<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–916
_________________

THRYV, INC., FKA DEX MEDIA, INC., PETITIONER v.
CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[April 20, 2020]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins

as to Parts I, II, III, and IV, dissenting.

Today the Court takes a flawed premise—that the Con-
stitution  permits  a  politically  guided  agency  to  revoke  an
inventor’s property right in an issued patent—and bends it
further,  allowing  the  agency’s  decision  to  stand  immune
from  judicial  review.  Worse,  the  Court  closes  the  court-
house not in a case where the patent owner is merely un-
happy  with  the  merits  of  the  agency’s  decision  but  where
the  owner  claims  the  agency’s  proceedings  were  unlawful
from the start.  Most remarkably, the Court denies judicial
review even though the government now concedes that the
patent owner is right and this entire exercise in property-
taking-by-bureaucracy was forbidden by law.

It  might  be  one  thing  if  Congress  clearly  ordained  this
strange  result.  But  it  did  not.  The  relevant  statute,  the
presumption of judicial review, and our precedent all point
toward  allowing,  not  forbidding,  inventors  their  day  in
court.  Yet, the Court brushes past these warning signs and,
in the process, carries us another step down the road of ced-
ing core judicial powers to agency officials and leaving the
disposition  of  private  rights  and  liberties  to  bureaucratic
mercy.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court.  It discusses legal precedent and the case at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U90

[09-15-00 14:33:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 357 (1998)

379

Souter, J., dissenting

ago when we observed in Morrissey v. Brewer that a parole
revocation proceeding “is often preferred to a new prosecu-
tion because of the procedural ease of recommitting the indi-
vidual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State.”
408
U. S., at 479; see also Cohen & Gobert, § 8.06, at 386 (“Favor-
ing the [exclusionary] rule’s applicability is the fact that the
revocation proceeding, often based on the items discovered
in the search, is used in lieu of a criminal trial”).

The reasons for this tendency to skip any new prosecution
are obvious.
If the conduct in question is a crime in its own
right, the odds of revocation are very high. Since time on
the street before revocation is not subtracted from the bal-
ance of the sentence to be served on revocation, Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U. S., at 480, the balance may well be long
enough to render recommitment the practical equivalent of
a new sentence for a separate crime. And all of this may
be accomplished without shouldering the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt; hence the obvious popularity of
revocation in place of new prosecution.

The upshot is that without a suppression remedy in revo-
cation proceedings, there will often be no inﬂuence capable
of deterring Fourth Amendment violations when parole rev-
ocation is a possible response to new crime. Suppression in
the revocation proceeding cannot be looked upon, then, as
furnishing merely incremental or marginal deterrence over
and above the effect of exclusion in criminal prosecution.
Instead, it will commonly provide the only deterrence to un-
constitutional conduct when the incarceration of parolees is
sought, and the reasons that support the suppression remedy
in prosecution therefore support it in parole revocation.

Because I would apply the exclusionary rule to evidence
offered in revocation hearings, I would afﬁrm the judgment
in this case. Scott gave written consent to warrantless
searches; the form he signed provided that he consented “to
the search of my person, property and residence, without a
warrant by agents of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter. It discusses the application of the exclusionary rule in parole revocation proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Syllabus

Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201.  Con-
temporaneous legal dictionaries explained that a claim does not “ac-
crue” as soon as the defendant acts, but only after the plaintiff suffers
the injury required to press her claim in court.

The Court’s precedent treats this definition of accrual as the “stand-
ard  rule  for  limitations  periods,”  Green,  578  U. S.,  at  554,  and  the
Court  has  “repeatedly  recognized  that  Congress  legislates  against”
this standard rule, Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U. S. 409, 418.  Conversely, the Court
has “reject[ed]” the possibility that a “limitations period commences at
a time when the [plaintiff] could not yet file suit” as “inconsistent with
basic  limitations  principles.”    Bay  Area  Laundry,  522  U. S.,  at  200.
The Court will not reach such a conclusion “in the absence of any such
indication in the text of the limitations period.”  Green, 578 U. S., at
554.  Departing from the traditional rule is particularly inappropriate
here because contemporaneous statutes demonstrate that Congress in
1948 knew how to create a limitations period that begins with the de-
fendant’s action instead of the plaintiff’s injury.

The Board would have this Court interpret §2401(a) as a defendant-
protective statute of repose that begins to run when agency action be-
comes final.  A statute of repose “puts an outer limit on the right to
bring a civil action” that is “measured. . . from the date of the last cul-
pable act or omission of the defendant.”  CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573
U. S. 1, 8.  But §2401(a)’s plaintiff-focused language makes it a “stat-
ute of limitations,” which—in contradistinction to statutes of repose—
are “based on the date when the claim accrued.”  Id., at 7–8.  Pp. 6–10.
(c)  The Board’s arguments to the contrary lack merit.  Pp. 10–23.

(1) The Board points to the many specific statutory review provi-
sions that start the clock at finality, contending that such statutes re-
flect a standard administrative-law practice of starting the limitations
period when “any proper plaintiff ” can challenge the final agency ac-
tion.  But  unlike  the  specific  review  provisions  that  the  Board  cites,
§2401(a)  does  not  refer  to  the  date  of  the  agency  action’s  “entry”  or
“promulgat[ion]”; it says “right of action first accrues.”  That textual
difference  matters.    The  latter  language  reflects  a  statute  of  limita-
tions and the former a statute of repose.  Moreover, the specific review
provisions  illustrate  that  Congress  has  sometimes  employed  the
Board’s  preferred  final-agency-action  rule—but  did  not  do  so  in
§2401(a).  As the Court observed in Rotkiske v. Klemm, it is “particu-
larly  inappropriate”  to  read  language  into  a  statute  of  limitations
“when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the
omitted language or provision.”  589 U. S. 8, 14.  Moreover, most of the
finality-focused statutes that the Board cites came after §2401(a) was
enacted in 1948.  These other, textually distinct statutes therefore do
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the syllabus. It outlines the legal reasoning and precedents used in a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
Opinion of the Court

Dept. of Labor, FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implemen-
tation Part 36, p. 4 (2017).  The Departments maintained
their position that the self-certification accommodation was
consistent with RFRA because it did not impose a substan-
tial burden and, even if it did, it utilized the least restrictive
means of achieving the Government’s interests.  Id., at 4–
5.

In 2017, the Departments tried yet again to comply with
Zubik, this time by promulgating the two IFRs that served
as the impetus for this litigation.  The first IFR significantly
broadened the definition of an exempt religious employer to
encompass an employer that “objects . . . based on its sin-
cerely held religious beliefs,” “to its establishing, maintain-
ing, providing, offering, or arranging [for] coverage or pay-
ments for some or all contraceptive services.”  82 Fed. Reg.
47812 (2017).  Among other things, this definition included
for-profit and publicly traded entities.  Because they were
exempt, these employers did not need to participate in the
accommodation  process,  which  nevertheless  remained
available under the IFR.  Id., at 47806.

As with their previous regulations, the Departments once
again invoked §300gg–13(a)(4) as authority to promulgate
this  “religious  exemption,”  stating  that  it  “include[d]  the
ability to exempt entities from coverage requirements an-
nounced in HRSA’s Guidelines.”  Id., at 47794.  Addition-
ally,  the  Departments  announced  for  the  first  time  that
RFRA  compelled  the  creation  of,  or  at  least  provided  the
discretion to create, the religious exemption.  Id., at 47800–
47806.  As  the  Departments  explained:  “We  know  from
Hobby  Lobby  that,  in  the  absence  of  any  accommodation,
the contraceptive-coverage requirement imposes a substan-
tial burden on certain objecting employers.  We know from
other lawsuits and public comments that many religious en-
tities have objections to complying with the [self-certification]
accommodation based on their sincerely held religious be-
liefs.”  Id., at 47806.  The Departments “believe[d] that the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically an opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a discussion of legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

ALITO, J., dissenting

rules on third-party standing provide a second, independ-
ent reason.  As a general rule, a plaintiff “must assert his
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to
relief  on  the  legal  rights  or  interests  of  third  parties.”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975).  We have recog-
nized a “limited” exception to this rule, but in order to qual-
ify,  a  litigant  must  demonstrate  (1)  closeness  to  the  third
party and (2) a hindrance to the third party’s ability to bring
suit.  Kowalski  v.  Tesmer,  543  U. S.  125,  129–130  (2004);
see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 410–411 (1991).

