<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

Opinion of the Court

The  case  proceeded  to  trial,  where  the  plaintiffs  pre
sented  testimony  from  four  fact  witnesses.    The  first  was
lead plaintiff William Whitford, a retired law professor at
the  University  of  Wisconsin  in  Madison.    Whitford  testi
fied  that  he  lives  in  Madison  in  the  76th  Assembly  Dis
trict, and acknowledged on cross-examination that this is,
under  any  plausible  circumstances,  a  heavily  Democratic
district.    Under  Act  43,  the  Democratic  share  of  the  As
sembly  vote  in  Whitford’s  district  is  81.9%;  under  the
ideal  map—their  Demonstration  Plan—the
plaintiffs’
projected Democratic share of the Assembly vote in Whit
ford’s district would be 82%.  147 Record 35–36.  Whitford
therefore  conceded  that  Act  43  had  not  “affected  [his]
ability  to  vote  for  and  elect  a  Democrat  in  [his]  district.”
Id.,  at  37.  Whitford  testified  that  he  had  nevertheless
suffered  a  harm  “relate[d]  to  [his]  ability  to  engage  in
campaign  activity  to  achieve  a  majority  in  the  Assembly
and the Senate.”  Ibid.  As he explained, “[t]he only practi
cal  way  to  accomplish  my  policy  objectives  is  to  get  a
majority of the Democrats in the Assembly and the Senate
ideally in order to get the legislative product I prefer.”  Id.,
at 33.

The plaintiffs also presented the testimony of legislative
aides  Adam  Foltz  and  Tad  Ottman,  as  well  as  that  of
Professor  Ronald  Gaddie,  a  political  scientist  who  helped
design the Act 43 districting map, regarding how that map
was  designed  and  adopted.  In  particular,  Professor  Gad-
die testified about his creation of what he and the District
Court called “S curves”: color-coded tables of the estimated
partisan  skew  of  different  draft  redistricting  maps.    See
218  F. Supp.  3d,  at  850,  858.    The  colors  corresponded
with  assessments  regarding  whether  different  districts
tilted  Republican  or  Democratic  under  various  statewide
political  scenarios.  The  S  curve  for  the  map  that  was
eventually  adopted  projected  that  “Republicans  would
maintain  a  majority  under  any  likely  voting  scenario,”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, likely from a court opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a description of witness testimony.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of the Court

II

As the state court recognized, this Court has considered
elector  pledge  requirements  before.    Some  seventy  years
ago Edmund Blair tried to become a presidential elector in
Alabama.  Like all States, Alabama lodged the authority to
pick  electors  in  the  political  parties  fielding  presidential
candidates.  And the Alabama Democratic Party required a
pledge  phrased  much  like  Washington’s  today.    No  one
could get on the party’s slate of electors without agreeing to
vote in the Electoral College for the Democratic presidential
candidate.  Blair  challenged  the  pledge  mandate.  He  ar-
gued  that  the  “intention  of  the  Founders  was  that  [presi-
dential] electors should exercise their judgment in voting.”
Ray, 343 U. S., at 225.  The pledge requirement, he claimed,
“interfere[d]  with  the  performance  of  this  constitutional
duty to select [a president] according to the best judgment
of the elector.”  Ibid.

Our decision in Ray rejected that challenge.  “Neither the
language  of  Art. II,  §1,  nor  that  of  the  Twelfth  Amend-
ment,” we explained, prohibits a State from appointing only
electors committed to vote for a party’s presidential candi-
date.  Ibid.  Nor did the Nation’s history suggest such a bar.
To  the  contrary,  “[h]istory  teaches  that  the  electors  were
expected to support the party nominees” as far back as the
earliest  contested  presidential  elections.
Id.,  at  228.
“[L]ongstanding practice” thus “weigh[ed] heavily” against
Blair’s claim.  Id., at 228–230.  And current voting proce-
dures did too.  The Court noted that by then many States
did  not  even  put  electors’  names  on  a  presidential  ballot.
See  id.,  at  229.  The  whole  system  presupposed  that  the
electors, because of either an “implied” or an “oral pledge,”
would vote for the candidate who had won the State’s pop-
ular election.  Ibid.

Ray, however, reserved a question not implicated in the
case:  Could  a  State  enforce  those  pledges  through  legal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the history and precedent surrounding elector pledges. It's part of a sequential narrative and provides relevant legal context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
48

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting

The logic of the Court’s decision could even affect profes-
sional sports.  Under the Court’s holding that Title VII pro-
hibits  employment  discrimination  because  of  transgender
status, an athlete who has the physique of a man but iden-
tifies as a woman could claim the right to play on a women’s
professional sports team.  The owners of the team might try
to claim that biological sex is a bona fide occupational qual-
ification  (BFOQ)  under  42  U. S. C.  §2000e–2(e),  but  the
BFOQ exception has been read very narrowly.  See Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 334 (1977).
  Housing.  The Court’s decision may lead to Title IX cases
against  any  college  that  resists  assigning  students  of  the
opposite biological sex as roommates.  A provision of Title
IX, 20 U. S. C. §1686, allows schools to maintain “separate
living facilities for the different sexes,” but it may be argued
that a student’s “sex” is the gender with which the student
identifies.50  Similar claims may be brought under the Fair
Housing Act.  See 42 U. S. C. §3604.

Employment by religious organizations.  Briefs filed by a
wide  range  of  religious  groups––Christian,  Jewish,  and
Muslim––express  deep  concern  that  the  position  now
adopted by the Court “will trigger open conflict with faith-

——————
year before, the student won the women’s competition by over a second
and a half––a time that had garnered tenth place in the men’s conference
meet just three years before.”  Id., at 15.

A transgender male—i.e., a biological female who was in the process of
transitioning  to  male  and  actively  taking  testosterone  injections––won
the  Texas  girls’  state  championship  in  high  school  wrestling  in  2017.
Babb, Transgender Issue Hits Mat in Texas, Washington Post, Feb. 26,
2017, p. A1, col. 1.

50 Indeed, the 2016 advisory letter issued by the Department of Justice
took  the  position  that  under  Title  IX  schools  “must  allow  transgender
students to access housing consistent with their gender identity.”  Dear
Colleague Letter 4.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Alito. It discusses potential implications of the Court's decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, focusing on areas like professional sports, housing, and employment by religious organizations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

clvii

Page

975

Werst v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

West v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
869

Westbrook v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136

Western Bulk Carriers KS; Centauri Shipping Ltd. v.  . . . . . . . . .
1147

West Virginia; Ferguson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
West Virginia; Hutzler v.
918

West Virginia; Jerdine v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

West Virginia; Leftwich v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913

West Virginia; Reed v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

West Virginia; Willett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

West Virginia; Yost v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Whaley; Farris v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  943,1046

818

Whatcom County; Rosch v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
989

Wheeler, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
866

Wheeler v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
982

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wheeler v. Kentucky
984

Wheeler v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wheeler v. Miller  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1141

Wheeler v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  962,1135

Whirty v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1027,1159

1024

Whisenhant v. Allen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Whitbeck; Raihala v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  842,1086

971

White; Cassell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
White; Choose Life Ill., Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

1050

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
White v. Department of Defense
White v. Donley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  864,881,1065

1155

White v. Florida Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
White v. Gates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  976,1102

White v. Luoma  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

905

White v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1082

White v. Rabner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

White v. School Dist. of Philadelphia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
White v. Supreme Court of N. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  916,1066

White v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  916,926,1033,1151

1106

White v. Workman  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947

Whitehead v. Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, LLP  . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

. . . . . . . . . . . . .
White Mountain Apache Tribal Court; Elliott v.
876

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Whiteside v. Russellville Newspapers, Inc.
White’s Mill Colony, Inc.; Weeks v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  886,1065

886

Whitﬁeld v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

. . .
Whitmore v. Pierce County Dept. of Community Corrections
844

Whittington v. Owens-Ill., Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

Whorley v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

Wick v. Prosper  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  601 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Per Curiam

a wide array of offices—rather than by granting rights  to
all.  It is therefore necessary, as Chief Justice Chase con-
cluded and the Colorado Supreme Court itself recognized,
to “ ‘ascertain[ ] what particular individuals are embraced’ ”
by the provision.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a (quoting Grif-
fin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 26 (No. 5,815) (CC Va. 1869) (Chase,
Circuit Justice)).  Chase went on to explain that “[t]o accom-
plish this ascertainment and ensure effective results, pro-
ceedings,  evidence,  decisions,  and  enforcements  of  deci-
sions,  more  or  less  formal,  are  indispensable.”  Id.,  at  26.
For  its  part,  the  Colorado  Supreme  Court  also  concluded
that there must be some kind of “determination” that Sec-
tion 3 applies to a particular person “before the disqualifi-
cation holds meaning.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a.

