<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

23

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

about extinguishing the Creek domain, or any shortage of
“will.”  Quite the opposite.  Through an open and concerted
effort, Congress did what it set out to do: transform a reser-
vation into a State.  “Mustering the broad social consensus
required to pass new legislation is a deliberately hard busi-
ness,”  as  the  Court  reminds  us.  Ibid.  Congress  did  that
hard work here, enacting not one but a steady progression
of major statutes.  The Court today does not give effect to
the cumulative significance of Congress’s actions, because
Congress  did  not  use  explicit  words  of  the  sort  the  Court
insists upon.  But Congress had no reason to suppose that
such words would be required of it, and this Court has held
that  they  were  not.  See  Hagen,  510  U. S.,  at  411–412;
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U. S., at 351; Solem, 465 U. S., at
471.

B
Under our precedents, we next consider the contempora-
neous  understanding  of  the  statutes  enacted  by  Congress
and  the  subsequent  treatment  of  the  lands  at  issue.  The
Court, however, declines to consider such evidence because,
in the Court’s view, the statutes clearly do not disestablish
any reservation, and there is no “ambiguity” to “clear up.”
Ante, at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).  That is not
the approach demanded by our precedent, supra, at 10–13,
and,  in  any  event,  the  Court’s  argument  fails  on  its  own
terms here.  I find it hard to see how anyone can come away
from the statutory texts detailed above with certainty that
Congress had no intent to disestablish the territorial reser-
vation.  At the very least, the statutes leave some ambigu-
ity, and thus “extratextual sources” ought to be consulted.
Ante, at 20.

Turning to such sources, our precedents direct us to “ex-
amine  all  the  circumstances”  surrounding  Congress’s  ac-
tions.  Parker, 577 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (quoting Ha-
gen,  510  U. S.,  at  412).    This  includes  evidence  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

THOMAS, J., concurring

carriers may be justified, even for industries not historically
recognized  as  common  carriers,  when  “a  business,  by  cir-
cumstances and its nature, . . . rise[s] from private to be of
public concern.”  See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233
U. S. 389, 411 (1914) (affirming state regulation of fire in-
surance rates).  At that point, a company’s “property is but
its  instrument,  the  means  of  rendering  the  service  which
has become of public interest.”  Id., at 408.

This latter definition of course is hardly helpful, for most
things can be described as “of public interest.”  But what-
ever may be said of other industries, there is clear historical
precedent  for  regulating  transportation  and  communica-
tions networks in a similar manner as traditional common
carriers.  Candeub 398–405.  Telegraphs, for example, be-
cause they “resemble[d] railroad companies and other com-
mon  carriers,”  were  “bound  to  serve  all  customers  alike,
without discrimination.”  Primrose v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 154 U. S. 1, 14 (1894).2

In exchange for regulating transportation and communi-
cation industries, governments—both State and Federal—
have sometimes given common carriers special government
favors.  Candeub 402–407.  For example, governments have
tied restrictions on a carrier’s ability to reject clients to “im-
munity from certain types of suits”3 or to regulations that
make it more difficult for other companies to compete with
the  carrier  (such  as  franchise  licenses).    Ibid.    By  giving

——————

2 This Court has been inconsistent about whether telegraphs were com-
mon carriers.  Compare Primrose, 154 U. S., at 14, with Moore v. New
York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 605 (1926).  But the Court has con-
sistently recognized that telegraphs were at least analogous enough to
common carriers to be regulated similarly.  Primrose, 154 U. S., at 14.

3 Telegraphs,  for  example,  historically  received  some  protection  from
defamation suits.  Unlike other entities that might retransmit defama-
tory content, they were liable only if they knew or had reason to know
that a message they distributed was defamatory.  Restatement (Second)
of Torts §581 (1976); see also O’Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F. 2d
539, 542 (CA1 1940).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 593 U.S. ____ (2021). It delves into the historical context and legal precedent surrounding the regulation of common carriers, particularly in the context of transportation and communication industries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1239

RECORDS—Continued

Original record, argument on  ....................................  26.8
References

—Briefs on merits.................................................  24.5
—Petitions for writ of certiorari........................  14.1(g)(i)

Translation of foreign language material .................  31

Rule

REHEARING

Amicus curiae briefs  ..................................................  37.3(a)
Certiﬁcate of counsel ....................................................  44.1, 44.2
Consecutive petitions  ..................................................  44.4
Judgment or decision on merits  ................................  44.1
Mandate, stay of  ...........................................................  45.2
Oral argument  ..............................................................  44.1, 44.2
Order  denying  petition  for  writ  of  certiorari  or

extraordinary writ ....................................................  44.2

Petitions

—Contents..............................................................  44.1, 44.2
—Copies, number to be ﬁled  .............................  44.1, 44.2
—Cover color .........................................................  33.1(g)(xiii)
—Deﬁciency, effect of ...........................................  44.6
—Documents,  format  and  general  speciﬁca

tions  ................................................................  33, 34
—Fee........................................................................  38(b)
—Page limits..........................................................  33.2(b)

—Service.................................................................  44.1, 44.2

—Time to ﬁle.......................................................  30.3, 44.1, 44.2, 44.4

—Word limits  ........................................................  33.1(g)(xiii)

Responses to petitions  ................................................  44.3

REPORTER OF DECISIONS

Publication of Court’s opinions...................................  41

REVIVOR

Revivor of cases ............................................................  35.1–35.3

RULES

Effective date.................................................................  48

Effect of noncompliance ...............................................  14.5, 18.13

Transition policy............................................................  48.3

SEAMEN

Suits by ...........................................................................  40.2

SERVICE

Procedure

—Commercial carrier ...........................................  29.3
—Copies, number to be served ..........................  29.3
—Electronic  ..........................................................  25.9, 37.3(a)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of rules and regulations, likely from a legal document.  It is not sequential text and is more likely a table of contents or index than the actual body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC. ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 19–1434.  Argued March 1, 2021—Decided June 21, 2021*

The question in these cases is whether the authority of Administrative
Patent  Judges  (APJs)  to  issue  decisions  on  behalf  of  the  Executive
Branch  is  consistent  with  the  Appointments  Clause  of  the  Constitu-
tion.  APJs conduct adversarial proceedings for challenging the valid-
ity  of  an  existing  patent  before  the  Patent  Trial  and  Appeal  Board
(PTAB).  During such proceedings, the PTAB sits in panels of at least
three of its members, who are predominantly APJs.  35 U. S. C. §§6(a),
(c).  The Secretary of Commerce appoints all members of the PTAB—
including 200-plus APJs—except for the Director, who is nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Senate.  §§3(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), 6(a).
After Smith & Nephew, Inc., and ArthroCare Corp. (collectively, Smith
& Nephew) petitioned for inter partes review of a patent secured by
Arthrex, Inc., three APJs concluded that the patent was invalid.  On
appeal to the Federal Circuit, Arthrex claimed that the structure of the
PTAB  violated  the  Appointments  Clause,  which  specifies  how  the
President may appoint officers to assist in carrying out his responsi-
bilities.  Art. II, §2, cl. 2.  Arthrex argued that the APJs were principal
officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and that their appointment by the Secretary of
Commerce was therefore unconstitutional.  The Federal Circuit held
that the APJs were principal officers whose appointments were uncon-
stitutional because neither the Secretary nor Director can review their
decisions or remove them at will.  To remedy this constitutional viola-
tion,  the  Federal  Circuit  invalidated  the  APJs’  tenure  protections,

——————

* Together with No. 19–1452, Smith & Nephew, Inc., et al. v. Arthrex,
Inc., et al. and No. 19–1458, Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., et al.,
also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U78

[09-06-00 18:35:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 116 (1998)

121

Opinion of the Court

gress made the law and it is up to Congress to change
it.”

Id., at 1481.

We granted certiorari, 522 U. S. 1038 (1998), to resolve a
Circuit split concerning the availability of a general maritime
survival action in cases of death on the high seas. Compare,
e. g., In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 117 F. 3d, at 1481,
with Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co., 125 F. 3d
1371, 1385 (CA11 1997).

