<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

gas] emission sources face different technological and
financial challenges in reducing emissions.  A sensible
regulatory  scheme  would  require  that  all  significant
sources  and  sinks  of  [greenhouse  gas]  emissions  be
considered in deciding how best to achieve any needed
emission reductions.

“Unilateral EPA regulation of motor vehicle [green-
house  gas]  emissions  could  also  weaken  U. S.  efforts
to  persuade  developing  countries  to  reduce  the
[greenhouse  gas]  intensity  of  their  economies.  Con-
sidering the large populations and growing economies
of  some  developing  countries,  increases  in  their
[greenhouse  gas]  emissions  could  quickly  overwhelm
the  effects  of  [greenhouse  gas]  reduction  measures  in
developed  countries.  Any  potential  benefit  of  EPA
regulation could be lost to the extent other nations de-
cided  to  let  their  emissions  significantly  increase  in
view  of  U. S.  emissions  reductions.    Unavoidably,  cli-
mate  change  raises  important  foreign  policy  issues,
and it is the President’s prerogative to address them.”
68 Fed. Reg. 52929–52931 (footnote omitted).

The  Court  dismisses  this  analysis  as  “rest[ing]  on  rea-
soning  divorced  from  the  statutory  text.”    Ante,  at  30.
“While  the  statute  does  condition  the  exercise  of  EPA’s
authority  on  its  formation  of  a  ‘judgment,’  . . .  that  judg-
ment must relate to whether an air pollutant ‘cause[s], or
contribute[s]  to,  air  pollution  which  may  reasonably  be
anticipated  to  endanger  public  health  or  welfare.’ ”    Ibid.
True  but  irrelevant.  When  the  Administrator  makes  a
judgment  whether  to  regulate  greenhouse  gases,  that
judgment  must  relate  to  whether  they  are  air  pollutants
that  “cause,  or  contribute  to,  air  pollution  which  may
reasonably  be  anticipated  to  endanger  public  health  or
welfare.”  42  U. S. C.  §7521(a)(1).    But  the  statute  says
nothing at all about the reasons for which the Administra-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Massachusetts v. EPA. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

29

Opinion of the Court

“The  liberty  of  the  press  was  to  be  unrestrained,  but  he
who used it was to be responsible in cases of its abuse; like
the  right  to  keep  fire  arms,  which  does  not  protect  him
who  uses  them  for  annoyance  or  destruction.”  Common-
wealth v.  Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313–314.  The analogy
makes no sense if firearms could not be used for any indi
vidual  purpose  at  all.  See  also  Kates,  Handgun  Prohibi
tion and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,
82  Mich.  L. Rev.  204,  244  (1983)  (19th-century  courts
never  read  “common  defence”  to  limit  the  use  of  weapons
to militia service).

We  therefore  believe  that  the  most  likely  reading  of  all
four  of  these  pre-Second  Amendment  state  constitutional
provisions is that they secured an individual right to bear
arms for defensive purposes.  Other States did not include
rights  to  bear  arms  in  their  pre-1789  constitutions—
although  in  Virginia  a  Second  Amendment  analogue  was
proposed  (unsuccessfully)  by  Thomas  Jefferson.    (It  read:
“No  freeman  shall  ever  be  debarred  the  use  of  arms
[within  his  own  lands  or  tenements].”18   1  The  Papers  of
Thomas Jefferson 344 (J. Boyd ed. 1950)).

Between  1789  and  1820,  nine  States  adopted  Second
Amendment  analogues.  Four  of  them—Kentucky,  Ohio,
Indiana, and Missouri—referred to the right of the people
to “bear arms in defence of themselves and the State.”  See
n. 8,  supra.  Another three States—Mississippi, Connecti
cut,  and  Alabama—used  the  even  more  individualistic
phrasing  that  each  citizen  has  the  “right  to  bear  arms  in
defence of himself and the State.”  See ibid.  Finally, two
States—Tennessee  and  Maine—used  the  “common  de
fence” language of Massachusetts.  See Tenn. Const., Art.
——————

18 JUSTICE STEVENS says that the drafters of the Virginia Declaration
of  Rights  rejected  this  proposal  and  adopted  “instead”  a  provision
written  by  George  Mason  stressing  the  importance  of  the  militia.    See
post, at 24, and n. 24.  There is no evidence that the drafters regarded
the Mason proposal as a substitute for the Jefferson proposal.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Second Amendment and its interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. 17 (2023)

37

Barrett, J., dissenting

considered whether Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. 460 (2012),
constituted  a  signifcant  change  in  law.  241  Ariz.,  at  208,
386 P. 3d, at 394.  The court observed that pre-Miller, “Ari-
zona  law”  allowed  trial  courts  to  impose  life  sentences  on
juveniles  “without  distinguishing  crimes  that  refected  `ir-
reparable  corruption'  rather  than  the  `transient  immaturity
of  youth.' ”  Valencia,  241  Ariz.,  at  209,  386  P.  3d,  at  395.
Miller, in holding that trial courts must weigh such consider-
ations  before  imposing  a  life  sentence  on  juveniles,  changed
Eighth  Amendment  doctrine  and  therefore  changed  the  law
in  Arizona.  241  Ariz.,  at  209,  386  P.  3d,  at  395;  see  also
Montgomery  v.  Louisiana,  577  U. S.  190,  208,  212  (2016).
Lynch, by contrast, did not change the content of federal law
and therefore did not change the law in Arizona.

If  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court's  distinction  between  a
change  in  law  and  a  change  in  the  application  of  law  seems
familiar,  it  should—federal  habeas  law  draws  the  same  line.
Take  everything about  this  case and  transplant  it to  federal
court:  A  federal  defendant  is  wrongfully  denied  a  Simmons
instruction,  the  Court  of  Appeals's  understanding  of  Sim-
mons is later summarily reversed in Lynch, and the defend-
ant (now a prisoner) then tries to obtain the beneft of Lynch
through  a  successive  or  delayed  motion  for  postconviction
relief.*  In this scenario, the federal prisoner faces the same
dilemma that  Cruz faces  in Arizona.  Pre-Lynch,  the Court
of  Appeals  was  unreceptive  to  the  Simmons  claim.  Post-
Lynch, the prisoner's claim is procedurally barred: Lynch is
not  “a  new  rule  of  constitutional  law”  or  a  “newly  recog-
nized” right because it merely applies an old rule, Simmons.
28 U. S. C. §§ 2255(f)(3), (h)(2).  If federal law limits a prison-
er's  Simmons  claim  to  an  initial,  timely  motion,  we  should
not  be  surprised  that  Arizona  has  made  a  similar  choice.

*This hypothetical is inapposite to Cruz's pending federal habeas action,
which appears to be a timely, initial federal fling.  See Cruz v. Ryan, 2018
WL 1524026, *3 (D Ariz., Mar. 28, 2018), appeal docketed sub nom.  Cruz
v. Credio, No. 21–99005 (CA9, Apr. 22, 2021).

Page Proof Pending Publication
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to sentencing juveniles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

JACKSON, J., concurring

Consistent analyses and outcomes are likely to remain elu-
sive because whether Bruen’s test is satisfied in a particular
case seems to depend on the suitability of whatever histor-
ical sources the parties can manage to cobble together, as
well  as  the  level  of  generality  at  which  a  court  evaluates
those sources—neither of which we have as yet adequately
clarified.

And the unresolved questions hardly end there.  Who is
protected by the Second Amendment, from a historical per-
spective?  To what conduct does the Second Amendment’s
plain  text  apply?  To  what  historical  era  (or  eras)  should
courts look to divine a historical tradition of gun regulation?
How many analogues add up to a tradition?  Must there be
evidence that those analogues were enforced or subject to
judicial  scrutiny?    How  much  support  can  nonstatutory
sources  lend?  I  could  go  on—as  others  have.    See,  e.g.,
United States v. Daniels, 77 F. 4th 337, 358–360 (CA5 2023)
(Higginson,  J.,  concurring)  (providing  a  similarly  nonex-
haustive list).  But I won’t.

