<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

31

Opinion of the Court

but that those intrusted with it should be kept in depend
ence on the people.”  Id., No. 37, at 223.

The people’s ultimate sovereignty had been expressed by

John  Locke  in  1690,  a  near  century  before  the  Constitu
tion’s formation:

“[T]he Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act
for  certain  ends,  there  remains  still  in  the  People  a
Supream  Power  to  remove  or  alter  the  Legislative,
when  they  find  the  Legislative  act  contrary  to  the
trust reposed in them.  For all Power given with trust
for  the  attaining  an  end,  being  limited  by  that  end,
whenever  that  end  is  manifestly  neglected,  or  op
posed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the
Power  devolve  into  the  hands  of  those  that  gave  it,
who may place it anew where they shall think best for
their  safety  and  security.”  Two  Treatises  of  Govern
ment §149, p. 385 (P. Laslett ed. 1964).

Our Declaration of Independence, ¶2, drew from Locke in
stating: “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed.”  And
our  fundamental  instrument  of  government  derives  its
authority  from  “We  the  People.”  U. S.  Const.,  Preamble.
As  this  Court  stated,  quoting  Hamilton:  “[T]he  true  prin
ciple of a republic is, that the people should choose whom
they  please  to  govern  them.”  Powell  v.  McCormack,  395
U. S. 486, 540–541 (1969) (quoting 2 Debates on the Fed
eral Constitution 257 (J. Elliot ed. 1876)).  In this light, it
would  be  perverse  to  interpret  the  term  “Legislature”  in
the  Elections  Clause  so  as  to  exclude  lawmaking  by  the
people, particularly where such lawmaking is intended to
check  legislators’  ability  to  choose  the  district  lines  they
run  in,  thereby  advancing  the  prospect  that  Members  of
Congress  will  in  fact  be  “chosen  . . .  by  the  People  of  the
several  States,”  Art. I,  §2.    See  Cain,  121  Yale  L. J.,  at
1817.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the concept of popular sovereignty. It contains legal citations, quotes from historical documents, and analysis of constitutional principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
4

MOYLE v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

have changed their tune about the exact types of medical
care that fall in the gap between state and federal law, but
the fundamentals of this dispute remain the same.

II
Most importantly, as JUSTICE KAGAN observes, the con-
flict between the state and federal law—as they are actually
being interpreted and applied on the ground—is both sub-
stantial  and  significant.  Ante,  at  4–6.  It  is  a  clash  that
clearly  exists  despite  the  attempt  by  Idaho’s  counsel  to
muddy the waters concerning the scope of the State’s law.
The textual conflict is plain.  EMTALA requires stabiliz-
ing  treatment  if  a  patient  has  an acute  medical  condition
that is so severe “that the absence of immediate medical at-
tention could be reasonably expected to” either result in a
serious  health  risk,  or  seriously  threaten  bodily  functions
or  organs.  42  U. S. C.  §§1395dd(b)(1),  (e)(1)(A).    In  such
cases, EMTALA requires hospitals “to provide such medical
treatment of the condition as may be necessary to assure,
within reasonable medical probability, that no material de-
. . .  occur.”
terioration  of  the  condition  is  likely  to
§1395dd(e)(3)(A).  Idaho’s  broad  criminalization  of  abor-
tion—unless the treating physician believes that the abor-
tion  is  “necessary  to  prevent  the  [patient’s]  death,”  Idaho
Code  Ann.  §18–622(2)(a)(i)—conflicts  with  the  text  of
EMTALA.  Put simply, under federal law, a hospital must
provide an emergency abortion that is reasonably necessary
to  preserve  a  patient’s  health  within  the  meaning  of
EMTALA.  But, under Idaho law, a doctor cannot provide
this  care  (required  by  federal  law)  without  committing  a
criminal act.

From the beginning of this litigation, the United States
has emphasized the host of emergency medical conditions
that  require  stabilizing  abortions—even  when  the  proce-
dure is not necessarily life saving.  That list includes pre-
eclampsia,  preterm  premature  rupture  of  the  membranes
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the conflict between Idaho's abortion law and the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). It delves into the legal arguments and interpretations of both laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1016

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 9, 2009

558 U. S.

No. 09–6833.  Poindexter v. Zavares, Executive Director,
Colorado  Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  10th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  850.

No.  09–6849.  Doe  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  305.

No.  09–6853.  Old  Chief  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  571  F.  3d  898.

No.  09–6863.  Johnson  v.  Gaetz,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6866.  Rocha  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6868.  Saunders  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  829.

No.  09–6874.  Covington  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  1336.

No. 09–6875.  Salley v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  247.

No.  09–6876.  Russo  v.  Hulick,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6879.  Guibilo v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  126.

No.  09–6881.  DeFeo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  257.

No.  09–6882.  Coplen  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  1094.

No.  09–6885.  Andrews  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  227.

No.  09–6886.  Burke  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  571  F.  3d  1048.

No. 09–6887.  Bibb v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  364.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case summaries from a legal document, likely a list of cases decided by the Supreme Court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

15

Opinion of the Court

as President and Vice President, and the tie vote that threw
the next election into the House.  See supra, at 3.  Both had
occurred  because  the  Constitution’s  original  voting  proce-
dures gave electors two votes for President, rather than one
apiece  for  President  and  Vice  President.    Without  the  ca-
pacity to vote a party ticket for the two offices, the electors
had foundered, and could do so again.  If the predominant
party’s  electors  used  both  their  votes  on  their  party’s  two
candidates, they would create a tie (see 1800).  If they in-
tentionally cast fewer votes for the intended vice president,
they  risked  the  opposite  party’s  presidential  candidate
sneaking into the second position (see 1796).  By allowing
the  electors  to  vote  separately  for  the  two  offices,  the
Twelfth  Amendment  made  party-line  voting  safe.  The
Amendment thus advanced, rather than resisted, the prac-
tice that had arisen in the Nation’s first elections.  An elec-
tor would promise to legislators or citizens to vote for their
party’s presidential and vice presidential candidates—and
then follow through on that commitment.  Or as the Court
wrote in Ray, the new procedure allowed an elector to “vote
the regular party ticket” and thereby “carry out the desires
of  the  people”  who  had  sent  him  to  the  Electoral  College.
Ray, 343 U. S., at 224, n. 11.  No independent electors need
apply.

Courts  and  commentators  throughout  the  19th  century
recognized  the electors as merely  acting on other people’s
preferences.  Justice Story wrote that “the electors are now
chosen  wholly  with  reference  to  particular  candidates,”
having either “silently” or “publicly pledge[d]” how they will
vote.  3  Commentaries  on  the  Constitution  of  the  United
States §1457, p. 321 (1833).  “[N]othing is left to the elec-
tors,” he continued, “but to register [their] votes, which are
already pledged.”  Id., at 321–322.  Indeed, any “exercise of
an independent judgment would be treated[ ] as a political
usurpation,  dishonourable  to  the  individual,  and  a  fraud
upon  his  constituents.”    Id.,  at  322.    Similarly,  William
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. The presence of citations, legal terminology ("President and Vice President," "Electoral College"), and a formal tone all point to this conclusion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring

Casey—two of this Court’s “most notoriously incorrect” sub-
stantive  due  process  decisions,  Timbs,  586  U. S.,  at  ___
(opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 2)—after more than 63
million abortions have been performed, see National Right
to Life Committee, Abortion Statistics (Jan.  2022), https://
www.nrlc.org/uploads/factsheets/FS01AbortionintheUS.pdf.
The  harm  caused  by  this  Court’s  forays  into  substantive
due process remains immeasurable.

