<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1126

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 15, 18, 22, 2000

529 U. S.

pauperis granted. Motion for leave to ﬁle petition for rehear-
ing denied.

May 18, 2000

Dismissal Under Rule 46

No. 99–9008. Gollehon v. Mahoney, Warden. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.1.

May 22, 2000

Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded

No. 99–1227. Bryon L. Rosquist, D. C., P. C., et al. v. Mc-
Cann et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment
vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of
United States v. Morrison, ante, p. 598. Reported below: 185
F. 3d 1113.

No. 99–1583. Pennsylvania v. D. M. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certio-
rari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further
consideration in light of Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119 (2000).
Reported below: 560 Pa. 166, 743 A. 2d 422.

Certiorari Dismissed

No. 99–8696. Buchanan v. Doe. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 198 F. 3d 244.

No. 99–8752. Gibson v. Susquehanna Township Commis-
sioners. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court’s Rule 39.8. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 816.

Miscellaneous Orders

No. D–2137.

In re Disbarment of Gereighty. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1112.]

No. D–2140.

In re Disbarment of Moore. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1150.]

No. D–2143.

In re Disbarment of Spina. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1150.]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a list of court orders and decisions. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and summaries of the court's actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Decisions</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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4

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

Opinion of the Court

(1998).

Logic  demands  that  there  be  a  link  between  the  stated
purpose  and  the  command.  The  Second  Amendment
would  be  nonsensical if  it  read,  “A  well  regulated  Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to petition for redress of grievances shall not be
infringed.”  That  requirement  of  logical  connection  may
cause  a  prefatory  clause  to  resolve  an  ambiguity  in  the
operative  clause  (“The  separation  of  church  and  state
being an important objective, the teachings of canons shall
have  no  place  in  our  jurisprudence.”    The  preface  makes
clear  that  the  operative  clause  refers  not  to  canons  of
interpretation  but  to  clergymen.)    But  apart  from  that
clarifying  function,  a  prefatory  clause  does  not  limit  or
expand the scope of the operative clause.  See F. Dwarris,
A  General  Treatise  on  Statutes  268–269  (P.  Potter  ed.
1871) (hereinafter Dwarris); T. Sedgwick, The Interpreta
tion and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law
42–45 (2d ed. 1874).3  “ ‘It is nothing unusual in acts . . . for
the  enacting  part  to  go  beyond  the  preamble;  the  remedy
often extends beyond the particular act or mischief which
first  suggested  the  necessity  of  the  law.’ ”    J.  Bishop,
——————

3 As  Sutherland  explains,  the  key  18th-century  English  case  on  the
effect of preambles,  Copeman v. Gallant, 1 P.  Wms. 314, 24 Eng. Rep.
404 (1716), stated that “the preamble could not be used to restrict the
effect of the words of the purview.”  J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statu
tory  Construction,  47.04  (N.  Singer  ed.  5th  ed.  1992).    This  rule  was
modified  in  England  in  an  1826  case  to  give  more  importance  to  the
preamble,  but  in  America  “the  settled  principle  of  law  is  that  the
preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute in cases where
the enacting part is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms.”  Ibid.

JUSTICE  STEVENS  says  that  we  violate  the  general  rule  that  every
clause in a statute must have effect.  Post, at 8.  But where the text of a
clause  itself  indicates  that  it  does  not  have  operative  effect,  such  as
“whereas” clauses in federal legislation or the Constitution’s preamble,
a court has no license to make it do what it was not designed to do.  Or
to put the point differently, operative provisions should be given effect
as operative provisions, and prologues as prologues.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It discusses the interpretation of the Second Amendment and the role of prefatory clauses in legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. VAELLO MADERO

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

II
Jose Luis Vaello Madero is a U. S. citizen who was born
in Puerto Rico in 1954.  In 1985, he moved to New York, and
in 2012, while still living in New York, he began receiving
SSI  after  suffering  from  a  serious  illness.    Approximately
one year later, Vaello Madero moved back to Puerto Rico.
Vaello Madero continued to receive monthly SSI payments
of  between  $733  and  $808  via  direct  deposit  after  he  re-
turned to Puerto Rico.

In June 2016, Vaello Madero, approaching his 62d birth-
day,  went  to  a  Social  Security  Administration  office  in
Puerto Rico to apply for Title II Social Security benefits.  As
a  result,  the  Social  Security  Administration  learned  that
Vaello Madero had moved from New York to Puerto Rico,
and within two months, the Administration reduced his SSI
benefits  to  $0,  retroactively  effective  to  August  2013.    By
letter,  the  Administration  notified  Vaello  Madero  that  he
was  “outside  of  the  United  States”  while  he  was  living  in
Puerto Rico.  App. 39, 45.

In  2017,  the  United  States  filed  suit  against  Vaello
Madero to recover the $28,081 (plus interest, costs, and at-
torney’s fees) that it calculated Vaello Madero had illegally
cashed while he resided in Puerto Rico.  As an affirmative
defense to the suit, Vaello Madero claimed that excluding
U. S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico from the SSI pro-
gram  violated  the  equal  protection  guarantee  of  the  Fifth
Amendment.3  The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Puerto Rico agreed, granting summary judgment to
Vaello Madero.

The  Court  of  Appeals  unanimously  affirmed.  See  956

——————

3 The  Fifth  Amendment’s  Due  Process  Clause  prohibits  the  Govern-
ment from denying a person the equal protection of laws.  See Bolling v.
Sharpe,  347  U. S.  497,  499  (1954).    “ ‘Equal  protection  analysis  in  the
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.’ ”  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 224 (1995)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *United States v. Vaello Madero*.  It provides background information about the case and the legal arguments involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

abusers, see, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 40 (conceding as much),
but it did not need to do so.  Although §922(g)(8) “is by no
means identical” to the surety or going armed laws, ante, at
13, it “restricts gun use to mitigate demonstrated threats of
physical violence, just as the surety and going armed laws
d[id],” ante, at 14.  That shared principle is sufficient.

II
The  dissent  reaches  a  different  conclusion  by  applying
the  strictest  possible  interpretation  of  Bruen.  It  picks  off
the  Government’s  historical  sources  one  by  one,  viewing
any basis for distinction as fatal.  See, e.g., post, at 18 (opin-
ion of THOMAS, J.) (“Although surety laws shared a common
justification with §922(g)(8), surety laws imposed a materi-
ally  different  burden”);  post,  at  25–26  (explaining  that
“[a]ffray laws are wide of the mark” because they “expressly
carve out the very conduct §922(g)(8) was designed to pre-
vent  (interpersonal  violence  in  the  home)”).    The  dissent
urges a close look “at the historical law’s justification as ar-
ticulated during the relevant time period,” post, at 28, and
a  “careful  parsing  of  regulatory  burdens”  to  ensure  that
courts do not “stray too far from [history] by eliding mate-
rial differences between historical and modern laws,” post,
at 15.  The dissent criticizes this Court for adopting a more
“piecemeal approach” that distills principles from a variety
of historical evidence rather than insisting on a precise his-
torical analogue.  Post, at 21.

If the dissent’s interpretation of Bruen were the law, then
Bruen really would be the “one-way ratchet” that I and the
other dissenters in that case feared, “disqualify[ing] virtu-
ally any ‘representative historical analogue’ and mak[ing]
it  nearly  impossible  to  sustain  common-sense  regulations
necessary to our Nation’s safety and security.”  597 U. S., at
112 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Thankfully, the Court rejects
that rigid approach to the historical inquiry.  As the Court
puts  it  today,  Bruen  was  “not  meant  to  suggest  a  law
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a case, referencing previous rulings and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 16–402.  Argued November 29, 2017—Decided June 22, 2018

Cell phones perform their wide and growing variety of functions by con-
tinuously  connecting  to  a  set  of  radio  antennas  called  “cell  sites.”
Each time a phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped
record known as cell-site location information (CSLI).  Wireless carri-
ers collect and store this information for their own business purposes.
Here, after the FBI identified the cell phone numbers of several rob-
bery  suspects,  prosecutors  were  granted  court  orders  to  obtain  the
suspects’  cell  phone  records  under  the  Stored  Communications  Act.
Wireless  carriers  produced  CSLI  for  petitioner  Timothy  Carpenter’s
phone, and the Government was able to obtain 12,898 location points
cataloging Carpenter’s movements over 127 days—an average of 101
data points per day.  Carpenter moved to suppress the data, arguing
that  the  Government’s  seizure  of  the  records  without  obtaining  a
warrant  supported  by  probable  cause  violated  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment.  The  District  Court  denied  the  motion,  and  prosecutors  used
the records at trial to show that Carpenter’s phone was near four of
the robbery locations at the time those robberies occurred.   Carpen-
ter was convicted.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Carpen-
ter  lacked  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  in  the  location  infor-
mation collected by the FBI because he had shared that information
with his wireless carriers.