The  Constitution  empowers  Congress  to  prescribe  how
those determinations should be made.  The relevant provi-
sion is Section 5, which enables Congress, subject of course
to judicial review, to pass “appropriate legislation” to “en-
force”  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.    See  City  of  Boerne  v.
Flores,  521  U. S.  507,  536  (1997).    Or  as  Senator  Howard
put  it  at  the  time  the  Amendment  was  framed,  Section  5
“casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for
the future, that all the sections of the amendment are car-
ried out in good faith.”  Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 2768.

Congress’s  Section  5  power  is  critical  when  it  comes  to
Section 3.  Indeed, during a debate on enforcement legisla-
tion less than a year after ratification, Sen. Trumbull noted
that  “notwithstanding  [Section  3]  . . .  hundreds  of  men
[were] holding office” in violation of its terms.  Cong. Globe,
41st Cong., 1st Sess., at 626.  The Constitution, Trumbull
noted, “provide[d] no means for enforcing” the disqualifica-
tion, necessitating a “bill to give effect to the fundamental
law embraced in the Constitution.”  Ibid.  The enforcement
mechanism  Trumbull  championed  was  later  enacted  as
part of the Enforcement Act of 1870, “pursuant to the power
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. The presence of citations, legal terminology ("Per Curiam", "App. to Pet. for Cert."), and discussion of constitutional provisions (Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3) strongly suggests this.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
ALITO, J., dissenting

appeal  with  a  two-sentence,  not-precedential opinion  that
solely  addressed  the  accept-all-comers  policy.    Christian
Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx.
645–646 (2009).

Like the majority of this Court, the Ninth Circuit relied
on the following Joint  Stipulation, which  the parties filed
in December 2005, well after Dean Kane’s deposition:

“Hastings  requires  that  registered  student  organiza-
tions allow any student to participate, become a mem-
ber,  or  seek  leadership  positions  in  the  organization,
regardless of their status or beliefs.”  App. 221.

Citing  the  binding  effect  of  stipulations,  the  majority
sternly  rejects  what  it  terms  “CLS’s  unseemly  attempt  to
escape  from  the  stipulation  and  shift  its  target  to  [the
Nondiscrimination Policy].”  Ante, at 11–12.

I  agree  that  the  parties  must  be  held  to  their  Joint
Stipulation,  but  the  terms  of  the  stipulation  should  be
respected.  What  was  admitted  in  the  Joint  Stipulation
filed in December 2005 is that Hastings had an accept-all-
comers  policy.  CLS  did  not  stipulate  that  its  application
had been denied more than a year earlier pursuant to such
a policy.  On the contrary, the Joint Stipulation notes that
the  reason  repeatedly  given  by  Hasting  at  that  time  was
that  the  CLS  bylaws  did  not  comply  with  the  Nondis-
crimination Policy.  See App. 228–229.  Indeed, the parties
did  not  even  stipulate  that  the  accept-all-comers  policy
existed  in  the  fall  of  2004.  In  addition,  Hastings  itself  is
now  attempting  to  walk  away  from  this  stipulation  by
disclosing  that  its  real  policy  is  an  accept-some-comers
policy.

——————

not  discriminate  on  the  basis  of  belief”).    Responding  to  these  argu-
ments,  the  law  school  remarked  that  CLS  “repeatedly  asserts  that
‘Hastings routinely recognizes student groups that limit membership or
leadership on the basis of belief.’ ”  Brief for Appellees in No. 06–15956
(CA9), p. 4.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses a case, legal arguments, and a specific stipulation made by the parties involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1003

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

No. 09–6700.  Santana v.  Trani, Warden, et al.  C. A. 10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  360.

No.  09–6702.  Burgie  v.  Arkansas.  Sup.  Ct.  Ark.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  2009  Ark.  382.

No.  09–6704.  Balentine  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6705.  Wagoner  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6706.  R.  T.  v.  N.  G.  S. C.  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  240.

No.  09–6710.  Robinson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  287  Fed.  Appx.  150.

No.  09–6713.  Simek  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  433.

No.  09–6714.  Suitt  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  867.

No.  09–6717.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  172.

No.  09–6719.  Lewis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–6720.  Knight v.  Kaminski et al.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  901.

No.  09–6722.  Ortiz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  167.

No. 09–6725.  Willis  v.  United States.  C. A.  8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6727.  Scaife  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  172.

No.  09–6728.  Surratt  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6731.  Dodds,  aka  Wilson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  336.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

925

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5991.  Vazquez-Henriquez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5992.  Tapia-Cortez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  793.

No.  09–5993.  Lucas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  618.

No.  09–5996.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  748.

No.  09–6000.  Kennedy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6001.  Johnson  v.  United  States  (two  judgments).

Ct.  App.  D.  C.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6002.  Allen  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  488.

No. 09–6003.  Benitez v. United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  823.

No.  09–6005.  Brown  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  345.

No.  09–6007.  Baxter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  830.

No.  09–6011.  Gaynor  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6012.  Gonzalez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  503.

No.  09–6014.  Frink  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  183.

No.  09–6015.  Horton  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6016.  Gaines  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.  Appx.  605.

No.  09–6017.  Hayden  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case citations, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

Catholic  church  where  no  funeral  was  taking  place.
(There  are nearly  19,000  Catholic  churches  in  the  United
States.4)  But of course, a small group picketing at any of
these locations would have probably gone unnoticed.

The  Westboro  Baptist  Church,  however,  has  devised  a
strategy that remedies this problem.  As the Court notes,
church  members  have  protested  at  nearly  600  military
funerals.  Ante, at 1.  They have also picketed the funerals
of  police  officers,5  firefighters,6  and  the  victims  of  natural
disasters,7  accidents,8  and  shocking  crimes.9   And  in  ad-
vance of these protests, they issue press releases to ensure
that their protests will attract public attention.10

This  strategy  works  because  it  is  expected  that  respon-
dents’ verbal assaults will wound the family and friends of
the  deceased  and  because  the  media  is  irresistibly  drawn
to the sight of persons who are visibly in grief.  The more
outrageous  the  funeral  protest,  the  more  publicity  the
Westboro  Baptist  Church  is  able  to  obtain.    Thus,  when
the  church  recently  announced  its  intention  to  picket  the
funeral  of  a  9-year-old  girl  killed  in  the  shooting  spree  in
Tucson—proclaiming  that  she  was  “better  off  dead”11—
their  announcement  was  national  news,12  and  the  church
——————

4 See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic Informa-

tion Project, http://www.usccb.org/comm/cip.shtml#toc4.

5 See  http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110124_St-Petersburg-FL-

Dead-Police.pdf.

6 See http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110120_Dead-Volunteer-

Firefighter-Connecting_the_Dots-Baltimore-MD.pdf.

7 See

http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110104_Newburg-and-

Rolla-MO-Tornado-Connecting-the-Dots.pdf.

8 See  http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20101218_Wichita-KS-Two-

Dead-Wichita-Bikers.pdf.

9 See  http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110129_Tampa-FL-God-

Sent-Military-Mom-Shooter-to-Kill-Kids.pdf.

10 See nn. 5–9, supra.
11 See

http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110109_AZ-Shooter-

Connecting-the-Dots-Day-2.pdf.

