<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

881

Opinion of the Court

In the end, two-thirds of the States did not enact mandatory
buckle-up laws, and the passive restraint requirement re-
mained in effect.

In sum, as DOT now tells us through the Solicitor General,
the 1984 version of FMVSS 208 “embodies the Secretary’s
policy judgment that safety would best be promoted if manu-
facturers installed alternative protection systems in their
ﬂeets rather than one particular system in every car.” Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 25; see 49 Fed. Reg.
28997 (1984). Petitioners’ tort suit claims that the manufac-
turers of the 1987 Honda Accord “had a duty to design, man-
ufacture, distribute and sell a motor vehicle with an effective
and safe passive restraint system, including, but not limited
to, airbags.” App. 3 (Complaint, ¶ 11).

In effect, petitioners’ tort action depends upon its claim
that manufacturers had a duty to install an airbag when they
manufactured the 1987 Honda Accord. Such a state law—
i. e., a rule of state tort law imposing such a duty—by its
terms would have required manufacturers of all similar cars
to install airbags rather than other passive restraint sys-
It
tems, such as automatic belts or passive interiors.
thereby would have presented an obstacle to the variety and
mix of devices that the federal regulation sought.
It would
have required all manufacturers to have installed airbags in
respect to the entire District-of-Columbia-related portion of
their 1987 new car ﬂeet, even though FMVSS 208 at that
time required only that 10% of a manufacturer’s nationwide
It
ﬂeet be equipped with any passive restraint device at all.
thereby also would have stood as an obstacle to the gradual
passive restraint phase-in that the federal regulation delib-
erately imposed.
In addition, it could have made less likely
the adoption of a state mandatory buckle-up law. Because
the rule of law for which petitioners contend would have
stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of ” the important means-related federal objectives that we
have just discussed, it is pre-empted. Hines, 312 U. S., at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the preemption of state law by federal regulation regarding passive restraint systems in vehicles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Syllabus

was  not  required  to  “consider  all  policy  alternatives,”  ibid.,  deferred
action  was  “within  the  ambit  of  the  existing”  policy,  ibid.;  indeed,  it
was the centerpiece of the policy.  In failing to consider the option to
retain deferred action, Duke “failed to supply the requisite ‘reasoned
analysis.’ ”  Id., at 57.

That  omission  alone  renders  Duke’s  decision  arbitrary  and  capri-
cious,  but  it  was  not  the  only  defect.  Duke  also  failed  to  address
whether there was “legitimate reliance” on the DACA Memorandum.
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 742.  Certain
features  of  the  DACA  policy  may  affect  the  strength  of  any  reliance
interests, but those features are for the agency to consider in the first
instance.  DHS has flexibility in addressing any reliance interests and
could have considered various accommodations.  While the agency was
not required to pursue these accommodations, it was required to assess
the existence and strength of any reliance interests, and weigh them
against competing policy concerns.  Its failure to do so was arbitrary
and capricious.  Pp. 17–26.

THE  CHIEF JUSTICE,  joined  by  JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER,
and JUSTICE KAGAN, concluded in Part IV that respondents’ claims fail
to establish a plausible inference that the rescission was motivated by
animus  in  violation  of  the  equal  protection  guarantee  of  the  Fifth
Amendment.  Pp. 27–29.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV.
GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and SO-
TOMAYOR, J., joined as to all but Part IV.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part.  THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part, in which ALITO and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  ALITO, J.,
and  KAVANAUGH, J.,  filed  opinions  concurring  in  the  judgment  in  part
and dissenting in part.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section. It summarizes the court's decision and reasoning, outlining the legal arguments and the outcome.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

to justify an intrusion on the Article II interests of the Pres-
idency.  The Nixon standard also  reduces the risk of sub-
jecting a President to unwarranted burdens, because it pro-
vides  that  a  prosecutor  may  obtain  a  President’s
information only in certain defined circumstances.

Although the Court adopted the Nixon standard in a dif-
ferent Article II context—there, involving the confidential-
ity of official, privileged information—the majority opinion
today  recognizes  that  there  are  also  important  Article  II
(and  Supremacy  Clause)  interests  at  stake  here.    A  state
criminal subpoena to a President raises Article II and Su-
premacy Clause issues because of the potential for a state
prosecutor to use the criminal process and issue subpoenas
in  a  way  that  interferes  with  the  President’s  duties,
through harassment or diversion.  Cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U. S. 731, 751–753 (1982).

Because this case again entails a clash between the inter-
ests of the criminal process and the Article II interests of
the  Presidency,  I  would  apply  the  longstanding  Nixon
“demonstrated,  specific  need”  standard  to  this  case.  The
majority opinion does not apply the Nixon standard in this
distinct Article II context, as I would have done.  That said,
the  majority  opinion  appropriately  takes  account  of  some
important concerns that also animate Nixon and the Con-
stitution’s balance of powers.  The majority opinion explains
that a state prosecutor may not issue a subpoena for a Pres-
ident’s personal information out of bad faith, malice, or an
intent to harass a President, ante, at 16; as a result of pros-
ecutorial impropriety, ibid.; to seek information that is not
relevant  to  an  investigation,  ante,  at  16,  19–20;  that  is
overly broad or unduly burdensome, ante, at 19–20; to ma-
nipulate,  influence,  or  retaliate  against  a  President’s  offi-
cial acts or policy decisions, ante, at 17, 20; or in a way that
would impede, conflict with, or interfere with a President’s
official  duties,  ante,  at  20–21.  All  nine  Members  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in a case before the Supreme Court. It discusses the Nixon standard regarding presidential immunity and its application to a state criminal subpoena.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

35

ALITO, J., dissenting

address this issue of pretext because the Ninth Circuit did
not  do  so  is  hard  to  take,  given  that  the  Ninth  Circuit
barely  addressed  anything,  disposing  of  this  case  in  pre-
cisely two sentences.

Neither  of  those  two  sentences  addressed  the  “novel
question,”  ante,  at  1,  to  which  the  bulk  of  this  Court’s
opinion  is  devoted,  i.e.,  whether  the  accept-all-comers
policy  is  reasonable  in  light  of  the  purposes  of  the  RSO
forum and is viewpoint neutral, see ante, at 17–31.  If it is
appropriate  for  us  to  consider  that  issue,  then  the  Ninth
Circuit’s failure to address the issue of pretext should not
stand in the way of review by this Court.

C
One  final  aspect  of  the  Court’s  decision  warrants  com-
ment.  In  response  to  the  argument  that  the  accept-all-
comers-policy  would  permit  a  small  and  unpopular  group
to be taken over by students who wish to silence its mes-
sage,  the  Court  states  that  the  policy  would  permit  a
registered  group  to  impose  membership  requirements
“designed  to  ensure  that  students  join  because  of  their
commitment to a group’s vitality, not its demise.”  Ante, at
27.  With this concession, the Court tacitly recognizes that
Hastings  does  not  really  have  an  accept-all-comers  pol-
icy—it  has  an  accept-some-dissident-comers  policy—and
the  line  between  members  who  merely  seek  to  change  a
group’s  message  (who  apparently  must  be  admitted)  and
those who seek a group’s “demise” (who may be kept out)
is hopelessly vague.

Here  is  an  example.  Not  all  Christian  denominations
agree  with  CLS’s  views  on  sexual  morality  and  other
matters.  During a recent year, CLS had seven members.
Suppose that 10 students who are members of denomina-
tions  that  disagree  with  CLS  decided  that  CLS  was  mis-
representing  true  Christian  doctrine.  Suppose  that  these
students  joined  CLS,  elected  officers  who  shared  their
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal arguments and reasoning surrounding a specific policy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

again  held  that  race-based  affirmative  action  in  higher
education  did  not  violate  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  or
Title VI.  Grutter, 539 U. S., at 343.  This time, however, the
Court also specifically indicated—despite the reservations
of  Justice  Ginsburg  and  Justice  Breyer—that  race-based
affirmative  action  in  higher  education  would  not  be
constitutionally  justified  after  another  25  years,  at  least
absent  something  not  “expect[ed].”    Ibid.    And  various
Members  of  the  Court  wrote  separate  opinions  explicitly
referencing the Court’s 25-year limit.

  Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court stated:  “We
expect  that  25  years  from  now,  the  use  of  racial
preferences  will  no  longer  be  necessary  to  further
the interest approved today.”  Ibid.

  JUSTICE THOMAS expressly concurred in “the Court’s
holding  that  racial  discrimination
in  higher
education admissions will be illegal in 25 years.”  Id.,
at 351 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

  JUSTICE  THOMAS,  joined  here  by  Justice  Scalia,
reiterated  “the  Court’s  holding”  that  race-based
affirmative  action  in  higher  education  “will  be
unconstitutional in 25 years” and “that in 25 years
the practices of the Law School will be illegal,” while
also  stating  that  “they  are,  for  the  reasons  I  have
given, illegal now.”  Id., at 375–376.

