<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

GORSUCH, J., concurring

What  is  OSHA’s  reply?

available for more than a year.  Over that span, Congress
has  adopted  several  major  pieces  of  legislation  aimed  at
combating COVID–19.  E.g., American Rescue Plan Act of
2021, Pub. L. 117–2, 135 Stat. 4.  But Congress has chosen
not to afford OSHA—or any federal agency—the authority
to issue a vaccine mandate.  Indeed, a majority of the Sen-
ate even voted to disapprove OSHA’s regulation.  See S.J.
Res. 29, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021).  It seems, too, that
the agency pursued its regulatory initiative only as a legis-
lative “ ‘work-around.’ ”  BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17
F. 4th 604, 612 (CA5 2021).  Far less consequential agency
rules have run afoul of the major questions doctrine.  E.g.,
MCI  Telecommunications  Corp.  v.  American  Telephone  &
Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 231 (1994) (eliminating rate-
filing requirement).  It is hard to see how this one does not.
It  directs  us  to  29  U. S. C.
§ 655(c)(1).  In that statutory subsection, Congress author-
ized  OSHA  to  issue  “emergency”  regulations  upon  deter-
mining that “employees are exposed to grave danger from
exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or
physically harmful” and “that such emergency standard[s]
[are] necessary to protect employees from such danger[s].”
According to the agency, this provision supplies it with “al-
most  unlimited  discretion ”  to  mandate  new  nationwide
rules in response to the pandemic so long as those rules are
“ reasonably  related ”  to  workplace  safety.    86  Fed.  Reg.
61402, 61405 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The  Court  rightly  applies  the  major  questions  doctrine
and concludes that this lone statutory subsection does not
clearly authorize OSHA’s mandate.  See ante, at 5–6.  Sec-
tion 655(c)(1) was not adopted in response to the pandemic,
but some 50 years ago at the time of OSHA’s creation.  Since
then,  OSHA  has  relied  on  it  to  issue  only  comparatively
modest rules addressing dangers uniquely prevalent inside
the workplace, like asbestos and rare chemicals.  See In re:
MCP No. 165, 20 F. 4th 264, 276 (CA6 2021) (Sutton, C. J.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in a case regarding OSHA's vaccine mandate. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of statutes, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
252

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

“well-settled,”  Catholic  Social  Services,  Inc.,  509  U. S.,  at
63–64 (quoting McNary, 498 U. S., at 496), the Court assumes
that  “Congress  legislates  with  knowledge  of ”  the  presump
tion,  id.,  at  496.  It  therefore  takes  “clear  and  convincing
evidence” to dislodge the presumption.  Catholic  Social
Services,  Inc.,  509  U. S.,  at  64  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  There is no such evidence here.

Finally,  we  stress  a  paramount  factor  in  the  decision  we
render today.  By deﬁning the various jurisdictional bars by
reference to other provisions in the INA itself, Congress en
sured  that  it,  and  only  it,  would  limit  the  federal  courts’  ju
risdiction.  To  read  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  to  apply  to  matters
where  discretion  is  conferred  on  the  Board  by  regulation,
rather  than  on  the  Attorney  General  by  statute,  would  ig
nore that congressional design.  If the Seventh Circuit’s con
struction of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) were to prevail, the Executive
would  have  a  free  hand  to  shelter  its  own  decisions  from
abuse-of-discretion  appellate court  review  simply by  issuing
a regulation declaring those decisions “discretionary.”  Such
an extraordinary delegation of authority cannot be extracted
from the statute Congress enacted.

V

A statute affecting federal jurisdiction “must be construed
both  with  precision  and  with  ﬁdelity  to  the  terms  by  which
Congress  has  expressed  its  wishes.”  Cheng  Fan  Kwok  v.
INS, 392 U. S. 206, 212 (1968).  As we have noted, see supra,
at  249,  and  as  amicus  emphasizes,  “many  provisions  of
IIRIRA  [we]re  aimed  at  protecting  [from  court  review  ex
ercises of] the Executive’s discretion.”  American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S., at 486 (emphasis de
leted).  But “no law pursues its purpose at all costs, and . . .
the  textual  limitations  upon  a  law’s  scope  are  no  less  a  part
of  its  ‘purpose’  than  its  substantive  authorizations.”  Ra
panos  v.  United  States,  547  U. S.  715,  752  (2006)  (plurality
opinion).  While  Congress  pared  back  judicial  review  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and discusses statutory interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxxxiii

Page
973
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  845,1101
851
991
866
1151
826
973
917
1142
1056
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  233,810

928

822

1079

945

1089

823

997

1012

958

Kopy v. Ryan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kor v. Felker
Koth v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
KPMG LLP; Arnold v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kramer v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kramer; Van Hoosen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kriger v. Bowen Property Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kristiadi v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Krstic v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Krzywkowski v. Bobby  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kucana v. Holder
Kuehne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kuhn v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives . . .
Kuperman v. Gerry
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kurji v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kurpinsky; Hupp v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kyung Suh Kim v. Synod of So. Cal. and Haw.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
L.; S. B.v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Laber v. Geren  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Labibe v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Labor Union.  See name of trade.

Lacen-Berrios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  809,1006

973

Lacey v. Montana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lacey v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948

Lachira v. Sutton  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  897,1139

Lacue v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928

998

LaFavors v. McNeil
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903

Laﬂer; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

Laﬂer; Isaac v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Lafon; Barr v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

LaForge v. Iowa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

Lagaite v. Livingston  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Laidlaw Transit, Inc.; Shropshire v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924

Lam v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

LaMarca v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Lamarque; Arnold v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

Lamarque; Barrett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887

Lamarque; Godbouldt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Lambert v. Michigan
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
977

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lamere v. United States
882

Landers v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Landin v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1017

Laney; Ware v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  840,1064
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI

BREYER, J., dissenting

pointed  out,  can  “li[e]  about  like  a  loaded  weapon”  await-
ing  discharge  in  another  case.  Korematsu,  supra,  at  246
(dissenting opinion).

A  damages  action,  however,  is  typically  brought  after
the emergency is over, after emotions have cooled, and at a
time when more factual information is available.  In such
circumstances,  courts  have  more  time  to  exercise  such
judicial  virtues  as  calm  reflection  and  dispassionate  ap-
plication  of  the  law  to  the  facts.    We  have  applied  the
Constitution  to  actions  taken  during  periods  of  war  and
national-security  emergency.  See  Boumediene,  553  U. S.,
at 732–733; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507; cf. Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952).  I
should  think  that  the  wisdom  of  permitting  courts  to
consider Bivens actions, later granting monetary  compen-
sation  to  those  wronged  at  the  time,  would  follow
a fortiori.

As is well known, Lord Atkins, a British judge, wrote in
the  midst  of  World  War  II  that  “amid  the  clash  of  arms,
the  laws  are  not  silent.    They  may  be  changed,  but  they
speak the same language in war as in peace.”  Liversidge
v. Anderson, [1942] A. C. 206 (H. L. 1941) 244.  The Court,
in my view, should say the same of this Bivens action.

With respect, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, likely from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

for example, filing a petition for rehearing en banc or seek-
ing a writ of certiorari.  Attorney General Cameron and the
lawyers from his office who had appeared as counsel for the
secretary  moved  to  withdraw,  and  the  attorney  general
moved to intervene as a party in his own right.  This was
nearly five months after the attorney general reappeared as
counsel for the secretary and over two years after the Dis-
trict Court entered the stipulated order of dismissal.  The
attorney general also tendered a petition for rehearing en
banc.
  The  Court  of  Appeals  denied  the  motion  and  dismissed
the petition for rehearing en banc.  It observed, among other
things,  that  the  attorney  general’s  motion  to  intervene
came “years into [the case’s] progress,” after both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals had issued decisions.
EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 831
Fed. Appx. 748, 750 (CA6 2020).  It explained that having
been “named . . . as a defendant” in the complaint and hav-
ing “stipulated [to his own] dismissal,” the attorney general
was unquestionably put on notice of the case long before the
Court  of  Appeals  issued  its  decision.    Id.,  at  751.    In  the
Court of Appeals’ view, allowing the attorney general to in-
tervene at this late hour would give would-be intervenors
“every  incentive  to  sit  out  litigation  until  [a  court  of  ap-
peals]  issue[s]  a  decision  contrary  to  their  preferences,
whereupon  they  can  spring  to  action.”    Id.,  at  750.    The
Court  of  Appeals  clarified  that  it  was  “not  reach[ing]  the
issue of whether Attorney General Cameron has a substan-
tial  legal  interest  in  the  subject  matter  of  this  case”  nor
“question[ing]  whether  states’  attorneys  general  may  ap-
propriately  intervene  to  defend  their  states’  laws,”  but
merely addressing the appropriateness of the attorney gen-
eral’s intervention under the circumstances of “this partic-
ular case.”  Id., at 752, n. 4.
  This Court granted the attorney general’s petition for cer-
tiorari, and now reverses.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center. It discusses the lower court's decision regarding the Attorney General's attempt to intervene in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21A8
_________________