II

Before Congress enacted DOHSA in 1920, the general law
of admiralty permitted a person injured by tortious conduct
to sue for damages, but did not permit an action to be
brought when the person was killed by that conduct. See
generally R. Hughes, Handbook of Admiralty Law 222–223
(2d ed. 1920). This rule stemmed from the theory that a
right of action was personal to the victim and thus expired
when the victim died. Accordingly, in the absence of an Act
of Congress or state statute providing a right of action, a
suit in admiralty could not be maintained in the courts of the
United States to recover damages for a person’s death. See
The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 213 (1886); The Alaska, 130
U. S. 201, 209 (1889).1

Congress passed such a statute, and thus authorized re-
covery for deaths on the high seas, with its enactment of
DOHSA. DOHSA provides a cause of action for “the death
of a person . . . caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default
occurring on the high seas,” § 761; this action must be
brought by the decedent’s personal representative “for the
exclusive beneﬁt of the decedent’s wife, husband, parent,

1 We later rejected this rule in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U. S. 375, 408–409 (1970), by overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199
(1886), and holding that a federal remedy for wrongful death exists under
general maritime law.
In Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U. S.
573, 574 (1974), we further held that such wrongful-death awards could
include compensation for loss of support and services and for loss of
society.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 116 (1998). It discusses the history of maritime law regarding wrongful death and the enactment of the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC.

Opinion of the Court

the  Federal  Power  Commission  (FPC)).    That  authority
allows  FERC  to  determine  whether  “any  rate,  charge,  or
classification . . . collected by any  natural-gas company in
connection with any transportation or sale of natural gas,
subject to the jurisdiction of [FERC],” or “any rule, regula
tion,  practice,  or  contract  affecting  such  rate,  charge,  or
classification  is  unjust,  unreasonable,  unduly  discrimina
tory,  or  preferential.”    15  U. S. C.  §717d(a)  (emphasis
added).  As  the  italicized  words  make  clear,  §5(a)  limits
the  scope  of  FERC’s  authority  to  activities  “in  connection
with  any  transportation  or  sale  of  natural  gas,  subject  to
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission.”
Ibid.  (emphasis
added).  And the Act, in §1(b), limits FERC’s “jurisdiction” to
(1)  “the  transportation  of  natural  gas  in  interstate  com
merce,” (2) “the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas
for  resale,”  and  (3)  “natural-gas  companies  engaged  in
such  transportation  or  sale.”  §717(b).  The  Act  leaves
regulation  of  other  portions  of  the  industry—such  as  pro
duction,  local  distribution  facilities,  and  direct  sales—to
the States.  See Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State
Corporation  Comm’n  of  Kan.,  489  U. S.  493,  507  (1989)
(Section  1(b)  of  the  Act  “expressly”  provides  that  “States
retain  jurisdiction  over  intrastate  transportation,  local
distribution,  and  distribution  facilities,  and  over  ‘the
production or gathering of natural gas’ ”).

To  simplify  our  discussion,  we  shall  describe  the  firms
that engage in interstate transportation as “jurisdictional
sellers”  or  “interstate  pipelines”  (though  various  brokers
and  others  may  also  fall  within  the  Act’s  jurisdictional
scope).  Similarly,  we  shall  refer  to  the  sales  over  which
FERC  has  jurisdiction  as  “jurisdictional  sales”  or  “whole
sale sales.”

2
Until the 1970’s, natural-gas regulation roughly tracked
the  industry  model  we  described  above.    Interstate  pipe
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) over natural gas sales. It provides legal context and definitions relevant to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Case Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TRUMP v. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

PROJECT

THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

absent  a  stay.”  Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
Where a party seeks a stay pending certiorari, as here, the
applicant satisfies the first factor only if it can show both
“a  reasonable  probability  that  certiorari  will  be  granted”
and “a significant possibility that the judgment below will
be  reversed.”  Barnes  v.  E-Systems,  Inc.  Group  Hospital
Medical & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U. S. 1301, 1302 (1991)
(Scalia,  J.,  in  chambers).  When  we  determine  that  those
critical  factors  are  satisfied,  we  must  “balance  the  equi-
ties”  by  “explor[ing]  the  relative  harms  to  applicant  and
respondent, as well as the interests of the public at large.”
Id.,  at  1304–1305  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted);  cf.
Nken,  supra,  at  435  (noting  that  the  factors  of  “assessing
the  harm  to  the  opposing  party  and  weighing  the  public
interest”  “merge  when  the  Government  is  the  opposing
party”).

The Government has satisfied the standard for issuing a
stay  pending  certiorari.    We  have,  of  course,  decided  to
grant  certiorari.    See  ante,  at  8–9.   And  I  agree  with  the
Court’s implicit conclusion that the Government has made
a  strong  showing  that  it  is  likely  to  succeed  on  the  mer-
its—that  is,  that  the  judgments  below  will  be  reversed.
The  Government  has  also  established  that  failure  to  stay
the injunctions will cause irreparable harm by interfering
with its “compelling need to provide for the Nation’s secu-
rity.”  Ante,  at  13.  Finally,  weighing  the  Government’s
interest  in  preserving  national  security  against  the  hard-
ships caused to respondents by temporary denials of entry
into  the  country,  the  balance  of  the  equities  favors  the
Government.  I would thus grant the Government’s appli-
cations for a stay in their entirety.

Reasonable minds may disagree on where the balance of
equities lies as between the Government and respondents
in  these  cases.    It  would  have  been  reasonable,  perhaps,
for  the  Court  to  have  left  the  injunctions  in place  only  as
to respondents themselves.  But the Court takes the addi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a stay pending certiorari and the balance of equities.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

Opinion of the Court

that a particular act be carried out.  Supra, at 6.  “Encour-
ages or  induces,”  however,  is  not  modified  by any  express
intent  requirement.    Because  the  text  of  clause  (iv)  lacks
that essential element, Hansen protests, it cannot possibly
be limited to either solicitation or facilitation.
  Once again, Hansen ignores the longstanding history of
these  words.    When  Congress  transplants  a  common-law
term,  the  “ ‘old  soil’ ”  comes  with  it.    Taggart  v.  Lorenzen,
587  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  5–6).    So  when
Congress placed “encourages” and “induces” in clause (iv),
the traditional intent associated with solicitation and facil-
itation was part of the package.  That, in fact, is precisely
how the federal aiding-and-abetting statute works.  It con-
tains no express mens rea requirement, providing only that
a person who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
procures”  a  federal  offense  is  “punishable  as  a  principal.”
18 U. S. C. §2(a).  Yet, consistent with “a centuries-old view
of culpability,” we have held that the statute implicitly in-
corporates the traditional state of mind required for aiding
and abetting.  Rosemond v. United States, 572 U. S. 65, 70–
71 (2014).
  Clause (iv) is situated among other provisions that work
the same way.  Consider those that immediately follow it:
The first makes it a crime to “engag[e] in any conspiracy to
the  preceding  acts,”  8  U. S. C.
commit  any  of
§1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I),  and  the  second  makes  it  a  crime  to
“ai[d] or abe[t] the commission of any of the preceding acts,”
§1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II).    Neither  of  these  clauses  explicitly
states an intent requirement.  Yet both conspiracy and aid-
ing  and  abetting  are  familiar  common-law  offenses  that
contain a particular mens rea.  See Rosemond, 572 U. S., at
76 (aiding and abetting); Ocasio v. United States, 578 U. S.
282, 287–288 (2016) (conspiracy).  Take an obvious exam-
ple: If the words “aids or abets” in clause (v)(II) were con-
sidered in a vacuum, they could be read to cover a person
who  inadvertently  helps  another  commit  a  §1324(a)(1)(A)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *United States v. Hansen*. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

917

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5722.  Redd  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  309.

No.  09–5729.  Thomas  v.  Thomas,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  554.

