<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

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[09-06-00 18:29:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

100

HOPKINS v. REEVES

Opinion of the Court

Enmund as essentially requiring the States to alter their
deﬁnitions of felony murder to include a mens rea require-
ment with respect to the killing.8
In Cabana v. Bullock, 474
U. S. 376 (1986), however, we rejected precisely such a read-
ing and stated that “our ruling in Enmund does not concern
the guilt or innocence of the defendant––it establishes no
new elements of the crime of murder that must be found by
the jury” and “does not affect the state’s deﬁnition of any
Id., at 385 (internal quotation marks
substantive offense.”
and citation omitted). For this reason, we held that a State
could comply with Enmund’s requirement at sentencing or
even on appeal. See 474 U. S., at 392. Accordingly, Tison
and Enmund do not affect the showing that a State must
make at a defendant’s trial for felony murder, so long as their
requirement is satisﬁed at some point thereafter. As such,
these cases cannot override state-law determinations of
when instructions on lesser included offenses are permissible
and when they are not.

Finally, respondent argues that the Nebraska Supreme
Court’s longstanding interpretation that felony murder has
no lesser included homicide offenses is arbitrary because, in
his view, it is based only on recitations from prior cases,
rather than on application of the lesser included offense tests
in place since his conviction. See Brief for Respondent 40–
43. This contention is certainly strained with respect to the
crime of second-degree murder, which requires proof of
intent to kill, while felony murder does not. See Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 28–303, 28–304 (1995).
It appears that the Ne-
braska Supreme Court has not undertaken respondent’s sug-
gested analysis with respect to unlawful act manslaughter––
unintentional killing, committed in the perpetration of an
unlawful act. See § 28–305. On his direct appeal, however,
respondent did not challenge the Nebraska Supreme Court’s

8 The dissent also appears to be of this view, contending that Nebraska’s
justiﬁcation for not providing an instruction on second-degree murder is
inapplicable when the death penalty is sought. See post, at 101–102.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's decision. It contains legal arguments, citations to case law, and references to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

389

Opinion of Stevens, J.

Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 285 (1983).
In this sense,
we think the phrase surely capacious enough to include a
ﬁnding that the state-court “decision” is simply “erroneous”
or wrong.
(We hasten to add that even “diametrically dif-
ferent” from, or “opposite” to, an established federal law
would seem to include “decisions” that are wrong in light of
that law.) And there is nothing in the phrase “contrary
to”—as the Court appears to agree—that implies anything
less than independent review by the federal courts. More-
over, state-court decisions that do not “conﬂict” with federal
law will rarely be “unreasonable” under either the Court’s
reading of the statute or ours. We all agree that state-court
judgments must be upheld unless, after the closest examina-
tion of the state-court judgment, a federal court is ﬁrmly
convinced that a federal constitutional right has been vio-
lated. Our difference is as to the cases in which, at ﬁrst
blush, a state-court judgment seems entirely reasonable, but
thorough analysis by a federal court produces a ﬁrm convic-
tion that that judgment is infected by constitutional error.
In our view, such an erroneous judgment is “unreasonable”
within the meaning of the Act even though that conclusion
was not immediately apparent.

In sum, the statute directs federal courts to attend to
every state-court judgment with utmost care, but it does not
require them to defer to the opinion of every reasonable
state-court judge on the content of federal law.
If, after
carefully weighing all the reasons for accepting a state
court’s judgment, a federal court is convinced that a prison-
er’s custody—or, as in this case, his sentence of death—vio-
lates the Constitution, that independent judgment should
prevail. Otherwise the federal “law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States” might be applied by
the federal courts one way in Virginia and another way in
California.
In light of the well-recognized interest in ensur-
ing that federal courts interpret federal law in a uniform
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 362 (2000). It discusses the standard of review for state court decisions in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ

Opinion of the Court

(and their attorneys).  Private plaintiffs are not accountable
to the people and are not charged with pursuing the public
interest in enforcing a defendant’s general compliance with
regulatory law.  See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 577.

In sum, the concrete-harm requirement is essential to the
Constitution’s  separation  of  powers.    To  be  sure,  the  con-
crete-harm  requirement  can  be  difficult  to  apply  in  some
cases.  Some advocate that the concrete-harm requirement
be ditched altogether, on the theory that it would be more
efficient or convenient to simply say that a statutory viola-
tion and a cause of action suffice to afford a plaintiff stand-
ing.  But as the Court has often stated, “the fact that a given
law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facil-
itating  functions  of  government,  standing  alone,  will  not
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”  Chadha, 462
U. S., at 944.  So it is here.3

——————

3 The lead dissent would reject the core standing principle that a plain-
tiff  must  always  have  suffered  a  concrete  harm,  and  would  cast  aside
decades  of  precedent  articulating  that  requirement,  such  as  Spokeo,
Summers, and Lujan.  Post, at 9–11 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).  As we see
it, the dissent’s theory would largely outsource Article III to Congress.
As we understand the dissent’s theory, a suit seeking to enforce “general
compliance with regulatory law” would not suffice for Article III standing
because such a suit seeks to vindicate a duty owed to the whole commu-
nity.  Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 345 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  But under the dissent’s theory, so long as Congress
frames a defendant’s obligation to comply with regulatory law as an ob-
ligation  owed  to individuals,  any  suit  to vindicate  that  obligation  sud-
denly suffices for Article III.  Suppose, for example, that Congress passes
a law purporting to give all American citizens an individual right to clean
air and clean water, as well as a cause of action to sue and recover $100
in damages from any business that violates any pollution law anywhere
in the United States.  The dissent apparently would find standing in such
a case.  We respectfully disagree.  In our view, unharmed plaintiffs who
seek to sue under such a law are still doing no more than enforcing gen-
eral  compliance  with  regulatory  law.    And  under  Article  III  and  this
Court’s precedents, Congress may not authorize plaintiffs who have not
suffered concrete harms to sue in federal court simply to enforce general
compliance with regulatory law.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in the case TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ. It delves into the legal concept of "concrete harm" and its requirement for standing in court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

did in FAIR.  Instead, the proper focus is on the character
of state action and its relationship to expression.  Because
Colorado seeks to apply CADA only to the refusal to provide
same-sex couples the full and equal enjoyment of the com-
pany’s  publicly  available  services,  so  that  the  company’s
speech “is only ‘compelled’ if, and to the extent,” the com-
pany chooses to offer “such speech” to the public, any bur-
den  on  speech  is  “plainly  incidental”  to  a  content-neutral
regulation of conduct.  Ibid.

The majority attempts to distinguish this clear holding of
FAIR by suggesting that the compelled speech in FAIR was
“incidental”  because  it  was  “logistical”  (e.g.,  “The  U. S.
Army recruiter will meet interested students in Room 123
at 11 a.m.”).  Ante, at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This attempt fails twice over.  First, the law schools in FAIR
alleged that the Solomon Amendment required them to cre-
ate and disseminate speech propagating the military’s mes-
sage, which they deeply objected to, and to include military
speakers in on- and off-campus forums (if the schools pro-
vided  equally  favorable  services  to  other  recruiters).    547
U. S., at 60–61; App. 27 and Brief for Respondents 5–8 in
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc.,  O. T.  2005,  No.  04–1152.    The  majority  simply  skips
over the Court’s key reasoning for why any speech compul-
sion was nevertheless “incidental” to the Amendment’s reg-
ulation  of  conduct:  It  would  occur  only  “if,  and  to  the  ex-
tent,” the regulated entity provided “such speech” to others.
FAIR, 547 U. S., at 62.  Likewise in O’Brien, the reason the
burden on O’Brien’s expression was incidental was not be-
cause his message was factual or uncontroversial.  But cf.
ante, at 19.  O’Brien burned his draft card to send a political
message, and the burden on his expression was substantial.
Still, the burden was “incidental” because it was ancillary
to a regulation that did not aim at expression.  391 U. S., at
377.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

KAGAN, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–111
_________________

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

COLORADO

[June 4, 2018]

 JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  joins,

concurring.

“[I]t  is  a  general  rule  that  [religious  and  philosophical]
objections  do  not  allow  business  owners  and  other  actors
in  the  economy  and  in  society  to  deny  protected  persons
equal  access  to  goods  and  services  under  a  neutral  and
generally applicable public accommodations law.”  Ante, at
9.  But  in  upholding  that  principle,  state  actors  cannot
show  hostility  to  religious  views;  rather,  they  must  give
those  views  “neutral  and  respectful  consideration.”    Ante,
at  12.    I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full  because  I  believe
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not satisfy that
obligation.    I  write  separately  to  elaborate  on  one  of  the
bases for the Court’s holding.

