<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08–769.  Argued October 6, 2009—Decided April 20, 2010

Congress  enacted  18  U. S. C.  §48  to  criminalize  the  commercial  crea-
tion, sale, or  possession of  certain depictions of animal  cruelty.  The
statute addresses only portrayals of harmful acts, not the underlying
conduct.  It applies to any visual or auditory depiction “in which a liv-
ing animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or
killed,”  if  that  conduct  violates  federal  or state  law  where  “the  crea-
tion,  sale,  or  possession  takes  place,”  §48(c)(1).    Another  clause  ex-
empts  depictions  with  “serious  religious,  political,  scientific,  educa-
tional,  journalistic,  historical,  or  artistic  value.”
§48(b).  The
legislative  background  of  §48  focused  primarily  on  “crush  videos,”
which feature the torture and killing of helpless animals and are said
to  appeal  to  persons  with  a  specific  sexual  fetish.    Respondent  Ste-
vens was indicted under §48 for selling videos depicting dogfighting.
He  moved  to  dismiss,  arguing  that  §48  is  facially  invalid  under  the
First  Amendment.    The  District  Court  denied  his  motion,  and  Ste-
vens was convicted.  The Third Circuit vacated the conviction and de-
clared  §48  facially  unconstitutional  as  a  content-based  regulation  of
protected speech.

Held: Section §48  is  substantially  overbroad,  and  therefore  invalid  un-

der the First Amendment.  Pp. 5–20.

(a) Depictions  of  animal  cruelty  are  not,  as  a  class,  categorically
unprotected  by  the  First  Amendment.   Because  §48  explicitly  regu-
lates  expression  based  on  content,  it  is  “ ‘presumptively  invalid,’  . . .
and  the  Government  bears  the  burden  to  rebut  that  presumption.”
United  States  v.  Playboy  Entertainment  Group,  Inc.,  529  U. S.  803,
817.    Since  its  enactment,  the  First  Amendment  has  permitted  re-
strictions on a few historic categories of speech—including obscenity,
defamation,  fraud,  incitement,  and  speech  integral  to  criminal  con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the full legal arguments and reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
Syllabus

only some of the laws.  Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 6.  Looking to
history, HHC attempts to sow doubt about §1983’s textually unquali-
fied sweep, and proffers a Spending Clause-based argument to narrow
§1983’s  meaning.    But  a  fuller  picture  of  the  relevant  history  lends
HHC no aid.

The Court is unpersuaded by HHC’s argument that, because Con-
gress  seems  to  have  enacted  the  FNHRA  pursuant  to  the  Spending
Clause, Talevski cannot invoke §1983 to vindicate rights recognized by
the FNHRA.  HHC starts with the Court’s observation that federal leg-
islation premised on the Spending Clause power is “much in the nature
of a contract,” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451
U. S. 1, 17.  From there, HHC argues that Spending Clause statutes
may  not  be  enforced  via  §1983  because  contracts  were not  generally
enforceable by third-party beneficiaries at when §1983 was enacted in
the 1870s.  The Court rejects HHC’s argument.  First, while the Court
has reasoned that Congress’s failure to displace firmly rooted common-
law  principles  generally  indicates  that  it  incorporated  those  estab-
lished  principles  into  §1983,  Wyatt  v.  Cole,  504  U.  S.  158,  163–164,
HHC’s  key  common-law  plank  here—that  third-party  beneficiaries
could  not  sue  to  enforce  contractual  obligations  during  the  relevant
time—is, at a minimum, contestable.  “[S]omething more than ‘ambig-
uous  historical  evidence’  is  required  [to]  ‘flatly  overrule a  number  of
major  decisions  of  this  Court,’ ”  Gamble  v.  United  States,  587  U. S.
___, ___.  Second, because “[t]here is no doubt that the cause of action
created by §1983 is, and was always regarded as, a tort claim,” Monte-
rey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U. S. 687, 727 (Scalia,
J.,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment),  HHC’s  focus  on
1870s  law  governing  third-party-beneficiary  suits  in  contract  is  per-
plexing, and HHC offers no reason those principles should be read to
displace the plain scope of “laws” in §1983.  Pp. 5–10.

(b) Under  the  Court’s  precedent,  the  FNHRA  provisions  at  issue
here unambiguously confer individual federal rights enforceable under
§1983, and the Court discerns no intent by Congress in FNHRA to pre-
clude private enforcement of these rights under §1983.  Pp. 11–23.

(1) Although federal statutes have the potential to create §1983-
enforceable rights, they do so under this Court’s precedents only when
the statute unambiguously confers those rights.  The Court has recog-
nized that the typical remedy for noncompliance with a federal statute
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause is not a private cause of ac-
tion for noncompliance but  rather termination of funds to the State.
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 280.  The parties here thus
dispute whether this is the atypical case; that is, whether the unnec-
essary-restraint  and  predischarge-notice  provisions  of  the  FNHRA
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the applicability of Section 1983 to rights conferred by the FNHRA. It delves into legal precedents and arguments regarding the interpretation of statutes and their enforceability.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BOECHLER v. COMMISSIONER

Opinion of the Court

I

Boechler is a law firm in Fargo, North Dakota.  In 2015,
the IRS notified Boechler of a discrepancy in its tax filings.
When Boechler did not respond, the agency assessed an “in-
tentional disregard” penalty and notified Boechler of its in-
tent to levy—in other words, to seize and sell—Boechler’s
property to satisfy the penalty.  See 26 U. S. C. §§6330(a),
6721(a)(2), (e)(2)(A).  That got Boechler’s attention, and in
an effort to prevent the levy, it requested a hearing before
the agency’s Independent Office of Appeals.  §6330(b).  This
proceeding—known  as  a  collection  due  process  hearing—
generally  provides  taxpayers  with  administrative  review
before  the  IRS  takes  their  property.    §6330(a)(1).  At  its
hearing, Boechler challenged the penalty, arguing both that
there was no discrepancy in its tax filings and that the pen-
alty was excessive.

The  Independent  Office  of  Appeals  sustained  the  pro-
posed levy.  Under §6330(d)(1), Boechler had 30 days to pe-
tition  the  Tax  Court  to  review  this  collection  due  process
determination.  But Boechler dropped the ball and filed its
petition a day late.  The Tax Court dismissed the petition
for  lack  of  jurisdiction  and  the  Eighth  Circuit  affirmed,
agreeing  that  §6330(d)(1)’s  30-day  filing  deadline  is  juris-
dictional and thus cannot be equitably tolled.  967 F. 3d 760
(2020).  We granted certiorari.  594 U. S. ___ (2021).

II
A
Jurisdictional requirements mark the bounds of a “court’s
adjudicatory authority.”  Kontrick  v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443,
455 (2004).  Yet not all procedural requirements fit that bill.
Many simply instruct “parties [to] take certain procedural
steps  at  certain  specified  times”  without  conditioning  a
court’s authority to hear the case on compliance with those
steps.  Henderson  v.  Shinseki,  562  U. S.  428,  435  (2011).
These nonjurisdictional rules “promote the orderly progress
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It sets the stage for the case, outlining the procedural history and the key legal issue at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:47] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

929

524 U. S.

June 15, 1998

No. 97–7811. Dixon v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 117.

No. 97–7976. Wolff, aka Caine, aka Osman v. United
States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
127 F. 3d 84.

No. 97–8188. Wronka v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 139.

No. 97–8446. Williams v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 710 So. 2d 1350.

No. 97–8608. Keller v. Oklahoma. C. A. 10th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 130.

No. 97–8630. Sanchez v. Sprunk, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 932.

No. 97–8632. Robinson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d

App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8633. Donohue v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 451 Pa. Super. 594, 678
A. 2d 826.

No. 97–8635. Hogan v. Kaiser. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 42.

No. 97–8639. Almeida v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th

Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 703 So. 2d 1233.

No. 97–8642.

Jackson v. Florida Department of Correc-
tions et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
707 So. 2d 1125.

No. 97–8644. Horton v. Mississippi State Senate. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 1455.

No. 97–8646. Garner v. Head. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari de-

nied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 136.

No. 97–8656. Harvey v. Grigas, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8658. McLeod v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 718 So. 2d 727.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It lacks the narrative flow of typical book content and is more akin to a legal docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

Opinion of the Court

broadly enough to criminalize mundane activities like mov-
ing  dirt,  this  unchecked  definition  of  “the  waters  of  the
United States” means that a staggering array of landown-
ers are at risk of criminal prosecution or onerous civil pen-
alties.