*

*

*
Because the Court properly applies our substantive due
process  precedents  to  reject  the  fabrication  of  a  constitu-
tional right to abortion, and because this case does not pre-
sent the opportunity to reject substantive due process en-
tirely, I join the Court’s opinion.  But, in future cases, we
should “follow the text of the Constitution, which sets forth
certain substantive rights that cannot be taken away, and
adds, beyond that, a right to due process when life, liberty,
or property is to be taken away.”  Carlton, 512 U. S., at 42
(opinion  of  Scalia,  J.).  Substantive  due  process  conflicts
with that textual command and has harmed our country in
many ways.  Accordingly, we should eliminate it from our
jurisprudence at the earliest opportunity.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It discusses the Court's decision on abortion rights and the legal doctrine of substantive due process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1139

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No.  08–10487.  Widner  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De

partment  of  Corrections,  ante,  p.  841;

No.  08–10510.  Harper  v.  Southern  Star  Concrete,  ante,

No.  08–10625.  GwanJun  Kim  v.  Department  of  Labor  et

p.  842;

al.,  ante,  p.  1023;

No.  08–10693.  Candia  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  848;
No.  08–10833.  Benham  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  856;
No.  08–11142.  Burke  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  873;
No.  09–120.  T.  G.  v.  Kentucky  Cabinet  for  Health  and

Family  Services,  ante,  p.  878;

No.  09–202.  Ward  v.  Trans  Union,  LLC,  ante,  p.  990;
No.  09–283.  Reeves v.  DSI  Security  Services et  al.,  ante,

p.  992;

No.  09–334.  Heimermann  v.  McCaughtry  et  al.,  ante,

p.  992;

No.  09–407.  Abreu-Velez  v.  Board  of  Regents  of  the

University  System  of  Georgia  et  al.,  ante,  p.  1025;

No.  09–413.  Husband  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  1012;
No.  09–433.  Wills  v.  Potter,  Postmaster  General,  ante,

p.  1025;

No.  09–5023.  Maxwell  v.  Arkansas,  ante,  p.  883;
No.  09–5043.  Hovind  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  992;
No. 09–5053.  Gruff v.  Wilson, Warden, et al., ante, p. 884;
No.  09–5068.  Hallford  v.  California,  ante,  p.  885;
No.  09–5089.  Gatewood  v.  Outlaw,  Warden,  ante,  p.  993;
No.  09–5187.  Hoffman  v.  Lincoln  General  Insurance

et  al.,  ante,  p.  891;

No.  09–5293.  Letizia  v.  New  York,  ante,  p.  896;
No.  09–5306.  Lachira  v.  Sutton,  ante,  p.  897;
No.  09–5308.  In  re  Johnson,  ante,  p.  812;
No.  09–5346.  Potter  v.  South  Coast  Plumbing  Systems,

Inc.,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  1026;

No.  09–5368.  Scott  v.  Hickman,  Warden,  ante,  p.  900;
No.  09–5475.  Cordell  v.  Sabol,  Warden,  et  al.,  ante,

p.  905;

No.  09–5493.  Rogers  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion,  ante,  p.  906;

No.  09–5545.  Gharb  v.  Unitronics  (1989)  (R”G)  Ltd.  et  al.,

ante,  p.  909;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, including case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions. It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Per Curiam

Catholic Diocese, 592 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6); see also
High Plains Harvest Church v. Polis, 592 U. S. ___ (2020).
  These  principles  dictated  the  outcome  in  this  case,  as
they did in Gateway City Church v. Newsom, 592 U. S. ___
(2021).  First, California treats some comparable secular ac-
tivities more favorably than at-home religious exercise, per-
mitting  hair  salons,  retail  stores,  personal  care  services,
movie theaters, private suites at sporting events and con-
certs, and indoor restaurants to bring together more than
three households at a time.  App. to Emergency Application
for Writ of Injunction 183–189.  Second, the Ninth Circuit
did  not conclude  that those  activities  pose  a  lesser  risk of
transmission  than  applicants’  proposed  religious  exercise
at home.  The Ninth Circuit erroneously rejected these com-
parators simply because this Court’s previous decisions in-
volved  public  buildings  as  opposed  to  private  buildings.
Tandon  v.  Newsom,  ___  F. 3d  ___,  ___,  ___–___,  2021  WL
1185157, *3, *5–*6 (CA9 2021).  Third, instead of requiring
the State to explain why it could not safely permit at-home
worshipers to gather in larger numbers while using precau-
tions  used  in  secular  activities,  the  Ninth  Circuit  errone-
ously  declared  that  such  measures  might  not  “translate
readily” to the home.  Id., at *8.  The State cannot “assume
the worst when people go to worship but assume the best
when people go to work.”  Roberts v. Neace, 958 F. 3d 409,
414 (CA6 2020) (per curiam).  And fourth, although Califor-
nia officials changed the challenged policy shortly after this
application  was  filed,  the  previous  restrictions  remain  in
place  until  April  15th, and officials  with  a  track  record  of
“moving the goalposts” retain authority to reinstate those
heightened restrictions at any time.  South Bay, 592 U. S.,
at ___ (statement of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 6).
  Applicants are likely to succeed on the merits of their free
exercise claim; they are irreparably harmed by the loss of
free exercise rights “for even minimal periods of time”; and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court decision. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the primary content meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

KAGAN, J., dissenting

coordinated method; a procedure.”  American Heritage Dic-
tionary 1768 (5th ed. 2018).  The majority complains that a
similar definition—cited to the Solicitor General’s brief but
originally from another dictionary—is just too darn broad.
Ante,  at  28;  see  Brief  for  United  States  31  (quoting  Web-
ster’s  New  International  Dictionary  2562  (2d  ed.  1959)).
“[A]lmost anything” capable of reducing emissions, the ma-
jority  says,  “could  constitute  such  a  ‘system’ ”  of  emission
reduction.  Ante, at 28.  But that is rather the point.  Con-
gress used an obviously broad word (though surrounding it
with constraints, see supra, at 7) to give EPA lots of latitude
in deciding how to set emissions limits.  And contra the ma-
jority, a broad term is not the same thing as a “vague” one.
Ante, at 18, 20, 28.  A broad term is comprehensive, exten-
sive, wide-ranging; a “vague” term is unclear, ambiguous,
hazy.  (Once again, dictionaries would tell the tale.)  So EPA
was quite right in stating in the Clean Power Plan that the
“[p]lain meaning” of the term “system” in Section 111 refers
to  “a  set  of  measures  that  work  together  to  reduce  emis-
sions.”  80 Fed. Reg. 64762.  Another of this Court’s opin-
ions, involving a matter other than the bogeyman of envi-
ronmental regulation, might have stopped there.

