<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

his students were otherwise occupied.”  Ante, at 1.  The rec-
ord before us, however, tells a different story.

A
The  District  serves  approximately  5,057  students  and
employs  332  teachers  and  400  nonteaching  personnel  in
Kitsap County, Washington.  The county is home to Bahá’ís,
Buddhists,  Hindus,  Jews,  Muslims,  Sikhs,  Zoroastrians,
and many denominations of Christians, as well as numer-
ous residents who are religiously unaffiliated.  See Brief for
Religious  and  Denominational  Organizations  et al.  as
Amici Curiae 4.

The District first hired Kennedy in 2008, on a renewable
annual contract, to serve as a part-time assistant coach for
the varsity football team and head coach for the junior var-
sity team at Bremerton High School (BHS).  Kennedy’s job
description  required  him  to  “[a]ccompany  and  direct”  all
home  and  out-of-town  games  to  which  he  was  assigned,
overseeing  preparation  and  transportation  before  games,
being “[r]esponsible for player behavior both on and off the
field,” supervising dressing rooms, and “secur[ing] all facil-
ities at the close of each practice.”  App. 32–34, 36.  His du-
ties  encompassed  “supervising  student  activities  immedi-
ately  following  the  completion  of  the  game”  until  the
students  were  released  to  their  parents  or  otherwise  al-
lowed to leave.  Id., at 133.

The District also set requirements for Kennedy’s interac-
tions with players, obliging him, like all coaches, to “exhibit
sportsmanlike conduct at all times,” “utilize positive moti-
vational strategies to encourage athletic performance,” and
serve as a “mentor and role model for the student athletes.”
Id.,  at  56.  In  addition,  Kennedy’s  position  made  him  re-
sponsible for interacting with members of the community.
In  this  capacity,  the  District  required  Kennedy  and  other
coaches to “maintain positive media relations,” “always ap-
proach officials with composure” with the expectation that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case document, specifically a dissenting opinion. It includes citations, names of parties involved, and a description of the case context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

payment of benefits when,” as in this case, a court later “in-
validates a VA interpretation or regulation” after a benefits
decision  becomes  final.  VA  Op.  9–94,  ¶6,  p.  5  (Mar.  25,
1994).  Under this practice and the statute codifying it, the
Board is instead simply “performing its assigned task when
it applies a regulation as promulgated by the [VA],” because
that regulation legally binds agency adjudicators.  VA Op.
25–95, ¶4, p. 2 (Dec. 6, 1995); see 38 U. S. C. §7104(c) (“The
Board shall be bound in its decisions by the regulations of
the Department”).  To be sure, when a previously applied
regulation is later invalidated, relief may be warranted for
“error”  in  a  case  still on  direct  appeal.    E.g., Wagner,  370
F. 3d, at 1092, 1097.  But on collateral review of a final de-
cision, the more limited category of “[c]lear and unmistaka-
ble error does not include the otherwise correct application
of a statute or regulation where, subsequent to the Board
decision challenged, there has been a change in the inter-
pretation  of  the  statute  or  regulation.”
38  CFR
§20.1403(e).1  The applicability of this principle does not de-
pend  on  the  reason  why  the  agency  changed  course:  A
change based on the conclusion that a prior interpretation
was wrong is still a changed interpretation.

Defined  by  this  regulatory  history,  the  statutory  term
“clear and unmistakable error” does not encompass a claim
like George’s.  When the Board decided George’s appeal in
1977, it followed the then-applicable 1961 regulation, as it
was  statutorily  obligated  to  do.    See  38  U. S. C.  §7104(c).
Decades later, the VA and the Federal Circuit rejected that

——————

1 As  should  be  clear  from  our  explanation,  the  principal  dissent  is
wrong to attribute to the Court the view that an agency decision in these
circumstances is “infected by no error of any kind.”  Post, at 4 (opinion of
GORSUCH, J.).  The issue in this case is the distinction between “errors”
cognizable on direct appeal and clear and unmistakable errors cognizable
on  collateral  review.  Throughout  his  opinion,  JUSTICE GORSUCH  elides
that distinction.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal standard for "clear and unmistakable error" in reviewing decisions by the Department of Veterans Affairs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  556 U. S. ____ (2009)

13

Opinion of the Court

context,  is  best  interpreted  as  limiting  agency  discretion.
For the reasons discussed earlier, §1326(b)’s silence cannot
bear that interpretation.

