<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

power to issue judgments with preclusive effect; that logic
would  not  seem  to  turn  on  the  nature  of  the  competent
tribunal.  And  at  the  same  time,  adopting  Hargis’  view
would  dramatically  undercut  agency  preclusion,  despite
what the Court has already said to the contrary.  Nothing
in Hargis’ avoidance argument is weighty enough to over-
come these weaknesses.

The claim that we should read the Lanham Act narrowly
to  avoid  Article  III  concerns  is  equally  unavailing—and
for  similar  reasons.  Hargis  argues  that  because  it  might
violate Article III if an agency could make a decision with
preclusive  effect  in  a  later  proceeding  before  a  federal
court,  we  should  conclude,  as  a  statutory  matter,  that
issue preclusion is unavailable.  Such a holding would not
fit with our precedent.  For instance, in Elliott, the Court,
relying  on  Utah  Construction,  explained  that  absent  a
contrary  indication,  Congress  presumptively  intends  that
an  agency’s  determination  (there,  a  state  agency)  has
preclusive  effect.  478  U. S.,  at  796–799;  see  also  Astoria,
501  U. S.,  at  110  (recognizing  the  “presumption”).    To  be
sure, the Court has never addressed whether such preclu-
sion offends Article III.  But because this Court’s cases are
so  clear,  there  is  no  ambiguity  for  this  Court  to  sidestep
through constitutional avoidance.2

III
The  next  question  is whether  there  is  an  “evident”  rea-
son  why  Congress  would  not  want  TTAB  decisions  to
——————

2 Our  dissenting  colleagues  argue  that  Utah  Construction’s  conclu-
sion  that  courts  “have  not  hesitated”  to  apply  administrative  preclu-
sion,  384  U. S.,  at  422,  was  mistaken  and  certainly  should  not  be
applied  to  statutes—such  as  the  Lanham  Act—enacted  prior  to  1966.
We do not decide who reads the history better.  The Court has repeat-
edly endorsed Utah Construction and, importantly, neither party chal-
lenges  its  historical  accuracy.    For  the  same  reason,  we  do  not  decide
whether  such  preclusion  is  unconstitutional  because  the  issue  is  not
before us.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court. It discusses the issue of issue preclusion in the context of the Lanham Act and agency decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a heading and case citation, likely from a legal document. It's not the main body text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation/Heading</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

29

KAGAN, J., dissenting

not so.  The plaintiffs objected to one specific practice—the
extreme  manipulation  of  district  lines  for  partisan  gain.
Elimination of that practice could have led to proportional
representation.  Or  it  could  have  led  to  nothing  close.
What was left after the practice’s removal could have been
fair,  or  could  have  been  unfair,  by  any  number  of
measures.  That was not the crux of this suit.  The plain-
tiffs  asked  only  that  the  courts  bar  politicians  from  en-
trenching  themselves  in  power  by  diluting  the  votes  of
their rivals’ supporters.  And the courts, using neutral and
manageable—and  eminently  legal—standards,  provided
that  (and  only  that)  relief.  This  Court  should  have
cheered,  not  overturned,  that  restoration  of  the  people’s
power to vote.

III
This  Court  has  long  understood  that  it  has  a  special
responsibility to remedy violations of constitutional rights
resulting  from  politicians’  districting  decisions.    Over  50
years  ago,  we  committed  to  providing  judicial  review  in
that sphere, recognizing as we established the one-person-
one-vote rule that “our oath and our office require no less.”
Reynolds,  377  U. S.,  at  566.    Of  course,  our  oath  and  our
office require us to vindicate all constitutional rights.  But
the  need  for  judicial  review  is  at  its  most  urgent  in  cases
like  these.    “For  here,  politicians’  incentives  conflict  with
voters’  interests,  leaving  citizens  without  any  political
remedy for their constitutional harms.”  Gill, 585 U. S., at
___ (KAGAN, J., concurring) (slip op., at 14).  Those harms
arise because politicians want to stay in office.  No one can
look to them for effective relief.

The  majority  disagrees,  concluding  its  opinion  with  a
paean  to  congressional  bills  limiting  partisan  gerryman-
ders.  “Dozens  of  [those]  bills  have  been  introduced,”  the
majority says.  Ante, at 33.  One was “introduced in 2005
and has been reintroduced in every Congress since.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion and discusses the importance of judicial review in cases of partisan gerrymandering.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

LUNA PEREZ v. STURGIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Opinion of the Court

seeks  relief  for  harms  flowing  from  Sturgis’s  alleged  past
shortcomings in providing a free and appropriate public ed-
ucation—a  harm  IDEA  exists  to  address—and  Mr.  Perez
chose to settle his administrative complaint rather than ex-
haust §1415(f) and (g)’s remedial processes.

If both views are plausible ones, we believe Mr. Perez’s
better  comports  with  the  statute’s  terms.  Start  with
§1415(l)’s  first  clause.  It  focuses  our  attention  on  “reme-
dies.”  A “remedy” denotes “the means of enforcing a right,”
and may come in the form of, say, money damages, an in-
junction, or a declaratory judgment.  Black’s Law Diction-
ary 1320 (8th ed. 2004); see also 13 Oxford English Diction-
ary  584–585  (2d  ed.  1991)  (defining  “remedy”  as  “[l]egal
redress”).  The  statute  then  proceeds  to  instruct  that
“[n]othing” in IDEA shall be construed as “restrict[ing] or
limit[ing]”  the  availability  of  any  of  these  things  “under”
other federal statutes like the ADA.
  Of course, §1415(l) carves out an exception to this rule.
The second clause bars individuals from “seeking relief” un-
der other federal laws unless they first exhaust “the proce-
dures under subsections (f) and (g).”  But, by its terms, this
limiting language does not apply to all suits seeking relief
that other federal laws provide.  The statute’s administra-
tive  exhaustion  requirement  applies  only  to  suits  that
“see[k] relief . . . also available under” IDEA.  And that con-
dition  simply  is  not  met  in  situations  like  ours,  where  a
plaintiff  brings  a  suit  under  another  federal  law  for  com-
pensatory damages—a form of relief everyone agrees IDEA
does not provide.

Admittedly, our interpretation treats “remedies” (the key
term in the first clause) as synonymous with the “relief” a
plaintiff  “seek[s]”  (the  critical  phrase  found  in  the  second
clause).  But a number of contextual clues persuade us that
is  exactly  how  an  ordinary  reader  would  understand  this
particular provision.  Not only does §1415(l) begin by direct-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute (IDEA) related to education. It delves into legal terminology and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
282

SOUTH  CAROLINA  v.  NORTH  CAROLINA

Opinion of Roberts, C. J.

sions  that  water  disputes  among  States  may  be  resolved  by
compact  or  decree  without  the  participation  of  individual
claimants”).1

The majority contends that the result in this case is not a
“new  development,”  and  that  its  holding  is  supported  by
“nearly  90  years”  of  precedent.  Ante,  at  264.  But  in  sup
port  of  those  statements,  the  majority  cites  only  four  deci
sions  in  which  the  Court  has  granted  a  motion  to  intervene
in  an  original  suit—and  of  course  none  in  which  this  Court
granted  the  motion  of  a  nonsovereign  entity  to  intervene  in
an  equitable  apportionment  action.  The  cases  the  majority
cites demonstrate what constitutes a “compelling interest in
[the intervenor’s] own right, apart from his interest in a class
with all other citizens and creatures of the state.”  New Jer
sey v.  New York, 345 U. S., at 373.  But the intervenor inter
ests  in  those  cases  were  quite  different  from  the  general
shared interest in water at issue here.

Take  Arizona  v.  California,  460  U. S.  605  (1983).  There
we  allowed  several  Indian  Tribes  to  intervene  in  a  water
dispute.  Id., at 615.  As the Court in that case made clear,
however,  the  Indian  Tribes  were  allowed  to  intervene  be
cause  they  were  sovereign  entities.  Ibid.  The  Court  dis
tinguished  New  Jersey  v.  New  York  on  that  very  ground.
See 460 U. S., at 615, n. 5.

