<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1246

INDEX

HABEAS CORPUS—Continued.

7.  Capital  murder—Sentencing  phase—Ineffective assistance  of  coun
sel.—It was objectively unreasonable under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U. S.  668,  for  Florida  Supreme  Court  and  Eleventh  Circuit  to  conclude
that  there  was  no  reasonable  probability  that  Porter’s  death  sentence
would  have  been  different  if  sentencing  judge  and  jury  at  his  state-court
murder trial had heard signiﬁcant mitigation evidence that his counsel had
failed to discover or present.  Porter v. McCollum, p. 30.

8.  Capital  murder—Sentencing  phase—Ineffective assistance  of  coun
sel.—Unreasonable  determination  of  facts.—For  purposes  of  28  U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(2), an Alabama court’s conclusion, during postconviction proceed
ings,  that  petitioner’s  counsel  made  a  strategic  decision  not  to  pursue  or
present evidence of his mental deﬁciencies during his trial’s penalty phase
was  not  an  unreasonable  determination  of  facts  in  light  of  evidence  pre
sented in state-court proceedings.  Wood v. Allen, p. 290.

9.  Evidence of guilt—Support for jury’s verdict.—Because trial record
includes  convincing  DNA  and  other  evidence  of  respondent’s  guilt,  lower
federal  courts  clearly  misapplied  Jackson  v.  Virginia,  443  U. S.  307,  by
granting  habeas  relief  based  on  a  report  prepared  by  respondent’s  DNA
expert  over  11  years  after  trial that  called  into  question  some  trial  testi
mony of State’s DNA expert.  McDaniel v. Brown, p. 120.

10.  Searches and seizures—Warrantless entry.—Michigan Court of
Appeals’ decision  afﬁrming suppression  of evidence on  ground that  an of
ﬁcer’s  warrantless entry  into respondent’s  house  violated Fourth  Amend
ment  is  contrary  to  this  Court’s  case  law,  particularly  Brigham  City  v.
Stuart, 547 U. S. 398.  Michigan v. Fisher, p. 45.

ILLEGAL  IMMIGRATION  REFORM  AND  IMMIGRANT  RESPONSI
BILITY  ACT  OF  1996.  See  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act.

ILLINOIS.  See  Constitutional  Law,  I.

IMMIGRATION  AND  NATIONALITY  ACT.

Illegal  Immigration  Reform  and  Immigrant  Responsibility  Act  of
1996—Review  of  Attorney  General’s  determinations.—Title  8  U. S. C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)’s proscription of judicial review of certain immigration deci
sions applies only to Attorney General determinations made discretionary
by statute, not to determinations declared discretionary by Attorney Gen
eral himself through regulation.  Kucana v. Holder, p. 233.

INEFFECTIVE  ASSISTANCE  OF  COUNSEL.  See  Habeas  Corpus,

3,  5,  6,  7,  8.

JUDGE’S  MISCONDUCT  AT  TRIAL.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  2.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document. Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and provide a guide to the document's contents rather than the actual content itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL
CONSULTANTS, INC.
Opinion of BREYER, J.

U. S. C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).  The Act delegates authority to
the Federal Communications Commission to make certain
additional exceptions from that general cell phone robocall
restriction.  §227(b)(2)(C).

More than 20 years later, Congress enacted another stat-
ute, which created the government-debt exception.  The Of-
fice of Management and Budget had reported to Congress
that in “this time of fiscal constraint . . . the Federal Gov-
ernment  should  ensure  that  all  debt  owed  to  the  United
States  is  collected  as  quickly  and  efficiently  as  possible.”
Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives,
Budget of the U. S. Government, Fiscal Year 2016, p. 128
(2015),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-
It  recommended
2016-PER/pdf/BUDGET-2016-PER.pdf.
that Congress permit “the use of automatic dialing systems
and  prerecorded  voice  messages”  to  contact  “wireless
phones in the collection of debt owed to or granted [sic] by
the United States.”  Ibid.

Congress  adopted  that  recommendation.  It  enacted  a
provision that excepts from the general cell phone robocall
restriction any call “made solely to collect a debt owed to or
guaranteed by the United States.”  129 Stat. 588; see also
ibid.  (categorizing  the  exception  as  a  “debt  collection  im-
provemen[t]” measure).  The question here is whether the
First Amendment prohibits the Federal Government from
enacting that government-debt collection measure.

II
The  plurality  finds  the  government-debt  exception  un-
constitutional primarily by applying a logical syllogism: (1)
“Content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny.”  Ante, at
6  (citing  Reed  v.  Town  of  Gilbert,  576  U. S.  155,  163–164
(2015)).  (2) The exception is based on “content.”  Ante, at 7.
(3) Hence, the exception is subject to “strict scrutiny.”  Ante,
at 9.  (4) And the Government concedes that the exception
cannot survive “strict scrutiny” examination.  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the constitutionality of a government debt collection exception to robocall regulations. It delves into legal precedents and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

31

Opinion of the Court

at 821–822.

The results of the Harvard admissions process reflect this
numerical commitment.  For the admitted classes of 2009
to 2018, black students represented a tight band of 10.0%–
11.7% of the admitted pool.  The same theme held true for
other minority groups:

Brief  for  Petitioner  in  No.  20–1199  etc.,  p.  23.    Harvard’s
focus on numbers is obvious.7
——————

7 The  principal  dissent  claims  that  “[t]he  fact  that  Harvard’s  racial
shares of admitted applicants varies relatively little . . . is unsurprising
and reflects the fact that the racial makeup of Harvard’s applicant pool
also  varies  very  little  over  this  period.”    Post,  at  35  (opinion  of
SOTOMAYOR, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But that is exactly
the point: Harvard must use precise racial preferences year in and year
out to maintain the unyielding demographic composition of its class.  The
dissent is thus left to attack the numbers themselves, arguing they were
“handpicked”  “from  a  truncated  period.”    Ibid.,  n.  29  (opinion  of
SOTOMAYOR, J.).  As supposed proof, the dissent notes that the share of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing a case and referencing arguments made within it. It contains legal jargon and references to specific court documents, making it unsuitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

39

THOMAS, J., concurring

taught us to beware of elites bearing racial theories.”  Par-
ents  Involved,  551  U. S.,  at  780–781  (THOMAS, J.,  concur-
ring).  We cannot now blink reality to pretend, as the dis-
sents  urge,  that  affirmative  action  should  be  legally
permissible merely because the experts assure us that it is
“good” for black students.  Though I do not doubt the sin-
cerity of my dissenting colleagues’ beliefs, experts and elites
have been wrong before—and they may prove to be wrong
again.  In part for this reason, the Fourteenth Amendment
outlaws government-sanctioned racial discrimination of all
types.  The stakes are simply too high to gamble.7  Then, as
now, the views that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy have
not been confined to the past, and we must remain ever vig-
ilant against all forms of racial discrimination.

C

Even taking the desire to help on its face, what initially
seems like aid may in reality be a burden, including for the
very people it seeks to assist.  Take, for example, the college
admissions  policies  here.    “Affirmative  action”  policies  do
nothing to increase the overall number of blacks and His-
panics able to access a college education.  Rather, those ra-
cial policies simply redistribute individuals among institu-
tions of higher learning, placing some into more competitive
institutions than they otherwise would have attended.  See
——————

7 Indeed, the lawyers who litigated Brown were unwilling to take this
bet, insisting on a colorblind legal rule.  See, e.g., Supp. Brief for Appel-
lants on Reargument in Nos. 1, 2, and 4, and for Respondents in No. 10,
in Brown v. Board of Education, O. T. 1953, p. 65 (“That the Constitution
is color blind is our dedicated belief ”); Brief for Appellants in Brown v.
Board of Education, O. T. 1952, No. 1, p. 5 (“The Fourteenth Amendment
precludes  a  state  from  imposing  distinctions  or  classifications  based
upon  race  and  color  alone”).    In  fact,  Justice  Marshall  viewed  Justice
Harlan’s Plessy dissent as “a ‘Bible’ to which he turned during his most
depressed  moments”;  no  opinion  “buoyed  Marshall  more  in  his  pre-
Brown days.”  In Memoriam: Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Proceedings
of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United States, p. X
(1993) (remarks of Judge Motley).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College. It delves into the arguments against affirmative action, citing historical precedents and emphasizing the importance of a colorblind legal system.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

undisputed  that  the  Government  currently  lacks  the
capability  to  do  anything  other  than  speculate  about  the
likely  date  and  time  of  future  removal  proceedings.    See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 47–49, 52–53.  At most, we can hope that
the  Government  develops  a  system  in  the  coming  years
that allows it to determine likely dates and times before it
sends out initial notices to appear.  But nothing in either
today’s  decision  or  the  statute  can  guarantee  such  an
outcome, so the Court  is left crossing its fingers and hop-
ing for the best.  Ante, at 12, n. 6, 18–19.