For  generation  shifting  fits  comfortably  within  the  con-
ventional  meaning  of  a  “system  of  emission  reduction.”
Consider one of the most common mechanisms of genera-
tion  shifting:  the  use  of  a  cap-and-trade  scheme.  Here  is
how  the  majority  describes  cap  and  trade:  “Under  such  a
scheme, sources that receive a reduction in their emissions
can sell a credit representing the value of that reduction to
others, who are able to count it toward their own applicable
emissions caps.”  Ante, at 8–9.  Does that sound like a “sys-
tem” to you?  It does to me too.  And it also has to this Court.
In the past, we have explained that “[t]his type of ‘cap-and-
trade’ system cuts costs while still reducing pollution to tar-
get levels.”  EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P., 572
U. S. 489, 503, n. 10 (2014) (emphasis added).  So what does
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of West Virginia v. EPA. It delves into the interpretation of the term "system" within the context of environmental regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., ET AL. v. ARKANSAS
TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 20–222.  Argued March 29, 2021—Decided June 21, 2021

Respondent shareholders (Plaintiffs) filed this securities-fraud class ac-
tion alleging that The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., and certain of its
executives (collectively, Goldman) violated securities laws and regula-
tions  prohibiting  material  misrepresentations  and  omissions  in  con-
nection  with  the  sale  of  securities.  15  U. S. C.  §78j(b);  17  CFR
§240.10b–5.  Plaintiffs allege that Goldman maintained an artificially
inflated stock price by repeatedly making false and misleading generic
statements about its ability to manage conflicts.  Under Plaintiffs’ in-
flation-maintenance  theory,  Goldman’s  alleged  misrepresentations
caused its stock price to remain inflated  until the market reacted to
the truth about Goldman’s practices—at which point Goldman’s stock
price dropped and Plaintiffs suffered losses.  Seeking to certify a class
of  Goldman  shareholders  harmed  by  reliance  on  Goldman’s  alleged
misrepresentations, Plaintiffs invoked the presumption, endorsed by
the Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224, that investors are
presumed to rely on the market price of a company’s security, which in
an efficient market will reflect all of the company’s public statements,
including misrepresentations.  The Basic presumption allows class-ac-
tion plaintiffs to prove reliance through evidence common to the class.
Goldman in turn sought to defeat class certification by rebutting the
Basic  presumption  through  evidence  that  its  alleged  misrepresenta-
tions had no impact on its stock price.  After an initial round of litiga-
tion which resulted in a remand from the Second Circuit, the District
Court certified the class based on Goldman’s failure to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that its alleged misrepresentations had
no price impact.  The Second Circuit authorized an appeal under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), and affirmed in a divided decision,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
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</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

judgment).1

But  even  accepting  Sosa’s  framework  does  not  end  the
matter.  As  the  Court  acknowledges,  there  is  a  strong
argument  that  “a  proper  application  of  Sosa  would  pre-
clude  courts  from  ever  recognizing  any  new  causes  of
action  under  the  ATS.”  Ante,  at  19.    I  believe  that  argu-
ment is correct.  For the reasons just described, separation
of  powers  considerations  ordinarily  require  us  to  defer  to
Congress  in  the  creation  of  new  forms  of  liability.    This
Court  hasn’t  yet  used  Sosa’s  assertion  of  discretionary
authority to recognize a new cause of action, and I cannot
imagine a sound reason, hundreds of years after the stat-
ute’s  passage,  to  start  now.    For  a  court  inclined  to  claim
the  discretion  to  enter  this  field,  it  is  a  discretion  best
exercised by staying out of it.

The  context  in  which  any  Sosa  discretion  would  be
exercised confirms the wisdom of restraint.  Sosa acknowl-
edged  that  any  decision  to  create  a  new  cause  of  action
would  “inevitably  [involve]  an  element  of  judgment  about
the practical consequences” that might follow.  Id., at 732–
733.  But  because  the  point  of  such  a  claim  would  be  to
vindicate  “a  norm  of  international  character,”  id.,  at  725,
those  “practical  consequences”  would  likely  involve  ques-
tions of foreign affairs and national security—matters that
implicate neither judicial expertise nor authority.  It is for
Congress  to  “define  and  punish  . . .  Offences  against  the
——————

1 The  dissent  claims  that  Congress’s  decision  to  give  federal  courts
“jurisdiction  over  claims  based  on  ‘the  law  of  nations,’ ”  necessarily
implies  the  authority  to  develop  that  law.    Post,  at  16.    That  does  not
follow.  Federal  courts  have  jurisdiction  over  all  kinds  of  cases—for
example, those arising under the law of torts or contracts.  Yet follow-
ing our decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), federal
courts  are  generally  no  longer  permitted  to  promulgate  new  federal
common  law  causes  of  action  in  those  areas.    Id.,  at  75.    I  can  see  no
reason  to  treat  the  law  of  nations  differently.    See  Sosa  v.  Alvarez-
Machain,  542  U. S.  692,  744–746  (2004)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  part
and concurring in judgment).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a dissenting opinion. It contains legal jargon and references to previous cases, indicating it is part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

380

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of Stevens, J.

had congruent concepts in mind.11
It is perfectly clear that
AEDPA codiﬁes Teague to the extent that Teague requires
federal habeas courts to deny relief that is contingent upon
a rule of law not clearly established at the time the state
conviction became ﬁnal.12

Teague’s core principles are therefore relevant to our con-
Justice Harlan recognized

struction of this requirement.

11 It is not unusual for Congress to codify earlier precedent in the habeas
context. Thus, for example, the exhaustion rule applied in Ex parte
Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1944) (per curiam), and the abuse of the writ doc-
trine applied in Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), were later
codiﬁed. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b) (1994 ed., Supp. III) (exhaustion re-
quirement); 28 U. S. C. § 2254, Rule 9(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts. A previous version of § 2254, as we
stated in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 111 (1985), “was an almost verba-
tim codiﬁcation of the standards delineated in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S.
293 (1963), for determining when a district court must hold an evidentiary
hearing before acting on a habeas petition.”

12 We are not persuaded by the argument that because Congress used
the words “clearly established law” and not “new rule,” it meant in this
section to codify an aspect of the doctrine of executive qualiﬁed immunity
rather than Teague’s antiretroactivity bar. Brief for Respondent 28–29,
n. 19. The warden refers us speciﬁcally to § 2244(b)(2)(A) and 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(e)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. III), in which the statute does in so many
words employ the “new rule” language familiar to Teague and its progeny.
Congress thus knew precisely the words to use if it had wished to codify
Teague per se. That it did not use those words in § 2254(d) is evidence,
the argument goes, that it had something else in mind entirely in amend-
ing that section. We think, quite the contrary, that the verbatim adoption
of the Teague language in these other sections bolsters our impression that
Congress had Teague—and not any unrelated area of our jurisprudence—
speciﬁcally in mind in amending the habeas statute. These provisions,
seen together, make it impossible to conclude that Congress was not fully
aware of, and interested in codifying into law, that aspect of this Court’s
habeas doctrine. We will not assume that in a single subsection of an
amendment entirely devoted to the law of habeas corpus, Congress made
the anomalous choice of reaching into the doctrinally distinct law of quali-
ﬁed immunity for a single phrase that just so happens to be the conceptual
twin of a dominant principle in habeas law of which Congress was fully
aware.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Williams v. Taylor*.  It discusses the application of the Teague doctrine to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

11

Opinion of the Court

number generator).  See Encino Motorcars, 584 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 8) (“[T]he distributive canon has the most force
when the statute allows for one-to-one matching”).  As just
explained,  the  consequent  “using  a  random  or  sequential
number generator” properly relates to both antecedents.

