<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1087

529 U. S.

April 24, 2000

No. 99–1294. Foster, Superintendent of Banking and
Administrator of Electronic Transfer Funds, Iowa Divi-
sion of Banking, Iowa Department of Commerce v. Bank
One, Utah, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 190 F. 3d 844.

No. 99–1330. Edmonds, Appearing as Tutrix of Her
Minor Son, Bell v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety
and Corrections et al. Ct. App. La., 2d Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 732 So. 2d 645.

No. 99–1343. Moenning v. Illinois Commerce Commission

et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1386. Qualls et al. v. City of Detroit et al. Ct.

App. Mich. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1387. Langlie v. Onan Corp. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 1137.

No. 99–1395. Motley v. New Jersey State Police et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 160.
No. 99–1397. CBT Group PLC et al. v. San Mateo County
Superior Court. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–1406.

Joytime Distributors & Amusement Co., Inc.
v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 338 S. C. 634, 528 S. E. 2d 647.

No. 99–1410. First Mount Vernon, I. L. A. v. Prince
George’s County. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 194 F. 3d 1304.

No. 99–1412. Cherokee Corporation of Linden, Virginia,
Inc. v. Capital Skiing Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 191 F. 3d 447.

No. 99–1420. Ellis et al. v. Washington County et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 225.
No. 99–1435. Graves v. Boone, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 447.

No. 99–1436. Lin v. Lin (two judgments). Ct. App. N. C.

Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases with their corresponding case numbers, dates, and lower court information. This is not the typical narrative text found within a book and is more likely a legal document or a list of cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ___ (2015)

11

KAGAN, J., dissenting

States, 573 U. S. ___, ___ – ___, n. 4 (2014) (slip op., at 6–7,
n. 4).  This Court has never thought that of such ordinary
stuff surplusage is made.  See ibid.; Connecticut Nat. Bank
v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992).

And  the  legislative  history  to  which  the  plurality  ap-
peals,  see  ante,  at  6,  only  cuts  against  it  because  those
materials  show  that  lawmakers  knew  that  §1519  and
§1512(c)(1) share much common ground.  Minority Leader
Lott  introduced  the  amendment  that  included  §1512(c)(1)
(along with other criminal and corporate fraud provisions)
late in the legislative process, explaining that he did so at
the  specific  request  of  the  President.    See  148  Cong.  Rec.
12509, 12512 (2002) (remarks of Sen. Lott).  Not only Lott
but several other Senators noted the overlap between the
President’s  package  and  provisions  already  in  the  bill,
most  notably  §1519.  See  id.,  at  12512  (remarks  of  Sen.
Lott);  id.,  at  12513  (remarks  of  Sen.  Biden); id.,  at  12517
(remarks  of  Sens.  Hatch  and  Gramm).    The  presence  of
both  §1519  and  §1512(c)(1)  in  the  final  Act  may  have
reflected  belt-and-suspenders  caution:  If  §1519  contained
some flaw, §1512(c)(1) would serve as a backstop.  Or the
addition of §1512(c)(1) may have derived solely from legis-
lators’ wish “to satisfy audiences other than courts”—that
is,  the  President  and  his  Justice  Department.    Gluck  &
Bressman,  Statutory  Interpretation  from  the  Inside,  65
Stan. L. Rev. 901, 935 (2013) (emphasis deleted).  Which-
ever the case, Congress’s consciousness of overlap between
the two provisions removes any conceivable reason to cast
aside  §1519’s  ordinary  meaning  in  service  of  preventing
some statutory repetition.

Indeed,  the  inclusion  of  §1512(c)(1)  in  Sarbanes-Oxley
creates a far worse problem for the plurality’s construction
of §1519 than for mine.  Section 1512(c)(1) criminalizes the
destruction  of  any  “record,  document,  or  other  object”;
§1519  of  any  “record,  document,  or  tangible  object.”    On
the plurality’s view, one “object” is really an object, where-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of specific sections of law (Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

21

Opinion of the Court

saving clause because Congress has imposed analogous lim-
itations on analogous claims by state prisoners and—by do-
ing so—has redefined §2255(e)’s implicit habeas benchmark
with respect to such “factual” and “constitutional” claims.
See 28 U. S. C. §§2244(b)(2)(A)–(B).  Since, the Government
asserts, Congress has imposed no analogous limitation on
statutory claims by state prisoners, it has not redefined the
implicit habeas benchmark with respect to statutory claims
like  Jones’.    And,  we  should  be  unwilling  to  infer  that
AEDPA limited such claims without a clearer textual indi-
cation.  The  Government  concludes  that  §2255(h)  renders
§2255 “inadequate or ineffective to test” a federal prisoner’s
statutory  claim  in  cases  where  the  prisoner  has  already
filed  one  §2255  motion  and  the  claim  otherwise  satisfies
pre-AEDPA habeas principles, which generally will require
“a ‘colorable showing of factual innocence.’ ”  McCleskey v.
Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 495 (1991) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wil-
son, 477 U. S. 436, 454 (1986) (plurality opinion)).9

——————

9 The Government also argues that Davis v. United States, 417 U. S.
333 (1974), and Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174 (1947), read together, dic-
tate that only an intervening decision of this Court, rather than a Court
of Appeals, can work such a change in the law as to justify an otherwise-
barred §2241 petition.  But this attempt to articulate an additional lim-
iting  principle  for  the  Government’s  theory  requires  turning  the  cases
inside out.  In Davis, where this Court allowed a statutory claim to pro-
ceed under §2255, the relevant narrowing decision came from the Ninth
Circuit.  See 417 U. S., at 341 (discussing United States v. Fox, 454 F. 2d
593 (CA9 1971)).  In Sunal, where two petitioners’ statutory claims were
barred from proceeding in habeas, it was this Court that had issued the
relevant  decision.  See  332  U. S.,  at  176  (discussing  Estep  v.  United
States, 327 U. S. 114 (1946)).  As we have recognized, see Reed v. Farley,
512 U. S. 339, 354 (1994), the holding of Sunal rested on what we would
today call the petitioners’ procedural default without cause: By not ap-
pealing their convictions, they had forfeited the argument that ended up
prevailing in Estep, and they had shown no “exceptional circumstances
which  excuse[d]  their  failure”  to  appeal.    332  U. S.,  at  183–184.    The
Sunal Court thus had no occasion to definitively resolve whether the pe-
titioners’ claims would have been cognizable in habeas but for their de-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States.  The language is formal and legalistic, discussing legal precedents and statutory interpretations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS

ALITO, J., dissenting

provisions are inextricably linked to the mandate, the fed-
eral defendants cannot enforce those provisions against the
state  plaintiffs.    And  the  state  plaintiffs  are  entitled  to  a
judgment providing as much.  That answer comports with
the reasoning of the NFIB joint dissent, which made clear
that  the  state  plaintiffs  should  not  be  required  to  comply
with the provisions of the ACA that burden them.  See 567
U. S., at 697–707.  And it comports with the remedial ap-
proach others have advocated in recent years.  See Murphy,
584  U. S.,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  3);
Seila Law, 591 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op.,
at 24); Barr v. American Assn. of Political Consultants, Inc.,
591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 5).  Thus,
under either the framework used in the NFIB joint dissent
or  the  alternative  framework  advocated  in  subsequent
cases, the state plaintiffs are entitled to relief freeing them
from  compliance  with  the  ACA  provisions  that  burden
them.

*

  *

  *

  No one can fail to be impressed by the lengths to which
this Court has been willing to go to defend the ACA against
all threats.  A penalty is a tax.  The United States is a State.
And 18 States who bear costly burdens under the ACA can-
not even get a foot in the door to raise a constitutional chal-
lenge.  So a tax that does not tax is allowed to stand and
support one of the biggest Government programs in our Na-
tion’s history.  Fans of judicial inventiveness will applaud
once again.
  But I must respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MURTHY v. MISSOURI

Syllabus

(3) To obtain forward-looking relief, the plaintiffs must establish
a substantial risk of future injury that is traceable to the Government
defendants and likely to be redressed by an injunction against them.
The  plaintiffs  who  have  not  pointed  to  any  past  restrictions  likely
traceable  to  the  Government  defendants  (i.e.,  everyone  other  than
Hines) are ill suited to the task of establishing their standing to seek
forward-looking relief.  But even Hines, with her superior showing on
past harm, has not shown enough to demonstrate likely future harm
at the hands of these defendants.  On this record, it appears that the
frequent, intense communications that took place in 2021 between the
Government defendants and the platforms had considerably subsided
by 2022, when Hines filed suit.  Thus it is “no more than conjecture”
to assume that Hines will be subject to Government-induced content
moderation.  Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 108.

