<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S
ENERGY GROUP, LLC, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 16–712.  Argued November 27, 2017—Decided April 24, 2018

Inter  partes  review  authorizes  the  United  States  Patent  and  Trade-
mark Office (PTO) to reconsider and cancel an already-issued patent
claim in limited circumstances.  See 35 U. S. C. §§311–319.  Any per-
son  who  is  not  the  owner  of  the  patent  may  petition  for  review.
§311(a).    If  review  is  instituted,  the  process  entitles  the  petitioner
and the patent owner to conduct certain discovery, §316(a)(5); to file
affidavits,  declarations,  and  written  memoranda,  §316(a)(8);  and  to
receive  an  oral  hearing  before  the  Patent  Trial  and  Appeal  Board,
§316(a)(10).    A  final  decision  by  the  Board  is  subject  to  Federal  Cir-
cuit review.  §§318, 319.
  Petitioner  Oil  States  Energy  Services,  LLC,  obtained  a  patent  re-
lating  to  technology  for  protecting  wellhead  equipment  used  in  hy-
draulic fracturing.  It sued respondent Greene’s Energy Group, LLC,
in  Federal  District  Court  for  infringement.    Greene’s  Energy  chal-
lenged the patent’s validity in the District Court and also petitioned
the PTO for inter partes review.  Both proceedings progressed in par-
allel.    The  District  Court  issued  a  claim-construction  order  favoring
Oil  States,  while  the  Board  issued  a  decision  concluding  that  Oil
States’ claims were unpatentable.  Oil States appealed to the Federal
Circuit.  In addition to its patentability arguments, it challenged the
constitutionality  of  inter  partes  review,  arguing  that  actions  to  re-
voke  a  patent  must  be  tried  in  an  Article  III  court  before  a  jury.
While the case was pending, the Federal Circuit issued a decision in
a  separate  case,  rejecting  the  same  constitutional  arguments  raised
by  Oil  States.    The  court then  summarily  affirmed  the  Board’s  deci-
sion in this case.

Held:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the legal argument.
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  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SHURTLEFF v. BOSTON

Syllabus

Speech Clause, deny petitioners’ flag-raising request.

Held: 1.  Boston’s  flag-raising  program  does  not  express  government

speech.  Pp. 5–12.

(a) The Free Speech Clause does not prevent the government from
declining to express a view.  See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
U. S. 460, 467–469.  The government must be able to decide what to
say and what not to say when it states an opinion, speaks for the com-
munity, formulates policies, or implements programs.  The boundary
between government speech and private expression can blur when, as
here, the government invites the people to participate in a program.
In those situations, the Court conducts a holistic inquiry to determine
whether the government intends to speak for itself or, rather, to regu-
late private expression.  The Court’s cases have looked to several types
of evidence to guide the analysis, including: the history of the expres-
sion at issue; the public’s likely perception as to who (the government
or a private person) is speaking; and the extent to which the govern-
ment has actively shaped or controlled the expression.  See Walker v.
Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U. S. 200, 209–213.
Considering these indicia in Summum, the Court held that the mes-
sages of permanent monuments in a public park constituted govern-
ment  speech,  even  when  the  monuments  were  privately  funded  and
donated.  See 555 U. S., at 470–473.  In Walker, the Court found that
license plate designs proposed by private groups also amounted to gov-
ernment speech because, among other reasons, the State that issued
the plates “maintain[ed] direct control over the messages conveyed” by
“actively” reviewing designs and rejecting over a dozen proposals.  576
U. S., at 213.  On the other hand, in Matal v. Tam, the Court concluded
that trademarking words or symbols generated by private registrants
did not amount to government speech because the Patent and Trade-
mark Office did not exercise sufficient control over the nature and con-
tent of those marks to convey a governmental message.  582 U. S.___,
___.  Pp. 5–6.

(b) Applying this government-speech analysis here, the Court finds
that some evidence favors Boston, and other evidence favors Shurtleff.
The history of flag flying, particularly at the seat of government, sup-
ports Boston.  Flags evolved as a way to symbolize communities and
governments.  Not just the content of a flag, but also its presence and
position  have  long  conveyed  important  messages  about  government.
Flying a flag other than a government’s own can also convey a govern-
mental  message.    For  example,  another  country’s  flag  outside  Blair
House, across the street from the White House, signals that a foreign
leader is visiting.  Consistent with this history, flags on Boston’s City
Hall Plaza usually convey the city’s messages.  Boston’s flag symbol-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, specifically outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision.  It is not the actual content of a book, but rather a summary and analysis of a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xxv

Page

Brown v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  846,1101

804,

Brown v. United States
848, 851, 883, 889, 897, 917, 919, 925, 926, 931, 959, 960, 963, 1005,

1006,1019,1039,1051,1059,1066,1098,1133

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Brown v. U. S. Court of Appeals
951
Brown v. U. S. District Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  928,1129
919
Browner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; Adamo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081
Bruce; Bledsoe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
869
Bruce v. Ohio  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877
Bruinsma; Lundeby v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152
Bruton; Hooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bryant v. Metro/State Newspaper  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953
938
Bryant; Murphy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bryant v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1063,1082

1001

Bryce v. Martinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brzowski v. Tristano
1026

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Buck v. Internal Revenue Service
1154

Budge; Matylinsky v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Buell-Wilson; Ford Motor Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1017

Bueno-Sierra v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Buescher; Gruber v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

Buescher; Independence Institute v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Building Industry Assn. of Central Cal.; Patterson v.
. . . . . . . . .
1148

Bullock v. Klein
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963

Bunchan v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bunche v. North Carolina  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Bundrant v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1054,1078,1095,1118

842

Bunn v. California
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Bunyard v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
810

Buono; Salazar v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113

Burdette; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Kuhn v.  . .
1125

Burger King; Lewis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

Burgess v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

Burgie v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811

Burke v. Aniskovich  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burke v. Pennsylvania
845

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burke v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  873,1016,1085,1139

906

Burkell v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Burkett; Rippy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969

Burkey v. Marberry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132

Burley v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Burnes v. Rogers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 624 (1998)

631

Opinion of the Court

We hold respondent’s HIV infection was a disability under
In
subsection (A) of the deﬁnitional section of the statute.
light of this conclusion, we need not consider the applicability
of subsections (B) or (C).

Our consideration of subsection (A) of the deﬁnition pro-
ceeds in three steps. First, we consider whether respond-
ent’s HIV infection was a physical impairment. Second, we
identify the life activity upon which respondent relies (repro-
duction and childbearing) and determine whether it consti-
tutes a major life activity under the ADA. Third, tying the
two statutory phrases together, we ask whether the impair-
ment substantially limited the major life activity.
In con-
struing the statute, we are informed by interpretations of
parallel deﬁnitions in previous statutes and the views of vari-
ous administrative agencies which have faced this interpre-
tive question.

A

The ADA’s deﬁnition of disability is drawn almost verba-
tim from the deﬁnition of “handicapped individual” included
in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 361, as amended,
29 U. S. C. § 706(8)(B) (1988 ed.), and the deﬁnition of “handi-
cap” contained in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
102 Stat. 1619, 42 U. S. C. § 3602(h)(1) (1988 ed.). Congress’
repetition of a well-established term carries the implica-
tion that Congress intended the term to be construed in ac-
cordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations. See
FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U. S. 426, 437–438
(1986); Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U. S. 678, 681–
682 (1965); ICC v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60, 65 (1945).
In this
case, Congress did more than suggest this construction; it
adopted a speciﬁc statutory provision in the ADA directing
as follows:

“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser
standard than the standards applied under title V of the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" from a case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, which is suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

623

Souter, J., dissenting

V

The Court does not strike down the proviso, however.

In-
stead, it preserves the irony of a statutory mandate to deny
recognition to virtually any expression capable of causing
offense in any quarter as the most recent manifestation of
a scheme enacted to “create and sustain . . . a climate en-
couraging freedom of thought,
imagination, and inquiry.”
§ 951(7).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a dissenting opinion in a Supreme Court case.  The presence of case citations, legal terminology ("proviso", "statutory mandate"), and the name of a Justice ("Souter") strongly suggest this is part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

15

Opinion of the Court

Lacs, 526 U. S., at 207.

Just as in Mille Lacs, there is no suggestion in the text
of  the  1868  Treaty  with  the  Crow  Tribe  that  the  parties
intended  the  hunting  right  to  expire  at  statehood.    The
treaty  identifies  four  situations  that  would  terminate  the
right:  (1)  the  lands  are  no  longer  “unoccupied”;  (2)  the
lands no longer belong to the United States; (3) game can
no  longer  “be  found  thereon”;  and  (4)  the  Tribe  and  non-
Indians  are  no  longer  at  “peace  . . .  on  the  borders  of  the
hunting  districts.”    Art.  IV,  15  Stat.  650.  Wyoming’s
statehood  does  not  appear  in  this  list.    Nor  is  there  any
hint in the treaty that any of these conditions would nec-
essarily  be  satisfied  at  statehood.  See  Mille  Lacs,  526
U. S., at 207.

