<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

plaintiffs  prove  their  cases  when  direct  evidence  can  be
hard to come by.  See Basic, 485 U. S., at 245.  These pre-
sumptions  operate  by  allowing  the  plaintiff  to  prove  only
certain specified “predicate fact[s]” at the outset.  St. Mary’s
Honor  Center  v.  Hicks,  509  U. S.  502,  506  (1993).    If  the
plaintiff does so, an inference or “presumption” arises that
the plaintiff has met its burden of persuasion, at least “in
the absence” of some competing “explanation.”  Ibid. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  At that point, the defendant
bears  a  burden  of  production  to  present  evidence  that,  if
“taken as true,” would “permit the conclusion” that the pre-
sumption  in  the  plaintiff ’s  favor  is  mistaken.    Id.,  at  509
(emphasis  deleted).    If  the  defendant  produces  such  evi-
dence, the presumption “drops from the case.”  Id., at 507
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  “[T]he  trier  of  fact”
then “proceeds to decide the ultimate question.”  Id., at 511.
Throughout this whole back-and-forth process, the burden
of persuasion never shifts:  The “plaintiff at all times bears
the ultimate burden of persuasion” to prove all aspects of
its  cause  of  action.  Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks  omit-
ted).

The Court has explained that nearly “all presumptions”
operate in this way.  Id., at 507.  The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence confirm the point too.  Rule 301, titled “Presumptions
in Civil Cases Generally,” provides that “the party against
whom a presumption is directed has the burden of produc-
ing evidence to rebut the presumption,” but “the burden of
persuasion . . . remains on the party who had it originally.”
Again, a burden of production may shift to the defendant,
but never the burden of persuasion.

Title  VII  practice  offers  a  familiar  illustration  of  these
principles.  There, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden
of  proving  that  his  employer  intentionally  discriminated
against him because of his race or some other unlawful fac-
tor.  See  St.  Mary’s  Honor  Center,  509  U. S., at  511.    But
because direct evidence of intentional discrimination can be
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the concept of presumptions in legal cases, particularly in the context of Title VII discrimination claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

signature  line  on  a  notice  of  appeal  as  a  “trivial,  ministe-
rial defect,” ante, at 14, the Court gives the game away by
once  again  assuming  its  own  conclusion.    Whether  the
omission of the date and time certain on a notice to appear
is essential for present purposes is the central issue in this
case,  and  the  Court  gives  no  textually  based  reason  to
think  that  it  is.    The  Government  could  reasonably  con-
clude that a notice to appear that omits the date and time
of a proceeding is still a notice to appear (albeit a defective
one), much in the same way that a complaint without the
e-mail  address  of  the  signer  is  still  a  complaint  (albeit  a
defective one, see Rule 11(a)), or a clock missing the num-
ber “8” is still a clock (albeit a defective one).

Pereira and the Court are right that §1229(a)(1) sets out
the  substantive  requirements  for  notices  to  appear,  but
that  fact  alone  does  not  control  whether  an  incomplete
notice to appear triggers the stop-time rule.5

B
With the text of both the stop-time rule and §1229(a)(1)
irreducibly  ambiguous,  the  Court  must  next  look  to  two
neighboring  provisions  to  support  its  conclusion  that  its
interpretation  is  the  only  reasonable  one.    Neither  provi-
sion is sufficient.

The  Court  first  observes  that  the  second  paragraph  of
§1229(a)  allows  the  Government  to  move  or  reschedule  a
removal  proceeding  unilaterally  and  then  to  inform  the
alien  of  “the  new  time  or  place  of  the  proceedings.”

——————

5 Of  course,  courts  should  still  demand  that  the  Government  justify
why  whatever  is  left  off  a  notice  to  appear  does  not  deprive  it  of  its
essential character as a “notice to appear.”  As the Government rightly
concedes,  for  example,  a  blank  sheet  of  paper  would  not  constitute  a
“notice to appear.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 39; see Brief for Respondent 35–36.
But for all the reasons the Government gives, omission of the date and
time  of  a  future  removal  proceeding  is  not,  by  itself,  enough  to  turn  a
notice to appear into something else.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of legal statutes and their application to a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

9

Opinion of the Court

The pipelines then moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the Natural Gas Act pre-empted respondents’
state-law  antitrust  claims.    The  District  Court  granted
their  motion.  It  concluded  that  the  pipelines  were  “juris
dictional sellers,” i.e., “natural gas companies engaged in”
the “transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce.”
Order in No. 03–cv–1431 (D Nev., July 18, 2011), pp. 4, 11.
And  it  held  that  respondents’  claims,  which  were  “aimed
at” these sellers’ “alleged practices of false price reporting,
wash trades, and anticompetitive collusive behavior” were
pre-empted  because  “such  practices,”  not  only  affected
nonjurisdictional  direct-sale  prices  but  also  “directly  af
fect[ed]” jurisdictional (i.e., wholesale) rates.  Id., at 36–37.
It  emphasized  that  the
price-manipulation  of  which  respondents  complained
affected  not  only  jurisdictional  (i.e.,  wholesale)  sales,  but
also  nonjurisdictional  (i.e.,  retail)  sales.  The  court  con
strued  the  Natural  Gas  Act’s  pre-emptive  scope  narrowly
in  light  of  Congress’  intent—manifested  in  §1(b)  of  the
Act—to  preserve  for  the  States  the  authority  to  regulate
nonjurisdictional  sales.    And  it  held  that  the  Act  did  not
pre-empt state-law claims aimed at obtaining damages for
excessively  high  retail  natural-gas  prices  stemming  from
interstate  pipelines’  price  manipulation,  even  if  the  ma
nipulation raised wholesale rates as well.  See In re West-
ern States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, 715
F. 3d 716, 729–736 (2013).

The  Ninth  Circuit  reversed.

The  pipelines  sought  certiorari.    They  asked  us  to  re
solve  confusion  in  the  lower  courts  as  to  whether  the
Natural  Gas  Act  pre-empts  retail  customers’  state  anti
trust law challenges to practices that also affect wholesale
rates.  Compare  id.,  at  729–736,  with  Leggett  v.  Duke
Energy Corp., 308 S. W. 3d 843 (Tenn. 2010).  We granted
the petition.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the preemption of state antitrust law by the Natural Gas Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

13

Opinion of the Court

As those examples illustrate, if the law of Article III did
not  require  plaintiffs  to  demonstrate  a  “concrete  harm,”
Congress  could  authorize  virtually  any  citizen  to  bring  a
statutory  damages  suit  against  virtually  any  defendant
who violated virtually any federal law.  Such an expansive
understanding of Article III would flout constitutional text,
history, and precedent.  In our view, the public interest that
private entities comply with the law cannot “be converted
into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as
such,  and  that  permits  all  citizens  (or,  for  that  matter,  a
subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm)
to sue.”  Lujan, 504 U. S., at 576–577.2

A  regime  where  Congress  could  freely  authorize  un-
harmed plaintiffs to sue defendants who violate federal law
not only would violate Article III but also would infringe on
the Executive Branch’s Article II authority.  We accept the
“displacement of the democratically elected branches when
necessary to decide an actual case.”  Roberts, 42 Duke L. J.,
at 1230.  But otherwise, the choice of how to prioritize and
how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants
who violate the law falls within the discretion of the Exec-
utive  Branch,  not  within  the  purview  of  private  plaintiffs

——————
and expansive causes of action that in turn have required greater judicial
focus on the requirements of Article III.  See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
578 U. S. 330 (2016); Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488
(2009); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 (1992).

2 A  plaintiff  must  show  that  the  injury  is  not  only  concrete  but  also
particularized.  But if there were no concrete-harm requirement, the re-
quirement  of  a  particularized  injury  would  do  little  or  nothing  to  con-
strain Congress from freely creating causes of action for vast classes of
unharmed plaintiffs to sue any defendants who violate any federal law.
(Congress might, for example, provide that everyone has an individual
right to clean air and can sue any defendant who violates any air-pollu-
tion law.)  That is one reason why the Court has been careful to empha-
size that concreteness and particularization are separate requirements.
See  Spokeo,  578  U. S.,  at  339–340;  see  generally  Bayefsky,  Constitu-
tional Injury and Tangibility, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2285, 2298–2300,
2368 (2018).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the concept of "concrete harm" in the context of Article III standing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–416.  Argued December 1, 2020—Decided June 17, 2021*

Respondents  are  six  individuals  from  Mali  who  allege  that  they  were
trafficked into Ivory Coast as child slaves to produce cocoa.  U. S.-based
companies Nestlé USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., do not own or operate
cocoa farms in Ivory Coast, but they do buy cocoa from farms located
there and provide those farms with technical and financial resources.
Respondents  sued  Nestlé,  Cargill,  and  others  under  the  Alien  Tort
Statute  (ATS)—which  provides  federal  courts  jurisdiction  to  hear
claims brought “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,” 28 U. S. C. §1350—
contending  that  this  arrangement  aids  and  abets  child  slavery.   Be-
cause  respondents’  injuries  occurred  overseas  and  the  only  domestic
conduct alleged by respondents was general corporate activity, the Dis-
trict Court dismissed the suit as an impermissible extraterritorial ap-
plication of the ATS under Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569
U. S. 108.  The Ninth Circuit held, as relevant, that respondents had
pleaded a domestic application of the ATS, as required by Kiobel, be-
cause the corporations’ major operational decisions originated in the
United States.