PANTELIS CHRYSAFIS, ET AL. v.
LAWRENCE K. MARKS

ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

[August 12, 2021]

  The application for injunctive relief presented to JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR  and  by  her  referred  to  the  Court  is  granted
pending  disposition  of  the  appeal  in  the  United  States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and disposition of
the  petition  for  a  writ  of  certiorari,  if  such  writ  is  timely
sought.   Should  the  petition  for  a writ  of  certiorari  be  de-
nied, this order shall terminate automatically.  In the event
the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall
terminate  upon  the  sending  down  of  the  judgment  of  this
Court.
  This order enjoins the enforcement of only Part A of the
COVID  Emergency  Eviction  and  Foreclosure  Prevention
Act (CEEFPA).  2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 381.  That is the only
relief  applicants  seek.    See  Case  No.  2:21-cv-02516,  ECF
No. 1 at 9; Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction 7,
40.   If  a tenant  self-certifies financial  hardship,  Part  A  of
CEEFPA  generally  precludes  a  landlord  from  contesting
that certification and denies the landlord a hearing.  This
scheme violates the Court’s longstanding teaching that or-
dinarily “no man can be a judge in his own case” consistent
with the Due Process Clause.  In re Murchison, 349 U. S.
133,  136  (1955);  see  United  States  v.  James  Daniel  Good
Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 53 (1993) (due process generally
requires a hearing).
  This order does not enjoin the enforcement of the Tenant
Safe Harbor Act (TSHA), which applicants do not challenge.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

Opinion of the Court

branches of government over records of intense political in-
terest  for  all  involved.  Rumely,  345  U. S.,  at  44  (quoting
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 37 (1922) (Taft, C. J.)).
The interbranch conflict here does not vanish simply be-
cause  the  subpoenas  seek  personal  papers  or  because  the
President sued in his personal capacity.  The President is
the  only  person  who  alone  composes  a  branch  of  govern-
ment.  As a result, there is not always a clear line between
his personal and official affairs.  “The interest of the man”
is  often  “connected  with  the  constitutional  rights  of  the
place.”  The Federalist No. 51, at 349.  Given the close con-
nection  between  the  Office  of  the  President  and  its  occu-
pant, congressional demands for the President’s papers can
implicate the relationship between the branches regardless
whether those papers are personal or official.  Either way,
a demand may aim to harass the President or render him
“complaisan[t] to the humors of the Legislature.”  Id., No.
71, at 483.  In fact, a subpoena for personal papers may pose
a heightened risk of such impermissible purposes, precisely
because  of  the  documents’  personal  nature  and  their  less
evident connection to a legislative task.  No one can say that
the controversy here is less significant to the relationship
between the branches simply because it involves personal
papers.  Quite the opposite.  That appears to be what makes
the matter of such great consequence to the President and
Congress.

In addition, separation of powers concerns are no less pal-
pable  here  simply  because  the  subpoenas  were  issued  to
third  parties.    Congressional  demands  for  the  President’s
information  present  an  interbranch  conflict  no  matter
where  the  information  is  held—it  is,  after  all,  the  Presi-
dent’s information.  Were it otherwise, Congress could side-
step constitutional requirements any time a President’s in-
formation  is  entrusted  to  a  third  party—as  occurs  with
rapidly  increasing  frequency.  Cf.  Carpenter  v.  United
States,  585  U. S.  ___,  ___,  ___  (2018)  (slip  op.,  at  15,  17).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the separation of powers and the implications of congressional subpoenas for presidential records.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

714

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Breyer, J., dissenting

of thought. See Muniz, supra, at 595–596 (describing Eng-
lish Star Chamber “wherein suspects were forced to choose
between revealing incriminating private thoughts and for-
saking their oath by committing perjury”); United States v.
Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 233 (1975) (“The Fifth Amendment
privilege . . . protects ‘a private inner sanctum of individual
feeling and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract
self-condemnation’ ” (quoting Couch v. United States, 409
Indeed, some have argued that the
U. S. 322, 327 (1973))).
Puritans championed the privilege because, had the 17th-
century state questioned them about their beliefs, they
would have had to answer truthfully and thus suffer condem-
nation. See L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 134
(1968) (“If [a Puritan] took the oath and lied, he committed
the unpardonable and cardinal sin of perjury which was sim-
ply not an option for a religious man”). This consideration
may prove less important today domestically, for the First
Amendment protects against the prosecution of thought
crime. But that fact also provides no reason for denying
protection where the prosecution is foreign.

The Court has said that the privilege reﬂects, too, “our
fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by in-
humane treatment and abuses.” Murphy, 378 U. S., at 55.
This concern with governmental “overreaching” would ap-
pear implicated as much when the foreseen prosecution is by
another country as when it is by another domestic jurisdic-
tion.
Indeed, the analogy to Murphy’s observation about
“cooperative federalism,” in which State and Federal Gov-
ernments wage “a united front against many types of crimi-
nal activity,” id., at 56, is a powerful one. That is because,
in the 30 years since Murphy, the United States has dramati-
cally increased its level of cooperation with foreign govern-
ments to combat crime. See generally E. Nadelman, Cops
Across Borders: The Internationalization of U. S. Criminal
Law Enforcement (1993); Bassiouni, Policy Considerations
on Inter-State Cooperation in Criminal Matters, 4 Pace Y. B.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

169

Breyer, J., dissenting

pajamas to recognize that the chemical nicotine, an impor-
tant tobacco ingredient, meets this test.

Although I now oversimplify, the FDA has determined
that once nicotine enters the body, the blood carries it almost
immediately to the brain. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44698–44699
(1966). Nicotine then binds to receptors on the surface of
brain cells, setting off a series of chemical reactions that
alter one’s mood and produce feelings of sedation and stimu-
lation. See id., at 44699, 44739. Nicotine also increases the
number of nicotinic receptors on the brain’s surface, and al-
ters its normal electrical activity. See id., at 44739. And
nicotine stimulates the transmission of a natural chemical
that “rewards” the body with pleasurable sensations (dopa-
mine), causing nicotine addiction. See id., at 44700, 44721–
44722. The upshot is that nicotine stabilizes mood, sup-
presses appetite, tranquilizes, and satisﬁes a physical craving
that nicotine itself has helped to create—all through chemical
action within the body after being metabolized.

This physiology—and not simply smoker psychology—
helps to explain why as many as 75% of adult smokers be-
lieve that smoking “reduce[s] nervous irritation,” 60 Fed.
Reg. 41579 (1995); why 73% of young people (10- to 22-year-
olds) who begin smoking say they do so for “relaxation,” 61
Fed. Reg. 44814 (1996); and why less than 3% of smokers
succeed in quitting each year, although 70% want to quit, id.,
at 44704. That chemistry also helps to explain the Surgeon
General’s ﬁndings that smokers believe “smoking [makes
them] feel better” and smoke more “in situations involving
negative mood.”
Id., at 44814. And, for present purposes,
that chemistry demonstrates that nicotine affects the “struc-
ture” and “function” of the body in a manner that is quite simi-
lar to the effects of other regulated substances. See id., at
44667 (FDA regulates Valium, NoDoz, weight-loss products).
Indeed, addiction, sedation, stimulation, and weight loss are
precisely the kinds of product effects that the FDA typically
reviews and controls. And, since the nicotine in cigarettes
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It discusses the physiological effects of nicotine and argues that these effects are similar to those of other regulated substances.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

Opinion of the Court

601 U. S. ___ (2023); 598 U. S. ___ (2023).2

II
A
Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Ju-
diciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate “Cases”
and “Controversies”—concrete disputes with consequences
for the parties involved.  The Framers appreciated that the
laws judges would necessarily apply in resolving those dis-
putes would not always be clear.  Cognizant of the limits of
human language and foresight, they anticipated that “[a]ll
new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill,
and  passed  on  the  fullest  and  most  mature  deliberation,”
would  be  “more  or  less  obscure  and  equivocal,  until  their
meaning” was settled “by a series of particular discussions
and adjudications.”  The Federalist No. 37, p. 236 (J. Cooke
ed. 1961) (J. Madison).

