<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

the  consequences  of  an  inaccurate  application  by  claiming  lack  of
knowledge.  As in other legal contexts, courts need not automatically
accept a copyright holder’s claim that it was unaware of the relevant
legal requirements.  Willful blindness may support a finding of actual
knowledge.    Additionally,  circumstantial  evidence  may  demonstrate
that an applicant was actually aware of, or willfully blind to, legally
inaccurate  information.    Second,  the  legal  maxim  that  “ignorance  of
the law is no excuse” does not apply in this civil case concerning the
scope of a statutory safe harbor that arises from ignorance of collateral
legal requirements.  Finally, the “knowledge” question that the parties
have argued, and which the Court decides, was a “subsidiary question
fairly included” in the petition’s question presented.  See this Court’s
Rule  14.1(a).    And  the  Ninth  Circuit  explicitly  addressed  the
knowledge issue when it held that Unicolors’ “knowledge” of the facts
underlying the inaccuracy on its application was sufficient to demon-
strate  knowledge  under  §411(b)(1)(A)  without  regard  to  Unicolors’
knowledge of the relevant law.  Pp. 8–9.

959 F. 3d 1194, vacated and remanded.

  BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  THOMAS,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J. joined, and in which  GOR-
SUCH, J. joined, except as to Part II.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a court case. It includes citations, case names, and a brief overview of the legal arguments and holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38

GOLAN v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

restoration of the restored copyright.

“(B)  Notices  of  intent  to  enforce  a  restored  copyright
served on a reliance party shall be signed by the owner or
the owner’s agent, shall identify the restored work and the
work  in  which  the  restored  work  is  used,  if  any,  in  detail
sufficient  to  identify  them,  and  shall  include  an  English
translation of the title, any other alternative titles known
to the owner by which the work may be identified, the use
or  uses  to  which  the  owner  objects,  and  an  address  and
telephone number at which the reliance party may contact
the owner.  If the notice is signed by an agent, the agency
relationship  must  have  been  constituted  in  writing  and
signed by the owner before service of the notice.
  “(3)  EFFECT  OF  MATERIAL  FALSE  STATEMENTS.—Any
material  false  statement  knowingly  made  with  respect  to
any  restored  copyright  identified  in  any  notice  of  intent
shall  make  void  all  claims  and  assertions  made  with
respect to such restored copyright.
“(f)
LIABILITY.—
  “(1) IN  GENERAL.—Any person who warrants, promises,
or  guarantees  that  a  work  does  not  violate  an  exclusive
right  granted  in  section  106  shall  not  be  liable  for  legal,
equitable,  arbitral,  or  administrative  relief  if  the  war-
ranty,  promise,  or  guarantee  is  breached  by  virtue  of  the
restoration of copyright under this section, if such warran-
ty, promise, or guarantee is made before January 1, 1995.
  “(2)  PERFORMANCES.—No  person  shall  be  required  to
perform any act if such performance is made infringing by
virtue of the restoration of copyright under the provisions
of this section, if the obligation to perform was undertaken
before January 1, 1995.
“(g)  PROCLAMATION  OF  COPYRIGHT  RESTORATION.—
Whenever  the  President  finds  that  a  particular  foreign
nation  extends,  to  works  by  authors  who  are  nationals
or  domiciliaries  of  the  United  States,  restored  copyright

 FROM  WARRANTY

AND  RELATED

IMMUNITY
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, likely from a court opinion or a legal document related to copyright restoration.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

BILSKI v. KAPPOS

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

Early American Patent Law

At the Constitutional Convention, the Founders decided
to give Congress a patent power so that it might “promote
the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”  Art. I, §8, cl. 8.  There is
little known history of that Clause.22  We do know that the
Clause passed without objection or debate.23  This is strik-
ing  because  other  proposed  powers,  such  as  a  power  to
grant  charters  of  incorporation,  generated  discussion
about  the  fear  that  they  might  breed  “monopolies.”24
Indeed,  at  the  ratification  conventions,  some  States  rec-
ommended  amendments  that  would  have  prohibited  Con-
gress  from  granting  “ ‘exclusive  advantages  of  com-
merce.’ ” 25    If  the  original  understanding  of  the  Patent

——————

Enterprise:  Merchants  and  Economic  Development  in  Revolutionary
Philadelphia  291  (1986)  (describing  new  methods  of  conducting  and
financing trade with China).

22 See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J.
Pat.  Off.  Soc.  5,  10  (1966)  (hereinafter  Seidel);  Walterscheid,  To  Pro-
mote  the  Progress  of  Science  and  Useful  Arts:  The  Background  and
Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Consti-
tution,  2  J.  Intell.  Prop.  L.  1,  26  (1994)  (hereinafter  Walterscheid,
Background  and  Origin);  Walterscheid,  To  Promote  the  Progress  59,
and  n. 12;  Prager,  A  History  of  Intellectual  Property  From  1545  to
1787, 26 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 711, 746 (1944).

23 Walterscheid, Background and Origin 26; 2 Records of the Federal

Convention of 1787, pp. 509–510 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).

24 J.  Madison,  Notes  of  Debates  in  the  Federal  Convention  of  1787,

pp. 638–639 (Ohio Univ. Press ed. 1966).

25 See Walterscheid, Background and Origin 38, n. 124, 55–56 (collect-
ing sources); see also The Objections of Hon. George Mason, One of the
Delegates  from  Virginia,  in  the  Late  Continental  Convention,  to  the
Proposed  Federal  Constitution,  Assigned  as  His  Reasons  For  Not
Signing  the  Same,  2  American  Museum  or  Repository  of  Ancient  and
Modern Fugitive Pieces, etc. 534, 536 (1787) (reprint 1965); Ratification
of the New Constitution by the Convention of the State of New York, 4
id.,  at  153,  156  (1789);  Remarks  on  the  Amendments  to  the  Federal
Constitution  Proposed  by  The  Conventions  of  Massachusetts,  New
Hampshire,  New  York,  Virginia,  South  and  North  Carolina,  with  the
Minorities of  Pennsylvania and Maryland by the  Rev. Nicholas Collin,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Stevens in the case of *Bilski v. Kappos*.  It discusses the history and intent behind the patent clause in the U.S. Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Commentary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Per Curiam

Appx., at 206.  Suffice it to say, a reasonable officer could
miss the connection between that case and this one.

Neither the panel majority nor the respondent have iden-
tified a single precedent finding a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation under similar circumstances.  The officers were thus
entitled to qualified immunity.

The petition for certiorari and the motions for leave to file
briefs  amici  curiae  are  granted,  and  the  judgment  of  the
Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a formal structure characteristic of court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

29

THOMAS, J., dissenting

removal treaties); The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867)
(States cannot tax Indian lands)).  It does not follow from
those  cases  that  the  Federal  Government  has  any  addi-
tional  authority  with  regard  to  Indians—much  less  a
sweeping, unbounded authority over all matters relating to
Indians.  Cf. Worcester, 6 Pet., at 547 (suggesting that tribes
had  long  been  left  to  regulate  their  internal  affairs).    At
each step, Kagama thus lacked any constitutional basis.

Nonetheless,  in  the  years  after  Kagama,  this  Court
started referring to a “plenary power” or “plenary author-
ity” that Congress possessed over Indian tribes, as well as
a trust relationship with the Indians.  See, e.g., Stephens v.
Cherokee  Nation,  174  U. S.  445,  478  (1899);  Lone  Wolf  v.
Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 565 (1903); Winton v. Amos, 255
U. S. 373, 391 (1921).  And, in the decades since, this Court
has increasingly gestured to such a plenary power, usually
in  the  context  of  regulating  a  tribal  government  or  tribal
lands,  while  conspicuously  failing  to  ground  the  power  in
any constitutional text and cautioning that the power is not
absolute.  See, e.g., ante, at 13 (noting this problem); United
States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U. S. 40, 54 (1946)
(opinion of Vinson, C. J.); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U. S. 49, 56–57 (1978).

