<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

FDA v. ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE

Opinion of the Court

2
In addition to alleging conscience injuries, the doctors cite
various  monetary  and  related  injuries  that  they  allegedly
will  suffer  as  a  result  of  FDA’s  actions—in  particular,
diverting  resources  and  time  from  other  patients  to  treat
patients with mifepristone complications; increasing risk of
liability suits from treating those patients; and potentially
increasing insurance costs.

Those  standing  allegations  suffer  from  the  same
problem—a  lack  of  causation.    The  causal  link  between
FDA’s  regulatory  actions  and  those  alleged  injuries  is  too
speculative  or  otherwise  too  attenuated  to  establish
standing.

To begin with, the claim that the doctors will incur those
injuries  as  a  result  of  FDA’s  2016  and  2021  relaxed
regulations lacks record support and is highly speculative.
The  doctors  have  not  offered  evidence  tending  to  suggest
that  FDA’s  deregulatory  actions  have  both  caused  an
increase  in  the  number  of  pregnant  women  seeking
treatment from the plaintiff doctors and caused a resulting
diversion  of  the  doctors’  time  and  resources  from  other
patients.  Moreover,  the  doctors  have  not  identified  any
instances in the past where they have been sued or required
to  pay  higher  insurance  costs  because  they  have  treated
pregnant women suffering mifepristone complications.  Nor
have  the  plaintiffs  offered  any  persuasive  evidence  or
reason to believe that the future will be different.

In any event, and perhaps more to the point, the law has
never  permitted  doctors  to  challenge  the  government’s
loosening  of  general  public  safety  requirements  simply
because more individuals might then show up at emergency
rooms or in doctors’ offices with follow-on injuries.  Stated
otherwise,  there  is  no  Article  III  doctrine  of  “doctor
standing”  that  allows  doctors  to  challenge  general

——————
175 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 739 (1972).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the standing of doctors to challenge FDA regulations. It delves into the legal arguments regarding causation and the scope of "doctor standing."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

21

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

longstanding,  traditional  category  of  state  tort  law,  but
rather,  that  Congress  intended  to  leave  the  status  quo
alone  (except,  of  course,  with  respect  to  those  aspects  of
state  tort  law  that  the  Act  expressly  altered).    See  1987
Report  691  (“It  is  not  the  Committee’s  intention  to  pre-
clude  court  actions  under  applicable  law.    The  Commit-
tee’s intent at the time of considering the Act . . . was . . .
to  leave  otherwise  applicable  law  unaffected,  except  as
expressly altered by the Act”).

The  majority  also  suggests  that  Congress  necessarily
intended to pre-empt design defect claims since the aim of
such tort suits is to promote the development of improved
designs and provide compensation for injured individuals,
and  the  Vaccine  Act  “provides  other  means  for  achieving
both  effects”—most  notably  through  the  no-fault  compen-
sation program and the National Vaccine Program.  Ante,
at 14, and nn. 57–60 (citing 42 U. S. C. §§300aa–1, 300aa–
2(a)(1)–(3),  300aa–3,  300aa–25(b),  300aa–27(a)(1)).    But
the  majority’s  position  elides  a  significant  difference  be-
tween  state  tort  law  and  the  federal  regulatory  scheme.
Although the Vaccine Act charges the Secretary of Health
and  Human  Services  with  the  obligation  to  “promote  the
development  of  childhood  vaccines”  and  “make  or  assure
improvements in . . .  vaccines, and research on vaccines,”
§300aa–27(a),  neither  the  Act  nor  any  other  provision  of
federal  law  places  a  legal  duty  on  vaccine  manufacturers
to  improve  the  design  of  their  vaccines  to  account  for
scientific  and  technological  advances.    Indeed,  the  FDA
does  not  condition  approval  of  a  vaccine  on  it  being  the
most  optimally  designed  among  reasonably  available
alternatives,  nor  does  it  (or  any  other  federal  entity)  en-
sure  that  licensed  vaccines  keep  pace  with  technological
and scientific advances.19  Rather, the function of ensuring

——————

19 See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 863 F. 2d 1173, 1177 (CA5 1988)
(“[T]he  FDA  is  a  passive  agency:  it  considers  whether  to  approve
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1065

Page

1152

Haws; Wilson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887

Hawthorne v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Hawthorne v. Caruso  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925

Hayden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Hayes v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936

Hayes v. Conway  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hayes v. Garcia
891

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hayes v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  811,975,1157

1123

Haygood v. Tilley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1062

Hayman v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
850

Haymond v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Haynes v. Blacketter
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Haynes; Hairston v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haynes v. Thaler
1002

Haynes v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haywood v. Bedatsky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

Haywood v. Tribeca Lending Corp.
1013

Hazelwood v. North Carolina  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

Hazlewood; Thomas Kinkade Co., LLC v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

HCA Health Services of Okla., Inc. v. Shinn
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878

HCA, Inc. v. Aon Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1129

Heald v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945

Health Care Service Corp. v. Pollitt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Hearne v. Davis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Hearns v. New Hampshire State Prison  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hearod v. Ollison
884

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Heartland Educational Consortium; Monacelli v.  . . . . .  897,1030,1066,1141

837

Heath v. Thaler
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
849

Heath v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

Hecke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Hecker v. Deere & Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Hedgpeth; Rodgers v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hefﬁngton v. Bush  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Heimermann v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  992,1139

995

Heinemann; Abraham v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Heinemann v. Wilson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
881

Helgerson v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

Helton v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967

Hemi Group, LLC v. New York City
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965

Hempstead; Luo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Henderson; Gaber v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Henderson v. Hernandez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Henderson v. Liggin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  830,918,934

Henderson v. United States
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

THOMAS, J., concurring

man who kidnaped, beat, raped, and murdered a 21-year-
old  pregnant  newlywed,  Karol  Hurst,  also  murdering  her
unborn  child,  and  then,  on  the  same  day,  murdered  a
sheriff ’s deputy acting in the line of duty.  Hall v. Florida,
572  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2014)  (slip  op.,  at  1).  And  in  Atkins
itself,  the  Court  granted  relief  to  a  man  who  carjacked
Eric Michael Nesbitt, forced him to withdraw money from
a  bank,  drove  him  to  a  secluded  area,  and  then  shot  him
multiple  times  before  leaving  him  to  bleed  to  death.    At-
kins v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 166–167, 510 S. E. 2d
445, 449–450 (1999).

The  Court  has  also  misinterpreted  the  Eighth  Amend-
ment to grant relief in egregious cases involving rape.  In
Kennedy  v.  Louisiana,  554  U. S.  407  (2008),  the  Court
granted  relief  to  a  man  who  had  been  sentenced  to  death
for  raping  his  8-year-old  stepdaughter.    The  rape  was  so
violent  that  it  “separated  her  cervix  from  the  back  of  her
vagina,  causing  her  rectum  to  protrude  into  the  vaginal
structure,”  and  tore  her  “entire  perineum  . . .  from  the
posterior  fourchette  to  the  anus.”    Id.,  at  414.  The  evi-
dence indicated that  the petitioner spent at least an hour
and  half  attempting  to  destroy  the  evidence  of  his  crime
before  seeking  emergency  assistance,  even  as  his  step-
daughter  bled  profusely  from  her  injuries.  Id.,  at  415.
And  in  Coker  v.  Georgia,  433  U. S.  584  (1977)  (plurality
opinion), the Court granted relief to a petitioner who had
escaped  from  prison,  broken  into  the  home  of  a  young
married couple and their newborn, forced the wife to bind
her  husband,  gagged  her  husband  with  her  underwear,
raped  her  (even  after  being  told  that  she  was  recovering
from  a  recent  childbirth),  and  then  kidnaped  her  after
threatening  her  husband,  Coker  v.  State,  234  Ga.  555,
556–557, 216 S. E. 2d 782, 786–787 (1975).  In each case,
the  Court  crafted  an  Eighth  Amendment  right  to  be  free
from execution for the  crime of rape—whether it be of an
adult, Coker, 433 U. S., at 592, or a child, Kennedy, supra,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses past cases where the Court granted relief based on the Eighth Amendment, focusing on cases involving rape and murder.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

BARRETT, J., concurring in part

connection  to  the  charged  offense.    And  if  the  evidence
comes in, the trial court can instruct the jury to consider it
only  for  lawful  purposes.  See  Richardson  v.  Marsh,  481
U. S. 200, 206–207 (1987).  I see no need to depart from that
familiar and time-tested procedure here.

