<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

37

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

programs  “res[t]  on  pernicious  assumptions  about  race”);
id.,  at  403  (ALITO,  J.,  joined  by  ROBERTS,  C. J.,  and
THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting)  (diversity  interests  “are  laudable
goals,  but  they  are  not  concrete  or  precise”);  id.,  at  413
(race-conscious  college  admissions  plan  “discriminates
against Asian-American students”); id., at 414 (race-conscious
admissions  plan  is  unconstitutional  because  it  “does  not
specify what it means to be ‘African-American,’ ‘Hispanic,’
‘Asian American,’ ‘Native American,’ or ‘White’ ”); id., at 419
(race-conscious  college  admissions  policies  rest  on  “perni-
cious stereotype[s]”).

Lost arguments are not grounds to overrule a case.  When
proponents of those arguments, greater now in number on
the  Court,  return  to  fight  old  battles  anew,  it  betrays  an
unrestrained  disregard  for  precedent.    It  fosters  the  Peo-
ple’s suspicions that “bedrock principles are founded . . . in
the proclivities of individuals” on this Court, not in the law,
and it degrades “the integrity of our constitutional system
of  government.”  Vasquez  v.  Hillery,  474  U. S.  254,  265
(1986).  Nowhere is the damage greater than in cases like
these that touch upon matters of representation and insti-
tutional legitimacy.

The Court offers no justification, much less “a ‘special jus-
tification,’ ”  for  its  costly  endeavor.  Dobbs  v.  Jackson
Women’s  Health  Organization,  597  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2022)
(joint opinion of BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dis-
senting) (slip op., at 31) (quoting Gamble v. United States,
587  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  11)).    Nor  could  it.
There is no basis for overruling Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher.
The Court’s precedents were correctly decided, the opinion
today is not workable and creates serious equal protection
problems,  important  reliance  interests  favor  respondents,
and there are no legal or factual developments favoring the
Court’s reckless course.  See 597 U. S., at ___ (joint opinion
of BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting) (slip
op., at 31); id., at ___–___ (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring) (slip
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically Justice Sotomayor's dissent. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

THOMAS, J., dissenting

While  the  English  were  concerned  about  preventing  in-
surrection  and  armed  rebellion,  §922(g)(8)  is  concerned
with preventing interpersonal violence.  “Dangerous” per-
son laws thus offer the Government no support.

ii
The Government also points to historical commentary re-
ferring to the right of “peaceable” citizens to carry arms.  It
principally  relies  on  commentary  surrounding  two  failed
constitutional proposals.3  First, at the Massachusetts con-
vention,  Samuel  Adams  unsuccessfully  proposed  that  the
Bill of Rights deny Congress the power “to prevent the peo-
ple of the United States, who are peaceable citizens, from
keeping  their  own  arms.”    6  Documentary  History  of  the
Ratification  of  the  Constitution  1453  (J.  Kaminski  &  G.
Saladino eds. 2000) (Documentary History).  Second, Anti-
Federalists at the Pennsylvania convention unsuccessfully
proposed a Bill of Rights providing a “right to bear arms for
the defense of themselves and their own state, or the United
States, or for the purpose of killing game.”  2 id., at 597–
598, ¶7 (M. Jensen ed. 1976).  The Anti-Federalists’ Bill of
Rights would also state that “no law shall be passed for dis-
arming  the  people or  any  of  them,  unless  for  crimes  com-
mitted,  or  real  danger  of  public  injury  from  individuals.”

——————

3 The Government also cites an amendment to the Massachusetts Con-
stitution providing that “the people have a right to keep and to bear Arms
for their Own and the Common defence.”  The Popular Sources of Politi-
cal  Authority:  Documents  on  the  Massachusetts  Constitution  of  1780,
p. 624 (O. Handlin & M. Handlin eds. 1966).  The Government empha-
sizes that the amendment’s proponents believed they “Ought Never to be
deprived” of their arms, so long as they “Continue[d] honest and Lawfull
Subjects of Government.”  Ibid.  Even if the amendment contemplated
disarming dishonest and unlawful subjects, the Government makes no
effort to define those terms or explain why they necessarily include the
individuals  covered  by  §922(g)(8).    In  any  event,  evidence  concerning
what proponents behind an amendment to a single state constitution be-
lieved is too paltry to define the Second Amendment right.  See Bruen,
597 U. S., at 46.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses the Second Amendment and the law regarding firearm ownership.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1140

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

January  11,  2010

558  U. S.

No.  09–5594.  Van  Myers  v.  Ennis  Independent  School

District,  ante,  p.  912;

No.  09–5647.  Hughes  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  914;
No.  09–5693.  Moore  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De

partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  950;

No.  09–5701.  McFarland  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division,  ante,  p.  950;

No.  09–5719.  In  re  Bojonquez,  ante,  p.  812;
No.  09–5746.  Barbour  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  917;
No. 09–5756.  Phillips v.  District of Columbia et al., ante,

No.  09–5825.  Torrence  v.  Ozmint,  Director,  South  Caro

lina  Department  of  Corrections,  ante,  p.  953;

Jordan  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  920;

Lyles  v.  Lemmon  et  al.,  ante,  p.  953;

Peoples  v.  Williams  et  al.,  ante,  p.  954;

In  re  Coppage,  ante,  p.  813;

Linton  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General,  ante,

Long  et  ux.  v.  Wood  Mizer  Products  Inc.,

Warman  v.  Marberry,  Warden,  et  al.,  ante,

p.  952;

No.  09–5831.
No.  09–5843.
No.  09–5872.
No.  09–5880.
No.  09–5925.

p.  955;

No.  09–5960.

ante,  p.  971;

No.  09–5988.

p.  955;

No.  09–6010.
No.  09–6064.
No.  09–6068.
No.  09–6124.
No.  09–6135.

Gurnsey  v.  California  et  al.,  ante,  p.  955;

Fan  v.  Roe,  ante,  p.  973;

Cutaia  v.  Florida,  ante,  p.  994;

Hoffman  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  929;

Cain  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia  Depart

ment  of  Corrections,  ante,  p.  995;

No.  09–6166.  Judd  v.  New  Mexico,  ante,  p.  996;
No.  09–6270.  Davis  v.  Knowles  et  al.,  ante,  p.  998;
No.  09–6282.  Derrickson  v.  District  Attorney  of  Dela

ware  County  et  al.,  ante,  p.  998;

No.  09–6328.  Yeager  v.  City  of  San  Diego,  California,

et  al.,  ante,  p.  1013;

No.  09–6414.  In  re  Ramirez,  ante,  p.  944;
No.  09–6437.  Yoder  v.  Brewer,  Governor  of  Arizona,

et  al.,  ante,  p.  1000;

No.  09–6469.  Daniel  v.  Scott  et  al.,  ante,  p.  1028;
No.  09–6487.  Jones  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  963;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case citations, likely from a legal document or journal.  It is not sequential text and does not appear to be the main body of a work.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

OHIO ET AL v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY ET AL

ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAY

No. 23A349.  Argued February 21, 2024—Decided June 27, 2024*

The Clean Air Act envisions a collaborative effort between States and the
federal government to regulate air quality.  When the Environmental
Protection  Agency  sets  standards  for  common  air  pollutants,  States
must submit a State Implementation Plan, or SIP, providing for the
“implementation, maintenance, and enforcement” of those standards
in their jurisdictions.  See 42 U. S. C. §7410(a)(1).  Because air currents
can carry pollution across state borders, States must also design their
plans with neighboring States in mind.  Under the Act’s “Good Neigh-
bor Provision,” state plans must prohibit emissions “in amounts which
will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with
maintenance by, any other State” of the relevant air-quality standard.
§7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).    Only  if  a  SIP  fails  to  satisfy  the  “applicable  re-
quirements” of the Act may EPA issue a Federal Implementation Plan,
or FIP, for the noncompliant State that fails to correct the deficiencies
in its SIP.  §§7410(k)(3), (c)(1).
  In 2015, EPA revised its air-quality standards for ozone, thus trig-
gering a requirement for States to submit new SIPs.  Years later, EPA
announced its intention to disapprove over 20 SIPs because the agency
believed they had failed to address adequately obligations under the
Good Neighbor Provision.  During the public-comment period for the
proposed SIP disapprovals, EPA issued a single proposed FIP to bind

——————

* Together  with  No.  23A350,  Kinder  Morgan,  Inc.,  et al.  v.  Environ-
mental Protection Agency et al.; No. 23A351, American Forest & Paper
Assn.  et al.  v.  Environmental  Protection  Agency,  No.  23A384,  United
States Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.,  also on ap-
plications for stay.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1017

558 U. S.

November 9, 2009

No.  09–6889.  Bueno-Sierra  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6891.  Alvarez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  995.

