<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–806
_________________

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
COUNTY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IVANKA TALEVSKI,
AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF GORGI TALEVSKI, DECEASED

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 8, 2023]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
I  agree  with  JUSTICE  ALITO  that  the  Federal  Nursing
Home  Reform  Act  (FNHRA)  cannot  be  enforced  through
Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, under Gonzaga Univ. v.
Doe, 536 U. S. 273 (2002).  I write separately to highlight
another and more fundamental reason why FNHRA cannot
be enforced under §1983.  Section 1983 provides a cause of
action to redress only “the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
But  legislation  enacted  pursuant  to  Congress’  spending
power, like FNHRA, does not “secure” rights by “law.”

For nearly all of our Nation’s history, it was understood
that there is a fundamental difference between the exercise
of Congress’ sovereign legislative powers, on the one hand,
and the exercise of its power to spend money and to attach
conditions to the receipt of that money, on the other.  Only
the former sort of legislation, which imposes obligations on
regulated parties with the force of law, directly secures by
law the rights corresponding to those obligations.  By con-
trast, an exercise of Congress’ spending power, whether it
comes from the so-called Spending Clause or elsewhere in
the Constitution, is no more than a disposition of funds.  As
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of a specific law (FNHRA). This type of content is highly suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal argument and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

GOLAN v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

tions  available  to  certain  users  to  mitigate  the  CTEA’s
impact).

B
Petitioners  attempt  to  distinguish  their  challenge  from
the  one  turned  away  in  Eldred.  First  Amendment  inter-
ests  of  a  higher  order  are  at  stake  here,  petitioners  say,
because  they—unlike  their  counterparts  in  Eldred—
enjoyed “vested rights” in works that had already entered
the  public  domain.    The  limited  rights  they  retain  under
copyright law’s “built-in safeguards” are, in their view, no
substitute for the unlimited use they enjoyed before §514’s
enactment.  Nor,  petitioners  urge,  does  §514’s  “unprece-
dented” foray into the public domain possess the historical
pedigree  that  supported  the  term  extension  at  issue  in
Eldred.  Brief for Petitioners 42–43.

However  spun,  these  contentions  depend  on  an  argu-
ment  we  considered  and  rejected  above,  namely,  that  the
Constitution  renders  the  public  domain  largely  untouch-
able  by  Congress.  Petitioners  here  attempt  to  achieve
under the banner of the First Amendment what they could
not win under the Copyright Clause: On their view of the
Copyright Clause, the public domain is inviolable; as they
read  the  First  Amendment,  the  public  domain  is  policed
through  heightened  judicial  scrutiny  of  Congress’  means
and ends.  As we have already shown, see supra, at 13–19,
the text of the Copyright Clause and the historical record
scarcely  establish  that  “once  a  work  enters  the  public
domain,”  Congress  cannot  permit  anyone—“not  even  the
creator—[to]  copyright  it,”  501  F. 3d,  at  1184.    And  noth-
ing  in  the  historical  record,  congressional  practice,  or  our
own jurisprudence warrants exceptional First Amendment
solicitude  for  copyrighted  works  that  were  once  in  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case Golan v. Holder. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS

JACKSON, J., dissenting

some obligation on the drivers to strike in the middle of the
night or before the next day’s jobs had started.  To the con-
trary,  it  was  entirely  lawful  for  the  drivers  to  start  their
workday per usual, and for the Union to time the strike to
put “maximum pressure on the employer at minimum eco-
nomic  cost  to  the  union.”  NLRB  v.  Insurance  Agents,  361
U. S. 477, 496 (1960); see also Lumbee Farms Co-op., 285
N. L. R. B., at 506.

Nor was the onus of protecting Glacier’s economic inter-
ests if a strike was called in the middle of the day on the
drivers—it was, instead, on Glacier, which could have taken
any number of prophylactic, mitigating measures.10  What
Glacier seeks to do here is to shift the duty of protecting an
employer’s property from damage or loss incident to a strike
onto the striking workers, beyond what the Board has al-
ready  permitted  via  the  reasonable-precautions  principle.
In my view, doing that places a significant burden on the
employees’ exercise of their statutory right to strike, unjus-
tifiably  undermining  Congress’s  intent.  Workers  are  not
indentured servants, bound to continue laboring until any
planned work stoppage would be as painless as possible for
their  master.  They  are  employees  whose  collective  and
peaceful decision to withhold their labor is protected by the
NLRA even if economic injury results.

*

*
Today,  the  majority  fails,  in  multiple  respects,  to  heed
Congress’s intent with respect to the Board’s primary role
in adjudicating labor disputes, despite ostensibly applying
——————

*

10 For example, Glacier could have instituted a lockout, see American
Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S. 300, 310 (1965), used nonstriking
employees to deliver the batched concrete, or had temporary replacement
drivers lined up and ready to go.  Glacier was on notice that a strike was
possible because the Union was statutorily required to give 60-days ad-
vance notice of the proposed termination or modification of the collective-
bargaining  agreement,  §158(d),  and  because  negotiations  had  broken
down.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge. It discusses labor law and the rights of striking workers. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the core content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

Byrd  v.  United  States,  584  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2018)  (slip
op., at 7–9) (“general property-based concept[s] guid[e] the
resolution  of  this  case”).  So  there  may  be  some  occasions
where Katz is capable of principled application—though it
may  simply  wind  up  approximating  the  more  traditional
option I will discuss in a moment.  Sometimes it may also
be  possible  to  apply  Katz  by  analogizing  from  precedent
when  the  line  between  an  existing  case  and  a  new  fact
pattern  is  short  and  direct.  But  so  far  this  Court  has
declined  to  tie  itself  to  any  significant  restraints  like
these.  See  ante,  at  5,  n. 1  (“[W]hile  property  rights  are
often  informative,  our  cases  by  no  means  suggest  that
such  an  interest  is  ‘fundamental’  or  ‘dispositive’  in  deter-
mining which expectations of privacy are legitimate”).

As  a  result,  Katz  has  yielded  an  often  unpredictable—
and  sometimes  unbelievable—jurisprudence.  Smith  and
Miller  are  only  two  examples;  there  are  many  others.
Take  Florida  v.  Riley,  488  U. S.  445  (1989),  which  says
that a police helicopter hovering 400 feet above a person’s
property  invades  no  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy.
Try  that  one  out  on  your  neighbors.    Or  California  v.
Greenwood, 486 U. S. 35 (1988), which holds that a person
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage he
puts  out  for  collection.    In  that  case,  the  Court  said  that
the  homeowners  forfeited  their  privacy  interests  because
“[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on
or  at  the  side  of  a  public  street  are  readily  accessible  to
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members
of  the  public.”    Id.,  at  40  (footnotes  omitted).  But  the
habits of raccoons don’t prove much about the habits of the
country.  I doubt, too, that most people spotting a neighbor
rummaging  through  their  garbage  would  think  they
lacked  reasonable  grounds  to  confront  the  rummager.
Making the decision all the stranger, California state law
expressly  protected  a  homeowner’s  property  rights  in
discarded trash.  Id., at 43.  Yet rather than defer to that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the precedent set by Katz v. United States, citing other cases as examples of unpredictable and sometimes unbelievable applications of the Katz test.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

591

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

The phrase “taking into consideration general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public” is what my grammar-school teacher would
have condemned as a dangling modiﬁer: There is no noun
to which the participle is attached (unless one jumps out of
paragraph (1) to press “Chairperson” into service). Even so,
it is clear enough that the phrase is meant to apply to those
who do the judging. The application reviewers must take
into account “general standards of decency” and “respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” when
evaluating artistic excellence and merit. One can regard
this as either suggesting that decency and respect are ele-
ments of what Congress regards as artistic excellence and
merit, or as suggesting that decency and respect are factors
to be taken into account in addition to artistic excellence
and merit. But either way, it is entirely, 100% clear that
decency and respect are to be taken into account in evaluat-
ing applications.

