<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

whether  the  content-moderation  provisions  are  facially
valid.  For the following three reasons, NetChoice failed to
meet its burden.

1
First, NetChoice did not establish which entities the stat-
utes cover.  This failure is critical because it is “impossible
to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first
knowing what the statute covers.”  Williams, 553 U. S., at
293.  When it sued Florida, NetChoice was reluctant to dis-
close which of its members were covered by S. B. 7072.  In-
stead,  it  filed  declarations  revealing  only  that  the  law
reached “Etsy, Facebook, and YouTube.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. in
No. 22–277, at 32.  In this Court, NetChoice was a bit more
forthcoming,  representing  that  S. B.  7072  also  covers  In-
stagram,  X,  Pinterest,  Reddit,  Gmail,  Uber,  and  other
e-commerce websites.  Id., at 69, 76; Brief for Respondents
in No. 22–277, at 7, 38, 49.20  But NetChoice has still not
provided a complete list.

NetChoice was similarly reluctant to identify its affected
members  in  the  Texas  case.    At  first,  NetChoice  “repre-
sented  . . .  that  only  Facebook,  YouTube,  and  [X]  are  af-
fected  by  the  Texas  law.”    Brief  for  Appellant  in  No.  21–
51178  (CA5),  at  1,  n. 1.    But  in  its  brief  in  this  Court,
NetChoice told us that H. B. 20 also regulates “some of the
Internet’s  most  popular  websites,  including  Facebook,  In-
stagram, Pinterest, TikTok, Vimeo, X (formerly known as
Twitter),  and  YouTube.”    Brief  for  Petitioners  in  No.  22–

——————

20 This  concession  suggests  that  S. B.  7072  may  “cover  websites  that
engage in primarily non-expressive conduct.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22–
277, at 34.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding content moderation provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

in prayer at the same time and location.  The Court ignores
this history.  The Court also ignores the severe disruption
to school events caused by Kennedy’s conduct, viewing it as
irrelevant because the Bremerton School District (District)
stated  that  it  was  suspending  Kennedy  to  avoid  it  being
viewed as endorsing religion.  Under the Court’s analysis,
presumably this would be a different case if the District had
cited  Kennedy’s  repeated  disruptions  of  school  program-
ming and violations of school policy regarding public access
to the field as grounds for suspending him.  As the District
did  not  articulate  those  grounds,  the  Court  assesses  only
the District’s Establishment Clause concerns.  It errs by as-
sessing them divorced from the context and history of Ken-
nedy’s prayer practice.

Today’s decision goes beyond merely misreading the rec-
ord.  The Court overrules Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602
(1971), and calls into question decades of subsequent prec-
edents that it deems “offshoot[s]” of that decision.  Ante, at
22.  In the process, the Court rejects longstanding concerns
surrounding  government  endorsement  of  religion  and  re-
places  the  standard  for  reviewing  such  questions  with  a
new  “history  and  tradition”  test.    In  addition,  while  the
Court  reaffirms  that  the  Establishment  Clause  prohibits
the government from coercing participation in religious ex-
ercise, it applies a nearly toothless version of the coercion
analysis, failing to acknowledge the unique pressures faced
by students when participating in school-sponsored activi-
ties.  This  decision  does  a  disservice  to  schools  and  the
young  citizens  they  serve,  as  well  as  to  our  Nation’s
longstanding commitment to the separation of church and
state.  I respectfully dissent.

I
As the majority tells it, Kennedy, a coach for the District’s
football program, “lost his job” for “pray[ing] quietly while
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision and provides legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Opinion of the Court

I
A

Congress has “broad and sweeping” power “to raise and
support armies.”  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367,
377 (1968).  It has long exercised that power to encourage
service in the Armed Forces in a variety of ways.  See, e.g.,
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 58 (2006) (campus recruiting); Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 376 (1974) (educational benefits).
Since  before  the  United  States’  entry  into  World  War  II,
Congress  has  sought,  in  particular,  to  smooth  volunteers’
reentry into civilian life by recognizing veterans’ “right to
return to civilian employment without adverse effect on . . .
career progress” in the federal work force and private em-
ployment.  H. R. Rep. No. 105–448, p. 2 (1998); see Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940, §§8(b)(A)–(B), (e), 54 Stat.
890, 891 (damages remedy against private employers).

The  Vietnam  War  prompted  Congress  to  extend  these
protections to employment by States.  Amidst political op-
position  to  the  war,  “some  State  and  local  jurisdictions
ha[d ]  demonstrated  a  reluctance,  and  even  an  unwilling-
ness,  to  reemploy”  returning  servicemembers.    S.  Rep.
No. 93–907, p. 110 (1974).  So Congress authorized private
damages suits against States to ensure that “veterans who
[had]  previously  held  jobs  as  school  teachers,  policemen,
firemen, and other State, county, and city employees” would
not  be  denied  their  old  jobs  as  reprisal  for  their  service.
Ibid.  The statute at issue, USERRA, embodies these pro-
tections today.

B

Petitioner Le Roy Torres enlisted in the Army Reserves
in 1989.  In 2007, he was called to active duty and deployed
to  Iraq.  While  serving,  Torres  was  exposed  to  toxic  burn
pits, a method of garbage disposal that sets open fire to all
manner of trash, human waste, and military equipment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the context of the USERRA (Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act). It sets the stage by outlining the history of Congressional efforts to protect veterans' employment rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

duty.   Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust En-
richment  §1,  and  Comment  a,  p. 3  (2010).  Similarly,  dis-
gorgement allows a beneficiary to “stri[p]” the trustee of “a
wrongful gain.”  Id., §3, Comment a, at 22.  Our Court drew
on these principles almost 200 years ago when it stated that
a  trustee’s  breach  of  loyalty  supports  a  cause  of  action
“without any further inquiry” into gain or loss to a trust or
its beneficiaries.  Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 553 (1846);
see  also,  e.g.,  id.,  at  556–557  (noting  this  rule’s  roots  in
“English  courts  of  chancery  from  an  early  day”);  see  also
Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 120 (1914) (under “the
principles governing the duty of a trustee,” it “makes no dif-
ference that the [trust] estate was not a loser in the trans-
action”); Bogert & Bogert §543 (similar).  Put another way,
“traditional remedies” like “unjust enrichment . . . are not
contingent on a plaintiff ’s allegation of damages beyond the
violation of his private legal right.”  Spokeo,  578 U. S., at
___–___ (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–3).

Nor does it matter whether the beneficiaries receive the
remedy themselves.  A beneficiary may require a trustee to
“restore”  assets  directly  “to  the  trust  fund.”   Bogert  &
Bogert §861; see also Restatement (Second) of Trusts §205.
In fact, because fiduciary duties are so paramount, the rem-
edy need not involve money at all.  A beneficiary may sue
to  “enjoin  the  trustee  from  committing  a  breach  of  trust”
and to “remove the trustee.”  Id., §199.

Congress built on this tradition by making plan fiduciar-
ies expressly liable to restore to the plan wrongful profits
and any losses their breach caused, and by providing for in-
junctive  relief  to  stop  the  misconduct  and  remove  the
wrongdoers.  See 29 U. S. C. §§1109, 1132(a)(2), (3).  In do-
ing  so,  Congress  rejected  the  Court’s  statement  that  a
“trust-law analogy . . . does not” apply to “plaintiffs who al-
lege mismanagement of a defined-benefit plan.”  Cf. ante, at
4.  To  the  contrary,  ERISA  imposes  “trust-like  fiduciary
standards,” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U. S. 489, 497 (1996),
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and discusses legal principles related to fiduciary duty and remedies for breach of trust.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

75

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  36 U. S. C. §21704A (The American Legion)

  36 U. S. C. §22703(c) (Amvets; Membership)

  36 U. S. C. §22704(d) (Amvets; Governing Body)

  36  U. S. C.  §60104(b)  (82nd  Airborne  Division

Association, Incorporated; Membership)

  36  U. S. C.  §60105(c)  (82nd  Airborne  Division
Association, Incorporated; Governing Body)

  36  U. S. C.  §70104(b)  (Fleet  Reserve  Associa-

tion; Membership)

  36  U. S. C.  §70105(c)  (Fleet  Reserve  Associa-

tion; Governing Body)

  36  U. S. C.  §140704(b)  (Military  Order  of  the

World Wars; Membership)

  36  U. S. C.  §140705(c)  (Military  Order  of  the

World Wars; Governing Body)

  36 U. S. C. §154704(b) (Non Commissioned Of-
ficers Association of the United States of Amer-
ica, Incorporated; Membership)

  36  U. S. C.  §154705(c)  (Non  Commissioned  Of-
ficers Association of the United States of Amer-
ica, Incorporated; Governing Body)