No. 09–6898.  Wallenfang v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  649.

No. 09–6900.  Landin v. United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6901.  Serrano  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6903.  Coleman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  643.

No.  09–6904.  Chambers  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  854.

No. 09–6905.  Epps v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  508.

No.  09–6906.  Carrizoza  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  234.

No. 09–6909.  Horne  v.  United States.  C. A.  4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  343.

No.  09–6910.  Harris  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  612.

No.  09–6911.  Guillory  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  344.

No.  09–6913.  Gillespie,  aka  Millspin  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.
Appx.  298.

No.  09–6914.  Garcia-Sanchez  v.  United  States  (Reported
below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  426);  and  Martinez-Quezada  v.  United
States  (345  Fed.  Appx.  222).  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6917.  Quiah  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  233.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

THOMAS, J., dissenting

something  closer  than  affray  laws,  which  expressly  carve
out the very conduct §922(g)(8) was designed to prevent (in-
terpersonal  violence  in  the  home).    Nor  would  I  conclude
that affray  laws—criminal laws regulating a  specific type
of public carry—are analogous to §922(g)(8)’s use of a civil
proceeding  to  bar  all  Second  Amendment-protected  activ-
ity.

2
The Court recognizes that surety and affray laws on their
own are not enough.  So it takes pieces from each to stitch
together an analogue for §922(g)(8).  Ante, at 13.  Our prec-
edents foreclose that approach.  The question before us is
whether a single historical law has both a comparable bur-
den  and  justification  as  §922(g)(8),  not  whether  several
laws  can  be  cobbled  together  to  qualify.    As  Bruen  ex-
plained, “determining whether a historical regulation is a
proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation
requires a determination of whether the two regulations”—
the  historical  and  modern  regulations—“are  ‘relevantly
similar.’ ”    597  U. S.,  at  28–29.    In  doing  so,  a  court  must
consider  whether
that  single  historical  regulation
“impose[s] a comparable burden on the right of armed self-
defense and whether that burden is comparably justified.”
Id., at 29 (emphasis added).

The  Court’s  contrary  approach  of  mixing  and  matching
historical  laws—relying  on  one  law’s  burden  and  another
law’s  justification—defeats  the  purpose  of  a  historical  in-
quiry altogether.  Given that imprisonment (which involved
disarmament) existed at the founding, the Government can
always  satisfy  this  newly  minted  comparable-burden  re-
quirement.  See  ante,  at  14–15.  That  means  the  Govern-
ment need only find a historical law with a comparable jus-
tification  to  validate  modern  disarmament  regimes.  As  a
result, historical laws fining certain behavior could justify
completely disarming a person for the same behavior.  That
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

25

Opinion of the Court

172.  Dr.  Evans’  report  provided  a  similar  explanation  of
the  way  in  which  midazolam  works,  see  id.,  at  293–294,
and  Dr.  Lubarsky  did  not  dispute  the  accuracy  of  that
explanation when he testified at the hearing.  Petitioners
contend,  however,  that  Dr.  Evans  erred  when  he  said  at
the  hearing  that  “[m]idazolam  attaches  to  GABA  recep-
tors,  inhibiting  GABA.”
Id.,  at  312  (emphasis  added).
Petitioners  contend  that  this  statement  was  incorrect
because  “far  from  inhibiting  GABA,  midazolam  facilitates
its binding to GABA receptors.”  Brief for Petitioners 38.

In  making  this  argument,  petitioners  are  simply  quar-
relling  with  the  words  that  Dr.  Evans  used  during  oral
testimony in an effort to explain how midazolam works in
terms  understandable  to  a  layman.    Petitioners  do  not
suggest  that  the  discussion  of  midazolam  in  Dr.  Evans’
expert  report  was  inaccurate,  and  as  for  Dr.  Evans’  pass-
ing use of the term “inhibiting,” Dr. Lubarksy’s own expert
report  states  that  GABA’s  “inhibition  of  brain  activity  is
accentuated  by  midazolam.”  App.  232  (emphasis  added).
Dr.  Evans’  oral  use  of  the  word  “inhibiting”—particularly
in  light  of  his  written  testimony—does  not  invalidate  the
District Court’s decision to rely on his testimony.

Petitioners  also  point  to  an  apparent  conflict  between
Dr.  Evans’  testimony  and  a  declaration  by  Dr.  Lubarsky
(submitted  after  the  District  Court  ruled)  regarding  the
biological process that produces midazolam’s ceiling effect.
But  even  if  Dr.  Lubarsky’s  declaration  is  correct,  it  is
largely  beside  the  point.  What  matters  for  present  pur-
poses is the dosage at which the ceiling effect kicks in, not
the  biological  process  that  produces  the  effect.    And  Dr.
Lubarsky’s declaration does not render the District Court’s
findings  clearly  erroneous  with  respect  to  that  critical
issue.

——————

782 (7th ed. 2006).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the testimony of expert witnesses and its relevance to a case. It delves into the specifics of a drug's mechanism and its effects, highlighting points of contention and the court's reasoning for accepting certain expert opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

15

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

that  preclearance  lessened  the  litigation  burden  on  cov
ered  jurisdictions  themselves,  because  the  preclearance
process is far less costly than defending against a §2 claim,
and clearance by DOJ substantially reduces the likelihood
that a §2 claim will be mounted.  Reauthorizing the Voting
Rights  Act’s  Temporary  Provisions:  Policy  Perspectives
and Views From the Field: Hearing before the Subcommit
tee  on  the  Constitution,  Civil  Rights  and  Property  Rights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d
Sess., pp. 13, 120–121 (2006).  See also Brief for States of
New York,  California, Mississippi, and North Carolina as
Amici Curiae 8–9 (Section 5 “reduc[es] the likelihood that
a  jurisdiction  will  face  costly  and  protracted  Section  2
litigation”).

The  number  of  discriminatory  changes  blocked  or  de
terred  by  the  preclearance  requirement  suggests  that  the
state  of  voting  rights  in  the  covered  jurisdictions  would
have been significantly different absent this remedy.  Sur
veying  the  type  of  changes  stopped  by  the  preclearance
procedure  conveys  a  sense  of  the  extent  to  which  §5  con
tinues to protect minority voting rights.  Set out below are
characteristic  examples  of  changes  blocked  in  the  years
leading up to the 2006 reauthorization:

	  In  1995,  Mississippi  sought  to  reenact  a  dual  voter
registration system, “which was initially enacted in
1892  to  disenfranchise  Black  voters,”  and  for  that
reason, was struck down by a federal court in 1987.
H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 39.

	  Following  the  2000  census,  the  City  of  Albany,
Georgia,  proposed  a  redistricting  plan  that  DOJ
found to be “designed with the purpose to limit and
retrogress  the  increased  black  voting  strength  . . .
in  the  city  as  a  whole.”    Id.,  at  37  (internal  quota
tion marks omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedents and discusses the impact of voting rights legislation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

Opinion of the Court

“wrongful conduct,” bad acts, and misfeasance.  J. Goldberg,
A. Sebok, & B. Zipursky, Tort Law: Responsibilities and Re-
dress 31 (2004).  Some level of blameworthiness is therefore
ordinarily required.  But, again, if aiding-and-abetting lia-
bility were taken too far, then ordinary merchants could be-
come liable for any misuse of their goods and services, no
matter how attenuated their relationship with the wrong-
doer.  And those who merely deliver mail or transmit emails
could be liable for the tortious messages contained therein.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts §876, Comment d, Illus.
9, p. 318 (1979) (cautioning against this result).

For these reasons, courts have long recognized the need
to cabin aiding-and-abetting liability to cases of truly cul-
pable conduct.  They have cautioned, for example, that not
“all those present at the commission of a trespass are liable
as principals” merely because they “make no opposition or
manifest no disapprobation of the wrongful” acts of another.
Brown v. Perkins, 83 Mass. 89, 98 (1861); see also Hilmes v.
Stroebel, 59 Wis. 74, 17 N. W. 539 (1883); Duke v. Feldman,
245 Md. 454, 457–458, 226 A. 2d 345, 347 (1967).  Put an-
other way, overly broad liability would allow for “one person
[to] be made a trespasser and even a felon against his or her
consent, and by the mere rashness or precipitancy or over-
heated  zeal  of  another.”  Bird  v.  Lynn,  49  Ky.  422,  423
(1850).  Moreover, unlike its close cousin conspiracy, aiding
and abetting does not require any agreement with the pri-
mary wrongdoer to commit wrongful acts, thus eliminating
a significant limiting principle.  See Nye & Nissen v. United
States, 336 U. S. 613, 620 (1949).

