<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

630

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Souter, J., dissenting

of rape and domestic violence; 5 and from representatives
of state law enforcement and private business.6 The record
includes reports on gender bias from task forces in 21
States,7 and we have the beneﬁt of speciﬁc factual ﬁndings

at 7–11 (testimony of American Medical Assn. president-elect Robert
McAfee).

5 See, e. g., id., at 13–17 (testimony of Lisa); id., at 40–42 (testimony of

Jennifer Tescher).

6 See, e. g., S. Hearing 102–369, at 24–36, 71–87 (testimony of attor-
neys general of Iowa and Illinois); id., at 235–245 (testimony of National
Federation of Business and Professional Women); S. Hearing No. 103–
596, at 15–17 (statement of James Hardeman, Manager, Counseling Dept.,
Polaroid Corp.).

7 See Judicial Council of California Advisory Committee on Gender Bias
in the Courts, Achieving Equal Justice for Women and Men in the Califor-
nia Courts (July 1996) (edited version of 1990 report); Colorado Supreme
Court Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts, Gender and Justice in the
Colorado Courts (1990); Connecticut Task Force on Gender, Justice and
the Courts, Report to the Chief Justice (Sept. 1991); Report of the Florida
Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission (Mar. 1990); Supreme
Court of Georgia, Commission on Gender Bias in the Judicial System, Gen-
der and Justice in the Courts (1991), reprinted in 8 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 539
(1992); Report of the Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts
(1990); Equality in the Courts Task Force, State of Iowa, Final Report
(Feb. 1993); Kentucky Task Force on Gender Fairness in the Courts, Equal
Justice for Women and Men (Jan. 1992); Louisiana Task Force on Women
in the Courts, Final Report (1992); Maryland Special Joint Comm., Gender
Bias in the Courts (May 1989); Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
Gender Bias Study of the Court System in Massachusetts (1989); Michigan
Supreme Court Task Force on Gender Issues in the Courts, Final Report
(Dec. 1989); Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in
the Courts, Final Report (1989), reprinted in 15 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 825
(1989); Nevada Supreme Court Gender Bias Task Force, Justice for Women
(1988); New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts,
Report of the First Year (June 1984); Report of the New York Task Force
on Women in the Courts (Mar. 1986); Final Report of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court Committee on Women in the Courts (June 1987); Utah
Task Force on Gender and Justice, Report to the Utah Judicial Council
(Mar. 1990); Vermont Supreme Court and Vermont Bar Assn., Gender and
Justice: Report of the Vermont Task Force on Gender Bias in the Legal
System (Jan. 1991); Washington State Task Force on Gender and Justice
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter in the case of United States v. Morrison. It includes citations to other sources and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

contains  comprehensive  prohibitions  on  bribes  and
gratuities  to  federal  officials.  See  76  Stat.  1119.  As  to
gratuities,  that  statute  imposes  criminal  penalties  on
federal officials who seek or accept “anything of value” for
“any official act.”  18 U. S. C. §201(c)(1)(B).

The  U. S.  Office  of  Government  Ethics,  or  OGE,  has
implemented  §201  and  promulgated  numerous  gratuities
rules and exceptions.  See 5 CFR §2635.202(c) (2023).  For
example, OGE has stated that federal officials may accept
gifts  that  are  “motivated  by  a  family  relationship  or
personal friendship,” not by the “position of the employee.”
§2635.204(b).  And OGE has also carved out exceptions for
officials to accept gifts of $20 or less per occasion, awards
and  honorary  degrees,  refreshments  at  social  events,  and
the like.  See §2635.204.

Importantly, because bribery can corrupt the official act,
Congress treats bribery as a far more serious offense than
gratuities.  For example, if a federal official accepts a bribe,
federal bribery law provides for a 15-year maximum prison
sentence.  See 18 U. S. C. §201(b).  By contrast, if a federal
official accepts a prohibited gratuity, federal gratuities law
sets a 2-year maximum prison sentence.  See §201(c).

B
In the 1970s and early 1980s, confusion emerged in the
Courts  of  Appeals  over  whether  the  federal  bribery  and
gratuities  laws  in  §201(b)  and  §201(c)  applied  not  only  to
federal  officials  but  also  to  state  and  local  officials.    See
In
Salinas  v.  United  States,  522  U. S.  52,  58  (1997).
response, Congress passed and President Reagan signed a
law now codified at 18 U. S. C. §666.  See 98 Stat. 2143.

As relevant here, §666 originally extended the gratuities
prohibition in §201(c) to most state and local officials.  See
Salinas,  522  U. S.,  at  58;  18  U.  S.  C.  §666(b)  (1982  ed.,
Supp. II).

But  after  only  two  years,  Congress  reversed course.  In
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the history and application of federal bribery and gratuity laws. It delves into specific statutes and their interpretations, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
920

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5819.  Doble  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5820.  Dawson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  782.

No.  09–5821.  Davis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  183.

No.  09–5823.  Walker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  899.

No.  09–5824.  Wagner  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  680.

No.  09–5826.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  224.

No.  09–5827.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  419.

No. 09–5831.  Jordan v. United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  303  Fed.  Appx.  439.

No.  09–5837.  Anderson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  773.

No. 09–5838.  Acosta v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  632.

No.  09–5839.  Barragan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  297  Fed.  Appx.  604.

No. 09–5840.  Barnes v.  Martinez, Warden.  C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5841.  Roberts  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5842.  Gonzales  Sanchez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.
802.

No.  09–5845.  Palmer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  401.

No.  09–5846.  Streich  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  926.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It is not sequential narrative text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1150

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 19, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–651.  Hirmer  et  vir  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–653.  Gearing  v.  California.  App.  Div.,  Super.  Ct.

Cal.,  County  of  Los  Angeles.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–655.  Wade  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  375.

No.  09–691.  Epis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  409.

No.  09–692.  Olis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5202.  Booker  v.  Mississippi.  Sup.  Ct.  Miss.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  5  So.  3d  356.

No.  09–5455.  Giles  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  754.

No.  09–6167.  Patterson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  1170.

No.  09–6179.  Aguilera-Meza  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  825.

No. 09–6245.  Hargrove v.  Walker, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  708.

No.  09–6441.  Glover  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  35.

No.  09– 6457.  Molina-Gazca,  aka  Martinez  v.  United
States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
571  F.  3d  470.

No.  09–6504.  Thompson  v.  Williams  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  678.

No.  09–6577.  Mitchell  v.  O’Brien.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6605.  Berry  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  707.

No.  09–6650.  Pendleton  v.  Ballard,  Warden.  Cir.  Ct.

Berkeley  County,  W. Va.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case summaries from a legal document, likely the Supreme Court's docket. It includes case numbers, parties involved, originating courts, and disposition (certiorari denied).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–511
_________________

TIM SHOOP, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.
RAYMOND A. TWYFORD, III

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2022]

JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  and

JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.

The Court today reviews a District Court’s pretrial order
requiring Ohio “to transport a prisoner in its custody to a
hospital for medical testing” in order to develop evidence to
support  the  prisoner’s  habeas  petition.    Ante,  at  1.  The
Court holds that the District Court’s order did not comply
with the All Writs Act because the District Court failed to
consider whether the evidence sought could be admissible
in the habeas proceeding.  See ante, at 9–10.  I would not
reach the merits of that question because I do not believe
that  the  Court  of  Appeals  had  jurisdiction  to  hear  the
State’s interlocutory appeal.  I respectfully dissent.

