<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

“contemporaneous understanding” of the status of the res-
ervation and the “history surrounding the passage” of the
relevant Acts.  Parker, 577 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); see Yankton Sioux Tribe,
522 U. S., at 351–354; Solem, 465 U. S., at 471.  The avail-
able evidence overwhelmingly confirms that Congress elim-
inated any Creek reservation.  That was the purpose iden-
tified by Congress, the Dawes Commission, and the Creek
Nation  itself.  And  that  was  the  understanding  demon-
strated by the actions of Oklahoma, the United States, and
the Creek.

According to reports published by Congress leading up to
Oklahoma statehood, the Five Tribes had failed to hold the
lands for the equal benefit of all Indians, and the tribal gov-
ernments were ill equipped to handle the largescale settle-
ment of non-Indians in the territories.  See supra, at 4–5;
Woodward, 238 U. S., at 296–297.  The Senate Select Com-
mittee  on  the  Five  Tribes  explained  that  it  was  “impera-
tive[ ]” to “establish[ ] a government over [non-Indians] and
Indians” in the territory “in accordance with the principles
of  our  constitution  and  laws.”  S. Rep.  No.  377,  at  12–13.
On  the  eve  of  the  Original  Creek  Agreement,  the  House
Committee on Indian Affairs emphasized that “[t]he inde-
pendent  self-government  of  the  Five  Tribes  ha[d]  practi-
cally  ceased,”  “[t]he  policy  of  the  Government  to  abolish
classes in Indian Territory and make a homogeneous popu-
lation  [wa]s  being  rapidly  carried  out,”  and  all  Indians
“should at once be put upon a level and equal footing with
the great population with whom they [were] intermingled.”
H. R. Rep. No. 1188, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1900).

The Dawes Commission understood Congress’s intent in
the same way.  The Commission explained that the “object
of Congress from the beginning has been the dissolution of
the tribal governments, the extinguishment of the commu-
nal or tribal title to the land, the vesting of possession and
title in severalty among the citizens of the Tribes, and the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA. It contains legal arguments and cites previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

oughness of the District Court’s opinion.  But if careful Dis-
trict Court consideration sufficed for an appellate court to
deny  a  stay,  then  appellate  courts  could  usually  end  the
stay  inquiry  right  there.    That  is  not  how  stay  analysis
works.  Contrary to the dissent’s implication, the fact that
the District Court here issued a lengthy opinion after con-
sidering a substantial record is the starting point, not the
ending point, for our analysis of whether to grant a stay.
  To sum up: In light of this Court’s many precedents ap-
plying the Purcell principle and staying lower court injunc-
tions of state election laws in the period close to an election,
I concur in the Court’s order granting a stay of the District
Court’s injunction here.  Contrary to the dissent’s mistaken
rhetoric, I take no position at this time on the ultimate mer-
its of the parties’ underlying legal dispute.  And I need not
do so until the Court receives full briefing, holds oral argu-
ment, and engages in our usual extensive internal deliber-
ations.    The  words  used  by  the  Court  in  Purcell  apply
equally  to  this  case:  “We  underscore  that  we  express  no
opinion  here  on  the  correct  disposition,  after  full  briefing
and argument, of the appeals from the District Court’s . . .
order  or  on  the  ultimate  resolution  of  these  cases.”    549
U. S., at 5.  “Given the imminence of the election and the
inadequate time to resolve the factual disputes, our action
today shall of necessity allow the election to proceed with-
out an injunction.”  Id., at 5–6.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It delves into the legal reasoning behind granting a stay in a case related to state election laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

Opinion of the Court

United States.”  The provision begins with a broad category,
“the waters of the United States,” which we may call cate-
gory A.  The provision provides that States may permit dis-
charges into these waters, but it then qualifies that States
cannot  permit  discharges  into  a  subcategory  of  A:  tradi-
tional navigable waters (category B).  Finally, it states that
a third category (category C), consisting of wetlands “adja-
cent” to traditional navigable waters, is “includ[ed]” within
B.  Thus,  States  may  permit  discharges  into  A  minus  B,
which includes C.  If C (adjacent wetlands) were not part of
A (“the waters of the United States”) and therefore subject
to  regulation  under  the  CWA,  there  would  be  no  point  in
excluding them from that category.  See Riverside Bayview,
474 U. S., at 138, n. 11 (recognizing that §1344(g) “at least
suggest[s] strongly that the term ‘waters’ as used in the Act
does  not  necessarily  exclude  ‘wetlands’ ”);  Rapanos,  547
U. S.,  at  768  (opinion  of  Kennedy,  J.).    Thus,  §1344(g)(1)
presumes  that  certain  wetlands  constitute  “waters  of  the
United States.”

But  what  wetlands  does  the  CWA  regulate?    Section
1344(g)(1) cannot answer that question alone because it is
not  the  operative  provision  that  defines  the  Act’s  reach.
See Riverside Bayview, 474 U. S., at 138, n. 11.  Instead, we
must  harmonize  the  reference  to  adjacent  wetlands  in
§1344(g)(1)  with  “the  waters  of  the  United  States,”
§1362(7), which is the actual term we are tasked with inter-
preting.  The formulation discussed above tells us how: be-
cause the adjacent wetlands in §1344(g)(1) are “includ[ed]”
within  “the  waters  of  the  United  States,”  these  wetlands
must qualify as “waters of the United States” in their own
right.  In other words, they must be indistinguishably part
of a body of water that itself constitutes “waters” under the
CWA.  See supra, at 14.

This understanding is consistent with §1344(g)(1)’s use of
“adjacent.”    Dictionaries  tell  us  that  the  term  “adjacent”
may  mean  either  “contiguous”  or  “near.”    Random  House
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the interpretation of the Clean Water Act and the definition of "waters of the United States."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
GINSBURG, J., dissenting

any  language  in  paragraph  (a)(4)  counteracts  Congress’
opening  instruction  in  §300gg–13(a)  that  group  health
plans “shall . . . provide” specified services.  See supra,  at
8–9.

The  Court  embraces,  and  the  opinion  concurring  in  the
judgment adopts, the Government’s argument.  The Court
correctly acknowledges that HRSA has broad discretion to
determine  what  preventive  services  insurers  should  pro-
vide for women.  Ante, at 15.  But it restates that HRSA’s
“discretion [is] equally unchecked in other areas, including
the ability to identify and create exemptions from its own
Guidelines.”  Ante, at 16.  See also ante, at 2–3 (KAGAN, J.,
concurring  in  judgment)  (agreeing  with  this  interpreta-
tion).  Like the Government, the Court and the opinion con-
curring  in  the  judgment  shut  from  sight  §300gg–13(a)’s
overarching  direction  that  group  health  plans  and  health
insurance issuers “shall” cover the specified services.  See
supra, at 8–9.  That “ ‘absent provision[s] cannot be supplied
by the courts,’ ” ante, at 16 (quoting Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  5),  militates  against  the
Court’s  conclusion,  not  in  favor  of  it.  Where  Congress
wanted  to  exempt  certain  employers  from  the  ACA’s  re-
quirements, it said so expressly.  See, e.g., supra, at 3, n. 2.
Section  300gg–13(a)(4)  includes  no  such  exemption.  See
supra, at 8–9.11

B
The position advocated by the Government and endorsed
by  the  Court  and  the  opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment
encounters further obstacles.

Most saliently, the language in §300gg–13(a)(4) mirrors

——————

11 The only language to which the Court points in support of its con-
trary conclusion is the phrase “as provided for.”  See ante, at 15.  This
phrase  modifies  “additional  preventive  care  and  screenings.”    §300gg–
13(a)(4).  It therefore speaks to what services shall be provided, not who
must provide them.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania*. It delves into the interpretation of a specific section of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) regarding preventive services.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES

Syllabus

prove  that  the  class  has  common  “questions  of  law  or  fact.”    Their
claims must depend upon a common contention of such a nature that
it  is  capable  of  classwide  resolution—which  means  that  determina-
tion of its  truth or falsity will resolve an  issue that is central to  the
validity of each one of the claims  in one stroke.  Here, proof of com-
monality  necessarily  overlaps  with  respondents’  merits  contention
that  Wal-Mart  engages  in  a  pattern  or  practice  of  discrimination.
The  crux  of  a  Title  VII  inquiry  is  “the  reason  for  a  particular  em-
ployment decision,” Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467
U. S.  867,  876,  and  respondents  wish  to  sue  for  millions  of  employ-
ment  decisions  at  once.  Without  some  glue  holding  together  the  al-
leged reasons for those decisions, it will be impossible to say that ex-
amination  of  all  the  class  members’  claims  will  produce  a  common
answer to the crucial discrimination question.  Pp. 8–12.

(b) General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147,
describes  the  proper  approach  to  commonality.    On  the  facts  of  this
case, the conceptual gap between an individual’s discrimination claim
and  “the  existence  of  a  class  of  persons  who  have  suffered  the  same
injury,”  id.,  at  157–158,  must  be  bridged  by  “[s]ignificant  proof  that
an  employer  operated  under  a  general  policy  of  discrimination,”  id.,
at 159, n. 15.  Such proof is absent here.  Wal-Mart’s announced pol-
icy forbids sex discrimination, and the company has penalties for de-
nials  of  equal  opportunity.    Respondents’  only  evidence  of  a  general
discrimination policy was a sociologist’s analysis asserting that Wal-
Mart’s corporate culture made it vulnerable to gender bias.  But be-
cause  he  could  not  estimate  what  percent  of  Wal-Mart  employment
decisions  might  be  determined  by  stereotypical  thinking,  his  testi-
mony was worlds away from “significant proof” that Wal-Mart “oper-
ated under a general policy of discrimination.”  Pp. 12–14.