  36 U. S. C. §190304(b) (Retired Enlisted Associ-

ation, Incorporated; Membership)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely referencing sections of the United States Code.  It is not sequential text and does not appear to be part of the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Statement of GORSUCH, J.

defend  the  Title  42  orders  on  appeal  because  the  federal
government was unlikely to do so with sufficient vigor.  Ul-
timately, the court of appeals denied the States’ motion to
intervene as untimely.6  So, late in 2022, the States turned
to this Court seeking two things.  First, they asked for ex-
pedited review of the appellate court’s order denying their
motion to intervene.  Second, they asked for a stay of the
D. C.  district  court’s  decree  vacating  the  Title  42  orders.
The  Court  granted  both  requests.    In  doing  so,  the  Court
effectively extended the Title 42 orders indefinitely.7

Now,  almost  five  months  later,  the  Court  puts  a  final
twist  on  the  tale.    It  vacates  the  appellate  court’s  order
denying the States’ motion to intervene and remands with
instructions to dismiss the motion as moot.  Why the sud-
den about-face?  Recently, Congress passed and the Presi-
dent  signed  into  law  a  joint  resolution  declaring  that  the
COVID–19  emergency  is  over.8    The  Secretary  of  Health
and Human Services, too, has issued his own directive an-
nouncing the end of the public-health emergency underly-
ing  the  Title  42  orders.9    Apparently,  these  developments
are enough to persuade the Court that the Title 42 orders
the government wished to withdraw a year ago are now as
good as gone and any dispute over them is moot.

I recite all this tortured procedural history not because I
think  the  Court’s  decision  today  is  wrong.    Nearly  five
months ago, I argued that the Court erred when it granted
expedited review and issued a stay.  As I explained at the
time, I do not discount the States’ concerns about what is
happening  at  the  border,  but  “the  current  border  crisis  is

——————

6 Arizona v. Mayorkas, 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (GORSUCH, J., dissent-

ing) (slip op., at 2).

7 See id., at ___ (slip op., at 3).
8 Pub. L. 118–3, 137 Stat. 6.
9 See  U. S.  Dept.  of  Health  and  Human  Services,  COVID–19  Public
Health  Emergency  (PHE),  https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/covid-19-
public-health-emergency/index.html.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or dissenting statement, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses procedural history and legal arguments related to the Title 42 orders.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Statement</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Alden, 527 U. S., at 716.

Although States generally retained their immunity from
suit, “in ratifying the Constitution, [they] did surrender a
portion  of  their  inherent  immunity.”    Federal  Maritime
Comm’n,  535  U. S.,  at  752.  As  Alexander  Hamilton  ex-
plained in The Federalist, sovereign immunity was part of
“the  general  sense  and  the  general  practice  of  mankind,”
and the Constitution therefore left it “with the States” un-
less they had “surrender[ed]” some portion “of this immun-
ity in the plan of the convention.”  The Federalist No. 81,
pp. 487–488 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also Hans, 134 U. S.,
at 13; Alden, 527 U. S., at 755.

During the Nation’s first 200 years, this Court recognized
only  two  instances  in  which  the  States  had  surrendered
their sovereign immunity in the constitutional plan, both of
which involved suits prosecuted by other sovereigns.  The
States had agreed to be sued by other States in this Court,
see Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 328
(1934), and by the United States in federal court, see United
States  v.  Texas,  143  U. S.  621,  644–645  (1892);  Franchise
Tax Bd., 587 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 9–10).  When it
came to private litigation, however, this Court long main-
tained  that  “the  Framers  thought  it  an  impermissible  af-
front to a State’s dignity to be required to answer the com-
plaints  of  private  parties  in  federal  courts,”  Federal
Maritime Comm’n, 535 U. S., at 760, and that “the Conven-
tion did not disturb States’ immunity from private suits,”
id., at 752.

Nevertheless, in the last two decades, the Court has rec-
ognized two surrenders of sovereign immunity in cases im-
plicating private parties.  First, in Central Va. Community
College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356 (2006), this Court held that
States  waived  immunity  against  the  federal  discharge  of
debts when they ratified the Bankruptcy Clause.  And, in
PennEast, 594 U. S. ___, it held that States waived immun-
ity  against  condemnation  proceedings  brought  by  private
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, indicating it is part of the core legal content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

Opinion of the Court

analysis  of  whether  the  text  and  context  were  consistent
with equitable tolling would have been wasted words if the
Court  had  already  held  that  §2409a(g)  was  jurisdictional.
Precisely because the Court’s inquiry was so focused on the
particular nature of equitable tolling, Beggerly also did not
address whether other exceptions such as “fraudulent con-
cealment or equitable estoppel might apply,” as Justice Ste-
vens  noted  in  his  concurrence.    Id.,  at  49.    If  anything,
Beggerly’s discussion of nonjurisdictional reasons why toll-
ing specifically was unavailable indicates the Court under-
stood §2409a(g) not to be jurisdictional.  Thus, Beggerly un-
dermines  any  notion  that  Block  and  Mottaz  had  put  the
jurisdictional question to rest.

All  three  cases  therefore  point  in  one  direction:  This
Court has never definitively interpreted §2409a(g) as juris-
dictional.7    For  similar  reasons,  the  Government’s  argu-
ment  about  legislative  acquiescence  is  unavailing.    Con-
gress amended the Act in 1986 to provide special rules for
States  in  the  wake  of  Block.  See  100  Stat.  3351–3352.
Then, as now, “none of our decisions establishe[d]” that the
time limit was jurisdictional, so there was no definitive ju-
dicial interpretation to which Congress could acquiesce.  Al-
exander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 291 (2001).  The mere
existence  of  a  decision  employing  the  term  jurisdiction
without elaboration does not show Congress adopted that
view.  Nor  can  the  Government’s  handful  of  lower  court
opinions stand in for a ruling of this Court, especially where
some of these decisions contain only fleeting references to
jurisdiction.8  See Boechler, 596 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op.,
at 7–8).

——————

7 The dissent invokes a fourth case, United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S.
596 (1990), which offers no more support.  Dalm involved a separate pro-
vision  of  a  separate  statute,  see  id.,  at  601–602,  and  cannot  render
§2490a(g) jurisdictional when Quiet Title  Act cases  like Block, Mottaz,
and Beggerly failed to do so.

8 See Fulcher v. United States, 696 F. 2d 1073, 1078 (CA4 1982).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion. It delves into the interpretation of a statute (likely §2409a(g)) and its jurisdictional implications. The language is formal and legalistic, citing previous cases and employing legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–71.  Argued October 1, 2018—Decided November 27, 2018

The Fish and Wildlife Service administers the Endangered Species Act
of  1973  on  behalf  of  the  Secretary  of  the Interior.    In  2001,  the  Ser-
vice  listed  the  dusky  gopher  frog  as  an  endangered  species.    See  16
U. S. C. §1533(a)(1).  That required the Service to designate “critical
habitat”  for  the  frog.  The  Service  proposed  designating  as  part  of
that critical habitat a site in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, which
the Service dubbed “Unit 1.”  The frog had once lived in Unit 1, but
the land had long been used as a commercial timber plantation, and
no  frogs  had  been  spotted  there  for  decades.    The  Service  concluded
that Unit 1 met the statutory definition of unoccupied critical habitat
because its rare, high-quality breeding ponds and distance from exist-
ing  frog  populations  made  it  essential  for  the  species’  conservation.
§1532(5)(A)(ii).  The Service then commissioned a report on the prob-
able  economic  impact  of  its  proposed  critical-habitat  designation.
§1533(b)(2).  With regard to Unit 1, the report found that designation
might bar future development of the site, depriving the owners of up
to  $33.9  million.    The  Service  nonetheless  concluded  that  the  poten-
tial  costs  were  not  disproportionate  to  the  conservation  benefits  and
proceeded to designate Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher
frog.

Unit 1 is owned by petitioner Weyerhaeuser and a group of family
landowners.  The owners of Unit 1 sued, contending that the closed-
canopy  timber  plantation  on  Unit  1  could  not  be  critical  habitat  for
the  dusky gopher  frog,  which  lives in  open-canopy  forests.    The  Dis-
trict Court upheld the designation.  The landowners also challenged
the  Service’s  decision  not  to  exclude  Unit  1  from  the  frog’s  critical
habitat, arguing that the Service had failed to adequately weigh the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

974

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

August 17, 19, 26, 27, 1998

524 U. S.

August 17, 1998

Vacated and Remanded After Certiorari Granted

No. 97–1620. Seif, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Protection, et al. v. Chester Residents
Concerned for Quality Living et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
[Certio-
Judgment vacated, and case remanded
rari granted, ante, p. 915.]
with instructions to dismiss in light of United States v. Munsing-
wear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).