I
Courts  of  Appeals  generally  have  jurisdiction  to  review
“final  decisions  of  the  district  courts.”    28  U. S. C.  §1291.
They do not ordinarily hear interlocutory appeals.  Limiting
appellate  jurisdiction  over  interlocutory  matters  avoids
piecemeal decisionmaking and “combine[s] in one review all
stages  of  the  proceeding  that  effectively  may  be  reviewed
and corrected if and when final judgment results.”  Cohen
v.  Beneficial  Industrial  Loan  Corp.,  337  U. S.  541,  546
(1949).  Too  many  interlocutory  appeals  could  slow  down
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion.  It includes citations, case names, and the names of justices. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it is part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

KAGAN, J., dissenting

eliminate  a  regulatory  requirement  or  condition.    Black’s
Law Dictionary 1894 (11th ed. 2019).  To “modify” means
“[t]o  make  somewhat  different”  or  “to  reduce  in  degree  or
extent”—so here, to lessen rather than eliminate such a re-
quirement.  Id., at 1203.  Then put the words together, as
they appear in the statute: To “waive or modify” a require-
ment means to lessen its effect, from the slightest adjust-
ment  up  to  eliminating  it  altogether.    Of  course,  making
such  changes  may  leave  gaps  to  fill.  So  the  statute  says
what is anyway obvious: that the Secretary’s waiver/modi-
fication power includes the ability to specify “the terms and
conditions to be applied in lieu of such [modified or waived]
statutory  and  regulatory  provisions.”    §1098bb(b)(2).    Fi-
nally, attach the “waive or modify” power to all the provi-
sions  relating  to  loan  cancellation:  The  Secretary  may
amend, all the way up to discarding, those provisions and
fill the holes that action creates with new terms designed to
counteract an emergency’s effects on borrowers.

Before  reviewing  how  that  statutory  scheme  operated
here, consider how it might work for a hypothetical emer-
gency  that  the  enacting  Congress  had  in  the  front  of  its
mind.  As noted above, a precursor to the HEROES Act was
a  statute  authorizing  the  Secretary  to  assist  student-loan
borrowers affected by September 11.  See supra, at 14.  The
HEROES Act, as Congress designed it, would give him the
identical power to address similar terrorist attacks in the
future.  So  imagine  the  horrific.    A  terrorist  organization
sets off a dirty bomb in Chicago.  Beyond causing deaths,
the  incident  leads  millions  of  residents  (including  many
with student loans) to flee the city to escape the radiation.
They must find new housing, probably new jobs.  And still
their  student-loan  bills  are  coming  due  every  month.    To
prevent  widespread  loan  delinquencies  and  defaults,  the
Secretary  wants  to  discharge  $10,000  for  the  class  of  af-
fected borrowers.  Is that legal?  Of course it is; it is exactly
what  Congress  provided  for.    The  statutory  preconditions
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Biden v. Nebraska. It delves into the interpretation of a statute regarding loan cancellation powers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting

by  or  in  support  of  the  employees.   The  Court  apparently
finds these arguments unpersuasive, and so do I, but for the
sake of completeness, I will address them briefly.

1
One argument, which relies on our decision in Price Wa-
terhouse  v.  Hopkins,  490  U. S.  228  (1989)  (plurality  opin-
ion), is that discrimination because of sexual orientation or
gender identity violates Title VII because it constitutes pro-
hibited discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes.  See
883 F. 3d, at 119–123; Hively, 853 F. 3d, at 346; 884 F. 3d
560, 576–577 (CA6 2018).  The argument goes like this.  Ti-
tle VII prohibits discrimination based on stereotypes about
the way men and women should behave; the belief that a
person should be attracted only to persons of the opposite
sex and the belief that a person should identify with his or
her biological sex are examples of such stereotypes; there-
fore, discrimination on either of these grounds is unlawful.
This argument fails because it is based on a faulty prem-
ise, namely, that Title VII forbids discrimination based on
sex stereotypes.  It does not.  It prohibits discrimination be-
cause of “sex,” and the two concepts are not the same.  See
Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S., at 251.  That does not mean,
however,  that  an  employee  or  applicant  for  employment
cannot prevail by showing that a challenged decision was
based  on  a  sex  stereotype.  Such  evidence  is  relevant  to
prove discrimination because of sex, and it may be convinc-
ing where the trait that is inconsistent with the stereotype
is one that would be tolerated and perhaps even valued in
a person of the opposite sex.  See ibid.

Much of the plaintiff ’s evidence in Price Waterhouse was
of this nature.  The plaintiff was a woman who was passed
over for partnership at an accounting firm, and some of the
adverse comments about her work appeared to criticize her
for  being  forceful  and  insufficiently  “feminin[e].”    Id.,  at
235–236.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1132

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 22, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8639. Duncan v. Barreras, Warden, et al. C. A.

10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 447.

No. 99–8641.

Jackson v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8643. McDowell v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 115 Nev. 575, 24 P. 3d 270.

No. 99–8648.

No. 99–8646. Mahon v. County of Los Angeles et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 384.
Jones v. Commissioner of Labor of New
York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 258 App. Div. 2d 795, 685 N. Y. S. 2d 869.
No. 99–8664. Coffee v. Doth, Commissioner of Human
Services of Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.
No. 99–8669. Taylor v. Dees, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 543.

No. 99–8670. Welch v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 202 F. 3d 262.

No. 99–8671. Walker v. Akers et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8673. Stemley v. Foti, Sheriff of Orleans Parish,

Louisiana, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8679.
tiorari denied.

Jeffers v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

No. 99–8680. Manthei v. Bogan, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 448.

No. 99–8686. Aldridge v. Zulpo-Dane et al. Ct. App. Cal.,

2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8687. Angleton v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 714 N. E. 2d 156.

No. 99–8689. Clay v. Sanders, Judge, Circuit Court of
Mississippi, Wilkinson County. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 440.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, court information, and dates. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

JACKSON, J., dissenting

of thousands of applicants has the capacity to take full ad-
vantage of the opportunity to attend, and contribute to, this
prestigious institution, and thus merits admission.92  And
UNC has concluded that ferreting this out requires under-
standing the full person, which means taking seriously not
just SAT scores or whether the applicant plays the trumpet,
but also any way in which the applicant’s race-linked expe-
rience bears on his capacity and merit.  In this way, UNC
is able to value what it means for James, whose ancestors
received  no  race-based  advantages,  to  make  himself  com-
petitive  for  admission  to  a  flagship  school  nevertheless.
Moreover, recognizing this aspect of James’s story does not
preclude UNC from valuing John’s legacy or any obstacles
that his story reflects.

So,  to  repeat:  UNC’s  program  permits,  but  does  not  re-
quire, admissions officers to value both John’s and James’s
love for their State, their high schools’ rigor, and whether
either  has  overcome  obstacles  that  are  indicative  of  their
“persistence of commitment.”93  It permits, but does not re-
quire,  them  to  value  John’s  identity  as  a  child  of  UNC
alumni (or, perhaps, if things had turned out differently, as
a  first-generation  White  student  from  Appalachia  whose
family struggled to make ends meet during the Great Re-
cession).  And it permits, but does not require, them to value
James’s race—not in the abstract, but as an element of who
he  is,  no  less  than  his  love  for  his  State,  his  high  school
courses, and the obstacles he has overcome.

Understood properly, then, what SFFA caricatures as an
unfair  race-based  preference  cashes  out,  in  a  holistic  sys-
tem,  to  a  personalized  assessment  of  the  advantages  and
disadvantages that every applicant might have received by
accident of birth plus all that has happened to them since.
It ensures a full accounting of everything that bears on the

——————

92 See 3 App. 1409, 1414, 1416.
93 Id., at 1414–1415.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the admissions process at UNC and the consideration of race as a factor. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 183 (2010)

197

Per Curiam

lack  of  a  regular  rule  with  proper  standards  to  determine
the  guidelines  for  broadcasting  could  compromise  the  or
derly,  decorous,  rational  traditions  that  courts  rely  upon  to
ensure the integrity of their own judgments.  These consid
erations,  too,  are  part  of  the  reasons  leading  to  the  decision
to grant extraordinary relief.

