<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

of  every  Englishman.”  1  Blackstone  123.  And  he  formu-
lated  those absolute  rights  as  “the  right  of  personal  secu-
rity,” which included the right to life; “the right of personal
liberty”;  and  “the  right  of  private  property.”  Id.,  at  125.
He defined “the right of personal liberty” as “the power of
loco-motion,  of  changing  situation,  or  removing  one’s
person  to  whatsoever  place  one’s  own  inclination  may
direct;  without  imprisonment  or  restraint,  unless  by  due
course of law.”  Id., at 125, 130.2

The  Framers  drew  heavily  upon  Blackstone’s  formula-
tion, adopting provisions in early State Constitutions that
replicated  Magna  Carta’s  language,  but  were  modified  to
refer  specifically  to  “life,  liberty,  or  property.”3    State
——————

2 The  seeds  of  this  articulation  can  also  be  found  in  Henry  Care’s
influential  treatise,  English  Liberties.    First  published  in  America  in
1721,  it  described  the  “three  things,  which  the  Law  of  England  . . .
principally  regards  and  taketh  Care  of,”  as  “Life,  Liberty  and  Estate,”
and described habeas corpus as the means by which one could procure
one’s “Liberty” from imprisonment.  The Habeas Corpus Act, comment.,
in  English  Liberties,  or  the  Free-born  Subject’s  Inheritance  185  (H.
Care comp. 5th ed. 1721).  Though he used the word “Liberties” by itself
more  broadly,  see,  e.g.,  id.,  at  7,  34,  56,  58,  60,  he  used  “Liberty”  in  a
narrow  sense  when  placed  alongside  the  words  “Life”  or  “Estate,”  see,
e.g., id., at 185, 200.

3 Maryland,  North  Carolina,  and  South  Carolina  adopted  the  phrase
“life,  liberty,  or  property”  in  provisions  otherwise  tracking  Magna
Carta: “That no freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized
of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any
manner  destroyed,  or  deprived  of  his  life,  liberty,  or  property,  but  by
the  judgment  of  his  peers,  or  by  the  law  of  the  land.”    Md.  Const.,
Declaration of Rights, Art. XXI (1776), in 3 Federal and State Constitu-
tions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws 1688 (F. Thorpe ed.
1909);  see  also  S. C.  Const.,  Art.  XLI  (1778),  in  6  id.,  at  3257;  N. C.
Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XII (1776), in 5 id., at 2788.  Massa-
chusetts  and  New  Hampshire  did  the  same,  albeit  with  some  altera-
tions  to  Magna  Carta’s  framework:  “[N]o  subject  shall  be  arrested,
imprisoned,  despoiled,  or  deprived  of  his  property,  immunities,  or
privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his
life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the
land.”  Mass.  Const.,  pt.  I,  Art.  XII  (1780),  in  3  id.,  at  1891;  see  also
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and discusses concepts of individual rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.

Syllabus

ernment program.  Pp. 6–15.

(a) The  Policy  Requirement  mandates  that  recipients  of  federal
funds explicitly agree with the Government’s policy to oppose prosti-
tution.  The  First  Amendment,  however,  “prohibits  the  government
from telling people what they must say.”  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Ac-
ademic  and  Institutional  Rights,  Inc.,  547  U. S.  47,  61.    As  a  direct
regulation,  the  Policy  Requirement  would  plainly  violate  the  First
Amendment.  The question is whether the Government may nonethe-
less  impose  that  requirement  as  a  condition  of  federal  funding.
Pp. 6–7.

(b) The  Spending  Clause  grants  Congress  broad  discretion  to  fund
private  programs  or  activities  for  the  “general  Welfare,”  Art. I,  §8,
cl. 1, including authority to impose limits on the use of such funds to
ensure they are used in the manner Congress intends.  Rust v. Sulli-
van, 500 U. S. 173, 195, n. 4.  As a general matter, if a party objects
to  those  limits,  its  recourse  is  to  decline  the  funds.    In  some  cases,
however,  a  funding  condition  can  result  in  an  unconstitutional  bur-
den  on  First  Amendment  rights.  The  distinction  that  has  emerged
from this Court’s cases is between conditions that define the limits of
the Government spending program—those that specify the activities
Congress  wants  to  subsidize—and  conditions  that  seek  to  leverage
funding  to  regulate  speech  outside  the  contours  of  the  federal  pro-
gram itself.

Rust illustrates the distinction.  In that case, the Court considered
Title X of the  Public Health Service Act, which authorized grants to
health-care  organizations  offering  family  planning  services,  but  pro-
hibited federal funds from being “used in programs where abortion is
a method of family planning.”  500 U. S., at 178.  To enforce the pro-
vision, HHS regulations barred Title X projects from advocating abor-
tion  and  required  grantees  to  keep  their  Title  X  projects  separate
from  their  other  projects.  The  regulations  were  valid,  the  Court  ex-
plained, because they governed only the scope of the grantee’s Title X
projects,  leaving  the  grantee  free  to  engage  in  abortion  advocacy
through  programs  that  were  independent  from  its  Title  X  projects.
Because the regulations did not prohibit speech “outside the scope of
the  federally  funded  program,”  they  did  not  run  afoul  of  the  First
Amendment.  Id., at 197.  Pp. 7–11.

(c) The  distinction  between  conditions  that  define  a  federal  pro-
gram  and  those  that  reach  outside  it  is  not  always  self-evident,  but
the  Court  is  confident  that  the  Policy  Requirement  falls  on  the  un-
constitutional  side  of  the  line.    To  begin,  the  Leadership  Act’s  other
funding  condition,  which  prohibits  Leadership  Act  funds  from  being
used “to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitu-
tion or sex trafficking,” §7631(e), ensures that federal funds will not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus or a legal case summary. It outlines the arguments and reasoning behind a Supreme Court case, focusing on the constitutionality of a funding condition related to opposing prostitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

x

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Barnes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barnes v. Keane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barnes v. Maloney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barnett v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barnett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barr v. Texas Comm’n on Judicial Conduct
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barram; Palmer v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barreras; Duncan v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barrett; Bradford v.
Barrios; Smith v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barth v. Public Service Electric and Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bates v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Battle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Batts v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Batts, Inc.; Coleman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baumgard v. United States
Baxter Healthcare Corp.; Tallakson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bayer; Johnstone v.
Bayless v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bayon v. Cisek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bays v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bazzetta v. Yukins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beachy v. Boise Cascade Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bearden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn. v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beaver; Rayonier Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beavers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beck v. Prupis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beckham v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beeson v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Behdani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . .
Belcher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bell v. Coe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bell; Coe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bell; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bell; King v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bell v. Nero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bell v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bell v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bell; Utley v.
Bell Atlantic Corp.; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bell Atlantic Global Wireless, Inc.; Allen-Sesker v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
Bello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1001
1027
1075
1040
1111
1020
1002
1132
1084
1024
1004
1115
1022
1021
1071
1109
1033
1058
1061
1024
1090
1099
1021
1129
1037
1095
1121
494
1095
1077
1026
1099
1032
1034
1084
1004
1041
1057
1102
1010,1031,1081,1145
1073
1131
1054
1010,1118,1145

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

877

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–68.  Odomes  v.  Louisiana.  Sup.  Ct.  La.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  6  So.  3d  790.

No.  09–72.  Brocail  v.  Detroit  Tigers,  Inc.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,
14th  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  268  S. W.  3d  90.

No.  09–73.  Lundeby  v.  Bruinsma,  Executive  Director,
Thomas J. Frederick Juvenile Justice Center, South Bend,
Indiana,  Custodian,  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–81.  Williams Controls, Inc. v.  Cuesta et al., Indi
vidually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated.
Sup.  Ct.  Okla.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  209  P.  3d
278.

No.  09–83.  Poo-Bah  Enterprises,  Inc.,  dba  Crazy  Horse
Too  v.  Cook  County,  Illinois,  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Ill.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  232  Ill.  2d  463,  905  N.  E.  2d  781.

No.  09–85.  Hani  Chen  v.  City  of  New  York,  New  York,
et  al.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.  N.  Y.,  2d  Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  54  App.  Div.  3d  797,  863  N.  Y.  S. 2d  373.

No. 09–87.  Martinez, Individually and as Personal Rep
resentative  of  the  Estate  of  Ginn  v.  Beggs,  Sheriff,
Cleveland  County,  Oklahoma,  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  1082.

No.  09–90.  Pierce  et  al.  v.  San  Diego  Unified  Port  Dis
trict.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340
Fed.  Appx.  351.

No. 09–92.  Davis et vir v.  Commissioner of Internal Rev
enue.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  301
Fed.  Appx.  398.