*

*

*
The Constitution does not insulate Presidents from crim-
inal liability for official acts.  But any statute regulating the
exercise  of  executive  power  is  subject  to  a  constitutional
challenge.  See, e.g., Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. 220, 235–
236  (2021);  Zivotofsky  v.  Clinton,  566  U. S.  189,  192–194
(2012); Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 487–488 (2010).  A criminal
statute is no exception.  Thus, a President facing prosecu-
tion may challenge the constitutionality of a criminal stat-
ute as applied to official acts alleged in the indictment.  If
that challenge fails, however, he must stand trial.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Barrett. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

9

Opinion of the Court

http://azredistricting.org/Maps/Final-Maps/default.asp  (all
Internet materials as visited June 25, 2015, and included
in Clerk of Court’s case file).  Less than four months later,
on  June  6,  2012,  the  Arizona  Legislature  filed  suit  in  the
United  States  District  Court  for  the  District  of  Arizona,
naming as defendants the AIRC, its five members, and the
Arizona Secretary of State.  The Legislature sought both a
declaration  that  Proposition  106  and  congressional  maps
adopted by the AIRC are unconstitutional, and, as affirm
ative  relief,  an  injunction  against  use  of  AIRC  maps  for
any congressional election after the 2012 general election.
A  three-judge  District  Court,  convened  pursuant  to  28
U. S. C.  §2284(a),  unanimously  denied  a  motion  by  the
AIRC to dismiss the suit for lack of standing.  The Arizona
Legislature, the court determined, had “demonstrated that
its  loss  of  redistricting  power  constitute[d]  a  [sufficiently]
concrete  injury.”    997  F. Supp.  2d  1047,  1050  (2014).    On
the merits, dividing two to one, the District Court granted
the  AIRC’s  motion  to  dismiss  the  complaint  for  failure  to
state  a  claim.  Decisions  of  this  Court,  the  majority  con
cluded,  “demonstrate  that  the  word  ‘Legislature’  in  the
Elections  Clause  refers  to  the  legislative  process  used  in
[a] state, determined by that state’s own constitution and
laws.”  Id., at 1054.  As the “lawmaking power” in Arizona
“plainly  includes  the  power  to  enact  laws  through  initia
tive,”  the  District  Court  held,  the  “Elections  Clause  per
mits  [Arizona’s]  establishment  and  use”  of  the  Commis
sion.  Id.,  at  1056.    Judge  Rosenblatt  dissented  in  part.
Proposition  106,  in  his  view,  unconstitutionally  denied
“the  Legislature”  of  Arizona  the  “ability  to  have  any  out
come-defining  effect  on  the  congressional  redistricting
process.”  Id., at 1058.

We postponed jurisdiction, and now affirm.

II
We  turn  first  to  the  threshold  question:  Does  the  Ari
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and a summary of the lower court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION

Opinion of the Court

In the Tribe’s view, the 1868 treaty imposed a duty on the
United States to take affirmative steps to secure water for
the Navajos.  With respect, the Tribe is incorrect.  The 1868
treaty “set apart” a reservation for the “use and occupation
of  the  Navajo  tribe.”  15  Stat.  668.    But  it  contained  no
“rights-creating or duty-imposing” language that imposed a
duty  on  the  United  States  to  take  affirmative  steps  to
secure  water  for  the  Tribe.    Navajo  Nation,  537  U. S.,  at
506.

Notably, the 1868 treaty did impose a number of specific
duties on the United States.  Cf. Jicarilla, 564 U. S., at 184–
185.  For example, the treaty required the United States to
construct  a  number  of  buildings  on  the  reservation,
including  schools,  a  chapel,  a  carpenter  shop,  and  a
blacksmith  shop.  15  Stat.  668–669.  The  treaty  also
mandated that the United States provide teachers for the
Navajos’ schools for at least 10 years, and to provide articles
of clothing or other goods to the Navajos.  Id., at 669.  And
the treaty required the United States to supply seeds and
agricultural implements for up to three years.  Ibid.

But  the  treaty  said  nothing  about  any  affirmative  duty
for the United States to secure water.  And as this Court
has  stated,  “Indian  treaties  cannot  be  rewritten  or

——————
apply  only  in  the  context  of  claims  seeking  damages  from  the  United
States  pursuant  to  the  Tucker  Act  and  Indian  Tucker  Act.    See  28
U. S. C. §§1491, 1505; see also Brief for Navajo Nation 29.  But Jicarilla’s
framework  for  determining  the  trust  obligations  of  the  United  States
applies to any claim seeking to impose trust duties on the United States,
including  claims  seeking  equitable  relief.    That  is  because  Jicarilla’s
reasoning  rests  upon  separation  of  powers  principles—not  on  the
particulars of the Tucker Acts.  As Jicarilla explains, the United States
is a sovereign, not a private trustee, and therefore the trust obligations
of the United States to the Indian tribes are established and governed by
treaty, statute, or regulation, rather than by the common law of trusts.
See 564 U. S., at 165, 177.  Stated otherwise, the trust obligations of the
United States to the Indian tribes are established by Congress and the
Executive, not created by the Judiciary.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a section of legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the interpretation of a treaty and the obligations of the United States to the Navajo Nation regarding water rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

PETER v. NANTKWEST, INC.

Syllabus

that do not limit attorney’s fees awards to prevailing parties.  See, e.g.,
id., at 254.  The presumption against fee shifting is particularly im-
portant here because reading §145 to permit an unsuccessful govern-
ment agency to recover attorney’s fees from a prevailing party “would
be  a  radical  departure  from  longstanding  fee-shifting  principles  ad-
hered to in a wide range of contexts.”  Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463
U. S. 680, 683.  Pp. 3–6.

(b) Section 145’s plain text does not overcome the American Rule’s
presumption against fee shifting.  Definitions of “expenses,” while ca-
pacious enough to include attorney’s fees, provide scant guidance.  The
mere failure to foreclose a fee award “neither specifically nor explicitly
authorizes courts to shift [fees].”  Baker Botts L. L. P. v. ASARCO LLC,
576 U. S. 121, ___.  The complete phrase “expenses of the proceeding”
would not have been commonly understood to include attorney’s fees
at  the  time  §145  was  enacted.    Finally,  the  modifier  “all”  does  not
transform  “expenses”  to  reach  an  outlay  it  would  not  otherwise  in-
clude.

In  common  statutory  usage,  the  term  “expenses”  alone  has  never
been considered to authorize an award of attorney’s fees with sufficient
clarity to overcome the American Rule presumption.  The appearance
of “expenses” and “attorney’s fees” together across various statutes in-
dicates that Congress understands the terms to be distinct and not in-
clusive of each other.  See, e.g., 11 U. S. C. §363(n).  Other statutes that
refer  to  attorney’s  fees  as  a  subset  of  expenses  show  only  that  “ex-
penses”  can  include  attorney’s  fees  when  so  defined.  See,  e.g.,  28
U. S. C. §361.  Nor do this Court’s cases further the Government’s po-
sition  that  the  Court  has  used  “expenses”  to  mean  “attorney’s  fees.”
See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 573.