In  addressing  a  discrete  instance  authorizing  a  closed-
circuit broadcast of a trial, Congress has illustrated the need
for  careful  guidelines  and  standards.  The  trial  of  the  two
defendants  in  the  Oklahoma  City  bombing  case  had  been
transferred  to  the  United  States District  Court  for  the  Dis
trict of Colorado, so it was set to take place in Denver.  That
meant the families of deceased and surviving victims in and
around  Oklahoma  City  would  not  have  the  opportunity  to
observe  the  trial.  Congress  passed  a  statute  that  allowed
victims’  families  to  watch  the  trial  on  closed-circuit  televi
sion.  42 U. S. C. § 10608.  The statute was drawn with care
to  provide  precise  and  detailed  guidance  with  respect  to
the  wide  range  of  issues  implicated  by  the  broadcast.  See
§ 10608(a) (the statute only applies “in cases where the venue
of  the  trial  is  changed”  to  a  city  that  is  “out  of  the  State”
and  “more  than  350  miles  from  the  location  in  which  those
proceedings originally would have taken place”); §§ 10608(a)–
(b)  (standards  for  who  can  view  such  trials);  § 10608(c)  (re
strictions on transmission).  And the statute gave the
Judicial Conference of the United States rulemaking author
ity  “to  effectuate  the  policy  addressed  by  this  section.”
§ 10608(g).  In  the  present  case,  by  contrast,  over  a  span  of
three  weeks  the  District  Court  and  Ninth  Circuit  Judicial
Council  issued,  retracted,  and  reissued  a  series  of  Web  site
postings  and  news  releases.  These  purport  to  amend  rules
and  policies  at  the  heart  of  an  ongoing  consideration  of
broadcasting federal trials.  And they have done so to make
sure  that  one  particular  trial  may  be  broadcast.  Congress’
requirement  of  a  notice-and-comment  procedure  prevents
just  such  arbitrary  changes  of  court  rules.  Instead,  courts
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically discussing the broadcasting of trials and the need for clear guidelines. It's part of a legal argument and not a standalone piece of text meant to be read independently.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–86.  Argued November 7, 2022—Decided April 14, 2023*

Michelle  Cochran  and  Axon  Enterprise,  Inc.—respondents  in  separate
enforcement actions initiated in the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—each filed suit
in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the agency
proceedings  against  them.
  When,  as  in  the  enforcement  actions
against Cochran and Axon, a Commission elects to institute adminis-
trative  proceedings  to  address  statutory  violations,  it  typically  dele-
gates the initial adjudication to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
with  authority  to  resolve  motions,  hold  a  hearing,  and  then  issue  a
decision.  As prescribed by statute, a party objecting to the Commission
proceedings makes its claims first within the Commission itself, and
then  (if  needed)  in  a  federal  court  of  appeals.  But  the  parties  here
sidestepped  that  review  scheme  and  brought  their  claims  in  district
court, seeking to enjoin the administrative proceedings.  Cochran and
Axon asserted that the tenure protections of the agencies’ ALJs render
them  insufficiently  accountable  to  the  President,  in  violation  of
separation-of-powers  principles.  Axon  also  attacked  as  unconstitu-
tional the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in
the FTC.  Each suit premised jurisdiction on district courts’ ordinary
federal-question  authority  to  resolve  “civil  actions  arising  under  the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 U. S. C. §1331.
Cochran’s and Axon’s suits initially met the same fate: dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction.  The district court in Cochran’s case held that the

——————

* Together with No. 21–1239, Securities and Exchange Commission et
al. v. Cochran, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.

  For the last 20 years, the country has engaged in conse-
quential policy, religious, and moral debates about the legal
status  of  millions  of  young  immigrants  who,  as  children,
were brought to the United States and have lived here ever
since.  Those young immigrants do not have legal status in
the United States under current statutory law.  They live,
go  to  school,  and  work  here  with  uncertainty  about  their
futures.  Despite many attempts over the last two decades,
Congress has not yet enacted legislation to afford legal sta-
tus to those immigrants.
  In 2012, exercising its view of the Executive’s prosecuto-
rial  discretion  under  Article  II  and  the  immigration  laws,
President Obama’s administration unilaterally instituted a
program known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals,
or  DACA.    Under  DACA,  eligible  young  immigrants  may
apply  for  and  receive  deferred  action.    They  must  renew
their  DACA  status  every  two  years.    Under  the  program,
the Executive Branch broadly forbears from enforcing cer-
tain  immigration  removal  laws  against  DACA  recipients.
And by virtue of the forbearance, DACA recipients also be-
come eligible for work authorization and other benefits.
  Since  2017,  President  Trump’s  administration  has
sought to rescind DACA based on its different and narrower
understanding  of  the  Executive’s  prosecutorial  discretion
under Article II and the immigration laws.  In its view, the
Executive Branch legally may not, and as a policy matter
should  not,  unilaterally  forbear  from  enforcing  the  immi-
gration laws against such a large class of individuals.  The
current administration has stated that it instead wants to
work with Congress to enact comprehensive legislation that
would address the legal status of those immigrants together
with other significant immigration issues.
  The question before the Court is whether the Executive
Branch acted lawfully in ordering rescission of the ongoing
DACA  program.    To  begin  with,  all  nine  Members  of  the
Court  accept,  as  do  the  DACA  plaintiffs  themselves,  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. It sets the context for the case and outlines the arguments of both sides.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2008

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 07–588.  Argued December 2, 2008—Decided April 1, 2009*

Petitioners’  powerplants  have  “cooling  water  intake  structures”  that
threaten the environment by squashing against intake  screens (“im-
pingement”)  or  suctioning  into  the  cooling  system  (“entrainment”)
aquatic  organisms  from  the  water  sources  tapped  to  cool  the  plants.
Thus,  the  facilities  are  subject  to  regulation  under  the  Clean  Water
Act,  which  mandates  that  “[a]ny  standard  established  pursuant  to
section 1311 . . . or section 1316 . . . and applicable to a point source
shall  require  that  the  location,  design,  construction,  and  capacity  of
cooling  water  intake  structures  reflect  the  best  technology  available
for minimizing adverse environmental impact.”  33 U. S. C. §1326(b).
Sections 1311 and 1316, in turn, employ a variety of “best technology”
standards  to  regulate  effluent  discharge  into  the  Nation’s  waters.
The  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  promulgated  the
§1326(b)  regulations  at  issue  after  nearly  three  decades  of  making
the “best technology available” determination on a case-by-case basis.
Its “Phase I” regulations govern new cooling water intake structures,
while the “Phase II” rules at issue apply to certain large existing fa-
cilities.  In the latter rules, the EPA set “national performance stan-
dards,”  requiring  most  Phase  II  facilities  to  reduce  “impingement
mortality for [aquatic organisms] by 80 to 95 percent from the calcu-
lation  baseline,”  and  requiring  a  subset  of  facilities  to  reduce  en-
trainment  of  such  organisms  by  “60  to  90  percent  from  [that]  base-
line.”  40  CFR  §125.94(b)(1),  (2).    However,  the  EPA  expressly
declined  to  mandate  closed-cycle  cooling  systems,  or  equivalent  re-

——————

* Together  with  No.  07–589,  PSEG  Fossil  LLC  et al.  v.  Riverkeeper,
Inc., et al., and No. 07–597, Utility Water Act Group v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,
et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

SANCHEZ v. MAYORKAS

Opinion of the Court

that “a grant of TPS does not constitute an ‘admission’ into
the  United  States.”  Sanchez  v.  Secretary  U. S.  Dept.  of
Homeland Security, 967 F. 3d 242, 252 (2020).  The court
observed  that  “admission”  and  “status”  are  separate  con-
cepts  in  immigration  law.  Id.,  at  246.  So,  the  court  con-
cluded,  providing  a  person  with  nonimmigrant  status  (as
the TPS provision does) does not mean admitting him (as
§1255 requires).  See ibid.

We granted certiorari, 592 U. S. ___ (2021), to resolve a
Circuit split over whether a TPS recipient who entered the
country unlawfully can still become an LPR.3  We now af-
firm the Third Circuit’s decision that he cannot.  The TPS
program gives foreign nationals nonimmigrant status, but
it does not admit them.  So the conferral of TPS does not
make  an  unlawful  entrant  (like  Sanchez)  eligible  under
§1255 for adjustment to LPR status.

