<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

19

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

conduct  rendered  illegal  and  strikes  the  appropriate  bal-
ance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court
in defining criminal liability.”).  In determining the mean-
ing of “tangible object” in §1519, “it is appropriate, before
we  choose  the  harsher  alternative,  to  require  that  Con-
gress  should  have  spoken  in  language  that  is  clear  and
definite.”  See Cleveland, 531 U. S., at 25 (quoting United
States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 222
(1952)).  See  also  Jones  v.  United  States,  529  U. S.  848,
858–859  (2000)  (rule  of  lenity  “reinforces”  the  conclusion
that arson of an owner-occupied residence is not subject to
federal prosecution under 18 U. S. C. §844(i) because such
a  residence  does  not  qualify  as  property  “used  in”  com-
merce or commerce-affecting activity).8

——————

8 The  dissent  cites  United  States  v.  McRae,  702  F. 3d  806,  834–838
(CA5  2012),  United  States  v.  Maury,  695  F. 3d  227,  243–244  (CA3
2012), and United States v. Natal, 2014 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 108852, *24–
*26 (Conn., Aug. 7, 2014), as cases that would not be covered by §1519
as we read it.  Post, at 18–19.  Those cases supply no cause for concern
that  persons  who  commit  “major”  obstructive  acts,  id.  at  18,  will  go
unpunished.  The defendant in McRae, a police officer who seized a car
containing a corpse and then set it on fire, was also convicted for that
conduct  under  18  U. S. C.  §844(h)  and  sentenced  to  a  term  of  120
months’ imprisonment for that offense.  See 702 F. 3d, at 817–818, 839–
840.  The defendant in Natal, who repainted a van to cover up evidence
of  a  fatal  arson,  was  also  convicted  of  three  counts  of  violating  18
U. S. C.  §3  and  sentenced  to  concurrent  terms  of  174  months’  impris-
onment.  See  Judgment  in  United  States  v.  Morales,  No.  3:12–cr–164
(Conn.,  Jan.  12,  2015).    And  the  defendant  in  Maury,  a  company  con-
victed under §1519 of concealing evidence that a cement mixer’s safety
lock  was  disabled  when  a  worker’s  fingers  were  amputated,  was  also
convicted  of  numerous  other  violations,  including  three  counts  of
violating  18  U. S. C.  §1505  for  concealing  evidence  of  other  worker
safety violations.  See 695 F. 3d, at 244–245.  See also United States v.
Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 2007 WL 2282514, *70 (NJ, Aug. 2,
2007) (setting forth charges against the company).  For those violations,
the company was fined millions of dollars and ordered to operate under
the supervision of a court-appointed monitor.  See 695 F. 3d, at 246.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of a specific law (18 U.S.C. §1519) and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of the Court

this suit would not affect their future benefit payments.  If
Thole and Smith were to lose this lawsuit, they would still
receive  the  exact  same  monthly  benefits  that  they  are  al-
ready slated to receive, not a penny less.  If Thole and Smith
were to win this lawsuit, they would still receive the exact
same monthly benefits that they are already slated to re-
ceive, not a penny more.  The plaintiffs therefore have no
concrete stake in this lawsuit.  To be sure, their attorneys
have a stake in the lawsuit, but an “interest in attorney’s
fees is, of course, insufficient to create an Article III case or
controversy where none exists on the merits of the underly-
ing claim.”  Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472,
480 (1990); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,
523  U. S.  83,  107  (1998)  (same).    Because  the  plaintiffs
themselves have no concrete stake in the lawsuit, they lack
Article III standing.

*

*

*
If Thole and Smith had not received their vested pension
benefits, they would of course have Article III standing to
sue and a cause of action under ERISA §502(a)(1)(B) to re-
See  29  U. S. C.
cover  the  benefits  due  to  them.
§1132(a)(1)(B).  But  Thole  and  Smith  have  received  all  of
their monthly pension benefits so far, and they will receive
those same monthly payments for the rest of their lives.

To nonetheless try to demonstrate their standing to chal-
lenge alleged plan mismanagement, the plaintiffs have ad-
vanced four alternative arguments.

First, analogizing to trust law, Thole and Smith contend
that  an  ERISA  defined-benefit  plan  participant  possesses
an  equitable  or  property  interest  in  the  plan,  meaning  in
essence that injuries to the plan are by definition injuries
to the plan participants.  Thole and Smith contend, in other
words, that a plan fiduciary’s breach of a trust-law duty of
prudence or duty of loyalty itself harms ERISA defined-ben-
efit plan participants,  even if the participants themselves
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the issue of standing in a lawsuit related to an ERISA defined-benefit plan. It delves into the legal arguments presented by the plaintiffs and the court's analysis of their claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

17

Opinion of the Court

just  as  they  can  adjudicate  infringement  in  suits  seeking
judicial  review  of  registration  decisions.    See  15  U. S. C.
§1119;  3  McCarthy  §21:20.    There  is  no  reason  to  think
that the same district judge in the same case should apply
two separate standards of likelihood of confusion.

Hargis  responds  that  the  text  is  not  actually  the  same
because the registration provision asks whether the marks
“resemble”  each  other,  15  U. S. C.  §1052(d),  while  the
infringement  provision  is  directed  towards  the  “use  in
commerce”  of  the  marks,  §1114(1).    Indeed,  according  to
Hargis, the distinction between “resembl[ance]” and “use”
has been key to trademark law for over a century.  There
is  some  force  to  this  argument.    It  is  true  that  “a  party
opposing  an  application  to  register  a  mark  before  the
Board  often  relies  only  on  its  federal  registration,  not  on
any  common-law  rights  in  usages  not  encompassed  by  its
registration,” and “the Board typically analyzes the marks,
goods, and channels of trade only as set forth in the appli-
cation  and  in  the  opposer’s  registration,  regardless  of
whether  the  actual  usage  of  the  marks  by  either  party
differs.”  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23; see
also id., at 5 (explaining that “the Board typically reviews
only the usages encompassed by the registration”) (citing 3
Gilson  §9.03[2][a][ii]);  3  McCarthy  §20:15,  at  20–45  (ex-
plaining  that  for  registration  “it  is  the  mark  as  shown  in
the application and as used on the goods described in the
application  which  must  be  considered,  not  the  mark  as
actually  used”).  This  means  that  unlike  in  infringement
litigation, “[t]he Board’s determination that a likelihood of
confusion does or does not exist will not resolve the confu-
sion issue with respect to non-disclosed usages.”  Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 23.

Hargis’  argument  falls  short,  however,  because  it  mis-
takes  a  reason  not  to  apply  issue  preclusion  in  some  or
even  many  cases  as  a reason  never  to  apply  issue  preclu-
sion.  Just because the TTAB does not always consider the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of issue preclusion in trademark law. It cites legal statutes and case law, and uses legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA

INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

SCALIA, J., dissenting

gress  to  challenge  the  Line  Item  Veto  Act,  which  they
claimed  “ ‘unconstitutionally  expand[ed]  the  President’s
power’ ”  and  “ ‘alter[ed]  the  constitutional  balance  of  pow-
ers  between  the  Legislative  and  Executive  Branches.’ ”
Id.,  at  816.  In  Massachusetts  v.  Mellon,  262  U. S.  447,
479–480  (1923),  we  refused  to  allow  a  State  to  pursue  its
claim that a conditional congressional appropriation “con-
stitute[d]  an  effective  means  of  inducing  the  States  to
yield  a  portion  of  their  sovereign  rights.”
(And  Mellon
involved a contention that one government infringed upon
another  government’s  power—far  closer  to  the  traditional
party-versus-party  lawsuit  than  is  an  intragovernmental
dispute.)  We  put  it  plainly:  “In  the  last  analysis,  the
complaint  of  the  plaintiff  State  is  brought  to  the  naked
contention that Congress has usurped the reserved powers
of  the  several  States,”  id.,  at  483—and  because  the  State
could not show a discrete harm except the alleged usurpa-
tion of its powers, we refused to allow the State’s appeal.

The  sole  precedent  the  Court  relies  upon  is  Coleman  v.
Miller,  307  U. S.  433  (1939).    Coleman  can  be  distin-
guished from the present case as readily as it was distin-
guished  in  Raines.  In  Raines,  the  accurate-in-fact  (but
inconsequential-in-principle)  distinction  was  that  the
Senators in Coleman had their votes nullified, whereas the
Members of Congress claimed that their votes could merely
be  rendered  ineffective  by  a  Presidential  line-item  veto.
Raines,  supra,  at  823–824.  In  the  present  case  we  could
make  the  accurate-in-fact  distinction  that  in  Coleman
individual legislators were found to have standing, whereas
here  it  is  the  governmental  body,  the  Arizona  Legisla-
ture,  that  seeks  to  bring  suit.  But  the  reality  is  that  the
supposed holding of Coleman stands out like a sore thumb
from the rest of our jurisprudence, which denies standing
for intragovernmental disputes.