This is so apparent that I am at a loss to understand what
the Court has in mind (other than the gutting of the statute)
when it speculates that the statute is merely “advisory.”
Ante, at 581. General standards of decency and respect for
Americans’ beliefs and values must (for the statute says that
the Chairperson “shall ensure” this result) be taken into ac-
count, see, e. g., American Heritage Dictionary 402 (3d ed.
1992) (“consider . . . [t]o take into account; bear in mind”), in
evaluating all applications. This does not mean that those
factors must always be dispositive, but it does mean that
they must always be considered. The method of compliance
proposed by the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)—
selecting diverse review panels of artists and nonartists that
reﬂect a wide range of geographic and cultural perspec-
tives—is so obviously inadequate that it insults the intelli-
gence. A diverse panel membership increases the odds that,
if and when the panel takes the factors into account, it will
reach an accurate assessment of what they demand. But it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia in the case 524 U.S. 569 (1998). It discusses the interpretation of a statute related to the National Endowment for the Arts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 598 (2000)

633

Souter, J., dissenting

41 (citing Biden, Domestic Violence: A Crime, Not a
Quarrel, Trial 56 (June 1993)).

The evidence as to rape was similarly extensive, sup-

porting these conclusions:

“[The incidence of] rape rose four times as fast as
the total national crime rate over the past 10 years.”
S. Rep. No. 101–545, at 30 (citing Federal Bureau of
Investigation Uniform Crime Reports (1988)).

“According to one study, close to half a million girls
now in high school will be raped before they graduate.”
S. Rep. No. 101–545, at 31 (citing R. Warshaw, I Never
Called it Rape 117 (1988)).

“[One hundred twenty-ﬁve thousand] college women
can expect to be raped during this—or any—year.”
S. Rep. No. 101–545, at 43 (citing testimony of Dr. Mary
Koss before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Aug. 29,
1990).

“[T]hree-quarters of women never go to the mov-
ies alone after dark because of the fear of rape and
nearly 50 percent do not use public transit alone after
dark for the same reason.” S. Rep. No. 102–197, p. 38
(1991) (citing M. Gordon & S. Riger, The Female Fear
15 (1989)).

“[Forty-one] percent of judges surveyed believed that
juries give sexual assault victims less credibility than
other crime victims.” S. Rep. No. 102–197, at 47 (citing
Colorado Supreme Court Task Force on Gender Bias in
the Courts, Gender & Justice in the Colorado Courts
91 (1990)).

“Less than 1 percent of all [rape] victims have col-
lected damages.” S. Rep. No. 102–197, at 44 (citing
report by Jury Verdict Research, Inc.).

“ ‘[A]n individual who commits rape has only about
4 chances in 100 of being arrested, prosecuted, and found
guilty of any offense.’ ” S. Rep. No. 101–545, at 33, n. 30
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites statistics and reports related to rape and sexual assault.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

3

Per Curiam

tries” as to which EO–1 had suspended entry, stating that
these  conditions  “demonstrate  [that]  nationals  [of  those
countries]  continue  to  present  heightened  risks  to  the
security  of  the  United  States,”  §1(e),  and  that  “some  of
those  who  have  entered  the  United  States  through  our
immigration  system  have  proved  to  be  threats  to  our
national security,” §1(h).

Having identified these concerns, EO–2 sets out a series
of  directives  patterned  on  those  found  in  EO–1.    Several
are  relevant  here.  First,  EO–2  directs  the  Secretary  of
Homeland  Security  to  conduct  a  global  review  to  deter-
mine  whether  foreign  governments  provide  adequate
information  about  nationals  applying  for  United  States
visas.  §2(a).  EO–2  directs  the  Secretary  to  report  his
findings  to  the  President  within  20  days  of  the  order’s
“effective  date,”  after  which  time  those  nations  identified
as  deficient  will  be  given  50  days  to  alter  their  practices.
§§2(b), (d)–(e).

Second, EO–2 directs that entry of nationals from six of
the  seven  countries  designated  in  EO–1—Iran,  Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—be “suspended for 90
days  from  the  effective  date”  of  the  order.    §2(c).  EO–2
explains  that  this  pause  is  necessary  to  ensure  that  dan-
gerous  individuals  do  not  enter  the  United  States  while
the Executive is working to establish “adequate standards
. . .  to  prevent  infiltration  by  foreign  terrorists”;  in  addi-
tion, suspending entry will “temporarily reduce investiga-
tive  burdens  on  agencies”  during  the  Secretary’s  20-day
review.  Ibid.  A separate section provides for case-by-case
waivers of the entry bar.  §3(c).

Third,  EO–2  suspends  “decisions  on  applications  for
refugee  status”  and  “travel  of  refugees  into  the  United
States under the USRAP” for 120 days following its effec-
tive  date.  §6(a).    During  that  period,  the  Secretary  of
State  is  instructed  to  review  the  adequacy  of  USRAP
application  and  adjudication  procedures  and  implement
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, likely an excerpt from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal citations, mentions of executive orders, and discusses immigration policy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

KAGAN, J., dissenting

I
  Following the 2020 census, the plaintiffs here challenged
Alabama’s newly enacted redistricting plan under Section
2.  Alabama’s population is 27% Black, but under the plan,
Black voters have the power to elect their preferred candi-
date in only one of the State’s seven congressional districts.
That alone does not demonstrate vote dilution.  What raises
the  prospect  of  a  Section  2  claim  is  that  Alabama’s  Black
population  is  heavily  “concentrated”  in  the  urban  popula-
tion centers and an area of the State known as the Black
Belt, “named for the region’s fertile black soil,” where many
enslaved people were taken during the antebellum period.
App.  to  Application  in  No.  21A375,  pp. 36–37,  160–161
(App.).  Because “Black voters in Alabama are relatively ge-
ographically compact,” the plaintiffs argued that the State
could have drawn a second congressional district, meeting
traditional districting criteria, in which Black Alabamians
would constitute a majority.  Id., at 161.  But the State had
instead “pack[ed]” much of the Black population into a sin-
gle district, and “crack[ed]” the remainder over three oth-
ers.    Id.,  at  36–41.    That  action,  the  plaintiffs  contended,
diluted their voting power.
  The  Court’s  longstanding  precedent  imposes  strict  re-
quirements  for  proving  a  vote-dilution  claim.    To  start,
plaintiffs must satisfy three conditions, often referred to as
the Gingles conditions.   Those  conditions  are:  (1) that  the
“minority  group  is  sufficiently  large  and  geographically
compact to constitute a majority” in a district, (2) that the
minority  group  “is  politically  cohesive,”  and  (3)  that  the
“white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . .

——————
docket.  The question this stay application presents is what to do in the
interim.  Should we freeze the District Court’s decision and thereby ena-
ble Alabama to proceed with the violation of voting rights found by that
court?    Or  should  we  leave  the  District  Court’s  decision  in  place,  thus
allowing a remedy to the adjudicated violation of rights to go into effect?
For the reasons that follow, the latter course is the only appropriate one.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case concerning Alabama's redistricting plan. It discusses the legal arguments and precedents related to voting rights and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. ITALIAN COLORS
RESTAURANT
Opinion of the Court

A  pair  of  our  cases  brings  home  the  point.    In  Gilmer,
supra, we had no qualms in enforcing a class waiver in an
arbitration  agreement  even  though  the  federal  statute  at
issue,  the  Age  Discrimination  in  Employment  Act,  ex-
pressly permitted collective actions.  We said that statutory
permission  did  “ ‘not  mean  that  individual  attempts  at
conciliation were intended to be barred.’ ”  Id., at 32.  And
in  Vimar  Seguros  y  Reaseguros,  S.  A.  v.  M/V  Sky  Reefer,
515 U. S. 528 (1995), we held that requiring arbitration in
a  foreign  country  was  compatible  with  the  federal  Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act.  That legislation prohibited any
agreement  “ ‘relieving’ ”  or  “ ‘lessening’ ”  the  liability  of  a
carrier  for  damaged  goods,  id.,  at  530,  534  (quoting  46
U. S. C. App. §1303(8) (1988 ed.))—which is close to codifi-
cation  of  an  “effective  vindication”  exception.  The  Court
rejected the argument that the “inconvenience and costs of
proceeding”  abroad  “lessen[ed]”  the  defendants’  liability,
stating  that  “[i]t  would  be  unwieldy  and  unsupported  by
the terms or policy of the statute to require courts to pro-
ceed case by case to tally the costs and burdens to particu-
lar  plaintiffs  in  light  of  their  means,  the  size  of  their
claims, and the relative burden on the carrier.”  515 U. S.,
at 532, 536.  Such a “tally[ing] [of] the costs and burdens”
is  precisely  what  the  dissent  would  impose  upon  federal
courts here.

