<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v.
WALL-STREET.COM, LLC
Opinion of the Court

respondent  Wall-Street.com,  LLC  (Wall-Street),  a  news
website.  The  license  agreement  required  Wall-Street  to
remove  from  its  website  all  content  produced  by  Fourth
Estate  before  canceling  the  agreement.  Wall-Street  can-
celed, but continued to display articles produced by Fourth
Estate.  Fourth  Estate  sued  Wall-Street  and  its  owner,
Jerrold  Burden,  for  copyright  infringement.    The  com-
plaint alleged that Fourth Estate had filed “applications to
register  [the]  articles  [licensed  to  Wall-Street]  with  the
Register  of  Copyrights.”    App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  18a.1
Because the Register had not yet acted on Fourth Estate’s
applications,2  the  District  Court,  on  Wall-Street  and  Bur-
den’s  motion,  dismissed  the  complaint,  and  the  Eleventh
Circuit  affirmed.    856  F. 3d  1338  (2017).    Thereafter,  the
Register  of  Copyrights  refused  registration  of  the  articles
Wall-Street had allegedly infringed.3

We  granted  Fourth  Estate’s  petition  for  certiorari  to
resolve  a  division  among  U. S.  Courts  of  Appeals  on
when registration occurs in accordance with §411(a).  585
U. S. ___  (2018).    Compare, e.g.,  856  F. 3d,  at  1341  (case
below)  (registration  has  been  made  under  §411(a)  when
the  Register  of  Copyrights  registers  a  copyright),  with,
e.g., Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F. 3d
612,  621  (CA9  2010)  (registration  has  been  made  under
§411(a)  when  the  copyright  claimant’s  “complete  applica-
tion” for registration is received by the Copyright Office).

——————

1 The Register of Copyrights is the “director of the Copyright Office of
the Library of Congress” and is appointed by the Librarian of Congress.
17  U. S. C.  §701(a).    The  Copyright Act  delegates  to  the  Register  “[a]ll
administrative functions and duties under [Title 17].”  Ibid.

2 Consideration  of  Fourth  Estate’s  filings  was  initially  delayed  be-
cause  the  check  Fourth  Estate  sent  in  payment  of  the  filing  fee  was
rejected  by  Fourth  Estate’s  bank  as  uncollectible.  App.  to  Brief  for
United States as Amicus Curiae 1a.

3 The  merits  of  the  Copyright  Office’s  decision  refusing  registration

are not at issue in this Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing a copyright infringement case. It includes case names, court information, and a summary of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH DAKOTA

No. 17–494.  Argued April 17, 2018—Decided June 21, 2018

South Dakota, like many States, taxes the retail sales of goods and ser-
vices in the State.  Sellers are required to collect and remit the tax to
the State, but if they do not then in-state consumers are responsible
for  paying  a  use  tax  at  the  same  rate.    Under  National  Bellas  Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753, and Quill Corp. v.
North  Dakota,  504  U. S.  298,  South  Dakota  may  not  require  a  busi-
ness that has no physical presence in the State to collect its sales tax.
Consumer  compliance  rates  are  notoriously  low,  however,  and  it  is
estimated that Bellas Hess and Quill cause South Dakota to lose be-
tween $48 and $58 million annually.  Concerned about the erosion of
its sales tax base and corresponding loss of critical funding for state
and  local  services,  the  South  Dakota  Legislature  enacted  a  law  re-
quiring  out-of-state  sellers  to  collect  and  remit  sales  tax  “as  if  the
seller  had  a  physical  presence  in  the  State.”    The  Act  covers  only
sellers that, on an annual basis, deliver more than $100,000 of goods
or services into the State or engage in 200 or more separate transac-
tions  for  the  delivery  of  goods  or  services  into  the  State.    Respond-
ents,  top  online  retailers  with  no  employees  or  real  estate  in  South
Dakota, each meet the Act’s minimum sales or transactions require-
ment, but do not collect the State’s sales tax.  South Dakota filed suit
in state court, seeking a declaration that  the Act’s requirements are
valid  and  applicable  to  respondents  and  an  injunction  requiring  re-
spondents  to  register  for  licenses  to  collect  and  remit  the  sales  tax.
Respondents sought summary judgment, arguing that the Act is un-
constitutional.    The  trial  court  granted  their  motion.    The  State  Su-
preme  Court  affirmed  on  the  ground  that  Quill  is  controlling  prece-
dent.

Held: Because the physical presence rule of Quill is unsound and incor-
rect, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, and National Bellas
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
42

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of BREYER, J.

C

Table 1: Costs of a Federal Seat

House

Average House Winner Spent

Average House Loser Spent

2012 Elections

$1,567,293

$496,637

Average Winner's Receipts from PACs

$665,728

Senate

Average Senate Winner Spent

Average Senate Loser Spent

$11,474,077

$7,435,446

Average Winner's Receipts from PACs

$2,185,650
Source: Center for Responsive Politics, Election Stats, online at

http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php.

Table 2: Leadership PACs

Number of Leadership
PACs
(contributing to federal
candidates)

Total Contributed
(to federal candidates)

2000 Elections

2002 Elections

2004 Elections

2006 Elections

2008 Elections

2010 Elections

2012 Elections

175

228

274

336

378

396

456

$17,000,000

$25,000,000

$30,700,000

$44,700,000

$40,600,000

$44,000,000

$46,400,000

Source: Center for Responsive Politics, Leadership PACs, online at

http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a table of data about campaign finance, likely extracted from a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Data Table</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

THOMAS, J., concurring

citizenship,” according to Charles Sumner, is “equality be-
fore the law.”  Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 384 (1872).6
The Citizenship Clause’s conferral of the “dignity and glory
of American citizenship” may well prohibit the Federal Gov-
ernment from denying citizens equality with respect to civil
rights.  Rather  than  continue  to  invoke  the  Fifth  Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause to justify Bolling, in an appro-
priate case, we should more carefully consider whether this
interpretation of the Citizenship Clause would yield a sim-
ilar, and more supportable, result.

——————

6 Sumner continued: “Ceasing to be a slave the former victim has be-
come not only a man, but a citizen, admitted alike within the pale of hu-
manity and within the pale of citizenship.  As a man he is entitled to all
the rights of man, and as a citizen he becomes a member of our common
household with equality as the prevailing law. . . . Whatever he may have
been,  he  is  now  the  same  as  ourselves.  Our  rights  are  his  rights;  our
equality is his equality; our privileges and immunities are his great pos-
session.”  Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 385.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It discusses the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its potential implications for civil rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of the Court

person  who  at  the  time  of  disposal  of  any  hazardous  sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazard-
ous substances were disposed of.”  See also §101(27).  The
second was a §113(f ) “contribution” action.  Under that pro-
vision, a “person who has resolved its liability to the United
States . . . for some or all of a response action or for some or
all  of  the  costs  of  such  action  in  [a ]  settlement  may  seek
contribution from any person who is not [already] party to
a [qualifying] settlement.”  §113(f )(3)(B).

Rather than increase Guam’s odds of recovery, however,
the second legal theory led to the dismissal of its complaint.
According to the D. C. Circuit, if a party can assert a con-
tribution claim under §113(f ), it cannot assert a cost-recov-
ery claim under §107(a).  See 950 F. 3d, at 111.  The court
then  determined  that  Guam  possessed  a  contribution
claim—at  least  at  one  point—because  the  remedial
measures  and  conditional  release  in  the  Clean  Water  Act
decree  sufficiently  “ ‘resolved  Guam’s  liability’ ”  for  the
dump.  Id., at 114–117 (brackets omitted).  But because the
2004 decree had triggered the since-expired 3-year statute
of limitations for contribution actions, Guam had no remedy
at all.  Id., at 107, 117; see also §113(g)(3).  We granted cer-
tiorari.  592 U. S. ___ (2021).