The Patent Act’s history reinforces that Congress did not intend to
shift attorney’s fees in §145 actions.  There is no evidence that the orig-
inal Patent Office ever paid its personnel from sums collected from ad-
verse  parties.    Neither  has  the  PTO,  until  this  litigation,  sought  its
attorney’s  fees  under  §145.  When  Congress  intended  to  provide  for
attorney’s fees in the Patent Act, it has stated so explicitly.  See, e.g.,
35 U. S. C. §285.  Pp. 6–10.

898 F. 3d 1177, affirmed.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the book and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

19

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Ignoring  all  this,  the  majority  empowers  the  President
to  hide  behind  an  administrative  review  process  that  the
Government refuses to disclose to the public.  See IRAP II,
883  F. 3d,  at  268  (“[T]he  Government  chose  not  to  make
the  review  publicly  available”  even  in  redacted  form);
IRAP v. Trump, No. 17–2231 (CA4), Doc. 126 (Letter from
S.  Swingle,  Counsel  for  Defendants-Appellants,  to  P.
Connor,  Clerk  of  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for
the  Fourth  Circuit  (Nov.  24,  2017))  (resisting  Fourth
Circuit’s  request  that  the  Government  supplement  the
record  with  the  reports  referenced  in  the  Proclamation).
Furthermore, evidence of which we can take judicial notice
indicates  that  the  multiagency  review  process  could  not
have  been  very  thorough.    Ongoing  litigation  under  the
Freedom  of  Information  Act  shows  that  the  September
2017  report  the  Government  produced  after  its  review
process  was  a  mere  17  pages.    See  Brennan  Center  for
Justice  v.  United States  Dept.  of  State,  No.  17–cv–7520
(SDNY),  Doc.  No.  31–1,  pp.  2–3.   That  the  Government’s
analysis  of  the  vetting  practices  of  hundreds  of  countries
boiled down to such a short document raises serious ques
tions  about  the  legitimacy  of  the  President’s  proclaimed
national-security rationale.

Beyond  that,  Congress  has  already  addressed  the
national-security  concerns  supposedly  undergirding  the
Proclamation  through  an  “extensive  and  complex”  frame
work  governing  “immigration  and  alien  status.”    Arizona
v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 395 (2012).7  The Immigra

——————

7 It  is  important  to  note,  particularly  given  the  nature  of  this  case,
that  many  consider  “using  the  term  ‘alien’  to  refer  to  other  human
beings”  to  be  “offensive  and  demeaning.”    Flores  v.  United States
Citizenship  &  Immigration  Servs.,  718  F.  3d  548,  551–552,  n. 1  (CA6
2013).  I use the term here only where necessary “to be consistent with
the  statutory  language”  that  Congress  has  chosen  and  “to  avoid  any
confusion  in  replacing  a  legal  term  of  art  with  a  more  appropriate
term.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision and cites legal precedents and evidence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
236

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

on  the  BIA  by  regulation  would  ignore  Congress’  design  to  retain  for
itself control over federal-court jurisdiction.  The Seventh Circuit’s con
struction  would  free  the  Executive  to  shelter  its  own  decisions  from
abuse-of-discretion  appellate  court  review  simply  by  issuing  a  regula
tion  declaring  those  decisions  “discretionary.”  Such  an  extraordinary
delegation  of  authority  cannot  be  extracted  from  the  statute  Congress
enacted.  Pp. 251–252.

533 F. 3d 534, reversed and remanded.

Ginsburg,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  Roberts,
C.  J.,  and  Stevens,  Scalia,  Kennedy,  Thomas,  Breyer,  and  Soto-
mayor, JJ., joined.  Alito, J., ﬁled an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p. 253.

Rick  M.  Schoenﬁeld  argued  the  cause  for  petitioner.
With  him  on  the  briefs  were  Michael  R.  Lang,  Elaine  J.
Goldenberg, and Lindsay C. Harrison.

Nicole  A.  Saharsky  argued  the  cause  for  respondent  in
support of petitioner.  With her on the briefs were Solicitor
General  Kagan,  Assistant  Attorney  General  West,  Deputy
Solicitor  General  Kneedler,  Deputy  Assistant  Attorney
General Osuna, Donald E. Keener, Jennifer P. Levings, and
Melissa Neiman-Kelting.

Amanda  C.  Leiter,  by  invitation  of  the  Court,  557  U. S.
951,  argued  the  cause  and  ﬁled  a  brief  as  amicus  curiae  in
support  of  the  judgment  below.  With  her  on  the  brief  was
RonNell Andersen Jones.*

Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner  Agron  Kucana  moved  to  reopen  his  removal
proceedings,  asserting  new  evidence  in  support  of  his  plea

*Briefs  of  amici  curiae  urging  reversal  were  ﬁled  for  the  American
Civil Liberties Union by Lee Gelernt, Steven R. Shapiro, and Lucas Gut
tentag; for Law Professors by Anne Harkavy, Catherine M. A. Carroll, and
Stephen I. Vladeck, pro se; and for the National Immigrant Justice Center
et al. by Jeffrey T. Green, Quin M. Sorenson, and Charles Roth.

Daniel  J.  Popeo  and  Richard  A. Samp  ﬁled  a  brief  for  the  Washington

Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging afﬁrmance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes case citations, the names of justices, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xlvii

Page

Edwards v. Rozum  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

Edwards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  867,895,960

816

Edwardsville; Cheek v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Efﬂer v. Iowa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Eghbal v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Eichwedel v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Eisenhauer v. Texas Dept. of Transportation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Eitel; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Ejikeme v. Violet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Elasali v. Mayer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
829

Elashi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
993

Eldridge v. Thaler
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
895

El Farra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

E. L. G. v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

Elgindy v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137

El-Hage v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

El-Hewie v. Bergen County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1105

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Eline v. Lara
Elizares v. Thomas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1141

1091

Ellenberg v. New Mexico Military Institute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937

Elliman, LLC; Legeno v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037

Elliott v. Kelly  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Elliott v. United States
Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

Ellis v. Mississippi Dept. of Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116

Ellis v. Shearin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000

Ellis v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  873,1002

958

Elmardoudi v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Elmore v. Ohio  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Eman v. Holder
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

Embry v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

Emergency Rooms, P. S.; Luke v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

Emerson v. Couvillion
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099

Emmanuel v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Endencia v. ADT Security Services, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Eng; Cooley v.
1148

English-Speaking Union v. Johnson
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Eniex; Kares v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ennis v. McDaniel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Ennis Independent School Dist.; Van Myers v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  912,1140

1027

Enriquez v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Ensey v. Oklahoma  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

Enterprise Leasing Co.; Monacelli v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Entler v. Washington  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

Opinion of the Court

or Congressional enactment each state ha[s] a right to ex-
ercise  jurisdiction  over  Indian  reservations  within  its
boundaries.”  New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496,
499 (1946).

In 1992:  “This Court’s more recent cases have recognized
the rights of States, absent a congressional prohibition, to
exercise  criminal  (and,  implicitly,  civil)  jurisdiction  over
non-Indians  located  on  reservation  lands.”  County  of  Ya-
kima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation,
502 U. S. 251, 257–258 (1992).

And as recently as 2001:  “State sovereignty does not end
at a reservation’s border.”  Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U. S. 353,
361 (2001).

In  accord  with  that  overarching  jurisdictional  principle
dating back to the 1800s, States have jurisdiction to prose-
cute crimes committed in Indian country unless preempted.
In the leading case in the criminal context—the McBratney
case from 1882—this Court held that States have jurisdic-
tion to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against
non-Indians in Indian country.  United States v. McBratney,
104 U. S. 621, 623–624 (1882).  The Court stated that Colo-
rado had “criminal jurisdiction” over crimes by non-Indians
against non-Indians “throughout the whole of the territory
within  its  limits,  including  the  Ute  Reservation.”    Id.,  at
624.  Several years later, the Court similarly decided that
Montana had criminal jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indi-
ans  against  non-Indians  in  Indian  country  within  that
State.  Draper  v.  United  States,  164  U. S.  240,  244–247
(1896).  The McBratney principle remains good law.