The majority’s opinion today continues in that vein—only
confirming  its  lack  of  any  constitutional  basis.    Like  so
many  cases  before  it,  the  majority’s  opinion  lurches  from
one  constitutional  hook  to  another,  not  quite  hanging  the
idea of a plenary power on any of them, while insisting that
the  plenary  power  is  not  absolute.    See  ante,  at  10–13.
While I empathize with the majority regarding the confu-
sion that Kagama and its progeny have engendered, I can-
not reflexively reaffirm a power that remains in search of a
constitutional basis.  And, while the majority points to a few
actual  constitutional  provisions,  like  the  Commerce  and
Treaty  Clauses,  those  provisions  cannot  bear  the  weight
that our cases have placed upon them.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites previous cases and argues against the majority's opinion, focusing on the lack of constitutional basis for a "plenary power" over Indian tribes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

45

Thomas, J., dissenting

Contrary to the Secretary’s representation, Brief for Pe-
titioners 31–32, the presumption favors not merely judicial
review “at some point,” but preenforcement judicial review.
While it is true that the presumption may not be quite as
strong when the question is now-or-later instead of now-or-
never, see Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200,
207, n. 8, 215, n. 20 (1994), our cases clearly establish that the
presumption applies in the former context.
Indeed, Abbott
Laboratories, the “important case . . . which marks the re-
cent era of increased access to judicial review,” Breyer,
supra, at 831, itself involved a preenforcement challenge to
a regulation. Although the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) did not authorize a preenforcement challenge to
the type of regulation the Secretary had issued, and indeed
expressly enumerated certain other kinds of regulations for
which preenforcement review was available, we explained
that these indicia of congressional intent must be viewed
through the lens of the presumption:

“The ﬁrst question we consider is whether Congress by
the [FDCA] intended to forbid pre-enforcement review
of this sort of regulation promulgated by the Com-
missioner. The question is phrased in terms of ‘pro-
hibition’ rather than ‘authorization’ because a survey of
our cases shows that judicial review of a ﬁnal agency
action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless
there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the
purpose of Congress.” Abbott Laboratories, 387 U. S.,
at 139–140.

We thus held that the suit could proceed.

Id., at 148.

More recently, in Haitian Refugee Center, we reafﬁrmed
the applicability of the presumption in the context of a pre-
enforcement challenge. At issue in that case was the consti-
tutionality of the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s

within the meaning of a relevant statute.’ ” Abbott Laboratories v. Gard-
ner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967) (quoting 5 U. S. C. § 702 (1964 ed., Supp. III)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in a case decided by the Supreme Court. It contains legal arguments, citations to other cases, and analysis of statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxxiii

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

Roberson v. LFI Fort Pierce, Inc.
808

Roberson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  868,1006,1156

Robert; Truly v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130

Roberts, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,1038

969
Roberts v. Bank of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121
Roberts v. Jenkins  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roberts; Paradise v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  920,923,959,961

Roberts v. United States
992

Robertson v. Michigan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
984

Robertson; Piggie v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

Robertson v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1090

Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
814

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robinson, In re
871

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robinson; Bouman v.
1014

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robinson v. Cain
1120

Robinson v. Florida
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912

Robinson v. Jackson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909

Robinson v. Johnson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Robinson v. LeBlanc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1103

Robinson v. Napolitano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robinson v. Ohio
894

Robinson v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912

Robinson v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety  . . . . . . . . . . . .
818,

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robinson v. United States
884,896,904,907,919,941,957,976,977,1003,1086,1133

Robinson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924

889

Robinson v. Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Robinson; York v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Robledo-Leyva v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
881

Robles v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rocha v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1016

Rochester, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  968,989

837

Rock; Gill v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937

Rock; Green v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935

Rock; Lavayen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rock; Reynoso v.
Rock Hill City Police Dept.; Miller v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Rockingham County Bd. of Ed.; Roach v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  968,1078

1149

Rockland County v. Federal Aviation Administration . . . . . . . . . .
892

Rodebaugh v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Roden v. Diah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Rodgers v. Colorado  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Rodgers v. Hedgpeth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Rodis v. San Francisco  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

to  control  distribution  of  a  particular  copy  is  exhausted
only  within  the  country  in  which  the  copy  is  sold.  See
Forsyth  &  Rothnie,  Parallel  Imports,  in  The  Interface
Between  Intellectual  Property  Rights  and  Competition
Policy  429,  430  (S.  Anderman  ed.  2007)  (hereinafter
Forsyth & Rothnie).  Another option is a rule of international
exhaustion,  under  which  the  authorized  distribution  of  a
particular copy anywhere in the world exhausts the copy
right  owner’s  distribution  right  everywhere  with  respect
to that copy.  See ibid.  The European Union has adopted
the  intermediate  approach  of  regional  exhaustion,  under
which  the  sale  of  a  copy  anywhere  within  the  European
Economic  Area  exhausts  the  copyright  owner’s  distribu
tion  right  throughout  that  region.    See  id.,  at  430,  445.
Section  602(a)(1),  in  my  view,  ties  the  United  States  to  a
national-exhaustion framework.  The Court’s decision, in con-
trast, places the United States solidly in the international
exhaustion camp.

Strong arguments have been made both in favor of, and
in opposition to, international exhaustion.  See Chiappetta
360  (“[r]easonable  people  making  valid  points  can,  and
do,  reach  conflicting  conclusions”  regarding  the  desirability
of  international  exhaustion).    International  exhaustion
subjects  copyright-protected  goods  to  competition  from
lower  priced  imports  and,  to  that  extent,  benefits  con-
sumers.  Correspondingly,  copyright  owners  profit  from  a
national-exhaustion regime, which also enlarges the mon
etary  incentive  to  create  new  copyrightable  works.  See
Forsyth & Rothnie 432–437 (surveying arguments for and
against international exhaustion).

Weighing  the  competing  policy  concerns,  our  Govern
ment  reached  the  conclusion  that  widespread  adoption  of
the  international-exhaustion  framework  would  be  incon
sistent  with  the  long-term  economic  interests  of  the  United
States.    See  Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  in
Quality King, O. T. 1997, No. 96–1470, pp. 22–26 (herein
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the concept of copyright exhaustion and the arguments for and against international exhaustion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1238

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

Rule

PARTIES

Appeals............................................................................  18.2
Certiorari ........................................................................  12.4, 12.6
Death, effect of ..............................................................  35.1–35.3
Listing, when required

—Briefs on merits.................................................  24.1(b)

—Petitions for writ of certiorari  ......................  14.1(b)

Public ofﬁcers

—Description of  ...................................................  35.4

—Effect of death or resignation  .......................  35.3

POSTPONING CONSIDERATION OF

JURISDICTION—See Appeals

PROCESS—See also Service

Dismissal of cases..........................................................  46.3

Form  ...............................................................................  45.1

Original actions .............................................................  17.7

PROHIBITION—See Extraordinary Writs
PROOF OF SERVICE—See Service
PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES

Costs allowed against...................................................  43.5

Description of.................................................................  35.4

Service on .......................................................................  29.4

Substitution of ...............................................................  35.3

PUERTO RICO—See State Courts
QUORUM

Absence, effect of ..........................................................  4.2

Number to constitute  ..................................................  4.2

RECESS—See Sessions of Court
RECORDS

Certiﬁcation and transmission

—Appeals  ..............................................................  18.11, 18.12

—Certiﬁed questions............................................  19.4

—Certiorari............................................................  12.7

Diagrams.........................................................................  32
Exhibits...........................................................................  26.7, 32
Joint appendix

—Costs, effect on allocation of...........................  26.3

—Inclusion of designated record .......  26.1–26.3, 26.4(b), 26.5, 26.8

Models  ............................................................................  32
Original documents

—On certiorari  .....................................................  12.7

—Return to lower courts  ...................................  1.2
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a table of contents or an index for a legal document, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It lists various rules and their corresponding section numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

Opinion of the Court

quotation marks omitted).