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

929 F. 3d. 623, reversed and remanded.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I and II, concluding that respondents here improperly seek ex-
traterritorial application of the ATS.  The Court’s two-step framework
for  analyzing  extraterritoriality  issues  first  presumes  that  a  statute

——————

* Together with No. 19–453, Cargill, Inc. v. Doe et al., also on certiorari

to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

19

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

quotation marks omitted).  And having just lost their tradi-
tional homelands to Georgia, who can doubt that the Cher-
okee  understood  this  promise  as  a  guarantee  that  they
would  retain  their  sovereign  authority  over  crimes  by  or
against  tribal  members  subject  only  to  federal,  not  state,
law?  That was certainly the contemporaneous understand-
ing  of  the  House  Committee  on  Indian  Affairs,  which  ob-
served  that  “[t]he  United  States  and  the  Indian  tribes
[would be] the sole parties” with power over new reserva-
tions in the West.  H. Rep. No. 474, at 18; see also Part I–
B, supra.  This Court has long shared the same view.  “By
treaties and statutes,” the Court has said, “the right of the
Cherokee [N]ation to exist as an autonomous body, subject
always  to  the  paramount  authority  of  the  United  States,
has been recognized.”  Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, 379–
380 (1896).4

——————

4 In  a  fleeting  aside,  the  Court  suggests  that  the  treaty  was  “sup-
planted”  by  the  Oklahoma  Enabling  Act  in  1906,  which  endowed  the
State with “inherent” authority to try crimes by or against tribal mem-
bers on tribal lands.  Ante, at 22–23.  But the Court cites no proof for its
ipse dixit, nor could it.  As we shall see, Congress took pains to abide its
treaty  promises  when  it  adopted  the  Oklahoma  Enabling  Act  and  has
never revoked them.  Nor may this Court abrogate treaties or statutes
by wishing them away in passing remarks.  In a Nation governed by the
rule of law, not men (or willful judges), only Congress may withdraw this
Nation’s treaty promises or revise its written laws.  See McGirt v. Okla-
homa, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 7).  Even on its own terms,
too, the Court’s discussion of the treaty turns out to be dicta.  In the end,
the Court abandons any suggestion that, with its admission to the Union,
the  Cherokee’s  treaties  somehow  evaporated  and  Oklahoma  gained  an
“inherent”  right  to  prosecute  crimes  by  or  against  tribal  members  on
tribal lands.  Instead, the Court resorts to a case-specific “balancing test”
that acknowledges state law may not apply on tribal lands even in the
absence of a preemptive statute.  See Part III–A, infra.

In the course of its dicta on the treaty, the Court highlights still two
other irrelevant facts—that the Cherokee engaged in treaties with the
Confederacy  during  the  Civil  War  and  that  “Congress  abolished  trea-
tymaking  with  the  Indian  nations  in  1871.”    Ante,  at  21,  n. 7,  22,  n. 8
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of treaties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

35

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

require her to stick to her bargain: “The owner who hangs
a shingle and offers her services to the public cannot retreat
from the promise of open service; to do so is to offer the pub-
lic marked money.  It is to convey the promise of a free and
open society and then take the prize away from the despised
few.”  J. Singer, We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Ac-
commodations and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B. U. L. Rev. 929,
949 (2015).

III
Today is a sad day in American constitutional law and in
the lives of LGBT people.  The Supreme Court of the United
States declares that a particular kind of business, though
open  to  the  public,  has  a  constitutional  right  to  refuse  to
serve members of a protected class.  The Court does so for
the first time in its history.  By issuing this new license to
discriminate in a case brought by a company that seeks to
deny same-sex couples the full and equal enjoyment of its
services, the immediate, symbolic effect of the decision is to
mark gays and lesbians for second-class status.  In this way,
the decision itself inflicts a kind of stigmatic harm, on top
of any harm caused by denials of service.  The opinion of the
Court is, quite literally, a notice that reads: “Some services
may be denied to same-sex couples.”

“The truth is,” these “affronts and denials” “are intensely
human and personal.”  S. Rep. No. 872, at 15 (internal quo-
tation  marks  omitted).  Sometimes  they  may  “harm  the
physical body, but always they strike at the root of the hu-
man spirit, at the very core of human dignity.”  Ibid.  To see
how, imagine a same-sex couple browses the public market
with their child.  The market could be online or in a shop-
ping mall.  Some stores sell products that are customized
and expressive.  The family sees a notice announcing that
services will be refused for same-sex weddings.  What mes-
sage does that send?  It sends the message that we live in a
society with social castes.  It says to the child of the same-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the implications of a decision that allows businesses to refuse service to same-sex couples.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

THOMAS, J., dissenting

same “dangerous” person laws to chip away at that Amend-
ment’s guarantee.

Even on their own terms, laws targeting “dangerous” per-
sons cannot support §922(g)(8).  Those laws were driven by
a  justification  distinct  from  that  of  §922(g)(8)—quashing
treason and rebellion.  The Stuart Kings’ reign was marked
by religious and political conflict, which at that time were
often one and the same.  The Parliament of the late 1600s
“re-established an intolerant episcopalian church” through
legislation targeting other sects, including “[a] fierce penal
code” to keep those other sects out of local government and
“to criminalize nonconformist worship.”  Oxford Handbook
of the English Revolution 212 (M. Braddick ed. 2015) (Ox-
ford  Handbook);  see  G.  Clark,  The  Later  Stuarts  1660–
1714, p. 22 (2d ed. 1955).  These laws were driven in large
part by a desire to suppress rebellion.  “Nonconformist min-
isters  were  thought  to  preach  resistance  to  divinely  or-
dained monarchs.”  Oxford Handbook 212; see Calendar of
State  Papers  Domestic:  Charles  II,  1661–1662,  p. 161  (M.
Green  ed.  1861)  (Calendar  Charles  II)  (“[P]reachers  go
about from county to county, and blow the flames of rebel-
lion”).  Various nonconformist insurrections gave credibility
to  these  fears.    See,  e.g.,  Clark,  The  Later  Stuarts,  at  22;
Privy Council to Lord Newport (Mar. 4, 1661), in Transac-
tions of the Shropshire Archaeological and Natural History
Society, Pt. 2, 3d Ser., Vol. 4, p. 161 (1904).

It is in this turbulent context that the English kings per-
mitted the disarming of “dangerous persons.”  English lords
feared that nonconformists—i.e., people with “ ‘wicked and
Rebellious  Principles’ ”—had  “ ‘furnished  themselves  with
quantities of Arms, and Ammunition’ ” “ ‘to put in Execution
their Trayterus designs.’ ”  Privy Council to Lord Newport
(Jan. 8, 1660), in id., at 156; see Calendar Charles II 541
(“The  fanatics  . . .  are  high  and  insolent,  and  threaten  all
loyal people; they will soon be in arms”).  In response, the
Crown  took  measures  to  root  out  suspected  rebels,  which
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into historical context and legal arguments surrounding a specific law (likely related to gun control).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xvii

Page

Estate. See name of estate.
930
Estep v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
Evans v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Evans v. Nevada Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety . . . .
965
Eyoum v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Fairfax County Dept. of Human Development; Sobin v.
. . . . . . . .
947
Falcone; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Falick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
Falkenberry v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,968
Faragher v. Boca Raton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
775
Father v. Boeing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,971
957
Fauver; Allmond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Fayetteville State Univ. Bd. of Trustees; Viswananthan v. . . . . . .
968
Federal Aviation Administration; Professional Pilots Federation v.
903
Federal Bureau of Investigation; Martinez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
FCC; Ameritech Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
FCC v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
FCC; GTE Midwest Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
FCC v. Iowa Utilities Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FCC; Keller Communications, Inc. v.
949
FCC; Southern New England Telephone Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FCC; U S WEST, Inc. v.
949
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Federal Employees v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . 903,950,977
FLRA v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,950,977
980
Federal Trade Comm’n; California Dental Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Federation of Conn. Taxpayer Organizations v. Burnham . . . . . . .
932
Federowicz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
980
Felzen; California Public Employee’s Retirement System v. . . . . .
907
Ferguson; Haley v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Ferguson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960
Ferreira v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935
Fey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fibreboard Corp.; Ortiz v.
905
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fields; Willoughby v.
569
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Finley; National Endowment for Arts v.
963
First Union National Bank; D & M Contracting Co. v.
. . . . . . . . .
963
First Union National Bank; McDufﬁe v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
Fitch; Rojas v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Flores v. Garcia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
Flores-Ochoa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Florida; Almeida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923
Florida; Brown v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Florida; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

399

Opinion of Stevens, J.

trary  to  the  fundamental  principle  of  judicial  restraint  that
courts  should  neither  anticipate  a  question  of  constitutional
law  in  advance  of  the  necessity  of  deciding  it  nor  formulate
a  rule  of  constitutional  law  broader  than  is  required  by  the
precise facts to which it is to be applied.”  Washington State
Grange, 552 U. S., at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Scanting that principle “threaten[s] to short circuit the dem
ocratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the
people from being implemented in a manner consistent with
the  Constitution.”  Id.,  at  451.  These  concerns  are  height
ened  when  judges  overrule  settled  doctrine  upon  which  the
legislature  has  relied.  The  Court  operates  with  a  sledge
hammer  rather  than  a  scalpel  when  it  strikes  down  one  of
Congress’  most  signiﬁcant  efforts  to  regulate  the  role  that
corporations  and  unions  play  in  electoral  politics.  It  com
pounds the offense by implicitly striking down a great many
state laws as well.

