<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

423

Opinion of Stevens, J.

them  directly,  we  have  never  cast  doubt  on  laws  that  place
special restrictions on campaign spending by foreign nation
als.  See, e. g., 2 U. S. C. § 441e(a)(1).  And we have consist
ently  approved  laws  that  bar  Government  employees,  but
not  others,  from  contributing  to  or  participating  in  political
activities.  See n. 45, supra.  These statutes burden the po
litical expression of one class of speakers, namely, civil serv
ants.  Yet we have sustained them on the basis of longstand
ing  practice  and  Congress’  reasoned  judgment  that  certain
regulations  which  leave  “untouched  full  participation  . . . in
political  decisions  at  the  ballot  box,”  Civil  Service  Comm’n
v.  Letter Carriers, 413  U. S.  548,  556  (1973)  (internal  quota
tion marks omitted), help ensure that public ofﬁcials are “suf
ﬁciently free from improper inﬂuences,” id., at 564, and that
“conﬁdence  in  the  system  of  representative  Government  is
not . . . eroded to a disastrous extent,” id., at 565.

The  same  logic  applies  to  this  case  with  additional  force
because it is the identity of corporations, rather than individ
uals,  that  the  Legislature  has  taken  into  account.  As  we
have  unanimously  observed,  legislatures  are  entitled  to  de
cide  “that  the  special  characteristics  of  the  corporate  struc
ture  require  particularly  careful  regulation”  in  an  electoral
context.  NRWC,  459  U. S.,  at  209–210.50  Not  only  has  the
distinctive  potential  of  corporations  to  corrupt  the  electoral
process  long  been  recognized,  but  within  the  area  of  cam
paign  ﬁnance,  corporate  spending  is  also  “furthest  from  the
core of political expression, since corporations’ First Amend
ment  speech  and  association  interests  are  derived  largely

over time, id., at 223.  “In short,” I concluded, “Tennessee ha[d] failed to
point to any legitimate interest that would justify its selective regulation
of campaign-related expression.”  Id., at 225.  These criticisms are inap
plicable to the case before us.

50 They  are  likewise  entitled  to  regulate  media  corporations  differently
from  other  corporations  “to  ensure  that  the  law  ‘does  not  hinder  or  pre
vent  the  institutional  press  from  reporting  on,  and  publishing  editorials
about, newsworthy events.’ ”  McConnell, 540 U. S., at 208 (quoting Aus
tin v.  Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 668 (1990)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It discusses the Court's precedent on regulating campaign spending by corporations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1010

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 9, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09M45.  Hoffart  v.  Herman  et  al.  Motion  for  leave  to

proceed  as  a  veteran  denied.

No.  132, Orig.  Alabama  et al.  v.  North Carolina.  Motion
of  the  Solicitor  General  for  leave  to  participate  in  oral  argument
as  amicus  curiae  and  for  divided  argument  granted.  Motion  of
the  parties  for  enlargement  of  time  for  oral  argument  granted
and time allocated as follows: 30 minutes for plaintiffs, 10 minutes
for the Solicitor General, 40 minutes for defendant, and 10 minutes
for  plaintiffs.

[For  earlier  order  herein,  see  ante,  p.  944.]

No. 08–240.  Mac’s Shell Service, Inc., et al. v.  Shell Oil

Products  Co.  LLC  et  al.;  and

No.  08–372.  Shell  Oil  Products  Co.  LLC  et  al.  v.  Mac’s
Shell Service, Inc., et al.  C. A. 1st Cir.
[Certiorari granted,
557 U. S. 903.]  Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to partic
ipate  in  oral  argument  as  amicus  curiae  and  for  divided  argu
ment  granted.

No.  08–304.  Graham  County  Soil  and  Water  Conserva
tion District et al. v.  United States ex rel. Wilson.  C.  A.
4th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 557 U. S. 918.]  Motion of the Solici
tor  General  for  leave  to  participate  in  oral  argument  as  amicus
curiae  and  for  divided  argument  granted.

No.  08–905.  Merck  &  Co.,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  Reynolds  et  al.
C. A. 3d Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 556 U. S. 1257.]  Motion of the
Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami
cus  curiae  and  for  divided  argument  granted.

No.  08–1175.  Florida  v.  Powell.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.

[Certiorari
granted,  557  U. S.  918.]  Motion  of  the  Solicitor  General  for  leave
to  participate  in  oral  argument  as  amicus  curiae  and  for  divided
argument  granted.

No. 08–1214.  Granite Rock Co. v. International Brother
hood of Teamsters et al.  C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted,
557  U. S.  933.]  Motion  of  respondents  for  divided  argument
granted.

No.  09–400.  Staub  v.  Proctor  Hospital.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.
The Solicitor General is invited to ﬁle a brief in this case express
ing  the  views  of  the  United  States.

No.  09–5096.  Howard  v.  Industrial  Commission  of  Ohio
et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Ohio.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their related motions, likely from a legal journal or docket. It's not sequential narrative text and contains legal jargon.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

920

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 8, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–8912. Springer v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-

enue. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8924. Lopez-Murcia v. United States. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 141.

No. 97–8926. Siddall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8929. Greer v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 137 F. 3d 247.

No. 97–8945. Gant v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 1261.

No. 97–8955. Nelson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 895.

No. 97–8956. Kirby v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1189.

No. 97–8957. Castro-Nino v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 930.

No. 97–8958. Roper v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 430.

No. 97–8959. Lee v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 120 F. 3d 263.

No. 97–8969. Smith v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 737.

No. 97–8970. Allen v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 144.

No. 97–8971. Harakal v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 320.

No. 97–8972. Mezzetta v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 265.

No. 97–8974. Harding v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 41.

No. 97–8982. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 676.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

gaming laws and regulations” would “operate as surrogate
federal  law  on  the  Tribe’s  reservation.”    Ysleta  del  Sur
Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F. 3d 1325, 1326, 1334 (1994) (Ysleta I).
A  quarter  century  of  confusion  and  litigation  followed.
Repeatedly, the Tribe sought to conduct gaming operations
within the confines of Ysleta I at its Speaking Rock Enter-
tainment Center, which houses restaurants, bars, and con-
cert venues.  Repeatedly, Texas argued that the Tribe’s ac-
tivities exceeded the Fifth Circuit’s mandate.  Faced with
these disputes, lower courts experimented with a variety of
approaches:  enjoining all on-reservation gaming, instruct-
ing  the  Tribe  to  seek  licenses  from  Texas  regulators,  and
even requiring the Tribe to obtain preapproval from a fed-
eral court before offering any new gaming operations.  One
court described this process as having “transformed [it] into
a quasi-regulatory body overseeing and monitoring the mi-
nutiae  of  the  [Tribe’s]  gaming-related  conduct.”    Texas  v.
Ysleta  del  Sur  Pueblo,  2016  WL  3039991,  *19  (WD  Tex.,
May 27, 2016).

D
The  current  case  represents  just  the  latest  in  this  long
line.  In 2016, the Tribe began offering bingo.  On its view,
it was free to offer at least this game because IGRA treats
bingo  as  a  class  II  game  for  which  no  state  permission  is
required so long as the State permits the game to be played
on  some  terms  by  some  persons.
  See  25  U. S. C.
§ 2710(b)(1)(A).    Citing  IGRA,  the  Tribe  did  not  just  offer
the sort of bingo played in church halls across the country.
It also offered “electronic bingo,” a game in which patrons
sit at “machines [that] look similar to a traditional slot ma-
chine.”  2019  WL  639971,  *5  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  Unlike typical slot machines, however, “the un-
derlying game is run using historical bingo draws.”  Ibid.

The State responded by seeking to shut down all of the
Tribe’s bingo operations.  Whatever IGRA may allow, Texas
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing a case involving gaming laws and regulations on a Native American reservation. It delves into the history of the case, the arguments presented by both parties, and the specific gaming activities in question.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

“(B)  if  death  results  from  the  use  of  such  ammuni-

tion—

“(i)  if  the  killing  is  murder  (as  defined  in  section
1111), be punished by death or sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and

“(ii) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in sec-
tion  1112),  be  punished  as  provided  in  section  1112.”
(Emphasis added.)