What are landowners to do if they want to build on their
property?  The EPA recommends asking the Corps for a ju-
risdictional  determination,  which  is  a  written  decision  on
whether  a  particular  site  contains  covered  waters.  Tr.  of
Oral  Arg.  86;  see  Corps,  Regulatory  Guidance  Letter  No.
16–01,  at  1  (2016)  (RGL  16–01);  33  CFR  §§320.1(a)(6),
331.2.  But the Corps maintains that it has no obligation to
provide jurisdictional determinations, RGL 16–01, at 2, and
it has already begun announcing exceptions to the legal ef-
fect of some previous determinations, see 88 Fed. Reg. 3136.
Even if the Corps is willing to provide a jurisdictional de-
termination, a property owner may find it necessary to re-
tain an expensive expert consultant who is capable of put-
ting  together  a  presentation  that  stands  a  chance  of
persuading  the  Corps.12    And  even  then,  a  landowner’s
chances  of  success  are  low,  as  the  EPA  admits  that  the
Corps finds jurisdiction approximately 75% of the time.  Tr.
of Oral Arg. 110.

If the landowner is among the vast majority who receive
adverse jurisdictional determinations, what then?  It would
be foolish to go ahead and build since the jurisdictional de-
termination might form evidence of culpability in a prose-
cution  or  civil  action.  The  jurisdictional  determination
could be challenged in court, but only after the delay and
expense  required  to  exhaust  the  administrative  appeals

——————

12 See 88 Fed. Reg. 3134; Corps, Questions and Answers for Rapanos
and  Carabell  Decision  16  (2007);  J.  Finkle,  Jurisdictional  Determina-
tions: An Important Battlefield in the Clean Water Act Fight, 43 Ecology
L. Q.  301,  314–315  (2016);  K.  Gould,  Drowning  in  Wetlands  Jurisdic-
tional  Determination  Process:  Implementation  of  Rapanos  v.  United
States, 30 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 413, 440 (2008).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the implications of the "waters of the United States" definition in the context of land ownership and development. It delves into the complexities of jurisdictional determinations and the challenges faced by landowners.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–297
_________________

TRANSUNION LLC, PETITIONER v. SERGIO L.
RAMIREZ

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 25, 2021]

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE

SOTOMAYOR, AND JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.

TransUnion  generated  credit  reports  that  erroneously
flagged many law-abiding people as potential terrorists and
drug traffickers.  In doing so, TransUnion violated several
provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) that en-
title consumers to accuracy in credit-reporting procedures;
to receive information in their credit files; and to receive a
summary of their rights.  Yet despite Congress’ judgment
that  such  misdeeds  deserve  redress,  the  majority  decides
that TransUnion’s actions are so insignificant that the Con-
stitution prohibits consumers from vindicating their rights
in federal court.  The Constitution does no such thing.

I
For decades, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) has compiled a list of “Specially Des-
ignated Nationals.”  The list largely includes terrorists and
drug  traffickers,  among  other  unseemly  types.    And,  as  a
general matter, Americans are barred from doing business
with those listed.  In the wake of the September 11 attacks,
TransUnion began to sell a new (and more expensive) type
of credit report that flagged whether an individual’s name
matched a name found on that list.

The system TransUnion used to decide which individuals
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal reasoning of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

restrict Miranda’s  application  in  collateral  proceedings  based  on  the
reasoning  in  Stone  v.  Powell,  428  U. S.  465  (1976).    Once  again  ac-
knowledging that Miranda adopted prophylactic rules, the Court bal-
anced the competing interests and found that the costs of adopting a
Stone-like rule outweighed any benefits.  In sum, the Court’s post-Mi-
randa cases acknowledge the prophylactic nature of the Miranda rules
and engage in cost-benefit analysis to define their scope.  Pp. 7–11.

(3) The Court’s decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428,
did not upset the firmly established prior understanding of Miranda
as  a  prophylactic  decision.  Dickerson  involved  a  federal  statute,  18
U. S. C. §3501, that effectively overruled Miranda by making the ad-
missibility  of  a  statement  given  during  custodial  interrogation  turn
solely on whether it was made voluntarily.  530 U. S., at 431–432.  The
Court held that Congress could not abrogate Miranda by statute be-
cause Miranda was a “constitutional decision” that adopted a “consti-
tutional rule,” 530 U. S., at 438–439, and the Court noted that these
rules could not have been made applicable to the States if they did not
have that status, see ibid.  At the same time, the Court made it clear
that it was not equating a violation of the Miranda rules with an out-
right  Fifth  Amendment  violation.    Instead,  the  Dickerson  Court  de-
scribed the Miranda rules as “constitutionally based” with “constitu-
tional underpinnings,” 530 U. S., at 440, and n. 5.  Those formulations
obviously  avoided  saying  that  a  Miranda  violation  is  the  same  as  a
violation of the Fifth Amendment right.  Miranda was a “constitutional
decision” and it adopted a “constitutional rule” in the sense that the
decision was based on the Court’s judgment about what is required to
safeguard that constitutional right.  And when the Court adopts a con-
stitutional prophylactic rule of this nature, Dickerson concluded, the
rule has the status of a “La[w] of the United States” that is binding on
the States under the Supremacy Clause (as Miranda implicitly held,
since three of the four decisions it reversed came from state court, 384
U. S., at 491–494, 497–499), and the rule cannot be altered by ordinary
legislation.  Dickerson thus asserted a bold and controversial claim—
that  this  Court  has  the  authority  to  create  constitutionally  based
prophylactic rules that bind both federal and state courts—but Dick-
erson cannot be understood any other way consistent with the Court’s
prior decisions.  Subsequent cases confirm that Dickerson did not up-
end the Court’s understanding of the Miranda rules as prophylactic.
In sum, a violation of Miranda does not necessarily constitute a viola-
tion of the Constitution, and therefore such a violation does not consti-
tute “the deprivation of [a] right . . . secured by the Constitution” for
purposes of §1983.  Pp. 11–13.

(b) A §1983 claim may also be based on “the deprivation of any rights
. . . secured by the . . . laws.”  But the argument that Miranda rules
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal analysis, likely from a court opinion or scholarly article. It discusses the legal implications of Miranda rights in the context of collateral proceedings and the case of Dickerson v. United States.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

more  than  necessary  to  remedy  a  complaining  party’s  in-
jury.  Washington State Grange v. Washington State Repub-
lican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 451 (2008).

As a result, the path for a litigant pursuing a facial chal-
lenge is deliberately difficult.  Typically, a plaintiff seeking
to render a law unenforceable in all of its applications must
show  that  the  law  cannot  be  constitutionally  applied
against anyone in any situation.  United States v. Stevens,
559 U. S. 460, 472–473 (2010).  This Court has carved out
an exception to this high bar for overbreadth challenges un-
der the First Amendment.  Some suggest this exception is
ill-advised.  United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S. ___,
___–___  (2020)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  5–6).
But  even  in  First  Amendment  overbreadth  challenges,  a
plaintiff  still  must  show  that  the  law  in  question  has  “ ‘a
substantial number of . . . applications [ that] are unconsti-
tutional,  judged  in  relation  to  the  statute’s  plainly  legiti-
mate sweep.’ ” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 473 (quoting Washing-
ton State Grange, 552 U. S., at 449, n. 6); see also Stevens,
559 U. S., at 481–482 (holding law unconstitutional under
First  Amendment  where  “impermissible  applications  . . .
far outnumber[ed] any permissible ones”).

Today, it seems any of these standards would demand too
much.  Instead of asking whether the law has a “substantial
number  of  unconstitutional  applications”  compared  to  its
“legitimate sweep,” the plurality asks whether the law will
impose a “ ‘substantial obstacle’ ” for a “ ‘large fraction’ ” of
“ ‘those women for whom the provision is an actual rather
than an irrelevant restriction.’ ”  Ante, at 39.  Concededly,
the  two  tests  sound  similar—after  all,  who  could  say
whether  a  “substantial  number”  is  more  or  less  than  a
“large  fraction”?    But  notice  the  switch  at  the  end,  where
the plurality limits our focus to women for whom the law is
an “actual” restriction.  Because of that limitation, it doesn’t
matter how many women continue to have convenient ac-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to a specific law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–147
_________________

ERIK EGBERT, PETITIONER v. ROBERT BOULE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 8, 2022]

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring in the judgment.
Our Constitution’s separation of powers prohibits federal
courts  from  assuming  legislative  authority.  As  the  Court
today acknowledges, Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents,  403  U. S.  388  (1971),  crossed  that  line  by
“impl[ying]” a new set of private rights and liabilities Con-
gress  never  ordained.  Ante,  at  5–6;  see  also Alexander  v.
Sandoval,  532  U. S.  275,  286  (2001);  Nestlé  USA,  Inc.  v.
Doe,  593  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2021)  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concur-
ring) (slip op., at 4–7).

