<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

25

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

The  Court  also  overstates  the  effects  of  enforcing  the
plain meaning of the Constitution in this case.  There is no
dispute that Arizona may continue to use its Commission
to  draw  lines  for  state  legislative  elections.    The  repre-
sentatives chosen in those elections will then be responsi-
ble for congressional redistricting as members of the state
legislature, so the work of the Commission will continue to
influence Arizona’s federal representation.

Moreover,  reading  the  Elections  Clause  to  require  the
involvement  of  the  legislature  will  not  affect  most  other
redistricting  commissions.    As  the  majority  notes,  many
States  have  commissions  that  play  an  “auxiliary  role”  in
congressional  redistricting.    Ante,  at  8,  and  nn.  8–9.    But
in  these  States,  unlike  in  Arizona,  the  legislature  retains
primary  authority  over  congressional  redistricting.    See
Brief  for  National  Conference  of  State  Legislatures  as
Amicus Curiae 3–17.

The majority also points to a scattered array of election-
related  laws  and  constitutional  provisions  enacted  via
popular  lawmaking  that  it  claims  would  be  “endangered”
by interpreting the Elections Clause to mean what it says.
Ante,  at  33.    Reviewing  the  constitutionality  of  these  far-
flung  provisions  is  well  outside  the  scope  of  this  case.
Suffice it to say that none of them purports to do what the
Arizona Constitution does here: set up an unelected, unac-
countable  institution  that  permanently  and  totally  dis-
places  the  legislature  from  the  redistricting  process.
“[T]his wolf comes as a wolf.”  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S.
654, 699 (1988) (SCALIA, J., dissenting).

Absent from the majority’s portrayal of the high motives
that inspired the Arizona Commission is any discussion of
——————

could  choose  a  20-year-old  Congressman,  a  25-year-old  Senator,  or  a
foreign  President.    But  see  Art. I,  §2,  cl. 2;  §3,  cl. 3;  Art. II,  §1,  cl. 5.
Term  Limits  instead  relied  on  analysis  of  the  text,  structure,  and
history  of  the  Constitution—all  factors  that  cut  strongly  against  the
majority’s position today.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's interpretation of the Elections Clause and provides legal reasoning to support its position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
Opinion of the Court

of  Health  and  Human  Services,  Labor,  and  the  Treasury
(Departments)—which jointly administer the relevant ACA
provision1—exempted certain employers who have religious
and conscientious objections from this agency-created man-
date.  The  Third  Circuit  concluded  that  the  Departments
lacked statutory authority to promulgate these exemptions
and  affirmed  the  District  Court’s  nationwide  preliminary
injunction.  This decision was erroneous.  We hold that the
Departments had the authority to provide exemptions from
the  regulatory  contraceptive  requirements  for  employers
with religious and conscientious objections.  We accordingly
reverse the Third Circuit’s judgment and remand with in-
structions  to  dissolve  the  nationwide  preliminary  injunc-
tion.

I

The ACA’s contraceptive mandate—a product of agency
regulation—has existed for approximately nine years.  Lit-
igation surrounding that requirement has lasted nearly as
long.  In light of this extensive history, we begin by summa-
rizing the relevant background.

A
The  ACA  requires  covered  employers  to  offer  “a  group
health plan or group health insurance coverage” that pro-
vides  certain  “minimum  essential  coverage.”    26  U. S. C.
§5000A(f )(2);  §§4980H(a),  (c)(2).    Employers  who  do  not
comply  face  hefty  penalties,  including  potential  fines  of
$100 per day for each affected employee.  §§4980D(a)–(b);
see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682,
696–697 (2014).  These cases concern regulations promul-
gated under a provision of the ACA that requires covered
employers  to  provide  women  with  “preventive  care  and
screenings”  without  “any  cost  sharing  requirements.”  42

——————

1 See 42 U. S. C. §300gg–92; 29 U. S. C. §1191c; 26 U. S. C. §9833.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the "Opinion of the Court" in the case of *Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania*.  It sets the stage for the legal arguments by outlining the background of the case and the relevant legal provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

15

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

“unavoidable” for purposes of §22(b)(1) only where there is
no  feasible  alternative  design  that  would  eliminate  the
side  effect  of  the  vaccine  without  compromising  its  cost
and utility.  See supra, at 7.  The majority’s premise—that
side  effects  stemming  from  a  vaccine’s  design  are  always
avoidable—is thus belied by the statutory text and legisla-
tive history of §22(b)(1).  And because its starting premise
is  invalid,  its  conclusion—that  the  design  of  a  vaccine  is
not subject to challenge in a tort action—is also necessar-
ily invalid.

The  majority’s  reading  suffers  from  an  even  more  fun-
damental  defect.  If  Congress  intended  to  exempt  vaccine
manufacturers  categorically  from  all  design  defect  liabil-
ity,  it  more  logically  would  have  provided:  “No  vaccine
manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages
arising  from  a  vaccine-related  injury  or  death  associated
with the administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988,
if the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied
by  proper  directions  and  warnings.”    There  would  have
been  no  need  for  Congress  to  include  the  additional  13
words  “the  injury  or  death  resulted  from  side  effects  that
were  unavoidable  even  though.”  See  TRW  Inc.  v.  An-
drews,  534  U. S.  19,  31  (2001)  (noting  “cardinal  principle
of  statutory  construction  that  a  statute  ought,  upon  the
whole,  to  be  so  construed  that,  if  it  can  be  prevented,  no
clause,  sentence,  or  word  shall  be  superfluous,  void,  or
insignificant” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U. S. 431 (2005),
this  Court  considered  an  analogous  situation  where  an
express  pre-emption  provision  stated  that  certain  States
“ ‘shall  not  impose  or  continue  in  effect  any  requirements
for  labeling  or  packaging  in  addition  to  or  different  from
those required under this subchapter.’ ”  Id., at 436 (quot-
ing  7  U. S. C.  §136v(b)  (2000  ed.)).    The  Bates  Court
stated:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations to other cases, and analysis of statutory language.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

GORSUCH, J., concurring

the same accommodation to Mr. Phillips when he refused
a  customer’s  request  that  would  have  required  him  to
violate his religious beliefs.  Ante, at 14–16.  As the Court
also  explains,  the  only  reason  the  Commission  seemed  to
supply  for  its  discrimination  was  that  it  found  Mr.  Phil-
lips’s  religious  beliefs  “offensive.”    Ibid.    That  kind  of
judgmental dismissal of a sincerely held religious belief is,
of course, antithetical to the First Amendment and cannot
begin to satisfy strict scrutiny.  The Constitution protects
not just popular religious exercises from the condemnation
of  civil  authorities.
It  protects  them  all.    Because  the
Court  documents  each  of  these  points  carefully  and  thor-
oughly, I am pleased to join its opinion in full.

The only wrinkle is this.  In the face of so much evidence
suggesting  hostility  toward  Mr.  Phillips’s  sincerely  held
religious  beliefs,  two  of  our  colleagues  have  written  sepa-
rately  to  suggest  that  the  Commission  acted  neutrally
toward  his  faith  when  it  treated  him  differently  from  the
other  bakers—or  that  it  could  have  easily  done  so  con-
sistent  with  the  First  Amendment.    See  post,  at  4–5,  and
n. 4  (GINSBURG,  J.,  dissenting);  ante,  at  2–3,  and  n.
(KAGAN,  J.,  concurring).    But,  respectfully,  I  do  not  see
how we might rescue the Commission from its error.