Held:

1. The  Government’s  acquisition  of  Carpenter’s  cell-site  records

was a Fourth Amendment search.  Pp. 4–18.

(a) The  Fourth  Amendment  protects  not  only  property  interests
but certain expectations of privacy as well.  Katz v. United States, 389
U. S.  347,  351.    Thus,  when  an  individual  “seeks  to  preserve  some-
thing as private,” and his expectation of privacy is “one that society is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1027

558 U. S.

November 16, 2009

No.  09–6369.  Edmond  v.  Caskey,  Warden.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6371.  Enriquez  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6372.  Clervil  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6375.  McCarthy  v.  Unknown.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6376.  D’Angelo  v.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  583.

No.  09–6382.  Odom  v.  Ozmint,  Director,  South  Carolina
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  254.

No.  09–6385.  Petersen  v.  Michigan  Department  of  Cor

rections.  Sup.  Ct.  Mich.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6387.  Barkus  v.  Runnels,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6397.  Christian v.  California et al.  Ct. App. Cal.,

2d  App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6398.  Del  Rio  v.  Texas  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6402.  Staten  v.  Parker,  Warden.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  166.

No.  09–6410.  Bynes  v.  Oklahoma.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Okla.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6411.  Whirty  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6413.  Roth  v.  Pennsylvania.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  943  A.  2d  321.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, court names, and decisions (certiorari denied). This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is more suitable for indexing as metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xxxii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

881

Cessna Aircraft Co.; Forsman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963

Cety-Morales v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
989

Chairman, Broadcasting Bd. of Governors; Grosdidier v.  . . . . . . .
907

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chamberlain; Aponte v.
987

Chamber of Commerce of U. S. v. Candelaria  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1017

Chambers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Chandler; Hyche v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Chandler; Morgan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
992

Chapman v. Casner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

Chapman v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Chapman Ventures, Inc.; Hopkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128

Chappell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
885

Charlan; Welch v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Charles v. Michigan
913

Charles v. Pentagon Federal Credit Union  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

Charles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Charles Industries; Laskey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  864,1086

Charleston Area Medical Center; Wahi v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  944,1158

Charleston County School Dist.; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  803,1090

992

Charlotte; Independence News, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Chase Bank USA, N. A.; Asher v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chase Home Finance LLC; Augustin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
988

1124

Chatman v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Chatman Ventures, Inc.; Hopkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chatman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  962,1131

924

Chaudhry v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chavarria v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

822

Chavez; Carranza v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

Chavez v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Chavez v. Swarthout
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057

Chavis v. Fischer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Check Recovery Systems, Inc. v. Hunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Cheek v. Edwardsville  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
853

Cheek v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  872,1038

Cheeseman v. Reedsport
1109

Chekkouri, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chen v. New York City
Chesapeake; Patterson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  885,1065

960

Chester v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1023

CHF Industries, Inc. v. Park B. Smith, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089

Chicago; McDonald v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Chicago; Sandoval v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Chicago Human Rights Comm’n; Powell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Chicago Tribune Co.; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

tini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 222–223 (1997).

Nowhere is this rule more clearly implicated than when
funds  flow  directly  from  the  public  treasury  to  a  house  of
worship.2  A house of worship exists to foster and further
religious  exercise.    There,  a  group  of  people,  bound  by
common religious beliefs, comes together “to shape its own
faith and mission.”  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church  and  School  v.  EEOC,  565  U. S.  171,  188  (2012).
Within its walls, worshippers gather to practice and reaf-
firm their faith.  And from its base, the faithful reach out
to  those  not  yet  convinced  of  the  group’s  beliefs.  When  a
government funds a house of worship, it underwrites this
religious exercise.

Tilton  v.  Richardson,  403  U. S.  672  (1971),  held  as
much.  The federal program at issue provided construction
grants to colleges and universities but prohibited grantees
from  using  the  funds  to  construct  facilities  “ ‘used  for
sectarian  instruction  or  as  a  place  for  religious  worship’ ”
or  “ ‘used  primarily  in  connection  with  any  part  of  the
program of a school or department of divinity.’ ”  Id., at 675
(plurality  opinion)  (quoting  20  U. S. C.  §751(a)(2)  (1964
ed.,  Supp.  V)).    It  allowed  the  Federal  Government  to
recover the grant’s value if a grantee violated this prohibi-
tion  within  twenty  years  of  the  grant.    See  403  U. S.,  at
675.    The  Court  unanimously  agreed  that  this  time  limit

——————

Felton,  521  U. S.  203,  222–223  (1997)  (internal  quotation  marks  omit-
ted).    Whether  government aid  has  such  an  effect  turns  on  whether  it
“result[s]  in  governmental  indoctrination,”  “define[s]  its  recipients  by
reference to religion,” or “create[s] an excessive entanglement” between
the  government  and  religion.    Id.,  at  234;  see  also  id.,  at  235  (same
considerations  speak  to  whether  the  aid  can  “reasonably  be  viewed  as
an endorsement of religion”).

2 Because  Missouri  decides  which  Scrap  Tire  Program  applicants
receive  state  funding,  this  case  does  not  implicate  a  line  of  decisions
about indirect aid programs in which aid reaches religious institutions
“only  as  a  result  of  the  genuine  and  independent  choices  of  private
individuals.”  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U. S. 639, 649 (2002).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer.  It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion is issued.
The syllabus  constitutes no part  of  the  opinion  of  the Court but has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–418.  Argued April 25, 2022—Decided June 27, 2022

Petitioner Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a high school football coach in
the Bremerton School District after he knelt at midfield after games to
offer a quiet personal prayer.  Mr. Kennedy sued in federal court, al-
leging that the District’s actions violated the First Amendment’s Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.  He also moved for a preliminary
injunction requiring the District to reinstate him.  The District Court
denied that motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  After the parties
engaged in discovery, they filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The District Court found that the “ ‘sole reason’ ” for the District’s de-
cision to suspend Mr. Kennedy was its perceived “risk of constitutional
liability”  under  the  Establishment  Clause  for  his  “religious  conduct”
after three games in October 2015.  443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1231.  The
District  Court  granted  summary  judgment  to  the  District  and  the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.  The Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear
the  case  en  banc  over  the  dissents  of  11  judges.    4  F.  4th  910,  911.
Several dissenters argued that the panel applied a flawed understand-
ing of the Establishment Clause reflected in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U. S.  602,  and  that  this  Court  has  abandoned  Lemon’s  “ahistorical,
atextual” approach to discerning Establishment Clause violations.  4
F. 4th, at 911, and n. 3.

Held: The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amend-
ment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance
from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor per-
mits the government to suppress such religious expression.  Pp. 11–32.
(a) Mr. Kennedy contends that the District’s conduct violated both
the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.
Where the Free Exercise Clause protects religious exercises, the Free
Speech Clause provides overlapping protection for expressive religious
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V.

BREYER, J., dissenting

“only indicates that parties have formed an association or
partnership  to  deal  in  such  goods.”    Id.,  at  602.    For  in-
stance, “parties united to produce or sell wine, or to raise
cotton  or  grain,”  may  well  “style  themselves  Wine  Com-
pany, Cotton Company, or Grain Company.”  Ibid.  But they
would not thereby gain the right to exclude others from the
use of those terms “for the obvious reason that all persons
have a right to deal in such articles, and to publish the fact
to the world.”  Id., at 603.  “[I]ncorporation of a company in
the name of an article of commerce, without other specifica-
tion,” we concluded, does not “create any exclusive right to
the use of the name.”  Ibid.