In  American  Textile,  the  Court  relied  in  part  on  a  stat-
ute’s  failure  to  mention  cost-benefit  analysis  in  holding
that  the  relevant  agency  was  not  required  to  engage  in
cost-benefit  analysis  in  setting  certain  health  and  safety
standards.    452  U. S.,  at  510–512.    But  under  Chevron,
that an agency is not required to do so does not mean that
an agency is not permitted to do so.

This extended consideration of the text of §1326(b), and
comparison  of  that  with  the  text  and  statutory  factors
applicable  to  four  parallel  provisions  of  the  Clean  Water
Act,  lead  us  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  well  within  the
bounds  of  reasonable  interpretation  for  the  EPA  to  con-
clude that cost-benefit analysis is not categorically forbid-
den.  Other arguments may be available to preclude such
a rigorous form of cost-benefit analysis as that which was
prescribed  under  the  statute’s  former  BPT  standard,
which  required  weighing  “the  total  cost  of  application  of
technology” against “the . . . benefits to be achieved.”  See,
supra, at 10.  But that question is not before us.

In  the  Phase  II  requirements  challenged  here  the  EPA
sought only to avoid extreme disparities between costs and
benefits.  The agency limited variances from the Phase II
“national performance standards” to circumstances where
the  costs  are  “significantly  greater  than  the  benefits”  of
compliance.  40  CFR  §125.94(a)(5)(ii).    In  defining  the
“national  performance  standards”  themselves  the  EPA
assumed  the  application  of  technologies  whose  benefits
“approach  those  estimated”  for  closed-cycle  cooling  sys-
tems  at  a  fraction  of  the  cost:  $389  million  per  year,  69
Fed. Reg. 41666, as compared with (1) at least $3.5 billion
per year to operate compliant closed-cycle cooling systems,
id.,  at  41605  (or  $1  billion  per  year  to  impose  similar
requirements  on  a  subset  of  Phase  II  facilities,  id.,  at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific statutes and regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CARSON v. MAKIN

BREYER, J., dissenting

which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Re-
ligion, has produced amongst its several sects.”  Id., at 68–
69 (appendix to dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J.).  To in-
terpret the Clauses with these concerns in mind may help
to further their original purpose of avoiding religious-based
division.

I  have  also  previously  explained  why  I  believe  that  a
“rigid,  bright-line”  approach  to  the  Religion  Clauses—an
approach  without  any  leeway  or  “play  in  the  joints”—will
too  often  work  against  the  Clauses’  underlying  purposes.
Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (dissenting opinion) (slip op., at
18); see also Van Orden, 545 U. S., at 669–700 (opinion con-
curring  in  judgment).
“[G]overnment  benefits  come  in
many shapes and sizes.”  Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip
op.,  at  16)  (dissenting  opinion).  Not  all  state-funded  pro-
grams that have religious restrictions carry the same risk
of creating social division and conflict.  In my view, that risk
can best be understood by considering the particular benefit
at issue, along with the reasons for the particular religious
restriction at issue.  See ibid.; Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 1) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment).
Recognition that States enjoy a degree of constitutional lee-
way  allows States  to  enact  laws  sensitive  to local  circum-
stances while also allowing this Court to consider those cir-
cumstances  in  light  of  the  basic  values  underlying  the
Religion Clauses.

In  a  word,  to  interpret  the  two  Clauses  as  if  they  were
joined at the hip will work against their basic purpose: to
allow for an American society with practitioners of over 100
different religions, and those who do not practice religion at
all,  to  live  together  without  serious  risk  of  religion-based
social divisions.

