of “Get Lucky” itself.  The
conduct  in  the  2011  Action  also  occurred  after  the  conclusion  of  the
2005 Action.  But claim preclusion generally “ ‘does not bar claims that
are  predicated  on  events  that  postdate  the  filing  of  the  initial  com-
plaint,’ ” Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. ___, ___, be-
cause events occurring after a plaintiff files suit often give rise to new
“operative facts” creating a new claim to relief.  Pp. 8–10.

(c) Marcel claims that treatises and this Court’s cases support a ver-
sion of “defense preclusion” that extends to the facts of this case.  But
none of those authorities describe scenarios applicable here, and they
are unlikely to stand for anything more than that traditional claim or
issue  preclusion  principles  may  bar  defenses  raised  in  a  subsequent
suit—principles that do not bar Lucky Brand’s release  defense here.
Pp. 10–12.

898 F. 3d 232, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

3

Syllabus

not  meaningfully  burden  the  Church’s  free  exercise  rights.    Absent
any such burden, the argument continues, the Department is free to
follow  the  State’s  antiestablishment  objection  to  providing  funds  di-
rectly  to  a  church.    But,  as  even  the  Department  acknowledges,  the
Free  Exercise Clause  protects  against  “indirect  coercion or  penalties
on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.”  Lyng,
485  U. S., at  450.  Trinity  Lutheran is not claiming any entitlement
to  a  subsidy.   It  is  asserting  a  right  to  participate  in  a  government
benefit  program  without  having  to  disavow  its  religious  character.
The express discrimination against religious exercise here is not the
denial of a grant, but rather the refusal to allow the Church—solely
because  it  is  a  church—to  compete  with  secular  organizations  for  a
grant.  Pp. 9–11.

(c) The Department tries to sidestep this Court’s precedents by ar-
guing that this case is instead controlled by Locke v. Davey.  It is not.
In  Locke,  the  State  of  Washington  created  a  scholarship  program  to
assist high-achieving students with the costs of postsecondary educa-
tion.  Scholarship recipients were free to use state funds at accredited
religious  and  non-religious  schools  alike,  but  they  could  not  use  the
funds  to  pursue  a  devotional  theology  degree.  At  the  outset,  the
Court  made  clear  that  Locke  was  not  like  the  cases  in  which  the
Court  struck  down  laws  requiring  individuals  to  “choose  between
their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”  540 U. S.,
at  720–721.  Davey  was  not  denied  a  scholarship  because  of  who  he
was; he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do.
Here  there  is no  question  that  Trinity  Lutheran was  denied  a  grant
simply because of what it is—a church.

The Court in Locke also stated that Washington’s restriction on the
use of its funds was in keeping with the State’s antiestablishment in-
terest in not using taxpayer funds to pay for the training of clergy, an
“essentially religious endeavor,” id., at 721.  Here, nothing of the sort
can  be  said  about  a  program  to  use  recycled  tires  to  resurface  play-
grounds.  At any rate, the Court took account of Washington’s anties-
tablishment interest only after determining that the scholarship pro-
gram  did  not  “require  students  to  choose  between  their  religious
beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”  Id., at 720–721.  There
is no dispute that Trinity Lutheran is put to the choice between being
a church and receiving a government benefit.  Pp. 11–14.

(d) The  Department’s  discriminatory  policy  does  not  survive  the
“most  rigorous”  scrutiny  that  this  Court  applies  to  laws  imposing
special disabilities on account of religious status.  Lukumi, 508 U. S.,
at 546.  That standard demands a state interest “of the highest order”
to  justify  the  policy  at  issue.  McDaniel,  435  U. S.,  at  628  (internal
quotation  marks  omitted).    Yet  the  Department  offers  nothing  more
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal argument, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court brief. It discusses the case of Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer and argues against the Department of Natural Resources' policy of excluding religious organizations from a grant program.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Court Brief Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

GORSUCH, J., concurring

that Congress will make an “[e]xtraordinary gran[t] of reg-
ulatory authority” through “vague language” in “ ‘a long-ex-
tant  statute.’ ”  Ante,  at  18–20  (quoting  Utility  Air,  573
U. S., at 324).  Recently, too, this Court found a clear state-
ment  lacking  when  OSHA  sought  to  impose  a  nationwide
COVID–19 vaccine mandate based on a statutory provision
that was adopted 40 years before the pandemic and that fo-
cused on conditions specific to the workplace rather than a
problem faced by society at large.  See NFIB v. OSHA, 595
U. S., at ___ (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3).  Of
course, sometimes old statutes may be written in ways that
apply to new and previously unanticipated situations.  See
Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 499 (1985).
But an agency’s attempt to deploy an old statute focused on
one problem to solve a new and different problem may also
be  a  warning  sign  that  it  is  acting  without  clear  congres-
sional authority.  See ante, at 18.

Third, courts may examine the agency’s past interpreta-
tions of the relevant statute.  See ante, at 20–21.  A “con-
temporaneous” and long-held Executive Branch interpreta-
tion of a statute is entitled to some weight  as evidence of
the statute’s original charge to an agency.  United States v.
Philbrick, 120 U. S. 52, 59 (1887).  Conversely, in NFIB v.
OSHA,  the  Court  found  it  “telling  that  OSHA,  in  its  half
century  of  existence,  ha[d]  never  before  adopted  a  broad
public health regulation” under the statute that the agency
sought to invoke as authority for a nationwide vaccine man-
date.  595 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8); ante, at 18; see also
Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 158–159 (noting that for
decades the FDA had said it lacked statutory power to reg-
ulate cigarettes).  As the Court states today, “ ‘the want of
[an] assertion of power by those who presumably would be
alert’ ”  to  it  is  “ ‘significant  in  determining  whether  such
power  was  actually  conferred.’ ”    Ante,  at  21.    When  an
agency  claims  to  have  found  a  previously  “unheralded
power,”  its  assertion  generally  warrants  “a  measure  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of West Virginia v. EPA. It delves into the interpretation of congressional authority and agency power, citing previous cases and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

source and the navigable water,” then the permit require-
ment “does not apply.”  Id., at 54.  A pollutant is “from” a
point source only if a point source is the last “conveyance”
that conducted the pollutant to navigable waters.

The Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, supports Maui,
at least in respect to groundwater.  Reiterating the position
taken in a recent EPA “Interpretive Statement,” see 84 Fed.
Reg. 16810 (2019), he argues that, given the Act’s structure
and history, “a release of pollutants to groundwater is not
subject  to”  the  Act’s  permitting  requirement  “even  if  the
pollutants  subsequently  migrate  to  jurisdictional  surface
waters,” such as the ocean.  Brief for United States as Ami-
cus Curiae 12 (capitalization omitted).

We  agree  that  statutory  context  limits  the  reach  of  the
statutory phrase “from any point source” to a range of cir-
cumstances narrower than that which the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation  suggests.    At  the  same  time,  it  is  signifi-
cantly  broader  than  the  total  exclusion  of  all  discharges
through groundwater described by Maui and the Solicitor
General.