No  other  Member  of  the  Court  joined  Justice  Powell’s
opinion.  Four  Justices  instead  would  have  held  that  the
government may use race for the purpose of “remedying the
effects  of  past  societal  discrimination.”  Id.,  at  362  (joint
opinion of Brennan,  White,  Marshall,  and Blackmun,  JJ.,
concurring  in  judgment  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part).
Four  other  Justices,  meanwhile,  would  have  struck  down
the Davis program as violative of Title VI.  In their view, it
“seem[ed]  clear  that  the  proponents  of  Title  VI  assumed
that the Constitution itself required a colorblind standard
on the part of government.”  Id., at 416 (Stevens, J., joined
by Burger, C. J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).  The Davis
program therefore flatly contravened a core “principle im-
bedded  in  the  constitutional  and  moral  understanding  of
the times”: the prohibition against “racial discrimination.”
Id., at 418, n. 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).

C

In  the  years  that  followed  our  “fractured  decision  in
Bakke,” lower courts “struggled to discern whether Justice
Powell’s” opinion constituted “binding precedent.”  Grutter,
539 U. S., at 325.  We accordingly took up the matter again
in 2003, in the case Grutter v. Bollinger, which concerned
the admissions system used by the University of Michigan
law school.  Id., at 311.  There, in another sharply divided
decision,  the  Court  for  the  first  time  “endorse[d]  Justice
Powell’s  view  that  student  body  diversity  is  a  compelling
state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.”  Id., at 325.

The Court’s analysis tracked Justice Powell’s in many re-
spects.  As for compelling interest, the Court held that “[t]he
Law  School’s  educational  judgment  that  such  diversity  is
essential to its educational mission is one to which we de-
fer.”  Id., at 328.  In achieving that goal, however, the Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of *Grutter v. Bollinger*. It delves into the Court's reasoning and the history of race-based admissions policies in higher education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1244

INDEX

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued.
speech  that  is  an  “electioneering  communication”  or  for  speech  expressly
advocating  a  candidate’s  election  or  defeat  violate  First  Amendment,  but
BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure requirements are valid as applied in this
case.  Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, p. 310.

III.  Right  to  Public  Trial.

Jury selection—Closed voir dire proceedings.—Sixth Amendment right
to  a  public  trial  extends  to  voir  dire  of  prospective  jurors;  when  a  party
seeking to close proceeding advances an overriding interest, trial court is
required to consider alternatives to closure even when they are not offered
by opposing party.  Presley v. Georgia, p. 209.

CORPORATE  EXPENDITURES  ON  POLITICAL  SPEECH.  See  Con

stitutional  Law,  II.

CRIMINAL  LAW.  See  Constitutional  Law,  III.

DEATH  PENALTY.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7.

DISCLOSURE  ORDERS.  See  Jurisdiction.

DISCOVERY  ORDERS.  See  Jurisdiction.

DNA  EVIDENCE.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  9.

DUE  PROCESS.  See  Constitutional  Law,  I.

EFFECTIVE  ASSISTANCE  OF  COUNSEL.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  3,

5,  6,  7,  8.

ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION.  See Constitutional Law, II.

ELECTRICITY  RATE  SETTING.  See  Federal  Power  Act.

EMPLOYER  AND  EMPLOYEES.  See  Railway  Labor  Act.

ENERGY  CONTRACTS.  See  Federal  Power  Act.

EVIDENCE  OF  GUILT.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  9.

FEDERAL  POWER  ACT.

Electricity rate setting—Mobile-Sierra doctrine—Wholesale-energy
contract.—Presumption  mandated  by  Mobile-Sierra  doctrine—which  re
quires  Federal  Energy  Regulatory  Commission  to  presume  that  an  elec
tricity  rate  set  by  a  freely  negotiated  wholesale-energy  contract  meets
FPA’s  “just  and  reasonable”  requirement,  16  U. S. C.  § 7824d(a),  unless
FERC  concludes  that  contract  seriously  harms  public  interest—does  not
depend on identity of complainant seeking FERC investigation and is not
limited  to  rate  challenges  brought  by  contracting  parties,  but  applies,  as
well, to challenges initiated by noncontracting parties.  NRG Power Mar
keting, LLC v. Maine Pub. Util. Comm’n, p. 165.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index, not the main body of the text. Indexes are not suitable for indexing as they provide a guide to the content rather than the content itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

306 GEBSER v. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

exceed the amount of a federal grant.18 That is surely not
relevant to the question whether the school district or the
injured student should bear the risk of harm—a risk against
which the district, but not the student, can insure.
It is not
clear to me why the well-settled rules of law that impose
responsibility on the principal for the misconduct of its
agents should not apply in this case. As a matter of policy,
the Court ranks protection of the school district’s purse
above the protection of immature high school students that
those rules would provide. Because those students are
members of the class for whose special beneﬁt Congress
enacted Title IX, that policy choice is not faithful to the
intent of the policymaking branch of our Government.

I respectfully dissent.

Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter and

Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

Justice Stevens’ opinion focuses on the standard of
school district liability for teacher-on-student harassment in
secondary schools.
I join that opinion, which reserves the
question whether a district should be relieved from dam-
ages liability if it has in place, and effectively publicizes and
enforces, a policy to curtail and redress injuries caused by
sexual harassment. Ante, at 304–305.
I think it appro-
priate to answer that question for these reasons: (1) the di-
mensions of a claim are determined not only by the plaintiff ’s

18 Amici curiae National School Boards Association and the New Jer-
sey School Boards Association point to a $1.4 million verdict in a recent
Title IX case. See Brief for National School Boards Association et al. as
Amici Curiae 5, and n. 4 (citing Canutillo Independent School Dist. v.
Leija, 101 F. 3d 393 (CA5 1996), cert. denied, 520 U. S. 1265 (1997)); see
also Brief for TASB Legal Assistance Fund et al. as Amici Curiae 23
(same). Signiﬁcantly, however, the District Judge in that case refused to
enter a judgment on that verdict; the judge instead ordered a new trial
on damages, limited to medical and mental health treatment and special
education expenses. See 887 F. Supp. 947, 957 (WD Tex. 1995), rev’d, 101
F. 3d 393 (CA5 1996).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It contains legal arguments, citations, and the formal language typical of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

881

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No. 09–173.  Ming Yen Hou v.  New York City Department
of  Environmental  Protection.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  60.

No.  09–175.  Jao  et  al.  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  302  Fed.
Appx.  520.

No.  09–178.  Farash  v.  Fleet  Bank,  fka  Summit  Bank,
et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326
Fed.  Appx.  77.

No. 09–181.  McMath v. United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  657.

No.  09–184.  White  v.  Donley,  Secretary  of  the  Air
Force.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310
Fed.  Appx.  159.

No.  09–189.  Helgerson  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  13th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–190.  Robles  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  971.

No.  09–192.  Jones  et  vir  v.  Commissioner  of  Internal
Revenue.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
560  F.  3d  1196.

No. 09–206.  Forsman, Individually and as Personal Rep
resentative  of  the  Estate  of  Forsman  et  al.,  et  al.  v.
Cessna  Aircraft  Co.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  562  F.  3d  1374.

No. 09–219.  Schery v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  767.

No.  09–238.  Navar  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  511.

No.  09–245.  Clark  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  395.

No.  09–5001.  Davis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1081

529 U. S.

April 17, 2000

No. 99–8706. Young v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 262.

No. 99–8707.

Javier Cordoba v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1053.

No. 99–8710. Stone v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 270.

No. 99–8711. Mendoza v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1329.

