<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–1314
_________________

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE, APPELLANT v.

ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING

COMMISSION ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

[June 29, 2015]

JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SCALIA  joins,

dissenting.

Reading today’s opinion, one would think the Court is a
great  defender  of  direct  democracy  in  the  States.    As  it
reads “the Legislature” out of the Times, Places and Man-
ner  Clause,  U. S.  Const.,  Art.  I,  §4,  the  majority  offers  a
paean to the ballot initiative.  It speaks in glowing terms
of  the  “characteristic  of  our  federal  system  that  States
retain  autonomy  to  establish  their  own  governmental
processes.”  Ante, at 27.  And it urges “[d]eference to state
lawmaking”  so  that  States  may  perform  their  vital  func-
tion as “ ‘laboratories’ ”of democracy.  Ante, at 28.

These sentiments are difficult to accept.  The conduct of
the  Court  in  so  many  other  cases  reveals  a  different  atti-
tude toward the States in general and ballot initiatives in
particular.    Just  last  week,  in  the  antithesis  of  deference
to  state  lawmaking  through  direct  democracy,  the  Court
cast  aside  state  laws  across  the  country—many  of  which
were  enacted  through  ballot  initiative—that  reflected  the
traditional definition of marriage.  See Obergefell v. Hodges,
ante, p. ___.

This  Court’s  tradition  of  disdain  for  state  ballot  initia-
tives  goes  back  quite  a  while.    Two  decades  ago,  it  held
unconstitutional  an  Arkansas  ballot  initiative  imposing
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. It sets the stage for the Justice's argument by highlighting the Court's apparent support for direct democracy while contrasting it with its past decisions that have struck down state laws, including those passed through ballot initiatives.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

anyone  with  whom  he  cohabitates  or  has  cohabitated.
§921(a)(32).  Third,  under  Section  922(g)(8)(C),  the  order
must  either  contain  a  finding  that  the  defendant  “repre-
sents a credible threat to the physical safety” of his intimate
partner or his or his partner’s child, §922(g)(8)(C)(i), or “by
its  terms  explicitly  prohibit[ ]  the  use,”  attempted  use,  or
threatened use of “physical force” against those individuals,
§922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

Rahimi’s restraining order met all three criteria.  First,
Rahimi had received notice and an opportunity to be heard
before  the  order  was  entered.    App.  2.    Second,  the  order
prohibited  him  from  communicating  with  or  threatening
C. M.  Id., at 3–4.  Third, the order met the requirements of
Section  922(g)(8)(C)(i),  because  it  included  a  finding  that
Rahimi  represented  “a  credible  threat  to  the  physical
safety” of C. M. or her family.  Id., at 2–3.  The order also
“explicitly  prohibit[ed]”  Rahimi  from  “the  use,  attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force” against C. M., sat-
isfying  the  independent  basis  for  liability  in  Section
922(g)(8)(C)(ii).  Id., at 3.

Rahimi  moved  to  dismiss  the  indictment,  arguing  that
Section  922(g)(8)  violated  on  its  face  the  Second  Amend-
ment right to keep and bear arms.  No. 4:21–cr–00083 (ND
Tex., May 7, 2021), ECF Doc. 17.  Concluding that Circuit
precedent  foreclosed  Rahimi’s  Second  Amendment  chal-
lenge, the District Court denied his motion.  Rahimi then
pleaded  guilty.  On  appeal,  he  again  raised  his  Second
Amendment challenge.  The appeal was denied, and Rahimi
petitioned for rehearing en banc.

While Rahimi’s petition was pending, this Court decided
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S.
1 (2022).  In Bruen, we explained that when a firearm reg-
ulation  is  challenged  under  the  Second  Amendment,  the
Government  must  show  that  the  restriction  “is  consistent
with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
Id., at 24.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of United States v. Rahimi and its relation to the Second Amendment. It delves into the specifics of the restraining order against Rahimi and how it intersects with firearm ownership regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 165 (2010)

173

Opinion of the Court

to  be  whether  the  rate  is  so  low  as  to  adversely  affect
the public interest—as where it might impair the ﬁnan
cial  ability  of  the  public  utility  to  continue  its  service,
cast  upon  other  consumers  an  excessive  burden,  or  be
unduly discriminatory.”  350 U. S., at 354–355 (some em
phasis added).

In a later case, we similarly explained: “The regulatory sys
tem  created  by the  [FPA]  is  premised on  contractual  agree
ments  voluntarily  devised  by  the  regulated  companies;  it
contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in circum
stances  of  unequivocal  public  necessity.”  Permian  Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 822 (1968).3

Two  Terms  ago,  in  Morgan  Stanley,  554  U. S.  527,  the
Court  reafﬁrmed  and  clariﬁed  the  Mobile-Sierra  doctrine.
That  case  presented  two  questions:  First,  does  the  Mobile-
Sierra presumption (that contract rates freely negotiated be
tween  sophisticated  parties  meet  the  just-and-reasonable
standard  imposed  by  16  U. S. C.  § 824d(a))  “apply  only  when
FERC  has  had  an  initial  opportunity  to  review  a  contract
rate without the presumption?”  554 U. S., at 531.  “Second,
does  the  presumption  [generally]  impose  as  high  a  bar  to
challenges  by  purchasers  of  wholesale  electricity  as  it  does
to  challenges  by  sellers?”  Id.,  at  531;  see  id.,  at  548.  An

3 Consistent with the lead role of contracts recognized in Mobile-Sierra,
we  held  in  United  Gas  Pipe  Line  Co.  v.  Memphis  Light,  Gas  and  Water
Div.,  358  U. S.  103,  110–113  (1958),  that  parties  may  contract  out  of  the
Mobile-Sierra presumption.  They could do so, we ruled, by specifying in
their contracts that a new rate ﬁled with the Commission would supersede
the  contract  rate.  Courts  of  Appeals  have  approved  an  option  midway
between  Mobile-Sierra  and  Memphis  Light:  A  contract  that  does  not
allow  the  seller  to  supersede  the  contract  rate  by  ﬁling  a  new  rate  may
nonetheless  permit  the  Commission  to  set  aside  the  contract  rate  if  it
results  in  an  unfair  rate  of  return,  without  a  further  showing  that  it  ad
versely  affects  the  public  interest.  See,  e. g.,  Papago  Tribal  Util.  Auth.
v.  FERC,  723  F.  2d  950,  953  (CADC  1983);  Louisiana  Power  &  Light  Co.
v.  FERC, 587 F. 2d 671, 675–676 (CA5 1979).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Mobile-Sierra doctrine in the context of energy regulation. It cites previous cases and legal precedents, indicating it's part of a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

expects any of it will be kept private.  But no one believes
that, if they ever did.

What to do?  It seems to me we could respond in at least
three  ways.    The  first  is  to  ignore  the  problem,  maintain
Smith  and  Miller,  and  live  with  the  consequences.    If  the
confluence  of  these  decisions  and  modern  technology
means our Fourth Amendment rights are reduced to nearly
nothing,  so  be  it.    The  second  choice  is  to  set  Smith  and
Miller  aside  and  try  again  using  the  Katz  “reasonable
expectation of privacy” jurisprudence that produced them.
The third is to look for answers elsewhere.

