<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

955

558 U. S.

October 13, 2009

No.  09–5904.  Hunter  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5916.  Powers v.  Snyder  et  al.  C. A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5921.  Haque  v.  Immigration  and  Customs  En

forcement  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5925.  Linton v. Holder, Attorney General.  C.  A.

11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5928.  Nika  v.  Nevada.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certiorari  de

nied.  Reported  below:  124  Nev.  1272,  198  P.  3d  839.

No.  09–5938.  Tyson  v.  Mize,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5956.  Catledge  v.  Mueller,  Director,  Federal
Bureau  of  Investigation,  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  464.

No.  09–5962.  Wilson  v.  Spencer,  Superintendent,  Massa
chusetts  Correctional  Institution  at  Norfolk.  C.  A.  1st
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5977.  Rittner  v.  Williams,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5980.  Sabet  v.  Intel  Corp.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5988.  Warman  v.  Marberry,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.

6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6006.  Barnes  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  2d

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  9  So.  3d  623.

No.  09–6010.  Gurnsey  v.  California  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6013.  Hill  v.  District  of  Columbia  Department
of  Employment  Services  et  al.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  964  A.  2d  619.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal publication. It contains case numbers, court names, and dates, but lacks continuous narrative text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention with respect to the individual involved; . . .

“(3)  with  respect  to  infants,  children,  and  adoles-
cents,  evidence-informed  preventive  care  and  screen-
ings  provided  for  in  the  comprehensive  guidelines
supported by [HRSA; and]

“(4) with respect to women, such additional preven-
tive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1)
as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported
by [HRSA] for purposes of this paragraph.”

At the start of this provision, Congress instructed who is
to “provide coverage for” the specified preventive health ser-
vices:  “group  health  plan[s]”  and  “health  insurance  is-
suer[s].”  §300gg–13(a).  As the Court of Appeals explained,
paragraph  (a)(4),  added  by  the  Women’s  Health  Amend-
ment,  granted  HRSA  “authority  to  issue  ‘comprehensive
guidelines’  concern[ing]  the  type  of  services”  group  health
plans and health insurance issuers must cover with respect
to women.  930 F. 3d, at 570 (emphasis added).  Nothing in
paragraph  (a)(4)  accorded  HRSA  “authority  to  undermine
Congress’s [initial] directive,” stated in subsection (a), “con-
cerning  who  must  provide  coverage  for  these  services.”
Ibid. (emphasis added).

The Government argues otherwise, asserting that “[t]he
sweeping authorization for HRSA to ‘provide[ ] for’ and ‘sup-
port[ ]’ guidelines ‘for purposes of ’ the women’s preventive-
services mandate clearly grants HRSA the power not just
to specify what services should be covered, but also to pro-
vide  appropriate  exemptions.”    Brief  for  HHS  et al.  15.10
This terse statement—the entirety of the Government’s tex-
tual case—slights the language Congress employed.  Most
visibly, the Government does not endeavor to explain how

——————

10 This opinion uses “Brief for HHS et al.” to refer to the Brief for Peti-
tioners in No. 19–454, filed on behalf of the Departments of HHS, Treas-
ury, and Labor, the Secretaries of those Departments, and the President.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and analyzes the wording of a specific law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

15

Opinion of the Court

proceed to the merits.15

III
On the merits, we instructed the parties to address this
question:  Do  the  Elections  Clause  of  the  United  States
Constitution and 2 U. S. C. §2a(c) permit Arizona’s use of
a  commission  to  adopt  congressional  districts?    The  Elec
tions  Clause  is  set  out  at  the  start  of  this  opinion,  supra,
at 2.  Section 2a(c) provides:

“Until  a  State  is  redistricted  in  the  manner  pro
vided by the law thereof after any apportionment, the
Representatives to which such State is entitled under
such  apportionment  shall  be  elected  in  the  following
manner:  [setting  out  five  federally  prescribed  redis
tricting procedures].”

Before  focusing  directly  on  the  statute  and  constitutional
prescriptions  in  point,  we  summarize  this  Court’s  prece
dent  relating  to  appropriate  state  decisionmakers  for
redistricting  purposes.    Three  decisions  compose  the  rele
vant  case  law:  Ohio  ex  rel.  Davis  v.  Hildebrant,  241  U. S.
565 (1916); Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U. S. 221 (1920);
and Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (1932).

A
Davis  v.  Hildebrant  involved  an  amendment  to  the

Constitution of Ohio vesting in the people the right, exer
cisable  by  referendum,  to  approve  or  disapprove  by  popu
lar vote any law enacted by the State’s legislature.  A 1915
Act redistricting the State for the purpose of congressional

——————

He  forgets  that  the  party  invoking  federal-court  jurisdiction  in  this
case, and inviting our review, is the Arizona State Legislature.

15 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  on  the  way  to  deciding  that  the  Arizona  Legisla
ture  lacks  standing,  first  addresses  the  merits.    In  so  doing,  he  over
looks that, in the cases he features, it was entirely immaterial whether
the law involved was adopted by a representative body or by the people,
through exercise of the initiative.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a discussion of relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

Opinion of the Court

The Fifth Circuit also erred by treating the defendants,
plaintiffs, and platforms each as a unified whole.  Our deci-
sions make clear that “standing is not dispensed in gross.”
TransUnion  LLC  v.  Ramirez,  594  U. S.  413,  431  (2021).
That  is,  “plaintiffs  must  demonstrate  standing  for  each
claim that they press” against each defendant, “and for each
form of relief that they seek.”  Ibid.  Here, for every defend-
ant,  there  must  be  at  least  one  plaintiff  with  standing  to
seek an injunction.  This requires a certain threshold show-
ing: namely, that a particular defendant pressured a par-
ticular platform to censor a particular topic before that plat-
form  suppressed  a  particular  plaintiff ’s  speech  on  that
topic.

Heeding  these  conditions  is  critically  important  in  a
sprawling suit like this one.  The plaintiffs faced speech re-
strictions on different platforms, about different topics, at

——————
715 (WD La. 2023).  But much of its evidence is inapposite.  For instance,
the court says that Twitter set up a “streamlined process for censorship
requests”  after  the  White  House  “bombarded”  it  with  such  requests.
Ibid., n. 662 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The record it cites says
nothing about “censorship requests.”  See App. 639–642.  Rather, in re-
sponse to a White House official asking Twitter to remove an imperson-
ation account of President Biden’s granddaughter, Twitter told the offi-
cial about a portal that he could use to flag similar issues.  Ibid.  This
has nothing to do with COVID–19 misinformation.  The court also found
that  “[a]  drastic  increase  in  censorship  . . .  directly  coincided  with  De-
fendants’  public  calls  for  censorship  and  private  demands  for  censor-
ship.”  680 F. Supp. 3d, at 715.  As to the “calls for censorship,” the court’s
proof included statements from Members of Congress, who are not par-
ties to this suit.  Ibid., and n. 658.  Some of the evidence of the “increase
in censorship” reveals that Facebook worked with the CDC to update its
list of removable false claims, but these examples do not suggest that the
agency “demand[ed]” that it do so.  Ibid.  Finally, the court, echoing the
plaintiffs’ proposed statement of facts, erroneously stated that Facebook
agreed  to  censor  content  that  did  not  violate  its  policies.    Id.,  at  714,
n. 655.  Instead,  on  several occasions,  Facebook  explained  that  certain
content did not qualify for removal under its policies but did qualify for
other forms of moderation.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the standing of the plaintiffs in a lawsuit. It delves into legal precedents and arguments regarding the requirements for demonstrating standing in a case involving alleged censorship.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 11–345
_________________

ABIGAIL NOEL FISHER, PETITIONER v. UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2013]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The University of Texas at Austin considers race as one
of various factors in its undergraduate admissions process.
Race is not itself assigned a numerical value for each ap-
plicant,  but  the  University  has  committed  itself  to
increasing racial minority enrollment on campus.  It refers
to this goal as a “critical mass.”  Petitioner, who is Cauca-
sian,  sued  the  University  after  her  application  was  re-
jected.  She  contends  that  the  University’s  use  of  race  in
the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The  parties  asked  the  Court  to  review  whether  the
judgment  below  was  consistent  with  “this  Court’s  deci-
sions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth  Amendment,  including  Grutter  v.  Bollinger,  539
U. S.  306  (2003).”  Pet.  for  Cert.  i.  The  Court  concludes
that  the  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  hold  the  University
to  the  demanding  burden  of  strict  scrutiny  articulated
in Grutter and Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S.
265, 305 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).  Because the Court
of  Appeals  did  not  apply  the  correct  standard  of  strict
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes the citation, notice, court information, and the start of the opinion itself. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it is the core legal text being discussed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

