<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SHURTLEFF v. BOSTON

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

inquiry  into  the  Clause’s  original  meaning.
  It  ignored
longstanding precedents.  And instead of bringing clarity to
the area, Lemon produced only chaos.  In time, this Court
came to recognize these problems, abandoned Lemon, and
returned to a more humble jurisprudence centered on the
Constitution’s original meaning.  Yet in this case, the city
chose to follow Lemon anyway.  It proved a costly decision,
and Boston’s travails supply a cautionary tale for other lo-
calities and lower courts.

*

To  see  how  all  this  unfolded,  start  with  Lemon  itself.
Lemon held out the promise that any Establishment Clause
dispute could be resolved by following a neat checklist fo-
cused on three questions:  (1) Did the government have a
secular purpose in its challenged action?  (2) Does the effect
of that action advance or inhibit religion?  (3) Will the gov-
ernment  action  “excessive[ly]  . . .  entangl[e]”  church  and
state?  403  U. S.,  at  612–613  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  But  from  the  start,  this  seemingly  simple  test
produced  more  questions  than  answers.    How  much
religion-promoting  purpose  is  too  much?  Are  laws  that
serve  both  religious  and  secular  purposes  problematic?
How much of a religion-advancing effect is tolerable?  What
does “excessive entanglement” even mean, and what (if an-
ything) does it add to the analysis?  Putting it all together,
too, what is a court to do when Lemon’s three inquiries point
in conflicting directions?  More than 50 years later, the an-
swers to all these questions remain unknown.

The only sure thing Lemon yielded was new business for
lawyers  and  judges.  Before  Lemon,  this  Court  had  never
held a flag or other similar public display to constitute an
unconstitutional “establishment” of religion. See Congres-
sional Research Service, C. Brougher, Public Display of the
Ten  Commandments  and  Other  Religious  Symbols  1–2
(2011)  (Brougher);  M.  McConnell,  No  More  (Old)  Symbol
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case *Shurtleff v. Boston*. It delves into the history and problems with the Lemon test, a legal framework for determining Establishment Clause violations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

Amendment does not regulate the compelled production of
documents  at  all.  Here  the  Government  received  the
relevant cell-site records pursuant to a court order compel-
ling  Carpenter’s  cell  service  provider  to  turn  them  over.
That  process  is  thus  immune  from  challenge  under  the
original understanding of the Fourth Amendment.

As  a  matter  of  modern  doctrine,  this  case  is  equally
straightforward.  As  JUSTICE  KENNEDY  explains,  no
search or seizure of Carpenter or his property occurred in
this case.  Ante, at 6–22; see also Part II, infra.  But even
if the majority were right that the Government “searched”
Carpenter,  it  would  at  most  be  a  “figurative  or  construc-
tive  search”  governed  by  the  Oklahoma  Press  standard,
not  an  “actual  search”  controlled  by  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment’s warrant requirement.

And  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  Government  met  the
Oklahoma Press standard here.  Under Oklahoma Press, a
court order must “ ‘be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant
in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will
not  be  unreasonably  burdensome.’ ”    Lone  Steer,  Inc.,
supra,  at  415.    Here,  the  type  of  order  obtained  by  the
Government  almost  necessarily  satisfies  that  standard.
The  Stored  Communications  Act  allows  a  court  to  issue
the  relevant  type of order “only if the governmental entity
offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable  grounds  to  believe  that  . . .  the  records  . . .
sough[t] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”  18  U. S. C.  §2703(d).    And  the  court  “may
quash  or  modify  such  order”  if  the  provider  objects  that
the  “records  requested  are  unusually  voluminous  in  na-
ture or compliance with such order otherwise would cause
an undue burden on such provider.”  Ibid.  No such objec-
tion  was  made  in  this  case,  and  Carpenter  does  not  sug-
gest  that  the  orders  contravened  the  Oklahoma  Press
standard in any other way.

That  is  what  makes  the  majority’s  opinion  so  puzzling.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the Carpenter v. United States case. It argues against the majority opinion's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in relation to cell-site location data.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1099

529 U. S.

May 1, 2000

No. 99–1453. United States ex rel. A–1 Ambulance Serv-
ice, Inc., et al. v. County of Monterey et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 1238.

No. 99–1465. Bazzetta v. Yukins, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 440.

No. 99–1474. Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors Inc.
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197
F. 3d 752.

No. 99–1476. Ott v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 510.

No. 99–1479. Haddad v. Lieberman. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1322.

No. 99–1493. Burgess v. Pelkey et al. Ct. App. D. C.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 A. 2d 783.

No. 99–1494. Lerman v. Township of Randolph et al.

Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1495. Dunn v. Installation Technicians, Inc., et
al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F.
3d 1345.

No. 99–1498. Davis v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indi-
ans et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
193 F. 3d 990.

No. 99–1505. Fergason v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1558. Behdani et al. v. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 196 F. 3d 1262.

No. 99–1573. Lai v. Dickinson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1351.

No. 99–1585. Orr v. Internal Revenue Service. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 180 F. 3d 656.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

To  make  matters  worse,  the  majority’s  answer  to  its
unasked  constitutional  question  is  not  even  clear.    After
today,  must  a  union  undertaking  a  special  assessment  or
dues  increase  obtain  affirmative  consent  to  collect  “any
funds”  or  solely  to  collect  funds  for  nonchargeable  ex-
penses?  May  a  nonmember  opt  not  to  contribute  to  a
special  assessment,  even  if  the  assessment  is  levied  to
fund  uncontestably  chargeable  activities?    Does  the  ma-
jority’s  new  rule  allow  for  any  distinction  between  non-
members  who  had  earlier  objected  to  the  payment  of
nonchargeable  expenses  and  those  who  had  not?  What
procedures govern this new world of fee collection?

Moreover, while the majority’s novel rule is, on its face,
limited  to  special  assessments  and  dues  increases,  the
majority strongly hints that this line may not long endure.
The  majority  pronounces  the  Court’s  explicit  holding  in
Machinists  v.  Street,  367  U. S.  740,  774  (1961)—that
“dissent  is  not  to  be  presumed[,]  it  must  affirmatively  be
made  known  to  the  union  by  the  dissenting  employee”—
nothing  but  an  “offhand  remark,”  made  by  Justices  who
did  not  “pause  to  consider  the  broader  constitutional
implications  of  an  affirmative  opt-out  requirement,”  ante,
at 12.  The reader is told that our precedents’ “acceptance
of the opt-out approach appears to have come about more
as  a  historical  accident  than  through  the  careful  applica-
tion of First Amendment principles.”  Ibid.  And that “[b]y
authorizing  a  union  to  collect  fees  from  nonmembers  and
permitting  the  use  of  an  opt-out  system  for  the  collection

——————

majority’s  view,  unconstitutional.    But  if  the  Court  was  dissatisfied
with  the  scope  of  the  questions  presented  here  it  should  not  have
granted certiorari in this case.  Or having granted it, the Court should
have asked for supplemental briefing on the question whether an opt-in
regime  is  constitutionally  required.    What  it  should  not  have  done—
cannot  do  under  our  rules—is  decide  that  question  without  having
provided  the  parties  and  potential  amici  an  opportunity  to  weigh  in
with their own considered views.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the constitutional implications of union fee collection and the opt-out system.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

Opinion of the Court

could not substitute “governmental regulation” for the “cru-
cial process” of editorial choice.  Id., at 258.

Next  up  was  Pacific  Gas  &  Elec.  Co.  v.  Public  Util.
Comm’n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1 (1986) (PG&E), which the Court
thought to follow naturally from Tornillo.  See 475 U. S., at
9–12  (plurality  opinion);  id.,  at  21  (Burger,  C. J.,  concur-
ring).  A private utility in California regularly put a news-
letter in its billing envelopes expressing its views of energy
policy.  The  State  directed  it  to  include  as  well  material
from a consumer-advocacy group giving a different perspec-
tive.  The utility objected, and the Court held again that the
interest in “offer[ing] the public a greater variety of views”
could not justify the regulation.  Id., at 12.  California was
compelling the utility (as Florida had compelled a newspa-
per) “to carry speech with which it disagreed” and thus to
“alter its own message.”  Id., at 11, n. 7, 16.