According to the Government, §924(c)(5) adds two penalties
together when death results: Someone convicted of murder
resulting from the use of such ammunition faces a 15-year
mandatory minimum sentence under §924(c)(5)(A) plus an
additional sentence for murder under §924(c)(5)(B)(i).  Tr.
of Oral Arg. 27, 31.

But subsection (j) is cast from a different mold.  Section
924(c)(5) groups the two penalties together and joins them
with the word “and.”  In contrast, several unrelated subsec-
tions separate subsections (c) and (j) structurally, and noth-
ing joins their penalties textually.  So even if those features
of §924(c)(5) make it operate as the Government contends,
those aspects of §924(c)(5) are missing from subsection (j).
In the Government’s own telling, then, §924(c)(5) shows
how Congress could have constructed penalties that might
ultimately add together.  Yet Congress did not implement
that design in subsection (j).

Equally  unavailing  is  the  Government’s  invocation  of
double jeopardy principles.  According to the Government’s
brief, “Section 924(j) amounts to the ‘same offense’ as Sec-
tion 924(c) for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause,” so
“a  defendant  may  be  punished  for  either  a  Section  924(c)
offense or a Section 924(j) offense, but not both.”  Brief for
United  States  22–26  (emphasis  added;  alterations  and
some internal quotation marks omitted).  The Government
argues that this conception of double jeopardy confirms sub-
section (j) incorporates all of subsection (c).  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of subsections (c) and (j) of a statute (likely related to firearms).  The language is formal and legalistic, referencing specific sections and court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Syllabus

596 U. S. ___, ___.  The district court is not required to articulate any-
thing  more  than  a  brief  statement  of  reasons.    See  Rita  v.  United
States, 551 U. S. 338, 356.

The broad discretion that the First Step Act affords to district courts
also  counsels  in  favor  of  deferential  appellate  review.    See  Solem  v.
Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 290, n. 16.  Section 404(c) of the First Step Act
confers particular discretion because the Act does not “require a court
to reduce any sentence.”  Other than legal errors in recalculating the
Guidelines to account for the Fair Sentencing Act’s changes, see Gall
v. United States, 552 U. S. 38, 51, appellate review should not be overly
searching.  Pp. 16–18.

991 F. 3d 279, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ.,  joined.  KAVANAUGH, J., filed  a  dis-
senting  opinion,  in  which  ROBERTS, C. J., and  ALITO and  BARRETT, JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi typically summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

BIDEN v. TEXAS

ALITO, J., dissenting

of MPP has contributed to the current border surge” by giv-
ing aliens the “perverse incentiv[e],” id., at 837, App. 196,
to cross the border illegally in hopes of being paroled and
released.  Id.,  at  79.  Thus,  the  Government  is  failing  to
meet the statutory detention mandate, not only because of
limitations on its detention capacity but also because it re-
fuses to use the contiguous-territory return authority.

Other than the argument that “shall” means “may,” the
Government’s only other textual argument is that it is pa-
roling aliens “on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitar-
ian reasons or significant public benefit,” as permitted un-
der §1182(d)(5)(A).  But the number of aliens paroled each
month under that provision—more than 27,000 in April of
this year5—gives rise to a strong inference that the Govern-
ment is not really making these decisions on a case-by-case
basis.  The  Government  argues  that  respondents  had  the
burden to show that it is not making case-by-case determi-
nations and that they have not met that burden, see Brief
for Petitioners 34, but information about the true nature of
these proceedings is in the Government’s possession, and it
has revealed little about what actually takes place.  At ar-
gument,  however,  the  Solicitor  General  argued  that  the
case-by-case determination requirement can be met simply
by going through a brief checklist for each alien.  See Tr. of
Oral  Arg.  58–60.    Even  the  rudimentary  step  of  verifying
that  an  alien  does  not  have  a  criminal  record  is  not  per-
formed in every case.  Id., at 31.  Such procedures are in-

——————

5 See, e.g., Defendants’ Monthly Report for April 2022 in No. 2:21–cv–
67, ECF Doc. 139, p. 4 (ND Tex., May 16, 2022) (“For the month of April
2022,  DHS  reported  that  the  total  number  of  applicants  for  admission
under Section 1225 paroled into the United States was 91,250.  This fig-
ure combines  88,452  [Customs  and  Border  Patrol]  grants  of  parole  . . .
and 27,654 individuals ‘. . . Paroled into the U. S. on a case-by-case basis
pursuant to 8 U. S. C. §1182(d)(5)’ ”); see also Defendants’ Monthly Re-
port for March 2022, ECF Doc. 136, p. 3.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U85

[09-14-00 16:49:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

260

HOHN v. UNITED STATES

Scalia, J., dissenting

same precedential effect as does a case decided upon full
Id., at 651, n. 1. But the sole au-
brieﬁng and argument.”
thority cited for that dictum was Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U. S. 651 (1974), which declined to give stare decisis effect,
not to opinions that had been issued without brieﬁng and
argument, but to judgments that had been issued without
opinion—“summary afﬁrmances” that did not “contain any
substantive discussion” of the point at issue or any other
point, id., at 670–671. Such judgments, afﬁrming without
comment the disposition appealed from, were common in the
days when this Court had an extensive mandatory jurisdic-
tion; they carried little more weight than denials of certio-
rari. House, by contrast, was a six-page opinion with sub-
stantive discussion on the point at issue here.
It reasoned:
(1) “Our authority . . . extends only to cases ‘in a circuit court
of appeals . . . .’ ”
(2) “Here the case was never ‘in’ the court
of appeals,” because of (3) “want of a certiﬁcate of probable
324 U. S., at 44.2 And it cited as authority Fergu-
cause.”
son v. District of Columbia, 270 U. S. 633 (1926). The new
rule that the Court today announces—that our opinions ren-
dered without full brieﬁng and argument (hitherto thought
to be the strongest indication of certainty in the outcome)
have a diminished stare decisis effect—may well turn out to
be the principal point for which the present opinion will be
It can be expected to affect the treatment of
remembered.
many signiﬁcant per curiam opinions by the lower courts,
and the willingness of Justices to undertake summary dispo-
sition in the future.

2 The concurrence asserts that this analysis was “virtually unreasoned.”
Ante, at 253 (opinion of Souter, J.).
It seems to me, to the contrary, that
there was virtually nothing more to be said. Not until today has anyone
thought that a “case” could consist of a disembodied request to appeal.
The concurrence joins the Court in relying upon a truly eccentric argu-
ment, and then blames the House Court for not discussing this eccentricity
at length.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia. It discusses the precedent set by a previous case and argues against the majority opinion's interpretation of stare decisis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

ALITO, J., dissenting

A
  In  my  view,  there is strong  evidence  that race  played  a
predominant  role  in the  production  of  the  plaintiffs’  illus-
trative maps and that it is most unlikely that a map with
more than one majority-black district could be created with-
out giving race such a role.  An expert hired by the Milligan
plaintiffs, Dr. Kosuke Imai, used a computer algorithm to
create 30,000 potential maps, none of which contained two
majority-black  districts.    See  2  App.  571–572;  Supp.  App.
59, 72.  In fact, in 20,000 of those simulations, Dr. Imai in-
tentionally created one majority-minority district, and yet
even  with  one  majority-minority  district  guaranteed  as  a
baseline, none of those 20,000 attempts produced a second
one.  See 2 App. 571–572; Supp. App. 72.
  Similarly, Dr. Moon Duchin, another expert hired by the
Milligan  plaintiffs,  opined  that  “it  is  hard  to  draw  two
majority-black  districts  by  accident.”    2  App.  714.    Dr.
Duchin  also  referred  to  a  study  where  she  generated  two
million  maps  of  potential  district  configurations  in  Ala-
bama, none of which contained a second majority-minority
district.  Id., at 710.  And the first team of trained mapmak-
ers that plaintiff Milligan consulted was literally unable to
draw  a  two-majority-black-district  map,  even  when  they
tried.  Id., at 511–512.  Milligan concluded at the time that
the feat was impossible.  Id., at 512.
  The majority quibbles about the strength of this evidence,
protesting that Dr. Imai’s studies failed to include as con-
trols  certain  redistricting  criteria  and  that  Dr.  Duchin’s
two-million-map study was based on 2010 census data, see
ante, at 26–27, and nn. 6–7, but this is unconvincing for sev-
eral  reasons.    It  is  plaintiffs’  burden  to  produce  evidence
and  satisfy  the  Gingles  preconditions,  so  if  their  experts’
maps  were  deficient,  that  is  no  strike  against  Alabama.
And the racial demographics of the State changed little be-
tween 2010 and 2020, Supp. App. 82, which is presumably
why Dr. Duchin herself raised the older study in answering
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in a case regarding redistricting. It presents arguments and evidence related to the role of race in the creation of electoral districts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

Moreover, the very same Congress passed both these laws
and  the  unambiguously  worded  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1866
that clearly prohibited discrimination on the basis of race.3
And, as noted above, the proponents of these laws explicitly
sought equal rights without regard to race while disavow-
ing any antisubordination view.

JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  argues  otherwise,  pointing  to  “a
number of race-conscious” federal laws passed around the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment.  Post, at 6
(dissenting opinion).  She identifies the Freedmen’s Bureau
Act of 1865, already discussed above, as one such law, but
she admits that the programs did not benefit blacks exclu-
sively.  She also does not dispute that legislation targeting
the needs of newly freed blacks in 1865 could be understood
as  directly  remedial.  Even  today,  nothing  prevents  the
States from according an admissions preference to identi-
fied victims of discrimination.  See Croson, 488 U. S., at 526
(opinion  of  Scalia,  J.)  (“While  most  of  the  beneficiaries
might  be  black,  neither  the  beneficiaries  nor  those  disad-
vantaged by the preference would be identified on the basis
of their race” (emphasis in original)); see also ante, at 39.

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR points also to the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which as discussed above, mandated that all citizens
have the same rights as those “enjoyed by white citizens.”
14  Stat.  27.    But  these  references  to  the  station  of  white
citizens do not refute the view that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment  is  colorblind.  Rather,  they  specify  that,  in  meeting
the  Amendment’s  goal  of  equal  citizenship,  States  must
level up.  The Act did not single out a group of citizens for

——————

3 UNC asserts that the Freedmen’s Bureau gave money to Berea Col-
lege at a time when the school sought to achieve a 50–50 ratio of black to
white students.  Brief for University Respondents in No. 21–707, p. 32.
But,  evidence  suggests  that,  at  the  relevant  time,  Berea  conducted  its
admissions without distinction by race.  S. Wilson, Berea College: An Il-
lustrated  History  2  (2006)  (quoting  Berea’s  first  president’s  statement
that the school “would welcome ‘all races of men, without distinction’ ”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the history of civil rights legislation and its relevance to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA

Opinion of THOMAS, J.
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

repeated  recognition  “that  privacy  of  association  is  pro-
tected  under  the  First  Amendment.”    561  U. S.,  at  240
(THOMAS, J., dissenting).    The  text  and  history  of  the  As-
sembly Clause suggest that the right to assemble includes
the right to associate anonymously.  See 4 Annals of Cong.
900–902,  941–942  (1795)  (defending  the  Democratic-Re-
publican societies, many of which met in secret, as exercis-
ing  individuals’  “leave  to  assemble”);  see  also  Brief  for
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae 13–20;
Reply Brief in No. 19–251, pp. 3–5; NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (discussing the history
of  anonymous  publications).  And  the  right  to  associate
anonymously  often  operates  as  a  vehicle  to  protect  other
First Amendment rights, such as the freedom of the press.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334, 361–367
(1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (“Founding-era Americans”
understood the freedom of the press to include the right of
printers and publishers not to be compelled to disclose the
authors of anonymous works).  Laws directly burdening the
right to associate anonymously, including compelled disclo-
sure laws, should be subject to the same scrutiny as laws
directly burdening other First Amendment rights.  Doe, 561
U. S., at 232, 240.

Second,  the  Court  holds  the  law  “overbroad”  and,  thus,
invalid in all circumstances.  Ante, at 16.  But I continue to
have  “doubts  about  [the]  origins  and  application”  of  our
“overbreadth doctrine.”  United States v. Sineneng-Smith,
590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op.,
at  1).  That  doctrine  purports  to  grant  federal  courts  the
power to invalidate a law “if a substantial number of its ap-
plications  are  unconstitutional,  judged  in  relation  to  the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”   Ibid. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  However, the Court has no power to
enjoin the lawful application of a statute just because that
statute  might  be  unlawful  as-applied  in  other  circum-
stances.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9); Borden v. United States,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas. It delves into legal arguments regarding anonymity in association and the "overbreadth doctrine."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1089

558 U. S.

December 14, 2009

No.  09–7594.  Bazemore  v.  United  States  District  Court
for the Southern District of Georgia.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

Miscellaneous  Orders

No.  09M57.  Salter  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De

partment  of  Corrections;  and

No. 09M58.  Hupp v.  Kurpinsky et al.  Motions to direct the
Clerk  to  ﬁle  petitions  for  writs  of  certiorari  out  of  time  denied.

No.  08–645.  Abbott  v.  Abbott.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

[Certiorari
granted,  557  U. S.  933.]  Motion  of  the  Solicitor  General  for  leave
to  participate  in  oral  argument  as  amicus  curiae  and  for  divided
argument granted.  Motion of S&W International ChildFind Pro
gram  et  al.  for  leave  to  participate  in  oral  argument  as  amici
curiae  and  for  divided  argument  denied.

No.  08–661.  American  Needle,  Inc.  v.  National  Football
League  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.
[Certiorari  granted,  557  U. S.
933.]  Motion  of  the  Solicitor  General  for  leave  to  participate  in
oral  argument  as  amicus  curiae  and  for  divided  argument
granted and time allocated as follows: 30 minutes for petitioner, 10
minutes for the Solicitor General, and 30 minutes for respondents.
No. 08–810.  Conkright et al. v. Frommert et al.  C. A. 2d
Cir.
[Certiorari  granted,  557  U. S.  933.]  Motion  of  the  Solicitor
General  for  leave  to  participate  in  oral  argument  as  amicus  cu
riae  and  for  divided  argument  granted.  Justice  Sotomayor
took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  motion.

No.  08–1200.  Jerman  v.  Carlisle,  McNellie,  Rini,
Kramer  &  Ulrich  L.  P.  A.  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.
[Certiorari
granted,  557  U. S.  933.]  Motion  of  the  Solicitor  General  for  leave
to  participate  in  oral  argument  as  amicus  curiae  and  for  divided
argument  granted.

No.  08–1521.  McDonald  et  al.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  Illi
nois,  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.
[Certiorari  granted,  557  U. S.  965.]
Motion of American Legislative Exchange Council for leave to ﬁle
a  brief  as  amicus  curiae  granted.

No.  08–10457.  Castillo  v.  Guidry.  Ct.  App.  La.,  5th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  802]  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal publication. It contains case numbers, court names, and brief descriptions of actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
ALITO, J., dissenting

ble.”  We have recognized as much when holding that a ma-
terially  identical  saving  clause  did  not  authorize  implied
remedies  under  a  separate  remedial  provision.   See  AMG
Capital Management,  LLC v. FTC, 593 U. S. ___, ___–___
(2021)  (slip  op.,  at  12–13).  And  in  the  §1983  context,  we
have similarly held that saving clauses do “not ‘refer to  a
suit for redress of a violation of the statut[e] at issue.’ ”  Ran-
cho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 126–127 (alterations omit-
ted); accord, Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 20–21, n. 31.

These results are understandable.  There is a considerable
difference  between  preserving  existing  remedies  for  con-
duct that happens to violate other laws and providing a one-
stop remedy for the precise provisions in a statute.  See Al-
exander,  532  U. S.,  at  289–290.  The  latter  interpretation
runs against a century of holdings that a statute “ ‘cannot
be held to destroy itself’ ” through a saving clause.  Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone,
Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 227–228 (1998) (quoting Texas & Pacific
R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446 (1907)).
Conversely, concluding that FNHRA “may be enforced only
through the statute’s express remed[ies]” gives full effect to
§1396r(h)(8)  because  “the  claims  available  under  §1983
prior to the enactment of the [Act] continue to be available.”
Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 126.