1 The majority contends that this dissent reads our precedents to estab
lish “a rule against nonstate intervention” in equitable apportionment ac
tions.  Ante,  at  265,  n.  3.  The  number  of  nonsovereigns  that  the  Court
should permit to intervene in water disputes is small—indeed, it was zero
until today.  But that does not mean that a private entity could not satisfy
the  New  Jersey  v.  New  York  test  by,  for  example,  asserting  water-use
rights that are not dependent upon the rights of state parties.  A private
party (or perhaps a Compact Clause entity) with a federal statutory right
to a certain quantity of water might have a compelling interest in an equi
table  apportionment  action  that  is  not  fairly  represented  by  the  States.
The  putative  intervenors  in  this  case,  however,  do  not  hold  rights  of  this
sort.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to water rights disputes between states.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

ratification.  State courts, for example, continued to inter-
pret the phrase “trial by jury” to require unanimity in fel-
ony guilty verdicts.  The New Hampshire Superior Court of
Judicature expounded on the point:

“The terms ‘jury,’ and ‘trial by jury,’ are, and for ages
have been well known in the language of the law.  They
were used at the adoption of the constitution, and al-
ways,  it  is  believed,  before  that  time,  and  almost  al-
ways since, in a single sense.

“A jury for the trial of a cause . . . must return their

unanimous verdict upon the issue submitted to them.
“All the books of the law describe a trial jury substan-
tially as we have stated it.  And a ‘trial by jury’ is a trial
by such a body, so constituted and conducted.  So far as
our knowledge extends, these expressions were used at
the adoption of the constitution and always before, in
these senses alone by all classes of writers and speak-
ers.”  Opinion of Justices, 41 N. H. 550, 551–552 (1860).

Other state courts held the same view.  The Missouri Su-
preme Court in 1860 called unanimity one of the “essential
requisites in a jury trial,” Vaughn v. Scade, 30 Mo. 600, 603,
and the Ohio Supreme Court in 1853 called it one of “the
essential and distinguishing features of the trial by jury, as
known  at  common  law,  and  generally,  if  not  universally,
adopted in this country,” Work v. State, 2 Ohio St. 296, 306.
Treatises  from  the  Reconstruction  era  likewise  adopted
this  position.    A  leading  work  on  criminal  procedure  ex-
plained that if a “statute authorizes [a jury] to find a verdict
upon anything short of . . . unanimous consent,” it “is void.”
1  J.  Bishop,  Criminal  Procedure  §761,  p.  532  (1866).  A
widely  read  treatise  on  constitutional  law  reiterated  that
“ ‘by  a  jury’  is  generally  understood  to  mean”  a  body  that
“must unanimously concur in the guilt of the accused before
a conviction can be had.”  G. Paschal, The Constitution of
the United States 210 (1876) (capitalization omitted).  And
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites historical legal precedents and treatises to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

JACKSON, J., dissenting

  The majority first points out that the 1885 version of the
encouragement  provision  criminalized  “knowingly  assist-
ing, encouraging or soliciting” certain immigration.  §3, 23
Stat.  333  (emphasis  added);  see  ante,  at  11.    Because  the
term  “encouraging”  was  placed  alongside  “assisting”  and
“soliciting” in this precursor provision, the majority main-
tains that the term “encouraging” is narrowed by the canon
of  noscitur  a  sociis,  “which  counsels  that  a  word  is  given
more precise content by the neighboring words with which
it  is  associated.”   Williams,  553  U. S.,  at  294; see  ante,  at
11.  In Williams, the Court (in an opinion by Justice Scalia)
reasoned that, “[w]hen taken in isolation,” the broad term
is  “susceptible  of  multiple  and  wide-
“ ‘promotes’ ”
ranging meanings,” but that, “in a list that includes ‘solic-
its,’ ‘distributes,’ and ‘advertises,’ [it] is most sensibly read
to mean the act of recommending purported child pornog-
raphy to another person for his acquisition.”  553 U. S., at
294–295.
  But,  as  the  majority  here  ultimately  goes  on  to
acknowledge, ante, at 12, the statutory word “encouraging”
was not actually accompanied by the narrower terms “solic-
iting” and “assisting” throughout the course of this statute’s
history.  And for the history to be meaningfully referenced,
the state of the statute must be considered over time, not
just at particular points in which words that seem to sup-
port a particular reading might have appeared.  The delta
between the purportedly narrow version of the statute that
the majority points to, and what later happened to the stat-
utory text, is important—and there is no dispute that Con-
gress  later  removed  the  terms  “soliciting”  and  “assisting”
from  the  encouragement  provision,  leaving  “encouraging”
and “inducing” to stand “in isolation,” 553 U. S., at 294.  See
ante,  at  13.    Tracing  the  history  over  time  clearly  estab-
lishes that Congress deleted the very narrowing terms that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of a specific legal statute and its historical context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

sex  weddings,  Colorado’s  public-accommodations
law
“alter[s]  the  expressive  content”  of  his  message.    Hurley,
515 U. S., at 572.  The meaning of expressive conduct, this
Court  has  explained,  depends  on  “the  context  in  which  it
occur[s].”  Johnson, 491 U. S., at 405.  Forcing Phillips to
make  custom  wedding  cakes  for  same-sex  marriages  re
quires  him  to,  at  the  very  least,  acknowledge  that  same-
sex weddings are “weddings” and suggest that they should
be  celebrated—the  precise  message  he  believes  his  faith
forbids.  The  First  Amendment  prohibits  Colorado  from
requiring  Phillips  to  “bear  witness  to  [these]  fact[s],”
Hurley,  515  U. S.,  at  574,  or  to  “affir[m]  . . .  a  belief  with
which [he] disagrees,” id., at 573.

B
The  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  nevertheless  concluded
that  Phillips’  conduct  was  “not  sufficiently  expressive”  to
be protected from state compulsion.  370 P. 3d, at 283.  It
noted that  a reasonable observer would not view Phillips’
conduct  as  “an  endorsement  of  same-sex  marriage,”  but
rather  as  mere  “compliance”  with  Colorado’s  public-
accommodations  law.  Id.,  at  286–287  (citing  Rumsfeld  v.
Forum  for  Academic  and  Institutional  Rights,  Inc.,  547
U. S.  47,  64–65  (2006)  (FAIR);  Rosenberger  v.  Rector  and
Visitors  of  Univ.  of  Va.,  515  U. S.  819,  841–842  (1995);
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 76–78
(1980)).  It also emphasized that Masterpiece could “disas
sociat[e]” itself from same-sex marriage by posting a “dis
claimer”  stating  that  Colorado  law  “requires  it  not  to
discriminate” or that “the provision of its services does not
constitute an endorsement.”  370 P. 3d, at 288.  This rea
soning is badly misguided.

1
The  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  was  wrong  to  conclude
that  Phillips’  conduct  was  not  expressive  because  a  rea
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The text delves into the First Amendment implications of a baker's refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1130

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 22, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1367. Abbott et al. v. Medgar Evers Houses As-
sociates, L. P., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 201 F. 3d 430.

No. 99–1370. New York et al. v. Yonkers Board of Edu-
cation et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 197 F. 3d 41.

No. 99–1439. Anderegg v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 Wash. App. 167, 978 P.
2d 1121.

No. 99–1526. University of Colorado Foundation, Inc.,
et al. v. American Cyanamid Co. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 1366.

No. 99–1537. Borden, Inc., et al. v. Morton’s Market,
Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 198 F. 3d 823.

No. 99–1538. Taranto, dba Tundra Taxi v. North Slope
Borough. Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 992 P. 2d 1111.

No. 99–1545. Gonzales et ux., Individually and as Per-
sonal Representatives of the Estate of Gonzales, De-
ceased v. City of Kerrville et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1337.

No. 99–1546. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc. v. Professor
Vladimir Popov MV in rem. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 199 F. 3d 220.

No. 99–1561. Oliver et vir v. Saha et al. Ct. App. Ky.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1569. Davis v. Hanover Insurance Co. App. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 48 Mass. App. 1108,
719 N. E. 2d 896.

No. 99–1588. Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of

Appeals. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1599. Hopper et al. v. Robinson, Administrator of
the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
of Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, courts, and dates. This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is more suitable for indexing as metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

905

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5462.  Ciocchetti  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  745.

No.  09–5463.  Clements,  aka  Dion,  aka  Harmon  v.  United
States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 323
Fed.  Appx.  284.

No.  09–5464.  Littles  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  873.

No.  09–5465.  Marshall  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  801.

No.  09–5467.  Martin  v.  Sullivan,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5468.  Joseph  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5469.  Koon  v.  South  Carolina.  Ct.  Common  Pleas

of  Cherokee  County,  S.  C.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5470.  Pine  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–5471.  Mines  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.  Appx.  719.

No.  09–5472.  Monroe  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  552.

No.  09–5473.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  168.

No.  09–5475.  Cordell  v.  Sabol,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5476.  Davis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  917.

No.  09–5477.  White  v.  Michigan  Department  of  Correc

tions.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5478.  Williams  v.  Wolfenbarger,  Warden.  C.  A.

