<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1060

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 3, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8320. Mustafa v. Robaczewski et al. C. A. 3d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 817.

No. 99–8329. Brown v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 250 Conn. 611, 737 A. 2d 404.

No. 99–8358. Gallo v. United States Attorney’s Office,
Eastern District of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 899.

No. 99–8366. Hill v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8393. Roane v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8397.
tiorari denied.

Jones v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

No. 99–8414. Diaz v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 985 P. 2d 83.

No. 99–8423. Mangiardi v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 255.

No. 99–8424.

Joiner v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8426. Spells v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 515.

No. 99–8439. Rau v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1327.

No. 99–8442. Snead v. Corcoran, Warden, et al. C. A.

4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 503.

No. 99–8452. Ortega-Gomez v. United States. C. A. 10th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 449.

No. 99–8453. Badger v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 658.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks the sequential narrative structure of typical book content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

President’s  exercise  of  his core  constitutional  powers,  this  immunity
must be absolute.  As for his remaining official actions, he is entitled
to at least presumptive immunity.  Pp. 5–15.

(1) Article  II  of  the  Constitution  vests  “executive  Power”  in  “a
President of the United States of America.”  §1, cl. 1.  The President
has duties of “unrivaled gravity and breadth.”  Trump v. Vance, 591
U. S. 786, 800.  His authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”  Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585.  In the latter case, the Presi-
dent’s authority is sometimes “conclusive and preclusive.”  Id., at 638
(Jackson, J., concurring).  When the President exercises such author-
ity,  Congress  cannot  act  on,  and  courts  cannot  examine,  the  Presi-
dent’s actions.  It follows that an Act of Congress—either a specific one
targeted at the President or a generally applicable one—may not crim-
inalize  the  President’s  actions  within  his  exclusive  constitutional
power.  Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution that
examines  such  Presidential  actions.   The  Court  thus  concludes  that
the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for con-
duct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority.  Pp. 6–9.

(2) Not all of the President’s official acts fall within his “conclusive
and preclusive” authority.  The reasons that justify the President’s ab-
solute immunity from criminal prosecution for acts within the scope of
his exclusive constitutional authority do not extend to conduct in areas
where his authority is shared with Congress.  To determine the Presi-
dent’s immunity in this context, the Court looks primarily to the Fram-
ers’ design of the Presidency within the separation of powers, prece-
dent on Presidential immunity in the civil context, and criminal cases
where a President resisted prosecutorial demands for documents.  P.
9.

(i) The Framers designed the Presidency to provide for a “vigor-
ous” and “energetic” Executive.  The Federalist No. 70, pp. 471–472 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).  They vested the President with “su-
pervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitiv-
ity.”  Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 750.  Appreciating the “unique
risks”  that  arise  when  the  President’s  energies  are  diverted  by  pro-
ceedings that might render him “unduly cautious in the discharge of
his official duties,” the Court has recognized Presidential immunities
and privileges “rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation
of powers and supported by our history.”  Id., at 749, 751, 752, n. 32.
In Fitzgerald, for instance, the Court concluded that a former Presi-
dent is entitled to absolute immunity from “damages liability for acts
within the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official responsibility.”  Id., at 756.
The Court’s “dominant concern” was to avoid “diversion of the Presi-
dent’s attention during the decisionmaking process caused by needless
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal arguments and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered the main body of the text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

Opinion of the Court

1426 (5th ed. 1979) (“especially in the plural, [water] may
designate  a  body  of  water,  such  as  a  river,  a  lake,  or  an
ocean,  or  an  aggregate  of  such  bodies  of  water,  as  in  the
phrases ‘foreign waters,’ ‘waters of the United States,’ and
the  like”  (emphasis  added));  Random  House  Dictionary  of
the English Language 2146 (2d ed. 1987) (Random House
Dictionary) (defining “waters” as “a. flowing water, or water
moving in waves: The river’s mighty waters. b. the sea or
seas bordering a particular country or continent or located
in a particular part of the world” (emphasis deleted)).  This
meaning is hard to reconcile with classifying “ ‘ “lands,” wet
or otherwise, as “waters.” ’ ”  Rapanos, 547 U. S., at 740 (plu-
rality  opinion)  (quoting  Riverside  Bayview,  474  U. S.,  at
132).

This reading also helps to align the meaning of “the wa-
ters of the United States” with the term it is defining: “nav-
igable waters.”  See Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844,
861 (2014) (“In settling on a fair reading of a statute, it is
not unusual to consider the ordinary meaning of a defined
term,  particularly  when  there  is  dissonance  between  that
ordinary  meaning  and  the  reach  of  the  definition”).    Alt-
hough  we  have  acknowledged  that  the  CWA  extends  to
more than traditional navigable waters, we have refused to
read “navigable” out of the statute, holding that it at least
shows that Congress was focused on “its traditional juris-
diction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact
or  which  could  reasonably  be  so  made.”    SWANCC,  531
U. S.,  at  172;  see  also  Appalachian  Electric,  311  U. S.,  at
406–407; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall., at 563.  At a minimum,
then, the use of “navigable” signals that the definition prin-
cipally refers to bodies of navigable water like rivers, lakes,
and oceans.  See Rapanos, 547 U. S., at 734 (plurality opin-
ion).

More  broadly,  this  reading  accords  with  how  Congress
has employed the term “waters” elsewhere in the CWA and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing previous cases and legal definitions. It delves into the interpretation of the term "waters" within the context of the Clean Water Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Opinion of the Court

The  county  prosecutors,  though,  decided  that  they  had
higher priorities.  They failed to present the case to a grand
jury in the required time.  The court therefore dismissed the
charges.

But Chiaverini decided not to let matters lie.  After all,
he had been arrested and held for three days, he thought
unjustifiably.  So he sued the officers under §1983, alleging
what is known as a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious
prosecution.  To  prevail  on  that  claim,  he  had  to  show
(among  other  things)  that  the  officers  brought  criminal
charges against him without probable cause.  See Thomp-
son, 596 U. S., at 43–44.  In addressing that issue, he gave
special attention to the felony charge for money laundering.
According to Chiaverini, the officers lacked probable cause
for that charge for two reasons.  First, they had no reason
to think he knew the ring was stolen; indeed, he said, their
claim that he had admitted as much was an out-and-out lie.
And second, they could not show—as, in his view, Ohio law
required—that  the  ring  was  worth  more  than  $1,000;  its
value was far less, more in line with its $45 purchase price.
So Chiaverini concluded that his suit satisfied the “without
probable cause” element of a Fourth Amendment malicious-
prosecution claim.

After  the  District  Court  granted  summary  judgment  to
the officers, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed.  It did so without addressing either of Chiaverini’s
arguments about the felony charge’s basis.  In the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s view, there was clearly probable cause to support the
two misdemeanor charges the officers had filed.  See App.
to Pet. for Cert. 11a–16a.  And because that was true, the
court thought, the validity of the felony charge did not mat-
ter.  “So long as probable cause supports at least one charge
against Chiaverini (like his receipt-of-stolen-property viola-
tion),” then his malicious-prosecution claim “based on other
charges  (like  his  money-laundering  charge)  also  fail[s].”
Id., at 10a.  Or said another way, a single valid charge in a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the details of a case and the legal arguments surrounding it. It contains legal terminology and references to specific court decisions, indicating its suitability for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxix

Page
1083
Garrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088
Garrison v. Wichita Falls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115
Garvey; Habelman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077
Garza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1007
Gaskin v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114
Gaskins v. O’Malley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1068
Gates Health Care Plan; Carr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042
Gay & Chacker, P. C.; Michelfelder v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039
Gaydos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1008
Geary v. McKinney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1090
Geary v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136
Gedman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1109
Gee; Angelo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138
Geers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144
Genco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144
Genco v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136
George v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1105
Georgia; Gulley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083
Georgia; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Georgia; O’Neal v.
1008
Georgia; Schaefer v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126
Gereighty, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131
Gerver; Benavides v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079
Gessa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116
G/H Contracting Co.; Collins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gibson; Berget v.
1114
Gibson; Braun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058
Gibson; Bryson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027
Gibson; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013
Gibson v. LaFevers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gibson; Robedeaux v.
Gibson v. Susquehanna Township Comm’rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126
Gibson Guitar Corp. v. MEC Import Handelsgesellschaft GmbH 1068
1042
Giles; Terrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1072
Gill v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1086
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gilmore; Ashford v.
1039
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gilmore; Franklin v.
1117
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gilmore; Smith v.
1003
Ginsberg; Scarfo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136
Giovannangeli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097,1128
Gitlitz v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1009
Glass v. Terhune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055
Glassman v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ALLEN ET AL. v. COOPER, GOVERNOR OF NORTH
CAROLINA, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–877.  Argued November 5, 2019—Decided March 23, 2020

In 1996, a marine salvage company named Intersal, Inc., discovered the
shipwreck of the Queen Anne’s Revenge off the North Carolina coast.
North Carolina, the shipwreck’s legal owner, contracted with Intersal
to conduct recovery operations.  Intersal, in turn, hired videographer
Frederick  Allen  to  document  the  efforts.  Allen  recorded  videos  and
took  photos  of  the  recovery  for  more  than  a  decade.    He  registered
copyrights in all of his works.  When North Carolina published some
of Allen’s videos and photos online, Allen sued for copyright infringe-
ment.  North Carolina moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground of
state sovereign immunity.  Allen countered that the Copyright Remedy
Clarification  Act  of  1990  (CRCA)  removed  the  States’  sovereign  im-
munity  in  copyright  infringement  cases.    The  District  Court  agreed
with Allen, finding in the CRCA’s text a clear congressional intent to
abrogate state sovereign immunity and a proper constitutional basis
for  that  abrogation.    The  court  acknowledged  that  Florida  Prepaid
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627,
precluded Congress from using its Article I powers—including its au-
thority over copyrights—to deprive States of sovereign immunity.  But
the court held that Congress could accomplish its objective under Sec-
tion  5  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.    The  Fourth  Circuit  reversed,
reading Florida Prepaid to prevent recourse to both Article I and Sec-
tion 5.

Held: Congress lacked authority to abrogate the States’ immunity from

copyright infringement suits in the CRCA.  Pp. 4–17.

(a) In general, a federal court may not hear a suit brought by any
person against a nonconsenting State.  But such suits are permitted if
Congress  has  enacted  “unequivocal  statutory  language”  abrogating
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the full legal arguments and reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
Syllabus

that because a foreign affiliate’s policy statement may be attributed to
them, American organizations themselves possess a First Amendment
right against the Policy Requirement’s imposition on their foreign af-
filiates.  First Amendment cases involving speech misattribution be-
tween  formally  distinct  speakers,  see,  e.g.,  Hurley  v.  Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 574–
575, however, are premised on something missing here: Government
compulsion to associate with another entity.  Even protecting the free
speech rights of only those foreign organizations that are closely iden-
tified with American organizations would deviate from the fundamen-
tal principle that foreign organizations operating abroad do not pos-
sess  rights  under  the  U. S.  Constitution  and  enmesh  the  courts  in
difficult  line-drawing  exercises.    Second,  plaintiffs  assert  that  the
Court’s 2013 decision encompassed both American organizations and
their  foreign  affiliates.    That  decision  did  not  facially  invalidate  the
Act’s  funding  condition,  suggest  that  the  First  Amendment  requires
the Government to exempt plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates or other foreign
organizations  from  the  Policy  Requirement,  or  purport  to  override
longstanding constitutional law and corporate law principles.  Pp. 3–
9.

911 F. 3d 104, reversed.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a
concurring opinion.  BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINS-
BURG and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.  KAGAN, J., took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of a book and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

THOMAS, J., dissenting

§222  “protects  the  interests  of  individuals  against  wrong
ful  uses  or  disclosures  of  personal  data,  the  rationale  for
these legal protections has not historically been grounded
on  a  perception  that  people  have  property  rights  in  per
sonal  data  as  such.”  Samuelson,  Privacy  as  Intellectual
Property?  52  Stan.  L.  Rev.  1125,  1130–1131  (2000)  (foot
note  omitted).  Any  property  rights  remain  with  the
companies.

E
The  Katz  test  comes  closer  to  the  text  of  the  Fourth
Amendment  when  it  asks  whether  an  expectation  of  pri-
vacy is “reasonable,” but it ultimately distorts that term as
well.  The  Fourth  Amendment  forbids  “unreasonable
searches.”  In other words, reasonableness determines the
legality  of  a  search,  not  “whether  a  search  . . .  within  the
meaning  of  the  Constitution  has  occurred.”  Carter,  525
U. S.,  at  97  (opinion  of  Scalia,  J.)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).
  Moreover,  the  Katz  test  invokes  the  concept  of  reason-
ableness in a way that would be foreign to the ratifiers of
the  Fourth  Amendment.    Originally,  the  word  “unreason-
able”  in  the  Fourth  Amendment  likely  meant  “against
reason”—as  in  “against  the  reason  of  the  common  law.”
See  Donahue  1270–1275;  Davies  686–693;  California  v.
Acevedo,  500  U. S.  565,  583  (1991)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring
in judgment).  At the founding, searches and seizures were

——————

But  this  order  was  vacated  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Tenth
Circuit.  U. S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F. 3d 1224, 1240 (1999).  Notably,
the  carrier  in  that  case  argued  that  the  FCC’s  regulation  of  customer
information  was  a  taking  of  its  property.  See  id.,  at  1230.    Although
the panel majority had no occasion to address this argument, see id., at
1239,  n. 14,  the  dissent  concluded  that  the  carrier  had  failed  to  prove
the information was “property” at all, see id., at 1247–1248 (opinion of
Briscoe, J.).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 585 U.S. ____ (2018). It delves into the legal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and privacy rights in the context of personal data.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 775 (1998)

793

Opinion of the Court

B

The Court of Appeals identiﬁed, and rejected, three pos-
sible grounds drawn from agency law for holding the City
vicariously liable for the hostile environment created by
It considered whether the two supervisors
the supervisors.
were acting within the scope of their employment when they
engaged in the harassing conduct. The court then enquired
whether they were signiﬁcantly aided by the agency rela-
tionship in committing the harassment, and also considered
the possibility of imputing Gordon’s knowledge of the harass-
ment to the City. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled out
liability for negligence in failing to prevent the harassment.
Faragher relies principally on the latter three theories of
liability.

1

A “master is subject to liability for the torts of his serv-
ants committed while acting in the scope of their employ-
ment.” Restatement § 219(1). This doctrine has tradition-
ally deﬁned the “scope of employment” as including conduct
“of the kind [a servant] is employed to perform,” occurring
“substantially within the authorized time and space limits,”
and “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master,” but as excluding an intentional use of force “un-
expectable by the master.”

Id., § 228(1).

Courts of Appeals have typically held, or assumed, that
conduct similar to the subject of this complaint falls outside
the scope of employment. See, e. g., Harrison, 112 F. 3d,
at 1444 (sexual harassment “ ‘simply is not within the job
description of any supervisor or any other worker in any
reputable business’ ”); 111 F. 3d, at 1535–1536 (case below);
Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F. 3d 258, 261
(CA4 1996) (“[I]llegal sexual harassment is . . . beyond the
scope of supervisors’ employment”); Gary, 59 F. 3d, at 1397
(harassing supervisor acts outside the scope of his employ-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 775 (1998). It discusses the legal theories of vicarious liability for hostile work environment harassment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  580 U. S. ____ (2017)

15

Opinion of the Court

sonably  calculated  to  enable  a  child  to  make  progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.