I  cannot  agree  with  respondent  that  the  1946  Lanham
Act “repudiate[d] Goodyear and its ilk.”  Brief for Respond-
ent 39.  It is true that the Lanham Act altered the common
law in certain important respects.  Most significantly, it ex-
tended  trademark  protection  to  descriptive  marks  that
have acquired secondary meaning.  See Qualitex Co. v. Ja-
cobson Products Co., 514 U. S. 159, 171 (1995).  But it did
not disturb the basic principle that generic terms are ineli-
gible for trademark protection, and nothing in the Act sug-
gests  that  Congress  intended  to  overturn  Goodyear.  We
normally assume that Congress did not overturn a common-
law principle absent some indication to the contrary.  See
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104,
108 (1991).  I can find no such indication here.  Perhaps that
is why the lower courts, the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board  (TTAB),  the  U. S.  Patent  and  Trademark  Office’s
(PTO)  Trademark  Manual  of  Examining  Procedure
(TMEP), and leading treatises all recognize Goodyear’s con-
tinued  validity.  See,  e.g.,  In re  Detroit  Athletic  Co.,  903
F. 3d 1297, 1304 (CA Fed. 2018); In re Katch, LLC, 2019 WL
2560528, *10 (TTAB 2019); TMEP §§1209.03(d) (Oct. 2018);
2 McCarthy §12:39; 4 L. Altman & M. Pollack, Callmann on
Unfair  Competition,  Trademarks  and  Monopolies  §18:11
(4th ed., June 2020 update).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into legal precedent and arguments surrounding trademark law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 29 (1968).  That is, powers related to
electors reside with States to the extent that the Constitu-
tion does not remove or restrict that power.  Thus, to inval-
idate a state law, there must be “something in the Federal
Constitution that deprives the [States of] the power to enact
such [a] measur[e].”  U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 850
(THOMAS, J., dissenting).

As the Court recognizes, nothing in the Constitution pre-
vents States from requiring Presidential electors to vote for
the candidate chosen by the people.  Petitioners ask us to
infer a constitutional right to elector independence by inter-
preting the terms “appoint,” “Electors,” “vote,” and “by Bal-
lot” to align with the Framers’ expectations of discretion in
elector voting.  But the Framers’ expectations aid our inter-
pretive inquiry only to the extent that they provide evidence
of  the  original  public  meaning  of  the  Constitution.    They
cannot be used to change that meaning.  As the Court ex-
plains, the plain meaning of the terms relied on by petition-
ers do not appear to “connote independent choice.”  Ante, at
11.  Thus, “the original expectation[s]” of the Framers as to
elector  discretion  provide  “no  reason  for  holding  that  the
power confided to the States by the Constitution has ceased
to exist.”  McPherson, 146 U. S., at 36; see also ante, at 12–
13.

*

*

*

“The  people  of  the  States,  from  whom  all  governmental
powers stem, have specified that all powers not prohibited
to the States by the Federal Constitution are reserved ‘to
the States respectively, or to the people.’ ” U. S. Term Lim-
its, supra, at 852 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).  Because I would
decide this case based on that fundamental principle, I con-
cur only in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of *Chiafalo v. Washington*.  It delves into the constitutional arguments surrounding the independence of presidential electors.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

13

Opinion of the Court

to the litigants and the courts that heard the case requires
that  it  be  remanded  so  that  the  admissions  process  can
be  considered  and  judged  under  a  correct  analysis.    See
Adarand, supra, at 237.  Unlike Grutter, which was decided
after  trial,  this  case  arises  from  cross-motions  for  sum-
mary  judgment.    In  this  case,  as  in  similar  cases,  in  de-
termining  whether  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  the
University  would  be  appropriate,  the  Court  of  Appeals
must assess whether the University has offered sufficient
evidence that would prove that its admissions program is
narrowly  tailored  to  obtain  the  educational  benefits  of
diversity.  Whether  this  record—and  not  “simple  . . .  as-
surances  of  good  intention,”  Croson,  supra,  at  500—is
sufficient is a question for the Court of Appeals in the first
instance.

*

*

*
Strict scrutiny must not be “ ‘strict in theory, but fatal in
fact,’ ”  Adarand,  supra,  at  237;  see  also  Grutter,  supra,  at
326.  But  the  opposite  is  also  true.    Strict  scrutiny  must
not be strict in theory but feeble in fact.  In order for judi-
cial  review  to  be  meaningful,  a  university  must  make  a
showing  that  its  plan  is  narrowly  tailored  to  achieve  the
only interest that this Court has approved in this context:
the benefits of a student body diversity that “encompasses
a . . . broa[d] array of qualifications and characteristics of
which  racial  or  ethnic  origin  is  but  a  single  though  im-
portant  element.”  Bakke,  438  U. S.,  at  315  (opinion  of
Powell,  J.).  The  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  is  va-
cated,  and  the  case  is  remanded  for  further  proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

 JUSTICE  KAGAN  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or

decision of this case.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 61 (2000)

69

Opinion of the Court

Second, Grifﬁn prohibited comments that suggest a de-
fendant’s silence is “evidence of guilt.” 380 U. S., at 615
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Robinson, 485
U. S. 25, 32 (1988) (“ ‘Grifﬁn prohibits the judge and pros-
ecutor from suggesting to the jury that it may treat the
defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt’ ” (quot-
ing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 319 (1976))). The
prosecutor’s comments in this case, by contrast, concerned
respondent’s credibility as a witness, and were therefore in
accord with our longstanding rule that when a defendant
takes the stand, “his credibility may be impeached and his
testimony assailed like that of any other witness.” Brown
“[W]hen [a de-
v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154 (1958).
fendant] assumes the role of a witness, the rules that gener-
ally apply to other witnesses—rules that serve the truth-
seeking function of the trial—are generally applicable to him
as well.” Perry v. Leeke, 488 U. S. 272, 282 (1989). See also
Reagan v. United States, 157 U. S. 301, 305 (1895).

Respondent points to our opinion in Geders v. United
States, 425 U. S. 80, 87–91 (1976), which held that the defend-
ant must be treated differently from other witnesses insofar
as sequestration orders are concerned, since sequestration
for an extended period of time denies the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. With respect to issues of credibility, how-
ever, no such special treatment has been accorded. Jenkins
v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231 (1980),
illustrates the point.
There the prosecutor in a ﬁrst-degree murder trial, during
cross-examination and again in closing argument, attempted
to impeach the defendant’s claim of self-defense by suggest-
ing that he would not have waited two weeks to report the
killing if that was what had occurred.
In an argument strik-
ingly similar to the one presented here, the defendant in
Jenkins claimed that commenting on his prearrest silence
violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-
incrimination because “a person facing arrest will not remain
silent if his failure to speak later can be used to impeach
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to a defendant's right to remain silent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

21

KAGAN, J., dissenting

deny,  minority  citizens’  voting  rights.    It  declines  to  con-
sider Congress’s use of an effects test, rather than a purpose
test,  to  assess  the  rules’  legality.    Nor  does  the  majority
acknowledge  the  force  of  Section  2’s  implementing  provi-
sion.  The majority says as little as possible about what it
means for voting to be “equally open,” or for voters to have
an equal “opportunity” to cast a ballot.  See ante, at 14–15.
It only grudgingly accepts—and then apparently forgets—
that the provision applies to facially neutral laws with dis-
criminatory consequences.  Compare ante, at 22, with ante,
at 25.  And it hints that as long as a voting system is suffi-
ciently “open,” it need not be equally so.  See ante, at 16, 18.
In sum, the majority skates over the strong words Congress
drafted to accomplish its equally strong purpose: ensuring
that  minority  citizens  can  access  the  electoral  system  as
easily as whites.7
  The  majority  instead  founds  its  decision  on  a  list  of
mostly  made-up  factors,  at  odds  with  Section  2  itself.    To
excuse this unusual free-form exercise, the majority notes