Coleman  was  a  peculiar  case  that  may  well  stand  for
nothing.  The opinion discussing and finding standing, and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to a case involving the Arizona Legislature and an Independent Redistricting Commission.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

TRUMP v. HAWAII

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

tion and Nationality Act sets forth, in painstaking detail, a
reticulated scheme regulating the admission of individuals
to the United States.  Generally, admission to the United
States  requires  a  valid  visa  or  other  travel  document.    8
U. S. C. §§1181, 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II).  To
obtain  a  visa,  an  applicant  must  produce  “certified
cop[ies]”  of  documents  proving  her  identity,  background,
and  criminal  history.  §§1202(b),  1202(d).    An  applicant
also  must  undergo  an  in-person  interview  with  a  State
Department  consular  officer.    §§1201(a)(1),  1202(h)(1),
22  CFR  §§42.62(a)–(b)
(2017);  see  also  8  U. S. C.
§§1202(h)(2)(D),  1202(h)(2)(F)  (requiring  in-person  inter
view if the individual “is a national of a country officially
designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor of
terrorism”  or  is  “a  member  of  a  group  or  section  that  . . .
poses a security threat to the United States”).  “Any alien
who  . . .  has  engaged  in  a  terrorist  activity,”  “incited  ter
rorist  activity,”  or  been  a  representative,  member,  or
endorser  of  a  terrorist  organization,  or  who  “is  likely  to
engage
activity,”
§1182(a)(3)(B),  or  who  has  committed  one  or  more  of  the
many  crimes  enumerated  in  the  statute  is  inadmissible
and
See
§1182(a)(2)(A)  (crime  of  moral  turpitude  or  drug  offense);
§1182(a)(2)(C)  (drug  trafficking  or  benefiting  from  a  rela
tive who recently trafficked drugs); §1182(a)(2)(D) (prosti
tution  or  “unlawful  commercialized  vice”);  §1182(a)(2)(H)
(human  trafficking);  §1182(a)(3)  (“Security  and  related
grounds”).

to  receive  a  visa.

ineligible

therefore

terrorist

entry

after

any

in

In addition to vetting rigorously any individuals seeking
admission  to  the  United  States,  the  Government  also
rigorously  vets  the  information-sharing  and  identity-
management  systems  of  other  countries,  as  evidenced  by
the Visa Waiver Program, which permits certain nationals
from a select group of countries to skip the ordinary visa-
application  process.    See  §1187.    To  determine  which
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Trump v. Hawaii. It discusses the Immigration and Nationality Act and the process of obtaining a visa.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

Opinion of the Court

tightly unified interpretation of these provisions would cre-
ate surplusage problems.  The United States argues, for ex-
ample,  that  a  reading  of  §113(f )(3)(B)  that  does  nothing
more than allow a party to seek contribution after settling
a  CERCLA  liability  would  be  redundant  with  §113(f )(1),
which  already  permits  contribution  “during  or  following
any civil action under [§§106 and 107].”  But there is legiti-
mate reason for separate provisions, even if both allow con-
tribution  only  for  a  CERCLA  liability.    For  example,
§113(f )(3)(B) specifies the consequences of a particular type
of resolution (i.e., settlement), explaining that an “adminis-
trative or judicially approved settlement” is sufficient and
reinforcing that a contribution claim will not extend to par-
ties  who  have  already  settled.    This  sort  of  belt-and-sus-
penders  approach  hardly  compels  an  all-encompassing
reading  of  §113(f )(3)(B).    Cf.  Rimini  Street,  Inc.  v.  Oracle
USA,  Inc.,  586  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  11)  (“We
have recognized that some redundancy is hardly unusual in
statutes addressing costs” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).  Rather than try “to avoid surplusage at all costs,” At-
interpret
lantic  Research,  551  U. S.,  at  137,  we
§113(f )(3)(B) in light of its text and place within a compre-
hensive statutory scheme.

*

*

*
The most natural reading of §113(f )(3)(B) is that a party
may seek contribution under CERCLA only after settling a
CERCLA-specific liability.  We thus reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It contains legal arguments, citations, and a ruling. While it is important legal text, it is not the kind of content typically indexed for general reading purposes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.

BREYER, J., dissenting

many organizations contracted in scope in 1952, when the
State Department modified foreign government immunity
to exclude commercial activities.  Most organizations could
not  rely  on  the  treaty  provisions  quoted  above  to  supply
the  necessary  immunity.    That  is  because,  unless  the
treaty provision granting immunity is “self-executing,” i.e.,
automatically  applicable,  the  immunity  will  not  be  effec-
tive in U. S. courts until Congress enacts additional legis-
lation  to  implement  it.  See  Medellin  v.  Texas,  552  U. S.
491,  504–505  (2008);  but  see  id.,  at  546–547  (BREYER, J.,
dissenting).  And  many  treaties  are  not  self-executing.
Thus, in the ordinary case, not even a treaty can guaran-
tee immunity in cases arising from commercial activities.

The  UN  provides  a  good  example.  As  noted,  the  UN
Charter  required  the  United  States  to  grant  the  UN  all
“necessary”  immunities,  but  it  was  not  self-executing.  In
1946,  the  UN  made  clear  that  it  needed  absolute  immu-
nity from suit, including in lawsuits based upon its commer-
cial activities.  See Convention on Privileges and Immuni-
ties  of  the  United  Nations,  Art. II,  §2,  Feb.  13,  1946,  21
U. S. T.  1422,  T. I. A. S.  No.  6900  (entered  into  force  Apr.
29,  1970);  see  also  App.  to  S. Exec.  Rep.  No.  91–17,  p. 14
(1970)  (“The  U. N.’s  immunity  from  legal  process  extends
to matters arising out its commercial dealings . . . ”).  But,
until  Congress  ratified  that  comprehensive  immunity
provision  in  1970,  no  U. S.  law  provided  that  immunity
but  for  the  Immunities  Act.    Id.,  at  1.  Both  the  UN  and
the  United  States  found  this  circumstance  satisfactory
because  they  apparently  assumed  the  Immunities  Act
extended  immunity  in  cases  involving  both  commercial
and  noncommercial  activities:  When  Congress  eventually
(in  1970)  ratified  the  UN’s  comprehensive  immunity  pro-
vision, the Senate reported that the long delay in ratifica-
tion  “appears  to  have  been  the  result  of  the  executive
branch  being  content  to  operate  under  the  provisions  of
the” Immunities Act.  Id., at 2.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the concept of foreign government immunity and its application to commercial activities.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.

MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

manded the case in light of Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus  Laboratories,  Inc.,  566  U. S.  ___  (2012).
See  Association  for  Molecular  Pathology  v.  Myriad  Genet-
ics, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012).

On  remand,  the  Federal  Circuit  affirmed  the  District
Court  in  part  and  reversed  in  part,  with  each  member  of
the  panel  writing  separately.    All  three  judges  agreed
that  only  petitioner  Ostrer  had  standing.    They  reasoned
that  Myriad’s  actions  against  him  and  his  stated  ability
and willingness to begin BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing if Myr-
iad’s patents were invalidated were sufficient for Article III
standing.  689  F. 3d,  at  1323;  id.,  at  1337  (opinion  of
Moore, J.); id., at 1348 (opinion of Bryson, J.).

With  respect  to  the  merits,  the  court  held  that  both
isolated DNA and cDNA were patent eligible under §101.
The  central  dispute  among  the  panel  members  was
whether  the  act  of  isolating  DNA—separating  a  specific
gene  or  sequence  of  nucleotides  from  the  rest  of  the
chromosome—is an inventive act that entitles the individ-
ual who first isolates it to a patent.  Each of the judges on
the  panel  had  a  different  view  on  that  question.    Judges
Lourie and Moore agreed that Myriad’s claims were patent
eligible under §101 but disagreed on the rationale.  Judge
Lourie  relied  on  the  fact  that  the  entire  DNA  molecule  is
held  together  by  chemical  bonds  and  that  the  covalent
bonds  at  both  ends  of  the  segment  must  be  severed  in
order to isolate segments of DNA.  This process technically
creates new molecules with unique chemical compositions.
See  id.,  at  1328  (“Isolated  DNA  . . .  is  a  free-standing
portion of a larger, natural DNA molecule.  Isolated DNA
has been cleaved (i.e., had covalent bonds in its backbone
chemically  severed)  or  synthesized  to  consist  of  just  a
fraction  of  a  naturally  occurring  DNA  molecule”).    Judge
Lourie  found  this  chemical  alteration  to  be  dispositive,
because  isolating  a  particular  strand  of  DNA  creates
a  nonnaturally  occurring  molecule,  even  though  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics. It delves into legal arguments and court decisions, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the core content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

the Colorado River, the Navajo Nation’s rights to use water
from the Colorado River” have never been adjudicated.  Id.,
at 36.  The United States acknowledges that it holds certain
water rights “in trust” for the Navajo.  See Tr. of Oral Arg.
26,  40.  It  does  not  dispute  that  it  exercises  considerable
control  over  the  disposition  of  water  from  the  Colorado
River.  And  it  concedes  that  the  Navajo’s  water  rights
“may . . . include some portion of the mainstream of the Col-
orado.”  Id., at 33.  But instead of resolving what the Nav-
ajo’s  water  rights  might  be,  the  United  States  has  some-
times resisted efforts to answer that question.