The record shows that abortion providers cannot satisfy
either  prong  of  this  test.    First,  a  woman  who  obtains  an
abortion typically does not develop a close relationship with
the doctor who performs the procedure.  On the contrary,
their  relationship  is  generally  brief  and  very  limited.  In
Louisiana, a woman may make her first visit to an abortion
clinic the day before the procedure, and if she goes to June
Medical, she is likely to have a short meeting with a coun-
selor,  not  the  doctor  who  will  actually  perform  the  proce-
dure.  See App. 784–786.  She will typically meet the abor-
tion doctor for the first time just before the procedure, and
if  Doe  1’s  description  is  representative,  their  relationship
consists of the doctor’s telling the woman what he will do,
offering to answer questions, informing her of his progress
as  the  abortion  is  performed,  and  asking  her  to  remain
calm.  Id., at 688.  Doe 4 testified that the surgical proce-
dure itself takes “two or three minutes.”  Record 14144.  Doe
3  testified  that  he  can  perform  six  abortions  an  hour  and
once performed 64 abortions in a 2-day period.  App. 207,
243.

In the case of medication abortions, patients are required
to schedule a follow-up appointment three weeks after the
procedure, see id., at 129–131, 690, but surgical abortions,
which  constitute  the  majority  of  the  procedures  at  June
Medical and across the State, do not require any follow-up,
id., at 691, and the great majority of women never return to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the legal standing of abortion providers and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. CAULKETT

Syllabus

interest  here  is  zero,  a  straightforward reading  of  the  statute  would
seem to favor the debtors.  This Court’s construction of §506(d)’s term
“secured  claim”  in  Dewsnup  v.  Timm,  502  U. S.  410,  however,  fore-
closes that reading and resolves the question presented here.  In de-
clining  to  permit  a  Chapter  7  debtor  to  “strip  down”  a  partially  un-
derwater  lien  under  §506(d)  to  the  value  of  the  collateral,  the  Court
in Dewsnup concluded that an allowed claim “secured by a lien with
recourse  to  the  underlying  collateral  . . .  does  not  come  within  the
scope  of  §506(d).”  Id.,  at  415.  Thus,  under  Dewsnup,  a  “secured
claim” is a claim supported by a security interest in property, regard-
less of whether the value of that property would be sufficient to cover
the claim.  Pp. 2–4.

(b) This  Court  declines  to  limit  Dewsnup  to  partially  underwater
liens.  Dewsnup’s definition did not depend on such a distinction.  Nor
is this distinction supported by Nobelman v. American Savings Bank,
508 U. S. 324, which addressed the interaction between the meaning
of the term “secured claim” in §506(a)—a definition that Dewsnup de-
clined to use for purposes of §506(d)—and an entirely separate provi-
sion,  §1322(b)(2).    See  508  U. S.,  at  327–332.    Finally,  the  debtors’
suggestion that the historical and policy concerns that motivated the
Court  in  Dewsnup  do  not  apply  in  the  context  of  wholly  underwater
liens  is  an  insufficient  justification  for  giving  the  term  “secured
claim” a different definition depending on the value of the collateral.
Ultimately,  the  debtors’  proposed  distinction  would  do  nothing  to
vindicate §506(d)’s original meaning and would leave an odd statuto-
ry framework in its place.  Pp. 5–7.

No. 13–1421, 566 Fed. Appx. 879, and No. 14–163, 556 Fed. Appx. 911,

reversed and remanded.

THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  SCALIA,  GINSBURG,  ALITO,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined,  and  in
which  KENNEDY,  BREYER,  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,  joined  except  as  to  the
footnote.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a condensed overview.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United  States  v. Detroit Timber  & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AMERICAN LEGION ET AL. v. AMERICAN HUMANIST
ASSN. ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED  STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–1717.  Argued February 27, 2019—Decided June 20, 2019 *

In  1918,  residents  of  Prince  George’s  County,  Maryland,  formed  a
committee for the purpose of erecting a memorial for the county’s sol-
diers  who  fell  in  World  War  I.  The committee decided that the me-
morial  should  be  a  cross,  which  was  not  surprising  since  the  plain
Latin  cross  had  become  a  central  symbol  of  the  war.    The image of
row  after  row  of  plain  white  crosses  marking the overseas graves of
soldiers  was  emblazoned  on  the  minds  of  Americans  at home.  The
memorial  would  stand  at  the  terminus  of  another World War I me-
morial—the  National  Defense  Highway  connecting  Washington  to
Annapolis.  When the committee ran out of funds, the local American
Legion  took  over  the  project, completing the memorial in 1925.  The
32-foot tall Latin cross displays the American Legion’s emblem at its
center  and  sits  on  a  large  pedestal  bearing,  inter  alia,  a  bronze
plaque that lists the names of the 49 county soldiers who had fallen
in  the  war.  At the dedication ceremony, a Catholic priest offered an
invocation and a Baptist pastor offered a benediction.  The Bladens-
burg Cross (Cross) has since been the site of patriotic events honoring
veterans  on,  e.g.,  V eterans  Day,  Memorial  Day,  and  Independence
Day.    Monuments  honoring  the veterans of other conflicts have been
added in a park near the Cross.  As the area around the Cross devel-
oped,  the  monument  came to be at the center of a busy intersection.
In 1961, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commis-
sion (Commission) acquired the Cross and the land where it sits, but

——————

* Together  with  No.  18–18,  Maryland-National  Capital  Park  and
Planning  Commission  v.  American  Humanist  Assn.  et al.,  also on certi-
orari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Court invokes that precedent to require a State to subsidize
religious  schools  if  it  enacts  an  education  tax  credit.    Be-
cause this decision further “slights both our precedents and
our history” and “weakens this country’s longstanding com-
mitment  to  a  separation  of  church  and  state  beneficial  to
both,” ibid., I respectfully dissent.

I
A
The  Montana  Supreme  Court  invalidated  a  state  tax-
credit program because it was inconsistent with the Mon-
tana Constitution’s “no-aid provision,” Art. X, §6(1), which
forbids government appropriations for sectarian purposes,
including  funding  religious  schools.  393  Mont.  446,  467–
468, 435 P. 3d 603, 614 (2018).  In so doing, the court ex-
pressly  declined  to  resolve  federal  constitutional  issues.
“Having concluded the Tax Credit Program violates” the no-
aid provision, the court held, “it is not necessary to consider
federal precedent interpreting the First Amendment’s less-
restrictive Establishment Clause.”  Ibid.  So too the court
declined to ground its holding on the Free Exercise Clause.
Ibid.    The  court  also  remedied  the  only  potential  harm  of
discriminatory treatment by striking down the program al-
together.  After  the  state  court’s  decision,  neither  secular
nor sectarian schools receive the program’s tax benefits.

Petitioners’  free  exercise  claim  is  not  cognizable.  The
Free Exercise Clause, the Court has said, protects against
“indirect  coercion  or  penalties  on  the  free  exercise  of  reli-
gion.”  Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.,
485 U. S. 439, 450 (1988).  Accordingly, this Court’s cases
have  required  not  only  differential  treatment,  cf.  ante,  at
11–12,  but  also  a  resulting  burden  on  religious  exercise,
Lyng, 485 U. S., at 450–451.

