<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

339

Opinion of the Court

come Tax Returns 2 (2009) (hereinafter Statistics of Income)
(5.8  million  for-proﬁt  corporations  ﬁled  2006  tax  returns).
PACs, furthermore, must exist before they can speak.
Given the onerous restrictions, a corporation may not be able
to establish a PAC in time to make its views known regard
ing candidates and issues in a current campaign.

Section  441b’s  prohibition  on  corporate  independent  ex
penditures is thus a ban on speech.  As a “restriction on the
amount  of  money  a  person  or  group  can  spend  on  political
communication during a campaign,” that statute “necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number
of  issues  discussed,  the  depth  of  their  exploration,  and  the
size  of  the  audience  reached.”  Buckley  v.  Valeo,  424  U. S.
1,  19  (1976)  (per  curiam).  Were  the  Court  to  uphold  these
restrictions,  the  Government  could  repress  speech  by  si
lencing  certain  voices  at  any  of  the  various  points  in  the
speech  process.  See  McConnell,  supra,  at  251  (opinion  of
Scalia, J.) (Government could repress speech by “attacking
all  levels  of  the  production  and  dissemination  of  ideas,”  for
“effective  public  communication  requires  the  speaker  to
make  use  of  the  services  of  others”).  If  § 441b  applied  to
individuals,  no  one  would  believe  that  it  is  merely  a  time,
place, or manner restriction on speech.  Its purpose and ef
fect  are  to  silence  entities  whose  voices  the  Government
deems to be suspect.

Speech  is  an  essential  mechanism  of  democracy,  for  it  is
the  means  to  hold  ofﬁcials  accountable  to  the  people.  See
Buckley,  supra,  at  14–15  (“In  a  republic  where  the  people
are  sovereign,  the  ability  of  the  citizenry  to  make  informed
choices among candidates for ofﬁce is essential”).  The right
of  citizens  to  inquire,  to  hear,  to  speak,  and  to  use  informa
tion to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-
government and a necessary means to protect it.  The First
Amendment “ ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to
speech  uttered  during  a  campaign  for  political  ofﬁce.”  Eu
v.  San  Francisco  County  Democratic  Central  Comm.,  489
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing campaign finance laws and the First Amendment right to free speech. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA

INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

SCALIA, J., dissenting

wanton  assaults  and  from  the  daily  aggressions  of
party spirit. . . .

“I am inclined to believe this practice of the Ameri-
can courts to be at once most favorable to liberty and
to public order.  If the judge could only attack the leg-
islator  only  openly  and  directly,  he  would  sometimes
be afraid to oppose him; and at other times party spir-
it  might  encourage  him  to  brave  it  at  every  turn. . . .
But  the  American  judge  is  brought  into  the  political
arena  independently  of  his  own  will.  He  judges  the
law only because he is obliged to judge a case.  The po-
litical  question  that  he  is  called  upon  to  resolve  is
connected  with  the  interests  of  the  parties,  and  he
cannot refuse to decide it without a denial of justice.”
A.  de  Tocqueville,  Democracy  in  America  102-03  (P.
Bradley ed. 1948).

That  doctrine  of  standing,  that  jurisdictional  limitation
upon  our  powers,  does  not  have  as  its  purpose  (as  the
majority  assumes)  merely  to  assure  that  we  will  decide
disputes in concrete factual contexts that enable “realistic
appreciation  of  the  consequences  of  judicial  action,”  ante,
at 14.  To the contrary.  “[T]he law of Art. III standing is
built  on  a  single  basic  idea—the  idea  of  separation  of
powers.”  Allen  v.  Wright,  468  U. S.  737,  752  (1984).    It
keeps us minding our own business.

We  consult  history  and  judicial  tradition  to  determine
whether  a  given  “ ‘disput[e  is]  appropriately  resolved
through the judicial process.’ ”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life,  504  U. S.  555,  560  (1992)  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  What history and judicial tradition show is that
courts do not resolve direct disputes between two political
branches  of  the  same  government  regarding  their  respec-
tive  powers.  Nearly  every  separation-of-powers  case
presents questions like the ones in this case.  But we have
never  passed  on  a  separation-of-powers  question  raised
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia. It discusses the concept of standing in court and its relation to the separation of powers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Opinion of the Court

B
The  “unremarkable”  principles  applied  in  Trinity  Lu-
theran and Espinoza suffice to resolve this case.  Maine of-
fers  its  citizens  a  benefit:  tuition  assistance  payments  for
any family whose school district does not provide a public
secondary school.  Just like the wide range of nonprofit or-
ganizations  eligible  to  receive  playground  resurfacing
grants in Trinity Lutheran, a wide range of private schools
are  eligible  to  receive  Maine  tuition  assistance  payments
here.  And like the daycare center in Trinity Lutheran, BCS
and Temple Academy are disqualified from this generally
available  benefit  “solely  because  of  their  religious  charac-
ter.”  582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10).  By “condition[ing]
the availability of benefits” in that manner, Maine’s tuition
assistance  program—like  the  program  in  Trinity  Lu-
theran—“effectively penalizes the free exercise” of religion.
Ibid. (quoting McDaniel, 435 U. S., at 626 (plurality opin-
ion)).

Our recent decision in Espinoza applied these basic prin-
ciples in the context of religious education that we consider
today.  There,  as  here,  we  considered  a  state  benefit  pro-
gram  under  which  public  funds  flowed  to  support  tuition
payments at private schools.  And there, as here, that pro-
gram specifically carved out private religious schools from
those eligible to receive such funds.  While the wording of
the Montana and Maine provisions is different, their effect
is the same: to “disqualify some private schools” from fund-
ing  “solely  because  they  are  religious.”    591  U. S.,  at  ___
(slip  op.,  at  20).  A  law  that  operates  in  that  manner,  we
held in Espinoza, must be subjected to “the strictest scru-
tiny.”  Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 11–12).

To  satisfy  strict  scrutiny,  government  action  “must  ad-
vance ‘interests of the highest order’ and must be narrowly
tailored in pursuit of those interests.”  Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993) (quot-
ing McDaniel, 435 U. S., at 628 (plurality opinion)).  “A law
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases (Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza) and analyzes a state tuition assistance program.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1037

558 U. S.

November 16, 2009

No. 09–7133.  Michel v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  125.

No. 09–7137.  Nelson v. United States.  C. A. 1st Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7138.  Castillo-Hernandez  v.  United  States.

C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–174.  Glogower  v.  Clark,  Liquidator  of  National
Business  Association  Trust  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Motion  of
National  Association  of  Insurance  Commissioners  for  leave  to  ﬁle
a  brief  as  amicus  curiae  granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  809.

No.  09–217.  Peters  v.  Scivantage  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  564  F.
3d  110.

No. 09–360.  Levine v. McCabe et al.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.
Appx.  315.

No. 09–427.  Grant v.  United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.
Appx.  19.

No.  09–444  (09A452).  Elliott  v.  Kelly,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th
Cir.  Application  for  stay  of  execution  of  sentence  of  death,  pre
sented  to  The  Chief  Justice,  and  by  him  referred  to  the  Court,
denied.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Stevens,  Justice  Gins
burg,  and  Justice  Sotomayor  would  grant  the  application  for
stay  of  execution.

No.  09–6919.  Dunlap  v.  Graham,  Superintendent,  Au
burn  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or
decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  583  F.  3d  160.

No. 09–6982.  Pitcher v. United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

LEONARD v. TEXAS

Statement of THOMAS, J.

sale.  It also affirmed the trial court’s rejection of petition-
er’s innocent-owner defense.  Petitioner had asserted that
the  money  was  not  related  to  a  drug  sale  at  all,  but  was
instead  from  a  home  she  had  recently  sold  in  Pennsylva-
nia.  The  court  deemed  this  testimony  insufficient  to  es-
tablish that she was in fact an innocent owner.

Petitioner  now  challenges  the  constitutionality  of  the
procedures used to adjudicate the seizure of her property.
In  particular,  she  argues  that  the  Due  Process  Clause
required  the  State  to  carry  its  burden  by  clear  and  con-
vincing  evidence  rather  than  by  a  preponderance  of  the
evidence.

