<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017)

3

Opinion of the Court

to the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
arguing  that  venue  was  improper  in  Delaware.  See  28
U. S. C. §1406.  Citing Fourco’s holding that a corporation
resides  only  in  its  State  of  incorporation  for  patent  in-
fringement  suits,  petitioner  argued  that  it  did  not
“resid[e]”  in  Delaware  under  the  first  clause  of  §1400(b).
It  further  argued  that  it  had  no  “regular  and  established
place of business” in Delaware under the second clause of
§1400(b).  Relying on Circuit precedent, the District Court
rejected these arguments, 2015 WL 5613160 (D Del., Sept.
24,  2015),  and  the  Federal  Circuit  denied  a  petition  for  a
writ  of  mandamus,  In re  TC  Heartland  LLC,  821  F. 3d
1338  (2016).  The  Federal  Circuit  concluded  that  subse-
quent  statutory  amendments  had  effectively  amended
§1400(b)  as  construed  in  Fourco,  with  the  result  that
§1391(c)  now  supplies  the  definition  of  “resides”  in
§1400(b).  821  F. 3d,  at  1341–1343.    Under  this  logic,
because  the  District  of  Delaware  could  exercise  personal
jurisdiction over petitioner, petitioner resided in Delaware
under §1391(c) and, therefore, under §1400(b).  We granted
certiorari, 580 U. S. ___ (2016), and now reverse.

II

A

The  history  of  the  relevant  statutes  provides  important
context  for  the  issue  in  this  case.    The  Judiciary  Act  of
1789  permitted  a  plaintiff  to  file  suit  in  a  federal  district
court if the defendant was “an inhabitant” of that district
or  could  be  “found”  for  service  of  process  in  that  district.
Act  of  Sept.  24,  1789,  §11,  1  Stat.  79.    The  Act  covered
patent cases as well as other civil suits.  Stonite Products
Co.  v.  Melvin  Lloyd  Co.,  315  U. S.  561,  563  (1942).    In
1887, Congress amended the statute to permit suit only in
the  district  of  which  the  defendant  was  an  inhabitant  or,
in  diversity  cases,  of  which  either  the  plaintiff  or  defend-
ant  was  an  inhabitant.    See  Act  of  Mar.  3,  1887,  §1,  24
  </content>
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This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and legal statutes, indicating it is part of a legal argument and decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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<suitable>
  <content>
22

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
GINSBURG, J., dissenting

inal administrative regulation accommodating religious ob-
jections  to  contraception  appropriately  implemented  the
ACA and RFRA consistent with Congress’ staunch determi-
nation to afford women employees equal access to preven-
tive services, thereby advancing public health and welfare
and women’s well-being.  I would therefore affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals.28

——————
procedurally invalid.  See ante, at 22–26 (opinion of the Court).

28 Although the Court does not reach the issue, the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in issuing a nationwide injunction.  The Admin-
istrative  Procedure  Act  contemplates  nationwide  relief  from  invalid
agency action.  See 5 U. S. C. §706(2) (empowering courts to “hold unlaw-
ful and set aside agency action”).  Moreover, the nationwide reach of the
injunction “was ‘necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.’ ”
Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. ___, ___, n. 15 (2018) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dis-
senting) (slip op., at 25, n. 13) (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Cen-
ter,  Inc.,  512  U. S.  753,  765  (1994)).    Harm  to  Pennsylvania  and  New
Jersey, the Court of Appeals explained, occurs because women who lose
benefits under the exemption “will turn to state-funded services for their
contraceptive needs and for the unintended pregnancies that may result
from the loss of coverage.”  930 F. 3d, at 562.  This harm is not bounded
by  state  lines.  The  Court  of  Appeals  noted,  for  example,  that  some
800,000 residents of Pennsylvania and New Jersey work—and thus re-
ceive their health insurance—out of State.  Id., at 576.  Similarly, many
students who attend colleges and universities in Pennsylvania and New
Jersey  receive  their  health  insurance  from  their  parents’  out-of-state
health plans.  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, which are not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

hoping  to  contest  “a  final  order  of  the  Commission.”  But
just as plainly, Ms. Cochran does not seek to challenge an
SEC final order.  Nor could she, because the agency has not
entered one in her case.  Ms. Cochran does not even seek
relief in anticipation of a final agency order.  Instead, she
seeks to avoid being hauled  before  an agency that she  al-
leges is unconstitutionally structured.  See ante, at 4.  That
is exactly the kind of “here-and-now injury” this Court has
held  “can  be  remedied  by  a  court”  without  regard  to  the
eventual outcome of agency proceedings.  Seila Law LLC v.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. ___, ___
(2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (slip op., at 10).
If all that were not enough, there is more.  A neighboring
statutory provision says that “the rights and remedies” the
Exchange Act authorizes “shall be in addition to any and all
other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in eq-
uity.”  §78bb(a)(2).  This Court has explained that a “saving
clause”  of  this  sort  “strongly  buttresse[s]”  the  conclusion
that a review provision such as §78y(a)(1) does not preclude
“traditional avenues of judicial relief.”  Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 142, 144 (1967).  And, of course,
one traditional avenue of relief is a suit in district court un-
der §1331 seeking to enjoin unconstitutional conduct.  See
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 491, n. 2 (2010).  Far from barring
Ms.  Cochran’s  path  to  court,  then,  the  Exchange  Act  ex-
pressly preserves it.

The story repeats itself when it comes to Axon.  The gov-
ernment insists that §5(c) of the FTC Act precludes district
courts  from  entertaining  constitutional  challenges  to  the
agency’s structure.  But §5(c) provides only that parties sub-
ject to “an order of the Commission to cease and desist from
using any method of competition or act or practice may ob-
tain  a  review  of  such  order  in  the  court  of  appeals  of  the
United  States.”    15  U. S. C.  §45(c).  And,  here  again,  we
have nothing like that.  The FTC has not ordered Axon to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in a case before the Supreme Court. It discusses the constitutionality of agency structure and cites relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

curring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment)).    States
cannot  put  individuals  to  the  choice  of  “be[ing]  compelled
to affirm someone else’s belief ” or “be[ing] forced to speak
when [they] would prefer to remain silent.”  Id., at 99.

III
Because Phillips’ conduct (as  described by  the Colorado
Court  of  Appeals)  was  expressive,  Colorado’s  public-
accommodations  law  cannot  penalize  it  unless  the  law
withstands  strict  scrutiny.    Although  this  Court  some
times reviews regulations of expressive conduct under the
more lenient test articulated in O’Brien,4 that test does not
apply  unless  the  government  would  have  punished  the
conduct regardless of its expressive component.  See, e.g.,
Barnes, 501 U. S., at 566–572 (applying O’Brien to evalu
ate  the  application  of a  general  nudity  ban  to  nude  danc
ing); Clark, 468 U. S., at 293 (applying O’Brien to evaluate
the application of a general camping ban to a demonstra
tion  in  the  park).  Here,  however,  Colorado  would  not  be
punishing  Phillips  if  he  refused  to  create  any  custom
wedding  cakes;  it  is  punishing  him  because  he  refuses  to
create  custom  wedding  cakes  that  express  approval  of
same-sex marriage.  In cases like this one, our precedents
demand  “ ‘the  most  exacting  scrutiny.’ ”    Johnson,  491
U. S., at 412; accord, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U. S. 1, 28 (2010).

The  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  address  whether  Colo
rado’s law survives strict scrutiny, and I will not do so in
the first instance.  There is an obvious flaw, however, with

——————

4 “[A]  government  regulation  [of  expressive  conduct]  is  sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers  an  important  or  substantial  governmental  interest;  if  the
governmental  interest  is  unrelated  to  the  suppression  of  free  expres
sion;  and  if  the  incidental  restriction  on  alleged  First  Amendment
freedoms  is  no  greater  than  is  essential  to  the  furtherance  of  that
interest.”  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it unsuitable for indexing as it is not general readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxxvi

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
905
Sanchez-Zubia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971
Sancho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Sanders v. Flynn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940
Sanders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
San Diego Police Dept.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
San Diego Uniﬁed Port Dist.; Doucette v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
San Francisco; Chase Manhattan Bank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
Santa Ana v. Hernandez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
Sapp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Sarkar v. Temple Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962
Sarraulte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
Sasser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Savage; Cannon v.
927
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Savers Life Ins. Co.; Darling v.
939
Sawchyn v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
381
Schacht; Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913
Schaner, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940
Scheumann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,969
Schleeper v. Missouri
909
School Bd. of Dade County; Longariello v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Schotten; Dehler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Schriro; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Schwarz v. Kogan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Scott v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
357
Scott; Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
910
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scott v. United States
939
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scottsdale Ins. Co.; Sawchyn v.
928
Seals v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Seaton; Coates v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,970
Seaton v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,971
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Secretary of Air Force; Belhomme v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972
Secretary of Defense; Ceminchuk v.
951
Secretary of Defense; General Media Communications, Inc. v.
. . .
904
Secretary of HHS; University Health Services, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . .
925
Secretary of HHS; Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v.
. .
951
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of Interior; Mausolf v.
937
Secretary of Interior; National Assn. of Home Builders of U. S. v.
954
Secretary of Navy; Arshal v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
Secretary of Navy; Darden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949,975
Secretary of State of Colo. v. American Const. Law Foundation
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Secretary of Treasury; Brown v.
912
Secretary of Treasury; United States v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Cummings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Epps v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
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<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment

Here, the Departments have adopted the majority’s read-
ing  of  the  statutory  delegation  ever  since  its  enactment.
Over  the  course  of  two  administrations,  the  Departments
have  shifted  positions  on  many  questions  involving  the
Women’s  Health  Amendment  and  the  ACA  more  broadly.
But not on whether the Amendment gives HRSA the ability
to  create  exemptions  to  the  contraceptive-coverage  man-
date.  HRSA adopted the original church exemption on the
same capacious understanding of its statutory authority as
the  Departments  endorse  today.  See  76  Fed.  Reg.  46623
(2011)  (“In  the  Departments’  view,  it  is  appropriate  that
HRSA, in issuing these Guidelines, takes into account the
effect on the religious beliefs of certain religious employers
if  coverage  of  contraceptive  services  were  required”).1
While the exemption itself has expanded, the Departments’
reading  of  the  statutory  delegation—that  the  law  gives
HRSA  discretion  over  the  “who”  question—has  remained
the same.  I would defer to that longstanding and reasona-
ble interpretation.

But that does not mean the Departments should prevail
when  these  cases  return  to  the  lower  courts.   The  States
challenged the exemptions not only as outside HRSA’s stat-
utory authority, but also as “arbitrary [and] capricious.”  5
——————

1 The First Amendment cannot have separately justified the church ex-
emption,  as  the  dissent  suggests.
  See  post,  at  12–13  (opinion  of
GINSBURG, J.).  That exemption enables a religious institution to decline
to provide contraceptive coverage to all its employees, from a minister to
a building custodian.  By contrast, the so-called ministerial exception of
the First Amendment (which the dissent cites, see post, at 13) extends
only to select employees, having ministerial status.  See Our Lady of Gua-
dalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at
14–16);  Hosanna-Tabor  Evangelical  Lutheran  Church  and  School  v.
EEOC, 565 U. S. 171, 190 (2012).  (Too, this Court has applied the min-
isterial exception only to protect religious institutions from employment
discrimination suits, expressly reserving whether the exception excuses
their non-compliance with other laws.  See id., at 196.)  And there is no
general constitutional immunity, over and above the ministerial excep-
tion, that can protect a religious institution from the law’s operation.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kagan in a case before the Supreme Court. It delves into the interpretation of a statutory delegation and the application of the Women's Health Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

49

Appendix to opinion of THOMAS, J.
  </content>
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This appears to be a citation and part of a legal document's appendix.  It is not the main body text and likely not suitable for indexing.
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  <content>
8

SHURTLEFF v. BOSTON

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

within the scope of their power to do so, they “are not speak-
ing as citizens for First Amendment purposes.”  Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 421 (2006).  And because “speech”
requires  the  purposeful  communication  of  the  speaker’s
own message, the message expressed must have been for-
mulated by a person with the power to determine what mes-
sages the government will communicate.  In short, the gov-
ernment  must
to  be
communicated” through official action.  Johanns, 544 U. S.,
at 562.

the  overall  message

“se[t]

Government  speech  is  thus  the  purposeful  communica-
tion of a governmentally determined message by a person
exercising a power to speak for a government.  But not all
governmental  activity  that  qualifies  as  “government
speech” in this literal and factual sense is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny.  For although we have said that the
Free  Speech  Clause  “has  no  application”  when  a  govern-
ment  is  “engaging  in  [its]  own  expressive  conduct,”  Sum-
mum, 555 U. S., at 467, we have also recognized that “the
Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the government’s
speech”  under  certain  conditions,  as  when  a  “government
seeks to compel private persons to convey the government’s
speech.”  Walker,  576  U. S.,  at  208;  see  also  Wooley  v.
Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).

That  is  because  the  government-speech  doctrine  is  not
based on the view—which we have neither accepted nor re-
jected—that governmental entities have First Amendment
rights.  See United States v. American Library Assn., Inc.,
539 U. S. 194, 210–211 (2003); Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94,
139, and n. 7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).2  Instead, the
——————

2 The text of the First Amendment also seems to exclude the possibility
that the Federal Government has a constitutional right to speak, since it
prohibits “Congress” and other federal entities and actors from “abridg-
ing the freedom of speech.”  A different analysis might be called for in a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Shurtleff v. Boston. It delves into the legal concept of government speech and its relationship to the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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  <content>
2

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC

Syllabus

review scheme specified in the Securities Exchange Act—“administra-
tive review followed by judicial review in a federal court of appeals”—
“implicitly divest[s] district courts of jurisdiction” over “challenges to
SEC proceedings,” including Cochran’s constitutional ones.  Likewise,
the district court in Axon’s case found that the FTC Act’s comparable
review scheme displaces §1331 jurisdiction for claims concerning the
FTC’s adjudications.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the  dis-
trict court’s dismissal of Axon’s constitutional challenges to the FTC
proceeding, concluding that the claims were the type that fell within
the FTC Act’s review scheme.  But the en banc Fifth Circuit disagreed
as to the equivalent SEC question, finding that Cochran’s claim would
not receive “meaningful judicial review” in a court of appeals; that the
claim  was  “wholly  collateral  to  the  Exchange  Act’s  statutory-review
scheme”; and that the claim fell “outside the SEC’s expertise.”

Held: The statutory review schemes set out in the Securities Exchange
Act  and  Federal  Trade  Commission  Act  do  not  displace  a  district
court’s federal-question jurisdiction over claims challenging as uncon-
stitutional the structure or existence of the SEC or FTC.  Pp. 7–18.

(a) Although  district  courts  may  ordinarily  hear  challenges  to  fed-
eral  agency  actions  by  way of  §1331’s  jurisdictional  grant  for  claims
“arising  under”  federal  law,  Congress  may  substitute  an  alternative
review scheme.  In both the Exchange Act and the FTC Act, Congress
did so: It provided for review of claims about agency action in a court
of appeals following the agency’s own review process.  The creation of
such a review scheme divests district courts of their ordinary jurisdic-
tion over covered cases.  But the statutory scheme does not necessarily
extend to every claim concerning agency action.  See, e.g., Thunder Ba-
sin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200, 207–213.  This Court has identi-
fied three considerations—commonly known as the Thunder Basin fac-
tors—to  determine  whether  particular  claims  concerning  agency
action are “of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within th[e]
statutory structure.”  Id., at 212.  First, could precluding district court
jurisdiction “foreclose all meaningful judicial review” of the claim?  Id.,
at 212–213.  Next, is the claim “wholly collateral” to the statute’s re-
view provisions?  Id, at 212.  And last, is the claim “outside the agency’s
expertise”?  Ibid.

The Court has twice held specific claims to fit within a statutory re-
view scheme, based on the Thunder Basin factors.  In Thunder Basin
itself, a coal company subject to the Mine Act filed suit in district court
instead  of  asserting  its  claims—as  a  statutory  scheme  prescribed—
first before a mine safety commission and then (if needed) a court of
appeals.  The crux of the dispute concerned the company’s refusal to
provide employee-designated union officials with access to the work-
place in accordance with the Mine Act.  The company also objected on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the case and the court's decision. It is not the actual content of a book and is likely meant to be a summary for legal professionals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

27

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

tion,  concerns  about  backsliding  persist.    In  2008,  for
example,  the  city  of  Calera,  located  in  Shelby  County,
requested preclearance of a redistricting plan that “would
have  eliminated  the  city’s  sole  majority-black  district,
which had been created pursuant to the consent decree in
Dillard.”    811  F. Supp.  2d  424,  443  (DC  2011).    Although
DOJ  objected  to  the  plan,  Calera  forged  ahead  with  elec
tions based on the unprecleared voting changes, resulting
in  the  defeat  of  the  incumbent  African-American  council
man  who  represented  the  former  majority-black  district.
Ibid.    The  city’s  defiance  required  DOJ  to  bring  a  §5  en
forcement  action  that  ultimately  yielded  appropriate
redress,  including  restoration  of  the  majority-black  dis
trict.  Ibid.;  Brief  for  Respondent-Intervenors  Earl  Cun
ningham et al. 20.

