<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

I

Understanding this lawsuit requires at least three pieces
of  context  the  Court’s  opinion  neglects.    It  requires  some
understanding of the history that led to the Treaty of 1868
establishing the Navajo Reservation.  It requires some in-
sight into the discussions that surrounded that Treaty.  Fi-
nally,  it  requires  an  appreciation  of  the  many  steps  the
Navajo took to avoid this litigation.

A

For centuries, the Navajo inhabited a stretch of land in
“present-day northwestern New Mexico, northeastern Ari-
zona, and the San Juan drainage beyond.”  J. Kessell, Gen-
eral Sherman and the Navajo Treaty of 1868:  A Basic and
Expedient  Misunderstanding,  12  W.  Hist.  Q.  251,  253
(1981) (Kessell).  This ancestral home was framed by “four
mountains  and  four  rivers”  the  Tribe  considered  sacred.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Nav-
ajo Tribe of Indians, With a Record of the Discussions That
Led  to  Its  Signing  2  (1968)  (Treaty  Record);  see  also  E.
Rosser, Ahistorical Indians and Reservation Resources, 40
Env.  L.  437,  445  (2010).    There,  tribal  members  “planted
their subsistence crops,” “hunted and gathered,” and “r[an]
their livestock” over the plains.  Kessell 253.

In the 1860s, that way of life changed forever.  In the af-
termath of the Mexican-American War—and following a pe-
riod of rapid westward expansion—the United States found
itself embroiled in a series of bitter conflicts with the Nav-
ajo.  P. Iverson, Diné:  A History of the Navajos 37–48 (2002)
(Iverson).  Eventually,  the  United  States  tasked  James
Henry Carleton with resolving them.  Id., at 47–48.  “Deter-
mined to bring an end to Native resistance in the territory,”
he elected for a program of “removal, isolation, and incar-
ceration.”  Id., at 48.  He hoped that time on a reservation
would teach the Navajo “ ‘the art of peace,’ ” and that, while
confined, they might “ ‘acquire new habits, new values, new
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion in a case involving the Navajo Nation. It provides historical context and sets up the arguments the dissenting judge will make.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL
CONSULTANTS, INC.
Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

New  weapons  in  the  fight  against  robocallers  have
emerged, too—including tools that allow consumers to more
easily screen and block unwanted calls.  Perhaps in recog-
nition of these changes, Congress relaxed the ban on cell-
phone robocallers in 2015.  Today, unsolicited calls are per-
mitted if they are “made solely to collect a debt owed to or
guaranteed by the United States.”

That leaves robocallers no shortage of material.  The gov-
ernment  backs  millions  upon  millions  of  loans—student
loans,  home  mortgages,  veterans’  loans,  farm  loans,  busi-
ness loans.  When it comes to student loans alone, the gov-
ernment guarantees more than $150 billion in private loans
involving over 7 million individuals.  And, to be clear, it’s
not just the government that’s allowed to call about these
loans.  Private lenders and debt collectors are free to send
in the robots too, so long as the debt at issue is ultimately
guaranteed by the government.

Today’s plaintiffs wish to use robocalls for something dif-
ferent:  to  campaign  and  solicit  donations  for  political
causes.  The plaintiffs allege that the law’s continuing ban
on  calls  like  theirs  violates  the  First  Amendment,  and on
the main points of their argument the parties agree.  First,
no one doubts the TCPA regulates speech.  Second, every-
one accepts that restrictions on speech—no matter how ev-
enhanded—must be justified by at least a “ ‘significant gov-
ernmental  interest.’ ”    Ward  v.  Rock  Against  Racism,  491
U. S.  781,  791  (1989).    And,  third,  the  parties  agree  that
laws  that  go  further  by  regulating  speech  on  the  basis  of
content invite still greater scrutiny.  When the government
seeks to censor speech based on its content, favoring certain
voices  and  punishing  others,  its  restrictions  must  satisfy
“strict scrutiny”—meaning they must be justified by inter-
ests that are “compelling,” not just significant.  After all, a
constitutional right would hardly be needed to protect pop-
ular speakers; the First Amendment does its real work in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, INC. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding robocalls and their application to political campaigning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

then forced Black convicted persons to labor in “plantations,
mines, and industries in the South.”  Id., at 50.  This system
of free forced labor provided tremendous benefits to South-
ern whites and was designed to intimidate, subjugate, and
control  newly  emancipated  Black  people.    See  Slavery  by
Another Name 5–6, 53.  The Thirteenth Amendment, with-
out more, failed to equalize society.

Congress thus went further and embarked on months of
deliberation about additional Reconstruction laws.  Those
efforts included the appointment of a Committee, the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, “to inquire into the condition
of the Confederate States.”  Report of the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction, S. Rep. No. 112, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1
(1866)  (hereinafter  Joint  Comm.  Rep.).  Among  other
things,  the  Committee’s  Report  to  Congress  documented
the “deep-seated prejudice” against emancipated Black peo-
ple in the Southern States and the lack of a “general dispo-
sition  to  place  the  colored  race,  constituting  at  least  two-
fifths of the population, upon terms even of civil equality.”
Id., at 11.  In light of its findings, the Committee proposed
amending the Constitution to secure the equality of “rights,
civil and political.”  Id., at 7.

Congress acted on that recommendation and adopted the
Fourteenth  Amendment.    Proponents  of  the  Amendment
declared that one of its key goals was to “protec[t] the black
man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same
shield which it throws over the white man.”  Cong. Globe,
39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2766 (1866) (Cong. Globe) (statement
of Sen. Howard).  That is, the Amendment sought “to secure
to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many
generations  [was]  held  in  slavery,  all  the  civil  rights  that
the superior race enjoy.”  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537,
555–556 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

To promote this goal, Congress enshrined a broad guar-
antee  of  equality  in  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the history of slavery and Reconstruction, and the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose of guaranteeing equal protection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1119

529 U. S.

May 15, 2000

No. 99–8893. Perkins v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1355.

No. 99–8894. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8897. McCoy v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 504.

No. 99–8916. Montgomery v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8919. Buitrago v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 183 F. 3d 1315.

No. 99–8920. Clark v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 446.

No. 99–8922. Townsend v. Booker, Superintendent, Mis-
sissippi State Penitentiary, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 200 F. 3d 816.

No. 99–8923. Wright v. Rowley, Superintendent, North-
east Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–8926. Dougherty v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 200 F. 3d 819.

No. 99–8928. Lankford v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 563.

No. 99–8932. Austin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 270.

No. 99–8933. Auborg et al. v. Massachusetts. App. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 Mass. App. 1106,
718 N. E. 2d 896.

No. 99–8934. Andrews v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 429.

No. 99–8936. Ascura v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8937. Olds v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 238.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks the narrative flow and contextual information typical of the main body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases or Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE

KAGAN, J., dissenting

tional  districting  requirements).  The  effect  is  to  make
gerrymanders far more effective and durable than before,
insulating  politicians  against  all  but  the  most  titanic
shifts  in  the  political  tides.    These  are  not  your  grand-
father’s—let alone the Framers’—gerrymanders.

The  proof  is  in  the  2010  pudding.    That  redistricting
cycle  produced  some  of  the  most  extreme  partisan  gerry-
manders  in  this  country’s  history.  I’ve  already  recounted
the results from North Carolina and Maryland, and you’ll
hear  even  more  about  those.  See  supra,  at  4–6;  infra,  at
19–20.  But  the  voters  in  those  States  were  not  the  only
ones  to  fall  prey  to  such  districting  perversions.    Take
Pennsylvania.  In the three congressional elections occur-
ring under the State’s original districting plan (before the
State Supreme Court struck it down), Democrats received
between 45% and 51% of the statewide vote, but won only
5 of 18 House seats.  See League of Women Voters v. Penn-
sylvania, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 178 A. 3d 737, 764 (2018).  Or go
next  door  to  Ohio.   There,  in  four  congressional  elections,
Democrats  tallied  between  39%  and  47%  of  the  statewide
vote,  but  never  won  more  than  4  of  16  House  seats.    See
Ohio  A.  Philip  Randolph  Inst.  v.  Householder,  373
F. Supp.  3d  978,  1074  (SD  Ohio  2019).    (Nor  is  there  any
reason  to  think  that  the  results  in  those  States  stemmed
from  political  geography  or  non-partisan  districting  crite-
ria, rather than from partisan manipulation.  See infra, at
15, 31.)  And gerrymanders will only get worse (or depend-
ing  on  your  perspective,  better)  as  time  goes  on—as  data
becomes  ever  more  fine-grained  and  data  analysis  tech-
niques continue to improve.  What was possible with paper
and pen—or even with Windows 95—doesn’t hold a candle
(or  an  LED  bulb?)  to  what  will  become  possible  with  de-
velopments  like  machine  learning.    And  someplace  along
this road, “we the people” become sovereign no longer.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Rucho v. Common Cause. It discusses the issue of gerrymandering and its increasing effectiveness due to advancements in data analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

494

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Breyer, J., dissenting

that “unequal and unreasonable” rates were imposed); see
also Field v. Clark, supra, at 691 (historically in the ﬂexible
tariff statutes Congress has “invest[ed] the President with
large discretion”).