No.  09–93.  Anapoell  v.  American  Express  Business  Fi

nance  Corp.  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–96.  Sommers,  Executrix  of  the  Estate  of  Som
mers,  Deceased  v.  Sommers  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Ind.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  898  N.  E.  2d  1234.

No.  09–97.  Ritchie  et  al.  v.  Vast  Resources,  Inc.  C.  A.

Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  1334.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, courts, and dates. This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is more suitable for a legal database or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

BREYER, J., dissenting

onlookers would understand GLIB as “contribut[ing] some-
thing  to”  the  parade’s  “common  theme,”  the  order  “essen-
tially requir[ed]” the Veterans Council “to alter the expres-
sive content of their parade.”   Id., at 572–573, 576.  That
violated the First Amendment.  Id., at 573.

The First Amendment violation in this case is even more
apparent.  In  Hurley,  the  Veterans  Council  had  merely
“combin[ed] multifarious voices” of disparate groups with-
out  bothering  to  “isolate  an  exact  message,”  yet  the  First
Amendment  protected  its  message  from  government-
compelled distortion all the same.  Id., at 569.  Respondents
in  this  case  have  done  the  Veterans  Council  one  better.
They have carefully constructed a cogent message and mar-
shaled their clearly identified foreign affiliates to express it
across the globe.  See supra, at 7–8, 10.
  Furthermore,  in  Hurley  we  could  only  speculate  about
what  GLIB’s  exact  message  was  and  why  the  Veterans
Council did not want to be associated with it.  See 515 U. S.,
at 574–575.  But here we know exactly what the challenged
message  is  (“a  policy  explicitly  opposing  prostitution  and
sex trafficking”) and why respondents don’t want to be as-
sociated with it (the message, among other things, purport-
edly  “ ‘stigmatizes  one  of  the  very  groups  whose  trust  [re-
spondents]  must  earn  to  conduct  effective  HIV/AIDS
prevention’ ”).  22 U. S. C. §7631(f ); Brief for Respondents
11.  For that reason as well, the First Amendment injury in
this case is open, obvious, and unusually well defined.

True, Hurley and our other speech-misattribution cases
dealt with a speaker complaining about being forced to af-
filiate  with  someone  else’s  speech,  rather  than  (as  here)
their pre-existing affiliate being forced to speak.  Cf. ante,
at 6.  But that factual distinction makes no constitutional
difference.  From a First Amendment perspective, the latter
situation is just as bad or even worse, not better.

Consider Hurley again.  If, rather than requiring the Vet-
erans Council to let GLIB march while carrying its banner,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 598 (2000)

607

Opinion of the Court

the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribu-
tion of marital property, or child custody decree.”

Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or
more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.
“The
powers of the legislature are deﬁned and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitu-
tion is written.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176
(1803) (Marshall, C. J.). Congress explicitly identiﬁed the
sources of federal authority on which it relied in enacting
§ 13981.
It said that a “Federal civil rights cause of action”
is established “[p]ursuant to the afﬁrmative power of Con-
gress . . . under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of
the Constitution.”
42 U. S. C. § 13981(a). We address Con-
gress’ authority to enact this remedy under each of these
constitutional provisions in turn.

II

Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of
Government demands that we invalidate a congressional
enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has
exceeded its constitutional bounds. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U. S., at 568, 577–578 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
United States v. Harris, 106 U. S., at 635. With this pre-
sumption of constitutionality in mind, we turn to the ques-
tion whether § 13981 falls within Congress’ power under
Article I, § 8, of the Constitution. Brzonkala and the United
States rely upon the third clause of the section, which gives
Congress power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”

As we discussed at length in Lopez, our interpreta-
tion of the Commerce Clause has changed as our Nation
has developed. See 514 U. S., at 552–557; id., at 568–574
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id., at 584, 593–599 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). We need not repeat that detailed review of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 598 (2000). It discusses the constitutionality of a federal civil rights cause of action under the Commerce Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
44

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

STEVENS, J., dissenting

English  guarantee,  Brief  for  United  States  in  United
States v. Miller, O. T. 1938, No. 696, pp 12–13; it also cited
Blackstone, id., at 9, n. 2, Cooley, id., at 12, 15, and Story,
id., at 15.  The Court is reduced to critiquing the number
of pages the Government devoted to exploring the English
legal  sources.  Only  two  (in  a  brief  21  pages  in  length)!
Would the Court be satisfied with four?  Ten?

The  Court  is  simply  wrong  when  it  intones  that  Miller
contained  “not  a  word”  about  the  Amendment’s  history.
Ante,  at  52.  The  Court  plainly  looked  to  history  to  con
strue the term “Militia,” and, on the best reading of Miller,
the  entire  guarantee  of  the  Second  Amendment.  After
noting  the  original  Constitution’s  grant  of  power  to  Con
gress  and  to  the  States  over  the  militia,  the  Court  ex
plained:

“With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and
render  possible  the  effectiveness  of  such  forces  the
declaration  and  guarantee  of  the  Second  Amendment
were  made.    It  must  be  interpreted  and  applied  with
that end in view.

“The  Militia  which  the  States  were  expected  to
maintain  and  train  is  set  in  contrast  with  Troops
which  they  were  forbidden  to  keep  without  the  con
sent of Congress.  The sentiment of the time strongly
disfavored  standing  armies;  the  common  view  was
that  adequate  defense  of  country  and  laws  could  be
secured  through  the  Militia—civilians  primarily,  sol
diers on occasion.

“The signification attributed to the term Militia ap
pears from the debates in the Convention, the history
and  legislation  of  Colonies  and  States,  and  the  writ
ings of approved commentators.”  Miller, 307 U. S., at
178–179.

The  majority  cannot  seriously  believe  that  the  Miller
Court did not consider any relevant evidence; the majority
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the case District of Columbia v. Heller. It argues against the majority opinion and cites previous legal cases and historical context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

333.  Expanding on this theme, Harvard and UNC have of-
fered a grab bag of interests to justify their programs, span-
ning from “ ‘training future leaders in the public and private
sectors’ ”  to  “ ‘enhancing  appreciation,  respect,  and  empa-
thy,’ ” with references to “ ‘better educating [their] students
through diversity’ ” in between.  Ante, at 22–23.  The Court
today finds that each of these interests are too vague and
immeasurable to suffice, ibid., and I agree.
  Even in Grutter, the Court failed to clearly define “the ed-
ucational benefits of a diverse student body.”  539 U. S., at
333.  Thus, in the years since Grutter, I have sought to un-
derstand  exactly  how  racial  diversity  yields  educational
benefits.  With nearly 50 years to develop their arguments,
neither Harvard nor UNC—two of the foremost research in-
stitutions in the world—nor any of their amici can explain
that critical link.

Harvard, for example, offers a report finding that mean-
ingful representation of racial minorities promotes several
goals.  Only one of those goals—“producing new knowledge
stemming from diverse outlooks,” 980 F. 3d 157, 174 (CA1
2020)—bears any possible relationship to educational ben-
efits.  Yet, it too is extremely vague and offers no indication
that, for example, student test scores increased as a result
of Harvard’s efforts toward racial diversity.

More fundamentally, it is not clear how racial diversity,
as opposed to other forms of diversity, uniquely and inde-
pendently  advances  Harvard’s  goal.    This  is  particularly
true because Harvard blinds itself to other forms of appli-
cant diversity, such as religion.  See 2 App. in No. 20–1199,
pp. 734–743.  It may be the case that exposure to different
perspectives and thoughts can foster debate, sharpen young
minds, and hone students’ reasoning skills.  But, it is not
clear how diversity with respect to race, qua race, furthers
this goal.  Two white students, one from rural Appalachia
and  one  from  a  wealthy  San  Francisco  suburb,  may  well
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It argues against the use of race as a factor in college admissions, citing a lack of clear evidence demonstrating the educational benefits of racial diversity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

BIDEN v. MISSOURI

Per Curiam

granted.

