<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

Opinion of the Court

framework  to  interpret  statutes  administered  by  federal
agencies.  After determining that a case satisfies the vari-
ous  preconditions  we  have  set  for  Chevron  to  apply,  a  re-
viewing court must first assess “whether Congress has di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue.”  Id., at 842.
If, and only if, congressional intent is “clear,” that is the end
of the inquiry.  Ibid.  But if the court determines that “the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue”  at  hand,  the  court  must,  at  Chevron’s  second  step,
defer to the agency’s interpretation if it “is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute.”  Id., at 843.  The re-
viewing courts in each of the cases before us applied Chev-
ron’s  framework  to  resolve  in  favor  of  the  Government
challenges to the same agency rule.

A
Before 1976, unregulated foreign vessels dominated fish-
ing in the international waters off the U. S. coast, which be-
gan  just  12  nautical  miles  offshore.    See,  e.g.,  S.  Rep.
No. 94–459, pp. 2–3 (1975).  Recognizing the resultant over-
fishing and the need for sound management of fishery re-
sources, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation  and  Management  Act  (MSA).  See  90  Stat.
331 (codified as amended at 16 U. S. C. §1801 et seq.).  The
MSA  and  subsequent  amendments  extended  the  jurisdic-
tion of the United States to 200 nautical miles beyond the
U. S. territorial sea and claimed “exclusive fishery manage-
ment authority over all fish” within that area, known as the
“exclusive economic zone.”  §1811(a); see Presidential Proc-
lamation No. 5030, 3 CFR 22 (1983 Comp.); §§101, 102, 90
Stat. 336.  The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
administers the MSA under a delegation from the Secretary
of Commerce.

The MSA established eight regional fishery management
councils  composed  of  representatives  from  the  coastal
States,  fishery  stakeholders,  and  NMFS.    See  16  U. S. C.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the Chevron framework for interpreting statutes and applies it to a case involving the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH

Opinion of the Court

Ordinary language aside, George tries to bolster his posi-
tion  with  analogies  to  precedent  from  other  contexts.    He
invokes an array of cases explaining that a judicial decision
states what the statute “always meant,” Rivers v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 313, n. 12 (1994), and an unau-
thorized regulation is a “ ‘nullity,’ ” Dixon v. United States,
381 U. S. 68, 74 (1965).  True enough.  Those general prin-
ciples, however, do not dispose of the issue before us.  As-
sume George is right that the “sound condition” provision
always required the VA to show that the veteran’s condition
was not later aggravated by service and that the 1961 reg-
ulation  conflicted  with  that  requirement.    We  would  still
have to decide whether the Board’s application of that bind-
ing regulation is the kind of “clear and unmistakable error”
for  which  collateral  relief  is  available  under  38  U. S. C.
§§5109A and 7111.  For the reasons we have explained, it
is not.

And while George suggests otherwise, there is nothing in-
congruous about a system in which this kind of error—the
application  of  a  since-rejected  statutory  interpretation—
cannot be remedied after final judgment.  On the contrary,
and as the lower courts have explained, the VA’s longstand-
ing approach is consistent with the general rule that “[t]he
new  interpretation  of  a  statute  can  only  retroactively
[a]ffect  decisions  still  open  on  direct  review.”    Disabled
American  Veterans  v.  Gober,  234  F. 3d  682,  698  (CA  Fed.
2001) (citing Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S.
86, 97 (1993)); see also Smith v. West, 11 Vet. App. 134, 138
(1998) (“ ‘New legal principles, even when applied retroac-
tively, do not apply to cases already closed’ ” (quoting Reyn-
oldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U. S. 749, 758 (1995); al-
teration  omitted)).  That  limitation  serves  important
interests in finality, preventing narrow avenues for collat-
eral review from ballooning into “substitute[s] for ordinary
error  correction  through  appeal.”    Harrington  v.  Richter,
562 U. S. 86, 102–103 (2011); see also United Student Aid
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

lxvii

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tennessee; Coe v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tennessee; Coker v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tennessee; Rogers v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tennessee; Strouth v.
Tennessee; Van Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tennessee; Ware v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Terhune; Glass v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Terhune; Hibbert v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
Ter Maat v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Ill., Inc.
Terrell v. Giles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tessmer; Atkins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tessmer; Morton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Antonio Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Broades v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Bullock v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Cabla v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Carmell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Dewberry v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Foster v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Fratta v.
Texas; Garcia Larrinaga v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Graham v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Howland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Ladd v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Larry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Leal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Mathonican v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; McLaren v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Powell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Pratt v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Prystash v.
Texas; Rivas Suniga v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Speth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Stevens v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Wingate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Woodward v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v.
Texas Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline; Hawkins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas Comm’n on Judicial Conduct; Barr v.

Page
1034,1084
1115
1129
1027
1091
1038
1009
1007
1098
1042
1134
1024
1008
1059
1066
1092
513
1131
1057
1023
1090
1091
1059
1125
1070
1034
1026
1007
1106
1109
1102
1116
1083
1102
1089
1005
1088
1041
1096
1090
1092
1111
1022
1020
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U98

[09-06-00 19:40:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 721 (1998)

741

Scalia, J., dissenting

several additional facts that California and the Court have
chosen to label “sentence enhancement allegations.” How-
ever California chooses to divide and label its criminal code,
I believe that for federal constitutional purposes those extra
four years are attributable to conviction of a new crime.2
Monge was functionally acquitted of that crime when the
California Court of Appeal held that the evidence adduced
at trial was insufﬁcient to sustain the trial court’s “enhance-
ment” ﬁndings, see Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 18
(1978). Giving the State a second chance to prove him
guilty of that same crime would violate the very core of the
double jeopardy prohibition.

That disposition would contradict, of course, the Court’s
holding in Almendarez-Torres that “recidivism” ﬁndings do
not have to be treated as elements of the offense, even if they
increase the maximum punishment to which the defendant is
exposed. That holding was in my view a grave constitu-
tional error affecting the most fundamental of rights.
I
note, in any event, that Almendarez-Torres left open the
question whether “enhancements” that increase the maxi-
mum sentence and that do not involve the defendant’s prior
criminal history are valid. That qualiﬁcation is an implicit
limitation on the Court’s holding today.

I respectfully dissent.

2 The Court contends that this issue “was neither considered by the state
courts nor discussed in petitioner’s brief before this Court.” Ante, at 728.
But Monge has argued consistently that reconsideration of the enhance-
ment issue would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. He did not explic-
itly contend that the enhancement was in reality an element of the offense
with which he was charged, but I believe that was fairly included within
the argument he did make.
“When an issue or claim is properly before
the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced
by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and
apply the proper construction of governing law.” Kamen v. Kemper
Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 99 (1991). See also United States
Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S.
439, 446 (1993).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in the case 524 U.S. 721 (1998).  It discusses the Double Jeopardy Clause and its application to sentencing enhancements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
GORSUCH, J., dissenting

  The  question  before  us  thus  becomes  whether  ANCs
count as “Indian tribes” under the longstanding terms Con-
gress adopted in ISDA almost 50 years ago.  To resolve that
dispositive question, we must answer two subsidiary ones:
(1)  Does  the  statute’s  final  clause  (call  it  the  recognition
clause) apply to the ANCs listed earlier?  (2) If so, are ANCs
“recognized as eligible for the special programs and services
provided by the United States to Indians because of their
status as Indians”?  In my view, the recognition clause does
apply  to  ANCs  along  with  the  other  listed  entities.    And
ANCs are not “recognized” as tribes eligible for the special
programs and services provided by the United States to In-
dians because of their status as Indians.