Neither  differential  treatment  nor  coercion  exists  here
because the Montana Supreme Court invalidated the tax-
credit program entirely.  393 Mont., at 467–468, 435 P. 3d,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of *Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue*.  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the case, referencing constitutional provisions and previous court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxxii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
943
Oklahoma; Hooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oklahoma; Humphreys v.
930
Oklahoma; Hung Thanh Le v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oklahoma; Keller v.
957
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oklahoma; Shown v.
958
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oklahoma; Toles v.
930
Oklahoma; Willingham v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
Ooley; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Oregon; Borck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Oregon; Boyd v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Oregon Dept. of Revenue; Pollin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
O’Riley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Orlick v. Katz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Ortiz v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
151
Ortiz v. Reed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Osman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Owens v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Oy Partek Ab v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pabst Brewing Co.; Rossetto v.
927
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Padilla-Pena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,906
Pahl, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,972
915
Painters Local Union No. 109 Pension Fund v. Smith Barney, Inc.
962
Palomo v. Territory of Guam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Panetti v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Paramount Pictures Corp.; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909,970
941
Parks v. Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Parks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965
Parnar v. Law Ofﬁces of John A. Chanin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Partek Ab v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
Pashuck v. Cooksey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913
Patterson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
Patterson; Anchorage Ed. Assn. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Payne v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
Pearson v. Hines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Pecaro v. New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing . . . . . . . . . .
982
Peguero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960
Pena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Penilla; Settles v.
929
Pennsylvania; Donohue v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
Pennsylvania; Elliott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pennsylvania; Washington v.
942
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole; Jones v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
357
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

marks omitted).

A
In  its  1864  election  platform,  the  Republican  Party
pledged to amend the Constitution to accomplish the “utter
and  complete  extirpation”  of  slavery  from  “the  soil  of  the
Republic.”  2 A. Schlesinger, History of U. S. Political Par-
ties  1860–1910,  p. 1303  (1973).    After  their  landslide  vic-
tory,  Republicans  quickly  moved  to  make  good  on  that
promise.  Congress proposed what would become the Thir-
teenth  Amendment  to  the  States  in  January  1865,  and  it
was ratified as part of the Constitution later that year.  The
new Amendment stated that “[n]either slavery nor involun-
tary servitude . . . shall exist” in the United States “except
as  a  punishment  for  crime  whereof  the  party  shall  have
been duly convicted.”  §1.  It thus not only prohibited States
from themselves enslaving persons, but also obligated them
to end enslavement by private individuals within their bor-
ders.  Its Framers viewed the text broadly, arguing that it
“allowed  Congress  to  legislate  not  merely  against  slavery
itself, but against all the badges and relics of a slave sys-
tem.”  A.  Amar,  America’s  Constitution:  A  Biography  362
(2005)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  The  Amend-
ment also authorized “Congress . . . to enforce” its terms “by
appropriate  legislation”—authority  not  granted  in  any
prior  Amendment.  §2.  Proponents  believed  this  enforce-
ment clause permitted legislative measures designed to ac-
complish the Amendment’s broader goal of equality for the
freedmen.

It  quickly  became  clear,  however,  that  further  amend-
ment would be necessary to safeguard that goal.  Soon after
the  Thirteenth  Amendment’s  adoption,  the  reconstructed
Southern  States  began  to  enact  “Black  Codes,”  which  cir-
cumscribed the newly won freedoms of blacks.  The Black
Code of Mississippi, for example, “imposed all sorts of disa-
bilities”  on  blacks,  “including  limiting  their  freedom  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College*. It discusses the history and interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
ALITO, J., dissenting

Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied
private right of action,” I also agree that there is no room
for “a multifactor balancing test to pick and choose which
federal requirements may be enforced by §1983 and which
may not.”  Id., at 286, 290 (emphasis added) (rejecting the
standard articulated in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329,
340–341 (1997)).  None of this is new ground.  We have pre-
viously held that  Gonzaga  “plainly repudiate[s] the ready
implication of a §1983 action that” our earlier decisions “ex-
emplified.”  Armstrong  v.  Exceptional  Child  Center,  Inc.,
575 U. S. 320, 330, n. (2015).

to

treat  medical  symptoms.”

The  two  FNHRA  provisions  that  respondent  invokes
demonstrate what it takes to satisfy this demanding stand-
ard.  First, the Act mandates that a “nursing facility must
protect and promote the rights of each resident, including
. . .  [t]he  right  to  be  free  from  . . .  chemical  restraints  im-
posed for purposes of discipline or convenience and not re-
quired
42  U. S. C.
§1396r(c)(1)(A).  Second,  the  Act  protects  “[t]ransfer  and
discharge  rights,”  precluding  a  “nursing  facility”  from
transferring  or  discharging  “each  resident”  except  in  cer-
tain  circumstances.    §1396r(c)(2)(A)  (boldface  deleted).
Both of these provisions explicitly use the term “rights” to
describe discrete and concrete duties that a defined party
(“nursing  facility”)  owes  to  a  particular  individual  (“each
resident”).  When  these  features  are  taken  together,  they
satisfy  the  standard  for  determining  whether  a  personal
right exists.  See Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 285–286; Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 288–289 (2001).

II
A
When determining whether individual rights are enforce-
able under §1983, I again see much common ground with
the majority and agree entirely with JUSTICE Barrett’s ex-
planation of the governing standard.  That question “boils
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It delves into legal arguments regarding the interpretation of §1983 and the enforceability of rights under it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

A  plaintiff  must  also  establish  that  the  defendant’s
conduct  was “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme
in  degree,  as  to  go  beyond  all  possible  bounds  of  decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
a  civilized  community.’ ”    Id.,  at  567,  380  A. 2d,  at  614
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, Comment d).

Although  the  elements  of  the  IIED  tort  are  difficult  to
meet, respondents long ago abandoned any effort to show
that  those  tough  standards  were  not  satisfied  here.    On
appeal,  they  chose  not  to  contest  the  sufficiency  of  the
evidence.  See  580  F. 3d  206,  216  (CA4  2009).    They  did
not  dispute  that  Mr.  Snyder  suffered  “ ‘wounds  that  are
truly  severe  and  incapable  of  healing  themselves.’ ”    Fi-
gueiredo-Torres,  supra,  at  653,  584  A. 2d,  at  75.    Nor  did
they  dispute  that  their  speech  was  “ ‘so  outrageous  in
character,  and  so  extreme  in  degree,  as  to  go  beyond  all
possible  bounds  of  decency,  and  to  be  regarded  as  atro-
cious,  and  utterly  intolerable  in  a  civilized  community.’ ”
Harris,  supra,  at  567,  380  A. 2d,  at  614.    Instead,  they
maintained that the First Amendment gave them a license
to engage in such conduct.  They are wrong.

II

It  is  well  established  that  a  claim  for  the  intentional
infliction of emotional distress can be satisfied by speech.
Indeed,  what  has  been  described  as  “[t]he  leading  case”
recognizing this tort involved speech.  Prosser and Keeton,
supra,  §12,  at  60  (citing  Wilkinson  v.  Downton,  [1897]  2
Q. B.  57);  see  also  Restatement  (Second)  of  Torts  §46,
illustration  1.    And  although  this  Court  has  not  decided
the question, I think it is clear that the First Amendment
does  not  entirely  preclude  liability  for  the  intentional
infliction of emotional distress by means of speech.

This Court has recognized that words may “by their very
utterance  inflict  injury”  and  that  the  First  Amendment
does  not  shield  utterances  that  form  “no  essential  part  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and discusses the elements of a tort claim.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

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12

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Opinion of the Court

the challenged provision. See id., at 761. And the Court
thought this fact helped make clear that the action arose
“under the Act whose beneﬁts [were] sought.”
Ibid. But
in a later case, Ringer, the Court reached a similar result
despite the absence of any request for such relief. See 466
U. S., at 616, 623.

In Ringer, four individuals brought a § 1331 action chal-
lenging the lawfulness (under statutes and the Constitution)
of the agency’s determination not to provide Medicare
Part A reimbursement to those who had undergone a partic-
ular medical operation. The Court held that § 405(h) barred
§ 1331 jurisdiction over the action, even though the challenge
was in part to the agency’s procedures, the relief requested
amounted simply to a declaration of invalidity (not an order
requiring payment), and one plaintiff had as yet no valid
claim for reimbursement because he had not even undergone
the operation and would likely never do so unless a court set
aside as unlawful the challenged agency “no reimbursement”
determination. See id., at 614–616, 621–623. The Court
reiterated that § 405(h) applies where “both the standing and
the substantive basis for the presentation” of a claim is the
Medicare Act, id., at 615 (quoting Salﬁ, 422 U. S., at 760–761)
(internal quotation marks omitted), adding that a “claim for
future beneﬁts” is a § 405(h) “claim,” 466 U. S., at 621–622,
and that “all aspects” of any such present or future claim
must be “channeled” through the administrative process, id.,
at 614. See also Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc.
v. Shalala, 525 U. S. 449, 456 (1999); Califano v. Sanders, 430
U. S. 99, 103–104, n. 3 (1977).