Duguid next turns to legislative purpose, but he merely
gestures  at  Congress’  “broad  privacy-protection  goals.”
Brief for Respondents 28 (emphasizing that Congress pro-
hibited calls made using an autodialer without “ ‘prior ex-
press  consent  of  the  called  party’ ”  (quoting  47  U. S. C.
§227(b)(1)(A))).  That  Congress  was  broadly  concerned
about intrusive telemarketing practices, however, does not
mean it adopted a broad autodialer definition.  Congress ex-
pressly found that the use of random or sequential number
generator technology caused unique problems for business,
emergency, and cellular lines.  See supra, at 2.  Unsurpris-
ingly, then, the autodialer definition Congress employed in-
cludes only devices that use such technology, and the auto-
dialer  prohibitions  target  calls  made  to  such  lines.  See
§227(b)(1)(A).8   The  narrow  statutory  design,  therefore,
does not support Duguid’s broad interpretation.

Duguid last warns that accepting Facebook’s interpreta-
tion  will  “unleash”  a  “torrent  of  robocalls.”  Brief  for  Re-
spondents 38 (quotation modified).  As Duguid sees it, the
thrust of congressional action since the TCPA’s enactment
has  been  to  restrict  nuisance  calls.    Because  technology
“adapt[s]  to  change,”  Duguid  argues,  the  TCPA  must  be
treated  as  an  “ ‘agile  tool.’ ”    Id.,  at  38,  41.  To  this  end,
Duguid asks this Court to focus not on whether a device has
the “senescent technology,” id., at 41, of random or sequen-
tial number generation but instead on whether it has the
“capacity to dial numbers without human intervention,” id.,
——————

8 By contrast, Congress did impose broader prohibitions elsewhere in
the TCPA.  See, e.g., 47 U. S. C. §§227(b)(1)(A) and (B) (prohibiting “ar-
tificial or prerecorded voice” calls, irrespective of the type of technology
used).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). It delves into legal arguments and cites relevant sections of the law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GOLAN v. HOLDER

Syllabus

ized by §514.  Pp. 23–32.

(a) The pathmarking Eldred decision is again instructive.  There,
the Court held that the CTEA’s enlargement of a copyright’s duration
did not offend the First Amendment’s freedom of expression guaran-
tee.  Recognizing that some restriction on expression is the inherent
and  intended  effect  of  every  grant  of  copyright,  the  Court  observed
that the Framers regarded copyright protection not simply as a limit
on the manner in which expressive works may be used, but also as an
“engine of free expression.”   537  U. S., at  219.  The  “traditional con-
tours”  of  copyright  protection,  i.e.,  the  “idea/expression  dichotomy”
and the “fair use” defense, moreover, serve as “built-in First Amend-
ment  accommodations.”    Ibid.   Given  the speech-protective  purposes
and safeguards embraced by copyright law, there was no call for the
heightened  review  sought  in  Eldred.  The  Court  reaches  the  same
conclusion here.  Section 514 leaves undisturbed the idea/expression
distinction  and  the  fair  use  defense.    Moreover,  Congress  adopted
measures  to  ease  the  transition  from  a  national  scheme  to  an  inter-
national copyright regime.  Pp. 23–26.

(b) Petitioners claim that First Amendment interests of a higher
order are at stake because they—unlike their Eldred counterparts—
enjoyed “vested rights” in works that had already entered the public
domain.  Their  contentions  depend  on  an  argument  already  consid-
ered  and  rejected,  namely,  that  the  Constitution  renders  the  public
domain  largely  untouchable  by  Congress.    Nothing  in  the  historical
record,  subsequent  congressional  practice,  or  this  Court’s  jurispru-
dence  warrants  exceptional  First  Amendment  solicitude  for  copy-
righted  works  that  were  once  in  the  public  domain.    Congress  has
several  times  adjusted  copyright  law  to  protect  new  categories  of
works as well as works previously in the public domain.  Section 514,
moreover,  does  not  impose  a  blanket  prohibition  on  public  access.
The question is whether would-be users of certain foreign works must
pay for their desired use of the author’s expression, or else limit their
exploitation  to  “fair  use”  of  those  works.    By  fully  implementing
Berne,  Congress  ensured  that  these  works,  like  domestic  and  most
other  foreign  works,  would  be  governed  by  the  same  legal  regime.
Section  514  simply  placed  foreign  works  in  the  position  they  would
have occupied if the current copyright regime had been in effect when
those works were created and first published.  Pp. 26–30.

609 F. 3d 1076, affirmed.

GINSBURG, J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  SCALIA,  KENNEDY,  THOMAS,  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,  joined.
BREYER, J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  ALITO, J.,  joined.    KA-
GAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of the Supreme Court. It is not the actual content of a book and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

25

BREYER, J., dissenting

pp.  8–9  (FEC,  Nov.  27,  2006)  (similar);  First  General
Counsel’s  Report,  In  re:  Nesbitt,  MUR  5445,  pp.  11–12
(FEC,  Feb.  2,  2005)  (similar);  First  General  Counsel’s
Report, In re: Keystone Corp., MUR 5019, pp. 23–29 (FEC,
Feb. 5, 2001) (similar); General Counsel’s Report #2,  In re:
Boston  Capital  Corp.,  MUR  4538,  pp.  17–18  (FEC,  Mar.
10,  2000)  (recommending  the  FEC  take  no  action  with
respect  to  the  §110.1(h)  issue).  Given  this  record  of  FEC
(in)activity,  my  reaction  to  the  plurality’s  reliance  upon
agency enforcement of this rule (as an adequate substitute
for  Congress’  aggregate  limits)  is  like  Oscar  Wilde’s  after
reading Dickens’ account of the death of Little Nell: “One
must have a heart of stone,” said Wilde, “to read [it] with
out laughing.”  Oxford Dictionary of Humorous Quotations
86 (N. Sherrin 2d ed. 2001).

