<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

TRUMP v. VANCE

Opinion of the Court

The President’s objection therefore must be limited to the
additional distraction caused by the subpoena itself.  But
that argument runs up against the 200 years of precedent
establishing that Presidents, and their official communica-
tions, are subject to judicial process, see Burr, 25 F. Cas., at
34,  even  when  the  President  is  under  investigation,  see
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 706.

2
The President next claims that the stigma of being sub-
poenaed will undermine his leadership at home and abroad.
Notably, the Solicitor General does not endorse this argu-
ment, perhaps because we have twice denied absolute im-
munity claims by Presidents in cases involving allegations
of  serious  misconduct.  See  Clinton,  520  U. S.,  at  685;
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 687.  But even if a tarnished reputation
were a cognizable impairment, there is nothing inherently
stigmatizing  about  a  President  performing  “the  citizen’s
normal  duty  of  . . .  furnishing  information  relevant”  to  a
criminal investigation.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665,
691 (1972).  Nor can we accept that the risk of association
with persons or activities under criminal investigation can
absolve a President of such an important public duty.  Prior
Presidents  have  weathered  these  associations  in  federal
cases, supra, at 6–10, and there is no reason to think any
attendant notoriety is necessarily greater in state court pro-
ceedings.

To  be  sure,  the  consequences  for  a  President’s  public
standing will likely increase if he is the one under investi-
gation.  But, again, the President concedes that such inves-
tigations are permitted under Article II and the Supremacy
Clause, and receipt of a subpoena would not seem to cate-
gorically magnify the harm to the President’s reputation.

Additionally, while the current suit has cast the Mazars
subpoena  into  the  spotlight,  longstanding  rules  of  grand
jury secrecy aim to prevent the very stigma the President
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court's opinion in the case of Trump v. Vance. It presents legal arguments and cites relevant precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

9

Opinion of the Court

396,  304  P. 3d  181,  185  (2013).    Amgen  alleged  that
Sandoz  engaged  in  “unlawful”  conduct  when  it  failed  to
provide  its  application  and  manufacturing  information
under  §262(l)(2)(A),  and  when  it  provided  notice  of  com-
mercial marketing under §262(l)(8)(A) before, rather than
after,  the  FDA  licensed  its  biosimilar.    Amgen  sought
injunctions to enforce both requirements.  Sandoz counter-
claimed  for  declaratory  judgments  that  the  asserted  pat-
ent  was  invalid  and  not  infringed  and  that  it  had  not
violated the BPCIA.

While  the  case  was  pending  in  the  District  Court,  the
FDA  licensed  Zarxio,  and  Sandoz  provided  Amgen  a  fur-
ther  notice  of  commercial  marketing.    The  District  Court
subsequently granted partial judgment on the pleadings to
Sandoz  on
its  BPCIA  counterclaims  and  dismissed
Amgen’s  unfair  competition  claims  with  prejudice.    2015
WL  1264756,  *7–*9  (ND  Cal.,  Mar.  19,  2015).    After  the
District  Court  entered  final  judgment  as  to  these  claims,
Amgen appealed to the Federal Circuit, which granted an
injunction pending appeal against the commercial market-
ing of Zarxio.

A  divided  Federal  Circuit  affirmed  in  part,  vacated  in
part, and remanded.  First, the court affirmed the dismis-
sal  of  Amgen’s  state-law  claim  based  on  Sandoz’s  alleged
It  held  that  Sandoz  did  not
violation  of  §262(l)(2)(A).
violate the BPCIA in failing to disclose its application and
manufacturing information.  It further held that the rem-
edies  contained  in  the  BPCIA  are  the  exclusive  remedies
for an applicant’s failure to comply with §262(l)(2)(A).  794
F. 3d 1347, 1357, 1360 (2015).

Second,  the  court  held  that  an  applicant  may  provide
effective  notice  of  commercial  marketing  only  after  the
FDA  has  licensed  the  biosimilar.  Id.,  at  1358.    Accord-
ingly, the 180-day clock began after Sandoz’s second, post-
licensure  notice.  The  Federal  Circuit  further  concluded
that the notice requirement is mandatory and extended its
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically discussing the Biosimilar Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA). It delves into legal arguments and court decisions regarding Sandoz's actions related to Amgen's biosimilar drug.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

with a presumption of soundness and required the govern-
ment  to  prove  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence  that  any
condition a veteran suffered was not aggravated by service.
Today, however, everyone accepts that the regulations the
agency relied on to reject Mr. George’s initial claim imper-
missibly  failed  to  implement  these  statutory  commands.
On any reasonable account, that amounts to a clear and un-
mistakable agency error entitling Mr. George to a new hear-
ing.  Regardless whether he can prevail under the test Con-
gress actually prescribed in § 1111, he is at least entitled to
a  hearing  consistent  with  the  law’s  terms.  The  agency’s
failure to provide him that simple (and legally compelled)
courtesy is inexcusable.

Of  course,  just  how  badly  the  agency’s  regulations  de-
parted from Congress’s commands in § 1111 may not have
been  widely  appreciated  until  the  Federal  Circuit  high-
lighted the problem in Wagner.  But a “judicial construction
of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the stat-
ute meant before as well as after the decision.”  Rivers  v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 311–313 (1994).  And
an agency’s “ ‘regulation which . . . operates to create a rule
out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.’ ”  Dixon
v. United States, 381 U. S. 68, 74 (1965).  From these prem-
ises, it follows that the agency’s ruling in this case, depend-
ing as it did on a statutorily impermissible regulation, was
infected by “clear and unmistakable error” that Mr. George
is entitled to have corrected “at any time.”  §§ 5109A, 7111.

B
What is the Court’s reply?  It highlights the fact that the
agency’s regulations bound its own internal administrative
decisionmakers  when  they  ruled  on  Mr.  George’s  initial
claim.  Given that, the Court says, the agency’s ruling was
perfectly sound at the time, infected by no error of any kind,
let alone clear and unmistakable error.  Of course, the Fed-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a case and cites relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

burdened  by  misgivings  about  the  law’s  wisdom,”  and
therefore should be allowed to intervene to “give voice to a
different perspective.”  Ibid.  The implication of the Court’s
holding  is  clear:  The  attorney  general’s  performance  fell
short of representing adequately the State’s interests in the
constitutionality of its law, and for that reason, petitioners
should be allowed to intervene.

This is simply wrong.  As a preliminary matter, petition-
ers and state respondents share the same interest: ensuring
the validity and enforcement of S. B. 824.  Cf. Trbovich v.
Mine Workers, 404 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1972) (allowing in-
tervention as of right where an intervenor’s interests as an
individual  union  member  were  “not  identical”  to  those  of
the existing party in the suit, the Secretary of Labor, who
sought  to  represent  the  public  interest).    Here,  state  re-
spondents explain that they “represen[t] . . . the State’s in-
terest in defending its laws.”  Brief for State Respondents
18.  Their counsel, the attorney general, is required to do
the same under North Carolina law.  See N. C. Gen. Stat.
Ann.  §114–2.  Identically,  petitioners  represent  that  they
seek  to  defend  “the  State’s  vital  interest  in  defending  the
constitutionality of North Carolina’s election laws.”  Brief
for Petitioners 15–16.  Indeed, petitioners cannot now seek
to represent any unique interest of the General Assembly
in the litigation because they abandoned that argument by
failing to appeal the District Court’s original order denying
intervention on that basis.  By their own admission, then,
petitioners seek only to represent the State’s interest in de-
fending  state  law,  an  interest  that  state  respondents  al-
ready represent.

The  Court  insists  that  petitioners’  “perspective”  never-
theless differs from that of state respondents, by focusing
on “defending the law vigorously on the merits without an
eye to crosscutting administrative concerns” such as obtain-
ing guidance for the administration of upcoming elections.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It argues against allowing certain petitioners to intervene in a case. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

Syllabus

eral conclusions in respect to the burden that Act 620 is likely to im-
pose upon women’s ability to access an abortion in Louisiana.  It found
that enforcing that requirement would prevent Does 1, 2, and 6 from
providing  abortions  altogether.  Doe  3  gave  uncontradicted,  in-court
testimony that he would stop performing abortions if he was the last
provider in northern Louisiana, so the departure of Does 1 and 2 would
also eliminate Doe 3.  And Doe 5’s inability to obtain privileges in the
Baton Rouge area would leave Louisiana with just one clinic with one
provider  to  serve  the  10,000  women  annually  who  seek  abortions  in
the State.  Those women not altogether prevented from obtaining an
abortion  would  face  “longer  waiting  times,  and  increased  crowding.”
Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at ___.  Delays in obtaining an abor-
tion might increase the risk that a woman will experience complica-
tions from the procedure and may make it impossible for her to choose
a  non-invasive  medication  abortion.    Both  expert  and  lay  witnesses
testified that the burdens of increased travel to distant clinics would
fall  disproportionately  on  poor  women,  who  are  least  able  to  absorb
them.  Pp. 31–35.

