<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

XIULU RUAN v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–1410.  Argued March 1, 2022—Decided June 27, 2022*

Petitioners Xiulu Ruan and Shakeel Kahn are medical doctors licensed
to  prescribe  controlled  substances.    Each  was  tried  for  violating  21
U. S. C. §841, which makes it a federal crime, “[e]xcept as authorized[,]
. . . for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense . . . a controlled substance.”  A federal regulation
authorizes  registered  doctors  to  dispense  controlled  substances  via
prescription,  but  only  if  the  prescription  is  “issued  for  a  legitimate
medical  purpose  by  an  individual  practitioner  acting  in  the  usual
course of his professional practice.”  21 CFR §1306.04(a).  At issue in
Ruan’s and Kahn’s trials was the mens rea required to convict under
§841 for distributing controlled substances not “as authorized.”  Ruan
and Kahn each contested the jury instructions pertaining to mens rea
given at their trials, and each was ultimately convicted under §841 for
prescribing in an unauthorized manner.  Their convictions were sepa-
rately affirmed by the Courts of Appeals.

Held: Section 841’s “knowingly or intentionally” mens rea applies to the
statute’s “except as authorized” clause.  Once a defendant meets the
burden of producing evidence that his or her conduct was “authorized,”
the  Government  must  prove  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  de-
fendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.
Pp. 4–16.

(a) Criminal  law  generally  seeks  to  punish  conscious  wrongdoing.
Thus, when interpreting criminal statutes, the Court “start[s] from a
longstanding presumption . . . that Congress intends to require a de-
fendant to possess a culpable mental state.”  Rehaif v. United States,

——————

* Together with No. 21–5261, Kahn v. United States, on certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the Court's decision and are not considered part of the actual opinion. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case and the Court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

THRYV, INC. v. CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

a decision shielded from judicial review under any interpre-
tation of §314(d).  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12).  So all the dis-
cussion about the reviewability of decisions outside §314(a)
turned out to be nothing more than dicta entirely unneces-
sary to the decision.  Nor did anything in Cuozzo directly
address  §315(b)  decisions,  let  alone  declare  them  to
be  “close  enough”  to  §314(a)  decisions  to  preclude  judicial
review.

That’s just the beginning of Thryv’s precedent problems,
too.  In SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U. S. ___ (2018), an
inter  partes  review  petitioner  challenged  the  Director’s
practice  of  instituting  review  of  some,  but  not  all,  of  the
claims challenged in a single petition.  The government ar-
gued  there—much  as  Thryv  argues  today—that  §314(d)
shielded this unlawful practice from judicial review.  In ad-
vancing this argument, the government seized on the same
language  in  Cuozzo  that  Thryv  now  embraces,  claiming
that its opponent’s “grounds for attacking the decision . . .
are  closely  tied”  to  the  §314(a)  institution  decision.    Brief
for Federal Respondent in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, O. T.
2017, No. 16–969, p. 13.  Because no one could say that the
petitioner’s argument in SAS Institute was “little more than
a challenge to the Patent Office’s conclusion under §314(a),”
584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13), we were forced to confront
whether Cuozzo and the relevant statutes actually barred
not  just  institution  decisions  under  §314(a)  but  things
“closely related” to them.

We held they did not.  We began, as we did in Cuozzo, by
noting the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review.”
SAS  Institute,  584  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  13)  (internal
quotation marks omitted).  We then put an end to any doubt
about what the dicta in that case might mean:  “Given the
strength of this presumption and the statute’s text, Cuozzo
concluded that §314(d) precludes judicial review only of the
Director’s  ‘initial  determination’  under  §314(a).”    Ibid.
(quoting Cuozzo, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9); emphasis
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL
CONSULTANTS, INC.
Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.

Twenty-four  years  later,  in  2015,  Congress  passed  and
President Obama signed the Bipartisan Budget Act.  In ad-
dition to making other unrelated changes to the U. S. Code,
that Act amended the TCPA’s restriction on robocalls to cell
phones.  It stated:

“(a)  IN  GENERAL.—Section  227(b)  of  the  Communica-
tions Act of 1934 (47 U. S. C. 227(b)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1)—

(A)  in  subparagraph  (A)(iii),  by  inserting  ‘,  unless
such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guar-
anteed  by  the  United  States’  after  ‘charged  for  the
call.’ ”  129 Stat. 588.2

In other words, Congress carved out a new government-

debt exception to the general robocall restriction.

The TCPA imposes tough penalties for violating the ro-
bocall restriction.  Private parties can sue to recover up to
$1,500  per  violation  or  three  times  their  actual  monetary
losses,  which  can  add  up  quickly  in  a  class  action.
§227(b)(3).    States  may  bring  civil  actions  against  ro-
bocallers  on  behalf  of  their  citizens.    §227(g)(1).  And  the

——————
healthcare-related calls.  In this case, plaintiffs do not separately chal-
lenge the validity of the FCC’s regulatory exceptions.

2 After the 2015 amendment, §227(b)(1) now provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States, or any
person  outside  the  United  States  if  the  recipient  is  within  the  United
States—

(A) to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes
or  made  with  the  prior  express  consent  of  the  called  party)  using  any
automatic  telephone  dialing  system  or  an  artificial  or  prerecorded
voice—

.

 .

 .

 .

 .

(iii) to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular tel-
ephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common
carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for
the call, unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guar-
anteed by the United States.”  (Emphasis added.)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and a 2015 amendment related to robocalls. It delves into the legal text of the amendment and its implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS v. FTC
ALITO, J., dissenting

them  in  this  way.1    Nor  is  there  anything  new  about  the
suspicion that the North Carolina Board—in attempting to
prevent  persons  other  than  dentists  from  performing
teeth-whitening  procedures—was  serving  the  interests  of
dentists and not the public.  Professional and occupational
licensing  requirements  have  often  been  used  in  such  a
way.2    But  that  is  not  what  Parker  immunity  is  about.
Indeed,  the  very  state  program  involved  in  that  case  was
unquestionably designed to benefit the regulated entities,
California raisin growers.

The  question  before  us  is  not  whether  such  programs
serve the public interest.  The question, instead, is whether
this  case  is  controlled  by  Parker,  and  the  answer  to  that
question  is  clear.    Under  Parker,  the  Sherman  Act  (and
the Federal Trade Commission Act, see FTC v. Ticor Title
Ins.  Co.,  504  U. S.  621,  635  (1992))  do  not  apply  to  state
agencies;  the  North  Carolina  Board  of  Dental  Examiners
is  a  state  agency;  and  that  is  the  end  of  the  matter.    By
straying  from  this  simple  path,  the  Court  has  not  only
distorted Parker; it has headed into a morass.  Determin-
ing  whether  a  state  agency  is  structured  in  a  way  that
militates  against  regulatory  capture  is  no  easy  task,  and
there  is  reason  to  fear  that  today’s  decision  will  spawn
confusion.  The Court has veered off course, and therefore
I cannot go along.

——————

1 S.  White,  History  of  Oral  and  Dental  Science  in  America  197–
214  (1876)  (detailing  earliest  American  regulations  of  the  practice  of
dentistry).

2 See, e.g., R. Shrylock, Medical Licensing in America 29 (1967) (Shry-
lock)  (detailing  the  deterioration  of  licensing  regimes  in  the  mid-19th
century,  in  part  out  of  concerns  about  restraints  on  trade);  Gellhorn,
The  Abuse  of  Occupational  Licensing,  44  U.  Chi.  L.  Rev.  6  (1976);
Shepard, Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental Care, 21 J. Law
& Econ. 187 (1978).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, specifically regarding Parker immunity and its application to the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

Opinion of the Court

B
This  case  arises  from  three  separate  child  custody  pro-

ceedings governed by ICWA.

