<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

GILL v. WHITFORD

Opinion of the Court

rymandering  claims.    Relevant  to  this  case,  an  amicus
brief in support of the LULAC plaintiffs proposed a “sym
metry standard” to “measure partisan bias” by comparing
how the two major political parties “would fare hypotheti
cally  if  they  each  . . .  received  a  given  percentage  of  the
vote.”  548 U. S., at 419 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.).  JUSTICE
KENNEDY  noted  some  wariness  at  the  prospect  of  “adopt
ing a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based
on unfair results that would occur in a hypothetical state
of affairs.”  Id., at 420.  Aside from that problem, he wrote,
the  partisan  bias  standard  shed  no  light  on  “how  much
partisan  dominance  is  too  much.”
 JUSTICE
KENNEDY  therefore  concluded  that  “asymmetry  alone  is
not  a  reliable  measure  of  unconstitutional  partisanship.”
Ibid.

Ibid.

Justice  Stevens  would  have  found  that  the  Texas  map

was  a  partisan  gerrymander  based  in  part  on  the  asym
metric  advantage  it  conferred  on  Republicans  in  convert
ing  votes  to  seats.
Id.,  at  466–467,  471–473  (opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Souter,
writing for himself and JUSTICE GINSBURG, noted that he
would not “rule out the utility of a criterion of symmetry,”
and that “further attention could be devoted to the admin
istrability  of  such  a  criterion  at  all  levels  of  redistricting
and  its  review.”  Id.,  at  483–484  (opinion  concurring  in
part and dissenting in part).

B
At  argument  on  appeal  in  this  case,  counsel  for  the
plaintiffs argued that this Court can address the problem
of  partisan  gerrymandering  because  it  must:  The  Court
should  exercise  its  power  here  because  it  is  the  “only
institution in the United States” capable of “solv[ing] this
problem.”  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  62.    Such  invitations  must  be
answered  with  care.    “Failure  of  political  will  does  not
justify unconstitutional remedies.”  Clinton v. City of New
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the issue of partisan gerrymandering. It contains legal citations and arguments, suggesting it's part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of the Court

court concluded that requiring Phillips to comply with the
statute  did  not violate his  free  exercise  rights.  The  Colo-
rado Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

Phillips  sought  review  here,  and  this  Court  granted
certiorari.  582 U. S. ___ (2017).  He now renews his claims
under  the  Free  Speech  and  Free  Exercise  Clauses  of  the
First Amendment.

II

A

Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons
and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as
inferior  in  dignity  and  worth.  For  that  reason  the  laws
and  the  Constitution  can,  and  in  some  instances  must,
protect  them  in  the  exercise  of  their  civil  rights.    The
exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be
given great weight and respect by the courts.  At the same
time,  the  religious  and  philosophical  objections  to  gay
marriage  are  protected  views  and  in  some  instances  pro-
tected  forms  of  expression.    As  this  Court  observed  in
Obergefell  v.  Hodges,  576  U. S.  ___  (2015),  “[t]he  First
Amendment  ensures  that  religious  organizations  and
persons  are  given proper  protection as  they seek  to  teach
the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their
lives and faiths.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 27).  Nevertheless,
while  those  religious  and  philosophical  objections  are
protected,  it  is  a  general  rule  that  such  objections  do  not
allow  business  owners  and  other  actors  in  the  economy
and  in  society  to  deny  protected  persons  equal  access  to
goods and services under a neutral and generally applica-
ble  public  accommodations  law.  See  Newman  v.  Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402, n. 5 (1968) (per
curiam);  see  also  Hurley  v.  Irish-American  Gay,  Lesbian
and  Bisexual  Group  of  Boston,  Inc.,  515  U. S.  557,  572
(1995)  (“Provisions  like  these  are  well  within  the  State’s
usual  power  to  enact  when  a  legislature  has  reason  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the Opinion of the Court. It sets the context for the case and discusses relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v.
RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
BARRETT, J., dissenting

EPA can appropriately adjust the RFP requirements it sets,
the statute requires EPA to review “the feasibility of achiev-
ing compliance” and “impacts of ” the RFP on regulated re-
fineries.  §§7545(o)(11)(B)–(C).  And if compliance is not fea-
sible in a given year, the RFP allows individual refineries
to carry a compliance deficit into the next year.  See ante,
at  2  (discussing  §7545(o)(5)(D)).  Recall  too  that  in  cases
where compliance would work severe economic harm on a
State or a region, the general-waiver provision allows EPA
in  part.
to  waive  the  requirements
§7545(o)(7)(A)(i).    Economic  concerns  are  at  the  center  of
other RFP waiver provisions as well.  See §7545(o)(7)(E)(ii)
(waiver  based  on  price  of  biomass-based  diesel  fuel);
§§7545(o)(8)(A)–(D)  (waiver  based  on  “significant  adverse
impacts on consumers,” including impacts on “supplies and
prices”).  Congress’ direct concern with economic difficulties
in separate provisions further undermines HollyFrontier’s
argument that Congress must have meant to vindicate such
concerns by granting EPA broad waiver power in subpara-
graph (B)(i).

in  whole  or

2

The Court’s structural counters are not persuasive.
First,  the  Court  cites  the  statute’s  instruction  that  a
small  refinery  can  file  a  subparagraph  (B)(i)  petition  “ ‘at
any time.’ ”  See ante, at 9 (quoting §7545(o)(9)(B)(i)).  This
argument  falls  apart  on  close  inspection.  “[A]t  any  time”
informs when a refinery may file an “extension” request; it
cannot change the type of request that EPA can grant.  By
using  the  phrase  “at  any  time,”  the  statute  gives  a  small
refinery with an exemption flexibility about when to file a
request to extend that exemption for the following year.

This  reading  does  not  leave  “at  any  time”  without  im-
portant work to do.  For one, the phrase means that refin-
eries need not seek exemptions before EPA’s fuel standards
are due—which is November 30 in the calendar year before
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a court case. It contains legal arguments, citations to statutes, and references to other parts of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

$250,000 of Cruz’s loans.  For support, it naturally points
to appellees’ stipulation that  “none of the $250,000 of the
loan  that  was  repaid  was  from  contributions  raised  after
the election.”  App. 329.  Thus, the Government says, the
Committee has not yet reached the cap in Section 304 on
the  use  of  post-election  funds,  and  can  still  repay  the  re-
maining balance without running afoul of that statutory re-
striction.  It is instead the agency’s regulation—with its 20-
day  limit—that  prevents  repayment  of  the  final  $10,000.
This matters, the Government insists, because “[s]tanding
is  not  dispensed  in  gross,”  and  plaintiffs  must  establish
standing separately for each claim that they press and each
form of relief that they seek.  Brief for Appellant 17 (quoting
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip
op., at 15)).  A challenge to the regulation, the Government
argues, is separate from a challenge to the statute that au-
thorized it.

For their part, appellees insist that the record, properly
interpreted,  shows  that  the  Committee  used  post-election
funds  to  repay  Cruz.    During  the  period  between  election
day and when the Committee repaid Cruz’s loans, the Com-
mittee received more than $250,000 in “redesignated” con-
tributions  to  Cruz’s  2024  campaign.    Those  contributions
came from individuals who donated to the 2018 election in
amounts exceeding their base limit and who, subsequent to
the election, redesignated the overlimit amount to the 2024
campaign.  See 11 CFR §110.1(b)(5).  Such funds, appellees
say, qualify as “post-election contributions” for purposes of
Section  304,  and  may  have  been  used  to  repay  the  first
$250,000 of Cruz’s loans.  See §116.12(a).

These arguments have an Alice in Wonderland air about
them, with the Government arguing that appellees would
not violate the statute by repaying Cruz, and the appellees
arguing that they would.  But this case has unfolded in an
unusual  way.  After  all,  Cruz  and  the  Committee  likely
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court is outlining the arguments made by both sides.  It is sequential text and contains relevant legal information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ___ (2015)

1

KAGAN, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________________

No. 13–7451
_________________________

JOHN L. YATES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[February 25, 2015]

 JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SCALIA,  JUSTICE

KENNEDY, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.

A  criminal  law,  18  U.  S.  C.  §1519,  prohibits  tampering
with  “any  record,  document,  or  tangible  object”  in  an
attempt  to  obstruct  a  federal  investigation.    This  case
raises  the  question  whether  the  term  “tangible  object”
means  the  same  thing  in  §1519  as  it  means  in  everyday
language—any  object  capable  of  being  touched.    The  an-
swer  should  be  easy:  Yes.    The  term  “tangible  object”  is
broad,  but  clear.    Throughout  the  U. S.  Code  and  many
States’  laws,  it  invariably  covers  physical  objects  of  all
kinds.  And  in  §1519,  context  confirms  what  bare  text
says:  All  the  words  surrounding  “tangible  object”  show
that Congress meant the term to have a wide range.  That
fits with Congress’s evident purpose in enacting §1519: to
punish  those  who  alter  or  destroy physical  evidence—any
physical  evidence—with  the  intent  of  thwarting  federal
law enforcement.

