<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SHOOP v. TWYFORD

Syllabus

appropriate in aid of” the District Court’s jurisdiction because Twyford
failed to show that the evidence he hoped to find would be useful to his
habeas case.  Because this Court agrees with the State’s second argu-
ment, it does not address the first.

In habeas cases such as this, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) restricts a federal court’s authority to grant re-
lief.  AEDPA provides that a federal habeas court cannot grant relief
in a case adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court
(1) contradicted or unreasonably applied this Court’s precedents, or (2)
handed down a decision “based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed-
ing.”  §§2254(d)(1)–(2).  AEDPA also restricts the ability of a federal
habeas court to develop and consider new evidence, limiting review of
factual determinations under §2254(d)(2) to “the evidence presented in
the  State  court  proceeding,”  and  review  of  legal  claims  under
§2254(d)(1) “to the record that was before the state court.”  Cullen v.
Pinholster,  563  U. S.  170,  181.    A  federal  court  may  admit  new  evi-
dence only in two limited situations: Either the claim must rely on a
“new” and “previously unavailable” “rule of constitutional law” made
retroactively  applicable  by  this  Court,  or  it  must  rely  on  “a  factual
predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.”  §2254(e)(2)(A).  But before a federal court
may decide whether to grant an evidentiary hearing or “otherwise con-
sider  new  evidence”  under  §2254(e)(2),  it  must  first  determine  that
such evidence could be legally considered in the prisoner’s case.  Shinn
v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U. S. ___, ___.  That is because a federal court
“may  never  needlessly  prolong  a  habeas  case,  particularly  given  the
essential need to promote the finality of state convictions.”  Id., at ___
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Twyford’s transportation request was granted under the All Writs
Act.  This Court has held that the All Writs Act cannot be used to cir-
cumvent  statutory  requirements  or  otherwise  binding  procedural
rules.  See Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Mar-
shals Service, 474 U. S. 34, 43.  In federal habeas proceedings, AEDPA
provides the governing rules.  And this Court’s precedents explain that
a district court must consider AEDPA’s requirements before facilitat-
ing the development of new evidence.  By the same token, if an order
issued under the All Writs Act enables a prisoner to fish for unusable
evidence, such a writ would not be “necessary or appropriate in aid of”
the federal court’s jurisdiction, as all orders issued under the Act must
be.  §1651(a).    “[G]uided  by  the  general  principles  underlying  [this
Court’s]  habeas  corpus  jurisprudence,”  Calderon  v.  Thompson,  523
U. S. 538, 554, a writ that enables a prisoner to gather evidence that
would not be admissible would “needlessly prolong” resolution of the
  </content>
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This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a court decision.  It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a legal analysis.
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<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U88

[09-06-00 16:44:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

308

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

CARON v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the first circuit

No. 97–6270. Argued April 21, 1998—Decided June 22, 1998

Federal law forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any
ﬁrearm, 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), and requires that a three-time violent
felon who violates § 922(g) receive an enhanced sentence, § 924(e).
However, a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive
offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender’s civil rights have been
restored, “unless such . . . restoration . . . expressly provides that the
person may not . . . possess . . . ﬁrearms.”
§ 921(a)(20). Petitioner,
who has an extensive criminal record, was convicted of possessing, inter
alia, six riﬂes and shotguns in violation of § 922(g). The District Court
enhanced his sentence based on one California conviction and three
Massachusetts convictions, but the First Circuit vacated the sentence,
concluding that his civil rights had been restored by operation of a
Massachusetts law that permitted him to possess riﬂes but restricted
his right to carry handguns. On remand, the District Court disre-
garded the Massachusetts convictions, ﬁnding that, because Massachu-
setts law allowed petitioner to possess riﬂes, § 921(a)(20)’s “unless
clause” was not activated, and that the handgun restriction was irrele-
vant because the case involved riﬂes and shotguns. The First Circuit
reversed, counting the convictions because petitioner remained subject
to signiﬁcant ﬁrearms restrictions.

Held: The handgun restriction activates the unless clause, making the
Massachusetts convictions count under federal law. The phrase “may
not . . . possess . . . ﬁrearms” must be interpreted under either of two
“all-or-nothing” approaches: either it applies when the State forbids one
or more types of ﬁrearms, as the Government contends; or it does not
apply if the State permits one or more types of ﬁrearms, regardless
of the one possessed in the particular case. This Court agrees with
the Government’s approach, under which a state weapons limitation
activates the uniform federal ban on possessing any ﬁrearms at all.
Even if a State permitted an offender to have the guns he possessed,
federal law uses the State’s determination that the offender is more
dangerous than law-abiding citizens to impose its own broader stric-
ture. Under petitioner’s approach, if he had possessed a handgun in
violation of state law, the unless clause would not apply because he could
have possessed a riﬂe. This approach contradicts a likely, and rational,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the legal issues, the parties involved, and the court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xviii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Clayton v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cleary Building Corp.; Zahran v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clements v. Florida Parole and Probation Comm’n . . . . . . . . . . .
Clendenin v. Virginia Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cleveland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clinton; Atraqchi v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clinton; Batts v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clinton; Chenoweth v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clinton; Government Employees v.
Clinton; Hyland v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clyburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coates v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cobb v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cobbin v. Suthers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cobbs v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cochran v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cody v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coe v. Bell
Coe; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coe v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coffee v. Doth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cohen v. Blanchet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cohen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cohn; O’Neill v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coker v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colacurcio v. Kent
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colarte v. LeBlanc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cole v. Tampa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coleman v. Connecticut
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coleman v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coleman v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coleman v. John Thomas Batts, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coleman v. Stewart
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coleman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Collier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colliers v. United States
Collins v. G/H Contracting Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Collins v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Collins v. Spokane Valley Fire Protection Dist. No. 1 . . . . . . . . .
Collins; Spokane Valley Fire Protection Dist. No. 1 v.
. . . . . . . . .
Collins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colonial Beach; Hershﬁeld v.
Colon-Munoz v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colorado; Diaz v.

Page
1059,1146
1021
1117
1015
1017
1059
1021
1012
1018
1088
1120
1040
1122
1057
1028,1105
1075
1100
1084
1034
1034,1084
1132
1058
1093
1062
1115
1053
1024
1073
1061
1085
1057,1083
1071
1038
1080,1138
1118
1120
1116
1058
1107
1107
1011
1004
1055
1060
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

Opinion of the Court

cases suggest an additional and “almost per se” rule forbid-
ding enforcement of state laws that have the “practical ef-
fect of controlling commerce outside the State,” even when
those  laws  do  not  purposely  discriminate  against  out-of-
state  economic  interests.    Ibid.   Petitioners  further  insist
that Proposition 12 offends this “almost per se” rule because
the  law  will  impose  substantial  new  costs  on  out-of-state
pork producers who wish to sell their products in California.

A
This  argument  falters  out  of  the  gate.    Put  aside  what
problems may attend the minor (factual) premise of this ar-
gument.  Focus just on the major (legal) premise.  Petition-
ers say the “almost per se” rule they propose follows ineluc-
tably  from  three  cases—Healy  v.  Beer  Institute,  491  U. S.
324  (1989);  Brown-Forman  Distillers  Corp.  v.  New  York
State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573 (1986); and Baldwin
v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 (1935).  A close look at
those cases, however, reveals nothing like the rule petition-
ers posit.  Instead, each typifies the familiar concern with
preventing  purposeful  discrimination  against  out-of-state
economic interests.
  Start with Baldwin.  There, this Court refused to enforce
New York laws that barred out-of-state dairy farmers from
selling  their  milk  in  the  State  “unless  the  price  paid  to”
them matched the minimum price New York law guaran-
teed in-state producers.  Id., at 519.  In that way, the chal-
lenged laws deliberately robbed out-of-state dairy farmers
of  the  opportunity  to  charge  lower  prices  in  New  York
thanks  to  whatever  “natural  competitive  advantage”  they
might have enjoyed over in-state dairy farmers—for exam-
ple,  lower  cost  structures,  more  productive  farming  prac-
tices, or “lusher pasturage.”  D. Regan, The Supreme Court
and  State  Protectionism:  Making  Sense  of  the  Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1248 (1986).  The
problem  with  New  York’s  laws  was  thus  a  simple  one:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to the Dormant Commerce Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1011

529 U. S.

March 6, 2000

No. 99–8075. Myers v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 248.

No. 99–8077. Larkins v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga

County. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8078. Kee Mann v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 1172.

No. 99–8080. Collins v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 279.

No. 99–8083. May v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 53.

No. 99–8087. Brown v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 818.

No. 99–8091. Robison v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 449.

No. 99–8093. Stuebing v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 264.