Certiorari Denied

August 19, 1998

No. 98–5562 (A–119). Chandler v. Greene, Warden. C. A.
4th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the
Justice Stevens and Jus-
Court, denied. Certiorari denied.
tice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.
Reported below: 145 F. 3d 1323.

Miscellaneous Order

August 26, 1998

No. A–173 (O. T. 1998). Ruiz Camacho v. Texas. Application
for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice
Scalia, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Justice
O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this
application.

Certiorari Denied

No. 98–5331 (A–125). Ruiz Camacho v. Johnson, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di-
vision. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sen-
tence of death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred
Justice Stevens and
to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.
Justice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execu-
tion. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 1279.

Miscellaneous Orders

August 27, 1998

No. D–1972.

In re Disbarment of Hynes. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 948.]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a section of a court docket or case summaries. It lists case numbers, dates, actions taken (e.g., certiorari granted, denied), and sometimes brief descriptions of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

of words or phrases is essential’ ” for satisfying the presen-
tation requirement, so long as the claim is “ ‘brought to the
attention of the state court with fair precision and in due
time.’ ”  Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 584 (1969) (quot-
ing New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 67
(1928)).

Hemphill has satisfied this requirement.  At every level
of his proceedings in state court, Hemphill argued that the
admission  of  Morris’  plea  allocution  violated  his  Sixth
Amendment  right  to  confrontation  as  interpreted  by  this
Court in Crawford.  Before the trial court, Hemphill timely
objected that admission of the plea allocution would be “a
Crawford violation.”  App. 160.  Before the Appellate Divi-
sion, he argued that the trial court “denied Mr. Hemphill
his 6th Amendment right to confront the witnesses against
him.”  Supp. App. to Brief in Opposition SA108.  And before
the Court of Appeals, he contended that “[t]he Appellate Di-
vision’s analysis,” which had affirmed the trial court’s ad-
mission of the plea allocution, “is absurd in the context of
the Confrontation Clause, the purpose of which is to afford
the accused the right to meaningfully test the prosecution’s
proof.”  App.  388.  “Once  a  federal  claim  is  properly  pre-
sented, a party can make any argument in support of that
claim.”  Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534 (1992).  The
Court  may  therefore  consider  any  argument  Hemphill
raises in support of his claim that he did not “forfei[t] his
right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the Confron-
tation  Clause”  by  “open[ing]  the  door  to  responsive  evi-
dence.”  Pet. for Cert. i.2

——————

2 According to the dissent, Hemphill did not present his constitutional
claim below because he “challenged only the misapplication of state law”
(i.e., the opening-the-door rule enunciated in People v. Reid, 19 N. Y. 3d
382, 971 N. E. 2d 353 (2012)) without developing his constitutional ob-
jection.  Post,  at  4  (opinion  of  THOMAS,  J.).  Not  so.  Hemphill  argued
before the Court of Appeals that the Appellate Division’s interpretation
of  Reid  in  his  case  “equates  presenting  a  valid,  evidence-based  third
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, arguments about constitutional rights, and references to prior court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY

Opinion of the Court

conducted  warrantless  blood  test.    That,  however,  is  a
reason  to  decide  each  case  on  its  facts,  as  we  did  in
Schmerber, not to accept the “considerable overgeneraliza
tion” that a per se rule would reflect.  Richards, 520 U. S.,
at 393.

The  context  of  blood  testing  is  different  in  critical  re
spects  from  other  destruction-of-evidence  cases  in  which
the  police  are  truly  confronted  with  a  “ ‘now  or  never’ ”
situation.  Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496, 505 (1973).
In  contrast  to,  for  example,  circumstances  in  which  the
suspect  has  control  over  easily  disposable  evidence,  see
Georgia  v.  Randolph,  547  U. S.  103,  116,  n. 6  (2006);
Cupp,  412  U. S.,  at  296,  BAC  evidence  from  a  drunk
driving suspect naturally dissipates over time in a gradual
and  relatively  predictable  manner.    Moreover,  because  a
police  officer  must  typically  transport  a  drunk-driving
suspect  to  a  medical  facility  and  obtain  the  assistance  of
someone  with  appropriate  medical  training  before  con
ducting  a  blood  test,  some  delay  between  the  time  of  the
arrest  or  accident  and  the  time  of  the  test  is  inevitable
regardless of whether police officers are required to obtain
a  warrant.  See  State  v.  Shriner,  751  N. W.  2d  538,  554
(Minn.  2008)  (Meyer,  J.,  dissenting).  This  reality  under
mines the force of the State’s contention, endorsed by the
dissent,  see  post,  at  3  (opinion  of  THOMAS,  J.),  that  we
should  recognize  a  categorical  exception  to  the  warrant
requirement  because  BAC  evidence  “is  actively  being
destroyed  with every  minute that passes.”  Brief for Peti
tioner 27.  Consider, for example, a situation in which the
warrant  process  will  not  significantly  increase  the  delay
before  the  blood  test  is  conducted  because  an  officer  can
take  steps  to  secure  a  warrant  while  the  suspect  is  being
transported  to  a  medical  facility  by  another  officer.    In
such a circumstance, there would be no plausible justifica
tion for an exception to the warrant requirement.

The State’s proposed per se rule also fails to account for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case Missouri v. McNeely. It discusses the legality of warrantless blood tests in DUI cases. The text is sequential and provides legal reasoning, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34  ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.

v. GOLDSMITH
KAGAN, J., dissenting

majority’s  reasoning,  someone  in  the  market  for  a  papal
portrait  could  use  either  one,  see  ante,  at  22–23.  Veláz-
quez’s portrait, although Bacon’s model, is not “the object of
[his]  commentary.”  Ante,  at  27;  see  A.  Zweite,  Bacon’s
Scream, in Francis Bacon: The Violence of the Real 71 (A.
Zweite ed. 2006) (Bacon “was not seeking to expose Veláz-
quez’s masterpiece,” but instead to “adapt it” and “give it a
new meaning”).  And absent that “target[ing],” the majority
thinks the portraits’ distinct messages make no difference.
Ante, at 27.  Recall how the majority deems irrelevant the
District Court’s view that the Goldsmith Prince is vulnera-
ble, the Warhol Prince iconic.  Too small a “degree of differ-
ence,” according to the majority.  Ante, at 33–34; see supra,
at  17.  So  too  here,  presumably:  the  stolid  Pope,  the  dis-
turbed  Pope—it  just  doesn’t  matter.  But  that  once  again
misses what a copier accomplished: the making of a wholly
new piece of art from an existing one.

The majority thus treats creativity as a trifling part of the
fair-use inquiry, in disregard of settled copyright principles
and  what  they  reflect  about  the  artistic  process.    On  the
majority’s  view, an artist had best not attempt to market
even  a  transformative  follow-on  work—one  that  adds  sig-
nificant new expression, meaning, or message.  That added
value (unless it comes from critiquing the original) will no
longer  receive  credit  under  factor  1.    And  so  it  can  never
hope  to  outweigh  factor  4’s  assessment  of  the  copyright
holder’s interests.  The result will be what this Court has
often  warned  against:  suppression  of  “the  very  creativity
which [copyright] law is designed to foster.”  Stewart, 495
U. S., at 236; see supra, at 11–12.  And not just on the mar-
gins.  Creative  progress  unfolds  through  use  and  reuse,
framing and reframing: One work builds on what has gone
before; and later works build on that one; and so on through
time.  Congress grasped the idea when it directed courts to
attend  to  the  “purpose  and  character”  of  artistic  borrow-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically focusing on the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith case. It argues against the majority's reasoning regarding fair use and copyright.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

35

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

addresses  “Patentability  of  Inventions  and  Grant  of  Pat-
ents.”  Particularly  because  petitioners’  reading  of  the
1999  Act  would  expand  §101  to  cover  a  category  of  proc-
esses that have not “historically been eligible” for patents,
Diehr,  450  U.  S.,  at  184,  we  should  be  loath  to  conclude
that Congress effectively amended §101 without saying so
clearly.  We  generally  presume  that  Congress  “does  not,
one  might  say,  hide  elephants  in  mouseholes.”    Whitman
v.  American  Trucking  Assns.,  Inc.,  531  U. S.  457,  468
(2001).

The  Act  therefore  is,  at  best,  merely  evidence  of  1999
legislative  views  on  the  meaning  of  the  earlier,  1952  Act.
“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress,” however, “form  a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”
United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960).  When a
later  statute  is  offered  as  “an  expression  of  how  the  . . .
Congress  interpreted  a  statute  passed  by  another  Con-
gress  . . .  a  half  century  before,”  “such  interpretation  has
very  little,  if  any,  significance.”    Rainwater  v.  United
States, 356 U. S. 590, 593 (1958).