The  plurality  instead  interprets  “tangible  object”  to
cover  “only  objects  one  can  use  to  record  or  preserve  in-
formation.”  Ante, at 7.  The concurring opinion similarly,
if  more  vaguely,  contends  that  “tangible  object”  should
refer to “something similar to records or documents”—and
shouldn’t  include  colonial  farmhouses,  crocodiles,  or  fish.
Ante, at 1 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment).  In my view,
conventional  tools  of  statutory  construction  all  lead  to  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It includes citations, case names, and the name of the justice writing the opinion.  This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it is part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

67

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  5  U. S. C.  §7204(b)  (Antidiscrimination;  Other

Prohibitions)

  6 U. S. C. §488f(b) (Secure Handling of Ammo-
nium Nitrate; Protection From Civil Liability)

  7  U. S. C.  §2020(c)(1)  (Supplemental  Nutrition

Assistance Program)

  8 U. S. C. §1152(a)(1)(A) (Immigration; Numer-
ical Limitations on Individual Foreign States)

  8 U. S. C. §1187(c)(6) (Visa Waiver Program for

Certain Visitors)

  8  U. S. C.  §1522(a)(5)  (Authorization  for  Pro-
grams for Domestic Resettlement of and Assis-
tance to Refugees)

  10 U. S. C. §932(b)(4) (Uniform Code of Military

Justice; Article 132 Retaliation)

  10  U. S. C.  §1034(j)(3)  (Protected  Communica-
tions;  Prohibition  of  Retaliatory  Personnel  Ac-
tions)

  12  U. S. C.  §302  (Directors  of  Federal  Reserve

Banks; Number of Members; Classes)

  12  U. S. C.  §1735f–5(a)  (Prohibition  Against
Discrimination on Account of Sex in Extension
of Mortgage Assistance)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely referencing specific sections of the United States Code. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it is not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

INDEX

1315

TAKING OF PROPERTY. See Constitutional Law, IX.

TAXES.

State and local ad valorem taxes—Reservation land.—State and local
governments may impose ad valorem taxes on reservation land that was
make alienable by Congress and sold to non-Indians, but was later re-
purchased by tribe. Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indi-
ans, p. 103.

TEACHER-STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT. See Education

Amendments of 1972.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS. See Communications Act of 1934.

TITLE DISPUTES. See Jurisdiction, 1.

TITLE IX. See Education Amendments of 1972.

TITLE VII. See Civil Rights Act of 1964.

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT. See Communica-

tions Act of 1934.

TRUST ACCOUNTS. See Constitutional Law, IX, 2.

VAGUENESS. See Constitutional Law, V.

VENUE. See Criminal Law, 4.

VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT. See

Civil Rights Act of 1964.

VOTERS. See Standing to Sue, 2.

WORDS AND PHRASES.

1. “Carries a ﬁrearm.”

18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). Muscarello v. United

States, p. 125.

2. “First becomes . . . covered.” Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 29 U. S. C. § 1162(2)(D)(i). Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp.,
p. 74.

3. “Operated.”

§ 107(a)(2), Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U. S. C. § 9507(a)(2). United
States v. Bestfoods, p. 51.

4. “Physical . . . impairment that substantially limits one or more of
[an individual’s] major life activities.” Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, 42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A). Bragdon v. Abbott, p. 624.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document. It lists topics and corresponding page numbers.  Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and provide a guide to the document's contents rather than the content itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1224

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

INDEX TO RULES

Rule

ABATEMENT—See Death

ADMISSION TO BAR

Application forms ..........................................................  5.2

Certiﬁcate of admission ...............................................  5.3, 5.6

Certiﬁcate of good standing........................................  5.6

Criminal Justice Act of 1964 .......................................  9.1

Documents required .....................................................  5.2

Duplicate certiﬁcate......................................................  5.6

Fees..................................................................................  5.5, 5.6

Oath or afﬁrmation, form of........................................  5.4

Open Court, admission in ............................................  5.3

Qualiﬁcations..................................................................  5.1

AFFIDAVIT

In forma pauperis proceedings .................................  39.1, 39.2
Service by nonmember of Bar....................................  29.5(c)

AMICUS CURIAE

Argument........................................................................  28.7

Briefs at petition stage

—Consent of parties to ﬁle .................................  37.2
—Copies, number to be ﬁled ..............................  33.1(f)
—Cover color .........................................................  33.1(g)(x)
—Cover, identiﬁcation of party supported ......  37.2(a)
—Documents,  format  and  general  require

ments ...............................................................  33, 34
—Notice of intent to ﬁle ......................................  37.2(a)
—Preparation  and  submission  costs,  identi

ﬁcation of sources paying ............................  37.6

—Purpose ...............................................................  37.1

—Service.................................................................  37.5

—Time to ﬁle  ........................................................  37.2

—Word limits  ........................................................  33.1(g)(x)

Briefs on merits

—Consent of parties to ﬁle .................................  37.3
—Copies, number to be ﬁled ..............................  33.1(f)
—Cover color .........................................................  33.1(g)(xi), (xii)
—Cover, identiﬁcation of party supported  .....  37.2(a)
—Documents,  format  and  general  require

ments ...............................................................  33, 34
—Electronic submission  .....................................  37.3(a)
—Preparation  and  submission  costs,  identi

ﬁcation of sources paying ............................  37.6
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index to the rules of the Supreme Court, not the actual content of the rules themselves. Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and are generally not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1064

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 30, 2009

558 U. S.

nied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or
decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  80.

No.  09–6609.  Dixon  v.  Grant  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consider
ation  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–6645.  Williams  v.  Jones,  Superintendent,  Hyde
Correctional  Institution.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  before
judgment  denied.

No.  09–6738.  Jones  v.  Scribner,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  before  judgment  denied.

No.  09–7146.  Reyes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consider
ation  or  decision  of  this  petition.

Rehearing  Denied

No.  08–1172.  Nacchio  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  815;

No.  08–1348.  Railsback  v.  Washington,  ante,  p.  817;

No.  08–1421.  Van  Auken  v.  Catron,  Catron  &  Pottow,

P.  A.,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  819;

No.  08–1485.  Brown  et  al.  v.  One  Beacon  Insurance  Co.,

Inc.,  ante,  p.  822;

sioner,  ante,  p.  823;

No.  08–1491.  Wagenknecht  v.  Levin,  Ohio  Tax  Commis

No.  08–1533.  Mehen  v.  Delta  Air  Lines,  Inc.,  et  al.,  ante,

p.  824;

No.  08–1576.  Linam  v.  Linam,  ante,  p.  827;
No.  08–9887.  Sampath v.  Concurrent Technologies  Corp.,

ante,  p.  830;

No. 08–10257.  Hawkins v.  Hamlet, Ltd., et al., ante, p. 835;
No.  08–10358.  Swift  v.  Stanford,  ante,  p.  837;
No.  08–10361.  Monacelli  v.  UPS  Store  et  al.,  ante,  p.  837;
No.  08–10431.  Davis  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion,  ante,  p.  839;

No.  08–10444.  Ware  v.  Laney  et  al.,  ante,  p.  840;
No.  08–10451.  O’Kelley  v.  Hall,  Warden,  ante,  p.  840;
No.  08–10497.  Dorsey  v.  Coleman,  Superintendent,  Fay

ette  State  Correctional  Institution,  ante,  p.  841;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case summaries from a legal document, likely the Supreme Court's docket. It includes case numbers, parties involved, circuit courts, and disposition information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

Syllabus

that an employer could refuse to hire a gay or transgender individual
without learning that person’s sex.  By intentionally setting out a rule
that makes hiring turn on sex, the employer violates the law, whatever
he might know or not know about individual applicants.  The employ-
ers also stress that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct
concepts from sex, and that if Congress wanted to address these mat-
ters in Title VII, it would have referenced them specifically.  But when
Congress  chooses  not  to  include  any  exceptions  to  a  broad  rule,  this
Court applies the broad rule.  Finally, the employers suggest that be-
cause  the  policies  at  issue  have  the  same  adverse  consequences  for
men  and  women,  a  stricter  causation  test  should  apply.    That  argu-
ment  unavoidably  comes  down  to  a  suggestion  that  sex  must  be  the
sole or primary cause of an adverse employment action under Title VII,
a suggestion at odds with the statute.  Pp. 16–23.

(2) The employers contend that few in 1964 would have expected
Title  VII  to  apply  to  discrimination  against  homosexual  and
transgender  persons.   But  legislative  history  has  no  bearing  here,
where  no  ambiguity  exists  about  how  Title  VII’s  terms  apply  to  the
facts.  See Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 574.  While it
is possible that a statutory term that means one thing today or in one
context might have meant something else at the time of its adoption
or might mean something different in another context, the employers
do not seek to use historical sources to illustrate that the meaning of
any of Title VII’s language has changed since 1964 or that the statute’s
terms ordinarily carried some missed message.  Instead, they seem to
say when a new application is both unexpected and important, even if
it is clearly commanded by existing law, the Court should merely point
out the question, refer the subject back to Congress, and decline to en-
force the law’s plain terms in the meantime.  This Court has long re-
jected  that  sort  of  reasoning.    And  the  employers’  new  framing  may
only add new problems and leave the Court with more than a little law
to overturn.  Finally, the employers turn to naked policy appeals, sug-
gesting that the Court proceed without the law’s guidance to do what
it thinks best.  That is an invitation that no court should ever take up.
Pp. 23–33.