The  Court  partly  relies  on  the  “disparate  consideration
of  Phillips’  case  compared  to  the  cases  of  [three]  other
bakers”  who  “objected  to  a  requested  cake  on  the  basis  of
conscience.”  Ante, at 14, 18.  In the latter cases, a customer
named  William  Jack  sought  “cakes  with  images  that
conveyed  disapproval  of  same-sex  marriage,  along  with
religious text”; the bakers whom he approached refused to
make  them.  Ante,  at  15;  see  post,  at  3  (GINSBURG,  J.,
dissenting)  (further  describing  the  requested  cakes).
Those  bakers  prevailed  before  the  Colorado  Civil  Rights
Division and Commission, while Phillips—who objected for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kagan.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)

727

Scalia, J., dissenting

*

*

*

This is not an important case, since it deals with the inter-
pretation of a statute that has been amended to eliminate,
for the future, the issue we today resolve. But an institu-
tion that is careless in small things is more likely to be care-
less in large ones; and an institution that is willful in small
things is almost certain to be willful in large ones. The fact
that nothing but the Court’s views of policy and “congres-
sional purpose” supports today’s judgment is a matter of
great concern, if only because of what it tells district and
circuit judges. The overwhelming majority of the Courts of
Appeals—9 out of 11—notwithstanding what they might
have viewed as the more desirable policy arrangement,
reached the result unambiguously demanded by the statu-
tory text. See ante, at 698, n. 2. Today’s decision invites
them to return to headier days of not-too-yore, when laws
meant what judges knew they ought to mean.

I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it is part of the actual content meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

77

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  42 U. S. C. §296g (Public Health Service; Prohi-
bition Against Discrimination by Schools on Ba-
sis of Sex)

  42  U. S. C.  §300w–7(a)(2)  (Preventive  Health
and Health Services Block Grants; Nondiscrim-
ination Provisions)

  42  U. S. C.  §300x–57(a)(2)  (Block  Grants  Re-
garding  Mental  Health  and  Substance  Abuse;
Nondiscrimination)

  42  U. S. C.  §603(a)(5)(I)(iii)  (Block  Grants  to
States  for  Temporary  Assistance  for  Needy
Families)

  42  U. S. C.  §708(a)(2)  (Maternal  and  Child
Health  Services  Block  Grant;  Nondiscrimina-
tion Provisions)

  42  U. S. C.  §1975a(a)  (Duties  of  Civil  Rights

Commission)

  42 U. S. C. §2000c(b) (Civil Rights; Public Edu-

cation; Definitions)

  42 U. S. C. §2000c–6(a)(2) (Civil Rights; Public
Education;  Civil  Actions  by  the  Attorney  Gen-
eral)

  42  U. S. C.  §2000e–2  (Equal  Employment  Op-
portunities; Unlawful Employment Practices)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely from a legal document.  It is not sequential text and does not appear to be the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

27

KAGAN, J., dissenting

faith with that congressional choice, courts must give agen-
cies  “ample  latitude”  to  revisit,  rethink,  and  revise  their
regulatory approaches.  Ibid.  So it is here.  Section 111(d)
was written, as I’ve shown, to give EPA plenty of leeway.
See supra, at 6–8.  The enacting Congress told EPA to pick
the “best system of emission reduction” (taking into account
various factors).  In selecting those words, Congress under-
stood—it had to—that the “best system” would change over
time.  Congress wanted and instructed EPA to keep up.  To
ensure the statute’s continued effectiveness, the “best sys-
tem”  should  evolve  as  circumstances  evolved—in  a  way
Congress knew it couldn’t then know.  See Massachusetts,
549 U. S., at 532.  EPA followed those statutory directions
to  the  letter  when  it  issued  the  Clean  Power Plan.    It  se-
lected  a  system  (as  the  regulated  parties  agree)  that
achieved  greater  emissions  reductions  at  lower  cost  than
any  technological  alternative  could  have,  while  maintain-
ing a reliable electricity market.  Even if that system was
novel, it was in EPA’s view better—actually, “best.”  So it
was the system that accorded with the enacting Congress’s
choice.

And  contra  the  majority,  it  is  that  Congress’s  choice
which counts, not any later one’s.  The majority says it “can-
not ignore” that Congress in recent years has “considered
and rejected” cap-and-trade schemes.  Ante, at 27–28.  But
under normal principles of statutory construction, the ma-
jority should ignore that fact (just as I should ignore that
Congress failed to enact bills barring EPA from implement-
ing the Clean Power Plan).  As we have explained time and
again, failed legislation “offers a particularly dangerous ba-
sis on which to rest an interpretation of an existing law a
different and earlier Congress” adopted.  Bostock v. Clayton
County, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 20) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496
U. S. 617, 632 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“Argu-
ments based on subsequent legislative history” should “not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
248

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

They  include  waivers  of  inadmissibility  based  on  certain
criminal  offenses,  § 1182(h),  or  based  on  fraud  or  misrepre
sentation,  § 1182(i);  cancellation  of  removal,  § 1229b;  permis
sion for voluntary departure, § 1229c; and adjustment of sta
tus, § 1255.

Other decisions speciﬁed by statute “to be in the discretion
of the Attorney General,” and therefore shielded from court
oversight by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), are of a like kind.  See, e. g.,
§ 1157(c)(1)  (discretion  to  admit  refugees  “determined  to  be
of  special  humanitarian  concern  to  the  United  States”);
§ 1181(b)  (discretion  to  waive  requirement  of  documentation
for  readmission);  § 1182(a)(3)(D)(iii)  (discretion  to  waive,  in
certain  cases,  inadmissibility  of  aliens  who  have  afﬁliated
with  a  totalitarian  party).  Decisions  on  reopening  motions
made  discretionary  by  regulation,  in  contrast,  are  adjunct
rulings: The motion to reopen is a procedural device serving
to ensure “that aliens [a]re getting a fair chance to have their
claims  heard.”  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  17.  A  court  decision  re
versing  the  denial  of  a  motion  to  reopen  does  not  direct  the
Executive to afford the alien substantive relief; ordinarily, it
touches  and  concerns  only  the  question  whether  the  alien’s
claims have been accorded a reasonable hearing.

If Congress wanted the jurisdictional bar to encompass de
cisions  speciﬁed  as  discretionary  by  regulation  along  with
those  made  discretionary  by  statute,  moreover,  Congress
could easily have said so.  In other provisions enacted simul
taneously  with  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii),  Congress  expressed  pre
cisely  that  meaning.  See  IIRIRA  § 213,  110  Stat.  3009–572
(“immigration  beneﬁts  pursuant  to  this  Act,  or  the  regula
tions  promulgated  thereunder ”),  codiﬁed  at  8  U. S. C.
§ 1324c(e)(2);  IIRIRA  § 372,  110  Stat.  3009–646  (“any  of  the
powers,  privileges,  or  duties  conferred  or  imposed  by  this
Act or regulations issued thereunder”), codiﬁed at 8 U. S. C.

statute, but provide judicial review for judgments that are just as lawfully
discretionary because the Attorney General is given the authority to make
them discretionary and has done so?”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 9; see id., at 13–14.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the scope of judicial review over discretionary decisions by the Attorney General in immigration cases. It delves into specific statutes and regulations, analyzing their language and intent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D.  C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–58
_________________

UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
TEXAS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2023]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
In  2021,  after  President  Biden  took  office,  the
Department  of  Homeland  Security  issued  new  Guidelines
for immigration enforcement.  The Guidelines prioritize the
arrest  and  removal  from  the  United  States  of  noncitizens
who are suspected terrorists or dangerous criminals, or who
have  unlawfully  entered  the  country  only  recently,  for
example.  Texas  and  Louisiana  sued  the  Department  of
Homeland  Security.    According  to  those  States,  the
Department’s new Guidelines violate federal statutes that
purportedly  require  the  Department  to  arrest  more
criminal noncitizens pending their removal.

The  States  essentially  want  the  Federal  Judiciary  to
order the Executive Branch to alter its arrest policy so as to
make  more  arrests.  But  this  Court  has  long held  “that  a
citizen  lacks  standing  to  contest  the  policies  of  the
prosecuting  authority  when  he  himself
is  neither
prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”  Linda R. S.
v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619 (1973).  Consistent with
that fundamental Article III principle, we conclude that the
States lack Article III standing to bring this suit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citation information, the title of the case, the date, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.  This type of text is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

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746

BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ELLERTH

Opinion of the Court

subject to vicarious liability for Slowik’s activity, but should have an
opportunity to assert and prove the afﬁrmative defense. Pp. 765–766.

123 F. 3d 490, afﬁrmed.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, O(cid:146)Connor, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Gins-
burg, J., ﬁled an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 766.
Thomas, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post,
p. 766.

James J. Casey argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Mary Margaret Moore and Robert A.
Wicker.

Ernest T. Rossiello argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Margaret A. Zuleger and Eric
Schnapper.

Deputy Solicitor General Underwood argued the cause for
the United States et al. as amici curiae urging afﬁrmance.
With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General Lee, Irving L. Gornstein, C.
Gregory Stewart, Philip B. Sklover, Carolyn L. Wheeler, and
Susan L. P. Starr.*

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
We decide whether, under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States by Carol Connor Flowe, Stephen A.
Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Sussan L. Mahallati; and for the Equal
Employment Advisory Council by Ann Elizabeth Reesman.

Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jona-
than P. Hiatt, Marsha S. Berzon, and Laurence Gold; for Equal Rights
Advocates et al. by Samuel A. Marcosson, Beth H. Parker, and Rose Fua;
and for the Rutherford Institute by John W. Whitehead and Steven H.
Aden.

David Benjamin Oppenheimer, H. Candace Gorman, and Paula A.
Brantner ﬁled a brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association
as amicus curiae.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case details, the opinion of the court, and information about the justices involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

electorate share lawmaking power under Arizona’s system
of government.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The
initiative, housed under the article of the Arizona Consti
tution  concerning  the  “Legislative  Department”  and  the
section  defining  the  State’s  “legislative  authority,”  re
serves  for  the  people  “the  power  to  propose  laws  and
amendments  to  the  constitution.”    Art. IV,  pt.  1,  §1.    The
Arizona Constitution further states that “[a]ny law which
may be enacted by the Legislature under this Constitution
may  be  enacted  by  the  people  under  the  Initiative.”
Art. XXII,  §14.    Accordingly,  “[g]eneral  references  to  the
power  of  the  ‘legislature’ ”  in  the  Arizona  Constitution
“include the people’s right (specified in Article IV, part 1)
to  bypass  their  elected  representatives  and  make  laws
directly through the initiative.”  Leshy xxii.

C
Proposition  106,  vesting  redistricting  authority  in  the
AIRC, was  adopted by  citizen initiative in 2000 against a
“background of recurring redistricting turmoil” in Arizona.
Cain,  Redistricting  Commissions:  A  Better  Political  Buf-
fer? 121 Yale L. J. 1808, 1831 (2012).  Redistricting plans
adopted by the Arizona Legislature sparked controversy in
every  redistricting  cycle  since  the  1970’s,  and  several  of
those  plans  were  rejected  by  a  federal  court  or  refused
preclearance  by  the  Department  of  Justice  under  the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.  See id., at 1830–1832.4

——————

4 From Arizona’s admission to the Union in 1912 to 1940, no congres
sional  districting  occurred  because  Arizona  had  only  one  Member  of
Congress.    K.  Martis,  The  Historical  Atlas  of  United  States  Congres
sional  Districts,  1789–1983,  p. 3  (1982)  (Table  1).    Court-ordered
congressional  districting  plans  were  in  place  from  1966  to  1970,  and
from  1982  through  2000.    See  Klahr  v.  Williams,  313  F. Supp.  148
(Ariz.  1970);  Goddard  v.  Babbitt,  536  F. Supp.  538  (Ariz.  1982);  Arizo-
nans  for  Fair  Representation  v.  Symington,  828  F. Supp.  684  (Ariz.
1992);  Norrander  &  Wendland,  Redistricting  in  Arizona,  in  Reappor
tionment  and  Redistricting  in  the  West  177,  178–179  (G.  Moncrief  ed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to constitutional provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
10

UNITED STATES v. HIGGS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Lisa Montgomery likewise made a “substantial threshold
showing” to the District Court that she was incompetent to
be executed.  See Electronic Case Filing in No. 2:21–cv–20
(SD  Ind.),  Doc.  17,  p.  15.    Based  on  expert  evidence  that
Montgomery  was  experiencing  a  dissociative  psychotic
state, the District Court concluded that her “current mental
state is so divorced from reality that she cannot rationally
understand the government’s rationale for her execution.”
Id., at 18.  These findings with respect to Purkey and Mont-
gomery raised significant questions as to whether their ex-
ecutions  comported  with  the  Constitution.    We  will  never
have  definitive  answers  to  those  questions  because  this
Court sanctioned their executions anyway.

III
There  is  no  matter  as  “grave  as  the  determination  of
whether a human life should be taken or spared.”  Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Pow-
ell, and Stevens, JJ.).  That decision is not something to be
rushed or taken lightly; there can be no “justice on the fly”
in matters of life and death.  See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S.
418,  427  (2009).  Yet  the  Court  has  allowed  the  United
States  to  execute  thirteen  people  in  six  months  under  a
statutory  scheme  and  regulatory  protocol  that  have  re-
ceived  inadequate  scrutiny,  without  resolving  the  serious
claims the condemned individuals raised.  Those whom the
Government executed during this endeavor deserved more
from this Court.  I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and references to previous cases, indicating it is part of the main body of the document and suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN

700

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

of supervised release “imposes punishment for defendants’
new offenses for violating the conditions of their supervised
release.” United States v. Page, 131 F. 3d 1173, 1176 (1997).
On this theory, that is, if the violation of the conditions of
supervised release occurred after the enactment of § 3583(h),
as Johnson’s did, the new law could be given effect without
applying it to events before its enactment.

While this understanding of revocation of supervised re-
lease has some intuitive appeal, the Government disavows it,
and wisely so in view of the serious constitutional questions
that would be raised by construing revocation and reimpris-
onment as punishment for the violation of the conditions of
supervised release. Although such violations often lead to
reimprisonment, the violative conduct need not be criminal
and need only be found by a judge under a preponderance of
the evidence standard, not by a jury beyond a reasonable
(1988 ed., Supp. V).
doubt. See 18 U. S. C. § 3583(e)(3)
Where the acts of violation are criminal in their own right,
they may be the basis for separate prosecution, which would
raise an issue of double jeopardy if the revocation of super-
vised release were also punishment for the same offense.
Treating postrevocation sanctions as part of the penalty for
the initial offense, however (as most courts have done),
avoids these difﬁculties. See, e. g., United States v. Wyatt,
102 F. 3d 241, 244–245 (CA7 1996) (rejecting double jeopardy
challenge on ground that sanctions for violating the condi-
tions of supervised release are part of the original sentence);
United States v. Beals, 87 F. 3d 854, 859–860 (CA7 1996) (not-
ing that punishment for noncriminal violations must be justi-
ﬁed by reference to original crimes), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Withers, 128 F. 3d 1167 (1997);
United States v. Meeks, 25 F. 3d 1117, 1123 (CA2 1994) (not-
ing absence of constitutional procedural protections in revo-
cation proceedings). Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778,
782 (1973) (“Probation revocation . . . is not a stage of a crimi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt. It contains legal jargon and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP

Syllabus

row, particularized context, however, does not support the broad elim-
ination of sovereign immunity across all areas of law.  Other statutes
aimed  at  promoting  restitution  to  Holocaust  victims,  on  which  the
heirs  rely,  generally  encourage  redressing  those  injuries  outside  of
public  court  systems  and  do  not  speak  to  sovereign  immunity.   See,
e.g., Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 130 Stat. 1524.
Pp. 14–15.

(c) This Court does not address Germany’s argument that the Dis-
trict Court was obligated to abstain from deciding the case on interna-
tional comity grounds or the heirs’ alternative argument that the sale
of the Welfenschatz is not subject to the domestic takings rule because
the consortium members were not German nationals at the time of the
transaction.  Pp. 15–16.

894 F. 3d. 406, vacated and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
The content appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a condensed overview rather than the full text meant for reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

MATAL v. TAM

Opinion of the Court

tible  to  dangerous  misuse.
If  private  speech  could  be
passed  off  as  government  speech  by  simply  affixing  a
government  seal  of  approval,  government  could  silence  or
muffle  the  expression  of  disfavored  viewpoints.    For  this
reason,  we  must  exercise  great  caution  before  extending
our government-speech precedents.

At  issue  here  is  the  content  of  trademarks  that  are
registered by the PTO, an arm of the Federal Government.
The Federal Government does not dream up these marks,
and  it  does  not  edit  marks  submitted  for  registration.
Except  as  required  by  the  statute  involved  here,  15
U. S. C.  §1052(a),  an  examiner  may  not  reject  a  mark
based  on  the  viewpoint  that  it  appears  to  express.    Thus,
unless that section is thought to apply, an examiner does
not inquire whether any viewpoint conveyed by a mark is
consistent  with  Government  policy  or  whether  any  such
viewpoint  is  consistent  with  that  expressed  by  other
marks  already  on  the  principal  register.    Instead,  if  the
mark  meets  the  Lanham  Act’s  viewpoint-neutral  require-
ments,  registration  is  mandatory.
Ibid.  (requiring  that
“[n]o  trademark  . . .  shall  be  refused  registration  on  the
principal  register  on  account  of  its  nature  unless”  it  falls
within  an  enumerated  statutory  exception).
  And  if  an
examiner finds that a mark is eligible for placement on the
principal  register,  that  decision  is  not  reviewed  by  any
higher  official  unless  the  registration  is  challenged.    See
§§1062(a), 1071; 37 CFR §41.31(a) (2016).  Moreover, once
a mark is registered, the PTO is not authorized to remove
it from the register unless a party moves for cancellation,
the registration expires, or the Federal Trade Commission
initiates  proceedings  based  on  certain  grounds.    See  15
U. S. C. §§1058(a), 1059, 1064; 37 CFR §§2.111(b), 2.160.

In  light  of  all  this,  it  is  far-fetched  to  suggest  that  the
content of a registered mark is government speech.  If the
federal  registration  of  a  trademark  makes  the  mark  gov-
ernment  speech,  the  Federal  Government  is  babbling
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the nature of trademarks and whether their registration by the government constitutes government speech. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of the Court

this condition because he committed his crimes on land re-
served for the Creek since the 19th century.