In short, “[a]llowing a plaintiff to circumvent [FNHRA’s]
administrative  remedies  would  be  inconsistent  with  Con-
gress’ carefully tailored scheme.”  Smith v.  Robinson, 468
U. S. 992, 1012 (1984).  I would thus hold that the Act pre-
cludes enforcement under §1983 and reverse the judgment
below.  I therefore respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TRUMP v. THOMPSON

Statement of KAVANAUGH, J.

would provide substantial protection for Presidential com-
munications, while still requiring disclosure in certain cir-
cumstances.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the privilege claim
at issue here would not succeed even under the Nixon and
Senate  Select  Committee  tests.  Therefore,  as  this  Court’s
order  today  makes  clear,  the  Court  of  Appeals’  broader
statements  questioning  whether  a  former  President  may
successfully invoke the Presidential communications privi-
lege  if  the  current  President  does  not  support  the  claim
were dicta and should not be considered binding precedent
going forward.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the Presidential communications privilege and its application to former presidents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MISSISSIPPI v. TENNESSEE ET AL.

ON EXCEPTIONS TO REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER

No. 143, Orig.  Argued October 4, 2021—Decided November 22, 2021

Mississippi  brought  an  original  action  against  Tennessee  for  damages
and other relief related to the pumping of groundwater by the City of
Memphis  from  the  Middle  Claiborne  Aquifer,  a  valuable  water  re-
source that lies beneath eight States.  Mississippi argues that Tennes-
see’s pumping—using wells Mississippi concedes are located entirely
in Tennessee—siphons water away from Mississippi and amounts to a
tortious taking of groundwater owned by Mississippi.  Mississippi ex-
pressly disclaims any equitable apportionment remedy, arguing that
the “fundamental premise of this Court’s equitable apportionment ju-
risprudence—that each of the opposing States has an equality of right
to use the waters at issue—does not apply to this dispute.”  Complaint
¶49.  The Special Master appointed by the Court to assess Mississippi’s
claims determined that the aquifer is an interstate water resource and
that  equitable  apportionment  is  the  exclusive  judicial  remedy.  Be-
cause  Mississippi’s  complaint  did  not  seek  equitable  apportionment,
the Special Master recommended that the Court dismiss the complaint
but grant Mississippi leave to amend.  Mississippi challenges the rec-
ommendation to dismiss; Tennessee objects to the recommendation to
grant Mississippi leave to file an amended complaint.

Held:  The waters of the Middle Claiborne Aquifer are subject to the ju-
dicial  remedy  of  equitable  apportionment;  Mississippi’s  complaint  is
dismissed without leave to amend.  Pp. 7–12.

(a)  The doctrine of equitable apportionment aims to produce a fair
allocation of a shared water resource between two or more States, see
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U. S. 176, 183, based on the principle that
States have an equal right to reasonable use of shared water resources.
Florida v. Georgia, 592 U. S. __, __.  The Court has applied the doctrine
to interstate rivers and streams, see South Carolina v. North Carolina,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

17

THOMAS, J., dissenting

is uniquely offensive to the States’ dignity because it pur-
ports “to press a State’s own courts into federal service to
coerce the other branches of the State,” thereby “turn[ing]
the State against itself ” and “commandeer[ing] the entire
political machinery of the State against its will and at the
behest of individuals.”  Alden, 527 U. S., at 749.  That kind
of “plenary federal control of state governmental processes
denigrates the separate sovereignty of the States.”  Ibid.

Second,  congressional  authorization  of  private  damages
actions  “threaten[s]  the  financial  integrity  of  the  States.”
Id.,  at  750.    It  can  “create  staggering  burdens”  and  give
“Congress a power and a leverage over the States that is not
contemplated by our constitutional design.”  Ibid.
  Third,  representative  government  itself  is  jeopardized
when  “deliberation  by  the  political  process  established  by
the  citizens  of  the  State”  is  replaced  with  “judicial  decree
mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the
private citizen.”  Id., at 751.  Political accountability—“es-
sential to our liberty and republican form of government”—
breaks  down  when  “the  Federal  Government  asserts  au-
thority  over  a  State’s  most  fundamental  political  pro-
cesses.”  Ibid.7

Notwithstanding  these  countervailing  structural  con-
cerns, both Torres and the Court think that constitutional
structure  supports  finding  plan-of-the-Convention  waiver
because  confirming  States’  sovereign  immunity  in  their
own courts would supposedly threaten the Federal Govern-
ment’s “power to wage war successfully” and jeopardize the
Nation’s  safety.  Ante,  at  11  (quoting  Lichter  v.  United
States, 334 U. S. 742, 780 (1948); internal quotation marks

——————

7 These unique structural dangers posed by granting the Federal Gov-
ernment authority to turn the State against itself again show why the
Court errs in concluding that precedents concerning plan-of-the-Conven-
tion waivers applicable to suits in federal court necessarily support waiv-
ers of immunity from suit in state court.  See ante, at 15; see also supra,
at 10, n. 4.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It argues against a particular legal interpretation and cites precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2011

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SACKETT ET VIR v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 10–1062.  Argued January 9, 2012—Decided March 21, 2012

The  Clean  Water  Act  prohibits  “the  discharge  of  any  pollutant  by  any
person,” 33 U. S. C. §1311, without a permit, into “navigable waters,”
§1344.    Upon  determining  that  a  violation  has  occurred,  the  Envi-
ronmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  may  either  issue  a  compliance
order or initiate a civil enforcement action.  §1319(a)(3).  The result-
ing  civil  penalty  may  not  “exceed  [$37,500]  per  day  for  each  viola-
tion.”  §1319(d).  The Government contends that the amount doubles
to $75,000 when the EPA prevails against a person who has been is-
sued a compliance order but has failed to comply.

The  Sacketts,  petitioners  here,  received  a  compliance  order  from
the EPA, which stated  that  their residential lot contained navigable
waters  and  that  their  construction  project  violated  the  Act.    The
Sacketts  sought  declarative  and  injunctive  relief  in  the  Federal  Dis-
trict  Court,  contending  that  the  compliance  order  was  “arbitrary
[and]  capricious”  under  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act  (APA),  5
U. S. C. §706(2)(A), and that it deprived them of due process in viola-
tion  of  the  Fifth  Amendment.    The  District  Court  dismissed  the
claims for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed,  concluding  that  the  Clean  Water  Act  precluded  pre-
enforcement  judicial  review  of  compliance  orders  and  that  such  pre-
clusion did not violate due process.

Held: The Sacketts may bring a civil action under the APA to challenge

the issuance of the EPA’s order.  Pp. 4–10.

(a) The APA provides for judicial review of “final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”  5 U. S. C. §704.
The  compliance  order  here  has  all  the  hallmarks  of  APA  finality.
Through  it,  the  EPA  “determined”  “rights  or  obligations,”  Bennett  v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically not indexed as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

THOMAS, J., concurring

that their amnesty came in the form of unfounded claims.
Arbitrariness  has  nothing  to  do  with  it.4   To  the  extent
that  we  are  ill  at  ease  with  these  disparate  outcomes,  it
seems to me that the best solution is for the Court to stop
making  up  Eighth  Amendment  claims  in  its  ceaseless
quest  to  end  the  death  penalty  through  undemocratic
means.

——————

4 JUSTICE  BREYER  appears  to  acknowledge  that  our  decision  holding
mandatory  death  penalty  schemes  unconstitutional,  Woodson  v.  North
Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion), may have introduced
the problem of arbitrary application.  Post, at 14.  I agree that Woodson
eliminated one reliable legislative response to concerns about arbitrari-
ness.  Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 486 (1993) (THOMAS, J., concur-
ring).    Because  that  decision  was  also  questionable  on  constitutional
grounds, id., at 486–488, I would be willing to revisit it in a future case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It contains legal arguments and references to previous cases, indicating it is part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1057

529 U. S.

April 3, 2000

No. 99–7990. Champion v. Rivers, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7991. Thomas-El v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7992. Sketoe v. Exxon Co., USA, et al. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 596.