To keep aiding-and-abetting liability grounded in culpa-
ble misconduct, criminal law thus requires “that a defend-
ant ‘in some sort associate himself with the venture, that
he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring
about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed’ ” before
he could be held liable.  Id., at 619 (quoting Peoni, 100 F. 2d,
at  402).  In  other  words,  the  defendant  has  to  take  some
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of aiding-and-abetting liability in tort law. It cites legal precedents and provides analysis of the legal principles involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

9

KAGAN, J., dissenting

After  all  (as  the  majority  rightly  notes),  racial  and  resi-
dential  gerrymanders  were  also  once  with  us,  but  the
Court  has  done  something  about  that  fact.  See  ante,  at
10.1   The  majority’s  idea  instead  seems  to  be  that  if  we
have  lived  with  partisan  gerrymanders  so  long,  we  will
survive.

to

led

so-called

That  complacency  has  no  cause.  Yes,  partisan  gerry-
mandering  goes  back  to  the  Republic’s  earliest  days.    (As
does vociferous opposition to it.)  But big data and modern
technology—of just the kind that the mapmakers in North
Carolina and Maryland used—make today’s gerrymander-
ing altogether different from the crude linedrawing of the
past.  Old-time efforts, based on little more than guesses,
dummymanders—
sometimes
gerrymanders  that  went  spectacularly  wrong.   Not  likely
in  today’s  world.  Mapmakers  now  have  access  to  more
granular data about party preference and voting behavior
than ever before.  County-level voting data has given way
to precinct-level or city-block-level data; and increasingly,
mapmakers  avail  themselves  of  data  sets  providing  wide-
ranging  information  about  even  individual  voters.  See
Brief  for  Political  Science  Professors  as  Amici  Curiae  20–
22.  Just  as  important,  advancements  in  computing  tech-
nology  have  enabled  mapmakers  to  put  that  information
to  use  with  unprecedented  efficiency  and  precision.  See
id., at 22–25.  While bygone mapmakers may have drafted
three  or  four  alternative  districting  plans,  today’s  map-
makers  can  generate  thousands  of  possibilities  at  the
touch of a key—and then choose the one giving their party
maximum  advantage  (usually  while  still  meeting  tradi-

——————

1 And  even  putting  that  aside,  any  originalist  argument  would  have
to  deal  with  an  inconvenient  fact.    The  Framers  originally  viewed
political parties themselves (let alone their most partisan actions) with
deep suspicion, as fomenters of factionalism and “symptom[s] of disease
in the body politic.”  G. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early
Republic, 1789–1815, p. 140 (2009).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the issue of partisan gerrymandering and argues that modern technology has made it a more potent issue than in the past.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

5

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

Americans  can  and  do  contribute  to  our  diverse  Nation.
Brief  for  Respondent  1–4,  42–43.    While  thoughtful  per-
sons  can  agree  or  disagree  with  this  approach,  the  disso-
nance between the trademark’s potential to teach and the
Government’s insistence on its own, opposite, and negative
interpretation  confirms  the  constitutional  vice  of  the
statute.

II
The parties dispute whether trademarks are commercial
speech  and  whether  trademark  registration  should  be
considered  a  federal  subsidy.  The  former  issue  may  turn
on whether certain commercial concerns for the protection
of trademarks might, as a general matter, be the basis for
regulation.  However that issue is resolved, the viewpoint
based  discrimination  at  issue  here  necessarily  invokes
heightened scrutiny.

“Commercial  speech  is  no  exception,”  the  Court  has
explained,  to  the  principle  that  the  First  Amendment
“requires  heightened  scrutiny  whenever  the  government
creates  a  regulation  of  speech  because  of  disagreement
with the message it conveys.”  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
564 U. S. 552, 566 (2011) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  Unlike content based discrimination, discrimination
based  on  viewpoint,  including  a  regulation  that  targets
speech for its offensiveness, remains of serious concern in
the commercial context.  See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod-
ucts Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 65, 71–72 (1983).

To the extent trademarks qualify as commercial speech,
they are an example of why that term or category does not
serve as a blanket exemption from the First Amendment’s
requirement  of  viewpoint  neutrality.    Justice  Holmes’
reference to the “free trade in ideas” and the “power of . . .
thought  to  get  itself  accepted  in  the  competition  of  the
market,”  Abrams  v.  United  States,  250  U. S.  616,  630
(1919) (dissenting opinion), was a metaphor.  In the realm
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23–5572.  Argued April 16, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024

The  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002  imposes  criminal  liability  on  anyone
who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, docu-
ment, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair
the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.”
18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(1).  The next subsection extends that prohibition
to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official
proceeding,  or  attempts  to  do  so.”    §1512(c)(2).    Petitioner  Joseph
Fischer was charged with violating §1512(c)(2) for his conduct on Jan-
uary  6,  2021.    On  that  day,  Congress  convened  in  a  joint  session  to
certify the votes in the 2020 Presidential election.  While they did so,
a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered out-
side the Capitol, and some eventually forced their way into the build-
ing, breaking windows and assaulting police.  App. 189.  This breach
of the Capitol delayed the certification of the vote.  The criminal com-
plaint alleges that Fischer was among those who invaded the building.
Fischer was charged with various crimes for his actions on January 6,
including obstructing an official proceeding in violation of §1512(c)(2).
He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that the provision criminal-
izes only attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence.
The  District  Court  granted  his  motion  in  relevant  part.  A  divided
panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceed-
ings.

Held:  To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish
that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an
official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used
in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so.

(a)  To  determine  the  scope  of  the  residual  “otherwise”  clause  in
§1512(c)(2), the Court must decide how it is linked to its “surrounding
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

BARRETT, J., dissenting

the Court can rely.  Cf. Katz, 546 U. S., at 372–373 (holding
that “those who crafted the Bankruptcy Clause” understood
it to “operat[e] free and clear of the State’s claim of sover-
eign  immunity”);  Fitzpatrick  v.  Bitzer,  427  U. S.  445,  456
(1976)  (holding  that  state  sovereign  immunity  is  neces-
sarily  limited  by  the  enforcement  provision  of  the  Four-
teenth Amendment); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192
U. S. 286, 314–318 (1904) (holding that Article 3, §2, gives
the Supreme Court jurisdiction over a suit brought by one
State against another); Texas, 143 U. S., at 642–646 (hold-
ing that Article 3, §2, gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction
over a suit brought by the United States against a State).
Nor, as discussed, does the constitutional structure single
out eminent domain for special treatment.  And while the
Court claims the support of history, the evidence it cites is
beside the point.

The Court relies exclusively on the fact that Congress and
the States, like the Colonies before them, have consistently
authorized private parties to exercise the right of eminent
domain to obtain property for mills, roads, and other public
improvements.  See ante, at 9–11.  As the Court notes, Con-
gress did so in the early days of the Republic only within
“areas subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction,” though we
later  held  that  Congress  could  take  property  within  state
boundaries as well.  Ante, at 8–9.  This history is long and
undisputed,  and  the  Court  presents  it  as  conclusive  evi-
dence on PennEast’s side of the ledger.

But the question before us is not whether Congress can
authorize  a  private  party  to  exercise  the  right  of  eminent
domain against another private party, which is the propo-
sition this history supports.  Nor is it whether Congress can
authorize  a  private  entity  to  take  state  property  through
means  other  than  a  condemnation  suit.    The  question  is
whether Congress can authorize a private party to bring a
condemnation suit against a State.  And on that score, the
Court comes up dry.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and argues against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529IND

Unit: $UBV [10-03-01 07:01:03] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

INDEX

1211

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938.

Public employer—Compensatory time.—Nothing in FLSA or its imple-
menting regulations prohibits a public employer from compelling use of
compensatory time. Christensen v. Harris County, p. 576.

FALSE CLAIMS ACT.

Standing—Private suit against State.—A private individual has stand-
ing to bring suit in federal court on behalf of United States under FCA,
but a State (or state agency) is not a “person” subject to qui tam liabil-
ity under Act. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States
ex rel. Stevens, p. 765.

FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT. See Venue.

FEDERAL COURTS. See Venue.

FEDERAL-QUESTION JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction.

FEDERAL RAILROAD SAFETY ACT OF 1970. See Pre-emption of

State Law, 1.

FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE.

Amendments to Rules, p. 1147.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Amendments to Rules, p. 1155.

FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

Amendments to Rules, p. 1179.

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.
Amendments to Rules, p. 1189.

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See Pre-emption of State Law.

FEE AWARDS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1.

FIFTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; VII.

FIRST AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, V; VI.