Furthermore,  even  assuming  that  Congress’  views  at
the  turn  of  the  21st  century  could  potentially  serve  as  a
valid  basis  for  interpreting  a  statute  passed  in  the  mid-
20th century, the First Inventor Defense Act does not aid
petitioners  because  it  does  not  show  that  the  later  Con-
gress itself understood §101 to cover business methods.  If
anything,  it  shows  that  a  few  judges  on  the  Federal  Cir-
cuit  understood  §101  in  that  manner  and  that  Congress
understood what those judges had done.  The Act appears
to reflect surprise and perhaps even dismay that business
methods  might  be  patented.    Thus,  in  the  months  follow-
ing  State  Street,  congressional  authorities  lamented  that
“business  methods  and  processes  . . .  until  recently  were
thought  not  to  be  patentable,”  H. R.  Rep.  No.  106–464,
p. 121 (1999); accord, H. R. Rep. No. 106–287, pt.  1, p.  31
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Stevens in a case regarding patent law. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of a specific statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xxxvii

Page

1080

Cooper v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cooper v. Kannrine
972

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cooper v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  830,870,1020,1058

1039

Cooper; Webster v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coplen v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1016

Coppage, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,1140

926
Corbett; Dyson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011
Corboy & Demetrio, P. C.; Pinnick v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Corcoran v. Levenhagen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cordell v. Paciﬁc Indemnity Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  905,1139

Cordell v. Sabol
1048

Corder v. Lewis Palmer School Dist. No. 38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientiﬁc Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

1049

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cordis Corp.; Boston Scientiﬁc Corp. v.
Cordis Corp.; Wakeﬁeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  805,1045

1152

Cordova v. Aragon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1082

Cordova v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878

Cordy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corines, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

Corines v. Broward County Sheriff ’s Dept.
Corines v. Killian  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1146

Corjasso v. Brown
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  903,1039

Cornes v. Illinois
Corning Glass Works, Inc.; Royse v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1046,1146

Cornwell v. Bobby  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

Corona-Cuevas v. Hall
1053

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corral v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1102

922

Corrales v. Neven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Correa-Ruiz v. Fortuno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Correctional Medical Systems; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Corrections Commissioner.  See name of commissioner.

Corrections Corporation of America; Sutton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corredor v. Federal Aviation Administration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corrigan, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corriveau; Scotti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cortinas v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cosmos Jewelry, Ltd.; Hon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Costa Crociere S. p. A.; Krupski v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S. A.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cottingham v. Policy Studies, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cotton v. Coleman
Cotton v. Kelley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
County.  See name of county.

Court of Appeals.  See also U. S. Court of Appeals.

972

967

813

844

956

973

1142

810

809

1029

870

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,1051
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

YATES v. UNITED STATES

KAGAN, J., dissenting

B
The  concurring  opinion  is  a  shorter,  vaguer  version  of
the plurality’s.  It relies primarily on the noscitur a sociis
and  ejusdem  generis  canons,  tries  to  bolster  them  with
§1519’s  “list  of  verbs,”  and  concludes  with  the  section’s
title.  See supra, at 7–8, 12–13, 14–15 (addressing each of
those arguments).  (Notably, even the concurrence puts no
stock  in  the  plurality’s  section-number  and  superfluity
claims.)  From  those  familiar  materials,  the  concurrence
arrives at the following definition: “ ‘tangible object’ should
mean  something  similar  to  records  or  documents.”    Ante,
at  4  (opinion  of  ALITO,  J.).    In  amplifying  that  purported
guidance,  the  concurrence  suggests  applying  the  term
“tangible  object”  in  keeping  with  what  “a  neighbor,  when
asked  to  identify  something  similar  to  record  or  docu-
ment,” might answer.  Ante, at 1.  “[W]ho wouldn’t raise an
eyebrow,”  the  concurrence  wonders,  if  the  neighbor  said
“crocodile”?  Ante,  at  1–2.    Courts  sometimes  say,  when
explaining the Latin maxims, that the “words of a statute
should  be  interpreted  consistent  with  their  neighbors.”
See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U. S. 89, 105 (2000).
The concurrence takes that expression literally.

But §1519’s meaning should not hinge on the odd game
of  Mad  Libs  the  concurrence  proposes.  No  one  reading
§1519 needs to fill in a blank after the words “records” and
“documents.”  That  is  because  Congress,  quite  helpfully,
already  did  so—adding  the  term  “tangible  object.”    The
issue in this case is what that term means.  So if the con-
currence wishes to ask its neighbor a question, I’d recom-
mend a more pertinent one: Do you think a fish (or, if the
concurrence prefers, a crocodile) is a “tangible object”?  As
to  that  query,  “who  wouldn’t  raise  an  eyebrow”  if  the
neighbor said “no”?

In  insisting  on  its  different  question,  the  concurrence
neglects  the  proper  function  of  catchall  phrases  like  “or
tangible object.”  The reason Congress uses such terms is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Kagan. It analyzes and critiques the concurring opinion in the Yates v. United States case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS

Syllabus

(1) Texas asks the Court to focus on subsection (a) of the Restora-
tion Act, which ends with the statement that “[t]he provisions of this
subsection are enacted in accordance with the tribe’s request in Tribal
Resolution No. T. C.–02–86.”  101 Stat. 668–669.  In that referenced
resolution, the Tribe announced its opposition to Texas’s legislative ef-
forts to have its gaming laws apply on tribal lands.  At the same time,
the Tribe also announced its own intention to prohibit gaming on its
reservation  and  authorized  the  acceptance  of  federal  legislation  pro-
hibiting gaming on tribal lands.  Texas claims that the reference to the
tribal resolution suggests the Restoration Act should be read “broadly”
to allow Texas to apply its gaming regulations on tribal lands.  As an
initial matter, subsection (a) does not purport to incorporate that res-
olution into federal law—something Congress knows how to do when
it wishes, see e.g., 25 U. S. C. §5396(b).  In addition, Texas’s “broad”
reading suffers from the same interpretative challenges already men-
tioned and defies Congress’s apparent adoption of Cabazon’s prohibi-
tory/regulatory distinction.  Finally, on this Court’s interpretation of
the  Restoration  Act,  Congress  did  legislate  “in  accordance  with”  the
Tribe’s resolution by expressly granting the Tribe federal recognition
and choosing not to apply Texas gaming regulations as surrogate fed-
eral law on tribal land.  Pp. 15–18.

(2) Texas appeals to public policy and argues that attempts to dis-
tinguish  between  prohibition  and  regulation  are  sure  to  prove  “un-
workable.”  It is not, however, this Court’s place to question whether
Congress adopted the wisest or most workable policy.  That the Resto-
ration  Act’s  prohibitory/regulatory  distinction  can  and  will  generate
borderline cases hardly makes it unique among federal statutes.  And
courts  have  applied  the  same  prohibitory/regulatory  framework  for
decades under Public Law 280.  Moreover, Texas’s alternative inter-
pretation  poses  its  own  “workability”  challenges,  as  federal  courts
would be charged with enforcing the minutiae of state gaming regula-
tions governing the conduct of permissible games.  Pp. 18–19.

955 F. 3d 408, vacated and remanded.

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BREYER, SO-
TOMAYOR, KAGAN, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dis-
senting opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
340  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

U. S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v.  Roy, 401
U. S. 265, 272 (1971)); see Buckley, supra, at 14 (“Discussion
of public issues and debate on the qualiﬁcations of candidates
are  integral  to  the  operation  of  the  system  of  government
established by our Constitution”).

For  these  reasons,  political  speech  must  prevail  against
laws  that  would  suppress  it,  whether  by  design  or  inadver
tence.  Laws  that  burden  political  speech  are  “subject  to
strict  scrutiny,”  which  requires  the  Government  to  prove
that  the  restriction  “furthers  a  compelling  interest  and  is
narrowly  tailored  to  achieve  that  interest.”  WRTL,  551
U. S.,  at 464  (opinion of  Roberts,  C. J.).  While  it might  be
maintained that political speech simply cannot be banned or
restricted as a categorical matter, see Simon & Schuster, 502
U. S.,  at  124  (Kennedy,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment),  the
quoted  language  from  WRTL  provides  a  sufﬁcient  frame
work for protecting the relevant First Amendment interests
in this case.  We shall employ it here.

Premised  on  mistrust  of  governmental  power,  the  First
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain sub
jects or viewpoints.  See, e. g., United States v.  Playboy En
tertainment  Group,  Inc.,  529  U. S.  803,  813  (2000)  (striking
down  content-based  restriction).  Prohibited,  too,  are  re
strictions  distinguishing  among  different  speakers,  allowing
speech by some but not others.  See First Nat. Bank of Bos
ton v.  Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 784 (1978).  As instruments to
censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions
based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply
a means to control content.