No. 09–5730.  Vargas v. United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  552  F.  3d  550.

No.  09–5732.  Valdes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  810.

No. 09–5736.  Krstic v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  1010.

No. 09–5737.  Hall v. McNeil, Secretary, Florida Depart
ment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5738.  Ferguson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  836.

No. 09–5743.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  915.

No. 09–5745.  Ayala v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5746.  Barbour  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  286  Fed.  Appx.  802.

No.  09–5749.  Hadley  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5752.  Fekos  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  122.

No.  09–5757.  Dicenso  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5758.  Cruz-Barrientos  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  150.

No.  09–5759.  Cuthbert  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  296  Fed.  Appx.  904.

No.  09–5760.  Davis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  351.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

21

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

the newly created U. S. District Courts of Oklahoma.  See
§16, 34 Stat. 276.  Pending cases not involving federal law,
including  those  that  involved  Indians  on  Indian  land  and
had  arisen  under  Arkansas  law,  were  transferred  to  the
new Oklahoma state courts.  §§16, 17, 20, id., at 276–277.
To dispel any potential confusion about the distribution of
criminal cases, Congress amended the Enabling Act the fol-
lowing year, clarifying that all cases for crimes that would
have  fallen  under  federal  jurisdiction  had  they  been  com-
mitted in a State would be transferred to the U. S. District
Courts.  Act of Mar. 4, 1907, §1, id., at 1286–1287.  All other
pending criminal cases would be “prosecuted to a final de-
termination  in  the  State  courts  of  Oklahoma.”   §3,  id.,  at
1287.  As for civil cases, the new state courts were immedi-
ately  empowered  to  resolve  even  disputes  that  previously
lay  at  the  core  of  tribal  self-governance.  E.g.,  Palmer  v.
Cully, 52 Okla. 454, 463–469, 153 P. 154, 157–158 (1915)
(per curiam) (marital dispute).4

In  sum,  in  statute  after  statute,  Congress  made  abun-
dantly  clear  its  intent  to  disestablish  the  Creek  territory.
The  Court,  for  purposes  of  the  disestablishment  question
before us, defines the Creek territory as “lands that would
lie outside both the legal jurisdiction and geographic bound-
aries of any State” and on which a tribe was “assured a right
to self-government.”  Ante, at 6.  That territory was elimi-
nated.  By establishing uniform laws for Indians and non-

——————

4 The  Court,  citing  United  States  v.  Sandoval,  231  U. S.  28,  47–48
(1913), argues that including a tribe within a new State is not necessarily
incompatible with the continuing existence of a reservation.  Ante, at 15–
16, n. 6.  But the tribe in Sandoval, the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico,
retained a rare communal title to their lands—which Congress explicitly
extinguished here.   231  U. S.,  at  47.   More  fundamentally,  the  Court’s
argument  suffers  from  the  same  flaw  that  runs  through  its  entire  ap-
proach, which maintains that each of Congress’s actions alone would not
be enough for disestablishment but never confronts the import of all of
them.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 591 U.S. ____ (2020). It delves into the historical context of the disestablishment of the Creek territory and Congress's actions regarding jurisdiction and tribal self-governance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

and  use  history.  And,  like  most  other  content,  advertise-
ments were displayed with ISIS’ messages, posts, and vid-
eos based on information about the viewer and the content
being  viewed.  Unlike  most  other  content,  however,  ISIS’
videos  and  messages  celebrated  terrorism  and  recruited
new  terrorists.    For  example,  ISIS  uploaded  videos  that
fundraised for weapons of terror and that showed brutal ex-
ecutions of soldiers and civilians alike.  And plaintiffs allege
that these platforms have been crucial to ISIS’ growth, al-
lowing it to reach new audiences, gain new members, and
spread its message of terror.

Plaintiffs  also  allege  that  defendants  have  known  that
ISIS  has  used  their  platforms  for  years.  Yet,  plaintiffs
claim  that  defendants  have  failed  to  detect  and  remove  a
substantial  number  of  ISIS-related  accounts,  posts,  and
videos.  (For example, plaintiffs aver that defendants “have
failed to implement . . . a basic account detection methodol-
ogy”  to  prevent  ISIS  supporters  from  generating  multiple
accounts on their platforms.  App. 150.)  Accordingly, plain-
tiffs  assert  that  defendants  aided  and  abetted  ISIS  by
knowingly  allowing  ISIS  and  its  supporters  to  use  their
platforms  and  benefit  from  their  “recommendation”  algo-
rithms,  enabling  ISIS  to  connect  with  the  broader  public,
fundraise, and radicalize new recruits.  And, in the process,
defendants allegedly have profited from the advertisements
placed on ISIS’ tweets, posts, and videos.

Plaintiffs  also  provide  a  set  of  allegations  specific  to
Google.  According  to  plaintiffs,  Google  has  established  a
system that shares revenue gained from certain advertise-
ments  on  YouTube  with  users  who  posted  the  videos
watched  with the advertisement.  As part of that system,
Google allegedly reviews and approves certain videos before
Google permits ads to accompany that video.  Plaintiffs al-
lege that Google has reviewed and approved at least some
ISIS  videos  under  that  system,  thereby  sharing  some
amount of revenue with ISIS.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the allegations made against social media platforms in a case related to ISIS. It provides context and details about the plaintiffs' claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

THRYV, INC. v. CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP

Opinion of the Court

invalidated 13 of Click-to-Call’s claims for want of the req-
uisite novelty and nonobviousness, and remanded with in-
structions to dismiss.

We granted certiorari to resolve the reviewability issue,
587 U. S. ___ (2019), and now vacate the Federal Circuit’s
judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the ap-
peal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

III
A
To determine whether §314(d) precludes judicial review
of the agency’s application of §315(b)’s time prescription, we
begin by defining §314(d)’s scope.  Section 314(d)’s text ren-
ders  “final  and  nonappealable”  the  “determination  by  the
Director whether  to institute an inter partes review under
this section.”  §314(d) (emphasis added).  That language in-
dicates  that  a  party  generally  cannot  contend  on  appeal
that the agency should have refused “to institute an inter
partes review.”

We held as much in Cuozzo.  There, a party contended on
appeal that the agency should have refused to institute in-
ter partes review because the petition failed §312(a)(3)’s re-
quirement that the grounds for challenging patent claims
must  be  identified  “with  particularity.”    579  U. S.,  at  ___
(slip  op.,  at  6)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    This
“contention that the Patent Office unlawfully initiated its
agency review is not appealable,” we held, for “that is what
§314(d) says.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7).  Section 314(d), we
explained, “preclud[es] review of the Patent Office’s institu-
tion  decisions”  with  sufficient  clarity  to  overcome  the
——————
ting en banc had considered and agreed with the panel majority’s conclu-
sion that a complaint voluntarily dismissed without prejudice can trigger
§315(b)’s time bar.  Click-to-Call Technologies, LP v. Ingenio, Inc., 899
F. 3d 1321, 1328, n. 3 (CA Fed. 2018).  On that issue, Judge Taranto is-
sued a concurring opinion, id., at 1343–1347, and Judge Dyk, joined by
Judge Lourie, issued a dissenting opinion, id., at 1350–1355.  That ques-
tion is outside the scope of our review.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court. It discusses a case involving patent law and the reviewability of agency decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1018

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 9, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6918.  Warren  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  566  F.  3d  1211.

No.  09–6920.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  449.

No.  09–6921.  Knight  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  900.

No.  09–6922.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  961.

No.  09–6929.  Meadows  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  571  F.  3d  131.

No. 09–6930.  Essell v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–6932.  Ross v. United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  821.

No.  09–6934.  Barbosa-Torres  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6935.  Knibbs v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  258.

No.  09–6940.  Gonzalez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6942.  Halter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6944.  Harris v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  444.

No. 09–6945.  Garcia v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  426.

No.  09–6946.  Hansley,  aka  Hansely  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.
Appx.  824.

No.  09–6955.  Osaki  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  302  Fed.  Appx.  660.