II

Modern civil forfeiture statutes are plainly designed, at
least  in  part,  to  punish  the  owner  of  property  used  for
criminal purposes.  See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509
U. S. 602, 618–619 (1993).  When a state wishes to punish
one  of  its  citizens,  it  ordinarily  proceeds  against  the  de-
fendant personally (known as “in personam”), and in many
cases  it  must  provide  the  defendant  with  full  criminal
procedural  protections.  Nevertheless,  for  reasons  dis-
cussed  below,  this  Court  permits  prosecutors  seeking
forfeiture  to  proceed  against  the  property  (known  as
“in rem”)  and  to  do  so  civilly.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.
James  Daniel  Good  Real  Property,  510  U. S.  43,  56–57
(1993).  In rem proceedings often enable the government to
seize  the  property  without  any  predeprivation  judicial
process and to obtain forfeiture of the property even when
the  owner  is  personally  innocent  (though  some  statutes,
including  the  one  here,  provide  for  an  innocent-owner
defense).  Civil  proceedings  often  lack  certain  procedural
protections that accompany criminal proceedings, such  as
the  right  to  a  jury  trial  and  a  heightened  standard  of
proof.

Partially  as  a  result  of  this  distinct  legal  regime,  civil
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the statement of Justice Thomas in the case of Leonard v. Texas. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

circumstances at the time, racial segregation did not “nec-
essarily  imply  the  inferiority  of  either  race  to  the  other”).
Congress was not persuaded.  Supporters of the soon-to-be
1875  Act  successfully  countered  that  symmetrical  re-
strictions  did  not  constitute  equality,  and  they  did  so  on
colorblind terms.

For  example,  they  asserted  that  “free  government  de-
mands the abolition of all distinctions founded on color and
race.”  2 Cong. Rec. 4083 (1874).  And, they submitted that
“[t]he time has come when all distinctions that grew out of
slavery  ought  to  disappear.”  Cong.  Globe,  42d  Cong.,  2d
Sess., 3193 (1872) (“[A]s long as you have distinctions and
discriminations between white and black in the enjoyment
of legal rights and privileges[,] you will have discontent and
parties divided between black and white”).  Leading Repub-
lican  Senator  Charles  Sumner  compellingly  argued  that
“any rule excluding a man on account of his color is an in-
dignity, an insult, and a wrong.”  Id., at 242; see also ibid.
(“I insist that by the law of the land all persons without dis-
tinction of color shall be equal before the law”).  Far from
conceding that segregation would be perceived as inoffen-
sive if race roles were reversed, he declared that “[t]his is
plain  oppression,  which  you  . . .  would  feel  keenly  were  it
directed against you or your child.”  Id., at 384.  He went on
to  paraphrase  the  English  common-law  rule  to  which  he
subscribed: “[The law] makes no discrimination on account
of color.”  Id., at 385.

Others echoed this view.  Representative John Lynch de-
clared that “[t]he duty of the law-maker is to know no race,
no color, no religion, no nationality, except to prevent dis-
tinctions on any of these grounds, so far as the law is con-
cerned.”  3 Cong. Rec. 945 (1875).  Senator John Sherman
believed that the route to peace was to “[w]ipe out all legal
discriminations  between  white  and  black  [and]  make  no
distinction  between  black  and  white.”  Cong.  Globe,  42d
Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  at  3193.    And,  Senator  Henry  Wilson
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in a case about affirmative action. It discusses historical arguments against segregation and for colorblindness in law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

333.  Expanding on this theme, Harvard and UNC have of-
fered a grab bag of interests to justify their programs, span-
ning from “ ‘training future leaders in the public and private
sectors’ ”  to  “ ‘enhancing  appreciation,  respect,  and  empa-
thy,’ ” with references to “ ‘better educating [their] students
through diversity’ ” in between.  Ante, at 22–23.  The Court
today finds that each of these interests are too vague and
immeasurable to suffice, ibid., and I agree.
  Even in Grutter, the Court failed to clearly define “the ed-
ucational benefits of a diverse student body.”  539 U. S., at
333.  Thus, in the years since Grutter, I have sought to un-
derstand  exactly  how  racial  diversity  yields  educational
benefits.  With nearly 50 years to develop their arguments,
neither Harvard nor UNC—two of the foremost research in-
stitutions in the world—nor any of their amici can explain
that critical link.

Harvard, for example, offers a report finding that mean-
ingful representation of racial minorities promotes several
goals.  Only one of those goals—“producing new knowledge
stemming from diverse outlooks,” 980 F. 3d 157, 174 (CA1
2020)—bears any possible relationship to educational ben-
efits.  Yet, it too is extremely vague and offers no indication
that, for example, student test scores increased as a result
of Harvard’s efforts toward racial diversity.

More fundamentally, it is not clear how racial diversity,
as opposed to other forms of diversity, uniquely and inde-
pendently  advances  Harvard’s  goal.    This  is  particularly
true because Harvard blinds itself to other forms of appli-
cant diversity, such as religion.  See 2 App. in No. 20–1199,
pp. 734–743.  It may be the case that exposure to different
perspectives and thoughts can foster debate, sharpen young
minds, and hone students’ reasoning skills.  But, it is not
clear how diversity with respect to race, qua race, furthers
this goal.  Two white students, one from rural Appalachia
and  one  from  a  wealthy  San  Francisco  suburb,  may  well
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It argues against the use of race as a factor in college admissions, citing a lack of clear evidence demonstrating the educational benefits of racial diversity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U92

[09-15-00 14:34:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 399 (1998)

405

Opinion of the Court

mentary disclosure of communications as an exception to the
privilege: “[T]he general rule with respect to conﬁdential
communications . . . is that such communications are privi-
leged during the testator’s lifetime and, also, after the testa-
tor’s death unless sought to be disclosed in litigation between
the testator’s heirs.” Osborn, 561 F. 2d, at 1340. The ra-
tionale for such disclosure is that it furthers the client’s in-
tent.

Id., at 1340, n. 11.2

Indeed, in Glover v. Patten, 165 U. S. 394, 406–408 (1897),
this Court,
in recognizing the testamentary exception,
expressly assumed that the privilege continues after the
individual’s death. The Court explained that testamentary
disclosure was permissible because the privilege, which
normally protects the client’s interests, could be impliedly
waived in order to fulﬁll the client’s testamentary intent.
Id., at 407–408 (quoting Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall. 175
(1866), and Russell v. Jackson, supra).

The great body of this case law supports, either by holding
or considered dicta, the position that the privilege does sur-
vive in a case such as the present one. Given the language
of Rule 501, at the very least the burden is on the Independ-

2 About half the States have codiﬁed the testamentary exception by pro-
viding that a personal representative of the deceased can waive the privi-
lege when heirs or devisees claim through the deceased client (as opposed
to parties claiming against the estate, for whom the privilege is not
waived). See, e. g., Ala. Rule Evid. 502 (1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 16–41–
101, Rule 502 (Supp. 1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27–503, Rule 503 (1995).
These statutes do not address expressly the continuation of the privilege
outside the context of testamentary disputes, although many allow the
attorney to assert the privilege on behalf of the client apparently without
temporal limit. See, e. g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16–41–101, Rule 502(c) (Supp.
1997). They thus do not refute or afﬁrm the general presumption in the
case law that the privilege survives. California’s statute is exceptional in
that it apparently allows the attorney to assert the privilege only so long
as a holder of the privilege (the estate’s personal representative) exists,
suggesting the privilege terminates when the estate is wound up. See
Cal. Code Evid. Ann. §§ 954, 957 (West 1995). But no other State has
followed California’s lead in this regard.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the attorney-client privilege in the context of a will. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