Recognizing its misstep, this Court has struggled for dec-
ades  to  find  its  way  back.    Initially,  the  Court  told  lower
courts  to  follow  a  “two  ste[p]”  inquiry  before  applying
Bivens to any new situation.  Ante, at 7.  At the first step, a
court had to ask whether the case before it presented a “new
context” meaningfully different from Bivens.  Ante, at 7.  At
the  second,  a  court  had  to  consider  whether  “ ‘special  fac-
tors’ ” counseled hesitation before recognizing a new cause
of action.  Ibid.  But these tests soon produced their own set
of questions:  What distinguishes the first step from the sec-
ond?  What  makes  a  context  “new”  or  a  factor  “special”?
And,  most  fundamentally,  on  what  authority  may  courts
recognize new causes of action even under these standards?
Today, the Court helpfully answers some of these linger-
ing questions.  It recognizes that our two-step inquiry really
boils down to a “single question”:  Is there “any reason to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice GorSUCH.  It cites legal precedents and discusses legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

Lemon interrupted this long line of precedents.  It offered
no plausible reason for ignoring their teachings.  And, as we
have  seen,  the  ahistoric  alternative  it  offered  quickly
proved both unworkable in practice and unsound in its re-
sults.  Nor is it as if Lemon vanquished the field even during
its heyday.  Often, this Court continued to look to history to
resolve certain Establishment Clause disputes outside the
context of religious displays.7  And several early decisions
applying Lemon were themselves rapidly overruled in part
or in whole.8  All of which in time led Justice after Justice
to conclude that Lemon was “flawed in its fundamentals,”
“unworkable in practice,” and “inconsistent with our history
and our precedents.”  County of Allegheny, 492 U. S., at 655,
669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).9

——————
___ (2020) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2).

7 See,  e.g.,  Marsh  v.  Chambers,  463  U. S.  783,  786  (1983)  (surveying
history to determine that “[f]rom colonial times through the founding of
the Republic and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer has coex-
isted with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom”).

8 See,  e.g.,  Agostini  v.  Felton,  521  U. S.  203,  236  (1997)  (overruling
School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 (1985), and Aguilar
v.  Felton,  473  U. S.  402  (1985));  Mitchell  v.  Helms,  530  U. S.  793,  835
(2000)  (plurality  opinion)  (overruling  Wolman  v.  Walter,  433  U. S.  229
(1977), and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975)).

9 See also, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 559 U. S. 700, 720–721 (2010) (plu-
rality opinion of Kennedy, J., joined in full by ROBERTS, C. J., and in part
by ALITO, J.); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 699–700 (2005) (BREYER,
J., concurring) (noting “Lemon’s checkered career in the decisional law of
this  Court”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted));  id.,  at  692–693
(THOMAS, J., concurring) (“This case would be easy if the Court were will-
ing to abandon the inconsistent guideposts it has adopted for addressing
Establishment Clause challenges”); McCreary County v. American Civil
Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U. S. 844, 890 (2005) (Scalia, J., joined in full
by Rehnquist, C. J., and THOMAS, J., and in part by Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) (“[A] majority of the Justices on the current Court . . . have, in sepa-
rate opinions, repudiated the brain-spun ‘Lemon test’ ”); Board of Ed. of
Kiryas  Joel  Village  School  Dist.  v.  Grumet,  512  U. S.  687,  720  (1994)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Lemon test and its history, citing other cases and opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–1392
_________________

THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2022]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
I write separately to explain my additional views about
why Roe was wrongly decided, why Roe should be overruled
at this time, and the future implications of today’s decision.

I

Abortion  is  a  profoundly  difficult  and  contentious  issue
because  it  presents  an  irreconcilable  conflict  between  the
interests of a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion and
the interests in protecting fetal life.  The interests on both
sides of the abortion issue are extraordinarily weighty.

On the one side, many pro-choice advocates forcefully ar-
gue  that  the  ability  to  obtain  an  abortion  is  critically  im-
portant for women’s personal and professional lives, and for
women’s health.  They contend that the widespread availa-
bility of abortion has been essential for women to advance
in society and to achieve greater equality over the last 50
years.  And they maintain that women must have the free-
dom to choose for themselves whether to have an abortion.
On the other side, many pro-life advocates forcefully ar-
gue that a fetus is a human life.  They contend that all hu-
man life should be protected as a matter of human dignity
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh in the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case.  It sets the stage for his arguments and cites relevant legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

SHURTLEFF v. BOSTON

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

ante, at 6, of covered performances.  One of the leading crit-
ics of the Act—the playwright George Bernard Shaw—was
denied permission to perform several plays, including Mrs.
Warren’s Profession, The Shewing-up of Blanco Posnet, and
Press Cuttings.1  But had the Lord Chamberlain approved
these  plays,  would  anyone  seriously  maintain  that  those
plays  were  thereby  transmuted  into  the  government’s
speech?

As this illustration shows, neither “control” nor “final ap-
proval  authority”  can  in  itself  distinguish  government
speech  from  censorship  of  private  speech,  and  analyzing
that  factor  in  isolation  from  speaker  identity  flattens  the
distinction  between  government  speech  and  speech  toler-
ated by the censor.  And it is not as though “actively” exer-
cising control over the “nature and content” of private ex-
pression  makes  a  difference,  as  the  Court  suggests,  ibid.
Censorship is not made constitutional by aggressive and di-
rect application.

Next, turn to the history of the means of expression.  Ibid.
Historical practice can establish that a means of expression
“typically represent[s] government speech.”  Summum, 555
U. S., at 470 (emphasis added); Tam, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 17).  But in determining whether speech is the gov-
ernment’s,  the  real  question  is  not  whether  a  form  of  ex-
pression is usually linked with the government but whether
the  speech  at  issue  expresses  the  government’s  own  mes-
sage.  Governments can put public resources to novel uses.
And  when  governments  allow  private  parties  to  use  a  re-
source  normally  devoted  to  government  speech  to  express
their own messages, the government cannot rely on histor-
ical expectations to pass off private speech as its own.  Cf.
Summum, 555 U. S., at 480 (explaining that even though
monuments in parks are normally government speech, that

——————

1 See  generally  L.  Hugo,  Edwardian  Shaw:  The  Writer  and  His  Age

197–230 (1999).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito in the case of Shurtleff v. Boston. Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain factual information and legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

because  the  prayers  were  “quie[t]”  and  the  students  were
otherwise “occupied.”  Ante, at 26.  The record contradicts
this narrative.  Even on the Court’s myopic framing of the
facts, at two of the three games on which the Court focuses,
players  witnessed  student  peers  from  the  other  team  and
other  authority  figures  surrounding  Kennedy  and  joining
him in prayer.  The coercive pressures inherent in such a
situation are obvious.  Moreover, Kennedy’s actual demand
to the District was that he give “verbal” prayers specifically
at  the  midfield  position  where  he  traditionally  led  team
prayers, and that students be allowed to join him “voluntar-
ily”  and  pray.  App.  64,  69–71.    Notably,  the  Court  today
does  not  embrace  this  demand,  but  it  nonetheless  rejects
the District’s right to ensure that students were not pres-
sured to pray.

To reiterate, the District did not argue, and neither court
below held, that “any visible religious conduct by a teacher
or  coach  should  be  deemed  . . .  impermissibly  coercive  on
students.”  Ante, at 28.  Nor has anyone contended that a
coach may never visibly pray on the field.  The courts below
simply recognized that Kennedy continued to initiate pray-
ers  visible  to  students,  while  still  on  duty  during  school
events,  under  the  exact  same  circumstances  as  his  past
practice of leading student prayer.  It is unprecedented for
the Court to hold that this conduct, taken as a whole, did
not raise cognizable coercion concerns.  Importantly, noth-
ing  in  the  Court’s  opinion  should  be  read  as  calling  into
question  that  Kennedy’s  conduct  may  have  raised  other
concerns regarding disruption of school events or misuse of
school  facilities  that  would  have  separately  justified  em-
ployment action against Kennedy.