II
Section  1255,  applied  according  to  its  plain  terms,  pre-
vents Sanchez from becoming an LPR.  There is no dispute
that Sanchez “entered the United States in the late 1990s
unlawfully,  without  inspection.”    Brief  for  Petitioners  13.
But as earlier described, §1255 requires an LPR applicant
like Sanchez to have entered the country “lawful[ly],” with
admitted.
to
“inspection”—that
§1101(a)(13)(A); see supra, at 1–2.  Indeed, §1255 imposes
an admission requirement twice over.  Its principal provi-
sion states that an applicant for LPR status must have been
“inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.”
——————

have

been

is,

3 Compare Sanchez v. Secretary U. S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 967
F. 3d 242, 245 (CA3 2020) (case below) (holding that such a person cannot
do so); Nolasco v. Crockett, 978 F. 3d 955, 959 (CA5 2020) (same); Serrano
v. United States Atty. Gen., 655 F. 3d 1260, 1265–1266 (CA11 2011) (per
curiam) (same), with Velasquez v. Barr, 979 F. 3d 572, 578 (CA8 2020)
(holding that he can); Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F. 3d 954, 958 (CA9 2017)
(same); Flores v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 718
F. 3d 548, 553–554 (CA6 2013).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Sanchez v. Mayorkas. It delves into the legal interpretation of immigration statutes and their application to Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–826
_________________

MIKE BROWN, ACTING WARDEN, PETITIONER
v. ERVINE DAVENPORT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[April 21, 2022]

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
After a state court determines that an error at trial did
not  prejudice  a  criminal  defendant,  may  a  federal  court
grant habeas relief based solely on its independent assess-
ment of the error’s prejudicial effect under Brecht v. Abra-
hamson, 507 U. S. 619 (1993)?  Or must a federal court also
evaluate the state court’s decision under the Antiterrorism
and  Effective  Death  Penalty  Act  of  1996  (AEDPA)?  The
Sixth Circuit ruled that an individual who satisfies Brecht
alone is entitled to habeas relief.  This was mistaken.  When
a state court has ruled on the merits of a state prisoner’s
claim, a federal court cannot grant relief without first ap-
plying both the test this Court outlined in Brecht and the
one Congress prescribed in AEDPA.

I
A
One evening in 2007, Annette White attended a gather-
ing with Ervine Davenport.  On the drive home, Mr. Dav-
enport killed Ms. White.  At trial, the only questions con-
cerned why and how.  Mr. Davenport claimed self-defense
and testified to that effect.  On his account, Ms. White grew
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1128

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

No. 09–7642.  Witherspoon v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7645.  Lopez-Frausto  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7648.  Sosa-Garcia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  987.

No.  09–7650.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  318.

No. 09–7652.  Smith v.  United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  1209.

No. 09–7656.  Carmichael v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  1270.

No.  09–7662.  Works  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  295.

No.  09–7663.  Trenkler  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7664.  Tillery  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7668.  Chappell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  728.

No. 09–7669.  Osley v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  349  Fed.  Appx.  418.

No.  09–7671.  Ponce-Aldona,  aka  Ponce-Aldana  v.  United
States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
579  F.  3d  1218.

No.  09–7675.  Smalls  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  505.

No.  09–7676.  Sternberg  v.  Michigan  State  University

et  al.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7679.  Armbrister  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  213.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TYLER v. HENNEPIN COUNTY

Opinion of the Court

Stat. §281.18; County of Blue Earth v. Turtle, 593 N. W. 2d
258, 261 (Minn. App. 1999).  That sale does not extinguish
the  taxpayer’s  debts.    Instead,  the  borrower  remains  per-
sonally liable.  See St. Paul v. St. Anthony Flats Ltd. Part-
nership, 517 N. W. 2d 58, 62 (Minn. App. 1994).  Had Tyler
received the surplus from the tax sale, she could have at the
very least used it to reduce any such liability.

At this initial stage of the case, Tyler need not definitively
prove her injury or disprove the County’s defenses.  She has
plausibly pleaded on the face of her complaint that she suf-
fered financial harm from the County’s action, and that is
enough for now.  See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561.

III
A
The Takings Clause, applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth  Amendment,  provides  that  “private  property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”  U. S.  Const.,  Amdt.  5.    States  have  long  imposed
taxes on property.  Such taxes are not themselves a taking,
but are a mandated “contribution from individuals . . . for
the  support  of  the  government  . . .  for  which  they  receive
compensation in the protection which government affords.”
County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 703 (1881).  In
collecting  these  taxes,  the  State  may  impose  interest  and
late  fees.    It  may  also  seize  and  sell  property,  including
land,  to  recover  the  amount  owed.    See  Jones  v.  Flowers,
547 U. S. 220, 234 (2006).  Here there was money remaining
after Tyler’s home was seized and sold by the County to sat-
isfy  her  past  due  taxes,  along  with  the  costs  of  collecting
them.  The  question  is  whether  that  remaining  value  is
property under the Takings Clause, protected from uncom-
pensated appropriation by the State.

The Takings Clause does not itself define property.  Phil-
lips  v.  Washington  Legal  Foundation,  524  U. S.  156,  164
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to property rights and tax sales.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

OHIO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.

Syllabus

dissenting  opinion,  in  which  GINSBURG,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a heading from a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion.  It is not the main body text and likely provides context rather than content meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Heading</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

Opinion of the Court

original position after a shot is fired.  Ibid.
  We turn next to how these components operate:

Figure 2.

When  the  shooter  engages  the  trigger  by  moving  it  back-
ward  (as  indicated  by  the  arrow),  the  square  point  of  the
trigger pivots downward and out of the notch securing the
hammer.  Ibid.  This movement releases the spring-loaded
hammer, allowing it to swing forward.  Ibid.

Figure 3.

At the top of the hammer’s rotation, it strikes the firing pin,
causing the weapon to fire a single shot.  See ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically describing the mechanics of a firearm. It includes citations and technical details, suggesting it's part of a legal analysis rather than the main body of the text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis/Technical Description</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 21A240 and 21A241
_________________

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, ET AL., APPLICANTS
v.
MISSOURI, ET AL.

21A240

XAVIER BECERRA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL., APPLICANTS
v.
LOUISIANA, ET AL.

21A241

ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS

 [January 13, 2022]

 JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS,  JUSTICE

GORSUCH, and JUSTICE BARRETT join, dissenting.

I join JUSTICE THOMAS’s dissent because I do not think
that  the  Federal  Government  is  likely  to  be  able  to  show
that  Congress  has  authorized  the  unprecedented  step  of
compelling  over  10,000,000  healthcare  workers  to  be  vac-
cinated  on  pain  of  being  fired.    The  support  for  the  argu-
ment that the Federal Government possesses such author-
ity  is  so  obscure  that  the  main  argument  now  pressed  by
the  Government—that  the  authority  is  conferred  by  a
hodgepodge  of  scattered  provisions—was  not  prominently
set out by the Government until its reply brief in this Court.
Before concluding that the Federal Government possesses
this authority, we should demand stronger statutory proof
than has been mustered to date.

But even if the Federal Government has the authority to
require  the  vaccination  of  healthcare  workers,  it  did  not
have the authority to impose that requirement in the way
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain substantial textual content relevant to legal analysis and research.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxxiv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804,1045

Page

869

886

1145

972

869

827

. . .  1046,1151

Illinois; Westbrook v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Whitﬁeld v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Wisconsin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Wordlow v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Illinois; Works v.
Illinois  Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n; Bilal v.
Illinois Dept. of Children and Family Services; Rucker v.
Illinois Dept. of Human Services; Strong v.
875

Illinois  Investment  Trust  No.  92–7163  v.  American  Grading  Co.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Haque v.  . . . . . . . . . .  955,1066

826

Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Improv West Associates v. Comedy Club, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

Independence Institute v. Buescher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
992

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Independence News, Inc. v. Charlotte
823

Indiana; Dunn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Indiana; KCH Acquisition, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Indiana; Kimco of Evansville, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Indiana; Pinkston v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Indiana Dept. of Environmental Mgmt.; Raybestos Products v.  . .
1087

Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC  . . . . . . . . . .
Industrial Comm’n of Ariz.; Cano v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  875,1065

Industrial Comm’n of Ohio; Howard v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  805,1010

922

Ingram v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Ingram v. Vazquez  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878

Ingrum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Inman v. United States
In re.  See name of party.