The  historical  record  likewise  does  not  support  the
State’s position.  See Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318
U. S.  423,  431–432  (1943)  (explaining  that  courts  “may
look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty,
the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by
the parties” to determine a treaty’s meaning).  Crow Tribe
leaders emphasized the importance of the hunting right in
the 1867 negotiations, see, e.g., Proceedings 88, and Com-
missioner Taylor assured them that the Tribe would have
“the  right  to  hunt  upon  [the  ceded  land]  as  long  as  the
game  lasts,”  id.,  at  86.    Yet  despite  the  apparent  im-
portance  of  the  hunting  right  to  the  negotiations,  Wyo-
ming  points  to  no  evidence  that  federal  negotiators  ever
proposed  that  the  right  would  end  at  statehood.    This
silence is especially telling because five States encompass-
ing lands west of the Mississippi River—Nebraska, Nevada,
Kansas, Oregon, and Minnesota—had been admitted to the
Union  in  just  the  preceding  decade.  See  ch.  36,  14  Stat.
391  (Nebraska,  Feb.  9,  1867);  Presidential  Proclamation
No.  22,  13  Stat.  749  (Nevada,  Oct.  31,  1864);  ch.  20,  12
Stat.  126  (Kansas,  Jan.  29,  1861);  ch.  33,  11  Stat.  383
(Oregon,  Feb.  14,  1859);  ch.  31,  11  Stat.  285  (Minnesota,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a treaty regarding hunting rights. It contains legal citations, references to historical events, and arguments based on treaty language and historical context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Many lower courts have responded to such prosecutions
with  more  restrained  readings  of  the  aggravated  identity
theft  statute.2    The  Fifth  Circuit  did  not.    To  resolve  the
conflict in the courts below, this Court granted certiorari,
598 U. S. ___ (2022), and now vacates the judgment of the
Fifth Circuit and remands.3

II
A
This case turns on two of §1028A(a)(1)’s elements.  Of the
various  possible  ways  to  violate  §1028A(a)(1),  petitioner
was convicted for “us[ing]” a patient’s means of identifica-
tion “in relation to” healthcare fraud.  The parties offer com-
peting readings of these two elements.

The  Government  reads  the  terms  broadly  and  in  isola-
tion.  On  the  Government’s  view,  “[a]  defendant  uses  a
means of identification ‘in relation to’ a predicate offense if
the  use  of  that  means  of  identification  ‘facilitates  or  fur-
thers’ the predicate offense in some way.”  Brief for United
States  10  (quoting  Smith  v.  United  States,  508  U. S.  223,
232  (1993)).  As  to  “uses,”  the  Government  seems  just  to
mean “employ[s]” in any sense.  Brief for United States 5,
7, 10–11.  Section 1028A(a)(1) would thus apply automati-
cally any time a name or other means of identification hap-
pens to be part of the payment or billing method used in the
commission  of  a  long  list  of  predicate  offenses.    In  other
words, virtually all of the time.

Petitioner,  in  response,  offers  a  more  targeted  reading.
For petitioner, using a means of identification in relation to

——————

2 See  Berroa,  856  F. 3d,  at  148,  155–157;  Michael,  882  F. 3d,  at  628;

Spears, 729 F. 3d, at 754; Hong, 938 F. 3d, at 1051.

3 The  Government  argued  below  that  because  petitioner  did  not
properly raise certain challenges to his §1028A conviction, he cannot ob-
tain  relief  without  meeting the  higher  bar  for  plain-error  review.    The
Fifth Circuit below did not decide that question, which this Court leaves
for remand.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the interpretation of a specific statute, §1028A(a)(1), and the arguments made by both the prosecution and the defendant.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Opinion of the Court

a self-starter.  She quickly became “a leading rock photog-
rapher” in an era “when women on the scene were largely
dismissed as groupies.”  Ibid.

In  1981,  Goldsmith  convinced  Newsweek  magazine  to
hire her to photograph Prince Rogers Nelson, then an “up
and  coming”  and  “hot  young  musician.”    2  App.  315.
Newsweek agreed, and Goldsmith took photos of Prince in
concert at the Palladium in New York City and in her studio
on West 36th Street.  Newsweek ran one of the concert pho-
tos, together with an article titled “ ‘The Naughty Prince of
Rock.’ ”  Id., at 320.  Goldsmith retained the other photos.
She holds copyright in all of them.

One of Goldsmith’s studio photographs, a black and white
portrait of Prince, is the original copyrighted work at issue
in this case.  See fig. 1, infra.

In  1984,  Goldsmith,  through  her  agency,  licensed  that
photograph to Vanity Fair to serve as an “artist reference
for an illustration” in the magazine.  1 App. 85.  The terms
of the license were that the illustration was “to be published
in  Vanity  Fair  November  1984  issue.    It  can  appear  one
time  full  page  and  one  time  under  one  quarter  page.  No
other usage right granted.”  Ibid.  Goldsmith was to receive
$400 and a source credit.

To  make  the  illustration,  Vanity  Fair  hired  pop  artist
Andy Warhol.  Warhol was already a major figure in Amer-
ican art, known among other things for his silkscreen por-
traits of celebrities.1  From Goldsmith’s photograph, Warhol

——————

1 A silkscreen is a fine mesh fabric used in screen printing.  Warhol’s
practice was to deliver a photograph to a professional silkscreen printer
with instructions for alterations, such as cropping and high contrasting.
1 App. 160, 163.  The latter alteration would “flatten” the image.  Once
Warhol approved, the printer would “reproduc[e]” the altered image “like
a photographic negative onto the screen.”  Id., at 164.  For canvas prints,
Warhol “would then place the screen face down on the canvas, pour ink
onto the back of the mesh, and use a squeegee to pull the ink through the
weave and onto the canvas.”  Ibid.  The resulting “high-contrast half-tone
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the Opinion of the Court. It sets the stage for the case by introducing the parties involved and the subject matter of the copyright dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE

Syllabus

applies only domestically and asks “whether the statute gives a clear,
affirmative  indication”  that  rebuts  the  presumption.  RJR  Nabisco,
Inc.  v.  European  Community,  579  U. S.  325,  337.    As  the  Court  has
already held, the ATS does not rebut the presumption of domestic ap-
plication.  Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 124.  In fact, the ATS does not expressly
“regulate conduct” at all, much less “evince a ‘clear indication of extra-
territoriality.’ ”  Id., at 115–118.  Second, where the statute, as here,
does  not  apply  extraterritorially,  plaintiffs  must  establish  that  “the
conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States
. . . even if other conduct occurred abroad.”  RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at
337.

The  parties  dispute  what  conduct  is  relevant  to  the  “focus”  of  the
ATS, but even if this dispute were resolved in respondents’ favor, their
complaint would impermissibly seek extraterritorial application of the
ATS.  Nearly all the conduct they allege aided and abetted forced la-
bor—providing  training,  equipment,  and  cash  to  overseas  farmers—
occurred  in  Ivory  Coast.  Pleading  general  corporate  activity,  like
“mere corporate presence,” Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 125, does not draw a
sufficient connection between the cause of action respondents seek and
domestic conduct.  To plead facts sufficient to support a domestic ap-
plication of the ATS, plaintiffs must allege more domestic conduct than
general corporate activity common to most corporations.  Pp. 3–5.

THOMAS, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BAR-
RETT, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which GOR-
SUCH and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.  GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opin-
ion, in which ALITO, J., joined as to Part I, and in which KAVANAUGH, J.,
joined as to Part II.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a condensed overview rather than the full text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

BROWN v. PLATA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

California  prisoners  four  times  this  Term  alone.  Cullen
v.  Pinholster,  563  U. S.  ___  (2011);  Felkner  v.  Jackson,
562 U. S. ___ (2011) (per curiam); Swarthout v. Cooke, 562
U. S. ___ (2011) (per curiam); Harrington, supra.  And yet
here,  the  Court  affirms  an  order  granting  the  functional
equivalent  of  46,000  writs  of  habeas  corpus,  based  on  its
paean to courts’ “substantial flexibility when making these
judgments.”  Ante, at 41.  It seems that the Court’s respect
for  state  sovereignty  has  vanished  in  the  case  where  it
most matters.

II

The  Court’s  opinion  includes  a  bizarre  coda  noting
that “[t]he State may wish to move for modification of the
three-judge  court’s  order  to  extend  the  deadline  for  the
required reduction to five years.”  Ante, at 46–47.  The Dis-
trict  Court,  it  says,  “may  grant  such  a  request  provided
that the State satisfies necessary and appropriate precon-
ditions  designed  to  ensure  the  measures  are  taken  to
implement  the  plan  without  undue  delay”;  and  it  gives
vague  suggestions  of  what  these  preconditions  “may  in-
clude,” such as “interim benchmarks.”  Ante, at 47.  It also
invites the District Court to “consider whether it is appro-
priate to order the State to begin without delay to develop
a  system  to  identify  prisoners  who  are  unlikely  to  reof-
fend,” and informs the State that it “should devise systems
to  select  those  prisoners  least  likely  to  jeopardize  public
safety.”  Ibid.  (What a good idea!)