*

*
The Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause are
equally integral in protecting religious freedom in our soci-
ety.  The first serves as “a promise from our government,”

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School District and the legal arguments surrounding religious expression in public schools.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

19

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

sensus  on  whether  the  sale  in  one  country  of  a  good  in-
corporating  protected  intellectual  property  exhausts  the
intellectual property owner’s right to control the distribu
tion  of  that  good  elsewhere.  Indeed,  the  members  of  the
World  Trade  Organization,  “agreeing  to  disagree,”14  pro
vided  in  Article  6  of  the  Agreement  on  Trade-Related
Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPS),  Apr.  15,
1994, 33 I. L. M. 1197, 1200, that “nothing in this Agree
ment shall be used to address the issue of . . . exhaustion.”
See Chiappetta 346 (observing that exhaustion of intellec
tual property rights was “hotly debated” during the TRIPS
negotiations  and  that  Article  6  “reflects  [the  negotiators’]
ultimate  inability  to  agree”  on  a  single  international
standard).  Similar  language  appears  in  other  treaties  to
which the United States is a party.  See World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, Art. 6(2),
Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105–17, p. 7 (“Nothing in
this Treaty shall affect the freedom of Contracting Parties
to  determine  the  conditions,  if  any,  under  which  the  ex
haustion of the right [to control distribution of copies of a
copyrighted  work]  applies  after  the  first  sale  or  other
transfer of ownership of the original or a copy of the work
with  the  authorization  of  the  author.”);  WIPO  Perfor
mances  and  Phonograms  Treaty,  Art.  8(2),  Dec.  20,  1996,
S.  Treaty  Doc.  No.  105–17,  p.  28  (containing  language
nearly  identical  to  Article  6(2)  of  the  WIPO  Copyright
Treaty).

In  the  absence  of  agreement  at  the  international  level,
each country has been left to choose for itself the exhaus
tion  framework  it  will  follow.    One  option  is  a  national
exhaustion regime, under which a copyright owner’s right

——————

14 Chiappetta,  The  Desirability  of  Agreeing  to  Disagree:  The  WTO,
TRIPS,  International  IPR  Exhaustion  and  a  Few  Other  Things,  21
Mich.  J.  Int’l  L.  333,  340  (2000)  (hereinafter  Chiappetta)  (internal
quotation marks omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It discusses the concept of intellectual property exhaustion and cites international treaties and legal scholarship.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

would  vacate  the  judgment  below  and  remand  for  dis-
missal of the petitions for review.

I

Article  III,  §2,  of  the  Constitution  limits  the  federal
judicial power to the adjudication of “Cases” and “Contro-
versies.”  “If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy,
the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the
law  in  the  course  of  doing  so.”  DaimlerChrysler  Corp.  v.
Cuno, 547 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) (slip op., at 5).  “Standing
to  sue  is  part  of  the  common  understanding  of  what  it
takes  to  make  a  justiciable  case,” Steel  Co.  v.  Citizens  for
Better  Environment,  523  U. S.  83,  102  (1998),  and  has
been described as “an essential and unchanging part of the
case-or-controversy  requirement  of  Article  III,”  Defenders
of Wildlife, supra, at 560.

Our modern framework for addressing standing is famil-
iar:  “A  plaintiff  must  allege  personal  injury  fairly  trace-
able  to  the  defendant’s  allegedly  unlawful  conduct  and
likely  to  be  redressed  by  the  requested  relief.”    Daimler-
Chrysler,  supra,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  6)  (quoting  Allen  v.
Wright,  468  U. S.  737,  751  (1984)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted)).  Applying that standard here, petitioners
bear  the  burden  of  alleging  an  injury  that  is  fairly  trace-
able  to  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency’s  failure  to
promulgate  new  motor  vehicle  greenhouse  gas  emission
standards,  and  that  is  likely  to  be  redressed  by  the  pro-
spective issuance of such standards.

Before  determining  whether  petitioners  can  meet  this
familiar  test,  however,  the  Court  changes  the  rules.  It
asserts  that  “States  are  not  normal  litigants  for  the  pur-
poses  of  invoking  federal  jurisdiction,”  and  that  given
“Massachusetts’  stake  in  protecting  its  quasi-sovereign
interests,  the  Commonwealth  is  entitled  to  special  solici-
tude in our standing analysis.”  Ante, at 15, 17 (emphasis
added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Massachusetts v. EPA. It discusses the concept of standing in court and how it applies to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
424  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of Stevens, J.

from  those  of  their  members  and  of  the  public  in  receiving
information,” Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161, n. 8 (citation omit
ted).  Campaign  ﬁnance  distinctions  based  on  corporate
identity  tend  to  be  less  worrisome,  in  other  words,  because
the  “speakers”  are  not  natural  persons,  much  less  members
of  our  political  community,  and  the  governmental  interests
are  of  the  highest  order.  Furthermore,  when  corporations,
as a class, are distinguished from noncorporations, as a class,
there is a lesser risk that regulatory distinctions will reﬂect
invidious discrimination or political favoritism.

If  taken  seriously,  our  colleagues’  assumption  that  the
identity  of  a  speaker  has  no  relevance  to  the  Government’s
ability  to  regulate  political  speech  would  lead  to  some  re
markable  conclusions.  Such  an  assumption  would  have  ac
corded  the  propaganda  broadcasts  to  our  troops  by  “Tokyo
Rose”  during  World  War  II  the  same  protection  as  speech
by  Allied  commanders.  More  pertinently,  it  would  appear
to  afford  the  same  protection  to  multinational  corporations
controlled  by  foreigners  as  to  individual  Americans:  To  do
otherwise,  after  all,  could  “ ‘enhance  the  relative  voice’ ”  of
some (i. e., humans) over others (i. e., nonhumans).  Ante, at
349–350  (quoting  Buckley,  424  U. S.,  at  49).51  Under  the

51 The  Court  all  but  confesses  that  a  categorical  approach  to  speaker
identity  is  untenable  when  it  acknowledges  that  Congress  might  be  al
lowed to take measures aimed at “preventing foreign individuals or associ
ations  from  inﬂuencing  our  Nation’s  political  process.”  Ante,  at  362.
Such  measures  have  been  a  part  of  U. S.  campaign  ﬁnance  law  for  many
years.  The  notion  that  Congress  might  lack  the  authority  to  distinguish
foreigners from citizens in the regulation of electioneering would certainly
have  surprised  the  Framers,  whose  “obsession  with  foreign  inﬂuence  de
rived from a fear that foreign powers and individuals had no basic invest
ment  in  the  well-being  of  the  country.”  Teachout,  The  Anti-Corruption
Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 393, n. 245 (2009) (hereinafter Teachout);
see  also  U. S.  Const.,  Art.  I,  § 9,  cl.  8  (“[N]o  Person  holding  any  Ofﬁce  of
Proﬁt  or  Trust  .  .  .  shall,  without  the  Consent  of  the  Congress,  accept  of
any  present,  Emolument,  Ofﬁce,  or  Title,  of  any  kind  whatever,  from  any
King, Prince, or foreign State”).  Professor Teachout observes that a cor
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It discusses the relevance of a speaker's identity in the context of campaign finance regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

Syllabus

The common practice of staying district court proceedings during the
pendency of an interlocutory appeal taken under §16(a) reflects com-
mon sense.  If the district court could move forward with pre-trial and
trial proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongoing, then
many of the asserted benefits of arbitration (efficiency, less expense,
less intrusive discovery, and the like) would be irretrievably lost—even
if the court of appeals later concluded that the case actually had be-
longed  in  arbitration  all  along.   Absent  a  stay,  parties  also  could  be
forced to settle to avoid the district court proceedings (including dis-
covery  and  trial)  that  they  contracted  to  avoid  through  arbitration.
The Griggs rule avoids these detrimental results.

Congress’s  longstanding  practice  reflects  the  Griggs  rule.    Given
Griggs, when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal and
to automatically stay the district court proceedings during that appeal,
Congress ordinarily need not say anything about a stay.  By contrast,
when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal, but not to
automatically  stay  district  court  proceedings  pending  that  appeal,
Congress typically says so.  Since the creation of the modern courts of
appeals system in 1891, Congress has enacted multiple statutory “non-
stay” provisions.  Pp. 2–7.

(b) Bielski’s arguments to overcome the Griggs principle are unper-
suasive.  First,  the  courts  of  appeals  possess  robust  tools  to  prevent
unwarranted delay and deter frivolous interlocutory appeals that an
automatic stay might otherwise encourage.  Second, Congress included
explicit  stay  requirements  in  two  other  statutory  provisions  for  rea-
sons particular to those statutes, not because Congress thought that
an interlocutory appeal did not ordinarily stay district court proceed-
ings.  Third, the result here does not create a special, arbitration-pre-
ferring procedural rule, but simply subjects arbitrability appeals to the
same  stay  principles  that  courts  apply  in  other  analogous  contexts
where an interlocutory appeal is authorized.  Fourth, experience shows
that ordinary discretionary stay factors would not adequately protect
parties’ rights to an interlocutory appellate determination of arbitra-
bility.  In any event, the background Griggs rule applies regardless of
how often courts might otherwise grant stays under the ordinary dis-
cretionary  stay  factors.  Fifth,  while  the  Court  has  recognized  that
questions of arbitrability are severable from merits questions, the sole
issue here is whether the district court’s authority to consider a case is
“involved in the appeal” when an appellate court considers the thresh-
old question of arbitrability, Griggs, 459 U. S., at 58.  The answer is
yes.  Pp. 7–10.