(c) The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convinc-
ingly  establishes  is  Wal-Mart’s  “policy”  of  giving  local  supervisors
discretion  over  employment  matters.    While  such  a  policy  could  be
the  basis  of  a  Title  VII  disparate-impact  claim,  recognizing  that  a
claim  “can”  exist  does  not  mean  that  every  employee  in  a  company
with  that  policy  has  a  common  claim.    In  a  company  of  Wal-Mart’s
size  and  geographical  scope,  it  is  unlikely  that  all  managers  would
exercise their discretion in a common way without some common di-
rection.    Respondents’  attempt  to  show  such  direction  by  means  of
statistical and anecdotal evidence falls well short.  Pp. 14–20.

2. Respondents’  backpay  claims  were  improperly  certified  under

Rule 23(b)(2).  Pp. 20–27.

(a) Claims  for  monetary  relief  may  not  be  certified  under  Rule
23(b)(2),  at  least  where  the  monetary  relief  is  not  incidental  to  the
requested injunctive or declaratory relief.  It is unnecessary to decide
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the court's reasoning for its decision regarding class certification in a discrimination case against Wal-Mart.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1058

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 3, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8042.

Johnstone v. Bayer, Director, Nevada De-
partment of Prisons. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 188 F. 3d 513.

No. 99–8046. Cohen v. Blanchet et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8047. Burk v. Kansas. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari de-

nied. Reported below: 26 Kan. App. 2d –––, 983 P. 2d 286.

No. 99–8048. Arrington v. Broward Community College,
South Campus. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 178 F. 3d 1303.

No. 99–8049. Bunney v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–8053. White v. Downes. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 454.

No. 99–8060. Carey v. Smith et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–8061. Cook v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8063. Collins v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8066. Saiyed v. Washington. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 254.

No. 99–8084. Taylor v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th

Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 746 So. 2d 463.

No. 99–8086. Bryson v. Gibson, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 1193.

No. 99–8112. Wojtaszek v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 A. 2d 593.

No. 99–8122. Ogunde v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names, court information, and certiorari decisions. This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a legal document and is more like a table of contents or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1029

529 U. S.

March 20, 2000

No. 99–8155. Floyd v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 270.

No. 99–8164. Uthman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 439.

No. 99–8166. Emmanuel v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 438.

No. 99–8167. Hamlin v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 255.

No. 99–8168. Horn v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 781.

No. 99–8173. Stevenson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 438.

No. 99–8174. Quintanilla v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 1139.

No. 99–8175.

Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 205.

No. 99–8177. Layne v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 556.

No. 99–8178. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 200 F. 3d 820.

No. 99–8180. Stull v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 818.

No. 99–8182. Bender v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st

Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 So. 2d 1181.

No. 99–8183. Adams v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 179 F. 3d 793.

No. 99–8185. Baker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 840.

No. 99–8187. Onaro v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 275.

No. 99–8188. Springfield v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 1180.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U50

[09-26-01 10:29:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

484

SLACK v. McDANIEL

Opinion of the Court

must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitu-
tional right, a demonstration that, under Barefoot, includes
showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been re-
solved in a different manner or that the issues presented
were “ ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed fur-
ther.’ ” Barefoot, supra, at 893, and n. 4 (“sum[ming] up”
the “ ‘substantial showing’ ” standard).

Where a district court has rejected the constitutional
claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c)
is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would ﬁnd the district court’s assessment
of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. The issue
becomes somewhat more complicated where, as here, the
district court dismisses the petition based on procedural
grounds. We hold as follows: When the district court denies
a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching
the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should
issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason
would ﬁnd it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists
of reason would ﬁnd it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling. This construction
gives meaning to Congress’ requirement that a prisoner
demonstrate substantial underlying constitutional claims and
is in conformity with the meaning of the “substantial show-
ing” standard provided in Barefoot, supra, at 893, and n. 4,
and adopted by Congress in AEDPA. Where a plain pro-
cedural bar is present and the district court is correct to in-
voke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not
conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing
the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to pro-
ceed further.
In such a circumstance, no appeal would be
warranted.

Determining whether a COA should issue where the peti-
tion was dismissed on procedural grounds has two compo-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the standard for issuing a Certificate of Appealability (COA) in habeas corpus cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT

Camille Pissarro, Rue Saint-Honoré in the Afternoon, Effect of Rain (1897)
Trial Exhibit #348
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a caption or reference to a piece of artwork within a legal document. It's likely not the main body text of the document and might be better categorized as supplementary information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Artwork Reference</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529IND

Unit: $UBV [10-03-01 07:01:03] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

1216

INDEX

WORDS AND PHRASES—Continued.

3. “Is released from imprisonment.” 18 U. S. C. § 3624(e). United

States v. Johnson, p. 53.

4. “Person.” False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. § 3729(a). Vermont Agency

of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, p. 765.

5. “To recover on any claim arising under.” § 205(h), Social Security
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405(h). Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care,
Inc., p. 1.

6. “Used.” 18 U. S. C. § 844(i).

Jones v. United States, p. 848.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document, not the main body of text. Indexes are not suitable for indexing as they provide references rather than content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

GORSUCH, J., concurring

of the Second Amendment.  So, in this facial challenge, the
question becomes whether that law, in at least some of its
applications, is consistent with historic firearm regulations.
To prevail, the government need not show that the current
law is a “ ‘dead ringer’ ” for some historical analogue.  Ante,
at 8 (quoting Bruen, 597 U. S., at 30).  But the government
must establish that, in at least some of its applications, the
challenged law “impose[s] a comparable burden on the right
of armed self-defense” to that imposed by a historically rec-
ognized regulation.  Id., at 29; see ante, at 7.  And it must
show that the burden imposed by the current law “is com-
parably justified.”  Bruen, 597 U. S., at 29; see ante, at 7.

Why do we require those showings?  Through them, we
seek to honor the fact that the Second Amendment “codified
a pre-existing right” belonging to the American people, one
that carries the same “scope” today that it was “understood
to have when the people adopted” it.  Heller, 554 U. S., at
592, 634–635.  When the people ratified the Second Amend-
ment,  they  surely  understood  an  arms-bearing  citizenry
posed some risks.  But just as surely they believed that the
right protected by the Second Amendment was itself vital
to  the  preservation  of  life  and  liberty.    See,  e.g.,  1  Black-
stone’s Commentaries, Editor’s App. 300 (St. George Tucker
ed. 1803) (observing that the Second Amendment may rep-
resent the “palladium of liberty,” for “[t]he right of self de-
fence is the first law of nature,” and “in most governments[,]
it has been the study of rulers to confine this right within
the  narrowest  limits”);  3  J.  Story,  Commentaries  on  the
Constitution of the United States §1890, p. 746 (1833) (“The
right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been
considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic”).
We  have  no  authority  to  question  that  judgment.    As
judges  charged  with  respecting  the  people’s  directions  in
the  Constitution—directions  that  are  “trapped  in  amber,”
see ante, at 7—our only lawful role is to apply them in the
cases that come before us.  Developments in the world may
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in a case titled "UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI".  It discusses the Second Amendment and its interpretation in the context of a legal challenge.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

898

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Stevens, J., dissenting

unambiguously expresses a decision by Congress that com-
pliance with a federal safety standard does not exempt a
manufacturer from any common-law liability.
In light of
this reference to common-law liability in the saving clause,
Congress surely would have included a similar reference in
§ 1392(d) if it had intended to pre-empt such liability. Chi-
cago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U. S. 328, 338
(1994) (noting presumption that Congress acts intentionally
when it includes particular language in one section of a stat-
ute but omits it in another).

The Court does not disagree with this interpretation of the
term “safety standard” in § 1392(d). Because the meaning of
that term as used by Congress in this statute is clear, the
text of § 1392(d) is itself sufﬁcient to establish that the Safety
Act does not expressly pre-empt common-law claims.
In
order to avoid the conclusion that the saving clause is super-
ﬂuous, therefore, it must follow that it has a different pur-
pose: to limit, or possibly to foreclose entirely, the possible
pre-emptive effect of safety standards promulgated by the
Secretary. The Court’s approach to the case has the practi-
cal effect of reading the saving clause out of the statute
altogether.15

Given the cumulative force of the fact that § 1392(d) does
not expressly pre-empt common-law claims and the fact that
§ 1397(k) was obviously intended to limit the pre-emptive ef-
fect of the Secretary’s safety standards, it is quite wrong for
the Court to assume that a possible implicit conﬂict with the
purposes to be achieved by such a standard should have the
same pre-emptive effect “ ‘as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’ ” Ante, at 873. Properly construed, the Safety
Act imposes a special burden on a party relying on an argu-
able, implicit conﬂict with a temporary regulatory policy—

15 The Court surely cannot believe that Congress included that clause in
the statute just to avoid the danger that we would otherwise fail to give
the term “safety standard” its ordinary meaning.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

9

Opinion of the Court

1014  (2003)).    And  in  Graham,  we  noted  that  “develop-
ments  in  psychology  and  brain  science  continue  to  show
fundamental  differences  between
juvenile  and  adult
minds”—for  example,  in  “parts  of  the  brain  involved  in
behavior control.”  560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17).5  We
reasoned  that  those  findings—of  transient  rashness,  pro-
clivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both
lessened  a  child’s  “moral  culpability”  and  enhanced  the
prospect  that,  as  the  years  go  by  and  neurological  devel-
opment occurs, his “ ‘deficiencies will be reformed.’ ”  Id., at
___ (slip op., at 18) (quoting Roper, 543 U. S., at 570).