III
Maybe  time  will  resolve  these  and  other  key  questions.
Maybe appellate courts, including ours, will find a way to
“[b]rin[g] discipline to the increasingly erratic and unprin-
cipled body of law that is emerging after Bruen.”  J. Blocher
&  E.  Ruben,  Originalism-by-Analogy  and  Second  Amend-
ment Adjudication, 133 Yale L. J. 99, 174 (2023).  Indeed,
“[m]any  constitutional  standards  involve  undoubted  gray

——————
were adopting would allow for such flexibility.  See District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 722 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing
doubt that the Framers “intended future generations to ignore [modern-
day] matters”).  It stifles both helpful innovation and democratic engage-
ment to read the Constitution to prevent advancement in this way.  In
any event, what we see now is that Bruen’s history-and-tradition test is
not  only  limiting  legislative  solutions,  it  also  appears  to  be  creating
chaos.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from a judge named Jackson. It discusses the complexities and potential issues with the "Bruen test" used in Second Amendment cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring

None  of  the  statutes  cited  by  the  Attorney  General  ap-
pears to create an office for the Special Counsel, and espe-
cially not with the clarity typical of past statutes used for
that purpose.  See, e.g., 43 Stat. 6 (“[T]he President is fur-
ther authorized and directed to appoint . . . special counsel
who shall have charge and control of the prosecution of such
litigation”).  Sections  509  and  510  are  generic  provisions
concerning  the  functions  of  the  Attorney  General  and  his
ability to delegate authority to “any other officer, employee,
or agency.”  Section 515 contemplates an “attorney specially
appointed by the Attorney General under law,” thereby sug-
gesting  that  such  an  attorney’s  office  must  have  already
been created by some other law.  (Emphasis added.)  As for
§533, it provides that “[t]he Attorney General may appoint
officials  . . .  to  detect  and  prosecute  crimes  against  the
United States.”  (Emphasis added.)  It is unclear whether
an “official” is equivalent to an “officer” as used by the Con-
stitution.  See  Lucia,  585  U. S.,  at  254–255  (opinion  of
THOMAS, J.) (considering the meaning of “officer”).  Regard-
less, this provision would be a curious place for Congress to
hide  the  creation  of  an  office  for  a  Special  Counsel.    It  is
placed in a chapter concerning the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation  (§§531–540d),  not  the  separate  chapters  concern-
ing  U. S.  Attorneys  (§§541–550)  or  the  now-lapsed  Inde-
pendent Counsel (§§591–599).4

To be sure, the Court gave passing reference to the cited
statutes as supporting the appointment of the Special Pros-
ecutor in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 694 (1974),
but it provided no analysis of those provisions’ text.  Per-
haps  there  is  an  answer  for  why  these  statutes  create  an
office for the Special Counsel.  But, before this consequen-

——————

4 Regulations remain on the books that contemplate an “outside” Spe-
cial Counsel, 28 CFR §600.1 (2023), but I doubt a regulation can create a
federal office without underlying statutory authority to do so.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the legal basis for the appointment of a Special Counsel, analyzing relevant statutes and their language.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE

Syllabus

crats.  It applied a three-part test, examining intent, effects, and cau-
sation.  The District Court’s “predominant intent” prong is borrowed
from the test used in racial gerrymandering cases.  However, unlike
race-based  decisionmaking,  which  is  “inherently  suspect,”  Miller  v.
Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 915, districting for some level of partisan ad-
vantage is not unconstitutional.  Determining that lines were drawn
on  the  basis  of  partisanship  does  not  indicate  that  districting  was
constitutionally  impermissible.    The  Common  Cause  District  Court
also required the plaintiffs to show that vote dilution is “likely to per-
sist” to such a degree that the elected representatives will feel free to
ignore the concerns of the supporters of the minority party.  Experi-
ence proves that accurately predicting electoral outcomes is not sim-
ple,  and  asking  judges  to  predict  how  a  particular  districting  map
will  perform  in  future  elections  risks  basing  constitutional  holdings
on  unstable  ground  outside  judicial  expertise.    The  District  Court’s
third prong—which gave the defendants an opportunity to show that
discriminatory  effects  were  due  to  a  “legitimate  redistricting  objec-
tive”—just  restates  the  question  asked  at  the  “predominant  intent”
prong.  Pp. 22–25.

(2) The  District  Courts  also  found  partisan  gerrymandering
claims  justiciable  under  the  First  Amendment,  coalescing  around  a
basic  three-part  test:  proof  of  intent  to  burden  individuals  based  on
their voting history or party affiliation, an actual burden on political
speech  or  associational  rights,  and  a  causal  link  between  the  invidi-
ous intent and actual burden.  But their analysis offers no “clear” and
“manageable”  way  of  distinguishing  permissible  from  impermissible
partisan motivation.  Pp. 25–27.

(3) Using  a  State’s  own  districting  criteria  as  a  baseline  from
which  to  measure  how  extreme  a  partisan  gerrymander  is  would  be
indeterminate  and  arbitrary.  Doing  so  would  still  leave  open  the
question  of  how  much  political  motivation  and  effect  is  too  much.
Pp. 27–29.

(4) The North Carolina District Court further held that the 2016
Plan violated Article I, §2, and the Elections Clause, Art. I,  §4, cl. 1.
But the Vieth plurality concluded—without objection from any other
Justice—that neither §2 nor §4 “provides a judicially enforceable limit
on  the  political  considerations  that  the  States  and  Congress  may
take into account when districting.”  541 U. S., at 305.  Any assertion
that partisan gerrymanders violate the core right of voters to choose
their  representatives  is  an  objection  more  likely  grounded  in  the
Guarantee  Clause  of  Article  IV,  §4,  which  “guarantee[s]  to  every
State in [the] Union a Republican Form of Government.”  This Court
has several times concluded that the Guarantee Clause does not pro-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the reasoning behind a court decision. It is not the main body of the text and focuses on legal arguments and precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

21

Opinion of the Court

the substance of the common-law [jury trial] right as it ex-
isted in 1791.”  Markman, 517 U. S., at 376.

VI

We turn now to the basic legal question before us: Was
Google’s copying of the Sun Java API, specifically its use of
the declaring code and organizational structure for 37 pack-
ages of that API, a “fair use.”  In answering this question,
we shall consider the four factors set forth in the fair use
statute as we find them applicable to the kind of computer
programs before us.  We have reproduced those four statu-
tory factors supra, at 13–14.  For expository purposes, we
begin with the second.

A. “The Nature of the Copyrighted Work”
The Sun Java API is a “user interface.”  It provides a way
through which users (here the programmers) can “manipu-
late and control” task-performing computer programs “via
a series of menu commands.”  Lotus Development Corp., 49
F. 3d,  at  809.  The  API  reflects  Sun’s  division  of  possible
tasks  that  a  computer  might  perform  into  a  set  of  actual
tasks that certain kinds of computers actually will perform.
Sun decided, for example, that its API would call up a task
that compares one integer with another to see which is the
larger.  Sun’s  API  (to  our  knowledge)  will  not  call  up  the
task of determining which great Arabic scholar decided to
use Arabic numerals (rather than Roman numerals) to per-
form that “larger integer” task.  No one claims that the de-
cisions  about  what  counts  as  a  task  are  themselves  copy-
rightable—although one might argue about decisions as to
how to label and organize such tasks (e.g., the decision to
name  a  certain  task  “max”  or  to  place  it  in  a  class  called
“Math.”  Cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99 (1880)).

As discussed above, supra, at 3–5, and in Appendix B, in-
fra, we can think of the technology as having three essential
parts.  First, the API includes “implementing code,” which
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the "fair use" of copyrighted material in the context of software. It delves into legal precedents and the specific factors considered in determining fair use.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

19

Opinion of the Court

is the whole project of the First Amendment.  And the gov-
ernment can take varied measures, like enforcing competi-
tion  laws,  to  protect  that  access.  Cf.,  e.g.,  Turner  I,  512
U. S.,  at  647  (protecting  local  broadcasting);  Hurley,  515
U. S., at 577 (discussing Turner I ).  But in case after case,
the Court has barred the government from forcing a private
speaker to present views it wished to spurn in order to re-
jigger  the  expressive  realm.    The  regulations  in  Tornillo,
PG&E, and Hurley all were thought to promote greater di-
versity of expression.  See supra, at 14–16.  They also were
thought to counteract advantages some private parties pos-
sessed in controlling “enviable vehicle[s]” for speech.  Hur-
ley, 515 U. S., at 577.  Indeed, the Tornillo Court devoted
six pages of its opinion to recounting a critique of the then-
current  media  environment—in  particular,  the  dispropor-
tionate “influen[ce]” of a few speakers—similar to one heard
today  (except  about  different  entities).    418  U. S.,  at  249;
see id., at 248–254; supra, at 14–15.  It made no difference.
However imperfect the private marketplace of ideas, here
was a worse proposal—the government itself deciding when
speech was imbalanced, and then coercing speakers to pro-
vide more of some views or less of others.