III
Virtually all water, polluted or not, eventually makes its
way to navigable water.  This is just as true for groundwa-
ter.  See generally 2 Van Nostrand’s Scientific Encyclopedia
2600  (10th  ed.  2008)  (defining  “Hydrology”).  Given  the
power  of  modern  science,  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  limitation,
“fairly traceable,” may well allow EPA to assert permitting
authority over the release of pollutants that reach naviga-
ble waters many years after their release (say, from a well
or pipe or compost heap) and in highly diluted forms.  See,
e.g.,  Brief  for  Aquatic  Scientists  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae
13–28.

The  respondents  suggest  that  the  standard  can  be  nar-
rowed by adding a “proximate cause” requirement.  That is,
to fall within the permitting provision, the discharge from
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of the Clean Water Act and its application to groundwater pollution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1008

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 6, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–7666. Geary v. McKinney et al. Sup. Ct. Colo.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7670. Deal v. Catoe, Director, South Carolina
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 168 F. 3d 481.

No. 99–7671. Gonzalez v. United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–7673. Schaefer v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 238 Ga. App. 594, 519 S. E. 2d 248.

No. 99–7676. Lindsey v. Catoe, Director, South Carolina
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 630.

No. 99–7677. Steele v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 741 So. 2d 487.

No. 99–7680. Valadez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7688. Antonio Gonzalez v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex.,

5th Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7696. Mann v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister et al.

Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7697. McLaughlin v. Cotner. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 410.

No. 99–7698.

Johnson v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 182 F. 3d 908.

No. 99–7700. Coombs v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–7705. Kulka v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–7706. Tunstall v. Kavanagh, Warden, et al. C. A.

4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1328.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

OHIO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.

Opinion of the Court

3
The plaintiffs also failed to prove that Amex’s antisteer-
ing  provisions  have  stifled  competition  among  credit-card
companies.  To the contrary, while these agreements have
been in place, the credit-card market experienced expand-
ing output and improved quality.  Amex’s business model
spurred  Visa  and  MasterCard  to  offer  new  premium  card
categories with higher rewards.  And it has increased the
availability  of  card  services,  including  free  banking  and
card-payment  services  for  low-income  customers  who
otherwise would not be served.  Indeed, between 1970 and
2001, the percentage of households with credit cards more
than quadrupled, and the proportion of households in the
bottom-income  quintile  with  credit  cards  grew  from  just
2% to over 38%.  See D. Evans & R. Schmalensee, Paying
With  Plastic:  The  Digital  Revolution  in  Buying  and  Bor-
rowing 88–89 (2d ed. 2005) (Paying With Plastic).

Nor have Amex’s antisteering provisions ended competi-
tion  between  credit-card  networks  with  respect  to  mer-
chant  fees.  Instead,  fierce  competition  between  networks
has constrained Amex’s ability to raise these fees and has,
at times, forced Amex to lower them.  For instance, when
Amex  raised  its  merchant  prices  between  2005  and  2010,
some  merchants  chose  to  leave  its  network.   88  F. Supp.
3d,  at  197.  And  when  its  remaining  merchants  com-
plained, Amex stopped raising its merchant prices.  Id., at
198.
In  another  instance  in  the  late  1980s  and  early
1990s,  competition  forced  Amex  to  offer  lower  merchant
fees  to  “everyday  spend”  merchants—supermarkets,  gas
stations,  pharmacies,  and  the  like—to  persuade  them  to
accept Amex.  See id., at 160–161, 202.

In  addition,  Amex’s  competitors  have  exploited  its
higher  merchant  fees  to  their  advantage.  By  charging
lower merchant fees, Visa, MasterCard, and Discover have
achieved  broader  merchant  acceptance—approximately  3
million  more  locations  than  Amex.    Id.,  at  204.    This
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the competitive landscape of the credit card market and Amex's anti-steering provisions. It provides arguments and evidence related to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Syllabus

that Colorado law can protect gay persons in acquiring products and
services  on  the  same  terms  and  conditions  as  are  offered  to  other
members of the public, the law must be applied in a manner that is
neutral toward religion.  To Phillips, his claim that using his artistic
skills  to  make  an  expressive  statement,  a  wedding  endorsement  in
his  own  voice  and  of  his  own  creation,  has  a  significant  First
Amendment  speech  component  and  implicates  his  deep  and  sincere
religious  beliefs.    His  dilemma  was  understandable  in  2012,  which
was  before  Colorado  recognized  the  validity  of  gay  marriages  per-
formed  in  the  State  and  before  this  Court  issued  United  States  v.
Windsor,  570  U. S.  744,  or  Obergefell.  Given  the  State’s  position  at
the  time,  there  is  some  force  to  Phillips’  argument  that  he  was  not
unreasonable  in  deeming  his  decision  lawful.    State  law  at  the  time
also  afforded  storekeepers  some  latitude  to  decline  to  create  specific
messages  they  considered  offensive.    Indeed,  while  the  instant  en-
forcement proceedings were pending, the State Civil Rights Division
concluded in at least three cases that a baker acted lawfully in declin-
ing  to  create  cakes  with  decorations  that  demeaned  gay  persons  or
gay marriages.  Phillips too  was entitled to a neutral and respectful
consideration  of  his  claims  in  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.
Pp. 9–12.

(b) That consideration was compromised, however, by the Commis-
sion’s  treatment  of  Phillips’  case,  which  showed  elements  of  a  clear
and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs moti-
vating his objection.  As the record shows, some of the commissioners
at  the  Commission’s  formal,  public  hearings  endorsed  the  view  that
religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere
or  commercial  domain,  disparaged  Phillips’  faith  as  despicable  and
characterized it as merely rhetorical, and compared his invocation of
his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Hol-
ocaust.  No commissioners objected to the comments.  Nor were they
mentioned  in  the  later  state-court  ruling  or  disavowed  in  the  briefs
filed here.  The comments thus cast doubt on the fairness and impar-
tiality of the Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case.

Another indication of hostility is the different treatment of Phillips’
case  and  the  cases  of  other  bakers  with  objections  to  anti-gay  mes-
sages who prevailed before  the Commission.  The Commission ruled
against  Phillips  in  part  on  the  theory  that  any  message  on  the  re-
quested wedding cake would be attributed to the customer, not to the
baker.  Yet the Division did not address this point in any of the cases
involving  requests  for  cakes  depicting  anti-gay  marriage  symbolism.
The Division also considered that each bakery was willing to sell oth-
er products to the prospective customers, but the Commission found
Phillips’  willingness  to  do  the  same  irrelevant.    The  State  Court  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the primary content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Ante, at 16; see Brief for Petitioners 48 (“The differing per-
spectives of Petitioners and State Board Respondents are a
product of their different relationships to the State”).  The
Court’s position rests in part on the assumption that lead-
ers  of  the  General  Assembly  have  a  unique  interest  that
should be represented in the litigation.  As noted, however,
the case’s procedural posture forecloses that argument be-
cause petitioners forfeited it.4