No. 17–1618, 723 Fed. Appx. 964, reversed and remanded; No. 17–1623,

883 F. 3d 100, and No. 18–107, 884 F. 3d 560, affirmed.

GORSUCH, J., delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  ALITO,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.  KAVANAUGH,
J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1126

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

No. 09–7469.  Cook v.  Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–7483.  Nowlin  v.  Hamrick,  Warden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7484.  Vasquez  v.  Kirkland,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  1029.

No.  09–7487.  Mendoza  v.  Steele,  Warden.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7488.  Avila v.  California.  Sup. Ct. Cal.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  46  Cal.  4th  680,  208  P.  3d  634.

No.  09–7490.  Warfield  v.  Grams,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  227.

No.  09–7504.  H.  R.  v.  Alameda  County  Social  Services

Agency.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st  App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7507.  Allison  v.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–7508.  Backus  v.  Hartley,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.
10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  346  Fed.  Appx.
336.

No.  09–7513.  Brown  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  5th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7520.  Barber  v.  Walker,  Warden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7523.  Watson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7539.  Boctor v.  Department of Veterans Affairs.
C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.
Appx.  625.

No. 09–7548.  Embry  v.  United States.  C. A.  7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  187.
  </content>
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This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
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Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

at  63–64.    It  seems  the  District’s  superintendent  first
learned of them only in September 2015, after an employee
from  another  school  commented  positively  on  the  school’s
practices to Bremerton’s principal.  See id., at 109, 229.  At
that point, the District reacted quickly.  On September 17,
the  superintendent  sent  Mr.  Kennedy  a  letter.  In  it,  the
superintendent  identified  “two  problematic  practices”  in
which Mr. Kennedy had engaged.  App. 40.  First, Mr. Ken-
nedy  had  provided  “inspirational  talk[s]”  that  included
“overtly  religious  references”  likely  constituting  “prayer”
with the students “at midfield following the completion of
. . . game[s].”  Ibid.  Second, he had led “students and coach-
ing staff in a prayer” in the locker-room tradition that “pre-
dated [his] involvement with the program.”  Id., at 41.

The District explained that it sought to establish “clear
parameters” “going forward.”  Ibid.  It instructed Mr. Ken-
nedy to avoid any motivational “talks with students” that
“include[d]  religious  expression,  including  prayer,”  and  to
avoid “suggest[ing], encourag[ing] (or discourag[ing]), or su-
pervis[ing]”  any  prayers  of  students,  which  students  re-
mained  free  to  “engage  in.”  Id.,  at  44.  The  District  also
explained that any religious activity on Mr. Kennedy’s part
must be “nondemonstrative (i.e., not outwardly discernible
as religious activity)” if “students are also engaged in reli-
gious conduct” in order to “avoid the perception of endorse-
ment.”  Id., at 45.  In offering these directives, the District
appealed  to  what  it  called  a  “direct  tension  between”  the
“Establishment Clause” and “a school employee’s [right to]
free[ly]  exercise”  his  religion.  Id.,  at  43.  To  resolve  that
“tension,”  the  District  explained,  an  employee’s  free  exer-
cise rights “must yield so far as necessary to avoid school
endorsement of religious activities.”  Ibid.

After  receiving  the  District’s  September  17  letter,  Mr.
Kennedy  ended  the  tradition,  predating  him,  of  offering
locker-room prayers.  Id., at 40–41, 77, 170–172.  He also
ended  his  practice  of  incorporating  religious references or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically the opinion of the court in a case. It discusses the actions of a school employee and the school district's response to his religious practices.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
26  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting

The only way out of this morass—for all of us—is to stare
at racial disparity unblinkingly, and then do what evidence
and experts tell us is required to level the playing field and
march forward together, collectively striving to achieve true
equality  for  all  Americans.  It  is  no  small  irony  that  the
judgment the majority hands down today will forestall the
end  of  race-based  disparities  in  this  country,  making  the
colorblind world the majority wistfully touts much more dif-
ficult to accomplish.

*

*

*

As the Civil War neared its conclusion, General William
T. Sherman and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton convened
a meeting of Black leaders in Savannah, Georgia.  During
the meeting, someone asked Garrison Frazier, the group’s
spokesperson, what “freedom” meant to him.  He answered,
“ ‘placing us where we could reap the fruit of our own labor,
and take care of ourselves . . . to have land, and turn it and

——————
ment,” ante, at 51.  JUSTICE THOMAS’s opinion also demonstrates an ob-
session with race consciousness that far outstrips my or UNC’s holistic
understanding that race can be a factor that affects applicants’ unique
life experiences.  How else can one explain his detection of “an organizing
principle based on race,” a claim that our society is “fundamentally rac-
ist,” and a desire for Black “victimhood” or racial “silo[s],” ante, at 49–52,
in  this  dissent’s  approval  of  an  admissions  program  that  advances  all
Americans’ shared pursuit of true equality by treating race “on par with”
other aspects of identity, supra, at 18?  JUSTICE THOMAS ignites too many
more straw men to list, or fully extinguish, here.  The takeaway is that
those who demand that no one think about race (a classic pink-elephant
paradox) refuse to see, much less solve for, the elephant in the room—
the race-linked disparities that continue to impede achievement of our
great Nation’s full potential.  Worse still, by insisting that obvious truths
be ignored, they prevent our problem-solving institutions from directly
addressing  the  real  import  and  impact  of  “social  racism”  and
“government-imposed  racism,”  ante,  at  55  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring),
thereby deterring our collective progression toward becoming a society
where race no longer matters.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses issues of racial disparity and affirmative action in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN

874

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Opinion of the Court

has thus refused to read general “saving” provisions to toler-
ate actual conﬂict both in cases involving impossibility, see,
e. g., AT&T, 524 U. S., at 228, and in “frustration-of-purpose”
cases, see, e. g., Locke, ante, at 103–112; International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U. S. 481, 493–494 (1987); see also Chi-
cago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,
450 U. S. 311, 328–331 (1981). We see no grounds, then,
for attempting to distinguish among types of federal-state
conﬂict for purposes of analyzing whether such a conﬂict
warrants pre-emption in a particular case. That kind of
analysis, moreover, would engender legal uncertainty with
its inevitable systemwide costs (e. g., conﬂicts, delay, and
expense) as courts tried sensibly to distinguish among varie-
ties of “conﬂict” (which often shade, one into the other)
when applying this complicated rule to the many federal
statutes that contain some form of an express pre-emption
provision, a saving provision, or as here, both. Nothing in
the statute suggests Congress wanted to complicate ordinary
experience-proved principles of conﬂict pre-emption with an
added “special burden.”
Indeed, the dissent’s willingness to
impose a “special burden” here stems ultimately from its
view that “frustration-of-purpos[e]” conﬂict pre-emption is a
freewheeling, “inadequately considered” doctrine that might
well be “eliminate[d].” Post, at 907–908, and n. 22.
In a
word, ordinary pre-emption principles, grounded in long-
standing precedent, Hines, supra, at 67, apply. We would
not further complicate the law with complex new doctrine.

IV

The basic question, then, is whether a common-law “no
airbag” action like the one before us actually conﬂicts with
FMVSS 208. We hold that it does.

In petitioners’ and the dissent’s view, FMVSS 208 sets a
minimum airbag standard. As far as FMVSS 208 is con-
cerned, the more airbags, and the sooner, the better. But
that was not the Secretary’s view. The Department of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's decision. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and discusses the interpretation of a federal safety standard (FMVSS 208).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

EGBERT v. BOULE

Opinion of the Court

Fifth  Amendment  sex-discrimination  claim,  see  Davis  v.
Passman,  442  U. S.  228  (1979);  and  second,  for  a  federal
prisoner’s inadequate-care claim under the Eighth Amend-
ment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980).

Since  these  cases,  the  Court  has  not  implied  additional
causes of action under the Constitution.  Now long past “the
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law pow-
ers  to  create  causes  of  action,”  Malesko,  534  U. S.,  at  75
(Scalia, J., concurring), we have come “to appreciate more
fully  the  tension  between”  judicially  created  causes  of  ac-
tion and “the Constitution’s separation of legislative and ju-
dicial power,” Hernández, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5).
At  bottom,  creating  a  cause  of  action  is  a  legislative  en-
deavor.  Courts engaged in that unenviable task must eval-
uate a “range of policy considerations . . . at least as broad
as the range . . . a legislature would consider.”  Bivens, 403
U. S., at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment); see also
post,  at  2  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).    Those
factors include “economic and governmental concerns,” “ad-
ministrative costs,” and the “impact on governmental oper-
ations systemwide.”  Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___, ___ (slip op.,
at 10, 13).  Unsurprisingly, Congress is “far more competent
than  the  Judiciary”  to  weigh  such  policy  considerations.
Schweiker, 487 U. S., at 423.  And the Judiciary’s authority
to do so at all is, at best, uncertain.  See, e.g., Hernández,
589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).

