<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

954

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 26, 1998

524 U. S.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F. 3d 774 and 133 F. 3d
382.

No. 97–1801. Pollin v. Oregon Department of Revenue.
Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 326 Ore. 427,
952 P. 2d 537.

No. 97–1804. Toth v. Michigan State Housing Develop-
ment Authority et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 136 F. 3d 477.

No. 97–1819. Lambing v. Godiva Chocolatier. C. A. 6th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 434.

No. 97–1827. Smith v. Supreme Court of Colorado. Sup.

Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 937 P. 2d 724.

No. 97–1831. Worthy v. Collagen Corp. Sup. Ct. Tex.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 967 S. W. 2d 360.

No. 97–1833. Bialczak et al. v. Barnett et al. C. A. 7th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 699.

No. 97–1843. Keller Communications, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 1073.

No. 97–1858. Schwarz v. Kogan, Chief Justice, Supreme
Court of Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 132 F. 3d 1387.

No. 97–1872. Arshal v. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 903.
No. 97–1877. Shoemaker v. United States et al. C. A. 2d

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 164 F. 3d 619.

No. 97–1884. Cummings v. West, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
136 F. 3d 1468.

No. 97–1885. Garrity v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 Mass. App. 349, 682 N. E.
2d 937.

No. 97–1887. Vingi v. Rhode Island et al. C. A. 1st Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 31.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case summaries from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and dates. This type of information is typically found in legal databases and is not the primary content meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1013

558 U. S.

November 9, 2009

No.  09–425.  Every  Penny  Counts,  Inc.  v.  American  Ex
press  Co.  et  al.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  563  F.  3d  1378.

No.  09–5168.  Delgado  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  286.

No.  09–5267.  Bunyard  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  45  Cal.  4th  836,  200  P.  3d  879.

No.  09–5421.  Hawkins  v.  Coyle,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  547  F.  3d  540.

No.  09–5598.  Hazelwood  v.  North  Carolina.  Ct.  App.
N.  C.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  187  N.  C.  App.  94,
652  S.  E.  2d  63.

No.  09–6307.  Sharpe  v.  Runnels,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6308.  Stone  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6309.  Spillman  v.  New  York.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.
N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 57 App.
Div.  3d  580,  870  N. Y.  S.  2d  363.

No.  09–6318.  Lowery  v.  Utah  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  812.

No. 09–6319.  Lopez  v.  Lewis, Warden.  C. A.  9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6328.  Yeager  v.  City  of  San  Diego,  California,
et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310
Fed.  Appx.  133.

No. 09–6334.  Dalton v. Texas.  Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  248  S. W.  3d  866.

No.  09–6344.  Kimbrough  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  796.

No.  09–6345.  Lee  v.  Arkansas.  Sup.  Ct.  Ark.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  2009  Ark.  255,  308  S. W.  3d  596.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, detailing case numbers, citations, and the disposition (certiorari denied). This is not the typical narrative content found within a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

27

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

emphasis added; alterations omitted).

These two approaches together stand for the proposition
that “[i]f a statutory right is not closely intertwined with a
federal  regulatory  program  Congress  has  power  to  enact,
and if that right neither belongs to nor exists against the
Federal Government, then it must be adjudicated by an Ar-
ticle III court.”  492 U. S., at 54–55 (emphasis added).  Once
in federal court, “[i]f the right is legal in nature, then it car-
ries with it the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury
trial.”  Id., at 55.

Because Granfinanciera did not involve a statutory right
that belonged to the Government in its sovereign capacity,
Atlas  Roofing  did  not  control  the  outcome.  Instead,  the
Court  applied  the  private-disputes  test  to  determine
whether fraudulent-conveyance “actions were ‘closely inter-
twined’ with the bankruptcy regime.”  Ante, at 20 (quoting
Granfinanciera, 492 U. S., at 54).  The Court held that the
fraudulent-conveyance actions “were not inseparable from
the bankruptcy process,” and thus the public-rights excep-
tion did not apply.  Ante, at 20 (citing Granfinanciera, 492
U. S., at 54, 56).

The  majority  brushes  aside  this  critical  distinction  be-
tween  Atlas  Roofing  and  Granfinanciera  in  one  sentence.
That “the Government is the party prosecuting this action,”
the majority writes, is meaningless because this Court has
“never  held  that  the  ‘presence  of  the  United  States  as  a
proper party to the proceeding is . . . sufficient’ by itself to
trigger the exception.”  Ante, at 22 (quoting Northern Pipe-
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 69,
n. 23 (1982) (plurality opinion)).  Here, too, the majority at-
tacks a strawman.  The SEC does not claim that the mere
presence of the United States as a proper party necessarily
means that a public right is at issue.  See Reply Brief 8, n. 2
(disclaiming  this  argument).9    Of  course  “what  matters  is

——————

9 Indeed,  “the  public-rights  doctrine  does  not  extend  to  any  criminal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, indicating it is part of a legal document and not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

SMITH v. ARIZONA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

of the case.”  Ibid.  As a result, experts either provided an-
swers  that  were  entirely  disconnected  from  “the  actual
case,” 1 Wigmore 2d §686, at 1095, or else they ignored the
hypothetical altogether, White 87.

Because  opposing  counsel  often  disagreed  for  strategic
reasons about which facts should be included in a hypothet-
ical, constructing a hypothetical that the judge would per-
mit was often a tricky and contentious business.  If counsel
did not include enough facts to satisfy opposing counsel, the
hypothetical would be met with an objection, and its suffi-
ciency would provide grist for an appeal.  F. Rossi, Expert
Witnesses 114 (1991).  The threat of dragging out litigation
led  counsel  to  make  their  hypotheticals  even  longer  and
more confusing.  Ibid.

By  the  early-20th  century,  this  form  of  testimony  was
scorned.  In  the  second  edition  of  his  treatise,  issued  in
1923, Wigmore proclaimed the hypothetical question “that
feature which does most to disgust men of science with the
law of Evidence.”  1 Wigmore 2d §686, at 1094.  Around the
same time, Judge Learned Hand labeled hypotheticals “the
most horific and grotesque wen upon the fair face of justice.”
Address of L. Hand: The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the
Heart  of  the  Matter,  in  Lectures  on  Legal  Topics,  1921–
1922,  p.  104  (1926).    Professor  Charles  T.  McCormick  de-
scribed hypotheticals as “an obstruction to the administra-
tion of justice.”  Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rule
and  Expert  Testimony,  23  Texas  L.  Rev.  109,  128  (1945)
(McCormick).  Experts shared these concerns; one lamented
that lawyers’ use of hypothetical questions was often “so un-
fair and confusing and degrading that it does not clarify the
issue nor help achieve justice.”  H. Hulbert, Psychiatric Tes-
timony  in  Probate  Proceedings,  2  Law  &  Contemp.  Prob.
448, 455 (1935).  Eventually, the use of hypothetical ques-
tions was “nearly universally recognized as a practical dis-
aster” by lawyers, judges, and witnesses alike.  Kaye §4.4,
at 189.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history and problems with hypothetical questions in expert testimony.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U72

[09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 11 (1998)

19

Opinion of the Court

II

The Solicitor General argues that respondents lack stand-
ing to challenge the FEC’s decision not to proceed against
AIPAC. He claims that they have failed to satisfy the “pru-
dential” standing requirements upon which this Court has
insisted. See, e. g., National Credit Union Admin. v. First
Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U. S. 479, 488 (1998) (NCUA);
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970) (Data Processing). He
adds that respondents have not shown that they “suffe[r] in-
jury in fact,” that their injury is “fairly traceable” to the
FEC’s decision, or that a judicial decision in their favor
would “redres[s]” the injury. E. g., Bennett v. Spear, 520
U. S. 154, 162 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992).
In his view, respondents’ District Court petition conse-
quently failed to meet Article III’s demand for a “case” or
“controversy.”