The plaintiffs’ counterarguments are unpersuasive.  First, they ar-
gue  that  they  suffer  “continuing,  present  adverse  effects”  from  their
past  restrictions,  as  they  must  now  self-censor  on  social  media.
O’Shea,  414  U. S.,  at  496.    But  the  plaintiffs  “cannot  manufacture
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears
of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”  Clapper,
568  U. S.,  at  416.    Second,  the  plaintiffs  suggest  that  the  platforms
continue  to  suppress  their  speech  according  to  policies  initially
adopted  under  Government  pressure.    But  the  plaintiffs  have  a  re-
dressability problem.  Without evidence of continued pressure from the
defendants,  the  platforms  remain  free  to  enforce,  or  not  to  enforce,
their  policies—even  those  tainted  by  initial  governmental  coercion.
And the available evidence indicates that the platforms have contin-
ued to enforce their policies against COVID–19 misinformation even
as  the  Federal  Government  has  wound  down  its  own  pandemic  re-
sponse measures.  Enjoining the Government defendants, therefore, is
unlikely to affect the platforms’ content-moderation decisions.  Pp. 21–
27.

(c) The plaintiffs next assert a “right to listen” theory of standing.
The  individual  plaintiffs  argue  that  the  First  Amendment  protects
their interest in reading and engaging with the content of other speak-
ers on social media.  This theory is startlingly broad, as it would grant
all social-media users the right to sue over someone else’s censorship—
at least so long as they claim an interest in that person’s speech.  While
the Court has recognized a “First Amendment right to receive infor-
mation  and  ideas,”  the  Court  has  identified  a  cognizable  injury  only
where the listener has a concrete, specific connection to the speaker.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 762.  Attempting to satisfy this
requirement, the plaintiffs emphasize that hearing unfettered speech
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the court's reasoning for denying standing to the plaintiffs in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

KAGAN, J., dissenting

placed such a “statute-by-statute evaluation (which was as-
suredly a font of uncertainty and litigation) with an across-
the-board  presumption.”  A.  Scalia,  Judicial  Deference  to
Administrative  Interpretations  of  Law,  1989  Duke  L.  J.
511, 516.  As a lover of the predictability that rules create,
Justice  Scalia  thought  the  latter  “unquestionably  better.”
Id., at 517.

On the other side of the balance, the most important stare
decisis factor—call it the “jolt to the legal system” issue—
weighs  heavily  against  overruling  Chevron.  Dobbs,  597
U. S.,  at  357  (ROBERTS,  C. J.,  concurring  in  judgment).
Congress and agencies alike have relied on Chevron—have
assumed its existence—in much of their work for the last
40 years.  Statutes passed during that time reflect the ex-
pectation that Chevron would allocate interpretive author-
ity between agencies and courts.  Rules issued during the
period likewise presuppose that statutory ambiguities were
the agencies’ to (reasonably) resolve.  Those agency inter-
pretations  may  have  benefited  regulated  entities;  or  they
may have protected members of the broader public.  Either
way, private parties have ordered their affairs—their busi-
ness  and  financial  decisions,  their  health-care  decisions,
their  educational  decisions—around  agency  actions  that
are suddenly now subject to challenge.  In Kisor, this Court
refused to overrule Auer because doing so would “cast doubt
on” many longstanding constructions of rules, and thereby
upset settled expectations.  588 U. S., at 587 (opinion of the
Court).  Overruling Chevron, and thus raising new doubts
about agency constructions of statutes, will be far more dis-
ruptive.

The majority tries to alleviate concerns about a piece of
that problem: It states that judicial decisions that have up-
held agency action as reasonable under Chevron should not
be  overruled  on  that  account  alone.  See  ante,  at  34–35.
That is all to the good: There are thousands of such deci-
sions, many settled for decades.  See supra, at 26.  But first,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Chevron deference doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U33

[10-04-01 09:21:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

53

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit

No. 98–1696. Argued December 8, 1999—Decided March 1, 2000

Respondent had been serving time in federal prison for multiple drug
and ﬁrearms felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid.
As a result, he had served 2.5 years’ too much prison time and was at
once set free, but a 3-year term of supervised release was yet to be
served on the remaining convictions. He ﬁled a motion to reduce his
supervised release term by the amount of extra prison time he served.
The District Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release
commenced upon respondent’s actual release from incarceration, not be-
fore. The Sixth Circuit reversed, accepting respondent’s argument that
his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left prison,
but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired.

Held: This Court is bound by the controlling statute, 18 U. S. C. § 3624(e),
which, by its necessary operation, does not reduce the length of a
supervised release term by reason of excess time served in prison.
Under § 3624(e), a supervised release term does not commence until an
individual “is released from imprisonment.” The ordinary, common-
sense meaning of “release” is to be freed from conﬁnement. To say
respondent was released while still imprisoned diminishes the concept
the word intends to convey. Section 3624(e) also provides that a super-
vised release term comes “after imprisonment,” once the prisoner is
“released by the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a probation
ofﬁcer.” Thus, supervised release does not run while an individual
remains in the Bureau of Prisons’ custody. The phrase “on the day the
person is released” in § 3624(e) suggests a strict temporal interpreta-
tion, not some ﬁctitious or constructive earlier time.
Indeed, the sec-
tion admonishes that “supervised release does not run during any period
in which the person is imprisoned.” The statute does provide for con-
current running of supervised release in speciﬁc, identiﬁed cases, but
the Court infers that Congress limited § 3624(e) to the exceptions set
forth. Finally, § 3583(e)(3) does not have a substantial bearing on the
interpretive issue, for this directive addresses instances where con-
ditions of supervised release have been violated, and the court orders
a revocation. While the text of § 3624(e) resolves the case, the Court’s
conclusion accords with the objectives of supervised release, which in-
clude assisting individuals in their transition to community life. Super-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case.  It includes case details, a brief description of the case, and the Court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

VIDAL v. ELSTER

Syllabus

This Court has twice concluded that trademark restrictions that dis-
criminate based on viewpoint violate the First Amendment.  See Matal
v. Tam, 582 U. S. 218; Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U. S. 388.

Because the names clause does not single out a trademark “based on
the  specific  motivating  ideology  or  the  opinion  or  perspective  of  the
speaker,”  Reed,  576  U. S.,  at  168,  it  does  not  facially  discriminate
against any viewpoint.  But a law that does not facially discriminate
based on viewpoint may still be found to discriminate based on view-
point  in  its  practical  operation.  See  Sorrell  v.  IMS  Health  Inc.,  564
U. S. 552, 565.  Elster suggests that is the case here because obtaining
consent for a trademark under the names clause is easier if it flatters
rather than mocks a subject.  But there are many reasons why a person
may  wish  to  withhold  consent  to  register  a  trademark  bearing  his
name.

Although  the  names  clause  is  not  viewpoint  based,  it  is  content
based because “it applies to particular speech because of the topic dis-
cussed or the idea or message expressed,” Reed, 576 U. S., at 163—i.e.,
it turns on whether the proposed trademark contains a person’s name.
Thus, the Court confronts a situation not addressed in Tam and Bru-
netti.  Pp. 3–6.

(b) Although a content-based regulation of speech is presumptively
unconstitutional, this Court has not decided whether heightened scru-
tiny  extends  to  a  content-based—but  viewpoint-neutral—trademark
restriction.  Several features of trademark counsel against a per se rule
of  applying  heightened  scrutiny  in  such  cases.   Most  importantly,
trademark  rights  have  always  coexisted  with  the  First  Amendment,
and the inherently content-based nature of trademark law has never
been a cause for constitutional concern.

This  country  has  recognized  trademark  rights  since  the  founding.
Much of early American trademark law came by way of English law,
where the protection of trademarks was an inherently content-based
endeavor.  For most of the 18th and 19th centuries, trademark law fell
largely within the “province of the States,” Tam, 582 U. S., at 224, and
went largely unrecorded.  The first reported decisions in state and fed-
eral  courts  revolved  around a  trademark’s  content.    See  Thomson v.
Winchester,  36  Mass.  214,  216;  Taylor  v.  Carpenter,  3  Story  458  (D.
Mass.).  And as recorded trademark law began to take off in the last
decades of the 19th century, its established content-based nature con-
tinued.    In  1870,  Congress  enacted  the  first  federal  trademark  law,
containing prohibitions on what could be protected as a trademark.  It
restricted a trademark based upon its content.  And as trademark dis-
putes increased, courts continued to assess trademarks based on their
content.  The content-based nature of trademark law did not change
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the arguments and issues in a Supreme Court case. It is not the main body of the legal opinion and focuses on summarizing the case's context and legal questions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

Opinion of the Court

EPA’s new interpretation is also difficult to reconcile with
the  statute’s  reference  to  “any  addition”  of  a  pollutant  to
navigable waters.  Cf. Milwaukee, 451 U. S., at 318 (“Every
point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by a per-
mit” (footnote omitted)).  It is difficult to reconcile EPA’s in-
terpretation  with  the  statute’s  inclusion  of  “wells”  in  the
definition of “point source,” for wells most ordinarily would
discharge pollutants through groundwater.  And it is diffi-
cult  to  reconcile  EPA’s  interpretation  with  the  statutory
provisions  that  allow  EPA  to  delegate  its  permitting  au-
thority to a State only if the State (among other things) pro-
vides “ ‘adequate authority’ ” to “ ‘control the disposal of pol-
lutants  into  wells.’ ”    §402(b),  86  Stat.  881.   What  need
would there be for such a proviso if the federal permitting
program the State replaces did not include such discharges
(from wells through groundwater) in the first place?