  Justice  Kennedy

“the  Court’s
referred
pronouncement  that  race-conscious  admissions
programs  will  be  unnecessary  25  years  from  now.”
Id., at 394 (dissenting opinion).

to

joined  by  Justice  Breyer,
  Justice  Ginsburg,
limit  but
acknowledged
questioned  it,  writing  that  “one  may  hope,  but  not
firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s span,
progress  toward  nondiscrimination  and  genuinely

the  Court’s  25-year
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the discussion surrounding the 25-year limit on race-based affirmative action in higher education as mentioned in the Grutter v. Bollinger case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
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286 GEBSER v. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

U. S. C. § 2000a–3(a) (1970 ed.); §§ 2000e–5(e), (g) (1970 ed.,
It was not until 1991 that Congress made dam-
Supp. II).
ages available under Title VII, and even then, Congress care-
fully limited the amount recoverable in any individual case,
calibrating the maximum recovery to the size of the em-
ployer. See 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(b)(3). Adopting petitioners’
position would amount, then, to allowing unlimited recovery
of damages under Title IX where Congress has not spoken
on the subject of either the right or the remedy, and in the
face of evidence that when Congress expressly considered
both in Title VII it restricted the amount of damages
available.

Congress enacted Title IX in 1972 with two principal ob-
jectives in mind: “[T]o avoid the use of federal resources to
support discriminatory practices” and “to provide individual
citizens effective protection against those practices.” Can-
non, supra, at 704. The statute was modeled after Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 441 U. S., at 694–696;
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555, 566 (1984), which
is parallel to Title IX except that it prohibits race discrimi-
nation, not sex discrimination, and applies in all programs
receiving federal funds, not only in education programs.
See 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq. The two statutes operate in
the same manner, conditioning an offer of federal funding on
in what
a promise by the recipient not to discriminate,
amounts essentially to a contract between the Government
and the recipient of funds. See Guardians, 463 U. S., at 599
(opinion of White, J.); id., at 609 (Powell, J., concurring in
judgment); cf. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Hal-
derman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981).

That contractual framework distinguishes Title IX from
Title VII, which is framed in terms not of a condition but of
an outright prohibition. Title VII applies to all employers
without regard to federal funding and aims broadly to “eradi-
cat[e] discrimination throughout the economy.” Landgraf
v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 254 (1994) (internal quo-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal citations, discusses legal precedents, and analyzes the application of Title IX.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

SEC v. JARKESY

GORSUCH, J., concurring

Jarkesy.  And  it  is  free  to  pursue  them  exactly  as  it  had
always done until 2010:  In a court, before a judge, and with
a jury.  With these observations, I am pleased to concur.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Judge Gorsuch. It contains legal terminology and follows a typical structure for such documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2011

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MILLER v. ALABAMA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF

ALABAMA

No. 10–9646.  Argued March 20, 2012—Decided June 25, 2012*

In each of these cases, a 14-year-old was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibil-
ity  of  parole.  In  No.  10−9647,  petitioner  Jackson  accompanied  two
other  boys  to  a  video  store  to  commit  a  robbery;  on  the  way  to  the
store, he learned that one of the boys was carrying a shotgun.  Jack-
son stayed outside the store for most of the robbery, but after he en-
tered,  one  of  his  co-conspirators  shot  and  killed  the  store  clerk.    Ar-
kansas  charged  Jackson  as  an  adult  with  capital  felony  murder  and
aggravated  robbery,  and  a  jury  convicted  him  of  both  crimes.    The
trial court imposed a statutorily mandated sentence of life imprison-
ment  without  the  possibility  of  parole.    Jackson  filed  a  state  habeas
petition, arguing that a mandatory life-without-parole term for a 14-
year-old  violates  the  Eighth  Amendment.    Disagreeing,  the  court
granted the State’s motion to dismiss.  The Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed.
  In  No.
 10−9646, petitioner Miller, along with a friend, beat Miller’s
neighbor  and  set  fire  to  his  trailer  after  an  evening  of  drinking  and
drug use.  The neighbor died.  Miller was initially charged as a juve-
nile, but his case was removed to adult court, where he was charged
with murder in the course of arson.  A jury found Miller guilty, and
the  trial  court  imposed  a  statutorily  mandated  punishment  of  life
without  parole.    The  Alabama  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  affirmed,
holding  that  Miller’s  sentence  was  not  overly  harsh  when  compared
to  his  crime,  and  that  its  mandatory  nature  was  permissible  under

——————

* Together  with  No.  10–9647,  Jackson  v.  Hobbs,  Director,  Arkansas
Department of Correction, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case, providing a summary of the case and the Court's decision. Syllabi are not considered part of the main body of the opinion and are meant for informational purposes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
The painting hanging in Lilly Cassirer’s home in Germany
Trial Exhibit #10
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a caption or label for a piece of evidence in a legal case. It's not the main body of text and likely provides context for a visual element.
  </thinking>
  <category>Trial Exhibit Label</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
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342

UNITED STATES v. BAJAKAJIAN

Opinion of the Court

fendant’s contention that this provision was “penal,” stating
instead that it was “fully as remedial in its character, de-
signed as plainly to secure [the] rights [of the Government],
as are the statutes rendering importers liable to duties.”
13
Wall., at 546. The Court reasoned:

“When foreign merchandise, subject to duties, is im-
ported into the country, the act of importation imposes
on the importer the obligation to pay the legal charges.
Besides this the goods themselves, if the duties be not
paid, are subject to seizure . . . . Every act, therefore,
which interferes with the right of the government to
seize and appropriate the property which has been for-
feited to it . . . is a wrong to property rights, and is a ﬁt
Ibid.
subject for indemnity.”

Signiﬁcantly, the fact that the forfeiture was a multiple of
the value of the goods did not alter the Court’s conclusion:

“The act of abstracting goods illegally imported, re-
ceiving, concealing, or buying them, interposes difﬁcul-
ties in the way of a government seizure, and impairs,
It is,
therefore, the value of the government right.
then, hardly accurate to say that the only loss the gov-
ernment can sustain from concealing the goods liable to
seizure is their single value . . . . Double the value may
Id., at 546–547.
not be more than complete indemnity.”

The early monetary forfeitures, therefore, were considered
not as punishment for an offense, but rather as serving the
remedial purpose of reimbursing the Government for the
losses accruing from the evasion of customs duties.17 They

17 In each of the statutes from the early Congresses cited by the dissent,
the activities giving rise to the monetary forfeitures, if undetected, were
likely to cause the Government losses in customs revenue. The forfeiture
imposed by the Acts of Aug. 4, 1790, and Mar. 2, 1799, was not simply for
“transferring goods from one ship to another,” post, at 346, but rather for
doing so “before such ship . . . shall come to the proper place for the
discharge of her cargo . . . and be there duly authorized by the proper
ofﬁcer or ofﬁcers of the customs to unlade” the goods, see 1 Stat. 157,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's decision. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis, all characteristic of legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

GORSUCH, J., concurring

can  be  corrected  otherwise  only  through  the  amendment
process.  See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587
U. S. 230, 248 (2019).  When it comes to fixing errors of stat-
utory interpretation, the Court has proceeded perhaps more
circumspectly.  But in that field, too, it has overruled even
longstanding but “flawed” decisions.  See, e.g., Leegin Crea-
tive Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 904,
907 (2007).

Recent history illustrates all this.  During the tenures of
Chief Justices Warren and Burger, it seems this Court over-
ruled an average of around three cases per Term, including
roughly  50  statutory  precedents  between  the  1960s  and
1980s alone.  See W. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Prec-
edents,  76  Geo.  L. J.  1361,  1427–1434  (1988)  (collecting
cases).  Many  of  these  decisions  came  in  settings  no  less
consequential  than  today’s.  In  recent  years,  we  have  not
approached the pace set by our predecessors, overruling an
average of just one or two prior decisions each Term.1  But
the point remains:  Judicial decisions inconsistent with the
written law do not inexorably control.