The  problem  goes  still  deeper,  for  the  Court  does  all  of
this  on  the  basis  of  pure  speculation.  Had  Citizens  United
maintained  a  facial  challenge,  and  thus  argued  that  there
are  virtually  no  circumstances  in  which  BCRA  § 203  can  be
applied  constitutionally,  the  parties  could  have  developed,
through  the  normal  process  of  litigation,  a  record  about  the
actual effects of § 203, its actual burdens and its actual bene
ﬁts,  on  all  manner  of  corporations  and  unions.4  “Claims  of
facial invalidity often rest on speculation,” and consequently
“raise the risk of premature interpretation of statutes on the

4 Shortly before Citizens  United mooted the issue by  abandoning its fa
cial  challenge,  the  Government  advised  the  District  Court  that  it  “re
quire[d] time to develop a factual record regarding [the] facial challenge.”
1:07–cv–2240–RCL–RWR,  Docket  Entry  No.  47,  p.  4  (Mar.  26,  2008).  By
reinstating  a  claim  that  Citizens  United  abandoned,  the  Court  gives  it
a  perverse  litigating  advantage  over  its  adversary,  which  was  deprived
of  the  opportunity  to  gather  and  present  information  necessary  to  its
rebuttal.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens regarding the Citizens United case. It delves into the legal reasoning and arguments against the majority decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1129

529 U. S.

May 22, 2000

No. 99–8724.
No. 99–8751.
No. 99–8829.

In re King;
In re Harris; and
In re Short. Petitions for writs of mandamus

denied.

Certiorari Granted

No. 99–1257. Browner, Administrator of Environmental
Protection Agency, et al. v. American Trucking Assns.,
Inc., et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported
below: 175 F. 3d 1027 and 195 F. 3d 4.

No. 99–1178. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers et al.
C. A. 7th Cir. Motions of Paciﬁc Legal Foundation and Randy
Peterson, National Association of Home Builders, and American
Farm Bureau Federation for leave to ﬁle briefs as amici curiae
granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 845.
No. 99–1379. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by
the petition. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1070.

No. 99–6218. Rogers v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 992 S. W. 2d 393.

Certiorari Denied

No. 98–1996. Pelchat v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 175 F. 3d 1025.

No. 98–9402. Davis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 173 F. 3d 430.

No. 98–9601. Bearden v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 178 F. 3d 1296.

No. 99–1203. Theriot et al. v. Parish of Jefferson et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 F. 3d 477.
No. 99–1209. Novato Fire Protection District v. United
States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 181 F. 3d 1135.

No. 99–1283. Kumar v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 639.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their status (granted, denied, etc.). This is likely part of a legal document and not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket or Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

443

Opinion of Stevens, J.

speak  on issues  of  general public  interest  implies no  compa
rable  right  in  the  quite  different  context  of  participation  in
a political campaign for election to public ofﬁce.”  435 U. S.,
at 788, n. 26; see also id., at 787–788 (acknowledging that the
interests in preserving public conﬁdence in Government and
protecting  dissenting  shareholders  may  be  “weighty  .  .  .  in
the  context  of  partisan  candidate  elections”).  Bellotti,  in
other words, did not touch the question presented in Austin
and  McConnell,  and  the  opinion  squarely  disavowed  the
proposition for which the majority cites it.

The majority attempts to explain away the distinction Bel
lotti drew—between general corporate speech and campaign
speech intended to promote or prevent the election of speciﬁc
candidates  for  ofﬁce—as  inconsistent  with  the  rest  of  the
opinion  and  with  Buckley.  Ante,  at  347,  357–360.  Yet  the
basis  for  this  distinction  is  perfectly  coherent:  The  anticor
ruption  interests  that  animate  regulations  of  corporate  par
ticipation  in  candidate  elections,  the  “importance”  of  which
“has  never  been  doubted,”  435  U. S.,  at  788,  n.  26,  do  not
apply equally to regulations of corporate participation in ref
erenda.  A referendum cannot owe a political debt to a cor
poration,  seek to  curry favor  with  a corporation,  or fear  the
corporation’s retaliation.  Cf. Austin, 494 U. S., at 678 (Ste
vens,  J.,  concurring);  Citizens  Against  Rent  Control/Coali
tion  for  Fair  Housing  v.  Berkeley,  454  U. S.  290,  299  (1981).
The  majority  likewise  overlooks  the fact  that,  over  the  past
30  years,  our  cases  have  repeatedly  recognized  the  candi
date/issue  distinction.  See,  e. g.,  Austin,  494  U. S.,  at  659;
NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 495–496; FCC v.  League of Women Vot
ers of Cal.,  468  U. S.  364,  371,  n.  9  (1984);  NRWC,  459  U. S.,
at  210,  n.  7.  The  Court’s  critique  of  Bellotti’s  footnote  26
puts it in the strange position of trying to elevate Bellotti to
canonical  status,  while  simultaneously  disparaging  a  critical
piece  of  its  analysis  as  unsupported  and  irreconcilable  with
Buckley.  Bellotti, apparently, is both the font of all wisdom
and internally incoherent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites previous cases and analyzes legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

education.1

 JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  JUSTICE  KAGAN,  and  JUSTICE
JACKSON disagree with the Court’s decision.  I respect their
views.  They  thoroughly  recount  the  horrific  history  of
slavery and Jim Crow in America, cf. Bakke, 438 U. S., at
395–402 (opinion of Marshall, J.), as well as the continuing
effects  of  that  history  on  African  Americans  today.    And
they  are  of  course  correct  that  for  the  last  five  decades,
Bakke  and  Grutter  have  allowed  narrowly  tailored  race-
based affirmative action in higher education.

But  I  respectfully  part  ways  with  my  dissenting
colleagues  on  the  question  of  whether,  under  this  Court’s
precedents,  race-based  affirmative  action
in  higher
education  may  extend  indefinitely  into  the  future.  The
dissents suggest that  the answer is yes.  But  this Court’s
precedents make clear that the answer is no.  See Grutter,
539  U. S.,  at  342–343;  Dowell,  498  U. S.,  at  247–248;
Croson, 488 U. S., at 510 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.).
To  reiterate:  For  about  50  years,  many  institutions  of
higher  education  have  employed  race-based  affirmative
In  the  abstract,  it  might  have  been
action  programs.
debatable how long those race-based admissions programs
could  continue  under  the  “temporary  matter”/“limited  in
time” equal protection principle recognized and applied by
this  Court.  Grutter,  539  U. S.,  at  342  (internal  quotation
marks omitted); cf. Dowell, 498 U. S., at 247–248.  But in
2003,  the  Grutter  Court  applied  that  temporal  equal
——————

1 The Court’s decision will first apply to the admissions process for the
college class of 2028, which is the next class to be admitted.  Some might
have debated how to calculate Grutter’s 25-year period—whether it ends
with  admissions  for  the  college  class  of  2028  or  instead  for  the  college
class  of  2032.    But  neither  Harvard  nor  North  Carolina  argued  that
Grutter’s 25-year period ends with the class of 2032 rather than the class
of 2028.  Indeed, notwithstanding the 25-year limit set forth in Grutter,
neither  university  embraced  any  temporal
limit  on  race-based
affirmative action in higher education, or identified any end date for its
continued use of race in admissions.  Ante, at 30–34.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case regarding affirmative action in higher education. It discusses the history of affirmative action and the Court's precedents on the topic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Supreme Court Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of the Court

ballot  for  his  party’s  presidential  nominee,  thus  tracking
the  State’s  popular  vote.  See  Ray,  343  U. S.,  at  227  (A
pledge requirement “is an exercise of the state’s right to ap-
point electors in such manner” as it chooses).  Or—so long
as  nothing  else  in  the  Constitution  poses  an  obstacle—a
State can add, as Washington did, an associated condition
of appointment: It can demand that the elector actually live
up to his pledge, on pain of penalty.  Which is to say that
the State’s appointment power, barring some outside con-
straint, enables the enforcement of a pledge like Washing-
ton’s.6

And  nothing  in  the  Constitution  expressly  prohibits
States  from  taking  away  presidential  electors’  voting  dis-
cretion as Washington does.  The Constitution is barebones
about  electors.    Article  II  includes  only  the  instruction  to
each  State  to  appoint,  in  whatever  way  it  likes,  as  many
electors as it has Senators and Representatives (except that
the State may not appoint members of the Federal Govern-
ment).  The Twelfth Amendment then tells electors to meet
in their States, to vote for President and Vice President sep-
arately, and to transmit lists of all their votes to the Presi-
dent  of  the  United  States  Senate  for  counting.  Appoint-
ments and procedures and . . . that is all.  See id., at 225.