No. 99–8712. Kapaev v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 596.

No. 99–8714. Alcantar-Valenzuela v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 461.

No. 99–8715. Torres v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 840.

No. 99–8716. Woolfolk v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 900.

No. 99–8717. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 854.

No. 99–8718. Valdez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8720. Casiano v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 433.

No. 99–8721. Nixon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 209 F. 3d 719.

No. 99–8725. Bell v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1347.

No. 99–8741. Dixon v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 200 F. 3d 700.

No. 99–8742. Duran v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 1071.

No. 99–8745. Grant v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1122.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

17

KAGAN, J., dissenting

tices  who  originally  objected  to  Abood  conceded  that  the
use of agency fees for bargaining on “economic issues” like
“salaries and pension benefits” would not raise significant
First  Amendment  questions.  431  U. S.,  at  263,  n. 16
(Powell,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).    Of  course,  most  of
those  issues  have  budgetary  consequences:  They  “affect[ ]
how public money is spent.”  Ante, at 29.  And some raise
important  non-budgetary disputes; teacher  merit pay is  a
good  example,  see  ante,  at  30.
  But  arguing  about  the
terms  of  employment  is  still  arguing  about  the  terms  of
employment: The workplace remains both the context and
the  subject  matter  of  the  expression.    If  all  that  speech
really  counted  as  “of  public  concern,”  as  the  majority
suggests, the mass of public employees’ complaints (about
pay  and  benefits  and  workplace  policy  and  such)  would
become  “federal  constitutional  issue[s].”    Guarnieri,  564
U. S., at 391.  And contrary to decades’ worth of precedent,
government  employers  would  then  have  far  less  control
over  their  workforces  than  private  employers  do.    See
supra, at 9–11.

Consider  an  analogy,  not  involving  union  fees:  Suppose
a government entity disciplines a group of (non-unionized)
employees for agitating for a better health plan at various
inopportune times and places.  The better health plan will
of  course  drive  up  public  spending;  so  according  to  the
majority’s analysis, the employees’ speech satisfies Picker-
ing’s “public concern” test.  Or similarly, suppose a public
employer  penalizes  a  group  of  (non-unionized)  teachers
who protest merit pay in the school cafeteria.  Once again,
the majority’s logic runs, the speech is of “public concern,”
so the employees have a plausible First Amendment claim.
(And indeed, the majority appears to concede as much, by
asserting  that  the  results  in  these  hypotheticals  should
turn on various “factual detail[s]” relevant to  the interest
balancing  that  occurs  at  the  Pickering  test’s  second  step.
Ante,  at  32,  n. 23.)    But  in  fact,  this  Court  has  always
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments regarding public employee speech and union fees.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Statement of GORSUCH, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20A136 (20–746)
_________________

SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH,
ET AL., v. GAVIN NEWSOM, GOVERNOR OF
CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

[February 5, 2021]

  Statement  of  JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE
THOMAS and JUSTICE ALITO join.
  Often, courts addressing First Amendment free exercise
challenges face difficult questions about whether a law re-
flects “ ‘subtle departures from neutrality,’ ” “ ‘religious ger-
rymander[ing],’ ”  or  “impermissible  targeting”  of  religion.
Church  of  Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508  U. S.
520,  534–535  (1993).    But  not  here.    Since  the  arrival  of
COVID–19, California has openly imposed more stringent
regulations  on  religious  institutions  than  on  many  busi-
nesses.  The State’s spreadsheet summarizing its pandemic
rules  even  assigns  places  of  worship  their  own  row.    See
App. to Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction, App.
G–3.  At “Tier 1,” applicable today in most of the State, Cal-
ifornia forbids any kind of indoor worship.  Meanwhile, the
State allows most retail operations to proceed indoors with
25% occupancy, and other businesses to operate at 50% oc-
cupancy or more.  See ibid; see also ___ F. 3d ___, 2021 WL
222814, App. A (CA9, Jan. 22, 2021).  Apparently, Califor-
nia is the only State in the country that has gone so far as
to  ban  all  indoor  religious  services.    See  Brief  for  Becket
Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae, 5–6.
  When a State so obviously targets religion for differential
treatment, our job becomes that much clearer.  As the Ninth
Circuit recognized, regulations like these violate the First
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case citations, the names of justices, and a discussion of legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment

certainly not all the way to viability.  Mississippi’s law al-
lows a woman three months to obtain an abortion, well be-
yond the point at which it is considered “late” to discover a
pregnancy.  See A. Ayoola, Late Recognition of Unintended
Pregnancies,  32  Pub.  Health  Nursing  462  (2015)  (preg-
nancy  is  discoverable  and  ordinarily  discovered  by  six
weeks  of  gestation).  I  see  no  sound  basis  for  questioning
the adequacy of that opportunity.

But that is all I would say, out of adherence to a simple
yet fundamental principle of judicial restraint: If it is not
necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is nec-
essary not to decide more.  Perhaps we are not always per-
fect  in  following  that  command,  and  certainly  there  are
cases  that  warrant  an  exception.  But  this  is  not  one  of
them.  Surely we should adhere closely to principles of judi-
cial  restraint  here,  where  the  broader  path  the  Court
chooses entails repudiating a constitutional right we have
not  only  previously  recognized,  but  also  expressly  reaf-
firmed applying the doctrine of stare decisis.  The Court’s
opinion is thoughtful and thorough, but those virtues can-
not  compensate  for  the  fact  that  its  dramatic  and  conse-
quential ruling is unnecessary to decide the case before us.

I
Let me begin with my agreement with the Court, on the
only  question  we  need  decide  here:  whether  to  retain  the
rule from Roe and Casey that a woman’s right to terminate
her pregnancy extends up to the point that the fetus is re-
garded as “viable” outside the womb.  I agree that this rule
should be discarded.

First, this Court seriously erred in Roe in adopting via-
bility as the earliest point at which a State may legislate to
advance  its  substantial  interests  in  the  area  of  abortion.
See ante, at 50–53.  Roe set forth a rigid three-part frame-
work anchored to viability, which more closely resembled a
regulatory  code  than  a  body  of  constitutional  law.    That
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. It discusses the viability standard in abortion law and argues for its rejection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MAYS v. HINES

Per Curiam

  Similarly untenable was the Sixth Circuit’s backstop the-
ory that a more aggressive attorney could have changed the
result  by  casting  doubt  on  Jones’  credibility.    814  Fed.
Appx., at 940.  As an initial matter, this conjecture ignores
that Jones’ brief testimony about discovering the body did
not indicate that Hines was the culprit.  Ample other evi-
dence was what did that.  Perhaps in light of this obvious
disjuncture, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of why an attack on
Jones’  credibility  would  have  been  productive  ultimately
circled back to the majority’s main assumption “that Jones
was a viable alternative suspect.”  Id., at 941.  Regardless,
to the extent Jones’ credibility actually mattered, the jury
already had several good reasons to be skeptical—for exam-
ple, his peculiar tale of discovering the body; the insinua-
tions  of  Hines’  attorney;  and  the  discrepancies  between
Jones’ exact description of finding the body and the account
of the first responders.  None of these made a difference.

III
  The Sixth Circuit had no reason to revisit the decision of
the Tennessee court, much less ignore the ample evidence
supporting  that  court’s conclusion.    We  grant  the  petition
for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s motion to proceed
in  forma  pauperis,  and  we  reverse  the  judgment  of  the
Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR dissents.

——————
heard  this  tale—and  Hines’  attorney  stressed  its  oddities—yet  found
that Hines was the murderer.  A federal court cannot now claim that the
truth would have made a difference.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in a case. It presents legal arguments and reasoning, ultimately reversing a lower court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

378

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of Stevens, J.

nothing about “reasonable judges,” presumably because all,
or virtually all, such judges occasionally commit error; they
make decisions that in retrospect may be characterized as
“unreasonable.”
Indeed, it is most unlikely that Congress
would deliberately impose such a requirement of unanimity
on federal judges. As Congress is acutely aware, reasonable
lawyers and lawgivers regularly disagree with one another.
Congress surely did not intend that the views of one such
judge who might think that relief is not warranted in a
particular case should always have greater weight than the
contrary, considered judgment of several other reasonable
judges.