B

“[W]hatever the challenges of applying the Constitution
to  ever-advancing  technology,  the  basic  principles”  of  the
First Amendment “do not vary.”  Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Assn., 564 U. S. 786, 790 (2011).  New commu-
nications media differ from old ones in a host of ways: No
one thinks Facebook’s News Feed much resembles an insert
put in a billing envelope.  And similarly, today’s social me-
dia  pose  dangers  not  seen  earlier:  No  one  ever  feared  the
effects of newspaper opinion pages on adolescents’ mental
health.  But analogies to old media, even if imperfect, can
be useful.  And better still as guides to decision are settled
principles about freedom of expression, including the ones
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses First Amendment rights and the role of government in regulating speech, drawing comparisons to past cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

720

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

Scalia, J., dissenting

As for the second step of the Court’s analysis: Even if
there were justiﬁcation for giving “revoke” something other
than its normal meaning, and even if the meaning the Court
adopts were not unheard of, the latter meaning still does not
provide the needed authorization for reimposition of super-
vised release. The statute does not say that the court may
“revoke” (“call back,” as the Court would have it) only part
of the term of supervised release, so there is no argument
that some portion remains in place for later use. Thus, even
if “revoke” means “call back,” a court would need statutory
authorization to reimpose this “called back” term of super-
vised release. But § 3583(e)(3) provides no such authoriza-
tion. The court is empowered to “revoke” the term; it is
empowered to require that “all or part” of the term be
served in prison; it is not empowered to reimpose “all or
part” of the term as a later term of supervised release.

ford English Dictionary 838 (2d ed. 1989) (OED).
Just as current usage
would allow one to say that “the emperor called back his decree,” so also
it would allow one to say that the emperor “revoked” his decree in that
ﬁgurative sense of “calling it back”—i. e., in the sense of canceling it.
It
is assuredly not current usage, however—I think not even rare current
usage—to use “revoke” to connote a literal calling back.
(“Since my bird
dog was ranging too far aﬁeld, I revoked him.”)

The Court chastises this example, suggesting that only a tippling hunter
would “revoke” his bird dog, as “dogs cannot be revoked, even though
sentencing orders can be.” Ante, at 707, n. 9.
I could not agree more.
However, the deﬁnition the Court employs (“call back” without the impli-
cation of cancellation) envisions that dogs can be revoked—thus illustrat-
ing its obscurity. The OED deﬁnition on which the Court relies, see ante,
at 706, n. 9, deﬁnes “revoke” as “to recall; to call or summon back . . . an
animal or thing.”
13 OED 838 (2d ed. 1989). The ﬁrst example it gives
of this usage is as follows: “These hounds . . . being acquainted with their
masters watchwordes, eyther in revoking or imboldening them to serve
the game.”
Ibid. Of course the Court’s “not unheard of ” usage, ante, at
706, is not limited to recalling dogs—oxen can be revoked as well, as the
OED’s third example illustrates: “Ye must revoke The patient Oxe unto
the Yoke.”

13 OED 838.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and references to legal statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

34; Part IV–C, infra.  The majority ignores, however, that
the Impeachment Judgment Clause cuts against its own po-
sition.  That  Clause  presumes  the  availability  of  criminal
process  as  a  backstop  by  establishing  that  an  official  im-
peached and convicted by the Senate “shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Pun-
ishment,  according  to  Law.”  Art.  I,  §3,  cl. 7  (emphasis
added).  That  Clause  clearly  contemplates  that  a  former
President  may  be  subject  to  criminal  prosecution  for  the
same conduct that resulted (or could have resulted) in an
impeachment judgment—including conduct such as “Brib-
ery,” Art. II, §4, which implicates official acts almost by def-
inition.1

B
Aware of its lack of textual support, the majority points
out that this Court has “recognized Presidential immunities
and privileges ‘rooted in the constitutional tradition of the
separation of powers and supported by our history.’ ”  Ante,
at 10 (quoting Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 749).  That is true,
as far as it goes.  Nothing in our history, however, supports
the majority’s entirely novel immunity from criminal pros-
ecution for official acts.

The  historical  evidence  that  exists  on  Presidential  im-
munity from criminal prosecution cuts decisively against it.
For instance, Alexander Hamilton wrote that former Presi-
dents would be “liable to prosecution and punishment in the
ordinary course of law.”  The Federalist No. 69, p. 452 (J.
Harv. Lib. ed. 2009).  For Hamilton, that was an important
distinction  between  “the  king  of  Great  Britain,”  who  was
“sacred  and  inviolable,”  and  the  “President  of  the  United
States,” who “would be amenable to personal punishment

——————

1 Article II, §4, provides: “The President, Vice President and all Civil
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeach-
ment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Trump v. United States. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

11

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

141, 151 (1989).3

The text of the Patent Act does not on its face give much
guidance  about  what  constitutes  a  patentable  process.
The statute defines the term “process” as a “process, art or
method  [that]  includes  a  new  use  of  a  known  process,
machine,  manufacture,  composition  of  matter,  or  mate-
rial.”  §100(b).  But,  this  definition  is  not  especially  help-
ful, given that it also uses the term “process” and is there-
fore somewhat circular.

As  lay  speakers  use  the  word  “process,”  it  constitutes
any series of steps.  But it has always been clear that, as
used in §101, the term does not refer to a “ ‘process’ in the
ordinary  sense  of  the  word,”  Flook,  437  U. S.,  at  588;  see
also  Corning  v.  Burden,  15  How.  252,  268  (1854)  (“[T]he
term process is often used in a more vague sense, in which
it cannot be the subject of a patent”).  Rather, as discussed
in some detail in Part IV, infra, the term “process” (along
with the definitions given to that term) has long accumu-
lated a distinctive meaning in patent law.  When the term
was used in the 1952 Patent Act, it was neither intended
nor  understood  to  encompass  any  series  of  steps  or  any
way to do any thing.

With  that  understanding  in  mind,  the  Government  has

——————

3 The Court quotes our decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S.
303  (1980),  for  the  proposition  that,  “ ‘[i]n  choosing  such  expansive
terms  . . .  modified  by  the  comprehensive  “any,”  Congress  plainly
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.’ ”  Ante,
at 4.  But the Court fails to mention which terms we were discussing in
Chakrabarty:  the  terms  “manufacture”  and  “composition  of  matter.”
See 447 U. S., at  308 (“In choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufac-
ture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’
Congress  plainly  contemplated  that  the  patent  laws  would  be  given
wide  scope”).    As  discussed  herein,  Congress’  choice  of  the  term  “proc-
ess”  reflected  a  background  understanding  of  what  sorts  of  series  of
steps  could  be  patented,  and  likely  reflected  an  intentional  design  to
codify that settled, judicial understanding.  This may not have been the
case with the terms at issue in Chakrabarty.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case. It delves into the interpretation of the Patent Act and the definition of "process" within that context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v.
CITY OF NEW YORK
ALITO, J., dissenting

State replaces its old law with a new one requiring certifi-
cation by three physicians.  Would the court be required to
dismiss the woman’s suit?  Suppose the court, following the
precedent  set  by  today’s  decision,  holds  that  the  case  is
moot,  and  suppose  that  the  woman  brings  a  second  case
challenging the new law on the same ground.  If the State
repeals that law and replaces it with one requiring certifi-
cation by two doctors, would the second suit be moot?  And
what  if  the  State  responds  to  a  third  suit  by  enacting
replacement  legislation  demanding  certification  by  one
doctor?

Mootness doctrine does not require such results.  A chal-
lenge to an allegedly unconstitutional law does not become
moot with the enactment of new legislation that reduces but
does not eliminate the injury originally alleged.  And that
is the situation here.