Truth  to  tell,  our  decision  in  AT&T  Mobility  all  but
resolves  this  case.  There  we  invalidated  a  law  condition-
ing  enforcement  of  arbitration  on  the  availability  of  class
procedure because that law “interfere[d] with fundamental

——————

(“the  only  economically  feasible  means  for  . . .  enforcing  [respondents’]

statutory  rights  is  via  a  class  action”),  the  class-action  waiver  was

unenforceable.    667  F.  3d,  at  218  (emphasis  added).    (The  dissent’s

assertion  to  the  contrary  cites  not  the  opinion  on  appeal  here,  but  an

earlier  opinion  that  was  vacated.    See  In re  American  Express  Mer-
chants’  Litigation,  554  F. 3d  300  (CA2  2009),  vacated  and  remanded,

559 U. S. 1103 (2010).)  That is the conclusion we reject.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court in the case AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. ITALIAN COLORS RESTAURANT.  It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxxvi

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
1065
1037
1099
1108
1099

Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.; Darby v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Innes; Kansas State Univ. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Installation Technicians, Inc.; Dunn v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intelpro Corp.; Environ Products, Inc. v.
Internal Revenue Service; Orr v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
International. For labor union, see name of trade.
International Business Machines Corp.; Briscoe v.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Intertanko v. Locke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
Investors Guaranty Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Stanley & Co.
Ioane v. B. A. Properties, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ioane v. Triplett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Iowa; Atwood v.
Iowa; Taylor v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Iredia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ironworkers v. Warshawsky & Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Irvin; Bryant v.
Irvin; Pruitt v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Isaacs v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Iwanski; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
J. A. Beaver; Rayonier Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson; Fields v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson v. Luebbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson; Thibeaux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson Road Co.; Harris v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jacksonville v. Lady J. Lingerie, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jacob; Hakim v.
Jaime v. McDaniel
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
James v. Hanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Janakakis; Janakakis-Kostun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jarvis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jarvis; Wayne v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Javier Cordoba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Javier Navarro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jay v. AT&T Corp.
Jeffcoat; Underwood v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jeffers v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jefferson; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1005
89
1062
1083
1006
1091
1021
1120
1003
1120
1133
1093
1144
1095
1003,1105
1090
1111
1007
1027,1132
1092
1076
1113
1117,1120,1123
1053
1053
1025
1118
1144
1096
1096
1017,1107
1115
1081
1094
1049
1025
1132
1089
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely found at the beginning of a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

tions for law-of-nations violations under the ATS.

The  plurality  dismisses  the  ATA  as  “an  inapt  analogy”

because  the  ATA  “provides  a  cause  of  action  only  to  ‘na
tional[s] of the United States,’ ” whereas the ATS “provides
a remedy for foreign nationals only.”  Ante, at 22 (quoting
18  U. S. C.  §2333(a)).  But  if  encompassing  different
groups of plaintiffs is what makes two statutes poor com
parators for each other, the TVPA, too, is an inapt analogy,
for  it  permits  suits  by  all  individuals,  U. S.  and  foreign
nationals alike.

The  plurality  also  posits  that  the  ATA  “suggests  that
there should be no common-law action under the ATS for
allegations  like  petitioners’,”  ante,  at  22,  because  permit
ting  such  suits  would  allow  foreign  plaintiffs  to  “bypass
Congress’ express limitations on liability under the [ATA]
simply by bringing an ATS lawsuit,” ibid.  Yet an ATS suit
alleging  terrorism-related  conduct  does  not  “bypass”  or
“displace”  any  “statutory  and  regulatory  structure,”  ibid.,
any  more  than  an  ATA  suit  does.    As  this  case  demon
strates,  U. S.  nationals  and  foreign  citizens  may  bring
ATA  and  ATS  suits  in  the  same  court,  at  the  same  time,
for the same underlying conduct.  To the extent the plural
ity  is  suggesting  that  Congress,  in  enacting  the  ATA,
meant to foreclose ATS suits based on terrorism financing,
the plurality offers no evidence to support that hypothesis,
and the legislative history suggests that Congress enacted
the  ATA  to  provide  U. S.  citizens  with  the  same  remedy
already  available  to  foreign  citizens  under  the  ATS.    See
Hearing  on  S.  2465  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Courts
and  Administrative  Practice  of  the  Senate  Committee  on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 90 (1990) (testimony
of Joseph A. Morris) (noting that ATS actions for terrorism
“would be preserved”).

At  bottom,  the  ATS  and  TVPA  are  related  but  distinct
statutes  that  coexist  independently.    There  is  no  basis  to
conclude  that  the  considered  judgment  Congress  made
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of statutes, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J.

But, if the holding is to the contrary, and more particularly
if  a  holding  that  administrative  law  judges  are  “inferior
Officers”  brings  with  it  application  of  Free  Enterprise
Fund’s limitation on “for cause” protections from removal,
then  a  determination  that  administrative  law  judges  are,
constitutionally speaking, “inferior Officers” would directly
conflict  with  Congress’  intent,  as  revealed  in  the  statute.
In that case, it would be clear to me that Congress did not
intend  that  consequence,  and  that  it  therefore  did  not
intend  to  make  administrative  law  judges  “inferior  Offi-
cers” at all.

B
Congress’  intent  on  the  question  matters,  in  my  view,
because  the  Appointments  Clause  is  properly  understood
to grant Congress a degree of leeway as to whether partic-
ular  Government  workers  are  officers  or  instead  mere
employees  not  subject  to  the  Appointments  Clause.    The
words  “by  Law”  appear  twice  in  the  Clause.    It  says  that
the  President  (“with  the  Advice  and  Consent  of  the  Sen-
ate”)  shall  appoint  “Ambassadors,  other  public  Ministers
and  Consuls,  Judges  of  the  supreme  Court,  and  all  other
Officers  of  the  United  States,  . . .  which  shall  be  estab-
lished by Law.”  Art. II, §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  It then
adds that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such  inferior  Officers,  as  they  think  proper,  in  the  Presi-
dent  alone,  in  the  Courts  of  Law,  or  in  the  Heads  of  De-
partments.”  Ibid. (emphasis added).

The  use  of  the  words  “by  Law”  to  describe  the  estab-
lishment  and  means  of  appointment  of  “Officers  of  the
United States,” together with the fact that Article I of the
Constitution  vests  the  legislative  power  in  Congress,
suggests  that  (other  than  the  officers  the  Constitution
specifically lists) Congress, not the Judicial Branch alone,
must play a major role in determining who is an “Office[r]
of the United States.”  And Congress’ intent in this specific
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the interpretation of the Appointments Clause. It delves into the constitutional debate surrounding the classification of administrative law judges. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of judicial opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

remaining compensation rules can pass muster under ordi-
nary rule of reason scrutiny.  Under the rule of reason, the
NCAA must supply a legally valid procompetitive justifica-
tion for its remaining compensation rules.  As I see it, how-
ever, the NCAA may lack such a justification.

The NCAA acknowledges that it controls the market for
college athletes.  The NCAA concedes that its compensation
rules set the price of student athlete labor at a below-mar-
ket rate.  And the NCAA recognizes that student athletes
currently have no meaningful ability to negotiate with the
NCAA over the compensation rules.

The  NCAA  nonetheless  asserts  that  its  compensation
rules are procompetitive because those rules help define the
product of college sports.  Specifically, the NCAA says that
colleges may decline to pay student athletes because the de-
fining feature of college sports, according to the NCAA, is
that the student athletes are not paid.

In my view, that argument is circular and unpersuasive.
The  NCAA  couches  its  arguments  for  not  paying  student
athletes in innocuous labels.  But the labels cannot disguise
the reality: The NCAA’s business model would be flatly il-
legal in almost any other industry in America.  All of the
restaurants in a region cannot come together to cut cooks’
wages on the theory that “customers prefer” to eat food from
low-paid cooks.  Law firms cannot conspire to cabin lawyers’
salaries in the name of providing legal services out of a “love
of the law.”  Hospitals cannot agree to cap nurses’ income
in order to create a “purer” form of helping the sick.  News
organizations cannot join forces to curtail pay to reporters
to  preserve  a  “tradition”  of  public-minded  journalism.
Movie  studios  cannot  collude  to  slash  benefits  to  camera
crews to kindle a “spirit of amateurism” in Hollywood.