(c) An  examination  of  the  record  also  shows  that  the  District
Court’s findings regarding the law’s asserted benefits are not “clearly
erroneous.”    The  court  found  that  the  admitting-privileges  require-
ment serves no “relevant credentialing function.”  250 F. Supp. 3d 27,
87.  Hospitals can, and do, deny admitting privileges for reasons unre-
lated to a doctor’s ability safely to perform abortions, focusing primar-
ily upon a doctor’s ability to perform the inpatient, hospital-based pro-
cedures  for  which  the  doctor  seeks  privileges—not  outpatient
abortions.  And nothing in the record indicates that the vetting of ap-
plicants  for  privileges  adds  significantly  to  the  vetting  already  pro-
vided by the State Board of Medical Examiners.  The court’s finding
that  the  admitting-privileges  requirement  “does  not  conform  to  pre-
vailing medical standards and will not improve the safety of abortion
in  Louisiana,”  ibid.,  is  supported  by  expert  and  lay  trial  testimony.
And, as in Whole Woman’s Health, the State introduced no evidence
“showing  that  patients  have  better  outcomes  when  their  physicians
have admitting privileges” or “of any instance in which an admitting
privileges requirement would have helped even one woman obtain bet-
ter treatment,”  250 F. Supp. 3d., at 64.  Pp. 35–38.

(d) In  light  of  the  record,  the  District  Court’s  significant  factual
findings—both as to burdens and as to benefits—have ample eviden-
tiary support and are not “clearly erroneous.”  Thus, the court’s related
factual and legal determinations and its ultimate conclusion that Act
620 is unconstitutional are proper.  P. 38.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE agreed that abortion providers in this case have
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It outlines the court's reasoning for finding a particular law (Act 620) unconstitutional.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 67 (2009)

77

Opinion of the Court

On his own initiative, unprompted by the Carrier, and in ex
ecutive  session,  the  industry  representative  asserted  that
the  on-property  record  included  no  proof  of  conferencing.
See ibid.  The Carrier thereafter embraced the panel mem
ber’s  objection.  The  neutral  referee  informed  the  Union  of
the issue and adjourned the hearing, allowing the Union “to
submit  evidence  that  conferencing  had  in  fact  occurred.”
See  id.,  ¶¶ 21–23.  The  Union  did  so,  offering  phone  logs,
handwritten  notes,  and  correspondence  between  the  parties
as  evidence  of  conferencing  in  each  of  the  ﬁve  cases.  E. g.,
Panel  Decision  67a–68a.  From  its  ﬁrst  notice  of  the  objec
tion,  however,  the  Union  maintained  that  the  proof-of
conferencing  issue  was  untimely  raised,  indeed  forfeited,
as  the  Carrier  itself  had  not  objected  prior  to  the  date  set
for argument  of the cases.  E. g.,  id., at 67a; Pet.  to Review
¶¶ 22, 29, 30, 54.

On  March  15,  2005,  nearly  one  year  after  the  question  of
conferencing ﬁrst arose, the panel, in ﬁve identical decisions,
dismissed  the  petitions  for  want  of  “authority  to  assume  ju
risdiction  over  the  claim[s].”  Panel  Decision  72a.  Citing
Circular  One,  see  supra,  at  73,  and  “the  weight  of  arbitral
precedent,”  the  panel  stated  that  “the  evidentiary  record”
must  be  deemed  “closed  once  a  Notice  of  Intent  has  been
ﬁled  with  the  NRAB  .  .  .  .”  Panel  Decision  71a.5  In  ex
plaining  why  the  record  could  not  be  supplemented  to  meet
the no-proof-of-conferencing objection, the panel emphasized
that  it  was  “an  appellate  tribunal,  as  opposed  to  one  which
is  empowered  to  consider  and  rule  on  de  novo  evidence  and
arguments.”  Id., at 69a.

The  two  labor  representatives  dissented.  The  Carrier’s
submissions, they reasoned, took no exception based on fail
ure  to  conference  or  to  prove  conferencing;  therefore,  they
concluded,  under  a  “well  settled  principle  governing  the

5 The  panel  observed,  however,  that  the  records  and  notes  offered  by
the  Union,  “on  their  face,  may  be  regarded  as  supportive  of  its  position
that the conference[s] occurred.”  Panel Decision 69a.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing a case involving labor disputes and arbitration. It cites legal precedents and outlines the arguments made by both sides.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

TRUMP v. VANCE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

immediately on remand.

I would vacate and remand to allow the District Court to
determine whether enforcement of this subpoena should be
enjoined because the President’s “duties as chief magistrate
demand his whole time for national objects.”  Id., at 34.  Ac-
cordingly, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a Supreme Court dissenting opinion. It contains legal citations and arguments, suggesting it is part of the actual content meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

9

BREYER, J., dissenting

now have plausible evidence of unreliability that (perhaps
due  to  DNA  evidence)  is  stronger  than  the  evidence  we
had  before.    In  sum,  there  is  significantly  more  research-
based  evidence  today  indicating  that  courts  sentence  to
death  individuals  who  may  well  be  actually  innocent  or
whose  convictions  (in  the  law’s  view)  do  not  warrant  the
death penalty’s application.

II
“Cruel”—Arbitrariness
The arbitrary imposition of punishment is the antithesis
of the rule of law.  For that reason, Justice Potter Stewart
(who supplied critical votes for the holdings in Furman v.
Georgia,  408  U. S.  238  (1972)  (per  curiam),  and  Gregg)
found the death penalty unconstitutional as administered
in 1972:

“These  death  sentences  are  cruel  and  unusual  in  the
same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual.  For,  of  all  the  people  convicted  of  [death
eligible  crimes],  many  just  as  reprehensible  as  these,
the[se]  petitioners  are  among  a  capriciously  selected
random handful upon which the sentence of death has
in fact been imposed.”  Furman, 408 U. S., at 309–310
(concurring opinion).

See  also  id.,  at  310  (“[T]he  Eighth  and  Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of
death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty
to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed”); id., at 313
(White,  J.,  concurring)  (“[T]he  death  penalty  is  exacted
with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes
and . . . there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few  cases  in  which  it  is  imposed  from  the  many  cases  in
which it is not”).

When  the  death  penalty  was  reinstated  in  1976,  this
Court acknowledged that the death penalty is (and would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the arguments against the death penalty, focusing on arbitrariness and the potential for executing innocent individuals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Syllabus

intent” and thus violated both §2 of the VRA and the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.    The  District  Court  rejected  all  of  the  plaintiffs’  claims.    The
court found that the out-of-precinct policy had no “meaningfully dis-
parate impact” on minority voters’ opportunities to elect representa-
tives of  their  choice.    Turning  to  the ballot-collection  restriction,  the
court found that it was unlikely to cause “a meaningful inequality” in
minority  voters’ electoral opportunities  and  that it  had not  been  en-
acted with discriminatory intent.  A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, but the en banc court reversed.  It first concluded that both
the out-of-precinct policy and the ballot-collection restriction imposed
a disparate burden on minority voters because they were more likely
to be adversely affected by those rules.  The en banc court also held
that the District Court had committed clear error in finding that the
ballot-collection law was not enacted with discriminatory intent.

Held: Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy and HB 2023 do not violate §2 of
the VRA, and HB 2023 was not enacted with a racially discriminatory
purpose.  Pp. 12–37.

(a) Two threshold matters require the Court’s attention.  First, the
Court rejects the contention that no petitioner has Article III standing
to appeal the decision below as to the out-of-precinct policy.  All that
is needed to entertain an appeal of that issue is one party with stand-
ing.  Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsyl-
vania, 591 U. S. ___, ___, n. 6.  Attorney General Brnovich, as an au-
thorized representative of the State (which intervened below) in any
action in federal court, fits the bill.  See Virginia House of Delegates v.
Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. ___, ___.  Second, the Court declines in these
cases to announce a test to govern all VRA §2 challenges to rules that
specify the time, place, or manner for casting ballots.  It is sufficient
for  present  purposes  to  identify  certain  guideposts  that  lead  to  the
Court’s decision in these cases.  Pp. 12–13.

(b) The Court’s statutory interpretation starts with a careful consid-

eration of the text.  Pp. 13–25.

(1) The Court first construed the current version of §2 in Thorn-
burg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, which was a vote-dilution case where the
Court took its cue from §2’s legislative history.  The Court’s many sub-
sequent  vote-dilution  cases  have  followed  the  path  Gingles  charted.
Because the Court here considers for the first time how §2 applies to
generally applicable time, place, or manner voting rules, it is appro-
priate to take a fresh look at the statutory text.  Pp. 13–14.