The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri’s
November  29,  2021,  order  granting  a  preliminary  injunc-
tion is stayed pending disposition of the Government’s ap-
peal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit and the disposition of the Government’s petition for
a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.  Should the
petition for a writ of  certiorari be denied, this order shall
terminate  automatically.  In  the  event  the  petition  for  a
writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon
the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

The District Court for the Western District of Louisiana’s
November  30,  2021,  order  granting  a  preliminary  injunc-
tion is stayed pending disposition of the Government’s ap-
peal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit and the disposition of the Government’s petition for a
writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.  Should the
petition for a writ of  certiorari be denied, this order shall
terminate  automatically.  In  the  event  the  petition  for  a
writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon
the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a Supreme Court order. It contains legal jargon and references to court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Court Order</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

contribute  only  a  small  fraction  of  their  campaign  funds
to  other  candidates.  Authorized  candidate  committees
may support other candidates up to a $2,000 base limit.  2
U. S. C.  §432(e)(3)(B).    In  the  2012  election,  House  candi-
dates spent a total of $1.1 billion.  Candidate-to-candidate
contributions  among  House  candidates  totaled  $3.65
million, making up just 0.3% of candidates’ overall spend-
ing.  NRSC  Brief  29.  The  most  that  any  one  individual
candidate  received  from  all  other  candidates  was  around
$100,000.  Brief  for  Appellee  39.    The  fact  is  that  candi-
dates  who  receive  campaign  contributions  spend  most  of
the money on themselves, rather than passing along dona-
tions  to  other  candidates.  In  this  arena  at  least,  charity
begins at home.10

Based  on  what  we  can  discern  from  experience,  the
indiscriminate  ban  on  all  contributions  above  the  aggre-
gate  limits  is  disproportionate  to  the  Government’s  inter-
est in preventing circumvention.  The Government has not
given  us  any  reason  to  believe  that  parties  or  candidates
would  dramatically  shift  their  priorities  if  the  aggregate
limits  were  lifted.  Absent  such  a  showing,  we  cannot
conclude that the sweeping aggregate limits are appropri-
ately  tailored  to  guard  against  any  contributions  that
might
implicate  the  Government’s  anticircumvention
interest.

A final point: It is worth keeping in mind that the base
limits themselves are a prophylactic measure.  As we have
——————

10 In  addition,  the  percentage  of  contributions  above  the  aggregate
limits  that  even  could be used for circumvention is limited  by the fact
that  many  of  the  modes  of  potential  circumvention  can  be  used  only
once  each  election.    For  example,  if  one  donor  gives  $2,600  to  100
candidates with safe House seats in the hopes that each candidate will
reroute  $2,000  to  Representative  Smith,  a  candidate  in  a  contested
district, no other donor can do the same, because the candidates in the
safe seats will have exhausted their permissible contributions to Smith.
So there is no risk that the circumvention scheme will repeat itself with
multiple other would-be donors to Smith.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in the case of McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. It discusses campaign finance regulations and the limits on contributions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
THOMAS, J., dissenting

It carries with it “no incidental power, nor does it draw after
it any consequences of that kind.”  Id., at 168.  Monroe pro-
ceeded  to  carefully  distinguish  the  spending  power  from
Congress’ authority to impose obligations and duties: “[T]he
use or application of the money after it is raised is a power
altogether of a different character” from Congress’ enumer-
ated regulatory powers such as the taxing power; “[i]t im-
poses no burden on the people, nor can it act on them in a
sense to take power from the States.”  Id., at 164.

Applying this understanding of the spending power to the
question of internal improvements, Monroe explained that
Congress  could  only  “appropriate  the  money  necessary  to
make them.”  Id., at 168.  Where none of Congress’ enumer-
ated regulatory powers was applicable, Monroe concluded,
“[f]or every act requiring legislative sanction or support the
State authority must be relied on.”  Ibid.  Thus, Congress
could not itself pass laws providing for “[t]he condemnation
of  the  land,  . . .  the  establishment  of  turnpikes  and  tolls,
and the protection of the work when finished.”  Ibid.

Monroe’s  summation  of  the  federal  spending  power,  re-
flecting that it does not carry with it any regulatory power,
was accepted throughout the 19th century by friends and
foes of federal power alike.  In his 1825 inaugural address,
President  John  Quincy  Adams  explained  that  Monroe’s
Views  had  “conciliated  the  sentiments  and  approximated
the opinions of enlightened minds upon the question of con-
stitutional power.”  Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1825, in 5
American State Papers, Foreign Relations 753, 755 (1858).
Five  years  later,  President  Andrew  Jackson  vetoed  the
Maysville  Road  Bill  of  1830  for  the  same  reasons  Monroe
had  vetoed  the  Cumberland  Road  Bill  of  1822:  Congress
lacks “[t]he right to exercise as much jurisdiction as is nec-
essary to preserve the works and to raise funds by the col-
lection of tolls to keep them in repair,” and “[w]ithout [such
power]  nothing  extensively  useful  can  be  effected.”    Rich-
ardson 492.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge named Thomas. It discusses the spending power of Congress and cites historical precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgement</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

MOYLE v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

III
Even if the Court is unwilling to decide the statutory in-
terpretation  question,  there  is  no  excuse  for  vacating  the
stay of the preliminary injunction.  In order to obtain that
injunction, the Government was required to make a strong
showing  that  it  was  likely  to  prevail  on  the  merits.    See
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U. S. 674, 690 (2008).  And as I have
explained, its argument was almost certain to lose.  That in
itself  is  sufficient  to  preclude  continuation  of  the  prelimi-
nary injunction.

Why then have six Justices voted to vacate the stay?  The
per curiam itself provides no explanation.  In separate opin-
ions, three of the six agree with the Government’s interpre-
tation of EMTALA, see supra, at 15, n. 17, and that at least
is an explanation that would make sense if the premise (the
correctness  of  the  Government’s  interpretation)  were
sound.  As for the remaining three, their only explanation
is that “the injunction will not stop Idaho from enforcing its
law in the vast majority of circumstances” and that there-
fore Idaho cannot show that it will be irreparably harmed
by  allowing  the  injunction  to  remain  in  place  during  the
pendency of the appeal.  Ante, at 7 (BARRETT, J., joined by
ROBERTS, C. J., and KAVANAUGH, J., concurring).  That jus-
tification is patently unsound.  “ ‘[A]ny time a State is en-
joined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by rep-
resentatives  of  its  people,  it  suffers  a  form  of  irreparable
injury.’ ”  Maryland  v.  King,  567  U. S.  1301,  1303  (2012)
(ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers).  And in this case, Idaho’s in-
jury is not abstract.  As I will explain, it is very likely that

——————
apply to Spending Clause measures or how Idaho can be bound by con-
ditions to which it has never agreed.

JUSTICE JACKSON’s opinion adds nothing to JUSTICE KAGAN’s legal anal-
ysis, but she reads my opinion to suggest “that States have free rein to
nullify federal law.”  Ante, at 7 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part).  Anyone who reads my opinion can see that it makes no such
suggestion but simply explains what the federal law in question means.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, likely from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

GOLAN v. HOLDER

BREYER, J., dissenting

understanding  that  they  were  “simply  according  formal
recognition  to  what  was  already  inherent  in  the  ‘very
nature  of  things’ ”);  S.  Stewart,  International  Copyright
and Neighbouring Rights 6–7 (2d ed. 1989) (describing the
European system of droit d’auteur).

This  utilitarian  understanding  of  the  Copyright  Clause
has long been reflected in the Court’s case law.  In Mazer,
for  example,  the  Court  refers  to  copyright  as  embodying
the  view  that  “encouragement  of  individual  effort  by  per-
sonal  gain  is  the  best  way  to  advance  public  welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors.”  347 U. S.,
at  219  (emphasis  added).    In  Twentieth  Century  Music
Corp.  v.  Aiken,  422  U. S.  151  (1975),  the  Court  says  that
underlying copyright is the understanding that “[c]reative
work  is  to  be  encouraged  and  rewarded,  but  private  moti-
vation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”
Id., at 156 (emphasis added).  And in Sony Corp. of Amer-
ica v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417 (1984), the
Court, speaking of both copyrights and patents, points out
that  the  “monopoly  privileges  that  Congress  may  author
ize  are  . . .  [not]  primarily  designed  to  provide  a  special
private  benefit.  Rather,  the  limited  grant  is  a  means  by
which an important public purpose may be achieved.  It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by
the  provision  of  a  special  reward.”  Id.,  at  429  (emphasis
added); see also, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City,  383  U. S.  1,  6  (1966)  (The  “constitutional  command
. . . ‘[to] promote the Progress [of Science]’ . . . is the stand-
ard  expressed  in  the  Constitution  and  it  may  not  be  ig
nored”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932)
(“The  sole  interest  of  the  United  States  . . .  lie[s]  in  the
general  benefits  derived  by  the  public  from  the  labors  of
authors”).

Congress  has  expressed  similar  views  in  congressional
Reports  on  copyright  legislation.    Thus,  for  example,  an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history and purpose of copyright law, citing previous cases and congressional reports.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

31

ALITO, J., dissenting

(or credentials) for immorality, moral turpitude, or unpro-
fessionalism,”  and,  the  survey  added,  “[h]omosexuality  is
considered to fall within all three categories.”25

The situation in California is illustrative.  California laws
prohibited  individuals  who  engaged  in  “immoral  conduct”
(which was construed to include homosexual behavior), as
well as those convicted of “sex offenses” (like sodomy), from
employment as teachers.  Cal. Educ. Code Ann.  §§13202,
13207, 13209, 13218, 13255 (West 1960).  The teaching cer-
tificates of individuals convicted of engaging in homosexual
acts were revoked.  See, e.g., Sarac v. State Bd. of Ed., 249
Cal. App. 2d 58, 62–64, 57 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72–73 (1967) (up-
holding  revocation  of  secondary  teaching  credential  from
teacher who was convicted of engaging in homosexual con-
duct on public beach), overruled in part, Morrison v. State
Bd. of Ed., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P. 2d 375 (1969).