We do not agree with the FEC’s “prudential standing”
claim. Congress has speciﬁcally provided in FECA that
“[a]ny person who believes a violation of this Act . . . has
occurred, may ﬁle a complaint with the Commission.”
§ 437g(a)(1).
It has added that “[a]ny party aggrieved by an
order of the Commission dismissing a complaint ﬁled by such
party . . . may ﬁle a petition” in district court seeking review
of that dismissal.
§ 437g(a)(8)(A). History associates the
word “aggrieved” with a congressional intent to cast the
standing net broadly—beyond the common-law interests and
substantive statutory rights upon which “prudential” stand-
ing traditionally rested. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 316 U. S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Sta-
tion, 309 U. S. 470 (1940); Ofﬁce of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F. 2d 994 (CADC 1966)
(Burger, J.); Associated Industries of New York State v.
Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (CA2 1943) (Frank, J.). Cf. Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 702 (stating that those “suf-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 11 (1998). It discusses the issue of standing in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

3

Opinion of the Court

dents  of  car  theft),  the  trial  court  denied  the  motion,  and
an  appellate  court  affirmed.    See  Jackson  v.  State,  No.
02–535,  2003  WL  193412,  *1  (Ark.  App.,  Jan.  29,  2003);
§§9–27–318(d), (e).  A jury later convicted Jackson of both
crimes.  Noting that “in view of [the] verdict, there’s only
one possible punishment,” the judge sentenced Jackson to
life without parole.  App. in No. 10–9647, p. 55 (hereinaf-
ter Jackson App.); see Ark. Code Ann. §5–4–104(b) (1997)
(“A defendant convicted of capital murder or treason shall
be  sentenced  to  death  or  life  imprisonment  without  pa-
role”).1  Jackson did not challenge the sentence on appeal,
and  the  Arkansas  Supreme  Court  affirmed  the  convic-
tions.  See 359 Ark. 87, 194 S. W. 3d 757.

Following  Roper  v.  Simmons,  543  U. S.  551  (2005),  in
which  this  Court  invalidated  the  death  penalty  for  all
juvenile  offenders  under  the  age  of  18,  Jackson  filed  a
state  petition  for  habeas  corpus.  He  argued,  based  on
Roper’s reasoning, that a mandatory sentence of life with-
out  parole  for  a  14-year-old  also  violates  the  Eighth
Amendment.  The circuit court rejected that argument and
granted  the  State’s  motion  to  dismiss.    See  Jackson  App.
72–76.  While  that  ruling  was  on  appeal,  this  Court  held
in Graham v. Florida that life without parole violates the
Eighth  Amendment  when  imposed  on  juvenile  nonhomi-
cide  offenders.  After  the  parties  filed  briefs  addressing
that  decision,  the  Arkansas  Supreme  Court  affirmed  the
dismissal  of  Jackson’s  petition.    See  Jackson  v.  Norris,
2011  Ark.  49,  ___  S. W.  3d  ___.  The  majority  found  that
Roper  and  Graham  were  “narrowly  tailored”  to  their  con-
texts:  “death-penalty  cases  involving  a  juvenile  and  life-
imprisonment-without-parole  cases  for  nonhomicide  of-

——————

1 Jackson  was  ineligible  for  the  death  penalty  under  Thompson  v.
Oklahoma,  487  U. S.  815  (1988)  (plurality  opinion),  which  held  that
capital punishment of offenders under the age of 16 violates the Eighth
Amendment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and legal statutes, indicating its nature as legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

Opinion of the Court

argument is as follows: At common law, misrepresentations
of  law  are  not  actionable;  only  misrepresentations  of  fact
are.  Because  the  FCA  incorporates  the  common  law  of
fraud,  it  embodies  that  same  limitation.  And  the  claims
here  would  have  been  knowingly  false  only  because  re-
spondents  correctly  understood  what  “usual  and  custom-
ary” meant.  Therefore, respondents conclude, their reports
were not false because of any misrepresentation of fact; to
the  contrary,  their  claims  would  have  been  false  only  be-
cause of their view of the law.

But those premises do not support that conclusion.  To be
sure,  many  courts  appear  to  have  stated—as  a  general
rule—that misrepresentations of law are not actionable at
common law.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts §545; W.
Keeton,  D.  Dobbs,  R.  Keeton,  &  D.  Owen,  Prosser  and
Keeton  on  Law  of  Torts  §109,  pp. 758–759  (5th  ed.  1984)
(Prosser & Keeton).  So, for example, if a defendant had told
the plaintiff, “your claim will be dismissed because federal
courts  lack  jurisdiction  over  claims  like  that,”  that  repre-
sentation  might  not  be  actionable  as  a  fraud.    See  ibid.;
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 983 F. 2d 1549,
1556 (CA10 1993).  Varying rationales appear to have been
given  for  this  rule,  including  that  such  statements  are  of
mere opinion and that no one could justifiably rely on them.
See Dobbs §677, at 688.

For purposes of these cases, we assume without deciding
that the FCA incorporates some version of this rule; even
then, the rule has significant limits on its own terms.  As
relevant here, statements involving some legal analysis re-
main actionable if they “carry with [them] by implication”
an assertion about “facts that justify” the speaker’s state-
ment.  Restatement (Second) of Torts §545, Comment c; see
also  Prosser  &  Keeton  §109,  at  759.    So,  as a  contrasting
example,  a  person  might  be  liable  for  falsely  stating  that
“the plumbing work that I did on your house complied with
state law.”  See Sorenson v. Gardner, 215 Ore. 255, 261, 334
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the common law rule regarding misrepresentations of law and its potential application to the False Claims Act (FCA). It delves into legal precedents and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ET AL. v. BROWN
ET AL.

CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–535.  Argued February 28, 2023—Decided June 30, 2023

To alleviate hardship expected to be caused by the impending resump-
tion of federal student-loan repayments that had been suspended dur-
ing the multi-year coronavirus pandemic, Secretary of Education Mi-
guel Cardona announced a substantial student-loan debt-forgiveness
plan (Plan).  The Plan discharges $10,000 to $20,000 of an eligible bor-
rower’s debt, depending on criteria such as the borrower’s income and
the  type  of  loan  held.    The  Secretary  invoked  the  Higher  Education
Relief  Opportunities  for  Students Act  of  2003  (HEROES  Act),  which
authorizes the Secretary “to waive or modify any provision” applicable
to federal “student financial assistance” programs “as may be neces-
sary to ensure that . . . recipients of student financial assistance” are
no  worse  off  “financially  in  relation  to  that  financial  assistance  be-
cause” of a national emergency or disaster.  20 U. S. C. §§1098bb(a)(1),
(a)(2)(A),  1098ee(2)(C)–(D).   The  HEROES  Act  also  exempts  rules
promulgated pursuant to it from the otherwise-applicable negotiated-
rulemaking and notice-and-comment processes.

Before  the  Plan  took  effect,  various  plaintiffs—including  respond-
ents here—sued to enjoin it.  Respondents Myra Brown and Alexander
Taylor are two borrowers who do not qualify for the maximum relief
available under the Plan.  Their one-count complaint alleges that the
Secretary was required to follow notice-and-comment and negotiated-
rulemaking procedures in promulgating the Plan, which all agree he
did  not  do.  Brown  and  Taylor  argue  that  the  HEROES  Act’s  proce-
dural  exemptions  apply  only  when  the  rule  promulgated  is  substan-
tively authorized by the Act, and because the HEROES Act does not
authorize the Plan (they argue), the Secretary was required to follow
negotiated rulemaking and notice and comment.  The District Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

172

PHILLIPS v. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

Souter, J., dissenting

III

In sum, we hold that the interest income generated by
funds held in IOLTA accounts is the “private property” of
the owner of the principal. We express no view as to
whether these funds have been “taken” by the State; nor
do we express an opinion as to the amount of “just compen-
sation,” if any, due respondents. We leave these issues to
be addressed on remand. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is

Afﬁrmed.

Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice

Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

The Court holds that “interest income generated by funds
held in IOLTA accounts is the ‘private property’ of the
owner of the principal.” Ante this page.
I do not join in
today’s ruling because the Court’s limited enquiry has led
it to announce an essentially abstract proposition; even as-
suming that the proposition correctly states the law, it may
ultimately turn out to have no signiﬁcance in resolving the
real issue raised in this case, which is whether the Interest
on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) scheme violates the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Since the sounder
course would be to vacate the similarly limited judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand for
the broader enquiry outlined below, I respectfully dissent.
The Court recognizes three distinct issues implicated by a
takings claim: whether the interest asserted by the plaintiff
is property, whether the government has taken that prop-
erty, and whether the plaintiff has been denied just compen-
sation for the taking.
Ibid. The Court is careful to address
only the ﬁrst of these questions, ibid., which is the only one
on which the Fifth Circuit ruled. See Washington Legal
Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation,
94 F. 3d 996, 1004 (1996).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter. It delves into legal arguments and cites previous court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

Report,  President  Ulysses  S.  Grant  implored  Congress  to
act.

It is against this backdrop that the 42d Congress enacted,
and President Grant signed, the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
The first section of that statute, as reenacted in 1874, cre-
ated  the  federal  cause  of  action  now  codified  as  §1983.
Chapman  v.  Houston  Welfare  Rights  Organization,  441
U. S.  600,  608,  and  n.  16  (1979)  (citing  Rev.  Stat.  §1979
(1874)).  The  “plain  language[’s]”  lack  of  “modifiers,”  Thi-
boutot, 448 U. S., at 4, reflected the regrettable reality that
“state instrumentalities” could not, or would not, fully pro-
tect federal rights, Mitchum, 407 U. S., at 242.