1

A. L. M. was placed in foster care with Chad and Jennifer
Brackeen when he was 10 months old.  Because his biolog-
ical mother is a member of the Navajo Nation and his bio-
logical father is a member of the Cherokee Nation, he falls
within  ICWA’s  definition  of  an  “Indian  child.”  Both  the
Brackeens and A. L. M.’s biological parents live in Texas.

After A. L. M. had lived with the Brackeens for more than
a  year,  they  sought  to  adopt  him.  A. L. M.’s  biological
mother,  father,  and  grandmother  all  supported  the  adop-
tion.  The Navajo and Cherokee Nations did not.  Pursuant
to  an  agreement  between  the  Tribes,  the  Navajo  Nation
designated  A. L. M.  as  a  member  and  informed  the  state
court that it had located a potential alternative placement
with  nonrelative  tribal  members  living  in  New  Mexico.
ICWA’s placement preferences ranked the proposed Navajo
family  ahead  of  non-Indian  families  like  the  Brackeens.
See §1915(a).

The  Brackeens  tried  to  convince  the  state  court  that
there  was  “good  cause”  to  deviate  from  ICWA’s  prefer-
ences.  They presented favorable testimony from A. L. M.’s
court-appointed guardian and from a psychological expert
who described the strong emotional bond between A. L. M.
and  his  foster  parents.    A. L. M.’s  biological  parents  and
grandmother  also  testified,  urging  the  court  to  allow
A. L. M. to remain with the Brackeens, “ ‘the only parents
[A. L. M.] knows.’ ”  App. 96.

The court denied the adoption petition, and the Texas De-
partment of Family and Protective Services announced its
intention  to  move  A. L. M.  from  the  Brackeens’  home  to
New Mexico.  In response, the Brackeens obtained an emer-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to a case about child custody and the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

290 GEBSER v. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

comparable express causes of action’ ”), quoting Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 736 (1975).
Moreover, an award of damages in a particular case might
well exceed a recipient’s level of federal funding. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 35 (Lago Vista’s federal funding for 1992–1993 was
roughly $120,000). Where a statute’s express enforcement
scheme hinges its most severe sanction on notice and un-
successful efforts to obtain compliance, we cannot attribute
to Congress the intention to have implied an enforcement
scheme that allows imposition of greater liability without
comparable conditions.

IV

Because the express remedial scheme under Title IX is
predicated upon notice to an “appropriate person” and an
opportunity to rectify any violation, 20 U. S. C. § 1682, we
conclude, in the absence of further direction from Congress,
that the implied damages remedy should be fashioned along
the same lines. An “appropriate person” under § 1682 is, at
a minimum, an ofﬁcial of the recipient entity with authority
to take corrective action to end the discrimination. Conse-
quently, in cases like this one that do not involve ofﬁcial pol-
icy of the recipient entity, we hold that a damages remedy
will not lie under Title IX unless an ofﬁcial who at a mini-
mum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and
to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has
actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s pro-
grams and fails adequately to respond.

We think, moreover, that the response must amount to de-
liberate indifference to discrimination. The administrative
enforcement scheme presupposes that an ofﬁcial who is ad-
vised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to bring
the recipient into compliance. The premise, in other words,
is an ofﬁcial decision by the recipient not to remedy the viola-
tion. That framework ﬁnds a rough parallel in the standard
of deliberate indifference. Under a lower standard, there
would be a risk that the recipient would be liable in dam-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt. It contains legal arguments, citations, and a formal tone, suggesting it's part of the main body of the document and suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

ALITO, J., dissenting

damages precludes mootness.  See 13C C. Wright, A. Miller,
& E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3533.3, n. 47
(3d ed. Supp. 2019) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Central
Radio Co. v.  Norfolk, 811 F. 3d 625, 631–632 (CA4 2016);
Morgan v. Plano Independent School Dist., 589 F. 3d 740,
748, n. 32 (CA5 2009); Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles,
279 F. 3d 862, 872 (CA9 2002); Amato v. Saratoga Springs,
170  F. 3d  311,  317  (CA2  1999)  (Sand,  J.,  joined  by  So-
tomayor, J.); Committee for First Amendment v. Campbell,
962 F. 2d 1517, 1526–1527 (CA10 1992); Henson v. Honor
Committee of U. Va., 719 F. 2d 69, 72, n. 5 (CA4 1983).6

2
It is even possible that one or more of the petitioners may
be eligible for compensatory damages.  To get such relief,
they would of course be required to show that they suffered
an “actual injury.”  See Carey, 435 U. S., at 266; D. Dobbs
& C. Roberts, Law of Remedies §7.4(1), p. 660 (3d ed. 2018).
But petitioners may be able to make such a  showing.  As
discussed  above,  the  failure  to  include  in  their  complaint
specific factual allegations of actual injury would not pre-
clude such recovery.7  See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(c).  Nor
were petitioners obligated to provide information support-
ing actual injury in opposing the City’s motion for summary
judgment.

If  we  were  to  reverse  the  judgment  below  and  hold  the
City’s old rule unconstitutional, it would be appropriate to

——————

6 A single Circuit has held that a claim for nominal damages alone does
not  maintain  a  live  dispute.   See  Flanigan’s  Enterprises,  Inc.  of  Ga. v.
Sandy Springs, 868 F. 3d 1248 (CA11 2017).  But that holding is difficult
to reconcile with Carey and Stachura’s endorsement of nominal damages
as an appropriate constitutional remedy.

7 Even if specific allegations in the complaint were necessary, the Dis-
trict Court could allow amendment.  See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 401 U. S. 321, 331 (1971); 6 Wright & Miller §1474 (3d ed.
2010).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedents and discusses the legal arguments surrounding the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

that  clear  command,  this  Court  has  long  acknowledged
that  governmental  actions  that  favor  one  religion  “inevi
tabl[y]” foster “the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of
those  who  [hold]  contrary  beliefs.”  Engel  v.  Vitale,  370
U. S.  421,  431  (1962).  That  is  so,  this  Court  has  held,
because  such  acts  send  messages  to  members  of  minority
faiths  “ ‘that  they  are  outsiders,  not  full  members  of  the
political community.’ ”  Santa Fe Independent School Dist.
v.  Doe,  530  U. S.  290,  309  (2000).    To  guard  against  this
serious harm, the Framers mandated a strict “principle of
denominational  neutrality.”  Larson,  456  U. S.,  at  246;
Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U. S. 687, 703 (1994) (recognizing the role of courts in
“safeguarding  a  principle  at  the  heart  of  the  Establish
ment  Clause,  that  government  should  not  prefer  one  reli
gion to another, or religion to irreligion”).

“When  the  government  acts  with  the  ostensible  and
predominant purpose” of disfavoring a particular religion,
“it  violates  that  central  Establishment  Clause  value  of
official  religious  neutrality,  there  being  no  neutrality
when  the  government’s  ostensible  object  is  to  take  sides.”
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky.,
545 U. S. 844, 860 (2005).  To determine whether plaintiffs
have proved an Establishment Clause violation, the Court
asks  whether  a  reasonable  observer  would  view  the  gov
ernment action as enacted for the purpose of disfavoring a
religion.  See  id.,  at  862,  866;  accord,  Town  of  Greece  v.
Galloway, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (plurality opinion) (slip
op., at 19).