As so interpreted, the bar of § 405(h) reaches beyond ordi-
nary administrative law principles of “ripeness” and “ex-
haustion of administrative remedies,” see Salﬁ, supra, at
757—doctrines that in any event normally require channel-
ing a legal challenge through the agency. See Abbott Labo-
ratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 148–149 (1967) (ripeness);
McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193–196 (1969) (ex-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Ringer and its implications for the interpretation of § 405(h) of the Social Security Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xi

Bello v. University of Dayton School of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Benally v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Benavides v. Gerver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bender v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Benn v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bennett; Artuz v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Benns v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Benson v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Benson v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bentley v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Berget v. Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Berman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Betemit v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bienvenu; Schroder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bierley v. Connelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Big D Enterprises, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Biggs v. Borg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
Bill Harbert Construction Co.; Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v.
Bisby v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bitterman v. Harding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Black, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blakeney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blanchet; Cohen v.
Blanton; Rayonier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blitchington v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blue v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blueﬁeld State College; Aziz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Board of Ed., Anne Arundel County; Salanik v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Board of Ed., Downey Uniﬁed School Dist.; DiLoreto v. . . . . . . . .
Board of Public Ed. for Savannah and Chatham County; Hearn v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Board of Review, Dept. of Labor; Lerro v.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Board of Zoning Appeals, King George County; Hershﬁeld v.
. . .
Bocelli v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bock v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bockhorst, Ehrlich & Kaminskee; Kalan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bogan; Manthei v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boglino; Whitford v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bohn; Sikora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boise Cascade Corp.; Beachy v.
Bolden v. Hesson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bolling v. Circuit Court of Va., Richmond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bollman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1083
1032
1131
1029
1083
1065
1079
1076
1117
1122
1042
1085
1137
1056
1050,1107
1018
1116
193
1124
1114
1085
1055
1058
1095
1101
1074
1004
1096
1067
1109
217
1034
1001,1065
1054
1070
1086
1033
1132
1075
1106
1021
1112
1057
1135
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, listing case names and corresponding page numbers. It is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U41

[09-26-01 09:10:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN

272

FLORIDA v. J. L.

Opinion of the Court

for United States 16. These contentions misapprehend the
reliability needed for a tip to justify a Terry stop.

An accurate description of a subject’s readily observable
location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited
sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person
whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however,
does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed
criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue re-
quires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not
just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. Cf. 4
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(h), p. 213 (3d ed. 1996)
(distinguishing reliability as to identiﬁcation, which is often
important in other criminal law contexts, from reliability as
to the likelihood of criminal activity, which is central
in
anonymous-tip cases).

A second major argument advanced by Florida and the
United States as amicus is, in essence, that the standard
Terry analysis should be modiﬁed to license a “ﬁrearm ex-
ception.” Under such an exception, a tip alleging an illegal
gun would justify a stop and frisk even if the accusation
would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. We de-
cline to adopt this position.

Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers some-
times justify unusual precautions. Our decisions recognize
the serious threat that armed criminals pose to public safety;
Terry’s rule, which permits protective police searches on the
basis of reasonable suspicion rather than demanding that of-
ﬁcers meet the higher standard of probable cause, responds
to this very concern. See 392 U. S., at 30. But an auto-
matic ﬁrearm exception to our established reliability analysis
would rove too far. Such an exception would enable any
person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intru-
sive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person sim-
ply by placing an anonymous call
falsely reporting the
target’s unlawful carriage of a gun. Nor could one securely
conﬁne such an exception to allegations involving ﬁrearms.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case Florida v. J.L. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

369

Opinion of the Court

lar distinction into BCRA’s disclosure requirements.  We re
ject this contention.

The  Court  has  explained  that  disclosure  is  a  less  restric
tive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of
speech.  See, e. g., MCFL, 479 U. S., at 262.  In Buckley, the
Court  upheld  a  disclosure  requirement  for  independent  ex
penditures  even  though  it  invalidated  a  provision  that  im
posed  a  ceiling  on  those  expenditures.  424  U. S.,  at  75–76.
In  McConnell, three  Justices  who  would  have  found  § 441b
to  be  unconstitutional  nonetheless  voted  to  uphold  BCRA’s
disclosure  and  disclaimer  requirements.  540  U. S.,  at  321
(opinion  of  Kennedy,  J.,  joined  by  Rehnquist,  C.  J.,  and
Scalia, J.).  And the Court has upheld registration and dis
closure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has
no  power  to  ban  lobbying  itself.  United  States  v.  Harriss,
347 U. S. 612, 625 (1954) (Congress “has merely provided for
a  modicum  of  information  from  those  who  for  hire  attempt
to  inﬂuence  legislation  or  who  collect  or  spend  funds  for
that purpose”).  For these reasons, we reject Citizens Unit
ed’s contention that the disclosure requirements must be lim
ited  to  speech  that  is  the  functional  equivalent  of  express
advocacy.

Citizens  United  also  disputes  that  an  informational  inter
est  justiﬁes  the  application  of  § 201  to  its  ads,  which  only
attempt to persuade viewers to see the ﬁlm.  Even if it dis
closed the funding sources for the ads, Citizens United says,
the  information  would  not  help  viewers  make  informed
choices  in  the  political  marketplace.  This  is  similar  to  the
argument rejected above with respect to disclaimers.  Even
if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public
has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate
shortly before an election.  Because the informational inter
est  alone  is  sufﬁcient  to  justify  application  of  § 201  to  these
ads,  it  is  not  necessary  to  consider  the  Government’s  other
asserted interests.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Citizens United case and the constitutionality of disclosure requirements. It's part of the legal argument and not suitable for indexing as standalone content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

Opinion of the Court

579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3).  The Patent Act provides
that, “[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, patents shall
have  the  attributes  of  personal  property.”    35  U. S. C.
§261.    This  provision  qualifies  any  property  rights  that  a
patent  owner  has  in  an  issued  patent,  subjecting  them  to
the express provisions of the Patent Act.  See eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 392 (2006).  Those
provisions include inter partes review.  See §§311–319.
  Nor do the precedents that Oil States cites foreclose the
kind of post-issuance administrative review that Congress
has  authorized  here.    To  be  sure,  two  of  the  cases  make
broad declarations that “[t]he only authority competent to
set  a  patent  aside,  or  to  annul  it,  or  to  correct  it  for  any
reason  whatever,  is  vested  in  the  courts  of  the  United
States,  and  not  in  the  department  which  issued  the  pat-
ent.”    McCormick  Harvesting  Machine  Co.,  supra,  at  609;
accord,  American  Bell  Telephone  Co.,  128  U. S.,  at  364.
But  those  cases  were  decided  under  the  Patent  Act  of
1870.  See id., at 371; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co.,
supra,  at  611.    That  version  of  the  Patent  Act  did  not
include  any  provision  for  post-issuance  administrative
review.    Those  precedents,  then,  are  best  read  as  a  de-
scription of the statutory scheme that existed at that time.
They do not resolve Congress’ authority under the Consti-
tution to establish a different scheme.3

——————

3 The dissent points to McCormick’s statement that the Patent Office
Commissioner could not invalidate the patent at issue because it would
“ ‘deprive the applicant of his property without due process of law, and
would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch.’ ”  Post, at 10 (quot-
ing McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 606, 612
(1898)).  But that statement followed naturally from the Court’s deter-
mination  that,  under  the  Patent  Act  of  1870,  the  Commissioner  “was
functus  officio”  and  “had  no  power  to  revoke,  cancel,  or  annul”  the
patent at issue.  169 U. S., at 611–612.

