<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1031

558 U. S.

November 16, 2009

No. 09–6564.  Hung Nguyen v. Superior Court of Califor
nia,  Orange  County,  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6565.  Reeves v.  Louisiana.  Sup. Ct. La.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  11  So.  3d  1031.

No.  09–6569.  Burroughs,  By  and  Through  Her  Next
Friend  Burroughs  v.  Broadspire,  fka  Kemper  Insurance
Co.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323
Fed.  Appx.  730.

No.  09–6570.  Adams  v.  Honda  Engineering  North
America,  Inc.  Sup.  Ct.  Ohio.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  122  Ohio  St.  3d  1411,  907  N.  E.  2d  1194.

No.  09–6571.  Bownes  v.  Epps,  Commissioner  Mississippi
Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–6573.  Maxwell  v.  Talley  et  al.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6587.  Scott  v.  Hanson.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  490.

No.  09–6619.  Polonczyk  v.  Arkansas  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6639.  Yeboah-Sefah  v.  Russo,  Superintendent,
Souza-Baranowski  Correctional  Center.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  53.

No.  09–6642.  Muhammad  v.  Sapp  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6649.  Ndongo  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.

C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6695.  Sang  v.  Scribner,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6724.  Valverde  v.  Arizona.  Sup.  Ct.  Ariz.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  220  Ariz.  582,  208  P.  3d  233.

No.  09–6735.  Bramit  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  46  Cal.  4th  1221,  210  P.  3d  1171.
  </content>
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This appears to be a list of court case orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the court's actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Case Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

The  Clause  was  also  intended  to  act  as  a  safeguard
against  manipulation  of  electoral  rules  by  politicians  and
factions in the States to entrench themselves or place their
interests  over  those  of the  electorate.    As  Madison  urged,
without the Elections Clause, “[w]henever the State Legis
latures  had  a  favorite  measure  to  carry,  they  would  take
care  so  to  mould  their  regulations  as  to  favor  the  candi
dates  they  wished  to  succeed.”  2  Records  of  the  Federal
Convention 241 (M. Farrand rev. 1966).  Madison spoke in
response  to  a  motion  by  South  Carolina’s  delegates  to
strike  out  the  federal  power.   Those  delegates  so  moved
because South Carolina’s coastal elite had malapportioned
their legislature, and wanted to retain the ability to do so.
See  J.  Rakove,  Original  Meanings:  Politics  and  Ideas  in
the  Making  of  the  Constitution  223–224  (1996).    The
problem Madison identified has hardly lessened over time.
Conflict  of  interest  is  inherent  when  “legislators  dra[w]
district  lines  that  they  ultimately  have  to  run  in.”    Cain,
121 Yale L. J., at 1817.

Arguments in support of congressional control under the
Elections Clause were reiterated in the public debate over
ratification.  Theophilus Parsons, a delegate at the Massa
chusetts  ratifying  convention,  warned  that  “when  faction
and party spirit run high,” a legislature might take actions
like  “mak[ing]  an  unequal  and  partial  division  of  the
states  into  districts  for  the  election  of  representatives.”
Debate in Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (16–17, 21
Jan.  1788),  in  2  The  Founders’  Constitution  256  (P.  Kur
land & R. Lerner eds. 1987).  Timothy Pickering of Massa
chusetts  similarly  urged  that  the  Clause  was  necessary
because  “the  State  governments  may  abuse  their  power,
and  regulate  . . .  elections  in  such  manner  as  would  be
highly  inconvenient  to  the  people.”    Letter  to  Charles
Tillinghast (24 Dec. 1787), in id., at 253.  He described the
Clause  as  a  way  to  “ensure  to  the  people  their  rights  of
election.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. It cites historical context and arguments related to the clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

CONCEPCION v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

court to accept a movant’s argument that evidence of reha-
bilitation or other changes in law counsel in favor of a sen-
tence reduction, or the Government’s view that evidence of
violent behavior in prison counsels against providing relief.
Nor does the First Step Act require a district court to make
a point-by-point rebuttal of the parties’ arguments.  All that
is required is for a district court to demonstrate that it has
considered the arguments before it.

*

*

*
The First Step Act does not require a district court to be
persuaded by the nonfrivolous arguments raised by the par-
ties before it, but it does require the court to consider them.
The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit  is  reversed,  and  the  case  is  remanded  for  further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the concluding portion. It discusses the requirements of the First Step Act regarding sentence reductions and the court's consideration of arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U73

[09-06-00 17:32:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

40

UNITED STATES v. BEGGERLY

Opinion of the Court

court’s ancillary jurisdiction, relating back to the Adams
28 U. S. C.
litigation, and on the Quiet Title Act (QTA).
§ 2409a. We hold that respondents were not entitled to
relief on either of these grounds.

The land in dispute between the United States and re-
spondents is located on Horn Island. Situated in the Gulf
of Mexico approximately 13 miles southwest of Pascagoula,
Horn Island is currently within the State of Mississippi.
It
was, at various times during the late 18th and early 19th
centuries, controlled by France, Britain, and Spain.
It is
part of the territory that came under the control of the
United States as a result of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803.
respondents’ predecessor-in-
In 1950, Clark Beggerly,
interest, purchased color of title to two tracts of land on Horn
Island at a tax sale in Jackson County. Beggerly paid $51.20
for one 626-acre tract. He and a friend also purchased a
second tract for $31.25. Beggerly retained 103 acres upon a
later division of this second tract.

In 1971, Congress enacted legislation authorizing the De-
partment of the Interior to create the Gulf Islands National
Seashore, a federal park on lands that include Horn Island.
16 U. S. C. § 459h. The legislation authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to acquire privately owned lands within the
proposed park’s boundaries.
§ 459h–1. The National Park
Service (NPS) began negotiating with respondents to pur-
chase the land. Before any deal could be completed, how-
ever, the NPS learned that the United States Government
had never patented the property. Believing that this meant
that respondents could not have had clear title, the NPS
backed out of the proposed deal.

During discovery in the Adams litigation, respondents
sought proof of their title to the land. Government ofﬁcials
searched public land records and told respondents that they
had found nothing proving that any part of Horn Island had
ever been granted to a private landowner. Even after the
settlement in the Adams litigation, however, respondents
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses a case involving land ownership on Horn Island and the legal arguments presented.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
liv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page
Ford v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  815,849,900,901,918,1102

1049
Ford Motor Co. v. Buell-Wilson
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819
Ford Motor Co. v. Delaware Director of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049
Ford Motor Co.; Maggard v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ford Motor Co.; Smith v.
941
Forestier v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935
Forney v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
881
Forsman v. Cessna Aircraft Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025
Forte v. Knight Ridder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910
Fortner v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
832
Fortner; Munoz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025
Fortuno; Correa-Ruiz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155
Foster v. Alabama
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1134
Fountain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113
480.00 Acres of Land v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
Fowler v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1157
Fowler v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1082
Fox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
899
Frakes; Rasmussen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026
Francis v. Miller  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
804
Francis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136
Franco; Athens Disposal Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136
Franco; Athens Services v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838
Franco v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Franco; Craver v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056
Franco-Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
899
995
Frank; Kendrick v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132
Frank v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Franke v. Poly-America Medical and Dental Beneﬁts Plan . . . . . .
825
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  801,1038

Frankel v. United States
868

Franklin v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

Franklin; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
829

Franklin v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1108

Franklin County Children Services; P. S. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frasure v. United States
1049

. . . . . . .
Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge 7; Hallinan v.
1084

Frauendorfer v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frazier v. Riley
809

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frazier v. Sebelius  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  947,1086

818

Frazier v. Smith  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

Fredrick, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
876

Fred’s Stores of Ark., Inc.; Peyton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.
. .
868

Freeman v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for legal cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U37

[09-26-01 08:37:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN

204

CORTEZ BYRD CHIPS, INC. v. BILL HARBERT
CONSTR. CO.
Opinion of the Court

permitting, not limiting, venue choice today. As against this
reasoning, speciﬁc to the history and function of a statute
addressing venue where arbitration is concerned, Harbert’s
citations of cases construing other special venue provisions
are beside the point. We found, for example, that Congress
had a restrictive intent as to venue in patent cases, see
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S.
222, 227–228 (1957); Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd
Co., 315 U. S. 561, 565–566 (1942), a restrictive intent for the
sake of protecting national banks when dealing with venue
for litigation against them, see Citizens & Southern Nat.
Bank v. Bougas, 434 U. S., at 44, and a restrictive intent as
to the geographic reach of Title VII, as evidenced by the lack
of extraterritorial venue and other enforcement mechanisms
in the statute, see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499
U. S. 244, 256 (1991). But the authority of these cases is not
that special venue statutes are deemed to be restrictive; they
simply show that analysis of special venue provisions must
be speciﬁc to the statute. With that we agree in holding the
permissive view of FAA venue provisions entitled to prevail.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–130
_________________

RAYMOND J. LUCIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2018]

JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,

concurring.