No. 99–7993. Robinson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 761 So. 2d 269.

No. 99–7994. Woodberry v. Day, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8004. Foster v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–8015. Bell v. Nero et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 176 F. 3d 481.

No. 99–8018. Sanchez v. Ayers, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8028. Castro v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8029. Kipkirwa v. Santa Clara County, Califor-

nia, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8030. Meeks v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 115 Nev. 576, 24 P. 3d 271.

No. 99–8031. Knight v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–8035. Cobbin v. Suthers, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 257.

No. 99–8036. Coleman v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 184 F. 3d 398.

No. 99–8039. Bolling v. Circuit Court of Virginia, City

of Richmond. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the main body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

SHOOP v. TWYFORD

BREYER, J., dissenting

take a convicted felon outside the prison’s walls.”  Ante, at
5, n. 1.  The Court says doing so “creates public safety risks
and burdens on the State that cannot be remedied after fi-
nal judgment.”  Ibid.  But what exactly are those risks?  The
order  here  requires  transporting  respondent  to  a  medical
center—the Ohio State University Wexner Medical Center.
11 F. 4th, at 520.  That medical center is the “official prison
hospital,” which “has the security and other infrastructure”
to  safely  accommodate  prisoners  and  does  so  regularly.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a; Tr. of Oral Arg. 40, 57–58.  Re-
spondent tells us that he has personally been transported
between the prison and the medical center 16 times without
incident.  Id., at 57.

Other orders might well create similar kinds of risks.  A
writ of habeas corpus might require the State to transport
a prisoner to court to testify or for trial, see §2241(c)(5), or
an  order  appointing  a  psychiatrist  or  other  expert  to  con-
duct a psychological examination might require the State to
allow  access  to  a  dangerous  prisoner,  see  Fed.  Rule  Civ.
Proc. 35(a).  Would the Court’s logic require that all such
orders with security risks be immediately appealable?  That
would be a dramatic extension of the collateral order doc-
trine, which we have said should remain “ ‘narrow,’ ” Digital
Equipment Corp., 511 U. S., at 868 (emphasis added).

Finally,  we  have  also  said  that  some  interlocutory  ap-
peals “mak[e] unwise use of appellate courts’ time, by forc-
ing them to decide in the context of a less developed record,
an issue very similar to one they may well decide anyway
later, on a record that will permit a better decision.” John-
son, 515 U. S., at 317.  That warning is applicable here.  The
question whether the transportation order was proper un-
der the All Writs Act is not conceptually distinct from the
merits of respondent’s habeas claims.  In order to obtain a
transportation order, the Court says, a prisoner must show
that “the desired evidence would be admissible in connec-
tion  with  a  particular  claim  for  relief.”  Ante,  at  11.  Of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the legal reasoning behind a court order and cites relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

Opinion of BREYER, J.

originate in a different part of our brains than most other
words.  Id., at 250.  And these types of swear words tend
to  attract  more  attention  and  are  harder  to  forget  than
other words.  See Jay, Caldwell-Harris, & King, Recalling
Taboo  and  Nontaboo  Words,  121  Am.  J.  Psych.  83,  83–86
(2008)  (collecting  research).  Notably,  that  has  remained
true even as the list of offensive swear words has changed
over  time:  In  the  last  few  centuries,  the  list  has  evolved
away from words of religious disrespect and toward words
that  are  sexually  explicit  or  that  crudely  describe  bodily
functions.  Mohr 253.  And the list of swear words may be
evolving  yet  again,  perhaps  in  the  direction  of  including
race-based epithets.  Id., at 254, 256.

These  attention-grabbing  words,  though  financially
valuable to some businesses that seek to attract interest in
their products, threaten to distract consumers and disrupt
commerce.  And  they  may  lead  to  the  creation  of  public
spaces that many will find repellant, perhaps on occasion
creating  the  risk  of  verbal  altercations  or  even  physical
confrontations.  (Just  think  about  how  you  might  react  if
you  saw  someone  wearing  a  t-shirt  or  using  a  product
emblazoned  with  an  odious  racial  epithet.)    The  Govern-
ment thus has an interest in seeking to disincentivize the
use  of  such  words  in  commerce  by  denying  the  benefit  of
trademark  registration.  Cf.  Brandenburg  v.  Ohio,  395
U. S.  444,  447  (1969)  (per  curiam)  (permitting  regulation
of words “directed to inciting or  producing imminent law-
less action” and “likely to incite or produce such action”).

Finally,  although  some  consumers  may  be  attracted  to
products  labeled  with  highly  vulgar  or  obscene  words,
others  may  believe  that  such  words  should  not  be  dis-
played  in  public  spaces  where  goods  are  sold  and  where
children  are  likely  to  be  present.    They  may  believe  that
trademark  registration  of  such  words  could  make  it  more
likely  that  children  will  be  exposed  to  public  displays
involving  such  words.  To  that  end,  the  Government  may
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case concerning trademark registration of offensive words. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

A

The majority’s rule requires a traffic stop to “en[d] when
tasks  tied  to  the  traffic  infraction  are—or  reasonably
should  have  been—completed.”    Ante,  at  5.    “If  an  officer
can  complete  traffic-based  inquiries  expeditiously,  then
that is the amount of time reasonably required to complete
the  stop’s  mission”  and  he  may  hold  the  individual  no
longer.  Ante,  at  8  (internal  quotation  marks  and  altera-
tions  omitted).  The  majority’s  rule  thus  imposes  a  one-
way  ratchet  for  constitutional  protection  linked  to  the
characteristics  of  the  individual  officer  conducting  the
stop:  If  a  driver  is  stopped  by  a  particularly  efficient  of-
ficer, then he will be entitled to be released from the traf-
fic stop after a shorter period of time than a driver stopped
by a less efficient officer.  Similarly, if a driver is stopped
by an officer with access to technology that can shorten a
records check, then he will be entitled to be released from
the stop after a shorter period of  time than an individual
stopped by an officer without access to such technology.

I “cannot accept that the search and seizure protections
of the Fourth Amendment are so variable and can be made
to  turn  upon  such  trivialities.”  Whren,  517  U. S.,  at  815
(citations omitted).  We have repeatedly explained that the
reasonableness inquiry must not hinge on the characteris-
tics  of  the  individual  officer  conducting  the  seizure.    We
have  held,  for  example,  that  an  officer’s  state  of  mind
“does  not  invalidate  [an]  action  taken  as  long  as  the  cir-
cumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”  Id., at
813 (internal quotation marks omitted).  We have spurned
theories that would make the Fourth Amendment “change
with  local  law  enforcement  practices.”    Moore,  supra,  at
172.  And  we  have  rejected  a  rule  that  would  require  the
offense  establishing  probable  cause  to  be  “closely  related
to” the offense identified by the arresting officer, as such a
rule  would  make  “the  constitutionality  of  an  arrest  . . .
vary from place to place and from time to time, depending
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It is sequential text and likely contains important content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of the Court

otherwise  eligible  church-owned  preschool  was  denied  a
grant  to  resurface  its  playground.   Missouri’s  policy  dis-
criminated against the Church “simply because of what it
is—a church,” and so the policy was subject to the “strictest
scrutiny,”  which it failed.  Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 11–
15).  We  acknowledged  that  the  State  had  not  “criminal-
ized” the way in which the Church worshipped or “told the
Church that it cannot subscribe to a certain view of the Gos-
pel.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11).  But the State’s discrimina-
tory  policy  was  “odious  to  our  Constitution  all  the  same.”
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 15).

Here  too  Montana’s  no-aid  provision  bars  religious
schools from public benefits solely because of the religious
character  of  the  schools.  The  provision  also  bars  parents
who wish to send their children to a religious school from
those  same  benefits,  again  solely  because  of  the  religious
character  of  the  school.  This  is  apparent  from  the  plain
text.  The  provision  bars  aid  to  any  school  “controlled  in
whole  or  in  part  by  any  church,  sect,  or  denomination.”
Mont. Const., Art. X, §6(1).  The provision’s title—“Aid pro-
hibited  to  sectarian  schools”—confirms  that  the  provision
singles out schools based on their religious character.  Ibid.
And the Montana Supreme Court explained that the provi-
sion forbids aid to any school that is “sectarian,” “religiously
affiliated,” or “controlled in whole or in part by churches.”
393 Mont., at 464–467, 435 P. 3d, at 612–613.  The provi-
sion plainly excludes schools from government aid solely be-
cause of religious status.  See Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S.,
at ___–___ (slip op., at 9–10).