Reversed and remanded.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1079

558 U. S.

December 7, 2009

No.  09–6798.  Hagins  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6805.  Pierce  v.  United  States  District  Court  for
the Central District of California.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No. 09–6811.  Dumas v.  Wong, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  442.

No. 09–6812.  Johnson v.  Garcia et al.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6829.  Pelletier  v.  Gerry,  Warden.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6836.  Millen  v.  Management  Cleaning  Controls.

Sup.  Ct.  Tenn.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6842.  Shelton  v.  King,  Superintendent,  South
Mississippi  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6848.  De  La  Vega  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6850.  Deleon-Puentes  v.  Sherry,  Warden.  C.  A.

6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6851.  Day  v.  Trybulski.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–6852.  Paradise  v.  Roberts,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6855.  O’Dwyer  v.  Louisiana  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  833.

No.  09–6861.  Knowles  v.  Province,  Warden.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  439.

No.  09–6862.  Kuperman  v.  Gerry,  Warden.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6864.  Lewis v.  Burtt, Warden.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  233.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the orders issued.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

SACKETT v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

property meets this definition.7

This Court first construed the meaning of “the waters of
the  United  States”  in  United  States  v.  Riverside  Bayview
Homes,  Inc.,  474  U. S.  121  (1985).  There,  we  were  con-
fronted  with  the  Corps’  assertion  of  authority  under  the
CWA over wetlands that “actually abut[ted] on a navigable
waterway.”  Id.,  at  135.    Although  we  expressed  concern
that wetlands seemed to fall outside “traditional notions of
‘waters,’ ” we nonetheless deferred to the Corps, reasoning
that “the transition from water to solid ground is not neces-
sarily or even typically an abrupt one.”  Id., at 132–133.

The agencies responded to Riverside Bayview by expand-
ing their interpretations even further.  Most notably, they
issued the “migratory bird rule,” which extended jurisdic-
tion to any waters or wetlands that “are or would be used
as  [a]  habitat”  by  migratory  birds  or  endangered  species.
See 53 Fed. Reg. 20765 (1988); 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (1986).
As the Corps would later admit, “nearly all waters were ju-
risdictional under the migratory bird rule.”8

In  Solid  Waste  Agency  of  Northern  Cook  Cty.  v.  Army
Corps  of  Engineers,  531  U. S.  159  (2001)  (SWANCC),  this
Court rejected the migratory bird rule, which the Corps had
used  to  assert  jurisdiction  over  several  isolated  ponds  lo-
cated wholly within the State of Illinois.  Disagreeing with
the Corps’ argument that ecological interests supported its
jurisdiction,  we  instead  held  that  the  CWA  does  not  “ex-
ten[d] to ponds that are not adjacent to open water.”  Id., at
168 (emphasis deleted).

Days after our decision, the agencies issued guidance that

——————

7 See Corps, Wetlands Delineation Manual (Tech. Rep. Y–87–1, 1987)
(Wetlands  Delineation  Manual);  see  also, e.g.,  Corps,  Regional  Supple-
ment to the Corps of Engineers Wetland Delineation Manual: Alaska Re-
gion (Version 2.0) (ERDC/EL Tr–07–24, 2007).

8 GAO, Waters and Wetlands: Corps of Engineers Needs To Evaluate
Its  District  Office  Practices  in  Determining  Jurisdiction  26  (GAO–04–
297, 2004) (GAO Report).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Sackett v. EPA. It delves into the interpretation of the "waters of the United States" definition within the Clean Water Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

15

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

countries  to  be  tried  for  murder  by  court-martial.    The
plurality  opinion  said  that  “no  agreement  with  a  foreign
nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of
the Constitution.”  Id., at 16.

To  be  sure,  the  Reid  plurality  purported  to  distinguish
the  ipse  dixit  of  Holland  with  its  own  unsupported  ipse
dixit.  “[T]he people and the States,” it said, “have delegated
[the  treaty]  power  to  the  National  Government  [so]  the
Tenth  Amendment  is  no  barrier.”  354  U. S.,  at  18.    The
opinion does not say why (and there is no reason why) only
the  Tenth  Amendment,  and  not  the  other  nine,  has  been
“delegated”  away  by  the  treaty  power.  The  distinction
between  provisions  protecting  individual  liberty,  on  the
one hand, and “structural” provisions, on the other, cannot
be  the  explanation,  since  structure  in  general—and  espe-
cially the structure of limited federal powers—is designed
to  protect  individual  liberty.    “The  federal  structure  . . .
secures the freedom of the individual. . . . By denying any
one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns
of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individ-
ual  from  arbitrary  power.”    Bond  v.  United  States,  564
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 9–10).

The  Government  raises  a  functionalist  objection:  If  the
Constitution  does  not  limit  a  self-executing  treaty  to  the
subject matter delineated in Article I, §8, then it makes no
sense to impose that limitation upon a statute implement-
ing a non-self-executing treaty.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 32–33.
The premise of the objection (that the power to make self-
executing  treaties  is  limitless)  is,  to  say  the  least,  argua-
ble.  But even if it is correct, refusing to extend that prop-
osition to non-self-executing treaties makes a great deal of
sense.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  the  self-aggrandizing
Federal Government wishes to take over the law of intes-
tacy.  If the President and the Senate find in some foreign
state  a  ready  accomplice,  they  have  two  options.    First,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia. It discusses the interpretation of the Constitution and its relation to treaties. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

GORSUCH, J., concurring

the same accommodation to Mr. Phillips when he refused
a  customer’s  request  that  would  have  required  him  to
violate his religious beliefs.  Ante, at 14–16.  As the Court
also  explains,  the  only  reason  the  Commission  seemed  to
supply  for  its  discrimination  was  that  it  found  Mr.  Phil-
lips’s  religious  beliefs  “offensive.”    Ibid.    That  kind  of
judgmental dismissal of a sincerely held religious belief is,
of course, antithetical to the First Amendment and cannot
begin to satisfy strict scrutiny.  The Constitution protects
not just popular religious exercises from the condemnation
of  civil  authorities.
It  protects  them  all.    Because  the
Court  documents  each  of  these  points  carefully  and  thor-
oughly, I am pleased to join its opinion in full.

The only wrinkle is this.  In the face of so much evidence
suggesting  hostility  toward  Mr.  Phillips’s  sincerely  held
religious  beliefs,  two  of  our  colleagues  have  written  sepa-
rately  to  suggest  that  the  Commission  acted  neutrally
toward  his  faith  when  it  treated  him  differently  from  the
other  bakers—or  that  it  could  have  easily  done  so  con-
sistent  with  the  First  Amendment.    See  post,  at  4–5,  and
n. 4  (GINSBURG,  J.,  dissenting);  ante,  at  2–3,  and  n.
(KAGAN,  J.,  concurring).    But,  respectfully,  I  do  not  see
how we might rescue the Commission from its error.

A full view of the facts helps point the way to the prob-
lem.  Start with William Jack’s case.  He approached three
bakers  and  asked  them  to  prepare  cakes  with  messages
disapproving  same-sex  marriage  on  religious  grounds.
App.  233,  243,  252.    All  three  bakers  refused  Mr.  Jack’s
request,  stating  that  they  found  his  request  offensive  to
their secular convictions.  Id., at 231, 241, 250.  Mr. Jack
responded  by  filing  complaints  with  the  Colorado  Civil
Id.,  at  230,  240,  249.    He  pointed  to
Rights  Division.
Colorado’s  Anti-Discrimination  Act,  which  prohibits  dis-
crimination  against  customers  in  public  accommodations
because  of  religious  creed,  sexual  orientation,  or  certain
other  traits.  See  ibid.;  Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §24–34–601(2)(a)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of *Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n*.  It discusses the case and the Court's reasoning, focusing on the protection of religious beliefs under the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U99

[09-15-00 14:41:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

760

BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ELLERTH

Opinion of the Court

ity based on an agent’s misuse of delegated authority, the
Restatement’s aided in the agency relation rule, rather than
the apparent authority rule, appears to be the appropriate
form of analysis.

D

We turn to the aided in the agency relation standard.

In a
sense, most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing
their tortious objective by the existence of the agency rela-
tion: Proximity and regular contact may afford a captive pool
of potential victims. See Gary v. Long, 59 F. 3d 1391, 1397
(CADC 1995). Were this to satisfy the aided in the agency
relation standard, an employer would be subject to vicarious
liability not only for all supervisor harassment, but also for
all co-worker harassment, a result enforced by neither the
EEOC nor any court of appeals to have considered the issue.
See, e. g., Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 F. 3d
868, 872 (CA6 1997), cert. denied, 522 U. S. 1110 (1998) (sex
discrimination); McKenzie v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 92
F. 3d 473, 480 (CA7 1996) (sex discrimination); Daniels v.
Essex Group, Inc., 937 F. 2d 1264, 1273 (CA7 1991) (race dis-
crimination); see also 29 CFR § 1604.11(d) (1997) (“knows or
should have known” standard of liability for cases of harass-
ment between “fellow employees”). The aided in the agency
relation standard, therefore, requires the existence of some-
thing more than the employment relation itself.