ALITO, J., dissenting

on this issue, see Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 155–
156 (1993); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 766 (1973), but
a plaintiff can satisfy the former burden simply by adducing
evidence—in  any  acceptable  form—that  race  did  not  pre-
dominate.
  A  plaintiff  need  not  offer  computer-related  evidence.
Once upon a time, legislative maps were drawn without us-
ing  a  computer,  and  nothing  prevents  a  §2  plaintiff  from
taking this old-school approach in creating an illustrative
district.  See, e.g., M. Altman, K. McDonald, & M. McDon-
ald,  From  Crayons  to  Computers:  The  Evolution  of  Com-
puter Use in Redistricting, 23 Soc. Sci. Computer Rev. 334,
335–336 (2005).  In that event, the plaintiff can simply call
upon the mapmaker to testify about the process he or she
used and the role, if any, that race played in that process.
The  defendant  may  seek  to  refute  that  testimony  in  any
way that the rules of civil procedure and evidence allow.
  If,  as  will  often  be  the  case  today,  a  §2  plaintiff ’s  map-
maker  uses  a  computer  program,  the  expert  can  testify
about  the  weight,  if  any,  that  the  program  gives  to  race.
The plaintiff will presumably argue that any role assigned
to race was not predominant, and the defendant can contest
this by cross-examining the plaintiff ’s expert, seeking the
actual program in discovery, and calling its own expert to
testify  about  the  program’s  treatment  of  race.    After  this,
the trial court will be in a position to determine whether the
program gave race a “predominant” role.
  This is an entirely workable scheme.  It does not obligate
either  party  to  offer  computer  evidence,  and  it  minimizes
the likelihood of a clash between what §2 requires and what
the Constitution forbids.  We have long assumed that §2 is
consistent  with  the  Constitution.    See,  e.g.,  Cooper,  581
U. S., at 301 (assuming States have a compelling interest
in  complying  with  §2);  Shaw  II,  517  U. S.,  at  915  (same);
Vera, 517 U. S., at 977 (plurality opinion) (same).  But that
cannot mean that every conceivable interpretation of §2 is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Allen v. Milligan. It discusses the legal standard for determining if race was a predominant factor in drawing a legislative map, focusing on the use of computer programs in the redistricting process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

dirt and rocks.  A few months later, the EPA sent the Sack-
etts a compliance order informing them that their backfill-
ing violated the CWA because their property contained pro-
tected  wetlands.    The  EPA  demanded  that  the  Sacketts
immediately “ ‘undertake activities to restore the Site’ ” pur-
suant to a “ ‘Restoration Work Plan’ ” that it provided.  Sack-
ett v. EPA, 566 U. S. 120, 125 (2012).  The order threatened
the Sacketts with penalties of over $40,000 per day if they
did not comply.

At  the  time,  the  EPA  interpreted  “the  waters  of  the
United States” to include “[a]ll . . . waters” that “could affect
interstate or foreign commerce,” as well as “[w]etlands ad-
jacent”  to  those  waters.  40  CFR  §§230.3(s)(3),  (7)  (2008).
“[A]djacent”  was  defined  to  mean  not  just  “bordering”  or
“contiguous,”  but  also  “neighboring.”    §230.3(b).  Agency
guidance instructed officials to assert jurisdiction over wet-
lands  “adjacent”  to  non-navigable  tributaries  when  those
wetlands had “a significant nexus to a traditional navigable
water.”6  A “significant nexus” was said to exist when “ ‘wet-
lands,  either  alone  or  in  combination  with  similarly  situ-
ated lands  in the region, significantly affect the chemical,
physical,  and  biological  integrity’ ”  of  those  waters.  2007
Guidance 8 (emphasis added).  In looking for evidence of a
“significant nexus,” field agents were told to consider a wide
range  of  open-ended  hydrological  and  ecological  factors.
See id., at 7.

According to the EPA, the “wetlands” on the Sacketts’ lot
are  “adjacent  to”  (in  the  sense  that  they  are  in  the  same
neighborhood as) what it described as an “unnamed tribu-
tary”  on  the  other  side  of  a  30-foot  road.    App.  33.  That
tributary feeds into a non-navigable creek, which, in turn,
feeds into Priest Lake, an intrastate body of water that the

——————

6 EPA & Corps, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U. S. Su-
preme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United
States 7–11 (2007) (2007 Guidance).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the Clean Water Act and a case involving the Sacketts family. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is part of the actual legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

964

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 26, July 8, 10, 13, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–1527. Ruck v. United Transportation Union, Exec-
utive Board, et al., 523 U. S. 1078. Motions for leave to ﬁle
petitions for rehearing denied.

Miscellaneous Orders

July 8, 1998

No. A–33 (O. T. 1998). Henderson v. Norris, Director, Ar-
kansas Department of Correction, et al. Application for
stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice
Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.

No. 98–5117 (A–29).

In re Henderson. Application for stay
of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Thomas,
and by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer
habeas corpus denied.
would grant the application for stay of execution.

Certiorari Denied

No. 98–5116 (A–28). Henderson v. Norris, Director, Ar-
kansas Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Appli-
cation for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to
Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Cer-
tiorari denied.

Rehearing Denied

July 10, 1998

No. 97–8791 (A–30). Plath v. Moore, Director, South Car-
olina Department of Corrections, et al., 523 U. S. 1143.
Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, addressed
to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied. Peti-
tion for rehearing denied.

Miscellaneous Orders

July 13, 1998

No. 98–5201 (A–45).

In re Thompson. Application for stay
of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice O(cid:146)Con-
nor, and by her referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ
of habeas corpus denied.

No. 98–5202 (A–46).

In re Thompson. Application for stay
of execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice O(cid:146)Con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal case summaries from the Supreme Court. It includes case numbers, dates, and brief descriptions of actions taken by the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

29

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

of adoption to have defined dimensions.  But in doing so, we
must  keep  in  mind  that  there  is  a  presumption  that  the
words  of  the  Constitution  are  to  be  interpreted  in  accord-
ance  with  their  “normal  and  ordinary”  sense.  Id.,  at  576
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Anyone advocating a
different reading must overcome that presumption.

B
1
What  was  the  free-exercise  right  understood  to  mean
when the Bill of Rights was ratified?  And in particular, was
it clearly understood that the right simply required equal
treatment for religious and secular conduct?  When Smith
was  decided,  scholars  had  not  devoted  much  attention  to
the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, and the
parties’ briefs ignored this issue, as did the opinion of the
Court.  Since then, however, the historical record has been
plumbed in detail,34 and we are now in a good position to

——————

34 See,  e.g.,  McConnell,  The Origins  and  Historical  Understanding  of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1990) (McConnell, Or-
igins); McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism 1109; McConnell, Freedom
From Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience?: A Critique
of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 819 (1998) (McConnell, Freedom From Persecution);
Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Histori-
cal Perspective, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 915 (1992) (Hamburger, Religious
Exemption); Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 Va. L. Rev. 835 (2004) (Ham-
burger, More Is Less); Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. Con-
temp. Legal Issues 313 (1996); Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemp-
tions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 245 (1991);
Campbell, Note, A New Approach to Nineteenth Century Religious Ex-
emption Cases, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 973 (2011) (Campbell, A New Approach);
Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and Re-
ligious Diversity, 59 UMKC L. Rev. 591 (1991); Lash, The Second Adop-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Four-
teenth  Amendment,  88  Nw.  U.  L.  Rev.  1106  (1994);  Lombardi,
Nineteenth-Century Free Exercise Jurisprudence and the Challenge of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal jargon and cites previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1076

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 17, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8408. Leone v. Kerley et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8412. Markay v. Farmer, Attorney General of

New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8422. Miller v. Davis-Morrell, Warden. C. A.

11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8446. Trudeau v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th

App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8460. Cintron v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 351 N. C. 39, 519 S. E. 2d
523.

No. 99–8462. Williams v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Po-
tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Jackson v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer-

No. 99–8469.

tiorari denied. Reported below: 127 Md. App. 785.

No. 99–8478. Polk v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 841.

No. 99–8510. Moore v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 793.

No. 99–8515. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1121.

No. 99–8517. Walton v. Taylor, Warden. Sup. Ct. Va.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8518. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 467.

No. 99–8522. Weslowski v. Department of the Army.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 217 F. 3d
854.

No. 99–8525. Steadman v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 643.

No. 99–8529. Benson v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265
App. Div. 2d 814, 697 N. Y. S. 2d 222.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1082

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 7, 2009

558 U. S.

No. 09–7242.  Clark v.  Pennsylvania.  Sup. Ct. Pa.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  599  Pa.  204,  961  A.  2d  80.

No.  09–7255.  White  v.  Rabner,  Chief  Justice,  Supreme
Court  of  New  Jersey.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  349  Fed.  Appx.  681.

No.  09–7329.  Solis-Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7355.  Richardson v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  347  Fed.  Appx.  481.

No.  09–7356.  Shareef  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  576  F.  3d  365.

No.  09–7359.  Barrera  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  347  Fed.  Appx.  51.

No.  09–7364.  Romero  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  470.

No.  09–7369.  Mathis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  997.

No.  09–7371.  Bryant  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7372.  Welch  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  859.

No.  09–7375.  Cordova  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  427.

No.  09–7376.  Deputy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7378.  Velasquez-Martinez  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.
Appx.  285.