*
Start with the first option.  Smith held that the govern-
ment’s use of a pen register to record the numbers people
dial on their phones doesn’t infringe a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because that information is freely disclosed
to the third party phone company.  442 U. S., at 743–744.
Miller  held  that  a  bank  account  holder  enjoys  no  reason-
able  expectation  of  privacy  in  the  bank’s  records  of  his
account activity.  That’s true, the Court reasoned, “even if
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will
be  used  only  for  a  limited  purpose  and  the  confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”  425 U. S.,
at  443.  Today  the  Court  suggests  that  Smith  and  Miller
distinguish between kinds of information disclosed to third
parties  and  require  courts  to  decide  whether  to  “extend”
those  decisions  to  particular  classes  of  information,  de-
pending  on  their  sensitivity.  See  ante,  at  10–18.    But  as
the  Sixth  Circuit  recognized  and  JUSTICE  KENNEDY  ex-
plains,  no  balancing  test  of  this  kind  can  be  found  in
Smith  and  Miller.  See  ante,  at  16  (dissenting  opinion).
Those  cases  announced  a  categorical  rule:  Once  you  dis-
close  information  to  third  parties,  you  forfeit  any  reason-
able expectation of privacy you might have had in it.  And
even  if  Smith  and  Miller  did  permit  courts  to  conduct  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to privacy rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

29

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

at  648.
  All  of  SFFA’s  proposals  are  methodologically
flawed because they rest on “ ‘terribly unrealistic’ ” assump-
tions about the applicant pools.  Id., at 643–645, 647.  For
example, as to one set of proposals, SFFA’s expert “unreal-
istically assumed” that “all of the top students in the candi-
date pools he use[d] would apply, be admitted, and enroll.”
Id.,  at  647.    In  addition,  some  of  SFFA’s  proposals  force
UNC to “abandon its holistic approach” to college admis-
sions, id., at 643–645, n. 43, a result “in deep tension with
the goal of educational diversity as this Court’s cases have
defined  it,”  Fisher  II,  579  U. S.,  at  386–387.   Others  are
“largely  impractical—not  to  mention  unprecedented—in
higher  education.”  567  F. Supp.  3d,  at  647.    SFFA’s  pro-
posed top percentage plans,24 for example, are based on a
made-up  and  complicated  admissions  index  that  requires
UNC  to  “access  . . .  real-time  data  for  all  high  school  stu-
dents.”  Ibid.    UNC  is  then  supposed  to  use  that  index,
which “would change every time any student took a stand-
ardized  test,”  to  rank  students  based  on  grades  and  test
scores.  Ibid.    One  of  SFFA’s  top  percentage  plans  would
even “nearly erase the Native American incoming class” at
UNC.  Id., at 646.  The courts below correctly concluded that
UNC is not required to adopt SFFA’s unrealistic proposals
to satisfy strict scrutiny.25

——————

24 Generally speaking, top percentage plans seek to enroll a percentage
of  the  graduating  high  school  students  with  the  highest  academic  cre-
dentials.  See, e.g., Fisher II, 579 U. S., at 373 (describing the University
of Texas’ Top Ten Percent Plan).

25 SFFA and JUSTICE GORSUCH reach beyond the factfinding below and
argue that universities in States that have banned the use of race in col-
lege  admissions  have  achieved  racial  diversity  through  efforts  such  as
increasing socioeconomic preferences, so UNC could do the same.  Brief
for Petitioner 85–86; ante, at 14.  Data from those States disprove that
theory.  Institutions in those States experienced “ ‘an immediate and pre-
cipitous  decline  in  the  rates  at  which  underrepresented-minority  stu-
dents applied . . . were admitted . . . and enrolled.’ ”  Schuette v. BAMN,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's stance on affirmative action in college admissions.  The text contains legal citations and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Committee  for  Public  Ed.  &  Religious  Liberty  v.  Nyquist,
413 U. S. 756, 774 (1973) (“No attempt is made to restrict
payments  to  those  expenditures  related  to  the  upkeep  of
facilities  used  exclusively  for  secular  purposes,  nor  do  we
think  it  possible  within  the  context  of  these  religion-
oriented  institutions  to  impose  such  restrictions”).    The
Church  has  a  religious  mission,  one  that  it  pursues
through  the  Learning  Center.    The  playground  surface
cannot  be  confined  to  secular  use  any  more  than  lumber
used  to  frame  the  Church’s  walls,  glass  stained  and  used
to form its windows, or nails used to build its altar.

B
The Court may simply disagree with this account of the
facts  and  think  that  the  Church  does  not  put  its  play-
ground to religious use.  If so, its mistake is limited to this
case.  But  if  it  agrees  that  the  State’s  funding  would  fur-
ther  religious  activity  and  sees  no  Establishment  Clause
problem,  then  it  must  be  implicitly  applying  a  rule  other
than the one agreed to in our precedents.

When  the  Court  last  addressed  direct  funding  of  reli-
gious  institutions,  in  Mitchell,  it  adhered  to  the  rule  that
the  Establishment  Clause  prohibits  the  direct  funding  of
religious  activities.  At  issue  was  a  federal  program  that
helped state and local agencies lend educational materials
to  public  and  private  schools,  including  religious  schools.
See 530 U. S., at 801–803 (plurality opinion).  The control-
ling concurrence assured itself that the program would not
lead to the public funding of religious activity.  It pointed
out  that  the  program  allocated  secular  aid,  that  it  did  so
“on  the  basis  of  neutral,  secular  criteria,”  that  the  aid
would  not  “supplant  non-[program]  funds,”  that  “no  . . .
funds  ever  reach  the  coffers  of  religious  schools,”  that
“evidence of actual diversion is de minimis,” and that the

——————

has not offered any such assurances to this Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of the facts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

IV

Twenty years later, no end is in sight.  “Harvard’s view
about when [race-based admissions will end] doesn’t have a
date on it.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 20–1199, p. 85; Brief for
Respondent  in  No.  20–1199,  p.  52.    Neither  does  UNC’s.
567 F. Supp. 3d, at 612.  Yet both insist that the use of race
in their admissions programs must continue.

But  we  have  permitted  race-based  admissions  only
within the confines of narrow restrictions.  University pro-
grams must comply with strict scrutiny, they may never use
race as a stereotype or negative, and—at some point—they
must  end.  Respondents’  admissions  systems—however
well intentioned and implemented in good faith—fail each
of these criteria.  They must therefore be invalidated under
the  Equal  Protection  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment.4

A
Because “[r]acial discrimination [is] invidious in all con-
texts,”  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614,
619 (1991), we have required that universities operate their
race-based admissions programs in a manner that is “suffi-
ciently  measurable  to  permit  judicial  [review]”  under  the
rubric of strict scrutiny, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Aus-
tin, 579 U. S. 365, 381 (2016) (Fisher II).  “Classifying and
assigning” students based on their race “requires more than
. . . an amorphous end to justify it.”  Parents Involved, 551
U. S., at 735.

Respondents have fallen short of satisfying that burden.

——————

4 The United States as amicus curiae contends that race-based admis-
sions  programs  further  compelling  interests  at  our  Nation’s  military
academies.  No military academy is a party to these cases, however, and
none  of  the  courts  below  addressed  the  propriety  of  race-based  admis-
sions  systems  in  that  context.    This  opinion  also  does  not  address  the
issue, in light of the potentially distinct interests that military academies
may present.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court's opinion in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the legal framework surrounding race-based admissions and the Court's reasoning for invalidating Harvard and UNC's programs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

136

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Opinion of the Court

commerce. Contrary to the dissent’s contention, the Act ad-
mits no remedial discretion once it is evident that the device
is misbranded.

Second, the FDCA requires the FDA to place all devices
that it regulates into one of three classiﬁcations. See
§ 360c(b)(1). The agency relies on a device’s classiﬁcation in
determining the degree of control and regulation necessary
to ensure that there is “a reasonable assurance of safety and
61 Fed. Reg. 44412 (1996). The FDA has
effectiveness.”
yet to classify tobacco products.
Instead, the regulations at
issue here represent so-called “general controls,” which the
Act entitles the agency to impose in advance of classiﬁcation.
See id., at 44404–44405. Although the FDCA prescribes no
deadline for device classiﬁcation, the FDA has stated that it
will classify tobacco products “in a future rulemaking” as
required by the Act.
Id., at 44412. Given the FDA’s ﬁnd-
ings regarding the health consequences of tobacco use, the
agency would have to place cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
in Class III because, even after the application of the Act’s
available controls, they would “presen[t] a potential unrea-
sonable risk of illness or injury.”
21 U. S. C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
As Class III devices, tobacco products would be subject to
the FDCA’s premarket approval process. See 21 U. S. C.
§ 360c(a)(1)(C) (1994 ed., Supp. III); 21 U. S. C. § 360e; 61
Fed. Reg. 44412 (1996). Under these provisions, the FDA
would be prohibited from approving an application for pre-
market approval without “a showing of reasonable assurance
that such device is safe under the conditions of use pre-
scribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling
thereof.”
In view of the FDA’s
conclusions regarding the health effects of tobacco use, the
agency would have no basis for ﬁnding any such reasonable
assurance of safety. Thus, once the FDA fulﬁlled its statu-
tory obligation to classify tobacco products, it could not allow
them to be marketed.

21 U. S. C. § 360e(d)(2)(A).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco products. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific sections of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
820

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–1424.  Rosenthal  v.  Committee  on  Professional
Standards,  Appellate  Division,  Supreme  Court  of  New
York,  Third  Judicial  Department.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.  N. Y.,
3d  Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  57  App.  Div.
3d  1085,  868  N. Y.  S.  2d  820.