Quite  apart  from  the  purpose  or  effect  of  regulating  con
tent, moreover, the Government may commit a constitutional
wrong  when  by  law  it  identiﬁes  certain  preferred  speakers.
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to oth
ers,  the  Government  deprives  the  disadvantaged  person  or
class  of  the  right  to  use  speech  to  strive  to  establish  worth,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the First Amendment and political speech. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

ALITO, J., concurring

§400.00(6) (West Cum. Supp. 2022); Suggestion of Mootness
in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. City of New
York, O. T. 2019, No. 18–280, pp. 5–7.

Exhibit  two  is  the  dissent  filed  in  Heller  by  JUSTICE
BREYER,  the  author  of  today’s  dissent.    At  issue  in Heller
was an ordinance that made it impossible for any District
of  Columbia  resident  to  keep  a  handgun  in  the  home  for
self-defense.  See 554 U. S., at 574–575.  Even the respond-
ent, who carried a gun on the job while protecting federal
facilities, did not qualify.  Id., at 575–576.  The District of
Columbia law was an extreme outlier; only a few other ju-
risdictions in the entire country had similar laws.  Never-
theless, JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent, while accepting for the
sake of argument that the Second Amendment protects the
right to keep a handgun in the home, concluded, based on
essentially the same test that today’s dissent defends, that
the District’s complete ban was constitutional.  See id., at
689, 722 (under “an interest-balancing inquiry. . .” the dis-
sent would “conclude that the District’s measure is a pro-
portionate, not a disproportionate, response to the compel-
ling concerns that led the District to adopt it”).

Like that dissent in Heller, the real thrust of today’s dis-
sent is that guns are bad and that States and local jurisdic-
tions should be free to restrict them essentially as they see
fit.3  That argument was rejected in Heller, and while the
dissent protests that it is not rearguing Heller, it proceeds
to do just that.  See post, at 25–28.

Heller correctly recognized that the Second Amendment

——————

3 If we put together the dissent in this case and JUSTICE BREYER’s Hel-
ler dissent, States and local governments would essentially be free to ban
the possession of all handguns, and it is unclear whether its approach
would impose any significant restrictions on laws regulating long guns.
The dissent would extend a very large measure of deference to legislation
implicating Second Amendment rights, but it does not claim that such
deference is appropriate when any other constitutional right is at issue.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen. It cites previous cases (Heller) and legal arguments, making it relevant content for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

15

THOMAS, J., dissenting

III

A

Arizona  has  not  challenged  the  constitutionality  of  the
NVRA itself in this case.  Nor has it alleged that Congress
lacks  authority  to  direct  the  EAC  to  create  the  federal
form.  As  a  result,  I  need  not  address  those  issues.    Ari-
zona did, however, argue that respondent’s interpretation
of §1973gg–4(a)(1) would raise constitutional concerns.  As
discussed,  supra,  I  too  am  concerned  that  respondent’s
interpretation of §1973gg–4(a)(1) would render the statute
unconstitutional under Article I, §2.  Accordingly, I would
interpret §1973gg–4(a)(1) to avoid the constitutional prob-
lems  discussed  above.  See  Zadvydas  v.  Davis,  533  U. S.
678,  689  (2001)  (“ ‘[I]t  is  a  cardinal  principle’  of  statutory
interpretation,  however,  that  when  an  Act  of  Congress
raises  ‘a  serious  doubt’  as  to  its  constitutionality,  ‘this
Court  will  first  ascertain  whether  a  construction  of  the
statute  is  fairly  possible  by  which  the  question  may  be
avoided’ ”  (quoting  Crowell  v.  Benson,  285  U. S.  22,  62
(1932))).

I cannot, therefore, adopt the Court’s interpretation that
§1973gg–4(a)(1)’s  “accept  and  use”  provision  requires
states  to  register  anyone  who  completes  and  submits  the
form.  Arizona  sets  citizenship  as  a  qualification  to  vote,
and it wishes to verify citizenship, as it is authorized to do
under  Article  1,  §2.  It  matters  not  whether  the  United
States  has  specified  one  way  in  which  it  believes  Arizona
might  be  able  to  verify  citizenship;  Arizona  has  the  inde-
pendent  constitutional  authority  to  verify  citizenship  in
the  way  it  deems  necessary.    See  in  Part  II–A–2,  supra.
By  requiring  Arizona  to  register  people  who  have  not

——————

Without  Naming  Electors,  Wall  Street  Journal,  Dec.  15,  2000,  p.  A6.

Constitutional avoidance is especially appropriate in this area because

the  NVRA  purports  to  regulate  presidential  elections,  an  area  over

which the Constitution gives Congress no authority whatsoever.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses the constitutionality of a specific section of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and the authority of states to verify voter citizenship.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

OHIO v. EPA

Syllabus

all those States.  EPA designed its proposed FIP based on which emis-
sions-control measures would maximize cost-effectiveness in improv-
ing ozone levels downwind and on the assumption the FIP would apply
to all covered States.  Commenters warned that the proposed SIP dis-
approvals were flawed and that a failure to achieve all the SIP disap-
provals as EPA envisioned would mean that EPA would need to reas-
sess  the  measures  necessary  to  maximize  cost-effective  ozone-level
improvements in light of a different set of States.  EPA proceeded to
issue its final FIP without addressing this concern.  Instead, EPA an-
nounced that its plan was severable: Should any jurisdiction drop out,
the plan would continue to apply unchanged to the remaining jurisdic-
tions.  Ongoing litigation over the SIP disapprovals soon vindicated at
least some of the commenters’ concerns.  Courts stayed 12 of the SIP
disapprovals, which meant EPA could not apply its FIP to those States.
  A number of the remaining States and industry groups challenged
the FIP in the D. C. Circuit.  They argued that EPA’s decision to apply
the FIP after so many other States had dropped out was “arbitrary” or
“capricious,” and they asked the court to stay any effort to enforce the
FIP against them while their appeal unfolded.  The D. C. Circuit de-
nied relief, and the parties renewed their request in this Court.

Held: The applications for a stay are granted; enforcement of EPA’s rule
against the applicants shall be stayed pending the disposition of the
applicants’ petition for review in the D. C. Circuit and any petition for
writ of certiorari, timely sought.  Pp. 9–20.

(a) When  deciding  an  application  for  a  stay,  the  Court  asks  (1)
whether the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) whether it
will suffer irreparable injury without a stay, (3) whether the stay will
substantially  injure  the  other  parties  interested  in  the  proceedings,
and (4) where the public interest lies.  Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418,
434.  When States and other parties seek to stay the enforcement of a
federal  regulation  against  them,  often  “the  harms  and equities  [will
be] very weighty on both sides.”  Labrador v. Poe, 601 U. S. ___, ___
(KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring  in  grant  of  stay).    Because  that  is  true
here, resolution of applicants’ stay request ultimately turns on the first
question: Who is likely to prevail at the end.  See Nken, 556 U. S., at
434.  Pp. 9–11.

(b) Applicants  are  likely  to  prevail  on  their  arbitrary-or-capricious
claim.  An agency action qualifies as “arbitrary” or “capricious” if it is
not “reasonable and reasonably explained.”  FCC v. Prometheus Radio
Project, 592 U. S. 414, 423.  Thus, the agency must offer “a satisfactory
explanation  for  its  action[,]  including  a  rational  connection  between
the facts found and the choice made” and cannot simply ignore “an im-
portant aspect of the problem.”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43.
  </content>
  <thinking>
The content appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the background of the case, the legal issues at hand, and the Court's decision to grant a stay.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
440  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of Stevens, J.

of  millions  of  dollars  of  their  general  funds  to  pay  for  these
ads.”  Id., at 127.  Congress passed § 203 to address this cir
cumvention,  prohibiting  corporations  and  unions  from  using
general  treasury  funds  for  electioneering  communications
that “refe[r] to a clearly identiﬁed candidate,” whether or not
those communications use the magic words.  2 U. S. C.
§ 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(I).