No. 99–8094. Mack v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8099.

Johnson v. United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–8101. Scaff-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 935.

No. 99–8103. Nelson v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–8105. Ajiboye v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1352.

No. 99–8115. Gomez Salazar v. United States. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 659.

No. 99–8118. Romero v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 576.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document, not typical reading content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U85

[09-14-00 16:49:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

238

HOHN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

which is hereby overruled. The Eight Circuit’s decision is vacated in
light of the Solicitor General’s position in this Court. Pp. 241–253.

99 F. 3d 892, vacated and remanded.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., ﬁled a concur-
ring opinion, post, p. 253. Scalia, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 254.

Eileen Penner argued the cause for petitioner. With her

on the briefs was Alan Untereiner.

Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General
Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.

Jeffrey S. Sutton, by invitation of the Court, 522 U. S. 944,

argued the cause and ﬁled a brief as amicus curiae.*

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court has
jurisdiction to review decisions of the courts of appeals deny-

*Briefs of amici curiae were ﬁled for the State of California et al. by
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George H. Wil-
liamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Se-
nior Assistant Attorney General, and Eric L. Christoffersen and Ward A.
Campbell, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for
their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Winston Bryant
of Arkansas, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware,
Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, James
E. Ryan of Illinois, Jeffrey A. Modisett of Indiana, Richard P. Ieyoub
of Louisiana, Michael C. Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon
of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Ne-
braska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New York,
W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsyl-
vania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Mark Barnett of South Dakota,
John Knox Walkup of Tennessee, Jan Graham of Utah, Mark L. Earley
of Virginia, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; and for the National Asso-
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Edward M. Chikofsky and Lisa
Kemler.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes the case name, citation, the court's decision, and the justices' opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

BREYER, J., dissenting

gun-law  decisions  issued  in  the  last  half-century  by  Su-
preme Courts in 42 States, which courts with “surprisingly
little variation,” have adopted a standard more deferential
than  strict  scrutiny).  While  these  state  cases  obviously
are not controlling, they are instructive.  Cf., e.g., Bartkus
v.  Illinois,  359  U. S.  121,  134  (1959)  (looking  to  the  “ex-
perience of state courts” as informative of a constitutional
question).  And they thus provide some comfort regarding
the  practical  wisdom  of  following  the  approach  that  I
believe  our  constitutional  precedent  would  in  any  event
suggest.

IV
The  present  suit  involves  challenges  to  three  separate
District  firearm  restrictions.  The  first  requires  a  license
from the District’s Chief of Police in order to carry a “pis-
tol,”  i.e.,  a  handgun,  anywhere  in  the  District.    See  D.  C.
Code  §22–4504(a)  (2001);  see  also  §§22–4501(a),  22–4506.
Because  the  District  assures  us  that  respondent  could
obtain  such  a  license  so  long  as  he  meets  the  statutory
eligibility  criteria,  and  because  respondent  concedes  that
those criteria are facially constitutional, I, like the major-
ity,  see  no  need  to  address  the  constitutionality  of  the
licensing requirement.  See ante, at 58–59.

The  second  District  restriction  requires  that  the  lawful
owner of a firearm keep his weapon “unloaded and disas-
sembled  or  bound  by  a  trigger  lock  or  similar  device”
unless it is kept at his place of business or being used for
lawful  recreational  purposes.  See  §7–2507.02.    The  only
dispute regarding this provision appears to be whether the
Constitution requires an exception that would allow some-
one  to  render  a  firearm  operational  when  necessary  for
self-defense  (i.e.,  that  the  firearm  may  be  operated  under
circumstances  where  the  common  law  would  normally
permit  a  self-defense  justification  in  defense  against  a
criminal charge).  See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer in the case District of Columbia v. Heller. It discusses the history of gun laws and the specific challenges to District firearm restrictions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Google does not dispute the Federal Circuit’s conclusion
that it copied the heart or focal points of Oracle’s work.  886
F. 3d,  at  1207.  The  declaring  code  is  what  attracted  pro-
grammers to the Java platform and why Google was so in-
terested in that code.  And Google copied that code “verba-
tim,” which weighs against fair use.  Harper, 471 U. S., at
565.  The majority does not disagree.  Instead, it concludes
that  Google  took  no  more  than  necessary  to  create  new
products.  That  analysis  fails  because  Google’s  use  is  not
transformative.  Campbell,  510  U. S.,  at  586  (recognizing
that  this  fourth  factor  “will  harken  back  to  the  [purpose-
and-character] statutory facto[r]”).  This factor thus weighs
against Google.

Even if Google’s use were transformative, the majority is
wrong to conclude that Google copied only a small portion
of  the  original  work.  The  majority  points  out  that  the
11,500  lines  of  declaring  code—enough  to  fill  about  600
pages in an appendix, Tr. of Oral Arg. 57—were just a frac-
tion of the code in the Java platform.  But the proper de-
nominator is declaring code, not all code.  A copied work is
quantitatively substantial if it could “serve as a market sub-
stitute for the original” work or “potentially licensed deriv-
atives” of that work. Campbell, 510 U. S., at 587.  The de-
claring code is what attracted programmers.  And it is what
made  Android  a  “market  substitute”  for  “potentially  li-
censed derivatives” of Oracle’s Java platform.  Google’s cop-
ying was both qualitatively and quantitatively substantial.

*

*
In sum, three of the four statutory fair-use factors weigh
decidedly  against  Google.    The  nature  of  the  copyrighted
work—the sole factor possibly favoring Google—cannot by
itself  support  a  determination  of  fair  use  because  holding

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding copyright infringement.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

Opinion of the Court

case  is  remanded  for  further  proceedings  not  inconsistent
with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the conclusion of a legal opinion, specifically the "It is so ordered" line.  Legal opinions often have specific formatting and structure, and this snippet fits that pattern.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

THOMAS, J., concurring

it  seems  unlikely  that  the  enacting  Congress  had  any
intent  on  this  question;  Congress  typically  does  not  pass
statutes with the expectation that some part will later be
deemed  unconstitutional.  See  Walsh  740–741;  Stern,
Separability  and  Separability  Clauses  in  the  Supreme
Court, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 76, 98 (1937) (Stern).  Without any
actual evidence of intent, the severability doctrine invites
courts  to  rely  on  their  own  views  about  what  the  best
statute  would  be.    See  Walsh  752–753;  Stern  112–113.
More  fundamentally,  even  if  courts  could  discern  Con-
gress’  hypothetical  intentions,  intentions  do  not  count
unless they are enshrined in a text that makes it through
the  constitutional  processes  of  bicameralism  and  present-
ment.  See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 586–588 (2009)
(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).    Because  we  have
“ ‘a Government of laws, not of men,’ ” we are governed by
“legislated  text,”  not  “legislators’  intentions”—and  espe-
cially not legislators’ hypothetical intentions.  Zuni Public
School Dist. No. 89 v. Department of Education, 550 U. S.
81,  119  (2007)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting).  Yet  hypothetical
intent  is  exactly  what  the  severability  doctrine  turns  on,
at  least  when  Congress  has  not  expressed  its  fallback
position in the text.

Second, the severability doctrine often requires courts to
weigh in on statutory provisions that no party has stand-
ing  to  challenge,  bringing  courts  dangerously  close  to
issuing  advisory  opinions.  See  Stern  77;  Lea,  Situational
Severability, 103 Va. L. Rev. 735, 788–803 (2017) (Lea).  If
one provision of a statute is deemed unconstitutional, the
severability doctrine places every other provision at risk of

——————

v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Charlestown,  68  Mass.  84,  99  (1854).    This
Court  adopted  the  Warren  formulation  in  the  late  19th  century,  see
Allen  v.  Louisiana,  103  U. S.  80,  84  (1881),  an  era  when  statutory
interpretation  privileged  Congress’  unexpressed  “intent”  over  the
enacted  text,  see,  e.g.,  Church  of  Holy  Trinity  v.  United  States,  143
U. S. 457, 472 (1892); United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763 (1878).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the legal doctrine of severability and argues against its application.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

JACKSON, J., dissenting

a particular unlawful act,” ante, at 6 (emphasis added).  But
the  encouragement  provision  hints  at  no  such  thing.    It
simply prohibits “encourag[ing] or induc[ing]” a noncitizen
“to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing
or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, en-
try,  or  residence  is  or  will  be  in  violation  of  law.”
§1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).  Nor does the ordinary meaning of “en-
courages or induces” carry the intent requirement that so-
licitation and facilitation do: By describing the attractions
of  my  hometown,  for  instance,  I  might  end  up  inducing  a
listener to move there, even if that was not my intent.
  It  is  also  telling  that  the  very  next  subdivision  of
§1324(a)(1)(A)  expressly  prohibits  “aid[ing]  or  abet[ting]
the
the  preceding  acts.”
§1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II).    That  provision  indicates  that  Con-
gress knows how to create an aiding-and-abetting prohibi-
tion  when  it  wants  to—and  that  it  did  not  do  so  in
§1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).3
  The majority’s mere observation that the encouragement
provision’s terms are used to define solicitation and facili-
tation is thus insufficient to establish that the terms mean
the same thing or incorporate the same features.