In any event, the difference in perspective the Court per-
ceives boils down only to a disagreement over trial strategy.
As the Court rightly concedes, the State has a strong inter-
est in the orderly administration of its elections.  See ante,
at 16 (acknowledging state respondents’ interest in “stabil-
ity  and  certainty”  in  an  upcoming  election).  That  is  not,
however, the only state interest that state respondents, rep-
resented by the attorney general, sought to defend.  The at-
torney general has insisted all along that the interests he
seeks to represent, and indeed is required to represent un-
der  state  law,  include  defending  the  constitutionality  of
North Carolina laws like the voter-identification law at is-
sue here.  See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §114–2.  These state
interests  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  The  attorney  gen-
eral’s choice to emphasize the State’s interest in election ad-
ministration  at  a  particular  stage  of  the  litigation,  while
simultaneously maintaining a firm position on the consti-
tutionality of S. B. 824, was merely a choice about litigation
strategy.  It is a choice with which petitioners might disa-
gree, but it does not render state respondents’ representa-
tion inadequate.  See 7C Wright, Miller, & Kane §1909 (“A
mere difference of opinion concerning the tactics with which

——————

4 The argument that petitioners may intervene to represent a different
“perspective”  might  have  been  a  better  fit  for  permissive  intervention
under  Rule  24(b),  rather  than  intervention  as  a  matter  of  right  under
Rule 24(a)(2).  Petitioners, however, did not ask this Court to review the
District Court’s conclusion that they were not entitled to permissive in-
tervention.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific laws and court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MALWAREBYTES, INC. v. ENIGMA SOFTWARE
GROUP USA, LLC
Statement of THOMAS, J.

The decision is one of the few where courts have relied on
purpose and policy to deny immunity under §230.  But the
court’s  decision  to  stress  purpose  and  policy  is  familiar.
Courts have long emphasized nontextual arguments when
interpreting §230, leaving questionable precedent in their
wake.

I agree with the Court’s decision not to take up this case.
I write to explain why, in an appropriate case, we should
consider  whether  the  text  of  this  increasingly  important
statute aligns with the current state of immunity enjoyed
by Internet platforms.

I

Enacted  at  the  dawn  of  the  dot-com  era,  §230  contains
two  subsections  that  protect  computer  service  providers
from  some  civil  and  criminal  claims.    The  first  is  defini-
tional.  It states, “No provider or user of an interactive com-
puter service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any  information  provided  by  another  information  content
provider.”  §230(c)(1).  This provision ensures that a com-
pany (like an e-mail provider) can host and transmit third-
party content without subjecting itself to the liability that
sometimes attaches to the publisher or speaker of unlawful
content.  The  second subsection  provides  direct  immunity
from some civil liability.  It states that no computer service
provider “shall be held liable” for (A) good-faith acts to re-
strict  access  to,  or  remove,  certain  types  of  objectionable
content;  or  (B)  giving  consumers  tools  to  filter  the  same
types of content.  §230(c)(2).  This limited protection enables
companies  to  create  community  guidelines  and  remove
harmful content without worrying about legal reprisal.

Congress  enacted  this  statute  against  specific  back-
ground legal principles.  See Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co.,
543 U. S. 481, 487 (2005) (interpreting a law by looking to
the “backdrop against which Congress” acted).  Tradition-
ally, laws governing illegal content distinguished between
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or commentary on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. It discusses the purpose and policy behind the statute, its subsections, and the legal context in which it was enacted.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Commentary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

27

Opinion of the Court

with a religious mission entrusts a teacher with the respon-
sibility of educating and forming students in the faith, judi-
cial intervention into disputes between the school and the
teacher threatens the school’s independence in a way that
the First Amendment does not allow.

*

*

*

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
in  each  case  is  reversed,  and  the  cases  are  remanded  for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

GORSUCH, J., concurring

with  the  States  and  Congress,  not  OSHA.    In  saying  this
much, we do not impugn the intentions behind the agency’s
mandate.  Instead,  we  only  discharge  our  duty  to  enforce
the law’s demands when it comes to the question who may
govern the lives of 84 million Americans.  Respecting those
demands may be trying in times of stress.  But if this Court
were to abide them only in more tranquil conditions, decla-
rations  of  emergencies  would  never  end  and  the  liberties
our  Constitution’s  separation  of  powers  seeks  to  preserve
would amount to little.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

549

Opinion of the Court

wick’s law and the Treason Clause are different from Article
38.07; with the ﬁrst two laws, “two witnesses [were] nec-
essary to support a conviction,” ibid. (emphasis added),
whereas with Article 38.07, the victim’s testimony plus cor-
roboration is not “necessary to convict in every case,” post,
at 560 (emphasis added). But a closer look at Fenwick’s law
and at the Treason Clause shows that this supposed dis-
tinction is simply incorrect. Fenwick’s law stated that no
person could be convicted of high treason “but by and
upon the Oaths and Testimony of Two lawfull Witnesses . . .
unlesse the Party indicted and arraigned or tryed shall
willingly without violence in open Court confesse the
.” See
same or shall stand Mute or refuse to plead .
n. 15, supra (emphasis added). And the Treason Clause, of
course, states that “No Person shall be convicted of Trea-
son unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same
overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.” U. S. Const.,
Art. III, § 3 (emphasis added). Plainly, in neither instance
were two witnesses “necessary to support a conviction,” as
the dissent claims. Accordingly, its assertion that Article
38.07 “is nothing like the two-witness rule on which Fenwick
vainly relied” appears erroneous, as does its accusation that
our reliance on Fenwick’s case “simply will not wash.” Post,
at 573.34

.

The dissent’s ﬁnal argument relies upon Hopt and runs
something like this. The “effect” of Article 38.07, it claims,
is the same, in certain cases, as a witness credibility rule.
See post, at 559, 563–566, 575. However differently Hopt-

34 Perhaps one can draw a distinction between convictions based on con-
fessions in open court and convictions based on third-party evidence and
the like (though how such a distinction would comport with the language
of the fourth category is not apparent). For example, an accused’s confes-
sion might be thought to be outside of the State’s control. But see n. 24,
supra.
It is not clear at all, though, that the availability of evidence other
than the victim’s testimony is any more within the State’s control than is
the defendant’s confession.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to a specific law (Article 38.07).  The language is formal and uses legal terminology, indicating it is part of the main body of the document and not a preface, table of contents, or other non-sequential element.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1026

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 16, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–443.  Buck  v.  Internal  Revenue  Service.  C.  A.
8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 324 Fed. Appx. 540.
No.  09–450.  Koloay  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 320 Fed. Appx. 729.
No.  09–454.  Gahagan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–455.  Clarke  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  949.

No.  09–456.  Adams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  338.

No.  09–467.  Miller  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  576  F.  3d  528.

No. 09–5330.  Gosselin v.  Colorado.  Ct. App. Colo.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  205  P.  3d  456.

No.  09–5346.  Potter  v.  South  Coast  Plumbing  Systems,
Inc.,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.  Dist.,  Div.  2.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5355.  Mongane  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.
C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.
Appx.  218.

No.  09–5374.  Lumsden  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  572.

No.  09–5388.  Francis  v.  Miller,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  8th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  894.

No.  09–5448.  Rodriguez  v.  Quality  Engineering  Prod
ucts  et  al.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  1st  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  995  So.  2d  987.

No.  09–5474.  Carter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  566  F.  3d  970.

No.  09–6004.  Butler  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  46  Cal.  4th  847,  209  P.  3d  596.