A  recent  FBI  investigation  provides  a  further  window
into  the  persistence  of  racial  discrimination  in  state  poli
tics.  See United States v. McGregor, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1339,
1344–1348  (MD  Ala.  2011).    Recording  devices  worn  by
state  legislators  cooperating  with  the  FBI’s  investigation
captured  conversations  between  members  of  the  state
legislature and their political allies.  The recorded conver
sations  are  shocking.    Members  of  the  state  Senate  deri
sively refer to African-Americans as “Aborigines” and talk
openly of their aim to quash a particular gambling-related
referendum  because  the  referendum,  if  placed  on  the
ballot,  might  increase  African-American  voter  turnout.
Id., at 1345–1346 (internal quotation marks omitted).  See
also  id.,  at  1345  (legislators  and  their  allies  expressed
concern  that  if  the  referendum  were  placed  on  the  ballot,
“ ‘[e]very  black,  every  illiterate’  would  be  ‘bused  [to  the
polls] on HUD financed buses’ ”).  These conversations oc
curred  not  in  the  1870’s,  or  even  in  the  1960’s,  they  took
place  in  2010.
Id.,  at  1344–1345.  The  District  Judge
presiding  over  the  criminal  trial  at  which  the  recorded
conversations  were  introduced  commented  that  the  “re
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically Justice Ginsburg's dissent. It provides legal arguments and examples to support her position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

9

Opinion of the Court

that  the  Government  had  explicitly  disavowed  that  argu-
ment before the District Court.  681 F. 3d, at 151, n. 1.  As
a result, in this Court the parties have devoted significant
effort to arguing whether section 229, as applied to Bond’s
offense, is a necessary and proper means of executing the
National  Government’s  power  to  make  treaties.    U. S.
Const.,  Art. II,  §2,  cl.  2.    Bond  argues  that  the  lower
court’s  reading  of  Missouri  v.  Holland  would  remove  all
limits  on  federal  authority,  so  long  as  the  Federal  Gov-
ernment  ratifies  a  treaty  first.   She  insists  that  to  effec-
tively  afford  the  Government  a  police  power  whenever  it
implements  a  treaty  would  be  contrary  to  the  Framers’
careful  decision  to  divide  power  between  the  States  and
the National Government as a means of preserving liberty.
To the extent that  Holland authorizes such usurpation of
traditional  state  authority,  Bond  says,  it  must  be  either
limited or overruled.

The Government replies that this Court has never held
that  a  statute  implementing  a  valid  treaty  exceeds  Con-
gress’s  enumerated  powers.  To  do  so  here,  the  Govern-
ment  says,  would  contravene  another  deliberate  choice  of
the  Framers:  to  avoid  placing  subject  matter  limitations
on  the  National  Government’s  power  to  make  treaties.
And  it  might  also  undermine  confidence  in  the  United
States as an international treaty partner.

Notwithstanding  this  debate,  it  is  “a  well-established
principle  governing  the  prudent  exercise  of  this  Court’s
jurisdiction  that  normally  the  Court  will  not  decide  a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon
which  to  dispose  of  the  case.”  Escambia  County  v.  Mc-
Millan,  466  U. S.  48,  51  (1984)  (per  curiam);  see  also
Ashwander  v.  TVA,  297  U. S.  288,  347  (1936)  (Brandeis,
J.,  concurring).  Bond  argues  that  section  229  does  not
cover her conduct.  So we consider that argument first.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the case of Bond v. United States and the legal arguments surrounding the application of a particular statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

“free  to  find  infringement  of  Marcel’s  ‘Get  Lucky’  mark
based  solely  on  Lucky  Brand’s  use  of  [the  phrase]  ‘Get
Lucky.’ ”  Id., at 112.  The court vacated and remanded for
further proceedings.

On remand to the District Court, Lucky Brand moved to
dismiss, arguing—for the first time since its motion to dis-
miss and answer in the 2005 Action—that Marcel had re-
leased  its  claims  by  entering  the  settlement  agreement.
Marcel countered that Lucky Brand was precluded from in-
voking the release defense, because it could have pursued
the defense fully in the 2005 Action but had neglected to do
so.  The District Court granted Lucky Brand’s motion to dis-
miss,  holding  that  it  could  assert  its  release  defense  and
that  the  settlement  agreement  indeed  barred  Marcel’s
claims.

The  Second  Circuit  vacated  and  remanded,  concluding
that  a  doctrine  it  termed  “defense  preclusion”  prohibited
Lucky Brand from raising the release defense in the 2011
Action.  898 F. 3d 232 (2018).  Noting that a different cate-
gory  of  preclusion—issue  preclusion—may  be  wielded
against a defendant, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U. S. 322 (1979), the court reasoned that the same should
be  true  of  claim  preclusion:  A  defendant  should  be  pre-
cluded  from  raising  an  unlitigated  defense  that  it  should
have raised earlier.  The panel then held that “defense pre-
clusion”  bars  a  party  from  raising  a  defense  where:  “(i)  a
previous action involved an adjudication on the merits”; “(ii)
the previous action involved the same parties”; “(iii) the de-
fense  was  either  asserted  or  could  have  been  asserted,  in
the prior action”; and “(iv) the district court, in its discre-
tion,  concludes  that  preclusion of the  defense  is  appropri-
ate.”  898 F. 3d, at 241.  Finding each factor satisfied in this
case, the panel vacated the District Court’s judgment.  We
granted  certiorari,  588  U. S.  ___  (2019),  to  resolve  differ-
ences  among  the  Circuits  regarding  when,  if  ever,  claim
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case involving trademark infringement and the legal doctrine of "defense preclusion."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

eral trial judges.  The Commission’s ALJs, like the Tax Court’s STJs,
“take  testimony,”  “conduct  trials,”  “rule  on  the  admissibility  of  evi-
dence,” and “have the power to enforce compliance with discovery or-
ders.”  Id.,  at  881–882.    So  point  for  point  from  Freytag’s  list,  SEC
ALJs  have  equivalent  duties  and  powers  as  STJs  in  conducting  ad-
versarial inquiries.

Moreover,  at  the  close  of  those  proceedings,  SEC  ALJs  issue  deci-
sions much like that in Freytag.  STJs prepare proposed findings and
an  opinion  adjudicating  charges  and  assessing  tax  liabilities.    Simi-
larly, the Commission’s ALJs issue initial decisions containing factu-
al  findings,  legal  conclusions,  and  appropriate  remedies.    And  what
happens  next  reveals  that  the  ALJ  can  play  the  more  autonomous
role.  In a major Tax Court case, a regular Tax Court judge must al-
ways review an STJ’s opinion, and that opinion comes to nothing un-
less  the  regular  judge  adopts  it.    By  contrast,  the  SEC  can  decide
against  reviewing  an  ALJ’s  decision,  and  when  it  does  so  the  ALJ’s
decision itself “becomes final” and is “deemed the action of the Com-
mission.”  17 CFR §201.360(d)(2); 15 U. S. C. §78d–1(c).  Pp. 5–11.

(b) Judge Elliot heard and decided Lucia’s case without a constitu-
tional appointment.  “[O]ne who makes a timely challenge to the con-
stitutional  validity  of  the  appointment  of  an  officer  who  adjudicates
his case”  is entitled to relief.  Ryder v. United States, 515 U. S. 177,
182.  Lucia made just such a timely challenge.  And the “appropriate”
remedy for an adjudication tainted with an appointments violation is
a new “hearing before a properly appointed” official.  Id., at 183, 188.
In  this  case,  that  official  cannot  be  Judge  Elliot,  even  if  he  has  by
now  received  a  constitutional  appointment.    Having  already  both
heard  Lucia’s  case  and  issued  an  initial  decision  on  the  merits,  he
cannot be expected to consider the matter as though he had not adju-
dicated  it  before.    To  cure  the  constitutional  error,  another  ALJ  (or
the Commission itself) must hold the new hearing.  Pp. 12–13.

 868 F. 3d 1021, reversed and remanded.

KAGAN,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  THOM-
AS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.  BREYER,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part,  in  which  GINSBURG  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,  joined  as  to  Part  III.
SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  GINSBURG,  J.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section. It summarizes the case and the court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

(1998).  For that, the Court draws on “existing rules or un-
derstandings” about property rights.  Ibid. (internal quota-
tion  marks  omitted).    State  law  is  one  important  source.
Ibid.; see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Flor-
ida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U. S. 702, 707
(2010).  But state law cannot be the only source.  Otherwise,
a State could “sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing
traditional property interests” in assets it wishes to appro-
priate.  Phillips, 524 U. S., at 167; see also Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies,  Inc.  v.  Beckwith,  449  U. S.  155,  164  (1980);
Hall v. Meisner, 51 F. 4th 185, 190 (CA6 2022) (Kethledge,
J., for the Court) (“[T]he Takings Clause would be a dead
letter if a state could simply exclude from its definition of
property any interest that the state wished to take.”).  So
we  also  look  to  “traditional  property  law  principles,”  plus
historical  practice  and  this  Court’s  precedents.    Phillips,
524 U. S., at 165–168; see, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328
U. S.  256,  260–267  (1946);  Ruckelshaus  v.  Monsanto  Co.,
467 U. S. 986, 1001–1004 (1984).