Price-fixing  labor  is  price-fixing  labor.    And  price-fixing
labor is ordinarily a textbook antitrust problem because it
extinguishes the free market in which individuals can oth-
erwise  obtain  fair  compensation  for  their  work.  See,  e.g.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in a case involving the NCAA. It delves into antitrust arguments related to athlete compensation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

individuals,”  Baker,  369  U. S.,  at  206.    The  plaintiffs’  mistaken  in-
sistence  that  the  claims  in  Baker  and  Reynolds  were  “statewide  in
nature” rests on a failure to distinguish injury from remedy.  In those
malapportionment  cases,  the  only  way  to  vindicate  an  individual
plaintiff’s right to an equally weighted vote was through a wholesale
“restructuring of the geographical distribution of seats in a state leg-
islature.”    Reynolds,  377  U. S.,  at  561.    Here,  the  plaintiffs’  claims
turn on allegations that their votes have been diluted.  Because that
harm  arises  from  the  particular  composition  of  the  voter’s  own  dis-
trict, remedying the harm does not necessarily require restructuring
all  of  the  State’s  legislative  districts.    It  requires  revising  only  such
districts as are necessary to reshape the voter’s district.  This fits the
rule that a “remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that
produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.”  Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 357.

The  plaintiffs  argue  that  their  legal  injury  also  extends  to  the
statewide harm to their interest “in their collective representation in
the legislature,” and in influencing the legislature’s overall “composi-
tion  and  policymaking.”  Brief  for  Appellees  31.    To  date,  however,
the Court has not found that this presents an individual and personal
injury of the kind required for Article III standing.  A citizen’s inter-
est  in  the  overall  composition  of  the  legislature  is  embodied  in  his
right to vote for his representative.  The harm asserted by the plain-
tiffs in this case is best understood as arising from a burden on their
own votes.  Pp. 12–17.

(c) Four of the plaintiffs in this case pleaded such a particularized
burden.    But  as  their  case  progressed  to  trial,  they  failed  to  pursue
their  allegations  of  individual  harm.    They  instead  rested  their  case
on  their  theory  of  statewide  injury  to  Wisconsin  Democrats,  in  sup-
port  of  which  they  offered  three  kinds  of  evidence.  First,  they  pre-
sented  testimony  pointing  to  the  lead  plaintiff’s  hope  of  achieving  a
Democratic  majority  in  the  legislature.    Under  the  Court’s  cases  to
date, that is a collective political interest, not an individual legal in-
terest.  Second,  they  produced  evidence  regarding  the  mapmakers’
deliberations as they drew district lines.  The District Court relied on
this  evidence  in  concluding  that  those  mapmakers  sought  to  under-
stand  the  partisan  effect  of  the  maps  they  were  drawing.   But  the
plaintiffs’  establishment  of  injury  in  fact  turns  on  effect,  not  intent,
and requires a showing of a burden on the plaintiffs’ votes that is “ac-
tual  or  imminent,  not  ‘conjectural’  or  ‘hypothetical.’ ”  Defenders  of
Wildlife,  504  U. S.,  at  560.    Third,  the  plaintiffs  presented  partisan-
asymmetry  studies  showing  that  Act  43  had  skewed  Wisconsin’s
statewide map in favor of Republicans.  Those studies do not address
the effect that a gerrymander has on the votes of particular citizens.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It discusses the legal standing of plaintiffs in a case concerning gerrymandering. The language is formal and legalistic, focusing on precedents and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

39

JACKSON, J., dissenting

bar in §2255(h).

In other words, as I see it, the negative inference that the
majority draws today rests on nothing—and certainly noth-
ing that actually derives from Congress’s intent.  Nothing
in the text of §2255, background principles concerning ha-
beas relief, or AEDPA’s enactment history compels (or even
supports)  the  conclusion  that  Congress  intended  to  com-
pletely  foreclose  claims  like  Jones’s.    And  it  is  especially
perverse to read the statute to lead to that result when do-
ing so gives rise to legally dissonant, arbitrary, and unten-
able outcomes.  So, the majority’s “straightforward” deter-
mination  that  this  statute  does  preclude  a  prisoner  in
Jones’s position from filing a successive petition to assert a
legal innocence claim (which it reaches by refusing to follow
the procedural norm that would have correctly framed the
issue as a matter of congressional intent relative to clear-
statement principles) appears to stem from the Court’s own
views concerning finality, not the will of Congress.

Ultimately,  of  course,  this  all  begs  the  question  of  how
(and whether) Congress will respond to the Court’s system-
atic neutering of the balanced postconviction processes that
the Legislature has established.  It seems to me that today’s
opinion—which unjustifiably closes off all avenues for cer-
tain defendants to secure meaningful consideration of their
innocence claims—creates an opening for Congress to step
in and fix this problem.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal content of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

JACKSON, J., dissenting

cuse;  the  law  simply  does  not  apply  to  him.    Unlike  a  de-
fendant who invokes an affirmative defense and relies on a
legal  determination  that  there  was  a  good  reason  for  his
otherwise  unlawful  conduct,  a  former  President  invoking
immunity relies on the premise that he can do whatever he
wants, however he wants, so long as he uses his “ ‘official
power’ ” in doing so.  Ante, at 19.  In the former paradigm,
the  President  remains  subject  to  law;  in  the  latter,  he  is
above it.

III
 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR has already warned of the dire con-
sequences that are likely to follow from the majority’s deci-
sion in this case.  Ante, at 29–30 (dissenting opinion).  I have
thus far endeavored merely to explain what today’s ruling
amounts to on a theoretical level: the Court’s abandonment
of the individual accountability model as applied to Presi-
dents, and its introduction of a new Presidential accounta-
bility model that authorizes the Judiciary to exempt Presi-
dents from punishment under law, depending on the official
or unofficial character of the criminal conduct at issue.

Here, I will highlight just two observations about the re-
sults that follow from this paradigm shift.  First, by chang-
ing the accountability paradigm in this fashion, the Court
has unilaterally altered the balance of power between the
three coordinate branches of our Government as it relates
to the Rule of Law, aggrandizing power in the Judiciary and
the  Executive,  to  the  detriment  of  Congress.    Second,  the
majority’s  new  Presidential  accountability  model  under-
mines the constraints of the law as a deterrent for future
Presidents who might otherwise abuse their power, to the
detriment of us all.

Consider  the  structural  implications  of  today’s  decision
from the standpoint of the separation of powers.  Until now,

A
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. The language is formal and legalistic, discussing concepts like immunity, accountability, and the separation of powers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

321

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. BAJAKAJIAN

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit

No. 96–1487. Argued November 4, 1997—Decided June 22, 1998

After customs inspectors found respondent and his family preparing to
board an international ﬂight carrying $357,144, he was charged with,
inter alia, attempting to leave the United States without reporting, as
required by 31 U. S. C. § 5316(a)(1)(A), that he was transporting more
than $10,000 in currency. The Government also sought forfeiture of
the $357,144 under 18 U. S. C. § 982(a)(1), which provides that a person
convicted of willfully violating § 5316 shall forfeit “any property . . .
involved in such an offense.” Respondent pleaded guilty to the failure
to report and elected to have a bench trial on the forfeiture. The Dis-
trict Court found, among other things, that the entire $357,144 was sub-
ject to forfeiture because it was “involved in” the offense, that the funds
were not connected to any other crime, and that respondent was trans-
porting the money to repay a lawful debt. Concluding that full for-
feiture would be grossly disproportional to the offense in question
and would therefore violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, the court ordered forfeiture of $15,000, in addition to three
years’ probation and the maximum ﬁne of $5,000 under the Sentencing
Guidelines. The Ninth Circuit afﬁrmed, holding that a forfeiture must
fulﬁll two conditions to satisfy the Clause: The property forfeited must
be an “instrumentality” of the crime committed, and the property’s
value must be proportional to its owner’s culpability. The court deter-
mined that respondent’s currency was not an “instrumentality” of the
crime of failure to report, which involves the withholding of information
rather than the possession or transportation of money; that, therefore,
§ 982(a)(1) could never satisfy the Clause in a currency forfeiture case;
that it was unnecessary to apply the “proportionality” prong of the test;
and that the Clause did not permit forfeiture of any of the unreported
currency, but that the court lacked jurisdiction to set the $15,000 forfeit-
ure aside because respondent had not cross-appealed to challenge it.