II

Guam now attacks two links in this chain of reasoning:
First, Guam retreats from its complaint and argues that it
never had a viable contribution claim under §113(f ), leaving
it free to pursue a cost-recovery action under §107(a).  The
reason,  argues  Guam,  is  that  a  contribution  claim  arises
only if a settlement resolves liability under CERCLA, and
not under some other law such as the Clean Water Act.  Sec-
ond,  Guam  contends  that  even  if  resolution  of  a  non-
CERCLA liability is enough, the decree did not adequately
“resolve” any sort of liability because Guam did not formally
admit responsibility and because the agreement left Guam
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a case involving Guam and hazardous substance disposal.  The text is sequential and provides context and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

LUCIA v. SEC

Opinion of the Court

cers, even when their decisions were not final.4

Freytag  says  everything  necessary  to  decide  this  case.
To  begin,  the  Commission’s  ALJs,  like  the  Tax  Court’s
STJs, hold a continuing office established by law.  See id.,
at  881.  Indeed,  everyone  here—Lucia,  the  Government,
and the amicus—agrees on that point.  See Brief for Peti-
tioners  21;  Brief  for  United  States  17–18,  n.  3;  Brief  for
Amicus  Curiae  22,  n.  7.  Far  from  serving  temporarily  or
episodically,  SEC  ALJs  “receive[ ]  a  career  appointment.”
5  CFR  §930.204(a)  (2018).    And  that  appointment  is  to  a
position created by statute, down to its “duties, salary, and
means  of  appointment.”  Freytag,  501  U. S.,  at  881;  see  5
U. S. C. §§556–557, 5372, 3105.

Still  more,  the  Commission’s  ALJs  exercise  the  same
“significant  discretion”  when  carrying  out  the  same  “im-
portant functions” as STJs do.  Freytag, 501 U. S., at 882.
Both  sets  of  officials  have  all  the  authority  needed  to
ensure  fair  and  orderly  adversarial  hearings—indeed,
nearly  all  the  tools  of  federal  trial  judges.    See  Butz,  438
U. S., at 513; supra, at 2.  Consider in order the four spe-
cific (if overlapping) powers Freytag mentioned.  First, the

——————

4 The Court also provided an alternative basis for viewing the STJs as
officers.  “Even if the duties of [STJs in major cases] were not as signifi-
cant  as  we  . . .  have  found  them,”  we  stated,  “our  conclusion  would  be
unchanged.”    Freytag,  501  U. S.,  at  882.    That  was  because  the  Gov-
ernment  had  conceded  that  in  minor  matters,  where  STJs  could  enter
final  decisions,  they  had  enough  “independent  authority”  to  count  as
officers.  Ibid.  And we thought it made no sense to classify the STJs as
officers  for  some  cases  and  employees  for  others.    See  ibid.  JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR  relies  on  that  back-up  rationale  in  trying  to  reconcile
Freytag  with  her  view  that  “a  prerequisite  to  officer  status  is  the
authority” to issue at least some “final decisions.”  Post, at 5 (dissenting
opinion).  But Freytag has two parts, and its primary analysis explicitly
rejects JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s theory that final decisionmaking authority
is  a  sine  qua  non  of  officer status.    See  501  U. S.,  at  881–882.    As  she
acknowledges,  she  must  expunge  that  reasoning  to  make  her  reading
work.  See post, at 5 (“That part of the opinion[ ] was unnecessary to the
result”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the case of Lucia v. SEC and cites previous legal precedents like Freytag. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Syllabus

Letters and accompanying press release, viewed in context of their is-
suance, reinforce the NRA’s First Amendment claim.  Pp. 12–15.

(c) The  Second  Circuit  concluded  that  Vullo’s  alleged  communica-
tions  were  “examples  of  permissible  government  speech”  and  “legiti-
mate enforcement action.”  49 F. 4th 700, 717–719.  The Second Circuit
could  only  reach  this conclusion,  however,  by  taking  the  complaint’s
allegations in isolation and failing to draw reasonable inferences in the
NRA’s favor.

Vullo’s arguments to the contrary lack merit.  The conceded illegal-
ity of the NRA-endorsed insurance programs does not insulate Vullo
from First Amendment scrutiny under Bantam Books.  Nor does her
argument that her actions targeted “nonexpressive” business relation-
ships change the fact that the NRA alleges her actions were aimed at
punishing or suppressing speech.  Finally, Vullo claims that the NRA’s
position, if accepted, would stifle government speech and hamper le-
gitimate enforcement efforts, but the Court’s conclusion simply reaf-
firms the general principle that where, as here, the complaint plausi-
bly  alleges  coercive  threats  aimed  at  punishing  or  suppressing
disfavored speech, the plaintiff states a First Amendment claim.  Pp.
15–18.

(d) The NRA’s allegations, if true, highlight the constitutional con-
cerns with the kind of strategy that Vullo purportedly adopted.  Alt-
hough the NRA was not the directly regulated party here, Vullo alleg-
edly used the power of her office to target gun promotion by going after
the NRA’s business partners.  Nothing in this case immunizes the NRA
from  regulation  nor  prevents  government  officials  from  condemning
disfavored views.  The takeaway is that the First Amendment prohib-
its government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish
or suppress speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private inter-
mediaries.  P. 19.

49 F. 4th 700, vacated and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  for  a  unanimous  Court.

GORSUCH, J., and JACKSON, J., each filed a concurring opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case. It outlines the arguments and the Court's decision, but it is not the actual content of the case itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
374  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Roberts, C. J., concurring

But  I  cannot  agree  with  my  dissenting  colleagues  on  how
these principles apply in this case.

The  majority’s  step-by-step  analysis  accords  with  our
standard  practice  of  avoiding  broad  constitutional  questions
except  when  necessary  to  decide  the  case  before  us.  The
majority  begins  by  addressing—and  quite  properly  reject-
ing—Citizens  United’s  statutory  claim  that  2  U. S. C.  § 441b
does  not  actually  cover  its  production  and  distribution  of
Hillary:  The  Movie  (hereinafter  Hillary).  If  there  were
a  valid  basis  for  deciding  this  statutory  claim  in  Citizens
United’s favor (and thereby avoiding constitutional adjudica
tion),  it would  be proper  to do  so.  Indeed, that  is precisely
the  approach  the  Court  took  just  last  Term  in  Northwest
Austin  Municipal  Util.  Dist.  No.  One  v.  Holder,  557  U. S.
193  (2009),  when  eight  Members  of  the  Court  agreed  to  de
cide  the  case  on  statutory  grounds  instead  of  reaching  the
appellant’s  broader  argument  that  the  Voting  Rights  Act  is
unconstitutional.

It  is  only  because  the  majority  rejects  Citizens  United’s
statutory claim that it proceeds to consider the group’s vari
ous  constitutional  arguments,  beginning  with  its  narrowest
claim  (that  Hillary  is  not  the  functional  equivalent  of  ex
press  advocacy)  and  proceeding  to  its  broadest  claim  (that
Austin  v.  Michigan  Chamber  of  Commerce,  494  U. S.  652
(1990), should be overruled).  This is the same order of oper
ations  followed  by  the  controlling  opinion  in  Federal  Elec
tion  Comm’n  v.  Wisconsin  Right  to  Life,  Inc.,  551  U. S.  449
(2007) (WRTL).  There  the appellant was  able to  prevail on
its  narrowest  constitutional  argument  because  its  broadcast
ads  did  not  qualify  as  the  functional  equivalent  of  express
advocacy;  there  was  thus  no  need  to  go  on  to  address  the
broader  claim  that  McConnell  v.  Federal  Election  Comm’n,
540  U. S.  93  (2003),  should  be  overruled.  WRTL,  551  U. S.,
at  482;  id.,  at  482–483  (Alito,  J.,  concurring).  This  case  is
different—not, as the dissent suggests, because the approach
taken  in  WRTL  has  been  deemed  a  “failure,”  post,  at  402,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It delves into the legal reasoning and analysis of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

LIU v. SEC

Opinion of the Court

remedy is consistent with the equitable principles underly-
ing §78u(d)(5).

*

*

*

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment below
and remand the case to the Ninth Circuit for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, specifically a court opinion. It contains legal citations, formatting typical of legal documents, and discusses legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
950

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 13, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–5665.  Rucker  v.  Norris,  Director,  Arkansas  De
partment  of  Correction.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  766.