Minnesota recognizes a homeowner’s right to real prop-
erty, like a  house, and to financial interests in that  prop-
erty, like home equity.  Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364
U. S.  40,  44  (1960)  (lien  on  boats);  Louisville  Joint  Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 590 (1935) (mortgage
on  farm).  Historically,  Minnesota  also  recognized  that  a
homeowner whose property has been sold to satisfy delin-
quent property taxes had an interest in the excess value of
her home above the debt owed.  See Farnham v. Jones, 32
Minn. 7, 11, 19 N. W. 83, 85 (1884).  But in 1935, the State
purported to extinguish that property interest by enacting
a law providing that an owner forfeits her interest in her
home when she falls behind on her property taxes.  See 1935
Minn. Laws pp. 713–714, §8.  This means, the County rea-
sons, that Tyler has no property interest protected by the
Takings Clause.

History  and  precedent  say  otherwise.    The  County  had
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and its application to a case involving property taxes in Minnesota. It cites legal precedents and analyzes relevant state law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

THOMAS, J., dissenting

marks omitted)).  As treatises shortly before the founding
explain, “there may be an Assault which will not amount to
an Affray; as where it happens in a private Place, out of the
hearing or seeing of any, except the Parties concerned; in
which Case it cannot be said to be to the Terror of the Peo-
ple.”  1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, at 134; see 1 Burn,
Justice of the Peace, at 13.  Affrays thus did not cover the
very conduct §922(g)(8) seeks to prevent—interpersonal vi-
olence in the home.

Second, affray laws did not impose a burden analogous to
§922(g)(8).  They  regulated  a  niche  subset  of  Second
Amendment-protected  activity.    As  explained,  affray  laws
prohibited only carrying certain weapons (“dangerous and
unusual”) in a particular manner (“terrifying the good peo-
ple of the land” without a need for self-defense) and in par-
ticular places (in public).  Meanwhile, §922(g)(8) prevents a
covered person from carrying any firearm or ammunition,
in any manner, in any place, at any time, and for any rea-
son.  Section  922(g)(8)  thus  bans  all  Second  Amendment-
protected  activity.    Indeed,  this  Court  has  already  con-
cluded that affray laws do not impose a burden “analogous
to the burden created by” an effective ban on public carry.
Bruen, 597 U. S., at 50.  Surely, then, a law that imposes a
public and private ban on a covered individual cannot have
an analogous burden either.

The Court counters that since affray laws “provided for
imprisonment,”  they
lesser  burden  than
imposed  a
§922(g)(8)’s disarmament.  Ante, at 14.  But, that argument
serves  only  to  highlight  another  fundamental  difference:
Affray laws were criminal statutes that penalized past be-
havior, whereas §922(g)(8) is triggered by a civil restraining
order that seeks to prevent future behavior.  Accordingly,
an  affray’s  burden  was  vastly  harder  to  impose.    To  im-
prison a person, a State had to prove that he committed the
crime of affray beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Constitu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the legal history of affray laws and compares them to the provisions of §922(g)(8) of the Gun Control Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

19

Opinion of the Court

that the agency’s “procedural determinations” may be sub-
ject  to  harmless-error  review,  §7607(d)(8),  the  Act  also
seems to treat separately challenges to agency “actions” like
the FIP before us, authorizing courts to “reverse any . . . ac-
tion,” found to be “arbitrary” or “capricious,” §7607(d)(9)(A)
(emphasis  added).    With  so  many  reasons  for  caution,  we
think sticking to our normal course of declining to consider
forfeited arguments the right course here.14

*
  The  applications  for  a  stay  in  Nos.  23A349,  23A350,
23A351,  and  23A384  are  granted.    Enforcement  of  EPA’s
rule against the applicants shall be stayed pending the dis-
position of the applicants’ petitions for review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit and any peti-
tion  for  writ  of  certiorari,  if  such  writ  is  timely  sought.
Should the petition for certiorari be denied, this order will
terminate automatically.  If the petition is granted, this or-
der shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment
of this Court.

It is so ordered.

——————

14 Admittedly, the dissent points to some statements in the FIP sug-
gesting  EPA  considered  nationwide  data  in  parts  of  its  analysis.    See,
e.g., post, at 14; see also, e.g., 88 Fed. Reg. 36721, 36727.  But other state-
ments in that rule and supporting documents also seem to suggest EPA
considered  state-specific  information.    See  Part  I–C,  supra.    If,  as  the
dissent posits, only nationwide data informed EPA’s analysis, why would
EPA say that, “for purposes of identifying the appropriate level of con-
trol,” it focused on “the 23 upwind states that were linked” to the down-
wind States, rather than, say, “all states in the contiguous U.S.”?  Final
Ozone Analysis 3 (footnote omitted).  Why would EPA explain that its
“findings regarding air quality improvement” downwind were a “central
component”  of  picking  the  appropriate  cost  levels  and  so  defining  a
State’s  significant  contribution?    88  Fed.  Reg.  36741.    And  why  would
EPA bother to “determine the relationship between changes in emissions
and  changes  in  ozone  contributions  on  a  state-by-state  . . .  basis”  and
“calibrat[e]” that relationship “based on state-specific source apportion-
ment”?  Final Ozone Analysis 43.  In asking these questions, we do not
profess answers; we simply highlight further reasons for caution.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses procedural matters related to a case and the court's decision to grant a stay.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
368  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

Citizens  United  argues  that  the  disclaimer  requirements
in  § 311  are  unconstitutional  as  applied  to  its  ads.  It  con
tends  that  the  governmental  interest  in  providing  informa
tion  to  the  electorate  does  not  justify  requiring  disclaimers
for  any  commercial  advertisements,  including  the  ones
at  issue  here.  We  disagree.  The  ads  fall  within  BCRA’s
deﬁnition  of  an  “electioneering  communication”:  They  re
ferred to then-Senator Clinton by name shortly before a pri
mary  and  contained  pejorative  references  to  her  candidacy.
See  530  F.  Supp.  2d,  at  276,  nn.  2–4.  The  disclaimers  re
quired  by  § 311  “provid[e]  the  electorate  with  information,”
McConnell,  supra,  at  196,  and  “insure  that  the  voters  are
fully  informed”  about  the  person  or  group  who  is  speaking,
Buckley,  supra,  at  76;  see  also  Bellotti,  435  U. S.,  at  792,
n. 32 (“Identiﬁcation of the source of advertising may be re
quired  as  a  means  of  disclosure,  so  that  the  people  will  be
able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being sub
jected”).  At  the very  least,  the disclaimers  avoid  confusion
by  making  clear  that  the  ads  are  not  funded  by  a  candidate
or political party.

Citizens  United  argues  that  § 311  is  underinclusive  be
cause  it  requires  disclaimers  for  broadcast  advertisements
but  not  for  print  or  Internet  advertising.  It  asserts  that
§ 311  decreases  both  the  quantity  and  effectiveness  of  the
group’s  speech  by  forcing  it  to  devote  four  seconds  of  each
advertisement to the spoken disclaimer.  We rejected these
arguments  in  McConnell,  supra,  at  230–231.  And  we  now
adhere  to  that  decision  as  it  pertains  to  the  disclosure
provisions.

As a ﬁnal point, Citizens United claims that, in any event,
the  disclosure  requirements  in  § 201  must  be  conﬁned  to
speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy.
The principal opinion in WRTL limited 2 U. S. C. § 441b’s re
strictions  on  independent  expenditures  to  express  advocacy
and its functional equivalent.  551 U. S., at 469–476 (opinion
of Roberts, C. J.).  Citizens United seeks to import a simi
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case. It delves into the constitutionality of disclaimer requirements for political advertisements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

Opinion of the Court

Arizona  order  requiring  cantaloupes  grown  in  state  to  be
processed and packed in state.  397 U. S., at 138–140.  The
Court held that Arizona’s order violated the dormant Com-
merce Clause.  Id., at 146.  Even if that order could be fairly
characterized as facially neutral, the Court stressed that it
“requir[ed]  business  operations  to  be  performed  in  [state]
that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere.”  Id., at
145.  The “practical effect[s]” of the order in operation thus
revealed a discriminatory purpose—an effort to insulate in-
state  processing  and  packaging  businesses  from  out-of-
state competition.  Id., at 140, 145.

Other  cases  in  the  Pike  line  underscore  the  same  mes-
sage.  In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., the Court
found no impermissible burden on interstate commerce be-
cause, looking to the law’s effects, “there [was] no reason to
suspect  that  the  gainers”  would  be  in-state  firms  or  that
“the losers [would be] out-of-state firms.”  449 U. S. 456, 473
(1981); see also id., at 474–477, and n. 2 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (asking whether the “ac-
tual purpose,” if not the “ ‘avowed purpose,’ ” of the law was
discrimination).  Similarly,  in  Exxon  Corp.  v.  Governor  of
Maryland, the Court keyed to the fact that the effect of the
challenged  law  was  only  to  shift  business  from  one  set  of
out-of-state suppliers to another.  437 U. S. 117, 127 (1978).
And in United  Haulers, a plurality upheld the challenged
law because it could not “detect” any discrimination in favor
of  in-state  businesses  or  against  out-of-state  competitors.
550 U. S., at 346.  In each of these cases and many more,
the presence or absence of discrimination in practice proved
decisive.