In Florida, the legislature enacted laws authorizing the
revocation of teaching certificates for “misconduct involving
moral  turpitude,”  Fla.  Stat.  Ann.  §229.08(16)  (1961),  and
this law was used to target homosexual conduct.  In 1964,
a legislative committee was wrapping up a 6-year campaign
to  remove  homosexual  teachers  from  public  schools  and
state  universities.  As  a  result  of  these  efforts,  the  state
board of education apparently revoked at least 71 teachers’
certificates and removed at least 14 university professors.
Eskridge, Dishonorable Passions, at 103.

Individuals  who  engaged  in  homosexual  acts  also  faced
the loss of other occupational licenses, such as those needed
to work as a “lawyer, doctor, mortician, [or] beautician.”26
See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1970) (at-
torney disbarred after conviction for homosexual conduct in

——————

25 Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosex-

ual Persons in the United States, 30 Hastings L. J. 799, 861 (1979).

26 Eskridge,  Challenging  the  Apartheid  of  the  Closet:  Establishing
Conditions  for  Lesbian  and  Gay  Intimacy,  Nomos,  and  Citizenship,
1961–1981, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 817, 819 (1997).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal codes and previous court cases, indicating it is part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

41

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

Mississippi’s own record illustrates how little facts on the
ground have changed since Roe and Casey, notwithstanding
the majority’s supposed “modern developments.”  Ante, at
33.  Sixty-two percent of pregnancies in Mississippi are un-
planned, yet Mississippi does not require insurance to cover
contraceptives and prohibits educators from demonstrating
proper  contraceptive  use.19    The  State  neither  bans  preg-
nancy discrimination nor requires provision of paid paren-
tal  leave.  Brief  for  Yale  Law  School  Information  Society
Project  as  Amicus  Curiae  13  (Brief  for  Yale  Law  School);
Brief for National Women’s Law Center et al. as Amici Cu-
riae 32.  It has strict eligibility requirements for Medicaid
and nutrition assistance, leaving many women and families
without basic medical care or enough food.  See Brief for 547
Deans,  Chairs,  Scholars  and  Public  Health  Professionals
et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  32–34  (Brief  for  547  Deans).    Alt-
hough 86 percent of pregnancy-related deaths in the State
are  due  to  postpartum  complications,  Mississippi  rejected
federal funding to provide a year’s worth of Medicaid cover-
age  to  women  after  giving  birth.    See  Brief  for  Yale  Law
School 12–13.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, health outcomes in
Mississippi are abysmal for both women and children.  Mis-
sissippi has the highest infant mortality rate in the country,

——————
the 1970s, long before Casey.  Today, 60 percent of women seeking abor-
tions have at least one child, and one-third have two or more.  See CDC,
K. Kortsmit et al., Abortion Surveillance—United States, 2019, 70 Mor-
bidity and Mortality Weekly Report 6 (2021).  These women know, even
as they choose to have an abortion, what it is to look at a sonogram image
and to value a fetal life.

19 Guttmacher Institute, K. Kost, Unintended Pregnancy Rates at the
State Level: Estimates for 2010 and Trends Since 2002, Table 1 (2015),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/stateup10.pdf;
Kaiser,  State  Requirements  for  Insurance  Coverage  of  Contraceptives
(May 1, 2022), https://www.kff.org/state-category/womens-health/family-
planning; Miss. Code Ann. §37–13–171(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 2021) (“In no
case shall the instruction or program include any demonstration of how
condoms or other contraceptives are applied”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It cites statistics and legal arguments to support its position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

27

JACKSON, J., dissenting

till it by our own labor.’ ”104

Today’s gaps exist because that freedom was denied far
longer  than  it  was  ever  afforded.  Therefore,  as  JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR  correctly  and amply  explains,  UNC’s  holistic
review program pursues a righteous end—legitimate “ ‘be-
cause it is defined by the Constitution itself.  The end is the
maintenance  of  freedom.’ ”    Jones  v.  Alfred  H.  Mayer  Co.,
392 U. S. 409, 443–444 (1968) (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1118 (1866) (Rep. Wilson)).

Viewed  from  this  perspective,  beleaguered  admissions
programs such as UNC’s are not pursuing a patently unfair,
ends-justified  ideal  of  a  multiracial  democracy  at  all.    In-
stead, they are engaged in an earnest effort to secure a more
functional  one.  The  admissions  rubrics  they  have  con-
structed  now  recognize  that  an  individual’s  “merit”—his
ability to succeed in an institute of higher learning and ul-
timately  contribute  something  to  our  society—cannot  be
fully determined without understanding that individual in
full.  There are no special favorites here.

UNC has thus built a review process that more accurately
assesses merit than most of the admissions programs that
have existed since this country’s founding.  Moreover, in so
doing,  universities  like  UNC  create  pathways  to  upward
mobility  for  long  excluded  and  historically  disempowered
racial groups.  Our Nation’s history more than justifies this
course  of  action.  And  our  present  reality  indisputably
establishes  that  such  programs  are  still  needed—for  the
general  public  good—because  after  centuries  of  state-
sanctioned  (and  enacted)  race  discrimination,  the  afore-
mentioned  intergenerational  race-based  gaps  in  health,
wealth, and well-being stubbornly persist.

Rather than leaving well enough alone, today, the major-
ity is having none of it.  Turning back the clock (to a time
before  the  legal  arguments  and  evidence  establishing  the

——————

104 Foner 179.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case concerning affirmative action. It presents arguments in favor of considering race as a factor in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1158

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 19, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–8062.  Cruz,  aka  Galindo-Cruz  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.
Appx.  971.

No. 09–8063.  Cardoza-Puente v.  United States.  C. A. 5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  95.

No. 09–8064.  Garcia v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  441.

No.  09–8071.  Herrod  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  180.

No.  09–8073.  Simpkins  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  966  A.  2d  398.

No.  09–8075.  Hecke  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  676.

No.  08–1401.  Metrish,  Warden  v.  Newman.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.
Motion  of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  543  F.  3d  793.

No.  09–315.  Busch  v.  Marple  Newton  School  District
et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Motion  of  Indian  River  School  District  for
leave to ﬁle a brief as amicus curiae granted.  Certiorari denied.
Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  89.

No.  09–333.  Garcia  et  al.  v.  Vilsack,  Secretary  of  Agri
culture.  C. A. D. C. Cir.  Certiorari denied.  The Chief Jus
tice  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.
Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  519.

No.  09–359.  Maldonado  v.  Iwasaki,  Director,  California
Department  of  Transportation.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Justice  Breyer  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or
decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  1037.

No.  09–430.  Wahi  v.  Charleston  Area  Medical  Center
et  al.  C. A.  4th  Cir.  Motion of  Association  of American  Physi
cians and Surgeons, Inc., for leave to ﬁle a brief as amicus curiae
granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  599.

No.  09–484.  O’Brien,  Superintendent,  Old  Colony  Cor
rectional  Center  v.  O’Laughlin.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Motion  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, circuit courts, and relevant case information. This type of content is not meant to be read sequentially like a typical book chapter.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

JACKSON, J., dissenting

I
A

Imagine  two  college  applicants  from  North  Carolina,
John and James.  Both trace their family’s North Carolina
roots to the year of UNC’s founding in 1789.  Both love their
State  and  want  great  things  for  its  people.    Both  want  to
honor their family’s legacy by attending the State’s flagship
educational institution.  John, however, would be the sev-
enth  generation  to  graduate  from  UNC.  He  is  White.
James would be the first; he is Black.  Does the race of these
applicants  properly  play  a  role  in  UNC’s  holistic  merits-
based admissions process?

To answer that question, “a page of history is worth a vol-
ume of logic.”  New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345,
349 (1921).  Many chapters of America’s history appear nec-
essary, given the opinions that my colleagues in the major-
ity have issued in this case.

Justice Thurgood Marshall recounted the genesis:

“Three  hundred  and  fifty  years  ago,  the  Negro  was
dragged to this country in chains to be sold into slavery.
Uprooted from his homeland and thrust into bondage
for  forced  labor,  the  slave  was  deprived  of  all  legal
rights.  It was unlawful to teach him to read; he could
be sold away from his family and friends at the whim
of  his  master;  and  killing  or  maiming  him  was  not  a
crime.  The system of slavery brutalized and dehuman-
ized both master and slave.”  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 387–388 (1978).