The Creek  Nation has joined Mr. McGirt as amicus  cu-
riae.  Not because the Tribe is interested in shielding Mr.
McGirt  from  responsibility  for  his  crimes.    Instead,  the
Creek  Nation  participates  because  Mr.  McGirt’s  personal
interests wind up implicating the Tribe’s.  No one disputes
that  Mr.  McGirt’s  crimes  were  committed  on  lands  de-
scribed as the Creek Reservation in an 1866 treaty and fed-
eral statute.  But, in seeking to defend the state-court judg-
ment below, Oklahoma has put aside whatever procedural
defenses  it  might  have  and  asked  us  to  confirm  that  the
land once given to the Creeks is no longer a reservation to-
day.

At another level, then, Mr. McGirt’s case winds up as a
contest between State and Tribe.  The scope of their dispute
is limited; nothing we might say today could unsettle Okla-
homa’s authority to try non-Indians for crimes against non-
Indians  on  the  lands  in  question.   See  United  States  v.
McBratney, 104 U. S. 621, 624 (1882).  Still, the stakes are
not insignificant.  If Mr. McGirt and the Tribe are right, the
State has no right to prosecute Indians for crimes commit-
ted  in  a  portion  of  Northeastern  Oklahoma  that  includes
most of the city of Tulsa.  Responsibility to try these matters
would fall instead to the federal government and Tribe. Re-
cently, the question has taken on more salience too.  While
Oklahoma  state  courts  have  rejected  any  suggestion  that
the lands in question remain a reservation, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has reached the opposite conclusion.  Murphy v. Royal,
875 F. 3d 896, 907–909, 966 (2017).  We granted certiorari
to settle the question.  589 U. S. ___ (2019).

Start with what should be obvious: Congress established
a reservation for the Creeks.  In a series of treaties, Con-

II
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites a case, discusses the parties involved, and outlines the central issue at stake.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
336  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

Virginia v.  Hicks, 539 U. S. 113, 119 (2003) (citation omitted).
Consequently,  “the  censor’s  determination  may  in  practice
be ﬁnal.”  Freedman, supra, at 58.

This  is  precisely  what  WRTL  sought  to  avoid.  WRTL
said  that  First  Amendment  standards  “must  eschew  ‘the
open-ended  rough-and-tumble  of  factors,’  which  ‘invit[es]
complex argument in  a trial court and  a virtually inevitable
appeal.’ ”  551 U. S., at 469 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.) (quot
ing Jerome  B.  Grubart,  Inc.  v.  Great  Lakes  Dredge  &  Dock
Co.,  513  U. S.  527,  547  (1995);  alteration  in  original).  Yet,
the  FEC  has  created  a  regime  that  allows  it  to  select  what
political  speech  is  safe  for  public  consumption  by  applying
ambiguous tests.  If parties want to avoid litigation and the
possibility  of  civil  and  criminal  penalties,  they  must  either
refrain  from  speaking  or  ask  the  FEC  to  issue  an  advisory
opinion  approving  of  the  political  speech  in  question.  Gov
ernment  ofﬁcials  pore  over  each  word  of  a  text  to  see  if,  in
their  judgment,  it  accords  with  the  11-factor  test  they  have
promulgated.  This  is  an  unprecedented  governmental  in
tervention into the realm of speech.

The ongoing chill upon speech that is beyond all doubt pro
tected  makes  it  necessary  in  this  case  to  invoke  the  earlier
precedents  that  a  statute  which  chills  speech  can  and  must
be  invalidated  where  its  facial  invalidity  has  been  demon
strated.  See  WRTL,  supra,  at  482–483  (Alito,  J.,  concur
ring); Thornhill v.  Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97–98 (1940).  For
these reasons we ﬁnd it necessary to reconsider Austin.

III

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”  Laws enacted
to control or suppress speech may operate at different points
in  the  speech  process.  The  following  are  just  a  few  exam
ples  of  restrictions  that  have  been  attempted  at  different
stages  of  the  speech  process—all  laws  found  to  be  invalid:
restrictions  requiring  a  permit  at  the  outset,  Watchtower
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case. It cites previous legal precedents and delves into the First Amendment implications of campaign finance regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part

and  geographically  compact  minority  populations.    See
Abbott,  585  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  4);  Johnson  v.  De
Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1006–1007, 1020 (1994); Voinovich,
507 U. S., at 153–154; see generally Brnovich v. Democratic
National Committee, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at
22) (“§2 does not demand proof of discriminatory purpose”);
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U. S. 471, 482 (1997)
(Congress “clearly expressed its desire that §2 not have an
intent component”); Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 923–924
(1994)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment)  (§2  adopts  a
“ ‘results’  test,  rather  than  an  ‘intent’  test”);  Chisom  v.
Roemer, 501 U. S. 380, 394, 404 (1991) (“proof of intent is
no  longer  required  to  prove  a  §2  violation”  as  “Congress
made  clear  that  a  violation  of  §2  could  be  established  by
proof of  discriminatory results  alone”);  Gingles, 478  U. S.,
at  71,  n.  34  (plurality  opinion)  (§2  does  not  require
“ ‘purpose of racial discrimination’ ”).
  Fourth, Alabama asserts that §2, as construed by Gingles
to require race-based redistricting in certain circumstances,
exceeds Congress’s remedial or preventive authority under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  As the Court
explains,  the  constitutional  argument  presented  by
Alabama  is  not  persuasive  in  light  of  the  Court’s
precedents.    See  ante,  at  33–34;  see  also  City  of  Rome  v.
United  States,  446  U. S.  156,  177–178  (1980).    JUSTICE
THOMAS notes, however, that even if Congress in 1982 could
constitutionally authorize race-based redistricting under §2
for some period of time, the authority to conduct race-based
redistricting cannot extend indefinitely into the future.  See
post,  at  44–45  (dissenting  opinion).   But  Alabama did  not
raise that temporal argument in this Court, and I therefore
would not consider it at this time.
  For those reasons, I vote to affirm, and I concur in all but
Part III–B–1 of the Court’s opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and precedents related to voting rights and redistricting.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

preliminary  injunction;  and  “did  not  seriously  engage”  in
discovery.  Id., at 164.

The  District  Court  again  denied  the  motion,  explaining
that it was “abundantly clear that [state respondents are]
actively  and  adequately  defending  this  lawsuit.”    App.  to
Pet. for Cert. 189.  The court recounted that state respond-
ents had “consistently ‘denied all substantive allegations of
unconstitutionality’ in this case” and had filed an “expan-
sive” brief opposing NAACP respondents’ motion for a pre-
liminary injunction on the merits.  Ibid.  The court also re-
jected  petitioners’  argument  that  the  attorney  general’s
conduct  in  the  pending  state-court  litigation  was  inade-
quate.  The court explained that the attorney general’s de-
cision not to move to dismiss the sixth state-court claim in
that  separate  litigation  “fell  well  within  the  range  of  rea-
sonable litigation strategies”; that the attorney general se-
cured reversal of the state-court preliminary injunction on
appeal; and that the attorney general “ ‘participated in ex-
tensive fact discovery’ ” in the state-court litigation.  Id., at
191,  192.  The  court  therefore  found  “no  sound  basis  on
which  to  speculate  . . .  that  [state  respondents]  and  [the]
Attorney General w[ould] abandon their duty to defend S.B.
824 in this case,” given that, by all appearances, they had
fully executed that duty in both the federal- and state-court
litigation thus far.  Id., at 193.

The  District  Court  also  rejected  petitioners’  request  for
permissive  intervention.    In  the  court’s  view,  petitioners’
contentions  in  the  federal  litigation,  including  their  re-
peated  skepticism  of  state  respondents’  ability  to  defend
state  law  vigorously,  demonstrated  that  intervention
“would only distract from the pressing issues in this case.”
Id., at 193–194.

Over a dissent by Judge Harris, the Court of Appeals va-
cated the District Court’s order and remanded for reconsid-
eration  of  petitioners’  request  to  intervene.    The  Court  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses a case, legal arguments, and court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

BREYER, J., dissenting

The  Court’s  reliance  in  our  prior  cases  on  the  notion  of
“play in the joints,” our hesitation to apply presumptions of
unconstitutionality,  and  our  tendency  to  confine  benefit-
related holdings to the context in which they arose all re-
flect a recognition that great care is needed if we are to re-
alize  the  Religion  Clauses’  basic  purpose  “to  promote  and
assure the fullest scope of religious liberty and religious tol-
erance  for  all  and  to  nurture  the  conditions  which  secure
the  best  hope  of  attainment  of  that  end.”  Schempp,  374
U. S., at 305 (opinion of Goldberg, J., joined by Harlan, J.);
see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 698 (2005) (BREYER,
J., concurring in judgment).

