<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

SNYDER v. PHELPS

ALITO, J., dissenting

reasons, but none is sound.

First—and  most  important—the  Court  finds  that  “the
overall  thrust  and  dominant  theme  of  [their]  demonstra-
tion  spoke  to”  broad  public  issues.  Ante,  at  8.    As  I  have
attempted  to  show,  this  portrayal  is  quite  inaccurate;
respondents’  attack  on  Matthew  was  of  central  impor-
tance.  But  in  any  event,  I  fail  to  see  why  actionable
speech  should  be  immunized  simply  because  it  is  inter-
spersed  with  speech  that  is  protected.  The  First  Amend-
ment  allows  recovery  for  defamatory  statements  that  are
interspersed  with  nondefamatory  statements  on  matters
of public concern, and there is no good reason why respon-
dents’ attack on Matthew Snyder and his family should be
treated differently.

Second,  the  Court  suggests  that  respondents’  personal
attack on Matthew Snyder is entitled to First Amendment
protection  because  it  was  not  motivated  by  a  private
grudge,  see  ante,  at  9,  but  I  see  no  basis  for  the  strange
distinction that the Court appears to draw.  Respondents’
motivation—“to increase publicity for its views,” ibid.—did
not  transform  their  statements  attacking  the  character
of  a  private  figure  into  statements  that  made  a  contri-
bution  to  debate  on  matters  of  public  concern.    Nor  did
their publicity-seeking motivation soften the sting of their
attack.  And as far as  culpability  is concerned, one might
well  think  that  wounding  statements  uttered  in  the  heat
of  a  private  feud  are  less,  not  more,  blameworthy  than
similar  statements  made  as  part  of  a  cold  and  calculated
strategy to slash a stranger as a means of attracting pub-
lic attention.

Third,  the  Court  finds  it  significant  that  respondents’
protest  occurred  on  a  public  street,  but  this  fact  alone
should  not  be  enough  to  preclude  IIED  liability.    To  be
sure,  statements  made  on  a  public  street  may  be  less
likely  to  satisfy  the  elements  of  the  IIED  tort  than  state-
ments  made  on  private  property,  but  there  is  no  reason
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Snyder v. Phelps. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the case, analyzing the majority opinion's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

17

Opinion of the Court

  Five  years  after  New  York,  the  Court  applied  the  same
principles to a federal statute requiring state and local law
enforcement  officers  to  perform  background  checks  and
related tasks in connection with applications for handgun
licenses.  Printz,  521  U. S.  898.  Holding  this  provision
unconstitutional,  the  Court  put  the  point  succinctly:  “The
Federal  Government”  may  not  “command  the  States’
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to adminis
ter  or  enforce  a  federal  regulatory  program.”  Id.,  at  935.
This  rule  applies,  Printz  held,  not  only  to  state  officers
with  policymaking  responsibility  but  also  to  those  as
signed more mundane tasks.  Id., at 929–930.

B
Our  opinions  in  New  York  and  Printz  explained  why

adherence  to  the  anticommandeering  principle  is  im
portant.  Without attempting a complete survey, we men
tion several reasons that are significant here.

First, the rule serves as “one of the Constitution’s struc
tural  protections  of  liberty.”    Printz,  supra,  at  921.    “The
Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for
the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract
political entities.”  New York, supra, at 181.  “To the con
trary,  the  Constitution  divides  authority  between  federal
and  state  governments  for  the  protection  of  individuals.”
Ibid.    “ ‘[A]  healthy  balance  of  power  between  the  States
and the Federal Government [reduces] the risk of tyranny
and  abuse  from  either  front.’ ”  Id.,  at  181–182  (quoting
Gregory, 501 U. S., at 458).

Second,  the  anticommandeering  rule  promotes  political

accountability.  When  Congress  itself  regulates,  the  re
sponsibility for the benefits and burdens of the regulation
is  apparent.  Voters  who  like  or  dislike  the  effects  of  the
regulation know who to credit or blame.  By contrast, if a
State  imposes  regulations  only  because  it  has  been  com
manded  to  do  so  by  Congress,  responsibility  is  blurred.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the "anticommandeering" principle, which prevents the federal government from forcing state officers to administer federal programs. The text cites previous cases (New York and Printz) and provides arguments for the importance of this principle.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

CRUZ v. ARIZONA

Opinion of the Court

cedural  rule  that  is  “ `frmly  established  and  regularly  fol-
lowed'  .  .  .  will  be  adequate  to  foreclose  review  of  a  federal
claim.”  Lee,  534  U. S.,  at  376.  Nevertheless,  in  “excep-
tional  cases,”  a  “generally  sound  rule”  may  be  applied  in  a
way  that  “renders  the  state  ground  inadequate  to  stop  con-
sideration of a federal question.”  Ibid.  This is one of those
exceptional cases.

In  particular,  this  case  implicates  this  Court's  rule,  re-
served  for  the  rarest  of  situations,  that  “an  unforeseeable
and  unsupported  state-court  decision  on  a  question  of  state
procedure  does  not  constitute  an  adequate  ground  to  pre-
clude  this  Court's  review  of  a  federal  question.”  Bouie  v.
City  of  Columbia,  378  U. S.  347,  354  (1964).  “Novelty  in
procedural  requirements  cannot  be  permitted  to  thwart  re-
view in this Court applied for by those who, in justifed reli-
ance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of
their federal constitutional rights.”  NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 457–458 (1958).  This Court has
applied  this  principle  for  over  a  century.  See,  e. g.,  Enter-
prise  Irrigation  Dist.  v.  Farmers  Mut.  Canal  Co.,  243  U. S.
157,  165  (1917)  (holding  that  a  state  ground  was  adequate
where it was not “without fair support or so unfounded as to
be essentially arbitrary or merely a device to prevent a review
of  the  other  [federal]  ground  of  the  judgment”).  And  this
Court  has  continued  to  reaffrm  this  important  rule.  See
Walker v. Martin, 562 U. S. 307, 320 (2011) (“A state ground,
no doubt, may be found inadequate when `discretion has been
exercised  to  impose  novel  and  unforeseeable  requirements
without fair or substantial support in prior state law' ” (quot-
ing 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4026, p. 386 (2d ed. 1996) (Wright & Miller))).
At  issue  here  is  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court's  decision
that  Cruz's  motion  for  postconviction  relief  failed  to  satisfy
Arizona  Rule  of  Criminal  Procedure  32.1(g).  Rule  32.1(g)
allows defendants to fle a successive or untimely postconvic-
tion  petition  if  there  has  been  “a  signifcant  change  in  the

Page Proof Pending Publication
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the court's reasoning for reviewing a case despite Arizona state procedural rules. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it's part of the main body of the opinion rather than a preface or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
832

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10085.  McNeill  v.  Goff,  Warden.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10087.  Dumont  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  1288.

No.  08–10091.  Bartsch  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st
App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  167  Cal.  App.
4th  896,  84  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  410.

No. 08–10093.  Bacon v. Laswell et al.  Sup. Ct. Nev.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  124  Nev.  1450,  238  P.  3d  794.

No.  08–10094.  Munoz  v.  Fortner  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  816.

No. 08–10099.  Cook v.  Florida.  Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  996  So.  2d  224.

No.  08–10106.  Peoples  v.  Barber  et  al.  (two  judgments).

C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10107.  Braley v.  California.  Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10112.  Curtis  v.  Oregon.  Ct.  App.  Ore.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  223  Ore.  App.  259,  195  P.  3d  923.

No.  08–10116.  Bennett  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  45  Cal.  4th  577,  199  P.  3d  535.

No.  08–10118.  Davis  v.  Third  Judicial  District  Court  of
Nevada,  Lyon  County,  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  08–10120.  Stubl  v.  Place.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  08–10138.  Anderson  v.  Cunningham.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  706.

No.  08–10140.  Beaty  v.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  Depart
ment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  554  F.  3d  780.

No.  08–10141.  Beeks  v.  Uribe,  Acting  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

Opinion of the Court

In her lawsuit, Ms. Smith alleged that, if she enters the
wedding website business to celebrate marriages she does
endorse, she faces a credible threat that Colorado will seek
to use CADA to compel her to create websites celebrating
marriages she does not endorse.  6 F. 4th 1160, 1173–1174
(CA10 2021).  As evidence, Ms. Smith pointed to Colorado’s
record of past enforcement actions under CADA, including
one that worked its way to this Court five years ago.  See
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9); see
also App. 25–155 (discussing Colorado’s other past enforce-
ment actions).

To facilitate the district court’s resolution of the merits of
her case, Ms. Smith and the State stipulated to a number
of facts:

  Ms. Smith is “willing to work with all people regard-
less of classifications such as race, creed, sexual ori-
entation,  and  gender,”  and  she  “will  gladly  create
custom graphics and websites” for clients of any sex-
ual orientation.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a.