*

*

*
Once  the  errors  and  false  leads  are  stripped  away,  the
most  that  remains  of  the  Court’s  argument  is  a  textually
permissible  interpretation  consistent  with  the  Court’s
view of “common sense.”  That is not enough to show that
the Government’s contrary interpretation is unreasonable.
Choosing  between  these  competing  interpretations  might
have been difficult in the first instance.  But under Chev-
ron,  that  choice  was  not  ours  to  make.    Under  Chevron,
this  Court  was  obliged  to  defer  to  the  Government’s
interpretation.

In  recent  years,  several  Members  of  this  Court  have
questioned  Chevron’s  foundations.  See,  e.g.,  ante,  at  2–3
(KENNEDY,  J.,  concurring);  Michigan  v.  EPA,  576  U. S.
___,  ___–___  (2015)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at
1–5);  Gutierrez-Brizuela  v.  Lynch,  834  F. 3d  1142,  1149
(CA10  2016)  (Gorsuch,  J.,  concurring).    But  unless  the
Court has overruled Chevron in a secret decision that has
somehow escaped my attention, it remains good law.

I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

since the law took effect.  Id., at *41.  The court explained
that  most  abortion  patients  in  Texas  first  seek  care  more
than six  weeks  after their  last  menstrual periods.   Id.,  at
*2.    The  court  thus  found  that  S.  B.  8  has  prohibited  as
many as 95% of abortions previously provided in the State.
Id.,  at  *40;  see  Whole  Woman’s  Health,  594  U. S.,  at  ___
(SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  2)  (warning  that
S. B. 8 would “immediately prohibi[t] care for at least 85%
of Texas abortion patients and . . . force many abortion clin-
ics to close”).
  On  a  human  level,  the  District  Court  relied  on  credible
declarations  that  described  the  threat  of  liability  under
S. B. 8 as “nothing short of agonizing” for abortion care pro-
viders.   2021  WL  4593319,  *38  (internal  quotation marks
omitted).    Providers  are  “seriously  concerned  that  even
providing  abortions  in  compliance  with  S.  B.  8  will  draw
lawsuits from anti-abortion vigilantes or others seeking fi-
nancial  gain.”    Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
Patients are “devastated” to learn they cannot access care,
and the “turmoil” caused by the Act leaves them “panicked,
both for themselves and their loved ones.”  Id., at *40 (in-
ternal  quotation  marks  omitted).*    Even  among  the  few
women who are able to receive abortion services in Texas,
S. B. 8 pushes patients “to make a decision about their abor-
tion  before  they  are  truly  ready  to  do  so.”    Ibid.  (internal
quotation marks omitted).
  The District Court rejected the State’s claim that Texas
residents  could  travel  to  other  States  to  access  abortion

——————

* The harm to vulnerable populations is especially acute.  For example,
because Texas’ judicial bypass process for minors seeking abortion care
“cannot realistically happen” before six weeks after the last menstrual
period, S. B. 8 forces pregnant minors who cannot confide in their fami-
lies (and unaccompanied migrant teenagers who cannot reach their fam-
ilies) to choose between “carry[ing] to term” and “tak[ing] matters into
their own hands.”  2021 WL 4593319, *40, and n. 62 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case regarding S.B. 8, a Texas law restricting abortion. It presents legal arguments and cites previous court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U77

[09-06-00 18:33:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

103

Syllabus

CASS COUNTY, MINNESOTA, et al. v. LEECH LAKE
BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit

No. 97–174. Argued February 24, 1998—Decided June 8, 1998

During the late 19th century, the Federal Government instituted a policy
of removing portions of reservation land from tribal ownership and fed-
eral protection, allotting some parcels to individual Indians in fee simple
and providing for other parcels to be sold to non-Indians. Most allot-
ments were implemented pursuant to the General Allotment Act (GAA),
which provided that land would be patented to individual Indians and
held in trust for 25 years, after which title would be conveyed in fee
simple, § 5, and that Indian allottees were subject to plenary state juris-
diction, § 6. The Burke Act amended § 6 to provide that state jurisdic-
tion did not attach until the end of the trust period, and contained a
proviso to the effect that the Secretary of the Interior could issue a fee
simple patent before the trust period’s end and thereafter restrictions as
to, inter alia, taxation would be removed. Allotment of the Minnesota
reservation lands of respondent Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians
(Band) was implemented through the Nelson Act of 1889, which pro-
vided for the reservation land to be alienated from tribal ownership in
three ways: under § 3, parcels were allotted to individual Indians as
provided by the GAA; under §§ 4 and 5, pine lands were sold at public
auction to non-Indians; and under § 6, agricultural lands were sold to
non-Indian settlers as homesteads. After Congress ended the allot-
ment practice, the Band began purchasing back parcels of reservation
land that had been allotted to individual Indians or sold to non-Indians.
Based on this Court’s decision, in County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251, 253–254, that a
county could assess ad valorem taxes on reservation land owned in fee
by individual Indians or the tribe that had originally been made alien-
able when patented under the GAA, petitioner Cass County began as-
sessing such taxes on 21 parcels of reservation land that had been alien-
ated under the Nelson Act and reacquired by the Band. Thirteen of
the parcels had been allotted to Indians and the remaining eight had
been sold to non-Indians. The Band paid the taxes, interest, and penal-
ties under protest and ﬁled suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the
county could not tax the parcels. The District Court granted the
county summary judgment, holding that the parcels were taxable be-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of legal cases and are not typically considered the main body of the text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

15

THOMAS, J., dissenting

at  1327  (addressing  whether  “the  [administrative  patent
judges] who presided over this inter partes review were . . .
constitutionally appointed”).  Given that this Court is gen-
erally one “of review, not of first view,” it is unclear why we
would grant relief on this ground.  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005).

Second, the idea that administrative patent judges are at
the top of  the chain of command is belied not only by  the
statutory scheme, see supra, at 7–10, but also by the major-
ity’s own refusal to ever name these judges principal offic-
ers.  See ante, at 19.

Third, even if the chain of command were broken, Senate
confirmation of an administrative patent judge would offer
no fix.  As Madison explained, the Senate’s role in appoint-
ments is an exception to the vesting of executive power in
the President; it gives another branch a say in the hiring of
executive officials.  1 Annals of Cong. 463 (1789).  An Article
II Vesting Clause problem cannot be remedied by stripping
away even more power from the Executive.

Fourth,  and  finally,  historical  practice  establishes  that
the vesting of executive power in the President did not re-
quire that every patent decision be appealable to a principal
officer.  As the majority correctly explains, these sorts of fi-
nal decisions were routinely made by inferior executive of-
ficers (or, perhaps, by mere executive employees).  See ante,
at  17–18.  If  no  statutory  path  to  appeal  to  an  executive
principal officer existed then, I see no constitutional reason
why such a path must exist now.

Perhaps this Vesting Clause theory misunderstands the
majority’s  argument.    After  all,  the  Court  never  directly
says that any law or action violates the Vesting Clause.  The
Court simply criticizes as overly formalistic the notion that
both Clauses do exactly what their names suggest: The Ap-
pointments Clause governs only appointments; the Vesting
Clause deals just with the vesting of executive power in the
President.  Ante,  at  13.  I  would  not  be  so  quick  to  stare
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It presents legal arguments and cites precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Syllabus

inflated.  The IOIA provides only default rules.  An international or-
ganization’s charter can always specify a different level of immunity,
and many do.  Nor is it clear that the lending activity of all develop-
ment  banks  qualifies  as  commercial  activity  within  the  meaning  of
the  FSIA.  But  even  if  it  does  qualify  as  commercial,  that  does  not
mean  the  organization  is  automatically  subject  to  suit,  since  other
FSIA  requirements  must  also  be  met,  see,  e.g.,  28  U. S. C.  §§1603,
1605(a)(2).  Pp. 13–15.

860 F. 3d 703, reversed and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
GINSBURG,  ALITO,  SOTOMAYOR,  KAGAN,  and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,  joined.
BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.  KAVANAUGH, J., took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of legal cases and are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they do not contain the full text of the legal arguments and decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN

866

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Opinion of the Court

tential creation of the kind of “safety standard” to which the
Safety Act’s express pre-emption provision refers. But it
declined to resolve that question because it found that peti-
tioners’ state-law tort claims posed an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of FMVSS 208’s objectives. For that reason, it
found that those claims conﬂicted with FMVSS 208, and that,
under ordinary pre-emption principles, the Act consequently
pre-empted the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals thus af-
ﬁrmed the District Court’s dismissal. 166 F. 3d 1236, 1238–
1243 (CADC 1999).