The  legal  effect  of  this  passage  is  unclear—I  suspect
intentionally so.  If it is nothing but a polite reminder to
the  State  and  to  the  District  Court  that  the  injunction  is
subject to modification, then it is entirely unnecessary.  As
both  the  State  and  the  District  Court  are  undoubtedly
aware,  a  party  is  always  entitled  to  move  to  modify  an
equitable decree, and the PLRA contains an express provi-
sion  authorizing  District  Courts  to  modify  or  terminate
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case BROWN v. PLATA. It contains legal arguments, citations to other cases, and a critical analysis of the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
GORSUCH, J., concurring

may decide to give additional attention to applications from
students within that group.”  397 F. Supp. 3d, at 146.

The last step is “lopping,” where the admissions commit-
tee trims the list of “prospective admits” before settling on
a final class.  Id., at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted).
At this stage, again, the committee considers the “charac-
teristics of the admitted class,” including its “racial compo-
sition.”  Ibid.  Once more, too, the committee may consider
each applicant’s race in deciding whom to “lop off.”  Ibid.

All  told,  the  district  court  made  a  number  of  findings
about  Harvard’s  use  of  race-based  tips.  For  example:
“[T]he tip[s] given for race impac[t] who among the highly-
qualified students in the applicant pool will be selected for
admission.”  Id., at 178.  “At least 10% of Harvard’s admit-
ted class . . . would most likely not be admitted in the ab-
sence  of  Harvard’s  race-conscious  admissions  process.”
Ibid.  Race-based tips are “determinative” in securing favor-
able decisions for a significant percentage of “African Amer-
ican and Hispanic applicants,” the “primary beneficiaries”
of this system.  Ibid.  There are clear losers too.  “[W]hite
and  Asian  American  applicants  are  unlikely  to  receive  a
meaningful race-based tip,” id., at 190, n. 56, and “overall”
the  school’s  race-based  practices  “resul[t]  in  fewer  Asian
American and white students being admitted,” id., at 178.
For  these  reasons  and  others  still,  the  district  court  con-
cluded  that  “Harvard’s  admissions  process  is  not  facially
neutral” with respect to race.  Id., at 189–190; see also id.,
at 190, n. 56 (“The policy cannot . . . be considered facially
neutral from a Title VI perspective.”).

Things work similarly at UNC.  In a typical year, about
44,000 applicants vie for 4,200 spots.  567 F. Supp. 3d, at
595.  Admissions  officers  read  each  application  and  rate
prospective students along eight dimensions:  academic pro-
gramming,  academic  performance,  standardized  tests,  ex-
tracurriculars,  special  talents,  essays,  background,  and
personal.  Id., at 600.  The district court found that “UNC’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the admissions process at Harvard and UNC, focusing on the use of race-based considerations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Statement of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MALWAREBYTES, INC. v. ENIGMA SOFTWARE
GROUP USA, LLC

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–1284.  Decided October 13, 2020

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

  Statement  of  JUSTICE  THOMAS  respecting  the  denial  of
certiorari.

This petition asks us to interpret a provision commonly
called §230, a federal law enacted in 1996 that gives Inter-
net  platforms  immunity  from  some  civil  and  criminal
claims.  47 U. S. C. §230.  When Congress enacted the stat-
ute, most of today’s major Internet platforms did not exist.
And in the 24 years since, we have never interpreted this
provision.  But many courts have construed the law broadly
to confer sweeping immunity on some of the largest compa-
nies in the world.

This case involves Enigma Software Group USA and Mal-
warebytes, two competitors that provide software to enable
individuals to filter unwanted content, such as content pos-
ing  security  risks.  Enigma  sued  Malwarebytes,  alleging
that Malwarebytes engaged in anticompetitive conduct by
reconfiguring its products to make it difficult for consumers
to download and use Enigma products.  In its defense, Mal-
warebytes  invoked  a  provision  of  §230  that  states  that  a
computer service provider cannot be held liable for provid-
ing tools “to restrict access to material” that it “considers to
be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, har-
assing, or otherwise objectionable.”  §230(c)(2).  The Ninth
Circuit relied heavily on the “policy” and “purpose” of §230
to conclude that immunity is unavailable when a plaintiff
alleges anticompetitive conduct.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a statement by Justice Thomas regarding the denial of certiorari in the case of Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, LLC.  It discusses the relevant legal statute (Section 230) and the arguments made in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

99

Opinion of the Court
Appendix A to opinion of the Court

35.  South Carolina (1883):

Sec. 1.  “That any person who shall administer to any
woman with child, or prescribe for any such woman, or
suggest to or advise or procure her to take, any medi-
cine, substance, drug or thing whatever, or who shall
use or employ, or advise the use or employment of, any
instrument or other means of force whatever, with in-
tent  thereby  to  cause  or  procure  the  miscarriage  or
abortion or premature labor of any such woman, unless
the same shall have been necessary to preserve her life,
or the life of such child, shall, in case the death of such
child  or  of  such  woman  results  in  whole  or  in  part
therefrom, be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon con-
viction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in
the Penitentiary for a term not more than twenty years
nor less than five years.”

Sec. 2.  “That any person who shall administer to any
woman  with  child,  or  prescribe  or  procure  or  provide
for  any  such  woman,  or  advise  or  procure  any  such
woman to take, any medicine, drug, substance or thing
whatever, or shall use or employ or advise the use or
employment of, any instrument or other means of force
whatever, with intent thereby to cause or procure the
miscarriage or abortion or premature labor of any such
woman, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by
imprisonment in the Penitentiary for a term not more
than five years, or by fine not more than five thousand
dollars, or by such fine and imprisonment both, at the
discretion of the Court; but no conviction shall be had
under the provisions of Section 1 or 2 of this Act upon
the uncorroborated evidence of such woman.”104

36.  Kentucky (1910):

Sec.  1.  “It  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person  to  pre-
scribe or administer to any pregnant woman, or to any

——————

104 1883 S. C. Acts pp. 547–548 (emphasis added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically excerpts from statutes related to abortion.  It is sequential text and likely part of the body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Statute Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

Opinion of BREYER, J.

  These  requirements  establish  that  admitting  privi-
leges serve no “ ‘relevant credentialing function’ ” be-
cause physicians may be denied privileges “for rea-
sons unrelated to competency.”  Id., at 87 (quoting
Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip. op.,
at 25)).

  They also make it “unlikely that the [a]ffected clinics
will be able to comply with the Act by recruiting new
physicians who have or can obtain admitting privi-
leges.”  250 F. Supp. 3d, at 82.

  Doe 3 testified credibly “that, as a result of his fears,
and the demands of his private OB/GYN practice, if
he is the last physician performing abortion in either
the entire state or in the northern part of the state,
he  will  not  continue  to  perform  abortions.”  Id.,  at
79;  see  also  id.,  at  78–79  (summarizing  that  testi-
mony).

  Enforcing  the  admitting-privileges  requirement
would therefore “result in a drastic reduction in the
number and geographic distribution of abortion pro-
viders, reducing the number of clinics to one, or at
most two, and leaving only one, or at most two, phy-
sicians providing abortions in the entire state,” Does
3  and  5,  who  would  only  be  allowed  to  practice  in
Shreveport and New Orleans.  Id., at 87.  Depending
on whether Doe 3 stopped practicing, or whether his
retirement was treated as legally relevant, the im-
pact would be a 55%–70% reduction in capacity.  Id.,
at 81.

  “The result of these burdens on women and provid-
ers,  taken  together  and  in  context,  is  that  many
women  seeking  a  safe,  legal  abortion  in  Louisiana
will be unable to obtain one.  Those who can will face
substantial  obstacles  in  exercising  their  constitu-
tional right to choose abortion due to the dramatic
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the impact of admitting privileges requirements on abortion access in Louisiana. It cites legal precedents and factual testimony to support its arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
56  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

any of the burdens and strife generated by affirmative ac-
tion policies.

In  fact,  meritocratic  systems  have  long  refuted  bigoted
misperceptions  of  what  black  students  can  accomplish.    I
have always viewed “higher education’s purpose as impart-
ing knowledge and skills to students, rather than a commu-
nal,  rubber-stamp,  credentialing  process.”    Grutter,  539
U. S., at 371–372 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part).  And, I continue to strongly believe (and have never
doubted) that “blacks can achieve in every avenue of Amer-
ican  life  without  the  meddling  of  university  administra-
tors.”  Id.,  at  350.  Meritocratic  systems,  with  objective
grading scales, are critical to that belief.  Such scales have
always  been  a  great  equalizer—offering  a  metric  for
achievement  that  bigotry  could  not  alter.    Racial  prefer-
ences take away this benefit, eliminating the very metric by
which those who have the most to prove can clearly demon-
strate  their  accomplishments—both  to  themselves  and  to
others.