Nor  is  it  significant  that  the  McCormick  Court  “equated  invention
patents with land patents.”  Post, at 10.  McCormick itself makes clear
that  the  analogy  between  the  two  depended  on  the  particulars  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Patent Act and the authority of administrative bodies to review patents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

viii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
1062
1018
1050
1010
1120
1092
1033
1117
1111
1018
1058
1145
1032
1065
1074
1119
1086
1001
1115

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arkansas; McGuire v.
Arkansas Dept. of Pollution Control and Ecology; Grifﬁth v.
. . . .
Arlington County School Bd. v. Tuttle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Armendariz-Mata v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Armentrout v. Missouri
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Armstrong v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Armstrong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arnaiz; Flanagan v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arnold v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arpaio; Mauro v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arrington v. Broward Community College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arrington v. Broward Community College, South Campus . . . . . .
Arroyo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Artuz v. Bennett
Artuz; Grosso v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ascura v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ashford v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ashiegbu v. Purviance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Askins; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Association. For labor union, see name of trade.
Atamian v. Gorkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atkins v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atkins v. Tessmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atlanta; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atraqchi v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atraqchi v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
AT&T Corp.; Audio Entertainment Network, Inc. v.
AT&T Corp.; Jay v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AT&T Corp.; M. C. Products v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AT&T Corp.; MRO Communications, Inc. v.
AT&T Management Pension Plan; Samaroo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General; Friend v.
Attorney General; Rashid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General; Raulerson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General; Richardson v.
. . .
Attorney General of Ala. v. Summit Medical Associates, P. C.
Attorney General of Fla.; Malowney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General of Neb. v. Carhart
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General of N. J.; Markay v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General of N. M.; Marsh v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General of Tenn.; Polyak v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General of Va.; Thomas v.
Atwell v. Atwell
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1135
1039
1134
1056
1059
1101
1144
1049
1144
1124
1062
1083
1136
1102
1036
1012
1055
1002,1016,1051,1086
1076
1009
1094
1085
1088
1080
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, not the main body text of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:

 603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Syllabus

Ibid.  Pp. 17–19.

(2) With the above principles in mind, the Court turns to the con-
duct alleged in the indictment.  Certain allegations—such as those in-
volving  Trump’s  discussions  with  the  Acting  Attorney  General—are
readily categorized in light of the nature of the President’s official re-
lationship  to  the  office  held  by  that  individual.    Other  allegations—
such as those involving Trump’s interactions with the Vice President,
state  officials,  and  certain  private  parties,  and  his  comments  to  the
general public—present more difficult questions.  Pp. 19–30.

(i) The  indictment  alleges  that  as  part  of  their  conspiracy  to
overturn  the  legitimate  results  of  the  2020  presidential  election,
Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to leverage the Justice De-
partment’s power and authority to convince certain States to replace
their  legitimate  electors  with  Trump’s  fraudulent  slates  of  electors.
According  to  the  indictment,  Trump  met  with  the  Acting  Attorney
General and other senior Justice Department and White House offi-
cials to discuss investigating purported election fraud and sending a
letter from the Department to those States regarding such fraud.  The
indictment further alleges that after the Acting Attorney General re-
sisted Trump’s requests, Trump repeatedly threatened to replace him.
The Government does not dispute that the indictment’s allegations
regarding  the  Justice  Department  involve  Trump’s  use  of  official
power.  The allegations in fact plainly implicate Trump’s “conclusive
and preclusive” authority.  The Executive Branch has “exclusive au-
thority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate
and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime.
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 693.  And the President’s “management of the Ex-
ecutive Branch” requires him to have “unrestricted power to remove
the most important of his subordinates”—such as the Attorney Gen-
eral—“in their most important duties.”  Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 750.
The  indictment’s  allegations  that  the  requested  investigations  were
shams or proposed for an improper purpose do not divest the President
of  exclusive  authority  over  the  investigative  and  prosecutorial  func-
tions of the Justice Department and its officials.  Because the Presi-
dent  cannot  be  prosecuted  for  conduct  within  his  exclusive  constitu-
tional authority, Trump is absolutely immune from prosecution for the
alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department of-
ficials.  Pp. 19–21.

(ii) The indictment next alleges that Trump and his co-conspira-
tors “attempted to enlist the Vice President to use his ceremonial role
at the January 6 certification proceeding to fraudulently alter the elec-
tion results.”  App. 187, Indictment ¶10(d).  In particular, the indict-
ment alleges several conversations in which Trump pressured the Vice
President to reject States’ legitimate electoral votes or send them back
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It outlines legal arguments and precedents related to the indictment of a former president.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

33

ALITO, J., dissenting

other  situation  in  which  a  party  is  allowed  to  invoke  the
right of a third party with blatantly adverse interests.  The
rule that the majority applies here is an abortion-only rule.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE properly notes that subsequent legal
developments may support overruling a precedent, ante, at
3–4, and that factor too is present here.  Both our general
standing  jurisprudence  and  our  treatment  of  third-party
standing have changed since Singleton.  We have stressed
the importance of insisting that a plaintiff assert an injury
that is particular to its own situation.  See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 7); Clapper
v. Amnesty  Int’l USA,  568 U. S. 398, 409 (2013); Lujan  v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992).  Moreover,
in  Kowalski,  543  U. S.  125,  we  refined  our  rule  for  third-
party  standing,  and  in  Newdow,  542  U. S.  1,  we  made  it
clear that a plaintiff cannot sue on behalf of a third party if
the parties’ interests may conflict.

The presence or absence of reliance is often a critical fac-
tor in applying the doctrine of stare decisis, see, e.g., Fran-
chise Tax Bd., 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17); Janus, 585
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 44); South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,
585  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2018)  (slip  op.,  at  20);  Hilton  v.  South
Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197, 206–207
(1991),  but  neither  the  plurality  nor  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE
claims  that  any  reliance  interests  are  at  stake  here.
Women wishing to obtain abortions have not taken any ac-
tion in reliance on the ability of abortion providers to sue on
their behalf, and eliminating third-party standing for pro-
viders would not interfere with the ability of women to sue.
Nor does it appear that abortion providers have done any-
thing  in  reliance  on  the  special  third-party  standing  rule
they have enjoyed.  If that rule were abrogated, they could
still ask to intervene or appear as an amicus curiae in a suit
brought by a woman, but it is deeply offensive to our rules
of standing to permit them to sue in the name of their pa-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent, standing, and the implications of overruling a previous decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

defendant is a fiduciary who has been entrusted with prop-
erty of some kind belonging to the plaintiff,” even if the de-
fendant is not “express[ly]” named a “trustee.”  J. Eichen-
grun, Remedying the Remedy of Accounting,  60 Ind. L. J.
463,  468–469,  and  n. 18  (1985)  (noting  cases);  see  also  A.
Newman, G. Bogert, & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trus-
tees §967, p. 201 (3d ed. 2010) (“fiduciary relationship [is]
sufficient to support an action for an accounting” whenever
the fiduciary exercises “discretion over trust” assets).

B

With these principles in mind, return to the Navajo’s case
and start with the most basic terms of the parties’ agree-
ment.  In signing the Treaty of 1868, the Navajo agreed to
“relinquish  all  right  to  occupy  any  territory  outside  their
reservation.”  Art. IX, 15 Stat. 670.  In exchange, the Navajo
were entitled to “make the reservation . . . their permanent
home.”  Art.  XIII,  id.,  at  671.  Even  standing  alone,  that
language  creates  enforceable  water  rights  under  Winters.
As both parties surely would have recognized, no people can
make a permanent home without the ability to draw on ad-
equate water.  Otherwise, the Tribe’s land would be “prac-
tically valueless,” “defeat[ing] the declared purpose” of the
Treaty.  Winters, 207 U. S., at 576–577.

Other clues make the point even more obvious.  Various
features of the Treaty were expressly keyed to an assump-
tion  about  the  availability  of  water.    The  United  States
agreed to build certain structures “within said reservation,
where . . . water may be convenient.”  Art. III, 15 Stat. 668.
Under the Treaty’s terms, too, individual Navajo were enti-
tled to select tracts of land within the reservation to “com-
mence  farming”  and  for  “purposes  of  cultivation.”  Art. V,
ibid.  If an individual could show that he “intend[ed] in good
faith  to  commence  cultivating  the  soil  for  a  living,”  the
Treaty entitled him to “receive seeds and agricultural im-
plements.”  Art. VII,  id.,  at  669.  Similarly,  the  Treaty
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and analyzes the terms of a treaty.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1128

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 22, 2000

529 U. S.

of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40
days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred
from the practice of law in this Court.