No.  09–6367.  Reed  v.  Florida  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
828

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–1588.  Mensah  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General,

et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1590.  RAR  Development  Associates  v.  New  Jer
sey  Schools  Construction  Corporation  et  al.  Super.  Ct.
N.  J.,  App.  Div.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1591.  Pichoff,  Special  Administrator  of  the  Es
tate  of  Pichoff,  Deceased  v.  QHG  of  Springdale,  Inc.,  dba
Northwest  Health  System,  aka  Northwest  Medical  Cen
ter  of Washington  County,  et  al.  C. A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  728.

No.  08–1593.  Nicholas  et  ux.,  Individually  and  as  Suc
cessors  in  Interest  to  the  Estate  of  Nicholas,  Deceased
v.  Boyd  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  773.

No. 08–1594.  Khalil v.  Holder, Attorney General.  C.  A.
3d Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported below:  309 Fed.  Appx. 624.
No.  08–7683.  Patton  v.  Harris  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–8246.  Sam  v.  Pennsylvania.  Sup.  Ct.  Pa.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  597  Pa.  523,  952  A.  2d  565.

No.  08–8672.  Feurtado  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.  Appx.  809.

No.  08–8682.  Meister  v.  Scott  et  al.  (two  judgments).

C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–8713.  Jackson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  549  F.  3d  963.

No.  08–8844.  Ihmoud  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–8848.  Watson  v.  Pennsylvania.  Sup.  Ct.  Pa.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  597  Pa.  483,  952  A.  2d  541.

No. 08–8871.  Paul v. United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  534  F.  3d  832.

No.  08–9100.  Meza  Segundo  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  270  S. W.  3d  79.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for indexing as part of a document's main content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

308

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all.”
Id., at 572
(opinion concurring in judgment). Erie’s ordinance, too, by
its terms prohibits not merely nude dancing, but the act—
irrespective of whether it is engaged in for expressive pur-
poses—of going nude in public. The facts that a preamble
to the ordinance explains that its purpose, in part, is to
“limi[t] a recent increase in nude live entertainment,” App.
to Pet. for Cert. 42a, that city councilmembers in supporting
the ordinance commented to that effect, see post, at 329–330,
and n. 16 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and that the ordinance
includes in the deﬁnition of nudity the exposure of devices
simulating that condition, see post, at 331, neither make the
law any less general in its reach nor demonstrate that what
the municipal authorities really ﬁnd objectionable is expres-
sion rather than public nakedness. As far as appears (and
as seems overwhelmingly likely), the preamble, the council-
members’ comments, and the chosen deﬁnition of the prohib-
ited conduct simply reﬂect the fact that Erie had recently
been having a public nudity problem not with streakers,
sunbathers, or hot dog vendors, see Barnes, supra, at 574
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), but with lap dancers.
There is no basis for the contention that the ordinance does
not apply to nudity in theatrical productions such as Equus
or Hair.
It was stipu-
lated in the trial court that no effort was made to enforce
the ordinance against a production of Equus involving nudity
that was being staged in Erie at the time the ordinance
became effective. App. 84. Notwithstanding Justice Ste-
vens’ assertion to the contrary, however, see post, at 328,
neither in the stipulation, nor elsewhere in the record, does
it appear that the city was aware of the nudity—and before
this Court counsel for the city attributed nonenforcement not
to a general exception for theatrical productions, but to the
fact that no one had complained. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. One
instance of nonenforcement—against a play already in pro-
duction that prosecutorial discretion might reasonably have

Its text contains no such limitation.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA

Opinion of the Court

view, the panel had impermissibly overridden the District
Court’s  factual  findings  and  evaluated  the  disclosure  re-
quirement  under  too  lenient  a  degree  of  scrutiny.    Id.,  at
1184–1187.

We granted certiorari.  592 U. S. ___ (2021).

II
A
The  First  Amendment  prohibits  government  from
“abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,  or  of  the  press;  or  the
right  of  the  people  peaceably  to  assemble,  and  to  petition
the  Government  for  a  redress  of  grievances.”    This  Court
has “long understood as implicit in the right  to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment a correspond-
ing right to associate with others.”  Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,  468  U. S.  609,  622  (1984).    Protected  association
furthers “a wide variety of political, social, economic, edu-
cational, religious, and cultural ends,” and “is especially im-
portant in preserving political and cultural diversity and in
shielding dissident expression from suppression by the ma-
jority.”  Ibid.  Government  infringement  of  this  freedom
“can take a number of forms.”  Ibid.  We have held, for ex-
ample,  that  the  freedom  of  association  may  be  violated
where a group is required to take in members it does not
want,  see  id.,  at  623,  where  individuals  are  punished  for
their political affiliation, see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347,
355 (1976) (plurality opinion), or where members of an or-
ganization are denied benefits based on the organization’s
message, see Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 181–182 (1972).
We have also noted that “[i]t is hardly a novel perception
that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged
in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on free-
dom of association as [other] forms of governmental action.”
NAACP  v.  Alabama  ex  rel.  Patterson,  357  U. S.  449,  462
(1958).  NAACP v. Alabama involved this chilling effect in
its starkest form.  The NAACP opened an Alabama office
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the First Amendment right to association and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA

Opinion of the Court

Cohen §6.04(4)(a) (“Before 1942 the state of New York reg-
ularly exercised or claimed the right to exercise jurisdiction
over the New York reservations, but a federal court decision
in that year raised questions about the validity of state ju-
risdiction”);  Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  in
Carpenter  v.  Murphy,  O.  T.  2018,  No.  17–1107,  pp. 7a–8a
(Letter from Secretary of the Interior, Mar. 27, 1963) (not-
ing  that  many  States  have  asserted  criminal  jurisdiction
over Indians without an apparent basis in a federal law).11
Oklahoma next points to various statements during the
allotment era which, it says, show that even the Creek un-
derstood  their  reservation  was  under  threat.    And  there’s
no doubt about that.  By 1893, the leadership of the Creek
Nation  saw  what  the  federal  government  had  in  mind:
“They  [the  federal  government]  do  not  deny  any  of  our
rights under treaty, but say they will go to the people them-
selves and confer with them and urge upon them the neces-
sity of a change in their present condition, and upon their
refusal  will  force  a  change  upon  them.”  P.  Porter  &  A.
McKellop, Printed Statement of Creek Delegates, reprinted
in Creek Delegation Documents 8–9 (Feb. 9, 1893).  Not a
decade  later,  and  as  a  result  of  these  forced  changes,  the
leadership recognized that “ ‘[i]t would be difficult, if not im-
possible  to  successfully  operate  the  Creek  government
now.’ ”  App. to Brief for Respondent 8a (Message to Creek

——————

11 Unable to answer Oklahoma’s admitted error about the very federal
criminal statute before us, the dissent travels far afield, pointing to the
fact an Oklahoma court heard a civil case in 1915 about an inheritance—
involving  members  of  a  different  Tribe—as  “evidence”  Congress  dises-
tablished the Creek Reservation.  See post, at 21 (citing Palmer v. Cully,
52  Okla.  454,  455–465,  153  P. 154,  155–157  (1915)  (per curiam)).  But
even  assuming  that  Oklahoma  courts  exercised  civil  jurisdiction  over
Creek members, too, the dissent never explains why this jurisdiction im-
plies  the  Creek  Reservation  must  have  been  disestablished.    After  all,
everyone agrees that the Creeks were prohibited from having their own
courts at the time.  So it should be no surprise that some Creek might
have resorted to state courts in hope of resolving their disputes.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion in the case MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to historical events.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