6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5479.  Velez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  604.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xcvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

889

McNeil; Rosa v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089

McNeil; Salter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

McNeil; Sanchez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

McNeil; Spears v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

McNeil; Taylor v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1007

McNeil v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

McNeil; Thomas v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950

McNeil; Valladares v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Vann v.
949

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Warlick v.
984

McNeil; Wheeler v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Widner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  841,1139

McNeil; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  885,909,994

1056

McNeil; Wright v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeill v. Goff  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  832,1085

1051

McNeill v. Stamper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeill v. Wayne County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  846,950

859

McNulty v. Penney  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

McQuiggin; Brown v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

McQuiggin; Kinney v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

McQuirter v. Michigan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1134

McRae v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
983

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McWhorter; Tibbs v.
1018

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meadows v. United States
914

Means v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Measure; Nesselrode v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
870

992

Medco Health Solutions, Inc.; Rx.com, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1023

Medel, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

Medela AG v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Medina v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1084

Medina v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
863

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Medina-Beltran v. United States
856

Medina-Vargas v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Medley; Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Medows v. Cayce
1029

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meehan v. New York
1138

Megia v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mehen v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  824,1064

Meier v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011

828

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meister v. Scott
Meizlik v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  907,1102

1095

Mejia v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mejia v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  939,1138

1157

Mejia-Rios v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
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  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY CHAPTER OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE

OF THE LAW, AKA HASTINGS CHRISTIAN FELLOW-

SHIP v. MARTINEZ ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 08–1371.  Argued April 19, 2010—Decided June 28, 2010

Respondent Hastings College of the Law (Hastings), a school within the
University  of  California  public-school  system,  extends  official  recog-
nition  to  student  groups  through  its  “Registered  Student  Organiza-
tion”  (RSO)  program.    Several  benefits  attend  this  school-approved
status,  including  the  use  of  school  funds,  facilities,  and  channels  of
communication, as well as Hastings’ name and logo.  In exchange for
recognition, RSOs must abide by certain conditions.  Critical here, all
RSOs must comply with the school’s Nondiscrimination Policy, which
tracks state law barring discrimination on a number of bases, includ-
ing religion and sexual orientation. Hastings interprets this policy, as
it  relates  to  the  RSO  program,  to  mandate  acceptance of  all  comers:
RSOs  must  allow  any  student  to  participate,  become  a  member,  or
seek leadership positions, regardless of her status or beliefs.

At the beginning of the 2004–2005 academic year, the leaders of an
existing  Christian  RSO  formed  petitioner  Christian  Legal  Society
(CLS)  by  affiliating  with  a  national  Christian  association  that  char-
ters  student  chapters  at  law  schools  throughout  the  country.    These
chapters must adopt bylaws that, inter alia, require members and of-
ficers to sign a “Statement of Faith” and to conduct their lives in ac-
cord with prescribed principles.  Among those tenets is the belief that
sexual  activity  should  not  occur  outside  of  marriage  between  a  man
and  a  woman.    CLS  interprets  its  bylaws  to  exclude  from  affiliation
anyone  who  engages  in  “unrepentant  homosexual  conduct”  or  holds
religious  convictions  different  from  those  in  the  Statement  of  Faith.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
932

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–1226.  Richardson  v.  Commission  on  Human
Rights  and  Opportunities  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  532  F.  3d  114.

No.  08–1242.  Beard,  Secretary,  Pennsylvania  Depart
ment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  v.  Bond.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Motion
of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  granted.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  539  F.  3d  256.

No.  08–1310.  Gibbons  v.  Savage,  Superintendent,  Go
wanda  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or
decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  112.

No.  08–1319.  Adcock  et  al.  v.  Freightliner  LLC  et  al.
C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Motion  of  National  Federation  of  Independent
Business  et  al.  for  leave  to  ﬁle  a  brief  as  amici  curiae  granted.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  550  F.  3d  369.

No.  08–1350.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  Department  of
Corrections  v.  Styers.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Motion  of  respondent
for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  granted.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  547  F.  3d  1026.

No.  08–1354.  DeSalvo  v.  Volhard  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  312
Fed.  Appx.  394.

No.  08–1358.  Holmes  v.  Louisiana.  Sup.  Ct.  La.  Motions
of National Organization on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, Constitution
Project, Louisiana Association of  Criminal Lawyers, and National
Center  on  Domestic  and  Sexual  Violence  et  al.  for  leave  to  ﬁle
briefs  as  amici  curiae  granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  5  So.  3d  42.

No. 08–1361.  Swisher International, Inc. v.  Vilsack, Sec
retary  of  Agriculture.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Motion  of  Paciﬁc
Legal  Foundation  et  al.  for  leave  to  ﬁle  a  brief  as  amici  curiae
granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  550  F.  3d  1046.

No.  08–1389.  Prelesnik,  Warden  v.  Avery.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.
Motion  of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  548  F.  3d  434.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, circuit courts, and disposition information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34  ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.

v. GOLDSMITH
Opinion of the Court

AWF asserts another, albeit related, purpose, which is to
comment on the “dehumanizing nature” and “effects” of ce-
lebrity.  Brief for Petitioner 44, 51.  No doubt, many of War-
hol’s works, and particularly his uses of repeated images,
can  be  perceived  as  depicting  celebrities  as  commodities.
But  again,  even  if  such  commentary  is  perceptible  on  the
cover  of  Condé  Nast’s  tribute  to  “Prince  Rogers  Nelson,
1958–2016,” on the occasion of the man’s death, AWF has a
problem: The asserted commentary is at Campbell’s lowest
ebb.  Because  it  “has  no  critical  bearing  on”  Goldsmith’s
photograph,20 the  commentary’s  “claim  to  fairness  in  bor-
rowing  from”  her  work  “diminishes  accordingly  (if  it  does
not vanish).”  510 U. S., at 580.21  The commercial nature of
the use, on the other hand, “loom[s] larger.”  Ibid.

——————

20 At  no  point  in  this  litigation  has  AWF  maintained  that  any  of  the
Prince  Series  works,  let  alone  Orange  Prince  on  the  cover  of  the  2016
Condé  Nast  special  edition,  comment  on,  criticize,  or  otherwise  target
Goldsmith’s photograph.  That makes sense, given that the photograph
was  unpublished  when  Goldsmith  licensed  it  to  Vanity  Fair,  and  that
neither Warhol nor Vanity Fair selected the photograph, which was in-
stead provided by Goldsmith’s agency.

21 The  dissent  wonders:  Why  does  targeting  matter?    See  post,  at  24
(opinion of KAGAN, J.).  The reason, as this opinion explains, is the first
factor’s attention to justification.  Supra, at 17–20, and nn. 7–8, 29–30,
and n. 18 (citing Campbell, 510 U. S., at 580–581; Google, 593 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 26)).  Compare, for example, a film adaptation of Gone
With  the  Wind  with  a  novel,  The  Wind  Done  Gone,  that  “inverts”  the
original’s “portrait of race relations” to expose its “romantic, idealized”
portrayal of the antebellum South.  SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F. 3d 1257, 1270 (CA11 2001); id., at 1280 (Marcus, J., specially
concurring).    Or,  to  build  from  one  of  the  artistic  works  the  dissent
chooses to feature, consider a secondary use that borrows from Manet’s
Olympia to shed light on the original’s depiction of race and sex.  See R.
Storr & C. Armstrong, Lunch With Olympia (2016).  Although targeting
is not always required, fair use is an affirmative defense, and AWF bears
the  burden  to  justify  its  taking  of  Goldsmith’s  work  with  some  reason
other than, “I can make it better.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the fair use of copyrighted material in the context of Andy Warhol's artwork. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the primary content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

BARRETT, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–1039
_________________

PENNEAST PIPELINE COMPANY, LLC, PETITIONER
v. NEW JERSEY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 29, 2021]

JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE

KAGAN, and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting.

A  straightforward  application  of  our  precedent  resolves
this case.  Congress passed the Natural Gas Act in reliance
on its power to regulate interstate commerce, and we have
repeatedly held that the Commerce Clause does not permit
Congress  to  strip  the  States  of  their  sovereign  immunity.
Recognizing that barrier, the Court insists that eminent do-
main  is  a  special  case.  New  Jersey  has  no  sovereign  im-
munity to assert, it says, because the States surrendered to
private condemnation suits in the plan of the Convention.
This argument has no textual, structural, or historical sup-
port.  Because there is no reason to treat private condem-
nation suits differently from any other cause of action cre-
ated  pursuant  to  the  Commerce  Clause,  I  respectfully
dissent.