Several state courts have held to the contrary, namely, that
neither the Act’s express pre-emption nor FMVSS 208 pre-
empts a “no airbag” tort suit. See, e. g., Drattel v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 92 N. Y. 2d 35, 43–53, 699 N. E. 2d 376, 379–386
(1998); Minton v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 80 Ohio
St. 3d 62, 70–79, 684 N. E. 2d 648, 655–661 (1997); Munroe v.
Galati, 189 Ariz. 113, 115–119, 938 P. 2d 1114, 1116–1120
(1997); Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N. E. 2d 327, 330–339 (Ind.
1995); Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 140 N. H. 203, 206–207,
665 A. 2d 345, 347–348 (1995). All of the Federal Circuit
Courts that have considered the question, however, have
found pre-emption. One rested its conclusion on the Act’s
express pre-emption provision. See, e. g., Harris v. Ford
Motor Co., 110 F. 3d 1410, 1413–1415 (CA9 1997). Others,
such as the Court of Appeals below, have instead found pre-
emption under ordinary pre-emption principles by virtue of
the conﬂict such suits pose to FMVSS 208’s objectives, and
thus to the Act itself. See, e. g., Montag v. Honda Motor
Co., 75 F. 3d 1414, 1417 (CA10 1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor
Co., 902 F. 2d 1116, 1121–1125 (CA3 1990); Taylor v. General
Motors Corp., 875 F. 2d 816, 825–827 (CA11 1989); Wood v.
General Motors Corp., 865 F. 2d 395, 412–414 (CA1 1988).
We granted certiorari to resolve these differences. We now
hold that this kind of “no airbag” lawsuit conﬂicts with the
objectives of FMVSS 208, a standard authorized by the Act,
and is therefore pre-empted by the Act.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the preemption of "no airbag" lawsuits under the Safety Act and FMVSS 208.  It cites legal precedents and arguments, indicating it's part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

7

GORSUCH, J., concurring

its  cause.  This  isn’t  a  case  where  the  Commission  self-
consciously  announced  a  change  in  its  legal  rule  in  all
public accommodation cases.  Nor is this a case where the
Commission  offered  some  persuasive  reason  for  its  dis-
crimination that might survive strict scrutiny.  Instead, as
the  Court  explains,  it  appears  the  Commission  wished  to
condemn Mr. Phillips for expressing just the kind of “irra-
tional”  or  “offensive  . . .  message”  that  the  bakers  in  the
first  case  refused  to  endorse.    Ante,  at  16.    Many  may
agree  with  the  Commission  and  consider  Mr.  Phillips’s
religious beliefs irrational or offensive.  Some may believe
he  misinterprets  the  teachings  of  his  faith.  And,  to  be
sure,  this  Court  has  held  same-sex  marriage  a  matter  of
constitutional right and various States have enacted laws
that  preclude  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  sexual  orien-
tation.  But  it  is  also  true  that  no  bureaucratic  judgment
condemning a sincerely held religious belief as “irrational”
or  “offensive”  will  ever  survive  strict  scrutiny  under  the
First  Amendment.    In  this  country,  the  place  of  secular
officials  isn’t  to  sit  in  judgment  of  religious  beliefs,  but
only to protect their free exercise.  Just as it is the “proud-
est boast of our free speech jurisprudence” that we protect
speech that we hate, it must be the proudest boast of our
free  exercise  jurisprudence  that  we  protect  religious  be-
liefs  that  we  find  offensive.  See  Matal  v.  Tam,  582  U. S.
___,  ___  (2017)  (plurality  opinion)  (slip  op.,  at  25)  (citing
United  States  v.  Schwimmer,  279  U. S.  644,  655  (1929)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).  Popular religious views are easy
enough  to  defend.  It  is  in  protecting  unpopular  religious
beliefs that we prove this country’s commitment to serving
as  a  refuge  for  religious  freedom.   See  Church  of  Lukumi
Babalu Aye, supra, at 547; Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indi-
ana  Employment  Security  Div.,  450  U. S.  707,  715–716
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 223–224 (1972);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 308–310 (1940).

Nor  can  any  amount  of  after-the-fact  maneuvering  by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a concurring opinion from a legal case. It delves into the First Amendment's protection of religious freedom and criticizes the Commission's attempt to label a religious belief as "irrational" or "offensive."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Concurring Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. ITALIAN COLORS

RESTAURANT
KAGAN, J., dissenting

the economic analysis.  In short, the agreement as applied
in  this  case  cuts  off  not  just  class  arbitration,  but  any
avenue for sharing, shifting, or shrinking necessary costs.
Amex  has  put  Italian  Colors  to  this  choice:  Spend  way,
way,  way  more  money  than  your  claim  is  worth,  or  relin-
quish your Sherman Act rights.

So  contra  the  majority,  the  court  below  got  this  case
right.  Italian  Colors  proved  what  the  plaintiff  in  Ran-
dolph  could  not—that  a  standard-form  agreement,  taken
as  a  whole,  renders  arbitration  of  a  claim  “prohibitively
expensive.”  531  U. S.,  at  92.    The  restaurant  thus  estab-
lished  that  the  contract  “operate[s]  . . .  as  a  prospective
waiver,”  and  prevents  the  “effective[ ]  . . .  vindicat[ion]”  of
Sherman  Act  rights.  Mitsubishi,  473  U. S.,  at  637,  and
n. 19.  I would follow our precedents and decline to compel
arbitration.

II
The majority is quite sure that the effective-vindication
rule  does  not  apply  here,  but  has  precious  little  to  say
about  why.    It  starts  by  disparaging  the  rule  as  having
“originated as dictum.”  Ante, at 6.  But it does not rest on
that swipe, and for good reason.  As I have explained, see
supra, at 3–4, the rule began as a core part of Mitsubishi:
We held there that federal statutory claims are subject to
arbitration  “so  long  as”  the  claimant  “effectively  may
vindicate its [rights] in the arbitral forum.”  473 U. S., at
637 (emphasis added).  The rule thus served as an essen-
tial condition of the decision’s holding.3  And in Randolph,

——————

3 The  majority  is  dead  wrong  when  it  says  that  Mitsubishi  reserved
judgment  on  “whether  the  arbitration  agreement’s  potential  depriva-
tion  of  a  claimant’s  right  to  pursue  federal  remedies  may  render  that
agreement unenforceable.”  Ante, at 6, n. 2.  What the Mitsubishi Court
had “no occasion to speculate on” was whether a particular agreement
in fact eliminated the claimant’s federal rights.  473 U. S., at 673, n. 19.
But we stated expressly that if the agreement did so (as Amex’s does),
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case. It delves into the economic analysis of an arbitration agreement and argues against its enforceability.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

139

Syllabus

SMITH,  WARDEN  v.  SPISAK

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit

No. 08–724.  Argued October 13, 2009—Decided January 12, 2010

After  the  Ohio  courts  sentenced  respondent  Spisak  to  death  and  denied
his  claims  on  direct  appeal  and  collateral  review,  he  ﬁled  a  federal  ha
beas  petition  claiming  that,  at  his  trial’s  penalty  phase,  (1)  the  instruc
tions and verdict forms unconstitutionally required the jury to consider
in  mitigation  only  those  factors  that  it  unanimously  found  to  be  miti
gating, see Mills v.  Maryland, 486 U. S. 367, and (2) his counsel’s inade
quate closing  argument deprived  him of  effective assistance of  counsel,
see Strickland v.  Washington, 466 U. S. 668.  The District Court denied
the  petition,  but  the  Sixth  Circuit  accepted  both  arguments  and  or
dered relief.