Schools’ successes, like students’ grades, also provide ob-
jective proof of ability.  Historically Black Colleges and Uni-
versities (HBCUs) do not have a large amount of racial di-
versity, but they demonstrate a marked ability to improve
the lives of their students.  To this day, they have proved
“to be extremely effective in educating Black students, par-
ticularly in STEM,” where “HBCUs represent seven of the
top eight institutions that graduate the highest number of
Black  undergraduate  students  who  go  on  to  earn  [science
and engineering] doctorates.”  W. Wondwossen, The Science
Behind HBCU Success, Nat. Science Foundation (Sept. 24,
2020),  https://beta.nsf.gov/science-matters/science-behind-
hbcu-success.  “HBCUs have produced 40% of all Black en-
gineers.”  Presidential  Proclamation  No.  10451,  87  Fed.
Reg.  57567  (2022).    And,  they  “account  for  80%  of  Black
judges,  50%  of  Black  doctors,  and  50%  of  Black  lawyers.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the merits of meritocratic systems in higher education and the potential drawbacks of affirmative action policies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

945

558 U. S.

October 13, 2009

No.  09–5815.  In  re  Vann.  Petition  for  writ  of  mandamus

denied.

No.  09–6108.  In  re  Bush.  Petition  for  writ  of  mandamus

and/or  prohibition  denied.

Certiorari  Granted

No.  08–1394.  Skilling  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  granted.  Reported  below:  554  F.  3d  529.

No.  09–38.  Health  Care  Service  Corp.  v.  Pollitt  et  al.
C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d
615.

No. 08–1341.  United States v.  Marcus.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Cer
tiorari  granted.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration or decision of this petition.  Reported below: 538 F. 3d 97.
No.  09–5327.  Holland  v.  Florida.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Motion
of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  granted.
Certiorari  granted.  Reported  below:  539  F.  3d  1334.

Certiorari  Denied

No.  08–1211.  Church  Homes,  Inc.,  dba  Avery  Heights  v.
National  Labor  Relations  Board.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  303  Fed.  Appx.  998.

No.  08–1356.  Sungwook  Kim  v.  Holder,  Attorney  Gen
eral.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560
F.  3d  833.

No.  08–1395.  Wallace  et  al.  v.  Montana  et  al.  (Reported
below: 348 Mont. 205, 201 P. 3d 70); and Kafka et al. v.  Bridge
water  et  al.  (348  Mont.  80,  201  P.  3d  8).  Sup.  Ct.  Mont.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No.  08–1476.  Loving  v.  Department  of  Defense  et  al.
C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  550  F.
3d  32.

No.  08–1478.  Kurji  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 306 Fed. Appx. 129.
No. 08–1482.  Mincey v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  233.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case numbers, citations, and decisions (granted or denied).
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/List of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

GARLAND v. CARGILL

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

trigger  to  maintain  continuous  fire.    Ibid.    So,  too,  a  ma-
chinegun that requires a user to hold down a button.  Mak-
ers  of  automatic  weapons  may  require  continuous  human
input for safety purposes; an accidental trigger pull that ac-
tivates  rapid  fire  is  less  harmful  if  it  does  not  require  af-
firmative human action to stop.  Requiring continuous pres-
sure  for  continuous  fire,  however,  does  not  prevent  a
firearm  from  “shoot[ing],  automatically  more  than  one
shot.”  §5845(b).

C
  This  Court  has  repeatedly  avoided  interpretations  of  a
statute that would facilitate its ready “evasion” or “enable
offenders to elude its provisions in the most easy manner.”
The  Emily,  9  Wheat.  381,  389–390  (1824);  see  also
Abramski  v.  United  States,  573  U. S.  169,  181–182,  185
(2014) (declining to read a gun statute in a way that would
permit  ready  “evasion,”  “defeat  the  point”  of  the  law,  or
“easily bypass the scheme”).  Justice Scalia called this in-
terpretive  principle  the  “presumption  against  ineffective-
ness.”  A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpre-
tation  of  Legal  Texts  63  (2012).    The  majority  arrogates
Congress’s  policymaking  role  to  itself  by  allowing  bump-
stock users to circumvent Congress’s ban on weapons that
shoot rapidly via a single action of the shooter.
  “The presumption against ineffectiveness ensures that a
text’s  manifest  purpose  is  furthered,  not  hindered.”    Ibid.
Before machineguns, a shooter could fire a gun only as fast
as his finger could pull the trigger.  Congress sought to re-
strict  the  civilian  use  of machineguns  because  they  elimi-
nated the need for a person rapidly to pull the trigger him-
self to fire continuously.  A bump stock serves that function.
Even a skilled sport shooter can fire an AR–15 at a rate of
only 180 rounds per minute by rapidly pulling the trigger.
Anyone shooting a bump-stock-equipped AR–15 can fire at
a rate between 400 and 800 rounds per minute with a single
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor in the Garland v. Cargill case. It discusses the legal interpretation of a statute related to automatic weapons and bump stocks.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

doing so, the university furthers “stereotypes that treat in-
dividuals  as  the  product  of  their  race,  evaluating  their
thoughts and efforts—their very worth as citizens—accord-
ing to a criterion barred to the Government by history and
the  Constitution.”  Id.,  at  912  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  Such  stereotyping  can  only  “cause[]  continued
hurt and injury,” Edmonson, 500 U. S., at 631, contrary as
it is to the “core purpose” of the Equal Protection Clause,
Palmore, 466 U. S., at 432.

C
If all this were not enough, respondents’ admissions pro-
grams also lack a “logical end point.”  Grutter, 539 U. S., at
342.

Respondents  and  the Government  first  suggest  that  re-
spondents’ race-based admissions programs will end when,
in  their  absence,  there  is  “meaningful  representation  and
meaningful diversity” on college campuses.  Tr. of Oral Arg.
in No. 21–707, at 167.  The metric of meaningful represen-
tation, respondents assert, does not involve any “strict nu-
merical benchmark,” id., at 86; or “precise number or per-
centage,”  id.,  at  167;  or  “specified  percentage,”  Brief  for
Respondent  in  No.  20–1199,  at  38  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).  So what does it involve?

Numbers all the same.  At Harvard, each full committee
meeting begins with a discussion of “how the breakdown of
the class compares to the prior year in terms of racial iden-
tities.”  397 F. Supp. 3d, at 146.  And “if at some point in the
admissions process it appears that a group is notably un-
derrepresented or has suffered a dramatic drop off relative
to the prior year, the Admissions Committee may decide to
give  additional  attention  to  applications  from  students
within that group.”  Ibid.; see also id., at 147 (District Court
finding that Harvard uses race to “trac[k] how each class is
shaping up relative to previous years with an eye towards
achieving a level of racial diversity”); 2 App. in No. 20–1199,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the arguments surrounding affirmative action in college admissions. It contains legal citations and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

989

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

No.  09–6776.  In  re  Garraud.  Petitions  for  writs  of  manda

mus  denied.

No.  08–10694.  In  re  Rochester.  Motion  of  petitioner  for
leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  petition  for  writ
of  mandamus  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–5226.  In  re  Rivas.  Petition  for  writ  of  mandamus
denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–5102.  In  re  Wheeler;  and
No.  09–6188.  In  re  Alpine.  Motions  of  petitioners  for  leave
to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  petitions  for  writs  of
mandamus  and/or  prohibition  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.

No.  09–6435.  In  re  Telfair.  Petition  for  writ  of  prohibi

tion  denied.

Certiorari  Granted

No.  08–1457.  New  Process  Steel,  L.  P.  v.  National  Labor
Relations  Board.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Re
ported  below:  564  F.  3d  840.

No. 09–223.  Levin, Tax Commissioner of Ohio v. Commerce
Energy,  Inc.,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Re
ported  below:  554  F.  3d  1094.

No.  08–998.  Hamilton,  Chapter  13  Trustee  v.  Lanning.
C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted  limited  to  the  following  ques
tion:  “Whether,  in  calculating  the  debtor’s  ‘projected  disposable
income’  during  the  plan  period,  the  bankruptcy  court  may  con
sider  evidence  suggesting  that  the  debtor’s  income  or  expenses
during  that  period  are  likely  to  be  different  from  her  income
or  expenses  during  the  preﬁling  period.”  Reported  below:  545
F.  3d  1269.

Certiorari  Denied

No. 08–1418.  Grosdidier et al. v. Chairman, Broadcasting
Board of Governors.  C. A. D. C. Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Re
ported  below:  560  F.  3d  495.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal orders from a court, including information about granted and denied petitions for writs of mandamus and prohibition, as well as granted and denied certiorari petitions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

666

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit

No. 97–873. Argued April 20, 1998—Decided June 25, 1998

When the Ofﬁce of Special Investigations of the Department of Justice’s
Criminal Division (OSI) subpoenaed respondent Balsys, a resident alien,
to testify about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his
immigration to the United States, he claimed the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, based on his fear of prosecution by
a foreign nation. The Federal District Court granted OSI’s petition to
enforce the subpoena, but the Second Circuit vacated the order, holding
that a witness with a real and substantial fear of prosecution by a for-
eign country may assert the privilege to avoid giving testimony in a
domestic proceeding, even if the witness has no valid fear of a criminal
prosecution in this country.