FLORIDA. See Constitutional Law, X, 2.

FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT.

Tobacco regulation—Food and Drug Administration authority.— Read-
ing FDCA as a whole, as well as in conjunction with Congress’ subsequent
tobacco-speciﬁc legislation, it is plain that Congress has not given FDA
authority to assert jurisdiction over tobacco products. FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., p. 120.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, II, 2; III.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents from a legal document. It lists topics and corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER
Opinion of the Court

from timber harvesting or road construction on a particu-
lar  tract  of  federal  land,  even  though  the  Government’s
action  would  obstruct  the  religious  practice  of  several
Native American Tribes that held certain sites on the tract
to  be  sacred.  Accepting  that  “[t]he  building  of  a  road  or
the  harvesting  of  timber  . . .  would  interfere  significantly
with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment
according  to  their  own  religious  beliefs,”  we  nonetheless
found  no  free  exercise  violation,  because  the  affected
individuals  were  not  being  “coerced  by  the  Government’s
action  into  violating  their  religious  beliefs.”  Id.,  at  449.
The  Court  specifically  noted,  however,  that  the  Govern-
ment action did not “penalize religious activity by denying
any  person  an  equal  share  of  the  rights,  benefits,  and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”  Ibid.
  In  Employment  Division,  Department  of  Human  Re-
sources  of  Oregon  v.  Smith,  494  U. S.  872  (1990),  we  re-
jected  a  free  exercise  claim  brought  by  two  members  of  a
Native  American  church  denied  unemployment  benefits
because they had violated Oregon’s drug laws by ingesting
peyote for sacramental purposes.  Along the same lines as
our  decision  in  Lyng,  we  held  that  the  Free  Exercise
Clause  did  not  entitle  the  church  members  to  a  special
dispensation from the general criminal laws on account of
their religion.  At the same time, we again made clear that
the  Free  Exercise  Clause  did  guard  against  the  govern-
ment’s  imposition  of  “special  disabilities  on  the  basis  of
religious  views  or  religious  status.”    494  U. S.,  at  877
(citing McDaniel, 435 U. S. 618).2

——————

2 This is not to say that any application of a valid and neutral law of
general  applicability  is  necessarily  constitutional  under  the  Free
Exercise  Clause.    Recently,  in  Hosanna-Tabor  Evangelical  Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171 (2012), this Court held that
the  Religion  Clauses  required  a  ministerial  exception  to  the  neutral
prohibition on employment retaliation contained in the Americans with
Disabilities  Act.    Distinguishing  Smith,  we  explained  that  while  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically referencing previous Supreme Court cases related to the Free Exercise Clause. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

ment  is  a  power  reserved  to  a  three-judge  district  court,
not a single-judge district court.  18 U. S. C. §3626(a).  In
accordance with that rule, the Coleman and Plata District
Judges  independently  requested  that  a  three-judge  court
be convened.  The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for
the  Ninth  Circuit  convened  a  three-judge  court  composed
of  the  Coleman  and  Plata  District  Judges  and  a  third,
Ninth  Circuit  Judge.    Because  the  two  cases  are  interre-
lated,  their  limited  consolidation  for  this  purpose  has  a
certain  utility  in  avoiding  conflicting  decrees  and  aiding
judicial consideration and enforcement.  The State in this
Court has not objected to consolidation, although the State
does  argue  that  the  three-judge  court  was  prematurely
convened.  The  State  also  objects  to  the  substance  of  the
three-judge court order, which requires the State to reduce
overcrowding in its prisons.

The appeal presents the question whether the remedial
order  issued  by  the  three-judge  court  is  consistent  with
requirements  and  procedures  set  forth  in  a  congressional
statute, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA).
18 U. S. C. §3626; see Appendix A, infra.  The order leaves
the  choice  of  means  to  reduce  overcrowding  to  the  discre-
tion of state officials.  But absent compliance through new
construction,  out-of-state  transfers,  or  other  means—or
modification  of  the  order  upon  a  further  showing  by  the
State—the State will be required to release some number
of  prisoners  before  their  full  sentences  have  been  served.
High  recidivism  rates  must  serve  as  a  warning  that  mis-
taken or premature release of even one prisoner can cause
injury  and  harm.    The  release  of  prisoners  in  large  num-
bers—assuming  the  State  finds  no  other  way  to  comply
with the order—is a matter of undoubted, grave concern.

At  the  time  of  trial,  California’s  correctional  facilities
held  some  156,000  persons.  This  is  nearly  double  the
number  that  California’s  prisons  were  designed  to  hold,
and California has been ordered to reduce its prison popu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" in the case of Brown v. Plata. It discusses the procedural history of the case and the issues at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO. v. APPLE INC.

Opinion of the Court

I

A

The federal patent laws have long permitted those who
invent  designs  for  manufactured  articles  to  patent  their
designs.  See  Patent  Act  of  1842,  §3,  5  Stat.  543–544.
Patent  protection  is  available  for  a  “new,  original  and
ornamental  design  for  an  article  of  manufacture.”  35
U. S. C. §171(a).  A patentable design “gives a peculiar or
distinctive  appearance  to  the  manufacture,  or  article  to
which  it  may  be  applied,  or  to  which  it  gives  form.”
Gorham Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 511, 525 (1872).  This Court
has  explained  that  a  design  patent  is  infringed  “if,  in  the
eye  of  an  ordinary  observer,  giving  such  attention  as  a
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the
same.”  Id., at 528.

In  1885,  this  Court  limited  the  damages  available  for
design  patent  infringement.  The  statute  in  effect  at  the
time  allowed  a  holder  of  a  design  patent  to  recover  “the
actual damages sustained” from infringement.  Rev. Stat.
§4919.  In  Dobson  v.  Hartford  Carpet  Co.,  114  U. S.  439
(1885), the lower courts had awarded the holders of design
patents  on  carpets  damages  in  the  amount  of  “the  entire
profit to the [patent holders], per yard, in the manufacture
and sale of carpets of the patented designs, and not merely
the  value  which  the  designs  contributed  to  the  carpets.”
Id.,  at  443.    This  Court  reversed  the  damages  award  and
construed the statute to require proof that the profits were
“due  to”  the  design  rather  than  other  aspects  of  the  car-
pets.  Id., at 444; see also Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U. S. 10,
17  (1886)  (“The  plaintiff  must  show  what  profits  or  dam-
ages are attributable to the use of the infringing design”).

In  1887,  in  response  to  the  Dobson  cases,  Congress
enacted  a  specific  damages  remedy  for  design  patent
infringement.  See S. Rep. No. 206, 49th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1–2 (1886); H. R. Rep. No. 1966, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 1–2
(1886).  The  new  provision  made  it  unlawful  to  manufac-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing design patent law. It cites relevant case law and statutes, indicating it's part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1168

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

Rule 6.  Argument Pro Hac Vice

1.  An  attorney  not  admitted  to  practice  in  the  highest
court of a State, Commonwealth, Territory or Possession, or
the  District  of  Columbia  for  the  requisite  three  years,  but
otherwise  eligible  for  admission  to  practice  in  this  Court
under Rule 5.1, may be permitted to argue pro hac vice.

2.  An attorney qualiﬁed to practice in  the courts of a for

eign state may be permitted to argue pro hac vice.

3.  Oral  argument  pro  hac  vice  is  allowed  only  on  motion
of  the  counsel of  record  for  the  party on  whose  behalf  leave
is requested.  The motion shall state concisely the qualiﬁca
tions of  the attorney who  is to  argue pro hac  vice.  It shall
be  ﬁled  with  the  Clerk,  in  the  form  required  by  Rule  21,  no
later  than  the  date  on  which  the  respondent’s  or  appellee’s
brief on the merits is due to be ﬁled, and it shall be accompa
nied by proof of service as required by Rule 29.

Rule 7.  Prohibition Against Practice

No employee of this Court shall practice as an attorney or
counselor  in  any  court  or  before  any  agency  of  government
while  employed  by  the  Court;  nor  shall  any  person  after
leaving  such  employment  participate  in  any  professional  ca
pacity  in  any  case  pending  before  this  Court  or  in  any  case
being considered for ﬁling in this Court, until two years have
elapsed  after  separation;  nor  shall  a  former  employee  ever
participate in any professional capacity in any case that was
pending in this Court during the employee’s tenure.

Rule 8.  Disbarment and Disciplinary Action

1.  Whenever  a  member of  the  Bar  of  this Court  has  been
disbarred or suspended from practice in any court of record,
or has engaged in conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar
of this Court, the Court will enter an order suspending that
member  from  practice  before  this  Court  and  affording  the
member  an  opportunity  to  show  cause,  within  40  days,  why
a  disbarment  order  should  not  be  entered.  Upon  response,
or  if  no  response  is  timely  ﬁled,  the  Court  will  enter  an  ap
propriate order.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It outlines procedures for attorneys practicing pro hac vice and prohibitions against certain practices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.

MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

limited to such applications.”  689 F. 3d, at 1349.

Nor  do  we  consider  the  patentability  of  DNA  in  which
the  order  of  the  naturally  occurring  nucleotides  has  been
altered.  Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a
different  inquiry,  and  we  express  no  opinion  about  the
application  of  §101  to  such  endeavors.  We  merely  hold
that genes and the information they encode are not patent
eligible under §101 simply because they have been isolated
from the surrounding genetic material.

*

*

*

For  the  foregoing  reasons,  the  judgment  of  the  Federal

Circuit is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the conclusion of the court. Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain factual information and legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U77

[09-06-00 18:33:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN

112

CASS COUNTY v. LEECH LAKE BAND OF
CHIPPEWA INDIANS
Opinion of the Court

ation may be conceded. . . . But while Congress may
make such provision, its intent to do so should be clearly
manifested.”

Id, at 149.

The Goudy Court concluded that it would “seem strange [for
Congress] to withdraw [federal] protection and permit the
Indian to dispose of his lands as he pleases, while at the same
time releasing [the lands] from taxation.”
Indeed,
because such congressional purpose would be unreasonable,
Congress would have to “clearly manifest” such a contrary
purpose in order to counteract the consequence of taxability
that ordinarily ﬂows from alienability.

Ibid.

Ibid.

In Yakima, we considered whether the GAA manifested
an unmistakably clear intent to allow state and local taxation
of reservation lands allotted under the GAA and owned in
fee by either the Yakima Indian Nation or individual Indi-
ans.3
In holding that the lands could be taxed, we noted
that the Burke Act proviso clearly manifested such an intent
by expressly addressing the taxability of fee-patented land.
502 U. S., at 259. We also indicated that the alienability of
allotted lands itself, as provided by § 5 of the GAA, similarly
manifested an unmistakably clear intent to allow taxation.4
We reasoned that Goudy, “without even mentioning the

3 We are concerned here only with Yakima’s holding with respect to ad
valorem taxes such as those at issue in this case. Yakima also held that
the GAA did not authorize the county to impose an excise tax on the sale
of land held by individual Indians or by the tribe, because such a tax did
not constitute the “taxation of land.” See County of Yakima v. Confeder-
ated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251, 268–269 (1992).
That holding, however, is not relevant to this case, which involves only an
ad valorem tax on land itself, rather than an excise tax on a transaction.
4 The Burke Act proviso, as noted, see supra, at 107, did not itself author-
ize taxation of fee-patented land; it merely altered the result of In re Heff,
197 U. S. 488 (1905), as to when parcels allotted to the Indians could be
alienated and taxed.
In re Heff had held this occurred as soon as allotted
lands were patented to the Indians in trust (during which the land would
still be under the protection of the Federal Government); the Burke Act
proviso stated that this did not occur until the lands were patented in fee.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing previous cases (Goudy and Yakima). It contains legal jargon and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

7

BREYER, J., dissenting

encouraging  customers  to  use  other,  less-expensive  cards.
Ibid.

The  District  Court  also  found  that  even  though  Ameri
can Express raised its merchant prices 20 times in this 5
year period, it did not lose the business of any large mer
chant.  Id.,  at  197.  Nor  did  American  Express  increase
benefits  (or  cut  credit-card  prices)  to  American  Express
cardholders in tandem with the merchant price increases.
Id.,  at  196.   Even  had  there  been  no  direct  evidence  of
injury  to  competition,  American  Express’  ability  to  raise
merchant  prices  without  losing  any  meaningful  market
share, in the District Court’s view, showed that American
Express possessed power in the relevant market.  See id.,
at 195.

The District Court also found that, in the absence of the
provisions,  prices  to  merchants  would  likely  have  been
lower.  Ibid.  It wrote that in the late 1990’s, Discover, one
of  American  Express’  competitors,  had  tried  to  develop  a
business  model  that  involved  charging  lower  prices  to
merchants than the other companies charged.  Id., at 213.
Discover  then  invited  each  “merchant  to  save  money  by
shifting  volume  to  Discover,”  while  simultaneously  offer
ing  merchants  additional  discounts  “if  they  would  steer
customers to Discover.”  Ibid.  The court determined that
these efforts failed because of American Express’ (and the
other  card  companies’)  “nondiscrimination  provisions.”
These  provisions,  the  court  found,  “denied  merchants  the
ability  to  express  a  preference  for  Discover  or  to  employ
any other tool by which they might steer share to Discov
er’s lower-priced network.”  Id., at 214.  Because the provi
sions  eliminated  any  advantage  that  lower  prices  might
produce, Discover “abandoned its low-price business model”
and  raised  its  merchant  fees  to  match  those  of  its
competitors.  Ibid.   This  series  of  events,  the  court  con
cluded was “emblematic of the harm done to the competi
tive process” by the “nondiscrimination provisions.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the case and the court's findings, citing specific sections of the court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL. v.
BRACKEEN ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–376.  Argued November 9, 2022—Decided June 15, 2023*

This case arises from three separate child custody proceedings governed
by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a federal statute that aims to
keep  Indian  children  connected  to  Indian  families.    ICWA  governs
state court adoption and foster care proceedings involving Indian chil-
dren.    Among  other  things,  the  Act  requires  placement  of  an  Indian
child according to the Act’s hierarchical preferences, unless the state
court finds “good cause” to depart from them.  25 U. S. C. §§1915(a),
(b).  Under those preferences, Indian families or institutions from any
tribe (not just the tribe to which the child has a tie) outrank unrelated
non-Indians or non-Indian institutions.  Further, the child’s tribe may
pass a resolution altering the prioritization order.  §1915(c).  The pref-
erences of the Indian child or her parent generally cannot trump those
set by statute or tribal resolution.

In involuntary proceedings, the Act mandates that the Indian child’s
parent or custodian and tribe be given notice of any custody proceed-
ings,  as  well  as  the  right  to  intervene.  §§1912(a),  (b),  (c).    Section
1912(d) requires a party seeking to terminate parental rights or to re-
move an Indian child from an unsafe environment to “satisfy the court
that  active  efforts  have  been  made  to  provide  remedial  services  and
rehabilitative  programs  designed  to  prevent  breakup  of  the  Indian
family,” and a court cannot order relief unless the party demonstrates,
by a heightened burden of proof and expert testimony, that the child is

——————

* Together with No. 21–377, Cherokee Nation et al. v. Brackeen et al.,
No. 21–378, Texas v. Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al., and No.
21–380, Brackeen et al. v. Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al., also
on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

established a prophylactic rule and that such a rule could
not alone provide a ground for §1983 liability.  Instead, the
jury was asked to decide whether Tekoh’s Fifth Amendment
right  had  been  violated.    The  court  instructed  the  jury  to
determine, based on “the totality of all the surrounding cir-
cumstances,”  whether  Tekoh’s  statement  had  been  “im-
properly  coerced  or  compelled,”  and  the  court  explained
that “[a] confession is improperly coerced or compelled . . .
if  a  police  officer  uses  physical  or  psychological  force  or
threats not permitted by law to undermine a person’s abil-
ity to exercise his or her free will.”  App. to Pet. for Cert.
119a.  The jury found in Vega’s favor, and Tekoh appealed.
A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that the “use of
an un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a crim-
inal  proceeding  violates  the  Fifth  Amendment  and  may
support a §1983 claim” against the officer who obtained the
statement.  Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles, 985 F. 3d 713,
722  (2021).  The  panel  acknowledged  that  this  Court  has
repeatedly  said  that  Miranda  adopted  prophylactic  rules
designed  to  protect  against  constitutional  violations  and
that  the  decision  did  not  hold  that  the  contravention  of
those  rules  necessarily  constitutes  a  constitutional  viola-
tion.  See 985 F. 3d, at 719–720.  But the panel thought that
our  decision  in  Dickerson  v.  United  States,  530  U. S.  428
(2000), “made clear that the right of a criminal defendant
against having an un-Mirandized statement introduced in
the prosecution’s case in chief is indeed a right secured by
the Constitution.”  985 F. 3d, at 720.  Therefore the panel
concluded that Tekoh could establish a violation of his Fifth
Amendment  right  against  compelled  self-incrimination
simply  by  showing  that  Miranda  had  been  violated.  See
985 F. 3d, at 720.  The panel thus remanded the case for a
new trial.