II
The majority believes that the principles set forth in this
Court’s earlier cases easily resolve this case.  But they do
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Carson v. Makin.  It delves into the interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and their application to a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

viii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
921
Belﬂower v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Belhomme v. Widnall
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970
Bell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
Beltran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
Bende v. Brogdon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971
Beneﬁcial Cal., Inc.; Viray v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
Bennett v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902
Berg, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
. . . . . . . . .
Bernard v. New York City Health and Hospital Corp.
949
Berry v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bestfoods v. Aerojet-General Corp.
924
Bestfoods; Michigan Dept. of Environmental Quality v.
. . . . . . . .
Bestfoods; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
51
Betka, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,972
943
Beverly v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. F. Goodrich Co.; Zollo Drum Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
Bialczak v. Barnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,954
928
Biddle v. United States
Bieri v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,959,972
971
Billemeyer v. Missouri
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Bioﬁlm, Inc. v. Boynton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Bittaker v. Calderon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women’s Clinic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blackmon, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Blackmon v. Poindexter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,970
Blackwell; Wilson v.
942
Blair v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,971
919
Blais v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
Blakley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902
Bleecker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
Blodgett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blue Fox, Inc.; Department of Army v.
905
Blue Mountain Women’s Clinic; Blackburn v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948
Blumenthal, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
Blumenthal v. Philip Morris, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility of Wis.; Goetz v.
934
Board of Ed. of New York City; Bronx Household of Faith v. . . . .
937
Board of Governors, FRS; Inner City Press/Community on Move v.
957
Boatwright v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
775
Boca Raton; Faragher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947
. . . . . . . . . . . .
BOC Group, Inc.; B. C. Rogers Processors, Inc. v.
Boeing Co.; Buck v.
943
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,971
Boeing Co.; Father v.
934
Bogins; Dias v.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

overruled in toto, and Roe itself was overruled in part.10  Ca-
sey threw out Roe’s trimester scheme and substituted a new
rule of uncertain origin under which States were forbidden
to adopt any regulation that imposed an “undue burden” on
a  woman’s  right  to  have  an  abortion.11    The  decision  pro-
vided  no  clear  guidance  about  the  difference  between  a
“due” and an “undue” burden.  But the three Justices who
authored  the  controlling  opinion  “call[ed]  the  contending
sides  of  a  national  controversy  to  end  their  national  divi-
sion” by treating the Court’s decision as the final settlement
of the question of the constitutional right to abortion.12

As has become increasingly apparent in the intervening
years, Casey did not achieve that goal.  Americans continue
to hold passionate and widely divergent views on abortion,
and state legislatures have acted accordingly.  Some have
recently  enacted  laws  allowing  abortion,  with  few  re-
strictions, at all stages of pregnancy.  Others have tightly
restricted abortion beginning well before viability.  And in
this case, 26 States have expressly asked this Court to over-
rule Roe and Casey and allow the States to regulate or pro-
hibit pre-viability abortions.

Before us now is one such state law.  The State of Missis-
sippi asks us to uphold the constitutionality of a law that
generally prohibits an abortion after the 15th week of preg-
nancy—several weeks before the point at which a fetus is
now regarded as “viable” outside the womb.  In defending
this  law,  the  State’s  primary  argument  is  that  we  should
reconsider and overrule Roe and Casey and once again allow
each State to regulate abortion as its citizens wish.  On the
other side, respondents and the Solicitor General ask us to

——————

10 Id., at 861, 870, 873 (overruling Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986)).

11 505 U. S., at 874.
12 Id., at 867.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. It discusses the overruling of previous precedents like Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, setting the stage for the court's decision on the Mississippi law restricting abortion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

11

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

or  a  janitor,  or  the  protections  against  disclosure  will  be
less  robust.  And  oh  yes,  the  fact  that  a  losing  defendant
will  be  liable  not  only for  damages  but  also  for  attorney’s
fees  under  §1988  will  greatly  encourage  lawyers  to  sue,
and defendants—for whom no safe harbor can be found in
the many  words of  today’s opinion—to settle.  This plain-
tiff’s claim has failed today, but the Court makes a gener-
ous gift to the plaintiff’s bar.