The Department counters that Trinity Lutheran does not
govern  here  because  the  no-aid  provision  applies  not  be-
cause  of  the  religious  character  of  the  recipients,  but  be-
cause of how the funds would be used—for “religious educa-
tion.”  Brief  for  Respondents  38.  In  Trinity  Lutheran, a
majority of the Court concluded that the Missouri policy vi-
olated the Free Exercise Clause because it discriminated on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing a previous case (Trinity Lutheran) and analyzing a state's no-aid provision. It delves into constitutional arguments related to religious freedom and discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1098

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 14, 2009

558 U. S.

No. 09–7530.  Lynch v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  570.

No.  09–7531.  Miller  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7532.  Murphy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  228.

No.  09–7533.  Rosales  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  65.

No. 09–7536.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7541.  Goodson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  379.

No.  09–7543.  Hernandez-Curiel  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 332 Fed. Appx. 418.
No.  09–7544.  Hull  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  573.
No.  09–7545.  Ogedengbe  v.  United  States;  and
No.  09–7546.  Ogedengbe  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7549.  Carter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7551.  Andrews  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  231.

No. 09–7552.  Major v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  549.

No.  09–7555.  Pons-Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7559.  Southern  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  393.

No.  09–7562.  Valenzuela-Ruiz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 343 Fed. Appx. 188.
No.  09–7572.  Dove  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  428.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case names, court citations, and disposition information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH ET AL. v. JACKSON,
JUDGE, DISTRICT COURT OF TEXAS, 114TH
DISTRICT, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–463.  Argued November 1, 2021—Decided December 10, 2021

The Court granted certiorari before judgment in this case to determine
whether  the  petitioners  may  pursue  a  pre-enforcement  challenge  to
Texas  Senate  Bill  8—the  Texas  Heartbeat  Act—a  Texas  statute  en-
acted in 2021 that prohibits physicians from performing or inducing
an abortion if the physician detected a fetal heartbeat.  S. B. 8 does not
allow  state officials  to  bring criminal  prosecutions or  civil  actions  to
enforce the law but instead directs enforcement through “private civil
actions”  culminating  in  injunctions  and  statutory  damages  awards
against those who perform or assist with prohibited abortions.  Tex.
Health & Safety Code Ann. §§171.204(a), 171.207(a), 171.208(a)(2), (3).
Tracking language from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.  v.
Casey, 505 U. S. 833, S. B. 8 permits abortion providers to defeat any
suit against them by showing, among other things, that holding them
liable  would  place  an  “undue  burden”  on  women  seeking  abortions.
§§171.209(a)–(b).
   The petitioners are abortion providers who sought pre-enforcement
review of S. B. 8 in federal court based on the allegation that S. B. 8
violates the Federal Constitution.  The petitioners sought an injunc-
tion barring the following defendants from taking any action to enforce
the  statute:  a  state-court  judge,  Austin  Jackson;  a  state-court  clerk,
Penny  Clarkston;  Texas  attorney  general,  Ken  Paxton;  executive  di-
rector of the Texas Medical Board, Stephen Carlton; executive director
of the Texas Board of Nursing, Katherine Thomas; executive director
of the Texas Board of Pharmacy, Allison Benz; executive commissioner
of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, Cecile Young;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

go beyond what was necessary to redress those injuries.

Consider some of the unchallenged provisions.  The Rule
requires  schools  to  provide  “reasonable  modifications”  to
pregnant students, including but not limited to “breaks dur-
ing  class  to  express  breast  milk,  breastfeed,  or  attend  to
health  needs  associated  with  pregnancy  or  related  condi-
tions.”  89 Fed. Reg. 33887.  A separate provision prohibits
schools from making a preemployment inquiry as to an ap-
plicant’s marital status and limits the circumstances under
which a school may make a preemployment inquiry as to an
applicant’s sex.  Id., at 33896.  The Rule also mandates that
schools prohibit staff and students from retaliating against
students who file Title IX complaints, and provides the pro-
cedure a school must follow upon receiving a complaint of
retaliation.  Ibid.  Those provisions (like many others in the
Rule)  do  not  reference  gender  identity  discrimination  or
hostile environment harassment and bear no apparent re-
lationship  to  respondents’  alleged  injuries.  As  litigation
over the Rule proceeds, respondents might be able to show
those other portions of the Rule will irreparably harm them
in a manner justifying further equitable relief.  At this junc-
ture, however, enjoining the application of any other part of
the Rule needlessly impairs the Government from enforcing
Title  IX  and  deprives  potential  claimants  of  protections
against forms of sex discrimination not at issue in respond-
ents’ suit.

Respondents  maintain  that  the  Government  must  re-
main enjoined from enforcing the entire Rule because the
challenged provisions “permeate” it.  Respondents fail to ex-
plain,  however,  why  enjoining  enforcement  of  the  entire
Rule at this stage is necessary to redress their alleged inju-
ries.  As  an  initial  matter,  many  unchallenged  provisions
(such as those governing preemployment inquiries about an
applicant’s marital status or sex and prohibiting pregnancy
discrimination) include no reference to gender identity dis-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses a specific rule and its implications, focusing on the scope of the injunction sought by the respondents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

even simple fact patterns, a court has little chance of deter-
mining  whether  a  novel,  never-before-enforced  state  law
can be constitutionally enforced against nonparties without
resorting  to  mere  speculation.  For  cases  such  as  these,
where the constitutional analysis depends on complex, fact-
specific questions, the task becomes impossible.

D
Facial challenges are particularly suspect given their or-
igins.  They appear to be the product of two doctrines that
are  themselves  constitutionally  questionable,  vagueness
and overbreadth.

At the time of the founding, it was well understood that
federal courts could hold a statute unconstitutional only in-
sofar  as  necessary  to  resolve  a  particular  case  or  contro-
versy.  See supra, at 5–6.  The Founders were certainly fa-
miliar with alternative systems that provided for the free-
floating review of duly enacted statutes.  For example, the
New York Constitution of 1777 created a Council of Revi-
sion, composed of the Governor, Chancellor, and New York
Supreme Court.  See Hansen, 599 U. S., at 786 (THOMAS, J.,
concurring).    The  Council  of  Revision  could  object  to  “any
measure of a [prospective] bill” based on “not only [its] con-
stitutionality . . . but also [its] policy.”  Id., at 787.  If the
Council lodged an objection, the Legislature’s only options
were to “conform to [the Council’s] objections, override them
by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, or simply let the bill
die.”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

In  our  Constitution,  the  Founders  refused  to  create  a
council of revision or involve the Federal Judiciary in the
business of reviewing statutes in the abstract.  “Despite the
support  of  respected  delegates  . . .  the  Convention  voted
against creating a federal council of revision on four differ-
ent  occasions.  No  other  proposal  was  considered  and  re-
jected  so  many  times.”  Id.,  at  789  (citation  omitted).    In-
stead,  the  Founders  created  a  Judiciary  with  “only  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It delves into the constitutional issues surrounding facial challenges to statutes. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

25

ALITO, J., dissenting

Amendment  rights  ha[d]  been  severely  impeached”  by
Katz and other recent cases.  See Brief for Respondent in
United  States  v.  Miller,  O.  T.  1975,  No.  74–1179,  p. 6.
Turning to Katz, he then argued that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the banks’ records regarding his
accounts.  Brief  for  Respondent  in  No.  74–1179,  at  6;  see
also Miller, supra, at 442–443.