II
A
  Start  with  the  question  whether  the  recognition  clause
applies to the ANCs.  As the nearest referent and part of an
integrated list of other modified terms, ANCs must be sub-
ject  to  its  terms.    Unsurprisingly,  the  Court  of  Appeals
reached  this  conclusion  unanimously.    Lawyers  often  de-
bate  whether  a  clause  at  the  end  of  a  series  modifies  the
entire  list  or  only  the  last  antecedent.    E.g.,  Lockhart  v.
United States, 577 U. S. 347, 350–352 (2016); id., at 362–
369 (KAGAN, J., dissenting); Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592
U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2021)  (slip  op.,  at  5–7);  id.,  at  ___–___
(ALITO,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment)  (slip  op.,  at  1–4).    In
ISDA, for example, some might wonder whether the recog-
nition clause applies only to ANCs or whether it also applies
to the previously listed entities—“Indian tribe[s], band[s],
nation[s],” etc.  But it would be passing strange to suggest
that the recognition clause applies to everything except the
term immediately preceding it.  A clause that leaps over its
nearest  referent  to  modify  every  other  term  would  defy
grammatical gravity and common sense alike.  See, e.g., Fa-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation. It delves into the legal interpretation of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) and its application to Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

“may exclude any area from critical habitat if he determines that the
benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of ” designation.  The
word “may” certainly confers discretion on the Secretary, but it does
not segregate his discretionary decision not to exclude from the man-
dated procedure to consider the economic and other impacts of desig-
nation  when  making  his  exclusion  decisions.    The  statute  is,  there-
fore, not “drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard
against  which  to  judge  the  [Secretary’s]  exercise  of  [his]  discretion”
not  to  exclude.  Lincoln,  508  U. S.,  at  191.    Weyerhaeuser’s  claim—
that the agency did not appropriately consider all the relevant statu-
tory  factors  meant  to  guide  the  agency  in  the  exercise  of  its  discre-
tion—is  the  sort  of  claim  that  federal  courts  routinely  assess  when
determining  whether  to  set  aside  an  agency  decision  as  an  abuse  of
discretion.  The Court of Appeals should consider in the first instance
the question whether the Service’s assessment of the costs and bene-
fits  of  designation  and  resulting  decision  not  to  exclude  Unit  1  was
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.  Pp. 10–15.

 827 F. 3d 452, vacated and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except KAVANAUGH, J., who took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the case summary and the court's reasoning. It is not the main body of the legal text and is likely not suitable for indexing as it provides a high-level overview rather than the actual content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

KANSAS v. GLOVER

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS

No. 18–556.  Argued November 4, 2019—Decided April 6, 2020

A Kansas deputy sheriff ran a license plate check on a pickup truck, dis-
covering  that  the  truck  belonged  to  respondent  Glover  and  that
Glover’s  driver’s  license  had  been  revoked.    The  deputy  pulled  the
truck over because he assumed that Glover was driving.  Glover was
in fact driving and was charged with driving as a habitual violator.  He
moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, claiming that the deputy
lacked reasonable suspicion.  The District Court granted the motion,
but the Court of Appeals reversed.  The Kansas Supreme Court in turn
reversed, holding that the deputy violated the Fourth Amendment by
stopping Glover without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Held: When the officer lacks information negating an inference that the
owner is driving the vehicle, an investigative traffic stop made after
running  a  vehicle’s  license  plate  and  learning  that  the  registered
owner’s  driver’s  license  has  been  revoked  is  reasonable  under  the
Fourth Amendment.  Pp. 3–10.

(a) An officer may initiate a brief investigative traffic stop when he
has “a particularized and objective basis” to suspect legal wrongdoing.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417.  The level of suspicion re-
quired is less than that necessary for probable cause and “depends on
‘ “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which rea-
sonable  and  prudent  men,  not  legal  technicians,  act.” ’ ”  Prado
Navarette v. California, 572 U. S. 393, 402.  Courts must therefore per-
mit  officers  to  make  “commonsense  judgments  and  inferences  about
human behavior.”  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 125.  P. 3.

(b) Here,  the  deputy’s  commonsense  inference  that  the  owner  of  a
vehicle was likely the vehicle’s driver provided more than reasonable
suspicion to initiate the stop.  That inference is not made unreasonable
merely because a vehicle’s driver is not always its registered owner or
because Glover had a revoked license.  Though common sense suffices
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

not  measurably  extend  the  duration  of  the  stop.”  555
U. S., at 333.  See also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93, 101
(2005)  (because  unrelated  inquiries  did  not  “exten[d]  the
time  [petitioner]  was  detained[,]  . . .  no  additional  Fourth
Amendment justification . . . was required”).  An officer, in
other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during
an otherwise lawful traffic stop.  But contrary to JUSTICE
ALITO’s suggestion, post, at 4, n. 2, he may not do so in  a
way  that  prolongs  the  stop,  absent  the  reasonable  suspi
cion  ordinarily  demanded  to  justify  detaining  an  individ
ual.  But see post, at 1–2 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (premising
opinion on the  dissent’s  own  finding  of  “reasonable  suspi
cion,”  although  the  District  Court  reached  the  opposite
conclusion,  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  declined  to  consider
the issue).

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an
officer’s  mission  includes  “ordinary  inquiries  incident  to
[the  traffic]  stop.”    Caballes,  543  U. S.,  at  408.    Typically
such  inquiries  involve  checking  the  driver’s  license,  de
termining  whether  there  are  outstanding  warrants
against  the  driver,  and  inspecting  the  automobile’s  regis
tration  and  proof  of  insurance.    See  Delaware  v.  Prouse,
440  U. S.  648,  658–660  (1979).    See  also  4  W.  LaFave,
Search  and  Seizure  §9.3(c),  pp.  507–517  (5th  ed.  2012).
These  checks  serve  the  same  objective  as  enforcement  of
the  traffic  code:  ensuring  that  vehicles  on  the  road  are
operated safely and responsibly.  See Prouse, 440 U. S., at
658–659;  LaFave,  Search  and  Seizure  §9.3(c),  at  516  (A
“warrant  check  makes  it  possible  to  determine  whether
the  apparent  traffic  violator  is  wanted  for  one  or  more
previous traffic offenses.”).

A  dog  sniff,  by  contrast,  is  a  measure  aimed  at  “de
tect[ing]  evidence  of  ordinary  criminal  wrongdoing.”
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 40–41 (2000).  See
also  Florida  v.  Jardines,  569  U. S.  1,  ___–___  (2013)  (slip
op.,  at  7–8).  Candidly,  the  Government  acknowledged  at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the legality of a dog sniff during a traffic stop. It delves into legal precedents and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

that the anti-lien provision “also” limits States’ recovery ef-
forts.  Ante,  at  2.  In  fact,  the  anti-lien  and  anti-recovery
provisions  establish  a  general  rule,  and  the  subsequently
enacted third-party liability provision and its companions
create a limited exception.  That exception, in turn, should
not be construed “to the farthest reach of [its] linguistic pos-
sibilit[y] if that result would contravene the statutory de-
sign.”  Maracich  v.  Spears,  570  U. S.  48,  60  (2013).    The
Court’s misframing, however, causes it to displace the back-
ground  principle  of  the  anti-lien  and  anti-recovery  provi-
sions  by  relying  on  language  in  the  assignment  provision
that is vague at best.

The Court places great weight on the assignment provi-
sion’s use of the word “any” in its reference to “rights . . . to
payment for medical care.”  §1396k(a)(1)(A); see ante, at 6.
The Court presumes that “ ‘[t]he word “any” has an expan-
sive meaning.’ ”  Ibid.  But whether the word “any” indicates
an intent to sweep broadly “necessarily depends on the stat-
utory  context.”  National  Assn.  of  Mfrs.  v.  Department  of
Defense, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 11).  Here, as
explained, statutory context establishes that the word “does
not bear the heavy weight the [Court] puts upon it.”  Ibid.
To the extent the Court suggests the word “any” supersedes
all other contrary contextual indications, it ignores prece-
dent.  See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S.
350, 356–358 (1994) (relying on context to interpret “ ‘any
law-enforcement  officer  or  law-enforcement  agency’ ”  as
limited to those making arrests under federal law).