12 See, e.g., Stanglin, Anti-Gay Church Group Plans to Picket Tucson
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the actions of the Westboro Baptist Church and their protests at funerals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Summary
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  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a summary or report about document changes, not the actual content of the document itself. It includes information about file sizes, dates, and instructions on how to read a change report.
  </thinking>
  <category>Change report</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

662

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Breyer, J., dissenting

the System, Hearing on S. 15 before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 37–38 (1991) (unani-
mous resolution of the National Association of Attorneys
General); but cf. Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender,
supra, at 77–84 (Conference of Chief Justices opposing
legislation).

Moreover, as Justice Souter has pointed out, Congress
compiled a “mountain of data” explicitly documenting the
interstate commercial effects of gender-motivated crimes of
violence. Ante, at 628–635, 653–654 (dissenting opinion).
After considering alternatives, it focused the federal law
upon documented deﬁciencies in state legal systems. And it
tailored the law to prevent its use in certain areas of tradi-
tional state concern, such as divorce, alimony, or child cus-
tody.
42 U. S. C. § 13981(e)(4). Consequently, the law be-
fore us seems to represent an instance, not of state/federal
conﬂict, but of state/federal efforts to cooperate in order
to help solve a mutually acknowledged national problem.
Cf. §§ 300w–10, 3796gg, 3796hh, 10409, 13931 (providing fed-
eral moneys to encourage state and local initiatives to com-
bat gender-motivated violence).

I call attention to the legislative process leading up to
enactment of this statute because, as the majority recog-
nizes, ante, at 614, it far surpasses that which led to the
enactment of the statute we considered in Lopez. And even
were I to accept Lopez as an accurate statement of the law,
which I do not, that distinction provides a possible basis for
upholding the law here. This Court on occasion has pointed
to the importance of procedural limitations in keeping the
power of Congress in check. See Garcia, supra, at 554
(“Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce
Clause powers must ﬁnd its justiﬁcation in the procedural
nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to com-
pensate for possible failings in the national political process
rather than to dictate a ‘sacred province of state autonomy’ ”
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 236 (1983))); see
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases and legislation, and references to the legislative process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ET AL. v. PHILIPP
ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 19–351.  Argued December 7, 2020—Decided February 3, 2021

Respondents are the heirs of German Jewish art dealers who formed a
consortium during the waning years of the Weimar Republic to pur-
chase a collection of medieval relics known as the Welfenschatz.  The
heirs allege that when the Nazi government rose to power, it unlaw-
fully coerced the consortium into selling the collection to Prussia for a
third of its value.  The relics are currently maintained by the Stiftung
Preussischer  Kulturbesitz  (SPK),  an  instrumentality  of  the  Federal
Republic of Germany, and displayed at a Berlin museum.  After unsuc-
cessfully seeking compensation in Germany, the heirs brought several
common law property claims in United States District Court against
Germany  and  SPK  (collectively  Germany).    Germany  moved  to  dis-
miss, arguing that it was immune from suit under the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act.  As relevant, Germany asserted that the heirs’
claims did not fall within the FSIA’s exception to sovereign immunity
for  “property  taken  in  violation  of  international  law,”  28  U. S. C.
§1605(a)(3), because a sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property
is not unlawful under the international law of expropriation.  The heirs
countered that the exception did apply because Germany’s purchase of
the Welfenschatz was an act of genocide, and the relics were therefore
taken  in  violation  of  international  human  rights  law.    The  District
Court denied Germany’s motion to dismiss, and the D. C. Circuit af-
firmed.

Held: The phrase “rights in property taken in violation of international
law,” as used in the FSIA’s expropriation exception, refers to violations
of the international law of expropriation and thereby incorporates the
domestic takings rule.  Pp. 4–16.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–1392
_________________

THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2022]

  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, concurring in the judgment.
  We  granted  certiorari  to  decide  one  question:  “Whether
all  pre-viability  prohibitions  on  elective  abortions  are  un-
constitutional.”  Pet. for Cert. i.  That question is directly
implicated  here:  Mississippi’s  Gestational  Age  Act,  Miss.
Code Ann. §41–41–191 (2018), generally prohibits abortion
after the fifteenth week of pregnancy—several weeks before
a fetus is regarded as “viable” outside the womb.  In urging
our  review,  Mississippi  stated  that  its  case  was  “an  ideal
vehicle”  to  “reconsider  the  bright-line  viability  rule,”  and
that a judgment in its favor would “not require the Court to
overturn” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Planned
Parenthood  of  Southeastern  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U. S.  833
(1992).  Pet. for Cert. 5.
  Today, the Court nonetheless rules for Mississippi by do-
ing just that.  I would take a more measured course.  I agree
with the Court that the viability line established by Roe and
Casey should be discarded under a straightforward stare de-
cisis analysis.  That line never made any sense.  Our abor-
tion  precedents  describe  the  right  at  issue  as  a  woman’s
right  to  choose  to  terminate  her  pregnancy.    That  right
should therefore extend far enough to ensure a reasonable
opportunity  to  choose,  but  need  not  extend  any  further—
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the legal reasoning and analysis relevant to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BIDEN v. TEXAS

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

Option  two:    DHS  may  choose  to  return  noncitizens  to
Mexico.  8  U. S. C.  §1225(b)(2)(C).    Consistent  with  that
statutory  authority,  the  prior  Administration  chose  to  re-
turn a relatively small group of noncitizens to Mexico.

In general, when there is insufficient detention capacity,
both the parole option and the return-to-Mexico option are
legally permissible options under the immigration statutes.
As the recent history illustrates, every President since the
late 1990s has employed the parole option, and President
Trump also employed the return-to-Mexico option for a rel-
atively small group of noncitizens.  Because the immigra-
tion statutes afford substantial discretion to the Executive,
different  Presidents  may  exercise  that  discretion  differ-
ently.  That is Administrative Law 101.  See Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto-
mobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).

To  be  sure,  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act  and  this
Court’s  decision  in  State  Farm  require  that  an  executive
agency’s exercise of discretion be reasonable and reasona-
bly  explained.    See  id.,  at  43  (majority  opinion);  see  also
FCC  v.  Prometheus  Radio  Project,  592  U. S.  ___,  ___−___,
___ (2021) (slip op., at 7−8, 11); FCC v. Fox Television Sta-
tions, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 514−515 (2009); 5 U. S. C. §706.
For example, when there is insufficient detention capacity
and  DHS  chooses  to  parole  noncitizens  into  the  United
States  rather  than  returning  them  to  Mexico,  DHS  must
reasonably explain why parole provides a “significant pub-
lic benefit.”  8 U. S. C. §1182(d)(5)(A); see, e.g., State Farm,
463 U. S., at 46–57.  Review under that State Farm stand-
ard is deferential but not toothless.  Id., at 56.

The question of whether DHS’s October 29 decision satis-
fies the State Farm standard is not before this Court at this
time.  The Court today therefore properly leaves the State
Farm issue for consideration on remand.  See ante, at 18,
25; Tr. of Oral Arg. 67−68.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in the case of Biden v. Texas. It discusses the legal framework surrounding the return of noncitizens to Mexico and the standard of review for such decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

mote instability and uncertainty.  For some couples, even
an  ordinary  drive  into  a  neighboring  State  to  visit  family
or friends risks causing severe hardship in the event of  a
spouse’s  hospitalization  while  across  state  lines.    In  light
of the fact that many States already allow same-sex mar-
riage—and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  these  marriages
already  have  occurred—the  disruption  caused  by  the
recognition bans is significant and ever-growing.

As  counsel  for  the  respondents  acknowledged  at  argu-
ment,  if  States  are  required  by  the  Constitution  to  issue
marriage  licenses  to  same-sex  couples,  the  justifications
for  refusing  to  recognize  those  marriages  performed  else-
where are  undermined.  See Tr. of Oral  Arg. on Question
2, p. 44.  The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex cou-
ples  may  exercise  the  fundamental  right  to  marry  in  all
States.  It  follows  that  the  Court  also  must  hold—and  it
now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to
refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed
in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.