At the outset, we can identify a class of cases where, be-
yond question, more than the mere existence of the employ-
ment relation aids in commission of the harassment: when a
supervisor takes a tangible employment action against the
subordinate. Every Federal Court of Appeals to have con-
sidered the question has found vicarious liability when a
discriminatory act results in a tangible employment action.
See, e. g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F. 3d 1122, 1127
(CA10 1993) (“ ‘If the plaintiff can show that she suffered an
economic injury from her supervisor’s actions, the employer
becomes strictly liable without any further showing . . .’ ”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt. It contains legal jargon and discusses legal precedents.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

Opinion of BREYER, J.

support  the  testimony  of  Doe  6  and  the  State’s  expert.
Three hospitals require doctors who receive admitting priv-
ileges to undergo a process of “focused professional practice
evaluation.”  See Record 2635, 2637, 2681 (Touro Hospital),
9054  (New  Orleans  East  Hospital),  10755  (East  Jefferson
Hospital).  As we have explained, this evaluation requires
hospital staff to observe a doctor with admitting privileges
while he or she performs a certain number of procedures.
See supra, at 22.  If the doctor admits no patients (and Doe
6 has no patients requiring admission), there is nothing to
observe.  Another  hospital  requires  physicians  to  admit  a
minimum  number  of  patients,  either  initially  or  after  re-
ceiving admitting privileges. Record 9150–9153 (West Jef-
ferson Hospital).  And one requires both.  Id., at 9040, 9069
(New Orleans East Hospital).  The record apparently is si-
lent  as  to  the  remaining  three  hospitals,  but  that  silence
cannot  contradict  the  well-supported  testimony  of  Doe  6
and the State’s expert that Doe 6 would not receive admit-
ting privileges from any of them.  Good faith does not re-
quire an exercise in futility.

We  recognize  that  Doe  5  was  able  to  secure  limited  ad-
mitting privileges at Touro Hospital, to which Doe 6 did not
apply.  But, unlike Doe 6, Doe 5 primarily performs surgical
abortions.  App.  1330.  And  while  Doe  5  was  a  hospital-
based  physician  as  recently  as  2012,  Doe  6  has  not  held
privileges  at  any  hospital  since  2005.    Id.,  at  1310,  1329.
Doe 5’s success therefore does not directly contradict the ev-
idence that we have described in respect to Doe 6 or render
the District Court’s conclusion as to Doe 6 clearly errone-
ous.  And, as we have said, “[a] finding that is ‘plausible’ in
light of the full record—even if another is equally or more
so—must govern.”  Cooper, 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4).
Without actually disputing any of the evidence we have
discussed,  JUSTICE  ALITO  maintains  that  the  plaintiffs
could  have  introduced  still  more  evidence  to  support  the
District Court’s determination.  See post, at 20.  As we have
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the reasoning provided by Justice Breyer. It discusses the evidence presented in a case and the court's analysis of that evidence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

or  that  a  protection  order  has  been  violated.”   Develop-
ments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence,
106 Harv. L. Rev. 1498, 1537 (1993).  The purpose of these
statutes  was  precisely  to  “counter  police  resistance  to
arrests in domestic violence cases by removing or restrict-
ing  police  officer  discretion;  mandatory  arrest  policies
would increase police response and reduce batterer recidi-
vism.”  Sack 1670.

Thus, when Colorado passed its statute in 1994, it joined
the  ranks  of  15  States  that  mandated  arrest  for  domestic
violence  offenses  and  19  States  that  mandated  arrest  for
domestic restraining order violations.  See Developments in
the Law, 106 Harv. L. Rev., at 1537, n. 68 (noting statutes
in  1993);  N.  Miller,  Institute  for  Law  and  Justice,  A  Law
Enforcement  and  Prosecution  Perspective  7,  and  n.  74,  8,
and n. 90 (2003), http://www.ilj.org/dv/dvvawa2000.htm (as
visited  June  24,  2005,  and  available  in  Clerk  of  Court’s
case  file)  (listing  Colorado  among  the  many  States  that
currently have mandatory arrest statutes).9

Given  the  specific  purpose  of  these  statutes,  there  can
be  no  doubt  that  the  Colorado  Legislature  used  the  term
“shall” advisedly in its domestic restraining order statute.
While “shall” is probably best read to mean “may” in other
Colorado  statutes  that  seemingly  mandate  enforcement,
cf.  Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §31–4–112  (Lexis  2004)  (police  “shall
suppress  all  riots,  disturbances  or  breaches  of  the  peace,
shall  apprehend  all  disorderly  persons  in  the  city  . . .”
(emphases added)), it is clear that the elimination of police
discretion  was  integral  to  Colorado  and  its  fellow  States’

——————

9 See also Brief for International Municipal Lawyers Association and
National League of Cities, National’s Sheriff’s Association, and County
Sheriffs of Colorado as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner 6 (“Colo-
rado is not alone in mandating the arrest of persons who violate protec-
tive orders.  Some 19 states require an arrest when a police officer has
probable cause to believe that such orders have been violated” (collect-
ing statutes)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens in the case of Castle Rock v. Gonzales. It discusses the purpose and intent of mandatory arrest statutes for domestic violence offenses.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Trusts §74, Comment a, p. 192 (1957); see Blair v. Commis-
sioner, 300 U. S. 5, 13 (1937).  Courts have long recognized
that  this  equitable  interest  gives  beneficiaries  a  basis  to
“have a breach of trust enjoined and . . . redress[ed].”  Ibid.;
see also Spokeo, 578 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).  That is, a
beneficiary’s  equitable  interest  allows  her  to  “maintain  a
suit” to “compel the trustee to perform his duties,” to “enjoin
the trustee from committing a breach of trust,” to “compel
the trustee to redress a breach of trust,” and to “remove the
trustee.”  Restatement (Second) of Trusts §199; see also id.,
§205 (beneficiary may require a trustee to restore “any loss
or depreciation in value of the trust estate” and “any profit
made by [the trustee] through the breach of trust”).3

So  too  here.  Because  respondents’  alleged  mismanage-
ment lost the pension fund hundreds of millions of dollars,
petitioners have stated an injury to their equitable property
interest in that trust.

2
The Court, by contrast, holds that participants and bene-
ficiaries  in  a  defined-benefit  plan  have  no  stake  in  their
plan’s assets.  Ante, at 4.  In other words, the Court treats
beneficiaries as mere bystanders to their own pensions.

That is wrong on several scores.  For starters, it creates
a paradox: In one breath, the Court determines that peti-
tioners  have  “no  equitable  or  property  interest”  in  their
plan’s assets, ante, at 4; in another, the Court concedes that
petitioners have an enforceable interest in receiving their
“monthly pension benefits,” ante, at 2.  Benefits paid from
where?  The plan’s assets, obviously.  Precisely because pe-
titioners  have  an  interest  in  payments  from  their  trust

——————

3 Even contingent and discretionary beneficiaries (those who might not
ever receive any assets from the trust) can sue to protect the trust absent
a personal financial loss (or an imminent risk of loss).  See A. Hess, G.
Bogert,  &  G. Bogert,  Law  of  Trusts  and Trustees  §871  (June  2019  up-
date) (Bogert & Bogert) (listing cases).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and discusses the legal arguments surrounding a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524BV$

Unit: $UII

[08-17-00 11:24:12] PGT: FRTBX

m

Erratum

487 U. S. 4, n.*, lines 4–5: Insert “Lynn Hecht Schafran,” following “for

the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by”.

ii
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of an erratum, likely from a legal document. It contains specific instructions for correcting a previous version.
  </thinking>
  <category>Erratum</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

31

KAGAN, J., dissenting

reasonable reliance need not be predicated on a prior judi-
cial  decision.  Some  agency  interpretations  never  chal-
lenged  under  Chevron  now  will  be;  expectations  formed
around  those  constructions  thus  could  be  upset,  in  a  way
the majority’s assurance does not touch.  And anyway, how
good  is  that  assurance,  really?  The  majority  says  that  a
decision’s  “[m]ere  reliance  on  Chevron”  is  not  enough  to
counter the force of stare decisis; a challenger will need an
additional “special justification.”  Ante, at 34.  The majority
is sanguine; I am not so much.  Courts motivated to over-
rule  an  old  Chevron-based  decision  can  always  come  up
with something to label a “special justification.”  Maybe a
court  will  say  “the  quality  of  [the  precedent’s]  reasoning”
was  poor.  Ante,  at  29.  Or  maybe  the  court  will  discover
something “unworkable” in the decision—like some excep-
tion that has to be applied.  Ante, at 30.  All a court need do
is look to today’s opinion to see how it is done.