commission  of  any  of

B
  The  majority  next  turns  to  “[s]tatutory  history”  to  sup-
port its transformation of the broad encouragement provi-
sion  that  Congress  wrote  into  a  narrow  solicitation  or
aiding-and-abetting prohibition.  Ante, at 11.  I agree that
the history of a statute can reveal Congress’s intent to use
terms  in  a  narrower  or  specialized  manner.    But,  here

——————

3 This is not a surplusage argument.  Cf. ante, at 15, n. 2.  I agree with
the majority that clause (iv) and clause (v)(II) have different aims.  My
point, instead, is that Congress’s failure to use the classic “aids or abets”
language in clause (iv), which it deploys just next door in clause (v)(II),
should give us pause before concluding that we can read clause (iv) as if
it included the same terms.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute (likely related to immigration) and argues against the majority's interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Syllabus

dence  to  establish  that  all  land  in  Wyoming  was  functionally  “occu-
pied” by 1890, its arguments fall outside the question presented and
are unpersuasive in any event.  Pp. 13–17.

2. Bighorn National Forest did not become categorically “occupied”
within the meaning of the 1868 Treaty when the national forest was
created.  Construing the treaty’s terms as “ ‘they would naturally be
understood  by  the  Indians,’ ”  Washington  v.  Washington  State  Com-
mercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658, 676, it is clear
that  the  Tribe  would  have  understood  the  word  “unoccupied”  to  de-
note an area free of residence or settlement by non-Indians.  That in-
terpretation follows from several cues in the treaty’s text.  For exam-
ple,  the  treaty  made  the  hunting  right  contingent  on  peace  “among
the  whites  and  Indians  on  the  borders  of  the  hunting  districts,”  15
Stat. 650, thus contrasting the unoccupied hunting districts with ar-
eas of white settlement.  Historical evidence confirms this reading of
“unoccupied.”  Wyoming’s  counterarguments  are  unavailing.    The
Federal Government’s exercise of control and withdrawing of the for-
est lands from settlement would not categorically transform the terri-
tory into an area resided on or settled by non-Indians; quite the oppo-
site.  Nor would mining and logging of the forest lands prior to 1897
have  caused  the  Tribe  to  view  the  Bighorn  Mountains  as  occupied.
Pp. 17–21.

3. This decision is limited in two ways.  First, the Court holds that
Bighorn  National  Forest  is  not  categorically  occupied,  not  that  all
areas within the forest are unoccupied.  Second, the state trial court de-
cided  that  Wyoming  could  regulate  the  exercise  of  the  1868  Treaty
right  “in  the  interest  of  conservation,”  an  issue  not  reached  by  the
appellate court.  The Court also does not address the viability of the
State’s arguments on this issue.  Pp. 21–22.

Vacated and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  GINS-
BURG, BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  ALITO, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and KAVANAUGH,
JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

75

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

abridgment of . . . constitutional freedoms”).

The same fundamental principle applies to religious prac-
tices that give offense.  The preservation of religious free-
dom depends on that principle.  Many core religious beliefs
are  perceived  as  hateful  by  members  of  other  religions  or
nonbelievers.  Proclaiming that there is only one God is of-
fensive to polytheists, and saying that there are many gods
is anathema to Jews, Christians, and Muslims.  Declaring
that Jesus was the Son of God is offensive to Judaism and
Islam, and stating that Jesus was not the Son of God is in-
sulting  to  Christian  belief.    Expressing  a  belief  in  God  is
nonsense  to  atheists,  but  denying  the  existence  of  God  or
proclaiming that religion has been a plague is infuriating to
those for whom religion is all-important.

Suppressing  speech—or  religious  practice—simply  be-
cause it expresses an idea that some find hurtful is a zero-
sum game.  While CSS’s ideas about marriage are likely to
be  objectionable  to  same-sex  couples,  lumping  those  who
hold traditional beliefs about marriage together with racial
bigots is insulting to those who retain such beliefs.  In Ober-
gefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015), the majority made a
commitment.  It refused to equate traditional beliefs about
marriage,  which  it  termed  “decent  and  honorable,”  id.,  at
672,  with  racism,  which  is  neither.  And  it  promised  that
“religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may
continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that,
by  divine  precepts,  same-sex  marriage  should  not  be  con-
doned.”  Id., at 679.  An open society can keep that promise
while still respecting the “dignity,” “worth,” and fundamen-
tal equality of all members of the community.  Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).

B

One final argument must be addressed.  Philadelphia and
many  of  its  amici  contend  that  preservation  of  the  City’s
policy is not dependent on Smith.  They argue that the City
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case. It delves into the principles of religious freedom and free speech, using examples to illustrate its points.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 18–1023, 18–1028 and 18–1038
_________________

MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS,
PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES

18–1023

18–1028

MODA HEALTH PLAN, INC., PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES

BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF NORTH
CAROLINA, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES

LAND OF LINCOLN MUTUAL HEALTH INSURANCE
COMPANY, AN ILLINOIS NONPROFIT MUTUAL
INSURANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES

18–1038

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[April 27, 2020]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act expanded
healthcare coverage to many who did not have or could not
——————

* JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE GORSUCH join all but Part III–C of this

opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, notice about potential revisions, the court's name, case numbers, parties involved, and the start of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR, PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BRUNETTI

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 18–302.  Argued April 15, 2019—Decided June 24, 2019

Respondent Erik Brunetti sought federal registration of the trademark
FUCT.  The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied his applica-
tion under a provision of the Lanham Act that prohibits registration
of  trademarks  that  “[c]onsist[ ]  of  or  comprise[ ]  immoral[ ]  or  scan-
dalous  matter,”  15  U. S. C.  §1052(a).    Brunetti  brought  a  First
Amendment challenge to the “immoral or scandalous” bar in the Fed-
eral Circuit, which invalidated the provision.

Held:  The  Lanham  Act’s  prohibition  on  registration  of  “immoral[ ]  or

scandalous” trademarks violates the First Amendment.

In Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. ___, this Court declared unconstitution-
al  the  Lanham  Act’s  ban  on  registering  marks  that  “disparage”  any
“person[ ], living or dead.”  §1052(a).  A divided Court agreed on two
propositions.    First,  if  a  trademark  registration  bar  is  viewpoint
based, it is unconstitutional.  And second, the disparagement bar was
viewpoint based.

The  “immoral  or  scandalous”  bar  similarly  discriminates  on  the
basis of viewpoint and so collides with this Court’s First Amendment
doctrine.    Expressive  material  is  “immoral”  when  it  is  “inconsistent
with rectitude, purity, or good morals”; “wicked”; or “vicious.”  So the
Lanham  Act  permits  registration  of  marks  that  champion  society’s
sense  of  rectitude  and  morality,  but  not  marks  that  denigrate  those
concepts.  And material is “scandalous” when it “giv[es] offense to the
conscience  or  moral  feelings”;  “excite[s]  reprobation”;  or  “call[s]  out
condemnation.”    So  the  Lanham  Act  allows  registration  of  marks
when their messages accord with, but not when their messages defy,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC

Syllabus

First,  preclusion  of  district  court  jurisdiction  “could  foreclose  all
meaningful judicial review.”  Id., at 212–13.  Adequate judicial review
does not usually demand a district court’s involvement.  And the stat-
utes  at issue  in  this  case  provide  for  judicial  review  of  adverse  SEC
and FTC actions in a court of appeals.  But Cochran and Axon assert
a  “here-and-now  injury”  from  being  subjected  to  an  illegitimate  pro-
ceeding, led by an illegitimate decisionmaker.  Seila Law LLC v. Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. ___, ___.  That injury is
impossible to remedy once the proceeding is over, which is when ap-
pellate review kicks in.  Judicial review of the structural constitutional
claims  would  thus  come  too late  to be meaningful.    To be  sure,  “the
expense and disruption” of “protracted adjudicatory proceedings” on a
claim do not alone justify immediate review.  FTC v. Standard Oil Co.
of Cal., 449 U. S. 232, 244.  But the nature of the injury here is differ-
ent: As with a right “not to stand trial” that is “effectively lost” if review
is deferred until after trial, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526,
Axon and Cochran will lose their rights not to undergo the complained-
of agency proceedings if they cannot assert those rights until the pro-
ceedings are over.

