<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

23

Opinion of the Court

a crime at all stages of pregnancy and authorized the impo-
sition of severe punishment.  See Lord Ellenborough’s Act,
43 Geo. 3, c. 58 (1803).  One scholar has suggested that Par-
liament’s decision “may partly have been attributable to the
medical man’s concern that fetal life should be protected by
the law at all stages of gestation.”  Keown 22.

In this country during the 19th century, the vast majority
of the States enacted statutes criminalizing abortion at all
stages  of  pregnancy.  See  Appendix  A,  infra  (listing  state
statutory provisions in chronological order).33  By 1868, the
year when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, three-
quarters  of  the  States,  28  out  of  37,  had  enacted  statutes
making  abortion  a  crime  even  if  it  was  performed  before
quickening.34  See ibid.  Of the nine States that had not yet

——————
of the Maine Medical Association 37–39 (1866); Report on Criminal Abor-
tion,  in  12  Transactions  of  the  American  Medical  Association  75–77
(1859);  W.  Guy,  Principles  of  Medical  Forensics  133–134  (1845);  J.
Chitty,  Practical  Treatise  on  Medical  Jurisprudence  438  (2d  Am.  ed.
1836); 1 T. Beck & J. Beck, Elements of Medical Jurisprudence 293 (5th
ed.  1823);  2  T.  Percival,  The  Works,  Literary,  Moral  and  Medical  430
(1807); see also Keown 38–39 (collecting English authorities).

33 See  generally  Dellapenna  315–319  (cataloging  the  development  of
the law in the States); E. Quay, Justifiable Abortion—Medical and Legal
Foundations, 49 Geo. L. J. 395, 435–437, 447–520 (1961) (Quay) (same);
J.  Witherspoon,  Reexamining  Roe:  Nineteenth-Century  Abortion  Stat-
utes  and  The  Fourteenth  Amendment,  17  St.  Mary’s  L. J.  29,  34–36
(1985) (Witherspoon) (same).

34 Some scholars assert that only 27 States prohibited abortion at all
stages.  See, e.g., Dellapenna 315; Witherspoon 34–35, and n. 15.  Those
scholars  appear  to  have  overlooked  Rhode  Island,  which  criminalized
abortion at all stages in 1861.  See Acts and Resolves R. I. 1861, ch. 371,
§1, p. 133 (criminalizing the attempt to “procure the miscarriage” of “any
pregnant woman” or “any woman supposed by such person to be preg-
nant,” without mention of quickening).  The amicus brief for the Ameri-
can Historical Association asserts that only 26 States prohibited abortion
at all stages, but that brief incorrectly excludes West Virginia and Ne-
braska from its count.  Compare Brief for American Historical Associa-
tion 27–28 (citing Quay), with Appendix A, infra.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing legal precedents and statutes. It discusses the history of abortion laws in the United States, focusing on the 19th century.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Historical Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Per Curiam

the Secretary to produce two sets of numbers—a valid tab-
ulation derived from the census, and an invalid tabulation
excluding  aliens  based  on  administrative  records  outside
the census.  Id., at ___, 2020 WL 5422959, *27.  The District
Court also ruled that the exclusion of aliens on the basis of
legal  status  would  contravene  the  requirement  in  §2a(a)
that  the  President  state  the  “whole  number  of  persons  in
each State” for purposes of apportionment.  Id., at ___, 2020
WL 5422959, *32.  The District Court declared the memo-
randum unlawful and enjoined the Secretary from includ-
ing the information needed to implement the memorandum
in his §141(b) report to the President.  Id., at ___, 2020 WL
5422959,  *35.  The  Government  appealed,  and  we  post-
poned  consideration  of  our  jurisdiction.    592  U. S.  ___
(2020).

A foundational principle of Article III is that “an actual
controversy must exist not only at the time the complaint is
filed, but through all stages of the litigation.”  Already, LLC
v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85, 90–91 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  As the plaintiffs concede, any chilling ef-
fect from the memorandum dissipated upon the conclusion
of the census response period.  The plaintiffs now seek to
substitute an alternative theory of a “legally cognizable in-
jury” premised on the threatened impact of an unlawful ap-
portionment  on  congressional  representation  and  federal
funding.  Id., at 100.  As the case comes to us, however, we
conclude that it does not—at this time—present a dispute
“appropriately resolved through the judicial process.”  Su-
san B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 157 (2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Two related doctrines of justiciability—each originating
in  the  case-or-controversy  requirement  of  Article III—
underlie this determination.  See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno,  547  U. S.  332,  352  (2006).    First,  a  plaintiff  must
demonstrate standing, including “an injury that is concrete,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, likely an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion.  It discusses justiciability doctrines, standing, and the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

THOMAS, J., dissenting

of  the  Federal  Government  using  those  powers  to  impose
financial liabilities on States enforceable by private parties.
Nor is there any evidence demonstrating that any kind of
judicial  proceedings—let  alone  private  damages  actions—
are “inextricably intertwined” with the war powers in the
way  that  judicial  condemnation  actions  are  intertwined
with eminent domain.  See supra, at 14–15, n. 6.

Second,  PennEast  emphasized  that  the  Constitution
vests  the  Federal  Government  “ ‘with  full  and  complete
power  to  execute  and  carry  out  its  purposes’ ”—including
the power of eminent domain—and that history shows that
the  Government  may  exercise  that  sovereign  power
through  private  delegatees.    594 U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at
15).  Here, there is no argument that employees granted a
cause of action under USERRA are “delegatees” of the war
powers in any meaningful sense.

Third, PennEast reasoned that recognizing New Jersey’s
immunity  claim  would  require  federal  delegatees  to  take
state  property,  thereby  forcing  States  to  file  inverse  con-
demnation  actions  for  just  compensation.    See  id.,  at  ___
(slip op., at 17).  The Court did not think that kind of ar-
rangement “would vindicate the principles underlying state
sovereign  immunity,”  including  the  principle  of  affording
States  “the  respect  owed  them  as  joint  sovereigns.”    Ibid.
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Here,  by  contrast,
there  is  no  sense  in  which  confirming  Texas’  immunity
would similarly undermine the principles underlying that
immunity.

*

*

*

In  the  end,  the  “history,  practice,  precedent,  and  the
structure of the Constitution” all demonstrate that States
did  not  surrender  their  sovereign  immunity  in  their  own
courts when Congress legislates pursuant to one of its war
powers.  Alden, 527 U. S., at 741, 754.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
968

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 20, 2009

558 U. S.

Professor  Rafael  I.  Pardo  for  leave  to  ﬁle  a  brief  as  amicus  cu
riae granted.

No.  08–1151.  Stop  the  Beach  Renourishment,  Inc.  v.
Florida  Department  of  Environmental  Protection  et  al.
Sup.  Ct.  Fla.
[Certiorari  granted,  557  U. S.  903.]  Motion  of  the
Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami
cus  curiae  and  for  divided  argument  granted.

No.  09–5973.  Torain  v.  Ameritech  Advanced  Data  Serv

ices.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.;

No. 09–6078.  GwanJun Kim v. Progressive Express Insur

ance  Co.  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.;

No. 09–6453.  Roach v.  Rockingham County Board of Edu

cation  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.;  and

No.  09–6595.  Schmitz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.
Motions  of  petitioners  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
denied.  Petitioners  are  allowed  until  November  10,  2009,  within
which  to  pay  the  docketing  fees  required  by  Rule  38(a)  and  to
submit  petitions  in  compliance  with  Rule  33.1  of  the  Rules  of
this  Court.

No.  09–6658.  In  re  Curtis;
No.  09–6677.  In  re  Warren;
No.  09–6716.  In  re  Martinez;  and
No.  09–6733.  In  re  Velarde.  Petitions  for  writs  of  habeas

corpus  denied.

No.  09–6708.  In  re  Berry;  and
No.  09–6748.  In  re  Carbin.  Motions  of  petitioners  for  leave
to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  petitions  for  writs  of
habeas  corpus  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–5944.  In  re  Williams;  and
No.  09–6024.  In  re  Rochester.  Motions  of  petitioners  for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petitions for writs
of  mandamus  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–204.  In  re  Klat.  Petition  for  writ  of  mandamus  and/

or  prohibition  denied.