C

Endrew’s parents argue that the Act goes even further.
In  their  view,  a  FAPE  is  “an  education  that  aims  to  pro-
vide  a  child  with  a  disability  opportunities  to  achieve
academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and contribute to
society  that  are  substantially  equal  to  the  opportunities
afforded children without disabilities.”  Brief for Petitioner
40.

This standard is strikingly similar to the one the lower
courts  adopted  in  Rowley,  and  it  is  virtually  identical  to
the  formulation  advanced  by  Justice  Blackmun  in  his
separate writing in that case.  See 458 U. S.,  at 185–186;
id.,  at  211  (opinion  concurring  in  judgment)  (“[T]he  ques-
tion  is  whether  Amy’s  program  . . .  offered  her  an  oppor-
tunity to understand and participate in the classroom that
was substantially equal to that given her non-handicapped
classmates”).  But the majority rejected any such standard
in clear terms.  Id., at 198 (“The requirement that States
provide  ‘equal’  educational  opportunities  would  . . .  seem
to  present  an  entirely  unworkable  standard  requiring
impossible  measurements  and  comparisons”).    Mindful
that Congress (despite several intervening amendments to
the  IDEA)  has  not  materially  changed  the  statutory  defi-
nition of a FAPE since Rowley was decided, we decline to
interpret  the  FAPE  provision  in  a  manner  so  plainly  at
odds  with  the  Court’s  analysis  in  that  case.    Compare
§1401(18) (1976 ed.) with §1401(9) (2012 ed.).

D

We will not attempt to elaborate on what “appropriate”
progress  will  look  like  from  case  to  case.    It  is  in  the  na-
ture of the Act and the standard we adopt to resist such an
effort:  The  adequacy  of  a  given  IEP  turns  on  the  unique
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal standard for "Free Appropriate Public Education" (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxv

Page
938
Keep; Moore v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
Kell v. Hatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Keller v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
Keller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Keller Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n
953
Kendall v. Kendall
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Kendrick v. Gilluhugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Kennedy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,970
Kennedy v. Paramount Pictures Corp.
953
Kenner; Jumonville v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Kentucky; Aljami v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Kentucky; Troxell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971
Kepka; Hayes v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Kerekes v. Apfel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
Kessler v. Brown & Williamson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
Key, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Keyser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Kilgore v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kimble v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
King v. Adamson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,971
965
King v. Greene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
King v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
King v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Aircraft Equipment Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920
Kirby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953
Klein v. Grievance Committee for Ninth Judicial Dist. of N. Y.
. .
940
Klopp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Lansing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970
Knowles v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910
Knupp v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Kogan; Schwarz v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
116
Korean Air Lines Co.; Dooley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Krain v. Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Kramer; Villacres v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Kreiger v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Krishnamurthy v. Nimmagadda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948
Krupa, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Kucera v. United Nebraska Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Kuku v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935
Kurtz, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Labor Union. See name of trade.
Laessig v. Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Laessig v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

944
971
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Syllabus

(b) Any  standard  for  resolving  partisan  gerrymandering  claims
must be grounded in a “limited and precise rationale”  and be “clear,
manageable,  and  politically  neutral.”  Vieth,  541  U. S.,  at  306–308
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).  The question is one of degree:
How  to  “provid[e]  a  standard  for  deciding  how  much  partisan  domi-
nance is too  much.”  LULAC, 548 U. S., at  420 (opinion of Kennedy,
J.).  Partisan gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that groups
with a certain level of political support should enjoy a commensurate
level of political power and influence.  Such claims invariably sound
in a desire for proportional representation, but the Constitution does
not  require  proportional  representation,  and  federal  courts  are  nei-
ther equipped nor authorized to apportion political power as a matter
of  fairness.  It  is  not  even clear what  fairness  looks  like  in  this  con-
text.    It  may  mean  achieving  a  greater  number  of  competitive  dis-
tricts by undoing packing and cracking so that supporters of the dis-
advantaged  party  have  a  better  shot  at  electing  their  preferred
candidates.    But  it  could  mean  engaging  in  cracking  and  packing  to
ensure each party its “appropriate” share of “safe” seats.  Or perhaps
it should be measured by adherence to “traditional” districting crite-
ria.    Deciding  among  those  different  visions  of  fairness  poses  basic
questions  that  are  political,  not  legal.    There  are  no  legal  standards
discernible in the Constitution for making such judgments.  And it is
only after determining how to define fairness that one can even begin
to answer the determinative question: “How much is too much?”

The fact that the Court can adjudicate one-person, one-vote claims
does  not  mean  that  partisan  gerrymandering  claims  are  justiciable.
This Court’s one-person, one-vote cases recognize that each person is
entitled to an equal say in the election of representatives.  It hardly
follows from that principle that a person is entitled to have his politi-
cal  party  achieve  representation  commensurate  to  its  share  of
statewide support.  Vote dilution in the one-person, one-vote cases re-
fers  to  the  idea  that  each  vote  must  carry  equal  weight.    That  re-
quirement does not extend to political parties; it does not mean that
each party must be influential in proportion to the number of its sup-
porters.   The  racial  gerrymandering  cases  are  also  inapposite:  They
call  for  the  elimination  of  a  racial  classification,  but  a  partisan  ger-
rymandering  claim  cannot  ask  for  the  elimination  of  partisanship.
Pp. 15–21.

(c) None  of  the  proposed  “tests”  for  evaluating  partisan  gerryman-
dering claims meets the need for a limited and precise standard that
is judicially discernible and manageable.  Pp. 22–30.

(1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one
of the districts in North Carolina’s 2016 Plan violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the legal arguments and reasoning behind the Court's decision on partisan gerrymandering.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. PALOMAR-SANTIAGO

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–437.  Argued April 27, 2021—Decided May 24, 2021

Respondent Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national living in the United
States, was convicted in California state court of felony DUI in 1988.
At the time, lower courts understood that conviction to be an “aggra-
vated  felony”  subjecting  a  noncitizen  to  removal  from  the  United
States.  8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Palomar-Santiago was removed
following a hearing before an immigration judge and a waiver of his
right to appeal.  In 2017, Palomar-Santiago was found in the United
States  and  indicted  on  one  count  of  unlawful  reentry  after  removal.
See  §1326(a).    The  statute  criminalizing  unlawful  reentry  provides
that  a  collateral  challenge  to  the  underlying  deportation  order  may
proceed only if the noncitizen first demonstrates that (1) “any admin-
istrative remedies that may have been available” were exhausted, (2)
“the opportunity for judicial review” was lacking, and (3) “the entry of
the  order  was  fundamentally  unfair.”    §1326(d).    Palomar-Santiago
moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his prior removal
order was invalid in light of the 2004 holding in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543
U. S. 1, that felony DUI is not an aggravated felony.  Following Ninth
Circuit precedent, the District Court and Court of Appeals held that
Palomar-Santiago  was  excused  from  proving  the  first  two  require-
ments of §1326(d) because his felony DUI conviction had not made him
removable.  The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held: Each  of  the  statutory  requirements  of  §1326(d)  is  mandatory.

Pp. 5–8.

(a) The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is incompatible with the text
of  §1326(d),  which  provides  that  defendants  charged  with  unlawful
reentry “may not” challenge their underlying removal orders “unless”
they “demonstrat[e]” each of three conditions.  Section 1326(d)’s first
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part

v. Mississippi, 588 U. S. ___ (2019).