Once  again,  we  say  nothing  new  here.    Some  time  ago,
Tracy  identified  the  congruity  between  our  core  dormant
Commerce Clause precedents and the Pike line.  519 U. S.,
at 298, n. 12.  Many lower courts have done the same.  See,
e.g., Rosenblatt v. Santa Monica, 940 F. 3d 439, 452 (CA9
2019);  Park  Pet  Shop,  Inc.  v.  Chicago,  872  F. 3d  495,  501
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the dormant Commerce Clause and citing relevant case law. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ

Opinion of the Court

2
The remaining 6,332 class members are a different story.
To  be  sure,  their  credit  files,  which  were  maintained  by
TransUnion,  contained  misleading  OFAC  alerts.  But  the
parties  stipulated  that  TransUnion  did  not  provide  those
plaintiffs’ credit information to any potential creditors dur-
ing the class period from January 2011 to July 2011.  Given
the absence of dissemination, we must determine whether
the 6,332 class members suffered some other concrete harm
for purposes of Article III.

The  initial  question  is  whether  the  mere  existence  of  a
misleading OFAC alert in a consumer’s internal credit file
at  TransUnion  constitutes  a  concrete  injury.    As  Judge
Tatel  phrased  it  in  a  similar  context,  “if  inaccurate  infor-
mation falls into” a consumer’s credit file, “does it make a
sound?”  Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Assn., Inc. v.
United States Dept. of Transp., 879 F. 3d 339, 344 (CADC
2018).

Writing the opinion for the D. C. Circuit in Owner-Oper-
ator, Judge Tatel answered no.  Publication is “essential to
liability”  in  a  suit  for  defamation.  Restatement  of  Torts
§577,  Comment  a,  at  192.  And  there  is  “no  historical  or
common-law analog where the mere existence of inaccurate
information, absent dissemination, amounts to concrete in-
jury.”  Owner-Operator, 879 F. 3d, at 344–345.  “Since the
basis of the action for words was the loss of credit or fame,
and not the insult, it was always necessary to show a pub-
lication of the words.”  J. Baker, An Introduction to English
Legal History 474 (5th ed. 2019).  Other Courts of Appeals
have similarly recognized that, as Judge Colloton summa-
rized, the “retention of information lawfully obtained, with-
out  further  disclosure,  traditionally  has  not  provided  the
basis for a lawsuit in American courts,” meaning that the
mere  existence  of  inaccurate  information  in  a  database  is
insufficient  to  confer  Article  III  standing.  Braitberg  v.
Charter  Communications,  Inc.,  836  F. 3d  925,  930  (CA8
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the Court's reasoning in the case TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ.  It discusses the concept of "concrete harm" in the context of Article III standing and whether the mere existence of a misleading OFAC alert in a credit file constitutes such harm.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U83

[09-06-00 20:30:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 206 (1998)

207

Counsel

Paul A. Tufano argued the cause for petitioners. With

him on the briefs was Syndi L. Guido.

Donald Specter argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Eve H. Cervantez and Arlene B.
Mayerson.

Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging afﬁrmance. On the brief
were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney
General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Paul
R. Q. Wolfson, Jessica Dunsay Silver, Linda F. Thome, and
Seth M. Galanter.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the State of Ne-
vada et al. by Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, and
Anne B. Cathcart, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Betty D. Montgom-
ery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and Elise
Porter and Todd R. Marti, Assistant Attorneys General, John M. Ferren,
Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and Gus F. Diaz, Acting
Attorney General of Guam, and by the Attorneys General for their respec-
tive jurisdictions as follows: William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, Grant
Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of
California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida,
Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G.
Lance of Idaho, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas,
Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank
J. Kelley of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of
Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hamp-
shire, Peter Verniero of New Jersey, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Dennis
C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heit-
kamp of North Dakota, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles Molony
Condon of South Carolina, Mark W. Barnett of South Dakota, John Knox
Walkup of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, Mark
L. Earley of Virginia, Julio A. Brady of the Virgin Islands, and William
U. Hill of Wyoming; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Rich-
ard Ruda and James I. Crowley; for the Criminal Justice Legal Founda-
tion by Kent S. Scheidegger; and for the Republican Caucus of the Pennsyl-
vania House of Representatives by John P. Krill, Jr., and David R. Fine.
Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the National
Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems et al. by Steven J.
Schwartz, James R. Pingeon, and Stephen F. Hanlon; and for the Na-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal case information, specifically the beginning of a Supreme Court case citation and the list of counsel involved. This type of information is generally not considered the main body of a legal document and is more like metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Counsel Information</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

them  to  determine  whether  they  remain  necessary.  See
Brief for Respondent in No. 20–1199, at 52; Brief for Uni-
versity Respondents in No. 21–707, at 58–59.  Respondents
point  to  language  in  Grutter  that,  they  contend,  permits
“the durational requirement [to] be met” with “periodic re-
views to determine whether racial preferences are still nec-
essary to achieve student body diversity.”  539 U. S., at 342.
But  Grutter  never  suggested  that  periodic  review  could
make unconstitutional conduct constitutional.  To the con-
trary, the Court made clear that race-based admissions pro-
grams eventually had to end—despite whatever periodic re-
view universities conducted.  Ibid.; see also supra, at 18.

Here, however, Harvard concedes that its race-based ad-
missions program has no end point.  Brief for Respondent
in No. 20–1199, at 52 (Harvard “has not set a sunset date”
for its program (internal quotation marks omitted)).  And it
acknowledges that the way it thinks about the use of race
in its admissions process “is the same now as it was” nearly
50 years ago.  Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 20–1199, at 91.  UNC’s
race-based admissions program is likewise not set to expire
any time soon—nor, indeed, any time at all.  The University
admits that it “has not set forth a proposed time period in
which  it  believes  it  can  end  all  race-conscious  admissions
practices.”  567 F. Supp. 3d, at 612.  And UNC suggests that
it might soon use race to a greater extent than it currently
does.  See Brief for University Respondents in No. 21–707,
at 57.  In short, there is no reason to believe that respond-
ents will—even acting in good faith—comply with the Equal
Protection Clause any time soon.

V
The  dissenting  opinions  resist  these  conclusions.  They
would  instead  uphold  respondents’  admissions  programs
based on their view that the Fourteenth Amendment per-
mits state actors to remedy the effects of societal discrimi-
nation  through  explicitly  race-based  measures.  Although
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the arguments surrounding affirmative action in college admissions. It presents legal reasoning and cites previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U60

[09-26-01 12:39:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

838

UNITED STATES v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting

standable manner,” § 504(c)—amounts to transmission into
a home. Hence “bleeding” violates the statute whenever
a clear transmission of an unrequested adult channel would
violate the statute.

.

Second, the majority’s characterization of this statutory
. speech” is an exaggeration.
scheme as “prohibit[ing] .
Ante, at 812. Rather, the statute places a burden on adult
channel speech by requiring the relevant cable operator
either to use better scrambling technology, or, if that technol-
ogy is too expensive, to broadcast only between 10 p.m. and
6 a.m. Laws that burden speech, say, by making speech less
proﬁtable, may create serious First Amendment issues, but
they are not the equivalent of an absolute ban on speech
itself. Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528
U. S. 377 (2000). Thus, this Court has upheld laws that do
not ban the access of adults to sexually explicit speech, but
burden that access through geographical or temporal zoning.
See, e. g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41
(1986); FCC v. Paciﬁca Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 (1976).
This Court has also recognized that material the First
Amendment guarantees adults the right to see may not be
suitable for children. And it has consequently held that leg-
islatures maintain a limited power to protect children by re-
stricting access to, but not banning, adult material. Com-
pare Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968) (upholding
ban on sale of pornographic magazines to minors), with But-
ler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380 (1957) (invalidating ban on all
books unﬁt for minors); see also Denver Area Ed. Telecom-
munications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U. S. 727, 737–753
(1996) (plurality opinion); Paciﬁca Foundation, supra, at
748–750; Reno, supra, at 887–889 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). The difference—between
imposing a burden and enacting a ban—can matter even
when strict First Amendment rules are at issue.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It discusses the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 and its implications for adult content transmission.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Snippet</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GALLARDO v. MARSTILLER

Opinion of the Court

United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  28–29  (explaining  that,
prior  to  §1396a(a)(25)(H)’s  enactment,  insurers  were
“thwarting  [§1396k(a)(1)(A)]  by  refusing  to  recognize  as-
signments and arguing that their insurance contracts for-
bade  assignments”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).3
Thus, the idea that one of these two complementary provi-
sions must “prevail” over the other is mistaken.

