<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

GARZA v. IDAHO

Opinion of the Court

the  status  quo  that  existed  before  counsel’s  deficient  per-
formance  forfeited  the  appeal,  and  it  allows  an  appellate
court to consider the appeal as that court otherwise would
have  done—on  direct  review,  and  assisted  by  counsel’s
briefing.

IV
We hold today that the presumption of prejudice recog-
nized  in  Flores-Ortega  applies  regardless  of  whether  a
defendant  has  signed  an  appeal  waiver.  This  ruling  fol-
lows  squarely  from  Flores-Ortega  and  from  the  fact  that
even  the  broadest  appeal  waiver  does  not  deprive  a  de-
fendant  of  all  appellate  claims.  Accordingly  where,  as
here, an attorney performed deficiently in failing to file a
notice  of  appeal  despite  the  defendant’s  express  instruc-
tions,  prejudice  is  presumed  “with  no  further  showing
from the defendant of the merits of his underlying claims.”
See Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S., at 484.

The  judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Idaho  is  there-
fore  reversed,  and  the  case  is  remanded  for  further  pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

We are confident that courts can continue to deal efficiently with such
cases via summary dispositions and the procedures outlined in Anders.
See 386 U. S., at 744; n. 9, supra.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the conclusion of the opinion in the case Garza v. Idaho. It contains legal reasoning and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1039

529 U. S.

March 27, 2000

No. 99–7547. Gaydos v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–7560. Brooks v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 187 Ill. 2d 91, 718 N. E. 2d 88.

No. 99–7627. Franklin v. Gilmore, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 877.

No. 99–7802. Davis v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 740 So. 2d 1135.

No. 99–7826. Fears v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de-

nied. Reported below: 86 Ohio St. 3d 329, 715 N. E. 2d 136.

No. 99–7860. Klumpp v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Po-
tosi Correctional Center. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.
Ibarra v. True. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari

No. 99–7861.

denied.

No. 99–7866. O’Neal v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 238 Ga. App. 446, 519 S. E. 2d 244.

No. 99–7869. Atkins v. Michigan. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–7872. Lingar v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi
Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 176 F. 3d 453.

No. 99–7873. Mojica v. Goord, Commissioner, New York
Department of Correctional Services. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 262
App. Div. 2d 1002, 693 N. Y. S. 2d 365.

No. 99–7875. Briggs v. Boys and Girls Club of Char-
lottesville/Albemarle et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 628.

No. 99–7876. Chandler v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7877. Sughrue v. Butler, Superintendent, Polk
Correctional Institute. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 190 F. 3d 542.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

985

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

No.  09–6536.  Naddi  v.  Hernandez,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.
9th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pau
peris  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.

No.  09–6684.  Howard  v.  United  States  District  Court
for  the  Southern  District  of  Ohio  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

Certiﬁcate  Dismissed

No. 09–166.  United States  v.  Seale.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Ques
tion certiﬁed by the United States Court  of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit  dismissed.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  566.

Statement  of  Justice  Stevens,  with  whom  Justice  Scalia

joins,  respecting  the  dismissal  of  the  certiﬁed  question.

This  certiﬁcate  presents  us  with  a  pure  question  of  law  that
may  well  determine  the  outcome  of  a  number  of  cases  of  ugly
racial  violence  remaining  from  the  1960’s.  The  question  is  what
statute  of  limitations  applies  to  a  prosecution  under  18  U. S. C.
§ 1201  commenced  in  2007  for  a  kidnaping  offense  that  occurred
in  1964.

James  Ford  Seale  was  found  guilty  of  violating  § 1201,  a  provi
sion  that  does  not  include  its  own  limitations  period.  Title  18
U. S. C.  § 3281  provides  that  “any  offense  punishable  by  death”
may  be  prosecuted  “at  any  time  without  limitation,”  whereas
§ 3282(a)  imposes  a  5-year  period  of  limitations  for  all  other  of
fenses  “[e]xcept  as  otherwise  expressly  provided  by  law.”  In
1964  a  violation  of  § 1201  was  a  capital  offense  when  the  victim
was harmed, and since 1994 a violation of § 1201 has been a capital
offense  when  the  kidnaping  results  in  the  loss  of  life.  But  for
more  than  two  decades  in  between,  Seale’s  crime  was  not  punish
able  by  death.

Several  developments  accounted  for  this.  In  1968  this  Court
held that the death penalty provision in the old § 1201 was uncon
stitutional because it applied “only to those defendants who assert
the  right  to  contest  their  guilt  before  a  jury,”  United  States  v.
Jackson,  390  U. S.  570,  581,  and  in  1972  we  cast  signiﬁcant  doubt
on  the  constitutionality  of  death  penalty  laws  nationwide,  Fur-
man v.  Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (per curiam).  Following Furman,
Congress  repealed  the  death  penalty  clause  of  § 1201,  see  Act  for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal case summaries from a court docket. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
148

SMITH  v.  SPISAK

Opinion of the Court

“ ‘We the jury recommend that the sentence of death be
imposed . . . .’ ”   Id., at 2975–2976.

The other verdict form read:

“ ‘We  the  jury  .  .  .  do  ﬁnd  that  the  aggravating  cir
cumstances  .  .  .  are  not  sufﬁcient  to  outweigh  the  miti
gation factors present in this case.
“ ‘We  the  jury  recommend  that  the  defendant  .  .  .  be
sentenced to life imprisonment . . . .’ ”   Id., at 2976.

The instructions and forms made clear that, to recommend
a  death  sentence,  the  jury  had  to  ﬁnd,  unanimously  and  be
yond a reasonable doubt, that each of the aggravating factors
outweighed any mitigating circumstances.  But the instruc
tions did not say that the jury must determine the existence
of  each  individual  mitigating  factor  unanimously.  Neither
the  instructions  nor  the  forms  said  anything  about  how—or
even  whether—the  jury  should  make  individual  determina
tions  that  each  particular  mitigating  circumstance  existed.
They  focused  only  on  the  overall  balancing  question.  And
the  instructions  repeatedly  told  the  jury  to  “conside[r]  all
of  the  relevant  evidence.”  Id.,  at  2974.  In  our  view  the
instructions  and  verdict  forms  did  not  clearly  bring  about,
either through what they said or what they implied, the cir
cumstance that Mills found critical, namely,

“a  substantial  possibility  that  reasonable  jurors,  upon
receiving the judge’s instructions in this case, and in at
tempting  to  complete  the  verdict  form  as  instructed,
well may have thought they were precluded from consid
ering any mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors agreed
on  the  existence  of  a  particular  such  circumstance.”
486 U. S., at 384.

We consequently conclude that the state court’s decision up
holding  these  forms  and  instructions  was  not  “contrary  to,
or . . . an unreasonable application of, clearly established Fed
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing jury instructions and verdict forms in a capital punishment case. It delves into the legal nuances of how mitigating factors should be considered by the jury.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

56a.  Morrissey-Berru provided religious instruction every
day using a textbook designed for use in teaching religion
to young Catholic students.  Id., at 45a–51a, 90a–92a; see
App. 79–80.  Under the prescribed curriculum, she was ex-
pected to teach students, among other things, “to learn and
express  belief  that  Jesus  is  the  son  of  God  and  the  Word
made  flesh”;  to  “identify  the  ways”  the  church  “carries  on
the mission of Jesus”; to “locate, read and understand sto-
ries from the Bible”; to “know the names, meanings, signs
and  symbols  of  each  of  the  seven  sacraments”;  and  to  be
able to “explain the communion of saints.”  App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 19–267, at 91a–92a.  She tested her students
on that curriculum in a yearly exam.  Id., at 87a.  She also
directed and produced an annual passion play.  Id., at 26a.
Morrissey-Berru prepared her students for participation
in the Mass and for communion and confession.  Id., at 68a,
81a, 88a–89a.  She also occasionally selected and prepared
students  to  read  at  Mass.  Id.,  at  83a,  89a.  And  she  was
expected to take her students to Mass once a week and on
certain feast days (such as the Feast Day of St. Juan Diego,
All  Saints  Day,  and  the  Feast  of  Our  Lady),  and  to  take
them  to  confession  and  to  pray  the  Stations  of  the  Cross.
Id., at 68a–69a, 83a, 88a.  Each year, she brought them to
the Catholic Cathedral in Los Angeles, where they partici-
pated as altar servers.  Id., at 95a–96a.  This visit, she ex-
plained, was “an important experience” because “[i]t is a big
honor” for children to “serve the altar” at the cathedral.  Id.,
at 96a.