In  Turner  Broadcasting  System,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  512  U. S.
622  (1994)  (Turner  I ),  the  Court  further  underscored  the
constitutional protection given to editorial choice.  At issue
were federal “must-carry” rules, requiring cable operators
to  allocate  some  of  their  channels  to  local  broadcast  sta-
tions.  The Court had no doubt that the First Amendment
was implicated, because the operators were engaging in ex-
pressive activity.  They were, the Court explained, “exercis-
ing editorial discretion over which stations or programs to
include  in  [their]  repertoire.”  Id.,  at  636.    And  the  rules
“interfere[d]” with that discretion by forcing the operators
to carry stations they would not otherwise have chosen.  Id.,
at  643–644.  In  a  later  decision,  the  Court  ruled  that  the
regulation  survived  First  Amendment  review  because  it
was necessary to prevent the demise of local broadcasting.
See  Turner  Broadcasting  System,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  520  U. S.
180, 185, 189–190 (1997) (Turner II ); see infra, at 28, n. 10.
But for purposes of today’s cases, the takeaway of Turner is
this holding: A private party’s collection of third-party con-
tent into a single speech product (the operators’ “repertoire”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing previous Supreme Court cases and discussing their relevance to the current case. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury as the result of its enforcement”).

The plaintiffs point out that these and other precedents
concern injuries anticipated in the future from a statute’s
later  enforcement.  Here,  the  plaintiffs  say,  they  have  al-
ready  suffered  a  pocketbook  injury,  for  they  have  already
bought health insurance.  They also emphasize the Court’s
statement in Lujan that, when a plaintiff is the “ ‘object’ ” of
a challenged Government action, “ ‘there is ordinarily little
question that the action . . . has caused him injury, and that
a judgment preventing . . . the action will redress it.’ ”  Brief
for  Respondent-Cross  Petitioner  Hurley  et al.  18  (quoting
Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562).  But critically, unlike Lujan,
here  no  unlawful  Government  action  “fairly  traceable”  to
§5000A(a)  caused  the  plaintiffs’  pocketbook  harm.    Here,
there  is  no  action—actual  or  threatened—whatsoever.
There  is  only  the  statute’s  textually  unenforceable  lan-
guage.

To consider the matter from the point of view of another
standing requirement, namely, redressability, makes clear
that the statutory language alone is not sufficient.  To de-
termine whether an injury is redressable, a court will con-
sider  the  relationship  between  “the  judicial  relief  re-
quested” and the “injury” suffered.  Allen, 468 U. S., at 753,
n. 19.  The plaintiffs here sought injunctive relief and a de-
claratory  judgment.    The  injunctive  relief,  however,  con-
cerned the Act’s other provisions that they say are insever-
able  from  the  minimum  essential  coverage  requirement.
The relief they sought in respect to the only provision they
attack as unconstitutional—the minimum essential cover-
age  provision—is  declaratory  relief,  namely,  a  judicial
statement  that  the  provision  they  attacked  is  unconstitu-
tional.  See App. 61–63 (“Count One: Declaratory Judgment
That  the  Individual  Mandate  of  the  ACA  Exceeds  Con-
gress’s Article I Constitutional Enumerated Powers” (bold-
face deleted)); 340 F. Supp. 3d, at 619 (granting declaratory
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the issue of standing in the context of the Affordable Care Act. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to injury, redressability, and the constitutionality of a specific provision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:23:43
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3BK

Pagination Table: RULES1

AMENDMENTS TO
FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE

The following amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure were prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States on April
17, 2000, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2075, and were reported to Congress by
The Chief Justice on the same date. For the letter of transmittal, see
post, p. 1148. The Judicial Conference report referred to in that letter is
not reproduced herein.

Note that under 28 U. S. C. § 2075, such amendments shall take effect
no earlier than December 1 of the year in which they are transmitted to
Congress unless otherwise provided by law.

For earlier publication of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
and amendments thereto, see, e. g., 461 U. S. 973, 471 U. S. 1147, 480 U. S.
1077, 490 U. S. 1119, 500 U. S. 1017, 507 U. S. 1075, 511 U. S. 1169, 514 U. S.
1145, 517 U. S. 1263, 520 U. S. 1285, and 526 U. S. 1169.

1147
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be an introductory section or preface to a document containing amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. It provides information about the amendments' origin, effective date, and cites previous publications of the rules.
  </thinking>
  <category>Introductory/Preface</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

JACKSON, J., dissenting

fails to support this connection—tenuous on its face—with
any evidence that Congress actually consulted our 1947 de-
cision when it drafted the 1952 amendments, or anything
else that might establish the primary significance that the
majority ascribes to our decision’s phrasing.
  The majority similarly characterizes Congress’s decision
to remove the intent requirement from the statute in 1986
as “a further effort to streamline” the encouragement pro-
vision.  Ante, at 16.  In other words, the Court today holds
that  Congress’s  removal  of “willfully  or  knowingly”  in  the
1986 amendments did not change the mens rea required to
violate this statute.  But the majority offers no support at
all  for  its  view  that  Congress  didn’t  really  mean  for  the
amendment  to  effect  any  substantive  change.    Instead,  it
conjures  up  its  own  “simple  explanation”:  There  was  “no
need” for an explicit mens rea because “encourage” and “in-
duce”  carry  the  mens  rea  associated  with  solicitation  and
facilitation.  Ante, at 15; see also ante, at 14 (reasoning that
Congress’s use of “encourages” and “induces” brought along
the “old soil” of “the traditional intent associated with solic-
itation  and  facilitation”  (internal  quotation  marks  omit-
ted)).  Of course, this argument merely assumes that Con-
gress intended for “encourage” and “induce” as they appear
in the encouragement provision to mean “solicit” and “facil-
itate”;  it  is  a  repackaging  of  the  majority’s  unwarranted
conflation of those terms.  See Part II–A, supra.
  The majority also invokes the presumption that a crimi-
nal  law  contains  an  intent  requirement  even  where  Con-
gress does not explicitly include one.  Ante, at 15–16.  But,
here,  the statutory  history  undermines  that  presumption.
Congress most certainly focused on the mens rea question
because  it  not  only  decided  to  remove  “willfully  or  know-
ingly” from the statute, it did so while inserting a separate
mens rea requirement for the knowledge of the noncitizen’s
immigration status.  The confluence of these choices implies
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

370

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

The jury found a probability of future dangerousness and
unanimously ﬁxed Williams’ punishment at death. The trial
judge concluded that such punishment was “proper” and
“just” and imposed the death sentence.
Id., at 154. The
Virginia Supreme Court afﬁrmed the conviction and sen-
tence. Williams v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 168, 360 S. E.
2d 361 (1987), cert. denied, Williams v. Virginia, 484 U. S.
1020 (1988).
It rejected Williams’ argument that when the
trial judge imposed sentence, he failed to give mitigating
weight to the fact that Williams had turned himself in. 234
Va., at 181–182, 360 S. E. 2d, at 369–370.

State Habeas Corpus Proceedings

In 1988 Williams ﬁled for state collateral relief in the
Danville Circuit Court. The petition was subsequently
amended, and the Circuit Court (the same judge who had
presided over Williams’ trial and sentencing) held an eviden-
tiary hearing on Williams’ claim that trial counsel had been
ineffective.3 Based on the evidence adduced after two days
of hearings, Judge Ingram found that Williams’ conviction
was valid, but that his trial attorneys had been ineffective
during sentencing. Among the evidence reviewed that had
not been presented at trial were documents prepared in con-
nection with Williams’ commitment when he was 11 years old
that dramatically described mistreatment, abuse, and neglect
during his early childhood, as well as testimony that he was
“borderline mentally retarded,” had suffered repeated head
injuries, and might have mental impairments organic in ori-
gin. App. 528–529, 595. The habeas hearing also revealed

3 While Williams’ petition was pending before the Circuit Court, Vir-
ginia amended its state habeas statute to vest in the State Supreme Court
exclusive jurisdiction to award writs of habeas corpus in capital cases.
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01–654(C)(1) (Supp. 1999). Shortly after the Circuit
Court held its evidentiary hearing, the Supreme Court assumed jurisdic-
tion over Williams’ petition and instructed the Circuit Court to issue ﬁnd-
ings of fact and legal recommendation regarding Williams’ ineffective-
assistance claims.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the text of a Supreme Court case. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a narrative of the case's proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

THOMAS, J., dissenting

case” conduct and judging whether that abstracted conduct
“presents a serious risk of physical injury”—“conspire[d] to
make [the residual clause] unconstitutionally vague.”  576
U. S., at 597–598 (majority opinion).