No. 99M87. Zimbovsky v. Massachusetts. Motion to direct
the Clerk to ﬁle petition for writ of certiorari out of time under
this Court’s Rule 14.5 denied.

No. 99M88. Tillis Trucking Co., Inc. v. Moses et al.; and
No. 99M89. Huertas Barbosa et al. v. Alejandro Bui-
trago Hospital et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to ﬁle peti-
tions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.

No. 99–1295. Gitlitz et al. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. C. A. 10th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1097.]
Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint
appendix granted.

No. 99–8264. Delespine v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division,
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration
of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante,
p. 1063] denied.

No. 99–9052. Samuel v. Nathan’s Famous Operating Corp.
C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until June 12, 2000, within
which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to
submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of
this Court.

No. 99–9267.
corpus denied.

In re Cavanaugh. Petition for writ of habeas

No. 99–9294.

In re Galloway. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As peti-
tioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
Justice Stevens dissents. See
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
id., at 4, and cases cited therein.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal journal or database. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

the  shooter,  who  must  repeatedly  activate  the  trigger  for
each shot.  Predictably, the House and Senate Reports re-
flect the same understanding of the phrase.  See H. R. Rep.
No. 1780, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (reporting that the
statute “contains the usual definition of machine gun as a
weapon designed  to shoot  more  than  one shot without  re-
loading  and  by  a  single  pull  of  the  trigger”);  S. Rep.  No.
1444, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (same).
  The  majority  cannot  disregard  these  statements  as  evi-
dence of legislative purpose.2  They are, along with contem-
poraneous dictionary definitions, some of the best evidence
of contemporaneous understanding.  Cf. McDonald v. Chi-
cago, 561 U. S. 742, 828 (2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (“Statements by legisla-
tors can assist . . . to the extent they demonstrate the man-
ner  in  which  the  public  used  or  understood  a  particular
word  or  phrase”).    Indeed,  at  oral  argument,  when  asked
what evidence there was “that as of 1934, the ordinary un-
derstanding of the phrase ‘function of the trigger’ referred
to  the  mechanics  of  the  gun  rather  than  . . .  the  shooter’s
motion,”  respondent’s  lawyer  could  not  point  to  a  single
piece of evidence that supports the majority’s reading.  Tr.
of  Oral  Arg.  98;  see  id.,  at  98–101.    He  even  agreed  that
Congress used the word “function” to ensure that the stat-
ute covered a wide variety of trigger mechanisms, including
both push and pull triggers.  Id., at 101–102.  In short, the
majority disregards the unrefuted evidence of the text’s or-
dinary  and  contemporaneous  meaning,  substituting  in-
stead its own understanding of the internal mechanics of an
AR–15 without looking at the actions of the shooter.

 This Court itself has also previously read the definition
of “machinegun” in this exact statute to refer to the action
——————

2 Of course, “authoritative legislative history can be useful, even when
the meaning can be discerned from the statute’s language, to reinforce
or to confirm a court’s sense of the text.”  R. Katzmann, Judging Statutes
35 (2014).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically focusing on the interpretation of a specific phrase within a statute. It cites legislative history and legal precedent to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 274 (1998)

289

Opinion of the Court

ing payment of monetary damages, and there is no indication
that payment of damages has been demanded as a condition
of ﬁnding a recipient to be in compliance with the statute.
See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Franklin
v. Gwinnett County School District, O. T. 1991, No. 90–918,
In Franklin, for instance, the Department of Educa-
p. 24.
tion found a violation of Title IX but determined that the
school district came into compliance by virtue of the offend-
ing teacher’s resignation and the district’s institution of a
grievance procedure for sexual harassment complaints.
503
U. S., at 64, n. 3.

Presumably, a central purpose of requiring notice of the
violation “to the appropriate person” and an opportunity for
voluntary compliance before administrative enforcement
proceedings can commence is to avoid diverting education
funding from beneﬁcial uses where a recipient was unaware
of discrimination in its programs and is willing to institute
prompt corrective measures. The scope of private damages
relief proposed by petitioners is at odds with that basic
objective. When a teacher’s sexual harassment is imputed
to a school district or when a school district is deemed to
have “constructively” known of the teacher’s harassment,
by assumption the district had no actual knowledge of the
teacher’s conduct. Nor, of course, did the district have an
opportunity to take action to end the harassment or to limit
further harassment.

It would be unsound, we think, for a statute’s express sys-
tem of enforcement to require notice to the recipient and
an opportunity to come into voluntary compliance while a
judicially implied system of enforcement permits substantial
liability without regard to the recipient’s knowledge or its
corrective actions upon receiving notice. Cf. Central Bank
of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A.,
511 U. S., at 180 (“[I]t would be ‘anomalous to impute to Con-
gress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially
implied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 274 (1998).  It discusses the purpose of notice and opportunity to comply in the context of Title IX enforcement.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

§7.6.1.2(a),  at  7:141.9   But  if,  as  the  Court  holds,  such
copies  can  in  any  event  be  imported  by  virtue  of  §109(a),
§602(a)(3)’s  work  has  already  been  done.  For  example,
had  Congress  conceived  of  §109(a)’s  sweep  as  the  Court
does,  what  earthly  reason  would  there  be  to  provide,  as
Congress  did  in  §602(a)(3)(C),  that  a  library  may  import
“no more than five copies” of a non-audiovisual work for its
“lending or archival purposes”?

The  far  more  plausible  reading  of  §§109(a)  and  602(a),
then, is that Congress intended §109(a) to apply to copies
made  in  the  United  States,  not  to  copies  manufactured
and sold abroad.  That reading of the first sale and impor
tation  provisions  leaves  §602(a)(3)’s  exceptions  with  real,
meaningful  work  to  do.    See  TRW  Inc.  v.  Andrews,  534
U. S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory
construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so
construed  that,  if  it  can  be  prevented,  no  clause,  sen
tence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  In the range of circum-
stances  covered  by  the  exceptions,  §602(a)(3)  frees  indi
viduals  and  entities  who  purchase  foreign-made  copies
abroad  from  the  requirement  they  would  otherwise  face
under  §602(a)(1)  of  obtaining  the  copyright  owner’s  per
mission to import the copies into the United States.10

——————

9 The term “gray market good” refers to a good that is “imported out
side  the  distribution  channels  that  have  been  contractually  negotiated
by  the  intellectual  property  owner.”    Forsyth  &  Rothnie,  Parallel
Imports,  in  The  Interface  Between  Intellectual  Property  Rights  and
Competition  Policy  429  (S.  Anderman  ed.  2007).    Such  goods  are  also
commonly called “parallel imports.”  Ibid.