No.  09–5673.  McNeill  v.  Wayne  County,  Michigan.  Cir.

Ct.  Wayne  County,  Mich.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5678.  Huusko  v.  Jenkins,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  633.

No.  09–5679.  Hunt  v.  Felker,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5681.  Gross  v.  Knight,  Superintendent,  Pendle
ton Correctional Facility.  C. A.  7th Cir.  Certiorari denied.
Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  668.

No.  09–5684.  Graham  v.  Addison,  Warden.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  670.

No.  09–5686.  Lopez  v.  Texas.  Ct. App.  Tex.,  4th  Dist.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  261  S. W.  3d  103.

No.  09–5689.  Lopez  v.  Texas.  Ct. App.  Tex.,  4th  Dist.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5693.  Moore  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–5695.  Thomas  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion, et al.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
339  Fed.  Appx.  364.

No.  09–5698.  Valladares  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5700.  Moffett  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  2d  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5701.  McFarland  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, court of origin, and whether certiorari was granted or denied.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Opinion of the Court

amend  Mifeprex’s  labeling  and  to  relax  some  of  the
restrictions that FDA had imposed.  In 2016, FDA approved
the  proposed  changes.  FDA  deemed  Mifeprex  safe  to
terminate pregnancies up to 10 weeks rather than 7 weeks.
FDA  allowed  healthcare  providers  such  as  nurse
practitioners to prescribe Mifeprex.  And FDA approved a
dosing  regimen  that  reduced  the  number  of  required  in-
person  visits  from  three  to  one—a  single  visit  to  receive
Mifeprex.  In  addition,  FDA  changed  prescribers’  adverse
event reporting obligations to require prescribers to report
only fatalities—a reporting requirement that was still more
stringent than the requirements for most other drugs.

In  2019,  FDA  approved  an  application  for  generic
mifepristone.  FDA established the same conditions of use
for generic mifepristone as for Mifeprex.

In  2021,  FDA  again  relaxed  the  requirements  for
Mifeprex and generic mifepristone.  Relying on experience
gained  during  the  COVID–19  pandemic  about  pregnant
women using mifepristone without an in-person visit to a
healthcare  provider,  FDA  announced  that  it  would  no
longer enforce the initial in-person visit requirement.

B
Because  mifepristone  is  used  to  terminate  pregnancies,
FDA’s  approval  and  regulation  of  mifepristone  have
generated substantial controversy from the start.  In 2002,
three pro-life associations submitted a joint citizen petition
asking  FDA  to  rescind  its  approval  of  Mifeprex.  FDA
denied their petition.

In  2019,  two  pro-life  medical  associations  filed  another
petition,  this  time  asking  FDA  to  withdraw  its  2016
modifications  to  mifepristone’s  conditions  of  use.    FDA
denied that petition as well.

This  case  began  in  2022.

Four  pro-life  medical
associations,  as  well  as  several  individual  doctors,  sued
FDA in the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the Opinion of the Court. It provides background information on the FDA's approval and regulation of mifepristone, a drug used to terminate pregnancies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of the Court

ject, explaining that much of it was “private” or mere “ru-
mors” and “neither safety nor justice” permitted him to “ex-
pos[e] names” apart from identifying the conspiracy’s “prin-
cipal actor”: Aaron Burr.  Id., at 39–40.  Instead of the entire
correspondence,  Jefferson  sent  Congress  particular  docu-
ments and a special message summarizing the conspiracy.
Id.,  at  39–43;  see  generally  Vance,  ante,  at  3–4.    Neither
Congress  nor  the  President  asked  the  Judiciary  to
intervene.2

Ever since, congressional demands for the President’s in-
formation  have  been  resolved  by  the  political  branches
without  involving  this  Court.  The  Reagan  and  Clinton
presidencies provide two modern examples:

During the Reagan administration, a House subcommit-
tee subpoenaed all documents related to the Department of
the Interior’s decision whether to designate Canada a recip-
rocal  country  for  purposes  of  the  Mineral  Lands  Leasing
Act.  President Reagan directed that certain documents be
withheld because they implicated his confidential relation-
ship  with  subordinates.    While  withholding  those  docu-
ments,  the  administration  made  “repeated  efforts”  at  ac-
commodation  through  limited  disclosures  and  testimony
over  a  period  of  several  months.  6  Op.  of  Office  of  Legal
Counsel  751,  780  (1982).    Unsatisfied,  the  subcommittee
and its parent committee eventually voted to hold the Sec-
retary of the Interior in contempt, and an innovative com-
promise soon followed:  All documents were made available,
but  only  for  one  day  with  no  photocopying,  minimal
notetaking,  and  no  participation  by  non-Members  of  Con-
gress.  Id., at 780–781; see H. R. Rep. No. 97–898, pp. 3–8
(1982).

——————

2 By contrast, later that summer, the Judiciary was called on to resolve
whether  President  Jefferson  could  be  issued  a  subpoena  duces  tecum
arising from Burr’s criminal trial.  See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807); see also Trump v. Vance, ante, at 5–7.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses historical precedents regarding presidential document disclosure to Congress.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
xxii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

924

1077

883

835

932

975

951

862

940

891

1150

1063

909

942

Bolanos-Renteria v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bolden v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bonavitacola; Savage v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bond v. Beard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bond; Beard v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bonilla v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bonner v. Marshall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bonner v. Thaler
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Book v. Norcott
Booker; Iswed v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Booker v. Mississippi
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Booker v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Borcsok v. Crowe  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Borough.  See name of borough.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Borthwell v. Jackson
995

Bosse v. Napolitano
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Boston Scientiﬁc Corp. v. Cordis Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Boston Scientiﬁc Corp.; Cordis Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Botes v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Bothe v. Hansen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

Bottomley v. Cate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Boudreau v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1062

Boulware v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Bouman v. Robinson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
871

Boutte v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
869

Bowden; United States v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bowen v. Oregon
815

Bowen Property Management; Kriger v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Bowens v. Quinn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Bowers v. Eugene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

1130

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bowie v. Thurmer
1117

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bowling v. Kentucky
Bowman v. Colorado  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1001,1141

1015

Bowman v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bowman v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  815,869,931

1031

Bownes v. Epps  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1135

Boyce v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Boyd; Nicholas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000

Boyd v. Sherrod  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  869,976,1005,1009,1058

801

Boyd v. Wachovia Bank N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

Boynes v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

BPI Communications, Inc.; Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v.  . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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  <content>
12

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Opinion of the Court

law  was  not  enacted  with  discriminatory  intent.    The  en
banc court did not claim that a majority of legislators had
voted for the law for a discriminatory purpose, but the court
held  that  these  lawmakers  “were  used  as  ‘cat’s  paws’ ”  by
others.  Id., at 1041.
  One judge in the majority declined to join the court’s hold-
ing  on  discriminatory  intent,  and  four  others  dissented
across the board.  A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed
by the Arizona attorney general on his own behalf and on
behalf  of  the  State,  which  had  intervened  below;  another
petition  was  filed  by  the  Arizona  Republican  Party  and
other private parties who also had intervened.  We granted
the petitions and agreed to review both the Ninth Circuit’s
understanding and application of VRA §2 and its holding on
discriminatory intent.  591 U. S. ___ (2020).