That conclusion was not inevitable.  The Johnson Court
did “not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the
application  of  a  qualitative  standard  such  as  ‘substantial
risk’  to  real-world  conduct.”  Id.,  at  603–604.    Thus,  the
Court “all but concede[d] that the residual clause would be
constitutional if,” rather than incorporating James’ categor-
ical  approach,  it  looked  to  whether  the  “ ‘real-world  con-
duct’ ” of the underlying conviction presented a serious risk
of physical injury to another.  576 U. S., at 632 (ALITO, J.,
dissenting).

Despite  recognizing  that  a  conduct-based  approach  was
constitutionally sound, the Court later extended Johnson to
the residual clause in §924(c).  See United States v. Davis,
588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019).  The Davis Court decided that the
§924(c)  residual  clause’s  language  was  so  similar  to  the
ACCA residual clause that it, too, must be void for vague-
ness.  Id., at ___–___, ___–___ (slip op., at 6–7, 24–25).  Four
of us, however, advanced a more sensible approach: Rather
than extend Johnson to nullify §924(c)’s residual clause, we
should simply not use the categorical approach when inter-
preting residual clauses and adopt a framework focused on
the defendant’s actual conduct that Johnson conceded was
constitutional.  See 588 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 16–17)
(KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting).
  As the Davis dissent explained, §924(c)’s residual clause
is best interpreted to call for a conduct-based approach.  Id.,
at ___–___ (slip op., at 17–24).  To begin with, the plain text
of the residual clause strongly supports a conduct-based ap-
proach.  See  ibid.  Further,  none  of  the  perceived  Sixth
Amendment concerns that attend to ACCA’s sentencing en-
hancement  are  present  in  the  §924(c)  context,  because  a
“jury will find the facts or, if the case ends in a guilty plea,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to the constitutionality of certain sentencing enhancements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxlix

Page

Turner v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  885,1036

858

Turpin v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Tuten v. Tennis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Tway v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  991,1092

Twin Rivers Worship Center; Ventimiglia v.
873

TXU Corp.; Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund Inc. v.
957

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tyler v. United States
947

Tyler Hill Corp. v. Yakin
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Tyson v. Mize  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1038

Tyson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

Tyus v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
863

UBS Financial Services, Inc.; Bavishi v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

Udoinyion v. REMAX of Atlanta  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

U-Haul Co. of Cal. v. Berkeley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
853

Ulibarri; Sandoval v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Underwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961

Union.  For labor union, see name of trade.

Union Pac. R. Co. v.  Locomotive Eng’rs Gen. Comm. Adjustment
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Regal-Beloit Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United.  For labor union, see name of trade.

United Airlines, Inc.; Hoffman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

United Airlines, Inc.; Vann v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

1044

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United Airlines, Inc.; Ville v.
938

United Healthcare of Midwest, Inc.; Schoedinger v.  . . . . . . . . . . .
United Online, Inc.; Laskey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  866,1086

1091

United Parcel Service; Merritt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

United Parcel Service; Pirincci v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United Services Automobile Assn.; Harper v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

United States.  See also name of other party.

United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. United States . . . . .
U. S. Bank; YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. Court of Appeals; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. Court of Appeals; Rodriguez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. Court of Appeals; Sibley v.
U. S. Court of Appeals; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Bazemore v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Brown v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Crutcher v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Dade v.
U. S. District Court; Daniels v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Howard v.
U. S. District Court; Khalafala v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Moore v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Oyague v.

1024

1076

951

991

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  943, 966

1024

1089

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  928, 1129

984

804

858

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  985,1075

855

812

944

67

969
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
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529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1026

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 20, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–7816. Hamilton v. Stegall, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7820. Grover v. Boyd et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 921.

No. 99–7821. Hornsby v. Evans, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 518.

No. 99–7829. Smithey v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 20 Cal. 4th 936, 978 P. 2d 1171.
No. 99–7832. Williams v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc. Sup.

Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 So. 2d 16.

No. 99–7834. Manzanares v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Wood

County. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7835. McLean v. Osborne, Warden, et al. C. A.

4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 502.

No. 99–7841. Leal v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–7846. Mendoza v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7850. Williams v. Corrections Corporation of
America et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 199 F. 3d 439.

No. 99–7851. Amado Lajara v. Morgan, Warden. C. A.

11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7853. Beeson v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 115 Nev. 537, 24 P. 3d 229.

No. 99–7854. Travaglia v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 A. 2d 190.

No. 99–7857. Ayele v. Allright Boston Parking, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201
F. 3d 426.

No. 99–7858. Chenard v. Nevada Department of Human
Resources, Welfare Division. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 115 Nev. 574, 24 P. 3d 269.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
6

MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

THOMAS, J., concurring

being  declared  nonseverable  and  thus  inoperative;  our
precedents  do  not  ask  whether  the  plaintiff  has  standing
to challenge those other provisions.  See National Federa-
tion  of  Independent  Business  v.  Sebelius,  567  U. S.  519,
696–697  (2012)  (joint  dissent)  (citing,  as  an  example,
Williams  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  of  La.,  278  U. S.  235,  242–
244 (1929)).  True, the plaintiff had standing to challenge
the  unconstitutional  part  of  the  statute.  But  the  severa-
bility  doctrine  comes  into  play  only  after  the  court  has
resolved  that  issue—typically  the  only  live  controversy
between  the  parties.  In  every  other  context,  a  plaintiff
must  demonstrate  standing  for  each  part  of  the  statute
that he wants to challenge.  See Lea 789, 751, and nn. 79–
80 (citing, as examples, Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n,
554  U. S.  724,  733–734  (2008);  DaimlerChrysler  Corp.  v.
Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 346, 350–353 (2006)).  The severabil-
ity  doctrine  is  thus  an  unexplained  exception  to  the  nor-
mal rules of standing, as well as the separation-of-powers
principles  that  those  rules  protect.  See  Steel  Co.  v.  Citi-
zens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 101 (1998).

In  sum,  our  modern  severability  precedents  are  in  ten-
sion with longstanding limits on the judicial power.  And,
though  no  party  in  this  case  has  asked  us  to  reconsider
these precedents, at some point, it behooves us to do so.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.  It delves into the legal doctrine of severability and its application to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

acted in 1946, 20 years before this Court said—even in dic-
tum—that  administrative  preclusion  was  an  established
common-law principle.  Thus, even if one thought that the
dictum in Utah Construction were sufficient to establish a
common-law  principle  in  favor  of  preclusion,  that  conclu-
sion would not warrant applying Astoria’s presumption to
this  enactment  from  the  1940’s.  And,  construing  the  Act
on  its  own  terms,  I  see  no  reason  to  conclude  that  Con-
gress intended administrative preclusion to apply to TTAB
findings  of  fact  in  a  subsequent  trademark  infringement
suit.  The Act says nothing to indicate such an intent, and
several features of the Act support the contrary inference.
The first feature indicating that Congress did not intend
preclusion  to  apply  is  the  limited  authority  the  Act  gives
the  TTAB.   The  Act  authorizes  the  TTAB  only  to  “deter-
mine  and  decide  the  respective  rights  of  [trademark]
registration,”  15  U. S. C.  §1067(a),  thereby  withholding
any  authority  from  the  TTAB  to  “determine  the  right  to
use”  a  trademark  or  to  “decide  broader  questions  of  in-
fringement  or  unfair  competition,”  TTAB  Manual  of  Pro-
cedure  §102.01  (2014).  This  limited  job  description  indi-
cates that TTAB’s conclusions regarding registration were
never  meant  to  become  decisive—through  application  of
administrative  preclusion—in  subsequent  infringement
suits.  See 15 U. S. C. §1115(a) (providing that registration
of a mark “shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of
——————

designed  to  be  a  principle  of  stability  or  repose,  [should  not]  become  a
vehicle  of  change  whereby  an  error  in  one  area  metastasizes  into
others,  thereby  distorting  the  law”).    As  for  the  parties’  lack  of  argu-
ment, I would not treat tools of statutory interpretation as claims that
can  be  forfeited.  If,  for  example,  one  party  peppered  its  brief  with
legislative history, and the opposing party did not challenge the propri-
ety of using legislative history, I still would not consider myself bound
to  rely  upon  it.    The  same  is  true  here:  Although  the  Court  has  com-
mented  in  the  past  that  the  presumption  of  administrative  preclusion
would apply to other statutes, we are not bound to apply it now to the
Lanham Act, even if the parties have assumed we would.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of statutes, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

subsidy that Montana law does not permit, there is nothing
for this Court to do.2