In short, EPA’s oblique argument about the statute’s ref-
erences  to  groundwater  cannot  overcome  the  statute’s
structure, its purposes, or the text of the provisions that ac-
tually govern.

D

Perhaps, as the two dissents suggest, the language could
be narrowed to similar effect by reading the statute to refer
only to the pollutant’s immediate origin.  See post, at 2–3
(opinion of THOMAS, J.); post, at 8 (opinion of ALITO, J.).  But
there  is  no  linguistic  basis  here  to  so  limit  the  statute  in
that way.  Again, whether that is the correct reading turns
on context.  JUSTICE THOMAS insists that in the case of a
discharge  through  groundwater,  the  pollutants  are  added
“from the groundwater.”  Post, at 2.  Indeed, but that does
not  mean  they  are  not  also  “from  the  point  source.”  Ibid.
When John comes to the hotel, John might have come from
the  train  station,  from  Baltimore,  from  Europe,  from  any
two of those three places, or from all three.  A sign that asks
all persons who arrive from Baltimore to speak to the desk
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY

Syllabus

in  part,  in  which  BREYER  and  ALITO,  JJ.,  joined.    THOMAS,  J.,  filed  a
dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a heading from a legal document, likely the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of legal cases and are not typically considered the main body of the text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Syllabus

Fund, 520 U. S. 806, 816.  Pp. 7–10.

891 F. 3d 1109, reversed and remanded.

  SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except BARRETT, J., who took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case.  THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and introductory information, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It's not the main body of the text and would not be suitable for indexing as it's not the actual content meant for reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

325

Opinion of the Court

the  functional  equivalent  of  express  advocacy  only  if  [it]  is
susceptible  of  no  reasonable  interpretation  other  than  as  an
appeal  to  vote  for  or  against  a  speciﬁc  candidate.”  Id.,  at
469–470.

Under this test, Hillary is equivalent to express advocacy.
The movie, in essence, is a feature-length negative advertise
ment that urges viewers to vote against Senator Clinton for
President.  In  light  of  historical  footage,  interviews  with
persons  critical  of  her,  and  voiceover  narration,  the  ﬁlm
would  be  understood  by  most  viewers  as  an  extended  criti
cism  of  Senator  Clinton’s  character  and  her  ﬁtness  for  the
ofﬁce  of  the  Presidency.  The  narrative  may  contain  more
suggestions  and  arguments  than  facts,  but  there  is  little
doubt  that  the  thesis  of  the  ﬁlm  is  that  she  is  unﬁt  for  the
Presidency.  The movie concentrates on alleged wrongdoing
during  the  Clinton  administration,  Senator  Clinton’s  qualiﬁ
cations  and  ﬁtness  for  ofﬁce,  and  policies  the  commentators
predict she would pursue if elected President.  It calls Sena
tor Clinton “Machiavellian,” App. 64a, and asks whether she
is  “the  most  qualiﬁed  to  hit  the  ground  running  if  elected
President,”  id.,  at  88a.  The  narrator  reminds  viewers  that
“Americans  have  never  been  keen  on  dynasties”  and  that
“a  vote  for  Hillary  is  a  vote  to  continue  20  years  of  a  Bush
or a Clinton in the White House,” id., at 143a–144a.

Citizens  United  argues  that  Hillary  is  just  “a  documen
tary ﬁlm that examines certain historical events.”  Brief for
Appellant 35.  We disagree.  The movie’s consistent empha
sis  is  on  the  relevance  of  these  events  to  Senator  Clinton’s
candidacy  for  President.  The  narrator  begins  by  asking
“could  [Senator  Clinton]  become  the  ﬁrst  female  President
in  the  history  of  the  United  States?”  App.  35a.  And  the
narrator  reiterates  the  movie’s  message  in  his  closing  line:
“Finally, before America decides on our next president, vot
ers  should  need  no  reminders  of  .  .  .  what’s  at  stake—the
well being and prosperity of our nation.”  Id., at 144a–145a.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion discussing the film "Hillary." The language is formal and legalistic, focusing on the film's potential to be considered "express advocacy" under campaign finance law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1127

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No.  09–7556.  Myrieckes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7563.  Dykes  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  46  Cal.  4th  731,  209  P.  3d  1.

No.  09–7582.  Karr  v.  Arizona.  Ct.  App.  Ariz.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  221  Ariz.  319,  212  P.  3d  11.

No.  09–7583.  Lindsey  v.  Georgia.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  285  Ga.  718,  681  S.  E.  2d  141.

No.  09–7586.  Watson  v.  Milyard,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.
10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.
741.

No. 09–7601.  Saybolt v. United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  195.

No.  09–7605.  Robbins  v.  Smith,  Warden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7613.  Quenga v.  Lanier, Warden, et al.  C. A. 11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7622.  Spears  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment of Corrections, et al.  Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  19  So.  3d  992.

No.  09–7626.  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  381.

No.  09–7627.  Ross  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7630.  Cedeno-Perez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  579  F.  3d  54.

No.  09–7632.  Clinton  v.  DiGuglielmo,  Superintendent,
State  Correctional  Institution  at  Graterford.  C.  A.  3d
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7635.  Pena-Hernandez v. United States.  C. A. 5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  52.

No.  09–7641.  Villafranca-Mendez  v.  United  States.

C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U79

[09-08-00 13:44:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

146

MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

does not derive from the statutory complex at issue its thesis
that “ ‘[c]arry’ implies personal agency and some degree of
possession, whereas ‘transport’ does not have such a limited
connotation and, in addition, implies the movement of goods
in bulk over great distances.” Ante, at 134. Looking to
provisions Congress enacted, one ﬁnds that the Legislature
did not acknowledge or routinely adhere to the distinction
the Court advances today; instead, Congress sometimes em-
ployed “transports” when, according to the Court, “carries”
was the right word to use.

Section 925(a)(2)(B), for example, provides that no criminal
sanction shall attend “the transportation of [a] ﬁrearm or
ammunition carried out to enable a person, who lawfully re-
ceived such ﬁrearm or ammunition from the Secretary of the
Army, to engage in military training or in competitions.”
The full text of § 926A, rather than the truncated version the
Court presents, see ibid., is also telling:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or
any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivi-
sion thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited
by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving
a ﬁrearm shall be entitled to transport a ﬁrearm for any
lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully
possess and carry such ﬁrearm to any other place where
he may lawfully possess and carry such ﬁrearm if, dur-
ing such transportation the ﬁrearm is unloaded, and nei-
ther the ﬁrearm nor any ammunition being transported
is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the
passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle:
Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a com-
partment separate from the driver’s compartment the
ﬁrearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked
container other than the glove compartment or console.”

In describing when and how a person may travel in a vehi-
cle that contains his ﬁrearm without violating the law,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the legal interpretation of the word "carry" versus "transport" in the context of firearm laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

300

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Opinion of O’Connor, J.

fects ﬂowing from the destruction of those cards. Post, at
311, n. 1.