Held: Concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self-

Incrimination Clause. Pp. 671–700.

(a) As a resident alien, Balsys is a “person” who, under that Clause,
cannot “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.” See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 596. However,
the question here is whether a criminal prosecution by a foreign govern-
ment not subject to this country’s constitutional guarantees presents a
“criminal case” for purposes of the privilege. Pp. 671–672.

(b) Balsys initially relies on the textual contrast between the Sixth
Amendment, which clearly applies only to domestic criminal proceed-
ings, and the Fifth, with its broader reference to “any criminal case,”
to argue that “any criminal case” means exactly that, regardless of the
prosecuting authority. But the argument overlooks the cardinal rule
to construe provisions in context. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital,
502 U. S. 215, 221. Because none of the other provisions of the Fifth
Amendment is implicated except by action of the government that it
binds, it would have been strange to choose such associates for a Clause
meant to take a broader view. Further, a more modest understanding,
that “any criminal case” distinguishes the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause from its Clause limiting grand jury indictments to
“capital, or otherwise infamous crime[s],” provides an explanation for
the text of the privilege.
Indeed, there is no known clear common-law
precedent or practice, contemporaneous with the framing, for looking to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a summary of the case rather than the full text of the legal arguments and opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

666

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Breyer, J., dissenting

or even most States.” Ante, at 626. But Congress had be-
fore it the task force reports of at least 21 States docu-
menting constitutional violations. And it made its own
ﬁndings about pervasive gender-based stereotypes ham-
pering many state legal systems, sometimes unconstitution-
ally so. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 103–138, pp. 38, 41–42, 44–47
(1993); S. Rep. No. 102–197, pp. 39, 44–49 (1991); H. R. Conf.
Rep. No. 103–711, p. 385 (1994). The record nowhere reveals
a congressional ﬁnding that the problem “does not exist”
elsewhere. Why can Congress not take the evidence before
it as evidence of a national problem? This Court has not
previously held that Congress must document the existence
of a problem in every State prior to proposing a national
solution. And the deference this Court gives to Congress’
chosen remedy under § 5, Flores, supra, at 536, suggests that
any such requirement would be inappropriate.

Despite my doubts about the majority’s § 5 reasoning,
I need not, and do not, answer the § 5 question, which I
would leave for more thorough analysis if necessary on an-
other occasion. Rather, in my view, the Commerce Clause
provides an adequate basis for the statute before us. And
I would uphold its constitutionality as the “necessary and
proper” exercise of legislative power granted to Congress by
that Clause.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion. The language, formatting (e.g., citations), and context strongly suggest this.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

970

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

July 28, August 12, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–8709. Blackmon v. Poindexter, Warden, et al.,

ante, p. 919;

No. 97–8711. Rawles v. Herzog et al., 523 U. S. 1142;
In re Flynn, 523 U. S. 1116;
No. 97–8735.
No. 97–8753. Kennedy v. Paramount Pictures Corp. et

al., ante, p. 909;

No. 97–8777. Norwood v. United States, 523 U. S. 1143; and
In re Bell, 523 U. S. 1136. Petitions for re-
No. 97–8931.
hearing denied.

Miscellaneous Orders

August 12, 1998

No. D–1971.

In re Disbarment of Toth. Peter J. Toth, of
Burlington, N. J., having requested to resign as a member of the
Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken from
the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before this
Court. The rule to show cause, issued on June 22, 1998 [ante,
p. 936], is discharged.

No. 97–7597. Knowles v. Iowa. Sup. Ct. Iowa.

[Certiorari
granted, 523 U. S. 1019.] Motion of respondent to dismiss the
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted denied.

Rehearing Denied

No. 97–1278.

Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail et al.

v. Rouse, Sheriff, Suffolk County, et al., ante, p. 951;

No. 97–1440. Gurney et al. v. United States, ante, p. 951;
No. 97–1529. Campbell v. United States, 523 U. S. 1078;
No. 97–1619. Gangopadhyay v. Gangopadhyay, 523 U. S.

1138;

No. 97–1714. Coates v. Seaton, ante, p. 938;
No. 97–1724. Barker v. Leeds et al., ante, p. 938;
No. 97–1742. Dorsey v. Dorsey, ante, p. 952;
No. 97–1773. Theis Research, Inc. v. Octel Communica-

tions Corp. et al., ante, p. 963;

No. 97–1784. Egbert v. Reis et al., ante, p. 953;
No. 97–1827. Smith v. Supreme Court of Colorado, ante,

p. 954;

No. 97–1854. Pierson v. Wilshire Terrace Corp., ante,

p. 940;

No. 97–1860. Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., et al., ante,

p. 940;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, likely a list of cases and orders from a court. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

a man and a woman.”  Ante, at 6.  Early Americans drew
heavily  on  legal  scholars  like  William  Blackstone,  who
regarded  marriage  between  “husband  and  wife”  as  one  of
the  “great  relations  in  private  life,”  and  philosophers  like
John Locke, who described marriage as “a voluntary com-
pact between man and woman” centered on “its chief end,
procreation”  and  the  “nourishment  and  support”  of  chil-
dren.  1  W.  Blackstone,  Commentaries  *410;  J.  Locke,
Second  Treatise  of  Civil  Government  §§78–79,  p.  39  (J.
Gough  ed.  1947).  To  those  who  drafted  and  ratified  the
Constitution, this conception of marriage and family “was
a  given:  its  structure,  its  stability,  roles,  and  values  ac-
cepted by all.”  Forte, The Framers’ Idea of Marriage and
Family,  in  The  Meaning  of  Marriage  100,  102  (R.  George
& J. Elshtain eds. 2006).

The  Constitution  itself  says  nothing  about  marriage,
and the Framers thereby entrusted the States with “[t]he
whole  subject  of  the  domestic  relations  of  husband  and
wife.”  Windsor, 570 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17) (quoting
In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593–594 (1890)).  There is no
dispute that every State at the founding—and every State
throughout  our  history  until  a  dozen  years  ago—defined
marriage  in  the  traditional,  biologically  rooted  way.    The
four  States  in  these  cases  are  typical.    Their  laws,  before
and after statehood, have treated marriage as the union of
a man and a woman.  See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388,
396–399 (CA6 2014).  Even when state laws did not spec-
ify  this  definition  expressly,  no  one  doubted  what  they
meant.  See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S. W. 2d 588, 589 (Ky.
App.  1973).    The  meaning  of  “marriage”  went  without
saying.

Of  course,  many  did  say  it.  In  his  first  American  dic-
tionary,  Noah  Webster  defined  marriage  as  “the  legal
union  of  a  man  and  woman  for  life,”  which  served  the
purposes of “preventing the promiscuous intercourse of the
sexes, . . . promoting domestic felicity, and . . . securing the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges. It discusses the historical and traditional understanding of marriage as between a man and a woman.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

GEORGIA v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.

Opinion of the Court

rights that can last over a century.  17 U. S. C. §§102, 106,
302.  If Georgia were correct, then unless a State took the
affirmative step of transferring its copyrights to the public
domain, all of its judges’ and legislators’ non-binding legal
works would be copyrighted.  And citizens, attorneys, non-
profits, and private research companies would have to cease
all copying, distribution, and display of those works or risk
severe  and  potentially  criminal  penalties.    §§501–506.
Some affected parties might be willing to roll the dice with
a potential fair use defense.  But that defense, designed to
accommodate  First  Amendment  concerns,  is  notoriously
fact sensitive and often cannot be resolved without a trial.
Cf. Harper  & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
471 U. S. 539, 552, 560–561 (1985).  The less bold among us
would have to think twice before using official legal works
that illuminate the law we are all presumed to know and
understand.

Thankfully,  there  is  a  clear  path  forward  that  avoids
these concerns—the one we are already on.  Instead of ex-
amining whether given material carries “the force of law,”
we ask only whether the author of the work is a judge or a
legislator.  If so, then whatever work that judge or legislator
produces in the course of his judicial or legislative duties is
not  copyrightable.  That  is  the  framework  our  precedents
long  ago  established,  and  we  adhere  to  those  precedents
today.

*
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

*

*

Eleventh Circuit.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses copyright law and its application to works created by judges and legislators.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529IND

Unit: $UBV [10-03-01 07:01:03] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

INDEX

1209

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued.
a viewpoint-neutral program to facilitate extracurricular student speech.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, p. 217.