I agree with the Court that this case is indistinguishable
from Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991).  If the
special trial judges in Freytag were “Officers of the United
States,”  Art. II,  §2,  cl. 2,  then  so  are  the  administrative
law  judges  of  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission.
Moving  forward,  however,  this  Court  will  not  be  able  to
decide every Appointments Clause case by comparing it to
Freytag.  And, as the Court acknowledges, our precedents
in this area do not provide much guidance.  See ante, at 6.
While precedents like Freytag discuss what is sufficient to
make  someone  an  officer  of  the  United  States,  our  prece-
I
dents  have  never  clearly  defined  what  is  necessary.
would  resolve  that  question  based  on  the  original  public
meaning of “Officers of the United States.”  To the Found-
ers, this term encompassed all federal civil officials “ ‘with
responsibility  for  an  ongoing  statutory  duty.’ ”  NLRB  v.
SW  General,  Inc.,  580  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2017)  (THOMAS,  J.,
concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  4);  Mascott,  Who  Are  “Officers
of  the  United  States”?  70  Stan.  L. Rev.  443,  564  (2018)
(Mascott).1

——————

1 I  address  only  the  dividing  line  between  “Officers  of  the  United
States,”  who  are  subject  to  the  Appointments  Clause,  and  nonofficer
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529IND

Unit: $UBV [10-03-01 07:01:03] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

INDEX

1215

SUPERTANKER REGULATION. See Pre-emption of State Law, 2.

SUPERVISED RELEASE. See Criminal Law, 4, 5.

SUPREME COURT.

1. Amendments to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, p. 1147.
2. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, p. 1155.
3. Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, p. 1179.
4. Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence, p. 1189.
5. Building Regulations, p. 1199.

TAYLOR GRAZING ACT.

Public rangelands—Secretary of Interior’s regulatory authority.—
Grazing regulations on public rangelands at issue do not exceed Secretary
of Interior’s authority under Act. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, p. 728.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996. See Constitutional Law,

VI, 2.

TELEVISION. See Constitutional Law, VI, 2.

TEXAS. See Constitutional Law, IV, 2.

TOBACCO REGULATION. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

TRADEMARK ACT OF 1946.

Trade dress infringement.—In an action for infringement of unregis-
tered trade dress under § 43(a) of Act, a product’s design is distinctive,
and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., p. 205.

UNIVERSITIES. See Constitutional Law, VI, 1.

VENUE.

Federal Arbitration Act—Motion to conﬁrm, vacate, or modify.—Act’s
venue provisions are permissive, allowing a motion to conﬁrm, vacate, or
modify an arbitration award to be brought either in district where award
was made or in any district proper under general venue statute. Cortez
Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., p. 193.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1994. See Constitutional

Law, I; III.

WASHINGTON. See Pre-emption of State Law, 2.

WISCONSIN. See Constitutional Law, VI, 1.

WITNESSES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2; VII; VIII.

WORDS AND PHRASES.

1. “Beneﬁts.”
2. “Fail[ure] to develop the factual basis of [a] claim in State court.”

18 U. S. C. § 666(b). Fischer v. United States, p. 667.

28

U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2). Williams v. Taylor, p. 420.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document. It lists topics and corresponding page numbers.  Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and provide a guide to the document's contents rather than the content itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524BV$

Unit: $UIV

[07-18-00 16:15:43] PGT: FRT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Allotment of Justices

It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits,
pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such
allotment be entered of record, effective September 30, 1994, viz.:
For the District of Columbia Circuit, William H. Rehnquist,

Chief Justice.

For the First Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice.
For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate

Justice.

For the Third Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice.
For the Fourth Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice.
For the Fifth Circuit, Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice.
For the Sixth Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice.
For the Seventh Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice.
For the Eighth Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice.
For the Ninth Circuit, Sandra Day O(cid:146)Connor, Associate

Justice.

For the Tenth Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice.
For the Eleventh Circuit, Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate

Justice.

For the Federal Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice.

September 30, 1994.

(For next previous allotment, and modiﬁcations, see 502 U. S.,

p. vi, 509 U. S., p. v, and 512 U. S., p. v.)

iv
  </content>
  <thinking>
The content appears to be a legal document, specifically an allotment of Supreme Court Justices to circuits. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal document excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

863

Syllabus

restraints, starting with a 10% requirement in 1987 vehicles. The
requirement was also conditional and would stay in effect only if two-
thirds of the States did not adopt mandatory buckle-up laws. A rule of
state tort law imposing a duty to install airbags in cars such as petition-
ers’ would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices
that the federal regulation sought and to the phase-in that the federal
It would also have made adoption of
regulation deliberately imposed.
state mandatory seatbelt laws less likely. This Court’s pre-emption
cases assume compliance with the state law duty in question, and do not
turn on such compliance-related considerations as whether a private
party would ignore state legal obligations or how likely it is that state
law actually would be enforced. Finally, some weight is placed upon
DOT’s interpretation of FMVSS 208’s objectives and its conclusion that
a tort suit such as this one would stand as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of those objectives. DOT is likely to have a thor-
ough understanding of its own regulation and its objectives and is
uniquely qualiﬁed to comprehend the likely impact of state require-
ments. Because there is no reason to suspect that the Solicitor Gener-
al’s representation of these views reﬂects anything other than the
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter, DOT’s failure in
promulgating FMVSS 208 to address pre-emption explicitly is not deter-
minative. Nor do the agency’s views, as presented here, lack coher-
ence. Pp. 874–886.

166 F. 3d 1236, afﬁrmed.

Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J.,
ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 886.

Arthur H. Bryant argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Leslie A. Brueckner and Robert M.
N. Palmer.

Malcolm E. Wheeler argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Benjamin S. Boyd, Mark A.
Brooks, and Brad J. Safon.

Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging afﬁrmance.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Matthew D. Roberts,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the syllabus section of a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal citations, summaries of arguments, and mentions of justices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

23

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

on its content alone.  This does not mean that unintention-
ally threatening communications are exempt from regula-
tion,  far  from  it.    As  explained  above,  there  are  far  fewer
First Amendment concerns with stalking laws that punish
repeated,  targeted,  unwanted  conduct  and  accompanying
speech.  For that reason, recklessness is quite sufficient.  As
to true threats, intent is neither an unusual nor an insur-
mountable bar.  “[C]ourts and juries every day pass upon
knowledge,  belief  and  intent  . . .  having  before  them  no
more than evidence of . . . words and conduct, from which,
in ordinary human experience, mental condition can be in-
ferred.”  American  Communications  Assn.  v.  Douds,  339
U. S. 382, 411 (1950).

*

*

*
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the First Amend-
ment requires a subjective mens rea in true-threats cases,
and  I  also  agree  that  recklessness  is  amply  sufficient  for
this case.  Yet I would stop there, leaving for another day
the question of the specific mens rea required to prosecute
true threats generally.  If that question is reached, however,
the answer is that true threats encompass a narrow band
of intentional threats.  Especially in a climate of intense po-
larization, it is dangerous to allow criminal prosecutions for
heated  words  based  solely  on  an  amorphous  recklessness
standard.  Our society has often concluded that an intent
standard sets a proper balance between safety and the need
for a guilty mind, even in cases that do not involve the First
Amendment.  Surely when the power of the State is called
upon  to  imprison  someone  based  on  the  content  of  their
words alone, this standard cannot be considered excessive.
Because I part ways with the Court on this score, I respect-
fully concur only in part and in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal nuances of true threats and the First Amendment, arguing for a subjective mens rea standard.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012)

5

Opinion of the Court

had  not  definitively  rejected  “retroactive”  protection  for
preexisting  foreign  works;  instead  it  had  punted  on  this
issue  of  Berne’s  implementation,  deferring  consideration
until  “a  more  thorough  examination  of  Constitutional,
commercial,  and  consumer  considerations  is  possible.”
BCIA House Report, at 51, 52.3

The  minimalist  approach  essayed  by  the  United  States
did not sit well with other Berne members.4  While negoti-
——————

3 See  also  S. Rep.  No.  103–412,  p.  225  (1994)  (“While  the  United
States  declared  its  compliance  with  the  Berne  Convention  in  1989,  it
never  addressed  or  enacted  legislation  to  implement  Article  18  of
the Convention.”); Memorandum from Chris Schroeder, Counselor to the
Assistant  Attorney  General,  Office  of  Legal  Counsel,  Dept.  of  Justice
(DOJ),  to  Ira  S.  Shapiro,  General  Counsel,  Office  of  the  U. S.  Trade
Representative (July 29, 1994), in W. Patry, Copyright and the GATT,
p.  C–15  (1995)  (“At  the  time  Congress  was  debating  the  BCIA,  it
reserved  the  issue  of  removing  works  from  the  public  domain.”);  Gen-
eral  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT):  Intellectual  Property
Provisions,  Joint  Hearing  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Intellectual
Property  and  Judicial  Administration  of  the  House  Committee  on  the
Judiciary  and  the  Subcommittee  on  Patents,  Copyrights  and  Trade-
marks  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  103d  Cong.,  2d
Sess., p. 120 (1994) (URAA Joint Hearing) (app. to statement of Bruce
A.  Lehman,  Assistant  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Commissioner  of
Patents and Trademarks (Commerce Dept.)) (“When the United States
adhered to the Berne Convention, Congress . . . acknowledged that the
possibility  of  restoring  copyright  protection  for  foreign  works  that  had
fallen into the public domain in the United States for failure to comply
with formalities was an issue that merited further discussion.”).