Gallardo  and

the  United  States  also

invoke
§§1396a(a)(25)(A) and (B), which require States to “take all
reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third
parties . . . to pay for care and services available under the
[Medicaid] plan” and to “seek reimbursement . . . to the ex-
tent  of  such  legal  liability.”    They  argue  that  these  provi-
sions are the Medicaid Act’s “main” or “anchor” third-party
liability provisions and limit the State’s recovery under any
other provision “to the extent of ” a third party’s payments
“for  care  and  services  available  under  the  plan,”
§§1396a(a)(25)(A)–(B), which they interpret to include only
payments for medical care that Medicaid has already cov-
ered.  Reply Brief 6 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18.

This argument suffers from several problems.  To begin,

——————

3 The  United  States  makes  a  similar  argument  when  it  relies  on
§1396a(a)(25)(I)(ii),  under  which  States  must  enact  laws  requiring
health insurers to “accept the State’s right of recovery and the assign-
ment to the State of any right of an individual or other entity to payment
from the party for an item or service for which payment has been made
under  the  State  plan.”  We disagree  that  this  provision  “suggests  that
Congress understood the assignment of rights under Section 1396k to be
limited to third-party payments for services covered by Medicaid.”  Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 19.  Like §1396a(a)(25)(H), this pro-
vision targets specific attempts by health insurers to avoid making pay-
ments to state Medicaid programs.  Its narrower focus on health insur-
ers, who typically pay only once medical services are rendered, explains
its application to a narrower category of third-party payments, and says
little to nothing about the meaning of §1396k(a)(1)(A)’s broader scope.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of certain sections of the Medicaid Act. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Opinion of the Court

presented by the defense in this case . . . .  In my judg-
ment, the defense’s argument, which in all respects is
appropriate  and  under  the  circumstances  of  this  case
probably a necessary argument to make, nonetheless,
opens the door to evidence offered by the [S]tate refut-
ing  the  claim  that  Morris  was,  in  fact,  the  shooter.”
App. 184, 185.

Based  on  this  ruling,  the  State  published  to  the  jury  the
portions of the transcript of Morris’ plea hearing containing
Morris’  admission  to  possessing  a  .357  revolver  and  his
counsel’s statements that he was doing so against counsel’s
advice, without corroborating evidence, in order to get out
of jail immediately.

Hemphill premised his closing argument, like the rest of
his defense, on the theory that Morris was the shooter.  The
State,  in  its  closing,  cited  Morris’  plea  allocution  and  em-
phasized that possession of a .357 revolver, not murder, was
“the crime [Morris] actually committed.”  Id., at 356.  After
deliberations  spanning  multiple  days,  the  jury  found
Hemphill guilty, and the court sentenced him to 25 years to
life in prison.

C
Hemphill appealed.  Before the Appellate Division, he ar-
gued, citing the State and Federal Constitutions, that “[t]he
court denied Mr. Hemphill his right to confront the witness
against him where it admitted Nicholas Morris’s guilty plea
statements . . . because the defense had opened the door to
this  evidence  even  though  counsel  had  scrupulously  fol-
lowed the court’s in limine rulings.”  Supp. App. to Brief in
Opposition  SA107.  He  added,  “the  prosecution’s  conduct
here  represented  the  type  of  overreach  the  Confrontation
Clause was enacted to prevent: the production of evidence
procured by the government without affording the accused
the opportunity to question its reliability through cross-ex-
amination.”  Id., at SA111.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically from an appellate court opinion. It discusses the defendant's arguments regarding the admission of evidence and the Confrontation Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U47

[10-04-01 09:34:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 420 (2000)

443

Opinion of the Court

vagueness was not the fault of petitioner. Counsel had no
reason to believe Stinnett had been married to Meinhard or
been represented by Woodson. The underdevelopment of
these matters was attributable to Stinnett and Woodson, if
anyone. We do not suggest the State has an obligation to
pay for investigation of as yet undeveloped claims; but if the
prisoner has made a reasonable effort to discover the claims
to commence or continue state proceedings, § 2254(e)(2) will
not bar him from developing them in federal court.

The Court of Appeals held state habeas counsel was not
diligent because petitioner’s investigator on federal habeas
discovered the relationships upon interviewing two jurors
who referred in passing to Stinnett as “Bonnie Meinhard.”
See Brief for Petitioner 35. The investigator later con-
ﬁrmed Stinnett’s prior marriage to Meinhard by checking
Cumberland County’s public records. See 189 F. 3d, at 426
(“The documents supporting [petitioner’s] Sixth Amendment
claims have been a matter of public record since Stinnett’s
divorce became ﬁnal in 1979.
Indeed, because [petitioner’s]
federal habeas counsel located those documents, there is lit-
tle reason to think that his state habeas counsel could not
have done so as well”). We should be surprised, to say the
least, if a district court familiar with the standards of trial
practice were to hold that in all cases diligent counsel must
check public records containing personal information per-
taining to each and every juror. Because of Stinnett and
Woodson’s silence, there was no basis for an investigation
into Stinnett’s marriage history. Section 2254(e)(2) does not
apply to petitioner’s related claims of juror bias and prosecu-
torial misconduct.

We further note the Commonwealth has not argued that
petitioner could have sought relief in state court once he dis-
covered the factual bases of these claims some time between
appointment of federal habeas counsel on July 2, 1996, and
the ﬁling of his federal habeas petition on November 20,
1996. As an indigent, petitioner had 120 days following ap-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the petitioner's claims of juror bias and prosecutorial misconduct, and the applicability of § 2254(e)(2) to these claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20A62
_________________

WILBUR ROSS, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL. v.
NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[October 13, 2020]

  The application for stay presented to JUSTICE KAGAN and
by her referred to the Court is granted. The district court’s
September  24,  2020  order  granting  a  preliminary  injunc-
tion  is  stayed  pending  disposition  of  the  appeal  in  the
United  States  Court  of Appeals  for the  Ninth Circuit  and
disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ
is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari
be  denied,  this  stay  shall  terminate  automatically.  In  the
event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the stay
shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of
this Court.
  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting from grant of stay.
  Today, the Court stays a preliminary injunction requir-
ing the Census Bureau to follow the data collection plan the
agency once described as necessary to avoid “risking signif-
icant  impacts  on  data  quality.”    Electronic  Case  Filing  in
No. 5:20–cv–5799, Doc. 198–7 (ND Cal., Sept. 22, 2020), p.
131 (ECF).  The injunction required the Bureau to continue
its data collection efforts until October 31, 2020, a deadline
the Bureau itself selected in response to the significant op-
erational disruptions  caused  by  the  COVID–19  pandemic.
The  Government  now  claims  that  this  Court’s  immediate
intervention  is  necessary  because,  absent  a  stay,  the  Bu-
reau  will  not  be  able  to  meet  the  December  31  statutory
deadline for reporting census results to the President.  This
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court.  It includes citations, case names, and legal jargon.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Opinion of the Court

224.  We therefore reject Saxon’s argument that §1 exempts
virtually all employees of major transportation providers.

B

While  Saxon  defines  the  relevant  class  of  workers  too
broadly, Southwest construes §1’s catchall category—“any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce”—too narrowly.  The airline argues that only work-
ers who physically move goods or people across foreign or
international  boundaries—pilots,  ship  crews,  locomotive
engineers,  and  the  like—are  “engaged  in  foreign  or  inter-
state commerce.”  So construed, §1 does not exempt cargo
loaders  because  they  do  not  physically  accompany  freight
across state or international boundaries.

Southwest’s reading rests on three arguments.  None per-
suades us.  First, taking its turn with ejusdem generis, the
airline  argues  that  because  “seamen”  are  “employed  on
board a vessel,” McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U. S.
337, 346 (1991) (emphasis added), and “ ‘railroad employees’
is somewhat ambiguous,” Brief for Petitioner 26, we should
limit the exempted class of railroad employees to those who
are physically on board a locomotive as it crosses state lines.
Then,  having  limited  railroad  employees  in  that  way,
Southwest likewise urges us to narrow §1’s catchall provi-
sion  to  exclude  those  airline-transportation  workers,  like
Saxon and other cargo loaders, who do not ride aboard an
airplane in interstate or foreign transit.

Southwest’s application of ejusdem generis is as flawed as
Saxon’s.  It purports to import a limitation from the defini-
tion of “seamen” into the definition of “railroad employees”
and  then  engrafts  that  limit  onto  the  catchall  provision.
But by conceding that “railroad employees” is ambiguous,
Southwest sinks its own ejusdem generis argument.  Again,
the  “inference  embodied  in  ejusdem  generis  [is]  that  Con-
gress  remained  focused  on  [some]  common  attribute”
shared by the preceding list of specific items “when it used
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute (likely related to labor laws).  It contains legal arguments, citations, and specific terminology common in legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–499
_________________

JOSEPH JESNER, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

ARAB BANK, PLC

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[April 24, 2018]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full  because  it  correctly
applies our precedents.  I also agree with the points raised
by my concurring  colleagues.   Courts should not be in the
business  of  creating  new  causes  of  action  under  the  Alien
Tort Statute, see post, at 2–5 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment), especially when it risks
international strife, see post, at 3–7 (ALITO, J., concurring
in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment).    And  the  Alien  Tort
Statute  likely  does  not  apply  to  suits  between  foreign
plaintiffs and foreign defendants.  See post, at 5–14 (opin-
ion of GORSUCH, J.).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

Opinion of the Court

“a  majority  of  voters  in  [Pennsylvania]  should  be  able  to
elect  a  majority  of  [Pennsylvania’s]  congressional  delega
tion”—as a “precept” for which there is “no authority.”  Id.,
at  308.  Yet  JUSTICE  KENNEDY  recognized  the  possibility
that  “in  another  case  a  standard  might  emerge  that  suit-
ably demonstrates how an apportionment’s de facto incor
poration  of  partisan  classifications  burdens”  representa
tional rights.  Id., at 312.