The  Framers  also  envisioned  that  the  final  “interpreta-
tion of the laws” would be “the proper and peculiar province
of the courts.”  Id., No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton).  Unlike the
political branches, the courts would by design exercise “nei-
ther Force nor Will, but merely judgment.”  Id., at 523.  To
ensure the “steady, upright and impartial administration of
the laws,” the Framers structured the Constitution to allow
judges to exercise that judgment independent of influence
from the political branches.  Id., at 522; see id., at 522–524;
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011).

This Court embraced the Framers’ understanding of the
judicial function early on.  In the foundational decision of
Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall famously de-
clared that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”  1 Cranch 137,

——————

2 Both petitions also presented questions regarding the consistency of
the Rule with the MSA.  See Pet. for Cert. in No. 22–451, p. i; Pet. for
Cert. in No. 22–1219, p. ii.  We did not grant certiorari with respect to
those questions and thus do not reach them.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of constitutional provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

65

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix B to opinion of ALITO, J.

Random  House  Webster’s  Unabridged  Dictionary
1754 (2d ed. 2001):

Sex (seks), n.  1. either the male or female division of a spe-
cies, esp. as differentiated with reference to the reproduc-
tive functions.  2. the sum of the structural and functional
differences  by  which  the  male  and  female  are  distin-
guished,  or  the  phenomena  or  behavior  dependent  on
these  differences.  3.  the  instinct  or  attraction  drawing
one sex toward another, or its manifestation in life and
conduct.  4. coitus.  5. genitalia.  6. to have sex, to engage
in sexual intercourse. – v.t.  7. to ascertain the sex of, esp.
of newly-hatched chicks.  8. sex up, Informal. a. to arouse
sexually: The only intent of that show was to sex up the
audience. b. to increase the appeal of; to make more in-
teresting, attractive, or exciting: We’ve decided to sex up
the  movie  with  some  battle  scenes.  [1350–1400;  ME  <  L
Sexus, perh. akin to secāre to divide (see SECTION)]

American Heritage Dictionary 1605 (5th ed. 2011):

Sex  (seks)  n.  1a.  Sexual  activity,  especially  sexual  inter-
course: hasn’t had sex in months. b. The sexual urge or in-
stinct  as  it  manifests  itself  in  behavior:  motivated  by  sex.
2a. Either of the two divisions, designated female and male,
by which most organisms are classified on the basis of their
reproductive organs and functions: How do you determine
the sex of a lobster? b. The fact or condition of existing in
these two divisions, especially the collection of characteris-
tics that distinguish female and male: the evolution of sex
in  plants;  a  study  that  takes  sex  into  account.  See  Usage
Note at gender. 3.  Females or males considered as a group:
dormitories that house only one sex. 4. One’s identity as ei-
ther female or male. 5. The genitals. ⸭ tr.v. sexed, sex-ing,
sex-es 1. To determine the sex of (an organism). 2. Slang a.
To arouse sexually. Often used with up. b. To increase the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document citing dictionary definitions.  While it contains text, it is not the primary content of the document and is likely meant for reference purposes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal citation/dictionary definition excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1157

558 U. S.

January 19, 2010

No.  09–8028.  Adams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  336.

No.  09–8030.  Akel  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  843.

No.  09–8032.  Eberhardt  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–8033.  Fowler  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  561.

No.  09–8035.  Falls  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–8036.  Glawson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  957.

No.  09–8038.  Humphrey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–8040.  Hayes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  680.

No.  09–8045.  Gravely  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  67.

No.  09–8047.  Hobereck  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  347  Fed.  Appx.  887.

No.  09–8051.  Colin-Lujan v.  United States.  C.  A.  5th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  348  Fed.  Appx.  913.

No. 09–8054.  Mejia-Rios, aka Mejio-Rios v.  United States.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.
Appx.  972.

No.  09–8056.  Ortega  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  539.

No.  09–8058.  Register  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–8060.  Walters  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  969.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and information about certiorari decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:47] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

930

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 15, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–8662. Solomon v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 220 Mich. App. 527, 560 N. W. 2d
651.

No. 97–8672. Cross v. City of Newark, California, et al.

Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8674. Borck v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 149 Ore. 779, 944 P. 2d 1003.

No. 97–8683. Davis v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de-

nied. Reported below: 703 So. 2d 1055.

No. 97–8685. Schleeper v. Missouri. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8686. Pierce v. Caruso, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8690. King v. Adamson et al. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8691. Krishnamurthy v. Nimmagadda et al. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125 F. 3d 858.

No. 97–8703. Estep v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8708. Cozzens v. Bozza et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 97–8731. Reynolds v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 80 Ohio St. 3d 670, 687 N. E. 2d 1358.

No. 97–8744. Hung Thanh Le v. Oklahoma; and Willing-
ham v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 947 P. 2d 535 (ﬁrst judgment) and 1074 (second
judgment).

No. 97–8780. Barbary v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 213 Wis. 2d 122, 570 N. W. 2d 253.

No. 97–8800. Humphreys v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App.

Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 P. 2d 565.

No. 97–8836. Sarkar v. Temple University. C. A. 3d Cir.

Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks sequential narrative and is more akin to a legal docket or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1234

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

Rule

FEES—See also Costs

Admission to Bar...........................................................  5.5, 5.6

Armed forces cases .......................................................  40.3

Certiﬁcate of good standing........................................  5.6

In forma pauperis proceedings .................................  39.4

Seamen cases..................................................................  40.2

Table ................................................................................  38

Taxable items  ................................................................  43.3

Veterans cases ...............................................................  40.1

HABEAS CORPUS—See also Extraordinary Writs

Custody of prisoners.....................................................  36
Documents, format and general requirements........  33, 34
Enlargement of prisoner on personal recognizance  36.3, 36.4
Order respecting custody of prisoners .....................  36.4
Petition for writ.............................................................  20.4(a)
Response to petition  ....................................................  20.4(b)

IN FORMA PAUPERIS PROCEEDINGS

Afﬁdavit as to status ....................................................  39.1

Briefs, preparation of ...................................................  33.2

Counsel

—Appointment.......................................................  39.7

—Compensation.....................................................  39.7

—Travel expenses.................................................  39.6

Denial of leave to proceed ...........................................  39.8

Docketing........................................................................  39.4

Joint appendix................................................................  26.3

Motions, form of ............................................................  39.1

Responses  ......................................................................  39.5

Substantive documents ................................................  39.2, 39.3

INTEREST

Inclusion  in  amount  of  bond  on  stay  pending

review  .........................................................................  23.4
Money judgments in civil cases..................................  42.1

JOINT APPENDIX

Arrangement of contents.............................................  26.5, 26.7

Certiﬁed cases................................................................  19.4

Contents  .........................................................................  26.1, 26.2

Copies, number to be ﬁled...........................................  26.1

Cost of printing .............................................................  26.3, 43.3

Cover color .....................................................................  26.6, 33.1(e)

Deferred method ...........................................................  26.4

Designating parts of record to be printed ...............  26.2

Dispensing with appendix  ..........................................  26.8
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal document, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It includes headings, subheadings, and rule numbers, indicating a structured and organized format.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Rules</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

997

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

No.  09–6202.  Thomas  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  377  Ill.  App.  3d  1144,  953
N.  E.  2d  84.

No.  09–6203.  Meredith  v.  Erath  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  579.

No.  09–6204.  Grayson  v.  Stevenson,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  159.

No.  09–6209.  Hannon  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  1146.

No. 09–6215.  Lopez  v.  Kennedy  et al.  C. A.  9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–6216.  Martin v.  California.  Ct.  App. Cal., 4th App.

Dist.,  Div.  2.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6225.  Blakeney  v.  Branker,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  572.

No.  09–6226.  Bernard  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6227.  Harley  v.  Beioh  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  134.

No.  09–6236.  Hearne  v.  Davis,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  171.

No.  09–6237.  S.  B.  et  ux.  v.  J.  L.  Ct.  App.  Mo.,  Southern

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  280  S. W.  3d  147.

No.  09–6244.  Thomas  v.  Horel,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  85.