The Court also repeatedly relies on the fact that the ac-
quisition  provision  and  third-party  liability  provision  use
specific language to limit the pool from which a State may
recover to funds that compensate for expenses Medicaid has
paid, whereas the assignment provision uses different lan-
guage.  See  ante,  at  7,  9,  11.    The  Court  invokes  the  pre-
sumption that “ ‘[w]here Congress includes particular lan-
guage  in  one  section  of  a  statute  but  omits  it  in  another
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and statutory interpretation, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
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  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxvii

Page

1128

Ponce-Aldana v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128

Ponce-Aldona v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1098

Pons-Martinez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035

Ponton v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Poo-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. Cook County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

Poorter; Adamson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

Pope v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Porter v. Adams  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Porter v. McCollum
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  961,1019,1034,1084

Porter v. United States
1054

Porterﬁeld; Berry v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

Portillo v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Portland; Time Warner Telecom of Ore., LLC v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

Post; Gilbert v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

Postmaster General; Blake v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Postmaster General; Fobbs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Postmaster General; Wills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1025,1139

1121

Potomac Place Associates, LLC; Redman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1103

Pottawattamie County v. McGhee
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

Potter; Blake v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Potter; Fobbs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Potter v. South Coast Plumbing Systems, Inc.  . . . . . . . . .  812,1026,1139

Potter; Wills v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1025,1139

843

Powell v. Arkansas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Powell v. Carey International, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

1124

Powell v. Chicago Human Rights Comm’n  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Powell v. Curry
1010

Powell; Florida v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967

Powell v. Keller  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057

Powell v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Powell v. San Diego Cty. Health and Human Services Agcy.
. .  902,1066

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  901,976,1059

Powell v. United States
1015

Power; Moncion v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Powers v. Snyder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prater v. Rubitschun
899

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  959,1082

Pratt v. United States
Preciado v. Runnels
1123

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  932,1085

Prelesnik v. Avery
1057

Prendergast v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
President of Islamic Republic of Iran; Asemani v.
805

. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  935,1087

President of U. S.; Gialto v.
President of U. S.; Holt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  969,1145

President of U. S.; Kiyemba v.
838

President of U. S.; Lutz v.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
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This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

A
Consider the Court’s longtime failure to grapple with the
historical doctrine of in loco parentis.  As I have previously
explained, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified against
the background legal principle that publicly funded schools
operated not as ordinary state actors, but as delegated sub-
stitutes  of  parents.  Id.,  at  411–413.  This  principle  freed
schools  from  the  constraints  the  Fourteenth  Amendment
placed on other government actors.  “[N]o one doubted the
government’s ability to educate and discipline children as
private schools did,” including “through strict discipline . . .
for behavior the school considered disrespectful or wrong.”
Id., at 411–412.  “The doctrine of in loco parentis limited the
ability of schools to set rules and control their classrooms in
almost no way.”  Id., at 416.

Plausible arguments can be raised in favor of departing
from  that  historical  doctrine.    When  the  Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, just three jurisdictions had com-
pulsory-education laws.  M. Katz, A History of Compulsory
Education Laws 17 (1976).  One might argue that the dele-
gation logic of in loco parentis applies only when delegation
is  voluntary.  But  cf.  id.,  at  11–13  (identifying  analogs  to
compulsory-education laws as early as the 1640s); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) (requiring States to
permit parents to send their children to nonpublic schools).
The Court, however, did not make that (or any other) argu-
ment against this historical doctrine.

Instead,  the  Court  simply  abandoned  the  foundational
rule without mentioning it.  See Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969).  Ra-
ther than wrestle with this history, the Court declared that
it  “ha[d]  been  the  unmistakable  holding  of  this  Court  for
almost 50 years” that students have free-speech rights in-
side schools.  Id., at 506.  “But the cases the Court cited in
favor of that bold proposition do not support it.”  Morse, 551
U. S., at 420, n. 8 (THOMAS, J., concurring).  The cases on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal precedent and arguments surrounding student free speech rights in schools.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

GORSUCH, J., concurring

instances, we do much the same when we speak of the “re-
straint” necessary “in assessing the reach of a federal crim-
inal statute.”  Id., at 129 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted);  accord,  Marinello,  584  U. S.,  at  6–7,  11;  Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 703 (2005).

But  make  no  mistake:  Whatever  the  label,  lenity  is
what’s  at  work  behind  today’s  decision,  just  as  it  is  in  so
many others.  Rightly so.  I am pleased to join.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

GILL v. WHITFORD

Opinion of the Court

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560, and n. 1 (1992).

We have long recognized that a person’s right to vote is
“individual  and  personal  in  nature.”    Reynolds  v.  Sims,
377  U. S.  533,  561  (1964).    Thus,  “voters  who  allege  facts
showing  disadvantage  to  themselves  as  individuals  have
standing to sue” to remedy that disadvantage.  Baker, 369
U. S., at 206.  The plaintiffs in this case alleged that they
suffered such injury from partisan gerrymandering, which
works  through  “packing”  and  “cracking”  voters  of  one
party to disadvantage those voters.  1 App. 28–29, 32–33,
Complaint  ¶¶5,  15.  That  is,  the plaintiffs  claim  a  consti
tutional right not to be placed in legislative districts delib
erately  designed  to  “waste”  their  votes  in  elections  where
their chosen candidates will win in landslides (packing) or
are  destined  to  lose  by  closer  margins  (cracking).    Id.,  at
32–33, ¶15.

To the extent the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution
of their votes, that injury is district specific.  An individual
voter in Wisconsin is placed in a single district.  He votes
for a single representative.  The boundaries of the district,
and  the  composition  of  its  voters,  determine  whether  and
to  what  extent  a  particular  voter  is  packed  or  cracked.
This  “disadvantage  to  [the  voter]  as  [an]  individual[ ],”
Baker, 369 U. S., at 206, therefore results from the bound
aries of the particular district in which he resides.  And a
plaintiff ’s remedy must be “limited to the inadequacy that
produced  [his]  injury  in  fact.”  Lewis  v.  Casey,  518  U. S.
343,  357  (1996).  In  this  case  the  remedy  that  is  proper
and sufficient lies in the revision of the boundaries of the
individual’s own district.

For  similar  reasons,  we  have  held  that  a  plaintiff  who
alleges  that  he  is  the  object  of  a  racial  gerrymander—a
drawing of district lines on the basis of race—has standing
to assert only that his own district has been so gerryman
dered.  See United States v. Hays, 515 U. S. 737, 744–745
(1995).  A plaintiff who complains of gerrymandering, but
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the concept of partisan gerrymandering and its impact on individual voters' rights. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to standing and remedies in such cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Opinion of the Court

“existing  remedies  do  not  provide  complete  relief.”  Ibid.
Rather, the court must ask only whether it, rather than the
political branches, is better equipped to decide whether ex-
isting remedies “should be augmented by the creation of a
new judicial remedy.”  Ibid; see also id., at 380 (“the ques-
tion [is] who should decide”).

III
Applying  the  foregoing  principles,  the  Court  of  Appeals
plainly  erred  when  it  created  causes  of  action  for  Boule’s
Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and First Amend-
ment retaliation claim.

A
The  Court  of  Appeals  conceded  that  Boule’s  Fourth
Amendment claim presented a new context for Bivens pur-
poses, yet it concluded there was no reason to hesitate be-
fore recognizing a cause of action against Agent Egbert.  See
998 F. 3d, at 387.  That conclusion was incorrect for two in-
dependent reasons: Congress is better positioned to create
remedies  in  the  border-security  context,  and  the  Govern-
ment already has provided alternative remedies that pro-
tect plaintiffs like Boule.  We address each in turn.

1
In  Hernández, we declined to create a damages remedy
for an excessive-force claim against a Border Patrol agent
who shot and killed a 15-year-old Mexican national across
the border in Mexico.  See 589 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at
1–2).  We did not recognize a Bivens action there because
“regulating the conduct of agents at the border unquestion-
ably  has  national  security  implications,”  and  the  “risk  of
undermining border security provides reason to hesitate be-
fore extending Bivens into this field.”  Hernández, 589 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 14).  This reasoning applies here with full
force.  During the alleged altercation with Boule, Agent Eg-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal precedent surrounding Bivens actions and applies it to a specific case involving a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–468
_________________

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. KAREN ROSS, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE CALI-
FORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD &
AGRICULTURE, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[May 11, 2023]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with  whom  JUSTICE KAGAN  joins,

concurring in part.

I join all but Parts IV–B and IV–D of JUSTICE GORSUCH’s
opinion.  Given the fractured nature of Part IV, I write sep-
arately to clarify my understanding of why petitioners’ Pike
claim fails.  In short, I vote to affirm the judgment because
petitioners fail to allege a substantial burden on interstate
commerce  as  required  by  Pike,  not  because  of  any  funda-
mental reworking of that doctrine.