A full view of the facts helps point the way to the prob-
lem.  Start with William Jack’s case.  He approached three
bakers  and  asked  them  to  prepare  cakes  with  messages
disapproving  same-sex  marriage  on  religious  grounds.
App.  233,  243,  252.    All  three  bakers  refused  Mr.  Jack’s
request,  stating  that  they  found  his  request  offensive  to
their secular convictions.  Id., at 231, 241, 250.  Mr. Jack
responded  by  filing  complaints  with  the  Colorado  Civil
Id.,  at  230,  240,  249.    He  pointed  to
Rights  Division.
Colorado’s  Anti-Discrimination  Act,  which  prohibits  dis-
crimination  against  customers  in  public  accommodations
because  of  religious  creed,  sexual  orientation,  or  certain
other  traits.  See  ibid.;  Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §24–34–601(2)(a)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of *Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n*.  It discusses the case and the Court's reasoning, focusing on the protection of religious beliefs under the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
908

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5522.  Perry  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5523.  Moya-Breteon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  839.

No.  09–5524.  Tipton  v.  Carlton,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.  Appx.  213.

No. 09–5525.  Toaz v. United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–5526.  Wilson v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  198.

No.  09–5527.  Van  Swait  v.  Evans,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5528.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  524.

No.  09–5529.  Mooney  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  303  Fed.  Appx.  737.

No.  09–5530.  Moore  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  187.

No. 09–5531.  Mohammad-Omar v.  United States.  C. A. 4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  259.

No. 09–5532.  Morris v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  121.

No.  09–5534.  Clark  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  771.

No.  09–5535.  Crum v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App. Fla.,  1st  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  7  So.  3d  537.

No.  09–5536.  Smithback  v.  Crain  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5537.  Rivera-Garcia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  29.

No.  09–5538.  Fowler  v.  Kelly,  Superintendent,  Missis
sippi  State  Penitentiary.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 09–893
_________________

AT&T MOBILITY LLC, PETITIONER v. VINCENT

CONCEPCION ET UX.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 27, 2011]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides
that  an  arbitration  provision  “shall  be  valid,  irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  9 U. S. C. §2.
The  question  here  is  whether  California’s  Discover  Bank
rule,  see  Discover  Bank  v.  Superior  Ct.,  36  Cal.  4th  148,
113 P. 3d 1100 (2005), is a “groun[d] . . . for the revocation
of any contract.”

It would be absurd to suggest that §2 requires only that
a  defense  apply  to  “any  contract.”    If  §2  means  anything,
it is that courts cannot refuse to enforce arbitration agree-
ments because of a state public policy against arbitration,
even  if  the  policy  nominally  applies  to  “any  contract.”
There  must  be  some  additional  limit  on  the  contract  de-
fenses  permitted  by  §2.    Cf.  ante,  at  17  (opinion  of  the
Court) (state law may not require procedures that are “not
arbitration as envisioned by the FAA” and “lac[k] its bene-
fits”);  post,  at  5  (BREYER,  J.,  dissenting)  (state  law  may
require  only  procedures  that  are  “consistent  with  the  use
of arbitration”).

I write separately to explain how I would find that limit
in  the  FAA’s  text.    As  I  would  read  it,  the  FAA  requires
that an agreement to arbitrate be enforced unless a party
successfully  challenges  the  formation  of  the  arbitration
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

BREYER, J., dissenting

students to accept particular religious beliefs and to engage
in particular religious practices.

The first school, Bangor Christian, has “educational ob-
jectives”  that  include  “ ‘lead[ing]  each  unsaved  student  to
trust  Christ  as  his/her  personal  savior  and  then  to  follow
Christ  as  Lord  of  his/her  life,’ ”  and  “ ‘develop[ing]  within
each student a Christian world view and Christian philoso-
phy of life.’ ”  Id., at 84.  Bangor Christian “does not believe
there is any way to separate the religious instruction from
the academic instruction.”  Id., at 85.  Academic instruction
and religious instruction are thus “completely intertwined.”
Ibid.  Bangor Christian teaches in its social studies class,
for example, “ ‘that God has ordained evangelism.’ ”  Id., at
87.  And in science class, students learn that atmospheric
layers “ ‘are evidence of God’s good design.’ ”  Id., at 89.

The second school, Temple Academy, similarly promotes
religion through academics.  Its “educational philosophy ‘is
based on a thoroughly Christian and Biblical world view.’ ”
Id.,  at  92.    The  school’s  “objectives”  include  “ ‘foster[ing]
within each student an attitude of love and reverence of the
Bible as the infallible, inerrant, and authoritative Word of
God.’ ”  Ibid.  And the school’s “ ‘academic growth’ objectives”
include “ ‘provid[ing] a sound academic education in which
the  subjec[t]  areas  are  taught  from  a  Christian  point  of
view,’ ” and “ ‘help[ing] every student develop a truly Chris-
tian  world  view  by  integrating  studies  with  the  truths  of
Scripture.’ ”  Id., at 93.  Like Bangor Christian, Temple “pro-
vides a ‘biblically-integrated education,’ which means that
the Bible is used in every subject that is taught.”  Id., at 96.
In mathematics classes, for example, students learn that “a
creator designed the universe such that ‘one plus one is al-
ways going to be two.’ ”  Ibid.

The  differences  between  this  kind  of  education  and  a
purely civic, public education are important.  “The religious
education and formation of students is the very reason for
the existence of most private religious schools.”  Our Lady
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 596 U.S. ____ (2022). It delves into the educational philosophies of two private religious schools and contrasts them with a purely civic, public education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

31

THOMAS, J., dissenting

source in one of Congress’ enumerated powers or the legis-
lative powers of the States.  Congress’ spending power can-
not secure rights by law.

IV

The contractual nature of spending conditions was taken
as a given until the second half of the 20th century, when
individuals first began to bring §1983 suits premised on vi-
olations  of  conditions  contained  within  spending  statutes
(usually, the Social Security Act).  From the enactment of
§1983’s predecessor statute in 1871 to the Court’s decision
in Thiboutot in 1980, this Court had never held that §1983
was  available  to  redress  any  and  all  violations  of  federal
legislation.  Indeed, there were almost “no square holdings”
concerning the precise scope of the statutory rights vindica-
ble by §1983.  Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organi-
zation,  441  U. S.  600,  645  (1979)  (Powell,  J.,  concurring);
see  also  Eisen  v.  Eastman,  421  F. 2d  560,  561–566  (CA2
1969) (Friendly, J.).  Perhaps the only such square holding
was that of Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U. S. 68 (1900),
which  narrowly  construed  §1983’s  predecessor  statute  to
“refer to civil rights only,” making it “inapplicable” in a suit
based on the federal patent laws.  Id., at 72.12

——————

12 This  civil  rights  connection  was  not  arbitrary.    Section  1983  origi-
nated in the Enforcement Act of 1871, which Congress “passed for the
express purpose of ‘enforc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.’ ”  Thiboutot, 448 U. S., at 25, n. 15 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting
17  Stat.  13;  alteration  in  original).    Moreover,  the  original  text  of  the
statute referred only to rights “secured by the Constitution of the United
States,” 17 Stat. 13, the words “and laws” being added as part of the gen-
eral 1874 revision of the federal statutes.  Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C.
§1983.    Under  the  circumstances,  there  is  substantial  reason  to  doubt
that  Congress  fundamentally  transformed  a  mechanism  to  enforce  the
Reconstruction Amendments into a freestanding right of action to reme-
diate the violation of any federal statute, even those enacted beyond Con-
gress’ civil rights enforcement powers.  Importantly, if statutory §1983
actions  were  confined  to  laws  enacted  under  Congress’  Reconstruction
Amendments enforcement powers—under which Congress may directly
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 599 U.S. ____ (2023).  It delves into the interpretation of Section 1983 and its applicability to spending conditions imposed by Congress.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Note:  All  undesignated  references  herein  to  the  United  States  Code

are to the 2006 edition.

Cases reported before page 801 are those decided with opinions of the
Court or decisions per  curiam.  Cases reported on page 801 et  seq.  are
those in which orders were entered.