——————

7 In a single sentence, the majority huffs that “nobody disputes” vari-
ous of these “points of law.”  Ante, at 21.  Excellent!  I only wish the ma-
jority would take them to heart, both individually and in combination.
For example, the majority says it agrees that Section 2 reaches beyond
denials of voting to any “abridgement.”  But then, as I’ll later discuss, it
insists that Section 2 has an interest only in rules that “block or seriously
hinder  voting”—which  appears  to  create  a  “denial  or  serious  abridge-
ment” standard.  Ante, at 16; see infra, at 22–23.  Or, for example, the
majority says it accepts that Section 2 may prohibit facially neutral elec-
tion rules.  But the majority takes every opportunity of casting doubt on
those applications.  Each facially neutral rule it mentions is one that it
“doubt[s]”  Congress  could  have  “intended  to  uproot.”    Ante,  at  18;  see
ante, at 6, 18, 21, 25.  And it criticizes this dissent for understanding the
statute (but how could anyone understand it differently?) as focusing on
the  racially  “disparate  impact”  of  neutral  election  rules  on  the  oppor-
tunity to vote.  Ante, at 21.  Most fundamentally, the majority refuses to
acknowledge how all the “points of law” it professes to agree with work
in tandem to signal a statute of significant power and scope.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion and cites legal precedents and interpretations of the Voting Rights Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORP. v. WALL-
STREET.COM, LLC, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–571.  Argued January 8, 2019—Decided March 4, 2019

Petitioner Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation (Fourth Estate), a
news  organization,  licensed  works  to  respondent  Wall-Street.com,
LLC  (Wall-Street), a  news  website.    Fourth  Estate  sued Wall-Street
and its owner for copyright infringement of news articles that Wall-
Street failed to remove from its website after canceling the parties’ li-
cense agreement.  Fourth Estate had filed applications to register the
articles with the Copyright Office, but the Register of Copyrights had
not acted on those applications.  Title 17 U. S. C. §411(a) states that
“no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States
work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the  copyright claim
has  been  made  in  accordance  with  this  title.”  The  District  Court
dismissed the complaint, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding
that  “registration  . . .  has  [not]  been  made”  under  §411(a)  until  the
Copyright Office registers a copyright.

Held: Registration occurs, and a copyright claimant may commence an
infringement  suit,  when  the  Copyright  Office  registers  a  copyright.
Upon  registration  of  the  copyright,  however,  a  copyright  owner  can
recover for infringement that occurred both before and after registra-
tion.  Pp. 3–12.

(a) Under  the  Copyright  Act  of  1976,  as  amended,  a  copyright  au-
thor  gains  “exclusive  rights”  in  her  work  immediately  upon  the
work’s creation.  17 U. S. C. §106.  A copyright owner may institute a
civil  action  for  infringement  of  those  exclusive  rights,  §501(b),  but
generally only after complying with §411(a)’s requirement that “reg-
istration . . . has been made.”  Registration is thus akin to an admin-
istrative  exhaustion  requirement that the owner must satisfy before
suing to enforce ownership rights.  P. 3.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Syllabus

stances where the school did not stand in loco parentis.  And the vul-
garity in B. L.’s posts encompassed a message of criticism.  In addition,
the school has presented no evidence of any general effort to prevent
students from using vulgarity outside the classroom.  Pp. 9–10.

(4) The school’s interest in preventing disruption is not supported
by the record, which shows that discussion of the matter took, at most,
5 to 10 minutes of an Algebra class “for just a couple of days” and that
some members of the cheerleading team were “upset” about the con-
tent  of  B.  L.’s  Snapchats.    App.  82–83.    This  alone  does  not  satisfy
Tinker’s demanding standards.  Pp. 10–11.

(5) Likewise,  there  is  little  to  suggest  a  substantial  interference
in,  or  disruption  of,  the  school’s  efforts  to  maintain  cohesion  on  the
school cheerleading squad.  P. 11.

964 F. 3d 170, affirmed.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH and BARRETT, JJ.,
joined.  ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court decision.  It is not the main body of the text and is not meant to be read and understood in its entirety.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

57

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

that today’s decision, departing from stare decisis for no le-
gitimate  reason,  is  its  own  loaded  weapon.  Weakening
stare decisis threatens to upend bedrock legal doctrines, far
beyond any single decision.  Weakening stare decisis creates
profound legal instability.  And as Casey recognized, weak-
ening  stare  decisis  in  a  hotly  contested  case  like  this  one
calls into question this Court’s commitment to legal princi-
ple.  It makes the Court appear not restrained but aggres-
sive,  not  modest  but  grasping.  In  all  those  ways,  today’s
decision takes aim, we fear, at the rule of law.

III
“Power,  not  reason,  is  the  new  currency  of  this  Court’s
decisionmaking.”    Payne,  501  U. S.,  at  844  (Marshall,  J.,
dissenting).  Roe has stood for fifty years.  Casey, a prece-
dent about precedent specifically confirming Roe, has stood
for thirty.  And the doctrine of stare decisis—a critical ele-
ment  of  the  rule  of  law—stands  foursquare  behind  their
continued existence.  The right those decisions established
and preserved is embedded in our constitutional law, both
originating in and leading to other rights protecting bodily
integrity,  personal  autonomy,  and  family  relationships.
The abortion right is also embedded in the lives of women—
shaping their expectations, influencing their choices about
relationships  and  work,  supporting  (as  all  reproductive
rights  do)  their  social  and  economic  equality.    Since  the
right’s recognition (and affirmation), nothing has changed
to support what the majority does today.  Neither law nor
facts nor attitudes have provided any new reasons to reach
a  different  result  than  Roe  and  Casey  did.  All  that  has
changed is this Court.

Mississippi—and  other  States  too—knew  exactly  what
they were doing in ginning up new legal challenges to Roe
and Casey.  The 15-week ban at issue here was enacted in
2018.  Other  States  quickly  followed:  Between  2019  and
2021, eight States banned abortion procedures after six to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority decision, citing legal precedent and the impact on women's rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., ET AL. v.

APPLE INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 15–777.  Argued October 11, 2016—Decided December 6, 2016

Section 289 of the Patent Act makes it unlawful to manufacture or sell
an “article of manufacture” to which a patented design or a colorable
imitation  thereof  has  been  applied  and  makes  an  infringer  liable  to
the patent holder “to the extent of his total profit.”  35 U. S. C. §289.
As  relevant  here,  a  jury  found  that  various  smartphones  manufac-
tured by petitioners (collectively, Samsung) infringed design patents
owned by respondent Apple Inc. that covered a rectangular front face
with  rounded  edges  and  a  grid  of  colorful  icons  on  a  black  screen.
Apple was awarded $399 million in damages—Samsung’s entire profit
from the sale of its infringing smartphones.  The Federal Circuit af-
firmed the damages award, rejecting Samsung’s argument that dam-
ages  should  be  limited  because  the  relevant  articles  of  manufacture
were the front face or screen rather than the entire smartphone.  The
court  reasoned  that  such  a  limit  was  not  required  because  the  com-
ponents of Samsung’s smartphones were not sold  separately to ordi-
nary consumers and thus were not distinct articles of manufacture.

Held: In the case of  a multicomponent product, the relevant “article of
manufacture” for arriving at a §289 damages award need not be the
end  product  sold  to  the  consumer  but  may  be  only  a  component  of
that product.  Pp. 4–9.

(a) The statutory text resolves the issue here.  An “article of manu-
facture,”  which  is  simply  a  thing  made  by  hand  or  machine,  encom-
passes  both  a  product  sold  to  a  consumer  and  a  component  of  that
product.    This  reading  is  consistent  with  §171(a)  of  the  Patent  Act,
which makes certain “design[s] for an article of manufacture” eligible
for  design  patent  protection,  and  which  has  been  understood  by  the
Patent Office and the courts to permit a design patent that extends to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
86

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation, likely part of a court document. Legal citations are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the main body of text meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

29

ALITO, J., dissenting

against censorship by the platforms.  See Reply Brief 9.  But
Psaki’s full answer undermines that interpretation.  Imme-
diately after noting President Biden’s support for antitrust
enforcement, Psaki added, “So his view is that there’s more
that  needs  to  be  done  to  ensure  that  this  type  of  . . .  life-
threatening  information  is  not  going  out  to  the  American
public.”  May 5 Press Briefing.  The natural interpretation
is that the White House might retaliate if the platforms al-
lowed free speech, not if they suppressed it.