4 The  dissent  implicitly  agrees  that,  whatever  tentative  conclusion
Congress  reached  in  1988,  Article  18  requires  the  United  States  to
“protect  the  foreign  works  at  issue,”  at  least  absent  a  special  conven-
tion  the  United  States  did  not  here  negotiate.    Post,  at  22.  See
also  post,  at  23  (citing  Gervais,  Golan  v.  Holder:  A  Look  at  the  Con-
straints  Imposed  by  the  Berne  Convention,  64  Vand.  L. Rev.  En  Banc
147,  151–152  (2011));  id.,  at  152  (“[T]he  Convention  clearly  requires
that  some  level  of  protection  be  given  to  foreign  authors  whose  works
have  entered  the  public  domain  (other  than  by  expiration  of  previous
copyright).”).    Accord  S.  Ricketson,  The  Berne  Convention  for  the
Protection  of  Literary  and  Artistic  Works  1886–1986,  p.  675  (1987)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing a case and referencing legal documents and arguments. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

CALVARY CHAPEL DAYTON VALLEY v. SISOLAK

ALITO, J., dissenting

4–5),  and  under  our  cases  religion  counts  as  a  viewpoint,
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S.
819, 831 (1995).  Here, the Directive plainly discriminates
on  the  basis  of  viewpoint.    Compare  the  directive’s  treat-
ment of casino entertainment and church services.  Both in-
volve  expression,  but  the  directive  favors  the  secular  ex-
pression  in  casino  shows  over  the  religious  expression  in
houses of worship.
  Calvary  Chapel  has  also  brought  to  our  attention  evi-
dence that the Governor has favored certain speakers over
others.  When large numbers of protesters openly violated
provisions of the Directive, such as the rule against groups
of more than 50 people, the Governor not only declined to
enforce  the  directive  but  publicly  supported  and  partici-
pated in a protest.  Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U. S., at
___–___ (slip op., at 14–16).  He even shared a video of pro-
testers standing shoulder to shoulder.  The State’s response
to news that churches might violate the directive was quite
different.    The  attorney  general  of  Nevada  is  reported  to
have said, “ ‘You can’t spit . . . in the face of law and not ex-
pect law to respond.’ ”2
  Public protests, of course, are themselves protected by the
First Amendment, and any efforts to restrict them would be
subject  to  judicial  review.    But  respecting  some  First
Amendment rights is not a shield for violating others.  The
State defends the Governor on the ground that the protests
expressed a viewpoint on important issues, and that is un-
doubtedly  true,  but  favoring  one  viewpoint  over  others  is
anathema to the First Amendment.

——————

2 Application 8, and n. 6 (quoting Lochhead, Sisolak, Elected Nevada
Officials  Discuss  Systemic  Racism,  Reform,  Las  Vegas  Review-Journal
(June  5,  2020),  www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-government/
nevada/sisolak-elected-nevada-officials-discuss-systemic-racism-reform-
2045833/).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the First Amendment and viewpoint discrimination in the context of a case involving a church and a state directive.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

SACKETT v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

regulated parties into “voluntary compliance” without the
opportunity for judicial review—even judicial review of the
question whether the regulated party is within the EPA’s
jurisdiction.  Compliance  orders  will  remain  an  effective
means  of  securing  prompt  voluntary  compliance  in  those
many cases where there is no substantial basis to question
their validity.

*

*

*

We  conclude  that  the  compliance  order  in  this  case  is
final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy
other than APA review, and that the Clean Water Act does
not  preclude  that  review.  We  therefore  reverse  the  judg
ment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  and  remand  the  case  for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the conclusion and disposition of the case Sackett v. EPA. It contains legal reasoning and is part of the core content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

“lawfully  made  under  this  title.”    And  neither  the  report
nor  its  accompanying  1960’s  draft  answers  the  question
before us here.  Cf. Quality King, 523 U. S., at 145 (with
out those five words, the import clause, via its reference to
§106, imports the “first sale” doctrine).

But  to  ascertain  the  best  reading  of  §109(a),  rather
than  dissecting  the  remarks  of  industry  representatives
concerning  §602  at  congressional  meetings  held  10  years
before  the  statute  was  enacted,  see  post,  at  13–16,  we
would  give  greater  weight  to  the  congressional  report
accompanying  §109(a),  written  a  decade  later  when  Con
gress passed the new law.  That report says:

“Section  109(a)  restates  and  confirms  the  principle

that, where the copyright owner has transferred own
ership  of  a  particular  copy  or  phonorecord  of  a  work,
the person to whom the copy or phonorecord is trans
ferred is entitled to dispose of it by sale, rental, or any
other  means.  Under  this  principle,  which  has  been
established by the court decisions and . . . the present
law,  the  copyright  owner’s  exclusive  right  of  public
distribution  would  have  no  effect  upon  anyone  who
owns ‘a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under  this  title’  and  who  wishes  to  transfer  it  to
someone else or to destroy it.

.

.

.

.

.

“To  come  within  the  scope  of  section  109(a),  a  copy
or phonorecord must have been ‘lawfully made under
this  title,’  though  not  necessarily  with  the  copyright
owner’s authorization.  For example, any resale of an
illegally  ‘pirated’  phonorecord  would  be  an  infringe
ment  but  the  disposition  of  a  phonorecord  legally
made  under  the  compulsory  licensing  provisions  of
section 115 would not.”  H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 79
(emphasis added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the "first sale" doctrine in copyright law. It cites legal precedents and congressional reports to support its arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Opinion of the Court

The Marietta Plan provides the same benefits, including
the  same  outpatient  dialysis  benefits,  to  individuals  with
and without end-stage renal disease.  Indeed, DaVita does
not  dispute  that  the  Plan’s  terms  apply  uniformly  to  all
Plan participants.  Therefore, the Plan does not “differenti-
ate  in  the  benefits  it  provides  between  individuals”  with
and  without  end-stage  renal  disease.
42  U. S. C.
§1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii).

In response, DaVita primarily argues that the statute au-
thorizes liability even when a plan limits benefits in a uni-
form way if the limitation on benefits has a disparate im-
pact on individuals with end-stage renal disease.

To begin with, the text of the statute cannot be read to
encompass  a  disparate-impact  theory.    That  text  requires
inquiry  into  whether  a  plan  provides  different  benefits  to
(i) those with end-stage renal disease and (ii) those without
end-stage renal disease.  The text does not ask about “the
effects of non-differentiating plan terms that treat all indi-
viduals equally.”  978 F. 3d, at 363 (opinion of Murphy, J.);
see also Amy’s Kitchen, 981 F. 3d, at 674−675.  In light of
that plain text, it comes as no surprise that the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services have never adopted a dis-
parate-impact theory in their longstanding regulations im-
plementing this statute.

The disparate-impact theory not only is atextual but also
would be all but impossible to fairly implement.  The prem-
ise of the disparate-impact theory is that the plan’s benefits
for  outpatient  dialysis  are  inadequate.    But  what  level  of
benefits  would  be  adequate,  and  how  would  courts  deter-
mine the level of benefits that qualifies as adequate?

Neither  the  statute  nor  DaVita  offers  a  basis  for  deter-
mining when coverage for outpatient dialysis could be con-
sidered  inadequate.  And  neither  the  statute  nor  DaVita

——————
this statutory provision appears to be whether the plan differentiates in
benefits between those with and those without end-stage renal disease.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute related to health insurance benefits for individuals with end-stage renal disease. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding disparate impact and the adequacy of benefits.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

Opinion of the Court

muster” “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we
have  applied  to  enumerated  constitutional  rights,”  id.,  at
628–629,  we  did  not  engage  in  means-end  scrutiny  when
resolving the constitutional question.  Instead, we focused
on  the  historically  unprecedented  nature  of  the  District’s
ban, observing that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation
have  come  close  to  [that]  severe  restriction.”    Id.,  at  629.
Likewise, when one of the dissents attempted to justify the
District’s  prohibition  with  “founding-era  historical  prece-
dent,” including “various restrictive laws in the colonial pe-
riod,” we addressed each purported analogue and concluded
that they were either irrelevant or “d[id] not remotely bur-
den the right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on
handguns.”  Id., at 631–632; see id., at 631–634.  Thus, our
earlier historical analysis sufficed to show that the Second
Amendment did not countenance a “complete prohibition”
on the use of “the most popular weapon chosen by Ameri-
cans for self-defense in the home.”  Id., at 629.

