<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

JONES v. HENDRIX

JACKSON, J., dissenting

of §2255(e), which was to “save” any claim that was availa-
ble prior to §2255(h)’s enactment where Congress has not
expressed a clear intent to foreclose it.  Jones’s legal inno-
cence claim fits that mold.

I am also deeply troubled by the constitutional implica-
tions of the nothing-to-see-here approach that the majority
takes with respect to the incarceration of potential legal in-
nocents.  See Part III, infra.  Apparently, legally innocent
or not, Jones must just carry on in prison regardless, since
(as the majority reads §2255) no path exists for him to ask
a federal judge to consider his innocence assertion.  But for-
ever slamming the courtroom doors to a possibly innocent
person who has never had a meaningful opportunity to get
a  new  and  retroactively  applicable  claim  for  release  re-
viewed on the merits raises serious constitutional concerns.
Thus, in my view, all roads lead to an interpretation of
§2255 that is diametrically opposed to the one that the ma-
jority  announces.  Whether  one  gets  there  by  virtue  of  a
proper reading of §2255(e) or an informed understanding of
§2255(h), or by affording due respect to the core constitu-
tional interests at stake, Jones’s successive petition alleg-
ing  legal  innocence  should  have  been  considered  on  the
merits.2  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

I
Section 2255(e) saves postconviction claims by authoriz-
ing the filing of a habeas petition under §2241 if the proce-
dures  §2255  affords  are  “inadequate  or  ineffective  to  test
the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention.”  §2255(e).  I see no
reason why the only circumstance in which §2255’s proce-
dures qualify as inadequate or ineffective for saving clause
purposes is when it is impossible or impractical for a pris-
oner to file a §2255 motion.  Contra, ante, at 6–7.  Quite to

——————

2 I take no position as to whether Jones’s legal innocence claim is actu-
ally meritorious.  This case is about whether §2255 should be interpreted
to prevent him from bringing the claim to a court in the first place.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case. It delves into the legal arguments and constitutional implications surrounding a claim of legal innocence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

ligious  conduct  while  permitting  secular  conduct  that  un-
dermines the government’s asserted interests in a similar
way,” or if it provides “a mechanism for individualized ex-
emptions.”  Fulton, 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).  Failing
either  the  neutrality  or  general  applicability  test  is  suffi-
cient to trigger strict scrutiny.  See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at
546.

In  this  case,  the  District’s  challenged  policies  were  nei-
ther  neutral  nor  generally  applicable.    By  its  own  admis-
sion, the District sought to restrict Mr. Kennedy’s actions
at least in part because of their religious character.  As it
put  it  in  its  September  17  letter,  the  District  prohibited
“any  overt  actions  on  Mr.  Kennedy’s  part,  appearing  to  a
reasonable observer to endorse even voluntary, student-in-
itiated  prayer.”    App.  81.    The  District  further  explained
that it could not allow “an employee, while still on duty, to
engage in religious conduct.”  Id., at 106 (emphasis added).
Prohibiting a religious practice was thus the District’s un-
questioned “object.”  The District candidly acknowledged as
much below, conceding that its policies were “not neutral”
toward religion.  991 F. 3d, at 1020.

The District’s challenged policies also fail the general ap-
plicability test.  The District’s performance evaluation after
the 2015 football season advised against rehiring Mr. Ken-
nedy  on  the  ground  that  he  “failed  to  supervise  student-
athletes after games.”  App. 114.  But, in fact, this was  a
bespoke  requirement  specifically  addressed  to  Mr.  Ken-
nedy’s  religious  exercise.    The  District  permitted  other
members of the coaching staff to forgo supervising students
briefly after the game to do things like visit with friends or
take personal phone calls.  App. 205; see also Part I–B, su-
pra.  Thus, any sort of postgame supervisory requirement
was  not  applied  in  an  evenhanded,  across-the-board  way.
Again recognizing as much, the District conceded before the
Ninth Circuit that its challenged directives were not “gen-
erally applicable.”  991 F. 3d, at 1020.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. It delves into the legal arguments regarding the neutrality and general applicability of the school district's policies towards a coach's religious expression.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

13

Opinion of the Court

could  justify  a  class  of  both  applicants  and  employees
if  the  discrimination  manifested  itself  in  hiring  and  pro-
motion  practices  in  the  same  general  fashion,  such  as
through  entirely  subjective  decisionmaking  processes.”
Ibid.  We think that statement precisely describes respon-
dents’  burden  in  this  case.    The  first  manner  of  bridging
the  gap  obviously  has  no  application  here;  Wal-Mart  has
no  testing  procedure  or  other  companywide  evaluation
method that can be charged with bias.  The whole point of
permitting discretionary decisionmaking is to avoid evalu-
ating employees under a common standard.

The second manner of bridging the gap requires “signifi-
cant  proof ”  that  Wal-Mart  “operated  under  a  general
policy  of  discrimination.”  That  is  entirely  absent  here.
Wal-Mart’s  announced  policy  forbids  sex  discrimination,
see  App.  1567a–1596a,  and  as  the  District  Court  recog-
nized  the  company  imposes  penalties  for  denials  of  equal
employment  opportunity,  222  F. R. D.,  at  154.    The  only
evidence  of  a  “general  policy  of  discrimination”  respon-
dents  produced  was  the  testimony  of  Dr.  William  Bielby,
their  sociological  expert.  Relying  on  “social  framework”
analysis,  Bielby  testified  that  Wal-Mart  has  a  “strong
corporate culture,” that makes it “ ‘vulnerable’ ” to “gender
bias.”  Id., at 152.  He could not, however, “determine with
any specificity how regularly stereotypes play a meaning-
ful  role  in  employment  decisions  at  Wal-Mart.    At  his
deposition . . . Dr. Bielby conceded that he could not calcu-
late whether 0.5 percent or 95 percent of the employment
decisions at Wal-Mart might be determined by stereotyped
thinking.”    222  F. R. D.  189,  192  (ND  Cal.  2004).    The
parties  dispute  whether  Bielby’s  testimony  even  met  the
standards  for  the  admission  of  expert  testimony  under
Federal  Rule  of  Evidence  702  and  our  Daubert  case,
see  Daubert  v.  Merrell  Dow  Pharmaceuticals,  Inc.,  509
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

GORSUCH, J., concurring

cial respect.  See ante, at 20–22.  Finally, there is a “mis-
match”  between  the  EPA’s  expertise  over  environmental
matters  and  the  agency’s  claim  that  “Congress  implicitly
tasked it, and it alone, with balancing the many vital con-
siderations  of  national  policy  implicated  in  deciding  how
Americans  will  get  their  energy.”  Ante,  at  25.  Such  a
claimed power “requires technical and policy expertise not
traditionally  needed  in  [the]  EPA’s  regulatory  develop-
ment.”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Again, in
observing this much, the Court does not purport to pass on
the  wisdom  of  the  agency’s  course.    It  acknowledges  only
that agency officials have sought to resolve a major policy
question without clear legislative authorization to do so.

III

In places, the dissent seems to suggest that we should not
be unduly “ ‘concerned’ ” with the Constitution’s assignment
of the legislative power to Congress.  Post, at 29 (opinion of
KAGAN, J.).  Echoing Woodrow Wilson, the dissent seems to
think  “a  modern  Nation”  cannot  afford  such  sentiments.
Post,  at  29–31.  But  recently,  our  dissenting  colleagues
acknowledged that the Constitution assigns “all legislative
Powers” to Congress and “bar[s their] further delegation.”
Gundy,  588  U. S.,  at  ___  (plurality  opinion  of  KAGAN,  J.)
(slip  op.,  at  4)  (internal  quotation  marks  and  alteration
omitted).  To be sure, in that case we disagreed about the
exact nature of the “nondelegation inquiry” courts must em-
ploy to vindicate the Constitution.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at
5).  But like Chief Justice Marshall, we all recognized that
the Constitution does impose some limits on the delegation
of legislative power.  See ibid.; Wayman, 10 Wheat., at 42–
43.  And  while  we  all  agree  that  administrative  agencies
have  important  roles  to  play  in  a  modern  nation,  surely
none of us wishes to abandon our Republic’s promise that
the people and their representatives should have a mean-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch in the case of West Virginia v. EPA.  It discusses the separation of powers and the limits of agency authority.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE

KAGAN, J., dissenting

B
The majority’s broadest claim, as I’ve noted, is that this
is a price we must pay because judicial oversight of parti-
san  gerrymandering  cannot  be  “politically  neutral”  or
“manageable.”  Ante,  at  19;  see  supra,  at  14.  Courts,  the
majority  argues,  will  have  to  choose  among  contested
notions  of  electoral  fairness.
(Should  they  take  as  the
ideal  mode  of  districting  proportional  representation,
many  competitive  seats,  adherence  to  traditional  district-
ing  criteria,  or  so  forth?)    See  ante,  at  16–19.  And  even
once courts have chosen, the majority continues, they will
have  to  decide  “[h]ow  much  is  too  much?”—that  is,  how
much  deviation  from  the  chosen  “touchstone”  to  allow?
Ante, at 19–20.  In answering that question, the majority
surmises,  they  will  likely  go  far  too  far.  See  ante,  at  15.
So  the  whole  thing  is  impossible,  the  majority  concludes.
To prove its point, the majority throws a bevy of question
marks on the page.  (I count nine in just two paragraphs.
See  ante,  at  19–20.)  But  it  never  tries  to  analyze  the
serious  question  presented  here—whether  the  kind  of
standard developed below falls prey to those objections, or
instead allows for neutral and manageable oversight.  The
answer,  as  you’ve  already  heard  enough  to  know,  is  the
latter.  That kind of oversight is not only possible; it’s been
done.