Morrissey-Berru  also  prayed  with  her  students.    Her
class began or ended every day with a Hail Mary.  Id., at
87a.  She led the students in prayer at other times, such as
when a family member was ill.  Id., at 21a, 81a, 86a–87a.
And she taught them to recite the Apostle’s Creed and the
Nicene Creed, as well as prayers for specific purposes, such
as in connection with the sacrament of confession.  Id., at
20a–21a, 92a.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically describing the religious activities of a teacher named Morrissey-Berru. It provides details about her curriculum, practices, and interactions with students.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY

THOMAS, J., dissenting

when  “ ‘the  needs  of  law  enforcement  [are]  so  compelling
that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.’ ”  563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6)
(quoting  Mincey  v.  Arizona,  437  U. S.  385,  394  (1978);
second alteration in original).  Thus, when exigent circum
stances  are  present,  officers  may  take  actions  that  would
typically  require  a  warrant,  such  as  entering  a  home  in
hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.  563 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at  6).  As  relevant  in  this  case,  officers  may  also  conduct
a  warrantless  search  when  they  have  probable  cause  to
believe  that  failure  to  act  would  result  in  “ ‘imminent
destruction  of  evidence.’ ”
Ibid.  (quoting  Brigham  City,
supra, at 403).

B
Once  police  arrest  a  suspect  for  drunk  driving,  each
passing minute eliminates probative evidence of the crime.
The human liver eliminates alcohol from the bloodstream
at  a  rate  of  approximately  0.015  percent  to  0.020  percent
per hour, ante, at 8, with some heavy drinkers as high as
0.022  percent  per  hour,  Brief  for  Petitioner  21  (citing
medical studies), depending on, among other things, a per-
son’s  sex,  weight,  body  type,  and  drinking  history.    Ante,
at  8–9;  Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  23.
The  Court  has  acknowledged  this  fact  since  Schmerber  v.
California, 384 U. S. 757, 770 (1966) (“We are told that the
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly
after  drinking  stops,  as  the  body  functions  to  eliminate
it  from  the  system”).  In  that  case,  the  Court  recognized
that  destruction  of  evidence  is  inherent  in  drunk-driving
cases  and  held  that  an  officer  investigating  a  drunk
driving  crime  “might  reasonably  [believe]  that  he  [is]
confronted  with  an  emergency,  in  which  the  delay  neces
sary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threat
en[s] ‘the destruction of evidence.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting Preston
v.  United  States,  376  U. S.  364,  367  (1964)).    The  Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Missouri v. McNeely. It delves into the legal justification for warrantless searches in drunk driving cases, citing precedents and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

GOLAN v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

Court granted the Attorney General’s motion for summary
judgment.  Golan  v.  Gonzales,  No.  Civ.  01–B–1854,  2005
WL 914754 (D. Colo., Apr. 20, 2005).  In rejecting petition-
ers’  Copyright  Clause  argument,  the  court  stated  that
Congress  “has  historically  demonstrated  little  compunc-
tion  about  removing  copyrightable  materials  from  the
public  domain.”  Id.,  at  *14.    The  court  next  declined  to
part  from  “the  settled  rule  that  private  censorship  via
copyright  enforcement  does  not  implicate  First  Amend-
ment concerns.”  Id., at *17.

The  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Tenth  Circuit  affirmed  in
part.  Golan  v.  Gonzales,  501  F. 3d  1179  (2007).    The
public  domain,  it  agreed,  was  not  a  “threshold  that  Con-
gress” was powerless to “traverse in both directions.”  Id.,
at 1187 (internal quotations marks omitted).  But §514, as
the  Court  of  Appeals  read  our  decision  in  Eldred  v.  Ash-
croft, 537 U. S. 186 (2003), required further First Amend-
ment  inspection,  501  F. 3d,  at  1187.    The  measure  “ ‘al-
tered the traditional contours of copyright protection,’ ” the
court  said—specifically,  the  “bedrock  principle”  that  once
works  enter  the  public  domain,  they  do  not  leave.    Ibid.
(quoting Eldred, 537 U. S., at 221).  The case was remand-
ed with an instruction to the District Court to address the
First  Amendment  claim  in  light  of  the  Tenth  Circuit’s
opinion.

On  remand,  the  District  Court’s  starting  premise  was
uncontested:  Section  514  does  not  regulate  speech  on  the
basis  of  its  content;  therefore  the  law  would  be  upheld  if
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant government inter-
est.”  611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170–1171 (Colo. 2009) (quot-
ing  Ward  v.  Rock  Against  Racism,  491  U. S.  781,  791
(1989)).  Summary  judgment  was  due  petitioners,  the

——————

entry of summary judgment for the Government on the claim that §514

violates the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing a case related to copyright law and the public domain. It contains legal citations, arguments, and court decisions, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxxi

Page

822

Hopkins v. D. C. Chapman Ventures, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907

Horel; Ervin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Horel; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Horel; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hornbreak; Green v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
884

Horne v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  926,1017

Horton v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925

Hostetter v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  887,1086

881

Hou v. New York City Dept. of Environmental Protection  . . . . . .
859

Housing Authority of Los Angeles; Moore v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Housman; Golden v.
1000

Houston; Ball v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916

Houston v. Hathaway  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Houston; Hunt v.
890

Houston; Leonor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Houston v. Texas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hovatter; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Hovind v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  992,1139

Howard v. Department of Army  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Howard v. Industrial Comm’n of Ohio
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  805,1010

Howard v. Supreme Court of Ohio  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1087,1146

Howard v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  830,939,1102

Howard v. U. S. District Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  985,1075

1118

Howard v. Upton
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Howerton; Spear v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Howes; Andrews v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Hoy v. Mentor Township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  878,1101

1126

H. R. v. Alameda County Social Services Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

Hrusovsky v. Harlow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Hrusovsky v. Sjolund  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Hubbell Inc.; Golden v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1002

Huber v. U. S. Parole Comm’n  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Hubert; Brooks v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943

Huckins; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hudson v. Georgia
949

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hudson v. Thaler
Hudson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  912,914

880

Hudson Area Schools v. Patterson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Huezo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936

Huff v. Kentucky Retirement Systems  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  831,1159

837

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hughes v. Hughes’ Estate
Hughes; Marr v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Hughes v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  835,886

Hughes v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  872,914,1140
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:

 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Syllabus

worry as to the possibility of damages actions stemming from any par-
ticular official decision.”  Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 694, n. 19.

By contrast, when prosecutors have sought evidence from the Pres-
ident, the Court has consistently rejected Presidential claims of abso-
lute immunity.  During the treason trial of former Vice President Aa-
ron  Burr,  for  instance,  Chief  Justice  Marshall  rejected  President
Thomas Jefferson’s claim that the President could not be subjected to
a subpoena.  Marshall simultaneously recognized, however, the exist-
ence  of  a  “privilege”  to  withhold  certain  “official  paper[s].”  United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14,694) (CC Va.).  And when a
subpoena  issued  to  President  Richard  Nixon,  the  Court  rejected  his
claim  of  “absolute  privilege.”    United  States v.  Nixon,  418  U. S.  683,
703.  But recognizing “the public interest in candid, objective, and even
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking,” it held that a
“presumptive privilege” protects Presidential communications.  Id., at
708.  Because  that  privilege  “relates  to  the  effective  discharge  of  a
President’s powers,” id., at 711, the Court deemed it “fundamental to
the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation
of powers under the Constitution.”  Id., at 708.  Pp. 9–12.

(ii) Criminally  prosecuting a President for official conduct un-
doubtedly poses a far greater threat of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch than simply seeking evidence in his
possession.  The danger is greater than what led the Court to recognize
absolute Presidential immunity from civil damages liability—that the
President would be chilled from taking the “bold and unhesitating ac-
tion” required of an independent Executive.  Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at
745.  Although the President might be exposed to fewer criminal pros-
ecutions  than civil  damages  suits,  the  threat  of  trial,  judgment,  and
imprisonment is a far greater deterrent and plainly more likely to dis-
tort  Presidential  decisionmaking  than  the  potential  payment  of  civil
damages.  The hesitation to execute the duties of his office fearlessly
and fairly that might result when a President is making decisions un-
der “a pall of potential prosecution,” McDonnell v. United States, 579
U. S. 550, 575, raises “unique risks to the effective functioning of gov-
ernment,” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 751.  But there is also a compelling
“public  interest  in  fair  and  effective  law  enforcement.”    Vance,  591
U. S., at 808.