I have found one contrary example—the single example
to which the plurality refers.  Ante, at 25 (citing Concilia
tion Agreement, In re Riley, MURs 4568, 4633, 4634, 4736
(FEC, Dec. 19, 2001)).  In that case, the FEC found prob
able cause to believe that three individual contributors to
several PACs had the requisite “knowledge” that the PACs
would use a “substantial portion” of their contributions to
support a candidate to whom they had already contributed—
Sam  Brownback,  a  candidate  for  the  Senate  (for  two  of
the  contributors),  and  Robert  Riley,  a  candidate  for  the
House (for the third).  The individuals had made donations
to  several  PACs  operating  as  a  network,  under  the  direc
tion of a single political consulting firm.  The two contribu
tors  to  Sam  Brownback  were  his  parents-in-law,  and  the
FEC  believed  they  might  be  using  the  PAC  network  to
channel  extra  support  to  him.    The  contributor  to  Robert
Riley was his son, and the FEC believed he might be doing
the same.  The facts in this case are unusual, for individ-
ual contributors are not typically relatives of the candidates
they  are  seeking  to  support,  and  ordinary  PACs  do  not
tend to work in coordination under the direction of a con
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and discusses campaign finance regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

dispositive.”  United  States  v.  Nixon,  418  U. S.  683,  706,
n. 16 (1974).  Insofar as the majority rails against the no-
tion that a “ ‘specific textual basis’ ” is required, ante, at 37
(quoting  Nixon  v.  Fitzgerald,  457  U. S.  731,  750,  n.  31
(1982)), it is attacking an argument that has not been made
here.  The omission in the text of the Constitution is worth
noting, however, for at least three reasons.

First,  the  Framers  clearly  knew  how  to  provide  for  im-
munity  from  prosecution.  They  did  provide  a  narrow  im-
munity for legislators in the Speech or Debate Clause.  See
Art. I, §6, cl. 1 (“Senators and Representatives . . . shall in
all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace,
be  privileged  from  Arrest  during  their  Attendance  at  the
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and re-
turning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in ei-
ther  House,  they  shall  not  be  questioned  in  any  other
Place”).  They did not extend the same or similar immunity
to Presidents.

Second, “some state constitutions at the time of the Fram-
ing  specifically  provided  ‘express  criminal  immunities’  to
sitting governors.”  Brief for Scholars of Constitutional Law
as  Amici  Curiae  4  (quoting  S.  Prakash,  Prosecuting  and
Punishing Our Presidents, 100 Tex. L. Rev. 55, 69 (2021)).
The Framers chose not to include similar language in the
Constitution  to  immunize  the  President.  If  the  Framers
“had  wanted  to  create  some  constitutional  privilege  to
shield  the  President  . . .  from  criminal  indictment,”  they
could have done so.  Memorandum from R. Rotunda to K.
Starr re: Indictability of the President 18 (May 13, 1998).
They did not.

Third, insofar as the Constitution does speak to this ques-
tion, it actually contemplates some form of criminal liability
for  former  Presidents.  The  majority  correctly  rejects
Trump’s argument that a former President cannot be pros-
ecuted unless he has been impeached by the House and con-
victed by the Senate for the same conduct.  See ante, at 32–
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the potential criminal liability of a former President.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  546 U. S. ____ (2006)

11

Opinion of the Court

B
Under the  more focused inquiry  required by  RFRA and
the compelling interest test, the Government’s mere invo-
cation  of  the  general  characteristics  of  Schedule  I  sub-
stances,  as  set  forth  in  the  Controlled  Substances  Act,
cannot carry the day.  It is true, of course, that Schedule I
substances  such  as  DMT  are  exceptionally  dangerous.
See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160, 162 (1991).
Nevertheless, there is no indication that Congress, in classi-
fying DMT, considered the harms posed by the particular
use  at  issue  here—the  circumscribed,  sacramental  use  of
hoasca  by  the  UDV.  The  question  of  the  harms  from  the
sacramental  use  of  hoasca  by  the  UDV  was  litigated  be-
low.  Before the District Court found that the Government
had  not  carried  its  burden  of  showing  a  compelling  inter-
est in preventing such harms, the court noted that it could
not  “ignore  that  the  legislative  branch  of  the  government
elected  to  place  materials  containing  DMT  on  Schedule  I
of the [Act], reflecting findings that substances containing
DMT  have  ‘a  high  potential  for  abuse,’  and  ‘no  currently
accepted  medical  use  in  treatment  in  the  United  States,’
and  that  ‘[t]here  is  a  lack  of  accepted  safety  for  use  of
[DMT]  under  medical  supervision.’ ”  282  F. Supp.  2d,  at
1254.  But  Congress’  determination  that  DMT  should  be
listed under Schedule I simply does not provide a categori-
cal answer that relieves the Government of the obligation
to shoulder its burden under RFRA.

This  conclusion  is  reinforced  by  the  Controlled  Sub-
stances Act itself.  The Act contains a provision authoriz-
ing  the  Attorney  General  to  “waive  the  requirement  for
registration  of  certain  manufacturers,  distributors,  or
dispensers  if  he  finds  it  consistent  with  the  public  health
and  safety.”  21  U. S. C.  §822(d).    The  fact  that  the  Act
itself contemplates that exempting certain people from its
requirements  would  be  “consistent  with  the  public  health
and  safety”  indicates  that  congressional  findings  with
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and its application to the use of DMT in a religious context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

BREYER, J., dissenting

uttered by its clearly identified affiliate is forced hypocrisy,
not free speech.  See ibid.

In sum, the Policy Requirement conditioned federal funds
on  an  unavoidable  and  irreversible  distortion  of  respond-
ents’  protected  speech.  We  therefore  held  in  AOSI I  that
the Policy Requirement “violates the First Amendment and
cannot be sustained.”  Id., at 221.

C
On remand from our decision, the District Court did what
district  courts  ought  to  do.  It  “tailor[ed]  ‘the  scope  of  the
remedy’  to  fit  ‘the  nature  and  extent  of  the  constitutional
violation’ ” that we identified in AOSI I.  Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U. S. 284, 294 (1976) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U. S. 717, 744 (1974)).

The  District  Court,  like  our  Court,  recognized  that  re-
spondents’ work—and with it their protected speech—has
a global reach.  But respondents, it turns out, use different
organizational  structures  to  deliver  services  in  different
places.  106 F. Supp. 3d 355, 360–361 (SDNY 2015).  Some-
times, particularly when foreign governments (or our own
government) require, respondents operate through legally
separate affiliates incorporated abroad.  Ibid.; see also, e.g.,
App. 368, 373–375.

In the District Court’s view, those corporate formalities
did  not  meaningfully  change  the  First  Amendment  calcu-
lus.  See  106  F. Supp.  3d,  at  360–361.   Respondents,  to-
gether with their affiliates, convey a clear, consistent mes-
sage  to  high-risk  populations,  government  officials,
healthcare  professionals,  prospective  employees,  and  pri-
vate donors across the globe.  See, e.g., App. 370–371, 391,
460–461.  They share the same name, logo, and branding—
all of which use identical colors, fonts, and imagery.  See,
e.g., id., at 445–455.  They adhere to shared values, work
towards common goals, and coordinate their collective mes-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

ALITO, J., dissenting

Court  conceded  only  that  “perhaps”  a  sitting  President
could  not  be  prosecuted  for  an  offense  punishable  by
“lengthy imprisonment” but that an offense requiring only
a short trial would be another matter.  395 F. Supp. 3d 283,
289, 311 (SDNY 2019).  And the Second Circuit was silent
on the question.