II
  We  begin  with  two  preliminary  matters.    Secretary  of
State  Hobbs  contends  that  no  petitioner  has  Article  III
standing  to  appeal  the  decision  below  as  to  the  out-of-
precinct  policy,  but  we  reject  that  argument.    All  that  is
needed to entertain an appeal of that issue is one party with
standing, see Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul
Home v. Pennsylvania, 591 U. S. ___, ___, n. 6 (2020) (slip
op., at 13, n. 6), and we are satisfied that Attorney General
Brnovich fits the bill.  The State of Arizona intervened be-
low, see App. 834; there is “[n]o doubt” as an Article III mat-
ter that “the State itself c[an] press this appeal,” Virginia
House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019)
(slip  op.,  at  4);  and  the  attorney  general  is  authorized  to
represent the State in any action in federal court, Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §41–193(A)(3) (2021); see Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 51, n. 4 (1997).
  Second, we think it prudent to make clear at the begin-
ning  that  we  decline  in  these  cases  to  announce  a  test  to
govern all VRA §2 claims involving rules, like those at issue
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" in the case of BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE. It discusses the court's jurisdiction and sets the stage for the legal arguments to follow.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

3

Syllabus

prohibition—in the place where the importance of the lawful defense
of  self,  family,  and  property  is  most  acute—would  fail  constitutional
muster.  Similarly,  the  requirement  that  any  lawful  firearm  in  the
home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible
for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and
is hence unconstitutional.  Because Heller conceded at oral argument
that  the  D. C.  licensing  law  is  permissible  if  it  is  not  enforced  arbi-
trarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy
his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement.
Assuming  he  is  not  disqualified  from  exercising  Second  Amendment
rights,  the  District  must  permit  Heller  to  register  his  handgun  and
must issue him a license to carry it in the home.  Pp. 56–64.

478 F. 3d 370, affirmed.

SCALIA,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined.  STEVENS, J., filed a
dissenting  opinion,  in  which  SOUTER,  GINSBURG,  and  BREYER,  JJ.,
joined.  BREYER,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  STEVENS,
SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case.  It is not the main body of the legal opinion and focuses on the key points and outcome of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

33

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

opinion below, the phrase “made by man” “is reminiscent”
of a 1790’s description of the limits of English patent law,
that an “invention must be ‘made by man’ ” and cannot be
“ ‘a philosophical principle only, neither organized or capa-
ble  of  being  organized’  from  a  patentable  manufacture.”
545  F. 3d, at  976  (quoting  Hornblower  v.  Boulton,  8  T.  R.
95, 98 (K.  B. 1799)).

The 1952 Act, in short, cannot be understood as expand-
ing  the  scope  of  patentable  subject  matter  by  suggesting
that  any  series  of  steps  may  be  patented  as  a  “process”
under §101.  If anything, the Act appears to have codified
the  conclusion  that  subject  matter  which  was  understood
not to be patentable in 1952 was to remain unpatentable.
Our recent  case law reinforces my view that  a series of
steps  for  conducting  business  is  not  a  “process”  under
§101.  Since Congress passed the 1952 Act, we have never
ruled on whether that Act authorizes patents on business
methods.  But  we  have  cast  significant  doubt  on  that
proposition  by  giving  substantial  weight  to  the  machine-
or-transformation  test,  as  general  methods  of  doing  busi-
ness do not pass that test.  And more recently, Members of
this  Court  have  noted  that  patents  on  business  methods
are of “suspect validity.”  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L.
C., 547 U. S. 388, 397 (2006) (KENNEDY, J., concurring).

*

*

*
Since  at  least  the  days  of  Assyrian  merchants,  people
have  devised  better  and  better  ways  to  conduct  business.
Yet  it  appears  that  neither  the  Patent  Clause,  nor  early
patent  law,  nor  the  current  §101  contemplated  or  was
publicly  understood  to  mean  that  such  innovations  are
patentable.  Although  it  may  be  difficult  to  define  with
precision  what  is  a  patentable  “process”  under  §101,  the
historical  clues  converge  on  one  conclusion:  A  business
method is not a “process.”  And to the extent that there is
ambiguity, we should be mindful of our judicial role.  “[W]e
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Stevens. It delves into the interpretation of patent law, particularly regarding the patentability of business methods.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

Syllabus

. . . intended to delegate . . . decision[s] of such economic and political
significance,”  i.e.,  how  much  coal-based  generation  there  should  be
over the coming decades, to any administrative agency.  Brown & Wil-
liamson, 529 U. S., at 160.  Nor can the Court ignore that the regula-
tory writ EPA newly uncovered in Section 111(d) conveniently enabled
it to enact a program, namely, cap-and-trade for carbon, that Congress
had already considered and rejected numerous times.  The importance
of  the  policy  issue  and  ongoing  debate  over  its  merits  “makes  the
oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.”  Gonzales,
546 U. S., at 267–268.  Pp. 20–28.

(c) Given that precedent counsels skepticism toward EPA’s claim
that Section 111 empowers it to devise carbon emissions caps based on
a generation shifting approach, the Government must point to “clear
congressional authorization” to regulate in that manner.  Utility Air,
573 U. S., at 324.  The Government can offer only EPA’s authority to
establish  emissions  caps  at  a  level  reflecting  “the  application  of  the
best  system  of  emission  reduction  . . .  adequately  demonstrated.”
§7411(a)(1).    The  word  “system”  shorn  of  all  context,  however,  is  an
empty vessel.  Such a vague statutory grant is not close to the sort of
clear authorization required.  The Government points to other provi-
sions  of  the  Clean  Air  Act—specifically  the  Acid  Rain  and  National
Ambient  Air  Quality  Standards  (NAAQS)  programs—that  use  the
word “system” or “similar words” to describe sector-wide mechanisms
for reducing pollution.  But just because a cap-and-trade “system” can
be used to reduce emissions does not mean that it is the kind of “system
of emission reduction” referred to in Section 111.

Finally, the Court has no occasion to decide whether the statutory
phrase “system of emission reduction” refers exclusively to measures
that  improve  the  pollution  performance  of  individual  sources,  such
that all other actions are ineligible to qualify as the BSER.  It is perti-
nent to the Court’s analysis that EPA has acted consistent with such
a limitation for four decades.  But the only question before the Court
is more narrow: whether the “best system of emission reduction” iden-
tified  by  EPA  in  the  Clean  Power  Plan  was  within  the  authority
granted to the Agency in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.  For the
reasons given, the answer is no.  Pp. 28–31.

985 F. 3d 914, reversed and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
ALITO,  GORSUCH,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined.    GORSUCH,  J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.  KAGAN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case.  It summarizes the legal arguments and the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

admitted  expert  testimony  about  the  seaworthiness  of  a
ship based on a survey conducted when the expert was not
present.  Thornton v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., Peake
37,  38,  170  Eng.  Rep.  70,  71  (N.  P.  1790).    Similarly,  an
early-19th century decision allowed ship surveyors to tes-
tify to  the seaworthiness of a vessel they had never seen.
Beckwith v. Sydebotham, 1 Camp. 116, 170 Eng. Rep. 897
(N. P. 1807).  The opposing party objected that the experts
did not know the underlying facts to be true, but the court
admitted  their  opinions  because  the  experts’  technical
knowledge could assist the jury.  Ibid.  The fact that “the
truth of the facts stated to them was not certainly known”
went to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility.
Ibid.

Throughout the 19th and into the 20th century, experts
generally testified in the form of an opinion in response to
a hypothetical question.  An attorney would ask an expert
to  assume  that  certain  facts  were  true  and  would  then
query whether a particular conclusion could conceivably fol-
low.  See 3 S. Saltzburg, M. Martin, D. Capra, & J. Berch,
Federal  Rules  of  Evidence  Manual  §703.02[1]  (13th  ed.
2023).

This procedure was highly artificial because it bore little
resemblance to the way in which experts actually form opin-
ions.  And the procedure surely did not conform to the way
lay jurors think and speak.