Acceptance  of  this  argument  would  have  flown  in  the
face  of  the  Fourth  Amendment’s  text,  and  the  Court  re-
jected that development.  Because Miller gave up “domin-
ion  and  control”  of  the  relevant  information  to  his  bank,
Rakas, 439 U. S., at 149, the Court ruled that he lost any
protected Fourth Amendment interest in that information.
See  Miller,  supra,  at  442–443.    Later,  in  Smith  v.  Mary-
land, 442 U. S. 735, 745 (1979), the Court reached a simi-
lar conclusion regarding a telephone company’s records of
a customer’s calls.  As JUSTICE KENNEDY concludes, Miller
and Smith are thus best understood as placing “necessary
limits  on  the  ability  of  individuals  to  assert  Fourth
Amendment  interests  in  property  to  which  they  lack  a
‘requisite connection.’ ”  Ante, at 8.

The  same  is  true  here,  where  Carpenter  indisputably
lacks  any  meaningful  property-based  connection  to  the
cell-site  records  owned  by  his  provider.    Because  the  rec-
ords are not Carpenter’s in any sense, Carpenter may not
seek to use the Fourth Amendment to exclude them.

By  holding  otherwise,  the  Court  effectively  allows  Car-
penter to object to the “search” of a third party’s property,
not  recognizing  the  revolutionary  nature  of  this  change.
The Court seems to think that Miller and Smith invented
a  new  “doctrine”—“the  third-party  doctrine”—and  the
Court  refuses  to  “extend”  this  product  of  the  1970’s  to  a
new  age  of  digital  communications.  Ante,  at  11,  17.  But
the  Court  fundamentally  misunderstands  the  role  of  Mil-
ler  and  Smith.  Those  decisions  did  not  forge  a  new  doc-
trine; instead, they rejected an argument that would have
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of the Court

Property Seized as a Result of Nazi Persecution, Especially
Jewish Property.  Germany established the Advisory Com-
mission  under  the  Washington  Conference  Principles  on
Nazi-Confiscated  Art,  an  initiative  spearheaded  by  the
United States to encourage the development of new mecha-
nisms for resolving Nazi-era claims.  See Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 4.  After hearing from expert wit-
nesses and reviewing documentary evidence, the Commis-
sion likewise concluded that the sale had occurred at a fair
price without duress.

Disappointed  by  the  proceedings  in  Germany,  the  heirs
filed  suit  in  Federal  District  Court  in  Washington,  D. C.
They brought several common law property claims against
Germany and SPK, seeking $250 million in compensation.
Petitioners SPK and the Federal Republic of Germany—col-
lectively  Germany—moved  to  dismiss  the  case.    Relevant
here,  Germany  argued  that  it  was  immune  from  suit  be-
cause the heirs’ claims did not fall within the FSIA’s excep-
tion to immunity for “property taken in violation of interna-
tional law.”  See 28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(3); see also §1603(a)
(defining “foreign state” to include “an agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign state”).  In doing so, Germany reasoned
that the purchase of the Welfenschatz could not have vio-
lated international law because a sovereign’s taking of its
own nationals’ property is not unlawful under the interna-
tional law of expropriation.  The heirs responded that the
exception  did  apply  because  Germany’s  purchase  of  the
Welfenschatz was an act of genocide and the taking there-
fore violated the international law of genocide.

The  District  Court  denied  Germany’s  motion,  248
F. Supp. 3d 59, 70–74 (DC 2017), and a panel of the D. C.
Circuit  affirmed,  894  F. 3d  406  (2018).    The  panel  agreed
with the heirs that the exception for property taken in vio-
lation of international law was satisfied because “genocide
perpetrated by a state even against its own nationals is a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the application of international law to a property dispute related to Nazi-era confiscation. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific cases and statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1137

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No. 09–481.  Sheehan v.  Jackson et al.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Mo
tion  of  Roger  Schlossberg  et  al.  for  leave  to  ﬁle  a  brief  as  amici
curiae  granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  574  F.  3d
248.

No.  09–494.  Crawford  et  al.  v.  TRW  Automotive  U.  S.
LLC.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Motion of Maurice & Jane Sugar Law Cen
ter  for  Economic  &  Social  Justice  et  al.  for  leave  to  ﬁle  a  brief
as  amici  curiae  granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
560  F.  3d  607.

No.  09–500.  De  George  v.  American  Airlines,  Inc.,  et  al.
C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no
part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported
below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  15.

No.  09–519.  Alameida,  Warden  v.  Phelps.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Motion  of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  1120.

No.  09–560.  Carlson,  Warden  v.  Bobadilla.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.
Motion  of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d  785.

No.  09–589.  Nghiem  v.  Department  of  Veterans  Affairs
et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.  Re
ported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  16.

No.  09–609.  Pitcher  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consider
ation  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  120.
No.  09–5852.  Nicholas  v.  Marshall,  Superintendent,
Sing  Sing  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or decision  of this petition.  Reported  below: 329 Fed.  Appx. 313.
No.  09–6231.  El-Hage,  aka  Sabbur  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no
part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported
below:  552  F.  3d  93,  157,  and  177.

No.  09–7043.  Almeyda  v.  Travis.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or decision  of this petition.  Reported  below: 326 Fed.  Appx. 585.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a list of court orders, detailing case numbers, citations, and actions taken. It is not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

KAGAN, J., dissenting

25–26.  But that is wrong.

Start with what this Court has said before on the subject,
reflecting  Congress’s  view  of  the  matter.    About  a  decade
ago, we recognized that Congress had “delegated to EPA” in
Section  111  “the  decision  whether  and  how  to  regulate
carbon-dioxide  emissions  from  powerplants.”    American
Elec. Power, 564 U. S., at 426.  To stress the key word (be-
cause the majority seems to miss it, see ante, at 26–27): not
merely “whether” but also “how.”  In making that delega-
tion, we explained, Congress knew well what it was doing.
Regulating  power  plant  emissions  is  a  complex  undertak-
ing.  To do it right requires “informed assessment of com-
peting interests”: “Along with the environmental benefit po-
tentially  achievable,  our  Nation’s  energy  needs  and  the
possibility  of  economic  disruption  must  weigh  in  the  bal-
ance.”  564 U. S., at 427; see §7411(a)(1) (instructing EPA
to  consider  “energy  requirements,”  “cost,”  and  other  fac-
tors).  Congress specifically “entrust[ed] such complex bal-
ancing  to  EPA,”  because  that  “expert  agency”  has  the
needed “scientific, economic, and technological resources” to
carry it out.  564 U. S., at 427–428.  So the balancing—in-
cluding  of  the  Nation’s  “energy  requirements”—that  the
majority  says  EPA  has  no  “comparative  expertise”  in?
§7411(a)(1); ante, at 25.  We explained 11 short years ago,
citing Congress, that it was smack in the middle of EPA’s
wheelhouse.

And  we  were  right.    Consider  the  Clean  Power  Plan’s
component parts—let’s call them the what, who, and how—
to see the rule’s normalcy.  The “what” is the subject matter
of the Plan: carbon dioxide emissions.  This Court has al-
ready found that those emissions fall within EPA’s domain.
We said then: “[T]here is nothing counterintuitive to the no-
tion that EPA can curtail the emission of substances that
are putting the global climate out of kilter.”  Massachusetts,
549 U. S., at 531.  This is not the Attorney General regulat-
ing  medical  care,  or  even  the  CDC  regulating  landlord-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of West Virginia v. EPA. It discusses the EPA's authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from power plants.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

895

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5258.  Edwards  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  481.

No.  09–5259.  El  Farra  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  554  F.  3d  752.

No.  09–5260.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  556.

No.  09–5261.  Marquez  v.  Connecticut.  Sup.  Ct.  Conn.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  291  Conn.  122,  967  A.  2d  56.
No.  09–5262.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  996.

No.  09–5263.  Jones  v.  Oklahoma.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Okla.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  201  P.  3d  869.

No.  09–5264.  Jones  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  463.

No.  09– 5265.  Mascorro-Chavarria  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.
Appx.  385.

No.  09–5266.  Smith  v.  Workman,  Warden.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  550  F.  3d  1258.

No.  09–5268.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  938.

No.  09–5271.  Clay  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  384.

No.  09–5272.  Cantrell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  785.

No.  09–5273.  Edwards  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  754.

No.  09–5274.  Sonczalla  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  842.