Taking into account these competing considerations, the Court con-
cludes  that  the  separation  of  powers  principles  explicated  in  the
Court’s  precedent  necessitate  at  least  a  presumptive  immunity  from
criminal prosecution for a President’s acts within the outer perimeter
of  his  official  responsibility.    Such  an  immunity  is  required  to  safe-
guard  the  independence  and  effective  functioning  of  the  Executive
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion or a portion of one, specifically discussing Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution. It cites legal precedents and delves into the arguments surrounding this complex issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Syllabus

tors to seek reelection in districts different from those they currently
represent affect the House’s representational nature.  Legislative dis-
tricts  change  frequently,  and  the  Virginia  Constitution  guards
against  representational  confusion  by  providing  that  delegates  con-
tinue to represent the districts that elected them, even if their reelec-
tion  campaigns  will  be  waged  in  different  districts.    In  short,  the
State  of  Virginia  would  rather  stop  than  fight on.   One House of  its
bicameral legislature cannot alone continue the litigation against the
will of its partners in the legislative process.  Pp. 7–12.

Appeal dismissed.  Reported below: 326 F. Supp. 3d 128.

  GINSBURG,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  THOMAS,
SOTOMAYOR,  KAGAN,  and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,  joined.    ALITO,  J.,  filed  a  dis-
senting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and BREYER and KAVANAUGH,
JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section from a legal case, specifically the syllabus. It summarizes the case and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

on the availability of abortion both in structuring their re-
lationships  and  in  planning  their  lives.    The  legal  frame-
work Roe and Casey developed to balance the competing in-
terests in this sphere has proved workable in courts across
the country.  No recent developments, in either law or fact,
have eroded or cast doubt on those precedents.  Nothing, in
short,  has  changed.    Indeed,  the  Court  in  Casey  already
found all of that to be true.  Casey is a precedent about prec-
edent.  It reviewed the same arguments made here in sup-
port of overruling Roe, and it found that doing so was not
warranted.  The Court reverses course today for one reason
and one reason only: because the composition of this Court
has changed.  Stare decisis, this Court has often said, “con-
tributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process” by ensuring that decisions are “founded in the law
rather than in the proclivities of individuals.”  Payne v. Ten-
nessee,  501  U. S.  808,  827  (1991);  Vasquez  v.  Hillery,  474
U. S. 254, 265 (1986).  Today, the proclivities of individuals
rule.  The Court departs from its obligation to faithfully and
impartially apply the law.  We dissent.

I
We start with Roe and Casey, and with their deep connec-
tions to a broad swath of this Court’s precedents.  To hear
the  majority  tell  the  tale,  Roe  and  Casey  are  aberrations:
They came from nowhere, went nowhere—and so are easy
to excise from this Nation’s constitutional law.  That is not
true.  After describing the decisions themselves, we explain
how  they  are  rooted  in—and  themselves  led  to—other
rights giving individuals control over their bodies and their
most personal and intimate associations.  The majority does
not wish to talk about these matters for obvious reasons; to
do so would both ground Roe and Casey in this Court’s prec-
edents and reveal the broad implications of today’s decision.
But the facts will not so handily disappear.  Roe and Casey
were from the beginning, and are even more now, embedded
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It argues against the majority opinion and discusses the legal precedents set by Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

Opinion of the Court

Jones’  primary  constitutional  argument  is  that  denying
him any opportunity to seek postconviction relief based on
Rehaif  would  violate  the  Suspension  Clause,  which  pro-
vides  that  “[t]he  Privilege  of  the  Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”  U. S. Const.,
Art. I, §9, cl. 2.  This “Suspension Clause argument fails be-
cause it would extend the writ of habeas corpus far beyond
its scope ‘when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.’ ”
Department  of  Homeland  Security  v.  Thuraissigiam,  591
U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 2) (quoting Boumediene v.
Bush,  553  U. S.  723,  746  (2008)).    When  the  Suspension
Clause was adopted, and for a long time afterward, Jones’
Rehaif claim would not have been cognizable in habeas at
all.

At the founding, a sentence after conviction “by a court of
competent jurisdiction” was “ ‘in itself sufficient cause’ ” for
a prisoner’s continued detention.  Brown v. Davenport, 596
U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 8) (quoting Ex parte Wat-
kins, 3 Pet. 193, 202 (1830)).  As Chief Justice Marshall ex-
plained in the seminal case of Ex parte Watkins, the crimi-
nal  judgment,  “in  its  nature,  conclude[d]  the  subject  on
which it [was] rendered,” “pronounce[d] the law of the case,”
and  “pu[t]  an  end  to  the  inquiry  concerning  fact.”    Id.,  at
202–203.  Of particular relevance here, a habeas court had
no power to “look beyond the judgment” to “re-examine the
charges on which it was rendered” for substantive errors of
law—even “if . . . the [sentencing] court ha[d] misconstrued
the law, and ha[d] pronounced an offence to be punishable
criminally, which [was] not so.”  Id., at 202, 209.

In rebuttal, Jones argues that pre-founding practice did
allow habeas courts to “look beyond the judgment” to ensure
that the convicting court had proved every element of the
crime for which a prisoner was committed.  But Jones fails
to identify a single clear case of habeas being used to reliti-
gate a conviction after trial by a court of general criminal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution to a particular case involving postconviction relief. It cites legal precedents and delves into the historical interpretation of habeas corpus.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

35

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

known list of places with an undisputed history of serious
problems  with  racial  discrimination  in  voting.    Recent
evidence  relating  to  Alabama  and  its  counties  was  there
for  all  to  see.  Multiple  Supreme  Court  decisions  had
upheld  the  coverage  provision,  most  recently  in  1999.
There  was  extensive  evidence  that,  due  to  the  preclear
ance  mechanism,  conditions  in  the  covered  jurisdictions
had  notably  improved.  And  there  was  evidence  that  pre
clearance  was  still  having  a  substantial  real-world  effect,
having stopped hundreds of discriminatory voting changes
in the covered jurisdictions since the last reauthorization.
In addition, there was evidence that racial polarization in
voting was higher in covered jurisdictions than elsewhere,
increasing  the  vulnerability  of  minority  citizens  in  those
jurisdictions.  And  countless  witnesses,  reports,  and  case
studies  documented  continuing  problems  with  voting  dis
In  light  of  this  rec
crimination  in  those  jurisdictions.
ord,  Congress  had  more  than  a  reasonable  basis  to
conclude that the existing coverage formula was not out of
sync with conditions on the ground in covered areas.  And
certainly  Shelby  County  was  no  candidate  for  release
through the mechanism Congress provided.  See supra, at
22–23, 26–28.

The  Court  holds  §4(b)  invalid  on  the  ground  that  it  is
“irrational  to  base  coverage  on  the  use  of  voting  tests  40
years  ago,  when  such  tests  have  been  illegal  since  that
time.”  Ante,  at  23.  But  the  Court  disregards  what  Con
gress set about to do in enacting the VRA.  That extraor
dinary  legislation  scarcely  stopped  at  the  particular  tests
and  devices  that  happened  to  exist  in  1965.    The  grand
aim of the Act is to secure to all in our polity equal citizen
ship  stature,  a  voice  in  our  democracy  undiluted  by  race.
As  the  record  for  the  2006  reauthorization  makes  abun
dantly clear, second-generation barriers to minority voting
rights  have  emerged  in  the  covered  jurisdictions  as  at
tempted  substitutes  for  the  first-generation  barriers  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the Supreme Court case Shelby County v. Holder. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and the Court's decision to invalidate a key provision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting

individual’s resilience and likelihood of enhancing the UNC
campus.  It  also  forecasts  his  potential  for  entering  the
wider  world  upon  graduation  and  making  a  meaningful
contribution to the larger, collective, societal goal that the
Equal Protection Clause embodies (its guarantee that the
United States of America offers genuinely equal treatment
to every person, regardless of race).