Second, another lesson tempers the first.  While judicial
decisions may not supersede or revise the Constitution or
federal statutory law, they merit our “respect as embodying
the considered views of those who have come before.”  Ra-
mos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83, 105 (2020).  As a matter of
professional responsibility, a judge must not only avoid con-
fusing his writings with the law.  When a case comes before
him, he must also weigh his view of what the law demands
against the thoughtful views of his predecessors.  After all,
“[p]recedent is a way of accumulating and passing down the
learning of past generations, a font of established wisdom

——————

1 For relevant databases of decisions, see Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Table of Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Deci-
sions,  Constitution  Annotated,  https://constitution.congress.gov/resources/
decisions-overruled/; see also H. Spaeth et al., 2023 Supreme Court Da-
tabase, http://supremecourtdatabase.org.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the role of precedent in judicial decision-making and cites previous Supreme Court cases to support his points.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

13

STEVENS, J., dissenting

ence  to  civilian  uses  of  weapons  tailors  the  text  of  the
Amendment  to  the  purpose  identified  in  its  preamble.10

——————

The Court allows that the phrase “bear Arms” did have as an idiomatic
meaning, “ ‘to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight,’ ” ante, at 12,
but  asserts  that  it  “unequivocally  bore  that  idiomatic  meaning  only
when followed by the preposition ‘against,’ which was in turn followed
by  the  target  of  the  hostilities,”  ante,  at  12–13.  But  contemporary
sources  make  clear  that  the  phrase  “bear  arms”  was  often  used  to
convey a military meaning without those additional words.  See, e.g., To
The  Printer,  Providence  Gazette,  (May  27,  1775)  (“By  the  common
estimate of three millions of people in America, allowing one in five to
bear arms, there will be found 600,000 fighting men”); Letter of Henry
Laurens to the Mass. Council (Jan. 21, 1778), in Letters of Delegates to
Congress  1774–1789,  p.  622  (P.  Smith  ed.  1981)  (“Congress  were
yesterday  informed  . . .  that  those  Canadians  who  returned  from
Saratoga  . . .  had  been  compelled  by  Sir  Guy  Carleton  to  bear  Arms”);
Of  the  Manner  of  Making  War  among  the  Indians  of  North-America,
Connecticut Courant (May 23, 1785) (“The Indians begin to bear arms
at the age of fifteen, and lay them aside when they arrive at the age of
sixty.    Some  nations  to  the  southward,  I  have  been  informed,  do  not
continue  their  military  exercises  after  they  are  fifty”);  28  Journals  of
the  Continental  Congress  1030  (G.  Hunt  ed.  1910)  (“That  hostages  be
mutually  given  as  a  security  that  the  Convention  troops  and  those
received in exchange for them do not bear arms prior to the first day of
May next”); H. R. J., 9th Cong., 1st Sess., 217 (Feb. 12, 1806) (“Whereas
the commanders of British armed vessels have impressed many Ameri
can  seamen,  and  compelled  them  to  bear  arms  on  board  said  vessels,
and  assist  in  fighting  their  battles  with  nations  in  amity  and  peace
with  the  United  States”);  H. R. J.,  15th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  182–183  (Jan.
14, 1819) (“[The petitioners] state that they were residing in the British
province  of  Canada,  at  the  commencement  of  the  late  war,  and  that
owing  to  their  attachment  to  the  United  States,  they  refused  to  bear
arms, when called upon by the British authorities . . .”).

10 Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 156 (1840), a case we cited in Miller,
further confirms this reading of the phrase.  In Aymette, the Tennessee
Supreme Court construed the guarantee in Tennessee’s 1834 Constitu
tion  that  “ ‘the  free  white  men  of  this  State,  have  a  right  to  keep  and
bear  arms  for  their  common  defence.’ ”    Explaining  that  the  provision
was adopted with the same goals as the Federal Constitution’s Second
Amendment, the court wrote: “The words ‘bear arms’ . . . have reference
to  their  military  use,  and  were  not  employed  to  mean  wearing  them
about the person as part of the dress.  As the object for which the right
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedents and analyzes the meaning of the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxxvii

Page
955
Sabet v. Intel Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sabino-Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974
Sabol; Cordell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  905,1139
1004
Sabol; Mayle v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
891
Saccoccia v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044
Sachar, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822
Safeway, Inc.; Hart v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991
Saffran v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Saﬁeddine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894
Sager v. Hall
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122
St. Amant v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1145
St. Bernard Parish Bureau of Prisions; Cooley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148
St. John; Maremont Corp. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048
St. Johns River Water Management Dist.; Modern, Inc. v.  . . . . . .
820
St. Johns United Church of Christ v. Babbitt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
St. Jude Medical, Inc.; Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v.
1115
. . . . . . . . . . .
St. Louis Bd. of Police Comm’rs; Thomas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  873,1101

St. Louis, Church of God, Inc.; Ventimiglia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  991,1092

952

St. Paul; Thomas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

Sairras v. Schleffer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
981

Salah; Boim v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

Salazar, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Salazar; Adam v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
810

Salazar v. Buono . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

Salazar; Devon Energy Corp. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Salazar; Gonzales v.
822

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Salazar; Orion Reserves Ltd. Partnership v.
Salazar v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  852,1101

873

Salazar; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Salazar-Galvan v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928

Salazar Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  852,1101

1133

Salcido v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saldana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1083,1133

1002

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saldarriaga-Palacio v. United States
1118

Salerno v. Michigan
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941

Salim v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Saline County Jail; Winnett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1016

Salley v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089

Salter v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Sam v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
876

Samadi v. Oliver  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Samano; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Samas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  937,1141

Sampath v. Concurrent Technologies Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  830,1064
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL
CONSULTANTS, INC.
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

n. 10; see also §227(b)(1)(A).  Nor has the Government “suf-
ficiently justified the differentiation between government-
debt collection speech and other important categories of ro-
bocall speech, such as political speech, charitable fundrais-
ing, issue advocacy, commercial advertising, and the like.”
Ante, at 9.

Nevertheless, I agree that the offending provision is sev-
erable.  See ante, at 2; post, at 11–12 (opinion of BREYER,
J.);  see  also  City  of  Ladue  v.  Gilleo,  512  U. S.  43,  51–53
(1994) (explaining that an appropriate “solution” to a law
that  covers  “too  little  speech  because  its  exemptions  dis-
criminate on the basis of [the speaker’s] messages” could be
to “remove” the discrimination).

With those understandings, I concur in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, INC.  It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

judgments  on  the  narrowest  grounds.’ ”49    But  notice  that
the dissent never actually gets around to telling us which
opinion in Apodaca it considers to be the narrowest and con-
trolling  one  under  Marks—or  why.   So  while  the  dissent
worries  that  we  defy  a  Marks  precedent,  it  is  oddly  coy
about where exactly that precedent might be found.

The parties recognize what the dissent does not:  Marks
has nothing to do with this case.  Unlike a Marks dispute
where the litigants duel over which opinion represents the
narrowest and controlling one, the parties before us accept
that Apodaca yielded no controlling opinion at all.  In par-
ticular, both sides admit that Justice Powell’s opinion can-
not  bind  us—precisely  because  he  relied  on  a  dual-track
rule of incorporation that an unbroken line of majority opin-
ions before and after Apodaca has rejected.  Still, the dis-
sent  presses  the  issue,  suggesting  that  a  single  Justice’s
opinion  can  overrule  prior  precedents  under  “the  logic”  of
Marks.50  But, as the dissent itself implicitly acknowledges,
Marks never sought to offer or defend such a rule.  And, as
we have seen, too, a rule like that would do more to harm
than advance stare decisis.

The  dissent’s  backup  argument  fares  no  better.    In  the
end, even the dissent is forced to concede that Justice Pow-
ell’s reasoning in Apodaca lacks controlling force.51  So far,
so good.  But then the dissent suggests Apodaca somehow
still manages to supply a controlling precedent as to its re-
sult.52  Look closely, though.  The dissent’s account of Apo-
daca’s result looks suspiciously like the reasoning of Justice
Powell’s opinion:  “In Apodaca, this means that when (1) a
defendant is convicted in state court, (2) at least 10 of the
12 jurors vote to convict, and (3) the defendant argues that
the  conviction  violates  the  Constitution  because  the  vote
——————

49 Id., at 193.
50 Post, at 10–11.
51 Post, at 11–12.
52 Post, at 8.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a section of legal opinion text, likely from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal arguments and precedents surrounding a specific case (Ramos v. Louisiana).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

29

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

the fact that the Court has not referred to Lemon in all sit-
uations support this Court’s decision to dismiss that prece-
dent entirely, particularly in the school context.

C
Upon overruling one “grand unified theory,” the Court in-
troduces  another:  It  holds  that  courts  must  interpret
whether  an  Establishment  Clause  violation  has  occurred
mainly  “by  ‘reference  to  historical  practices  and  under-
standings.’ ”  Ante, at 23 (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U. S.,
at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Here again, the
Court  professes  that  nothing  has  changed.    In  fact,  while
the Court has long referred to historical practice as one el-
ement  of  the  analysis  in  specific  Establishment  Clause
cases, the Court has never announced this as a general test
or exclusive focus.  American Legion, 588 U. S., at ___–___
(BREYER, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–3) (noting that the
Court was “appropriately ‘look[ing] to history for guidance’ ”
but was not “adopt[ing] a ‘history and tradition test’ ”).