10 The  Court  asserts  that  its  reading  of  §109(a)  is  bolstered  by  §104,
which extends the copyright “protection[s]” of Title 17 to a wide variety
of foreign works.  See ante, at 10–11.  The “protection under this title”
afforded  by  §104,  however,  is  merely  protection  against  infringing
conduct within the United States, the only place where Title 17 applies.
See  4  W.  Patry,  Copyright  §13:44.10,  pp. 13–128  to  13–129  (2012)
(hereinafter Patry).  Thus, my reading of the phrase “under this title” in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. It delves into the interpretation of copyright law regarding the importation of copyrighted materials.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xvii

Page

953

Barnes; Allen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Barnes v. Cain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Barnes v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

Barnes v. Harrison-Belk  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920

Barnes v. Martinez  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Barnes v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

Barnett v. Boatwright
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barnett v. Roper
1059

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barnett v. United States
817

Barr v. Lafon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barr; Morters v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  946,1065

920

Barragan v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barrera v. United States
1082

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barrett v. Lamarque
852

Barrett v. Mississippi  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barrett v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  946,992

1051

Barrios-Beltran v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1100

Barron v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099

Barros v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Barry v. Holder
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

Barsch v. O’Toole  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132

Bartleson; Swain v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1146

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bartoli, In re
861

Bartow; Pharm v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bartow; Suttle v.
Bartsch v. California
832

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1007

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Basardh v. Gates
1008

Basciano v. Martinez
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Bason v. Yukins  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bass-Jones Lesure; Bell v.
918

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Batavichus v. Holder
865

Bataz Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bates v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  840,863

836

Batista v. New York  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Batiste v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948

Battle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Bauer; Mark v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

Baugh v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baumer v. Cate
1050

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baumgartner v. Ohio
821

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baumhammers v. Pennsylvania
856

Baumruk v. Missouri
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
863

Bavishi v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925

Baxter v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CARNEY, GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE v. ADAMS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 19–309.  Argued October 5, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020

Delaware’s Constitution contains a political balance requirement for ap-
pointments to the State’s major courts.  No more than a bare majority
of judges on any of its five major courts “shall be of the same political
party.”  Art. IV, §3.  In addition, on three of those courts, those mem-
bers  not  in  the  bare  majority  “shall  be  of  the  other  major  political
party.”  Ibid.    Respondent  James  R.  Adams,  a  Delaware  lawyer  and
political  independent,  sued  in  Federal  District  Court,  claiming  that
Delaware’s “bare majority” and “major party” requirements violate his
First Amendment right to freedom of association by making him inel-
igible to become a judge unless he joins a major political party.  The
District Court held that Adams had standing to challenge both require-
ments  and  that  Delaware’s  balancing  scheme  was  unconstitutional.
The Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.  It held that
Adams did have standing to challenge the major party requirement,
because it categorically excludes independents from becoming judges
on three courts, but that he lacked standing to challenge the bare ma-
jority requirement, which does not preclude independents from eligi-
bility for any vacancy.

Held: Because Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to ap-
ply for a judicial vacancy in the  imminent future, he has failed to show
a  “personal,”  “concrete,”  and  “imminent”  injury necessary  for  Article
III standing.  Pp. 4–13.

(a) Two aspects of standing doctrine are relevant here.  First, stand-
ing requires an “ ‘injury in fact’ ” that must be “concrete and particu-
larized,” as well as “ ‘actual or imminent.’ ”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U. S. 555, 560.  Second, a grievance that amounts to nothing
more than an abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in
the proper application of the law does not count as an “injury in fact”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 220 (2010)

231

Alito, J., dissenting

34–38.  If  any  such  questions  had  been  asked  and  answers
favorable  to  petitioner’s  position  had  been  provided,  one
would expect that information to appear in the proffer.

After  examining  the  proffer  made  by  petitioner’s  attor
neys,  the  District  Court  concluded  that  this  submission  did
not  justify  formal  discovery.  With  respect  to  what  the  per
curiam  describes  as  the  “unreported  ex  parte  contacts  be
tween  the  jury  and  the  judge,”  ante,  at  221—which  appar
ently  consisted  of  a  brief  exchange  of  words  that  occurred
when the judge entered the room in a restaurant where the
jurors were dining—the District Court concluded that “noth
ing that Petitioner has presented provides even the slightest
indication  that  anything  more  than  a  simple  greeting  oc
curred,” App. C to Pet. for Cert. 43.

With respect to the gifts that were given to the judge and
a  bailiff  after  the  trial  ended,  the  District  Court  stressed
that they were “inappropriate” and represented “an unusual
display of poor taste in the context of a proceeding so grave
as  a  capital  trial,”  ibid.,  but  the  court  noted  that  petitioner
had  not  proffered  any  evidence  that  any  of  the  jurors  or
court  personnel  who  were  interviewed  had  said  anything
that substantiated the assertion that “an inappropriate rela
tionship existed between the judge, the bailiff, and the jury,”
id., at 44.

A fair reading of the Court of Appeals’ opinion is that that
court  likewise  held  that  petitioner  was  not  entitled  to  the
discovery  he  sought  because  that  discovery  was  unlikely  to
yield  evidence  substantiating  his  claim.  See  554  F.  3d,  at

chocolate penis to the trial judge”); id., at 37 (a juror “remembered discus
sion about giving a chocolate penis to the judge”).  Nevertheless, petition
er’s  proffer  includes  no  information  as  to  why  the  gifts  were  given—not
even a statement to the effect that the jurors interviewed were asked this
question  and  said  that  they  did  not  know.  Cf.  id.,  at  35  (noting  that  a
particular  juror  “did  not  know  whose  idea  it  was  to  send  the  chocolate
penis to the judge,” but not including any representation as to her under
standing of why the gifts may have been given (emphasis added)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 558 U.S. 220 (2010). It discusses the arguments made by the dissenting justice and the lower court's rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

794

FARAGHER v. BOCA RATON

Opinion of the Court

ment in creating hostile environment); Nichols v. Frank, 42
F. 3d 503, 508 (CA9 1994) (“The proper analysis for employer
liability in hostile environment cases is . . . not whether an
employee was acting within his ‘scope of employment’ ”);
Bouton v. BMW of North Am., Inc., 29 F. 3d 103, 107 (CA3
1994) (sexual harassment is outside scope of employment);
see also Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc., decided with
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F. 3d 490, 561
(CA7 1997) (en banc) (Manion, J., concurring and dissenting)
(supervisor’s harassment would fall within scope of employ-
ment only in “the rare case indeed”), aff ’d, ante, p. 742;
Lindemann & Grossman 812 (“Hostile environment sexual
harassment normally does not trigger respondeat superior
liability because sexual harassment rarely, if ever, is among
the ofﬁcial duties of a supervisor”). But cf. Martin v. Cava-
lier Hotel Corp., 48 F. 3d 1343, 1351–1352 (CA4 1995) (hold-
ing employer vicariously liable in part based on ﬁnding that
the supervisor’s rape of employee was within the scope of
employment); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F. 2d
178, 184 (CA6) (holding that a supervisor’s harassment was
within the scope of his employment, but nevertheless requir-
ing the victim to show that the employer failed to respond
adequately when it learned of the harassment), cert. denied,
506 U. S. 1041 (1992).
In so doing, the courts have empha-
sized that harassment consisting of unwelcome remarks and
touching is motivated solely by individual desires and serves
no purpose of the employer. For this reason, courts have
likened hostile environment sexual harassment to the classic
“frolic and detour” for which an employer has no vicarious
liability.

These cases ostensibly stand in some tension with others
arising outside Title VII, where the scope of employment has
been deﬁned broadly enough to hold employers vicariously
liable for intentional torts that were in no sense inspired by
any purpose to serve the employer.
In Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F. 2d 167 (1968), for example,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the scope of employment in cases of hostile work environment sexual harassment.  It cites various legal cases and provides analysis of their reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

583

Opinion of the Court

In contrast, the “decency and respect” criteria do not
silence speakers by expressly “threaten[ing] censorship of
ideas.” See ibid. Thus, we do not perceive a realistic dan-
ger that § 954(d)(1) will compromise First Amendment val-
ues. As respondents’ own arguments demonstrate, the con-
siderations that the provision introduces, by their nature, do
not engender the kind of directed viewpoint discrimination
that would prompt this Court to invalidate a statute on its
face. Respondents assert, for example, that “[o]ne would be
hard-pressed to ﬁnd two people in the United States who
could agree on what the ‘diverse beliefs and values of the
American public’ are, much less on whether a particular
work of art ‘respects’ them”; and they claim that “ ‘[d]ecency’
is likely to mean something very different to a septegenarian
in Tuscaloosa and a teenager in Las Vegas.” Brief for Re-
spondents 41. The NEA likewise views the considerations
enumerated in § 954(d)(1) as susceptible to multiple interpre-
tations. See Department of the Interior and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations for 1992, Hearing before the Subcom-
mittee on Interior and Related Agencies of the House
Committee on Appropriations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 234
(1991) (testimony of John Frohnmayer) (“[N]o one individual
is wise enough to be able to consider general standards of
decency and the diverse values and beliefs of the American
people all by him or herself. These are group decisions”).
Accordingly, the provision does not introduce considerations
that, in practice, would effectively preclude or punish the
Indeed, one could hardly
expression of particular views.
anticipate how “decency” or “respect” would bear on grant
applications in categories such as funding for symphony
orchestras.