I
As  a  “general  rule,”  Congress  cannot  circumvent  state
sovereign  immunity’s  limitations  on  the  judicial  power
through its Article I powers.  Allen v. Cooper, 589 U. S. ___,
___ (2020) (slip op., at 7).  Thus, even in areas where Article
I grants it “complete lawmaking authority,” Congress lacks
a tool that it could otherwise use to implement its power:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Barrett.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual content of a legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

89

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF
WASHINGTON, et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit

No. 98–1701. Argued December 7, 1999—Decided March 6, 2000*

After the supertanker Torrey Canyon spilled crude oil off the coast of
England in 1967, both Congress, in the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
of 1972 (PWSA), and the State of Washington enacted more stringent
regulations for tankers and provided for more comprehensive remedies
in the event of an oil spill. The ensuing question of federal pre-emption
of the State’s laws was addressed in Ray v. Atlantic Richﬁeld Co., 435
In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in
U. S. 151.
Alaska, causing the largest oil spill in United States history. Again,
both Congress and Washington responded. Congress enacted the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The State created a new agency and di-
rected it to establish standards to provide the “best achievable protec-
tion” (BAP) from oil spill damages. That agency promulgated tanker
design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. Petitioner
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko),
a trade association of tanker operators, brought this suit seeking declar-
atory and injunctive relief against state and local ofﬁcials responsible for
enforcing the BAP regulations. Upholding the regulations, the District
Court rejected Intertanko’s arguments that the BAP standards invaded
an area long pre-empted by the Federal Government. At the appeal
stage, the United States intervened on Intertanko’s behalf, contending
that the District Court’s ruling failed to give sufﬁcient weight to the
substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The
Ninth Circuit held that the State could enforce its laws, save one requir-
ing vessels to install certain navigation and towing equipment, which
was “virtually identical to” requirements declared pre-empted in Ray.

Held: Washington’s regulations regarding general navigation watch pro-
cedures, crew English language skills and training, and maritime cas-
ualty reporting are pre-empted by the comprehensive federal regula-
tory scheme governing oil tankers; these cases are remanded so the

*Together with No. 98–1706, International Association of Independent
Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke, Governor of Washington, et al.,
also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a summary of the case rather than the full text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

duct  that  presents  a  serious  potential  risk  of  physical
injury to another.”  The use of these two different terms in
§924(e)  indicates  that  “conduct”  refers  to  things  done
during  the  commission  of  an  offense  that  are  not  part  of
the  elements  needed  for  conviction.    Because  those  extra
actions  vary  from  case  to  case,  it  is  natural  to  interpret
“conduct”  to  mean  real-world  conduct,  not  the  conduct
involved in some Platonic ideal of the offense.

Second,  as the  Court  points out, standards like the one
in  the  residual  clause  almost  always  appear  in  laws  that
call  for  application  by  a  trier  of  fact.  This  strongly  sug
gests  that  the  residual  clause  calls  for  the  same  sort  of
application.

Third, if the Court is correct that the residual clause is
nearly  incomprehensible  when  interpreted  as  applying  to
an  “idealized  ordinary  case  of  the  crime,”  then  that  is
telling  evidence  that  this  is  not  what  Congress  intended.
When another interpretation is ready at hand, why should
we assume that Congress gave the clause a meaning that
is impossible—or even, exceedingly difficult—to apply?

D
Not only does the “real-world conduct” interpretation fit
the  terms  of  the  residual  clause,  but  the  reasons  that
persuaded  the  Court  to  adopt  the  categorical  approach  in
Taylor  either  do  not  apply  or  have  much  less  force  in
residual clause cases.
  In  Taylor,  the  question  before  the  Court  concerned  the
meaning  of  “burglary,”  one  of  ACCA’s  enumerated  of-
fenses.    The  Court  gave  three  reasons  for  holding  that  a
judge making an ACCA determination should generally look
only at the elements of the offense of conviction and not to
other things that the defendant did during the commission
of the offense.  First, the Court thought that ACCA’s use of
the term “convictions” pointed to the categorical approach.
The Court wrote: “Section 924(e)(1) refers to ‘a person who
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

within subsection (c).  Nor does subsection (j) call for impos-
ing any sentence from subsection (c).  Instead, subsection
(j) provides its own set of penalties.  See §§924(j)(1)–(2).

To be sure, subsection (j) references subsection (c).  But it
does so only with respect to offense elements, not penalties.
Subsection (j)’s offense elements include causing death “in
the course of a violation of subsection (c).”  §924(j).  And to
define that phrase, one must consult subsection (c)’s offense
elements (i.e., what it takes to violate that subsection).  But
that  is  where  subsection  (c)’s  role  in  subsection  (j)  stops.
One need not consult subsection (c)’s sentences in order to
sentence a subsection (j) defendant.

Thus, a defendant who is sentenced under subsection (j)
does not receive a “term of imprisonment imposed . . . under
[subsection (c)].”  Consequently, §924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s consecu-
tive-sentence mandate does not apply.

III
A
The Government tries to deflect this conclusion by blend-
ing subsections (c) and (j) together.  It claims that “Congress
incorporated Section 924(c) as a whole into Section 924(j).”
Brief for United States 15.  Under that view, a subsection
(j) defendant faces subsection (j)’s penalties plus subsection
(c)’s penalties—including subsection (c)’s mandatory mini-
mum sentences and its consecutive-sentence mandate.

The actual statute bears no resemblance to the Govern-
ment’s vision.  Subsection (j) nowhere mentions—let alone
incorporates—subsection  (c)’s  penalties.    Instead,  as  just
explained, subsection (j)’s only reference to subsection (c) is
limited to offense elements.  Supra this page.

Moreover, a sentencing court cannot follow both subsec-
tion  (c)  and  subsection  (j)  as  written.    Combining  the  two
subsections would set them on a collision course; indeed, in
some cases, the maximum sentence would be lower than the
minimum sentence.  Take voluntary manslaughter using a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the interpretation of a specific section of law (likely related to firearms) and argues about the application of sentencing guidelines.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

39

ALITO, J., dissenting

conduct is not sex discrimination, the statute does not ap-
ply.  Thus, this lesson simply takes us back to the question
whether  discrimination  because  of  sexual  orientation  or
gender identity is a form of discrimination because of bio-
logical  sex.    For  reasons  already  discussed,  see  Part  I–A,
supra, it is not.

It likewise proves nothing of relevance here to note that
an  employer  cannot  escape  liability  by  showing  that  dis-
crimination on a prohibited ground was not its sole motiva-
tion.  So long as a prohibited ground was a motivating fac-
tor, the existence of other motivating factors does not defeat
liability.

The Court makes much of the argument that “[i]n Phil-
lips, the employer could have accurately spoken of its policy
as one based on ‘motherhood.’ ”  Ante, at 14; see also ante,
at 16.  But motherhood, by definition, is a condition that can
be  experienced  only  by  women,  so  a  policy  that  distin-
guishes between motherhood and parenthood is necessarily
a policy that draws a sex-based distinction.  There was sex
discrimination  in  Phillips,  because  women  with  children
were  treated  disadvantageously  compared  to  men  with
children.

Lesson number two—“the plaintiff ’s sex need not be the
sole  or  primary  cause  of  the  employer’s  adverse  action,”
ante, at 14—is similarly unhelpful.  The standard of causa-
tion in these cases is whether sex is necessarily a “motivat-
ing factor” when an employer discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity.  42 U. S. C. §2000e–
2(m).  But the essential question—whether discrimination
because of sexual orientation or gender identity constitutes
sex discrimination—would be the same no matter what cau-
sation standard applied.  The Court’s extensive discussion
of causation standards is so much smoke.

Lesson  number  three––“an  employer  cannot  escape  lia-
bility  by  demonstrating  that  it  treats  males  and  females
comparably as groups,” ante, at 15, is also irrelevant.  There
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments about sex discrimination and its application to sexual orientation and gender identity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV.

Opinion of the Court

requires “ ‘the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, trans
fer, or discipline an employee.’ ”  Id., at 470 (quoting Hall,
supra,  at  355).    The  court  concluded  that  Davis  was  not
Vance’s supervisor and thus that Vance could not recover
from BSU unless she could prove negligence.  Finding that
BSU was not negligent with respect to Davis’ conduct, the
court affirmed.  646 F. 3d, at 470–473.

II

A

Title  VII  of  the  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1964  makes  it  “an
unlawful  employment  practice  for  an  employer  . . .  to
discriminate  against  any  individual  with  respect  to  his
compensation,  terms,  conditions,  or  privileges  of  employ
ment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”  42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1).  This pro
vision  obviously  prohibits  discrimination  with  respect  to
employment  decisions  that  have  direct  economic  conse
quences,  such  as  termination,  demotion,  and  pay  cuts.
But not long after Title VII was enacted, the lower courts
held  that  Title  VII  also  reaches  the  creation  or  perpetua
tion of a discriminatory work environment.