2
As the foregoing shows, Heller’s methodology centered on
constitutional text and history.  Whether it came to defining
the character of the right (individual or militia dependent),
suggesting  the  outer  limits  of  the  right,  or  assessing  the
constitutionality of a particular regulation, Heller relied on
text and history.  It did not invoke any means-end test such
as strict or intermediate scrutiny.

Moreover,  Heller  and  McDonald  expressly  rejected  the
application  of  any  “judge-empowering  ‘interest-balancing
inquiry’ that ‘asks whether the statute burdens a protected
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to
the statute’s salutary effects upon other important govern-
mental interests.’ ”  Heller, 554 U. S., at 634 (quoting id., at
689–690 (BREYER, J., dissenting)); see also McDonald, 561
U. S.,  at  790–791  (plurality  opinion)  (the  Second  Amend-
ment does not permit—let alone require—“judges to assess
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Heller and McDonald cases regarding the Second Amendment. It delves into the legal reasoning and historical context surrounding these cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

not regulate hunters’ disposal of their kills or improper gar-
bage disposal by restaurants, both of which posed a similar
hazard.  Id., at 544–545.  The Court concluded that this and
other  forms  of  underinclusiveness  meant  that  the  ordi-
nances were not generally applicable.  Id., at 545–546.

B
The City initially argued that CSS’s practice violated sec-
tion 3.21 of its standard foster care contract.  We conclude,
however, that this provision is not generally applicable as
required by Smith.  The current version of section 3.21 spec-
ifies in pertinent part:

“Rejection  of  Referral.  Provider  shall  not  reject  a
child  or  family  including,  but  not  limited  to,  . . .  pro-
spective foster or adoptive parents, for Services based
upon . . . their . . . sexual orientation . . . unless an ex-
ception is granted by the Commissioner or the Commis-
sioner’s  designee,  in  his/her  sole  discretion.”  Supp.
App. to Brief for City Respondents 16–17.

This provision requires an agency to provide “Services,”
defined as “the work to be performed under this Contract,”
App. 560, to prospective foster parents regardless of their
sexual orientation.

Like the good cause provision in Sherbert, section 3.21 in-
corporates a system of individual exemptions, made availa-
ble in this case at the “sole discretion” of the Commissioner.
The City has made clear that the Commissioner “has no in-
tention of granting an exception” to CSS.  App. to Pet. for
Cert.  168a.  But  the  City  “may  not  refuse  to  extend  that
[exemption] system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without
compelling reason.”  Smith, 494 U. S., at 884 (quoting Roy,
476 U. S., at 708).

The  City  and  intervenor-respondents  resist  this  conclu-
sion on several grounds.  They first argue that governments
should enjoy greater leeway under the Free Exercise Clause
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON

Opinion of the Court

difference,  the  Article  10(a)  phrase  “send  judicial  docu
ments”  encompasses  sending  documents  for  the  purposes
of service.

II

A

In  interpreting  treaties,  “we  begin  with  the  text  of  the
treaty  and  the  context  in  which  the  written  words  are
used.”  Schlunk,  486  U. S.,  at  699  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted).  For  present  purposes,  the  key  word  in
Article 10(a) is “send.”  This is a broad term,1 and there is
no apparent reason why it would exclude the transmission
of  documents  for  a  particular  purpose  (namely,  service).
Moreover,  the  structure  of  the  Hague  Service  Convention
strongly counsels against such a reading.

The key structural point is that the scope of the Conven
tion  is  limited  to  service  of  documents.    Several  elements
of  the  Convention  indicate  as  much.    First,  the  preamble
states  that  the  Convention  is  intended  “to  ensure  that
judicial  and  extrajudicial  documents  to  be  served  abroad
shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient
time.”  (Emphasis added.)  And Article 1 defines the Con
vention’s scope by stating that the Convention “shall apply
in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is
occasion  to  transmit  a  judicial  or  extrajudicial  document
for service abroad.”  (Emphasis added.)  Even the Conven
tion’s full title reflects that the Convention concerns “Ser
vice Abroad.”

We have also held as much.  Schlunk, 486 U. S., at 701
(stating  that  the  Convention  “applies  only  to  documents
transmitted for service abroad”).  As we explained, a pre
liminary  draft  of  Article  1  was  criticized  “because  it  sug
gested  that  the  Convention  could  apply  to  transmissions
——————

1 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1568 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “send,” in
part, as “[t]o cause to be moved or conveyed from a present location to
another place; esp., to deposit (a writing or notice) in the mail”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON. It is sequential text and contains the actual legal arguments and reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY

Opinion of the Court

ability  to  sue  nonconsenting  States,  the  court  held  that
PennEast  was  not  authorized  to  condemn  New  Jersey’s
property.  938 F. 3d, at 111–113.

We granted certiorari to determine whether the NGA au-
thorizes  certificate  holders  to  condemn  land  in  which  a
State claims an interest.  592 U. S. ___ (2021).

II
We  begin  by  addressing  a  jurisdictional  issue  raised  by
the United States.  As just noted, the Third Circuit ruled in
New Jersey’s favor based on the State’s statutory argument
that  the  NGA  did  not  delegate  to  certificate  holders  the
right  to  file  condemnation  actions  against  nonconsenting
States.  The United States now argues that the Third Cir-
cuit  lacked  jurisdiction  to  decide  that  question  under  15
U. S. C. §717r(b), which gives the court of appeals review-
ing FERC’s certificate order (here, the D. C. Circuit) “exclu-
sive” jurisdiction to “affirm, modify, or set aside such order.”
According to the United States, New Jersey’s statutory ar-
gument,  if  accepted,  would  modify  FERC’s  order  because
FERC “expressly stated” in the order that PennEast “would
have authority to acquire the necessary land or property to
construct the approved facilities by exercising the right of
eminent domain.”  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
15 (internal quotation marks omitted).

PennEast  and  the  respondents  both  argue  that  the
United  States  is  wrong.  We  agree.   New  Jersey  does  not
seek  to  modify  FERC’s  order;  it  asserts  a  defense  against
the  condemnation  proceedings  initiated  by  PennEast.    To
determine  whether  the  District  Court  correctly  rejected
New  Jersey’s  defense,  the  Third  Circuit  needed  to  decide
whether §717f(h) grants natural gas companies the right to
bring  condemnation  suits  against  States.    Its  conclusion
that §717f(h) does not authorize such suits did not “modify”
or “set aside” FERC’s order, which neither purports to grant
PennEast  the  right  to  file  a  condemnation  suit  against
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey. It delves into the jurisdictional issues and the interpretation of the Natural Gas Act (NGA) regarding eminent domain rights for natural gas companies against states.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

5

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

reasonable  for  States  to  try  to  stop  abuse  from  occurring
before it happens.

C
1

It  is  not  enough,  however,  that  the  law  before  us  is
designed to serve a compelling state interest; it also must
not  “burden  substantially  more  speech  than  is  necessary
to  further  the  government’s  legitimate  interests.”    Ward,
491  U. S.,  at  798–799;  see  also  McCullen  v.  Coakley,  573
U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2014)  (slip  op.,  at  18–19).  The  North
Carolina law fails this requirement.

A straightforward reading of the text of N. C. Gen. Stat.
Ann.  §14–202.5  compels  the  conclusion  that  it  prohibits
sex  offenders  from  accessing  an  enormous  number  of
websites.  The  law  defines  a  “commercial  social  network-
ing  Web  site”  as  one  with  four  characteristics.    First,  the
website  must  be  “operated  by  a  person  who  derives  reve-
nue  from  membership  fees,  advertising,  or  other  sources
related to the operation of the Web site.”  §14–202.5(b)(1).
Due  to  the  prevalence  of  advertising  on  websites  of  all
types,  this  requirement  does  little  to  limit  the  statute’s
reach.

Second,  the  website  must  “[f]acilitat[e]  the  social  intro-
duction  between  two  or  more  persons  for  the  purposes  of
friendship,  meeting  other  persons,  or  information  ex-
changes.”  §14–202.5(b)(2).  The term “social introduction”
easily  encompasses  any  casual  exchange,  and  the  term
“information  exchanges”  seems  to  apply  to  any  site  that
provides an opportunity for a visitor to post a statement or
comment  that  may  be  read  by  other  visitors.    Today,  a
great many websites include this feature.