The  scenario  apparently  contemplated  by  the  District
Court  is  striking.  If  a  sitting  President  were  charged  in
New York County, would he be arrested and fingerprinted?
He  would  presumably  be  required  to  appear  for  arraign-
ment in criminal court, where the judge would set the con-
ditions for his release.  Could he be sent to Rikers Island or
be  required  to  post  bail?  Could  the  judge  impose  re-
strictions on his travel?  If the President were scheduled to
travel abroad—perhaps to attend a G–7 meeting—would he
have to get judicial approval?  If the President were charged
with a complicated offense requiring a long trial, would he
have to put his Presidential responsibilities aside for weeks
on end while sitting in a Manhattan courtroom?  While the
trial was in progress, would aides be able to approach him
and whisper in his ear about pressing matters?  Would he
be able to obtain a recess whenever he needed to speak with
an  aide  at  greater  length  or  attend  to  an  urgent  matter,
such as speaking with a foreign leader?  Could he effectively
carry out all his essential Presidential responsibilities after
the trial day ended and at the same time adequately confer
with his trial attorneys regarding his defense?  Or should
he be expected to give up the right to attend his own trial
and be tried in absentia?  And if he were convicted, could he
be imprisoned?  Would aides be installed in a nearby cell?

This entire imagined scene is farcical.  The “right of all

——————
argument in this Court, however, counsel for respondent stated: “We’re
mindful that as a state actor our office cannot investigate a president for
any official acts and that we cannot prosecute a president while in office.”
Tr. of Oral Arg. 54.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal argument, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in a Supreme Court case. It discusses hypothetical scenarios regarding the prosecution of a sitting President, raising concerns about the practicality and implications of such an event.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

3

Syllabus

to use race as an admissions factor “was made in good faith.”  It pre-
sumed that the school had acted in good faith and gave petitioner the
burden of rebutting that presumption.  It thus undertook the narrow-
tailoring  requirement  with  a  “degree  of  deference”  to  the  school.
These expressions of the controlling standard are at odds with Grut-
ter’s command that “all racial classifications imposed by government
‘must  be  analyzed  by  a reviewing  court  under  strict  scrutiny.’ ”    539
U. S.,  at  326.  Strict  scrutiny  does  not  permit  a  court  to  accept  a
school’s assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissi-
ble way without closely examining how the process works in practice,
yet  that  is  what  the  District  Court  and  Fifth  Circuit  did  here.    The
Court  vacates  the  Fifth  Circuit’s  judgment.    But  fairness  to  the  liti-
gants and the courts that heard the case requires that it be remanded
so that the admissions process can be considered and judged under a
correct analysis.  In determining whether summary judgment in the
University’s  favor  was  appropriate,  the  Fifth  Circuit  must  assess
whether  the  University  has  offered  sufficient  evidence  to  prove  that
its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational
benefits of diversity.  Pp. 8–13.

631 F. 3d 213, vacated and remanded.

KENNEDY, J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA, THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
SCALIA,  J.,  and  THOMAS,  J.,  filed  concurring  opinions.    GINSBURG,  J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.  KAGAN, J., took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the case's background, the court's decision, and the justices' participation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

384 U. S. 436 (1966), could be introduced to impeach that
defendant’s  credibility,  so  long  as  the  jury  was  instructed
not to consider them as evidence of his guilt.  In Walder v.
United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954), the Court affirmed the
use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment for impeachment when the trial court had “carefully
charged the jury” that it could not be considered evidence of
guilt.  Id., at 64.  In Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554 (1967),
the Court upheld the admission of evidence of the defend-
ant’s prior criminal convictions for the purpose of sentence
enhancement,  provided  that  the  jury  was  instructed  that
this evidence could not be used in determining guilt.
In
Watkins  v.  Sowders,  449  U. S.  341  (1981),  the  Court  pre-
sumed  that  a  jury  could  properly  evaluate  an  eyewitness
identification  “under  the  instructions  of  the  trial  judge.”
Id., at 347.  And in Tennessee v. Street, 471 U. S. 409 (1985),
the  Court  approved  the  admission  of  an  accomplice’s  in-
criminating  confession  given  the  “pointe[d]  instruct[ions]
[of] the trial court ‘not to consider the truthfulness of [the
confession] in any way whatsoever.’ ”  Id., at 414–415.

Most recently in Samia, we held that a limiting instruc-
tion was sufficient to defeat a Confrontation Clause claim.
In  that  homicide  case,  evidence  showed  that  Samia  had
traveled with his codefendant Stillwell to the Philippines to
commit a murder for hire.  Samia, 599 U. S., at 640.  The
trial  court  admitted  Stillwell’s  confession,  which,  as  re-
dacted, stated that he was in a van with some “other per-
son ” when that person shot the victim, but the court told
the jury that the confession could be considered only for the
purpose  of  determining  whether  Stillwell  himself  was
guilty.  Id., at 642.  Samia argued that admitting the con-
fession even with the limiting instruction would inevitably
prejudice  him  because  “other  evidence  and  statements  at
trial enabled the jury to immediately infer that the ‘other
person’  described  in  the  confession  was  Samia  him-
self.”  Ibid.  Nevertheless, we presumed that the jury was
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito. It cites previous Supreme Court cases to support its argument about the admissibility of certain evidence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

term or attempt self-induced abortions outside of the medi-
cal system.
  The  Court  should  have  put  an  end  to  this  madness
months ago, before S. B. 8 first went into effect.  It failed to
do so then, and it fails again today.  I concur in the Court’s
judgment that the petitioners’ suit may proceed against cer-
tain  executive  licensing  officials  who  retain  enforcement
authority  under  Texas law,  and  I trust  the District  Court
will  act  expeditiously  to  enter  much-needed  relief.    I  dis-
sent, however, from the Court’s dangerous departure from
its precedents, which establish that federal courts can and
should issue relief when a State enacts a law that chills the
exercise of a constitutional right and aims to evade judicial
review.  By foreclosing suit against state-court officials and
the  state  attorney  general,  the  Court  effectively  invites
other States to refine S. B. 8’s model for nullifying federal
rights.    The  Court  thus  betrays  not  only  the  citizens  of
Texas, but also our constitutional system of government.

I
  I have previously described the havoc S. B. 8’s unconsti-
tutional  scheme  has  wrought  for  Texas  women  seeking
abortion care and their medical providers.1  I do not repeat
those details here, but I briefly outline the law’s numerous
procedural  and  substantive  anomalies,  most  of  which  the
Court simply ignores.
  S.  B.  8  authorizes  any  person—who  need  not  have  any
relationship to the woman, doctor, or procedure at issue—
to  sue,  for  at  least  $10,000  in  damages,  anyone  who  per-
forms, induces, assists, or even intends to assist an abortion
in violation of Texas’ unconstitutional 6-week ban.  See Tex.
Health & Safety Code Ann. §171.208(a) (West Cum. Supp.