Page

1111

AAFIS, Inc.; S & DTrading Academy, LLC v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
886

Aaron v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1051

Abbey v. United States
1089

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abbott v. Abbott
1123

Abbott v. DeKalb  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909

Abdullah v. Brewer
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
988

Abdullahi; Pﬁzer Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1051

Abebe v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
808

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abercrombie v. Department of Agriculture
1154

Abernathy; Cleveland v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Ablest Stafﬁng Services; Falso v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Abner v. Probate Court of Mobile
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

Abraham v. Delaware  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Abraham v. Heinemann
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

Abraham; Nicoloudakis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abrams v. Department of Veterans Affairs
864

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Ga.  . . . .  1025,1139

1050

Abshire; Louisiana v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1143

Abu-Jamal; Beard v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

Accent Builders, Inc.; United States ex rel. Darian v.  . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Acevedo; de Jesus v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

Achobe v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Acosta v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920

Acosta v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Acuna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

1114

Adair v. McGuireWoods LLP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Adam v. Salazar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1100

Adames v. Beretta U. S. A. Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Adamo v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adams; Cook v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

vii
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and page number.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

enforcement efforts.  See Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S.
598, 607–608 (1985).  That is because the Executive Branch
(i)  invariably  lacks  the  resources  to  arrest  and  prosecute
every  violator  of  every  law  and  (ii)  must  constantly  react
and  adjust  to  the  ever-shifting  public-safety  and  public-
welfare needs of the American people.

This  case  illustrates  the  point.  As  the  District  Court
found, the Executive Branch does not possess the resources
necessary to arrest or remove all of the noncitizens covered
by  §1226(c)  and  §1231(a)(2).  That  reality  is  not  an
anomaly—it  is  a  constant.  For  the  last  27  years  since
§1226(c)  and  §1231(a)(2)  were  enacted  in  their  current
form, all five Presidential administrations have determined
that  resource  constraints  necessitated  prioritization  in
making immigration arrests.

In light of inevitable resource constraints and regularly
changing  public-safety  and  public-welfare  needs,  the
Executive  Branch  must  balance  many  factors  when
devising arrest and prosecution policies.  That complicated
balancing process in turn leaves courts without meaningful
  Cf.  Heckler  v.
standards  for  assessing  those  policies.
Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 830–832 (1985); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508
U. S.  182,  190–192  (1993).    Therefore,  in  both  Article  III
cases  and Administrative  Procedure  Act  cases,  this  Court
has  consistently  recognized  that  federal  courts  are
generally not the proper forum for resolving claims that the
Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more
prosecutions.  See Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 619; cf. Heckler,
470 U. S., at 831 (recognizing the “general unsuitability for
judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement”);
ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 283 (1987) (“it
is entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be the
subject of judicial review”).3

——————

3 Also, the plaintiffs here are States, and federal courts must remain
mindful  of  bedrock  Article  III  constraints  in  cases  brought  by  States
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Executive Branch's discretion in immigration enforcement. It provides legal arguments and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

Opinion of the Court

have  gone  unchallenged  by  Alabama  in  any  event.    See
Cooper, 581 U. S., at 309.  Nor is there a basis to upset the
District Court’s legal conclusions.  The Court faithfully ap-
plied our precedents and correctly determined that, under
existing law, HB1 violated §2.

III
  The heart of these cases is not about the law as it exists.
It  is  about  Alabama’s  attempt  to  remake  our  §2  jurispru-
dence anew.
  The  centerpiece  of  the  State’s  effort  is  what  it  calls  the
“race-neutral benchmark.”  The theory behind it is this: Us-
ing modern computer technology, mapmakers can now gen-
erate millions of possible districting maps for a given State.
The maps can  be  designed  to  comply with traditional dis-
tricting  criteria  but  to  not  consider  race.    The  mapmaker
can determine how many majority-minority districts exist
in each map, and can then calculate the median or average
number  of  majority-minority  districts  in  the  entire  multi-
million-map  set.    That  number  is  called  the  race-neutral
benchmark.
  The State contends that this benchmark should serve as
the  point of  comparison  in  §2  cases.   The  benchmark, the
State says, was derived from maps that were “race-blind”—
maps  that  cannot  have  “deni[ed]  or  abridge[d]”  anyone’s
right to vote “on account of race” because they never took
race into “account” in the first place.  52 U. S. C. §10301(a).
Courts in §2 cases should therefore compare the number of
majority-minority districts in the State’s plan to the bench-
mark.  If those numbers are similar—if the State’s map “re-
sembles”  the  benchmark  in  this  way—then,  Alabama  ar-
gues,  the  State’s  map  also  cannot  have  “deni[ed]  or
abridge[d]” anyone’s right to vote “on account of race.”  Ibid.
  Alabama  contends  that  its  approach  should  be  adopted
for two reasons.  First, the State argues that a race-neutral
benchmark best matches the text of the Voting Rights Act.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and a case involving Alabama's redistricting plan.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

324

UNITED STATES v. BAJAKAJIAN

Opinion of the Court

opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O(cid:146)Connor and Scalia, JJ., joined,
post, p. 344.

Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor Gen-
eral Dellinger, Acting Solicitor General Waxman, Acting
Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral Dreeben, and Kathleen A. Felton.

James E. Blatt argued the cause and ﬁled a brief for

respondent.*

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Hosep Bajakajian attempted to leave the
United States without reporting, as required by federal law,
that he was transporting more than $10,000 in currency.
Federal law also provides that a person convicted of willfully
violating this reporting requirement shall forfeit to the Gov-
18
ernment “any property . . . involved in such offense.”
U. S. C. § 982(a)(1). The question in this case is whether for-
feiture of the entire $357,144 that respondent failed to de-
clare would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. We hold that it would, because full forfeiture
of respondent’s currency would be grossly disproportional to
the gravity of his offense.

I

On June 9, 1994, respondent, his wife, and his two daugh-
ters were waiting at Los Angeles International Airport to
board a ﬂight to Italy; their ﬁnal destination was Cyprus.
Using dogs trained to detect currency by its smell, customs
inspectors discovered some $230,000 in cash in the Bajakaji-
ans’ checked baggage. A customs inspector approached re-
spondent and his wife and told them that they were required
to report all money in excess of $10,000 in their possession
or in their baggage. Respondent said that he had $8,000 and

*Ronald D. Maines ﬁled a brief for the Clarendon Foundation as amicus

curiae urging afﬁrmance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U76

[09-06-00 18:29:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

102

HOPKINS v. REEVES

Stevens, J., dissenting

spondent intended to kill his victim, or under Tison v. Ari-
zona, 481 U. S. 137 (1987), that he had the moral equivalent
of such an intent. The rationale for Nebraska’s general rule
that second-degree murder is not a lesser included offense of
felony murder does not, therefore, apply to this case.2 To
be faithful to the teaching of Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625
(1980), the Court should therefore hold that respondent was
entitled to the requested instruction.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

2 Moreover, a recent Nebraska Supreme Court decision suggests that
Nebraska law may be in ﬂux on the question whether second-degree mur-
der is a lesser included offense of felony murder. Only a few weeks ago,
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a jury verdict ﬁnding a defendant
guilty of second-degree murder constituted an implied acquittal of the
crime of ﬁrst-degree murder, as deﬁned in § 28–303 of Nebraska’s criminal
code, and therefore barred a second prosecution under that section for
either felony murder or premeditated murder. Nebraska v. White, 254
In reaching that holding the Court
Neb. 566, 577 N. W. 2d 741 (1998).
explained: “The conduct prohibited by § 28–303 is ﬁrst degree murder.
Premeditated murder and felony murder are not denominated in Nebras-
ka’s statutes as separate and independent offenses, but only ways in which
criminal liability for ﬁrst degree murder may be charged and prosecuted.”
Id., at 577, 577 N. W. 2d, at 748. The difference between a charge of
premeditated murder and a charge of felony murder “is a difference in the
State’s theory of how [the defendant] committed the single offense of ﬁrst
degree murder. . . . Therefore, we hold that the crime of ﬁrst degree mur-
der, as deﬁned in § 28–303, constitutes one offense even though there may
be alternate theories by which criminal liability for ﬁrst degree murder
may be charged and prosecuted in Nebraska.”
Ibid. Given this holding,
the Nebraska Supreme Court may conclude that second-degree murder is
a lesser included offense of both premeditated and felony murder, as they
are both part of the “one offense” of ﬁrst-degree murder.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens in the case Hopkins v. Reeves. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