The  current  legal  regime  governing  the  Colorado  River
began  with  a  1922  interstate  compact  between  seven
States.  That  agreement  split  the  Colorado  into  two  ba-
sins—an  Upper  Basin  and  a  Lower  Basin.  See  Colorado
River Compact, Art. II, Colo. Rev. Stat. §37–61–101 (2022).
The  compact  answered  some  high-level  questions  about
which States could lay claim to which sections of the river.
But  it  did  not  purport  to  “affec[t]  the  obligations  of  the
United States of America to Indian [T]ribes.”  Id., Art. VII.
In  that  way,  it  left  the  Navajo  with  no  insight  into  what
water they could claim as their own.

Six years later, Congress entered the picture by passing
the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057, codified at
43 U. S. C. §§617–619b.  That Act had a profound impact on
the Lower Basin.  It authorized the construction of the Hoo-
ver Dam and the creation of Lake Mead.  §617.  More than
that, it gave the Secretary of the Interior substantial power
to divvy up the resulting impounded water.  Failing agree-
ment  among  the  States  in  the  region,  the  law  authorized
the Secretary to enter into contracts for the delivery of wa-
ter  and  provided  that  “[n]o  person”  may  have  water  from
the mainstream of the Colorado in the Lower Basin “except
by  contract.”    §617d;  see  also  Arizona  v.  California,  373
U. S. 546, 565 (1963) (Arizona I ).  In adopting this law, Con-
gress hoped “to put an end to the long-standing dispute over
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses water rights, legal precedents, and historical context related to the Colorado River.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

45

THOMAS, J., dissenting

omitted).  The next section of City of Rome then separately
examined and upheld the reasonableness of the extension’s
7-year time period.  See id., at 181–182.  City of Rome thus
stands  for  precisely  the  propositions  for  which  City  of
Boerne cited it: Congress may adopt “[p]reventive measures
. . . when there is reason to believe that many of the laws
affected by the congressional enactment have a significant
likelihood of being unconstitutional,” 521 U. S., at 532, par-
ticularly  when  it  employs  “termination  dates,  geographic
restrictions,  or  egregious  predicates”  that  “tend  to  ensure
Congress’ means are proportionate to ends legitimate,” id.,
at  533;  see  also  id.,  at  532–533  (analyzing  Katzenbach  in
similar terms); Shelby County, 570 U. S., at 535, 545–546
(same).    Again,  however,  the  amended  §2  lacks  any  such
salutary limiting principles; it is unbounded in time, place,
and  subject  matter,  and  its  districting-related  commands
have no nexus to any likely constitutional wrongs.
  In short, as construed by the District Court, §2 does not
remedy or deter unconstitutional discrimination in district-
ing in any way, shape, or form.  On the contrary, it requires
it, hijacking the districting process to pursue a goal that has
no  legitimate  claim  under  our  constitutional  system:  the
proportional  allocation  of  political  power  on  the  basis  of
race.  Such a statute “cannot be considered remedial, pre-
ventive  legislation,”  and  the  race-based  redistricting  it
would command cannot be upheld under the Constitution.
City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 532.21
——————

21 JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH,  at  least,  recognizes  that  §2’s  constitutional
footing is problematic, for he agrees that “race-based redistricting cannot
extend  indefinitely  into  the  future.”    Ante,  at  4  (opinion  concurring  in
part).  Nonetheless, JUSTICE KAVANAUGH votes to sustain a system of in-
stitutionalized racial discrimination in districting—under the aegis of a
statute that applies nationwide and has no expiration date—and thus to
prolong the “lasting harm to our society” caused by the use of racial clas-
sifications in the allocation of political power.  Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 657.
I cannot agree with that approach.  The Constitution no more tolerates
this discrimination today than it will tolerate it tomorrow.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of the Constitution, specifically regarding Section 2 and its application to redistricting based on race.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1002

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6657.  Doublin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  235.

No. 09–6660.  Morales-Pitones v. United States.  C. A. 5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  441.

No.  09–6661.  Yates  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  452.

No.  09–6663.  Slinger  v.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–6667.  Ellis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  471.

No.  09–6668.  Valle  Mercado  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  390.

No.  09–6670.  Carrillo-Palacios  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 327 Fed. Appx. 511.

No.  09–6671.  Croto  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  570  F.  3d  11.

No.  09–6678.  Hardimon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  660.

No.  09–6680.  Huber  v.  United  States  Parole  Commission.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.
Appx.  699.

No.  09–6681.  Haynes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  420.

No.  09–6685.  Blanco  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  139.

No.  09–6687.  Carter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6688.  Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  404.

No.  09– 6691.  Saldarriaga-Palacio  v.  United  States.

C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NASA v. NELSON

Opinion of the Court

erations,  combined  with  the  protections  against  public
dissemination  provided  by  the  Privacy  Act  of  1974,  5
U. S. C. §552a, satisfy any “interest in avoiding disclosure”
that  may  “arguably  ha[ve]  its  roots  in  the  Constitution.”
Whalen, supra, at 599, 605.

I

A

The  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration
(NASA)  is  an  independent  federal  agency  charged  with
planning  and  conducting  the  Government’s  “space  activi-
ties.”  Pub.  L.  111–314,  §3,  124  Stat.  3333,  51  U. S. C.
§20112(a)(1).  NASA’s  workforce  numbers  in  the  tens  of
thousands of employees.  While many of these workers are
federal civil servants, a substantial majority are employed
directly  by  Government  contractors.    Contract  employees
play  an  important  role  in  NASA’s  mission,  and  their  du-
ties are functionally equivalent to those performed by civil
servants.

One NASA facility, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
in  Pasadena,  California,  is  staffed  exclusively  by  contract
employees.  NASA owns JPL, but the California Institute
of  Technology  (Cal  Tech)  operates  the  facility  under  a
Government  contract.    JPL  is  the  lead  NASA  center  for
deep-space  robotics  and  communications.    Most  of  this
country’s unmanned space missions—from the Explorer 1
satellite  in  1958  to  the  Mars  Rovers  of  today—have  been
developed  and  run  by  JPL.    JPL  scientists  contribute  to
technology-development
NASA  earth-observation  and
projects.  Many JPL employees also engage in pure scien-
tific  research  on  topics  like  “the  star  formation  history  of
the universe” and “the fundamental properties of quantum
fluids.”  App. 64–65, 68.

Twenty-eight  JPL  employees  are  respondents  here.
Many  of  them  have  worked  at  the  lab  for  decades,  and
none  has  ever  been  the  subject  of  a  Government  back-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of an opinion from the Supreme Court case NASA v. Nelson. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO

Opinion of the Court

harms,  to  both  individuals  and  society,  that  attend  true
threats of violence—as evidenced in this case.  See supra,
at 2, 6.  The injury associated with those statements caused
history  long  ago  to  place  them  outside  the  First  Amend-
ment’s bounds.  When despite that judgment we require use
of  a  subjective  mental-state  standard,  we  necessarily  im-
pede some true-threat prosecutions.  And as we go up the
subjective  mens  rea  ladder,  that  imposition  on  States’  ca-
pacity  to  counter  true  threats  becomes  still  greater—and,
presumably, with diminishing returns for protected expres-
sion.  In advancing past recklessness, we make it harder for
a  State  to  substantiate  the  needed  inferences about mens
rea (absent, as is usual, direct evidence).  And of particular
importance, we prevent States from convicting morally cul-
pable defendants.  See Elonis, 575 U. S., at 745 (opinion of
ALITO, J.).  For  reckless  defendants  have  done  more  than
make a bad mistake.  They have consciously accepted a sub-
stantial risk of inflicting serious harm.