(2) In 1982, Congress amended the language in §2 that had been
interpreted to require proof of discriminatory intent by a plurality of
the Court in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55.  In place of that language,
§2(a) now uses the phrase “in a manner which results in a denial or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus from a Supreme Court case, outlining the case's background, the issues before the court, and the court's holdings. Syllabi are not meant to be the primary content of a document and are generally not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

all, when a State provides exactly the tort claim the plain-
tiff seeks, it provides him with all the process he is due.  See
id.,  at  284;  Cordova,  816  F. 3d,  at  662  (opinion  of  Gor-
such, J.).    And,  consistent  with  the  common  law,  many
States recognize claims for malicious prosecution.  Indeed,
the relevant State here (Ohio) permits such a cause of ac-
tion.  Notably, too, unlike the tort this Court seeks to cobble
together under the aegis of the Fourth Amendment, Ohio’s
tort does not require a plaintiff to prove that he was seized.
Compare Trussell v. General Motors Corp., 53 Ohio St. 3d
142, 145–146, 559 N. E. 2d 732, 735–736 (1990), with ante,
at  1  (majority  opinion).  Of  course,  should  a  State  fail  to
provide a malicious-prosecution claim to secure his proce-
dural  due  process  rights,  or  a  fair  forum  for  entertaining
such a claim, a federal court may need to act to vindicate
§1983 and the promise of procedural due process.  Cordova,
816  F. 3d,  at  665  (opinion  of  Gorsuch, J.).  But  in  many
cases  (this  one  included),  a  State  malicious-prosecution
claim may be both easier for a plaintiff to prove than any-
thing the Court today provides and sufficient to ensure any
process he is due.  Albright, 510 U. S., at 285–286 (opinion
of Kennedy, J.); Cordova, 816 F. 3d, at 662 (opinion of Gor-
such, J.).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38

SEC v. JARKESY

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

and “it behooves the judiciary to apply a corrective by ex-
ceeding its own authority” through requiring civil-penalty
claims  to  proceed  before  a  federal  jury.  Stranahan,  214
U. S., at 340.  As this Court said over a century ago in this
public-rights context, that belief “mistakenly assumes that
the  courts  can  alone  be  safely  intrusted  with  power,  and
that hence it is their duty to unlawfully exercise preroga-
tives which they have no right to exert, upon the assump-
tion  that  wrong  must  be  done  to  prevent  wrong  being  ac-
complished.”  Ibid.

By giving respondents a jury trial, even one that the Con-
stitution does not require, the majority may think that it is
protecting  liberty.    That  belief,  too,  is  deeply  misguided.
The  American  People  should  not  mistake  judicial  hubris
with the protection of individual rights.  Our first President
understood this well.  In his parting words to the Nation,
he reminded us that a branch of Government arrogating for
itself the power of another based on perceptions of what, “in
one instance, may be the instrument of good . . . is the cus-
tomary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.”
Farewell  Address  (1796),  in  35  The  Writings  of  George
Washington 229 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940) (footnote omitted).
The majority today ignores that wisdom.

Because the Court disregards its own precedent and its
coequal partners in our tripartite system of Government, I
respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, likely from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and historical references, all characteristic of suitable content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

21

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

Sosa, supra, at 726.

According  to  petitioners,  the  TVPA  is  not  a  useful
guidepost  because  Congress  limited  liability  under  that
statute  to  “individuals”  out  of  concern  for  the  sovereign
immunity  of  foreign  governmental  entities,  not  out  of
general hesitation about corporate liability under the ATS.
The argument seems to run as follows: The TVPA provides
a  right  of  action  to  victims  of  torture  and  extrajudicial
killing,  and  under  international  law  those  human-rights
violations  require  state  action.    For  a  corporation’s  em-
ployees to violate these norms therefore would require the
corporation  to  be  an  instrumentality  of  a  foreign  state  or
other sovereign entity.  That concern is absent, petitioners
insist, for crimes that lack a state-action requirement—for
example,  genocide,  slavery,  or,  in  the  present  case,  the
financing of terrorists.

At  least  two  flaws  inhere  in  this  argument.   First,  in
Mohamad  the  Court  unanimously  rejected  petitioners’
account  of  the  TVPA’s  legislative  history.    566  U. S.,  at
453,  458–460.    The  Court  instead  read  that  history  to
demonstrate  that  Congress  acted  to  exclude  all  corporate
entities, not just the sovereign ones.  Id., at 459–460 (cit-
ing  Hearing  and  Markup  on  H. R.  1417  before  the  House
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  and  Its  Subcommittee  on
Human  Rights  and  International  Organizations,  100th
Cong., 2d Sess., 87–88 (1988)); see also 566 U. S., at 461–
462 (BREYER, J., concurring).  Second, even for international-
law  norms  that  do  not  require  state  action,  plaintiffs
can  still  use  corporations  as  surrogate  defendants  to
challenge  the  conduct  of  foreign  governments.    In  Kiobel,
for  example,  the  plaintiffs  sought  to  hold  a  corporate
defendant  liable  for  “aiding  and  abetting  the  Nigerian
Government  in  committing,”  among  other  things,  “crimes
against humanity.”  569 U. S., at 114; see also, e.g., Sarei
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F. 3d 736, 761–763 (CA9 2011) (en
banc)  (corporate  defendant  allegedly  used  Papua  New
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and corporate liability. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, indicating it's part of the main body of the text and not a preliminary or structural element.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. 17 (2023)

23

Opinion of the Court

tive  Clemency  to  testify  that  the  board  no  longer  had  au-
thority  to  parole  any  capital  defendants.  In  response,  the
State  sought  to  prevent  Cruz  from  offering  evidence  as  to
“the  prospects  of  parole  for  an  inmate  sentenced  to  life  im-
prisonment.”  Id.,  at  45.  The  trial  court  precluded  the
testimony.

During  the  aggravation/mitigation  phase  of  an  Arizona
capital trial, the jury must frst determine whether an aggra-
vating  circumstance  exists.  The  jury  here  found  a  single
aggravating  factor  that  Cruz  knowingly  killed  a  police  off-
cer.  See  Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  § 13–703(F)(10)  (2003)  (re-
numbered  as  § 13–751(F)(8)).  The  jury  then  heard  from  16
defense  witnesses  who  testifed  to  Cruz's  good  behavior  in
prison,  his  abuse  and  neglect  as  a  child,  his  posttraumatic
stress disorder, and his history of drug use, including around
the time of the offense.

After  counsel  made  closing  arguments,  the  judge  in-
structed  the  jury  that  Cruz  was  eligible  for  three  penalties:
(1)  “Death  by  lethal  injection”;  (2)  “Life  imprisonment  with
no possibility of parole or release from imprisonment on any
basis”; and (3) “Life imprisonment with a possibility of parole
or  release  from  imprisonment”  after  25  years.  App.  94.
The reference to parole was plainly wrong.  See Lynch, 578
U. S., at 615  (the only “release” available  under Arizona law
is  executive  clemency,  not  parole).  The  judge  further  in-
structed  the  jury  that  its  only choice  was  whether  or  not  to
sentence Cruz to death; if the jury did not vote for death, the
judge would then choose between the two remaining possible
sentences.  The jury sentenced Cruz to death.

Three  jurors, unprompted  by Cruz,  issued a  press release
the  next  day.  The  jurors  explained  that  this  had  been  a
“gut-wrenching  decision”  and  that  “[t]here was  not  one  per-
son on the jury who did not cry.”  App. 144.  They reported
that they would rather have voted for life without the possi-
bility of parole, but that they were not given that option.  A
fourth  juror  later  stated  in  a  declaration:  “If  I  could  have

Page Proof Pending Publication
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Cruz v. Arizona. It contains legal arguments, citations, and details about the trial proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI

Opinion of the Court

specific procedures and times for considering its terms and
the proper means for its enforcement.  It is logical, then, to
assume that Congress will be explicit if it intends to create
a  private  cause  of  action.    With  respect  to  the  Constitu-
tion,  however,  there  is  no  single,  specific  congressional
action to consider and interpret.