When we asked in McConnell “whether a compelling gov
ernmental  interest  justiﬁe[d]”  § 203,  we  found  the  question
“easily answered”: “We have repeatedly sustained legislation
aimed at ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense ag
gregations  of  wealth  that  are  accumulated  with  the  help  of
the  corporate  form  and  that  have  little  or  no  correlation  to
the  public’s  support  for  the  corporation’s  political  ideas.’ ”
540  U. S.,  at  205  (quoting  Austin,  494  U. S.,  at  660).  These
precedents  “represent  respect  for  the  legislative  judgment
that the special characteristics of the corporate structure re
quire particularly careful regulation.”  540 U. S., at 205 (in
ternal  quotation  marks  omitted).  “Moreover,  recent  cases
have  recognized  that  certain  restrictions  on  corporate  elec
toral involvement permissibly hedge against ‘ “circumvention
of  [valid]  contribution  limits.” ’ ”  Ibid.  (quoting  Beaumont,
539  U. S., at  155, in  turn  quoting FEC  v.  Colorado  Republi
can Federal  Campaign Comm., 533  U. S. 431, 456, and  n. 18
(2001)  (Colorado  II);  alteration  in  original).  BCRA,  we
found, is faithful to the compelling governmental interests in
“ ‘preserving  the  integrity  of  the  electoral  process,  prevent
ing corruption, . . . sustaining the active, alert responsibility
of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct
of  the  government,’ ”  and  maintaining  “ ‘the  individual  citi
zen’s  conﬁdence  in  government.’ ”  540  U. S.,  at  206–207,
n.  88  (quoting  Bellotti,  435  U. S.,  at  788–789;  some  internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted).  What made the an
swer even easier than it might have been otherwise was the
option  to  form  PACs,  which  give  corporations,  at  the  least,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case. It discusses campaign finance regulations and the court's reasoning behind upholding certain restrictions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

Opinion of the Court

their transgender status.  884 F. 3d 560 (2018).  During the
course  of  the  proceedings  in  these  long-running  disputes,
both Mr. Zarda and Ms. Stephens have passed away.  But
their estates continue to press their causes for the benefit
of their heirs.  And we granted certiorari in these matters
to resolve at last the disagreement among the courts of ap-
peals over the scope of Title VII’s protections for homosex-
ual and transgender persons.  587 U. S. ___ (2019).

II
This Court normally interprets a statute in accord with
the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its
enactment.  After all, only the words on the page constitute
the  law  adopted  by  Congress  and  approved  by  the  Presi-
dent.  If  judges  could  add  to,  remodel,  update,  or  detract
from  old  statutory  terms  inspired  only  by  extratextual
sources and our own imaginations, we would risk amending
statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the peo-
ple’s  representatives.  And  we  would  deny  the  people  the
right to continue relying on the original meaning of the law
they have counted on to settle their rights and obligations.
See  New  Prime  Inc.  v.  Oliveira,  586  U. S.  ___,  ___–___
(2019) (slip op., at 6–7).

With this in mind, our task is clear.  We must determine
the ordinary public meaning of Title VII’s command that it
is “unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or
to  discharge  any  individual,  or  otherwise  to  discriminate
against  any  individual  with  respect  to  his  compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such  individual’s  race,  color,  religion,  sex,  or  national
origin.”  §2000e–2(a)(1).  To do so, we orient ourselves to the
time of the statute’s adoption, here 1964, and begin by ex-
amining  the  key  statutory  terms  in  turn  before  assessing
their impact on the cases at hand and then confirming our
work against this Court’s precedents.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" from a case. It sets the context for the case, mentions the parties involved, and outlines the Court's approach to interpreting the relevant statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xlv

Marchan Moreno v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marcone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marcum v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maricopa County; Gutenkauf v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
Marigold Foods, Inc.; Rainy Lake One Stop, Inc. v.
Marine Drilling Mgmt. Co.; Frank’s Casing & Rental Tools v.
. . .
Marino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Markay v. Farmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marlow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marsh v. Madrid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marsh v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martin; Franks v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martin; Nubine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martin v. Perez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martinez v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martinez-Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maryland; Cabana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maryland; Jackson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maryland; Young-Bey v.
Massachusetts; Auborg v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Massachusetts; Emerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Massachusetts; Pagano v.
Massachusetts; Zimbovsky v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Massachusetts ABC Comm’n; Massachusetts Food Assn. v.
. . . . .
Massachusetts Food Assn. v. Massachusetts ABC Comm’n . . . . .
Mathonican v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mattina; Haynes v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mauro v. Arpaio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
May v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
May Dept. Stores; Douthitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mayes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mayeux v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mayor of Baltimore; Gaskins v.
. .
Mayor of New York City; Greater N. Y. Metro. Food Council v.
Mays v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McArthur; Illinois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McBay v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McBride v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McCallum v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McCann; Bryon L. Rosquist, D. C., P. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McCaughtry; Seeley v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McCleary v. Mirza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1114
1017
1041,1125
1069
1038
1098
1137
1076
1131
1009
1134
1007
1025
1113
1123,1135
1102
1029
1080
1010
1076
1122
1119
1030
1062
1125,1128
1105
1105
1007
1007
1018
1011
1054
1105
1009
1114
1066
1009
1097
1114
1106
1027
1126
1061
1110
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Syllabus

Held: A  naturally  occurring  DNA  segment  is  a  product  of  nature  and
not patent eligible merely because it has  been isolated,  but cDNA is
patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.  Pp. 10–18.

(a) The  Patent  Act  permits  patents  to  be  issued  to  “[w]hoever  in-
vents  or  discovers  any  new  and  useful  . . .  composition  of  matter,”
§101,  but  “laws  of  nature,  natural  phenomena,  and  abstract  ideas”
“ ‘are basic tools of scientific and technological work’ ” that lie beyond
the  domain  of  patent  protection,  Mayo,  supra,  at  ___.  The  rule
against  patents  on  naturally  occurring  things  has  limits,  however.
Patent protection strikes a delicate balance between creating “incen-
tives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery” and “imped[ing]
the  flow  of  information  that  might  permit,  indeed  spur,  invention.”
Id., at ___.  This standard is used to determine whether Myriad’s pa-
tents  claim  a  “new  and  useful  . . .  composition  of  matter,”  §101,  or
claim naturally occurring phenomena.  Pp. 10–11.

(b) Myriad’s  DNA  claim  falls  within  the  law  of  nature  exception.
Myriad’s  principal  contribution  was  uncovering  the  precise  location
and genetic sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.  Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, is central to the patent-eligibility inquiry
whether  such  action  was  new  “with  markedly  different  characteris-
tics from any found in nature,” id., at 310.  Myriad did not create or
alter  either  the  genetic  information  encoded  in  the  BCRA1  and
BCRA2  genes  or  the  genetic  structure  of  the  DNA.    It  found  an  im-
portant  and  useful  gene,  but  groundbreaking,  innovative,  or  even
brilliant  discovery  does  not  by  itself  satisfy  the  §101  inquiry.   See
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127.  Finding
the  location  of  the  BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes  does  not  render  the
genes patent eligible “new . . . composition[s] of matter,” §101.  Myri-
ad’s  patent  descriptions  highlight  the  problem  with  its  claims:  They
detail the extensive process of discovery, but extensive effort alone is
insufficient to satisfy §101’s demands.  Myriad’s claims are not saved
by  the  fact  that  isolating  DNA  from  the  human  genome  severs  the
chemical  bonds  that  bind  gene  molecules  together.    The  claims  are
not  expressed  in  terms  of  chemical  composition,  nor  do  they  rely  on
the chemical changes resulting from the isolation of a particular DNA
section.  Instead, they focus on the genetic information encoded in the
BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes.    Finally,  Myriad  argues  that  the  Patent
and Trademark Office’s past practice of awarding gene patents is en-
titled to deference, citing J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int’l, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, a case where Congress had endorsed a PTO
practice in subsequent legislation.  There has been no such endorse-
ment here, and the United States argued in the Federal Circuit and
in  this  Court  that  isolated  DNA  was  not  patent  eligible  under  §101.
Pp. 12–16.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing the key points of a Supreme Court case (Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.). It outlines the legal reasoning behind the court's decision regarding the patentability of isolated DNA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Opinion of the Court

tional  corporations  like  Arab  Bank.    For  13  years,  this
litigation has “caused significant diplomatic tensions” with
Jordan, a critical ally in one of the world’s most sensitive
regions.  Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  30.
“Jordan  is  a  key  counterterrorism  partner,  especially  in
the  global  campaign  to  defeat  the  Islamic  State  in  Iraq
and  Syria.”  Id.,  at  31.    The  United  States  explains  that
Arab  Bank  itself  is  “a  constructive  partner  with  the
United States in working to prevent terrorist financing.”  Id.,
at  32  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Jordan  consid-
ers  the  instant  litigation  to  be  a  “grave  affront”  to  its
sovereignty.  See  Brief  for  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan
as Amicus Curiae 3; see ibid. (“By exposing Arab Bank to
massive  liability,  this  suit  thus  threatens  to  destabilize
Jordan’s economy and undermine its cooperation with the
United States”).

