<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

III

There  is  a  better  way.  Our  job  is  to  interpret  the  laws
Congress  has  adopted.   It  is  a  task  that  “begins  with  the
language of the [relevant] statute[s]” and, when “the statu-
tory  language  provides  a  clear  answer,  it  ends  there  as
well.”  Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U. S. 432, 438
(1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because no one
doubts that §1331 vests district courts with jurisdiction to
hear  these  cases,  the  only  question  properly  before  us  is
whether Congress has actually carved out some exception
in some other statute.  The government points to two can-
didates.  But the government’s arguments from those laws
are so improbable that the Court barely mentions them.  I
pause  to  walk  through  each  only  to  illustrate  how  these
cases should have been resolved.

In Ms. Cochran’s case, the government directs our atten-
tion to §78y(a)(1) of the Exchange Act.  That provision says
that “[a] person aggrieved by a final order of the Commis-
sion . . . may obtain review of the order in the United States
Court  of  Appeals  . . .  by  filing  in  such  court  . . .  a  written
petition requesting that the order be modified or set aside
in  whole  or  in  part.”   15  U. S. C.  §78y(a)(1).  Plainly,  the
statute promises jurisdiction in a court of appeals for those

——————
agency invokes Thunder Basin and regardless of whether the agency it-
self  may  prefer  to  proceed in  court.  See  Wilkins  v.  United  States,  598
U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (slip op., at 4) (“courts have a duty to consider [ju-
risdictional bars] sua sponte”).  But this Court has never said Thunder
Basin commands anything like that.  At the very least, then, the Court
should acknowledge Thunder Basin for what it truly is:  a judge-made
exhaustion requirement, not a jurisdictional rule.  Even that much can-
dor, however, would not rescue the contrivance.  As this Court has rec-
ognized, we possess no more authority to “impos[e] extra-statutory limi-
tations”  on  the  “capacity  to  sue”  than  we  do  to  impose  extra-statutory
limitations on the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.  Ross v. Blake,
578  U. S.  632,  640,  n. 1  (2016);  see  Jones  v.  Bock,  549  U. S.  199,  203
(2007) (“crafting and imposing” exhaustion rules “not required by” stat-
ute “exceeds the proper limits on the judicial role”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC. It delves into the interpretation of specific statutes and their implications for jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

17

Opinion of the Court

tribe” with the Secretary’s list, but ignore why ANCs were
excluded from that list in the first place.  The Court declines
to take that doubtful step.

Despite asking the Court to consider post-ISDA statutes
to  determine  whether  ANCs  are  “Indian  tribes”  under
ISDA,  moreover,  respondents  largely  fail  to  address  post-
ISDA  congressional  actions  that  contradict  their  position.
First,  consider  Congress’  treatment  of  the  Cook  Inlet  Re-
gion, Inc. (CIRI), the regional ANC for the ANCSA region
covering more than half the Alaskan population.  See The
Twelve  Regions,  ANCSA  Regional  Association  (June  1,
2021),  https://ancsaregional.com/the-twelve-regions.
In
1994, CIRI contracted under ISDA through its designated
healthcare  provider  to  offer  healthcare  benefits  to  Alaska
Natives  and  American  Indians  in  Anchorage  and  the
Matanuska-Susitna Valley.  See Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v.
Shalala, 166 F. 3d 986, 988 (CA9 1999).  A group of Alaska
Native villages sued, arguing that the Federal Government
should  have  first  obtained  their  approval.  Ibid.;  see  25
U. S. C. §5304(l) (“[I]n any case where [an ISDA contract]
benefit[s] more than one Indian tribe, the approval of each
such Indian tribe” is required).  Congress mooted the dis-
pute by passing a bill that waived ISDA’s normal tribal ap-
proval  requirement  for  CIRI’s  healthcare  contracts.  De-
Interior  and  Related  Agencies
partment  of
Appropriations Act, 1998, §325(a), 111 Stat. 1597–1598.  In
so doing, Congress not only assumed CIRI was eligible to
enter into ISDA contracts (notwithstanding its lack of fed-
eral recognition), but actively cleared the way for it to do so.
Next, consider the Native American Housing Assistance
and  Self-Determination  Act  of  1996  (NAHASDA),  25
U. S. C.  §4101  et  seq.,  which  incorporates  ISDA’s  “Indian
tribe”  definition,  see  §4103(13)(B).  NAHASDA  creates  a
housing block grant program for Indian tribes.  §4111.  The
regional  ANCs  (acting  through  their  designated  housing
authorities)  are  among  the  largest  recipients  of  these

the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal status of Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

RITTER v. MIGLIORI

ALITO, J., dissenting

To illustrate why the Third Circuit’s interpretation is suf-
ficiently questionable and important to merit review, I offer
the following thoughts on the interpretation of the statute
in question.  As I will explain, it appears to me, based on
the review that I have been able to conduct in the time al-
lowed, that the Third Circuit’s interpretation is very likely
wrong.  It seems plainly contrary to the statutory language,
but as is almost always the case when we decide whether to
grant emergency relief, I do not rule out the possibility that
further briefing and argument might convince me that my
current view is unfounded.  But with that caveat, I will pro-
ceed to discuss the statutory language.

The statutory provision in question reads as follows:

“No person acting under color of law shall . . . deny
the right of any individual to vote in any election be-
cause  of  an  error  or  omission  on  any  record  or  paper
related  to  any  application,  registration,  or  other  act
requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not ma-
terial in determining whether such individual is quali-
fied  under  State  law  to  vote  in  such  election.”
§10101(a)(2)(B).

This provision has five elements: (1) the proscribed con-
duct must be engaged in by a person who is “acting under
color  of  law”;  (2)  it  must  have  the  effect  of  “deny[ing]”  an
individual  “the  right  to  vote”;  (3)  this  denial  must  be  at-
tributable to “an error or omission on [a] record or paper”;
(4) the “record or paper” must be  “related to [an] applica-
tion, registration, or other act requisite to voting”; and (5)
the error or omission must not be “material in determining
whether such individual is qualified under State law to vote
in such election.”  Ibid.

The Third Circuit held that the failure to count mail-in
ballots  that  did  not  include  the  date  on  which  they  were
filled out constituted a  violation of this provision, but the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It analyzes a specific statute and the interpretation of that statute by a lower court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

795

Stevens, J., dissenting

of the word “person,” the National Association of Attorneys
General adopted a resolution urging Congress to make it
easier for States to be relators.6 When Congress amended
the FCA in 1986—and enacted the word “person” in § 3729
at issue here—it had all of this information before it, i. e.,
that federal judges had accepted States as relators (and
hence as “persons”); that the States considered themselves
to be statutory “persons” and wanted greater freedom to be
“persons” who could sue under the Act; and that the United
States had taken a like position. See S. Rep. No. 99–345,
at 12–13.

In sum, it is quite clear that when the 1986 amendments
were adopted, there was a general understanding that States
and state agencies were “persons” within the meaning of
the Act.

II

The text of the 1986 amendments conﬁrms the pre-existing
understanding. The most signiﬁcant part of the amend-
ments is the enactment of a new § 3733 granting authority
to the Attorney General to issue a civil investigative de-
mand (CID) before commencing a civil proceeding on be-
half of the United States. A series of interwoven deﬁni-
tions in § 3733 unambiguously demonstrates that a State is a
“person” who can violate § 3729.

Section 3733 authorizes the Attorney General to issue a
CID when she is conducting a “false claims law investi-
gation.”
§ 3733(a). A “false claims law investigation” is
deﬁned as an investigation conducted “for the purpose of as-
certaining whether any person is or has been engaged in
any violation of a false claims law.” § 3733(l)(2) (emphasis
added). And a “false claims law” includes § 3729—the pro-
vision at issue in this case. § 3733(l)(1)(A). Quite plainly,
these provisions contemplate that any “person” may be en-

6 Congress adopted the suggestion of the Attorneys General in

§ 3730(e)(4)(A).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

JACKSON, J., dissenting

  Because

books  in  order  to  avoid  chilling  constitutionally  protected
speech.  See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 486–487
(1965).
interpretation  of
the  majority’s
§1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) diverges from the text and history of the
provision, and simultaneously subverts the speech-protective
goals of the constitutional doctrine plainly implicated here,
I respectfully dissent.