  She will not produce content that “contradicts bibli-

cal truth” regardless of who orders it.  Ibid.

  Her belief that marriage is a union between one man
and one woman is a sincerely held religious convic-
tion.  Id., at 179a.

  All  of  the  graphic  and  website  design  services  Ms.
Smith provides are “expressive.”  Id., at 181a.
  The  websites  and  graphics  Ms.  Smith  designs  are
“original, customized” creations that “contribut[e] to
the overall messages” her business conveys “through
the websites” it creates.  Id., at 181a–182a.

——————
tected classification.  Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(2)(a) (2022).  The Com-
munication Clause, Ms. Smith notes, prohibits any speech inconsistent
with the Accommodation Clause.  Because Colorado concedes that its au-
thority to apply the Communication Clause to Ms. Smith stands or falls
with its authority to apply the Accommodation Clause, see Brief for Re-
spondents 44–45, we focus our attention on the Accommodation Clause.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the facts of a case. It provides context and background information relevant to the legal arguments being made.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

17

Opinion of the Court

If  the  last  decade  of  Second  Amendment  litigation  has
taught this Court anything, it is that federal courts tasked
with making such difficult empirical judgments regarding
firearm regulations under the banner of “intermediate scru-
tiny” often defer to the determinations of legislatures.  But
while that judicial deference to legislative interest balanc-
ing  is  understandable—and,  elsewhere,  appropriate—it  is
not deference that the Constitution demands here.  The Sec-
ond Amendment “is the very product of an interest balanc-
ing  by  the  people”  and  it  “surely  elevates  above  all  other
interests  the  right  of  law-abiding,  responsible  citizens  to
use arms” for self-defense.  Heller, 554 U. S., at 635.  It is
this balance—struck by the traditions of the American peo-
ple—that demands our unqualified deference.

D
The test that we set forth in Heller and apply today re-
quires  courts  to  assess  whether  modern  firearms  regula-
tions are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and
historical understanding.  In some cases, that inquiry will
be fairly straightforward.  For instance, when a challenged
regulation  addresses  a  general  societal  problem  that  has
persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly sim-
ilar  historical  regulation  addressing  that  problem  is  rele-
vant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent
with the Second Amendment.  Likewise, if earlier genera-
tions  addressed  the  societal  problem,  but  did  so  through
materially different means, that also could be evidence that

——————
is to resolve legal questions presented in particular cases or controver-
sies.  That “legal inquiry is a refined subset” of a broader “historical in-
quiry,” and it relies on “various evidentiary principles and default rules”
to resolve uncertainties.  W. Baude & S. Sachs, Originalism and the Law
of the Past, 37 L. & Hist. Rev. 809, 810–811 (2019).  For example, “[i]n
our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party
presentation.”  United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020)
(slip  op.,  at  3).    Courts  are  thus  entitled  to  decide  a  case  based  on  the
historical record compiled by the parties.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the interpretation of the Second Amendment and the legal framework surrounding firearm regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
142

SMITH  v.  SPISAK

Opinion of the Court

ments and ordered habeas relief.  We now reverse the Court
of Appeals.

I

In  1983,  an  Ohio  jury  convicted  Spisak  of  three  murders
and  two  attempted  murders  at  Cleveland  State  University
in  1982.  The  jury  recommended,  and  the  judge  imposed,  a
death  sentence.  The  Ohio  courts  denied  Spisak’s  claims,
both  on  direct  appeal  and  on  collateral  review.  State  v.
Spisak,  36  Ohio  St.  3d  80,  521  N.  E.  2d  800  (1988)  (per  cu
riam);  State  v.  Spisak,  No.  67229,  1995  WL  229108  (Ohio
App.,  8th  Dist.,  Cuyahoga  Cty.,  Apr.  13,  1995);  State  v.
Spisak,  73  Ohio  St.  3d  151,  652  N.  E.  2d  719  (1995)  (per
curiam).

Spisak  then  sought  a  federal  writ  of  habeas  corpus.
Among other claims, he argued that the sentencing phase of
his  trial  violated  the  U. S.  Constitution  for  the  two  reasons
we  consider  here.  The  District  Court  denied  his  petition.
Spisak  v.  Coyle,  Case  No.  1:95CV2675  (ND  Ohio,  Apr.  18,
2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. 95a.  But the Court of Appeals
accepted Spisak’s two claims, namely, his mitigation instruc
tion  claim  and  his  ineffective-assistance-of-counsel  claim.
Spisak  v.  Mitchell,  465  F.  3d  684,  703–706,  708–711  (CA6
2006).  The Court of Appeals consequently ordered the Dis
trict  Court  to  issue  a  conditional  writ  of  habeas  corpus  for
bidding Spisak’s execution.  Id., at 715–716.

The  State  of  Ohio  then  sought  certiorari  in  this  Court.
We  granted  the  petition  and  vacated  the  Court  of  Appeals’
judgment.  Hudson v.  Spisak, 552 U. S. 945 (2007).  We re
manded the case for further consideration in light of two re
cent  cases  in  which  this  Court  had  held  that  lower  federal
courts  had  not  properly  taken  account  of  the  deference  fed
eral law grants state-court determinations on federal habeas
review.  Ibid.;  see  28  U. S. C.  § 2254(d);  Carey  v.  Musladin,
549  U. S.  70  (2006);  Schriro  v.  Landrigan,  550  U. S.  465
(2007).  On  remand,  the  Sixth  Circuit  reinstated  its  earlier
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses a case, "SMITH v. SPISAK," and outlines the background and procedural history.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

BARRETT, J., concurring

arise  in  litigation  that  more  thoroughly  exposes  the  rele-
vant  facts  about  particular  social-media  platforms  and
functions.  The answers in any given case might cast doubt
on—or might vindicate—a social-media company’s invoca-
tion of its First Amendment rights.  Regardless, the analy-
sis is bound to be fact intensive, and it will surely vary from
function to function and platform to platform.  And in a fa-
cial  challenge,  answering  all  of  those  questions  isn’t  even
the  end  of  the  story:  The  court  must  then  find  a  way  to
measure the unconstitutional relative to the constitutional
applications to determine whether the law “prohibits a sub-
stantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly
legitimate sweep.”  United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762,
770 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A facial challenge to either of these laws likely forces a
court to bite off more than it can chew.  An as-applied chal-
lenge,  by  contrast,  would  enable  courts  to  home  in  on
whether  and  how  specific  functions—like  feeds  versus  di-
rect  messaging—are  inherently  expressive  and  answer
platform-  and  function-specific  questions  that  might  bear
on  the  First  Amendment  analysis.  While  the  governing
constitutional  principles  are  straightforward,  applying
them in one fell swoop to the entire social-media universe
is not.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from a case involving social media platforms and First Amendment rights. It delves into the complexities of facial versus as-applied challenges in this context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

THOMAS, J., concurring

Respondent/Cross-Petitioner  States  18–30,1  and  they  did
not even clearly raise it in reply.2  Third, this Court has not
addressed  standing-through-inseverability  in  any  detail,
largely relying on it through implication.  See post, at 16–
20; Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S.
83,  91  (1998)  (“We  have  often  said  that  drive-by  jurisdic-
tional rulings . . . have no precedential effect”).  And fourth,
this Court has been inconsistent in describing whether in-
severability is a remedy or merits question.  To the extent
the  parties  seek  inseverability  as  a  remedy,  the  Court  is
powerless to grant that relief.  See Murphy v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Assn., 584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op.,
at 3–4) (THOMAS, J., concurring); see also Barr v. American
Assn. of Political Consultants, 591 U. S. ___, ___, n. 8 (2020)

——————

1 The  States  instead  raised  the  two  pocketbook  injury  theories  dis-
cussed by the Court, ante, at 10; Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner
States  19–28,  along  with  another  irrelevant  theory.    Both  theories  fo-
cused only on the mandate’s unlawfulness.  The dissent points to certain
language arguably touching on standing-through-inseverability, post, at
13–14, but I respectfully disagree.  That language addresses a different
theory—the argument that the unlawful mandate harms the States by
increasing the cost of complying with other Act provisions, such as re-
porting requirements relating to the mandate.  Ante, at 14–16; Brief for
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner States 20–25 (discussing how “the individ-
ual mandate itself increased the costs to state respondents in at least six
ways” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).  As the Court
notes, “[n]o one claims these other provisions violate the Constitution.”
Ante, at 16.  And, the Court does not address the argument that these
provisions are otherwise unlawful.  Ante, at 10 (“declin[ing] to consider”
the standing-through-inseverability theory raised by the dissent “on be-
half of the state plaintiffs”).