But whether the harm is evident to our “intuition,” ibid.,
is not the proper inquiry.
If it were, we would simply say
there is no doubt that a regulation prohibiting public nudity
would alleviate the harmful secondary effects associated
In any event, Justice Souter conﬂates
with nude dancing.
two distinct concepts under O’Brien: whether there is a sub-
stantial government interest and whether the regulation fur-
thers that interest. As to the government interest, i. e.,
whether the threatened harm is real, the city council relied
on this Court’s opinions detailing the harmful secondary ef-
fects caused by establishments like Kandyland, as well as on
its own experiences in Erie. Justice Souter attempts to
denigrate the city council’s conclusion that the threatened
harm was real, arguing that we cannot accept Erie’s ﬁndings
because the subject of nude dancing is “fraught with some
emotionalism,” post, at 314. Yet surely the subject of draft-
ing our citizens into the military is “fraught” with more emo-
tionalism than the subject of regulating nude dancing.
Ibid.
Justice Souter next hypothesizes that the reason we can-
not accept Erie’s conclusion is that, since the question
whether these secondary effects occur is “amenable to empir-
ical treatment,” we should ignore Erie’s actual experience
and instead require such an empirical analysis. Post, at
314–315, n. 3 (referring to a “scientiﬁcally sound” study of-
fered by an amicus curiae to show that nude dancing estab-
In Nixon, how-
lishments do not cause secondary effects).
ever, we ﬂatly rejected that idea. 528 U. S., at 394 (noting
that the “invocation of academic studies said to indicate” that
the threatened harms are not real is insufﬁcient to cast doubt
on the experience of the local government).

As to the second point—whether the regulation furthers
the government interest—it is evident that, since crime and
other public health and safety problems are caused by the
presence of nude dancing establishments like Kandyland, a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Erie v. Pap's A.M. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

ALITO, J., dissenting

(May 26, 2021).9

Perhaps the most intense period of White House pressure
began a short time later.  On July 15, Surgeon General Vi-
vek Murthy released an advisory titled “Confronting Health
Misinformation.”  78 Record 25171, 25173.  Dr. Murthy sug-
gested, among other things, algorithmic changes to demote
misinformation  and  additional  consequences  for  misinfor-
mation  “ ‘super-spreaders.’ ”    U. S.  Public  Health  Service,
Confronting  Health  Misinformation:  The  U. S.  Surgeon
General’s Advisory on Building a Healthy Information En-
vironment 12 (2021).10  Dr. Murthy also joined Psaki at a
press  conference,  where  he  asked  the  platforms  to  take
“much,  much  more  . . .  aggressive  action”  to  combat
COVID–19  misinformation  “because  it’s  costing  people
their  lives.”  Press  Briefing  by  Press  Secretary  Jen  Psaki
and  Surgeon  General  Dr.  Vivek  H.  Murthy  (July  15,
2021).11

At the same press conference, Psaki singled out Facebook
as a primary driver of misinformation and asked the plat-
form to make several changes.  Facebook “should provide,
publicly and transparently, data on the reach of COVID–19
[and] COVID vaccine misinformation.”  Ibid.  It “needs to
move  more  quickly  to  remove  harmful,  violative  posts.”
Ibid.  And it should change its algorithm to promote “qual-
ity  information  sources.”  Ibid.    These  recommendations
echoed  Slavitt’s  and  Flaherty’s  private  demands  from  the
preceding  months—as  Psaki  herself  acknowledged.    The
White  House  “engage[s]  with  [Facebook]  regularly,”  she
said, and Facebook “certainly understand[s] what our asks

——————

9 https://about.fb.com/news/2021/05/taking-action-against-people-who-

repeatedly-share-misinformation.

10 https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-misinformation-

advisory.pdf.

11 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/07/
15/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-surgeon-general-dr-
vivek-h-murthy-july-15-2021.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal citations, arguments, and references to specific events and individuals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Syllabus

erally requires the SEC to return a defendant’s gains to wronged in-
vestors.  The parties, however, do not identify a specific order in this
case directing any proceeds to the Treasury.  If one is entered on re-
mand, the lower courts may evaluate in the first instance whether that
order would be for the benefit of investors and consistent with equita-
ble principles.  Pp. 14–17.

(2) Imposing  disgorgement  liability  on  a  wrongdoer  for  benefits
that  accrue  to  his  affiliates  through  joint-and-several  liability  runs
against the rule in favor of holding defendants individually liable.  See
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 25–26.  The common law did, however,
permit  liability  for  partners  engaged  in  concerted  wrongdoing.  See,
e.g., Ambler, 20 Wall., at 559.  On remand, the Ninth Circuit may de-
termine  whether  the  facts  are  such  that  petitioners  can,  consistent
with  equitable  principles,  be  found  liable  for  profits  as  partners  in
wrongdoing or whether individual liability is required.  Pp. 17–18.

(3) Courts  may  not  enter  disgorgement  awards  that  exceed  the
gains “made upon any business or investment, when both the receipts
and payments are taken into the account.”  Goodyear, 9 Wall., at 804.
When the “entire profit of a business or undertaking” results from the
wrongdoing,  a  defendant  may  be  denied  “inequitable  deductions.”
Root,  105  U.  S.,  at  203.  Accordingly,  courts  must  deduct  legitimate
expenses  before  awarding  disgorgement  under  §78u(d)(5).    The  Dis-
trict  Court  below  did  not  ascertain  whether  any  of  petitioners’  ex-
penses were legitimate.  On remand, the lower courts should examine
whether  including  such  expenses  in  a  profits-based  remedy  is  con-
sistent with the equitable principles underlying §78u(d)(5).  Pp. 18–20.

754 Fed. Appx. 505, vacated and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH,
JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It summarizes the court's reasoning and holdings, not the actual content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

in  diplomatic  engagements  with  Mexico,  diverting  atten-
tion  from  more  productive  efforts  to  fight  transnational
criminal  and  smuggling  networks  and  address  the  root
causes of migration.”  Id., at 262a.

In  light  of  those  conclusions,  the  Secretary  announced
that he was once again “hereby terminating MPP.”  Id., at
263a.  He explained that DHS would “continue complying
with  the  [District  Court’s]  injunction  requiring  good-faith
implementation  and  enforcement  of  MPP.”    Id.,  at  264a.
But he noted that “the termination of MPP” would be “im-
plemented as soon as practicable after a final judicial deci-
sion to vacate” that injunction.  Ibid.  The Government then
moved to vacate the injunction on the ground that the Oc-
tober 29 Memoranda had superseded the June 1 Memoran-
dum, but the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

The  Court  of  Appeals  instead  affirmed  the  District
Court’s judgment in full.  With respect to the INA question,
the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s anal-
ysis of the relevant provisions.  That is, the court explained,
section  1225(b)(2)(A)  “sets  forth  a  general,  plainly  obliga-
tory  rule:  detention  for  aliens  seeking  admission,”  while
section  1225(b)(2)(C)  “authorizes  contiguous-territory  re-
turn as an alternative.”  20 F. 4th, at 996.  Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals reasoned, “DHS is violating (A)’s mandate,
refusing to avail itself of (C)’s authorized alternative, and
then  complaining  that  it  doesn’t  like  its  options.”    Ibid.,
n. 18.

The  Court  of  Appeals  also  held  that  “[t]he  October  29
Memoranda  did  not  constitute  a  new  and  separately  re-
viewable ‘final agency action.’ ”  Id., at 951.  The Court of
Appeals distinguished “DHS’s June 1 decision to terminate
MPP,” which it claimed “had legal effect,” from the June 1
Memorandum, the October 29 Memoranda, and “any other
subsequent memos,” which it held “simply explained DHS’s
decision.”  Ibid.    The  Court  of  Appeals  then  criticized  the
Government for proceeding “without a hint of an intention
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, references to court cases and memoranda, and discusses legal arguments and interpretations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

The District further noted that “[d]uring the time following
completion of the game, until players are released to their
parents or otherwise allowed to leave the event, Mr. Ken-
nedy,  like  all  coaches,  is  clearly  on  duty  and  paid  to  con-
tinue supervision of students.”  Id., at 79.

The  District  stated  that  it  had  no  objection  to  Kennedy
returning to the stadium when he was off duty to pray at
the 50-yard line, nor with Kennedy praying while on duty
if it did not interfere with his job duties or suggest the Dis-
trict’s endorsement of religion.  The District explained that
its establishment concerns were motivated by the specific
facts  at  issue,  because  engaging  in  prayer  on  the  50-yard
line immediately after the game finished would appear to
be an extension of Kennedy’s “prior, long-standing and well-
known history of leading students in prayer” on the 50-yard
line  after  games.  Id.,  at  81.  The  District  therefore  reaf-
firmed its prior directives to Kennedy.