The Court cites one case in support of its holding, Lewis
v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 482–483 (1990),
but  that  decision  is  wholly  inapposite.    The  situation  in
Lewis  was  complicated,  but  the  critical  point  for  present
purposes is that, by the time the case reached this Court,
the enactment of new legislation meant that the plaintiff no
longer had Article III standing to assert its original claim.
Id.,  at  478–479.  But  instead  of  simply  ordering  that  the
case be dismissed, the Court remanded to give the plaintiff
the opportunity to assert a different claim and, if necessary,
to amend the complaint or “develop the record” to show it
had standing to pursue this new claim.  Id., at 482.

The situation here is entirely different.  It is not disputed
that  petitioners  have  standing  to  contest  the  City’s  re-
strictions  on  trips  to  out-of-city  ranges  and  competitions,
and as a result of those restrictions, petitioners have suf-
fered  and  will  continue  to  suffer  injury  that  is  concrete,
traceable to actions taken by the City, and remediable by a
court.  See  Spokeo,  Inc.  v.  Robins,  578  U. S.  ___  (2016).
They are not asserting a new claim.  Their original claim—
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically focusing on the mootness doctrine. It presents arguments and cites legal precedents to support the author's position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

BARRETT, J., concurring

babysitter takes the kids on a road trip to an amusement
park, where they spend two days on rollercoasters and one
night in a hotel.  Was the babysitter’s trip consistent with
the parent’s instruction?  Maybe in a literal sense, because
the  instruction  was  open-ended.  But  was  the  trip  con-
sistent with a reasonable understanding of the parent’s in-
struction?  Highly doubtful.  In the normal course, permis-
sion to spend money on fun authorizes a babysitter to take
children to the local ice cream parlor or movie theater, not
on a multiday excursion to an out-of-town amusement park.
If  a  parent  were  willing  to  greenlight  a  trip  that  big,  we
would expect much more clarity than a general instruction
to “make sure the kids have fun.”

But what if there is more to the story?  Perhaps there is
obvious contextual evidence that the babysitter’s jaunt was
permissible—for example, maybe the parent left tickets to
the amusement park on the counter.  Other clues, though
less obvious, can also demonstrate that the babysitter took
a reasonable view of the parent’s instruction.  Perhaps the
parent  showed  the  babysitter  where  the  suitcases  are,  in
the event that she took the children somewhere overnight.
Or  maybe  the  parent  mentioned  that  she  had  budgeted
$2,000 for weekend entertainment.  Indeed, some relevant
points of context may not have been communicated by the
parent  at  all.    For  instance,  we  might  view  the  parent’s
statement differently if this babysitter had taken the chil-
dren on such trips before or if the babysitter were a grand-
parent.

In  my  view,  the  major  questions  doctrine  grows  out  of
these  same  commonsense  principles  of  communication.
Just as we would expect a parent to give more than a gen-
eral  instruction  if  she  intended  to  authorize  a  babysitter-
led getaway, we also “expect Congress to speak clearly if it
wishes  to  assign  to  an  agency  decisions  of  vast  ‘economic
and  political  significance.’ ”    Utility  Air,  573  U. S.,  at  324.
That clarity may come from specific words in the statute,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Barrett. It discusses the concept of "major questions doctrine" using an analogy of a babysitter and a parent's instructions.  The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

43

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of BREYER, J.

Table 3: Joint Fundraising Committees

Number of Joint
Fundraising
Committees

“Senate”
Related

“House”
Related

2008 Elections

2010 Elections

2012 Elections

269

367

508

31

37

67

34

60

89

Source: Federal Election Commission, online at

http://www.fec.gov/data/CommitteeSummary.do.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table, likely extracted from a legal document. Tables of contents and data tables are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they don't contain the main narrative text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Data Table</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

THOMAS, J., concurring

life, liberty, or property.  See, e.g., Johnson v. United States,
576 U. S. 591, 623 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judg-
ment).  Other sources, by contrast, suggest that “due pro-
cess  of  law”  prohibited  legislatures  “from  authorizing  the
deprivation  of  a  person’s  life,  liberty,  or  property  without
providing him the customary procedures to which freemen
were entitled by the old law of England.”  United States v.
Vaello Madero, 596 U. S. ___, ____ (2022) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring) (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Either  way,  the  Due  Process  Clause  at  most  guarantees
process.  It does not, as the Court’s substantive due process
cases suppose, “forbi[d] the government to infringe certain
‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what pro-
cess is provided.”  Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 302 (1993);
see also, e.g., Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125
(1992).

As I have previously explained, “substantive due process”
is an oxymoron that “lack[s] any basis in the Constitution.”
Johnson, 576 U. S., at 607–608 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see
also, e.g., Vaello Madero, 596 U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., con-
curring)  (slip  op.,  at  3)  (“[T]ext  and  history  provide  little
support  for  modern  substantive  due  process  doctrine”).
“The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees
only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or
property could define the substance of those rights strains
credulity for even the most casual user of words.”  McDon-
ald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 811 (2010) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment);  see  also
United States v. Carlton, 512 U. S. 26, 40 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).  The resolution of this case is thus
straightforward.  Because the Due Process Clause does not
secure any substantive rights, it does not secure a right to
abortion.

The Court today declines to disturb substantive due pro-
cess jurisprudence generally or the doctrine’s application in
other, specific contexts.  Cases like Griswold v. Connecticut,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Due Process Clause and its application to abortion rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

the legislature.  That would not have been greatly disrup-
tive.

I  therefore  respectfully  dissent  from  the  denial  of  the
stay, but further review of the judgment below may be war-
ranted once a petition for a writ of certiorari is filed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual legal reasoning and arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

nearly four decades when Smith was decided.  In that ear-
lier  case,  Adell  Sherbert,  a  Seventh-day  Adventist,  was
fired because she refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath
Day.  374 U. S., at 399.  Unable to find other employment
that did not require Saturday work, she applied for unem-
ployment compensation but was rejected because state law
disqualified claimants who “ failed, without good cause . . .
to  accept  available  suitable  work  when  offered. ”  Id.,  at
399–401, and n. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The
State Supreme Court held that this denial of benefits did
not violate Sherbert’s free-exercise right, but this Court re-
versed.

In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court be-
gan  by  surveying  the  Court’s  few  prior  cases  involving
claims  for  religious  exemptions  from  generally  applicable
laws.  Id., at 402–403.  In those decisions, the Court had not
articulated a clear standard for resolving such conflicts, but
as the Sherbert opinion accurately recounted, where claims
for  religious  exemptions  had  been  rejected,  “[t]he  conduct
or actions [in question] invariably posed some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order.”  Id., at 403.  (As will
be shown below, this description of the earlier decisions cor-
responds closely with the understanding of the scope of the
free-exercise  right  at  the  time  of  the  First  Amendment’s
adoption.  See infra, at 29–36.)

After noting these earlier decisions, the Court turned to
the case at hand and concluded that the denial of benefits
imposed a substantial burden on Sherbert’s free exercise of
religion.  374  U. S.,  at  404.    It  “force[d]  her  to  choose  be-
tween following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the pre-
cepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand.”  Ibid.  As a result, the Court reasoned, the decision
below could be sustained only if it was “justified by a ‘com-
pelling state interest.’ ”  Id., at 403, 406.  The State argued
that its law was needed to prevent “the filing of fraudulent
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Fulton v. Philadelphia. It discusses the precedent set by the Sherbert case and its implications for the current case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

33

THOMAS, J., concurring

makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits,
it  demeans  us  all.”    Grutter,  539  U. S.,  at  353  (opinion  of
THOMAS, J.).