Vega’s  petition  for  rehearing  en  banc  was  denied,  but
Judge Bumatay, joined by six other judges, filed a dissent
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles. It delves into the application of Miranda rights and their implications for Fifth Amendment protections.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

39

Opinion of the Court

time,” as opposed to those that “are highly unusual in soci-
ety  at  large.”  Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
Whatever  the  likelihood  that  handguns  were  considered
“dangerous  and  unusual”  during  the  colonial  period,  they
are  indisputably  in  “common  use”  for  self-defense  today.
They are, in fact, “the quintessential self-defense weapon.”
Id., at 629.  Thus, even if these colonial laws prohibited the
carrying  of  handguns  because  they  were  considered  “dan-
gerous and unusual weapons” in the 1690s, they provide no
justification for laws restricting the public carry of weapons
that are unquestionably in common use today.

The third statute invoked by respondents was enacted in
East New Jersey in 1686.  It prohibited the concealed carry
of  “pocket  pistol[s]”  or  other  “unusual  or  unlawful  weap-
ons,” and it further prohibited “planter[s]” from carrying all
pistols  unless  in  military  service  or,  if  “strangers,”  when
traveling  through  the  Province.    An  Act  Against  Wearing
Swords,  &c.,  ch.  9,  in  Grants,  Concessions,  and  Original
Constitutions  of  the  Province  of  New  Jersey  290  (2d  ed.
1881) (Grants and Concessions).  These restrictions do not
meaningfully support respondents.  The law restricted only
concealed carry, not all public carry, and its restrictions ap-
plied only to certain “unusual or unlawful weapons,” includ-
ing “pocket pistol[s].”  Ibid.  It also did not apply to all pis-
tols,  let  alone  all  firearms.  “Pocket  pistols”  had  barrel
lengths of perhaps 3 or 4 inches, far smaller than the 6-inch
to  14-inch  barrels  found  on  the  other  belt  and  hip  pistols
that were commonly used for lawful purposes in the 1600s.
J. George, English Pistols and Revolvers 16 (1938); see also,
e.g., 14 Car. 2 c. 3, §20 (1662); H. Peterson, Arms and Armor
in  Colonial  America,  1526–1783,  p. 208  (1956)  (Peterson).
Moreover,  the  law  prohibited  only  the  concealed  carry  of
pocket pistols; it presumably did not by its terms touch the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing historical gun laws and their relevance to contemporary gun rights. It is sequential text and provides relevant information about the legal arguments being made.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

catch-22.  If the statute was working, there would be less
evidence of discrimination, so opponents might argue that
Congress  should  not  be  allowed  to  renew  the  statute.    In
contrast,  if  the  statute  was  not  working,  there  would  be
plenty  of  evidence  of  discrimination,  but  scant  reason  to
renew a failed regulatory regime.  See Persily 193–194.

This  is  not  to  suggest  that  congressional  power  in  this
area is limitless.  It is this Court’s responsibility to ensure
that Congress has used appropriate means.  The question
meet  for  judicial  review  is  whether  the  chosen  means  are
“adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in
view.”  Ex  parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346 (1880).  The
Court’s role, then, is not to substitute its judgment for that
of  Congress,  but  to  determine  whether  the  legislative
record  sufficed  to  show  that  “Congress  could  rationally
have  determined  that  [its  chosen]  provisions  were  appro
priate methods.”  City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 176–177.

In  summary,  the  Constitution  vests  broad  power  in
Congress to protect the right to vote, and in particular to
combat  racial  discrimination  in  voting.  This  Court  has
repeatedly  reaffirmed  Congress’  prerogative  to  use  any
rational means in exercise of its power in this area.  And
both  precedent  and  logic  dictate  that  the  rational-means
test  should  be  easier  to  satisfy,  and  the  burden  on  the
statute’s  challenger  should  be  higher,  when  what  is  at
issue is the reauthorization of a remedy that the Court has
previously  affirmed,  and  that  Congress  found,  from  con
temporary evidence, to be working to advance the legisla
ture’s legitimate objective.

III

The 2006 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act fully
satisfies  the  standard  stated  in  McCulloch,  4  Wheat.,  at
421:  Congress  may  choose  any  means  “appropriate”  and
“plainly adapted to” a legitimate constitutional end.  As we
shall see, it is implausible to suggest otherwise.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It discusses the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act and the standard of review for its reauthorization.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
42

PORTER  v.  McCOLLUM

Per Curiam

recommendation  of  a  death  sentence  for  the  murder  of  Wil
liams but rejected the jury’s death-sentence recommendation
for  the  murder  of  Burrows.  The  sentencing  judge  believed
that  there  were  four  aggravating  circumstances  related  to
the  Williams  murder  but  only  two  for  the  Burrows  murder.
Accordingly, the judge must have reasoned that the two ag
gravating  circumstances  that  were  present  in  both  cases
were  insufﬁcient  to  warrant  a  death  sentence  but  that  the
two  additional  aggravating  circumstances  present  with  re
spect  to  the  Williams  murder  were  sufﬁcient  to  tip  the  bal
ance in favor of a death sentence.  But the Florida Supreme
Court  rejected  one  of  these  additional  aggravating  circum
stances,  i. e.,  that  Williams’  murder  was  especially  heinous,
atrocious, or cruel, ﬁnding the murder “consistent with . . . a
crime of passion” even though premeditated to a heightened
degree.  564  So.  2d,  at  1063–1064.  Had  the  judge  and  jury
been  able  to  place  Porter’s  life  history  “on  the  mitigating
side  of  the  scale,”  and  appropriately  reduced  the  ballast  on
the  aggravating  side  of  the  scale,  there  is  clearly  a  reason
able  probability  that  the  advisory  jury—and  the  sentencing
judge—“would  have  struck  a  different  balance,”  Wiggins,
supra,  at  537,  and  it  is  unreasonable  to  conclude  otherwise.
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision that Porter was not
prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to conduct a thorough—or
even  cursory—investigation  is  unreasonable.  The  Florida
Supreme  Court  either  did  not  consider  or  unreasonably  dis
counted  the  mitigation  evidence  adduced  in  the  postconvic
tion  hearing.  Under  Florida  law,  mental  health  evidence
that  does  not  rise  to  the  level  of  establishing  a  statutory
mitigating  circumstance  may  nonetheless  be  considered  by
the sentencing judge and jury as mitigating.  See, e. g., Hos-
kins  v.  State,  965  So.  2d  1,  17–18  (Fla.  2007)  (per  curiam).
Indeed, the Constitution requires that “the sentencer in capi
tal cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigat
ing factor.”  Eddings v.  Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 112 (1982).
Yet neither the postconviction trial court nor the Florida Su
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, likely from a court opinion. It discusses the sentencing of a defendant named Porter and the arguments made regarding mitigating factors.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
62

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

fundamentally at odds with how we usually think about lib-
erties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  As Justice Jackson
famously put it, “[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of politi-
cal controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majori-
ties and officials.”  Barnette, 319 U. S., at 638.  Smith, by
contrast, held that protection of religious liberty was better
left to the political process than to courts.  494 U. S., at 890.
In Smith’s view, the Nation simply could not “afford the lux-
ury” of protecting the free exercise of religion from gener-
ally applicable laws.  Id., at 888.  Under this interpretation,
the free exercise of religion does not receive the judicial pro-
tection afforded to other, favored rights.

C
Workability.  One of Smith’s supposed virtues was ease of
application, but things have not turned out that way.  In-
stead, at least four serious problems have arisen and con-
tinue to plague courts when called upon to apply Smith.

1
“Hybrid-rights”  cases.  The  “hybrid  rights”  exception,
which  was  essential  to  distinguish  Yoder,  has  baffled  the
lower courts.  They are divided into at least three camps.
See  Combs  v.  Homer-Center  School  Dist.,  540  F. 3d  231,
244–247 (CA3 2008) (describing Circuit split).  Some courts
have taken the extraordinary step of openly refusing to fol-
low this part of Smith’s interpretation.  The Sixth Circuit
was remarkably blunt: “[H]old[ing] that the legal standard
under the Free Exercise Clause depends on whether a free-
exercise  claim  is  coupled  with  other  constitutional  rights
. . . is completely illogical.”  Kissinger v. Board of Trustees
of Ohio State Univ., 5  F. 3d 177, 180 (1993).  The Second
and  Third  Circuits  have  taken  a  similar  approach.    See
Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F. 3d 134, 144 (CA2 2003) (“We
. . . can think of no good reason for the standard of review
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Fulton v. Philadelphia. It delves into the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and critiques the precedent set by the Smith case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U79

[09-08-00 13:44:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

148

MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

those statutes, in light of their purposes and of common
sense.” McFadden, 13 F. 3d, at 467 (Breyer, C. J., dissent-
ing). So reading the “Firearms” statutes, I would not ex-
tend the word “carries” in § 924(c)(1) to mean transports out
of hand’s reach in a vehicle.12

II

Section 924(c)(1), as the foregoing discussion details, is not
decisively clear one way or another. The sharp division in
the Court on the proper reading of the measure conﬁrms,
“[a]t the very least, . . . that the issue is subject to some
doubt. Under these circumstances, we adhere to the famil-
iar rule that, ‘where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute,
doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.’ ” Adamo
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275, 284–285 (1978)
(citation omitted); see United States v. Granderson, 511 U. S.
39, 54 (1994) (“[W]here text, structure, and history fail to
establish that the Government’s position is unambiguously
correct—we apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambigu-
“Carry” bears many mean-
ity in [the defendant’s] favor.”).