Finally, in July, the White House asserted that the plat-
forms “should be held accountable” for publishing misinfor-
mation.  61 Record 19400; see supra, at 11–13.  The totality
of this record—constant haranguing, dozens of demands for
compliance,  and  references  to  potential  consequences—
evince “a scheme of state censorship.” Bantam Books, 372
U. S., at 72.

2

The Government tries to spin these interactions as fairly
benign.  In its telling, Flaherty, Slavitt, and other officials
merely  “asked  the  platforms  for  information”  and  then
“publicly and privately criticized the platforms for what the
officials perceived as a . . . failure to live up to the platforms’
commitments.”  Brief for Petitioners 31.  References to con-
sequences, the Government claims, were “fleeting and gen-
eral”  and  “cannot  plausibly  be  characterized  as  coercive
threats.”  Id., at 32.

This characterization is not true to what happened.  Slav-
itt  and  Flaherty  did  not  simply  ask  Facebook  for  infor-
mation.  They browbeat the platform for months and made
it clear that if it did not do more to combat what they saw
as  misinformation,  it  might  be  called  to  account  for  its
shortcomings.  And as for the supposedly “fleeting” nature
of  the  numerous  references  to  potential  consequences,
death threats can be very effective even if they are not de-
livered every day.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically focusing on arguments against government censorship on social media platforms. It contains legal citations, analysis of statements made by government officials, and arguments about the nature of those statements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

Opinion of the Court

Three provisions of the Constitution refer to “the people”
in  a  context  other  than  “rights”—the  famous  preamble
(“We the people”), §2 of Article I (providing that “the peo
ple”  will  choose  members  of  the  House),  and  the  Tenth
Amendment  (providing  that  those  powers  not  given  the
Federal  Government  remain  with  “the  States”  or  “the
people”).  Those  provisions  arguably  refer  to  “the  people”
acting  collectively—but  they  deal  with  the  exercise  or
reservation  of  powers,  not  rights.      Nowhere  else  in  the
Constitution does a “right” attributed to “the people” refer
to anything other than an individual right.6

What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitu
tion  that  mention  “the  people,”  the  term  unambiguously
refers  to  all  members  of  the  political  community,  not  an
unspecified  subset.  As  we  said  in  United  States  v.  Ver-
dugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 265 (1990):

“ ‘[T]he  people’  seems  to  have  been  a  term  of  art  em
ployed  in  select  parts  of  the  Constitution. . . .  [Its
uses]  sugges[t]  that  ‘the  people’  protected  by  the

——————

in a defined militia.  And JUSTICE STEVENS is dead wrong to think that
the  right  to  petition  is  “primarily  collective  in  nature.”    Ibid.  See
McDonald v. Smith,  472  U. S.  479,  482–484  (1985)  (describing  histori
cal origins of right to petition).

6 If we look to other founding-era documents, we find that some state
constitutions  used  the  term  “the  people”  to  refer  to  the  people  collec
tively,  in  contrast  to  “citizen,”  which  was  used  to  invoke  individual
rights.    See  Heyman,  Natural  Rights  and  the  Second  Amendment,  in
The  Second  Amendment  in  Law  and  History  179,  193–195  (C.  Bogus
ed.  2000)  (hereinafter  Bogus).    But  that  usage  was  not  remotely  uni
form.  See,  e.g.,  N. C.  Declaration  of  Rights  §XIV  (1776),  in  5  The
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic
Laws 2787, 2788 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (hereinafter Thorpe) (jury trial);
Md.  Declaration  of  Rights  §XVIII  (1776),  in  3   id.,  at  1686,  1688  (vici
nage requirement); Vt. Declaration of Rights ch. 1, §XI (1777), in 6  id.,
at  3737,  3741  (searches  and  seizures);    Pa.  Declaration  of  Rights  §XII
(1776), in 5 id., at 3081, 3083 (free speech).  And, most importantly, it
was clearly not the terminology used in the Federal Constitution, given
the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of "the people" in the context of the Second Amendment. It cites legal precedents and analyzes historical documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

25

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

Merrill  decision.  At  that  time,  no  statutory  provision
expressly  codified  the  first  sale  doctrine.    Instead,  copy
right law merely provided that copyright owners had “the
sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing,
copying,  executing,  finishing,  and  vending”  their  works.
Copyright Act of 1891, §1, 26 Stat. 1107.

In  Bobbs-Merrill,  the  Court  addressed  the  scope  of  the
statutory  right  to  “ven[d].”    In  granting  that  right,  the
Court  held,  Congress  did  not  intend  to  permit  copyright
owners  “to  fasten  . . .  a  restriction  upon  the  subsequent
alienation  of  the  subject-matter  of  copyright  after  the
owner  had  parted  with  the  title  to  one  who  had  acquired
full dominion over it and had given a satisfactory price for
it.”  210  U. S.,  at  349–350.    “[O]ne  who  has  sold  a  copy
righted  article  . . .  without  restriction,”  the  Court  ex
plained, “has parted with all right to control the sale of it.”
Id., at 350.  Thus, “[t]he purchaser of a book, once sold by
authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again,
although he could not publish a new edition of it.”  Ibid.

Under  the  logic  of  Bobbs-Merrill,  the  sale  of  a  foreign
manufactured  copy  in  the  United  States  carried  out  with
the  copyright  owner’s  authorization  would  exhaust  the
copyright  owner’s  right  to  “vend”  that  copy.    The  copy
could  thenceforth  be  resold,  lent  out,  or  otherwise  redis
tributed without further authorization from the copyright
owner.  Although §106(3) uses the word “distribute” rather
than “vend,” there is no reason to think Congress intended
the word “distribute” to bear a meaning different from the
construction  the  Court  gave  to  the  word  “vend”  in  Bobbs-
Merrill.  See  ibid.  (emphasizing  that  the  question  before
the  Court  was  “purely  [one]  of  statutory  construction”).19
——————

19 It appears that the Copyright Act of 1976 omitted the word “vend”
and  introduced  the  word  “distribute”  to  avoid  the  “redundan[cy]”
present in pre-1976 law.  Copyright Law Revision: Report of the Regis
ter  of  Copyrights  on  the  General  Revision  of  the  U. S.  Copyright  Law,
87th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  21  (H. R.  Judiciary  Comm.  Print  1961)  (noting
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous case law and analyzes the legal implications of copyright law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
892

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No. 09–5197.  Giddings v.  Montana.  Sup. Ct. Mont.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  349  Mont.  347,  208  P.  3d  363.

No.  09–5198.  Gorman  v.  National  Transportation  Safety
Board  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  558  F.  3d  580.

No. 09–5199.  Price v. United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  270.

No.  09–5200.  Byers  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  825.

No.  09–5203.  Ruiz-Arriaga  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  280.

No. 09–5204.  Sebolt v.  United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  468.

No. 09–5206.  Guerrero-Robledo, aka Guerrero v.  United
States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
565  F.  3d  940.

No.  09–5207.  Hammond  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  95.

No.  09–5208.  Eastom  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  879.

No.  09–5209.  Loya-Sotello  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  251.

No.  09–5210.  Jones  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  689.

No.  09–5211.  Clemmons  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  835.

No.  09–5212.  Kiser  v.  Tennessee.  Sup.  Ct.  Tenn.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  284  S. W.  3d  227.

No.  09–5215.  Cook  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  936.