Intel Corp.; Sabet v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Internal Revenue Service; Buck v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Internal Revenue Service; Maxwell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
International.  For labor union, see name of trade.

1096

Iowa; Efﬂer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
866

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Iowa; Kinney v.
1030

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Iowa; LaForge v.
1055

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Iowa; Leonard v.
841

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Iowa; Stringer v.
969

Iowa City Development Bd.; Anderson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
803

Iran; Asemani v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Isa v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1046,1151

Isaac v. Laﬂer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

803

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Islamic Republic of Iran; Asemani v.
868

Island v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Isom v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  957,1135

1095

Israel v. Ridley-Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

955

1026

1130
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, not the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

showing that those burdens clearly outweigh the benefits of
a state or local practice.”  Department of Revenue of Ky. v.
Davis,  553  U. S.  328,  353  (2008);  see  also  United  Haulers
Assn.,  Inc.  v.  Oneida-Herkimer  Solid  Waste  Management
Authority,  550  U. S.  330,  346  (2007)  (plurality  opinion)
(Pike applies to “a nondiscriminatory statute like this one”).
Nor have our cases applied Pike only where a State regu-
lates the instrumentalities of transportation.  Pike itself ad-
dressed  an  Arizona  law  regulating  cantaloupe  packaging.
See 397 U. S., at 138.  And we have since applied Pike to
invalidate nondiscriminatory state laws that do not concern
transportation.  Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S. 624, 643–
646 (1982).  As a majority of the Court agrees, Pike extends
beyond laws either concerning discrimination or governing
interstate  transportation.    See  ante,  at  2  (opinion  of
SOTOMAYOR,  J.);  post,  at  1–2  (KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring
in part and dissenting in part).

Speaking  for  three  Members  of  the  Court,  JUSTICE
GORSUCH objects that balancing competing interests under
Pike is simply an impossible judicial task.  See ante, at 18–
21.  I certainly appreciate the concern, see United Haulers,
550 U. S., at 343, 347, but sometimes there is no avoiding
the need to weigh seemingly incommensurable values.  See,
e.g., Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147,
162 (1939) (weighing “the purpose to keep the streets clean
and of good appearance” against the “the constitutional pro-
tection of the freedom of speech and press”); Winston v. Lee,
470 U. S. 753, 760 (1985) (“The reasonableness” under the
Fourth Amendment “of surgical intrusions beneath the skin
depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individ-
ual’s interests in privacy and security are weighed against
society’s interests in conducting  the procedure.”); Adding-
ton v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979) (“In considering what
standard should govern in a civil commitment proceeding,
we must assess both the extent of the individual’s interest
in  not  being  involuntarily  confined  indefinitely  and  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically citing case law and legal arguments. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

7

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

limits  “as  a  coherent  system  rather  than  merely  a  collec-
tion of individual limits stacking prophylaxis upon prophy-
laxis.”  Ibid.

McCutcheon  and  the  RNC  appealed  directly  to  this
Court, as authorized by law.  28 U. S. C. §1253.  In such a
case, “we ha[ve] no discretion to refuse adjudication of the
case  on  its  merits,”  Hicks  v.  Miranda,  422  U. S.  332,  344
(1975),  and  accordingly  we  noted  probable  jurisdiction.
568 U. S. ___ (2013).

II

A

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, presented this Court with
its first opportunity to evaluate the constitutionality of the
original  contribution  and  expenditure  limits  set  forth  in
FECA.  FECA imposed a $1,000 per election base limit on
contributions from an individual to a federal candidate.  It
also  imposed  a  $25,000  per  year  aggregate  limit  on  all
contributions from an individual to candidates or political
committees.  18  U. S. C.  §§608(b)(1),  608(b)(3)  (1970  ed.,
Supp.  IV).    On  the  expenditures  side,  FECA  imposed
limits  on  both  independent  expenditures  and  candidates’
overall campaign expenditures.  §§608(e)(1), 608(c).

Buckley  recognized  that  “contribution  and  expenditure
limitations  operate  in  an  area  of  the  most  fundamental
First  Amendment  activities.”  424  U. S.,  at  14.    But  it
distinguished  expenditure  limits  from  contribution  limits
based  on  the  degree  to  which  each  encroaches  upon  pro-
tected  First  Amendment  interests.    Expenditure  limits,
the Court explained, “necessarily reduce[ ] the quantity of
expression  by  restricting  the  number  of  issues  discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached.”  Id.,  at  19.  The  Court  thus  subjected  expendi-
ture  limits  to  “the  exacting  scrutiny  applicable  to  lim-
itations  on  core  First  Amendment  rights  of  political
expression.”  Id.,  at  44–45.    Under  exacting  scrutiny,  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and legal codes, indicating it's part of a legal document and not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

Opinion of the Court

state  enabling  acts  not  to  displace  state  jurisdiction.  See
id., at 243–247; Organized Village of Kake, 369 U. S., at 67–
71.  In Organized Village of Kake, the Court specifically ad-
dressed  several  state  enabling  acts,  including  the  Okla-
homa Enabling Act, and stated that statutory language re-
serving  jurisdiction  and  control  to  the  United  States  was
meant to preserve federal jurisdiction to the extent that it
existed  before  statehood,  not  to  make  federal  jurisdiction
exclusive.  Id., at 67–70.  Consistent with that precedent,
today’s  decision  recognizes  that  the  Federal  Government
and the State have concurrent jurisdiction over crimes com-
mitted by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.9
The dissent incorrectly seeks to characterize various as-
pects of the Court’s decision as dicta.  To be clear, the Court
today holds that Indian country within a State’s territory is
part  of  a  State,  not  separate  from  a  State.  Therefore,  a
State has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in In-
dian country unless state jurisdiction is preempted.  With
respect  to  crimes  committed  by  non-Indians  against  Indi-
ans in Indian country, the Court today further holds that
the  General  Crimes  Act  does  not  preempt  the  State’s  au-
thority to prosecute; that Public Law 280 does not preempt

——————

9 The dissent characterizes the Court’s opinion in several ways that are
not  accurate.    Post,  at  38−41.   For  example,  the  dissent  suggests  that
States may not exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians
against  non-Indians  in  Indian  country—the  reverse  of  the  scenario  in
this case.  To reiterate, we do not take a position on that question.  See
supra, at 19, n. 6.

The dissent also hints that the jurisdictional holding of the Court in
this case may apply only in Oklahoma.  That is incorrect.  The Court’s
holding is an interpretation of federal law, which applies throughout the
United  States:    Unless  preempted,  States  may  exercise  jurisdiction  to
prosecute  crimes  committed  by  non-Indians  against  Indians  in  Indian
country.

Finally, the statutory definition of Indian country includes “all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished.”  See
18 U. S. C. §1151.  Therefore, States may prosecute crimes committed by
non-Indians against Indians in those allotments.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion in the case of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1061

529 U. S.

April 3, 2000

No. 99–8454. Coleman v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 251 Conn. 249, 741 A. 2d 1.

No. 99–8455. Russo v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 283.

No. 99–8464. Meling v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8475. Obodoagha v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 516.

No. 99–8476. Skyers v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8480. Payne v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8483. Seeley v. McCaughtry, Warden. C. A. 7th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8487. Cowan v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 646.

No. 99–8490. Bayless v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 116.

No. 99–8491. Bozon Pappa v. United States. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 522.

No. 99–8492. Maldonado-Olivas v. United States. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1114.

No. 99–8494. King v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1306.