Consider  neutrality  first.    Contrary  to  the  majority’s
suggestion,  the  District  Courts  did  not  have  to—and  in
fact  did  not—choose  among  competing  visions  of  electoral
fairness.  That is because they did not try to compare the
State’s actual map to an “ideally fair” one (whether based
on  proportional  representation  or  some  other  criterion).
Instead,  they  looked  at  the  difference  between  what  the
State  did  and  what  the  State  would  have  done  if  politi-
cians  hadn’t  been  intent  on  partisan  gain.  Or  put  differ-
ently,  the  comparator  (or  baseline  or  touchstone)  is  the
result not of a judge’s philosophizing but of the State’s own
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Rucho v. Common Cause. It delves into the arguments made by the majority and presents a counter-argument regarding the feasibility of judicial oversight of partisan gerrymandering.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

International  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  the  Fi-
nancing  of  Terrorism,  Dec.  9,  1999,  S.  Treaty  Doc.  No.
106–49,  2178  U. N. T. S.  232.    But  by  its  terms  the  Con-
vention  imposes  its  obligations  only  on  nation-states  “to
enable”  corporations  to  be  held  liable  in  certain  circum-
stances under domestic law.  The United States and other
nations,  including  Jordan,  may  fulfill  their  obligations
under  the  Convention  by  adopting  detailed  regulatory
regimes  governing  financial  institutions.  See,  e.g.,  18
U. S. C.  §2333(a)  (private  right  of  action  under  the  Anti-
Terrorism  Act);  31  U. S. C.  §5311  et seq.  (Bank  Secrecy
Act); 31 CFR pt. 595 (2017) (Terrorism Sanctions Regula-
tions); Brief for Central Bank of Jordan as Amicus Curiae
5  (describing  Jordan’s  “comprehensive  approach  to  pre-
venting  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing”).  The
Convention  neither  requires  nor  authorizes  courts,  with-
out congressional authorization, to displace those detailed
regulatory regimes by allowing common-law actions under
the  ATS.  And  nothing  in  the  Convention’s  text  requires
signatories to hold corporations liable in common-law tort
actions raising claims under international law.

In addition, petitioners and their amici cite a few cases
from  other  nations  and  the  Special  Tribunal  for  Lebanon
that, according to petitioners, are examples of corporations
being held liable for violations of international law.  E.g.,
Brief for Petitioners 50–51.  Yet even assuming that these
cases  are  relevant  examples,  at  most  they  demonstrate
that  corporate  liability  might  be  permissible  under  inter-
national law in some circumstances.  That falls far short of
establishing  a  specific,  universal,  and  obligatory  norm  of
corporate liability.

It must be remembered that international law is distinct
from  domestic  law  in  its  domain  as  well  as  its  objectives.
International  human-rights  norms  prohibit  acts  repug-
nant to all civilized peoples—crimes like genocide, torture,
and slavery, that make their perpetrators “enem[ies] of all
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the applicability of international law to corporations. It delves into the nuances of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and its implications for corporate liability.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

HOLT v. HOBBS

Opinion of the Court

religion,  whether  or  not  compelled  by,  or  central  to,  a
system  of  religious  belief.”    §2000cc–5(7)(A).    Congress
mandated that this concept “shall be construed in favor of
a  broad  protection  of  religious  exercise,  to  the  maximum
extent  permitted  by  the  terms  of  this  chapter  and  the
Constitution.”  §2000cc–3(g).    And  Congress  stated  that
RLUIPA “may require a government to incur expenses in
its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden
on  religious  exercise.”    §2000cc–3(c).  See  Hobby  Lobby,
supra, at ___ – ___, ___ (slip op., at 6–7, 43).

B
Petitioner,  as  noted,  is  in  the  custody  of  the  Arkansas
Department  of  Correction  and  he  objects  on  religious
grounds  to  the  Department’s  grooming  policy,  which  pro-
vides  that  “[n]o  inmates  will  be  permitted  to  wear  facial
hair other than a neatly trimmed mustache that does not
extend  beyond  the  corner  of  the  mouth  or  over  the  lip.”
App.  to  Brief  for  Petitioner  11a.    The  policy  makes  no
exception for inmates who object on religious grounds, but
it  does  contain  an  exemption  for  prisoners  with  medical
needs:  “Medical  staff  may  prescribe  that  inmates  with  a
diagnosed dermatological problem may wear facial hair no
longer  than  one  quarter  of  an  inch.”    Ibid.    The  policy
provides  that  “[f]ailure  to  abide  by  [the  Department’s]
grooming  standards  is  grounds  for  disciplinary  action.”
Id., at 12a.

Petitioner  sought  permission  to  grow  a  beard  and,  al-
though he believes that his faith requires him not to trim
his beard at all, he proposed a “compromise” under which
he  would  grow  only  a  1⁄2-inch  beard.    App.  164.    Prison
officials  denied  his  request,  and  the  warden  told  him:
“[Y]ou will abide by [Arkansas Department of Correction]
policies  and  if  you  choose  to  disobey,  you  can  suffer  the
consequences.”    No.  5:11–cv–00164  (ED  Ark.,  July  21,
2011),  Doc.  13,  p.  6  (Letter  from  Gaylon  Lay  to  Gregory
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case HOLT v. HOBBS. It discusses the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and its application to a prisoner's request to grow a beard for religious reasons.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

532

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

insure itself against liabilities arising out of its former coal
operations, that indemnity is neither enhanced nor sup-
planted by the Coal Act and does not affect the availability
of the declaratory relief Eastern seeks.

We are also not persuaded by respondents’ argument that
the Coal Act “moderate[s] and mitigate[s] the economic im-
pact” upon Eastern. See Connolly, 475 U. S., at 225–226.
Although Eastern is not assigned the premiums for former
employees who later worked for companies that signed the
1978 NBCWA, see 26 U. S. C. §§ 9706(a)(1), (2), Eastern had
no control over the activities of its former employees subse-
quent to its departure from the coal industry in 1965. By
contrast, the provisions of the MPPAA that we identiﬁed as
potentially moderating the employer’s liability in Connolly
were generally within the employer’s control. See 475 U. S.,
at 226, n. 8. The mere fact that Eastern is not forced to bear
the burden of lifetime beneﬁts respecting all of its former
employees does not mean that the company’s liability for
some of those employees is not a signiﬁcant economic burden.
For similar reasons, the Coal Act substantially interferes
with Eastern’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.
The Act’s beneﬁciary allocation scheme reaches back 30 to
50 years to impose liability against Eastern based on the
company’s activities between 1946 and 1965. Thus, even
though the Act mandates only the payment of future health
beneﬁts, it nonetheless “attaches new legal consequences to
[an employment relationship] completed before its enact-
ment.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 270
(1994).

Retroactivity is generally disfavored in the law, Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 208 (1988), in ac-
cordance with “fundamental notions of justice” that have
been recognized throughout history, Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U. S. 827, 855 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring). See also, e. g., Dash v. Van Kleeck,
7 Johns. *477, *503 (NY 1811) (“It is a principle in the Eng-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1142

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 12, 13, 15, 2010

558 U. S.

sented  to  Justice  Scalia,  and  by  him  referred  to  the  Court,
denied.  Certiorari  denied.

January  13,  2010

Dismissal  Under  Rule  46

No.  09–6679.  Hartman  v.  Strickland,  Governor  of  Ohio,
et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  dismissed  under  this  Court’s
Rule  46.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  497.