Held: Full forfeiture of respondent’s $357,144 would violate the Excessive

Fines Clause. Pp. 327–344.

(a) The forfeiture at issue is a “ﬁne” within the meaning of the Clause,
which provides that “excessive ﬁnes [shall not be] imposed.” The
Clause limits the Government’s power to extract payments, whether in
cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense. Austin v. United
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case *United States v. Bajakajian*.  It outlines the background of the case, the legal issues involved, and the Court's holding. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a summary rather than the full content of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE

Opinion of the Court

account when districting.”  541 U. S., at 305.

The  District  Court  nevertheless  asserted  that  partisan
gerrymanders  violate  “the  core  principle  of  [our]  republi-
can government” preserved in Art. I, §2, “namely, that the
voters  should  choose  their  representatives,  not  the  other
way  around.”    318  F. Supp.  3d,  at  940  (quoting  Arizona
State  Legislature,  576  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op., at  35);  inter-
nal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).  That
seems  like  an  objection  more  properly  grounded  in  the
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, §4, which “guarantee[s] to
every  State  in  [the]  Union  a  Republican  Form  of  Govern-
ment.”  This Court has several times concluded, however,
that the Guarantee Clause does not provide the basis for a
justiciable  claim.  See,  e.g.,  Pacific  States  Telephone  &
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912).

V
Excessive  partisanship  in  districting  leads  to  results
that  reasonably  seem unjust.    But  the  fact  that  such  ger-
rymandering is “incompatible with democratic principles,”
Arizona State Legislature, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1),
does not mean that the solution lies with the federal judi-
ciary.    We  conclude  that  partisan  gerrymandering  claims
present political questions beyond the reach of the federal
courts.  Federal judges have no license to reallocate politi-
cal power between the two major political parties, with no
plausible  grant  of  authority  in  the  Constitution,  and  no
legal  standards  to  limit  and  direct  their  decisions.
“[J]udicial action must be governed by standard, by rule,”
and  must  be  “principled,  rational,  and  based  upon  rea-
soned  distinctions”  found  in  the  Constitution  or  laws.
Vieth,  541  U. S.,  at  278,  279  (plurality  opinion).    Judicial
review  of  partisan  gerrymandering  does  not  meet  those
basic requirements.

Today  the  dissent  essentially  embraces  the  argument
that  the  Court  unanimously  rejected  in  Gill:  “this  Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in the case of Rucho v. Common Cause. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding partisan gerrymandering and the judiciary's role in addressing it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

and fundamental morality.  And they stress that a signifi-
cant  percentage  of  Americans  with  pro-life  views  are
women.

When it comes to abortion, one interest must prevail over
the other at any given point in a pregnancy.  Many Ameri-
cans of good faith would prioritize the interests of the preg-
nant woman.  Many other Americans of good faith instead
would  prioritize  the  interests  in  protecting  fetal  life—at
least unless, for example, an abortion is necessary to save
the life of the mother.  Of course, many Americans are con-
flicted or have nuanced views that may vary depending on
the particular time in pregnancy, or the particular circum-
stances of a pregnancy.

The issue before this Court, however, is not the policy or
morality of  abortion.  The issue before this Court is  what
the  Constitution  says  about  abortion.  The  Constitution
does not take sides on the issue of abortion.  The text of the
Constitution does not refer to or encompass abortion.  To be
sure, this Court has held that the Constitution protects un-
enumerated rights that are deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.  But a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in Amer-
ican  history  and  tradition,  as  the  Court  today  thoroughly
explains.1

On the question of abortion, the Constitution is therefore
neither pro-life nor pro-choice.  The Constitution is neutral
and leaves the issue for the people and their elected repre-
sentatives to resolve through the democratic process in the

——————

1 The  Court’s  opinion  today  also  recounts  the  pre-constitutional
common-law  history  in  England.    That  English  history  supplies  back-
ground information on the issue of abortion.  As I see it, the dispositive
point  in  analyzing  American  history  and  tradition  for  purposes  of  the
Fourteenth Amendment inquiry is that abortion was largely prohibited
in most American States  as  of 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment
was  ratified,  and  that  abortion  remained  largely  prohibited  in  most
American States until Roe was decided in 1973.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Kavanaugh in the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. It discusses the constitutional basis for abortion rights and argues that the Constitution does not explicitly protect a right to abortion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  580 U. S. ____ (2016)

9

Opinion of the Court

remanded  for  further  proceedings  consistent  with  this
opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and the end of a court opinion. It is not the main body of text meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation/Court Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Syllabus

v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 485.

All this leads the Court to conclude that “[t]he basic and consequen-
tial tradeoffs” inherent in a mass debt cancellation program “are ones
that  Congress  would  likely  have  intended  for  itself.”    West  Virginia,
597 U. S., at ___.  In such circumstances, the Court has required the
Secretary to “point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ ” to justify the
challenged  program.  Id.,  at  ___,  ___  (quoting  Utility  Air  Regulatory
Group v.  EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324).  And as explained, the HEROES
Act provides no authorization for the Secretary’s plan when examined
using  the  ordinary  tools  of  statutory  interpretation—let  alone  “clear
congressional authorization” for such a program.  Pp. 19–25.

Reversed and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
ALITO,  GORSUCH,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined.  BARRETT,  J.,
filed a concurring opinion.  KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the court's decision and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U50

[09-26-01 10:29:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

488

SLACK v. McDANIEL

Opinion of the Court

as though it had not been ﬁled, subject to whatever condi-
tions the court attaches to the dismissal. Rose v. Lundy
dictated that, whatever particular claims the petition con-
tained, none could be considered by the federal court.

Slack’s 1991 petition was dismissed under the procedure
established in Rose v. Lundy. No claim made in Slack’s 1991
petition was adjudicated during the three months it was
pending in federal court. As such, the 1995 petition should
not have been dismissed on the grounds that it was second
or successive. Reasoning to the contrary found in the Court
of Appeals’ Farmer decision, rendered before Martinez-
Villareal, is incorrect. See also In re Turner, 101 F. 3d 1323
(CA9 1997) (refusing to apply rules governing second or suc-
cessive petitions to a petitioner whose prior habeas petition
had been dismissed for failure to exhaust). Our view that
established practice demonstrates that Slack’s 1995 petition
is not second or successive is conﬁrmed as well by opinions
of the Courts of Appeals which have addressed the point
under similar circumstances. E. g., Carlson v. Pitcher, 137
F. 3d 416, 420 (CA6 1998) (“We join with every other court
to consider the question, and hold that a habeas petition ﬁled
after a previous petition has been dismissed on exhaustion
grounds is not a ‘second or successive’ petition”); Turner,
supra; Christy v. Horn, 115 F. 3d 201, 208 (CA3 1997); Dick-
inson v. Maine, 101 F. 3d 791 (CA1 1996); Camarano v. Irvin,
98 F. 3d 44, 45–46 (CA2 1996).

The State complains that this rule is unfair. The ﬁling of
a mixed petition in federal court requires it to appear and
to plead failure to exhaust. The petition is then dismissed
without prejudice, allowing the prisoner to make a return
trip through the state courts to exhaust new claims. The
State expresses concern that, upon exhaustion, the prisoner
would return to federal court but again ﬁle a mixed petition,
causing the process to repeat itself.
In this manner, the
State contends, a vexatious litigant could inject undue delay
into the collateral review process. To the extent the tactic
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court's opinion in the case Slack v. McDaniel. It contains legal arguments, citations to other cases, and discussion of procedural rules.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1573
_________________

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v.
ANGIE MORIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

[June 15, 2022]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion in full.  The Court faithfully ap-
plies precedent to hold that California’s anti-waiver rule for
claims under the State’s Labor Code Private Attorneys Gen-
eral  Act  of  2004  (PAGA)  is  pre-empted  only  “insofar  as  it
precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-
individual  claims  through  an  agreement  to  arbitrate.”
Ante, at 20.  In its analysis of the parties’ contentions, the
Court also details several important limitations on the pre-
emptive  effect  of  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act  (FAA).   See
ante, at 11–17.  As a whole, the Court’s opinion makes clear
that California is not powerless to address its sovereign con-
cern that it cannot adequately enforce its Labor Code with-
out assistance from private attorneys general.