On October 16, after playing of the game had concluded,
Kennedy shook hands with the opposing team, and as ad-
vertised, knelt to pray while most BHS players were sing-
ing  the  school’s  fight  song.  He  quickly  was  joined  by
coaches  and  players  from  the  opposing  team.  Television
news cameras surrounded the group.2  Members of the pub-
lic  rushed  the  field  to  join  Kennedy,  jumping  fences  to
access the field and knocking over student band members.
After  the  game,  the  District  received  calls  from  Satanists
who “ ‘intended to conduct ceremonies on the field after foot-
ball games if others were allowed to.’ ”  Id., at 181.  To secure
the field and enable subsequent games to continue safely,
the District was forced to make security arrangements with

——————

2 The  Court  describes  the  events  of  the  October  16  game  as  having
“spurred media coverage of Mr. Kennedy’s case.”  Ante, at 5.  In fact, the
District Court found that Kennedy himself generated the media coverage
by publicizing his dispute with the District in his initial Facebook posting
and in his media appearances before the October 16 game.  443 F. Supp.
3d 1223, 1230 (WD Wash. 2020).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. It discusses the District's stance on a coach praying on the field after games.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

KAGAN, J., dissenting

of fair use.  Id., at 583.  And that was so even though the
rap song was, as everyone agreed, recorded and later sold
for profit.  See id., at 573.

Just  two  Terms  ago,  in  Google,  we  made  all  the  same
points.  We quoted Campbell in explaining that the factor 1
inquiry is “whether the copier’s use ‘adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering’ the
copyrighted  work  ‘with  new  expression,  meaning,  or  mes-
sage.’ ”  593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 24).  We again described
“a copying use that adds something new and important” as
“transformative.”    Ibid.  We  reiterated  that  protecting
transformative uses “stimulate[s] creativity” and thus “ful-
fill[s] the objective of copyright law.”  Ibid. (quoting Leval
1111).  And then we gave an example.  Yes, of course, we
pointed to Andy Warhol.  (The majority claims not to be em-
barrassed  by  this  embarrassing  fact  because  the  specific
reference  was  to  his  Soup  Cans,  rather  than  his  celebrity
images.  But drawing a distinction between a “commentary
on consumerism”—which is how the majority describes his
soup canvases, ante, at 27—and a commentary on celebrity
culture, i.e., the turning of people into consumption items,
is slicing the baloney pretty thin.)  Finally, the Court con-
ducted the first-factor inquiry it had described.  Google had
replicated  Sun  Microsystems’  computer  code  as  part  of  a
“commercial endeavor,” done “for commercial profit.”  593
U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  27).    No  matter,  said  the  Court.
“[M]any  common  fair  uses  are  indisputably  commercial.”
Ibid.    What  mattered  instead  was  that  Google  had  used
Sun’s  code  to  make  “something  new  and  important”:  a
“highly creative and innovative” software platform.  Id., at
___–___ (slip op., at 24–25).  The use of the code, the Court
held, was therefore “transformative” and “point[ed] toward
fair use.”  Id., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 25, 28).

Campbell and Google also illustrate the difference it can
make in the world to protect transformative works through
fair use.  Easy enough to say (as the majority does, see ante,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases (Campbell and Google) and analyzes their application to the current case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not
more  than  One  Thousand  Dollars  ($1,000.00).”  §10–109
(emphasis added).  Other States have similar laws, first re-
quiring a pledge as a condition of appointment and then pe-
nalizing the violation of that pledge.  See, e.g., Ind. Code §3–
10–4–1.7(a) (2019) (imposing pledge requirement); §3–10–
4–9(d)  (stating  that  “[a]  presidential  elector  who  . . .  pre-
sents a ballot marked in violation of the presidential elec-
tor’s  pledge  executed  under  section  1.7  . . .  of  this  chapter,
vacates the office of presidential elector” (emphasis added));
Minn. Stat. §208.43 (2020 Cum. Supp.) (imposing pledge re-
quirement);  §208.46(c)  (stating  that  “[a]n  elector  who  . . .
presents a ballot marked in violation of the elector’s pledge
executed under section 208.43 . . . vacates the office of elec-
tor” (emphasis added)).2

But not all States attempt to bind electors’ votes through
the appointment process.  Some States simply impose a le-
gal duty that has no connection to elector appointment.  See
ante, at 5.  For example, New Mexico imposes a legal duty
on its electors: “All presidential electors shall cast their bal-
lots in the electoral college for the candidates of the political
party  which  nominated  them  as  presidential  electors.”
N. M. Stat. Ann. §1–15–9(A) (Supp. 2011).  And “[a]ny pres-
idential  elector  who  casts  his  ballot  in  violation  of  [this
duty] is guilty of a fourth degree felony.”  §1–15–9(B).  Cal-
ifornia has a similar system.  It first imposes a legal duty
on electors to vote for the nominated candidates of the po-
litical  party  they  represent  if  those  candidates  are  alive.
Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §6906 (West 2019).  It then imposes a
punishment  on  “[e]very  person  charged  with  the  perfor-
mance of any duty under any law of this state relating to
or
elections,

willfully

neglects

who

——————

2 See  also  Mont.  Code  Ann.  §§13–25–304,  13–25–307(4)  (2019);  Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§32–713(2), 32–714(4) (2016); Wash. Rev. Code §§29A.56.084,
29A.56.090(3) (2019).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 591 U.S. ____ (2020). It delves into the legal requirements and consequences surrounding presidential electors' votes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

Figure 4. One of Lynn Goldsmith’s photographs of Prince
on the cover of Musician magazine.

People  magazine,  in  fact,  paid  Goldsmith  $1,000  to  use
one of her copyrighted photographs in a special collector’s
edition, “Celebrating Prince: 1958–2016,” just after Prince
died.  People’s tribute, like Condé Nast’s, honors the life and
music of Prince.  Other magazines, including Rolling Stone
and Time, also released special editions.  See fig. 5, infra.
All of them depicted Prince on the cover.  All of them used
a copyrighted photograph in service of that object.  And all
of them (except Condé Nast) credited the photographer.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the use of copyrighted photographs in magazines. It provides context and examples related to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xliv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1006

Dharni v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

Dhurandhar, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Diah; Roden v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diallo v. Holder
Diallo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

Diaz v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  867,1065

1154

Diaz v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961

Diaz v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

Diaz-Argueta v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

Diaz-Pineda v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dicenso v. United States
960

Dickens v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Diggs v. Louisiana
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Diggs v. Stevenson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967

DiGianni v. Cuomo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

DiGuglielmo; Clinton v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

DiGuglielmo; Santos v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

DiGuglielmo; Teagle v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DiGuglielmo; Yenglee v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Dillard v. Bazzle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  884,1101

1025

Dillard’s Inc.; Gregory v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Dillehay v. Department of Housing and Urban Development  . . . .
1076

Dillon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dinkens v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958

Dinkins v. Sebelius  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  844,1065

929

Dinunzio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Dinwiddie; Mays v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

Diodoro v. Pennsylvania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905

Dion v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Catledge v.
955

. . . . . . . .
Director  of  penal  or  correctional  institution.  See  name  or  title

of director.

1111

DirecTV, Inc.; Treesh v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Disabled American Veterans; Lenham v.
1149

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Discover Charge Card; MacDermid v.
1149

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Discover Financial Services; MacDermid v.
855

Dismuke v. Mississippi  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Disney Co.; Wakeﬁeld v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042

District Attorney of Del. County; Derrickson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . .  998,1140

District Court.  See U. S. District Court.

District Judge.  See U. S. District Judge.

District of Columbia; Hobley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
802

District of Columbia; Phillips v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  952,1140

District of Columbia Dept. of Employment Services; Hill v.  . . .  955,1086
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1094

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 24, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8781. Weaver v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 123.

No. 99–8782. Washington v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 262.

No. 99–8783. Tenaud v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8789. Lowe v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 516.

No. 99–8793. Shashaty v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 251 Conn. 768, 742 A. 2d 786.

No. 99–8795.

Javier Navarro v. United States. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1337.

No. 99– 8798. Baker v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Clermont

County. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8800. Williams et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 252.

No. 99–8807. Triplett v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 990.

No. 99–8815. Rothenbach v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 241.

No. 99–8818. White v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1353.

No. 99–8824. Allen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1354.

No. 99–1399. Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of
Mamaroneck et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Motions of Paciﬁc Legal
Foundation and National Association of Home Builders for leave
to ﬁle briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 94 N. Y. 2d 96, 721 N. E. 2d 971.

No. 99–1484. Polyak v. Summers, Attorney General of
Tennessee, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner to defer
consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certio-
rari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of the Court

responsible  for  an  injury  to  a  foreign  citizen.    See  id.,  at
715–719; Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 123–124.

Over  the  first  190  years  or  so  after  its  enactment,  the
ATS  was  invoked  but  a  few  times.    Yet  with  the  evolving
recognition—for  instance,  in  the  Nuremberg  trials  after
World  War  II—that  certain  acts  constituting  crimes
against  humanity  are  in  violation  of  basic  precepts  of
international  law,  courts  began  to  give  some  redress  for
violations  of  international  human-rights  protections  that
are clear and unambiguous.  In the modern era this began
with  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Second
Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (1980).