Roper  and  Graham  emphasized  that  the  distinctive  at-
tributes  of  youth  diminish  the  penological  justifications
for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders,
even  when  they  commit  terrible  crimes.    Because  “ ‘[t]he
heart of the retribution rationale’ ” relates to an offender’s
blameworthiness, “ ‘the case for retribution is not as strong
with  a  minor  as  with  an  adult.’ ”    Graham,  560  U. S.,  at
___ (slip op., at 20–21) (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S.
137, 149 (1987); Roper, 543 U. S., at 571).  Nor can deter-
rence  do  the  work  in  this  context,  because  “ ‘the  same
characteristics  that  render  juveniles  less  culpable  than
adults’ ”—their  immaturity,  recklessness,  and  impetuos-
ity—make  them  less  likely  to  consider  potential  punish-

——————

5 The  evidence  presented  to  us  in  these  cases  indicates  that  the  sci-
ence  and  social  science  supporting  Roper’s  and  Graham’s  conclusions
have  become  even  stronger.    See,  e.g.,  Brief  for  American  Psychologi-
cal  Association  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  3  (“[A]n  ever-growing  body  of
research  in  developmental  psychology  and  neuroscience  continues  to
confirm  and  strengthen  the  Court’s  conclusions”);  id.,  at  4  (“It  is  in-
creasingly  clear  that  adolescent  brains  are  not  yet  fully  mature  in
regions and systems related to higher-order executive functions such as
impulse  control,  planning  ahead,  and  risk  avoidance”);  Brief  for  J.
Lawrence  Aber  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  12–28  (discussing  post-Graham
studies);  id.,  at  26–27  (“Numerous  studies  post-Graham  indicate  that
exposure to deviant peers leads to increased deviant behavior and is a
consistent predictor of adolescent delinquency” (footnote omitted)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing previous cases (Roper and Graham) and discussing legal reasoning related to juvenile sentencing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30  NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON

Opinion of the Court

NCAA  had  not  adopted  any  consistent  definition.    Id.,  at
1070.  Instead, the court found, the NCAA’s rules and re-
strictions  on  compensation  have  shifted  markedly  over
time.  Id.,  at  1071–1074.  The  court  found,  too,  that  the
NCAA adopted these restrictions without any reference to
“considerations of consumer demand,” id., at 1100, and that
some were “not necessary to preserve consumer demand,”
id., at 1075, 1080, 1104.  None of this is product redesign; it
is a straightforward application of the rule of reason.

C
Finally,  the  NCAA  attacks  as  “indefensible”  the  lower
courts’  holding  that  substantially  less  restrictive  alterna-
tives  exist  capable  of  delivering  the  same  procompetitive
benefits as its current rules.  Brief for Petitioner in No. 20–
512, at 46.  The NCAA claims, too, that the district court’s
injunction threatens to “micromanage” its business.  Id., at
50.

Once more, we broadly agree with the legal principles the
NCAA  invokes.  As  we  have  discussed,  antitrust  courts
must give wide berth to business judgments before finding
liability.  See supra, at 15–19.  Similar considerations apply
when it comes to the remedy.  Judges must be sensitive to
the possibility that the “continuing supervision of a highly
detailed  decree”  could  wind  up  impairing  rather  than  en-
hancing competition.  Trinko, 540 U. S., at 415.  Costs asso-
ciated with ensuring compliance with judicial decrees may
exceed efficiencies gained; the decrees themselves may un-
intentionally suppress procompetitive innovation and even
facilitate collusion.  See supra, at 26–27.  Judges must be
wary,  too,  of  the  temptation  to  specify  “the  proper  price,
quantity, and other terms of dealing”—cognizant that they
are  neither  economic  nor  industry  experts.  Trinko,  540
U. S., at 408.  Judges must be open to reconsideration and
modification  of  decrees  in  light  of  changing  market  reali-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court's opinion in the case of NCAA v. Alston. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

41

THOMAS, J., dissenting

circumstances inquiry, a court applying §2 can always em-
broider its vote-dilution determination with findings about
past  or  present  unconstitutional  discrimination.    But  this
possibility does nothing to heal either the fundamental con-
tradictions between §2 and the Constitution or its extreme
overbreadth  relative  to  actual  constitutional  wrongs.    “A
generalized assertion of past discrimination” cannot justify
race-based  redistricting,  “because  it  provides  no  guidance
for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the
injury it seeks to remedy.”  Shaw II, 517 U. S., at 909 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  To justify a statute tend-
ing toward the proportional allocation of political power by
race  throughout  the  Nation,  it  cannot  be  enough  that  a
court can recite some indefinite quantum of discrimination
in the relevant jurisdiction.  If it were, courts “could uphold
[race-based]  remedies  that  are  ageless  in  their  reach  into
the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.”
Wygant  v.  Jackson  Bd.  of  Ed.,  476  U. S.  267,  276  (1986)
(plurality  opinion).    That  logic  “would  effectively  assure
that race will always be relevant in [redistricting], and that
the ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental
decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being’s
race will never be achieved.”  Parents Involved, 551 U. S.,
at 730 (plurality opinion) (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted).
  For an example of these baleful results, we need look no
further  than  the  congressional  districts  at  issue  here.    In
1992, Alabama and a group of §2 plaintiffs, whom a federal
court chose to regard as the representatives “of all African-
American citizens of the State of Alabama,” stipulated that
the State’s black population was “ ‘sufficiently compact and
contiguous to comprise a single member significant major-
ity  (65%  or  more)  African  American  Congressional  dis-
trict,’ ” and that, “ ‘[c]onsequently,’ ” such a “ ‘district should
be created.’ ” Wesch v. Hunt, 785 F. Supp. 1491, 1493, 1498
(SD  Ala.).   Accepting  that stipulation,  the  court reworked
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and its application to redistricting.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

23

Opinion of the Court

on all this, Justice Marshall concluded, because the defend-
ant before the Court had not been convicted “for being” an
“alcoholic,  but  for  [engaging  in  the  act  of]  being  in  public
while drunk on a particular occasion,” Robinson did not ap-
ply.  Powell, 392 U. S., at 532.6

This case is no different from Powell.  Just as there, the
plaintiffs here seek to expand Robinson’s “small” intrusion
“into  the  substantive  criminal  law.”  Just  as  there,  the
plaintiffs here seek to extend its rule beyond laws address-
ing  “mere  status”  to  laws  addressing  actions  that,  even  if
undertaken  with  the  requisite  mens  rea,  might  “in  some
sense” qualify as “ ‘involuntary.’ ”  And just as Powell could
find  nothing  in  the  Eighth  Amendment  permitting  that
course, neither can we.  As we have seen, Robinson already
sits uneasily with the Amendment’s terms, original mean-
ing,  and  our  precedents.    Its  holding  is  restricted  to  laws
that  criminalize  “mere  status.”  Nothing  in  the  decision
called into question the “broad power” of States to regulate
acts undertaken with some mens rea.  And, just as in Pow-
ell,  we  discern  nothing  in  the  Eighth  Amendment  that
might provide us with lawful authority to extend Robinson
beyond its narrow holding.

——————

6 Justice White, who cast the fifth vote upholding the conviction, con-
curred in the result.  Writing only for himself, Justice White expressed
some sympathy for Justice Fortas’s theory, but ultimately deemed that
“novel construction” of the Eighth Amendment “unnecessary to pursue”
because the defendant hadn’t proven that his alcoholism made him “un-
able to stay off the streets on the night in question.”  392 U. S., at 552,
n. 4, 553–554 (White, J., concurring in result).  In Martin, the Ninth Cir-
cuit suggested Justice White’s solo concurrence somehow rendered the
Powell  dissent  controlling  and  the  plurality  a  dissent.    See  Martin  v.
Boise, 920 F. 3d 584, 616–617 (2019).  Before us, neither the plaintiffs
nor  the  dissent  defend  that  theory,  and  for  good  reason:    In  the  years
since Powell, this Court has repeatedly relied on Justice Marshall’s opin-
ion, as we do today.  See, e.g., Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U. S. 271, 280 (2020);
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U. S. 735, 768, n. 38 (2006); Jones v. United States,
463 U. S. 354, 365, n. 13 (1983).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, indicating it is part of the core legal reasoning and analysis of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

SEC v. JARKESY

GORSUCH, J., concurring

To get there took a dash of fiction and a pinch of surmise.
From time to time, the Court observed, judges appoint their
own  special  “masters  and  commissioners”  to  prepare  re-
ports on fact issues or damages.  Id., at 51.  These reports
are nonbinding and “essentially . . . advisory.”  Ibid.  Judges
themselves  remain  the  decisionmakers.    In  Crowell,  the
Court embraced the fiction that Executive Branch officials
might similarly act as assistants or adjuncts to Article III
courts.  And because judges often adopt the proposed find-
ings  of  their  masters  and  commissioners,  the  Court  sur-
mised, Article III posed no bar to Congress taking a further
step and requiring judges to treat the findings of Executive
Branch officials as essentially “final.”  Id., at 46.  “To hold
otherwise,” the Court reasoned, “would be to defeat the ob-
vious purpose of the legislation”:  “to furnish a prompt, con-
tinuous, expert, and inexpensive method for dealing with a
class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to ex-
amination and determination by an administrative agency
specially assigned to that task.”  Ibid.