No.  08–1429.  Beal  v.  CSX  Corp.  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  324.

No.  08–1430.  Smith  et  al.,  as  Co-Personal  Representa
tives  of  the  Estate  of  Smith,  Deceased,  et  al.  v.  Ford
Motor  Co.  et  al.  Ct.  Civ.  App.  Okla.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1431.  Reddy  v.  Matthews  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th

App.  Dist.,  Div.  2.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1433.  Lawrence  v.  Goldberg.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–1434.  Katz  v.  Mabus,  Secretary  of  the  Navy.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  303  Fed.
Appx.  125.

No. 08–1435.  Chung v.  Superior Court of California, San
Francisco  County,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st  App.  Dist.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No.  08–1437.  Russell  et  ux.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  551  F.  3d  1174.

No. 08–1440.  Haeg v.  Cole.  Sup. Ct. Alaska.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  200  P.  3d  317.

No.  08–1444.  Aspen  Creek  Estates,  Ltd.  v.  Town  of
Brookhaven, New York, et al.  Ct. App. N. Y.  Certiorari de
nied.  Reported  below:  12  N. Y.  3d  735,  904  N.  E.  2d  816.

No.  08–1445.  Childress  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  169.

No.  08–1446.  Grain  et  ux.  v.  Trinity  Health  et  al.  C.  A.

6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  551  F.  3d  374.

No.  08–1447.  St. Johns  United  Church of  Christ  et al.  v.
Babbitt, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

vi

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Ajiboye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Akers; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Akinkoye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A’Ku v. Motorola, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alabama; Castillo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alabama; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alabama; Dunaway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alabama; Lee v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alabama; Nickerson v.
Alabama; Steele v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alabama; Tarver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alabama; Wright v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alabama Dept. of Corrections; Gann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alaska; Alhilawi v.
Alberto-Genao v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alcantar-Valenzuela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aldridge v. Zulpo-Dane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alejandro Buitrago Hospital; Huertas Barbosa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alexander v. Flowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfonso Jaime v. McDaniel
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alford v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alhilawi v. Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allegheny Power System; Renahan v.
Allen v. Time Warner Cable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Allen-Sesker v. Bell Atlantic Global Wireless, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allen-Sesker v. Chesapeake Directory Sales Co.
Allison; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allright Boston Parking, Inc.; Ayele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alsbrook v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alvarado v. McKay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alvarez v. United States
Alvarez v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Amado Lajara v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
American Airlines, Inc. v. Cruz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
American Cyanamid Co.; Sherman v.
American Cyanamid Co.; University of Colo. Foundation, Inc. v. . . .
American Grain Trimmers v. Ofﬁce of Workers’ Comp. Programs
American Honda Motor Co.; Geier v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
American Society of Assn. Executives v. United States . . . . . . . .
American S. S. Owners Prot. & Ind. Assn. v. United States Lines
American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc.
. . . . .
American Trucking Assns., Inc.; Browner v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
America Online; Richardson v.

Page
1011
1132
1084
1071
1036
1039
1089
1133
1114
1008
1063
1001
1090
1021
1102
1081
1132
1128
1138
1118
1134
1021
1069
1114
1032,1094
1054
1054
1100
1026
1001
1024,1125
1043
1115
1026
1144
1037
1130
1064
861
1108
1038
1054
1129
1131
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely found at the beginning of a legal document. It lists cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

Opinion of the Court

serves to “identify and distinguish [the mark user’s] goods
. . .  and  to indicate  the  source  of  the  goods.”   §1127.6    Be-
cause  the  proceedings  below  were  not  in  accord  with  this
understanding  of  extraterritoriality,  we  vacate  the  judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

6 JUSTICE JACKSON has proposed a further elaboration of “use in com-
merce,” see post, at 1–4 (concurring opinion), but we have no occasion to
address the precise contours of that phrase here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the concluding portion. It cites legal precedent and discusses the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

(online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov).
  Finally, on election day, a voter may drop off an absentee
ballot at a polling place until 8:00 p.m.  Memorandum from
M.  Wolfe,  Administrator  of  the  Wisconsin  Elections  Com-
mission,  to  Wisconsin  Municipal  Clerks  (Mar.  31,  2020)
(online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov).
  In sum, as the Governor of Wisconsin correctly said back
in March as the COVID–19 crisis broke: “The good news is
that absentee voting in Wisconsin is really easy.”  Marley,
The Deadline to Request an Absentee Ballot in Wisconsin
Is Friday.  Here’s How You Do It., Milwaukee Journal Sen-
tinel,  Mar.  13,  2020  (online  source  archived  at  www.su-
premecourt.gov).
  The current statistics for the November election bear out
the Governor’s statement that absentee voting in Wisconsin
is “really easy.”  In huge and unprecedented numbers, Wis-
consin voters have already taken advantage of the State’s
generous  absentee  voting  procedures  for  the  November
election.   As  of  October  26,  2020, the  Wisconsin  Elections
Commission has mailed 1,706,771 absentee ballots to Wis-
consin voters.  And it has already received back from voters
1,344,535 completed absentee ballots.  Wisconsin Elections
Commission,  Absentee  Ballot  Report—November  3,  2020
General  Election
https://elec-
tions.wi.gov/node/7207.
  As those statistics suggest, the dissent’s charge that Wis-
consin has disenfranchised absentee voters is not tenable.
As the Seventh Circuit explained, the “district court did not
find that any person who wants to avoid voting in person on
Election Day would be unable to cast a ballot in Wisconsin
by planning ahead and taking advantage of the opportuni-
ties allowed by state law.”  Bostelmann, ___ F. 3d, at ___.
  The  dissent  insists,  however,  that  “tens  of  thousands”
and perhaps even 100,000 votes will not be counted if we do
not reinstate the District Court’s extension of the deadline.
Post, at 3 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  The District Court arrived

2020),

(Oct.

26,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in a case related to absentee voting in Wisconsin. It cites legal documents, statistics, and references to other court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–783
_________________

NATHAN VAN BUREN, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 3, 2021]

 JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
Nathan  Van  Buren,  a  former  police  sergeant,  ran  a
license-plate  search  in  a  law  enforcement  computer  data-
base in exchange for money.  Van Buren’s conduct plainly
flouted his department’s policy, which authorized him to ob-
tain  database  information  only  for  law  enforcement  pur-
poses.  We  must  decide  whether  Van  Buren  also  violated
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), which
makes  it  illegal  “to  access  a  computer  with  authorization
and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer  that  the  accesser  is  not  entitled  so  to  obtain  or
alter.”

He did not.  This provision covers those who obtain infor-
mation  from  particular  areas  in  the  computer—such  as
files, folders, or databases—to which their computer access
does not extend.  It does not cover those who, like Van Bu-
ren, have improper motives for obtaining information that
is otherwise available to them.

I
A

Technological advances at the dawn of the 1980s brought
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, the date, and the introduction to the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

JACKSON, J., dissenting

claims  for  conduct  that  is  protected  by  the  NLRA.  See
Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 503 (1984).  But
“if the Board decides that the conduct is not protected,” the
state court may proceed to “entertain the litigation.”  Davis,
476 U. S., at 397.1

With these general principles in mind, I now turn to the

particulars of this case.

II
This  suit  arises  out  of  a  union-organized  strike.    Peti-
tioner  Glacier  Northwest  is  a  concrete-delivery  company,
and  respondent  International  Brotherhood  of  Teamsters
Local Union No. 174 (Union) represents Glacier’s concrete-
delivery  truckdrivers.   After  the  drivers  went  on  strike,
Glacier sent disciplinary letters to some of the drivers.  The
Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board,
alleging that the disciplinary letters were unlawful retalia-
tion against the drivers for engaging in strike conduct that
is protected by the NLRA.

Glacier then filed a complaint in Washington state court,
alleging that the Union engaged in tortious conduct when
it instructed the drivers to strike at a time when there was
wet concrete in some of the company’s delivery trucks.  In
response, the Union filed another Board charge, maintain-
ing  that  Glacier’s  lawsuit  constituted  additional  unlawful
retaliation.