Slavery  should  have  been  (and  was  to  many)  self-
evidently  dissonant  with  our  avowed  founding  principles.
When  the  time  came  to  resolve  that  dissonance,  eleven
States chose slavery.  With the Union’s survival at stake,
Frederick  Douglass  noted,  Black  Americans  in  the  South
“were almost the only reliable friends the nation had,” and
“but for their help . . . the Rebels might have succeeded in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It sets the stage for the argument by presenting a hypothetical scenario and referencing historical context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

EGBERT v. BOULE

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

At bottom, Boule’s claim is materially indistinguishable
from the claim brought in Bivens.  His case therefore does
not  present  a  new  context  for  the  purposes  of  assessing
whether a Bivens remedy is available.

2

Even assuming that this case presents a new context, no

special factors warrant foreclosing a Bivens action.

The  Court  “has  not  defined  the  phrase  ‘special  factors
counselling hesitation,’ ” but it has recognized that the “in-
quiry  must  concentrate  on  whether  the  Judiciary  is  well
suited,  absent  congressional  action  or  instruction,  to  con-
sider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a dam-
ages action to proceed.”  Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 12); see also Hernández, 589 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at
7–8).  For example, where a claim “would call into question
the formulation and implementation of a general policy” or
“require courts to interfere in an intrusive way with sensi-
tive  functions  of  the  Executive  Branch,”  recognizing  a
Bivens action may be inappropriate.  Ziglar, 582 U. S., at
___–___ (slip op., at 17–18); see also, e.g., Chappell v. Wal-
lace, 462 U. S. 296, 300 (1983) (declining to extend Bivens
where military personnel sought damages from superior of-
ficers,  citing  concerns  about  “tamper[ing]  with  the  estab-
lished relationship between enlisted military personnel and
their superior officers,” which lies “at the heart of the nec-
essarily unique structure of the Military Establishment”).
Precedent thus establishes that “separation-of-powers prin-
ciples . . . should be central to the [special-factors] analysis.”
Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12).

Here, the only possible special factor is that Boule’s prop-
erty abuts an international border.  Boule’s case, however,
is a far cry from others in which the Court declined to ex-
tend Bivens for reasons of national security or foreign rela-
tions.  In  Hernández,  for  example,  a  CBP  agent  shot  and
killed a Mexican child across the U. S.-Mexico border.  589
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of EGBERT v. BOULE. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the availability of a Bivens remedy in this case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U53

[09-26-01 10:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 576 (2000)

585

Opinion of the Court

tory time exception enacted by Congress in the wake of
Garcia would become a nullity when employees who refuse
to use compensatory time reach the statutory maximums on
accrual. Petitioners’ position would convert § 207(o)(3)(A)’s
shield into a sword, forcing employers to pay cash compen-
sation instead of providing compensatory time to employees
who work overtime.

At bottom, we think the better reading of § 207(o)(5) is
that it imposes a restriction upon an employer’s efforts to
prohibit the use of compensatory time when employees re-
quest to do so; that provision says nothing about restricting
an employer’s efforts to require employees to use compensa-
tory time. Because the statute is silent on this issue and
because Harris County’s policy is entirely compatible with
§ 207(o)(5), petitioners cannot, as they are required to do by
29 U. S. C. § 216(b), prove that Harris County has violated
§ 207.

Our interpretation of § 207(o)(5)—one that does not pro-
hibit employers from forcing employees to use compensatory
time—ﬁnds support in two other features of the FLSA.
First, employers remain free under the FLSA to decrease
the number of hours that employees work. An employer
may tell the employee to take off an afternoon, a day, or even
an entire week. Cf. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc., 450 U. S. 728, 739 (1981) (“[T]he FLSA was
designed . . . to ensure that each employee covered by the
Act . . . would be protected from the evil of overwork . . .”
(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). Second,
the FLSA explicitly permits an employer to cash out accu-
mulated compensatory time by paying the employee his reg-
ular hourly wage for each hour accrued. § 207(o)(3)(B); 29
CFR § 553.27(a) (1999). Thus, under the FLSA an employer
is free to require an employee to take time off work, and an
employer is also free to use the money it would have paid in
wages to cash out accrued compensatory time. The com-
pelled use of compensatory time challenged in this case
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a case.  It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–9526
_________________

JIMCY MCGIRT, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA

[July 9, 2020]

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO and
join,  and  with  whom  JUSTICE

JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH
THOMAS joins except as to footnote 9, dissenting.

In  1997,  the  State  of  Oklahoma  convicted  petitioner
Jimcy McGirt of molesting, raping, and forcibly sodomizing
a four-year-old girl, his wife’s granddaughter.  McGirt was
sentenced  to  1,000  years  plus  life  in  prison.  Today,  the
Court holds that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute
McGirt—on  the  improbable  ground  that,  unbeknownst  to
anyone for the past century, a huge swathe of Oklahoma is
actually  a  Creek  Indian  reservation,  on  which  the  State
may not prosecute serious crimes committed by Indians like
McGirt.  Not only does the Court discover a Creek reserva-
tion that spans three million acres and includes most of the
city of Tulsa, but the Court’s reasoning portends that there
are four more such reservations in Oklahoma.  The redis-
covered reservations encompass the entire eastern half of
the State—19 million acres that are home to 1.8 million peo-
ple, only 10%–15% of whom are Indians.

Across this vast area, the State’s ability to prosecute se-
rious crimes will be hobbled and decades of past convictions
could well be thrown out.  On top of that, the Court has pro-
foundly destabilized the governance of eastern Oklahoma.
The  decision  today  creates  significant  uncertainty  for  the
State’s continuing authority over any area that touches In-
dian affairs, ranging from zoning and taxation to family and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It cites the case, the justices involved, and provides a summary of the case and the dissenting opinion's stance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

XIULU RUAN v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

Court effectively endorsed its honest-effort standard in United States
v. Moore, 423 U. S. 122, as that case did not address mens rea at all.
Nor does United States v. Yermian, 468 U. S. 63, support the Govern-
ment here, as that case dealt with a jurisdictional clause, to which the
presumption of scienter does not apply.

Finally, the Government argues that requiring it to prove that a doc-
tor knowingly or intentionally acted not “as authorized” will allow bad-
apple doctors to escape liability by claiming idiosyncratic views about
their prescribing authority.  But the Court has often rejected this kind
of argument, see, e.g., Rehaif, 588 U. S., at ___, and does so again here.
Pp. 9–15.

(d) The  Court of  Appeals  in  both  cases  evaluated  the  jury  instruc-
tions relating to mens rea under an incorrect understanding of §841’s
scienter requirements.  On remand, those courts may address whether
the instructions complied with the mens rea standard set forth here,
as well as whether any instructional error was harmless.  P. 15.

966 F. 3d 1101 and 989 F. 3d 806, vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J. delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.  ALITO,
J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment,  in  which  THOMAS,  J.,
joined, and in which BARRETT, J., joined as to Parts I–A, I–B, and II.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a condensed overview rather than the full textual content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

GORSUCH, J., concurring

with  his  religious  faith.  The  Commission  denied  Mr.
Phillips that choice, even as it afforded the bakers in Mr.
Jack’s case the choice to refuse to advance a message they
deemed  offensive  to  their  secular  commitments.    That  is
not neutral.

Nor  would  it  be  proper  for  this  or  any  court  to  suggest
that  a  person  must  be  forced  to  write  words  rather  than
create  a  symbol  before  his  religious  faith  is  implicated.
Civil  authorities,  whether  “high  or  petty,”  bear  no  license
to declare what is or should be “orthodox” when it comes to
religious  beliefs,  id.,  at  642,  or  whether  an  adherent  has
“correctly perceived” the commands of his religion, Thomas,
supra,  at  716.    Instead,  it  is  our  job  to  look  beyond  the
formality  of  written  words  and  afford  legal  protection  to
any  sincere  act  of  faith.    See  generally  Hurley  v.  Irish-
American  Gay,  Lesbian  and  Bisexual  Group  of  Boston,
Inc.,  515  U. S.  557,  569  (1995)  (“[T]he  Constitution  looks
beyond  written  or  spoken  words  as  mediums  of  ex-
pression,”  which  are  “not  a  condition  of  constitutional
protection”).