The majority also tries to distinguish these examples on
the ground that the President there executed congressional
policy while here he rejects that policy. See ante, at 444.
The President here, however, in exercising his delegated
authority does not reject congressional policy. Rather, he
executes a law in which Congress has speciﬁed its desire
that the President have the very authority he has exercised.
See Part III, supra.

The majority further points out that these cases concern
imports, an area that, it says, implicates foreign policy and
therefore justiﬁes an unusual degree of discretion by the
President. See ante, at 445. Congress, however, has not
limited its delegations of taxation authority to the “foreign
policy” arena. The ﬁrst Congress gave the Secretary of the
Treasury the “power to mitigate or remit” statutory penal-
ties for nonpayment of liquor taxes “upon such terms and
conditions as shall appear to him reasonable.” Act of Mar.
3, 1791, ch. 15, § 43, 1 Stat. 209. A few years later, the Sec-
retary was authorized, in lieu of collecting the stamp duty
enacted by Congress, “to agree to an annual composition for
the amount of such stamp duty, with any of the said banks,
of one per centum on the amount of the annual dividend
made by such banks.” Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat.
528. More recently, Congress has given to the Executive
Branch the authority to “prescribe all needful rules and reg-
ulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code],
including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by
reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal reve-
nue.”
26 U. S. C. § 7805(a). And the Court has held that
such rules and regulations, “which undoubtedly affect indi-
vidual taxpayer liability, are . . . without doubt the result of
entirely appropriate delegations of discretionary authority
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer in the case of Clinton v. City of New York.  It contains legal arguments and citations, which are typical of legal text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Syllabus

ernment role models for students are those who eschew any visible re-
ligious expression would undermine a long constitutional tradition in
which learning how to tolerate diverse expressive activities has always
been “part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society.”  Lee v. Wes-
iman, 505 U. S. 577, 590.  No historically sound understanding of the
Establishment Clause begins to “mak[e] it necessary for government
to be hostile to religion” in this way.  Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306,
314.  Pp. 24–30.

iii. There is no conflict between the constitutional commands of
the First Amendment in this case.  There is only the “mere shadow” of
a conflict, a false choice premised on a misconstruction of the Estab-
lishment Clause.  School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U. S. 203, 308 (Goldberg, J., concurring).  A government entity’s con-
cerns about phantom constitutional violations do not justify actual vi-
olations of an individual’s First Amendment rights.  Pp. 30–31.

(c) Respect for religious expressions is indispensable to life in a free
and diverse Republic.  Here, a government entity sought to punish an
individual for engaging in a personal religious observance, based on a
mistaken  view  that  it  has  a  duty  to  suppress  religious  observances
even as it allows comparable secular speech.  The Constitution neither
mandates nor tolerates that kind of discrimination.  Mr. Kennedy is
entitled to summary judgment on his religious exercise and free speech
claims.  Pp. 31–32.

991 F. 3d 1004, reversed.

  GORSUCH,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  THOMAS,  ALITO,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined,  and  in  which  KA-
VANAUGH, J., joined, except as to Part III–B.  THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J.,
filed concurring opinions.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's opinion. It is not the main body of the legal text and likely provides a high-level overview for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

Opinion of the Court

Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400 (1968) (per cu-
riam).

Over  time,  governments  in  this  country  have  expanded
public accommodations laws in notable ways too.  Statutes
like Colorado’s grow from nondiscrimination rules the com-
mon law sometimes imposed on common carriers and places
of traditional public accommodation like hotels and restau-
rants.  Dale, 530 U. S., at 656–657.  Often, these enterprises
exercised  something  like  monopoly  power  or  hosted  or
transported  others  or  their  belongings  much  like  bailees.
See,  e.g.,  Liverpool  &  Great  Western  Steam  Co.  v.  Phenix
Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 437 (1889); Primrose v. Western Un-
ion Telegraph Co., 154 U. S. 1, 14 (1894).  Over time, some
States, Colorado included, have expanded the reach of these
nondiscrimination  rules  to  cover  virtually  every  place  of
business engaged in any sales to the public.  Compare 1885
Colo. Sess. Laws pp. 132–133 (a short list of entities origi-
nally bound by the State’s public accommodations law) with
Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(1) (currently defining a public
accommodation  to  include  “any  place  of  business  engaged
in any sales to the public”).

Importantly, States have also expanded their laws to pro-
hibit more forms of discrimination.  Today, for example, ap-
proximately half the States have laws like Colorado’s that
expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation.2  And, as we have recognized, this is entirely “un-
exceptional.”  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip
——————

2 Besides Colorado, this includes Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §51 (West 2020);
Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a–81d (2021); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 6, §4504 (2019);
Haw.  Rev.  Stat.  §489–3  (Cum.  Supp.  2021);  Ill.  Comp.  Stat.,  ch.  775,
§5/1–102  (West  2021);  Iowa  Code  §216.7  (2022);  Me.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.,
Tit. 5, §4591 (2013); Md. State Govt. Code Ann. §20–304 (2021); Mass.
Gen. Laws, ch. 272, §98 (2021); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §37.2302 (West
2013); Minn. Stat. §363A.11 (2022); Nev. Rev. Stat. §651.070 (2017); N.
H.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §354–A:17  (2022);  N.  J.  Stat.  Ann.  §10:5–12  (West
2013);  N. M.  Stat.  Ann.  §28–1–7  (2022);  N.  Y.  Exec.  Law  Ann.  §291(2)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and discusses the evolution of public accommodations laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE v. ARGUS LEADER MEDIA

Opinion of the Court

radically different constructions.  Ratzlaf v. United States,
510 U. S. 135, 143 (1994).

C

That leaves Argus Leader to try to salvage the result, if
not  the  reasoning,  of  National  Parks.  But  here  its
arguments  prove  no  more  persuasive.    The  company
begins by rearranging the text of Exemption 4 to create a
phrase  that  does  not  appear  in  the  statute:  “confidential
commercial information.”  Then, it suggests this synthetic
term mirrors a preexisting common law term of art.  And
finally  it  asserts  that  the  common  law  term  covers  only
information whose release would lead to substantial com-
petitive  harm.    But  Argus  Leader  points  to  no  treatise  or
case  decided  before  Exemption  4’s  adoption  that  assigned
any  such  meaning  to  the  terms  actually  before  us:  “com-
mercial  or  financial  information  [that  is]  privileged  or
confidential.”  So  even  accepting  (without  granting)  that
other  phrases  may  carry  the  specialized  common  law
meaning  Argus  Leader  supposes,  the  parties  have  mus-
tered no evidence that the terms of Exemption 4 did at the
time  of  their  adoption.  Nor  will  this  Court  ordinarily
imbue  statutory  terms  with  a  specialized  common  law
meaning when Congress hasn’t itself invoked the common
law  terms  of  art  associated  with  that  meaning.    See,  e.g.,
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U. S. 223, 233–235 (2011).

Alternatively, the company suggests that, whatever the
merits  of  National  Parks  as  an  initial  matter,  Congress
effectively  ratified  its  understanding  of  the  term  “confi-
dential”  by  enacting  similar  phrases  in  other  statutes  in
the  years  since  that  case  was  decided.    To  be  sure,  the
ratification  canon  can  sometimes  prove  a  useful  interpre-
tive  tool.  But  it  derives  from  the  notion  that  Congress  is
aware  of  a  definitive  judicial  interpretation  of  a  statute
when  it  reenacts  the  same  statute  using  the  same  lan-
guage.  Helsinn Healthcare S. A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a legal exemption. It contains legal jargon and references to previous court cases, indicating its suitability for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

Opinion of the Court

unabashedly control the content that will appear to users,
exercising  authority  to  remove,  label  or  demote  messages
they disfavor.5

Except that Texas’s law limits their power to do so.  As
noted earlier, the law’s central provision prohibits the large
social-media  platforms  (and  maybe  other  entities 6)  from
“censor[ing]” a “user’s expression” based on its “viewpoint.”
§143A.002(a)(2); see supra, at 7.  The law defines “expres-
sion”  broadly,  thus  including  pretty  much  anything  that
might be posted.  See §143A.001(2).  And it defines “censor”
to  mean  “block,  ban,  remove,  deplatform,  demonetize,  de-
boost, restrict, deny equal access or visibility to, or other-
wise  discriminate  against  expression.”    §143A.001(1).7
That is a long list of verbs, but it comes down to this: The
platforms cannot do any of the things they typically do (on
their main feeds) to posts they disapprove—cannot demote,
label, or remove them—whenever the action is based on the

——————

5 We therefore do not deal here with feeds whose algorithms respond
solely to how users act online—giving them the content they appear to
want, without any regard to independent content standards.  See post,
at 2 (BARRETT, J., concurring).  Like them or loathe them, the Community
Standards  and  Community  Guidelines  make  a  wealth  of  user-agnostic
judgments about what kinds of speech, including what viewpoints, are
not worthy of promotion.  And those judgments show up in Facebook’s
and YouTube’s main feeds.