Third,  a  website  must  “[a]llo[w]  users  to  create  Web
pages or personal profiles that contain information such as
the name or nickname of the user, photographs placed on
the  personal  Web  page  by  the  user,  other  personal  infor-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a North Carolina law restricting access to websites for sex offenders.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

Opinion of the Court

these  submissions  did  not  sway  the  Court.    That  an  em-
ployer  discriminates  intentionally  against  an  individual
only in part because of sex supplies no defense to Title VII.
Nor does the fact an employer may happen to favor women
as a class.
  In Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435
U. S.  702  (1978),  an  employer  required  women  to  make
larger pension fund contributions than men.  The employer
sought to justify its disparate treatment on the ground that
women tend to live longer than men, and thus are likely to
receive  more  from  the  pension  fund  over  time.    By  every-
one’s admission, the employer was not guilty of animosity
against women or a “purely habitual assumptio[n] about a
woman’s  inability  to  perform  certain  kinds  of  work”;  in-
stead, it relied on what appeared to be a statistically accu-
rate statement about life expectancy.  Id., at 707–708.  Even
so, the Court recognized, a rule that appears evenhanded at
the group level can prove discriminatory at the level of in-
dividuals.  True, women as a class may live longer than men
as  a  class.    But  “[t]he  statute’s  focus  on  the  individual  is
unambiguous,” and any individual woman might make the
larger pension contributions and still die as early as a man.
Id., at 708.  Likewise, the Court dismissed as irrelevant the
employer’s insistence that its actions were motivated by a
wish to achieve classwide equality between the sexes:  An
employer’s intentional discrimination on the basis of sex is
no more permissible when it is prompted by some further
intention (or motivation), even one as prosaic as seeking to
account for actuarial tables.  Ibid.  The employer violated
Title  VII  because,  when  its  policy  worked  exactly  as
planned, it could not “pass the simple test” asking whether
an individual female employee would have been treated the
same regardless of her sex.  Id., at 711.

In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S.
75 (1998), a male plaintiff alleged that he was singled out
by his male co-workers for sexual harassment.  The Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It cites relevant case law (Manhart and Oncale) and analyzes legal principles related to sex discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Syllabus

basis for invalidating the program.  The Court was obligated to disre-
gard the no-aid provision and decide this case consistent with the Fed-
eral Constitution.  Pp. 20–22.

393 Mont. 446, 435 P. 3d 603, reversed and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a con-
curring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.  ALITO, J., and GORSUCH,
J., filed concurring opinions.  GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which KAGAN, J., joined.  BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
KAGAN, J., joined as to Part I.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are typically summaries of legal cases and not the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

in  Statehood”  and  “the  establishment  of  popular  self-gov-
ernment”);  District  of  Columbia  v.  Carter,  409  U. S.  418,
431–432  (1973)  (“From  the  moment  of  their  creation,  the
Territories were destined for admission as States into the
Union, and ‘as a preliminary step toward that foreordained
end—to tide over the period of ineligibility—Congress, from
time to time, created territorial governments, the existence
of which was necessarily limited’ ” (quoting O’Donoghue v.
United  States,  289  U. S.  516,  537  (1933))).    But  critically,
the  transitional  phase  was  never  intended  to  last  indefi-
nitely.  See Amar, America’s Constitution, at 273 (describ-
ing  the  Founders’  understanding  that  “[t]he  older  states
would help their younger siblings grow up and would there-
after regard them as equals, rather than as permanent ad-
olescents—the  status  to  which  Mother  England  had
wrongly relegated her own New World wards”).  The histor-
ical examples thus reveal little, if anything, about Congress’
ability  to  establish  territorial  officers  in  Territories  that
(much like Puerto Rico) have long operated under the full
measure of self-government.

This  Court’s  precedents  do  not  speak  to  that  circum-
stance either.  No doubt the Court has said that the Terri-
tories Clause gives Congress “full and complete legislative
authority over the people of the Territories and all the de-
partments of the territorial governments.”  County of Yank-
ton, 101 U. S., at 132–133; see also id., at 133 (“Congress
may not only abrogate laws of  the territorial legislatures,
but  it  may  itself  legislate  directly  for  the  local  govern-
ment”); Sere v. Pitot, 6 Cranch 332, 337 (1810); ante, at 3–4
(THOMAS, J.,  concurring  in  judgment).    But  none  of  those
cases had to do with the Appointments Clause.  More im-
portant, none of them addressed the scope of Congress’ au-
thority with respect to a fully self-governing Territory.  See
Leibowitz, Defining Status, at 15 (observing that “the broad
statements  of  Congressional  power”  in  those  cases  “were
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the historical context of U.S. territories and their relationship to Congress, particularly regarding the Appointments Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

3

Syllabus

14.

693 F. 3d 605, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  all  other
Members  joined,  except  KAGAN, J.,  who  took  no  part  in  the  considera-
tion or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and introductory information, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It's not the main body of the text and would not be suitable for indexing as it's not the actual content meant to be read.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

11

THOMAS, J., concurring

vant  whether  the  University’s  racial  discrimination  in-
creases or decreases tolerance.

Finally, while the University admits that racial discrim-
ination  in  admissions  is  not  ideal,  it  asserts  that  it  is  a
temporary  necessity  because  of  the  enduring  race  con-
sciousness of our society.  See Brief for Respondents 53–54
(“Certainly all aspire for a colorblind society in which race
does  not  matter  . . . .    But  in  Texas,  as  in  America,  ‘our
highest  aspirations  are  yet  unfulfilled’ ”).    Yet  again,  the
University  echoes  the  hollow  justifications  advanced  by
the segregationists.  See, e.g., Brief for State of Kansas on
Reargument  in  Brown  v.  Board  of  Education,  O. T.  1953,
No.  1,  p.  56  (“We  grant  that  segregation  may  not  be  the
ethical  or  political  ideal.    At  the  same  time  we  recognize
that  practical  considerations  may  prevent  realization  of
the ideal”); Brief for Respondents in Sweatt 94 (“The racial
consciousness and feeling which exists today in the minds
of  many  people  may  be  regrettable  and  unjustified.    Yet
they are a reality which must be dealt with by the State if
it is to preserve harmony and peace and at the same time
furnish equal education to both groups”); id., at 96 (“ ‘[T]he
mores  of  racial  relationships  are  such  as  to  rule  out,  for
the  present  at  least,  any  possibility  of  admitting  white
persons  and  Negroes  to  the  same  institutions’ ”);  Brief  for
Appellees in Briggs 26–27 (“[I]t would be unwise in admin-
istrative  practice  . . .  to  mix  the  two  races  in  the  same
schools at the present time and under present conditions”);
Brief  for  Appellees  on  Reargument  in  Briggs  v.  Elliott,
O. T. 1953, No. 2, p. 79 (“It is not ‘racism’ to be cognizant
of the fact that mankind has struggled with race problems
and  racial  tensions  for  upwards  of  sixty  centuries”).    But
these  arguments  too  were  unavailing.    The  Fourteenth
Amendment views racial bigotry as an evil to be stamped
out,  not  as  an  excuse  for  perpetual  racial  tinkering  by
the  State.  See  DeFunis  v.  Odegaard,  416  U. S.  312,  342
(1974)  (Douglas,  J.,  dissenting)  (“The  Equal  Protection
Clause  commands  the  elimination  of  racial  barriers,  not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in a Supreme Court case. It discusses the University's use of racial discrimination in admissions and compares it to past justifications for segregation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

for resolution as a matter of constitutional law.

Of  course,  the  Constitution  contemplates  that  democ-
racy is the appropriate process for change, so long as that
process does not abridge fundamental rights.  Last Term,
a plurality  of this Court reaffirmed the importance of the
democratic  principle  in  Schuette  v.  BAMN,  572  U. S.  ___
(2014),  noting  the  “right  of  citizens  to  debate  so  they  can
learn  and  decide  and  then,  through  the  political  process,
act  in  concert  to  try  to  shape  the  course  of  their  own
times.”  Id., at ___ – ___ (slip op., at 15–16).  Indeed, it is
most  often  through  democracy  that  liberty  is  preserved
and  protected  in  our  lives.    But  as  Schuette  also  said,
“[t]he freedom secured by the Constitution consists, in one
of  its  essential  dimensions,  of  the  right  of  the  individual
not to be injured by the unlawful exercise of governmental
power.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 15).  Thus, when the rights
of persons are violated, “the Constitution requires redress
by the courts,” notwithstanding the more general value of
democratic  decisionmaking.  Id.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  17).
This  holds  true  even  when  protecting  individual  rights
affects issues of the utmost importance and sensitivity.