In Filartiga, it was alleged that a young man had been
tortured  and  murdered  by  Peruvian  police  officers,  and
that  an  officer  named  Pena-Irala  was  one  of  the  supervi-
sors  and  perpetrators.    Some  members  of  the  victim’s
family  were  in  the  United  States  on  visas.  When  they
discovered  that  Pena-Irala  himself  was  living  in  New
York,  they  filed  suit  against  him.    The  action,  seeking
damages  for  the  suffering  and  death  he  allegedly  had
caused,  was  filed  in  the  United  States  District  Court  for
the  Eastern  District  of  New  York.    The  Court  of  Appeals
found that there was jurisdiction under the ATS.  For this
holding it relied upon the universal acknowledgment that
acts  of  official  torture  are  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations.
Id., at 890.  This Court did not review that decision.

In  the  midst  of  debates  in  the  courts  of  appeals  over
whether the court in Filartiga was correct in holding that
plaintiffs could bring ATS actions based on modern human-
rights  laws  absent  an  express  cause  of  action  created
by  an  additional  statute,  Congress  enacted  the  Torture
Victim  Protection  Act  of  1991  (TVPA),  106  Stat.  73,  note
following  28  U. S. C.  §1350.    H. R.  Rep.  No.  102–367,
pp. 3–4 (1991) (H. R. Rep.) (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic,  726  F. 2d  774  (CADC  1984));  S. Rep.  No.  102–
249, pp. 3–5 (1991) (S. Rep.) (same).  The TVPA—which is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

SACKETT v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

in other laws.  The CWA repeatedly uses “waters” in con-
texts that confirm the term refers to bodies of open water.
See  33  U. S. C.  §1267(i)(2)(D)  (“the  waters  of  the  Chesa-
peake Bay”); §1268(a)(3)(I) (“the open waters of each of the
Great Lakes”); §1324(d)(4)(B)(ii) (“lakes and other surface
(“estuarine  waters”);
waters”);
§1343(c)(1) (“the waters of the territorial seas, the contigu-
ous zone, and the oceans”); §§1346(a)(1), 1375a(a) (“coastal
recreation waters”); §1370 (state “boundary waters”).  The
use of “waters” elsewhere in the U. S. Code likewise corre-
lates to rivers, lakes, and oceans.13

§1330(g)(4)(C)(vii)

Statutory  history  points  in  the  same  direction.    The
CWA’s predecessor statute covered “interstate or navigable
waters” and defined “interstate waters” as “all rivers, lakes,
and  other  waters  that  flow  across  or  form  a  part  of  State
boundaries.”  33 U. S. C. §§1160(a), 1173(e) (1970 ed.) (em-
phasis added); see also Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30
Stat. 1151 (codified, as amended, at 33 U. S. C. §403) (pro-
hibiting unauthorized obstructions “to the navigable capac-
ity of any of the waters of the United States”).

This Court has understood the CWA’s use of “waters” in
the  same  way.  Even  as  Riverside  Bayview  grappled  with
whether adjacent wetlands could fall within the CWA’s cov-
erage,  it  acknowledged  that  wetlands  are  not  included  in
“traditional notions of ‘waters.’ ”  474 U. S., at 133.  It ex-
plained  that  the  term  conventionally  refers  to  “hydro-
graphic features” like  “rivers” and “streams.”  Id., at 131.
SWANCC  went  even  further,  repeatedly  describing  the
“waters” covered by the Act as “open water” and suggesting

——————

13 See, e.g., 16 U. S. C. §745 (“the waters of the seacoast . . . the waters
of the lakes”); §4701(a)(7) (“waters of the Chesapeake Bay”); 33 U. S. C.
§4 (“the waters of the Mississippi River and its tributaries”); 43 U. S. C.
§390h–8(a) (“the waters of Lake Cheraw, Colorado . . . the waters of the
Arkansas River”); 46 U. S. C. §70051 (allowing the Coast Guard to take
control  of  particular  vessels  during  an  emergency  in  order  to  “prevent
damage or injury to any harbor or waters of the United States”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of "waters" in the Clean Water Act. It provides textual analysis of the law and relevant case precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Opinion of the Court

A
Since Heller and McDonald, the two-step test that Courts
of  Appeals  have  developed  to  assess  Second  Amendment
claims  proceeds  as  follows.    At  the  first  step,  the  govern-
ment may justify its regulation by “establish[ing] that the
challenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope
of the right as originally understood.”  E.g., Kanter v. Barr,
919  F. 3d  437,  441  (CA7  2019)  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  But see United States v. Boyd, 999 F. 3d 171, 185
(CA3 2021) (requiring claimant to show “ ‘a burden on con-
duct  falling  within  the  scope  of  the  Second  Amendment’s
guarantee’ ”).    The  Courts  of  Appeals  then  ascertain  the
original scope of the right based on its historical meaning.
E.g.,  United  States  v.  Focia,  869  F. 3d  1269,  1285  (CA11
2017).  If the government can prove that the regulated con-
duct falls beyond the Amendment’s original scope, “then the
analysis can stop there; the regulated activity is categori-
cally unprotected.”  United States v. Greeno, 679 F. 3d 510,
518 (CA6 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But if
the historical evidence at this step is “inconclusive or sug-
gests that the regulated activity is not categorically unpro-
tected,” the courts generally proceed to step two.  Kanter,
919 F. 3d, at 441 (internal quotation marks omitted).

At  the  second  step,  courts  often  analyze  “how  close  the
law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and
the severity of the law’s burden on that right.”  Ibid. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  The Courts of Appeals gen-
erally maintain “that the core Second Amendment right is
limited  to  self-defense  in  the  home.”  Gould,  907  F. 3d,  at
671  (emphasis  added).  But  see  Wrenn,  864  F. 3d,  at  659
(“[T]he Amendment’s core generally covers carrying in pub-
lic for self defense”).  If a “core” Second Amendment right is
burdened,  courts  apply  “strict  scrutiny”  and  ask  whether
the  Government  can  prove  that  the  law  is  “narrowly  tai-
lored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.”  Kolbe
v. Hogan, 849 F. 3d 114, 133 (CA4 2017) (internal quotation
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, likely from a court opinion. It outlines a two-step test used by Courts of Appeals to assess Second Amendment claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TERRY v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–5904.  Argued May 4, 2021—Decided June 14, 2021

Petitioner Tarahrick Terry contends that he is eligible to receive a sen-
tence reduction for his 2008 crack cocaine conviction.  In 1986, Con-
gress  established  mandatory-minimum  penalties  for  certain  drug  of-
fenses.  That legislation defined three relevant penalties for possession
with intent to distribute cocaine.  The first two carried mandatory min-
imum  sentences  based  on  drug  quantity:  a  5-year  mandatory  mini-
mum  (triggered  by  either  5  grams  of  crack  cocaine  or  500  grams  of
powder cocaine) and a 10-year mandatory minimum (triggered by ei-
ther 50 grams of crack or 5 kilograms of powder).  100 Stat. 3207–2,
3207–3.  The third penalty differed from the first two: it did not carry
a mandatory minimum sentence, did not treat crack and powder co-
caine offenses differently, and did not depend on drug quantity.  Id., at
3207–4.    Petitioner  was  subjected  to  this  third  penalty  when  he
pleaded guilty in 2008 to possession with intent to distribute an un-
specified amount of crack.  The District Court determined that his of-
fense involved about 4 grams of crack.

Two years later, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which
increased the crack quantity thresholds from 5 grams to 28 for the 5-
year mandatory minimum and from 50 grams to 280 for the 10-year
mandatory  minimum.    §2(a),  124  Stat.  2372.    But  Congress  did  not
make this change retroactive until 2018, when it enacted the First Step
Act.  After that, Petitioner sought resentencing on the ground that he
was convicted of a crack offense modified by the Fair Sentencing Act.
The  District  Court  denied  his  motion,  and  the  Eleventh  Circuit  af-
firmed.

Held: A crack offender is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First
Step Act only if convicted of a crack offense that triggered a mandatory
minimum sentence.  The First Step Act makes an offender eligible for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

losses as calculated by the statutory formula and sought a money judg-
ment for the unpaid sums owed.  Only one petitioner prevailed in the
trial courts, and the Federal Circuit ruled for the Government in each
appeal, holding that §1342 had initially created a Government obliga-
tion to pay the full amounts, but that the subsequent appropriations
riders impliedly “repealed or suspended” that obligation.

Held:

1. The  Risk  Corridors  statute  created  a  Government  obligation  to

pay insurers the full amount set out in §1342’s formula.  Pp. 9–16.