I
  Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) makes it a federal crime to “en-
courag[e] or induc[e]” a noncitizen “to come to, enter, or re-
side in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard
of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will
be in violation of law.”  For ease of reference, I will refer to
this as the “encouragement provision.”
  Respondent Hansen argues that the encouragement pro-
vision is unconstitutional under our First Amendment over-
breadth doctrine, and the Ninth Circuit below agreed.  Nei-
ther  the  Government  nor  the  majority  disputes  that
conclusion if the statute is read according to its plain terms.
And, indeed, when read literally, the encouragement provi-
sion prohibits so much protected speech that it appears to
qualify as overbroad under our precedents.

A
  A  statute  is  overbroad—and  thus  facially  invalid—if  “a
substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”
United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 473 (2010) (internal
quotation  marks  omitted).    The  overbreadth  inquiry  thus
generally  requires  comparing  the  First  Amendment-
protected  expression  that  a  statute  impermissibly  pun-
ishes, on the one hand (let’s call that “category one”), with
the unprotected speech and conduct that the statute validly
prohibits, on the other (“category two”).
  Starting with category one: With respect to the sweep of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the constitutionality of a specific statute and uses legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1053

529 U. S.

April 3, 2000

No. 98–2053. Colacurcio et al. v. City of Kent. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 163 F. 3d 545.

No. 99–220. DCR, Inc., et al. v. Pierce County. Ct. App.
Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 Wash. App. 660,
964 P. 2d 380.

No. 99–356. City of Jacksonville v. Lady J. Lingerie, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 176
F. 3d 1358.

No. 99–881. Good v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 1355.

No. 99–941. Forte v. Department of Veterans Affairs.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d
1338.

No. 99–1089. Dew et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 2d

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 366.

No. 99–1110. Mafrige v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 466.

No. 99–1123. Cutshall v. Sundquist, Governor of Ten-
nessee. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
193 F. 3d 466.

No. 99–1134. Melka Marine, Inc. v. United States. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 1370.

No. 99–1143. Sofaer v. District of Columbia Court of
Appeals et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 728 A. 2d 625.

No. 99–1210. Noorily et al. v. Thomas & Betts Corp.
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188
F. 3d 153.

No. 99–1247. Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa et al. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 F. 3d 1328.

No. 99–1250. Harris et ux. v. Jackson Road Co. Sup. Ct.
Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86 Ohio St. 3d 203,
714 N. E. 2d 377.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence” under
§924(c).

The District Court sentenced Taylor to 360 months’ im-
prisonment—a 240-month sentence for the conspiracy and
a  120-month  consecutive  sentence  for  the  §924(c)  convic-
tion.  Taylor appealed, but in 2011 the Court of Appeals dis-
missed the appeal because Taylor had waived his appellate
rights in his plea agreement.  Order in United States v. Tay-
lor, No. 09–4468, ECF Doc. 54 (CA4, Jan. 7, 2011).  In 2015,
he  then  unsuccessfully  sought  postconviction  relief  under
28  U. S. C.  §2255.  United  States  v.  Taylor,  2015  WL
4095845, *1 (ED Va., July 7, 2015).

Decided around the time of his failed §2255 motion, one
of this Court’s cases appeared to give Taylor another chance
to  challenge  his  conviction.    In  Johnson  v.  United  States,
576 U. S. 591 (2015), the Court struck down the similarly
worded residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), as unconstitutionally vague.  The following year,
in Welch v. United States, 578 U. S. 120 (2016), the Court
held  that  Johnson  applies  retroactively  on  collateral  re-
view.  Citing those two decisions, Taylor moved for permis-
sion  to  file  a  second-or-successive  §2255  petition.    He  ar-
gued  that  §924(c)’s  residual  clause  paralleled  ACCA’s
residual clause and therefore was unconstitutionally vague.
979 F. 3d, at 206.  He further argued that attempted Hobbs
Act  robbery  was  not  a  “crime  of  violence”  under  §924(c)’s
elements clause because it lacked “as an element the use,
attempted  use,  or  threatened  use  of  physical  force.”
§924(c)(3)(A).

The Court of Appeals granted the motion to file a succes-
sive habeas petition and, in 2020, vacated Taylor’s §924(c)
conviction.  It  did  so  because,  as  the  Court  explains,  our
precedents  require  that  courts  apply  a  “categorical  ap-
proach” when interpreting the elements clause.  Ante, at 11.
Under that approach, a criminal defendant who commits a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It contains legal citations, case names, and arguments related to a specific legal statute (§924(c)).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

421

Opinion of the Court

and became effective on January 1, 1997. The following day,
six Members of Congress who had voted against the Act
brought suit in the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia challenging its constitutionality. On April 10, 1997, the
District Court entered an order holding that the Act is un-
In obedi-
constitutional. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25.
ence to the statutory direction to allow a direct, expedited
appeal to this Court, see §§ 692(b)–(c), we promptly noted
probable jurisdiction and expedited review, 520 U. S. 1194
(1997). We determined, however, that the Members of Con-
gress did not have standing to sue because they had not “al-
leged a sufﬁciently concrete injury to have established Arti-
cle III standing,” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 830 (1997);
thus, “[i]n . . . light of [the] overriding and time-honored con-
cern about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper
constitutional sphere,” id., at 820, we remanded the case to
the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.

Less than two months after our decision in that case, the
President exercised his authority to cancel one provision in
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105–33, 111 Stat.
251, 515, and two provisions in the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, Pub. L. 105–34, 111 Stat. 788, 895–896, 990–993. Ap-
pellees, claiming that they had been injured by two of those
cancellations, ﬁled these cases in the District Court. That
Court again held the statute invalid, 985 F. Supp. 168, 177–
182 (1998), and we again expedited our review, 522 U. S. 1144
(1998). We now hold that these appellees have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act and, reaching the
merits, we agree that the cancellation procedures set forth
in the Act violate the Presentment Clause, Art. I, § 7, cl. 2,
of the Constitution.

I

We begin by reviewing the canceled items that are at issue

in these cases.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the constitutionality of a law and the standing of the parties involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1008

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  granted.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–261.  Wubayeh  et  al.  v.  City  of  New  York,  New
York,  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Soto-
mayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  peti
tion.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  60.

No.  09–321.  Gottlieb  v.  Securities  and  Exchange  Com
mission.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.  Re
ported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  424.

No.  09–6075.  Savinon  v.  Khahaifa,  Superintendent,  Or
leans  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or
decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  41.

No. 09–6224.  Basciano v.  Martinez,  Warden.  C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  316
Fed.  Appx.  50.

No.  09–6647.  Simmons  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  560  F.
3d  98.

No. 09–6675.  Noster v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  to  defer  consideration  of  petition  for  writ  of
certiorari  denied.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  573  F.  3d
664.

No.  09–6817.  Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  313
Fed.  Appx.  402.

No. 09–6825.  Kopp v.  United  States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consider
ation  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  141.
No.  09–6858.  Anderson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SEC v. JARKESY

GORSUCH, J., concurring

charges against Mr. Jarkesy.  The charges were serious; the
agency accused him of defrauding investors.  The relief the
agency sought was serious, too:  millions of dollars in civil
penalties.  See SEC, Division of Enforcement’s Post-Hear-
ing  Memorandum  of  Law  in  In re  John  Thomas  Capital
Management Group, LLC, Admin. Proc. File No. 3–15255,
pp. 28–29 (SEC, Apr. 7, 2014).  For most of the SEC’s 90-
year existence, the Commission had to go to federal court to
secure that kind of relief against someone like Mr. Jarkesy.
Ante, at 3–4.  Proceeding that way in this case hardly would
have promised him an easy ride.  But it would have at least
guaranteed Mr. Jarkesy a jury, an independent judge, and
traditional  procedures  designed  to  ensure  that  anyone
caught up in our judicial system receives due process.