No.  09–6960.  Fleck  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  264.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not the actual content of a book and is likely a legal docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6/17/2022 12:11:51 PM

Compare Results

Old File:

20-1263.pdf

31 pages (188 KB)
6/3/2022 2:51:40 PM

versus

New File:

20-1263_new.pdf

31 pages (188 KB)
6/17/2022 12:09:19 PM

Total Changes

Content

2

2  Replacements
0  Insertions
0  Deletions

Styling and
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0  Styling
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file://NoURLProvided[6/17/2022 12:11:51 PM]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a file comparison report, not the actual text content of a document. It focuses on metadata and changes made between two PDF files.
  </thinking>
  <category>File comparison report</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

924

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 15, 1998

524 U. S.

manded for further consideration in light of Cass County v. Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, ante, p. 103. Reported below:
106 F. 3d 130.

No. 97–296. Michigan Department of Environmental

Quality v. Bestfoods et al.; and

No. 97–464. Bestfoods v. Aerojet-General Corp. et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and cases
remanded for further consideration in light of United States v.
Bestfoods, ante, p. 51. Reported below: 113 F. 3d 572.

No. 97–1163. Donahey et ux. v. Livingstone et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari granted,
judgment vacated, and case re-
manded for further consideration in light of United States v. Best-
foods, ante, p. 51. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 838.

No. 97–1209. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co. v. Gray
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated,
and case remanded for further consideration in light of Dooley v.
Korean Air Lines Co., ante, p. 116. Reported below: 125 F. 3d
1371.

No. 97–7931. Coleman v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur-
ther consideration in light of Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346
(1997).

Miscellaneous Orders

No. A–901 (97–1900). Buzzetti, dba Cozy Cabin, et al. v.
City of New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Application for stay,
addressed to Justice Souter and referred to the Court, denied.

No. D–1963.

In re Disbarment of Marshall.

James
Warner Marshall, of Orange, Conn., is suspended from the practice
of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40
days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred
from the practice of law in this Court.

No. D–1964.

In re Disbarment of Green.
James Ryan
Green, of Fontana, Wis., is suspended from the practice of law in
this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re-
quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, likely a list of court cases and miscellaneous orders. It includes case numbers, court names, and brief descriptions of actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

ALITO, J., concurring
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–511
_________________

FACEBOOK, INC., PETITIONER v.
NOAH DUGUID, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 1, 2021]

 JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that an “automatic telephone dial-
ing system,” as defined in the Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 1991, must have the capacity to “store . . . tele-
phone numbers” by “using a random or sequential number
generator.”  47  U. S. C.  §227(a)(1)(A).    I  also  agree  with
much  of  the  Court’s  analysis  and  the  analysis  in  several
Court of Appeals decisions on this question.  See Gadelhak
v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F. 3d 458, 463–468 (CA7 2020);
Glasser  v.  Hilton  Grand  Vacations  Co.,  948  F. 3d  1301,
1306–1312 (CA11 2020).

I write separately to address the Court’s heavy reliance
on  one  of  the  canons  of  interpretation  that  have  come  to
play a prominent role in our statutory interpretation cases.
Cataloged in a treatise written by our former colleague An-
tonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, counsel for respondents
in  this  case,  these  canons  are  useful  tools,  but  it  is  im-
portant to keep their limitations in mind.  This may be es-
pecially true with respect to the particular canon at issue
here, the “series-qualifier” canon.

According  to  the  majority’s  recitation  of  this  canon,
“ ‘[w]hen  there  is  a  straightforward,  parallel  construction
that involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a modifier at
the end of the list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’ ”
Ante, at 5 (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.  This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U47

[10-04-01 09:34:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 420 (2000)

433

Opinion of the Court

proceedings. The prisoner had not developed the facts of
his claim in state collateral proceedings, an omission caused
by the negligence of his state postconviction counsel. See
id., at 4, 8–9. The Court characterized this as the “prison-
er’s failure to develop material facts in state court.”
Id.,
at 8. We required the prisoner to demonstrate cause and
prejudice excusing the default before he could receive a
hearing on his claim, ibid., unless the prisoner could “show
that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from
failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing,” id., at 12.

Section 2254(e)(2)’s initial inquiry into whether “the appli-
cant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State
court proceedings” echoes Keeney’s language regarding “the
state prisoner’s failure to develop material facts in state
court.”
In Keeney, the Court borrowed the cause and prej-
udice standard applied to procedurally defaulted claims, see
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 87–88 (1977), deciding
there was no reason “to distinguish between failing to prop-
erly assert a federal claim in state court and failing in state
court to properly develop such a claim.” Keeney, supra, at
8. As is evident from the similarity between the Court’s
phrasing in Keeney and the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2),
Congress intended to preserve at least one aspect of
Keeney’s holding: prisoners who are at fault for the deﬁ-
ciency in the state-court record must satisfy a heightened
standard to obtain an evidentiary hearing. To be sure, in
requiring that prisoners who have not been diligent satisfy
§ 2254(e)(2)’s provisions rather than show cause and preju-
dice, and in eliminating a freestanding “miscarriage of jus-
tice” exception, Congress raised the bar Keeney imposed on
prisoners who were not diligent in state-court proceedings.
Contrary to the Commonwealth’s position, however, there is
no basis in the text of § 2254(e)(2) to believe Congress used
“fail” in a different sense than the Court did in Keeney or
otherwise intended the statute’s further, more stringent re-
quirements to control the availability of an evidentiary hear-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text from a court opinion. It discusses the legal standard for obtaining an evidentiary hearing in federal court on a claim that was not properly developed in state court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Per Curiam

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–366
_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, ET AL., APPELLANTS
v. NEW YORK, ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

[December 18, 2020]

 PER CURIAM.
Every  ten  years,  the  Nation  undertakes  an  “Enumera-
tion” of its population “in such Manner” as Congress “shall
by Law direct.”  U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 3.  This census
plays a critical role in apportioning Members of the House
of  Representatives  among  the  States,  allocating  federal
funds to the States, providing information for intrastate re-
districting,  and  supplying  data  for  numerous  initiatives
conducted  by  governmental  entities,  businesses,  and  aca-
demic researchers.  Department of Commerce v. New York,
588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 2).

Congress has given both the Secretary of Commerce and
the President functions to perform in the enumeration and
apportionment process.  The Secretary must “take a decen-
nial census of population . . . in such form and content as he
may determine,” 13 U. S. C. §141(a), and then must report
to  the  President  “[t]he  tabulation  of  total  population  by
States”  under  the  census  “as  required  for  the  apportion-
ment,”  §141(b).  The  President  in  turn  must  transmit  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion.  It includes the case name, citation information, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Supreme Court Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code

are to the 1994 edition.

Cases reported before page 901 are those decided with opinions of the
Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 901 et seq. are
those in which orders were entered. The opinion reported on page 1301
et seq. is that written in chambers by an individual Justice.

Page
939
Ab v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
624
Abbott; Bragdon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Abdeslem v. U. S. Embassy, Manila, Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Abdullah v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abrams v. Barnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
Adames v. Batista . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,971
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,971
Adamson; King v.
917
Adelman v. Colonial Park Apartments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924
Aerojet-General Corp.; Bestfoods v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902
Aham-Neze, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925
Ahwinona v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aircraft Equipment Co.; Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v.
11
Akins; Federal Election Comm’n v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Alabama; McLeod v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
981
Alabama; South Central Bell Telephone Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Alabama; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915
Alachua County School Bd.; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Alameda County Network of Mental Health Clients; Darden v.
. .
925
Alaska; Ahwinona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912
Alexander & Alexander of N. Y., Inc.; Christy v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Aljami v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940
Allah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Allard v. Elo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
Allen v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920
Allen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962
Allery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
978
Allin; Rivera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Allmond v. Fauver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Almeida v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases reported and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1133

529 U. S.

May 22, 2000

No. 99–8690. Ayers v. City of Memphis et al. C. A. 6th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8693. Dominguez v. Kuhlmann, Superintendent,
Sullivan Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–8698. Pruitt v. Irvin, Superintendent, Wende

Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8709. Stewart v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 302 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 746
N. E. 2d 915.