In  the  leading  case  of  Rogers  v.  EEOC,  454  F. 2d  234
(1971), the Fifth Circuit recognized a cause of action based
on this theory.  See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477  U. S.  57,  65–66  (1986)  (describing  development  of
hostile  environment  claims  based  on  race).  The  Rogers
court  reasoned  that  “the  phrase  ‘terms,  conditions,  or
privileges  of  employment’  in  [Title  VII]  is  an  expansive
concept  which  sweeps  within  its  protective  ambit  the
practice  of  creating  a  working  environment  heavily
charged  with  ethnic  or  racial  discrimination.”    454  F. 2d,
at 238.  The court observed that “[o]ne can readily envision
working  environments  so  heavily  polluted  with  discrimi
nation  as  to  destroy  completely  the  emotional  and  psy
chological  stability  of  minority  group  workers.”    Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the legal framework surrounding hostile work environments under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It cites relevant case law and legal statutes, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Finally, after the delegates at the Massachusetts Ratifi
cation Convention had compiled a list of proposed amend
ments  and  alterations,  a  motion  was  made  to  add  to  the
list  the  following  language:  “[T]hat  the  said  Constitution
never  be  construed  to  authorize  Congress  to  . . .  prevent
the  people  of  the  United  States,  who  are  peaceable  citi
zens,  from  keeping  their  own  arms.”    Cogan  181.  This
motion,  however,  failed  to  achieve  the  necessary  support,
and  the  proposal  was  excluded  from  the  list  of  amend
ments the State sent to Congress.  2 Schwartz 674–675.

Madison,  charged  with  the  task  of  assembling  the  pro
posals  for  amendments  sent  by  the  ratifying  States,  was
the  principal  draftsman  of  the  Second  Amendment.23    He
had  before  him,  or  at  the  very  least  would  have  been
aware of, all of these proposed formulations.  In addition,
Madison  had  been  a  member,  some  years  earlier,  of  the
committee  tasked  with  drafting  the  Virginia  Declaration
of  Rights.  That  committee  considered  a  proposal  by  Tho
mas  Jefferson  that  would  have  included  within  the  Vir
ginia  Declaration  the  following  language:  “No  freeman
shall  ever  be  debarred  the  use  of  arms  [within  his  own
lands  or  tenements].”  1  Papers  of  Thomas  Jefferson  363
(J.  Boyd  ed.  1950).  But  the  committee  rejected  that  lan
guage,  adopting  instead  the  provision  drafted  by  George
Mason.24

——————

23 Madison explained in a letter to Richard Peters, Aug. 19, 1789, the
paramount  importance  of  preparing  a  list  of  amendments  to  placate
those  States  that  had  ratified  the  Constitution  in  reliance  on  a  com
mitment  that  amendments  would  follow:  “In  many  States  the  [Consti
tution] was adopted under a tacit compact in [favor] of some subsequent
provisions  on  this  head.    In  [Virginia].    It  would  have  been  certainly
rejected,  had  no  assurances  been  given  by  its  advocates  that  such
provisions would be pursued.  As an honest man I feel my self bound by
this  consideration.”  Creating  the  Bill  of  Rights  281,  282  (H.  Veit,  K.
Bowling, & C. Bickford eds. 1991) (hereinafter Veit).

24 The  adopted  language,  Virginia  Declaration  of  Rights  ¶13  (1776),
read as follows: “That a well-regulated Militia, composed of the body of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It discusses the historical context of the Second Amendment and cites relevant sources.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY

Opinion of the Court

Although nonconsenting States are generally immune from
suit, they surrendered their immunity from the exercise of
the federal eminent domain power when they ratified the
Constitution.  That power carries with it the ability to con-
demn property in court.  Because the Natural Gas Act del-
egates the federal eminent domain power to private parties,
those  parties  can  initiate  condemnation  proceedings,  in-
cluding against state-owned property.

I
A
Natural gas has been a part of the Nation’s energy supply
since at least the 1820s, when an “enterprising gunsmith”
named  William  Aaron  Hart  developed  a  natural  gas  well
near Fredonia, New York.  D. Waples, The Natural Gas In-
dustry in Appalachia 12 (2d ed. 2012).  Initially, difficulties
in transporting natural gas limited its distribution, as the
available  pipeline  technology  did  not  allow  producers  to
reach the sprawling American markets.  See Tarr, Trans-
forming  an  Energy  System,  in  The  Governance  of  Large
Technical Systems 26 (O. Coutard ed. 1999).  Over the fol-
lowing century, however, that technology slowly improved.
In 1891, one of the first interstate pipelines—albeit a rudi-
mentary and inefficient one—was built to carry natural gas
from central Indiana to Chicago.  And in the 1920s, devel-
opment  began  in  earnest  on  the  country’s  pipeline  infra-
structure.  See id., at 27–28; J. Speight, Natural Gas 20–
21, 26 (2007).

In 1938 Congress passed the Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52
Stat. 821, to regulate the transportation and sale of natural
gas  in  interstate  commerce.  Congress  vested  the  Federal
Power  Commission  (now  the  Federal  Energy  Regulatory
Commission) with the authority to administer the NGA, in-
cluding by approving the construction and extension of in-
terstate pipelines.  The NGA provides that in order to build
an interstate pipeline, a natural gas company must obtain
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Penneast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey. It delves into the legal framework surrounding eminent domain and its application to natural gas pipelines.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1005

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

No.  09–6779.  Garcia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6781.  Jean-Charles  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6783.  Boyd  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  865.

No. 09–6787.  Brito v. United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–6799.  Barian v. United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6800.  Brewer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  Armed

Forces.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  67  M.  J.  408.

No. 09–6804.  Hamani v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6807.  Chung  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  862.

No.  09–6808.  Coltrane  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  283.

No. 09–6809.  De La Garza-Valles v. United States.  C. A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 328 Fed. Appx. 307.

No.  09–6810.  Celedon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6813.  Ross v. United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  700.

No.  09–6814.  Rinick  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–6815.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6816.  Jones  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  566  F.  3d  353.

No.  09–6819.  Sanchez-Ramirez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  570  F.  3d  75.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

BREYER, J., dissenting

injured); an elementary school in Newtown, Connecticut (26
dead); and many, many more.  See, e.g., R. Todt, 3 Dead, 11
Wounded in Philadelphia Shooting on Busy Street, Wash-
ington Post, June 5, 2022; A. Hernández, J. Slater, D. Bar-
rett,  &  S.  Foster-Frau,  At  Least  19  Children,  2  Teachers
Killed at Texas Elementary School, Washington Post, May
25, 2022; A. Joly, J. Slater, D. Barrett, & A. Hernandez, 10
Killed  in  Racially  Motivated  Shooting  at  Buffalo  Grocery
Store, Washington Post, May 14, 2022; C. McWhirter & V.
Bauerlein,  Atlanta-Area  Shootings  at  Spas  Leave  Eight
Dead, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 17, 2021; A. Hassan, Day-
ton Gunman Shot 26 People in 32 Seconds, Police Timeline
Reveals, N. Y. Times, Aug. 13, 2019; L. Alvarez & R. Pérez-
Peña, Orlando Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub, Leaving 50
Dead, N. Y. Times, June 12, 2016; J. Horowitz, N. Corasa-
niti, & A. Southall, Nine Killed in Shooting at Black Church
in Charleston, N. Y. Times, June 17, 2015; R. Lin, Gunman
Kills 12 at ‘Dark Knight Rises’ Screening in Colorado, L. A.
Times, July 20, 2012;  J. Barron,  Nation Reels After  Gun-
man Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut, N. Y.
Times,  Dec.  14,  2012.    Since  the  start  of  this  year  alone
(2022), there have already been 277 reported mass shoot-
ings—an average of more than one per day.  Gun Violence
Archive; see also Gun Violence Archive, General Methodol-
ogy,  https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/methodology  (de-
fining mass shootings to include incidents in which at least
four victims are shot, not including the shooter).