No.  09–5218.  Rodebaugh  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  864.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for indexing as part of a document's main content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

303

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

Petitioners do not contest these representations, but offer
in response only that Pap’s could very easily get back into
the nude dancing business. The Court adopts petitioners’
line, concluding that because respondent is still incorporated
in Pennsylvania, it “could again decide to operate a nude
dancing establishment in Erie.” Ante, at 287. That plainly
does not sufﬁce under our cases. The test for mootness we
have applied in voluntary-termination cases is not whether
the action originally giving rise to the controversy could not
conceivably reoccur, but whether it is “absolutely clear that
the . . . behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc.,
393 U. S. 199, 203 (1968) (emphasis added). Here I think
that test is met. According to Panos’ uncontested sworn af-
ﬁdavit, Pap’s ceased doing business at Kandyland, and the
premises were sold to an independent developer, in 1998—
the year before the petition for certiorari in this case was
ﬁled.
It strains credulity to suppose that the 72-year-old
Mr. Panos shut down his going business after securing his
victory in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and before the
city’s petition for certiorari was even ﬁled, in order to in-
crease his chances of preserving his judgment in the statisti-
cally unlikely event that a (not yet ﬁled) petition might be
granted. Given the timing of these events, given the fact
that respondent has no existing interest in nude dancing (or
in any other business), given Panos’ sworn representation
that he does not intend to invest—through Pap’s or other-
wise—in any nude dancing business, and given Panos’ ad-

ment. The only fact mentioned by the Court to justify regarding it as
perjurious is that respondent failed to raise mootness in its brief in opposi-
tion to the petition for certiorari. That may be good basis for censure, but
it is scant basis for suspicion of perjury—particularly since respondent, far
from seeking to “insulate a favorable decision from review,” ante, at 288,
asks us in light of the mootness to vacate the judgment below. Reply to
Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 5.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Scalia in the case 529 US 277.  It discusses the issue of mootness in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

ALITO, J., dissenting

the State statute of limitations.”  H. R. Rep., at 3; see also
145 Cong. Rec. 25896 (Rep. Gallegly) (“[I]t is the prosecu-
tors from around this country, Federal prosecutors as well
as  State  prosecutors,  that  have  made  an  appeal  to  us  for
this”); Hearing on Depictions of Animal Cruelty 21 (“If the
production of the video is not discovered during the actual
filming,  then  prosecution  for  the  offense  is  virtually  im-
possible without a cooperative eyewitness to the filming or
an undercover police operation”); id., at 34–35 (discussing
example of case in which state prosecutor “had the defen-
dant  telling  us  he  produced  these  videos,”  but  where
prosecution  was  not  possible  because  the  State  could  not
prove where or when the tape was made).

In light of the practical problems thwarting the prosecu-
tion  of  the  creators  of  crush  videos  under  state  animal
cruelty  laws,  Congress  concluded  that  the  only  effective
way  of  stopping  the  underlying  criminal  conduct  was  to
prohibit  the  commercial  exploitation  of  the  videos  of  that
conduct.  And  Congress’  strategy  appears  to  have  been
vindicated.    We  are  told  that  “[b]y  2007,  sponsors  of  §48
declared  the  crush  video  industry  dead.    Even  overseas
Websites  shut  down  in  the  wake  of  §48.    Now,  after  the
Third Circuit’s decision [facially invalidating the statute],
crush  videos  are  already  back  online.”    Humane  Society
Brief 5 (citations omitted).

2
The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it
most  certainly  does  not  protect  violent  criminal  conduct,
even  if  engaged  in  for  expressive  purposes.  Crush  videos
present  a  highly  unusual  free  speech  issue  because  they
are  so  closely  linked  with  violent  criminal  conduct.    The
videos record the commission of violent criminal acts, and
it  appears  that  these  crimes  are  committed  for  the  sole
purpose  of  creating  the  videos.    In  addition,  as  noted
above,  Congress  was  presented  with  compelling  evidence
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of a law prohibiting the commercial exploitation of "crush videos."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

1

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 15–1293
_________________

JOSEPH MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED

STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

PETITIONER v. SIMON SHIAO TAM

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 19, 2017]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in

the judgment.

I  join  the  opinion  of  JUSTICE  ALITO,  except  for  Part  II.
Respondent  failed  to  present  his  statutory  argument
either to the Patent and Trademark Office or to the Court
of  Appeals,  and  we  declined  respondent’s  invitation  to
grant  certiorari  on  this  question.    Ante,  at  9.    I  see  no
reason to address this legal question in the first instance.
See  Star  Athletica,  L.  L.  C.  v.  Varsity  Brands,  Inc.,  580
U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 6).

I  also  write  separately  because  “I  continue  to  believe
that  when  the  government  seeks  to  restrict  truthful
speech  in  order  to  suppress  the  ideas  it  conveys,  strict
scrutiny  is  appropriate,  whether  or  not  the  speech  in
question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’ ”  Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 572 (2001) (THOMAS,
J.,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment);  see
also,  e.g.,  44  Liquormart,  Inc.  v.  Rhode  Island,  517  U. S.
484,  518  (1996)  (same).    I  nonetheless  join  Part  IV  of
JUSTICE  ALITO’s  opinion  because  it  correctly  concludes
that  the  disparagement  clause,  15  U. S. C.  §1052(a),  is
unconstitutional  even  under  the  less  stringent  test  an-
nounced  in  Central  Hudson  Gas  &  Elec.  Corp.  v.  Public
Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case citations, the names of justices, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

This power “shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising  under  this  Constitution,  the  Laws  of  the  United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their  Authority.”  §2  (emphasis  added).    When  a  federal
court  has  jurisdiction  over  a  case  or  controversy,  it  has  a
“virtually  unflagging  obligation”  to  exercise  it.    Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S.
800, 817 (1976).

The mere filing of a complaint in federal court, however,
does not a case (or controversy) make.  Article III “does not
extend the judicial power to every violation of the constitu-
tion” or federal law “which may possibly take place.”  Co-
hens  v.  Virginia,  6  Wheat.  264,  405  (1821).   Rather,  the
power extends only “to ‘a case in law or equity,’ in which a
right, under such law, is asserted.”  Ibid. (emphasis added).
Key to the scope of the judicial power, then, is whether an
individual asserts his or her own rights.  At the time of the
founding, whether a court possessed judicial power over an
action  with  no  showing  of  actual  damages  depended  on
whether  the  plaintiff  sought  to  enforce  a  right  held  pri-
vately by an individual or a duty owed broadly to the com-
munity.  See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 344–346
(2016)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring);  see  also  Thole  v.  U. S.
Bank N. A., 590 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (same) (slip op.,
at  1–2);  3  W.  Blackstone,  Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of
England 2 (J. Chitty ed. 1826); 4 id., at 5.  Where an indi-
vidual sought to sue someone for a violation of his private
rights,  such  as  trespass  on  his  land,  the  plaintiff  needed
only  to  allege  the  violation.    See  Entick  v.  Carrington,  2
Wils.  K.  B.  275,  291,  95  Eng.  Rep.  807,  817  (K.  B.  1765).
Courts typically did not require any showing of actual dam-
age.  See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U. S. ___, ___–___
(2021)  (slip  op.,  at  5–6).    But  where  an  individual  sued
based on the violation of a duty owed broadly to the whole
community, such as the overgrazing of public lands, courts
required “not only injuria [legal injury] but also damnum
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of the Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV.

Opinion of the Court

owners  have  already  invested  in  plans  to  more  profitably
develop the site.  App. 80–83.  The report recognized that
anyone  developing  the  area  may  need  to  obtain  Clean
Water  Act  permits  from  the  Army  Corps  of  Engineers
before filling any wetlands on Unit 1.  33 U. S. C. §1344(a).
Because Unit 1 is designated as critical habitat, Section 7
of  the  ESA  would  require  the  Corps  to  consult  with  the
Service before issuing any permits.