IV

Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part
of either political branch of the Government.

— Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 865 (1984)

Those  were  the  days,  when  we  knew  what  we  are  not.
When we knew that as between courts and agencies, Con-
gress would usually think agencies the better choice to re-
solve  the  ambiguities and  fill  the  gaps  in  regulatory  stat-
utes.  Because  agencies  are  “experts  in  the  field.”    And
because they are part of a political branch, with a claim to
making  interstitial  policy.  And  because  Congress  has
charged them, not us, with administering the statutes con-
taining  the  open  questions.    At  its  core,  Chevron  is  about
respecting that allocation of responsibility—the conferral of
primary authority over regulatory matters to agencies, not
courts.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision and discusses the implications of overruling precedent based on Chevron deference.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1230

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

CERTIORARI—Continued

Rule

Distribution of papers to Court  ................................  15.5
Docketing

—Fee........................................................................  12.1, 38(a)
—Notice to respondents  .....................................  12.3
Frivolous petitions, damages and costs  ...................  42.2
Motion to dismiss petition barred..............................  15.4
Multiple judgments, review of  ..................................  12.4
Objections to jurisdiction  ...........................................  15.4
Parties .............................................................................  12.4, 12.6
Petitions for writ

—Contents..............................................................  14
—Copies, number to be ﬁled  .............................  12.1, 12.2
—Cover color .........................................................  33.1(g)(i)
—Deﬁciency, effect of  ..........................................  14.5
—Documents,  format  and  general  require

ments ...............................................................  33, 34
—Page limits..........................................................  14.3, 33.2(b)

—Service  ...............................................................  12.3

—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  13, 29.2, 30.2, 30.3

—Word limits .........................................................  14.3, 33.1(g)(i)

Record, certiﬁcation and transmission  ....................  12.7

Rehearing, petitions for  ..............................................  44.2

Reply briefs to briefs in opposition..................  15.6, 33.1(g)(iii), 33.2(b)

Respondents in support of petitioner  ......................  12.6

Stays pending review ..................................................  23.2, 23.4

Summary disposition ....................................................  16.1

Supplemental briefs......................................................  15.8, 33.1(g)(iv)

CLERK

Announcement of absence of quorum .......................  4.2

Announcement of recesses ..........................................  4.3

Argument calendar .......................................................  27.1, 27.2

Authority to reject ﬁlings ...........................................  1.1

Costs, itemization in mandate ....................................  43.6

Custody of records and papers...................................  1.2

Diagrams, custody and disposition ............................  32

Exhibits, custody and disposition ..............................  32

Fees as taxable items ...................................................  43.3

Fees, table of..................................................................  38

Filing documents with .................................................  29.1, 29.2

Hearing lists, preparation of.......................................  27.2

In forma pauperis proceedings, docketing .............  39.4

Lodgings .........................................................................  32.3

Models, custody and disposition .................................  32
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It outlines specific rules related to certiorari proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules/Regulations</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

29

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

determination.

These  and  other  considerations  that  must  shape  and
instruct the formulation of principles of international and
domestic law are matters that the political branches are in
the  better  position  to  define  and  articulate.    For  these
reasons, judicial deference requires that any imposition of
corporate liability on foreign corporations for violations of
international law must be determined in the first instance
by the political branches of the Government.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the concluding portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citations, the name of the Justice who wrote the opinion, and the formal language typical of legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

Opinion of the Court

is implausible would be an understatement.9  Because eve-
ryday overbilling cases would account for the majority of vi-
olations in practice, the Government’s reading places at the
core of the statute its most improbable applications.

Finally, the Government makes a familiar plea: There is
no reason to mistrust its sweeping reading, because prose-
cutors will act responsibly.  To this, the Court gives a just-
as-familiar response: We “cannot construe a criminal stat-
ute on the assumption that the Government will ‘use it re-
sponsibly.’ ”  McDonnell, 579 U. S., at 576 (quoting United
States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 480 (2010)).  “[T]o rely upon
prosecutorial discretion to narrow the otherwise wide-rang-
ing  scope  of  a  criminal  statute’s  highly  abstract  general
statutory language places great power in the hands of the
prosecutor.”  Marinello,  584  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  9).
This  concern  is  particularly  salient  here.  If  §1028A(a)(1)
applies virtually automatically to a swath of predicate of-
fenses,  the  prosecutor  can  hold  the  threat  of  charging  an
additional 2-year mandatory prison sentence over the head
of any defendant who is considering going to trial.

III

All the points above are different wells drawing from the
same  source.    The  Court  need  not  decide  whether  any  of
these points, standing alone, would be dispositive.  Taken
together,  from  text  to  context,  from  content  to  common
sense,  §1028A(a)(1)  is  not  amenable  to  the  Government’s
attempt to push the statutory envelope.  A defendant “uses”
another  person’s  means  of  identification  “in  relation  to”  a
predicate offense when this use is at the crux of what makes

——————

9 Even the Government had trouble stomaching some of these results,
offering  inconsistent  accounts  of  certain  examples.    The  Government
claimed,  for  example,  that  if  “an  applicant  for  a  bank  loan  . . .  slightly
inflates his salary while correctly identifying the co-signer,” “the inclu-
sion  of  the co-signer’s  name  is  not  ‘in  relation  to’  the  fraud.”    Brief  for
United States 31–32 (some internal quotation marks omitted).  This can-
not be squared with the Government’s own “facilitates” standard.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute (likely §1028A(a)(1)) and argues against a broad interpretation put forth by the Government.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

immediate  aftermath  of  Cabazon,  Congress  adopted  not
just the Restoration Act; it also adopted other laws govern-
ing tribal gaming activities.  In these laws, Congress again
appeared to reference and employ Cabazon’s distinction be-
tween prohibition and regulation—and Congress did so in
ways demonstrating that it clearly understood how to grant
a State regulatory jurisdiction over a Tribe’s gaming activ-
ities when it wished to do so.  Cf. Lagos v. United States,
584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 6–7).

Consider two examples.  On the same day it passed the
Restoration Act, Congress adopted a statute involving the
Wampanoag  Tribe.  But,  contrary  to  its  approach  in  the
Restoration  Act,  Congress  subjected  that  Tribe’s  lands  to
“those laws and regulations which prohibit or regulate the
conduct of bingo or any other game of chance.”  Wampanoag
Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., Indian Claims Settlement
Act  of  1987,  §  9,  101  Stat.  709–710  (emphasis  added).
Shortly  after  the  Restoration  Act,  Congress  adopted  an-
other statute, this one governing the Catawba Tribe’s gam-
ing activities.  In it, Congress provided that “all laws, ordi-
nances,  and  regulations  of  the  State,  and  its  political
subdivisions, shall govern the regulation of . . . gambling or
wagering  by  the  Tribe  on  and  off  the  Reservation.”    Ca-
tawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina Land Claims Settle-
ment Act of 1993, § 14(b), 107 Stat. 1136 (emphasis added).
That Congress chose to use the language of Cabazon in
different ways in three statutes closely related in time and
subject matter seems to us too much to ignore.  See State
Farm Fire  & Casualty Co.  v. United States ex rel. Rigsby,
580  U. S.  26,  34  (2016)  (explaining  that  when  Congress
“use[s]  . . .  explicit  language  in  one  provision,”  that  “cau-
tions against inferring the same limitation in another pro-
vision”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).    For  two
Tribes, Congress did more than just prohibit on tribal lands
those  gaming  activities  prohibited  by  state  law.  It  said
state  regulations  should  apply  as  a  matter  of  federal  law
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the legal framework surrounding tribal gaming in the United States. It references previous legal cases and legislation, indicating it's part of the main body of the opinion and not a separate section like a table of contents or introductory paragraph.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CHIAVERINI ET AL. v. CITY OF NAPOLEON, OHIO, ET
AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–50.  Argued April 15, 2024—Decided June 20, 2024

This case involves a dispute between petitioner Jascha Chiaverini and
police officers from Napoleon, Ohio.  The officers charged Chiaverini,
a jewelry store owner, with three crimes: receiving stolen property, a
misdemeanor; dealing in precious metals without a license, also a mis-
demeanor; and money laundering, a felony.  After obtaining a warrant,
the police arrested Chiaverini and detained him for three days.  But
county prosecutors later dropped the case.  Chiaverini, believing that
his arrest and detention were unjustified, then sued the officers, alleg-
ing  what  is  known  as  a  Fourth  Amendment  malicious-prosecution
claim under 42 U. S. C. §1983.  To prevail on this claim, he had to show
that the officers brought criminal charges against him without proba-
ble cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure of his person.  The Dis-
trict Court, however, granted summary judgment to the officers, and
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.  The Court of Ap-
peals  held  that  Chiaverini’s  prosecution  was  supported  by  probable
cause.  In holding this, the court did not address whether the officers
had probable cause to bring the money-laundering charge.  In its view,
there  was  clearly  probable  cause  to  charge  Chiaverini  with  the  two
misdemeanors.  And so long as one charge was supported by probable
cause,  it  thought,  a  malicious-prosecution  claim  based  on  any  other
charge must fail.