The Framers could have done it differently; other consti-
tutional drafters of their time did.  In the founding era, two

——————

6 The concurring opinion would have us make fine distinctions among
state laws punishing faithless voting—treating some as conditions of ap-
pointment and others not, depending on small semantic differences.  See
post, at 6–9 (distinguishing, for example, between Oklahoma’s law fining
an  elector  for  violating  his  oath  (to  vote  for  his  party’s  candidate)  and
Washington’s law fining an elector for not voting for his party’s candidate
(whom he took an oath to support)).  The Electors themselves raised no
such argument, and they were right not to do so.  No matter the precise
phrasing,  a  law  penalizing  faithless  voting  (like  a  law  merely  barring
that practice) is an exercise of the State’s power to impose conditions on
the appointment of electors.  See Ray v. Blair, 343 U. S. 154, 227 (1952).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text discussing the legality of Washington's law regarding faithless electors.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Syllabus

acquisition of lands in all the States.”  Id., at 371–372.  Kohl involved
the  condemnation  of  private  land,  but  the  Court  subsequently  made
clear that “[t]he fact that land is owned by a state is no barrier to its
condemnation by the United States.”  Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy
F. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508, 534.  Pp. 7–9.

(2) For as long as the eminent domain power has been exercised
by the United States, it has also been delegated to private parties.  The
Colonies, the States, and the Federal Government have commonly au-
thorized the private condemnation of land for public works.  And in the
years following Kohl, the Court confirmed that private delegatees, like
the  United  States,  can  exercise  the  federal  eminent  domain  power
within the States.  In Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525,
for  example,  the  Court  rejected  a  landowner’s  claim  that  Congress
could not delegate its authority to condemn property necessary to con-
struct a bridge between New York and New Jersey.  Congress had the
sovereign power to construct bridges for interstate commerce, and the
Court confirmed Congress could choose to do so through a corporation.
Id., at 530.  These powers, the Court noted, could be exercised “with or
without  a  concurrent  act  of  the  State  in  which  the  lands  lie.”    Ibid.
Early cases also reflected the understanding that state property was
not  immune  from  the  exercise  of  delegated  federal  eminent  domain
power.  See Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co., 32 F. 9 (Bradley, Cir.
J.).  The contrary position—that a federal delegatee could not condemn
a State’s land without the State’s consent—would give rise to the “di-
lemma of requiring the consent of the state” in virtually every infra-
structure  project  authorized by  the  Federal  Government.  Id.,  at  17.
The  Court  in  Cherokee  Nation  v.  Southern  Kansas  R.  Co.,  135  U.  S.
641,  echoed  Stockton’s  explanation  of  the  superior  eminent  domain
power of the Federal Government when it rejected a challenge to a pri-
vate railroad company’s exercise of the federal eminent domain power
against  land  owned  by  the  Cherokees.    In  reaching  that  result,  the
Court acknowledged that “the national government, in the execution
of its rightful authority, could exercise the power of eminent domain in
the several States,” and the Court labeled as “strange” the notion that
the Federal Government “could not exercise the same power in a Ter-
ritory occupied by an Indian nation or tribe.”  135 U. S., at 656–657.
Pp. 9–11.

(3) Section  717f(h)  delegates  to  certificate  holders  the  power  to
condemn any necessary rights-of-way, including land in which a State
holds an interest.  This delegation of the federal eminent domain au-
thority is consistent with the Nation’s history and this Court’s prece-
dents.  FERC’s issuance to a company of a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity to build a pipeline carries with it the power—if the
company cannot acquire the necessary rights-of-way by contract at an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, likely an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the history and application of eminent domain power, particularly the ability of private parties to exercise this power under delegation from the federal government.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

THOMAS, J., concurring

States, and by the Federal Government.

We  owe  victims  more  than  this  sort  of  pseudoscientific
assessment of their lives.  It is bad enough to tell a mother
that  her  child’s  murder  is  not  “worthy”  of  society’s  ulti-
mate  expression  of  moral  condemnation.    But  to  do  so
based  on  cardboard  stereotypes  or  cold  mathematical
calculations is beyond my comprehension.  In my decades
on  the  Court,  I  have  not  seen  a  capital  crime  that  could
not  be  considered  sufficiently  “blameworthy”  to  merit  a
death  sentence  (even  when  genuine  constitutional  errors
justified a vacatur of that sentence).3

A  small  sample  of  the  applications  for  a  stay  of  execu-
tion  that  have  come  before  the  Court  this  Term  alone
proves my point.  Mark Christeson was due to be executed
in October 2014 for his role in the murder of Susan Brouk
and  her  young  children,  Adrian  and  Kyle.  After  raping

——————

3 For  his  part,  JUSTICE  BREYER  explains  that  his  experience  on  the
Court has shown him “discrepancies for which [he] can find no rational
explanations.”  Post, at 16.  Why, he asks, did one man receive death for
a  single-victim  murder,  while  another  received  life  for  murdering  a
young  mother  and  nearly  killing  her  infant?  Ibid.   The  outcomes  in
those two cases may not be morally compelled, but there was certainly
a  rational  explanation  for  them:  The  first  man,  who  had  previously
confessed  to  another  murder,  killed  a  disabled  man  who  had  offered
him a place to stay for the night.  State v. Badgett, 361 N. C. 234, 239–
240,  644  S. E.  2d  206,  209–210  (2007).    The  killer  stabbed  his  victim’s
throat and prevented him from seeking medical attention until he bled
to death.  Ibid.  The second man expressed remorse for his crimes and
claimed  to  suffer  from  mental  disorders.    See  Charbonneau,  Andre
Edwards Sentenced to Life in Prison for 2001 Murder, WRAL, Mar. 26,
2004,  online  at  http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/109648  (all  Inter-
net  materials  as  visited  June  25,  2015,  and  available  in  Clerk  of  Court’s
case file); Charbonneau, Jury Finds Andre Edwards Guilty of First-Degree
Murder, WRAL, Mar. 23, 2004, online at http://www.wral.com/news/local/
story/109563.    The  other  “discrepancies”  similarly  have  “rational”
explanations,  even  if  reasonable  juries  could  have  reached  different
results.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of *GLOSSIP v. GROSS*. It delves into the ethical considerations surrounding capital punishment and the application of the death penalty.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MERRILL v. MILLIGAN

KAGAN, J., dissenting

usually  to  defeat  the  minority’s  preferred  candidate.”
Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40 (1993) (quoting Thorn-
burg  v.  Gingles,  478  U. S.  30,  50–51  (1986);  alterations
omitted).    If  plaintiffs  satisfy  those  conditions,  they  must
then show that a Section 2 “violation has occurred based on
the  totality  of  the  circumstances.”    Bartlett  v.  Strickland,
556  U. S.  1,  12  (2009)  (plurality  opinion).    Those  circum-
stances include the history of race-based discrimination in
the State (especially as to voting rights), the extent to which
voting is racially polarized, and the extent to which minor-
ity candidates have struggled to get elected to public office.
See Gingles, 478 U. S., at 36–37, 44–45.
  Under  our  precedent,  plaintiffs  have  long  satisfied  the
first Gingles condition—the only condition at issue in Ala-
bama’s stay application—by showing that another “reason-
ably compact” majority-minority district can be drawn, con-
sistent  with  “traditional  districting  principles.”    See,  e.g.,
League  of  United  Latin  American  Citizens  v.  Perry,  548
U. S.  399,  430,  433  (2006)  (LULAC).   Those principles  in-
clude—in addition to compactness—contiguity, respect for
existing  political  subdivisions,  and  the  desire  to  keep  to-
gether  existing  communities  of  interest.2    See  id.,  at  433;
Alabama  Legislative  Black  Caucus  v.  Alabama,  575  U. S.
254, 272 (2015).  To make the requisite showing, plaintiffs
typically submit one or more illustrative, alternative maps
complying  with  traditional  districting  criteria  while  also
adding a majority-minority district.
  The plaintiffs here did just that.  In a seven-day prelimi-
nary  injunction  hearing  with  live  testimony  from  17  wit-
nesses,  they  built  an  extensive  factual  record,  including
substantial evidence going to the ease of creating a second
majority-Black district.  Based on that record, the District

——————

2 Alabama’s  redistricting  guidelines  define  a  “community of  interest”
as  “an  area  with  recognized similarities  of  interests,  including  but  not
limited to ethnic, racial, economic, tribal, social, geographic, or historical
identities.”  App. 46.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Merrill v. Milligan. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to voting rights and redistricting.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BABCOCK v. KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–480.  Argued October 13, 2021—Decided January 13, 2022