——————

1 JUSTICE THOMAS seeks to undercut our Garmon precedent by describ-
ing it as “od[d]” and “strang[e]” relative to “ ‘the usual preemption rule.’ ”
Ante,  at  1,  3  (opinion  concurring  in  judgment).    But,  as  discussed,  the
Garmon  rule  is  not  a  standard  preemption  doctrine;  it  is  different  be-
cause it is doing different work.  Garmon protects Congress’s judgment
that the Board, not state or federal courts, should be generally responsi-
ble for the development of our Nation’s labor law.  The required pause
when Garmon’s “arguably protected” test is satisfied allows for efficient
resolution  of  the  dispute  prior  to  the  expenditure  of  state  judicial  re-
sources, and the temporary nature of the pause makes it narrower, not
broader, in effect than ordinary preemption.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 598 U.S. ____ (2023). It delves into the legal arguments surrounding labor law and the interplay between state and federal jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  546 U. S. ____ (2006)

5

Opinion of the Court

tropic  Substances,  a  treaty  signed  by  the  United  States
and implemented by the Act.  Feb. 21, 1971, [1979–1980],
32 U. S. T. 543, T. I. A. S. No. 9725.  See 282 F. Supp. 2d,
at 1252–1253.

The District Court heard evidence from both parties on
the  health  risks  of  hoasca  and  the  potential  for  diversion
from  the  church.    The  Government  presented  evidence  to
the effect that use of hoasca, or DMT more generally, can
cause  psychotic  reactions,  cardiac  irregularities,  and
adverse  drug  interactions.    The  UDV  countered  by  citing
studies  documenting  the  safety  of  its  sacramental  use  of
hoasca and presenting evidence that minimized the likeli-
hood of the health risks raised by the Government.  With
respect to diversion, the Government pointed to a general
rise in the illicit use of hallucinogens, and cited interest in
the illegal use of DMT and hoasca in particular; the UDV
emphasized  the  thinness  of  any  market  for  hoasca,  the
relatively small amounts of the substance imported by the
church,  and  the  absence  of  any  diversion  problem  in  the
past.

The  District  Court  concluded  that  the  evidence  on
health  risks  was  “in  equipoise,”  and  similarly  that  the
evidence  on  diversion  was  “virtually  balanced.”    Id.,  at
1262, 1266.  In the face of such an even showing, the court
reasoned that the Government had failed to demonstrate a
compelling interest justifying what it acknowledged was a
substantial  burden  on  the  UDV’s  sincere  religious  exer-
cise.  Id.,  at  1255.  The  court  also  rejected  the  asserted
interest  in  complying  with  the  1971  Convention  on  Psy-
chotropic  Substances,  holding  that  the  Convention  does
not apply to hoasca.  Id., at 1266–1269.

The  court  entered  a  preliminary  injunction  prohibiting
the Government from enforcing the Controlled Substances
Act  with  respect  to  the  UDV’s  importation  and  use  of
hoasca.  The injunction requires the church to import the
tea pursuant to federal permits, to restrict control over the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing a case involving the use of hoasca in a religious context. It cites legal precedents, discusses evidence presented in court, and outlines the court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
334
1083
1094
1077
1073
1119
1115
1087
1068
1130
1031
1116
1006
1098

Bond v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bonner v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Mamaroneck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bonowitz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Booker; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Booker; Townsend v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boone; Bates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boone; Graves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Borden, Inc.; Mendoza v.
Borden, Inc. v. Morton’s Market, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Borelli v. True . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Borg; Biggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Borgert; Fee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Borodaty v. West Penn Power Co.
Borough. See name of borough.
Bosch GmbH; Abbey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boss Capital, Inc. v. Casselberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bostedt v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boston v. Luebbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boulineau v. Garner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boulter; Iacobucci v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bowersox; DeCloud v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bowles; Wordlaw v.
Boyd, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boyd; Grover v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boyer; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
Boys and Girls Club of Charlottesville/Albemarle; Briggs v.
Bozon Pappa v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bradford v. Barrett
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bradley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brattain v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Braun v. Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brazzell v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bremer v. Housing Authority of New Orleans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Mamaroneck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bridenbaugh v. O’Bannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brigano; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Briggs v. Boys and Girls Club of Charlottesville/Albemarle . . . . .
Briscoe v. International Business Machines Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Britz v. Cowan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Broades v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Broad Lane, Inc.; Richardson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Broadway v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brocamonte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1009,1095
1020
1031,1125
1121
1009
1015
1025
1056
1095
1026
1065
1039
1061
1084
1125
1040
1114
1114
1114
1094
1003
1134
1039
1005
1006
1059
1133
1056
1135
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, listing case names and corresponding page numbers. It is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

century  ago,  so  too  does  Massachusetts’  well-founded
desire to preserve its sovereign territory today.  Cf. Alden
v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999) (observing that in the
federal system, the States “are not relegated to the role of
mere  provinces  or  political  corporations,  but  retain  the
dignity,  though  not  the  full  authority,  of  sovereignty”).
That  Massachusetts  does  in  fact  own  a  great  deal  of  the
“territory  alleged  to  be  affected”  only  reinforces  the  con-
clusion  that  its  stake  in  the  outcome  of  this  case  is  suffi-
ciently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial
power.

When  a  State  enters  the  Union,  it  surrenders  certain
sovereign  prerogatives.    Massachusetts  cannot  invade
Rhode  Island  to  force  reductions  in  greenhouse  gas  emis-
sions,  it  cannot  negotiate  an  emissions  treaty  with  China
or  India,  and  in  some  circumstances  the  exercise  of  its
police  powers  to  reduce  in-state  motor-vehicle  emissions
might  well  be  pre-empted.    See  Alfred  L.  Snapp  &  Son,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592, 607 (1982)
(“One  helpful  indication  in  determining  whether  an  al-
leged  injury  to  the  health  and  welfare  of  its  citizens  suf-
fices  to  give  the  State  standing  to  sue  parens  patriae  is
whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would
likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking
powers”).

These  sovereign  prerogatives  are  now  lodged  in  the
Federal  Government,  and  Congress  has  ordered  EPA  to
protect Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing stan-
dards applicable to the “emission of any air pollutant from
any class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which in
[the Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public  health  or  welfare.”    42  U. S. C.  §7521(a)(1).    Con-
gress  has  moreover  recognized  a  concomitant  procedural
right  to  challenge  the  rejection  of  its  rulemaking  petition
as  arbitrary  and  capricious.    §7607(b)(1).  Given  that  pro-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text discussing the standing of Massachusetts to sue the EPA. It is sequential text and contains relevant information about the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Opinion of the Court

have  his  right  to  the  free  exercise  of  religion  limited  by
generally  applicable  laws.    Still,  the  delicate  question  of
when  the  free  exercise  of  his  religion  must  yield  to  an
otherwise  valid  exercise  of  state  power  needed  to  be  de-
termined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on
the  part  of  the  State  itself  would  not  be  a  factor  in  the
balance  the  State  sought  to  reach.    That  requirement,
however,  was  not  met  here.  When  the  Colorado  Civil
Rights  Commission  considered  this  case,  it  did  not  do
so  with  the  religious  neutrality  that  the  Constitution
requires.

Given  all  these  considerations,  it  is  proper  to  hold  that
whatever  the  outcome  of  some  future  controversy  involv-
ing  facts  similar  to  these,  the  Commission’s  actions  here
violated  the  Free  Exercise  Clause;  and  its  order  must  be
set aside.

I

A

Masterpiece  Cakeshop,  Ltd.,  is  a  bakery  in  Lakewood,
Colorado, a suburb of Denver.  The shop offers a variety of
baked goods, ranging from everyday cookies and brownies
to  elaborate  custom-designed  cakes  for  birthday  parties,
weddings, and other events.

Jack  Phillips  is  an  expert  baker  who  has  owned  and
operated the shop for 24 years.  Phillips is a devout Chris-
tian.  He has explained that his “main goal in life is to be
obedient  to”  Jesus  Christ  and  Christ’s  “teachings  in  all
aspects of his life.”  App. 148.  And he seeks to “honor God
through his work at Masterpiece Cakeshop.”  Ibid.  One of
Phillips’  religious  beliefs  is  that  “God’s  intention  for  mar-
riage from the beginning of history is that it is and should
be the union of one man and one woman.”  Id., at 149.  To
Phillips,  creating  a  wedding  cake  for  a  same-sex  wedding
would  be  equivalent  to  participating  in  a  celebration  that
is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in a case. It discusses religious freedom and the application of state laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1056

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 3, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–7205. Medina v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181 F. 3d 1078.