Even  so,  it  is  a  significant  step  under  separation-of-
powers  principles  for  a  court  to  determine  that  it  has  the
authority, under the judicial power, to create and enforce a
cause  of  action  for  damages  against  federal  officials  in
order  to  remedy  a  constitutional  violation.    When  deter-
mining  whether  traditional  equitable  powers  suffice  to
give  necessary  constitutional  protection—or  whether,  in
addition,  a  damages  remedy  is  necessary—there  are  a
number  of  economic  and  governmental  concerns  to  con-
sider.  Claims  against  federal  officials  often  create  sub-
stantial costs, in the form of defense and indemnification.
Congress,  then,  has  a  substantial  responsibility  to  deter-
mine  whether,  and  the  extent  to  which,  monetary  and
other liabilities should be imposed upon individual officers
and  employees  of  the  Federal  Government.    In  addition,
the  time  and  administrative  costs  attendant  upon  intru-
sions  resulting  from  the  discovery  and  trial  process  are
significant factors to be considered.  In an analogous con-
text, Congress, it is fair to assume, weighed those concerns
in deciding not to substitute the Government as defendant
in suits seeking damages for constitutional violations.  See
28  U. S. C.  §2679(b)(2)(A)  (providing  that  certain  provi-
sions  of  the  Federal  Tort  Claims  Act  do  not  apply  to  any
claim  against  a  federal  employee  “which  is  brought  for  a
violation of the Constitution”).

For  these  and  other  reasons,  the  Court’s  expressed
caution as to implied causes of actions under congressional
statutes  led  to  similar  caution  with  respect  to  actions  in
the Bivens  context, where the action is implied to enforce
the  Constitution  itself.    Indeed,  in  light  of  the  changes  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Ziglar v. Abbasi. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

999

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

No.  09–6285.  Brown  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  Pennsylva
nia.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331
Fed.  Appx.  898.

No. 09–6294.  Cox v. Illinois.  App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  383  Ill.  App.  3d  1142,  968  N.  E.
2d  217.

No. 09–6297.  J. M. B. v.  New Jersey.  Sup. Ct. N. J.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  197  N.  J.  563,  964  A.  2d  752.

No.  09–6299.  Garcia  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  3d  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6304.  Snow v.  Kansas.  Ct. App. Kan.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  40  Kan.  App.  2d  747,  195  P.  3d  282.

No.  09–6311.  Mendez  v.  Knowles,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  757.

No. 09–6339.  Lewis v.  United States.  C. A. Fed. Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  670.

No. 09–6341.  Cargyle S. v.  Prince George’s County Child

Protective  Services.  Ct.  App.  Md.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6363.  Armstrong  v.  Kerestes,  Superintendent,
State  Correctional  Institution  at  Mahanoy,  et  al.  C.  A.
3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6378.  Hutchinson v. Maine.  Sup. Jud. Ct. Me.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  969  A.  2d  923.

No.  09–6396.  Garcell  v.  North  Carolina.  Sup.  Ct.  N.  C.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  363  N.  C.  10,  678  S.  E.
2d  618.

No.  09–6417.  Smith  v.  Richards.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  991.

No.  09–6420.  DeNictolis  et  al.  v.  Clarke,  Commissioner,
Massachusetts  Department  of  Correction.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6436.  Almond  v.  Pollard,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.

7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, including case numbers, citations, and disposition. It is not sequential narrative text and is likely not meant to be read as a continuous story.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

ALITO, J., dissenting

state  judgments  regarding  the  welfare  of  resident  Indian
children.  Lara, 541 U. S., at 205.  And third, the law “in-
terfere[s] with the power [and] authority of [every] State”
in the conduct of state judicial proceedings and determina-
tion of child custody arrangements.  Ibid.  That is, in fact,
its express design.  See, e.g., §§1911(c), 1912, 1915.  These
indicators  confirm  that  ICWA  surpasses  even  a  generous
understanding of Congress’s Indian affairs authority.

*

*

*
I  am  sympathetic  to  the  challenges  that  tribes  face  in
maintaining  membership  and  preserving  their  cultures.
And I do not question the idea that the best interests of chil-
dren may in some circumstances take into account a desire
to enable children to maintain a connection with the culture
of  their  ancestors.  The  Constitution  provides  Congress
with  many  means  for  promoting  such  interests.    But  the
Constitution does not permit Congress to displace long-ex-
ercised state authority over child custody proceedings to ad-
vance those interests at the expense of vulnerable children
and their families.

Because I would hold that Congress lacked authority to
enact  the  challenged  ICWA  provisions,  I  respectfully  dis-
sent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

I
The underlying dispute in this case concerns the consti-
tutionality  of  North  Carolina’s  voter-identification  law,
Senate Bill 824 (S. B. 824), enacted in 2018.  The North Car-
olina  State  Conference  of  the  NAACP  (NAACP  respond-
ents) sued members of the North Carolina State Board of
Elections (state respondents) and the Governor in Federal
District  Court,  alleging  that  the  law  violated  the  Four-
teenth  and  Fifteenth  Amendments  and  §2  of  the  Voting
Rights Act by, among other things, discriminating against
Black  and  Latino  voters.    The  state  attorney  general  ap-
peared as counsel to represent the Governor and state re-
spondents.  See  N. C.  Gen.  Stat.  Ann.  §114–2  (2021)
(providing that the attorney general has a “duty” “to appear
for the State” in any matter “in which the State may be a
party  or  interested”  and  to  “represent  all  State  depart-
ments,  agencies,  institutions,  commissions,  bureaus  or
other organized activities of the State”).  NAACP respond-
ents also filed a parallel challenge to S. B. 824 in state court.
See Holmes v. Moore, No. 18–CV–15292 (Super. Ct. Wake
Cty., N. C.).

Shortly after the federal suit was filed, Philip E. Berger,
the president pro tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and
Timothy K. Moore, the speaker of the North Carolina House
of Representatives (petitioners here), filed a motion to in-
tervene “on behalf of the General Assembly.”  App. 55.  They
sought to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a)(2), claiming a “significantly protectable in-
terest  in  the  validity  of  S.B.  824.”    App.  61.  Petitioners
cited, among other things, a state statute conferring upon
them standing to intervene on behalf of the General Assem-
bly  in  cases  challenging  state  law.  Id.,  at  61–62  (citing
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §1–72.2).  In the alternative, petition-
ers  sought  permissive  intervention  under  Federal  Rule  of
Civil Procedure 24(b).

The District Court denied the motion without prejudice,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP*.  It provides context about the case, the parties involved, and the legal arguments being made.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES v. BETHUNE-HILL

ALITO, J., dissenting

expressly, what I take from its use of the term “judicially
cognizable” injury rather than “concrete” injury is that the
decision  here  is  not  really  based  on  the  Lujan  factors,
which  set  out  the  “irreducible”  minimum  demanded  by
Article  III.    504  U. S.,  at  560.    Instead,  the  argument
seems to be that the House’s injury is insufficient for some
other, only-hinted-at reason.
  Both  the  United  States,  appearing  as  an  amicus,  and
the  Commonwealth  of  Virginia  are  more  explicit.    The
Solicitor General’s brief argues as follows:

“In  the  federal  system,  the  Constitution  gives  Con-
gress only ‘legislative Powers,’ U. S. Const. Art. 1, §1,
and the ‘power to seek judicial relief . . . cannot possi-
bly  be  regarded  as  merely  in  aid  of  the  legislative
function.’    Buckley  v.  Valeo,  424  U. S.  1,  138  (1976)
(per  curiam).    As  a  result,  ‘once  Congress  makes  its
choice  in  enacting  legislation,  its  participation  ends.’
Bowsher  v.  Synar,  478  U. S.  714,  733  (1986). . . .  The
same  is  true  here.    A  branch  of  a  state  government
that  makes  rather  than  enforces  the  law  does  not  it-
self  have  a  cognizable  Article  III  interest  in  the  de-
fense  of  its  laws.”    Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus
Curiae 14–15 (emphasis added).

The Virginia Solicitor General makes a similar argument.
See Brief for State Appellees 42–44.
  These  arguments  are  seriously  flawed  because  the
States  are  under  no  obligation  to  follow  the  Federal  Con-
stitution’s  model  when  it  comes  to  the  separation  of  pow-
ers.  See Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 689, n. 4
(1980); cf. Raines, supra, at 824, n. 8; Arizona State Legis-
lature  v.  Arizona  Independent  Redistricting  Comm’n,  576
U. S.  ___,  ___,  n. 12  (2015)  (slip  op.,  at  14,  n. 12).    If  one
House  of  Congress  or  one  or  more  Members  of  Congress
attempt  to  invoke  the  power  of  a  federal  court,  the  court
must consider whether this attempt is consistent with the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill. It discusses the arguments made by the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia regarding the standing of the House of Delegates to bring a lawsuit.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

11

Opinion of the Court

though  redrawing  district  lines  indeed  may  affect  the
membership  of  the  chamber,  the  House  as  an  institution
has no cognizable interest in the identity of its members.6
Although  the  House  urges  that  changes  to  district  lines
will  “profoundly  disrupt  its  day-to-day  operations,”  Reply
Brief 3, it is scarcely obvious how or why that is so.  As the
party  invoking  this  Court’s  jurisdiction,  the  House  bears
the burden of doing more than “simply alleg[ing] a nonob-
vious harm.”  Wittman, 578 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).
  Analogizing  to  “group[s]  other  than  a  legislative  body,”
the  dissent  insists  that  the  House  has  suffered  an  “obvi-
ous” injury.  Post, at 3.  But groups like the string quartet
and  basketball  team  posited  by  the  dissent  select  their
own members.  Similarly, the political parties involved in
the cases the dissent cites, see post, at 3, n. 1 (citing New
York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196,
202  (2008),  and  Eu  v.  San  Francisco  County  Democratic
Central  Comm.,  489  U. S.  214,  229–230  (1989)),  select
their  own  leadership  and  candidates.    In  stark  contrast,
the House does not select its own members.  Instead, it is
a representative body composed of members chosen by the
people.  Changes to its membership brought about by the
voting  public  thus  inflict  no  cognizable  injury  on  the
House.7
  The House additionally asserts injury from the creation
of what it calls “divided constituencies,” suggesting that a

——————

6 The  dissent  urges  that  changes  to  district  lines  will  alter  the
House’s  future  legislative  output.    See  post,  at  1–5.    A  legislative
chamber as an institution, however, suffers no legally cognizable injury
from changes to the content of legislation its future members may elect
to  enact.    By  contrast,  the  House  has  an  obvious  institutional  interest
in the manner in which it goes about its business.