Using a recklessness standard also fits with the analysis
in  our  defamation  decisions.  As  noted  earlier,  the  Court
there  adopted  a  recklessness  rule,  applicable in  both  civil
and criminal contexts, as a way of accommodating compet-
ing  interests.  See  supra,  at  7–8.  In  the  more  than  half-
century in which that standard has governed, few have sug-
gested that it needs to be higher—in other words, that still
more  First  Amendment  “breathing  space”  is  required.
Gertz,  418  U. S.,  at  342.    And  we  see  no  reason  to  offer
greater insulation to threats than to defamation.  See Elo-
nis,  575  U. S.,  at  748  (opinion  of  ALITO, J.).  The  societal
interests in countering the former are at least as high.  And
the  protected  speech  near  the  borderline  of  true  threats
(even  though  sometimes  political,  as  in  Rogers)  is,  if  any-
thing, further from the First Amendment’s central concerns
than the chilled speech in Sullivan-type cases (i.e., truthful
reputation-damaging statements about public officials and
figures).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the legal standard for "true threats" and the use of a recklessness standard.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS v. FTC

Syllabus

all respects.

Held:  Because a controlling number of the Board’s decisionmakers are
active market participants in the occupation the Board regulates, the
Board can invoke state-action antitrust immunity only if it was sub-
ject to active supervision by the State, and here that requirement is
not met.  Pp. 5–18.

(a) Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free
market  structures.    However,  requiring  States  to  conform  to  the
mandates of the Sherman Act at the expense of other values a State
may  deem  fundamental  would  impose  an  impermissible  burden  on
the  States’  power  to  regulate.    Therefore,  beginning  with  Parker  v.
Brown,  317  U. S.  341,  this  Court  interpreted  the  antitrust  laws  to
confer  immunity  on  the  anticompetitive  conduct  of  States  acting  in
their sovereign capacity.  Pp. 5–6.

(b) The  Board’s  actions  are  not  cloaked  with  Parker  immunity.    A
nonsovereign actor controlled by active market participants—such as
the Board—enjoys Parker immunity only if “ ‘the challenged restraint
. . .  [is]  clearly  articulated  and  affirmatively  expressed  as  state  poli-
cy,’  and  . . .  ‘the  policy  . . .  [is]  actively  supervised  by  the  State.’ ”
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 568 U. S. ___, ___ (quoting
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U. S. 97, 105).  Here, the Board did not receive active supervision of
its anticompetitive conduct.  Pp. 6–17.

(1) An entity may not invoke Parker immunity unless its actions
are an exercise of the State’s sovereign power.  See Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor  Advertising,  Inc.,  499  U. S.  365,  374.    Thus,  where  a  State
delegates control over a market to a nonsovereign actor the Sherman
Act confers immunity only if the State accepts political accountability
for  the  anticompetitive  conduct  it  permits  and  controls.    Limits  on
state-action immunity are most essential when a State seeks to dele-
gate its regulatory power to active market participants, for dual alle-
giances are not always apparent to an actor and prohibitions against
anticompetitive  self-regulation  by  active  market  participants  are  an
axiom  of  federal  antitrust  policy.    Accordingly,  Parker  immunity  re-
quires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign actors, espe-
cially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession,
result  from  procedures  that  suffice  to  make  it  the  State’s  own.
Midcal’s two-part test provides a proper analytical framework to re-
solve  the  ultimate  question  whether  an  anticompetitive  policy  is  in-
deed  the  policy  of  a  State.  The  first  requirement—clear  articula-
tion—rarely will achieve that goal by itself, for entities purporting to
act  under  state  authority  might  diverge  from  the  State’s  considered
definition of the public good and engage in private self-dealing.  The
second  Midcal  requirement—active  supervision—seeks  to  avoid  this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case *North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC*. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

they were “constantly being observed by others,” and “com-
municate effectively” with parents.  Ibid.

Finally, District coaches had to “[a]dhere to [District] pol-
icies and administrative regulations” more generally.  Id.,
at 30–31.  As relevant here, the District’s policy on “Reli-
gious-Related  Activities  and  Practices”  provided  that
“[s]chool staff shall neither encourage or discourage a stu-
dent from engaging in non-disruptive oral or silent prayer
or  any  other  form  of  devotional  activity”  and  that  “[r]eli-
gious  services,  programs  or  assemblies  shall  not  be  con-
ducted in school facilities during school hours or in connec-
tion with any school sponsored or school related activity.”
Id., at 26–28.

B
In September 2015, a coach from another school’s football
team informed BHS’ principal that Kennedy had asked him
and his team to join Kennedy in prayer.  The other team’s
coach told the principal that he thought it was “ ‘cool’ ” that
the District “ ‘would allow [its] coaches to go ahead and in-
vite other teams’ coaches and players to pray after a game.’ ”
Id., at 229.

The District initiated an inquiry into whether its policy
on Religious-Related Activities and Practices had been vio-
lated.  It  learned  that,  since  his  hiring  in  2008,  Kennedy
had been kneeling on the 50-yard line to pray immediately
after shaking hands with the opposing team.  Kennedy re-
counted  that  he  initially  prayed  alone  and  that  he  never
asked any student to join him.  Over time, however, a ma-
jority of the team came to join him, with the numbers vary-
ing  from  game  to  game.    Kennedy’s  practice  evolved  into
postgame talks in which Kennedy would hold aloft student
helmets and deliver speeches with “overtly religious refer-
ences,”  which  Kennedy  described  as  prayers,  while  the
players kneeled around him.  Id., at 40.  The District also
learned that students had prayed in the past in the locker
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. It contains legal arguments, citations, and descriptions of events related to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

Respondents claim they are harmed by three provisions
of  the  Rule.  First,  at  34  CFR  §106.10,  the  Rule  defines
“[d]iscrimination on the basis of sex” to “includ[e] discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex stereotypes, sex characteristics,
pregnancy  or  related  conditions,  sexual  orientation,  and
Second,  at
gender  identity.”
§106.31(a)(2),  the  Rule  addresses  Title  IX’s  application  in
sex-separated spaces.  89 Fed. Reg. 33887.  The Rule leaves
untouched Title IX’s explicit recognition that schools may
differentiate between students on the basis of sex in some
contexts, such as in assigning dormitories and creating ath-
letic teams.2  Outside those statutory exceptions, however,

89  Fed.  Reg.  33886.

——————
CFR §§106.40(b)(3)(v), 106.57); a provision affirming the legal rights of
parents and guardians to act on behalf of complainants and respondents,
89 Fed. Reg. 33885 (to be codified in 34 CFR §106.6(g)); three provisions
addressing schools’ obligations in responding to claims implicating Title
IX, including measures to assist impacted parties, employee-notification
requirements,  Title  IX  coordinator  duties,  applicable  grievance  proce-
dures, and protection of personally identifiable information, 89 Fed. Reg.
33888–33895 (to be codified in 34 CFR §§106.44, 106.45, 106.46); a pro-
vision addressing schools’ obligations to designate Title IX coordinators,
and adopt and implement a nondiscrimination policy and grievance pro-
cedures, 89 Fed. Reg. 33885–33886 (to be codified in 34 CFR §106.8); a
provision  clarifying  schools’  obligations  with  respect  to  retaliation,  89
Fed. Reg. at 33896 (to be codified in 34 CFR §106.71); a provision clari-
fying  that  the  Department  of  Education’s  Assistant  Secretary  of  Civil
Rights will not deem a recipient to have violated the Title IX regulations
solely  because  the  Assistant  Secretary  would  have  reached  a  different
decision  in  a  particular  complaint  alleging  sex-based  harassment,  89
Fed. Reg.  at 33895 (to be codified in 34 CFR §106.47); and a provision
addressing what pre-employment inquiries a school may make regarding
an individual’s marital status and sex, 89 Fed. Reg. 33896 (to be codified
in 34 CFR §106.60).