In  answering  that  question,  this  Court  has  generally
considered the text of the government policy, its operation,
and any available evidence regarding “the historical back
ground of the decision under challenge, the specific series
of  events  leading  to  the  enactment  or  official  policy  in
question,  and  the  legislative  or  administrative  history,
including  contemporaneous  statements  made  by”  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and legal principles to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES v. BETHUNE-HILL

Opinion of the Court

emphasizes its role in enacting redistricting legislation in
particular.  The House observes that, under Virginia law,
“members  of  the  Senate  and  of  the  House  of  Delegates  of
the  General  Assembly  shall  be  elected  from  electoral
districts  established  by  the  General  Assembly.”    Va.
Const.,  Art.  2,  §6.    The  House  has  standing,  it  contends,
because  it  is  “the  legislative  body  that  actually  drew  the
redistricting  plan,”  and  because,  the  House  asserts,  any
remedial order will transfer redistricting authority from it
to  the  District  Court.    Brief  for  Appellants  23,  26–28  (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  But the Virginia consti-
tutional  provision  the  House  cites  allocates  redistricting
authority  to  the  “General  Assembly,”  of  which  the  House
constitutes only a part.
  That  fact  distinguishes  this  case  from  Arizona  State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n,
576  U. S.  ___  (2015),  in  which  the  Court  recognized  the
standing  of  the  Arizona  House  and  Senate—acting  to-
gether—to  challenge  a  referendum  that  gave  redistricting
authority  exclusively  to  an  independent  commission,
thereby  allegedly  usurping  the  legislature’s  authority
under  the  Federal  Constitution  over  congressional  redis-
tricting.  In contrast to this case, in Arizona State Legisla-
ture  there  was  no  mismatch  between  the  body  seeking  to
litigate  and  the  body  to  which  the  relevant  constitutional
provision allegedly assigned exclusive redistricting author-
ity.  See 576 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 11–12).  Just as
individual  members  lack  standing  to  assert  the  institu-
tional  interests  of  a  legislature,  see  Raines,  521  U. S.,  at
829,4  a  single  House  of  a  bicameral  legislature  lacks  ca-
pacity to assert interests belonging to the legislature as a
whole.
  Moreover,  in  Arizona  State  Legislature,  the  challenged

——————

4 Raines held that individual Members of Congress lacked standing to

challenge the Line Item Veto Act.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the standing of the Virginia House of Delegates in a redistricting case. It cites legal precedent and constitutional provisions, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U98

[09-06-00 19:40:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

738

MONGE v. CALIFORNIA

Scalia, J., dissenting

appropriate. That sentencer often considers new factual is-
sues and additional evidence under much less demanding
proof requirements than apply at the conviction stage. The
fundamental distinction between facts that are elements
of a criminal offense and facts that go only to the sentence
provides the foundation for our entire double jeopardy juris-
prudence—including the “same elements” test for determin-
ing whether two “offence[s]” are “the same,” see Block-
burger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932), and the rule (at
issue here) that the Clause protects an expectation of ﬁnality
with respect to offences but not sentences. The same dis-
tinction also delimits the boundaries of other important con-
stitutional rights, like the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury and the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

I do not believe that that distinction is (as the Court seems
to assume) simply a matter of the label afﬁxed to each fact
by the legislature. Suppose that a State repealed all of the
violent crimes in its criminal code and replaced them with
only one offense, “knowingly causing injury to another,”
bearing a penalty of 30 days in prison, but subject to a series
of “sentencing enhancements” authorizing additional punish-
ment up to life imprisonment or death on the basis of various
levels of mens rea, severity of injury, and other surrounding
circumstances. Could the State then grant the defendant
a jury trial, with requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, solely on the question whether he “knowingly
cause[d] injury to another,” but leave it for the judge to de-
termine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the de-
fendant acted intentionally or accidentally, whether he used
a deadly weapon, and whether the victim ultimately died
from the injury the defendant inﬂicted?
If the protections
extended to criminal defendants by the Bill of Rights can be
so easily circumvented, most of them would be, to borrow a
phrase from Justice Field, “vain and idle enactment[s], which
accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia.  It discusses legal concepts related to double jeopardy and sentencing enhancements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

21

BREYER, J., dissenting

in  time  of  war  or  national  emergency?    In  my  view,  they
should.

For  one  thing,  a  Bivens  action  comes  accompanied  by
many legal safeguards designed to prevent the courts from
interfering with Executive and Legislative Branch activity
reasonably  believed  to  be  necessary  to  protect  national
security.
In  Justice  Jackson’s  well-known  words,  the
Constitution is not “a suicide pact.”  Terminiello v. Chicago,
337  U. S.  1,  37  (1949)  (dissenting  opinion).    The  Consti-
tution  itself  takes  account  of  public  necessity.    Thus,  for
example, the Fourth Amendment does not forbid  all Gov-
ernment  searches  and  seizures;  it  forbids  only  those  that
are  “unreasonable.”    Ordinarily,  it  requires  that  a  police
officer  obtain  a  search  warrant  before  entering  an  apart-
ment,  but  should  the  officer  observe  a  woman  being
dragged  against  her  will  into  that  apartment,  he  should,
and  will,  act  at  once.    The  Fourth  Amendment  makes
allowances  for  such  “exigent  circumstances.”    Brigham
City  v.  Stuart,  547  U. S.  398,  401  (2006)  (warrantless
entry  justified  to  forestall  imminent  injury).    Similarly,
the Fifth Amendment bars only conditions of confinement
that  are  not  “reasonably  related  to  a  legitimate  govern-
mental objective.”  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 539.  What
is  unreasonable  and  illegitimate  in  time  of  peace  may  be
reasonable and legitimate in time of war.

Moreover,  Bivens  comes  accompanied  with  a  qualified-
immunity  defense.  Federal  officials  will  face  suit  only  if
they have violated a constitutional right that was “clearly
established” at the time they acted.  Harlow, 457 U. S., at
818.

Further,  in  order  to  prevent  the  very  presence  of  a
Bivens  lawsuit  from  interfering  with  the  work  of  a  Gov-
ernment  official,  this  Court  has  held  that  a  com-
plaint  must  state  a  claim  for  relief  that  is  “plausible.”
Iqbal,  556  U. S.,  at  679.    “[C]onclusory”  statements  and
Id.,  at  678.
“[t]hreadbare”  allegations  will  not  suffice.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal framework surrounding Bivens actions, particularly in the context of national security and qualified immunity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017)

3

Syllabus

to  reconsider  that  decision,  the  only  question  here  is  whether  Con-
gress  changed  §1400(b)’s  meaning  when  it  amended  §1391.    When
Congress  intends  to  effect  a  change  of  that  kind,  it  ordinarily  pro-
vides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the amended provi-
sion’s  text.    No  such  indication  appears  in  the  current  version  of
§1391.

Respondent points out that the current §1391(c) provides a default
rule  that,  on  its  face,  applies  without  exception  “[f]or  all  venue  pur-
poses.”    But  the  version  at  issue  in  Fourco  similarly  provided  a  de-
fault rule that applied “ ‘for venue purposes,’ ” 353 U. S., at 223, and
those phrasings are not materially different in this context.  The ad-
dition  of  the  word  “all”  to  the  already  comprehensive  provision  does
not  suggest  that  Congress  intended  the  Court  to  reconsider  its  deci-
sion in Fourco.  Any argument based on this language is even weaker
now  than  it  was  when  the  Court  rejected  it  in  Fourco.  Fourco  held
that §1400(b) retained a meaning distinct from the default definition
contained  in  §1391(c),  even though  the  latter,  by  its  terms,  included
no exceptions.  The current version of §1391 includes a saving clause,
which  expressly  states  that  the  provision  does  not  apply  when  “oth-
erwise  provided  by  law,”  thus  making  explicit  the  qualification  that
the  Fourco  Court  found  implicit  in  the  statute.    Finally,  there  is  no
indication  that  Congress  in  2011  ratified  the  Federal  Circuit’s  deci-
sion in VE Holding.  Pp. 7–10.

821 F. 3d 1338, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  all  other
Members joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case. It includes citations, case names, and a brief overview of the Court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

57

Opinion of the Court

the  home  “the  most  preferred  firearm  in  the  nation  to
‘keep’  and  use  for  protection  of  one’s  home  and  family,”
478 F. 3d, at 400, would fail constitutional muster.