This case concerns retirement benefits due under the Social Security Act
for a retired “military technician (dual status),” 10 U. S. C. §10216, a
civilian position formerly held by David Babcock.  Like all dual-status
technicians, Babcock was required to maintain membership in the Na-
tional  Guard.    For  his  full-time  job  as  a  technician,  which  included
work as a test pilot and pilot instructor, Babcock received civil-service
pay and Civil Service Retirement System pension payments from the
Office  of  Personnel  Management.    For  his  separate  National  Guard
service, which included part-time drills, training exercises, and one ac-
tive-duty deployment, Babcock received military pay and military pen-
sion  payments  from  a  different  arm  of  the  Federal  Government,  the
Defense Finance and Accounting Service.  Upon retirement, Babcock
applied to the Social Security Administration for benefits.  The agency
granted Babcock benefits but applied a statutory “windfall elimination
provision” and reduced the amount of benefits to reflect Babcock’s re-
ceipt  of  civil-service  pension  payments  for  his  work  as  a  technician.
Babcock sought reconsideration, arguing that the reduction should not
apply  because  the  pension  payments  at  issue  fell  within  a  statutory
exception for payments “based wholly on service as a member of a uni-
formed service.”  The agency denied reconsideration, and Babcock ex-
hausted available avenues of agency review before filing suit in federal
court.  The District Court upheld the agency’s decision, and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed.

Held: Civil-service  pension  payments  based  on  employment  as  a  dual-
status  military  technician  are  not  payments  based  on  “service  as  a
member of a uniformed service” under 42 U. S. C. §415(a)(7)(A)(III).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the detailed content of the case.
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  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

VIDAL v. ELSTER

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

analogue  may  require  a  different  approach.    Post,  at  15.
But, we need not develop such a comprehensive theory to
address the relatively simple case before us today.  See post,
at 1 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part).

We  conclude  that  the  names  clause  is  of  a  piece  with  a
common-law  tradition  regarding  the  trademarking  of
names.  We see no reason to disturb this longstanding tra-
dition, which supports the restriction of the use of another’s
name in a trademark.

III
Our colleagues would address the names clause with two
analogies.  Neither is compelling in this case.  Under both
analogies, the test would boil down to what a judge believes
is  “reasonable  in  light  of  the  purpose”  of  trademark  law.
Post, at 5 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); see post, at 7–8 (opin-
ion of BARRETT, J.).  But, no matter the approach taken, we
all agree that the names clause does not violate the First
Amendment.

JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  would  pull  “strands  of  precedent”
together to conclude that heightened scrutiny does not ap-
ply  to  trademark  registration  because  it  is  a Government
initiative or benefit.  Post, at 8.  This conclusion rests pri-
marily upon cases in which the Government provides a cash
subsidy or conditions the use of a public payroll to collect
union  dues.   See  ibid.   But,  those  cases  “occupy  a  special
area  of  First  Amendment  case  law,  and  they  are  far  re-
moved  from  the  registration  of  trademarks.”    Tam,  582
The  Government-
U. S.,  at  241  (plurality  opinion).
benefit  cases  are  an  ill  fit  for  the  names  clause,  and  we
would not graft this precedent, which JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR
acknowledges  is  not  controlling,  onto  this  trademark  dis-
pute.  Post, at 8–9.

JUSTICE BARRETT, echoed by JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, would
import the test that we have used for a “limited public fo-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Vidal v. Elster*. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

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OCTOBER TERM, 1997

51

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. BESTFOODS et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit

No. 97–454. Argued March 24, 1998—Decided June 8, 1998

The United States brought this action under § 107(a)(2) of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) against, among others, respondent CPC International Inc.,
the parent corporation of the defunct Ott Chemical Co. (Ott II), for the
costs of cleaning up industrial waste generated by Ott II’s chemical
plant. Section 107(a)(2) authorizes suits against, among others, “any
person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility.” The trial focused on whether CPC, as a parent
corporation, had “owned or operated” Ott II’s plant within the meaning
of § 107(a)(2). The District Court said that operator liability may attach
to a parent corporation both indirectly, when the corporate veil can be
pierced under state law, and directly, when the parent has exerted
power or inﬂuence over its subsidiary by actively participating in, and
exercising control over, the subsidiary’s business during a period of haz-
ardous waste disposal. Applying that test, the court held CPC liable
because CPC had selected Ott II’s board of directors and populated its
executive ranks with CPC ofﬁcials, and another CPC ofﬁcial had played
a signiﬁcant role in shaping Ott II’s environmental compliance policy.
The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although recognizing that a parent com-
pany might be held directly liable under § 107(a)(2) if it actually operated
its subsidiary’s facility in the stead of the subsidiary, or alongside of it
as a joint venturer, that court refused to go further. Rejecting the
District Court’s analysis, the Sixth Circuit explained that a parent cor-
poration’s liability for operating a facility ostensibly operated by its sub-
sidiary depends on whether the degree to which the parent controls the
subsidiary and the extent and manner of its involvement with the facil-
ity amount to the abuse of the corporate form that will warrant piercing
the corporate veil and disregarding the separate corporate entities of
the parent and subsidiary. Applying Michigan veil-piercing law, the
court decided that CPC was not liable for controlling Ott II’s actions,
since the two corporations maintained separate personalities and CPC
did not utilize the subsidiary form to perpetrate fraud or subvert justice.

Held:

1. When (but only when) the corporate veil may be pierced, a parent
corporation may be charged with derivative CERCLA liability for its
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the background of the case, the legal issues involved, and the court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

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236

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

HOHN v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit

No. 96–8986. Argued March 3, 1998—Decided June 15, 1998

Petitioner Hohn ﬁled a motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 to vacate his convic-
tion for “use” of a ﬁrearm during a drug trafﬁcking offense, 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(c)(1), claiming the evidence was insufﬁcient to prove such “use”
under this Court’s intervening decision in Bailey v. United States, 516
U. S. 137. While the motion was pending, Congress enacted the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 102 of which
amends the statutory provision which had required state prisoners to
obtain a certiﬁcate of probable cause before appealing the denial of a
habeas petition. The amended provision speciﬁes, inter alia, that an
appeal may not be taken to a court of appeals from the ﬁnal order in a
§ 2255 proceeding, § 2253(c)(1)(B), unless a circuit justice or judge issues
a certiﬁcate of appealability, § 2253(c)(1), upon a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right, § 2253(c)(2). The District Court de-
nied Hohn’s motion, and he ﬁled a notice of appeal, which the Eighth
Circuit treated as an application for a certiﬁcate of appealability. A
three-judge panel declined to issue a certiﬁcate, ruling that Hohn did
In the panel’s view, Bailey simply interpreted
not satisfy § 2253(c)(2).
§ 924(c)(1), and a district court’s incorrect application of a statute does
not violate the Constitution. Hohn then petitioned for review of the
certiﬁcate denial under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1), which provides in relevant
part that “[c]ases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Su-
preme Court” “[b]y writ of certiorari.” The Government now says that
Hohn’s claim was, in fact, constitutional in nature and asks the Court to
vacate the judgment and remand so the Eighth Circuit can reconsider
in light of this concession. Since both parties argue that this Court has
jurisdiction, an amicus curiae was appointed to argue the contrary
position.

Held: This Court has jurisdiction under § 1254(1) to review denials of ap-
plications for certiﬁcates of appealability by a circuit judge or a court of
appeals panel. Hohn’s certiﬁcate application is a “case in” the Court of
Appeals under § 1254(1) because the word “case,” as used in a statute,
means a court proceeding, suit, or action, Blyew v. United States, 13
Wall. 581, 595; the dispute here is a proceeding seeking relief for an
immediate and redressable injury, i. e., wrongful detention in violation
of the Constitution; and there is adversity as well as the other requisite
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi provide a summary of the case and the Court's decision, and are not considered part of the main body of the legal opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

23

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

“expose them to the fire of public criticism,” id., at 187.

But  this  argument,  which  boils  down  to  a  policy  judg-
ment of questionable validity, cannot vitiate the constitu-
tional  allocation  of  powers.  The  Judicial  Branch  is  sepa-
rate  from  the  political  branches  for  a  reason:  It  has  the
obligation to apply the law to cases and controversies that
come  before  it,  and  concerns  about  the  popular  esteem  of
individual judges—or even the Judiciary as a whole—have
no  place  in  that  analysis.    Our  system  of  Government
could  not  long  survive  absent  adherence  to  the  written
Constitution that formed it.