Nonetheless,  rather  than  dispense  with  Bivens  alto-
gether, we have emphasized that recognizing a cause of ac-
tion under Bivens is “a disfavored judicial activity.”  Ziglar,
582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Hernández, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).  When  asked  to  imply  a
Bivens action, “our watchword is caution.”  Id., at ___ (slip
op., at 6).  “[I]f there are sound reasons to think Congress
might  doubt  the  efficacy  or  necessity  of  a  damages  rem-
edy[,]  the  courts  must  refrain  from  creating  [it].”    Ziglar,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the implications of Bivens actions and the Court's approach to creating new causes of action. It's part of a larger legal argument and contains legal citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES

Syllabus

GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and the start of a syllabus.  Syllabi are typically not considered part of the main body text of a legal document and are not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v.
MORRISSEY-BERRU
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

in  Catholic  pedagogy  (or  even  religion).    Morrissey-Berru
had no such credentials when the school hired her, as she
held a bachelor’s degree in English language arts with a mi-
nor in secondary education.  App. 73–74.  Many years after
Morrissey-Berru had begun teaching at the school, though,
the school did ask her to attend a catechist course on the
history  of  the  Catholic  Church.  769  Fed.  Appx.  460,  461
(CA9  2019)  (per curiam)  (opinion  below  in  No.  19–267);
App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–267, at 85a.  The record does
not  disclose  whether  Morrissey-Berru  ever  completed  the
full  catechism-certification  program,  and  in  fact  suggests
that she did not.  E.g., Excerpts of Record in No. 17–56624
(CA9), pp. 41–42, 44–45, 67.

Morrissey-Berru  taught  her  class  a  range  of  subjects:
reading, writing, math, grammar, vocabulary, science, so-
cial studies, and religion.  App. 75.  When teaching religion,
Morrissey-Berru  followed  the  contents  of  a  preselected
workbook.  App. 79–80.  Morrissey-Berru also “led her stu-
dents in daily prayer” and assisted with planning a monthly
mass.  769  Fed.  Appx.,  at  461.  But  she  did  not  recall
“lead[ing her] students in any devotional exercises.”  App.
to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–267, at 89a.

In  2014,  when  Morrissey-Berru  was  in  her  sixties,  the
school  did  not  renew  Morrissey-Berru’s  contract.    Id.,  at
30a–31a.  Like St. James, Our Lady of Guadalupe School
has neither cited nor asserted a religious reason for the ter-
mination.

B
On  these  records,  the  Ninth  Circuit  correctly  concluded
that neither school had shown that the ministerial excep-
tion barred the teachers’ claims for disability and age dis-
crimination.  At the very least, these cases should have pro-
ceeded to trial.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the
teachers, the facts do not entitle the employers to summary
judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the case of Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and the application of the ministerial exception.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

788

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment

False Claims Act does not subject a State (or state agency)
to liability in such actions. The judgment of the Second
Circuit is reversed.

Justice Breyer, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court in full.

opinion of Justice Ginsburg.

It is so ordered.

I also join the

Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joins,

concurring in the judgment.

I join the Court’s judgment and here state the extent to

which I subscribe to the Court’s opinion.

I agree with the Court that the qui tam relator is prop-
erly regarded as an assignee of a portion of the Govern-
ment’s claim for damages. See ante, at 773. And I agree,
most vitally, that “Article III’s restriction of the judicial
power to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’
is properly under-
stood to mean ‘cases and controversies of the sort tradi-
tionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’ ”
Ante, at 774. On that key matter, I again agree that his-
tory’s pages place the qui tam suit safely within the “case”
or “controversy” category. See ante, at 774–778.

In Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S.
83 (1998), I reasoned that if Congress did not authorize a
citizen suit, a court should dismiss the citizen suitor’s com-
plaint without opining “on the constitutionality of what Con-
Id., at 134 (opinion
gress might have done, but did not do.”
concurring in judgment).
I therefore agree that the Court
properly turns ﬁrst to the statutory question here presented:
Did Congress authorize qui tam suits against the States.
Concluding that Congress did not authorize such suits, the
Court has no cause to engage in an Eleventh Amendment
inquiry, and appropriately leaves that issue open.

I do not ﬁnd in the False Claims Act any clear statement
subjecting the States to qui tam suits brought by private
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens.  It is sequential text and contains legal reasoning, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

3

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

of  fact  or  of  law,  the  resolution  of  which  will  advance  the
determination of the class members’ claims.3

B
The  District  Court,  recognizing  that  “one  significant  is-
sue common to the class may be sufficient to warrant cer-
tification,”  222  F. R. D.  137,  145  (ND  Cal.  2004),  found
that the plaintiffs easily met that test.  Absent an error of
law or an abuse of discretion, an appellate tribunal has no
warrant to upset the District Court’s finding of commonal-
ity.  See  Califano  v.  Yamasaki,  442  U. S.  682,  703  (1979)
(“[M]ost  issues  arising under  Rule  23  . . .  [are]  committed
in  the  first  instance  to  the  discretion  of  the  district
court.”).

The  District  Court  certified  a  class  of  “[a]ll  women  em-
ployed  at  any  Wal-Mart  domestic  retail  store  at  any  time
since  December  26,  1998.”  222  F. R. D.,  at  141–143  (in-
ternal  quotation  marks  omitted).  The  named  plaintiffs,
led  by  Betty  Dukes,  propose  to  litigate,  on  behalf  of  the
class, allegations that Wal-Mart discriminates on the basis
of  gender  in  pay  and  promotions.   They  allege  that  the
company  “[r]eli[es]  on  gender  stereotypes  in  making  em-
ployment  decisions  such  as  . . .  promotion[s]  [and]  pay.”
App.  55a.  Wal-Mart  permits  those  prejudices  to  infect
personnel decisions, the plaintiffs contend, by leaving pay
and promotions in the hands of “a nearly all male manage-
rial  workforce”  using  “arbitrary  and  subjective  criteria.”
Ibid.  Further  alleged  barriers  to  the  advancement  of
female employees include the company’s requirement, “as
a  condition  of  promotion  to  management  jobs,  that  em-

——————

3 The Court suggests Rule 23(a)(2) must mean more than it says.  See
ante, at 8–10.  If the word “questions” were taken literally, the majority
asserts,  plaintiffs  could  pass  the  Rule  23(a)(2)  bar  by  “[r]eciting  . . .
questions” like “Do all of us plaintiffs indeed work for Wal-Mart?”  Ante,
at  9.  Sensibly  read,  however,  the  word  “questions”  means  disputed
issues, not any utterance crafted in the grammatical form of a question.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. It discusses the legal standard for class certification and the arguments made by the plaintiffs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC. v. BUSK

Opinion of the Court

Opinion Letter the Department issued in 1951.  The letter
found  noncompensable  a  preshift  security  search  of  em-
ployees  in  a  rocket-powder  plant  “ ‘for  matches,  spark
producing  devices  such  as  cigarette  lighters,  and  other
items  which  have  a  direct  bearing  on  the  safety  of  the
employees,’ ”  as  well  as  a  postshift  security  search  of  the
employees  done  “ ‘for  the  purpose  of  preventing  theft.’ ”
Opinion Letter from Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour Div.,
to  Dept.  of  Army,  Office  of  Chief  of  Ordnance  (Apr.  18,
1951), pp. 1–2 (available in Clerk of Court’s case file).  The
Department  drew  no  distinction  between  the  searches
conducted  for  the  safety  of  the  employees  and  those  con-
ducted  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  theft—neither  were
compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act.

B
The  Court  of  Appeals  erred  by  focusing  on  whether  an
employer required a particular activity.  The integral and
indispensable  test  is  tied  to  the  productive  work  that  the
employee is employed to perform.  See, e.g., IBP, 546 U. S.,
at  42;  Mitchell,  supra,  at  262;  Steiner,  350  U. S.,  at  249–
251;  see  also  29  CFR  §790.8(a)  (explaining  that  the  term
“principal  activities”  was  “considered  sufficiently  broad  to
embrace  within  its  terms  such  activities  as  are  indispen-
sable  to  the  performance  of  productive  work”  (internal
quotation  marks  omitted;  emphasis  added));  §790.8(c)
(“Among  the  activities  included  as  an  integral  part  of  a
principal activity are those closely related activities which
are indispensable to its performance” (emphasis added)).

If  the  test  could  be  satisfied  merely  by  the  fact  that  an
employer required an activity, it would sweep into “princi-
pal  activities”  the  very  activities  that  the  Portal-to-Portal
Act  was  designed  to  address.    The  employer  in  Anderson,
for  instance,  required  its  employees  to  walk  “from  a
timeclock  near  the  factory  gate  to  a  workstation”  so  that
they  could  “begin  their  work,”  “but  it  is  indisputable  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing a case related to employee compensation under the Portal-to-Portal Act. It cites previous legal cases and regulations, indicating it's part of a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

MURTHY v. MISSOURI

ALITO, J., dissenting

In short, when Hines sued in August 2022, there was still
a link between the White House and the injuries she was
presently suffering and could reasonably expect to suffer in
the future.  That is enough for traceability.

