<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GALLARDO, AN INCAPACITATED PERSON, BY AND
THROUGH HER PARENTS AND CO-GUARDIANS VASSALLO ET
AL. v. MARSTILLER, SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA
AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–1263.  Argued January 10, 2022—Decided June 6, 2022

Petitioner Gianinna Gallardo suffered catastrophic injuries resulting in
permanent disability when a truck struck her as she stepped off her
Florida  school  bus.    Florida’s  Medicaid  agency  paid  $862,688.77  to
cover Gallardo’s initial medical expenses, and the agency continues to
pay  her  medical  expenses.    Gallardo,  through  her  parents,  sued  the
truck’s owner and driver, as well as the Lee County School Board.  She
sought  compensation  for  past  medical  expenses,  future  medical  ex-
penses, lost earnings, and other damages.  That litigation resulted in
a  settlement  for  $800,000,  with  $35,367.52  expressly  designated  as
compensation for past medical expenses.  The settlement did not spe-
cifically allocate any amount for future medical expenses.

The  Medicaid  Act  requires  participating  States  to  pay  for  certain
needy individuals’ medical costs and then to make reasonable efforts
to  recoup  those  costs  from  liable  third  parties.
  42  U. S. C.
§1396k(a)(1)(A).  Under Florida’s Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act,
a  beneficiary  like  Gallardo  who  “accept[s]  medical  assistance”  from
Medicaid  “automatically  assigns  to  the  [state]  agency  any  right”  to
third-party payments for medical care.  Fla. Stat. §409.910(6)(b).  Ap-
plied to Gallardo’s settlement, Florida’s statutory framework entitled
the State to $300,000—i.e., 37.5% of $800,000, the percentage the stat-
ute sets as presumptively representing the portion of the tort recovery
that is for “past and future medical expenses,” absent clear and con-
vincing rebuttal evidence.  §§409.910(11)(f )(1), (17)(b).  Gallardo chal-
lenged  the  presumptive  allocation  in  an  administrative  proceeding.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

Woman’s  Health  cost-benefit  standard.  Ante,  at  4–11
(ROBERTS,  C. J.,  concurring  in  judgment);  ante,  at  14–20
(THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting);  ante,  at  4  (ALITO,  J.,  joined  by
THOMAS,  GORSUCH,  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  dissenting);
ante, at 15–18 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting).  A different five
Members of the Court conclude that Louisiana’s admitting-
privileges law is unconstitutional because it “would restrict
women’s access to abortion to the same degree as” the Texas
law  in  Whole  Woman’s  Health.  Ante,  at  12  (opinion  of
ROBERTS, C. J.); see also ante, at 16–40 (opinion of BREYER,
J., joined by GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.).

I agree with the first of those two conclusions.  But I re-
spectfully dissent from the second because, in my view, ad-
ditional factfinding is necessary to properly evaluate Loui-
siana’s  law.  As  JUSTICE  ALITO  thoroughly  and  carefully
explains, the factual record at this stage of plaintiffs’ facial,
pre-enforcement  challenge  does  not  adequately  demon-
strate that the three relevant doctors (Does 2, 5, and 6) can-
not obtain admitting privileges or, therefore, that any of the
three Louisiana abortion clinics would close as a result of
the admitting-privileges law.  I expressed the same concern
about the incomplete factual record more than a year ago
during the stay proceedings, and the factual record has not
changed since then.  See June Medical Services, L.L.C. v.
Gee, 586 U. S. ___ (2019) (opinion dissenting from grant of
application for stay).  In short, I agree with JUSTICE ALITO
that the Court should remand the case for a new trial and
additional  factfinding  under  the  appropriate  legal  stand-
ards.2

——————

2 In  my  view,  the  District  Court  on  remand  should  also  address  the
State’s new argument (raised for the first time in this Court) that these
doctors and clinics lack third-party standing.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal arguments and factual considerations surrounding a specific law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Statement of GORSUCH, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ARIZONA, ET AL. v. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 22–592.  Decided May 18, 2023

The December 16, 2022 order of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denying pe-
titioners’ motion to intervene is vacated, and the case is re-
manded to that court with instructions to dismiss the mo-
tion as moot.

JUSTICE JACKSON dissents from the vacatur of the order
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit and would instead dismiss the writ of certi-
orari as improvidently granted.
  Statement of JUSTICE GORSUCH.

This  case  concerns  the  “Title  42  orders.”    Those  emer-
gency decrees severely restricted immigration to this coun-
try  for  the  ostensible  purpose  of  preventing  the  spread  of
COVID–19.  The federal government began issuing the or-
ders in March 2020 and continued issuing them until April
2022, when officials decided they were no longer necessary.1
If that seems reasonable enough, events soon took a turn.
In a federal district court in Louisiana, a number of States
argued that the government’s decision to end the Title 42
orders violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U. S. C. §551 et seq., because agency officials had not pro-
vided advance notice of their decision or invited public com-
ment.2  The States did not seriously dispute that the public-

——————

1 87 Fed. Reg. 19944–19946, 19956 (2022).
2 Louisiana v. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 603 F. Supp.

3d 406, 412 (WD La. 2022).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the names of the justices involved, and the case title.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

BREYER, J., dissenting

the  website  at  issue.  In re  North  Carolina  Lottery,  866
F. 3d, at 1367; see also Brief for International Trademark
Association as Amicus Curiae 10–11; TMEP § 1209.03(m).
These scenarios are not presented here, as “Booking.com”
conveys only a website associated with booking.

C
The  majority  believes  that  Goodyear  is  inapposite  be-
cause of the nature of the domain name system.  Because
only one entity can hold the contractual rights to a particu-
lar domain name at a time, it contends, consumers may in-
fer that a “generic.com” domain name refers to some specific
entity.  Ante, at 9.

That fact does not distinguish Goodyear.  A generic term
may  suggest  that  it  is  associated  with  a  specific  entity.
That  does  not  render  it  nongeneric.    For  example,  “Wine,
Inc.” implies the existence of a specific legal entity incorpo-
rated under the laws of some State.  Likewise, consumers
may perceive “The Wine Company” to refer to some specific
company rather than a genus of companies.  But the addi-
tion  of  the  definite  article  “the”  obviously  does  not  trans-
form the generic nature of that term.  See In re The Com-
puter Store, Inc., 211 USPQ 72, 74–75 (TTAB 1981).  True,
these terms do not carry the exclusivity of a domain name.
But that functional exclusivity does not negate the principle
animating Goodyear: Terms that merely convey the nature
of the producer’s business should remain free for all to use.
See 128 U. S., at 603.

This case illustrates the difficulties inherent in the ma-
jority’s fact-specific approach.  The lower courts determined
(as the majority highlights), that consumers do not use the
term “Booking.com” to refer to the class of hotel reservation
websites in ordinary speech.  915 F. 3d 171, 181–183 (CA4
2019); ante, at 7.  True, few would call Travelocity a “Book-
ing.com.”  Ibid.  But literal use is not dispositive.  See 915
F. 3d, at 182; H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. International Assn.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis of a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

BIDEN v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

entry  to  await  their  exclusion  proceedings  in  Canada  or
Mexico.  The BIA noted the lack of “any evidence that this
is a practice known to Congress” and “the absence of a sup-
porting  regulation.”    In re  Sanchez-Avila,  21  I.  &  N.  Dec.
444,  465  (1996)  (en  banc).  Congress  responded  mere
months later by adding section 1225(b)(2)(C) to IIRIRA and
conferring on the Secretary express authority (“may”) to en-
gage in the very practice that the BIA had questioned.  And
INS acknowledged that clarification shortly thereafter, ex-
plaining  that  section  1225(b)(2)(C)  and  its  implementing
regulation  “simply  add[ ]  to  the  statute  and  regulation  a
long-standing  practice  of  the  Service.”    62  Fed.  Reg.  445
(1997).  That modest backstory suggests a more humble role
for section 1225(b)(2)(C) than as a mandatory “safety valve”
for  any  alien  who
is  not  detained  under  section
1225(b)(2)(A).