A
The Constitution’s colorblind rule reflects one of the core
principles  upon  which  our  Nation  was  founded:  that  “all
men are created equal.”  Those words featured prominently
in our Declaration of Independence and were inspired by a
rich  tradition  of  political  thinkers,  from  Locke  to  Montes-
quieu, who considered equality to be the foundation of a just
government.    See,  e.g.,  J.  Locke,  Second  Treatise  of  Civil
Government 48 (J. Gough ed. 1948); T. Hobbes, Leviathan
98 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1962); 1 B. Montesquieu, The Spirit of
Laws 121 (T. Nugent transl., J. Prichard ed. 1914).  Several
Constitutions enacted by the newly independent States at
the founding reflected this principle.  For example, the Vir-
ginia  Bill  of  Rights  of  1776  explicitly  affirmed  “[t]hat  all
men are by nature equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights.”  Ch. 1, §1.  The State Constitutions
of  Massachusetts,  Pennsylvania,  and  New  Hampshire
adopted  similar  language.  Pa.  Const.,  Art.  I  (1776),  in  2
Federal and State Constitutions 1541 (P. Poore ed. 1877);
Mass.  Const.,  Art.  I  (1780),  in  1  id.,  at  957;  N. H.  Const.,
Art. I (1784), in 2 id., at 1280.5  And, prominent Founders

——————

5 In fact, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1783 declared that slav-
ery was abolished in Massachusetts by virtue of the newly enacted Con-
stitution’s provision of equality under the law.  See The Quock Walker
Case, in 1 H. Commager, Documents of American History 110 (9th ed.
1973) (Cushing, C. J.) (“[W]hatever sentiments have formerly prevailed
in this particular or slid in upon us by the example of others, a different
idea has taken place with the people of America, more favorable to the
natural  rights  of  mankind,  and  to  that  natural,  innate  desire  of  Lib-
erty . . . .  And upon this ground our Constitution of Government . . . sets
out with declaring that all men are born free and equal . . . and in short
is totally repugnant to the idea of being born slaves”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It contains legal citations, references to historical documents and legal principles, and a formal writing style characteristic of legal texts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1035

558 U. S.

November 16, 2009

No.  09–7053.  Gibson  v.  Vaughan,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  172.

No. 09–7055.  Garcia v.  United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7059.  Gresham  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7061.  Cantu  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  186.

No.  09–7065.  Longstreet  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  911.

No.  09–7067.  Ponton  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  179.

No.  09–7068.  Nelson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  709.

No.  09–7070.  Pulliam  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  566  F.  3d  784.

No.  09–7075.  Cameron  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  399.

No.  09–7076.  Carey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  256.

No.  09–7077.  Esquivel  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7078.  Dahler  v.  Holinka,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7080.  Torres-Torres  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7081.  Woodberry  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  267  Fed.  Appx.  221.

No.  09–7084.  Loera  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  406.

No.  09–7090.  Polak  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  573  F.  3d  428.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and information about the disposition of each case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:25:22
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CV

Pagination Table: RULES1

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Supreme Court of the United States
washington, d. c.

April 17, 2000

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States of America in Congress Assembled:

By direction of the Supreme Court of the United States, I
have the honor to submit to the Congress the amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that have been
adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant
to Section 2072 of Title 28, United States Code.

Accompanying these rules are excerpts from the report of
the Judicial Conference of the United States containing the
Committee Notes submitted to the Court for its consider-
ation pursuant to Section 331 of Title 28, United States Code.

Sincerely,

(Signed) William H. Rehnquist

Chief Justice of the United States

1156
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a letter of transmittal, which is not part of the main body of the text and provides contextual information about the rules being submitted.
  </thinking>
  <category>Letter of Transmittal</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U51

[09-26-01 10:31:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

500

BECK v. PRUPIS

Opinion of the Court

We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. 1158 (1999), to resolve a
conﬂict among the Courts of Appeals on the question
whether a person injured by an overt act in furtherance of a
conspiracy may assert a civil RICO conspiracy claim under
§ 1964(c) for a violation of § 1962(d) even if the overt act does
not constitute “racketeering activity.” The majority of the
Circuits to consider this question have answered it in the
negative. See, e. g., Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co.,
985 F. 2d 383, 388 (CA8), cert. denied, 508 U. S. 957 (1993);
Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F. 2d 41, 48 (CA1 1991);
Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F. 2d 291, 294–295 (CA9
1990), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 921 (1991); Hecht v. Commerce
Clearing House, Inc., 897 F. 2d 21, 25 (CA2 1990). Other
Circuits have allowed RICO conspiracy claims where the
overt act was, as in the instant case, merely the termina-
tion of employment, and was not, therefore, racketeering
activity. See, e. g., Khurana v. Innovative Health Care
Systems, Inc., 130 F. 3d 143, 153–154 (CA5 1997), vacated
sub nom. Teel v. Khurana, 525 U. S. 979 (1998); Schiffels
v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 978 F. 2d 344, 348–
349 (CA7 1992); Shearin v. E. F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885
F. 2d 1162, 1168–1169 (CA3 1989).

II

This case turns on the combined effect of two provisions
of RICO that, read in conjunction, provide a civil cause of
action for conspiracy. Section 1964(c) states that a cause of
. by reason of a
action is available to anyone “injured . .
violation of section 1962.” Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful
for a person “to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.” To determine what
it means to be “injured . . . by reason of ” a “conspir[acy],”
we turn to the well-established common law of civil conspir-
acy. As we have said, when Congress uses language with a
settled meaning at common law, Congress
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the part discussing the legal basis for civil RICO conspiracy claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xxx

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page
1049
Carey International, Inc.; Powell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cargyle  S.  v.  Prince  George’s  County  Child  Protective  Services
999
Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L. P. A.; Jerman v.  . . .  810,1089
981
Carlsen; Lapetina v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137
Carlson v. Bobadilla  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000
Carlson; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818
Carlstadt v. Tomu Development Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893
Carlton; Farra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974
Carlton; Montague v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
Carlton; Tipton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816
Carlyle Fortran Trust v. nVIDIA Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128
Carmichael v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096
Carmona v. Astrue  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Carneal v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1006
Carney v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149
Carnival Corp. v. Thomas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Thomas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133
Caron v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
100
Carpenter; Mohawk Industries, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carpenters; Macerich Management Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012
Carr v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  900,936,1108

822

Carranza v. Chavez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

Carrasco-Flores v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

Carrasquillo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carreto v. United States
1085

Carrillo v. United States
871

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1002

Carrillo-Palacios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carrizoza v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1017

Carro; Wells v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  866,1020

995

Carroll v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940

Carroll v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Carruth v. Alabama  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
975

Carter, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,988

1112

Carter v. Burns
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

Carter; Doan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

Carter v. Gaetz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
867

Carter v. Pennsylvania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carter v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  906,1002,1026,1098

Carter v. United States
1080

Carter County; Walker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Cartledge; Evans v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Cartledge v. Ofﬁce of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Caruso v. Bazzetta  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–147
_________________

ERIK EGBERT, PETITIONER v. ROBERT BOULE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 8, 2022]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In  Bivens  v.  Six  Unknown  Fed.  Narcotics  Agents,  403
U. S.  388  (1971),  this  Court  authorized  a  damages  action
against federal officials for alleged violations of the Fourth
Amendment.  Over the past 42 years, however, we have de-
clined 11 times to imply a similar cause of action for other
alleged constitutional violations.  See Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U. S. 296 (1983); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367 (1983);
United States v. Stanley, 483 U. S. 669 (1987); Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412 (1988); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471
(1994); Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61
(2001); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U. S. 537 (2007); Hui v. Cas-
taneda, 559 U. S. 799 (2010); Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U. S.
118 (2012); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. ___ (2017); Hernán-
dez v. Mesa, 589 U. S. ___ (2020).  Nevertheless, the Court
of Appeals permitted not one, but two constitutional dam-
ages actions to proceed against a U. S. Border Patrol agent:
a  Fourth  Amendment  excessive-force  claim  and  a  First
Amendment  retaliation  claim.  Because  our  cases  have
made clear that, in all but the most unusual circumstances,
prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the
courts, we reverse.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion.  It includes citations, case names, and the name of the Justice delivering the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the legal reasoning and decision-making of the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

KAGAN, J., dissenting

cises  of  constitutional  linedrawing  go,  Abood  stands  well
above  average.  In  the  40  years  since  Abood,  this  Court
has  had  to  resolve  only  a  handful  of  cases  raising  ques-
tions about the distinction.  To my knowledge, the circuit
courts  are  not  divided  on  any  classification  issue;  neither
are  they  issuing  distress  signals  of  the  kind  that  some-
times  prompt  the  Court  to  reverse  a  decision.    See,  e.g.,
Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. ___ (2015) (overruling
precedent  because  of  frequent  splits  and  mass  confusion).
And  that  tranquility  is  unsurprising:  There  may  be  some
gray  areas  (there  always  are),  but  in  the  mine  run  of
cases,  everyone  knows  the  difference  between  politicking
and  collective  bargaining.    The  majority  cites  some  disa-
greement  in  two  of  the  classification  cases  this  Court
decided—as  if  non-unanimity  among  Justices  were  some-
thing  startling.    And  it  notes  that  a  dissenter  in  one  of
those  cases  called  the  Court’s  approach  “malleable”  and
“not  principled,”  ante,  at  39—as  though  those  weren’t
stock  terms  in  dissenting  vocabulary.    See,  e.g.,  Murr  v.
Wisconsin,  582  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2017)  (ROBERTS, C. J.,  dis-
senting) (slip op., at 2); Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U. S. ___, ___
(2016)  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  1);  Alabama
Legislative  Black  Caucus  v.  Alabama,  575  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2015) (slip op., at 13) (SCALIA, J., dissenting).  As I wrote
in  Harris  a  few  Terms  ago:  “If  the  kind  of  hand-wringing
about blurry lines that the majority offers were enough to
justify breaking with precedent, we might have to discard
whole volumes of the U. S. Reports.”  573 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 15).