——————
School Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U. S. 218 (1964), for the proposi-
tion that eliminating a public benefit does not always remedy discrimi-
nation.  See Reply Brief 5.  But Griffin is inapposite.  There, a Virginia
county closed its public schools and so-called “private schools” were set
up in their place to avoid a court desegregation order.  See 377 U. S., at
223.  These so-called private schools “were open to whites only and . . .
were  in  fact run  by  a  practical  partnership  between  State  and  county,
designed to preserve segregated education.”  Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U. S. 217, 221–222 (1971).  That is nothing like what the Montana Su-
preme Court’s remedy achieved here.  Nor have petitioners said other-
wise; there is no allegation that Montana confers clandestine tax credits
solely to secular schools.

2 Petitioners here have not asserted a free exercise claim on a theory
that they were victims of religious animus, either.  Cf. Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 533 (1993).  Instead, one con-
currence seeks to make the argument for them while attempting to com-
pare the state constitutional provision here with a nonunanimous jury
rule rooted in racial animus.  Ante, at 1 (opinion of ALITO, J.) (citing the
dissent in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___ (2020)).  But those questions
are not before the Court.

In any case, the concurrence’s arguments are as misguided as they are
misplaced.  Citing the Court’s opinion in Ramos, the concurrence main-
tains that a law’s “ ‘uncomfortable past’ must still be ‘[e]xamined.’ ” Ante,
at 10 (opinion of ALITO, J.).  But as previously explained: “Where a law
otherwise  is  untethered  to  [discriminatory]  bias—and  perhaps  also
where a legislature actually confronts a law’s tawdry past in reenacting
it—the new law may well be free of discriminatory taint.”  Ramos, 590
U. S.,  at  ___  (SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  concurring  in  part)  (slip  op.,  at  4).    That
could not “be said of the laws at issue” in Ramos.  Ibid.  It can be here.
See Part II, infra.

The concurrence overlooks the starkly different histories of these state
laws.  Also  missing  from  the  concurrence  (and  the  amicus  briefs  it  re-
peats) is the stubborn fact that the constitutional provision at issue here
was adopted in 1972 at a convention where it was met with overwhelm-
ing support by religious leaders (Catholic and non-Catholic), even those
who examined the history of prior no-aid provisions.  See Brief for Re-
spondents 16–27; 6 Montana Constitutional Convention 1971–1972 Pro-
ceedings and Transcript, pp. 2012–2013, 2016–2017 (Mont. Legislature
and Legislative Council); see also ante, at 12–13 (BREYER, J., dissenting);
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue*.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

do with Article I legislative power.  See Whitman v. Ameri-
can Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 472 (2001); Depart-
ment  of  Transportation  v.  Association  of  American  Rail-
roads, 575 U. S. 43, 67–88 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring
in judgment).  It has also established territorial courts that
do  not  comply  with  Article  III.   See  Baude,  Adjudication
Outside  Article  III,  133  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1511,  1525–1530
(2020) (analyzing territorial courts in early Territories).

The powers vested in territorial governments are distinct
from the powers of the National Government.  Territorial
legislatures exercise the legislative power of the Territory,
not  Article  I  legislative  power.  Cincinnati  Soap  Co.  v.
United  States,  301  U. S.  308,  322–323  (1937).    Territorial
officials exercise the executive power of the Territory, not
Article II executive power.  Snow v. United States, 18 Wall.
317, 321–322 (1873).  And territorial courts exercise the ju-
dicial power of the Territory, not the “judicial power of the
United States” under Article III.  American Ins. Co. v. 356
Bales  of  Cotton,  1  Pet.  511,  546  (1828);  Clinton  v.  En-
glebrecht, 13 Wall. 434, 447 (1872).

B
Given  the  distinction  between  territorial  and  national
powers,  the  question  becomes  whether  officers  exercising
Article  IV  territorial  power  are  officers  “of  the  United
States”  under  the  original  meaning  of  the  Appointments
Clause.  They are not.  Both the text of the Appointments
Clause and historical practice support this conclusion.

1
The text of the Appointments Clause indicates that “Of-
ficers of the United States” refers to officers exercising the
powers of the National Government, not officers exercising
territorial power.  The Clause applies to the appointment of

——————
(Virgin Islands); Act of Aug. 1, 1950, §10, 64 Stat. 387 (Guam).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 590 U.S. ____ (2020). It delves into the interpretation of the Appointments Clause and its application to territorial officers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–357
_________________

CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v.
ROBBIN L. FULTON, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[January 14, 2021]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring.
Section  362(a)(3)  of  the  Bankruptcy  Code  provides  that
the  filing  of  a  bankruptcy  petition  “operates  as  a  stay”  of
“any act . . . to exercise control over property of the [bank-
ruptcy]  estate.”  11  U. S. C.  §362(a)(3).    I  join  the  Court’s
opinion  because  I  agree  that,  as  used  in  §362(a)(3),  the
phrase  “exercise  control  over”  does  not  cover  a  creditor’s
passive  retention  of  property  lawfully  seized  prebank-
ruptcy.  Hence, when a creditor has taken possession of a
debtor’s property, §362(a)(3) does not require the creditor to
return the property upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
I  write  separately  to  emphasize  that  the  Court  has  not
decided whether and when §362(a)’s other provisions may
require a creditor to return a debtor’s property.  Those pro-
visions stay, among other things, “any act to create, perfect,
or enforce any lien against property of the estate” and “any
act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against [a] debtor”
that arose prior to bankruptcy proceedings.  §§362(a)(4), (6);
see, e.g., In re Kuehn, 563 F. 3d 289, 294 (CA7 2009) (hold-
ing that a university’s refusal to provide a transcript to a
student-debtor “was an act to collect a debt” that violated
the  automatic  stay).  Nor  has  the  Court  addressed  how
bankruptcy courts should go about enforcing creditors’ sep-
arate obligation to “deliver” estate property to the trustee
or debtor under §542(a).  The City’s conduct may very well
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, case names, and discusses legal concepts related to bankruptcy law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

KELLY v. UNITED STATES ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 18–1059.  Argued January 14, 2020—Decided May 7, 2020

During  former  New  Jersey  Governor  Chris  Christie’s  2013  reelection
campaign,  his  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff,  Bridget  Anne  Kelly,  avidly
courted  Democratic  mayors  for  their  endorsements,  but  Fort  Lee’s
mayor refused to back the Governor’s campaign.  Determined to pun-
ish the mayor, Kelly, Port Authority Deputy Executive Director Wil-
liam Baroni, and another Port Authority official, David Wildstein, de-
cided to reduce from three to one the number of lanes long reserved at
the George Washington Bridge’s toll plaza for Fort Lee’s morning com-
muters.  To disguise their efforts at political retribution, Wildstein de-
vised a cover story: The lane realignment was for a traffic study.  As
part  of  that  cover  story,  the  defendants  asked  Port  Authority  traffic
engineers to collect some numbers about the effect of the changes.  At
the suggestion of a Port Authority manager, they also agreed to pay an
extra  toll  collector  overtime  so  that  Fort  Lee’s  one  remaining  lane
would not be shut down if the collector on duty needed a break.  The
lane  realignment  caused  four  days  of  gridlock  in  Fort  Lee,  and  only
ended  when  the  Port  Authority’s  Executive  Director  learned  of  the
scheme.  Baroni and Kelly were convicted in federal court of wire fraud,
fraud on a federally funded program or entity (the Port Authority), and
conspiracy to commit each of those crimes.  The Third Circuit affirmed.