The procedure’s aim was to prevent a jury from jumping
to the conclusion that the facts packed into the hypothetical
were  true,  but  it  is  questionable  whether  the  practice
achieved that objective.  For instance, here is the question
that defense counsel asked a psychiatric witness in Charles
Guiteau’s trial for murdering President Garfield:

“Q. . . . Assume it to be a fact that there was a strong
hereditary taint of insanity in the blood of the prisoner
at the bar; also that at about the age of thirty-five years
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito. It cites historical legal precedents and discusses the evolution of expert testimony in court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

27

KAGAN, J., dissenting

goalposts for triggering the major-questions doctrine.  Who
knows—by next year, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services may be found unable to implement the Medicare
program  under  a  broad  delegation  because  of  his  actions’
(enormous) “economic impact.”  Ante, at 21.
  To  justify  this  use  of  its  heightened-specificity  require-
ment, the majority relies largely on history: “[P]ast waivers
and  modifications,”  the  majority  argues,  “have  been  ex-
tremely  modest.”  Ante,  at  20.    But  first,  it  depends  what
you think is “past.”  One prior action, nowhere counted by
the majority, is the suspension of loan payments and inter-
est accrual begun in COVID’s first days.  That action cost
the  Federal  Government  over  $100  billion,  and  benefited
many  more  borrowers  than  the  forgiveness  plan  at  issue.
See supra, at 21.  And second, it’s all relative.  Past actions
were  more  modest  because  the  precipitating  emergencies
were more modest.  (The COVID emergency generated, all
told,  over  $5  trillion  in  Government  relief  spending.)    In
providing  more  significant  relief  for  a  more  significant
emergency—or call it unprecedented relief for an unprece-
dented  emergency—the  Secretary  did  what  the  HEROES
Act contemplates.  Imagine asking the enacting Congress:
Can  the  Secretary  use  his  powers  to  give  borrowers  more

——————
BARRETT’s views on properly contextual interpretation of delegation pro-
visions.  See  West  Virginia,  597  U. S.,  at  ___–___  (dissenting  opinion)
(slip  op.,  at  14–19).    But  then  consider  two  of  the  contextual  factors
JUSTICE BARRETT views as “telltale sign[s]” of whether an agency has ex-
ceeded the scope of a delegation.  Ante, at 12.  First, she asks, is there a
“mismatch[ ]” between a “backwater provision” or “subtle device” and an
agency’s exercise of power?  Ibid.  And second, is the agency official op-
erating within or “outside [his] wheelhouse”?  Ante, at 12–13.  Here, for
the  reasons  stated  above,  there  is  no  mismatch:  The  broadly  worded
“waive or modify” delegation IS the HEROES Act, not some tucked away
ancillary provision.  And as JUSTICE BARRETT agrees, “this is not a case
where the agency is operating entirely outside its usual domain.”  Ante,
at 15.  So I could practically rest my case on JUSTICE BARRETT’s reason-
ing.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal dissenting opinion. It discusses the "major-questions doctrine" and the Secretary of Health and Human Services' actions regarding student loan forgiveness.  The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of BREYER, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–896
_________________

TAE D. JOHNSON, ACTING DIRECTOR OF U. S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCE-
MENT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ANTONIO
ARTEAGA-MARTINEZ

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 13, 2022]

JUSTICE  BREYER,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in

part.

The Government can normally detain persons unlawfully
present in, and ordered removed from, the United States for
a  90-day  statutory  “removal  period.”    8  U. S. C.  §1231(a).
However,  §1231(a)(6)  provides  that  the  Attorney  General
may sometimes hold such a person in custody for a longer
period.  It says:

“An alien ordered removed [1] who is inadmissible [2]
[or]  removable  [as  a  result  of  violations  of  status  re-
quirements  or  entry  conditions,  certain  violations  of
criminal law, or reasons of security or foreign policy] or
[3] who has been determined by the Attorney General
to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with
the order of removal, may be detained beyond the re-
moval period . . . .”

In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 689 (2001), “we read
an implicit limitation into” this provision.  Because a “stat-
ute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise
a serious constitutional problem,” we held that the “statute,
read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xv

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

Attorney General of Fla.; Porter v.
30

Attorney General of Ind.; Wright v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  845,1038

859

Attorney General of Kan.; Adkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Attorney General of Md.; Beckett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Attorney General of Md.; Lay v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967

Attorney General of N. Y.; DiGianni v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Attorney General of N. Y.; Shinnecock Smoke Shop v.  . . . . . . . . .
933

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General of N. Y.; Smith v.
926

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General of Pa.; Dyson v.
1057

Attorney General of Wash.; Parmelee v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atwater v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
846

931

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atwell v. United States
Augustin, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  814,1101

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
988

Augustin v. Chase Home Finance LLC
1135

Augustine-Neri v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Austin v. McCann  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

Avalos-Rios v. United States
1012

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Avery v. First Resolution Management Corp.
Avery; Prelesnik v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  932,1085

1059

Avery v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945

Avery Heights v. National Labor Relations Bd.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Avila v. California
1126

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
993

Avila v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co.; Wiggenhorn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ayala v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  864,917

1049

Ayers; Cooper v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ayers; Himmelberger v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

882

Ayres; Askew v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  845,1065

Ayres v. Virginia
1030

Ayyar v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958

Azubike v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  928,966

Azzara v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

B. v. J. L.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

B. v. New Jersey
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

Babb v. Drug Enforcement Administration
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

Babb v. Watson
820

Babbitt; St. Johns United Church of Christ v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Babcock v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

Babinski v. Voss  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

Bables v. Kansas City School Dist.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1135

Baca-Quiroz v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961

Baccam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Backey v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

Backus v. Hartley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the book.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1033

529 U. S.

March 20, 2000

No. 99–1000. Armstrong v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Motion of Arrowhead Counties Association et al. for leave to ﬁle
a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 186 F. 3d 1055.

No. 99–1009. DeBauche v. Trani et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Mo-
tion of Appleseed Electoral Reform Law Project et al. for leave
to ﬁle a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 191 F. 3d 499.

No. 99–1011. Knight Publishing Co., dba The Charlotte
Observer, et al. v. Presbyterian Health Services Corp.
Sup. Ct. N. C. Motions of News & Observer Publishing Co., Inc.,
and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. for
leave to ﬁle briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 350 N. C. 449, 515 S. E. 2d 675.

No. 99–1140. Tallakson et al. v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondents for leave to
lodge Court of Appeals’ appendix under seal granted. Motion of
respondents for leave to ﬁle Rule 29.6 listing under seal granted.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consid-
Certiorari denied.
eration or decision of these motions and this petition. Reported
below: 202 F. 3d 273.

No. 99–7718. Smith v. Amoco Oil Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration

rari denied.
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 456.

Rehearing Denied

No. 99–819. Howard v. New York Times Co., 528 U. S. 1080;
No. 99–872. Hill v. Kansas City Area Transportation

Authority, 528 U. S. 1137;

No. 99–1023. Kalan v. Bockhorst, Ehrlich & Kaminskee,

528 U. S. 1139;

No. 99– 5191. Gulley v. Department of Health and

Human Services et al., 528 U. S. 890;

No. 99–6392. Smith v. Johnson, Warden, 528 U. S. 1026;
No. 99–6641. Lukens v. Oregon State Office for Serv-

ices to Children and Families, 528 U. S. 1052;

No. 99–6659. Winslow v. Angelone, Director, Virginia

Department of Corrections, 528 U. S. 1084;

No. 99–6680. Cuozzo v. Waynick et al., 528 U. S. 1085;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It's likely part of a legal document or database, not the main body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1034
_________________

NARKIS ALIZA GOLAN, PETITIONER v.
ISACCO JACKY SAADA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 15, 2022]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of In-
ternational  Child  Abduction,  Mar.  26,  1986,  T. I. A. S.  No.
11670,  S.  Treaty  Doc.  No.  99–11  (Treaty  Doc.),  if  a  court
finds that a child was wrongfully removed from the child’s
country of habitual residence, the court ordinarily must or-
der  the  child’s  return.    There  are,  however,  exceptions  to
that rule.  As relevant here, a court is not bound to order a
child’s return if it finds that return would put the child at a
grave risk of physical or psychological harm.  In such a cir-
cumstance, a court has discretion to determine whether to
deny return.

In  exercising  this  discretion,  courts  often  consider
whether  any  “ameliorative  measures,”  undertaken  either
“by the parents” or “by the authorities of the state having
jurisdiction  over  the  question  of  custody,”  could  “reduce
whatever risk might otherwise be associated with a child’s
repatriation.”  Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F. 3d 240, 248 (CA2
1999) (Blondin I).  The Second Circuit has made such con-
sideration a requirement, mandating that district courts in-
dependently “examine the full range of options that might
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
206

HOLLINGSWORTH  v.  PERRY

Breyer, J., dissenting

likely  to  make  them  well known  than  a  closed-circuit  broad
cast to another federal courthouse.