Certiorari  Granted

January  15,  2010

No.  09–337.  Krupski  v.  Costa  Crociere  S.  p.  A.  C.  A.  11th
Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Petitioner’s  brief  is  to  be  ﬁled  on  or
before  Thursday,  February  25,  2010.  Respondent’s  brief  is  to  be
ﬁled  on  or  before  Thursday,  March  25,  2010.  Reply  briefs,  if  any,
are  to  be  ﬁled  in  accordance  with  this  Court’s  Rule  25.3.  Re
ported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  892.

No. 09–448.  Hardt v.  Reliance  Standard Life Insurance
Co.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Petitioner’s  brief  is  to
be  ﬁled  on  or  before  Thursday,  February  25,  2010.  Respondent’s
brief  is  to  be  ﬁled  on  or  before  Thursday,  March  25,  2010.  Reply
briefs,  if  any,  are  to  be  ﬁled  in  accordance  with  this  Court’s  Rule
25.3.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  332.

No.  09–475.  Monsanto  Co.  et  al.  v.  Geertson  Seed  Farms
et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Petitioners’  brief  is
to  be  ﬁled  on  or  before  Thursday,  February  25,  2010.  Respond
ents’  brief  is  to  be  ﬁled  on  or  before  Thursday,  March  25,  2010.
Reply briefs, if any, are to be ﬁled in accordance with this Court’s
Rule  25.3.  Justice  Breyer  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or
decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  570  F.  3d  1130.

No.  09–497.  Rent-A-Center,  West,  Inc.  v.  Jackson.  C.  A.
9th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Petitioner’s  brief  is  to  be  ﬁled  on
or  before  Thursday,  February  25,  2010.  Respondent’s  brief  is  to
be  ﬁled  on  or  before  Thursday,  March  25,  2010.  Reply  briefs,  if
any,  are  to  be  ﬁled  in  accordance  with  this  Court’s  Rule  25.3.
Reported  below:  581  F.  3d  912.

No.  09–559.  Doe  et  al.  v.  Reed,  Secretary  of  State  of
Washington,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Peti
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their statuses, including grant dates for certiorari and filing deadlines. This is not the typical content found within the body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

Opinion of the Court

Uzuegbunam  alleges  occurred  when  campus  officials  en-
forced the speech policies against him.

A
In determining whether nominal damages can redress a
past injury, we look to the forms of relief awarded at com-
mon law.  “Article III’s restriction of the judicial power to
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ is properly understood to mean
‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable
to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’ ”  Vermont Agency
of  Natural  Resources  v.  United  States  ex  rel.  Stevens,  529
U. S. 765, 774 (2000) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102 (1998)); cf. Memphis Com-
munity School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299, 306 (1986)
(relief for “§1983 plaintiffs . . . is ordinarily determined ac-
cording  to  principles  derived  from  the  common  law  of
torts”).  The parties here agree that courts at common law
routinely  awarded  nominal  damages.    They,  instead,  dis-
pute what kinds of harms those damages could redress.

Both sides agree that nominal damages historically could
provide prospective relief.  The award of nominal damages
was one way for plaintiffs at common law to “obtain a form
of declaratory relief in a legal system with no general de-
claratory judgment act.”  D. Laycock & R. Hasen, Modern
American Remedies 636 (5th ed. 2019).  For example, a tres-
pass to land or water rights might raise a prospective threat
to a property right by creating the foundation for a future
claim  of  adverse  possession  or  prescriptive  easement.
Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 253, 268 (1832) (“If an unlawful
diversion [of water] is  suffered for twenty years, it ripens
into a right, which cannot be controverted”).  By obtaining
a declaration of trespass, a property owner could “vindicate
his  right  by  action”  and  protect  against  those  future
threats.  Ibid.   Courts  at  common  law  would  not  declare
property boundaries in the abstract, “but the suit for nomi-
nal  damages  allowed  them  to  do  so  indirectly.”    Laycock,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the concept of nominal damages and their historical use in common law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

BREYER, J., dissenting

our society ever further beyond the bounds of the Framers’
imaginations,  attempts  at  “analogical  reasoning”  will  be-
come increasingly tortured.  In short, a standard that relies
solely on history is unjustifiable and unworkable.

IV

Indeed, the Court’s application of its history-only test in
this  case  demonstrates  the  very  pitfalls  described  above.
The historical evidence reveals a 700-year Anglo-American
tradition  of  regulating  the  public  carriage  of  firearms  in
general, and concealed or concealable firearms in particu-
lar.  The Court spends more than half of its opinion trying
to discredit this tradition.  But, in my view, the robust evi-
dence  of  such  a  tradition  cannot  be  so  easily  explained
away.  Laws regulating the public carriage of weapons ex-
isted in England as early as the 13th century and on this
Continent  since  before  the  founding.    Similar  laws  re-
mained on the books through the ratifications of the Second
and Fourteenth Amendments through to the present day.
Many of those historical regulations imposed significantly
stricter restrictions on public carriage than New York’s li-
censing  requirements  do  today.  Thus,  even  applying  the
Court’s history-only analysis, New York’s law must be up-
held because “historical precedent from before, during, and
. . . after the founding evinces a comparable tradition of reg-
ulation.”  Ante, at 18 (majority opinion) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

A. England.
The right codified by the Second Amendment was “ ‘inher-
ited from our English ancestors.’ ”  Heller, 554 U. S., at 599
(quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281 (1897));
see also ante, at 30 (majority opinion).  And some of Eng-
land’s earliest laws regulating the public carriage of weap-
ons  were  precursors  of  similar  American  laws  enacted
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*.  It discusses historical context and legal precedent related to gun regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

ALITO, J., dissenting

majority-minority district is “compact.”  Neither the Voting
Rights Act (VRA) nor the Constitution imposes a compact-
ness  requirement.    The  Court  notes  that  we  have  struck
down bizarrely shaped districts, ante, at 19–20, but we did
not do that for esthetic reasons.  Compactness in and of it-
self is not a legal requirement—or even necessarily an es-
thetic one.  (Some may find fancifully shaped districts more
pleasing to the eye than boring squares.)
  The same is true of departures from other traditional dis-
tricting criteria.  Again, nothing in the Constitution or the
VRA demands compliance with these criteria.  If a whimsi-
cal state  legislature  cavalierly disregards county  and  mu-
nicipal  lines  and  communities  of  interest,  draws  weirdly
shaped districts, departs radically from a prior map solely
for the purpose of change, and forces many incumbents to
run  against  each  other,  neither  the  Constitution  nor  the
VRA  would  make  any  of  that  illegal  per  se.    Bizarrely
shaped districts and other marked departures from tradi-
tional districting criteria matter because mapmakers usu-
ally  heed  these  criteria,  and  when  it  is  evident  that  they
have not done so, there is reason to suspect that something
untoward—specifically,  unconstitutional  racial  gerryman-
dering—is  afoot.    See,  e.g.,  Shaw  v.  Reno,  509  U. S.  630,
643–644  (1993);  Bush  v.  Vera,  517  U. S.  952,  979  (1996)
(plurality opinion); cf. LULAC, 548 U. S., at 433–435.
  Conspicuous  violations  of  traditional  districting  criteria
constitute strong circumstantial evidence of unconstitution-
ality.  And when it is shown that the configuration of a dis-
trict  is  attributable  predominantly  to  race,  that  is  more
than circumstantial evidence that the district is unlawful.
That is direct evidence of illegality because, as we have of-
ten held, race may not “predominate” in the drawing of dis-
trict lines.  See, e.g., Cooper, 581 U. S., at 292; Bethune-Hill
v.  Virginia  State  Bd.  of  Elections,  580  U. S.  178,  191–192
(2017);  Shaw  v.  Hunt,  517  U. S.  899,  906–907  (1996)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Allen v. Milligan. It discusses the legal standards for evaluating voting district maps, focusing on the issue of racial gerrymandering.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

“[i]n later years, we came to appreciate more fully the ten-
sion  between  this  practice  and  the  Constitution’s  separa-
tion of legislative and judicial power,” Hernández, 589 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 5).  Because Erie denied the existence of
a federal general common law, “a federal court’s authority
to  recognize  a  damages  remedy  must  rest  at  bottom  on  a
statute  enacted  by  Congress.”  Hernández,  589  U. S.,  at
___–___ (slip op., at 5–6).  It follows that any judicially cre-
ated cause of action risks “upset[ting] the careful balance of
interests struck by the lawmakers.”  Ibid.