No.  09–6139.  In  re  Traylor.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave
to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  petition  for  writ  of
mandamus  and/or  prohibition  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their statuses, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and focuses on legal proceedings rather than a story or informative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket/Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

under international law, “the distinction between conduct
that  does  and  conduct  that  does  not  violate  the  law  of
nations can turn on whether the conduct is done by or on
behalf  of  a  State  or  by  a  private  actor  independently  of  a
State.”  Kiobel,  621  F. 3d,  at  177  (Leval,  J.,  concurring  in
judgment).

The international-law norm against genocide, for exam
ple,  imposes  obligations  on  all  actors.    Acts  of  genocide
thus  violate  the  norm  irrespective  of  whether  they  are
committed  privately  or  in  concert  with  the  state.    See
Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the
Crime  of  Genocide,  Art.  II,  Dec.  9,  1948,  102  Stat.  3045
(defining  “genocide”  as  “any  of  the  following  acts  commit
ted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical,  racial  or  religious  group”);  see  also  18  U. S. C.
§1091(a) (“Whoever” commits genocide “shall be punished
as  provided  in  subsection  (b)”).    In  contrast,  other  norms,
like the prohibition on torture, require state action.  Con
duct  thus  qualifies  as  torture  and  violates  the  norm  only
when done “by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or  acquiescence  of  a  public  official  or  other  person  acting
in  an  official  capacity.”    Convention  Against  Torture  and
Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or  Pun
ishment, Art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20,
1465 U. N. T. S. 114 (Torture Convention).1

Footnote  20  in  Sosa  flags  this  distinction  and  instructs
courts  to  consider  whether  there  is  “sufficient  consensus”
that,  with  respect  to  the  particular  conduct  prohibited
under  “a  given  norm,”  the  type  of  defendant  being  sued
can  be  alleged  to  have  violated  that  specific  norm.  542
U. S.,  at  732,  n. 20.    Because  footnote  20  contemplates  a
——————

1 This  distinction  is  similar  to  the  state-action  doctrine  in  domestic
law.  The prohibitions in the Bill of Rights, for instance, apply only to
state  actors,  whereas  the  Thirteenth  Amendment’s  prohibition  on
slavery  applies  to  all  actors,  state  and  private.    See  United  States  v.
Kozminski, 487 U. S. 931, 942 (1988).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC. It discusses international law principles regarding state action and the applicability of norms like genocide and torture to private actors.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

7

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

It is telling that the Court’s precedents have recognized
just  one  narrow  situation  in  which  viewpoint  discrimina-
tion  is  permissible:  where  the  government  itself  is  speak-
ing  or  recruiting  others  to  communicate  a  message  on  its
behalf.  See  Legal  Services  Corporation  v.  Velazquez,  531
U. S.  533,  540–542  (2001);  Board  of  Regents  of  Univ.  of
Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, 229, 235 (2000);
Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 833.  The exception is necessary
to allow the government to stake out positions and pursue
policies.  See  Southworth,  supra,  at  235;  see  also  ante,  at
13–14.  But  it  is  also  narrow,  to  prevent  the  government
from  claiming  that  every  government  program  is  exempt
from the First Amendment.  These cases have identified a
number of factors that, if present, suggest the government
is  speaking  on  its  own  behalf;  but  none  are  present  here.
See ante, at 14–18.

There  may  be  situations  where  private  speakers  are
selected  for  a  government  program  to  assist  the  govern-
ment in advancing a particular message.  That is not this
case either.  The central purpose of trademark registration
is  to  facilitate  source  identification.    To  serve  that  broad
purpose,  the  Government  has  provided  the  benefits  of
federal registration to millions of marks identifying every
type of product and cause.  Registered trademarks do so by
means  of  a  wide  diversity  of  words,  symbols,  and  mes-
sages.  Whether a mark is disparaging bears no plausible
relation  to  that  goal.  While  defining  the  purpose  and
scope of a federal program for these purposes can be com-
plex, see, e.g., Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for
Open Society Int’l, Inc., 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op.,
at 8), our cases are clear that  viewpoint discrimination is
not  permitted  where,  as  here,  the  Government  “expends
funds  to  encourage  a  diversity  of  views  from  private
speakers,”  Velazquez,  supra,  at  542  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

NASA v. NELSON

Opinion of the Court

II
As  noted,  respondents  contend  that  portions  of  SF–85
and Form 42 violate their “right to informational privacy.”
Brief for Respondents 15.  This Court considered a similar
claim  in  Whalen,  429  U. S.  589,  which  concerned  New
York’s  practice  of  collecting  “the  names  and  addresses  of
all persons” prescribed dangerous drugs with  both “legiti-
mate  and  illegitimate  uses.”    Id.,  at  591.    In  discussing
that  claim,  the  Court  said  that  “[t]he  cases  sometimes
characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ ” actually involved “at
least two different kinds of interests”: one, an “interest in
avoiding  disclosure  of  personal  matters”;6  the  other,  an
interest  in  “making  certain  kinds  of  important  decisions”
free  from  government  interference.7   The  patients  who
brought  suit  in  Whalen  argued  that  New  York’s  statute
“threaten[ed]  to  impair”  both  their  “nondisclosure”  inter-
ests  and  their  interests  in  making  healthcare  decisions
independently.  Id.,  at  600.  The  Court,  however,  upheld
the statute as a “reasonable exercise of New York’s broad
police powers.”  Id., at 598.

Whalen  acknowledged  that  the  disclosure  of  “private
information”  to  the  State  was  an  “unpleasant  invasion  of
privacy,”  id.,  at  602,  but  the  Court  pointed  out  that  the
New  York  statute  contained  “security  provisions”  that

——————

6 429  U. S.,  at  598–599,  and  n. 25  (citing  Olmstead  v.  United  States,
277  U.  S.  438,  478  (1928)  (Brandeis,  J.,  dissenting)  (describing  “the
right  to  be  let  alone”  as  “the  right  most  valued  by  civilized  men”);
Griswold  v.  Connecticut,  381  U. S.  479,  483  (1965)  (“[T]he  First
Amendment  has  a  penumbra  where  privacy  is  protected  from  govern-
mental  intrusion”);  Stanley  v.  Georgia,  394  U. S.  557,  559,  568  (1969);
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 79 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); and id., at 78 (Powell, J., concurring)).

7 429 U. S., at 599–600, and n. 26 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113
(1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S.
1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); and Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 587 (1897)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case NASA v. Nelson. It discusses the concept of informational privacy and cites a previous case, Whalen.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

only  the  declaring  code  and  organizational  structure  that
was necessary for Java-trained programmers to activate fa-
miliar tasks (while, as we said, writing its own implement-
ing code).  Hence the copied material, in the judge’s view,
was a “system or method of operation,” which copyright law
specifically states cannot be copyrighted.  Id., at 977 (citing
17 U. S. C. §102(b)).

On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed.  That court held
that  both  the  API’s  declaring  code  and  its  organizational
structure could be copyrighted.  Oracle, 750 F. 3d, at 1354.
It  pointed  out  that  Google  could  have  written  its  own  de-
claring  code  just  as  it  wrote  its  own  implementing  code.
And because in principle Google might have created a whole
new  system  of  dividing  and  labeling  tasks  that  could  be
called up by programmers, the declaring code (and the sys-
tem)  that  made  up  the  Sun  Java  API  was  copyrightable.
Id., at 1361.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Oracle’s plea that it de-
cide whether Google had the right to use the Sun Java API
because doing so was a “fair use,” immune from copyright
liability.  The Circuit wrote that fair use “both permits and
requires ‘courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
which that law is designed to foster.’ ”  Id., at 1372–1373.
But, it added, this “is not a case in which the record contains
sufficient  factual  findings  upon  which  we  could  base  a de
novo assessment of Google’s affirmative defense of fair use.”
Id., at 1377.  And it remanded the case for another trial on
that question.  Google petitioned this Court for a writ of cer-
tiorari, seeking review of the Federal Circuit’s copyrighta-
bility determination.  We denied the petition.  Google, Inc.
v. Oracle America, Inc., 576 U. S. 1071 (2015).