And  in  any  event,  one  stare  decisis  factor—reliance—
dominates  all  others  here  and  demands  keeping  Abood.
Stare  decisis,  this  Court  has  held,  “has  added  force  when
the  legislature,  in  the  public  sphere,  and  citizens,  in  the
private  realm,  have  acted  in  reliance  on  a  previous  deci-
sion.”  Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n,
502  U. S.  197,  202  (1991).    That  is  because  overruling  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

15

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

there was ambiguous about mixed questions of law and fact:
Were these (reviewable) questions of law, or (unreviewable)
determinations of fact?  Because the statute could be inter-
preted either way, this Court held, the presumption of re-
viewability  preserved  the  aliens’  ability  to  argue  mixed
questions  on  appeal.  Today,  the  textual  arguments  for
shielding  the  agency’s  decision  from  review  are  even
weaker, and the same presumption that preserved judicial
review for felons seeking discretionary relief from removal
should do no less work for patent holders seeking to defend
their inventions.

IV

Even if the statute’s plain language and the presumption
in favor of review dictate a ruling against it, Thryv finishes
by suggesting we must ignore all that and rule for it anyway
because  precedent  commands  it.  Maybe  our  precedent  is
wrong, the company says, but it binds us all the same.

In  particular,  Thryv  points  us  to  Cuozzo.  There,  the
Court  suggested  that  §314(d)  could  preclude  review  in
cases:  (1) where a litigant challenges the Director’s reason-
able likelihood of success determination under §314(a), or
(2) where a litigant “grounds its claim in a statute closely
related  to  that  decision  to  institute  inter  partes  review.”
579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12).  That first path is faithful
to the plain language of §314(d).  The second appears no-
where in the statute but is, instead, a product of the judicial
imagination.  Still,  Thryv  says,  we  must  follow  that  path
wherever  it  leads  and,  because  §315(b)  decisions  are
“closely  related”  to  §314(a)  decisions,  we  shouldn’t  review
them.

But Cuozzo hardly held so much.  In fact, Cuozzo had no
need to explore the second path it imagined, for it quickly
concluded that the argument before it was “little more than
a challenge to the Patent Office’s conclusion under §314(a),”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to patent law and judicial review.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

43

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix B to opinion of BREYER, J.

B

Executions 1977–2014
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a citation and a heading from a legal document, likely part of an appendix. It's not the main body text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Appendix</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Syllabus

 KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  JACKSON, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined in full,
and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Parts II, III and IV.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the front matter of a legal opinion, specifically the citation and a list of participating justices. This information is not part of the main body of the legal argument and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Front Matter</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

96

UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

Opinion of the Court

Puget Sound. Most is extracted from Alaska’s North Slope
reserve and is shipped to Washington on United States ﬂag
vessels. Foreign-ﬂag vessels arriving from nations such
as Venezuela and Indonesia also call at Washington’s oil
installations.

The bulk of oil transported on water is found in tankers,
vessels which consist of a group of tanks contained in a ship-
shaped hull, propelled by an isolated machinery plant at the
stern. The Court described the increase in size and num-
bers of these ships close to three decades ago in Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U. S. 325, 335
(1973), noting that the average vessel size increased from
16,000 tons during World War II to 76,000 tons in 1966.
(The term “tons” refers to “deadweight tons,” a way of mea-
suring the cargo-carrying capacity of the vessels.) Between
1955 and 1968, the world tanker ﬂeet grew from 2,500 vessels
Ibid. By December 1973, 366 tankers in the
to 4,300.
world tanker ﬂeet were in excess of 175,000 tons, see 1
M. Tusiani, The Petroleum Shipping Industry 79 (1996), and
by 1998 the number of vessels considered “tankers” in the
merchant ﬂeets of the world numbered 6,739, see U. S. Dept.
of Transp., Maritime Administration, Merchant Fleets of the
World 1 (Oct. 1998).

The size of these vessels, the frequency of tanker opera-
tions, and the vast amount of oil transported by vessels with
but one or two layers of metal between the cargo and the
water present serious risks. Washington’s waters have
been subjected to oil spills and further threatened by near
misses.
In December 1984, for example, the tanker ARCO
Anchorage grounded in Port Angeles Harbor and spilled
239,000 gallons of Alaskan crude oil. The most notorious oil
spill in recent times was in Prince William Sound, Alaska,
where the grounding of the Exxon Valdez released more
than 11 million gallons of crude oil and, like the Torrey Can-
yon spill before it, caused public ofﬁcials intense concern
over the threat of a spill.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text discussing the risks of oil spills, specifically referencing tanker accidents. It provides context and background information relevant to the legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Background/Argument</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

67

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

of Members of Congress have a college degree.40  So do most
business leaders.41  Indeed, many state and local leaders in
North Carolina attended college in the UNC system.  See
Southern Governors Brief 8.  More than half of judges on
the  North  Carolina  Supreme  Court  and  Court  of  Appeals
graduated from the UNC system, for example, and nearly a
third of the Governor’s cabinet attended UNC.  Ibid.  A less
diverse pipeline to these top jobs accumulates wealth and
power unequally across racial lines, exacerbating racial dis-
parities  in  a  society  that  already  dispenses  prestige  and
privilege based on race.

The  Court  ignores  the  dangerous  consequences  of  an
America where its leadership does not reflect the diversity
of the People.  A system of government that visibly lacks a
path  to  leadership  open  to  every  race  cannot  withstand
scrutiny “in the eyes of the citizenry.”  Grutter, 539 U. S., at
332.  “[G]ross disparity in representation” leads the public
to wonder whether they can ever belong in our Nation’s in-
stitutions,  including  this  one,  and  whether  those  institu-
tions work for them.  Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 21–707, p. 171
(“The Court is going to hear from 27 advocates in this sit-
ting  of  the  oral  argument  calendar,  and  two  are  women,
even  though  women  today  are  50  percent  or  more  of  law
school graduates.  And I think it would be reasonable for a
woman to look at that and wonder, is that a path that’s open
to me, to be a Supreme Court advocate?” (remarks of Solic-
itor General Elizabeth Prelogar)).42
——————

40 K. Schaeffer, Pew Research Center, The Changing Face of Congress

in 8 Charts (Feb. 7, 2023).

41 See J. Martelli & P. Abels, The Education of a Leader: Educational
Credentials and Other Characteristics of Chief Executive Officers, J. of
Educ. for Bus. 216 (2010); see also J. Moody, Where the Top Fortune 500
CEOs Attended College, U. S. News & World Report (June 16, 2021).