THOMAS, J., dissenting

up the lost population, District 1 would have to extend east-
ward  through  largely  majority-white  rural  counties  along
the length of Alabama’s border with the Florida panhandle.
The plaintiffs do not assert that white residents on the Gulf
Coast  have  anything  special  in  common  with  white  resi-
dents in those communities, and the District Court made no
such finding.  The plaintiffs’ maps would thus reduce Dis-
trict  1  to  the  leftover  white  communities  of  the  southern
fringe  of  the  State,  its  shape  and  constituents  defined  al-
most entirely by the need to make District 2 majority-black
while also retaining a majority-black District 7.
  The  plaintiffs’  mapmaking  experts  left  little  doubt  that
their plans prioritized race over neutral districting criteria.
Dr. Moon  Duchin,  who devised four  of  the  plans,  testified
that achieving “two majority-black districts” was a “nonne-
gotiable principl[e]” in her eyes, a status shared only by our
precedents’ “population balance” requirement.  2 App. 634;
see also id., at 665, 678.  Only “after” those two “nonnego-
tiable[s]” were satisfied did Dr. Duchin then give lower pri-
ority  to  “contiguity”  and  “compactness.”    Id.,  at  634.    The
architect of the other seven maps, William Cooper, consid-
ered “minority voting strengt[h]” a “traditional redistricting
principl[e]” in its own right, id., at 591, and treated “the mi-
nority population in and of itself ” as the paramount com-
munity of interest in his plans, id., at 601.
  Statistical  evidence  also  underscored  the  illustrative
maps’ extreme racial sorting.  Another of the plaintiffs’ ex-
perts, Dr. Kosuke Imai, computer generated 10,000 district-
ing  plans  using  a  race-blind  algorithm  programmed  to
observe  several  objective  districting  criteria.    Supp.  App.
58–59.    None  of  those plans contained  even one  majority-
black district.  Id., at 61.  Dr. Imai generated another 20,000
plans using the same algorithm, but with the additional con-
straint  that  they  must  contain  at  least  one  majority-
black  district;  none  of  those  plans  contained  a  second
majority-black  district,  or  even  a  second  district  with  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.

COMER, DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF

NATURAL RESOURCES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 15–577.  Argued April 19, 2017—Decided June 26, 2017

The Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center is a Missouri pre-
school  and  daycare  center.    Originally  established  as  a  nonprofit  or-
ganization,  the  Center  later  merged  with  Trinity  Lutheran  Church
and now operates under its auspices on church property.  Among the
facilities at the Center is a playground, which has a coarse pea gravel
surface  beneath  much  of  the  play  equipment.    In  2012,  the  Center
sought  to  replace  a  large  portion  of  the  pea  gravel  with  a  pour-in-
place  rubber  surface  by  participating  in  Missouri’s  Scrap  Tire  Pro-
gram.  The  program,  run  by  the  State’s  Department  of  Natural  Re-
sources,  offers  reimbursement  grants  to  qualifying  nonprofit  organi-
zations  that  install  playground  surfaces  made  from  recycled  tires.
The Department had a strict and express policy of denying grants to
any applicant owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious
entity.  Pursuant to that policy, the Department denied the Center’s
application.    In  a  letter  rejecting  that  application,  the  Department
explained that under Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution,
the  Department  could  not  provide  financial  assistance  directly  to  a
church.  The Department ultimately awarded 14 grants as part of the
2012 program.  Although the Center ranked fifth out of the 44 appli-
cants, it did not receive a grant because it is a church.

Trinity Lutheran sued in Federal District Court, alleging that the
Department’s failure to approve its application violated the Free Ex-
ercise Clause of the First Amendment.  The District Court dismissed
the  suit.  The  Free  Exercise  Clause,  the  court  stated,  prohibits  the
government  from  outlawing  or  restricting  the  exercise  of  a  religious
practice, but it generally does not prohibit withholding an affirmative
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U85

[09-14-00 16:49:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 236 (1998)

255

Scalia, J., dissenting

2253(c)(1), the statutorily required certiﬁcate was called a
“certiﬁcate of probable cause” rather than a certiﬁcate of ap-
pealability, but the effect of failure to obtain it was precisely
the same: The case could not proceed to the court of appeals.
On an attempt to obtain review of denial of the certiﬁcate in
this Court, we held that since petitioner’s “case was never
‘in’ the court of appeals, for want of a certiﬁcate,” we lacked
jurisdiction under § 1254(1).

Ibid.
The Court concedes that House is squarely on point but
opts to overrule it because its “conclusion was erroneous,”
ante, at 251. The Court does not dispute that petitioner’s
§ 2255 action was never in the Court of Appeals; its overrul-
ing of House is instead based on the proposition that peti-
tioner’s request for a COA is, in and of itself, a “case” within
the meaning of § 1254(1), see ante, at 241–242, 246–249, and
that that case was “in” the Court of Appeals and hence can
be reviewed here, ante, at 241–246. Most of the Court’s
analysis is expended in the effort to establish that petitioner
made his request for a COA to the Court of Appeals as such,
rather than to the circuit judges in their individual capacity,
ibid. Even that effort is unsuccessful, since it comes up
against the pellucid language of AEDPA to the contrary.
Section 102 does not permit application for a COA to a court
of appeals; it states that the application must be made to a
“circuit justice or judge.” That this means precisely what it
says is underscored by § 103 of AEDPA, which amends Rule
22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure: “If [a COA]
it shall be
request is addressed to the court of appeals,
deemed addressed to the judges thereof and shall be consid-
ered by a circuit judge or judges as the court deems appro-
priate.” As though drafted in anticipatory refutation of the
Court’s countertextual holding today, the Advisory Commit-
tee’s Notes on Rule 22 explicitly state that “28 U. S. C. § 2253
does not authorize the court of appeals as a court to grant a
certiﬁcate of probable cause.”

28 U. S. C. App., p. 609.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal citations, arguments, and references to specific statutes and case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

lawfully  perform  abortions  tomorrow.    Millions  of  Ameri-
cans move between States every year to pursue their pro-
fession.  Yet with conditions ripe for market entry and ex-
pansion,  today’s  decision  foresees  nothing  but  clinic
closures and unmet demand.

Not only questionable, the plurality’s assumptions are al-
ready contradicted by emerging evidence.  For example, a
major hospital reacted to the law by developing a new type
of  admitting  privileges  expressly  for  an  abortion  provider
seeking to comply with Act 620.  Whether this type of priv-
ileges  satisfies  the  statute  is  yet  unknown—so,  again  as-
suming the worst, today’s decision simply ignores the pos-
sibility.
If  nothing  else,  this  development  belies  the
prediction that hospitals statewide would stand idly by as
thousands upon thousands of requests for abortions go un-
fulfilled.

What’s more, as this suit was in progress, the State dis-
covered two additional Louisiana abortion providers not re-
flected in the district court’s opinion.  No one disputes the
accuracy of the State’s information about these two provid-
ers.  Nor  could  anyone  deny  the  importance  of  this  infor-
mation, when so much of today’s decision seems to turn on
the  exact  quantity  and  distribution  of  a  relatively  small
number of abortion providers.  Normally, this Court might
hesitate to deliver a fact-bound decision premised on facts
we know to be incorrect.  But today’s decision, assuming the
worst  once  more,  simply  proceeds  as  if  these  providers
didn’t exist.