7 The dissent further suggests that “we must assume that the district-
ing  plan  enacted  by  the  legislature  embodies  the  House’s  judgment”
regarding  the  best  way  to  select  its  members.    Post,  at  4.    For  the
reasons  explained  supra,  at  7–10,  however,  the  House’s  role  in  the
legislative process does not give it standing to pursue this appeal.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the House of Representatives' standing to challenge redistricting plans.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.

Opinion of the Court

to  the  rights  in  question.    See  Jones  v.  Alfred  H.  Mayer
Co., 392 U. S. 409, 427–430 (1968).  Similarly, the Federal
Tort  Claims  Act  states  that  the  “United  States  shall  be
liable” in tort “in the same manner and to the same extent
as  a  private  individual  under  like  circumstances.”    28
U. S. C.  §2674.    That  provision  is  most  naturally  under-
stood to make the United States liable in the same way as
a  private  individual  at  any  given  time.    See  Richards  v.
United  States,  369  U. S.  1,  6–7  (1962).    Such  “same  as”
provisions  dot  the  statute  books,  and  federal  and  state
courts  commonly  read  them  to  mandate  ongoing  equal
treatment of two groups or objects.  See, e.g., Adamson v.
Bowen, 855 F. 2d 668, 671–672 (CA10 1988) (statute mak-
ing United States liable for fees and expenses “to the same
extent  that  any  other  party  would  be  liable  under  the
common law or under the terms of any statute” interpreted
to  continuously  tie  liability  of  United  States  to  that  of
any  other  party);  Kugler’s  Appeal,  55  Pa.  123,  124–125
(1867) (statute making the procedure for dividing election
districts  “the  same  as”  the  procedure  for  dividing  town-
ships interpreted to continuously tie the former procedure
to the latter).

The  IFC  objects  that  the  IOIA  is  different  because  the
purpose of international organization immunity is entirely
distinct  from  the  purpose  of  foreign  sovereign  immunity.
Foreign sovereign immunity, the IFC argues, is grounded
in the mutual respect of sovereigns and serves the ends of
international  comity  and  reciprocity.    The  purpose  of
international organization immunity, on the other hand, is
to allow such organizations to freely pursue the collective
goals  of  member  countries  without  undue  interference
from  the  courts  of  any  one  member  country.    The  IFC
therefore urges that the IOIA should not be read to tether
international  organization  immunity  to  changing  foreign
sovereign immunity.

But  that  gets  the  inquiry  backward.    We  ordinarily
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the interpretation of the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) and its relationship to foreign sovereign immunity. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2019)

1

Statement of GINSBURG, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DAVID THOMPSON, ET AL., v. HEATHER HEBDON,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ALASKA
PUBLIC OFFICES COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–122.  Decided November 25, 2019

  Statement of JUSTICE GINSBURG.

I do not oppose a remand to take account of  Randall v.
Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230 (2006).  I note, however, that Alaska’s
law does not exhibit certain features found troublesome in
Vermont’s law.  For example, unlike in Vermont, political
parties in Alaska are subject to much more lenient contri-
bution  limits  than  individual  donors.
  Alaska  Stat.
§15.13.070(d)  (2018);  see  Randall,  548  U. S.,  at  256–259.
Moreover, Alaska has the second smallest legislature in the
country  and  derives  approximately  90  percent  of  its  reve-
nues  from  one  economic  sector—the  oil  and  gas  industry.
As the District Court suggested, these characteristics make
Alaska “highly, if not uniquely, vulnerable to corruption in
politics  and  government.”  Thompson  v.  Dauphinais,  217
F. Supp. 3d 1023, 1029 (Alaska 2016).  “[S]pecial justifica-
tion” of this order may warrant Alaska’s low individual con-
tribution limit.  See Randall, 548 U. S., at 261.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a statement from Justice Ginsburg. It contains legal citations, case names, and discusses legal arguments and precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

Opinion of the Court

A use that shares the purpose of a copyrighted work, by con-
trast, is more likely to provide “the public with a substantial
substitute  for  matter  protected  by  the  [copyright  owner’s]
interests in the original wor[k] or derivatives of [it],” id., at
207, which undermines the goal of copyright.

In a narrower sense, a use may be justified because copy-
ing is reasonably necessary to achieve the user’s new pur-
pose.  Parody, for example, “needs to mimic an original to
make  its  point.”    Campbell,  510  U. S.,  at  580–581.    Simi-
larly, other commentary or criticism that targets an origi-
nal work may have compelling reason to “ ‘conjure up’ ” the
original by borrowing from it.  Id., at 588.7  An independent
justification  like  this  is  particularly  relevant  to  assessing
fair use where an original work and copying use share the
same or highly similar purposes, or where wide dissemina-
tion  of  a  secondary  work  would  otherwise  run  the  risk  of
substitution  for  the  original  or  licensed  derivatives  of  it.
See id., at 580, n. 14; Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 557.  Once
again,  the  question  of  justification  is  one  of  degree.    See
Leval  1111  (“[I]t  is  not  sufficient  simply  to  conclude
whether or not justification exists.  The question remains
how  powerful,  or  persuasive,  is  the  justification,  because
the court must weigh the strength of the secondary user’s
justification against factors favoring the copyright owner”).
In sum, the first fair use factor considers whether the use
of  a  copyrighted  work  has  a  further  purpose  or  different
character,  which  is  a  matter  of  degree,  and  the  degree  of

——————

7 Return to the example of a book review.  The review’s use of quoted
material  may  be  justified  in  both  the  broad  and  the  narrower  senses.
First, the use is likely to serve a different purpose than the material it-
self.  See n. 4, supra.  Second, there may be compelling reason to borrow
from the original to achieve that purpose because the review targets the
material for comment or criticism.  But again, the question of justifica-
tion will depend on the individual use or uses.  See Patry, Fair Use §3:1,
at 129–130.  Even book reviews are not entitled to a presumption of fair-
ness.  Campbell, 510 U. S., at 581.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the concept of "fair use" in copyright law. It delves into the legal analysis and reasoning behind fair use, citing relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

45

Per  Curiam

MICHIGAN  v.  FISHER

on  petition  for  writ  of  certiorari  to  the  court  of
appeals of michigan

No. 09–91.  Decided December 7, 2009

Fisher was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and possession
of  a  ﬁrearm  during  the  commission of  a  felony.  Police  responding  to  a
domestic disturbance at respondent Fisher’s house found damaged prop
erty  and  blood  at  the  scene,  observed  Fisher  screaming  and  throwing
things  inside  the  house,  and  saw  that  his  hand  was  cut.  When  Fisher
refused  to  open  the  door  or  tell  ofﬁcers  whether  he  needed  medical  at
tention, Ofﬁcer Goolsby entered the house, where he found Fisher point
ing a riﬂe at him.  But the trial court suppressed Goolsby’s statement,
ruling that the ofﬁcer had violated the Fourth Amendment by entering
the house without a warrant.  The Michigan Court of Appeals afﬁrmed.
Held:  Goolsby’s entry into the house was lawful under the emergency aid
exception to the warrant requirement, which applies where ofﬁcers have
“an  objectively  reasonable  basis  for  believing”  that  medical  assistance
is needed  or persons are in  danger.  Brigham City v.  Stuart,  547 U. S.
398, 406.  Here, it was reasonable to believe that Fisher had hurt him
self and needed treatment or that he was about to hurt, or had already
hurt, someone else.

Certiorari granted; reversed and remanded.