The  dynamic  of  our  constitutional  system  is  that  indi-
viduals need not await legislative action before asserting a
fundamental  right.    The  Nation’s  courts  are  open  to  in-
jured individuals who come to them to vindicate their own
direct, personal stake in our basic charter.  An individual
can invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or
she  is  harmed,  even  if  the  broader  public  disagrees  and
even  if  the  legislature  refuses  to  act.    The  idea  of  the
Constitution  “was  to  withdraw  certain  subjects  from  the
vicissitudes  of  political  controversy,  to  place  them  beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”  West Vir-
ginia  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Barnette,  319  U. S.  624,  638  (1943).
This is why “fundamental rights may not be submitted to
a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the relationship between democracy and individual rights, citing relevant Supreme Court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

GHGs.

“Reducing the wide range of uncertainty inherent in
current model predictions will require major advances
in understanding and modeling of the factors that de-
termine  atmospheric  concentrations  of  greenhouse
gases  and  aerosols,  and  the  processes  that  determine
the  sensitivity  of  the  climate  system.”  68  Fed.  Reg.
52930.

I simply cannot conceive of what else the Court would like
EPA to say.

II

A

Even  before  reaching  its  discussion  of  the  word  “judg-
ment,” the Court makes another significant error when it
concludes that “§202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorizes
EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles  in  the  event  that  it  forms  a  ‘judgment’  that  such
emissions contribute to climate change.”  Ante, at 25 (em-
phasis added).  For such authorization, the Court relies on
what  it  calls  “the  Clean  Air  Act’s  capacious  definition  of
‘air pollutant.’ ”  Ante, at 30.

“Air pollutant” is defined by the Act as “any air pollution
agent or combination of such agents, including any physi-
cal,  chemical,  . . .  substance  or  matter  which  is  emitted
into  or  otherwise  enters  the  ambient  air.”  42  U. S. C.
§7602(g).  The  Court  is  correct  that  “[c]arbon  dioxide,
methane,  nitrous  oxide,  and  hydrofluorocarbons,”  ante,  at
26,  fit  within  the  second  half  of  that  definition:  They  are
“physical, chemical, . . . substance[s] or matter which [are]
emitted into or otherwise ente[r] the ambient air.”  But the
Court mistakenly believes this to be the end of the analy-
sis.  In order to be an “air pollutant” under the Act’s defi-
nition,  the  “substance  or  matter  [being]  emitted  into  . . .
the ambient air” must also meet the first half of the defini-
tion—namely, it must be an “air pollution agent or combi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion in the case of Massachusetts v. EPA. It delves into the interpretation of the Clean Air Act and its applicability to greenhouse gas emissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

ALITO, J., dissenting

The main issue in Price Waterhouse––the proper alloca-
tion of the burdens of proof in a so-called mixed motives Ti-
tle VII case—is not relevant here, but the plurality opinion,
endorsed  by  four  Justices,  commented  on  the  issue  of  sex
stereotypes.  The  plurality  observed  that  “sex  stereotypes
do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a par-
ticular employment decision” but “can certainly be evidence
that gender played a part.”  Id., at 251.17  And the plurality
made it clear that “[t]he plaintiff must show that the em-
ployer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.”
Ibid.

Plaintiffs who allege that they were treated unfavorably
because  of  their  sexual  orientation  or  gender  identity  are
not  in  the  same  position  as  the  plaintiff  in  Price  Water-
house.  In  cases  involving  discrimination  based  on  sexual
orientation  or  gender  identity,  the  grounds  for  the  em-
ployer’s  decision—that  individuals  should  be  sexually  at-
tracted  only  to  persons  of  the  opposite  biological  sex  or
should identify with their biological sex—apply equally to
men and women.  “[H]eterosexuality is not a female stereo-
is  not  a  sex-
type;
specific stereotype at all.”  Hively, 853 F. 3d, at 370 (Sykes,
J., dissenting).

it  not  a  male  stereotype;

it

To be sure, there may be cases in which a gay, lesbian, or
transgender  individual  can  make  a  claim  like  the  one  in
Price Waterhouse.  That is, there may be cases where traits
or behaviors that some people associate with gays, lesbians,
or transgender individuals are tolerated or valued in per-
sons of one biological sex but not the other.  But that is a

——————

17 Two other Justices concurred in the judgment but did not comment
on the issue of stereotypes.  See id., at 258–261 (opinion of White, J.); id.,
at 261–279 (opinion of O’Connor, J.).  And Justice Kennedy reiterated on
behalf of the three Justices in dissent that “Title VII creates no independ-
ent cause of action for sex stereotyping,” but he added that “[e]vidence of
use by decisionmakers of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite relevant to
the question of discriminatory intent.”  Id., at 294.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in a case related to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. It cites previous case law and delves into the legal arguments surrounding the issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

GINSBURG, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–352
_________________

B & B HARDWARE, INC., PETITIONER v. HARGIS

INDUSTRIES, INC., DBA SEALTITE BUILDING

FASTENERS, DBA EAST TEXAS

 FASTENERS ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[March 24, 2015]

 JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring.
The  Court  rightly  recognizes  that  “for  a  great  many
registration  decisions  issue  preclusion  obviously  will  not
apply.”  Ante,  at  14–15.  That  is  so  because  contested
registrations  are  often  decided  upon  “a  comparison  of  the
marks  in  the  abstract  and  apart  from  their  marketplace
usage.”  6 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competi-
tion §32:101, p. 32–247 (4th ed. 2014).  When the registra-
tion  proceeding  is  of  that  character,  “there  will  be  no
[preclusion]  of  the  likel[ihood]  of  confusion  issue  . . .  in  a
later  infringement  suit.”    Ibid.  On  that  understanding,  I
join the Court’s opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Ginsburg.  It includes citations, case names, and legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

ALITO, J., dissenting

*

*

*

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It is sequential and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

17

Opinion of the Court

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000).  In the
ordinary case, that context has no great effect on the appro-
priate  analysis.  Nonetheless,  our  precedent  teaches  that
there are “extraordinary cases” that call for a different ap-
proach—cases in which the “history and the breadth of the
authority  that  [the  agency]  has  asserted,”  and  the  “eco-
nomic and political significance” of that assertion, provide
a  “reason  to  hesitate  before  concluding  that  Congress”
meant to confer such authority.  Id., at 159–160.

Such cases have arisen from all corners of the adminis-
trative  state.    In  Brown  &  Williamson,  for  instance,  the
Food  and  Drug  Administration  claimed  that  its  authority
over “drugs” and “devices” included the power to regulate,
and  even  ban,  tobacco  products.    Id.,  at  126–127.  We  re-
jected that “expansive construction of the statute,” conclud-
ing  that  “Congress  could  not  have  intended  to  delegate”
such a sweeping and consequential authority “in so cryptic
a fashion.”  Id., at 160.  In Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. De-
partment of Health  and Human  Servs., 594  U. S. ___, ___
(2021)  (per curiam)  (slip  op.,  at  3),  we  concluded  that  the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention could not, un-
der its authority to adopt measures “necessary to prevent
the . . . spread of ” disease, institute a nationwide eviction
moratorium in response to the COVID–19 pandemic.  We
found the statute’s language a “wafer-thin reed” on which
to rest such a measure, given “the sheer scope of the CDC’s
claimed authority,” its “unprecedented” nature, and the fact
that  Congress  had  failed  to  extend  the  moratorium  after
previously having done so.  Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–8).
Our decision in Utility Air addressed another question re-
garding EPA’s authority—namely, whether EPA could con-
strue the term “air pollutant,” in a specific provision of the
Clean Air Act, to cover greenhouse gases.  573 U. S., at 310.
Despite its textual plausibility, we noted that the Agency’s
interpretation  would  have  given  it  permitting  authority
over  millions  of  small  sources,  such  as  hotels  and  office
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing previous cases and discussing the scope of agency authority. It is likely part of a larger legal document and contains relevant information for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

Court  has  repeatedly  acknowledged,  the  word  evades  a
uniform,  consistent  meaning.  See  Kucana  v.  Holder,  558
U. S. 233, 245 (2010) (“ ‘under’ is chameleon”); Ardestani v.
INS,  502  U. S.  129,  135  (1991)  (“under”  has  “many  dic
tionary  definitions”  and  “must  draw  its  meaning  from  its
context”).