To limit this stress on the separation of powers, our prec-
edents have made clear that the second step of Sosa—which
applies in any context where a plaintiff asks a court to cre-
ate  a  cause  of  action—is  extraordinarily  strict.   A  court
“ ‘must’ ” not create a private right of action if it can identify
even  one  “ ‘sound  reaso[n]  to  think  Congress  might  doubt
the efficacy or necessity of [the new] remedy.’ ”  Jesner, 584
U. S., at ___ (majority opinion) (slip op., at 18) (quoting Ab-
basi, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13)); see also Hernández,
589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (same).  This test is demand-
ing by design, and we have yet to find it satisfied.  See Jes-
ner, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 27) (no judicially created
causes of action against foreign corporations); see also Sosa,
542  U. S., at 725 (no  judicially created cause  of  action for
illegal detention even under the less-demanding standard
initially created by Sosa).

B

Regardless  of  whether  respondents  have  satisfied  the
first step of the Sosa test, it is clear that they have not sat-
isfied the second.  Our decisions since Sosa, as well as con-
gressional  activity,  compel  the  conclusion  that  federal
courts should not recognize private rights of action for vio-
lations of international law beyond the three historical torts
identified in Sosa.

We recently identified a sound reason to think Congress
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Sosa test for recognizing private rights of action for violations of international law.  It delves into legal precedents and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxxvii

Page

1154

Johnson v. Cate
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Johnson v. Cook Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Johnson; English-Speaking Union v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  867,952,1101

Johnson v. Florida
1016

Johnson v. Gaetz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Johnson v. Garcia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

Johnson v. George . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Johnson v. Gibson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Giddens v.
938

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. Girdich
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Johnson; Jones v.
897

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Joyner v.
Johnson v. Kelly  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  909,1102,1152

1054

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. Missouri
993

Johnson v. Nevada Dept. of Corrections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Johnson v. Oregon
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

Johnson; Pace v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
891

Johnson v. Pinchak  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Richardson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  984,1090

909

Johnson; Robinson v.
840

Johnson v. Roper
Johnson v. Shinseki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1022,1109

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Johnson; Singleton v.
1123

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. Sisto
Johnson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1141

Johnson v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  855,972,1110

860,

Johnson v. United States
863,895,920,925,958,976,1003,1018,1051,1059,1062,1128,1134,
1135,1144

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Johnson; Updike v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. Wengler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. Wisconsin
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Wrinn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnston v. Allen
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Joint Comm. of Plumbing & Pipeﬁtting v. Washington Group Int’l
Jointer v. Garcia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jolley v. Department of Housing and Urban Development  . . . . . .
Jones v. Bayer Healthcare LLC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jones v. Burdette  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jones v. California
Jones v. Carlson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jones v. Commissioner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jones; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

836

867

1123

860

1024

1053

1115

896

826

821

1113

996

1000

881

873
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1208

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

Type of Document

(vii)  Reply Brief on the Merits (Rule 24.4)
(viii)  Reply  to  Plaintiff ’s  Exceptions  to  Report  of

Word
Limits
6,000

Color of

Cover

yellow

Special Master (Rule 17)

15,000

orange

(ix)  Reply  to  Exceptions  by  Party  Other  Than

Plaintiff to Report of Special Master (Rule 17)  15,000

yellow

(x)  Brief  for  an  Amicus  Curiae  at  the  Petition
Stage  or  pertaining  to  a  Motion  for  Leave  to
ﬁle a Bill of Complaint (Rule 37.2)

(xi)  Brief  for  an  Amicus  Curiae  in  Support  of  the
Plaintiff,  Petitioner,  or  Appellant,  or  in  Sup
port  of  Neither  Party,  on  the  Merits  or  in
an  Original  Action  at  the  Exceptions  Stage
(Rule 37.3)

(xii)  Brief  for  an  Amicus  Curiae  in  Support  of  the
Defendant,  Respondent,  or  Appellee,  on  the
Merits  or  in  an  Original  Action  at  the  Excep
tions Stage (Rule 37.3)

(xiii)  Petition for Rehearing (Rule 44)

6,000

cream

9,000

light
green

9,000
3,000

dark
green
tan

(h)  A document prepared under Rule 33.1 must be accom
panied  by  a  certiﬁcate  signed  by  the  attorney,  the  unrepre
sented  party,  or  the  preparer  of  the  document  stating  that
the  brief  complies  with  the  word  limitations.  The  person
preparing  the  certiﬁcate  may  rely  on  the  word  count  of  the
word-processing system used to prepare the document.  The
word-processing  system  must  be  set  to  include  footnotes  in
the  word  count.  The  certiﬁcate  must  state  the  number  of
words in the document.  The certiﬁcate shall accompany the
document  when  it  is  presented  to  the  Clerk  for  ﬁling  and
shall  be  separate  from  it.  If  the  certiﬁcate  is  signed  by  a
person  other  than  a  member  of  the  Bar  of  this  Court,  the
counsel of record, or the unrepresented party, it must contain
a  notarized  afﬁdavit  or  declaration  in  compliance  with  28
U. S. C. § 1746.

2.  81⁄2- by  11-Inch  Paper  Format:  (a)  The  text  of  every
document, including any appendix thereto, expressly permit
ted  by  these  Rules  to  be  presented  to  the  Court  on  81⁄2- by
11-inch paper shall appear double spaced, except for indented
quotations,  which  shall  be  single  spaced,  on  opaque,  un
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a set of rules and formatting guidelines for legal documents submitted to a court. It is not the typical narrative content found within a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Guidelines</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

45

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

18–21, a heavy emphasis on grades and standardized test
scores disproportionately disadvantages underrepresented
racial minorities.  Stated simply, race is one small piece of
a much larger admissions puzzle where most of the pieces
disfavor  underrepresented  racial  minorities.    That  is  pre-
cisely why underrepresented  racial minorities remain un-
derrepresented.  The Court’s suggestion that an already ad-
vantaged  racial  group  is  “disadvantaged”  because  of  a
limited use of race is a myth.

The majority’s true objection appears to be that a lim-
ited use of race in college admissions does, in fact, achieve
what it is designed to achieve: It helps equalize opportunity
and  advances  respondents’  objectives  by  increasing  the
number  of  underrepresented  racial  minorities  on  college
campuses, particularly Black and Latino students.  This is
unacceptable,  the  Court  says,  because  racial  groups  that
are  not  underrepresented  “would  be  admitted  in  greater
numbers” without these policies.  Ante, at 28.  Reduced to
its  simplest  terms,  the  Court’s  conclusion  is  that  an  in-
crease in the representation of racial minorities at institu-
tions of higher learning that were historically reserved for
white Americans is an unfair and repugnant outcome that
offends the Equal Protection Clause.  It provides a license
to  discriminate  against  white  Americans,  the  Court  says,
which  requires  the  courts  and  state  actors  to  “pic[k]  the
right races to benefit.”  Ante, at 38.

Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment or its history sup-
ports the Court’s shocking proposition, which echoes argu-
ments made by opponents of Reconstruction-era laws and
this Court’s decision in Brown.  Supra, at 2–17.  In a society
where  opportunity  is  dispensed  along  racial  lines,  racial
equality cannot be achieved without making room for un-
derrepresented groups that for far too long were denied ad-
mission through the force of law, including at Harvard and
UNC.  Quite the opposite: A racially integrated vision of so-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision and provides legal reasoning to support its stance on affirmative action in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

officer also recognized heavy use of air freshener, which, in
his experience, indicated the presence of contraband in the
vehicle.  “[C]ommonsense judgments and inferences about
human  behavior”  further  support  the  officer’s  conclusion
that  Pollman’s  story  about  their  trip  was  likely  a  cover
story for illegal activity.  Id., at 125.  Taking into account
all the relevant facts, Officer Struble possessed reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to conduct the dog sniff.

Rodriguez  contends  that  reasonable  suspicion  cannot
exist because each of the actions giving rise to the officer’s
suspicions could be entirely innocent, but our cases easily
dispose of that argument.  Acts that, by themselves, might
be innocent can, when taken together, give rise to reason-
able  suspicion.    United  States  v.  Arvizu,  534  U. S.  266,
274–275 (2002).  Terry is a classic example, as it involved
two individuals repeatedly walking back and forth, looking
into  a  store  window,  and  conferring  with  one  another  as
well  as  with  a  third  man.    392  U. S.,  at  6.   The  Court
reasoned  that  this  “series  of  acts,  each  of  them  perhaps
innocent in itself, . . . together warranted further investi-
gation,” id., at 22, and it has reiterated that analysis in a
number  of  cases,  see,  e.g.,  Arvizu,  supra,  at  277;  United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 9–10 (1989).  This one is no
different.