(a) The  Government  may  incur  an  obligation  directly  through
statutory language, without also providing details about how the obli-
gation must be satisfied.  See United States v. Langston, 118 U. S. 389.
Pp. 9–11.

(b) Section  1342  imposed  a  legal  duty  of  the  United  States  that
could mature into a legal liability through the insurers’ participation
in the exchanges.  This conclusion flows from the express terms and
context of §1342, which imposed an obligation by using the mandatory
term  “shall.”    The  section’s  mandatory  nature  is  underscored  by  the
adjacent provisions, which differentiate between when the HHS Sec-
retary “shall” take certain actions and when she “may” exercise discre-
tion.  See §§1341(b)(2), 1343(b).  Section 1342 neither requires the Risk
Corridors program to be budget-neutral nor suggests that the Secre-
tary’s payments to unprofitable plans pivoted on profitable plans’ pay-
ments  to  the  Secretary  or  that  a  partial  payment  would  satisfy  the
Government’s whole obligation.  It thus must be given its plain mean-
ing: The Government “shall pay” the sum prescribed by §1342.  Pp. 11–
13.

(c) Contrary to the Government’s contention, neither the Appro-
priations Clause nor the Anti-Deficiency Act addresses whether Con-
gress itself can create or incur an obligation directly by statute.  Nor
does  §1342’s  obligation-creating  language turn  on  whether  Congress
expressly provided budget authority before appropriating funds.  The
Government’s  arguments  also  conflict  with  well-settled  principles  of
statutory  interpretation.    That  §1342  contains  no  language  limiting
the obligation to the availability of appropriations, while Congress ex-
pressly used such limiting language in other Affordable Care Act pro-
visions,  indicates  that  Congress  intended  a  different  meaning  in
§1342.  Pp. 13–16.

2. Congress did not impliedly repeal the obligation through its ap-

propriations riders.  Pp. 16–23.

(a) Because “ ‘repeals by implication are not favored,’ ” Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 549, this Court will regard each of two statutes
effective unless Congress’ intention to repeal is “ ‘clear and manifest,’ ”
or the laws are “irreconcilable,” id., at 550–551.  In the appropriations
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. It outlines the case's background, the issues presented, and the Court's holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

 KAGAN, J., concurring
KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 19–431 and 19–454
_________________

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME, PETITIONER
v.
PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.

19–431

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.

19–454

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[July 8, 2020]

 JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, con-

curring in the judgment.

I  would  uphold  HRSA’s  statutory  authority  to  exempt
certain  employers  from  the  contraceptive-coverage  man-
date, but for different reasons than the Court gives.  I also
write  separately  because  I  question  whether  the  exemp-
tions can survive administrative law’s demand for reasoned
decisionmaking.    That  issue  remains  open  for  the  lower
courts to address.

The majority and dissent dispute the breadth of the dele-
gation in the Women’s Health Amendment to the ACA.  The
Amendment states that a health plan or insurer must offer
coverage  for  “preventive  care  and  screenings  . . .  as  pro-
vided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA]
for  purposes  of  this  paragraph.”    42  U. S. C.  §300gg–
13(a)(4).  The  disputed  question  is  just  what  HRSA  can
“provide for.”  Both the majority and the dissent agree that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kagan. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MOORE v. HARPER

THOMAS, J., dissenting

I
Here is the case before us in a nutshell: A group of plain-
tiffs  sued  various  state  officials under  state  law.    The  de-
fendants raised both state-law and federal-law defenses.  In
the interlocutory judgment below, the State Supreme Court
rejected  both  defenses  and  remanded  for  further  proceed-
ings.  We granted review to consider the defendants’ federal
defense.  But  then,  in  subsequent  proceedings,  the  state
court  revisited  defendants’  alternative  state-law  defense
and held that it was meritorious.  As a result, the court fi-
nally adjudicated the whole case in the defendants’ favor,
dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.

This is a straightforward case of mootness.  The federal
defense  no  longer  makes  any  difference  to  this  case—
whether we agree with the defense, disagree with it, or say
nothing at all, the final judgment in this litigation will be
exactly the same.  The majority does not seriously contest
that fact.  Even so, it asserts jurisdiction to decide this free-
floating defense that affects no live claim for relief, reason-
ing that a justiciable case or controversy exists as long as
its  opinion  can  in  any  way  “alter  the  presently  operative
statutes of ” a State.  Ante, at 7 (internal quotation marks
omitted).  By its own lights, the majority “is acting not as
an Article III court,” Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U. S.
___, ___ (2021) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3),
but as an ad hoc branch of a state legislature.  That is em-
phatically not our job.  Compare U. S. Const., Art. III, §1,
with N. C. Const., Art. II, §1.

A
To review the history of this case is to demonstrate that
the question presented is moot.  In 2021, the North Carolina
General Assembly passed an Act to redistrict the State for
elections to the U. S. House of Representatives.  Plaintiffs-
respondents filed an action in state court, seeking to enjoin
state elections officials (defendants-respondents here) from
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It provides context about the case and the legal issues at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION

Opinion of the Court

to Pet. for Cert 61a.2  The agreement authorized AT&T to
make unilateral amendments, which it did to the arbitra-
tion provision on several occasions.  The version at issue in
this case reflects revisions made in December 2006, which
the parties agree are controlling.

The  revised  agreement  provides  that  customers  may
initiate dispute proceedings by completing a one-page No-
tice of Dispute form available on AT&T’s Web site.  AT&T
may  then  offer  to  settle  the  claim;  if  it  does  not,  or  if
the  dispute  is  not  resolved  within  30  days,  the  customer
may  invoke  arbitration  by  filing  a  separate  Demand  for
Arbitration,  also  available  on  AT&T’s  Web  site.    In  the
event  the  parties  proceed  to  arbitration,  the  agreement
specifies  that  AT&T  must  pay  all  costs  for  nonfrivolous
claims;  that  arbitration  must  take  place  in  the  county  in
which the customer is billed; that, for claims of $10,000 or
less,  the  customer  may  choose  whether  the  arbitration
proceeds in person, by telephone, or based only on submis-
sions; that either party may bring a claim in small claims
court  in  lieu  of  arbitration;  and  that  the  arbitrator  may
award  any  form  of  individual  relief,  including  injunctions
and presumably punitive damages.  The agreement, more-
over,  denies  AT&T  any  ability  to  seek  reimbursement  of
its  attorney’s  fees,  and,  in  the  event  that  a  customer  re-
ceives  an  arbitration  award  greater  than  AT&T’s  last
written  settlement  offer,  requires  AT&T  to  pay  a  $7,500
minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant’s
attorney’s fees.3

The  Concepcions  purchased  AT&T  service,  which  was
advertised  as  including  the  provision  of  free  phones;  they

——————

2 That  provision  further  states  that  “the  arbitrator  may  not  consoli-
date  more  than  one  person’s  claims,  and  may  not  otherwise  preside
over any form of a representative or class proceeding.”  App. to Pet. for
Cert. 61a.

3 The  guaranteed  minimum  recovery  was  increased  in  2009  to

$10,000.  Brief for Petitioner 7.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the terms of an arbitration agreement between AT&T and its customers. It provides a detailed analysis of the agreement's provisions, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Contract Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:26:35
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CR

Pagination Table: RULES1

AMENDMENTS TO
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The following amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
were prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 17,
2000, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2072, and were reported to Congress by
The Chief Justice on the same date. For the letter of transmittal, see
post, p. 1180. The Judicial Conference report referred to in that letter is
not reproduced herein.

Note that under 28 U. S. C. § 2074, such amendments shall take effect
no earlier than December 1 of the year in which they are transmitted to
Congress unless otherwise provided by law.

For earlier publication of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and the amendments thereto, see 327 U. S. 821, 335 U. S. 917, 949, 346
U. S. 941, 350 U. S. 1017, 383 U. S. 1087, 389 U. S. 1125, 401 U. S. 1025,
406 U. S. 979, 415 U. S. 1056, 416 U. S. 1001, 419 U. S. 1136, 425 U. S.
1157, 441 U. S. 985, 456 U. S. 1021, 461 U. S. 1117, 471 U. S. 1167, 480
U. S. 1041, 485 U. S. 1057, 490 U. S. 1135, 495 U. S. 967, 500 U. S. 991,
507 U. S. 1161, 511 U. S. 1175, 514 U. S. 1159, 517 U. S. 1285, 520 U. S.
1313, 523 U. S. 1227, and 526 U. S. 1189.