*

*

*

Although  on  the  surface  these  cases  require  only  a
straightforward  application  of  the  APA,  closer  scrutiny
reveals serious constitutional questions lurking beneath.  I
have “acknowledge[d] the importance of stare decisis to the
stability of our Nation’s legal system.”  “But stare decisis is
only an ‘adjunct’ of our duty as judges to decide by our best
lights what the Constitution means.”  McDonald v. Chicago,
561  U. S.  742,  812  (2010)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in
part  and  concurring  in  judgment)  (citation  omitted).    By
my best lights, the entire line of precedent beginning with
Seminole Rock raises serious constitutional questions and
should be reconsidered in an appropriate case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into constitutional arguments and cites previous legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SANCHEZ ET UX. v. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 20–315.  Argued April 19, 2021—Decided June 7, 2021

Petitioner Jose Santos Sanchez is a citizen of El Salvador who challenges
the  denial  of  his  application  to  become  a  lawful  permanent  resident
(LPR) of the United States.  Sanchez entered the United States unlaw-
fully in 1997.  In 2001, the Government granted him Temporary Pro-
tected Status (TPS).  The TPS program allows foreign nationals of a
country  designated  by  the  Government  as  having  unusually  bad  or
dangerous conditions to live and work in the United States while the
conditions last.  See §1254a.  In 2014, Sanchez applied under §1255 of
the immigration laws to obtain LPR status.  Section 1255 provides a
way for a “nonimmigrant”—a foreign national lawfully present in this
country on a temporary basis—to obtain an “[a]djustment of status” to
LPR.  8 U. S. C. §1255.  The United States Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Services determined Sanchez ineligible for LPR status because he
entered  the  United  States  unlawfully.   Sanchez  successfully  chal-
lenged  that  decision  before  the  District  Court,  which  reasoned  that
Sanchez’s TPS required treating him as if he had been lawfully admit-
ted to the country for purposes of his LPR application.  The Third Cir-
cuit reversed, finding Sanchez’s unlawful entry into the country pre-
cluded his eligibility for LPR status under §1255, notwithstanding his
TPS.

Held: A TPS recipient who entered the United States unlawfully is not
eligible under §1255 for LPR status merely by dint of his TPS.  Section
1255 provides that eligibility for LPR status generally requires an “ad-
mission” into the country— defined to mean “the lawful entry of the
alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.”  §1101(a)(13)(A).  Sanchez did not enter lawfully.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Opinion of the Court

declined to  grant certiorari, 559 U. S. 904 (2010), and de-
nied without prejudice Mississippi’s request for leave to file
a bill of complaint, 559 U. S. 901 (2010).

C
In 2014, Mississippi again sought leave from this Court
to file a bill of complaint against Tennessee, Memphis, and
MLGW.  That is the basis of this suit.  Mississippi’s com-
plaint alleges that MLGW “has forcibly siphoned into Ten-
nessee  hundreds  of  billions  of  gallons  of  high  quality
groundwater  owned  by  Mississippi.”    Complaint  ¶23.    It
says that MLGW’s “mechanical pumping” is to blame and
that  the  “groundwater  taken  by  Defendants  from  within
Mississippi’s borders would have never under normal, nat-
ural circumstances been drawn into Tennessee.”  Id., ¶24.
This “wrongful taking,” the State contends, “is evidenced by
a  substantial  drop  in  pressure  and  corresponding  draw-
down of stored groundwater” in northwest Mississippi, and
by  a  cone  of  depression  extending  miles  into  its  territory.
Id., ¶25.  As a result, Mississippi says, it has to drill its own
wells deeper to access the aquifer, and use more electricity
to pump water to the surface.  Id., ¶54(b).

Mississippi  claims  an  absolute  “ownership”  right  to  all
groundwater  beneath  its  surface—even  after  that  water
has crossed its borders.  See id., ¶¶8–12, 39.  It argues that
Tennessee’s pumping thus amounts to a tortious taking of
property, and it seeks at least $615 million in damages.  See
id., ¶¶55–56.  Mississippi expressly disclaims equitable ap-
portionment, arguing that the “fundamental premise of this
Court’s equitable apportionment jurisprudence—that each
of  the  opposing  States  has  an  equality  of  right  to  use  the
waters at issue—does not apply to this dispute.”  Id., ¶49.

We granted Mississippi leave to file its complaint and ap-
pointed Judge Eugene E. Siler, Jr., of the Sixth Circuit to
serve as Special Master.  He has ably discharged his duties.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations to previous cases, a summary of the current case, and mentions of legal arguments and procedures.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U98

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 721 (1998)

737

Scalia, J., dissenting

(1975).7
It is this same traditional understanding of funda-
mental fairness—dating back centuries to the common-law
plea of autrefois acquit and buttressed by a special interest
in ﬁnality—that undergirds the Double Jeopardy Clause.8

I respectfully dissent.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Souter and Jus-

tice Ginsburg join, dissenting.

I agree with the Court ’s determination that Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), should not be extended, and
its conclusion that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
apply to noncapital sentencing proceedings.
I do not, how-
ever, agree with the Court’s assumption that only a sentenc-
ing proceeding was at issue here.

Like many other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause makes sense only against the backdrop
In
of traditional principles of Anglo-American criminal law.
that tradition, defendants are charged with “offence[s].” A
criminal “offence” is composed of “elements,” which are fac-
tual components that must be proved by the state beyond a
reasonable doubt and submitted (if the defendant so desires)
to a jury. Conviction of an “offence” renders the defendant
eligible for a range of potential punishments, from which a
sentencing authority ( judge or jury) then selects the most

early years as a Nation,” id., at 361, justiﬁed our conclusion “that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged,” id., at 364.

7 In Mullaney, we unanimously extended the protection of Winship to
determinations that go not to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, but simply
to the length of his sentence.
421 U. S., at 697–698; see also Almendarez-
Torres, 523 U. S., at 251–252 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

8 Justice Scalia accurately characterizes the potential consequences of
today’s decision as “sinister.” Post, at 739.
It is not, however, California
that has taken “the ﬁrst steps” down the road the Court follows today.
It was the Court’s decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79
(1986).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Opinion of the Court

§2255(e)’s  “saving  clause,”  which  provides  that  a  federal
prisoner may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus un-
der §2241 if—and only if—§2255’s “remedy by motion is in-
adequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
Invoking  this  clause,  Jones  petitioned  the  U. S.  District
Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of  Arkansas,  the  district
where he was imprisoned, for a writ of habeas corpus under
§2241.

The  District  Court  dismissed  Jones’  habeas  petition  for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit
affirmed.  8 F. 4th 683 (2021).  The Eighth Circuit rejected
Jones’ argument that the saving clause permits recourse to
§2241 to present a §2255(h)-barred claim based on an inter-
vening  decision  of  statutory  interpretation,  as  well  as  his
argument that foreclosing relief on his Rehaif claim would
violate the Suspension Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §9, cl. 2.
In doing so, the Eighth Circuit deepened a split among the
Courts  of  Appeals  about  whether  prisoners  in  Jones’  cir-
cumstances may resort to §2241 via the saving clause.

We granted certiorari.  596 U. S. ___ (2022).  The Solicitor
General then noticed her intent to defend the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s judgment but not its rationale.  We appointed Morgan
Ratner as amicus curiae to argue in support of the Eighth
Circuit’s reasoning.  597 U. S. ___ (2022).  She has ably dis-
charged her responsibilities.

II
Consistent with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, we hold
that §2255(e)’s saving clause does not permit a prisoner as-
serting an intervening change in statutory interpretation to
circumvent  AEDPA’s  restrictions  on  second  or  successive
§2255 motions by filing a §2241 petition.  We begin by con-
sidering  the  role  of  the  saving  clause  in  §2255  prior  to
AEDPA’s  enactment.    We  then  consider  the  impact  of
AEDPA on the statutory scheme.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the Opinion of the Court. It sets the stage for the case by outlining the procedural history, the legal issues at play, and the court's approach to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

29

Opinion of the Court

state  that  she  supervises  Kitchen  Assistants  and  Substi
tutes and “[l]ead[s] and direct[s]” certain other employees,
id., at 12–13.  But under the dissent’s preferred approach,
supervisor status hinges not on formal job titles or “paper
descriptions”  but  on  “specific  facts  about  the  working
relationship.”  Post,  at  20–21  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).

Turning  to  the  “specific  facts”  of  petitioner’s  and  Davis’
working  relationship,  there  is  simply  no  evidence  that
Davis directed petitioner’s day-to-day activities.  The record
indicates  that  Bill  Kimes  (the  general  manager  of  the
Catering  Division)  and  the  chef  assigned  petitioner’s
daily  tasks,  which  were  given  to  her  on  “prep  lists.”    No.
1:06–cv–1452–SEB–JMS,  2008  WL  4247836,  *7  (SD  Ind.,
Sept. 10, 2008); App. 430, 431.  The fact that Davis some
times may have handed prep lists to petitioner, see id., at
74,  is  insufficient  to  confer  supervisor  status,  see  App.  to
Pet.  for  Cert.  92a  (EEOC  Guidance).    And  Kimes—not
Davis—set petitioner’s work schedule.  See App. 431.  See
also id., at 212.