644

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Souter, J., dissenting

Wickard, however,
it had certainly been no less obvious
that “mining” practices could substantially affect commerce,
even though Carter Coal Co., supra, had held mining regu-
lation beyond the national commerce power. When we try
to fathom the difference between the two cases, it is clear
that they did not go in different directions because the
Carter Coal Court could not understand a causal connection
that the Wickard Court could grasp; the difference, rather,
turned on the fact that the Court in Carter Coal had a
reason for trying to maintain its categorical, formalistic
distinction, while that reason had been abandoned by the
time Wickard was decided. The reason was laissez-faire
economics, the point of which was to keep government in-
terference to a minimum. See Lopez, supra, at 605–606
(Souter, J., dissenting). The Court in Carter Coal was
still trying to create a laissez-faire world out of the 20th-
century economy, and formalistic commercial distinctions
were thought to be useful instruments in achieving that ob-
ject. The Court in Wickard knew it could not do any such
thing and in the aftermath of the New Deal had long since
stopped attempting the impossible. Without the animating
economic theory, there was no point in contriving formal-
isms in a war with Chief Justice Marshall’s conception of the
commerce power.

If we now ask why the formalistic economic/noneconomic
distinction might matter today, after its rejection in Wick-
ard, the answer is not that the majority fails to see causal
connections in an integrated economic world. The answer
is that in the minds of the majority there is a new animating
theory that makes categorical formalism seem useful again.
Just as the old formalism had value in the service of an
in serving a
economic conception, the new one is useful
conception of federalism.
It is the instrument by which
assertions of national power are to be limited in favor of
preserving a supposedly discernible, proper sphere of state
autonomy to legislate or refrain from legislating as the in-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Souter. It discusses the Wickard v. Filburn case and its implications for the Commerce Clause. The text is sequential and coherent, indicating it is part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

388

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of Stevens, J.

Our disagreement with the Court about the precise
meaning of the phrase “contrary to,” and the word “unrea-
sonable,” is, of course, important, but should affect only a
narrow category of cases. The simplest and ﬁrst deﬁnition
of “contrary to” as a phrase is “in conﬂict with.” Webster’s

AEDPA’s “unreasonable application of ” has the same meaning as Justice
Thomas’ “ ‘patently unreasonable’ ” standard mentioned in his dictum in
Wright.
505 U. S., at 291 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 422
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). To the extent the “broader debate” in
Wright touched upon the Court’s novel distinction today between what is
“wrong” and what is “unreasonable,” it was in the context of a discussion
not about the standard of review habeas courts should use for law-
application questions, but about whether a rule is “new” or “old” such
that Teague’s retroactivity rule would bar habeas relief; Justice Thomas
contended that Teague barred habeas “whenever the state courts have
interpreted old precedents reasonably, not [as Justice O’Connor sug-
gested] only when they have done so ‘properly.’ ”
505 U. S., at 291–292,
n. 8. Teague, of course, as Justice O’Connor correctly pointed out, “did
not establish a standard of review at all,” 505 U. S., at 303–304; rather
than instructing a court how to review a claim, it simply asks, in absolute
terms, whether a rule was clear at the time of a state-court decision. We
thus do not think Wright “conﬁrms” anything about the meaning of
§ 2254(d)(1), which is, as our division reﬂects, anything but “clear.” Post,
at 412.

As for the other bases for the Court’s view, the only two speciﬁc cita-
tions to the legislative history upon which it relies, post, at 408, do no
more than beg the question. One merely quotes the language of the stat-
ute without elaboration, and the other goes to slightly greater length in
stating that state-court judgments must be upheld unless “unreasonable.”
Neither sheds any light on what the content of the hypothetical category
of “decisions” that are wrong but nevertheless not “unreasonable.” Fi-
nally, while we certainly agree with the Court, post, at 403, that AEDPA
wrought substantial changes in habeas law, see supra, at 386; see also,
e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b) (1994 ed., Supp. III) (strictly limiting second or
successive petitions); § 2244(d) (1-year statute of limitations for habeas
petitions); § 2254(e)(2) (limiting availability of evidentiary hearings on
habeas); §§ 2263, 2266 (strict deadlines for habeas court rulings), there is
an obvious fallacy in the assumption that because the statute changed
pre-existing law in some respects, it must have rendered this speciﬁc
change here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Williams v. Taylor*. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
52

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

many possible explanations for what happened in the Sen-
ate.  The rejection of the proviso could have been due to a
general objection to religious exemptions, but it could also
have been based on any of the following grounds: opposition
to  this  particular  exemption,  the  belief  that  conscientious
objectors  were  already  protected  by  the  Free  Exercise
Clause, a belief that military service fell within the public
safety carveout, or the view that Congress should be able to
decide whether to grant or withhold such exemptions based
on its assessment of what national security required at par-
ticular times.

*

*

*

In sum, based on the text of the Free Exercise Clause and
evidence about the original understanding of the free-exer-
cise right, the case for Smith fails to overcome the more nat-
ural reading of the text.  Indeed, the case against Smith is
very convincing.

V
That  conclusion  cannot  end  our  analysis.    “We  will  not
overturn a past decision unless there are strong grounds for
doing so,” Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employ-
ees, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 34), but at the same
time,  stare  decisis  is  “not  an  inexorable  command.”    Ibid.
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    It  “is  at  its  weakest
when we interpret the Constitution because our interpreta-
tion can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by
overruling our prior decisions.”  Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S.
203, 235 (1997).  And it applies with “perhaps least force of
all  to  decisions  that  wrongly  denied  First  Amendment
rights.”  Janus, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 34); see also
Federal  Election  Comm’n  v.  Wisconsin  Right  to  Life,  Inc.,
551 U. S. 449, 500 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (“This Court has not hesitated to
overrule  decisions  offensive  to  the  First  Amendment  (a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion. It contains legal arguments and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 321 (1998)

355

Kennedy, J., dissenting

purposes of the ban on excessive ﬁnes was to prevent the
King from assessing unpayable ﬁnes to keep his enemies in
debtor’s prison. See Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt.,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U. S. 257, 267 (1989); 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373
(1769) (“[C]orporal punishment, or a stated imprisonment,
. . . is better than an excessive ﬁne, for that amounts to im-
prisonment for life. And this is the reason why ﬁnes in the
.”).
king’s court are frequently denominated ransoms .
Concern with imprisonment may explain why the Excessive
Fines Clause is coupled with, and follows right after, the
Excessive Bail Clause. While the concern is not implicated
here—for of necessity the money is there to satisfy the for-
feiture—the Court’s restrictive approach could subvert this
purpose. Under the Court’s holding, legislators may rely on
mandatory prison sentences in lieu of ﬁnes. Drug lords will
be heartened by this, knowing the prison terms will fall upon
their couriers while leaving their own wallets untouched.

.

At the very least, today’s decision will encourage legisla-
tures to take advantage of another avenue the majority
leaves open. The majority subjects this forfeiture to scru-
tiny because it is in personam, but it then suggests most in
rem forfeitures (and perhaps most civil forfeitures) may not
be ﬁnes at all. Ante, at 331, 340–341, and n. 16; but see ante,
at 331, n. 6. The suggestion, one might note, is inconsistent
or at least in tension with Austin v. United States, 509 U. S.
602 (1993).
In any event, these remarks may encourage a
legislative shift from in personam to in rem forfeitures,
avoiding mens rea as a predicate and giving owners fewer
procedural protections. By invoking the Excessive Fines
Clause with excessive zeal, the majority may in the long run
encourage Congress to circumvent it.

IV

The majority’s holding may not only jeopardize a vast
range of ﬁnes but also leave countless others unchecked by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1038

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 27, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1273. American Steamship Owners Mutual Pro-
tection and Indemnity Assn., Inc., et al. v. United States
Lines, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 197 F. 3d 631.