This  is  not  the  first  time,  furthermore,  that  a  foreign
sovereign has appeared in this Court to note its objections
to  ATS  litigation.    Sosa,  542  U. S.,  at  733,  n.  21  (noting
objections by the European Commission and South Africa);
Brief  for  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  as  Amicus
Curiae in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., O. T. 2012,
No. 10–1491, p. 1; Brief for the Government of the United
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  and  the
Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands  as  Amici  Curiae  in  No.  10–
1491,  p.  3.    These  are  the  very  foreign-relations  tensions
the First Congress sought to avoid.

Petitioners insist that whatever the faults of this litiga-
tion—for  example,  its  tenuous  connections  to  the  United
States  and  the  prolonged  diplomatic  disruptions  it  has
caused—the  fact  that  Arab  Bank  is  a  foreign  corporate
entity,  as  distinct  from  a  natural  person,  is  not  one  of
them.  That  misses  the  point.  As  demonstrated  by  this
litigation,  foreign  corporate  defendants  create  unique
problems.  And  courts  are  not  well  suited  to  make  the
required policy judgments that are implicated by corporate
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the implications of litigation against a foreign corporation. It delves into diplomatic tensions and policy considerations, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

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[09-28-01 09:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

722

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

Scalia, J., dissenting

part of the term of supervised release to be served in prison,
with the rest of the term remaining in place to be served on
supervised release.
In the text actually adopted, however,
the supervised-release term is not left in place, but is explic-
itly “revoked.” 5

Further, if one assumes, as the Court does, that a revoked
term somehow “survives the . . . order of revocation,” ante,
at 705, and retains effect (even without any statutory au-
thorization for reimposition or reactivation), then it would
follow that whatever part of it is not required to be served
in prison is necessarily still
in effect. Thus the district
court would have no discretion not to require the remainder
of the term to be served on supervised release. Yet the
Court seems to view further supervised release as only an
“option.” Ante, at 704, 713, n. 13; accord, ante, at 713–714
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part).

The Court’s confusing discussion of how § 3583(a) would
produce consequences similar to those its opinion achieves—
and consequences that are entirely reasonable—i f
§ 3583(e)(3) read differently from the way it does read, ante,
I do not contend that the
at 707–708, is entirely irrelevant.
result the Court reaches is any way remarkable, only that it
is not the result called for by the statute. The Court care-
fully does not maintain—and it could not, for reasons I need
not describe—that subsection (a) justiﬁes imposition of post-

5 The concurrence adjusts for that inconvenient fact by simply changing
the object of the verb, concluding that “after the right to be on supervised
release has been revoked there is yet an unexpired term of supervised
release that can be allocated . . . in whole or in part to conﬁnement and to
release . . . .” Ante, at 713 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (emphasis
added). The statute, however, does not revoke “the right to be on super-
vised release”; it revokes the “term of supervised release” itself, see
§ 3583(e)(3), which is utterly incompatible with the notion that the term
remains in place. Switching the object of “revoke” is no fair in itself, and
it leaves the provision entirely redundant, since revoking “the right to be
on supervised release” adds nothing to “requir[ing] the person to serve in
prison all or part of the term,” § 3583(e)(3).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

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[09-26-01 13:01:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

688

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

Thomas, J., dissenting

ment is, no doubt, subject to an extensive list of statutory
and regulatory requirements, not because the Government
intends to provide “beneﬁts” to the contractor, but because
the Federal Government intends to place controls on the ex-
penditure of federal dollars. See United States v. Copeland,
143 F. 3d 1439, 1442 (CA11 1998) (discussing regulatory bur-
dens on defense contractors). Similarly, private insurers no
doubt impose various requirements on those who receive re-
In requiring hospitals to meet
imbursements from them.
certain standards, the Federal Government is no different
from these private insurers, except that the Federal Govern-
ment exercises vastly greater market power.
In other
words, the imposition on health care providers of an intricate
regulatory scheme is irrelevant to the question whether
funds paid pursuant to that scheme are beneﬁts.

Third, the Court contends that some health care providers
receive “special treatment” in the form of lump sum pay-
ments designed to ensure the providers’ ability to satisfy
ﬁnancial obligations. Ante, at 674. This feature of Medi-
care is also insufﬁcient to show that any “beneﬁts” were re-
ceived by West Volusia Hospital Authority. These payments,
which are part of the prospective payment system, see
supra, at 685, are based on estimated costs of providing serv-
ices to Medicare beneﬁciaries. See, e. g., 42 CFR § 412.108
(1999). Like the standard reimbursement schemes outlined
above, this payment system does not subsidize the hospital,
it pays the hospital prospectively for performing a service.
Finally, the Court concludes, based on its observations of
Medicare, that “Medicare operates with a purpose and design
above and beyond point-of-sale patient care,” namely, “ensur-
ing the availability of quality health care for the broader
community.” Ante, at 677, 680. According to the Court,
Medicare guarantees that “providers possess the capacity to
render, on an ongoing basis, medical care to the program’s
qualifying patients.” Ante, at 680.
In other words, Medi-
care exists to guarantee patients’ access to quality medical
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC

Opinion of the Court

Stat. 552; see also Stonite, supra, at 563–564.

This  Court’s  decision  in  In  re  Hohorst,  150  U. S.  653,
661–662 (1893), arguably suggested that the 1887 Act did
not apply to patent cases.  As a result, while some courts
continued to apply the Act to patent cases, others refused
to  do  so  and  instead  permitted  plaintiffs  to  bring  suit  (in
line  with  the  pre-1887  regime)  anywhere  a  defendant
could be found for service of process.  See Stonite, supra, at
564–565.
In  1897,  Congress  resolved  the  confusion  by
enacting a patent specific venue statute.  See Act of Mar.
3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.  In so doing, it “placed pat-
ent  infringement  cases  in  a  class  by  themselves,  outside
the scope of general venue legislation.”  Brunette Machine
Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U. S. 706, 713
(1972).  This  new  statute  (§1400(b)’s  predecessor)  permit-
ted  suit  in  the  district  of  which  the  defendant  was  an
“inhabitant,”  or  a  district  in  which  the  defendant  both
maintained  a  “regular  and  established  place  of  business”
and  committed  an  act  of  infringement.    29  Stat.  695.  At
the  time,  a  corporation  was  understood  to  “inhabit”  only
the  State  in  which  it  was  incorporated.    Shaw  v.  Quincy
Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 449–450 (1892).

The Court addressed the scope of §1400(b)’s predecessor
in  Stonite.  In  that  case,  the  two  defendants  inhabited
different  districts  within  a  single  State.    The  plaintiff
sought  to  sue  them  both  in  the  same  district,  invoking  a
then  governing  general  venue  statute  that,  if  applicable,
permitted  it  to  do  so.  315  U. S.,  at  562–563.  This  Court
rejected the plaintiff ’s venue choice on the ground that the
patent  venue  statute  constituted  “the  exclusive  provision
controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings” and
thus  was  not  supplemented  or  modified  by  the  general
venue  provisions.  Id.,  at  563.    In  the  Court’s  view,  the
patent  venue  statute  “was  adopted  to  define  the  exact
jurisdiction  of  the  federal  courts  in  actions  to  enforce
patent  rights,”  a  purpose  that  would  be  undermined  by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing patent venue law. It cites previous court cases and legislation, indicating it's part of a legal argument rather than the main body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Case Analysis</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
84

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and part of a court document.  It is likely not the main body text of a book and should not be indexed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

Opinion of the Court

“possess[ion]  with  intent  to  use  any  drug  paraphernalia
to,”  among  other  things,  “store”  or  “conceal”  a  “controlled
substance.”  Kansas defines “controlled substance” as any
drug  included  on  its  own  schedules,  and  makes  no  refer-
ence  to  §802  or  any  other  federal  law.  §21–5701(a).1    At
the  time  of  Mellouli’s  conviction,  Kansas’  schedules  in-
cluded at least nine substances not included in the federal
lists.  See §65–4105(d)(30), (31), (33), (34), (36) (2010 Cum.
Supp.);  §65–4111(g)  (2002);  §65–4113(d)(1),  (e),  (f )  (2010
Cum. Supp.); see also Brief for Respondent 9, n. 2.

The  question  presented  is  whether  a  Kansas  conviction
for  using  drug  paraphernalia  to  store  or  conceal  a  con-
trolled substance, §21–5709(b), subjects an alien to depor-
tation  under  §1227(a)(2)(B)(i),  which  applies  to  an  alien
“convicted of a violation of [a state law] relating to a con-
trolled substance (as defined in [§802]).”