We have adhered to this understanding of §1983’s opera-
tion.  To  guarantee  the  protection  of  federal  rights,  “the
§1983  remedy  . . .  is,  in  all  events,  supplementary  to  any
remedy any State might have.”  Owens v. Okure, 488 U. S.
235, 248 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); Knick
v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at
11).  And  we  have  consistently  refused  to  read  §1983’s
“plain language” to mean anything other than what it says.
Thiboutot, 448 U. S., at 4–6 (observing that our cases, run-
ning back to at least 1968, only make sense if “laws” indeed
means “laws”).

2
We  are  not  persuaded  by  HHC’s  argument  (which
JUSTICE  THOMAS  supports,  see  post,  at  1,  35  (dissenting

——————
the  proper  corrective.’ ”    365  U. S.,  at  175  (quoting  Cong.  Globe,  42d
Cong., 1st Sess., App. 374 (1871)).  Another, summing up the same facts,
stated:

“ ‘Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear
not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as
if they might be accomplices. . . . [A]ll the apparatus  and machinery of
civil  government,  all  the  processes  of  justice,  skulk  away  as  if  govern-
ment and justice were crimes and feared detection.  Among the most dan-
gerous things an injured party can do is to appeal to justice.’ ”  Mitchum,
407 U. S., at 241 (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 78).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the history and interpretation of Section 1983 of the U.S. Code.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

188

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Breyer, J., dissenting

ing” that “the crux of FDA jurisdiction over drugs lay
in manufacturers’ representations as revelatory of their
intent”).

What changed? For one thing, the FDA obtained evi-
dence sufﬁcient to prove the necessary “intent” despite
the absence of speciﬁc “claims.” See supra, at 172–174.
This evidence, which ﬁrst became available in the early
1990’s, permitted the agency to demonstrate that the tobacco
companies knew nicotine achieved appetite-suppressing,
mood-stabilizing, and habituating effects through chemical
(not psychological) means, even at a time when the compa-
nies were publicly denying such knowledge.

Moreover, scientiﬁc evidence of adverse health effects
mounted, until, in the late 1980’s, a consensus on the serious-
ness of the matter became ﬁrm. That is not to say that con-
cern about smoking’s adverse health effects is a new phe-
in
nomenon. See, e. g., Higginson, A New Counterblast,
Out-door Papers 179, 194 (1863) (characterizing tobacco as
“ ‘a narcotic poison of the most active class’ ”).
It is to say,
however, that convincing epidemiological evidence began to
appear mid-20th century; that the ﬁrst Surgeon General’s
Report documenting the adverse health effects appeared in
1964; and that the Surgeon General’s Report establishing nic-
otine’s addictive effects appeared in 1988. At each stage,
the health conclusions were the subject of controversy, di-
minishing somewhat over time, until recently—and only re-
cently—has it become clear that there is a wide consensus
about the health problem. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44701–44706
(1996).

Finally, administration policy changed. Earlier adminis-
trations may have hesitated to assert jurisdiction for the rea-
sons prior Commissioners expressed. See supra, at 186–187
and this page. Commissioners of the current administration
simply took a different regulatory attitude.

Nothing in the law prevents the FDA from changing its
policy for such reasons. By the mid-1990’s, the evidence
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the evolution of the FDA's understanding of tobacco and its regulation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

131

Opinion of the Court

several tobacco-speciﬁc statutes fully cognizant of the FDA’s
In fact, the court reasoned,
position. See id., at 168–176.
Congress has considered and rejected many bills that would
have given the agency such authority. See id., at 170–171.
This, along with the absence of any intent by the enacting
Congress in 1938 to subject tobacco products to regulation
under the FDCA, demonstrates that Congress intended to
withhold such authority from the FDA.
Id., at 167–176.
Having resolved the jurisdictional question against the
agency, the Court of Appeals did not address whether the
regulations exceed the FDA’s authority under 21 U. S. C.
§ 360j(e) or violate the First Amendment. See 153 F. 3d, at
176, n. 29.

We granted the federal parties’ petition for certiorari, 526
U. S. 1086 (1999), to determine whether the FDA has author-
ity under the FDCA to regulate tobacco products as custom-
arily marketed.

II

The FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products is founded on its conclusions that nicotine is a
“drug” and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are “drug
delivery devices.” Again, the FDA found that tobacco prod-
ucts are “intended” to deliver the pharmacological effects
of satisfying addiction, stimulation and tranquilization, and
weight control because those effects are foreseeable to any
reasonable manufacturer, consumers use tobacco products
to obtain those effects, and tobacco manufacturers have de-
signed their products to produce those effects. 61 Fed. Reg.
44632–44633 (1996). As an initial matter, respondents take
issue with the FDA’s reading of “intended,” arguing that it
is a term of art that refers exclusively to claims made by the
manufacturer or vendor about the product. See Brief for
Respondent Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 6. That is,
a product is not a drug or device under the FDCA unless the
manufacturer or vendor makes some express claim concern-
ing the product’s therapeutic beneﬁts. See id., at 6–7. We
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 120 (2000).  It discusses the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco products.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

ernment  a  freer  hand  in  compelling  speech.  See  Pacific
Gas & Elec., supra, at 8, 16 (collecting cases); Virginia Bd.
of  Pharmacy  v.  Virginia  Citizens  Consumer  Council,  Inc.,
425  U. S.  748,  761  (1976)  (deeming  it  “beyond  serious
dispute”  that  “[s]peech  . . .  is  protected  even  though  it  is
carried  in  a  form  that  is  ‘sold’  for  profit”).    Further,  even
assuming that most for-profit companies prioritize maxim
izing  profits  over  communicating  a  message,  that  is  not
true  for  Masterpiece  Cakeshop.    Phillips  routinely  sacri-
fices profits to ensure that Masterpiece operates in a way
that  represents  his  Christian  faith.    He  is  not  open  on
Sundays,  he  pays  his  employees  a  higher-than-average
wage, and he loans them money in times of need.  Phillips
also  refuses  to  bake  cakes  containing  alcohol,  cakes  with
racist or homophobic messages, cakes criticizing God, and
cakes  celebrating  Halloween—even  though  Halloween  is
one  of  the  most  lucrative  seasons  for  bakeries.  These
efforts  to  exercise  control  over  the  messages  that  Master
piece sends are still more evidence that Phillips’ conduct is
expressive.  See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U. S. 241, 256–258 (1974); Walker v. Texas Div., Sons
of  Confederate  Veterans,  Inc.,  576  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2015)
(slip op., at 15).

2

The Colorado Court of Appeals also erred by suggesting
that Phillips could simply post a disclaimer, disassociating
Masterpiece  from  any  support  for  same-sex  marriage.
Again,  this  argument  would  justify  any  law  compelling
speech.  And  again,  this  Court  has  rejected  it.    We  have
described  similar  arguments  as  “beg[ging]  the  core  ques
tion.”  Tornillo,  supra,  at  256.  Because  the  government
cannot  compel  speech,  it  also  cannot  “require  speakers  to
affirm  in  one  breath  that  which  they  deny  in  the  next.”
Pacific  Gas  &  Elec.,  475  U. S.,  at  16;  see  also  id.,  at  15,
n. 11  (citing  PruneYard,  447  U. S.,  at  99  (Powell,  J.,  con
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n*. It is part of the text meant to be read and understood, not a structural element like a table of contents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

BROWN v. DAVENPORT

Opinion of the Court

121.

None of this answers the question we face today.  Where
the  petitioner  in  Fry  sought  to  suggest  that  AEDPA  ren-
dered Brecht a dead letter, the petitioner here argues nearly
the opposite.  And the Court’s ruling in Fry is, if anything,
affirmatively unhelpful to Mr. Davenport.  Not only did Fry
hold that this Court’s equitable precedents like Brecht co-
exist side-by-side with AEDPA, it expressly recognized that
AEDPA “sets forth a precondition to the grant of habeas re-
lief . . . not an entitlement to it.”  551 U. S., at 119–120.  Ra-
ther than suggest Brecht duplicates AEDPA or vice versa,
Fry  thus  stands  as  a  reminder  that  the  two  tests  impose
analytically distinct preconditions to relief.

require

Mr. Davenport offers no persuasive reply.  Instead, he in-
vites us to overlook all of this and train our attention to a
brief passage at the end of Fry’s relevant analysis.  There,
he notes, the Court said this:  “[I]t certainly makes no sense
to
tests
(AEDPA/Chapman  and  Brecht)  when  the  latter  obviously
subsumes the former.”  551 U. S., at 120.  On Mr. Daven-
port’s telling, whatever else Fry did or said, this language
means  it  adopted  his  theory  that  a  court  applying  Brecht
necessarily applies AEDPA along the way.