Per Curiam.
Police  ofﬁcers  responded  to  a  complaint  of  a  disturbance
near  Allen  Road  in Brownstown,  Michigan.*  Ofﬁcer  Chris
topher Goolsby later testiﬁed that, as he and his partner ap
proached  the  area,  a  couple  directed  them  to  a  residence
where  a  man  was  “going  crazy.”  Docket  No.  276439,  2008
WL  786515, *1  (Mich. App.,  Mar. 25,  2008) (per  curiam) (al
teration and internal quotation marks omitted).  Upon their
arrival, the ofﬁcers found a household in considerable chaos:
a pickup truck in the driveway with its front smashed, dam
aged  fenceposts  along  the  side  of  the  property,  and  three

*We  have  taken  the  facts  from  the  opinion  of  the  Michigan  Court  of

Appeals.  Except where indicated, the parties do not dispute the facts.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary. It includes information about the case name, court, date, and a brief description of the events leading up to the legal issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

481

Opinion of Thomas, J.

California’s Constitution to provide that “[o]nly marriage be
tween  a man  and  a woman  is valid  or  recognized in  Califor
nia.”  Cal.  Const.,  Art.  I,  § 7.5.  Any  donor  who  gave  more
than $100 to any committee supporting or opposing Proposi
tion 8 was required to disclose his full name, street address,
occupation,  employer’s  name  (or  business  name,  if  self-
employed),  and  the  total  amount  of  his  contributions.1  See
Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 84211(f) (West 2005).  The California
Secretary  of  State  was  then  required  to  post  this  informa
tion  on  the  Internet.  See  §§ 84600–84601;  §§ 84602–84602.1
(West  Supp.  2010);  §§ 84602.5–84604  (West  2005);  § 85605
(West Supp. 2010); §§ 84606–84609 (West 2005).

Some opponents of Proposition 8 compiled this information
and  created  Web  sites  with  maps  showing  the  locations  of
homes or businesses of Proposition 8 supporters.  Many sup
porters  (or  their  customers)  suffered  property  damage,  or
threats of physical violence or death, as a result.  They cited
these  incidents  in a  complaint  they  ﬁled  after the  2008  elec
tion,  seeking  to  invalidate  California’s  mandatory  disclosure
laws.  Supporters recounted being told: “ ‘Consider yourself
lucky.  If I had a gun I would have gunned you down along
with  each  and  every  other  supporter,’ ”  or,  “ ‘we  have  plans
for you and your friends. ’ ”  Complaint in ProtectMar
riage.com—Yes  on  8  v.  Bowen,  Case  No.  2:09–cv–00058–
MCE–DAD  (ED  Cal.),  ¶ 31.  Proposition  8  opponents  also
allegedly  harassed  the  measure’s  supporters  by  defacing  or
damaging  their  property.  Id.,  ¶ 32.  Two  religious  organi
zations supporting Proposition 8 reportedly received through
the  mail  envelopes  containing  a  white  powdery  substance.
Id., ¶ 33.

1 BCRA  imposes  similar  disclosure  requirements.  See,  e. g.,  2 U.  S.  C.
§ 434(f)(2)(F)  (“Every  person  who  makes  a  disbursement  for  the  direct
costs  of  producing  and  airing  electioneering  communications  in  an  aggre
gate amount in excess of $10,000 during any calendar year” must disclose
“the  names  and  addresses  of  all  contributors  who  contributed  an  aggre
gate  amount  of  $1,000  or  more  to  the  person  making  the  disbursement”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a description of a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

23

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Indeed,  this  Court  has  already  rejected  such  an  indis-
criminate approach in the specific context of disclosure re-
quirements.    Just  over  a  decade  ago,  in  Reed,  petitioners
demonstrated that their own supporters would face reprisal
if their opposition to expanding domestic partnership laws
became public.  That evidence did not support a facial chal-
lenge  to  Washington’s  public  disclosure  law,  however,  be-
cause the “typical referendum petitio[n] concern[ed] tax pol-
icy, revenue, budget, or other state law issues,” and “there
[was] no reason to assume that any burdens imposed by dis-
closure of typical referendum petitions would be remotely
like the burdens plaintiffs fear in this case.”  561 U. S., at
200–201 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at
202–203  (ALITO,  J.,  concurring)  (“Many  referendum  peti-
tions concern relatively uncontroversial matters, and plain-
tiffs have provided no reason to think that disclosure of sig-
natory  information  in  those  contexts  would  significantly
chill the willingness of voters to sign.  Plaintiffs’ facial chal-
lenge therefore must fail” (citation omitted)).

So too here.  Many charitable organizations “concern rel-
atively uncontroversial matters” and petitioners “have pro-
vided no reason to think that” confidential disclosure of do-
nor  information  “would  significantly  chill  the  willingness
of ” most donors to give.  Nor does the Court provide such a
reason.  It merely highlights threats that public disclosure
would  pose  to  these  two  petitioners’  supporters.    Those
threats  provide  “scant  evidence”  of  anything  beyond  “the
specific  harm”  that  petitioners’  donors  might  experience
were their Schedule B information publicly disclosed.  Id.,
at  200–201.  Petitioners’  “facial  challenge  therefore  must
fail.”  Id., at 203 (ALITO, J., concurring).

How, then, can their facial challenge succeed?  Only be-
cause  the  Court  has  decided,  in  a  radical  departure  from
precedent, that there no longer need be any evidence that a
disclosure requirement is likely to cause an objective bur-
den  on  First  Amendment  rights  before  it  can  be  struck
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

975

558 U. S.

October 20, 2009

No.  09–6422.  Gordon  v.  California.  Ct. App.  Cal.,  1st  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6433.  Vores  v.  Merit  Systems  Protection  Board.
C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.
Appx.  883.

No. 09–6462.  Rashid v.  United States.  C. A. 1st Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6464.  Wright  v.  Volland,  Judge,  Superior  Court
of  Alaska,  Third  Judicial  District  at  Anchorage,  et  al.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.
Appx.  496.

No. 09–6494.  Wilson v. United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  445.

No.  09–6495.  Bonilla  v.  United  States;  and
No.  09–6517.  Villatoro  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  968  A.  2d  39.

No.  09–6507.  Werst  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  779.

No. 09–6508.  Wright v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  148.

No.  09–6513.  Gonzalez-Gamez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  629.

No.  09–6514.  Green  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–6515.  Hayes v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  222.

No.  09–6519.  Peterson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  228.

No. 09–6520.  Carson v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  75.

No.  09–6523.  Deckard  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, court names, and dates, but lacks continuous narrative text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–404
_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
WASHINGTON, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2022]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause generally immun-
izes the Federal Government from state laws that directly
regulate or discriminate against it.  See South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U. S. 505, 523 (1988).  Congress, however, can
authorize such laws by waiving this constitutional immun-
ity.  See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U. S. 174, 180
(1988).

This  case  concerns  state  workers’  compensation  laws.
Congress  has  enacted  a  statute  that  waives  the  Federal
Government’s  constitutional  immunity  insofar  as  a  “state
authority  charged  with  enforcing  . . .  the  state  workers’
compensation laws . . . appl[ies] the laws” to land or projects
“belonging to the [Federal] Government, in the same way
and to the same extent as if the premises were under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the State.”  40 U. S. C. §3172(a).

The  question  before  us  is  whether  a  Washington  State
workers’  compensation  law  falls  within  the  scope  of  this
congressional waiver.  The state law, by its terms, applies
only to federal workers who work at one federal facility in
Washington.  The law makes it easier for these workers to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, the date, and the beginning of the opinion itself. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal text of a significant decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

rule, we have made plain that most time bars are nonjuris-
dictional.”  Ibid.  Nothing about §2409a(g)’s text or context
gives  reason  to  depart  from  this  beaten  path.  Section
2409a(g) states that an action “shall be barred unless it is
commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it
accrued.”  This  “text  speaks  only  to  a  claim’s  timeliness,”
and  its  “mundane  statute-of-limitations  language  say[s]
only what every time bar, by definition, must: that after a
certain time a claim is barred.”  Id., at 410.  Further, “[t]his
Court has often explained that Congress’s separation of a
filing deadline from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the
time bar is not jurisdictional.”  Id., at 411.  The Quiet Title
Act’s  jurisdictional  grant  is  in  28  U. S. C.  §1346(f ),4  well
afield of §2409a(g).  And “[n]othing conditions the jurisdic-
tional grant on the limitations perio[d], or otherwise links
those separate provisions.”  Wong, 575 U. S., at 412.  Sec-
tion  2409a(g)  therefore  lacks  a  jurisdictional  clear  state-
ment.

B
The Government does not focus on the text of §2409a(g),
but instead points to a trilogy of decisions by this Court that
purportedly  establish  that  the  provision  is  jurisdictional.