No.  09–7380.  Pratt  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–7387.  Fox v. United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  573  F.  3d  1050.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

licensing-official  respondents  had  enforcement  authority,
the chance of them using it is, at present, entirely “imagi-
nary” and “speculative.”  Younger, 401 U. S., at 42.
  The irony of this case is that S. B. 8 has generated more
litigation against those who oppose abortion than those who
perform it.  Respondent Clarkston, a state-court clerk, re-
ports that only three S. B. 8 complaints have been filed in
the State of Texas, none of which has been served.  Brief for
Respondent Clarkston 9–10.  The private litigants brought
those actions only after a San Antonio doctor performed a
postheartbeat  abortion  and  openly  advertised  it  in  the
Washington Post.  See A. Braid, Why I Violated Texas’s Ex-
treme  Abortion  Ban,  Washington  Post,  Sept.  19,  2021,
p. A31, col. 2.  Opponents of abortion, meanwhile, have been
sued 14 times in the Texas state courts, including by some
of the very petitioners in this case.  See Brief for Respond-
ent Clarkston 10.4  Petitioners cast aspersions on the Texas
state courts, but those courts are not dawdling in these pre-
enforcement  actions.    The  Texas  courts  held  summary-
judgment  hearings  on  November  10  and  entered  partial
judgment  for  the  abortion  providers  on  December  9.    See
Van  Stean  v.  Texas,  No.  D–1–GN–21–004179  (Dist.  Ct.
Travis Cty., Tex., Dec. 9, 2021).  Simply put, S. B. 8’s sup-
porters  are  under  greater  threat  of  litigation  than  its  de-
tractors.
  Despite the foregoing, the principal opinion indicates that
the  prospect  of suit  by the  licensing  respondents is  immi-
nent.  It cites petitioners’ complaint, but the only relevant
paragraph conclusorily asserts a “risk [of] professional dis-
cipline”  because  certain  respondents  allegedly  “retain  the

——————

4 Dr. Braid also has filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois against
the three pro se plaintiffs who filed S. B. 8 actions against him.  See Com-
plaint in Braid v. Stilley, No. 21–cv–5283 (Oct. 5, 2021), ECF Doc. 1.  Two
of the three S. B. 8 plaintiffs have made filings in the case, and both are
proceeding pro se.  Meanwhile, 12 attorneys, all from major law firms or
interest groups, represent Dr. Braid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring and dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in a case related to Texas abortion law (S.B. 8).  It delves into the legal arguments and provides specific examples to support Justice Thomas's stance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–111
_________________

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

COLORADO

[June 4, 2018]

 JUSTICE  GINSBURG,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR

joins, dissenting.

There is much in the Court’s opinion with which I agree.
“[I]t  is  a  general  rule  that  [religious  and  philosophical]
objections  do  not  allow  business  owners  and  other  actors
in  the  economy  and  in  society  to  deny  protected  persons
equal  access  to  goods  and  services  under  a  neutral  and
generally applicable public accommodations law.”  Ante, at
9.  “Colorado  law  can  protect  gay  persons,  just  as  it  can
protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever
products and services they choose on the same terms and
conditions as  are  offered  to  other members  of  the  public.”
Ante, at 10.  “[P]urveyors of goods and services who object
to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons [may not]
put  up  signs  saying  ‘no  goods  or  services  will  be  sold  if
they  will  be  used  for  gay  marriages.’  ”  Ante,  at  12.  Gay
persons  may  be  spared  from  “indignities  when  they  seek
goods  and  services  in  an  open  market.”  Ante,  at  18.1  I

——————

1 As JUSTICE THOMAS observes, the Court does not hold that wedding
cakes are speech or expression entitled to First Amendment protection.
See ante, at 1 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Nor could it, consistent with our First Amendment precedents.  JUSTICE
THOMAS  acknowledges  that  for  conduct  to  constitute  protected  expres-
sion,  the  conduct  must  be  reasonably  understood  by  an  observer  to  be
communicative.    Ante,  at  4  (citing  Clark  v.  Community  for  Creative
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual legal reasoning and arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

610

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Opinion of the Court

First, we observed that § 922(q) was “a criminal statute
that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might de-
ﬁne those terms.”
Id., at 561. Reviewing our case law, we
noted that “we have upheld a wide variety of congressional
Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we have
concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate
commerce.”
Id., at 559. Although we cited only a few ex-
amples, including Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942);
Hodel, supra; Perez, supra; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U. S. 294 (1964); and Heart of Atlanta Motel, supra, we
stated that the pattern of analysis is clear. Lopez, 514 U. S.,
“Where economic activity substantially affects
at 559–560.
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will
be sustained.”

Id., at 560.

Both petitioners and Justice Souter’s dissent downplay
the role that the economic nature of the regulated activity
plays in our Commerce Clause analysis. But a fair reading
of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the
conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case.
See, e. g., id., at 551 (“The Act [does not] regulat[e] a com-
mercial activity”), 560 (“Even Wickard, which is perhaps
the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause author-
ity over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a
way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not”),
561 (“Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regu-
lation of economic activity”), 566 (“Admittedly, a determi-
nation whether an intrastate activity is commercial or non-
commercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty.
But, so long as Congress’ authority is limited to those powers
enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enu-
merated powers are interpreted as having judicially enforce-
able outer limits, congressional legislation under the Com-
merce Clause always will engender ‘legal uncertainty’ ”), 567
(“The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court in a case. It contains legal citations, analysis of previous cases, and arguments related to the Commerce Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–1449
_________________

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC., DBA CALPORTLAND,
PETITIONER v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 174

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
WASHINGTON

[June 1, 2023]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,

concurring in the judgment.

I  agree  that  petitioner’s  state-court  claims  are  not  pre-
empted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  The
majority reaches this conclusion, however, by applying the
Court’s precedent in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), which held that state courts
are  disabled  from  adjudicating  state-law  claims  that  con-
cern conduct “arguably” protected under the NLRA.  Id., at
245–246.  Because this Court has previously held that the
type of conduct alleged here is not protected, I join JUSTICE
ALITO’s opinion concurring in the judgment.  I write sepa-
rately to emphasize the oddity of Garmon’s broad pre-emp-
tion regime.

This Court typically applies a high bar before concluding
that federal law “strip[s] state courts of jurisdiction to hear
their own state claims.”  Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian,
590 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 11–12).  Likewise,
the Court  generally requires a “clear” purpose to displace
state law before finding that a federal statute does so.  Wy-
eth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

As the majority notes, however, Garmon “goes beyond the
usual preemption rule.”  Ante, at 3.  In Garmon, the Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal reasoning of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

BREYER, J., dissenting

based  on  actual  innocence.    All  had  been  imprisoned  for
more  than  30  years  (and  one  for  almost  40  years)  at  the
time of their exonerations.  National Registry of Exonera
tions, Exonerations in 2014, p. 2 (2015).

The  stories  of  three  of  the  men  exonerated  within  the
last  year  are  illustrative.  DNA  evidence  showed  that
Henry Lee McCollum did not commit the rape and murder
for  which  he  had  been  sentenced  to  death.    Katz  &  Eck
holm,  DNA  Evidence  Clears  Two  Men  in  1983  Murder,
N. Y.  Times,  Sept.  3,  2014,  p.  A1.    Last  Term,  this  Court
ordered that Anthony Ray Hinton, who had been convicted
of murder, receive further hearings in state court; he was
exonerated earlier this year because the forensic evidence
used  against  him  was  flawed.  Hinton  v.  Alabama,  571
U. S.  ___  (2014)  (per  curiam);  Blinder,  Alabama  Man  on
Death  Row  for  Three  Decades  Is  Freed  as  State’s  Case
Erodes,  N. Y.  Times,  Apr.  4,  2014,  p.  A11.    And  when
Glenn Ford, also convicted of murder, was exonerated, the
prosecutor admitted that even “[a]t the time this case was
tried  there  was  evidence  that  would  have  cleared  Glenn
Ford.”  Stroud,  Lead  Prosecutor  Apologizes  for  Role  in
Sending  Man  to  Death  Row,  Shreveport  Times,  Mar.  27,
2015.  All three of these men spent 30 years on death row
before being exonerated.  I return to these examples infra.
Furthermore,  exonerations  occur  far  more  frequently
where  capital  convictions,  rather  than  ordinary  criminal
convictions, are at issue.  Researchers have calculated that
courts  (or  State  Governors)  are  130  times  more  likely  to
exonerate a defendant where a death sentence is at issue.
They  are  nine  times  more  likely  to  exonerate  where  a
capital  murder,  rather  than  a  noncapital  murder,  is  at
issue.  Exonerations 2012 Report 15–16, and nn. 24–26.