The inquiry mandated by the amendment relates to the
way in which a federal habeas court exercises its duty to
decide constitutional questions; the amendment does not
alter the underlying grant of jurisdiction in § 2254(a), see
n. 7, supra.10 When federal judges exercise their federal-
question jurisdiction under the “judicial Power” of Article
III of the Constitution, it is “emphatically the province and
duty” of those judges to “say what the law is.” Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). At the core of this

10 Indeed, Congress roundly rejected an amendment to the bill eventu-
ally adopted that directly invoked the text of the jurisdictional grant, 28
U. S. C. § 2254(a) (providing that the federal courts “shall entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus” (emphasis added)). The amend-
ment read: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an application for
a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a
judgment or order of a State court shall not be entertained by a court of
the United States unless the remedies in the courts of the State are inade-
141
quate or ineffective to test the legality of the person’s detention.”
Cong. Rec. 14991 (1995) (amendment of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis added).
In
speaking against the Kyl amendment, Senator Specter (a key proponent
of the eventual habeas reform) explained that when “dealing with the
question of jurisdiction of the Federal courts to entertain questions on
Federal issues, on constitutional issues, I believe it is necessary that the
Federal courts retain that jurisdiction as a constitutional matter.”
Id.,
at 15050.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice Stevens in the case of Williams v. Taylor. It contains legal analysis and argumentation, which is suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES

BREYER, J., dissenting

icated on the assumption that a union’s allocation of funds
for chargeable and nonchargeable purposes is not likely to
vary  greatly  from  one  year  to  the  next,”  ante,  at  18;  that
(Step  2)  this  assumption  does  not  apply  to  midyear  as-
sessments; hence (Step 3) what appears binding precedent
(namely Hudson) does not bind the Court in its interpreta-
tion  of  the  Constitution  as  applied  to  those  assessments.
Ibid.

I  must  jump  this  logical  ship,  however,  at  Step  1.  I
cannot  find  in  Hudson  the  “assumption”  of  uniform  ex-
penditures that the Court says underlies it.  The assump-
tion  does  not  appear  there  explicitly.    And  it  is  hard  to
believe  any  such  assumption  could  implicitly  lurk  within
a  case  involving  a  union’s  political  expenditures.  Those
expenditures  inevitably  vary  from  political  season  to
season.  They  inevitably  depend  upon  the  number  and
kind  of  union-related  matters  currently  visible  on  the
political  agenda.  Cf.,  e.g.,  App.  102,  158,  223  (union’s
chargeability  proportion  varies  significantly  over  three
years, from 56.35% in 2004, to 68.8% in 2005, to 60.3% in
2006).  And it is hard to believe that the Members of this
Court, when deciding Abood, were not fully aware of these
obvious facts.

B
A  stronger  case  can  be  made  for  allowing  nonmember
employees who did not object at the beginning of the dues
year  to  object  (for  the  first  time)  to  a  special  assessment.
That  is  because,  unlike  the  nonmember  who  objected
initially, the union will not permit that initially nonobject-
ing  nonmember  to  withhold  anything  from  the  special
assessment  fee.    Nonetheless,  there  are  powerful  reasons
not to allow the nonmember who did not object initially to
the annual fee to object now for the first time to the mid-
year special assessment.

For  one  thing,  insofar  as  a  new  objection  permits  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Knox v. Service Employees. It delves into the legal reasoning behind the Court's decision regarding union dues and assessments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

sembles  inter  partes  review.   The  parties  have  cited  nothing  to  sug-
gest that the Framers were not aware of this common practice when
writing  the  Patent  Clause,  or  that  they  excluded  the  practice  from
the  scope  of  the  Clause.      Relatedly,  the  fact  that  American  courts
have traditionally adjudicated patent validity in this country does not
mean  that  they  must  forever  do  so.    See  post,  at  8–10.    Historical
practice is not decisive here because matters governed by the public-
rights doctrine may be assigned to the Legislature, the Executive, or
the Judiciary.  Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra, at 451.  That Congress
chose  the  courts  in  the  past  does  not  foreclose  its  choice  of  the  PTO
today.  Pp. 12–15.

(d) Finally, the similarities between the various procedures used
in  inter  partes  review  and  procedures  typically  used  in  courts  does
not lead to the conclusion that inter partes review violates Article III.
This  Court  has  never  adopted  a  “looks  like”  test  to  determine  if  an
adjudication  has  improperly  occurred  outside  an  Article  III  court.
See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 563.  Pp. 15–16.

(e) This holding is narrow.  The Court addresses only the consti-
tutionality of inter partes review and the precise constitutional chal-
lenges  that  Oil  States  raised  here.    The  decision  should  not  be  mis-
construed as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of
the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.  Pp. 16–17.
  2. Inter  partes  review  does  not  violate  the  Seventh  Amendment.
When  Congress  properly  assigns  a  matter  to  adjudication  in  a  non-
Article  III  tribunal,  “the  Seventh  Amendment  poses  no  independent
bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.”  Gran-
financiera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 52–53.  Thus, the rejection
of  Oil  States’  Article  III  challenge  also  resolves  its  Seventh  Amend-
ment challenge.  P. 17.

639 Fed. Appx. 639, affirmed.

  THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  KENNEDY,
GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  BREYER,
J., filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in which  GINSBURG and  SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,
joined.  GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–939
_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2024]

 JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  with  whom  JUSTICE  KAGAN  and

JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.

Today’s decision to grant former Presidents criminal im-
munity reshapes the institution of the Presidency.  It makes
a mockery of the principle, foundational to our Constitution
and system of Government, that no man is above the law.
Relying on little more than its own misguided wisdom about
the  need  for  “bold  and  unhesitating  action”  by  the  Presi-
dent, ante, at 3, 13, the Court gives former President Trump
all the immunity he asked for and more.  Because our Con-
stitution does not shield a former President from answering
for criminal and treasonous acts, I dissent.

I
The indictment paints a stark portrait of a President des-

perate to stay in power.

In  the  weeks  leading  up  to  January  6,  2021,  then-
President Trump allegedly “spread lies that there had been
outcome-determinative  fraud  in  the  election  and  that  he
had actually won,” App. 181, Indictment ¶2, despite being
“notified repeatedly” by his closest advisers “that his claims
were untrue,” id., at 188, ¶11.

When  dozens  of  courts  swiftly  rejected  these  claims,
Trump allegedly “pushed officials in certain states to ignore
the popular vote; disenfranchise millions of voters; dismiss
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court.  It is sequential text and likely part of the actual legal content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

MURTHY v. MISSOURI

Opinion of the Court

their misinformation policies.9

Privately,  Facebook  sent  monthly  “Covid  Insights”  re-
ports to officials in the White House and the Surgeon Gen-
eral’s  Office,  at  least  until  July  2022.    These  reports  con-
tained information about the top 100 vaccine-related posts
in the United States, including whether Facebook took ac-
tion  against  any  of  them.  In  June,  Facebook  asked  if  it
should  continue  sending  these  reports,  as  it  had  stopped
seeing  “problematic  vaccine  related”  content  in  the  top
posts.  50 id., at 15,645–15,646.  The official replied that,
though he would “normally say we are good to discontinue,”
the  reports  would  be  helpful  “as  we  start  to  ramp  up  . . .
vaccines” for children under five.  Id., at 15,645.  The record
contains no other evidence of private contact with respect
to COVID–19 misinformation.