*

*

*
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970), the
Court  distilled  a  general  principle  from  its  prior  cases.
“Where [a] statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden  imposed  on  such  commerce  is  clearly  excessive  in
relation to the putative local benefits.”  Id., at 142.  Further,
“the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact
on interstate activities.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

915

524 U. S.

June 8, 1998

Certiorari Granted

No. 97–1337. Minnesota et al. v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.
Reported below: 124 F. 3d 904.

No. 97–53. Roberts, Guardian for Johnson v. Galen of
Virginia, Inc., Formerly dba Humana Hospital-University
of Louisville, dba University of Louisville Hospital.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented
by the petition. Reported below: 111 F. 3d 405.

No. 97–1139. United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno. C. A.
3d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 121 F. 3d
841.

No. 97–1620. Seif, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Protection, et al. v. Chester Residents
Concerned for Quality Living et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion
of Washington Legal Foundation for leave to ﬁle a brief as amicus
curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 132 F. 3d
925.

Certiorari Denied

No. 97–1469. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McDaniel. Sup.
Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 955 S. W. 2d 257.

No. 97–1477. Long et ux., Individually and as Parents
and Next Friends of Long, a Minor, et al. v. Alachua
County School Board et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704 So. 2d 523.

No. 97–1532. Camp et al. v. Riley. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 84 F. 3d 437.

No. 97–1564. Thriftway Marketing Corp. et al. v. De-
Vaney. Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
124 N. M. 512, 953 P. 2d 277.

No. 97–1616. Painters Local Union No. 109 Pension Fund
et al. v. Smith Barney, Inc., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 590.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (granted or denied). It is sequential text and likely part of the actual legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

3

Syllabus

the extensive guidance for the two liability grounds specifically men-
tioned in the Act, strongly suggests that design defects were not men-
tioned because they are not a basis for liability.  The Act’s mandates
lead to the same conclusion.  It provides for federal agency improve-
ment  of  vaccine  design  and  for  federally  prescribed  compensation,
which are other means for achieving the two beneficial effects of de-
sign-defect  torts—prompting  the  development  of  improved  designs,
and  providing  compensation  for  inflicted  injuries.    The  Act’s  struc-
tural  quid  pro  quo  also  leads  to  the  same  conclusion.   The  vaccine
manufacturers fund an informal, efficient compensation program for
vaccine injuries in exchange for avoiding costly tort litigation and the
occasional disproportionate jury verdict.  Taxing their product to fund
the compensation program, while leaving their liability for design de-
fect  virtually  unaltered,  would  hardly  coax  them  back  into  the  mar-
ket.  Pp. 13–16.

561 F. 3d 233, affirmed.

SCALIA,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  KENNEDY, THOMAS, BREYER, and  ALITO, JJ.,  joined.    BREYER,
J., filed a concurring opinion.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which GINSBURG, J., joined.  KAGAN, J., took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's opinion and the justices' participation. It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

GOLAN v. SAADA

Opinion of the Court

requirements set forth in the Convention and ICARA.  The
Second Circuit’s rule, by instructing district courts to order
return “if at all possible,” improperly elevated return above
the Convention’s other objectives.  Blondin I, 189 F. 3d, at
248.  The Convention does not pursue return exclusively or
at all costs.  Rather, the Convention “is designed to protect
the  interests  of  children  and  their  parents,”  Lozano,  572
U. S., at 19 (ALITO, J., concurring), and children’s interests
may  point  against  return  in  some  circumstances.    Courts
must remain conscious of this purpose, as well as the Con-
vention’s  other  objectives  and  requirements,  which  con-
strain courts’ discretion to consider ameliorative measures
in at least three ways.

First,  any  consideration  of  ameliorative  measures  must
prioritize the child’s physical and psychological safety.  The
Convention explicitly recognizes that the child’s interest in
avoiding  physical  or  psychological  harm,  in  addition  to
other interests, “may overcome the return remedy.”  Id., at
16 (majority opinion) (cataloging interests).8  A court may
therefore  decline  to  consider
imposing  ameliorative
measures  where  it  is  clear  that  they  would  not  work  be-
cause the risk is so grave.  Sexual abuse of a child is one

——————

8 The explanatory report for the Convention, which is “recognized by
the  [Hague]  Conference  as  the  official  history  and  commentary  on  the
Convention and is a source of background on the meaning of the provi-
sions  of  the  Convention,”  supports  this  understanding.    51  Fed.  Reg.
10503.  The explanatory report describes that the general “interest of the
child in not being removed from its habitual residence,” the foundation
for the general return principle, “gives way before the primary interest
of any person in not being exposed to physical or psychological danger or
being placed in an intolerable situation.”  1980 Conférence de La Haye
de  droit  international  privé,  Enlèvement d’enfants,  E.  Pérez-Vera,  Ex-
planatory Report, in 3 Actes et documents de la Quatorzième session, p.
433,  ¶29  (1982).    This  Court  has  repeatedly  referenced  the  report  in
Hague Convention cases, without “decid[ing] whether this Report should
be given greater weight than a scholarly commentary.”  Abbott v. Abbott,
560 U. S. 1, 19 (2010); see, e.g., Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U. S. ___, ___,
n. 2 (2020) (slip op., at 8, n. 2).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Golan v. Saada*. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

Phillips met Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins when they
entered his shop in the summer of 2012.  Craig and Mul-
lins  were  planning  to  marry.    At  that  time,  Colorado  did
not  recognize  same-sex  marriages,  so  the  couple  planned
to  wed  legally  in  Massachusetts  and  afterwards  to  host  a
reception  for  their  family  and  friends  in  Denver.    To  pre-
pare  for  their  celebration,  Craig  and  Mullins  visited  the
shop and told Phillips that they were interested in order-
ing  a  cake  for  “our  wedding.”    Id.,  at  152  (emphasis  de-
leted).  They  did  not  mention  the  design  of  the  cake  they
envisioned.

Phillips  informed  the  couple  that  he  does  not  “create”
wedding  cakes  for  same-sex  weddings.    Ibid.    He  ex-
plained, “I’ll make your birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell
you cookies and brownies, I just don’t make cakes for same
sex  weddings.”    Ibid.  The  couple  left  the  shop  without
further discussion.

The  following  day,  Craig’s  mother,  who  had  accompa-
nied the couple to the cakeshop and been present for their
interaction  with  Phillips,  telephoned  to  ask  Phillips  why
he  had  declined  to  serve  her  son.    Phillips  explained  that
he  does  not  create  wedding  cakes  for  same-sex  weddings
because  of  his  religious  opposition  to  same-sex  marriage,
and also because Colorado (at that time) did not recognize
same-sex  marriages.    Id.,  at  153.  He  later  explained  his
belief  that  “to  create  a  wedding  cake  for  an  event  that
celebrates something that directly goes against the teach-
ings of the Bible, would have been a personal endorsement
and  participation  in  the  ceremony  and  relationship  that
they were entering into.”  Ibid. (emphasis deleted).

B
For most of its history, Colorado has prohibited discrim-
ination  in  places  of  public  accommodation.    In  1885,  less
than  a  decade  after  Colorado  achieved  statehood,  the
General  Assembly  passed  “An  Act  to  Protect  All  Citizens
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary. It sets the scene, introduces the parties involved, and outlines the initial interaction that led to the dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summary/Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

ALITO, J., dissenting

interpretation, a notice that omits some of the information
required by §1229(a)(1) might still be a “notice to appear.”
We  often  use  language  in  this  way.    In  everyday  life,  a
person  who  sees  an  old  Chevy  with  three  wheels  in  a
junkyard would still call it a car.  Language is often used
the same way in the law.  Consider the example of a notice
of appeal.  Much like a notice to appear, a notice of appeal
must meet several substantive requirements; all notices of
appeal,  for  example,  “must  be  signed.”  Fed.  Rule  Civ.
Proc.  11(a).  So  what  happens  if  a  notice  of  appeal  is  in-
complete  in  some  way—say,  because  it  is  unsigned  but
otherwise impeccable?  If a court clerk wanted to point out
the lack of a signature to an attorney, the clerk is far more
likely  to  say,  “there  is  a  problem  with  your  notice  of  ap-
peal,” than to say, “there is a problem with this document
you  filed;  it’s  not  signed  and  therefore  I  don’t  know  what
to call it, but I can’t call it a notice of appeal because it is
unsigned.”