Furthermore, and importantly, the fact that UNC’s holis-
tic process ensures a full accounting makes it far from clear
that  any  particular  applicant  of  color  will  finish  ahead  of
any particular nonminority applicant.  For example, as the
District Court found, a higher percentage of the most aca-
demically  excellent  in-state  Black  candidates  (as  SFFA’s
expert defined academic excellence) were denied admission
than similarly qualified White and Asian American appli-
cants.94  That, if nothing else, is indicative of a genuinely

——————

94 See 567 F. Supp. 3d, at 617, 619; 3 App. 1078–1080.  The majority
cannot  deny  this  factual  finding.    Instead,  it  conducts  its  own  back-of-
the-envelope  calculations  (its  numbers  appear  nowhere  in  the  District
Court’s opinion) regarding “the overall acceptance rates of academically
excellent applicants to UNC,” in an effort to trivialize the District Court’s
conclusion.  Ante,  at  5,  n. 1.  I  am  inclined  to  stick  with  the  District
Court’s findings over the majority’s unauthenticated calculations.  Even
when the majority’s ad hoc statistical analysis is taken at face value, it
hardly  supports  what  the  majority  wishes  to  intimate:  that  Black  stu-
dents  are  being  admitted  based  on  UNC’s  myopic  focus  on  “race—and
race alone.”  Ante, at 28, n. 6.  As the District Court observed, if these
Black students “were largely defined in the admissions process by their
race, one would expect to find that every” such student “demonstrating
academic excellence . . . would be admitted.”  567 F. Supp. 3d, at 619 (em-
phasis added).  Contrary to the majority’s narrative, “race does not even
act as a tipping point for some students with otherwise exceptional qual-
ifications.”  Ibid.  Moreover, as the District Court also found, UNC does
not even use the bespoke “academic excellence” metric that SFFA’s ex-
pert “ ‘invented’ ” for this litigation.  Id., at 617, 619; see also id., at 624–
625.  The majority’s calculations of overall acceptance rates by race on
that metric bear scant relationship to, and thus are no indictment of, how
UNC’s admissions process actually works (a recurring theme in its opin-
ion).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the admissions process at UNC and the use of race as a factor.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

59

Opinion of the Court

substantial  obstacle  “in  a  large  fraction  of  cases  in  which
[it] is relevant,” 505 U. S., at 895, but there is obviously no
clear line between a fraction that is “large” and one that is
not.  Nor  is  it  clear  what  the  Court  meant  by  “cases  in
which” a regulation is “relevant.”  These ambiguities have
caused  confusion  and  disagreement.  Compare  Whole
Woman’s  Health  v.  Hellerstedt,  579  U. S.  582,  627–628
(2016), with id., at 666–667, and n. 11 (ALITO, J., dissent-
ing).

2

The difficulty of applying Casey’s  new rules surfaced in
that very case.  The controlling opinion found that Pennsyl-
vania’s  24-hour  waiting  period  requirement  and  its
informed-consent  provision  did  not  impose  “undue  bur-
den[s],” Casey, 505 U. S., at 881–887, but Justice Stevens,
applying the same test, reached the opposite result,  id., at
920–922 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
That did not bode well, and then-Chief Justice Rehnquist
aptly observed that “the undue burden standard presents
nothing more workable than the trimester framework.”  Id.,
at 964–966 (dissenting opinion).

The ambiguity of the “undue burden” test also produced
disagreement in later cases.  In Whole Woman’s Health, the
Court  adopted  the  cost-benefit  interpretation  of  the  test,
stating  that  “[t]he  rule  announced  in  Casey  . . .  requires
that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion
access  together  with  the  benefits  those  laws  confer.”  579
U. S., at 607 (emphasis added).  But five years later, a ma-
jority of the Justices rejected that interpretation.  See June
Medical,  591  U. S.  ___.   Four  Justices  reaffirmed  Whole
Woman’s Health’s instruction to “weigh” a law’s “benefits”
against  “the  burdens  it  imposes  on  abortion  access.”    591
U. S., at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 2) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  But THE CHIEF JUSTICE—who cast
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the "undue burden" standard used in abortion cases and its application in various rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

of  VRA-occasioned  increases  in  black  voting.    Whatever
the  device  employed,  this  Court  has  long  recognized  that
vote  dilution,  when  adopted  with  a  discriminatory  pur
pose, cuts down the right to vote as certainly as denial of
access to the ballot.  Shaw, 509 U. S., at 640–641; Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964).  See also H. R. Rep. No.
109–478,  p. 6  (2006)  (although  “[d]iscrimination  today  is
more  subtle  than  the  visible  methods  used  in  1965,”  “the
effect  and  results  are  the  same,  namely  a  diminishing  of
the minority community’s ability to fully participate in the
electoral process and to elect their preferred candidates”).
In  response  to  evidence  of  these  substituted  barriers,
Congress reauthorized the VRA for five years in 1970, for
seven years in 1975, and for 25 years in 1982.  Ante, at 4–5.
Each  time,  this  Court  upheld  the  reauthorization  as  a
valid  exercise  of  congressional  power.    Ante,  at  5.    As  the
1982 reauthorization approached its 2007 expiration date,
Congress  again  considered  whether  the  VRA’s  preclear
ance mechanism remained an appropriate response to the
problem of voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions.
Congress did not take this task lightly.  Quite the oppo
site.  The  109th  Congress  that  took  responsibility  for  the
renewal  started  early  and  conscientiously.
In  October
2005,  the  House  began  extensive  hearings,  which  contin
ued  into  November  and  resumed  in  March  2006.  S. Rep.
No.  109–295,  p.  2  (2006).    In  April  2006,  the  Senate  fol
lowed suit, with hearings of its own.  Ibid.  In May 2006,
the  bills  that  became  the  VRA’s  reauthorization  were
introduced in both Houses.  Ibid.  The House held further
hearings  of  considerable  length,  as  did  the  Senate,  which
continued to hold hearings into June and July.  H. R. Rep.
109–478,  at  5;  S. Rep.  109–295,  at  3–4.    In  mid-July,  the
House  considered  and  rejected  four  amendments,  then
passed  the  reauthorization  by  a  vote  of  390  yeas  to  33
nays.  152 Cong. Rec. H5207 (July 13, 2006); Persily, The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and its reauthorization.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

59

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Asian American students.  Ante, at 43–44.  It is true that
SFFA “allege[d]” that Harvard discriminates against Asian
American students.  Ante, at 43.  Specifically, SFFA argued
that Harvard discriminates against Asian American appli-
cants vis-à-vis white applicants through the use of the per-
sonal rating, an allegedly “highly subjective” component of
the admissions process that is “susceptible to stereotyping
and bias.”  Harvard II, 980 F. 3d, at 196; see Brief for Pro-
fessors  of  Economics  as  Amici  Curiae  24.    It  is  also  true,
however, that there was a lengthy trial to test those allega-
tions, which SFFA lost.  JUSTICE THOMAS points to no legal
or factual error below, precisely because there is none.

To  begin,  this  part  of SFFA’s  discrimination claim  does
not even fall under the strict scrutiny framework in Grutter
and its progeny, which concerns the use of racial classifica-
tions.  The personal rating is a facially race-neutral compo-
nent of Harvard’s admissions policy.38  Therefore, even as-
suming for the sake of argument that Harvard engages in
racial discrimination through the personal rating, there is
no  connection  between  that  rating  and  the  remedy  that
SFFA  sought  and  that  the  majority  grants  today:  ending
the limited use of race in the entire admissions process.  In
any event, after assessing the credibility of fact witnesses
and  considering  extensive  documentary  evidence  and  ex-
pert testimony, the courts below found “no discrimination
against Asian Americans.”  Harvard II, 980 F. 3d, at 195,
n. 34, 202; see id., at 195–204.

There is no question that the Asian American community
continues to struggle against potent and dehumanizing ste-
reotypes  in  our  society.  It  is  precisely  because  racial  dis-
crimination persists in our society, however, that the use of

——————

38 Before 2018, Harvard’s admissions procedures were silent on the use
of race in connection with the personal rating.  Harvard II, 980 F. 3d, at
169.  Harvard later modified its instructions to say explicitly that “ ‘an
applicant’s  race  or  ethnicity  should  not  be  considered  in  assigning  the
personal rating.’ ”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the arguments made by SFFA (Students for Fair Admissions) regarding alleged discrimination against Asian American applicants at Harvard. The text analyzes the legal framework and the factual findings of the lower courts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:05] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1108

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 15, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1165. LaFargue et al. v. United States et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 516.
No. 99–1170. Yost v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 185 F. 3d 1178.

No. 99–1174. Roberts v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 F. 3d 1125.

No. 99–1191. Glover v. West, Secretary of Veterans Af-
fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185
F. 3d 1328.

No. 99–1193. Frazer v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 21 Cal. 4th 737, 982 P. 2d 180.

No. 99–1259. Arizaga Ramos v. District Director, Execu-
tive Office for Immigration Review, Office of Immigration
Judge. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202
F. 3d 279.

No. 99–1279. Swenson et ux. v. Washington Department
of Social and Health Services. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 94 Wash. App. 511, 973 P. 2d 474.

No. 99–1321. American Society of Association Execu-
tives v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 195 F. 3d 47.

No. 99–1325. Environ Products, Inc. v. Intelpro Corp.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 217 F. 3d
852.

No. 99–1344. Livoti v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 322.

No. 99–1361. Caprotti, For Herself and on Behalf of
Her Three Minor Sons, Caprotti et al. v. Town of Wood-
stock et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 94 N. Y. 2d 73, 721 N. E. 2d 957.