On this record, it appears that the frequent, intense com-
munications that took place in 2021 had considerably sub-
sided by 2022.  (Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the changed
state of the pandemic.)  It is thus very difficult for Hines to
show that she faces future harm that is traceable to officials
in the White House and the Surgeon General’s Office.  Re-
call the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning regarding traceability for
past harms: In the face of a governmental “pressure cam-
paign,” the “platforms’ censorship decisions were likely at-
tributable at least in part to [their] reluctance to risk the
adverse legal or regulatory consequences that could result
from a refusal to adhere to the government’s directives.”  83
F. 4th, at 370.  But in the months leading up to this suit,
these officials issued no directives and threatened no con-
sequences.  They only asked for information about the most
popular  vaccine-related  posts.    Hines  does  not  allege  that
her content has fallen, or is likely to fall, in that category.
——————

9 According to a declaration submitted by the Surgeon General’s Chief
of Staff, no one in that office met with the platforms to discuss their sub-
missions “or otherwise had substantive communications with social me-
dia companies about the RFI.”  61 Record 19,480.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the section discussing the lack of evidence of ongoing pressure from government officials on social media platforms regarding COVID-19 misinformation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20A87
_________________

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN,
NEW YORK v. ANDREW M. CUOMO,
GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK

ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

[November 25, 2020]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
I vote to grant the applications of the Roman Catholic Di-
ocese of Brooklyn and Agudath Israel of America for tempo-
rary  injunctions  against  New  York’s  10-person  and  25-
person  caps  on  attendance  at  religious  services.    On  this
record, temporary injunctions are warranted because New
York’s severe caps on attendance at religious services likely
violate the First Amendment.  Importantly, the Court’s or-
ders today are not final decisions on the merits.  Instead,
the  Court  simply  grants  temporary  injunctive  relief  until
the Court of Appeals in December, and then this Court as
appropriate, can more fully consider the merits.

To begin with, New York’s 10-person and 25-person caps
on attendance at religious services in red and orange zones
(which are areas where COVID–19 is more prevalent) are
much more severe than most other States’ restrictions, in-
cluding the California and Nevada limits at issue in South
Bay  United  Pentecostal  Church  v.  Newsom,  590  U. S.  ___
(2020), and Calvary Chapel  Dayton Valley v.  Sisolak, 591
U. S. ___ (2020).  In South Bay, houses of worship were lim-
ited to 100 people (or, in buildings with capacity of under
400, to 25% of capacity).  And in Calvary, houses of worship
were limited to 50 people.

New  York  has  gone  much  further.    In  New  York’s  red
zones, most houses of worship are limited to 10 people; in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh in a case regarding religious service attendance limits during the COVID-19 pandemic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TURNER v. ROGERS

THOMAS, J., dissenting

“civil  contempt  is  not  a  ‘criminal  prosecution’  within  the
meaning  of  the  Sixth  Amendment”).    He  argues  instead
that  “the  right  to  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  persons
facing  incarceration  arises  not  only  from  the  Sixth
Amendment, but also from the requirement of fundamen-
tal  fairness  under  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Four-
teenth Amendment.”  Brief for Petitioner 28.  In his view,
this Court has relied on due process to “rejec[t] formalistic
distinctions  between  criminal  and  civil  proceedings,  in-
stead  concluding  that  incarceration  or  other  confinement
triggers the right to counsel.”  Id., at 33.

But  if  the  Due  Process  Clause  created  a  right  to  ap-
pointed  counsel  in  all  proceedings  with  the  potential  for
detention,  then  the  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  appointed
counsel  would  be  unnecessary.  Under  Turner’s  theory,
every instance in which the Sixth Amendment guarantees
a  right  to  appointed  counsel  is  covered  also  by  the  Due
Process  Clause.  The  Sixth  Amendment,  however,  is  the
only constitutional provision that even mentions the assis-
tance  of  counsel;  the  Due  Process  Clause  says  nothing
about counsel.  Ordinarily, we do not read a general provi-
sion  to  render  a  specific  one  superfluous.    Cf.  Morales  v.
Trans  World  Airlines,  Inc.,  504  U. S.  374,  384  (1992)
(“[I]t  is  a  commonplace  of  statutory  construction  that  the
specific governs the general”).  The fact that one constitu-
tional  provision  expressly  provides  a  right  to  appointed
counsel  in  specific  circumstances  indicates  that  the  Con-
stitution  does  not  also  sub  silentio  provide  that  right  far
more  broadly  in  another,  more  general,  provision.  Cf.
Albright  v.  Oliver,  510  U. S.  266,  273  (1994)  (plurality
opinion)  (“Where  a  particular  Amendment  provides  an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against
a  particular  sort  of  government  behavior,  that  Amend-
ment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due
process,’  must  be  the  guide  for  analyzing  these  claims”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); id., at 281 (KENNEDY,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND

Syllabus

direct  discharge  from  a  point  source  into  navigable  waters  or  when
there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge.  Pp. 4–18.

(a) Statutory context limits the reach of the phrase “from any point
source”  to  a  range  of  circumstances  narrower  than  that  which  the
Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable” interpretation suggests.  At the same
time,  it  is  significantly  broader  than  the  total  exclusion  of  all  dis-
charges through groundwater, as urged by Maui and by the Solicitor
General as amicus curiae.  Pp. 4–5.

(b) The Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable” limitation could allow EPA
to assert permitting authority over the release of pollutants that reach
navigable waters many years after their release.  But Congress did not
intend to provide EPA with such broad authority.  First, to interpret
“from” so broadly might require a permit in unexpected circumstances,
such as, e.g., the 100-year migration of pollutants through 250 miles of
groundwater to a river.  Second, the statute’s structure indicates that,
as to groundwater pollution and nonpoint source pollution, Congress
left substantial responsibility and autonomy to the States and did not
give  EPA  authority  that  could  seriously  interfere  with  this  state  re-
sponsibility.  Third, the Act’s legislative history strongly supports the
conclusion  that  the  permitting  provision  does  not  extend  so  far.    Fi-
nally, longstanding regulatory practice shows that EPA has success-
fully  applied  the  permitting  provision  to  pollution  discharges  from
point  sources  that  reached  navigable  waters  through  groundwater
using a narrower interpretation than that of the Ninth Circuit.  Pp. 5–
10.

(c) Maui, the Government, and the two dissents argue for interpre-
tations that, in light of the statute’s language, structure, and purposes,
are also too extreme.  Pp. 10–15.

(1) Maui  and  the  Solicitor  General  argue  that  the  statute’s  per-
mitting  requirement  does  not  apply  if  a  pollutant,  having  emerged
from a “point source,” must travel through any amount of groundwater
before reaching navigable waters.  That narrow interpretation would
risk  serious  interference  with  EPA’s  ability  to  regulate  point  source
discharges,  and  Congress  would  not  have  intended  to  create  such  a
large and obvious loophole in one of the Clean Water Act’s key regula-
tory innovations.  P. 10.

(2) Reading “from” in the phrase “from any point source” together
with “conveyance” in the point source definition “any . . . conveyance,”
Maui argues that the meaning of “from any point source” is not about
where the pollution originated, but about how it got there.  Thus, Maui
claims, a permit is required only if a point source ultimately delivers
the pollutant to navigable waters.  By contrast, if a pollutant travels
through groundwater, then the groundwater is the conveyance and no
permit  is  required.    But  Maui’s  definition  of  “from”  as  connoting  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal syllabus, providing a summary of a court case. It is not the actual content of the book and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

SACKETT v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

EPA designated as traditionally navigable.  To establish a
significant  nexus,  the  EPA  lumped  the  Sacketts’  lot  to-
gether with the Kalispell Bay Fen, a large nearby wetland
complex that the Agency regarded as “similarly situated.”
According  to  the  EPA,  these  properties,  taken  together,
“significantly affect” the ecology of Priest Lake.  Therefore,
the EPA concluded, the Sacketts had illegally dumped soil
and gravel onto “the waters of the United States.”