According to the report, that consultation process could
result  in  one  of  three  outcomes.    First,  it  could  turn  out
that  the  wetlands  in  Unit  1  are  not  subject  to  the  Clean
Water  Act  permitting  requirements,  in  which  case  the
landowners  could  proceed  with  their  plans  unimpeded.
Second,  the  Service  could  ask  the  Corps  not  to  issue  per-
mits to the landowners to fill some of the wetlands on the
site,  in  effect  prohibiting  development  on  60%  of  Unit  1.
The  report  estimated  that  this  would  deprive  the  owners
of  $20.4  million  in  development  value.    Third,  by  asking
the  Corps  to  deny  even  more  of  the  permit  requests,  the
Service  could  bar  all  development  of  Unit  1,  costing  the
owners  $33.9  million.    The  Service  concluded  that  those
potential  costs  were  not  “disproportionate”  to  the  conser-
vation  benefits  of  designation.  “Consequently,”  the  Ser-
vice  announced,  it  would  not  “exercis[e]  [its]  discretion  to
exclude” Unit 1 from the dusky gopher frog’s critical habi-
tat.  App. 188–190.

C
Weyerhaeuser  and  the  family  landowners  sought  to
vacate  the  designation  in  Federal  District  Court.    They
contended that Unit 1 could not be critical habitat for the
dusky  gopher  frog  because  the  frog  could  not  survive
there: Survival would  require replacing the closed-canopy
timber  plantation  encircling  the  ponds  with  an  open-
canopy  longleaf  pine  forest.    The  District  Court  nonethe-
less  upheld  the  designation.    Markle  Interests,  LLC  v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion discussing the case of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1011

558 U. S.

November 9, 2009

of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,
p.  805]  denied.

No.  09–5856.  Wagner  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  808]  denied.

No.  09–6154.  In  re  Millen.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[ante,  p.  813]  denied.

No. 09–296.  In re Kalil.  Petition for writ of mandamus and/
or  prohibition  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

Certiorari  Denied

No.  08–1413.  Laroche  v.  Shinseki,  Secretary  of  Veter
ans  Affairs.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  389.

No.  08–1500.  Federal  Express  Corp.  v.  Equal  Employ
ment  Opportunity  Commission.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  842.

No.  08–1507.  Meier  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  976.

No.  08–1595.  Manning  v.  United  States  et  al.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  546  F.  3d  430.

No.  08–10454.  Knox  et  al.  v.  New  York.  Ct.  App.  N.  Y.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  12  N.  Y.  3d  60,  903  N.  E.
2d  1149.

No.  09–162.  Perry  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314
Fed.  Appx.  663.

No.  09–168.  Pinnick  et  al.  v.  Corboy  &  Demetrio,  P.  C.,

et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Ill.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–201.  Simplicity  Manufacturing,  Inc.  v.  Berrier
et  ux.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563
F.  3d  38.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative and is formatted in a way typical of legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES v. PROMETHEUS

LABORATORIES, INC.

Syllabus

these thresholds “indicate a need” to decrease or increase (respective-
ly) the drug dosage.

Petitioners Mayo Collaborative Services and Mayo Clinic Rochester
(Mayo)  bought  and  used  diagnostic  tests  based  on  Prometheus’  pa-
tents.  But in 2004 Mayo announced that it intended to sell and mar-
ket  its  own,  somewhat  different,  diagnostic  test.    Prometheus  sued
Mayo contending that Mayo’s test infringed its patents.  The District
Court found that the test infringed the patents but granted summary
judgment  to  Mayo,  reasoning  that  the  processes  claimed  by  the  pa-
tents  effectively  claim  natural  laws  or  natural  phenomena—namely,
the correlations between thiopurine metabolite levels and the toxicity
and  efficacy  of  thiopurine  drugs—and  therefore  are  not  patentable.
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding the processes to be patent eligi-
ble under the Circuit’s “machine or transformation test.”  On remand
from  this  Court  for  reconsideration  in  light  of  Bilski  v.  Kappos,  561
U. S. ___, which clarified that the “machine or transformation test” is
not  a  definitive  test  of  patent  eligibility,  id.,  at  ___–___,  the  Federal
Circuit reaffirmed its earlier conclusion.

Held: Prometheus’ process is not patent eligible.  Pp. 8–24.

(a) Because  the  laws  of  nature  recited  by  Prometheus’  patent
claims—the  relationships  between  concentrations  of  certain  metabo-
lites  in  the  blood  and  the  likelihood  that  a  thiopurine  drug  dosage
will prove ineffective or cause harm—are not themselves patentable,
the claimed processes are not patentable unless they have additional
features that provide practical assurance that the processes are genu-
ine applications of those laws rather than drafting efforts designed to
monopolize  the  correlations.    The  three  additional  steps  in  the
claimed  processes  here  are  not  themselves  natural  laws  but  neither
are  they  sufficient  to  transform  the  nature  of  the  claims.    The  “ad-
ministering”  step  simply  identifies  a  group  of  people  who  will  be  in-
terested  in  the  correlations,  namely,  doctors  who  used  thiopurine
drugs  to  treat  patients  suffering  from  autoimmune  disorders.    Doc-
tors had been using these drugs for this purpose long before these pa-
tents  existed.    And  a  “prohibition  against  patenting  abstract  ideas
‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula
to  a  particular  technological  environment.’ ”  Bilski,  supra,  at  ___.
The “wherein” clauses simply tell a doctor about the relevant natural
laws, adding, at most, a suggestion that they should consider the test
results  when  making  their  treatment  decisions.    The  “determining”
step  tells  a  doctor  to  measure  patients’  metabolite  levels,  through
whatever  process  the  doctor  wishes  to  use.    Because  methods  for
making  such  determinations  were  well  known  in  the  art,  this  step
simply  tells  doctors  to  engage  in  well-understood,  routine,  conven-
tional activity previously engaged in by scientists in the field.  Such
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus or a summary of a legal case, specifically Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. It outlines the case, the legal issues, and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
904

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5443.  Tucker  v.  Chipla  College.  Dist.  Ct.  App.
Fla.,  1st  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  7  So.  3d  539.
No. 09–5444.  Vance v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  853.

No.  09–5445.  Villegas-Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 325 Fed. Appx. 260.
No.  09–5446.  Pina-Garcia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  420.

No.  09–5447.  Baugh  v.  California  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  536.

No.  09–5449.  Stephens  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5450.  Santa v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5452.  Rainey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  779.

No.  09–5453.  Silva  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  301.

No.  09–5454.  Smith  v.  Nevada.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  125  Nev.  1081,  281  P.  3d  1222.

No.  09–5456.  Dixon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  348.

No.  09–5457.  Diaz-Argueta  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  1047.

No.  09–5458.  Robinson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5459.  Sepulveda  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  820.

No.  09–5460.  Calderon  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.
Appx.  583.

No.  09–5461.  De  La  Fe  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  1st

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  3  So.  3d  1248.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

BREYER, J., dissenting

the same corruption concerns posed by contributions made
directly to the candidate or officeholder”); id., at 308 (opin
ion  of  KENNEDY,  J.)  (“The  making  of  a  solicited  gift  is  a
quid both to the recipient of the money and to the one who
solicits the payment”); Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 460, n. 23
(explaining  how  a  candidate  can  “become  a  player  [in  his
party] beyond his own race” by “directing donations to the
party  and  making  sure  that  the  party  knows  who  raised
the money,” and that “the donor’s influence is multiplied”
in  such  instances).  And,  as  the  statements  collected  in
Appendix A, infra, make clear, we have believed this with
good reason.

Example Two: Donations to Individual Candidates (The
$3.6  Million  Check).  The  first  example  significantly  un-
derstates  the  problem.    That  is  because  federal  election
law also allows a single contributor to give $5,200 to each
party candidate over a 2-year election cycle (assuming the
candidate  is  running  in  both  a  primary  and  a  general
election).  §441a(a)(1)(A);  78  Fed.  Reg.  8532.  There  are
435 party candidates for House seats and 33 party candi
dates  for  Senate  seats  in  any  given  election  year.    That
makes  an  additional  $2.4  million  in  allowable  contribu
tions.  Thus,  without  an  aggregate  limit,  the  law  will
permit a wealthy individual to write a check, over a 2-year
election  cycle,  for  $3.6  million—all  to  benefit  his  political
party  and  its  candidates.    See  Appendix  B,  Table  2(a),
infra, at 39.