If there is a silver lining, though, it may be here.  This
Court  generally  recognizes  that  facts  can  change  over
time—and  that, when  they do, legal conclusions based on
them may have to change as well.  Even so-called “perma-
nent injunctions” are actually provisional—open to modifi-
cation  “to  prevent  the  possibility  that  [they]  may  operate
injuriously in the future.”  Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290
U. S. 177, 179 (1933) (per curiam).  After all, when the facts
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority decision and provides specific examples to support its claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

424

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of the Court

In § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress
amended § 1042 of the Internal Revenue Code to permit own-
ers of certain food reﬁners and processors to defer the rec-
ognition of gain if they sell their stock to eligible farmers’
cooperatives.4 The purpose of the amendment, as repeat-
edly explained by its sponsors, was “to facilitate the transfer
of reﬁners and processors to farmers’ cooperatives.” 5 The

4 Section 968(a) of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 amended 26 U. S. C.
§ 1042 by adding a new subsection (g), which deﬁned the sellers eligible
for the exemption as follows:

“(2) QUALIFIED REFINER OR PROCESSOR.—For purposes of this
subsection, the term ‘qualiﬁed reﬁner or processor’ means a domestic
corporation—

“(A) substantially all of the activities of which consist of the active
conduct of the trade or business of reﬁning or processing agricultural or
horticultural products, and

“(B) which, during the 1-year period ending on the date of the sale,
purchases more than one-half of such products to be reﬁned or processed
from—

“(i) farmers who make up the eligible farmers’ cooperative which is pur-
chasing stock in the corporation in a transaction to which this subsection
is to apply, or

111 Stat. 896.

“(ii) such cooperative.”
5 H. R. Rep. No. 105–148, p. 420 (1997); see also 141 Cong. Rec. S18739
(Dec. 15, 1995) (Senator Hatch, introducing a previous version of the bill,
stating that it “would provide farmers who form farmers cooperatives the
opportunity for an ownership interest in the processing and marketing of
their products”); ibid. (Senator Craig, cosponsor of a previous bill, stating
that “[c]urrently, farmers cannot compete with other business entities . . .
in buying such [processing] businesses because of the advantages inherent
in the tax deferrals available in transactions with these other purchases”;
bill “would be helpful to farmers cooperatives”); App. 116–117 (Letter from
Congresspersons Roberts and Stenholm (Dec. 1, 1995)) (congressional
sponsors stating that a previous version of the bill was intended to “pro-
vide American farmers a more ﬁrm economic footing and more control
over their economic destiny. We believe this proposal will help farmers,
through their cooperatives, purchase facilities to reﬁne and process their
raw commodities into value-added products. . . . It will encourage farmers
to help themselves in a more market-oriented environment by vertically
integrating.
If this legislation is passed, we are conﬁdent that, 10 years
from now, we will look on this bill as one of the most beneﬁcial actions
Congress took for U. S. farmers”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of an opinion for the case Clinton v. City of New York. It discusses a specific amendment to the Internal Revenue Code and its purpose.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

841

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No. 08–10475.  Wood v.  Scutt, Warden.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  861.

No.  08–10476.  Woodard  v.  City  of  New  Albany,  Indiana.
Ct.  App.  Ind.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  884  N.  E.
2d  953.

No.  08–10477.  Cairo  Rodriguez  v.  California.  Ct.  App.

Cal.,  2d  App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10480.  Owens  v.  Grams,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10483.  Olivares  v.  Garcia,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  494.

No.  08–10484.  Philpot  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  7  So.  3d  535.

No.  08–10487.  Widner  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10488.  Watts  v.  Runnels,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 302 Fed. Appx. 652.

No.  08–10489.  Tucker  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  5th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  987  So.  2d  717.

No. 08–10493.  Stringer v.  Iowa.  Ct. App. Iowa.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  760  N. W.  2d  211.

No.  08–10496.  Consalvo  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  3  So.  3d  1014.

No.  08–10497.  Dorsey  v.  Coleman,  Superintendent,  Fay
ette State Correctional Institution.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–10498.  Chapman  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.  App.  3d  1127,  970
N.  E.  2d  127.

No.  08–10503.  Fanfan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  105.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal case orders, including case numbers, court information, and certiorari decisions. It is not sequential narrative text and is likely not meant to be read as a continuous story.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

892

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Stevens, J., dissenting

tive for the use of such technologies, the standard provided
that a vehicle equipped with an airbag or other nonbelt sys-
tem would count as 1.5 vehicles for the purpose of determin-
ing compliance with the required 10, 25, or 40% minimum
passive restraint requirement during the phase-in period.
49 CFR § 571.208, S4.1.3.4(a)(1) (1998). With one oblique ex-
ception,5 there is no mention, either in the text of the ﬁnal
standard or in the accompanying comments, of the possibility
that the risk of potential tort liability would provide an in-
centive for manufacturers to install airbags. Nor is there
any other speciﬁc evidence of an intent to preclude common-
law tort actions.

II

Before discussing the pre-emption issue, it is appropriate
to note that there is a vast difference between a rejection of
Honda’s threshold arguments in favor of federal pre-emption
and a conclusion that petitioners ultimately would prevail
I express no opinion on
on their common-law tort claims.
the possible merit, or lack of merit, of those claims.
I do
observe, however, that even though good-faith compliance
with the minimum requirements of Standard 208 would not
provide Honda with a complete defense on the merits,6 I as-

systems such as airbags and passive interiors.”
(1984).

49 Fed. Reg. 29000

5 In response to a comment that the manufacturers were likely to use
the cheapest system to comply with the new standard, the Secretary
stated that she believed “that competition, potential liability for any deﬁ-
cient systems[,] and pride in one’s product would prevent this.”

Ibid.

6 Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F. 2d 395, 417 (CA1 1988) (collect-
ing cases). The result would be different, of course, if petitioners had
brought common-law tort claims challenging Honda’s compliance with a
mandatory minimum federal standard—e. g., claims that a 1999 Honda was
negligently and defectively designed because it was equipped with airbags
as required by the current version of Standard 208. Restatement (Third)
of Torts: General Principles § 14(b), and Comment g (Discussion Draft,
Apr. 5, 1999) (“If the actor’s adoption [or rejection] of a precaution would
require the actor to violate a statute, the actor cannot be found negligent
for failing to adopt [or reject] that precaution”); cf. ante, at 871–872 (dis-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

cise of market power.  Instead, plaintiffs must prove that Amex’s an-
tisteering  provisions  increased  the  cost  of  credit-card  transactions
above a competitive level, reduced the number of credit-card transac-
tions,  or  otherwise  stifled  competition  in  the  two-sided  credit-card
market.  They failed to do so.  Pp. 15–20.

(1) The plaintiffs offered no evidence that the price of credit-card
transactions was higher than the price one would expect to find in a
competitive market.  Amex’s increased merchant fees reflect increas-
es in the value of its services and the cost of its transactions, not an
ability to charge above a competitive price.  It uses higher merchant
fees to offer its cardholders a more robust rewards program, which is
necessary  to  maintain  cardholder  loyalty  and  encourage  the  level  of
spending that makes it valuable to merchants.  In addition, the evi-
dence that does exist cuts against the plaintiffs’ view that Amex’s an-
tisteering provisions are the cause of any increases in merchant fees:
Visa  and  MasterCard’s  merchant  fees  have  continued  to  increase,
even at merchant locations where Amex is not accepted.  Pp. 16–17.

(2) The  plaintiffs’  evidence  that  Amex’s  merchant-fee  increases
between  2005  and  2010  were  not  entirely  spent  on  cardholder  re-
wards does not prove that Amex’s antisteering provisions gave it the
power  to  charge  anticompetitive  prices.    This  Court  will  “not  infer
competitive injury from price and output  data  absent some evidence
that tends to prove that output was restricted or prices were above a
competitive level.”  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobac-
co Corp., 509 U. S. 209, 237.  There is no such evidence here.  Output
of credit-card transactions increased during the relevant period, and
the plaintiffs did not show that Amex charged more than its competi-
tors.  P. 17.

(3) The  plaintiffs  also  failed  to  prove  that  Amex’s  antisteering
provisions have stifled competition among credit-card companies.  To
the contrary, while they have been in place, the market experienced
expanding output and improved quality.  Nor have Amex’s antisteer-
ing  provisions  ended  competition  between  credit-card  networks  with
respect  to  merchant  fees.  Amex’s  competitors  have  exploited  its
higher merchant fees to their advantage.  Lastly, there is nothing in-
herently  anticompetitive  about  the  provisions.    They  actually  stem
negative  externalities  in  the  credit-card  market  and  promote  inter-
brand  competition.    And  they  do  not  prevent  competing  credit-card
networks  from  offering  lower  merchant  fees  or  promoting  their
broader merchant acceptance.  Pp. 18–20.

 838 F. 3d 179, affirmed.

THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  BREYER, J., filed a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing the court's decision in a case. It outlines the arguments and reasoning behind the court's ruling, focusing on the competitive impact of Amex's anti-steering provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529IND

Unit: $UBV [10-03-01 07:01:03] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

1210

INDEX

CRIMINAL LAW—Continued.
in” commerce or commerce-affecting activity, arson of such a dwelling
is not subject to federal prosecution under 18 U. S. C. § 844(i).
Jones v.
United States, p. 848.