6 The scope of the Texas law, a matter crucial to the facial inquiry, is
unsettled, as previously discussed.  See supra, at 10–11.  The Texas so-
licitor  general  at  oral  argument  stated  that  he  understood  the  law  to
cover Facebook and YouTube, but “d[id]n’t know” whether it also covered
other platforms and applications.  Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22–555, pp. 61–
62.

7 In  addition  to  barring  “censor[ship]”  of  “expression,”  the  law  bars
“censor[ship]” of people.  More specifically, it prohibits taking the desig-
nated “censor[ial]” actions against any “user” based on his “viewpoint,”
regardless of whether that “viewpoint is expressed on a social media plat-
form.”  §§143A.002(a)(1), (b); see supra, at 7.  Because the Fifth Circuit
did not focus on that provision, instead confining its analysis to the law’s
ban  on  “censor[ing]”  a  “user’s  expression”  on  the  platform,  we  do  the
same.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses a case called "MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC" and delves into the legal arguments surrounding a Texas law that restricts social media platforms' content moderation practices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

them.  The Court may choose to disregard our precedents,
but it does not purport to overrule a single one.  As a result,
today’s decision surely marks an embarrassing new entry
into  the  anticanon  of  Indian  law.    But  its  mistakes  need
not—and should not—be repeated.

III

Doubtless  for  some  of  these  reasons,  even  the  Court
ultimately  abandons  its  suggestion  that  Oklahoma  is
“inherent[ly]”  free  to  prosecute  crimes  by  non-Indians
against  tribal  members  on  a  tribal  reservation  absent  a
federal statute “preempt[ing]” its authority.  Ante, at 15.  In
the  end,  the  Court  admits  that  tribal  sovereignty  can
require  the  exclusion  of  state  authority  even  absent  a
preemptive  federal  statute.  Ante,  at  18.  But  then,  after
correcting  course,  the  Court  veers  off  once  more.  To
determine  whether  tribal  sovereignty  displaces  state
authority  in  a  case  involving  a  non-Indian  defendant  and
an Indian victim on a reservation in Oklahoma, the Court
resorts to a “Bracker balancing” test.  Ibid.  Applying that
test, the Court concludes that Oklahoma’s interests in this
case  outweigh  those  of  the  Cherokee.    All  this,  too,  is
mistaken root and branch.

A

Begin  with  the  most  fundamental  problem.  The  Court
invokes what it calls the “Bracker balancing” test with no
more  appreciation  of  that  decision’s  history  and  context
than it displays in its initial suggestion that the usual rules
of preemption apply to Tribes.  The Court tells us nothing
about  Bracker  itself,  its  reasoning,  or  its  limits.    Perhaps
understandably so, for Bracker never purported to claim for
this  Court  the  raw  power  to  “balance”  away  tribal
sovereignty  in  favor  of  state  criminal  jurisdiction  over
crimes  by  or  against  tribal  members—let  alone  ordain  a
wholly  different  set  of  jurisdictional  rules  than  Congress
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to tribal sovereignty and state criminal jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Syllabus

discussed below weigh strongly in favor of overruling Roe and Casey.
Pp. 39–66.

(1) The nature of the Court’s error.  Like the infamous decision in
Plessy v. Ferguson, Roe was also egregiously wrong and on a collision
course with the Constitution from the day it was decided.  Casey per-
petuated  its  errors,  calling  both  sides  of  the  national  controversy  to
resolve their debate, but in doing so, Casey necessarily declared a win-
ning side.  Those on the losing side—those who sought to advance the
State’s  interest  in  fetal  life—could  no  longer  seek  to  persuade  their
elected  representatives  to  adopt  policies  consistent  with  their  views.
The Court short-circuited the democratic  process by closing it to  the
large number of Americans who disagreed with Roe.  Pp. 43–45.

(2) The  quality  of  the  reasoning.  Without  any  grounding  in  the
constitutional  text,  history,  or  precedent,  Roe  imposed  on  the  entire
country  a  detailed  set  of  rules  for  pregnancy  divided  into  trimesters
much like those that one might expect to find in a statute or regulation.
See 410 U. S., at 163–164.  Roe’s failure even to note the overwhelming
consensus of state laws in effect in 1868 is striking, and what it said
about the common law was simply wrong.  Then, after surveying his-
tory, the opinion spent many paragraphs conducting the sort of fact-
finding that might be undertaken by a legislative committee, and did
not explain why the sources on which it relied shed light on the mean-
ing of the Constitution.  As to precedent, citing a broad array of cases,
the Court found support for a constitutional “right of personal privacy.”
Id., at 152.  But Roe conflated the right to shield information from dis-
closure and the right to make and implement important personal de-
cisions  without  governmental  interference.  See  Whalen  v.  Roe,  429
U. S. 589, 599–600.  None of these decisions involved what is distinc-
tive  about  abortion:  its  effect  on  what  Roe  termed  “potential  life.”
When the Court summarized the basis for the scheme it imposed on
the  country,  it  asserted  that  its  rules  were  “consistent  with,”  among
other things, “the relative weights of the respective interests involved”
and “the demands of the profound problems of the present day.”  Roe,
410 U. S., at 165.  These are precisely the sort of considerations that
legislative  bodies  often  take  into  account  when  they  draw  lines  that
accommodate competing interests.  The scheme Roe produced looked
like  legislation,  and  the  Court  provided  the  sort  of  explanation  that
might be expected from a legislative body.  An even more glaring defi-
ciency  was  Roe’s  failure  to  justify  the  critical  distinction  it  drew  be-
tween pre- and post-viability abortions.  See id., at 163.  The arbitrary
viability  line,  which  Casey  termed  Roe’s  central  rule,  has  not  found
much support among philosophers and ethicists who have attempted
to justify a right to abortion.  The most obvious problem with any such
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the reasoning behind overturning Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
GORSUCH, J., dissenting

agrees, providing two competing theories for its result.  Re-
spectfully, I find neither persuasive and would affirm.

I
  The  Alaska  Native  Claims  Settlement  Act  of  1971
(ANCSA)  sought  to  “settle  all  land  claims  by  Alaska  Na-
tives” by “transfer[ring] $962.5 million in state and federal
funds and approximately 44 million acres of Alaska land to
state-chartered  private  business  corporations”  in  which
Alaska Natives were given shares.  Alaska v. Native Village
of  Venetie  Tribal  Government,  522  U. S.  520,  523–524
(1998); 43 U. S. C. §1601 et seq.  In particular, ANCSA es-
tablished over 200 “Village Corporations” and 12 “Regional
Corporations.”    §§1602,  1606.    The  Village  Corporations
were created to hold and manage “lands, property, funds,
and  other  rights  and  assets  for  and  on  behalf  of  a  Native
village.”  §1602(j).  Meanwhile, shares in the Regional Cor-
porations went to individuals across many different tribes
and villages.  §§1604, 1606(g)(1)(A).  These corporations re-
ceived most of the settlement funds and lands Congress pro-
vided,  assets  they  use  to  “conduct  business  for  profit.”
§§1606(d), 1610–1613; see also Brief for Federal Petitioner
5.  Today, ANCs are involved in oil and gas, mining, mili-
tary contracting, real estate, construction, communications
and  media,  engineering,  plastics,  timber,  and  aerospace
manufacturing, among other things.  GAO, Report to Con-
gressional  Requesters,  Regional  Alaska  Native  Corpora-
tions:  Status  40  Years  After  Establishment,  and  Future
Considerations  (GAO–13–121,  Dec.  2012).    “In  fiscal  year
2017,  ANCs  had  a  combined  net  revenue  of  $9.1  billion.”
Confederated  Tribes  of  Chehalis  Reservation  v.  Mnuchin,
456 F. Supp. 3d 152, 157 (DC 2020).
  Everyone agrees that ANCs are entitled to some CARES
Act  relief.    Already,  they  have  received  benefits  Congress
allocated to corporations, like the Paycheck Protection Pro-
gram.  See Brief for Respondent Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch in the case of Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation. It provides background information on the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) and its impact on Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting

(1997).  If the Court finds it appropriate to adopt this the-
ory, it should own up to what it is doing.5

Many will applaud today’s decision because they agree on
policy grounds with the Court’s updating of Title VII.  But
the  question  in  these  cases  is  not  whether  discrimination
because of sexual orientation or gender identity should be
outlawed.  The  question  is  whether  Congress  did  that  in
1964.