2 Specifically, those contexts include membership in fraternities or so-
rorities, 20 U. S. C. §1681(a)(6), separate living facilities, §1686, and ath-
letic teams, Education Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 612.  The Depart-
ment explained in the Rule that neither §106.31(a)(2) nor anything else
in the Rule addresses or alters existing requirements governing sex sep-
aration in athletics, which is the subject of a separate rulemaking.  89
Fed. Reg. 33816–33817.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal codes and regulations, making it unsuitable for indexing as it is not general-purpose readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

BREYER, J., dissenting

of  only  61.4  square  miles  of  urban  area.    See  Dept.  of
Commerce, Bureau of Census, United States: 2000 (pt. 1),
p. 11 (2002) (Table 8).  The adjacent States do permit the
use  of  handguns  for  target  practice,  and  those  States  are
only a brief subway  ride away.   See Md. Crim. Law Code
Ann.  §4–203(b)(4)  (Lexis  Supp.  2007)  (general  handgun
restriction  does  not  apply  to  “the  wearing,  carrying,  or
transporting by a person of a handgun used in connection
with,” inter alia, “a target shoot, formal or informal target
practice, sport shooting event, hunting, [or] a Department
of  Natural  Resources-sponsored  firearms  and  hunter
safety  class”);  Va.  Code  Ann.  §18.2–287.4  (Lexis  Supp.
2007)  (general  restriction  on  carrying  certain  loaded  pis-
tols  in  certain  public  areas  does  not  apply  “to  any  person
actually  engaged  in  lawful  hunting  or  lawful  recreational
shooting  activities  at  an  established  shooting  range  or
shooting contest”); Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, Metrorail System Map, http://www.wmata.com/
metrorail/systemmmap.cfm.

Of  course,  a  subway  rider  must  buy  a  ticket,  and  the
ride takes time.  It also costs money to store a pistol, say,
at a target range, outside the District.  But given the costs
already  associated  with  gun  ownership  and  firearms
training,  I  cannot  say  that  a  subway  ticket  and  a  short
subway  ride  (and  storage  costs)  create  more  than  a  mini-
mal  burden.  Compare  Crawford  v.  Marion  County  Elec-
tion Bd., 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 3) (BREYER,
J.,  dissenting)  (acknowledging  travel  burdens  on  indigent
persons  in  the  context  of  voting  where  public  transporta-
tion options were limited).  Indeed, respondent and two of
his  coplaintiffs  below  may  well  use  handguns  outside  the
District  on  a  regular  basis,  as  their  declarations  indicate
that  they  keep  such  weapons  stored  there.    See  App.  to
Pet.  for  Cert.  77a  (respondent);  see  also  id.,  at  78a,  84a
(coplaintiffs).  I  conclude  that  the  District’s  law  burdens
the Second Amendment’s primary objective little, or not at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer in the case District of Columbia v. Heller. It discusses the burdens placed on Second Amendment rights by the District of Columbia's handgun ban, particularly focusing on the accessibility of target practice and storage options outside the District.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

25

BREYER, J., dissenting

Miller,  Azrael,  &  Hemenway,  Household  Firearm  Owner-
ship and Suicide Rates in the United States, 13 Epidemi-
ology  517  (2002).  Still  others  suggest  that  the  defensive
uses  of  handguns  are  not  as  great  in  number  as  respon-
dent’s  amici  claim.  See,  e.g.,  Brief  for  American  Public
Health  Assn.  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  17–19  (hereinafter
APHA Brief) (citing studies).

Respondent and his amici reply to these responses; and
in  doing  so,  they  seek  to  discredit  as  methodologically
flawed  the  studies  and  evidence  relied  upon  by  the  Dis-
trict.  See, e.g., Criminologists’ Brief 9–17, 20–24; Brief for
Assn.  Am.  Physicians  and  Surgeons,  Inc.  as  Amicus  Cu-
riae  12–18;  SLF  Brief  17–22;  Britt,  Kleck,  &  Bordua,  A
Reassessment  of  the  D.C.  Gun  Law,  30  Law  &  Soc.  Rev.
361  (1996)  (criticizing  the  Loftin  study).    And,  of  course,
the  District’s  amici  produce  counter-rejoinders,  referring
to articles that defend their studies.  See, e.g., APHA Brief
23, n. 5 (citing McDowall, Loftin, & Wiersema et al., Using
Quasi-Experiments  to  Evaluate  Firearm  Laws,  30  Law  &
Soc. Rev. 381 (1996)).

The  upshot  is  a  set  of  studies  and  counterstudies  that,
at  most,  could  leave  a  judge  uncertain  about  the  proper
policy  conclusion.  But  from  respondent’s  perspective  any
such  uncertainty  is  not  good  enough.  That  is  because
legislators,  not  judges,  have  primary  responsibility  for
drawing policy conclusions from empirical fact.  And, given
that  constitutional  allocation  of  decisionmaking  responsi-
bility,  the  empirical  evidence  presented  here  is  sufficient
to allow a judge to reach a firm legal conclusion.

In  particular  this  Court,  in  First  Amendment  cases
applying  intermediate  scrutiny,  has  said  that  our  “sole
obligation”  in  reviewing  a  legislature’s  “predictive  judg-
ments”  is  “to  assure  that,  in  formulating  its  judgments,”
the legislature “has drawn reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence.”  Turner, 520 U. S., at 195 (internal
quotation  marks  omitted).    And  judges,  looking  at  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites studies and legal precedents to support the author's argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
998

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6256.  Wick  v.  Prosper,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  624.

No.  09–6257.  Flowers  v.  Phelps,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6258.  Graham  v.  Missouri.  Ct.  App.  Mo.,  Western

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  284  S. W.  3d  735.

No.  09–6261.  Taylor  v.  Minnesota.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6265.  Blie  v.  Artus,  Superintendent,  Clinton

Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6266.  Hardy v.  Smith, Warden.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6267.  Bibbs  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6270.  Davis  v.  Knowles  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  557.

No.  09–6272.  Carter  v.  Gaetz,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6274.  Miller  v.  South  Carolina  Department  of
Probation,  Parole,  and  Pardon  Services.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  407.

No.  09–6276.  Perez  v.  Colorado.  Ct.  App.  Colo.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–6281.  LaFavors v. McNeil, Secretary, Florida De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6282.  Derrickson  v.  District  Attorney  of  Dela
ware  County  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  132.

No. 09–6283.  Artis v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry-
dock  Co.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
322  Fed.  Appx.  306.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

NO:1, which codes for the typical BRCA1 gene.  689 F. 3d,
at  1326,  n. 9;  id.,  at  1337  (Moore,  J.,  concurring  in  part);
id., at 1356 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

Claim 5 of the ’282 patent claims a subset of the data in
claim 1.  In particular, it claims “[a]n isolated DNA having
at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1.”  App. 822.
The practical effect of claim 5 is to assert a patent on any
series  of  15  nucleotides  that  exist  in  the  typical  BRCA1
gene.  Because  the  BRCA1  gene  is  thousands  of  nucleo-
tides long, even BRCA1 genes with substantial mutations
are likely to contain at least one segment of 15 nucleotides
that  correspond  to  the  typical  BRCA1  gene.    Similarly,
claim 6 of the ’282 patent claims “[a]n isolated DNA hav-
ing  at  least  15  nucleotides  of  the  DNA  of  claim  2.”  Ibid.
This  claim  operates  similarly  to  claim  5,  except  that  it
references the cDNA-based claim 2.  The remaining claims
at issue are similar, though several list common mutations
rather  than  typical  BRCA1  and  BRCA2  sequences.    See
ibid. (claim 7 of the ’282 patent); id., at 930 (claim 1 of the
’473  patent);  id.,  at  1028  (claims  1,  6,  and  7  of  the  ’492
patent).

C

Myriad’s  patents  would,  if  valid,  give  it  the  exclusive
right  to  isolate  an  individual’s  BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes
(or any strand of 15 or more nucleotides within the genes)
by  breaking  the  covalent  bonds  that  connect  the  DNA  to
the  rest  of  the  individual’s  genome.    The  patents  would
also give Myriad the exclusive right to synthetically create
BRCA cDNA.  In Myriad’s view, manipulating BRCA DNA
in  either  of  these  fashions  triggers  its  “right  to  exclude
others  from  making”  its  patented  composition  of  matter
under  the  Patent  Act.    35  U. S. C.  §154(a)(1);  see  also
§271(a)  (“[W]hoever  without  authority  makes  . . .  any
patented invention . . . infringes the patent”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion discussing patent claims related to BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. It delves into the specifics of the claims and their potential implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

27

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

tion, however, this Court did not reject petitioners’ account
of  the  TVPA’s  legislative  history  in  Mohamad.  In  fact,
that decision agreed that the legislative history “clarifi[es]
that  the  Act  does  not  encompass  liability  against  foreign
states.”  566  U. S.,  at  459.    What  Mohamad  rejected  was
the  argument  that  because  the  TVPA  forecloses  liability
against  foreign  states,  it  necessarily  permits  liability
against  corporations.
In  concluding  that  the  TVPA
encompasses  only  natural  persons,  Mohamad  took  no
position on why Congress excluded organizations from its
reach.11

To  infer  from  the  TVPA  that  no  corporation  may  ever
be  held  liable  under  the  ATS  for  any  violation  of  any
international-law  norm,  moreover,  ignores  that  Congress
has elsewhere imposed liability on corporations for conduct
prohibited  by  customary  international  law.    For  instance,
the  Antiterrorism  Act  of  1990  (ATA)  created  a  civil  cause
of  action  for  U. S.  nationals  injured  by  an  act  of  interna
tional  terrorism  and  expressly  provides  for  corporate
liability.   18  U. S. C.  §2333.    That  Congress  foreclosed
corporate  liability  for  torture  and  extrajudicial  killing
claims  under  the  TVPA  but  permitted  corporate  liability
for  terrorism-related  claims  under  the  ATA  is  strong
evidence  that  Congress  exercises  its  judgment  as  to  the
appropriateness  of  corporate  liability  on  a  norm-by-norm
basis, and that courts should do the same when consider
ing  whether  to  permit  causes  of  action  against  corpora

——————

been in conflict with the FSIA.