application

formal

both

of

We do not see how we might read so much into so little.
Doubtless, there are some cases “when” Brecht does “sub-
sum[e]” AEDPA, just as Fry says.  551 U. S., at 120.  As we
have seen, and as was the case in Fry, if a state court has
not  adjudicated  the  petitioner’s  claim  on  the  merits,
AEDPA falls away.  Likewise, if a federal court determines
that  a  habeas  petition  fails  because  of  Brecht,  there  is  no
need  to  prolong  the  matter  by  “formal[ly]  appl[ying]”
AEDPA as well.  551 U. S., at 120.  But none of this means,
and Fry never said, that a Brecht inquiry always subsumes
an AEDPA inquiry.  Nor did Fry even have reason to con-
sider the relationship between Brecht and AEDPA in cases
like ours—where a state court has issued a decision on the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Court's reasoning in the case of Brown v. Davenport. It delves into the relationship between two legal precedents, AEDPA and Brecht, and argues that they are distinct tests for granting habeas relief.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

33

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

explained, “restrictions on direct contributions are preven-
tative, because few if any contributions to candidates will
involve quid pro quo arrangements.”  Citizens United, 558
U. S.,  at  357.  The  aggregate  limits  are  then  layered  on
top, ostensibly to prevent circumvention of the base limits.
This  “prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis  approach”  requires
that  we  be  particularly  diligent  in  scrutinizing  the  law’s
fit.  Wisconsin  Right  to  Life,  551  U. S.,  at  479  (opinion  of
ROBERTS,  C. J.);  see  McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at  268–269
(opinion of THOMAS, J.).

2
Importantly, there are multiple alternatives available to
Congress  that  would  serve  the  Government’s  anticircum-
vention interest, while avoiding “unnecessary abridgment”
of First Amendment rights.  Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25.

The most obvious might involve targeted restrictions on
transfers  among  candidates  and  political  committees.
There  are  currently  no  such  limits  on  transfers  among
party  committees  and  from  candidates  to  party  commit-
tees.  See  2  U. S. C.  §441a(a)(4);  11  CFR  §113.2(c).    Per-
haps  for  that  reason,  a  central  concern  of  the  District
Court,  the  Government,  multiple  amici  curiae,  and  the
dissent has been the ability of party committees to trans-
fer money freely.  If Congress agrees that this is problem-
atic, it might tighten its permissive transfer rules.  Doing
so  would  impose  a  lesser  burden  on  First  Amendment
rights,  as  compared  to  aggregate  limits  that  flatly  ban
contributions  beyond  certain  levels.    And  while  the  Gov-
ernment has not conceded that transfer restrictions would
be  a  perfect  substitute  for  the  aggregate  limits,  it  has
recognized that they would mitigate the risk of circumven-
tion.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29.

One possible option for restricting transfers would be to
require contributions above the current aggregate limits to
be  deposited  into  segregated,  nontransferable  accounts
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing campaign finance regulations and the constitutionality of aggregate contribution limits. It delves into legal precedents and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

27

ALITO, J., dissenting

not “resolve [the conflict] on its own.”  N. Clegg & J. New-
stead, Our Response to the Decision on Facebook’s EU-US
Data Transfers, Meta (May 22, 2023).23  Rather, the plat-
form relied on the White House to negotiate an agreement
that would preserve its ability to maintain its trans-Atlan-
tic  operations.  K.  Mackrael,  EU  Approves  Data-Transfer
Deal  With  U. S.,  Averting  Potential  Halt  in  Flows,  Wall
Street Journal, July 10, 2023.24

It  is  therefore  beyond  any  serious  dispute  that  the  top-
ranking  White  House  officials  and  the  Surgeon  General
possessed  the  authority  to  exert  enormous  coercive  pres-
sure.

B
1
Second, I turn to of the officials’ communications with Fa-
cebook, which possess all the hallmarks of coercion that we
identified in Bantam Books and Vullo.  Many of the White
House’s emails were “phrased virtually as orders,” Bantam
Books, 372 U. S., at 68, and the officials’ frequent follow-ups
ensured that they were understood as such, id., at 63.  To
take a few examples, after Flaherty read an article about
content causing vaccine hesitancy, he demanded “to know
that  [Facebook  was]  trying”  to  combat  the  issue  and  “to
know that you’re not playing a shell game with us when we
ask you what is going on.”  30 Record 9365; see supra, at 7.
The next month, he requested “assurances, based in data,”
that Facebook was not “making our country’s vaccine hesi-
tancy problem worse.”  30 Record 9371; see supra, at 7–8.
A week after that, he questioned Facebook about its policies
“for removal vs demoting,” and when the platform did not

——————

23 https://about.fb.com/news/2023/05/our-response-to-the-decision-on-

facebooks-eu-us-data-transfers.

24 https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-approves-data-transfer-deal-with-

u-s-averting-potential-halt-in-flows-7a149c9.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal citations, arguments, and references to specific events and individuals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

Our acceptance of race-based state action has been rare
for a reason.  “Distinctions between citizens solely because
of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality.”  Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U. S. 495, 517 (2000) (quot-
ing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943)).
That principle cannot be overridden except in the most ex-
traordinary case.

B
These cases involve whether a university may make ad-
missions  decisions  that  turn  on  an  applicant’s  race.  Our
Court first considered that issue in Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, which involved a set-aside admissions
program used by the University of California, Davis, medi-
cal  school.    438  U. S.,  at  272–276.    Each  year,  the  school
held 16 of its 100 seats open for members of certain minor-
ity groups, who were reviewed on a special admissions track
separate  from  those  in  the  main  admissions  pool.    Id.,  at

——————
Board  of  Education,  347  U. S.  483  (1954),  in  the  infamous  case  Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944).  There, the Court up-
held the internment of “all  persons of Japanese ancestry in prescribed
West Coast . . . areas” during World War II because “the military urgency
of the situation demanded” it.  Id., at 217, 223.  We have since overruled
Korematsu,  recognizing  that  it  was  “gravely  wrong  the  day  it  was  de-
cided.”  Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 38).  The
Court’s  decision  in  Korematsu  nevertheless  “demonstrates  vividly  that
even the most rigid scrutiny can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate
racial classification” and that “[a]ny retreat from the most searching ju-
dicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error occurring
in the future.”  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 236
(1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The principal dissent, for its part, claims that the Court has also per-
mitted  “the  use  of  race  when  that  use  burdens  minority  populations.”
Post, at 38–39 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).  In support of that claim, the
dissent cites two cases that have nothing to do with the Equal Protection
Clause.  See ibid. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873
(1975) (Fourth Amendment case), and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U. S. 543 (1976) (another Fourth Amendment case)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the use of race in university admissions. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Opinion of the Court

App. §§1–3, 1–5 (Cum. Supp. 2023).  Nor is that State alone.
Florida’s  Constitution  prohibits  “any  person  [from]  con-
fin[ing] a pig during pregnancy . . . in such a way that she
is  prevented  from  turning  around  freely.”  Art.  X,  §21(a).
Arizona, Maine, Michigan, Oregon, and Rhode Island, too,
have laws regulating animal confinement practices within
their  borders.  See  Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §13–2910.07(A)
(2018);  Me.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.,  Tit.  7,  §§4020(1)–(2)  (2018);
Mich.  Comp.  Laws  §287.746(2)  (West  Cum.  Supp.  2022);
Ore. Rev. Stat. §§600.150(1)–(2) (2021); R. I. Gen. Laws §4–
1.1–3 (Supp. 2022).

This case involves a challenge to a California law known
as Proposition 12.  In November 2018 and with the support
of about 63% of participating voters, California adopted a
ballot initiative that revised the State’s existing standards
for the in-state sale of eggs and announced new standards
for the in-state sale of pork and veal products.  App. to Pet.
for Cert. 37a–46a.  As relevant here, Proposition 12 forbids
the in-state sale of whole pork meat that comes from breed-
ing pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are “confined in
a  cruel  manner.”  Cal.  Health  &  Safety  Code  Ann.
§25990(b)(2)  (West  Cum.  Supp.  2023).  Subject  to  certain
exceptions, the law deems confinement “cruel” if it prevents
a  pig  from  “lying  down,  standing  up,  fully  extending  [its]
limbs, or turning around freely.”  §25991(e)(1).  Since Prop-
osition 12’s adoption, the State has begun developing “pro-
posed regulations” that would permit compliance “certi-
fication[s]”  to  be  issued  “by  non-governmental  third
parties, many used for myriad programs (e.g., ‘organic’) al-
ready.”  Brief for Intervenor Respondents 30, n. 8.