Why is that so?  To some degree, it must be because the
law  that  governs  capital  cases is more  complex.    To  some
degree, it must reflect the fact that courts scrutinize capi
tal cases more closely.  But, to some degree,  it likely also
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the issue of wrongful convictions and exonerations, particularly in capital cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

668

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Syllabus

contention, general personal testimonial integrity or privacy is not a
reliable guide to the Clause’s scope of protection. Fifth Amendment
tradition offers, in practice, a conditional protection of testimonial pri-
vacy. Since the judiciary could not recognize fear of foreign prosecu-
tion and at the same time preserve the Government’s existing rights to
seek testimony in exchange for immunity (because domestic courts could
not enforce the immunity abroad), extending the privilege would change
the balance of private and governmental interests that has been ac-
cepted for as long as there has been Fifth Amendment doctrine. Balsys
also argues that Murphy’s policy catalog supports application of the
privilege in order to prevent the Government from overreaching to fa-
cilitate foreign criminal prosecutions in a spirit of “cooperative inter-
nationalism.” Murphy recognized “cooperative federalism”—the team-
work of state and national ofﬁcials to ﬁght interstate crime—but only
to underscore the signiﬁcance of the Court’s holding that a federal court
could no longer ignore fear of state prosecution when ruling on a privi-
lege claim. Since in this case there is no counterpart to Malloy, impos-
ing the Fifth Amendment beyond the National Government, there is no
premise in Murphy for appealing to “cooperative internationalism” by
analogy to “cooperative federalism.” The analogy must, instead, be to
the pre-Murphy era when the States were not bound by the privilege.
Even if “cooperative federalism” and “cooperative internationalism” did
support expanding the privilege’s scope, Balsys has not shown that the
likely costs and beneﬁts justify such expansion. Cooperative conduct
between the United States and foreign nations may one day develop to
a point at which fear of foreign prosecution could be recognized under
the Clause as traditionally understood, but Balsys has presented no in-
terest rising to such a level of cooperative prosecution. Pp. 690–700.

119 F. 3d 122, reversed and remanded.

Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, O(cid:146)Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and in which
Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to Parts I, II, and III. Stevens, J.,
ﬁled a concurring opinion, post, p. 700. Ginsburg, J., ﬁled a dissenting
opinion, post, p. 701. Breyer, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which
Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 702.

Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause
for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solici-
tor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General
Keeney, Barbara McDowell, and Joseph C. Wyderko.
  </content>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

ix

Page
945
Bolling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
Bond v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
Bonner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Booher v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Booker v. Apfel
939
Boone; Oy Partek Ab v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Booth v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Borck v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bourie, In re
Bowden, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,966
907
Bowen v. Gundy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Bowen v. Oistead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
Bowens v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Bower v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Bowersox; Kilgore v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919
Bowersox; Tyler v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
966
Boxer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Boyd v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Boynton; Bioﬁlm, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bozza; Cozzens v.
930
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,971
Bradin, In re
Bradley v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
624
Bragdon v. Abbott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Branch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,931
927
Brand Management, Inc. v. Menard, Inc.
Branstad; Gavin v.
955
Brauer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,975
948
Breeze, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967
Bridge, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919
Brincat v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962
Brito v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Brockman v. Sweetwater County School Dist. No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . .
926
Brogdon; Bende v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934
Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Ed. of New York City . . . .
982
Brooker v. Durocher Dock & Dredge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brooks v. Missouri
928
Brooks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brookshire v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade.
Brown, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. Ford Motor Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. Plaut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

913
909
923
916
939
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
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  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
36

PORTER  v.  McCOLLUM

Per Curiam

tually removed all of the knives from the house.  According
to  Porter’s  brother,  Porter  developed  a  serious  drinking
problem  and  began  drinking  so  heavily  that  he  would  get
into ﬁghts and not remember them at all.

In  addition  to  this  testimony  regarding  his  life  history,
Porter presented an expert in neuropsychology, Dr. Dee, who
had examined Porter and administered a number of psycho
logical assessments.  Dr. Dee concluded that Porter suffered
from  brain damage  that could  manifest in  impulsive, violent
behavior.  At the time of the crime, Dr. Dee testiﬁed, Porter
was substantially impaired in his ability to conform his con
duct to the law and suffered from an extreme mental or emo
tional  disturbance,  two  statutory  mitigating  circumstances,
Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6).  Dr. Dee also testiﬁed that Porter had
substantial  difﬁculties  with  reading,  writing,  and  memory,
and  that  these  cognitive  defects  were  present  when  he  was
evaluated for competency to stand trial.  2 Tr. 227–228 (Jan.
5, 1996); see also Record 904–906.  Although the State’s ex
perts  reached  different  conclusions  regarding  the  statutory
mitigators,5  each  expert  testiﬁed  that  he  could  not  diagnose
Porter or rule out a brain abnormality.  2 Tr. 345, 382 (Jan.
5, 1996); 3 id., at 405.

The  trial  judge  who  conducted  the  state  postconviction
hearing,  without  determining  counsel’s  deﬁciency,  held  that
Porter  had  not  been  prejudiced  by  the  failure  to  introduce
any  of  that  evidence.  Record  1203,  1206.  He  found  that
Porter  had  failed  to  establish  any  statutory  mitigating  cir
cumstances,  id.,  at  1207,  and  that  the  nonstatutory  mitigat
ing  evidence  would  not  have  made  a  difference  in  the  out

erans  Affairs  (VA),  reporting  that  approximately  23%  of  the  Iraq  and
Afghanistan war veterans seeking treatment at a VA medical facility had
been preliminarily diagnosed with PTSD).

5 The  State  presented  two  experts,  Dr.  Riebsame  and  Dr.  Kirkland.
Neither  of  the  State’s  experts  had  examined  Porter,  but  each  testiﬁed
that  based  upon  their  review  of  the  record,  Porter  met  neither  statutory
mitigating circumstance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically focusing on the defendant's mental state and mitigating circumstances. It includes details about expert testimony, legal statutes, and the trial judge's findings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

appear”  that  fails  to  specify  “the
listed”
§1229(a)(1) trigger the stop-time rule?4  Pet. for Cert. i.

items

in

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the question
presented by Pereira, which focuses on all “items listed” in
§1229(a)(1),  sweeps  more  broadly  than  necessary  to  re-
solve  the  particular  case  before  us.    Although  the  time-
and-place information in a notice to appear will vary from
case  to  case,  the  Government  acknowledges  that  “[m]uch
of  the  information  Section  1229(a)(1)  calls  for  does  not”
change  and  is  therefore  “included  in  standardized  lan-
guage  on  the  I–862  notice-to-appear  form.”  Brief  for  Re-
spondent  36  (referencing  8  U. S. C.  §§1229(a)(1)(A)–(B),
(E)–(F), and (G)(ii)).  In fact, the Government’s 2006 notice
to  Pereira  included  all  of  the  information  required  by
§1229(a)(1), except it failed to specify the date and time of
Pereira’s  removal  proceedings.  See  App.  10–12.  Accord-
ingly,  the  dispositive  question  in  this  case  is  much  nar-
rower, but no less vital: Does a “notice to appear” that does
not  specify  the  “time  and  place  at  which  the  proceedings
will  be  held,”  as  required  by  §1229(a)(1)(G)(i),  trigger  the
stop-time rule?5

——————

4 Compare  Orozco-Velasquez  v.  Attorney  General  United  States,  817
F. 3d 78, 83–84 (CA3 2016) (holding that the stop-time rule unambigu-
ously  requires  service  of  a  “notice  to  appear”  that  meets  §1229(a)(1)’s
requirements), with Moscoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1079, 1083
(CA9  2015)  (finding  the  statute  ambiguous  and  deferring  to  the  BIA’s
interpretation);  O’Garro  v.  United  States  Atty.  Gen.,  605  Fed.  Appx.
951,  953  (CA11  2015)  (per  curiam)  (same);  Guaman-Yuqui  v.  Lynch,
786  F. 3d  235,  239–240  (CA2  2015)  (per  curiam)  (same);  Gonzalez-
Garcia  v.  Holder,  770  F. 3d  431,  434–435  (CA6  2014)  (same);  Yi  Di
Wang v. Holder, 759 F. 3d  670,  674–675  (CA7  2014) (same); Urbina  v.
Holder, 745 F. 3d 736, 740 (CA4 2014) (same).