Crowell  itself  only  went  so  far,  however.    The  case  fell
within federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction, and tribunals
sitting in admiralty in England and America alike had long
heard  certain  matters  falling  within  the  public  rights  ex-
ception.  See Culley, 601 U. S., at 398 (GORSUCH, J., concur-
ring).  In deciding those matters, courts had long tolerated
some flexibility in procedures, had long restricted appellate
review of factual findings, and had always proceeded with-
out a jury.  Crowell, 285 U. S., at 45, 53.

Soon, though, none of that mattered.  Almost in a blink,
the admiralty limitation was discarded, and more and more
agencies began assuming adjudicatory functions previously
reserved for judges and juries, employing novel procedures
that sometimes bore faint resemblance to those observed in
court.  Along the way, prominent voices in and out of gov-
ernment expressed concern at this development.  Consider
just two typical examples.  Were an agency endowed with
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the history and evolution of administrative law, particularly the expansion of agency power in adjudicating disputes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
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<suitable>
  <content>
14

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

of the proceeds of a qui tam action “does not even fully ma-
terialize  until  the  litigation  is  completed  and  the  relator
prevails”).

Because  PAGA  actions  do  not  adjudicate  the  individual
claims of multiple absent third parties, they do not present
the problems of notice, due process, and adequacy of repre-
sentation that render class arbitration inconsistent with ar-
bitration’s  traditionally  individualized  form.  See  Concep-
cion, 563 U. S., at 347–348.  Of course, as a practical matter,
PAGA  actions  do  have  something  important  in  common
with  class  actions.    Because  PAGA  plaintiffs  represent  a
principal with a potentially vast number of claims at its dis-
posal, PAGA suits “greatly increas[e] risks to defendants.”
Id., at 350.  But our precedents do not hold that the FAA
allows  parties  to  contract  out  of  anything  that  might  am-
plify defense risks.  Instead, our cases hold that States can-
not  coerce  individuals  into  forgoing  arbitration  by  taking
the individualized and informal procedures characteristic of
traditional arbitration off the table.  Litigation risks are rel-
evant to that inquiry because one way in which state law
may coerce parties into forgoing their right to arbitrate is
by conditioning that right on the use of a procedural format
that makes arbitration artificially unattractive.  The ques-
tion, then, is whether PAGA contains any procedural mech-
anism at odds with arbitration’s basic form.

Viking  suggests  an  answer.    Our  FAA  precedents  treat
bilateral arbitration as the prototype of the individualized
and informal form of arbitration protected from undue state
interference by the FAA.  See Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at
___–___ (slip op., at 8–9); see also American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U. S. 228, 238 (2013); Con-
cepcion, 563 U. S., at 347–349; Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at
685–686.  Viking posits that a proceeding is “bilateral” in
the relevant sense if—but only if—it involves two and only
two parties and the arbitration “ ‘is conducted by and on be-
half of the individual named parties only.’ ”  Wal-Mart, 564
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana*.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the opinion, not a preface or other non-content element.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting

the teacher’s purpose is to educate, not to proselytize.  The
Peace Cross, however, is not of that genre.

II
A
  “For nearly two millennia,” the Latin cross has been the
“defining  symbol”  of  Christianity, R. Jensen, The Cross:
History, Art, and Controversy ix (2017), evoking the foun-
dational  claims  of  that  faith.    Christianity  teaches  that
Jesus  Christ  was  “a  divine Savior” who “illuminate[d] a
path toward salvation and redemption.”  Lynch, 465 U. S.,
at  708  (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Central to the religion
are the beliefs that “the son of God,” Jesus Christ, “died on
the  cross,”  that  “he  rose  from  the  dead,”  and  that  “his
death and resurrection offer the possibility of eternal life.”
Brief  for  Amici  Christian  and  Jewish  Organizations  7.6
“From  its  earliest  times,”  Christianity  was  known  as
“religio  crucis—the  religion  of the cross.”  R. Viladesau,
The Beauty of the Cross: The Passion of Christ in Theol-
ogy and the Arts, From the Catacombs to the Eve of the
Renaissance 7 (2006).  Christians wear crosses, not as an
ecumenical  symbol,  but  to  proclaim  their  adherence  to
Christianity.
  An exclusively Christian symbol, the Latin cross is not
emblematic  of  any  other  faith.    Buono,  559  U. S.,  at 747
(Stevens,  J.,  dissenting);  Viladesau,  supra,  at  7  (“[T]he
cross  and  its  meaning  . . .  set  Christianity  apart  from
other world religions.”).7  The principal symbol of Christi-
——————

6 Under  “one  widespread  reading  of  Christian  scriptures,”  non-
Christians are barred from eternal life and, instead, are condemned to
hell.    Brief  for  Amici  Christian  and  Jewish  Organizations  2.    On this
reading,  the  Latin  cross  symbolizes both the promise of salvation and
the threat of damnation by “divid[ing] the world between the saved and
the damned.”  Id., at 12.

7 Christianity  comprises  numerous denominations.  The term is here
used  to distinguish Christian sects from religions that do not embrace
the defining tenets of Christianity.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the religious significance of the Latin cross and its use in a public monument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. ET AL. v. RUSSO,
INTERIM SECRETARY, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–1323.  Argued March 4, 2020—Decided June 29, 2020*

Louisiana’s Act 620, which is almost word-for-word identical to the Texas
“admitting privileges” law at issue in Whole Woman’s Health v. Heller-
stedt, 579 U. S. ___, requires any doctor who performs abortions to hold
“active admitting privileges at a hospital . . . located not further than
thirty  miles  from  the  location  at  which  the  abortion  is  performed  or
induced,” and defines “active admitting privileges” as being “a member
in good standing” of the hospital’s “medical staff . . . with the ability to
admit a patient and to provide diagnostic and surgical services to such
patient.”

In these consolidated cases, five abortion clinics and four abortion
providers challenged Act 620 before it was to take effect, alleging that
it  was  unconstitutional  because  (among  other  things)  it  imposed  an
undue burden on the right of their patients to obtain an abortion.  (The
plaintiff providers and two additional doctors are referred to as Does 1
through  6.)    The  plaintiffs  asked  for  a  temporary  restraining  order
(TRO), followed by a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from
taking effect.  The defendant (State) opposed the TRO request but also
urged the court not to delay ruling on the preliminary injunction mo-
tion, asserting that there was no doubt about the physicians’ standing.
Rather than staying the Act’s effective date, the District Court provi-
sionally forbade the State to enforce the Act’s penalties, while directing

——————

* Together with No. 18–1460, Russo, Interim Secretary, Louisiana De-
partment of Health and Hospitals v. June Medical Services L. L. C. et al.,
also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the legal issues and the court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

GARLAND v. CARGILL

Opinion of the Court

converting a weapon into a machinegun.”  Ibid.  With a ma-
chinegun, a shooter can fire multiple times, or even contin-
uously, by engaging the trigger only once.  This capability
distinguishes a machinegun from a semiautomatic firearm.
With a semiautomatic firearm, the shooter can fire only one
time by engaging the trigger.  The shooter must release and
reengage the trigger to fire another shot.  Machineguns can
ordinarily achieve higher rates of fire than semiautomatic
firearms because the shooter does not need to release and
reengage the trigger between shots.
  Shooters  have  devised  techniques  for  firing  semiauto-
matic  firearms  at  rates  approaching  those  of  some  ma-
chineguns.  One technique is called bump firing.  A shooter
who bump fires a rifle uses the firearm’s recoil to help rap-
idly manipulate the trigger.  The shooter allows the recoil
from one shot to push the whole firearm backward.  As the
rifle  slides  back  and  away  from  the  shooter’s  stationary
trigger finger, the trigger is released and reset for the next
shot.  Simultaneously, the shooter uses his nontrigger hand
to maintain forward pressure on the rifle’s front grip.  The
forward pressure counteracts the recoil and causes the fire-
arm (and thus the trigger) to move forward and “bump” into
the shooter’s trigger finger.  This bump reengages the trig-
ger and causes another shot to fire, and so on.
  Bump firing is a balancing act.  The shooter must main-
tain enough forward pressure to ensure that he will bump
the  trigger  with  sufficient  force  to  engage  it.    But,  if  the
shooter applies too much forward pressure, the rifle will not
slide back far enough to allow the trigger to reset.  The right
balance  produces  a  reciprocating  motion  that  permits  the
shooter  to  repeatedly  engage  and  release  the  trigger  in
rapid succession.
  Although  bump  firing  does  not  require  any  additional
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text discussing the technical differences between machine guns and semiautomatic firearms, specifically focusing on a technique called "bump firing."  It provides a detailed explanation of how bump firing works and the skill required to execute it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
40

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

BREYER, J., dissenting
BREYER, J., dissenting

cost  as  one  of  the  reasons  why  Nebraska  legislators  re
cently  repealed  the  death  penalty  in  that  State);  cf.  Cali
fornia  Commission  on  the  Fair  Administration  of  Justice,
Report  and  Recommendations  on  the  Administration  of
the Death Penalty in California 117 (June 30, 2008) (death
penalty costs California $137 million per year; a compara
ble system of life imprisonment without parole would cost
$11.5  million  per  year),  online  at  http://www.ccfaj.org/rr
dp-official.html;  Dáte,  The  High  Price  of  Killing  Killers,
Palm  Beach  Post,  Jan.  4,  2000,  p.  1A  (cost  of  each  execu
tion is $23 million above cost of life imprisonment without
parole in Florida).