On remand the District Court, sitting with a jury, heard
evidence for a week.  The court instructed the jury to an-
swer one question: Has Google “shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that its use in Android” of the declaring code
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. It delves into copyright law and the specific arguments made by both parties regarding the copyrightability of the Java API.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

5

Opinion of the Court

ure  to  warn  if  they  have  complied  with  all  regulatory
requirements  (including  but  not  limited  to  warning  re-
quirements)  and  have  given  the  warning  either  to  the
claimant  or  the  claimant’s  physician.25   They  are  immu-
nized from liability for punitive damages absent failure to
comply with regulatory requirements, “fraud,” “intentional
and wrongful withholding of information,” or other “crimi-
nal or illegal activity.”26  And most relevant to the present
case,  the  Act  expressly  eliminates  liability  for  a  vaccine’s
unavoidable, adverse side effects:

“No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil ac-
tion for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury
or  death  associated  with  the  administration  of  a  vac-
cine  after  October  1,  1988,  if  the  injury  or  death  re-
sulted  from  side  effects  that  were  unavoidable  even
though the vaccine was properly prepared and was ac-
companied by proper directions and warnings.”27

B
The  vaccine  at  issue  here  is  a  DTP  vaccine  manufac-
tured  by  Lederle  Laboratories.  It  first  received  federal
approval  in  1948  and  received  supplemental  approvals  in
1953  and  1970.  Respondent  Wyeth  purchased  Lederle  in
1994 and stopped manufacturing the vaccine in 1998.

Hannah Bruesewitz was born on October 20, 1991.  Her
pediatrician  administered  doses  of  the  DTP  vaccine  ac-
cording  to  the  Center  for  Disease  Control’s  recommended
childhood immunization schedule.  Within 24 hours of her
April  1992  vaccination,  Hannah  started  to  experience

——————

25 See §300aa–22(b)(2), (c).  The immunity does not apply if the plain-
tiff establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the manufacturer
was  negligent,  or  was  guilty  of  fraud,  intentional  and  wrongful  with-
holding  of  information,  or  other  unlawful  activity.    See  §§300aa–
22(b)(2), 300aa–23(d)(2).
26 §300aa–23(d)(2).
27 §300aa–22(b)(1).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing a case and referencing legal statutes. It is likely part of a larger legal document and contains important legal information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

that arises as an “inevitable result of the government’s con-
duct in requiring disclosure.”  Buckley, 424 U. S., at 65.

The Law Center (but not the Foundation) argues that we
should apply strict scrutiny, not exacting scrutiny.  Under
strict  scrutiny,  the  government  must  adopt  “the  least  re-
strictive  means  of  achieving  a  compelling  state  interest,”
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U. S. 464, 478 (2014), rather than
a means substantially related to a sufficiently important in-
terest.  The Law Center contends that only strict scrutiny
adequately  protects  the  associational  rights  of  charities.
And although the Law Center acknowledges that we have
applied exacting scrutiny in prior disclosure cases, it argues
that  those  cases  arose  in  the  electoral  context,  where  the
government’s important interests justify less searching re-
view.

It is true that we first enunciated the exacting scrutiny
standard  in  a  campaign  finance  case.    See  Buckley,  424
U. S.,  at  64–68.    And  we  have  since  invoked  it  in  other
election-related settings.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed-
eral Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 366–367 (2010); Davis
v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 744 (2008).  But
exacting  scrutiny  is  not  unique  to  electoral  disclosure  re-
gimes.  To  the  contrary,  Buckley  derived  the  test  from
NAACP  v.  Alabama  itself,  as  well  as  other  nonelection
cases.  See 424 U. S., at 64 (citing Gibson v. Florida Legis-
lative Investigation Comm., 372 U. S. 539 (1963); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S.
479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960)).  As
we explained in NAACP v. Alabama, “it is immaterial” to
the level of scrutiny “whether the beliefs sought to be ad-
vanced  by  association  pertain  to  political,  economic,  reli-
gious or cultural matters.”  357 U. S., at 460–461.  Regard-
less  of  the  type  of  association,  compelled  disclosure
requirements are reviewed under exacting scrutiny.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta*.  It discusses the legal standard of "exacting scrutiny" applied to compelled disclosure requirements, particularly in the context of charities.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

467

Opinion of Scalia, J.

manned and ﬁtted out, and employed for such purposes as in
his opinion the public service may require,” Act of Feb. 28,
1803, ch. 11, § 3, 2 Stat. 206. President Jefferson reported
that “[t]he sum of ﬁfty thousand dollars appropriated by Con-
gress for providing gun boats remains unexpended. The fa-
vorable and peaceable turn of affairs on the Mississippi ren-
dered an immediate execution of that law unnecessary,” 13
Annals of Cong. 14 (1803). Examples of appropriations com-
mitted to the discretion of the President abound in our his-
tory. During the Civil War, an Act appropriated over $76
million to be divided among various items “as the exigencies
of the service may require,” Act of Feb. 25, 1862, ch. 32, 12
Stat. 344–345. During the Great Depression, Congress ap-
propriated $950 million “for such projects and/or purposes
and under such rules and regulations as the President in his
discretion may prescribe,” Act of Feb. 15, 1934, ch. 13, 48
Stat. 351, and $4 billion for general classes of projects, the
money to be spent “in the discretion and under the direction
of the President,” Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of
1935, 49 Stat. 115. The constitutionality of such appropria-
tions has never seriously been questioned. Rather, “[t]hat
Congress has wide discretion in the matter of prescrib-
ing details of expenditures for which it appropriates must,
of course, be plain. Appropriations and other acts of Con-
gress are replete with instances of general appropriations of
large amounts, to be allotted and expended as directed by
designated government agencies.” Cincinnati Soap Co. v.
United States, 301 U. S. 308, 321–322 (1937).

Certain Presidents have claimed Executive authority to
withhold appropriated funds even absent an express confer-
ral of discretion to do so.
In 1876, for example, President
Grant reported to Congress that he would not spend money
appropriated for certain harbor and river improvements, see
Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 267, 19 Stat. 132, because “[u]nder
no circumstances [would he] allow expenditures upon works
not clearly national,” and in his view, the appropriations
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically the opinion of Justice Scalia in a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history of congressional appropriations and presidential discretion in spending.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

less obscure and equivocal.”  The Federalist No. 37, p. 229
(C.  Rossiter  ed.  1961).  As  Chief  Justice  Rehnquist
explained, the Constitution is in some parts “obviously not
a specifically worded document but one couched in general
phraseology.”  W.  Rehnquist,  The  Notion  of  a  Living
Constitution, 54 Texas L. Rev. 693, 697 (1976).

That is especially true with respect to the broadly worded
or vague individual-rights provisions.  (I will use the terms
“broadly  worded”  and  “vague”  interchangeably  in  this
opinion.)  For example, the First Amendment provides that
“Congress  shall  make  no  law”  “abridging  the  freedom  of
speech.”  And  the  Second  Amendment,  at  issue  here,
guarantees  that “the right of  the  people to keep and bear
Arms” “shall not be infringed.”

Read  literally,  those  Amendments  might  seem  to  grant
absolute  protection,  meaning  that  the  government  could
never regulate speech or guns in any way.  But American
law  has
long  recognized,  as  a  matter  of  original
understanding  and  original  meaning,  that  constitutional
rights generally come with exceptions.