No.  09–6248.  Brown  v.  Samano.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.

No. 09–6249.  Ansel v. Superior Court of California, Sac
ramento  County,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  34.

No.  09– 6250.  Ashipa  v.  Ohio.  Ct.  App.  Ohio,  Hamilton

County.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, detailing case numbers, citations, and the court's decision (certiorari denied). This is not the typical narrative content found within a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

FILED-RATE REQUIREMENTS. See Communications Act of 1934.

INDEX

1311

FIREARMS. See Criminal Law, 1, 2, 3.

FIRST AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, V.

FLORIDA. See Criminal Law, 4.

FOREIGN PROSECUTION AS BASIS FOR CLAIMING PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. See Constitutional Law,
VII.

FORFEITURE OF FUNDS. See Constitutional Law, III.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, I; II, 2.

FOURTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, VIII.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. See Constitutional Law, V.

FUNDING FOR ARTS. See Constitutional Law, V.

GROUP HEALTH PLANS. See Employee Retirement Income Secu-

rity Act of 1974.

HABEAS CORPUS. See Constitutional Law, IV; Jurisdiction, 3.

HEALTH CARE BENEFITS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; IX, 1;

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

HIV AS A DISABILITY. See Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990, 2.

IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION. See Education Amendments of

1972.

INDEPENDENT COUNSEL. See Attorney-Client Privilege.

INDIANS. See Taxes.

INMATES’ RIGHTS. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,

1.

INTEREST ON LAWYERS TRUST ACCOUNT (IOLTA) PROGRAMS.

See Constitutional Law, IX, 2.

JURISDICTION.

1. Court of Appeals—Settlement reopening.—Neither Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) nor Quiet Title Act gave Fifth Circuit jurisdiction
to reopen a settlement agreement in which title to disputed land was
quieted in United States in return for a payment to respondents. United
States v. Beggerly, p. 38.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal document. It lists topics and corresponding sections, not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

3

Opinion of the Court

The funeral procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of
the  picket  site.    Although  Snyder  testified  that  he  could
see the tops of the picket signs as he drove to the funeral,
he  did  not  see  what  was  written  on  the  signs  until  later
that night,  while watching a news broadcast covering the
event.  Id., at 2084–2086.1

B
Snyder  filed  suit  against  Phelps,  Phelps’s  daughters,
and the Westboro Baptist Church (collectively Westboro or
the  church)  in  the  United  States  District  Court  for  the
District  of  Maryland  under  that  court’s  diversity  jurisdic-
tion.  Snyder  alleged  five  state  tort  law  claims:  defama-
tion, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of
emotional  distress,  intrusion  upon  seclusion,  and  civil
conspiracy.    Westboro  moved  for  summary  judgment
contending,  in  part,  that  the  church’s  speech  was  insu-
lated  from  liability  by  the  First  Amendment.    See  533
F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (Md. 2008).
——————

1 A few weeks after the funeral, one of the picketers posted a message
on  Westboro’s  Web  site  discussing  the  picketing  and  containing  relig-
iously  oriented  denunciations  of  the  Snyders,  interspersed  among
lengthy Bible quotations.  Snyder discovered the posting, referred to by
the parties as the “epic,” during an Internet search for his son’s name.
The  epic  is  not  properly  before  us  and  does  not  factor  in  our  analysis.
Although the epic was submitted to the jury and discussed in the courts
below, Snyder never mentioned it in his petition for certiorari.  See Pet.
for  Cert.  i  (“Snyder’s  claim  arose  out  of  Phelps’  intentional  acts  at
Snyder’s  son’s  funeral”  (emphasis  added));  this  Court’s  Rule  14.1(g)
(petition  must  contain  statement  “setting  out  the  facts  material  to
consideration  of  the  question  presented”).    Nor  did  Snyder  respond  to
the statement in the opposition to certiorari that “[t]hough the epic was
asserted as a basis for the claims at trial, the petition . . . appears to be
addressing only claims based on the picketing.”  Brief in Opposition 9.
Snyder  devoted  only  one  paragraph  in  the  argument  section  of  his
opening merits brief to the epic.  Given the foregoing and the fact that
an Internet posting may raise distinct issues in this context, we decline
to  consider  the  epic  in  deciding  this  case.    See  Ontario  v.  Quon,  560
U. S. ___, ___ – ___ (2010) (slip op., at 10–12).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of the Court

The dissent reads our cases differently, contending that
they permit an officer to use only the common sense derived
from his “experiences in law enforcement.”  Post, at 5 (opin-
ion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).  Such a standard defies the “common
sense”  understanding  of  common  sense,  i.e.,  information
that is accessible to people generally, not just some special-
ized subset of society.  More importantly, this standard ap-
pears  nowhere  in  our  precedent.    In  fact,  we  have  stated
that reasonable suspicion is an “abstract” concept that can-
not  be  reduced  to  “a  neat  set  of  legal  rules,”  Arvizu,  534
U. S.,  at  274  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  and  we
have  repeatedly  rejected  courts’  efforts  to  impose  a  rigid
structure on the concept of reasonableness, ibid.; Sokolow,
490 U. S., at 7–8.  This is precisely what the dissent’s rule
would do by insisting that officers must be treated as bifur-
cated persons, completely precluded from drawing factual
inferences  based  on  the  commonly  held  knowledge  they
have acquired in their everyday lives.

The dissent’s rule would also impose on police the burden
of pointing to specific training materials or field experiences
justifying reasonable suspicion for the myriad infractions in
municipal criminal codes.  And by removing common sense
as a source of evidence, the dissent would considerably nar-
row the daylight between the showing required for probable
cause and the “less stringent” showing required for reason-
able  suspicion.  Prouse,  440  U. S.,  at  654;  see  White,  496
U. S., at 330.  Finally, it would impermissibly tie a traffic
stop’s  validity  to  the  officer’s  length  of  service.  See
Devenpeck  v.  Alford,  543  U. S.  146,  154  (2004).    Such  re-
quirements  are  inconsistent  with  our  Fourth  Amendment
jurisprudence, and we decline to adopt them here.

In reaching this conclusion, we in no way minimize the
significant  role  that  specialized  training  and  experience
routinely play in law enforcement investigations.  See, e.g.,
Arvizu,  534  U. S.,  at  273–274.    We  simply  hold  that  such
experience is not required in every instance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in a Supreme Court case. It discusses the standard for reasonable suspicion in law enforcement, arguing against a narrow interpretation that relies solely on specialized training and experience.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

21

Opinion of the Court

at 458–459.

2
Notwithstanding  these  safeguards,  respondents  argue
that  statutory  exceptions  to  the  Privacy  Act’s  disclosure
bar, see §§552a(b)(1)–(12), leave its protections too porous
to  supply  a  meaningful  check  against  “unwarranted  dis-
closures,”  Whalen,  supra,  at  605.    Respondents  point  in
particular  to  what  they  describe  as  a  “broad”  exception
for  “routine  use[s],”  defined  as  uses  that  are  “compatible
with  the  purpose  for  which  the  record  was  collected.”
§§552a(b)(3), (a)(7).

Respondents’  reliance  on  these  exceptions  rests  on  an
incorrect reading of both our precedents and the terms of
the Privacy Act.  As to our cases, the Court in Whalen and
Nixon  referred  approvingly  to  statutory  or  regulatory
protections against “unwarranted disclosures” and “undue
dissemination”  of  personal  information  collected  by  the
Government.  Whalen, supra, at 605; Nixon, supra, at 458.
Neither  case  suggested  that  an  ironclad  disclosure  bar  is
needed to satisfy privacy interests that may be “root[ed] in
the Constitution.”  Whalen, supra, at 605.  In Whalen, the
New  York  statute  prohibiting  “[p]ublic  disclosure  of  the
identity  of  patients”  was  itself  subject  to  several  excep-
tions.  429  U. S.,  at  594–595,  and  n. 12.    In  Nixon,  the
protections  against  “undue  dissemination”  mentioned  in
the opinion were not even before the Court, but were to be
included  in  forthcoming  regulations  “mandate[d]”  by  the
challenged  Act.  433  U. S.,  at  458;  see  id.,  at  437–439
(explaining  that  the  Court  was  limiting  its  review  to  the
Act’s “facial validity” and was not considering the Admin-
istrator’s  forthcoming  regulations).    Thus,  the  mere  fact
that  the  Privacy  Act’s  nondisclosure  requirement  is  sub-
ject to exceptions does not show that the statute provides
insufficient protection against public disclosure.