In my view, Apodaca warrants the same fate as Swain.
After all, the “requirements of unanimity and impartial se-
lection thus complement each other in ensuring the fair per-
formance  of  the  vital  functions  of  a  criminal  court  jury.”
Johnson, 406 U. S., at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  And as
Justice Thurgood Marshall forcefully explained in dissent
in  Apodaca,  to  “fence  out  a  dissenting  juror  fences  out  a
voice from the community, and undermines the principle on
which our whole notion of the jury now rests.”  Johnson, 406
U. S., at 402 (Marshall, J., dissenting in both Johnson and
Apodaca).

To  be  clear,  one  could  advocate  for  and  justify  a  non-
unanimous  jury  rule  by  resort  to  neutral  and  legitimate
principles.  England  has  employed  non-unanimous  juries,
and various legal organizations in the United States have
at times championed non-unanimous juries.  See, e.g., Ju-
ries Act 1974, ch. 23, §17 (Eng.); ABA Project on Standards
for  Criminal  Justice,  Trial  By  Jury  §1.1,  p.  7  (App.  Draft
1968); ALI, Code of Criminal Procedure §355, p. 99 (1930).
And  Louisiana’s  modern  policy  decision  to  retain  non-
unanimous juries—as distinct from its original decision in
the  late  1800s  to  adopt  non-unanimous  juries—may  have
been motivated by neutral principles (or just by inertia).

But the question at this point is not whether the Consti-
tution prohibits non-unanimous juries.  It does.  Rather, the
disputed question here is whether to overrule an erroneous
constitutional  precedent  that  allowed  non-unanimous
juries.  And  on  that  question—the  question  whether  to
overrule—the Jim Crow origins and racially discriminatory
effects  (and  the  perception  thereof )  of  non-unanimous
juries in Louisiana and Oregon should matter and should
count heavily in favor of overruling, in my respectful view.
After all, the non-unanimous jury “is today the last of Lou-
isiana’s  Jim  Crow  laws.”    Aiello,  supra,  at  63.  And  this
Court  has  emphasized  time  and  again  the  “imperative  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh in the case of Ramos v. Louisiana. It discusses the history and implications of non-unanimous juries, particularly in the context of racial discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

495

Breyer, J., dissenting

by Congress.” Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490
I do not believe the Court would hold the
U. S., at 222.
same delegations at issue in J. W. Hampton and Field uncon-
stitutional were they to arise in a more obviously domestic
area.

Finally, the tax-related delegation is limited in ways that
tend to diminish any widespread risk of arbitrary Presiden-
tial decisionmaking:

(1) The Act does not give the President authority to
change general tax policy. That is because the limited tax
beneﬁts are deﬁned in terms of deviations from tax policy,
i. e., special beneﬁts to fewer than 100 individuals. See 2
U. S. C. § 691e(9)(A)(i) (1994 ed., Supp. II); see also Analytical
Perpectives 84 (deﬁning “tax expenditure” as “a preferential
exception to the baseline provisions of the tax structure”).
(2) The Act requires the President to make the same kind
of policy judgment with respect to these special beneﬁts as
with respect to items of spending. He is to consider the
budget as a whole, he is to consider the particular history of
the tax beneﬁt provision, and he is to consider whether the
provision is worth the loss of revenue it causes in the same
way that he must decide whether a particular expenditure
item is worth the added revenue that it requires. See
supra, at 484–485.

(3) The delegated authority does not destroy any individu-
al’s expectation of receiving a particular beneﬁt, for the Act
is written to say to the small group of taxpayers who may
receive the beneﬁt, “Taxpayers, you will receive an exemp-
tion from ordinary tax laws, but only if the President decides
the budgetary loss is not too great.”

(4) The “limited tax beneﬁt” provisions involve only a
small part of the federal budget, probably less than one per-
cent of total annual outlays and revenues. Compare Budget
303 (federal outlays and receipts in 1997 were both over $1.5
trillion) with App. to Juris. Statement 71a (President’s can-
cellation message for Snake River appellees’ limited tax ben-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1229

CAPITAL CASES

Brief in opposition.........................................................  15.1
Habeas corpus proceedings .........................................  20.4(b)
Notation of......................................................................  14.1(a)

CERTIFIED QUESTIONS

Rule

Appearance of counsel..................................................  19.3
Appendix.........................................................................  19.4
Argument, setting case for .........................................  19.4
Briefs on merits

—Contents and speciﬁcations .............................  19.5, 24
—Documents,  format  and  general  require

ments ...............................................................  33, 34

—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  19.5, 25

Certiﬁcate, contents of .................................................  19.1
Costs, allowance of........................................................  43.4
Record .............................................................................  19.4

CERTIORARI

Appendix to petition for writ .....................................  14.1(i)

Before judgment in court of appeals, petition ﬁled  11
Briefs in opposition

—Capital cases, mandatory in ...........................  15.1
—Contents..............................................................  15.2
—Copies, number to be ﬁled ..............................  15.3
—Cover color  ........................................................  33.1(g)(ii)
—Documents,  format  and  general  require

ments ...............................................................  33, 34
—Page limits..........................................................  15.2, 33.2(b)

—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  15.3
—Word limits .........................................................  15.2, 33.1(g)(ii)

Briefs in support of petition barred  .........................  14.2
Common-law writs  .......................................................  20.6
Constitutionality of statute, procedure when issue

raised ...........................................................................  29.4(b), (c)

Cross-petitions

—Conditional, when permitted  .........................  12.5
—Contents..............................................................  12.5, 14.1(e)(iii)
—Distribution to Court  ......................................  15.7
—Fee  ......................................................................  12.5
—Notice to cross-respondents ............................  12.5
—Service.................................................................  12.5
—Time to ﬁle  ........................................................  13.4
Denial, sufﬁcient reasons for.......................................  14.4
Dismissal of petitions  ..................................................  35.1
Disposition of petitions  ...............................................  16
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a table of contents or a list of rules with corresponding page numbers. It is not sequential text and does not appear to be the main body of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

35

Opinion of the Court

Both  sides  make  important  policy  arguments,  but  sup-
porters of Roe and Casey must show that this Court has the
authority to weigh those arguments and decide how abor-
tion  may  be  regulated  in  the  States.  They  have  failed  to
make that showing, and we thus return the power to weigh
those arguments to the people and their elected represent-
atives.

D
1
The dissent is very candid that it cannot show that a con-
stitutional right to abortion has any foundation, let alone a
“ ‘deeply  rooted’ ”  one,  “ ‘in  this  Nation’s  history  and  tradi-
tion.’ ”    Glucksberg,  521  U. S.,  at  721;  see  post,  at  12–14
(joint  opinion  of  BREYER,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.).
The  dissent  does  not  identify  any  pre-Roe  authority  that
supports such a right—no state constitutional provision or
statute,  no  federal  or  state  judicial  precedent,  not  even  a
scholarly treatise.  Compare post, at 12–14, n. 2, with su-
pra, at 15–16, and n. 23.  Nor does the dissent dispute the
fact that abortion was illegal at common law at least after
quickening; that the 19th century saw a trend toward crim-
inalization of pre-quickening abortions; that by 1868, a su-
permajority of States (at least 26 of 37) had enacted stat-
utes criminalizing abortion at all stages of pregnancy; that
by  the  late  1950s  at  least  46  States  prohibited  abortion
“however and whenever performed” except if necessary to
save “the life of the mother,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 139; and that
when Roe was decided in 1973 similar statutes were still in
effect in 30 States.  Compare post, at 12–14, nn. 2–3, with
supra, at 23–25, and nn. 33–34.47

The dissent’s failure to engage with this long tradition is

——————

47 By  way  of  contrast,  at  the  time  Griswold v.  Connecticut,  381  U. S.
479 (1965), was decided, the Connecticut statute at issue was an extreme
outlier.  See Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. as
Amicus Curiae in Griswold v. Connecticut, O. T. 1964, No. 496, p. 27.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It argues against the existence of a constitutional right to abortion and cites historical and legal precedent to support this claim.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

23

Opinion of the Court

v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 267–268 (2006)).  As then-Speaker
of the House Nancy Pelosi explained:

“People think that the President of the United States
has the power for debt forgiveness.  He does not.  He
can postpone.  He can delay.  But he does not have that
power.  That has to be an act of Congress.”  Press Con-
ference,  Office  of  the  Speaker  of  the  House  (July  28,
2021).