It indisputably did not.

I
A

Title VII, as noted, prohibits discrimination “because of
. . . sex,” §2000e–2(a)(1), and in 1964, it was as clear as clear
could be that this meant discrimination because of the ge-
netic and anatomical characteristics that men and women
have  at  the  time  of  birth.    Determined  searching  has  not
found a single dictionary from that time that defined “sex”
to  mean
identity,  or
“transgender  status.”6  Ante,  at  2.    (Appendix  A,  infra,  to

sexual  orientation,  gender

——————

5 That  is  what  Judge  Posner did  in  the  Seventh  Circuit case  holding
that Title VII prohibits discrimination because of sexual orientation.  See
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Ind., 853 F. 3d 339 (2017) (en
banc).  Judge Posner agreed with that result but wrote:

“I  would  prefer  to  see  us  acknowledge  openly  that  today  we,  who  are
judges rather than members of Congress, are imposing on a half-century-
old statute a meaning of ‘sex discrimination’ that the Congress that en-
acted it would not have accepted.”  Id., at 357 (concurring opinion) (em-
phasis added).

6 The Court does not define what it means by “transgender status,” but
the American Psychological Association describes “transgender” as “[a]n
umbrella  term  encompassing  those  whose  gender  identities  or  gender
roles  differ  from  those  typically  associated  with  the  sex  they  were  as-
signed at birth.”  A Glossary: Defining Transgender Terms, 49 Monitor
on Psychology 32 (Sept. 2018), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2018/09/ce-
corner-glossary.    It  defines  “gender  identity”  as  “[a]n  internal  sense  of
being male, female or something else, which may or may not correspond
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

BROWN v. DAVENPORT

Opinion of the Court

state  court  may  reject  the  petitioner’s  claims  after  a  fair
hearing.  No appellate court, including this one, may see fit
to reverse that final judgment.  Yet still, Brown suggested,
a  federal  district  court  approaching  the  same  case  years
later  should  be  free  to  decide  de novo  whether  the  state-
court  proceedings  “resulted  in  a  satisfactory  conclusion”
and to issue habeas relief if that conclusion is found want-
ing.  Id., at 463; see also Wright, 505 U. S., at 287–288 (plu-
rality  opinion).  The  traditional  distinction  between  juris-
dictional defects and mere errors in adjudication no longer
restrained federal habeas courts.  Full-blown constitutional
error correction became the order of the day.

This shift did not go unnoticed.  Concurring only in the
result, Justice Jackson contended that the Court’s decision
“trivializ[ed]  . . .  the  writ”  and  was  inconsistent  with  the
presumption of finality that traditionally attached to crim-
inal convictions.  Brown, 344 U. S., at 536, 543.  He warned,
too, that the Court’s ruling threatened “haystack[s]” of new
habeas petitions—and that federal courts would struggle to
identify  the  meritorious  “needle[s]”  among  them.    Id.,  at
537.  Over the ensuing years, that prediction proved presci-
ent:  Federal courts struggled with an exploding caseload of
habeas  petitions  from state  prisoners.    See, e.g.,  Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 274, n. 37 (1973) (Powell,
J.,  concurring)  (“In  1971  . . .  state  prisoners  alone  filed
7,949 petitions for habeas in federal district courts, over 14
times the number filed when Mr. Justice Jackson voiced his
misgivings”);  B. Garrett  &  L.  Kovarsky,  Federal  Habeas
Corpus 135–136 (2013) (documenting the rise of habeas fil-
ings by state prisoners).2

——————

2 The dissent does not dispute that habeas courts refused to engage in
full-blown constitutional error correction at the time of the founding.  But
it contends the practice became the norm by some (unspecified) point in
the “mid-19th century.”  Post, at 2–3 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  The dissent’s
revisionist  account  contradicts  this  Court’s  understanding.    See,  e.g.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the evolution of habeas corpus law. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

13

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

not suggest that the State had targeted Cohen to suppress
his  view  itself  (i.e.,  his  sharp  distaste  for  the  draft),  such
that it would have accepted an equally colorful statement
of praise for the draft (or hostility toward war protesters).
Rather,  the  Court  suggested  that  the  State  had  simply
engaged  in  what  later  courts  would  more  precisely  call
viewpoint-neutral  content  discrimination—it  had  regu-
lated “the form or content of individual expression.”  Id., at
24; see id., at 25–26.

Cohen  also  famously  recognized  that  “words  are  often
chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force,”
id., at 26, and that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric,”
id.,  at  25.  That  is  all  consistent  with  observing  that  a
plain,  blanket  restriction  on  profanity  (regardless  of  the
idea to which it is attached) is a viewpoint-neutral form of
content discrimination.  The essence of Cohen’s discussion
is that profanity can serve to tweak (or amplify) the view-
point that a message expresses, such that it can be hard to
disentangle  the  profanity  from  the  underlying  message—
without the profanity, the message is not quite the same.
See  id.,  at  25–26.  But  those  statements  merely  reinforce
that  profanity  is  still  properly  understood  as  protected
First Amendment content.  See also R. A. V., 505 U. S., at
384–385.  Cohen’s  discussion  does  not  also  go  further  to
declare, as Brunetti suggests, that a provision that treats
all instances of profanity equally is nevertheless by nature
an  instance  of  “the  government  target[ing]  . . .  particular
views  taken  by  speakers  on  a  subject.”  Rosenberger,  515
U. S., at 829.  To be sure, such a restriction could have the
incidental  effect  of  tamping  down  the  overall  volume  of
debate  on  all  sides.  But  differential  effects  alone,  as  ex-
plained  above,  do  not  render  a  restriction  viewpoint  (or
even  content)  discriminatory.  See  Ward,  491  U. S.,  at
791–792.8

——————

8 That does not mean, of course, that a government may elude harsher
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal opinion, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the case of Cohen v. California and the First Amendment implications of profanity.  The language is formal and legalistic, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

STANDING AKIMBO, LLC v. UNITED STATES

Statement of THOMAS, J.

prevent disclosure of relevant records held by the State.6  In
other words, petitioners have found that the Government’s
willingness  to  often  look  the  other  way  on  marijuana  is
more episodic than coherent.

This  disjuncture  between  the  Government’s  recent  lais-
sez-faire policies on marijuana and the actual operation of
specific laws is not limited to the tax context.  Many mari-
juana-related  businesses  operate  entirely  in  cash  because
federal  law  prohibits  certain  financial  institutions  from
knowingly accepting deposits from or providing other bank
services to businesses that violate federal law.  Black & Ga-
leazzi, Cannabis Banking: Proceed With Caution, American
Bar Assn., Feb. 6, 2020.  Cash-based operations are under-
standably enticing to burglars and robbers.  But, if mariju-
ana-related  businesses,  in  recognition  of  this,  hire  armed
guards for protection, the owners and the guards might run
afoul of a federal law that imposes harsh penalties for using
a  firearm  in  furtherance  of  a  “drug  trafficking  crime.”  18
U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A).  A marijuana user similarly can find
himself  a  federal  felon  if  he  just  possesses  a  firearm.
§922(g)(3).  Or petitioners and similar businesses may find
themselves on the wrong side of a civil suit under the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.  See, e.g.,
Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, 859 F. 3d 865, 876–
877 (CA10 2017) (permitting such a suit to proceed).

I could go on.  Suffice it to say, the Federal Government’s
current approach to marijuana bears little resemblance to
——————

6 In their petition for a writ of certiorari, petitioners contend that the
lack of a deduction for ordinary business expenses causes the tax to fall
outside the Sixteenth Amendment’s authorization of “taxes on incomes.”
Therefore, they contend the tax is unconstitutional.  That argument im-
plicates several difficult questions, including the differences between “di-
rect”  and  “indirect”  taxes  and  how  to  interpret  the  Sixteenth  Amend-
ment.  Cf. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567
U. S. 519, 570–571 (2012); Taft v. Bowers, 278 U. S. 470, 481–482 (1929).
In light of the still-developing nature of the dispute below, I agree with
the Court’s decision not to delve into these questions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the statement of Justice Thomas in the case of STANDING AKIMBO, LLC v. UNITED STATES. It delves into the complexities and inconsistencies of federal marijuana laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

FRIEDMAN v. HIGHLAND PARK

THOMAS, J., dissenting

concluded, the ordinance “may increase the public’s sense
of  safety,”  which  alone  is  “a  substantial  benefit.”    Id.,
at  412.  Heller,  however,  forbids  subjecting  the  Second
Amendment’s “core protection . . . to a freestanding ‘interest-
balancing’  approach.”  Heller,  supra,  at  634.    This  case
illustrates why.  If a broad ban on firearms can be upheld
based on conjecture that the public might feel safer (while
being  no  safer  at  all),  then  the  Second  Amendment  guar-
antees nothing.