——————

1 See United States v. Texas, 595 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2021) (SOTOMAYOR,
J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part)  (slip  op.,  at  4–7);  Whole
Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 594 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2021) (SOTOMAYOR,
J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1–3).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring and dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding Texas's S.B. 8 abortion law and the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

19

Opinion of the Court

sending  such  notices.    §§20507(a)(4),  (c).    By  its  terms,
subsection  (c)  simply  provides  one  way—the  minimal
way—in  which  a  State  “may  meet  the  [NVRA’s]  require-
ment[s]”  for  change-of-residence  removals.    §20507(c)
(emphasis added).  As respondents agreed at argument, it
is not the only way.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 53.

C
  Nothing in the two dissents changes our analysis of the
statutory language.

1
  Despite its length and complexity, the principal dissent
sets out only two arguments.  See post, at 7–8 (opinion of
BREYER,  J.).    The  first  is  one  that  we  have  already  dis-
cussed at length, namely, that the Failure-to-Vote Clause
prohibits any use of the failure to vote except as permitted
by  subsections  (c)  and  (d).    We  have  explained  why  this
argument  is  insupportable,  supra,  at  12–16,  and  the  dis-
sent has no answer to any of the problems we identify.
  The dissent’s only other argument is that Ohio’s process
violates  §20507(a)(4),  which  requires  States  to  make  a
“reasonable effort” to remove the names of ineligible voters
from  the  rolls.    The  dissent  thinks  that  this  provision
authorizes the federal courts to go beyond the restrictions
set  out  in  subsections  (b),  (c),  and  (d)  and  to  strike  down
any  state  law  that  does  not  meet  their  own  standard  of
“reasonableness.”    But  see  Brief  for  United  States  as
Amicus  Curiae  28–29.    The  dissent  contends  that  Ohio’s
system  violates  this  supposed  “reasonableness”  require-
ment primarily because it relies on the failure to mail back
the  postcard  sent to those who  have  not  engaged  in  voter
activity for  two  years.   Based on  its own  cobbled-together
statistics, post, at 12–13, and a feature of human nature of
which  the  dissent  has  apparently  taken  judicial  notice
(i.e., “the human tendency not to send back cards received
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the majority opinion responds to the dissenting opinions.  The language is formal and legalistic, discussing specific sections of a law (the NVRA) and the arguments made by the dissenting justices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

995

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

No.  09–6102.  Kendrick  v.  Frank  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  34.

No.  09–6105.  Borthwell  v.  Jackson,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6111.  Smith  v.  Ozmint,  Director,  South  Carolina
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6118.  Rone  v.  Michigan.  Sup.  Ct.  Mich.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  483  Mich.  1018,  765  N. W.  2d  313.

No.  09–6127.  Hawthorne  v.  Caruso,  Director,  Michigan
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6130.  Gumbs  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General,  et  al.

C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6132.  Fuentes  Rios  v.  Cate,  Secretary,  Califor
nia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6134.  Carroll  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  574  F.  3d  1354.

No.  09–6135.  Cain  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia  Depart
ment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  486.

No.  09–6144.  Pedroso  v.  Louisiana.  Sup.  Ct.  La.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  993  So.  2d  1220.

No.  09–6146.  Abraham  v.  Heinemann.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  4.

No.  09–6147.  Amason  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6148.  Scott v.  Florida.  Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  6  So.  3d  622.

No. 09–6149.  Lopez v.  McKune, Warden, et al.  C. A. 10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  695.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal publication. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the orders issued.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

21

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of ALITO, J.

tent;  that  is,  the  law  permitted  the  employer  to  assist
union  speech  on  matters  relating  to  collective  bargaining
but  made  it  harder  for  the  union  to  collect  money  to  sup-
port its election activities.  Id., at 188.  Upholding this law,
we  characterized  it  as  imposing  a  “modest  limitation”  on
an “extraordinary benefit,” namely, taking money from the
wages  of  non-union  members  and  turning  it  over  to  the
union  free  of  charge.    Id.,  at  184.    Refusing  to  confer  an
even  greater  benefit,  we  held,  did  not  upset  the  market-
place of ideas and did not abridge the union’s free speech
rights.  Id., at 189–190.

Ysursa  v.  Pocatello  Ed.  Assn.,  555  U. S.  353  (2009),  is
similar.  There,  we  considered  an  Idaho  law  that  allowed
public  employees  to  elect  to  have  union  dues  deducted
from  their  wages  but  did  not  allow  such  a  deduction  for
money  remitted  to  the  union’s  political  action  committee.
Id.,  at  355.    We  reasoned  that  the  “the  government  . . .
[was]  not  required  to  assist  others  in  funding  the  expres-
sion  of  particular  ideas.”  Id.,  at  358;  see  also  id.,  at  355
(“The First Amendment . . . does not confer an affirmative
right  to  use  government  payroll  mechanisms  for  the  pur-
pose of obtaining funds for expression”).

Davenport  and  Ysursa  are  akin  to  our  subsidy  cases.
Although  the  laws  at  issue  in  Davenport  and  Ysursa  did
not provide cash subsidies to the unions, they conferred a
very  valuable  benefit—the  right  to  negotiate  a  collective-
bargaining  agreement  under  which  non-members  would
be obligated to pay an agency fee that the public employer
would collect and turn over to the union free of charge.  As
in  the  cash  subsidy  cases,  the  laws  conferred  this  benefit
because  it  was  thought  that  this  arrangement  served
important government interests.  See Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 224–226 (1977).  But the challenged
laws  did  not  go  further  and  provide  convenient  collection
mechanisms for money to be used in political activities.  In
essence,  the  Washington  and  Idaho  lawmakers  chose  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing previous cases and discussing legal precedents. It's likely part of a larger legal document and contains important information for understanding a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

LIU v. SEC

Syllabus

remedy into a punitive sanction, courts restricted it to an individual
wrongdoer’s net profits to be awarded for victims.  Pp. 5–14.

(1) Whether  it  is  called  restitution,  an  accounting,  or  disgorge-
ment, the equitable remedy that deprives wrongdoers of their net prof-
its from unlawful activity reflects both the foundational principle that
“it would be inequitable that [a wrongdoer] should make a profit out of
his own wrong,” Root v. Railway Co., 105 U. S. 189, 207, and the coun-
tervailing equitable principle that the wrongdoer should not be pun-
ished  by  “pay[ing]  more  than  a  fair  compensation  to  the  person
wronged,” Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136, 145–146.  The remedy
has been a mainstay of equity courts, and is not limited to cases in-
volving a breach of trust or fiduciary duty, see Root, 105 U. S., at 214.
Pp. 6–9.

(2) To  avoid  transforming  a profits  award  into  a  penalty,  equity
courts restricted the remedy in various ways.  A constructive trust was
often imposed on wrongful gains for wronged victims.  See, e.g., Bur-
dell v. Denig, 92 U. S. 716, 720.  Courts also generally awarded profits-
based remedies against individuals or partners engaged in concerted
wrongdoing,  not  against  multiple  wrongdoers  under  a  joint-and-sev-
eral liability theory.  See, e.g., Ambler v. Whipple, 20 Wall. 546, 559.
Finally, courts limited awards to the net profits from wrongdoing after
deducting  legitimate  expenses.    See,  e.g.,  Rubber  Co.  v.  Goodyear,  9
Wall. 788, 804.  Pp. 9–12.