42 Racial inequality in the pipeline to this institution, too, will deepen.
See J. Fogel, M. Hoopes, & G. Liu, Law Clerk Selection and Diversity:
Insights From Fifty Sitting Judges of the Federal Courts of Appeals 7–8
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the lack of diversity in leadership positions and the potential consequences of this disparity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

lxi

Sallee v. U. S. Parole Comm’n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Salomon Smith Barney Inc.; Harris Trust and Savings Bank v.
. .
Samara Brothers, Inc.; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Samaroo v. AT&T Management Pension Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Samarra; Cameron v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sammy’s of Mobile, Ltd. v. Mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Samuel v. Nathan’s Famous Operating Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Samuels v. Henry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
San Antonio Independent School Dist.; Owsley v.
San Bernardino County; Luna v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanchez v. Ayers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanchez v. Schomig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanders, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanders; Clay v.
Sanders; Selman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.; Reeves v.
San Francisco; Lambert v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanjurjo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sankofa v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
San Mateo County Superior Court; CBT Group PLC v.
. . . . . . . .
Santa Clara County; Kipkirwa v.
Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Santerian; Fizzano Brothers Concrete Products, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . .
Santos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanwick v. Carver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saratoga County; Pravda v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saunders, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saunders v. Kearney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Savage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Say; Richardson v.
Scaff-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scalf, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scarborough v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scarfo v. Ginsberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schaefer v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scharringhausen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scheidly v. Travelers Ins. Co.
Schlamer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schneider; Snyder’s Bakery, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schneider; United States Bakery, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schomig; Sanchez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schroder v. Bienvenu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1106
1051
205
1062
1075
1052
1128
1056
1020
1095
1057
1089
1137
1016
1132
1101
1028
1002
1045
1010
1097
1087
1057,1145
1002
1022
1028
1107
1012
1016
1063
1055
1100
1011
1050
1120
1003
1008
1070
1054,1144
1005
1062
1062
1089
1056
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

15

BREYER, J., dissenting

The Constitution does not prohibit the use of prosecuto
rial  discretion.  Id.,  at  199,  and  n.  50  (joint  opinion  of
Stewart,  Powell,  and  Stevens,  JJ.);  McCleskey  v.  Kemp,
481 U. S. 279, 307–308, and n. 28, 311–312 (1987).  It has
not  proved  possible  to  increase  capital  defense  funding
significantly.  Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics
of Death, 94 Va. L. Rev. 283, 355 (2008) (“Capital defend
ers are notoriously underfunded, particularly in states . . .
that  lead  the  nation  in  executions”);  American  Bar  Assn.
(ABA) Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense  Counsel  in  Death  Penalty  Cases,  Guideline  9.1,
Commentary  (rev.  ed.  Feb.  2003),  in  31  Hofstra  L. Rev.
913,  985  (2003)  (“[C]ompensation  of  attorneys  for  death
penalty  representation  remains  notoriously  inadequate”).
And  courts  cannot  easily  inquire  into  judicial  motivation.
See, e.g., Harris, supra.

Moreover, racial and gender biases may, unfortunately,
reflect  deeply  rooted  community  biases  (conscious  or  un
conscious),  which,  despite  their  legal  irrelevance,  may
affect  a  jury’s  evaluation  of  mitigating  evidence,  see
Callins v. Collins, 510 U. S. 1141, 1153 (1994) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Perhaps it should
not be surprising that the biases and prejudices that infect
society  generally  would  influence  the  determination  of
who is sentenced to death”).  Nevertheless, it remains the
jury’s  task  to  make  the  individualized  assessment  of
whether  the  defendant’s  mitigation  evidence  entitles  him
to mercy.  See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 319
(1989);  Lockett  v.  Ohio,  438  U. S.  586,  604–605  (1978)
(opinion of Burger, C. J.); Woodson, 428 U. S., at 304–305
(plurality opinion).

Finally,  since  this  Court  held  that  comparative  propor
tionality  review  is  not  constitutionally  required,  Pulley  v.
Harris, 465 U. S. 37 (1984), it seems unlikely that appeals
can  prevent  the  arbitrariness  I  have  described.    See
Kaufman-Osborn,  Capital  Punishment,  Proportionality
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the use of prosecutorial discretion, funding for capital defense, and potential biases in jury decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

cannot  lawfully  divert  them  elsewhere—just  as  a  lawyer
cannot dispose of a client’s property entrusted to him with-
out  permission.  And  the  only  way  to  ensure  compliance
with that obligation is to give the Tribe just what they re-
quest—an assessment of the water rights the federal gov-
ernment holds on the Tribe’s behalf.

III
The Court does not dispute most of this.  It agrees that
the Navajo enjoy “water rights implicitly reserved to accom-
plish the purpose of the reservation.”  Ante, at 2.  It agrees
that the United States cannot lawfully interfere with those
water rights.  Ante, at 2, 6, 7.  And it leaves open the possi-
bility that the Navajo “may be able to assert the interests
they claim in water rights litigation.”  Ante, at 12.  Really,
the Court gets off the train just one stop short.  It insists
(and then repeats—again and again) that the United States
owes no “affirmative duty” to the Navajo with respect to wa-
ter,  and  therefore  does  not  need  to  take  any  “affirmative
steps” to help the Tribe on that score.  Ante, at 2, 6–13.  This
reasoning reflects three errors.

A

The Court begins by misapprehending the nature of the
Navajo’s complaint.  Though it never quite cashes out what
the  phrase  “affirmative  steps”  means,  the  Court  appears
concerned that allowing this complaint to proceed could re-
sult in a court order requiring the United States to “buil[d]
pipelines,  pumps,  wells,  or  other  water  infrastructure.”
Ante, at 2, 6, 7.  More than that, the Court worries that—if
a lower court finds that the United States has any water-
related  responsibilities  to  the  Tribe—the  federal  govern-
ment might even eventually find itself on the hook to “farm
land,  mine  minerals,  harvest  timber,  build  roads,  or  con-
struct  bridges  on  the  reservation.”    Ante,  at  13;  see  also
ante, at 9.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

15

Opinion of the Court

induce private parties like Lexis to assist in preparing af-
fordable annotated codes for widespread distribution.  That
appeal  to  copyright  policy,  however,  is  addressed  to  the
wrong forum.  As Georgia acknowledges, “[I]t is generally
for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue
the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U. S. 186, 212 (2003).  And that principle requires adher-
ence  to  precedent  when,  as  here,  we  have  construed  the
statutory text and “tossed [the ball] into Congress’s court,
for acceptance or not  as that branch elects.”  Kimble, 576
U. S., at 456.

Turning to our government edicts precedents, Georgia in-
sists that they can and should be read to focus exclusively
on whether a particular work has “the force of law.”  Brief
for Petitioners 32 (capitalization deleted).  JUSTICE THOMAS
appears to endorse the same view.  See post, at 4.  But that
framing has multiple flaws.

Most obviously, it cannot be squared with the reasoning
or results of our cases—especially Banks.  Banks, following
Wheaton  and  the  “judicial  consensus”  it  inspired,  denied
copyright protection to judicial opinions without excepting
concurrences  and  dissents  that  carry  no  legal  force.    128
U. S., at 253 (emphasis deleted).  As every judge learns the
hard way, “comments in [a] dissenting opinion” about legal
principles and precedents “are just that: comments in a dis-
senting  opinion.”    Railroad  Retirement  Bd.  v.  Fritz,  449
U. S. 166, 177, n. 10 (1980).  Yet such comments are covered
by the government edicts doctrine because they come from
an official with authority to make and interpret the law.

Indeed, Banks went even further and withheld copyright
protection from headnotes and syllabi produced by judges.
128 U. S., at 253.  Surely these supplementary materials do
not have the force of law, yet they are covered by the doc-
trine.  The simplest explanation is the one Banks provided:
These non-binding works are not copyrightable because of
who creates them—judges acting in their judicial capacity.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the "government edicts doctrine" and its application to copyright law.  The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

855

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10803.  King  v.  Nooth,  Superintendent,  Snake
River  Correctional  Institution.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  08–10804.  Johnson  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10805.  Kinney  v.  Bergh,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10806.  Keleta  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  552  F.  3d  861.

No.  08–10807.  Smith  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.

Dist.,  Div.  3.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10808.  Strunk  v.  Evans,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10809.  Santiago  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  62.

No.  08–10810.  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  780.

No.  08–10811.  Sanchez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  801.

No.  08–10812.  Weaver  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  554  F.  3d  718.

No.  08–10815.  Dismuke  v.  Mississippi.  Sup.  Ct.  Miss.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10816.  Caldwell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  669.

No.  08–10818.  Khalafala  v.  United  States  District
Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of  California.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10819.  Watt  v.  Roth  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 08–10820.  Watts v. United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  553  F.  3d  603.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, courts, and certiorari decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

25

THOMAS, J., dissenting

and  the  provision  of  maternity  benefits  depended  on  “the
power of the cooperating states to compel birth registration,
the licensing of mid-wives, etc.”  Ibid.  Thus, more than 100
years after Monroe’s Views, it was still well understood that
the Federal Government’s spending power needed to work
with “the wider coercive powers of the states” to accomplish
its ends.  Ibid.  And, a State’s acceptance of federal funds in
return  for  exercising  its  own  powers  did  not  expand  the
Federal Government’s legislative powers.