——————
the Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity.”  Wong, 575 U. S., at
417–418  (citing  Irwin  v.  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs,  498  U. S.  89
(1990)).  Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, Irwin extends to the “many
statutes  that  create  claims  for  relief  against  the  United  States  or  its
agencies [and] apply only to Government defendants.”  Scarborough v.
Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 422 (2004); cf. also Boechler v. Commissioner, 596
U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 3) (applying clear statement rule to pe-
titions for review of agency action).  Notably, even the dissent in Wong
did not engage in such an attempt to turn back the clock, instead arguing
that the provision in that case was jurisdictional based on its specific text
and history.  See 575 U. S., at 423–428 (opinion of ALITO, J.).

4 Section 1346(f ) provides that “[t]he district courts shall have exclu-
sive original jurisdiction of civil actions under section 2409a to quiet title
to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed
by the United States.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically part of the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the jurisdictional nature of a statute (Section 2409a(g)) and cites previous legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of the Court

“knowledge” of a topic likely means to suggest that he actu-
ally knows a thing or two about it.  But the law will some-
times
impute  knowledge—often  called  “constructive”
knowledge—to a person who fails to learn something that a
reasonably diligent person would have learned.  See id., at
1043.  Similarly, we held in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559
U. S. 633 (2010), that the word “discovery,” when used in a
statute  of  limitations  without  qualification,  “encompasses
not  only  those  facts  the  plaintiff  actually  knew,  but  also
those  facts  a  reasonably  diligent  plaintiff  would  have
known.”  Id., at 648.  The addition of “actual” in §1113(2)
signals  that  the  plaintiff ’s  knowledge  must  be  more  than
“potential, possible, virtual, conceivable, theoretical, hypo-
thetical,  or  nominal.”  Black’s  Law  Dictionary  53  (4th  ed.
1951).  Indeed, in Merck, we cited §1113(2) as evidence of
the  “linguistic  distinction”  between  “ ‘actual  knowledge’ ”
and the “hypothetical” knowledge that a reasonably diligent
plaintiff  would  have.    559  U. S.,  at  646–647  (quoting
§1113(2); emphasis in original).

Congress  has  drawn  the  same  distinction  elsewhere  in
ERISA.  Multiple provisions contain alternate 6-year and 3-
year limitations periods, with the 6-year period beginning
at “the date on which the cause of action arose” and the 3-
year period starting at “the earliest date on which the plain-
tiff acquired  or should have acquired actual  knowledge  of
the existence of such cause of action.”  §§1303(e)(6), (f )(5)
(emphasis  added);  accord,  §§1370(f )(1)–(2),  1451(f )(1)–(2).
ERISA also requires plaintiffs challenging the suspension
of benefits under §1085 to do so within “one year after the
earliest date on which the plaintiff acquired or should have
acquired actual knowledge of the existence of such cause of
action.”  §1085(e)(9)(I)(iv).  Thus, Congress has repeatedly
drawn  a  “linguistic  distinction”  between  what  an  ERISA
plaintiff actually knows and what he should actually know.
Merck, 559 U. S., at 647.  And when Congress has included
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal concept of "actual knowledge" in the context of ERISA statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SMITH ET AL. v. SPIZZIRRI ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–1218.  Argued April 22, 2024—Decided May 16, 2024

The  Federal  Arbitration  Act  (FAA)  sets  forth  procedures  for  enforcing
arbitration agreements in federal court.  Section 3 of the FAA, entitled
“Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration,” pro-
vides that when a dispute is subject to arbitration, the court “shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration  has  been  had  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  agree-
ment, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceed-
ing with such arbitration.”  9 U. S. C. §3.  In this case, petitioners filed
suit  against  respondents  in  state  court  alleging  violations  of  federal
and  state  employment  laws.  Respondents  then  removed  to  federal
court  and  filed  a  motion  to  compel  arbitration  and  dismiss  the  suit.
Petitioners agreed their claims were arbitrable, but contended that §3
of the FAA required the District Court to stay the action pending arbi-
tration rather than dismissing it entirely.  The District Court issued
an order compelling arbitration and dismissed the case without preju-
dice.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held: When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable
dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pend-
ing arbitration, §3 compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks
discretion to dismiss the suit.  Statutory text, structure, and purpose
all point to this conclusion.  The plain text of §3 requires a court to stay
the proceeding upon request.  The statute’s use of the word “shall” “cre-
ates  an  obligation  impervious to  judicial discretion.”  Lexecon  Inc.  v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35.  The obliga-
tion is to “stay” the proceeding.  Respondents insist that “stay” “means
only that the court must stop parallel in-court litigation, which a court
may  achieve  by  dismissing,”  Brief  for  Respondents  15,  but  respond-
ents’  reading  disregards  the  long-established  legal  meaning  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
90

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and part of a legal document. Legal citations and document headers are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they don't contain the main textual content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

25

GORSUCH, J., concurring

have read a solo opinion in Bakke like a statute while read-
ing Title VI as a mere suggestion.  A proper respect for the
law demands the opposite.  Title VI bears independent force
beyond the Equal Protection Clause.  Nothing in it grants
special deference to university administrators.  Nothing in
it  endorses  racial  discrimination  to  any  degree  or  for  any
purpose.  Title VI is more consequential than that.

*
In  the  aftermath  of  the  Civil  War,  Congress  took  vital
steps  toward  realizing  the  promise  of  equality  under  the
law.  As important as those initial efforts were, much work
remained to be done—and much remains today.  But by any
measure, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 stands as a landmark
on this journey and one of the Nation’s great triumphs.  We
have no right to make a blank sheet of any of its provisions.
And when we look to the clear and powerful command Con-
gress set forth in that law, these cases all but resolve them-
selves.  Under Title VI, it is never permissible “ ‘to say “yes”
to one person . . . but to say “no” to another person’ ” even in
part “ ‘because of the color of his skin.’ ”  Bakke, 438 U. S.,
at 418 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the importance of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its prohibition against racial discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
Opinion of the Court

A
Starting with the plain meaning, an “Indian tribe” under
ISDA is a “tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or
community, including any Alaska Native village or regional
or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant
to [ANCSA], which is recognized as eligible for the special
programs and services provided by the United States to In-
dians  because  of  their  status  as  Indians.”    25  U. S. C.
§5304(e).  The definition’s first two clauses are straightfor-
ward  enough.    The  first  lists  entities  that  might  count  as
Indian  tribes  under  the  Act  (e.g.,  tribes,  bands,  nations).
The second, “the Alaska clause,” makes clear that  Alaska
Native villages and ANCs are “includ[ed].”  The third, “the
recognized-as-eligible clause,” requires more analysis.  Ac-
cording  to  that  clause,  the  listed  entities  must  be  “recog-
nized as eligible for the special programs and services pro-
vided  by  the  United  States  to  Indians  because  of  their
status as Indians.”

ANCs,  of  course,  are  “established  pursuant  to”  ANCSA
within the meaning of the Alaska clause.  They are thereby
“recognized as eligible” for ANCSA’s benefits.  The trickier
question  is  whether  eligibility  for  the  benefits  of  ANCSA
counts as eligibility for “the special programs and services
provided by the United States to Indians because of their
status as Indians.”

It  does.  Contrary  to  the  dissent’s  view,  post,  at  9–10
(opinion of GORSUCH, J.), ANCSA is readily described as a
special program provided by the United States to “Indians”
(in  this  case,  Alaska  Natives).    See  43  U. S. C.  §1626  (de-
scribing  ANCSA’s  relationship  to  “other  programs”).    The
scope of that program is substantial: ANCSA made ANCs
eligible to select tens of millions of acres of land and receive
hundreds of millions of tax-exempt dollars.  §§1605, 1610,
1611.  Not  just  a  one-time  payment,  ANCSA  provides  for
revenue sharing among the regional ANCs to ensure Alaska
Natives across the State benefit from an ongoing equitable
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in the case YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS RESERVATION.  It delves into the interpretation of the term "Indian tribe" within the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

17

BREYER, J., dissenting

tion as one way both to diminish the risk of conflict and to
promote  economic  development  and  commercial  prosper-
ity.  Congress  at  that  time  and  at  the  request  of  many  of
those  organizations  enacted  the  Immunities  Act.  Given
the  differences  between  international  organizations  and
nation states, along with the Act’s purposes and the risk of
untoward consequences, I would leave the Immunities Act
where  we  found  it—as  providing  for  immunity  in  both
commercial and noncommercial suits.

My decision rests primarily not upon linguistic analysis,
but  upon  basic  statutory  purposes.    Linguistic  methods
alone, however artfully employed, too often can be used to
justify  opposite  conclusions.    Purposes,  derived  from  con-
text,  informed  by  history,  and  tested  by  recognition  of
related  consequences,  will  more  often  lead  us  to  legally
sound, workable interpretations—as they have consistently
done  in  the  past.  These  methods  of  interpretation  can
help  voters  hold  officials  accountable  for  their  decisions
and  permit  citizens  of  our  diverse  democracy  to  live  to-
gether  productively  and  in  peace—basic  objectives  in
America of the rule of law itself.