25

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, 89 Inter-
preter Releases 1557, App. 4, p. 2 (Aug. 20, 2012).  In fact,
DHS  repeatedly  argued  in  court  that  the  2014  memoran-
dum was a valid exercise of prosecutorial discretion in part
because deferred action created no rights on which recipi-
ents could rely.  Before the Fifth Circuit, DHS stated that
“DHS  may  revoke  or  terminate  deferred  action  and  begin
removal proceedings at any time at its discretion.”  Brief for
Appellants  in  Texas  v.  United  States,  No.  15–40238,  p. 7;
see also id., at 45–46.  And before this Court, in that same
litigation,  DHS  reiterated  that  “DHS  has  absolute  discre-
tion  to  revoke  deferred  action  unilaterally,  without  notice
or  process.”  Brief  for  United  States  in  United  States  v.
Texas, O. T. 2015, No. 15–674, p. 5; see also id., at 37.  If
that  treatment  of  reliance  interests  was  incorrect,  it  pro-
vides yet one more example of a deficiency in DACA’s issu-
ance, not its rescission.

*

*

*
President  Trump’s  Acting  Secretary  of  Homeland  Secu-
rity inherited a program created by President Obama’s Sec-
retary  that  was  implemented  without  statutory  authority
and  without  following  the  APA’s  required  procedures.
Then-Attorney  General  Sessions  correctly  concluded  that
this ultra vires program should be rescinded.  These cases
could—and should—have ended with a determination that
his legal conclusion was correct.

Instead, the majority today concludes that DHS was re-
quired  to  do  far  more.  Without  grounding  its  position  in
either  the  APA  or  precedent,  the  majority  declares  that
DHS  was  required  to  overlook  DACA’s  obvious  legal  defi-
ciencies and provide additional policy reasons and justifica-
tions before restoring the rule of law.  This holding is incor-
rect,  and  it  will  hamstring  all  future  agency  attempts  to
undo  actions  that  exceed  statutory  authority.    I  would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas regarding the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. It cites legal precedents and arguments made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

41

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix B to opinion of BREYER, J.

Table 3: Proliferating PACs

Base Limit
(per year)

Number
(PACs)

Years

$5,000

$5,000

$5,000

$5,000

$5,000

$5,000

$5,000

$5,000

$5,000

$5,000

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

200

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

Base Limit
(per
election)

Number
(candi-
dates)

Elec-
tions

$5,000

$5,000

$5,000

etc.

$5,000

10

10

10

etc.

10

2

2

2

etc.

2

Rich Donor One

Rich Donor Two

Rich Donor Three

Rich Donor Four

Rich Donor Five

Rich Donor Six

Rich Donor Seven

Rich Donor Eight

Rich Donor Nine

Rich Donor Ten
Total Contribu-
tions to PACs
(by 10 Donors)
Total Contribu-
tions by Each
Donor

PAC One

PAC Two

PAC Three

. . .

PAC 200
Total Contribu-
tions by PACs
(to 10 Candi-
dates)
Total Contribu-
tions to Each
Candidate

Source: 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(C), 441a(a)(2)(A).

Total
Contribu-
tions
(per 2-year
cycle)

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

$20,000,000

$2,000,000

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

etc.

$100,000

$20,000,000

$2,000,000
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a table from a legal document, likely an appendix. Tables of contents, lists of questions, and copyright information are not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Syllabus

tion  of  the  law  of  nations  or  a  treaty  of  the  United  States.”    28
U. S. C. §1350.  The ATS is “strictly jurisdictional” and does not by its
own terms provide or delineate the definition of a cause of action for
international-law violations.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692,
713–714.  It was enacted against the backdrop of the general common
law, which in 1789 recognized a limited category of “torts in violation
of  the  law  of  nations,”  id.,  at  714;  and  one  of  its  principal  objectives
was to avoid foreign entanglements by ensuring the availability of a
federal forum where the failure to have one might cause another na-
tion  to  hold  the  United  States  responsible  for  an  injury  to  a  foreign
citizen,  see  id.,  at  715–719.    The  ATS  was  invoked  but  a  few  times
over its first 190 years, but with the evolving recognition—e.g., in the
Nuremberg  trials—that  certain  crimes  against  humanity  violate
basic precepts of international law, courts began to give some redress
for  violations  of  clear  and  unambiguous  international  human-rights
protections.    After  the  Second  Circuit  first  permitted  plaintiffs  to
bring ATS actions based on modern human-rights laws, Congress en-
acted the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), creating an
express cause of action for victims of torture and extrajudicial killing
in  violation  of  international  law.  ATS  suits  became  more  frequent;
and modern ATS litigation has the potential to involve groups of for-
eign plaintiffs suing foreign corporations in the United States for al-
leged  human-rights  violations  in  other  nations.   In  Sosa,  the  Court
held  that  in  certain  narrow  circumstances  courts  may  recognize  a
common-law cause of action for claims based on the present-day law
of nations, 542 U. S., at 732, but it explicitly held that ATS litigation
implicates  serious  separation-of-powers  and  foreign-relations  con-
cerns,  id.,  at  727–728.    The  Court  subsequently  held  in  Kiobel  that
“the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to [ATS] claims,”
569  U. S.,  at  124,  and  that  even  claims  that  “touch  and  concern  the
territory  of  the  United  States  . . .  must  do  so  with  sufficient  force  to
displace” that presumption, id., at 124–125.  Pp. 6–11.

(b) Sosa is consistent with this Court’s general reluctance to extend
judicially  created  private  rights  of  action.    Recent  precedents  cast
doubt on courts’ authority to extend or create private causes of action,
even in the realm of domestic law, rather than leaving such decisions
to the Legislature, which is better positioned “to consider if the public
interest would be served by  imposing a new substantive legal liabil-
ity,”  Ziglar  v.  Abbasi,  582  U. S.  ___,  ___  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  This  caution  extends  to  the  question  whether  the  courts
should exercise the judicial authority to mandate a rule imposing lia-
bility upon artificial entities like corporations.  Thus, in Correctional
Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 72, the Court concluded that
Congress, not the courts, should decide whether corporate defendants
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the background and legal precedents relevant to a case. It is not the actual content meant to be read and understood by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

15

Opinion of the Court

And  even  if  an  international  development  bank’s  lend-
ing  activity  does  qualify  as  commercial,  that  does  not
mean  the  organization  is  automatically  subject  to  suit.
The  FSIA  includes  other  requirements  that  must  also  be
met.  For  one  thing,  the  commercial  activity  must  have  a
sufficient  nexus  to  the  United  States.  See  28  U. S. C.
§§1603, 1605(a)(2).  For another, a lawsuit must be “based
upon”  either  the  commercial  activity  itself  or  acts  per-
formed  in  connection  with  the  commercial  activity.  See
§1605(a)(2).  Thus,  if  the  “gravamen”  of  a  lawsuit  is  tor-
tious activity abroad, the suit is not “based upon” commer-
cial activity within the meaning of the FSIA’s commercial
activity exception.  See OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs,
577 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507
U. S. 349, 356–359 (1993).  At oral argument in this case,
the Government stated that it has “serious doubts” whether
petitioners’ suit, which largely concerns allegedly tortious
conduct  in  India,  would  satisfy  the  “based  upon”  require-
ment.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 25–26.  In short, restrictive immun-
ity  hardly  means  unlimited  exposure  to  suit  for  interna-
tional organizations.