The Court reserves any meaningful explanation of its his-
tory-and-tradition test for another day, content for now to
disguise it as established law and move on.  It should not
escape  notice,  however,  that  the  effects  of  the  majority’s
new rule could be profound.  The problems with elevating
history and tradition over purpose and precedent are well
documented.  See  Dobbs,  597  U. S.,  at  ___  (BREYER,
SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN, JJ.,  dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  16)
(explaining  that  the  Framers  “defined  rights  in  general
terms to permit future evolution in their scope and mean-
ing”); New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (BREYER, J., dissenting) (slip op.,
at 24–28) (explaining the pitfalls of a “near-exclusive reli-
ance on history” and offering examples of when this Court
has “misread” history in the past); Brown v. Davenport, 596
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (slip op., at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1111

529 U. S.

May 15, 2000

No. 99–1543.
Certiorari denied.

Johnson v. Johnson et al. C. A. 6th Cir.

No. 99–1547. Nisco v. Town of Perinton. Ct. App. N. Y.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 N. Y. 2d 1040, 719 N. E.
2d 928.

No. 99–1550. Correia v. Meachum, Connecticut Commis-
sioner of Corrections, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 430.

No. 99–1576. Barnett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 138.

No. 99–1578. Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. National Park
Service. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
194 F. 3d 120.

No. 99–1587. Evans v. Hobbs, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 288.

No. 99–1589. Ramey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 438.

No. 99–1593.

Jackson v. Gammon, Superintendent, Mo-
berly Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 349.

No. 99–1598. Horton v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d
1327.

No. 99–1601. Davis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 200 F. 3d 820.

No. 99–1606. Pierce v. Lucero, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 282.

No. 99–1608. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 658.

No. 99–1622. Arnold et al. v. Merit Systems Protection
Board et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 230 F. 3d 1377.

No. 99–1628. Montana v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 947.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

3

Syllabus

whether  monetary  claims  can  ever  be  certified  under  the  Rule  be-
cause,  at  a  minimum,  claims  for  individualized  relief,  like  backpay,
are  excluded.    Rule  23(b)(2)  applies  only  when  a  single,  indivisible
remedy  would  provide  relief  to  each  class  member.    The  Rule’s  his-
tory  and  structure  indicate  that  individualized  monetary  claims  be-
long  instead  in  Rule  23(b)(3),  with  its  procedural  protections  of  pre-
dominance,  superiority,  mandatory  notice,  and  the  right  to  opt  out.
Pp. 20–23.

(b) Respondents  nonetheless  argue  that  their  backpay  claims
were appropriately certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because those claims
do  not  “predominate”  over  their  injunctive  and  declaratory  relief  re-
quests.  That interpretation has no basis in the Rule’s text and does
obvious  violence  to  the  Rule’s  structural  features.    The  mere  “pre-
dominance” of a proper (b)(2) injunctive claim does nothing to justify
eliminating Rule 23(b)(3)’s procedural protections, and creates incen-
tives for class representatives to place at risk potentially valid mone-
tary relief claims.  Moreover, a district court would have to reevalu-
ate  the  roster  of  class  members  continuously  to  excise  those  who
leave  their  employment  and  become  ineligible  for  classwide  injunc-
tive  or  declaratory  relief.    By  contrast,  in  a  properly  certified  (b)(3)
class action for backpay, it would be irrelevant whether the plaintiffs
are  still  employed  at  Wal-Mart.    It  follows  that  backpay  claims
should not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).  Pp. 23–26.

(c) It is unnecessary to decide whether there are any forms of “in-
cidental” monetary relief that are consistent with the above interpre-
tation  of  Rule  23(b)(2)  and  the  Due  Process  Clause  because  respon-
dents’  backpay  claims  are  not
incidental  to  their  requested
injunction.  Wal-Mart  is  entitled  to  individualized  determinations  of
each employee’s eligibility for backpay.  Once a plaintiff establishes a
pattern  or  practice  of  discrimination,  a  district  court  must  usually
conduct  “additional  proceedings  . . .  to  determine  the  scope  of  indi-
vidual  relief.”  Teamsters  v.  United  States,  431  U. S.  324,  361.    The
company  can  then  raise  individual  affirmative  defenses  and  demon-
strate that its action was lawful.  Id., at 362.  The Ninth Circuit erred
in trying to replace such proceedings with Trial by Formula.  Because
Rule 23 cannot be interpreted to “abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right,” 28 U. S. C. §2072(b), a class cannot be certified on the
premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory de-
fenses to individual claims.  Pp. 26–27.

603 F. 3d 571, reversed.

SCALIA,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which GINS-
BURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to Parts I and III.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the court's reasoning and decision in a case. It discusses the applicability of Rule 23(b)(2) in class action lawsuits, particularly regarding monetary claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U72

[09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

36

FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. AKINS

Scalia, J., dissenting

scription of CIA expenditures.
Just as the (more indirect)
harm caused to Mr. Akins by the allegedly unlawful failure
to enforce FECA is precisely the same as the harm caused
to everyone else: unavailability of a description of AIPAC’s
activities.

The Constitution’s line of demarcation between the Execu-
tive power and the judicial power presupposes a common un-
derstanding of the type of interest needed to sustain a “case
or controversy” against the Executive in the courts. A sys-
tem in which the citizenry at large could sue to compel Exec-
utive compliance with the law would be a system in which
the courts, rather than the President, are given the primary
responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted,” Art. II, § 3. We do not have such a system because
the common understanding of the interest necessary to sus-
tain suit has included the requirement, afﬁrmed in Richard-
son, that the complained-of injury be particularized and dif-
ferentiated, rather than common to all the electorate. When
the Executive can be directed by the courts, at the instance
of any voter, to remedy a deprivation that affects the entire
electorate in precisely the same way—and particularly when
that deprivation (here, the unavailability of information) is
one inseverable part of a larger enforcement scheme—there
has occurred a shift of political responsibility to a branch
designed not to protect the public at large but to protect
individual rights.
“To permit Congress to convert the un-
differentiated public interest in executive ofﬁcers’ compli-
ance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the
courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President
to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitu-
tional duty . . . .” Lujan, supra, at 577.
If today’s decision
is correct, it is within the power of Congress to authorize
any interested person to manage (through the courts) the
Executive’s enforcement of any law that includes a require-
ment for the ﬁling and public availability of a piece of paper.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION

Opinion of the Court

United States and the Navajos knew how to impose specific
affirmative duties on the United States when they wanted
to do so.

Third,  the  Navajos  refer  to  the  lengthy  Colorado  River
water  rights  litigation  that  unfolded  in  a  series  of  cases
decided by this Court from the 1960s to the early 2000s, and
they  note  that  the  United  States  once  opposed  the
intervention of the Navajos in that litigation.  See Response
of United States to Motion of Navajo Tribe To Intervene in
Arizona v. California, O. T. 1961, No. 8, Orig.  The Navajos
point to the United States’s opposition as evidence that the
United  States  has  control  over  the  reserved  water  rights.
According  to  the  Navajos,  the  United  States’s  purported
control  supports  their  view  that  the  United  States  owes
trust duties to the Navajos.  But the “Federal Government’s
liability” on a breach-of-trust claim “cannot be premised on
control alone.”  United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U. S.
287,  301  (2009).    Again,  the  Federal  Government  must
“expressly  accep[t]”  trust  responsibilities  in  a  treaty,
statute,  or  regulation  that  contains  “rights-creating  or
duty-imposing” language.  United States v. Jicarilla Apache
Nation, 564 U. S. 162, 177 (2011); United States v. Navajo
Nation,  537  U. S.  488,  506  (2003).    The  Navajos  have  not
identified  anything  of  the  sort.    In  addition,  the  Navajos
may  be  able  to  assert  the  interests  they  claim  in  water
rights litigation, including by seeking to intervene in cases
that  affect  their  claimed  interests,  and  courts  will  then
assess the Navajos’ claims and motions as appropriate.  See
28 U. S. C. §1362; Arizona v. California, 460 U. S. 605, 615
(1983); see also Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501
U. S.  775,  784  (1991);  Moe  v.  Confederated  Salish  and
Kootenai  Tribes  of  Flathead  Reservation,  425  U. S.  463,
472–474 (1976).3

——————

3 Similarly, the Navajos argue that the United States’s control over the
Colorado River “drives home the duty to secure water.”  Brief for Navajo
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Arizona v. Navajo Nation*. It contains legal arguments and citations, which are typical of legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 139 (2010)

163

Opinion of Stevens, J.