In 2010, however, all that changed.  With the passage of
the Dodd Frank Act, Congress gave the SEC an alternative
to court proceedings.  Now, the agency could funnel cases
like  Mr.  Jarkesy’s  through  its own  “adjudicatory”  system.
See 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–1865.  That is the route the SEC
chose when it filed charges against Mr. Jarkesy.

There is little mystery why.  The new law gave the SEC’s
Commissioners—the same officials who authorized the suit
against  Mr.  Jarkesy—the  power  to  preside  over  his  case
themselves and issue judgment.  To be sure, the Commis-
sioners opted, as they often do, to send Mr. Jarkesy’s case
in the first instance to an “administrative law judge” (ALJ).
See 17 CFR §201.110 (2023).  But the title “judge” in this
context is not quite what it might seem.  Yes, ALJs enjoy
some  measure  of  independence  as  a  matter  of  regulation
and statute from the lawyers who pursue charges on behalf
of the agency.  But they remain servants of the same mas-
ter—the  very  agency  tasked  with  prosecuting  individuals
like  Mr.  Jarkesy.    This  close  relationship,  as  others  have
long recognized, can make it “extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, for th[e ALJ] to convey the image of being an im-
partial  fact  finder.”  B.  Segal,  The  Administrative  Law
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case SEC v. Jarkesy. It discusses the legal context surrounding the case and the implications of the Dodd-Frank Act on the SEC's adjudicatory process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

with Van Buren: The phrase “is not entitled so to obtain” is
best read to refer to information that a person is not entitled
to obtain by using a computer that he is authorized to ac-
cess.4

2
The Government’s primary counterargument is that Van
Buren’s reading renders the word “so” superfluous.  Recall
the definition: “to access a computer with authorization and
to use such access to obtain . . . information in the computer
that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain.”  §1030(e)(6)
(emphasis added).  According to the Government, “so” adds
nothing  to  the  sentence  if  it  refers  solely  to  the  earlier
stated manner of obtaining the information through use of
a  computer  one  has  accessed  with  authorization.    What
matters on  Van Buren’s reading,  as the Government sees
it, is simply that the person obtain information that he is
not entitled to obtain—and that point could be made even
if “so” were deleted.  By contrast, the Government insists,
“so” makes a valuable contribution if it incorporates all of
the circumstances that might qualify a person’s right to ob-
tain information.  Because only its interpretation gives “so”

——————
other property to have been so embezzled, stolen, [or] converted . . . re-
tains the same with intent to convert it to his use,” is subject to punish-
ment); §1708 (“[W]hoever steals, takes, or abstracts, or by fraud or de-
ception  obtains,  or  attempts  so  to  obtain,”  parcels  of  mail  is  subject  to
punishment).

4 The dissent criticizes this interpretation as inconsistent with “basic
principles of property law,” and in particular the “familiar rule that an
entitlement  to  use  another  person’s  property  is  circumstance  specific.”
Post, at 4–5 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).  But common-law principles “should
be imported into statutory text only when Congress employs a common-
law term”—not when Congress has outlined an offense “analogous to a
common-law crime without using common-law terms.”  Carter v. United
States, 530 U. S. 255, 265 (2000) (emphasis deleted).  Relying on the com-
mon law is particularly ill advised here because it was the failure of pre-
existing law to capture computer crime that helped spur Congress to en-
act the CFAA.  See supra, at 2.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case Van Buren v. United States. It delves into the interpretation of a specific section of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

Opinion of the Court

§3, 1 Stat. 548 (“proof of the several circumstances neces-
sary to entitle the applicants to the benefits of this act, may
be taken before . . . a judge of the supreme or superior court,
or the first justice or first judge of the court of common pleas
or country court of any state”).

There  is  more.  Shortly  after  ratification,  Congress
passed a detailed statute that required state-court judges
to  gather  and  certify  reports.  Act  of  July  20,  1790,  §3,  1
Stat. 132.  The Act authorized commanders of ships to re-
quest examinations of their vessels from any “justice of the
peace  of  the  city,  town  or  place.”  Ibid.    The  judge  would
order three qualified people to prepare a report on the ves-
sel’s condition, which the judge would review and “endorse.”
Ibid.  Then, the judge was required to issue an order regard-
ing “whether the said ship or vessel is fit to proceed on the
intended  voyage;  and  if  not,  whether  such  repairs  can  be
made or deficiencies supplied where the ship or vessel then
lays.”  Ibid.

These early congressional enactments “provid[e] ‘contem-
poraneous  and  weighty  evidence’  of  the  Constitution’s
meaning.”  Bowsher  v.  Synar,  478  U. S.  714,  723  (1986).
Collectively,  they  demonstrate  that  the  Constitution  does
not prohibit the Federal Government from imposing adju-
dicative  tasks  on  state  courts.    This  makes  sense  against
the backdrop of the Madisonian Compromise: Since Article
III established only the Supreme Court and made inferior
federal courts optional, Congress could have relied almost
entirely  on  state  courts  to  apply  federal  law.    Printz,  521
U. S.,  at  907.    Had  Congress  taken  that  course,  it  would
have  had  to  rely  on  state  courts  to  perform  adjudication-
adjacent tasks too.

We now confirm what we suggested in Printz: Congress
may impose ancillary recordkeeping requirements related
to  state-court  proceedings  without  violating  the  Tenth
Amendment.  Such requirements do not offload the Federal
Government’s responsibilities onto the States, nor do they
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the relationship between federal and state courts regarding certain tasks. It's part of a larger legal argument and contains citations to legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1077

529 U. S.

April 17, 2000

No. 99–8530.

Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 542.

No. 99–8534. Clark v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1354.

No. 99–8536. Parker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 440.

No. 99–8537. Banks v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1342.

No. 99–8542. Bonowitz et al. v. United States. Ct. App.

D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 A. 2d 18.

No. 99– 8544. Abram v. Department of Agriculture.

C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8547. Pulido v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8550. Lawson v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Montgomery

County. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8558. Peterson et ux. v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 306 Ill. App. 3d 1091,
715 N. E. 2d 1221.

No. 99–8559. Holland v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 415.

No. 99–8561. Eidson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 661.

No. 99–8562. Monaco v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 381 and 199 F. 3d 1324.
No. 99–8563. Beers v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 1297.

No. 99–8567. Fripp v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8568. Hall v. Calbone, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 913.

No. 99–8569. Garza v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 366.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J.

APPENDIXES
A
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993

“SEC. 2.  FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
“(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—
  “(1) The right of citizens of the United States to vote is a
fundamental right;
  “(2)  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Federal,  State,  and  local  gov-
ernments to promote the exercise of that right; and
  “(3)  discriminatory  and  unfair  registration  laws  and
procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter
participation in elections for Federal office and dispropor-
tionately  harm  voter  participation  . . .  ,  including  racial
minorities.
“(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are—
  “(1) to  establish  procedures  that  will  increase the  num-
ber of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for
Federal office;
  “(2)  to  make  it  possible  for  Federal,  State,  and  local
governments  to  implement  this  Act  in  a  manner  that
enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in
elections for Federal office;
  “(3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and
  “(4)  to  ensure  that  accurate  and  current  voter  registra-
tion rolls are maintained.”  107 Stat. 77.

“SEC.  5.
  SIMULTANEOUS  APPLICATION  FOR  VOTER
REGISTRATION  AND APPLICATION  FOR MOTOR VEHICLE
DRIVER’S LICENSE.
  “(d) CHANGE OF ADDRESS.—Any change of address form
submitted  in  accordance  with  State  law  for  purposes  of  a
State motor vehicle driver's license shall serve as notifica-
tion  of  change  of  address  for  voter  registration  with  re-
spect  to  elections  for  Federal  office  for  the  registrant  in-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. It includes section headings, legal language, and citations. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

393

Opinion of the Court

claim did not satisfy the “prejudice” component of the Strick-
land test.17

Cases such as Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157 (1986), and
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364 (1993), do not justify a
departure from a straightforward application of Strickland
when the ineffectiveness of counsel does deprive the defend-
ant of a substantive or procedural right to which the law
entitles him.18
In the instant case, it is undisputed that
Williams had a right—indeed, a constitutionally protected
right—to provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that
his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to offer.