In  short,  the  Court’s  precedents  establish  that  Indian
country  is  part  of  a  State’s  territory  and  that,  unless
preempted, States have jurisdiction over crimes committed
in Indian country.

III
The  central  question  that  we  must  decide,  therefore,  is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It cites previous cases and establishes legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

legislation.”  Id., at 693 (emphasis deleted).

Justice  Brewer—widely  recognized  as  “a

leading
spokesman for ‘substantized’ due process,” Gamer, Justice
Brewer  and  Substantive  Due  Process:  A  Conservative
Court  Revisited,  18  Vand.  L. Rev.  615,  627  (1965)—
employed similar reasoning while riding circuit, though he
did  not  identify  the  constitutional  source  of  judicial  au-
thority  to  nullify  vague  laws.  In  reviewing  an  Iowa  law
authorizing fines against railroads for charging more than
a “reasonable and just” rate, Justice Brewer mentioned in
dictum  that  “no  penal  law  can  be  sustained  unless  its
mandates  are  so  clearly  expressed  that  any  ordinary
person  can  determine  in  advance  what  he  may  and  what
he  may  not  do  under  it.”  Chicago  &  N. W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dey,
35 F. 866, 876 (CC SD Iowa 1888).

Constitutional  vagueness  challenges  in  this  Court  ini-
tially  met  with  some  resistance.  Although  the  Court
appeared to acknowledge the possibility of unconstitution-
ally  indefinite  enactments,  it  repeatedly  rejected  vague-
ness  challenges  to  penal  laws  addressing  railroad  rates,
Railroad  Comm’n  Cases,  116  U. S.  307,  336–337  (1886),
liquor  sales,  Ohio  ex rel.  Lloyd  v.  Dollison,  194  U. S.  445,
450–451  (1904),  and  anticompetitive  conduct,  Nash  v.
United  States,  229  U. S.  373,  376–378  (1913);  Waters-
Pierce  Oil  Co.  v.  Texas  (No.  1),  212  U. S.  86,  108–111
(1909).

In  1914,  however,  the  Court  nullified  a  law  on  vague-
ness  grounds  under  the  Due  Process  Clause  for  the  first
time.  In  International  Harvester  Co.  of  America  v.  Ken-
tucky,  234  U. S.  216  (1914),  a  tobacco  company  brought  a
Fourteenth  Amendment  challenge  against  several  Ken-
tucky  antitrust  laws  that  had  been  construed  to  render
unlawful  “any  combination  [made]  . . .  for  the  purpose  or
with  the  effect  of  fixing  a  price  that  was  greater  or  less
than  the  real  value  of  the  article,”  id.,  at  221.    The  com-
pany argued that by referring to “real value,” the laws pro-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It discusses the history of vagueness challenges in constitutional law, citing previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 45 (2009)

49

Per Curiam

Even  a  casual  review  of  Brigham  City  reveals  the  ﬂaw
in  this  reasoning.  Ofﬁcers  do  not  need  ironclad  proof  of
“a likely serious, life-threatening” injury to invoke the emer
gency  aid  exception.  The  only  injury  police  could  conﬁrm
in  Brigham  City  was  the  bloody  lip  they  saw  the  juvenile
inﬂict  upon  the  adult.  Fisher  argues  that  the  ofﬁcers  here
could  not  have  been  motivated  by  a  perceived  need  to  pro
vide  medical  assistance,  since  they  never  summoned  emer
gency  medical  personnel.  This  would  have  no  bearing,  of
course, upon their need to ensure that Fisher was not endan
gering  someone  else  in  the  house.  Moreover,  even  if  the
failure to summon medical personnel conclusively established
that  Goolsby  did  not  subjectively  believe,  when  he  entered
the house, that Fisher or someone else was seriously injured
(which  is  doubtful),  the  test,  as  we  have  said,  is  not  what
Goolsby believed, but whether there was “an objectively rea
sonable  basis  for  believing”  that  medical  assistance  was
needed, or persons were in danger, Brigham City, supra, at
406; Mincey, supra, at 392.

It was error for the Michigan Court of Appeals to replace
that objective inquiry into appearances with its hindsight de
termination  that  there  was  in  fact  no  emergency.  It  does
not  meet  the  needs  of  law  enforcement  or  the  demands  of
public safety to require ofﬁcers to walk away from a situation
like the one they encountered here.  Only when an apparent
threat has become an actual harm can ofﬁcers rule out innoc
uous  explanations  for  ominous  circumstances.  But  “[t]he
role  of  a  peace  ofﬁcer  includes  preventing  violence  and  re
storing  order,  not  simply  rendering  ﬁrst  aid  to  casualties.”
Brigham City, supra, at 406.  It sufﬁced to invoke the emer
gency  aid  exception  that  it  was  reasonable  to  believe  that
Fisher had hurt himself (albeit nonfatally) and needed treat
ment  that  in  his  rage  he  was  unable  to  provide,  or  that
Fisher was about to hurt, or had already hurt, someone else.
The Michigan Court of Appeals required more than what the
Fourth Amendment demands.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court decision. It discusses the legal precedent set by the case of Brigham City and applies it to the current case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xli

Page

Davis v. Eitel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Davis v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  952,1093

879

Davis v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Davis; Hardison v.
1029

Davis v. Harmon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Davis; Hearne v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Davis v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Davis v. Kansas State Bd. of Indigent Defense Services
1129

. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  998,1140

Davis v. Knowles
903

Davis v. Laﬂer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Davis v. McNeil
878

Davis; Michigan v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Davis; Mottram v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852

Davis v. New Bern  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
846

Davis v. North Carolina  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Davis v. Oregon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
886

Davis; Peoples v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Davis; Rice v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
966

Davis v. Smith  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Davis; Stanko v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Davis; Sumner v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Davis v. Tarrant County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

961

Davis v. Tennessee  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Davis v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  839,1064

832

Davis v. Third Judicial District Court of Nev., Lyon County
. . . .
Davis v. Tilzer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
992

Davis v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
867,

881,887,905,917,920,922,927,948,970,1057,1129,1134

Davis v. Vanderville  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  954,1086

920

Dawson v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Day v. Trybulski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

DBC v. Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce, Bd. of Patent Appeals . . . .
822

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. C. Chapman Ventures, Inc.; Hopkins v.
1155

DC Comics; Restituto Embuscado v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deakins v. California
972

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dean v. Blaisdell  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  953,1102

911

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dean v. Tennessee
959

Dean v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939

DeAngelo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811

Deaton; Rhine v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
977

DeBerry v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Debose v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
975

Deckard v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931

Declouet v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MILLER v. ALABAMA

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Brief );  Brief  for  Respondent  in  No.  10–9646,  p.  30  (Ala-
bama  Brief ).  The  Court  accepts  that  over  2,000  of  those
prisoners received that sentence because it was mandated
by  a  legislature.    Ante,  at  22,  n. 10.    And  it  recognizes
that the Federal Government and most States impose such
mandatory sentences.  Ante, at 19–20.  Put simply, if a 17-
year-old is convicted of deliberately murdering an innocent
victim,  it  is  not  “unusual”  for  the  murderer  to  receive  a
mandatory  sentence  of  life  without  parole.  That  reality
should preclude finding that mandatory life imprisonment
for juvenile killers violates the Eighth Amendment.