No. 99–8719. Williams v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8722. Muhammad v. Florida Department of Cor-

rections et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8723. Morse v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–8726. Richardson v. Broad Lane, Inc., et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 822.

No. 99–8728. Baptist v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 303 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 747
N. E. 2d 1115.

No. 99–8729. Kinchloe v. Michigan et al. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8730. Lassan v. City of Gulf Shores. Ct. Crim.
App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 778 So. 2d 877.

No. 99–8731. Lee v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 768 So. 2d 1032.

No. 99–8735. Cittadino v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8736. Butler v. Pitzer, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th

Cir. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is likely part of a legal document or database and not the main body of text meant for reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Syllabus

ATS  may  afford  federal  judges  “discretion  [to]  conside[r]  [creating]
new cause[s] of action” if they “rest on a norm of international char-
acter  accepted  by  the  civilized  world  and  defined  with  a  specificity
comparable  to  the  features  of  the  [three  specified]  18th-century”
torts.  Id., at 725.  This is doubtful, for the people’s elected represent-
atives, not judges, make the laws that govern them.  But even accept-
ing Sosa’s framework, a proper application of that framework would
preclude courts from recognizing any new causes of action under the
ATS.    When  courts  are  confronted  with  a  request  to  fashion  a  new
cause of action, “separation-of-powers principles are or should be cen-
tral  to  the  analysis.”  Ziglar  v.  Abbasi,  582  U. S.  ___,  ___.    The  first
and  most  important  question  is  whether  Congress  or  the  courts
should  decide,  and  the  right  answer  “most  often  will  be  Congress.”
Ibid.    There  is  no  reason  to  make  a  special  exception  for  the  ATS,
which was designed as “a jurisdictional statute creating no new caus-
es of action.”  Sosa, 542 U. S., at 724.  The context in which any Sosa
discretion would be exercised confirms the wisdom of restraint.  The
“practical consequences” that might follow a decision to create a new
ATS  cause  of  action,  see  id.,  at  732–733,  would  likely  involve  ques-
tions of foreign affairs and national security—matters implicating the
expertise  and  authority  not  of  the  Judiciary  but  of  the  political
branches.  Pp. 2–5.

(b) Another  independent  problem  is  that  this  suit  is  by  foreigners
against  a  foreigner  over  the  meaning  of  international  norms.    The
original understanding of the ATS, which was but one clause in one
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, likely would have required a do-
mestic defendant in order to comply with the requirements of the Di-
versity-of-Citizenship Clause of Article III.  Precedent interpreting a
neighboring  provision  of  the  Judiciary  Act  confirms  that  conclusion.
See Mossman v. Higginson, 4 Dall. 12, 14.  In any event, separation-
of-powers limits on the judicial function and deference to the political
branches  should  lead  federal  courts  to  require  a  domestic  defendant
before agreeing to exercise any Sosa-generated discretion to entertain
an ATS suit.  Pp. 5–14.

 KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–B–1, and II–C, in which
ROBERTS,  C. J.,  and  THOMAS,  ALITO,  and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,  joined,  and  an
opinion  with  respect  to  Parts  II–A,  II–B–2,  II–B–3,  and  III,  in  which
ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a concurring
opinion.  ALITO,  J.,  and  GORSUCH,  J.,  filed  opinions  concurring  in  part
and  concurring  in  the  judgment.    SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting
opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, outlining the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a summary of a legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

ALITO, J., dissenting

with  the  conduct  of  a  person  who  really  wanted  to  get
privileges.

Doe 5.  Doe 5 is an OB/GYN who performs abortions at
Women’s Clinic in New Orleans and Delta Clinic in Baton
Rouge.  Doe  5  did  not  testify  at  the  hearing  in  District
Court,  but  the  District  Court  found  that  he  proceeded  in
“good faith” based on a declaration and the transcript of a
deposition.  250 F. Supp. 3d, at 75–76.

Doe 5 obtained courtesy privileges at Touro Hospital in
New  Orleans,  see  App.  1401,  and  therefore  all  agree  that
Act 620 would not prevent him from practicing at Women’s
Clinic, id., at 1397.  The remaining question is whether the
law  would  bar  him  from  performing  abortions  in  Baton
Rouge.

Doe 5 could continue to do that if one hospital in that area
granted him admitting privileges, and Doe 5 testified that
one,  Woman’s  Hospital,  will  grant  him  privileges  once  he
finds  a  doctor  who  is  willing  to  cover  him  when  he  is  not
available.  See id., at 1334.  Doe 5 asked exactly one doctor
to serve as his covering physician.  That does not show that
he “could not find a covering physician,” ante,  at 23, if he
made other inquiries.

The plurality justifies Doe 5’s meager effort based on pure
speculation.    Because  the  one  doctor  Doe  5  asked  had  a
transfer  agreement  with  the  Baton  Rouge  abortion  clinic,
the  plurality  reasons  that  “Doe  5  could  have  reasonably
thought that, if this doctor wouldn’t serve as his covering
physician, no one would.”  Ante, at 28.  The plurality goes
on to say that “it was well within the District Court’s dis-
cretion to credit that reading of the record.”  Ibid.

This argument shows how far the plurality is willing to
go to strike down the Louisiana law.  The plurality relies on
speculation  about  why  Doe  5  made  only  one  inquiry  and
why the District Court found this one inquiry sufficient.  In
fact, however, Doe 5 never explained why he asked only one
doctor, and he never intimated that he gave up because that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses a case involving abortion rights and the granting of hospital privileges. The text is sequential and presents a coherent argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Syllabus

scheme and that any exemptions were meant to end rapidly.  They note
that subparagraph (A) is titled “temporary exemption,” that it was per-
mitted  to  expire  in  2013,  and  that  subparagraph  (B)(i) speaks  of  ex-
tending “the exemption under subparagraph (A).”  Context, however,
suggests subparagraph (B) is not part of some sunset scheme.  Subpar-
agraph (A)(ii)’s exemptions did not have to expire in 2013; they could
have lasted indefinitely.  Subparagraph (B)(i)’s “at any time” language
expressly contemplates exemptions beyond 2013.  That looks nothing
like readymade examples of sunset schemes, which Congress eschewed
here.  E.g., §247d–7f(b).  Finally, even on respondents’ reading, a small
refinery  with  an  unbroken  record  of  failing  to  comply  with  the  RFP
may continue to seek and obtain extensions forever.  Pp. 11–12.

(c) In  an  appeal  to  public  policy,  respondents  argue  that  subpara-
graph (B) was adopted to “funnel small refineries toward compliance
over time” and that enforcing a continuity requirement helps advance
that goal.  Consistent with that view, the Tenth Circuit concluded the
number of small refinery exemptions “should have tapered down” over
time.  Petitioners counter that the statute seeks to increase production
of renewable fuel while offering an annual “safety valve” for small re-
fineries.  Neither the statute’s text, structure, nor history affords suf-
ficient  guidance  to  choose  between  these  competing  narratives  and
metaphors.  Instead, the analysis can be guided only by the statute’s
text—and that nowhere commands a continuity requirement.  Pp. 12–
16.

948 F. 3d 1206, reversed.

GORSUCH,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  THOMAS,  BREYER,  ALITO,  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.  BAR-
RETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus. It summarizes the arguments and holdings of the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

Opinion of the Court

burden  a  person’s  exercise  of  religion  even  if  the  burden
results  from  a  rule  of  general  applicability,”  unless  the
government  “demonstrates  that  application  of  the  burden
to  the  person––(1) is  in  furtherance  of  a  compelling  gov-
ernmental  interest;  and  (2) is  the  least  restrictive  means
of  furthering  that  compelling  governmental  interest.”  42
U. S. C. §§2000bb–1(a), (b).  In making RFRA applicable to
the  States  and  their  subdivisions,  Congress  relied  on
Section  5  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  but  in  City  of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507 (1997), this Court held that
RFRA  exceeded  Congress’  powers  under  that  provision.
Id., at 532–536.