Four  Justices  dissented  in  three  different  opinions.
Justice  Stevens  would  have  permitted  the  plaintiffs’
claims  to  proceed  on  a  district-by-district  basis,  using  a
legal  standard  similar  to  the  standard  for  racial  gerry
mandering  set  forth  in  Shaw  v.  Hunt,  517  U. S.  899
(1996).  See 541 U. S., at 335–336, 339.  Under this stand
ard, any district with a “bizarre shape” for which the only
possible explanation was “a naked desire to increase parti
san  strength”  would  be  found  unconstitutional  under  the
Equal  Protection  Clause.
Id.,  at  339.  Justice  Souter,
joined by JUSTICE GINSBURG, agreed that a plaintiff alleg
ing  unconstitutional  partisan  gerrymandering  should
proceed on a district-by-district basis, as “we would be able
to call more readily on some existing law when we defined
what is suspect at the district level.”  See id., at 346–347.

JUSTICE BREYER dissented on still other grounds.  In his
view,  the  drawing  of  single-member  legislative  districts—
even according to traditional criteria—is “rarely . . . politi
cally  neutral.”  Id.,  at  359.  He  therefore  would  have  dis
tinguished  between  gerrymandering  for  passing  political
advantage and gerrymandering leading to the “unjustified
entrenchment” of a political party.  Id., at 360–361.

The Court last took up this question in League of United
Latin  American  Citizens  v.  Perry,  548  U. S.  399  (2006)
(LULAC).  The  plaintiffs  there  challenged  a  mid-decade
redistricting map passed by the Texas Legislature.  As in
Vieth,  a  majority  of  the  Court  could  find  no  justiciable
standard  by  which  to  resolve  the  plaintiffs’  partisan  ger
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Court's decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer. It delves into the dissenting opinions and the Court's previous ruling on partisan gerrymandering in LULAC.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

7

Opinion of the Court

Fourth  Amendment,  and  by  the  First  and  Second
Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are re
served in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to
a class of persons who are part of a national commu
nity  or  who  have  otherwise  developed  sufficient  con
nection with this country to be considered part of that
community.”

This  contrasts  markedly  with  the  phrase  “the  militia”  in
the prefatory clause.  As we will describe below, the “mili
tia”  in  colonial  America  consisted  of  a  subset  of  “the  peo
ple”—those  who  were  male,  able  bodied,  and  within  a
certain  age  range.  Reading  the  Second  Amendment  as
protecting  only  the  right  to  “keep  and  bear  Arms”  in  an
organized  militia  therefore  fits  poorly  with  the  operative
clause’s  description  of  the  holder  of  that  right  as  “the
people.”

We  start  therefore  with  a  strong  presumption  that  the
Second  Amendment  right  is  exercised  individually  and
belongs to all Americans.

b. “Keep  and  bear  Arms.”  We  move  now  from  the
holder  of  the  right—“the  people”—to  the  substance  of  the
right: “to keep and bear Arms.”

Before addressing the verbs “keep” and “bear,” we inter
pret their object: “Arms.”  The 18th-century meaning is no
different  from  the  meaning  today.  The  1773  edition  of
Samuel  Johnson’s  dictionary  defined  “arms”  as  “weapons
of  offence,  or  armour  of  defence.”   1  Dictionary  of  the
English  Language  107  (4th  ed.)  (hereinafter  Johnson).
Timothy  Cunningham’s  important  1771  legal  dictionary
defined  “arms”  as  “any  thing  that  a  man  wears  for  his
defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast
at  or  strike  another.”    1  A  New  and  Complete  Law  Dic
tionary  (1771);  see  also  N.  Webster,  American  Dictionary
of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1989) (hereinaf
ter Webster) (similar).
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It discusses the interpretation of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
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2

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Syllabus

that Colorado law can protect gay persons in acquiring products and
services  on  the  same  terms  and  conditions  as  are  offered  to  other
members of the public, the law must be applied in a manner that is
neutral toward religion.  To Phillips, his claim that using his artistic
skills  to  make  an  expressive  statement,  a  wedding  endorsement  in
his  own  voice  and  of  his  own  creation,  has  a  significant  First
Amendment  speech  component  and  implicates  his  deep  and  sincere
religious  beliefs.    His  dilemma  was  understandable  in  2012,  which
was  before  Colorado  recognized  the  validity  of  gay  marriages  per-
formed  in  the  State  and  before  this  Court  issued  United  States  v.
Windsor,  570  U. S.  744,  or  Obergefell.  Given  the  State’s  position  at
the  time,  there  is  some  force  to  Phillips’  argument  that  he  was  not
unreasonable  in  deeming  his  decision  lawful.    State  law  at  the  time
also  afforded  storekeepers  some  latitude  to  decline  to  create  specific
messages  they  considered  offensive.    Indeed,  while  the  instant  en-
forcement proceedings were pending, the State Civil Rights Division
concluded in at least three cases that a baker acted lawfully in declin-
ing  to  create  cakes  with  decorations  that  demeaned  gay  persons  or
gay marriages.  Phillips too  was entitled to a neutral and respectful
consideration  of  his  claims  in  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.
Pp. 9–12.

(b) That consideration was compromised, however, by the Commis-
sion’s  treatment  of  Phillips’  case,  which  showed  elements  of  a  clear
and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs moti-
vating his objection.  As the record shows, some of the commissioners
at  the  Commission’s  formal,  public  hearings  endorsed  the  view  that
religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere
or  commercial  domain,  disparaged  Phillips’  faith  as  despicable  and
characterized it as merely rhetorical, and compared his invocation of
his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Hol-
ocaust.  No commissioners objected to the comments.  Nor were they
mentioned  in  the  later  state-court  ruling  or  disavowed  in  the  briefs
filed here.  The comments thus cast doubt on the fairness and impar-
tiality of the Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case.

Another indication of hostility is the different treatment of Phillips’
case  and  the  cases  of  other  bakers  with  objections  to  anti-gay  mes-
sages who prevailed before  the Commission.  The Commission ruled
against  Phillips  in  part  on  the  theory  that  any  message  on  the  re-
quested wedding cake would be attributed to the customer, not to the
baker.  Yet the Division did not address this point in any of the cases
involving  requests  for  cakes  depicting  anti-gay  marriage  symbolism.
The Division also considered that each bakery was willing to sell oth-
er products to the prospective customers, but the Commission found
Phillips’  willingness  to  do  the  same  irrelevant.    The  State  Court  of
  </content>
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10

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

Opinion of the Court

that issue.  In the lower courts, NetChoice and the States
alike treated the laws as having certain heartland applica-
tions, and mostly confined their battle to that terrain.  More
specifically, the focus  was on how the laws applied to the
content-moderation practices that giant social-media plat-
forms use on their best-known services to filter, alter, or la-
bel their users’ posts.  Or more specifically still, the focus
was on how the laws applied to Facebook’s News Feed and
YouTube’s  homepage.    Reflecting  the  parties’  arguments,
the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits also mostly confined their
analysis in that way.  See 34 F. 4th, at 1210, 1213 (consid-
ering “platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Tik-
Tok” and content moderation in “viewers’ feeds”); 49 F. 4th,
at 445, 460, 478, 492 (considering platforms “such as Face-
book, Twitter, and YouTube” and referencing users’ feeds);
see also id., at 501 (Southwick, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (analyzing a curated feed).  On their way
to opposing conclusions, they concentrated on the same is-
sue: whether a state law can regulate the content-moderation
practices  used  in  Facebook’s  News  Feed  (or  near  equiva-
lents).  They did not address the full range of activities the
laws cover, and measure the constitutional against the un-
constitutional  applications.  In  short,  they  treated  these
cases more like as-applied claims than like facial ones.