The answer is that the matters I have discussed, such as
lack  of  reliability,  the  arbitrary  application  of  a  serious
and  irreversible  punishment,  individual  suffering  caused
by  long  delays,  and  lack  of  penological  purpose  are  quin
tessentially judicial matters.  They concern the infliction—
indeed  the  unfair,  cruel,  and  unusual  infliction—of  a
serious  punishment  upon  an  individual.    I  recognize  that
in 1972 this Court, in a sense, turned to Congress and the
state  legislatures  in  its  search  for  standards  that  would
increase  the  fairness  and  reliability  of  imposing  a  death
penalty.  The legislatures responded.  But, in the last four
decades,  considerable  evidence  has  accumulated  that
those responses have not worked.

Thus  we  are  left  with  a  judicial  responsibility.    The
Eighth  Amendment  sets  forth  the  relevant  law,  and  we
must  interpret  that  law.    See  Marbury  v.  Madison,  1
Cranch 137, 177 (1803); Hall, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
19) (“That exercise of independent judgment is the Court’s
judicial  duty”).    We  have  made  clear  that  “ ‘the  Constitu
tion  contemplates  that  in  the  end  our  own  judgment  will
be  brought  to  bear  on  the  question  of  the  acceptability  of
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.’ ”  Id., at
___  (slip  op.,  at  19)  (quoting  Coker  v.  Georgia,  433  U. S.
584,  597  (1977)  (plurality  opinion));  see  also  Thompson  v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Glossip v. Gross*. It contains legal arguments and citations, characteristic of judicial opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005)

3

Syllabus

new  species  of  government  benefit  or  service,  but  out  of  a  function
that  government  actors  have  always  performed—arresting  people
when they have probable cause.  A benefit’s indirect nature was fatal
to a due process claim in O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447
U. S. 773, 787.  Here, as there, “[t]he simple distinction between gov-
ernment action that directly affects a citizen’s legal rights . . . and ac-
tion that is directed against a third party and affects the citizen only
. . .  incidentally,  provides  a  sufficient  answer  to”  cases  finding  gov-
ernment-provided services to be entitlements.  Id., at 788.  Pp. 17–19.

366 F. 3d 1093, reversed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST,
C. J.,  and  O’CONNOR,  KENNEDY,  SOUTER,  THOMAS,  and  BREYER,  JJ.,
joined.    SOUTER,  J.,  filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in  which  BREYER,  J.,
joined.  STEVENS, J., filed a  dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal case syllabus, containing a summary of the case and the justices' opinions.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of the Court

any, can we say that the Creek Reservation persists today?
To determine whether a tribe continues to hold a reser-
vation, there is only one place we may look: the Acts of Con-
gress.  This Court long ago held that the Legislature wields
significant constitutional authority when it comes to tribal
relations, possessing even the authority to breach its own
promises  and  treaties.    Lone  Wolf  v.  Hitchcock,  187  U. S.
553, 566–568 (1903).  But that power, this Court has cau-
tioned,  belongs  to  Congress  alone.  Nor  will  this  Court
lightly infer such a breach once Congress has established a
reservation.  Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 470 (1984).

Under our Constitution, States have no authority to re-
duce federal reservations lying within their borders.  Just
imagine if they did.  A State  could encroach  on the tribal
boundaries  or  legal  rights  Congress  provided,  and,  with
enough time and patience, nullify the promises made in the
name of the United States.  That would be at odds with the
Constitution,  which  entrusts  Congress  with  the  authority
to regulate commerce with Native Americans, and directs
that federal treaties and statutes are the “supreme Law of
the Land.”  Art. I, §8; Art. VI, cl. 2.  It would also leave tribal
rights in the hands of the very neighbors who might be least
inclined to respect them.

Likewise, courts have no proper role in the adjustment of
reservation borders.  Mustering the broad social consensus
required to pass new legislation is a deliberately hard busi-
ness  under  our  Constitution.    Faced  with  this  daunting
task, Congress sometimes might wish an inconvenient res-
ervation would simply disappear.  Short of that, legislators
might seek to pass laws that tiptoe to the edge of disestab-
lishment and hope that judges—facing no possibility of elec-
toral consequences themselves—will deliver the final push.
But  wishes  don’t  make  for  laws,  and  saving  the  political
branches the embarrassment of disestablishing a reserva-
tion is not one of our constitutionally assigned prerogatives.
“[O]nly  Congress  can  divest  a  reservation  of  its  land  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal basis for the existence of tribal reservations and the role of Congress in their establishment and modification.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

KAGAN, J., dissenting

same [effects], namely a diminishing of the minority com-
munity’s ability to fully participate in the electoral process.”
H. R.  Rep.  No.  109–478,  p. 6  (2006).    Congress  thus  reau-
thorized the preclearance scheme for 25 years.
  But this Court took a different view.  Finding that “[o]ur
country has changed,” the Court saw only limited instances
of  voting  discrimination—and  so  no  further  need  for  pre-
clearance.  Shelby County, 570 U. S., at 547–549, 557.  Dis-
placing  Congress’s  contrary  judgment,  the  Court  struck
down the coverage formula essential to the statute’s opera-
tion.  The legal analysis offered was perplexing: The Court
based  its  decision  on  a  “principle  of  equal  [state]  sover-
eignty” that a prior decision of ours had rejected—and that
has  not  made  an  appearance  since.    Id.,  at  544  (majority
opinion);  see  id.,  at  587–588  (Ginsburg,  J.,  dissenting).
Worse  yet  was  the  Court’s  blithe  confidence  in  assessing
what  was  needed  and  what  was  not.    “[T]hings  have
changed  dramatically,”  the  Court  reiterated,  id.,  at  547:
The statute that was once a necessity had become an impo-
sition.  But how did the majority know there was nothing
more for Section 5 to do—that the (undoubted) changes in
the country went so far as to make the provision unneces-
sary?    It didn’t,  as  Justice  Ginsburg  explained  in  dissent.
The  majority’s  faith  that  discrimination  was  almost  gone
derived, at least in part, from the success of Section 5—from
its record of blocking discriminatory voting schemes.  Dis-
carding  Section  5  because  those  schemes  had  diminished
was “like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm be-
cause you are not getting wet.”  Id., at 590.
  The rashness of the act soon became evident.  Once Sec-
tion 5’s strictures came off, States and localities put in place
new restrictive voting laws, with foreseeably adverse effects
on minority voters.  On the very day Shelby County issued,
Texas  announced  that  it  would  implement  a  strict  voter-
identification requirement that had failed to clear Section
5.    See  Elmendorf  &  Spencer,  Administering  Section  2  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal reasoning behind a decision and its potential consequences.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

57

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

conscious admissions programs, and achieved successful le-
gal  careers,  despite  having  different  educational  back-
grounds than their peers.  A discredited hypothesis that the
Court  previously  rejected  is  no  reason  to  overrule  prece-
dent.

JUSTICE THOMAS claims that the weight of this evidence
is  overcome  by  a  single  more  recent  article  published  in
2016.  Ante, at 41, n. 8.  That article, however, explains that
studies supporting the mismatch hypothesis “yield mislead-
ing conclusions,” “overstate the amount of mismatch,” “pre-
clude one from drawing any concrete conclusions,” and rely
on methodologically flawed assumptions that “lea[d] to an
upwardly-biased estimate of mismatch.”  P. Arcidiacono &
M.  Lovenheim,  Affirmative  Action  and  the  Quality-Fit
Trade-off,  54  J.  Econ.  Lit.  3,  17,  20  (2016);  see  id.,  at  6
(“economists should be very skeptical of the mismatch hy-
pothesis”).  Notably, this refutation of the mismatch theory
was  coauthored  by  one  of  SFFA’s  experts,  as  JUSTICE
THOMAS seems to recognize.