With respect to the First Amendment, for example, this
Court’s  “jurisprudence  over  the  past  216”—now  233—
“years has rejected an absolutist interpretation.”   Federal
Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S.
449,  482  (2007)  (opinion  of  ROBERTS, C. J.);  see  R.  Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 Ind. L. J. 1, 21–22 (1971).  From 1791 to the present, “the
First  Amendment  has  permitted  restrictions  upon  the
content  of  speech  in  a  few  limited  areas”—including
obscenity,  defamation,  fraud,  and  incitement.    United
States  v.  Stevens,  559  U. S.  460,  468  (2010)  (quotation
marks  omitted).    So  too  with  respect  to  the  Second
Amendment:  “Like  most  rights,  the  right  secured  by  the
Second Amendment is not unlimited”; it is “not a right to
keep  and  carry  any  weapon  whatsoever  in  any  manner
whatsoever  and  for  whatever  purpose.”  District  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It delves into the interpretation of the Second Amendment and discusses the concept of exceptions to constitutional rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
74

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  34  U. S. C.  §10228(c)  (Prohibition  of  Federal
Control Over State and Local Criminal Justice
Agencies; Prohibition of Discrimination)

  34 U. S. C. §11133(a)(16) (Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention; State Plans)

  34  U. S. C.  §12161(g)  (Community  Schools
Youth  Services  and  Supervision  Grant  Pro-
gram)

  34 U. S. C. §12361 (Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement; Civil Rights for Women)

  34 U. S. C. §20110(e) (Crime Victims Fund; Ad-

ministration Provisions)

  34 U. S. C. §50104(a) (Emergency Federal Law

Enforcement Assistance)

  36  U. S. C.  §20204(b)  (Air  Force  Sergeants  As-

sociation; Membership)

  36 U. S. C. §20205(c) (Air Force Sergeants Asso-

ciation; Governing Body)

  36 U. S. C. §21003(a)(4) (American GI Forum of

the United States; Purposes)

  36  U. S. C.  §21004(b)  (American  GI  Forum  of

the United States; Membership)

  36  U. S. C.  §21005(c)  (American  GI  Forum  of

the United States; Governing Body)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely from a court opinion.  Legal citations are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Chevron, but in so doing, it poignantly lays bare the flaws
of our entire executive-deference jurisprudence.  Even if the
Court is not willing to question Chevron itself, at the very
least, we should consider taking a step away from the abyss
by revisiting Brand X.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal citations and arguments, indicating it is part of the actual content meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 624 (1998)

651

Opinion of the Court

to petitioner’s offer to treat respondent in a hospital.
Id.,
at 943, n. 4. Petitioner testiﬁed that he believed hospitals
had safety measures, such as air ﬁltration, ultraviolet lights,
and respirators, which would reduce the risk of HIV trans-
mission. App. 151. Petitioner made no showing, however,
that any area hospital had these safeguards or even that he
had hospital privileges.
Id., at 31. His expert also ad-
mitted the lack of any scientiﬁc basis for the conclusion that
Id.,
these measures would lower the risk of transmission.
at 209. Petitioner failed to present any objective, medical
evidence showing that treating respondent in a hospital
would be safer or more efﬁcient in preventing HIV transmis-
sion than treatment in a well-equipped dental ofﬁce.

We are concerned, however, that the Court of Appeals
might have placed mistaken reliance upon two other sources.
In ruling no triable issue of fact existed on this point, the
Court of Appeals relied on the 1993 CDC Dentistry Guide-
lines and the 1991 American Dental Association Policy on
HIV.
107 F. 3d, at 945–946. This evidence is not deﬁnitive.
As noted earlier, the CDC Guidelines recommended certain
universal precautions which, in CDC’s view, “should reduce
the risk of disease transmission in the dental environment.”
U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health
Service, CDC, Recommended Infection-Control Practices
for Dentistry, 41 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Rep.
No. RR–8, p. 1 (May 28, 1993). The Court of Appeals deter-
mined that, “[w]hile the guidelines do not state explicitly
that no further risk-reduction measures are desirable or that
routine dental care for HIV-positive individuals is safe, those
two conclusions seem to be implicit in the guidelines’ detailed
delineation of procedures for ofﬁce treatment of HIV-positive
patients.”
In our view, the Guidelines do
not necessarily contain implicit assumptions conclusive of the
point to be decided. The Guidelines set out CDC’s recom-
mendation that the universal precautions are the best way

107 F. 3d, at 946.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the case and presents legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

7

Opinion of the Court

text of the APA’s rulemaking provisions, and it improperly
imposes  on  agencies  an  obligation  beyond  the  “maximum
procedural  requirements”  specified  in  the  APA,  Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 524 (1978).

A

The  text  of  the  APA  answers  the  question  presented.
Section 4 of the APA provides that “notice of proposed rule
making  shall  be  published  in  the  Federal  Register.”  5
U. S. C.  §553(b).    When  such  notice  is  required  by  the
APA,  “the  agency  shall  give  interested  persons  an  oppor-
tunity to participate in the rule making.”  §553(c).  But §4
further states that unless “notice or hearing is required by
statute,”  the  Act’s  notice-and-comment  requirement  “does
not  apply  . . .  to  interpretative  rules.”    §553(b)(A).    This
exemption  of  interpretive  rules  from  the  notice-and-
comment  process  is  categorical,  and  it  is  fatal  to  the  rule
announced in Paralyzed Veterans.

Rather  than  examining  the  exemption  for  interpretive
rules contained in §4(b)(A) of the APA, the D. C. Circuit in
Paralyzed  Veterans  focused  its  attention  on §1  of  the  Act.
That section defines “rule making” to include not only the
initial  issuance  of  new  rules,  but  also  “repeal[s]”  or
“amend[ments]”  of  existing  rules.    See  §551(5).  Because
notice-and-comment  requirements  may  apply  even  to
these later agency actions, the court reasoned, “allow[ing]
an  agency  to  make  a  fundamental  change  in  its  interpre-
tation  of  a  substantive  regulation  without  notice  and
comment”  would  undermine  the  APA’s  procedural  frame-
work.  117 F. 3d, at 586.

This reading of the APA conflates the differing purposes
of  §§1  and  4  of  the  Act.  Section  1  defines  what  a  rule-
making  is.  It  does not,  however,  say  what  procedures  an
agency must use when it engages in rulemaking.  That is
the purpose of §4.  And §4 specifically exempts interpretive
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites legal precedents and delves into the interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U53

[09-26-01 10:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 576 (2000)

577

Syllabus

has violated § 207. Two other features of the FLSA support this inter-
pretation: Employers are permitted to decrease the number of hours
that employees work, and employers also may cash out accumulated
compensatory time by paying the employee his regular hourly wage for
each hour accrued. The county’s policy merely involves doing both of
these steps at once. A Department of Labor opinion letter taking the
position that an employer may compel the use of compensatory time
only if the employee has agreed in advance to such a practice is not
entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837.
Interpretations such as those in
opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force
of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference. They are “entitled to
respect,” but only to the extent that they are persuasive, Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140, which is not the case here. Chevron
deference does apply to an agency interpretation contained in a regula-
tion, but nothing in the Department of Labor’s regulation even arguably
requires that an employer’s compelled use policy must be included in an
agreement. And deference to an agency’s interpretation of its regula-
tion is warranted under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461, only when
the regulation’s language is ambiguous, which is not the case here.
Pp. 582–588.

158 F. 3d 241, afﬁrmed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, and in which
Scalia, J., joined except as to Part III. Souter, J., ﬁled a concurring
opinion, post, p. 589. Scalia, J., ﬁled an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 589. Stevens, J., ﬁled a dissent-
ing opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 592.
Breyer, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined,
post, p. 596.

Michael T. Leibig argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Richard H. Cobb and Murray E.
Malakoff.

Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief
were Solicitor General Waxman, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Allen H. Feldman, and
Edward D. Sieger.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the syllabus and the beginning of the opinion. It contains legal citations, case names, and a summary of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Syllabus

Held: New  York’s  proper-cause  requirement  violates  the  Fourteenth
Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-de-
fense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms in public for self-defense.  Pp. 8–63.

(a) In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, and McDonald v.
Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, the Court held that the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments  protect  an  individual  right  to  keep  and  bear  arms  for
self-defense.  Under Heller, when the Second Amendment’s plain text
covers  an  individual’s  conduct,  the  Constitution  presumptively  pro-
tects that conduct, and to justify a firearm regulation the government
must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation.  Pp. 8–22.

(1) Since Heller and McDonald, the Courts of Appeals have devel-
oped a “two-step” framework for analyzing Second Amendment chal-
lenges that combines history with means-end scrutiny.  The Court re-
jects that two-part approach as having one step too many.  Step one is
broadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted in the Sec-
ond Amendment’s text, as informed by history.  But Heller and McDon-
ald do not support a second step that applies means-end scrutiny in
the  Second  Amendment  context.  Heller’s  methodology  centered  on
constitutional text and history.  It did not invoke any means-end test
such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, and it expressly rejected any
interest-balancing inquiry akin to intermediate scrutiny.  Pp. 9–15.