The collateralism factor also favors  Axon  and Cochran.  The  chal-
lenges to the Commissions’ authority have nothing to do with either
the  enforcement-related  matters  the  Commissions  regularly  adjudi-
cate or those they would adjudicate in assessing the charges against
Axon and Cochran.  Elgin, 567 U. S., at 22.  The parties’ claims are
thus “ ‘collateral’ to any Commission orders or rules from which review
might be sought.”  Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 490.

Finally,  Cochran’s  and  Axon’s  claims  are  “outside  the  [Commis-
sions’] expertise.”  Thunder Basin, 510 U. S., at 212.  The Court in Free
Enterprise Fund determined that claims that tenure protections vio-
late Article II raise “standard questions of administrative” and consti-
tutional  law,  detached  from  “considerations  of  agency  policy.”    561
U. S., at 491.  That statement covers Axon’s and Cochran’s claims that
ALJs  are  too  far  insulated  from  the  President’s  removal  authority.
And Axon’s constitutional challenge to the combination of prosecuto-
rial and adjudicative functions in the FTC is similarly distant from the
FTC’s  “competence  and  expertise.”  Ibid.    The  Commission  knows  a
good deal about competition policy, but nothing special about the sep-
aration of powers.  For that reason, “agency adjudications are gener-
ally  ill  suited  to  address  structural  constitutional  challenges”—like
those maintained here.  Carr v. Saul, 593 U. S. ___, ___.  The Court
concludes that the claims here are not the type the statutory review
schemes at issue reach.  Pp. 10–18.

No. 21–86, 986 F. 3d 1173, reversed and remanded; No. 21–1239, 20 F.

4th 194, affirmed and remanded.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing the arguments and reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It is not the actual content of the case being argued, but rather an analysis of the legal issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Opinion of the Court

1986,  Congress  amended  §666  and  thereby  avoided  the
law’s  “possible  application  to  acceptable  commercial  and
business practices.”  H. R. Rep. No. 99–797, p. 30 (1986); see
100 Stat. 3612–3613.  As a result of its amendment in 1986,
the  text  of  §666  for  state  and  local  officials  now  closely
resembles the bribery provision for federal officials, §201(b),
rather  than  the  gratuities  provision  for  federal  officials,
§201(c).  As relevant here, §666 makes it a crime for most
state  and  local  officials  to  “corruptly”  solicit,  accept,  or
agree  to  accept  “anything  of  value”  “intending  to  be
influenced  or  rewarded  in  connection  with”  any  official
business
or  more.
§§666(a)(1)(B), (b).  That crime carries a 10-year maximum
prison sentence.  §666(a).

transaction  worth  $5,000

or

C
This case involves the former mayor of Portage, Indiana.
Portage is a city in northwest Indiana with a population of
about 38,000.

Like  other  States,

criminalizes  bribery
Indiana
committed by state and local officials.  See Ind. Code §35–
  Indiana  also  prescribes  civil
44.1–1–2(a)(2)  (2023).
penalties  such  as  fines,  reprimands,  and  disqualification
from state employment if state officials accept gratuities in
violation of the State’s Code of Ethics.  See Ind. Code §4–2–
6–12 (2021); 42 Ind. Admin. Code §1–5–1 (2024).

But  Indiana  does  not  impose  general  criminal  or  civil
prohibitions on local officials who accept gratuities, leaving
such  regulation  to  the  local  governments  themselves.  As
relevant  here,  the  City  of  Portage  sets  limits  on  the  gifts
that  local  officials  can  accept  from  contractors  doing
business with the City.  See Portage, Ind., Municipal Code
of Ordinances §§2–178(e)–(f) (2024).

In 2013, the City of Portage awarded two contracts to a
local  truck  company,  Great  Lakes  Peterbilt,  to  purchase
trash trucks.  In total, the City paid about $1.1 million for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of a former mayor of Portage, Indiana, and the relevant laws regarding bribery and gratuities. It cites legal statutes and codes, indicating its legal context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.
v. GOLDSMITH
KAGAN, J., dissenting

undermines creative freedom.  I respectfully dissent.2

I
A

Andy Warhol is the avatar of transformative copying.  Cf.
Google, 593 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 24–25) (selecting
Warhol,  from  the  universe  of  creators,  to  illustrate  what
transformative  copying  is).  In  his  early  career,  Warhol
worked as a commercial illustrator and became experienced
in  varied  techniques  of  reproduction.  By  night,  he  used
those  techniques—in  particular,  the  silkscreen—to  create
his own art.  His own—even though in one sense not.  The
silkscreen enabled him to make brilliantly novel art out of
existing  “images  carefully  selected  from  popular  culture.”
D. De Salvo, God Is in the Details, in Andy Warhol Prints
22 (4th rev. ed. 2003).  The works he produced, connecting
traditions of fine art with mass culture, depended on “ap-
propriation[s]”: The use of “elements of an extant image[ ]
is Warhol’s entire modus operandi.”  B. Gopnik, Artistic Ap-
propriation vs. Copyright Law, N. Y. Times, Apr. 6, 2021,
p. C4  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  And  with  that
m.o.,  he  changed  modern  art;  his  appropriations  and  his
originality were flipsides of each other.  To a public accus-
tomed  to  thinking  of  art  as  formal  works  “belong[ing]  in

——————

2 One preliminary note before beginning in earnest.  As readers are by
now aware, the majority opinion is trained on this dissent in a way ma-
jority opinions seldom are.  Maybe that makes the majority opinion self-
refuting?  After all, a dissent with “no theory” and “[n]o reason” is not
one usually thought to merit pages of commentary and fistfuls of come-
back footnotes.  Ante, at 36.  In any event, I’ll not attempt to rebut point
for point the majority’s varied accusations; instead, I’ll mainly rest on my
original submission.  I’ll just make two suggestions about reading what
follows.  First, when you see that my description of a precedent differs
from  the  majority’s,  go  take  a  look  at  the  decision.    Second,  when  you
come across an argument that you recall the majority took issue with, go
back to its response and ask yourself about the ratio of reasoning to ipse
dixit.  With those two recommendations, I’ll take my chances on readers’
good judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal dissent, specifically from Justice Kagan in the case of Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith. It is part of a legal argument and not suitable for indexing as it is.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissent)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

Suits  where  one  business  challenges  the  under-
regulation of another go well beyond competitor suits.  One
example is the Court’s landmark decision in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers  Association  of  United  States,  Inc.  v.  State
Farm  Mutual  Automobile  Insurance  Co.,  463  U. S.  29
(1983).  That case arose when several insurance companies
challenged a federal agency’s rescission of safety standards
for new motor vehicles.  The Court held that the agency’s
decision to rescind those safety standards was subject to the
same degree of judicial review as the decision to issue the
standards in the first place.  See id., at 40–44.  The Court
also  concluded  that  the  rescission  of  the  safety  standards
was arbitrary and capricious.  See id., at 44–57.

At  no  point  in  that  landmark  opinion  on  the  judicial
review  of  agency  actions  did  the  Court  state  (or  need  to
state) the obvious:  Because the agency did not regulate the
insurers themselves, the insurers could obtain relief from
the  downstream  effects  of  the  agency’s  rescission  of  the
safety standards only if the insurers could obtain vacatur of
that rescission.  The Court did not dwell on that remedial
point  because  the  availability  of  vacatur  was  presumably
obvious to all involved.  Only now—some 40 years later—
does the Government imply that the premise of State Farm
was mistaken.

The  Government’s  new  position  would  also  largely
eliminate  the  common  form  of  environmental  litigation
where  private  citizens  sue  a  federal  agency  based  on  the
externalities  that  an  agency  action  is  likely  to  produce.
Litigation  often  arises  when  a  federal  agency  approves  a
development  project  with  potential  effects  on
the
environment  or  on  other  property  owners.  Examples
include  the  construction  of  a  new  pipeline,  see  Delaware
Riverkeeper  Network  v.  FERC,  753  F. 3d  1304  (CADC
2014),  or  the  mining  of  federal  land,  see  WildEarth
Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F. 3d 298 (CADC 2013).  In those
cases,  the  plaintiff  generally  cannot  bring  an  APA  suit
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses legal precedent and the implications of a particular case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

THOMAS, J., dissenting

omitted);  Brief  for  Petitioner  26.  But  this  argument  con-
flates the preservation of state sovereign immunity with a
license to interfere with federal warmaking.  As we already
cautioned in Alden, “The constitutional privilege of a State
to assert its sovereign immunity in its own courts does not
confer upon the State a concomitant right to disregard the
Constitution or valid federal law.”  527 U. S., at 754–755.