Held: The presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal pro-
ceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-
prosecution  claim  relating  to  another,  baseless  charge.    The  parties,
and the United States as amicus curiae, all agree with this conclusion,
which follows from both the Fourth Amendment and traditional com-
mon-law practice.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1121

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No.  09–7218.  Austin  v.  McCann,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7219.  Miller v. Pennsylvania.  Super. Ct. Pa.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  965  A.  2d  276.

No. 09–7225.  Crutchfield v.  Florida Department of Cor

rections  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7228.  Woods  v.  Missouri.  Ct.  App.  Mo.,  Western

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  284  S. W.  3d  630.

No.  09–7232.  Tiffer  v.  Worker’s  Compensation  et  al.
C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.
Appx.  108.

No.  09–7233.  Payne  v.  Tinsley  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7239.  Jeffers  v.  Mize,  Superintendent,  Pendle
ton Correctional Facility.  C. A.  7th Cir.  Certiorari denied.
No.  09–7244.  Watkins  v.  Georgia.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  285  Ga.  107,  674  S.  E.  2d  275.

No.  09–7245.  Yenglee  v.  DiGuglielmo,  Superintendent,
State  Correctional  Institution  at  Graterford,  et  al.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7247.  Williams  v.  Horel,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  333.

No.  09–7259.  Redman  v.  Potomac  Place  Associates,  LLC.
Ct.  App.  D.  C.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  972  A.  2d
316.

No.  09–7262.  Roberts  v.  Jenkins,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  670.

No.  09–7263.  Sanders  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  5th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  17  So.  3d  1242.

No.  09–7264.  Stephens  v.  Cain,  Warden.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7265.  Sutton  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  4th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ZF AUTOMOTIVE US, INC. v. LUXSHARE, LTD.

Syllabus

Lithuania expropriated investments.  Relevant here, the treaty estab-
lishes a procedure for resolving “any dispute between one Contracting
Party and [an] investor of the other Contracting Party concerning” in-
vestments in the first Contracting Party’s territory, and offers parties
four options for dispute resolution.  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 21–
518, pp. 64a–65a.  The Fund chose an ad hoc arbitration in accordance
with Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law, with each party selecting one arbitrator and those
two  choosing  a  third.    After  initiating  arbitration,  the  Fund  filed  a
§1782  application  in  federal  court,  seeking  information  from  Simon
Freakley, who was appointed as a temporary administrator of Snoras,
and  AlixPartners,  LLP,  a  New  York-based  consulting  firm  where
Freakley serves as CEO.  AlixPartners resisted discovery, arguing that
the ad hoc arbitration panel was not a “foreign or international tribu-
nal” under §1782 but instead a private adjudicative body.  The District
Court  rejected  that  argument  and  granted  the  Fund’s  discovery  re-
quest.  The Second Circuit affirmed.

Held: Only a governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative body con-
stitutes a “foreign or international tribunal” under 28 U. S. C. §1782,
and the bodies at issue in these cases do not qualify.  Pp. 5–17.

(a) Section 1782(a) provides that a district court may order discovery
“for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”  Stand-
ing  alone,  the  word  “tribunal”  can  be  used  either  as  a  synonym  for
“court,” in which case it carries a distinctively governmental flavor, or
more broadly to refer to any adjudicatory body.  While a prior version
of  §1782  covered  “any  judicial  proceeding”  in  “any  court  in  a  foreign
country,” §1782 (1958 ed.), Congress later expanded the provision to
cover proceedings in a “foreign or international tribunal.”  That shift
created “ ‘the possibility of U. S. judicial assistance in connection with
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings abroad.’ ”  Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U. S. 241, 258 (alterations omitted).
But while a “tribunal” thus need not be a formal “court,” read in con-
text—with  “tribunal”  attached  to  the  modifiers  “foreign  or  interna-
tional”—§1782’s phrase is best understood to refer to an adjudicative
body that exercises governmental authority.

“Foreign tribunal” more naturally refers to a tribunal belonging to a
foreign  nation  than  to  a  tribunal  that  is  simply  located  in  a  foreign
nation.  And for a tribunal to belong to a foreign nation, the tribunal
must possess sovereign authority conferred by that nation.  This read-
ing of “foreign tribunal” is reinforced by the statutory defaults for dis-
covery  procedure  under  §1782,  which  permit  district  courts  to  pre-
scribe the practice and procedure, “which may be in whole or part the
practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tri-
bunal.”  §1782(a) (emphasis added).  The statute thus presumes that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a legal case. Syllabi typically summarize the legal issues, procedural history, and holdings of a case. They are not meant to be the primary content of the document and often provide a high-level overview rather than the full text of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

25

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

a unanimous jury trial has “little practical importance go-
ing forward.”75  In the dissent’s telling, Louisiana has “abol-
ished” nonunanimous verdicts and Oregon “seemed on the
verge of doing the same until the Court intervened.”76  But,
as the dissent itself concedes, a ruling for Louisiana would
invite  other  States  to  relax  their  own  unanimity  require-
ments.77  In fact, 14 jurisdictions have already told us that
they would value the right to “experiment” with nonunani-
mous juries.78  Besides, Louisiana’s law bears only prospec-
tive  effect,  so  the  State  continues  to  allow  nonunanimous
verdicts for crimes committed before 2019.79  And while the
dissent speculates that our grant of certiorari contributed
to the failure of legal reform efforts in Oregon, its citation
does not support its surmise.  No doubt, too, those who risk
being  subjected  to  nonunanimous  juries  in  Louisiana  and
Oregon today, and elsewhere tomorrow, would dispute the
dissent’s suggestion that their Sixth Amendment rights are
of “little practical importance.”

That point suggests another.  In its valiant search for re-
liance  interests,  the  dissent  somehow  misses  maybe  the
most important one:  the reliance interests of the American
people.  Taken at its word, the dissent would have us dis-
card  a  Sixth  Amendment  right  in  perpetuity  rather  than
ask two States to retry a slice of their prior criminal cases.
Whether that slice turns out to be large or small, it cannot
outweigh the interest we all share in the preservation of our
constitutionally promised liberties.  Indeed, the dissent can
cite no case in which the one-time need to retry defendants
has  ever  been  sufficient  to  inter  a  constitutional  right
forever.

——————
75 Post, at 2.
76 Ibid.
77 Post, at 3.
78 Brief for State of Utah et al. as Amici Curiae 1.
79 See 2018 La. Reg. Sess., Act 722.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice Gorsuch. It delves into arguments regarding the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict.  The language, citations, and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 666 (1998)

703

Breyer, J., dissenting

as the basic principles underlying the privilege, convince
me that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination should encompass not only feared domestic
prosecutions, but also feared foreign prosecutions where the
danger of an actual foreign prosecution is substantial.

I

I begin with a point that focuses upon precedent setting
forth the current understanding of the scope of the word
“any,” and that reveals the basic difference between the ma-
jority’s view of the privilege and the view this Court has
previously taken and should continue to take. The majority
focuses upon one case, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of
N. Y. Harbor, supra, which itself discusses much historically
relevant precedent. And the majority’s focus upon that one
case is appropriate.

Murphy holds that “the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination protects . . . a federal witness against in-
crimination under state . . . law.”
Id., at 77–78. As I read
Murphy, the Court thought this conclusion ﬂowed naturally
from its basic understanding of the scope of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. On that understanding, the privi-
lege prohibits federal courts (and state courts through the
Fourteenth Amendment) from compelling a witness to fur-
nish testimonial evidence that may be used to prove his guilt
if that witness may reasonably fear criminal prosecution.
See id., at 60–63 (discussing the English cases, King of Two
Sicilies v. Willcox, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 301, 61 Eng. Rep. 116
(Ch. 1851), and United States of America v. McRae, 3 L. R.
Ch. 79 (1867), as ones that, if rightly understood, embody
that proposition of law).

The privilege, understood in this way, requires the aboli-
tion of any “same sovereign” rule.
It is often reasonable for
a federal witness to fear state prosecution, and vice versa.
Indeed, where testimony may incriminate and immunity has
not been granted, it is so reasonable that one can say, as a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>