In sum, from the framing of the Constitution to well into
the 20th century, it was virtually undisputed that Congress’
spending power was nothing more than a power to spend.
It included no regulatory authority to bind parties, to secure
rights or impose duties with the force of federal law, and no
authority  to  directly  regulate  the  States  even  with  their
consent.

E
When cases concerning expansive federal spending pro-
grams  first  began  to  reach  this  Court,  they  vividly  illus-
trated  both  the  enduring  understanding  of  the  spending
power as a nonregulatory power and the contractual under-
standing of spending conditions.  The Federal Government
defended major spending programs on the basis of that un-
derstanding, and the programs survived this Court’s review
only because of those traditional premises.

In  Massachusetts  v.  Mellon,  262  U. S.  447  (1923),  the
Court rejected as nonjusticiable Massachusetts’ claim that
the Maternity Act of 1921 was “an attempt to legislate out-
side  the  powers  granted  to  Congress  by  the  Constitution
and within the field of local powers exclusively reserved to
the  States.”  Id.,  at  482.  The  Court  first  stated  that  it
“[p]robably . . . would be sufficient to point out that the pow-
ers of the State are not invaded, since the statute imposes
no obligation but simply extends an option which the State
is free to accept or reject.”  Id., at 480.  In other words, the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 599 U.S. ____ (2023). It delves into the historical understanding and limitations of Congress' spending power.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

The  Eleventh  Circuit  reversed.  906  F. 3d  1229.    The
Court began by reviewing the three 19th-century cases in
which we articulated the government edicts doctrine.  See
Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (1834); Banks v. Manchester,
128  U. S.  244  (1888);  Callaghan  v.  Myers,  128  U. S.  617
(1888).  The  Court  understood  those  cases  to  establish  a
“rule” based on an interpretation of the statutory term “au-
thor” that “works created by  courts in the performance of
their official duties did not belong to the judges” but instead
fell  “in  the  public  domain.”  906  F. 3d,  at  1239.    In  the
Court’s view, that rule “derive[s] from first principles about
the nature of law in our democracy.”  Ibid.  In a democracy,
the Court reasoned, “the People” are “the constructive au-
thors”  of  the  law,  and  judges  and  legislators  are  merely
“draftsmen . . . exercising delegated authority.”  Ibid.  The
Court  therefore  deemed  the  “ultimate  inquiry”  to  be
whether a work is “attributable to the constructive author-
ship of the People.”  Id., at 1242.  The Court identified three
factors to guide that inquiry: “the identity of the public offi-
cial who created the work; the nature of the work; and the
process by which the work was produced.”  Id., at 1254.  The
Court found that each of those factors cut in favor of treat-
ing the OCGA annotations as government edicts authored
by the People.  It therefore rejected the Commission’s asser-
tion of copyright, vacated the injunction against PRO, and
directed that judgment be entered for PRO.

We granted certiorari.  588 U. S. ___ (2019).

II
We hold that the annotations in Georgia’s Official Code
are  ineligible  for  copyright  protection,  though  for  reasons
distinct  from  those  relied  on  by  the  Court  of  Appeals.    A
careful  examination  of  our  government  edicts  precedents
reveals a straightforward rule based on the identity of the
author.  Under  the  government  edicts  doctrine,  judges—
and,  we  now  confirm,  legislators—may  not  be  considered
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and lays out the Court's reasoning for its decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

Opinion of the Court

commit clear error when it found that the prisoners failed
to  establish  that  Oklahoma’s  use  of  a  massive  dose  of
midazolam  in  its  execution  protocol  entails  a  substantial
risk of severe pain.

I

A

The  death  penalty  was  an  accepted  punishment  at  the
time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  and  the  Bill  of
Rights.  In that era, death sentences were usually carried
out  by  hanging.    The  Death  Penalty  in  America:  Current
Controversies  4  (H.  Bedau  ed.  1997).    Hanging  remained
the  standard  method  of  execution  through  much  of  the
19th  century,  but  that  began  to  change  in  the  century’s
later years.  See Baze, supra, at 41–42.  In the 1880’s, the
Legislature of the State of New York appointed a commis-
sion  to  find  “ ‘the  most  humane  and  practical  method
known  to  modern  science  of  carrying  into  effect  the  sen-
tence of death in capital cases.’ ”  In re Kemmler, 136 U. S.
436, 444 (1890).  The commission recommended electrocu-
tion, and in 1888, the Legislature enacted a law providing
for  this  method  of  execution.  Id.,  at  444–445.  In  subse-
quent years, other States followed New York’s lead in the
“ ‘belief that electrocution is less painful and more humane
than hanging.’ ”  Baze, 553 U. S., at 42 (quoting Malloy v.
South Carolina, 237 U. S. 180, 185 (1915)).

In  1921,  the  Nevada  Legislature  adopted  another  new
method of execution, lethal gas, after concluding that this
was “the most humane manner known to modern science.”
State v. Jon, 46 Nev. 418, 437, 211 P. 676, 682 (1923).  The
Nevada  Supreme  Court  rejected  the  argument  that  the
use of lethal gas was unconstitutional, id., at 435–437, 211
P.,  at  681–682,  and  other  States  followed  Nevada’s  lead,
see,  e.g.,  Ariz.  Const.,  Art.  XXII,  §22  (1933);  1937  Cal.
Stats.  ch.  172,  §1;  1933  Colo.  Sess.  Laws  ch.  61,  §1;  1955
Md. Laws ch. 625, §1, p. 1017; 1937 Mo. Laws p. 222, §1.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the history of execution methods in the United States. It provides context for a legal argument and is likely part of the main body of the text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Syllabus

the full committee’s votes is tentatively accepted for admission.  At the
end  of  this  process,  the  racial  composition  of  the  tentative  applicant
pool is disclosed to the committee.  The last stage of Harvard’s admis-
sions process, called the “lop,” winnows the list of tentatively admitted
students to arrive at the final class.  Applicants that Harvard consid-
ers  cutting  at  this  stage  are  placed  on  the  “lop  list,”  which  contains
only four pieces of information: legacy status, recruited athlete status,
financial aid eligibility, and race.  In the Harvard admissions process,
“race is a determinative tip for” a significant percentage “of all admit-
ted African American and Hispanic applicants.”

UNC  has  a  similar  admissions  process.    Every  application  is  re-
viewed first by an admissions office reader, who assigns a numerical
rating to each of several categories.  Readers are required to consider
the applicant’s race as a factor in their review.  Readers then make a
written recommendation on each assigned application, and they may
provide an applicant a substantial “plus” depending on the applicant’s
race.  At this stage, most recommendations are provisionally final.  A
committee of experienced staff members then conducts a “school group
review” of every initial decision made by a reader and either approves
or rejects the recommendation.  In making those decisions, the com-
mittee may consider the applicant’s race.

Petitioner, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), is a nonprofit or-
ganization whose stated purpose is “to defend human and civil rights
secured by law, including the right of individuals to equal protection
under  the  law.”    SFFA  filed  separate  lawsuits  against  Harvard  and
UNC, arguing that their race-based admissions programs violate, re-
spectively, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  After separate bench
trials,  both  admissions  programs  were  found  permissible  under  the
Equal Protection Clause and this Court’s precedents.  In the Harvard
case, the First Circuit affirmed, and this Court granted certiorari.  In
the UNC case, this Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Held: Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs violate the Equal Pro-

tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pp. 6–40.

(a) Because SFFA complies with the standing requirements for or-
ganizational plaintiffs articulated by this Court in Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, SFFA’s obligations un-
der Article III are satisfied, and this Court has jurisdiction to consider
the merits of SFFA’s claims.

The  Court  rejects  UNC’s  argument  that  SFFA  lacks  standing  be-
cause  it  is  not  a  “genuine”  membership  organization.    An  organiza-
tional plaintiff can satisfy Article III jurisdiction in two ways, one of
which is to assert “standing solely as the representative of its mem-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case, outlining the background, arguments, and holding of the case.  It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a summary and overview.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

Syllabus

 KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  SOTOMAYOR,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined  in  full,  and  in
which JACKSON, J., joined as to Parts I, II and III–A.  BARRETT, J., filed a
concurring opinion.  JACKSON, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment.  THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment.  ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case syllabus, which typically provides a summary of the court's decision.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>