2 This  lack  of  legal  development  is  particularly  significant  because
standing-through-inseverability—assuming  it  is  a  legitimate  theory  of
standing—is fundamentally a merits-like exercise that requires courts to
apply ordinary principles of statutory interpretation to determine if it is
at least “arguable” that a statute links the lawfulness of one provision to
the lawfulness of another.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environ-
ment,  523  U. S.  83,  89  (1998).    Thus,  a  failure  to  develop  a  standing-
through-inseverability argument poses a significant obstacle to review.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the legal concept of "standing-through-inseverability" and its application in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J.

electoral process by ensuring the maintenance of an accu-
rate  and  current  voter  registration  roll  for  elections  for
Federal office—
  “(1) shall be uniform, nondiscriminatory, and in compli-
ance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U. S. C. 1973
et seq.); and
  “(2)  shall  not  result  in  the  removal  of  the  name  of  any
person  from the  official  list of  voters  registered  to  vote  in
an  election  for  Federal  office  by  reason  of  the  person’s
failure to vote.
  “(c) VOTER REMOVAL PROGRAMS.—(1) A State may meet
the  requirement  of  subsection  (a)(4)  by  establishing  a
program under which—
  “(A)  change-of-address  information  supplied  by  the
Postal  Service  through  its  licensees  is  used  to  identify
registrants whose addresses may have changed; and
  “(B)  if  it  appears  from  information  provided  by  the
Postal Service that—
  “(i)  a  registrant  has  moved  to  a  different  residence  ad-
dress  in  the  same  registrar's  jurisdiction  in  which  the
registrant  is  currently  registered,  the  registrar  changes
the  registration  records  to  show  the  new  address  and
sends the registrant a notice of the change by forwardable
mail  and  a  postage prepaid  pre-addressed return  form  by
which  the  registrant  may  verify  or  correct  the  address
information; or
  “(ii)  the  registrant  has  moved  to  a  different  residence
address not in the same registrar's jurisdiction, the regis-
trar  uses  the  notice  procedure  described  in  subsection
(d)(2) to confirm the change of address.
  “(2)(A)  A  State  shall  complete,  not  later  than  90  days
prior to the date of a primary or general election for Fed-
eral office, any program the purpose of which is to system-
atically  remove  the  names  of  ineligible  voters  from  the
official lists of eligible voters.
  “(B)  Subparagraph  (A)  shall  not  be  construed  to  pre-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a dissenting opinion in a case. It includes legal citations and discusses voter registration procedures.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC.

Syllabus

does not compel a different conclusion.  Pp. 8–12.

(b) Neither  the  Lanham  Act’s  text  nor  its  structure  rebuts  the
“presumption”  in  favor  of  giving  preclusive  effect  to  TTAB  decisions
where  the  ordinary  elements  of  issue  preclusion  are  met.    Astoria,
501 U. S., at 108.  This case is unlike Astoria.  There, where exhaust-
ing the administrative process was a prerequisite to suit in court, giv-
ing  preclusive  effect  to  the  agency’s  determination  in  that  very  ad-
ministrative  process  could  have  rendered  the  judicial  suit  “strictly
pro forma.” Id., at 111.  By contrast, registration involves a separate
proceeding to decide separate rights.  Pp. 12–14.

(c) There  is  no  categorical  reason  why  registration  decisions  can
never  meet  the  ordinary  elements  of  issue  preclusion.  That  many
registrations  will not satisfy those ordinary elements does not mean
that none will.  Pp. 15–22.

(1) Contrary  to  the  Eighth  Circuit’s  conclusion,  the  same  likeli-
hood-of-confusion standard applies to both registration and infringe-
ment.  The  factors  that  the  TTAB  and  the  Eighth  Circuit  use  to  as-
sess  likelihood  of  confusion  are  not  fundamentally  different,  and,
more important, the operative language of each statute is essentially
the same.

Hargis claims that the standards are different, noting that the reg-
istration provision asks whether the marks “resemble” each other, 15
U. S. C.  §1052(d),  while  the  infringement  provision  is  directed  to-
wards the “use in commerce” of the marks, §1114(1).  That the TTAB
and a district court do not always consider the same usages, however,
does not mean that the TTAB applies a different standard to the us-
ages  it  does  consider.  If  a  mark  owner  uses  its  mark  in  materially
the same ways as the usages included in its registration application,
then the TTAB is deciding the same likelihood-of-confusion issue as a
district  court  in  infringement  litigation.    For  a  similar  reason,  the
Eighth Circuit erred in holding that issue preclusion could not apply
because  the  TTAB  relied  too  heavily  on  “appearance  and  sound.”
Pp. 15–19.

(2) The fact that the TTAB and district courts use different pro-
cedures  suggests  only  that  sometimes  issue  preclusion  might  be  in-
appropriate, not that it always is.  Here, there is no categorical “rea-
son  to  doubt  the  quality,  extensiveness,  or  fairness,”  Montana  v.
United  States,  440  U. S.  147,  164,  n. 11,  of  the  agency’s  procedures.
In large part they are exactly the same as in federal court.  Also con-
trary to the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion, B&B, the party opposing reg-
istration, not Hargis, bore the burden of persuasion before the TTAB,
just as it did in the infringement suit.  Pp. 19–21.

(3)   Hargis  is  also  wrong  that  the  stakes  for  registration  are  al-
ways  too  low  for  issue  preclusion  in  later  infringement  litigation.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically outlining the reasoning behind a court's decision. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the core content of a typical book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

27

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

why these protections that are sufficient in every other con-
text  would  be  insufficient  here.  It  simply  asserts  that  it
would  be  “untenable”  and  would  deprive  immunity  of  its
“ ‘intended  effect.’ ”    Ante,  at  31  (quoting  Fitzgerald,  457
U. S.,  at  756).    The  majority  hazards  an  explanation  that
the use of official-acts evidence will “raise a unique risk that
the jurors’ deliberations will be prejudiced by their views of
the  President’s  policies  and  performance  while  in  office.”
Ante, at 31.  That “unique risk,” however, is not a product
of  introducing  official-acts  evidence.  It  is  simply  the  risk
involved in any suit against a former President, including
the private-acts prosecutions the majority says it would al-
low.

VII
Today’s decision to grant former Presidents immunity for
their official acts is deeply wrong.  As troubling as this crim-
inal immunity doctrine is in theory, the majority’s applica-
tion of the doctrine to the indictment in this case is perhaps
even more troubling.  In the hands of the majority, this new
official-acts immunity operates as a one-way ratchet.

First,  the  majority  declares  all  of  the  conduct  involving
the Justice Department and the Vice President to be official
conduct, see ante, at 19–24, yet it refuses to designate any
course of conduct alleged in the indictment as private, de-
spite concessions from Trump’s counsel.6  Trump’s counsel
conceded,  for  example,  that  the  allegation  that  Trump

——————

6 The majority protests that it is “adher[ing] to time-tested practices”
by “deciding what is required to dispose of this case and remanding” to
lower courts to sort out the details.  Ante, at 41.  Yet it implicitly acknowl-
edges that it reaches far beyond what any lower court considered or any
party briefed by designating certain conduct official in the first instance.
See ibid. (noting “the lack of factual analysis in the lower courts, and the
lack of briefing on how to categorize the conduct alleged”).  In reaching
out to shield some conduct as official while refusing to recognize any con-
duct as unofficial, the majority engages in judicial activism, not judicial
restraint.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision to grant immunity to former Presidents for their official acts.  The text is sequential and part of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

Opinion of the Court

could use sodium thiopental as part of a single-drug proto-
col.  They have since suggested that it might also be con-
stitutional  for  Oklahoma  to  use  pentobarbital.    But  the
District  Court  found  that  both  sodium  thiopental  and
pentobarbital  are  now  unavailable  to  Oklahoma’s  De-
partment  of  Corrections.    The  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed
that  finding,  and  it  is  not  clearly  erroneous.  On  the  con-
trary, the record shows that Oklahoma has been unable to
procure those drugs despite a good-faith effort to do so.