Citing  nothing  but  his  own  long-held  belief,  JUSTICE
THOMAS also equates affirmative action in higher education
with segregation, arguing that “racial preferences in college
admissions  ‘stamp  [Black  and  Latino  students]  with  a
badge  of  inferiority.’ ”  Ante,  at  41  (quoting  Adarand,  515
U. S., at 241 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment)).  Studies disprove this sentiment, which ech-
oes “tropes of stigma” that “were employed to oppose Recon-
struction  policies.”  A.  Onwuachi-Willig,  E.  Houh,  &  M.
Campbell, Cracking the Egg: Which Came First—Stigma or
Affirmative Action? 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1299, 1323 (2008); see, e.g.,
id.,  at  1343–1344  (study  of  seven  law  schools  showing  that
stigma results from “racial stereotypes that have attached his-
torically to different groups, regardless of affirmative action’s
existence”).  Indeed,  equating  state-sponsored  segregation
with race-conscious admissions policies that promote racial
integration trivializes the harms of segregation and offends
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites legal precedents, academic studies, and makes arguments against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Opinion of the Court

mailing did not mention the OFAC alert in Ramirez’s file.
The  following  day,  TransUnion  sent  Ramirez  a  second
mailing—a  letter  alerting  him  that  his  name  was  consid-
ered a potential match to names on the OFAC list.  The sec-
ond mailing did not include an additional copy of the sum-
mary  of  rights.    Concerned  about  the  mailings,  Ramirez
consulted a lawyer and ultimately canceled a planned trip
to Mexico.  TransUnion eventually removed the OFAC alert
from Ramirez’s file.

In February 2012, Ramirez sued TransUnion and alleged
three violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  First, he
alleged that TransUnion, by using the Name Screen prod-
uct, failed to follow reasonable procedures to ensure the ac-
curacy of information in his credit file.  See §1681e(b).  Sec-
ond, he claimed that TransUnion failed to provide him with
all the information in his credit file upon his request.  In
particular,  TransUnion’s  first  mailing  did  not  include  the
fact that Ramirez’s name was a potential match for a name
on  the  OFAC  list.  See  §1681g(a)(1).    Third,  Ramirez  as-
serted  that  TransUnion  violated  its  obligation  to  provide
him with a summary of his rights “with each written disclo-
sure,” because TransUnion’s second mailing did not contain
a summary of Ramirez’s rights.  §1681g(c)(2).  Ramirez re-
quested statutory and punitive damages.

Ramirez also sought to certify a class of all people in the
United States to whom TransUnion sent a mailing during
the period from January 1, 2011, to July 26, 2011, that was
similar  in  form  to  the  second  mailing  that  Ramirez  re-
ceived.  TransUnion opposed certification.  The U. S.  Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California rejected
TransUnion’s  argument  and  certified  the  class.    301
F. R. D. 408 (2014).

Before  trial,  the  parties  stipulated  that  the  class  con-
tained 8,185 members, including Ramirez.  The parties also
stipulated that only 1,853 members of the class (including
Ramirez)  had  their  credit  reports  disseminated  by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an excerpt from an opinion of the court. It contains legal terminology, citations, and a description of a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
84

UNION PACIFIC R. CO. v. LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS

Opinion of the Court

the  Board  no  authority  to  adopt  rules  of  jurisdictional  di
mension.  See  45  U. S. C.  § 153  First  (v)  (authorizing  the
NRAB to “adopt such rules as it deems necessary to control
proceedings  before  the  respective  divisions  and  not  in  con
ﬂict with the provisions of this section”).  And when the fact
of conferencing is genuinely contested, we see no reason why
the  panel  could  not  adjourn  the  proceeding  pending  cure  of
any  lapse.  Circular  One  does  not  exclude  such  a  sensible
solution.

The  Carrier  cites  NRAB  decisions  that  allegedly  support
characterization  of  conferencing  as  jurisdictional.  If  the
NRAB lacks authority to deﬁne the jurisdiction of its panels,
however,  surely  the  panels  themselves  lack  that  authority.
Furthermore,  NRAB  panels  have  variously  addressed  the
matter.  For example, in NRAB Third Div. Award No. 15880
(Oct. 26, 1967), the panel, although characterizing the confer
encing  requirement  as  “jurisdictional,”  said  that  “[i]f  one  of
the  parties  refuses  or  fails  to  avail  itself  of  a  conference
where there is an opportunity to do so, it cannot then assert
the  defense  of  a  lack  of  jurisdiction.”  Id.,  at  2.  See  also
NRAB  Fourth  Div.  Award  No.  5074  (June  21,  2001)  (same);
NRAB  Third  Div.  Award  No.  28147  (Oct.  16,  1989)  (same).
Cf.  Arbaugh,  546  U. S.,  at  511  (“unreﬁned”  uses  of  the  word
“jurisdiction”  are  entitled  to  “no  precedential  effect”  (inter
nal  quotation  marks  omitted)).  And  in  NRAB  First  Div.
Award No. 23867, p. 5 (Apr. 7, 1988), the panel observed that
the  ordinary  remedy  for  lack  of  conferencing  is  to  “dismiss
th[e]  claim  without  prejudice  to  allow  Claimant  to  cure  the
jurisdictional defect.”  That panel reached the merits never
theless.  Ibid.  Cf.  Steel  Co.,  523  U. S.,  at  94  (“Jurisdiction
is  power  to  declare the  law,  and  when  it  ceases to  exist,  the
only  function  remaining  to  the  [tribunal]  is  that  of  announc
ing  the  fact  and  dismissing  the  cause.”  (quoting  Ex  parte
McCardle,  7  Wall.  506,  514  (1869))).  We  note,  in  addition,
the  acknowledgment  of  the  Carrier’s  counsel  that,  if  confer
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing a case involving the Union Pacific Railroad Company and Locomotive Engineers. The text delves into the interpretation of jurisdictional rules and the role of conferencing in dispute resolution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

35

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

——————
man  disturb  the  peace,  the  happiness  or  safety  of  society”  (emphasis
added)); Md. Declaration of Rights, Art. 33 (1776), in id., at 17 (“That as
it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks
most acceptable to him, all persons professing the christian religion are
equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty, wherefore no per-
son ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate on account of
his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious practice, unless
under colour of religion any man shall disturb the good order, peace or
safety of the state, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others,
in  their  natural,  civil  or  religious  rights”  (emphasis  added));  Mass.
Const., pt. I, Art. II (1780), in id., at 20–21 (“It is the right as well as the
duty of all men in society, publickly, and at stated seasons, to worship
the  SUPREME  BEING,  the  Great  Creator  and  Preserver  of  the  Uni-
verse.  And no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his per-
son, liberty, or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season
most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious
profession or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the publick peace,
or  obstruct  others  in  their  religious  worship”  (emphasis  added));  N. H.
Const., pt. I, Art. V (1783), in id., at 22–23 (“Every individual has a nat-
ural and unalienable right to worship GOD according to the dictates of
his own conscience, and reason; and no subject shall be hurt, molested,
or restrained in his person, liberty or estate for worshipping GOD in the
manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience,
. . .  provided  he  doth  not  disturb  the  public  peace,  or  disturb  others  in
their  religious  worship”  (emphasis  added));  N. Y.  Const.,  Art.  XXXVIII
(1777), in id., at 26 (“[T]he free Exercise and Enjoyment of religious Pro-
fession and Worship, without Discrimination or Preference, shall forever
hereafter be allowed within this State to all Mankind.  Provided, That
the Liberty of Conscience hereby granted, shall not be so construed, as
to excuse Acts of Licentiousness, or justify Practices inconsistent with the
Peace or Safety of this State” (some emphasis added)); Charter of Rhode
Island and Providence Plantations (1663), in id., at 34 (guaranteeing free
exercise for matters that “do not Actually disturb the Civil Peace of Our
said  Colony”  so  long  as  persons  “[b]ehav[e]  themselves  Peaceably  and
Quietly, And [do] not Us[e] This Liberty to Licentiousness and Prophane-
ness;  nor  to  the  Civil  Injury,  or  outward  Disturbance  of  others”  (some
emphasis  added));  S. C.  Const.,  Art.  VIII, §1  (1790),  in id.,  at  41  (“The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall, forever hereafter, be allowed within
this state to all mankind; provided that the liberty of conscience thereby
declared  shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state” (em-
phasis added)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, specifically citing various state constitutions and their provisions regarding religious freedom.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC.

Opinion of the Court

two levels of authority” separate the President from PTAB
decisions, post, at 1, but the unchecked exercise of executive
power by an officer buried many layers beneath the Presi-
dent poses more, not less, of a constitutional problem.  Con-
spicuously  absent  from  the  dissent  is  any  concern  for  the
President’s ability to “discharge his own constitutional duty
of  seeing  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed.”    Myers  v.
United States, 272 U. S. 52, 135 (1926).

The  other  dissent  charges  that  the  Court’s  opinion  has
“no  foundation”  in  past  decisions.  Post,  at  5  (opinion  of
BREYER,  J.).  Of  course,  we  have  a  different  view  on  the
proper application of Edmond in this dispute.  As for other
past decisions, it is the dissent that expressly grounds its
analysis in dissenting opinions from Free Enterprise Fund
and  Seila  Law,  while  frankly  acknowledging  that  the
Court’s opinions in those cases support the principles that
guide us here.  Post, at 5–7.