*

*

*
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embod-
ies  the  highest  ideals  of  love,  fidelity,  devotion,  sacrifice,
and  family.  In  forming  a  marital  union,  two  people  be-
come something greater than once they were.  As some of
the  petitioners  in  these  cases  demonstrate,  marriage
embodies  a  love  that  may  endure  even  past  death.    It
would  misunderstand  these  men  and  women  to  say  they
disrespect the idea of marriage.  Their plea is that they do
respect  it,  respect  it  so  deeply  that  they  seek  to  find  its
fulfillment  for  themselves.    Their  hope  is  not  to  be  con-
demned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civiliza-
tion’s oldest institutions.  They ask for equal dignity in the
eyes of the law.  The Constitution grants them that right.

The  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Sixth

Circuit is reversed.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in the Obergefell v. Hodges case. It discusses the importance of marriage and the right of same-sex couples to marry.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

Opinion of the Court

Pursuant to the warrant, the Government eventually seized
and sold a plot of the collector’s land.  Id., at 274.  Plaintiffs
later attacked the purchaser’s title, arguing that the initial
seizure was void because the Government had audited the
collector’s account and issued the warrant itself without ju-
dicial involvement.  Id., at 275.

The Court upheld the sale.  It explained that pursuant to
its power to collect revenue, the Government could rely on
“summary proceedings” to compel its officers to “pay such
balances of the public money” into the Treasury “as may be
in  their  hands.”  Id.,  at  281,  285.    Indeed,  the  Court  ob-
served,  there  was  an  unbroken  tradition—long  predating
the  founding—of  using  these  kinds  of  proceedings  to  “en-
force  payment  of  balances  due  from  receivers  of  the  reve-
nue.”  Id., at 278; see id., at 281.  In light of this historical
practice, the Government could issue a valid warrant with-
out  intruding  on  the  domain  of  the  Judiciary.    See  id.,  at
280–282.  The challenge to the sale thus lacked merit.

This principle extends beyond cases involving the collec-
tion  of  revenue.
In  Oceanic  Steam  Navigation  Co.  v.
Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (1909), we considered the imposi-
tion of a monetary penalty on a steamship company.  Pur-
suant to its plenary power over immigration, Congress had
excluded immigration by aliens afflicted with “loathsome or
dangerous contagious diseases,” and it authorized customs
collectors to enforce the prohibition with fines.  Id., at 331–
334.  When  a  steamship  company  challenged  the  penalty
under Article III, we upheld it.  Congress’s power over for-
eign commerce, we explained, was so total that no party had
a “ ‘vested right’ ” to import anything into the country.  Id.,
at 335 (quoting Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 493
(1904)).  By  the  same  token,  Congress  could  also  prohibit
immigration by certain classes of persons and enforce those
prohibitions  with  administrative  penalties  assessed  with-
out a jury.  See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 214 U. S., at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the historical precedent for summary proceedings in cases of revenue collection and immigration enforcement. It delves into specific Supreme Court cases and legal arguments, indicating it's part of a legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1228

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

BRIEFS ON MERITS—Continued

Rule

—Copies, number to be ﬁled  .............................  25.1, 33.1(f)
—Cover color .........................................................  33.1(g)(v)
—Documents,  format  and  general  require

ments ...............................................................  33, 34

—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  25.1, 25.5

—Word limits..................................................  24.3, 33.1(d), 33.1(g)(v)

Proof of service requirement  .....................................  25.8

References to joint appendix or record  ...................  24.5

Reply briefs

—Contents  ............................................................  24.4
—Copies, number to be ﬁled  .............................  25.3
—Cover color .........................................................  33.1(g)(vii)
—Documents,  format  and  general  require

ments  ..............................................................  33, 34

—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  25.3, 25.5

—Word limits...............................................  24.3, 33.1(d), 33.1(g)(vii)

Respondents and appellees

—Contents  ............................................................  24.2
—Copies, number to be ﬁled  .............................  25.2
—Cover color .........................................................  33.1(g)(vi)
—Documents,  format  and  general  require

ments  ..............................................................  33, 34
—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  25.2, 25.5
—Word limits .........................................................  24.3, 33.1(g)(vi)

Service  ...........................................................................  29.3–29.5
Striking by Court  ........................................................  24.6
Submission after argument  ........................................  25.7
Supplemental briefs

—Contents  ............................................................  25.6
—Copies, number to be ﬁled  .............................  25.6
—Cover color  ........................................................  33.1(g)(iv)
—Documents,  format  and  general  require

ments ...............................................................  33, 34

—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  25.6
—Word limits  ........................................................  33.1(g)(iv)

Table of authorities ......................................................  24.1(c), 34.2
Table of contents  ..........................................................  24.1(c), 34.2

CALENDAR

Call of cases for argument ..........................................  27.1
Clerk, preparation by ...................................................  27.1
Combined cases .............................................................  27.3
Hearing lists...................................................................  27.2
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a list of rules, likely from a legal document. It is not sequential narrative text and is more akin to an index or table of contents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 256 (2010)

289

Opinion of Roberts, C. J.

cial  Master’s  recommendation  to  deny  intervention,  the
Court  nonetheless  permitted  those  entities  to  participate  as
amici.  See 507 U. S., at 589–590; Nebraska v.  Wyoming, 502
U. S.  1055  (1992).2  The  majority  does  not  explain  why  that
familiar  and  customary  approach  might  be  inadequate  in
this case.

*

*

*

Our  original  jurisdiction  over  actions  between  States  is
concerned with disputes so serious that they would be
grounds  for  war  if  the  States  were  truly  sovereign.  Texas
v.  New  Mexico,  462  U. S.,  at  571,  n.  18.  A  dispute  between
States  over  rights  to  water  ﬁts  that  bill;  a  squabble  among
private  entities  within  a  State  over  how  to  divvy  up  that
State’s  share  does  not.  A  judgment  in  an  equitable  appor
tionment  action  binds  the  States;  it  is  not  binding  with  re
spect to particular uses asserted by private entities.  Allow
ing intervention by such entities would vastly complicate and
delay  already  complicated  and  lengthy  actions.  And  the
beneﬁts private entities might bring can be readily secured,
as  has  typically  been  done,  by  their  participation  as  amici
curiae.

In  light  of  all  this,  it  is  difﬁcult  to  understand  why  the
Court grants nonsovereign entities leave to intervene in this
equitable apportionment action, and easy to understand why
the Court has never before done so in such a case.

I  would  grant  South  Carolina’s  exceptions,  and  deny  the

motions to intervene.

2 No  party  ﬁled  exceptions  to  the  Special  Master’s  recommendation  to
deny intervention in Nebraska v.  Wyoming.  The Special Master later al
lowed one of the entities, Basin Electric Power Cooperative, to intervene
as  a  party  based  on  changed  circumstances.  See  Addendum  to  Reply
Brief  for  Duke  Energy  2–5.  That  decision  was  never  reviewed  by  the
Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Roberts. It delves into the legal reasoning behind the Court's decision to allow intervention by non-sovereign entities in an equitable apportionment action.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).  Respect for the separation of
powers is hardly served by refusing a legislatively assigned
task.

II

Applying  the  wrong  standard  at  Sosa’s  second  step,
JUSTICE THOMAS reaches the wrong answer.  He announces
that, except for “the three historical torts likely on the mind
of the First Congress,” “there always is a sound reason” for
courts  to  refuse  to  recognize  actionable  torts  under  the
ATS.4  Ante, at 11.  He offers three reasons for this dramatic
curtailment of the ATS.  None is persuasive.