Because  the  dissent  concedes  that  our  approach  in  this
case deprives petitioner of none of the protections that Ti-
tle  VII  offers,  the  dissent’s  critique  is  based  on  nothing
more  than  a  hypothesis  as  to  how  our  approach  might
affect  the  outcomes  of  other  cases—cases  where  an  em
ployee  who cannot  take  tangible  employment  actions,  but
who  does  direct  the  victim’s  daily  work  activities  in  a
meaningful way, creates an unlawful hostile environment,
and  yet  does  not  wield  authority  of  such  a  degree  and
nature  that  the  employer  can  be  deemed  negligent  with
respect  to  the  harassment.    We  are  skeptical  that  there
are a great number of such cases.  However, we are confi
dent  that,  in  every  case,  the  approach  we  take  today  will
be more easily administrable than the approach advocated
by the dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the definition of a supervisor under Title VII. It presents legal arguments and cites case law, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
946

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 13, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  08–1530.  Sirmons  et  al.  v.  Williams.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  354.

No.  08–9822.  Bagley  v.  South  Carolina.  Sup.  Ct.  S.  C.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10386.  Rodriguez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  408.

No.  08–10699.  Fayall  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  448.

No.  08–10799.  Poe  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  1113.

No.  08–10814.  Alberico  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  24.

No.  08–10862.  Castel  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  298  Fed.
Appx.  492.

No. 09–23.  Smith v. United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  1158.

No.  09–32.  Barrett  et  ux.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  1140.

No. 09–53.  Kelley v.  Florida.  Sup. Ct. Fla.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  3  So.  3d  970.

No. 09–133.  Morters v.  Barr et al.  Ct. App. Wis.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Wis.  2d  413,  763  N. W.  2d  560.

No.  09–139.  Everson  v.  Liberty  Mutual  Assurance  Co.

C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–140.  Rushing  v.  Kelly,  Superintendent,  Missis
sippi  State  Penitentiary.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–145.  Barsch  v.  O’Toole  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  637.

No.  09–146.  Anderson  v.  Vanguard  Car  Rental  USA  Inc.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.
Appx.  830.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.

COMER
GORSUCH, J., concurring in part

be described both ways.

Neither do I see why the First Amendment’s Free Exer-
cise Clause should care.  After all, that Clause guarantees
the  free  exercise  of  religion,  not  just  the  right  to  inward
belief  (or  status).    Employment  Div.,  Dept.  of  Human
Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877 (1990).  And
this  Court  has  long  explained  that  government  may  not
“devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to perse-
cute  or  oppress  a  religion  or  its  practices.”  Church  of
Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508  U. S.  520,  547
(1993).  Generally the government may not force people to
choose  between  participation  in  a  public  program  and
their  right  to  free  exercise  of  religion.    See  Thomas  v.
Review  Bd.  of  Indiana  Employment  Security  Div.,  450
U. S.  707,  716  (1981);  Everson  v.  Board  of  Ed.  of  Ewing,
330  U. S.  1,  16  (1947).    I  don’t  see  why  it  should  matter
whether we describe that benefit, say, as closed to Luther-
ans  (status)  or  closed  to  people  who  do  Lutheran  things
(use).  It is free exercise either way.

For these reasons, reliance on the status-use distinction
does not suffice for me to distinguish  Locke v. Davey, 540
U. S. 712 (2004).  See ante, at 12.  In that case, this Court
upheld a funding restriction barring a student from using
a  scholarship  to  pursue  a  degree  in  devotional  theology.
But  can  it  really  matter  whether  the  restriction  in  Locke
was phrased in terms of use instead of status (for was it a
student  who  wanted  a  vocational  degree  in  religion?  or
was it a religious student who wanted the necessary edu-
cation for his chosen vocation?).  If that case can be correct
and distinguished, it seems it might be only because of the
opinion’s claim of a long tradition against the use of public
funds  for  training  of  the  clergy,  a  tradition  the  Court
correctly explains has no analogue here.  Ante, at 13.

Second and for similar reasons, I am unable to join the
footnoted  observation,  ante,  at  14,  n. 3,  that  “[t]his  case
involves express discrimination based on religious identity
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding religious freedom and government benefits.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

21

BREYER, J., dissenting

legal  changes  to  which  the  plurality  points  makes  clear
that those changes cannot effectively stop the abuses that
I have depicted.

First,  the  plurality  points  out  that  in  1976  (a  few
months after this Court decided Buckley) Congress “added
limits  on  contributions  to  political  committees,”  i.e.,  to
PACs.  Ante,  at  11;  accord,  90  Stat.  487  (codified  at  2
U. S. C.  §441a(a)(1)(C)).    But  Example  Three,  the  here
relevant  example,  takes  account  of  those  limits,  namely,
$5,000 to a PAC in any given year.  And it shows that the
per-PAC limit does not matter much when it comes to the
potential  for  circumvention,  as  long  as  party  supporters
can  create  dozens  or  hundreds  of  PACs.    Federal  law
places no upper limit on the number of PACs supporting a
party  or  a  group  of  party  candidates  that  can  be  estab
lished.  And  creating  a  PAC  is  primarily  a  matter  of  pa
perwork, a knowledgeable staff person, and a little time.

Second,  the  plurality  points  out  that  in  1976,  Congress
“also  added  an  antiproliferation  rule  prohibiting  donors
from  creating  or  controlling  multiple  affiliated  political
committees.”  Ante,  at  12.    The  rule  provides  that  “all
contributions  made  by  political  committees  established or
financed or maintained or controlled” by the same corpora
tion, labor organization, person, or group of persons, “shall
be  considered  to  have  been  made  by  a  single  political
committee.”  §441a(a)(5).    But  different  supporters  can
create  different  PACs.   Indeed,  there  were  roughly  2,700
“nonconnected”  PACs  (i.e.,  PACs  not  connected  to  a  spe-
cific corporation or labor union) operating during the 2012
elections.  Ante,  at  24.    In  a  future  without  aggregate
contribution  limits,  far  more  nonconnected  PACs  will
likely  appear.  The  plurality  also  notes  that  the  FEC  can
examine  certain  “ ‘circumstantial  factors,’ ”  such  as  “ ‘com
mon or overlapping membership’ ” or “ ‘similar patterns  of
contributions,’ ” to determine whether a group of PACs are
affiliated.  Ante,  at  25  (quoting  11  CFR  §100.5(g)(4)(ii)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion and provides legal reasoning and examples to support its stance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

21

Opinion of the Court

history, the image of monuments being taken down will be
evocative,  disturbing,  and  divisive.    Cf.  Van  Orden,  545
U. S., at 704 (opinion of BREYER, J.) (“[D]isputes concern-
ing  the  removal  of  longstanding  depictions  of  the  Ten
Commandments  from  public  buildings  across  the  Nation
. . . could thereby create the very kind of religiously based
divisiveness  that  the  Establishment  Clause  seeks  to
avoid”).
  These  four  considerations  show  that  retaining  estab-
lished,  religiously  expressive  monuments,  symbols,  and
practices  is  quite  different  from  erecting  or  adopting  new
ones.  The passage of time gives rise to a strong presump-
tion of constitutionality.

C
  The  role  of  the  cross  in  World  War  I  memorials  is  il-
lustrative  of  each  of  the  four  preceding  considerations.
Immediately following the war, “[c]ommunities across Amer-
ica built memorials to commemorate those who had served
the  nation  in  the  struggle  to  make  the  world  safe  for  de-
mocracy.”  G. Piehler, The American Memory of War, App.
1124.    Although  not  all  of  these  communities  included  a
cross  in  their  memorials,  the  cross  had  become  a  symbol
closely  linked  to  the  war.    “[T]he  First  World  War  wit-
nessed a dramatic change in . . . the symbols used to com-
memorate th[e] service” of the fallen soldiers.  Id., at 1123.
In  the  wake  of  the  war,  the  United  States  adopted  the
cross  as  part  of  its  military  honors,  establishing  the  Dis-
tinguished Service Cross and the Navy Cross in 1918 and

——————

nation  and  thus  removed  “plate[s],  statues  and  other  fittings  from
places  of  worship,”  destroyed  “crosses,  bells,  shrines  and  other,  ‘exter-
nal  signs  of  worship,’ ”  and  altered  “personal  and  place  names  which
had  any  ecclesiastical  connotations  to  more  suitably  Revolutionary
ones.”    Tallett,  Dechristianizing  France:  The  Year  II  and  the  Revolu-
tionary  Experience,  in  Religion,  Society  and  Politics  in  France  Since
1789, pp. 1–2 (F. Tallett & N. Atkin eds. 1991).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

Opinion of the Court

990 (CADC 1977).  While to the modern eye each of these
examples may seem “plainly [to] constitut[e] discrimination
because of biological sex,” post, at 38 (ALITO, J., dissenting),
all were hotly contested for years following Title VII’s en-
actment.  And as with the discrimination we consider today,
many federal judges long accepted interpretations of Title
VII  that  excluded  these  situations.    Cf.  post,  at  21–22
(KAVANAUGH,  J.,  dissenting)  (highlighting  that  certain
lower courts have rejected Title VII claims based on homo-
sexuality  and  transgender  status).    Would  the  employers
have  us  undo  every  one  of  these  unexpected  applications
too?