12 The Court places undue reliance on Representative Poff ’s statement
that § 924(c)(1) seeks “ ‘to persuade the man who is tempted to commit a
Federal felony to leave his gun at home.’ ” Ante, at 132 (quoting 114
Cong. Rec. 22231 (1968)). As the Government argued in its brief to this
Court in Bailey:
“In making that statement, Representative Poff was not referring to the
‘carries’ prong of the original Section 924(c). As originally enacted, the
‘carries’ prong of the statute prohibited only the ‘unlawful’ carrying of a
ﬁrearm while committing an offense. The statute would thus not have
applied to an individual who, for instance, had a permit for carrying a gun
and carried it with him when committing an offense, and it would have
had no force in ‘persuading’ such an individual ‘to leave his gun at home.’
Instead, Representative Poff was referring to the ‘uses’ prong of the origi-
nal Section 924(c).” Brief for United States in Bailey v. United States,
O. T. 1995, Nos. 94–7448 and 94–7492, p. 28.
Representative Poff ’s next sentence conﬁrms that he was speaking of
“uses,” not “carries”: “Any person should understand that if he uses his
114 Cong. Rec., at
gun and is caught and convicted, he is going to jail.”
22231 (emphasis added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

33

Opinion of the Court

quotation marks omitted).

Respondents’ second proffered end point fares no better.
Respondents assert that universities will no longer need to
engage  in  race-based  admissions  when,  in  their  absence,
students nevertheless receive the educational benefits of di-
versity.  But as we have already explained, it is not clear
how  a  court  is  supposed  to  determine  when  stereotypes
have broken down or “productive citizens and leaders” have
been created.  567 F. Supp. 3d, at 656.  Nor is there any way
to  know  whether  those  goals  would  adequately  be  met  in
the absence of a race-based admissions program.  As UNC
itself  acknowledges,  these  “qualitative  standard[s]”  are
“difficult to measure.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 21–707, at 78;
but  see  Fisher  II,  579  U. S.,  at  381  (requiring  race-based
admissions programs to operate in a manner that is “suffi-
ciently measurable”).

Third,  respondents  suggest  that  race-based  preferences
must  be  allowed  to  continue  for  at  least  five  more  years,
based  on  the  Court’s  statement  in  Grutter  that  it  “ex-
pect[ed]  that  25  years  from  now,  the  use  of  racial  prefer-
ences will no longer be necessary.”  539 U. S., at 343.  The
25-year  mark  articulated  in  Grutter,  however,  reflected
only that Court’s view that race-based preferences would,
by 2028, be unnecessary to ensure a requisite level of racial
diversity on college campuses.  Ibid.  That expectation was
oversold.  Neither  Harvard  nor  UNC  believes  that  race-
based admissions will in fact be unnecessary in five years,
and both universities thus expect to continue using race as
a  criterion  well  beyond  the  time  limit  that  Grutter  sug-
gested.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 20–1199, at 84–85; Tr.
of  Oral  Arg.  in  No.  21–707,  at  85–86.  Indeed,  the  high
school applicants that Harvard and UNC will evaluate this
fall using their race-based admissions systems are expected
to graduate in 2028—25 years after Grutter was decided.

Finally, respondents argue that their programs need not
have  an  end  point  at  all  because  they  frequently  review
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legality of race-based admissions programs at universities.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

25

Opinion of the Court

them prayers, and supervised the prayers led by students.
She prepared them for Mass, accompanied them to Mass,
and prayed with them there.  See supra, at 8–9.

In Biel’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the
Hosanna-Tabor  exception  should  be  interpreted  narrowly
because the ADA, 42 U. S. C. §12101 et seq., and Title VII,
§2000e–2, contain provisions allowing religious employers
to give preference to members of a particular faith in em-
ploying individuals to do work connected with their activi-
ties.  911 F. 3d, at 611, n. 5; post, at 2–3.  But the Hosanna-
Tabor exception serves an entirely different purpose.  Think
of the quintessential case where a church wants to dismiss
its minister for poor performance.  The church’s objection in
that situation is not that the minister has gone over to some
other faith but simply that the minister is failing to perform
essential functions in a satisfactory manner.

While  the Ninth  Circuit  treated  the  circumstances  that
we  cited  in  Hosanna-Tabor  as  factors  to  be  assessed  and
weighed in every case, respondents would make the govern-
ing test even more rigid.  In their view, courts should begin
by deciding whether the first three circumstances—a min-
isterial title, formal religious education, and the employee’s
self-description as a minister—are met and then, in order
to  check  the  conclusion  suggested  by  those  factors,  ask
whether the employee performed a religious function.  Brief
for  Respondents  20–24.  For  reasons  already  explained,
there  is  no  basis  for  treating  the  circumstances  we  found
relevant in Hosanna-Tabor in such a rigid manner.

Respondents go further astray in suggesting that an em-
ployee can never come within the Hosanna-Tabor exception
unless the employee is a “practicing” member of the religion
with which the employer is associated.  Brief for Respond-
ents 12–13, 21.  In hiring a teacher to provide religious in-
struction, a religious school is very likely to try to select a
person who meets this requirement, but insisting on this as
a necessary condition would create a host of problems.  As
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Hosanna-Tabor exception and its application in a particular case.  The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is part of the core legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Court does not prejudge the possibility.  Pp. 14–16.

Syllabus

  GORSUCH, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the
opinion of the Court except as to Part II–C.  ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and BAR-
RETT, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and THOMAS, J., joined except for
Part II–C.  THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN,
JJ., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and a summary of the court's opinions. It is not the main body of the legal text and likely provides context for the actual case content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Syllabus

(a) The text of the HEROES Act does not authorize the Secretary’s
loan  forgiveness  program.  The  Secretary’s  power  under  the  Act  to
“modify”  does  not  permit  “basic  and  fundamental  changes  in  the
scheme”  designed  by  Congress.  MCI  Telecommunications  Corp.  v.
American  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.,  512  U. S.  218,  225.    Instead,
“modify” carries “a connotation of increment or limitation,” and must
be  read  to  mean  “to  change  moderately  or  in  minor  fashion.”    Ibid.
That is how the word is ordinarily used and defined, and the legal def-
inition is no different.

The authority to “modify” statutes and regulations allows the Secre-
tary to make modest adjustments and additions to existing provisions,
not transform them.  Prior to the COVID–19 pandemic, “modifications”
issued under the Act were minor and had limited effect.  But the “mod-
ifications” challenged here create a novel and fundamentally different
loan forgiveness program.  While Congress specified in the Education
Act a few narrowly delineated situations that could qualify a borrower
for loan discharge, the Secretary has extended such discharge to nearly
every borrower in the country.  It is “highly unlikely that Congress”
authorized such a sweeping loan cancellation program “through such
a subtle device as permission to ‘modify.’ ”  Id., at 231.

The Secretary responds that the Act authorizes him to “waive” legal
provisions  as  well  as  modify  them—and  that  this  additional  term
“grant[s] broader authority” than would “modify” alone.  But the Sec-
retary’s invocation of the waiver power here does not remotely resem-
ble how it has been used on prior occasions, where it was simply used
to  nullify  particular  legal  requirements.    The  Secretary  next  argues
that the power to “waive or modify” is greater than the sum of its parts:
Because waiver allows the Secretary “to eliminate legal obligations in
their entirety,” the combination of “waive or modify” must allow him
“to  reduce  them  to  any  extent  short  of  waiver”  (even  if the  power  to
“modify” ordinarily does not stretch that far).  But the challenged loan
forgiveness program goes beyond even that.  In essence, the Secretary
has drafted a new section of the Education Act from scratch by “waiv-
ing” provisions root and branch and then filling the empty space with
radically new text.