Nevertheless, the Virginia Supreme Court read our deci-
sion in Lockhart to require a separate inquiry into fundamen-
tal fairness even when Williams is able to show that his law-
yer was ineffective and that his ineffectiveness probably
affected the outcome of the proceeding.

It wrote:

17 “But the ‘prejudice’ component of the Strickland test does not impli-
cate these concerns.
It focuses on the question whether counsel’s deﬁ-
cient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceed-
[466 U. S., at 687]; see Kimmelman, 477 U. S.,
ing fundamentally unfair.
at 393 (Powell, J., concurring). Unreliability or unfairness does not result
if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any
substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him. As we
have noted, it was the premise of our grant in this case that Perry was
correctly decided, i. e., that respondent was not entitled to an objection
based on ‘double counting.’ Respondent therefore suffered no prejudice
from his counsel’s deﬁcient performance.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S.
364, 372 (1993).

18 In her concurring opinion in Lockhart, Justice O’Connor stressed
this precise point.
“I write separately only to point out that today’s deci-
sion will, in the vast majority of cases, have no effect on the prejudice
inquiry under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). The deter-
minative question—whether there is ‘a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different,’ id., at 694—remains unchanged. This case, however, con-
cerns the unusual circumstance where the defendant attempts to demon-
strate prejudice based on considerations that, as a matter of law, ought
not inform the inquiry.”

Id., at 373.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court from a case.  It cites previous cases and legal precedents, indicating it is part of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

THOMAS, J., concurring

crimination  in  admissions  to  consider  the  fact  that  its
“beneficiaries” are underperforming in the classroom).  “It
is  a  fact  that  in  virtually  all  selective  schools  . . .  where
racial  preferences  in  admission  is  practiced,  the  majority
of  [black]  students  end  up  in  the  lower  quarter  of  their
class.”  S. Cole & E. Barber, Increasing Faculty Diversity:
The  Occupational  Choices  of  High-Achieving  Minority
Students 124 (2003).  There is no reason to believe this is
not  the  case  at  the  University.  The  University  and  its
dozens of amici are deafeningly silent on this point.

Furthermore,  the  University’s  discrimination  does
nothing  to  increase  the  number  of  blacks  and  Hispanics
who have access to a college education generally.  Instead,
the  University’s  discrimination  has  a  pervasive  shifting
effect.  See  T.  Sowell,  Affirmative  Action  Around  the
World  145–146  (2004).  The  University  admits  minorities
who otherwise would have attended less selective colleges
where  they  would  have  been  more  evenly  matched.    But,
as a result of the mismatching, many blacks and Hispan-
ics who likely would have excelled at less elite schools are
placed  in  a  position  where  underperformance  is  all  but
inevitable  because  they  are  less  academically  prepared
than the white and Asian students with whom they must
compete.  Setting aside the damage wreaked upon the self-
confidence  of  these  overmatched  students,  there  is  no
evidence that they learn more at the University than they
would  have  learned  at  other  schools  for  which  they  were
better prepared.  Indeed, they may learn less.

The Court of Appeals believed that the University needed
to enroll more blacks and Hispanics because they remained
“clustered  in  certain  programs.”    631  F. 3d  213,  240
(CA5  2011)  (“[N]early  a  quarter  of  the  undergraduate
students  in  [the  University’s]  College  of  Social  Work  are
Hispanic,  and  more  than  10%  are  [black].  In  the  College
of  Education,  22.4%  of  students  are  Hispanic  and  10.1%
are [black]”).  But racial discrimination may be the cause
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. It argues against the use of race as a factor in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1089

529 U. S.

April 24, 2000

No. 99–7487. Salazar-Olivares v. United States. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 179 F. 3d 228.

No. 99–7588.

Jones v. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
190 F. 3d 1224.

No. 99–7594. Buss v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de-

nied. Reported below: 187 Ill. 2d 144, 718 N. E. 2d 1.

No. 99–7623. Nielson v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 187 Ill. 2d 271, 718 N. E. 2d 131.

No. 99–7808. Falsetta v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 21 Cal. 4th 903, 986 P. 2d 182.
No. 99–7863. Pospisil v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 F. 3d 1023.

No. 99–7878. Sanchez v. Schomig, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 619.

No. 99–7920. Dunaway v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 746 So. 2d 1042.

No. 99–8317. Murphy v. City of Smithville, Tennessee,
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198
F. 3d 246.

No. 99–8318. LaTorre v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 A. 2d 1146.

No. 99–8319.

Johnson v. Jefferson. Ct. App. D. C. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–8334. Trice v. McNeal. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–8337. Rivas Suniga v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8341. Rogers v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99– 8342. Simmons v. Luebbers, Superintendent,
Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

ALITO, J., dissenting

precedents in another way.  We have been sensitive to the
gravity  of  “ ‘trapp[ing]’ ”  States  “ ‘between  the  competing
hazards of liability’ ” imposed by the Constitution and the
VRA.    Id.,  at  196  (quoting  Vera,  517  U. S.,  at  977).    The
VRA’s demand that States not unintentionally “dilute” the
votes of particular groups must be reconciled with the Con-
stitution’s demand that States generally avoid intentional
augmentation of the political power of any one racial group
(and thus the diminution of the power of other groups).  The
plurality’s  predominance  analysis  shreds  that  prudential
concern.  If a private plaintiff can demonstrate §2 liability
based on the production of a map that the State has every
reason to believe it could not constitutionally draw, we have
left “state legislatures too little breathing room” and virtu-
ally guaranteed that they will be on the losing end of a fed-
eral court’s judgment.  Bethune-Hill, 580 U. S., at 196.

*

  *

  *
  The Court’s treatment of Gingles is inconsistent with the
text of §2, our precedents on racial predominance, and the
fundamental principle that  States  are  almost always pro-
hibited from basing decisions on race.  Today’s decision un-
necessarily  sets  the  VRA  on  a  perilous  and  unfortunate
path.  I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it is part of the main body of the text and not a separate element like a table of contents or introductory paragraph.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–9972.  Argued January 21, 2015—Decided April 21, 2015

Officer  Struble,  a  K–9  officer,  stopped  petitioner  Rodriguez  for  driving
on a highway shoulder, a violation of Nebraska law.  After Struble at-
tended to everything relating to the stop, including, inter alia, check-
ing the driver’s licenses of Rodriguez and his passenger and issuing a
warning for the traffic offense, he asked Rodriguez for permission to
walk  his  dog  around  the  vehicle.    When  Rodriguez  refused,  Struble
detained  him  until  a  second  officer  arrived.    Struble  then  retrieved
his dog, who alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle.  The en-
suing  search  revealed  methamphetamine.    Seven  or  eight  minutes
elapsed  from  the  time  Struble  issued  the  written  warning  until  the
dog alerted.

Rodriguez was indicted on federal drug charges.  He moved to sup-
press the evidence seized from the vehicle on the ground, among oth-
ers,  that  Struble  had  prolonged  the  traffic  stop  without  reasonable
suspicion  in  order  to  conduct  the  dog  sniff.    The  Magistrate  Judge
recommended denial of the motion.  He found no reasonable suspicion
supporting  detention  once  Struble  issued  the  written  warning.   Un-
der Eighth Circuit precedent, however, he concluded that prolonging
the  stop  by  “seven  to  eight  minutes”  for  the  dog  sniff  was  only  a  de
minimis intrusion on Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights and was
for that reason permissible.  The District Court then denied the mo-
tion to suppress.  Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea and was
sentenced to five years in prison.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed.  Not-
ing that the seven or eight minute delay was an acceptable “de mini-
mis  intrusion  on  Rodriguez’s  personal  liberty,”  the  court  declined  to
reach the question whether Struble had reasonable suspicion to con-
tinue Rodriguez’s detention after issuing the written warning.

Held:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2010

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BROWN, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v.