B
Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia, entered the United States
on a student visa in 2004.  He attended U. S. universities,
earning  a  bachelor  of  arts  degree,  magna  cum  laude,  as
well  as  master’s  degrees  in  applied  mathematics  and
economics.
  After  completing  his  education,  Mellouli
worked  as  an  actuary  and  taught  mathematics  at  the
University  of  Missouri-Columbia.    In  2009,  he  became  a
conditional  permanent  resident  and,  in  2011,  a  lawful
permanent  resident.  Since  December  2011,  Mellouli  has
been engaged to be married to a U. S. citizen.

In  2010,  Mellouli  was  arrested  for  driving  under  the
influence and driving with a suspended license.  During a
postarrest  search  in  a  Kansas  detention  facility,  deputies
discovered  four  orange  tablets  hidden  in  Mellouli’s  sock.
According  to  a  probable-cause  affidavit  submitted  in  the
——————

1 At  the  time  of  Mellouli’s  conviction,  Kan.  Stat.  Ann.  §§21–5701(a)
and 21–5709(b) (2013 Cum. Supp.) were codified at, respectively, §§21–
36a01(a) and 21–36a09(b) (2010 Cum. Supp.).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal citations, case names, and discusses legal concepts related to drug paraphernalia and immigration law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

process  their  administrative  appeals.    See  Brief  for  Na-
tional  Law  School  Veterans  Clinic  Consortium  as  Amicus
Curiae 18.  Over the past five years, it seems that the Vet-
erans  Court  has  affirmed  less  than  10  percent  of  the
agency’s decisions.  See ibid.  Internal audits have revealed
massive  numbers  of  improperly  denied  claims.    See  id.,
at 19.  I would not add to these problems by shielding the
Department from the inconvenience of having to answer for
its own clear and unmistakable errors.  Respectfully, I dis-
sent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It is sequential and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

acknowledged  that  the  Criminal  Code  contains  “sections
that would have been appropriate for the [G]overnment to
pursue”  if  it  wished  to  prosecute  him  for  tampering  with
evidence.  App. 91.  Section 2232(a), set out supra, at 1–2,
fit that description.  But §1519, Yates insisted, did not.

The  Government  countered  that  a  “tangible  object”
within §1519’s compass is “simply something other than a
document or record.”  App. 93.   The trial judge expressed
misgivings  about  reading  “tangible  object”  as  broadly  as
the Government urged:  “Isn’t there a Latin phrase [about]
construction of a statute . . . .  The gist of it is . . . you take
a  look  at  [a]  line  of  words,  and  you  interpret  the  words
consistently.  So  if  you’re  talking  about  documents,  and
records, tangible objects are tangible objects in the nature
of a document or a record, as opposed to a fish.”  Ibid.  The
first-instance judge nonetheless followed controlling Elev-
enth Circuit precedent.  While recognizing that §1519 was
passed as part of legislation targeting corporate fraud, the
Court of Appeals had instructed that “the broad language
of §1519 is not limited to corporate fraud cases, and ‘Con-
gress  is  free  to  pass  laws  with  language  covering  areas
well  beyond  the  particular  crisis  du  jour  that  initially
prompted  legislative  action.’ ”  No.  2:10–cr–66–FtM–
29SPC (MD Fla., Aug. 8, 2011), App. 116 (quoting United
States v.  Hunt, 526 F. 3d 739, 744 (CA11 2008)).  Accord-
ingly,  the  trial  court  read  “tangible  object”  as  a  term  “in-
dependent”  of  “record”  or  “document.”    App.  116.  For
violating §1519 and §2232(a), the court sentenced Yates to
imprisonment  for  30  days,  followed  by  supervised  release
for  three  years.    App.  118–120.    For  life,  he  will  bear  the
stigma of having a federal felony conviction.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found the text of §1519
“plain.”  733  F. 3d  1059,  1064  (2013).    Because  “tangible
object”  was  “undefined”  in  the  statute,  the  Court  of  Ap-
peals gave the term its “ordinary or natural meaning,” i.e.,
its  dictionary  definition,  “[h]aving  or  possessing  physical
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute (Section 1519) and its application in a case involving Yates.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR

THOMAS, J., dissenting

This Court eventually extended the categorical approach
to  ACCA’s  residual  clause  as  well.    In  James  v.  United
States, 550 U. S. 192 (2007), the Court, at the urging of both
parties, “employ[ed] the ‘categorical approach’ ” to analyze
ACCA’s  residual  clause.    Id.,  at  202  (quoting  Shepard  v.
United States, 544 U. S. 13, 17 (2005)).  That clause defines
a  “violent  felony”  as  one  that  “otherwise  involves  conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.”  §924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  James explained that ACCA’s
residual-clause  categorical  approach  boiled  down  to  two
steps.  First, a court looked to the elements of the crime for
which the defendant was convicted and asked what conduct
the “ordinary case” of that crime entailed.  550 U. S., at 208.
Second, the court asked whether that “ordinary case” “pre-
sent[ed] a serious potential risk of injury to another” com-
parable  to  that  posed  by  the  specific  crimes  listed  in  the
enumerated-offenses clause.  Id., at 204, 208–209.  If it did,
then the predicate crime was a “violent felony.”

That  test  proved  difficult  to  apply.  In  particular,  the
Court struggled with how to define the “ordinary case” of a
given predicate crime.  See Johnson, 576 U. S., at 597 (“How
does one go about deciding what kind of conduct the ordi-
nary case of a crime involves?  A statistical analysis of the
state reporter?  A survey?  Expert evidence?  Google?  Gut
instinct?” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Court
likewise struggled in assessing what level of risk the ordi-
nary case presented.  Id., at 598.  After trying to apply this
approach  several  times,  see,  e.g.,  Begay  v.  United  States,
553 U. S. 137 (2008), the Court in Johnson ultimately aban-
doned the project.  But rather than reassess whether it had
adopted the right analytical framework in light of ACCA’s
text and statutory context, the Court in Johnson nullified
ACCA’s  residual  clause  altogether.    See  576  U. S.,  at  624
(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).    According  to  the
Court,  the  “[t]wo  features”  of  the  residual-clause  analysis
that  the  Court  set  out  in  James—identifying  “ordinary
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, likely part of a dissenting opinion in a Supreme Court case. It discusses the application of the "categorical approach" to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

294

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Opinion of O’Connor, J.

So, while the demonstrators were allowed to erect “symbolic
tent cities,” they were not allowed to sleep overnight in
those tents. Even though the regulation may have directly
limited the expressive element involved in actually sleeping
in the park, the regulation was nonetheless content neutral.
Similarly, even if Erie’s public nudity ban has some mini-
mal effect on the erotic message by muting that portion of
the expression that occurs when the last stitch is dropped,
the dancers at Kandyland and other such establishments are
free to perform wearing pasties and G-strings. Any effect
on the overall expression is de minimis. And as Justice
Stevens eloquently stated for the plurality in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 70 (1976), “even
though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tol-
erate the total suppression of erotic materials that have
some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s in-
terest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untram-
meled political debate,” and “few of us would march our sons
and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to
see” speciﬁed anatomical areas exhibited at establishments
like Kandyland.
If States are to be able to regulate second-
ary effects, then de minimis intrusions on expression such
as those at issue here cannot be sufﬁcient to render the ordi-
nance content based. See Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, supra, at 299; Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989) (even if regulation has an incidental
effect on some speakers or messages but not others, the reg-
ulation is content neutral if it can be justiﬁed without refer-
ence to the content of the expression).

This case is, in fact, similar to O’Brien, Community for
Creative Non-Violence, and Ward. The justiﬁcation for the
government regulation in each case prevents harmful “sec-
ondary” effects that are unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression. See, e. g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, supra,
at 791–792 (noting that “[t]he principal justiﬁcation for the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Erie v. Pap's A.M. It contains legal analysis and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

(d) The Government’s interpretation of the “exceeds authorized ac-
cess” clause would attach criminal penalties to a breathtaking amount
of commonplace computer activity.  For instance, employers commonly
state that computers and electronic devices can be used only for busi-
ness purposes.  On the Government’s reading, an employee who sends
a personal e-mail or reads the news using a work computer has vio-
lated  the  CFAA.    The  Government  speculates  that  other  provisions
might limit its prosecutorial power, but its charging practice and policy
indicate otherwise.  The Government’s approach would also inject ar-
bitrariness into the assessment of criminal liability, because whether
conduct like Van Buren’s violated the CFAA would depend on how an
employer phrased the policy violated (as a “use” restriction or an “ac-
cess” restriction).  Pp. 17–20.

940 F. 3d 1192, reversed and remanded.

BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BREYER, SO-
TOMAYOR,  KAGAN,  GORSUCH,  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.  THOMAS,  J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, specifically discussing the "exceeds authorized access" clause of the CFAA. It provides a legal argument and cites relevant case information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>