And mass shootings are just one part of the problem.  Easy
access  to  firearms  can  also  make  many  other  aspects  of
American life more dangerous.  Consider, for example, the
effect of guns on road rage.  In 2021, an average of 44 people
each month were shot and either killed or wounded in road
rage  incidents,  double  the  annual  average  between  2016
and  2019.    S.  Burd-Sharps  &  K.  Bistline,  Everytown  for
Gun Safety, Reports of Road Rage Shootings Are on the Rise
(Apr.  4,  2022),  https://www.everytownresearch.org/reports-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically focusing on the issue of gun violence in America. It cites specific examples of mass shootings and provides statistics on road rage incidents involving firearms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Argument</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

23

Opinion of the Court

ture  posts  (presumably  about  the  2024  Presidential  elec-
tion)  must  contain  content  that  falls  within  a  misinfor-
mation trend that the FBI has identified or will identify in
the future.  The FBI must pressure the platforms to remove
content within that category.  The platform must then sup-
press  Hoft’s  post,  and  it  must  do  so  at  least  partly  in  re-
sponse to the FBI, rather than in keeping with its own con-
tent-moderation policy.  Hoft cannot satisfy his burden with
such conjecture.  CISA, meanwhile, stopped switchboarding
in mid-2022, and the Government has represented that it
will not resume operations for the 2024 election.  Especially
in light of his poor showing of traceability in the past, Hoft
has failed to demonstrate likely future injury at the hands
of the FBI or CISA—so the injunction against those entities
cannot survive.

The  doctors  and  the  state  plaintiffs,  who  focus  on
COVID–19 content, have a similarly uphill battle vis-à-vis
the  White  House,  the  Surgeon  General’s  Office,  and  the
CDC.  Hines, with her superior showing on past harm, is in
a slightly better position to demonstrate likely future harm
at the hands of these defendants.  Still, she has not shown
enough.

Starting with the White House and Surgeon General’s Of-
fice,  the  vast  majority  of  their  public  and  private  engage-
ment with the platforms occurred in 2021, when the pan-
demic was still in full swing.  By August 2022, when Hines
joined  the  case,  the  officials’  communications  about
COVID–19  misinformation  had  slowed  to  a  trickle.    Pub-
licly,  the  White  House  Press  Secretary  made  two  state-
ments in February and April 2022.  First, she said that the
platforms  should  continue  “call[ing]  out  misinformation
and disinformation.”  3 Record 758.  Two months later, she
spoke  generally  about  §230  and  antitrust  reform,  but  did
not  mention  content  moderation  or  COVID–19  misinfor-
mation.  In March 2022, the Surgeon General issued a vol-
untary “Request for Information” from the platforms about
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case and arguments related to content moderation and misinformation. It's part of the ongoing legal discourse and not the primary content meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER
Opinion of the Court

B
Trinity  Lutheran  sued  the  Director  of  the  Department
in  Federal  District  Court.    The  Church  alleged  that  the
Department’s  failure  to  approve  the  Center’s  application,
pursuant  to  its  policy  of  denying  grants  to  religiously
affiliated  applicants,  violates  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  of
the  First  Amendment.    Trinity  Lutheran  sought  declara-
tory and injunctive relief prohibiting the Department from
discriminating against the Church on that basis in future
grant applications.

The  District  Court  granted  the  Department’s  motion  to
dismiss.  The  Free  Exercise  Clause,  the  District  Court
stated,  prohibits  the  government  from  outlawing  or  re-
stricting  the  exercise  of  a  religious  practice;  it  generally
does  not  prohibit  withholding  an  affirmative  benefit  on
account  of  religion.    The  District  Court  likened  the  De-
partment’s  denial  of  the  scrap  tire  grant  to  the  situation
this  Court  encountered  in  Locke  v.  Davey,  540  U. S.  712
(2004).  In  that  case,  we  upheld  against  a  free  exercise
challenge  the  State  of  Washington’s  decision  not  to  fund
degrees  in  devotional  theology  as  part  of  a  state  scholar-
ship  program.    Finding  the  present  case  “nearly  indistin-
guishable  from  Locke,”  the  District  Court  held  that  the
Free  Exercise  Clause  did  not  require  the  State  to  make
funds available under the Scrap Tire Program to religious
institutions  like  Trinity  Lutheran.  Trinity  Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1137,
1151 (WD Mo. 2013).

The  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Eighth  Circuit  affirmed.
The  court  recognized  that  it  was  “rather  clear”  that  Mis-
souri  could  award  a  scrap  tire  grant  to  Trinity  Lutheran
without running afoul of the Establishment Clause of the
United  States  Constitution.    Trinity  Lutheran  Church  of
Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F. 3d 779, 784 (2015).  But,
the  Court  of  Appeals  explained,  that  did  not  mean  the
Free Exercise Clause compelled the State to disregard the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing a case involving religious freedom and government grants. It sets the context of the case and outlines the arguments made by both parties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH

Opinion of the Court

of the VA then determines whether the veteran satisfies all
legal prerequisites, including the requirement that military
service caused or aggravated the disability.  §511(a); see 38
CFR §3.100(a) (2021).  To that end, the statute governing
wartime service imposes a “[p]resumption of sound condi-
tion”: If a veteran’s disability was not noted at the time of
entry into service, then the veteran is presumptively enti-
tled to benefits unless the VA shows by a heightened bur-
den of proof that the disability “existed before . . . and was
not aggravated by such service.”  38 U. S. C. §1111.  After
applying  this  and  other  statutory  and  regulatory  require-
ments, the regional office issues an initial decision granting
or denying benefits.  §§511(a), 5104(a).

A veteran dissatisfied with this decision may challenge it
through several layers of direct review.  As a general rule,
the veteran may appeal within one year to the VA’s Board
of Veterans’ Appeals (Board).  §§7105(b)(1), 7104(a).  If the
Board also denies relief, the veteran may seek further re-
view outside the agency.  Such review was once limited to
constitutional and certain statutory claims, but since 1988
Congress has generally allowed veterans 120 days to appeal
any  Board  decision  to  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  Veterans
Claims (Veterans Court).  See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562
U. S. 428, 432, and n. 1 (2011); §§7252(a), 7261(a), 7266(a).
A veteran dissatisfied with that court’s decision may seek
review  of  any  legal  issue  in  the  Federal  Circuit  and  ulti-
mately in this Court.  §7292; 28 U. S. C. §1254(1).

After this direct appeal process, the benefits decision gen-
erally  becomes  “final  and  conclusive  and  may  not  be  re-
viewed  by  any  other  official  or  by  any  court.”    38  U. S. C.
§511(a); see §7104(a).  Still, the veteran enjoys a few limited
options for seeking collateral review in exceptional circum-
stances.  E.g., §5108(a) (supplemental claim based on new
and relevant evidence); §503(a) (discretionary relief based
on  administrative  error);  §5110(g)  (increase  of  benefits
based on subsequent liberalizing legal change).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the appeals process for veterans' benefits. It provides a detailed explanation of the different levels of review available to veterans who disagree with a VA benefits decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 120 (2010)

125

Per Curiam

time  to  get  from  the  bar  to  Jane  Doe’s  house  and  to
assault  Jane  Doe  before  she  made  the  telephone  call  to
her mother at approximately 1:00 a.m.  While Jane Doe
could  not  identify  her  assailant,  her  description  of  his
clothing was similar to what Troy was wearing; she also
said  that  her  assailant  smelled  like  beer  or  vomit  and
testimony  indicated  that  Troy  had  been  drinking  beer
and  had  vomited  several  times  that  night.  Further
more, testimony indicated that Troy got home at approx
imately 1:30 a.m., which gave him enough time to assault
Jane  Doe.  Additionally,  [witnesses]  testiﬁed  that  they
saw  someone  resembling  Troy  in  a  black  jacket  and
black  hat  stumbling  in  the  road  near  Jane  Doe’s  house
at 1:05 a.m.  Troy also washed his pants and shirt when
he  got  home,  arguably  to  remove  the  blood  evidence
from  his  clothes.  Finally,  the  DNA  evidence  indicated
that  semen  collected  from  Jane  Doe’s  underwear
matched Troy’s and that only 1 in 3,000,000 other people
had matching DNA (the second DNA test indicated that
1  in  10,000  people  had  matching  DNA).”  Ibid.,  934
P. 2d, at 241–242.

Respondent also argued on appeal that the trial court erred
in failing to conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether
the  DNA  evidence  was  reliable.  The  court  found  respond
ent had not raised this issue in the trial court and concluded
there was no plain error in the trial court’s failure to conduct
a hearing.  Id., at 284, 934 P. 2d, at 241.