(2) Historical  analysis  can  sometimes  be  difficult  and  nuanced,
but reliance on history to inform the meaning of constitutional text is
more legitimate, and more administrable, than asking judges to “make
difficult empirical judgments” about “the costs and benefits of firearms
restrictions,”  especially  given  their  “lack  [of]  expertise”  in  the  field.
McDonald, 561 U. S., at 790–791 (plurality opinion).  Federal courts
tasked  with  making  difficult  empirical  judgments  regarding  firearm
regulations under the banner of “intermediate scrutiny” often defer to
the determinations of legislatures.  While judicial deference to legisla-
tive interest balancing is understandable—and, elsewhere, appropri-
ate—it is not deference that the Constitution demands here.  The Sec-
ond Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the
people,”  and  it  “surely  elevates  above  all  other  interests  the  right  of
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms” for self-defense.  Heller,
554 U. S., at 635.  Pp. 15–17.

(3) The test that the Court set forth in Heller and applies today
requires  courts  to  assess  whether  modern  firearms  regulations  are
consistent  with  the  Second  Amendment’s  text  and  historical  under-
standing.  Of course, the regulatory challenges posed by firearms today
are  not  always  the  same  as  those  that  preoccupied  the  Founders  in
1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868.  But the Constitution
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the court's holding and reasoning, which is not the type of content meant to be indexed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

21

Opinion of the Court

Pass, No. 1:18–cv–01823 (D Ore.), ECF Doc. 63–4, pp. 2, 16;
Tr. of Oral Arg. 159.  In that respect, the city’s laws parallel
those  found  in  countless  jurisdictions  across  the  country.
See  Part  I–A,  supra.  And  because  laws  like  these  do  not
criminalize mere status, Robinson is not implicated.5

C
If Robinson does not control this case, the plaintiffs and
the dissent argue, we should extend it so that it does.  Per-
haps a person does not violate ordinances like Grants Pass’s
simply by being homeless but only by engaging in certain
acts  (actus  rei)  with  certain  mental  states  (mentes  reae).
Still,  the  plaintiffs  and  the  dissent  insist,  laws  like  these
seek  to  regulate  actions  that  are  in  some  sense  “involun-
tary,” for some homeless persons cannot help but do what
the law forbids.  See Brief for Respondents 24–25, 29, 32;
post, at 16–17 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).  And, the plain-
tiffs and the dissent continue, we should extend Robinson
to prohibit the enforcement of laws that operate this way—
laws that don’t proscribe status as such but that proscribe
acts,  even  acts  undertaken  with  some  required  mental
state,  the  defendant  cannot  help  but  undertake.    Post,  at
16–17.  To rule otherwise, the argument goes, would “ ‘effec-
tively’ ” allow cities to punish a person because of his status.
Post,  at  25.  The  Ninth  Circuit  pursued  just  this  line  of
thinking below and in Martin.

The problem is, this Court has already rejected that view.

——————

5 At  times,  the  dissent  seems  to  suggest,  mistakenly,  that  laws  like
Grants  Pass’s  apply  only  to  the  homeless.  See post,  at  13.  That  view
finds  no  support  in  the  laws  before  us.  Perhaps  the  dissent  means  to
suggest that some cities selectively “enforce” their public-camping laws
only against homeless persons.  See post, at 17–19.  But if that’s the dis-
sent’s  theory,  it  is  not  one  that  arises  under  the  Eighth  Amendment’s
Cruel  and  Unusual  Punishments  Clause.    Instead,  if  anything,  it  may
implicate  due  process  and  our  precedents  regarding  selective  prosecu-
tion.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Armstrong,  517  U. S.  456  (1996).    No
claim like that is before us in this case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

23

KENNEDY, J., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of KENNEDY, J.

APPENDIX

“§2703.  Required  disclosure  of  customer  communi-
cations or records

  “(d)  REQUIREMENTS  FOR  COURT  ORDER.—A  court  order
for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by
any  court  that  is  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  and
shall  issue  only  if  the  governmental  entity  offers  specific
and  articulable  facts  showing  that  there  are  reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication,  or  the  records  or  other  information
sought,  are  relevant  and  material  to  an  ongoing  criminal
investigation.  In the case of a State governmental author-
ity, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the
law  of  such  State.  A  court  issuing  an  order  pursuant  to
this  section,  on  a  motion  made  promptly  by  the  service
provider,  may  quash  or  modify  such  order,  if  the  infor-
mation  or  records  requested  are  unusually  voluminous  in
nature  or  compliance  with  such  order  otherwise  would
cause an undue burden on such provider.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, specifically a section from a court case. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a specific statute being referenced.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Case Law Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xliii

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Loli v. Citibank, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Long; Louisiana Dept. of Transportation and Development v.
. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Long v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Longman v. Food Lion, Inc.
Lopez v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lopez-Ayala v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Los Angeles County; Mahon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Los Angeles County; United States ex rel. A–1 Amb. Serv. v.
. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Loughridge v. United States
Louisiana; Benn v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Broadway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Hebert v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Johnson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Lucky v.
Louisiana v. Penn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Penns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Thibodeaux v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Wolfe v.
Louisiana; Wright v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections; Edmonds v. . . .
Louisiana Dept. of Transportation and Development v. Long . . . .
Love v. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lowe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Loy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lozano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lucero; Pierce v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lucero; Souders v.
Lucky v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Luebbers; Boston v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Luebbers; Hampton v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Luebbers; Jackson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Luebbers; Klumpp v.
Luebbers; Lingar v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Luebbers; Nickerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Luebbers; Nyhuis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Luebbers; Parker v.
Luebbers; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Luebbers; Simmons v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Luebbers; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lukan v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lukens, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lukens v. Oregon State Ofﬁce for Services to Children and Families
Luker; Robinson v.
Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.; Johnson v.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
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1024

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

17

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

there confronted a claim, based on Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U. S. 702 (1997), that the Fourteenth Amendment
“must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with cen-
tral  reference  to  specific  historical  practices”—exactly  the
view today’s majority follows.  Obergefell, 576 U. S., at 671.
And the Court specifically rejected that view.4  In doing so,
the Court reflected on what the proposed, historically cir-
cumscribed  approach  would  have  meant  for  interracial
marriage.  See ibid.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers
did not think it gave black and white people a right to marry
each  other.  To  the  contrary,  contemporaneous  practice
deemed that act quite as unprotected as abortion.  Yet the
Court  in  Loving  v.  Virginia,  388  U. S.  1  (1967),  read  the
Fourteenth Amendment to embrace the Lovings’ union.  If,
Obergefell explained, “rights were defined by who exercised
them  in  the  past,  then  received  practices  could  serve  as
their own continued justification”—even when they conflict
with “liberty” and “equality” as later and more broadly un-
derstood.  576  U. S.,  at  671.  The  Constitution  does  not
freeze  for  all  time  the  original  view  of  what  those  rights
guarantee, or how they apply.

That does not mean anything goes.  The majority wishes
people to think there are but two alternatives: (1) accept the
original applications of the Fourteenth Amendment and no
others, or (2) surrender to judges’ “own ardent views,” un-
grounded in law, about the “liberty that Americans should
enjoy.”  Ante, at 14.  At least, that idea is what the majority
sometimes tries to convey.  At other times, the majority (or,
rather, most of it) tries to assure the public that it has no
designs on rights (for example, to contraception) that arose
only in the back half of the 20th century—in other words,

——————

4 The majority ignores that rejection.  See ante, at 5, 13, 36.  But it is
unequivocal:  The  Glucksberg  test,  Obergefell  said,  “may  have  been  ap-
propriate” in considering physician-assisted suicide, but “is inconsistent
with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental
rights, including marriage and intimacy.”  576 U. S., at 671.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, indicating it is part of the main body of the text and not a preface, table of contents, or other non-sequential element.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
130

McDANIEL  v.  BROWN

Per Curiam

that  one  of  Troy’s  brothers  would  also  match  the  DNA  left
at the scene.