A  far  more  serious  difficulty  arises  out  of  the  uncer
tainty and complexity surrounding the second step’s effort
to  read  the  necessary  geographical  limitation  into  the  word
“applicable”  (or  the  equivalent).  Where,  precisely,  is  the
Copyright  Act  “applicable”?    The  Act  does  not  instantly
protect  an  American  copyright  holder  from  unauthorized
piracy  taking  place  abroad.    But  that  fact  does  not  mean
the Act is inapplicable to copies made abroad.  As a matter
of  ordinary  English,  one  can  say  that  a  statute  imposing,
say,  a  tariff  upon  “any  rhododendron  grown  in  Nepal”
applies  to  all  Nepalese  rhododendrons.  And,  similarly,
one can say that the American Copyright Act is applicable
to  all  pirated  copies,  including  those  printed  overseas.
Indeed,  the  Act  itself  makes  clear  that  (in  the  Solicitor
General’s  language)  foreign-printed  pirated  copies  are  “sub
ject  to”  the  Act.
  §602(a)(2)  (2006  ed.,  Supp.  V)  (refer-
ring  to  importation  of  copies  “the  making  of  which  either
constituted  an  infringement  of  copyright,  or  which  would
have  constituted  an  infringement  of  copyright  if  this  title
had been applicable”); Brief for United States 5.  See also
post,  at  6  (suggesting  that  “made  under”  may  be  read  as
“subject to”).

The  appropriateness  of  this  linguistic  usage  is  under
scored  by  the  fact  that  §104  of  the  Act  itself  says  that
works  “subject  to  protection  under  this  title”  include  un
published  works  “without  regard  to  the  nationality  or
domicile of the author,” and works “first published” in any
one of the nearly 180 nations that have signed a copyright
treaty  with  the  United  States.    §§104(a),  (b)  (2006  ed.)
(emphasis  added);  §101  (2006  ed.,  Supp.  V)  (defining
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt discussing the scope of the Copyright Act. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis of specific wording within the Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

2
In  response  to  all  of  that  evidence  of  the  FSIA’s
exclusively civil scope, Halkbank emphasizes a sentence of
the FSIA codified at 28 U. S. C. §1604:  “Subject to existing
international  agreements,”  a  “foreign  state  shall  be
immune  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  the  United
States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605
to  1607  of  this  chapter.”    Halkbank  contends  that  §1604
renders  it  immune  not  only  from  civil  suits  but  also  from
criminal prosecutions.

In complete isolation, §1604 might be amenable to that
reading.  But this Court has a “duty to construe statutes,
not  isolated  provisions.”    Graham  County  Soil  and  Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U. S.
280,  290  (2010)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    And
the Court must read the words Congress enacted “in their
context  and  with  a  view  to  their  place  in  the  overall
statutory  scheme.”    Davis  v.  Michigan  Dept.  of  Treasury,
489  U. S.  803,  809  (1989).  When  we  consider  §1604
alongside  its  neighboring  FSIA  provisions,  it  becomes
overwhelmingly  evident  that  §1604  does  not  grant
immunity  to  foreign  states  and  their  instrumentalities  in
criminal matters.

Section  1330(a)  is  the  place  to  start.  This  Court  has
explained that “Sections 1604 and 1330(a) work in tandem.”
Argentine  Republic  v.  Amerada  Hess  Shipping  Corp.,  488
U. S. 428, 434 (1989).  Indeed, the public law containing the
FSIA begins with §1330 and then later follows with §1604.
See  90  Stat.  2891–2892.  Recall  that  §1330(a)  confers
district-court  jurisdiction  over  “any  nonjury  civil  action
against  a  foreign  state”  as  to  “any  claim  for  relief  in
personam  with  respect  to  which  the  foreign  state  is  not
entitled to immunity.”  Section 1604 then confers immunity
on foreign states unless an enumerated statutory exception
applies.  See §§1605–1607.

Reading  the  two  provisions  together  (as  we  must)  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and its application to a case involving Türkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. and the United States.  The text is sequential and provides legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.
v. GOLDSMITH
Opinion of the Court

Figure 5. Four special edition magazines commemorating Prince
after he died in 2016.

When  Goldsmith  saw  Orange  Prince  on  the  cover  of
Condé Nast’s special edition magazine, she recognized her
work.  “It’s the photograph,” she later testified.  1 App. 290.
Orange Prince crops, flattens, traces, and colors the photo
but otherwise does not alter it.  See fig. 6, infra.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion discussing a copyright case involving Andy Warhol Foundation and Goldsmith. It includes a description of artwork and legal testimony.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

JACKSON, J., concurring

justice.”  Ante, at 15.3  Meanwhile, many States have done
just  that.  See  J.  Decker,  The  Varying  Parameters  of  Ob-
struction  of  Justice  in  American  Criminal  Law,  65  La.
L. Rev. 49, 77, and n. 236 (2004) (collecting statutes).4  The
drafters of the Model Penal Code, too, proposed such a gen-
eral obstruction crime. See ALI, Model Penal Code §242.1,
p. 201 (1980) (“A person commits a misdemeanor if he pur-
posely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of
law or other governmental function by force, violence, phys-
ical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any
other unlawful act”).

Given that Congress has never before passed a similarly
broad obstruction law when others have long existed, it is
highly unlikely that Congress intended for subsection (c)(2)
to  establish  a  first-of-its-kind  general  federal  obstruction
crime.  Nothing in the enactment history of  §1512(c) sug-
gests that Congress believed that it was creating an all-en-
compassing  statute  that  would  obviate  the  need  for  any
other obstruction prohibitions.

This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that, un-
like §1512(c)(2), nearly all of the broad, all-purpose obstruc-
tion statutes that various States have enacted are classified
as misdemeanors.  See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §18–8–102(3)
(2023); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2921.31(B) (Lexis 2024).  As a

——————

3 That  is  not  to  say,  of  course,  that  Congress  could  not  enact  such  a
statute if it so chose.  “We have traditionally exercised restraint in as-
sessing the reach of a federal criminal statute . . . out of deference to the
prerogatives of Congress,” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600
(1995), not because broad criminal proscriptions are beyond the scope of
Congress’s power.

4 See also, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §18–8–102(1) (2023) (“A person commits
obstructing government operations if he intentionally obstructs, impairs,
or hinders the performance of a governmental function by a public serv-
ant, by using or threatening to use violence, force, or physical interfer-
ence  or  obstacle”);  Ohio  Rev.  Code  Ann.  §2921.31(A)  (Lexis  2024)  (“No
person . . . shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in
the performance of the public official’s lawful duties”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Jackson in the case of *Fischer v. United States*.  It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute and its potential implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

SHURTLEFF v. BOSTON

Opinion of the Court

All told, while the historical practice of flag flying at gov-
ernment buildings favors Boston, the city’s lack of meaning-
ful  involvement  in  the  selection  of  flags  or  the  crafting  of
their messages leads us to classify the flag raisings as pri-
vate,  not  government,  speech—though  nothing  prevents
Boston from changing its policies going forward.

III
Last,  we  consider  whether  Boston’s  refusal  to  allow
Shurtleff  and  Camp  Constitution  to  raise  their  flag
amounted to impermissible viewpoint discrimination.

Boston  acknowledges  that  it  denied  Shurtleff ’s  request
because it believed flying a religious flag at City Hall could
violate the Establishment Clause.  And it admits this con-
cern proceeded from the premise that raising the flag would
express government speech.  See Brief in Opposition 23 (ex-
plaining  that  “viewpoint  neutrality”  was  “incompatible”
with Boston’s view of its program).  But we have rejected
that  premise  in  the  preceding  pages.    We  must  therefore
consider Boston’s actions in light of our holding.

When a government does not speak for itself, it may not
exclude  speech  based  on  “religious  viewpoint”;  doing  so
“constitutes
impermissible  viewpoint  discrimination.”
Good  News  Club  v.  Milford  Central  School,  533  U. S.  98,
112 (2001).  Applying that rule, we have held, for example,
that a public university may not bar student-activity funds
from reimbursing only religious groups.  See Rosenberger,
515 U. S., at 830–834.  Here, Boston concedes that it denied
Shurtleff ’s  request  solely  because  the  Christian  flag  he
asked to raise “promot[ed] a specific religion.”  App. to Pet.
for Cert. 155a (quoting Rooney deposition).  Under our prec-
edents, and in view of our government-speech holding here,
that refusal discriminated based on religious viewpoint and
violated the Free Speech Clause.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the part discussing viewpoint discrimination. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

287

Opinion of the Court

The city of Erie petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which
526 U. S. 1111 (1999). Shortly thereafter,
we granted.
Pap’s ﬁled a motion to dismiss the case as moot, noting that
Kandyland was no longer operating as a nude dancing club,
and Pap’s was not operating a nude dancing club at any other
location. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as Moot 1. We
denied the motion. 527 U. S. 1034 (1999).