In  2001,  respondent  sought  state  postconviction  relief,
claiming,  inter  alia,  that  his  trial  counsel  was  constitution
ally  ineffective  for  failing  to  object  to  the  admission  of  the
DNA  evidence.  He  argued  that  there  were  a  number  of
foundational  problems  with  the  DNA  evidence,  and  that  if
trial counsel had objected, the evidence would have been ex
cluded or at least its importance diminished.  He noted that
because  trial  counsel  “totally  failed  to  challenge  the  DNA
evidence in the case,” counsel “failed to preserve valid issues
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, likely from a court opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a summary of evidence presented in a trial.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HUI ET AL. v. CASTANEDA, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTA-

TIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CASTANEDA, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 08–1529.  Argued March 2, 2010—Decided May 3, 2010

While  detained  by  immigration  authorities,  Francisco  Castaneda  per-
sistently  sought  treatment  for  a  bleeding,  suppurating  lesion.  Al-
though a U. S. Public Health Service (PHS) physician’s assistant and
three outside specialists repeatedly advised that Castaneda urgently
needed  a  biopsy,  petitioners—a  PHS  physician  and  a  commissioned
PHS officer—denied the request.  After Castaneda was released from
custody, tests confirmed that he had metastatic cancer.  He then filed
this suit, raising medical negligence claims against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§1346, 2671–
2680,  and  constitutional  claims  against  petitioners  under  Bivens  v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 397.  When Cas-
taneda  died,  respondents,  his  representative  and  heir,  were  substi-
tuted  as  plaintiffs.    The  District  Court  denied  petitioners’  motion  to
dismiss the Bivens action, rejecting their claim of absolute immunity
under  42  U. S. C.  §233(a),  which  provides:  “The  [FTCA]  remedy
against  the  United  States  provided  by  [28  U. S. C.  §§1346(b)  and
2672] for damage for personal injury, including death, resulting from
the performance of medical . . . or related functions . . . by any [PHS]
commissioned officer or employee . . . while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, shall be exclusive of any other civil action or
proceeding by reason of the same subject-matter against the officer or
employee.”  (Emphasis added.)  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held: The  immunity  provided  by  §233(a)  precludes  Bivens  actions
against individual PHS officers or employees for harms arising out of
constitutional  violations  committed  while  acting  within  the  scope  of
their office or employment.  Pp. 5–13.

(a) The  Court’s  inquiry  begins  and  ends  with  §233(a)’s  text,  which
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

sex  weddings,  Colorado’s  public-accommodations
law
“alter[s]  the  expressive  content”  of  his  message.    Hurley,
515 U. S., at 572.  The meaning of expressive conduct, this
Court  has  explained,  depends  on  “the  context  in  which  it
occur[s].”  Johnson, 491 U. S., at 405.  Forcing Phillips to
make  custom  wedding  cakes  for  same-sex  marriages  re
quires  him  to,  at  the  very  least,  acknowledge  that  same-
sex weddings are “weddings” and suggest that they should
be  celebrated—the  precise  message  he  believes  his  faith
forbids.  The  First  Amendment  prohibits  Colorado  from
requiring  Phillips  to  “bear  witness  to  [these]  fact[s],”
Hurley,  515  U. S.,  at  574,  or  to  “affir[m]  . . .  a  belief  with
which [he] disagrees,” id., at 573.

B
The  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  nevertheless  concluded
that  Phillips’  conduct  was  “not  sufficiently  expressive”  to
be protected from state compulsion.  370 P. 3d, at 283.  It
noted that  a reasonable observer would not view Phillips’
conduct  as  “an  endorsement  of  same-sex  marriage,”  but
rather  as  mere  “compliance”  with  Colorado’s  public-
accommodations  law.  Id.,  at  286–287  (citing  Rumsfeld  v.
Forum  for  Academic  and  Institutional  Rights,  Inc.,  547
U. S.  47,  64–65  (2006)  (FAIR);  Rosenberger  v.  Rector  and
Visitors  of  Univ.  of  Va.,  515  U. S.  819,  841–842  (1995);
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 76–78
(1980)).  It also emphasized that Masterpiece could “disas
sociat[e]” itself from same-sex marriage by posting a “dis
claimer”  stating  that  Colorado  law  “requires  it  not  to
discriminate” or that “the provision of its services does not
constitute an endorsement.”  370 P. 3d, at 288.  This rea
soning is badly misguided.

1
The  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  was  wrong  to  conclude
that  Phillips’  conduct  was  not  expressive  because  a  rea
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The text delves into the First Amendment implications of a baker's refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

7

Opinion of the Court

interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value
and  concern  to  the  public,”  San  Diego,  supra,  at  83–84.
See  Cox  Broadcasting  Corp.  v.  Cohn,  420  U. S.  469,
492–494  (1975);  Time,  Inc.  v.  Hill,  385  U. S.  374,  387–
388  (1967).  The  arguably  “inappropriate  or  controversial
character  of  a  statement  is  irrelevant  to  the  question
whether it deals with a matter of public concern.”  Rankin
v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 387 (1987).

Our  opinion  in  Dun  &  Bradstreet,  on  the  other  hand,
provides an example of speech of only private concern.  In
that  case  we  held,  as  a  general  matter,  that  information
about  a  particular  individual’s  credit  report  “concerns  no
public issue.”  472 U. S., at 762.  The content of the report,
we explained, “was speech solely in the individual interest
of  the  speaker  and  its  specific  business  audience.”    Ibid.
That was confirmed by the fact that the particular report
was  sent  to  only  five  subscribers  to  the  reporting  service,
who  were  bound  not  to  disseminate  it  further.    Ibid.    To
cite  another  example,  we  concluded  in  San  Diego  v.  Roe
that,  in  the  context  of  a  government  employer  regulating
the speech of its employees, videos of an employee engag-
ing  in  sexually  explicit  acts  did  not  address  a  public  con-
cern;  the  videos  “did  nothing  to  inform  the  public  about
any  aspect  of  the  [employing  agency’s]  functioning  or
operation.”  543 U. S., at 84.

Deciding whether speech is of public or private concern
requires  us  to  examine  the  “ ‘content,  form,  and  context’ ”
of that speech, “ ‘as revealed by the whole record.’ ”  Dun &
Bradstreet, supra, at 761 (quoting Connick, supra, at 147–
148).  As  in  other  First  Amendment  cases,  the  court  is
obligated  “to  ‘make  an  independent  examination  of  the
whole  record’  in  order  to  make  sure  that  ‘the  judgment
does  not  constitute  a  forbidden  intrusion  on  the  field  of
free  expression.’ ”    Bose  Corp.  v.  Consumers  Union  of
United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting New
York  Times,  supra,  at  284–286).    In  considering  content,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of "public concern" in the context of free speech.  It cites previous Supreme Court cases and analyzes their relevance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30  MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

federal and state law, and that is something that Congress
has  rarely  done.    For  example,  the  advertising  of  ciga
rettes  is  heavily  regulated  but  not  totally  banned.    See
Federal  Cigarette  Labeling  and  Advertising  Act,  79  Stat.
282; Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act,
§§201–204, 123 Stat. 1842–1848.

It is true that at one time federal law prohibited the use

of  the  mail  or  interstate  commerce  to  distribute  adver
tisements of lotteries that were permitted under state law,
but that is no longer the case.  See United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., 509 U. S. 418, 421–423 (1993).  In 1975,
Congress  passed  a  new  statute,  codified  at  18  U. S. C.
§1307,  that  explicitly  exempts  print  advertisements  re
garding  a  lottery  lawfully  conducted  by  States,  and  in
Greater  New  Orleans  Broadcasting  Assn.,  Inc.  v.  United
States,  527  U. S.  173,  176  (1999),  we  held  that  the  First
Amendment  protects  the  right  of  a  radio  or  television
station  in  a  State  with  a  lottery  to  run  such  advertise
ments.  In  light  of  these  developments,  we  do  not  think
that  Congress  would  want  the  advertising  provisions  to
stand if the remainder of PASPA must fall.

For  these  reasons,  we  hold  that  no  provision  of  PASPA
is  severable  from  the  provision  directly  at  issue  in  these
cases.

*

*

*

The  legalization  of  sports  gambling  is  a  controversial
subject.  Supporters  argue  that  legalization  will  produce
revenue for the States and critically weaken illegal sports
betting  operations,  which  are  often  run  by  organized
crime.  Opponents contend that legalizing sports gambling
will  hook  the  young  on  gambling,  encourage  people  of
modest  means  to  squander  their  savings  and  earnings,
and corrupt professional and college sports.

The  legalization  of  sports  gambling  requires  an  im
portant  policy  choice,  but  the  choice  is  not  ours  to  make.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion discussing the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA). It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the act and the potential consequences of its legalization.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

962

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 26, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–9279. Palomo v. Territory of Guam. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 907.

No. 97–9285. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 138 F. 3d 952.