C
Redressability.  Finally, Hines was required to show that
the  threat  of  future  injury  she  faced  when  the  complaint
was  filed  “likely  would  be  redressed”  by  injunctive  relief.
FDA  v.  Alliance  for  Hippocratic  Medicine,  602  U. S.  367,
380 (2024).  This required proof that a preliminary injunc-
tion would reduce Hines’s “risk of [future] harm . . . to some
extent.”  Massachusetts  v.  EPA,  549  U. S.  497,  526  (2007)
(emphasis added).  And as we recently explained, “[t]he sec-
ond  and  third  standing  requirements—causation  and  re-
dressability—are often ‘flip sides of the same coin.’ ”  Alli-
ance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S., at 380.  Therefore,
“[i]f a defendant’s action causes an injury, enjoining the ac-
tion  or  awarding  damages  for  the  action  will  typically  re-
dress that injury.”  Id., at 381.

Hines easily satisfied that requirement.  For the reasons
just explained, there is ample proof that Hines’s past inju-
ries were a “predictable effect” of the Government’s censor-
ship campaign, and the preliminary injunction was likely to
prevent the continuation of the harm to at least “some ex-
tent.”  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S., at 526.

The Court disagrees because Facebook “remain[s] free to
enforce  . . .  even  those  [policies]  tainted  by  initial  govern-
mental coercion.”  Ante, at 26.  But as with traceability, the
Court applies a new and elevated standard for redressabil-
ity, which has never required plaintiffs to be “certain” that
a  court  order  would  prevent  future  harm.    Larson  v.
Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 243–244, n. 15 (1982).  In Massachu-
setts v. EPA, for example, no one could say that the relief
sought—reconsideration  by  the  EPA  of  its  decision  not  to
regulate the emission of greenhouse gases—would actually
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Murthy v. Missouri. It discusses the legal concepts of traceability and redressability in the context of standing to sue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 61 (2000)

63

Opinion of the Court

General Robinson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and
Deborah Watson.

Beverly Van Ness argued the cause and ﬁled a brief for

respondent.*

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we consider whether it was constitutional
for a prosecutor, in her summation, to call the jury’s atten-
tion to the fact that the defendant had the opportunity to
hear all other witnesses testify and to tailor his testimony
accordingly.

I

Respondent’s trial on 19 sodomy and assault counts and
3 weapons counts ultimately came down to a credibility de-
termination. The alleged victim, Nessa Winder, and her
friend, Breda Keegan, testiﬁed that respondent physically
assaulted, raped, and orally and anally sodomized Winder,
and that he threatened both women with a handgun. Re-
spondent testiﬁed that he and Winder had engaged in con-
sensual vaginal intercourse. He further testiﬁed that dur-
ing an argument he had with Winder, he struck her once in
the face. He denied raping her or threatening either woman
with a handgun.

During summation, defense counsel charged Winder and
Keegan with lying. The prosecutor similarly focused on the
credibility of the witnesses. She stressed respondent’s in-
terest in the outcome of the trial, his prior felony conviction,
and his prior bad acts. She argued that respondent was a
“smooth slick character . . . who had an answer for every-

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson;
and for the New York State District Attorneys Association by William J.
Fitzpatrick, Steven A. Hovani, and Michael J. Miller.

Deanne E. Maynard and Lisa Kemler ﬁled a brief for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging
afﬁrmance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the beginning of the Court's analysis of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  547 U. S. ____ (2006)

5

Opinion of the Court

with  the  principles  of  equity  adopted  by  Congress.    The
court’s categorical rule is also in tension with Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 422–
430  (1908),  which  rejected  the  contention  that  a  court  of
equity  has  no  jurisdiction  to  grant  injunctive  relief  to  a
patent  holder  who  has  unreasonably  declined  to  use  the
patent.

In  reversing  the  District  Court,  the  Court  of  Appeals
departed  in  the  opposite  direction  from  the  four-factor
test.  The  court  articulated  a  “general  rule,”  unique  to
patent  disputes,  “that  a  permanent  injunction  will  issue
once infringement and validity have been adjudged.”  401
F. 3d,  at  1338.  The  court  further  indicated  that  injunc-
tions  should  be  denied  only  in  the  “unusual”  case,  under
“exceptional circumstances” and “ ‘in rare instances . . . to
protect  the  public  interest.’ ”    Id.,  at  1338–1339.    Just  as
the District Court erred in its categorical denial of injunc-
tive  relief,  the  Court  of  Appeals  erred  in  its  categorical
grant of such relief.  Cf. Roche Products v. Bolar Pharma-
ceutical Co., 733 F. 2d 858, 865 (CAFed 1984) (recognizing
the  “considerable  discretion”  district  courts  have  “in  de-
termining  whether  the  facts  of  a  situation  require  it  to
issue an injunction”).

Because  we  conclude  that  neither  court  below  correctly
applied the traditional four-factor framework that governs
the  award  of  injunctive  relief,  we  vacate  the  judgment  of
the Court of Appeals, so that the District Court may apply
that framework in the first instance.  In doing so, we take
no position on whether permanent injunctive relief should
or should not issue in this particular case, or indeed in any
number  of  other  disputes  arising  under  the  Patent  Act.
We  hold  only  that  the  decision  whether  to  grant  or  deny
injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the
district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised
consistent  with  traditional  principles  of  equity,  in  patent
disputes  no  less  than  in  other  cases  governed  by  such
standards.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the awarding of injunctions in patent disputes. It delves into legal precedents and principles, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 382, 327 P. 3d 129, 148 (2014).  Alt-
hough  the  statute’s  language  suggests  that  an  “aggrieved
employee”  sues  “on  behalf  of  himself  or  herself  and  other
current  or  former  employees,”  §2699(a),  California  prece-
dent holds that a PAGA suit is a “ ‘representative action’ ”
in which the employee plaintiff sues as an “ ‘agent or proxy’ ”
of the State.  Id., at 380, 327 P. 3d, at 147 (quoting Arias v.
Superior  Court,  46  Cal.  4th  969,  986,  209  P. 3d  923,  933
(2009)).

As  the  California  courts  conceive  of  it,  the  State  “is  al-
ways  the  real  party  in interest  in the  suit.”   Iskanian,  59
Cal. 4th, at 382, 327 P. 3d, at 148.2  The primary function
of PAGA is to delegate a power to employees to assert “the
same  legal  right  and  interest  as  state  law  enforcement
agencies,” Arias, 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933.  In
other words, the statute gives employees a right to assert

——————

2 The extent to which PAGA plaintiffs truly act as agents of the State
rather than complete assignees is disputed.  See Magadia v. Wal-Mart
Assocs., Inc., 999 F. 3d 668, 677 (CA9 2021) (holding that PAGA “lacks
the procedural controls necessary to ensure that California” retains “sub-
stantial  authority  over  the  case”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).
Agency requires control.  See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 713
(2013).  But apart from the exhaustion process, the statute does not fea-
ture any explicit control mechanisms, such as provisions authorizing the
State to intervene or requiring its approval of settlements.

That  said,  California  precedent  strongly  suggests  that  the  State  re-
tains inherent authority to manage PAGA actions.  There is no other ob-
vious way to understand California precedent’s description of the State
as the “real party in interest.”  See generally 1A Cal. Jur. 3d Actions §31
(real-party-in-interest status is based on ownership and control over the
cause of action).  And a theory of total assignment appears inconsistent
with  the  fact  that  employees  have  no  assignable  interest  in  a  PAGA
claim.  See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Supe-
rior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1002, 209 P. 3d 937, 943
(2009)  (Amalgamated  Transit);  see  also  Turrieta  v.  Lyft,  Inc.,  69  Cal.
App.  5th  955,  972,  284  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  767,  780  (2021)  (The  employee’s
“ability to file PAGA claims on behalf of the state does not convert the
state’s interest into their own or render them real parties in interest”).
For purposes of this opinion, we assume that PAGA plaintiffs are agents.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the nature of PAGA (Private Attorneys General Act) lawsuits in California. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding whether PAGA plaintiffs are true agents of the state or complete assignees of claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

IANCU v. BRUNETTI

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

I
Trademark  registration,  as  the  majority  notes,  is  not
required for using, owning, or suing others for infringing a
trademark.  Rather, the trademark-registration system is
an ancillary system set up by the Government that confers
a small number of noncash benefits on trademark-holders
who register their marks.  See ante, at 2.

The Government need not provide this largely commer-
cial benefit at all.  Once the Government does provide the
benefit, however, it may not restrict access on the basis of
the  viewpoint  expressed  by  the  relevant  mark.    See  ante,
at  4–5.  For  that  reason,  the  Court  concluded  in  Matal  v.
Tam, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), that §1052(a)’s provision direct-
ing the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to deny
registration to “disparag[ing]” trademarks was unconstitu-
tional.  This  case  centers  on  a  neighboring  set  of  re-
strictions:  §1052(a)’s  provision  barring  registration  of
marks featuring “immoral . . . or scandalous matter.”