(3) Congress incorporated these longstanding equitable principles
into §78u(d)(5), but courts have occasionally awarded disgorgement in
ways  that  test  the  bounds  of  equity  practice.    Petitioners  claim  that
disgorgement  is  necessarily  a  penalty  under  Kokesh,  and  thus  not
available at equity.  But Kokesh expressly declined to reach that ques-
tion.  The  Government  contends  that  the  SEC’s  interpretation  has
Congress’ tacit support.  But Congress does not enlarge the breadth of
an equitable, profit-based remedy simply by using the term “disgorge-
ment” in various statutes.  Pp. 12–14.

(b) Petitioners briefly claim that their disgorgement award crosses
the bounds of traditional equity practice by failing to return funds to
victims,  imposing  joint-and-several  liability,  and  declining  to  deduct
business expenses from the award.  Because the parties did not fully
brief these narrower questions, the Court does not decide them here.
But certain principles may guide the lower courts’ assessment of these
arguments on remand.  Pp. 14–20.

(1) Section 78u(d)(5) provides limited guidance as to whether the
practice of depositing a defendant’s gains with the Treasury satisfies
its command that any remedy be “appropriate or necessary for the ben-
efit of investors,” and the equitable nature of the profits remedy gen-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the arguments and issues in a case. It is not the main body of the text and is more focused on legal analysis than narrative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 156 (1998)

183

Breyer, J., dissenting

v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 75–76
(1913). This principle suggests that the government must
pay the current value of condemned land, not the added
value that a highway it builds on the property itself creates.
It also suggests that condemnation of, say, riparian rights
in order to build a dam must be followed by compensation
for these rights, not for the value of the electricity that the
dam would later produce. Cf. id., at 76; Twin City Power
Co., supra, at 226–228; United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 423–424, 427 (1940).
Indeed, no
one would say that such electricity was, for Takings Clause
purposes, the owner’s “private property,” where, as here, in
the absence of the lawful government “taking,” there would
have been no such property.

These legal analogies more directly address the key as-
sumption raised by the question presented, namely, that “ab-
sent the IOLTA program,” no “interest” could have been
earned.
I consequently believe that the interest earned is
not the client’s “private property.”

I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis.  While it is part of a legal document, it is the actual content meant to be read and understood, not a table of contents, copyright information, or other non-sequential text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D.  C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–1449
_________________

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC., DBA CALPORTLAND,
PETITIONER v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 174

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
WASHINGTON

[June 1, 2023]

 JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
Glacier  Northwest,  a  concrete  company,  depends  on  its
truck  drivers  to  deliver  concrete  to  customers  in  a  timely
manner.  But when relations between Glacier and its driv-
ers soured, the drivers went on strike.  Their labor union
allegedly  designed  the  strike  with  the  intent  to  sabotage
Glacier’s  property.  Although  Glacier  managed  to  avoid
damage to its delivery trucks by deploying emergency ma-
neuvers, the concrete that it had already produced that day
went to waste.  Glacier sued the union in state court for de-
stroying its property.  But the company did not get very far:
The  state  court  dismissed  Glacier’s  tort  claims  on  the
ground  that  they  were  preempted  by  the  National  Labor
Relations Act.  We reverse.

I
A
Enacted  in  1935,  the  National  Labor  Relations  Act
(NLRA) “encourag[es] the practice and procedure of collec-
tive bargaining” between labor and management to resolve
“industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case information, and the introduction to the Court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

17–18.  For its part, Axon has endured a similarly tortuous
path.  Over the course of three years, the district court dis-
missed its case, 452 F. Supp.  3d 882 (Ariz. 2020), and the
court of appeals affirmed, 986 F. 3d 1173 (CA9 2021), only
to have this Court reverse that judgment today.

This  is  what  a  win  looks  like  under  Thunder  Basin.
When you replace clear jurisdictional rules with a jumble of
factors, the room for disagreement grows.  The incentive to
litigate increases.  Years and fortunes are lost just figuring
out where a case belongs.  Ms. Cochran and Axon have al-
ready endured multi-year odysseys through the entire fed-
eral judicial system—and no judge yet has breathed a word
about the merits of their claims.  Nor can I fault the district
court  in  Ms.  Cochran’s  case,  or  all  of  the  lower  courts  in
Axon’s  case,  for  thinking  the  Thunder  Basin  factors  re-
quired dismissal.  When we give our lower-court colleagues
such  confused  instructions,  we  guarantee  different  courts
will regularly reach different outcomes on the same facts.
Maybe even worse is what Thunder Basin means for oth-
ers.  Not many possess the perseverance of Ms. Cochran and
Axon.  The cost, time, and uncertainty associated with liti-
gating  a  raft  of  opaque  jurisdictional  factors  will  deter
many people from even trying to reach the court of law to
which they are entitled.  Nor is the loss of a day in court in
favor of one before an agency a small thing.  Agencies like
the  SEC  and  FTC  combine  the  functions  of  investigator,
prosecutor, and judge under one roof.  They employ relaxed
rules of procedure and evidence—rules they make for them-
selves.    The  numbers  reveal  just  how  tilted  this  game  is.
From 2010 to 2015, the SEC won 90% of its contested in-
house proceedings compared to 69% of the cases it brought
in federal court.  See G. Mark, Response: SEC Enforcement
Discretion, 94 Texas L. Rev. 261, 262 (2016).  Meanwhile,
some say the FTC has not lost an in-house proceeding in 25
years.  See Brief for Petitioner in No. 21–86, p. 47.  But see
Brief for American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the case of Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC and critiques the legal precedent set by Thunder Basin.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
816

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–1216.  Barry  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.  C.  A.
11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.
631.

No.  08–1232.  Carlyle  Fortran  Trust  v.  nVIDIA  Corp.
et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  302
Fed.  Appx.  514.

No.  08–1238.  Stoyanov  v.  Mabus,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,
et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305
Fed.  Appx.  945.

No.  08–1245.  National  Taxpayers  Union  v.  Social  Secu
rity  Administration,  Office  of  the  Inspector  General.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  302  Fed.
Appx.  115.

No.  08–1266.  Guerra  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  283.

No.  08–1280.  Mikos  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  539  F.  3d  706.

No.  08–1283.  Choose  Life  Illinois,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  White,
Secretary  of  State  of  Illinois.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  547  F.  3d  853.

No.  08–1284.  DBC  v.  Patent  and  Trademark  Office,
Board  of  Patent  Appeals  and  Interferences.  C.  A.  Fed.
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  545  F.  3d  1373.

No. 08–1285.  Finker et al. v.  Weber.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  554  F.  3d  1379.

No. 08–1287.  Family Dollar Stores, Inc. v.  Morgan et al.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  551  F.  3d
1233.

No. 08–1291.  Tucker et al. v.  Hardin County, Tennessee,
et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  539
F.  3d  526.

No.  08–1295.  Cheek  et  al.  v.  City  of  Edwardsville,  Kan
sas, et al.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
324  Fed.  Appx.  699.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and relevant court information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>