The likelihood of any “irreparable” harm is further dimin
ished by the fact that the court order before us would simply
increase  the  trial’s  viewing  audience  from  the  occupants  of
one  courtroom  in  one  courthouse  to  the  occupants  of  ﬁve
other  courtrooms  in  ﬁve  other  courthouses  (in  all  of  which
taking  pictures  or  retransmissions  have  been  forbidden).
By  way  of  comparison  literally  hundreds  of  national  and  in
ternational  newspapers  are  already  covering  this  trial  and
reporting in detail the names and testimony of all of the wit
nesses.  See, e. g., Leff, Woman Recalls Emotional Ordeal of
Gay  Marriage  Ban,  Associated  Press,  Jan.  11,  2010.  I  see
no  reason  why  the  incremental  increase  in  exposure  caused
by  transmitting  these  proceedings  to  ﬁve  additional  court
rooms  would  create  any  further  risk  of  harm,  as  the  Court
apparently believes.  See ante, at 195–196.  Moreover, if in
respect to any particular witness this transmission threatens
harm,  the  District  Court  can  prevent  that  harm.  Chief
Judge Walker has already said that he would keep the broad
cast  “completely  under  the  Court’s  control,  to  permit  the
Court  to  stop  it  if  [it]  proves  to  be  a  problem,  if  it  proves
to  be  a  distraction,  [or]  if  it  proves  to  create  problems  with
witnesses.”  See  Exh.  2,  at  45,  App.  to  Pet.  The  Circuit
Council  conﬁrmed  in a  press  release  that the  District  Court
“willfully  control  the  process”  and  that  “Judge  Walker  has
reserved  the  right  to  terminate  any  part  of  the  audio,  or
video,  or  both,  for  any  duration”  or  to  terminate  participa
tion in the pilot program “at any time.”  News Release, Fed
eral Courthouses To Offer Remote Viewing of Proposition 8
Trial  (Jan.  8,  2010),  http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/
general/2010/01/08/Prop8_Remote_Viewing_Locations.pdf
(as  visited  Jan.  13,  2010,  and  available  in  Clerk  of  Court’s
case  ﬁle).  Surely  such  ﬁrm  control,  exercised  by  an  able
District Court  Judge with 20 years  of trial-management ex
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the potential harm of broadcasting a trial and argues against the concerns raised.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

Opinion of the Court

action to a court of appeals.  So Free Enterprise Fund’s anal-
ysis of the judicial review factor does not control.

Yet  a  problem  remains,  stemming  from  the  interaction
between the alleged injury and the timing of review.  To see
the difficulty, think first about Thunder Basin and Elgin.
If an appellate court had ruled in favor of the coal company
or the federal employee on review of an agency decision, the
court could have remedied the party’s injury.  It could have
revoked the fine assessed on the company or reinstated the
employee with backpay.  But not so here.  The harm Axon
and Cochran allege is “being subjected” to “unconstitutional
agency  authority”—a  “proceeding  by  an  unaccountable
ALJ.”  Brief for Axon 36; see Brief for Cochran 37 (contend-
ing she suffers harm from “having to appear in proceedings”
before  an  unconstitutionally  insulated  ALJ).    That  harm
may  sound  a  bit  abstract;  but  this  Court  has  made  clear
that it is “a here-and-now injury.”  Seila Law LLC v. Con-
sumer  Financial  Protection  Bureau,  591  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2020) (slip op., at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted).
And—here is the rub—it is impossible to remedy once the
proceeding is over, which is when appellate review kicks in.
Suppose a court of appeals agrees with Axon, on review of
an adverse FTC decision, that ALJ-led proceedings violate
the separation of powers.  The court could of course vacate
the FTC’s order.  But Axon’s separation-of-powers claim is
not  about  that  order;  indeed,  Axon  would  have  the  same
claim  had  it  won  before  the  agency.    The  claim,  again,  is
about subjection to an illegitimate proceeding, led by an il-
legitimate  decisionmaker.    And  as  to  that  grievance,  the
court of appeals can do nothing: A proceeding that has al-
ready  happened  cannot  be  undone.
  Judicial  review  of
Axon’s  (and  Cochran’s)  structural  constitutional  claims
would come too late to be meaningful.

The limits of that conclusion are important to emphasize.
The  Government,  in  disputing  our  position,  notes  that
many  review  schemes—involving  not  only  agency  action
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the timing and effectiveness of judicial review for certain constitutional claims.  It delves into the concept of "structural constitutional claims" and argues that traditional appellate review might be insufficient to remedy the harm caused by an unconstitutional proceeding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxiv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

1019

Handle with Care Behavior Mgmt. System v. N. Y. Div. for Youth
863

Handley v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
872

Handy v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Hani Chen v. New York City  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hanks v. Wright  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  914,1066

Hanna v. United States
872

Hannah v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  910

Hannon v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  997

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1019,1141

Hanover Direct, Inc.; Greene v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1018

Hansely v. United States
823

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hansen; Bothe v.
1018

Hansley v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hanson v. Oklahoma  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

1031

Hanson; Scott v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haque v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . .  955,1066

Haque v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  831,1038

1002

Hardimon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Hardin County; Tucker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Hardison v. Davis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1142

Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Hardy v. Bennett  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Hardy; Blount v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

Hardy v. Smith  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113

Hargis Industries, Inc. v. B&B Hardware, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hargrove v. Walker
1150

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harley v. Beioh
1050

Harley v. Securities and Exchange Comm’n  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Harley v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

Harlow; Hrusovsky v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

Harmon; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harmon v. United States
Harper v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
884

Harper v. Southern Star Concrete  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  842,1139

1049

Harper v. United Services Automobile Assn.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harrell v. Idaho
Harrell v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  984,1130

1093

Harrimon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Harris v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harris v. Culver City  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Harris v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  893,1066

Harris v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  839,996

884

Harris v. Jarriel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Harris; Patton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

Syllabus

hard to see how anyone could reasonably expect a court to rely on Chev-
ron in any particular case or expect it to produce readily foreseeable
outcomes.  And rather than safeguarding reliance interests, Chevron
affirmatively  destroys  them  by  allowing  agencies  to  change  course
even when Congress has given them no power to do so.

The only way to “ensure that the law will not merely change errati-
cally, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion,” Vasquez
v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265, is for the Court to leave Chevron behind.
By overruling Chevron, though, the Court does not call into question
prior  cases  that  relied  on  the  Chevron  framework.  The  holdings  of
those  cases  that  specific  agency  actions  are  lawful—including  the
Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are still subject to statutory
stare decisis despite  the Court’s change in interpretive methodology.
See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 457.  Mere reliance
on Chevron cannot constitute a “ ‘special justification’ ” for overruling
such a  holding.  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S.
258, 266 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443).  Pp.
29–35.

No.  22–451,  45  F.  4th  359  &  No.  22–1219,  62  F.  4th  621,  vacated  and

remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., and
GORSUCH,  J.,  filed  concurring  opinions.  KAGAN,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting
opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined, and in which JACKSON, J., joined
as it applies to No. 22–1219.  JACKSON, J., took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case in No. 22–451.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a condensed overview rather than the full text meant for reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

conflict with the so-called “rule of the last antecedent.”  Un-
der that rule, “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordi-
narily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it
immediately follows.”  Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26
(2003);  see  also  Lockhart  v.  United  States,  577  U. S.  347,
351 (2016).  The rule of the last antecedent is context de-
pendent.  This Court has declined to apply the rule where,
like here, the modifying clause appears after an integrated
list.  See Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
543 U. S. 335, 344, n. 4 (2005) (collecting cases).  Moreover,
even if the rule of the last antecedent were relevant here, it
would provide no help to Duguid.  The last antecedent be-
fore “using a random or sequential number generator” is not
“produce,” as Duguid needs it to be, but rather “telephone
numbers  to  be  called.”  There  is  “no  grammatical  basis,”
Cyan,  583  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  22),  for  arbitrarily
stretching the modifier back to include “produce,” but not
so far back as to include “store.”