*

*

*
I  would  conclude  that  the  police  did  not  violate  the
Fourth Amendment here.  Officer Struble possessed prob-
able  cause  to  stop  Rodriguez  for  driving  on  the  shoulder,
and  he  executed  the  subsequent  stop  in  a  reasonable
manner.  Our decision in Caballes requires no more.  The
majority’s  holding  to  the  contrary  is  irreconcilable  with
Caballes  and  a  number  of  other  routine  police  practices,
distorts  the  distinction  between  traffic  stops  justified  by
probable cause and those justified by reasonable suspicion,
and  abandons  reasonableness  as  the  touchstone  of  the
Fourth Amendment.  I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Rodriguez v. United States. It discusses the legal standard for reasonable suspicion in the context of a traffic stop and a drug-sniffing dog.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

3

Opinion of the Court

2004,  Arizona  voters  adopted  Proposition  200,  a  ballot
initiative  designed  in  part  “to  combat  voter  fraud  by  re-
quiring  voters  to  present  proof  of  citizenship  when  they
register  to  vote  and  to  present  identification  when  they
vote  on  election  day.”    Purcell  v.  Gonzalez,  549  U. S.  1,  2
(2006) (per curiam).2  Proposition 200 amended the State’s
election  code  to  require  county  recorders  to  “reject  any
application  for  registration  that  is  not  accompanied  by
satisfactory  evidence  of  United  States  citizenship.”    Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §16–166(F) (West Supp. 2012).  The proof-
of-citizenship requirement is satisfied by (1) a photocopy of
the  applicant’s  passport  or  birth  certificate,  (2)  a  driver’s
license  number,  if  the  license  states  that  the  issuing  au-
thority verified the holder’s U. S.  citizenship, (3) evidence
of  naturalization,  (4)  tribal  identification,  or  (5)  “[o]ther
documents or methods of proof . . . established pursuant to
the  Immigration  Reform  and  Control  Act  of  1986.”    Ibid.
The  EAC  did  not  grant  Arizona’s  request  to  include  this
new  requirement  among  the  state-specific  instructions
for  Arizona  on  the  Federal  Form.    App.  225.  Conse-
quently, the Federal Form includes a statutorily required
attestation,  subscribed  to  under  penalty  of  perjury,  that
an  Arizona  applicant  meets  the  State’s  voting  require-
ments
the  citizenship  requirement),  see
§1973gg–7(b)(2), but does not require concrete evidence of
citizenship.

(including

The  two  groups  of  plaintiffs  represented  here—a  group
of  individual  Arizona  residents  (dubbed  the  Gonzalez
plaintiffs, after lead plaintiff Jesus Gonzalez) and a group
of  nonprofit  organizations  led  by  the  Inter  Tribal  Council
of  Arizona  (ITCA)—filed  separate  suits  seeking  to  enjoin
the  voting  provisions  of  Proposition  200.  The  District

——————

2 In May 2005, the United States Attorney General precleared under
§5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 the procedures Arizona adopted to
implement Proposition 200.  Purcell, 549 U. S., at 3.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites a previous case, provides background information on a law (Proposition 200), and outlines the legal challenges to it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

29

Opinion of the Court

630, 647 (1993))).

Yet  by  accepting  race-based  admissions  programs  in
which some students may obtain preferences on the basis
of race alone, respondents’ programs tolerate the very thing
that Grutter foreswore: stereotyping.  The point of respond-
ents’ admissions programs is that there is an inherent ben-
efit in race qua race—in race for race’s sake.  Respondents
admit as much.  Harvard’s admissions process rests on the
pernicious  stereotype  that  “a  black  student  can  usually
bring something that a white person cannot offer.”  Bakke,
438 U. S., at 316 (opinion of Powell, J.) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 20–1199, at
92.    UNC  is  much  the  same.    It  argues  that  race  in  itself
“says [something] about who you are.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. in
No. 21–707, at 97; see also id., at 96 (analogizing being of a
certain race to being from a rural area).

We  have  time  and  again  forcefully  rejected  the  notion
that  government  actors  may  intentionally  allocate  prefer-
ence to those “who may have little in common with one an-
other but the color of their skin.”  Shaw, 509 U. S., at 647.
The  entire  point  of  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  is  that
treating someone differently because of their skin color is
not like treating them differently because they are from a
city or from a suburb, or because they play the violin poorly
or well.

“One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbid-
den classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth
of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her
own merit and essential qualities.”  Rice, 528 U. S., at 517.
But when a university admits students “on the basis of race,
it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that
[students] of a particular race, because of their race, think
alike,” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911–912 (1995) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)—at the very least alike in
the sense of being different from nonminority students.  In
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the use of race-based admissions programs in higher education. It cites previous Supreme Court cases and delves into the legal and ethical arguments surrounding affirmative action.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

See  Reiter  v.  Sonotone  Corp.,  442  U. S.  330,  341  (1979).
Even read for all they are worth, the handful of words on
which the Court rests its entire holding today—a “showing”
that “in fact” “sever[s] the link”—cannot begin to carry the
weight the Court assigns them.  See ante, at 10 (emphasis
deleted).  These terms do not even appear together in Basic:
The Court has to pluck the phrase “in fact” from one sen-
tence and the phrase “[a] showing that severs the link” from
another, and then combine them to create a new clause that
appears nowhere in the U. S. Reports—a “showing” that “in
fact  sever[s]  the  link.”  Ante,  at  10  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).  Even then, the Court’s newly handcrafted
phrase does not so much as mention the terms “burden of
persuasion” or “price impact.”

The  hard  truth  is  that  in  the  30-plus  years  since  Basic
this Court has never (before) suggested that plaintiffs are
relieved from carrying the burden of persuasion on any as-
pect of their own causes of action.  To the contrary, when
discussing the presumption it created, Basic expressly ref-
erenced  Rule  301  and  invoked  its  normal  order  of  opera-
tions.  And this Court has long explained that presumptions
“properly used” refer only to devices “for allocating the pro-
duction  burden,”  and  not  the  burden  of  persuasion.    Bur-
dine, 450 U. S., at 255, n. 8 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  Are we really to believe that Basic—while referencing
traditional understandings embodied in Rule 301 and just
seven years after Burdine—secretly meant to depart from
traditional  and  “proper”  understandings  about  how  pre-
sumptions  work?    Thanks  to  spliced  clauses  found  in  two
sentences this Court has never before read that way?  All
while using words that carry another and much more natu-
ral meaning?  To state the theory is to refute it.

If Basic doesn’t command today’s result, the Court offers
a backup theory.  Separately, it insists, Halliburton II re-
quires us to shift a burden of persuasion to the defendant.
Specifically, the Court points to the fact that Halliburton II
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the dissenting opinion of Justice Gorsuch. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of precedent cases like Basic and Halliburton II. The language is formal and uses legal terminology, indicating its suitability for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012)

35

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

notice of intent to enforce a restored copyright; and

“(ii)(I)  the  act  of  infringement  commenced  after
the end of the 12-month period beginning on the date the
notice of intent is received;

“(II)  the  act  of  infringement  commenced  before  the
end of the 12-month period described in subclause (I) and
continued after the end of that 12-month period, in which
case remedies shall be available only for the infringement
occurring after the end of that 12-month period; or

“(III)  copies  or  phonorecords  of  a  work  in  which
copyright  has  been  restored  under  this  section  are  made
after receipt of the notice of intent.
“In the event that notice is provided under both subpara-
graphs  (A)  and  (B),  the  12-month  period  referred  to  in
such subparagraphs shall run from the earlier of publica-
tion or service of notice.
  “(3)  EXISTING  DERIVATIVE  WORKS.—(A)  In  the  case  of  a
derivative work that is based upon a restored work and is
created—

“(i) before the date of the enactment of the Uruguay
Round  Agreements  Act,  if  the  source  country  of  the  re-
stored work is an eligible country on such date, or

“(ii)  before  the  date  on  which  the  source  country  of
the  restored  work  becomes  an  eligible  country,  if  that
country  is  not  an  eligible  country  on  such  date  of
enactment,
“a  reliance  party  may  continue  to  exploit  that  derivative
work  for  the  duration  of  the  restored  copyright  if  the
reliance party pays to the owner of the restored copyright
reasonable  compensation  for  conduct  which  would  be
subject to a remedy for infringement but for the provisions
of this paragraph.

“(B) In the absence of an agreement between the parties,
the  amount  of  such  compensation  shall  be  determined  by
an action in United States district court, and shall reflect
any harm to the actual or potential market for or value of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text, specifically from a court opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a structured format typical of legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 19–251 and 19–255
_________________

AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION,
PETITIONER
19–251
v.
ROB BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER, PETITIONER
19–255
v.
ROB BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2021]

 CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the

Court, except as to Part II–B–1.