Aside  from  reiterating  its  interpretation  of  the  statute,
the dissent offers little to rebut our conclusion that “indica-
tors from our previous major questions cases are present”
here.  Post,  at  15  (BARRETT,  J.,  concurring).  The  dissent
insists  that  “[s]tudent  loans  are  in  the  Secretary’s  wheel-
house.”  Post, at 26 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  But in light of
the sweeping and unprecedented impact of the Secretary’s
loan forgiveness program, it would seem more accurate to
describe  the  program  as  being  in  the  “wheelhouse”  of  the
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.  Rather
than dispute the extent of that impact, the dissent chooses
to  mount  a  frontal  assault  on  what  it  styles  “the  Court’s
made-up major questions doctrine.”  Post, at 29–30.  But its
attempt to relitigate West Virginia is misplaced.  As we ex-
plained in that case, while the major questions “label” may
be relatively recent, it refers to “an identifiable body of law
that has developed over a series of significant cases” span-
ning decades.  West Virginia, 597 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
20).  At any rate, “the issue now is not whether [West Vir-
ginia] is correct.  The question is whether that case is dis-
tinguishable from this one.  And it is not.”  Collins v. Yellen,
594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (KAGAN, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2).

The Secretary, for his part, acknowledges that West Vir-
ginia is the law.  Brief for United States 47–48.  But he ob-
jects  that  its  principles  apply  only  in  cases  concerning
“agency action[s] involv[ing] the power to regulate, not the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, indicating it's part of the main body of the legal text and not a preliminary or supplementary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1118

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–7033.  Smith  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7047.  Strong  v.  Dragovich,  Superintendent,
State  Correctional  Institution  at  Chester,  et  al.  C.  A.
3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7048.  Rush  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7051.  Giberson  v.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  634.

No.  09–7054.  Howard  v.  Upton,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7056.  Good  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  1st  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  10  So.  3d  1130.

No.  09–7057.  Taylor  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7058.  Tuley  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7063.  Taylor v.  Sampson et al.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7082.  Ware  v.  Harry,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7086.  Calderon-Lopez  v.  Puerto  Rico  Court  of
First Instance, San Juan Part, et al.  C. A. 1st Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–7087.  Bundrant  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7088.  Salerno  v.  Michigan.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Certio

rari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case summaries from a legal document, likely a Supreme Court docket.  It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

7

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

dered  by  these  cases  rested  in  part  on  the  government’s
intrusion  upon  privacy.    But  the  framers  chose  not  to
protect privacy in some ethereal way dependent on judicial
intuitions.    They  chose  instead  to  protect  privacy  in  par-
ticular  places  and  things—“persons,  houses,  papers,  and
effects”—and  against  particular  threats—“unreasonable”
governmental “searches and seizures.”  See Entick, supra,
at 1066 (“Papers are the owner’s goods and chattels; they
are  his  dearest  property;  and  so  far  from  enduring  a  sei-
zure,  that  they  will  hardly  bear  an  inspection”);  see  also
ante, at 1–21 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

Even taken on its own terms, Katz has never been suffi-
ciently justified.  In fact, we still don’t even know what its
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test is.  Is it supposed
to  pose  an  empirical  question  (what  privacy  expectations
do people actually have) or a normative one (what expecta-
tions should they have)?  Either  way brings  problems.  If
the  test  is  supposed  to  be  an  empirical  one,  it’s  unclear
why  judges  rather  than  legislators  should  conduct  it.
Legislators  are  responsive  to  their  constituents  and  have
institutional resources designed to help them discern and
enact  majoritarian  preferences.
  Politically  insulated
judges  come  armed  with  only  the  attorneys’  briefs,  a  few
law clerks, and their own idiosyncratic experiences.  They
are hardly the representative group you’d expect (or want)
to be making empirical judgments for hundreds of millions
of  people.  Unsurprisingly,  too,  judicial  judgments  often
fail  to  reflect  public  views.    See  Slobogin  &  Schumacher,
Reasonable  Expectations  of  Privacy  and  Autonomy  in
Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Under-
standings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 Duke
L. J. 727, 732, 740–742 (1993).  Consider just one example.
Our  cases  insist  that  the  seriousness  of  the  offense  being
investigated  does  not  reduce  Fourth  Amendment  protec-
tion.  Mincey  v.  Arizona,  437  U. S.  385,  393–394  (1978).
Yet scholars suggest that most people are more tolerant of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 585 U.S. ____ (2018).  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain factual information and legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

beliefs of particular citizens.”  Id., at 699.22

Roy signals a critical distinction in the Court’s religious
exercise  jurisprudence:  A  religious  adherent  may  be  enti-
tled to religious accommodation with regard to her own con-
duct, but she is not entitled to “insist that . . . others must
conform  their  conduct  to  [her]  own  religious  necessities.’ ”
Caldor,  472  U. S.,  at  710  (quoting  Otten  v.  Baltimore  &
Ohio  R. Co.,  205  F. 2d  58,  61  (CA2  1953)  (Hand,  J.);  (em-
phasis  added).23    Counsel  for  the  Little  Sisters  acknowl-
edged as much when he conceded that religious “employers
could [not] object at all” to a “government obligation” to pro-
vide contraceptive coverage “imposed directly on the insur-
ers.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 41.24

But that is precisely what the self-certification accommo-
dation  does.  As  the  Court  recognized  in  Hobby  Lobby:
“When a group-health-insurance issuer receives notice that
[an employer opposes coverage for some or all contraceptive
services for religious reasons], the issuer must then exclude
[that] coverage from the employer’s plan and provide sepa-
rate  payments  for  contraceptive  services  for  plan  partici-
pants.”  573 U. S., at 698–699; see also id., at 738 (Kennedy,
——————

22 JUSTICE ALITO disputes the relevance of Roy, asserting that the reli-
gious adherent in that case faced no penalty for noncompliance with the
legal requirement under consideration.  See ante, at 6, n. 5.  As JUSTICE
ALITO  acknowledges,  however,  the  critical  inquiry  has  two  parts.    See
ante, at 6–7.  It is not enough to ask whether noncompliance entails “sub-
stantial  adverse  practical  consequences.”    One  must  also  ask  whether
compliance substantially burdens religious exercise.  Like Roy, my dis-
sent homes in on the latter question.

23 Even if RFRA sweeps more broadly than the Court’s pre-Smith ju-
risprudence in some respects, see Hobby Lobby, 573 U. S., at 695, n. 3;
but see id., at 749–750 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting), there is no cause to
believe that Congress jettisoned this fundamental distinction.

24 JUSTICE ALITO  ignores  the  distinction  between  (1)  a  request  for  an
accommodation with regard to one’s own conduct, and (2) an attempt to
require  others  to  conform  their  conduct  to  one’s  own  religious  beliefs.
This  distinction  is  fatal  to  JUSTICE  ALITO’s  argument  that  the  self-
certification accommodation violates RFRA.  See ante, at 6–10.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

981

524 U. S.

September 29, 1998

ing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 10, 1998.
Brief of respondents is to be ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon
opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 8, 1998.
A reply brief, if any, is to be ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon
opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 29, 1998.
This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply. Justice O’Connor took
no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 134 F. 3d 873.