The Court concludes that the FAA poses no bar to the ad-
judication of respondent Angie Moriana’s “non-individual”
PAGA claims, but that PAGA itself “provides no mechanism
to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims
once an individual claim has been committed to a separate
proceeding.”  Ante, at 21.  Thus, the Court reasons, based
on available guidance from California courts, that Moriana
lacks “statutory standing” under PAGA to litigate her “non-
individual”  claims  separately  in  state  court.    Ibid.  Of
course, if this Court’s understanding of state law is wrong,
California courts, in an appropriate case, will have the last
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Angie Moriana.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain valuable legal information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

11

Opinion of the Court

C
  Next,  the  producers  retort  that  this  case  differs  from
Hudgens  because  New York  City  has  designated  MNN  to
operate the public access channels on Time Warner’s cable
system,  and  because  New  York  State  heavily  regulates
MNN  with  respect  to  the  public  access  channels.    Under
this  Court’s  cases,  however,  those  facts  do  not  establish
that MNN is a state actor.
  New  York  City’s  designation  of  MNN  to  operate  the
public  access  channels  is  analogous  to  a  government  li-
cense,  a  government  contract,  or  a  government-granted
monopoly.    But  as  the  Court  has  long  held,  the  fact  that
the  government  licenses,  contracts  with,  or  grants  a  mo-
nopoly  to  a  private  entity  does  not  convert  the  private
entity  into  a  state  actor—unless  the  private  entity  is
performing  a  traditional,  exclusive  public  function.    See,
e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U. S., at 543–544
(exclusive-use  rights  and  corporate  charters);  Blum,  457
U. S., at 1011 (licenses); Rendell-Baker, 457 U. S., at 840–
841  (contracts);  Polk  County,  454  U. S.,  at  319,  n. 9,  and
320–322  (law  licenses);  Jackson,  419  U. S.,  at  351–352
(electric monopolies); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v.  Democratic  National  Committee,  412  U. S. 94,  120–121
(1973)  (broadcast  licenses);  Moose  Lodge  No.  107  v.  Irvis,
407 U. S. 163, 176–177 (1972) (liquor licenses); cf. Trustees
——————

this  Court  said  in  passing  dicta  that  “a  speaker  must  seek  access  to
public property or to private property dedicated to public use to evoke
First Amendment concerns.”  473 U. S. 788, 801 (1985).  But Cornelius
dealt with government-owned property.  As JUSTICE THOMAS explained
in  Denver  Area  Educational  Telecommunications  Consortium,  Inc.  v.
FCC,  the  Court’s  admittedly  imprecise  and  overbroad  phrase  in  Cor-
nelius  is  not  consistent  with  this  Court’s  case  law  and  should  not  be
read  to  suggest  that  private  property  owners  or  private  lessees  are
subject  to  First  Amendment  constraints  whenever  they  dedicate  their
private  property  to  public  use  or  otherwise  open  their  property  for
speech.  518 U. S. 727, 827–828 (1996) (opinion concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the concept of state actors and the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SANCHEZ v. MAYORKAS

Opinion of the Court

here) on an “admission” into this country.  And an “admis-
sion”  is  defined  as  “the  lawful  entry  of  the  alien  into  the
United States after inspection and authorization by an im-
migration officer.”  §1101(a)(13)(A).  The admission—or, to
use  the  definitional  phrase,  “lawful  entry”—requirement
appears  in  two  pertinent  provisions  of  §1255.    One  states
that  a  nonimmigrant  may  become  an  LPR  only  if  he  has
been  “inspected  and  admitted  or  paroled  into  the  United
States.”  §1255(a).  And another states that a nonimmigrant
who  has  previously  worked  without  authorization  in  the
United States may become an LPR only if his presence here
is  “pursuant  to  a  lawful  admission.”
§1255(k)(1);  see
§1255(c)(2).1

A separate provision of immigration law establishes the
TPS  program,  which  provides  humanitarian  relief  to  for-
eign nationals in the United States who come from specified
countries.  See §1254a.  The Government may designate a
country for the program when it is beset by especially bad
or dangerous conditions, such as arise from natural disas-
ters  or  armed  conflicts.  The  country’s  citizens,  if  already
present in the United States, may then obtain TPS.  That
status protects them from removal and authorizes them to
work here for as long as the TPS designation lasts.  A per-
son’s unlawful entry into the United States will usually not
preclude granting him TPS.  See §1254a(c)(2)(A)(ii); 8 CFR
§244.3 (2020).  And relevant here, the TPS provision states:
“[F]or purposes of adjustment of status under section 1255,”
a  person  given  TPS  “shall  be  considered  as  being  in,  and
status  as  a  nonimmigrant.”
maintaining,
§1254a(f )(4).

lawful

——————

1 Section  1255(k)’s  requirement  of  a  lawful  admission,  unlike
§1255(a)’s, applies even if the nonimmigrant has been paroled into the
United States—that is, received temporary permission to enter the coun-
try  “for  urgent  humanitarian  reasons  or  significant  public  benefit.”    8
U. S. C. §1182(d)(5)(A).  So a nonimmigrant who has worked without au-
thorization cannot rely on his parolee status (if any) to become an LPR.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing immigration law and the requirements for obtaining lawful permanent residency (LPR) status. It delves into the definitions of "admission" and "lawful entry" within the context of immigration law, referencing specific sections of the U.S. Code.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

396

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

Counsel failed to introduce available evidence that Wil-
liams was “borderline mentally retarded” and did not ad-
vance beyond sixth grade in school.
Id., at 595. They
failed to seek prison records recording Williams’ commenda-
tions for helping to crack a prison drug ring and for return-
ing a guard’s missing wallet, or the testimony of prison ofﬁ-
cials who described Williams as among the inmates “least
likely to act in a violent, dangerous or provocative way.”
Id., at 569, 588. Counsel failed even to return the phone call
of a certiﬁed public accountant who had offered to testify
that he had visited Williams frequently when Williams was
incarcerated as part of a prison ministry program, that Wil-
liams “seemed to thrive in a more regimented and structured
environment,” and that Williams was proud of the carpentry
degree he earned while in prison.

Id., at 563–566.

Of course, not all of the additional evidence was favorable
to Williams. The juvenile records revealed that he had been
thrice committed to the juvenile system—for aiding and
abetting larceny when he was 11 years old, for pulling a false
ﬁre alarm when he was 12, and for breaking and entering
Id., at 534–536. But as the Federal Dis-
when he was 15.
trict Court correctly observed, the failure to introduce the
comparatively voluminous amount of evidence that did speak
in Williams’ favor was not justiﬁed by a tactical decision to
focus on Williams’ voluntary confession. Whether or not
those omissions were sufﬁciently prejudicial to have affected
the outcome of sentencing, they clearly demonstrate that
trial counsel did not fulﬁll their obligation to conduct a thor-
ough investigation of the defendant’s background. See 1
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4–4.1, commentary,
p. 4–55 (2d ed. 1980).

We are also persuaded, unlike the Virginia Supreme Court,
that counsel’s unprofessional service prejudiced Williams
within the meaning of Strickland. After hearing the addi-
tional evidence developed in the postconviction proceedings,
the very judge who presided at Williams’ trial, and who once
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the performance of Williams' trial counsel. It contains legal arguments, citations, and details about the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

29

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and
the  Acceptance  of  Congress,  become  the  Seat  of  the  Gov-
ernment of the United States, and to exercise like Author-
ity over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legisla-
ture of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erec-
tion of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other
needful Buildings . . . .”