PLATA ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR
THE EASTERN AND NORTHERN DISTRICTS OF CALIFORNIA

No. 09–1233.  Argued November 30, 2010—Decided May 23, 2011

California’s  prisons  are  designed  to  house  a  population  just  under
80,000,  but  at  the  time  of  the  decision  under  review  the  population
was  almost  double  that.    The  resulting  conditions  are  the  subject  of
two  federal  class  actions.    In  Coleman  v.  Brown,  filed  in  1990,  the
District Court found that prisoners with serious mental illness do not
receive minimal, adequate care.  A Special Master appointed to over-
see  remedial  efforts  reported  12  years  later  that  the  state  of  mental
health care in California’s prisons was deteriorating due to increased
overcrowding.  In  Plata  v.  Brown,  filed  in  2001,  the  State  conceded
that  deficiencies  in  prison  medical  care  violated  prisoners’  Eighth
Amendment  rights  and  stipulated  to  a  remedial  injunction.    But
when  the  State  had  not  complied  with  the  injunction  by  2005,  the
court  appointed  a  Receiver  to  oversee  remedial  efforts.    Three  years
later,  the  Receiver  described  continuing  deficiencies  caused  by  over-
crowding.  Believing that a remedy for unconstitutional medical and
mental  health  care  could  not  be  achieved  without  reducing  over-
crowding,  the  Coleman  and  Plata  plaintiffs  moved  their  respective
District  Courts  to  convene  a  three-judge  court  empowered  by  the
Prison  Litigation  Reform  Act  of  1995  (PLRA)  to  order  reductions  in
the  prison  population.    The  judges  in  both  actions  granted  the  re-
quest,  and  the  cases  were  consolidated  before  a  single  three-judge
court.  After hearing testimony and making extensive findings of fact,
the court ordered California to reduce its prison population to 137.5%
of design capacity within two years.  Finding that the prison popula-
tion  would  have  to  be  reduced  if  capacity  could  not  be  increased
through new construction, the court ordered the State to formulate a
compliance plan and submit it for court approval.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

103

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they don't contain the main body of the text meant for reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

The  logical  implication  of  the  Court’s  definition  of  the
word “under” is that any copy manufactured abroad—even
a piratical one made without the copyright owner’s author
ization and in violation of the law of the country where it
was created—would fall within the scope of §109(a).  Any
such  copy  would  have  been  made  “in  accordance  with”  or
“in compliance with” the U. S. Copyright Act, in the sense
that  manufacturing  the  copy  did  not  violate  the  Act  (be
cause the Act does not apply extraterritorially).

The  Court  rightly  refuses  to  accept  such  an  absurd
conclusion.  Instead, it interprets §109(a) as applying only
to copies whose making actually complied with Title 17, or
would  have  complied  with  Title  17  had  Title  17  been  ap
plicable  (i.e.,  had  the  copies  been  made  in  the  United
States).  See ante, at 8 (“§109(a)’s ‘first sale’ doctrine would
apply  to  copyrighted  works  as  long  as  their  manufacture
met the requirements of American copyright law.”).  Con
gress,  however,  used  express  language  when  it  called  for
such  a  counterfactual  inquiry  in  17  U. S. C.  §§602(a)(2)
and  (b).  See  §602(a)(2)  (“Importation  into  the  United
States or exportation from the United States, without the
authority  of  the  owner  of  copyright  under  this  title,  of
copies or phonorecords, the making of which either consti
tuted  an  infringement  of  copyright,  or  which  would  have
constituted  an  infringement  of  copyright  if  this  title  had
been  applicable,  is  an  infringement  of  the  exclusive  right
to  distribute  copies  or  phonorecords  under  section  106.”
(emphasis  added));  §602(b)  (“In  a  case  where  the  making

——————

under this title.”  The word “made” signifies that the conduct at issue is
the  creation  or  manufacture  of  a  copy.    See  Webster’s  Third  New
International  Dictionary  1356  (1961)  (defining  “made”  as  “artificially
produced by a manufacturing process”).  The word “lawfully” indicates
that  for  §109(a)  to  apply,  the  copy’s  creation  must  have  complied  with
some  body  of  law.    Finally,  the  prepositional  phrase  “under  this  title”
clarifies what that body of law is—namely, the copyright prescriptions
contained in Title 17 of the U. S. Code.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It delves into the interpretation of copyright law, particularly regarding the "first sale" doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

JACKSON, J., dissenting

the plain text of the encouragement provision, there is no
dispute  that,  “[i]n  ordinary  parlance,  ‘induce’  means  ‘[to]
lead on; to influence; to prevail on; to move by persuasion
or influence,’ ” and “ ‘encourage’ means to ‘inspire with cour-
age, spirit, or hope.’ ”  Ante, at 9.  Thus, on its face, the en-
couragement provision’s use of the terms “encourage” and
“induce”  seems  to  encompass  any  and  all  speech  that
merely  persuades,  influences,  or  inspires  a  noncitizen  to
come to, enter, or reside in this country in violation of law.
  If speech of this nature is, in fact, sufficient to trigger po-
tential prosecution under this statute, the provision would
put  all  manner  of  protected  speech  in  the  Government’s
prosecutorial crosshairs.  It would reach, for example, the
grandmother  who  says  she  misses  her  noncitizen  grand-
child, leading the grandchild to move illegally to the United
States.    It  would  also  apply  to  the  doctor  who  informs  a
noncitizen  patient  that  a  necessary  medical  treatment  is
more readily available in the United States, influencing the
patient  to  stay  beyond  the  expiration  of  his  visa  to  await
treatment.  The college counselor who advises an undocu-
mented student that she can obtain a private scholarship to
attend college in the United States, inspiring the student to
reside here, would also fall within the scope of the statute.
  The  encouragement  provision,  on  this  broad  reading,
would also punish abstract advocacy of illegal conduct, even
though such speech is plainly permissible under the First
Amendment.  For instance, the plain text of the statute ap-
pears to prohibit a person from saying to a noncitizen who
has no authorization to reside here, “I encourage you to live
in the United States.”  But that speech is plainly protected.
See  United  States  v.  Williams,  553  U. S.  285,  298–300
(2008).  In Williams, this Court explained that “abstract ad-
vocacy” of  child pornography—including the phrase  “I en-
courage you to obtain child pornography”—qualifies as pro-
tected  speech,  even  though  the  “recommendation  of  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against a broad interpretation of the "encouragement provision" of a law, claiming it would criminalize protected speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  ENDREW F. v. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. RE–1

Opinion of the Court

curriculum.2

Rowley  had  no  need  to  provide  concrete  guidance  with
respect to a child who is not fully integrated in the regular
classroom  and  not  able  to  achieve  on  grade  level.    That
case concerned a young girl who was progressing smoothly
through  the  regular  curriculum.    If  that  is  not  a  reason-
able  prospect  for  a  child,  his  IEP  need  not  aim  for  grade-
level advancement.  But his educational program must be
appropriately ambitious in light of his circumstances, just
as  advancement  from  grade  to  grade  is  appropriately
ambitious for most children in the regular classroom.  The
goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to
meet challenging objectives.

Of  course  this  describes  a  general  standard,  not  a  for-
mula.  But whatever else can be said about it, this stand-
ard  is  markedly  more  demanding  than  the  “merely  more
than  de  minimis”  test  applied  by  the  Tenth  Circuit.    It
cannot  be  the  case  that  the  Act  typically  aims  for  grade-
level  advancement  for  children  with  disabilities  who  can
be  educated  in  the  regular  classroom,  but  is  satisfied
with barely more than de minimis progress for those who
cannot.

When  all  is  said  and  done,  a  student  offered  an  educa-
tional  program  providing  “merely  more  than  de  minimis”
progress from year to year can hardly be said to have been
offered an education at all.  For children with disabilities,
receiving  instruction  that  aims  so  low  would  be  tanta-
mount  to  “sitting  idly  . . .  awaiting  the  time  when  they
were old enough to ‘drop out.’ ”   Rowley, 458  U. S., at 179
(some  internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    The  IDEA
demands  more.  It  requires  an  educational  program  rea-
——————

2 This  guidance  should  not  be  interpreted  as  an  inflexible  rule.  We
declined  to  hold  in  Rowley,  and  do  not  hold  today,  that  “every  handi-
capped child who is advancing from grade to grade . . . is automatically
receiving a [FAPE].”  Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School
Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 203, n. 25 (1982).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion discussing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). It delves into the standard of educational progress required for students with disabilities, contrasting it with a more lenient "de minimis" standard.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH

Opinion of the Court

id.,  at  908.    But,  as  discussed  above,  “the  knowledge  and
substantial  assistance”  components  “should  be  considered
relative to one another” as part of a single inquiry designed
to  capture  conscious  and  culpable  conduct.  Camp,  948
F. 2d,  at  459  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    The
“knowing” part of that inquiry is therefore designed to cap-
ture the defendants’ state of mind with respect to their ac-
tions and the tortious conduct (even if not always the par-
ticular terrorist act), not the same general awareness that
defines Halberstam’s second element.