The  majority  finds  viewpoint  discrimination  here  by
treating the terms “scandalous” and “immoral” as compris-
ing a unified standard that allows messages “aligned with
conventional moral standards” but forbids messages “hos-
tile to” such standards.  See  ante, at 6.  While the major-
ity’s interpretation of the statute is a reasonable one, it is
not the only reasonable one.

A

As  the  majority  notes,  there  are  dictionary  definitions
for  both  “immoral”  and  “scandalous”  that  do  suggest  a
viewpoint-discriminatory meaning.  See ante, at 5–6.  And
as for the word “immoral,” I agree with the majority that
there  is  no  tenable  way  to  read  it  that  would  ameliorate
the  problem.  The  word  clearly  connotes  a  preference  for
“rectitude and morality” over its opposite.  See ante, at 5.

It  is  with  regard  to  the  word  “scandalous”  that  I  part
ways with the majority.  Unquestionably, “scandalous” can
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor in the case of Iancu v. Brunetti.  It discusses the constitutionality of trademark restrictions based on "immoral" or "scandalous" content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of the Court

Allowing  §315(b)  appeals  would  tug  against  that  objec-
tive,  wasting  the  resources  spent  resolving  patentability
and leaving bad patents enforceable.  A successful §315(b)
appeal would terminate in vacatur of the agency’s decision;
in lieu of enabling judicial review of patentability, vacatur
would  unwind  the  agency’s  merits  decision.   See  Cuozzo,
579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8).  And because a patent owner
would need to appeal on §315(b) untimeliness grounds only
if  she  could  not  prevail  on  patentability,  §315(b)  appeals
would operate to save bad patent claims.  This case illus-
trates the dynamic.  The agency held Click-to-Call’s patent
claims invalid, and Click-to-Call does not contest that hold-
ing.  It resists only the agency’s institution decision, mind-
ful  that  if  the  institution  decision  is  reversed,  then  the
agency’s  work  will  be  undone  and  the  canceled  patent
claims resurrected.

Other features of the statutory design confirm that Con-
gress prioritized patentability over §315(b)’s timeliness re-
quirement.  A petitioner’s failure to satisfy §315(b) does not
prevent the agency from conducting inter partes review of
the challenged patent claims; the agency can do so at an-
other petitioner’s request.  §311(a).  Nor does failure to sat-
isfy §315(b) prevent the original initiator from participating
on the merits; the §315(b)-barred party can join a proceed-
ing initiated by another petitioner.  §315(b), (c).  And once
inter partes review is instituted, the agency may issue a fi-
nal written decision even “[i]f no petitioner remains in the
inter partes review.”  §317(a).  It is unsurprising that a stat-
utory scheme so consistently elevating resolution of patent-
ability above a petitioner’s compliance with §315(b) would
exclude §315(b) appeals, thereby preserving the Board’s ad-
judication of the merits.

——————
honest count on first view, but a jaundiced one on second look?  See post,
at 19–20.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the implications of appeals related to timeliness requirements in patent proceedings. It delves into the legislative intent and structure of relevant sections of the law, arguing against allowing appeals based on timeliness.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

17

Opinion of the Court

By contrast, in Lane a public employer sought to termi-
nate an employee after he testified at a criminal trial about
matters involving his government employment.  573 U. S.,
at 233.  The Court held that the employee’s speech was pro-
tected by the First Amendment.  Id., at 231.  In doing so,
the Court held that the fact the speech touched on matters
related to public employment was not enough to render it
government  speech.  Id.,  at  239–240.    Instead,  the  Court
explained, the “critical question . . . is whether the speech
at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s
duties.”  Id.,  at  240.  It  is  an  inquiry  this  Court  has  said
should  be  undertaken  “practical[ly],”  rather  than  with  a
blinkered focus on the terms of some formal and capacious
written job description.  Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 424.  To pro-
ceed  otherwise  would  be  to  allow  public  employers  to  use
“excessively broad job descriptions” to subvert the Consti-
tution’s protections.  Ibid.

Applying these lessons here, it seems clear to us that Mr.
Kennedy  has  demonstrated  that  his  speech  was  private
speech,  not  government  speech.  When  Mr.  Kennedy  ut-
tered the three prayers that resulted in his suspension, he
was not engaged in speech “ordinarily within the scope” of
his duties as a coach.  Lane, 573 U. S., at 240.  He did not
speak pursuant to government policy.  He was not seeking
to convey a government-created message.  He was not in-
structing  players,  discussing  strategy,  encouraging  better
on-field  performance,  or  engaged  in  any  other  speech  the
District paid him to produce as a coach.  See Part I–B, su-
pra.    Simply  put:   Mr.  Kennedy’s  prayers  did  not  “ow[e
their] existence” to Mr. Kennedy’s responsibilities as a pub-
lic employee.  Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 421.

The timing and circumstances of Mr. Kennedy’s prayers
confirm the point.  During the postgame period when these
prayers occurred, coaches were free to attend briefly to per-
sonal matters—everything from checking sports scores on
their phones to greeting friends and family in the stands.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding whether the coach's prayers constituted government speech or private speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

THOMAS, J., dissenting

two  majority-minority  congressional  districts”—roughly
proportional control.  1 App. 135 (emphasis added); see also
id., at 314 (“Plaintiffs seek an order . . . ordering a congres-
sional redistricting plan that includes  two majority-Black
congressional districts”).
  Remarkably, the majority fails to acknowledge that two
minority-controlled  districts  would  mean  proportionality,
or  even  that  black  Alabamians  are  about  two-sevenths  of
the State.  Yet that context is critical to the issues before
us, not least because it explains the extent of the racial sort-
ing  the  plaintiffs’  goal  would  require.    “[A]s  a  matter  of
mathematics,” single-member districting “tends to deal out
representation  far  short  of  proportionality  to  virtually  all
minorities,  from  environmentalists  in  Alaska  to  Republi-
cans in Massachusetts.”  M. Duchin & D. Spencer, Models,
Race,  and  the  Law,  130  Yale  L. J.  Forum  744,  752 (2021)
(Duchin & Spencer).  As such, creating two majority-black
districts would require Alabama to aggressively “sort voters
on the basis of race.”  Wisconsin Legislature, 595 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 2).
  The plaintiffs’ 11 illustrative maps make that clear.  All
11 maps refashion existing District 2 into a majority-black
district while preserving the current black majority in Dis-
trict  7.    They  all  follow  the  same  approach:  Starting with
majority-black areas of populous Montgomery County, they

——————
heart of urban Birmingham.  See Supp. App. 207–208.  Of the Jefferson
County residents captured by the “finger,” 75.48% were black.  Wesch,
785 F. Supp., at 1569.  In the southeast, District 7 swallowed a jigsaw-
shaped  portion  of  Montgomery  County,  the  residents  of  which  were
80.18% black.  Id., at 1575.  Three years later, in Miller v. Johnson, 515
U. S. 900, 923–927 (1995), we rejected the “max-black” policy as unwar-
ranted by §5 and inconsistent with the Constitution.  But “much damage
to  the  States’  congressional  and  legislative  district  maps  had  already
been done,” including in Alabama.  Alabama Legislative Black Caucus,
575 U. S., at 299 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Allen v. Milligan. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

13

ALITO, J., dissenting

first ground adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Repsis—that
is, the ground that relied on Race Horse.  Ante, at 18, n. 5.
But nowhere in the decision below can any such limitation
be  found.  The  Wyoming  appellate  court  discussed  the
second ground for the Repsis judgment, see App. to Pet. for
Cert.  22  (“[T]he  creation  of  the  Big  Horn  National  Forest
resulted  in  the  ‘occupation’  of  the  land,  extinguishing  the
off-reservation  hunting  right”),  and  it  concluded  that  the
judgment  in  Repsis,  not  just  one  of  the  grounds  for  that
judgment,  “preclude[s]  Herrera  from  attempting  to  reliti-
gate  the  validity  of  the  off-reservation  hunting  right  that
was  previously  held  to  be  invalid,”  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.
31.6

2
Herrera  takes  a  different  approach  in  attempting  to
circumvent  the  effect  of  the  alternative  Repsis  ground.
When  a  judgment  rests  on  two  independently  sufficient

——————

6 The  decision  below,  in  other  words,  held  that  the  issue  that  was
precluded was whether members of the Crow Tribe have a treaty right
to  hunt  in  Bighorn.    The  majority  rejects  this  definition  of  the  issue,
and  instead  asks  only  whether  the  first  line  of  reasoning  in  Repsis
retains  preclusive  effect.    Such  hairsplitting  conflicts  with  the  funda-
mental  purpose  of  issue  preclusion—laying  legal  disputes  at  rest.    If
courts  allow  a  party  to  escape  preclusion  whenever  a  decision  on  one
legal  question  can  be  divided  into  multiple  or  alternate  parts,  the
doctrine of preclusion would lose its value.  The majority’s “[n]arrower
definition  of  the  issues  resolved  augments  the  risk  of  apparently
inconsistent  results”  and  undermines  the  objectives  of  finality  and
economy  served  by  preclusion.    18  C.  Wright,  A.  Miller,  &  E.  Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure §4417, p. 470 (3d ed. 2016).