To  solicit  contributions  in  California,  charitable  organi-
zations must disclose to the state Attorney General’s Office
the  identities  of  their  major  donors.    The  State  contends
that having this information on hand makes it easier to po-
lice misconduct by charities.  We must decide whether Cal-
ifornia’s disclosure requirement violates the First Amend-
ment right to free association.

I

The  California  Attorney  General’s  Office  is  responsible
for  statewide  law  enforcement,  including  the  supervision
and regulation of charitable fundraising.  Under state law,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the names of the parties involved, and a brief summary of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

curring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment)).    States
cannot  put  individuals  to  the  choice  of  “be[ing]  compelled
to affirm someone else’s belief ” or “be[ing] forced to speak
when [they] would prefer to remain silent.”  Id., at 99.

III
Because Phillips’ conduct (as  described by  the Colorado
Court  of  Appeals)  was  expressive,  Colorado’s  public-
accommodations  law  cannot  penalize  it  unless  the  law
withstands  strict  scrutiny.    Although  this  Court  some
times reviews regulations of expressive conduct under the
more lenient test articulated in O’Brien,4 that test does not
apply  unless  the  government  would  have  punished  the
conduct regardless of its expressive component.  See, e.g.,
Barnes, 501 U. S., at 566–572 (applying O’Brien to evalu
ate  the  application  of a  general  nudity  ban  to  nude  danc
ing); Clark, 468 U. S., at 293 (applying O’Brien to evaluate
the application of a general camping ban to a demonstra
tion  in  the  park).  Here,  however,  Colorado  would  not  be
punishing  Phillips  if  he  refused  to  create  any  custom
wedding  cakes;  it  is  punishing  him  because  he  refuses  to
create  custom  wedding  cakes  that  express  approval  of
same-sex marriage.  In cases like this one, our precedents
demand  “ ‘the  most  exacting  scrutiny.’ ”    Johnson,  491
U. S., at 412; accord, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U. S. 1, 28 (2010).

The  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  address  whether  Colo
rado’s law survives strict scrutiny, and I will not do so in
the first instance.  There is an obvious flaw, however, with

——————

4 “[A]  government  regulation  [of  expressive  conduct]  is  sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers  an  important  or  substantial  governmental  interest;  if  the
governmental  interest  is  unrelated  to  the  suppression  of  free  expres
sion;  and  if  the  incidental  restriction  on  alleged  First  Amendment
freedoms  is  no  greater  than  is  essential  to  the  furtherance  of  that
interest.”  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it unsuitable for indexing as it is not general readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

KENNEDY, J., dissenting

reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  in  information  they
“voluntarily  conveyed  to  the  [companies]  and  exposed  to
their employees in the ordinary course of business.”   Mil-
ler,  supra,  at  442;  see  Smith,  442  U. S.,  at  744.    Rather,
the  defendants  “assumed  the  risk  that  the  information
would be divulged to police.”  Id., at 745.

Miller and Smith have been criticized as being based on
too  narrow  a  view  of  reasonable  expectations  of  privacy.
See,  e.g.,  Ashdown,  The  Fourth  Amendment  and  the  “Le-
gitimate  Expectation  of  Privacy,”  34  Vand.  L. Rev.  1289,
13131316 (1981).  Those criticisms, however, are unwar-
ranted.  The  principle  established  in  Miller  and  Smith  is
correct  for  two  reasons,  the  first  relating  to  a  defendant’s
attenuated interest in property owned by another, and the
second  relating  to  the  safeguards  inherent  in  the  use  of
compulsory process.

First,  Miller  and  Smith  placed  necessary  limits  on  the
ability  of  individuals  to  assert  Fourth  Amendment  inter-
ests  in  property  to  which  they  lack  a  “requisite  connec-
tion.”  Minnesota  v.  Carter,  525  U. S.  83,  99  (1998)
(KENNEDY,  J.,  concurring).    Fourth  Amendment  rights,
after  all,  are  personal.    The  Amendment  protects  “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their . . . persons, houses,
papers, and effects”—not the persons, houses, papers, and
effects of others.  (Emphasis added.)

The  concept  of  reasonable  expectations  of  privacy,  first
announced in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967),
sought  to  look  beyond  the  “arcane  distinctions  developed
in  property  and  tort  law”  in  evaluating  whether  a  person
has  a  sufficient  connection  to  the  thing  or  place  searched
to  assert  Fourth  Amendment  interests  in  it.    Rakas  v.
Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143 (1978).  Yet “property concepts”
are,  nonetheless,  fundamental  “in  determining  the  pres-
ence  or  absence  of  the privacy  interests  protected  by  that
Amendment.”  Id., at 143144, n. 12.  This is so for at least
two  reasons.  First,  as  a  matter  of  settled  expectations
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the concept of reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of information shared with third parties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xvi

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
918
Doe; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
Doherty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962
Dolenc v. Demore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dollar Systems, Inc.; Cassan Enterprises, Inc. v.
924
Donahey v. Livingstone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
Dong v. Smithsonian Institution, Hirshhorn Museum . . . . . . . . . .
929
Donohue v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co.
116
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dorsey v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,970
919
Dorsey; Luman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Doucette v. San Diego Uniﬁed Port Dist.
955
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dougan v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956,971
969
Doyle, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Doyle v. Dillon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Doyle v. Jefferson County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Dreher v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973
Drew, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
976
DuBois v. Greene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
DuBoise; Gilday v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
DuBuc v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dumas v. Illinois
959
Duncan; Lara v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Duncan; Wasko v.
982
Durocher Dock & Dredge; Brooker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Easter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
498
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
East St. Louis; Mays v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934
Eaton v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947
Eddy Potash, Inc. v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Edwards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
Egbert v. Reis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,970
908
Eggena v. Social Security Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950
Eidson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Eisenhauer v. Massachusetts Bar Counsel
919
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,977
951
Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
742
Ellerth; Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
Elliott v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
Elliott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
978
Ellis v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Elo; Allard v.
963
Engelhart v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923
Enoch v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Epps v. West
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

810

FARAGHER v. BOCA RATON

Thomas, J., dissenting

3

The Court of Appeals also rejected the possibility that it
could hold the City liable for the reason that it knew of the
harassment vicariously through the knowledge of its supervi-
sors. We have no occasion to consider whether this was
error, however. We are satisﬁed that liability on the ground
of vicarious knowledge could not be determined without fur-
ther factﬁnding on remand, whereas the reversal necessary
on the theory of supervisory harassment renders any remand
for consideration of imputed knowledge entirely unjustiﬁable
(as would be any consideration of negligence as an alterna-
tive to a theory of vicarious liability here).

III

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for reinstate-
ment of the judgment of the District Court.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins,

dissenting.

For the reasons given in my dissenting opinion in Burling-
ton Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, ante, p. 742, absent an ad-
verse employment consequence, an employer cannot be held
vicariously liable if a supervisor creates a hostile work envi-
ronment. Petitioner suffered no adverse employment con-
sequence; thus the Court of Appeals was correct to hold that
the city of Boca Raton (City) is not vicariously liable for the
conduct of Chief Terry and Lieutenant Silverman. Because
the Court reverses this judgment, I dissent.

As for petitioner’s negligence claim, the District Court
made no ﬁnding as to the City’s negligence, and the Court of
Appeals did not directly consider the issue.
I would there-
fore remand the case to the District Court for further pro-
I disagree with the Court’s
ceedings on this question alone.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It contains legal arguments, citations, and a formal structure typical of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
276

SOUTH  CAROLINA  v.  NORTH  CAROLINA

Opinion of Roberts, C. J.

Because  we  are  not  persuaded that  Charlotte’s  interest  is
sufﬁciently  unique  and  not  properly  represented  by  North
Carolina  to  require  the  city’s  intervention  as  a  party  in  this
litigation, we sustain South Carolina’s exception.8

III

We  thus  overrule  South  Carolina’s  exceptions  to  the  Spe
cial  Master’s  First  Interim  Report  with  respect  to  the
CRWSP  and  Duke  Energy,  but  we  sustain  South  Carolina’s
exception with respect to Charlotte.

It is so ordered.

Chief  Justice  Roberts,  with  whom  Justice  Thomas,
Justice  Ginsburg,  and  Justice  Sotomayor  join,  concur
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

The Court  correctly rejects  the Special  Master’s formula
tion  of  a  new  test  for  intervention  in  original  actions,  and
correctly  denies  the  city  of  Charlotte  leave  to  intervene.
The  majority  goes  on,  however,  to  misapply  our  established
test  in  granting  intervention  to  Duke  Energy  Carolinas,
LLC  (Duke  Energy),  and  the  Catawba  River  Water  Supply
Project (CRWSP).