III

Although  we  granted  certiorari  to  review  respondent’s
Jackson  claim,  the  parties  now  agree  that  the  Court  of  Ap
peals’  resolution  of  his  claim  under  Jackson  was  in  error.
See Brief for Respondent 2–3; Reply Brief for Petitioners 1.
Indeed, respondent argues the Court of Appeals did not de
cide  his  case  under  Jackson  at  all,  but  instead  resolved  the
question  whether  admission  of  Romero’s  inaccurate  testi
mony  rendered  his  trial  fundamentally  unfair  and  then  ap
plied Jackson to determine whether that error was harmless.
Although both petitioners and respondent are now aligned
on  the  same  side  of  the  questions  presented  for  our  review,
the  case  is  not  moot  because  “the  parties  continue  to  seek
different relief ” from this Court.  Paciﬁc Bell Telephone Co.
v.  linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U. S. 438, 446 (2009).
Respondent primarily argues that we afﬁrm on his proposed
alternative ground or remand to the Ninth Circuit for analy
sis of his due process claim under the standard for harmless
error  of  Brecht  v.  Abrahamson,  507  U. S.  619  (1993).  The
State,  on  the  other  hand,  asks  us  to  reverse.  Respondent
and one amicus have also suggested that we dismiss the case
as  improvidently  granted,  Brief  for  National  Association  of
Criminal  Defense  Lawyers  as  Amicus  Curiae  27–28,  but
we  think  prudential  concerns  favor  our  review  of  the  Court
of  Appeals’  application  of  Jackson.  Cf.  Paciﬁc  Bell,  supra,
at 447.

Respondent no longer argues it was proper for the District
Court to admit the Mueller Report for the purpose of evalu
ating  his  Jackson  claim,  Brief  for  Respondent  35,  and  con
cedes  the  “purpose  of  a  Jackson  analysis  is  to  determine
whether  the  jury  acted  in  a  rational  manner  in  returning  a
guilty  verdict  based  on  the  evidence  before  it,  not  whether
improper  evidence  violated  due  process,”  id.,  at  2.  There
has  been  no  suggestion  that  the  evidence  adduced  at  trial
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the opinion of the court. It contains legal jargon and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

17

Opinion of the Court

Texas suggests that Congress’s reference to the tribal reso-
lution at least augurs in favor of a “broa[d]” reading of sub-
section (a).  Brief for Respondent 22; see also post, at 9–10.
But saying that tells us nothing about how much broader
the  law  should  be  read.    And,  as  we  have  seen,  the  only
“broader”  reading  of  subsection  (a)  Texas  offers  faces  its
challenges—  it  requires  us  to  believe  that  subsection  (a)
swallows subsection (b) whole, makes a nullity of subsection
(c),  and  defies  Congress’s  apparent  adoption  of  Cabazon’s
prohibitory/regulatory distinction.

There is still another and maybe more fundamental prob-
lem  here.  On  our  interpretation  of  the  Restoration  Act,
Congress did legislate “in accordance with” the Tribe’s res-
olution: It expressly granted the Tribe federal recognition
and chose not to apply Texas gaming regulations as surro-
gate  federal  law  on  tribal  land.    Of  course,  Congress  also
sought  to  act  in  accordance  with  at  least  some  of  Texas’s
concerns by banning those games fully barred by Texas law.
In the end, it seems each got half a loaf.

By contrast, adopting Texas’s alternative interpretation
of the Restoration Act would make a mockery of Congress’s
statement  that  it  sought  to  act  “in  accordance  with”  the
Tribe’s  resolution.  On  the  State’s  view,  all  of  its  gaming
regulations  serve  as  surrogate  federal  law  applicable  on
tribal lands.  That’s a result few would dare to describe as
“accord[ing] with” the tribal resolution.  In fact, it’s an out-
come more nearly the opposite of what the Tribe sought and
closer to what it described as a “wholly unsatisfactory . . .
infringement upon the Tribe[’s] power of self government”
and “[i]nconsistent with the central purposes of restoration
of the federal trust relationship.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 122.
To be sure and as Texas and the dissent both highlight,
the  statutory  terms  Congress  finally  settled  on  were  in
some respects more generous to the Tribe than those its res-
olution authorized tribal negotiators in Washington to ac-
cept.  Rather than ban all gaming on tribal lands, Congress
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the interpretation of a law (the Restoration Act) and its implications for tribal gaming regulations. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of the Court

argument that §113 stripped the Montana courts of juris-
diction over the landowners’ claim for restoration damages.
The court recognized that §113 strips federal courts (and, it
was willing to assume, state courts) of jurisdiction to review
challenges  to  EPA  cleanup  plans.    But  the  Montana  Su-
preme  Court  reasoned  that  the  landowners’  plan  was  not
such  a  challenge  because  it  would  not  “stop,  delay,  or
change the work EPA is doing.”  Id., at 83, 408 P. 3d, at 520.
The landowners were “simply asking to be allowed to pre-
sent their own plan to restore their own private property to
a jury of twelve Montanans who will then assess the merits
of that plan.”  Id., at 84, 408 P. 3d, at 521.

The Montana Supreme Court also rejected Atlantic Rich-
field’s  argument  that  the  landowners  were  potentially  re-
sponsible parties (sometimes called PRPs) prohibited from
taking  remedial  action  without  EPA  approval  under
§122(e)(6) of the Act.  The Court observed that the landown-
ers had “never been treated as PRPs for any purpose—by
either EPA or [Atlantic Richfield]—during the entire thirty-
plus years” since the designation of the Superfund site, and
that the statute of limitations for a claim against the land-
owners had run.  Id., at 86, 408 P. 3d, at 522.  “Put simply,
the PRP horse left the barn decades ago.”  Ibid.

Justice Baker concurred, stressing that on remand Atlan-
tic Richfield could potentially defeat the request for resto-
ration damages on the merits by proving that the restora-
tion plan conflicted with EPA’s cleanup plan.  Id., at 87–90,
408 P. 3d, at 523–525.  Justice McKinnon dissented.  She
argued  that  the  landowners’  restoration  plan  did  conflict
with  the  Superfund  cleanup  and  thus  constituted  a  chal-
lenge under §113(h) of the Act, over which Montana courts
lacked jurisdiction.  Id., at 90–101, 408 P. 3d, at 525–532.

We granted certiorari.  587 U. S. ___ (2019).

We  begin  with  two  threshold  questions:  whether  this

II
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the arguments and reasoning of a lower court case. It delves into legal statutes and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

KAGAN, J., dissenting

at a time when he can return the favor—by a vote, a con-
tract,  an  appointment.    It  takes  no  political  genius  to  see
the heightened risk of corruption—the danger of “I’ll make
you  richer  and  you’ll  make  me  richer”  arrangements  be-
tween donors and officeholders.  Section 304 has guarded
against that threat for two decades, but no longer.  In dis-
carding  the  statute,  the  Court  fuels  non-public-serving,
self-interested governance.  It injures the integrity, both ac-
tual  and  apparent,  of  the  political  process.  I  respectfully
dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

Opinion of the Court

retaliation claim “threaten[s] to set off broad-ranging dis-
covery in which there is often no clear end to the relevant
evidence.”  Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip
op., at 11) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“[U]ndoubtedly,” then, the “prospect of personal liability”
under the First Amendment would lead “to new difficulties
and expense.”  Schweiker, 487 U. S., at 425.  Federal em-
ployees “face[d with] the added risk of personal liability for
decisions that they believe to be a correct response to im-
proper [activity] would be deterred from” carrying out their
duties.  Bush,  462  U. S.,  at  389.  We  are  therefore  “con-
vinced” that, in light of these costs, “Congress is in a better
position to decide whether or not the public interest would
be served” by imposing a damages action.  Id., at 390.

The Court of Appeals nonetheless extended Bivens to the
First  Amendment  because,  in  its  view,  retaliation  claims
are “well-established,” and Boule alleges that Agent Egbert
“was  not  carrying  out  official  duties”  when  he  retaliated
against him.  998 F. 3d, at 391.  Neither rationale has merit.
First,  just  because  plaintiffs  often  plead  unlawful  retalia-
tion to establish a First Amendment violation is not a rea-
son to afford them a cause of action to sue federal officers
for money damages.  If anything, that retaliation claims are
common, and therefore more likely to impose “a significant
expansion  of  Government  liability,”  Meyer,  510  U. S.,  at
486, counsels against permitting Bivens relief.