*

*

*
The International Organizations Immunities Act grants
international  organizations  the  “same  immunity”  from
suit  “as  is  enjoyed  by  foreign  governments”  at  any  given
time.  Today,  that  means  that  the  Foreign  Sovereign
Immunities  Act  governs  the  immunity  of  international
organizations.  The  International  Finance  Corporation  is
therefore not absolutely immune from suit.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the D. C. Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and its application to international organizations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

17

Opinion of the Court

respondents’  statistical  proof  fails.    Even  if  it  established
(as  it  does  not)  a  pay  or  promotion  pattern  that  differs
from the nationwide figures or the regional figures in all of
Wal-Mart’s  3,400  stores,  that  would  still  not demonstrate
that  commonality  of  issue  exists.    Some  managers  will
claim  that  the  availability  of  women,  or  qualified  women,
or interested women, in their stores’ area does not mirror
the national or regional statistics.  And almost all of them
will  claim  to  have  been  applying  some  sex-neutral,
performance-based  criteria—whose  nature  and  effects
will  differ  from  store  to  store.  In  the  landmark  case  of
ours  which  held  that  giving  discretion  to  lower-level  su-
pervisors  can  be  the  basis  of  Title  VII  liability  under  a
disparate-impact theory, the plurality opinion conditioned
that holding on the corollary that merely proving that the
discretionary  system  has  produced  a  racial  or  sexual
disparity  is  not  enough.  “[T]he  plaintiff  must  begin  by
identifying  the  specific  employment  practice  that  is  chal-
lenged.”  Watson,  487  U. S.,  at  994;  accord,  Wards  Cove
Packing  Co.  v.  Atonio,  490  U. S.  642,  656  (1989)  (approv-
ing  that  statement),  superseded  by  statute  on  other
grounds,  42  U. S. C.  §2000e–2(k).    That  is  all  the  more
necessary  when  a  class  of  plaintiffs  is  sought  to  be  certi-
fied.  Other  than  the  bare  existence  of  delegated  discre-
tion,  respondents  have  identified  no  “specific  employment
practice”—much  less  one  that  ties  all  their  1.5  million
claims together.  Merely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy of
discretion  has  produced  an  overall  sex-based  disparity
does not suffice.

Respondents’  anecdotal  evidence  suffers  from  the  same
defects, and in addition is too weak to raise any inference
that  all  the  individual,  discretionary  personnel  decisions
are  discriminatory.    In  Teamsters  v.  United  States,  431
U. S.  324  (1977),  in  addition  to  substantial  statistical
evidence of company-wide discrimination, the Government
(as plaintiff) produced about 40 specific accounts of racial
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*. It delves into the legal arguments regarding class certification and statistical proof of discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

Opinion of the Court

who  does  not  live  in  a  gerrymandered  district,  “assert[s]
only  a  generalized  grievance  against  governmental  con
duct  of  which  he  or  she  does  not  approve.”    Id.,  at  745.
Plaintiffs  who  complain  of  racial  gerrymandering  in  their
State cannot sue to invalidate the whole State’s legislative
districting  map;  such  complaints  must  proceed  “district
by-district.”  Alabama  Legislative  Black  Caucus  v.  Ala
bama, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 6).

The plaintiffs argue that their claim of statewide injury

is  analogous  to  the  claims  presented  in  Baker  and  Reyn
olds, which they assert were “statewide in nature” because
they  rested  on  allegations  that  “districts  throughout  a
state  [had]  been  malapportioned.”    Brief  for  Appellees  29.
But, as we have already noted, the holdings in Baker and
Reynolds  were  expressly  premised  on  the  understanding
that the injuries giving rise to those claims were “individ
ual  and  personal  in  nature,”  Reynolds,  377  U. S.,  at  561,
because  the  claims  were  brought  by  voters  who  alleged
“facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals,”
Baker, 369 U. S., at 206.

The  plaintiffs’  mistaken  insistence  that  the  claims  in
Baker and Reynolds were “statewide in nature” rests on a
failure  to  distinguish  injury  from  remedy.  In  those  mal
apportionment  cases,  the  only  way  to  vindicate  an  indi
vidual  plaintiff ’s  right  to  an  equally  weighted  vote  was
through  a  wholesale  “restructuring  of  the  geographical
distribution of seats in a state legislature.”  Reynolds, 377
U. S., at 561; see, e.g., Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149,
156–160 (WD Okla. 1963) (directing the county-by-county
reapportionment  of  the  Oklahoma  Legislature),  aff ’d
sub nom.  Williams  v.  Moss,  378  U. S.  558  (1964)  ( per
curiam).

Here,  the  plaintiffs’  partisan  gerrymandering  claims
turn  on  allegations  that  their  votes  have  been  diluted.
That  harm  arises  from  the  particular  composition  of  the
voter’s  own  district,  which  causes  his  vote—having  been
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the legal arguments surrounding partisan gerrymandering. It cites previous cases and delves into the specific nature of the plaintiffs' claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

403

Opinion of Stevens, J.

The  majority  suggests  that,  even  though  it  expressly  dis
missed its facial challenge, Citizens United nevertheless pre
served  it—not  as  a  freestanding  “claim,”  but  as  a  potential
argument  in  support  of  “a  claim  that  the  FEC  has  violated
its  First  Amendment  right  to  free  speech.”  Ante,  at  330;
see also ante, at 376 (Roberts, C. J., concurring) (describing
Citizens  United’s  claim  as:  “[T]he  Act  violates  the  First
Amendment”).  By this novel logic, virtually any submission
could  be  reconceptualized  as  “a  claim  that  the  Government
has  violated  my  rights,”  and  it  would  then  be  available  to
the  Court  to  entertain  any  conceivable  issue  that  might  be
relevant to that claim’s disposition.  Not only the as-applied/
facial distinction, but the basic relationship between litigants
and  courts,  would  be  upended  if  the  latter  had  free  rein  to
construe the former’s claims at such high levels of generality.
There  would  be  no  need  for  plaintiffs  to  argue  their  case;
they  could  just  cite  the  constitutional  provisions  they  think
relevant, and leave the rest to us.9

Finally, the majority suggests that though the scope of Cit
izens  United’s  claim  may  be  narrow, a  facial  ruling  is  neces
sary as a matter of remedy.  Relying on a law review article,
it  asserts  that  Citizens  United’s  dismissal  of  the  facial  chal
lenge does not prevent us “ ‘from making broader pronounce
ments  of  invalidity  in  properly  “as-applied”  cases.’ ”  Ante,
at 331 (quoting Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and

press  advocacy,  there  has  been  little  doubt  about  what  counts  as  express
advocacy since the “magic words” test of Buckley v.  Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 44,
n. 52 (1976) (per curiam).  Yet even though Citizens United’s briefs never
once  mention  § 441b’s  restriction  on  express  advocacy;  even  though  this
restriction  does  not  generate  chilling  concerns;  and  even  though  no  one
has suggested that Hillary counts as express advocacy; the majority none
theless  reaches  out  to  opine  that  this  statutory  provision  is  “invalid”  as
well.  Ante, at 365.