No. 99–7398. Cervantes-Perez v. United States. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 515.

No. 99–7406. Williams v. City of Atlanta. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 486.

No. 99–7545. Hinton, aka Baldwin v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 461.

No. 99–7620. Kaluna v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 1188.

No. 99–7825. Solis Sosa v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 240.

No. 99–7962. Patel v. PMA Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 3d

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 904.

No. 99–7963. Oates v. Englund et al. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1321.

No. 99–7969. Pfeil v. Everett, Warden. Sup. Ct. Wyo.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7972. Schroder v. Bienvenu et al. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 478.

No. 99–7973. Samuels v. Henry, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7974. Wordlaw v. Bowles, Sheriff, Dallas
County, Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 205 F. 3d 1337.

No. 99–7982. Taylor v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–7983. Broadway v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 753 So. 2d 801.

No. 99–7986. Chae Ho Lee v. Ramirez-Palmer, Warden,

et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be a typical part of a book's content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

11

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

dence of every kind.  Congress placed §1519 (and its com-
panion provision §1520) at  the end of the  chapter, follow-
ing  immediately  after  the  pre-existing  §1516,  §1517,  and
§1518, each of them prohibiting obstructive acts in specific
contexts.  See §1516 (audits of recipients of federal funds);
§1517  (federal  examinations  of  financial  institutions);
§1518  (criminal  investigations  of  federal  health  care  of-
fenses).  See also S. Rep. No. 107–146, at 7 (observing that
§1517  and  §1518  “apply  to  obstruction  in  certain  limited
types of cases, such as bankruptcy fraud, examinations of
financial institutions, and healthcare fraud”).

But Congress did not direct codification of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act’s other additions to Chapter 73 adjacent to these
specialized  provisions.  Instead,  Congress  directed  place-
ment  of  those  additions  within  or  alongside  retained  pro-
visions  that  address  obstructive  acts  relating  broadly  to
official proceedings and criminal trials:  Section 806, “Civil
Action  to  protect  against  retaliation  in  fraud  cases,”  was
codified  as  §1514A  and  inserted  between  the  pre-existing
§1514,  which  addresses  civil  actions  to  restrain  harass-
ment  of  victims  and  witnesses  in  criminal  cases,  and
§1515,  which  defines  terms  used  in  §1512  and  §1513.
Section  1102,  “Tampering  with  a  record  or  otherwise
impeding  an  official  proceeding,”  was  codified  as  §1512(c)
and  inserted  within  the  pre-existing  §1512,  which  ad-
dresses tampering with a victim, witness, or informant to
impede any official proceeding.  Section 1107, “Retaliation
against informants,” was codified as §1513(e) and inserted
within the pre-existing §1513, which addresses retaliation
against  a  victim,  witness,  or  informant  in  any  official
proceeding.  Congress  thus  ranked  §1519,  not  among  the
broad  proscriptions,  but  together  with  specialized  provi-
sions  expressly  aimed  at  corporate  fraud  and  financial
audits.  This  placement  accords  with  the  view  that  Con-
gress’  conception  of  §1519’s  coverage  was  considerably
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text, specifically from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the placement and intent of a specific section of law (§1519) within a larger legal framework.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

accords with the definition here, which regulates a person’s
“use” of a computer after entering it.  §1030(e)(6).  Here, as
in other contexts of property law, a person’s authority to use
his access to property is circumstance dependent.  The ma-
jority’s focus on the term “access”—at the expense of “au-
thority” and “entitled”—harms, not helps, its argument.

II
What the text and established concepts of property law
make clear, statutory history reinforces. The original text
of this Act expressly prohibited accessing a computer with
authorization and then “us[ing] the opportunity such access
provides for purposes to which such authorization does not
extend.”  98 Stat. 2191.  The Act thus applied when persons
used computers for improper reasons—just like Van Buren
indisputably did here.

The  majority  does  not  deny  this.  Instead,  it  notes  that
Congress amended the text in 1986 to its present definition,
and it says that the Court can presume that Congress’ de-
cision  to  omit  the  term  “purpose”  necessarily  eliminated
any  prohibition  against  obtaining  information  for  an  im-
proper purpose.  Ante, at 17.

But  the  majority  cannot  so  easily  evade  this  history.
True,  the  statute  previously  included  the  term  “purpose”
and  now  does  not,  but  the  majority  fails  to  consider  how
that change affected the statute.  Often, deleting a word ex-
pands, rather than constricts, the scope of a provision.  If a
city changes a sign in a park from “no unleashed dogs” to
“no dogs,” nobody would presume that unleashed dogs are
now allowed.  The same is true when the specific is replaced
by the general (“no dogs” to “no pets”).

Congress’ change to this statute similarly broadened the
law.  The original text prohibited accessing a computer with
authorization  then  “us[ing]  the  opportunity  such  access
provides for purposes to which such authorization does not
extend.”  The term “purpose” limited that clause to purpose-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Van Buren v. United States. It delves into the interpretation of a specific law and its amendments, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

991

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

No.  09–215.  Raspanti  v.  Office  of  Disciplinary  Counsel.
Sup.  Ct.  La.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  8  So.  3d  526.
No.  09–218.  McCrory  v.  Can  Do,  Inc.,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  La.,

3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  3  So.  3d  91.

No.  09–228.  Martinez  et  ux.  v.  Masseri  et  al.  Ct.  App.

N.  M.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–230.  Amorrortu  v.  Republic  of  Peru.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  400.

No. 09–236.  Ventimiglia v.  St. Louis, Church of God, Inc.,
dba  Twin  Rivers  Worship  Center,  et  al.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–237.  Rodriguez  v.  United  States  Court  of  Ap
peals  for  the  District  of  Columbia  Circuit.  C.  A.  D.  C.
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–246.  Bridgeport  Roman  Catholic  Diocesan  Corp.
et  al.  v.  New  York  Times  Co.  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Conn.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  292  Conn.  1,  970  A.  2d  656.

No.  09–248.  Mohawk  Industries,  Inc.  v.  Williams  et  al.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d
1350.

No.  09–251.  Saffran  v.  Novastar  Mortgage,  Inc.  C.  A.

1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–254.  American Insurance Co. et al. v.  AstenJohn
son,  Inc.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
562  F.  3d  213.

No.  09–258.  Arnold  v.  KPMG  LLP  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  349.

No.  09–260.  Wayne-Dalton  Corp.  v.  Amarr  Co.  C.  A.  Fed.

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  906.

No.  09–262.  USI  MidAtlantic,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  William  A.
Graham Co., dba Graham Co.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certiorari denied.
Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  425.

No.  09–267.  Bazargani  v.  Snyder  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  351.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is more of a legal docket than readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

BARRETT, J., dissenting

challenging  the  plan  itself,  not  the  denial  of  reconsidera-
tion.  So the procedural bar on objections not raised in the
comments presents a significant obstacle—in two ways.
  First, consider the Court’s basic theory: that EPA offered
“no reasoned response” to comments allegedly questioning
whether  the  plan’s  emissions  limits  depend  on  the  States
covered.  Ante, at 12.  That EPA failed to adequately explain
its final rule in response to comments is “an objection to the
notice and comment process itself,” which applicants “obvi-
ously did not and could not have raised . . . during the pe-
riod  for  public  comment.”    EME  Homer  City  Generation,
L. P. v. EPA, 795 F. 3d 118, 137 (CADC 2015) (Kavanaugh,
J.).    No  one  could  have  raised  during  the  proposal’s  com-
ment period the objection that the “final rule was not ‘rea-
sonably explained.’ ”  Ante, at 13 (emphasis added).
  The D. C. Circuit, on remand in EME Homer, considered
a  similar  objection  that  EPA  had  “violated  the  Clean  Air
Act’s notice and comment requirements”: EPA had “signifi-
cantly amend[ed] the Rule between the proposed and final
versions  without  providing  additional  opportunity  for  no-
tice and comment.”  795 F. 3d, at 137.  But because this pro-
cedural  objection  could  not  have  been  raised  during  the
comment period, “the only appropriate path for petitioners”
under §7607(d)(7)(B) was to raise it “through an initial pe-
tition for reconsideration to EPA.”  Ibid.  So the D. C. Cir-
cuit lacked “authority at th[at] time to reach this question.”
Ibid.    While  such  “logical  outgrowth”  challenges  typically
are cognizable under the Administrative Procedure Act, see
Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F. 2d 741, 747 (CADC 1991), the
Clean Air Act channels these challenges through reconsid-
eration proceedings.  This Court’s failure-to-explain objec-
tion may face the same problem: It is not judicially review-
able in its current posture.1

——————

1 The  Court  offers  a

feeble  response  to  this  application  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments regarding the EPA's plan and the procedural limitations on judicial review.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Opinion of the Court

Indian survival are significantly reduced if our children, the
only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage,
are to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure
to the ways of their People.”  Hearings on S. 1214 before the
Subcommittee  on  Indian  Affairs  and  Public  Lands  of  the
House  Committee  on  Interior  and  Insular  Affairs,  95th
Cong., 2d Sess., 193 (1978).