Nor  does  the  substance  of  the  “routine  use”  exception
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal citations, arguments, and references to previous rulings.  The structured format and legal terminology suggest it is part of the main body of the opinion and not a preface, table of contents, or other non-sequential text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
472  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of Stevens, J.

Ibid.  It  is  for  reasons  such  as  these  that  our  campaign  ﬁ
nance jurisprudence has long appreciated that “the ‘differing
structures  and  purposes’  of  different  entities  ‘may  require
different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity
of the electoral process.’ ”  NRWC, 459 U. S., at 210 (quoting
California Medical Assn., 453 U. S., at 201).

The Court’s facile depiction of corporate electioneering as
sumes  away  all  of  these  complexities.  Our  colleagues  ridi
cule  the  idea  of  regulating  expenditures  based  on  “nothing
more”  than  a  fear  that  corporations  have  a  special  “ability
to  persuade,”  ante,  at  382  (opinion  of  Roberts,  C.  J.),
as  if  corporations  were  our  society’s  ablest  debaters  and
viewpoint-neutral  laws  such  as  § 203  were  created  to  sup
press  their  best  arguments.  In  their  haste  to  knock  down
yet another straw man, our colleagues simply ignore the fun
damental  concerns  of  the  Austin  Court  and  the  legislatures
that  have  passed  laws  like  § 203:  to  safeguard  the  integrity,
competitiveness,  and  democratic  responsiveness  of  the  elec
toral  process.  All  of  the  majority’s  theoretical  arguments
turn on a proposition with undeniable surface appeal but lit
tle  grounding  in  evidence  or  experience,  “that  there  is  no
such  thing  as  too  much  speech,”  Austin,  494  U. S.,  at  695
(Scalia,  J.,  dissenting).74  If  individuals  in  our  society  had
inﬁnite  free  time  to  listen  to  and  contemplate  every  last  bit
of speech uttered by anyone, anywhere; and if broadcast ad
vertisements  had  no  special  ability  to  inﬂuence  elections
apart from the merits of their arguments (to the extent they
make  any);  and  if  legislators  always  operated  with  noth
ing  less  than  perfect  virtue;  then  I  suppose  the  majority’s
premise  would  be  sound.  In  the  real  world,  we  have  seen,
corporate  domination  of  the  airwaves  prior  to  an  election
may  decrease  the  average  listener’s  exposure  to  relevant
viewpoints, and it may diminish citizens’ willingness and ca
pacity to participate in the democratic process.

74 Of  course,  no  presiding  person  in  a  courtroom,  legislature,  classroom,

polling place, or family dinner would take this hyperbole literally.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It delves into the arguments surrounding corporate spending in elections.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Dickinson,  Administrative  Justice  and  the  Supremacy  of
Law  39–75  (1927).    Sometimes  this  Court  refused  to  re-
view  factual  determinations  of  administrative  agencies at
all, Smelting Co., 104 U. S., at 640, 646, and sometimes it
allowed  lower  courts  to  engage  in  essentially  de novo
review  of  factual  determinations,  see  ICC  v.  Alabama
Midland R. Co., 168 U. S. 144, 174 (1897); Reckendorfer v.
Faber, 92 U. S. 347, 351–355 (1876).

In  the  early  20th  century,  the  Court  began  to  move
toward  substantial-evidence  review  of  administrative
determinations involving mixed questions of law and fact,
ICC v. Union Pacific R. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 546–548 (1912),
but reserved the authority to review de novo any so-called
“jurisdictional facts.”  Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62–
63 (1932).  Courts then struggled to determine the bound-
ary between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional facts, and
thus  to  determine  the  appropriate  standard  of  review  for
administrative decisions.  See, e.g., Estep v. United States,
327  U. S.  114,  142  (1946)  (Frankfurter,  J.,  concurring  in
result)  (noting  the  “casuistic  difficulties  spawned”  in
Crowell  and  the  “attritions  of  that  case  through  later
decisions”).  Although  Congress  provided  for  substantial-
evidence  review  in  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act,  5
U. S. C. §706(2)(E), it required de novo review in the Lan-
ham Act.

I need not take a side in this historical debate about the
proper level of review for administrative findings of fact to
conclude that its existence provides yet another reason to
doubt  that  Congress  intended  administrative  preclusion
to apply to the Lanham Act.

III
In  addition  to  being  unsupported  by  our  precedents  or
historical  evidence,  the  majority’s  application  of  adminis-
trative preclusion raises serious constitutional concerns.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the history and application of administrative preclusion in legal cases, particularly in relation to the Lanham Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

Second,  as  Heller  and  McDonald  established  and  the
Court today again explains, the Second Amendment “is nei-
ther  a  regulatory  straightjacket  nor  a  regulatory  blank
check.”  Ante,  at  21.  Properly  interpreted,  the  Second
Amendment allows a “variety” of gun regulations.  Heller,
554 U. S., at 636.  As Justice Scalia wrote in his opinion for
the Court in Heller, and JUSTICE ALITO reiterated in rele-
vant part in the principal opinion in McDonald:

“Like  most  rights,  the  right  secured  by  the  Second
Amendment  is  not  unlimited.    From  Blackstone
through  the  19th-century  cases,  commentators  and
courts  routinely  explained  that  the  right  was  not  a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner  whatsoever  and  for  whatever  purpose. . . .
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-
arms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding
the  carrying  of  firearms  in  sensitive  places  such  as
schools  and  government  buildings,  or  laws  imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.  [Footnote  26:  We  identify  these  presumptively
lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list
does not purport to be exhaustive.]

“We also recognize another important limitation on
the  right  to  keep  and  carry  arms.    Miller  said,  as  we
have  explained,  that  the  sorts  of  weapons  protected
were those in common use at the time.  We think that
limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition
of  prohibiting  the  carrying  of  dangerous  and  unusual
weapons.”  Heller, 554 U. S., at 626−627, and n. 26 (ci-
tations and quotation marks omitted); see also McDon-
ald, 561 U. S., at 786 (plurality opinion).

*

*

*

With those additional comments, I join the opinion of the

Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It cites previous cases (Heller and McDonald) and discusses the interpretation of the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

37

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

Appropriations  Act,  H. R.  2471,  117th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  78
(2022).  Meanwhile,  the  Solicitor  General  has  offered  the
Executive  Branch’s  judgment  that  McGirt’s  “practical
consequences”  do  not  justify  this  Court’s  intervention,
explaining  that  the  Department  of  Justice  is  “working
diligently with tribal and State partners” in Oklahoma.  See
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 32.

isn’t

A  Federal  Bureau

in  Oklahoma,  “the  sky

There is even more evidence cutting against the Court’s
dystopian  tale.  According  to  a  recent  United  States
falling”  and
Attorney
“partnerships  between  tribal  law  enforcement  and  state
law  enforcement”  are  strong.  A. Herrera,  Trent  Shores
Reflects  on  His  Time  as  U. S.  Attorney,  Remains
Committed to Justice for Indian Country, KOSU-NPR (Feb.
24,  2021),  www.kosu.org/politics/2021-02-24/trent-shores-
reflects-on-his-time-as-u-s-attorney-remains-committed-to-
of
justice-for-indian-country.
Investigation  special  agent  in  charge  of  Oklahoma  has
stated that violent crimes “ ‘are being pursued as heavily as
they  were  in  the  past,  and  in  some  cases,  maybe  even
stronger.’ ”  A. Brothers, Oklahoma Special Agent Says FBI
Faces  Challenges  in  3  Categories,  News  on  6  (Feb.  14,
2022), https://www.newson6.com/story/620b261bf8cd4a07e
5cb845b/oklahoma-special-agent-says-fbi-faces-challenges-
in-3-categories.  And the Tribes—those most affected by all
this  supposed  lawlessness  within  their  reservations—tell
us  that,  after  a  period  of  adjustment,  federal  prosecutors
are now pursuing lower level offenses vigorously too.  See
Brief for Muscogee (Creek) Nation as Amicus Curiae on Pet.
for Cert. 11–12, and nn. 21–22 (collecting indictments).  The
federal  government  has  made  a  similar  representation  to
this Court.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 118.  Nor is it any secret that
those  convicted  of  federal  crimes  generally  receive  longer
sentences  than  individuals  convicted  of  similar  state
offenses.  See,  e.g.,  Bureau  of  Justice  Statistics,  Felony
Sentences  in  State  Courts,  2006—Statistical  Tables  9
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and cites to other legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