II

As a preliminary matter, we must address the justiciabil-
ity question.
“ ‘[A] case is moot when the issues presented
are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.’ ” County of Los Angeles v. Davis,
440 U. S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395
U. S. 486, 496 (1969)). The underlying concern is that, when
the challenged conduct ceases such that “ ‘there is no reason-
able expectation that the wrong will be repeated,’ ” United
States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 633 (1953), then it
becomes impossible for the court to grant “ ‘any effectual re-
lief whatever’ to [the] prevailing party,” Church of Scien-
tology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting
Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653 (1895)).
In that case, any
opinion as to the legality of the challenged action would be
advisory.

Here, Pap’s submitted an afﬁdavit stating that it had
“ceased to operate a nude dancing establishment in Erie.”
Status Report Re Potential Issue of Mootness 1 (Sept. 8,
1999). Pap’s asserts that the case is therefore moot because
“[t]he outcome of this case will have no effect upon Respond-
ent.” Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as Moot 1. Simply
closing Kandyland is not sufﬁcient to render this case moot,
however. Pap’s is still incorporated under Pennsylvania law,
and it could again decide to operate a nude dancing establish-
ment in Erie. See Petitioner’s Brief in Opposition to Motion
Justice Scalia differs with our assessment
to Dismiss 3.
as to the likelihood that Pap’s may resume its nude dancing
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the issue of mootness in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
THOMAS, J., dissenting

Consistent with its text, Federalist advocates of the Con-
stitution defended the General Welfare Clause to the rati-
fying public as nothing more than a limitation on the taxing
power.  See, e.g., 3 Debates on the Constitution 207 (J. Elliot
ed. 1876) (Elliot’s Debates) (E. Randolph, Virginia Conven-
tion)  (“The  plain  and  obvious  meaning  of  this  is,  that  no
more duties, taxes, imposts, and excises, shall be laid, than
are sufficient to pay the debts, and provide for the common
defence and general welfare, of the United States”); N. Web-
ster,  An  Examination  Into  the  Leading  Principles  of  the
Federal Constitution, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of
the United States 50 (P. Ford ed. 1888) (“[I]n the very clause
which gives the power of levying duties and taxes, the pur-
poses to which the money shall be appropriated are speci-
fied,  viz.  to  pay  the  debts  and  provide  for  the  common  de-
fence  and  general  welfare  of  the  United  States”);  see  also
Natelson 47–49.  “[T]heir basic message was that the lan-
guage in question was not a grant at all—rather it was a
restriction on federal authority.”  Id., at 39.  As Governor
Randolph  emphatically  declared:  “Is  this  an  independent,
separate, substantive power, to provide for the general wel-
fare of the United States?  No, sir.”  3 Elliot’s Debates 466.
Federalists went out of their way to specifically disclaim
that the General Welfare Clause would vest any independ-
ent  regulatory  power.  For  example,  James  Madison  ex-
pressly  rejected  Anti-Federalist  attempts  to  portray  the
General Welfare Clause as granting “an unlimited commis-

——————
Clause is simply a restriction on the Taxing Clause.  The Committee of
Style slightly altered the text agreed to by the Convention by changing
the comma after “Excises” into a semicolon, so that the General Welfare
Clause “became an additional power, conjoined to the power to tax, ra-
ther than merely a limitation on it.”  Hamburger 283.  The Convention,
however,  recognized  the  alteration  and  restored  the  comma,  “corrobo-
rat[ing] the conclusion that the General Welfare Clause was not an inde-
pendent power.”  Natelson 28.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge named Thomas. It discusses the interpretation of the General Welfare Clause in the US Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgement</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

be admitted “ ‘on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.’ ”  Ante,
at 13.  It distorts the dissent in Plessy to advance a color-
blindness  theory.    Ante,  at  38–39;  see  also  ante,  at  22
(GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring)  (“[T]oday’s  decision  wakes  the
echoes of Justice John Marshall Harlan [in Plessy]”); ante,
at  3  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (same).  The  Court  also  in-
vokes  the  Brown  litigators,  relying  on  what  the  Brown
“plaintiffs had argued.”  Ante, at 12; ante, at 35–36, 39, n. 7
(opinion of THOMAS, J.).

If there was a Member of this Court who understood the
Brown  litigation,  it  was  Justice  Thurgood  Marshall,  who
“led the litigation campaign” to dismantle segregation as a
civil rights lawyer and “rejected the hollow, race-ignorant
conception of equal protection” endorsed by the Court’s rul-
ing today.  Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 9.  Justice Marshall joined
the Bakke plurality and “applaud[ed] the judgment of the
Court that a university may consider race in its admissions
process.”  438 U. S., at 400.  In fact, Justice Marshall’s view
was that Bakke’s holding should have been even more pro-
tective  of  race-conscious  college  admissions  programs  in
light of the remedial purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the legacy of racial inequality in our society.  See id., at
396–402  (arguing  that  “a  class-based  remedy”  should  be
constitutionally  permissible  in  light  of  the  hundreds  of
“years of class-based discrimination against [Black Ameri-
cans]”).  The Court’s recharacterization of Brown is nothing
but revisionist history and an affront to the legendary life
of Justice Marshall, a great jurist who was a champion of
true  equal  opportunity,  not  rhetorical  flourishes  about
colorblindness.

C
Two  decades  after  Brown,  in  Bakke,  a  plurality  of  the
Court held that “the attainment of a diverse student body”
is a “compelling” and “constitutionally permissible goal for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the history of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education, referencing landmark cases like Brown v. Board of Education and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF COLORADO

No. 22–138.  Argued April 19, 2023—Decided June 27, 2023

From 2014 to 2016, petitioner Billy Counterman sent hundreds of Face-
book  messages  to  C. W.,  a  local  singer  and  musician.    The  two  had
never met, and C. W. did not respond.  In fact, she tried repeatedly to
block him, but each time, Counterman created a new Facebook account
and resumed contacting C. W.  Several of his messages envisaged vio-
lent harm befalling her.  Counterman’s messages put C. W. in fear and
upended her daily existence: C. W. stopped walking alone, declined so-
cial engagements, and canceled some of her performances.  C. W. even-
tually contacted the authorities.  The State charged Counterman un-
der a Colorado statute making it unlawful to “[r]epeatedly . . . make[ ]
any  form  of  communication  with  another  person”  in  “a  manner  that
would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress
and does cause that person . . . to suffer serious emotional distress.”
Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §18–3–602(1)(c).    Counterman  moved  to  dismiss  the
charge on First Amendment grounds, arguing that his messages were
not “true threats” and therefore could not form the basis of a criminal
prosecution.  Following Colorado law, the trial court rejected that ar-
gument under an objective standard, finding that a reasonable person
would consider the messages threatening.  Counterman appealed, ar-
guing that the First Amendment required the State to show not only
that his statements were objectively threatening, but also that he was
aware of their threatening character.  The Colorado Court of Appeals
disagreed and affirmed his conviction.  The Colorado Supreme Court
denied review.

Held: The State must prove in true-threats cases that the defendant had
some subjective understanding of his statements’ threatening nature,
but the First Amendment requires no more demanding a showing than
recklessness.  Pp. 4–14.

(a) The  First  Amendment  permits  restrictions  upon  the content  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

21

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

discrimination is distinct from, and not a form of, sex dis-
crimination.
  In sum, all of the usual indicators of ordinary meaning—
common parlance, common usage by Congress, the practice
in  the  Executive  Branch,  the  laws  in  the  States,  and  the
decisions of this Court—overwhelmingly establish that sex-
ual  orientation  discrimination  is  distinct  from,  and  not  a
form of, sex discrimination.  The usage has been consistent
across decades, in both the federal and state contexts.
  Judge Sykes summarized the law and language this way:
“To  a  fluent  speaker  of  the  English  language—then  and
now—. . . discrimination ‘because of sex’ is not reasonably
understood to include discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation,  a  different  immutable  characteristic.    Classifying
people  by  sexual  orientation  is  different  than  classifying
them by sex.  The two traits are categorically distinct and
widely recognized as such.  There is no ambiguity or vague-
ness here.”  Hively, 853 F. 3d, at 363 (dissenting opinion).
  To tie it all together, the plaintiffs have only two routes
to succeed here.  Either they can say that literal meaning
overrides ordinary meaning when the two conflict.  Or they
can say that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “discrimi-
nate  because  of  sex”  encompasses  sexual  orientation  dis-
crimination.  But the first flouts long-settled principles of
statutory  interpretation.    And  the  second  contradicts  the
widespread ordinary use of the English language in Amer-
ica.

II
  Until the last few years, every U. S. Court of Appeals to
address this question concluded that Title VII does not pro-
hibit discrimination because of sexual orientation.  As noted
above, in the first 10 Courts of Appeals to consider the is-
sue, all 30 federal judges agreed that Title VII does not pro-
hibit  sexual  orientation  discrimination.    30  out  of  30
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It delves into the interpretation of Title VII and its application to sexual orientation discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>