III
The  Court’s  refusal  to review  a  decision  that  flouts  two
of  our  Second  Amendment  precedents  stands  in  marked
contrast  to  the  Court’s  willingness  to  summarily  reverse
courts  that  disregard  our  other  constitutional  decisions.
E.g.,  Maryland  v.  Kulbicki,  ante,  at  1  (per  curiam)  (sum-
marily  reversing  because  the  court  below  applied  Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), “in name only”);
Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U. S. ___ (2015) (per curiam)
(summarily  reversing  a  judgment  inconsistent  with  this
Court’s  recent  Fourth  Amendment  precedents);  Martinez
v. Illinois, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (per curiam) (slip op.,
at  10)  (summarily  reversing  judgment  that  rested  on  an
“understandable”  double  jeopardy  holding  that  nonethe-
less “r[an] directly counter to our precedents”).

There is no basis for a different result when our Second
Amendment precedents are at stake.  I would grant certio-
rari  to  prevent  the  Seventh  Circuit  from  relegating  the
Second Amendment to a second-class right.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically focusing on the Second Amendment. It presents legal arguments and cites previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ANIMAL SCIENCE PRODUCTS, INC. v.
HEBEI WELCOME PHARMACEUTICAL CO.
Opinion of the Court

engage  in  its  own  research  and  consider  any  relevant
material thus found,” Advisory Committee’s 1966 Note on
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 44.1, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 892 (herein-
after  Advisory  Committee’s  Note).    Because  the  Second
Circuit  ordered  dismissal  of  this  case  on  the  ground  that
the foreign government’s statements could not be gainsaid,
we  vacate  that  court’s  judgment  and  remand  the  case  for
further consideration.

I
  Petitioners,  U. S.-based  purchasers  of  vitamin  C  (here-
inafter  U. S.  purchasers),  filed  a  class-action  suit  against
four  Chinese  corporations  that  manufacture  and  export
the  nutrient  (hereinafter  Chinese  sellers).    The  U. S.
purchasers  alleged  that  the  Chinese  sellers,  two  of  whom
are  respondents  here,  had  agreed  to  fix  the  price  and
quantity  of  vitamin  C  exported  to  the  United States from
China,  in  violation  of  §1  of  the  Sherman  Act,  15  U. S. C.
§1.  More particularly, the U. S. purchasers stated that the
Chinese  sellers  had  formed  a  cartel  “facilitated  by  the
efforts  of  their  trade  association,”  the  Chamber  of  Com-
merce  of  Medicines  and  Health  Products  Importers  and
Exporters  (Chamber).    Complaint  in  No.  1:05–CV–453,
Docket  No.  1,  ¶43.    The  Judicial  Panel  on  Multidistrict
Litigation  consolidated  the  instant  case  and  related  suits
for  pretrial  proceedings  in  the  United  States  District
Court for the Eastern District of New York.
  The  Chinese  sellers  moved  to  dismiss  the  U. S.  pur-
chasers’ complaint on the ground that Chinese law required
them  to  fix  the  price  and  quantity  of  vitamin  C  exports.
Therefore,  the  Chinese  sellers  urged,  they  are  shielded
from liability under U. S. antitrust law by the act of state
doctrine,  the  foreign  sovereign  compulsion  doctrine,  and
principles  of  international  comity.    The  Ministry  of  Com-
merce of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  (Ministry)  filed  a
brief  as  amicus  curiae  in  support  of  the  Chinese  sellers’
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of ANIMAL SCIENCE PRODUCTS, INC. v. HEBEI WELCOME PHARMACEUTICAL CO. It sets the context of the case and the arguments presented.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.
v. GOLDSMITH
Syllabus

alternative, fair use.  Goldsmith counterclaimed for infringement.  The
District Court considered the four fair use factors in 17 U. S. C. §107
and granted AWF summary judgment on its defense of fair use.  The
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that all four fair use factors favored
Goldsmith.  In this Court, the sole question presented is whether the
first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes,” §107(1), weighs in favor of AWF’s recent commercial
licensing to Condé Nast.

Held: The  “purpose  and  character”  of  AWF’s  use  of  Goldsmith’s  photo-
graph in commercially licensing Orange Prince to Condé Nast does not
favor AWF’s fair use defense to copyright infringement.  Pp. 12–38.

(a) AWF contends that the Prince Series works are “transformative,”
and that the first fair use factor thus weighs in AWF’s favor, because
the works convey a different meaning or message than the photograph.
But  the  first  fair  use  factor  instead  focuses  on  whether  an  allegedly
infringing use has a further purpose or different character, which is a
matter of degree, and the degree of difference must be weighed against
other considerations, like commercialism.  Although new expression,
meaning, or message may be relevant to whether a copying use has a
sufficiently distinct purpose or character, it is not, without more, dis-
positive of the first factor.  Here, the specific use of Goldsmith’s photo-
graph alleged to infringe her copyright is AWF’s licensing of Orange
Prince to Condé Nast.  As portraits of Prince used to depict Prince in
magazine  stories  about  Prince,  the  original  photograph  and  AWF’s
copying  use  of  it  share  substantially  the  same  purpose.    Moreover,
AWF’s use is of a commercial nature.  Even though Orange Prince adds
new expression to Goldsmith’s photograph, in the context of the chal-
lenged use, the first fair use factor still favors Goldsmith.  Pp. 12–27.
(1) The Copyright Act encourages creativity by granting to the crea-
tor of an original work a bundle of rights that includes the rights to
reproduce the copyrighted work and to prepare derivative works.  17
U. S. C. §106.  Copyright, however, balances the benefits of incentives
to create against the costs of restrictions on copying.  This balancing
act is reflected in the common-law doctrine of fair use, codified in §107,
which provides: “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship,
or  research,  is  not  an  infringement  of  copyright.”    To  determine
whether a particular use is “fair,” the statute enumerates four factors
to be considered.  The factors “set forth general principles, the appli-
cation of which requires judicial balancing, depending upon relevant
circumstances.”  Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 593 U. S. ___, ___.
The first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, in-
cluding whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the case, the legal arguments, and the court's decision.  It is not the actual content of a book and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

23

BREYER, J., dissenting

2d 880, 894 (1972) (collecting sources) (“[C]ruelty of capital
punishment  lies  not  only  in  the  execution  itself  and  the
pain incident thereto, but also in the dehumanizing effects
of  the  lengthy  imprisonment  prior  to  execution  during
which the judicial and administrative procedures essential
to  due  process  of  law  are  carried  out”  (footnote  omitted));
District  Attorney  for  Suffolk  Dist.  v.  Watson,  381  Mass.
648,  673,  411  N.  E.  2d  1274,  1287  (1980)  (Braucher,  J.,
concurring)  (death  penalty  unconstitutional  under  State
Constitution  in  part  because  “[it]  will  be  carried  out  only
after agonizing months and years of uncertainty”); see also
Riley  v.  Attorney  General  of  Jamaica,  [1983]  1  A. C.  719,
734–735  (P.  C.  1982)  (Lord  Scarman,  joined  by  Lord
Brightman, dissenting) (“execution after inordinate delay”
would  infringe  prohibition  against  “cruel  and  unusual
punishments”  in  §10  of  the  “Bill  of  Rights  of  1689,”  the
precursor  to  our  Eighth  Amendment);  Pratt  v.  Attorney
Gen. of Jamaica, [1994] 2 A. C. 1, 4 (P. C. 1993); id., at 32–
33  (collecting  cases  finding  inordinate  delays  unconstitu
tional  or  the  equivalent);  State  v.  Makwanyane  1995  (3)
SA391  (CC)  (S. Afr.);  Catholic  Commission  for  Justice  &
Peace  in  Zimbabwe  v.  Attorney-General,  [1993]  1  Zim.
L. R.  242,  282  (inordinate  delays  unconstitutional);  Soer
ing  v.  United  Kingdom,  11  Eur.  Ct.  H.  R.  (ser.  A),  p.  439
(1989)  (extradition  of  murder  suspect  to  United  States
would violate the European Convention on Human Rights
in light of risk of delay before execution); United States v.
Burns, [2001] 1 S. C. R. 283, 353, ¶123 (similar).