A  spirited  debate  preceded  the  vote  on  Proposition  12.
Proponents  observed  that,  in  some  farming  operations,
pregnant  pigs  remain  “[e]ncased”  for  16  weeks  in  “fit-to-
size” metal crates.  M. Scully, A Brief for the Pigs: The Case
of  National  Pork  Producers  Council  v.  Ross,  National  Re-
view, July 11, 2022, https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It cites legal codes and discusses a specific law (Proposition 12) and related legal challenges.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Supreme Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

Opinion of the Court

Chemical  Co.  v.  Meyer,  139  U. S.  540,  544  (1891).    It  is
therefore “an elementary principle that every man is enti-
tled  to  the  use  of  his  own  name  in  his  own  business.”    F.
Treadway,  Personal  Trade-Names,  6  Yale  L.  J.  141,  143–
144 (1897) (Treadway); see also A. Greeley, Foreign Patent
and Trademark Laws §138, p. 135 (1899) (“The right of any
one to place his own name on goods sold by him is recog-
nized  as  a  natural  right  and  cannot  be  interfered  with”).
“The  notion  that  people  should  be  able  to  use  their  own
name to identify their goods or business is deeply rooted in
American  mores.”    B.  Pattishall,  D.  Hilliard,  &  J.  Welch,
Trademarks and Unfair Competition §2.06 (2001).

Recognizing a person’s ownership over his name, the com-
mon  law  restricted  the  trademarking  of  names.    It  pre-
vented  a  person  from  trademarking  any  name—even  his
own—by  itself.    In  “the  early  years  of  trademark  law,”
courts recognized that “ there can be no trade-mark in the
name of a person, because . . . every person has the right to
use his own name for the purposes of trade.”  2 McCarthy
§13:5 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Restate-
ment §14, Comment e (“[A]t early common law, the recogni-
tion of an unencumbered right to use one’s name in trade
effectively  precluded  the  existence  of  trademark  or  trade
name rights in personal names”); W. Browne, Law of Trade-
Marks §206, p. 219 (2d ed. 1885) (“The rule is, that a man
cannot turn his mere name into a trade-mark”); McLean v.
Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, 252 (1878) (explaining that a person
cannot obtain “the exclusive use of a name, merely as such,
without more”).

The common law did, however, allow a person to obtain a
trademark containing his own name—with a caveat: A per-
son could not use a mark containing his name to the exclu-
sion  of  a  person  with  the  same  name.    “A  corollary  of  the
right  to  use  one’s  own  name  and  identity  in  trade  is  the
right to stop others from doing so—at least those who don’t
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the common law regarding the use of personal names in trademarks. It cites legal precedents and scholarly works to support its arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

331

Stevens, J., dissenting

genitals” (and certain other regions of the body) “with less
than a fully opaque covering.” 501 U. S., at 569, n. 2. The
Erie ordinance duplicates that deﬁnition in all material re-
spects, but adds the following to its deﬁnition of “[n]udity”:

“ ‘[T]he exposure of any device, costume, or covering
which gives the appearance of or simulates the genitals,
pubic hair, natal cleft, perineum anal region or pubic
hair region; or the exposure of any device worn as a
cover over the nipples and/or areola of the female
breast, which device simulates and gives the realistic
appearance of nipples and/or areola.’ ” Ante, at 283–
284, n. (emphasis added).

Can it be doubted that this out-of-the-ordinary deﬁnition of
“nudity” is aimed directly at the dancers in establishments
such as Kandyland? Who else is likely to don such gar-
ments? 17 We should not stretch to embrace fanciful ex-
planations when the most natural reading of the ordinance
unmistakably identiﬁes its intended target.

It is clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Erie ordi-
nance was a response to a more speciﬁc concern than nudity
in general, namely, nude dancing of the sort found in Kandy-
land.18 Given that the Court has not even tried to defend

17 Is it seriously contended (as would be necessary to sustain the ordi-
nance as a general prohibition) that, when crafting this bizarre deﬁnition
of “nudity,” Erie’s concern was with the use of simulated nipple covers on
“nude beaches and [by otherwise] unclothed purveyors of hot dogs and
machine tools”? Barnes, 501 U. S., at 574 (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment); see also ante, at 308 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
It is
true that one might conceivably imagine that is Erie’s aim. But it is far
more likely that this novel deﬁnition was written with the Kandyland
dancers and the like in mind, since they are the only ones covered by the
law (recall that plays like Equus are exempted from coverage) who are
likely to utilize such unconventional clothing.

18 The plurality states that Erie’s ordinance merely “replaces and up-
dates provisions of an ‘Indecency and Immorality’ ordinance” from the
mid-19th century, just as the statute in Barnes did. Ante, at 290. First
of all, it is not clear that this is correct. The record does indicate that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal jargon, citations, and arguments related to a specific ordinance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xli

Page

905

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United. For labor union, see name of trade.
United Nebraska Bank; Kucera v.
United States. See name of other party.
931
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Mosseri v.
937
. . .
U. S. District Judge; Judicial Council of Fifth Judicial Circuit v.
958
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. Embassy, Manila, Philippines; Abdeslem v.
978
. . .
U. S. House of Representatives; Department of Commerce v.
931
U. S. Postal Service; Campbell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952
Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
Universal Maritime Service Corp.; Wright v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
University Health Services, Inc. v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
University of Louisville Hospital; Roberts v.
971
University of Mass. Medical Center; Rothman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
U S WEST, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n . . . . . . . . .
Utterback, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967
Valdes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,972
911
Valdez v. Fonoimoana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919
Valenzuela Rodriguez v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
Valera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
Valeriano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
Vallejo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Vance; Narron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Van Damme; DePrins v.
926
Vann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
Vasquez v. Stinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vaughn; Devery v.
971
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vaughn; Laessig v.
925
VBR; Russell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Verbeck, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Victoria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Villacres v. Kramer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Village. See name of village.
Vingi v. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Viray v. Beneﬁcial California, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Viray v. Steuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Virginia; Kreiger v.
Virginia; Stewart v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Viswanathan v. Fayetteville State Univ. Bd. of Trustees . . . . . . .
Waco Independent School Dist.; Pruitt v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker; Day v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker v. Michigan Public Service Comm’n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walkoviak v. District Court of Tex., Harris County . . . . . . . . . . .

954
971
969
968
979
946
939
944
963
907
910
969
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1100

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 1, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1586. Holt v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 M. J. 173.

No. 99–7110. Richard v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7207. Sheppard v. Painter, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 909.

No. 99–7239. Fischler v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 522.

No. 99–7716. Cody v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–7968. Richardson v. Say et al. Ct. App. La., 2d

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 So. 2d 771.

No. 99– 8050. Steele v. Allison, Director, Orange
County Correctional Facility. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–8162. Guzman v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8290. Ryan v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 257 Neb. 635, 601 N. W. 2d 473.

No. 99–8406. Kessler v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 182 F. 3d 932.

No. 99–8407. Liggins v. B. T. Office Products. C. A. 8th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8419. Miles v. Dunnigan et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8420. Linton v. Sullivan et al. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 917.

No. 99–8428. Scott v. Miller, Superintendent, Eastern
New York Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–8432. Winkle v. Oakland Jockey Club. C. A. 8th

Cir. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's section on case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.

ALITO, J., concurring

50,  63–64  (1976)  (plurality  opinion)  (“Nor  may  speech  be
curtailed because it invites dispute, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions the way they are, or even stirs people to an-
ger”); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969) (“It is
firmly  settled  that  under  our  Constitution  the  public  ex-
pression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers”).  It
is unreasonable to infer that parents who send a child to a
public  school  thereby  authorize  the  school  to  take  away
such a critical right.

To  her  credit,  petitioner’s  attorney  acknowledged  this
during  oral  argument.
  As  she  explained,  even  if  such
speech is deeply offensive to members of the school commu-
nity and may cause a disruption, the school cannot punish
the student who spoke out; “that would be a heckler’s veto.”
Tr. of Oral Arg. 15–16.17  The school may suppress the dis-
ruption, but it may not punish the off-campus speech that
prompted other students to engage in misconduct.  See id.,
at 5–6 (“[I]f listeners riot because they find speech offensive,
schools should punish the rioters, not the speaker.  In other
words, the hecklers don’t get the veto”); see also id., at 27–
28.