The Act thus aims to keep Indian children connected to
Indian families.  “Indian child” is defined broadly to include
not only a child who is “a member of an Indian tribe,” but
also one who is “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”
§1903(4).  If the Indian child lives on a reservation, ICWA
grants the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction over all child
custody  proceedings,  including  adoptions  and  foster  care
proceedings.  §1911(a).  For other Indian children, state and
tribal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction, although the
state  court  is  sometimes  required  to  transfer  the  case  to
tribal court.  §1911(b).  When a state court adjudicates the
proceeding, ICWA governs from start to finish.  That is true
regardless of whether the proceeding is “involuntary” (one
to which the parents do not consent) or “voluntary” (one to
which they do).

Involuntary  proceedings  are  subject  to  especially  strin-
gent safeguards.  See 25 CFR §23.104 (2022); 81 Fed. Reg.
38832–38836 (2016).  Any party who initiates an “involun-
tary proceeding” in state court to place an Indian child in
foster  care  or  terminate  parental  rights  must  “notify  the
parent  or  Indian  custodian  and  the  Indian  child’s  tribe.”
§1912(a).  The parent or custodian and tribe have the right
to intervene in the proceedings; the right to request extra
time to prepare for the proceedings; the right to “examine
all reports or other documents filed with the court”; and, for
indigent parents or custodians, the right to court-appointed
counsel.  §§1912(a), (b), (c).  The party attempting to termi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and its provisions regarding child custody proceedings involving Native American children.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

foreign  state  for  purposes  of  the  FSIA.    Brief  for  United
States 28; see also 16 F. 4th, at 342, n. 8.)

Since  the  FSIA’s  enactment,  this  Court  has  repeatedly
stated that the statute applies in “civil” actions.  See, e.g.,
Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, 596
U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 5); Republic of Argentina v.
NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U. S. 134, 141 (2014); Altmann, 541
U. S.,  at  691;  Verlinden,  461  U. S.,  at  488.    Although  the
Court has not expressly held that the FSIA covers only civil
matters,  the  Court  has  never  applied  the  Act’s  immunity
provisions in a criminal case.

We now hold that the FSIA does not grant immunity to
foreign  states  or  their  instrumentalities  in  criminal
proceedings.  Through  the  FSIA,  Congress  enacted  a
comprehensive  scheme  governing  claims  of  immunity  in
civil
their
instrumentalities.  That  scheme  does  not  cover  criminal
cases.

against

actions

foreign

states

and

1
To  begin  with,  the  text  of  the  FSIA  indicates  that  the
statute  exclusively  addresses  civil  suits  against  foreign
states  and  their  instrumentalities.    The  first  provision  of
the  FSIA  grants  district  courts  original  jurisdiction  over
“any nonjury civil action against a foreign state” as to “any
claim  for  relief  in  personam  with  respect  to  which  the
foreign  state  is  not  entitled  to  immunity.”    28  U. S. C.
§1330(a) (emphasis added); 90 Stat. 2891.

The  FSIA  then  sets  forth  a  carefully  calibrated  scheme
that relates only to civil cases.  For instance, the sole FSIA
venue  provision  exclusively  addresses  venue  in  a  “civil
action” against a foreign state.  §1391(f ).  The Act similarly
provides  for  removal  to  federal  court  of  a  “civil  action”
brought  in  state  court.  §1441(d).  The  Act  prescribes
detailed  rules—including  those  governing  service  of  “the
summons  and  complaint,”  §1608(a)(1),  along  with  “an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and its application to criminal proceedings. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

Opinion of the Court

Roman times.  See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Compe-
tition  §9,  Comment  b  (1993).  The  principle  underlying
trademark  protection  is  that  distinctive  marks—words,
names,  symbols,  and  the  like—can  help  distinguish  a
particular artisan’s goods from those of others.  Ibid.  One
who first uses a distinct mark in commerce thus acquires
rights to that mark.  See 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and
Unfair  Competition  §16:1  (4th  ed.  2014)  (hereinafter
McCarthy).  Those  rights  include  preventing  others  from
using the mark.  See 1 A. LaLonde, Gilson on Trademarks
§3.02[8] (2014) (hereinafter Gilson).

Though  federal  law  does  not  create  trademarks,  see,
e.g.,  Trade-Mark  Cases,  100  U. S.  82,  92  (1879),  Congress
has  long  played  a  role  in  protecting  them.    In  1946,  Con-
gress  enacted  the  Lanham  Act,  the  current  federal  trade-
mark  scheme.    As  relevant  here,  the  Lanham  Act  creates
at  least  two  adjudicative  mechanisms  to  help  protect
marks.  First,  a  trademark  owner  can  register  its  mark
with the PTO.  Second, a mark owner can bring a suit for
infringement in federal court.

Registration  is  significant.    The  Lanham  Act  confers
“important legal rights and benefits” on trademark owners
who register their marks.  3 McCarthy §19:3, at 19–21 see
also  id.,  §19:9,  at  19–34  (listing  seven  of  the  “procedural
and substantive legal advantages” of registration).  Regis-
tration,  for  instance,  serves  as  “constructive  notice  of  the
registrant’s  claim  of  ownership”  of  the  mark.    15  U. S. C.
§1072.  It  also  is  “prima  facie  evidence  of  the  validity  of
the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of
the  owner’s  ownership  of  the  mark,  and  of  the  owner’s
exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on
or in connection with the goods or services specified in the
certificate.”  §1057(b).  And  once  a  mark  has  been  regis-
tered for five years, it can become “incontestable.”  §§1065,
1115(b)

To obtain the benefits of registration, a mark owner files
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the legal principles of trademark protection and the Lanham Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Federalist No. 59, at 360 (emphasis deleted); see also U. S.
Term Limits, Inc., 514 U. S., at 863 (THOMAS, J., dissent-
ing) (Article I, §4, designed “to ensure that the States hold
congressional elections in the first place, so that Congress
continues  to  exist”);  id.,  at  863,  and  n.  10  (same,  citing
ratification  era  sources).    Reflecting  this  understanding
of the reasoning behind Article I, §4, many of the original
13 States proposed constitutional amendments that would
have strictly cabined the Times, Places and Manner Clause
to  situations  in  which  state  failure  to  hold  elections
threatened  the  continued  existence  of  Congress.    See  2
Elliot’s  Debates  177  (Massachusetts);  18  Documentary
History  71–72
(J.  Kaminski  &  G.  Saladino  eds.  1995)
(South  Carolina);  id.,  at  187–188  (New  Hampshire);  3
Elliot’s  Debates  661  (Virginia);  Ratification  of  the  Constitu-
tion  by  the  State  of  New  York  (July  26,  1788)  (New  York),
online  at  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratny.asp
(all Internet materials as visited June 6, 2013, and availa-
ble  in  Clerk  of  Court’s  case  file);  4  Elliot’s  Debates  249
(North  Carolina);  Ratification  of  the  Constitution  by  the
State  of  Rhode  Island  (May  29,  1790)  (Rhode  Island),  online
at  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratri.asp.
  Al-
though  these  amendments  were  never  enacted,  they  un-
derscore  how  narrowly  the  ratification  conventions  con-
strued Congress’ power under the Times, Places and Man-
ner  Clause.  In  contrast  to  a  state  refusal  to  hold  federal
elections  at  all,  a  state  decision  to  alter  the  qualifica-
tions  of  electors  for  state  legislature  (and  thereby  for
federal elections as well) does not threaten Congress’ very
existence.