has

administration

In  addition  to  contradicting  the  statutory  text  and  con-
text, the novelty of respondents’ interpretation bears men-
tion.  Since IIRIRA’s enactment 26 years ago, every Presi-
dential
section
1225(b)(2)(C) as purely discretionary.  Indeed, at the time
of  IIRIRA’s  enactment  and  in  the  decades  since,  congres-
sional  funding  has  consistently  fallen  well  short  of  the
amount needed to detain all land-arriving inadmissible al-
iens at the border, yet no administration has ever used sec-
tion 1225(b)(2)(C) to return all such aliens that it could not
otherwise detain.

interpreted

And  the  foreign  affairs  consequences  of  mandating  the
exercise  of  contiguous-territory  return  likewise  confirm
that the Court of Appeals erred.  Article II of the Constitu-
tion  authorizes  the  Executive  to  “engag[e]  in  direct  diplo-
macy with foreign heads of state and their ministers.”  Zi-
votofsky v. Kerry, 576 U. S. 1, 14 (2015).  Accordingly, the
Court has taken care to avoid “the danger of unwarranted
judicial  interference  in  the conduct  of  foreign  policy,”  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  It cites legal precedent and discusses the practical implications of different interpretations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

BARRETT, J., dissenting

(emphasis deleted).  Now suppose the same guest returns
to  the  same  hotel  three  years  later  and,  upon  arrival,  re-
quests to “extend” her prior stay.  The hotel employee would
no doubt “scratch her head.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 26.  Why?  Be-
cause it is highly unnatural to speak of “extending” a stay
that ended years before.

Similar examples spring readily to mind.  One would not
normally ask to “extend” a newspaper subscription long af-
ter it expired.  Or request, after child number two, to “ex-
tend” the parental-leave period completed after child num-
ber  one.  Or  report  that  an  athlete  signed  a  contract
“extension” with her first team after spending several sea-
sons with a rival squad.  These examples do not derive their
force  by  superimposing  a  “continuity  requirement”  on  the
word “extend.”  Cf. ante, at 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16.  Instead,
continuity  is  inherent  in  the  way  that  people  usually  use
the word “extension”—namely, to reference something cur-
rently “in existence” such that  there is a “continuing con-
nection  with  the  thing  to  be  extended.”    Brief  for  Federal
Respondent 21.  That is so, moreover, absent any additional
“modifying language” requiring the “extension” to be “ ‘con-
secutive’ ” or “ ‘successive.’ ”  Ante, at 8.

By  dismissing  the  need  for  a  continuing  connection  be-
tween the first period and the second, the Court forgoes the
“far more natural” reading of extend.  Taniguchi v. Kan Pa-
cific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 569 (2012).  The upshot?
A refinery could ask to “extend” an exemption it had in 2010
in the year 2040, with no need to connect the two periods.
It defies ordinary usage to deem the second exemption “an
extension” of the first, as opposed to a new, standalone ex-
emption.  HollyFrontier recognizes as much, seeking to de-
flect this example as “extreme” and “highly unlikely.”  Tr.
of  Oral  Arg.  28.    Unlikely  or  not,  it  follows  logically  from
HollyFrontier’s  reading  of  “extension”—which  shows  just
how far this interpretation strays from the term’s ordinary
meaning.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion. It uses legal terminology and cites a previous case. The content is sequential and focuses on interpreting the word "extend" in a legal context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting

through that most American of means forced Black people
into  sharecropping  roles,  where  they  somehow  always
tended  to  find  themselves  in  debt  to  the  landowner  when
the growing season closed, with no hope of recourse against
the ever-present cooking of the books.13

Sharecropping is but one example of race-linked obstacles
that the law (and private parties) laid down to hinder the
progress  and  prosperity  of  Black  people.    Vagrancy  laws
criminalized free Black men who failed to work for White
landlords.14  Many States barred freedmen from hunting or
fishing to ensure that they could not live without entering
de facto reenslavement as sharecroppers.15  A cornucopia of
laws (e.g., banning hitchhiking, prohibiting encouraging a
laborer  to  leave  his  employer,  and  penalizing  those  who
prompted  Black  southerners  to  migrate  northward)  en-
sured  that  Black  people  could  not  freely  seek  better  lives
elsewhere.16  And when statutes did not ensure compliance,
state-sanctioned (and private) violence did.17

Thus emerged Jim Crow—a system that was, as much as
anything else, a comprehensive scheme of economic exploi-
tation to replace the Black Codes, which themselves had re-
placed slavery’s form of comprehensive economic exploita-
tion.18    Meanwhile,  as  Jim  Crow  ossified,  the  Federal

——————

13 R. Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Gov-
ernment Segregated America 154 (2017) (Rothstein); Baradaran 33–34;
Wilkerson 53–55.

14 Baradaran 20–21; Du Bois 173–179, 694–696, 698–699; R. Goluboff,
The  Thirteenth  Amendment  and  the  Lost  Origins  of  Civil  Rights,  50
Duke  L. J.  1609,  1656–1659  (2001)  (Goluboff );  Wilkerson  152  (noting
persistence of this practice “well into the 1940s”).

15 Baradaran 20.
16 Goluboff 1656–1659 (recounting presence of these practices well into

the 20th century); Wilkerson 162–163.

17 Rothstein 154.
18 C. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L. J.

421, 424 (1960); Foner 47–48; Du Bois 179, 696; Baradaran 38–39.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history of racial discrimination in the United States, focusing on Jim Crow laws and their economic impact.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

LORA v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 22–49.  Argued March 28, 2023—Decided June 16, 2023

A federal court imposing multiple prison sentences typically has discre-
tion to run the sentences concurrently or consecutively.  See 18 U. S. C.
§3584.  An exception exists in §924(c), which provides that “no term of
imprisonment  imposed  on  a  person  under  this  subsection  shall  run
concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.”  §924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
Here,  the  Court  considers  whether  §924(c)’s  bar  on  concurrent  sen-
tences  extends  to  a  sentence  imposed  under  a  different  subsection,
§924(j).

Petitioner Efrain Lora was convicted of the federal crime of aiding
and abetting a violation of §924(j)(1), which penalizes “a person who,
in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a per-
son through the use of a firearm,” where “the killing is a murder.”  A
violation of subsection (c) occurs when a person “uses or carries a fire-
arm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traffick-
ing crime,” or “possesses a firearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.”
§924(c)(1)(A).  Lora was also convicted of a second federal crime, con-
spiring to distribute drugs.

At sentencing, the District Court concluded that it lacked discretion
to run the sentences for Lora’s two convictions concurrently, because
§924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s  bar  on  concurrent  sentences  governs  §924(j)  sen-
tences.  The District Court sentenced Lora to consecutive terms of im-
prisonment for the drug-distribution-conspiracy count and the §924(j)
count.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s bar on concurrent sentences does not gov-
ern  a  sentence  for  a  §924(j)  conviction.   A  §924(j)  sentence  therefore
can run either concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence.
Pp. 3–10.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

lxiv

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Smith v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Tally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smithey v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smithville; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Snead v. Corcoran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Snipes v. Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Snyder; Fry’s Food Stores of Ariz., Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Snyder’s Bakery, Inc. v. Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sofaer v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sokolow, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soler v. United States
Solid Waste Agcy. of N. Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers . .
Solis Sosa v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sondalle; Prihoda v.
Sondalle; Richards v.
Sosa v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Souders v. Lucero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
South Carolina; Foye v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
South Carolina; Hughes v.
South Carolina; Joytime Distributors & Amusement Co. v.
. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
South Carolina; Legette v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
South Carolina; Reliford v.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Southwestern Bell Video Services, Inc.; Austin v.
Southworth; Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v.
. . . . . .
Spain v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spanierman; Hutchinson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spells v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spencer; Kobayashi v.
Speth v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spina, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Spokane Valley Fire Protection Dist. No. 1 v. Collins
. . . . . . . . .
Spokane Valley Fire Protection Dist. No. 1; Collins v.
Springer v. Hustler Magazine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Springer v. Inﬁnity Group Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Springﬁeld v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sprint PCS; Richardson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . .
Star Bank; Hahn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
State. See name of State.
State Bar of Cal.; Dixon v.