9 The  majority  adds  that  the  distinction  between  facial  and  as-applied
challenges  does  not  have  “some  automatic  effect”  that  mechanically  con
trols the judicial task.  Ante, at 331.  I agree, but it does not follow that
in any given case we should ignore the distinction, much less invert it.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens in the case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It argues against the majority's interpretation of the case and its implications for the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges to legislation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 728 (2000)

729

Syllabus

“permitted use,” which refers to forage “allocated by, or under the guid-
ance of an applicable land use plan.” The new deﬁnitions do not exceed
the Secretary’s authority under § 315b. First, § 315b’s words “so far as
consistent with the purposes” of the Act and “issuance of a permit”
creates no “right, title, interest, or estate” make clear that the ranchers’
interest in permit stability is not absolute and that the Secretary is
free reasonably to determine just how, and the extent to which, grazing
privileges are to be safeguarded. Moreover, since Congress itself has
directed development of land use plans, and their use in the allocation
process, it is difﬁcult to see how a deﬁnitional change that simply refers
to using such plans could violate the Taylor Act by itself, without more.
Given the broad discretionary powers that the Taylor Act grants the
Secretary, the Act must be read as here granting him at least ordinary
administrative leeway to assess “safeguard[ing]” in terms of the Act’s
other purposes and provisions. Second, the pre-1995 AUM system that
petitioners seek to “safeguard” did not offer them anything like absolute
security, for the Secretary had well-established pre-1995 authority to
cancel, modify, or decline to review permits, including the power to do
so pursuant to a land use plan. Third, the new deﬁnitional regulations
by themselves do not automatically bring about a self-executing change
that would signiﬁcantly diminish the security of grazing privileges.
The Interior Department represents that the new deﬁnitions merely
clarify terminology. The new regulations do seem to tie grazing privi-
leges to land use plans more explicitly than did the old. However, all
Bureau of Land Management lands have been covered by land use plans
for nearly 20 years, yet the ranchers have not provided a single example
in which interaction of plan and permit has jeopardized or might jeopar-
dize permit security. A particular land use plan might lead to a denial
of privileges that the pre-1995 regulations would have provided, but
the question here is whether the deﬁnition changes by themselves vio-
late the Act’s requirement that grazing privileges be “adequately safe-
guarded.” They do not. Pp. 739–744.

(b) The deletion of the phrase “engaged in the livestock business”
from § 4110.1(a) does not violate the statutory limitation to “stock own-
ers.” Section 315b, just two sentences after using “stock owners,”
gives preference to “landowners engaged in the livestock business.”
This indicates that Congress did not intend to make the phrases syn-
onyms. Neither the Act’s legislative history nor its basic purpose sug-
gests an absolute limit to those engaged in the livestock business was
intended by the term “stock owner.” The ranchers’ underlying concern
is that the amendment is part of a scheme to end grazing on public lands
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It summarizes the legal arguments and reasoning behind the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

PATEL v. GARLAND

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

with an appropriate court of appeals.”  According to the ma-
jority, this language would make no sense and do no work
unless we read subparagraph (B)(i) to bar judicial review of
any decision under § 1255.  As the majority puts it, subpar-
agraph (D)’s directive preserving judicial review for consti-
tutional  claims  and  questions  of  law  necessarily  implies
that  “something”  must  remain  unamenable  to  judicial  re-
view under subparagraph (B)(i).  Ante, at 9.  And the only
“remaining  category”  that  could  be  immune  from  judicial
review is subparagraph (B)(i) cases involving “questions of
fact” like Mr. Patel’s.  Ibid.

This  argument  falters  almost  immediately.    Everyone
agrees that, at the very least, subparagraph (B)(i) precludes
judicial review of the Attorney General’s second-step discre-
tionary judgments “regarding the granting of relief.”  And
everyone agrees that subparagraph (D) restores judicial re-
view of these discretionary judgments only to the extent a
legal question or constitutional claim is in play.  So, for ex-
ample, if the Attorney  General sought to exercise his dis-
cretion to discriminate against an applicant on the basis of
race, subparagraph (D) would allow judicial review despite
the terms of subparagraph (B)(i).  But if no legal or consti-
tutional  defect  is  alleged,  judicial  review  would  be  imper-
missible.  It is hardly necessary to adopt the majority’s in-
terpretation  to  fit  these  two  provisions  together  and  give
each real work to do.

Even more fundamentally, the majority’s argument pro-
ceeds  on  a  mistaken  assumption.    On  its  view,  subpara-
graph (D) must leave something unreviewable under sub-
paragraph  (B)(i)  for  the  former  to  make  any  sense  as  an
exception.  But  that  takes  far  too  blinkered  a  view  of  the
statutory scheme; it is not as if these are the only two pro-
visions in our Nation’s immigration laws.  By its terms, sub-
paragraph (D) operates across a whole chapter of the U. S.
Code.  And in fact, subparagraph (D) undoubtedly performs
real work as an exception with respect to other provisions
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into the interpretation of specific legal provisions and argues against the majority's stance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

remedy  against  the  importation  of  foreign-made  copies  of
their copyrighted works.  As the Court recognizes, ante, at
3,  this  case  turns  on  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  “lawfully
made under this title” in §109(a).  In my view, that phrase
is most sensibly read as referring to instances in which a
copy’s  creation  is  governed  by,  and  conducted  in  compli
ance  with,  Title  17  of  the  U. S.  Code.    This  reading  is
consistent  with  the  Court’s  interpretation  of  similar  lan
guage  in  other  statutes.    See  Florida  Dept.  of  Revenue  v.
Piccadilly  Cafeterias,  Inc.,  554  U. S.  33,  52–53  (2008)
(“under” in 11 U. S. C. §1146(a), a Bankruptcy Code provi
sion  exempting  certain  asset  transfers  from  stamp  taxes,
means “pursuant to”); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 135
(1991) (the phrase “under section 554” in the Equal Access
to  Justice  Act  means  “subject  to”  or  “governed  by”  5
U. S. C. §554 (internal quotation marks omitted)).  It also
accords  with  dictionary  definitions  of  the  word  “under.”
See,  e.g.,  American  Heritage  Dictionary  1887  (5th  ed.
2011)  (“under”  means,  among  other  things,  “[s]ubject  to
the authority, rule, or control of ”).