Few laws in the history of our Nation have come close to
the  severe restriction  of  the  District’s  handgun  ban.  And
some  of  those  few  have  been  struck  down.  In  Nunn  v.
State, the  Georgia Supreme Court struck down a prohibi
tion  on  carrying  pistols  openly  (even  though  it  upheld  a
prohibition on carrying concealed weapons).  See 1 Ga., at
251.  In  Andrews  v.  State,  the  Tennessee  Supreme  Court
likewise held that a statute that forbade openly carrying a
pistol  “publicly  or  privately,  without  regard  to  time  or
place,  or  circumstances,”  50  Tenn.,  at  187,  violated  the
state  constitutional  provision  (which  the  court  equated
with  the  Second  Amendment).    That  was  so  even  though
the statute did not restrict the carrying of long guns.  Ibid.
See  also  State  v.  Reid,  1  Ala.  612,  616–617  (1840)  (“A
statute  which,  under  the  pretence  of  regulating,  amounts
to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be
so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose
of defence, would be clearly unconstitutional”).

It  is  no  answer  to  say,  as  petitioners  do,  that  it  is  per
missible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the
possession of other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.  It
is enough to note, as we have observed, that the American
people have considered the handgun to be the quintessen
tial  self-defense  weapon.    There  are  many  reasons  that  a
citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier
to store in a location that is readily accessible in an emer
gency;  it  cannot  easily  be  redirected  or  wrestled  away  by
an attacker; it is easier to use for those without the upper-
body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed
at a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the
police.  Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popu

——————

tional laws, and would have no effect.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Second Amendment and handgun ownership. It's part of a larger legal argument and contains legal citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of the Court

ed. 2020).  To prevent complications arising from pre-appeal
enforcement of judgments, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
62(b) provides that a party “may obtain a stay by providing
a bond or other security.”  These bonds are often called su-
persedeas  bonds,  tracking  the  name  of  a  traditional  writ
that  was  used  to  stay  the  execution  of  a  legal  judgment.
See,  e.g.,  Hardeman  v.  Anderson,  4  How.  640,  642  (1846)
(issuing  a  “writ  of  supersedeas  to  stay  execution  on  the
judgment”).  “A supersedeas bond is a contract by which a
surety  obligates  itself  to  pay  a  final  judgment  rendered
against  its  principal  under  the  conditions  stated  in  the
bond.”  13 A Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure §62.19 (3d ed.
Supp. 2021).

B
The cost dispute before us arises out of litigation between
the city of San Antonio—acting on behalf of a class of 173
Texas  municipalities—and  a  number  of  popular  online
travel  companies  (OTCs).    In  2006,  San  Antonio  alleged
that the OTCs had been systematically underpaying hotel
occupancy  taxes  by  calculating  them  using  the  wholesale
rate that the OTCs negotiated with hotels rather than the
retail rate that consumers paid for hotel rooms.  After a jury
trial,  the  District  Court  entered  a  judgment  of  approxi-
mately $55 million in favor of the class.

The OTCs quickly sought to secure supersedeas bonds to
stay the judgment.  They negotiated with San Antonio over
the terms of the bonds, and the city ultimately supported
the  OTCs’  efforts  to  stay  the  judgment  with  supersedeas
bonds totaling almost $69 million, an amount that was cal-
culated  to  cover  the  judgment  plus  18  months  of  interest
and further taxes.  The District Court approved the bonds,
which were subsequently increased at San Antonio’s urging
to  cover  what  grew  to  be  an  $84  million  judgment  after
years of post-trial motions.

The OTCs eventually appealed, and the Court of Appeals
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It sets the stage for a case involving a dispute over hotel occupancy taxes and the use of supersedeas bonds to stay a judgment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CALVARY CHAPEL DAYTON VALLEY v. SISOLAK

ALITO, J., dissenting

casinos to operate at 50% capacity is hard to swallow, and
the State’s efforts to justify the discrimination are feeble.  It
notes that patrons at gaming tables are supposed to wear
masks and that the service of food at casinos is now limited,
but congregants in houses of worship are also required to
wear  masks,  and  they  do  not  consume  meals  during  ser-
vices.
  The State notes that facilities other than houses of wor-
ship,  such  as  museums,  art  galleries,  zoos,  aquariums,
trade  schools,  and  technical  schools,  are  also  treated  less
favorably than casinos, but obviously that does not justify
preferential treatment for casinos.
  Finally, the State argues that preferential treatment for
casinos is justified because the State is in a better position
to enforce compliance by casinos, which are under close su-
pervision by state officials and subject to penalties if they
violate state rules.  By contrast, the State notes, rules for
houses of worship must be enforced by local authorities.
  This  argument might make  some sense  if  enforcing  the
50% capacity rule were materially harder than enforcing a
flat 50-person rule.  But there is no reason to think that is
so, let alone that it would be compelling enough to justify
differential treatment of religion.  Local officials responsi-
ble for enforcing maximum occupancy limits during normal
times presumably know or can easily ascertain the limit for
particular churches, and the State does not claim that these
officials have any trouble enforcing those limits.  In many
jurisdictions, buildings that host gatherings are required to
post their maximum occupancy figure in a prominent loca-
tion.  Enforcing a 50% limit would not require local officials
to  do  anything  more  than  divide  that  figure  in  half,  and
there is no reason to think that enforcing that limit would
be any harder than enforcing a 50-person maximum.
  Moreover,  even  if  the  State’s  special  regulatory  power
over casinos could justify different rules for those facilities,
the State would still have no explanation why facilities like
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in a case involving the capacity restrictions on religious gatherings versus casinos.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

fire  an  M16  from  that  required  to  fire  a  bump-stock-
equipped  AR–15.    The  majority  argues  that  “holding  the
trigger down on  a fully automatic rifle is not manual input
in  addition  to  a  trigger’s  function—it  is  what  causes  the
trigger to function in the first place” whereas “pushing on
the front grip [of a bump-stock equipped semiautomatic ri-
fle] will not cause the weapon to fire unless the shooter also
engages the trigger with his other hand.”  Ante, at 16.  The
shooter  of  a  bump-stock-equipped  AR–15,  however,  need
not “pull” the trigger to fire.  Instead, he need only place a
finger on the finger rest and push forward on the front grip
or barrel with his other hand.  Instead of pulling the trigger,
the forward motion pushes the bump stock into his finger.
  Second, the majority tries to cabin “single function of the
trigger”  to  a  single  mechanism  for  activating  continuous
fire.  See ante, at 14–15.  A shooter can fire a bump-stock-
equipped  semiautomatic  rifle  in  two  ways.    First,  he  can
choose  to  fire  single  shots  via  distinct  pulls  of  the  trigger
without exerting any additional pressure.  Second, he can
fire  continuously  via  maintaining  constant  forward  pres-
sure on the barrel or front grip.  The majority holds that the
forward pressure cannot constitute a “single function of the
trigger” because a shooter can also fire single shots by pull-
ing the trigger.  That logic, however, would also exclude a
Tommy  Gun  and  an  M16,  the  paradigmatic  examples  of
regulated machineguns in 1934 and today.  Both weapons
can  fire  either  automatically  or  semiautomatically.    A
shooter  using  a  Tommy  Gun  in  automatic  mode  could
——————
more than one shot by a single function of the trigger, it could not do so
‘automatically.’ ”  Ante, at 13, n. 6.  That is correct, as far as the majority’s
reasoning goes.  The majority defines “ ‘single function of the trigger’ ” as
a reset of a rifle’s internal trigger mechanism.  Ante, at 11.  A more accu-
rate  definition  is  the  human  action  required  to  initiate  the  firing  se-
quence.  Supra, at 7–10.  The majority’s argument for why “something
more  than a  ‘single  function  of  the  trigger’  is  required  to  fire  multiple
shots,” ante, at 15, is therefore relevant to both its discussion of “auto-
matically” and my discussion of “single function of the trigger.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal definition of "automatic" firearms and argues against the majority's interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ

Opinion of the Court

U. S. 520 (1993) (infringement of free exercise)).

In determining whether a harm is sufficiently concrete to
qualify as an injury in fact, the Court in Spokeo said that
Congress’s  views  may  be  “instructive.”    578  U. S.,  at  341.
Courts must afford due respect to Congress’s decision to im-
pose  a  statutory  prohibition  or  obligation  on  a  defendant,
and to grant a plaintiff a cause of action to sue over the de-
fendant’s  violation  of  that  statutory  prohibition  or  obliga-
tion.  See id., at 340–341.  In that way, Congress may “ele-
vate  to  the  status  of  legally  cognizable  injuries  concrete,
de facto  injuries  that  were  previously  inadequate  in  law.”
Id., at 341 (alterations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see Lujan, 504 U. S., at 562–563, 578; cf., e.g., Allen v.
Wright,  468  U. S.  737,  757,  n.  22  (1984)  (discriminatory
treatment).  But  even  though  “Congress  may  ‘elevate’
harms that ‘exist’ in the real world before Congress recog-
nized them to actionable legal status, it may not simply en-
act an injury into existence, using its lawmaking power to
transform  something  that  is  not  remotely  harmful  into
something  that  is.”  Hagy  v.  Demers  &  Adams,  882  F. 3d
616, 622 (CA6 2018) (Sutton, J.) (citing Spokeo, 578 U. S.,
at 341).

Importantly, this Court has rejected the proposition that
“a  plaintiff  automatically  satisfies  the  injury-in-fact  re-
quirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory
right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindi-
cate that right.”  Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 341.  As the Court
emphasized in Spokeo, “Article III standing requires a con-
crete  injury  even  in  the  context  of  a  statutory  violation.”
Ibid.

Congress’s  creation  of  a  statutory  prohibition  or  obliga-
tion  and  a  cause  of  action  does  not  relieve  courts  of  their
responsibility  to  independently  decide  whether  a  plaintiff
has  suffered  a  concrete  harm  under  Article  III  any  more
than, for example, Congress’s enactment of a law regulating
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the concept of "injury in fact" in the context of Article III standing. It delves into Supreme Court precedents and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

304 GEBSER v. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.

Stevens, J., dissenting

289. That fact did not affect the Court’s analysis, much less
persuade the Court that a damages remedy was unavailable.
Cf. Cannon, 441 U. S., at 711 (“The fact that other provisions
of a complex statutory scheme create express remedies has
not been accepted as a sufﬁcient reason for refusing to imply
an otherwise appropriate remedy under a separate section”).
The majority’s inappropriate reliance on Title IX’s admin-
istrative enforcement scheme to limit the availability of a
damages remedy leads the Court to require not only actual
knowledge on the part of “an ofﬁcial who at a minimum has
authority to address the alleged discrimination and to insti-
tute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf,” but also
that ofﬁcial’s “refus[al] to take action,” or “deliberate indif-
ference” toward the harassment. Ante, at 290.13 Presum-
ably, few Title IX plaintiffs who have been victims of inten-
tional discrimination will be able to recover damages under
this exceedingly high standard. The Court fails to recog-
nize that its holding will virtually “render inutile causes of
action authorized by Congress through a decision that no
remedy is available.” Franklin, 503 U. S., at 74.

IV

We are not presented with any question concerning the
afﬁrmative defenses that might eliminate or mitigate the
recovery of damages for a Title IX violation.
It has been
argued, for example, that a school district that has adopted
and vigorously enforced a policy that is designed to prevent
sexual harassment and redress the harms that such conduct
may produce should be exonerated from damages liability.14

13 The only decisions the Court cites to support its adoption of such a
stringent standard are cases arising under a quite different statute, 42
U. S. C. § 1983. See ante, at 291.

14 See Brief for National Education Association as Amicus Curiae 15
(proposing afﬁrmative defense that “the entity had adopted and has
implemented an effective prevention and compliance program”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

IN RE WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

of Oral Arg. in No. 21–50792 (CA5, Jan. 7, 2022), at 37:40–
38:17.

Ten days after argument, before this Court had taken any
action on the mandamus petition, the panel granted Texas’
request  for  certification.  See  Whole  Woman’s  Health  v.
Jackson,  2022  WL  142193,  *2,  ___  F. 4th  ___,  ___  (CA5
2022).  The  majority  professed  that  “the  issues  before  [it]
[we]re not about abortion,” and it deemed certification war-
ranted primarily because the plurality and the solo dissent
in  Whole  Woman’s  Health  II  had  expressed  some  uncer-
tainty as to the best reading of state law.  2022 WL 142193,
*1–*3.  Judge Higginson dissented again.  He emphasized
that  the  delay  inherent  in  certification  was  inconsistent
with this Court’s mandate.  Id., at *6.  He added that the
panel’s decision to certify “effectively t[old] the Court that
its  opinion  was  advisory”;  explained  that  Texas’  request
was untimely; and concluded that the panel’s decision gave
Texas a second bite at a reading of state law that the Fifth
Circuit had previously adopted, but this Court had rejected.
Id., at *7.

II
The  panel’s  actions  on  remand  clearly  defy  this  Court’s
judgment  for  the  reasons  ably  explained  by  Judge  Hig-
ginson.  This Court could, and should, have granted a writ
of mandamus ordering the panel below to withdraw certifi-
cation and remand to the District Court.  Mandamus relief
is  an  “extraordinary  remedy”  appropriate  for  the  “excep-
tional circumstances” now before this Court, where a lower
court’s failure to follow this Court’s clear dictates has left
petitioners with “no other adequate means” to enforce their
“clear  and  indisputable”  rights.  Cheney  v.  United  States
Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 380–381 (2004) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).

After this Court resolved the appeal, there was no defen-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It discusses a case involving Whole Woman's Health and Texas, focusing on the Fifth Circuit Court's actions regarding certification and the appropriate course of action for the Supreme Court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO. v. APPLE INC.

Opinion of the Court

A
The text resolves this case.  The term “article of manu-
facture,” as used in §289, encompasses both a product sold
to a consumer and a component of that product.

“Article  of  manufacture”  has  a  broad  meaning.    An
“article”  is  just  “a  particular  thing.”    J.  Stormonth,  A
Dictionary of the English Language 53 (1885) (Stormonth);
see also American Heritage Dictionary, at 101 (“[a]n indi-
vidual  thing  or  element  of  a  class;  a  particular  object  or
item”).  And  “manufacture”  means  “the  conversion  of  raw
materials  by  the  hand,  or  by  machinery,  into  articles
suitable  for  the  use  of  man”  and  “the  articles  so  made.”
Stormonth 589; see also American Heritage Dictionary, at
1070  (“[t]he  act,  craft,  or  process  of  manufacturing  prod-
ucts,  especially  on  a  large  scale”  or  “[a]  product  that  is
manufactured”).  An  article  of  manufacture,  then,  is  sim-
ply a thing made by hand or machine.

So  understood,  the  term  “article  of  manufacture”  is
broad  enough  to  encompass  both  a  product  sold  to  a  con-
sumer  as  well  as  a  component  of  that  product.    A  compo-
nent of a product, no less than the product itself, is a thing
made  by  hand  or  machine.  That  a  component  may  be
integrated  into  a  larger  product,  in  other  words,  does  not
put it outside the category of articles of manufacture.