Held: Because the scheme here did not aim to obtain money or property,
Baroni and Kelly could not have violated the federal-program fraud or
wire fraud laws.

The federal wire fraud statute makes it a crime to effect (with the
use of the wires) “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money  or  property  by  means  of  false  or  fraudulent  pretenses,  repre-
sentations,  or  promises.”    18  U. S. C.  §1343.    Similarly,  the  federal-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GILL v. WHITFORD

KAGAN, J., concurring

statewide  partisan  gerrymander,  whether  alleged  by  a
party  member  or  the  party  itself,  has  nothing  to  do  with
the packing or cracking of any single district’s lines.  The
complaint in such a case is instead that the  gerrymander
has  burdened  the  ability  of  like-minded  people  across  the
State  to  affiliate  in  a  political  party  and  carry  out  that
organization’s  activities  and  objects.    See  supra,  at  8–9.
Because a plaintiff can have that complaint without living
in  a  packed  or  cracked  district,  she  need  not  show  what
the  Court  demands  today  for  a  vote  dilution  claim.    Or
said  otherwise:  Because  on  this  alternative  theory,  the
valued association and the injury to it are statewide, so too
is the relevant standing requirement.

On occasion, the plaintiffs here have indicated that they
have  an  associational  claim  in  mind.    In  addition  to  re
peatedly alleging vote dilution, their complaint asserted in
general  terms  that  Wisconsin’s  districting  plan  infringes
their “First Amendment right to freely associate with each
other  without  discrimination  by  the  State  based  on  that
association.”    1  App.  61,  Complaint  ¶91.    Similarly,  the
plaintiffs  noted  before  this  Court  that  “[b]eyond  diluting
votes, partisan gerrymandering offends First Amendment
values  by  penalizing  citizens  because  of  . . .  their  associa
tion with a political party.”  Brief for Appellees 36 (inter
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).  And  finally,  the  plaintiffs’
evidence  of  partisan  asymmetry  well  fits  a  suit  alleging
associational  injury  (although,  as  noted  below,  that  was
not how it was used, see infra, at 11).  As the Court points
out,  what  those  statistical  metrics  best  measure  is  a  ger
rymander’s effect “on the fortunes of political parties” and
those associated with them.  Ante, at 20.

In  the  end,  though,  I  think  the  plaintiffs  did  not  suffi
ciently advance a First Amendment associational theory to
avoid  the  Court’s  holding  on  standing.  Despite  referring
to  that  theory  in  their  complaint,  the  plaintiffs  tried  this
case  as  though  it  were  about  vote  dilution  alone.    Their
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Gill v. Whitford. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding partisan gerrymandering and the plaintiffs' standing to sue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

Opinion of the Court

right.  See  Treaty  Between  the  United  States  of  America
and  the  Eastern  Band  of  Shoshonees  [sic]  and  the
Bannack [sic] Tribe of Indians (Shoshone-Bannock Treaty),
July  3,  1868,  15  Stat.  674–675  (“[T]hey  shall  have  the
right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States
so  long  as  game  may  be  found  thereon,  and  so  long  as
peace  subsists  among  the  whites  and  Indians  on  the  bor-
ders  of  the  hunting  districts”).  The  Race  Horse  Court
concluded that Wyoming’s admission to the United States
extinguished  the  Shoshone-Bannock  Treaty  right.    163
U. S., at 505, 514–515.

Race  Horse  relied  on  two  lines  of  reasoning.    The  first
turned on the doctrine that new States are admitted to the
Union  on  an  “equal  footing”  with  existing  States.    Id.,  at
511–514  (citing,  e.g.,  Lessee  of  Pollard  v.  Hagan,  3  How.
212  (1845)).  This  doctrine  led  the  Court  to  conclude  that
the  Wyoming  Statehood  Act  repealed  the  Shoshone  and
Bannock  Tribes’  hunting  rights,  because  affording  the
Tribes  a  protected  hunting  right  lasting  after  statehood
would  be  “irreconcilably  in  conflict”  with  the  power—
“vested in all other States of the Union” and newly shared
by Wyoming—“to regulate the killing of game within their
borders.”  163 U. S., at 509, 514.

Second,  the  Court  found  no  evidence  in  the  Shoshone-
Bannock  Treaty  itself  that  Congress  intended  the  treaty
right to continue in “perpetuity.”  Id., at 514–515.  To the
contrary,  the  Court  emphasized  that  Congress  “clearly
contemplated  the  disappearance  of  the  conditions”  speci-
fied in the treaty.  Id., at 509.  The Court decided that the
rights  at  issue  in  the  Shoshone-Bannock  Treaty  were
“essentially  perishable”  and  afforded  the  Tribes  only  a
“temporary and precarious” privilege.  Id., at 515.

More  than  a  century  after  Race  Horse  and  four  years
after  Repsis  relied  on  that  decision,  however,  Mille  Lacs
undercut  both  pillars  of  Race  Horse’s  reasoning.  Mille
Lacs considered an 1837 Treaty that guaranteed to several
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the case of Race Horse and its impact on tribal hunting rights. It cites legal precedents and analyzes the reasoning behind previous court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

(“We  propose  a  test  using  a  way  that’s  not  too  dissimilar
from the tort ‘reasonable man’ test”).  After some question
ing  from  the  Justices,  the  lawyer  conceded  that  his  test
should  also  require  individuals  to  subjectively  expect
privacy.  See  id.,  at  12.  With  that  modification,  Justice
Harlan seemed to accept the lawyer’s test almost verbatim
in his concurrence.

Although the majority opinion in Katz had little practi
cal  significance  after  Congress  enacted  the  Omnibus
Crime  Control  and  Safe  Streets  Act  of  1968,  Justice  Har
lan’s  concurrence  profoundly  changed  our  Fourth  Amend
ment  jurisprudence.
It  took  only  one  year  for  the  full
Court  to  adopt  his  two-pronged  test.    See  Terry  v.  Ohio,
392  U. S.  1,  10  (1968).   And  by  1979,  the  Court  was  de
scribing  Justice  Harlan’s  test  as  the  “lodestar”  for  deter
mining whether a “search” had occurred.  Smith v. Mary-
land,  442  U. S.  735,  739  (1979).    Over  time,  the  Court
minimized  the  subjective  prong  of  Justice  Harlan’s  test.
See  Kerr,  Katz  Has  Only  One  Step:  The  Irrelevance  of
Subjective  Expectations,  82  U. Chi.  L. Rev.  113  (2015).
That left the objective prong—the “reasonable expectation
of  privacy”  test  that  the  Court  still  applies  today.    See
ante,  at  5;  United  States  v.  Jones,  565  U. S.  400,  406
(2012).

II
  Under  the  Katz  test,  a  “search”  occurs  whenever  “gov
ernment officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation
of privacy.’ ”  Jones, supra, at 406.  The most glaring prob
lem with this test is that it has “no plausible foundation in
the text of the Fourth Amendment.”  Carter, 525 U. S., at
97  (opinion  of  Scalia,  J.).    The  Fourth  Amendment,  as
relevant  here,  protects  “[t]he  right  of  the  people  to  be
secure  in  their  persons,  houses,  papers,  and  effects,
against  unreasonable  searches.”    By  defining  “search”  to
mean  “any  violation  of  a  reasonable  expectation  of  pri-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 585 U.S. ____ (2018). It delves into the history and interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, particularly focusing on the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test established in Katz v. United States.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

415 F. 3d 50, reversed and remanded.

Syllabus

STEVENS, J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  KENNEDY,
SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dis-
senting  opinion,  in  which  SCALIA,  THOMAS,  and  ALITO,  JJ.,  joined.
SCALIA,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  ROBERTS,  C. J.,  and
THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and the list of justices involved in the case. This type of information is generally not considered part of the main body text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Justice Participation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

Opinion of the Court

They  “plainly  discriminate[d]”  against  out-of-staters by
“erecting  an  economic  barrier  protecting  a  major  local  in-
dustry against competition from without the State.”  Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 354 (1951) (discussing
Baldwin).  Really,  the  laws  operated  like  “a  tariff  or  cus-
toms duty.”  West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S.
186, 194 (1994); see Baldwin, 294 U. S., at 523 (condemning
the  challenged  laws  for  seeking  to  “protec[t]”  New  York
dairy farmers “against competition from without”).