No. 99–1374. Watkins v. Professional Security Bureau,
Ltd. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201
F. 3d 439.

No. 99–1415. Adams v. Driscoll et al. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181 F. 3d 1285.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, court names, and brief descriptions. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents (Legal Cases)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of BREYER, J.

reduction in abortion services.”  Id., at 88; see id., at
79, 82, 87–88.

  In sum, “Act 620 does not advance Louisiana’s legit-
imate  interest  in  protecting  the  health  of  women
seeking abortions.  Instead, Act 620 would increase
the risk of harm to women’s health by dramatically
reducing the availability of safe abortion in Louisi-
ana.”  Id., at 87; see also id., at 65–66.

The District Court added that

“there is no legally significant distinction between this
case  and  [Whole  Woman’s  Health]:  Act  620  was  mod-
eled after the Texas admitting privileges requirement,
and it functions in the same manner, imposing signifi-
cant obstacles to abortion access with no countervailing
benefits.”  Id., at 88.

On the basis of these findings, the court held that Act 620
and its implementing regulations are unconstitutional.  It
entered  an  injunction  permanently  forbidding  their  en-
forcement.

E
The State appealed.  A divided panel of the Court of Ap-
peals  reversed  the  District  Court’s  judgment.  The  panel
majority concluded that Act 620’s impact was “dramatically
less”  than  that  of  the  Texas  law  invalidated  in  Whole
Woman’s Health.  June Medical Services L. L. C. v. Gee, 905
F. 3d  787,  791  (CA5  2018).    “Despite  its  diligent  effort  to
apply  [Whole  Woman’s  Health]  faithfully,”  the  majority
thought  that  the  District  Court  had  “clearly  erred  in  con-
cluding otherwise.”  Id., at 815.

With respect to the Act’s asserted benefits, the majority
thought that, “[u]nlike Texas, Louisiana presents some ev-
idence of a minimal benefit.”  Id., at 805.  Rejecting the Dis-
trict Court’s contrary finding, it concluded that the admit-
real,  and
ting-privileges

“performs  a

requirement
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of Justice Breyer's opinion in a case concerning abortion access in Louisiana.  It cites previous legal cases and discusses the arguments and findings of lower courts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

who ordered it.  In addition to creating and delivering the
cake—a  focal  point  of  the  wedding  celebration—Phillips
sometimes  stays  and  interacts  with  the  guests  at  the
wedding.  And the guests often recognize his creations and
seek  his  bakery  out  afterward.    Phillips  also  sees  the
inherent symbolism in wedding cakes.  To him, a wedding
cake  inherently  communicates  that  “a  wedding  has  oc
curred,  a  marriage  has  begun,  and  the  couple  should  be
celebrated.”  App. 162.

Wedding  cakes  do,  in  fact,  communicate  this  message.
A  tradition  from  Victorian  England  that  made  its  way  to
America  after  the  Civil  War,  “[w]edding  cakes  are  so
packed  with  symbolism  that  it  is  hard  to  know  where  to
begin.”  M. Krondl, Sweet Invention: A History of Dessert
321 (2011) (Krondl); see also ibid. (explaining the symbol
ism  behind  the  color,  texture,  flavor,  and  cutting  of  the
cake).  If an average person walked into a room and saw a
white, multi-tiered cake, he would immediately know that
he had stumbled upon a wedding.  The cake is “so stand
ardised  and  inevitable  a  part  of  getting  married  that  few
ever  think  to  question  it.”    Charsley,  Interpretation  and
Custom:  The  Case  of  the  Wedding  Cake,  22  Man  93,  95
(1987).  Almost  no  wedding,  no  matter  how  spartan,  is
missing the cake.  See id., at 98.  “A whole series of events
expected in the context of a  wedding would be impossible
without it: an essential photograph, the cutting, the toast,
and the distribution of both cake and favours at the wed
ding and afterwards.”  Ibid.  Although the cake is eventu
ally eaten, that is not its primary purpose.  See id., at 95
(“It  is  not  unusual  to  hear  people  declaring  that  they  do
not like wedding cake, meaning that they do not like to eat
it.  This includes people who are, without question, having
such  cakes  for  their  weddings”);  id.,  at  97  (“Nothing  is
made  of  the  eating  itself ”);  Krondl  320–321  (explaining
that  wedding  cakes  have  long  been  described  as  “inedi
ble”).  The  cake’s  purpose  is  to  mark  the  beginning  of  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the symbolism of wedding cakes in the context of a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
118

MOHAWK  INDUSTRIES,  INC.  v.  CARPENTER

Opinion of Thomas, J.

ruling  at  issue  is  “particularly  injurious  or  novel.”  Ante,
at  110.  If  that  is  right,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is,  then
the  opinion  raises  the  question  why  such  avenues  were  not
also  adequate  to  address  the  orders  whose  unusual  impor
tance or particularly injurious nature we have held justiﬁed
immediate appeal under Cohen.  See, e. g., Sell, 539 U. S., at
177.  Second, the facts of this particular case seem in several
respects to undercut the Court’s conclusion that the beneﬁts
of  collateral  order  review  “cannot  justify  the  likely  institu
tional  costs.”  Ante,  at  112.*  The  Court  responds  that
these  case-speciﬁc  arguments  miss  the  point  because  the
focus of the Cohen analysis is whether the “entire category”
or  “class  of  claims”  at  issue  merits  appellate  review  under
the  collateral  order  doctrine.  Ante,  at  107  (internal  quota
tion  marks  omitted).  That  is  exactly  right,  and  illustrates
what  increasingly  has  bothered  me  about  making  this  kind
of appealability determination via case-by-case adjudication.
The  exercise  forces  the  reviewing  court  to  subordinate  the
realities  of  each  case  before  it  to  generalized  conclusions
about the “likely” costs and beneﬁts of allowing an exception
to the ﬁnal judgment rule in an entire “class of cases.”  The
Court concedes that Congress, which holds the constitutional
reins in this area, has determined that such value judgments

*The  Court  concludes,  for  example,  that  in  most  cases  ﬁnal  judgment
review of an erroneous privilege ruling will sufﬁce to vindicate the injured
party’s  rights  because  the  appellate  court  can  vacate  the  adverse  judg
ment  and  remand  for  a  new  trial  in  which  the  protected  material  is  ex
cluded.  Ante,  at  109.  But  this  case  appears  to  involve  one  of  the  (per
haps  rare)  situations  in  which  ﬁnal  judgment  review  might  not  be
sufﬁcient  because  it  is  a  case  in  which  the  challenged  order  already  has
had  “implications beyond  the  case at  hand,” namely,  in  the separate  class
action in Williams v.  Mohawk Indus., Inc., No. 4:04–CV–00003–HLM (ND
Ga.).  Ante,  at  112.  The  Court  also  concludes  that  the  “likely  institu
tional costs” of  allowing collateral order review would  outweigh its bene
ﬁts  because,  inter  alia,  such  review  would  “needlessly  burden  the  courts
of  appeals.”  Ibid.  But  as the  Court  concedes,  it  must speculate  on  this
point  because  the  three  Circuits  that  allow  Cohen  appeals  of  privilege
rulings have not been overwhelmed.  See ante, at 113.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the arguments surrounding the appealability of certain orders. It's part of a larger legal discussion and contains legal jargon and references to case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Opinion of the Court

“[T]he term ‘automatically’ as it modifies ‘shoots, is de-
signed  to  shoot,  or  can  be  readily  restored  to  shoot,’
means functioning as the result of a self-acting or self-
regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple
rounds  through  a  single  function  of  the  trigger;  and
‘single function of the trigger’ means a single pull of the
trigger and analogous motions.  The term ‘machinegun’
includes a bump-stock-type device, i.e., a device that al-
lows a semi-automatic firearm to shoot more than one
shot with a single pull of the trigger by harnessing the
recoil energy of the semi-automatic firearm to which it
is affixed so that the trigger resets and continues firing
without additional physical manipulation of the trigger
by the shooter.”  Id., at 66553–66554.

The  final  Rule  also  repudiated  ATF’s  previous  guidance
that bump stocks did not qualify as “machineguns” under
§5845(b).  Id., at 66530–66531.  And, it ordered owners of
bump  stocks  to  destroy  them  or  surrender  them  to  ATF
within  90  days.    Id.,  at  66530.    Bump-stock  owners  who
failed  to comply would be subject  to criminal  prosecution.
Id., at 66525; see also 18 U. S. C. §922(o)(1).