Held:

1.  Because the state court’s upholding of the mitigation jury instruc
tions and forms was not “contrary to, or . . . an  unreasonable application
of,  clearly  established  Federal  law,  as  determined  by  [this]  Court,”  28
U. S. C.  § 2254(d)(1),  the  Sixth  Circuit  was  barred  from  reaching  a  con
trary decision.  The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the instruc
tions  and  forms  contravened  Mills,  in  which  this  Court  held  that  the
jury  instructions  and  verdict  forms  at  issue  violated  the  Constitution
because, read naturally, they told the jury that it could not ﬁnd a partic
ular  circumstance  to  be  mitigating  unless  all  12  jurors  agreed  that  the
mitigating circumstance had been proved to exist, 486 U. S., at 380–381,
384.  Even assuming that Mills sets forth the pertinent “clearly estab
lished  Federal  law”  for  reviewing  the  state-court  decision  in  this  case,
the  instructions  and  forms  used  here  differ  signiﬁcantly  from  those  in
Mills:  They  made  clear  that,  to  recommend  a  death  sentence,  the  jury
had to ﬁnd unanimously that each of the aggravating factors outweighed
any mitigating circumstances, but they did not say that the jury had to
determine  the  existence  of  each  individual  mitigating  factor  unani
mously.  Nor  did  they  say  anything  about  how—or  even  whether—the
jury should make individual determinations that each particular mitigat
ing circumstance existed.  They focused only on the overall question of
balancing  the  aggravating  and  mitigating  factors,  and  they  repeatedly
told  the  jury  to  consider  all  relevant  evidence.  Thus,  the  instructions
and verdict forms did not clearly bring about, either through what they
said or what they implied, the constitutional error in the Mills instruc
tions.  Pp. 143–149.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section from a legal case, specifically the syllabus or summary of the Supreme Court case *Smith, Warden v. Spisak*.  It outlines the case's background, the issues presented, and the Court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

TURNER v. ROGERS

Opinion of the Court

involving  incarceration,  not  that  a  right  to  counsel  exists
in all such cases (a position that would have been difficult
to reconcile with Gagnon).

B

family  receives  welfare  support

Civil  contempt  proceedings  in  child  support  cases  con-
stitute  one  part  of  a  highly  complex  system  designed  to
assure  a  noncustodial  parent’s  regular  payment  of  funds
typically  necessary  for  the  support  of  his  children.  Often
from  a  state-
the
administered  federal  program,  and  the  State  then  seeks
reimbursement  from  the  noncustodial  parent.  See  42
U. S. C.  §§608(a)(3)  (2006  ed.,  Supp.  III),  656(a)(1)  (2006
ed.);  S. C.  Code  Ann.  §§43–5–65(a)(1),  (2)  (2010  Cum.
Supp.).  Other  times  the  custodial  parent  (often  the
mother,  but  sometimes  the  father,  a  grandparent,  or  an-
other  person  with  custody)  does  not  receive  government
benefits  and  is  entitled  to  receive  the  support  payments
herself.

The  Federal  Government  has  created  an  elaborate
procedural  mechanism  designed  to  help  both  the  govern-
ment  and  custodial  parents  to  secure  the  payments  to
which  they  are  entitled.    See  generally  Blessing  v.  Free-
stone, 520 U. S. 329, 333 (1997) (describing the “interlock-
ing  set  of  cooperative  federal-state  welfare  programs”  as
they relate to child support enforcement); 45 CFR pt. 303
(2010) (prescribing standards for state child support agen-
cies).  These  systems  often  rely  upon  wage  withholding,
expedited  procedures  for  modifying  and  enforcing  child
support  orders,  and  automated  data  processing.
42
U. S. C. §§666(a), (b), 654(24).  But sometimes States will
use  contempt  orders  to  ensure  that  the  custodial  parent
receives  support  payments  or  the  government  receives
reimbursement.  Although  some  experts  have  criticized
this  last-mentioned  procedure,  and  the  Federal  Govern-
ment  believes  that  “the  routine  use  of  contempt  for  non-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the use of civil contempt proceedings in child support cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CANIGLIA v. STROM

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

home without a warrant in certain situations, including: to
fight a fire and investigate its cause; to prevent the immi-
nent destruction of evidence; to engage in hot pursuit of a
fleeing  felon  or  prevent  a  suspect’s  escape;  to  address  a
threat to the safety of law enforcement officers or the gen-
eral  public;  to  render  emergency  assistance  to  an  injured
occupant; or to protect an occupant who is threatened with
serious injury.  See Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U. S. ___, ___
(2019) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 6); City and County of
San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. 600, 612 (2015); Ken-
tucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460, 462 (2011); Michigan v.
Fisher, 558 U. S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam); Brigham City
v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006); Minnesota v. Olson, 495
U. S.  91,  100  (1990);  Michigan  v.  Clifford,  464  U. S.  287,
293, and n. 4 (1984) (plurality opinion); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U. S. 385, 392–394 (1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S.
499,  509–510  (1978);  United  States  v.  Santana,  427  U. S.
38, 42–43 (1976); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U. S. 294, 298–299 (1967); Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23,
40–41 (1963) (plurality opinion).

Over the years, many courts, like the First Circuit in this
case, have relied on what they have labeled a “community
caretaking”  doctrine  to  allow  warrantless  entries  into  the
home for a non-investigatory purpose, such as to prevent a
suicide or to conduct a welfare check on an older individual
who  has  been  out  of  contact.  But  as  the  Court  today  ex-
plains, any such standalone community caretaking doctrine
was primarily devised for searches of cars, not homes.  Ante,
at  3–4;  see  Cady  v.  Dombrowski,  413  U. S.  433,  447–448
(1973).

That said, this Fourth Amendment issue is more labeling
than substance.  The Court’s Fourth Amendment case law
already  recognizes  the  exigent  circumstances  doctrine,
which allows an officer to enter a home without a warrant
if the “exigencies of the situation make the needs of law en-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh in the case of CANIGLIA v. STROM. It discusses the Fourth Amendment and warrantless searches of homes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–277
_________________

WAL-MART STORES, INC., PETITIONER v.

BETTY DUKES ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2011]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
We  are  presented  with  one  of  the  most  expansive  class
actions ever.  The District Court and the Court of Appeals
approved the certification of a class comprising about one
and  a  half  million  plaintiffs,  current  and  former  female
employees  of  petitioner  Wal-Mart  who  allege  that  the
discretion  exercised  by  their  local  supervisors  over  pay
and  promotion  matters  violates  Title  VII  by  discriminat-
ing against women.  In addition to injunctive and declara-
tory  relief,  the  plaintiffs  seek  an  award  of  backpay.    We
consider  whether  the  certification  of  the  plaintiff  class
was consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)
and (b)(2).

I

A

Petitioner  Wal-Mart  is  the  Nation’s  largest  private
employer.  It  operates  four  types  of  retail  stores  through-
out the country: Discount Stores, Supercenters, Neighbor-
hood Markets, and Sam’s Clubs.  Those stores are divided
into seven nationwide divisions, which in turn comprise 41
regions of 80 to 85 stores apiece.  Each store has between
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the court's name, the case name, and the beginning of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

exemption  for  such  employees  is  known  as  the  “adminis-
trative” exemption.

The  FLSA  grants  the  Secretary  of  Labor  authority  to
“defin[e]”  and  “delimi[t]”  the  categories  of  exempt  admin-
istrative  employees.  Ibid.  The  Secretary’s  current  regu-
lations  regarding  the  administrative  exemption  were
promulgated  in  2004  through  a  notice-and-comment
rulemaking.  As  relevant  here,  the  2004  regulations  dif-
fered from the previous regulations in that they contained
a  new  section  providing  several  examples  of  exempt  ad-
ministrative employees.  See 29 CFR §541.203.  One of the
examples  is  “[e]mployees  in  the  financial  services  indus-
try,”  who,  depending  on  the  nature  of  their  day-to-day
work,  “generally  meet  the  duties  requirements  for  the
administrative  exception.”
§541.203(b).    The  financial
services  example  ends  with  a  caveat,  noting  that  “an
employee whose primary duty is selling financial products
does not qualify for the administrative exemption.”  Ibid.

In 1999 and again in 2001, the Department’s Wage and
Hour  Division  issued  letters  opining  that  mortgage-loan
officers  do  not  qualify  for  the  administrative  exemption.
See  Opinion  Letter,  Loan  Officers/Exempt  Status,  6A
LRR,  Wages  and  Hours  Manual  99:8351  (Feb.  16,  2001);
Opinion  Letter,  Mortgage  Loan  Officers/Exempt  Status,
id.,  at  99:8249.  (May  17,  1999).  In  other  words,  the  De-
partment  concluded  that  the  FLSA’s  minimum  wage  and
maximum  hour  requirements  applied  to  mortgage-loan
officers.  When  the  Department  promulgated  its  current
FLSA  regulations  in  2004,  respondent  Mortgage  Bankers
Association (MBA), a national trade association represent-
ing real estate finance companies, requested a new opinion
In  2006,  the  De-
interpreting  the  revised  regulations.
partment  issued  an  opinion  letter  finding  that  mortgage-
loan  officers  fell  within  the  administrative  exemption
under  the  2004  regulations.  See App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  in
No. 13–1041, pp. 70a–84a.  Four years later, however, the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically discussing the "administrative exemption" under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and its application to mortgage-loan officers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
36  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

Just three years later, Parliament responded by writing
the “predecessor to our Second Amendment” into the 1689
English Bill of Rights, Heller, 554 U. S., at 593, guarantee-
ing that “Protestants . . . may have Arms for their Defence
suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law,” 1 Wm.
& Mary c. 2, §7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 417 (1689).  Alt-
hough this right was initially limited—it was restricted to
Protestants and held only against the Crown, but not Par-
liament—it  represented  a  watershed  in  English  history.
Englishmen had “never before claimed . . . the right of the
individual to arms.”  Schwoerer 156.12  And as that individ-
ual right matured, “by the time of the founding,” the right
to keep and bear arms was “understood to be an individual
right protecting against both public and private violence.”
Heller, 554 U. S., at 594.