This  reading  of  article  of  manufacture  in  §289  is  con-
sistent with 35 U. S. C. §171(a), which makes “new, origi-
nal  and  ornamental  design[s]  for  an  article  of  manufac-
ture”  eligible  for  design  patent  protection.3   The  Patent

——————

3 As originally enacted, the provision protected “any new and original
design for a manufacture.”  §3, 5 Stat. 544.  The provision listed exam-
ples,  including  a  design  “worked  into  or  worked  on,  or  printed  or
painted or cast or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture” and a
“shape or configuration of any article of manufacture.”  Ibid.  A stream-
lined  version  enacted  in  1902  protected  “any  new,  original,  and  orna-
mental  design  for  an  article  of  manufacture.”    Ch.  783,  32  Stat.  193.
The Patent Act of 1952 retained that language.  See §171, 66 Stat. 813.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of the term "article of manufacture" in a legal context. It provides legal analysis and cites relevant statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U40

[10-04-01 09:23:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN

244

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

GARNER, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES OF
GEORGIA, et al. v. JONES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit

No. 99–137. Argued January 11, 2000—Decided March 28, 2000

Respondent escaped while serving a life sentence for murder, committed
another murder, and was sentenced to a second life term. Georgia law
requires the State’s Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to consider
inmates serving life sentences for parole after seven years. At the time
respondent committed his second offense, the Board’s Rule 475–3–.05(2)
required that reconsiderations for parole take place every three years.
Acting pursuant to statutory authority, the Board subsequently ex-
tended the reconsideration period to at least every eight years. The
Board has the discretion to shorten that interval, but declined to do so
when it applied the amended Rule in respondent’s case, citing his multi-
ple offenses and the circumstances and nature of his second offense.
Respondent sued petitioner Board members, claiming that retroactive
application of the amended Rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The District Court denied respondent’s motion for discovery and
awarded petitioners summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit re-
versed.
It found that the amended Rule’s retroactive application was
necessarily an ex post facto violation and that the Rule differed in mate-
rial respects from the change in California parole law sustained in Cali-
fornia Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499.
It did not con-
sider the Board’s internal policies regarding its implementation of the
Rule, ﬁnding, among other things, that such policies were unenforceable
and easily changed.

Held:

1. The Court of Appeals’ analysis failed to reveal whether retroactive
application of the amendment to Rule 475–3–.05(2) violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause. The controlling inquiry is whether such application cre-
ates a sufﬁcient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached
to the covered crimes. Morales, supra, at 509. Here, the question
is whether amended Rule 475–3–.05(2) creates a signiﬁcant risk of pro-
longing respondent’s incarceration. That risk is not inherent in the
amended Rule’s framework, and it has not otherwise been demonstrated
on the record. While Morales identiﬁed several factors convincing this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court decision. It includes information about the case name, citation, parties involved, and a brief overview of the legal issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

21

GORSUCH, J., concurring

Clause requires any consideration of race to satisfy “strict
scrutiny,” meaning it must be “narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests.”  Grutter, 539 U. S., at
326 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Outside the con-
text  of  higher  education,  “our  precedents  have  identified
only  two”  interests  that  meet  this  demanding  standard:
“remediating specific, identified instances of past discrimi-
nation  that  violated  the  Constitution  or  a  statute,”  and
“avoiding  imminent  and  serious  risks  to  human  safety  in
prisons.”  Ante, at 15 (opinion for the Court).

Within  higher  education,  however,  an  entirely  distinct
set of rules emerged.  Following Bakke, this Court declared
that judges may simply “defer” to a school’s assertion that
“diversity is essential” to its “educational mission.”  Grutter,
539 U. S., at 328.  Not all schools, though—elementary and
secondary schools apparently do not qualify for this defer-
ence.  See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 724–725 (2007).  Only col-
leges and universities, the Court explained, “occupy a spe-
cial  niche  in  our  constitutional  tradition.”    Grutter,  539
U. S., at 329.  Yet even they (wielding their “special niche”
authority) cannot simply assert an interest in diversity and
discriminate as they please.  Fisher, 579 U. S., at 381.  In-
stead, they may consider race only as a “plus” factor for the
purpose  of  “attaining  a  critical  mass  of  underrepresented
minority  students”  or  “a  diverse  student  body.”    Grutter,
539 U. S., at 335–336 (internal quotation marks omitted).
At the same time, the Court cautioned, this practice “must
have a logical end point.”  Id., at 342.  And in the meantime,
“outright  racial  balancing”  and  “quota  system[s]”  remain
“patently  unconstitutional.”    Id.,  at  330,  334.  Nor  may  a
college  or  university  ever  provide  “mechanical,  predeter-
mined  diversity  bonuses.”  Id.,  at  337  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted).    Only  a  “tip”  or  “plus”  is  constitutionally
tolerable, and only for a limited time.  Id., at 338–339, 341.
If  you  cannot  follow  all  these  twists  and  turns,  you  are
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the legal precedent surrounding the use of race in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

913

Stevens, J., dissenting

petitioners’ cause of action, and because I cannot agree with
the Court’s unprecedented use of inferences from regulatory
history and commentary as a basis for implied pre-emption,
I am convinced that Honda has not overcome the presump-
tion against pre-emption in this case.
I therefore respect-
fully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal jargon and references to case citations, indicating it is part of the actual legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

21

Opinion of the Court

*

*

*
Because  petitioner  did  not  use  the  patient’s  means  of
identification in relation to a predicate offense within the
meaning of §1028A(a)(1), the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal jargon and cites specific sections of law, indicating it is part of the actual legal content of a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

impound lot.1

Peake’s situation is far too common.2  Drivers in low-in-
come  communities  across  the  country  face  similar  vicious
cycles: A driver is assessed a fine she cannot immediately
pay; the balance balloons as late fees accrue; the local gov-
ernment seizes the driver’s vehicle, adding impounding and
storage fees to the growing debt; and the driver, now with-
out reliable transportation to and from work, finds it all but
impossible to repay her debt and recover her vehicle.  See
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Cu-
riae  11–16,  31–32.  Such  drivers  may  turn  to  Chapter  13
bankruptcy for a “fresh start.”  Marrama, 549 U. S., at 367
(internal quotation marks omitted).3  But without their ve-
hicles,  many  debtors  quickly  find  themselves  unable  to
make their Chapter 13 payments.  The cycle thus continues,
disproportionately  burdening  communities  of  color,  see
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Cu-
riae 17, and interfering not only with debtors’ ability to earn
an income and pay their creditors but also with their access
to childcare, groceries, medical appointments, and other ne-
cessities.

Although the Court today holds that §362(a)(3) does not

——————

1 Even though §362(a)(3) does not require turnover, whether and when
the City may sell impounded cars is an entirely different matter.  See,
e.g., In re Cowen, 849 F. 3d 943, 950 (CA10 2017) (“It’s not hard to come
up with examples of . . . ‘acts’ that ‘exercise control’ over, but do not ‘ob-
tain possession of,’ the estate’s property, e.g., a creditor in possession who
improperly sells property belonging to the estate”).

2 See, e.g., Ramos, Chicago Seized and Sold Nearly 50,000 Cars Over
Tickets  Since  2011,  Sticking  Owners  With  Debt,  WBEZ  News  (Jan.  7,
2019) (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov).

3 The 10-year period from 2007 to 2017, for instance, saw a tenfold in-
crease in the number of Chicagoans filing Chapter 13 bankruptcies that
involved  debt  to  the  City.    See  Sanchez  &  Kambhampati,  Driven  Into
Debt: How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists Into Bankruptcy,
ProPublica  Illinois  (Feb.  27,  2018)  (online  source  archived  at  www.su-
premecourt.gov).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the issue of vehicle impoundment and its impact on low-income communities, particularly in the context of bankruptcy proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

THOMAS, J., dissenting

But this lack of complete control did not render the mili-
tary  judges  principal  officers.    That  is  because  one  of  the
two missing powers resided, to a limited degree, in a differ-
ent  entity:  the  CAAF.  Ibid.   CAAF  could  not  “reevaluate
the facts” where “there [was] some competent evidence in
the record to establish each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.”  Id., at 665.  Still, it was “significant . . .
that the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals ha[d] no
power  to  render  a  final  decision  on  behalf  of  the  United
States  unless  permitted  to  do  so  by  other  Executive  offic-
ers.”  Ibid.  Having recounted the various means of super-
vision, the Court held that the military judges were inferior
officers.  Consistent  with  the  Constitution,  Congress  had
the power to vest the judges’ appointments in the Secretary
of Transportation.  Id., at 665–666.