Finally,  when  applying  Halberstam’s  six  substantiality
factors, the Ninth Circuit appears to have regarded the fac-
tors  as  a  sequence  of  disparate,  unrelated  considerations
without a common conceptual core.  See 2 F. 4th, at 909–
910.  That is incorrect.  The point of those factors is to help
courts capture the essence of aiding and abetting: partici-
pation in another’s wrongdoing that is both significant and
culpable enough to justify attributing the principal wrong-
doing  to  the  aider  and  abettor.  The  Ninth  Circuit  thus
erred in focusing (as it did) primarily on the value of defend-
ants’  platforms  to  ISIS,  rather  than  whether  defendants
culpably associated themselves with ISIS’ actions.  For ex-
ample,  when  applying  the  second  factor  (the  amount  and
kind of assistance), the Ninth Circuit should have consid-
ered  that  defendants’  platforms  and  content-sorting  algo-
rithms were generally available to the internet-using pub-
lic.  That  focus  reveals  that  ISIS’  ability  to  benefit  from
these  platforms  was  merely  incidental  to  defendants’  ser-
vices and general business models; it was not attributable
to any culpable conduct of defendants directed toward ISIS.
And, when considering the fourth and fifth factors (the de-
fendants’ relationship to ISIS and the defendants’ state of
mind),  the Ninth  Circuit  should have  given  much  greater
weight to defendants’ arm’s-length relationship with ISIS—
which was essentially no different from their relationship
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the "aiding and abetting" concept in the context of a case involving Twitter and ISIS. It delves into legal precedents and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

whether each statute’s “full range of applications” are con-
stitutional.  See ante, at 10, 12.  But, the Court repeats that
very same error.  Out of the sea of “variegated and complex”
functions  that  platforms  perform,  ante,  at  11,  the  Court
plucks  out  two  (Facebook’s  News  Feed  and  YouTube’s
homepage), and declares that they may be protected by the
First  Amendment.  See  ante,  at  26  (opining  on  what  the
“current record suggests”).  The Court does so on a record
that  it  itself  describes  as  “incomplete”  and  “underdevel-
oped,” ante, at 12, 20, and by sidestepping several pressing
factual  and  legal  questions,  see  post,  at  29–32  (ALITO,  J.,
concurring in judgment).  As JUSTICE ALITO explains, the
Court’s approach is both unwarranted and mistaken.  See
ibid.

I agree with JUSTICE ALITO’s analysis and join his opin-
ion in full.  I write separately to add two observations on
the  merits  and  to  highlight  a  more  fundamental  jurisdic-
tional problem.  The trade associations have brought facial
challenges alleging that H. B. 20 and S. B. 7072 are uncon-
stitutional  in  many  or  all  of  their  applications.    But,  Art-
icle III of the Constitution permits federal courts to exercise
judicial power only over “Cases” and “Controversies.”  Ac-
cordingly,  federal  courts  can  decide  whether  a  statute  is
constitutional only as applied to the parties before them—
they lack authority to deem a statute “facially” unconstitu-
tional.

I
  As JUSTICE ALITO explains, the trade associations have
failed to provide many of the basic facts necessary to evalu-
ate their challenges to H. B. 20 and S. B. 7072.  See post, at
22–29.  I make two additional observations.

First, with respect to certain provisions of H. B. 20 and
S. B. 7072, the Court assumes that the framework outlined
in  Zauderer  v.  Office  of  Disciplinary  Counsel  of  Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626 (1985), applies.  See ante, at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Moody v. NetChoice, LLC. It discusses the Court's analysis of the constitutionality of certain statutes and raises jurisdictional concerns.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

612

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Opinion of the Court

an explicit connection with or effect on interstate com-
Id., at 562. Such a jurisdictional element may es-
merce.”
tablish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress’ regu-
lation of interstate commerce.

Third, we noted that neither § 922(q) “ ‘nor its legislative
history contain[s] express congressional ﬁndings regarding
the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a
school zone.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting Brief for United States, O. T.
1994, No. 93–1260, pp. 5–6). While “Congress normally is
not required to make formal ﬁndings as to the substantial
burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce,” 514
U. S., at 562 (citing McClung, supra, at 304; Perez, 402 U. S.,
at 156), the existence of such ﬁndings may “enable us to eval-
uate the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affect[s] interstate commerce, even though no
such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked eye.” 514
U. S., at 563.

Finally, our decision in Lopez rested in part on the fact
that the link between gun possession and a substantial effect
on interstate commerce was attenuated.
Id., at 563–567.
The United States argued that the possession of guns may
lead to violent crime, and that violent crime “can be ex-
pected to affect the functioning of the national economy in
two ways. First, the costs of violent crime are substantial,
and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are
spread throughout the population. Second, violent crime
reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas
Id.,
within the country that are perceived to be unsafe.”
at 563–564 (citation omitted). The Government also argued
that the presence of guns at schools poses a threat to the
educational process, which in turn threatens to produce a
less efﬁcient and productive work force, which will nega-
tively affect national productivity and thus interstate com-
merce.

Ibid.

We rejected these “costs of crime” and “national pro-
ductivity” arguments because they would permit Congress
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION

BREYER, J., dissenting

The specific rule of state law in question consists of the
California Supreme Court’s application of these principles
to hold that “some” (but not “all”) “class action waivers” in
consumer  contracts  are  exculpatory  and  unconscionable
under California “law.”  Discover Bank v. Superior Ct., 36
Cal. 4th 148, 160, 162, 113 P. 3d 1100, 1108, 1110 (2005).
In  particular,  in  Discover  Bank  the  California  Supreme
Court stated that, when a class-action waiver

“is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a set
ting in which disputes between the contracting parties
predictably  involve  small  amounts  of  damages,  and
when  it  is  alleged  that  the  party  with  the  superior
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliber
ately  cheat  large  numbers  of  consumers  out  of  indi
vidually  small  sums  of  money,  then  . . .  the  waiver
becomes  in  practice  the  exemption  of  the  party  ‘from
responsibility  for  [its]  own  fraud,  or  willful  injury  to
the  person  or  property  of  another.’ ”    Id.,  at  162–163,
113 P. 3d, at 1110.

In  such  a  circumstance,  the  “waivers  are  unconscionable
under California law and should not be enforced.”  Id., at
163, 113 P. 3d, at 1110.

The Discover Bank rule does not create a “blanket policy
in California against class action waivers in the consumer
context.”  Provencher  v.  Dell,  Inc.,  409  F. Supp. 2d  1196,
1201  (CD  Cal.  2006).    Instead,  it  represents  the  “appli
cation  of  a  more  general  [unconscionability]  principle.”
Gentry v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. 4th 443, 457, 165 P. 3d 556,
564 (2007).  Courts applying California law have enforced
class-action  waivers  where  they  satisfy  general  uncon
scionability standards.  See, e.g., Walnut Producers of Cal.
v.  Diamond  Foods,  Inc.,  187  Cal.  App.  4th  634,  647–650,
114  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  449,  459–462  (2010);  Arguelles-Romero
v.  Superior  Ct.,  184  Cal.  App.  4th  825,  843–845,  109  Cal.
Rptr. 3d 289, 305–307 (2010); Smith v. Americredit Finan-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to class action waivers in consumer contracts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1115

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No.  09–572.  DeOcampo  v.  Superior  Court  of  California,
Alameda County, et al.  Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–573.  Cutter  v.  Northwest  Administrators,  Inc.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.
Appx.  577.