For one thing, government benefits come in many shapes
and  sizes.  The  appropriate  way  to  approach  a  State’s
benefit-related decision may well vary depending upon the
relation between the Religion Clauses and the specific ben-
efit  and  restriction  at  issue.    For  another,  disagreements
that concern religion and its relation to a particular benefit
may prove unusually difficult to resolve.  They may involve
small but important details of a particular benefit program.
Does one detail affect one religion negatively and another
positively?  What about a religion that objects to the partic-
ular way in which the government seeks to enforce manda-
tory  (say,  qualification-related)  provisions  of  a  particular
benefit program?  See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church Acad-
emy  v.  East  Longmeadow,  885  F. 2d  940  (CA1  1989)
(BREYER, J., for the court).  Or the religious group that for
religious reasons cannot accept government support?  See
Brief  for  Respondents  20–21  (noting,  inter  alia,  Seventh-
day Adventists’ support for Montana’s no-aid provision on
this  ground).  And  what  happens  when  qualification  re-
quirements mean that government money flows to one reli-
gion rather than another?  Courts are ill equipped to deal
with such conflicts.  Yet, in a Nation with scores of different
religions,  many  such  disagreements  are  possible.    And  I
have only scratched the surface.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It delves into the complexities of applying the Religion Clauses to government benefit programs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

3

BREYER, J., concurring

able” nor the phrase “the principle of Comment k” tells us
which  courts’  view  Congress  intended  to  adopt.    Silence
cannot  tell  us  to  follow  those  States  where  juries  decided
the design-defect question.

II
The  legislative  history  describes  the  statute  more  gen-
erally  as  trying  to  protect  the  lives  of  children,  in  part
by  ending  “the  instability  and  unpredictability  of  the
childhood  vaccine  market.”    H. R.  Rep.,  at  7;  see  ante,  at
2–3.  As the Committee Report makes clear, routine vacci-
nation  is  “one  of  the  most  spectacularly  effective  public
health  initiatives  this  country  has  ever  undertaken.”
H. R. Rep., at 4.  Before the development of routine whoop-
ing  cough  vaccination,  for  example,  “nearly  all  children”
in  the  United  States  caught  the  disease  and  more  than
4,000  people  died  annually,  most  of  them  infants.    U. S.
Dept. of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease
Control  and  Prevention,  What  Would  Happen  if  We
Stopped  Vaccinations?  http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/
whatifstop.htm  (all  Internet  materials  as  visited  Feb. 17,
2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); Prevent-
ing  Tetanus,  Diphtheria,  and  Pertussis  Among  Adoles-
cents:  Use  of  Tetanus  Toxoid,  Reduced  Diptheria  Toxoid
and  Acellular  Pertussis  Vaccines,  55  Morbidity  and  Mor-
tality Weekly Report, No. RR–3, p. 2 (Mar. 24, 2006) (here-
inafter  Preventing  Tetanus)  (statistics  for  1934–1943),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5503.pdf;  U. S.  Dept.
of  Health  and  Human  Services,  Centers  for  Disease  Con-
trol  and  Prevention,  Epidemiology  and  Prevention  of
Vaccine-Preventable  Diseases  200  (11th  ed.  rev.  May
2009).  After  vaccination  became  common,  the  number  of
annual  cases  of  whooping  cough  declined  from  over
200,000  to  about  2,300,  and  the  number  of  deaths  from
about 4,000 to about 12.  Preventing Tetanus 2; Childhood
Immunizations,  House  Committee  on  Energy  and  Com-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 562 U.S. ____ (2011).  It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing in a legal document database.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

lx

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Rodriguez v. Litscher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rodriguez v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rodriguez v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rodriguez v. West
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rodriguez-Matos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roe; Crayon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rogers v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rogers v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rogers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roland, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Romero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Romero-Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ronne; Port of Portland v.
Ronsini; Worthington Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rooney; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rosas-Davila v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roseboro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rosquist, D. C., P. C. v. McCann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rothenbach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rowley; Wright v.
Roxy Screening Rooms v. Miramax Film Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Royer; Grayson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ruiz Rivera, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ruiz-Suarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russel, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russell; Farooq v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russell; Grinnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rutherford Institute; Muka v.
Ryan v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ryan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Safouane v. Washington Dept. of Social and Health Services . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saha; Oliver v.
St. Joseph County Family Independence Agency; Mensah v. . . .
St. Louis Southwestern R. Co.; Bock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
St. Meinrad School of Theology; McEnroy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saiyed v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Salanik v. Board of Ed. of Anne Arundel County . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Salazar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Salazar-Olivares v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Salcedo Gonzales v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1023
1012
1118,1123,1136,1137
1117
1004
1044
1041
1089
1129
1010
1064
1011
1135
1086
1019
1092
1045
1122
1083
1126
1102
1094
1119
1012
1067
1107
1080
1065
1079
1079
1061
1054
1100
1044
1112
1130
1038,1125
1086
1068
1058
1096
1011
1089
1072
  </content>
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This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–382
_________________

TERRITORY OF GUAM, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[May 24, 2021]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The  Comprehensive  Environmental  Response,  Compen-
sation,  and  Liability  Act  of  1980,  commonly  known  as
CERCLA,  establishes  a  complex  statutory  scheme  for  re-
sponding to certain environmental hazards.  94 Stat. 2767,
as amended, 42 U. S. C. §9601 et seq.  Several of its provi-
sions address what is often the crucial question in a reme-
dial action: Who pays?

Today’s case involves §113(f )(3)(B) of the Act,1 which al-
lows “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United
States or a State” in a settlement to seek “contribution”—
that  is,  money  from  another  responsible  individual.  The
question  is  whether  a  party  must  resolve  a  CERCLA-
specific liability in order to trigger this right, or whether a
broader  array  of  settlements  involving  environmental  lia-
bility will do.  We hold that CERCLA contribution requires
resolution of a CERCLA-specific liability.

——————

1 For the sake of simplicity, we cite CERCLA’s provisions as they ap-
pear in the Act itself.  The most relevant corresponding sections of Title
42  of  the  U.  S.  Code  are  §9607  (§107  of  CERCLA)  and  §9613  (§113  of
CERCLA).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case information, and the introduction to the Court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

17

Opinion of the Court

to  guarantee  eventual  freedom,”  but  must  provide  “some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demon-
strated  maturity  and  rehabilitation”).  By  making  youth
(and  all  that  accompanies  it)  irrelevant  to  imposition  of
that  harshest  prison  sentence,  such  a  scheme  poses  too
great a risk of disproportionate punishment.  Because that
holding  is  sufficient  to  decide  these  cases,  we  do  not  con-
sider  Jackson’s  and  Miller’s  alternative  argument  that
the  Eighth  Amendment  requires  a  categorical  bar  on  life
without  parole  for  juveniles,  or  at  least  for  those  14  and
younger.  But  given  all  we  have  said  in  Roper,  Graham,
and  this  decision  about  children’s  diminished  culpability
and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible
penalty  will  be  uncommon.    That  is  especially  so  because
of  the  great  difficulty  we  noted  in  Roper  and  Graham  of
distinguishing  at  this  early  age  between  “the  juvenile  of-
fender  whose  crime  reflects  unfortunate  yet  transient
immaturity,  and  the  rare  juvenile  offender  whose  crime
reflects  irreparable  corruption.”  Roper,  543  U. S.,  at  573;
Graham, 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17).  Although we do
not  foreclose  a  sentencer’s  ability  to  make  that  judgment
in  homicide  cases,  we  require  it  to  take  into  account  how
children  are  different,  and  how  those  differences  coun-
sel  against  irrevocably  sentencing  them  to  a  lifetime  in
prison.8
——————

8 Given  our  holding,  and  the  dissents’  competing  position,  we  see  a
certain  irony  in  their  repeated  references  to  17-year-olds  who  have
committed  the  “most  heinous”  offenses,  and  their  comparison  of  those
defendants to the 14-year-olds here.  See post, at 2 (opinion of ROBERTS,
C. J.) (noting the “17-year old [who] is convicted of deliberately murder-
ing an innocent victim”); post, at 3 (“the most heinous murders”); post,
at  7  (“the  worst  types  of  murder”);  post,  at  5  (opinion  of  ALITO,  J.)
(warning the reader not to be “confused by the particulars” of these two
cases);  post,  at  1  (discussing  the  “171⁄2-year-old  who  sets  off  a  bomb  in
a crowded mall”).  Our holding requires factfinders to attend to exactly
such  circumstances—to  take  into  account  the  differences  among  de-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Eighth Amendment and sentencing guidelines for juveniles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

PATEL v. GARLAND

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

I
A

Pankajkumar  Patel  has  lived  in  the  United  States  for
nearly  30  years.  He  and  his  wife  Jyotsnaben  Patel  cur-
rently reside in Georgia.  They have three sons—one who is
already a U. S. citizen, and two who are lawful permanent
residents  and  spouses  of  U. S.  citizens.    As  a  young  man,
Mr.  Patel  entered  the  country  illegally.    But  in  2007,  he
tried to make things right by applying for an adjustment of
his immigration status to a lawful permanent resident (also
known as a green card).