No. 97–2000. American Manufacturers Mutual Insur-
ance Co. et al. v. Sullivan et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of
National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. for leave to
ﬁle a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Brief
of petitioners is to be ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon oppos-
ing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 10, 1998.
Brief of respondents is to be ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon
opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 8, 1998.
A reply brief, if any, is to be ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon
opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 29, 1998.
This Court’s Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 139
F. 3d 158.

No. 97–2044. United States v. Haggar Apparel Co. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be ﬁled
with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3
p.m., Tuesday, November 10, 1998. Brief of respondent is to be
ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be-
fore 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 8, 1998. A reply brief, if any, is
to be ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on
or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 29, 1998. This Court’s Rule
29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 127 F. 3d 1460.

No. 97–2045. South Central Bell Telephone Co. et al.
v. Alabama et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Motions of AlliedSignal, Inc.,
et al. and Committee on State Taxation for leave to ﬁle briefs as
amici curiae granted. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1
and 2 presented by the petition. Brief of petitioners is to be ﬁled
with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3
p.m., Tuesday, November 10, 1998. Brief of respondents is to be
ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be-
fore 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 8, 1998. A reply brief, if any, is
to be ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, outlining case details and deadlines for filing briefs. It's not sequential narrative text and likely belongs in a legal database rather than a general document index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

JACKSON, J., dissenting

criminal sentence for gifts to 19 million state and local offi-
cials” without federal guidance).

Starting with this historical disadvantage regarding the
scope of the statute, the majority must show that Congress
made  major  changes  to  §666  that  might  account  for  the
sans-gratuity  interpretation  the  majority  adopts  today.
But several features of the statutory and legislative history
convince me of the opposite.

For  one,  Congress  said  that  it  was  not  making  major
changes  to  the  statute.    The  1986  revisions  to  §666  were
part  of  a  package  of  changes  that  Congress  specifically
deemed “technical and minor.”  H. R. Rep. No. 99–797, p. 16
(1986);  see  also  Criminal  Law  and  Procedure  Technical
Amendments Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3592.  And the revisions
themselves  are  largely  in  keeping  with  this  characteriza-
tion.  Relevant here, Congress teased out a “corruptly” mens
rea requirement and swapped the previous “for or because
of ” language for the current “intending to be influenced or
rewarded” phrasing.  Id., at 3613.  None of this, on its face,
evinces clear congressional intent to extract an entire cate-
gory of previously covered illicit payments from §666.

Undeterred,  the  majority  says  that  when  Congress
amended §666, it was attempting to fashion that provision
after §201(b)—the bribery statute that covers federal offi-
cials.  See ante, at 8–9.2  Again, the statutory and legislative
record suggests otherwise: In fact, history establishes that
Congress had a different model statute in mind.

Congress had used a phrase identical to §666’s “intending
to be influenced or rewarded” language just a few months
before when it amended 18 U. S. C. §215, an anticorruption
statute that applies to bank employees.  See 100 Stat. 779.

——————

2 Section 201(b)(2)(A) imposes federal criminal penalties on “[w]hoever
. . . being a public official . . . corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts,
or agrees to receive or accept anything of value . . . in return for . . . being
influenced in the performance of any official act.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Jackson. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

534

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

a similar safeguard against retrospective legislation con-
cerning property rights. See id., at 394 (opinion of Chase,
J.) (“The restraint against making any ex post facto laws
was not considered, by the framers of the constitution, as
extending to prohibit the depriving a citizen even of a vested
right to property; or the provision, ‘that private property
should not be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion,’ was unnecessary”).
In Security Industrial Bank, we
considered a Takings Clause challenge to a Bankruptcy Code
provision permitting debtors to avoid certain liens, possibly
including those predating the statute’s enactment. We ex-
pressed “substantial doubt whether the retroactive destruc-
tion of the appellees’ liens . . . comport[ed] with the Fifth
Amendment,” and therefore construed the statute as apply-
ing only to lien interests vesting after the legislation took
effect.
459 U. S., at 78–79. Similar concerns led this Court
to strike down a bankruptcy provision as an unconstitutional
taking where it affected substantive rights acquired before
the provision was adopted. Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 601–602 (1935).

Like those provisions, the Coal Act operates retroactively,
divesting Eastern of property long after the company be-
lieved its liabilities under the 1950 W&R Fund to have been
settled. And the extent of Eastern’s retroactive liability is
substantial and particularly far reaching. Even in areas in
which retroactivity is generally tolerated, such as tax legisla-
tion, some limits have been suggested. See, e. g., United
States v. Darusmont, 449 U. S. 292, 296–297 (1981) (per cu-
riam) (noting Congress’ practice of conﬁning retroactive ap-
plication of tax provisions to “short and limited periods”).
The distance into the past that the Act reaches back to
impose a liability on Eastern and the magnitude of that
liability raise substantial questions of fairness. See Con-
nolly, supra, at 229 (O(cid:146)Connor, J., concurring) (questioning
constitutionality of imposing liability on “employers for un-
funded beneﬁts that accrued in the past under a pension plan
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the constitutionality of a retroactive law. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2005

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. v. O
CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE UNIAO DO
VEGETAL ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–1084.  Argued November 1, 2005—Decided February 21, 2006

Congress  enacted  the  Religious  Freedom  Restoration  Act  of  1993
(RFRA) in response to Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Ore.  v.  Smith,  494  U. S.  872,  where,  in  upholding  a  generally  appli-
cable  law  that  burdened  the  sacramental  use  of  peyote,  this  Court
held  that  the  First  Amendment’s  Free  Exercise  Clause  does  not  re-
quire  judges  to  engage  in  a  case-by-case  assessment  of  the  religious
burdens  imposed  by  facially  constitutional  laws,  id.,  at  883–890.
Among  other  things,  RFRA  prohibits  the  Federal  Government  from
substantially  burdening  a  person’s  exercise  of  religion,  “even  if  the
burden  results  from  a  rule  of  general  applicability,”  42  U. S. C.
§2000bb–1(a),  except  when  the  Government  can  “demonstrat[e]  that
application  of  the  burden  to  the  person  (1)  [furthers]  a  compelling
government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of further-
ing that . . . interest,” §2000bb–1(b).

Members of respondent church (UDV) receive communion by drink-
ing hoasca, a tea brewed from plants unique to the Amazon Rainfor-
est that contains DMT, a hallucinogen regulated under Schedule I of
the Controlled Substances Act, see 21 U. S. C. §812(c), Schedule I(c).
After  U. S.  Customs  inspectors  seized  a  hoasca  shipment  to  the
American  UDV  and  threatened  prosecution,  the  UDV  filed  this  suit
for  declaratory  and  injunctive  relief,  alleging,  inter  alia,  that  apply-
ing  the  Controlled  Substances  Act  to  the  UDV’s  sacramental hoasca
use  violates  RFRA.    At  a  hearing  on  the  UDV’s  preliminary  injunc-
tion  motion,  the  Government  conceded  that  the  challenged  applica-
tion would substantially burden a sincere exercise of religion, but ar-
gued  that  this  burden  did  not  violate  RFRA  because  applying  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
Opinion of the Court

Harv. L. Rev. 169 (1901) (same).  Those cases did not reach
this issue, and whatever their continued validity we will not
extend them in these cases.  See Reid, supra, at 14.

Neither,  since  we  hold  the  appointment  method  valid,
need we consider the application of the de facto officer doc-
trine.  See Ryder v. United States, 515 U. S. 177 (1995) (dis-
cussing the doctrine); see also, e.g., Brief for Aurelius et al.
48–69 (arguing the doctrine does not apply in this context);
Brief  for  UTIER  69–85  (same);  Reply  Brief  for  United
States 26–47 (insisting to the contrary); Brief for Cross-Re-
spondent  COFINA  Senior  Bondholders’  Coalition  14–46
(same).