For example, the Court notes that early Congresses “es-
tablished military bonuses to reward service, even requir-
ing Virginia to give land to some Revolutionary War offic-
ers.”  Ante, at 9 (citing Act of Aug. 10, 1790, ch. 40, 1 Stat.
182).8  It asks, incredulously, “Could Virginia have refused
to go along?”  Ante, at 9.  But that question is a non sequitur.
No one disputes “the supremacy of federal power in the area
of military affairs.”  Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496
U. S.  334,  351  (1990).   Instead,  all  agree  that  the  United
States could lawfully sue Virginia in federal court to secure
an  injunction  requiring  it  to  comply  with  federal  law.  In
fact,  USERRA  already  authorizes  suits  by  the  United
States  to  enforce  USERRA’s  requirements.  §4323(a)(1).

——————

8 The Court’s characterization of the Act of Aug. 10, 1790, as “requiring
Virginia to give land to some Revolutionary War officers” “at the expense
of state sovereignty,” ante, at 9, is deeply misleading.  Virginia had ceded
the  relevant  lands  to  the  United  States  in  1784,  but  conditionally  re-
served some of it for the State’s Revolutionary War soldiers.  See Wallace
v.  Parker,  6  Pet.  680,  687  (1832)  (Marshall,  C. J.,  for  the  Court).    The
1790 Act opened up the ceded land to those soldiers, and provided that
the  Secretary  of  War  would  send  the  Virginia  Governor  the  names  of
those soldiers who were entitled to the land under Virginia law.  See §2,
1 Stat. 183.  The 1790 Act also provided that the land would be surveyed,
that the Executive Branch would draw up land patents for eligible sol-
diers, and that the Secretary of State would transmit  those patents  to
the  Virginia  Governor  who  would,  in  turn,  deliver  the  patents  to  the
grantees.  See §§4–6, id., at 183–184.  At most, the 1790 Act required the
Virginia Governor only to deliver advantageous federal land patents to
the State’s own soldiers.  How that statute was enacted “at the expense
of state sovereignty,” ante, at 9, is beyond me.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and cites previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

TRUMP v. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
PROJECT

Per Curiam

U. S.  753,  770  (1972).    In  addition,  the  Fourth  Circuit
erred  by  focusing  on  the  President’s  campaign-trail  com-
ments  to  conclude  that  §2(c)—religiously  neutral  on  its
face—nonetheless  has  a  principally  religious  purpose.    At
the  very  least,  the  Government  argues,  the  injunction  is
too broad.

In  Hawaii,  the  Government  likewise  argues  that  re-
spondents Hawaii and Dr. Elshikh lack standing and that
(at  a  minimum)  the  injunction  should  be  narrowed.  The
Government’s  principal  merits  contention  pertains  to  a
statutory  provision  authorizing  the  President  to  “suspend
the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens” to this country
“[w]henever  [he]  finds  that  the  entry  of  any  aliens  or  of
any  class  of  aliens  . . .  would  be  detrimental  to  the  inter-
ests of the United States.”  8 U. S. C. §1182(f ).  The Ninth
Circuit held that “[t]here is no sufficient finding in [EO–2]
that  the  entry  of  the  excluded  classes  would  be  detri-
mental  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States.”    Hawaii,
2017 WL 2529640, at *14.  This, the Government argues,
constitutes  impermissible  judicial  second-guessing  of  the
President’s judgment on a matter of national security.

In  addition  to  seeking  certiorari,  the  Government  asks
the  Court  to  stay  the  injunctions  entered  below,  thereby
permitting the enjoined provisions to take effect.  Accord-
ing  to  the  Government,  it  is  likely  to  suffer  irreparable
harm unless a stay issues.  Focusing mostly on §2(c), and
pointing to the descriptions of conditions in the six desig-
nated  nations,  the  Government  argues  that  a  90-day
pause on entry is necessary to prevent potentially danger-
ous individuals from entering the United States while the
Executive  reviews  the  adequacy  of  information  provided
by  foreign  governments  in  connection  with  visa  adjudica-
tions.  Additionally,  the  Government  asserts,  the  tempo-
rary bar is  needed to reduce the Executive’s investigative
burdens while this review proceeds.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, likely an excerpt from a court brief or opinion. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to a case involving President Trump and immigration policy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U74

[09-06-00 17:54:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 51 (1998)

69

Opinion of the Court

executive ofﬁcer,” and on “the conduct of CPC ofﬁcials with
respect to Ott II affairs, particularly Arnold Ott”); id., at 558
(“CPC actively participated in, and at times controlled, the
policy-making decisions of its subsidiary through its repre-
sentation on the Ott II board of directors”); id., at 559 (“CPC
also actively participated in and exerted control over day-
to-day decision-making at Ott II through representation in
the highest levels of the subsidiary’s management”).

In imposing direct liability on these grounds, the District
Court failed to recognize that “it is entirely appropriate for
directors of a parent corporation to serve as directors of its
subsidiary, and that fact alone may not serve to expose the
parent corporation to liability for its subsidiary’s acts.”
American Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F. 2d 56, 57 (CA2),
cert. denied, 488 U. S. 852 (1988); see also Kingston Dry
Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F. 2d 265, 267
(CA2 1929) (L. Hand, J.) (“Control through the ownership of
shares does not fuse the corporations, even when the direc-
tors are common to each”); Henn & Alexander 355 (noting
that it is “normal” for a parent and subsidiary to “have iden-
tical directors and ofﬁcers”).

This recognition that the corporate personalities remain
distinct has its corollary in the “well established principle [of
corporate law] that directors and ofﬁcers holding positions
with a parent and its subsidiary can and do ‘change hats’
to represent the two corporations separately, despite their
common ownership.” Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129
F. 3d 773, 779 (CA5 1997); see also Fisser v. International
Bank, 282 F. 2d 231, 238 (CA2 1960). Since courts generally
presume “that the directors are wearing their ‘subsidiary
hats’ and not their ‘parent hats’ when acting for the subsid-
iary,” P. Blumberg, Law of Corporate Groups: Procedural
Problems in the Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations
§ 1.02.1, p. 12 (1983); see, e. g., United States v. Jon-T Chemi-
cals, Inc., 768 F. 2d 686, 691 (CA5 1985), cert. denied, 475
U. S. 1014 (1986), it cannot be enough to establish liability
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 51 (1998). It discusses the legal principle of corporate separateness and whether a parent corporation can be held liable for the actions of its subsidiary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20A66
_________________

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL. v.
WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY

[October 26, 2020]

  JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring in denial of application
to vacate stay.
  Approximately  30  States,  including  Wisconsin,  require
that absentee ballots be received by election day in order to
be counted.  Like most States, Wisconsin has retained that
deadline for the November 2020 election, notwithstanding
the COVID–19 pandemic.  In advance of the November elec-
tion, however, a Federal District Court in Wisconsin unilat-
erally changed the State’s deadline for receipt of absentee
ballots.  Citing the pandemic, the court extended the dead-
line for receipt of absentee ballots by six days—from elec-
tion day, November 3, to November 9, so long as the ballots
are postmarked on or before election day, November 3.
  The  Seventh  Circuit  stayed  the  District  Court’s  injunc-
tion, ruling that the District Court had violated this Court’s
precedents  in  two  fundamental  ways:  first,  by  changing
state election rules too close to an election; and second, by
usurping the state legislature’s authority to either keep or
make  changes  to  state  election  rules  in  light  of  the  pan-
demic.
  Applicants here ask that we vacate the Seventh Circuit’s
stay and reinstate the District Court’s order extending the
deadline  for  absentee  ballots  to  be  received  in  Wisconsin.
The Court today denies the applications and maintains the
Seventh Circuit’s stay of the District Court’s order.  I agree
with  the  Court’s  decision  to  deny  the  applications,  and  I
write separately to explain why.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case regarding absentee ballot deadlines in Wisconsin.  It is suitable for indexing as it is part of the legal record and contains important information about a legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1233

EFFECTIVE DATE

Revised Rules ................................................................  48

Rule

EXHIBITS

Briefs, reference in .......................................................  24.5

Custody of Clerk ...........................................................  32.1

Inclusion in joint appendix..........................................  26.7

Removal or other disposition......................................  32.2

EXTENSION OF TIME

Filing briefs on merits .................................................  25.5

Filing jurisdictional statements .................................  18.3, 30.2, 30.3

Filing papers or documents, generally .....................  30.2–30.4

Filing petitions for rehearing .....................................  30.3, 44.1

Filing petitions for writ of certiorari........................  13.5, 30.2, 30.3