Our  precedent  supports  this  conclusion.    When  deter-
mining  whether  a  punishment  is  cruel  and  unusual,  this
Court  typically  begins  with  “ ‘objective  indicia  of  society’s
standards,  as  expressed  in  legislative  enactments  and
state  practice.’ ”    Graham  v.  Florida,  560  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2010) (slip op., at 10); see also, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana,
554  U. S.  407,  422  (2008);  Roper  v.  Simmons,  543
U. S. 551, 564 (2005).  We look to these “objective indicia” to
ensure that we are not simply following our own subjective
values  or  beliefs.  Gregg  v.  Georgia,  428  U. S.  153,  173
(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
Such tangible evidence of societal standards enables us to
determine whether there is a “consensus against” a given
sentencing  practice.  Graham,  supra,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at
10).  If there is, the punishment may be regarded as “un-
usual.”  But  when,  as  here,  most  States  formally  require
and  frequently  impose  the  punishment  in  question,  there
is no objective basis for that conclusion.

Our  Eighth  Amendment  cases  have  also  said  that  we
should take guidance from “evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”  Ante, at 6
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 102 (1976); inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Mercy  toward  the  guilty
can  be  a  form  of  decency,  and  a  maturing  society  may
abandon  harsh  punishments  that  it  comes  to  view  as
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's stance on mandatory life imprisonment for juvenile killers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

309,  798  N. E. 2d  941.    Nor  is  the  right  to  same-sex
marriage  deeply  rooted  in  the  traditions  of  other  na-
tions.  No country allowed same-sex couples to marry
until the Netherlands did so in 2000.

“What  [those  arguing  in  favor  of  a  constitutional
right to same sex marriage] seek, therefore, is not the
protection of a deeply rooted right but the recognition
of a very new right, and they seek this innovation not
from a legislative body elected by the people, but from
unelected  judges.  Faced  with  such  a  request,  judges
have cause for both caution and humility.”  Id., at ___
(slip op., at 7–8) (footnote omitted).

For today’s majority, it does not matter that the right to
same-sex  marriage  lacks  deep  roots  or  even  that  it  is
contrary to long-established tradition.  The Justices in the
majority  claim  the  authority  to  confer  constitutional  pro-
tection upon that right simply because they believe that it
is fundamental.

II
Attempting to circumvent the problem presented by the
newness  of  the  right  found  in  these  cases,  the  majority
claims  that  the  issue  is  the  right  to  equal  treatment.
Noting that marriage is a fundamental right, the majority
argues  that  a  State  has  no  valid  reason  for  denying  that
right  to  same-sex  couples.  This  reasoning  is  dependent
upon  a  particular  understanding  of  the  purpose  of  civil
marriage.    Although  the  Court  expresses  the  point  in
loftier  terms,  its  argument  is  that  the  fundamental  pur-
pose of marriage is to promote the well-being of those who
choose to marry.  Marriage provides emotional fulfillment
and the promise of support in times of need.  And by bene-
fiting  persons  who  choose  to  wed,  marriage  indirectly
benefits  society  because  persons  who  live  in  stable,  ful-
filling,  and  supportive  relationships  make  better  citizens.
It  is  for  these  reasons,  the  argument  goes,  that  States
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding same-sex marriage and the interpretation of constitutional rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

liii

Page

Florida; Murray v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Florida; Parker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969

Florida; Perritte v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
851

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Peterson v.
885

Florida v. Powell
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1010

Florida; Reed v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

Florida; Robinson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

Florida; Rothery v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

Florida; Sanders v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Florida; Scott v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Florida; Sengvong v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Florida; Setts v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

Florida; Simpson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

Florida; Small v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

Florida; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Florida; Theiss v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

Florida; Tucker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

Florida; Vathis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Florida; Wheeler v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
866

Florida Assn. of Prof. Lobbyists v. Div. of Legis. Servs. of Fla.  . .
880

Florida Bar; Sibley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943

Florida Bar Bd. of Governors; Liberty Counsel v.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
948

824

Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation; Finstad v.
1121

Florida Dept. of Corrections; Crutchﬁeld v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida Dept. of Env. Prot.; Stop the Beach Renourishment v.  . .  810,968

1155

Florida Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles; White v.  . .
876

Florida Dept. of Juvenile Justice; Singleton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1109

Florida Power & Light Co.; Muino v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Flowers v. McNeil
998

Flowers v. Phelps  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Floyd v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  891,1102

Floyd; Wise v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1033,1141

1134

Flucker v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910

Fluellen v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Flynn v. Kansas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Flynn v. Yara  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Fobbs v. Potter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

Folino; Baines v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
885

Fontenot v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fonville v. United States
814

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foose, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1023

Ford v. Christiana Care Health Systems
865

Ford; Morgan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Ford v. Polk  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 19–267 and 19–348
_________________

19–267

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL, PETITIONER
v.
AGNES MORRISSEY-BERRU

19–348

ST. JAMES SCHOOL, PETITIONER
v.
DARRYL BIEL, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF KRISTEN BIEL

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[July 8, 2020]

 JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG

joins, dissenting.

Two  employers  fired  their  employees  allegedly  because
one had breast cancer and the other was elderly.  Purport-
ing to rely on this Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171
(2012), the majority shields those employers from disability
and age-discrimination claims.  In the Court’s view, because
the employees taught short religion modules at Catholic el-
ementary  schools,  they  were  “ministers”  of  the  Catholic
faith and thus could be fired for any reason, whether reli-
gious  or  nonreligious, benign  or  bigoted,  without  legal  re-
course.  The  Court  reaches  this  result  even  though  the
teachers taught primarily secular subjects, lacked substan-
tial religious titles and training, and were not even required
to be Catholic.  In foreclosing the teachers’ claims, the Court
skews the facts, ignores the applicable standard of review,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court dissenting opinion. It includes case citations, the names of the justices, and a summary of the case and the dissent's argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

“injury in fact.”  And it consequently does not show stand-
ing.  Hollingsworth, supra, at 706; see also Lance v. Coff-
man, 549 U. S. 437, 439–441 (2007) (per curiam) (describing
this Court’s “lengthy pedigree” in refusing to serve as a fo-
rum for generalized grievances).

In other words, a plaintiff cannot establish standing by
asserting an abstract “general interest common to all mem-
bers of the public,” id., at 440, “no matter how sincere” or
“deeply committed” a plaintiff is to vindicating that general
interest  on  behalf  of  the  public,  Hollingsworth,  supra,  at
706–707.  Justice Powell explained the reasons for this lim-
itation.  He  found  it  “inescapable”  that  to  find  standing
based upon that kind of interest “would significantly alter
the  allocation  of  power  at  the  national  level,  with  a  shift
away  from  a  democratic  form  of  government.”    United
States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 188 (1974) (concurring
opinion).  He added that “[w]e should be ever mindful of the
contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to per-
mit general oversight of the elected branches of government
by a nonrepresentative, and in large measure insulated, ju-
dicial  branch.”  Ibid.;  see  also  Schlesinger  v.  Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 222 (1974); Warth v.
Seldin,  422  U. S.  490,  500  (1975).    Cf.  Federal  Election
Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 21–25 (1998) (finding stand-
ing where a group of voters suffered concrete, though wide-
spread,  harm  when  they  were  prevented  from  accessing
publicly disclosable voting-related material).

B
We  here  must  ask  whether  Adams  established  that,  at
the  time  he  filed  suit,  Delaware’s  major  party  provision
caused him a concrete, particularized “injury in fact” over
and above the abstract generalized grievance suffered by all
citizens of Delaware who (if Adams is right) must live in a
State subject to an unconstitutional judicial selection crite-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the concept of "standing" in legal cases and applies it to a specific case involving Delaware's major party provision for judicial selection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U48

[09-26-01 10:25:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

454

EDWARDS v. CARPENTER

Breyer, J., concurring in judgment

whether respondent’s appellate counsel was constitutionally
ineffective in not raising the sufﬁciency-of-the-evidence claim
in the ﬁrst place.

*

*

*

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins,

concurring in the judgment.