The  Director  here  possesses  even  greater  functional
power over the Board than that possessed by the Judge Ad-
vocate General.  Like the Judge Advocate General, the Di-
rector  exercises  administrative  oversight  over  the  Board.
Because the Board is within the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, all of its powers and duties are ultimately held by the
Director.  35  U. S. C.  §3(a)(1).    He  “direct[s]”  and  “super-
vis[es]” the Office and “the issuance of patents.”  §3(a)(2)(A).
He may even “fix the rate of basic pay for the administrative
patent judges.”  §3(b)(6).  And ultimately, after the Board
has reached a decision in a specific case, the Director alone
has the power to take final action to cancel a patent claim
or confirm it. §318(b).

Also like the Judge Advocate General in Edmond, the Di-
rector prescribes uniform procedural rules and formulates
policies  and  procedures  for  Board  proceedings.    Among
other things, he has issued detailed regulations that govern
“Trial Practice and Procedure” before the Board.  37 CFR
pt. 42 (2020); see also ibid. (prescribing regulations govern-
ing,  inter  alia,  discovery,  oral  argument,  termination  of
trial, notice, privilege, filing fees, etc.); see also 35 U. S. C.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or court document, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It contains legal arguments, citations to legal precedents (e.g., "594 U. S. ____ (2021)"), and references to specific statutes (e.g., "35 U. S. C. §3(a)(1)").
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

stage, I would not so readily dismiss the allegation that an
executive  decision  disproportionately  harms  the  same  ra-
cial group that the President branded as less desirable mere
months earlier.

Finally, the plurality finds nothing untoward in the “spe-
cific sequence of events leading up to the challenged deci-
sion.”  Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 267 (1977).  I disagree.  As late
as  June  2017,  DHS  insisted  it  remained  committed  to
DACA,  even  while  rescinding  a  related  program,  the  De-
ferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Perma-
nent Residents.  App. 718–720.  But a mere three months
later,  DHS  terminated  DACA  without,  as  the  plurality
acknowledges, considering important aspects of the termi-
nation.  The abrupt change in position plausibly suggests
that  something  other than  questions  about  the  legality of
DACA  motivated  the  rescission  decision.  Accordingly,  it
raises the possibility of a “significant mismatch between the
decision . . . made and the rationale . . . provided.”  Depart-
ment  of  Commerce  v.  New  York,  588  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)
(slip op., at 26).  Only by bypassing context does the plural-
ity conclude otherwise.

*

*

*
The facts in respondents’ complaints create more than a
“sheer  possibility  that  a  defendant  has  acted  unlawfully.”
Iqbal, 556 U. S., at 678.  Whether they ultimately amount
to actionable discrimination should be determined only af-
ter  factual  development  on  remand.  Because  the  Court
prematurely  disposes  of  respondents’  equal  protection
claims  by  overlooking  the  strength  of  their  complaints,  I
join all but Part IV of the opinion and do not concur in the
corresponding part of the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the arguments surrounding the Department of Homeland Security's rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and its potential discriminatory implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
962

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 13, 2009

558 U. S.

No. 09–6390.  Rogers  v.  United States.  C. A.  3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  485.

No.  09–6393.  Tilghman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  269.

No.  09–6403.  James  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  960.

No.  09–6404.  Malone  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6405.  Wheeler  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  250.

No.  09–6407.  Urbano  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  1150.

No.  09–6409.  Blocker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  151.

No.  09–6415.  Styer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  573  F.  3d  151.

No.  09–6418.  Clark  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  992.

No. 09–6423.  Scott v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  822.

No.  09–6427.  Marguet-Pillado  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  1078.

No.  09–6432.  Boam  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  642.

No.  09–6438.  Thomas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  438.

No. 09–6444.  Dartez v. United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  308.

No.  09–6445.  Douglas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  635.

No.  09–6446.  Chatman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  555.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their disposition (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

purpose and legislative history, however, neither supports
the Government’s atextual position that Congress intended
the  stop-time  rule  to  apply  when  a  noncitizen  has  been
deprived  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  his  removal  pro-
ceedings.  By  the  Government’s  own  account,  Congress
enacted  the  stop-time  rule  to  prevent  noncitizens  from
exploiting  administrative  delays  to  “buy  time”  during
which  they  accumulate  periods  of  continuous  presence.
Id., at 37–38 (citing  H. R. Rep.  No. 104–469, pt. 1, p. 122
(1996)).  Requiring  the  Government  to  furnish  time-and-
place  information  in  a  notice  to  appear,  however,  is  en-
tirely consistent with that objective because, once a proper
notice to appear is served, the stop-time rule is triggered,
and  a  noncitizen  would  be  unable  to  manipulate  or  delay
removal proceedings to “buy time.”  At the end of the day,
given  the  clarity  of  the  plain  language,  we  “apply  the
statute as it is written.”  Burrage, 571 U. S., at 218.

IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals  for  the  First  Circuit  is  reversed,  and  the  case  is
remanded  for  further  proceedings  consistent  with  this
opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It presents legal arguments and a conclusion based on statutory interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

317

Stevens, J., dissenting

opinion).5
I may not be less ignorant of nude dancing than
I was nine years ago, but after many subsequent occasions
to think further about the needs of the First Amendment,
I have come to believe that a government must toe the mark
more carefully than I ﬁrst insisted.
I hope it is enlighten-
ment on my part, and acceptable even if a little late. See
Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U. S.
595, 600 (1949) (per curiam) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

II

The record before us now does not permit the conclusion
that Erie’s ordinance is reasonably designed to mitigate real
harms. This does not mean that the required showing can-
not be made, only that, on this record, Erie has not made it.
I would remand to give it the opportunity to do so.6 Accord-
ingly, although I join with the plurality in adopting the
O’Brien test, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s disposi-
tion of the case.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,

dissenting.

Far more important than the question whether nude danc-
ing is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment
are the dramatic changes in legal doctrine that the Court
endorses today. Until now, the “secondary effects” of com-
mercial enterprises featuring indecent entertainment have
justiﬁed only the regulation of their location. For the ﬁrst
time, the Court has now held that such effects may justify

5 See Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson, in 44 Great Books of the Western

World 82 (R. Hutchins & M. Adler eds. 1952).

6 This suggestion does not, of course, bar the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court from choosing simpler routes to disposition of the case if they exist.
Respondent mounted a federal overbreadth challenge to the ordinance; it
also asserted a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Either one
of these arguments, if successful, would obviate the need for the factual
development that is a prerequisite to O’Brien analysis.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and the author's perspective.  While it is part of a legal document, it is the actual content meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1650
_________________

CARLOS CONCEPCION, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

[June 27, 2022]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
There is a longstanding tradition in American law, dating
back to the dawn of the Republic, that a judge at sentencing
considers the whole person before him or her “as an individ-
ual.”  Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 113 (1996).  In
line with this history, federal courts today generally “exer-
cise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence
used” to craft appropriate sentences.  Williams v. New York,
337 U. S. 241, 246 (1949).  When a defendant appears for
sentencing, the sentencing court considers the defendant on
that  day,  not  on  the  date  of  his  offense  or  the  date  of  his
conviction.  Pepper  v.  United  States,  562  U. S.  476,  492
(2011).  Similarly, when a defendant’s sentence is set aside
on  appeal,  the  district  court  at  resentencing  can  (and  in
many  cases,  must)  consider  the  defendant’s  conduct  and
changes  in  the  Federal  Sentencing  Guidelines  since  the
original sentencing.  Ibid.

Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018 against that
backdrop.  The First Step Act authorizes district courts to
reduce the prison sentences of defendants convicted of cer-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the beginning of the opinion itself. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxi

Page
940
Hamilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
Hanley; Rudd v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920
Harakal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920
Harding v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962
Harmon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971
Harms v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Harold v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Harris v. Higgins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
. . . . . .
Harris County Appraisal Dist.; Deer Park School Dist. v.
947
Harrison; Eddy Potash, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Harshbarger; Lu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Harvey v. Grigas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harvey; Phillips v.
911
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hassan v. AT&T Corp.
917
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hatcher; Kell v.
957
Hatcher; Rayborn v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Hauck v. Mills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Hawkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950
Hayden, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953
Hayden v. Grayson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Hayes v. Western Weighing and Inspection Bureau . . . . . . . . . . .
971
Haynes v. Kepka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Haynes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
Hazlehurst; Collins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Head; Garner v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
964
Henderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
964
Henderson v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hennessey; Nary v.
Hernandez; Santa Ana v.
936
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,963
935
Herzog, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970
Herzog; Rawles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Hesterlee v. Goodwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934
Hetzel v. Prince William County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
Hickey v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Higgins; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
High Tech Medical Instrumentation; New Image Industries v.
953
. .
Higley; Sikora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,971
973
Hill, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
Hill v. French . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
Hilliard v. Kaiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
Hilt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Hinchliffe v. Prudential Home Mortgage Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901
Hindin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxxvii

Jefferson Parish; Theriot v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jefferson Univ.; Michelfelder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jemison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jennings; Payne v.
Jennings v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jennings v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jensen v. Lawseth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jensen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jerry M. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JF Hotel Management v. Flynn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jimenez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
J. L.; Florida v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Adams v.
Johnson v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Bisby v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Brattain v.
Johnson; Bybee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Carter v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Clayton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Coleman v.
Johnson; Collins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Delespine v.
Johnson; Doby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Dones v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Douglas v.
Johnson; Espinoza Rodriguez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. Essex County Hospital Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Fergason v.
Johnson; Ford v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Harriman v.
Johnson; Hartman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Hines v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. Jefferson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Joiner v.
Johnson; Joseph v.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1129
1095
1120
1051
1080
1009
1040
1131
1118
1054
1062
266
1096
1075
1020
1008
1124
1040
1117
1117
1039
1059,1146
1057,1083
1058
1058
1063,1128
1059
1022
1115
1041
1070
1099
1072
1083
1097
1059
1043
1060
1007
1027,1132
1089
1090,1111
1060
1105
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

Syllabus

court  held  that  the  obligation  to  explain  “millions  of  [decisions]  per
day”  is  “unduly  burdensome  and  likely  to  chill  platforms’  protected
speech.”  34 F. 4th, at 1230.

The  Fifth  Circuit  disagreed  across  the  board,  and  so  reversed  the
preliminary injunction of the Texas law.  In that court’s view, the plat-
forms’ content-moderation activities are “not speech” at all, and so do
not implicate the First Amendment.  49 F. 4th 439, 466, 494.  But even
if  those  activities  were  expressive,  the  court  determined  the  State
could regulate them to advance its interest in “protecting a diversity
of ideas.”  Id., at 482.  The court further held that the statute’s indi-
vidualized-explanation provisions would likely survive, even assuming
the platforms were engaged in speech.  It found no undue burden un-
der Zauderer because the platforms needed only to “scale up” a “com-
plaint-and-appeal process” they already used.  49 F. 4th, at 487.

Held: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because
neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Fifth Circuit conducted a proper
analysis  of  the  facial  First  Amendment  challenges  to  Florida  and
Texas laws regulating large internet platforms.  Pp. 9–31.

(a) NetChoice’s  decision  to  litigate  these  cases  as  facial  challenges
comes at a cost.  The Court has made facial challenges hard to win.  In
the First Amendment context, a plaintiff must show that “a substan-
tial number of [the law’s] applications are unconstitutional, judged in
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”  Americans for Pros-
perity Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U. S. 595, 615.

So far in these cases, no one has paid much attention to that issue.
Analysis and arguments below focused mainly on how the laws applied
to the content-moderation practices that giant social-media platforms
use  on  their  best-known  services  to  filter,  alter,  or  label  their  users’
posts, i.e., on how the laws applied to the likes of Facebook’s News Feed
and YouTube’s homepage.  They did not address the full range of ac-
tivities the laws cover, and measure the constitutional against the un-
constitutional applications.

The  proper  analysis  begins  with  an  assessment  of  the  state  laws’
scope.  The laws appear to apply beyond Facebook’s News Feed and its
ilk.  But it’s not clear to what extent, if at all, they affect social-media
giants’ other services, like direct messaging, or what they have to say
about other platforms and functions.  And before a court can do any-
thing else with these facial challenges, it must “determine what [the
law] covers.”  United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 770.

The next order of business is to decide which of the laws’ applications
violate the First Amendment, and to measure them against the rest.
For the content-moderation provisions, that means asking, as to every
covered  platform  or  function,  whether  there  is  an  intrusion  on  pro-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the case's background, the lower courts' rulings, and the Supreme Court's decision to vacate the judgments and remand the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
286

SOUTH  CAROLINA  v.  NORTH  CAROLINA

Opinion of Roberts, C. J.

be  allowed  to  intervene  because,  as  a  bistate  entity,  its  full
range  of  interests  cannot  be  represented  entirely  by  either
North or South Carolina.  See ante, at 268–271.

CRWSP’s  motion  arguably  presents  a  different  case  from
that  of  Duke  Energy,  one  not  deﬁnitively  resolved  by  this
Court  in  New  Jersey  v.  New  York.  At  the  end  of  the  day,
however, I  agree with the Special Master ’s premise—
CRWSP’s  position  is  really  no  different  from  Charlotte’s.
I  disagree  with  her  conclusion,  of  course,  because  I  agree
with  the  Court  that  Charlotte  should  not  be  allowed  to
intervene.

A bistate entity cannot be allowed to intervene merely be
cause  it  embodies  an  “intermingling  of  state  interests.”
Ante,  at  271,  n.  6.  The  same  would  be  true  of  any  bistate
entity,  or  indeed  any  corporation  or  individual  conducting
business in both States.  An exception for such cases would
certainly  swallow  the  New  Jersey  v.  New  York  rule.  Enti
ties  with  interests  in  both  States  must  seek  to  vindicate
those  interests  within  each  State.  Bistate  entities  are  not
States entitled to invoke our original jurisdiction, and should
not  be  effectively  accorded  an  automatic  right  to  intervene
as parties in cases within that jurisdiction.

With  respect  to  both  Duke  Energy  and  CRWSP,  the  ma
jority further relies on its conclusion that the States will not
“properly  represent”  the  interests  of  those  entities.  Ante,
at  270;  see  ante,  at  273.  If  by  that  the  Court  means  that
the States may adopt positions adverse to Duke Energy and
CRWSP, that surely cannot be enough.  The guiding princi
ple articulated in New Jersey v.  New York is “that the state,
when a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign inter
est, ‘must be deemed to represent all its citizens,’ ” and may
not be “judicially impeached on matters of policy by its own
subjects.”  345 U. S.,  at 372–373 (quoting  Kentucky v.  Indi
ana, 281 U. S., at 173–174).  This case involves a “matter of
sovereign interest”—the equitable apportionment of water—
and  the  States  therefore  “properly  represen[t]”  the  shared
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in a case involving water rights between South Carolina and North Carolina.  It discusses the issue of intervention by a bistate entity (CRWSP) and cites previous legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

11

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

today guarantees it will recur tomorrow.  These cases will
keep coming until the Court musters the fortitude to supply
an answer.  Respectfully, it should have done so today.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It's sequential and contains meaningful content, suggesting it's part of the actual legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>