Respondents’ claim that the provision is facially unconsti-
tutional may be reduced to the argument that the criteria in
§ 954(d)(1) are sufﬁciently subjective that the agency could
utilize them to engage in viewpoint discrimination. Given
the varied interpretations of the criteria and the vague ex-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 569 (1998).  It discusses the constitutionality of a provision related to funding for the arts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

GORSUCH, J., concurring

duce them.  Instead, the Commission accepted the bakers’
view that the specific cakes Mr. Jack requested conveyed a
message offensive to their convictions and allowed them to
refuse  service.  Having  done  that  there,  it  must  do  the
same here.

Any  other  conclusion  would  invite  civil  authorities  to
gerrymander  their  inquiries  based  on  the  parties  they
prefer.  Why  calibrate  the  level  of  generality  in  Mr.  Phil-
lips’s  case  at  “wedding  cakes”  exactly—and  not  at,  say,
“cakes”  more  generally  or  “cakes  that  convey  a  message
regarding  same-sex  marriage”  more  specifically?
  If
“cakes” were the relevant level of generality, the Commis-
sion  would  have  to  order  the  bakers  to  make  Mr.  Jack’s
requested cakes just as it ordered Mr. Phillips to make the
requested  cake  in  his  case.  Conversely,  if  “cakes  that
convey a message regarding same-sex marriage” were the
relevant level of generality, the Commission would have to
respect  Mr.  Phillips’s  refusal  to  make  the  requested  cake
just  as  it  respected  the  bakers’  refusal  to  make  the  cakes
Mr.  Jack  requested.
In  short,  when  the  same  level  of
generality  is  applied  to  both  cases,  it  is  no  surprise  that
the bakers have to be treated the same.  Only by adjusting
the dials just right—fine-tuning the level of generality up
or  down  for  each  case  based  solely  on  the  identity  of  the
parties  and  the  substance  of  their  views—can  you  engi-
neer  the  Commission’s  outcome,  handing  a  win  to  Mr.
Jack’s  bakers  but  delivering  a  loss  to  Mr.  Phillips.    Such
results-driven  reasoning  is  improper.    Neither  the  Com-
mission  nor  this  Court  may  apply  a  more  specific  level  of
generality  in  Mr.  Jack’s  case  (a  cake  that  conveys  a  mes-
sage regarding same-sex marriage) while applying a higher
level  of  generality  in  Mr.  Phillips’s  case  (a  cake  that
conveys  no  message  regarding  same-sex  marriage).    Of
course,  under  Smith  a  vendor  cannot  escape  a  public
accommodations law just because his religion frowns on it.
But for any law to comply with the First Amendment and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a case involving a baker's refusal to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

27

Opinion of the Court

insurers—falls  comfortably  within  the  class  of  money-
mandating statutes that permit recovery of money damages
in the Court of Federal Claims.

Bolstering our finding is §1342’s focus on compensating
insurers for past conduct.  In assessing Tucker Act actions,
this Court has distinguished statutes that “attempt to com-
pensate  a  particular  class  of  persons  for  past  injuries  or
labors”  from  laws  that  “subsidize  future  state  expendi-
tures.”  Bowen,  487  U. S.,  at  906,  n.  42.    (The  first  group
permits Tucker Act suits; the second does not.)  The Risk
Corridors statute sits securely in the first category: It uses
a  backwards-looking  formula  to  compensate  insurers  for
losses  incurred  in  providing  healthcare  coverage  for  the
prior year.13

2
Nor is there a separate remedial scheme supplanting the
Court  of  Federal  Claims’  power  to  adjudicate  petitioners’
claims.

True, the Tucker Act “is displaced” when “a law assert-
edly  imposing  monetary  liability  on  the  United  States
contains its own judicial remedies.”  Bormes, 568 U. S., at

——————

13 Despite  agreeing  that  “[t]he  Court  is  correct”  on  the  case  law,  the
dissent proposes supplemental briefing and re-argument.  Post, at 4, 8.
We underscore, however, that all Members of this Court agree that to-
day’s cases do not break new doctrinal ground.

The Federal Circuit, moreover, concurs in our conclusion.  892 F. 3d,
1311,  1320,  n. 2  (2018)  (holding  that  §1342  “is  money-mandating  for
[Tucker  Act]  purposes”  (citing  Greenlee  County  v.  United  States,  487
F. 3d 871, 877 (CA Fed. 2007))).  It also agrees with our analysis broadly,
having held that “shall pay” language “generally makes a statute money-
mandating” under the Tucker Act.  Id., at 877 (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Conversely, the Court of Appeals has concluded that a statute
is not money mandating where the Government enjoys “complete discre-
tion” in determining whether (and whom) to pay.  See, e.g., Doe v. United
States,  463  F. 3d  1314,  1324  (2006)  (noting  that  the  statutory
term, “may,” creates a rebuttable presumption that the “statute creates
discretion”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the applicability of the Tucker Act to a particular statute. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1072

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

Thomas, J., concurring

558 U. S.

Supreme  Court  of  India,  or  the  Privy  Council.”  Knight,  supra,
at  990  (Thomas,  J.,  concurring  in  denial  of  certiorari).

Eager  to  distinguish  this  case  from  Knight  and  all  the  other
cases  in  which  the  Court  has  refused  to  grant  relief  on  Lackey
grounds, Justice Stevens asserts that the petition here presents
important  questions  regarding  the  proper  procedural  vehicle  for
bringing  a  Lackey  claim  that  merit  this  Court’s  review.  First,
the  procedural  posture  in  which  a  Lackey  claim  arises  does  not
change  the  fact  that  the  claim  itself  has  no  constitutional  founda
tion.  Accordingly, the claim’s procedural posture does not matter
for  purposes  of  merits  relief;  a  Lackey  claim  would  fail  no  matter
how  it  arrived.  In  addition,  Justice  Stevens  concedes  that  the
unusual  contours  of  petitioner’s  Eighth  Amendment  claim  are  the
reason  the  procedural  questions  in  this  case  are  difﬁcult.  Given
that,  our  order  in  this  case  rightly  adheres  to  our  precedents
denying  relief  on  Lackey  claims,  however  presented.  Second,
even  if  the  procedural  claims  in  this  case  had  merit,  they  would
not warrant review because Justice Stevens admits that a “suc
cessful  Lackey  claim  would  have  the  effect  of  rendering  invalid  a
particular  death  sentence,”  ante,  at  1069,  and  thus  would  “ ‘di
rectly  call  into  question  the  “fact”  or  “validity”  of  the  sentence
itself,’ ”  ibid.  (quoting  Nelson  v.  Campbell,  541  U. S.  637,  644
(2004)).  Accordingly,  the  Sixth  Circuit  plainly  did  not  err  in
treating  petitioner’s  §1983  motion  as  “the  functional  equivalent
of ” a habeas petition.  Ante, at 1069.  And for the reasons above,
the  panel’s  treatment  of  the  petition  as  a  second  or  successive
petition would not, even if  reversed, entitle petitioner to the mer
its  relief  he  seeks.

At  bottom,  Justice  Stevens’  arguments  boil  down  to  policy
disagreements  with  the  Constitution  and  the  Tennessee  Legisla
ture.  Ibid.  (“[D]elaying  an  execution  does  not  further  public
purposes  of  retribution  and  deterrence  but  only  diminishes  what
ever  possible  beneﬁt  society  might  receive  from  petitioner’s
death.  .  .  .  In  other  words,  the  penological  justiﬁcations  for  the
death penalty diminish as the delay lengthens” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).  Such views, no matter how “steadfast[ly]” held,
ante,  at  1067,  are  not  grounds  for  enjoining  petitioner’s  execution
or  for  granting  certiorari  on  the  procedural  questions  that  attend
his  Lackey  claim.  As  long  as  our  system  affords  capital  defend
ants  the  procedural  safeguards  this  Court  has  long  endorsed,  de
fendants  who  avail  themselves  of  these  procedures  will  face  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a Lackey claim and the procedural posture of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>