“Sympathy,  of  course,  is  not  part  of  your  consideration.
And even if it was, certainly, don’t look to him for sym
pathy,  because he  demands  none.  And, ladies  and  gen
tlemen,  when  you  turn  and  look  at  Frank  Spisak,  don’t
look  for  good  deeds,  because  he  has  done  none.  Don’t
look for good thoughts, because he has none.  He is sick,
he is twisted.  He is demented, and he is never going to
be any different.”  465 F. 3d, at 705 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

And then the strategy really broke down: At no point did
counsel endeavor to direct his negative statements about his
client  toward  an  express  appeal  for  leniency.5  On  the  con
trary,  counsel  concluded  by  telling  the  jury  that  “whatever
you  do,  we  are  going  to  be  proud  of  you,”  ibid.  (internal
quotation marks omitted), which I take to mean that, in coun
sel’s  view,  “either  outcome,  death  or  life,  would  be  a  valid
conclusion,” ibid.

Spisak’s crimes, and the seemingly unmitigated hatred mo
tivating  their  commission,  were truly  awful.  But  that  does
not excuse a lawyer’s duty to represent his client within the
bounds of prevailing professional norms.  The mere fact that
counsel, laudably, may have had a “strategy” to build rapport
with the jury and lessen the impact of the prosecution’s case
does  not  excuse  counsel’s  utter  failure  to  achieve  either  of
these  objectives  through  his  closing  argument.  In  short,
counsel’s argument grossly transgressed the bounds of what
constitutionally competent counsel would have done in a sim
ilar situation.

III

Notwithstanding  these  two  serious  constitutional  errors,
I agree with the Court that these errors do not entitle Spisak

5 Counsel did attempt to appeal to the jury’s sense of humanity, perhaps
implicitly  suggesting  that  humane  people  do  not  condemn  others,  espe
cially  those  with  mental  illness,  to  death.  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  339a–
341a.  But counsel never requested a life sentence on behalf of his client.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in the case of Spisak v. Ohio. It discusses the lawyer's closing argument and its constitutionality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring

end goal: One lawsuit can provide relief to a large group of
people.  “As compared to a class action,” however, associa-
tional  standing  seems  to  require  “show[ing]  an  injury  to
only a single member,” and the association “need not show
that  litigation  by  representation  is  superior  to  individual
litigation.”  13A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice  and  Procedure  §3531.9.5,  pp.  879–880  (3d  ed.,
Supp. 2023); see also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a).  Associa-
tional  standing  thus  allows  a  party  to  effectively  bring  a
class action without satisfying any of the ordinary require-
ments.  Second, associational standing creates the possibil-
ity of asymmetrical preclusion.  The basic idea behind pre-
clusion is that a party gets only one bite at the apple.  If a
party litigates and loses an issue or claim, it can be barred
from reasserting that same issue or claim in another suit.
In general, preclusion prevents the relitigation of claims or
issues  only  by  a  party  to  a  previous  action,  and  we  have
been careful to limit the exceptions to that rule.  See Taylor
v. Sturgell, 553 U. S. 880, 892–893 (2008).  In the context of
associational  standing,  the  general  rule  would  mean  that
preclusion applies only to the association, even though the
purpose of the association’s suit is to assert the injuries of
its members.  See id., at 893–896.  But, if the association
loses, it is not clear whether the adverse judgment would
bind the members.  See Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477
U. S. 274, 290 (1986) (suggesting that, if an association fails
to  adequately  represent  its  members,  “a  judgment  won
against it might not preclude subsequent claims by the as-
sociation’s members without offending due process princi-
ples”).  Associational standing might allow a member two
bites  at  the  apple—after  an  association’s  claims  are  re-
jected, the underlying members might be able to assert the
exact same issues or claims in a suit in their own names.

In short, our associational-standing doctrine appears to
create serious problems, both constitutional and otherwise.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the complexities and potential issues with associational standing in legal proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
234

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER

Syllabus

(1)  The  amicus  defending  the  Seventh  Circuit’s  judgment  urges
that regulations sufﬁce to trigger § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s proscription.  She
comprehends “under” in “authority . . . speciﬁed under this subchapter”
to  mean,  e. g.,  “pursuant  to,”  “subordinate  to.”  Administrative  regula
tions  count  for  § 1252(a)(2)(B)  purposes,  she  submits,  because  they  are
issued “pursuant to,” and are measures “subordinate to,” the legislation
they serve to implement.  On that reading, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) would bar
judicial review of any decision that an executive regulation places within
the BIA’s discretion, including the decision to deny a motion to reopen.
The  parties,  on  the  other  hand,  read  the  statutory  language  to  mean
“speciﬁed  in,”  or  “speciﬁed  by,”  the  subchapter.  On  their  reading,
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  precludes  judicial  review  only  when  the  statute  itself
speciﬁes  the  discretionary  character  of  the  Attorney  General’s  author
ity.  Pp. 243–244.

(2)  The  word  “under”  “has  many  dictionary  deﬁnitions  and  must
draw  its  meaning  from  its  context.”  Ardestani  v.  INS,  502  U. S.  129,
135.  Examining the provision at issue in statutory context, the parties’
position  stands  on  ﬁrmer  ground.  Section  1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  is  far  from
IIRIRA’s  only  jurisdictional  limitation.  It  is  sandwiched  between  two
subsections, § 1252(a)(2)(A) and § 1252(a)(2)(C), both dependent on statu
tory  provisions,  not  on  any  regulation,  to  deﬁne  their  scope.  Given
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)’s  statutory  placement,  one  would  expect  that  it,  too,
would cover statutory provisions alone.  Pp. 245–246.

(3)  Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) places within the no-judicial-review cat
egory  “any  judgment  regarding  the  granting  of  relief  under  section
1182(h),  1182(i),  1229b,  1229c,  or  1255.”  Each  of  the  referenced  statu
tory  provisions  addresses  a  different  form  of  discretionary  relief  from
removal and contains language indicating that the decision is entrusted
to  the  Attorney  General’s  discretion.  Clause  (i)  does  not  refer  to  any
regulatory  provision.  The  proximity  of  clause  (i)  and  the  clause  (ii)
catchall,  and  the  words  linking  them—“any  other  decision”—suggests
that Congress had in mind decisions of the same genre, i. e., those made
discretionary  by  legislation.  Read  harmoniously,  both  clauses  convey
that Congress barred court review of discretionary decisions only when
Congress  itself  set  out  the  Attorney  General’s  discretionary  authority
in the statute.  Pp. 246–247.

(4)  Also signiﬁcant  is the character  of the decisions  insulated from
judicial review in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  The listed determinations are sub
stantive decisions the Executive makes involving whether or not aliens
can  stay  in  the  country.  Other  decisions  speciﬁed  by  statute  “to  be  in
the  discretion  of  the  Attorney  General,”  and  therefore  shielded  from
court  oversight  by  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii),  are  of  a  like  kind.  See,  e. g.,
§ 1157(c)(1).  Decisions  on  reopening  motions  made  discretionary  by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, outlining the arguments and reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a summary and analysis of a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
Opinion of the Court

Leavitt,  460  F. 3d  1,  5–6  (CADC  2006)  (Garland,  J.)  (per-
mitting an agency to provide an “amplified articulation” of
a prior “conclusory” observation (internal quotation marks
omitted)).  This route has important limitations.  When an
agency’s initial explanation “indicate[s] the determinative
reason for the final action taken,” the agency may elaborate
later on that reason (or reasons) but may not provide new
ones.  Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 143 (1973) (per curiam).
Alternatively,  the  agency  can  “deal  with  the  problem
afresh” by taking new agency action.  SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U. S. 194, 201 (1947) (Chenery II).  An agency taking
this route is not limited to its prior reasons but must comply
with the procedural requirements for new agency action.

The District Court’s remand thus presented DHS with a
choice: rest on the Duke Memorandum while elaborating on
its prior reasoning, or issue a new rescission bolstered by
new reasons absent from the Duke Memorandum.  Secre-
tary Nielsen took the first path.  Rather than making a new
decision,  she  “decline[d]  to  disturb  the  Duke  memoran-
dum’s rescission” and instead “provide[d] further explana-
tion” for that action.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 121a.  Indeed,
the  Government’s  subsequent  request  for  reconsideration
described  the  Nielsen  Memorandum  as  “additional  expla-
nation for [Duke’s] decision” and asked the District Court
to “leave in place [Duke’s] September 5, 2017 decision to re-
scind the DACA policy.”  Motion to Revise Order in No. 17–
cv–1907 etc. (D DC), pp. 2, 19. Contrary to the position of
the  Government  before  this  Court,  and  of  JUSTICE
KAVANAUGH  in  dissent,  post,  at  4  (opinion  concurring  in
judgment in part and dissenting in part), the Nielsen Mem-
orandum was by its own terms not a new rule implementing
a new policy.