Page
1075
1095
1028
1005
1028,1062,1068
1026
1089
1060
1042
1110
1062
1053
1127
1080
1129
1056,1145
1118
1102
1056,1145
1121
1067
1072
1025
1087
1093
1062
1082
217
1059
1068
1060
1055
1088
1126
1107
1107
1037
1020
1029
1131
1130
1020

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1042
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

537

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

Finally, the nature of the governmental action in this case
is quite unusual. That Congress sought a legislative remedy
for what it perceived to be a grave problem in the funding
of retired coal miners’ health beneﬁts is understandable;
complex problems of that sort typically call for a legislative
solution. When, however, that solution singles out certain
employers to bear a burden that is substantial in amount,
based on the employers’ conduct far in the past, and un-
related to any commitment that the employers made or to
any injury they caused, the governmental action implicates
fundamental principles of fairness underlying the Takings
Clause. Eastern cannot be forced to bear the expense of
lifetime health beneﬁts for miners based on its activities dec-
ades before those beneﬁts were promised. Accordingly, in
the speciﬁc circumstances of this case, we conclude that the
Coal Act’s application to Eastern effects an unconstitutional
taking.

D

Eastern also claims that the manner in which the Coal Act
imposes liability upon it violates substantive due process.
To succeed, Eastern would be required to establish that its
liability under the Act is “arbitrary and irrational.” Turner
Elkhorn, supra, at 15. Our analysis of legislation under the
Takings and Due Process Clauses is correlated to some ex-
tent, see Connolly, supra, at 223, and there is a question
whether the Coal Act violates due process in light of the
Act’s severely retroactive impact. At the same time, this
Court has expressed concerns about using the Due Process
Clause to invalidate economic legislation. See Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 731 (1963) (noting “our abandonment
of the use of the ‘vague contours’ of the Due Process Clause
to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believ[e] to be
economically unwise” (footnote omitted)); see also William-
son v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955)
(“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
Clause . . . to strike down . . . laws, regulatory of business
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 498 (1998). It discusses the constitutionality of the Coal Act's application to Eastern, arguing that it constitutes an unconstitutional taking and potentially violates substantive due process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

798

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Stevens, J., dissenting

“presumption” does not quite do the heavy lifting the Court
would like it to do. What’s more, the doctrinal origins of
that “presumption” meant only that the enacting sovereign
was not normally thought to be a statutory “person.” See,
e. g., United States v. California, 297 U. S., at 186 (“[T]he
canon of construction that a sovereign is presumptively
not intended to be bound by its own statute unless named
in it . . . has its historical basis in the English doctrine that
the Crown is unaffected by acts of Parliament not speciﬁcally
directed against it. The presumption is an aid to consist-
ent construction of statutes of the enacting sovereign when
their purpose is in doubt” (emphasis added)); see also United
States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 275; United States
v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 321 (1877); Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 73 (1989) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). The reason for presuming that an enacting sov-
ereign does not intend to authorize litigation against itself
simply does not apply to federal statutes that apply equally
to state agencies and private entities. Finally, the “afﬁrm-
ative showing” the Court would require to demonstrate
is
that the word “person” includes States, ante, at 781,
plainly found in the statutory text discussed above.

The Court’s ﬁrst textual argument is based on the fact
that the deﬁnition of the term “person” included in § 3733’s
“The presence of
CID provision expressly includes States.
such a deﬁnitional provision in § 3733,” the Court argues,
“together with the absence of such a provision from the
deﬁnitional provisions contained in § 3729 . . . suggests that
States are not ‘persons’ for purposes of qui tam liability
under § 3729.” Ante, at 784. Leaving aside the fact that
§ 3733’s deﬁnition actually cuts in the opposite direction,
see supra, at 795–796, this argument might carry some
weight if the deﬁnitional provisions in § 3729 included some
deﬁnition of “person” but simply neglected to mention
States. But the deﬁnitional provisions in § 3729 do not in-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

Opinion of the Court

Post,  at  30–31.  And  the  principal  dissent  makes  this
suggestion  even  though  the  Court  held  in  Wilkerson  that
this  method  (the  firing  squad)  is  constitutional  and  even
though,  in  the  words  of  the  principal  dissent,  “there  is
some  reason  to  think  that  it  is  relatively  quick  and  pain-
less.”  Post,  at  30.  Tellingly  silent  about  the  methods  of
execution  most  commonly  used  before  States  switched  to
lethal  injection  (the  electric  chair  and  gas  chamber),  the
principal dissent implies that it would be unconstitutional
to  use  a  method  that  “could  be  seen  as  a  devolution  to  a
more primitive era.”  Ibid.  If States cannot return to any
of the “more primitive” methods used in the past and if no
drug  that  meets  with  the  principal  dissent’s  approval  is
available  for  use  in  carrying  out  a  death  sentence,  the
logical  conclusion  is  clear.    But  we  have  time  and  again
reaffirmed that capital punishment is not per se unconsti-
tutional.  See,  e.g.,  Baze,  553  U. S.,  at  47;  id.,  at  87–88
(SCALIA,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment);  Gregg,  428  U. S.,  at
187  (joint  opinion  of  Stewart,  Powell,  and  Stevens,  JJ.);
id.,  at  226  (White,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment);  Resweber,
329 U. S., at 464; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S., at 447; Wilker-
son,  99  U. S.,  at  134–135.    We  decline  to  effectively  over-
rule these decisions.

V

We  also  affirm  for  a  second  reason:  The  District  Court
did not commit clear error when it found that midazolam
is  highly  likely  to  render  a  person  unable  to  feel  pain
during  an  execution.    We  emphasize  four  points  at  the
outset of our analysis.

First,  we  review  the  District  Court’s  factual  findings
under  the  deferential  “clear  error”  standard.    This  stand-
ard  does  not  entitle  us  to  overturn  a  finding  “simply  be-
cause [we are] convinced that [we] would have decided the
case  differently.”  Anderson  v.  Bessemer  City,  470  U. S.
564, 573 (1985).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the constitutionality of a method of execution. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of factual findings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

Opinion of the Court

the basis of religious status.  A plurality declined to address
discrimination with respect to “religious uses of funding or
other forms of discrimination.”  582 U. S., at ___, n. 3 (slip
op., at 14, n. 3).  The plurality saw no need to consider such
concerns  because  Missouri  had  expressly  discriminated
“based on religious identity,” ibid., which was enough to in-
validate  the  state  policy  without  addressing  how  govern-
ment funds were used.

This case also turns expressly on religious status and not
religious use.  The Montana Supreme Court applied the no-
aid  provision  solely  by  reference  to  religious  status.    The
Court repeatedly explained that the no-aid provision bars
aid to “schools controlled in whole or in part by churches,”
“sectarian schools,” and “religiously-affiliated schools.”  393
Mont.,  at  463–467,  435  P. 3d,  at  611–613.    Applying  this
provision  to  the  scholarship  program,  the  Montana  Su-
preme  Court  noted  that  most  of  the  private  schools  that
would benefit from the program were “religiously affiliated”
and “controlled by churches,” and the Court ultimately con-
cluded that the scholarship program ran afoul of the Mon-
tana  Constitution  by  aiding  “schools  controlled  by
churches.”  Id.,  at  466–467,  435  P. 3d,  at  613–614.    The
Montana Constitution discriminates based on religious sta-
tus just like the Missouri policy in Trinity Lutheran, which
excluded  organizations  “owned  or  controlled  by  a  church,
sect, or other religious entity.”  582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
2).

The Department points to some language in the decision
below indicating that the no-aid provision has the goal or
effect of ensuring that government aid does not end up be-
ing used for “sectarian education” or “religious education.”
393 Mont., at 460, 466–467, 435 P. 3d, at 609, 613–614.  The
Department  also  contrasts  what  it  characterizes  as  the
“completely  non-religious”  benefit  of  playground  resurfac-
ing in Trinity Lutheran with the unrestricted tuition aid at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the case of Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue. It delves into the legal arguments and precedents related to religious discrimination in state funding programs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

ALITO, J., concurring

in  the  meantime,  courts  may  be  required  to  grapple  with
the basic Fourth Amendment question of reasonableness.