Brown-Forman and Healy differed from Baldwin only in
that  they  involved  price-affirmation,  rather  than  price-
fixing, statutes.  In Brown-Forman, New York required liq-
uor  distillers  to  affirm  (on  a  monthly  basis)  that  their  in-
state  prices  were  no  higher  than  their  out-of-state  prices.
476 U. S., at 576.  Once more, the goal was plain:  New York
sought  to  force  out-of-state  distillers  to  “surrender”  what-
ever cost advantages they enjoyed against their in-state ri-
vals.  Id., at 580.  Once more, the law amounted to “simple
economic  protectionism.”  Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).

In  Healy,  a  Connecticut  law  required  out-of-state  beer
merchants  to  affirm  that  their  in-state  prices  were  no
higher than those they charged in neighboring States.  491
U. S.,  at  328–330.  Here,  too,  protectionism  took  center
stage.  As  the  Court  later  noted,  “[t]he  essential  vice  in
laws” like Connecticut’s is that they “hoard” commerce “for
the benefit of ” in-state merchants and discourage consum-
ers from crossing state lines to make their purchases from
nearby out-of-state vendors.  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarks-
town,  511  U. S.  383,  391–392  (1994).    Nor  did  the  law  in
Healy even try to cloak its discriminatory purpose:  “By its
plain terms, the Connecticut affirmation statute applie[d]
solely to interstate” firms, and in that way “clearly discrim-
inate[d] against interstate commerce.”  491 U. S., at 340–
341.  The  Court  also  worried  that,  if  the  Connecticut  law
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing cases related to economic protectionism and discrimination against out-of-state businesses.  It cites previous Supreme Court cases and analyzes their reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

ALITO, J., dissenting

III

Based  on  the  relevant  text,  context,  statutory  history,
and statutory  purpose, the  Government makes a convinc-
ing case that the stop-time rule can be triggered even by a
notice to appear that omits the date and time of a removal
proceeding.  But the Court holds instead that in order “to
trigger  the  stop-time  rule,  the  Government  must  serve  a
notice  to  appear  that,  at  the  very  least,  ‘specif[ies]’  the
‘time  and  place’  of  the  removal  proceedings.”    Ante,  at  9.
According to the Court, that conclusion is compelled by the
statutory text, the statutory context, and “common sense.”
Ante,  at  12.    While  the  Court’s  interpretation  may  be
reasonable, the Court goes much too far in saying that it is
the only reasonable construction.

A
Start  with  the  text.    As  noted,  the  stop-time  rule  pro-
vides that “any period of . . . continuous physical presence
in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the
alien  is  served  a  notice  to  appear  under  section  1229(a).”
§1229b(d)(1).  The Court does not dispute that it is entirely
consistent  with  standard  English  usage  to  read  this
language as the Government and I do.  See ante, at 15.  It
therefore  follows  that  the  stop-time  rule  itself  does  not
foreclose the Government’s interpretation.

That  leaves  only  §1229(a)(1),  which  specifies  the  infor-
mation that a notice to appear must contain.  The Court’s
treatment  of  this  provision  contradicts  itself.  On  the  one
hand, the Court insists that this provision is “definitional”
and  that  it  sets  out  the  essential  characteristics  without
which a notice is not a notice to appear.  Ante, at 13.  But
on  the  other  hand,  the  Court  states  that  it  “leaves  for
another  day  whether  a  putative  notice  to  appear  that
omits  any  of  the  other  categories  of  information  enumer-
ated in §1229(a)(1) triggers the stop-time rule.”  Ante, at 8,
n. 5.  The Court cannot have it both ways.  If §1229(a)(1) is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the interpretation of a specific legal rule ("stop-time rule") and its application to immigration proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

961

558 U. S.

October 13, 2009

No.  09–6355.  Underwood  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  825.

No.  09–6356.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6357.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6358.  Thomas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  492.

No.  09–6359.  Underwood  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  92.

No.  09–6360.  Pettiette  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  362.

No.  09–6361.  Porter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  848.

No.  09–6364.  Roberts  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  388.

No. 09–6368.  Jordan v.  Federal Bureau of Prisons et al.
C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.
Appx.  752.

No.  09–6370.  Diaz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6373.  Rashad,  aka  Coleman  v.  United  States.

C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6374.  Davis  v.  Tennessee.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tenn.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6377.  Hill v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6380.  Gallagos  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  943.

No.  09–6381.  Mullen  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  61.

No. 09–6386.  Phasung Lu Baccam v.  United States.  C.  A.

8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  1197.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

died, the cemetery was willing to include those words, but
not  the  words  that  described  Cynthia’s  relationship  to
Sherry: “ ‘beloved life partner.’ ”  N. Knauer, Gay and Les-
bian Elders 102 (2011).  There are many such stories, too
many to tell here.  And after today, too many to come.

I fear that the symbolic damage of the Court’s opinion is
done.  But that does not mean that we are powerless in the
face  of  the  decision.    The  meaning  of  our  Constitution  is
found not in any law volume, but in the spirit of the people
who live under it.  Every business owner in America has a
choice  whether  to  live  out  the  values  in  the  Constitution.
Make  no  mistake:  Invidious  discrimination  is  not  one  of
them.  “[D]iscrimination in any form and in any degree has
no justifiable part whatever in our democratic way of life.”
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 242 (1944) (Mur-
phy, J., dissenting).  “It is unattractive in any setting but it
is utterly revolting among a free people who have embraced
the  principles  set  forth  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United
States.”  Ibid.

The  unattractive  lesson  of  the  majority  opinion  is  this:
What’s mine is mine, and what’s yours is yours.  The lesson
of the history of public accommodations laws is altogether
different.  It is that in a free and democratic society, there
can be no social castes.  And for that to be true, it must be
true in the public market.  For the “promise of freedom” is
an  empty  one  if  the  Government  is  “powerless  to  assure
that a dollar in the hands of [one person] will purchase the
same thing as a dollar in the hands of a[nother].”  Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 443 (1968).  Because the
Court today retreats from that promise, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and references to previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

GORSUCH, J., concurring

descendants or people [s]prung from [s]ome noted head, or
a  collective  number  of  people  in  a  colony”);  N.  Bailey,  An
Universal Etymological English Dictionary  (22d ed. 1770)
(“a  [c]ompany  of  [p]eople  dwelling  together  in  the  [s]ame
[w]ard or [l]iberty”).

This  observation  sheds  light  on  why  ordinary  speakers
use the two terms differently.  It explains, for instance, why
it is grammatical to say you are vacationing “in Colorado,”
but not to say you are vacationing “in Navajo.”  It explains
why it is sensible to say you are meeting “with some Cher-
okee,” but not to say you are meeting “with some New Jer-
sey.”  But this point also helps us make sense of why the
Legislative  Branch  may  regulate  commerce  with  Indian
Tribes  differently  than  it  may  regulate  commerce  among
the States.  Because Tribes are collections of people, the In-
dian Commerce Clause endows Congress with the “author-
ity to regulate commerce with Native Americans” as indi-
viduals.  McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip
op., at 7).  By contrast, Congress’s power under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause operates only on commerce that in-
volves “more States than one.”  Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.
1, 194 (1824).  In other words, commerce that takes place
“among” (or between) two or more territorial units, and not
just  any  commerce  that  involves  some  member  of  some
State.  See Green 649–654.