To be sure, the Statute of Northampton survived both Sir
John  Knight’s  Case  and  the  English  Bill  of  Rights,  but  it
was no obstacle to public carry for self-defense in the dec-
ades leading to the founding.  Serjeant William Hawkins,
in his widely read 1716 treatise, confirmed that “no wearing
of Arms is within the meaning of [the Statute of Northamp-
ton], unless it be accompanied with such Circumstances as
are apt to terrify the People.”  1 Pleas of the Crown 136.  To
illustrate  that  proposition,  Hawkins  noted  as  an  example
that “Persons of Quality” were “in no Danger of Offending
against  this  Statute  by  wearing  common  Weapons”  be-
cause, in those circumstances, it would be clear that they

——————
interpretations of Sir John Knight’s Case, we will favor the one that is
more consistent with the Second Amendment’s command.

12 Even Catholics, who fell beyond the protection of the right to have
arms, and who were stripped of all “Arms, Weapons, Gunpowder, [and]
Ammunition,” were at least allowed to keep “such necessary Weapons as
shall be allowed . . . by Order of the Justices of the Peace . . . for the De-
fence of his House or Person.”  1 Wm. & Mary c. 15, §4, in 3 Eng. Stat. at
Large 399 (1688).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the historical context of the Second Amendment. It presents legal arguments and cites historical documents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of the Court

The next clause (but don’t get attached: it will soon be su-
perseded) set out the procedures the electors were to follow
in casting their votes.  In brief, each member of the College
would cast votes for two candidates in the presidential field.
The candidate with the greatest number of votes, assuming
he had a majority, would become President.  The runner-up
would become Vice President.  If no one had a majority, the
House  of  Representatives  would  take  over  and  decide  the
winner.

That plan failed to anticipate the rise of political parties,
and soon proved unworkable.  The Nation’s first contested
presidential election occurred in 1796, after George Wash-
ington’s retirement.  John Adams came in first among the
candidates, and Thomas Jefferson second.  That meant the
leaders of the era’s two warring political parties—the Fed-
eralists and the Republicans—became President and Vice
President respectively.  (One might think of this as fodder
for a new season of Veep.)  Four years later, a different prob-
lem arose.  Jefferson and Aaron Burr ran that year as a Re-
publican  Party  ticket,  with  the  former  meant  to  be  Presi-
dent  and  the  latter  meant  to  be  Vice.  For  that  plan  to
succeed, Jefferson had to come in first and Burr just behind
him.  Instead, Jefferson came in first and Burr . . . did too.
Every elector who voted for Jefferson also voted for Burr,
producing a tie.  That threw the election into the House of
Representatives,  which  took  no  fewer  than  36  ballots  to
elect Jefferson.  (Alexander Hamilton secured his place on
the Broadway stage—but possibly in the cemetery too—by
lobbying Federalists in the House to tip the election to Jef-
ferson, whom he loathed but viewed as less of an existential
threat to the Republic.)  By then, everyone had had enough
of the Electoral College’s original voting rules.

The result was the Twelfth Amendment, whose main part
provided that electors would vote separately for President
and  Vice  President.  The  Amendment,  ratified  in  1804,
says:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion discussing the history and evolution of the Electoral College. It provides context and background information, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis/Historical Context</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
886

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5069.  Hughes  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5071.  Daniel  v.  Trancoso,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  Ill.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5072.  Zahn  v.  City  of  San  Diego,  California.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.
Appx.  591.

No.  09–5073.  Whitfield  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  377  Ill.  App.  3d  1145,  953
N.  E.  2d  84.

No. 09–5075.  Jones v.  McDaniel, Warden, et al.  C. A. 9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  784.

No.  09–5079.  Brazelton  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  750.

No.  09–5080.  Aaron  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.  App.  3d  1125,  970
N.  E.  2d  127.

No.  09–5081.  Voigt  v.  Wisconsin.  Ct.  App.  Wis.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–5082.  Weeks v.  White’s Mill Colony, Inc.  Ct. App.

S.  C.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5084.  Morehouse  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  87.

No.  09–5085.  Peoples  v.  Davis  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–5086.  Smith v.  Denny, Warden.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  68.

No.  09–5087.  Greene  v.  Finger  Lakes  Developmental
Disabilities  Service  Office  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5088.  Peer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  442.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). This is not the typical content found within a book and is more suited for a legal database or journal.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

Syllabus

supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State,”
Ticor, supra, at 638.  Further, the state supervisor may not itself be
an  active  market  participant.    In  general,  however,  the  adequacy  of
supervision otherwise will depend on all the circumstances of a case.
Pp. 17–18.

717 F. 3d 359, affirmed.

KENNEDY,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  GINSBURG,  BREYER,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined.
ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section from a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus.  It summarizes the case and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

TRUMP v. HAWAII

THOMAS, J., concurring

authority of courts.  Id., at 711–717.

This Court has long respected these traditional limits on
equity  and  judicial  power.  See,  e.g.,  Scott  v.  Donald,  165
U. S. 107, 115 (1897) (rejecting an injunction based on the
theory  that  the  plaintiff  “so  represents  [a]  class”  whose
rights  were  infringed  by  a  statute  as  “too  conjectural  to
furnish a safe basis upon which a court of equity ought to
grant  an  injunction”).    Take,  for  example,  this  Court’s
decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
There,  a  taxpayer  sought  to  enjoin  the  enforcement  of  an
appropriation  statute.    The  Court  noted  that  this  kind  of
dispute  “is  essentially  a  matter  of  public  and  not  of  indi-
vidual concern.”  Id., at 487.  A general interest in enjoin-
ing implementation of an illegal law, this Court explained,
provides  “no  basis  . . .  for  an  appeal  to  the  preventive
powers of a court of equity.”  Ibid.  Courts can review the
constitutionality  of  an  act  only  when  “a  justiciable  issue”
requires it to decide whether to “disregard an unconstitu-
tional enactment.”  Id., at 488.  If the statute is unconsti-
tutional, then courts enjoin “not the execution of the stat-
ute, but the acts of the official.”  Ibid.  Courts cannot issue
an injunction based on a mere allegation “that officials of
the executive department of the government are executing
and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be uncon-
stitutional.”  Ibid.    “To  do  so  would  be  not  to  decide  a
judicial controversy.”  Id., at 488–489.

By  the  latter  half  of  the  20th  century,  however,  some
jurists  began  to  conceive  of  the  judicial  role  in  terms  of
resolving general questions of legality, instead of address-
ing  those  questions  only  insofar  as  they  are  necessary  to
resolve individual cases and controversies.  See Bray 451.
That  is  when  what  appears  to  be  “the  first  [universal]
injunction  in  the  United  States”  emerged.  Bray  438.  In
Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F. 2d 518 (CADC 1963), the
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  District  of  Columbia  Circuit
addressed  a  lawsuit  challenging  the  Secretary  of  Labor’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Trump v. Hawaii. It discusses the limits of judicial power, particularly in cases involving injunctions against government actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:23:43
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3BK

Pagination Table: RULES1

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Supreme Court of the United States
washington, d. c.

April 17, 2000

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States of America in Congress Assembled:

By direction of the Supreme Court of the United States, I
have the honor to submit to the Congress the amendments
to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure that have
been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States
pursuant to Section 2075 of Title 28, United States Code.

Accompanying these rules are excerpts from the report of
the Judicial Conference of the United States containing the
Committee Notes submitted to the Court for its consider-
ation pursuant to Section 331 of Title 28, United States Code.

Sincerely,

(Signed) William H. Rehnquist

Chief Justice of the United States

1148
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a letter of transmittal, which is typically a formal document introducing a set of rules or regulations. It is not the main content of the document and is not meant to be indexed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Letter of Transmittal</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

BREYER, J., dissenting

tax benefit here inures to donors, who choose to support a
particular scholarship organization.  That organization, in
turn,  awards  scholarships  to  students  for  the  qualifying
school of their choice.  The majority points to cases in which
we have upheld programs where, as here, state funds make
their way to religious schools by means of private choices.
Ante,  at  7  (citing  Zelman,  536  U. S.,  at  649–653).    As  the
Court  acknowledged  in  Trinity  Lutheran,  however,  that
does not answer the question whether providing such aid is
required.  582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).