Because Secretary Nielsen chose to elaborate on the rea-
sons for the initial rescission rather than take new admin-
istrative action, she was limited to the agency’s original rea-
sons,  and  her  explanation  “must  be  viewed  critically”  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the reasoning behind a decision made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It cites legal precedents and analyzes the actions taken by the DHS Secretary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6  SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM

Statement of GORSUCH, J.

entertainment  industry  has  adopted  COVID–19  testing
protocols.  See ___ F. 3d., at ___, 2021 WL 222814, *13.  But,
if that’s true, it is unclear why California’s religious insti-
tutions might be denied a similar opportunity.  Rather than
assume such testing is infeasible, California might have at
least offered the option, or sought to adapt it to churches.
In my view, the State must do more to tailor the require-
ments  of  public  health  to  the  rights  of  its  people.    The
Court’s order today at least allows the applicants to press
these points on remand.
  No doubt, California will argue on remand, as it has be-
fore,  that  its  prohibitions  are  merely  temporary  because
vaccinations  are  underway.    But  the  State’s  “temporary”
ban on indoor worship has been in place since August 2020,
and  applied  routinely  since  March.    California  no  longer
asks its movie studios, malls, and manicurists to wait.  And
one  could  be  forgiven  for  doubting  its  asserted  timeline.
Government actors have been moving the goalposts on pan-
demic-related  sacrifices  for  months,  adopting  new  bench-
marks  that  always  seem  to  put  restoration  of  liberty  just
around the corner.  As this crisis enters its second year—
and  hovers  over  a  second  Lent,  a  second  Passover,  and  a
second Ramadan—it is too late for the State to defend ex-
treme  measures  with  claims  of  temporary  exigency,  if  it
ever could.  Drafting narrowly tailored regulations can be
difficult.  But if Hollywood may host a studio audience or
film a singing competition while not a single soul may enter
California’s churches, synagogues, and mosques, something
has gone seriously awry.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or dissenting statement from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the case of South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom and argues against the state's restrictions on indoor worship services.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Statement</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

KAGAN, J., dissenting

anything  like  that—and  for  that  reason,  the  standard
First  Amendment  rule  is  that  the  “difference  between
compelled  speech  and  compelled  silence”  is  “without  con-
stitutional  significance.”  Riley  v.  National  Federation  of
Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 796 (1988); see Wooley
v.  Maynard,  430  U. S.  705,  714  (1977)  (referring  to  “[t]he
right  to  speak  and  the  right  to  refrain  from  speaking”  as
“complementary  components”  of  the  First  Amendment).
And if anything, the First Amendment scales tip the oppo-
site way when (as here) the government is not compelling
actual  speech,  but  instead  compelling  a  subsidy  that  oth-
ers  will  use  for  expression.    See  Brief  for  Eugene  Volokh
et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  4–5  (offering  many  examples  to
show  that  the  First  Amendment  “simply  do[es]  not  guar-
antee that one’s hard-earned dollars will never be spent on
speech  one  disapproves  of ”).3    So  when  a  government
mandates a speech subsidy from a public employee—here,
we might think of it as levying a tax to support collective
bargaining—it  should  get  at  least  as  much  deference  as
when  it  restricts  the  employee’s  speech.    As  this  case
shows,  the  former  may  advance  a  managerial  interest  as
well  as  the  latter—in  which  case  the  government’s  “freer
hand”  in  dealing  with  its  employees  should  apply  with
equal (if not greater) force.  NASA, 562 U. S., at 148.

Third  and  finally,  the  majority  errs  in  thinking  that
under  the  usual  deferential  approach,  the  government
should  lose  this  case.  The  majority  mainly  argues  here

——————

3 That’s why this Court has blessed the constitutionality of compelled
speech subsidies in a variety of cases beyond Abood, involving a variety
of  contexts  beyond  labor  relations.   The  list  includes  mandatory  fees
imposed on state bar members (for professional expression); university
students (for campus events); and fruit processors (for generic advertis-
ing).  See  Keller  v.  State  Bar  of  Cal.,  496  U. S.  1,  14  (1990);  Board  of
Regents  of  Univ.  of  Wis.  System  v.  Southworth,  529  U. S.  217,  233
(2000); Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U. S. 457, 474
(1997); see also infra, at 20.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments regarding compelled speech and subsidies, citing relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

23

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

Statutory  Useful  Arts,  34  J.  Pat.  Off.  Soc.  487,  493–500
(1952);  see  also  Thomas,  The  Patenting  of  the  Liberal
Professions,  40  Boston  College  L. Rev.  1139,  1164  (1999)
(“[The  Framers  of  the  Constitution]  undoubtedly  contem-
plated  the  industrial,  mechanical  and  manual  arts  of  the
late  eighteenth  Century,  in  contrast  to  the  seven  ‘liberal
arts’ and the four ‘fine arts’ of classical learning”).  Indeed,
just  days  before  the  Constitutional  Convention,  one  dele-
gate  listed  examples  of  American  progress  in  “manufac-
tures and  the useful arts,” all of  which involved the  crea-
tion  or  transformation  of  physical  substances.  See  T.
Coxe, An Address to an Assembly of the Friends of Ameri-
can  Manufactures  17–18  (1787)  (listing,  inter  alia,  meal,
ships,  liquors,  potash,  gunpowder,  paper,  starch,  articles
of iron, stone work, carriages, and harnesses).  Numerous
scholars  have  suggested  that  the  term  “useful  arts”  was
widely  understood  to  encompass  the  fields  that  we  would
now  describe  as  relating  to  technology  or  “technological
arts.”29

——————

today call mechanics, technology, and engineering).  See also D. Defoe,
A  General  History  of  Discoveries  and  Improvements,  in  Useful  Arts
(1727); T. Coxe, An Address to an Assembly of the Friends of American
Manufactures  17–18  (1787);  G.  Logan,  A  Letter  to  the  Citizens  of
Pennsylvania,  on  the  Necessity  of  Promoting  Agriculture,  Manufac-
tures, and the Useful Arts 12–13 (2d ed. 1800); W. Kenrick, An Address
to  the  Artists  and  Manufacturers  of  Great  Britain  21–38  (1774);  cf.
Corning  v.  Burden,  15  How.  252,  267  (1854)  (listing  the  “arts  of  tan-
ning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, [and]
smelting ores”).

29 See,  e.g.,  1  D.  Chisum,  Patents  G1–23  (2010);  Lutz,  Patents  and
Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U. S. Constitution,
18  Geo.  Wash.  L. Rev.  50,  54  (1949–1950);  Samuelson,  Benson  Revis-
ited:  The  Case  Against  Patent  Protection  for  Algorithms  and  Other
Computer-Related Inventions, 39 Emory L. J. 1025, 1033, n.  24 (1990);
Seidel 10, 13; see also Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equipment  Corp.,  340  U. S.  147,  154  (1950)  (Douglas,  J.,  concurring)
(explaining that in the Framers’ view, an “invention, to justify a patent,
had to serve the ends of science—to push back the frontiers of chemis-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 561 U.S. ____ (2010). It cites legal precedents and scholarly works to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

GOLAN v. SAADA

Opinion of the Court

granted Saada’s petition for B. A. S.’ return.  It rejected Go-
lan’s argument that Saada could not be trusted to comply
with  a  court  order,  expressing  confidence  in  the  Italian
courts’ abilities to enforce the protective order.  The District
Court additionally ordered Saada to pay Golan $150,000 to
facilitate B. A. S.’ return to Italy and to cover Golan’s and B.
A. S.’ living costs while they resettled.  The Second Circuit
affirmed, concluding that the District Court did not clearly
err in determining that Saada likely would comply with the
Italian  protective  order,  given  his  compliance  with  other
court  orders  and  the  threat  of  enforcement  by  Italian  au-
thorities of its order.  833 Fed. Appx. 829 (2020).

This Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Sec-
ond Circuit properly required the District Court, after mak-
ing a grave-risk finding, to examine a full range of possible
ameliorative  measures  before  reaching  a  decision  as  to
whether  to  deny  return,  and  to  resolve  a  division  in  the
lower  courts  regarding  whether  ameliorative  measures
must  be  considered  after  a  grave-risk  finding.6    595  U. S.
___ (2021).