C

History reinforces the conclusion that the unreviewable
executive  power  exercised  by  APJs  is  incompatible  with
their status as inferior officers.  Since the founding, princi-
pal officers have directed the decisions of inferior officers on
matters of law as well as policy.  Hamilton articulated the
principle  of  constitutional  accountability  underlying  such
supervision in a 1792 Treasury circular.  Writing as Secre-
tary  of  the  Treasury  to  the  customs  officials  under  his
charge, he warned that any deviations from his instructions
“would be subversive of uniformity in the execution of the
laws.”  3 Works of Alexander Hamilton 557 (J. Hamilton ed.
1850).  “The power to superintend,” he explained, “must im-
ply a right to judge and direct,” thereby ensuring that “the
responsibility for a wrong construction rests with the head
of the department, when it proceeds from him.”  Id., at 559.
Early  congressional  statutes  expressly  empowered  de-
partment heads to supervise the work of their subordinates,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of the opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of constitutional principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA

Opinion of the Court

diminish its boundaries.”  Solem, 465 U. S., at 470.  So it’s
no matter how many other promises to a tribe the federal
government  has  already  broken.    If  Congress  wishes  to
break  the  promise  of  a  reservation,  it  must  say  so.
History shows that Congress knows how  to  withdraw a
reservation when it can muster the will.  Sometimes, legis-
lation has provided an “[e]xplicit reference to cession” or an
“unconditional  commitment  . . .  to  compensate  the  Indian
tribe for its opened land.”  Ibid.  Other times, Congress has
directed that tribal lands shall be “ ‘restored to the public
domain.’ ”    Hagen  v.  Utah,  510  U. S.  399,  412  (1994)  (em-
phasis deleted).  Likewise, Congress might speak of a res-
ervation  as  being  “ ‘discontinued,’ ”  “ ‘abolished,’ ”  or  “ ‘va-
cated.’ ”  Mattz  v.  Arnett,  412  U. S.  481,  504,  n. 22  (1973).
Disestablishment has “never required any particular form
of words,” Hagen, 510 U. S., at 411.  But it does require that
Congress  clearly  express  its  intent  to  do  so,  “[c]ommon[ly
with  an]  ‘[e]xplicit  reference  to  cession  or  other  language
evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal in-
terests.’ ”  Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U. S. 481, ___–___ (2016)
(slip op., at 6).

B
In an effort to show Congress has done just that with the
Creek Reservation, Oklahoma points to events during the
so-called “allotment era.”  Starting in the 1880s, Congress
sought to pressure many tribes to abandon their communal
lifestyles and parcel their lands into smaller lots owned by
individual  tribe  members.  See  1  F.  Cohen,  Handbook  of
Federal Indian Law §1.04 (2012) (Cohen), discussing Gen-
eral Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.  Some al-
lotment  advocates  hoped  that  the  policy  would  create  a
class  of  assimilated,  landowning,  agrarian  Native  Ameri-
cans.  See  Cohen  §1.04;  F.  Hoxie,  A  Final  Promise:  The
Campaign  To  Assimilate  18–19  (2001).    Others  may  have
hoped that, with lands in individual hands and (eventually)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the legal requirements for Congress to disestablish a Native American reservation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

SANDOZ INC. v. AMGEN INC.

Syllabus

ly works on the facts of this case: Sandoz failed to disclose the requi-
site  information  under  §262(l)(2)(A),  and  was  accordingly  subject  to
the consequence specified in §262(l)(9)(C).  As a result, there is noth-
ing  to  decide  on  this  point  as  a  matter  of  federal  law.    The  court  on
remand  should  determine  whether  California  law  would  treat  non-
compliance with §262(l)(2)(A) as “unlawful,” and whether the BPCIA
pre-empts any additional state-law remedy for failure to comply with
§262(l)(2)(A).  Pp. 13–15.

(c) An applicant may provide notice of commercial marketing before
obtaining  a  license.    Section  262(l)(8)(A)  states  that  the  applicant
“shall  provide  notice  to  the  reference  product  sponsor  not  later  than
180 days before the date of the first commercial marketing of the bio-
logical product licensed under subsection (k).”  Because the phrase “of
the  biological  product  licensed  under  subsection  (k)”  modifies  “com-
mercial  marketing”  rather  than  “notice,”  “commercial  marketing”  is
the point in time by which the biosimilar must be “licensed.”  Accord-
ingly,  the  applicant  may  provide  notice  either  before  or  after  receiv-
ing FDA approval.  Statutory context confirms that §262(l)(8)(A) con-
tains  a  single  timing  requirement  (180  days  before  marketing),
rather than the two requirements posited by the Federal Circuit (af-
ter  licensing,  and  180  days  before  marketing).    “Had  Congress  in-
tended  to”  impose  two  timing  requirements  in  §262(l)(8)(A),  “it  pre-
sumably  would  have  done  so  expressly  as  it  did  in  the”  adjacent
provision,  §262(l)(8)(B).  Russello  v.  United  States,  464  U.  S.  16,  23.
Amgen’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive, and its various policy
arguments cannot overcome the statute’s plain language.  Pp. 15–18.

794 F. 3d 1347, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  BREYER, J.,

filed a concurring opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision. It's not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

ALITO, J., dissenting

verdicts by less than a unanimous jury,” citing Apodaca).

Consistent  with  these  statements  of  the  governing  law,
whenever defendants convicted by non-unanimous verdicts
sought  review  in  this  Court  and  asked  that  Apodaca  be
overruled, the Court denied those requests—without a sin-
gle registered dissent.10  Even the legal academy, never shy
about  puncturing  misconceptions,  was  taken  in.11    Every-
body thought Apodaca was a precedent.  But, according to
three of the Justices in the majority, everybody was fooled.
Apodaca, the precedent, was a mirage.  Can this be true?

No,  it  cannot.  The  idea  that  Apodaca  was  a  phantom
precedent  defies  belief.    And  it  certainly  disserves  im-
portant  objectives  that  stare  decisis  exists  to  promote,  in-
cluding evenhandedness, predictability, and the protection
of legitimate reliance.  See, e.g., Gamble v. United States,
587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019); Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment,

——————

10 See, e.g., Magee v. Louisiana, 585 U. S. ___ (2018); Sims v. Louisi-
ana, 584 U. S. ___ (2018); Baumberger v. Louisiana, 583 U. S. ___ (2017);
Jackson v. Louisiana, 572 U. S. 1088 (2014); McElveen v. Louisiana, 568
U. S. 1163 (2013); Miller v. Louisiana, 568 U. S. 1157 (2013); Bowen v.
Oregon,  558  U. S.  815  (2009);  Lee  v.  Louisiana,  555  U. S.  823  (2008);
McIntyre  v.  Louisiana,  449  U. S.  871  (1980);  Hodges  v.  Louisiana,  434
U. S. 1074 (1978).  On June 7, 1972, shortly after Apodaca was handed
down, the Court denied certiorari in a number of cases asking the Court
to recognize a right to unanimity in state jury trials.  Blevins v. Oregon,
406  U. S.  972;  Martinka  v.  Oregon,  406  U. S.  973;  Andrews  v.  Oregon,
406 U. S. 973; Planck v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 973; Riddell v. Oregon, 406
U. S. 973; Mitchell v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 973; Atkison v. Oregon, 406 U. S.
973;  Temple  v.  Oregon,  406  U. S.  973;  Davis  v.  Oregon,  406  U. S.  974;
O’Dell v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 974; Miller v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 974.

Contrary to the majority opinion, I am not arguing that the denial of
certiorari is precedential.  See ante, at 19, n. 56.  My point, instead, is
that the Court’s pattern of denying review in cases presenting the ques-
tion whether unanimity is required in state trials is evidence that this
Court regarded Apodaca as a precedent.

11 D.  Rudstein,  C.  Erlinder,  &  D.  Thomas,  3  Criminal  Constitutional
Law §14.03[3] (2019); W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, 6 Crimi-
nal  Procedure  §22.1(e)  (2015);  W.  Rich,  2  Modern  Constitutional  Law
§30:27 (2011).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the precedent set by the Apodaca case and argues that the majority opinion is incorrect in its interpretation of that precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Statement of THOMAS, J.

has broad ramifications given that 36 States allow medici-
nal marijuana use and 18 of those States also allow recrea-
tional use.5

Given  all  these  developments,  one  can  certainly  under-
stand why an ordinary person might think that the Federal
Government  has  retreated  from  its  once-absolute  ban  on
marijuana.  See, e.g., Halper, Congress Quietly Ends Fed-
eral Government’s Ban on Medical Marijuana, L. A. Times,
Dec. 16, 2014.  One can also perhaps understand why busi-
ness  owners  in  Colorado,  like  petitioners,  may  think  that
their  intrastate  marijuana  operations  will  be  treated  like
any other enterprise that is legal under state law.

Yet,  as  petitioners  recently  discovered,  legality  under
state law and the absence of federal criminal enforcement
do not ensure equal treatment.  At issue here is a provision
of  the  Tax  Code  that  allows  most  businesses  to  calculate
their taxable income by subtracting from their gross reve-
nue the cost of goods sold and other ordinary and necessary
business expenses, such as rent and employee salaries.  See
26 U. S. C. §162(a); 26 CFR. 1.61–3(a) (2020).  But because
of a public-policy provision in the Tax Code, companies that
deal in controlled substances prohibited by federal law may
subtract only the cost of goods sold, not the other ordinary
and  necessary  business  expenses.    See  26  U. S. C.  §280E.
Under this rule, a business that is still in the red after it
pays its workers and keeps the lights on might nonetheless
owe substantial federal income tax.

As things currently stand, the Internal Revenue Service
is investigating whether petitioners deducted business ex-
penses in violation of §280E, and petitioners are trying to

——————
(2016).