2
The  second  constitutional  difficulty  resulting  from
lengthy  delays  is  that  those  delays  undermine  the  death
penalty’s  penological  rationale,  perhaps  irreparably  so.
The  rationale  for  capital  punishment,  as  for  any  punish
ment, classically rests upon society’s need to secure deter
rence, incapacitation, retribution, or rehabilitation.  Capi
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and excerpt from a dissenting opinion. It contains legal jargon, case names, and references to legal precedents. This type of content is generally not suitable for indexing as it is highly specialized and not meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

among  execution  methods  such  as  hanging,  electrocution,
or lethal injection.”  In re Fed. Bureau of Prisons’ Execution
Protocol Cases, 955 F. 3d 106, 113 (CADC 2020) (Execution
Protocol Cases I) (Katsas, J., concurring).  Others read the
FDPA  to  incorporate  nearly  all  state  execution  protocols,
including  those  details  that  precede  the  execution  itself.
See Order in In re Fed. Bureau of Prisons’ Execution Proto-
col Cases, No. 20–5361, at 4–5 (CADC, Dec. 10, 2020) (en
banc)  (per curiam)  (Execution  Protocol  Cases  II)  (Wilkins,
J.,  dissenting);  see  also  Execution  Protocol  Cases  I,  955
F. 3d,  at  149,  151  (Tatel,  J.,  dissenting).1   This  Court  has
yet to say which interpretation is correct.  See Mitchell v.
United States, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (SOTOMAYOR, J., re-
specting denial of application for stay) (slip op., at 2) (call-
ing  for  the  Court  to  “address  this  issue  in  an  appropriate
case”).  Worse,  the  Court  has  actively  prevented  lower
courts from providing definitive answers themselves.  Just
four days ago, the D. C. Circuit granted Lisa Montgomery a
stay of her execution so it could decide this issue en banc.
See Order in Montgomery v. Rosen, No. 21–5001 (Jan. 11,
2011) (en banc).  This Court vacated that stay without ex-
planation.  Montgomery was executed hours later.

Another outstanding question concerns the FDPA’s pro-
vision  that  “[a]  sentence  of  death  shall  not  be  carried  out
upon a person who is [intellectually disabled].”  18 U. S. C.
§3596(c).  Alfred  Bourgeois  and  Corey  Johnson  presented
substantial evidence that they were intellectually disabled

——————

1  Other  judges  and  courts  have  taken  different  positions  along  this
spectrum.  See Execution Protocol Cases I, 955 F. 3d, at 134 (Rao, J., con-
curring); Order in Montgomery v. Rosen, No. 21–5001, pp. 7–8 (CADC,
Jan. 11, 2021) (Millett, J., dissenting); United States v. Vialva, 976 F. 3d
458,  462  (CA5  2020)  (per  curiam);  LeCroy  v.  United  States,  975  F.  3d
1192, 1198 (CA11 2020) (“Whatever that phrase means, we are confident
that  it  does  not  extend  to  ensuring  a  lawyer’s  presence  at  execution”);
United  States  v.  Mitchell,  971  F.  3d  993,  996–997  (CA9  2020)  (per  cu-
riam); Peterson v. Barr, 965 F. 3d 549, 554 (CA7 2020).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 592 U.S. ____ (2021). Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and content of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

that alien’s removal from the United States.”  533 U. S., at 689.  The
bond hearing requirements articulated by the Third Circuit, however,
reach  substantially  beyond  the  limitation  on  detention  authority
Zadvydas recognized.  Zadvydas does not require, and Jennings v. Ro-
driguez, 583 U. S. ___, does not permit, the Third Circuit’s application
of the canon of constitutional avoidance.  Pp. 6–8.

(c) Constitutional  challenges

to  prolonged  detention  under
§1231(a)(6)  were  not  addressed  below,  in  part  because  those  courts
read §1231(a)(6) to require a bond hearing.  Arteaga-Martinez’s alter-
native  theory  that  he  is  presumptively  entitled  to  release  under
Zadvydas also was not addressed below.  The Court leaves these argu-
ments for the lower courts to consider in the first instance.  See Cutter
v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7.  Pp. 8–10.

Reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT,
JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH,
J., joined as to Part I.  BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court decision.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GONZALES v. O CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE
UNIAO DO VEGETAL
Opinion of the Court

Court  looked  beyond  broadly  formulated  interests  justify-
ing the general applicability of government mandates and
scrutinized  the asserted harm of granting specific exemp-
tions  to  particular  religious  claimants.  In  Yoder,  for  ex-
ample,  we  permitted  an  exemption  for  Amish  children
from a compulsory school attendance law.  We recognized
that  the  State  had  a  “paramount”  interest  in  education,
but held that “despite its admitted validity in the general-
ity  of  cases,  we  must  searchingly  examine  the  interests
that the State seeks to promote . . . and the impediment to
those  objectives  that  would  flow  from  recognizing  the
claimed Amish exemption.”  406 U. S., at 213, 221 (empha-
sis added).  The Court explained that the State needed “to
show  with  more  particularity  how  its  admittedly  strong
interest  . . .  would  be  adversely  affected  by  granting  an
exemption to the Amish.”  Id., at 236 (emphasis added).

In  Sherbert,  the  Court  upheld  a  particular  claim  to  a
religious  exemption  from  a  state  law  denying  unemploy-
ment benefits to those who would not work on Saturdays,
but explained that it was not announcing a constitutional
right  to  unemployment  benefits  for  “all  persons  whose
religious  convictions  are  the  cause  of  their  unemploy-
ment.”  374  U. S.,  at  410  (emphasis  added).    The  Court
distinguished  the  case  “in  which  an  employee’s  religious
convictions serve to make him a nonproductive member of
society.”
Ibid.;  see  also  Smith,  494  U. S.,  at  899
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (strict scrutiny “at
least  requires  a  case-by-case  determination  of  the  ques-
tion,  sensitive  to  the  facts  of  each  particular  claim”).
Outside  the  Free  Exercise  area  as  well,  the  Court  has
noted  that  “[c]ontext  matters”  in  applying  the  compelling
interest test, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 327 (2003),
and has emphasized that “strict scrutiny does take ‘relevant
differences’  into  account—indeed,  that  is  its  fundamental
purpose,” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200,
228 (1995).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt discussing the Free Exercise Clause and the compelling interest test. It provides legal precedent and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

therefore reverse the judgments below and remand with in-
structions to dissolve the nationwide injunctions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a court opinion. It's sequential and contains meaningful legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

9

Opinion of the Court

Glossip, Benjamin Cole, John Grant, and Warner—filed a
motion  for  a  preliminary  injunction.  All  four  men  had
been convicted of murder and sentenced to death by Okla-
homa  juries.  Glossip  hired  Justin  Sneed  to  kill  his  em-
ployer,  Barry  Van  Treese.    Sneed  entered  a  room  where
Van  Treese  was  sleeping  and  beat  him  to  death  with  a
baseball  bat.    See  Glossip  v.  State,  2007  OK  CR  12,  157
P. 3d  143,  147–149.    Cole  murdered  his  9-month-old
daughter  after  she  would  not  stop  crying.    Cole  bent  her
body backwards until he snapped her spine in half.  After
the child died, Cole played video games.  See Cole v. State,
2007 OK CR 27, 164 P. 3d 1089, 1092–1093.  Grant, while
serving  terms  of  imprisonment  totaling  130  years,  killed
Gay  Carter,  a  prison  food  service  supervisor,  by  pulling
her  into  a  mop  closet  and  stabbing  her  numerous  times
with  a  shank.  See  Grant  v.  State,  2002  OK  CR  36,  58
P. 3d 783, 789.  Warner anally raped and murdered an 11-
month-old  girl.  The  child’s  injuries  included  two  skull
fractures, internal brain injuries, two fractures to her jaw,
a  lacerated  liver,  and  a  bruised  spleen  and  lungs.    See
Warner v. State, 2006 OK CR 40, 144 P. 3d 838, 856–857.
The  Oklahoma  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  affirmed  the
murder  conviction  and  death  sentence  of  each  offender.
Each  of  the  men  then  unsuccessfully  sought  both  state
postconviction  and  federal  habeas  corpus  relief.    Having
exhausted  the  avenues  for  challenging  their  convictions
and  sentences,  they  moved  for  a  preliminary  injunction
against Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol.

B

In  December  2014,  after  discovery,  the  District  Court
held  a  3-day  evidentiary  hearing  on  the  preliminary  in-
junction motion.  The District Court heard testimony from
17 witnesses and reviewed numerous exhibits.  Dr. David
Lubarsky,  an  anesthesiologist,  and  Dr.  Larry  Sasich,  a
doctor  of  pharmacy,  provided  expert  testimony  about
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Glossip et al. vs. the State of Oklahoma. It outlines the background of the case, the crimes committed by the defendants, and their legal proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

573

Opinion of the Court

peals’ determination that § 954(d)(1), on its face, impermissi-
bly discriminates on the basis of viewpoint and is void for
vagueness under the First and Fifth Amendments. We con-
clude that § 954(d)(1) is facially valid, as it neither inherently
interferes with First Amendment rights nor violates consti-
tutional vagueness principles.

I
A

.