II
A
“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of
a statute, begins with its text.”  Abbott, 560 U. S., at 10 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  As described above, when
“a child has been wrongfully removed or retained” from his
country of habitual residence, Article 12 of the Hague Con-
vention  generally  requires  the  deciding  authority  (here,  a
district court) to “order the return of the child.”  Treaty Doc.,
——————

6 Compare In re Adan, 437 F. 3d 381, 395 (CA3 2006) (requiring con-
sideration of ameliorative measures); Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F. 3d 1028,
1035 (CA9 2005) (same); Blondin II, 238 F. 3d 153, 163, n. 11 (CA2 2001)
(same), with Acosta v. Acosta, 725 F. 3d 868, 877 (CA8 2013) (considera-
tion not required in all circumstances); Baran v. Beaty, 526 F. 3d 1340,
1346–1352  (CA11  2008)  (same);  Danaipour v. McLarey,  386  F. 3d  289,
303 (CA1 2004) (same).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case involving the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The text is sequential and provides legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH v. HETRONIC INT’L, INC.

Opinion of the Court

Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337.3  They do not.

It is a “rare statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial
effect despite lacking an express statement of extraterrito-
riality.”  Id.,  at  340.  Our  decision  in  RJR  Nabisco  illus-
trates  the  clarity  required  at  step  one  of  our  framework.
There, we held that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act could have extraterritorial application in
some circumstances because many of its predicate offenses
“plainly  apply  to  at  least  some  foreign  conduct”  and  “[a]t
least  one  predicate  . . .  applies  only  to  conduct  occurring
outside the United States.”  Id., at 338.

Here,  neither  provision  at  issue  provides  an  express
statement of extraterritorial application or any other clear
indication that it is one of the “rare” provisions that none-
theless  applies  abroad.    Both  simply  prohibit  the  use  “in
commerce,” under congressionally prescribed conditions, of
protected trademarks when that use “is likely to cause con-
fusion.”  §§1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1).

Hetronic acknowledges that neither provision on its own
signals  extraterritorial  application,  but  it  argues  that  the
requisite indication can be found in the Lanham Act’s defi-
nition of “commerce,” which applies to both provisions.  Un-
der that definition, “ ‘commerce’ means all commerce which
may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”  §1127.  Hetronic
offers two reasons why this definition is sufficient to rebut
the presumption against extraterritoriality.  First, it argues
that  the  language  naturally  leads  to  this  result  because
Congress  can  lawfully  regulate  foreign  conduct  under  the
Foreign Commerce Clause.  Second, it contends that extra-
territoriality is confirmed by the fact that this definition is
unique in the U. S. Code and thus differs from what it de-
scribes as “boilerplate” definitions of “ ‘commerce’ ” in other
——————

3 Our cases sometimes refer to whether the “statute” applies extrater-
ritorially, but the two-step analysis applies at the level of the particular
provision implicated.  See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 346; Morrison
v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 264–265 (2010).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the extraterritorial application of trademark laws. It delves into legal precedents and statutory interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
Opinion of the Court

We  later  relied  on  Healy  in  Widmar.  In  that  case,  a
public  university,  in  an  effort  to  avoid  state  support  for
religion,  had  closed  its  facilities  to  a  registered  student
group  that  sought  to  use  university  space  for  religious
worship and discussion.  454 U. S., at 264–265.  “A univer
sity’s mission is education,” we observed, “and decisions of
this  Court  have  never  denied  a  university’s  authority  to
impose  reasonable  regulations  compatible  with  that  mis
sion upon the use of its campus and facilities.”  Id., at 268,
n. 5.  But  because  the  university  singled  out  religious
organizations  for  disadvantageous  treatment,  we  sub
jected the university’s regulation to strict scrutiny.  Id., at
269–270.  The  school’s  interest  “in  maintaining  strict
separation  of  church  and  State,”  we  held,  was  not  “suffi
ciently compelling to justify . . . [viewpoint] discrimination
against  . . .  religious  speech.”    Id.,  at  270,  276  (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Most  recently  and  comprehensively,  in  Rosenberger,  we
reiterated  that  a  university  generally  may  not  withhold
benefits  from  student  groups  because  of  their  religious
outlook.  The officially recognized student group in Rosen-
berger  was  denied  student-activity-fee  funding  to  distrib
——————

basis  of  its  expressive  content,  acts  are  not  shielded  from  regulation
merely because they express a discriminatory . . . philosophy.” (emphasis
added)).  As  discussed  infra,  at  28–31,  Hastings’  all-comers  policy  is
paradigmatically viewpoint neutral.  The dissent’s contention that “the
identity of the student group” is the only “way of distinguishing Healy,”
post, at 16, is thus untenable.

The  dissent’s  description  of  Healy  also  omits  the  Healy  Court’s
observation that “[a] college administration may . . . requir[e] . . . that a
group  seeking  official  recognition  affirm  in  advance  its  willingness  to
adhere to reasonable campus law.  Such a requirement does not impose
an impermissible condition on the students’ associational rights. . . .  It
merely constitutes an agreement to conform with reasonable standards
respecting  conduct. . . .    [T]he  benefits  of  participation  in  the  internal
life of the college community may be denied to any group that reserves
the  right  to  violate  any  valid  campus  rules  with  which  it  disagrees.”
408 U. S., at 193–194.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez. It cites previous legal cases and analyzes their relevance to the current case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

Circuit  use  different  factors  to  assess  likelihood  of  confu-
sion.  For  one  thing,  the  factors  are  not  fundamentally
different,  and  “[m]inor  variations  in  the  application  of
what  is  in  essence  the  same  legal  standard  do  not  defeat
preclusion.”  Id.,  at  ___,  n. 9  (slip  op.,  at  12,  n. 9).    More
important,  if  federal  law  provides  a  single  standard,  par-
ties cannot escape preclusion simply by litigating anew in
tribunals  that  apply  that  one  standard  differently.    A
contrary  rule  would  encourage  the  very  evils  that  issue
preclusion helps to prevent.

The  real  question,  therefore,  is  whether  likelihood  of
confusion for purposes of registration is the same standard
as  likelihood  of  confusion  for  purposes  of  infringement.
We  conclude  it  is,  for  at  least  three  reasons.    First,  the
operative  language  is  essentially  the  same;  the  fact  that
the registration provision separates “likely” from “to cause
confusion,  or  to  cause  mistake,  or  to  deceive”  does  not
change  that  reality.3  See  2  Gilson  §5.01[2][a],  at  5–17
(explaining  that  “the  same  statutory  test”  applies).    Sec-
ond,  the  likelihood-of-confusion  language  that  Congress
used  in  these  Lanham  Act  provisions  has  been  central  to
trademark  registration  since  at  least  1881.  See  Act  of
Mar.  3,  1881,  ch.  138,  §3,  21  Stat.  503  (using  a  “likely  to
cause  confusion”  standard  for  registration).  That  could
hardly  have  been  by  accident.    And  third,  district  courts
can  cancel  registrations  during  infringement  litigation,
——————

3 Compare  15  U. S. C.  §1114(1)  (“Any  person  who  shall  . . .  use  in
commerce  any  . . .  mark  in  connection  with  the  sale,  offering  for  sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to  deceive  . . .  shall  be  liable  in  a  civil  action  by  the  registrant  for  the
remedies  hereinafter  provided”  (emphasis  added))  with  §1052(d)  (“No
trademark . . . shall be refused registration . . . unless it . . . [c]onsists of
or  comprises  a  mark  which  so  resembles  a  mark  registered  in  the
Patent  and  Trademark  Office  . . .  as  to  be  likely,  when  used  on  or  in
connection  with  the  goods  of  the  applicant,  to  cause  confusion,  or  to
cause mistake, or to deceive . . .” (emphasis added)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the standard for likelihood of confusion in trademark law. It cites legal precedents and statutes, indicating it's part of the main body of the text and not a preliminary or supplementary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
Opinion of the Court

equivalent  of  speech  itself”).
It  therefore  makes  little
sense  to  treat  CLS’s  speech  and  association  claims  as
discrete.  See  Citizens  Against  Rent  Control/Coalition  for
Fair  Housing  v.  Berkeley,  454  U. S.  290,  300  (1981).    In
stead,  three  observations  lead  us  to  conclude  that  our
limited-public-forum  precedents  supply  the  appropriate
framework  for  assessing  both  CLS’s  speech  and  associa
tion rights.

First, the same considerations that have led us to apply
a  less  restrictive  level  of  scrutiny  to  speech  in  limited
public  forums  as  compared  to  other  environments,  see
supra,  at  12–13,  and  n.  11,  apply  with  equal  force  to  ex
pressive association occurring in limited public forums.  As
just  noted,  speech  and  expressive-association  rights  are
closely  linked.    See  Roberts,  468  U. S.,  at  622  (Associa
tional freedom is “implicit in the right to engage in activi
ties  protected  by  the  First  Amendment.”).    When  these
intertwined  rights  arise  in  exactly  the  same  context,  it
would be anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive
constitutional  review  under  our  limited-public-forum  test
only to be invalidated as an impermissible infringement of
expressive association.  Accord Brief for State Universities
and  State  University  Systems  as  Amici  Curiae  37–38.
That result would be all the more anomalous in this case,
for  CLS  suggests  that  its  expressive-association  claim
plays a part auxiliary to speech’s starring role.  See Brief
for Petitioner 18.