8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 does not require a contrary result.
This  Court’s  Rule  17.2  allows  the  Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  to
be  taken  as  “guides”  to  procedure  in  original  actions.  See  Arizona  v.
California,  460  U. S.  605,  614  (1983).  Even  if  we  were  to  look  to  the
standard  for  intervention  of  right  in  civil  matters,  Charlotte  would  not
be entitled  to intervene  in this  dispute because  an existing  party—North
Carolina—adequately represents Charlotte’s interest.  See Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc.  24(a)(2).  To  the  extent  that  the  standard  for  permissive  interven
tion  may  be  an  appropriate  guide  when  a  movant  presents  a  sufﬁciently
“important  but  ancillary  concern,”  see  Arizona,  supra,  at  614–616,  we
ﬁnd  no  such  concern  here.  North  Carolina’s  adequate  representation  of
Charlotte and the heightened standard for intervention in original actions,
see  New  Jersey  v.  New  York,  345  U. S.,  at  373,  persuade  us  not  to  apply
the standard for permissive intervention set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(b)(1)(B).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the intervention of parties in a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA

INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

how  it  has  actually  functioned.  The  facts  described  in  a
recent  opinion  by  a  three-judge  District  Court  detail  the
partisanship  that  has  affected  the  Commission  on  issues
ranging  from  staffing  decisions  to  drawing  the  district
lines.  See  Harris  v.  Arizona  Independent  Redistricting
Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (Ariz. 2014).  The per curiam
opinion  explained  that  “partisanship  played  some  role
in the design of the map,” that “some of the commissioners
were  motivated  in  part  in  some  of  the  linedrawing  deci-
sions  by  a  desire  to  improve  Democratic  prospects  in  the
affected  districts,”  and  that  the  Commission  retained  a
mapping  consultant  that  “had  worked  for  Democratic,
independent, and nonpartisan campaigns, but no Republi-
can  campaigns.”  Id.,  at  1046,  1047,  1053.  The  hiring  of
the  mapping  consultant  provoked  sufficient  controversy
that  the  Governor  of  Arizona,  supported  by  two-thirds  of
the Arizona Senate, attempted to remove the chairwoman
of  the  Commission  for  “substantial  neglect  of  duty  and
gross  misconduct  in  office.”
Id.,  at  1057;  see  Arizona
Independent  Redistricting  Comm’n  v.  Brewer,  229  Ariz.
347,  275  P. 3d  1267  (2012)  (explaining  the  removal  and
concluding  that  the  Governor  exceeded  her  authority
under the Arizona Constitution).

Judge  Silver’s  separate  opinion  noted  that  “the  very
structure  of  Arizona’s  reformed  redistricting  process  re-
flects that partisanship still plays a prominent role.”  993
F. Supp.  2d,  at  1083.    Judge  Wake’s  separate  opinion
described  the  Commission’s  “systematic  overpopulation  of
Republican  plurality  districts  and  underpopulation  of
Democratic  plurality  districts”  as  “old-fashioned  partisan
malapportionment.”  Id., at 1091, 1108.  In his words, the
“Commission  has  been  coin-clipping  the  currency  of  our
democracy—everyone’s  equal  vote—and  giving  all  the
shavings to one party, for no valid reason.”  Id., at 1092.

The  District  Court  concluded  by  a  two-to-one  margin
that this partisanship did not rise to the level of a consti-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n. It discusses the partisan nature of the redistricting process and cites lower court opinions to support its claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 19–840 and 19–1019
_________________

19–840

CALIFORNIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
TEXAS, ET AL.

19–1019

TEXAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 17, 2021]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
There  is  much  to  commend  JUSTICE  ALITO’s  account  of
“our epic Affordable Care Act trilogy.”  Post, at 1 (dissenting
opinion).  This Court has gone to great lengths to rescue the
Act from its own text.  Post, at 1–2.  So have the Act’s de-
fenders,  who  argued  in  first  instance  that  the  individual
coverage  mandate  is  the  Act’s  linchpin,  yet  now,  in  an
about-face, contend that it is just a throwaway sentence.

But, whatever the Act’s dubious history in this Court, we
must assess the current suit on its own terms.  And, here,
there  is  a  fundamental  problem  with  the  arguments  ad-
vanced by the plaintiffs in attacking the Act—they have not
identified any unlawful action that has injured them.  Ante,
at 5, 11, 14–16.  Today’s result is thus not the consequence
of the Court once again rescuing the Act, but rather of us
adjudicating  the  particular  claims  the  plaintiffs  chose  to
bring.

I
This Court first encountered the Act in 2011.  That case
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$86Q 02-17-99 18:23:51 PAGES OPINPGT

272

FORNEY v. APFEL

Opinion of the Court

mand order, as the Government has every right to do. See
Finkelstein, supra, at 619.

The Solicitor General points to many cases that ﬁnd a right
to appeal in roughly comparable circumstances. See Brief
for Respondent 21, n. 12 (citing Gargoyles, Inc. v. United
States, 113 F. 3d 1572 (CA Fed. 1997) (permitting appeal
where prevailing party recovered reasonable royalty but was
denied lost proﬁts); Castle v. Rubin, 78 F. 3d 654 (CADC
1996) (per curiam) (permitting appeal where prevailing
party awarded partial backpay but denied reinstatement and
front pay); La Plante v. American Honda Motor Co., 27 F.
3d 731 (CA1 1994) (permitting appeal where prevailing party
awarded compensatory but not punitive damages); Graziano
v. Harrison, 950 F. 2d 107 (CA3 1991) (permitting appeal
where prevailing party awarded damages but denied at-
torney’s fees); Ragen Corp. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 912
F. 2d 619 (CA3 1990) (permitting appeal where prevailing
party denied consequential damages); Carrigan v. Exxon
Co., U. S. A., 877 F. 2d 1237 (CA5 1989) (permitting appeal
where prevailing party awarded damages but not injunc-
tive relief)).

The contrary authority that amicus, through diligent ef-
forts, has found arose in less closely analogous circumstances
and consequently does not persuade us. Brief for Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below 17, and n. 13; see,
e. g., Parr v. United States, 351 U. S. 513, 518 (1956) (order
granting Government’s motion to dismiss indictment without
prejudice as not appealable by defendant in part because the
dismissal would not be “ﬁnal” (emphasis added)); see also
CH2M Hill Central, Inc. v. Herman, 131 F. 3d 1244, 1246–
1247 (CA7 1997) (claimant cannot appeal agency appeals
panel remand of case for further agency hearing, for appeals
order is not type of ﬁnal agency decision that is reviewable
under relevant judicial review statute); Director, Ofﬁce of
Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Bath Iron Works
Corp., 853 F. 2d 11, 16 (CA1 1988) (same); Stripe-A-Zone v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section.  It contains legal arguments and citations to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

have been able to hold civil marriage ceremonies in States
that  recognize  same-sex  marriages  and  private  religious
ceremonies  in  all  States.    They  have  been  able  to  travel
freely around the country, making their homes where they
please.  Far  from  being  incarcerated  or  physically  re-
strained,  petitioners  have  been  left  alone  to  order  their
lives as they see fit.

Nor,  under  the  broader  definition,  can  they  claim  that
the  States  have  restricted  their  ability  to  go  about  their
daily  lives  as  they  would  be  able  to  absent  governmental
restrictions.  Petitioners do not ask this Court to order the
States  to  stop  restricting  their  ability  to  enter  same-sex
relationships,  to  engage  in  intimate  behavior,  to  make
vows  to  their  partners  in  public  ceremonies,  to  engage  in
religious  wedding  ceremonies,  to  hold  themselves  out  as
married, or to raise children.  The States have imposed no
such restrictions.  Nor have the States prevented petition-
ers from approximating a number of incidents of marriage
through  private  legal  means,  such  as  wills,  trusts,  and
powers of attorney.

Instead,  the  States  have  refused  to  grant  them  govern-
mental entitlements.  Petitioners claim that as a matter of
“liberty,” they are entitled to access privileges and benefits
that  exist  solely  because  of  the  government.  They  want,
for  example,  to  receive  the  State’s  imprimatur  on  their
marriages—on state issued marriage licenses, death certif-
icates,  or  other  official  forms.    And  they  want  to  receive
various  monetary  benefits,  including  reduced  inheritance
taxes upon the death of a spouse, compensation if a spouse
dies as a result of a work-related injury, or loss of consor-
tium  damages  in  tort  suits.    But  receiving  governmental
recognition  and  benefits  has  nothing  to  do  with  any  un-
derstanding  of  “liberty”  that  the  Framers  would  have
recognized.