Second,  the  Court  of  Appeals’  scope-of-duty  observation
does not meaningfully limit the number of potential Bivens
claims  or  otherwise  undermine  the  reasons  for  hesitation
stated  above.  It  is  easy  to  allege  that  federal  employees
acted beyond the scope of their authority when claiming a
constitutional violation.  And, regardless, granting Bivens
relief because a federal agent supposedly did not act pursu-
ant to his law-enforcement mission “misses the point.”  Her-
nández, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14).  “The question is
not whether national security,” or some other governmental
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the legal reasoning behind a decision, citing previous cases and arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring

when it vetoed a bill passed by the legislature that called
for  a  convention  to  revise  New  York’s  Constitution.    1  C.
Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 623–626
(1906) (Lincoln).  The State Assembly then issued a report
lambasting “the Council for usurping the legislature’s role
as the democratic representative of the people”; the legisla-
ture subsequently enacted a new bill that succeeded in call-
ing for a constitutional convention.  Barry 247; Lincoln 626–
629.    The  same  sentiment  arose  at  the  convention  when,
echoing arguments that had also been made in Philadelphia
against a federal council of revision, opponents of the Coun-
cil  argued  that  it  had  “ ‘usurped  the  power  of  judging  the
expediency as well as the constitutionality of bills passed by
the  legislature’ ”  and  that  it  had  “ ‘in  fact  become  a  third
branch of the legislature.’ ”  Barry 247 (quoting N. Carter &
W.  Stone,  Reports  of  the  Proceedings  and  Debates  of  the
Convention of 1821, pp. 55, 79 (1821)).  Unsurprisingly, the
Council was abolished, and New York’s 1821 Constitution
placed the veto power solely in the Governor.  Barry 248.
  When courts apply the facial overbreadth doctrine, they
function in a manner strikingly similar to the federal coun-
cil of revision that the Framers rejected.  The doctrine con-
templates that courts can declare laws unconstitutional in
the abstract without the law ever being applied against any
individual in an unconstitutional manner.  Along the way,
courts must examine the sum total of the law’s application
to people who are not parties to any proceeding; courts then
weigh the law’s various applications to determine if any un-
constitutional  applications  outweigh  the  law’s  constitu-
tional sweep or might “chill” protected speech.  That is noth-
ing short of a society-wide policy determination of the sort
that  legislatures  perform.    Yet,  the  Court  has  never  even
attempted to ground this doctrine “in the text or history of
the First Amendment.”  Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S., at ___–
___ (concurring  opinion) (slip  op.,  at  2–3).   Instead, it  has
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It cites legal precedents and discusses the history of the Council of Revision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

YATES v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

said “crocodile”?

This  reading,  of  course,  has  its  shortcomings.  For  in-
stance,  this  is  an  imperfect  ejusdem  generis  case  because
“record”  and  “document”  are  themselves  quite  general.
And  there  is  a  risk  that  “tangible  object”  may  be  made
superfluous—what  is  similar  to  a  “record”  or  “document”
but  yet  is  not  one?    An  e-mail,  however,  could  be  such  a
thing.  See United States Sentencing Commission, Guide-
lines  Manual  §2J1.2  and  comment.  (Nov.  2003)  (reading
“records, documents, or tangible objects” to “includ[e]” what
is  found  on  “magnetic,  optical,  digital,  other  electronic,
or  other  storage  mediums  or  devices”).  An  e-mail,  after
all, might not be a “document” if, as was “traditionally” so,
a document was a “piece of paper with information on it,”
not  “information  stored  on  a  computer,  electronic  storage
device,  or  any  other  medium.”  Black’s  Law  Dictionary
587–588  (10th  ed.  2014).  E-mails  might  also  not  be  “rec-
ords”  if  records  are  limited  to  “minutes”  or  other  formal
writings  “designed  to  memorialize  [past]  events.”    Id.,  at
1465.  A hard drive, however, is tangible and can contain
files  that  are  precisely  akin  to  even  these  narrow  defini-
tions.  Both  “record”  and  “document”  can  be  read  more
expansively,  but  adding  “tangible  object”  to  §1519  would
ensure  beyond  question  that  electronic  files  are  included.
To be sure, “tangible object” presumably can capture more
than just e-mails; Congress enacts “catchall[s]” for “known
unknowns.”  Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860
(2009).  But  where  noscitur  a  sociis  and  ejusdem  generis
apply,  “known  unknowns”  should  be  similar  to  known
knowns,  i.e.,  here,  records  and  documents.    This  is  espe-
cially  true  because  reading  “tangible  object”  too  broadly
could render “record” and “document” superfluous.

Next,  consider  §1519’s  list  of  verbs:  “alters,  destroys,
mutilates,  conceals,  covers  up,  falsifies,  or  makes  a  false
entry  in.”  Although  many  of  those  verbs  could  apply  to
nouns  as  far-flung  as  salamanders,  satellites,  or  sand
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of a specific law (likely §1519) and its application to electronic data.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529BV$

Take: SPIX

08-17-01 13:00:55

The dashed line indicates the top edge of the book.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

UNITED STATES

REPORTS

529

OCT. TERM 1999

BUILDING REGULATIONS

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The dashed line indicates the bottom edge of the book.

This layout was established for the maximum spine width. It should
be centered on the spine (left and right) to full width of the spine.
The excess (left and right) is to be omitted.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be metadata about a book, including information about the job number, a take number, date, and instructions for book binding. It is not the main content of the book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Book Metadata</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

959

558 U. S.

October 13, 2009

No.  09–6300.  Zayas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  43.

No.  09–6301.  Brown  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  856.

No.  09–6303.  Roberts  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  555.

No. 09–6305.  Story, aka Jones v.  United States.  C. A. 4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  422.

No.  09–6310.  Pratt  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  11.

No.  09–6314.  Green  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–6315.  Taylor v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  349.

No.  09–6316.  Wells  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  781.

No.  09–6317.  Littlejohn  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  963  A.  2d  167.

No.  09–6320.  Cochran  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  244.

No. 09–6321.  Dean v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  377.

No.  09–6322.  De  Leon-Godinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 334 Fed. Appx. 818.

No.  09–6323.  Ciocan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  773.

No.  09–6324.  Cantu  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6325.  Quezada-Enriquez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  1228.

No.  09–6326.  Stewart  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  102.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v.
PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 20–1199.  Argued October 31, 2022—Decided June 29, 2023*

Harvard College and the University of North Carolina (UNC) are two of
the oldest institutions of higher learning in the United States.  Every
year, tens of thousands of students apply to each school; many fewer
are admitted.  Both Harvard and UNC employ a highly selective ad-
missions process to make their decisions.  Admission to each school can
depend on a student’s grades, recommendation letters, or extracurric-
ular involvement.  It can also depend on their race.  The question pre-
sented  is  whether  the  admissions  systems  used  by  Harvard  College
and UNC are lawful under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.

At Harvard, each application for admission is initially screened by a
“first reader,” who assigns a numerical score in each of six categories:
academic, extracurricular, athletic, school support, personal, and over-
all.  For the “overall” category—a composite of the five other ratings—
a  first  reader can  and  does consider  the  applicant’s  race.    Harvard’s
admissions subcommittees then review all applications from a partic-
ular geographic area.  These regional subcommittees make recommen-
dations to the full admissions committee, and they take an applicant’s
race  into  account.    When  the  40-member  full  admissions  committee
begins its deliberations, it discusses the relative breakdown of appli-
cants by race.  The goal of the process, according to Harvard’s director
of admissions, is ensuring there is no “dramatic drop-off” in minority
admissions from the prior class.  An applicant receiving a majority of

——————

* Together with No. 21–707, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Uni-
versity  of  North  Carolina  et al.,  on  certiorari  before  judgment  to  the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Syllabus

standing to assert the constitutional rights of their patients and con-
cluded that because Louisiana’s Act 620 imposes a burden on access to
abortion just as severe as that imposed by the nearly identical Texas
law invalidated four years ago in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
579 U. S. ___, it cannot stand under principles of stare decisis.  Pp. 1–
16.

 BREYER,  J.,  announced  the  judgment  of  the  Court  and  delivered  an
opinion, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  ROB-
ERTS, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.  THOMAS, J., filed
a dissenting opinion.  ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GOR-
SUCH, J., joined, in which THOMAS, J., joined except as to Parts III–C and
IV–F, and in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III.  GOR-
SUCH, J., and KAVANAUGH, J., filed dissenting opinions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case opinion, specifically the syllabus and the list of justices who participated.  This is not the main body of the text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus and Participation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U90

[09-15-00 14:33:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 357 (1998)

373

Souter, J., dissenting

As to the police, the majority says that regular ofﬁcers
investigating crimes almost always act with the prospect of
a criminal prosecution before them. Their fear of eviden-
tiary suppression in the criminal trial will have as much de-
terrent effect as can be expected, therefore, while any risk
of suppression in parole administration is too unlikely to be
on their minds to inﬂuence their conduct.