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS—See also Habeas Corpus

Briefs in opposition

—Copies, number to be ﬁled ..............................  20.3(b)

—Cover color  ........................................................  33.1(g)(ii)

—Page limits..........................................................  33.2(b)

—Time to ﬁle  ........................................................  20.3(b)

—Word limits .........................................................  33.1(g)(ii)

Considerations governing issuance  ..........................  20.1

Petitions

—Certiorari, common-law writ of......................  20.6

—Contents  ............................................................  20.2

—Copies, number to be ﬁled ..............................  20.2

—Cover color  ........................................................  33.1(g)(i)

—Docketing............................................................  20.2

—Documents,  format  and  general  require

ments ...............................................................  33, 34

—Habeas corpus, writ of .....................................  20.4

—Mandamus, writ of ............................................  20.3

—Page limits..........................................................  33.2(b)

—Prohibition, writ of ...........................................  20.3

—Service.................................................................  20.2, 29

—Word limits .........................................................  33.1(g)(i)

Response to petitions for habeas corpus

—Cover color .........................................................  33.1(g)(ii)

—Page limits  ........................................................  33.2(b)

—When required  ..................................................  20.4(b)

—Word limits .........................................................  33.1(g)(ii)

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND

EVIDENCE

As guides to procedure in original actions ..............  17.2
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a table of contents or an index for a legal document, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It lists rule numbers and corresponding topics, indicating its purpose is to guide users to specific sections within the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

GALLARDO v. MARSTILLER

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Con-
gress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate in-
clusion or exclusion.’ ”  Russello v. United States, 464 U. S.
16,  23  (1983).    This  is  unpersuasive.  Putting  aside  the
many  contextual  clues  that  support  Gallardo’s  reading  of
the assignment provision, see supra, at 6–7, the presump-
tion  the  Court  cites  is  “ ‘strongest’  in  those  instances  in
which  the  relevant  statutory  provisions  were  ‘considered
simultaneously when the language raising the implication
was inserted.’ ”  Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U. S. 474, 486
(2008).  It  has  less  force  where,  as  here,  different  Con-
gresses  enacted  the  provisions  at  issue  over  the  course  of
multiple decades.  The presumption is especially unhelpful
in this case because it cuts both ways: Since 1965, the anti-
lien provision has specified that a State may not impose a
lien against a beneficiary’s property “on account of medical
assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf.”  §1396p(a)(1)
(emphasis  added).  Accepting  the  Court’s  logic,  Congress
should  have  required  an  assignment  that  unambiguously
reached payments for both furnished and unfurnished care
using  this  existing  “paid  or  to  be  paid”  language,  but  it
failed to do so in the assignment provision.  See ante, at 11.
Meanwhile, the Court fails to give due regard to the clear
textual limitations imposed by the Act as a whole.  For in-
stance, as to the assignment provision’s mirror image in the
insurer acceptance provision, see supra, at 7, the Court rea-
sons  that  the  latter’s  “narrower  focus  on  health  insurers,
who typically pay only once medical services are rendered,
explains  its  application  to  a  narrower  category  of  third-
party payments,” ante, at 10, n. 3.  This is beside the point.
In the assignment provision, Congress required beneficiar-
ies to assign certain rights to the State; in the insurer ac-
ceptance  provision,  it  required  insurers  to  accept  that  as-
signment.  It makes no sense that Congress would require
insurers  to  accept  only  a  sliver  of  the  mandatory  assign-
ment, regardless of how insurers typically pay.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and references to case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY

BARRETT, J., dissenting

“authorization  of  suits  by  private  parties  against  uncon-
senting States.”  Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S.
44, 72 (1996).  Consistent with this principle, we have re-
jected arguments that the Indian Commerce Clause, the In-
terstate  Commerce  Clause,  or  the  Intellectual  Property
Clause  allows  Congress  to  abrogate  a  State’s  immunity
from suit.  Ibid.; Allen, 589 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–
7).

We  have  recognized  but  one  exception  to  this  general
limit on Congress’ Article I powers: the Bankruptcy Clause.
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7).  Based on the “principally in rem”
nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction and the “ ‘unique history’ ”
of that clause, we reasoned that States “already ‘agreed in
the plan of the Convention not to assert any sovereign im-
munity defense’ in bankruptcy proceedings.”  Id., at ___–___
(slip op., at 7–8) (quoting Central Va. Community College v.
Katz, 546 U. S. 356, 377 (2006)).  Other than this “good-for-
one-clause-only  holding,”  we  have  not  held  that  Article  I
trumps state sovereign immunity.  Allen, 589 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 9).1

State surrender of immunity to private suits is therefore
rare in our constitutional system.  Nonetheless, the Court
insists that private condemnation suits are one of the rare
exceptions.

II
A
According to the Court, the States surrendered their im-
munity  to  private  condemnation  suits  in  the  “plan  of  the
Convention.”  Ante, at 15.  Making this showing is no easy
task.  We will not conclude that States relinquished their
sovereign  immunity  absent  “compelling  evidence  that  the

——————

1 Apart from Article I, we have recognized that Congress can subject
nonconsenting  States  to  private  suits  pursuant  to  its  power  to  enforce
the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  Fitzpatrick  v.  Bitzer,  427  U. S.  445,  456
(1976).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the concept of state sovereign immunity and its exceptions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

THOMAS, J., dissenting

“commerce” with the Indian tribes.  Ibid.  Indeed, Justice
McLean  asked,  if  Congress  could  enact  this statute,  “why
may not [C]ongress legislate on crimes for the states gener-
ally?”  Id.,  at  940.  He  concluded  that  Congress  “trans-
cended their constitutional powers” in asserting a general
criminal jurisdiction over tribal lands within the limits of a
State.  Ibid.  And, given the limited nature of the Federal
Government’s  authority,  state  laws  thus  played  a  signifi-
cant role in regulating Indians within the territorial limits
of States.  See id., at 939.

III
The Constitution’s text and the foregoing history point to
a  set  of  discrete,  enumerated  powers  applicable  to  Indian
tribes—just  as  in  any  other  context.    Although  our  cases
have  at  times  suggested  a  broader  power  with  respect  to
Indians, there is no evidence for such a free-floating author-
ity  anywhere  in  the  text  or  original  understanding  of  the
Constitution.  To the contrary, all of the Government’s early
acts with respect to Indians are easily explicable under our
normal  understanding  of  the  Constitution’s  enumerated
powers.  For example, the Treaty Clause supported the Fed-
eral Government’s treaties with Indians, and the Property
Clause supported the gifts allocated to Indians.  The powers
to regulate territories and foreign affairs supported the reg-
ulation of passports and penalties for criminal acts on In-
dian lands.  The various war-related powers supported mil-
itary campaigns against Indian tribes.  And the Commerce
Clause supported the regulation of trade with Indian tribes.
Moreover, the Founders deliberately chose to enumerate
one  power  specific  to  Indian  tribes:  the  power  to  regulate
“Commerce” with tribes.  Because the Constitution contains

——————
provisions  against  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  deemed  not  to  be  an
Indian, who committed a crime on Indian lands within “a part of the ter-
ritory of the United States, and not within the limits of any particular
State.”  United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567, 571–572 (1846).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of constitutional provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

JANUS v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE,

COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,

COUNCIL 31, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 16–1466.  Argued February 26, 2018—Decided June 27, 2018

Illinois  law  permits  public  employees  to  unionize.    If  a  majority  of  the
employees  in  a  bargaining  unit  vote  to  be  represented  by  a  union,
that  union  is  designated  as  the  exclusive  representative  of  all  the
employees,  even  those  who do  not  join.   Only  the  union  may  engage
in collective bargaining; individual employees may not be represented
by  another  agent  or  negotiate  directly  with  their  employer.    Non-
members are required to pay what is generally called an “agency fee,”
i.e., a percentage of the full union dues.  Under Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 235–236, this fee may cover union expenditures
attributable  to  those  activities  “germane”  to  the  union’s  collective-
bargaining  activities  (chargeable  expenditures),  but  may  not  cover
the union’s political and ideological projects (nonchargeable expendi-
tures).  The union sets the agency fee annually and then sends non-
members a notice explaining the basis for the fee and the breakdown
of expenditures.  Here it was 78.06% of full union dues.