First, JUSTICE THOMAS  argues that “creating a cause of
action to enforce international law beyond three historical
torts invariably gives rise to foreign-policy concerns.”  Ante,
at  9.  He  offers  no  meaningful  support  for  that  sweeping
assertion, nor does he explain why an ATS suit for the tort
of  piracy,  for  example,  would  categorically  present  fewer
foreign-policy concerns than a suit for aiding and abetting
child slavery.  That said, JUSTICE THOMAS is correct insofar
as he observes that, in some subset of cases, the diplomatic
costs of allowing an ATS suit to proceed may outweigh the
benefits of providing redress to an injured foreign citizen.
“[W]hen international friction” does arise, however, “a court
——————
leaves  no  room  to  doubt  that  Congress  intended  foreign  citizens  to  be
able to bring “civil action[s]” for “tort[s] . . . committed in violation of the
law of nations.”  28 U. S. C. §1350.

4 Notably, JUSTICE THOMAS’ alternative disposition would not answer
the  question  this  Court  granted  certiorari  to  address,  i.e.,  whether  do-
mestic corporations are immune from suit under the ATS (regardless of
the kind of torts for which they are sued).  See Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–
416, at i; Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–453, at i.  For reasons similar to those
articulated in my dissent in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. ___, ___
(2018),  I  would  answer  this  question  in  the  negative.    (So  would  four
other Justices.)  As JUSTICE GORSUCH ably explains, there is no reason to
insulate domestic corporations from liability for law-of-nations violations
simply because they are legal rather than natural persons.  See post, at
1–4 (concurring opinion).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1086

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 7, 2009

558 U. S.

No. 08–10225.  Shabazz, aka Dennis v.  First Correctional

Medical  Services  et  al.,  ante,  p.  834;

No.  08–10488.  Watts  v.  Runnels,  Warden,  et  al.,  ante,

p.  841;

No.  08–10511.  Raihala  v.  Whitbeck  et  al.,  ante,  p.  842;
No. 08–10643.  Kenyon v. Wyoming Department of Correc

tions  et  al.,  ante,  p.  846;

No.  08–10728.  Stevens  v.  Nevada,  ante,  p.  850;
No.  08–10743.  Oswald  v.  Thurmer,  Warden,  ante,  p.  851;
No.  08–10841.  Samuel  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  857;
No.  08–10962.  Rojas-Barrera  v.  Wengler,  Warden,  ante,

p.  863;

No.  08–10977.  Laskey  v.  Charles  Industries,  ante,  p.  864;
No.  08–11014.  Laskey  v.  United  Online,  Inc.,  ante,  p.  866;
No.  09–101.  Smith  et  al. v.  Thomas  Jefferson  University

Hospital  et  al.,  ante,  p.  878;

No.  09–171.  Halliwell  et  al.  v.  Superior  Court  of  Cali

fornia,  Sonoma  County,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  947;

No.  09–172.  Halliwell  et  al.  v.  Superior  Court  of  Cali

fornia,  Sonoma  County,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  947;

No.  09–199.  Halliwell  et  al.  v.  Superior  Court  of  Cali

fornia,  Sonoma  County,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  970;

No.  09–210.  Frazier  v.  Sebelius,  Secretary  of  Health

and  Human  Services,  ante,  p.  947;

No.  09–295.  Bert  v.  Comptroller  of  the  Treasury  of

Maryland,  ante,  p.  948;

ury,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  948;

No.  09–324.  Wiley  v.  Geithner,  Secretary  of  the  Treas

No.  09–5097.  Hostetter  v.  Virginia,  ante,  p.  887;
No.  09–5109.  Woods  v.  Social  Security  Administration,

ante,  p.  887;

No.  09–5228.  McCarthy  v.  Jenkins  et  al.,  ante,  p.  893;
No.  09–5349.  Merriweather  v.  Reynolds,  Warden,  et  al.,

ante,  p.  899;

No.  09–5458.  Robinson  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  904;
No.  09–5605.  Gonzalez  v.  Asset  Acceptance,  LLC,  et  al.,

ante,  p.  912;

No.  09–5867.  Davis  v.  Vanderville  et  al.,  ante,  p.  954;
No.  09–5902.  Griffin  v.  Ortiz  et  al.,  ante,  p.  954;
No.  09–6013.  Hill  v.  District  of  Columbia  Department

of  Employment  Services  et  al.,  ante,  p.  955;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case citations from a legal document, likely a Supreme Court docket.  It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

JACKSON, J., dissenting

context in particular, the Court “may impose a limiting con-
struction  on  a  statute  only  if  it  is  ‘readily  susceptible’  to
such a construction.”  Ibid. (some internal quotation marks
omitted).
  Application of our ordinary principles of statutory inter-
pretation here reveals that the encouragement provision is
not susceptible to the narrow solicitation or facilitation con-
struction  that  the  majority  adopts,  as  explained  below.
Thus,  this  statute  is  overbroad  and  facially  invalid  under
the First Amendment.

II
  The majority contends that the encouragement provision
in  a  “specialized,
uses  “ ‘encourage’ ”  and  “ ‘induce’ ”
criminal-law  sense,”  under  which  those  words  are  essen-
tially  synonymous  with  solicitation  and  facilitation  and
carry certain narrowing features of those crimes.  Ante, at
9.  But that construction of the statute is untenable for the
reasons that follow.

A
  The  majority  starts  its  interpretation  of  the  encourage-
ment provision “with some background on solicitation and
facilitation,”  ante,  at  6,  instead  of  addressing  any  of  the
terms  in  the  encouragement  provision  itself.    This  is  the
first clue that the majority’s statutory analysis is unusual.
Ordinarily, we start with the text of the statute being inter-
preted.    Yet  the  words  “solicitation”  and  “facilitation”  ap-
pear nowhere in the encouragement provision.  (As the ma-
jority notes, facilitation is “also called aiding and abetting,”
ibid.—another term that is absent from the encouragement
provision.)
  The  majority  goes  on  to  explain  that  the  terms  that  do
appear  in  the  encouragement  provision—“encourage”  and
“induce”—are also often used (with other words) to define
“solicitation” and “facilitation.”  Ante, at 6–8.  For example,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It focuses on statutory interpretation and the First Amendment.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

571

Syllabus

but neither is the Court persuaded that, in other applications, the lan-
guage of § 954(d)(1) itself will give rise to the suppression of protected
expression. Any content-based considerations that may be taken into
account are a consequence of the nature of arts funding; the NEA has
limited resources to allocate among many “artistically excellent” proj-
ects, and it does so on the basis of a wide variety of subjective criteria.
Respondent’s reliance on Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 837—in which the Court overturned a public uni-
versity’s objective decision denying funding to all student publications
having religious editorial viewpoints—is therefore misplaced. The
NEA’s mandate is to make esthetic judgments, and the inherently
content-based “excellence” threshold for NEA support sets it apart from
the subsidy at issue in Rosenberger. Moreover, although the First
Amendment applies in the subsidy context, Congress has wide latitude
to set spending priorities. See, e. g., Regan v. Taxation with Represen-
tation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 549. Unless § 954(d)(1) is applied in a
manner that raises concern about the suppression of disfavored view-
points, the Court will uphold it. Pp. 580–588.

(b) The lower courts also erred in invalidating § 954(d)(1) as unconsti-
tutionally vague. The First and Fifth Amendments protect speakers
from arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of vague standards.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 432–433. Section 954(d)(1)’s
terms are undeniably opaque, and if they appeared in a criminal statute
or regulatory scheme, they could raise substantial vagueness concerns.
It is unlikely, however, that speakers will be compelled to steer too far
clear of any forbidden area in the context of NEA grants. As a practi-
cal matter, artists may conform their speech to what they believe to be
the NEA decisionmaking criteria in order to acquire funding. But
when the Government is acting as patron rather than sovereign, the
consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe.
In the con-
text of selective subsidies, it is not always feasible for Congress to legis-
late with clarity.
Indeed, to accept respondents’ vagueness argument
would be to call into question the constitutionality of the many valuable
Government programs awarding scholarships and grants on the basis of
subjective criteria such as “excellence.” Pp. 588–590.