9

Opinion of the Court

attributes of arbitration.”  563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).
“[T]he switch from bilateral to class arbitration,” we said,
“sacrifices  the  principal  advantage  of  arbitration—its
informality—and  makes  the  process  slower,  more  costly,
and  more  likely  to  generate  procedural  morass  than  final
judgment.”  Id.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  14).    We  specifically
rejected the argument that class arbitration was necessary
to prosecute claims “that might otherwise slip through the
legal system.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17).5

*

*

*
The regime established by the Court of Appeals’ decision
would require—before a plaintiff can be held to contractu-
ally  agreed  bilateral  arbitration—that  a  federal  court
determine (and the parties litigate) the legal requirements
for  success  on  the  merits  claim-by-claim  and  theory-by-
theory,  the  evidence  necessary  to  meet  those  requirements,
the  cost  of  developing  that  evidence,  and  the  damages
that  would  be  recovered  in  the  event  of  success.    Such  a
preliminary  litigating  hurdle  would  undoubtedly  destroy
the  prospect  of  speedy  resolution  that  arbitration  in  gen-
eral  and  bilateral  arbitration  in  particular  was  meant  to
secure.  The FAA does not sanction such a judicially created
superstructure.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

——————

5 In  dismissing  AT&T  Mobility  as  a  case  involving  pre-emption  and
not  the  effective-vindication  exception,  the  dissent  ignores  what  that
case  established—that  the  FAA’s  command  to  enforce  arbitration
agreements  trumps  any  interest  in  ensuring  the  prosecution  of  low-
value  claims.    The  latter  interest,  we  said,  is  “unrelated”  to  the  FAA.
563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17).  Accordingly, the FAA does, contrary
to the dissent’s assertion, see post, at 5, favor the absence of litigation
when that is the consequence of a class-action waiver, since its “ ‘princi-
pal purpose’ ” is the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to
their  terms.  563  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  9–10)  (quoting  Volt  Infor-
mation  Sciences,  Inc.  v.  Board  of  Trustees  of  Leland  Stanford  Junior
Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 487 (1989)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, arguments, and a conclusion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U90

[09-15-00 14:33:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

370

PENNSYLVANIA BD. OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE v. SCOTT
Souter, J., dissenting

Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Ori-
gins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1389
(1983). See also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 18–19, and
n. 1 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Segura v. United States,
468 U. S. 796, 828, and n. 22 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 978, and n. 37 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).

Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg and

Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

The Court’s holding that the exclusionary rule of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), has no application to parole revo-
cation proceedings rests upon mistaken conceptions of the
actual function of revocation, of the objectives of those who
gather evidence in support of petitions to revoke, and, conse-
quently, of the need to deter violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment that would tend to occur in administering the parole
laws.
In reality a revocation proceeding often serves the
same function as a criminal trial, and the revocation hearing
may very well present the only forum in which the State will
seek to use evidence of a parole violation, even when that
evidence would support an independent criminal charge.
The deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is therefore
implicated as much by a revocation proceeding as by a con-
ventional trial, and the exclusionary rule should be applied
accordingly. From the Court’s conclusion to the contrary, I
respectfully dissent.

This Court has said that the primary purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule “is to deter future unlawful police conduct and
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States
v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974). Because the exclu-
sionary rule thus “operates as a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter. It discusses the application of the exclusionary rule in parole revocation proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

LUCKY BRAND DUNGAREES, INC. v.
MARCEL FASHIONS GROUP, INC.
Opinion of the Court

in 1990, Lucky Brand began selling apparel using the reg-
istered trademark “Lucky Brand” and other marks that in-
clude the word “Lucky.”  779 F. 3d 102, 105 (CA2 2015).

Three categories of marks are at issue in this case: Mar-
cel’s  “Get  Lucky”  mark;  Lucky  Brand’s  “Lucky  Brand”
mark; and various other marks owned by Lucky Brand that
contain  the  word  “Lucky.”    These  trademarks  have  led  to
nearly  20  years  of  litigation  between  the  two  companies,
proceeding in three rounds.

A
In 2001—the first round—Marcel sued Lucky Brand, al-
leging that Lucky Brand’s use of the phrase “Get Lucky” in
advertisements infringed Marcel’s trademark.  In 2003, the
parties signed a settlement agreement.  As part of the deal,
Lucky Brand agreed to stop using the phrase “Get Lucky.”
App. 191.  In exchange, Marcel agreed to release any claims
regarding Lucky Brand’s use of its own trademarks.  Id., at
191–192.

B
The  ink  was  barely  dry  on  the  settlement  agreement
when, in 2005, the parties began a second round of litiga-
tion  (2005  Action).  Lucky  Brand  filed  suit,  alleging  that
Marcel and its licensee violated its trademarks by copying
its  designs  and  logos  in  a  new  clothing  line.    As  relevant
here, Marcel filed several counterclaims that all turned, in
large part, on Lucky Brand’s alleged continued use of “Get
Lucky”: One batch of allegations asserted that Lucky Brand
had continued to use Marcel’s “Get Lucky” mark in viola-
tion of the settlement agreement, while others alleged that
Lucky  Brand’s  use  of  the  phrase  “Get  Lucky”  and  “Lucky
Brand” together was “confusingly similar to”—and thus in-
fringed––Marcel’s “Get Lucky” mark.  Defendants’ Answer,
Affirmative  Defenses,  and  Counterclaims  to  Plaintiffs’
Complaint in No. 1:05–cv–06757 (SDNY), Doc. 40–2, p. 39;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing trademark infringement. It provides context about the history of litigation between two companies, Lucky Brand and Marcel Fashions Group.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
332  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

considered  the  question  of  its  facial  validity.  The  holding
and validity of Austin were essential to the reasoning of the
McConnell  majority  opinion,  which  upheld  BCRA’s  exten
sion  of  § 441b.  See  540  U. S.,  at  205  (quoting  Austin,  494
U. S.,  at  660).  McConnell  permitted  federal  felony  punish
ment for speech by all corporations, including nonproﬁt ones,
that speak on prohibited subjects shortly before federal elec
tions.  See 540 U. S., at 203–209.  Four Members of the Mc
Connell Court would have overruled Austin, including Chief
Justice  Rehnquist,  who  had  joined  the  Court’s  opinion  in
Austin  but  reconsidered  that  conclusion.  See  540  U. S.,  at
256–262  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  part,  concurring  in  judg
ment  in  part,  and  dissenting  in  part);  id.,  at  273–275
(Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in result in part,
concurring  in  judgment  in  part,  and  dissenting  in  part);  id.,
at  322–338  (opinion  of  Kennedy,  J.,  joined  by  Rehnquist,
C.  J.,  and  Scalia,  J.).  That  inquiry  into  the  facial  validity
of the statute was facilitated by the extensive record, which
was “over 100,000 pages” long, made in the three-judge Dis
trict  Court.  McConnell  v.  Federal  Election  Comm’n,  251
F. Supp. 2d 176, 209 (DC 2003) (per curiam) (McConnell I).
It is not the case, then, that the Court today is premature in
interpreting  § 441b  “ ‘on  the  basis  of  [a]  factually  barebones
recor[d].’ ”  Washington  State  Grange  v.  Washington  State
Republican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 450 (2008) (quoting Sabri v.
United States, 541 U. S. 600, 609 (2004)).

The  McConnell  majority  considered  whether  the  statute
was  facially  invalid.  An  as-applied  challenge  was  brought
in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n,
546  U. S.  410,  411–412  (2006)  (per  curiam),  and  the  Court
conﬁrmed that the challenge could be maintained.  Then, in
WRTL,  the  controlling  opinion  of  the  Court  not  only  enter
tained  an  as-applied  challenge  but  also  sustained  it.  Three
Justices noted that they would continue to maintain the posi
tion that the record in McConnell demonstrated the invalid
ity  of  the  Act  on  its  face.  551  U. S.,  at  485–504  (opinion  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It delves into the court's reasoning and precedents related to campaign finance regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

lxv

State Employees’ Retirement System; McKinney v. . . . . . . . . . . .
State System of Higher Ed. of Pa. (SSHE); Lal v.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Steadman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Steele v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Steele v. Allison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Steele v. California Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Steele v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Steele v. Moorman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stegall; Hamilton v.
Steigmann; Wronke v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stell v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stelly; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stemley v. Foti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stenberg v. Carhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stephens v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stephney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sterling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stevens v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stevens v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stevens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stevens; Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
Stevenson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart; Coleman v.
Stewart; Hartline v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart; Palomino v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart; Poland v.
Stewart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stillo v. Illinois State Retirement Systems, Judges’ Ret. Sys.
. . .
Stimpson v. Tuscaloosa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stonier v. Digital Equipment Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Storr; Muhammad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stradwick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Straub; Willman v.
Strouth v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stubbleﬁeld; Wagoner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stuebing v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stull v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Suarez; BankBoston, N. A. v.
Sublett v. Swoopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sughrue v. Butler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sullivan; Linton v.