6.  The  three  categories  of  cases  discussed  above  are
simply  illustrative.    Searches  and  seizures  conducted  for
other  non-law-enforcement  purposes  may  arise  and  may
present their own Fourth Amendment issues.  Today’s de-
cision does not settle those questions.

*

*
In sum, the Court properly rejects the broad “community
caretaking” theory on which the decision below was based.
The  Court’s  decision  goes  no  further,  and  on  that  under-
standing, I join the opinion in full.

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito. It discusses Fourth Amendment issues and the Court's decision on a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Opinion of the Court

twice  a  year,  the  borrower  can  instead  make  small
payments throughout the year.  And the arrangement also
assists the bank by ensuring that the borrower’s insurance
and  tax  bills  are  timely  paid,  thus  protecting  the  loan
collateral (the home) against tax foreclosure or uninsured
damage.

In light of those benefits to both sides, the vast majority
of  home  mortgages  come  with  escrow  accounts.    Indeed,
many  federal  agencies  and  programs  require  them.    The
Federal  Housing  Administration  and  the  Department  of
Agriculture’s Rural Housing Service, for example, mandate
escrow  accounts  for  mortgages  that  they  administer  or
insure.

In the 1970s, Congress found that some national banks
were  engaging  in  “certain  abusive  practices”  and  that
“significant reforms” were necessary to protect borrowers.
12  U. S. C.  §2601(a).   To  that  end,  Congress  passed  and
President  Ford  signed  the  Real  Estate  Settlement
Procedures  Act  of  1974,  or  RESPA.    Among  other  things,
RESPA extensively regulates national banks’ operation of
escrow  accounts.    RESPA  first  sets  out  the  general  terms
for  national  banks  that  operate  escrow  accounts.    For
example,  RESPA  requires  national  banks  to  “promptly
retur[n] to the borrower” any funds left over after the loan
is  paid,  §2605(g),  and  to  provide  borrowers  with
notifications  and  account  statements,  §§2609(b),  (c).
RESPA also contains a specific safeguard for borrowers:  It
caps the amount that national banks can require borrowers
to deposit into escrow accounts.  §2609(a).  But as relevant
to  this  case,  RESPA  (unlike  New  York  law,  as  we  will
discuss) does not mandate that national banks pay interest
to borrowers on the balances of their escrow accounts.1
——————

1 Another  federal  law,  the  Truth  in  Lending  Act,  also  addresses
national  banks’  operation  of  mortgage-escrow  accounts.    The  Truth  in
Lending  Act  requires  national  banks  to  operate  escrow  accounts  for
certain  mortgages.    82  Stat.  146,  15  U. S. C.  §1639d.    For  those
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses escrow accounts in the context of mortgages and regulations like RESPA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

GORSUCH, J., concurring

weight.  As Chief Justice Marshall warned, “It is a maxim
not  to  be  disregarded,  that  general  expressions,  in  every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which
those expressions are used.”  Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat.
264, 399 (1821).  To the extent a past court  offered views
“beyond the case,” those expressions “may be respected” in
a later case “but ought not to control the judgment.”  Ibid.
One “obvious” reason for this, Marshall continued, had to
do with the limits of the adversarial process we inherited
from  England:    Only  “[t]he  question  actually  before  the
Court  is  investigated  with  care,  and  considered  in  its  full
extent.  Other principles which may serve to  illustrate it,
are  considered  in  their  relation  to  the  case  decided,  but
their  possible  bearing  on  all  other  cases  is  seldom  com-
pletely investigated.”  Id., at 399–400.

Abraham  Lincoln  championed  these  traditional  under-
standings  in  his  debates  with  Stephen  Douglas.    Douglas
took the view that a single decision of this Court—no mat-
ter how flawed—could definitively resolve a contested issue
for everyone and all time.  Those who thought otherwise, he
said, “aim[ed] a deadly blow to our whole Republican sys-
tem  of  government.”  Speech  at  Springfield,  Ill.  (June  26,
1857), in 2 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 401 (R.
Basler ed. 1953) (Lincoln Speech).  But Lincoln knew better.
While  accepting  that  judicial  decisions  “absolutely  deter-
mine” the rights of the parties to a court’s judgment, he re-
fused to accept that any single judicial decision could “fully
settl[e]”  an issue,  particularly  when  that  decision  departs
from  the  Constitution.  Id.,  at  400–401.    In cases  such as
these, Lincoln explained, “it is not resistance, it is not fac-
tious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat [the decision] as
not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the
country.”  Id., at 401.

After the Civil War, the Court echoed some of these same
points.  It stressed that every statement in a judicial opin-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It cites legal precedents and discusses legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

25

ALITO, J., dissenting

subtle and sophisticated.  The message was delivered piece-
meal by various officials over a period of time in the form of
aggressive  questions,  complaints,  insistent  requests,  de-
mands, and thinly veiled threats of potentially fatal repris-
als.  But the message was unmistakable, and it was duly
received.

The principle recognized in Bantam Books and Vullo re-
quires  a  court  to  distinguish  between  permissible  persua-
sion and unconstitutional coercion, and in Vullo, we looked
to three leading factors that are helpful in making that de-
termination:  (1)  the  authority  of  the  government  officials
who are alleged to have engaged in coercion, (2) the nature
of statements made by those officials, and (3) the reactions
of the third party alleged to have been coerced.  602 U. S.,
at 189–190, and n. 4, 191–194.  In this case, all three factors
point to coercion.

A
I begin with the authority of the relevant officials—high-
ranking  White  House  officials  and  the  Surgeon  General.
High-ranking White House officials presumably speak for
and may have the ability to influence the President, and as
discussed  earlier,  a  Presidential  administration  has  the
power  to  inflict  potentially  fatal  damage  to  social  media
platforms like Facebook.  See supra, at 5.  Facebook appre-
ciates what the White House could do, and President Biden
has spoken openly about that power—as he has every right
to do.  For instance, he has declared that the “policy of [his]
Administration [is] to enforce the antitrust laws to meet the
challenges posed  by  . . .  the  rise  of  the  dominant  Internet
platforms,” and he has directed the Attorney General and
other agency heads to “enforce the antitrust laws . . . vigor-
ously.”  Promoting Competition in the American Economy,
Executive  Order  No.  14036,  3  CFR  609  (2021).19    He  has
——————

19 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/
2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

775

Opinion of the Court

74 L. Q. Rev. 561, 585 (1958). Starting in the 14th century,
as the royal courts began to extend jurisdiction to suits in-
volving wholly private wrongs, the common-law qui tam ac-
tion gradually fell into disuse, although it seems to have
remained technically available for several centuries. See 2
W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 369 (8th ed. 1824).

At about the same time, however, Parliament began en-
acting statutes that explicitly provided for qui tam suits.
These were of two types: those that allowed injured parties
to sue in vindication of their own interests (as well as the
Crown’s), see, e. g., Statute Providing a Remedy for Him
Who Is Wrongfully Pursued in the Court of Admiralty, 2
Hen. IV, ch. 11 (1400), and—more relevant here—those that
allowed informers to obtain a portion of the penalty as a
bounty for their information, even if they had not suffered
an injury themselves, see, e. g., Statute Prohibiting the Sale
of Wares After the Close of Fair, 5 Edw. III, ch. 5 (1331); see
generally Common Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. VI, ch. 39,
sched. (1951) (listing informer statutes). Most, though not
all, of the informer statutes expressly gave the informer a
cause of action, typically by bill, plaint, information, or action
of debt. See, e. g., Bill for Leases of Hospitals, Colleges, and
Other Corporations, 33 Hen. VIII, ch. 27 (1541); Act to Avoid
Horse-Stealing, 31 Eliz. I, ch. 12, § 2 (1589); Act to Prevent
the Over-Charge of the People by Stewards of Court-Leets
and Court-Barons, 2 Jac. I, ch. 5 (1604).