2. Federal bribery statute—Medicare provider fraud.—In prohibiting
defrauding organizations that “receiv[e] . . . beneﬁts in excess of $10,000
under a Federal program,” 18 U. S. C. § 666(b) covers fraud perpetrated
on organizations participating in Medicare. Fischer v. United States,
p. 667.

3. Prior conviction—Pre-emptive admission by defendant.—Where
Government’s motion in limine to admit a defendant’s prior felony con-
viction as impeachment evidence is granted and defendant then pre-
emptively introduces that prior conviction evidence on direct examination,
defendant may not challenge admission of such evidence on appeal. Ohler
v. United States, p. 753.

4. Supervised release—Effect of excess prison time.—Controlling stat-
ute, 18 U. S. C. § 3624(e), by its necessary operation, does not reduce length
of a supervised release term by reason of excess time served in prison.
United States v. Johnson, p. 53.

5. Supervised release following reimprisonment.—In authorizing a dis-
trict court to impose an additional term of supervised release following
reimprisonment of those who violate conditions of an initial term, 18
U. S. C. § 3583(h) does not apply retroactively, so no ex post facto viola-
tion occurred in this case; but § 3583(e)(3), at time of Johnson’s conviction,
Johnson v.
gave District Court authority to reimpose supervised release.
United States, p. 694.

DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, II.

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. See Constitutional Law,

IX; Habeas Corpus, 1.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Fair Labor Standards Act of

1938.

ENFORCEMENT POWER. See Constitutional Law, III.

EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law, 3.

EX POST FACTO LAWS. See Constitutional Law, IV; Criminal

Law, 5.

EXTRACURRICULAR STUDENT SPEECH. See Constitutional Law,

VI, 1.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an index from a legal document, listing topics and corresponding page numbers.  Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and are not the primary content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
290

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

Syllabus

WOOD  v.  ALLEN,  COMMISSIONER,  ALABAMA

DEPARTMENT  OF  CORRECTIONS,  et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit

No. 08–9156.  Argued November 4, 2009—Decided January 20, 2010

Under  28  U. S. C.  § 2254(d)(2),  a  federal  court  may  grant  a  state  prisoner
habeas  relief  if  his  claim  was  adjudicated  on  the  merits  in  state  court
and “resulted in a decision . . .  based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed
ing.”  Under § 2254(e)(1), “a determination of a factual issue made by a
State  court  [is]  presumed  to  be  correct,”  and  the  petitioner  has  “the
burden  of  rebutting  the  presumption  of  correctness  by  clear  and  con
vincing evidence.”

Petitioner  Wood  was  convicted  of  capital  murder  and  sentenced  to
death  in  Alabama  state  court.  Two  of  his  court-appointed  attorneys,
Dozier and Ralph, had signiﬁcant trial experience, but the third, Trotter,
had  only  recently  been  admitted  to  the  bar.  After  exhausting  his  ap
peals, Wood sought postconviction relief under Alabama Rule of Crimi
nal  Procedure  32,  arguing,  among  other  things,  that  he  was  mentally
retarded and not eligible for the death penalty, and that his trial counsel
were ineffective because they failed to investigate and present evidence
of his mental deﬁciencies during the trial’s penalty phase.  The Rule 32
court conducted evidentiary hearings and denied the claims initially and
on remand.  As to the mental retardation claim, it found that Wood had
not  shown  deﬁcits  in  his  adaptive  functioning.  As  to  the  ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim, it concluded that he had not established that
his counsel’s performance was deﬁcient or that any deﬁciency prejudiced
his  defense.  In  so  doing,  it  made  a  factual  ﬁnding  that  counsel  had
made a strategic decision not to pursue evidence of Wood’s alleged retar
dation.  Observing  that  counsel  had  asked  Dr.  Kirkland  to  conduct  a
mental  evaluation,  had  thoroughly  reviewed  his  report,  and  had  deter
mined  that  no  further  investigation  was  warranted,  the  court  addition
ally held that counsel appeared to have made a strategic decision not to
present  their  limited  mental-deﬁciency  evidence  to  the  jury  because
having  Dr.  Kirkland  testify  was  not  in  Wood’s  best  interest.  It  also
found no reasonable probability of a different outcome had the evidence
developed  in  the  Rule  32  proceedings  been  presented  at  trial.  Wood
subsequently  sought  federal  habeas  relief  under  § 2254.  The  District
Court  rejected  all  but  his  ineffective-assistance-of-counsel  claim.  The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court case. It includes information about the case name, court, citation, and a brief overview of the legal issues involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

to precedent significantly undermines this Court’s commit-
ment to stare decisis and the rule of law.

This case may involve a different statute from Atlas Roof-
ing, but the schemes are remarkably similar.  Here, just as
in Atlas Roofing, Congress identified a problem; concluded
that the existing remedies were inadequate; and enacted a
new regulatory scheme as a solution.  The problem was a
lack  of  transparency  and  accountability  in  the  securities
market  that  contributed  to  the  Great  Depression  of  the
1930s.  See ante, at 1.  The inadequate remedies were the
then-existing state statutory and common-law fraud causes
of action.  The solution was a comprehensive federal scheme
of  securities  regulation  consisting  of  the  Securities  Act  of
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940.  See ibid.  In particular, Con-
gress  enacted  these  securities  laws  to  ensure  “full  disclo-
sure”  and  promote  ethical  business  practices  “in  the
securities  industry,”  SEC  v.  Capital  Gains  Research  Bu-
reau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 186 (1963), as well as to “protect
investors  against  manipulation  of  stock  prices,”  Ernst  &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 195 (1976).

The  prophylactic  nature  of  the  statutory  regime  also  is
virtually indistinguishable from the OSHA scheme at issue
in Atlas Roofing.  Among other things, these securities laws
prohibit  the  misrepresentation  or  concealment  of  various
material facts through the imposition of federal registration
and disclosure requirements.  See ante, at 2.  Critically, fed-
eral-securities laws do not require proof of actual reliance
on an investor’s misrepresentations or that an “investor has
actually suffered financial loss.”  Ante, at 4; see also SEC v.
Life Partners Holdings, Inc. 854 F. 3d 765, 779 (CA5 2017);
SEC v. Blavin, 760 F. 2d 706, 711 (CA6 1985) (per curiam).
OSHA too prohibits conduct that could, but does not neces-
sarily, injure a private person.  Atlas Roofing, 430 U. S., at
445 (OSHA remedies “exis[t] whether or not an employee is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent and the similarities between a securities law scheme and the OSHA scheme at issue in a previous case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page
879
Pannell v. Burnette
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875
Pannell v. Hall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pannell v. Penfold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088
Pannell v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1019,1141

844

Panton v. Nash  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

Papierz v. Jackson
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1051

Paracha v. Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paradise v. Roberts
957

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paredes v. Marshall
1052

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Parent; Del Gallo v.
1023

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Park B. Smith, Inc.; CHF Industries, Inc. v.
956

Park City Municipal Corp.; Travis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Parker v. Allen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

. . . . . . . .
Parker v. Board of Supervisors, Univ. of La.-Lafayette
969

Parker v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1105

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Parker v. Louisiana
903

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Parker; Scott v.
1027

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Parker; Staten v.
899

Parker; Thomas v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927

Parker v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Parkhurst v. Tabor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1063

Park Mini Storage Center Co. v. Sam’s Club
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1063

. . . . . . . . . . . .
Park Mini Storage Center Co. v. Sam’s East, Inc.
Parmelee v. McKenna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057

Parr v. Middle Tenn. State Univ.
865

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1038

Parra v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1061

Parra-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Parsley; Greenwell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1043

Passmore, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

Pasternak; United States ex rel. Darian v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914

Pate v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

. . .
Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce, Bd. of Patent Appeals; DBC v.
1050

Patrick v. Shinseki  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1143

Patrick v. Smith  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Patten v. Fleming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935

Patterson; Antoine v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Patterson v. Building Industry Assn. of Central Cal.  . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Patterson v. Chesapeake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  885,1065

1117

Patterson v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Patterson; Hudson Area Schools v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Patterson; Magwood v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1023,1108

Patterson v. State, County & Municipal Employees  . . . . . . . . .  878,1065

1150

Patterson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Patton v. Harris  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case compilation. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

456

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of Scalia, J.