11 Petitioners  may  be  right  that  Congress  limited  liability  under  the
TVPA to natural persons to harmonize the statute with the FSIA.  That
Congress  thought  it  necessary  to  achieve  that  goal  by  foreclosing
liability against all organizational defendants, not just those operating
under  the  authority  of  a  foreign  government,  might  indicate  that
Congress  thought  such  line  drawing  would  be  difficult,  or  that  an
expansive approach was the cleanest way to avoid the statute becoming
a backdoor to suits against foreign governments.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of a specific law (the TVPA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

31

all.

BREYER, J., dissenting

2

The majority briefly suggests that the “right to keep and
bear Arms” might encompass an interest in hunting.  See,
e.g.,  ante,  at  26.    But  in  enacting  the  present  provisions,
the  District  sought  “to  take  nothing  away  from  sports-
men.”  DC  Rep., at 33.  And any inability of District resi-
dents  to  hunt  near  where  they  live  has  much  to  do  with
the  jurisdiction’s  exclusively  urban  character  and  little  to
do with the District’s firearm laws.  For reasons similar to
those  I  discussed  in  the  preceding  subsection—that  the
District’s  law  does  not  prohibit  possession  of  rifles  or
shotguns,  and  the  presence  of  opportunities  for  sporting
activities  in  nearby  States—I  reach  a  similar  conclusion,
namely, that the District’s law burdens any sports-related
or  hunting-related  objectives  that  the  Amendment  may
protect little, or not at all.

3

The District’s law does prevent a resident from keeping
a loaded handgun in his home.  And it consequently makes
it more difficult for the householder to use the handgun for
self-defense  in  the  home  against  intruders,  such  as  bur-
glars.  As  the  Court  of  Appeals  noted,  statistics  suggest
that  handguns  are  the  most  popular  weapon  for  self  de-
fense.  See  478  F. 3d,  at  400  (citing  Kleck  &  Gertz,  86  J.
Crim. L. & C., at 182–183).  And there are some legitimate
reasons  why  that  would  be  the  case:  Amici  suggest  (with
some empirical support) that handguns are easier to hold
and control (particularly for persons with physical infirmi-
ties),  easier  to  carry,  easier  to  maneuver  in  enclosed
spaces, and that a person using one will still have a hand
free to dial 911.  See ILEETA Brief 37–39; NRA Brief 32–
33; see also ante, at 57.  But see Brief for Petitioners 54–
55  (citing  sources  preferring  shotguns  and  rifles  to  hand-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it unsuitable for indexing as it is not general readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

925

524 U. S.

June 15, 1998

No. D–1965.

In re Disbarment of Mendelson. Michael
Sweig Mendelson, of Chicago, Ill., is suspended from the practice
of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40
days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred
from the practice of law in this Court.

No. D–1966.

In re Disbarment of Taylor. George Michael
Taylor, of Springﬁeld, Ill., is suspended from the practice of law
in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.

No. M–80. Ahwinona v. Alaska et al. Motion to direct the
Clerk to ﬁle petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this
Court’s Rule 14.5 denied.

No. 65, Orig. Texas v. New Mexico. Motion of the River
Master for fees and expenses granted, and the River Master is
awarded a total of $2,445 for the period January 1 through March
31, 1998, to be paid equally by the parties.
[For earlier order
herein, see, e. g., 522 U. S. 910.]

No. 96–1400. California et al. v. Deep Sea Research,
Inc., et al., 523 U. S. 491. Motion of respondent Deep Sea Re-
search, Inc., to retax costs denied.

No. 97–8978. Russell v. VBR. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Peti-
tioner is allowed until July 6, 1998, within which to pay the dock-
eting fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in com-
pliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

No. 97–8710.

In re Crooms. Petition for writ of mandamus

denied.

Certiorari Granted

No. 97–1489. Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v.
Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 pre-
sented by the petition. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 1135.

No. 97–7541. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 122 F. 3d 185.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal orders from a court, including case numbers, parties involved, and the court's decisions.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Orders</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
clxii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

906

Young v. Sirmons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Young v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Young v. Transportation Deputy Sheriff I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Young v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  862,873,1004

1099

Younge v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903

Younger; Belcher v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Yu v. Washington  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Yukins; Bason v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1019

Yunxia Liu v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

Zabala v. New York  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  886,1065

Zahn v. San Diego
958

Zaldivar v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1106

Zani v. Social Security Administration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852

Zapata v. Hartley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

Zapata v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Zavares; Jenner v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1016

Zavares; Poindexter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

Zavares; Wiegand v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959

Zayas v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Zdun v. Henderson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

Zedner v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zenk; Walker v.
956

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963

Zetino-Morales v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

Zied-Campbell v. Richman  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zoeller; Wright v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  845,1038

Zuniga v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  830,849

829

Zweigart v. Oregon

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

906

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 1, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–7790. Padilla-Pena v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 457.

No. 97–8025. Canaan v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 683 N. E. 2d 227.

No. 97–8096. Cloutier v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 178 Ill. 2d 141, 687 N. E. 2d 930.

No. 97–8142. Call v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 1402.

No. 97–8453. Owens v. Arizona et al. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8461. Orlick v. Katz. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari

denied.

No. 97–8464. Bittaker v. Calderon, Warden. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8465. Cooper v. Schriro, Director, Missouri De-
partment of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 956 S. W. 2d 234.

No. 97–8466. Graves v. Carr. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 151.

No. 97–8468. McGrew v. Whitaker et al. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 366.

No. 97–8473. Wasko v. Duncan, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125 F. 3d 860.

No. 97–8476. Sobin v. Fairfax County Department of

Human Development. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8479. Cannon v. Savage, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8480. Brown v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 700 So. 2d 684.

No. 97–8486. Walton v. Bartlett, Acting Superintend-
ent, Oregon State Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 41.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks the sequential narrative structure of typical book content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

SACKETT v. EPA

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

ordinary  meaning  and  longstanding  agency  practice,  a
wetland is “adjacent” to a covered water (i) if the wetland is
adjoining—that  is,  contiguous  to  or  bordering—a  covered
water—or  (ii)  if  the  wetland  is  separated  from  a  covered
water  only  by  a  man-made  dike  or  barrier,  natural  river
berm, beach dune, or the like.

The  Court  and  I  agree  that  wetlands  in  the  first
category—that is, wetlands adjoining a covered water—are
covered  as  adjacent  wetlands.  Ante,  at  19–22.  But  the
Court  and  I  disagree  about  the  second  category—that  is,
wetlands  separated  from  a  covered  water  only  by  a  man-
made dike or barrier, natural river berm, beach dune, or the
like.  The  Court  concludes  that  wetlands  in  that  second
category  are  not  covered  as  adjacent  wetlands  because
those wetlands do not have a continuous surface connection
to a covered water—in other words, those wetlands are not
I  disagree  because  the
adjoining  the  covered  water.
statutory  text  (“adjacent”)  does  not  require  a  continuous
surface  connection  between  those  wetlands  and  covered
waters.

The  ordinary  meaning  of  the  term  “adjacent”  has  not
changed  since  Congress  amended  the  Clean  Water  Act  in
1977 to expressly cover “wetlands adjacent” to waters of the
United States.  91 Stat. 1601; 33 U. S. C. §1344(g).  Then as
now, “adjacent” means lying near or close to, neighboring,
or  not  widely  separated.
Indeed,  the  definitions  of
“adjacent”  are  notably  explicit  that  two  things  need  not
touch  each  other  in  order  to  be  adjacent.    “Adjacent”
includes “adjoining” but is not limited to “adjoining.”  See,
e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 62 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining
“adjacent”  as  “Lying  near  or  close  to;  sometimes,
contiguous;  neighboring;  . . .  may  not  actually  touch”);
Black’s  Law  Dictionary  50  (11th  ed.  2019)  (defining
“adjacent”  as  “Lying  near  or  close  to,  but  not  necessarily
touching”);
e.g.,  Webster’s  Third  New
International  Dictionary  26  (1976)  (defining “adjacent”  as

see  also,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in the case of Sackett v. EPA. It delves into the legal definition of "adjacent" in the context of wetlands and the Clean Water Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

what the questions are.  And it seems to me a few things
can be said.