Finally,  as  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  recognizes,  post,  at  8
(opinion concurring in judgment), we need not, and there-
fore do not, decide questions concerning the application of
the  Federal  Relations  Act  and  Public  Law  600.    No  party
has argued that those Acts bear any significant relation to
the  answer  to  the  Appointments  Clause  question  now  be-
fore us.

For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of  Appeals  and  remand  the  cases  for  further  proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the concluding portion. It discusses the court's reasoning for reversing the lower court's judgment and remanding the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

BREYER, J., dissenting

that the Second Amendment seeks to protect, and whether
there  are  practical  less  burdensome  ways  of  furthering
those  interests.    The  ultimate  question  is  whether  the
statute imposes burdens that, when viewed in light of the
statute’s  legitimate  objectives,  are  disproportionate.    See
Nixon, 528 U. S., at 402 (BREYER, J., concurring).

A
No  one  doubts  the  constitutional  importance  of  the
statute’s  basic  objective,  saving  lives.    See,  e.g.,  Salerno,
481 U. S., at 755.  But there is considerable debate about
whether the District’s  statute helps to achieve that objec-
tive.  I begin by reviewing the statute’s tendency to secure
that  objective  from  the  perspective  of  (1)  the  legislature
(namely,  the  Council  of  the  District  of  Columbia)  that
enacted the statute in  1976, and (2) a court that seeks to
evaluate the Council’s decision today.

1
First,  consider  the  facts  as  the  legislature  saw  them
when  it  adopted  the  District  statute.    As  stated  by  the
local  council  committee  that  recommended  its  adoption,
the  major  substantive  goal  of  the  District’s  handgun  re-
striction  is  “to  reduce  the  potentiality  for  gun-related
crimes  and  gun-related  deaths  from  occurring  within  the
District of Columbia.”  Hearing and Disposition before the
House Committee on the District of Columbia, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., on H. Con. Res. 694, Ser. No. 94–24, p. 25 (1976)
(herinafter  DC  Rep.)  (reproducing,  inter  alia,  the  Council
committee report).  The committee concluded, on the basis
of “extensive public hearings” and “lengthy research,” that
“[t]he  easy  availability  of  firearms  in  the  United  States
has  been  a  major  factor  contributing  to  the  drastic  in-
crease in gun-related violence and crime over the past  40
years.”  Id., at 24, 25.  It reported to the Council “startling
statistics,”  id.,  at  26,  regarding  gun-related  crime,  acci-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer in the case District of Columbia v. Heller. It discusses the Second Amendment and the District's handgun restriction statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

55

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix A to opinion of ALITO, J.

APPENDIXES
A

Webster’s New International Dictionary 2296 (2d ed.
1953):

sex (sĕks), n. [F. sexe, fr. L. sexus; prob. orig., division, and
akin to L. secare to cut.  See SECTION.] 1. One of the two
divisions of organisms formed on the distinction of male
and female; males or females collectively. 2. The sum of
the  peculiarities  of  structure  and  function  that  distin-
guish a male from a female organism; the character of be-
ing  male  or  female,  or  of  pertaining  to  the  distinctive
function of the male or female in reproduction. Conjuga-
tion, or fertilization (union of germplasm of two individu-
als), a process evidently of great but not readily explain-
able importance in the perpetuation of most organisms,
seems to be the function of differentiation of sex, which
occurs in nearly all organisms at least at some stage in
their  life  history.  Sex  is  manifested  in  the  conjugating
cells by the larger size, abundant food material, and im-
mobility of the female gamete (egg, egg cell, or ovum), and
the small size and the locomotive power of the male gam-
ete (spermatozoon or spermatozoid), and in the adult or-
ganisms often by many structural, physiological, and (in
higher  forms)  psychological  characters,  aside  from  the
necessary modification of the reproductive apparatus. Cf.
HERMAPHRODITE, 1. In botany the term sex is often extended
to the distinguishing peculiarities of staminate and pis-
tillate flowers, and hence in dioecious plants to the indi-
viduals bearing them.

In many animals and plants the body and germ cells
have been shown to contain one or more chromosomes of
a special kind (called sex chromosomes; idiochromosomes;
accessory  chromosomes)  in  addition  to  the  ordinary
paired  autosomes.  These  special  chromosomes  serve  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dictionary definition of the word "sex" from a legal document.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Textual content</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

BREYER, J., dissenting

is  generally  of  little  value  in  separating  generic  from  de-
scriptive terms.  See Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Co.,
460 F. 3d 971, 975–976 (CA8 2006); Hunt Masters, Inc. v.
Landry’s Seafood Restaurant, Inc., 240 F. 3d 251, 254–255
(CA4 2001); A. J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F. 2d 291,
301–303  (CA3  1986);  Miller  Brewing  Co.  v.  Jos.  Schlitz
Brewing  Co.,  605  F. 2d  990,  995  (CA7  1979);  In re  Hikari
Sales USA, Inc., 2019 WL 1453259, *13 (TTAB 2019).  Alt-
hough  this  is  the  minority  viewpoint,  see  2  McCarthy
§12:17.25, I  nonetheless  find  it  to be  the  more  persuasive
one.

Consider the survey evidence that respondent introduced
below.  Respondent’s survey showed that 74.8% of partici-
pants  thought  that  “Booking.com”  is  a  brand  name,
whereas 23.8% believed it was a generic name.  App. 66.  At
the same time, 33% believed that “Washingmachine.com”—
which does not correspond to any company—is a brand, and
60.8% thought it was generic.  Ibid.

is  not

inherently  more  descriptive

What could possibly account for that difference?  “Book-
ing.com”
than
“Washingmachine.com”  or  any  other  “generic.com.”    The
survey  participants  who  identified  “Booking.com”  as  a
brand  likely  did  so  because  they  had  heard  of  it,  through
advertising or otherwise.  If someone were to start a com-
pany called “Washingmachine.com,” it could likely secure a
similar level of consumer identification by investing heavily
in advertising.  Would that somehow transform the nature
of the term itself?  Surely not.  This hypothetical shows that
respondent’s survey tested consumers’ association of “Book-
ing.com” with a particular company, not anything about the
term itself.  But such association does not establish that a
term  is  nongeneric.    See  Kellogg,  305  U. S.,  at  118–119;
Abercrombie, 537 F. 2d, at 9.

Under the majority’s approach, a “generic.com” mark’s el-
igibility for trademark protection turns primarily on survey
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the genericness of the trademark "Booking.com."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

11

Opinion of the Court

the statutory purposes.”  361 U. S., at 291–292.  The Com-
mission argues that these cases consequently support  the
proposition  that  the  traditional  equitable  “authority  to
grant an ‘injunction’ includes the power to grant restorative
monetary remedies.”  Brief for Respondent 21.

The  problem  for  the  Commission  is  that  we  did  not  in
these two cases purport to set forth a universal rule of in-
terpretation.    And  both  cases  involved  different  statutes.
See Porter, 328 U. S., at 397 (Emergency Price Control Act
provision authorizing courts to issue “ ‘a permanent or tem-
porary  injunction,  restraining  order,  or  other  order’ ”);
Mitchell, 361 U. S., at 289 (Fair Labor Standards Act provi-
sion authorizing courts to “ ‘restrain violations’ ” of the Act’s
antiretaliation ban).  In both cases, we recognized that the
text and structure of the statutory scheme at issue can, “in
so  many  words,  or  by  a  necessary  and  inescapable  infer-
ence,  restric[t]  the  court’s  jurisdiction  in  equity.”    Porter,
328 U. S., at 398; Mitchell, 361 U. S., at 291.  Thus in Porter
we  examined  “other  provision[s]  of  the  [Emergency  Price
Control] Act” to determine whether they “expressly or im-
pliedly  preclud[e]  a  court  from  ordering  restitution  in  the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction.”  328 U. S., at 403.  And
in Mitchell we examined other provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act before concluding that there was “no indica-
tion in the language” that the statute precluded equitable
relief in the form of lost wages.  361 U. S., at 294.