This Court has long appreciated these points of distinc-
tion.  For example, in United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407
(1866), the Court upheld a federal statute that prohibited
the  sale  of  alcohol  by  non-Indians  to  Indians—on  or  off
tribal land.  Id., at 416–417.  Giving the Indian Commerce
Clause its most natural reading, the Court concluded that
the  power  to  regulate  commerce  with  Indian  Tribes  must
mean the power to regulate “commerce with the individuals
composing  those  [T]ribes.”  Id.,  at  417  (emphasis  added).
For that reason, too, “[t]he locality of the [commerce could]
have nothing to do with the [scope of the] power.”  Id., at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the distinction between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause, focusing on the nature of Indian Tribes as collections of people.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

634

BRAGDON v. ABBOTT

Opinion of the Court

virus invades different cells in the blood and in body tissues.
Certain white blood cells, known as helper T-lymphocytes or
CD4‘ cells, are particularly vulnerable to HIV. The virus
attaches to the CD4 receptor site of the target cell and fuses
its membrane to the cell’s membrane. HIV is a retrovirus,
which means it uses an enzyme to convert its own genetic
material into a form indistinguishable from the genetic mate-
rial of the target cell. The virus’ genetic material migrates
to the cell’s nucleus and becomes integrated with the cell’s
chromosomes. Once integrated, the virus can use the cell’s
own genetic machinery to replicate itself. Additional copies
of the virus are released into the body and infect other cells
in turn. Young, The Replication Cycle of HIV–1, in The
AIDS Knowledge Base, pp. 3.1–2 to 3.1–7 (P. Cohen, M.
Sande, & P. Volberding eds., 2d ed. 1994) (hereinafter AIDS
Knowledge Base); Folks & Hart, The Life Cycle of Human
Immunodeﬁciency Virus Type 1, in AIDS: Etiology, Diagno-
sis, Treatment and Prevention 29–39 (V. DeVita et al. eds.,
4th ed. 1997) (hereinafter AIDS: Etiology); Greene, Molecu-
lar Insights into HIV–1 Infection, in The Medical Manage-
ment of AIDS 18–24 (M. Sande & P. Volberding eds., 5th
ed. 1997) (hereinafter Medical Management of AIDS). Al-
though the body does produce antibodies to combat HIV in-
fection, the antibodies are not effective in eliminating the
virus. Pantaleo et al., Immunopathogenesis of Human Im-
munodeﬁciency Virus Infection, in AIDS: Etiology 79; Gard-
ner, HIV Vaccine Development, in AIDS Knowledge Base
3.6–5; Haynes, Immune Responses to Human Immunodeﬁ-
ciency Virus Infection, in AIDS: Etiology 91.

The virus eventually kills the infected host cell. CD4‘
cells play a critical role in coordinating the body’s immune
response system, and the decline in their number causes
corresponding deterioration of the body’s ability to ﬁght in-
fections from many sources. Tracking the infected individu-
al’s CD4‘ cell count is one of the most accurate measures of
the course of the disease. Greene, Medical Management of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text discussing the HIV virus and its impact on the immune system. It provides scientific information about the virus's lifecycle and its effects on CD4+ cells.
  </thinking>
  <category>Informational Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

Syllabus

do not provide judges “a roving license” to reassess the wisdom of state
legislation in light of any conceivable out-of-state interest, economic or
otherwise.  United Haulers, 550 U. S., at 343.  Pp 25–27.

JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  joined  by  JUSTICE KAGAN, concluded  that  the
judgment should be affirmed, not because courts are incapable of bal-
ancing  economic  burdens  against  noneconomic  benefits  as  Pike  re-
quires or because of any other fundamental reworking of that doctrine,
but because petitioners fail to plausibly allege a substantial burden on
interstate commerce as required by Pike.  Pp 1–3.

JUSTICE  BARRETT  concluded  that  the  judgment  should  be  affirmed
because  Pike  balancing  requires  both  the  benefits  and  burdens  of  a
State law to be judicially cognizable and comparable, see Department
of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U. S. 328, 354–355, but the benefits and
burdens  of  Proposition  12  are  incommensurable;  that  said,  the  com-
plaint plausibly alleges a substantial burden on interstate commerce
because Proposition 12’s costs are pervasive, burdensome, and will be
felt primarily (but not exclusively) outside California.  Pp 1–2.

 GORSUCH, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV–A, and V, in which
THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, an opinion with
respect  to  Parts  IV–B  and  IV–D,  in  which  THOMAS  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,
joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV–C, in which THOMAS, SO-
TOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in part, in which KAGAN, J., joined.  BARRETT, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, in which ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ.,
joined.  KAVANAUGH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal arguments and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

Opinion of the Court

are particularly reluctant to disrupt precedents interpret-
ing  language  that  Congress  has  since  reenacted.    As  we
explained  last  Term  in  Helsinn  Healthcare  S. A.  v.  Teva
Pharmaceuticals  USA,  Inc.,  586  U. S.  ___  (2019),  when
Congress  “adopt[s]  the  language  used  in  [an]  earlier  act,”
we  presume  that  Congress  “adopted  also  the construction
given by this Court to such language, and made it a part of
the enactment.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (quoting Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 16 (1948)).  A century of cases
have rooted the government edicts doctrine in the word “au-
thor,” and Congress has repeatedly reused that term with-
out  abrogating  the  doctrine.    The  term  now  carries  this
settled  meaning,  and  “critics  of  our  ruling  can  take  their
objections  across  the  street,  [where]  Congress  can  correct
any  mistake  it  sees.”  Kimble  v.  Marvel  Entertainment,
LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015).3

Moving on from the text, Georgia invokes what it views
as the official position of the Copyright Office, as reflected
in  the  Compendium  of  U. S.  Copyright  Office  Practices
(Compendium).  But,  as  Georgia  concedes,  the  Compen-
dium is a non-binding administrative manual that at most

——————

3 JUSTICE THOMAS disputes the applicability of the Helsinn Healthcare
presumption because States have asserted copyright in statutory anno-
tations  over  the  years  notwithstanding  our  government  edicts  prece-
dents.  Post, at 11–12.  In JUSTICE THOMAS’s view, those assertions prove
that our precedents could not have provided clear enough guidance for
Congress to incorporate.  But that inference from state behavior proves
too much.  The same study cited by JUSTICE THOMAS to support a practice
of claiming copyright in non-binding annotations also reports that “many
states claim copyright interest in their primary law materials,” including
statutes and regulations.  Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights in
Primary Law Materials, 23 Hastings Com. & Entertainment L. J. 81, 109
(2000) (emphasis added).  JUSTICE THOMAS concedes that such assertions
are plainly foreclosed by our government edicts precedents.  Post, at 4.
That interested  parties  have  pursued ambitious  readings  of  our  prece-
dents does not mean those precedents are incapable of providing mean-
ingful guidance to us or to Congress.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and references to legal doctrines.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
6

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,

HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ

Syllabus

that  it  systematically—and  impermissibly—burdens  most  heavily
those  groups  whose  viewpoints  are  out  of  favor  with  the  campus
mainstream.  This argument fails because “[a] regulation that serves
purposes  unrelated  to  the  content  of  expression  is  deemed  neutral,
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but
not others.”  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791.  Hast-
ings’ requirement that RSOs accept all comers, the Court is satisfied,
is  “justified  without  reference  to  the  content  [or  viewpoint]  of  the
regulated speech.”  Id., at 791.  It targets the act of rejecting would-be
group members without reference to the reasons motivating that be-
havior.  Pp. 29–31.

3. Neither lower court addressed CLS’s argument that Hastings se-
lectively  enforces  its  all-comers  policy.    This  Court  is  not  the  proper
forum  to  air  the  issue  in  the  first  instance.    On  remand,  the  Ninth
Circuit  may  consider  this  argument  if,  and  to  the  extent,  it  is  pre-
served.  Pp. 31–32.

319 Fed. Appx. 645, affirmed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  STEVENS,
KENNEDY, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.  STEVENS, J., and KEN-
NEDY, J., filed concurring opinions.  ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision.  It is not the full text of the case and lacks sequential narrative.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
906

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5481.  Wright  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5482.  Beckles  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  832.