Petitioners do not seriously contest this factual finding,
and  they  have  not  identified  any  available  drug  or  drugs
that could be used in place of those that Oklahoma is now
unable  to  obtain.  Nor  have  they  shown  a  risk  of  pain  so
great  that  other  acceptable,  available  methods  must  be
used.  Instead,  they  argue  that  they  need  not  identify  a
known  and  available  method  of  execution  that  presents
less  risk.    But  this  argument  is  inconsistent  with  the
controlling  opinion  in  Baze,  553  U. S.,  at  61,  which  im-
posed a requirement that the Court now follows.2

Petitioners  contend  that  the  requirement  to  identify  an
alternative method of execution contravenes our pre-Baze
decision  in  Hill  v.  McDonough,  547  U. S.  573  (2006),  but
they misread that decision.  The portion of the opinion in
Hill  on  which  they  rely  concerned  a  question  of  civil  pro-
cedure, not a substantive Eighth Amendment question.  In

——————

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s dissent (hereinafter principal dissent), post, at
24–25,  inexplicably  refuses  to  recognize  that  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE’s
opinion in Baze sets out the holding of the case.  In Baze, the opinion of
THE CHIEF JUSTICE was joined by two other JUSTICES.  JUSTICES SCALIA
and  THOMAS  took  the  broader  position  that  a  method  of  execution  is
consistent  with  the  Eighth  Amendment  unless  it  is  deliberately  de-
signed to inflict pain.  553 U. S., at 94 (THOMAS, J. concurring in judg-
ment).  Thus,  as  explained  in  Marks  v.  United  States,  430  U. S.  188,
193  (1977),  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE’s  opinion  sets  out  the  holding  of  the
case.    It  is  for  this  reason  that  petitioners  base  their  argument  on  the
rule set out in that opinion.  See Brief for Petitioners 25, 28.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the case of *Glossip v. Gross* and the availability of drugs for lethal injection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

431

Opinion of Stevens, J.

if  not  also  the  very  notion  of  “corporate  speech”—was
inconceivable.56

Justice Scalia also emphasizes the unqualiﬁed nature of
the First  Amendment text.  Ante, at  386, 392–393.  Yet he
would  seemingly  read  out  the  Free  Press  Clause:  How  else
could he claim that my purported views on newspapers must
track  my  views  on  corporations  generally?  Ante,  at  390.57
Like virtually all modern lawyers, Justice Scalia presum
ably believes that the First Amendment restricts the Execu
tive, even though its language refers to Congress alone.  In
any  event,  the  text  only  leads  us  back  to  the  questions  who
or  what  is  guaranteed  “the  freedom  of  speech,”  and,  just  as
critically, what  that freedom consists  of and under  what cir
cumstances  it  may  be  limited.  Justice  Scalia  appears  to
believe that because corporations are created and utilized by
individuals,  it  follows  (as  night  the  day)  that  their  election
eering  must  be  equally  protected  by  the  First  Amendment

56 Postratiﬁcation practice bolsters the conclusion that the First Amend
ment,  “as  originally  understood,”  ante,  at  353,  did  not  give  corporations
political  speech  rights  on  a  par  with  the  rights  of  individuals.  Well  into
the  modern  era  of  general  incorporation  statutes,  “[t]he  common  law  was
generally  interpreted  as  prohibiting  corporate  political  participation,”
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Boston  v.  Bellotti,  435  U. S.  765,  819  (1978)  (White,
J.,  dissenting),  and  this  Court  did  not  recognize  any  First  Amendment
protections for corporations until the middle part of the 20th century, see
ante, at 342 (listing cases).

57 In  fact,  the  Free  Press  Clause  might  be  turned  against  Justice
Scalia, for two reasons.  First, we learn from it that the drafters of the
First  Amendment  did  draw  distinctions—explicit  distinctions—between
types  of  “speakers,”  or  speech  outlets  or  forms.  Second,  the  Court’s
strongest  historical  evidence  all  relates  to  the  Framers’  views  on  the
press,  see  ante,  at  353–354;  ante,  at  388–390  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring),  yet
while the Court tries to sweep this evidence into the Free Speech Clause,
the  Free  Press  Clause  provides  a  more  natural  textual  home.  The  text
and history highlighted by our colleagues suggests why one type of corpo
ration, those that are part of the press, might be able to claim special First
Amendment status, and therefore why some kinds of “identity”-based dis
tinctions might be permissible after all.  Once one accepts that much, the
intellectual ediﬁce of the majority opinion crumbles.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from Justice Stevens in the case of Citizens United v. FEC. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other parts of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
Opinion of the Court

or  other  organized  group  or  community,  including  any
Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as
defined  in  or  established  pursuant  to  the  Alaska  Native
Claims Settlement Act[,] which is recognized as eligible for
the special programs and services provided by the United
States  to  Indians  because  of  their  status  as  Indians.”    25
U. S. C. §5304(e).

The Department of the Treasury asked the Department
of the Interior, the agency that administers ISDA, whether
Alaska  Native  Corporations  (ANCs)  meet  that  definition.
Consistent with its longstanding view, the Interior Depart-
ment  said  yes.    The  Treasury  Department  then  set  aside
approximately $500 million of CARES Act funding for the
ANCs.  The question presented is whether ANCs are “In-
dian tribe[s]” under ISDA, and are therefore eligible to re-
ceive the CARES Act relief set aside by the Treasury De-
partment.  The Court holds that they are.

I
This  is  not  the  first  time  the  Court  has  addressed  the
unique circumstances of Alaska and its indigenous popula-
tion.  See, e.g., Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U. S. ___ (2019); Stur-
geon v. Frost, 577 U. S. 424 (2016); Alaska v. Native Village
of  Venetie  Tribal  Government,  522  U. S.  520  (1998);
Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U. S. 45 (1962).
The  “simple  truth”  reflected  in  those  prior  cases  is  that
“Alaska is often the exception, not the rule.”  Sturgeon, 577
U. S.,  at  440.    To  see why,  one  must  first  understand  the
United  States’  unique  historical  relationship  with  Alaska
Natives.

A

When  the  United  States  purchased  the  Territory  of
Alaska from Russia in 1867, Alaska Natives lived in com-
munities  dispersed  widely  across  Alaska’s  365  million
acres.  In the decades that followed, “[t]here was never an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the case YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS RESERVATION. It sets the context for the case and discusses prior legal precedents related to Alaska Natives.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

7

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

new marriage and to celebrate the couple.2

Accordingly,  Phillips’  creation  of  custom  wedding  cakes
is  expressive.  The  use  of  his  artistic  talents  to  create  a
well-recognized  symbol  that  celebrates  the  beginning  of  a
marriage  clearly  communicates  a  message—certainly
more  so  than  nude  dancing,  Barnes  v.  Glen  Theatre,  Inc.,
501  U. S.  560,  565–566  (1991),  or  flying  a  plain  red  flag,
Stromberg  v.  California,  283  U. S.  359,  369  (1931).3    By
forcing Phillips to create custom wedding cakes for same
——————

2 The Colorado Court of Appeals acknowledged that “a wedding cake,

in  some  circumstances,  may  convey  a  particularized  message  celebrat
ing  same-sex  marriage,”  depending  on  its  “design”  and  whether  it  has
“written  inscriptions.”  Craig  v.  Masterpiece  Cakeshop,  Inc.,  370  P. 3d
272,  288  (2015).    But  a  wedding  cake  needs  no  particular  design  or
written  words  to  communicate  the  basic  message  that  a  wedding  is
occurring, a marriage has  begun, and the couple should be celebrated.
Wedding  cakes  have  long  varied  in  color,  decorations,  and  style,  but
those differences do not prevent people from recognizing wedding cakes
as wedding cakes.  See Charsley, Interpretation and Custom: The Case
of  the  Wedding  Cake,  22  Man  93,  96  (1987).    And  regardless,  the
Commission’s  order  does  not  distinguish  between  plain  wedding  cakes
and  wedding  cakes  with  particular  designs  or  inscriptions;  it  requires
Phillips  to  make  any  wedding  cake  for  a  same-sex  wedding  that  he
would make for an opposite-sex wedding.

3 The  dissent  faults  Phillips  for  not  “submitting  . . .  evidence”  that
wedding  cakes  communicate  a  message.  Post,  at  2,  n. 1  (opinion  of
GINSBURG,  J.).  But  this  requirement  finds  no  support  in  our  prece
dents.  This  Court  did  not  insist  that  the  parties  submit  evidence
detailing the expressive nature of parades, flags, or nude dancing.  See
Hurley  v.  Irish-American  Gay,  Lesbian  and  Bisexual  Group  of  Boston,
Inc.,  515  U. S.  557,  568–570  (1995);  Spence,  418  U. S.,  at  410–411;
Barnes, 501 U. S., at 565–566.  And we do not need extensive evidence
here  to  conclude  that  Phillips’  artistry  is  expressive,  see  Hurley,  515
U. S., at 569, or that wedding cakes at least communicate the basic fact
that  “this  is  a  wedding,”  see  id.,  at  573–575.    Nor  does  it  matter  that
the couple also communicates a message through the cake.  More than
one  person can  be  engaged in  protected  speech  at  the  same  time.    See
id.,  at  569–570.    And  by  forcing  him  to  provide  the  cake,  Colorado  is
requiring Phillips to be “intimately connected” with the couple’s speech,
which  is  enough  to  implicate  his  First  Amendment  rights.    See  id.,  at
576.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It discusses the expressive nature of wedding cakes and the First Amendment rights of the baker.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

use  is  inherently  bound  together  with  uncopyrightable
ideas (general task division and organization) and new cre-
ative  expression  (Android’s  implementing  code).    Unlike
many other programs, its value in significant part derives
from  the  value  that  those  who  do  not  hold  copyrights,
namely,  computer  programmers,  invest  of  their  own  time
and effort to learn the API’s system.  And unlike many other
programs, its value lies in its efforts to encourage program-
mers to learn and to use that system so that they will use
(and continue to use) Sun-related implementing programs
that Google did not copy.