For obvious reasons, the informer statutes were highly
subject to abuse, see M. Davies, The Enforcement of English
Apprenticeship 58–61 (1956)—particularly those relating to
obsolete offenses, see generally 3 E. Coke, Institutes of the
Laws of England 191 (4th ed. 1797) (informer prosecutions
under obsolete statutes had been used to “vex and entangle
the subject”). Thus, many of the old enactments were re-
pealed, see Act for Continuing and Reviving of Divers Stat-
utes and Repeal of Divers Others, 21 Jac. I, ch. 28, § 11
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court from a case. It contains legal citations, historical context, and analysis of legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
44

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

BREYER, J., dissenting

The argument about method, however, is by far the less
important  argument  surrounding  today’s  decision.    Far
more  important  are  the  unfortunate  consequences  that
today’s decision is likely to spawn.  Not least of these, as I
have said, is the fact that the decision threatens to throw
into doubt the constitutionality of gun laws throughout the
United States.  I can find no sound legal basis for launch-
ing the courts on so formidable and potentially dangerous
a  mission.  In  my  view,  there  simply  is  no  untouchable
constitutional right guaranteed by the Second Amendment
to  keep  loaded  handguns  in  the  house  in  crime-ridden
urban areas.

VI

For these reasons, I conclude that the District’s measure
is a proportionate, not a disproportionate, response to the
compelling concerns that led the District to adopt it.  And,
for  these  reasons  as  well  as  the  independently  sufficient
reasons  set  forth  by  JUSTICE  STEVENS,  I  would  find  the
District’s  measure  consistent  with  the  Second  Amend-
ment’s demands.

With respect, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a portion of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It presents legal arguments and reasoning, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–418
_________________

JOSEPH A. KENNEDY, PETITIONER v.
BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 27, 2022]

JUSTICE ALITO, concurring.
The expression at issue in this case is unlike that in any
of our prior cases involving the free-speech rights of public
employees.  Petitioner’s expression occurred while at work
but during a time when a brief lull in his duties apparently
gave him a few free moments to engage in private activities.
When he engaged in this expression, he acted in a purely
private capacity.  The Court does not decide what standard
applies  to  such  expression  under  the  Free  Speech  Clause
but holds only that retaliation for this expression cannot be
justified based on any of the standards discussed.  On that
understanding, I join the opinion in full.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

301

Opinion of O’Connor, J.

ban on such nude dancing would further Erie’s interest in
preventing such secondary effects. To be sure, requiring
dancers to wear pasties and G-strings may not greatly re-
duce these secondary effects, but O’Brien requires only that
the regulation further the interest in combating such effects.
Even though the dissent questions the wisdom of Erie’s cho-
sen remedy, post, at 323 (opinion of Stevens, J.), the “ ‘city
must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment
with solutions to admittedly serious problems,’ ” Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S., at 52 (quoting American
Mini Theatres, 427 U. S., at 71 (plurality opinion)).
It also
may be true that a pasties and G-string requirement would
not be as effective as, for example, a requirement that the
dancers be fully clothed, but the city must balance its efforts
to address the problem with the requirement that the re-
striction be no greater than necessary to further the city’s
interest.

The ordinance also satisﬁes O’Brien’s third factor, that the
government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, as discussed supra, at 289–296. The fourth and
ﬁnal O’Brien factor—that the restriction is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of the government interest—
is satisﬁed as well. The ordinance regulates conduct, and
any incidental impact on the expressive element of nude
dancing is de minimis. The requirement that dancers wear
pasties and G-strings is a minimal restriction in furtherance
of the asserted government interests, and the restriction
leaves ample capacity to convey the dancer’s erotic message.
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S., at 572 (plurality
opinion of Rehnquist, C. J., joined by O’Connor and Ken-
nedy, JJ.); id., at 587 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
Justice Souter points out that zoning is an alternative
means of addressing this problem.
It is far from clear, how-
ever, that zoning imposes less of a burden on expression than
the minimal requirement implemented here.
In any event,
since this is a content-neutral restriction, least restrictive
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice O'Connor in the case 529 US 277 (2000). Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the reasoned arguments and legal analysis relevant to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

JACKSON, J., dissenting

2011, the Board issued Regulation II, capping debit-card in-
terchange fees at 21 cents per transaction plus 0.05 percent
of the transaction.  76 Fed. Reg. 43420 (2011) (codified at
12 CFR §253.3(b) (2022)).

As  often  happens,  affected  parties  challenged  Regula-
tion II almost immediately after the Board issued it  Sev-
eral large trade groups sued under the APA, alleging that
Regulation II was, in several respects, arbitrary, capricious,
and not in accordance with law.  NACS v. Board of Gover-
nors  of  FRS,  958  F.  Supp.  2d  85,  95–96  (DC  2013).  Ulti-
mately, the D. C. Circuit rejected that challenge in relevant
part.  NACS v. Board of Governors of FRS, 746 F. 3d 474,
477 (2014).  And, a few months after that, we denied certi-
orari.  See 574 U. S. 1121 (2015).

B
Now consider the facts of this challenge.  In the majority’s
telling,  this  is  about  a  single  “truckstop  and  convenience
store located in Watford City, North Dakota.”  Ante, at 1.

Not quite.  Rather, two large trade groups initially filed
this action in 2021—a full decade after the Federal Reserve
Board  finalized  the  debit-card-fee  regulations  at  issue.
Those groups were the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers
Association, a “trade association that has existed since the
mid-1950s,” and the North Dakota Retail Association, an-
other trade group.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 53.  Corner Post,
which had only opened its doors in 2018, was not a party to
the trade groups’ initial complaint.  The Government moved
to dismiss the pleading, invoking §2401(a)’s 6-year statute
of limitations.  In response, the trade groups sought leave
to amend.

It was only then that Corner Post was added as a plain-
tiff.  And,  importantly,  other  than  the  addition  of  Corner
Post,  the  trade  groups’  complaint  remained  practically
identical to the untimely one they had filed before.  Other
than a few changes of phrasing and some newly available
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Jackson. It contains legal citations, references to previous court cases, and arguments about the application of regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–1140
_________________

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND LIFE

ADVOCATES, DBA NIFLA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

XAVIER BECERRA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2018]

JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG,
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
The petitioners ask us to consider whether two sections
of a California statute violate the First Amendment.  The
first  section  requires  licensed  medical  facilities  (that  pro-
vide women with assistance involving pregnancy or family
planning)  to  tell  those  women  where  they  might  obtain
help,  including  financial  help,  with  comprehensive  family
planning services, prenatal care, and abortion.  The second
requires  unlicensed  facilities  offering  somewhat  similar
services  to  make  clear  that  they  are  unlicensed.    In  my
view both statutory sections are likely constitutional, and
I dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusions.

I
The  first  statutory  section  applies  to  licensed  medical
facilities  dealing  with  pregnancy  and  which  also  provide
specific  services  such  as  prenatal  care,  contraception
counseling,  pregnancy  diagnosis,  or  abortion-related  ser-
vices.  Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§123471(a), 1204,
1206(h)  (West  2018)  (covering  “primary  care  clinics”  that
serve low-income women); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, §75026
(2018)  (“primary  care  clinics”  are  medical  facilities  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Syllabus

(a) Before  recognizing  an  ATS  common-law  action,  federal  courts
must  apply  the  two-part  test  announced  in  Sosa.  The  threshold
question is whether a plaintiff can demonstrate that the alleged vio-
lation is “ ‘of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.’ ”  542
U. S., at 732.  Assuming that such a norm can control, it must be de-
termined  whether  allowing  the  case  to  proceed  under  the  ATS  is  a
proper exercise of judicial discretion or whether caution requires the
political branches to grant specific authority before corporate liability
can be imposed.  Id., at 732–733, and nn. 20–21.  With regard to the
first Sosa question, the Court need not resolve whether corporate lia-
bility is a question governed by international law or whether that law
imposes  liability  on  corporations,  because,  as  shown  by  the  parties’
opposing arguments, there is at least sufficient doubt on the point to
turn  to  Sosa’s  second  question:  whether  the  Judiciary  must  defer  to
Congress  to  determine  in  the  first  instance  whether  that  universal
norm has been recognized and, if so, whether it should be enforced in
ATS suits. Pp. 11–18.