The second suggestion fares no better.  Suggesting that
this  case  is  only  about  “wedding  cakes”—and  not  a  wed-
ding cake celebrating a same-sex wedding—actually points
up  the  problem.    At  its  most  general  level,  the  cake  at
issue in Mr. Phillips’s case was just a mixture of flour and
eggs;  at  its  most  specific  level,  it  was  a  cake  celebrating
the same-sex wedding  of Mr. Craig and Mr.  Mullins.  We
are  told  here,  however,  to  apply  a  sort  of  Goldilocks  rule:
describing  the  cake  by  its  ingredients  is  too  general;  un-
derstanding  it  as  celebrating  a  same-sex  wedding  is  too
specific; but regarding it as a generic wedding cake is just
right.  The  problem  is,  the  Commission  didn’t  play  with
the  level  of  generality  in  Mr.  Jack’s  case  in  this  way.    It
didn’t  declare,  for  example,  that  because  the  cakes  Mr.
Jack requested were just cakes about weddings generally,
and all such cakes were the same, the bakers had to pro-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the arguments surrounding religious freedom and the application of anti-discrimination laws in the context of a baker refusing to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

357

Opinion of the Court

(CADC 1975) (en banc) (per curiam)).  The Court, in conse
quence,  has  noted  that  restrictions  on  direct  contributions
are  preventative,  because  few  if  any  contributions  to  candi
dates  will  involve  quid  pro  quo  arrangements.  MCFL,  479
U. S.,  at  260;  NCPAC,  470  U. S.,  at  500;  Federal  Election
Comm’n  v.  National  Right  to  Work  Comm.,  459  U. S.  197,
210 (1982) (NRWC).  The Buckley Court, nevertheless, sus
tained  limits  on  direct  contributions  in  order  to  ensure
against  the  reality  or  appearance  of  corruption.  That  case
did  not  extend  this  rationale  to  independent  expenditures,
and the Court does not do so here.

“The  absence  of  prearrangement  and  coordination  of  an
expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only under
mines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also
alleviates  the  danger  that  expenditures  will  be  given  as  a
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 47; see ibid. (independent expenditures
have a “substantially diminished potential for abuse”).  Lim
its on independent expenditures, such as § 441b, have a chill
ing  effect  extending  well  beyond  the  Government’s  interest
in  preventing  quid  pro  quo  corruption.  The  anticorruption
interest is not sufﬁcient to displace the speech here in ques
tion.  Indeed, 26 States do not restrict independent expendi
tures  by  for-proﬁt  corporations.  The  Government  does  not
claim  that  these  expenditures  have  corrupted  the  political
process  in  those  States.  See  Supp.  Brief  for  Appellee  18,
n.  3;  Supp.  Brief  for  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United
States of America as Amicus Curiae 8–9, n. 5.

A  single  footnote  in  Bellotti  purported  to  leave  open  the
possibility that corporate independent expenditures could be
shown to cause corruption.  435 U. S., at 788, n. 26.  For the
reasons explained above, we  now conclude that independent
expenditures,  including  those  made  by  corporations,  do  not
give  rise  to  corruption  or  the  appearance  of  corruption.
Dicta  in  Bellotti’s  footnote  suggested  that  “a  corporation’s
right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the primary content meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 274 (1998)

299

Stevens, J., dissenting

agency law,8 under which the district is responsible for Wal-
drop’s misconduct because “he was aided in accomplishing
the tort by the existence of the agency relation.” Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) (1957).9 This case pre-
sents a paradigmatic example of a tort that was made pos-
sible, that was effected, and that was repeated over a
prolonged period because of the powerful inﬂuence that Wal-
drop had over Gebser by reason of the authority that his
employer, the school district, had delegated to him. As a
secondary school teacher, Waldrop exercised even greater
authority and control over his students than employers and
supervisors exercise over their employees. His gross mis-
use of that authority allowed him to abuse his young stu-
dent’s trust.10

8 The Court’s holding is also questionable as a factual matter. Waldrop
himself surely had ample authority to maintain order in the classes that
he conducted.
Indeed, that is a routine part of every teacher’s responsi-
bilities.
If Gebser had been the victim of sexually harassing conduct by
other students during those classes, surely the teacher would have had
ample authority to take corrective measures. The fact that he did not
prevent his own harassment of Gebser is the consequence of his lack of
will, not his lack of authority.

9 The Court suggests that agency principles are inapplicable to this case
because Title IX does not expressly refer to an “agent,” as Title VII does.
See ante, at 283 (citing 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b)). Title IX’s focus on the
protected class rather than the fund recipient fully explains the statute’s
failure to mention “agents” of the recipient, however. See n. 5, supra.
Moreover, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57 (1986),
we viewed Title VII’s reference to an “agent” as a limitation on the liabil-
ity of the employer: “Congress’ decision to deﬁne ‘employer’ to include any
‘agent’ of an employer, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to
place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title
VII are to be held responsible.”

Id., at 72.
10 For example, Waldrop ﬁrst sexually abused Gebser when he visited
her house on the pretense of giving her a book that she needed for a school
project. See App. 54a (deposition of Alida Star Gebser). Gebser, then a
high school freshman, stated that she “was terriﬁed”: “He was the main
teacher at the school with whom I had discussions, and I didn’t know what
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

21

Opinion of the Court

net  as  a  means  to  grow  their  companies  and  access  a
national  market,  without  exposing  them  to  the  daunting
complexity  and  business-development  obstacles  of  nation
wide  sales  tax  collection.”    Brief  for  Respondents  29.
These  burdens  may  pose  legitimate  concerns  in  some
instances,  particularly  for  small  businesses  that  make  a
small volume of sales to customers in many States.  State
taxes  differ,  not  only  in  the  rate  imposed  but  also  in  the
categories  of  goods  that  are  taxed  and,  sometimes,  the
relevant  date  of  purchase.    Eventually,  software  that  is
available at a reasonable cost may make it easier for small
businesses  to  cope  with  these  problems.    Indeed,  as  the
physical  presence  rule  no  longer  controls,  those  systems
may well become available in a short period of time, either
from private providers or from state taxing agencies them
selves.  And  in  all  events,  Congress  may  legislate  to  ad
dress  these  problems  if  it  deems  it  necessary  and  fit  to
do so.

In this case, however,  South Dakota affords small mer
chants a reasonable degree of protection.  The law at issue
requires  a  merchant  to  collect  the  tax  only  if  it  does  a
considerable  amount  of  business  in  the  State;  the  law  is
not  retroactive;  and  South  Dakota  is  a  party  to  the
Streamlined  Sales  and  Use  Tax  Agreement,  see  infra
at 23.

Finally,  other  aspects  of  the  Court’s  Commerce  Clause
doctrine  can  protect  against  any  undue  burden  on  inter
state  commerce,  taking  into  consideration  the  small  busi
nesses, startups, or others who engage in commerce across
state  lines.  For  example,  the  United  States  argues  that
tax-collection  requirements  should  be  analyzed  under  the
balancing  framework  of  Pike  v.  Bruce  Church,  Inc.,  397
U. S.  137.    Others  have  argued  that  retroactive  liability
risks a double tax burden in violation of the Court’s appor
tionment  jurisprudence  because  it  would  make  both  the
buyer and the seller legally liable for collecting and remit
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Commerce Clause and its application to sales tax collection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

31

Opinion of the Court

directly translated into foregone dollars, is not “cognizable
under the Copyright Act.”  Id., at 592.

Further,  we  must  take  into  account  the  public  benefits
the copying will likely produce.  Are those benefits, for ex-
ample,  related  to  copyright’s  concern  for  the  creative  pro-
duction  of  new  expression?  Are  they  comparatively  im-
portant,  or  unimportant,  when  compared  with  dollar
amounts likely lost (taking into account as well the nature
of  the  source  of  the  loss)?    Cf.  MCA,  INC.  v.  Wilson,  677
F. 2d 180, 183 (CA2 1981) (calling for a balancing of public
benefits and losses to copyright owner under this factor).

We do not say that these questions are always relevant
to the application of fair use, not even in the world of com-
puter programs.  Nor do we say that these questions are the
only questions a court might ask.  But we do find them rel-
evant here in helping to determine the likely market effects
of Google’s reimplementation.