No. 97–9288. Funches v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 1405.

No. 97–9291. Buck v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 929.

No. 97–9294. Clipper v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159 F. 3d 637.

No. 97–9301. Allery v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 609.

No. 97–9302. Brito v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 397.

No. 97–9304. Leuro-Rosas v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9305. Winfield et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 896.

No. 97–9313.

Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 137 F. 3d 1355.

No. 97–9314. Modrak v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 149 F. 3d 1166.

No. 97–9316. Harmon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 899.

No. 97–9319. Sust v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1188.

No. 97–9326. Dolenc v. Demore. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 97–9332. Shannon v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 137 F. 3d 1112.

No. 97–9333. Sarraulte v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 140 F. 3d 1041.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

NASA v. NELSON

Opinion of the Court

only  when  they  are  “relevant  and  necessary”  to  an  end
law.  5  U. S. C.
“required  to  be  accomplished”  by
§552a(e)(1).    Individuals  are  permitted  to  access  their
records
them.
§§552a(d)(1),(2).  Subject  to  certain  exceptions,  the  Gov-
ernment  may  not  disclose  records  pertaining  to  an  indi-
vidual without that individual’s written consent.  §552a(b).

amendments

request

and

to

C
About two months before the October 2007 deadline for
completing  the  NACI,  respondents  brought  this  suit,
claiming,  as  relevant  here,  that  the  background-check
process  violates  a  constitutional  right  to  informational
privacy.  App.  82  (Complaint  for  Injunctive  and  Declara-
tory  Relief).4    The  District  Court  denied  respondents’
motion for a preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit
granted  an  injunction  pending  appeal,  506  F. 3d  713
(2007), and later reversed the District Court’s order.  The
court  held  that  portions  of  both  SF–85  and  Form  42  are
likely  unconstitutional  and  should  be  preliminarily  en-
joined.  512 F. 3d 1134, vacated and superseded, 530 F. 3d
865 (2008).

Turning  first  to  SF–85,  the  Court  of  Appeals  noted
respondents’ concession “that most of the questions” on the
form are “unproblematic” and do not “implicate the consti-
tutional right to informational privacy.”  530 F. 3d, at 878.
But  the  court  determined  that  the  “group  of  questions
concerning  illegal  drugs”  required  closer  scrutiny.    Ibid.
Applying  Circuit  precedent,  the  court  upheld  SF–85’s
inquiries into recent involvement with drugs as “necessary
to further the government’s legitimate interest” in combat-
ing  illegal-drug  use.  Id.,  at  879.  The  court  went  on  to
hold,  however,  that  the  portion  of  the  form  requiring

——————

4 Respondents  sought  to  represent  a  class  of  “JPL  employees  in  non-

sensitive positions.”  App. 79.  No class has been certified.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case NASA v. NELSON. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding privacy rights and government access to personal information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
902

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5402.  McCloud  v.  Kentucky.  Ct.  App.  Ky.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  279  S. W.  3d  162.

No.  09–5403.  Vaughn  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5404.  R.  W.  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  958  A.  2d  259.

No.  09–5405.  Velazquez  v.  Lape,  Superintendent,  Cox
sackie  Correctional  Facility,  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–5406.  Powell  v.  San  Diego  County  Health  and
Human  Services  Agency.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.  Dist.,
Div.  1.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5408.  Wilson  v.  Smith,  Correctional  Administra
tor,  Albermarle  Correctional  Institution.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  608.

No.  09–5409.  Graves  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  10th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  271  S. W.  3d  801.

No.  09–5410.  Moment  v.  Maryland  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  767.

No. 09–5412.  Brinda v. United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  464.

No.  09–5413.  Adams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5414.  Pinnock  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  545.

No.  09–5415.  Oloba-Aisony  v.  Scribner,  Warden.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5416.  Brown  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia  De
partment  of  Corrections.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5417.  Rodriguez Pinero,  aka Domieque-Rodriguez
v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  805.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ROTKISKE v. KLEMM

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

v.  Glover,  21  Wall.  342  (1875);  Sherwood  v.  Sutton,  21  F.
Cas. 1303 (No. 12,782) (CC NH 1828) (Story, J.).  Nothing
in today’s decision prevents parties from invoking that well-
settled doctrine.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It includes case citations and a judge's name, suggesting it's part of the main body of the decision rather than a preface or table of contents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

944

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 22, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–8944. Day v. Walker, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 433.

No. 97–8950. Swinney et al. v. California. Ct. App. Cal.,

3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9004. Swinick v. Rosen. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9017. Wilson v. Burton, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9022. Laessig v. City of Philadelphia et al. C. A.

3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1154.

No. 97–9073. Thomas v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9075. Boyd v. Oregon. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari

denied.

No. 97–9086. Diaconu v. Defense Logistics Agency et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1153.
No. 97–9089. Steele v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 768.

No. 97–9094. Dehler v. Schotten, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9105. Reynolds v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1182.

No. 97–9113. Riebold v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 1226.

No. 97–9142. Gay v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1171.

No. 97–9147. Sentenn v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 117 F. 3d 1416.

No. 97–9148. Lloyd et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F. 3d 206.

No. 97–9151. Wayne v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, court origins, and certiorari decisions. This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is more suitable for indexing as metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

15

BREYER, J., dissenting

Clauses,  it  is  only  by  “preserving  doctrinal  flexibility  and
recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic application”
of those provisions.  Yoder, 406 U. S., at 221.

The Court proceeded in just this way in Locke.  It consid-
ered the same precedents the majority today cites in sup-
port of its presumption of unconstitutionality.  But it found
that  applying  the  presumption  set  forth  in  those  cases  to
Washington’s decision not to fund devotional degrees would
“extend”  them  “well  beyond  not  only  their  facts  but  their
reasoning.”  540  U. S.,  at  720.    In  my  view,  that  analysis
applies equally to this case.

Montana’s  law  does  not  punish  religious  exercise.
Cf. Locke, 540 U. S., at 720 (citing Church of Lukumi Ba-
balu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508  U. S.  520,  535  (1993));  see
ante, at 11.  It does not deny anyone, because of their faith,
the right to participate in political affairs of the community.
Cf. Locke, 540 U. S., at 720–721 (citing McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U. S. 618, 626 (1978)); see ante, at 11–12.  And it does
not require students to choose between their religious be-
liefs and receiving secular government aid such as unem-
ployment benefits.  Cf. Locke, 540 U. S., at 720 (citing Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403–404 (1963)); see ante, at
11–12.  The State has simply chosen not to fund programs
that, in significant part, typically involve the teaching and
practice of religious devotion.  And “a legislature’s decision
not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.”
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S.
540, 549 (1983); see also Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485
U. S. 360, 368 (1988).

I disagree, then, with what I see as the majority’s doctri-
nal omission, its misplaced application of a legal presump-
tion, and its suggestion that this presumption is appropri-
ate in many, if not all, cases involving government benefits.
As I see the matter, our differences run deeper than a sim-
ple disagreement about the application of prior case law.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal precedents to argue against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U53

[09-26-01 10:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

578

CHRISTENSEN v. HARRIS COUNTY

Opinion of the Court

Michael P. Fleming argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Michael A. Stafford, Bruce S.
Powers, and William John Bux.*

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 52
Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq. (1994 ed. and
Supp. III), States and their political subdivisions may com-
pensate their employees for overtime by granting them com-
pensatory time or “comp time,” which entitles them to take
time off work with full pay. § 207(o).
If the employees do
not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer
is obligated to pay cash compensation under certain circum-
stances.
§§ 207(o)(3)–(4). Fearing the ﬁscal consequences
of having to pay for accrued compensatory time, Harris
County adopted a policy requiring its employees to schedule
time off in order to reduce the amount of accrued compensa-
tory time. Employees of the Harris County Sheriff ’s De-
partment sued, claiming that the FLSA prohibits such a pol-
icy. The Court of Appeals rejected their claim. Finding
that nothing in the FLSA or its implementing regulations
prohibits an employer from compelling the use of compensa-
tory time, we afﬁrm.

I
A

The FLSA generally provides that hourly employees who
work in excess of 40 hours per week must be compensated

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jona-
than P. Hiatt, Deborah Greenﬁeld, James B. Coppess, and Laurence Gold;
for the International Association of Fire Fighters by Thomas A. Woodley;
and for the National Association of Police Organizations by Stephen R.
McSpadden.

Jeffrey A. Hollingsworth ﬁled a brief for Spokane Valley Fire Protec-

tion District No. 1 as amicus curiae urging afﬁrmance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes case citations, information about the parties involved, and the text of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>