Although copyrights protect many different kinds of writ-
ing,  Leval  1116,  we  have  emphasized  the  need  to
“recogni[ze] that some works are closer to the core of [copy-
right]  than  others,”  Campbell,  510  U. S.,  at  586.    In  our
view, for the reasons just described, the declaring code is, if
copyrightable  at  all,  further  than  are  most  computer  pro-
grams (such as the implementing code) from the core of cop-
yright.  That fact diminishes the fear, expressed by both the
dissent  and  the  Federal  Circuit,  that  application  of  “fair
use” here would seriously undermine the general copyright
protection that Congress provided for computer programs.
And it means that this factor, “the nature of the copyrighted
work,” points in the direction of fair use.

B. “The Purpose and Character of the Use”

In the context of fair use, we have considered whether the
copier’s use “adds something new, with a further purpose or
different  character,  altering”  the  copyrighted  work  “with
new expression, meaning or message.”  Id., at 579.  Com-
mentators  have  put  the  matter  more  broadly,  asking
whether the copier’s use “fulfill[s] the objective of copyright
law to stimulate creativity for public illumination.”  Leval
1111.  In answering this question, we have used the word
“transformative” to describe a copying use that adds some-
thing new and important.  Campbell, 510 U. S., at 579.  An
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of "fair use" in copyright law. It delves into the nature of the copyrighted work and the purpose of the copying.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

17

THOMAS, J., dissenting

That new definition eviscerates copyright.  A movie stu-
dio that converts a book into a film without permission not
only creates a new product (the film) but enables others to
“create  products”—film  reviews,  merchandise,  YouTube
highlight  reels,  late  night  television  interviews,  and  the
like.  Nearly every computer program, once copied, can be
used to create new products.  Surely the majority would not
say that an author can pirate the next version of Microsoft
Word  simply  because  he  can  use  it  to  create  new  manu-
scripts.11

Ultimately,  the  majority  wrongly  conflates  transforma-
tive use with derivative use.  To be transformative, a work
must do something fundamentally different from the origi-
nal.  A work that simply serves the same purpose in a new
context—which  the  majority  concedes  is  true  here—is  de-
rivative, not transformative.  Congress made clear that Or-
acle  holds  “the  exclusive  rights  . . .  to  prepare  derivative
works.”  §106(2).  Rather than create a transformative prod-
uct, Google “profit[ed] from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price.”  Harper, 471
U. S., at 562.

D.  The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The statutory fair-use factors also instruct us to consider
“the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole.”  §107(3).  In gen-
eral, the greater the amount of use, the more likely the cop-
ying  is  unfair.  Ibid.  But  even  if  the  copier  takes  only  a
small  amount,  copying  the  “ ‘heart’ ”  or  “focal  points”  of  a
work  weighs  against  fair  use,  Harper,  471  U. S.,  at  565–
566,  unless  “ ‘no  more  was  taken  than  necessary’ ”  for  the
copier to achieve transformative use, Campbell, 510 U. S.,
at 589.

——————

11 Because the majority’s reasoning would undermine copyright protec-
tion for so many products long understood to be protected, I understand
the majority’s holding as a good-for-declaring-code-only precedent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in a copyright case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of copyright law, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not general readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ

Opinion of the Court

matting violations created a risk of future harm.  Specifi-
cally,  the  plaintiffs  contend  that  consumers  who  received
the information in this dual-mailing format were at risk of
not  learning  about  the  OFAC  alert  in  their  credit  files.
They  say  that  they  were  thus  at  risk  of  not  being  able  to
correct  their  credit  files  before  TransUnion  disseminated
credit  reports  containing  the  misleading  information  to
third-party businesses.  As noted above, the risk of future
harm on its own does  not support Article III standing for
the plaintiffs’ damages claim.  In any event, the plaintiffs
made no effort here to explain how the formatting error pre-
vented them from contacting TransUnion to correct any er-
rors before misleading credit reports were disseminated to
third-party  businesses.    To  reiterate,  there  is no  evidence
that  “a  single  other  class  member  so  much  as  opened  the
dual mailings,” “nor that they were confused, distressed, or
relied on the information in any way.”  951 F. 3d, at 1039,
1041 (opinion of McKeown, J.).

For its part, the United States as amicus curiae, but not
the plaintiffs, separately asserts that the plaintiffs suffered
a  concrete  “informational  injury”  under  several  of  this
Court’s precedents.  See Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins,
524 U. S. 11 (1998); Public Citizen v. Department of Justice,
491 U. S. 440 (1989).  We disagree.  The plaintiffs did not
allege that they failed to receive any required information.
They argued only that they received it in the wrong format.
Therefore, Akins and Public Citizen do not control here.  In
addition, those cases involved denial of information subject
to public-disclosure or sunshine laws that entitle all mem-
bers of the public to certain information.  This case does not
involve such a public-disclosure law.  See Casillas v. Madi-
son  Avenue  Assocs.,  Inc.,  926  F. 3d  329,  338  (CA7  2019);
Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F. 3d 990, 1004
(CA11  2020).    Moreover,  the  plaintiffs  have  identified  no
“downstream consequences” from failing to receive the re-
quired information.  Trichell, 964 F. 3d, at 1004.  They did
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the plaintiffs' standing in a case against TransUnion. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Syllabus

actors.  There is no way that the PASPA anti-authorization provision
can be understood as a regulation of private actors.  It does not confer
any  federal  rights  on  private  actors  interested  in  conducting  sports
gambling operations or impose any federal restrictions on private ac-
tors.  Pp. 21–24.

3. PASPA’s  provision  prohibiting  state  “licens[ing]”  of  sports
gambling  schemes  also  violates  the  anticommandeering  rule.  It  is-
sues a direct order to the state legislature and suffers from the same
defect  as  the  prohibition  of  state  authorization.    Thus,  this  Court
need not decide whether New Jersey’s 2014 law violates PASPA’s anti-
licensing provision.  Pp. 24–25.

4. No provision of PASPA is severable from the provisions direct-

ly at issue.  Pp. 26–30.

(a) Section  3702(1)’s  provisions  prohibiting  States  from  “op-
erat[ing],”  “sponsor[ing],”  or  “promot[ing]”  sports  gambling  schemes
cannot  be  severed.    Striking  the  state  authorization  and  licensing
provisions while leaving the state operation provision standing would
result in a scheme sharply different from what Congress contemplat-
ed  when  PASPA  was  enacted.  For  example,  had  Congress  known
that  States  would  be  free  to  authorize  sports  gambling  in  privately
owned  casinos,  it  is  unlikely  that  it  would  have  wanted  to  prevent
States from operating sports lotteries.  Nor is it likely that Congress
would  have  wanted  to  prohibit  such  an  ill-defined  category  of  state
conduct as sponsorship or promotion.  Pp. 26–27.

(b) Congress  would  not  want  to  sever  the  PASPA  provisions
that  prohibit  a  private  actor  from  “sponsor[ing],”  “operat[ing],”  or
“promot[ing]”  sports  gambling  schemes  “pursuant  to”  state  law.
§3702(2).    PASPA’s  enforcement  scheme  makes  clear  that  §3702(1)
and  §3702(2)  were  meant  to  operate  together.   That  scheme—suited
for challenging state authorization or licensing or a small number of
private operations—would break down if a State broadly decriminal-
ized sports gambling.  Pp. 27–29.

(c) PASPA’s provisions prohibiting the “advertis[ing]” of sports
gambling are also not severable.  See §§3702(1)–(2).  If they were al-
lowed to stand, federal law would forbid the advertising of an activity
that is legal under both federal and state law—something that Con-
gress has rarely done.  Pp. 29–30.