5 The  Court  leaves  for  another  day  whether  a  putative  notice  to  ap-
pear that omits any of the other categories of information enumerated
in  §1229(a)(1)  triggers  the  stop-time  rule.    Contrary  to  the  dissent’s
assertion, this exercise of judicial restraint is by no means “tantamount
to  admitting”  that  the  Government’s  (and  dissent’s)  atextual  interpre-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in the case of Pereira v. Sessions. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U80

[09-06-00 20:24:32] PAGES PGT: OPIN

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

151

Per Curiam

NEW MEXICO ex rel. ORTIZ v. REED

on petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme
court of new mexico

No. 97–1217. Decided June 8, 1998

After Ohio ofﬁcials told respondent they planned to revoke his parole, he
ﬂed to New Mexico. That State’s Governor issued an extradition war-
rant, and respondent was arrested. A New Mexico trial court granted
him habeas relief on his claim that he was not a “fugitive” for extradition
purposes because he ﬂed under duress, believing that Ohio authorities
intended to revoke his parole without due process and to cause him
physical harm if he were returned to prison. The State Supreme
Court afﬁrmed.

Held: The Extradition Clause imposes a mandatory duty on the asylum
State, affording no discretion to its executive ofﬁcers or courts. Once
a Governor has granted extradition, a court considering release on ha-
beas can decide only whether (a) the documents on their face are in
order; (b) the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding
State; (c) the petitioner is the person named in the extradition request;
and (d) the petitioner is a fugitive. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U. S. 282,
289. Claims relating to what actually happened in the demanding
State, the law of that State, and what may be expected to happen in
that State when the fugitive returns are issues to be decided by the
demanding State, not the asylum State. See Pacileo v. Walker, 449
U. S. 86, 88 (per curiam).

Certiorari granted; 124 N. M. 129, 947 P. 2d 86, reversed and remanded.

Per Curiam.

Respondent, sentenced to a term of 25 years upon convic-
tion of armed robbery and theft of drugs, was paroled from
the Ohio correctional system in 1992.
In the following year
Ohio prison ofﬁcials told respondent they planned to revoke
his parole status. Before the scheduled date of his meeting
with his parole ofﬁcer, respondent ﬂed from Ohio to New
Mexico.

Ohio sought extradition and the Governor of New Mexico
issued a warrant directing the extradition of respondent.
He was arrested in October 1994, and later that year sought
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes the case name, citation, a brief summary of the facts and legal issues, the Court's holding, and the disposition of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U92

[09-15-00 14:34:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN

400

SWIDLER & BERLIN v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

that the exception reﬂects a policy judgment that the interest in settling
estates outweighs any posthumous interest in conﬁdentiality; and that,
by analogy, the interest in determining whether a crime has been com-
mitted should trump client conﬁdentiality, particularly since the estate’s
ﬁnancial interests are not at stake—does not square with the case law’s
implicit acceptance of the privilege’s survival and with its treatment of
testamentary disclosure as an “exception” or an implied “waiver.” And
his analogy’s premise is incorrect, since cases have consistently rec-
ognized that the testamentary exception furthers the client’s intent,
whereas there is no reason to suppose the same is true with respect to
grand jury testimony about conﬁdential communications. Knowing
that communications will remain conﬁdential even after death serves a
weighty interest in encouraging a client to communicate fully and
frankly with counsel; posthumous disclosure of such communications
may be as feared as disclosure during the client’s lifetime. The Inde-
pendent Counsel’s suggestion that a posthumous disclosure rule will
chill only clients intent on perjury, not truthful clients or those assert-
ing the Fifth Amendment, incorrectly equates the privilege against
self-incrimination with the privilege here at issue, which serves much
broader purposes. Clients consult attorneys for a wide variety of
reasons, many of which involve conﬁdences that are not admissions of
crime, but nonetheless are matters the clients would not wish divulged.
The suggestion that the proposed exception would have minimal impact
if conﬁned to criminal cases, or to information of substantial importance
in particular criminal cases, is unavailing because there is no case law
holding that the privilege applies differently in criminal and civil cases,
and because a client may not know when he discloses information to his
attorney whether it will later be relevant to a civil or criminal matter,
let alone whether it will be of substantial importance. Balancing ex
post the importance of the information against client interests, even
limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the
privilege’s application and therefore must be rejected. The argument
that the existence of, e. g., the crime-fraud and testamentary exceptions
to the privilege makes the impact of one more exception marginal fails
because there is little empirical evidence to support it, and because the
established exceptions, unlike the proposed exception, are consistent
with the privilege’s purposes.
Indications in United States v. Nixon,
418 U. S. 683, 710, and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, that privileges
must be strictly construed as inconsistent with truth seeking are inap-
posite here, since those cases dealt with the creation of privileges not
recognized by the common law, whereas here, the Independent Counsel
seeks to narrow a well-established privilege. Pp. 403–411.

124 F. 3d 230, reversed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court case syllabus.  It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

THOMAS, J., concurring

that commerce or navigation.  And if congress has the
right to regulate every employment or pursuit thus re-
motely  connected  with  that  commerce,  of  which  they
have the control, then it has the right to regulate nearly
the entire business and employment of the citizens of
the several states. . . . Yet, if congress has the power to
regulate all these employments, and a thousand others
equally connected with that commerce, then it can reg-
ulate nearly all the concerns of life, and nearly all the
employments of the citizens of the several states; and
the state governments might as well be abolished.  It is
not sufficient, then, that navigation, or trade, or busi-
ness of any kind, within a state, be remotely connected,
or, perhaps, connected at all with ‘commerce with for-
eign nations, or among the several states, or with the
Indian tribes,’ it should be a part of that commerce, to
authorize  congress  to  regulate  it.”  The  James  Morri-
son, 26 F. Cas. 579, 581 (No. 15,465) (DC Mo. 1846).

The  Court’s  observation  that  “federal  regulation  was
largely limited to ensuring that ‘traditional navigable wa-
ters’  . . .  remained  free  of  impediments,”  ante,  at  2,  thus
does no more than reflect the original understanding of the
federal authority over navigable waters.

B
As noted above, the scope of Congress’ authority over wa-
ters was defined by the traditional concept of navigability,
imported  with  significant  modifications  from  the  English
common law.3  Thus, Congress could regulate only “naviga-

——————

3 The English rule tied navigability to the ebb and flow of the tides, but
began to be eroded in America as early as the Northwest Ordinance of
1787 due to the superior commercial capacity of American inland rivers.
See The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563 (1871); Propeller Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 454–457 (1852); see also Economy Light & Power
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 598 U.S. ____ (2023). It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

(Donahue).  Adams  agreed  that  “[p]roperty  must  be  se
cured,  or  liberty  cannot  exist.”    Discourse  on  Davila,  in  6
The Works of John Adams 280 (C. Adams ed. 1851).

Of  course,  the  founding  generation  understood  that,  by
securing  their  property,  the  Fourth  Amendment  would
often protect their privacy as well.  See, e.g., Boyd, supra,
at  630  (explaining  that  searches  of  houses  invade  “the
privacies  of  life”);  Wilkes  v.  Wood,  19  How.  St.  Tr.  1153,
1154  (C. P.  1763)  (argument  of  counsel  contending  that
seizures  of  papers  implicate  “our  most  private  concerns”).
But  the  Fourth  Amendment’s  attendant  protection  of
privacy  does  not  justify  Katz’s  elevation  of  privacy  as  the
sine  qua  non  of  the  Amendment.    See  T. Clancy,  The
Fourth Amendment: Its History and Interpretation §3.4.4,
p. 78  (2008)  (“[The  Katz  test]  confuse[s]  the  reasons  for
exercising  the  protected  right  with  the  right  itself.    A
purpose  of  exercising  one’s  Fourth  Amendment  rights
might be the desire for privacy, but the individual’s motiva
tion is not the right protected”); cf. United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez,  548  U. S.  140,  145  (2006)  (rejecting  “a  line  of
reasoning  that  ‘abstracts  from  the  right  to  its  purposes,
and then eliminates the right’ ”).  As the majority opinion
in  Katz  recognized,  the  Fourth  Amendment  “cannot  be
translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy,’ ”
as its protections “often have nothing to do with privacy at
all.”  389 U. S., at 350.  Justice Harlan’s focus on privacy
in  his  concurrence—an  opinion  that  was  issued  between
Griswold  v.  Connecticut,  381  U. S.  479  (1965),  and  Roe  v.
Wade,  410  U. S.  113  (1973)—reflects  privacy’s  status  as
the organizing constitutional idea of the 1960’s and 1970’s.
The organizing constitutional idea of the founding era, by
contrast, was property.