In  sum,  Congress’  definition  of  an  autodialer  requires
that in all cases, whether storing or producing numbers to
be called, the equipment in question must use a random or
sequential  number  generator.    This  definition  excludes
equipment like Facebook’s login notification system, which
does not use such technology.5

——————

5 JUSTICE ALITO notes that he “agree[s] with much of the Court’s anal-
ysis,” as well as its ultimate conclusion about the interpretive question
before us, yet he concurs in the judgment only.  Post, at 1.  His apprehen-
sion appears to stem from what he sees as the Court’s “heavy reliance”
on  the  series-qualifier  canon.  Ibid.  Such  canons,  he  argues,  are  “not
inflexible rules.”  Post, at 4.  On that point, we agree: Linguistic canons
are  tools  of  statutory  interpretation  whose  usefulness  depends  on  the
particular statutory text and context at issue.  That may be all JUSTICE
ALITO  seeks  to  prove  with  his  discussion  and  list  of  “sentences  that
clearly go against the canon,” post, at 3.  (That the grammatical structure
of  every  example  he  provides  is  materially  dissimilar  from  that  of  the
clause at issue in this case proves the point.)  But to the extent that he
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute related to autodialers. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of grammatical structure.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

13

SCALIA, J., dissenting

prison injunctions.  See 18 U. S. C. §3626(b).

I  suspect,  however,  that  this  passage  is  a  warning  shot
across the bow, telling the District Court that it had better
modify the injunction if the State requests what we invite
it to request.  Such a warning, if successful, would achieve
the benefit of a marginal reduction in the inevitable mur-
ders, robberies, and rapes to be committed by the released
inmates.  But  it  would  achieve  that  at  the  expense  of  in-
tellectual  bankruptcy,  as  the  Court’s  “warning”  is  en-
tirely  alien  to  ordinary  principles  of  appellate  review  of
injunctions.  When  a  party  moves  for  modification  of
an injunction, the district court is entitled to rule on that
motion  first,  subject  to  review  for  abuse  of  discretion  if  it
declines  to  modify  the  order.    Horne  v.  Flores,  557  U. S.
___, ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 10, 20).  Moreover, when a
district  court  enters  a  new  decree  with  new  benchmarks,
the  selection  of  those  benchmarks  is  also  reviewed  under
a  deferential,  abuse-of-discretion  standard  of  review—a
point the Court appears to recognize.  Ante, at 45.  Appel-
late  courts  are  not  supposed  to  “affirm”  injunctions  while
preemptively noting that the State “may” request, and the
District Court “may” grant, a request to extend the State’s
deadline to release prisoners by three years based on some
suggestions  on  what  appropriate  preconditions  for  such  a
modification “may” include.

Of  course  what  is  really  happening  here  is  that  the
Court,  overcome  by  common  sense,  disapproves  of  the
results  reached  by  the  District  Court,  but  cannot  remedy
them  (it  thinks)  by  applying  ordinary  standards  of  appel-
late review.  It has therefore selected a solution unknown
in our legal system:  A deliberately ambiguous set of sug-
gestions  on  how  to  modify  the  injunction,  just  deferential
enough  so  that  it  can  say  with  a  straight  face  that  it  is
“affirming,” just stern enough to put the District Court on
notice  that  it  will  likely  get  reversed  if  it  does  not  follow
them.  In  doing  this,  the  Court  has  aggrandized  itself,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It argues against the majority opinion's approach to modifying a prison injunction. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of judicial opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Judicial Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

BREYER, J., dissenting

guns for purposes of self-defense).  To that extent the law
burdens to some degree an interest in self-defense that for
present purposes I have assumed the Amendment seeks to
further.

C
In weighing needs and burdens, we must take account of
the  possibility  that  there  are  reasonable,  but  less  restric-
tive alternatives.  Are there other potential measures that
might  similarly  promote  the  same  goals  while  imposing
lesser restrictions?  See Nixon, 528 U. S., at 402 (BREYER,
J.,  concurring)  (“existence  of  a  clearly  superior,  less  re-
strictive  alternative”  can  be  a  factor  in  determining
whether  a  law  is  constitutionally  proportionate).    Here  I
see none.

The  reason  there  is  no  clearly  superior,  less  restrictive
alternative to the District’s handgun ban is that the ban’s
very  objective  is  to  reduce  significantly  the  number  of
handguns  in  the  District,  say,  for  example,  by  allowing  a
law  enforcement  officer  immediately  to  assume  that  any
handgun  he  sees  is  an  illegal  handgun.    And  there  is  no
plausible  way  to  achieve  that  objective  other  than  to  ban
the guns.

It  does  not  help  respondent’s  case  to  describe  the  Dis-
trict’s  objective  more  generally  as  an  “effort  to  diminish
the  dangers  associated  with  guns.”    That  is  because  the
very  attributes  that  make  handguns  particularly  useful
for  self-defense  are  also  what  make  them  particularly
dangerous.  That they are easy to hold and control means
that  they  are  easier  for  children  to  use.  See  Brief  for
American Academy of Pediatrics et al. as Amici Curiae 19
(“[C]hildren as young as three are able to pull the trigger
of  most  handguns”).  That  they  are  maneuverable  and
permit a free hand likely contributes to the fact that they
are by far the firearm of choice for crimes such as rape and
robbery.  See Weapon Use and Violent Crime 2 (Table 2).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cl

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1079

U. S. District Court; Pierce v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924

U. S. District Court; Robinson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

U. S. District Court; Sturdivant v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
808

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Voinche v.
872

U. S. District Court; Winns v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
806

U. S. District Judge; Butcher v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
808

U. S. District Judge; Danser v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Judge; Wise v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1033,1141

1002

U. S. Parole Comm’n; Huber v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1084

U. S. Parole Comm’n; Romero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

U. S. Postal Service; Gaston v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

U. S. Postal Service; Pirant v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. Probation Ofﬁce; Mauldin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912

1048

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United States Trustee; Price v.
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  967,987

Unitronics (1989) (R’’G) Ltd.; Gharb v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  909,1139

University of Ark. Medical Center; Manns v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

818

. . . . . . . . .
University of Colo., Health Sciences Center; Lucas v.
University of Mass. Bd. of Trustees; Dasisa v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  803,1045

970

University of Tex. Health Science Center at Houston; Sullivan v.
1027

Unknown; McCarthy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unus v. Kane  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

836

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Updike v. Johnson
1131

Upshaw v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
UPS Store; Monacelli v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  837,1064

906

Upton; Fults v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

Upton; Howard v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
982

Upton; McClain v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Upton; Mosley v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Upton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

962

Urbano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  853,1159

Uribe; Andrade Calles v.
832

Uribe; Beeks v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

Urista v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
US Airways, Inc.; Jaffe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  806,1022

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

USA Mobility Wireless, Inc. v. Quon
911

Uscanga-Mora v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

Usher, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USI MidAtlantic, Inc. v. Graham Co.
991

USI MidAtlantic, Inc. v. William A. Graham Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

Utah; Cahoon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1046

Utah; Cline v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Utah; Lowery v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Uttecht; Garnett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

27

Opinion of the Court

seek  leadership  positions  in—groups  pursuing  missions
wholly at odds with their personal beliefs.  And if a rogue
student  intent  on  sabotaging  an  organization’s  objectives
nevertheless  attempted  a  takeover,  the  members  of  that
group would not likely elect her as an officer.