100 F. 3d 671, reversed and remanded.

O(cid:146)Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in all but Part
II–B of which Ginsburg, J., joined. Scalia, J., ﬁled an opinion concur-
ring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 590. Souter,
J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 600.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 569 (1998). It discusses the constitutionality of a provision in the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) funding guidelines.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

670

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Opinion of the Court

OSI, which was created to institute denaturalization and
deportation proceedings against suspected Nazi war crimi-
nals, is now investigating whether, contrary to his repre-
sentations, Balsys participated in Nazi persecution during
World War II. Such activity would subject him to deporta-
tion for persecuting persons because of their race, religion,
national origin, or political opinion under §§ 1182(a)(3)(E) and
1251(a)(4)(D), as well as for lying on his visa application
under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and 1251(a)(1)(A).

When OSI issued a subpoena requiring Balsys to testify
at a deposition, he appeared and gave his name and address,
but he refused to answer any other questions, such as those
directed to his wartime activities in Europe between 1940–
1945 and his immigration to the United States in 1961.
In
response to all such questions, Balsys invoked the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination,
claiming that his answers could subject him to criminal
prosecution. He did not contend that he would incriminate
himself under domestic law,1 but claimed the privilege be-
cause his responses could subject him to criminal prosecution
by Lithuania, Israel, and Germany.

OSI responded with a petition in Federal District Court to
enforce the subpoena under § 1225(a). Although the District
Court found that if Balsys were to provide the information
requested, he would face a real and substantial danger of
prosecution by Lithuania and Israel (but not by Germany),
it granted OSI’s enforcement petition and ordered Balsys to
testify, treating the Fifth Amendment as inapplicable to a
918 F. Supp.
claim of incrimination solely under foreign law.
588 (EDNY 1996). Balsys appealed, and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s
order, holding that a witness with a real and substantial fear
of prosecution by a foreign country may assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege to avoid giving testimony in a domes-

1 The Government advises us that the statute of limitation bars criminal

prosecution for any misrepresentation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a court case. It discusses a legal issue related to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and its application to potential prosecution by foreign countries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

litigation” that procedural rules often “seek to promote.”  Henderson v.
Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435.

Given the risk of disruption and waste that accompanies the juris-
dictional label, a procedural requirement will be construed as jurisdic-
tional only if Congress “clearly states” that it is.  Boechler v. Commis-
sioner,  596  U. S.  ___,  ___.  To  determine  whether  the  statutory  text
“plainly show[s] that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdic-
tional consequences,” courts apply “traditional tools of statutory con-
struction.”  United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410.

Section 2409a(g) lacks a jurisdictional clear statement, and nothing
about  §2409a(g)’s  text  or  context  gives  reason  to  depart  from  this
Court’s observation that “most time bars are nonjurisdictional.”  Ibid.
Section 2409a(g) states that an action “shall be barred unless it is com-
menced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued.”  This
“text speaks only to a claim’s timeliness,” and its “mundane statute-of-
limitations  language  say[s]  only  what  every  time  bar,  by  definition,
must: that after a certain time a claim is barred.”  Ibid.  Further, “[t]his
Court has often explained that Congress’s separation of a filing dead-
line from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the time bar is not juris-
dictional.”  Id., at 411.  Here, the Quiet Title Act’s jurisdictional grant
is  in  §1346(f),  well  afield  of  §2409a(g).    And  “[n]othing  [in  §1346(f)]
conditions  the  jurisdictional  grant  on  the  limitations  perio[d  in
§2409a(g)] or otherwise links those separate provisions.”  Id., at 412.
Pp. 3–5.

(b) None of the three decisions of this Court on which the Govern-
ment relies—Block, 461 U. S. 273, United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S.
834,  and  United  States  v.  Beggerly,  524  U. S.  38—definitively  inter-
preted §2409a(g) as jurisdictional.  This Court has made clear that it
will not undo a “definitive earlier interpretation” of a statutory provi-
sion as jurisdictional without due regard for the principles of stare de-
cisis.  John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 138.
Yet the mere fact that this Court previously described something as
jurisdictional is not dispositive, as “[c]ourts, including this Court, have
more  than  occasionally  misused  the  term  ‘jurisdictional’  to  refer  to
nonjurisdictional prescriptions.”  Fort Bend, 587 U. S., at ___–___, n. 4.
To  separate  “definitive”  interpretations  of  jurisdiction  from  those  in
which the term “jurisdictional” has been used imprecisely, the Court
asks if a prior decision addressed whether a provision is “ ‘technically
jurisdictional,’ ” i.e., whether  it  truly  operates  as  a  limit  on  a  court’s
subject-matter  jurisdiction,  and  whether  anything  in  the  decision
“turn[ed] on that characterization.”  Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S.
500,  512  (quoting  Steel  Co.  v.  Citizens  for  Better  Environment,  523
U. S. 83, 91).  A decision that simply states that “the court is dismiss-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case. It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather an overview of the legal issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529IND

Unit: $UBV [10-03-01 07:01:03] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

INDEX

1213

LANHAM ACT. See Trademark Act of 1946.

LUGGAGE SEARCHES. See Constitutional Law, X, 1.

MARITIME OIL TRANSPORT. See Pre-emption of State Law, 2.

MEDICARE. See Criminal Law, 2; Jurisdiction.

NATIONAL TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY ACT OF 1966.

See Pre-emption of State Law, 3.

NUDE DANCING. See Constitutional Law, V.

NURSING HOMES. See Jurisdiction.

OIL TRANSPORT. See Pre-emption of State Law, 2.

PAROLE. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1.

PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW.

1. Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970—Adequacy of railroad crossing
warning devices—State tort laws.—Act,
in conjunction with 23 CFR
§§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), pre-empts state tort claims concerning a railroad’s
failure to maintain adequate warning devices at crossings where federal
funds have participated in devices’ installation. Norfolk Southern R. Co.
v. Shanklin, p. 344.

2. Maritime oil transport—State regulations.—Washington’s super-
tanker regulations on general navigation watch procedures, crew English
language skills and training, and maritime casualty reporting are pre-
empted by a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme; case is remanded
to determine validity of other state regulations in light of considerable
federal interest at stake. United States v. Locke, p. 89.

3. National Trafﬁc and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966—State
common-law tort action—Automobile airbags.—Act, read with relevant
regulatory standard, pre-empted a state common-law tort action in which
petitioners claimed that respondent manufacturer, who complied with
standard, should have equipped a 1987 car with airbags. Geier v. Ameri-
can Honda Motor Co., p. 861.

PRIOR CONVICTIONS AS EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law, 3.

PRISON TERMS. See Criminal Law, 4.

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. See Constitutional

Law, VII.

PROSECUTOR’S TRIAL COMMENTS. See Constitutional Law, II,

2; VII; VIII.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents from a legal document. It lists topics and corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 21–1326 and 22–111
_________________

UNITED STATES, ET AL., EX REL. TRACY SCHUTTE,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
SUPERVALU INC., ET AL.

21–1326

UNITED STATES, ET AL., EX REL. THOMAS PROCTOR,
PETITIONER
v.
SAFEWAY, INC.

22–111

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 1, 2023]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The False Claims Act (FCA) imposes liability on anyone
who  “knowingly”  submits  a  “false”  claim  to  the  Govern-
ment.  31  U. S. C.  §3729(a).    In  some  cases,  that  rule  is
straightforward:  If  a  law  authorized  payment  of  $100  for
“each”  medical  test,  and  a  doctor  knows  that  he  did  five
tests  but  submits  a  claim  for  ten,  then  he  has  knowingly
submitted  a  false  claim.  But  sometimes  the  rule  is  less
clear.  If  a  law  authorized  payment  for  only  “customary”
medical tests, some doctors might be confused when it came
time  for  billing.    And,  while  some  doctors  might  honestly
mistake what that term means, others might correctly un-
derstand whatever “customary” meant in this context—and
submit claims that were inaccurate anyway.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the introduction to the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

831

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–9995.  Bannister  v.  Illinois.  Sup.  Ct.  Ill.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  232  Ill.  2d  52,  902  N.  E.  2d  571.

No.  08–10000.  Huff  v.  Kentucky  Retirement  Systems.