The Sacketts filed suit under the Administrative Proce-
dure  Act,  5  U. S. C.  §702  et seq.,  alleging  that  the  EPA
lacked jurisdiction because any wetlands on their property
were not “waters of the United States.”  The District Court
initially dismissed the suit, reasoning that the compliance
order  was  not  a  final  agency  action,  but  this  Court  ulti-
mately held that the Sacketts could bring their suit under
the APA.  See Sackett, 566 U. S., at 131.  After seven years
of additional proceedings on remand, the District Court en-
tered summary judgment for the EPA.  2019 WL 13026870
(D Idaho, Mar. 31, 2019).  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, hold-
ing that the CWA covers adjacent wetlands with a signifi-
cant  nexus  to  traditional  navigable  waters  and  that  the
Sacketts’ lot satisfied that standard.  8 F. 4th 1075, 1091–
1093 (2021).

We granted certiorari to decide the proper test for deter-
mining whether wetlands are “waters of the United States.”
595 U. S. ___ (2022).

II
A

In  defining  the  meaning  of  “the  waters  of  the  United
States,” we revisit what has been “a contentious and diffi-
cult  task.”  National  Assn.  of  Mfrs.  v.  Department  of  De-
fense, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 1).  The phrase
has sparked decades of agency action and litigation.  In or-
der to resolve the CWA’s applicability to wetlands, we begin
by reviewing this history.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the Sackett v. EPA case. It sets the context for the case and outlines the legal issues at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

21

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

text of the Constitution (and, indeed, with his entire theory
of legal interpretation).  As he put it, “What I look for in the
Constitution  is  precisely  what  I  look  for  in  a  statute: the
original meaning of the text.”  A. Scalia, A Matter of Inter-
pretation 38 (1997).  See also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573
U. S.  513,  575–583  (2014)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  judg-
ment); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept.
of Environmental Protection, 560 U. S. 702, 722 (2010) (plu-
rality  opinion  of  Scalia,  J.);  Maryland  v.  Craig,  497  U. S.
836, 860–861 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008), is a prime example of his
usual approach, and it is a model of what a reexamination
of the Free Exercise Clause should entail.  In Heller, after
observing that the “Constitution was written to be under-
stood  by  the  voters,”  Justice  Scalia’s  opinion  begins  by
presuming  that  the  “words  and  phrases”  of  the  Second
Amendment  carry  “their  normal  and  ordinary  . . .  mean-
ing.”  Id., at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The
opinion  then  undertakes  a  careful  examination  of  all  the
Amendment’s  key  terms.  It  does  not  simply  ask  whether
its interpretation of the text is  “permissible.”  Smith, 494
U. S., at 878.

B
Following the sound approach that the Court took in Hel-
ler, we should begin by considering the “normal and ordi-
nary” meaning of the text of the Free Exercise Clause: “Con-
gress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion].”  Most of these terms and phrases—“Congress,”27
——————

27 Although the First Amendment refers to “Congress,” we have held
that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment—which references  the  entire  “State,”
not  just  a  legislature—makes  the  rights  protected  by  the  Amendment
applicable to the States.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Ham-
ilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U. S. 245 (1934); Cantwell, 310 U. S.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of the Constitution, particularly the Free Exercise Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

first  declared  the  prohibition  invalid  because  of  its  un-
equal  treatment  of  interracial  couples.    It  stated:  “There
can  be  no  doubt  that  restricting  the  freedom  to  marry
solely  because  of  racial  classifications  violates  the  central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”  388 U. S., at 12.
With  this  link  to  equal  protection  the  Court  proceeded  to
hold  the  prohibition  offended  central  precepts  of  liberty:
“To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a
basis  as  the  racial  classifications  embodied  in  these  stat-
utes,  classifications  so directly  subversive  of  the  principle
of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without
due process of law.”  Ibid.  The reasons why marriage is a
fundamental right became more clear and compelling from
a  full  awareness  and  understanding  of  the  hurt  that  re-
sulted from laws barring interracial unions.

The  synergy  between  the  two  protections  is  illustrated
further  in  Zablocki.  There  the  Court  invoked  the  Equal
Protection  Clause  as  its  basis  for  invalidating  the  chal-
lenged  law,  which,  as  already  noted,  barred  fathers  who
were  behind  on  child-support  payments  from  marrying
without  judicial  approval.  The  equal  protection  analysis
depended  in  central  part  on  the  Court’s  holding  that  the
law  burdened  a  right  “of  fundamental  importance.”    434
U. S., at 383.  It was the essential nature of the marriage
right, discussed at length in Zablocki, see id., at 383–387,
that  made  apparent  the  law’s  incompatibility  with  re-
quirements  of  equality.    Each  concept—liberty  and  equal
protection—leads to a stronger understanding of the other.
Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court  has  recognized  that  new  insights  and  societal  un-
derstandings  can  reveal  unjustified  inequality  within  our
most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed
and  unchallenged.  To  take  but  one  period,  this  occurred
with  respect  to  marriage  in  the  1970’s  and  1980’s.    Not-
withstanding the gradual erosion of the doctrine of cover-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the landmark case Obergefell v. Hodges and its implications for marriage equality. It cites previous cases and legal precedents to support its arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of the Court

1807), in 10 Works of Thomas Jefferson 398, n. (P. Ford ed.
1905).  His “personal attendance,” however, was out of the
question, for it “would leave the nation without” the “sole
branch which the constitution requires to be always in func-
tion.”  Letter from T. Jefferson to G. Hay (June 17, 1807),
in id., at 400–401, n.

Before  Burr  received  the  subpoenaed  documents,  Mar-
shall rejected the prosecution’s core legal theory for treason
and  Burr  was  accordingly  acquitted.    Jefferson,  however,
was not done.  Committed to salvaging a conviction, he di-
rected the prosecutors to proceed with a misdemeanor (yes,
misdemeanor) charge for inciting war against Spain.  Burr
then renewed his request for Wilkinson’s October 21 letter,
which he later received a copy of, and subpoenaed a second
letter,  dated  November  12,  1806,  which  the  prosecutor
claimed was privileged.  Acknowledging that the President
may withhold information to protect public safety, Marshall
instructed that Jefferson should “state the particular rea-
sons” for withholding the letter.  United States v. Burr, 25
F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807).  The court, pay-
ing “all proper respect” to those reasons, would then decide
whether to compel disclosure.  Ibid.  But that decision was
averted when the misdemeanor trial was cut short after it
became  clear  that  the  prosecution  lacked  the  evidence  to
convict.

In the two centuries since the Burr trial, successive Pres-
idents have accepted Marshall’s ruling that the Chief Exec-
utive is subject to subpoena.  In 1818, President Monroe re-
ceived a subpoena to testify in a court-martial against one
of his appointees.  See Rotunda, Presidents and Ex-Presi-
dents as Witnesses: A Brief Historical Footnote, 1975 U. Ill.
L. Forum 1, 5.  His Attorney General, William Wirt—who
had  served  as  a  prosecutor  during  Burr’s  trial—advised
Monroe  that,  per  Marshall’s  ruling,  a  subpoena  to  testify
may  “be  properly  awarded  to  the  President.”    Id.,  at  5–6.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the historical precedent of the President being subject to subpoena, citing the Burr trial.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 09–893
_________________

AT&T MOBILITY LLC, PETITIONER v. VINCENT

CONCEPCION ET UX.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 27, 2011]

JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG,  JUS-

TICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.