The Secretary also cites a procedural provision in the HEROES Act
directing the Secretary to publish a notice in the Federal Register, “in-
clud[ing] the terms and conditions to be applied in lieu of such statu-
tory and regulatory provisions” as the Secretary has waived or modi-
§1098bb(b)(2).    In  the  Government’s  view,  that  language
fied.
authorizes  both  “waiving  and  then  putting  [the  Secretary’s]  own  re-
quirements in”—a sort of “red penciling” of the existing law.  But ra-
ther than implicitly granting the Secretary authority to draft new sub-
stantive statutory provisions at will, §1098bb(b)(2) simply imposes the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal argument or a portion of a court opinion. It cites legal precedent (MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.) and analyzes the interpretation of specific statutory language (the HEROES Act).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1225

AMICUS CURIAE—Continued

Rule

—Purpose ...............................................................  37.1
—Service.................................................................  37.5
—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  37.3
—Word limits  ........................................................  33.1(g)(xi), (xii)

Cities, counties, and towns ..........................................  37.4
Consent of parties

—To argument  ......................................................  28.7
—To ﬁle brief .........................................................  37.2, 37.3, 37.5

Electronic transmission  ..............................................  37.2(a)
Motions for leave to ﬁle briefs

—At petition stage ...............................................  37.2(b)

—Objection to........................................................  37.5
—On merits ............................................................  37.3(b)
—Service  ...............................................................  37.5
—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  37.2(b), 37.3(b)
—When unnecessary ............................................  37.4
—Word limits  ........................................................  37.5
Notice of intent to ﬁle  .................................................  37.2(a)
Rehearing  ......................................................................  37.3(a), 44.5
States,  Commonwealths,  Territories,  and  Posses

sions  ............................................................................  37.4
United States  ................................................................  37.4

APPEALS

Afﬁrm, motion to...........................................................  18.6, 21.2(b)
Briefs opposing motion to dismiss or to afﬁrm  18.8, 33.1(g)(iii), 33.2(b)
Certiﬁcation of record ..................................................  18.11, 18.12
Cross-appeals .................................................................  18.4, 18.9, 25.4
Dismissal

—After docketing .................................................  18.6, 21.2(b)

—Before docketing  ..............................................  18.5

—By agreement of parties ..................................  18.5, 46.1

—On death of party  ............................................  35

—On motion ..........................................  18.5, 18.6, 21.2(b), 33.1(g)(ii)

Docketing, notice to appellees ....................................  18.3
Frivolous appeals, damages  .......................................  42.2
Joint appendix, preparation of....................................  26
Jurisdictional statements

—Copies, number to be ﬁled ..............................  18.3
—Cover color .........................................................  33.1(g)(i)
—Deﬁciencies, effect of ........................................  18.13
—Distribution to Court .......................................  18.5, 18.6, 21.2(b)
—Documents,  format  and  general  require

ments ...............................................................  33, 34
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a table of contents or an index for a legal document, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It lists rule numbers and their corresponding sections, indicating a structured overview rather than continuous narrative text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

7

ALITO, J., dissenting

intent  to  pre-empt  that  we  should  expect  to  find  when
Congress  has  exercised  its  Elections  Clause  power  in  a
way that is constitutionally questionable.  Indeed, even if
neither  the  presumption  against  pre-emption  nor  the
canon of constitutional avoidance applied, the better read-
ing  of  the  Act  would  be  that  Arizona  is  free  to  require
those who use the federal form to supplement their appli-
cations with proof of citizenship.

I agree with the Court that the phrase “accept and use,”
when  read  in  isolation,  is  ambiguous,  ante,  at  6–7,  but
I  disagree  with  the  Court’s  conclusion  that  §1973gg–
4(a)(1)’s use of that phrase means that a State must treat
the federal form as a complete application and must either
grant  or  deny  registration  without  requiring  that  the  ap-
plicant  supply  additional  information.    Instead,  I  would
hold that a State “accept[s] and use[s]” the federal form so
long as it uses the form as a meaningful part of the regis-
tration process.

The  Court  begins  its  analysis  of  §1973gg–4(a)(1)’s  con-
text  by  examining  unrelated  uses  of  the  word  “accept”
elsewhere in the United States Code.  Ante, at 7–8.  But a
better  place  to  start  is  to  ask  what  it  normally  means  to
“accept and use” an application form.  When the phrase is
used  in  that  context,  it  is  clear  that  an  organization  can
“accept and use” a form that it does not treat as a complete
application.  For  example,  many  colleges  and  universities
accept  and  use  the  Common  Application  for  Undergradu-
ate  College  Admission  but  also  require  that  applicants
submit various additional forms or documents.  See Com-
mon Application, 2012–2013 College Deadlines, Fees, and
Requirements,  https://www.commonapp.org/CommonApp/
MemberRequirements.aspx  (all  Internet  materials  as
visited  June  10,  2013,  and  available  in  Clerk  of  Court’s
case  file).  Similarly,  the  Social  Security  Administration
undoubtedly  “accepts  and  uses”  its  Social  Security  card
application form even though someone applying for a card
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 570 U.S. ____ (2013).  It delves into the interpretation of a specific section of the United States Code and its implications for state voter registration laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata
to  enforce  repose,”  it  admitted  that  “courts  have  used
language  to  the  effect  that  res  judicata  principles  do  not
apply  to  administrative  proceedings.”  384  U. S.,  at  421–
422.  These contradictory signals are not typically the stuff
of  which  background  rules  of  common  law  are  made.    Cf.
Kirtsaeng  v.  John  Wiley  &  Sons,  Inc.,  568  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2013) (slip op., at 17) (presuming that Congress intended
to  retain  the  “first  sale”  doctrine  in  copyright  statutes
based  on  that  common-law  doctrine’s  “impeccable  historic
pedigree”).

B
If  the  occasion  had  arisen  in  Astoria  for  the  Court  to
examine the history of administrative preclusion, it would
have discovered that the issue was far from settled.

At common law, principles of res judicata and collateral
estoppel applied only to a decision by a “court of competent
jurisdiction.”  Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82, 102 (1869);
accord,  Hopkins  v.  Lee,  6  Wheat.  109,  113  (1821);  Re-
statement of Judgments §§4, 7, and Comment f, pp. 20, 41,
45 (1942).  That rule came with the corollary requirement
that  the  court  be  “legally  constituted”—that  is,  a  court
“known to and recognized by the law.”  2 H. Black, Law of
Judgments  §516,  p.  614  (1891).    A  court  not  “legally  con-
stituted”  lacked  jurisdiction  to  enter  a  legally  binding
judgment,  and  thus  any  such  judgment  could  have  no
preclusive effect.  Ibid.

Nineteenth  century  courts  generally  understood  the
term “court of competent jurisdiction” to include all courts
with  authority  and  jurisdiction  conclusively  to  resolve  a
dispute.  See J. Wells, A Treatise on the Doctrines of Res
Judicata and Stare Decisis §§422–423, pp. 336–338 (1878);
2  Black,  supra,  §516,  at  613–614.    Thus,  courts  of  law,
courts of equity, admiralty courts, and foreign courts could
all satisfy the requirement of a “[c]ourt of competent juris-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal principles like res judicata and collateral estoppel in the context of administrative proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lix

Page

Girard Police Dept.; Karnofel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  802,1045

938

Girdich; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074

Giurbina; Hon Chung Lau v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

Gladkihs v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1062

Gladney v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

Glass; D’Aria v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

Glass; Evans v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

Glass; McCray v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1157

Glawson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1100

Global Network Communications, Inc. v. New York City  . . . . . . .
1037

Glogower v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144

Glover; Slezak v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
806

Glover v. Thurmer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1150

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Glover v. United States
952

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gocio v. Florida
1012

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Godaddy.com Inc.; Martini v.
887

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Godbouldt v. Lamarque
943

Goddard; Hall v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  832,1085

Goff; McNeill v.
820

Goldberg; Lawrence v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

Golden v. Housman  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Golden v. Hubbell Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811

Golden Gate Restaurant Assn. v. San Francisco  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Gomez v. Clark  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gomez-Garcia v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1129

1110

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gomis v. Holder
901

Gonzales v. Salazar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gonzales v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  864,1057

920

Gonzales Sanchez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gonzalez v. Asset Acceptance, LLC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912,1086

Gonzalez v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

819

Gonzalez v. Deerﬁeld Beach  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

Gonzalez; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gonzalez v. Smith  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  840,1138

835

Gonzalez v. Sullivan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gonzalez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . .  891,912,925,1000,1018,1061,1135

975

Gonzalez-Gamez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004

Gonzalez-Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
867

Gonzalez Rivera v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

Gonzalez-Zotelo v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

Good v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Goodman; Ashabranner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Goodman v. Harris County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  868,1156

Goodman v. United States
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>