Ct.  App.  Ky.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10028.  Robledo-Leyva  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  859.

No.  08–10038.  Bennett  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  962.

No.  08–10041.  Pelullo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  823.

No.  08–10046.  Furnish  v.  Kentucky.  Sup.  Ct.  Ky.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  267  S. W.  3d  656.

No.  08–10061.  Nyhammer  v.  New  Jersey.  Sup.  Ct.  N.  J.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  197  N.  J.  383,  963  A.  2d  316.

No.  08–10071.  Garcia  Nunez  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas
Department  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institu
tions  Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  294  Fed.  Appx.  104.

No.  08–10074.  Stitt  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  552  F.  3d  345.

No.  08–10075.  Rashid  v.  United  States;
No.  08–10508.  Haque  v.  United  States;  and
No. 09–5712.  Haque  v.  United States.  C. A.  6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  510.

No. 08–10079.  Rice v.  Davis, Warden.  Sup. Ct. Va.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 08–10080.  Spear v.  Howerton, Warden.  C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10083.  Ray  v.  Allen,  Commissioner,  Alabama  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–10084.  Ruiz  v.  Birkett,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Syllabus

judgment against its original action.  Pp. 18–25.

20 F. 4th 928, reversed and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BREYER,
SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.  KAVANAUGH, J., filed
a  concurring  opinion.  ALITO,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which
THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opin-
ion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined as to all but the
first sentence.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and summary. It includes information about the case name, court, and the opinions filed. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's metadata about the case rather than the actual content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

17

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

appeals.  To determine whether to grant a stay, the court of
appeals  may  then  promptly  review  the  Government’s
likelihood of success on the merits, among other factors.  If
the  court  of  appeals  denies  a  stay,  the  Government  may
seek further review in this Court.  See Labrador v. Poe, 601
U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in grant
of stay) (slip op., at 2).  The Government’s frustration with
the occasional incorrect district court vacatur of an agency
rule  is  understandable.    But  especially  given  the  readily
accessible  and  regularly  utilized  procedures  for  staying  a
district court’s vacatur,8 we should not overreact by entirely
gutting  vacatur  as  a  remedy  and  thereby  barring
unregulated  but  adversely  affected  parties  from  bringing
APA suits.

Not  surprisingly,  when  asked  at  oral  argument  in  this
case  about  the  extraordinary  consequences  of  its  new  no-
vacatur position, the Government seemed to backpedal and
hedge a bit.  The Government suggested that vacatur may
actually still be appropriate if it is “the only way to give the
party  before  the  court  relief.”    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  76.    The
Government also said that “it’s possible that the only way
to provide” Corner Post “relief would be vacatur.”  Ibid.

I appreciate the Government’s apparent attempt to back
away  from  its  extreme  stance.  But  in  doing  so,  the
Government also revealed the weakness of its position.  The
meaning  of  “set  aside”  in  the  APA  cannot  reasonably
depend  on  the  specific  party  before  the  court.    Either  the
APA authorizes vacatur, or it does not.

More  to  the  point,  the  Government’s  answer  at  oral
argument is a solution in search of a problem.  The federal
courts have long interpreted the APA to authorize vacatur
of agency actions.  Both the text and the history of the APA
support  that  interpretation,  and  courts  have  had  no  real

——————

8 If the problem became sufficiently severe, the Executive Branch could

always ask Congress to limit the remedies available under the APA.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It delves into the legal interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) regarding the vacatur of agency rules.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court

Orthopedic  Associates,  P. A.  v.  Allstate  Ins.  Co.,  559  U. S.
393,  419–420  (2010)  (Stevens,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and
concurring in judgment).  Many rules “are rationally capa-
ble of classification as either.”  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S.
460, 472 (1965); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U. S.
717,  726  (1988)  (“Except  at  the  extremes,  the  terms  ‘sub-
stance’ and ‘procedure’ precisely describe very little except
a dichotomy.”).  Procedure, after all, is often used as a vehi-
cle to achieve substantive ends.  When a governor vetoes a
bill because of a disagreement with its policy consequences,
has the governor exercised a procedural or substantive re-
straint on lawmaking?  Smiley did not endorse such murky
inquiries  into  the  nature  of  constitutional  restraints,  and
we see no neat distinction today.

D
Were  there  any  doubt,  historical  practice  confirms  that
state legislatures remain bound by state constitutional re-
straints  when  exercising  authority  under  the  Elections
Clause.  We  have  long  looked  to  “settled  and  established
practice”  to  interpret  the  Constitution.    The  Pocket  Veto
Case, 279 U. S. 655, 689 (1929).  And we have found histor-
ical  practice  particularly  pertinent  when  it  comes  to  the
Elections and Electors Clauses.  Smiley, 285 U. S., at 369
(Elections Clause); Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U. S. ___,
___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 12–14) (Electors Clause).

Two state constitutional provisions adopted shortly after
the founding offer the strongest evidence.  Delaware’s 1792
Constitution provided that the State’s congressional repre-
sentatives “shall be voted for at the same places where rep-
resentatives  in  the  State  legislature  are  voted  for,  and  in
the  same  manner.”  Art.  VIII,  §2.  Even  though  the  Elec-
tions Clause stated that the “Places” and “Manner” of fed-
eral elections shall be “prescribed” by the state legislatures,
the Delaware Constitution expressly enacted rules govern-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text discussing the historical practice surrounding state constitutional restraints on lawmaking.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxvii

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Flood v. Frank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Flores v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florez Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Bender v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Byrd v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Deese v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida v. J. L.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; King v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Robinson v.
Florida; Taylor v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Wallace v.
Florida v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida Dept. of Corrections; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida Dept. of Corrections; Muhammad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida Parole and Probation Comm’n; Clements v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
Florida State Division of Human Services; Corey v. . . . . . . . . . . .
Flournoy v. Moskowitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Flowers; Alexander v.
Flowers v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Floyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Flynn; JF Hotel Management v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Food Lion, Inc.; Longman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ford v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ford v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ford Motor Co.; McFadden v.
Ford Motor Co.; Van Sickle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foreman v. Dallas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Forrest v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Forte v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foster, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foster v. Bank One, Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foster v. Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foster v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foster v. Penn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foster v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foti; Stemley v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fowler v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fowler; LaRouche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fowler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foye v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Francis v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Francis v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1091
1062
1043
1029
1031
1118
266
1071
1057
1058
1030,1125
1124
1091
1133
1117
1006
1072
1138
1009
1029
1054
120
1067
1014
1072
1021
1125
1069
1067
1136
1053
1146
1087
1027
1025
1109
1057
1132
1055
1035
1103
1072
1042
1007
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CARNEY v. ADAMS

Opinion of the Court

Pleas.  The provision says that no more than a bare major-
ity  of  judges  on  any  of  these  courts  “shall  be  of  the  same
political party.”  Ibid.  (We shall call this requirement the
“bare majority” requirement.)  The Delaware Constitution
also  contains  a  second  requirement  applicable  only  to  the
Supreme  Court,  the  Chancery  Court,  and  the  Superior
Court.  It says that the remaining members of those three
courts (those not in the bare majority) “shall be of the other
major political party.”  Ibid.  (We shall call this the “major
party” requirement.)  Thus, all five courts are subject to the
“bare majority” requirement, and three of the five courts are
additionally subject to the “major party” requirement.

On February 21, 2017, plaintiff-respondent James R. Ad-
ams  sued  Delaware’s  Governor,  John  Carney,  in  Federal
District Court.  Adams, then a newly registered political in-
dependent,  claimed  that  both  of  Delaware’s  political  bal-
ance  requirements  violated  his  First  Amendment  right  to
freedom of association by making him ineligible to become
a judge unless he rejoined a major political party.