5 Hartman, Cannabis Overview, Nat. Conference of State Legislatures
(June  22,  2021),  https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-jus-
tice/marijuana-overview.aspx.  The state recreational use number does
not include South Dakota, where a state court overturned a ballot meas-
ure legalizing marijuana.  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court Justice's statement. It discusses the legal complexities surrounding marijuana businesses and the application of tax laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Supreme Court Statement</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
54

BEARD  v.  KINDLER

Syllabus

Court  has  framed  the  adequacy  inquiry  by  asking  whether  the  state
rule  was  “ﬁrmly  established  and  regularly  followed.”  Id.,  at  376.  A
discretionary state  procedural rule  can serve as  an adequate  ground to
bar federal habeas review even if the appropriate exercise of discretion
may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases but not others.
A  contrary  holding  would  pose  an  unnecessary  dilemma  for  the
States:  They  could  preserve  ﬂexibility  by  granting  courts  discretion  to
excuse procedural errors, but only at the cost of undermining the ﬁnality
of state court judgments.  Or States could preserve the ﬁnality of their
judgments  by  withholding  such  discretion,  but  only  at  the  cost  of  pre
cluding any ﬂexibility in applying the rules.  If forced to choose, many
States would opt for mandatory rules to avoid the high costs of plenary
federal  review.  That  would  be  unfortunate  in  many  cases,  as  discre
tionary  rules  are  often  desirable.  The  federal  system,  for  example,
often grants the trial judge broad discretion when his ringside perspec
tive  at  the  main  event  offers  him  a  comparative  advantage  in  decision-
making.  The  States  have  followed  suit.  Given  the  federalism  and
comity  concerns  motivating  the  adequate  state  ground  doctrine  in  the
habeas context, see Coleman, supra, at 730, this Court should not disre
gard  discretionary  state  procedural  rules  that  are  in  place  in  nearly
every  State  and  are  substantially  similar  to  those  given  full  force
in  federal  courts.  Cf.  Francis  v.  Henderson,  425  U. S.  536,  541–542.
Pp. 60–63.

542 F. 3d 70, vacated and remanded.

Roberts,  C.  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  all  other
Members  joined,  except  Alito,  J.,  who  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or decision of the case.  Kennedy, J., ﬁled a concurring opinion, in which
Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 63.

Ronald Eisenberg argued the cause for petitioners.  With
him  on  the  briefs  were  Thomas  W.  Dolgenos  and  Lynne
Abraham.

Matthew C. Lawry  argued  the  cause  for  respondent.
With him on the brief were Leigh Skipper, Jennifer L. Giv
ens, and Billy H. Nolas.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the State of Cali
fornia  et  al.  by  Edmund  G.  Brown,  Jr.,  Attorney  General  of  California,
Dane  R.  Gillette,  Chief  Assistant  Attorney  General,  and  Donald  E.
de Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, by Kevin T. Kane, Chief State’s
Attorney  of Connecticut,  by  Richard S.  Gebelein,  Chief Deputy  Attorney
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision and reasoning. It's not the main body of the legal text and is more of a summary or overview.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of the Court

equally.  So an employer who fires a woman, Hannah, be-
cause  she  is  insufficiently  feminine  and  also  fires  a  man,
Bob, for being insufficiently masculine may treat men and
women as groups more or less equally.  But in both cases
the employer fires an individual in part because of sex.  In-
stead of avoiding Title VII exposure, this employer doubles
it.

B
From  the  ordinary  public  meaning  of  the  statute’s  lan-
guage at the time of the law’s adoption, a straightforward
rule emerges:  An employer violates Title VII when it inten-
tionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex.
It doesn’t matter if other factors besides the plaintiff ’s sex
contributed to the decision.  And it doesn’t matter if the em-
ployer treated women as a group the same when compared
to men as a group.  If the employer intentionally relies in
part on an individual employee’s sex when deciding to dis-
charge the employee—put differently, if changing the em-
ployee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the em-
ployer—a  statutory  violation  has  occurred.  Title  VII’s
message  is  “simple  but  momentous”:    An  individual  em-
ployee’s sex is “not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or
compensation of employees.”  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U. S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion).

The statute’s message for our cases is equally simple and
momentous:  An individual’s homosexuality or transgender
status is not relevant to employment decisions.  That’s be-
cause it is impossible to discriminate against a person for
being  homosexual  or  transgender  without  discriminating
against that individual based on sex.  Consider, for exam-
ple, an employer with two employees, both of whom are at-
tracted to men.  The two individuals are, to the employer’s
mind, materially identical in all respects, except that one is
a  man  and  the  other  a  woman.  If  the  employer  fires  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of Title VII to cases of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2013

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. QUALITY STORES, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 12–1408.  Argued January 14, 2014—Decided March 25, 2014

Respondent  Quality  Stores,  Inc.,  and  its  affiliates  (collectively  Quality
Stores) made severance payments to employees who were involuntar-
ily  terminated  as  part  of  Quality  Stores’  Chapter  11  bankruptcy.
Payments—which were made pursuant to plans that did not tie pay-
ments to the receipt of state unemployment insurance—varied based
on job seniority and time served.  Quality Stores paid and withheld,
inter alia, taxes required under the Federal Insurance Contributions
Act  (FICA),  26  U. S. C.  §3101  et  seq.  Later  believing  that  the  pay-
ments  should  not  have  been  taxed  as  wages  under  FICA,  Quality
Stores sought a refund on behalf of itself and about 1,850 former em-
ployees.  When  the  Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  did  not  allow  or
deny  the  refund,  Quality  Stores  initiated  proceedings  in  the  Bank-
ruptcy  Court,  which  granted  summary  judgment  in  its  favor.  The
District Court and Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that severance
payments are not wages under FICA.

Held: The  severance  payments  at  issue  are  taxable  wages  for  FICA

purposes.  Pp. 4–15.

(a) FICA defines “wages” broadly as “all remuneration for employ-
ment.”  §3121(a).  As a matter of plain meaning, severance payments
fit this definition: They are a form of remuneration made only to em-
ployees in consideration for employment.  “Employment” is “any ser-
vice  . . .  performed  . . .  by  an  employee”  for  an  employer.    §3121(b).
By varying according to a terminated employee’s function and senior-
ity, the severance payments at issue confirm the principle that “ser-
vice”  “mea[ns]  not  only  work  actually  done  but  the  entire  employer-
employee relationship for which compensation is paid.”  Social Secu-
rity Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358, 365–366.  This broad definition is
reinforced by the specificity of FICA’s lengthy list of exemptions.  The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Reporter’s Note

The  attached  opinion  has  been  revised  to  refect  the  usual  publication
and  citation  style  of  the  United  States  Reports.  The  revised  pagination
makes  available  the  offcial  United  States  Reports  citation  in  advance  of
publication.  The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the  Court.  A  list  of  counsel  who  argued  or  fled  briefs  in  this  case,  and
who  were  members  of  the  bar  of  this  Court  at  the  time  this  case  was
argued,  has  been  inserted  following  the  syllabus.  Other  revisions  may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation.  The following additional edits were made:

None

Page Proof Pending Publication
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a reporter's note explaining the changes made to the opinion before its official publication. It provides information about citation style, pagination, and other editorial adjustments. This type of information is not typically considered part of the main body of the legal opinion and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Reporter's Note</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

the statute for one main reason: It adopts the Tribe’s argu-
ment that  the use of the word “prohibited” in §107(a) im-
plicitly incorporates the jurisdictional framework of Public
Law 280 and Cabazon Band.

1
There are a number of reasons to be skeptical of this ap-
proach.  First, Congress knew how to incorporate the Public
Law 280 framework where it wished to do so.  We know that
because  that  is  precisely  what  Congress  did  in  §105(f )  of
the  Restoration  Act.  There  is  little  reason  to  think  that
Congress would have done so elsewhere in the very same
Act with nothing more than a wink and a nudge.

Second,  there  is  no  evidence  that  Congress  intended  to
use the word “prohibited” in §107(a) as a term of art.  The
word  “prohibit”  appears  thousands  of  times  in  the  U. S.
Code.  See Brief for Respondent 24, n. 6.  The fact that our
decision in Cabazon Band used this generic term to describe
the  bounds of  Public  Law  280  is  hardly  enough  to  turn  it
into a term of art with a more particularized meaning.

Third, the text of §107(a) of the Restoration Act bears lit-
tle  resemblance  to  the  statutory  language  of  Public  Law
280.  Compare 18 U. S. C. §1162 and 28 U. S. C. §1360 (set-
ting  forth  provisions  of  Public  Law  280)  with  §107  of  the
Restoration Act.  Thus, this is not a situation where a more
recent enactment carries with it the “old soil” of a predeces-
sor statute or rule.  See F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on  the  Reading  of  Statutes,  47  Colum.  L. Rev.  527,  537
(1947).

Finally, the language used in §107 does not signal an in-
tent  to  adopt  Cabazon  Band’s  unique  dichotomy  between
laws  that  are  “ ‘criminal/prohibitory’ ”  and  those  that  are
“ ‘civil/regulatory.’ ”  480 U. S., at 209.  The Tribe points to
§107(a)’s  use  of  the  word  “prohibited”  and  §107(b)’s  refer-
ence to the State lacking “regulatory jurisdiction” on tribal
lands  to  suggest  that  only  Texas’s  gaming  laws  that  are
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 596 U.S. ____ (2022). It presents legal arguments against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>