As to the likely amount of loss, the jury could have found
that Android did not harm the actual or potential markets
for Java SE.  And it could have found that Sun itself (now
Oracle)  would  not  have  been  able  to  enter  those  markets
successfully whether Google did, or did not, copy a part of
its API.  First, evidence at trial demonstrated that, regard-
less  of  Android’s  smartphone  technology,  Sun  was  poorly
positioned to succeed in the mobile phone market.  The jury
heard ample evidence that Java SE’s primary market was
laptops and desktops.  App. 99, 200.  It also heard that Sun’s
many  efforts  to  move  into  the  mobile  phone  market  had
proved unsuccessful.  Id., at 135, 235, 671.  As far back as
2006, prior to Android’s release, Sun’s executives projected
declining  revenue  for  mobile  phones  because  of  emerging
smartphone  technology.  Id.,  at  240.    When  Sun’s  former
CEO  was  asked  directly  whether  Sun’s  failure  to  build  a
smartphone  was  attributable  to  Google’s  development  of
Android, he answered that it was not.  Id., at 650.  Given
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case involving Google and Oracle. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it unsuitable for indexing as it is not general readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

LIU ET AL. v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–1501.  Argued March 3, 2020—Decided June 22, 2020

To punish securities fraud, the Securities and Exchange Commission is
authorized  to  seek  “equitable  relief”  in  civil  proceedings,  15  U. S. C.
§78u(d)(5).  In  Kokesh  v.  SEC,  581  U. S.  ___,  this  Court  held  that  a
disgorgement order in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
enforcement action constitutes a “penalty” for purposes of the applica-
ble  statute  of  limitations.  The  Court  did  not,  however,  address
whether  disgorgement  can  qualify  as  “equitable  relief”  under
§78u(d)(5), given that equity historically excludes punitive sanctions.
Petitioners Charles Liu and Xin Wang solicited foreign nationals to
invest in the construction of a cancer-treatment center, but, an SEC
investigation revealed, misappropriated much of the funds in violation
of the terms of a private offering memorandum.  The SEC brought a
civil  action  against  petitioners,  seeking,  as  relevant  here,  disgorge-
ment equal to the full amount petitioners had raised from investors.
Petitioners argued that the disgorgement remedy failed to account for
their  legitimate  business  expenses,  but  the  District  Court  disagreed
and ordered petitioners jointly and severally liable for the full amount.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held: A disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net prof-
its  and  is  awarded  for  victims  is  equitable  relief  permissible  under
§78u(d)(5).  Pp. 5–20.

(a) In  interpreting  statutes  that  provide  for  “equitable  relief,”  this
Court analyzes whether a particular remedy falls into “those catego-
ries of relief that were typically available in equity.”  Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates, 508 U. S. 248, 256.  Relevant here are two principles of eq-
uity jurisprudence.  Equity practice has long authorized courts to strip
wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains.  And to avoid transforming that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are typically used for informational purposes and are not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the full content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY

Syllabus

not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conduct-
ing a blood test without a warrant.  Pp. 4–13, 20–23.

(a) The principle that a warrantless search of the person is reason-
able  only  if  it  falls  within  a  recognized  exception,  see,  e.g.,  United
States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 224, applies here, where the search
involved a compelled physical intrusion beneath McNeely’s skin and
into his veins to obtain a blood sample to use as evidence in a crimi-
nal investigation.  One recognized exception “applies when ‘ “the exi-
gencies of the situation” make the needs of law enforcement so com-
pelling  that  [a]  warrantless  search  is  objectively  reasonable.’ ”
Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___.  This Court looks to the totality
of  circumstances  in  determining  whether  an  exigency  exits.    See
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 406.  Applying this approach
in Schmerber, the Court found a warrantless blood test reasonable af-
ter  considering  all  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  that  case  and
carefully basing its holding on those specific facts, including that al-
cohol levels decline after drinking stops and that testing was delayed
while officers transported the injured suspect to the hospital and in-
vestigated the accident scene.  Pp. 4–8.

(b) The  State  nonetheless  seeks  a  per se  rule,  contending  that  exi-
gent  circumstances  necessarily  exist  when  an  officer  has  probable
cause to believe a person has been driving under the influence of al-
cohol because BAC evidence is inherently evanescent.  Though a per-
son’s  blood  alcohol  level  declines  until  the  alcohol  is  eliminated,  it
does  not  follow  that  the  Court  should  depart  from  careful  case-by-
case assessment of exigency.  When officers in drunk-driving investi-
gations can reasonably obtain a warrant before having a blood  sam-
ple  drawn  without  significantly  undermining  the  efficacy  of  the
search,  the  Fourth  Amendment  mandates  that  they  do  so.    See
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456.  Circumstances may
make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the alcohol’s dissipa-
tion will support an exigency, but that is a reason to decide each case
on its facts, as in Schmerber, not to accept the “considerable overgen-
eralization”  that  a  per se  rule  would  reflect,  Richards  v.  Wisconsin,
520 U. S. 385, 393.  Blood testing is different in critical respects from
other destruction-of-evidence cases.  Unlike a situation where, e.g., a
suspect has control over easily disposable evidence, see Cupp v. Mur-
phy, 412 U. S. 291, 296, BAC evidence naturally dissipates in a grad-
ual and relatively predictable manner.  Moreover, because an officer
must typically take a DWI suspect to a medical facility and obtain a
trained  medical  professional’s  assistance  before  having  a  blood  test
conducted, some delay between the time of the arrest or accident and
time  of  the  test  is  inevitable  regardless  of  whether  a  warrant  is  ob-
tained.  The  State’s  rule  also  fails  to  account  for  advances  in  the  47
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, specifically discussing the case of Missouri v. McNeely.  It outlines the legal arguments and reasoning behind the court's decision regarding warrantless blood tests in DUI cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

15

Opinion of the Court

it cannot.  See Brief for Petitioner 24–25; Brief for United
States  as  Amicus  Curiae  28–29.  “While  not  necessarily
controlling, the policies followed at other well-run institu-
tions would be relevant to a determination of the need for
a  particular  type  of  restriction.”  Procunier  v.  Martinez,
416  U. S.  396,  414,  n. 14  (1974).    That  so  many  other
prisons  allow  inmates  to  grow  beards  while  ensuring
prison  safety  and  security  suggests  that  the  Department
could  satisfy  its  security  concerns  through  a  means  less
restrictive  than  denying  petitioner  the  exemption  he
seeks.

We  do  not  suggest  that  RLUIPA  requires  a  prison  to
grant  a  particular  religious  exemption  as  soon  as  a  few
other jurisdictions do so.  But when so many prisons offer
an  accommodation,  a  prison  must,  at  a  minimum,  offer
persuasive  reasons  why  it  believes  that  it  must  take  a
different  course,  and  the  Department  failed  to  make  that
showing  here.  Despite  this,  the  courts  below  deferred  to
these  prison  officials’  mere  say-so  that  they  could  not
accommodate  petitioner’s  request.    RLUIPA,  however,
demands  much  more.  Courts  must  hold  prisons  to  their
statutory burden, and they must not “assume a plausible,
less  restrictive  alternative  would  be  ineffective.”    Playboy
Entertainment, 529 U. S., at 824.

We emphasize that although RLUIPA provides substan-
tial protection for the religious exercise of institutionalized
persons,  it  also  affords  prison  officials  ample  ability  to
maintain security.  We highlight three ways in which this
is  so.  First,  in  applying  RLUIPA’s  statutory  standard,
courts  should  not  blind  themselves  to  the  fact  that  the
analysis  is conducted  in  the  prison  setting.    Second,  if  an
institution  suspects  that  an  inmate  is  using  religious
activity  to  cloak  illicit  conduct,  “prison  officials  may  ap-
propriately  question  whether  a  prisoner’s  religiosity,
asserted  as  the  basis  for  a  requested  accommodation,  is
authentic.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 725, n. 13
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and its application to a prison setting.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

	  In  2001,  the  mayor  and  all-white  five-member
Board  of  Aldermen  of  Kilmichael,  Mississippi,
abruptly  canceled  the  town’s  election  after  “an
unprecedented  number”  of  African-American  can
didates  announced  they  were  running  for  office.
DOJ  required  an  election,  and  the  town  elected  its
first black mayor and three black aldermen.  Id., at
36–37.

	  In 2006, this Court found that Texas’ attempt to re
draw a congressional district to reduce the strength
of  Latino  voters  bore  “the  mark  of  intentional  dis
crimination  that  could  give  rise  to  an  equal  protec
tion  violation,”  and  ordered  the  district  redrawn  in
compliance  with  the  VRA.    League  of  United  Latin
American  Citizens  v.  Perry,  548  U. S.  399,  440
(2006).
In  response,  Texas  sought  to  undermine
this  Court’s  order  by  curtailing  early  voting  in  the
district, but was blocked by an action to enforce the
§5  preclearance  requirement.  See  Order  in  League
of  United  Latin  American  Citizens  v.  Texas,  No.
06–cv–1046 (WD Tex.), Doc. 8.

	  In 2003, after African-Americans won a majority of
the  seats  on  the  school  board  for  the  first  time  in
history,  Charleston  County,  South  Carolina,  pro
posed  an  at-large  voting  mechanism  for  the  board.
The  proposal,  made  without  consulting  any  of  the
African-American  members  of  the  school  board,
was  found  to  be  an  “ ‘exact  replica’ ”  of  an  earlier
voting scheme that, a federal court had determined,
violated  the  VRA.  811  F. Supp.  2d  424,  483  (DDC
2011).  See  also  S. Rep.  No.  109–295,  at  309.    DOJ
invoked §5 to block the proposal.