II

Not only must we be satisﬁed that we have statutory juris-
diction to hear this case; we must be satisﬁed that we have
jurisdiction under Article III.
“To meet the standing re-
quirements of Article III, ‘[a] plaintiff must allege personal
injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful
conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’ ”
Raines, 521 U. S., at 818, quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S.
737, 751 (1984).

In the ﬁrst action before us, appellees Snake River Potato
Growers, Inc. (Snake River) and Mike Cranney, Snake Riv-
er’s Director and Vice-Chairman, challenge the constitution-
ality of the President’s cancellation of § 968 of the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997. The Snake River appellees have stand-
ing, in the Court’s view, because § 968 gave them “the equiv-
alent of a statutory ‘bargaining chip,’ ” and “[b]y depriving
them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation
inﬂicted a sufﬁcient likelihood of economic injury to estab-
lish standing under our precedents.” Ante, at 432.
It is
unclear whether the Court means that deprivation of a
“bargaining chip” itself sufﬁces for standing, or that such
deprivation sufﬁces in the present case because it creates
a likelihood of economic injury. The former is wrong as a
matter of law, and the latter is wrong as a matter of fact,
on the facts alleged.

For the proposition that “a denial of a beneﬁt in the bar-
gaining process” can sufﬁce for standing the Court relies in
a footnote, see ante, at 433, n. 22, on Northeastern Fla. Chap-
ter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville,
508 U. S. 656 (1993). There, an association of contractors
alleged that a city ordinance according racial preferences
in the award of city contracts denied its members equal
protection of the laws.
Id., at 658–659. The association’s
members had regularly bid on and performed city contracts,
and would have bid on designated set-aside contracts but for
Id., at 659. We held that the association had
the ordinance.
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This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to case law. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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  <content>
22

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

Arizona  Enabling  Act—enacted  close  in  time  to  its  Okla-
homa counterpart—as reinforcing the traditional rule “that
the States lac[k] jurisdiction” on tribal lands over crimes by
or  against  Native  Americans.    McClanahan,  411  U. S.,  at
175;  see  also  Warren  Trading  Post  Co.  v.  Arizona  Tax
Comm’n, 380 U. S. 685, 687, n. 3 (1965).5

4

The few occasions on which Congress has even arguably
authorized  the  application  of  state  criminal  law  on  tribal
reservations still do not come anywhere near granting Ok-
lahoma the power it seeks.  In the late 1800s, this Court in
——————

5 In  places,  the  Court  seems  to  suggest  that  the  Oklahoma  Enabling
Act endowed the State with “inherent” jurisdiction to try any crime com-
mitted within its borders.  See ante, at 22–23.  But in the end the Court
abandons  any  suggestion  that  with  statehood  Oklahoma  gained  an  in-
herent right to try cases involving tribal members within tribal bounds.
See Part III–A, infra.  So, once more, the Court’s discussion of the Okla-
homa Enabling Act turns out to be dicta future litigants are free to cor-
rect.  Much correction is warranted.  Not only does the Court fail to quote,
let alone offer any analysis of, the relevant statutory text.  Its suggestion
that the Oklahoma Enabling Act granted the State criminal jurisdiction
over tribal lands would require us to suppose that Congress abrogated
two treaties with the Cherokee without ever saying so—an interpreta-
tion that would grossly defy our Nation’s promises and this Court’s obli-
gation to read congressional work as a harmonious whole.  Reading the
Oklahoma  Enabling  Act  in  line  with  the  Court’s  ill-considered  dicta
would also defy this Court’s longstanding precedents in Tiger, Ramsey,
and McClanahan.  Of course, the Court tries to invoke McBratney and
Draper as contrary authority.  But as we will see in a moment, both cases
carefully reiterated the rule that statehood does not imply the right to
try crimes on tribal lands by or against tribal members.  The Court also
cites Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60 (1962).  But that
case involved Alaska’s Anti-Fish-Trap Conservation Law, not the Okla-
homa  Enabling  Act.    Admittedly,  Egan  quotes  comments  from  a  1954
legislative committee hearing about the Alaska Enabling Act in which a
few participants also happened to express views on the meaning of the
Oklahoma Enabling Act, passed almost 50 years earlier.  See id., at 71.
But surely this Court cannot think a few stray post-enactment legislative
comments, “unmoored from any statutory text,” ante, at 11, control over
the statutory terms or our more specific precedents.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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2

SANDOZ INC. v. AMGEN INC.

Opinion of the Court

the  requirement  that  an  applicant  provide  its  application
and manufacturing information to the manufacturer of the
biologic is enforceable by injunction.  We conclude that an
injunction  is  not  available  under  federal  law,  but  we  re-
mand for the court below to decide whether an injunction
is  available  under  state  law.  The  second  question  is
whether  the  applicant  must  give  notice  to  the  manufac-
turer after, rather than before, obtaining a license from the
FDA  for  its  biosimilar.    We  conclude  that  an  applicant
may provide notice before obtaining a license.

I
The  complex  statutory  scheme  at  issue  in  these  cases
establishes  processes  both  for  obtaining  FDA  approval  of
biosimilars  and  for  resolving  patent  disputes  between
manufacturers  of  licensed  biologics  and  manufacturers  of
biosimilars.  Before turning to the questions presented, we
first explain the statutory background.

A
A biologic is a type of drug derived from natural, biologi-
cal sources such as animals or microorganisms.  Biologics
thus  differ  from  traditional  drugs,  which  are  typically
synthesized from chemicals.1  A manufacturer of a biologic
may market the drug only if the FDA has licensed it pur-
suant  to  either  of  two  review  processes  set  forth  in  §262.
The default pathway for approval, used for new biologics,
is  set  forth  in  §262(a).  Under  that  subsection,  the  FDA
may  license  a  new  biologic  if,  among  other  things,  the
manufacturer  demonstrates  that  it  is  “safe,  pure,  and
potent.”  §262(a)(2)(C)(i)(I).    In  addition  to  this  default
route,  the  statute  also  prescribes  an  alternative,  abbrevi-
ated  route  for  FDA  approval  of  biosimilars,  which  is  set

——————

1FDA, What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers (Aug. 5, 2015), http://
www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cber/
ucm133077.htm (as last visited June 6, 2017).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the case SANDOZ INC. v. AMGEN INC. It sets the stage for the legal arguments and issues to be discussed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

The trial that followed was “the greatest spectacle in the
short  history  of  the  republic,”  complete  with  a  Founder-
studded cast.  N. Isenberg, Fallen Founder: The Life of Aa-
ron Burr 351 (2007).  People flocked to Richmond to watch,
massing in tents and covered wagons along the banks of the
James  River,  nearly  doubling  the  town’s  population  of
5,000.  Burr’s  defense  team  included  Edmund  Randolph
and Luther Martin, both former delegates at the Constitu-
tional Convention and renowned advocates.  Chief Justice
John Marshall, who had recently squared off with the Jef-
ferson administration in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137
(1803), presided as Circuit Justice for Virginia.  Meanwhile
Jefferson,  intent  on  conviction,  orchestrated  the  prosecu-
tion  from  afar,  dedicating  Cabinet  meetings  to  the  case,
peppering  the  prosecutors  with  directions,  and  spending
nearly $100,000 from the Treasury on the five-month pro-
ceedings.

In the lead-up to trial, Burr, taking aim at his accusers,
moved  for  a  subpoena  duces  tecum  directed  at  Jefferson.
The  draft  subpoena  required  the  President  to  produce  an
October 21, 1806 letter from Wilkinson and accompanying
documents, which Jefferson had referenced in his message
to Congress.  The prosecution opposed the request, arguing
that a President could not be subjected to such a subpoena
and that the letter might contain state secrets.  Following
four days of argument, Marshall announced his ruling to a
packed chamber.