2. Telecommunications Act of 1996—Cable television regulation—Sex-
ually oriented programming.—Because Government failed to prove that
§ 505 of Act, which requires cable television operators to fully scramble
sexually oriented programming before 10 p.m., is least restrictive means
for addressing “signal bleed,” District Court did not err in holding statute
violative of First Amendment. United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., p. 803.

VII. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.

Prosecutor’s comments on presence at trial.—A prosecutor’s comments
that respondent had an opportunity to hear all other witnesses before
testifying and tailor his testimony accordingly did not violate his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Portuondo v. Agard,
p. 61.

VIII. Right to be Present at Trial and Confront Accusers.

Prosecutor’s comments.—A prosecutor’s comments that respondent had
an opportunity to hear all other witnesses before testifying and tailor his
testimony accordingly did not violate his Sixth Amendment rights to be
present at trial and confront his accusers. Portuondo v. Agard, p. 61.

IX. Right to Counsel.

Effective assistance—Failure to present mitigating evidence.—Fourth
Circuit’s decision concluding that petitioner was not denied his right to
effective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyers failed to investigate
and to present substantial mitigating evidence is reversed. Williams v.
Taylor, p. 362.

X. Searches and Seizures.

1. Bus passenger—Manipulation of luggage.—A law enforcement ofﬁ-
cer’s physical manipulation of a bus passenger’s carry-on luggage violates
Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches. Bond
v. United States, p. 334.

2. Stop and frisk—Anonymous tip.—An anonymous tip that a person
is carrying a gun is not, without more, sufﬁcient to justify a police ofﬁcer’s
stop and frisk of that person. Florida v. J. L., p. 266.

CONVICTIONS AS EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law, 3.

CRIMINAL LAW. See Constitutional Law, II, 2; IV; VII–X; Habeas

Corpus.

1. Arson—Federal prosecution.—Because an owner-occupied residence
not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property “used
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an index from a legal textbook or journal. It lists topics and corresponding page numbers.  Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and are not the primary content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
UNITED STATES

REPORTS

558

OCT. TERM 2009
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a report header or metadata, not the main body text of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Report Header</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

15

Opinion of the Court

prodigiously and incoherently.  It is saying many unseemly
things.  See App. to Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., as Amicus
Curiae.  It  is  expressing  contradictory  views.9    It  is  una-
shamedly  endorsing  a  vast  array  of  commercial  products
and  services.  And  it  is  providing  Delphic  advice  to  the
consuming public.

For  example,  if  trademarks  represent  government
speech,  what  does  the  Government  have  in  mind  when  it
advises  Americans  to  “make.believe”  (Sony),10  “Think
different”  (Apple),11  “Just  do  it”  (Nike),12  or  “Have  it  your
way”  (Burger  King)13?  Was  the  Government  warning
about  a  coming  disaster  when  it  registered  the  mark
“EndTime Ministries”14?

The  PTO  has  made  it  clear  that  registration  does  not
constitute  approval  of  a  mark.  See  In  re  Old  Glory  Con-
dom  Corp.,  26  USPQ 2d  1216,  1220,  n. 3  (TTAB  1993)
(“[I]ssuance  of  a  trademark  registration  . . .  is  not  a  gov-
ernment imprimatur”).  And it is unlikely that more than
a  tiny  fraction  of  the  public  has  any  idea  what  federal
registration  of  a  trademark  means.    See  Application  of
National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 49 C. C. P. A. (Pat.)
854,  863,  297  F. 2d  941,  949  (1962)  (Rich,  J.,  concurring)
(“The  purchasing  public  knows  no  more  about  trademark
registrations  than  a  man  walking  down  the  street  in  a

——————

9 Compare  “Abolish  Abortion,”  Registration  No.  4,935,774  (Apr.  12,
2016),  with  “I  Stand  With  Planned  Parenthood,”  Registration  No.
5,073,573 (Nov. 1, 2016); compare “Capitalism Is Not  Moral, Not Fair,
Not Freedom,” Registration No. 4,696,419 (Mar. 3, 2015), with “Capital-
ism  Ensuring  Innovation,”  Registration  No.  3,966,092  (May  24,  2011);
compare  “Global  Warming  Is  Good,”  Registration  No.  4,776,235  (July
21,  2015),  with  “A  Solution  to  Global  Warming,”  Registration  No.
3,875,271 (Nov. 10, 2010).

10 “make.believe,” Registration No. 4,342,903 (May 28, 2013).
11 “Think Different,” Registration No. 2,707,257 (Apr. 15, 2003).
12 “Just Do It,” Registration No. 1,875,307 (Jan. 25, 1995).
13 “Have It Your Way,” Registration No. 0,961,016. (June 12, 1973)
14 “EndTime Ministries,” Registration No. 4,746,225 (June 2, 2015).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically discussing the nature of trademarks and government speech. It presents arguments and examples related to trademark registration.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

1

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 12–71
_________________

ARIZONA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. THE INTER

TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZONA, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 17, 2013]

JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment.

The  opinion  for  the  Court  insists  on  stating  a  proposi-
tion  that,  in  my  respectful  view,  is  unnecessary  for  the
proper disposition of the case and is incorrect in any event.
The  Court  concludes  that  the  normal  “starting  presump-
tion that Congress does not intend to supplant state law,”
New  York  State  Conference  of  Blue  Cross  &  Blue  Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 654 (1995), does
not  apply  here  because  the  source  of  congressional  power
is the Elections Clause and not some other provision of the
Constitution.  See ante, at 10–12.

There  is  no  sound  basis  for  the  Court  to  rule,  for  the
first  time,  that  there  exists  a  hierarchy  of  federal  powers
so  that  some  statutes  pre-empting  state  law  must  be  in-
terpreted  by  different  rules  than  others,  all  depending
upon which power Congress has exercised.  If the Court is
skeptical  of  the  basic  idea  of  a  presumption  against  pre-
emption as a helpful instrument of construction in express
pre-emption  cases,  see  Cipollone  v.  Liggett  Group,  Inc.,
505  U. S.  504,  545  (1992)  (SCALIA,  J.,  concurring  in  judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part), it should say so and
apply that skepticism across the board.

There are numerous instances in which Congress, in the
undoubted  exercise  of  its  enumerated  powers,  has  stated
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1118

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 15, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8821. Woodard v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–8822.

Jerry M. v. District of Columbia et al. Ct.
App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 A. 2d 1206.

No. 99–8826. Prihoda v. Sondalle, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8828. Pratt v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 742 A. 2d 209.

No. 99–8831. Truitt v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–8835.

Johnson v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–8844. Coropuna v. Virginia Department of Cor-
rections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
182 F. 3d 907.

No. 99–8847. Alfonso Jaime v. McDaniel, Warden, et al.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8856. Deese v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 753 So. 2d 94.

No. 99–8859. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 178 F. 3d 1286.

No. 99–8864. Fidalgo v. United States; and
No. 99–8981. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 184 F. 3d 821.

No. 99–8871. Bello v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8872. Collier v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8878. Munoz-Amado, aka Munoz v. United States.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 57.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1045

558 U. S.

November 30, 2009

for  leave  to  participate  in  oral  argument  as  amici  curiae  and  for
divided  argument  denied.

No.  08–10543.  Karnofel  v.  Girard  Police  Department
et  al.  Ct.  App.  Ohio,  Trumbull  County.  Motion  of  petitioner
for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma
pauperis  [ante,  p.  802]  denied.

No.  08–10578.  Wells  v.  Vasquez,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  802]  denied.

No.  08–10650.  Dasisa  v.  University  of  Massachusetts
Board  of  Trustees.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for
reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pau
peris  [ante,  p.  803]  denied.

No.  08–10732.  In  re  Alpine.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[ante,  p.  814]  denied.

No.  08–10847.  Simmons  v.  Flecker.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Motion
of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed
in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  803]  denied.

No.  08–10986.  Strong  v.  Illinois  Department  of  Human
Services.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsidera
tion  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,
p.  804]  denied.

No.  08–10997.  Williams  v.  Church’s  Chicken  et  al.  Ct.
App.  Cal.,  2d  App.  Dist.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration
of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,
p.  812]  denied.

No.  09–5074.  Wakefield  v.  Cordis  Corp.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  805]  denied.

No.  09–5111.  Simmons  v.  California  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  805]  denied.

No.  09–5356.  Curto  v.  Siwek.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Motion  of  peti
tioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal orders, specifically denials of motions to proceed in forma pauperis. It lacks sequential narrative and is more akin to a legal docket than readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

choice to opt out of it.5

Let me be absolutely clear: I do not doubt that Wheaton
genuinely  believes  that  signing  the  self-certification  form
is  contrary  to  its  religious  beliefs.    But  thinking  one’s
religious  beliefs  are  substantially  burdened—no  matter
how sincere or genuine that belief may be—does not make
it so.