C
Finding no support in the historical record, respondents
and  the  United  States  instead  chiefly  assert  that  this
Court’s  precedents  involving  the  Times,  Places  and  Man-
ner  Clause  give  Congress  authority  over  voter  qualifica-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites historical sources and legal precedents to argue against a particular interpretation of the Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
50

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

Appendix to opinion of THOMAS, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a heading from a legal document, likely part of a case citation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

5

Opinion of the Court

Kimball R. Anderson argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Charles P. Sheets, Bruce R.
Braun, and Brian E. Neuffer.*

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is one of jurisdiction. An associa-
tion of nursing homes sued, inter alios, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and another federal
party (hereinafter Secretary)
in Federal District Court
claiming that certain Medicare-related regulations violated
various statutes and the Constitution. The association in-
voked the court’s federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1331. The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground
that it lacked jurisdiction.
It believed that a set of special
statutory provisions creates a separate, virtually exclusive,
system of administrative and judicial review for denials of
Medicare claims; and it held that one of those provisions ex-
plicitly barred a § 1331 suit. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395ii (incor-
porating into the Medicare Act 42 U. S. C. § 405(h), which
provides that “[n]o action . . . to recover on any claim” arising
under the Medicare laws shall be “brought under section
1331 .
. of title 28”). The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed.

.

We conclude that the statutory provision at issue, § 405(h),
as incorporated by § 1395ii, bars federal-question jurisdiction
here. The association or its members must proceed instead
through the special review channel that the Medicare stat-
utes create. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395cc(h), (b)(2)(A), 1395ii;
§§ 405(b), (g), (h).

*Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the American
Association of Homes and Services for the Aging by Mark H. Gallant; for
the American Health Care Association et al. by Thomas C. Fox and Har-
vey M. Tettlebaum; for the American Hospital Association by Charles G.
Curtis, Jr., and Edward J. Green; and for the American Medical Associa-
tion et al. by Paul M. Smith, Robert M. Portman, Michael L. Ile, Leonard
A. Nelson, Richard N. Peterson, Ann E. Allen, Stuart M. Gerson, Saul J.
Morse, and Robert J. Kane.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

918

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 8, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–8572. Father v. Boeing Co. et al. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 125.

No. 97–8604. Tunnicliff v. Moriarty. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 125 F. 3d 842.

No. 97–8605. Adames v. Batista et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8606.
No. 97–8607.

Johnson v. Doe et al. (two judgments); and
Johnson v. Doe et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
No. 97–8606 (ﬁrst judgment) and No. 97–8607, 230 App. Div. 2d
513, 660 N. Y. S. 2d 916; No. 97–8606 (second judgment), 230 App.
Div. 2d 513, 660 N. Y. S. 2d 782.

No. 97–8616. Peterson v. Zimmerman, Chief Justice, Su-
preme Court of Utah, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 97–8619. Gilday v. DuBois, Commissioner, Massachu-
setts Department of Correction, et al. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F. 3d 277.

No. 97–8625. Anderson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 288 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 711
N. E. 2d 832.

No. 97–8631. Bennett v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 238
App. Div. 2d 898, 660 N. Y. S. 2d 772.

No. 97–8649. Merkobrad v. United States et al. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8655. Richardson v. Turtle Wax, Inc. C. A. 7th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 1268.

No. 97–8668. Pikitus v. Shenandoah Borough Council.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 149 F. 3d 1165.

No. 97– 8669.

J. C. v. Iowa. Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari

denied.

No. 97–8696. Rudd v. Hanley et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and information about the court's decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring

U. S., at 296–297; see also Cobell v. Norton, 240 F. 3d 1081,
1086  (CADC  2001);  Shoshone  Indian  Tribe  of  Wind  River
Reservation v. United States, 364 F. 3d 1339, 1348 (CA Fed.
2004).

In United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U. S. 162
(2011), the Court took steps to rectify this confusion.  There,
we explained that the Federal Government is “not a private
trustee” but a “sovereign,” id., at 173–174, and that “[t]he
Government assumes Indian trust responsibilities only to
the extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities by stat-
ute,” id., at 177.  Accordingly, any legal trusts established
or duties self-imposed by the Government for a tribe’s ben-
efit are “defined and governed by statutes rather than the
common law.”  Id., at 174; see also id., at 173 (emphasizing
that “ ‘[t]he general relationship between the United States
and the Indian tribes is not comparable to a private trust
relationship’ ”).  The Court’s opinion today represents a step
in the same direction, making clear that tribes’ legal claims
against  the  Government  must  be  based  on  specific  provi-
sions of positive law, not merely an amorphous “trust rela-
tionship.”

However, the Court has also invoked the “trust relation-
ship” to shape at least two other areas of its Indian-law ju-
risprudence—with questionable results.  For example, the
Court  has  identified  “the  unique  trust  relationship”  with
the Indians as the source of pro-Indian “canons of construc-
tion” that are supposedly “applicable [only] in Indian law.”
County  of  Oneida  v.  Oneida  Indian  Nation  of  N.  Y.,  470
U. S. 226, 247 (1985); see also EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous-
ing Auth., 260 F. 3d 1071, 1081 (CA9 2001) (refusing to ap-
ply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to
tribes in part because of those canons).  But it is far from
clear how such a trust relationship would support different
interpretive tools.  The first cases to apply those pro-Indian
canons did not ground them in any “trust relationship,” but
in  the  more  basic  idea  that  ambiguous  treaty  provisions
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and legal precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

Opinion of the Court

gregate.    Rather  than  suggesting  that  the  statutory  lan-
guage  bears  some  other  meaning,  the  employers  and  dis-
sents merely suggest that, because few in 1964 expected to-
day’s  result,  we  should  not  dare  to  admit  that  it  follows
ineluctably from the statutory text.  When a new applica-
tion emerges that is both unexpected and important, they
would seemingly have us merely point out the question, re-
fer the subject back to Congress, and decline to enforce the
plain terms of the law in the meantime.

That is exactly the sort of reasoning this Court has long
rejected.  Admittedly,  the  employers  take  pains  to  couch
their  argument  in  terms  of  seeking  to  honor  the  statute’s
“expected  applications”  rather  than  vindicate  its  “legisla-
tive intent.”  But the concepts are closely related.  One could
easily contend that legislators only intended expected ap-
plications or that a statute’s purpose is limited to achieving
applications  foreseen  at  the  time  of  enactment.    However
framed,  the  employer’s  logic  impermissibly  seeks  to  dis-
place  the  plain  meaning  of  the  law  in  favor  of  something
lying beyond it.

If  anything,  the  employers’  new  framing  may  only  add
new problems.  The employers assert that “no one” in 1964
or for some time after would have anticipated today’s result.
But is that  really true?  Not long after the law’s passage,
gay and transgender employees began filing Title VII com-
plaints, so at least some people foresaw this potential appli-
cation.  See,  e.g.,  Smith  v.  Liberty  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  395  F.
Supp.  1098,  1099  (ND  Ga.  1975)  (addressing  claim  from
1969); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F. 2d 659,
661  (CA9  1977)  (addressing  claim  from  1974).    And  less
than a decade after Title VII’s passage, during debates over
the  Equal  Rights  Amendment,  others  counseled  that  its
language—which  was  strikingly  similar  to  Title  VII’s—
might also protect homosexuals from discrimination.  See,
e.g., Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 Yale L.
J. 573, 583–584 (1973).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the application of the law to cases of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI

Syllabus

United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 382.  The litigation
process might also implicate the discussion and deliberations that led
to the formation of the particular policy, requiring courts to interfere
with sensitive Executive Branch functions.  See Clinton v. Jones, 520
U. S. 681, 701.

Other special factors counsel against extending Bivens to cover the
detention policy claims against any of the petitioners.  Because those
claims challenge major elements of the Government’s response to the
September  11  attacks,  they  necessarily  require  an  inquiry  into  na-
tional-security  issues.  National-security  policy,  however,  is  the  pre-
rogative  of  Congress  and  the  President,  and  courts  are  “reluctant  to
intrude  upon”  that  authority  absent  congressional  authorization.
Department  of  Navy  v.  Egan,  484  U. S.  518,  530.    Thus,  Congress’
failure to provide a damages remedy might be more than mere over-
sight, and its silence might be more than “inadvertent.”  Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412, 423.  That silence is also relevant and telling
here, where Congress has had nearly 16 years to extend “the kind of
remedies  [sought  by]  respondents,”  id.,  at  426,  but  has  not  done  so.
Respondents also may have had available “ ‘other alternative forms of
judicial relief,’ ” Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U. S. 118, 124, including in-
junctions and habeas petitions.