Mr. Patel had at least some reason to hope.  The Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA) expressly authorizes the
Attorney General to grant relief in cases like his.  The stat-
ute sets forth a two-step process.  At the first step, the gov-
ernment must determine if an individual is statutorily eli-
gible  for  an  adjustment  of  status.   Various  circumstances
specified by law, including prior criminal convictions, may
render  an  applicant  ineligible  for  relief.  See  8  U. S. C.
§§ 1255(i)(2)(A), 1182.  At the second step, once an individ-
ual  has  established  his  statutory  eligibility  for  relief,  the
Attorney General or his designee is entitled to grant or deny
an  adjustment  of  status  “in  his  discretion.”    §§ 1255(a),
(i)(2); see also 8 CFR § 1240.1(a) (2021) (delegating this au-
thority to immigration judges).  Because this second step is
discretionary, “mere eligibility” for relief does not “automat-
ically result in a grant of the application.”  Matter of Arai,
13  I. & N. Dec.  494,  495  (BIA  1970).  Instead,  “the  actual
granting of relief . . . is in all cases a matter of grace.”  INS
v.  St.  Cyr,  533  U. S.  289,  308  (2001)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).

Seeking relief under this scheme, Mr. Patel filed an ap-
plication with the necessary paperwork.  Soon, the govern-
ment responded by returning a document allowing Mr. Pa-
tel to continue to work and remain in the country while it
processed his application.  So far, so good.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case document, specifically a dissenting opinion. It sets the context of the case by introducing the plaintiff, his immigration history, and the legal framework surrounding his application for adjustment of status.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

Opinion of the Court

discriminate purposefully against out-of-state economic in-
terests.  But the pork producers do not suggest that Califor-
nia’s law offends this principle.  Instead, they invite us to
fashion  two  new  and  more  aggressive  constitutional  re-
strictions  on  the  ability  of  States  to  regulate  goods  sold
within their borders.  We decline that invitation.  While the
Constitution  addresses  many  weighty  issues,  the  type  of
pork chops California merchants may sell is not on that list.

I
Modern American grocery stores offer a dizzying array of
choice.  Often, consumers may choose among eggs that are
large,  medium,  or  small;  eggs  that  are  white,  brown,  or
some  other  color;  eggs  from  cage-free  chickens  or  ones
raised consistent with organic farming standards.  When it
comes  to  meat  and  fish,  the  options  are  no  less  plentiful.
Products  may  be  marketed  as  free  range,  wild  caught,  or
graded by quality (prime, choice, select, and beyond).  The
pork
sometimes
come with “antibiotic-free” and “crate-free” labels.  USDA,
Report  to  Congress:  Livestock  Mandatory  Reporting
18
(2018),  https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/
media/LMR2018ReporttoCongress.pdf.  Much of this prod-
uct differentiation reflects consumer demand, informed by
individual taste, health, or moral considerations.

issue  here,

products

too,

at

Informed by similar concerns, States (and their predeces-
sors)  have  long  enacted  laws  aimed  at  protecting  animal
welfare.  As far back as 1641, the Massachusetts Bay Col-
ony  prohibited  “Tirranny  or  Crueltie  towards  any  bruite
Creature.”    Body  of  Liberties  §92,  in  A  Bibliographical
Sketch  of  the  Laws  of  the  Massachusetts  Colony  52–53
(1890).  Today,  Massachusetts  prohibits  the  sale  of  pork
products from breeding pigs (or their offspring) if the breed-
ing  pig  has  been  confined  “in  a  manner  that  prevents  [it]
from lying down, standing up, fully extending [its] limbs or
turning  around  freely.”  Mass.  Gen.  Laws  Ann.,  ch.  129,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of National Pork Producers Council v. Ross. It delves into the arguments surrounding California's law regulating pork production and touches upon consumer preferences and historical animal welfare legislation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524bv$spin 07-17-00 17:51:50

UNITED STATES

REPORTS

524

OCT. TERM 1997
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a header or metadata section, likely indicating a legal document or report. It's not sequential narrative text and likely not meant for direct reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Report Header</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
292

WOOD  v.  ALLEN

Syllabus

not  mere  oversight  or  neglect  but  the  result  of  a  deliberate  decision  to
focus  on  other  defenses.  Most  of  the  contrary  evidence  Wood  high
lights—e. g.,  that  Dozier  and  Ralph  put  the  inexperienced  Trotter  in
charge of the penalty phase proceedings—speaks not to whether counsel
made  a  strategic  decision,  but  to  whether  counsel’s  judgment  was  rea
sonable,  a  question  not  before  this  Court.  Any  evidence  plausibly  in
consistent  with  the  strategic-decision  ﬁnding  does  not  sufﬁce  to  show
that the ﬁnding was unreasonable.  Pp. 300–303.

2.  Because  Wood’s  argument  that  the  state  court  unreasonably  ap
plied Strickland in rejecting his ineffective-assistance claim on the mer
its is not “fairly included” in the questions presented under this Court’s
Rule 14.1(a), it will not be addressed here.  Pp. 303–304.

542 F. 3d 1281, afﬁrmed.

Sotomayor,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  Roberts,
C.  J.,  and  Scalia,  Thomas,  Ginsburg,  Breyer,  and  Alito,  JJ.,  joined.
Stevens,  J.,  ﬁled  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  Kennedy,  J.,  joined,
post, p. 305.

Kerry  Alan  Scanlon  argued  the  cause  for  petitioner.
With  him  on  the  briefs  were  David  O.  Bickart,  Robert  M.
Grass,  Karen  R.  Robinson,  Dionne  A.  Fraser,  and  Brady
W.  Mills.

Corey  L.  Maze,  Solicitor  General  of  Alabama,  argued  the
cause  for  respondents.  With  him  on  the  brief  were  Troy
King,  Attorney  General,  and  Henry  M.  Johnson,  Assistant
Attorney General.*

*Briefs  of  amici  curiae  urging  reversal  were  ﬁled  for  the  American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by  Larry W. Yackle, Steven R. Shapiro, John
Holdridge, and Brian W. Stull; and for the National Association of Crimi
nal  Defense  Lawyers  by  Jonathan  L.  Marcus  and  Barbara  E.  Bergman.
Briefs  of  amici  curiae  urging  afﬁrmance  were  ﬁled  for  the  State  of
Indiana et al. by Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas
M.  Fisher,  Solicitor  General,  and  Stephen  R.  Creason,  Section  Chief,  by
Richard S. Gebelein, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Delaware, and by
the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: John W. Suth
ers of Colorado, Bill McCollum of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia,
Tom Miller of  Iowa,  Steve  Six  of  Kansas,  James  D.  “Buddy”  Caldwell  of
Louisiana,  Martha  Coakley  of  Massachusetts,  Jim  Hood  of  Mississippi,
Steve Bullock of Montana, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Richard Cordray
of  Ohio,  Henry  D.  McMaster  of  South  Carolina,  Robert  E.  Cooper,  Jr.,  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal arguments and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Opinion of the Court

546 U. S., at 369–372.  But we read PennEast as resting on
a  broader  point:  The  Federal  Government’s  eminent  do-
main power is complete, such that no State may frustrate
its exercise by claiming immunity to forestall the transfer
of  property.    And  that  conclusion  applies  equally  to  Con-
gress’ powers to raise and maintain the military.

Texas further argues that Congress cannot subject it to
suit under USERRA because there is no founding-era his-
tory of similar litigation against States.  See Brief for Re-
spondent 25.  But PennEast did not require any such his-
tory,  as  the  dissent  acknowledges.    594  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip
op., at 19) (citing Texas, 143 U. S., at 646); see post, at 14,
n. 6.  Again, in PennEast, we considered the inferences that
flow from our constitutional structure and asked whether
States may, consistent with that structure, claim immunity
to frustrate federal objectives.  And again, answering that
question here, we find that the States waived their immun-
ity under Article I, §8, cls. 12 and 13.

Texas’ contrary view would permit States to thwart na-
tional military readiness.  We need not stray from the stat-
ute at hand to see the danger of this approach.  If a State—
or even 25 States—decided to protest a war by refusing to
employ returning servicemembers, Congress, on Texas’ tell-
ing, would be powerless to authorize private reinstatement
suits against those States.  The potentially debilitating ef-
fect on national security would not matter.

We think it does matter for a simple reason.  Text, his-
tory,  and  precedent  show  that  the  States,  in  coming  to-
gether to form a Union, agreed to sacrifice their sovereign
immunity for the good of the common defense.

*

*
We consequently reverse the judgment of the Texas Court
of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

*

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" from a case called *Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety*.  It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

against the developer, who is usually a private party.  See
§704 (authorizing review of “agency action”).  Instead, the
plaintiff typically sues the federal agency that approved the
development  and  asks  a  federal  court  to  vacate  that
approval.

Some  of  those  suits  proceed  under  the  APA;  others
proceed  under  federal  statutory  review  provisions  that
similarly authorize courts to “set aside” agency action.  See,
e.g.,  15  U. S. C.  §717r(b)  (Natural  Gas  Act);  16  U. S. C.
§825l(b) (Federal Power Act).  Regardless, all of those suits
depend on the availability of vacatur.