*

*
Because I deem it the “duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
177 (1803), I concur only in the judgment.

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Scalia. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

plaintiffs  to  sue  the  immediate  “perpetrator”  of  a  human
trafficking violation.  §4(a)(4)(A), 117 Stat. 2878.  And then
in 2008, Congress created  the present private right  of  ac-
tion, allowing plaintiffs to sue defendants who are involved
indirectly with slavery.  §§221, 222(b)(3),  122 Stat. 5067–
5068.

This Act highlights that there are many different ways to
create a cause of action that would enforce developments in
international  law  beyond  the  three  historical torts  identi-
fied in Sosa—too many for courts to choose from when using
the  limited  judicial  discretion  that  Sosa  recognizes.  Con-
gress may well decide to create a cause of action against one
category  of  defendants  but  not  another.   See  Jesner,  584
U. S., at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 20) (recognizing
that Congress “unambiguously” limited the only legislative
cause of action passed under the ATS to one category of de-
fendants).  Or it might make distinctions—as it did in the
TVPRA—between  direct  and  indirect  liability.  Congress
settled on the current approach to private remedies against
human trafficking only after its “understanding of the prob-
lem evolved” through years of studying “how to best craft a
response.”  Brief for Members of Congress as Amici Curiae
9, 13.  The judicial role is to resolve cases and controversies,
which typically present only the perspectives of the parties.
The Judiciary does not have the “institutional capacity” to
consider  all  factors  relevant  to  creating  a  cause  of  action
that  will  “inherent[ly]”  affect  foreign  policy.  Jesner,  584
U. S., at ___ (majority opinion) (slip op., at 19).  Respond-
ents  attempt  to  brush aside  these concerns  by suggesting
that their allegations about decades-old conduct could sat-
isfy  the TVPRA  if  Congress  had  enacted that law  earlier.
This observation simply proves the point.  Congress chose
not to write a retroactive statute.  To create a cause of ac-
tion here would impermissibly second-guess Congress’ de-
cision not to subject past conduct to a new standard.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

GORSUCH, J., concurring

which  raises  the  question:  What  powers  does  the  federal
government possess with respect to Tribes?

1
Because the federal government enjoys only “limited” and
“enumerated  powers,”  we  look  to  the  Constitution’s  text.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819).  Notably,
our founding document does not include a plenary federal
authority  over  Tribes.    Nor  was  this  an  accident,  at  least
not in the final accounting.  The framers considered a gen-
eral  Indian  Affairs  Clause  but  left  it  on  the  cutting-room
floor.  See L. Toler, The Missing Indian Affairs Clause, 88
U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 444–476 (2021) (Toler).  That choice
reflects  an  important  insight  about  the  Constitution’s
Indian-law bargain:  “Without an Indian affairs power,” any
assertion of unbounded federal authority over the Tribes is
“constitutionally wanting.”  Id., at 476.

Instead of a free-floating Indian-affairs power, the fram-
ers opted for a bundle of federal authorities tailored to “the
regulation of [the Nation’s] intercourse with the Indians.”
Worcester, 6 Pet., at 559.  In keeping with the framers’ faith
in  the  separation  of  powers,  they  chose  to  split  those  au-
thorities  “between  the  [E]xecutive  and  the  [L]egislature.”
Toler 479.  “The residue of Indian affairs power”—all those
Indian-related powers not expressly doled out by the Con-
stitution—remained
“the  sovereign
[T]ribes.”  Id., at 481.