C
In  shifting  the  focus  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  from
property  to  privacy,  the  Katz  test  also  reads  the  words
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, focusing on the balance between property rights and privacy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

Syllabus

also  Draper  v.  United  States,  164  U. S.  240,  244–247.    Accordingly,
States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in Indian coun-
try unless preempted.  Pp. 4–6.

(b) Under Court precedent, a State’s jurisdiction in Indian country
may be preempted by federal law under ordinary principles of federal
preemption,  or  when  the  exercise  of  state  jurisdiction  would  unlaw-
fully  infringe  on  tribal  self-government.  Neither  serves  to  preempt
state jurisdiction in this case.  Pp. 6–20.

(1) Castro-Huerta points to two federal laws—the General Crimes
Act and Public Law 280—that, in his view, preempt Oklahoma’s au-
thority to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians
in Indian country.  Neither statute, however, preempts the State’s ju-
risdiction.  Pp. 7–18.

(i) The General Crimes Act does not preempt state authority to
prosecute Castro-Huerta’s crime.  It provides that “the general laws of
the  United  States  as  to  the  punishment  of  offenses  committed  . . .
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall
extend to the Indian country.”  18 U. S. C. §1152.  By its terms, the Act
simply “extend[s]” the federal laws that apply on federal enclaves to
Indian country.  The Act does not say that Indian country is equivalent
to a federal enclave for jurisdictional purposes, that federal jurisdic-
tion  is  exclusive  in  Indian  country,  or  that  state  jurisdiction  is
preempted in Indian country.
  Castro-Huerta  claims  that  the  General  Crimes  Act  does  indeed
make Indian country the jurisdictional equivalent of a federal enclave.
Castro-Huerta is wrong as a matter of text and precedent.

Pointing to the history of territorial separation and Congress’s reen-
actment of the General Crimes Act after this Court suggested in dicta
in Williams v. United States, 327 U. S. 711, 714, that States lack juris-
diction over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in In-
dian country, Castro-Huerta argues that Congress implicitly intended
for the Act to provide the Federal Government with exclusive jurisdic-
tion over crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian
country.  But the text of the Act says no such thing; the idea of territo-
rial separation has long since been abandoned; and the reenactment
canon  cannot  be  invoked  to  override  clear  statutory  language  of  the
kind present in the General Crimes Act.  Castro-Huerta notes that the
Court  has  repeated  the  Williams  dicta  on  subsequent  occasions,  but
even repeated dicta does not constitute precedent and does not alter
the plain text of the General Crimes Act.  Pp. 7–16.

(ii) Castro-Huerta’s attempt to invoke Public Law 280, 67 Stat.
588, is also unpersuasive.  That law affirmatively grants certain States
(and  allows  other  States  to  acquire)  broad  jurisdiction  to  prosecute
state-law offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case. It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a summary of legal proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

557

Breyer, J., dissenting

And the Due Process Clause can offer protection against leg-
islation that is unfairly retroactive at least as readily as the
Takings Clause might, for as courts have sometimes sug-
gested, a law that is fundamentally unfair because of its ret-
roactivity is a law that is basically arbitrary. See, e. g., Pen-
sion Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467
U. S. 717, 728–730 (1984); id., at 730 (“[R]etroactive aspects
of legislation [imposing withdrawal liability on employers
participating in pension plan] must meet the test of due proc-
ess”); id., at 733 (“[R]etrospective civil legislation may offend
due process if it is particularly harsh and oppressive” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 17 (1976). Cf. United States v. Carl-
ton, 512 U. S. 26, 30 (1994) (retroactive tax provision); Welch
v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134, 147 (1938) (same); National Labor
Relations Board v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F. 2d 141, 149,
151 (CA9 1952) (invalidating administrative order as “arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,” see 5 U. S. C.
§ 706(2)(A), because “[t]he inequity of . . . retroactive policy
making . . . is the sort of thing our system of law abhors”).
Nor does application of the Due Process Clause automati-
cally trigger the Takings Clause, just because the word
“property” appears in both. That word appears in the midst
of different phrases with somewhat different objectives,
thereby permitting differences in the way in which the term
is interpreted. Compare, e. g., United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564 (1977) (“person” includes cor-
porations for purposes of Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy
Clause), with Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201, 206 (1988)
(“person” does not include a corporation for purposes of Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause).

Insofar as the plurality avoids reliance upon the Due Proc-
ess Clause for fear of resurrecting Lochner v. New York,
198 U. S. 45 (1905), and related doctrines of “substantive
due process,” that fear is misplaced. Cf.
id., at 75–76
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Lincoln Fed. Union v. Northwestern
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses legal concepts like due process and the Takings Clause, referencing previous court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

17

THOMAS, J., dissenting

lieu  of  applying  Strickland’s  fact-specific  inquiry,  thereby
departing  even  further  from  the  original  meaning  of  the
Sixth Amendment.

There  are  a  few  problems  with  these  precedents  that
should cause us to pause before extending them.  First, the
ineffective-assistance  standard  apparently  originated  not
in  the  Sixth  Amendment,  but  in  our  Due  Process  Clause
jurisprudence.  See McMann, supra, at 771, n. 14. Second,
“[t]he  Constitution,  by  its  terms,  does  not  mandate  any
particular  remedy  for  violations  of  its  own  provisions.”
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 157 (2006)
(ALITO,  J.,  dissenting);  cf.  Collins  v.  Virginia,  584  U. S.
___,  ___–___  (2018)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at
2–5) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is not required
by  the  Fourth  Amendment).    Strickland  does  not  explain
how the Constitution requires a new trial for violations of
any right to counsel.

Third, our precedents seek to use the Sixth Amendment
right  to  counsel  to  achieve  an  end  it  is  not  designed  to
guarantee.  The  right  to  counsel  is  not  an  assurance  of
an  error-free  trial  or  even  a  reliable  result.    It  ensures
fairness  in  a  single  respect:  permitting  the  accused  to
employ the services of an attorney.  The structural protec-
tions  provided  in  the  Sixth  Amendment  certainly  seek  to
promote  reliable  criminal  proceedings,  but  there  is  no
substantive  right  to  a  particular  level  of  reliability.    In
assuming  otherwise,  our  ever-growing  right-to-counsel
precedents  directly  conflict  with  the  government’s  legiti-
I
mate  interest  in  the  finality  of  criminal  judgments.
would  proceed  with  far  more  caution  than  the  Court  has
traditionally demonstrated in this area.

C
The  Court  should  hesitate  before  further  extending  our
precedents and imposing additional costs on the taxpayers
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It presents legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

precedent  protecting  the  right  of  a  married  couple  not  to
procreate,  it  cannot  be  said  the  Court  or  the  States  have
conditioned the right to marry on the capacity or commit-
ment to procreate.  The constitutional marriage right has
many aspects, of which childbearing is only one.

Fourth  and  finally,  this  Court’s  cases  and  the  Nation’s
traditions  make  clear  that  marriage  is  a  keystone  of  our
social  order.  Alexis  de  Tocqueville  recognized  this  truth
on  his  travels  through  the  United  States  almost  two  cen-
turies ago:

“There is certainly no country in the world where the
tie of marriage is so much respected as in America . . .
[W]hen the American retires from the turmoil of pub-
lic life to the bosom of his family, he finds in it the im-
age of order and of peace . . . . [H]e afterwards carries
[that  image]  with  him  into  public  affairs.”    1  Democ-
racy in America 309 (H. Reeve transl., rev. ed. 1990).

In  Maynard  v.  Hill,  125  U. S.  190,  211  (1888),  the  Court
echoed  de  Tocqueville,  explaining  that  marriage  is  “the
foundation  of  the  family  and  of  society,  without  which
there  would  be  neither  civilization  nor  progress.”  Mar-
riage,  the  Maynard  Court  said,  has  long  been  “ ‘a  great
public  institution,  giving  character  to  our  whole  civil
polity.’ ”  Id., at 213.  This idea has been reiterated even as
the institution has evolved in substantial ways over time,
superseding rules related to parental consent, gender, and
race once thought by many to be essential.  See generally
N. Cott, Public Vows.  Marriage remains a building block
of our national community.