No. 99–8495. Nam Nhat Ngo v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 833.

No. 99–8501. Liquori v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 516.

No. 99–8509. Mendoza-Iribe v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 742.

No. 99–8513. Turner v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 425.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Case Summaries)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–351
_________________

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. ALAN PHILIPP, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[February 3, 2021]

 CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the

Court.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides that for-
eign nations are presumptively immune from the jurisdic-
tion  of  United  States  courts.    The  statute,  however,  sets
forth several specific exceptions.  One such exception pro-
vides that a sovereign does not enjoy immunity in any case
“in which rights in property taken in violation of interna-
tional law are in issue.”  28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(3).  The ques-
tion presented is whether a country’s alleged taking of prop-
erty from its own nationals falls within this exception.

I
This case concerns several dozen medieval relics and de-
votional objects known as the Welfenschatz.  The treasure
(“schatz”) of the German Welf dynasty, the pieces date back
to the early days of the Holy Roman Empire and occupy a
unique position in German history and culture.  The collec-
tion  was  assembled  within  Germany’s  Brunswick  Cathe-
dral  over  the  course  of  several  centuries,  before  being
moved to a Hanoverian chapel in 1671 and later to Switzer-
land for safekeeping in the wake of World War I.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case information, and the introduction to the Court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

Opinion of the Court

But “[r]edressability requires that the court be able to af-
ford relief through the exercise of its power, not through the
persuasive  or  even  awe-inspiring  effect  of  the  opinion  ex-
plaining the exercise of its power.”  Franklin v. Massachu-
setts,  505  U. S.  788,  825  (1992)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in
part  and  concurring  in  judgment)  (emphasis  in  original);
see also United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U. S. 932, 937
(2011) (per curiam) (a judgment’s “possible, indirect benefit
in  a  future  lawsuit”  does  not  preserve  standing).  Other-
wise, redressability would be satisfied whenever a decision
might persuade actors who are not before the court—con-
trary to Article III’s strict prohibition on “issuing advisory
opinions.”  Carney v. Adams, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip
op., at 4).  It is a federal court’s judgment, not its opinion,
that  remedies  an  injury;  thus  it  is  the  judgment,  not  the
opinion, that demonstrates redressability.  The individual
petitioners can hope for nothing more than an opinion, so
they cannot satisfy Article III.10

B
Texas  also  lacks  standing  to  challenge  the  placement
preferences.  It  has  no  equal  protection  rights  of  its  own,
South  Carolina  v.  Katzenbach,  383  U. S.  301,  323  (1966),
and it cannot assert equal protection claims on behalf of its
citizens because “[a] State does not have standing as parens
patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government,”
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458
U. S. 592, 610, n. 16 (1982).11  That should make the issue

——————

10 Of course, the individual petitioners can challenge ICWA’s constitu-
tionality  in  state  court,  as  the  Brackeens  have  done  in  their  adoption
proceedings for Y. R. J.  994 F. 3d 249, 294 (2021) (principal opinion of
Dennis, J.).

11 Texas claims that it can assert third-party standing on behalf of non-
Indian families.  This argument is a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent
the limits on parens patriae standing.  The case on which Texas relies,
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U. S. 42 (1992), allowed a State to represent
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Haaland v. Brackeen. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.
v. GOLDSMITH
Syllabus

has a further purpose or different character.  Second, the first factor
relates to the justification for the use.  In a broad sense, a use that has
a distinct purpose is justified because it furthers the goal of copyright,
namely,  to  promote  the  progress  of  science  and  the  arts,  without  di-
minishing the incentive to create.  In a narrower sense, a use may be
justified because copying is reasonably necessary to achieve the user’s
new  purpose.    Parody,  for  example,  “needs  to  mimic  an  original  to
make its point.”  Id., at 580–581.  Similarly, other commentary or crit-
icism  that  targets  an  original  work  may  have  compelling  reason  to
“conjure up” the original by borrowing from it.  Id., at 588.  An inde-
pendent justification like this is particularly relevant to assessing fair
use where an original work and copying use share the same or highly
similar  purposes,  or  where  wide  dissemination  of  a  secondary  work
would otherwise run the risk of substitution for the original or licensed
derivatives of it.  See, e.g., Google, 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26).

In  sum,  if  an  original  work  and  secondary  use  share  the  same  or
highly similar purposes, and the secondary use is commercial, the first
fair  use  factor  is  likely  to  weigh against  fair  use,  absent  some  other
justification for copying.  Pp. 13–20.

(2) The  fair  use  provision,  and  the  first  factor  in  particular,  re-
quires an analysis of the specific “use” of a copyrighted work that is
alleged to be “an infringement.”  §107.  The same copying may be fair
when used for one purpose but not another.  See Campbell, 510 U. S.,
at 585.  Here, Goldsmith’s copyrighted photograph has been used in
multiple ways.  The Court limits its analysis to the specific use alleged
to be infringing in this case—AWF’s commercial licensing of Orange
Prince  to  Condé  Nast—and  expresses  no  opinion  as  to  the  creation,
display, or sale of the original Prince Series works.  In the context of
Condé  Nast’s  special  edition  magazine  commemorating  Prince,  the
purpose of the Orange Prince image is substantially the same as that
of Goldsmith’s original photograph.  Both are portraits of Prince used
in  magazines  to  illustrate  stories  about  Prince.    The  use  also  is  of  a
commercial  nature.    Taken  together,  these  two  elements  counsel
against fair use here.  Although a use’s transformativeness may out-
weigh  its  commercial  character,  in  this  case  both  point  in  the  same
direction.  That does not mean that all of Warhol’s derivative works,
nor all uses of them, give rise to the same fair use analysis.  Pp. 20–
27.

(b) AWF contends that the purpose and character of its use of Gold-
smith’s photograph weighs in favor of fair use because Warhol’s silk-
screen image of the photograph has a different meaning or message.
By adding new expression to the photograph, AWF says, Warhol made
transformative use of it.  Campbell did describe a transformative use
as one that “alter[s] the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal excerpt, specifically a portion of a court syllabus discussing the concept of fair use in copyright law. It analyzes the case of Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith and delves into the factors considered when determining fair use.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

OHIO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.

Syllabus

with merchants.  To avoid higher fees, merchants sometimes attempt
to dissuade cardholders from using Amex cards at the point of sale—
a practice known as “steering.”  Amex places antisteering provisions
in its contracts with merchants to combat this.

In  this  case,  the  United  States  and  several  States  (collectively,
plaintiffs)  sued  Amex,  claiming  that  its  antisteering  provisions  vio-
late  §1  of  the  Sherman  Antitrust  Act.    The  District  Court  agreed,
finding that the credit-card market should be treated as two separate
markets—one  for  merchants  and  one  for  cardholders—and  that
Amex’s  antisteering  provisions  are  anticompetitive  because  they  re-
sult in higher merchant fees.  The Second Circuit reversed.  It deter-
mined  that  the  credit-card  market  is  one  market,  not  two.    And  it
concluded that Amex’s antisteering provisions did not violate §1.

Held:  Amex’s  antisteering  provisions  do  not  violate  federal  antitrust

law.  Pp. 8–20.

(a) Section  1  of  the  Sherman  Act  prohibits  “unreasonable  re-
straints” of trade.  State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 10.  Restraints
may be unreasonable in one of two ways—unreasonable per se or un-
reasonable as judged under the “rule of reason.”  Business Electronics
Corp.  v.  Sharp  Electronics  Corp.,  485  U. S.  717,  723.    The  parties
agree that Amex’s antisteering provisions should be judged under the
rule  of  reason  using  a  three-step  burden-shifting  framework.    They
ask this Court to decide whether the plaintiffs have satisfied the first
step in that framework—i.e., whether they have proved that Amex’s
antisteering provisions have a substantial anticompetitive effect that
harms consumers in the relevant market.  Pp. 8–10.