The  President,  Marshall  declared,  does  not  “stand  ex-
empt from the general provisions of the constitution” or, in
particular, the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that those ac-
cused have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses for
their defense.  United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33–34
(No.  14,692d)  (CC  Va.  1807).    At  common  law  the  “single
reservation” to the duty to testify in response to a subpoena
was “the case of the king,” whose “dignity” was seen as “in-
compatible”  with  appearing  “under  the  process  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the trial of Aaron Burr and the legal arguments surrounding the President's obligation to comply with a subpoena.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

JACKSON, J., dissenting

violate the  immigration  laws—while  inserting a  mens  rea
requirement  for  knowledge  or  reckless  disregard  of  the
noncitizen’s immigration status.  See Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986, §112(a), 100 Stat. 3381–3382.  Sim-
ultaneously, and for the first time, Congress made it a crime
to  encourage  or  induce  an  unauthorized  noncitizen  not
merely to enter the United States, but also to encourage or
induce such a person to “reside” here unlawfully.  Ibid.
  Finally, in 1996, Congress crafted a separate penalty en-
hancement  for  certain  kinds  of  violations.    It  raised  the
maximum punishment from 5 years to 10 years of impris-
onment  if  the  offender  violates  the  encouragement  provi-
sion  “for  the  purpose  of  commercial  advantage  or  private
financial  gain.”    §1324(a)(1)(B)(i);  see  Illegal  Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, §203(a),
110 Stat. 3009–565.
  As  these  developments  illustrate,  Congress  has  repeat-
edly  revisited  the  scope  of  the  encouragement  provision.
And, in so doing, it has consistently expanded the reach and
severity of this criminal law from its modest 1885 origins.
Most  notably,  the  particular  amendments  that  Congress
has made to the encouragement provision demonstrate its
intent to specifically reject the pillars of the majority’s hold-
ing.
  To reiterate: The terms “solicit” and “assist” appeared in
the  text  of  the  statute  between  1885  and  1952,  at  which
point Congress removed them.  Likewise, between 1952 and
1986, violating this statute required that the speaker “will-
fully  or  knowingly”  encourage  or  induce  a  noncitizen  to
transgress  the  immigration  laws.    But  in  1986,  Congress
deleted this primary mens rea requirement.

2
  The  majority’s  efforts  to  spin  the  encouragement  provi-
sion’s enlightening enactment history in favor of the major-
ity’s narrow interpretation are unavailing.
  </content>
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This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites legal statutes and discusses the history of their interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON

Syllabus

supervision of a highly detailed decree” could wind up impairing rather
than enhancing competition.  Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Of-
fices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U. S. 398, 415.  The district court’s
injunction honored these principles, though.  The court enjoined only
certain restraints—and only after finding both that relaxing these re-
strictions  would  not  blur  the  distinction  between  college  and  profes-
sional  sports  and  thus  impair  demand,  and  further  that  this  course
represented a significantly (not marginally) less restrictive means of
achieving  the  same  procompetitive  benefits  as  the  NCAA’s  current
rules.  Finally, the court’s injunction preserves considerable leeway for
the NCAA, while individual conferences remain free to impose what-
ever rules they choose.  To the extent the NCAA believes meaningful
ambiguity exists about the scope of its authority, it may seek clarifica-
tion from the district court.  Pp. 30–36.

958 F. 3d 1239, affirmed.

  GORSUCH,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  for  a  unanimous  Court.    KA-
VANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal case syllabus, specifically the Supreme Court case NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON.  Syllabi are summaries of legal cases and are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the primary content of the document.
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  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
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Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–334
_________________

CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF
AND ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED TEXAS
MUNICIPALITIES, PETITIONER v.
HOTELS.COM, L. P., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[May 27, 2021]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Civil litigation in the federal courts is often an expensive
affair, and each party, win or lose, generally bears many of
its  own  litigation  expenses,  including  attorney’s  fees  that
are subject to the so-called American Rule.  Baker Botts L.
L. P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U. S. 121, 126 (2015).  But cer-
tain “costs” are treated differently.  Federal Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 39 governs the taxation of appellate “costs,”
and the question in this case is whether a district court has
the discretion to deny or reduce those costs.  We hold that
it does not and therefore affirm the judgment below.

I
A
There  is  a  longstanding  tradition  of  awarding  certain
costs other than attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in the
federal  courts.  Marx  v.  General  Revenue  Corp.,  568  U. S.
371, 377, and n. 3 (2013); see, e.g., Winchester v. Jackson, 3
Cranch 514 (1806).  Today, Federal Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 39 sets out the procedure for assessing and taxing
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the title of the case, the date, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxiv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

828

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pennsylvania; Sam v.
1081

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pennsylvania; Slade v.
1125

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pennsylvania; Strong v.
1052

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pennsylvania; Walter v.
828

Pennsylvania; Watson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922

Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole; Rodriguez v.
. . . . . . .
911

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections; Hess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections; Robinson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pennsylvania Dept. of Welfare; Clayton v.
809

Pennsylvania Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review; Riley v.  . . . .
1007

Penn Trafﬁc Co.; Fisher v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1100

Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corp.; Oneida Ltd. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913

Pentagon Federal Credit Union; Charles v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
832

Peoples v. Barber  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Peoples v. Davis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
886

Peoples v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  954,1140

844

Pepsi Bottling Group; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1061

Peraza-Carrillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pereira v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  882,1062

998

Perez v. Colorado  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Perez v. Oregon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Perez v. Texas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099

Perez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

Perez-Cruz v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000

Perez Gonzalez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Perez-Oliveros v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099

Perkins v. North Carolina
866

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130

Perkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Perkins v. Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
895

Perlman; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
851

Perritte v. Florida
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

Perry v. Byrnes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Perry; Hollingsworth v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  183,1107

Perry v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  908,1011

866

Perry v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Perry v. Virginia
825

Personnel Decisions, Inc.; Business Planning Systems, Inc. v.
. . .
991

Peru; Amorrortu v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Pesarik, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

Peter v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037

Peters v. Scivantage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039

Peters v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

Petersen v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
885

Peterson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
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</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1263
_________________

GIANINNA GALLARDO, AN INCAPACITATED PERSON, BY
AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND CO-GUARDIANS PILAR
VASSALLO AND WALTER GALLARDO, PETITIONER
v. SIMONE MARSTILLER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA AGENCY FOR
HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 6, 2022]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Medicaid requires participating States to pay for certain
needy individuals’ medical costs and then to make reason-
able efforts to recoup those costs from liable third parties.
Consequently, a State must require Medicaid beneficiaries
to assign the State “any rights . . . to payment for medical
care  from  any  third  party.”  42  U. S. C.  §1396k(a)(1)(A).
That  assignment  permits  a  State  to  seek  reimbursement
from  the  portion  of  a  beneficiary’s  private  tort  settlement
that  represents  “payment  for  medical  care,”  ibid.,  despite
the Medicaid Act’s general prohibition against seeking re-
imbursement from a beneficiary’s “property,” §1396p(a)(1).
The question presented is whether §1396k(a)(1)(A) permits
a State to seek reimbursement from settlement payments
allocated for future medical care.  We conclude that it does.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE

Opinion of the Court

It  does  not  strike  any  registrant  solely  by  reason  of  the
failure to vote.  Instead, as expressly permitted by federal
law,  it  removes  registrants  only  when  they  have  failed  to
vote  and  have  failed  to  respond  to  a  change-of-residence
notice.

C
  Respondents  and  the  dissent  advance  an  alternative
interpretation  of  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause,  but  that
reading is inconsistent with both the text of the clause and
the  clarification  of  its  meaning  in  §21083(a)(4)(A).    Re-
spondents argue that the clause allows States to consider
nonvoting only to the extent that subsection (d) requires—
that  is,  only  after  a  registrant  has  failed  to  mail  back  a
notice.    Any  other  use  of  the  failure  to  vote,  including  as
the  trigger  for  mailing  a  notice, they  claim,  is  proscribed.
In  essence,  respondents  read  the  language  added  to  the
clause  by  HAVA—“except  that  nothing  in  this  paragraph
may be construed to prohibit a State from using the proce-
dures  described  in  subsections  (c)  and  (d)”—as  an  excep-
tion  to  the  general  rule  forbidding  the  use  of  nonvoting.
See  Brief  for  Respondents  37.    And  the  Sixth  Circuit
seemed  to  find  this  point  dispositive,  reasoning  that  “ ‘ex-
ceptions  in  statutes  must  be  strictly  construed.’ ”    838
F. 3d, at 708 (quoting Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F. 2d
730, 739 (CA6 1941)).
  We  reject  this  argument  for  three  reasons.    First,  it
distorts  what  the  new  language  added  by  HAVA  actually
says.  The new language does not create an exception to a
general rule against the use of nonvoting.  It does not say
that  the  failure  to  vote  may  not  be  used  “except  that this
paragraph does not prohibit a State from using the proce-
dures  described  in  subsections  (c)  and  (d).”    Instead,  it
says that “nothing in this paragraph may be construed” to
have that effect.  §20507(b)(2) (emphasis added).  Thus, it
sets  out  not  an  exception,  but  a  rule  of interpretation.    It
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a law related to voter registration. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific sections of a law (HAVA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–58
_________________

UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
TEXAS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2023]

JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  and

JUSTICE BARRETT join, concurring in the judgment.