Congress  responded  to  City  of  Boerne  by  enacting
RLUIPA,  which  applies  to  the  States  and  their  subdivi-
sions  and  invokes  congressional  authority  under  the
Spending  and  Commerce  Clauses.  See  §2000cc–1(b).
RLUIPA  concerns  two  areas  of  government  activity:  Sec-
tion  2  governs  land-use  regulation,  §2000cc;  and  Section
3—the  provision  at  issue  in  this  case—governs  religious
exercise by institutionalized persons, §2000cc–1.  Section 3
mirrors  RFRA  and  provides  that  “[n]o  government  shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if
the  burden  results  from  a  rule  of  general  applicability,
unless  the  government  demonstrates  that  imposition  of
the  burden  on  that  person––(1) is  in  furtherance  of  a
compelling  governmental  interest;  and  (2)  is  the  least
restrictive  means  of  furthering  that  compelling  govern-
  RLUIPA  thus  allows
mental  interest.”
prisoners  “to  seek  religious  accommodations  pursuant  to
the  same  standard  as  set  forth  in  RFRA.”  Gonzales  v.  O
Centro  Espírita  Beneficente  União  do  Vegetal,  546  U. S.
418, 436 (2006).

§2000cc–1(a).

Several  provisions  of  RLUIPA  underscore  its  expansive
protection  for  religious  liberty.    Congress  defined  “reli-
gious  exercise”  capaciously  to  include  “any  exercise  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt discussing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). It cites legal precedents and outlines the act's provisions regarding religious exercise in institutions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Elizondo Alvarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ellis v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ellis v. Washington County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ellison v. Cycmanick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Elo; Pimentel Feliz v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Elo; Sirbaugh v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Emerson v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Emmanuel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Endicott; McMillian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Engle; Philip Morris Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Englund; Oates v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Enigwe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Environmental Protection Agency; Byrd v.
Environ Products, Inc. v. Intelpro Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Erie v. “Kandyland” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Erie v. Pap’s A. M.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Espinoza Rodriguez v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Essex County Hospital Center; Johnson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Estate. See name of estate.
Estrada; Leon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Euﬁnger; Featherstone v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evans v. Hobbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evans; Hornsby v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evans v. Lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evans; Webb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Everett; Pfeil v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evers Houses Associates, L. P.; Abbott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evey v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Excinia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Exxon Co., USA; Sketoe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Exxon Corp.; Rochon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fair v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fairly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Faiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Falcon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Falcon v. Richmond Police Dept.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Falquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Falsetta v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Famous Barr; Douthitt v.
Fanello; Hutson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Farah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fargo; Copper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xxv

Page
1043
1066
1072
1087
1074
1074
1125
1030
1029
1104
1144
1056
1136
1018
1108
277
277
1041
1070

1113
1072
1111
1026
1072
1103
1113
1056
1130
1103
1028
1057
1090
1007
1136
1103
1036
1007
1079
1089
1054
1031
1121
1017
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

13

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

relatively predictably.6

Of  course,  there  are  important  countervailing  concerns.
While  experts  can  work  backwards  from  the  BAC  at  the
time  the  sample  was  taken  to  determine  the  BAC  at  the
time  of  the  alleged  offense,  longer  intervals  may  raise
questions  about  the  accuracy  of  the  calculation.    For  that
reason,  exigent  circumstances  justifying  a  warrantless
blood  sample  may  arise  in  the  regular  course  of  law  en
forcement  due  to  delays  from  the  warrant  application
process.  But  adopting  the  State’s  per se  approach  would
improperly  ignore  the  current  and  future  technological
developments  in  warrant  procedures,  and  might  well
diminish the incentive for jurisdictions “to pursue progres
sive  approaches  to  warrant  acquisition  that  preserve  the
protections  afforded  by  the  warrant  while  meeting  the
legitimate  interests  of  law  enforcement.”  State  v.  Rodri-
guez, 2007 UT 15, ¶46, 156 P. 3d 771, 779.

In short, while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the
blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case,
as  it  did  in  Schmerber,  it  does  not  do  so  categorically.
Whether  a  warrantless  blood  test  of  a  drunk-driving  sus
pect is reasonable must be determined case by case based
on the totality of the circumstances.

C
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
THE CHIEF JUSTICE agrees that the State’s proposed per se
rule  is  overbroad  because  “[f]or  exigent  circumstances  to
——————

6 The  dissent  claims  that  a  “50-state  survey  [is]  irrelevant  to  the  ac
tual disposition of this case” because Missouri requires written warrant
applications.    Post,  at  8.  But  the  per se  exigency  rule  that  the  State
seeks  and  the  dissent  embraces  would  apply  nationally  because  it
treats  “the  body’s  natural  metabolization  of  alcohol”  as  a  sufficient
basis for a warrantless search everywhere and always.  Post, at 1.  The
technological  innovations  in  warrant  procedures  that  many  States
have  adopted  are  accordingly  relevant  to  show  that  the  per se  rule  is
overbroad.

  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case cited at the beginning. It discusses the legal reasoning around warrantless blood tests in drunk driving cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

21

Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.

allowing all robocalls to cell phones.

When,  as  here,  the  Court  confronts  an  equal-treatment
constitutional  violation,  the  Court  generally  applies  the
same commonsense severability principles described above.
If the statute contains a severability clause, the Court typ-
ically severs the discriminatory exception or classification,
and thereby extends the relevant statutory benefits or bur-
dens to those previously exempted, rather than nullifying
the benefits or burdens for all.  In light of the presumption
of severability, the Court generally does the same even in
the absence of a severability clause.  The Court’s precedents
reflect that preference for extension rather than nullifica-
tion.  See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U. S. ___,
___ (2017) (slip op., at 25); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S.
76, 89–91 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 202–
204,  213–217  (1977)  (plurality  opinion);  Jimenez  v.  Wein-
berger, 417 U. S. 628, 637–638 (1974); Department of Agri-
culture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 529, 537–538 (1973); Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 678–679, 690–691 (1973)
(plurality opinion); Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333,
361–367 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result).

To be sure, some equal-treatment cases can raise complex
questions about whether it is appropriate to extend benefits
or burdens, rather than nullifying the benefits or burdens.
See,  e.g.,  Morales-Santana,  582  U. S.  ___.    For  example,
there can be due process, fair notice, or other independent
constitutional barriers to extension of benefits or burdens.
Cf. Miller v. Albright, 523 U. S. 420, 458–459 (1998) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment); see generally Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional
Legislation, 28 Clev. St. L. Rev. 301 (1979).  There also can
be knotty questions about what is the exception and what
is the rule.  But here, we need not tackle all of the possible
hypothetical applications of severability doctrine in equal-
treatment cases.  The government-debt exception is a rela-
tively  narrow  exception  to  the  broad  robocall  restriction,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the application of severability principles in equal treatment constitutional violations. It contains legal citations and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting

The Court tries to cloud the issue by spending many pages
discussing matters that are beside the point.  The Court ob-
serves  that  a  Title  VII  plaintiff  need  not  show  that  “sex”
was  the  sole  or  primary  motive  for  a  challenged  employ-
ment decision or its sole or primary cause; that Title VII is
limited to discrimination with respect to a list of specified
actions  (such  as  hiring,  firing,  etc.);  and  that  Title  VII
protects individual rights, not group rights.  See ante, at 5–
9, 11.

All that is true, but so what?  In cases like those before
us, a plaintiff must show that sex was a “motivating factor”
in the challenged employment action, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–
2(m), so the question we must decide comes down to this: if
an individual employee or applicant for employment shows
that his or her sexual orientation or gender identity was a
“motivating factor” in a hiring or discharge decision, for ex-
ample,  is  that  enough  to  establish  that  the  employer  dis-
criminated “because of . . . sex”?  Or, to put the same ques-
tion in different terms, if an employer takes an employment
action  solely  because  of  the  sexual  orientation  or  gender
identity of an employee or applicant, has that employer nec-
essarily discriminated because of biological sex?