Neither does it address related concerns that I have pre-
viously described.  Private choice cannot help the taxpayer
who does not want to finance the propagation of religious
beliefs, whether his own or someone else’s.  It will not help
religious minorities too few in number to support a school
that  teaches  their  beliefs.    And  it  will  not  satisfy  those
whose religious beliefs preclude them from participating in
a  government-sponsored  program.    Some  or  many  of  the
persons who fit these descriptions may well feel ignored—
or  worse—when  public  funds  are  channeled  to  religious
schools.  See Zelman, 536 U. S., at 728 (BREYER, J., dissent-
ing).  These feelings may, in turn, sow religiously inspired
political  conflict  and  division—a  risk  that  is  considerably
greater  where  States  are  required  to  include  religious
schools in programs like the one before us here.  And it is
greater still where, as here, those programs benefit only a
handful  of  a  State’s  many  religious  denominations.    See
ibid.;
(2019),
Scholarships,
Sky
www.bigskyscholarships.org/schools.

Schools

Big

Indeed,  the  records  of  Montana’s  constitutional  conven-
tion show that these concerns were among the reasons that
a  religiously  diverse  group  of  delegates,  including  faith
leaders  of  different  denominations,  supported  the  no-aid
provision.  See Brief for Respondents 18–23; Brief for Mon-
tana Constitutional Convention Delegates as Amici Curiae
19–21, 22, 24–25 (noting support  for the provision from a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from Justice Breyer in the case of *Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue*.  It delves into the arguments against using state funds to support religious schools through scholarship programs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

ZF AUTOMOTIVE US, INC. v. LUXSHARE, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

Russia and Lithuania’s intent that an ad hoc panel exercise
governmental authority.  For instance, the treaty does not
itself create the panel; instead, it simply references the set
of rules that govern the panel’s formation and procedure if
an  investor  chooses  that  forum.  In  addition,  the  ad hoc
panel “functions independently” of and is not affiliated with
either Lithuania or Russia.  5 F. 4th, at 226.  It consists of
individuals chosen by the parties and lacking any “official
affiliation with Lithuania, Russia, or any other governmen-
tal or intergovernmental entity.”  Ibid.  And it lacks other
possible indicia of a governmental nature.  See ibid. (“[T]he
panel receives zero government funding,” “the proceedings
. . . maintain confidentiality,” and the “ ‘award may be made
public only with the consent of both parties’ ”).4

Indeed, the ad hoc panel at issue in the Fund’s dispute
with Lithuania is “materially indistinguishable in form and
function” from the DIS panel resolving the dispute between
ZF  and  Luxshare.  Brief  for  George  A.  Bermann  et  al.  as
Amici Curiae 19.  In a private arbitration, the panel derives
its  authority  from  the  parties’  consent  to  arbitrate.  The
ad hoc panel in this case derives its authority in essentially
the  same  way.    Russia  and  Lithuania  each  agreed  in  the
treaty to submit to ad hoc arbitration if an investor chose
it.  The Fund took Lithuania up on that offer by initiating
such an arbitration, thereby triggering the formation of an

——————

4 Comparing Article 10 of the treaty (governing investor-state disputes)
with Article 11 (governing state-to-state disputes) further suggests that
the ad hoc panel under Article 10 is of a nongovernmental nature.  Arti-
cle 11 provides that an unsettled dispute between the countries “shall,
upon the request of either Contracting Party, be submitted to an Arbitral
Tribunal.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 21–518, p. 65a.  Each country is
involved in forming that arbitral body and funds its operations.  See id.,
at 66a–67a.  Article 11 also provides, under some circumstances, for the
countries  to  invite  officials  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  to  ap-
point  the  body’s  members.  Id.,  at  66a.  This  reflects  a  higher  level  of
government  involvement  and  highlights  the  absence  of  such  details  in
Article 10’s ad hoc arbitration option.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the nature of an ad hoc arbitration panel. It contains legal arguments and citations, suggesting it is part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary or supplementary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS

Syllabus

or employees.  See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140–
141.  The Court has explained that §702 “requir[es] a litigant to show,
at the outset of the case, that he is injured in fact by agency action.”
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 127.  A litigant therefore
cannot  bring  an  APA  claim  unless  and  until  she  suffers  an  injury.
While §702 equips injured parties with a cause of action, §704 provides
that  judicial  review  is  available  in  most  cases  only  for  “final  agency
action.”  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 177–178.  Reading §702 and
§704  together,  a  plaintiff  may  bring  an  APA  claim  only  after  she  is
injured by final agency action.

To determine whether Corner Post’s APA claim is timely, the Court
must interpret §2401(a), which provides that civil actions against the
United States “shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six
years after the right of action first accrues.”  The Board says an APA
claim “accrues” under §2401(a) when agency action is “final” for pur-
poses of §704; the claim can accrue for purposes of the statute of limi-
tations even before the plaintiff suffers an injury.  The Court disagrees.
A right of action “accrues” when the plaintiff has a “complete and pre-
sent cause of action,” which is when she has the right to “file suit and
obtain relief.”  Green v. Brennan, 578 U. S. 547, 554.  Because an APA
plaintiff may not file suit and obtain relief until she suffers an injury
from final agency action, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run until she is injured.  Pp. 4–6.

(b) Congress enacted §2401(a) in 1948, two years after it enacted the
APA.  Section 2401(a)’s predecessor was the statute-of-limitations pro-
vision for the Little Tucker Act, which provided for district court juris-
diction over certain claims against the United States.  When Congress
revised and recodified the Judicial Code in 1948, it converted the Little
Tucker  Act’s  statute  of  limitations  into  §2401(a)’s  general  statute  of
limitations for all suits against the Government.  But Congress contin-
ued to start the statute of limitations period when the right “accrues.”
Compare 36 Stat. 1093 (“after the right accrued for which the claim is
made”) with §2401(a) (“after the right of action first accrues”).

“Accrue” had a well-settled meaning in 1948, as it does now: A “right
accrues when it comes into existence,” United States v. Lindsay, 346
U. S.  568,  569—i.e.,  “when  the  plaintiff  has  a  complete  and  present
cause of action,” Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U. S. 442, 448.  This definition
has appeared “in dictionaries from the 19th century up until today,”
which explain that a cause of action accrues when a suit may be main-
tained  thereon.    568  U. S.,  at  448.  Thus,  a  cause  of  action  does  not
become complete and present—it does not accrue—“until the plaintiff
can file suit and obtain relief.”  Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically outlining the reasoning behind a court's decision in the case of Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS. It delves into legal concepts like the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), statutes of limitations, and the accrual of a cause of action.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–6827
_________________

GREGORY HOUSTON HOLT, AKA ABDUL MAALIK

MUHAMMAD, PETITIONER v. RAY HOBBS,

DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[January 20, 2015]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring.
I  concur  in  the  Court’s  opinion,  which  holds  that  the
Department  failed  to  show  why  the  less  restrictive  al-
ternatives  identified  by  petitioner  in  the  course  of  this
litigation  were  inadequate  to  achieve  the  Department’s
compelling  security-related  interests.    I  write  separately
to  explain  my  understanding  of  the  applicable  legal
standard.

Nothing  in  the  Court’s  opinion  calls  into  question  our
prior  holding  in  Cutter  v.  Wilkinson  that  “[c]ontext  mat-
ters”  in  the  application  of  the  Religious  Land  Use  and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat.
803, 42 U. S. C. §2000cc et seq.  544 U. S. 709, 723 (2005)
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    In  the  dangerous
prison  environment,  “regulations  and  procedures”  are
needed  to  “maintain  good  order,  security  and  discipline,
consistent  with  consideration  of  costs  and  limited  re-
sources.”  Ibid.  Of course, that is not to say that cost alone
is  an  absolute  defense  to  an  otherwise  meritorious
RLUIPA  claim.    See  §2000cc–3(c).    Thus,  we  recognized
“that  prison  security  is  a  compelling  state  interest,  and
that deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in
this area.”  Cutter, 544 U. S., at 725, n. 13.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor.  It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

Opinion of the Court

That  Mr.  Kennedy  has  discharged  his  burdens  is  effec-
tively undisputed.  No one questions that he seeks to engage
in a sincerely motivated religious exercise.  The exercise in
question  involves,  as  Mr.  Kennedy  has  put  it,  giving
“thanks through prayer” briefly and by himself “on the play-
ing field” at the conclusion of each game he coaches.  App.
168, 171.  Mr. Kennedy has indicated repeatedly that he is
willing  to  “wai[t]  until  the  game  is  over  and  the  players
have left the field” to “wal[k] to mid-field to say [his] short,
private,  personal  prayer.”  Id.,  at  69;  see  also  id.,  at  280,
282.  The contested exercise before us does not involve lead-
ing prayers with the team or before any other captive audi-
ence.  Mr. Kennedy’s “religious beliefs do not require [him]
to lead any prayer . . . involving students.”  Id., at 170.  At
the  District’s  request,  he  voluntarily  discontinued  the
school  tradition  of  locker-room  prayers  and  his  postgame
religious  talks  to  students.  The  District  disciplined  him
only  for  his  decision  to  persist  in  praying  quietly  without
his players after three games in October 2015.  See Parts I–
B and I–C, supra.