Furthermore,  just  because  a  legal  document  is  incom-
plete, it does not necessarily follow that it is without legal
effect.  Consider again the notice of appeal.  As a general
matter,  an  appeal  “may  be  taken”  in  a  civil  case  “only  by
filing a notice of appeal” “within 30 days after entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.”  Fed. Rules App. Proc.
3(a),  4(a)(1)(A).  While  an  unsigned  notice  of  appeal  does
not meet the substantive requirements set out in Rule 11,
in  Becker  v.  Montgomery,  532  U. S.  757,  763,  768  (2001),
this  Court  unanimously  held  that  a  litigant  who  filed  a
timely  but  unsigned  notice  of  appeal  still  beat  the  30-day
clock for filing appeals.  As we explained, “imperfections in
noticing  an  appeal  should  not  be  fatal  where  no  genuine
doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment,
to which appellate court.”  Id., at 767.

If Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be
read  in  this  way,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  do  the  same
with  §1229(a)(1).  And  in  trying  to  distinguish  an  empty
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Alito. It discusses the interpretation of a legal rule and uses examples to support the argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xxiv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

1030

863

Page

Brito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  903,922,1005

Broadspire; Burroughs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1031,1159

Brocail v. Detroit Tigers, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  877,1065

1058

Brock v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969

Brockman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1075

Bromell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Bronson v. Kelchner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1050

Brookens v. Solis
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Brookhaven; Aspen Creek Estates, Ltd. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Brooks v. Dormire
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113

Brooks; Grisham v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Brooks v. Hubert  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Brooks v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brooks v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,894,921,930,1006

Broom v. Strickland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Broomﬁeld v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brotherhood.  For labor union, see name of trade.

Broward County Sheriff ’s Dept.; Corines v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1051

843

Broward County Sheriff ’s Ofﬁce; Ramsay v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Brower v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  814,1065

996

Brown v. American Inst. for Research in Behavioral Sciences  . . .
1028

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. California
1085

Brown; Cassens Transport Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

Brown; Corjasso v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. Falcone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Brown v. Florida
1126

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Brown v. Gutierrez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Brown v. Hathaway  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144

Brown; Hon Lau v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Brown v. Hovatter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

Brown v. Johnson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Brown v. Kelley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957

Brown v. Kerestes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. Konteh
120

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown; McDaniel v.
848

Brown v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Brown v. McQuiggin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  822,1064

Brown v. One Beacon Ins. Co.
Brown v. Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  999,1078

807

Brown v. Rivera  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Brown; Ruvalcaba v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Brown v. Samano  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. South Carolina
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ALLEN v. COOPER

Opinion of the Court

equivalent—for  both,  that  is,  exceedingly  slight.    And  the
scope  of  the  two  statutes  is  identical—extending  to  every
infringement case against a State.  It follows that the bal-
ance the laws strike between constitutional wrong and stat-
utory remedy is correspondingly askew.  In this case, as in
Florida Prepaid, the law’s “indiscriminate scope” is “out of
proportion” to any due process problem.  527 U. S., at 646–
647; see supra, at 13.  In this case, as in that one, the statute
aims to “provide a uniform remedy” for statutory infringe-
ment,  rather  than  to  redress  or  prevent  unconstitutional
conduct.  527 U. S., at 647; see supra, at 13.  And so in this
case, as in that one, the law is invalid under Section 5.

That  conclusion,  however,  need  not  prevent  Congress
from passing a valid copyright abrogation law in the future.
In doing so, Congress would presumably approach the issue
differently  than when  it passed the CRCA.   At that time,
the Court had not yet decided Seminole Tribe, so Congress
probably thought that Article I could support its all-out ab-
rogation of immunity.  See supra, at 6.  And to the extent it
relied  on  Section  5,  Congress  acted  before  this  Court  cre-
ated the “congruence and proportionality” test.  See supra,
at 11.  For that reason, Congress likely did not appreciate
the importance of linking the scope of its abrogation to the
redress  or  prevention  of  unconstitutional  injuries—and  of
creating a legislative record to back up that connection.  But
going forward, Congress will know those rules.  And under
them, if it detects violations of due process, then it may en-
act a proportionate response.  That kind of tailored statute
can  effectively  stop  States  from  behaving  as  copyright  pi-
rates.  Even  while  respecting  constitutional  limits,  it  can
bring digital Blackbeards to justice.

III
Florida Prepaid all but prewrote our decision today.  That
precedent made clear that Article I’s Intellectual Property
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section of a case. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of constitutional issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

was not unanimous, the challenge fails.”53  Where does the
convenient “state court” qualification come from?  Neither
the Apodaca plurality nor the dissent included any limita-
tion like that—their opinions turned on the meaning of the
Sixth Amendment.  What the dissent characterizes as Apo-
daca’s  result  turns  out  to  be  nothing  more  than  Justice
Powell’s reasoning about dual-track incorporation dressed
up to look like a logical proof.

in

the

All of this does no more than highlight an old truth.  It is
usually  a  judicial  decision’s  reasoning—its  ratio  de-
cidendi—that allows it to have life and effect in the dispo-
sition  of  future  cases.54  As  this  Court  has  repeatedly  ex-
plained
context  of  summary  affirmances,
“ ‘unexplicated’ ”  decisions  may  “ ‘settl[e]  the  issues  for  the
parties, [but they are] not to be read as a renunciation by
this  Court  of  doctrines  previously  announced  in  our  opin-
ions.’ ”55  Much the same may be said here.  Apodaca’s judg-
ment line resolved that case for the parties in that case.  It
is binding in that sense.  But stripped from any reasoning,
its judgment alone cannot be read to repudiate this Court’s

——————

53 Ibid.  See also post, at 11, n. 6 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part)
(offering the same argument by contending that “[t]he result of Apodaca”
means “state criminal juries need not be unanimous”).

54 See J. Salmond, Jurisprudence §62, p. 191 (G. Williams ed., 10th ed.
1947) (“The concrete decision is binding between the parties to it, but is
the abstract ratio decidendi which alone has the force of law as regards
the world at large”); F. Schauer, Precedent, in Routledge Companion to
Philosophy of Law 129 (A. Marmor ed. 2012) (“[T]he traditional answer
to  the  question  of  what  is  a  precedent  is that  subsequent  cases  falling
within the ratio decidendi—or rationale—of the precedent case are con-
trolled by that case”); N. Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Prece-
dent 65–66 (2008).

55 Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U. S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam) (quoting
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 392 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring);
see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 1001–1002 (1996) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring in judgment).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically focusing on the reasoning and precedent surrounding a case.  It cites previous cases and legal scholarship, indicating its place within a larger legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

statutes.  Brief for Respondent 23.

Neither  reason  is  sufficient.    When  applying  the  pre-
sumption, “ ‘we have repeatedly held that even statutes . . .
that expressly refer to “foreign commerce” ’ ” when defining
“commerce” are not extraterritorial.  Morrison, 561 U. S., at
262–263; see also RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 344.  This con-
clusion dooms Hetronic’s argument.  If an express statutory
reference to “foreign commerce” is not enough to rebut the
presumption, the same must be true of a definition of “com-
merce” that refers to Congress’s authority to regulate for-
eign commerce.  That result does not change simply because
the  provision  refers  to “all”  commerce  Congress  can  regu-
late.  See Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 118 (“[I]t is well established
that generic terms like ‘any’ or ‘every’ do not rebut the pre-
sumption  against  extraterritoriality”).    And  the  mere  fact
that the Lanham Act contains a substantively similar defi-
nition that  departs from the so-called “boilerplate” defini-
tions used in other statutes cannot justify a different con-
clusion either.

C
Because §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1) are not extraterrito-
rial, we must consider when claims involve “domestic” ap-
plications  of  these  provisions.  As  discussed  above,  the
proper test requires determining the provision’s focus and
then ascertaining whether Hetronic can “establish that ‘the
conduct  relevant  to  [that]  focus  occurred  in  the  United
States.’ ”  Nestlé, 593 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4).