The  weighty  implications  of  the  employers’  argument
from expectations also reveal why they cannot hide behind
the no-elephants-in-mouseholes canon.  That canon recog-
nizes that Congress “does not alter the fundamental details
of  a  regulatory  scheme  in  vague  terms  or  ancillary  provi-
sions.”  Whitman  v.  American  Trucking  Assns.,  Inc.,  531
U. S.  457,  468  (2001).  But  it  has  no  relevance  here.    We
can’t deny that today’s holding—that employers are prohib-
ited from firing employees on the basis of homosexuality or
transgender  status—is  an  elephant.    But  where’s  the
mousehole?  Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination in
employment is a major piece of federal civil rights legisla-
tion.  It is written in starkly broad terms.  It has repeatedly
produced  unexpected  applications,  at  least  in  the  view  of
those on the receiving end of them.  Congress’s key drafting
choices—to focus on discrimination against individuals and
not  merely  between  groups  and  to  hold  employers  liable
whenever sex is a but-for cause of the plaintiff ’s injuries—
virtually  guaranteed  that  unexpected  applications  would
emerge  over  time.  This  elephant  has  never  hidden  in  a
mousehole; it has been standing before us all along.

With  that,  the  employers  are  left  to  abandon  their  con-
cern for expected applications and fall back to the last line
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in a case. It delves into the interpretation of Title VII and its application to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

EGBERT v. BOULE

Opinion of the Court

traveled more than 7,500 miles.  See id., at 102.

Later  that  afternoon,  Agent  Egbert  observed  one  of
Boule’s  vehicles—a  black  SUV  with  the  license  plate
“SMUGLER”—returning  to  the  Inn.    Agent  Egbert  sus-
pected that Boule’s Turkish guest was a passenger and fol-
lowed  the  SUV  into  the  driveway  so  he  could  check  the
guest’s immigration status.  On Boule’s account, the situa-
tion escalated from there.  Boule instructed Agent Egbert
to leave his property, but Agent Egbert declined.  Instead,
Boule  claims,  Agent  Egbert  lifted  him  off  the  ground  and
threw him against the SUV.  After Boule collected himself,
Agent Egbert allegedly threw him to the ground.  Agent Eg-
bert then checked the guest’s immigration paperwork, con-
cluded that everything was in order, and left.  Later that
evening, Boule’s Turkish guest unlawfully entered Canada
from Smuggler’s Inn.

Boule  lodged  a  grievance  with  Agent  Egbert’s  supervi-
sors,  alleging  that  Agent  Egbert  had  used  excessive  force
and caused him physical injury.  Boule also filed an admin-
istrative claim with Border Patrol pursuant to the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA).  See 28 U. S. C. §2675(a).  Accord-
ing  to  Boule,  Agent  Egbert  retaliated  against  him  while
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, likely from a court opinion. It presents a narrative of events and actions taken by individuals involved in an incident.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

Law of Nations” and to regulate foreign commerce.  U. S.
Const.,  Art.  I.,  §8.    And  it  is  for  the  President  to  resolve
diplomatic disputes and command the armed forces.  Art.
II,  §§2–3.    Foreign  policy  and  national  security  decisions
are  “delicate,  complex,  and  involve  large  elements  of
prophecy”  for  which  “the  Judiciary  has  neither  aptitude,
facilities[,]  nor  responsibility.”  Chicago  &  Southern  Air
Lines,  Inc.  v.  Waterman  S.  S.  Corp.,  333  U. S.  103,  111
(1948)  (Jackson,  J.).  And  I  find  it  difficult  to  imagine  a
case in which a federal court might safely conclude other-
wise.    Take  this  very  lawsuit  by  way  of  example.    The
Kingdom  of  Jordan  considers  it  to  be  “a  ‘grave  affront’  to
its  sovereignty,”  and  the  State  Department  worries  about
its  foreign  policy  implications.  Ante,  at  26.    Whether
American  interests  justify  the  “practical  consequence”  of
offending  another  nation  in  this  way  (or  in  worse  ways
yet) is a question that should be addressed “only by those
directly  responsible  to  the  people  whose  welfare”  such
decisions  “advance  or  imperil.”    Waterman  S.  S.  Corp.,
supra,  at  111.    So  while  I  have  no  quarrel  with  the  dis-
sent’s observation, post, at 15–16, that lower federal courts
are  not  free  to  overrule  Sosa’s  framework  or  treat  it  as
optional, I do know that the analysis Sosa requires should
come out the same way in virtually every case.  If Sosa is
right—and I am sure it is—that federal courts must “inev-
itably”  exercise  “an  element  of  judgment”  about  delicate
questions  of  foreign  affairs  when  deciding  whether  to
create  a  new  cause  of  action,  then  judges  should  exercise
good  judgment  by  declining  the  project  before  we  create
real trouble.

II

Another independent problem lurks here.  This is a suit
by  foreigners  against  a  foreigner  over  the  meaning  of
international  norms.  Respectfully,  I  do  not  think  the
original  understanding  of  the  ATS  or  our  precedent  per-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the scope of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the judiciary's role in interpreting international law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

punished.  The owners of such marks are merely denied cer-
tain additional benefits associated with federal trademark
registration”).

B
Now consider the facts of this case.  Respondent Steve El-
ster  wants  to  sell  shirts  with  the  phrase  TRUMP  TOO
SMALL on them.  He also wants increased trademark pro-
tection by federally registering the phrase.  In the registra-
tion  request,  Elster  explained  that  the  phrase  “invokes  a
memorable exchange between President Trump and Sena-
tor Marco Rubio from a 2016 presidential primary debate,
and  aims  to  ‘convey[ ]  that  some  features  of  President
Trump  and  his  policies  are  diminutive.’ ”  In re  Elster,  26
F. 4th 1328, 1330 (CA Fed. 2022) (alteration in original).

When the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office rejected the
registration request, it denied Elster the opportunity to se-
cure  the  Government-bestowed  benefits  associated  with
registration.  Critically,  the  denial  did  not  prevent  Elster
from communicating his message.  It also did not restrict
his preferred mode of expression.  Elster can still sell shirts
displaying the same message.  Elster could also use a dif-
ferent  phrase  (such  as  ELSTER  APPAREL)  as  a  source
identifier to obtain the desired benefits of registration while
continuing to sell shirts with his preferred message across
the  front.  See  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  23–24  (discussing  “Elster
Apparel” example).  Put simply, the denial only barred El-
ster from registering a mark asserting exclusive rights in
another person’s name without their written consent.

III
A
Because  trademark  registration  criteria  limit  statutory
benefits  in  a  necessarily  content-based  scheme,  the  First
Amendment  requires  the  criteria  to  be  viewpoint  neutral
and reasonable.  Supra, at 5–9; Brunetti, 588 U. S., at 424
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case. It discusses trademark law, free speech, and the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

weapon is unlikely to use that weapon in violent ways.

B
If  we  were  to  abandon  the  categorical  approach,  the
facts of Johnson’s offense would satisfy the residual clause
as  well.  According  to  the  record  in  this  case,  Johnson
possessed  his  sawed-off  shotgun  while  dealing  drugs.
When  police  responded  to  reports  of  drug  activity  in  a
parking  lot,  they  were  told  by  two  people  that  “Johnson
and  another  individual  had  approached  them  and  offered
to  sell  drugs.”  PSR  ¶45.    The  police  then  searched  the
vehicle  where  Johnson  was  seated  as  a  passenger,  and
they  found  a  sawed-off  shotgun  and  five  bags  of  mari-
juana.  Johnson admitted that the gun was his.

Understood in this context, Johnson’s conduct posed an
acute  risk  of  physical  injury  to  another.    Drugs  and  guns
are never a safe combination.  If one of his drug deals had
gone  bad  or  if  a  rival  dealer  had  arrived  on  the  scene,
Johnson’s  deadly  weapon  was  close  at  hand.  The  sawed-
off nature of the gun elevated the risk of collateral damage
beyond  any  intended  targets.  And  the  location  of  the
crime—a  public  parking  lot—significantly  increased  the
chance  that  innocent  bystanders  might  be  caught  up  in
the  carnage.    This  is  not  a  case  of  “mere  possession”  as
Johnson  suggests.    Brief  for  Petitioner  i.  He  was  not
storing the  gun in a safe, nor was it a family heirloom or
collector’s item.  He illegally possessed the weapon in case
he needed to use it during another crime.  A judge or jury
could  thus  conclude  that  Johnson’s  offense  qualified  as  a
violent felony.

There should be no doubt that Samuel Johnson was an
armed  career  criminal.  His  record  includes  a  number  of
serious felonies.  And he has been caught with dangerous
weapons on numerous occasions.  That this case has led to
the  residual  clause’s  demise  is  confounding.  I  only  hope
that  Congress  can  take  the  Court  at  its  word  that  either
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Johnson v. United States. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding the classification of Johnson's crime as a violent felony.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>