No. 99–1276. Greene v. Douglas et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1322.

No. 99–1280. Fisher v. Michigan. Cir. Ct. Oakland County,

Mich. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1297. Mensah v. St. Joseph County Family Inde-
pendence Agency et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 187 F. 3d 636.

No. 99–1298. Ware v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1300. Coleman v. Stewart et al. Ct. Civ. App. Ala.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 777 So. 2d 329.

No. 99–1302. Tuckness v. Henderson, Postmaster Gen-
eral, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 194 F. 3d 1321.

No. 99–1318. Simmons v. Wetherall et al. Sup. Ct. Conn.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1338. Smith et al. v. Harris County et al. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 241.

No. 99–1359. Ferreira v. Idaho. Ct. App. Idaho. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 133 Idaho 474, 988 P. 2d 700.

No. 99–1364. Rainy Lake One Stop, Inc., et al. v. Mari-
gold Foods, Inc., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 195 F. 3d 430.

No. 99–1409. City of Kansas City v. Harmon et al. C. A.

8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 321.

No. 99–7489. Parker v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Po-
tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 188 F. 3d 923.

No. 99–7537. Feagin, aka Amon v. United States. C. A.

11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 543.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, court origins, and citations to lower court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 290 (2010)

307

Stevens, J., dissenting

App.  327,  and  was  “functioning,  at  most,”  in  this  borderline
range,  id.,  at  328.  Wood  was  “reading  on  less  than  a  3rd
grade  level.”  Id.,  at  327.  His  former  special  education
teacher testiﬁed during postconviction review that Wood was
classiﬁed as “educable mentally retarded” by the local school
system.  Id., at 403.  In short, Wood has the type of signiﬁ
cant mental deﬁcits that we recognize as “inherently mitigat
ing,” Tennard v.  Dretke, 542 U. S. 274, 287 (2004).3

Despite  the  powerful  mitigating  value  of  this  evidence,
“[n]o  evidence  of  Wood’s  mental  retardation  was  ever  pre
sented to the jury.”  542 F. 3d 1281, 1314 (CA11 2008) (Bar
kett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Counsel
was clearly aware that this evidence existed, id., at 1318, but
chose not to investigate it beyond the conclusions outlined in
Dr.  Kirkland’s  report,  App.  283.  In  the  Court’s  view,  the
record  reasonably  supports  the  state  court’s  conclusion  that
“counsel  made  a  strategic  decision  not  to  inquire  further
into”  Wood’s  mental  deﬁciencies,  ante,  at  303.  Although  I
agree  with  the  majority  that  the  failure  was  the  result  of  a
“decision,”  albeit  a  hasty  one,  the  Court  regrettably  fails  to
consider whether the decision was also “strategic” as a mat
ter of fact.

A decision cannot be fairly characterized as “strategic” un
less  it  is  a  conscious  choice  between  two  legitimate  and  ra
tional alternatives.  It must be borne of deliberation and not
happenstance,  inattention,  or  neglect.  See  Wiggins,  539
U. S., at 526 (concluding that counsel’s “failure to investigate
thoroughly resulted from inattention, not reasoned strategic
judgment”);  Strickland,  466  U. S.,  at  690–691.  Moreover,
“a  cursory  investigation”  does  not  “automatically  justif[y]  a

3 Although  Wood  does  not  fall  within  the  class  of  individuals  we  identi
ﬁed  in  Atkins  v.  Virginia,  536  U. S.  304  (2002),  against  whom  the  death
penalty may not be constitutionally imposed, “the reality that [the defend
ant]  was  ‘borderline  mentally  retarded,’  might  well . . . inﬂuenc[e]  the
jury’s  appraisal  of  his  moral  culpability.”  Williams  v.  Taylor,  529  U. S.
362, 398 (2000).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the defendant's mental deficiencies and the failure of his counsel to present this evidence at trial.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxxx

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

Scott; Daniel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1028,1140

995

Scott v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scott v. Hanson
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  900,1139

Scott v. Hickman
828

Scott; Meister v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903

Scott v. Parker  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Scott; Ryan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852

Scott v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  928,962,1004,1036,1063

844

Scotti v. Corriveau  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
870

Scotti v. Scotti  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

Scoville v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Scriber v. Koppel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1064

Scribner; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

Scribner; Mabry v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

Scribner; Oloba-Aisony v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Scribner; Rosser v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scribner; Sang v.
1048

Scurlark v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

Scutt; Wood v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

S & D Trading Academy, LLC v. AAFIS, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
985

Seale; United States v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sealed Petitioner v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  871,1006

Sealed Petitioners v. United States
Sealtite Building Fasteners v. B&B Hardware, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . .
1113

1014

Seaman v. Astrue  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909

Seaman v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
993

Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Collier v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Thorogood v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Seattle; Andrews v.
850

Seay v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  844,1065

Sebelius; Dinkins v.
Sebelius; Frazier v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  947,1086

814

Sebelius; Marquardt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
892

Sebolt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sebuliba; Grifﬁn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  903,1066

Secarea v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  878,1065

938

Sechrest; McDaniel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Secretary of Agriculture; American Crystal Sugar Co. v.  . . . . . . .
1158

Secretary of Agriculture; Garcia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of Agriculture; McCarthy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  988,1116

932

Secretary of Agriculture; Swisher International, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  864,881,1065

Secretary of Air Force; White v.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,1006
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, not the actual content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Texas gaming regulations as surrogate federal law on tribal
land.”  Ante,  at  17.    Texas,  the  Court  suggests,  should  be
happy to have gotten what had never been in question from
the beginning—a ban on games fully barred by the State.
That was its “half a loaf.”  Ibid.

In making this claim, the Court relies on cherry-picked
excerpts  from  the  resolution’s  preamble.  But  the  text  of
§107(a) of the Restoration Act rules out the Court’s analy-
sis.  Section 107(a) expressly states that the provision was
“enacted  in  accordance  with  the  tribe’s  request  in  Tribal
Resolution No. T.C.–02–86.”  101 Stat. 668–669 (emphasis
added).  As  noted,  the  resolution  contains  only  one  single
“request[ ]”—that Congress ban on tribal lands “all gaming,
gambling, lottery, or bingo, as defined by the laws and ad-
ministrative regulations of the State of Texas.”  App. to Pet.
for Cert. 123 (emphasis added).  The resolution’s preamble
makes up no part of this “request,” so the Court’s reliance
on it is misplaced.  “Or to put the point differently, operative
provisions  should  be  given  effect  as  operative  provisions,
and prologues as prologues.”  District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U. S. 570, 578, n. 3 (2008).3

In  sum,  §107(a)  of  the  Restoration  Act  is  best  read  to
mean that all of Texas’s gaming laws apply on the Tribe’s
reservation.

B
The Court  rejects this  straightforward interpretation of

——————

3 The Court accuses the dissent of “reshap[ing] the tribal resolution to
its liking” by focusing on the Tribe’s request in the resolution.  Ante, at
18, n. 4.  The reason we focus on the “request” in the tribal resolution is
because that is precisely what Congress directed us to do.  See 101 Stat.
668–669.  Of course, as this opinion elsewhere makes clear, the resolu-
tion’s preamble is emphatic in expressing the Tribe’s intent to prohibit
all gaming activities and its willingness to compromise on the application
of state gaming law in order to secure federal trust status.  See supra, at
3.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas*. It delves into the interpretation of a specific section of the Restoration Act and its implications for tribal gaming regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U41

[09-26-01 09:10:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN

276

FLORIDA v. J. L.

Kennedy, J., concurring

objective reason to believe that this tip had some particular
indicia of reliability.

If an informant places his anonymity at risk, a court can
consider this factor in weighing the reliability of the tip. An
instance where a tip might be considered anonymous but
nevertheless sufﬁciently reliable to justify a proportionate
police response may be when an unnamed person driving a
car the police ofﬁcer later describes stops for a moment and,
face to face, informs the police that criminal activity is occur-
ring. This too seems to be different from the tip in the pres-
ent case. See United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F. 2d
760 (CA9 1978).