With the establishment of the NEA in 1965, Congress em-
barked on a “broadly conceived national policy of support for
. arts in the United States,” see § 953(b), pledging
the .
federal funds to “help create and sustain not only a climate
encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry
but also the material conditions facilitating the release of . . .
§ 951(7). The enabling statute vests the
creative talent.”
NEA with substantial discretion to award grants; it identi-
ﬁes only the broadest funding priorities, including “artis-
tic and cultural signiﬁcance, giving emphasis to American
“professional excel-
creativity and cultural diversity,”
lence,” and the encouragement of “public knowledge, educa-
tion, understanding, and appreciation of the arts.” See
§§ 954(c)(1)–(10).

Applications for NEA funding are initially reviewed by
advisory panels composed of experts in the relevant ﬁeld of
the arts. Under the 1990 amendments to the enabling stat-
ute, those panels must reﬂect “diverse artistic and cultural
points of view” and include “wide geographic, ethnic, and
minority representation,” as well as “lay individuals who are
knowledgeable about the arts.”
§§ 959(c)(1)–(2). The pan-
els report to the 26-member National Council on the Arts
(Council), which,
in turn, advises the NEA Chairperson.
The Chairperson has the ultimate authority to award grants
but may not approve an application as to which the Council
has made a negative recommendation.

§ 955(f).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 569 (1998). It discusses the constitutionality of a section of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) enabling statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS

ALITO, J., dissenting

In sum, all of these authorities point, not to the majority’s
new  rule,  but  to  the  same  ordinary  questions  we  ask  in
every case—whether the plaintiff has a concrete, traceable,
and redressable injury.

C
Despite the majority’s capacious understanding of execu-
tive discretion, today’s opinion assures the reader that the
decision “do[es] not suggest that federal courts may never
entertain  cases  involving  the  Executive  Branch’s  alleged
failure to make more arrests or bring more prosecutions,”
despite its otherwise broad language covering the “exercise
of enforcement discretion over whether to arrest or prose-
cute.”  Ante,  at  5,  9.    The  majority  lists  five  categories  of
cases in which a court would—or at least might—have Ar-
ticle  III  jurisdiction  to  entertain  a  challenge  to  arrest  or
prosecution policies, but this list does nothing to allay con-
cern about the Court’s new path.  The Court does not iden-
tify any characteristics that are shared by all these catego-
ries and that distinguish them from cases in which it would
not find standing.  In addition, the Court is unwilling to say
that  cases  in  four  of  these  five  categories  are actually  ex-
empted from its general rule, and the one remaining cate-
gory  is  exceedingly  small.  I  will  discuss  these  categories
one by one.

First,  the  majority  distinguishes  “selective-prosecution”
suits by a plaintiff “to prevent his or her own prosecution,”
ante,  at  9.  But  such  claims  are ordinarily  brought  as  de-
fenses  in  ongoing  prosecutions,  as  in  the  cases  the  Court
cites, and are rarely brought in standalone actions where a
plaintiff  must  prove  standing.    This  category  is  therefore
little more than a footnote to the Court’s general rule.

Second, the majority grants that “the standing analysis
might differ when Congress elevates de facto injuries to the
status of legally cognizable injuries,” and it hypothesizes a
situation  in  which  Congress  “(i)  specifically  authorize[s]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of United States v. Texas. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding standing in cases involving the Executive Branch's enforcement discretion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

37

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

After  exhaustive  evidence-gathering  and  deliberative
process,  Congress  reauthorized  the  VRA,  including  the
coverage provision, with overwhelming bipartisan support.
It  was  the  judgment  of  Congress  that  “40  years  has  not
been a sufficient amount of time to eliminate the vestiges
of  discrimination  following  nearly  100  years  of  disregard
for the dictates of the 15th amendment and to ensure that
the right of all citizens to vote is protected as guaranteed
by  the  Constitution.”    2006  Reauthorization  §2(b)(7),  120
Stat.  577.  That  determination  of  the  body  empowered  to
enforce  the  Civil  War  Amendments  “by  appropriate  legis
lation”  merits  this  Court’s  utmost  respect.    In  my  judg
ment,  the  Court  errs  egregiously  by  overriding  Congress’
decision.

*
For  the  reasons  stated,  I  would  affirm  the  judgment  of

*

*

the Court of Appeals.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It presents legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GE ENERGY POWER CONVERSION FRANCE SAS
v. OUTOKUMPU STAINLESS USA, LLC
Opinion of the Court

them).”  Arthur  Andersen  LLP  v.  Carlisle,  556  U. S.  624,
630 (2009).

The “traditional principles of state law” that apply under
Chapter 1 include doctrines that authorize the enforcement
of a contract by a nonsignatory.  Id., at 631 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  For example, we have recognized that
arbitration agreements may be enforced by nonsignatories
through “ ‘assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego,
incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories,
waiver and estoppel.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting 21 R. Lord, Williston
on Contracts §57:19, p. 183 (4th ed. 2001)).

This  case  implicates  domestic  equitable  estoppel  doc-
trines.  Generally, in the arbitration context, “equitable es-
toppel  allows  a  nonsignatory  to  a  written  agreement  con-
taining an arbitration clause to compel arbitration where a
signatory to the written agreement must rely on the terms
of that agreement in asserting its claims against the non-
signatory.”  Id., at 200 (2017).  In Arthur Andersen, we rec-
ognized that Chapter 1 of the FAA permits a nonsignatory
to rely on state-law equitable estoppel doctrines to enforce
an arbitration agreement.  556 U. S., at 631–632.

B
The  New  York  Convention  is  a  multilateral  treaty  that
addresses  international  arbitration.  21  U. S. T.  2517,
T. I. A. S. No. 6997.  It focuses almost entirely on arbitral
awards.  Article I(1) describes the Convention as applying
only  to  “the  recognition  and  enforcement  of  arbitral
awards.”  Id., at 2519.  Articles III, IV, and V contain recog-
nition  and  enforcement  obligations  related  to  arbitral
awards  for  contracting  states  and  for  parties  seeking  the
enforcement of arbitral awards.  Id., at 2519–2520.  Article
VI addresses when an award can be set aside or suspended.
Id., at 2520.  And Article VII(1) states that the “Convention
shall  not  . . .  deprive  any  interested  party  of  any  right  he
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of arbitration agreements and equitable estoppel doctrines. It cites legal precedents and delves into the interpretation of legal treaties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

767

Counsel

Attorneys General, David M. Rocchio, Special Assistant At-
torney General, Ronald A. Shems, and Carter G. Phillips.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
respondent United States. With him on the briefs were So-
licitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Malcolm
L. Stewart, Michael F. Hertz, Douglas N. Letter, and Michael
E. Robinson.

Theodore B. Olson argued the cause for respondent Ste-
vens. With him on the briefs were Thomas G. Hungar,
Miguel A. Estrada, Stephen J. Soule, Matthew E. C. Pifer,
and Mark G. Hall.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the State of New
York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Preeta D.
Bansal, Solicitor General, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, and
Howard L. Zwickel, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys
General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama,
Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Mark Pryor of
Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard
Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butter-
worth of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii,
Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Jeffrey A. Modisett of
Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P.
Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of
Maryland, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi,
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana,
Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T.
McLaughlin of New Hampshire, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Pa-
tricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina,
Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A.
Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael
Fisher of Pennsylvania, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Mark
Barnett of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, John Cornyn
of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, Mark L. Earley of Virginia, Christine O.
Gregoire of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and
Gay Woodhouse of Wyoming; for the City of New York et al. by Leonard
J. Koerner, James K. Hahn, Richard A. Devine, Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr.,
Thomas Burnham, Donna M. Lach, Louise H. Renne, and Patrick J. Ma-
honey; for the Alabama Medicaid Agency et al. by Charles A. Miller and
Caroline M. Brown; for the American Medical Association et al. by Jack
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal case information, specifically the beginning of a Supreme Court case citation and the list of attorneys involved. This type of information is generally not considered the main body text of a legal document and is more like metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Attorney Information</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

5

Syllabus

Importantly, there are multiple alternatives available to Congress
that would serve the Government’s interest in preventing circumven-
tion  while  avoiding  “unnecessary  abridgment”  of  First  Amendment
rights.    Buckley,  supra,  at  25.    Such  alternatives  might  include  tar-
geted  restrictions  on  transfers  among  candidates  and  political  com-
mittees, or tighter earmarking rules.  Transfers, after all, are the key
to  the  Government’s  concern  about  circumvention,  but  they  can  be
addressed  without  such  a  direct  and  broad  interference  with  First
Amendment rights.  Pp. 30–35.

(4) Disclosure  of  contributions  also  reduces  the  potential  for
abuse  of  the  campaign  finance  system.
  Disclosure  requirements,
which  are  justified  by  “a  governmental  interest  in  ‘provid[ing]  the
electorate  with  information’  about  the  sources  of  election-related
spending,”  Citizens  United,  supra,  at  367,  may  deter  corruption  “by
exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publici-
ty,”  Buckley,  supra  at  67.    Disclosure  requirements  may  burden
speech,  but  they  often  represent  a  less  restrictive  alternative  to  flat
bans on certain types or quantities of speech.  Particularly with mod-
ern technology, disclosure now offers more robust protections against
corruption than it did when Buckley was decided.  Pp. 35–36.