Much of the parties’ dispute in this case misses this crit-
ical point and centers on the “focus” of the relevant provi-
sions without regard to the “conduct relevant to that focus.”
WesternGeco, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5).  Abitron con-
tends that §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1) focus on preventing
infringing  use  of  trademarks,  while  Hetronic  argues  that
they focus both on protecting the goodwill of mark owners
and on preventing consumer confusion.  The United States
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the extraterritorial reach of certain provisions of the Lanham Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

Opinion of the Court

“in  which  a  living  animal  is  intentionally  maimed,  muti-
lated,  tortured,  wounded,  or  killed,”  if  that  conduct  vio-
lates  federal  or  state  law  where  “the  creation,  sale,  or
possession  takes  place.”    §48(c)(1).    In  what  is  referred  to
as  the  “exceptions  clause,”  the  law  exempts  from  prohibi-
tion  any  depiction  “that  has  serious  religious,  political,
scientific,  educational,  journalistic,  historical,  or  artistic
value.”  §48(b).

The  legislative  background  of  §48  focused  primarily  on
the interstate market for “crush videos.”  According to the
House  Committee  Report  on  the  bill,  such  videos  feature
the  intentional  torture  and  killing  of  helpless  animals,
including cats, dogs, monkeys, mice, and hamsters.  H. R.
Rep.  No.  106–397,  p.  2  (1999)  (hereinafter  H.  R.  Rep.).
Crush videos often depict women slowly crushing animals
to death “with their bare feet or while wearing high heeled
shoes,” sometimes while “talking to the animals in a kind
of  dominatrix  patter”  over  “[t]he  cries  and  squeals  of  the
animals, obviously in great pain.”  Ibid.  Apparently these
depictions  “appeal  to  persons  with  a  very  specific  sexual

——————

years, or both.

  “(b)

 EXCEPTION.—Subsection  (a)  does  not  apply  to  any  depiction
that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic,
historical, or artistic value.

  “(c)

 DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

  “(1)  the  term  ‘depiction  of  animal  cruelty’  means  any  visual  or
auditory  depiction,  including  any  photograph,  motion-picture  film,
video  recording,  electronic  image,  or  sound  recording  of  conduct  in
which  a  living  animal  is  intentionally  maimed,  mutilated,  tortured,
wounded,  or  killed,  if  such  conduct  is  illegal  under  Federal  law  or  the
law  of  the  State  in  which  the  creation,  sale,  or  possession  takes  place,
regardless  of  whether  the  maiming,  mutilation,  torture,  wounding,  or
killing took place in the State; and

“(2)  the  term  ‘State’  means  each  of  the  several  States,  the  Dis-
trict  of  Columbia,  the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico,  the  Virgin  Is-
lands,  Guam,  American  Samoa,  the  Commonwealth  of  the  Northern
Mariana Islands, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession
of the United States.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text, specifically the text of a law (likely the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act) and its legislative history.  It is not the type of content meant to be read and understood by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1028

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 16, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6419.  Dutra  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  3d  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6421.  Derringer  v.  Moore  et  al.  Ct.  App.  N.  M.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6424.  Simmons  v.  Bazzle,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  149.

No. 09–6426.  Small v.  Florida.  Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  11  So.  3d  960.

No.  09–6428.  Mohiuddin  v.  Raytheon  Co.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6431.  Bables v. Kansas City, Missouri, School Dis
trict.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327
Fed.  Appx.  678.

No.  09–6439.  McGee  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  12  So.  3d  752.

No.  09–6443.  McCray  v.  Glass.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  3d  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6450.  Lomax  v.  Mize,  Superintendent,  Reception

Diagnostic  Center.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6451.  Kitchen  v.  Michigan  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6458.  Torres  v.  Amerada  Hess  Corp.  Super.  Ct.

N.  J.,  App.  Div.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6463.  Brown  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  6th  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6468.  Telfair  v.  Tandy,  Administrator,  Drug  En
forcement  Agency,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  176.

No. 09–6469.  Daniel v.  Scott et al.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6471.  Daly  v.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  Depart
ment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
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  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

1

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–302
_________________

ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR,
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PETITIONER v. ERIK BRUNETTI

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2019]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The  Court’s  decision  today  will  beget  unfortunate  re-
sults.  With  the  Lanham  Act’s  scandalous-marks  provi-
sion, 15 U. S. C. §1052(a), struck down as unconstitutional
viewpoint  discrimination,  the  Government  will  have  no
statutory basis to refuse (and thus no choice but to begin)
registering marks containing the most vulgar, profane, or
obscene words and images imaginable.

The  coming  rush  to  register  such  trademarks—and  the
Government’s  immediate  powerlessness  to  say  no—is
eminently  avoidable.  Rather  than  read  the  relevant  text
as  the  majority  does,  it  is  equally  possible  to  read  that
provision’s  bar  on  the  registration  of  “scandalous”  marks
to address only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity.  Such a
narrowing  construction  would  save  that  duly  enacted
legislative  text  by  rendering  it  a  reasonable,  viewpoint-
neutral  restriction  on  speech  that  is  permissible  in  the
context  of  a  beneficial  governmental  initiative  like  the
trademark-registration  system.  I  would  apply  that  nar-
rowing  construction  to  the  term  “scandalous”  and  accord-
ingly reject petitioner Erik Brunetti’s facial challenge.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Sotomayor.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual legal reasoning and arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012)

39

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

protection  on  substantially  the  same  basis  as  provided
under  this  section,  the  President  may  by  proclamation
extend  restored  protection  provided  under  this  section  to
any work—

“(1) of which one or more of the authors is, on the date of
first  publication,  a  national,  domiciliary,  or  sovereign
authority of that nation; or

“(2) which was first published in that nation.

“The  President  may  revise,  suspend,  or  revoke  any  such
proclamation  or  impose  any  conditions  or  limitations  on
protection under such a proclamation.
“(h)  DEFINITIONS.—For  purposes  of  this  section  and  sec-
tion 109(a):

“(1)  The  term  “date  of  adherence  or  proclamation”
means  the  earlier  of  the  date  on  which  a  foreign  nation
which, as of the date the WTO Agreement enters into force
with respect to the United States, is not a nation adhering
to  the  Berne  Convention  or  a  WTO  member  country,
becomes—

“(A) a nation adhering to the Berne Convention;
“(B) a WTO member country;
“(C) a nation adhering to the WIPO Copyright Treaty;
“(D) a nation adhering to the WIPO Performances and

Phonograms Treaty; or

“(E) subject to a Presidential proclamation under

subsection (g).

“(2) The “date of restoration” of a restored copyright is—

“(A)  January  1,  1996,  if  the  source  country  of  the
restored  work  is  a  nation  adhering  to  the  Berne  Conven-
tion or a WTO member country on such date, or

“(B) the date of adherence or proclamation, in the case

of any other source country of the restored work.

“(3)  The  term  “eligible  country”  means  a  nation,  other

than the United States, that—

“(A) becomes a WTO member country after the date of

the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text, specifically excerpts from a statute. It is likely part of the body of the text and not a separate element like a table of contents or copyright information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
4

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
Opinion of the Court

The  Talevskis  complained  again  to  the  Department,
which  later  issued  a  report  regarding  the  Talevskis’  com-
plaints.  Subsequently,  petitioner  American  Senior  Com-
munities  LLC  (ASC),  which  manages  VCR,  contacted  Mr.
Talevski’s  wife,  Ivanka,  to  discuss  the  possibility  of  Mr.
Talevski’s return.  At this point, however, Mr. Talevski had
acclimated to his new home, and the Talevskis feared retri-
bution against him if he returned to VCR.  So they opted to
leave him in the new facility, which meant that every fam-
ily visit required a 3-hour round trip.

that

In 2019, Mr. Talevski (through Ivanka) sued VCR, ASC,
and petitioner Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion
County  (collectively,  HHC)  under  Rev.  Stat.  §1979,  42
U. S. C. §1983.2  The lawsuit claimed that HHC’s treatment
of  Mr.  Talevski—in  particular,  the  use  of  chemical  re-
straints and the persistent transfer attempts—had violated
the  FNHRA  guaranteed  him  as  a
rights
nursing-home resident.  The District Court granted HHC’s
subsequent motion to dismiss the complaint, reasoning that
no plaintiff can enforce provisions of the FNHRA via §1983.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.  It
concluded that, under this Court’s precedent, the relevant
FNHRA provisions “unambiguously confer individually en-
forceable rights on nursing-home residents,” making those
rights presumptively enforceable via §1983.  6 F. 4th 713,
720 (2021).  The Court of Appeals held further that the pre-
sumption  had  not  been  rebutted  here,  because  nothing  in
the  FNHRA  indicated  congressional  intent  to  foreclose
§1983 enforcement of these rights.  Id., at 720–721.