The  Court  also  hints  that  the  state  court  might  have  thought  that
Wyoming  forfeited  reliance  on  issue  preclusion,  ante,  at  18,  n. 5,  but
there  is  no  basis  for  that  suggestion.    The  Wyoming  appellate  court
invited  the  parties  to  submit  supplemental  briefs  on  issue  preclusion
and  specifically  held  that  “it  [was]  proper  for  the  Court  to  raise  this
issue  sua  sponte  when  no  factual  development  is  required,  and  the
parties are given an opportunity to fully brief the issues.”  App. to Pet.
for Cert. 10, n. 2.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It cites a previous case (Repsis) and delves into legal arguments regarding issue preclusion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

GARZA v. IDAHO

THOMAS, J., dissenting

faulted  the  Ninth  Circuit  for  “fail[ing]  to  engage  in  the
circumstance-specific  reasonableness  inquiry  required  by
Strickland.”    528  U. S.,  at  478.    We  concluded  that  this
failure “alone mandates vacatur and remand.”  Ibid.

We  further  explained  that  counsel’s  failure  to  consult
with  the  client  about  an  appeal  constitutes  deficient  per-
formance only when counsel should have consulted.  Id., at
479.  The Court was clear: “We cannot say, as a constitu-
tional  matter,  that  in  every  case  counsel’s  failure  to  con-
sult  with  the  defendant  about  an  appeal  is  necessarily
unreasonable.”  Ibid.  In determining whether counsel has
a duty to consult, we stated that “a highly relevant factor
in  this  inquiry  will  be  whether  the  conviction  follows  a
trial or guilty plea, both because a guilty plea reduces the
scope  of  potentially  appealable issues  and  because  such  a
plea  may  indicate  that  the  defendant  seeks  an  end  to
judicial proceedings.”  Id., at 480.  Finally, “[e]ven in cases
when the defendant pleads guilty, the court must consider
such  factors  as  whether  the  defendant  received  the  sen-
tence  bargained  for  as  part  of  the  plea  and  whether  the
plea  expressly  reserved  or  waived  some  or  all  appeal
rights.”  Ibid.  We rejected the argument that choosing not
to  consult  was  outside  the  scope  of  valid,  strategic  deci-
sionmaking,  as  “we  have  consistently  declined  to  impose
mechanical  rules  on  counsel.”  Id.,  at  481.   In  sum,  we
“reject[ed]  a  bright-line  rule  that  counsel  must  always
consult  with  the  defendant  regarding  an  appeal”  and
instructed  courts  to  evaluate  whether  the  decision  to
consult was “reasonable” under the circumstances.  Id., at
480–481.

We  also  rejected  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  “per se  prejudice
rule”  because  it  “ignore[d]  the  critical  requirement  that
counsel’s  deficient  performance  must  actually  cause  the
forfeiture of the defendant’s appeal.”  Id., at 484.  We held
that, “to show prejudice in these circumstances, a defend-
ant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probabil-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Garza v. Idaho. It delves into the legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel regarding appeals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
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(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CHIAFALO ET AL. v. WASHINGTON

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

No. 19–465.  Argued May 13, 2020—Decided July 6, 2020

When Americans cast ballots for presidential candidates, their votes ac-
tually  go  toward  selecting  members  of  the  Electoral  College,  whom
each  State  appoints  based  on  the  popular  returns.    The  States  have
devised mechanisms to ensure that the electors they appoint vote for
the presidential candidate their citizens have preferred.  With two par-
tial exceptions, every State appoints a slate of electors selected by the
political party whose candidate has won the State’s popular vote.  Most
States  also  compel  electors  to  pledge  to  support  the  nominee  of  that
party.  Relevant here, 15 States back up their pledge laws with some
kind of sanction.  Almost all of these States immediately remove a so-
called  “faithless  elector”  from  his  position,  substituting  an  alternate
whose vote the State reports instead.  A few States impose a monetary
fine on any elector who flouts his pledge.

Three Washington electors, Peter Chiafalo, Levi Guerra, and Esther
John (the Electors), violated their pledges to support Hillary Clinton
in the 2016 presidential election.  In response, the State fined the Elec-
tors $1,000 apiece for breaking their pledges to support the same can-
didate  its  voters  had.    The  Electors  challenged  their  fines  in  state
court,  arguing  that  the  Constitution  gives  members  of  the  Electoral
College the right to vote however they please.  The Washington Supe-
rior Court rejected that claim, and the State Supreme Court affirmed,
relying  on  Ray  v.  Blair,  343  U. S.  214.    In  Ray,  this  Court  upheld  a
pledge requirement—though one without a penalty to back it up.  Ray
held that pledges were consistent with the Constitution’s text and our
Nation’s history, id., at 225–230; but it reserved the question whether
a State can enforce that requirement through legal sanctions.

Held: A State may enforce an elector’s pledge to support his party’s nom-

inee—and the state voters’ choice—for President.  Pp. 8–18.

(a) Article II, §1 gives the States the authority to appoint electors “in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
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  <content>
10

AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSN. v. BECERRA

Opinion of the Court

reimbursement  rates  by  hospital  group  thus  depends  on
whether  HHS  has  obtained  acquisition  cost  survey  data
from  hospitals.  The  statute  expressly  authorizes  HHS  to
vary rates by hospital group if HHS has conducted such a
survey.  But the statute does not authorize such a variance
in  rates  if  HHS  has  not  conducted  a  survey.    Cf.  Babb  v.
Wilkie, 589 U. S. ___, ____ (2020) (slip op., at 12); Sandoz
Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 16);
Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983).

The statute thus protects all hospitals by imposing an im-
portant procedural prerequisite—namely, a survey of hos-
pitals’ acquisition costs for prescription drugs—before HHS
may  target  particular  groups  of  hospitals  for  lower  reim-
bursement  rates.  The  survey  allows  the  agency  to  deter-
mine whether there is in fact meaningful, statistically sig-
nificant variation among hospitals’ acquisition costs.  The
data  regarding  variation  in  hospitals’  acquisition  costs  in
turn help HHS determine whether and how much it should
vary the reimbursement rate among hospital groups.  See
§§1395l(t)(14)(D)(iii)–(iv).  But absent that survey data, as
not  make
Congress
“billion-dollar  decisions  differentiating  among  particular
hospital groups.”  967 F. 3d, at 837 (Pillard, J., dissenting).
In this case, all agree that HHS did not conduct a survey
of hospitals’ acquisition costs.  See, e.g., 82 Fed. Reg. 52501.
HHS nonetheless varied the rates by hospital group, fixing
a substantially lower reimbursement rate for 340B hospi-
tals than for non-340B hospitals.

determined,  HHS  may

Under the text and structure of the statute, this case is
therefore straightforward: Because HHS did not conduct a
survey of hospitals’ acquisition costs, HHS acted unlawfully
by reducing the reimbursement rates for 340B hospitals.

HHS maintains that there is more to the case than that
straightforward analysis would suggest.  HHS emphasizes
that even when it does not conduct a survey of acquisition
costs  and  thus  is  required  to  employ  option  2  (based  on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSN. v. BECERRA. It delves into the legal interpretation of a statute regarding hospital reimbursement rates and the procedural requirements for varying those rates.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

547

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

ed.)). These authorities conﬁrm my view that the case is
controlled not by the Takings Clause but by well-settled due
process principles respecting retroactive laws.

Given my view that the takings analysis is inapplicable
in this case, it is unnecessary to comment upon the plural-
ity’s effort to resolve a jurisdictional question despite little
brieﬁng by the parties on a point which has divided the
Courts of Appeals.

II

When the constitutionality of the Coal Act is tested under
the Due Process Clause, it must be invalidated. Accepted
principles forbidding retroactive legislation of this type are
sufﬁcient to dispose of the case.

Although we have been hesitant to subject economic legis-
lation to due process scrutiny as a general matter, the Court
has given careful consideration to due process challenges to
legislation with retroactive effects. As today’s plurality
opinion notes, for centuries our law has harbored a singular
distrust of retroactive statutes. Ante, at 532–533.
In the
words of Chancellor Kent: “A retroactive statute would par-
take in its character of the mischiefs of an ex post facto law
. . . ; and in every other case relating to contracts or property,
it would be against every sound principle.”
1 J. Kent, Com-
mentaries on American Law *455; see also ibid. (rule against
retroactive application of statutes to be “founded not only in
English law, but on the principles of general jurisprudence”).
Justice Story reached a similar conclusion: “Retrospective
laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and, as has been forcibly
said, neither accord with sound legislation nor with the fun-
damental principles of the social compact.”
2 J. Story, Com-
mentaries on the Constitution § 1398 (5th ed. 1891).

The Court’s due process jurisprudence reﬂects this dis-
trust. For example, in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U. S. 1, 15 (1976), the Court held due process re-
quires an inquiry into whether in enacting the retroactive
law the legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.
Even though prospective economic legislation carries with it
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 498 (1998). It discusses due process principles and the Court's stance on retroactive legislation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.