Art. II, §1, cl. 2: “Each State shall appoint, in such Man-
ner  as  the  Legislature  thereof  may  direct,  a  Number  of
Electors,  equal  to  the  whole  Number  of  Senators  and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress:  but  no  Senator  or  Representative,  or  Person
holding  an  Office  of  Trust  or  Profit  under  the  United
States, shall be appointed an Elector.”

Art.  IV,  §3,  cl.  1:  “New  States  may  be  admitted  by  the
Congress  into  this  Union;  but  no  new  State  shall  be
formed  or  erected  within  the  Jurisdiction  of  any  other
State;  nor  any  State  be  formed  by  the  Junction  of  two  or
more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the
Legislatures  of  the  States  concerned  as  well  as  of  the
Congress.”

Art.  IV,  §4:  “The  United  States  shall  guarantee  to  every
State  in  this  Union  a  Republican  Form  of  Government,
and  shall  protect  each  of  them  against  Invasion;  and  on
Application  of  the  Legislature,  or  of  the  Executive  (when
the  Legislature  cannot  be  convened),  against  domestic
Violence.”

Art. V: “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall  deem  it  necessary,  shall  propose  Amendments  to
this  Constitution,  or,  on  the  Application  of  the  Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Con-
vention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically excerpts from the United States Constitution.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Constitutional Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

489

Breyer, J., dissenting

spending in laws that mention no standard at all. See, e. g.,
Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 535–536 (granting the
President recess authority to transfer money “appropriated
for a particular branch of expenditure in [a] department” to
be “applied [instead] to another branch of expenditure in the
same department”); Revenue and Expenditure Control Act
of 1968, §§ 202(b), 203(b), 82 Stat. 271–272; (authorizing the
President annually to reserve up to $6 billion in outlays and
$10 billion in new obligation authority); Second Supplemen-
tal Appropriations Act, 1969, § 401, 83 Stat. 82; Second Sup-
plemental Appropriations Act, 1970, §§ 401, 501, 84 Stat. 405–
407.
In this case, too, context and purpose can give meaning
to highly general language. See Federal Radio Comm’n v.
Nelson Bros., supra, at 285; Fahey v. Malonee, supra, at
250–253; cf. Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S., at 777 (Con-
gress has “at least expressed . . . satisfaction with the exist-
ing speciﬁcity of the Act”); Train v. City of New York, 420
U. S. 35, 44–47 (1975) (disallowing President Nixon’s efforts
to impound funds because Court found Congress did not in-
tend him to exercise the power in that instance).

On the other hand, I must recognize that there are impor-
tant differences between the delegation before us and other
broad, constitutionally acceptable delegations to Executive
Branch agencies—differences that argue against my conclu-
In particular, a broad delegation of authority to an
sion.
administrative agency differs from the delegation at issue
here in that agencies often develop subsidiary rules under
the statute, rules that explain the general “public interest”
language. Doing so diminishes the risk that the agency will
use the breadth of a grant of authority as a cloak for unrea-
sonable or unfair implementation. See 1 K. Davis, Adminis-
trative Law § 3:15, pp. 207–208 (2d ed. 1978). Moreover,
agencies are typically subject to judicial review, which re-
view provides an additional check against arbitrary imple-
mentation. See, e. g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer. It contains legal citations, arguments, and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BALDWIN v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

(2008)).  The  Constitution  also  restricted  the  legislative
power by dividing it between two Houses that check each
other, one of which was kept close to the people through bi-
ennial elections.  See Department of Transportation v. As-
sociation  of  American  Railroads,  575  U. S.  43,  74  (2015)
(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment).  When the Executive
exercises judicial or legislative power, however, it does so
largely free of these safeguards.  The Executive is not insu-
lated from external threats, and it is by definition an agent
of will, not judgment.  The Executive also faces election less
frequently than do Members of the House, and its power is
vested in a single person.

Perhaps worst of all, Chevron deference undermines the
ability of the Judiciary to perform its checking function on
the other branches.  The Founders expected that the Fed-
eral  Government’s  powers  would  remain  separated—and
the people’s liberty secure—only if the branches could check
each other.  The Judiciary’s checking power is its authority
to apply the law in cases or controversies properly before it.
See Michigan, supra, at ___, n. 1 (THOMAS, J., concurring)
(slip op., at 4, n. 1); Perez, supra, at 124–126 (THOMAS, J.,
concurring in judgment).  When the Executive is free to dic-
tate  the  outcome  of  cases  through  erroneous  interpreta-
tions, the courts cannot check the Executive by applying the
correct interpretation of the law.

B
Chevron deference appears to be inappropriate in many
cases for another reason: It is likely contrary to the APA,
“which [Chevron] did not even bother to cite.”  United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).  The APA provides that, “[t]o the extent necessary to
decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall de-
cide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or ap-
plicability of the terms of an agency action.”  5 U. S. C. §706.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding Chevron deference, a legal doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting

The flagship educational institution of a former Confeder-
ate State has embraced its constitutional obligation to af-
ford genuine equal protection to applicants, and, by exten-
sion, to the broader polity that its students will serve after
graduation.   Surely  that  is  progress  for  a  university  that
once  engaged  in  the  kind  of  patently  offensive  race-
dominated admissions process that the majority decries.

With its holistic review process, UNC now treats race as
merely one aspect of an applicant’s life, when race played a
totalizing, all-encompassing, and singularly determinative
role for applicants like James for most of this country’s his-
tory: No matter what else was true about him, being Black
meant he had no shot at getting in (the ultimate race-linked
uneven playing field).  Holistic programs like UNC’s reflect
the reality that Black students have only relatively recently
been permitted to get into the admissions game at all.  Such
programs  also  reflect  universities’  clear-eyed  optimism
that, one day, race will no longer matter.

So much upside.  Universal benefits ensue from holistic
admissions programs that allow consideration of all factors
material to merit (including race), and that thereby facili-
tate diverse student populations.  Once trained, those UNC
students who have thrived in the university’s diverse learn-
ing environment are well equipped to make lasting contri-
butions  in  a  variety  of  realms  and  with  a  variety  of  col-
leagues, which, in turn, will steadily decrease the salience
of race for future generations.  Fortunately, UNC and other
institutions of higher learning are already on this beneficial
path.  In fact, all that they have needed to continue moving
this  country  forward  (toward  full  achievement  of  our  Na-
tion’s founding promises) is for this Court to get out of the
way and let them do their jobs.  To our great detriment, the
majority cannot bring itself to do so.

B
The overarching reason the majority gives for becoming
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues in favor of holistic admissions processes that consider race as one factor among many.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

23

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

disadvantage  foreign  holders  of  U. S.  copyrights.    This
dissonance scarcely enhances the United States’ “role as a
trusted partner in multilateral endeavors.”  Vimar Seguros
y  Reaseguros,  S.  A.  v.  M/V  Sky  Reefer,  515  U. S.  528,
539 (1995).

V

I  turn  now  to  the  Court’s  justifications  for  a  decision
difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  Copyright  Act’s  text  and
history.