To make it easier for a wealthy donor to make a contri
bution  of  this  size,  the  parties  can  simply  enlarge  the
composition  of  the  Joint  Party  Committee  described  in
Example  One,  so  that  it  now  includes  party  candidates.
And  a  party  can  proliferate  such  joint  entities,  perhaps
calling the first the “Smith Victory Committee,” the second
the “Jones Victory Committee,” and the like.  See 11 CFR
§102.17(c)(5)  (2012).  (I  say  “perhaps”  because  too  trans
parent  a  name  might  call  into  play  certain  earmarking
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses campaign finance laws and the potential for corruption.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20  ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.

v. GOLDSMITH
Opinion of the Court

difference must be balanced against the commercial nature
of the use.  If an original work and a secondary use share
the same or highly similar purposes, and the secondary use
is of a commercial nature, the first factor is likely to weigh
against  fair  use,  absent  some  other  justification  for  copy-
ing.8

2
The fair use provision, and the first factor in particular,
requires  an  analysis  of  the  specific  “use”  of  a  copyrighted
work  that  is  alleged  to  be  “an  infringement.”  §107.  The
same  copying  may  be  fair  when  used  for  one  purpose  but
not another.  See Campbell, 510 U. S., at 585 (contrasting
the use of a copyrighted work “to advertise a product, even
in a parody,” with “the sale of a parody for its own sake, let
alone one performed a single time by students in school”);
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U. S. 417, 449–451 (1984) (contrasting the recording of TV

——————

8 Consider,  for  example,  this  Court’s  analysis  of  the  first  factor  in
Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 593 U. S. ___ (2021).  Google stressed
that “[t]he fact that computer programs are primarily functional makes
it difficult to  apply traditional copyright concepts in that technological
world.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 35).  Still, in evaluating the purpose and
character of Google’s use of Sun Microsystems’ code, the Court looked,
first, to whether the purpose of the use was significantly different from
that of the original; and, second, to the strength of other justifications for
the use.  Although Google’s use was commercial in nature, it copied Sun’s
code, which was “created for use in desktop and laptop computers,” “only
insofar  as  needed  to
in
smartphone[s].”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 26).  That is, Google put Sun’s
code to use in the “distinct and different computing environment” of its
own  Android  platform,  a  new  system  created  for  new  products.  Ibid.
Moreover,  the  use  was  justified  in  that  context  because  “shared  inter-
faces  are  necessary  for  different  programs  to  speak  to  each  other”  and
because “reimplementation of interfaces is necessary if programmers are
to be able to use their acquired skills.”  Ibid.; see also id., at ___ (slip op.,
at 8).

include  tasks  that  would  be  useful
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing fair use in copyright law. It cites previous cases and delves into the factors considered when determining fair use.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

KAGAN, J., dissenting

union  fees  alone,  from  the  usual  rules  governing  public
employees’ speech.

“Time  and  again  our  cases  have  recognized  that  the
Government  has  a  much  freer  hand”  in  dealing  with  its
employees than with “citizens at large.”  NASA v. Nelson,
562 U. S. 134, 148 (2011) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  The  government,  we  have  stated,  needs  to  run  “as
effectively and efficiently as possible.”  Engquist v. Oregon
Dept.  of  Agriculture,  553  U. S.  591,  598  (2008)  (internal
quotation  marks  omitted).  That  means  it  must  be  able,
much as a private employer is, to manage its workforce as
it thinks fit.  A public employee thus must submit to “cer-
tain  limitations  on  his  or  her  freedom.”    Garcetti  v.  Ce-
ballos, 547 U. S. 410, 418 (2006).  Government workers, of
course, do not wholly “lose their constitutional rights when
they  accept  their  positions.”    Engquist,  553  U. S.,  at  600.
But  under  our  precedent,  their  rights  often  yield  when
weighed “against the realities of the employment context.”
Ibid.   If  it  were  otherwise—if  every  employment  decision
were  to  “bec[o]me  a  constitutional  matter”—“the  Govern-
ment could not function.”  NASA, 562 U. S., at 149 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).

Those  principles  apply  with  full  force  when  public
employees’  expressive  rights  are  at  issue.    As  we  have  ex-
plained:  “Government  employers,  like  private  employers,
need  a  significant  degree  of  control  over  their  employees’
words”  in  order  to  “efficient[ly]  provi[de]  public  services.”
Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 418.  Again, significant control does
not mean absolute authority.  In particular, the Court has
guarded  against  government  efforts  to  “leverage  the  em-
ployment relationship” to shut down its employees’ speech
as private citizens.  Id., at 419.  But when the government
imposes  speech  restrictions  relating  to  workplace  opera-
tions, of the kind a private employer also would, the Court
reliably  upholds  them.    See,  e.g.,  id.,  at  426;  Connick  v.
Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 154 (1983).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxxxix

Page

1029

Luoma; White v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136

Lupin Ltd.; Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

Luster v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Luttrell; Benson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Lutz v. Obama
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
876

Lygren v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  953,1140

Lyles v. Lemmon
Lynch; Harvey v.
891

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lynch v. Hertzig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  861,1101

Lynch v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  900,1098

1116

Lyons v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

M. v. Capistrano Uniﬁed School Dist.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Mabe v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

Mabry v. Scribner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Mabus; Hungate v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Mabus; Katz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Mabus; Stoyanov v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

MacDermid v. Discover Charge Card  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

MacDermid v. Discover Financial Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

Macerich Management Co. v. Carpenters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Machado v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

Macia v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Macias v. McNeil
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  969,977

Macias v. United States
Mackay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034

1060

Mackey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1010

Mac’s Shell Service, Inc. v. Shell Oil Products Co. LLC  . . . . . . . .
1010

Mac’s Shell Service, Inc.; Shell Oil Products Co. LLC v.
. . . . . . .
937

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maddox v. Prudenti
1060

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Madrigal-Diaz v. United States
1049

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maggard v. Ford Motor Co.
906

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Magnan v. Oklahoma
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1023,1108

Magwood v. Patterson
1138

Main v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
900

Maine; Alexandre v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maine; Hutchinson v.
1001

Maine; Morse v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Maine; Stark v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
165,810

Maine Public Utilities Comm’n; NRG Power Marketing, LLC v.
Maisano v. Ruiz
897

Maisano v. Ryan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  971,994

888

Maitre v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1098

Major v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Major-Davis v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

815

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–1082.  City  of  Maywood,  California,  et  al.  v.
Densmore.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
320  Fed.  Appx.  497.

No.  08–1097.  Adam  et  al.  v.  Salazar,  Secretary  of  the
Interior.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
292  Fed.  Appx.  646.

No.  08–1100.  Pirant  v.  United  States  Postal  Service.
C. A. 7th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 542 F. 3d 202.

No.  08–1117.  Bowen  v.  Oregon.  Ct.  App.  Ore.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  215  Ore.  App.  199,  168  P.  3d  1208,  and
220  Ore.  App.  380,  185  P.  3d  1129.

No.  08–1122.  Clark  et  al.  v.  Jenkins.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  7th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  248  S. W.  3d  418.

No.  08–1133.  Wuterich  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  Armed

Forces.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  67  M.  J.  63.

No. 08–1144.  J. L. Spoons, Inc., et al. v.  Guzman, Director,
Ohio  Department  of  Public  Safety,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  538  F.  3d  379.

No.  08–1172.  Nacchio  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  1234.

No. 08–1176.  Ford v. United States.  C. A. 1st Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  548  F.  3d  1.

No.  08–1184.  Bowman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  765.

No.  08–1188.  Robinson  v.  Ohio.  Ct.  App.  Ohio,  Lucas

County.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–1205.  Botes v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  290  Fed.  Appx.  316.

No.  08–1213.  Caruso,  Director,  Michigan  Department  of

Corrections,  et  al.  v.  Bazzetta  et  al.;  and

No.  08–1345.  Bazzetta  et  al.  v.  Caruso,  Director,  Michi
gan Department of Corrections, et al.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  290  Fed.  Appx.  905.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, courts, and reporting information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>