 832 F. 3d 389, reversed.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and KENNEDY, THOMAS, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, and in which
BREYER, J., joined as to all but Part VI–B.  THOMAS, J., filed a concur-
ring  opinion.  BREYER,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  part  and  dis-
senting in part.  GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SO-
TOMAYOR, J., joined, and in which BREYER, J., joined in part.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association. It outlines the legal arguments and reasoning behind the court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
ALITO, J., concurring

“demonstrates  that  application  of  the  burden  to  the  per-
son—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental in-
terest;  and (2)  is  the  least  restrictive  means of  furthering
that  compelling  governmental  interest.”    §§2000bb–1(a)–
(b).  Applying RFRA to the contraceptive mandate thus pre-
sents three questions.  First, would the mandate substan-
tially burden an employer’s exercise of religion?  Second, if
the mandate would impose such a burden, would it never-
theless serve a “compelling interest”?  And third, if it serves
such  an  interest,  would  it  represent  “the  least  restrictive
means of furthering” that interest?
  Substantial burden.  Under our decision in Hobby Lobby,
requiring  the  Little  Sisters  or  any  other  employer  with  a
similar  religious  objection  to  comply  with  the  mandate
would  impose  a  substantial  burden.  Our  analysis  of  this
question in Hobby Lobby can be separated into two parts.
First, would non-compliance have substantial adverse prac-
tical consequences?  573 U. S., at 720–723.  Second, would
compliance cause the objecting party to violate its religious
beliefs, as it sincerely understands them?  Id., at 723–726.
The answer to the first question is indisputable.  If a cov-
ered  employer  does  not  comply  with  the  mandate  (by
providing contraceptive coverage or invoking the accommo-
dation), it faces penalties of $100 per day for each of its em-
ployees.  26 U. S. C. §4980D(b)(1).  “And if the employer de-
cides to stop providing health insurance altogether and at
least  one  full-time  employee  enrolls  in  a  health  plan  and
qualifies for a subsidy on one of the government-run ACA
exchanges, the employer must pay $2,000 per year for each
of its full-time employees.  §§4980H(a), (c)(1).”  573 U. S., at
697.  In Hobby Lobby, we found these “severe” financial con-
sequences sufficient to show that the practical effect of non-
compliance would be “substantial.”5  Id., at 720.

——————
5 This  is  one  of  the  differences  between  these  cases  and  Bowen  v.  Roy,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case *Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania*. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the contraceptive mandate and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY

Opinion of the Court

quirement when the Federal Government authorizes a pri-
vate party to exercise its eminent domain power.  The re-
spondents do not dispute that the federal eminent domain
power can be delegated, or that §717f(h) speaks with suffi-
cient  clarity  to  delegate  the  power  to  condemn  privately
owned land.  They argue only that §717f(h) fails to delegate
the power to condemn States’ property interests.  But the
federal eminent domain power is “complete in itself,” Kohl,
91 U. S., at 374, and the States consented to the exercise of
that power—in its entirety—in the plan of the Convention.
The States thus have no immunity left to waive or abrogate
when it comes to condemnation suits by the Federal Gov-
ernment and its delegatees.

V

When the Framers met in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787, they sought to create a cohesive national sovereign in
response  to  the  failings  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation.
Over the course of the Nation’s history, the Federal Govern-
ment and its delegatees have exercised the eminent domain
power to give effect to that vision, connecting our country
through  turnpikes,  bridges,  and  railroads—and  more  re-
cently  pipelines,  telecommunications  infrastructure,  and
electric transmission facilities.  And we have repeatedly up-
held these exercises of the federal eminent domain power—
whether  by  the  Government  or  a  private  corporation,
whether through an upfront taking or a direct condemna-
tion  proceeding,  and  whether  against  private  property  or
state-owned land.

The  NGA  fits  well  within  this  tradition.    From  humble
beginnings in central Indiana, the Nation’s interstate pipe-
line  system  has  grown  to  span  hundreds  of  thousands  of
miles.  This development was made possible by the enact-
ment of §717f(h) in 1947.  By its terms, §717f(h) authorizes
FERC certificate holders to condemn all necessary rights-
of-way, whether owned by private parties or States.  Such
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the federal eminent domain power and its application to state-owned land.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

366

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Syllabus

concurring in the judgment, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 399.
Rehnquist, C. J., ﬁled an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 416.

John J. Gibbons argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Brian A. Powers, by appointment of
the Court, 526 U. S. 1110, and Ellen O. Boardman.

Robert Q. Harris, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia,
argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was
Mark L. Earley, Attorney General.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the American Bar
Association by Philip S. Anderson, Abe Krash, Kathleen A. Behan, and
John A. Freedman; for the American Civil Liberties Union by Larry W.
Yackle and Steven R. Shapiro; for the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers by John D. Cline and Lisa B. Kemler; for the Virginia
College of Criminal Defense Attorneys et al. by Gerald T. Zerkin; for
Professors Lance G. Banning et al. by Barry Levenstam and Jeffrey T.
Shaw; and for Marvin E. Frankel et al. by Abner J. Mikva.

Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the State of
California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, David
Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Senior As-
sistant Attorney General, and Donald E. De Nicola and Ward A. Camp-
bell, Deputy Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of
Alaska, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, Ken Salazar of Colorado, John M. Bai-
ley of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of
Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E.
Ryan of Illinois, Carla Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana,
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts,
Michael C. Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri,
Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue
Del Papa of Nevada, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Patricia A.
Madrid of New Mexico, Michael E. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi
Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew
Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of
Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of
South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, John Cornyn of Texas,
Jan Graham of Utah, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, and Darrell
McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Founda-
tion by Kent S. Scheidegger.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically the beginning of a Supreme Court case opinion. It includes information about the case name, the parties involved, and the justices who filed opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Opinion - Beginning</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–138
_________________

BILLY RAYMOND COUNTERMAN, PETITIONER v.
COLORADO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
COLORADO

[June 27, 2023]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.

  I  join  JUSTICE  BARRETT’s  dissent  in  full.    I  write  sepa-
rately  to  address  the  majority’s  surprising  and  misplaced
reliance on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254
(1964).  In New York Times, this Court held that the First
Amendment  bars  public  figures  from  recovering  damages
for defamation unless they can show that the statement at
issue  was  made  with  “ ‘actual  malice’—that  is,  with
knowledge  that  it  was  false  or  with  reckless  disregard  of
whether it was false or not.”  Id., at 280.  Like the majority’s
decision today, “New York Times and the Court’s decisions
extending it were policy-driven decisions masquerading as
constitutional  law.”  McKee  v.  Cosby,  586  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (slip
op., at 2).  Instead of simply applying the First Amendment
as it was understood at the time of the Founding, “the Court
fashioned its own ‘ “federal rule[s]” ’ by balancing the ‘com-
peting values at stake in defamation suits.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 334, 348 (1974));
see also Bose Corp. v.  Consumers  Union of United States,
Inc.,  466  U. S.  485,  501–502  (1984)  (acknowledging  that
“the rule enunciated in the New York Times case” is “largely
a judge-made rule of law,” the “content” of which is “given
meaning through the evolutionary process of common-law
adjudication”).    “The  constitutional  libel  rules  adopted  by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

Opinion of the Court

or  otherwise  lawfully  assumed  state  jurisdiction  to  prose-
cute crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country.

Moreover,  if  Castro-Huerta’s  interpretation  of  the  Gen-
eral Crimes Act were correct, then the Act would preclude
States from prosecuting any crimes in Indian country—pre-
sumably  even  those  crimes  committed  by  non-Indians
against non-Indians—just as States ordinarily cannot pros-
ecute crimes committed in federal enclaves.  But this Court
has long held that States may prosecute crimes committed
by non-Indians against non-Indians in Indian country.  See
McBratney,  104  U. S.,  at  623–624;  Draper,  164  U. S.,  at
242–246.  Those holdings, too, contravene Castro-Huerta’s
argument regarding the General Crimes Act.

In advancing his enclave argument, Castro-Huerta also
tries to analogize the text of the General Crimes Act to the
text  of  the  Major  Crimes  Act.    He  asserts  that  the  Major
Crimes Act grants the Federal Government exclusive juris-
diction to prosecute certain major crimes committed by In-
dians in Indian country.  But the Major Crimes Act contains
substantially different language than the General Crimes
Act.  Unlike the General Crimes Act, the Major Crimes Act
says that defendants in Indian country “shall be subject to
the  same  law”  as  defendants  in  federal  enclaves.    See  18
U. S. C. §1153 (“Any Indian who commits against the per-
son or property of another Indian or other person any of ”
certain major offenses “shall be subject to the same law and
penalties as all other persons committing any of the above
offenses,  within  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  United
States”).  So  even  assuming  that  the  text  of  the  Major
Crimes Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over
major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country, see,
e.g.,  United  States  v.  John,  437  U. S.  634,  651,  and  n.  22
(1978); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U. S. 99, 103 (1993), that
conclusion does not translate to the differently worded Gen-
eral Crimes Act.

In  short,  the  General  Crimes  Act  does  not  treat  Indian
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the General Crimes Act and its application to crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

849

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10701.  Harris  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  887.

No.  08–10702.  Gil  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  212.

No. 08–10703.  Ford v.  United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  550  F.  3d  975.

No. 08–10704.  Ikbal v.  United  States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  604.

No.  08–10705.  Heath  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  263.

No. 08–10706.  Granado-Mena v.  United States.  C. A. 11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  771.

No. 08–10707.  Hicks v.  United  States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  758.