The  Federal  Arbitration  Act  says  that  an  arbitration
agreement  “shall  be  valid,  irrevocable,  and  enforceable,
save  upon  such  grounds  as  exist  at  law  or  in  equity  for
the  revocation  of  any  contract.”  9  U. S. C.  §2  (emphasis
added).  California law sets forth certain circumstances in
which  “class  action  waivers”  in  any  contract  are  unen
forceable.  In my view, this rule of state law is consistent
with the federal Act’s language and primary objective.  It
does not “stan[d] as an obstacle” to the Act’s “accomplish
ment  and  execution.”  Hines  v.  Davidowitz,  312  U. S.  52,
67 (1941).  And the Court is wrong to hold that the federal
Act pre-empts the rule of state law.

I
The California law in question consists of an authorita
tive  state-court  interpretation  of  two  provisions  of  the
California Civil Code.  The first provision makes unlawful
all  contracts  “which  have  for  their  object,  directly  or  in
directly,  to  exempt  anyone  from  responsibility  for  his
own . . . violation of law.”  Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §1668 (West
1985).  The second provision authorizes courts to “limit the
application of any unconscionable clause” in a contract so
“as to avoid any unconscionable result.”  §1670.5(a).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

a  serious  risk  of  physical  injury  due  to  the  connection
between short-barreled shotguns and other serious crimes.
As the Government explains, these firearms are “weapons
not  typically  possessed  by  law-abiding  citizens  for  lawful
purposes,”  District  of  Columbia  v.  Heller,  554  U. S.  570,
625  (2008),  but  are  instead  primarily  intended  for  use  in
criminal  activity.  In  light  of  that  intended  use,  the  Gov-
ernment reasons that the ordinary case of this possession
offense will involve the use of a short-barreled shotgun in
a serious crime, a scenario obviously posing a serious risk
of physical injury.

But  even  assuming  that  those  who  unlawfully  possess
these  weapons  typically  intend  to  use  them  in  a  serious
crime,  the  risk  that  the  Government  identifies  arises  not
from the act of possessing the weapon, but from the act of
using  it.  Unlike  attempted  burglary  (at  least  of  the  type
at issue in James) or intentional vehicular flight—conduct
that by itself often or always invites a dangerous confron-
tation—possession  of  a  short-barreled  shotgun  poses  a
threat  only  when  an  offender  decides  to  engage  in  addi-
tional,  voluntary  conduct  that  is  not  included  in  the  ele-
ments of the crime.  Until this weapon is assembled, load-
ed, or used, for example, it poses no risk of injury to others
in  and  of  itself.    The  risk  of  injury  to  others  from  mere
possession  of  this  firearm  is  too  attenuated  to  treat  this
offense  as  a  violent  felony.    I  would  reverse  the  Court  of
Appeals on that basis.

II

As  the  foregoing  analysis  demonstrates,  ACCA’s  resid-
ual  clause  can  be  applied  in  a  principled  manner.    One
would have thought this proposition well established given
that  we  have  already  decided  four  cases  addressing  this
clause.  The majority nonetheless concludes that the oper-
ation of this provision violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the classification of a crime as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PETER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE v. NANTKWEST, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 18–801.  Argued October 7, 2019—Decided December 11, 2019

The Patent Act provides two mutually exclusive methods for challenging
an adverse decision by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).  A dis-
satisfied  applicant  may  appeal  directly  to  the  Federal  Circuit,  35
U. S. C. §141, or, as relevant here, may file a new civil action against
the PTO Director in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, §145.  Under this second proceeding, the applicant
must pay “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings.”  Ibid.

Respondent NantKwest, Inc., filed a §145 civil action after its patent
application  was  denied.    The  District  Court  granted  summary  judg-
ment to the PTO, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.  The PTO moved
for reimbursement of expenses, including the pro rata salaries of PTO
attorneys and a paralegal who worked on the case.  The District Court
denied the motion, concluding that the statutory language referencing
expenses was not sufficient to rebut the “American Rule” presumption
that parties are responsible for their own attorney’s fees.  The en banc
Federal Circuit affirmed.

Held: The PTO cannot recover the salaries of its legal personnel under

§145.  Pp. 3–10.

(a) The “American Rule”—the bedrock principle that “[e]ach litigant
pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract
provides  otherwise,”  Hardt  v.  Reliance  Standard  Life  Ins.  Co.,  560
U. S. 242, 253—provides the starting point for assessing whether §145
authorizes payment of the PTO’s legal fees.  Contrary to the Govern-
ment’s view, this Court has never suggested that any statute is exempt
from the presumption against fee shifting or limited its American Rule
inquiries to prevailing party statutes.  Rather, it has developed a line
of precedents addressing statutory deviations from the American Rule
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U98

[09-06-00 19:40:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 721 (1998)

723

Syllabus

matter of legislative grace, not constitutional command, and it does not
compel extension of the double jeopardy bar. Pp. 733–734.

16 Cal. 4th 826, 941 P. 2d 1121, afﬁrmed.

O(cid:146)Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., ﬁled
a dissenting opinion, post, p. 734. Scalia, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in
which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 737.

Cliff Gardner, by appointment of the Court, 522 U. S. 1106,

argued the cause and ﬁled briefs for petitioner.

David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney General of Cali-
fornia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the
brief were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George
Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wen-
delin Pollack, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D.
Martynec, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Carl
N. Henry, Deputy Attorney General.

Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging afﬁrmance. With him on
the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben.*

*David M. Porter and Robert Weisberg ﬁled a brief for the National

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers urging reversal.

Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts et al. by Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General
of Massachusetts, Ellyn H. Lazar, Assistant Attorney General, and Dan
Schweitzer, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as
follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Gale
A. Norton of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane
Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker
of Georgia, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Jim Ryan of Illinois, Jeffrey A. Modi-
sett of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard
P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Hubert H.
Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W.
(Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg
of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Peter Verniero of New
Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Car-
olina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and summary. It includes information about the case name, court, and the syllabus. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it is metadata about the case rather than the actual content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation and Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Syllabus

 ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  KAGAN, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the citation and introductory information for a Supreme Court case, likely found at the beginning of the official opinion. This type of information is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC.

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J.

the Heads of Departments.”  Art. II, §2, cl. 2.  The words “by
Law  . . .  as  they  think  proper”  strongly  suggest  that  Con-
gress has considerable freedom to determine the nature of
an inferior officer’s job, and that courts ought to respect that
judgment.  See Lucia v. SEC, 585 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018)
(BREYER, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in  part)  (slip  op.,  at  9–10).    In  a  word,  the  Constitution
grants to Congress the “authority to create both categories
of offices—those the President must fill with the Senate’s
concurrence and ‘inferior’ ones. . . . That constitutional as-
signment  to  Congress  counsels  judicial  deference.”    In  re
Sealed Case, 838 F. 2d 476, 532 (CADC) (R. Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654
(1988).  Article I’s grant to Congress of broad authority to
enact laws of different kinds concerning different subjects—
and to implement those laws in ways that Congress deter-
mines are “necessary and proper”—suggests the same.  Art.
I, §8, cl. 18.

Even a small degree of “judicial deference” should prove
sufficient to validate the statutes here.  For one, the provi-
sions at issue fall well within Article I’s grant to Congress
of the patent power.  Nothing in them represents an effort
by the “Legislative Branch [to] aggrandize itself at the ex-
pense  of  the  other  two  branches.”    Buckley  v.  Valeo,  424
U. S.  1,  129  (1976)  (per  curiam).  There  is  accordingly  no
general separation-of-powers defect that has arisen in other
cases.  See, e.g., Metropolitan Washington Airports Author-
ity v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U. S.
252, 277 (1991).

For another, Congress’ scheme is consistent with our Ap-
pointments Clause precedents.  They require only that an
inferior officer be “directed and supervised at some level,”
Edmond v. United States, 520 U. S. 651, 663 (1997), and the
Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) are supervised by two
separate  Senate-confirmed  officers,  the  Secretary  of  Com-
merce and the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring and dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in a case involving Arthrex, Inc.  It delves into constitutional arguments regarding the appointment of inferior officers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>