Section  109(a),  properly  read,  affords  Kirtsaeng  no
defense  against  Wiley’s  claim  of  copyright  infringement.
The  Copyright  Act,  it  has  been  observed  time  and  again,
does  not  apply  extraterritorially.    See  United  Dictionary
Co.  v.  G.  &  C.  Merriam  Co.,  208  U.  S.  260,  264  (1908)
(copyright statute requiring that U. S. copyright notices be
placed in all copies of a work did not apply to copies pub
lished abroad because U. S. copyright laws have no “force”
beyond  the  United  States’  borders);  4  M.  Nimmer  &  D.
Nimmer,  Copyright  §17.02,  p. 17–18  (2012)  (hereinafter
Nimmer)  (“[C]opyright  laws  do  not  have  any  extraterrito
rial  operation.”);  4  W.  Patry,  Copyright  §13:22,  p. 13–66
(2012)  (hereinafter  Patry)  (“Copyright  laws  are  rigor-
ously  territorial.”).  The  printing  of  Wiley’s  foreign
manufactured  textbooks  therefore  was  not  governed  by
Title  17.  The  textbooks  thus  were  not  “lawfully  made
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. It delves into the interpretation of copyright law and its application to foreign-made copies of copyrighted works.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

801

Stevens, J., dissenting

payers and citizens for whose beneﬁt the wrongdoer was
being chastised.” 453 U. S., at 263. That rationale is in-
applicable here. The taxpaying “citizens for whose beneﬁt”
the FCA is designed are the citizens of the United States,
not the citizens of any individual State that might violate the
It is true, of course, that the taxpayers of a State that
Act.
violates the FCA will ultimately bear the burden of paying
the treble damages.
It is not the coffers of the State (and
hence state taxpayers), however, that the FCA is designed
to protect, but the coffers of the National Government (and
hence the federal taxpayers). Accordingly, a treble dam-
ages remedy against a State does not “burden the very tax-
payers” the statute was designed to protect.11

III

Each of the constitutional issues identiﬁed in the Court’s
opinion requires only a brief comment. The historical evi-
dence summarized by the Court, ante, at 774–778, is obvi-
ously sufﬁcient to demonstrate that qui tam actions are
“cases” or “controversies” within the meaning of Article III.
That evidence, together with the evidence that private
prosecutions were commonplace in the 19th century, see
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83,
127–128, and nn. 24–25 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment), is also sufﬁcient to resolve the Article II question
that the Court has introduced sua sponte, ante, at 778, n. 8.
As for the State’s “Eleventh Amendment” sovereign im-
munity defense, I adhere to the view that Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996), was wrongly decided.
See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 97–99
(2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U. S.,
at 100–185 (Souter, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Congress’
clear intention to subject States to qui tam actions is also

11 It is also worth mentioning that treble damages may be reduced
to double damages if the court makes the requisite ﬁndings under
§§ 3729(a)(7)(A)–(C).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

Opinion of the Court

same product to all.  Brief for Respondents 15, 20.  At bot-
tom, Colorado’s theory rests on a belief that the Tenth Cir-
cuit  erred  at  the  outset  when  it  said  this  case  implicates
pure speech.  Id., at 19.  Instead, Colorado says, this case
involves  only  the  sale  of  an  ordinary  commercial  product
and  any  burden  on  Ms.  Smith’s  speech  is  purely  “inci-
dental.”  Id., at 18, 25–28; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 65, 97–98.
On the State’s telling, then, speech more or less vanishes
from the picture—and, with it, any need for First Amend-
ment scrutiny.  In places, the dissent seems to advance the
same line of argument.  Post, at 29 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR,
J.).

This  alternative  theory,  however,  is  difficult  to  square
with the parties’ stipulations.  As we have seen, the State
has stipulated that Ms. Smith does not seek to sell an ordi-
nary  commercial  good  but  intends  to  create  “customized
and tailored” speech for each couple.  App. to Pet. for Cert.
181a, 187a.  The State has stipulated that “[e]ach website
303 Creative designs and creates is an original, customized
creation for each client.”  Id., at 181a.  The State has stipu-
lated,  too,  that  Ms.  Smith’s  wedding  websites  “will  be  ex-
pressive in nature, using text, graphics, and in some cases
videos to celebrate and promote the couple’s wedding and
unique love story.”  Id., at 187a.  As the case comes to us,
then, Colorado seeks to compel just the sort of speech that
it tacitly concedes lies beyond the reach of its powers.

Of course, as the State emphasizes, Ms. Smith offers her
speech  for  pay  and  does  so  through  303  Creative  LLC,  a
company in which she is “the sole member-owner.”  Id., at
181a; see also post, at 33 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.) (em-
phasizing Ms. Smith’s “commercial” activity).  But none of
that makes a difference.  Does anyone think a speechwriter
loses  his  First  Amendment  right  to  choose  for  whom  he
works if he accepts money in return?  Or that a visual artist
who  accepts  commissions  from  the  public  does  the  same?
Many of the world’s great works of literature and art were
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court's opinion in the case 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. It delves into the arguments surrounding free speech rights and the application of those rights in a commercial context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DUPREE v. YOUNGER

Syllabus

trial “supersedes the record existing at the time of the summary-judg-
ment  motion,”  ibid.,  it  follows  that  a  party  must  raise  a  sufficiency
claim in a post-trial motion in order to preserve it for appeal, id., at
191–192.  That motion allows the district court to take first crack at
the question that the appellate court will ultimately face: Was there
sufficient evidence in the trial record to support the jury’s verdict?

The same is not true for pure questions of law resolved in an order
denying summary judgment.  These conclusions are not “supersede[d]”
by later developments in the litigation, id., at 184, and so such rulings
merge into the final judgment, at which point they are reviewable on
appeal, Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 712.  The re-
viewing court does not benefit from having a district court reexamine
a purely legal pretrial ruling after trial, because nothing at trial will
have given the district court any reason to question its prior analysis.
Younger’s counterarguments are unpersuasive.  Ortiz does not hold,
as  Younger  contends,  that  any  order  denying  summary  judgment—
whether  decided  on  legal  or  factual  grounds—is  unreviewable  under
28  U. S. C.  §1291.    While  an  interlocutory  order  denying  summary
judgment is typically not immediately appealable, §1291 does not in-
sulate interlocutory orders from appellate scrutiny, but rather delays
their  review  until  final  judgment.    And  while  Younger  insists  there
should be no two-track system of summary judgment, in which factual
and legal claims follow different routes, nothing in Rule 56 supports
his argument for uniformity.  On the contrary, fitting the preservation
rule to the rationale (factual or legal) underlying the summary-judg-
ment order is consistent with the text of Rule 56.  It also makes sense:
Factual development at trial will not change the district court’s pre-
trial answer to a purely legal question, so a post-trial motion require-
ment would amount to an empty exercise.  Finally, while Younger pre-
dicts  that  a  separate  preservation  rule  for  legal  issues  will  prove
unworkable because the line between factual and legal questions can
be “vexing” for courts and litigants, Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U. S. 273, 288, experience demonstrates that Younger overstates the
need for a bright-line rule.  “Courts of appeals have long found it pos-
sible  to  separate  factual  from  legal  matters.”    Teva  Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U. S. 318, 328.  Here, the Court does not
decide whether the issue Dupree raised on appeal is purely legal, and
remands for the Fourth Circuit to evaluate that question in the first
instance.  Pp. 4–9.

Vacated and remanded.

BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a legal case, summarizing the court's reasoning and decision. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a condensed overview rather than the full content of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>