This is true even if the student’s off-premises speech on a
matter of public concern is intemperate and crude.  When a
student  engages  in  oral  or  written  communication  of  this
nature,  the  student  is  subject  to  whatever  restraints  the
student’s parents impose, but the student enjoys the same
First  Amendment  protection  against  government  regula-
tion as all other members of the public.  And the Court has

——————

17 Counsel  was  asked  what  a  school  could  have  done  during  the  Vi-
etnam War era if a student said, “[the] war is immoral, American soldiers
are baby killers, I hope there are a lot of casualties so that people will
rise up.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 15.  Counsel agreed that “[e]ven if that would
cause a disruption in the school,” “the school couldn’t do anything about
it.”  Ibid.  In her words, “that would be a heckler’s veto, no can do.”  Id.,
at 15–16.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito. It discusses First Amendment rights related to student speech, citing previous cases and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

also  name  as  defendants  Stephen  Carlton,  Katherine
Thomas, Allison Benz, and Cecile Young.  On the briefing
and  argument  before  us,  it  appears  that  these  particular
defendants fall within the scope of Ex parte Young’s historic
exception to state sovereign immunity.  Each of these indi-
viduals is an executive licensing official who may or must
take enforcement actions against the petitioners if they vi-
olate the terms of Texas’s Health and Safety Code, includ-
ing S. B. 8.  See, e.g., Tex. Occ. Code Ann. §164.055(a); Brief
for Petitioners 33–34.  Accordingly, we hold that sovereign
immunity  does  not  bar  the  petitioners’  suit  against  these
named defendants at the motion to dismiss stage.3
  JUSTICE  THOMAS  alone  reaches  a  different  conclusion.
He  emphasizes  that  suits  seeking  equitable  relief  against
executive officials are permissible only when supported by
tradition.  See post, at 2–3 (opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in  part).   He  further emphasizes that  the  rele-
vant  tradition  here,  embodied  in  Ex parte  Young,  permits
equitable relief against only those officials who possess au-
thority to enforce a challenged state law.  Post, at 3–4.  We
agree with  all  of  these principles; our disagreement is  re-
stricted to their application.
  JUSTICE THOMAS suggests that the licensing-official de-
fendants lack authority to enforce S. B. 8 because that stat-
ute  says  it  is  to  be  “exclusively”  enforced  through  private
civil  actions  “[n]otwithstanding  . . .  any  other  law.”    See
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §171.207(a).  But the same
provision of S. B. 8 also states that the law “may not be con-
strued to . . . limit the enforceability of any other laws that
regulate or prohibit abortion.”  §171.207(b)(3).  This saving
clause  is  significant  because,  as  best  we  can  tell  from  the
briefing  before  us,  the  licensing-official  defendants  are
——————

3 The petitioners may proceed against Ms. Young solely based on her
authority to supervise licensing of abortion facilities and ambulatory sur-
gical centers, and not with respect to any other enforcement authority
under Chapter 171 of the Texas Health and Safety Code.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson*. It discusses the applicability of *Ex parte Young* to the case and the arguments made by Justice Thomas.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

Opinion of the Court

ests.  Thus, in its motion to intervene, the House observed
that  it  was  “the  legislative  body  that  actually  drew  the
redistricting  plan  at  issue,”  and  argued  that  the  existing
parties—including  the  State  Defendants—could  not  ade-
quately  protect  its  interests.    App.  2965–2967.    Nowhere
in its motion did the House suggest it was intervening as
agent  of  the  State.    That  silence  undermines  the  House’s
attempt  to  proceed  before  us  on  behalf  of  the  State.    As
another portion of the Court’s Karcher decision clarifies, a
party may not wear on appeal a hat different from the one
it wore at trial.  484 U. S., at 78 (parties may not appeal in
particular  capacities  “unless  the  record  shows  that  they
participated in those capacities below”).3

B
  The House also maintains that, even if it lacks standing
to pursue this appeal as the State’s agent, it has standing
in  its  own  right.    To  support  standing,  an  injury  must  be
“legally  and  judicially  cognizable.”    Raines  v.  Byrd,  521
U. S.  811,  819  (1997).    This  Court  has  never  held  that  a
judicial  decision  invalidating  a  state  law  as  unconstitu-
tional inflicts a discrete, cognizable injury on each organ of
government  that  participated  in  the  law’s  passage.    The
Court’s precedent thus lends no support for the notion that
one House of a bicameral legislature, resting solely on its
role  in  the  legislative  process,  may  appeal  on  its  own
behalf a judgment invalidating a state enactment.
  Seeking  to  demonstrate  its  asserted  injury,  the  House
——————

3 Nor  can  we  give  ear  to  the  House’s  assertion  that  forfeiture  or  ac-
quiescence  bar  the  State  Defendants  from  contesting  the  House’s
authority  to  represent  the  State’s  interests.    See  Brief  for  Appellants
29–30.    As  earlier  observed,  standing  to  sue  (or  appeal)  is  a  nonwaiv-
able  jurisdictional  requirement.    See  supra,  at  3.    Moreover,  even  if
forfeiture  were  not  beyond  the  pale,  the  State  Defendants  here  could
hardly be held to have relinquished an objection to the House’s partici-
pation in a capacity—on behalf of the State itself—in which the House
was not participating in the District Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the standing of the House of Representatives to appeal a case.  The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Opinion of the Court

“written notice” that, as relevant here, “specif[ies] . . . [t]he
time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be
held.”  §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).  Thus,  when  the  term  “notice  to
appear” is used elsewhere in the statutory section, includ-
ing as the trigger for the stop-time rule, it carries with it
the  substantive  time-and-place  criteria  required  by
§1229(a).

Resisting  this  straightforward  understanding  of  the
text, the dissent posits that “§1229(a)(1)’s language can be
understood  to  define  what  makes  a  notice  to appear  com-
plete.”  Post, at 10 (emphasis in original).  In the dissent’s
view,  a  defective  notice  to  appear  is  still  a  “notice  to  ap-
pear”  even  if  it  is  incomplete—much  like  a  three-wheeled
Chevy  is  still  a  car.  Post,  at  10–11.  The  statutory  text
proves otherwise.  Section 1229(a)(1) does not say a “notice
to  appear”  is  “complete”  when  it  specifies  the  time  and
place  of  the  removal  proceedings.  Rather,  it  defines  a
“notice to appear” as a “written notice” that “specif[ies],” at
a  minimum,  the  time  and  place  of  the  removal  proceed-
ings.  §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).    Moreover,  the  omission  of  time-
and-place information is not, as the dissent asserts, some
trivial,  ministerial  defect,  akin  to  an  unsigned  notice  of
appeal.  Cf. Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U. S. 757, 763, 768
(2001).  Failing  to  specify  integral  information  like  the
time  and  place  of  removal  proceedings  unquestionably
would “deprive [the notice to appear] of its essential char-
acter.”  Post, at 12, n. 5; see supra, at 12–13, n. 7.9
——————

§356(a)(1)  (“In  this  section,  such  a  drug  is  referred  to  as  a  ‘break-
through therapy’ ”); 38 U. S. C. §7451(a)(2) (“hereinafter in this section
referred to as ‘covered positions’ ”); 42 U. S. C. §285g–4(b) (“hereafter in
this section referred to as ‘medical rehabilitation’ ”).

9 The dissent maintains that Congress’ decision to make the stop-time
rule  retroactive  to  certain  pre-IIRIRA  “orders  to  show  cause”  “sheds
considerable  light  on  the  question  presented”  because  orders  to  show
cause  did  not  necessarily  include  time-and-place  information.    Post,  at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion discussing the interpretation of a statute. It contains legal jargon and references to case law, indicating its suitability for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

THRYV, INC. v. CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

left to toss.  If Congress had wanted to insulate from review
only “[t]he” “determination” that a petition has a “reason-
able likelihood” of success, the company suggests, Congress
could have spoken of insulating “the determination under
subsection  (a)”  rather  than  “the  determination  under  this
section.”  And  Thryv  reminds  us  that  Congress  used  that
latter formulation in nearby and predecessor statutes.  See,
e.g., §303(c) (“[a] determination by the Director pursuant to
subsection (a) of this section . . . will be final and nonappeal-
able”); §312(c) (2006 ed.; repealed 2011) (“[a] determination
by  the  Director  under  subsection  (a)  shall  be  final  and
non-appealable”).

But so what?  One could replace the phrase “my next-door
neighbor  to  the  west”  with  “my  neighbor  at  123  Main
Street”  (assuming  that  is  her  address)  and  the  meaning
would  be  the  same.  Likewise,  it  hardly  matters  whether
Congress spoke of the “determination” “under this section”
or “under subsection (a).”  Either way, our attention is di-
rected within, not beyond, §314.  And what’s Thryv’s alter-
native?  It would have us read language speaking of the Di-
rector’s  determination  “under  this  section”  to  encompass
any decision related to the initiation of inter partes review
found anywhere in the AIA—an entire chapter of the U. S.
Code.  That’s sort of like reading “my next-door neighbor to
the  west”  to  include  “anyone  in  town.”  Nor  do  things  get
better  for  Thryv  with  a  careful  assessment  of  nearby  and
predecessor statutes.  They reveal that Congress knew ex-
actly how to give broader directions like the one Thryv ima-
gines when it wished to do so.  See, e.g., §314(b) (directing
our attention to the Director’s decision whether to institute
inter partes review “under this chapter” rather than “under
this section”).