Moreover,  more  recently,  we  have  held,  based  on  our
reading of a statutory scheme as a whole, that a provision’s
grant of an “injunction” or other equitable powers does not
automatically authorize a court to provide monetary relief.
Rather,  we  have  said,  the  scope  of  equitable  relief  that  a
provision authorizes “remains a question of interpretation
in each case.”  Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248,
257 (1993).  Our decision in Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.,
516 U. S. 479 (1996), is instructive.  There, we considered a
provision  in  the  Resource  Conservation  and  Recovery  Act
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and delves into the interpretation of statutory language regarding equitable remedies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA

Opinion of the Court

passed ERISA, the word “actual” meant what it means to-
day:  “existing  in  fact  or  reality.”  Webster’s  Seventh  New
Collegiate Dictionary 10 (1967); accord, Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate  Dictionary  13  (11th  ed.  2005)  (same);  see  also
American  Heritage  Dictionary  14  (1973)  (“In  existence;
real; factual”); id., at 18 (5th ed. 2011) (“Existing in reality
and not potential, possible, simulated, or false”).  So did the
word “knowledge,” which meant and still means “the fact or
condition of being aware of something.”  Webster’s Seventh
New  Collegiate  Dictionary  469  (1967);  accord,  Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 691 (2005) (same); see also
American  Heritage  Dictionary  725  (1973)  (“Familiarity,
awareness, or understanding gained through experience or
study”);  id.,  at  973  (2011)  (same).  Thus,  to  have  “actual
knowledge”  of  a  piece  of  information,  one  must  in  fact  be
aware of it.

Legal  dictionaries  give  “actual  knowledge”  the  same
meaning:  “[r]eal  knowledge  as  distinguished  from  pre-
sumed  knowledge  or  knowledge  imputed  to  one.”    Ballen-
tine’s Law Dictionary 24 (3d ed. 1969); accord, Black’s Law
“actual
(11th  ed.  2019)
Dictionary  1043
knowledge”  as  “[d]irect  and  clear  knowledge,  as  distin-
guished from constructive knowledge”).4  The qualifier “ac-
tual” creates that distinction.  In everyday speech, “actual
knowledge”  might  seem  redundant;  one  who  claims

(defining

——————

4 Petitioners cite this dictionary’s somewhat puzzling second definition
of  “actual  knowledge,”  which  it  dubs  “implied  actual  knowledge”:
“[k]nowledge of information that would lead a reasonable person to in-
quire further.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1043 (11th ed. 2019).  Not even
this entry, however, appears to equate “implied actual knowledge” with
“actual knowledge” as normally understood.  It instead proceeds to ref-
erence the common-law “discovery rule,” ibid., under which a limitations
period  begins  when  “the  plaintiff  discovers  (or  reasonably  should  have
discovered)  the  injury  giving  rise  to  the  claim,”  id.,  at  585  (emphasis
added); see also Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 646 (2010).  As
we  noted  in  Merck,  that  rule  is  broader  than  “actual  knowledge.”  Id.,
at 647.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the meaning of "actual knowledge" in the context of ERISA. It provides definitions and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of the Court

gable waters); id., at 10–11 (discussing regulations of vine-
yards  to  control  water  pollution);  id.  at  17–19  (discussing
livestock grazing management, including utilization ratios
and time restrictions); Nonpoint Source Management Pro-
gram,  Annual  Report  (Maine)  8–10  (2018)  (discussing  in-
stallation of livestock fencing and planting of vegetation to
reduce  nonpoint  source  pollution);  Oklahoma’s  Nonpoint
Source Management Program, Annual Report 5, 14 (2017)
(discussing program to encourage voluntary no-till farming
to reduce sediment pollution).

The  Act  envisions  EPA’s  role  in  managing  nonpoint
source  pollution  and  groundwater  pollution  as  limited  to
studying the issue, sharing information with and collecting
information from the States, and issuing monetary grants.
See  §§105, 208,  86  Stat.  825,  839;  see  also  Water  Quality
Act  of  1987,  §316,  101  Stat.  52  (establishing  Nonpoint
Source Management Programs).  Although the Act grants
EPA specific authority to regulate certain point source pol-
lution  (it  can  also  delegate  some  of  this  authority  to  the
States acting under EPA supervision, see §402(b), 86 Stat.
880),  these  permitting  provisions  refer  to  “point  sources”
and “navigable waters,” and say nothing at all about non-
point  source  regulation  or  groundwater  regulation.    We
must doubt that Congress intended to give EPA the author-
ity to apply the word “from” in a way that could interfere as
seriously with States’ traditional regulatory authority—au-
thority the Act preserves and promotes—as the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s “fairly traceable” test would.

Third, those who look to legislative history to help inter-
pret  a  statute  will  find  that  this  Act’s  history  strongly
supports our conclusion that the permitting provision does not
extend so far.  Fifty years ago, when Congress was consid-
ering the bills that became the Clean Water Act, William
Ruckelshaus, the first EPA Administrator, asked Congress
to grant EPA authority over “ground waters” to “assure that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Clean Water Act and its implications for regulating nonpoint source pollution. It cites legal precedents and legislative history to support its arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

  Instead,  only  further  questions  follow.    Under  the  peti-
tioners’ theory, would clerks have to assemble a blacklist of
banned claims subject to immediate dismissal?  What kind
of inquiry would a state court have to apply to satisfy due
process before dismissing those suits?  How notorious would
the alleged constitutional defects of a claim have to be be-
fore a state-court clerk would risk legal jeopardy merely for
filing it?  Would States have to hire independent legal coun-
sel for their clerks—and would those advisers be the next
target  of  suits  seeking  injunctive  relief ?    When  a  party
hales a state-court clerk into federal court for filing a com-
plaint  containing  a  purportedly  unconstitutional  claim,
how would the clerk defend himself consistent with his eth-
ical obligation of neutrality?  See Tex. Code of Judicial Con-
duct  Canon  3(B)(10)  (2021)  (instructing  judges  and  court
staff to abstain from taking public positions on pending or
impending proceedings).  Could federal courts enjoin those
who perform other ministerial tasks potentially related to
litigation, like the postal carrier who delivers complaints to
the courthouse?  Many more questions than answers would
present themselves if the Court journeyed this way.
  Our  colleagues  writing  separately  today  supply  no  an-
swers  either.    They  agree  that  state-court  judges  are  not
proper defendants  in  this  lawsuit  because they  are  “in  no
sense adverse” to the parties whose cases they decide.  Post,
at 4 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.).  At the same time, our col-
leagues say they would allow this case to proceed against
clerks like Ms. Clarkston.  See ibid.; see also post, at 7 (opin-
ion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).  But in doing so they fail to address
the many remedial questions their path invites.  They ne-
glect to explain how clerks who merely docket S. B. 8 law-
suits  can  be  considered  “adverse  litigants”  for  Article  III
purposes while the judges they serve cannot.  And they fail
to  reconcile  their  views  with  Ex parte  Young.   THE  CHIEF
JUSTICE acknowledges, for example, that clerks set in mo-
tion the “ ‘machinery’ ” of court proceedings.  Post, at 4.  Yet
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the legal implications of a particular case and raises questions about the potential consequences of a certain legal interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>