Syllabus

continuously  equivalent.    The  IOIA  is  thus  like  other  statutes  that
use  similar  or  identical  language  to  place  two  groups  on  equal  foot-
ing.  See,  e.g.,  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1866,  42  U. S. C.  §§1981(a),  1982;
Federal  Tort  Claims  Act,  28  U. S. C.  §2674.    Whatever  the  ultimate
purpose of international organization immunity may be, the immedi-
ate purpose of the IOIA immunity provision is expressed in language
that Congress typically uses to make one thing continuously equiva-
lent to another.  Pp. 6–9.

(b) That reading is confirmed by the “reference canon” of statutory
interpretation.    When  a  statute  refers  to  a  general  subject,  the  stat-
ute  adopts  the  law  on  that  subject  as  it  exists  whenever  a  question
under the statute arises.  In contrast, when a statute refers to anoth-
er statute by specific title, the referenced statute is adopted as it ex-
isted  when  the  referring  statute  was  enacted,  without  any  subse-
quent amendments.  Federal courts have often relied on the reference
canon  to  harmonize  a  statute  with  an  external  body  of  law  that  the
statute refers to generally.  The IOIA’s reference to the immunity en-
joyed  by  foreign  governments  is  to  an  external  body  of  potentially
evolving law, not to a specific provision of another statute.  Nor is it a
specific  reference  to  a  common  law  concept  with  a  fixed  meaning.
The phrase “immunity enjoyed by foreign governments” is not a term
of art with substantive content but rather a concept that can be given
scope  and  content  only  by  reference  to  the  rules  governing  foreign
sovereign immunity.  Pp. 9–11.

(c) The D. C. Circuit relied upon Atkinson’s conclusion that the ref-
erence canon’s probative force was  outweighed by an IOIA provision
authorizing  the  President  to  alter  the  immunity  of  an  international
organization.    But  the  fact  that  the  President  has  power  to  modify
otherwise applicable immunity rules is perfectly compatible with the
notion that those rules might themselves change over time in light of
developments in the law governing foreign sovereign immunity.  The
Atkinson court also did not consider the opinion of the State Depart-
ment, whose views in this area ordinarily receive “special attention,”
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling
Co.,  581  U. S.  ___,  ___,  and  which  took  the  position  that  immunity
rules of the IOIA and the FSIA were linked following the FSIA’s en-
actment.  Pp. 11–13.

(d) The  IFC  contends  that  interpreting  the  IOIA  immunity  provi-
sion  to  grant  only  restrictive  immunity  would  defeat  the  purpose  of
granting  immunity  in  the  first  place,  by  subjecting  international  or-
ganizations  to  suit  under  the  commercial  activity  exception  of  the
FSIA for most or all of their core activities.  This would be particular-
ly  true  with  respect  to  international  development  banks,  which  use
the tools of commerce to achieve their objectives.  Those concerns are
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, specifically discussing the interpretation of the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA). It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the core content of a book.
  </thinking>
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<suitable>
  <content>
16  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

The  Court  thus  made  clear  that  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment’s equality guarantee applied to members of all races,
including  Asian  Americans,  ensuring  all  citizens  equal
treatment under law.

Seven  years  later,  the  Court  relied  on  the  Slaughter-
House view to conclude that “[t]he words of the [Fourteenth
A]mendment . . . contain a necessary implication of a posi-
tive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,—
the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against
them distinctively as colored.”  Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U. S. 303, 307–308 (1880).  The Court thus found that
the Fourteenth Amendment banned “expres[s]” racial clas-
sifications, no matter the race affected, because these clas-
sifications  are  “a  stimulant  to  . . .  race  prejudice.”    Id.,  at
308.  See also ante, at 10–11.  Similar statements appeared
in  other  cases  decided  around  that  time.    See  Virginia  v.
Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318 (1880) (“The plain object of these
statutes  [enacted  to  enforce  the  Fourteenth  Amendment],
as of the Constitution which authorized them, was to place
the colored race, in respect of civil rights, upon a level with
whites.  They made the rights and responsibilities, civil and
criminal, of the two races exactly the same”); Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U. S. 339, 344–345 (1880) (“One great purpose of
[the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments] was to raise
the colored race from that condition of inferiority and servi-
tude in which most of them had previously stood, into per-
fect equality of civil rights with all other persons within the
jurisdiction of the States”).

This Court’s view of the Fourteenth Amendment reached
its  nadir  in  Plessy,  infamously  concluding  that  the  Four-
teenth Amendment “could not have been intended to abol-
ish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as dis-
tinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”  163 U. S.,
at 544.  That holding stood in sharp contrast to the Court’s
earlier  embrace  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s  equality
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College*. It discusses the Fourteenth Amendment and its application to racial equality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

suits, as officers are still protected by the requirement that the plain-
tiff  show  the  absence  of  probable  cause  and  by  qualified  immunity.
Pp. 7–11.

794 Fed. Appx. 140, reversed and remanded.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  ALITO,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and summary. It includes information about the case name, citation, syllabus, and the justices involved. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's metadata about the case rather than the actual content.
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

81

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  47 U. S. C. §§554(b) and (c) (Cable Communica-

tions; Equal Employment Opportunity)

  47  U. S. C.  §555a(c)  (Cable  Communications;
Limitation of Franchising Authority Liability)

  48  U. S. C.  §1542(a)  (Virgin  Islands;  Voting

Franchise; Discrimination Prohibited)

  48 U. S. C. §1708 (Discrimination Prohibited in
Rights  of  Access  to,  and  Benefits  From,  Con-
veyed Lands)

  49  U. S. C.  §306(b)  (Duties  of  the  Secretary  of
Transportation; Prohibited Discrimination)

  49  U. S. C.  §5332(b)  (Public  Transportation;

Nondiscrimination)

  49  U. S. C.  §40127  (Air  Commerce  and  Safety;

Prohibitions on Discrimination)

  49  U. S. C.  §47123(a)  (Airport  Improvement;

Nondiscrimination)

  50  U. S. C.  §3809(b)(3)  (Selective  Service  Sys-

tem)

  50  U. S. C.  §4842(a)(1)(B)  (Anti-Boycott  Act  of

2018)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely from a legal document.  It is not sequential text and does not appear to be the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
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  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
930

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–6151.  Hunter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  272.

No.  09–6152.  Gantt  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  163.

No.  09–6155.  Culberson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6158.  Pickett  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  963.

No.  09–6159.  Starling  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  477.

No.  09–6161.  Gray  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  1330.

No.  09–6162.  Ross  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  117.

No.  09–6163.  Spearman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6164.  Linton v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  401.

No.  09–6171.  Havens  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  280.

No.  09–6172.  Mitchell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6175.  Taylor v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  229.

No.  09–6176.  Sherrer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6178.  Brooks v.  United States.  C. A. 1st Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6182.  Ramirez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  751.

No.  09–6183.  Cameron  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  378.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, court names, and reporting information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
8

BOND v. UNITED STATES

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

and the act is meant as a menacing message, a small-time
equivalent of leaving a severed horse head in the bed?  See
ibid.  (using  the  “concerns”  driving  the  Convention—“acts
of  war,  assassination,  and  terrorism”—as  guideposts  of
statutory meaning).  Moreover, the Court’s illogical embel-
lishment  seems  to  apply  only  to  the  “use”  of  a  chemical,
ante, at 15, but “use” is only 1 of 11 kinds of activity that
the  statute  prohibits.    What,  one  wonders,  makes  some-
thing a “chemical weapon” when it is merely “stockpile[d]”
or “possess[ed]?”  To these questions and countless others,
one guess is as bad as another.

No one should have to ponder the totality of the circum-
stances  in  order  to  determine  whether  his  conduct  is  a
felony.  Yet that is what the Court will now require of all
future handlers of harmful toxins—that is to say, all of us.
Thanks to the Court’s revisions, the Act, which before was
“[N]o
merely  broad,  is  now  broad  and  unintelligible.
standard  of  conduct  is  specified  at  all.”    Coates  v.  Cincin
nati,  402  U.  S.  611,  614  (1971).    Before  long,  I  suspect,
courts will be required to say so.

II.  The Constitutional Question
Since  the  Act  is  clear,  the  real  question  this  case  pre-
sents  is  whether  the  Act  is  constitutional  as  applied  to
petitioner.  An unreasoned and citation-less sentence from
our  opinion  in  Missouri  v.  Holland,  252  U. S.  416  (1920),
purported to furnish the answer: “If the treaty is valid”—
and no one argues that the Convention is not—“there can
be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Arti-
cle  I,  §8,  as  a  necessary  and  proper  means  to  execute  the
powers  of  the  Government.”  Id.,  at  432.4   Petitioner  and

——————

4 Nineteen  years  earlier,  the  Court  embraced  a  similar  view—also
without reasoning.  See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, 121 (1901) (“The
power  of  Congress  to  make  all  laws  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying
into execution . . . all [powers] vested in the Government of the United
States . . . includes the power to enact such legislation as is appropriate
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Scalia in the case of Bond v. United States. It delves into the interpretation and constitutionality of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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