I believe the Court of Appeals correctly decided the basic
question: “Whether a federal habeas court is barred from
considering an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as
‘cause’ for the procedural default of another claim when
the ineffective-assistance claim is itself procedurally de-
faulted.” The question’s phrasing itself reveals my basic
concern. Although the question, like the majority’s opin-
ion, is written with clarity, few lawyers, let alone unrep-
resented state prisoners, will readily understand it. The
reason lies in the complexity of this Court’s habeas corpus
jurisprudence—a complexity that in practice can deny the
fundamental constitutional protection that habeas corpus
seeks to assure. Today’s decision unnecessarily adds to that
complexity and cannot be reconciled with our consistent rec-
ognition that the determination of “cause” is a matter for the
federal habeas judge.

To explain why this is so, and at the risk of oversimpliﬁ-
cation, I must reiterate certain elementary ground rules. A
federal judge may issue a writ of habeas corpus freeing a
state prisoner, if the prisoner is “in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U. S. C. § 2254(a). However, the judge may not issue the
writ if an adequate and independent state-law ground justi-
ﬁes the prisoner’s detention, regardless of the federal claim.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer in the case Edwards v. Carpenter.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

35

Opinion of the Court

both  opinions  are  thorough  and  thoughtful  in  many  re-
spects, this Court has long rejected their core thesis.

The  dissents’  interpretation  of  the  Equal  Protection
Clause is not new.  In Bakke, four Justices would have per-
mitted  race-based  admissions  programs  to  remedy  the  ef-
fects of societal discrimination.  438 U. S., at 362 (joint opin-
ion  of  Brennan,  White,  Marshall,  and  Blackmun,  JJ.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).  But
that minority view was just that—a minority view.  Justice
Powell, who provided the fifth vote and controlling opinion
in Bakke, firmly rejected the notion that societal discrimi-
nation constituted a compelling interest.  Such an interest
presents “an amorphous concept of injury that may be age-
less in its reach into the past,” he explained.  Id., at 307.  It
cannot “justify a [racial] classification that imposes disad-
vantages  upon  persons  . . .  who  bear  no  responsibility  for
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the [race-based] admis-
sions program are thought to have suffered.”  Id., at 310.

The Court  soon adopted Justice Powell’s analysis as its
own.  In the years after Bakke, the Court repeatedly held
that  ameliorating  societal  discrimination  does  not  consti-
tute a compelling interest that justifies race-based state ac-
tion.  “[A]n effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrim-
ination  is  not  a  compelling  interest,”  we  said  plainly  in
Hunt, a 1996 case about the Voting Rights Act.  517 U. S.,
at 909–910.  We reached the same conclusion in Croson, a
case that concerned a preferential government contracting
program.  Permitting  “past  societal  discrimination”  to
“serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to
open the door to competing claims for ‘remedial relief ’ for
every  disadvantaged  group.”    488  U. S.,  at  505.    Opening
that door would shutter another—“[t]he dream of a Nation
of equal citizens . . . would be lost,” we observed, “in a mo-
saic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasur-
able claims of past wrongs.”  Id., at 505–506.  “[S]uch a re-
sult  would  be  contrary  to  both  the  letter  and  spirit  of  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the precedent set by the Bakke case and subsequent rulings on the use of race-based admissions programs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

THOMAS, J., dissenting

the law against carrying concealed weapons”).  Sources that
do  discuss  disarmament  generally  describe  nonpeaceable
citizens  as  those  who  threaten  the  public  or  government.
For example, the Government quotes a Union General’s or-
der that “all loyal and peaceable citizens in Missouri will be
permitted to bear arms.”  Headquarters, Dept. of the Mis-
souri, General Orders, No. 86 (Aug. 25, 1863), in The War
of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies, Ser. 1, Vol. 22, Pt. 2, p. 475
(1888).  Yet, the Government fails to mention that the Un-
ion General’s order addresses the “[l]arge numbers of men
. . .  leaving  the  broken  rebel  armies  . . .  and  returning  to
Missouri . . . with the purpose of following a career of plun-
der and murder.”  Id., at 474.  The order provided that “all
those  who  voluntarily  abandon[ed]  the  rebel  cause”  could
return  to  Missouri,  but  only  if  they  “surrender[ed]  them-
selves  and  their  arms,”  “[took]  the  oath  of  allegiance  and
[gave] bond for their future good conduct.”  Ibid.  By con-
trast,  “all  loyal  and  peaceable  citizens  in  Missouri  w[ere]
permitted  to  bear  arms”  to  “protect  themselves  from  vio-
lence”  and  “aid  the  troops.”    Id.,  at  475.  Thus,  the  term
“loyal and peaceable” distinguished between the former re-
bels residing in Missouri who were disarmed to prevent re-
bellion  and  those  citizens  who  would  help  fight  against
them.

The  Government’s  smorgasbord  of  commentary  proves
little of relevance, and it certainly does not establish a “his-
torical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right
to keep and bear arms.”  Bruen, 597 U. S., at 19.

iii

The  Government’s  remaining  evidence  is  even  further
afield.  The Government points to an assortment of firearm
regulations, covering everything from storage practices  to
treason and mental illness.  They are all irrelevant for pur-
poses  of  §922(g)(8).    Again,  the  “central  considerations”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the historical context and legal arguments surrounding gun rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

29

Opinion of the Court

this  area  are  complex  and  context  specific.    We  hold  only
that state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of
judicial  review  such  that  they  arrogate  to  themselves  the
power vested in state legislatures to regulate federal elec-
tions.

B
We  decline  to  address  whether  the  North  Carolina  Su-
preme  Court  strayed  beyond  the  limits  derived  from  the
Elections Clause.  The legislative defendants did not mean-
ingfully present the issue in their petition for certiorari or
in their briefing, nor did they press the matter at oral argu-
ment.  See  Bay  Area  Laundry  and  Dry  Cleaning  Pension
Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 206–208
(1997); see also California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021)
(slip op., at 10).  Counsel for the defendants expressly dis-
claimed the argument that this Court should reassess the
North Carolina Supreme Court’s reading of state law.  Tr.
of Oral Arg. 7 (“We’re not asking this Court to second-guess
or  reassess.  We  say  take  the  North  Carolina  Supreme
Court’s decision on face value and as fairly reflecting North
Carolina  law  . . . .”).  When  pressed  whether  North  Caro-
lina’s Supreme Court did not fairly interpret its State Con-
stitution,  counsel  reiterated  that  such  an  argument  was
“not our position in this Court.”  Id., at 54.  Although coun-
sel attempted to expand the scope of the argument in rebut-
tal,  such  belated  efforts  do  not  overcome  prior  failures  to
preserve  the  issue  for  review.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  28
(“[C]ounsel making the opening argument shall present the
case  fairly  and  completely  and  not  reserve  points  of  sub-
stance for rebuttal.”).

*

*
State courts retain the authority to apply state constitu-
tional restraints when legislatures act under the power con-
ferred  upon  them  by  the  Elections  Clause.  But  federal

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the limits of judicial review in cases involving state regulation of federal elections.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

7

Opinion of the Court

particular  type  of  claim,  the  analysis  is  straightforward:
The  conflicting  rule  is  displaced  by  the  FAA.  Preston  v.
Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 353 (2008).  But the inquiry becomes
more  complex  when  a  doctrine  normally  thought  to  be
generally  applicable,  such  as  duress  or,  as  relevant  here,
unconscionability,  is  alleged  to  have  been  applied  in  a
fashion  that  disfavors  arbitration.    In  Perry  v.  Thomas,
482 U. S. 483 (1987), for example, we noted that the FAA’s
preemptive effect might extend even to grounds tradition-
ally thought to exist “ ‘at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.’ ”  Id., at 492, n. 9 (emphasis deleted).  We
said  that  a  court  may  not  “rely  on  the  uniqueness  of  an
agreement  to  arbitrate  as  a  basis  for  a  state-law  holding
that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would
enable  the  court  to  effect  what  . . .  the  state  legislature
cannot.”  Id., at 493, n. 9.