The Court holds that Texas and Louisiana lack Article III
standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity’s Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration
Law.  I agree.  But respectfully, I diagnose the jurisdictional
defect differently.  The problem here is redressability.

I
Article III vests federal courts with the power to decide
“Cases” and “Controversies.”  Standing doctrine honors the
limitations inherent in this assignment by ensuring judges
attend to actual harms rather than abstract grievances.  “If
individuals and groups could invoke the authority of a fed-
eral  court  to  forbid  what  they  dislike  for  no  more  reason
than they dislike it, we would risk exceeding the judiciary’s
limited  constitutional  mandate  and  infringing  on  powers
committed to other branches of government.”  American Le-
gion v. American Humanist Assn., 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019)
(GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3).

To establish standing to sue in federal court, a plaintiff
must show that it has suffered a concrete and particular-
ized injury, one that is both traceable to the defendant and
redressable  by  a  court  order.  See  Lujan  v.  Defenders  of
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992).  If a plaintiff fails
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal reasoning of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

different types of sources.  First, we reviewed “[t]hree im-
portant  founding-era  legal  scholars  [who]  interpreted  the
Second Amendment in published writings.”  Ibid.  Second,
we looked to “19th-century cases that interpreted the Sec-
ond Amendment” and found that they “universally support
an  individual  right”  to  keep  and  bear  arms.  Id.,  at  610.
Third, we examined the “discussion of the Second Amend-
ment  in  Congress  and  in  public  discourse”  after  the  Civil
War, “as people debated whether and how to secure consti-
tutional rights for newly freed slaves.”  Id., at 614.  Fourth,
we  considered  how  post-Civil  War  commentators  under-
stood the right.  See id., at 616–619.

After holding that the Second Amendment protected an
individual right to armed self-defense, we also relied on the
historical understanding of the Amendment to demark the
limits on the exercise of that right.  We noted that, “[l]ike
most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is
not unlimited.”  Id., at 626.  “From Blackstone through the
19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely ex-
plained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any
weapon  whatsoever  in  any  manner  whatsoever  and  for
whatever purpose.”  Ibid.  For example, we found it “fairly
supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the car-
rying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons’ ” that the Second
Amendment  protects  the  possession  and  use  of  weapons
that  are  “ ‘in  common  use  at  the  time.’ ”    Id.,  at  627  (first
citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of Eng-
land 148–149 (1769); then quoting United States v. Miller,
307 U. S. 174, 179 (1939)).  That said, we cautioned that we
were  not  “undertak[ing]  an  exhaustive  historical  analysis
today  of  the  full  scope  of  the  Second  Amendment”  and
moved on to considering the constitutionality of the District
of Columbia’s handgun ban.  554 U. S., at 627.

We assessed the lawfulness of that handgun ban by scru-
tinizing  whether  it  comported  with  history  and  tradition.
Although we noted that the ban “would fail constitutional
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Second Amendment and its interpretation. It cites historical sources and legal precedents, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

SNYDER v. PHELPS

Syllabus

tentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress  or  intrusion  upon  seclu-
sion—the  allegedly  unlawful  activity  Westboro  conspired  to  accom-
plish—Snyder also cannot recover for civil conspiracy based on those
torts.  P. 14.

(d)  Westboro  addressed  matters  of  public  import  on  public  prop-
erty, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of lo-
cal  officials.    It  did  not  disrupt  Mathew  Snyder’s  funeral,  and  its
choice to picket at that time and place did not alter the nature of its
speech.  Because  this  Nation  has  chosen  to  protect  even  hurtful
speech  on  public  issues  to  ensure  that  public  debate  is  not  stifled,
Westboro must be shielded from tort liability for its picketing in this
case.  Pp. 14–15.

580 F. 3d 206, affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  SCALIA,
KENNEDY,  THOMAS,  GINSBURG,  BREYER,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,
joined.  BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion.  ALITO, J., filed a dissent-
ing opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a condensed overview rather than the full text meant for reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

41

Opinion of the Court

avoid.  Ignoring  those  risks,  the  dissents  are instead  con-
tent  to  leave  the  preservation  of  our  system  of  separated
powers up to the good faith of prosecutors.

Finally, the principal dissent finds it “troubling” that the
Court does not “designate any course of conduct alleged in
the indictment as private.”  Post, at 27.  Despite the unprec-
edented  nature  of  this  case,  the  significant  constitutional
questions that it raises, its expedited treatment in the lower
courts and in this Court, the lack of factual analysis in the
lower courts, and the lack of briefing on how to categorize
the conduct alleged, the principal dissent would go ahead
and  declare  all  of  it  unofficial.    The  other  dissent,  mean-
while, analyzes the case under comprehensive models and
paradigms  of  its  own  concoction  and  accuses  the  Court  of
providing “no meaningful guidance about how to apply [the]
new paradigm or how to categorize a President’s conduct.”
Post, at 13 (opinion of JACKSON, J.).  It would have us ex-
haustively define every application of Presidential immun-
ity.  See post, at 13–14.  Our dissenting colleagues exude an
impressive infallibility.  While their confidence may be in-
spiring,  the  Court  adheres  to  time-tested  practices  in-
stead—deciding what is required to dispose of this case and
remanding after “revers[ing] on a threshold question,” Zi-
votofsky, 566 U. S., at 201, to obtain “guidance from the lit-
igants [and] the court below,” Vidal v. Elster, 602 U. S. 286,
328 (2024) (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment).

V

This case poses a question of lasting significance: When
may a former President be prosecuted for official acts taken
during his Presidency?  Our Nation has never before needed
an answer.  But in addressing that question today, unlike
the political branches and the public at large, we cannot af-
ford to fixate exclusively, or even primarily, on present exi-
gencies.  In a case like this one, focusing on “transient re-
sults” may have profound consequences for the separation
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the case, the arguments made by the dissenting justices, and the Court's reasoning for its decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CHIAVERINI v. CITY OF NAPOLEON

Syllabus

Under the Fourth Amendment, a pretrial detention counts as an un-
reasonable  seizure,  and  so  is  illegal,  unless  it  is  based  on  probable
cause.  See Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. 357, at 364–369.  Even when a
detention is justified at the outset, moreover, it may become unreason-
ably prolonged if the reason for it lapses.  Rodriguez v. United States,
575 U. S., 348, 354–357.  So if an invalid charge causes a detention to
start or continue, then the Fourth Amendment is violated.  Bringing
the invalid charge alongside a valid one does not categorically preclude
this possibility.  As the starkest possible example, consider a person
detained on a drug offense supported by probable cause and a gun of-
fense that is not.  If the prosecutor drops the gun charge, leaving the
person in jail on the drug charge alone, then the baseless charge has
caused a constitutional violation by unreasonably extending the deten-
tion.  The person should not be categorically barred from bringing a
Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim just because the base-
less charge was brought along with a good one.

The  same  conclusion  follows  from  the  common-law  principles  gov-
erning malicious-prosecution suits.  This Court has analogized claims
like Chiaverini’s to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution, and
has  explained  that  the  tort  can  inform  courts’  understanding  of  this
type  of  claim.    Thompson  v.  Clark,  596  U. S.  36,  43–44.    A  plaintiff
bringing a common-law malicious-prosecution suit had to show that an
official initiated a charge without probable cause.  But he did not have
to show that every charge brought against him lacked an adequate ba-
sis.  See, e.g., Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189, 198 (it was no “defen[s]e
that there was probable cause for part of the prosecution”).

These uncontested points suffice to doom the Sixth Circuit’s categor-
ical rule barring a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim if
any charge is valid.  Of course, a Fourth Amendment malicious-prose-
cution  suit  depends  not  just  on  an  unsupported  charge,  but  on  that
charge’s  causing  a  seizure—like  the  arrest  and  three-day  detention
here.  The parties and amicus curiae offer three different views of how
that causation element is met when a valid charge is also in the pic-
ture.  But this issue is not properly before the Court, so the Sixth Cir-
cuit should address it on remand. Pp. 4–8.