(b) Especially  here,  in  the  realm  of  international  law,  it  is  im-
portant to look to analogous statutes for guidance on the appropriate
boundaries  of  judge-made  causes  of  action.    The  logical  statutory
analogy  for  an  ATS  common-law  action  is  the  TVPA—the  only  ATS
cause of action created by Congress rather than the courts.  Drafted
as “an unambiguous and modern basis for [an ATS] cause of action,”
H. R. Rep. No. 102–367, p. 3, the TVPA reflects Congress’ considered
judgment  of  the  proper  structure  for  such  an  action.    Absent  a  com-
pelling justification, courts should not deviate from that model.  Rel-
evant  here,  the  TVPA  limits  liability  to  “individuals,”  a  term  which
unambiguously limits liability to natural persons, Mohamad v. Pales-
tinian  Authority,  566  U. S.  449,  453–456.    Congress’  decision  to  ex-
clude liability  for corporations in TVPA actions is all but dispositive
in this case.  Pp. 19–23.

(c) Other  considerations  relevant  to  the  exercise  of  judicial  discre-
tion also counsel against allowing liability under the ATS for foreign
corporations,  absent  congressional  instructions.    Corporate  liability
under  the  ATS  has  not  been  shown  to  be  essential  to  serving  that
statute’s goals, the ATS will seldom be the only way for plaintiffs to
hold the perpetrators liable, and plaintiffs still can sue the individual
corporate  employees  responsible  for  a  violation  of  international  law
under the ATS.  That the corporate form can be an instrument for in-
flicting  grave  harm  and  suffering  poses  serious  and  complex  ques-
tions  for  the  international  community  and  for  Congress.    And  this
complexity makes it all the more important that Congress determine
whether  victims  of  human-rights  abuses  may  sue  foreign  corpora-
tions in federal court.  Pp. 23–25.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a summary and analysis of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

IV

While the Court reaches the right result today, its choice
of the wrong path matters.  Not just because continuing to
apply the Thunder Basin factors leaves the law badly dis-
torted.  It also matters because Thunder Basin’s throw-it-
in-a-blender  approach  to  jurisdiction  imposes  serious  and
needless costs on litigants and lower courts alike.

Jurisdictional rules, this Court has often said, should be
“clear and easy to apply.”  Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing
Servs.  of Chicago, 583 U. S.  17, ___ (2017) (slip  op.,  at 8);
see also Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U. S. 358, 364, n. 2 (1990); Fore-
most Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U. S. 668, 676–677 (1982).
For  parties,  “[c]omplex  jurisdictional  tests  complicate  a
case, eating up time and money as [they] litigate, not the
merits of their claims, but which court is the right court to
decide those claims.”  Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. 77,
94  (2010).    For  courts,  jurisdictional  rules  “mark  the
bounds”  of  their  “ ‘adjudicatory  authority.’ ”  Boechler  v.
Commissioner,  596  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2022)  (slip  op.,  at  2).
Judges therefore “benefit from straightforward rules under
which they can readily assure themselves of their power to
hear  a  case,”  Hertz,  559  U. S.,  at  94,  while  “adventitious”
rules leave them with “almost impossible” tasks to perform
that squander their limited resources, Executive Jet Avia-
tion, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249, 266 (1972).

There are many words to describe the Thunder Basin fac-
tors, but “clear and easy to apply” are not among them.  To
appreciate the trouble Thunder Basin can generate for liti-
gants and lower courts alike, consider some of the facts of
Ms.  Cochran’s  case  that  do  not  find  their  way  into  the
Court’s opinion.

A single mother of two and a certified public accountant,
Ms.  Cochran  began  looking  for  part-time  work  in  2007.

——————
the Exchange Act and the FTC Act preserve their right to proceed in dis-
trict court to address the here-and-now injuries they assert.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the complexities of jurisdictional rules and criticizes the "Thunder Basin factors" approach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND

ALITO, J., dissenting

That a permit is required in this situation is important
because the Clean Water Act’s definition of a “point source”
is  very  broad,  and  as  a  result,  many  discharges  onto  the
surface  of  land  are  likely  to  be  covered.  As  noted,  “point
source[s]”  include  “ditch[es]”  and  “channel[s],”  as  well  as
“any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from
which  pollutants  . . .  may  be  discharged.”    §1362(14).
Therefore  if  water  discharged  on  the  surface  of  the  land
finds  or  creates  a  passage  leading  to  navigable  waters,  a
permit  may  be  required  if  the  course  that  the  discharge
takes is (1) a “conveyance” that is (2) “discernible” and (3)
“confined.”

Those  three  requirements  are  rather  easily  satisfied.
When  a  liquid  flows  over  the  surface  of  land  to  navigable
waters, the surface is a conveyance, i.e., a “means of carry-
ing or transporting something” from one place to another.
Webster’s  Third  New  International  Dictionary  499  (1971)
(Webster’s Third); Random House Dictionary of the English
Language  320  (1967)  (Random  House).6   This  conveyance
would be “discernible,” i.e., capable of being seen.  Webster’s
Third 644; Random House 409.  And it would be “confined,”

——————
Water Act “does not forbid the ‘addition of any pollutant directly to nav-
igable waters from any point source.’ ”  547 U. S., at 743.  As noted, Jus-
tice Scalia’s opinion is open to the possibility that a permit is required if
point source A discharges into point source B, and point source B then
discharges  into  covered  waters.    Thus,  his  opinion  apparently  regards
that situation as involving an indirect discharge.  I would describe that
discharge as direct because point source B discharges directly into cov-
ered waters, but the difference is purely semantic.

6 As we have said, the Act’s point-source “definition makes plain that a
point source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it need only
convey the pollutant to ‘navigable waters,’ which are, in turn, defined as
‘the waters of the United States.’ ”  South Fla. Water Management Dist.
v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U. S. 95, 105 (2004).  The label is a bit of a mis-
nomer:  Although  labeled  “point  sources,”  “[t]ellingly,  the  examples  . . .
listed  by  the  Act  include  pipes,  ditches,  tunnels,  and  conduits,  objects
that do not themselves generate pollutants but merely transport them.”
Ibid. (citing §1362(14)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the Clean Water Act and its definition of "point source" pollution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017)

9

Opinion of the Court

Nevils’).

We  made  no  choice  between  the  two  interpretations
set  out  in  McVeigh,  however,  because  the  answer  made
no  difference  to  the  question  there  presented.    Id.,  at
698.
“[E]ven  if  FEHBA’s  preemption  provision  reaches
contract-based reimbursement claims,” we explained, “that
provision  is  not  sufficiently  broad  to  confer  federal  juris-
diction.”  Ibid.    Because  §8902(m)(1)  is  a  “choice-of-law
prescription,” not a “jurisdiction-conferring provision,” id.,
at  697,  we  had  no  cause  to  consider  §8902(m)(1)’s  text,
context, and purpose, as we do today, see supra, at 6–8.3

III
Nevils  further  contends  that,  if  §8902(m)(1)  covers
subrogation and reimbursement clauses in OPM contracts,
then the statute itself would violate the Supremacy Clause
by  assigning  preemptive  effect  to  the  terms  of  a  contract,
not to the laws of the United States.  We conclude, however,
that  the  statute,  not  a  contract,  strips  state  law  of  its
force.

Without  §8902(m)(1),  there  would  be  no  preemption  of
state insurance law.  FEHBA contract terms have preemp-
tive  force  only  as  they  “relate  to  the  nature,  provision,  or
extent  of  coverage  or  benefits  (including  payments  with
respect  to  benefits),”  §8902(m)(1)—i.e.,  when  the  contract
terms  fall  within  the  statute’s  preemptive  scope.    It  is
therefore the statute that “ensures that [FEHBA contract]
terms  will  be  uniformly  enforceable  nationwide,  notwith-
standing  any  state  law  relating  to  health  insurance  or
plans.”  Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  28  (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).