The first step in the proper facial analysis is to assess the
state laws’ scope.  What activities, by what actors, do the
laws prohibit or otherwise regulate?  The laws of course dif-
fer one from the other.  But both, at least on their face, ap-
pear  to  apply  beyond  Facebook’s  News  Feed  and  its  ilk.
Members of this Court asked some of the relevant questions
at  oral  argument.  Starting  with  Facebook  and  the  other
giants:  To  what  extent,  if  at  all,  do  the  laws  affect  their
other  services,  like  direct  messaging  or  events  manage-
ment?  See Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22–555, pp. 62–63; Tr. of
Oral  Arg.  in  No.  22–277,  pp. 24–25;  App.  in  No.  22–277,
pp. 129, 159.  And beyond those social-media entities, what
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case *Moody v. NetChoice*.  It discusses the scope of the laws being challenged and how they apply to various online platforms and services.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

Opinion of the Court

to these requirements.  See post, at 3, 14–15.  And the re-
quirements  are  themselves  prophylactic  measures,  given
that  “few  if  any  contributions  to  candidates  will  involve
quid pro quo arrangements.”  Citizens United, 558 U. S., at
357.  Such  a  prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis  approach,  we
have explained, is a significant indicator that the regulation
may not be necessary for the interest it seeks to protect.  See
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 221; see also Bennett, 564 U. S.,
at 752 (“In the face of [the State’s] contribution limits [and]
strict disclosure requirements . . . it is hard to imagine what
marginal corruption deterrence could be generated by [an
additional measure].”).

There is no cause for a different conclusion here.  Because
the Government is defending a restriction on speech as nec-
essary  to  prevent  an  anticipated  harm,  it  must  do  more
than “simply posit the existence of the disease sought to be
cured.”  Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v.
Federal  Election  Comm’n,  518  U. S.  604,  618  (1996).    It
must  instead  point  to  “record  evidence  or  legislative  find-
ings” demonstrating the need to address a special problem.
Ibid.  We have “never accepted mere conjecture as adequate
to  carry  a  First  Amendment  burden.”    McCutcheon,  572
U. S., at 210 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 392 (2000)).

Yet the Government is unable to identify a single case of
quid pro quo corruption in this context—even though most
States do not impose a limit on the use of post-election con-
tributions to repay candidate loans.  Cf. Brief for Campaign
Legal  Center  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  17–18  (citing  the  10
States  that  do  impose  such  a  prohibition).    Our  previous
cases have found the absence of such evidence significant.
See Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 357 (the Government did
not claim that the political process was corrupted in the 26
States that allowed unrestricted independent expenditures
by  corporations);  McCutcheon,  572  U. S.,  at  209,  n. 7  (the
Government presented no evidence of corruption in the 30
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing campaign finance regulations. It cites previous Supreme Court cases and legal arguments, indicating it's part of the main body of the opinion and not a preliminary or supplementary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP

Syllabus

and violated the separation of powers.  The President did not, however,
argue  that  any  of  the requested  records  were  protected  by  executive
privilege.

In Mazars, the District Court granted judgment for the House and
the  D. C.  Circuit  affirmed,  finding  that  the  subpoena  issued  by  the
Oversight  Committee  served  a  valid  legislative  purpose  because  the
requested information was relevant to reforming financial disclosure
requirements for Presidents and presidential candidates.  In Deutsche
Bank, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction and the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed in substantial part, holding that the Intelligence
Committee properly issued its subpoena to Deutsche Bank as part of
an investigation into alleged foreign influence in the U. S. political pro-
cess,  which  could  inform  legislation  to  strengthen  national  security
and combat foreign meddling.  The court also concluded that the sub-
poenas issued by the Financial Services Committee to Deutsche Bank
and  Capital  One  were  adequately  related  to  potential  legislation  on
money laundering, terrorist financing, and the global movement of il-
licit funds through the real estate market.

Held: The courts below did not take adequate account of the significant
separation of powers concerns implicated by congressional subpoenas
for the President’s information.  Pp. 7–20.

(a) Historically, disputes over congressional demands for presiden-
tial documents have been resolved by the political branches through
negotiation and compromise without involving this Court.  The Court
recognizes that this dispute is the first of its kind to reach the Court;
that such disputes can raise important issues concerning relations be-
tween the branches; that similar disputes recur on a regular basis, in-
cluding  in  the  context  of  deeply  partisan  controversy;  and  that  Con-
gress  and  the  Executive  have  nonetheless  managed  for  over  two
centuries  to  resolve  these  disputes  among  themselves  without  Su-
preme Court guidance.  Such longstanding practice “ ‘is a consideration
of great weight’ ” in cases concerning “the allocation of power between
[the] two elected branches of Government,” and it imposes on the Court
a duty of care to ensure that it does not needlessly disturb “the com-
promises  and  working  arrangements”  reached  by  those  branches.
NLRB  v.  Noel  Canning,  573  U. S.  513,  524–526  (quoting  The  Pocket
Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 689).  Pp. 7–11.

(b) Each House of Congress has the power “to secure needed infor-
mation”  in  order  to  legislate.    McGrain  v.  Daugherty,  273  U. S.  135,
161.  This power is “indispensable” because, without information, Con-
gress  would  be  unable  to  legislate  wisely  or  effectively.    Watkins  v.
United  States,  354  U. S.  178,  215.    Because  this  power  is  “justified
solely as an adjunct to the legislative process,” it is subject to several
limitations.  Id., at 197.  Most importantly, a congressional subpoena
  </content>
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This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal arguments and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered the main body of the text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
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  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of the Court

U. S. C. §300gg–13(a)(4).2

The statute does not define “preventive care and screen-
ings,” nor does it include an exhaustive or illustrative list
of such services.  Thus, the statute itself does not explicitly
require coverage for any specific form of “preventive care.”
Hobby Lobby, 573 U. S., at 697.  Instead, Congress stated
that coverage must include “such additional preventive care
and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guide-
lines supported by the Health Resources and Services Ad-
ministration”  (HRSA),  an  agency  of  the  Department  of
Health and Human Services (HHS).  §300gg–13(a)(4).  At
the time of the ACA’s enactment, these guidelines were not
yet written.  As a result, no specific forms of preventive care
or screenings were (or could be) referred to or incorporated
by reference.

Soon  after  the  ACA’s  passage,  the  Departments  began
promulgating rules related to §300gg–13(a)(4).  But in do-
ing so, the Departments did not proceed through the notice
and  comment  rulemaking  process,  which  the  Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) often requires before an agency’s
regulation  can  “have  the  force  and  effect  of  law.”  Perez  v.
Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 96 (2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also 5 U. S. C. §553. Instead,
the Departments invoked the APA’s good cause exception,
which permits an agency to dispense with notice and com-
ment and promulgate an IFR that carries immediate legal
force.  §553(b)(3)(B).

The first relevant IFR, promulgated in July 2010, primar-
ily focused on implementing other aspects of §300gg–13.  75

——————

2 The  ACA  exempts  “grandfathered”  plans  from  42  U. S. C.  §300gg–
13(a)(4)—i.e.,  “those  [plans]  that  existed  prior  to  March  23,  2010,  and
that have not made specified changes after that date.”  Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682, 699 (2014).  See §§18011(a), (e); 29 CFR
§2590.715–1251 (2019).  As of 2018, an estimated 16 percent of employ-
ees “with employer-sponsored coverage were enrolled in a grandfathered
group health plan.”  84 Fed. Reg. 5971 (2019).
  </content>
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This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the Affordable Care Act and its requirements for preventive care coverage.
  </thinking>
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529US1

Unit: $U41

[09-26-01 09:10:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN

268

FLORIDA v. J. L.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether an anony-
mous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more,
sufﬁcient to justify a police ofﬁcer’s stop and frisk of that
person. We hold that it is not.

I

On October 13, 1995, an anonymous caller reported to the
Miami-Dade Police that a young black male standing at a
particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a
gun. App. to Pet. for Cert. A–40 to A–41. So far as the
record reveals, there is no audio recording of the tip, and
nothing is known about the informant. Sometime after the
police received the tip—the record does not say how long—
two ofﬁcers were instructed to respond. They arrived at
the bus stop about six minutes later and saw three black
Id., at A–42. One of the
males “just hanging out [there].”
three, respondent J. L., was wearing a plaid shirt.
Id., at
A–41. Apart from the tip, the ofﬁcers had no reason to sus-
pect any of the three of illegal conduct. The ofﬁcers did not
see a ﬁrearm, and J. L. made no threatening or otherwise
unusual movements.
Id., at A–42 to A–44. One of the of-
ﬁcers approached J. L., told him to put his hands up on the
bus stop, frisked him, and seized a gun from J. L.’s pocket.
The second ofﬁcer frisked the other two individuals, against
whom no allegations had been made, and found nothing.

Pennsylvania, Jose A. Fuentes Agostini of Puerto Rico, Sheldon White-
house of Rhode Island, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Paul G.
Summers of Tennessee, John Cornyn of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah,
Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, and Gay Woodhouse of Wyoming.

Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the Congress of
Racial Equality, Inc., by Stefan B. Tahmassebi; for the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by James J. Tomkovicz and Bar-
bara E. Bergman; for the National Riﬂe Association of America et al. by
Robert Dowlut and David B. Kopel; and for the Rutherford Institute by
John W. Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.
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This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes the case name, the name of the Justice delivering the opinion, and the start of the legal argument.
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