HHC  filed  a  petition  for  certiorari,  which  we  granted.3

——————

2 Marion  County,  Indiana,  owns  Health  and  Hospital  Corporation,

which in turn wholly owns VCR.

3 After  the  Seventh  Circuit’s  ruling,  Mr.  Talevski  passed  away.    We
granted Ivanka Talevski’s substitution motion, and substituted her as a
party at the same time we granted certiorari.  See Supreme Court Rule
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the beginning of the case HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION CTY. v. TALEVSKI. It contains legal arguments, citations, and details about the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
14

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

federal criminal laws, is not above them.

Chief Justice Marshall’s decisions in Burr and our deci-
sion  in  Nixon  recognized  the  distinct  interests  present  in
criminal  prosecutions.  Although  Burr  acknowledged  that
the President’s official papers may be privileged and pub-
licly unavailable, it did not grant him an absolute exemp-
tion from responding to subpoenas.  See Burr II, 25 F. Cas.,
at 192; Burr I, 25 F. Cas., at 33–34.  Nixon likewise recog-
nized  a  strong  protection  for  the  President’s  confidential
communications—a “presumptive privilege”—but it did not
entirely  exempt  him  from  providing  evidence  in  criminal
proceedings.  418 U. S., at 708.

Taking into account these competing considerations, we
conclude that the separation of powers principles explicated
in our precedent necessitate at least a presumptive immun-
ity from criminal prosecution for a President’s acts within
the outer perimeter of his official responsibility.  Such an
immunity  is  required  to  safeguard  the  independence  and
effective functioning of the Executive Branch, and to enable
the President to carry out his constitutional duties without
undue  caution.  Indeed,  if  presumptive  protection  for  the
President is necessary to enable the “effective discharge” of
his powers when a prosecutor merely seeks evidence of his
official  papers  and  communications,  id.,  at  711,  it  is  cer-
tainly necessary when the prosecutor seeks to charge, try,
and imprison the President himself for his official actions.
At  a  minimum,  the  President  must  therefore  be  immune
from prosecution for an official act unless the Government
can  show  that  applying  a  criminal  prohibition  to  that  act
would  pose  no  “dangers  of  intrusion  on  the  authority  and
functions of the Executive Branch.”  Fitzgerald, 457 U. S.,
at 754.

But as we explain below, the current stage of the proceed-
ings in this case does not require us to decide whether this
immunity is presumptive or absolute.  See Part III–B, infra.
Because we need not decide that question today, we do not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case *Trump v. United States*. It contains legal analysis and cites previous cases, indicating it is part of the core content of the document and suitable for indexing.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC v. FTC

Syllabus

by  seeking  equitable  monetary  relief  directly  in  district  court  under
§13(b)’s authorization to seek a “permanent injunction.”  In doing so,
the  Commission  acted  in  accordance  with  its  increasing  tendency  to
use §13(b) to seek monetary awards without prior use of the Commis-
sion’s traditional administrative proceedings.  The desirability of the
Commission’s practice aside, the question is whether Congress, by en-
acting §13(b) and using the words “permanent injunction,” granted the
Commission  authority  to  obtain  monetary  relief  directly  from  courts
and effectively bypass the requirements of the administrative process.
Pp. 3–6.

(b) Section 13(b) does not explicitly authorize the Commission to ob-
tain court-ordered monetary relief, and such relief is foreclosed by the
structure and history of the Act.  Section 13(b) provides that the “Com-
mission may seek . . . a permanent injunction.”  §53(b).  By its terms,
this provision concerns prospective injunctive relief, not retrospective
monetary relief.  Section 13(b) allows the Commission to go directly to
district court when the Commission seeks injunctive relief pending ad-
ministrative  proceedings  or  when  it  seeks  only  a  permanent  injunc-
tion.  Other statutory provisions, in particular the conditioned and lim-
ited monetary relief authorized in §19, confirm this conclusion.  It is
highly unlikely that Congress, without mentioning the matter, would
grant  the  Commission  authority  to  circumvent  its  traditional  §5  ad-
ministrative proceedings.  Pp. 6–10.

(c) The  Commission’s  contrary  arguments  are  unavailing.    First,
Porter  v.  Warner  Holding  Co.,  328  U. S.  395,  and  Mitchell  v.  Robert
DeMario  Jewelry,  Inc.,  361  U. S.  288,  did  not  adopt  a  universal  rule
that statutory authority to grant an injunction automatically encom-
passes the power to grant equitable monetary remedies.  Instead, the
text and structure of the particular statutory scheme at issue can limit
a court’s jurisdiction in equity.  Second, in enacting §19 two years after
§13(b), Congress did not simply create an alternative enforcement path
with  similar  remedies.    The  Court  does  not  believe  Congress  would
have enacted §19’s provisions expressly authorizing monetary relief if
§13(b) already implicitly allowed the Commission to obtain that same
monetary  relief  without  satisfying  §19’s  conditions  and  limitations.
Third, §19’s saving clauses—preserving “any authority of the Commis-
sion under any other provision of law” and “any other remedy or right
of action provided by State or Federal law,” §57b(e)—do not help an-
swer whether §13(b) gave the Commission the authority to obtain eq-
uitable monetary relief directly in court in the first place.  Fourth, the
Act’s  1994  and  2006  amendments,  which  did  not  modify  the  specific
language at issue here, do not demonstrate congressional acquiescence
to  lower  court  rulings  that  favor  the  Commission’s  interpretation  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a summary and analysis of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
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  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

658

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Breyer, J., dissenting

interstate effects of wheat grown for home consumption);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, supra, at 258 (“ ‘[I]f it is interstate
commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local
the operation which applies the squeeze’ ” (quoting United
States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U. S. 460, 464
(1949))). Nothing in the Constitution’s language, or that of
earlier cases prior to Lopez, explains why the Court should
ignore one highly relevant characteristic of an interstate-
commerce-affecting cause (how “local” it is), while placing
critical constitutional weight upon a different, less obviously
relevant, feature (how “economic” it is).

Most importantly, the Court’s complex rules seem unlikely
to help secure the very object that they seek, namely, the
protection of “areas of traditional state regulation” from
federal intrusion. Ante, at 615. The Court’s rules, even
if broadly interpreted, are underinclusive. The local pick-
pocket is no less a traditional subject of state regulation
than is the local gender-motivated assault. Regardless,
the Court reafﬁrms, as it should, Congress’ well-established
and frequently exercised power to enact laws that satisfy
a commerce-related jurisdictional prerequisite—for example,
that some item relevant to the federally regulated activity
has at some time crossed a state line. Ante, at 609, 611–612,
613, and n. 5; Lopez, supra, at 558; Heart of Atlanta Motel,
supra, at 256 (“ ‘[T]he authority of Congress to keep the
channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and inju-
rious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer
open to question’ ” (quoting Caminetti v. United States,
242 U. S. 470, 491 (1917))); see also United States v. Bass,
404 U. S. 336, 347–350 (1971) (saving ambiguous felon-in-
possession statute by requiring gun to have crossed state
line); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S. 563, 575 (1977)
(interpreting same statute to require only that gun passed
“in interstate commerce” “at some time,” without question-
ing constitutionality); cf., e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 2261(a)(1) (making
it a federal crime for a person to cross state lines to commit
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a dissenting opinion. The language and formatting suggest it is part of a larger legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Snippet</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
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  <content>
4

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

from scratch.”  Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.
3d 1339, 1349 (2014).  Through an API, a programmer can
draw  upon  a  vast  library  of  prewritten  code  to  carry  out
complex  tasks.    For  lay  persons,  including  judges,  juries,
and many others, some elaboration of this description may
prove useful.