Many  APA  suits  similarly  challenge  federal  emissions
limits  or  efficiency  standards  for  cars,  trucks,  and  other
sources of pollution.  See, e.g., American Public Gas Assn.
v.  Department  of  Energy,  72  F. 4th  1324  (CADC  2023).
When  a  plaintiff  alleges  that  an  emissions  limit  does  too
little to stop third parties from polluting the environment,
the  plaintiff  cannot  bring  an  APA  suit  against  the  third
party.  Rather,  the  plaintiff  must  sue  the  agency  that
enacted  the  emissions  limit.    If  the  vacatur  remedy  were
unavailable,  the  agency  that  enacted  the  emissions  limit
would  never  face  litigation  from  unregulated  parties
seeking stricter limits; the agency could face litigation only
from regulated parties seeking looser limits.

Workers and their unions also regularly challenge agency
rules  that  rescind  or  loosen  federal  workplace  safety
standards.  See,  e.g.,  Transportation  Div.  of  Int’l  Assn.  of
Sheet  Metal,  Air,  Rail,  and  Transp.  Workers  v.  Federal
Railroad  Admin.,  988  F. 3d  1170  (CA9  2021)  (railroad
industry); United Steel v. Mine Safety and Health Admin.,
925 F. 3d 1279 (CADC 2019) (mining industry).  Those suits
often arise under statutory review provisions that, like the
APA,  authorize  courts  to  “set  aside”  agency  actions.    See,
e.g.,  28  U. S. C. §2342(7)  (railroad  industry);  30  U. S. C.
§816(a)(1) (mining industry).  And the suits all depend on
the availability of vacatur as a remedy.  In particular, the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the legal concept of vacatur and its importance in judicial review of agency action.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD
FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC,
ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 18–1334.  Argued October 15, 2019—Decided June 1, 2020*

In 2016, in response to a fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico, Congress invoked its
Article IV power to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory . . . belonging to the United States,”  §3, cl. 2, to enact the
Puerto  Rico  Oversight,  Management,  and  Economic  Stability  Act
(PROMESA).  PROMESA created a Financial Oversight and Manage-
ment Board, whose seven voting members are to be appointed by the
President without the Senate’s advice and consent.  Congress author-
ized  the  Board  to  file  for  bankruptcy  on  behalf  of  Puerto  Rico  or  its
instrumentalities,  to  supervise  and  modify  Puerto  Rico’s  laws  and
budget, and to gather evidence and conduct investigations in support
of these efforts.

After  President  Obama  selected  the  Board’s  members,  the  Board
filed bankruptcy petitions on behalf of the Commonwealth and five of
its entities.  Both court and Board had decided a number of matters
when several creditors moved to dismiss the proceedings on the ground
that the Board members’ selection violated the Constitution’s Appoint-
ments Clause, which says that the President “shall nominate, and by

——————

* Together with No. 18–1475, Aurelius Investment, LLC, et al. v. Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico et al., No. 18–1496, Official Committee of Un-
secured Creditors of All Title III Debtors Other Than COFINA v. Aurelius
Investment, LLC, et al., No. 18–1514,  United States v. Aurelius Invest-
ment, LLC, et al., and No. 18–1521, Unión de Trabajadores de la Indus-
tria  Elećtrica  y  Riego,  Inc.  v.  Financial  Oversight  and  Management
Board for Puerto Rico et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

Id.,  at  1372.

as trained on the likelihood-of-success requirement stated
The  §315(b)  timeliness
in  §314(a).
determination,  the  majority  concluded,  “is  not  ‘closely
related’  to  the  institution  decision  addressed  in  §314(a).”
Id., at 1374 (quoting Cuozzo, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
12)).  The majority therefore held that for §315(b) appeals,
§314(d)  does  not  displace  the  usual  presumption  favoring
judicial review of agency action.  Wi-Fi One, 878 F. 3d, at
1374–1375.
In  a  concurring  opinion,  Judge  O’Malley
emphasized a “simpler” basis for the same conclusion.  Id.,
at 1375.  In her view, §314(d) shields from review only the
agency’s assessment of a petition’s “substantive adequacy,”
not questions about the agency’s “authority to act.”  Id., at
1376.

Judge Hughes, joined by Judges Lourie, Bryson, and Dyk,
dissented,  expressing  a  position  that  today’s  dissent
characterizes as “extraordinary.”  Post, at 6.  Those judges
concluded  that  §314(d)  conveys  Congress’  “clear  and
unmistakable”  “intent  to  prohibit  judicial  review  of  the
Board’s  [inter  partes  review]  institution  decision.”  Wi-Fi
One, 878 F. 3d, at 1378.  That prohibition applies to §315(b)
issues, the Federal Circuit dissenters maintained, because
§315(b)  “describes  when  an  [inter  partes  review]  may  be
‘instituted.’ ”  Id., at 1377, 1378–1379 (quoting §315(b)).

In light of its en banc decision in Wi-Fi One, the Court of
Appeals granted panel rehearing in this case.  Treating the
Board’s application of §315(b) as judicially reviewable, the
panel’s revised opinion held that the Board erred by insti-
tuting review.  The petition for inter partes review here was
untimely, the Court of Appeals held, because the 2001 in-
fringement complaint, though dismissed without prejudice,
started the one-year clock under §315(b).3  The court there-
fore vacated the Board’s final written decision, which had

——————

3 A footnote in the panel’s opinion noted that the Court of Appeals sit-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing a case and its legal precedents. It contains citations, legal terminology, and a detailed analysis of the arguments made by different parties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

588

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS v. FINLEY

Opinion of the Court

that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech
or a criminal penalty at stake. So long as legislation does
not infringe on other constitutionally protected rights, Con-
gress has wide latitude to set spending priorities. See
Regan, supra, at 549.
In the 1990 amendments that incor-
porated § 954(d)(1), Congress modiﬁed the declaration of pur-
pose in the NEA’s enabling Act to provide that arts funding
should “contribute to public support and conﬁdence in the
use of taxpayer funds,” and that “[p]ublic funds . . . must
ultimately serve public purposes the Congress deﬁnes.”
§ 951(5). And as we held in Rust, Congress may “selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding
an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem
in another way.”
In doing so, “the Gov-
ernment has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it
has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of
the other.”
Ibid.; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 475
(1977) (“There is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encourage-
ment of an alternative activity consonant with legislative
policy”).

500 U. S., at 193.

III

The lower courts also erred in invalidating § 954(d)(1)
as unconstitutionally vague. Under the First and Fifth
Amendments, speakers are protected from arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement of vague standards. See NAACP
v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 432–433 (1963). The terms of the
provision are undeniably opaque, and if they appeared in a
criminal statute or regulatory scheme, they could raise sub-
stantial vagueness concerns.
It is unlikely, however, that
speakers will be compelled to steer too far clear of any “for-
bidden area” in the context of grants of this nature. Cf.
Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus,
Inc., 482 U. S. 569, 574 (1987) (facially invalidating a ﬂat ban
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley.  It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

13

Opinion of the Court

court of appeals’ judgment involves surmise about legisla-
tive  purpose  and  arguments  from  public  policy.    Like  the
Tenth  Circuit,  they  emphasize  that,  by  the  time  the  peti-
tioners sought new exemptions in 2017 and 2018, small re-
fineries already “had many years to ponder . . . whether it
made  sense  to  enter  into  or  remain  in  the  market.”    948
F. 3d, at 1247.  The respondents argue that subparagraph
(B) was adopted for the purpose of “funnel[ing] small refin-
eries toward compliance over time.”  Id., at 1246.  And they
submit  that  enforcing  a  continuity  requirement  helps
advance congressional goals such as increasing “biofuel pro-
duction,  energy  independence,  and  environmental  protec-
tion.”  Ibid.

The dissent seemingly agrees.  It acknowledges that Con-
gress provided other ameliorating provisions to address var-
ious challenges to the fuel market.  Post, at 8–10.  For ex-
ample and as we have already seen, §7545(o)(7)(A) grants
EPA authority to waive RFP obligations at any time across
an  entire  State  or  region  to  address  severe  hardships  or
shortages.  Section 7545(o)(7)(E)(ii) provides a more limited
waiver  with  respect  to  biomass-based  diesel  fuels.   And
§7545(o)(8)(D)(i)  provided  a  waiver  authority  to  address
hardships for consumers “in calendar year 2006.”  But on
the  dissent’s  view,  everything  else  in  the  statute  aims  to
“[f]unnel[ ]  refineries  toward  compliance.”    Post,  at  9.  In-
deed, the dissent finds it “odd” that our reading would per-
mit hardship relief only to small refineries in existence in
2008 and not to new ones, post, at 13—and  that our reading
“will require EPA to examine the 2008 study” when review-
ing extension applications “decades from now,” post, at 9.