C
  Michael Cargill surrendered two bump stocks to ATF un-
der protest.  He then filed suit to challenge the final Rule,
asserting a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act.
As relevant, Cargill alleged that ATF lacked statutory au-
thority to promulgate the final Rule because bump stocks
are  not  “machinegun[s]”  as  defined  in  §5845(b).    After  a
bench trial,  the District  Court  entered  judgment for  ATF.
The court concluded that “a bump stock fits the statutory
definition  of  a  ‘machinegun.’ ”    Cargill  v.  Barr,  502
F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1194 (WD Tex. 2020).
  The  Court  of  Appeals  initially  affirmed,  20  F. 4th  1004
(CA5 2021), but later reversed after rehearing en banc, 57
F. 4th 447 (CA5 2023).  A majority agreed, at a minimum,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing case law and legislation. It delves into the legal definition of "machinegun" and its application to bump stocks.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1134

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 22, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8738. Alford v. United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 208 F. 3d 205.

No. 99–8739. Duke v. Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Okla-
homa Housing Authority. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1123.

No. 99–8744. Hairston v. Idaho. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 133 Idaho 496, 988 P. 2d 1170.

No. 99–8756. Penns v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 758 So. 2d 776.

No. 99–8760. McLean v. Members of Virginia Board of
Corrections et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 203 F. 3d 821.

No. 99–8761. Marsh v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–8762. Murdock v. Washington et al. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 510.

No. 99–8763. Atkins v. Tessmer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8764. Coronado v. Walker, Superintendent, Au-
burn Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–8773. Hill v. Brigano, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 833.

No. 99–8784. Coutee v. Dormire, Superintendent, Jef-
ferson City Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 249.

No. 99–8834. Kikuyama v. Maddock, Warden, et al. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 278.

No. 99–8845. Chappell v. Deeds, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 236.

No. 99–8857. Farmer v. Trent, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct.
App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 206 W. Va. 231,
523 S. E. 2d 547.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, court origins, and reporting information. This type of structured data is not typically suitable for indexing as it is not narrative text meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

445

Opinion of Stevens, J.

worse, the law at issue did not make any allowance for corpo
rations  to  spend  money  through  PACs.  Id.,  at  768,  n.  2
(opinion of the Court).  This really was a complete ban on a
speciﬁc, preidentiﬁed subject.  See MCFL, 479 U. S., at 259,
n.  12  (stating  that  2  U. S. C.  § 441b’s  expenditure  restriction
“is  of  course  distinguishable  from  the  complete  foreclosure
of any opportunity for political speech that we invalidated in
the  state  referendum  context  in .
 Bellotti”  (emphasis
added)).

.

.

The  majority  grasps  a  quotational  straw  from  Bellotti,
that  speech  does  not  fall  entirely  outside  the  protection  of
the First Amendment merely because it comes from a corpo
ration.  Ante,  at  346–347.  Of  course  not,  but  no  one  sug
gests  the  contrary,  and  neither  Austin  nor  McConnell  held
otherwise.  They held that even though the expenditures at
issue were subject to First Amendment scrutiny, the restric
tions  on  those  expenditures  were  justiﬁed  by  a  compelling
state interest.  See McConnell, 540 U. S., at 205; Austin, 494
U. S., at 658, 660.  We acknowledged in Bellotti that numer
ous  “interests  of  the  highest  importance”  can  justify  cam
paign  ﬁnance  regulation.  435  U. S.,  at  788–789.  But  we
found  no  evidence  that  these  interests  were  served  by  the
Massachusetts law.  Id., at 789.  We left open the possibility
that our decision might have been different if there had been
“record  or  legislative  ﬁndings  that  corporate  advocacy
threatened  imminently  to  undermine  democratic  processes,
thereby  denigrating  rather  than  serving  First  Amendment
interests.”  Ibid.

Austin  and  McConnell,  then,  sit  perfectly  well  with  Bel
lotti.  Indeed,  all  six  Members  of  the  Austin  majority  had
been on the Court at the time of Bellotti, and none so much
as  hinted  in  Austin  that  they  saw  any  tension  between  the
decisions.  The difference between the cases is not that Aus
tin and McConnell rejected First Amendment protection for
corporations whereas Bellotti accepted it.  The difference is
that  the  statute  at  issue  in  Bellotti  smacked  of  viewpoint
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC.

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J.

*

*
In my view, today’s  decision is both unprecedented and
unnecessary, and risks pushing the Judiciary further into
areas where we lack both the authority to act and the ca-
pacity to act wisely.  I respectfully dissent.

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring/dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)

3

Syllabus

These provisions reflect what the Court said in Rowley by focusing on
“progress  in  the  general  education  curriculum.”    §§1414(d)(1)(A)(i)
(I)(aa), (II)(aa), (IV)(bb).

Rowley  did  not  provide  concrete  guidance  with  respect  to  a  child
who  is  not  fully  integrated  in  the  regular  classroom  and  not  able  to
achieve on grade level.  A child’s IEP need not aim for grade-level ad-
vancement if that is not a reasonable prospect.  But that child’s edu-
cational program must be appropriately ambitious in light of his cir-
cumstances,
is
appropriately  ambitious  for  most  children  in  the  regular  classroom.
The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet
challenging objectives.

just  as  advancement

from  grade

to  grade

This  standard  is  more  demanding  than  the  “merely  more  than  de
minimis”  test  applied  by  the  Tenth  Circuit.    It  cannot  be  right  that
the  IDEA  generally  contemplates  grade-level  advancement  for  chil-
dren  with  disabilities  who  are  fully  integrated  in  the  regular  class-
room, but is satisfied with barely more than de minimis progress for
children who are not.  Pp. 9–15.

(b) Endrew’s  parents  argue  that  the  Act  goes  even  further  and  re-
quires States to provide children with disabilities educational oppor-
tunities  that  are  “substantially  equal  to  the  opportunities  afforded
children without disabilities.”  Brief for Petitioner 40.  But the lower
courts  in  Rowley  adopted  a  strikingly  similar  standard,  and  this
Court rejected it in clear terms.  Mindful that Congress has not ma-
terially changed the statutory definition of a FAPE since Rowley was
decided,  this  Court  declines  to  interpret  the  FAPE  provision  in  a
manner  so  plainly  at  odds  with  the  Court’s  analysis  in  that  case.
P. 15.

(c) The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances
of  the  child  for  whom  it  was  created.    This  absence  of  a  bright-line
rule should not be mistaken for “an invitation to the courts to substi-
tute  their  own  notions  of  sound  educational  policy  for  those  of  the
school authorities which they review.”  Rowley, 458 U. S., at 206.  At
the same time, deference is based on the application of expertise and
the exercise of judgment by school authorities.  The nature of the IEP
process ensures that parents and school representatives will fully air
their  respective  opinions  on  the  degree  of  progress  a  child’s  IEP
should  pursue;  thus,  by  the  time  any  dispute  reaches  court,  school
authorities  will  have  had  the  chance  to  bring  their  expertise  and
judgment to bear on areas of disagreement.  See §§1414, 1415; Row-
ley, 458 U. S., at 208–209.  At that point, a reviewing court may fairly
expect  those  authorities  to  be  able  to  offer  a  cogent  and  responsive
explanation for their decisions that shows the IEP is reasonably cal-
culated  to  enable  the  child  to  make  progress  appropriate  in  light  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It discusses the legal standard for "Free Appropriate Public Education" (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Supreme Court Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MOORE v. HARPER

ALITO, J., dissenting

that this Court has no authority to overrule a state supreme
court’s interpretation of state law.

Both sides advance serious arguments, but based on the
briefing we have received, my judgment is that the appli-
cants’ argument is stronger.  The question presented is one
of  federal  not  state  law  because  the  state  legislature,  in
promulgating rules for congressional elections, acts pursu-
ant to a constitutional mandate under the Elections Clause.
Cf.  Bush,  531  U. S.,  at  113  (Rehnquist,  C. J.,  concurring)
(compliance  with  the  Electors  Clause  “presents  a  federal
constitutional question”).  And if the language of the Elec-
tions Clause is taken seriously, there must be some limit on
the authority of state courts to countermand actions taken
by state legislatures when they are prescribing rules for the
conduct of federal elections.  I think it is likely that the ap-
plicants would succeed in showing that the North Carolina
Supreme Court exceeded those limits.

The applicants will be irreparably harmed if a stay is not
granted  because  they  will  be  deprived  of  their  constitu-
tional  prerogative  to  draw  the  congressional map  in  their
State, and the public interest will be disserved if the 2022
congressional  elections  in  North  Carolina  are  held  using
districts that we eventually determine were unconstitution-
ally imposed.