The  proper  balance  in  situations  like  this,  between  deterring  con-
stitutional violations and freeing high officials to make the lawful de-
cisions necessary to protect the Nation in times of great peril, is one
for the Congress to undertake, not the Judiciary.  The Second Circuit
thus erred in allowing respondents’ detention policy claims to proceed
under Bivens.  Pp. 17–23.

3. The  Second  Circuit  also  erred  in  allowing  the  prisoner  abuse
claim  against  Warden  Hasty  to  go  forward  without  conducting  the
required  special  factors  analysis.    Respondents’  prisoner  abuse  alle-
gations against Warden Hasty state a plausible ground to find a con-
stitutional violation should a Bivens remedy be implied.  But the first
question  is  whether  the  claim  arises  in  a  new  Bivens  context.  This
claim  has  significant  parallels  to  Carlson,  which  extended  Bivens  to
cover  a  failure  to  provide  medical  care  to  a  prisoner,  but  this  claim
nevertheless seeks to extend Carlson to a new context.  The constitu-
tional  right  is  different  here:  Carlson  was  predicated  on  the  Eighth
Amendment while this claim was predicated on the Fifth.  The judi-
cial guidance available to this warden with respect to his supervisory
duties was less developed.  There might have been alternative reme-
dies available.  And Congress did not provide a standalone damages
remedy  against  federal  jailers  when  it  enacted  the  Prison  Litigation
Reform  Act  some  15  years  after  Carlson.  Given  this  Court’s  ex-
pressed  caution  about  extending  the  Bivens  remedy,  this  context
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to Bivens actions and the detention policy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH

Opinion of the Court

abetted the Reina nightclub attack, with a strict nexus be-
tween  their  assistance  and  that  attack.  Neither  side  is
quite right.

To start, we find it unnecessary to parse whether the tex-
tual object of “aids and abets” is “the person” or the “act of
international terrorism.”  That syntactic dispute makes lit-
tle  difference  here,  because  aiding  and  abetting  is  inher-
ently a rule of secondary liability for specific wrongful acts.
See  Prosser  &  Keeton  323.  As  stated  above,  the  rule  im-
poses liability for a wrong on those who “hel[p] another to
complete its commission.”  Rosemond, 572 U. S., at 70 (em-
phasis  added).  Or,  as  Halberstam  put  it,  the  defendant
must aid and abet “a tortious act.”  705 F. 2d, at 484.

Nor would a contrary rule make sense for torts.  That is
because tort law imposes liability only when someone com-
mits an actual tort; merely agreeing to commit a tort or sug-
gesting  a  tortious  act  is  not,  without  more,  tortious.    See
Prosser  &  Keeton  324;  Halberstam,  705  F. 2d,  at  479.11
“Enterprises” or “conspiracies” alone are therefore not tor-
tious—the focus must remain on the tort itself.  The same
is true here: The ATA opens the courthouse doors only if the
plaintiff is “injured . . . by reason of an act of international
terrorism.”  §2333(a).  JASTA  further  restricts  secondary
liability by requiring that the “act of international terror-
ism”  be  “committed,  planned,  or  authorized  by”  a  foreign
terrorist organization designated as such “as of the date on
which  such  act  of  international  terrorism  was  committed,
planned, or authorized.”  §2333(d).  Thus, it is not enough,

——————

11 In  this respect,  tort  law  is different  from  criminal  law,  which does
punish mere agreements to commit crimes.  See, e.g., 2 LaFave §12.2(b),
at 372 (“At common law a conspiracy was punishable even though no act
was done beyond the mere making of the agreement”); see also 1 J. Ohlin,
Wharton’s Criminal Law §8.7, p. 242 (16th ed. 2021) (noting that statu-
tory requirements of an “overt act” generally do not require that the overt
act be criminal); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 785, n. 17 (1975)
(similar).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of aiding and abetting in the context of international terrorism.  It delves into the legal definitions and implications, referencing relevant case law and statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

this day, the United States has never denied that the Nav-
ajo may have water rights in the mainstream of the Colo-
rado River (and perhaps elsewhere) that it holds in trust for
the  Tribe.    Instead,  the  government’s  constant  refrain  is
that the Navajo can have all they ask for; they just need to
go somewhere else and do something else first.

The Navajo have tried it all.  They have written federal
officials.  They have moved this Court to clarify the United
States’ responsibilities when representing them.  They have
sought to intervene directly in water-related litigation.  And
when all of those efforts were rebuffed, they brought a claim
seeking  to  compel  the  United  States  to  make  good  on  its
treaty obligations by providing an accounting of what water
rights it holds on their behalf.  At each turn, they have re-
ceived  the  same  answer:  “Try  again.”    When  this  routine
first began in earnest, Elvis was still making his rounds on
The Ed Sullivan Show.

If there is any silver lining here it may be this.  While the
Court finds the present complaint lacking because it under-
stands it as seeking “affirmative steps,” the Court does not
pass  on  other  potential  pleadings  the  Tribe  might  offer,
such as those alleging direct interference with their water
rights.  Importantly, too, the Court recognizes that the Nav-
ajo “may be able to assert the interests they claim in water
rights litigation, including by seeking to intervene in cases
that affect their claimed interests.”  Ante, at 12.  After to-
day,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  this  Court  (or  any  court)  could
ever again fairly deny a request from the Navajo to inter-
vene  in  litigation  over  the  Colorado  River  or  other  water
sources to which they might have a claim.  Principles of es-
toppel, if nothing else, may have something to say about the
United States’ ability to oppose requests like that moving
forward.  Cf. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 11, 73–
74, n. 97 (1969).  All of which leaves the Navajo in a familiar
spot.  As they did at Bosque Redondo, they must again fight
for themselves to secure their homeland and all that must
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Navajo Nation's water rights and the government's response to their claims. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

13

Opinion of the Court

We conclude that a change in law justifies an exception
to  preclusion  in  this  case.  There  is  no  question  that  the
Tenth  Circuit  in  Repsis  relied  on  this  Court’s  binding
decision  in  Race  Horse  to  conclude  that  the  1868  Treaty
right terminated upon Wyoming’s statehood.  See 73 F. 3d,
at  994.  When  the  Tenth  Circuit  reached  its  decision  in
Repsis, it had no authority to disregard this Court’s hold-
ing  in  Race  Horse  and  no  ability  to  predict  the  analysis
this  Court  would  adopt  in  Mille  Lacs.  Mille  Lacs  repudi-
ated Race  Horse’s reasoning.  Although we recognize that
it  may  be  difficult  at  the  margins  to  discern  whether  a
particular  legal  shift  warrants  an  exception  to  issue  pre-
clusion,  this  is  not  a  marginal  case.  At  a  minimum,  a
repudiated  decision  does  not  retain  preclusive  force.  See
Limbach, 466 U. S., at 363.3

C
We  now  consider  whether,  applying  Mille  Lacs,  Wyo-
ming’s admission to the Union abrogated the Crow Tribe’s
off-reservation treaty hunting right.  It did not.

First,  the  Wyoming  Statehood  Act  does  not  show  that
Congress  intended  to  end  the  1868  Treaty  hunting  right.
If Congress seeks to abrogate treaty rights, “it must clearly
——————

Tulsa, 198 F. 3d 1219, 1222–1223 (CA10 2000); Mendelovitz v. Adolph
Coors Co., 693 F. 2d 570, 579 (CA5 1982).

3 We do not address whether a different outcome would be justified if
the  State  had  identified  “compelling  concerns  of  repose  or  reliance.”
See  18  C.  Wright,  A.  Miller,  &  E.  Cooper,  Federal  Practice  and  Proce-
dure §4425, p. 726 (3d ed. 2016).  Wyoming here has not done so.  The
State  suggests  that  public  support  for  its  conservation  efforts  may  be
jeopardized  if  it  no  longer  has  “unquestioned”  authority  over  wildlife
management  in  the  Bighorn  Mountains.    Brief  for  Respondent  54.
Wyoming  does  not  explain  why  its  authority  to  regulate  Indians  exer-
cising  their  treaty  rights  when  necessary  for  conservation  is  not  suffi-
cient  to  preserve  that  public  support,  see  infra,  at  22.    The  State’s
passing  reference  to  upsetting  the  settled  expectations  of  private
property owners is unconvincing because the 1868 Treaty right applies
only to “unoccupied lands of the United States.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the preclusive effect of a previous court decision and its relation to treaty rights.  The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>