Instant caller identiﬁcation is widely available to police,
and, if anonymous tips are proving unreliable and distracting
to police, squad cars can be sent within seconds to the loca-
tion of the telephone used by the informant. Voice record-
ing of telephone tips might, in appropriate cases, be used by
police to locate the caller.
It is unlawful to make false re-
ports to the police, e. g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 365.171(16) (Supp.
2000); Fla. Stat. § 817.49 (1994), and the ability of the police
to trace the identity of anonymous telephone informants may
be a factor which lends reliability to what, years earlier,
might have been considered unreliable anonymous tips.

These matters, of course, must await discussion in other

cases, where the issues are presented by the record.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy in the case of Florida v. J.L. It contains legal analysis and reasoning, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

23

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

that could be had under Bivens”); Minneci, 565 U. S., at 120
(rejecting  Bivens  action  for  Eighth  Amendment  violations
against employees of a privately operated federal prison be-
cause “state tort law authorizes adequate alternative dam-
ages  actions—actions  that  provide  both  significant  deter-
rence and compensation”).  By the Court’s logic, however,
the existence of any disciplinary framework, even if crafted
by the Executive Branch rather than Congress, and even if
wholly nonparticipatory and lacking any judicial review, is
sufficient to bar a court from recognizing a Bivens remedy.
That reasoning, as disturbing as it is wrong, marks yet an-
other  erosion  of  Bivens’  deterrent  function  in  the  law  en-
forcement sphere.8

C
The Court thinly veils its disapproval of Bivens, ending
its  opinion  by  citing  a  string  of  dissenting  opinions  and
single-Member  concurrences  by  various  Members  of  this
Court expressing criticisms of Bivens.  Ante, at 16–17.  But
the  Court  unmistakably  stops  short  of  overruling  Bivens
and its progeny, and appropriately so.  Even while declining
to extend Bivens to new contexts, this Court has reaffirmed
that it did “not inten[d] to cast doubt on the continued force,
or  even  the  necessity,  of  Bivens  in  the  search-and-seizure
context in which it arose.”  Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at  11).  Although  today’s  opinion  will  make  it  harder  for
plaintiffs  to  bring  a  successful  Bivens  claim,  even  in  the
Fourth  Amendment  context,  the  lower  courts  should  not
read it to render Bivens a dead letter.

That said, the Court plainly modifies the Bivens standard
in a manner that forecloses Boule’s claims and others like
them  that  should  be  permitted  under  this  Court’s  Bivens

——————

8 Even beyond its doctrinal innovations on the merits, the Court also
fashions a brand new, Bivens-specific procedural rule under which it ex-
cuses Egbert’s forfeiture of his argument that CBP’s administrative pro-
cess suffices as an alternative remedy.  Ante, at 12, n. 3.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses the Bivens case and its implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1002

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 6, 2000

529 U. S.

nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. Re-
ported below: 194 F. 3d 1311.

Miscellaneous Orders

In re Delbosque;

No. 99M69.
No. 99M70. Camoscio v. DeMinico et al.; and
No. 99M71. Palmer v. Barram, Administrator, General
Services Administration. Motions to direct the Clerk to ﬁle
petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.

No. 99–62. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,
Individually and as Next Friend for Her Minor Children,
et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 528 U. S. 1002.] Mo-
tion of Texas et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as
amici curiae and for divided argument granted.

No. 99–474. Natsios, Secretary of Administration and
Finance of Massachusetts, et al. v. National Foreign
Trade Council. C. A. 1st Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 528 U. S.
1018.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate
in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument
granted.

No. 99–478. Apprendi v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J.

[Cer-
tiorari granted, 528 U. S. 1018.] Motion of the Solicitor General
for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and
for divided argument granted.

No. 99–536. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc. C. A. 5th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 528 U. S. 985.] Motion
of petitioner to strike respondent’s lodging appendix denied. Mo-
tion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argu-
ment as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted to be
divided as follows: 20 minutes for petitioner and 10 minutes for
the Solicitor General.

No. 99–830. Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska,
et al. v. Carhart. C. A. 8th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 528 U. S.
1110.] Motion of Alan Ernest for leave to represent children un-
born and born alive denied. Motion of Alan Ernest for leave to
ﬁle a brief as amicus curiae denied.

No. 99–7889. Holmes v. Department of the Navy. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their statuses, likely from a legal document. It's not sequential narrative text and contains legal jargon.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xci

Page

848

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martin v. Cate
860

Martin v. Grayer
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Martin v. Holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Martin v. Luoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Martin v. Merrill
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Martin v. Reynolds  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Martin v. San Antonio
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

Martin v. Select Portfolio Servicing Holding Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . .
905

Martin v. Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  926,928,1130

Martin v. United States
860

Martin v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martin & Drought, Inc.; Kastner v.
1145

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martinez, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,968

939

Martinez v. Artus  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920

Martinez; Barnes v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1008

Martinez; Basciano v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martinez v. Beggs
1001

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martinez; Bryce v.
1076

Martinez; Christian Legal Soc., UC Hastings College of Law v.  . .
1076

Martinez; Hastings Christian Fellowship v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991

Martinez v. Masseri  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931

Martinez; Texas v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862,

Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865,882,911,926,1002,1004,1008,1060,1062,1150

1111

Martinez-Madera v. Holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martinez-Quezada v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1017

Martinez-Rodriguez v. Holder
990

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131

Martinez-Torres v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Martinez-Valdez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036

Martinez-Vasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948

Martini v. AT&T Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

Martini v. Godaddy.com Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Martini v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Martin’s Estate v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs
. . . . . . . .
804

Maryland; Asemani v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

Maryland; Bridgeford v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
884

Maryland; Farmer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Maryland; Marshner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

Maryland; Moment v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1063

Maryland Casualty Co.; Tradin Organics USA, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . .
846

Mary Washington Hospital; Wollstein v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Masarik v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mascorro-Chavarria v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
895

Mason v. Guzdek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  940,1102
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC.

Opinion of BREYER, J.

achievable,” both “without regard to cost.”  Ibid.

As  this  language  suggests,  the  Act’s  sponsors  had  rea-
sons  for  minimizing  the  EPA’s  investigation  of,  and  reli-
ance  upon,  cost-benefit  comparisons.    The  preparation  of
formal  cost-benefit  analyses  can  take  too  much  time,
thereby delaying regulation.  And the sponsors feared that
such analyses would emphasize easily quantifiable factors
over  more  qualitative  factors  (particularly  environmental
factors,  for  example,  the  value  of  preserving  non-
marketable species of fish).  See S. Rep., at 47.  Above all,
they  hoped  that  minimizing  the  use  of  cost-benefit  com-
parisons  would  force  the  development  of  cheaper  control
technologies; and doing so, whatever the initial inefficien-
cies,  would  eventually  mean  cheaper,  more  effective
cleanup.  See id., at 50–51.

Nonetheless,  neither  the  sponsors’  language  nor  the
underlying rationale requires the Act to be read in a way
that  would  forbid  cost-benefit  comparisons.  Any  such
total  prohibition  would  be  difficult  to  enforce,  for  every
real choice requires a decisionmaker to weigh advantages
against  disadvantages,  and  disadvantages  can  be  seen  in
terms of (often quantifiable) costs.  Moreover, an absolute
prohibition  would  bring  about  irrational  results.    As  the
respondents  themselves  say,  it  would  make  no  sense  to
require  plants  to  “spend  billions  to  save  one  more  fish  or
plankton.”  Brief  for  Respondents  Riverkeeper,  Inc.,  et al.
29.  That is so even if the industry might somehow afford
those billions.  And it is particularly so in an age of limited
resources  available  to  deal  with  grave  environmental
problems, where too much wasteful expenditure devoted to
one  problem  may  well  mean  considerably  fewer  resources
available  to  deal  effectively  with  other  (perhaps  more
serious) problems.