For  that  reason,  just  as  a  couple  vows  to  support  each
other, so does society pledge to support the couple, offering
symbolic  recognition  and  material  benefits  to  protect  and
nourish the union. Indeed, while the States are in general
free  to  vary  the  benefits  they  confer  on  all  married  cou-
ples, they have throughout our history made marriage the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of the Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges. It discusses the historical and societal importance of marriage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U55

[09-26-01 13:01:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

678

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

care, and it follows that the beneﬁts of the program extend
in a broader manner as well. The argument limiting the
term “beneﬁts” to the program’s targeted or primary bene-
ﬁciaries would exclude, for example, a Medicare intermedi-
ary (such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield), a result both par-
ties disavow. For present purposes it cannot be disputed
the providers themselves derive signiﬁcant advantage by
satisfying the participation standards imposed by the Gov-
ernment. These advantages constitute beneﬁts within the
meaning of the federal bribery statute, a statute we have
described as “expansive,” “both as to the [conduct] forbidden
and the entities covered.” Salinas v. United States, 522
U. S. 52, 56 (1997).

Subsection (b) identiﬁes several sources as providing bene-
ﬁts under a federal program—“a grant, contract, subsidy,
loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assist-
18 U. S. C. § 666(b). This language indicates that
ance.”
Congress viewed many federal assistance programs as pro-
viding beneﬁts to participating organizations. Coupled with
the broad substantive prohibitions of subsection (a), the lan-
guage of subsection (b) reveals Congress’ expansive, unam-
biguous intent to ensure the integrity of organizations par-
ticipating in federal assistance programs.

Subsection (c) of the statute bears on the analysis. The
provision removes from the statute’s coverage any “bona ﬁde
salary, wages, fees, or other compensation paid, or expenses
paid or reimbursed,
in the usual course of business.”
§ 666(c). Petitioner argues that the subsection operates to
exclude the payments in question because they are either
“compensation” or “expenses paid or reimbursed,” or some
combination of the two, and that the payments are made in
the “usual course of business.” We disagree.

The subsection provides that the speciﬁed sorts of pay-
ments are not ones to which the section applies. One infer-
ence from this formulation is that the described payments
would have been beneﬁts but for the subsection (c) exemp-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the text of a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, all of which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

25

Opinion of the Court

As the plaintiffs note, the disclosure and summary-of-rights
requirements are designed to protect consumers’ interests
in learning of any inaccuracies in their credit files so that
they can promptly correct the files before they are dissemi-
nated to third parties.

In  support  of  standing,  the  plaintiffs  thus  contend  that
the  TransUnion  mailings  were  formatted  incorrectly  and
deprived  them  of  their  right  to  receive  information  in  the
format  required  by  statute.  But  the  plaintiffs  have  not
demonstrated  that  the  format  of  TransUnion’s  mailings
caused them a harm with a close relationship to a harm tra-
ditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in
American  courts.  See  Spokeo,  578  U. S.,  at  341.    In  fact,
they do not demonstrate that they suffered any harm at all
from the formatting violations.  The plaintiffs presented no
evidence  that,  other  than  Ramirez,  “a  single  other  class
member  so  much  as  opened  the  dual  mailings,”  “nor  that
they were confused, distressed, or relied on the information
in any way.”  951 F. 3d, at 1039, 1041 (opinion of McKeown,
J.) (emphasis added).  The plaintiffs put forth no evidence,
moreover,  that  the  plaintiffs  would  have  tried  to  correct
their credit files—and thereby prevented dissemination of
a misleading report—had they been sent the information in
the  proper  format.  Ibid.   Without  any  evidence  of  harm
caused by the format of the mailings, these are “bare proce-
dural  violation[s],  divorced  from  any  concrete  harm.”
Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 341.  That does not suffice for Article
III standing.8

The  plaintiffs  separately  argue  that  TransUnion’s  for-

——————

8 The District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that Ramirez
(in addition to the other 8,184 class members) had standing as to those
two claims.  In this Court, TransUnion has not meaningfully contested
Ramirez’s individual standing as to those two claims.  We have no reason
or basis to disturb the lower courts’ conclusion on Ramirez’s individual
standing as to those two claims.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the issue of standing in a lawsuit. It delves into the legal arguments regarding harm and procedural violations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC. v. ARKANSAS TEACHER

RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Opinion of the Court

the allocation of the burden is unlikely to make much dif-
ference  on  the  ground.    In  most  securities-fraud  class  ac-
tions, as in this one, the plaintiffs and defendants submit
competing  expert  evidence  on  price  impact.  The  district
court’s task is simply to assess all the evidence of price im-
pact—direct  and  indirect—and  determine  whether  it  is
more  likely  than  not  that  the  alleged  misrepresentations
had a price impact.  The defendant’s burden of persuasion
will have bite only when the court finds the evidence in eq-
uipoise—a situation that should rarely arise.  Cf. Medina v.
California, 505 U. S. 437, 449 (1992) (preponderance of the
evidence  burden  matters  “only  in  a  narrow  class  of  cases
where the evidence is in equipoise”).

*

*

*
The Second Circuit correctly placed the burden of proving
a lack of price impact on Goldman.  But because it is unclear
whether the Second Circuit properly considered the generic
nature of Goldman’s alleged misrepresentations in review-
ing the District Court’s price impact determination, we va-
cate  the  judgment  of  the  Second  Circuit  and  remand  the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses the burden of proof in securities fraud class actions and specifically addresses the case of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System.  The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

Opinion of the Court

websites  will  discuss  how  the  couple  met,  explain  their
backgrounds, families, and future plans, and provide infor-
mation about their upcoming wedding.  All of the text and
graphics on these websites will be “original,” “customized,”
and “tailored” creations.  Id., at 187a.  The websites will be
“expressive in nature,” designed “to communicate a partic-
ular message.”  Id., at 181a.  Viewers will know, too, “that
the  websites  are  [Ms.  Smith’s]  original  artwork,”  for  the
name of the company she owns and operates by herself will
be displayed on every one.  Id., at 187a.

While  Ms.  Smith  has  laid  the  groundwork  for  her  new
venture,  she  has  yet  to  carry  out  her  plans.    She  worries
that, if she does so, Colorado will force her to express views
with which she disagrees.  Ms. Smith provides her website
and graphic services to customers regardless of their race,
creed, sex, or sexual orientation.  Id., at 184a.  But she has
never created expressions that contradict her own views for
anyone—whether  that  means  generating  works  that  en-
courage violence, demean another person, or defy her reli-
gious beliefs by, say, promoting atheism.  See ibid.; see also
Tr. of Oral Arg. 19–20.  Ms. Smith does not wish to do oth-
erwise now, but she worries Colorado has different plans.
Specifically,  she  worries  that,  if  she  enters  the  wedding
website  business,  the  State  will  force  her  to  convey  mes-
sages inconsistent with her belief that marriage should be
reserved to unions between one man and one woman.  App.
to Pet. for Cert. 177a–190a.  Ms. Smith acknowledges that
her views about marriage may not be popular in all quar-
ters.  But, she asserts, the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause protects her from being compelled to speak what she
does not believe.  The Constitution, she insists, protects her
right to differ.

To clarify her rights, Ms. Smith filed a lawsuit in federal

B
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the part outlining the plaintiff's (Ms. Smith) arguments and concerns.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xli

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1099
Lai v. Dickinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lajara v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026
Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc. v. Professor Vladimir Popov MV 1130
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037
Lakian; Grand Rapids Plastics, Inc. v.
1004
Lal v. State System of Higher Ed. of Pa. (SSHE)
. . . . . . . . . . . .
1074
Lamartiniere; Hudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1009,1125
Lambert; Crosby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1009
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lambert; Hiivala v.
1091
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lambert; Redeagle-Belgarde v.
1045
Lambert v. San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092
Lampson v. West
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1023,1125
Lane v. National Data Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131
Laney; Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Langley; Roberts v.
1087
Langlie v. Onan Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119
Lankford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1084,1096
Lappin; Nagy v.
1101
Larch v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011
Larkins v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024
Larned State Hospital; Thomas v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035
LaRouche v. Fowler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1090
Larrinaga v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034
Larry v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091
Larson v. Trippett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133
Lassan v. Gulf Shores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089
LaTorre v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1041
Lattany v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1019
Lauderbaugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1040
Lawseth; Jensen v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077
Lawson v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052,1131
Laxton; Abram v.
1029
Layne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1073
Lea County District Court; Frazier v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026
Leal v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024
LeBlanc; Colarte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1073
LeCureux; VanDorsten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133
Lee v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1020
Lee; Baca v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1040
Lee v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056
Lee v. Ramirez-Palmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125
Lefkowitz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093
Legette v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034
LeGrande, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report.  It lists the cases and their corresponding page numbers.
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