No. 08–10708.  Garza v.  Texas.  Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  261  S. W.  3d  361.

No.  08–10709.  Hageman  v.  Nooth,  Superintendent,  Snake
River  Correctional  Institution.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  996.

No.  08–10710.  Zuniga  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  653.

No.  08–10711.  Trainor  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10713.  Shah  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  294  Fed.  Appx.  951.

No.  08–10714.  Schexnayder  v.  Louisiana.  Sup.  Ct.  La.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  994  So.  2d  29.

No.  08–10715.  Staples  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10716.  Noriega-Valenzuela  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.
Appx.  655.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J.

victory here mostly Pyrrhic.  But that is because the only
problem  with  the  challenged  part  of  §3702(1)  lies  in  its
means, not its end.  Congress has the constitutional power
to  prohibit  sports  gambling  schemes,  and  no  party  here
argues that there is any constitutional defect in §3702(2)’s
alternative means of doing so.

I  consequently  join  JUSTICE  GINSBURG’s  dissenting
opinion  in  part,  and  all  but  Part  VI–B  of  the  Court’s
opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Decker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DeCloud v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deedrick v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deeds; Chappell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dees; Gulledge v.
Dees; Taylor v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deese v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dehaney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deiulemar Compagnia Di Navigazione; Paciﬁc Eternity, S. A. v. . . .
Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
de la Luz Saldana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Delbosque, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DeLeon v. Garcia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Delespine v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
delos Reyes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Del Valle Hernandez v. New York City Law Dept. Corp. Counsel
DeMinico; Camoscio v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DeNictolis v. Maloney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Agriculture; Abram v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Agriculture; McFall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Air Force; Bonner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Army; Crews v.
. . . . . . .
Department of Army; Iceland S. S. Co., Ltd.-Eimskip v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Army; Weslowski v.
Department of Defense; Partridge v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Ed.; Abidekun v.
. . . . .
Department of Energy; Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v.
Department of Health and Human Services; Gulley v.
. . . . . . . . .
Department of Labor; Rasten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Navy; Holmes v.
Department of Navy; Paul v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of State; People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v.
Department of Veterans Affairs; Forte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DePluzer v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Depree, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Derden v. Hargett
DeTella; Calhoun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Detroit; Qualls v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DeVore, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dew v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dewberry v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. H. L. Associates, Inc. v. O’Gorman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diamonds and Lace Showbar v. Chattanooga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diaz v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1016
1025
1112
1134
1074
1132
1118
1138
1109
1052
1120
1002
1073
1063,1128
1065
1090
1002
1074
1077
1012
1083
1105
1112
1076
1051
1064
1003
1033
1125
1002
1135
1104
1053
1088
1052
1059
1009,1095
1087
1086
1053
1131
1110
1052
1060
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ARIZONA ET AL. v. NAVAJO NATION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–1484.  Argued March 20, 2023—Decided June 22, 2023*

An 1868 peace treaty between the United States and the Navajo Tribe
established the Navajo Reservation that today spans some 17 million
acres,  almost  entirely  in  the  Colorado  River  Basin  of  the  western
United States.  The Federal Government’s reservation of land for an
Indian tribe implicitly reserves the right to use needed water from var-
ious  sources—such  as  groundwater,  rivers,  streams,  lakes,  and
springs—that  arise  on,  border,  cross,  underlie,  or  are  encompassed
within the reservation.  See Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564,
576–577.  While the Tribe has the right to use needed water from the
reservation’s numerous water sources, the Navajos face the same wa-
ter scarcity problem that many in the western United States face.  In
the Navajos’ view, the Federal Government’s efforts to assist the Nav-
ajos with their water needs did not fully satisfy the trust obligations of
the United States under the 1868 treaty.  The Navajos filed suit seek-
ing  to  compel  the  United  States  to  take  affirmative  steps  to  secure
needed water for the Tribe—including by assessing the Tribe’s water
needs, developing a plan to secure the needed water, and potentially
building pipelines, pumps, wells, or other water infrastructure.  The
States of Arizona, Nevada, and Colorado intervened against the Tribe
to protect those States’ interests in water from the Colorado River.  The
U. S. District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the Navajo
Tribe’s complaint, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding in relevant
part that the United States has a duty under the 1868 treaty to take
affirmative steps to secure water for the Navajos.

——————

* Together with No. 22–51, Department of the Interior et al. v. Navajo

Nation et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
956

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 13, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6028.  Cortinas  v.  Nevada.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  124  Nev.  1013,  195  P.  3d  315.

No.  09–6066.  Taylor  v.  Roper,  Superintendent,  Potosi
Correctional Center.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Re
ported  below:  561  F.  3d  859.

No.  09–6089.  Childress  v.  Cameron,  Superintendent,
State  Correctional  Institution  at  Cresson.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6109.  Walker  v.  Zenk,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  144.

No.  09–6119.  Conn  v.  Klopotoski,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional  Institution  at  Dallas,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  122.

No.  09–6174.  Gaston  v.  United  States  Postal  Service
et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319
Fed.  Appx.  155.

No.  09–6200.  Williams  v.  Drew,  Warden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6205.  McIntyre  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6206.  Travis  v.  Park  City  Municipal  Corporation
et al.  C.  A. 10th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported  below: 565
F.  3d  1252.

No.  09–6207.  Tate  v.  Merit  Systems  Protection  Board.
C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.
Appx.  319.

No.  09–6211.  Troxelle  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  176.

No.  09–6217.  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  934.

No.  09–6218.  Rollness  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  996  and  320  Fed.
Appx.  797.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

an institution of higher education.”  Id., at 311–312.  And
that was so, he opined, because a university was entitled as
a matter of academic freedom “to make its own judgments
as to . . . the selection of its student body.”  Id., at 312.

But  a  university’s  freedom  was  not  unlimited.    “Racial
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect,”
Justice Powell explained, and antipathy toward them was
deeply  “rooted  in  our  Nation’s  constitutional  and  demo-
graphic history.”  Id., at 291.  A university could not employ
a quota system, for example, reserving “a specified number
of seats in each class for individuals from the preferred eth-
nic groups.”  Id., at 315.  Nor could it impose a “multitrack
program  with  a  prescribed  number  of  seats  set  aside  for
each identifiable category of applicants.”  Ibid.  And neither
still  could  it  use  race  to  foreclose  an  individual  “from  all
consideration  . . .  simply  because  he  was  not  the  right
color.”  Id., at 318.

The role of race had to be cabined.  It could operate only
as “a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file.”  Id., at 317.  And
even  then,  race  was  to  be  weighed  in  a  manner  “flexible
enough  to  consider  all  pertinent  elements  of  diversity  in
light  of  the  particular  qualifications  of  each  applicant.”
Ibid.    Justice  Powell  derived  this  approach  from  what  he
called the “illuminating example” of the admissions system
then used by Harvard College.  Id., at 316.  Under that sys-
tem, as described by Harvard in a brief it had filed with the
Court, “the race of an applicant may tip the balance in his
favor just as geographic origin or a life [experience] may tip
the balance in other candidates’ cases.”  Ibid. (internal quo-
tation  marks  omitted).  Harvard  continued:  “A  farm  boy
from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College that a
Bostonian cannot offer.  Similarly, a black student can usu-
ally  bring  something  that  a  white  person  cannot  offer.”
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The result, Har-
vard  proclaimed,  was  that  “race  has  been”—and  should
be—“a factor in some admission decisions.”  Ibid. (internal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion discussing the use of race in college admissions. It cites previous legal cases and arguments, making it part of the main body of the document and suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

KIRTSAENG, DBA BLUECHRISTINE99 v. JOHN WILEY
& SONS, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 11–697.  Argued October 29, 2012—Decided March 19, 2013

The  “exclusive  rights”  that  a  copyright  owner  has  “to  distribute  copies
. . . of [a] copyrighted work,” 17 U. S. C. §106(3), are qualified by the
application  of  several  limitations  set  out  in  §§107  through  122,  in-
cluding the “first sale” doctrine, which provides that “the owner of a
particular  copy  or  phonorecord  lawfully  made  under  this  title  . . .  is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or oth-
erwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord,” §109(a).
Importing a copy made abroad without the copyright owner’s permis-
sion  is  an  infringement  of  §106(3).    See  §602(a)(1).    In  Quality  King
Distributors,  Inc.  v.  L’anza  Research  Int’l,  Inc.,  523  U. S.  135,  145,
this Court held that §602(a)(1)’s reference to §106(3) incorporates the
§§107  through  122  limitations,  including  §109’s  “first  sale”  doctrine.
However, the copy in Quality King was initially manufactured in the
United States and then sent abroad and sold.