RSOs, moreover, in harmony with the all-comers policy,
may  condition  eligibility  for  membership  and  leadership
on  attendance,  the  payment  of  dues,  or  other  neutral
requirements  designed  to  ensure  that  students  join  be
cause  of  their  commitment  to  a  group’s  vitality,  not  its
demise.  See supra, at 4, n. 2.  Several RSOs at Hastings
limit their membership rolls and officer slates in just this
way.  See, e.g., App. 192 (members must “[p]ay their dues
on a timely basis” and “attend meetings regularly”); id., at
173 (members must complete an application and pay dues;
“[a]ny  active  member  who  misses  a  semester  of  regularly
scheduled  meetings  shall  be  dropped  from  rolls”);  App.  to
Pet.  for  Cert.  129a  (“Only  Hastings  students  who  have
held  membership  in  this  organization  for  a  minimum  of
one semester shall be eligible to be an officer.”).23

Hastings,  furthermore,  could  reasonably  expect  more
from  its  law  students  than  the  disruptive  behavior  CLS
hypothesizes—and to build this expectation into its educa
tional  approach.  A  reasonable  policy  need  not  anticipate
and preemptively close off every opportunity for avoidance
or manipulation.  If students begin to exploit an all-comers
policy by hijacking organizations to distort or destroy their
missions,  Hastings  presumably  would  revisit  and  revise
its  policy.    See  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  41  (counsel  for  Hastings);
Brief for Hastings 38.

Finally,  CLS  asserts  (and  the  dissent  repeats,  post,  at

——————

23 As  Hastings  notes,  other  “checks  [are  also]  in  place”  to  prevent
RSO-sabotage.    Brief  for  Hastings  43,  n. 16.    “The  [Law]  School’s
student code of conduct applies to RSO activities and, inter alia, prohib
its  obstruction  or  disruption,  disorderly  conduct,  and  threats.”  Ibid.
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the all-comers policy in student organizations. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK

Opinion of the Court

People v. Reid, 19 N. Y. 3d 382, 388, 971 N. E. 2d 353, 357
(2012).

The question is whether the admission of the plea allocu-
tion  under  New  York’s  rule  in  People  v.  Reid  violated
Hemphill’s  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  confront  the  wit-
nesses against him.  The Court holds that it did.  Hemphill
did not forfeit his confrontation right merely by making the
plea allocution arguably relevant to his theory of defense.

I
A
In April 2006, Ronnell Gilliam and several other individ-
uals got into a physical fight near Tremont Avenue in the
Bronx.  Shortly after the fight, someone fired a 9-millimeter
handgun.  The  bullet killed  a  2-year-old  child  sitting  in  a
nearby minivan.

Police officers determined that Gilliam was involved and
that Nicholas Morris, Gilliam’s best friend, had been at the
scene.  Officers  searched  Morris’  apartment.   On  Morris’
nightstand, the officers found a 9-millimeter cartridge and
three .357-caliber bullets.  Three witnesses identified Mor-
ris as the shooter out of a police lineup.

The  police  arrested  Morris  the  next  day  and  observed
bruising  on  his  knuckles  consistent  with  fist  fighting.
Gilliam  then  surrendered  and  identified  Morris  as  the
shooter.  Gilliam later returned to the police station and re-
canted, stating that Hemphill, Gilliam’s cousin, had in fact
been  the  shooter.
Investigators  initially  did  not  credit
Gilliam’s  recantation;  instead,  the  State  charged  Morris
with the child’s murder and for possession of a 9-millimeter
handgun.  After opening statements at Morris’ 2008 trial,
however, the State decided not to oppose Morris’ application
for a mistrial to allow the State to reconsider the charges
against him.

Approximately  six  weeks  later,  the  State  agreed  to  dis-
miss the murder charges against Morris if he pleaded guilty
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, specifically the opinion of the court in the case of Hemphill v. New York. It sets the stage for the case, outlining the events leading up to the charges against Morris and the subsequent plea deal.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

13

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

and  Davidson  Cty.,  555  U. S.  271,  276  (2009)  (EEOC
guidelines  merited  Skidmore  deference);  Federal  Express
Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U. S. 389, 399–403 (2008) (same);
Meritor, 477 U. S., at 65 (same).4

The EEOC’s definition of supervisor reflects the agency’s
“informed judgment” and “body of experience” in enforcing
Title  VII.  Id.,  at  65  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
For  14  years,  in  enforcement  actions  and  litigation,
the  EEOC  has  firmly  adhered  to  its  definition.    See  Brief
for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  28  (citing  numerous
briefs  in  the  Courts  of  Appeals  setting  forth  the  EEOC’s
understanding).

In  developing  its  definition  of  supervisor,  the  EEOC
paid  close  attention  to  the  Faragher  and  Ellerth  frame-
work.    An  employer  is  vicariously  liable  only  when  the
authority it has delegated enables actionable harassment,
the  EEOC  recognized.    EEOC  Guidance  405:7654.    For
that  reason,  a  supervisor’s  authority  must  be  “of  a  suffi-
cient magnitude so as to assist the harasser . . . in carry-
ing  out  the  harassment.”  Ibid.  Determining  whether  an
employee  wields  sufficient  authority  is  not  a  mechanical
inquiry, the EEOC explained; instead, specific facts about
the employee’s job function are critical.  Id., at 405:7653 to
405:7654.  Thus,  an  employee  with  authority  to  increase
another’s  workload  or  assign  undesirable  tasks  may  rank
as  a  supervisor,  for  those  powers  can  enable  harassment.
Id.,  at  405:7654.  On  the  other  hand,  an  employee  “who
directs  only  a  limited  number  of  tasks  or  assignments”

——————

4 Respondent’s  amici  maintain  that  the  EEOC  Guidance is  ineligible
for  deference  under  Skidmore  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  323  U. S.  134  (1944),
because  it  interprets  Faragher  and  Burlington  Industries,  Inc.  v.
Ellerth,  524  U. S.  742  (1998),  not  the  text  of  Title  VII.    See  Brief  for
Society  for  Human  Resource  Management  et al.  11–16.    They  are
mistaken.    The  EEOC  Guidance  rests  on the  employer liability  frame-
work  set  forth  in  Faragher  and  Ellerth,  but  both  the  framework  and
EEOC Guidance construe the term “agent” in 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites previous cases and legal documents, and discusses the interpretation of legal terms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U39

[09-26-01 13:21:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 217 (2000)

231

Opinion of the Court

sentative.”
Id., at 234. The principles outlined in Abood
provided the foundation for our later decision in Keller.
There we held that lawyers admitted to practice in California
could be required to join a state bar association and to fund
activities “germane” to the association’s mission of “regulat-
ing the legal profession and improving the quality of legal
services.”
496 U. S., at 13–14. The lawyers could not, how-
ever, be required to fund the bar association’s own political
expression.

Id., at 16.

The proposition that students who attend the University
cannot be required to pay subsidies for the speech of other
students without some First Amendment protection follows
from the Abood and Keller cases. Students enroll in public
universities to seek fulﬁllment of their personal aspirations
and of their own potential.
If the University conditions the
opportunity to receive a college education, an opportunity
comparable in importance to joining a labor union or bar as-
sociation, on an agreement to support objectionable, extra-
curricular expression by other students, the rights acknowl-
edged in Abood and Keller become implicated.
It infringes
on the speech and beliefs of the individual to be required, by
this mandatory student activity fee program, to pay subsi-
dies for the objectionable speech of others without any recog-
nition of the State’s corresponding duty to him or her. Yet
recognition must be given as well to the important and sub-
stantial purposes of the University, which seeks to facilitate
a wide range of speech.

In Abood and Keller, the constitutional rule took the form
of limiting the required subsidy to speech germane to the
purposes of the union or bar association. The standard of
germane speech as applied to student speech at a university
is unworkable, however, and gives insufﬁcient protection
both to the objecting students and to the University program
itself. Even in the context of a labor union, whose functions
are, or so we might have thought, well known and under-
stood by the law and the courts after a long history of gov-
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This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It references prior cases (Abood and Keller) and discusses the First Amendment implications of mandatory student activity fees.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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Cite as:  566 U. S. ____ (2012)

3

ALITO, J., concurring

Institute as Amicus Curiae 7–13.
  Allowing  aggrieved  property  owners  to  sue  under  the
Administrative  Procedure  Act  is  better  than  nothing,  but
only clarification of the reach of the Clean Water Act can
rectify the underlying problem.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and a portion of a judicial opinion. It is sequential text and likely part of the actual content meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Judicial Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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