Page
1083
1004
1076
1008
1100
1064
1041
1072
1026
1101
1101
1098
1132
1002,1016,1051,1086
1024
1070
1078
1062
1041
1028
765
1029,1138
1038
1073
1133
1041
1013
1005,1059,1078,1112,1125
1069
1053
1035
1081,1137
1109
1071
1120
1021
1027
1101
1011
1029
1106
1124
1039
1100
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
68  UNION  PACIFIC  R.  CO.  v.  LOCOMOTIVE  ENGINEERS

Syllabus

CBA.  The Union asserts that the parties conferenced all ﬁve disputes
and the Carrier concedes that they conferenced at least two.  Dissatis
ﬁed with the outcome of the on-property proceedings, the Union sought
arbitration  before  the  NRAB’s  First  Division.  Both  parties  ﬁled  sub
missions  in the  ﬁve  cases,  but neither  mentioned  conferencing  as a  dis
puted matter.  Yet, in each case, both parties necessarily knew whether
the  Union  and  the  Carrier  had  conferred;  and  the  Board’s  governing
rule, published in Circular One, which prescribes Board procedures, in
structs carriers and employees to “set forth all relevant, argumentative
facts,” 29 CFR § 301.5(d), (e).  Just prior to the hearing, one of the arbi
tration  panel’s  industry  representatives  objected,  sua  sponte,  that  the
on-property  record  included  no  proof  of  conferencing.  The  Carrier
thereafter embraced  that objection.  The  referee allowed  the Union  to
submit  evidence  of  conferencing.  The  Union  did  so,  but  it  maintained
that  the  proof-of-conferencing  issue  was  untimely  raised,  indeed  for
feited, as the Carrier had not objected before the date set for argument.
The panel, in ﬁve identical decisions, dismissed the petitions for want of
jurisdiction.  The  record  could  not  be  supplemented  to  meet  the  no
proof-of-conferencing  objection,  the  panel  reasoned,  for  as  an  appellate
tribunal, the panel was not empowered to consider de novo evidence and
arguments.  The  Union  sought  review  in  the  Federal  District  Court,
which  afﬁrmed  the  Board’s  decision.  On  appeal,  the  Seventh  Circuit
observed that the “single question” at issue was whether written docu
mentation  of  the  conference  in  the  on-property  record  was  a  necessary
prerequisite  to  NRAB  arbitration,  and  determined  that  there  was  no
such  prerequisite  in  the  statute  or  rules.  But  instead  of  resting  its
decision  on  the  Union’s  primary,  statute-based  argument—that  the
panel  erred  in  ruling  that  it  lacked  jurisdiction  over  the  cases—it  re
versed  on  the  ground  that  the  NRAB’s  proceedings  were  incompatible
with due process.

Held:

1.  The Seventh Circuit erred in resolving the Union’s appeal under a
constitutional,  rather  than  a  statutory,  headline.  This  Court  granted
certiorari to address whether NRAB orders may be set aside for failure
to  comply  with  due  process  notwithstanding  § 153  First  (q)’s  limited
grounds  for  review.  But  so  long  as  a  respondent  does  not  “seek  to
modify the judgment below,” true here, the respondent may “rely upon
any matter appearing in the record in support of the judgment.”  Blum
v.  Bacon, 457 U. S. 132, 137, n. 5.  The Seventh Circuit understood that
the  Union  had  pressed  “statutory  and  constitutional”  arguments,  but
observed that both arguments homed in on a “single question”: Is writ
ten documentation of the conference in the on-property record a neces
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, likely from a court opinion. It outlines the facts of a case involving a labor dispute between the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Locomotive Engineers union, focusing on the issue of whether proof of conferencing was required for arbitration.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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2

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR

Syllabus

Taylor’s §924(c) conviction and remanded the case for resentencing.  In
reaching its judgment, the Fourth Circuit noted that other courts have
held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does qualify as a crime of vio-
lence under the elements clause.

Held: Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of vio-
lence” under §924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires
proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use
force.  Pp. 3–13.

(a) The Court applies a “categorical approach” to determine whether
a federal felony may serve as a predicate for a conviction and sentence
under the elements clause, which poses the question whether the fed-
eral felony in question “has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force.”  §924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).  The
relevant inquiry is not how any particular defendant may commit the
crime but whether the federal felony at issue always requires the gov-
ernment  to  prove—beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  as  an  element  of  its
case—the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.  This Court
has  long  understood  similarly  worded  statutes  to  demand  similarly
categorical inquiries.  See, e.g., Borden v. United States, 593 U. S. ___,
___.

An  attempted  Hobbs  Act  robbery  does  not  satisfy  the  elements
clause.  To secure a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the
government must prove that the defendant intended to complete the
offense and that the defendant completed a “substantial step” toward
that end.  See, e.g., United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U. S. 102, 107.
An intention is just that, no more.  And whatever a substantial step
requires, it does not require the government to prove that the defend-
ant  used,  attempted  to  use,  or  even  threatened  to  use  force  against
another person or his property—even if the facts would allow the gov-
ernment to do so in many cases.  As the Model Penal Code explains
with respect to the Hobbs Act’s common-law robbery analogue, “there
will be cases, appropriately reached by a charge of attempted robbery,
where  the  actor  does  not  actually  harm  anyone  or  even  threaten
harm.”  ALI, Model Penal Code §222.1, p. 114.  But no element of at-
tempted  Hobbs  Act  robbery  requires  proof  that  the  defendant  used,
attempted to use, or threatened to use force.  Pp. 3–6.

(b) The government’s countervailing arguments fail.  Pp. 6–13.

(1) The government first argues that the elements clause encom-
passes not only any offense that qualifies as a “crime of violence” but
also any attempt to commit such a crime.  But the elements clause only
asks whether the defendant did commit a crime of violence as defined
by the statute.  Pp. 6–7.

(2) The  government  next  argues  that  the  “substantial  step”  ele-
ment of attempted Hobbs Act robbery categorically requires it to prove
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the court's decision in a case. It summarizes the legal arguments and the court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2005

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

EBAY INC. ET AL. v. MERCEXCHANGE, L. L. C.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 05–130.  Argued March 29, 2006—Decided May 15, 2006

Petitioners  operate  popular  Internet  Web  sites  that  allow  private  sell-
ers  to  list  goods  they  wish  to  sell.    Respondent  sought  to  license  its
business  method  patent  to  petitioners,  but  no  agreement  was
reached.  In respondent’s subsequent patent infringement suit, a jury
found  that  its  patent  was  valid,  that  petitioners  had  infringed  the
patent,  and  that  damages  were  appropriate.    However,  the  District
Court denied respondent’s motion for permanent injunctive relief.  In
reversing,  the  Federal  Circuit  applied  its  “general  rule  that  courts
will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent
exceptional circumstances.”  401 F. 3d 1323, 1339.

Held: The  traditional  four-factor  test  applied  by  courts  of  equity  when
considering  whether  to  award  permanent  injunctive  relief  to  a  pre-
vailing  plaintiff  applies  to  disputes  arising  under  the  Patent  Act.
That test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered
an  irreparable  injury;  (2)  that  remedies  available  at  law  are  inade-
quate to compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the balance
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity
is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved
by a permanent injunction.  The decision to grant or deny such relief
is  an  act  of  equitable  discretion  by  the  district  court,  reviewable  on
appeal  for  abuse  of  discretion.  These  principles  apply  with  equal
force to Patent Act disputes.  “[A] major departure from the long tra-
dition of equity practice should not be lightly implied.”  Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo,  456  U. S.  305,  320.    Nothing  in  the  Act  indicates
such a departure.  Pp. 2–6.