First, the fact that a third party has access to or posses-
sion of your papers and effects does not necessarily elimi-
nate your interest in them.  Ever hand a private document
to a friend to be returned?  Toss your keys to a valet at a
restaurant?  Ask  your  neighbor  to  look  after  your  dog
while you travel?  You would not expect the friend to share
the document with others; the valet to lend your car to his
buddy;  or  the  neighbor  to  put  Fido  up  for  adoption.    En-
trusting your stuff to others is a bailment.  A bailment is
the “delivery of personal property by one person (the bailor)
to  another  (the  bailee)  who  holds  the  property  for  a
certain  purpose.”  Black’s  Law  Dictionary  169  (10th  ed.
2014);  J.  Story,  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Bailments
§2, p. 2 (1832) (“a bailment is a delivery of a thing in trust
for  some  special  object  or  purpose,  and  upon  a  contract,
expressed or implied, to conform to the object or purpose of
the  trust”).    A  bailee  normally  owes  a  legal  duty  to  keep
the  item  safe,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  parties’  con-
tract if they have one, and according to the “implication[s]
from their conduct” if they don’t.  8 C. J. S., Bailments §36,
pp.  468–469  (2017).  A  bailee  who  uses  the  item  in  a  dif-
ferent  way  than  he’s  supposed  to,  or  against  the  bailor’s
instructions, is liable for conversion.  Id., §43, at 481; see
Goad v. Harris, 207 Ala. 357, 92 So. 546, (1922); Knight v.
Seney,  290  Ill.  11,  17,  124  N. E.  813,  815–816  (1919);
Baxter  v.  Woodward,  191  Mich.  379,  385,  158  N. W.  137,
139  (1916).   This  approach  is  quite  different  from  Smith
and  Miller’s  (counter)-intuitive  approach  to  reasonable
expectations  of  privacy;  where  those  cases  extinguish
Fourth  Amendment  interests  once  records  are  given  to  a
third party, property law may preserve them.

Our  Fourth  Amendment  jurisprudence  already  reflects
this truth.  In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1878), this
Court  held  that  sealed  letters  placed  in  the  mail  are  “as
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the concept of bailment and its relevance to Fourth Amendment rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring

wise general citizenship language.  14 Stat. 27.1  As Trum-
bull  explained,  the  provision  created  a  bond  between  all
Americans; “any statute which is not equal to all, and which
deprives  any  citizen  of  civil  rights  which  are  secured  to
other citizens,” was “an unjust encroachment upon his lib-
erty” and a “badge of servitude” prohibited by the Constitu-
tion.  Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 474 (emphasis
added).

Trumbull and most of the Act’s other supporters identi-
fied the Thirteenth Amendment as a principal source of con-
stitutional authority for the Act’s nondiscrimination provi-
sions.  See,  e.g.,  id.,  at  475  (statement  of  Sen.  Trumbull);
id.,  at  1152  (statement  of  Rep.  Thayer);  id.,  at  503–504
(statement of Sen. Howard).  In particular, they explained
that  the  Thirteenth  Amendment  allowed  Congress  not
merely to legislate against slavery itself, but also to counter
measures “which depriv[e] any citizen of civil rights which
are secured to other citizens.”  Id., at 474.

But  opponents  argued  that  Congress’  authority  did  not
sweep so broadly.  President Andrew Johnson, for example,
contended that Congress lacked authority to pass the meas-
ure, seizing on the breadth of the citizenship text and em-
phasizing state authority over matters of state citizenship.
See S. Doc. No. 31, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 6 (1866) (John-
son veto message).  Consequently, “doubts about the consti-
tutional authority conferred by that measure led supporters
to  supplement  their  Thirteenth  Amendment  arguments
with  other  sources  of  constitutional  authority.”    R.  Wil-
liams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision,
99  Va.  L. Rev.  493,  532–533  (2013)  (describing  appeals  to
the naturalization power and the inherent power to protect

——————

1 In fact, Indians would not be considered citizens until several decades
later.    Indian  Citizenship  Act  of  1924,  ch.  233,  43  Stat.  253  (declaring
that all Indians born in the United States are citizens).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 600 U.S. ____ (2023). It discusses the historical context and constitutional arguments surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

BREYER, J., dissenting

and  Stevens,  JJ.);  Proffitt  v.  Florida,  428  U. S.  242,  247
(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 268 (1976) (joint opinion of
Stewart,  Powell,  and  Stevens,  JJ.);  but  cf.  Woodson  v.
North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opin
ion)  (striking  down  mandatory  death  penalty);  Roberts  v.
Louisiana,  428  U. S.  325,  331  (1976)  (plurality  opinion)
(similar).  The  circumstances  and  the  evidence  of  the
death  penalty’s  application  have  changed  radically  since
then.  Given those changes, I believe that it is now time to
reopen the question.

In  1976,  the  Court  thought  that  the  constitutional  in
firmities in the death penalty could be healed; the Court in
effect  delegated  significant  responsibility  to  the  States  to
develop  procedures  that  would  protect  against  those  con
stitutional problems.  Almost 40 years of studies, surveys,
and experience strongly indicate, however, that this effort
has  failed.  Today’s  administration  of  the  death  penalty
involves  three  fundamental  constitutional  defects:  (1)
serious  unreliability,  (2)  arbitrariness  in  application,  and
(3)  unconscionably  long  delays  that  undermine  the  death
penalty’s  penological  purpose.    Perhaps  as  a  result,  (4)
most  places  within  the  United  States  have  abandoned  its
use.

I  shall  describe  each  of  these  considerations,  emphasiz
ing  changes  that  have  occurred  during  the  past  four  dec
ades.  For it is those changes, taken together with my own
20  years  of  experience  on  this  Court,  that  lead  me  to  be
lieve  that  the  death  penalty,  in  and  of  itself,  now  likely
constitutes  a  legally  prohibited  “cruel  and  unusual  pun
ishmen[t].”  U. S. Const., Amdt. 8.

I
“Cruel”—Lack of Reliability
This  Court  has  specified  that  the  finality  of  death  cre
ates  a  “qualitative  difference”  between  the  death  penalty
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the constitutionality of the death penalty and cites previous cases.  The text is sequential and contains legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

commerce.  See  ante,  at  2  (opinion  of  BARRETT,  J.)  (“The
complaint plausibly alleges that Proposition 12’s costs are
pervasive, burdensome, and will be felt primarily (but not
exclusively) outside California.”).

*

*

*
In my view, petitioners plausibly allege a substantial bur-
den against interstate commerce.  I would therefore remand
the case for the Ninth Circuit to decide whether it is plau-
sible that the “burden . . . is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits.”  Pike, 397 U. S., at 142.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It includes case names, citations, and legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

53

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

fixed  star  in  our  constitutional  constellation,  if  there  is
one)” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Citizens United
v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 365 (2010) (over-
ruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S.
652 (1990)); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S.
624, 642 (1943) (overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Go-
bitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940)).

In assessing whether to overrule a past decision that ap-
pears to be incorrect, we have considered a variety of fac-
tors, and four of those weigh strongly against Smith: its rea-
soning; its consistency with other decisions; the workability
of the rule that it established; and developments since the
decision was handed down.  See Janus, 585 U. S., at ___–
___ (slip op., at 34–35).  No relevant factor, including reli-
ance, weighs in Smith’s favor.

A

Smith’s reasoning.  As explained in detail above, Smith is
a methodological outlier.  It ignored the “normal and ordi-
nary”  meaning  of  the  constitutional  text,  see  Heller,  554
U. S., at 576, and it made no real effort to explore the un-
derstanding  of  the  free-exercise  right  at  the  time  of  the
First  Amendment’s  adoption.  And  the  Court  adopted  its
reading of the Free Exercise Clause with no briefing on the
issue from the parties or amici.  Laycock, 8 J. L. & Religion,
at 101.

Then there is Smith’s treatment of precedent.  It looked
for  precedential  support  in  strange  places,  and  the  many
precedents that stood in its way received remarkably rough
treatment.