An  obvious  illustration  of  this  point  would  be  a  case
finding unconscionable or unenforceable as against public
policy  consumer  arbitration  agreements  that  fail  to  pro-
vide  for  judicially  monitored  discovery.    The  rationaliza-
tions for such a holding are neither difficult to imagine nor
different in kind from those articulated in Discover Bank.
A  court  might  reason  that  no  consumer  would  knowingly
waive  his  right  to  full  discovery,  as  this  would  enable
companies  to  hide  their  wrongdoing.  Or  the  court  might
simply  say  that  such  agreements  are  exculpatory—re-
stricting  discovery  would  be  of  greater  benefit  to  the
company  than  the  consumer,  since  the  former  is  more
likely to be sued than to sue.  See Discover Bank, supra, at
161,  113  P. 3d,  at  1109  (arguing  that  class  waivers  are
similarly  one-sided).  And,  the  reasoning  would  continue,
because such a rule applies the general principle of uncon-
scionability  or  public-policy  disapproval  of  exculpatory
agreements,  it  is  applicable  to  “any”  contract  and  thus
preserved by §2 of the FAA.  In practice, of course, the rule
would  have  a  disproportionate  impact  on  arbitration
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to claims of unconscionability in arbitration agreements.  It cites previous Supreme Court cases and delves into the complexities of balancing general contract law principles with the FAA's preemptive effect.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CANTERO ET AL., INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. BANK OF AMERICA,
N. A.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 22–529.  Argued February 27, 2024—Decided May 30, 2024

The  United  States  maintains  a  dual  system  of  banking.    Banks  with
federal  charters—called  national  banks—are  subject  primarily  to
federal  oversight  and  regulation.    Banks  with  state  charters  are
subject to additional state oversight and regulation.  As relevant here,
the National Bank Act expressly grants national banks the power to
administer home mortgage loans.  12 U. S. C. §371(a).  When national
banks  make  home  mortgage  loans,  they  often  offer  escrow  accounts
designed to protect both the bank and the borrower.  Escrow accounts
ensure  the  availability  of  funds  to  pay  the  insurance  premium  and
property taxes on the borrower’s behalf.  Escrow accounts operated by
national  banks  are  extensively  regulated  by  the  Real  Estate
Settlement Procedures Act of 1974.  RESPA was designed to protect
borrowers from “certain abusive practices” that were being carried on
by  national  banks.    §2601(a).  But  RESPA  does  not  mandate  that
national  banks  pay  interest  to  borrowers  on  the  balances  of  their
escrow accounts.  New York state law is different.  It provides that a
bank “shall” pay borrowers “interest” on the balance held in an escrow
account  maintained  in  connection  with  a  mortgage  on  certain  real
estate.  N. Y. Gen. Oblig. Law Ann. §5–601.

In  this  case,  petitioner  Alex  Cantero  and  petitioners  Saul  Hymes
and  Ilana  Harwayne-Gidansky  obtained  home  mortgage  loans  from
Bank of America, a national bank chartered under the National Bank
Act.  Both contracts required the borrowers to make monthly deposits
into escrow accounts.  Bank of America did not pay interest on the bal-
ances held in either escrow account, but informed the borrowers that
the New York interest-on-escrow law was preempted by the National
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are informational in nature and not meant to be indexed as part of the actual legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxliv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1080

Thaler; Bell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Thaler; Berkley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

Thaler; Bethany v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Bibbs v.
862

Thaler; Bonner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  846,1101

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1054,1078,1095,1118

Thaler; Bundrant v.
1119

Thaler; Byrd v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Caldwell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  858,1074

862

Thaler; Cerf v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
900

Thaler; Colman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

Thaler; Cooks v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

Thaler; Dahl v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Thaler; Dale v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Daniel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

839

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Davidson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  839,1064

Thaler; Davis v.
900

Thaler; De La O v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
993

Thaler; Eldridge v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

Thaler; Enriquez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
805

Thaler; Fenlon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Thaler; Flores v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
885

Thaler; Fontenot v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Thaler; Freeman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Thaler; Garcia Nunez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

Thaler; Garland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
882

Thaler; Green v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

Thaler; Grumbles v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Hailey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  893,1102

1095

Thaler; Haynes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Heath v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Thaler; Hogues v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  884,1065

949

Thaler; Hudson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Thaler; Hunter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Thaler; Hutchins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Ijadimini v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  840,1101

Thaler; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  855,972,1110

825

Thaler; Kavali v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Thaler; Ketchum v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

Thaler; Lauer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
983

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Lopez Ortiz v.
1153

Thaler; Major-Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  950,1140

Thaler; McFarland v.
1125

Thaler; McGrath v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

TRUMP v. VANCE

ALITO, J., dissenting

initially on trial for his life sought to obtain exculpatory ev-
idence from the very man who was orchestrating the prose-
cution.  Ante, at 5.  Marshall’s ruling took note of the context
in which the evidence was sought.  He stated: “If there be a
paper in the possession of the executive, which is not of an
official  nature,  he  must  stand,  as  respects  that  paper,  in
nearly  the  same  situation  with  any  other  individual  who
possesses a paper which might be required for the defense.”
Burr, 25 F. Cas., at 191 (emphasis added).

Second, it is significant that Burr, unlike the prosecutor
in the present case, did not have the option of postponing
his  request  for  information  until  the  President’s  term
ended.  Burr  had  not  chosen  to  be  charged  or  tried  while
Jefferson was in office, and by the time Jefferson’s tenure
ended, his trial was history.  Third, because the case was
prosecuted  in  federal  court  under  federal  law,  it  entirely
lacked the federalism concerns that lie at the heart of the
present case.

The lesson we should take from Marshall’s jurisprudence
is the lesson of McCulloch—the importance of preventing a
State  from  undermining  the  lawful  exercise  of  authority
conferred by the Constitution on the Federal Government.
There is considerable irony in the Court’s invocation of Mar-
shall  to  defend  a  decision  allowing  a  State’s  prosecutorial
power to run roughshod over the functioning of a branch of
the Federal Government.

The Court’s other examples of presidential subpoenas, far
from  supporting  the  Court’s  holding,  actually  show  that
usual procedures have been substantially altered in cases
involving Presidents.  In every one of the examples, a Pres-
ident did not testify in person, as is almost always required
when a witness is subpoenaed to testify at a criminal trial
or before a grand jury, but instead was deposed.  Ante, at 8.
The  examples  involving  Presidents  Ford  and  Carter  oc-
curred under modern federal rules of procedure, and allow-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Trump v. Vance. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to presidential subpoenas.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

49

Thomas, J., dissenting

enough that compliance with the challenged regulations
and manual is the more rational option. For one, nursing
homes face the prospect of termination—the most severe of
remedies—simply by virtue of failing to submit a voluntary
plan of correction and correct the deﬁciencies. See 42 CFR
§ 488.456(b)(1) (1998). The Secretary’s only response is that
terminations are rarely imposed in fact, and certainly are
not imposed where the provider has postponed correction
of its deﬁciencies in order to preserve its appeal rights. But
any such leniency is solely a matter of grace by the Secre-
tary, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 31, and provides little comfort to
a nursing facility pondering the § 1395cc(h) route to judicial
review. And exposure to the termination remedy is not the
only consequence faced by a nursing home that forestalls
correction of its deﬁciencies. The Secretary also may im-
pose civil monetary penalties, which accrue for each day
of noncompliance, 42 CFR §§ 488.430, 488.440(b) (1998), and
thus quite plainly stand as a calibrated deterrent to the for-
bearance strategy. Cf. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 148
(1908) (“[T]o impose upon a party interested the burden of
obtaining a judicial decision . . . only upon the condition that
if unsuccessful he must suffer imprisonment and pay ﬁnes . . .
in effect, to close up all approaches to the courts”).12
is,
Other costs of the forbearance strategy are less tangible,
but potentially as signiﬁcant. For example, a ﬁnding of a
deﬁciency at a nursing facility—which may well rest on un-
balanced or inaccurate data—is posted in a place easily ac-
cessible to residents, 42 CFR § 483.10(g)(1) (1998), disclosed

12 In Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200 (1994), the ag-
grieved mine operator was similarly subject to civil penalties ($5,000) for
each day of noncompliance with statutory provisions, which would become
ﬁnal and payable after review by the agency and the appropriate court of
appeals.
Id., at 204, n. 4, 218. But, unlike the nursing homes at issue
here, the aggrieved mine operator apparently had the option of complying
and then bringing a judicial challenge. See id., at 221 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Statement of ALITO, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22A557
_________________

IVAN ANTONYUK, ET AL. v. STEVEN NIGRELLI, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING SUPERINTENDENT OF
NEW YORK STATE POLICE, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY

[January 11, 2023]

The  application  to  vacate  stay  presented  to  JUSTICE

SOTOMAYOR and by her referred to the Court is denied.