But, as usual, the other side presents a plausible compet-
ing narrative.  On the petitioners’ account, the statute seeks
to increase production of renewable fuel while also offering
a  “safety  valve”  each  year  for  small  refineries  that  might
otherwise face extinction.  According to the small refineries,
the respondents’ competing “funnel” metaphor makes little
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the arguments made by both sides in a case. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute and its implications for small refineries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ALABAMA ASSN. OF REALTORS v. DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.
Per Curiam

spread of disease is markedly different from the direct tar-
geting of disease that characterizes the measures identified
in  the  statute.  Reading  both  sentences  together,  rather
than the first in isolation, it is a stretch to maintain that
§361(a) gives the CDC the authority to impose this eviction
moratorium.

Even if the text were ambiguous, the sheer scope of the
CDC’s  claimed  authority  under  §361(a)  would  counsel
against the Government’s interpretation.  We expect Con-
gress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exer-
cise  powers  of  “vast  ‘economic  and  political  significance.’ ”
Utility  Air  Regulatory  Group  v.  EPA,  573  U. S.  302,  324
(2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U. S. 120, 160 (2000)).  That is exactly the kind of power
that the CDC claims here.  At least 80% of the country, in-
cluding between 6 and 17 million tenants at risk of eviction,
falls within the moratorium.  See Response in Opposition
26, 29.  While the parties dispute the financial burden on
landlords,  Congress  has  provided  nearly  $50  billion  in
emergency  rental  assistance—a  reasonable  proxy  of  the
moratorium’s  economic  impact.    See  86  Fed.  Reg.  43247.
And the issues at stake are not merely financial.  The mor-
atorium intrudes into an area that is the particular domain
of state law: the landlord-tenant relationship.  See Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 68–69 (1972).  “Our precedents re-
quire  Congress  to  enact  exceedingly  clear  language  if  it
wishes  to  significantly  alter  the  balance  between  federal
and state power and the power of the Government over pri-
vate property.”  United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture
River Preservation Assn., 590 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip
op., at 15–16).

Indeed, the Government’s read of §361(a) would give the
CDC a breathtaking amount of authority.  It is hard to see
what measures this interpretation would place outside the
CDC’s reach, and the Government has identified no limit in
§361(a)  beyond  the  requirement  that  the  CDC  deem  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the interpretation of a specific statute (§361(a)) and its application to a CDC eviction moratorium. It delves into legal arguments, precedents, and the scope of agency authority.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

DOES 1–3 v. MILLS

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

327, 330–331 (1969)).  This Court’s precedents “do not sup-
port such a lopsided inquiry.”  741 F. 3d, at 57.

That takes us to the application of strict scrutiny.  Strict
scrutiny requires the State to show that its challenged law
serves  a  compelling  interest  and  represents  the  least  re-
strictive means for doing so.  Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546.  For
purposes of resolving this application, I accept that what we
said 11 months ago remains true today—that “[s]temming
the spread of COVID–19” qualifies as “a compelling inter-
est.”  Roman  Catholic  Diocese  of  Brooklyn  v.  Cuomo,  592
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2020)  (per curiam)  (slip  op.,  at  4).  At  the
same time, I would acknowledge that this interest cannot
qualify  as  such  forever.  Back  when  we  decided  Roman
Catholic  Diocese,  there  were  no  widely  distributed  vac-
cines.1  Today there are three.2  At that time, the country
had comparably few treatments for those suffering with the
disease.  Today  we  have  additional  treatments  and  more
appear near.3  If human nature and history teach anything,
——————

1 Our opinion in Roman Catholic Diocese was published on November
25, 2020.  COVID–19 vaccines outside of clinical trials weren’t available
to the public until the following month.  See P. Loftus & M. West, First
Covid-19  Vaccine  Given  to  U. S.  Public,  Wall  Street  J.,  Dec.  14,  2020,
https: // www.wsj.com /articles/covid-19-vaccinations-in-the-u-s-slated-to-
begin-monday-11607941806.

2 Over  200  million  Americans,  nearly  seven  in  ten,  have  received  at
least one dose of these vaccines.  Nearly six in ten Americans have been
fully vaccinated, including about 85% of those older than 65.  See CDC,
COVID–19 Vaccinations in the United States, COVID Data Tracker (Oct.
28,  2021),  http://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccinations_vacc-
total-admin-rate-total.  Among States, Maine has particularly high vac-
cination  rates:    About  70%  of  its  population  has  been  fully  vaccinated,
good for fourth-best in the Nation.  See Maine Coronavirus Vaccination
Progress, USA Facts (Oct. 26, 2021), https://usafacts.org/visualizations/
covid-vaccine-tracker-states/state/maine.

3 C. Johnson, Merck’s Experimental Pill To Treat COVID–19 Cuts Risk
of Hospitalization and Death in Half, the Pharmaceutical Company Re-
ports,  Washington  Post,  Oct.  1,  2021,  https://www.washingtonpost.
com/health/2021/10/01/pill-to-treat-covid/  (noting  that  as  of  October  1,
2021,  “[t]he  United  States  moved  a  major  step  closer  . . .  to  having  an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

ALITO, J., dissenting

“ ‘background  check,’ ”  he  said,  is  not  within  his  “ ‘frame-
work.’ ”5

Doe 4, who practiced at the now-defunct Causeway Clinic
near  New  Orleans,  recounted  the  meager  vetting  that  oc-
curred when he was hired at that facility.  He had to pro-
duce a valid medical license and DEA license but was not
required  “to  undergo  anything  similar  to  review  by  a  cre-
dentials committee.”  Record 14156.

In light of these practices, it is no surprise that the Loui-
siana Department of Health has issued Statements of Defi-
ciency  against  abortion  facilities  for  failing  to  adopt  “ ‘a
detailed credentialing process for physicians,’ ” failing to in-
vestigate  “ ‘possible  restrictions’ ”  on  physicians’  licenses,
and  failing  to  look  into  “ ‘evidence  of  prior  malpractice
claims/settlements.’ ”6

Louisiana adopted Act 620 in the aftermath of the Kermit
Gosnell grand jury report, which expounded on the failures
of regulatory oversight that allowed Gosnell’s practices to
continue for an extended period.  See Report of Grand Jury
in  No.  0009901–2008  (1st  Jud.  Dist.  Pa.,  Jan.  14,  2011).
The  grand  jury  concluded  that  closer  supervision  would
have uncovered Gosnell’s egregious health and safety viola-
tions.  Gosnell had a medical license, but it is doubtful that
any hospital would have given him admitting privileges.

In sum, contrary to the plurality’s assertion, there is am-
ple evidence in the record showing that requiring admitting
privileges has health and safety benefits.  There is certainly
room  for  debate  about  the  need  for  this  requirement,  but
under  our  case  law,  this  Court’s  task  is  not  to  ascertain
whether  a  law  “adds  significantly”  to  the  existing  regula-
tory framework.  Instead, when confronted with a genuine
dispute about a law’s benefits, we have afforded legislatures
“wide discretion” in assessing whether a regulation serves

——————

5 Ibid.
6 Id., at 9.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the issue of admitting privileges for abortion providers and cites evidence to support the author's position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

Puerto Rico on its own initiative, even if it had been abun-
dantly  explicit  in  its  intention  to  do  so.  The  truism  that
“one  Congress  cannot  bind  a  later  Congress,”  Dorsey  v.
United States, 567 U. S. 260, 274 (2012), appears to have its
limits:  As  scholars  have  noted,  certain  congressional  ac-
tions  are  not  subject  to  recantation.    See,  e.g.,  Magruder,
The  Commonwealth  Status  of  Puerto  Rico,  15  U.  Pitt.
L. Rev. 1, 14 (1953) (listing as examples the congressional
grant  of  independence  to  the  Philippine  Islands  and  con-
gressional grant of private title to public lands under home-
stead laws); Issacharoff, 94 Ind. L. J., at 14 (“Once a Con-
gress has disposed of a territory, of necessity it binds future
Congresses to the consequences of that decision”); T. Aleini-
koff,  Semblances  of  Sovereignty:  The  Constitution,  the
State, and American Citizenship 90 (2002) (“The granting
of neither statehood nor independence may be revoked, nor
may land grants or other ‘vested interests’ be called back by
a subsequent Congress”).

Plausible reasons may exist to treat Public Law 600 and
the Federal Government’s recognition of Puerto Rico’s sov-
ereignty as similarly irrevocable, at least in the absence of
mutual  consent.  Congress  made  clear  in  Public  Law  600
that the agreement between the Federal Government and
Puerto Rico was “in the nature of a compact.”  64 Stat. 319.
That “solemn undertaking, based upon mutual consent, . . .
of  such  profound  character  between  the  Federal  Govern-
ment and a community of U. S. citizens,” has struck many
as “incompatible with the concept of unilateral revocation.”
E.g., Report of the United States-Puerto Rico Commission
on  the  Status  of  Puerto  Rico  12–13  (1966);  see  also  A.
Leibowitz,  Defining  Status:  A  Comprehensive  Analysis  of
United  States  Territorial  Relations  172–173  (1989)  (de-
scribing  how  “many  in  the  Congress”  understood  Public
Law 600 to constitute “an irrevocable grant of authority in
local affairs with an understanding of mutual consent being
required before Congress would resolve the ultimate status
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the concept of congressional actions being binding on future Congresses, particularly in the context of Puerto Rico's status.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>