Vacated and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  SOTOMAYOR,  KAVANAUGH,  BARRETT,  and  JACKSON,  JJ.,  joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. GOR-
SUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal case syllabus, providing a summary of the court's decision. It is not the actual content of the book and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U76

[09-06-00 18:29:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN

92

HOPKINS v. REEVES

Opinion of the Court

commit the underlying felony. State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206,
217, 344 N. W. 2d 433, 442 (1984). Although a conviction
for felony murder renders a defendant eligible for the death
penalty, see § 28–303, the jury is not charged with sentencing
the defendant; under Nebraska law, capital sentencing is a
judicial function, § 29–2520.

At trial, respondent requested that the jury be instructed
on both murder in the second degree and manslaughter,
which, he argued, were lesser included offenses of felony
murder. App. 6–9.1 The trial court refused on the ground
that the Nebraska Supreme Court consistently has held that
second-degree murder and manslaughter are not lesser in-
Id., at 10. Respondent’s jury
cluded offenses of that crime.
thus was presented with only the two felony-murder counts.2
Although respondent raised an insanity defense, the jury re-
jected it and convicted him on both counts. A three-judge
sentencing panel then convened to consider aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.
It sentenced respondent to death
on both convictions.

After the Nebraska Supreme Court afﬁrmed his convic-
tions and sentences, State v. Reeves, 216 Neb. 206, 344 N. W.
2d 433, cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1028 (1984), respondent unsuc-
cessfully pursued state collateral relief, State v. Reeves, 234
Neb. 711, 453 N. W. 2d 359 (1990). This Court then vacated
the Nebraska Supreme Court’s judgment for further consid-
eration in light of Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738
(1990), because respondent’s death sentence had been based
in part on an invalid aggravating factor. See Reeves v. Ne-
braska, 498 U. S. 964 (1990). On remand, the Nebraska Su-

1 Under Nebraska law, second-degree murder is deﬁned as “caus[ing] the
death of a person intentionally, but without premeditation,” § 28–304, and
manslaughter as “kill[ing] another without malice, either upon a sudden
quarrel, or caus[ing] the death of another unintentionally while in the com-
mission of an unlawful act,” § 28–305.

2 Respondent did not request an instruction on sexual assault in the

ﬁrst degree.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court case. It contains legal terminology, citations, and a narrative of the case proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

where  it  collects  and  keeps  charitable  organizations’  tax
forms.  The majority holds that a California regulation re-
quiring charitable organizations to disclose tax forms con-
taining the names and contributions of their top donors un-
constitutionally  burdens  the  right  to  associate  even  if  the
forms are not publicly disclosed.

In so holding, the Court discards its decades-long require-
ment that, to establish a cognizable burden on their associ-
ational rights, plaintiffs must plead and prove that disclo-
sure  will  likely  expose  them  to  objective  harms,  such  as
threats, harassment, or reprisals.  It also departs from the
traditional,  nuanced  approach  to  First  Amendment  chal-
lenges, whereby the degree of means-end tailoring required
is  commensurate  to  the  actual  burdens  on  associational
rights.  Finally,  it  recklessly  holds  a  state  regulation  fa-
cially invalid despite petitioners’ failure to show that a sub-
stantial proportion of those affected would prefer anonym-
ity, much less that they are objectively burdened by the loss
of it.

Today’s analysis marks reporting and disclosure require-
ments  with  a  bull’s-eye.  Regulated  entities  who  wish  to
avoid their obligations can do so by vaguely waving toward
First Amendment “privacy concerns.”  Ante, at 17.  It does
not  matter  if  not  a  single  individual  risks  experiencing  a
single  reprisal  from  disclosure,  or  if  the  vast  majority  of
those affected would happily comply.  That is all irrelevant
to  the  Court’s  determination  that  California’s  Schedule  B
requirement is facially unconstitutional.  Neither precedent
nor  common  sense  supports  such  a  result.    I  respectfully
dissent.

I
Charitable organizations that wish to solicit tax-deducti-
ble contributions from California residents must maintain
membership in a registry managed by the California attor-
ney  general.  Cal.  Govt.  Code  Ann.  §§12584,  12585  (West
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

ALITO, J., concurring
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

be said, however, when a doctor knowingly or purposefully
issues  a  prescription  to  facilitate  “addiction  and  recrea-
tional abuse,” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 274 (2006).
Objectives of that kind are alien to medical practice, and a
doctor who prescribes drugs for those purposes is not “act-
ing as a physician” in any meaningful sense.

I  would  thus  hold  that  a  doctor  who  acts  in  subjective
good  faith  in  prescribing  drugs  is  entitled  to  invoke  the
CSA’s  authorization  defense.  Under  the  correct  under-
standing of that defense, a doctor acts “in the course of pro-
fessional practice” in issuing a prescription under the CSA
if—but only if—he or she believes in good faith that the pre-
scription is a valid means of pursuing a medical purpose.  A
doctor who knows that he or she is acting for a purpose for-
eign to medicine—such as facilitating addiction or recrea-
tional drug abuse—is not protected by the CSA’s authoriza-
tion  to  distribute  controlled  substances  by  prescription.
Such doctors may be convicted of unlawfully distributing or
dispensing a controlled substance under §841(a)(1).

Based  on  this  holding,  I  would  vacate  the  judgments  of
the Courts of Appeals below.  And like the Court, I would
leave it to those courts to determine on remand whether the
instructions  provided  in  petitioners’  respective  trials  ade-
quately described the good-faith defense and whether any
errors in the instructions were harmless.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito. It delves into the legal interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and its authorization defense in the context of prescription drug distribution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
90

ALVAREZ  v.  SMITH

Opinion of the Court

would  be  reasonable”  in  the  circumstances.  § 570/505(b).
When  an  ofﬁcer  has  seized  property  without  a  warrant,  the
relevant  law enforcement  agency must  notify the  State’s at
torney  within  52  days  of  the  seizure;  the  State’s  attorney
must notify  the property owner of  any impending forfeiture
within a further 45 days; and, if the owner wishes to contest
forfeiture, the State’s attorney must begin judicial forfeiture
proceedings within yet a further 45 days.  See ch.  725,
§§ 150/5–150/6.  Thus,  the  statute  gives  the  State  up  to  142
days, nearly ﬁve months, to begin judicial forfeiture proceed-
ings—during  which  time  the  statute  permits  the  State  to
keep the car or cash within its possession.

On  November  22,  2006,  six  individuals  (respondents  or
plaintiffs) brought this federal civil rights action against de
fendants  the  city  of  Chicago,  the  superintendent  of  the  Chi
cago Police Department, and the Cook County State’s Attor
ney  (the  petitioner  here,  whom  we  shall  call  the  “State’s
Attorney”).  See Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983.  Three
of  the  individuals,  Chermane  Smith,  Edmanuel  Perez,  and
Tyhesha  Brunston,  said  that  earlier  in  2006  the  police  had,
upon their arrests, seized their cars without a warrant.  See
Complaint  ¶ 25,  App.  34a  (Smith,  seizure  on  Jan.  19,  2006);
id.,  ¶ 26,  at  34a  (Perez,  seizure  on  Mar.  8,  2006);  id.,  ¶ 27,  at
34a (Brunston, seizure on Apr. 8, 2006); Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Class Certiﬁcation ¶ 8, App. 39a.  The other three plaintiffs,
Michelle  Waldo,  Kirk  Yunker,  and  Tony  Williams,  said  that
earlier  in  2006  police  had,  upon  their  arrests,  seized  their
cash  without  a  warrant.  See  Complaint  ¶ 28,  App.  34a–35a
(Waldo,  seizure  on  Jan.  20,  2006);  id.,  ¶ 29,  at  35a  (Yunker,
seizure on Sept. 26, 2006); id., ¶ 30, at 35a (Williams, seizure
in  July  2006);  Plaintiffs’  Motion  for  Class  Certiﬁcation  ¶ 8,
App.  39a.  The  plaintiffs  added  that  the  police  department
still had custody of their property.  See Complaint ¶¶ 24–30,
App. 34a–35a.  They claimed that the failure of the State to
provide  a  speedy  postseizure  hearing  violated  the  Federal
Due  Process  Clause.  See  U. S.  Const.,  Amdt.  14,  § 1.  And
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing a case called Alvarez v. Smith. It delves into legal arguments regarding property seizures and due process rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>