The majority’s assumption will only sometimes be true,
however, and in many, or even most cases, it will quite likely
be false. To be sure, if a police ofﬁcer acts on the spur of
the moment to seize evidence or thwart crime, he may have
no idea of a perpetrator’s parole status. But the contrary
will almost certainly be the case when he has ﬁrst identiﬁed
the person he has his eye on: the local police know the local
felons, criminal history information is instantly available na-
tionally, and police and parole ofﬁcers routinely cooperate.
See, e. g., United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd.
of Parole, 441 F. 2d 1216, 1217 (CA2 1971) (police ofﬁcer, who
had obtained “reasonable grounds” to believe that the pa-
rolee was dealing in stolen goods, informed the parole ofﬁcer;
the parole ofﬁcer and police ofﬁcer together searched parol-
ee’s apartment), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1025 (1972); Grimsley
v. Dodson, 696 F. 2d 303, 304 (CA4 1982) (upon receipt of
information about probationer, probation ofﬁcer contacted a
sheriff, sheriff obtained search warrant, and together they
searched probationer’s house), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1134
(1983); State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 75
Ohio St. 3d 82, 83–84, 661 N. E. 2d 728, 730 (1996) (police
ofﬁcers suspected parolee had committed burglary and asked
his parole ofﬁcer to search his residence; parolee was then
reincarcerated for violating his parole conditions); People v.
Stewart, 242 Ill. App. 3d 599, 611–612, 610 N. E. 2d 197, 206
(1993) (police conducting illegal trafﬁc stop and subsequent
search and seizure knew or had reason to know that defend-
ant was on probation); People v. Montenegro, 173 Cal. App.
3d 983, 986, 219 Cal. Rptr. 331, 332 (4th Dist. 1985) (police
contacted parole agent so that they could conduct search of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

reference or provide any other indication that it was trans-
forming §362(a)(3).  The better account of the statutory his-
tory is that the 1984 amendment, by adding the phrase re-
garding the exercise of control, simply extended the stay to
acts  that  would  change  the  status  quo  with respect  to  in-
tangible  property  and  acts  that  would  change  the  status
quo with respect to tangible property without “obtain[ing]”
such property.

*

*

*
Though the parties debate the issue at some length, we
need not decide how the turnover obligation in §542 oper-
ates.  Nor do we settle the meaning of other subsections of
§362(a).2  We hold only that mere retention of estate prop-
erty after the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not violate
§362(a)(3)  of  the  Bankruptcy  Code.    The  judgment  of  the
Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 JUSTICE BARRETT took no part in the consideration or de-

cision of this case.

It is so ordered.

——————

2 In  respondent  Shannon’s  case,  the  Bankruptcy  Court  determined
that by retaining Shannon’s vehicle and demanding payment, the City
also had violated §§362(a)(4) and (a)(6).  Shannon presented those theo-
ries to the Court of Appeals, but the court did not reach them.  926 F. 3d,
at 926, n. 1.  Neither do we.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the concluding portion. It contains legal reasoning, citations, and mentions of specific sections of the Bankruptcy Code.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v.
RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
Opinion of the Court

nowhere commands a continuity requirement.

*

The respondents have not shown that EPA’s approval of
the  petitioners’  extension  requests  was  in  excess  of  the
Agency’s statutory authority.  5 U. S. C. §706(2)(C).  To the
extent  the  court  of  appeals  vacated  EPA’s  orders  on  this
ground, the judgment is

Reversed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the concluding portion. It references legal statutes and court proceedings, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

as  they  must,  that  Florida  cannot  recover  anticipated  ex-
penses for services it has not furnished, but may pursue re-
imbursement only for expenses it has paid (i.e., Florida can
recover  no  more  than  $1,000).  The  parties  further  agree
that Florida can recover these expenses from the portion of
the  beneficiary’s  settlement  allocated  for  these  expenses
(i.e., the $200), and that Florida can challenge the allocation
of the settlement if it contends that too low a portion was
designated for past medical expenses.  The parties also do
not dispute that Florida cannot recover from the $800 rep-
resenting  nonmedical  expenses.
  The  only  dispute  is
whether  Florida  also  may  recover  its  past  medical  costs
from the distinct portion of the beneficiary’s settlement rep-
resenting  future  medical  expenses  (i.e.,  the  $500)—ex-
penses it has not paid and might never pay.  Under a proper
reading  of  the  applicable  statutory  provisions  in  context,
Florida may not do so.

As Ahlborn explains, Florida’s ability to seek reimburse-
ment  from  Gallardo’s  settlement  hinges  on  establishing
that an exception to the anti-lien and anti-recovery provi-
sions  applies.    Several  provisions,  enacted  over  a  span  of
decades,  set  forth  the  exception  relevant  here.    The  first,
§§1396a(a)(25)(A) and (B) (collectively, the third-party lia-
bility provision), was enacted three years after the Medicaid
Act  and  the  anti-lien  and  anti-recovery  provisions.  The
third-party liability provision authorizes a State only to re-
cover for “medical assistance” that “has been made availa-
ble on behalf of the individual,” and only “after medical as-
§1396a(a)(25)(B)
sistance  has  been  made  available.”
(emphasis added).  And it authorizes recovery only “to the
extent  of,”  ibid.,  “the  legal  liability  of  third  parties  . . .  to
pay  for  care  and  services  available  under  the  plan,”
§1396a(a)(25)(A).  In this context, the provision’s reference
to care “available under the plan” can only be understood to
refer to care that is available by virtue of having been paid
under the plan, not care that theoretically may or may not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 596 U.S. ____ (2022). It delves into the legal arguments surrounding Medicaid reimbursement and the interpretation of specific statutory provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

CANTERO v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A.

Opinion of the Court

the  case  for  further  proceedings  consistent  with  this
opinion.4

It is so ordered.

——————

4 During the course of the litigation, the parties have raised two other
issues that the Court of Appeals did not address and that it may address
as  appropriate  on  remand:  first,  the  significance  here  (if  any)  of  the
preemption rules of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; and
second,  the  relevance  here  (if  any)  of  the  Dodd-Frank  provision  that
preempts state consumer financial laws if a federal law “other than title
62  of  the  Revised  Statutes”  preempts  the  state  law,  12  U. S. C.
§25b(b)(1)(C).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the concluding section. It includes citations and references to legal proceedings, indicating it's not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Oracle’s declaring code was central to its business model.
Oracle  profited  financially  by  encouraging  developers  to
create programs written in Java and then charging manu-
facturers a fee to embed in their devices the Java software
platform needed to run those programs.  To this end, Oracle
created  a  work  called  Java  2  Platform,  Standard  Edition,
which included a highly organized library containing about
30,000 methods.  Oracle gave developers free access to these
methods to encourage them to write programs for the Java
platform.  In return, developers were required to make their
programs compatible with the Java platform on any device.
Developers were encouraged to make improvements to the
platform, but they were required to release beneficial mod-
ifications to the public.  If a company wanted to customize
the platform and keep those customizations secret for busi-
ness purposes, it had to pay for a separate license.

By 2005, many companies were racing to develop operat-
ing systems for what would become modern smartphones.
Oracle’s  strategy  had  successfully  encouraged  millions  of
programmers to learn Java.  As a result, Java software plat-
forms were in the vast majority of mobile phones.  Google
wanted to attract those programmers to Android by includ-
ing in Android the declaring code with which they were now
familiar.  But the founder of Android, Andrew Rubin, un-
derstood that the declaring code was copyrighted, so Google
sought  a  custom  license  from  Oracle.  At  least  four  times
between  2005  and  2006,  the  two  companies  attempted  to
——————

public static int MaxNum (int x, int y, int z) {

if (x >= y && x >= z) return x;
else if (y >= x && y >= z) return y;
else return z;
}

The first line is declaring code that defines the method, including what
inputs  (integers  x,  y,  and  z)  it  can  process  and  what  it  can  output  (an
integer).  The remainder is implementing code that checks which of the
inputs is largest and returns the result.  Once this code is written, a pro-
grammer could invoke it by typing, for example, “MaxNum (4, 12, 9).”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC. The text discusses Oracle's business model and the dispute surrounding Java code. The code snippet provided is an example of Java code and is likely used to illustrate a point in the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>