Respondent,  John  Wiley  &  Sons,  Inc.,  an  academic  textbook  pub-
lisher,  often  assigns  to  its  wholly  owned  foreign  subsidiary  (Wiley
Asia) rights to publish, print, and sell foreign editions of Wiley’s Eng-
lish  language  textbooks  abroad.    Wiley  Asia’s  books  state  that  they
are  not  to  be  taken  (without  permission)  into  the  United  States.
When petitioner Kirtsaeng moved from Thailand to the United States
to study mathematics, he asked friends and family to buy foreign edi-
tion English-language textbooks in Thai book shops, where they sold
at low prices, and to mail them to him in the United States.  He then
sold  the  books,  reimbursed  his  family  and  friends,  and  kept  the
profit.

Wiley  filed  suit,  claiming  that  Kirtsaeng’s  unauthorized  importa-
tion  and  resale  of  its  books  was  an  infringement  of  Wiley’s  §106(3)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1235

JOINT APPENDIX—Continued

Exhibits, inclusion of ....................................................  26.7
Extraordinary writs......................................................  20.6
In forma pauperis proceedings .................................  26.2
References in briefs......................................................  24.1(g), 24.5
Time to ﬁle...................................................................  26.1, 26.4, 26.9, 30.4

Rule

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT—See Appeals
JUSTICES

Applications to individual Justices

—Clerk, ﬁled with  ...............................................  22.1

—Copies, number to be ﬁled  .............................  22.2

—Disposition ..........................................................  22.4, 22.6

—Distribution ........................................................  22.3

—Documents, format............................................  22.2, 33.2

—Referral to full Court  ......................................  22.5
—Renewal  .............................................................  22.4
—Service.................................................................  22.2

Extensions of time to ﬁle

—Documents and papers .....................................  30.2–30.4
—Jurisdictional statements  ...............................  18.3, 30.2, 30.3
—Petitions for rehearing.....................................  30.3
—Petitions for writ of certiorari........................  13.5, 30.2, 30.3
—Reply briefs on merits  ....................................  30.3

Habeas corpus proceedings .........................................  36
Leave to ﬁle document in excess of word limits  ...  33.1(d)
Petitions for rehearing.................................................  44.1
Stays ................................................................................  22.5, 23

LIBRARY

Persons to whom open .................................................  2.1
Removal of books ..........................................................  2.3
Schedule of hours ..........................................................  2.2

LODGING

Non-record material .....................................................  32.3

MANDAMUS—See Extraordinary Writs
MANDATES

Costs, inclusion of .........................................................  43.6

Dismissal of cases  ........................................................  46.3

Federal-court cases .......................................................  45.3

Petition for rehearing, effect of..................................  45.2

State-court cases ...........................................................  45.2

MARSHAL

Announcement of recesses ..........................................  4.3
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a table of contents or an index for a legal document, listing rules and their corresponding sections. It is not sequential text meant to be read as a narrative.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

22; see also id., at 9–10 (endorsing Lord Holt’s view in Lane
v. Cotton).

This  bargain,  America  would  soon  realize,  had  long  ex-
cluded half of society.  Women, though having won the right
to vote half a century earlier, were not equal in public.  In-
stead, a “separate-spheres ideology” had “assigned women
to the home and men to the market.”  E. Sepper & D. Din-
ner, Sex in Public, 129 Yale L. J. 78, 83, 88–90 (2019) (Sep-
per  &  Dinner).    Women  were  excluded  from  restaurants,
bars, civic and professional organizations, financial institu-
tions, and sports.  “Just as it did for the civil rights struggle,
public accommodations served as kindling for feminist mo-
bilization.”  Id.,  at  83,  97–104;  cf.  S.  Mayeri,  Reasoning
From Race: Feminism, Law, and the Civil Rights Revolu-
tion 9–40 (2011).  In response to a movement for women’s
liberation, numerous States banned discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations on the basis of “sex.”  See Sepper & Din-
ner  104,  nn.  145–147  (collecting  statutes).    Colorado  was
the first State to do so.  See 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 74, p.
200.

In the decades that followed, the Nation opened its eyes
to another injustice.  People with disabilities, though inher-
ently  full  and  equal  members  of  the  public,  had  been  ex-
cluded  from  many  areas  of  public  life.  This  exclusion
worked harms not only to disabled people’s standards of liv-
ing, but to their dignity too.  So Congress, responding once
again to a social movement, this time against the subordi-
nation of people with disabilities, banned discrimination on
that basis and secured by law disabled people’s equal access
to public spaces.  See S. Bagenstos, Law and the Contradic-
tions  of  the  Disability  Rights  Movement  13–20  (2009);  R.
Colker, The Disability Pendulum 22–68 (2005).  The center-
piece of this political and social action was the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).  Title III of the ADA
provides  that  “[n]o  individual  shall  be  discriminated
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the history of civil rights legislation, focusing on the exclusion of women and people with disabilities from public accommodations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GILL ET AL. v. WHITFORD ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

No. 16–1161.  Argued October 3, 2017—Decided June 18, 2018

Members of the Wisconsin Legislature are elected from single-member
legislative  districts.    Under  the  Wisconsin  Constitution,  the  legisla-
ture  must  redraw  the  boundaries  of  those  districts  following  each
census.  After the 2010 census, the legislature passed a new district-
ing plan known as Act 43.  Twelve Democratic voters, the plaintiffs in
this case, alleged that Act 43 harms the Democratic Party’s ability to
convert  Democratic  votes  into  Democratic  seats  in  the  legislature.
They asserted that Act 43 does this by “cracking” certain Democratic
voters among different districts in which those voters fail to achieve
electoral  majorities  and  “packing”  other  Democratic  voters  in  a  few
districts in which Democratic candidates win by large margins.  The
plaintiffs argued that the degree to which packing and cracking has
favored one political party over another can be measured by an “effi-
ciency  gap”  that  compares  each  party’s  respective  “wasted”  votes—
i.e., votes cast for a losing candidate or for a winning candidate in ex-
cess  of  what  that  candidate  needs  to  win—across  all  legislative  dis-
tricts.    The  plaintiffs  claimed  that  the  statewide  enforcement  of  Act
43 generated an excess of wasted Democratic votes, thereby violating
the  plaintiffs’  First  Amendment  right  of  association  and  their  Four-
teenth Amendment right to equal protection.  The defendants, sever-
al  members  of  the  state  election  commission,  moved  to  dismiss  the
plaintiffs’ claims.  They argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge the constitutionality of Act 43 as a whole because, as indi-
vidual  voters,  their  legally  protected  interests  extend  only  to  the
makeup of the legislative district in which they vote.  The three-judge
District  Court  denied  the  defendants’  motion  and,  following  a  trial,
concluded that Act 43 was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.
Regarding standing, the court held that the plaintiffs had suffered a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

clear recognition of the transformative effect the Fifteenth
Amendment  aimed  to  achieve.  Notably,  “the  Founders’
first  successful  amendment  told  Congress  that  it  could
‘make no law’ over a certain domain”; in contrast, the Civil
War Amendments used “language [that] authorized trans
formative  new  federal  statutes  to  uproot  all  vestiges  of
unfreedom  and  inequality”  and  provided  “sweeping  en
forcement  powers  . . .  to  enact  ‘appropriate’  legislation
targeting state abuses.”  A. Amar, America’s Constitution:
A  Biography  361,  363,  399  (2005).    See  also  McConnell,
Institutions  and  Interpretation:  A  Critique  of  City  of
Boerne  v.  Flores,  111  Harv.  L. Rev.  153,  182  (1997)
(quoting  Civil  War-era  framer  that  “the  remedy  for  the
violation  of  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  amendments
was  expressly  not  left  to  the  courts.    The  remedy  was
legislative.”).

The stated purpose of the Civil War Amendments was to
arm Congress with the power and authority to protect all
persons  within  the  Nation  from  violations  of  their  rights
by  the  States.    In  exercising  that  power,  then,  Congress
may  use  “all  means  which  are  appropriate,  which  are
plainly  adapted”  to  the  constitutional  ends  declared  by
these  Amendments.    McCulloch,  4  Wheat.,  at  421.    So
when  Congress  acts  to  enforce  the  right  to  vote  free  from
racial  discrimination,  we  ask  not  whether  Congress  has
chosen  the  means  most  wise,  but  whether  Congress  has
rationally selected means appropriate to a legitimate end.
“It  is  not  for  us  to  review  the  congressional  resolution  of
[the need for its chosen remedy].  It is enough that we be
able  to  perceive  a  basis  upon  which  the  Congress  might
resolve the conflict as it did.”  Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U. S. 641, 653 (1966).

Until  today,  in  considering  the  constitutionality  of  the
VRA, the Court has accorded Congress the full measure of
respect its judgments in this domain should garner.  South
Carolina  v.  Katzenbach  supplies  the  standard  of  review:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history and purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, arguing for a broad interpretation of Congress's power to enforce these rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>