A

The  Court  asserts  that  its  holding  “is  consistent  with
antitrust  laws  that  ordinarily  forbid  market  divisions.”
Ante,  at  32.  See  also  ante,  at  18  (again  referring  to  anti
trust principles).  Section 602(a)(1), however, read as I do
and  as  the  Government  does,  simply  facilitates  copyright
owners’  efforts  to  impose  “vertical  restraints”  on  distribu
tors  of  copies  of  their  works.    See  Forsyth  &  Rothnie  435
(“Parallel  importation  restrictions  enable  manufacturers
and distributors to erect ‘vertical restraints’ in the market
through  exclusive  distribution  agreements.”).    See  gener-
ally  Leegin  Creative  Leather  Products,  Inc.  v.  PSKS,  Inc.,
551  U. S.  877  (2007)  (discussing  vertical  restraints).    We
have  held  that  vertical  restraints  are  not  per se  illegal
under §1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §1, because such
“restraints can have procompetitive effects.”  551 U. S., at
881–882.17

——————

17 Despite  the  Court’s  suggestion  to  the  contrary,  this  case  in  no
way  implicates  the  per  se  antitrust  prohibition  against  horizontal
“ ‘[a]greements  between  competitors  to  allocate  territories  to  minimize
competition.’ ”    Ante,  at  32  (quoting  Palmer  v.  BRG  of  Ga.,  Inc.,  498
U. S. 46, 49 (1990) (per curiam)).  Wiley is not requesting authority to
enter  into  collusive  agreements  with  other  textbook  publishers  that
would,  for  example,  make  Wiley  the  exclusive  supplier  of  textbooks
on  particular  subjects  within  particular  geographic  regions.    Instead,
Wiley asserts no more than the prerogative to impose vertical restraints
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It cites legal precedents and discusses the Copyright Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U74

[09-06-00 17:54:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

72

UNITED STATES v. BESTFOODS

Opinion of the Court

holder acts in his ostensible capacity, so here we may refer
to them in distinguishing a parental ofﬁcer’s oversight of a
subsidiary from such an ofﬁcer’s control over the operation
of the subsidiary’s facility.
“[A]ctivities that involve the fa-
cility but which are consistent with the parent’s investor
status, such as monitoring of the subsidiary’s performance,
supervision of the subsidiary’s ﬁnance and capital budget de-
cisions, and articulation of general policies and procedures,
should not give rise to direct liability.” Oswald 282. The
critical question is whether, in degree and detail, actions di-
rected to the facility by an agent of the parent alone are
eccentric under accepted norms of parental oversight of a
subsidiary’s facility.

There is, in fact, some evidence that CPC engaged in just
this type and degree of activity at the Muskegon plant. The
District Court’s opinion speaks of an agent of CPC alone who
played a conspicuous part in dealing with the toxic risks em-
anating from the operation of the plant. G. R. D. Williams
worked only for CPC; he was not an employee, ofﬁcer, or
director of Ott II, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, and thus, his actions
were of necessity taken only on behalf of CPC. The District
Court found that “CPC became directly involved in environ-
mental and regulatory matters through the work of . . . Wil-
liams, CPC’s governmental and environmental affairs direc-
tor. Williams . . . became heavily involved in environmental
issues at Ott II.”
777 F. Supp., at 561. He “actively partici-
pated in and exerted control over a variety of Ott II environ-
mental matters,” ibid., and he “issued directives regarding
Ott II’s responses to regulatory inquiries,” id., at 575.

We think that these ﬁndings are enough to raise an issue
of CPC’s operation of the facility through Williams’s actions,
though we would draw no ultimate conclusion from these
ﬁndings at this point. Not only would we be deciding in the
ﬁrst instance an issue on which the trial and appellate courts
did not focus, but the very fact that the District Court did
not see the case as we do suggests that there may be still
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the degree of control a parent company (CPC) exerted over a subsidiary's (Ott II) facility. It delves into legal precedents and specific actions taken by an agent of CPC, raising questions about potential liability.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–511.  Argued December 8, 2020—Decided April 1, 2021

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) proscribes abu-
sive  telemarketing  practices  by,  among  other  things,  restricting  cer-
tain communications made with an “automatic telephone dialing sys-
tem.”  The  TCPA  defines  such  “autodialers”  as  equipment  with  the
capacity both “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, us-
ing a random or sequential number generator,” and to dial those num-
bers.    47  U. S. C.  §227(a)(1).    Petitioner  Facebook,  Inc.,  maintains  a
social media platform that, as a security feature, allows users to elect
to receive text messages when someone attempts to log in to the user’s
account  from  a  new  device  or  browser.    Facebook  sent  such  texts  to
Noah  Duguid,  alerting  him  to  login  activity  on  a  Facebook  account
linked to his telephone number, but Duguid never created that account
(or any account on Facebook).  Duguid tried without success to stop the
unwanted  messages,  and  eventually  brought  a  putative  class  action
against  Facebook.    He  alleged  that  Facebook  violated  the  TCPA  by
maintaining a database that stored phone numbers and programming
its equipment to send automated text messages.  Facebook countered
that the TCPA does not apply because the technology it used to text
Duguid did not use a “random or sequential number generator.”  The
Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that §227(a)(1) applies to a notifica-
tion system like Facebook’s that has the capacity to dial automatically
stored numbers.

Held: To qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system” under the
TCPA,  a  device  must  have  the  capacity  either  to  store  a  telephone
number using a random or sequential number generator, or to produce
a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator.
Pp. 4–12.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1114

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

Super.  Ct.  Pa.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  959  A.  2d
980.

No.  09–524.  Nitro  Distributing,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  Alticor,
Inc., et al.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
565  F.  3d  417.

No.  09–528.  Bridgeport  Port  Authority  v.  Bridgeport  &
Port  Jefferson  Steamboat  Co.  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  79.

No.  09–535.  Papierz  v.  Jackson  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  587.

No.  09–537.  Smith  v.  Kentucky.  Ct.  App.  Ky.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–540.  El-Hewie  v.  Bergen  County,  New  Jersey,
et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  348
Fed.  Appx.  790.

No.  09–541.  Jafari  et  al.  v.  Wynn  Las  Vegas,  LLC,  et  al.
C. A. 7th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 569 F. 3d 644.

No.  09–544.  Lock  v.  General  Services  Administration.
C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.
Appx.  662.

No.  09–545.  Keenan  et  ux.  v.  Pyle  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  809.

No.  09–546.  James  et  al.  v.  Harris  County,  Texas.  C.  A.

5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  612.

No.  09–551.  Friedland  v.  TIC-The  Industrial  Co.  et  al.
C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  566  F.  3d
1203.

No. 09–554.  Adair  v.  McGuireWoods  LLP et al.  C.  A. 4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  294.

No.  09–562.  Smith  v.  United  States  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  789.

No.  09–566.  Brown  v.  Konteh,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  191.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and citations to lower court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

EBAY INC. v. MERCEXCHANGE, L. L. C.

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring

ceutical  Co.,  733  F. 2d  858,  865–867  (1984).    At  the  same
time,  there  is  a  difference  between  exercising  equitable
discretion  pursuant  to  the  established  four-factor  test  and
writing on an entirely clean slate.  “Discretion is not whim,
and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps
promote  the  basic  principle  of  justice  that  like  cases
should be decided alike.”  Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,
546  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2005)  (slip  op.,  at  6).    When  it  comes  to
discerning  and  applying  those  standards,  in  this  area  as
others, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”   New
York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349 (1921) (opinion
for the Court by Holmes, J.).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Roberts. It contains legal citations and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GALLARDO v. MARSTILLER

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

that States may reimburse themselves for medical care fur-
nished on behalf of a beneficiary not only from the portions
of  the  beneficiary’s  settlement  representing  compensation
for Medicaid-furnished care, but also from settlement funds
that compensate the Medicaid beneficiary for future medi-
cal care for which Medicaid has not paid and might never
pay.  The Court does so by reading one statutory provision
in  isolation  while  giving  short  shrift  to  the  statutory  con-
text, the relationships between the provisions at issue, and
the framework set forth in precedent.  The Court’s holding
is inconsistent with the structure of the Medicaid program
and  will  cause  needless  unfairness  and  disruption.    I  re-
spectfully dissent.

I
Congress conditions a State’s receipt of federal Medicaid
funding, see 42 U. S. C. §1396d(b), on compliance with fed-
eral requirements for the program.  The Court today details
at length one of these requirements: that a state Medicaid
plan pursue reimbursement for the State’s payments where
reimbursement is available from a third party.  See ante, at
1–3.  It  devotes  comparatively  little  attention  to  another
central requirement: that a State not assert claims against
the property of Medicaid beneficiaries or recipients.

Under the Medicaid Act’s anti-lien provision, enacted in
1965 as part of the original Act, “[n]o lien may be imposed
against the property of any individual prior to his death on
account  of  medical  assistance”  provided  under  the  state
Medicaid plan, whether “paid or to be paid.”  §1396p(a)(1);
see Ahlborn, 547 U. S., at 283–284.  In addition, the Act’s
anti-recovery provision, also enacted in 1965, provides that
“[n]o adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance cor-
rectly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan
may be made.”  §1396p(b)(1).  Together, the anti-lien and
anti-recovery provisions establish that acceptance of Medi-
caid does not render a beneficiary indebted to the State or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of Medicaid statutes and their implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>