With respect, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  It is sequential text and provides legal reasoning, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

“subject to revision on the grounds of clear and unmistaka-
ble error.”  Full stop.  This Court should not be in the busi-
ness of adding words to the law, let alone to insulate badly
mistaken agency decisions from any chance of correction.

III
In  the  end,  it  is  hard  to  avoid  the  impression  that  the
Court thinks an old agency ruling in Mr. George’s case just
isn’t  worth  revisiting.    See  ante,  at  10.  Maybe,  too,  that
might seem an understandable impulse on first encounter.
After all, in civil and criminal litigation new judicial inter-
pretations about a law’s meaning normally do not apply to
old cases after they have reached final judgment.  See, e.g.,
Harper  v.  Virginia  Dept.  of  Taxation,  509  U. S.  86,  94–97
(1993).

But it turns out that impulse is doubly misguided here.
For  one  thing,  it  is  a  mistake  to  equate  veteran  benefits
cases with ordinary civil and criminal litigation.  Recogniz-
ing the sacrifices of those who have left private life to serve
their  country,  Congress  has  ordained  that  a  veteran  may
petition for review of clear and unmistakable errors in past
administrative  decisions  “at  any  time.”    §§ 5109A(d),
7111(d).  Congress’s  “whole  purpose”  in  setting  up  this
scheme was “to make an exception to [the usual rule of] fi-
nality” for our veterans in recognition of their service to the
Nation.  Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 529 (2005).

For  another  thing,  this  case  doesn’t  just  affect  Mr.
George.  It  risks  insulating  countless  other  decisions  in
which the Department has wrongly denied veteran benefits
based  on  self-serving  regulations  inconsistent  with  Con-
gress’s instructions.  See, e.g., Brief for National Veterans
Legal Services Program et al. as Amici Curiae 15–27; Brief
for Swords to Plowshares et al. as Amici Curiae 19–20.  Vet-
erans  already  face  challenges  enough  in  dealing  with  the
Department.  On average, the agency takes seven years to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:26] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1042

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 27, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8072. Mendoza et al. v. Pennington et al. Ct.
App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 239 Ga. App. 300,
519 S. E. 2d 715.

No. 99–8073. Menchaca v. Olivarez, Warden. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1317.

No. 99–8098. Kingston v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8110. Zain v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 W. Va. 54, 528 S. E. 2d
748.

No. 99–8132. Williams v. California et al. Ct. App. Cal.,
2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 Cal. App.
4th 710, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665.

No. 99–8136. Berget v. Gibson, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 518.

No. 99–8143. Montanya v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8144. Michelfelder v. Gay & Chacker, P. C. Super.

Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8146. Francis v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8147. Dixon v. State Bar of California. Sup. Ct.

Cal. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8149. Hawkins v. Maine Bureau of Insurance.

Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8179. McKinney v. Hanks, Superintendent, Wa-
bash Valley Correctional Facility. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–8201. Terrell v. Giles, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8215. Snipes v. Cook et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1309.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

29

Opinion of the Court

raise  a  plausible  inference  that  the  rescission  was  moti-
vated by animus.

*

*

*
We  do  not  decide  whether  DACA  or  its  rescission  are
sound policies.  “The wisdom” of those decisions “is none of
our  concern.”  Chenery  II,  332  U. S.,  at  207.    We  address
only whether the agency complied with the procedural re-
quirement that it provide a reasoned explanation for its ac-
tion.  Here the agency failed to consider the conspicuous is-
sues of whether to retain forbearance and what if anything
to  do  about  the  hardship  to  DACA  recipients.    That  dual
failure raises doubts about whether the agency appreciated
the scope of its discretion or exercised that discretion in a
reasonable manner.  The appropriate recourse is therefore
to  remand  to  DHS  so  that  it  may  consider  the  problem
anew.

The judgment in NAACP, No. 18–588, is affirmed.7  The
judgment in Regents, No. 18–587, is vacated in part and re-
versed in part.  And in Batalla Vidal, No. 18–589, the Feb-
ruary  13,  2018  order  granting  respondents’  motion  for  a
preliminary injunction is vacated, the November 9, 2017 or-
der partially denying the Government’s motion to dismiss
is affirmed in part, and the March 29, 2018 order partially
denying the balance of the Government’s motion to dismiss
is reversed in part.  All three cases are remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

7 Our affirmance of the NAACP order vacating the rescission makes it
unnecessary to examine the propriety of the nationwide scope of the in-
junctions issued by the District Courts in Regents and Batalla Vidal.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the procedural requirements for agency action and the specific case of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

KAGAN, J., dissenting

American  Elec.  Power,  564  U. S.,  at  416–417;  Massachu-
setts,  549  U. S.,  at  528–532.    EPA  thus  serves  as  the  Na-
tion’s  “primary  regulator  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions.”
American  Elec.  Power,  564  U. S.,  at  428.    And  among  the
most significant of the entities it regulates are fossil-fuel-
fired (mainly coal- and natural-gas-fired) power plants.  To-
day,  those  electricity-producing  plants  are  responsible  for
about one quarter of the Nation’s greenhouse gas emissions.
See EPA, Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Apr. 14,
2022),  https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-
gas-emissions.  Curbing that output is a necessary part of
any effective approach for addressing climate change.

To  carry  out  its  Section  111  responsibility,  EPA  issued
the Clean Power Plan in 2015.  The premise of the Plan—
which  no  one  really  disputes—was  that  operational  im-
provements at the individual-plant level would either “lead
to only small emission reductions” or would cost far more
than  a  readily  available  regulatory  alternative.  80  Fed.
Reg. 64727–64728 (2015).  That alternative—which fossil-
fuel-fired plants were “already using to reduce their [carbon
dioxide]  emissions”  in “a  cost  effective  manner”—is  called
generation shifting.  Id., at 64728, 64769.  As the Court ex-
plains, the term refers to ways of shifting electricity gener-
ation from higher emitting sources to lower emitting ones—
more  specifically,  from  coal-fired  to  natural-gas-fired
sources, and from both to renewable sources like solar and
wind.  See ante, at 8.  A power company (like the many sup-
porting  EPA  here)  might  divert  its  own  resources  to  a
cleaner source, or might participate in a cap-and-trade sys-
tem with other companies to achieve the same emissions-
reduction goals.

This  Court  has  obstructed  EPA’s  effort  from  the  begin-
ning.  Right  after  the  Obama  administration  issued  the
Clean  Power  Plan,  the  Court  stayed  its  implementation.
That action was unprecedented: Never before had the Court
stayed a regulation then under review in the lower courts.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the Clean Power Plan and the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA

Opinion of the Court

State.”  Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, §9, 23 Stat. 385 (em-
phasis added); see also 18 U. S. C. §1151 (defining “Indian
country” even more broadly).  By contrast, every one of the
statutes the State directs us to merely discusses the assign-
ment of cases among courts in the Indian Territory.  They
say nothing about the  division of responsibilities between
federal  and  state  authorities  after  Oklahoma  entered  the
Union.  And  however  enlightened  the  State  may  think  it
was for territorial law to apply to all persons irrespective of
race, some Tribe members may see things differently, given
that the same policy entailed the forcible closure of tribal
courts in defiance of treaty terms.

Left to hunt for some statute that might have rendered
the  MCA  inapplicable  in  Oklahoma  after  statehood,  the
best the State can find is the Oklahoma Enabling Act.  Con-
gress adopted that law in preparation for Oklahoma’s ad-
mission in 1907.  Among its many provisions sorting out the
details associated with Oklahoma’s transition to statehood,
the Enabling Act transferred all nonfederal cases pending
in territorial courts to Oklahoma’s new state courts.  Act of
June  16,  1906,  §20,  34  Stat.  277;  see  also  Act  of  Mar.  4,
1907,  §3,  34  Stat.  1287  (clarifying  treatment  of  cases  to
which  United  States  was  a  party).  The  State  says  this
transfer made its courts the inheritors of the federal terri-
torial courts’ sweeping authority to try Indians for crimes
committed on reservations.

But, at best, this tells only half the story.  The Enabling
Act not only sent all nonfederal cases pending in territorial
courts to state court.  It also transferred pending cases that
arose  “under  the  Constitution,  laws,  or  treaties  of  the
United States” to federal district courts.  §16, 34 Stat. 277.
Pending  criminal  cases  were  thus  transferred  to  federal
court if the prosecution would have belonged there had the
Territory been a State at the time of the crime.  §1, 34 Stat.
1287  (amending  the  Enabling  Act).    Nor  did  the  statute
make any  distinction between cases arising in the former
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>