1179
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be an introductory section to a document containing amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It provides information about the amendments' origin, effective date, and references to previous publications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Introductory Information/Legal Notice</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE

BREYER, J., dissenting

the  procedures  described  in  subsections  (c)  and  (d)  to
remove  an  individual”  from  the  federal  voter  roll  is  per-
missible  and  does  not  violate  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause.
See  §8(b)(2)  of  the  National  Voter  Registration  Act,  107
Stat.  83,  and  as  amended,  116  Stat.  1728,  52  U. S. C.
§20507(b)(2).

3
  Subsection  (c),  which  is  entitled  “Voter  Removal  Pro-
grams,” explains how “[a] State may meet the requirement
of  subsection  (a)(4).”    §20507(c)(1).    Because  subsection
(a)(4) itself incorporates all of the relevant requirements of
subsections  (b),  (c),  and  (d)  within  it,  see  §20507(a)(4),
subsection (c) sets forth one way a State can comply with
the  basic  requirements  of  §8  at issue  in  this  case (includ-
ing  subsection  (b)).    A  State’s  removal  program  qualifies
under  subsection  (c)  if  the  following  two  things  are  true
about the program:

  “(A)  change-of-address  information  supplied  by  the
Postal Service through its licensees is used to identify
registrants whose addresses may have changed; and
  “(B) if it appears [that] the registrant has moved to
a  different  residence  address  not  in  the  same  regis-
trar’s jurisdiction, the registrar uses the notice proce-
dure  described  in  subsection  (d)(2)  to  confirm  the
change of address.”  §20507(c)(1).

The upshot is that subsection (c) explains one way a State
may  comply  with  subsection  (a)’s  Reasonable  Program
requirement  without  violating  subsection  (b)’s  Failure-to-
Vote prohibition.  It is a roadmap that points to a two-step
removal process.  At step 1, States first identify registered
voters  whose  addresses  may  have  changed;  here,  subsec-
tion  (c)  points  to  one  (but  not  the  only)  method  a  State
may  use  to  do  so.    At  step  2,  subsection  (c)  explains,
States  must  “confirm  the  change  of  address”  by  using  a
special  notice  procedure,  which  is  further  described  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal procedures related to voter registration and removal from voter rolls.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

JACKSON, J., dissenting

Congress’s laws, passed by the representatives of the Peo-
ple,  bound  the  People  and  their  elected  officials  just  the
same.  Law, we have explained, “is the only supreme power
in our system of government, and every man who by accept-
ing  office  participates  in  its  functions  is  only  the  more
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe
the  limitations  which  it  imposes  upon  the  exercise  of  the
authority which it gives.”  Lee, 106 U. S., at 220.  With its
adoption of a paradigm that sometimes exempts the Presi-
dent from the dictates of the law (when the Court says so),
this Court has effectively snatched from the Legislature the
authority to bind the President (or not) to Congress’s man-
dates, and it has also thereby substantially augmented the
power of both the Office of the Presidency and itself.

As to the former, it should go without saying that the Of-
fice of the Presidency, the apex of the Executive Branch, is
made significantly more powerful when the constraints of
the criminal law are lifted with respect to the exercise of a
President’s official duties.  After today’s ruling, the Presi-
dent must still “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted,” Art. II, §3; yet, when acting in his official capacity,
he has no obligation to follow those same laws himself.

But whatever additional power the majority’s new Presi-
dential  accountability  model  gives  to  the  Presidency,  it
gives doubly to the Court itself, for the majority provides no
meaningful guidance about how to apply this new paradigm
or how to categorize a President’s conduct.  For instance, its
opinion  lists  some  examples  of  the  “core”  constitutional
powers with respect to which the President is now entitled
to absolute immunity—a list that apparently includes the
removal power, the power to recognize foreign nations, and
the  pardon  power.    Ante,  at  6–9.    However,  the  majority
does not—and likely cannot—supply any useful or admin-
istrable definition of the scope of that “core.”  For what it’s
worth,  the  Constitution’s  text  is  no  help  either;  Article  II
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  It delves into legal arguments about presidential immunity and the separation of powers.  This type of content is highly suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal reasoning and analysis of a significant legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ALABAMA ASSN. OF REALTORS v. DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.
BREYER, J., dissenting

First,  it  is  far  from  “demonstrably”  clear  that  the  CDC
lacks the power to issue its modified moratorium order.  The
CDC’s current order is substantially more tailored than its
prior eviction moratorium, which automatically applied na-
tionwide.  Justified by the Delta-variant surge, the modified
order targets only those regions currently experiencing sky-
rocketing rates.  86 Fed. Reg. 43244, 43245, 43250 (2021).
If  a  covered  county  “no  longer  experiences  substantial  or
high levels of community transmission,” the order “will no
longer apply” there.  Id., at 43250.  To illustrate the differ-
ence,  when  we  denied  applicants’  last  motion,  fewer  than
20% of counties would have been covered under the modi-
fied  moratorium  order’s  criteria.    See  CDC,  COVID–19
State Profile Report 476 (June 25, 2021).  Today, however,
that figure is over 90%.  See infra, at 7.

To be protected from eviction, a tenant must reside in a

covered area and attest that he or she:

(1) has “used best efforts to obtain all available govern-
mental assistance for rent or housing”;

(2) satisfies certain income requirements;

(3)  is  unable  to  pay  rent  “due  to  substantial  loss  of
household income, loss of
compensable  hours  of
work or wages, a lay-off, or extraordinary out-of-pocket
medical expenses”;

(4) continues to “us[e] best efforts to make timely par-
tial rent payments that are as close to the full rent pay-
ment as . . . permit[ted]”; and

(5)  has  “no  other  available  housing  options.”    Id.,  at
43245.

Unlike  under  New  York’s  moratorium,  see  Chrysafis  v.
Marks, post, at 1, landlords remain free to “challeng[e]” in
court “the truthfulness of a tenant’s . . . declaration”  that
he or she qualifies for the order’s protection.  86 Fed. Reg.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Services. It discusses the CDC's eviction moratorium order and its legal basis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

963

524 U. S.

June 26, 1998

No. 97–9335. Andrade v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1180.

No. 97–9343. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1186.

No. 97–9388. Frohwirth v. Cooke, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 901.

No. 97–1144. United States v. Ooley. C. A. 9th Cir. Mo-
tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 116 F. 3d 370.

No. 97–1630. Melendez v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Citizen Action of New York et al.
for leave to ﬁle a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 907.

No. 97–1773. Theis Research, Inc. v. Octel Communica-
tions Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of Intellectual Prop-
erty Creators et al. for leave to ﬁle a brief as amici curiae granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 51.

No. 97–8837. Cooper v. Calderon, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari before judgment denied.

Rehearing Denied

No. 97–1494. Greb et al. v. General Motors Corp., 523

U. S. 1077;

No. 97–1533. McDuffie, dba D & M Contracting Co. v.

First Union National Bank, 523 U. S. 1120;

No. 97–1540. Walker v. Michigan Public Service Commis-

sion et al., 523 U. S. 1120;

No. 97–7568. Shaw v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, 523 U. S.
1027;

In re Robinson, 523 U. S. 1071;
No. 97–7841.
No. 97–8141. Cuthbert v. District Court of Appeal of

Florida, Fifth District, et al., 523 U. S. 1109; and

In re Washington, ante, p. 903. Petitions for

No. 97–8525.
rehearing denied.

No. 97–885. Engelhart et al. v. Consolidated Rail Cor-

poration et al., 522 U. S. 1147; and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal journal or database. It's not sequential narrative text and is formatted in a way that suggests it's not meant to be read as a continuous story.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
100

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and part of a court opinion.  It is likely not the main body of text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1074

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 7, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6818.  Smith  v.  Donahue  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Ind.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported
below:  907  N.  E.  2d  553.

No.  09–6828.  Caldwell  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  pro
ceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See
this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–6843.  Dasisa  v.  Expert  Care  Nursing  Service,
Inc.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed
in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this
Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–6871.  Addleman  v.  Washington  et  al.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Motion of  petitioner for leave  to proceed in  forma pauperis
denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–6878.  Hon  Chung  Lau  v.  Giurbina,  Warden,  et  al.
C. A. 9th Cir.  Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.

No.  09–6888.  Beaver  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment of Corrections.  Sup. Ct. Fla.  Motion of petitioner
for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari
dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported  below:  18  So.
3d  527.

No.  09–6969.  Gossett  v.  Administration  of  George  W.
Bush  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed.  See
this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  843.

Miscellaneous  Orders

No.  09M43.  de  Johnson  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis with
out  an  afﬁdavit  of  indigency  executed  by  petitioner  granted.
Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision
of  this  petition.

No.  08–1341.  United  States  v.  Marcus.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
[Certiorari granted, ante, p. 945.]  Motion of the Solicitor General
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal journal or database. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>