This matter came to us only seven days before the dead-
line for candidates to file on March 4, but promptly granting
a  stay  would  have  been  only  minimally  disruptive  in  the
circumstances here.  The General Assembly’s remedial map
provides that the first map enacted by the Assembly would
become effective by operation of law if we “stay[ed]” the or-
ders  of  the  North  Carolina  Supreme  Court.    What  candi-
dates  were  required  to  do  by  March  4  was  to  file  a  short
form,  and  the  only  change  that  they  would  have  been  re-
quired to make had we granted the application was to en-
sure that the form they submitted specified the district in
which  they  were  running  under  the  first  plan  adopted  by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Moore v. Harper.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain valuable textual information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

61

Opinion of the Court

hooligans.    The  Pennsylvania  law  to  which  JUSTICE
BREYER  refers levied a fine of 5 shillings on one who fired
a  gun  or  set  off  fireworks  in  Philadelphia  without  first
obtaining a license from the governor.  See Act of Aug. 26,
1721, §4, in 3 Stat. at Large 253–254.  Given Justice Wil
son’s explanation that the right to self-defense with arms
was  protected  by  the  Pennsylvania  Constitution,  it  is
unlikely that this law (which in any event amounted to at
most a licensing regime) would have been enforced against
a  person  who  used  firearms  for  self-defense.    JUSTICE
BREYER  cites  a  Rhode  Island  law  that  simply  levied  a  5
shilling fine on those who fired guns in streets and taverns,
a  law  obviously  inapplicable  to  this  case.  See  An  Act  for
preventing Mischief being done in the town of Newport, or
in any other town in this Government, 1731, Rhode Island
Session Laws.  Finally, JUSTICE  BREYER points to a Mas
sachusetts  law  similar  to  the  Pennsylvania  law,  prohibit
ing “discharg[ing] any Gun or Pistol charged with Shot or
Ball  in  the  Town  of  Boston.”  Act  of  May  28,  1746,  ch.  X,
Acts and  Laws of Mass. Bay 208.  It is again implausible
that this would have been enforced against a citizen acting
in self-defense, particularly given its preambulatory refer
ence  to  “the  indiscreet  firing  of  Guns.”  Ibid.  (preamble)
(emphasis added).

A  broader  point  about  the  laws  that  JUSTICE  BREYER
cites:  All  of  them  punished  the  discharge  (or  loading)  of
guns with a small fine and forfeiture of the weapon (or in a
few  cases  a  very  brief  stay  in  the  local  jail),  not  with  sig
nificant  criminal  penalties.29    They  are  akin  to  modern
penalties for minor public-safety infractions like speeding

——————

29 The  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania  described  the  amount  of  five
shillings  in  a  contract  matter  in  1792  as  “nominal  consideration.”
Morris’s Lessee v. Smith, 4 Dall. 119, 120 (Pa. 1792).  Many of the laws
cited punished violation with fine in a similar amount; the 1783 Massa
chusetts gunpowder-storage law carried a somewhat larger fine of £10
(200 shillings) and forfeiture of the weapon.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing historical gun laws and their potential application to self-defense. It contains legal citations and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

KAGAN, J., dissenting

come out right unless each factor is assessed correctly.  This
case, of course, is about (and only about) the first.

And that factor is distinctive: It is the only one that fo-
cuses on what the copier’s use of the original work accom-
plishes.  The first factor asks about the “character” of that
use—its “main or essential nature[,] esp[ecially] as strongly
marked and serving to distinguish.”  Webster’s Third New
International  Dictionary  376  (1976).    And  the  first  factor
asks about the “purpose” of the use—the “object, effect, or
result aimed at, intended, or attained.”  Id., at 1847.  In that
way, the first factor gives the copier a chance to make his
case.  See P. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv.
L. Rev. 1105, 1116 (1990) (describing factor 1 as “the soul
of ” the “fair use defense”).  Look, the copier can say, at how
I altered the original, and what I achieved in so doing.  Look
at how (as Judge Leval’s seminal article put the point) the
original was “used as raw material” and was “transformed

——————
owner”).  The majority asserts that it is “aware of no authority for the
proposition”  that  the  fourth  factor  can  thus  protect  against  unlicensed
film adaptations, insisting that the first factor must do (or at least share
in) the work.  Ante, at 29, n. 17; see ante, at 16, 28–29, 36.  But Google is
the “authority for the proposition”: That’s just what it said, in so many
words.  And anyway, the majority’s own first-factor test, applied consist-
ently, would favor, not stop, the freeloading filmmaker.  As you’ve seen
(and I’ll discuss below), that test boils down to whether a follow-on work
serves substantially the same commercial purpose as the original—here,
“depict[ing]  Prince  in  magazine  stories  about  Prince.”  Ante,  at  12–13;
see ante, at 22–23, and n. 11, 27, n. 15, 33, 35.  A film adaptation doesn’t
fit  that  mold:  The  filmmaker  (unlike  Warhol,  in  the  majority’s  view)
wants to reach different buyers, in different markets, consuming differ-
ent  products.  The  majority  at  one  point  suggests  it  might  have  some
different factor 1 test in its back pocket to deal with this problem.  See
ante, at 35, n. 22.  But assuming the majority’s approach, as stated re-
peatedly  in  its  opinion,  is  truly  the  majority’s  approach,  factor  1  won’t
help the author in the book-to-film situation.  Under that approach, it is
the  fourth  factor,  not  the  first,  which  has  to  “take[ ]  care  of  derivative
works like book-to-film adaptations.”  Ante, at 29, n. 17.  It’s a good thing
the majority errs in believing that the fourth factor isn’t up to the job.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments regarding copyright law and fair use, specifically focusing on the first factor in the fair use analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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529US3

Unit: $U58

[09-26-01 12:26:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 753 (2000)

759

Opinion of the Court

But here Ohler runs into the position taken by the Court
in a similar, but not identical, situation in Luce v. United
States, 469 U. S. 38 (1984), that “[a]ny possible harm ﬂowing
from a district court’s in limine ruling permitting impeach-
ment by a prior conviction is wholly speculative.”
Id., at 41.
Only when the Government exercises its option to elicit the
testimony is an appellate court confronted with a case where,
under the normal rules of trial, the defendant can claim the
denial of a substantial right if in fact the district court’s
in limine ruling proved to be erroneous.
In our view, there
is nothing “unfair,” as Ohler puts it, about putting her to her
choice in accordance with the normal rules of trial.

Finally, Ohler argues that applying this rule to her situa-
tion unconstitutionally burdens her right to testify. She re-
lies on Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44 (1987), where we held
that a prohibition of hypnotically refreshed testimony in-
terfered with the defendant’s right to testify. But here the
rule in question does not prevent Ohler from taking the
stand and presenting any admissible testimony which she
chooses. She is of course subject to cross-examination and
In
subject to impeachment by the use of a prior conviction.
a sense, the use of these tactics by the Government may
deter a defendant from taking the stand. But, as we said in
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 215 (1971):

“It has long been held that a defendant who takes the
stand in his own behalf cannot then claim the privilege
against cross-examination on matters reasonably related
to the subject matter of his direct examination. . . . It is
not thought overly harsh in such situations to require
that the determination whether to waive the privilege
take into account the matters which may be brought out
It is also generally recognized
on cross-examination.
that a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf
may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or the
like. . . . Again, it is not thought inconsistent with the
enlightened administration of criminal justice to require
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It cites previous cases and discusses legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. v.
JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–1392.  Argued December 1, 2021—Decided June 24, 2022

Mississippi’s  Gestational  Age  Act  provides  that  “[e]xcept  in  a  medical
emergency or in the case of a severe fetal abnormality, a person shall
not intentionally or knowingly perform . . . or induce an abortion of an
unborn human being if the probable gestational age of the unborn hu-
man being has been determined to be greater than fifteen (15) weeks.”
Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191.  Respondents—Jackson Women’s Health
Organization, an abortion clinic, and one of its doctors—challenged the
Act in Federal District Court, alleging that it violated this Court’s prec-
edents establishing a constitutional right to abortion, in particular Roe
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.
v.  Casey,  505  U. S.  833.    The  District  Court  granted  summary  judg-
ment in favor of respondents and permanently enjoined enforcement
of the Act, reasoning that Mississippi’s 15-week restriction on abortion
violates this Court’s cases forbidding States to ban abortion pre-viabil-
ity.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed.  Before this Court, petitioners defend
the Act on the grounds that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and
that the Act is constitutional because it satisfies rational-basis review.

Held: The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and Casey
are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the
people and their elected representatives.  Pp. 8–79.