No.  09–5483.  Young  v.  Sirmons,  Warden.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  551  F.  3d  942.

No.  09–5484.  Jones  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  725.

No.  09–5485.  Carter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  1107.

No.  09–5486.  Carneal  v.  Kentucky.  Sup.  Ct.  Ky.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  274  S. W.  3d  420.

No.  09–5489.  Berry  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  332.

No.  09–5492.  Gueye  v.  Thomas  M.  Cooley  Law  School

et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5493.  Rogers  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5494.  Fults  v.  Upton,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5495.  Anderson  v.  Southland  Bank  et  al.  Sup.

Ct.  Ala.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  21  So.  3d  1196.

No.  09–5497.  Boice  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  301  Fed.  Appx.  205.

No.  09–5498.  Anderson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5499.  Burkell  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  4th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  992  So.  2d  848.

No.  09–5500.  Murphy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5501.  Magnan  v.  Oklahoma.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Okla.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  207  P.  3d  397.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

365

Syllabus

ently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.
Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may
grant relief if the state court identiﬁes the correct governing legal prin-
ciple from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle
to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Pp. 402–409.

(b) In deﬁning what qualiﬁes as an “unreasonable application of . . .
clearly established Federal law,” the Fourth Circuit erred in holding
that a state-court decision involves such an application only if the state
court has applied federal law in a manner that reasonable jurists would
all agree is unreasonable. That standard would tend to mislead federal
habeas courts by focusing on a subjective inquiry. Rather, the federal
court should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly estab-
lished federal law was objectively unreasonable. Cf. Wright v. West,
505 U. S. 277, 304. Although difﬁcult to deﬁne, “unreasonable” is a com-
mon legal term familiar to federal judges. For present purposes, the
most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law
is different from an incorrect application of federal law. See, e. g., id.,
at 305. Because Congress speciﬁcally used the word “unreasonable,”
and not a term like “erroneous” or “incorrect,” a federal habeas court
may not grant relief simply because it concludes in its independent judg-
ment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established
federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must
also be unreasonable. Finally, the phrase “clearly established Federal
law, as determined by [this] Court” refers to the holdings, as opposed to
the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-
court decision.
In this respect, the quoted phrase bears only a slight
connection to this Court’s jurisprudence under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S.
288. Whatever would qualify as an “old rule” under Teague will consti-
tute “clearly established Federal law, as determined by [this] Court,”
see, e. g., Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222, 228, but with one caveat: Sec-
tion 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to this
Court’s jurisprudence. Pp. 409–413.

Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, in which O’Con-
nor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an opin-
ion with respect to Parts II and V, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to Part II (except as to the footnote), in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J.,
joined, except as to the footnote, and an opinion concurring in part and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 362 (2000). It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses the application of legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

3

Opinion of the Court

the results of the blood test, arguing in relevant part that,
under  the  circumstances,  taking  his  blood  for  chemi
cal  testing  without  first  obtaining  a  search  warrant  vio-
lated  his  rights  under  the  Fourth  Amendment.  The  trial
court agreed.  It concluded that the exigency exception to
the warrant requirement did not apply because, apart from
the  fact  that  “[a]s  in  all  cases  involving  intoxication,
[McNeely’s]  blood  alcohol  was  being  metabolized  by  his
liver,”  there  were  no  circumstances  suggesting  the  officer
faced  an  emergency  in  which  he  could  not  practicably
obtain  a  warrant.    No.  10CG–CR01849–01  (Cir. Ct.  Cape
Giradeau  Cty.,  Mo.,  Div.  II,  Mar.  3,  2011),  App.  to  Pet.
for  Cert.  43a.    On  appeal,  the  Missouri  Court  of  Appeals
stated  an  intention  to  reverse  but  transferred  the  case
directly  to  the  Missouri  Supreme  Court.    No.  ED  96402
(June 21, 2011), id., at 24a.

The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.  358 S. W. 3d 65
(2012) (per curiam).  Recognizing that this Court’s decision
in  Schmerber  v.  California,  384  U. S.  757,  “provide[d]  the
backdrop”  to  its  analysis,  the  Missouri  Supreme  Court
held  that  “Schmerber  directs  lower  courts  to  engage  in
a  totality  of  the  circumstances  analysis  when  determin
ing whether exigency permits a nonconsensual, warrantless
blood  draw.”  358  S. W.  3d,  at  69,  74.    The  court  further
concluded  that  Schmerber  “requires  more  than  the  mere
dissipation of blood-alcohol evidence to support a warrant
less blood draw in an alcohol-related case.”  358 S. W. 3d,
at 70.  According to the court, exigency depends heavily on
the existence of additional “ ‘special facts,’ ” such as whether
an  officer  was  delayed  by  the  need  to  investigate  an  ac-
cident  and  transport  an  injured  suspect  to  the  hospital,
as  had  been  the  case  in  Schmerber.  358  S. W.  3d,  at  70,

——————

charged  with  a  class  D  felony  under  Missouri  law,  which  carries  a

maximum  imprisonment  term  of  four  years.    See  Mo.  Ann.  Stat.

§§558.011, 577.023.1(5), 577.023.3 (West 2011).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the beginning of an opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA

INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

U. S. 437, 449 (1905).  We ought to give effect to the words
they used.

The  majority  today  shows  greater  concern  about  redis-
tricting practices than about the meaning of the Constitu-
tion.  I  recognize  the  difficulties  that  arise  from  trying  to
fashion  judicial  relief  for  partisan  gerrymandering.    See
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267 (2004); ante, at 1.  But our
inability to find a manageable standard in that area is no
excuse to abandon a standard of meaningful interpretation
in  this  area.  This  Court  has  stressed  repeatedly  that  a
law’s  virtues  as  a  policy  innovation  cannot  redeem  its
inconsistency  with  the  Constitution.    “Failure  of  political
will  does  not  justify  unconstitutional  remedies.”  Clinton,
524  U. S.,  at  449  (KENNEDY,  J.,  concurring);  see  Stern  v.
Marshall,  564  U. S.  ___  (2011);  Free  Enterprise  Fund  v.
Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Bd.,  561  U. S.  477
(2010);  Bowsher  v.  Synar,  478  U. S.  714  (1986);  Chadha,
462 U. S. 919; Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).
Indeed, the Court has enforced the text of the Constitu-
tion  to  invalidate  state  laws  with  policy  objectives  remi-
niscent of this one.  Two of our precedents held that States
could not use their constitutions to impose term limits on
their  federal  representatives  in  violation  of  the  United
States  Constitution.    Cook,  531  U. S.  510;  U. S.  Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779 (1995).  The people
of  the  States  that  enacted  these  reforms  surely  viewed
them  as  measures  that  would  “place  the  lead  rein  in  the
people’s  hands.”    Ante,  at  27.  Yet  the  Court  refused  to
accept “that the Framers spent significant time and energy
in  debating  and  crafting  Clauses  that  could  be  easily
evaded.”  Term  Limits,  514  U. S.,  at  831.    The  majority
approves just such an evasion of the Constitution today.6

——————

6 Term Limits was of course not decided on the abstract principle that
“the people should choose whom they please to govern them.”  Ante, at
27, n. 24 (quoting 514 U. S., at 783).  If that were the rule, the people
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and references to previous rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

959

524 U. S.

June 26, 1998

No. 97–9102. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 1330.

No. 97–9107. Lyons v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9125. Pierce v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 138 F. 3d 951.

No. 97–9140. Hilt v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 97–9149. Lara v. Duncan, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9159. Zamora-Martinez v. United States. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 381.

No. 97–9162. Fraser v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139
F. 3d 904.

No. 97–9174. Vasquez et al. v. Stinson, Superintendent,
Great Meadow Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9182. Bieri v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–9183. Hill v. French, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 915.

No. 97–9186. Gibbons v. Larkins, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Dallas. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 97–9194. Guanipa v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 1460.

No. 97–9199. Flores-Ochoa v. United States. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 1022.

No. 97–9200. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 896.

No. 97–9203. Baksh v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 149 F. 3d 1165.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document, not typical readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>