Petitioner Mark Janus is a state employee whose unit is represent-
ed  by  a  public-sector  union  (Union),  one  of  the  respondents.    He  re-
fused to join the Union because he opposes many of its positions, in-
cluding  those  taken  in  collective  bargaining.    Illinois’  Governor,
similarly  opposed  to  many  of  these  positions,  filed  suit  challenging
the  constitutionality  of  the  state  law  authorizing  agency  fees.    The
state attorney general, another respondent, intervened to defend the
law,  while  Janus  moved  to  intervene  on  the  Governor’s  side.  The
District  Court  dismissed  the  Governor’s  challenge  for  lack  of  stand-
ing,  but  it  simultaneously  allowed  Janus  to  file  his  own  complaint
challenging  the  constitutionality  of  agency  fees.    The  District  Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U55

[09-26-01 13:01:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 667 (2000)

677

Opinion of the Court

whether an organization receives “beneﬁts” within the
meaning of § 666(b) turns on whether the Federal Govern-
ment was the source of the payment. Funds received under
a federal assistance program, the Government asserts, can
be traced from federal coffers, often through an intermediary
or carrier, to the health care provider. Under its view, the
“federal-program source of the funds” satisﬁes the beneﬁts
deﬁnition. Brief for United States 11.

We reject petitioner’s reading of the statute but without
endorsing the Government’s broader position. We conclude
Medicare payments are “beneﬁts,” as the term is used in its
ordinary sense and as it is intended in the statute. The
noun “beneﬁt” means “something that guards, aids, or pro-
motes well-being: advantage, good”; “useful aid”; “payment,
gift [such as] ﬁnancial help in time of sickness, old age, or
unemployment”; or “a cash payment or service provided
for under an annuity, pension plan, or insurance policy.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 204 (1971).
These deﬁnitions support petitioner’s assertion that qualify-
ing patients receive beneﬁts under the Medicare program.
It is commonplace for individuals to refer to their retirement
or health plans as “beneﬁts.” So it ought not to be disputed
that the elderly and disabled rank as the primary beneﬁciar-
ies of the Medicare program. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395c, 1395j;
42 CFR § 400.202 (1999) (deﬁning “beneﬁciary” as the “per-
son who is entitled to Medicare beneﬁts”); Shalala v. Guern-
sey Memorial Hospital, 514 U. S. 87, 91 (1995) (“Under the
Medicare reimbursement scheme . . . participating hospitals
furnish services to program beneﬁciaries and are reimbursed
by the Secretary through ﬁscal intermediaries”); Good Sa-
maritan Hospital, 508 U. S., at 404 (same).

That one beneﬁciary of an assistance program can be iden-
tiﬁed does not foreclose the existence of others, however.
In
this respect petitioner’s construction would give incomplete
meaning to the term “beneﬁts.” Medicare operates with a
purpose and design above and beyond point-of-sale patient
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the meaning of "benefits" in the context of a legal statute. It uses legal terminology and cites previous cases, indicating its suitability for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U41

[09-26-01 09:10:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN

266

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

FLORIDA v. J. L.

certiorari to the supreme court of florida

No. 98–1993. Argued February 29, 2000—Decided March 28, 2000

After an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a young
black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt
was carrying a gun, ofﬁcers went to the bus stop and saw three black
males, one of whom, respondent J. L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart
from the tip, the ofﬁcers had no reason to suspect any of the three of
illegal conduct. The ofﬁcers did not see a ﬁrearm or observe any un-
usual movements. One of the ofﬁcers frisked J. L. and seized a gun
from his pocket.
J. L., who was then almost 16, was charged under
state law with carrying a concealed ﬁrearm without a license and pos-
sessing a ﬁrearm while under the age of 18. The trial court granted
his motion to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search. The
intermediate appellate court reversed, but the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida quashed that decision and held the search invalid under the Fourth
Amendment.

Held: An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without
more, sufﬁcient to justify a police ofﬁcer’s stop and frisk of that person.
An ofﬁcer, for the protection of himself and others, may conduct a care-
fully limited search for weapons in the outer clothing of persons engaged
in unusual conduct where, inter alia, the ofﬁcer reasonably concludes in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons in question may be armed and presently dangerous. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 30. Here, the ofﬁcers’ suspicion that J. L. was carry-
ing a weapon arose not from their own observations but solely from a
call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller. The tip
lacked sufﬁcient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to
make a Terry stop: It provided no predictive information and therefore
left the police without means to test the informant’s knowledge or credi-
bility. See Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 327. The contentions of
Florida and the United States as amicus that the tip was reliable be-
cause it accurately described J. L.’s visible attributes misapprehend the
reliability needed for a tip to justify a Terry stop. The reasonable sus-
picion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of
illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.
This Court also declines to adopt the argument that the standard Terry
analysis should be modiﬁed to license a “ﬁrearm exception,” under
which a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case Florida v. J. L.  It summarizes the facts of the case and the Court's holding. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the full text content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
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</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
6

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
GINSBURG, J., dissenting

“Under  th[e]  accommodation,  [an  employer]  can  self-
certify that it opposes providing coverage for particular
contraceptive  services.    See  45  CFR  §§147.131(b)(4),
(c)(1)  [(2013)];  26  CFR  §§54.9815–2713A(a)(4),  (b).    If
[an  employer]  makes  such  a  certification,  the  [em-
ployer’s] insurance issuer or third-party administrator
must ‘[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive coverage from
the  group  health  insurance  coverage  provided  in  con-
nection with the group health plan’ and ‘[p]rovide sep-
arate payments for any contraceptive services required
to  be  covered’  without  imposing  ‘any  cost-sharing  re-
quirements  . . .  on  the  [employer],  the  group  health
plan,  or  plan  participants  or  beneficiaries.’  45  CFR
§147.131(c)(2); 26 CFR §54.9815–2713A(c)(2).”  Id., at
731 (some alterations in original).8

The self-certification accommodation, the Court observed
in Hobby Lobby, “does not impinge on [an employer’s] belief
that providing insurance coverage for . . . contraceptives . . .
violates [its] religion.”  Ibid.  It serves “a Government inter-
est of the highest order,” i.e., providing women employees
“with cost-free access to all FDA-approved methods of con-
traception.”  Id.,  at  729.    And  “it  serves  [that]  stated  in-
teres[t] . . . well.”  Id., at 731; see id., at 693 (Government
properly accommodated employer’s religion-based objection
to  covering  contraceptives  under  employer’s  health  insur-
ance plan when the harm to women of doing so “would be
precisely zero”).  Since the ACA’s passage, “[gainfully em-
ployed] [w]omen, particularly in lower-income groups, have
reported greater affordability of coverage, access to health
——————

8 This  opinion  refers  to  the  contraceptive-coverage  accommodation
made in 2013 as the “self-certification accommodation.”  See ante, at 6
(opinion of the Court).  Although this arrangement “requires the issuer
to  bear  the  cost  of  [contraceptive]  services,  HHS  has  determined  that
th[e] obligation will not impose any net expense on issuers because its
cost will be less than or equal to the cost savings resulting from th[ose]
services.”  Hobby Lobby, 573 U. S., at 698–699.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case of Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania. It discusses the contraceptive coverage accommodation under the Affordable Care Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

unprotected category of “true threats.”  Yet such statements
can  also  be  punished  if  they  fall  into  another  category  of
unprotected speech, such as speech integral to criminal con-
duct.  Or they might warrant less First Amendment protec-
tion for other reasons.  On the other hand, there is the ques-
tion of what constitutes the well-defined and longstanding
category of unprotected true threats.  It is with this latter
question  that  I  do  not  see  the  need  to  address  whether  a
mens rea of recklessness is sufficient across the board.

First, the courts below did not address whether reckless-
ness was sufficient to prosecute true threats and neither of
the actual parties have advocated a recklessness standard.
Colorado  disclaimed  the  idea  that  recklessness  was  re-
quired, and petitioner asserted, correctly, that recklessness
had  not  been  raised  under  traditional  principles  of  party
presentation.  The briefing on recklessness consists almost
entirely of a few pages of an argument in the alternative at
the tail end of an amicus brief filed by the United States.

Second,  because  petitioner  was  prosecuted  for  stalking
involving threatening speech, this case does not require re-
sort to the true-threats exemption to the First Amendment.
True-threats doctrine covers content-based prosecutions
for single utterances of “pure speech,” which need not even
be  communicated  to  the  subject  of  the  threat.  Watts  v.
United States, 394 U. S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam).  The
First  Amendment  would  normally  place  strict  limits  on
such prosecutions.  So there is typically a need to determine
whether the speech in question falls within the tradition-
ally unprotected category of true threats.

This  is  not  such  a  case,  however.    Petitioner  was  con-
victed for “stalking [causing] serious emotional distress” for
a combination of threatening statements and repeated, un-
wanted,  direct  contact  with  C.  W.  497  P. 3d  1039,  1043
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal nuances of "true threats" and their prosecution, referencing case law and legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MALWAREBYTES, INC. v. ENIGMA SOFTWARE
GROUP USA, LLC
Statement of THOMAS, J.

third-party  content  in  good  faith,  it  is  protected  by
§230(c)(2)(A).