Second,  and  closely  related,  the  strict  scrutiny  we  have
applied  in  some  settings  to  laws  that  burden  expressive
association would, in practical effect, invalidate a defining
characteristic  of  limited  public  forums—the  State  may
“reserv[e]  [them]  for  certain  groups.”  Rosenberger,  515
U. S.,  at  829.    See  also  Perry  Ed.  Assn.,  460  U. S.,  at  49
(“Implicit  in  the  concept”  of  a  limited  public  forum  is  the
State’s “right to make distinctions in access on the basis of
. . .  speaker  identity.”);  Cornelius,  473  U. S.,  at  806  (“[A]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of limited-public-forum precedents to speech and association rights.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

17

ALITO, J., dissenting

facts.”  United  States  v.  Powell,  423  U. S.  87,  92  (1975).
Thus,  our  holdings  and  our  dicta  prohibit  the  Court’s
expansion  of  the  vagueness  doctrine.    The  Constitution
does  not  allow  us  to  hold  a  statute  void  for  vagueness
unless it is vague in all its applications.

IV
Because  I  would  not  strike  down  ACCA’s  residual
clause, it is necessary for me to address whether Johnson’s
conviction  for  possessing  a  sawed-off  shotgun  qualifies  as
a violent felony.  Under either the categorical approach or
a conduct-specific inquiry, it does.

A
The  categorical  approach  requires  us  to  determine
whether “the conduct encompassed by the elements of the
offense,  in  the  ordinary  case,  presents  a  serious  potential
risk of injury to another.”  James, 550 U. S., at 208.  This
is an “inherently probabilistic” determination that consid
ers  the  circumstances  and  conduct  that  ordinarily  attend
the offense.  Id., at 207.  The mere fact that a crime could
be  committed  without  a  risk  of  physical  harm  does  not
exclude  it  from  the  statute’s  reach.    See  id.,  at  207–208.
Instead,  the  residual  clause  speaks  of  “potential  risk[s],”
§924(e)(2)(B)(ii),  a  term  suggesting  “that  Congress  in-
tended to encompass possibilities even more contingent or
remote than a simple ‘risk,’ much less a certainty.”  James,
supra, at 207–208.

Under these principles, unlawful possession of a sawed-
off shotgun qualifies as a violent felony.  As we recognized
in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 625 (2008),
sawed-off  shotguns  are  “not  typically  possessed  by  law-
abiding  citizens  for  lawful  purposes.”    Instead,  they  are
uniquely  attractive  to  violent  criminals.    Much  easier  to
conceal than long-barreled shotguns used for hunting and
other  lawful  purposes,  short-barreled  shotguns  can  be
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Johnson v. United States*. It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

Opinion of the Court

canceling  a  patent  in  18th-century  England,  which  more
closely  resembles  inter  partes  review:  a  petition  to  the
Privy  Council  to  vacate  a  patent.    See  Lemley,  supra,  at
1681–1682;  Hulme,  Privy  Council  Law  and  Practice  of
Letters Patent for Invention From the Restoration to 1794,
33 L. Q. Rev. 63 (1917).  The Privy Council was composed
of  the  Crown’s  advisers.    Lemley,  supra,  at  1681.    From
the 17th through the 20th centuries, English patents had
a  standard  revocation  clause  that  permitted  six  or  more
Privy  Counsellors  to  declare  a  patent  void  if  they  deter-
mined  the  invention  was  contrary  to  law,  “prejudicial”  or
“inconvenient,”  not  new,  or  not  invented  by  the  patent
owner.    See  11  W.  Holdsworth,  A  History  of  English  Law
426–427, and n. 6 (1938); Davies, The Early History of the
Patent  Specification,  50  L.  Q.  Rev.  86,  102–106  (1934).
Individuals  could  petition  the  Council  to  revoke  a  patent,
and  the  petition  was  referred  to  the  Attorney  General.
The  Attorney  General  examined  the  petition,  considered
affidavits from the petitioner and patent owner, and heard
from  counsel.    See,  e.g.,  Bull  v.  Lydall,  PC2/81,  pp.  180–
181  (1706).    Depending  on  the  Attorney  General’s  conclu-
sion,  the  Council  would  either  void  the  patent  or  dismiss
the  petition.    See,  e.g.,  Darby  v.  Betton,  PC2/99,  pp.  358–
359  (1745–1746)  (voiding  the  patent);  Baker  v.  James,
PC2/103,  pp.  320–321,  346–347  (1752)  (dismissing  the
petition).
  The Privy  Council was a prominent feature of the Eng-
lish  system.    It  had  exclusive  authority  to  revoke  patents
until  1753,  and  after  that,  it  had  concurrent  jurisdiction
with  the  courts.    See  Hulme,  33  L.  Q.  Rev.,  at  189–191,
193–194.  The Privy Council continued to consider revoca-
tion  claims  and  to  revoke  patents  throughout  the  18th
century.  Its last revocation was in 1779.  See id., at 192–
193.  It considered, but did not act on, revocation claims in
1782,  1794,  and  1810.    See  ibid.;  Board  of  Ordinance  v.
Parr, PC1/3919 (1810).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt discussing the history of patent revocation in 18th-century England, specifically focusing on the role of the Privy Council.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis/Historical Context</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

TRUMP v. VANCE

THOMAS, J., dissenting

He  is  “Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States.”  Art. II,
§2, cl. 1.  He has “Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent  of  the  Senate,  to  make  Treaties.”    Cl.  2.    He  has  the
power to “nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent  of  the  Senate  [to]  appoint  Ambassadors  [and]  other
public Ministers and Consuls.”  Ibid.  He has the power to
fill  vacancies  that  arise  during  a  Senate  recess  until  “the
End of [the Senate’s] next Session.”  Cl. 3.  And he is respon-
sible for “receiv[ing] Ambassadors and other public Minis-
ters” from foreign countries.  §3.

The President also has residual powers granted by Arti-
cle  II’s  Vesting  Clause.    “By  omitting  the  words  ‘herein
granted’ in [the Vesting Clause of] Article II, the Constitu-
tion indicates that the ‘executive Power’ vested in the Pres-
ident is not confined to those powers expressly identified in
the document.”  Zivotofsky, 576 U. S., at 34–35 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.).  Rather, the Constitution “vests the residual
foreign  affairs  powers  of  the  Federal  Government—i.e.,
those  not  specifically  enumerated  in  the  Constitution—in
the President.”  Id., at 33.  Evidence from both the founding
and  the  early  years  of  the  Constitution  confirms  that  the
residual foreign affairs powers of the Government were part
of the “executive Power.”  Id., at 35–40.

The President has extensive domestic responsibilities as
well.  He is given “[t]he executive Power,” Art. II, §1, cl. 1,
and is directed to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted,” §3.  “The vesting of the executive power in the Pres-
ident  was  essentially  a  grant  of  the  power  to  execute  the
laws.”  Myers  v.  United  States,  272  U. S.  52,  117  (1926).
Even under a proper understanding of the scope of federal
power,  the  President  could  not  possibly  execute  all  of  the
laws himself.  The President must accordingly appoint sub-
ordinates “to act for him under his direction in the execu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Trump v. Vance. It discusses the powers of the President as outlined in the Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxxii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

837

Hughes’ Estate; Hughes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922

Hughley v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
863

Hulick; Bennett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1016

Hulick; Russo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1098

Hull v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
988

Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
988

Humanitarian Law Project; Holder v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1006

Humbert v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1063

Hummel; Pitkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Humphrey v. Florida
1088

Humphrey v. Onondaga County Sheriff ’s Dept.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1157

Humphrey v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Hungate v. Mabus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hung Lin Wu v. Holder
1031

Hung Nguyen v. Superior Court of Cal., Orange County  . . . . . . .
826

Hunt; Check Recovery Systems, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950

Hunt v. Felker
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

Hunt v. Houston  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hunt; Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v.
Hunt v. Wolfenbarger  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  894,1066

834

Hunter v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Hunter v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hunter v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  918,930,1084,1143

1089

Hupp v. Kurpinsky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hurell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

1043

Hurst v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004

Hurt v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Husband v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1012,1139

957

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hussain v. United States
842

Husser v. Dexter
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Hutchins v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

Hutchins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

Hutchinson v. Maine  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
890

Hutchinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1134

Huttinger v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

Hutzler v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950

Huusko v. Jenkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  850,970

Huynh v. United States
873

Hyche v. Chandler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Hyde v. Alabama
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hyde v. United States
1125

Hynes v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

I. v. Orange County Social Services Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ibanez v. United States
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>