No.  09–576.  Cartledge  v.  Office  of  Personnel  Manage

ment.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–578.  Stark  v.  Maine.  Sup.  Jud.  Ct.  Me.  Certiorari

denied.

No. 09–591.  Pizzonia  v.  United States.  C. A.  2d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  455.

No.  09–593.  Nordberg  v.  Ocean  Meadows  Condominium

Assn.  Sup.  Jud.  Ct.  Me.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–596.  Cardiac  Pacemakers,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  St.  Jude
Medical,  Inc.,  et  al.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  576  F.  3d  1348.

No.  09–599.  Allen  v.  Tennessee.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tenn.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09– 605.  Joint  Administrative  Committee  of  the
Plumbing  and  Pipefitting  Industry  in  the  Detroit  Area
et  al.  v.  Washington  Group  International,  Inc.  C.  A.  6th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  626.

No.  09–614.  Babcock  et  al.  v.  Arthur  J.  Gallagher  &  Co.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.
Appx.  384.

No. 09–616.  Ritchie v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  238.

No.  09–622.  Willaman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–624.  O’Dea  v.  BNSF  Railway  Co.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  785.

No.  09–634.  Schneider  v.  Commissioner  of  Internal  Rev
enue.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326
Fed.  Appx.  143.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

others, any one of whom could represent a source of expo-
sure to” the virus.  Id., at 61408.  The agency backed up its
conclusions with hundreds of reports of workplace COVID–
19  outbreaks—not  just  in  cheek-by-jowl  settings  like  fac-
tory assembly lines, but in retail stores, restaurants, medi-
cal facilities, construction areas, and standard offices.  Id.,
at  61412–61416.  But  still,  OSHA  took  care  to  tailor  the
Standard.  Where it could exempt work settings without ex-
posing  employees  to  grave  danger,  it  did  so.    See  id.,  at
61419–61420; supra, at 3.  In sum, the agency did just what
the Act told it to: It protected employees from a grave dan-
ger posed by a new virus as and where needed, and went no
further.  The  majority,  in  overturning  that  action,  substi-
tutes judicial diktat for reasoned policymaking.

The result of its ruling is squarely at odds with the stat-
utory scheme.  As shown earlier, the Act’s explicit terms au-
thorize  the  Standard.  See  supra,  at  4–6.    Once  again,
OSHA  must  issue  an  emergency  standard  in  response  to
new  hazards  in  the  workplace  that  expose  employees  to
“grave danger.”  §655(c)(1); see supra, at 2–4.  The entire
point of that provision is to enable OSHA to deal with emer-
gencies—to put into effect the new measures needed to cope
with new workplace conditions.  The enacting Congress of
course did not tell the agency to issue this Standard in re-
sponse  to  this  COVID–19  pandemic—because  that  Con-
gress could not predict the future.  But that Congress did
indeed  want  OSHA  to  have  the  tools  needed  to  confront
emerging  dangers  (including  contagious  diseases)  in  the
workplace.  We  know  that,  first  and  foremost,  from  the
breadth of the authority Congress granted to OSHA.  And
we know that because of how OSHA has used that authority
from the statute’s beginnings—in ways not dissimilar to the
action here.  OSHA has often issued rules applying to all or
nearly all workplaces in the Nation, affecting at once many
tens of millions of employees.  See, e.g., 29 CFR §1910.141.
It has previously regulated infectious disease, including by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal dissenting opinion, likely from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion and cites previous legal precedents and OSHA regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

9

Opinion of the Court

treated as if they were six feet tall does not imply that no
men are six feet tall.”  CSX Corp., 518 F. 3d, at 1342.

In  the  last  of  its  textual  arguments,  Quality  Stores
draws attention to the boldface heading of §3402(o), which
states,  “Extension  of  withholding  to  certain  payments
other than wages.”  It contends the heading declares that
the payments enumerated within §3402(o) are “other than
wages.”  Captions, of course, can be “a useful aid in resolv-
ing” a statutory text’s “ambiguity.”  FTC v. Mandel Broth-
ers,  Inc.,  359  U.  S.  385,  388–389  (1959).  But  Quality
Stores cannot rely on the statutory heading to support its
argument  that  §3402(o),  without  ambiguity,  excludes  all
severance  payments  from  the  definition  of  wages.    The
heading  states  that  withholding  is  extended  to  “certain
payments.”  This  falls  short  of  a  declaration  that  all  the
payments listed in §3402(o) are not wages.

Next, the regulatory background against which §3402(o)
was  enacted  illustrates  the  limited  nature  of  the  problem
the provision was enacted to address.  For this purpose, it
is  instructive  to  concentrate  on  the  statutory  term  “sup-
plemental  unemployment  benefits,”  which  defines  the
scope of §3402(o)’s income-tax withholding mandate.

The  concept  of  SUBs  originated  in  labor  demands  for  a
guaranteed annual wage.  When it became clear this was
“impractical in their industries, unions such as the Steel-
workers  and  the  United  Auto  Workers  transformed  their
guaranteed  annual  wage  demands  into  proposals  to  sup-
plement existing unemployment compensation programs.”
Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U. S. 191, 200 (1980).  A
SUB  plan,  as  originally  conceived,  offered  “second-level
protection  against  layoff ”  by  supplementing  unemploy-
ment benefits offered by the States.  Ibid.

In  the  1950’s,  major  American  employers  such  as  Ford
Motor Company adopted SUB plans of this type, agreeing
to  fund  trusts  that  would  provide  SUBs  to  terminated
employees.    For  example,  Ford’s  contract  with  employees
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute related to income tax withholding. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis of relevant case law and regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

953

558 U. S.

October 13, 2009

No.  09–5822.  Tillman  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  14th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5825.  Torrence  v.  Ozmint,  Director,  South  Caro
lina  Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  55.

No.  09–5828.  Larry  v.  Branker,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  552  F.  3d  356.

No. 09–5829.  Johnson v.  California.  Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5832.  Lay v.  Louisiana.  Sup. Ct. La.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  10  So.  3d  726.

No.  09–5834.  Page  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5835.  Dean  v.  Blaisdell,  Warden.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5836.  Allen  v.  Barnes,  Deputy  Sheriff,  Los
Angeles  County,  California,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  740.

No.  09–5843.  Lyles  v.  Lemmon  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–5849.  Bryant v.  Metro/State Newspaper.  Sup. Ct.

S.  C.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5850.  Perkins  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–5851.  Medina  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  381  Ill.  App.  3d  1138,  966
N.  E.  2d  604.

No.  09–5855.  Thompson  v.  Adams,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5858.  Kelley  v.  Ohio.  Ct.  App.  Ohio,  Mahoning
County.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  179  Ohio  App.  3d
666,  903  N.  E.  2d  365.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, court names, and decisions (certiorari denied). This type of information is not typically considered suitable for indexing as it's not the main body of text from a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

HERRERA v. WYOMING

Opinion of the Court

May  11,  1858).  Federal  negotiators  had  every  reason  to
bring  up  statehood  if  they  intended  it  to  extinguish  the
Tribe’s hunting rights.

In  the  face  of  this  evidence,  Wyoming  nevertheless
contends that the 1868 Treaty expired at statehood pursu-
ant  to  the  Mille  Lacs  analysis.  Wyoming  does  not  argue
that  the  legal  act  of  Wyoming’s  statehood  abrogated  the
treaty  right,  and  it  cannot  contend  that  statehood  is  ex-
plicitly  identified  as  a  treaty  expiration  point.  Instead,
Wyoming draws on historical sources to assert that state-
hood, as a practical matter, marked the arrival of “civiliza-
tion” in the Wyoming Territory and thus rendered all the
lands in the State occupied.  Brief for Respondent 48.  This
claim cannot be squared with Mille Lacs.