Many  other  federal  statutes  preempt  state  law  in  this
way,  leaving  the  context-specific  scope  of  preemption  to

——————

3 Because the statute alone resolves this dispute, we need not consider

whether Chevron deference attaches to OPM’s 2015 rule.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

Opinion of the Court

such misattribution).  Yet all those entities, the Court held,
were entitled to First Amendment protection for refusing to
carry  the  speech.    See  supra,  at  14–16.    To  be  sure,  the
Court  noted  in  PruneYard  and  FAIR,  when  denying  such
protection, that there was little prospect of misattribution.
See 447 U. S., at 87; 547 U. S., at 65.  But the key fact in
those cases, as noted above, was that the host of the third-
party speech was not itself engaged in expression.  See su-
pra, at 16–17.  The current record suggests the opposite as
to Facebook’s News Feed and YouTube’s homepage.  When
the platforms use their Standards and Guidelines to decide
which third-party content those feeds will display, or how
the display will be ordered and organized, they are making
expressive choices.  And because that is true, they receive
First Amendment protection.

C

And once that much is decided, the interest Texas relies
on cannot sustain its law.  In the usual First Amendment
case, we must decide whether to apply strict or intermedi-
ate scrutiny.  But here we need not.  Even assuming that
the less stringent form of First Amendment review applies,
Texas’s law does not pass.  Under that standard, a law must
further a “substantial governmental interest” that is “unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression.”  United States
v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968).  Many possible inter-
ests relating to social media can meet that test; nothing said
here puts regulation of NetChoice’s members off-limits as
to  a  whole  array  of  subjects.    But  the  interest  Texas  has
asserted cannot carry the day: It is very much related to the
suppression of free expression, and it is not valid, let alone
substantial.

Texas  has  never  been  shy,  and  always  been  consistent,
about  its  interest:  The  objective  is  to  correct  the  mix  of
speech that the major social-media platforms present.  In
this Court, Texas described its law as “respond[ing]” to the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in the case of Moody v. NetChoice, LLC.  It delves into First Amendment arguments related to social media content moderation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
972

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 20, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–5966.  Moorman  v.  Jowers  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  733.

No.  09–5972.  Muhammad,  aka  Cooper  v.  Kannrine  et  al.

C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5974.  Barnes  v.  Cain,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  La.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  993  So.  2d  1233.

No.  09– 5982.  Sutton  v.  Corrections  Corporation  of
America  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  685.

No.  09–5983.  Qazza  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.

Dist.,  Div.  3.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5984.  Serna  v.  Goodno  et  al.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  944.

No.  09–5989.  Wordlow  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  387  Ill.  App.  3d  1182,  981
N.  E.  2d  539.

No.  09–5990.  Wilson  v.  Curiel  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–5997.  Johnson v.  Thaler, Director, Texas Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5999.  Powell  v.  Curry  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  940.

No. 09–6008.  Deakins v.  California.  Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6020.  Harris  v.  Sweatt,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6021.  Gates  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.

Dist.,  Div.  2.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6022.  Rodriguez  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
327  Fed.  Appx.  466.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Opinion of the Court

days  of  testimony  and  argument,  Judge  Elliot  issued  an
initial decision concluding that Lucia had violated the Act
and  imposing  sanctions,  including  civil  penalties  of
$300,000 and a lifetime bar from the investment industry.
In  his  decision,  Judge  Elliot  made  factual  findings  about
only  one  of  the  four  ways  the  SEC  thought  Lucia’s
slideshow  misled  investors.    The  Commission  thus  re-
manded for factfinding on the other three claims, explain-
ing that an ALJ’s “personal experience with the witnesses”
places  him  “in  the  best  position  to  make  findings  of  fact”
and “resolve any conflicts in the evidence.”  App. to Pet. for
Cert. 241a.  Judge Elliot then made additional findings of
deception  and  issued  a  revised  initial  decision,  with  the
same sanctions.  See id., at 118a.

On  appeal  to  the  SEC,  Lucia  argued  that  the  adminis-
trative  proceeding  was  invalid  because  Judge  Elliot  had
not  been  constitutionally  appointed.    According  to  Lucia,
the Commission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United States”
and thus subject to the Appointments Clause.  Under that
Clause,  Lucia  noted,  only  the  President,  “Courts  of  Law,”
or  “Heads  of  Departments”  can  appoint  “Officers.”    See
Art. II, §2, cl. 2.  And none of those actors had made Judge
Elliot an ALJ.  To be sure, the Commission itself counts as
a  “Head[ ]  of  Department[ ].”    Ibid.;  see  Free  Enterprise
Fund  v.  Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Bd.,  561
U. S.  477,  511–513  (2010).  But  the  Commission  had  left
the  task  of  appointing  ALJs,  including  Judge  Elliot,  to
SEC  staff  members.    See  supra,  at  1.  As  a  result,  Lucia
contended,  Judge  Elliot  lacked  constitutional  authority  to
do his job.

The Commission rejected Lucia’s argument.  It held that
the  SEC’s  ALJs  are  not  “Officers  of  the  United  States.”
Instead,  they  are  “mere  employees”—officials  with  lesser
responsibilities  who
the  Appointments
fall  outside
Clause’s ambit.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 87a.  The Commis-
sion  reasoned  that  its  ALJs  do  not  “exercise  significant
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Lucia v. SEC. It delves into the constitutional arguments surrounding the appointment of administrative law judges (ALJs) within the SEC.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AMERICAN LEGION  v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

BREYER,  J., concurring

ers of the Peace Cross acted with the undeniably secular
motive of commemorating local soldiers; no evidence sug-
gests  that  they  sought  to disparage or exclude any reli-
gious group; the secular values inscribed on the Cross and
its place among other memorials strengthen its message of
patriotism and commemoration; and, finally, the Cross has
stood on the same land for 94 years, generating no contro-
versy in the community until this lawsuit was filed.  Noth-
ing  in  the record suggests that the lack of public outcry
“was  due  to  a  climate of intimidation.”  Van Orden, 545
U. S.,  at  702  (BREYER,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).    In
light  of  all these circumstances, the Peace Cross cannot
reasonably be understood as “a government effort to favor
a  particular  religious  sect”  or to “promote religion over
nonreligion.”  Ibid.  And, as the Court explains, ordering
its removal or alteration at this late date would signal “a
hostility toward religion that has no place in our Estab-
lishment Clause traditions.”  Id., at 704.
  The case would be different, in my view, if there were
evidence that the organizers had “deliberately disrespected”
members  of  minority  faiths  or  if  the  Cross  had  been
erected  only  recently,  rather  than  in  the  aftermath  of
World  War  I.    See  ante,  at  29;  see  also Van Orden, 545
U. S.,  at  703  (opinion  of BREYER,  J.)  (explaining  that, in
light  of  the  greater  religious  diversity  today,  “a  more
contemporary state effort” to put up a religious display is
“likely  to  prove  divisive  in  a  way  that [a] longstanding,
pre-existing monument [would] not”).  But those are not
the circumstances presented to us here, and I see no rea-
son  to  order this  cross  torn  down  simply  because other
crosses would raise constitutional concerns.
  Nor do I understand the Court’s opinion today to adopt a
“history and tradition test” that would permit any newly
constructed religious memorial on public land.  See post,
at  1,  4  (KAV ANAUGH,  J.,  concurring);  cf.  post,  at  8−9
(GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment).  The Court appro-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of American Legion v. American Humanist Association. It delves into the constitutional arguments surrounding a war memorial cross on public land.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U90

[09-15-00 14:33:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 357 (1998)

365

Opinion of the Court

urging application of the rule. United States v. Payner, 447
U. S. 727, 734 (1980).

The costs of excluding reliable, probative evidence are par-
ticularly high in the context of parole revocation proceed-
ings. Parole is a “variation on imprisonment of convicted
criminals,” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 477 (1972), in
which the State accords a limited degree of freedom in re-
turn for the parolee’s assurance that he will comply with the
In most
often strict terms and conditions of his release.
cases, the State is willing to extend parole only because it is
able to condition it upon compliance with certain require-
ments. The State thus has an “overwhelming interest” in
ensuring that a parolee complies with those requirements
and is returned to prison if he fails to do so.
Id., at 483.
The exclusion of evidence establishing a parole violation,
however, hampers the State’s ability to ensure compliance
with these conditions by permitting the parolee to avoid the
consequences of his noncompliance. The costs of allowing a
parolee to avoid the consequences of his violation are com-
pounded by the fact that parolees (particularly those who
have already committed parole violations) are more likely to
commit future criminal offenses than are average citizens.
See Grifﬁn v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 880 (1987).
Indeed,
this is the very premise behind the system of close parole
supervision.