(a) The  critical  question  is  whether  the  Constitution,  properly  un-
derstood,  confers  a  right  to  obtain  an  abortion.  Casey’s  controlling
opinion  skipped  over  that  question  and  reaffirmed  Roe  solely  on  the
basis of stare decisis.  A proper application of stare decisis, however,
requires an assessment of the strength of the grounds on which Roe
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion, not the actual content of the opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not meant to be indexed as part of the main text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

Instead, this Court’s precedent, along with historical stat-
utes and cases, reflect a commonsense understanding that
threatening someone is an intentional act.  As to what in-
tent  is  needed,  “[t]raditionally,  one  intends  certain  conse-
quences  when  he  desires  that  his  acts  cause  those  conse-
quences or knows that those consequences are substantially
certain to result from his acts.”  Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S.
137,  150  (1987)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  This
does not require showing that an individual intends to carry
through with the threat.  But it does require showing that
an individual desires to threaten or is substantially certain
that her statements will be understood as threatening.

Today,  unfortunately,  the  Court  unnecessarily  departs
from this traditional understanding.  That is not to say that
I disagree with the Court on everything.  Far from it.  I join
the Court’s conclusion that some subjective mens rea is re-
quired in true-threats cases.  I also agree that in this par-
ticular  case,  where  petitioner  was  prosecuted  for  stalking
that involved threatening statements, a mens rea of reck-
lessness  is  amply  sufficient.    Where  I  part  ways  with  the
Court is that I would not reach the distinct and more com-
plex question whether a mens rea of recklessness is suffi-
cient for true-threats prosecutions generally.  Further, re-
quiring  nothing  more  than  a  mens  rea  of  recklessness  is
inconsistent with precedent, history, and the commitment
to  even  harmful  speech  that  the  First  Amendment  en-
shrines.  I therefore respectfully concur only in part and in
the judgment.

I

As  an  initial  matter,  I  do  not  believe  that  this  Court
should reach the question whether recklessness is sufficient
for true-threats prosecutions.  A key conceptual distinction
is helpful for explaining why.  On the one hand, there are
statements that are objectively threatening.  In some cases,
such statements can be punished because they fall into the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Counterman v. Colorado.  It delves into the legal definition of threats and the required mens rea (mental state) for prosecution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Opinion of the Court

section shall be construed as a grant of civil or criminal reg-
ulatory jurisdiction to the State of Texas.

JURISDICTION  OVER  ENFORCEMENT  AGAINST
(c)
MEMBERS.—  [T]he  courts  of  the  United  States  shall  have
exclusive  jurisdiction  over  any  offense  in  violation  of  sub-
section (a) that is committed by the tribe . . . .”  101 Stat.
668–669.

Perhaps the most striking feature about this language is
its dichotomy between prohibition and regulation.  On the
one hand, subsection (a) says that gaming activities prohib-
ited by state law are also prohibited as a matter of federal
law (using some variation of the word “prohibited” no fewer
than three times).  On the other hand, subsection (b) insists
that the statute does not grant Texas civil or criminal reg-
ulatory jurisdiction with respect to matters covered by this
“section,” a section concerned exclusively with gaming.  The
implication  that  Congress  drew  from  Cabazon  and  meant
for us to apply its same prohibitory/regulatory framework
here seems almost impossible to ignore.  See Part II–B, in-
fra.

But before getting to that, we start with a careful look at
the statute’s terms standing on their own.  Often enough in
ordinary  speech,  to  prohibit  something  means  to  “forbid,”
“prevent,” or “effectively stop” it, or “make [it] impossible.”
Webster’s  Third  International  Dictionary  1813  (1986)
(Webster’s Third); see 7 Oxford English Dictionary 596 (2d
ed. 1989) (OED); Black’s Law Dictionary 1212 (6th ed. 1990)
(Black’s).  Meanwhile, to regulate something is usually un-
derstood to mean to “fix the time, amount, degree, or rate”
of an activity “according to rule[s].”  Webster’s Third 1913;
see  8  OED  524;  Black’s  1286.    Frequently,  then,  the  two
words are “not synonymous.”  Id., at 1212.

That fact presents Texas with a problem.  The State con-
cedes that its laws do not forbid, prevent, effectively stop,
or make bingo impossible.  Instead, the State admits that it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of a statute related to gaming activities and the distinction between prohibition and regulation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

BROWN v. PLATA

ALITO, J., dissenting

The majority approves the three-judge court’s refusal to
receive fresh evidence based largely on the need for “[o]r-
derly  trial  management.”    Ante,  at  26.  The  majority  rea-
sons that the three-judge court had closed the book on the
question  of  constitutional  violations  and  had  turned  to
the question of remedy.  Ibid.  As noted, however, the ex-
tent of any continuing constitutional violations was highly
relevant to the question of remedy.

The  majority  also  countenances  the  three-judge  court’s
reliance  on  dated  findings.    The  majority  notes  that  the
lower court considered recent reports by the Special Mas-
ter and Receiver, ante, at 18–19, but the majority provides
no  persuasive  justification  for  the  lower  court’s  refusal  to
receive  hard,  up-to-date  evidence  about  any  continuing
violations.    With  the  safety  of  the  people  of  California  in
the balance, the record on this issue should not have been
closed.

The  majority  repeats  the  lower  court’s  error  of  reciting
statistics  that  are  clearly  out  of  date.    The  Court  notes
the lower court’s finding that as of 2005 “an inmate in one
of  California’s  prisons  needlessly  dies  every  six  to  seven
days.”  See  ante,  at  9.  Yet  by  the  date  of  the  trial  before
the  three-judge  court,  the  death  rate  had  been  trending
downward  for  10  quarters,  App.  2257,  and  the  number  of
likely preventable deaths fell from 18 in 2006 to 3 in 2007,
a  decline  of  83  percent.5    Between  2001  and  2007,  the
——————

decree, an accurate assessment of conditions as of that date was essen-
tial in order to ensure that the relief did not sweep more broadly than
necessary.

5 2008  Death  Reviews  22.    The  majority  elides  the  improvement  by
combining  likely  preventable  deaths  with  those  that  were  “possibly
preventable,” ante, at 7, n. 4, that is, cases in which “[i]n the judgment
of the reviewer,” 2008 Death Reviews 3, “it’s fifty-fifty that better care
would have possibly prevented the death,” App. 2277; id., at 2256.  As
the majority acknowledges, even this class of cases is now dramatically
diminished, and the three-judge court must take the current conditions
into account when revising its remedy going forward.  Ante, at 7, n. 4.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Brown v. Plata. It argues against the majority's decision and provides reasoning based on the evidence presented.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

DAVIS v. ERMOLD

Statement of THOMAS, J.

(2018)  (describing  owners  of  wedding  studio who  declined
to participate in same-sex weddings for religious reasons as
treating homosexuals like “ ‘social outcasts’ ” (quoting Mas-
terpiece  Cakeshop,  Ltd.  v.  Colorado  Civil  Rights  Comm’n,
584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 9))).

*

*

*
This  petition  implicates  important  questions  about  the
scope of our decision in Obergefell, but it does not cleanly
present them.  For that reason, I concur in the denial of cer-
tiorari.  Nevertheless,  this  petition  provides  a  stark  re-
minder  of  the  consequences  of  Obergefell.  By  choosing  to
privilege a novel constitutional right over the religious lib-
erty interests explicitly protected in the First Amendment,
and by doing so undemocratically, the Court has created a
problem that only it can fix.  Until then, Obergefell will con-
tinue to have “ruinous consequences for religious liberty.”
576 U. S., at 734 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It discusses the implications of the Obergefell v. Hodges decision on religious liberty.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1029

558 U. S.

November 16, 2009

No.  09–6473.  Cotton  v.  Coleman,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional  Institution  at  Fayette.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6474.  Davis  v.  Harmon,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  8th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  448.

No.  09–6475.  Collie  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  709.

No.  09–6477.  Darby  v.  Moore,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  567.

No.  09–6479.  Dahl  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6480.  Chavarria  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6481.  Taylor  v.  Murphy,  Commissioner,  Connecti
cut Department of Correction, et al.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6483.  White  v.  Luoma,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6486.  Asante  v.  New  York.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.
N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 47 App.
Div.  3d  1129,  849  N. Y.  S.  2d  184.

No.  09–6488.  Judd  v.  New  Mexico.  Ct.  App.  N.  M.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6493.  Larson  v.  Minnesota.  Ct.  App.  Minn.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6500.  Andrews  v.  City  of  Seattle,  Washington.

Ct.  App.  Wash.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6502.  Taylor  et  ux.  v.  National  City  Bank.  Sup.

Ct.  Ind.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6505.  Meehan  v.  New  York.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.

N. Y.,  3d  Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the orders issued.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Legal Database Entry</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>