The  answers  to  those  questions  must  be  no, unless  dis-
crimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity
inherently constitutes discrimination because of sex.  The
Court  attempts  to  prove  that  point,  and  it  argues,  not
merely that the terms of Title VII can be interpreted that
way  but  that  they  cannot  reasonably  be  interpreted  any
other way.  According to the Court, the text is unambiguous.
See ante, at 24, 27, 30.

The arrogance of this argument is breathtaking.  As I will
show, there is not a shred of evidence that any Member of
Congress interpreted the statutory text that way when Ti-
tle VII was enacted.  See Part III–B, infra.  But the Court
apparently thinks that this was because the Members were
not  “smart  enough  to  realize”  what  its  language  means.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Bostock v. Clayton County.  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the interpretation of Title VII and its application to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

One cannot plausibly conclude that the First Congress—
seeking to “adapt” the Northwest Ordinance to the Consti-
tution, 1 Stat. 51—prescribed methods of appointing terri-
torial officers that violated the Appointments Clause.  Ra-
ther, the First Congress recognized the distinction between
territorial and national powers, see supra, at 6–8, and un-
derstood  that  officers  performing  duties  pursuant  to  only
Article IV territorial powers are not officers “of the United
States.”  For these reasons, I would hold that the original
meaning of the phrase “Officers of the United States” does
not include territorial  officers exercising only powers con-
ferred under Article IV.

C
Under the original meaning of the Appointments Clause,
the Board’s members are not “Officers of the United States.”
They are territorial officers exercising power granted under
Article IV.

The  Board  is  “an  entity  within  the  territorial  govern-
ment,” 48 U. S. C. §2121(c)(1), created “pursuant to article
IV,  section  3  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,”
§2121(b)(2),  and  funded  by  the  Territory,  §2127(b).    The
members  of  the  Board  perform  duties  involving  the  over-
sight  of  Puerto  Rico’s  finances  and  fiscal  reform  efforts,
§§2141–2152, and the representation of Puerto Rico in debt
restructuring proceedings, §§2161–2177.  Because “they do
not exercise the national executive power,” “national judi-
cial power,” or national legislative power, the Board’s mem-
bers are “Article IV executives,” not Officers of the United
States  under  the  Appointments  Clause.  See  Freytag  v.
Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 913 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment)  (emphasis  de-
leted).

The Court rightfully acknowledges the territorial nature
of the Board’s duties.  Ante, at 14–20.  But in the process,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 590 U.S. ____ (2020). It delves into the interpretation of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution and its application to territorial officers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

948

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 26, 1998

524 U. S.

Miscellaneous Orders

No. D–1933.

In re Disbarment of Phillips. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 523 U. S. 1057.]

No. D–1936.

In re Disbarment of Greer. Disbarment en-

tered.

[For earlier order herein, see 523 U. S. 1069.]

No. D–1938.

In re Disbarment of Rotter. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 523 U. S. 1069.]

No. D–1939.

In re Disbarment of Irons. Disbarment en-

tered.

[For earlier order herein, see 523 U. S. 1069.]

No. D–1942.

In re Disbarment of Collins. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 523 U. S. 1092.]

No. D–1943.

In re Disbarment of Kantor. Further con-
[For earlier order

sideration of rule to show cause deferred.
herein, see 523 U. S. 1092.]

No. D–1944.

In re Disbarment of Hall. Disbarment en-

tered.

[For earlier order herein, see 523 U. S. 1092.]

No. D–1946.
ment entered.

In re Disbarment of Blumenthal. Disbar-
[For earlier order herein, see 523 U. S. 1104.]

No. D–1947.

In re Disbarment of Krupa. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 523 U. S. 1104.]

No. D–1951.

In re Disbarment of Breeze. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 523 U. S. 1114.]

No. D–1965.

In re Disbarment of Mendelson. Michael
Sweig Mendelson, of Chicago, Ill., having requested to resign as
a member of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name
be stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of
law before this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on June
15, 1998 [ante, p. 925], is discharged.

No. D–1972.

In re Disbarment of Hynes. Douglas James
Hynes, of Farmingdale, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of
law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of miscellaneous orders from the Supreme Court, specifically regarding disbarments. It's not a continuous narrative and lacks the typical structure of a book chapter or section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

Opinion of the Court

present cause of action.  Green, 578 U. S., at 554.  Rather,
§2401(a)  uses  standard  language  that  had  a  well-settled
meaning in 1948: “right of action first accrues.”  Moreover,
Congress knew how to depart from the traditional rule to
create a limitations period that begins with the defendant’s
action instead of the plaintiff ’s injury: Just six years before
it enacted §2401(a), Congress passed the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, which required challenges to Office of
Price Administration actions to be filed “[w]ithin a period of
sixty  days  after  the  issuance  of  any  regulation  or  order.”
§203(a), 56 Stat. 31 (emphasis added); see also Administra-
tive Orders Review Act (Hobbs Act), §4, 64 Stat. 1130 (1950)
(allowing petitions for review “within sixty days after entry
of ”  a  “final  order  reviewable  under  this  Act”).    Section
2401(a), by contrast, stuck with the standard accrual lan-
guage.

Section 2401(a) thus operates as a statute of limitations
rather than a statute of repose.  “[A] statute of limitations
creates ‘a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the
date when the claim accrued.’ ”  CTS Corp. v. Waldburger,
573 U. S. 1, 7–8 (2014) (quoting Black’s 1546 (9th ed. 2009)).
That  describes  §2401(a),  with  its  reference  to  when  the
right of action “accrues,” to a tee.  “A statute of repose, on
the other hand, puts an outer limit on the right to bring a
civil action” that is “measured not from the date on which
the claim accrues but instead from the date of the last cul-
pable  act  or  omission  of  the  defendant.”    573  U. S.,  at  8.
Such statutes bar “ ‘any suit that is brought after a specified
time since the defendant acted . . . even if this period ends
before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.’ ”  Ibid.
(quoting  Black’s  1546).   That  describes  statutes  like  the
Hobbs Act, which sets a filing deadline of 60 days from the
“entry” of the agency order.  64 Stat. 1130.  Statutes of lim-
itations “require plaintiffs to pursue diligent prosecution of
known claims”; statutes of repose reflect a “legislative judg-
ment that a defendant should be free from liability after the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the interpretation of a statute of limitations. It contains legal terminology and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

JACKSON, J., dissenting

again, the particulars matter.  And the history of this par-
ticular statute  only  underscores  that  it cannot  be  read  as
the majority wishes.  At every turn, Congress has sought to
expand the reach of this criminal law, including by deleting
the terms and mens rea requirement that the majority at-
tempts to read back into the statute.