(b) Applying the rule of reason generally requires an accurate defi-
nition  of  the  relevant  market.    In  this  case,  both  sides  of  the  two-
sided credit-card market—cardholders and merchants—must be con-
sidered.  Only a company with both cardholders and merchants will-
ing to use its network could sell transactions and compete in the cred-
it-card  market.    And  because  credit-card  networks  cannot  make  a
sale  unless  both  sides  of  the  platform  simultaneously  agree  to  use
their services, they exhibit more pronounced indirect network effects
and  interconnected  pricing  and  demand.    Indeed,  credit-card  net-
works are best understood as supplying only one product—the trans-
action—that  is  jointly  consumed  by  a  cardholder  and  a  merchant.
Accordingly, the two-sided market for credit-card transactions should
be analyzed as a whole.  Pp. 10–15.

(c) The plaintiffs have not carried their burden to show anticompet-
itive  effects.  Their  argument—that  Amex’s  antisteering  provisions
increase merchant fees—wrongly focuses on just one side of the mar-
ket.  Evidence of a price increase on one side of a two-sided transac-
tion platform cannot, by itself, demonstrate an anticompetitive exer-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the case summary and the court's reasoning in the case of Ohio v. American Express Co. It provides a structured overview of the legal arguments and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BIDEN ET AL. v. TEXAS ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–954.  Argued April 26, 2022—Decided June 30, 2022

In January 2019, the Department of Homeland Security began to imple-
ment  the  Migrant  Protection  Protocols  (MPP).  Under  MPP,  certain
non-Mexican nationals arriving by land from Mexico were returned to
Mexico to await the results of their removal proceedings under section
1229a of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  MPP was imple-
mented pursuant to a provision of the INA that applies to aliens “ar-
riving  on  land  .  .  .  from  a  foreign  territory  contiguous  to  the  United
States”  and  provides  that  the  Secretary  of  Homeland  Security  “may
return the alien to that territory pending a proceeding under section
1229a.”  8 U. S. C. §1225(b)(2)(C).  Following a change in Presidential
administrations,  the  Biden  administration  announced  that  it  would
suspend the program, and on June 1, 2021, the Secretary of Homeland
Security issued a memorandum officially terminating it.

The States of Texas and Missouri (respondents) brought suit in the
Northern District of Texas against the Secretary and others, asserting
that the June 1 Memorandum violated the INA and the Administra-
tive  Procedure  Act  (APA).    The  District  Court  entered  judgment  for
respondents.  The court first concluded that terminating MPP would
violate the INA, reasoning that section 1225 of the INA “provides the
government two options” with respect to illegal entrants: mandatory
detention pursuant to section 1225(b)(2)(A) or contiguous-territory re-
turn pursuant to section 1225(b)(2)(C).  554 F. Supp. 3d 818, 852.  Be-
cause  the  Government  was  unable  to  meet  its  mandatory  detention
obligations under section 1225(b)(2)(A) due to resource constraints, the
court  reasoned,  terminating  MPP  would  necessarily  lead  to  the  sys-
temic violation of section 1225 as illegal  entrants were released into
the United States.  Second, the District Court concluded that the June
1 Memorandum was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Opinion of the Court

we examine whether the right at issue in this case is rooted
in our Nation’s history and tradition and whether it is an
essential component of what we have described as “ordered
liberty.”  Finally, we consider whether a right to obtain an
abortion is part of a broader entrenched right that is sup-
ported by other precedents.

A
1

Constitutional analysis must begin with “the language of
the  instrument,”  Gibbons  v.  Ogden,  9  Wheat.  1,  186–189
(1824),  which  offers  a  “fixed  standard”  for  ascertaining
what our founding document means, 1 J. Story, Commen-
taries on the Constitution of the United States §399, p. 383
(1833).  The Constitution makes no express reference to a
right to obtain an abortion, and therefore those who claim
that  it  protects  such  a  right  must  show  that  the  right  is
somehow implicit in the constitutional text.

Roe,  however,  was  remarkably  loose  in its  treatment  of
the  constitutional  text.    It  held  that  the  abortion  right,
which is not mentioned in the Constitution, is part of a right
to privacy, which is also not mentioned.  See 410 U. S., at
152–153.  And that privacy right, Roe observed, had been
found to spring from no fewer than five different constitu-
tional  provisions—the  First,  Fourth,  Fifth,  Ninth,  and
Fourteenth Amendments.  Id., at 152.

The  Court’s  discussion  left  open  at  least  three  ways  in
which  some  combination  of  these  provisions  could  protect
the abortion right.  One possibility was that the right was
“founded  . . .  in  the  Ninth  Amendment’s  reservation  of
rights  to  the  people.”    Id.,  at  153.    Another  was  that  the
right was rooted in the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendment,
or  in  some  combination  of  those  provisions,  and  that  this
right had been “incorporated” into the Due Process Clause
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  just  as  many  other  Bill  of
Rights provisions had by then been incorporated.  Ibid; see
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the constitutional basis for abortion rights and references previous rulings like Roe v. Wade.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 624 (1998)

657

Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.

tion whether respondent Abbott’s disease posed “a signiﬁ-
cant risk to the health or safety of [petitioner Bragdon] that
[could not] be eliminated by a modiﬁcation of policies, prac-
tices, or procedures . . . .”

42 U. S. C. § 12182(b)(3).

Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas join, and with whom Justice O(cid:146)Con-
nor joins as to Part II, concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part.

I

Is respondent Abbott (hereinafter respondent)—who has
tested positive for the human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV)
but was asymptomatic at the time she suffered discrimina-
tory treatment—a person with a “disability” as that term
is deﬁned in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA)? The term “disability” is deﬁned in the ADA to
include:

“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual;

“(B) a record of such an impairment; or
“(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”

42 U. S. C. § 12102(2).

It is important to note that whether respondent has a dis-
ability covered by the ADA is an individualized inquiry.
The Act could not be clearer on this point: Section 12102(2)
states explicitly that the disability determination must be
made “with respect to an individual.” Were this not sufﬁ-
ciently clear, the Act goes on to provide that the “major life
activities” allegedly limited by an impairment must be those
§ 12102(2)(A).
“of such individual.”

The individualized nature of the inquiry is particularly im-
portant in this case because the District Court disposed of it
on summary judgment. Thus all disputed issues of material
fact must be resolved against respondent. She contends
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 624 (1998). It includes citations, legal terminology, and a discussion of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

581; see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U. S. 320,
341 (2000) (Bossier II); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U. S. 461,
479  (2003).  Section  5  now  forbids  voting  changes  with
“any  discriminatory  purpose”  as  well  as  voting  changes
that  diminish  the  ability  of  citizens,  on  account  of  race,
color, or language minority status, “to elect their preferred
candidates of choice.”  42 U. S. C. §§1973c(b)–(d).

Shortly after this reauthorization, a Texas utility district
brought  suit,  seeking  to  bail  out  from  the  Act’s  cover-
age and, in the alternative, challenging the Act’s constitu-
tionality.  See Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 200–201.  A
three-judge  District  Court  explained  that  only  a  State  or
political subdivision was eligible to seek bailout under the
statute,  and  concluded  that  the  utility  district  was  not  a
political subdivision, a term that encompassed only “coun-
ties, parishes, and voter-registering subunits.”  Northwest
Austin  Municipal  Util.  Dist.  No.  One  v.  Mukasey,  573
F. Supp.  2d  221,  232  (DC  2008).  The  District  Court  also
rejected the constitutional challenge.  Id., at 283.

We  reversed.  We  explained  that  “ ‘normally  the  Court
will  not  decide  a  constitutional  question  if  there  is  some
other  ground  upon  which  to  dispose  of  the  case.’ ”    North-
west  Austin,  supra,  at  205  (quoting  Escambia  County  v.
McMillan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam)).  Conclud-
ing that “underlying constitutional concerns,” among other
things, “compel[led] a broader reading of the bailout provi-
sion,” we construed the statute to allow the utility district
to  seek  bailout.  Northwest  Austin,  557  U. S.,  at  207.  In
doing so we expressed serious doubts about the Act’s con-
tinued constitutionality.