(d) The Government offers an additional rationale for the aggregate
limits, arguing that the opportunity for corruption exists whenever a
legislator is given a large check, even if the check consists of contri-
butions within the base limits to be divided among numerous candi-
dates  or  committees.    That  rationale  dangerously  broadens  the  cir-
cumscribed definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in prior
cases.  Buckley  confined  its  analysis  to  the  possibility  that  “massive
amounts of money” could be funneled to a particular candidate in ex-
cess  of  the  base  limits.    424  U. S.,  at  38.    Recasting  as  corruption  a
donor’s widely distributed support for a political party would dramat-
ically  expand  government  regulation  of  the  political  process.    And
though  the  Government  suggests  that  solicitation  of  large  contribu-
tions  poses  the  corruption  danger,  the  aggregate  limits  are  not  lim-
ited to any direct solicitation by an officeholder or candidate.  Pp. 36–
39.

 JUSTICE THOMAS agreed that the aggregate limits are invalid under
the First Amendment, but would overrule Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1, and subject BCRA’s aggregate limits to strict scrutiny, which they
would  surely  fail.  Buckley’s  “analytic  foundation  . . .  was  tenuous
from the very beginning and has only continued to erode in the inter-
vening years.”  Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S.
377,  412  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting).    Contributions  and  expenditures
are  simply  “two  sides  of  the  same  First  Amendment  coin,”  and  this
Court’s  efforts  to  distinguish  the  two  have  produced  mere  “word
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing campaign finance regulations and the First Amendment. It presents arguments and reasoning related to the constitutionality of aggregate contribution limits.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

29

GORSUCH, J., concurring

418; see also Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259,
270 (1876) (quoting Holliday and echoing this point in the
context of the Foreign Commerce Clause).  More than that,
Holliday  recognized  that  this  focus  on  individuals  means
that  Indian  commerce  must  cover  “something  more”  than
just economic exchange.  3 Wall., at 417 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  While it includes “buying and selling and
exchanging commodities,” it also extends to the entire “in-
tercourse  between  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  and
those [T]ribes.”  Ibid.  That “intercourse,” the Court recog-
nized, is “another branch of commerce” with Indians, “and
a very important one” at that.  Ibid.

If the Constitution’s text left any uncertainty about the
scope of Congress’s Indian commerce power, early practice
liquidated it.  The First Congress adopted the initial Indian
Trade  and  Intercourse  Act,  which  prohibited  the  “sale  of
lands made by any Indians” to non-Indians absent a public
treaty.  Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, §4, 1 Stat. 138.  The law
also  extended  criminal  liability  to  non-Indians  who  “com-
mit[ted] any crime upon, or trespass against, the person or
property  of  any  peaceable  and  friendly  Indian”  in  Indian
country.  §5,  ibid.    The  first  of  these  provisions  arguably
addressed a narrow question of commerce.  But the second
“plainly  regulated  noneconomic”  interaction.    A.  Amar,
America’s  Constitution  and  the  Yale  School  of  Constitu-
tional  Interpretation,  115  Yale  L. J.  1997,  2004,  n. 25
(2006).

Despite that fact, the Act (and its successors) were “not
controversial exercises of congressional power.”  N. Newton,
Federal Power Over Indians:  Its Sources, Scope, and Lim-
itations,  132  U. Pa.  L. Rev.  195,  201,  n. 25  (1984).    Any
doubt about their validity “would have been quieted by the
[C]ommerce Clause’s commitment of commerce with the In-
dian [T]ribes to Congress.”  Ibid.  As Justice McLean (riding
circuit) recognized, punishing non-Indians for “committing
violence upon the persons or property of the Indians,” fell
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It cites legal precedents and discusses the scope of Congress's power over Indian commerce.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal resvision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–631
_________________

WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[July 6, 2020]

 JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH  announced  the  judgment  of  the
Court  and  delivered  an  opinion,  in  which  THE  CHIEF
JUSTICE  and  JUSTICE  ALITO  join,  and  in  which  JUSTICE
THOMAS joins as to Parts I and II.

Americans passionately disagree about many things.  But
they are largely united in their disdain for robocalls.  The
Federal Government receives a staggering number of com-
plaints  about  robocalls—3.7  million  complaints  in  2019
alone.  The States likewise field a constant barrage of com-
plaints.

For nearly 30 years, the people’s representatives in Con-
gress have been fighting back.  As relevant here, the Tele-
phone  Consumer  Protection  Act  of  1991,  known  as  the
TCPA,  generally  prohibits  robocalls  to  cell  phones  and
home phones.  But a 2015 amendment to the TCPA allows
robocalls that are made to collect debts owed to or guaran-
teed by the Federal Government, including robocalls made
to collect many student loan and mortgage debts.

This case concerns robocalls to cell phones.  Plaintiffs in
this case are political and nonprofit organizations that want
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the name of the justices involved, and the introduction to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

1043

Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.; Davis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  921,1039

Bayer Corp.; Ronwin v.
827

Bayer Corp.; ValuePest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Bayer Healthcare LLC; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926

Baylor v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991

Bazargani v. Snyder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089

Bazemore v. U. S. District Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
864

Baziruwiha v. Supershuttle International Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Bazzetta v. Caruso  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Bazzetta; Caruso v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  884,1101

Bazzle; Dillard v.
1028

Bazzle; Simmons v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113

B&B Hardware, Inc.; Hargis Industries, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113

. . . . . . . . . .
B&B Hardware, Inc.; Sealtite Building Fasteners v.
820

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beal v. CSX Corp.
1120

Beal v. Levine
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

Beal v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1143

Beard v. Abu-Jamal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932

Beard v. Bond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

Beard; Bond v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

Beard; Cook v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53

Beard v. Kindler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
829

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beard; Miller v.
866

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beard; Williams v.
832

Beaty v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  870,1065

Beaumont Hospital; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1074,1146

Beaver v. McNeil
Becerra-Fuentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

1106

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beck; Karnofel v.
1032

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beckett v. Gansler
906

Beckles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Becnel; O’Dwyer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  944,1090

1151

Bedatsky; Haywood v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Bedford v. Webb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
832

Beeks v. Uribe  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Beggs; Martinez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Beioh; Harley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Belcher; Allen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903

Belcher v. Younger  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

Bell v. Bass-Jones Lesure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Bell v. Norwood  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Bell v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  963,1136

Bell v. United States
973

Belleque; Hampton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
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  <category>Table of Contents</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
10

CARSON v. MAKIN

BREYER, J., dissenting

Maine’s  Constitution  guarantees  Maine’s  children  a  free
public education by requiring that all towns provide “for the
support and maintenance of public schools.”  Art. VIII, pt.
1, §1; see also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, §2(1) (2008).
Because of the State’s rural geography and dispersed popu-
lation, however, over half of Maine’s school districts do not
operate public secondary schools.  App. 70.  To fulfill its con-
stitutional promise, Maine created a program that provides
some  parents  in  these  districts  with  a  monetary  grant  to
help them educate their children “at the public school or the
approved  private  school  of  the  parent’s  choice.”    Me.  Rev.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, §5204(4) (Cum. Supp. 2021).  The pro-
gram’s “function is limited to authorizing the provision of
tuition subsidies to the parents of children who live within
school [districts] that simply do not have the resources to
operate a public school system, and whose children would
otherwise not be given an opportunity to receive a free pub-
lic education.”  Hallissey v. School Administrative Dist. No.
77, 2000 ME 143, ¶16, 755 A. 2d 1068, 1073.

Under Maine law, an “approved” private school must be
“nonsectarian.”  §2951(2).    A  school  fails  to  meet  that  re-
quirement (and is deemed “sectarian”) only if it is both (1)
“ ‘associated with a particular faith or belief system’ ”  and
also (2) “ ‘promotes the faith or belief system with which it
is  associated  and/or  presents  the  [academic]  material
taught  through  the  lens  of  this  faith.’ ”    979  F. 3d,  at  38
(quoting Maine’s then-education commissioner).  To deter-
mine whether a school is sectarian, the “ ‘focus is on what
the school teaches through its curriculum and related activ-
ities, and how the material is presented.’ ”  Ibid. (emphasis
deleted).  “ ‘[A]ffiliation or association with a church or reli-
gious institution . . . is not dispositive’ ” of sectarian status.
Ibid.

The  two  private  religious  schools  at  issue  here  satisfy
both of these criteria.  They are affiliated with a church or
religious organization.  See App. 80, 91.  And they also teach
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Carson v. Makin. It contains legal arguments and references to statutes and previous rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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