Without any plausible textual or contextual hook for its
position,  Thryv  finishes  by  advancing  a  parade  of  policy
horribles.  It notes that the AIA imposes lots of other con-
straints on inter partes review besides the §315(b) timing
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of a specific section of the AIA (America Invents Act) and argues against a particular interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

Opinion of the Court

defendant through the introduction of his own coerced tes-
timony.  It did so despite the strong and obvious interest in
preventing  perjury  because  the  very  introduction  of  the
coerced  testimony  would  violate  the  Fifth  Amendment’s
provision  that  “[n]o  person  . . .  shall  be  compelled  in  any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  In view of
that guarantee, balancing of interests was “not simply un-
necessary,” but “impermissible.”  Portash, 440 U. S., at 459.
The  Sixth  Amendment  speaks  with  equal  clarity:  “In  all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  It admits
no exception for cases in which the trial judge believes un-
confronted testimonial hearsay might be reasonably neces-
sary  to  correct  a  misleading  impression.    Courts  may  not
overlook its command, no matter how noble the motive.  See
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 145 (2006)
(“It is true enough that the purpose of the rights set forth
in  [the  Sixth]  Amendment  is  to  ensure  a  fair  trial;  but  it
does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as
the trial is, on the whole, fair”).

D
The  State  warns  that  a  reversal  will  leave  prosecutors
without recourse to protect against abuses of the confronta-
tion right.  These concerns are overstated.  State and fed-
eral hearsay rules generally preclude all parties from intro-
ducing unreliable, out-of-court statements for the truth of
the matter asserted.  See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 802.  Even
for otherwise admissible evidence, “well-established rules,”
such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403, “permit trial judges
to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by
certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of
the  issues,  or  potential  to  mislead  the  jury.”    Holmes  v.
South Carolina, 547 U. S. 319, 326 (2006).  If a court admits
evidence  before  its  misleading  or  unfairly  prejudicial  na-
ture becomes apparent, it generally retains the authority to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and its application to the admission of coerced testimony.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1082

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 17, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8746. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 658.

No. 99–8747. Earls v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 283.

No. 99–8748. Garcia-Hernandez v. United States. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1353.

No. 99–8753. Filler v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 386.

No. 99–8754. Gonzalez-Miranda v. United States. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1117.

No. 99–8755. Hook v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 299.

No. 99–8758. Burkhalter v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 1096.

No. 99–8759. Cadena-Guerrero v. United States. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1337.

No. 99–8774. Dominguez-Carmona v. United States; and
No. 99–8775. Hernandez-Villanueva v. United States.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d
283.

No. 99–1248. Cook Group, Inc., et al. v. Wilson et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave to ﬁle sealed and
trade secret materials from proceedings below under seal granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1329.

No. 99–1368. City of Austin v. Southwestern Bell Video
Services, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of National Association
of Telecommunications Ofﬁcers and Advisors et al. for leave to
ﬁle a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 193 F. 3d 309.

No. 99–1500. Calderon, Warden v. McDowell. C. A. 9th
Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d
1253.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for indexing as part of a document's main content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

BREYER, J., dissenting

lic money to promote religion.  And considering the Estab-
lishment Clause concerns underlying the program, Maine’s
decision not to fund such schools falls squarely within the
play  in  the  joints  between  those  two  Clauses.    Maine  has
promised all children within the State the right to receive a
free public education.  In fulfilling this promise, Maine en-
deavors  to  provide  children  the  religiously  neutral  educa-
tion required in public school systems.  And that, in signif-
icant part, reflects the State’s antiestablishment interests
in  avoiding  spending  public  money  to  support  what  is  es-
sentially  religious  activity.  The  Religion  Clauses  give
Maine the ability, and flexibility, to make this choice.

B
In  my  view,  Maine’s  nonsectarian  requirement  is  also
constitutional because it supports, rather than undermines,
the Religion Clauses’ goal of avoiding religious strife.  Forc-
ing Maine to fund schools that provide the sort of religiously
integrated education offered by Bangor Christian and Tem-
ple Academy creates a similar potential for religious strife
as  that  raised  by  promoting  religion  in  public  schools.  It
may appear to some that the State favors a particular reli-
gion over others, or favors religion over nonreligion.  Mem-
bers of minority religions, with too few adherents to estab-
lish  schools,  may  see  injustice  in  the  fact  that  only  those
belonging to more popular religions can use state money for
religious education.  Taxpayers may be upset at having to
finance the propagation of religious beliefs that they do not
share and with which they disagree.  And parents in school
districts that have a public secondary school may feel indig-
nant that only some families in the State—those families in
the  more  rural  districts  without  public  schools—have  the
opportunity to give their children a Maine-funded religious
education.

Maine legislators who endorsed the State’s nonsectarian
requirement  understood  this  potential  for  social  conflict.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the constitutionality of Maine's nonsectarian requirement in its school funding program.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID

Syllabus

(a) This  case  turns  on  whether  the  clause  “using  a  random  or  se-
quential number generator” in §227(a)(1)(A) modifies both of the two
verbs that precede it (“store” and “produce”), as Facebook contends, or
only the closest one (“produce”), as maintained by Duguid.  The most
natural reading of the text and other aspects of §227(a)(1)(A) confirm
Facebook’s  view.  First,  in  an  ordinary  case,  the  “series-qualifier
canon” instructs that a modifier at the end of a series of nouns or verbs
applies to the entire series.  Here, that canon indicates that the modi-
fying phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” quali-
fies both antecedent verbs, “store” and “produce.”  Second, the modify-
ing phrase immediately follows a concise, integrated clause (“store or
produce telephone numbers to be called”), which uses the word “or” to
connect two verbs that share a common direct object (“telephone num-
bers to be called”).  Given this structure, it would be odd to apply the
modifier to just one part of the cohesive clause.  Third, the comma in
§227(a)(1)(A)  separating  the  modifying  phrase  from  the  antecedents
suggests that the qualifier applies to all of the antecedents, instead of
just the nearest one.  Pp. 4–6.

Duguid’s insistence that a limiting clause should ordinarily be read
as modifying only the phrase that it immediately follows (the so-called
“rule of the last antecedent”) does not help his cause for two reasons.
First, the Court has declined to apply that rule in the specific context
where, as here, the modifying clause appears after an integrated list.
Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 344, n.
4.  Second,  the  last  antecedent  before  the  clause  at  issue  in
§227(a)(1)(A) is not “produce,” as Duguid argues, but rather “telephone
numbers to be called.”  Pp. 6–7.

(b) The statutory context confirms that the TCPA’s autodialer defi-
nition excludes equipment that does not use a random or sequential
number generator.  Congress found autodialer technology harmful be-
cause  autodialers  can  dial  emergency lines  randomly  or  tie  up  all  of
the sequentially numbered phone lines at a single entity.  Facebook’s
interpretation of §227(a)(1)(A) better matches the scope of the TCPA
to these specific concerns.  Duguid’s interpretation, on the other hand,
would encompass any equipment that stores and dials telephone num-
bers.  Pp. 7–8.

(c)  Duguid’s other counterarguments do not overcome the clear com-
mands of the statute’s text and broader context.  First, he claims that
his interpretation best accords with the “sense” of the text.  It would
make  little  sense  however,  to  classify  as  autodialers  all  equipment
with the capacity to store and dial telephone numbers, including vir-
tually all modern cell phones.  Second, Duguid invokes the “distribu-
tive  canon,”  which  provides  that  a  series  of  antecedents  and  conse-
quents should be distributed to one another based on how they most
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the court's reasoning in the case of Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid. It is not the actual content meant to be read and understood by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U60

[09-26-01 12:39:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

816

UNITED STATES v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, INC.
Opinion of the Court

III

The District Court concluded that a less restrictive al-
ternative is available: § 504, with adequate publicity. 30
F. Supp. 2d, at 719–720. No one disputes that § 504, which
requires cable operators to block undesired channels at indi-
vidual households upon request, is narrowly tailored to the
Government’s goal of supporting parents who want those
channels blocked. The question is whether § 504 can be
effective.

In support of

When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to
a content-based speech restriction, it is the Government’s ob-
ligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to
achieve its goals. The Government has not met that burden
here.
its position, the Government cites
empirical evidence showing that § 504, as promulgated and
implemented before trial, generated few requests for
household-by-household blocking. Between March 1996 and
May 1997, while the Government was enjoined from enforc-
ing § 505, § 504 remained in operation. A survey of cable
operators determined that fewer than 0.5% of cable subscrib-
Id., at 712.
ers requested full blocking during that time.
The uncomfortable fact is that § 504 was the sole blocking
regulation in effect for over a year; and the public greeted it
with a collective yawn.