	  In 1993, the City of Millen, Georgia, proposed to de

lay  the  election  in  a  majority-black  district  by  two
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It cites previous cases and provides examples of alleged voting rights violations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

at 327, this reality informs the exigency of respondents’ cur-
rent admissions policies and their racial diversity goals.

i
For much of its history, UNC was a bastion of white su-
premacy.  Its leadership included “slaveholders, the leaders
of  the  Ku  Klux  Klan,  the  central  figures  in  the  white  su-
premacy  campaigns  of  1898  and  1900,  and  many  of  the
State’s most ardent defenders of Jim Crow and race-based
Social Darwinism in the twentieth century.”  3 App. 1680.
The university excluded all people of color from its faculty
and  student  body,  glorified  the  institution  of  slavery,  en-
forced its own Jim Crow regulations, and punished any dis-
sent from racial orthodoxy.  Id., at 1681–1683.  It resisted
racial integration after this Court’s decision in Brown, and
was forced to integrate by court order in 1955.  3 App. 1685.
It took almost 10 more years for the first Black woman to
enroll at the university in 1963.  See Karen L. Parker Col-
lection,  1963–1966,  UNC  Wilson  Special  Collections  Li-
brary.  Even then, the university admitted only a handful
of  underrepresented  racial  minorities,  and  those  students
suffered constant harassment, humiliation, and isolation.  3
App. 1685.  UNC officials openly resisted racial integration
well into the 1980s, years after the youngest Member of this
Court was born.19  Id., at 1688–1690.  During that period,

——————

19 In 1979, prompted by lawsuits filed by civil rights lawyers under Ti-
tle VI, the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare “revoked
UNC’s federal funding for its continued noncompliance” with Brown.  3
App. 1688; see Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636, 637 (DC 1972);
Adams  v.  Califano,  430  F. Supp.  118,  121  (DC  1977).    North  Carolina
sued the Federal Government in response, and North Carolina Senator
Jesse Helms introduced legislation to block federal desegregation efforts.
3 App. 1688.  UNC praised those actions by North Carolina public offi-
cials.  Ibid.  The litigation ended in 1981, after the Reagan administra-
tion settled with the State.  See North Carolina v. Department of Educa-
tion, No. 79–217–CIV–5 (EDNC, July 17, 1981) (Consent Decree).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the history of racial discrimination at UNC and the context for their current admissions policies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

FDA v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

cate stay) (slip op., at 7) (deference not due where the gov-
ernment “has not for a moment considered whether recent
COVID conditions demand changes”).

*

  *

  *
  This  country’s  laws  have  long  singled  out  abortions  for
more  onerous  treatment  than  other  medical  procedures
that  carry  similar  or  greater  risks.    See  Greenhouse  &
Siegel,  Casey  and  the  Clinic  Closings:  When  “Protecting
Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 Yale L. J. 1428, 1430 (2016).
Like many of those laws, maintaining the FDA’s in-person
requirements  for  mifepristone  during  the  pandemic  not
only  treats  abortion exceptionally,  it imposes an unneces-
sary, irrational, and unjustifiable undue burden on women
seeking to exercise their right to choose.  One can only hope
that  the  Government  will  reconsider  and  exhibit  greater
care and empathy for women seeking some measure of con-
trol over their health and reproductive lives in these unset-
tling times.  See Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 172 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[Women’s] ability to realize their full potential
. . . is intimately connected to their ability to control their
reproductive  lives”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).
For now, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from Justice Sotomayor. It contains legal arguments and references to previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
866

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–11010.  Rangel  v.  Adams,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11011.  Thomas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  263.

No.  08–11014.  Laskey  v.  United  Online,  Inc.  Ct.  App.

Cal.,  1st  App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11015.  Kramer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  84.

No.  08–11017.  Jakaj  v.  Michigan.  Cir.  Ct.  Wayne  County,

Mich.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11018.  Kinney  v.  Iowa.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.

No. 08–11019.  Perry v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  246.

No.  08–11020.  McGregory  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st
Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  378  Ill.  App.  3d  1122,
955  N.  E.  2d  185.

No.  08–11021.  Perkins  v.  North  Carolina.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11022.  Rheault  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  55.

No. 08–11024.  Ward v.  Delaware.  Sup. Ct. Del.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  970  A.  2d  257.

No.  08–11025.  Wells  v.  Carro,  Judge,  Supreme  Court  of
New  York,  New  York  County.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.  N.  Y.,  1st
Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  60  App.  Div.  3d
517,  874  N. Y.  S.  2d  857.

No.  08–11026.  Wheeler  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  4  So.  3d  599.

No.  08–11027.  Williams  v.  Beard,  Secretary,  Pennsylva
nia  Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.  Appx.  125.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

33

Opinion of the Court

specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment” do not “mar[k] the outer limits of
the  substantive  sphere  of  liberty  which  the  Fourteenth
Amendment protects.”  505 U. S., at 848.  Abortion is noth-
ing new.  It has been addressed by lawmakers for centuries,
and  the  fundamental  moral  question  that  it  poses  is  age-
less.
  Defenders  of  Roe  and  Casey  do  not  claim  that  any  new
scientific learning calls for a different answer to the under-
lying moral question, but they do contend that changes in
society  require  the  recognition  of  a  constitutional  right  to
obtain  an  abortion.    Without  the  availability  of  abortion,
they  maintain,  people  will  be  inhibited  from  exercising
their freedom to choose the types of relationships they de-
sire, and women will be unable to compete with men in the
workplace and in other endeavors.

Americans who believe that abortion should be restricted
press  countervailing  arguments  about  modern  develop-
ments.  They note that attitudes about the pregnancy of un-
married women have changed drastically; that federal and
state laws ban discrimination on the basis of pregnancy;42
that leave for pregnancy and childbirth are now guaranteed
by law in many cases;43 that the costs of medical care asso-

——————

42 See,  e.g.,  Pregnancy  Discrimination  Act,  92  Stat.  2076,  42  U. S. C.
§2000e(k) (federal law prohibiting pregnancy discrimination in employ-
ment);  Dept.  of  Labor,  Women’s  Bureau,  Employment  Protections  for
Workers  Who  Are  Pregnant  or  Nursing,  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
wb/pregnant-nursing-employment-protections  (showing  that  46  States
and the District of Columbia have employment protections against preg-
nancy discrimination).

43 See,  e.g.,  Family  and  Medical  Leave  Act  of  1993,  107  Stat.  9,  29
U. S. C.  §2612  (federal  law  guaranteeing  employment  leave  for  preg-
nancy and birth); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Access to Paid and Unpaid
Family Leave in 2018, https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2019/access-to-paid-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It discusses arguments for and against abortion rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

BARRETT, J., dissenting

Both formulations are problematic—and not only because
both  are  atextual.  The  first,  focused  solely  on  physical
items, would leave (c)(2) with almost no work to do.  Sub-
section (c)(1) already prohibits “alter[ing], destroy[ing], mu-
tilat[ing],  or  conceal[ing]”  documents,  records,  or  objects.
This  essentially  covers  the  waterfront  of  acts  that  impair
the integrity or availability of objects.  True, (c)(2) could also
encompass  “cover[ing]  up,  falsif[ying],  or  mak[ing]  a  false
entry in” a record or document.  See 18 U. S. C. §1519.  But
it seems “unlikely” that Congress used the “expansive” lan-
guage of (c)(2) “to address such narrow concerns.”  64 F. 4th,
at 344.  The somewhat amorphous “other things” limitation
has the benefit of giving (c)(2) a wider berth, but it is un-
clear how the Court landed on it.  The term does not appear
in (c)(1) or in §1512’s surrounding subsections, which refer
specifically  to  records,  documents,  objects,  and  testimony.
The “other things” formulation comes from the Court, not
Congress.

The Court’s uncertainty about the relevant “common at-
tribute” is a tell that Congress did not intend to define (c)(2)
by reference to (c)(1).  Indeed, “[h]ad Congress intended to
limit  [§1512(c)(2)]’s  reach”  as  the  Court  asserts,  it  “easily
could  have  written”  the  catchall  to  say  “otherwise  impair
the integrity or availability of records, documents, objects,
or other things for use in an official proceeding.”  Ali, 552
U. S., at 227; see ante, at 8–9.2  It did not, and we should
not pretend that it did.

B
The  Court  relies  on  statutory  context  to  “confir[m]  that

——————

2 Indeed, Congress could have looked to 18 U. S. C. §1505 as a model.
That  statute  makes  it  a  crime  to  “willfully  withhol[d],  misrepresen[t],
remov[e]  from  any  place,  concea[l],  cove[r]  up,  destro[y],  mutilat[e],
alte[r], or by other means falsif[y] any documentary material, answers to
written  interrogatories,  or  oral  testimony”  with  the  intent  to  obstruct
“any civil investigative demand.”  §1505 (emphasis added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>