Wyoming’s  arguments  boil  down  to  an  attempt  to  read
the treaty impliedly to terminate at statehood, precisely as
Mille  Lacs  forbids.  The  State  sets  out  a  potpourri  of  evi-
dence  that  it  claims  shows  statehood  in  1890  effectively
coincided  with  the  disappearance  of  the  wild  frontier:  for
instance,  that  the  buffalo  were  extinct  by  the  mid-1870s;
that  by  1880,  Indian  Department  regulations  instructed
Indian  agents  to  confine  tribal  members  “ ‘wholly  within
the  limits  of  their  respective  reservations’ ”;  and  that  the
Crow  Tribe  stopped  hunting  off-reservation  altogether  in
1886.  Brief for Respondent 47 (quoting §237 Instructions
to Indian Agents (1880), as published in Regulations of the
Indian Dept. §492 (1884)).

Herrera  contradicts  this  account,  see  Reply  Brief  for
Petitioner 5, n. 3, and the historical record is by no means
clear.  For  instance,  game  appears  to  have  persisted  for
longer  than  Wyoming  suggests.  See  Dept.  of  Interior,
Ann.  Rep.  of  the  Comm’r  of  Indian  Affairs  495  (1873)
(Black  Foot:  “On  the  other  side  of  the  river  below,  there
are  plenty  of  buffalo;  on  the  mountains  are  plenty  of  elk
and  black-tail  deer;  and  white-tail  deer  are  plenty  at  the
foot  of  the  mountain”).  As  for  the  Indian  Department
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the interpretation of a treaty. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to historical events.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

“building  blocks.”  Id.,  at  64667.  The  first  building  block
was “heat rate improvements” at coal-fired plants—essen-
tially  practices  such  plants  could  undertake  to  burn  coal
more  efficiently.  Id.,  at  64727.    But  such  improvements,
EPA stated, would “lead to only small emission reductions,”
because  coal-fired  power  plants  were  already  operating
near  optimum  efficiency.  Ibid.   On  the  Agency’s  view,
“much larger emission reductions [were] needed from [coal-
fired plants] to address climate change.”  Ibid.

So the Agency included two additional building blocks in
its BSER, both of which involve what it called “generation
shifting from higher-emitting to lower-emitting” producers
of electricity.  Id., at 64728.  Building block two was a shift
in  electricity  production  from  existing  coal-fired  power
plants to natural-gas-fired plants.  Ibid.  Because natural
gas plants produce “typically less than half as much” carbon
dioxide  per  unit  of  electricity  created  as  coal-fired  plants,
the  Agency  explained,  “this  generation  shift  [would]  re-
duce[ ] CO2 emissions.”  Ibid.  Building block three worked
the same way, except that the shift was from both coal- and
gas-fired plants to “new low- or zero-carbon generating ca-
pacity,” mainly wind and solar.  Id., at 64729, 64748.  “Most
of the CO2 controls” in the rule came from the application
of building blocks two and three.  Id., at 64728.

The  Agency  identified  three  ways  in  which  a  regulated
plant  operator  could  implement  a  shift  in  generation  to
cleaner  sources.  Id.,  at  64731.  First,  an  operator  could
simply reduce the regulated plant’s own production of elec-
tricity.  Second, it could build a new natural gas plant, wind
farm, or solar installation, or invest in someone else’s exist-
ing facility and then increase generation there.  Ibid.  Fi-
nally,  operators  could  purchase  emission  allowances  or
credits  as  part  of  a  cap-and-trade  regime.    Id.,  at  64731–
64732.  Under such a scheme, sources that achieve a reduc-
tion  in  their  emissions  can  sell  a  credit  representing  the
value of that reduction to others, who are able to count it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically the opinion of the court in the case of West Virginia v. EPA. It discusses the EPA's approach to regulating carbon emissions from power plants, outlining the "building blocks" of their strategy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

335

Opinion of the Court

WRTL  adopted  an  objective  “appeal  to  vote”  test  for  deter
mining whether a communication was the functional equiva
lent  of  express  advocacy,  551  U. S.,  at  470  (opinion  of  Rob
erts, C. J.), the FEC adopted a two-part, 11-factor balancing
test  to  implement  WRTL’s  ruling.  See  11  CFR  § 114.15;
Brief  for  Wyoming  Liberty  Group  et  al.  as  Amici  Curiae
17–27 (ﬁled Jan. 15, 2009).

This  regulatory  scheme  may  not  be  a  prior  restraint  on
speech in the strict sense of that term, for prospective speak
ers  are  not  compelled  by  law  to  seek  an  advisory  opinion
from  the  FEC  before  the  speech  takes  place.  Cf.  Near  v.
Minnesota  ex  rel.  Olson,  283  U. S.  697,  712–713  (1931).  As
a practical matter, however, given the complexity of the reg
ulations and the deference courts show to administrative de
terminations, a speaker who wants to avoid threats of crimi
nal  liability  and  the  heavy  costs  of  defending  against  FEC
enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior per
mission  to  speak.  See  2  U. S. C.  § 437f;  11  CFR  § 112.1.
These onerous restrictions thus function as the equivalent of
prior restraint by giving the FEC power analogous to licens
ing  laws  implemented  in  16th- and  17th-century  England,
laws  and  governmental  practices  of  the  sort  that  the  First
Amendment was drawn to prohibit.  See Thomas v.  Chicago
Park Dist., 534 U. S. 316, 320 (2002); Lovell v.  City of Grifﬁn,
303  U. S.  444,  451–452  (1938);  Near,  supra,  at  713–714.  Be
cause  the  FEC’s  “business  is  to  censor,  there  inheres  the
danger  that  [it]  may  well  be  less  responsive  than  a  court—
part of an independent branch of government—to the consti
tutionally  protected  interests  in  free  expression.”  Freed
man  v.  Maryland,  380  U. S.  51,  57–58  (1965).  When  the
FEC  issues  advisory  opinions  that  prohibit  speech,  “[m]any
persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and
sometimes  risk)  of  vindicating  their  rights  through  case-by
case  litigation,  will  choose  simply  to  abstain  from  protected
speech—harming not only themselves but society as a whole,
which  is  deprived  of  an  uninhibited  marketplace  of  ideas.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the FEC's regulations on campaign speech and comparing them to prior restraint. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

Opinion of the Court

the right to an abortion.22

B
1

Until  the  latter  part  of  the  20th  century,  there  was  no
support in American law for a constitutional right to obtain
an  abortion.    No  state  constitutional  provision  had  recog-
nized such a right.  Until a few years before Roe was handed
down, no federal or state court had recognized such a right.
Nor had any scholarly treatise of which we are aware.  And
although law review articles are not reticent about advocat-
ing  new  rights,  the  earliest  article  proposing  a  constitu-
tional right to abortion that has come to our attention was
published only a few years before Roe.23

——————

22 That is true regardless of whether we look to the Amendment’s Due
Process  Clause  or  its  Privileges  or  Immunities  Clause.  Some  scholars
and Justices have maintained that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
is the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that guarantees substan-
tive  rights.  See,  e.g.,  McDonald  v.  Chicago,  561  U. S.  742,  813–850
(2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Dun-
can, 391 U. S., at 165–166 (Black, J., concurring); A. Amar, Bill of Rights:
Creation and Reconstruction 163–180 (1998) (Amar); J. Ely, Democracy
and Distrust 22–30 (1980); 2 W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution
in the History of the United States 1089–1095 (1953).  But even on that
view, such a right would need to be rooted in the Nation’s history and
tradition.  See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–552 (No. 3,230) (CC
ED Pa. 1823) (describing unenumerated rights under the Privileges and
Immunities  Clause,  Art.  IV,  §2,  as  those  “fundamental”  rights  “which
have,  at  all  times,  been  enjoyed  by  the  citizens  of  the  several  states”);
Amar 176 (relying on Corfield to interpret the Privileges or Immunities
Clause);  cf.  McDonald,  561  U. S.,  at  819–820,  832,  854  (opinion  of
THOMAS, J.) (reserving the question whether the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause protects “any rights besides those enumerated in the Consti-
tution”).

23 See  R.  Lucas,  Federal  Constitutional  Limitations  on  the  Enforce-
ment and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N. C. L. Rev. 730
(1968) (Lucas); see also D. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality 334–335 (1994)
(Garrow)  (stating  that  Lucas  was  “undeniably  the  first  person  to  fully
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It discusses the historical lack of recognition for a constitutional right to abortion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>