We  explained  that  §5  “imposes  substantial  federalism
costs” and “differentiates between the States, despite our his-
toric tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty.”
Id.,  at  202,  203  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
We  also  noted  that  “[t]hings  have  changed  in  the  South.
Voter turnout and registration rates now approach parity.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the Voting Rights Act and its constitutionality. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, indicating it's part of a larger legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

744

PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL v. BABBITT

Opinion of the Court

agement, Rangeland Reform ’94: Final Environmental
Impact Statement 144 (1994).

Of course, the new deﬁnitions seem to tie grazing privi-
leges to land use plans more explicitly than did the old. But,
as we have pointed out, the Secretary has since 1976 had the
authority to use land use plans to determine the amount of
permissible grazing, 43 U. S. C. § 1712. The Secretary also
points out that since development of land use plans began
nearly 20 years ago, “all BLM lands in the lower 48 States
are covered by land use plans,” and “all grazing permits in
those States have now been issued or renewed in accordance
with such plans, or must now conform to them.” Brief for
Respondents 26. Yet the ranchers have not provided us
with a single example in which interaction of plan and permit
has jeopardized or might yet jeopardize permit security. An
amicus brief ﬁled by a group of Farm Credit Institutions
says that the deﬁnitional change will “threate[n]” their
“lending policies.” Brief for Farm Credit Institutions as
Amicus Curiae 3. But they do not explain why that is so,
nor do they state that the new deﬁnitions will, in fact, lead
them to stop lending to ranchers.

We recognize that a particular land use plan could change
pre-existing grazing allocation in a particular district. And
that change might arguably lead to a denial of grazing privi-
leges that the pre-1995 regulations would have provided.
But the affected permit holder remains free to challenge
such an individual effect on grazing privileges, and the
courts remain free to determine its lawfulness in context.
We here consider only whether the changes in the deﬁnitions
by themselves violate the Taylor Act’s requirement that
recognized grazing privileges be “adequately safeguarded.”
Given the leeway that the statute confers upon the Secre-
tary, the less-than-absolute pre-1995 security that permit
holders enjoyed, and the relatively small differences that the
new deﬁnitions create, we conclude that the new deﬁnitions
do not violate that law.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Taylor Act and grazing privileges on public lands. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

5

Syllabus

vide  the  basis  for  a  justiciable  claim.    See,  e.g.,  Pacific  States  Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118.  Pp. 29–30.

(d) The  conclusion  that  partisan  gerrymandering  claims  are  not
justiciable  neither  condones  excessive  partisan  gerrymandering  nor
condemns complaints about districting to echo into a void.  Numerous
States are actively addressing the issue through state constitutional
amendments and legislation placing power to draw electoral districts
in the hands of independent commissions, mandating particular dis-
tricting criteria for their mapmakers, or prohibiting drawing district
lines  for  partisan  advantage.    The  Framers  also  gave  Congress  the
power  to  do  something  about  partisan  gerrymandering  in  the  Elec-
tions  Clause.    That  avenue  for  reform  established  by  the  Framers,
and used by Congress in the past, remains open.  Pp. 30–34.

318 F. Supp. 3d 777 and 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, vacated and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
ALITO, GORSUCH,  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.  KAGAN, J.,  filed  a  dis-
senting  opinion,  in  which  GINSBURG,  BREYER,  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It includes case names, volume and page numbers, and a summary of the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

President’s  statements  did  not  show  “that  the  challenged
restrictions violate the ‘minimum requirement of neutral-
ity’  to  religion,”  ante,  at  2  (quoting  Lukumi,  508  U. S.,  at
533), it is hard to see how Governor Cuomo’s do.

*

*

*

Free religious exercise is one of our most treasured and
jealously guarded constitutional rights.  States may not dis-
criminate  against  religious  institutions,  even  when  faced
with a crisis as deadly as this one.  But those principles are
not at stake today.  The Constitution does not forbid States
from responding to public health crises through regulations
that treat  religious institutions equally or more favorably
than  comparable  secular  institutions,  particularly  when
those regulations save lives.  Because New York’s COVID–
19 restrictions do just that, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor.  It discusses the balance between religious freedom and public health regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

9

ALITO, J., dissenting

Parker  doctrine  and  is  misdirected  by  subsequent  cases
that  extended  that  doctrine  (in  certain  circumstances)  to
private  entities.    The  Court  requires  the  North  Carolina
Board  to  satisfy  the  two-part  test  set  out  in  California
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U. S. 97 (1980), but the party claiming Parker immunity in
that case was not a state agency but a private trade asso-
ciation.  Such  an  entity  is  entitled  to  Parker  immunity,
Midcal  held,  only  if  the  anticompetitive  conduct  at  issue
was  both  “ ‘clearly  articulated’ ”  and  “ ‘actively  supervised
by  the  State  itself.’ ”  445  U. S.,  at  105.    Those  require-
ments are needed where a State authorizes private parties
to engage in anticompetitive conduct.  They serve to iden-
tify  those  situations  in  which  conduct  by  private  parties
can be regarded as the conduct of a State.  But when the
conduct  in  question  is  the  conduct  of  a  state  agency,  no
such inquiry is required.

This  case  falls  into  the  latter  category,  and  therefore
Midcal  is  inapposite.    The  North  Carolina  Board  is  not  a
private trade association.  It is a state agency, created and
empowered  by  the  State  to  regulate  an  industry  affecting
public  health.
It  would  not  exist  if  the  State  had  not
created it.  And for purposes of Parker, its membership is
irrelevant;  what  matters  is  that  it  is  part  of  the  govern-
ment of the sovereign State of North Carolina.

Our decision in Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U. S. 34 (1985),
which  involved  Sherman  Act  claims  against  a  municipal-
ity,  not  a  State  agency,  is  similarly  inapplicable.   In  Hal-
lie,  the  plaintiff  argued  that  the  two-pronged  Midcal  test
should  be  applied,  but  the  Court  disagreed.    The  Court
acknowledged  that  municipalities  “are  not  themselves
sovereign.” 471 U. S., at 38.  But recognizing that a munic-
ipality is “an arm of the State,”  id., at 45, the Court held
that a municipality should be required to satisfy only the
first  prong  of  the  Midcal  test  (requiring  a  clearly  articu-
lated  state  policy),  471  U. S.,  at  46.    That  municipalities
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to the Parker doctrine and antitrust law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

 882 F. 3d 300, reversed in part and remanded.

Syllabus

  KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  THOMAS,  ALITO,  and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,  joined.    SOTOMAYOR,  J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and introductory material, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It's not the main body of the text and would not be suitable for indexing as it's not the actual content meant for reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation and Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

difficulty applying the remedy in practice.  Some 78 years
after  the  APA  and  57  years  after  Abbott  Laboratories,  I
would  not  suddenly  throw  out  that  sound  and  settled
interpretation  of  the  APA  and  eliminate  entire  classes  of
historically  common  and  vitally
litigation
against federal agencies.

important

*

*

*
The Government’s crusade against vacatur would create
“strange and even absurd consequences.”  Sohoni, The Past
and Future of Universal Vacatur, 133 Yale L. J., at 2340.
In this opinion, I have described one such consequence:  It
would leave unregulated plaintiffs like Corner Post without
a  remedy  in  APA  challenges  to  agency  rules.  The
Government’s  position  therefore  would  fundamentally
reshape  administrative
leaving  administrative
law,
agencies with extraordinary new power to issue rules free
from potential suits by unregulated but adversely affected
parties—businesses, environmental plaintiffs, workers, the
list goes on.

I  agree  with  the  longstanding  consensus—a  consensus
based on text, history, precedent, and common sense—that
vacatur  is  an  appropriate  remedy  when  a  federal  court
holds  that  an  agency  rule  is  unlawful.    Because  vacatur
remains an available remedy under the APA, Corner Post
can obtain meaningful relief if it prevails in this lawsuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the legal concept of vacatur and its application in cases challenging agency rules.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>