Statement  of  JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE
THOMAS  joins,  respecting  the  denial  of  the  application  to
vacate stay.

The New York law at issue in this application presents
novel  and  serious  questions  under  both  the  First  and  the
Second Amendments.  The District Court found, in a thor-
ough opinion, that the applicants were likely to succeed on
a  number  of  their  claims,  and  it  issued  a  preliminary  in-
junction as to twelve provisions of the challenged law.  With
one  exception,  the  Second  Circuit  issued  a  stay  of  the  in-
junction in full, and in doing so did not provide any expla-
nation for its ruling.  App. to Emergency Application 2.  In
parallel cases presenting related issues, the Second Circuit
has likewise issued unreasoned summary stay orders, but
in those cases it has ordered expedited briefing.  See, e.g.,
Order in Hardaway v. Nigrelli, No. 22–2933 (CA2, Dec. 7,
2022), ECF Doc. 53; Order in Christian v. Nigrelli, No. 22–
2987 (CA2, Dec. 12, 2022), ECF Doc. 40.

I  understand  the  Court’s  denial  today  to  reflect  respect
for  the  Second  Circuit’s  procedures  in  managing  its  own
docket,  rather  than  expressing  any  view  on  the  merits  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the statement of a Justice. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

921

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5847.  Ronwin  v.  Bayer  Corp.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  508.

No. 09–5848.  Brooks v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  599.

No.  09–5853.  McCullough  v.  Norris,  Director,  Arkansas
Department of Correction.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.

No.  09–5854.  Prince  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  400.

No.  09–5857.  Waterman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  144.

No.  09–5859.  Dade  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5868.  Hood  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  226.

No.  09–5870.  Falkner  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  699.

No.  09–5871.  Harvey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  175.

No.  09–5875.  Hirt  v.  Montana.  Sup.  Ct.  Mont.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  350  Mont.  162,  206  P.  3d  908.

No.  09–5879.  Doak  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  4th  Dist.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  386  Ill.  App.  3d  1132,  970  N.  E.
2d  630.

No.  09–5881.  Peter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–5884.  Lundy  v.  United States.  C. A.  7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5888.  Moorman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  950.

No.  09–5890.  Smith  v.  McBride,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  App.
W. Va.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  224  W. Va.  196,  681
S.  E.  2d  81.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, including case numbers, citations, and disposition. This type of information is generally not considered part of the main body text of a legal document and is more suitable for indexing as metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1145

558 U. S.

January 19, 2010

tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported
below:  15  So.  3d  582.

No.  09–7599.  Bailey  v.  Wakefield  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As
petitioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat
ters  from  petitioner  unless  the  docketing  fee  required  by  Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506
U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See
id.,  at  4,  and  cases  cited  therein.

Miscellaneous  Orders

No. 09A541.  Norton v.  Fannie Mae.  Ct. App. Ga.  Applica
tion  for  stay,  addressed  to  Justice  Sotomayor  and  referred  to
the  Court,  denied.

No. 09M63.  Kastner  v.  Martin  & Drought, Inc.,  fka Mar

tin,  Drought  &  Torres,  Inc.,  et  al.;  and

No. 09M64.  Cooley v. St. Bernard Parish Bureau of Pris
ons et al.  Motions to direct the Clerk to ﬁle petitions for writs
of  certiorari  out  of  time  denied.

No.  1,  Orig.  Wisconsin  et  al.  v.  Illinois  et  al.;
No.  2,  Orig.  Michigan  v.  Illinois  et  al.;  and
No.  3,  Orig.  New  York  v.  Illinois  et  al.  Motion  of  Michi
[For  earlier  order  herein,

gan  for  preliminary  injunction  denied.
see, e.  g.,  449  U. S.  48.]

No.  08–1234.  Kiyemba  et  al.  v.  Obama,  President  of  the
United  States,  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.
[Certiorari  granted,
ante, p. 969.]  Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis  granted.

No.  09–338.  Renico,  Warden  v.  Lett.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

[Cer
tiorari  granted,  ante,  p. 1047.]  Motion  of  respondent  for  appoint
ment  of  counsel  granted.  Marla  R.  McCowan,  of  Detroit,  Mich.,
is  appointed  to  serve  as  counsel  for  respondent  in  this  case.

No. 09–529.  Virginia Office of Protection and Advocacy
v.  Reinhard, Commissioner, Virginia Department of Behav
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220

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

Per  Curiam

WELLONS  v.  HALL,  WARDEN

on  petition  for  writ  of  certiorari  to  the  united
states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit

No. 09–5731.  Decided January 19, 2010

In afﬁrming petitioner Wellons’ murder conviction and death sentence, the
Georgia  Supreme  Court  rejected  claims  of  misconduct  by  the  trial
judge,  some  jurors,  and  a  bailiff.  Wellons  sought  state  habeas  relief
and moved to develop evidence supporting the claims, but the court held
that  the  matter  had  been  decided  on  appeal  and  thus  was  res  judicata.
The  Federal  District  Court  denied  Wellons’  requests  for  habeas  relief,
discovery,  and  an  evidentiary  hearing,  ruling that  his  claims  of  miscon
duct were procedurally barred.  The Eleventh Circuit afﬁrmed.

Held:  The Eleventh Circuit’s holding was in error under Cone v.  Bell, 556
U. S. 449.  “When a state court declines to review the merits of a peti
tioner’s  claim  on  the  ground  that  it  has  done  so  already,  it  creates  no
bar to federal habeas review.”  Id., at 466.  On remand, the court must
address  Wellons’  entitlement  to  discovery  and  an  evidentiary  hearing.

Certiorari granted; 554 F. 3d 923, vacated and remanded.

Per Curiam.
From beginning to end, judicial proceedings conducted for
the  purpose  of  deciding  whether  a  defendant  shall  be  put
to  death  must  be  conducted  with  dignity  and  respect.  The
disturbing facts of this case raise serious questions concern
ing the conduct of the trial, and this petition raises a serious
question  about  whether  the  Court  of  Appeals  carefully  re
viewed  those  facts  before  addressing  petitioner’s  constitu
tional  claims.  We  know  that  the  Court  of  Appeals  com
mitted the same procedural error that we corrected in Cone
v.  Bell, 556 U. S. 449, 466–467  (2009).  We do not know how
the  court  would  have  ruled  if  it  had  the  beneﬁt  of  our  deci
sion in that case.

Petitioner Marcus Wellons was convicted in Georgia state
court of rape and murder and sentenced to death.  Although
the  trial  looked typical,  there  were  unusual events  going  on
behind  the  scenes.  Only  after  the  trial  did  defense  counsel
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This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court decision. It includes information about the case name, parties involved, court history, and a brief summary of the ruling.
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