1
  The  history  of  the  encouragement  provision  is  a  tale  of
expansion.  Up first was an 1885 law focused specifically on
contract labor.  Ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332.  It made “knowingly
assisting, encouraging or soliciting the migration or impor-
tation of ” a noncitizen into the United States “to perform
labor or service of any kind under contract or agreement”
unlawful.  §3, id., at 333.  Congress revised this prohibition
in 1917, to add “induce.”  §5, 39 Stat. 879.  Thus, as of the
early 20th century, it was a misdemeanor “to induce, assist,
encourage, or solicit . . . the importation or migration of any
contract laborer,” or to attempt to do the same.  Ibid.
  Significantly for present purposes, in 1952, Congress de-
leted  the  statute’s  references  to  solicitation  and  assis-
tance—leaving “encourages” and “induces” to stand alone.
66 Stat. 229.  What is more, Congress expanded the prohi-
bition to all unlawful entry, not merely contract labor.  Ibid.
And  it  also  ratcheted  up  the  punishment.    Ibid.    So
amended, the statute made it a felony to “willfully or know-
ingly encourag[e] or induc[e], or attemp[t] to encourage or
induce,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  the  entry  into  the
United  States”  of  any  noncitizen  who  had  not  been  “duly
admitted” or who was not “lawfully entitled to enter or re-
side within the United States.”  Ibid.
  Congress  enacted  the  current  version  of  the  encourage-
ment provision in 1986.  It removed the mens rea require-
ment  relating  to  the  encouragement  or  inducement  ele-
ment—excising  from  the  statute  that  a  violator  must
“willfully or knowingly” encourage or induce a noncitizen to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

KAGAN, J., dissenting

the court issued its order.  See ibid.  This Court has previ-
ously  denied  stays  of  districting  orders  issued  at  similar
times.    See,  e.g.,  Harris  v.  McCrory,  159  F. Supp.  3d  600
(MDNC) (enjoining a State from using its  enacted map in
February of an election year, despite mid-March primary),
stay  denied,  577  U. S.  1129  (2016);  Personhuballah  v.  Al-
corn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552 (ED Va.) (imposing a new reme-
dial map in January of an election year, despite mid-June
primary), stay denied, 577 U. S. 1125 (2016).  I see no rea-
son to do otherwise here.  The plaintiffs “commenced their
lawsuits  within  hours  or  days  of  the  enactment”  of  Ala-
bama’s plan in November 2021.  App. 203.  And the District
Court immediately expedited its proceedings; indeed, con-
sistent  with  everything  else  the  court  did  right,  it  moved
with  astonishing  speed.    The  only  delay  (of  a  few  weeks)
came  “at the  request”  of the  State.   Ibid.   Alabama is  not
entitled to keep violating Black Alabamians’ voting rights
just because the court’s order came down in the first month
of an election year.

*

  *

  *
  Today’s decision is one more in a disconcertingly long line
of cases in which this Court uses its shadow docket to signal
or make changes in the law, without anything approaching
full  briefing  and  argument.    Here,  the  District  Court  ap-
plied  established  legal  principles  to  an  extensive  eviden-
tiary  record.    Its  reasoning  was  careful—indeed,  exhaus-
tive—and  justified  in  every  respect.    To  reverse  that
decision  requires  upsetting  the  way  Section  2  plaintiffs
have  for  decades—and  in  line  with  our  caselaw—proved
vote-dilution claims.  That is a serious matter, which cannot
properly occur without thorough consideration.  Yet today
the Court skips that step, staying the District Court’s order
based on the untested and unexplained view that the law
needs to change.  That decision does a disservice to our own
appellate  processes,  which  serve  both  to  constrain  and  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal precedents and argues against the majority opinion's decision to stay a lower court order.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xlvii

Page
1138
McSwain v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1090
McWeeney v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111
Meachum; Correia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1068
MEC Import Handelsgesellschaft GmbH; Gibson Guitar Corp. v.
1130
Medgar Evers Houses Associates, L. P.; Abbott v.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
1004
Medical Society of N. J. v. Robins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1102
Medina v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056
Medina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057
Meeks v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095
Meese; Chappell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1075
Meisner; Nasim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083
Mekalonis v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
1061
Meling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053
Melka Marine, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1068
Mellon v. Cassidy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1107
Meloncon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037
Melton; A–1 Ambulance Service, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012
Member of Congress v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1134
Members of Va. Bd. of Corrections; McLean v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133
Memphis; Ayers v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042
Menchaca v. Olivarez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131
Mendenhall; Webb v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1070
Mendez v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1068
Mendoza v. Borden, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026
Mendoza v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042,1145
Mendoza v. Pennington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081
Mendoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1061
Mendoza-Iribe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1038,1125
Mensah v. St. Joseph County Family Independence Agency . .
1097
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mercy Hospital Anderson; Brokamp v.
1111
Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Arnold v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1009
Merritt v. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1107
Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052
Metropolitan Government of Nashville; Deja Vu of Nashville v.
. . .
Meyers; McDonald v.
1113
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Tamiami Partners, LTD 1018,1125
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003
Michaels v. Bank of America N. T. & S. A.
1068
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michaels; Seddio v.
1042
Michelfelder v. Gay & Chacker, P. C.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095
Michelfelder v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039
Michigan; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1038
Michigan; Fisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Kinchole v.
1073
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; McGregor v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Norwood v. Western Federal Credit Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Novato Fire Protection Dist. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Novecon, Ltd. v. Bulgarian-American Enterprise Fund . . . . . . . .
Nubine v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nuth; Colvin-El v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nyhuis v. Luebbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oakland Jockey Club; Winkle v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oates v. Englund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O’Bannon; Bridenbaugh v.
Obodoagha v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Occidental Petroleum Corp.; Zucker v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oden v. Prunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Odom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ofﬁce of Workers’ Comp. Programs; American Grain Trimmers v.
O’Gorman; D. H. L. Associates, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ogunde v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Anthony v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Baker v.
Ohio; Bays v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Brumett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Cowans v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Fears v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Larkins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Lawson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Manzanares v.
Ohio; Morrison v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Naugle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Ridenbaugh v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oklahoma; Barnett v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oklahoma; Foster v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oklahoma; Martinez v.
Oklahoma; Thornburg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oklahoma; Townsend v.
Oklahoma; Wilkins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Okolie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Old Dominion Univ.; Razzaq v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Olds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Olguin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Olin Corp. v. Cullen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Olivarez; Menchaca v.
Oliver v. Saha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oliver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Olivo Rodriguez v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

51

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

Even with Roe’s protection, these women face immense ob-
stacles to raising the money needed to obtain abortion care
early in their pregnancy.  See Brief for Abortion Funds 7–
12.26  After today, in States where legal abortions are not
available,  they  will  lose  any  ability  to  obtain  safe,  legal
abortion care.  They will not have the money to make the
trip  necessary;  or  to  obtain  childcare  for  that  time;  or  to
take time off work.  Many will endure the costs and risks of
pregnancy  and  giving  birth  against  their  wishes.    Others
will  turn  in  desperation  to  illegal  and  unsafe  abortions.
They may lose not just their freedom, but their lives.27

Finally, the expectation of reproductive control is integral
to  many  women’s  identity  and  their  place  in  the  Nation.
See Casey, 505 U. S., at 856.  That expectation helps define

——————

26 The average cost of a first-trimester abortion is about $500.  See Brief
for  Abortion  Funds  7.    Federal  insurance  generally  does  not  cover  the
cost of abortion, and 35 percent of American adults do not have cash on
hand to cover an unexpected expense that high.  Guttmacher Institute,
M. Donovan, In Real Life: Federal Restrictions on Abortion Coverage and
https://www.
the  Women  They
guttmacher.org/gpr/2017/01/real-life-federal-restrictions-abortion-coverage-
and-women-they-impact#:~:text=Although%20the%20Hyde%20Amendment%
20bars,provide%20abortion%20coverage%20to%20enrollees;  Brief  for
Abortion Funds 11.

Impact

2017),

(Jan.

5,

27 Mississippi  is  likely  to  be  one  of  the  States  where  these  costs  are
highest, though history shows that it will have company.  As described
above, Mississippi provides only the barest financial support to pregnant
women.  See  supra,  at  41–42.    The  State  will  greatly  restrict  abortion
care without addressing any of the financial, health, and family needs
that motivate many women to seek it.  The effects will be felt most se-
verely, as they always have been, on the bodies of the poor.  The history
of state abortion restrictions is a history of heavy costs exacted from the
most vulnerable women.  It is a history of women seeking illegal abor-
tions in hotel rooms and home kitchens; of women trying to self-induce
abortions by douching with bleach, injecting lye, and penetrating them-
selves with knitting needles, scissors, and coat hangers.  See L. Reagan,
When  Abortion  Was  a  Crime  42–43,  198–199,  208–209  (1997).    It  is  a
history of women dying.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically regarding the overturning of Roe v. Wade. It argues against the decision and highlights the negative consequences for women, particularly those who are poor.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>