No.  09–5275.  Sanchez-Alvarez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 310 Fed. Appx. 653.
No.  09–5276.  Jones  v.  Perlman,  Superintendent,  Mid-
state Correctional Facility.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case citations, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

and  ushering  in  the  Jim  Crow  era,  the  Court  finally  cor-
rected course in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483
(1954), announcing that primary schools must either deseg-
regate  with  all  deliberate  speed  or  else  close  their  doors.
See also Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955)
(Brown II ).  It then pulled back in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U. S.  306  (2003),  permitting  universities  to  discriminate
based on race in their admissions process (though only tem-
porarily) in order to achieve alleged “educational benefits of
diversity.”  Id., at 319.  Yet, the Constitution continues to
embody a simple truth: Two discriminatory wrongs cannot
make a right.

I wrote separately in Grutter, explaining that the use of
race in higher education admissions decisions—regardless
of whether intended to help or to hurt—violates the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Id., at 351 (opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part).  In the decades since, I have repeat-
edly stated that Grutter was wrongly decided and should be
overruled.  Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 570 U. S.
297, 315, 328 (2013) (concurring opinion) (Fisher I ); Fisher
v.  University  of  Tex.  at  Austin,  579  U. S.  365,  389  (2016)
(dissenting opinion).  Today, and despite a lengthy interreg-
num, the Constitution prevails.

Because the Court today applies genuine strict scrutiny
to the race-conscious admissions policies employed at Har-
vard and the University of North Carolina (UNC) and finds
that  they  fail  that  searching  review,  I  join  the  majority
opinion in full.  I write separately to offer an originalist de-
fense of the colorblind Constitution; to explain further the
flaws of the Court’s Grutter jurisprudence; to clarify that all
forms of discrimination based on race—including so-called
affirmative action—are prohibited under the Constitution;
and to emphasize the pernicious effects of all such discrim-
ination.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It delves into the history of race-based admissions policies in higher education and argues against their constitutionality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

31

Opinion of the Court

tion” against the asserted constitutional interests of U. S.
citizens.  Id., at 770.

The  principal  dissent  suggests  that  Mandel  has  no
bearing  on  this  case,  post,  at  14,  and  n. 5  (opinion  of
SOTOMAYOR, J.) (hereinafter the dissent), but our opinions
have  reaffirmed  and  applied  its  deferential  standard  of
review across different contexts and constitutional claims.
In Din, JUSTICE KENNEDY reiterated that “respect for the
political  branches’  broad  power  over  the  creation  and
administration of the immigration system” meant that the
Government  need  provide  only  a  statutory  citation  to
explain a visa denial.  576 U. S., at ___ (opinion concurring
in judgment) (slip op., at 6).  Likewise in Fiallo, we applied
Mandel  to  a  “broad  congressional  policy”  giving  immigra-
tion  preferences  to  mothers  of  illegitimate  children.    430
U. S., at 795.  Even though the statute created a “categori-
cal” entry classification that discriminated on the basis of
sex  and  legitimacy,  post,  at  14,  n. 5,  the  Court  concluded
that “it is not the judicial role in cases of this sort to probe
and  test  the  justifications”  of  immigration  policies.    430
U. S.,  at  799  (citing  Mandel,  408  U. S.,  at  770).    Lower
courts  have  similarly  applied  Mandel  to  broad  executive
action.  See  Rajah  v.  Mukasey,  544  F.  3d  427,  433,  438–
439  (CA2  2008)  (upholding  National  Security  Entry-Exit
Registration System instituted after September 11, 2001).
Mandel’s  narrow  standard  of  review  “has  particular
force”  in  admission  and  immigration  cases  that  overlap
with “the area of national security.”  Din, 576 U. S., at ___
(KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3).  For
one,  “[j]udicial  inquiry  into  the  national-security  realm
raises concerns for the separation of powers” by intruding
on  the  President’s  constitutional  responsibilities  in  the
area of foreign affairs.  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. ___, ___
(2017) (slip op., at 19) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For  another,  “when  it  comes  to  collecting  evidence  and
drawing inferences” on questions of national security, “the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and discusses legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

JACKSON, J., dissenting

only  today’s  Court  could  love.    Ignoring  the  plain  text  of
§666—which,  again,  expressly  targets  officials  who  “cor-
ruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept payments “intend-
ing to be influenced or rewarded”—the Court concludes that
the statute does not criminalize gratuities at all.  This is so,
apparently,  because  “[s]tate  and  local  governments  often
regulate the gifts that state and local officials may accept,”
ante,  at  1,  which,  according  to  the  majority,  means  that
§666 cannot.

The  Court’s  reasoning  elevates  nonexistent  federalism
concerns over the plain text of this statute and is a quintes-
sential example of the tail wagging the dog.  Section 666’s
regulation  of  state,  local,  and  tribal  governments  reflects
Congress’s express choice to reach those and other entities
receiving  federal  funds.  And  Congress  not  only  had  good
reasons for doing so, it also had the authority to take such
legislative action, as this Court has already recognized.  See
Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 600, 605, 608 (2004). We
have long held that when Congress has appropriated fed-
eral money, it “does not have to sit by and accept the risk of
operations thwarted by local and state improbity.”  Id., at
605.

Both the majority and Snyder suggest that interpreting
§666 to cover gratuities is problematic because it gives “fed-
eral prosecutors unwarranted power to allege crimes that
should be handled at the State level.”  App. 14–15 (empha-
sis added); see also ante, at 10–11.  But woulds, coulds, and
shoulds of this nature must be addressed across the street
with Congress, not in the pages of the U. S.  Reports.  We
have previously and wisely declined “to express [a] view as
to [§666’s] soundness as a policy matter.”  Sabri, 541 U. S.,
at 608, n.  But, today, the Court can stay silent no longer.
Its decision overrides the intent of Congress—and the pol-
icy preferences of the constituents that body represents—
as unequivocally expressed by the plain text of the statute.
Respectfully, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of a specific statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Olmstead  and  rejected  Fourth  Amendment  challenges  to
various methods of electronic surveillance.  See On Lee v.
United  States,  343  U. S.  747,  749–753  (1952)  (use  of  mi
crophone  to  overhear  conversations  with  confidential
informant); Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 131–
132,  135–136  (1942)  (use  of  detectaphone  to  hear  conver
sations in office next door).

In the 1960’s, however, the Court began to retreat from
Olmstead.  In  Silverman  v.  United  States,  365  U. S.  505
(1961),  for  example,  federal  officers  had  eavesdropped  on
the  defendants  by  driving  a  “spike  mike”  several  inches
into the house they were occupying.  Id., at 506–507.  This
was a “search,” the Court held, because the “unauthorized
physical  penetration  into  the  premises”  was  an  “actual
intrusion  into  a  constitutionally  protected  area.”    Id.,  at
509,  512.  The  Court  did  not  mention  Olmstead’s  other
holding  that  intangible  conversations  are  not  “persons,
houses,  papers,  [or]  effects.”  That  omission  was  signifi
cant.  The  Court  confirmed  two  years  later  that  “[i]t  fol
lows  from  [Silverman]  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  may
protect  against  the  overhearing  of  verbal  statements  as
well as against the more traditional seizure of ‘papers and
effects.’ ”    Wong  Sun  v.  United  States,  371  U. S.  471,  485
(1963); accord, Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 51 (1967).
In  Katz,  the  Court  rejected  Olmstead’s  remaining  hold-
ing—that eavesdropping is not a search absent a physical
intrusion  into  a  constitutionally  protected  area.  The
federal  officers  in  Katz  had  intercepted  the  defendant’s
conversations  by  attaching  an  electronic  device  to  the
outside of a public telephone booth.  389 U. S., at 348.  The
Court  concluded  that  this  was  a  “search”  because  the
officers  “violated  the  privacy  upon  which  [the  defendant]
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth.”  Id., at
353.  Although the device did not physically penetrate the
booth,  the  Court  overruled  Olmstead  and  held  that  “the
reach  of  [the  Fourth]  Amendment  cannot  turn  upon  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 585 U.S. ____ (2018). It discusses the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding electronic surveillance, referencing landmark cases like Olmstead, Silverman, Wong Sun, and Katz.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>