To the extent that the Framers would have recognized a
natural  right  to  marriage  that  fell  within  the  broader
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas in the Obergefell v. Hodges case. It argues against the recognition of same-sex marriage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

362

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR, WARDEN

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit

No. 98–8384. Argued October 4, 1999—Decided April 18, 2000

A Virginia jury convicted petitioner Williams of robbery and capital
murder, and, after a sentencing hearing, found a probability of future
dangerousness and unanimously ﬁxed his punishment at death. Con-
cluding that such punishment was “proper” and “just,” the trial judge
imposed the death sentence. The Virginia Supreme Court afﬁrmed.
In state habeas corpus proceedings, the same trial judge found, on the
evidence adduced after hearings, that Williams’ conviction was valid,
but that his counsel’s failure to discover and present signiﬁcant mitigat-
ing evidence violated his right to the effective assistance of counsel
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668.
In rejecting the trial
judge’s recommendation that Williams be resentenced, the State Su-
preme Court held, inter alia, that the trial judge had failed to recognize
that Strickland had been modiﬁed by Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S.
364, 369, and that Williams had not suffered sufﬁcient prejudice to war-
rant relief.
In habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U. S. C. § 2254, the
federal trial judge agreed with the state trial judge that the death
sentence was constitutionally inﬁrm on ineffective-assistance grounds.
The federal judge identiﬁed ﬁve categories of mitigating evidence that
counsel had failed to introduce and rejected the argument that such
failure had been a strategic decision to rely primarily on the fact that
Williams had confessed voluntarily. As to prejudice, the judge deter-
mined, among other things, that there was a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different, see Strickland, 466 U. S., at 694. Applying
an amended version of § 2254(d)(1) enacted in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the judge concluded that
the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed, construing § 2254(d)(1) to prohibit federal habeas relief
unless the state court had interpreted or applied the relevant precedent
in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable.
The court declared that it could not say that the Virginia Supreme
Court’s decision on prejudice was an unreasonable application of the
Strickland or Lockhart standards established by the Supreme Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case *Williams v. Taylor*. Syllabi are typically summaries of legal cases and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS v. FTC
Opinion of the Court

recognized  Congress’  purpose  to  respect  the  federal  bal
ance  and  to  “embody  in  the  Sherman  Act  the  federalism
principle  that  the  States  possess a  significant  measure  of
sovereignty  under  our  Constitution.”    Community  Com-
munications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982).  Since
1943, the Court has reaffirmed the importance of Parker’s
central holding.  See, e.g., Ticor, supra, at 632–637; Hoover
v.  Ronwin,  466  U. S.  558,  568  (1984);  Lafayette  v.  Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 394–400 (1978).

III
In this case the Board argues its members were invested
by North Carolina with the power of the State and that, as
a  result,  the  Board’s  actions  are  cloaked  with  Parker
immunity.  This argument fails, however.  A nonsovereign
actor  controlled  by  active  market  participants—such  as
the Board—enjoys Parker immunity only if it satisfies two
requirements:  “first  that  ‘the  challenged  restraint  . . .  be
one  clearly  articulated  and  affirmatively  expressed  as
state  policy,’  and  second  that  ‘the  policy  .  .  .  be  actively
supervised  by  the  State.’ ”    FTC  v.  Phoebe  Putney  Health
System, Inc., 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 7) (quot
ing  California  Retail  Liquor  Dealers  Assn.  v.  Midcal  Alu-
minum,  Inc.,  445  U. S.  97,  105  (1980)).    The  parties  have
assumed  that  the  clear  articulation  requirement  is  satis
fied, and we do the same.  While North Carolina prohibits
the unauthorized practice of dentistry, however, its Act is
silent  on  whether  that  broad  prohibition  covers  teeth
whitening.  Here,  the  Board  did  not  receive  active  super
vision  by  the  State  when  it  interpreted  the  Act  as  ad
dressing teeth whitening and when it enforced that policy
by  issuing  cease-and-desist  letters  to  nondentist  teeth
whiteners.

A
Although state-action immunity exists to avoid conflicts
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the application of state-action immunity in the context of a case involving dental practice regulations. It delves into legal precedents and the specific requirements for immunity, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1127

529 U. S.

May 22, 2000

No. D–2146.

In re Disbarment of Scully. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1150.]

No. D–2147.

In re Disbarment of Carlson. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1151.]

No. D–2151.

In re Disbarment of Travis. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 1035.]

No. D–2155.

In re Disbarment of Moore. Disbarment en-
Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter,
[For earlier order herein, see

tered.
and Justice Ginsburg dissent.
ante, p. 1063.]

No. D–2160.

In re Disbarment of Tierney.
James Patrick
Tierney, of Malibu, Cal., is suspended from the practice of law in
this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re-
quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.

No. D–2161.

In re Disbarment of Sokolow. Lloyd B. So-
kolow, of Schenectady, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of
law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.

No. D–2162.

In re Disbarment of Murchison. Alton G.
Murchison III, of Charlotte, N. C., is suspended from the practice
of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40
days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred
from the practice of law in this Court.

No. D–2163.

In re Disbarment of Friedler. Sydney
Friedler, of Hempstead, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of
law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.

No. D–2164.

In re Disbarment of Carlson. Robert Bent
Carlson, of North Port, Fla., is suspended from the practice of
law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.

No. D–2165.

In re Disbarment of Tamer. David Ferris
Tamer, of Winston-Salem, N. C., is suspended from the practice
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal orders, specifically regarding disbarments. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Orders/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

next day after the October 16 homecoming game.1

Before  the  homecoming  game,  Kennedy  made  multiple
media appearances to publicize his plans to pray at the 50-
yard line, leading to an article in the Seattle News and a
local television broadcast about the upcoming homecoming
game.  In the wake of this media coverage, the District be-
gan receiving a large number of emails, letters, and calls,
many of them threatening.

The  District  responded  to  Kennedy’s  letter  before  the
game on October 16.  It emphasized that Kennedy’s letter
evinced  “materia[l]  misunderstand[ings]”  of  many  of  the
facts  at  issue.    Id.,  at  76.  For  instance,  Kennedy’s  letter
asserted that he had not invited anyone to pray with him;
the District noted that that might be true of Kennedy’s Sep-
tember  17  prayer  specifically,  but  that  Kennedy  had
acknowledged inviting others to join him on many previous
occasions.  The District’s September 17 letter had explained
that Kennedy traditionally held up helmets from the BHS
and opposing teams while players from each team kneeled
around him.  While Kennedy’s letter asserted that his pray-
ers “occurr[ed] ‘on his own time,’ after his duties as a Dis-
trict  employee  had  ceased,”  the  District  pointed  out  that
Kennedy  “remain[ed]  on  duty”  when  his  prayers  occurred
“immediately  following  completion  of  the  football  game,
when students are still on the football field, in uniform, un-
der  the  stadium  lights,  with  the  audience  still  in  attend-
ance, and while Mr. Kennedy is still in his District-issued
and  District-logoed  attire.”    Id.,  at  78  (emphasis  deleted).
——————

1 The Court recounts that Kennedy was “willing to say his ‘prayer while
the players were walking to the locker room’ or ‘bus,’ and then catch up
with his team.”  Ante, at 4 (quoting App. 280–282); see also ante, at 5.
Kennedy made the quoted remarks, however, only during his deposition
in the underlying litigation, stating in response to a question that such
timing would have been “physically possible” and “possibly” have been
acceptable to him, but that he had never “discuss[ed] with the District
whether that was a possibility for [him] to do” and had “no idea” whether
his lawyers raised it with the District.  App. 280.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous events in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1062

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 30, 2009

558 U. S.

No. 09–7314.  Holmes v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  151.

No. 09–7315.  Harris v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  471.

No.  09–7316.  Guerrero  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  345  Fed.  Appx.  274.

No.  09–7317.  Gladney  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  734.

No.  09–7318.  Felan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  499.

No.  09–7321.  Hall  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  340.

No.  09–7323.  Hayman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  872.

No.  09–7324.  Holycross  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  81.

No.  09–7327.  Peguero  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  394.

No.  09–7331.  Ortiz-Ruiz,  aka  Garcia-Salgado  v.  United
States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 330
Fed.  Appx.  66.

No.  09–7332.  Pereira  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7334.  Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7335.  Lewis v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  905.

No.  09–7336.  Jackson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  576  F.  3d  465.

No.  09–7337.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7340.  Boudreau  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  431.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case citations from a legal document, likely a Supreme Court docket. It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>