Consider in more detail just what an API does.  A com-
puter can perform thousands, perhaps millions, of different
tasks  that  a  programmer  may  wish  to  use.   These  tasks
range from the most basic to the enormously complex.  Ask
the computer, for example, to tell you which of two numbers
is the higher number or to sort one thousand numbers in
ascending order, and it will instantly give you the right an-
swer.  An API divides and organizes the world of computing
tasks in a particular way.  Programmers can then use the
API  to  select  the  particular  task  that  they  need  for  their
programs.  In Sun’s API (which we refer to as the Sun Java
API), each individual task is known as a “method.”  The API
groups somewhat similar methods into larger “classes,” and
groups  somewhat  similar  classes  into  larger  “packages.”
This  method-class-package  organizational  structure  is  re-
ferred to as the Sun Java API’s “structure, sequence, and
organization,” or SSO.

For each task, there is computer code, known as “imple-
menting code,” that in effect tells the computer how to exe-
cute the particular task you have asked it to perform (such
as telling you, of two  numbers, which is the higher).  See
Oracle,  872  F. Supp.  2d,  at  979–980.    The  implementing
code  (which  Google  independently  wrote)  is  not  at  issue
here.  For a single task, the implementing code may be hun-
dreds of lines long.  It would be difficult, perhaps impossi-
ble, for a programmer to create complex software programs
without  drawing  on  prewritten  task-implementing  pro-
grams to execute discrete tasks.

But  how  do  you  as  the  programmer  tell  the  computer
which of the implementing code programs it should choose,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically explaining the concept of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) in a way understandable to a non-technical audience. It provides context and definitions relevant to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Explanation</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

be held.  Thus, Pereira contends, that notice did not  trig-
ger the stop-time rule, and the clock continued to run.

The  Board  of  Immigration  Appeals  (BIA)  has  rejected
this interpretation of the stop-time rule in the past.  It has
held that “[a]n equally plausible reading” is that the stop-
time  rule  “merely  specifies  the  document  the  [Govern-
ment]  must  serve  on  the  alien  to  trigger  the  ‘stop-time’
rule  and  does  not  impose  substantive  requirements  for  a
notice to appear to be effective in order for that trigger to
occur.”  In re Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644, 647 (2011).  It
therefore  held  in  this  case  that  Pereira  is  ineligible  for
cancellation of removal.

II

A

Pereira, on one side, and the Government and the BIA,
on  the  other,  have  a  quasi-metaphysical  disagreement
about the meaning of the concept of a notice to appear.  Is
a notice to appear a document that contains certain essen-
tial  characteristics,  namely,  all  the  information  required
by  §1229(a)(1),  so  that  any  notice  that  omits  any  of  that
information  is  not  a  “notice  to  appear”  at  all?    Or  is  a
notice  to  appear  a  document  that  is  conventionally  called
by  that  name,  so  that  a  notice  that  omits  some  of  the
information required by §1229(a)(1) may still be regarded
as a “notice to appear”?

Picking  the  better  of  these  two  interpretations  might
have been a challenge in the first instance.  But the Court
did not need to decide that question, for under Chevron we
are  obligated  to  defer  to  a  Government  agency’s  interpre-
tation  of  the  statute  that  it  administers  so  long  as  that
interpretation  is  a  “ ‘permissible’ ”  one.    INS  v.  Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415, 424 (1999).  All that is required is
that the Government’s view be “reasonable”; it need not be
“the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpreta-
tion  deemed  most  reasonable  by  the  courts.”    Entergy
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 585 U.S. ____ (2018). It delves into the interpretation of a "notice to appear" in immigration law and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL
CONSULTANTS, INC.
Syllabus

subject matter, or its content.”  Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U. S.  92,  95.  Under  this  Court’s  precedents,  content-based  laws  are
subject to strict scrutiny.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155,
165.  Section  227(b)(1)(A)(iii)’s  robocall  restriction,  with  the  govern-
ment-debt exception, is content based because it favors speech made
for the purpose of collecting government debt over political and other
speech.  Pp. 6–7.

(b) The  Government’s  arguments  for  deeming  the  statute  content-
neutral are unpersuasive.  First, §227(b)(1)(A)(iii) does not draw dis-
tinctions based on speakers, and even if it did, that would not “auto-
matically render the distinction content neutral.”  Reed, 576 U. S., at
170.  Second, the law here focuses on whether the caller is speaking
about a particular topic and not, as the Government contends, simply
on whether the caller is engaged in a particular economic activity.  See
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 563–564.  Third, while “the
First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce
or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech,” this law “does
not simply have an effect on speech, but is directed at certain content
and is aimed at particular speakers.”  Id., at 567.

(c) As  the  Government  concedes,  the  robocall  restriction  with  the
government-debt exception cannot satisfy strict scrutiny.  The Govern-
ment has not sufficiently justified the differentiation between govern-
ment-debt collection speech and other important categories of robocall
speech, such as political speech, issue advocacy, and the like.  Pp. 7–9.
JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH,  joined  by  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE  and  JUSTICE
ALITO, concluded in Part III that the 2015 government-debt exception
is severable from the underlying 1991 robocall restriction.  The TCPA
is  part  of  the  Communications  Act,  which  has  contained  an  express
severability clause since 1934.  Even if that clause did not apply to the
exception, the presumption of severability would still apply.  See, e.g.,
Free  Enterprise  Fund  v.  Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Bd.,
561 U. S. 477.  The remainder of the law is capable of functioning in-
dependently and would be fully operative as a law.  Severing this rel-
atively narrow exception to the broad robocall restriction fully cures
the First Amendment unequal treatment problem and does not raise
any other constitutional problems.  Pp. 9–24.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR concluded that the government-debt exception
fails under intermediate scrutiny and is severable from the rest of the
Act.  Pp. 1–2.

JUSTICE BREYER, joined by JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE KAGAN,
would have upheld the government-debt exception, but given the con-
trary  majority  view,  agreed  that  the  provision  is  severable  from  the
rest of the statute.  Pp. 11–12.

JUSTICE  GORSUCH  concluded  that  content-based  restrictions  on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It is not the actual content of a book and is structured for legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

GORSUCH, J., concurring

developments.  This Court itself has acknowledged that its
plenary-power cases embodied a “trend . . . away from the
idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state juris-
diction.”  Id., at 172, and n. 7.

It is no coincidence either that this Court’s plenary-power
jurisprudence emerged in the same era as Indian boarding
schools and other assimilationist policies.  See D. Moore &
M.  Steele,  Revitalizing  Tribal  Sovereignty  in  Treatymak-
ing, 97 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 137, 142 (2022).  Rather, “[f]ederal
bureaucratic  control  over  Indian  leadership  and  govern-
ments ran parallel to the government’s control over Indian
children” during this period.  Fletcher & Singel 930.  Indian
boarding  schools  and  other  intrusive  “federal  educational
programs . . . could not have been implemented without fed-
eral control of reservation governance.”  Ibid.  Nor could any
of  these  federal  intrusions  on  internal  tribal  affairs  have
been  possible  without  this  Court’s  plenary-power  misad-
venture.

I do not mean to overstate the point.  Even in the heyday
of the plenary-power theory, this Court never doubted that
Tribes retain a variety of self-government powers.  It has
always  acknowledged  that  Tribes  are  “a  separate  people,
with the power of regulating their internal and social rela-
tions.”  Kagama, 118 U. S., at 381–382.  They may “make
their own substantive law in internal matters.”  Martinez,
436 U. S., at 55.  They may define their own membership.
Roff, 168 U. S., at 222.  They may set probate rules of their
choice.  Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1, 29 (1899).  And—es-
pecially relevant here—they may handle their own family-
law matters, Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial
Dist. of Mont., 424 U. S. 382, 387 (1976) (per curiam), and
domestic disputes, United States v. Quiver, 241 U. S. 602,
605 (1916).  But for a  period at least, this Court let itself
drift  from  the  “basic  policy  of  Worcester,”  and  with  it  the
Constitution’s  promise  of  tribal  sovereignty.  Williams  v.
Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 219 (1959).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the history of tribal sovereignty and the Court's interpretation of its plenary power over Native American affairs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>