The District Court was correct to direct its attention to
the import of this tepid response. Placing the burden of
proof upon the Government, the District Court examined
whether § 504 was capable of serving as an effective, less
restrictive means of reaching the Government’s goals.
Id.,
at 715, 718–719.
It concluded that § 504, if publicized in an
adequate manner, could be.

Id., at 719–720.

The District Court employed the proper approach. When
the Government restricts speech, the Government bears
the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United
States, 527 U. S. 173, 183 (1999) (“[T]he Government bears
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the case *United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.* It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
46  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

ment initially ran from July 1, 2012, until June 30, 2015.
App.  331.  Since  then,  the  agreement  has  been  extended
pursuant  to  a  provision  providing  for  automatic  renewal
for  an  additional  year  unless  either  party  gives  timely
notice  that  it  desires  to  amend  or  terminate  the  contract.
Ibid.  Thus, for the past three years, the Union could not
have been confident about the continuation of the agency-
fee arrangement for more than a year at a time.

Because  public-sector  collective-bargaining  agreements
are  generally  of  rather  short  duration,  a  great  many  of
those now in effect probably began or were renewed since
Knox  (2012)  or  Harris  (2014).  But  even  if  an  agreement
antedates  those  decisions,  the  union  was  able  to  protect
itself if an agency-fee provision was essential to the overall
bargain.  A  union’s  attorneys  undoubtedly  understand
that  if  one  provision  of  a  collective-bargaining  agreement
is  found  to  be  unlawful,  the  remaining  provisions  are
likely  to  remain  in  effect.    See  NLRB  v.  Rockaway  News
Supply Co., 345 U. S. 71, 76–79 (1953); see also 8 R. Lord,
Williston  on  Contracts  §19:70  (4th  ed.  2010).    Any  union
believing that an agency-fee provision was essential to its
bargain could have insisted on a provision giving it greater
protection.  The  agreement  in  the  present  case,  by  con
trast, provides expressly that the invalidation of any part
of  the  agreement  “shall  not  invalidate  the  remaining
portions,”  which  “shall  remain  in  full  force  and  effect.”
App.  328.  Such  severability  clauses  ensure  that  “entire
contracts”  are  not  “br[ought]  down”  by  today’s  ruling.
Post, at 23, n. 5 (KAGAN, J., dissenting).

In  short,  the  uncertain  status  of  Abood,  the  lack  of
clarity  it  provides,  the  short-term  nature  of  collective-
bargaining agreements, and the ability of unions to protect
themselves  if  an  agency-fee  provision  was  crucial  to  its
bargain  all  work  to  undermine  the  force  of  reliance  as  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding agency fees in public-sector unions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

25

Opinion of the Court

remanded for the lower court to conduct the predominance
analysis itself, explaining that “the use of an express racial
target”  was  just  one  factor  among  others  that  the  court
would have to consider as part of “[a] holistic analysis.”  Id.,
at  192.   JUSTICE  THOMAS  dissented in  relevant  part,  con-
tending  that  because  “the  legislature  sought  to  achieve  a
[black voting-age population] of at least 55%,” race neces-
sarily  predominated  in  its  decisionmaking.    Id.,  at  198
(opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).  But the
Court did not join in that view, and JUSTICE THOMAS again
dissents along the same lines today.
  The second flaw in the dissent’s proposed approach is its
inescapable  consequence:  Gingles  must  be  overruled.    Ac-
cording  to  the  dissent,  racial  predominance  plagues  every
single illustrative map ever adduced at the first step of Gin-
gles.  For all those maps were created with an express tar-
get  in  mind—they  were  created  to  show,  as  our  cases  re-
quire, that an additional majority-minority district could be
drawn.  That is the whole point of the enterprise.  The up-
shot of the approach the dissent urges is not to change how
Gingles is applied, but to reject its framework outright.
  The contention that mapmakers must be entirely “blind”
to race has no footing in our §2 case law.  The line that we
have  long  drawn  is  between  consciousness  and  predomi-
nance.  Plaintiffs adduced at least one illustrative map that
comported with our precedents.  They were required to do
no more to satisfy the first step of Gingles.

2
  The next condition Alabama would graft onto §2 is a re-
quirement that plaintiffs demonstrate, at the totality of cir-
cumstances  stage,  that  the  State’s  enacted  plan  contains
fewer  majority-minority  districts  than  the  race-neutral
benchmark.  Brief for Alabama 43.  If it does not, then §2
should drop out of the picture.  Id., at 44.
  Alabama argues that is what should have happened here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to voting rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

SEC v. JARKESY

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

actually injured or killed as a result of the [unsafe or un-
healthy  working]  condition”).    The  employer’s  failure  to
maintain  safe  and  healthy  working  conditions  violates
OSHA even if there is no actionable harm to an employee,
just as a misrepresentation to investors in connection with
the buying or selling of securities violates federal-securities
law even if there is no actual injury to the investors.

Moreover, both here and in Atlas Roofing, Congress em-
powered  the  Government  to  institute  administrative  en-
forcement proceedings to adjudicate potential violations of
federal law and impose civil penalties on a private party for
those violations, all while making the final agency decision
subject  to  judicial  review.  In  bringing  a  securities  claim,
the SEC seeks redress for a “violation” that “is committed
against the United States rather than an aggrieved individ-
ual,” which “is why, for example, a securities-enforcement
action may proceed even if victims do not support or are not
parties to the prosecution.”  Kokesh v. SEC, 581 U. S. 455,
463  (2017).    Put  differently,  the  SEC  seeks  to  “ ‘remedy
harm  to  the  public  at  large’ ”  for  violation  of  the  Govern-
ment’s  rights.  Ibid.    The  Government  likewise  seeks  to
remedy a public harm when it enforces OSHA’s prohibition
of unsafe working conditions.

Ultimately,  both  cases  arise  between  the  Government
and others in connection with the performance of the Gov-
ernment’s constitutional functions, and involve the Govern-
ment  acting  in  its  sovereign  capacity  to  bring  a  statutory
claim on behalf of the United States in order to vindicate
the public interest.  They both involve, as Atlas Roofing put
it, “new cause[s] of action, and remedies therefor, unknown
to the common law.”  430 U. S., at 461.  Neither Article III
nor  the  Seventh  Amendment  prohibits  Congress  from  as-
signing the enforcement of these new “Governmen[t] rights
to civil penalties” to non-Article III adjudicators, and thus
“supplying speedy and expert resolutions of the issues in-
volved.”  Id., at 450, 461.  In a world where precedent means
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into legal arguments regarding the enforcement of OSHA regulations and compares it to securities law enforcement by the SEC.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U45

[09-26-01 10:03:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 344 (2000)

345

Syllabus

the sole question here is whether they “are applicable” to all warn-
ing devices actually installed with federal funds. Easterwood answers
this question as well, because it held that the requirements in (b)(3)
and (4) are mandatory for all such devices.
Id., at 666. They estab-
lish a standard of adequacy that determines the type of warning device
to be installed when federal funds participate in the crossing im-
provement project. Once the FHWA has approved and funded the
improvement and the devices are installed and operating, the regu-
lation displaces state and private decisionmaking authority with a
federal-law requirement.
Importantly, this is precisely the interpre-
tation of §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) that the FHWA endorsed in Easter-
wood. The Government’s position here—that (b)(3) and (4) only apply
where the warning devices have been selected based on diagnostic
studies and particularized analyses of a crossing’s conditions—is not
entitled to deference, because it contradicts the regulation’s plain text
as well as the FHWA’s own previous construction that the Court
adopted as authoritative in Easterwood. Respondent’s argument that
pre-emption does not apply here because this crossing presented sev-
eral (b)(3) factors, and because the TDOT did not install pavement
markings required by the FHWA’s Manual on Uniform Trafﬁc Control
Devices, misconceives how pre-emption operates under these circum-
stances.
If they are applicable, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) establish a fed-
eral standard for adequacy that displaces state tort law addressing the
same subject. Whether the State should have originally installed dif-
ferent or additional devices, or whether conditions at the crossing have
since changed such that different devices would be appropriate, is im-
material. Nothing prevents a State from revisiting the adequacy of
devices installed using federal funds, or from installing more protec-
tive devices at such crossings with their own funds or additional FHWA
funding, but the State cannot hold the railroad responsible for the ade-
quacy of those devices. Pp. 352–359.

173 F. 3d 386, reversed and remanded.

O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Breyer, J., ﬁled a concurring opinion, post, p. 359. Ginsburg, J., ﬁled a
dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 360.

Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were G. Paul Moates, Stephen B. Kinnaird,
Everett B. Gibson, and Wiley G. Mitchell, Jr.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the syllabus and the beginning of the opinion. It contains legal citations, case names, and a summary of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>