This  modest  understanding  is  a  far  cry  from  what  has
prevailed  in  court.  Adopting  the  too-common  practice  of
reading extra immunity into statutes where it does not be-
long, see Baxter v. Bracey, 590 U. S. —— (2020) (THOMAS,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), courts have relied
on policy and purpose arguments to grant sweeping protec-
tion to Internet platforms.  E.g., 1 R. Smolla, Law of Defa-
mation  §4:86,  p. 4–380  (2d  ed.  2019)  (“[C]ourts  have  ex-
tended  the  immunity  in  §230  far  beyond  anything  that
plausibly  could  have  been  intended  by  Congress);  accord,
Rustad  &  Koenig,  Rebooting  Cybertort  Law,  80  Wash.  L.
Rev. 335, 342–343 (2005) (similar).  I address several areas
of concern.

A
Courts  have  discarded  the  longstanding  distinction  be-
tween  “publisher”  liability  and  “distributor”  liability.    Al-
though  the  text  of  §230(c)(1)  grants  immunity  only  from
“publisher” or “speaker” liability, the first appellate court to
consider the statute held that it eliminates distributor lia-
bility too—that is, §230 confers immunity even when a com-
pany distributes content that it knows is illegal.  Zeran v.
America Online, Inc., 129 F. 3d 327, 331–334 (CA4 1997).
In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed that permit-
ting distributor liability “would defeat the two primary pur-
poses of the statute,” namely, “immuniz[ing] service provid-
ers” and encouraging “selfregulation.”  Id., at 331, 334.  And
subsequent decisions, citing Zeran, have adopted this hold-
ing as a categorical rule across all contexts.  See, e.g., Uni-
versal  Communication  Systems,  Inc.  v.  Lycos,  Inc.,  478  F.
3d 413, 420 (CA1 2007); Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of
NY, Inc., 17 N. Y. 3d 281, 288–289, 952 N. E. 2d 1011, 1017
(2011);  Doe  v.  Bates,  2006  WL  3813758,  *18  (ED  Tex.,
Dec. 27, 2006).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a statement by Justice Thomas. It delves into the interpretation of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and its implications for internet platforms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

KEMP v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Rule 60(b)(1) includes legal errors made by judges.2

B

Both  the  Government’s  and  Kemp’s  interpretations  of
Rule 60(b) depart from aspects of our reading.  Their rea-
sons for doing so are unavailing.

1
The  Government  contends  that  the  term  “mistake”  en-
compasses  only  so-called  “obvious”  legal  errors.    Brief  for
United  States  11.    Several  Courts  of  Appeals  agree  that
Rule 60(b)(1) may be used to correct only “ ‘obvious errors’
of law, such as overlooking controlling statutes or case law.”
In re  Ta  Chi  Navigation  (Panama)  Corp.  S. A.,  728  F. 2d
699, 703 (CA5 1984).  The Government argues that this lim-
itation “has historical roots” because courts of equity tradi-
tionally “could grant relief from legal errors, but only ‘in the
most unquestionable and flagrant cases.’ ”  Brief for United
States  18  (quoting  Snell  v.  Insurance  Co.,  98  U. S.  85,  91
(1878)).

We  are  unconvinced.    None  of  the  English  language  or
legal dictionaries noted above, supra, at 4–5, suggests this
“obviousness” gloss.  Nor does the Government tie the eq-
uity practice it invokes to the text or history of Rule 60(b).
Finally, we question the administrability of a rule that re-
quires courts to decide not only whether there was a “mis-
take” but also whether that mistake was sufficiently “obvi-
ous.”  The  text  does  not  support—let  alone  require—that
judges engage in this sort of complex line-drawing.

2

We are similarly unconvinced by Kemp’s arguments for

——————

2 Here, Kemp alleged that the District Court erred by misapplying con-
trolling law to record facts.  In deciding that this alleged error is a “mis-
take,” we do not decide whether a judicial decision rendered erroneous
by subsequent legal or factual changes also qualifies as a “mistake” un-
der Rule 60(b)(1).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the interpretation of Rule 60(b)(1) and its application to legal errors.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

information knowingly shared with another.  But the fact
of  “diminished  privacy  interests  does  not  mean  that  the
Fourth  Amendment  falls  out  of  the  picture  entirely.”
Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16).  Smith and Miller,
after all, did not rely solely on the act of sharing.  Instead,
they  considered  “the  nature  of  the  particular  documents
sought” to determine whether “there is a legitimate ‘expec-
tation  of  privacy’  concerning  their  contents.”    Miller,  425
U. S., at 442.  Smith pointed out the limited capabilities of
a  pen  register;  as  explained  in  Riley,  telephone  call  logs
reveal  little  in  the  way  of  “identifying  information.”
Smith, 442 U. S., at 742; Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 24).  Miller likewise noted that checks were “not confi-
dential  communications  but  negotiable  instruments  to  be
used  in  commercial  transactions.”  425  U. S.,  at  442.  In
mechanically  applying  the  third-party  doctrine  to  this
case, the Government fails to appreciate that there are no
comparable limitations on the revealing nature of CSLI.

The  Court  has  in  fact  already  shown  special  solicitude
for  location  information  in  the  third-party  context.
In
Knotts, the Court relied on Smith to hold that an individ-
ual  has  no  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  in  public
movements  that  he  “voluntarily  conveyed  to  anyone  who
wanted to look.”  Knotts, 460 U. S., at 281; see id., at 283
(discussing  Smith).  But  when  confronted  with  more  per-
vasive tracking, five Justices agreed that longer term GPS
monitoring  of  even  a  vehicle  traveling  on  public  streets
constitutes  a  search.  Jones,  565  U. S.,  at  430  (ALITO,  J.,
concurring  in  judgment);  id.,  at  415  (SOTOMAYOR,  J.,
concurring).   JUSTICE  GORSUCH  wonders  why  “someone’s
location  when  using  a  phone”  is  sensitive,  post,  at  3,  and
JUSTICE  KENNEDY  assumes  that  a  person’s  discrete
movements “are not particularly private,” post, at 17.  Yet
this case is not about “using a phone” or a person’s move-
ment at a particular time.  It is about a detailed chronicle
of  a  person’s  physical  presence  compiled  every  day,  every
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Carpenter v. United States. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the privacy implications of cell site location information (CSLI).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

15

Opinion of the Court

  The truth is, many paths exist to vindicate the supremacy
of federal law in this area.  Even aside from the fact that
eight Members of the Court agree sovereign immunity does
not bar the petitioners from bringing this pre-enforcement
challenge  in  federal  court,  everyone  acknowledges  that
other pre-enforcement challenges may be possible in state
court  as  well.5    In  fact,  14  such  state-court  cases  already
seek  to  vindicate  both  federal  and  state  constitutional
claims against S. B. 8—and they have met with some suc-
cess at the summary judgment stage.  See supra, at 2.  Sep-
arately, any individual sued under S. B. 8 may pursue state
and federal constitutional arguments in his or her defense.
See n. 1, supra.  Still further viable avenues to contest the
law’s compliance with the Federal Constitution also may be
possible; we do not prejudge the possibility.  Given all this,
JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR’S  suggestion  that  the  Court’s  ruling
somehow “clears the way” for the “nullification” of federal
law along the lines of what happened in the Jim Crow South
not only wildly mischaracterizes the impact of today’s deci-
sion, it cheapens the gravity of past wrongs.  Post, at 11.
  The  truth  is,  too,  that  unlike  the  petitioners  before  us,
those  seeking  to  challenge  the  constitutionality  of  state
laws are not always able to pick and choose the timing and
preferred forum for their arguments.  This Court has never
recognized an unqualified right to pre-enforcement review
of  constitutional  claims  in  federal  court.    In  fact,  general
federal question jurisdiction did not even exist for much of
this  Nation’s  history.    See  Mims  v.  Arrow  Financial  Ser-
vices, LLC, 565 U. S. 368, 376 (2012).  And pre-enforcement
review  under  the  statutory regime  the petitioners  invoke,

——————

5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s complaint thus isn’t really about whether this
case  should  proceed.   It  is  only  about  which  particular  defendants  the
petitioners may sue in this particular lawsuit.  And even when it comes
to  that  question,  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR  agrees  with  the  Court  regarding
the  proper  disposition  of  several  classes  of  defendants—state-court
judges, licensing officials, and Mr. Dickson.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the various ways in which federal law can be vindicated, even in the face of state laws that may conflict with it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>