Looking for a case that had endorsed its no-exemptions
view, Smith turned to Gobitis, 310 U. S., at 586, a decision
that  Justice  Scalia  himself  later acknowledged  was  “erro-
neous,” Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S., at 500–501
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Smith v. Employment Division. It cites previous cases and analyzes their reasoning, making it relevant legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xxvii

Cairo Rodriguez v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calderon v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calderon v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calderon-Lopez v. Puerto Rico Court of First Instance  . . . . . . . .
Caldwell, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Caldwell v. Thaler
Caldwell v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Caldwell; Wilson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Abebe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Avila v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Ayyar v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Bartsch v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Baugh v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Bennett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Bernard v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Braley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Bramit v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Bunn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Bunyard v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Butler v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Cairo Rodriguez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Chavarria v.
California; Christian v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Clark v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Coats v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Covarrubias Ruezga v.
California; Cox v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Daly v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Daniels v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Daughtery v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Deakins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; De La Vega v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Dey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Dobshinsky v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Doolin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Drake v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Dutra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Dykes v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Franco v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Garcia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Gates v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Gearing v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

841

904

1132

1118

1023

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  858,1074

855

847

1051

1126

1030

832

904

832

997

832

1031

1028

842

1013

1026

841

1029

1027

1106

839

825

970

1055

1014

840

1124

972

1079

804

914

863

1119

1028

1127

838

999

972

1150
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

Opinion of the Court

Administrative  Procedure  Act  108  (1947);  see  also  Kisor,
588 U. S., at 582 (plurality opinion) (same).  That “present
law,” as we have described, adhered to the traditional con-
ception of the judicial function.  See supra, at 9–13.

Various  respected  commentators  contemporaneously
maintained that the APA required reviewing courts to ex-
ercise independent judgment on questions of law.  Professor
John  Dickinson,  for  example,  read  the  APA  to  “impose  a
clear mandate that all [questions of law] shall be decided by
the reviewing Court itself, and in the exercise of its own in-
dependent  judgment.”    Administrative  Procedure  Act:
Scope  and  Grounds  of  Broadened  Judicial  Review,  33
A. B. A. J.  434,  516  (1947).    Professor  Bernard  Schwartz
noted that §706 “would seem . . . to be merely a legislative
restatement of the familiar review principle that questions
of law are for the reviewing court, at the same time leaving
to the courts the task of determining in each case what are
questions of  law.”    Mixed  Questions  of  Law and  Fact  and
the Administrative Procedure Act, 19 Ford. L. Rev. 73, 84–
85  (1950).  And  Professor  Louis  Jaffe,  who  had  served  in
several  agencies  at  the  advent  of  the  New  Deal,  thought
that §706 leaves it up to the reviewing “court” to “decide as
a ‘question of law’ whether there is ‘discretion’ in the prem-
ises”—that is, whether the statute at issue delegates par-
ticular discretionary authority to an agency.  Judicial Con-
trol of Administrative Action 570 (1965).

The  APA,  in  short,  incorporates  the  traditional  under-
standing of the judicial function, under which courts must
exercise  independent  judgment  in  determining  the  mean-
ing  of  statutory  provisions.  In  exercising  such  judgment,
though, courts may—as they have from the start—seek aid
from  the  interpretations  of  those  responsible  for  imple-
menting particular statutes.  Such interpretations “consti-
tute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance” con-
sistent  with  the  APA.  Skidmore,  323  U. S.,  at  140.    And
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Administrative Procedure Act and its implications for judicial review. It cites legal precedents and scholarly commentary, indicating it's part of the main body of the text and not a preliminary or supplementary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC

BREYER, J., concurring

merce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (Comm. Print 1986) (here-
inafter Childhood Immunizations).

But  these  gains  are  fragile;  “[t]he  causative  agents  for
these  preventable  childhood  illnesses  are  ever  present  in
the  environment,  waiting  for  the  opportunity  to  attack
the unprotected individual.”  Hearing on S. 827 before the
Senate  Committee  on  Labor  and  Human  Resources,  99th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, pp. 20–21 (1985) (hereinafter Hear-
ings)  (testimony  of  the  American  Academy  of  Pediatrics);
see  California  Dept.  of  Public  Health,  Pertussis  Re-
port  (Jan.  7,  2011),  www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/immunize/
Documents/PertussisReport2011–01–07.pdf
2010,
8,383 people in California caught whooping cough, and 10
infants  died).  Even  a  brief  period  when  vaccination  pro-
grams  are  disrupted  can  lead  to children’s  deaths.    Hear-
ings  20–21;  see  Gangarosa  et al.,  Impact  of  Anti-Vaccine
Movements  on  Pertussis  Control:  The  Untold  Story,  351
Lancet  356–361  (Jan.  31,  1998)  (when  vaccination  pro-
grams  are  disrupted,  the  number  of  cases  of  whooping
cough skyrockets, increasing by orders of magnitude).

(In

In considering the NCVIA, Congress found that a sharp
increase in tort suits brought against whooping cough and
other  vaccine  manufacturers  between  1980  and  1985  had
“prompted  manufacturers  to  question  their  continued
participation  in  the  vaccine  market.”    H. R.  Rep.,  at  4;
Childhood  Immunizations  85–86.    Indeed,  two  whooping
cough  vaccine  manufacturers  withdrew  from  the  market,
and other vaccine manufacturers, “fac[ing] great difficulty
in  obtaining  [product  liability]  insurance,”  told  Congress
that  they  were  considering  “a  similar  course  of  action.”
H. R.  Rep.,  at  4;  Childhood  Immunizations  68–70.    The
Committee Report explains that, since there were only one
or  two  manufacturers  of  many  childhood  vaccines,  “[t]he
loss  of  any  of  the  existing  manufacturers  of  childhood
vaccines . . . could create a genuine public health hazard”;
it “would present the very real possibility of vaccine short-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC. It discusses the history of vaccine liability and the impact of lawsuits on the vaccine market.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 12–398
_________________

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY,

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MYRIAD

GENETICS, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 13, 2013]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent  Myriad  Genetics,  Inc.  (Myriad),  discovered
the  precise  location  and  sequence  of  two  human  genes,
mutations of which can substantially increase the risks of
breast  and  ovarian  cancer.    Myriad  obtained  a  number
of  patents  based  upon  its  discovery.    This  case  involves
claims  from  three  of  them  and  requires  us  to  resolve
whether a naturally occurring segment of deoxyribonucleic
acid  (DNA)  is  patent  eligible  under  35  U. S. C.  §101  by
virtue of its isolation from the rest of the human genome.
We  also  address  the  patent  eligibility  of  synthetically
created DNA known as complementary DNA (cDNA), which
contains  the  same  protein-coding  information  found  in
a  segment  of  natural  DNA  but  omits  portions  within  the
DNA  segment  that  do  not  code  for  proteins.    For  the  rea-
sons  that  follow,  we  hold  that  a  naturally  occurring  DNA
segment  is  a  product  of  nature  and  not  patent  eligible
merely  because  it  has  been  isolated,  but  that  cDNA  is
patent  eligible  because  it  is  not  naturally  occurring.    We,
therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BIDEN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.
v. NEBRASKA ET AL.

CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–506.  Argued February 28, 2023—Decided June 30, 2023

Title  IV  of  the  Higher  Education  Act  of  1965  (Education  Act)  governs
federal financial aid mechanisms, including student loans.  20 U. S. C.
§1070(a).  The Act authorizes the Secretary of Education to cancel or
reduce loans in certain limited circumstances.  The Secretary may can-
cel a set amount of loans held by some public servants, see §§1078–10,
1087j, 1087ee.  He may also forgive the loans of borrowers who have
died  or  become  “permanently  and  totally  disabled,”  §1087(a)(1);  bor-
rowers  who  are  bankrupt,  §1087(b);  and  borrowers  whose  schools
falsely certify them, close down, or fail to pay lenders.  §1087(c).

The  issue  presented  in  this  case  is  whether  the  Secretary  has  au-
thority under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students
Act of 2003 (HEROES Act) to depart from the existing provisions of the
Education Act and establish a student loan forgiveness program that
will  cancel  about  $430  billion  in  debt  principal  and  affect  nearly  all
borrowers.  Under the HEROES Act, the Secretary “may waive or mod-
ify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student fi-
nancial assistance programs under title IV of the [Education Act] as
the Secretary deems necessary in connection with a war or other mili-
tary  operation  or  national  emergency.”    §1098bb(a)(1).    As  relevant
here, the Secretary may issue such waivers or modifications only “as
may be necessary to ensure” that “recipients of student financial assis-
tance under title IV of the [Education Act affected by a national emer-
gency] are not placed in a worse position financially in relation to that
financial  assistance  because  of
[the  national  emergency].”
§§1098bb(a)(2)(A), 1098ee(2)(C)–(D).

In 2022, as the COVID–19 pandemic came to its end, the Secretary
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