An  analogy  used  by  the  Seventh  Circuit  may  help  to
explain why Wheaton’s complicity theory cannot be legally
sound:

“Suppose it is wartime, there is a draft, and a Quaker
is  called  up.    Many  Quakers  are  pacifists,  and  their
pacifism  is  a  tenet  of  their  religion.  Suppose  the
Quaker who’s been called up tells the selective service
system  that  he’s  a  conscientious  objector.    The  selec-
tive  service  officer  to  whom  he  makes  this  pitch  ac-
cepts the sincerity of his refusal to bear arms and ex-
cuses  him.    But  as  the  Quaker  leaves  the  selective
service  office,  he’s  told:  ‘you  know  this  means  we’ll
have to draft someone in place of you’—and the Quaker
replies  indignantly  that  if  the  government  does
that, it will be violating his religious beliefs.  Because
his  religion  teaches  that  no  one  should  bear  arms,
drafting another person in his place would make him
responsible  for  the  military  activities  of  his  replace-
ment, and by doing so would substantially burden his
own  sincere  religious  beliefs.    Would  this  mean  that
by  exempting  him  the  government  had  forced  him  to

——————

5 Wheaton  notes  that  the  back  of  the  self-certification  form  provides
third-party  administrators  with  notice  of  their  regulatory  obligations.
See Emergency Application for Injunction Pending Appellate Review 8;
see also Appendix, infra.  That notice is merely an instruction to third-
party  administrators;  it  is  not  a  part  of  any  of  the  representations
required  on  the  front  of  the  form.    No  statement  to  which  Wheaton
must assent in any way reflects agreement with or endorsement of the
notice.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*.  It is sequential and contains the actual legal argument, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

105

Opinion of the Court
Appendix B to opinion of the Court

years, in the penitentiary, and fined in a sum not ex-
ceeding one thousand dollars; and if any woman by rea-
son of such treatment shall die, the person, or persons,
administering, or causing to be administered such poi-
son, substance, or liquid, or using or causing to be used,
any instrument, as aforesaid, shall be deemed guilty of
manslaughter, and if convicted, be punished by impris-
onment for a term not less than three years in the pen-
itentiary, and fined in a sum not exceeding one thou-
sand  dollars,  unless  it  appear  that  such  miscarriage
was procured or attempted by, or under advice of a phy-
sician  or  surgeon,  with  intent  to  save  the  life  of  such
woman, or to prevent serious and permanent bodily in-
jury to her.”113

8.  Utah (1876):

Sec.  142.  “Every  person  who  provides,  supplies,  or
administers  to  any  pregnant  woman,  or  procures  any
such woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance,
or  uses  or  employs  any  instrument  or  other  means
whatever,  with  intent  thereby  to  procure  the  miscar-
riage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to
preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary  not  less  than  two  nor  more  than  ten
years.”114

9.  North Dakota (1877):

Sec.  337.  “Every  person  who  administers  to  any
pregnant  woman,  or  who  prescribes  for  any  such
woman, or advises or procures any such woman to take
any  medicine,  drug  or  substance,  or  uses  or  employs

——————

113 1869 Terr. of Wyo. Gen. Laws p. 104 (emphasis added).  Wyoming

became a State in 1889.  See 26 Stat. 222–226.

114 Terr.  of  Utah  Comp.  Laws  §1972  (1876)  (emphasis  added).    Utah
became a State in 1896.  See Presidential Proclamation No. 9, 29 Stat.
876–877.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text, specifically excerpts from historical laws regarding abortion.  It is sequential and likely part of the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

83

Opinion of the Court
Appendix A to opinion of the Court

instrument or means whatever with intent thereby to
procure  the  miscarriage  of  such  woman,  unless  the
same  shall  be  necessary  to  preserve  her  life,  or  shall
have been advised by a respectable physician to be nec-
essary for that purpose, shall upon conviction, be pun-
ished  by  fine  not  exceeding  five  hundred  dollars,  and
by imprisonment in the county jail, not less than three,
and not exceeding six months.”75

8.  Massachusetts (1845):

Ch. 27.  “Whoever, maliciously or without lawful jus-
tification, with  intent to cause and procure the miscar-
riage  of  a  woman  then  pregnant  with  child,  shall  ad-
minister to her, prescribe for her, or advise or direct her
to take or swallow, any poison, drug, medicine or nox-
ious thing, or shall cause or procure her with like in-
tent, to take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine or
noxious  thing;  and  whoever  maliciously  and  without
lawful justification, shall use any instrument or means
whatever with the like intent, and every person, with
the like intent, knowingly aiding and assisting such of-
fender or offenders, shall be deemed guilty of felony, if
the woman die in consequence thereof, and shall be im-
prisoned not more than twenty years, nor less than five
years in the State Prison; and if the woman doth not
die  in  consequence  thereof,  such  offender  shall  be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by im-
prisonment  not  exceeding  seven  years,  nor  less  than
one year, in the state prison or house of correction, or
common jail, and by fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars.”76

9.  Michigan (1846):

Sec. 33.  “Every person who shall administer to any

——————

75 1841 Ala. Acts p. 143 (emphasis added).
76 1845 Mass. Acts p. 406 (emphasis added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text, specifically excerpts from historical abortion laws in different states.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of the Court

respondents sought to apply the ATS extraterritorially be-
cause the only domestic conduct alleged was general corpo-
rate activity.  While this suit was on appeal, we held that
courts  cannot  create  new  causes  of  action  against  foreign
corporations under the ATS.  Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584
U. S. ___ (2018).  The Ninth Circuit then reversed the Dis-
trict Court in part.  Although the Ninth Circuit determined
that Jesner compelled dismissal of all foreign corporate de-
fendants, it concluded that the opinion did not foreclose ju-
dicial creation of causes of action against domestic corpora-
tions.   The  Ninth  Circuit  also  held  that  respondents  had
pleaded a domestic application of the ATS, as required by
Kiobel, because the “financing decisions . . . originated” in
the  United  States.  Doe  v.  Nestlé,  S. A.,  906  F. 3d  1120,
1124–1126  (2018);  see  also  929  F. 3d  623  (2019).  We
granted certiorari, 591 U. S. ___ (2020), and now reverse.

II

Petitioners and the United States argue that respondents
improperly seek extraterritorial application of the ATS.  We
agree.

Our precedents “reflect a two-step framework for analyz-
ing extraterritoriality issues.”  RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Euro-
pean Community, 579 U. S. 325, 337 (2016).  First, we pre-
sume that a statute applies only domestically, and we ask
“whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication”
that  rebuts  this  presumption.  Ibid.  For  the  ATS,  Kiobel
answered that question in the negative.  569 U. S., at 124.
Although we have interpreted its purely jurisdictional text
to  implicitly  enable  courts  to  create  causes  of  action,  the
ATS does not expressly “regulate conduct” at all, much less
“evince  a  ‘clear  indication  of  extraterritoriality.’ ”  Id.,  at
115–118.  Courts thus cannot give “extraterritorial reach”
to any cause of action judicially created under the ATS.  Id.,
at  117–118.  Second, where  the statute,  as  here, does  not
apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that “the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and discusses legal arguments related to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

Opinion of the Court

For example, this Court in Campbell considered whether
parody may be fair use.  In holding that it may, the Court
explained that “parody has an obvious claim to transform-
ative value” because “it can provide social benefit, by shed-
ding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating
a new one.”  510 U. S., at 579.  The use at issue in Campbell
was 2 Live Crew’s copying of certain lyrics and musical ele-
ments from Roy Orbison’s song, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” to cre-
ate  a  rap  derivative  titled  “Pretty  Woman.”   Without  a
doubt, 2 Live Crew transformed Orbison’s song by adding
new lyrics and musical elements, such that “Pretty Woman”
had a new message and different aesthetic than “Oh, Pretty
Woman.”  Indeed, the whole genre of music changed from
rock ballad to rap.  That was not enough for the first factor
to weigh in favor of fair use, however.  The Court found it
necessary  to  determine  whether  2  Live  Crew’s  transfor-
mation of Orbison’s song rose to the level of parody, a dis-
tinct purpose of commenting on the original or criticizing it.
See id., at 580–583.

Distinguishing between parody (which targets an author
or work for humor or ridicule) and satire (which ridicules
society but does not necessarily target an author or work),
the Court further explained that “[p]arody needs to mimic
an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use
the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagina-
tion, whereas satire can stand on  its own two feet and so
requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”  Id., at
580–581.  More generally, when “commentary has no criti-

——————
2000)  (newspaper’s  reproduction,  without  alteration,  of  photograph  of
beauty  pageant  winner  to  explain  controversy  over  whether  her  title
should be withdrawn had transformative purpose because “ ‘the pictures
were the story’ ”), with Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F. 3d
109, 114–115 (CA2 1998) (film advertisement’s alteration of well-known
photograph  by  superimposing  actor’s  face  on  actress’  body  had  trans-
formative purpose of parody).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the concept of fair use in copyright law, specifically referencing the case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music. It provides legal analysis and cites relevant case law, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

463

Opinion of Scalia, J.

Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 474, 476 (1982). While
Snake River in the present case may indeed have enough of
a “stake” to assure adverseness, the matter it brings before
us is inappropriate for our resolution because its allegations
do not establish an injury in fact, attributable to the Presi-
dential action it challenges, and remediable by this Court’s
invalidation of that Presidential action.

Because, in my view, Snake River has no standing to bring
this suit, we have no jurisdiction to resolve its challenge to
the President’s authority to cancel a “limited tax beneﬁt.”

III

I agree with the Court that the New York appellees have
standing to challenge the President’s cancellation of § 4722(c)
of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 as an “item of new direct
spending.” See ante, at 430–431. The tax liability they
will incur under New York law is a concrete and particular-
ized injury, fairly traceable to the President’s action, and
avoided if that action is undone. Unlike the Court, however,
I do not believe that Executive cancellation of this item of
direct spending violates the Presentment Clause.

The Presentment Clause requires, in relevant part, that
“[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States; If he ap-
prove he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it.” U. S.
Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. There is no question that enactment
of the Balanced Budget Act complied with these require-
ments: the House and Senate passed the bill, and the Presi-
dent signed it into law.
It was only after the requirements
of the Presentment Clause had been satisﬁed that the Presi-
dent exercised his authority under the Line Item Veto Act
to cancel the spending item. Thus, the Court’s problem with
the Act is not that it authorizes the President to veto parts
of a bill and sign others into law, but rather that it authorizes
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice Scalia in the case of Clinton v. City of New York. It discusses the issue of presidential line-item veto and standing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

11

Opinion of the Court

not  end  there.  The  phrase  “even  though”  in  the  clause
“even  though  the  vaccine  was  properly  prepared  and
[labeled]”  is  meant  to  signal  the  unexpected:  unavoidable
side  effects  persist  despite  best  manufacturing  and  label-
ing  practices.43    But  petitioners’  reading  eliminates  any
opposition  between  the  “even  though”  clause—called  a
concessive  subordinate  clause  by  grammarians—and  the
word  “unavoidable.”44    Their  reading  makes  preemption
turn  equally  on  unavoidability,  proper  preparation,  and
proper  labeling.  Thus,  the  dissent  twice  refers  to  the
requirements of proper preparation and proper labeling as
“two additional prerequisites” for preemption independent
of  unavoidability.45    The  primary  textual  justification  for
the  dissent’s  position  depends  on  that  independence.46
But linking independent ideas is the job of a coordinating
junction like “and,” not a subordinating junction like “even
though.”47
——————

43 The  dissent’s  assertion  that  we  treat  “even  though”  as  a  synonym
for  “because”  misses  the  subtle  distinction  between  “because”  and
“despite.”  See post, at 17, n. 14.  “Even though” is a close cousin of the
latter.   See  Webster’s  New  International  Dictionary  709,  2631  (2d  ed.
1957).    The  statement  “the  car  accident  was  unavoidable  despite  his
quick  reflexes”  indicates  that  quick  reflexes  could  not  avoid  the  acci-
dent,  and  leaves  open  two  unstated  possibilities:  (1)  that  other,  un-
stated  means  of  avoiding  the  accident  besides  quick  reflexes  existed,
but  came  up  short  as  well;  or  (2)  that  quick  reflexes  were  the  only
possible  way  to  avoid  the  accident.    Our  interpretation  of  §300aa–
22(b)(1)  explains  why  we  think  Congress  meant  the  latter  in  this
context.  (Incidentally, the statement “the car accident was unavoidable
because of his quick reflexes” makes no sense.)

44 See W. Follett, Modern American Usage: A Guide 61 (1966).
45 Post, at 9, 17.
46 Post, at 3–5.
47 The dissent responds that these “additional prerequisites” act “in a
concessive, subordinating fashion,” post, at 17, n. 14 (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted).  But that is no more true of the dissent’s
conjunctive interpretation of the present text than it is of all provisions
that  set  forth  additional  requirements—meaning  that  we  could  elimi-
nate “even though” from our English lexicon, its function being entirely
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion discussing the interpretation of a particular statute. It contains legal citations, grammatical analysis, and arguments about the meaning of specific phrases within the text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

Hochul Releases Comprehensive Plan to Address Prevent-
able Health Care Staffing Shortage (Sept. 25, 2021), https://
www.governor.ny.gov/news/preparation-monday-vaccination-
deadline - governor-hochul-releases-comprehensive-plan-
address.  As the State’s website explains, unemployment in-
surance  cases  are  generally  “reviewed  on  a  case-by-case
basis,”  but  healthcare  workers  who  refuse  a  vaccine  are
“ineligible.”    N.  Y.  State  Dept.  of  Labor,  Unemploy-
ment  Insurance  Top  Frequently  Asked  Questions  (Sept.
25,  2021),  https://dol.ny.gov/unemployment-insurance-top-
frequently-asked-questions.

C

Facing the imminent loss of their jobs and unemployment
benefits, the doctors and nurses before us filed two separate
lawsuits seeking a preliminary injunction preventing New
York from enforcing its new mandate against them.  In the
first suit, District Judge David Hurd granted the requested
relief after concluding that New York’s “intentional change
in language is the kind of religious gerrymander” that vio-
lates  the  First  Amendment.    Dr.  A.  v.  Hochul,  2021  WL
4734404,  *8  (NDNY,  Oct.  12,  2021)  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted).  In  the  second  suit,  the  District  Court
reached a contrary conclusion and denied relief without an
opinion.  We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, No. 21–cv–
4954  (EDNY,  Sept.  12,  2021),  App.  to  Application  for  In-
junctive Relief in No. 21A125, p. 6.  Ultimately, the Second
Circuit issued a combined judgment rejecting all of the ap-
plicants’  claims  and  dissolving  the  preliminary  injunction
issued in Dr. A.  See We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul,
17 F. 4th 368 (CA2 2021) (per curiam).

II

We assess requests for temporary injunctive relief under
a familiar standard that focuses, among other things, on the
merits of the applicants’ underlying claims and the harms
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents, discusses specific cases, and uses legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

YATES v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

 JUSTICE  GINSBURG,  joined  by  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE,  JUSTICE  BREYER,
and  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  concluded  that  a  “tangible  object”  within
§1519’s compass is one used to record or preserve information.  Pp. 6–
20.

(a) Although dictionary definitions of the words “tangible” and “ob-
ject”  bear  consideration  in  determining  the  meaning  of  “tangible  ob-
ject” in §1519, they are not dispositive.  Whether a statutory term is
unambiguous  “is  determined  [not  only]  by  reference  to  the  language
itself,  [but  also  by]  the  specific  context  in  which  that  language  is
used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”  Robinson v.
Shell  Oil  Co.,  519  U. S.  337,  341.    Identical  language  may  convey
varying  content  when  used  in  different  statutes,  sometimes  even  in
different provisions of the same statute.  See, e.g., FAA v. Cooper, 566
U. S. ___, ___.  Pp. 7–10.

(b)  Familiar  interpretive  guides  aid  the  construction  of  “tangible
object.”  Though not commanding, §1519’s heading—“Destruction, al-
teration,  or  falsification  of  records  in  Federal  investigations  and
bankruptcy”—conveys no suggestion that the section prohibits spolia-
tion of any and all physical evidence, however remote from records.

Section 1519’s position within Title 18, Chapter 73, further signals
that §1519 was not intended to serve as a cross-the-board ban on the
destruction of physical evidence.  Congress placed §1519 at the end of
Chapter  73  following  immediately  after  pre-existing  specialized  pro-
visions expressly aimed at corporate fraud and financial audits.

The  contemporaneous  passage  of  §1512(c)(1),  which  prohibits  a
person  from  “alter[ing],  destroy[ing],  mutilat[ing],  or  conceal[ing]  a
record, document, or other object . . . with the intent to impair the ob-
ject’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding,” is also
instructive.    The  Government  argues  that  §1512(c)(1)’s  reference  to
“other object” includes any and every physical object.  But if §1519’s
reference to “tangible object” already included all physical objects, as
the Government also contends, then Congress had no reason to enact
§1512(c)(1).  Section 1519 should not be read to render superfluous an
entire  provision  passed  in  proximity  as  part  of  the  same  Act.    See
Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. ___, ___.

The  words  immediately  surrounding  “tangible  object”  in  §1519—
“falsifies,  or  makes  a  false  entry  in  any  record  [or]  document”—also
cabin  the  contextual  meaning  of  that  term.    Applying  the  canons
noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, “tangible object,” as the last in
a list of terms that begins “any record [or] document,” is appropriate-
ly read to refer, not to any tangible object, but specifically to the sub-
set  of  tangible  objects  used  to  record  or  preserve  information.    This
moderate  interpretation  accords  with  the  list  of  actions  §1519  pro-
scribes;  the  verbs  “falsif[y]”  and  “mak[e]  a  false  entry  in”  typically
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, specifically focusing on the interpretation of a legal statute (Section 1519). It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the core narrative content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>