Thus  Senator  Muskie  used  nuanced  language,  which
one can read as leaving to the Agency a degree of author-
ity  to  make  cost-benefit  comparisons  in  a  manner  that  is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a law related to environmental protection. It delves into the legislative intent behind the law and analyzes the implications of cost-benefit comparisons in its application.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

938

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 22, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–1677.

Joos v. Joos. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–1708. Nakamura v. Chun et al.

Int. Ct. App. Haw.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 Haw. 523, 950 P. 2d 707.

No. 97–1710. Biofilm, Inc., et al. v. Boynton et al. Ct.

App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–1714. Coates v. Seaton. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari

denied.

No. 97–1718. Moss v. Garrity et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–1719. Rhett v. Carnegie Center Associates.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 290.

No. 97–1724. Barker v. Leeds et al. Ct. App. Ky. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–1728. Salguero v. California. App. Dept., Super.

Ct. Cal., Alameda County. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–1730. Deer Park Independent School District
et al. v. Harris County Appraisal District et al. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 1095.

No. 97–1731. Bowen v. Oistead et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 125 F. 3d 800.

No. 97–1738. May et al. v. Town of Mountain Village.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d
576.

No. 97–1750. Bryant, on Behalf of Bryant v. Caddo Par-
ish School Board. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 129 F. 3d 608.

No. 97–1755. Coffey v. Collester, Judge, Superior Court,
Morristown, New Jersey, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1153.

No. 97–1757. Moore v. Keep et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 928.

No. 97–1761. Federation of Connecticut Taxpayer Orga-
nizations et al. v. Burnham, Treasurer of Connecticut,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

Viking contends that these decisions require enforcement
of contractual provisions waiving the right to bring PAGA
actions because PAGA creates a form of class or collective
proceeding.  If  this  is  correct,  Iskanian’s  prohibition  on
PAGA waivers presents parties with the same impermissi-
ble choice as the rules we have invalidated in our decisions
concerning class- and collective-action waivers: Either arbi-
trate disputes using a form of class procedure, or do not ar-
bitrate at all.

Moriana  offers  a  very  different  characterization  of  the
statute.  As she sees it, any conflict between Iskanian and
the  FAA  is  illusory  because  PAGA  creates  nothing  more
than a substantive cause of action.  The only thing that is
distinctive about PAGA, she supposes, is that it allows em-
ployee  plaintiffs  to  increase  the  available  penalties  that
may be awarded in an action by proving additional predi-
cate violations of the Labor Code.  But that does not make
a PAGA action a class action, because those violations are
not  distinct  claims  belonging  to  distinct  individuals.    In-
stead,  they  are  predicates  for  expanded  liability  under  a
single  cause  of  action.   In  Moriana’s  view,  that  means  Is-
kanian invalidates waivers of substantive rights, and does
not  purport  to  invalidate  anything  that  can  meaningfully
be described as an “arbitration agreement.”4

——————

4 Moriana declines to defend one of the Iskanian court’s own bases for
holding that the FAA does not mandate enforcement of PAGA waivers.
The Iskanian court reasoned that a PAGA action lies outside the FAA’s
coverage entirely because §2 is limited to controversies “arising out of ”
the contract between the parties, 9 U. S. C. §2 (emphasis added), and a
PAGA  action  “is  not  a  dispute  between  an  employer  and  an  employee
arising out of their contractual relationship,” but “a dispute between an
employer and the state.”  Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59
Cal. 4th 348, 387, 327 P. 3d 129, 151 (2014).  We reject this argument.
Although the terms of §2 limit the FAA’s enforcement mandate to agree-
ments to arbitrate controversies that “arise out of ” the parties’ contrac-
tual relationship, disputes resolved in PAGA actions satisfy this require-
ment.  The contractual relationship between the parties is a but-for cause
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the intersection of the Fair Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the enforceability of waivers for PAGA actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

KAGAN, J., dissenting

in  American  life.  With  misaligned,  “Day-Glo”  colors  sug-
gesting  “artificiality  and  industrial  production,”  Warhol
portrayed the actress as a “consumer product.”  The Metro-
politan Museum of Art Guide 233 (2012); The Metropolitan
Museum of Art, Marilyn (2023) (online source archived at
https://www.supremecourt.gov).  And  in  so  doing,  he  “ex-
posed the deficiencies” of a “mass-media culture” in which
“such superficial icons loom so large.”  1 App. 208, 210 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  Out of a publicity photo
came both memorable portraiture and pointed social com-
mentary.

As with Marilyn, similarly with Prince.  In 1984, Vanity
Fair commissioned Warhol to create a portrait based on a
black-and-white  photograph  taken  by  noted  photographer
Lynn Goldsmith:

As he did in the Marilyn series, Warhol cropped the photo,
so that Prince’s head fills the whole frame: It thus becomes
“disembodied,” as if “magically suspended in space.”  Id., at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites artwork and discusses its social commentary, likely in the context of a larger legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

(Shaw II); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 920 (1995).1
  Because  non-predominance  is  a  longstanding  and  vital
feature of districting law, it must be honored in a Gingles
plaintiff ’s illustrative district.  If race predominated in the
creation of such a district, the plaintiff has failed to satisfy
both our precedent, which requires “reasonably configured”
districts,  and  the  terms  of  §2,  which  demand  equal  open-
ness.  Two Terms ago, we engaged in a close analysis of the
text of §2 and explained that its “key requirement” is that
the  political  processes  leading  to  nomination  or  election
must  be  “ ‘equally  open  to  participation’  by  members  of  a
protected class.”  Brnovich v. Democratic National Commit-
tee, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 6, 15) (quoting 52
U. S. C. §10301(b); emphasis deleted).  “[E]qual openness,”
we stressed, must be our “touchstone” in interpreting and
applying that provision.  594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15).
  When the race of one group is the predominant factor in
the creation of a district, that district goes beyond making
the  electoral  process  equally  open  to  the  members  of  the
group in question.  It gives the members of that group an
advantage that §2 does not require and that the Constitu-
tion  may  forbid.    And  because  the  creation  of  majority-
minority districts is something of a zero-sum endeavor, giv-
ing an advantage to one minority group may disadvantage
others.

C
  What all this means is that a §2 plaintiff who claims that
a districting map violates §2 because it fails to include an
additional majority-minority district must show at the out-
set that such a district can be created without making race
the predominant factor in its creation.  The plaintiff bears
both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion

——————

1 Alabama’s  districting  guidelines  explicitly  incorporate  this  non-
predominance  requirement.    See  Singleton  v.  Merrill,  582  F. Supp.  3d
924, 1036 (ND Ala. 2022).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding districting and the Voting Rights Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

ALITO, J., concurring

accommodation.  As  noted,  after  great  effort,  the  Govern-
ment concluded that it was not possible to solve the problem
without using an “employer’s plan, issuer, or third party ad-
ministrator.”  83 Fed. Reg. 57546.  As a result, the Depart-
ments turned to the current rule, under which an objecting
party  must  certify  that  it  “objects,  based  on  its  sincerely
held  religious  beliefs,  to  its  establishing,  maintaining,
providing, offering, or arranging for (as applicable)” either
“[c]overage  or payments for some or all contraceptive ser-
vices” or “[a] plan, issuer, or third party administrator that
provides or arranges such coverage or payments.”  45 CFR
§§147.132(a)(2)(i)–(ii).

The  States  take  exception  to  the  new  religious  rule  on
several grounds.  First, they complain that it grants an ex-
emption  to  some  employers  who  were  satisfied  with  the
prior accommodation, but there is little basis for this argu-
ment.  An employer who is satisfied with the accommoda-
tion  may  continue  to  operate  under  that  regime.  See
§§147.131(c)–(d); 83 Fed. Reg. 57569–57571.  And unless an
employer has a religious objection to the accommodation, it
is unclear why an employer would give it up.  The accom-
modation does not impose any cost on an employer, and it
provides an added benefit for the employer’s work force.