Ibid.

The exclusionary rule, moreover, is incompatible with the
traditionally ﬂexible, administrative procedures of parole
revocation. Because parole revocation deprives the parolee
not “of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled,
but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on ob-
servance of special parole restrictions,” Morrissey v. Brewer,
supra, at 480, States have wide latitude under the Consti-
tution to structure parole revocation proceedings.5 Most

5 We thus have held that a parolee is not entitled to “the full panoply”
of due process rights to which a criminal defendant is entitled, Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (1972), and that the right to counsel generally
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 357 (1998). It discusses the application of the exclusionary rule in parole revocation proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

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[09-06-00 20:39:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

224

AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.
v. CENTRAL OFFICE TELEPHONE, INC.
Opinion of the Court

force any classiﬁcations, regulations, or practices affecting
such charges” except those set forth in the tariff, § 203(c).
Unsurprisingly, the cases decided under the ICA make it
clear that discriminatory “privileges” come in many guises,
and are not limited to discounted rates.
“[A] preference or
rebate is the necessary result of every violation of [the ana-
log to § 203(c) in the ICA] where the carrier renders or pays
for a service not covered by the prescribed tariffs.” United
In
States v. Wabash R. Co., 321 U. S. 403, 412–413 (1944).
Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155 (1912), we
rejected a shipper’s breach-of-contract claim against a rail-
road for failure to ship a carload of race horses by a particu-
larly fast train. We held that the contract was invalid as a
matter of law because the carrier’s tariffs “did not provide
for an expedited service, nor for transportation by any par-
ticular train,” and therefore the shipper received “an undue
advantage . . . that is not one open to others in the same
situation.”
Id., at 163, 165. Similarly, in Davis v. Cornwell,
264 U. S. 560 (1924), we invalidated the carrier’s agreement
to provide the shipper with a number of railroad cars on a
speciﬁed day; such a special advantage, we said, “is illegal,
when not provided for in the tariff.”
Id., at 562. See also
Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, supra, at 653; Wight
v. United States, 167 U. S. 512, 517–518 (1897); I. Lake, Dis-
crimination by Railroads and Other Public Utilities 310–315
(1947).

III

The Ninth Circuit distinguished the Court’s ﬁled rate
cases involving claims for special services on the ground that
the services at issue there “should have been included in the
tariff and made available to all” because “the customer
would have been expected to pay a higher rate” for those
108 F. 3d, at 989, n. 9. But that is precisely the
services.
case here.
Indeed, the additional services and guarantees
that respondent claims it was entitled to by virtue of Ms.
Kisor’s representations and petitioner’s sales brochures—
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the concept of discriminatory "privileges" in pricing and service offerings. It cites relevant case law to support its arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

861

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10912.  Roden  et  al.  v.  Diah  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  253.

No.  08–10913.  Wright  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.  Appx.  188.

No.  08–10915.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  726.

No.  08–10916.  Pharm  v.  Bartow,  Director,  Wisconsin  Re

source  Center.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10917.  Tharps  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  759.

No.  08–10918.  Phillips  v.  Illinois.  Sup.  Ct.  Ill.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  233  Ill.  2d  62,  908  N.  E.  2d  1.

No.  08–10919.  Keyes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10920.  Curry  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  231.

No.  08–10921.  McClaren  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  232.

No.  08–10922.  Lynch  v.  Hertzig  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  3d

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10924.  Reed  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10925.  Saterstad  v.  Stover  et  al.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  954  A.  2d  48.

No.  08–10926.  Rodgers  v.  Colorado.  Ct.  App.  Colo.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10928.  Hand  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  547.

No.  08–10929.  Suttle  v.  Bartow,  Director,  Wisconsin  Re

source  Center.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case citations, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

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[09-11-00 13:24:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 321 (1998)

349

Kennedy, J., dissenting

the entire $357,144. See 18 U. S. C. § 982(a)(1). The only
ground for reducing the forfeiture, then, is that any higher
amount would be unconstitutional. The majority afﬁrms the
reduced $15,000 forfeiture on de novo review, see ante, at
336–337, and n. 11, which it can do only if a forfeiture of
even $15,001 would have suffered from a gross disproportion.
Indeed, the majority leaves open whether the $15,000 forfeit-
ure itself was too great. See ante, at 337, n. 11. Money
launderers, among the principal targets of this statute, may
get an even greater return from their crime.

Ibid.

The majority does not explain why respondent’s knowing,
willful, serious crime deserves no higher penalty than
It gives only a cursory explanation of why forfeit-
$15,000.
ure of all of the money would have suffered from a gross
disproportion. The majority justiﬁes its evisceration of the
ﬁne because the money was legal to have and came from a
legal source. See ante, at 337–338. This fact, however,
shows only that the forfeiture was a ﬁne, not that it was
excessive. As the majority puts it, respondent’s money was
lawful to possess, was acquired in a lawful manner, and was
It was not, however, lawful to pos-
lawful to export.
sess the money while concealing and smuggling it. Even if
one overlooks this problem, the apparent lawfulness of the
money adds nothing to the argument.
If the items pos-
sessed had been dangerous or unlawful to own, for instance,
narcotics, the forfeiture would have been remedial and would
not have been a ﬁne at all. See Austin, supra, at 621; e. g.,
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S.
354, 364 (1984) (unlicensed guns); Commonwealth v. Dana,
43 Mass. 329, 337 (1841) (forbidden lottery tickets).
If re-
spondent had acquired the money in an unlawful manner, it
would have been forfeitable as proceeds of the crime. As a
rule, forfeitures of criminal proceeds serve the nonpunitive
ends of making restitution to the rightful owners and of
compelling the surrender of property held without right or
ownership. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U. S. 267, 284
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring

power is used where “the legal rights at issue are indisput-
ably clear” and, even then, “sparingly and only in the most
critical and exigent circumstances.”  S. Shapiro, K. Geller,
T.  Bishop,  E.  Hartnett  &  D.  Himmelfarb,  Supreme  Court
Practice  §17.4,  p. 17-9  (11th  ed.  2019)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted) (collecting cases).
  Although  California’s  guidelines  place  restrictions  on
places of worship, those restrictions appear consistent with
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  Similar
or  more  severe  restrictions  apply  to  comparable  secular
gatherings,  including  lectures,  concerts,  movie  showings,
spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where large
groups of people gather in close proximity for extended pe-
riods of time.  And the Order exempts or treats more leni-
ently  only  dissimilar  activities,  such  as  operating  grocery
stores,  banks,  and  laundromats,  in  which  people  neither
congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for
extended periods.
  The  precise  question  of  when  restrictions  on  particular
social  activities  should  be  lifted  during  the  pandemic  is  a
dynamic  and  fact-intensive  matter  subject  to  reasonable
disagreement.  Our Constitution principally entrusts “[t]he
safety  and  the  health  of  the  people”  to  the  politically  ac-
countable officials of the States “to guard and protect.”  Ja-
cobson  v.  Massachusetts,  197  U. S.  11,  38  (1905).    When
those  officials  “undertake[  ]  to  act  in  areas  fraught  with
medical  and  scientific  uncertainties,”  their  latitude  “must
be especially broad.”  Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S.
417, 427 (1974).  Where those broad limits are not exceeded,
they should not be subject to second-guessing by an “une-
lected federal judiciary,” which lacks the background, com-
petence, and expertise to assess public health and is not ac-
countable  to  the  people.    See  Garcia  v.  San  Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 545 (1985).
  That  is  especially  true  where,  as  here,  a  party  seeks
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom.  It delves into legal arguments regarding the restrictions placed on places of worship during the pandemic and the balance between religious freedom and public health concerns.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>