Governor Carney moved to dismiss for lack of standing,
and  Adams  filed  an  amended  complaint  in  an  attempt  to
rectify  the  problem.    App.  1–2,  17–18.  After  discovery
largely centered on Adams’ history and intentions in seek-
ing a judgeship, the parties cross-moved for summary judg-
ment.  Governor  Carney  argued  (1)  that  Adams  lacked
standing to assert his constitutional claim, and (2) that, in
any  event,  the  requirements  were  constitutional.    Adams
argued only that he was entitled to summary judgment on
the merits because the political balance requirements made
independents like him ineligible for a judgeship.

The  District  Court  denied  Governor  Carney’s  summary
judgment motion.  Id., at 165; App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a.  It
held that Adams had standing to challenge both the “major
party” requirement for membership on the Supreme Court,
the Chancery Court, and the Superior Court and the “bare
majority” requirement for membership on the Family Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the case Carney v. Adams. It sets the context for the case by outlining the relevant legal provisions and the plaintiff's claim.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

employs directly.  See 40 U. S. C. §3172(c).

As compared to the general state workers’ compensation
regime, Washington’s law makes it easier for federal con-
tract workers at Hanford to establish their entitlement to
workers’ compensation.  In particular, the statute creates a
causal presumption that certain diseases and illnesses are
caused  by  the  cleanup  work  at  Hanford.    See  Wash.  Rev.
Code §§51.32.187(2), (3), (4).  The presumption is rebuttable
only  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence.  §51.32.187(2)(b).
And the presumption lasts for a worker’s entire life, even
after the worker’s time at Hanford ends.  §51.32.187(5)(a).
Because the Federal Government pays workers’ compensa-
tion claims for federal contractors at Hanford, see App. 48–
50,  Washington’s  law  increases  workers’  compensation
costs for the Federal Government.

The United States brought suit against Washington, ar-
guing  that  its  law  violated  the  Supremacy  Clause  by  dis-
criminating against the Federal Government.  The District
Court concluded that the state law fell within the scope of
the  federal  waiver  of  immunity  contained  in  40  U. S. C.
§3172 and was therefore constitutional.  The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.  See 994 F. 3d 994, 1012 (2020).  We granted cer-
tiorari  to  determine  the  constitutionality  of  Washington’s
law.

II
Washington first claims that this case is moot.  After we
granted certiorari, Washington enacted a new statute, see
S.  5890,  67th  Leg.,  Reg.  Sess.  (2022),  which  changed  the
scope of the original law.  The law’s causal presumption no
longer  applies  exclusively  to  Hanford  site  workers  who
“work, either directly or indirectly, for the United States.”
§51.32.187(1)(b).  Instead, under the new law, the presump-
tion applies more broadly to any “worker working at a radi-
ological hazardous waste facility.”  2022 Wash. Sess. Laws
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the Opinion of the Court. It sets the stage for the case by outlining the relevant facts and legal issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

KAGAN, J., dissenting

counted.  See ante, at 27.  But elections are often fought and
won  at  the  margins—certainly  in  Arizona.    Consider  the
number of votes separating the two presidential candidates
in the most recent election: 10,457.  That is fewer votes than
Arizona discarded under the out-of-precinct policy in two of
the  prior  three  presidential  elections.    This  Court  previ-
ously rejected the idea—the “erroneous assumption”—“that
a small group of voters can never influence the outcome of
an election.”  Chisom, 501 U. S., at 397, n. 24.  For that rea-
son, we held that even “a small minority” group can claim
Section 2 protection.  See ibid.  Similarly here, the out-of-
precinct policy—which discards thousands upon thousands
of  ballots  in  every  election—affects  more  than  sufficient
votes  to  implicate Section  2’s  guarantee  of  equal  electoral
opportunity.
  And the out-of-precinct policy operates unequally: Ballots
cast by minorities are more likely to be discarded.  In 2016,
Hispanics, African Americans, and Native Americans were
about  twice  as  likely—or  said  another  way,  100%  more
likely—to  have  their  ballots  discarded  than  whites.    See
App. 122.  And it is possible to break that down a bit.  Sixty
percent of the voting in Arizona is from Maricopa County.
There,  Hispanics  were  110%  more  likely,  African  Ameri-
cans  86%  more  likely,  and  Native  Americans  73%  more
likely  to  have  their  ballots  tossed.    See  id.,  at  153.    Pima
County,  the  next  largest  county,  provides  another  15%  of
the  statewide  vote.    There,  Hispanics  were  148%  more
likely,  African  Americans  80%  more  likely,  and  Native
Americans 74% more likely to lose their votes.  See id., at
157.  The record does not contain statewide figures for 2012.
But in Maricopa and Pima Counties, the percentages were
about the same  as  in  2016.   See id.,  at  87,  91.    Assessing
those disparities, the plaintiffs’ expert found, and the Dis-
trict Court accepted, that the discriminatory impact of the
out-of-precinct  policy  was  statistically  significant—mean-
ing, again, that it was highly unlikely to occur by chance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee. It discusses the impact of an out-of-precinct voting policy and its disproportionate effect on minority voters.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES ET AL. v. RAIMONDO,
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 22–451.  Argued January 17, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024*

The  Court  granted  certiorari  in  these  cases  limited  to  the  question
whether Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837, should be overruled or clarified.  Under the Chev-
ron doctrine, courts have sometimes been required to defer to “permis-
sible”  agency  interpretations  of  the  statutes  those  agencies  adminis-
ter—even when a reviewing court reads the statute differently.  Id., at
843.  In each case below, the reviewing courts applied Chevron’s frame-
work to resolve in favor of the Government challenges by petitioners
to a rule promulgated by the National Marine Fisheries Service pur-
suant  to  the  Magnuson-Stevens  Act,  16  U. S. C.  §1801  et seq.,  which
incorporates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §551
et seq.

Held: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their
independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within
its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency inter-
pretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is
overruled.  Pp. 7–35.

(a) Article  III  of  the  Constitution  assigns  to  the  Federal  Judiciary
the  responsibility  and  power  to  adjudicate  “Cases”  and  “Controver-
sies”—concrete  disputes  with  consequences  for  the  parties  involved.
The Framers appreciated that the laws judges would necessarily apply
in resolving those disputes would not always be clear, but envisioned

——————

*Together  with  No.  22–1219,  Relentless, Inc., et  al. v. Department  of
Commerce, et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview for readers and are not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the full text of the court's analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

3

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

people  of  a  State  and  the  State  itself,  must  be  given  by
them  or  by  the  legislative  and  political  department  of
the government of the United States.”  Giles v. Harris, 189
U. S. 475, 488 (1903).

Congress  learned  from  experience  that  laws  targeting
particular  electoral  practices  or  enabling  case-by-case
litigation were inadequate to the task.  In the Civil Rights
Acts  of  1957,  1960,  and  1964,  Congress  authorized  and
then expanded the power of “the Attorney General to seek
injunctions  against  public  and  private  interference  with
the  right  to  vote  on  racial  grounds.”    Katzenbach,  383
U. S., at 313.  But circumstances reduced the ameliorative
potential of these legislative Acts:

“Voting suits are unusually onerous to prepare, some
times  requiring  as  many  as  6,000  man-hours  spent
combing  through  registration  records  in  preparation
for trial.  Litigation has been exceedingly slow, in part
because  of the  ample  opportunities  for  delay  afforded
voting  officials  and  others  involved  in  the  proceed
ings.  Even when favorable decisions have finally been
obtained,  some  of  the  States  affected  have  merely
switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the
federal decrees or have enacted difficult new tests de
signed to prolong the existing disparity between white
and Negro registration.  Alternatively, certain local of
ficials  have  defied  and  evaded  court  orders  or  have
simply  closed  their  registration  offices  to  freeze  the
voting rolls.”  Id., at 314 (footnote omitted).

Patently, a new approach was needed.

Answering that need, the Voting Rights Act became one
of the most consequential, efficacious, and amply justified
exercises  of  federal  legislative  power  in  our  Nation’s  his
tory.  Requiring federal preclearance of changes in voting
laws in the covered jurisdictions—those States and locali
ties where opposition to the Constitution’s commands were
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It discusses the history of voting rights legislation and the need for the Voting Rights Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>