The States also object to the new rule because it makes
exemptions  available  to  publicly  traded  corporations,  but
the Government is “not aware” of any publicly traded cor-
porations that object to compliance with the mandate.  Id.,
at  57562.  For  all  practical  purposes,  therefore,  it  is  not
clear that the new rule’s provisions concerning entities that
object to the mandate on religious grounds go any further
than necessary to bring the mandate into compliance with
RFRA.

In  any  event,  while  RFRA  requires  the  Government  to
employ the least restrictive means of furthering a compel-
ling  interest  that  burdens  religious  belief,  it  does  not  re-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 591 U.S. ____ (2020). It delves into the details of a religious exemption related to contraceptive coverage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

l

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moran Ramos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . .
Moreno v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morgan; Amado Lajara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morgan; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morgan v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morgan; Macemon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morganherring v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
Morgan Stanley & Co.; Investors Guaranty Fund Ltd. v.
Morrison; Brzonkala v.
Morrison v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morrison; United States v.
Morse v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morton v. Tessmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morton’s Market, Inc.; Borden, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mosby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moses; Pride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moses; Tillis Trucking Co. v.
Moskowitz; Flournoy v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Motley v. New Jersey State Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Motorola, Inc.; A’Ku v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mr. Bones BBQ v. Austin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MRO Communications, Inc. v. AT&T Corp.
Muhammad, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Muhammad v. Florida Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Muhammad v. Storr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Muka v. Rutherford Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Muldrow v. Sequoyah County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 . . . . . . . . .
Muldrow; Sequoyah County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v.
. . . . . . . .
Mungal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Munoz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Munoz-Amado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Murakami; E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Murchinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Murchison, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Murdock v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Murphy; Atraqchi v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Murphy v. Smithville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Murray, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Murray v. Smiltneek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Murray v. Varner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mustafa v. Robaczewski
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Myers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nagy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1010
1075
1114
1026
1093
1023
1027
1024
1062
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 598,1063
1050
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 598,1062
1133
1024
1130
1084
1064
1128
1072
1087
1071
1124
1124
1003
1133
1071
1054
1049
1037
1123
1118
1118
1105
1104
1127
1134
1101
1089
1016
1054
1073
1060
1011,1031
1065
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

Syllabus

curring  opinion,  in  which  THOMAS,  J.,  joined.  THOMAS,  J.,  filed  a  con-
curring opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined.  BREYER, J., filed a dissent-
ing opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section header from a legal case, likely a syllabus.  It is not the main body of the text and is not meant to be read sequentially.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1085

558 U. S.

December 7, 2009

No.  09–7474.  Michael  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  576  F.  3d  323.

No.  09–7475.  Oruche  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  578.

No.  09–7477.  Mayberry  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  859.

No.  09–7482.  Yarbrough  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  266.

No.  09–7491.  Vasquez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1375.  Cassens  Transport  Co.  et  al.  v.  Brown
et al.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Motions of Michigan Self-Insurers Associ
ation,  American  Trucking  Associations,  Inc.,  DRI–The  Voice  of
the  Defense  Bar,  and  National  Council  of  Self-Insurers  et  al.  for
leave  to  ﬁle  briefs  as  amici  curiae  granted.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  546  F.  3d  347.

No. 09–536.  Burke v. United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–7362.  Suriel  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.
Appx.  136.

No.  09–7397.  Flores  Carreto  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d
Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  583
F.  3d  152.

No.  09–7908  (09A543).  Biros  v.  Strickland,  Governor  of
Ohio,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Application  for  stay  of  execution
of  sentence  of  death,  presented  to  Justice  Stevens,  and  by
him referred to the Court, denied.  Certiorari denied.  Reported
below:  588  F.  3d  921.

Rehearing  Denied

No.  08–1389.  Prelesnik,  Warden  v.  Avery,  ante,  p.  932;
No.  08–10085.  McNeill  v.  Goff,  Warden,  ante,  p.  832;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, including case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken. It is not sequential narrative text and is likely not meant to be read as a continuous story.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

KAGAN, J., dissenting

statutory  ambiguities,  as  Congress  well  knows,  is  “often
more a question of policy than of law.”  Pauley v. BethEn-
ergy Mines, Inc., 501 U. S. 680, 696 (1991).  The task is less
one of construing a text than of balancing competing goals
and  values.   Consider  the  statutory  directive  to  achieve
“substantial  restoration  of  the  [Grand  Canyon’s]  natural
quiet.”  See supra, at 6.  Someone is going to have to decide
exactly what that statute means for air traffic over the can-
yon.  How many flights, in what places and at what times,
are consistent with restoring enough natural quiet on the
ground?  That is a policy trade-off of a kind familiar to agen-
cies—but peculiarly unsuited to judges.  Or consider Chev-
ron  itself.  As  the  Court  there  understood,  the  choice  be-
tween defining a “stationary source” as a whole plant or as
a pollution-emitting device is a choice about how to “recon-
cile”  two  “manifestly  competing  interests.”  467  U. S.,  at
865.  The  plantwide  definition  relaxes  the  permitting  re-
quirement  in  the  interest  of  promoting  economic  growth;
the device-specific definition strengthens that requirement
to  better  reduce  air  pollution.  See  id.,  at  851,  863,  866.
Again, that is a choice a judge should not be making, but
one  an  agency  properly  can.    Agencies  are  “subject  to  the
supervision  of  the  President,  who  in  turn  answers  to  the
public.”  Kisor, 588 U. S., at 571–572 (plurality opinion).  So
when faced with a statutory ambiguity, “an agency to which
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities” may
rely on an accountable actor’s “views of wise policy to inform
its judgments.”  Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865.

None of this is to say that deference to agencies is always
appropriate.  The Court over time has fine-tuned the Chev-
ron  regime  to  deny  deference  in  classes  of  cases  in  which
Congress has no reason to prefer an agency to a court.  The
majority treats those “refinements” as a flaw in the scheme,
ante, at 27, but they are anything but.  Consider the rule
that an agency gets no deference when construing a statute
it  is  not  responsible  for  administering.    See  Epic  Systems
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the concept of judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes, citing relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SMITH v. ARIZONA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA,
DIVISION ONE

No. 22–899.  Argued January 10, 2024—Decided June 21, 2024

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal de-
fendant the right to confront the witnesses against him.  In operation,
the Clause protects a defendant’s right of cross-examination by limit-
ing the prosecution’s ability to introduce statements made by people
not in the courtroom.  The Clause thus bars the admission at trial of
an absent witness’s statements unless the witness is unavailable and
the defendant had a prior chance to subject her to cross-examination.
Crawford  v. Washington,  541  U. S.  36,  53–54.    This  prohibition  “ap-
plies only to testimonial hearsay,” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813,
823,  and  in  that  two-word  phrase  are  two  limits.    First,  in  speaking
about  “witnesses”—or  “those  who  bear  testimony”—the  Clause  con-
fines itself to “testimonial statements,” a category this Court has vari-
ously  described.  Id.,  at  823,  826.    Second,  the  Clause  bars  only  the
introduction of hearsay—meaning, out-of-court statements offered “to
prove  the  truth  of  the  matter  asserted.”    Anderson  v.  United  States,
417 U. S. 211, 219.  Relevant here, the Confrontation Clause applies
in full to forensic evidence.  For example, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massa-
chusetts, 557 U. S. 305, prosecutors introduced “certificates of analy-
sis” stating that lab tests had identified a substance seized from the
defendant as cocaine.  The Court held that the defendant had a right
to  cross-examine  the  lab  analysts  who  prepared  the  certificates.    In
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U. S. 647, the Court relied on Melen-
dez-Diaz to hold that a State could not introduce one lab analyst’s writ-
ten findings through the testimony of a substitute analyst.  Finally, in
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U. S. 50, the Court considered a case where
one lab analyst related an absent analyst’s findings on the way to stat-
ing her own conclusion.  The state court held that the testimony did
not  implicate  the  Confrontation  Clause  because  the  absent  analyst’s
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This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a brief overview of the case for readers.
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