401 F. 3d 1323, vacated and remanded.

THOMAS, J.,  delivered  the  opinion  for  a  unanimous  Court.    ROBERTS,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of court opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case's legal issues and holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:47] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

928

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 15, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–1811. Blakley et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 137 F. 3d 1349.

No. 97–1814. Seals, aka Brooks v. United States. C. A.

D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 451.

No. 97–1823. Saile v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 443.

No. 97–1826. Biddle v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 427.

No. 97–5076. Law v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 105 F. 3d 670.

No. 97–5347. Bonner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 114 F. 3d 1202.

No. 97–5882. Chargualaf v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 114 F. 3d 1196.

No. 97–6069. Rivero-Cabanas v. United States. C. A. 1st

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 114 F. 3d 1170.

No. 97–6319. Pyle et ux. v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 113 F. 3d 1249.

No. 97–6823. Grant v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F. 3d 216.

No. 97–6853. Young v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F. 3d 794.

No. 97–6969. Reyes v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 120 F. 3d 271.

No. 97–7002. White v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–7171. McDonald v. United States; and
No. 97–7173. Davis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 127 F. 3d 38.

No. 97–7179. Shelby v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 121 F. 3d 1118.

No. 97–7571. Phillips v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, circuit courts, and certiorari decisions. This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is more suitable for indexing as metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summaries/Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
970

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 20, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–191.  J.  W.  v.  Knight,  Senior  Status  Judge,  Circuit
Court  of  Mercer  County,  West  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  App.
W.  Va.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  223  W.  Va.  785,  679
S.  E.  2d  617.

No. 09–193.  Abner v.  Probate Court of Mobile, Alabama.

Sup.  Ct.  Ala.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–195.  Reust  v.  Alaska.  Sup.  Ct.  Alaska.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  206  P.  3d  437.

No.  09–199.  Halliwell  et  al.  v.  Superior  Court  of  Cali
fornia,  Sonoma  County,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st  App.  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–209.  Culver  v.  Alabama.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Ala.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  22  So.  3d  499.

No.  09–232.  Cox  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.

Dist.,  Div.  2.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–266.  Bowens et al. v. Quinn, Governor of Illinois.
C. A. 7th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 561 F. 3d 671.

No.  09–286.  Sullivan  v.  University  of  Texas  Health  Sci
ence  Center  at  Houston  Dental  Branch  et  al.  Ct.  App.
Tex.,  10th  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–313.  Howard  v.  Department  of  the  Army.  C.  A.
4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 307 Fed. Appx. 765.

No. 09–318.  Morris et al. v.  Lanpher et al.  C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  399.

No.  09–323.  Scambos  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  221.

No.  09–332.  Minh  Huynh  et  ux.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 334 Fed. Appx. 636.

No.  09–339.  Tway  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  377.

No. 09–344.  Davis v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  279.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case citations from a legal document, likely a Supreme Court docket.  It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual legal arguments or opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION

Opinion of the Court

impact  is  limited  to  the  size  of  individual  disputes,  and
presumably  outweighed  by  savings  from  avoiding  the
courts.  But when damages allegedly owed to tens of thou-
sands of potential claimants are aggregated and decided at
once,  the  risk  of  an  error  will  often  become  unacceptable.
Faced  with  even  a  small  chance  of  a  devastating  loss,
defendants  will  be  pressured  into  settling  questionable
claims.  Other courts have noted the risk of “in terrorem”
settlements  that  class  actions  entail,  see,  e.g.,  Kohen  v.
Pacific Inv. Management Co. LLC, 571 F. 3d 672, 677–678
(CA7 2009), and class arbitration would be no different.

Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class
litigation.  In litigation, a defendant may appeal a certifi-
cation decision on an interlocutory basis and, if unsuccess-
ful, may appeal from a final judgment as well.  Questions
of law are reviewed de novo and questions of fact for clear
error.  In contrast, 9 U. S. C. §10 allows a court to vacate
an arbitral award only where the award “was procured by
corruption,  fraud,  or  undue  means”;  “there  was  evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators”; “the arbitrators
were  guilty  of  misconduct  in  refusing  to  postpone  the
hearing  . . .  or  in  refusing  to  hear  evidence  pertinent  and
material to the controversy[,] or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced”; or
if the “arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award . . .
was  not  made.”  The  AAA  rules  do  authorize  judicial  re-
view  of  certification  decisions,  but  this  review  is  unlikely
to  have  much  effect  given  these  limitations;  review  un-
der  §10  focuses  on  misconduct  rather  than  mistake.    And
parties  may  not  contractually  expand  the  grounds  or
nature of judicial review.  Hall Street Assocs., 552 U. S., at
578.  We find it hard to believe that defendants would bet
the  company  with  no  effective  means  of  review,  and  even
harder  to  believe  that  Congress  would  have  intended  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the drawbacks of class arbitration. It's sequential text and provides relevant legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

THOMAS, J., dissenting

standing and, consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction.

II

Even if the plaintiffs had standing, the Court would still
lack the authority to enjoin Louisiana’s law, which repre-
sents a constitutionally valid exercise of the State’s tradi-
tional police powers.  The plurality and THE CHIEF JUSTICE
claim that the Court’s judgment is dictated by “our prece-
dents,”  particularly  Whole  Woman’s  Health.  Ante,  at  38
(plurality  opinion);  see  also  ante,  at  2,  11–16  (ROBERTS,
C. J., concurring in judgment).  For the detailed reasons ex-
plained  by  JUSTICE ALITO,  this  is  not  true.  Post,  at  3–23
(dissenting opinion).

But today’s decision is wrong for a far simpler reason: The
Constitution does not constrain the States’ ability to regu-
late or even prohibit abortion.  This Court created the right
to abortion based on an amorphous, unwritten right to pri-
vacy, which it grounded in the “legal fiction” of substantive
due  process,  McDonald  v.  Chicago,  561  U. S.  742,  811
(2010)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in
judgment).    As  the  origins  of  this  jurisprudence  readily
demonstrate,  the  putative  right  to  abortion  is  a  creation
that should be undone.

A
The  Court  first  conceived  a  free-floating  constitutional
right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479
(1965).  In that case, the Court declared unconstitutional a
state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives, finding that
it violated a married couple’s “right of privacy.”  Id., at 486.
The Court explained that this right could be found in the
“penumbras” of five different Amendments to the Constitu-
tion—the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth.  Id., at 484.
Rather than explain what free speech or the quartering of
troops had to do with contraception, the Court simply de-
clared that these rights had created “zones of privacy” with
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

do  not  evidence  hostility  to  religion  of  the  kind  we  have
previously  held  to  signal  a  free-exercise  violation,  nor  do
the  comments  by  one  or  two  members  of  one  of  the  four
decisionmaking  entities  considering  this  case  justify  re-
versing the judgment below.

I

On  March  13,  2014—approximately  three  months  after
the  ALJ  ruled  in  favor  of  the  same-sex  couple,  Craig  and
Mullins,  and  two  months  before  the  Commission  heard
Phillips’  appeal  from  that  decision—William  Jack  visited
three  Colorado  bakeries.  His  visits  followed  a  similar
pattern.  He requested two cakes

“made  to  resemble  an  open  Bible.   He  also  requested
that each cake be decorated with Biblical verses.  [He]
requested  that  one  of  the  cakes  include  an  image  of
two groomsmen, holding hands, with a red ‘X’ over the
image.  On  one  cake,  he  requested  [on]  one  side[,]
. . .   ‘God  hates  sin.    Psalm  45:7’  and  on  the  opposite
side  of  the  cake  ‘Homosexuality  is  a  detestable  sin.
Leviticus 18:2.’  On the second cake, [the one] with the
image  of  the  two  groomsmen  covered  by  a  red  ‘X’
[Jack] requested [these words]: ‘God loves sinners’ and
on  the  other  side  ‘While  we  were  yet  sinners  Christ
died for us.  Romans 5:8.’ ”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 319a;
see id., at 300a, 310a.

In contrast to Jack, Craig and Mullins simply requested a
wedding  cake:  They  mentioned  no  message  or  anything
else distinguishing the cake they wanted to buy from any
other wedding cake Phillips would have sold.

One bakery told Jack it would make cakes in the shape
of Bibles, but would not decorate them with the requested
messages;  the  owner  told  Jack  her  bakery  “does  not  dis-
criminate” and “accept[s] all humans.”  Id., at 301a (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).  The  second  bakery  owner
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>