Nor  does  anyone  question  that,  in  forbidding  Mr.  Ken-
nedy’s brief prayer, the District failed to act pursuant to a
neutral and generally applicable rule.  A government policy
will not qualify as neutral if it is “specifically directed at . . .
religious practice.”  Smith, 494 U. S., at 878.  A policy can
fail this test if it “discriminate[s] on its face,” or if a religious
exercise is otherwise its “object.”  Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533;
see also Smith, 494 U. S., at 878.  A government policy will
fail the general applicability requirement if it “prohibits re-

——————
Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 18).  To resolve
today’s case, however, we have no need to consult that test.  Likewise,
while the test we do apply today has been the subject of some criticism,
see, e.g., Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 5),
we have no need to engage with that debate today because no party has
asked us to do so.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case involving religious freedom and the actions of a school district.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

Opinion of the Court

protocol  if  it  violates  the  Eighth  Amendment,  federal
courts  should  not  “embroil  [themselves]  in  ongoing  scien-
tific controversies beyond their expertise.”  Baze, supra, at
51.  Accordingly,  an  inmate  challenging  a  protocol  bears
the  burden  to  show,  based  on  evidence  presented  to  the
court, that there is a substantial risk of severe pain.

A
Petitioners attack the District Court’s findings of fact on
two main grounds.3  First, they argue that even if midazo-
lam is powerful enough to induce unconsciousness, it is too
weak  to  maintain  unconsciousness  and  insensitivity  to
pain  once  the  second  and  third  drugs  are  administered.
Second,  while  conceding  that  the  500-milligram  dose  of
midazolam  is  much  higher  than  the  normal  therapeutic
dose,  they  contend  that  this  fact  is  irrelevant  because
midazolam  has  a  “ceiling  effect”—that  is,  at  a  certain
point,  an  increase  in  the  dose  administered  will  not  have
any  greater  effect  on  the  inmate.    Neither  argument
succeeds.

The  District  Court  found  that  midazolam  is  capable  of
placing a person “at a sufficient level of unconsciousness to
resist  the  noxious  stimuli  which  could  occur  from  the

——————

3 Drs. Lubarsky and Sasich, petitioners’ key witnesses, both testified
that  midazolam  is  inappropriate  for  a  third  reason,  namely,  that  it
creates  a  risk  of  “paradoxical  reactions”  such  as  agitation,  hyperactiv-
ity, and combativeness.  App. 175 (expert report of Dr. Lubarsky); id., at
242, 244 (expert report of Dr. Sasich).  The District Court found, how-
ever,  that  the  frequency  with  which  a  paradoxical  reaction  occurs  “is
speculative” and that the risk “occurs with the highest frequency in low
therapeutic  doses.”  Id.,  at  78.    Indeed,  Dr.  Sasich  conceded  that  the
incidence or risk of paradoxical reactions with midazolam “is unknown”
and that reports estimate the risk to vary only “from 1% to above 10%.”
Id., at 244.  Moreover, the mere fact that a method of execution might
result  in  some  unintended  side  effects  does  not  amount  to  an  Eighth
Amendment violation.  “[T]he Constitution does not demand the avoid-
ance of all risk of pain.”  Baze, 553 U. S., at 47 (plurality opinion).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Glossip v. Gross*. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND

THOMAS, J., dissenting

that argument because “a point source need not be the orig-
inal source of the pollutant; it need only convey the pollu-
tant to ‘navigable waters.’ ”  Id., at 105.  Although that case
did  not  involve  the  exact  question  presented  here,  the
direct-discharge  interpretation  comports  well  with  that
previous decision.

B
The  Court’s  main  textual  argument  reads  the  word
“from” in isolation.  But as the Court recognizes, “the word
‘from’ necessarily draws its meaning from context.”  Ante,
at 9–10.  The Court’s example using “arrive” instead of “ad-
dition” is thus unpersuasive, ante, at 13–14, because “from”
takes different meanings with different verbs.  The Court’s
culinary example also misses the mark, ante, at 14, because
if the drippings from the meat collect in the pan before the
chef adds them to the gravy, the drippings are added to the
gravy from the pan, not from the meat.  This point becomes
clear if we reorder the majority’s recipe to match the stat-
ute; the chef has not added the drippings to the gravy from
the meat.  The Court’s bathwater example, ante, at 14, suf-
fers  from  the  same  problem;  if  the  well  water  is  put  in  a
bucket before it is put in the bathtub, it is added to the bath-
tub from the bucket.  Only by reading the phrase in its en-
tirety  can  we  interpret  the  definition  of  “discharge.”    See
Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 132 (1993).

The Court also asserts that a narrower reading than the
one it adopts would create a “massive loophole” in the stat-
ute.  Ante, at 15.  Far from creating a loophole, my reading
is the most logical because it is consonant with the scope of
Congress’ power.  The CWA presumably was passed as an
exercise of Congress’ authority “to regulate Commerce with
foreign  Nations,  and  among  the  several  States,  and  with
the Indian Tribes.”  U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3.  My inter-
pretation ties the statute more closely to navigable waters,
on the theory that they are at least a channel of these kinds
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge named Thomas. It delves into the interpretation of a statute, likely the Clean Water Act (CWA), and argues against the majority opinion's reading of a particular phrase.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

goods or services.  The second is the right of all persons to
exercise  fundamental  freedoms  under  the  First  Amend-
ment,  as  applied  to  the  States  through  the  Fourteenth
Amendment.

The  freedoms  asserted  here  are  both  the  freedom  of
speech  and  the  free  exercise  of  religion.    The  free  speech
aspect  of  this  case  is  difficult,  for  few  persons  who  have
seen  a  beautiful  wedding  cake  might  have  thought  of  its
creation  as  an  exercise  of  protected  speech.  This  is  an
instructive  example,  however,  of  the  proposition  that  the
application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can
deepen our understanding of their meaning.

One  of  the  difficulties  in  this  case  is  that  the  parties
disagree  as  to  the  extent  of  the  baker’s  refusal  to  provide
service.  If  a  baker  refused  to  design  a  special  cake  with
words or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, a
cake  showing  words  with  religious  meaning—that  might
be different from a refusal to sell any cake at all.  In defin-
ing  whether  a  baker’s  creation  can  be  protected,  these
details might make a difference.

The  same  difficulties  arise  in  determining  whether  a
baker has a valid free exercise claim.  A baker’s refusal to
attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut the right
way, or a refusal to put certain religious words or decora-
tions on the cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has
been  baked  for  the  public  generally  but  includes  certain
religious words or symbols on it are just three examples of
possibilities that seem all but endless.

Whatever  the  confluence  of  speech  and  free  exercise
principles  might  be  in  some  cases,  the  Colorado  Civil
Rights Commission’s consideration of this case was incon-
sistent  with  the  State’s  obligation  of  religious  neutrality.
The reason and motive for the baker’s refusal were based
on  his  sincere  religious  beliefs  and  convictions.    The
Court’s precedents make clear that the baker, in his capac-
ity  as  the  owner  of  a  business  serving  the  public,  might
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It delves into the intersection of free speech and free exercise of religion in the context of a baker's refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH

Syllabus

clear and unmistakable error.  Pp. 5–12.

(a) This case turns on the meaning of the 1997 statute subjecting a
final  veterans’  benefits  decision  to  collateral  review  on  grounds  of
“clear and unmistakable error.”  111 Stat. 2271 (38 U. S. C. §§5109A,
7111).  No statute defines the term “clear and unmistakable error,” but
the modifiers “clear” and “unmistakable” as well as the statutory struc-
ture suggest a narrow category.  A robust regulatory backdrop fills in
the details.  Where Congress employs a term of art “ ‘ “obviously trans-
planted from another legal source,” ’ it ‘ “brings the old soil with it.” ’ ”
Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U. S. ___, ___.  That principle applies here.
The  Court  agrees  with  the  Federal  Circuit  that  Congress  “codif[ied]
and  adopt[ed]  the  [clear-and-unmistakable-error]  doctrine  as  it  had
developed under” decades of prior agency practice.  Cook v. Principi,
318 F. 3d 1334, 1344 (en banc).  That history reveals that this category
of  error  does  not  encompass  a  subsequent  “change  in  law  . . .  or  a
change in interpretation of law.”  38 CFR §3.105 (Cum. Supp. 1963).
And the invalidation of a prior regulation constitutes a “change in in-
terpretation of law” under historical agency practice.  Defined by this
regulatory history, the statutory term “clear and unmistakable error”
does not encompass a claim like George’s.  Pp. 5–8.

(b) In response, George argues that the VA has distorted the history
of agency practice that the 1997 statute codified.  But across a century
of  review  for  clear  and  unmistakable  error,  George  can  muster  only
one uncertain outlier case sustaining a claim that arguably resembles
his, which does not move the mountain of contrary regulatory author-
ity.  He alternatively argues that the VA is wrong to call a later deci-
sion invalidating a regulation a “change in interpretation of law.”  But
that is a perfectly natural use of language.  George tries to bolster his
position  by  invoking  cases  explaining  that  a  judicial  decision  states
what the statute “always meant,” Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511
U. S. 298, 313, n. 12, and an unauthorized regulation is a “ ‘nullity,’ ”
Dixon v. United States, 381 U. S. 68, 74.  But those general principles
do not disturb the conclusion that the Board’s application of a then-
binding  regulation  is  not  the  kind of  “clear  and  unmistakable  error”
for which collateral relief is available under §§5109A and 7111.  And
that longstanding VA approach is consistent with the general rule that
the new interpretation of a statute can only retroactively affect deci-
sions still open on direct review.

George also leans on what he describes as the plain meaning of the
words “clear and unmistakable error.”  But as he concedes elsewhere,
the real question is not what might be called clear and unmistakable
error  in  the  abstract,  but  what  the  prevailing  understanding  of  this
term of art was when Congress codified it.  The fact that Congress did
not expressly enact the specific regulatory principle barring collateral
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It discusses the interpretation of a specific legal term ("clear and unmistakable error") and its application in the context of veterans' benefits.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

MOORE v. HARPER

THOMAS, J., dissenting

on the question presented.  In every case properly before it,
any court—state or federal—must ascertain and apply the
substantive law that properly governs that case.  Thus, the
court naturally must apply the Federal Constitution rather
than  any  statute  in  conflict  with  it.  The  court  must  also
apply the state constitution over any conflicting statute en-
acted under a power limited by that constitution.  Petition-
ers’ argument, however, is that legislation about the times,
places, and manner of congressional elections is not limited
by state constitutions—because the power to regulate those
subjects comes from the Federal Constitution, not the peo-
ple of the State.  Right or wrong, this question has nothing
to do with whether state courts have the power to conduct
judicial review in the first place.  To say that “state judicial
review”  authorizes  applying  state  constitutions  over  con-
flicting Elections Clause legislation, ante, at 15, is simply to
assume away petitioners’ argument.

III
The  majority  opinion  ends  with  some  general  advice  to
state and lower federal courts on how to exercise “judicial
review” “in cases implicating the Elections Clause.”  Ante,
at 28.  As the majority offers no clear rationale for its inter-
pretation of the Clause, it is impossible to be sure what the
consequences of that interpretation will be.  However, judg-
ing  from  the  majority’s  brief  sketch  of  the  regime  it  envi-
sions, I worry that today’s opinion portends serious troubles
ahead for the Judiciary.

The majority uses the separate writings in Bush v. Gore,
531 U. S. 98 (2000) (per curiam), as a loose touchstone for
the kind of judicial review that it apparently expects federal
courts to conduct in future cases like this one.  On its face,
this is an awkward analogy, for there is a significant differ-
ence between Bush and Harper I.  In Bush, the state court’s
judgment was based on an interpretation of state statutory
law,  enacted  by  the  state  legislature.    Thus,  the  relevant
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of constitutional issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

Opinion of the Court

immunity.  In the context of a civil proceeding, this Court
has recognized that a suit not governed by the FSIA “may
still  be  barred  by  foreign  sovereign  immunity  under  the
common  law.”  Samantar  v.  Yousuf,  560  U. S.  305,  324
(2010).  Halkbank maintains that principles of common-law
immunity  preclude  this  criminal  prosecution  even  if  the
FSIA  does  not.  To  that  end,  Halkbank  contends  that
common-law-immunity  principles  operate  differently  in
criminal cases than in civil cases.  See Brief for Petitioner
34–35,  44.  And  Halkbank  argues  that  the  Executive
Branch
common-law
immunity by initiating prosecution.  Id., at 44.

cannot  unilaterally  abrogate

The  Government  disagrees.    Reasoning  from  pre-FSIA
history  and  precedent,  the  Government  asserts  that  the
common  law  does  not  provide  for  foreign  sovereign
immunity  when,  as  here,  the  Executive  Branch  has
commenced a federal criminal prosecution of a commercial
entity like Halkbank.  See Brief for United States 21.  In
the  alternative,  the  Government  contends  that  any
common-law immunity in criminal cases would not extend
to  commercial  activities  such  as  those  undertaken  by
Halkbank.  Id., at 16–21.

The Court  of Appeals did not fully consider the various
arguments  regarding  common-law  immunity  that  the
parties press in this Court.  See 16 F. 4th, at 350–351.  Nor
did  the  Court  of  Appeals  address  whether  and  to  what
extent  foreign  states  and  their  instrumentalities  are
differently situated for purposes of common-law immunity
in the criminal context.  We express no view on those issues
and  leave  them  for  the  Court  of  Appeals  to  consider  on
remand.  Cf. Samantar, 560 U. S., at 325–326.

*

*
With respect to the holding of the Court of Appeals that
the District Court has jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. §3231,
we  affirm.  With  respect  to  the  holding  of  the  Court  of

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the issue of foreign sovereign immunity in a criminal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xiii

Page
960
Clymore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Chiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953
Coates v. Seaton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,970
938
Coffey v. Collester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cohen; Ceminchuk v.
951
Cohen; General Media Communications, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903
Cohen v. Little Six, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903
Cohen v. Mystic Lake Casino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Cohn, Liﬂand, Perlman, Hermann & Knopf; Weissman v. . . . . . . .
942
Colbert v. INOVA Health Care Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Cole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924
Coleman v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Collagen Corp.; Worthy v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Collester; Coffey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948
Collins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
Collins v. Hazlehurst
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
Colonial Park Apartments; Adelman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colorado; Burge v.
959
Commissioner; Fraser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Commissioner; Jeppsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commissioner; Sherwood v.
Commissioner; Springer v.
920
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner.
Commonwealth. See name of Commonwealth.
939
Connor v. Flynn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
Consolidated Rail Corp.; Engelhart v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cooke; Frohwirth v.
Cookish v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917,971
927
Cooksey; Pashuck v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
Cooper v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Cooper v. Schriro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Corcoran; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960
Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner.
Cossett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cossett Construction Co., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cotton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Couch v. Sprint Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
County. See name of county.
Cox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cozy Cabin v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cozzens v. Bozza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crabtree; Delancy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crafton v. Crafton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

960
924
930
932
958

946
946
961
952
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–1498
_________________

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, PETITIONER v.
GREGORY A. CHRISTIAN, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF MONTANA

[April 20, 2020]

CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the

Court.

For  nearly  a  century,  the  Anaconda  Copper  Smelter  in
Butte, Montana contaminated an area of over 300 square
miles  with  arsenic  and  lead.  Over  the  past  35  years,  the
Environmental  Protection  Agency  has  worked  with  the
current owner of the smelter, Atlantic Richfield Company,
to implement a cleanup plan under the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980.  EPA projects that the cleanup will continue through
2025.

A  group  of  98  landowners  sued  Atlantic  Richfield  in
Montana  state  court  for  common  law  nuisance,  trespass,
and strict liability.  Among other remedies, the landowners
sought  restoration  damages,  which  under  Montana  law
must be spent on rehabilitation of the property.  The land-
owners’  proposed  restoration  plan  includes  measures  be-
yond  those  the  agency  found  necessary  to  protect  human
health and the environment.

We consider whether the Act strips the Montana courts
of  jurisdiction  over  the  landowners’  claim  for  restoration
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case information, and the introduction to the Court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>