the  province  of

What was included in the federal government’s bundle of
enumerated powers?  In the early years, the most important
component was the authority to “make Treaties” with the
Tribes.  Art. II,  §2,  cl. 2.    But  other  provisions  also  facili-
tated the management of Indian relations.  The Constitu-
tion vested in Congress the power to “declare War” against
the Tribes.  Art. I., §8, cl. 11.  It gave Congress authority to
“dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations re-
specting  the  Territory  or  other  Property  belonging  to  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch in the case of Haaland v. Brackeen. It delves into the constitutional powers of the federal government regarding Native American Tribes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

JACKSON, J., dissenting

the majority notes that one legal dictionary “defines ‘abet’
as ‘[t]o encourage or set another on to commit a crime,’ ” and
it cites other legal dictionaries that also use “encourage” to
define “abet.”  Ante, at 7.  Similarly, the majority observes
that  the  federal  “ban  on  soliciting  a  crime  of  violence  . . .
penalizes those who ‘solici[t], comman[d], induc[e], or oth-
erwise endeavo[r] to persuade’ another person ‘to engage in
[the unlawful] conduct.’ ”  Ibid.  Because the terms “encour-
age” and “induce” are used to define the crimes of solicita-
tion and facilitation, the majority concludes that the statu-
tory terms “ ‘[e]ncourage’ and ‘induce’ have well-established
legal  meanings”  that  “incorporat[e]  common-law  liability
for solicitation or facilitation.”  Ante, at 9.
  This contention—that, because the broad terms that Con-
gress actually used are sometimes spotted in the definition
of other, narrower words, the statute’s broad terms are lim-
ited  by  the  meaning  of  those  narrower  words  and  those
words’ characteristics—is puzzling.  The majority cites no
precedent for this novel approach to interpreting words in
a statute.  And its logic falls apart in light of the English
lexicon and how dictionary definitions tend to work.
  Broad words are often used to define narrower ones.  So
the fact that a word is used to help define another word does
not necessarily mean that the former is synonymous with
the  latter  or  incorporates  all  of  its  connotations.    For  in-
stance, the word “furniture” might be used in the definition
of a “chair,” but not all pieces of furniture are chairs, nor do
all pieces of furniture have four legs or other common chair-
like characteristics.  Similarly, “to move” is used to define
“to  walk,”  “to  run,”  and  “to  fly.”    But  that  does  not  make
these four terms interchangeable.
  So, too, here.  The phrase “encourages or induces” is not
synonymous  with  “solicits”  or  “facilitates”  (or  “aids  and
abets”).  For example, among the other characteristics of so-
licitation  and  facilitation  (discussed  further  in  Part  II–C,
infra) is the fact that they require “an intent to bring about
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of legal terms and their application within a specific case.  The language is formal and analytical, characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

JACKSON, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–842
_________________

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,
PETITIONER v. MARIA T. VULLO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 30, 2024]

JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.
Applying our decision in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U. S. 58 (1963), the Court today explains that a “gov-
ernment official cannot coerce a private party to punish or
suppress disfavored speech on her behalf.”  Ante, at 11.  I
agree.  I write separately to stress the important distinction
between government coercion, on the one hand, and a vio-
lation of the First Amendment, on the other.

I
Coercion of a third party can be the means by which the
government  violates  the  First  Amendment  rights  of  an-
other.  But the fact of coercion, without more, does not state
a  First  Amendment  claim.  Rather,  in  addition  to  finding
that the government has crossed a line from persuasion to
coercion, courts must assess how that coercion actually vio-
lates a speaker’s First Amendment rights.

Our  decision  in  Bantam  Books  provides  one  example  of
how  government  coercion  of  a  third  party  can  indirectly
bring about a First Amendment violation.  As the majority
explains,  ante,  at  9–10,  Bantam  Books  held  that  a  Rhode
Island commission’s efforts to coerce intermediary book dis-
tributors into pulling certain publications from circulation
violated the First Amendment rights of the books’ publish-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Jackson.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

seriously  disputed  that  the  Act  covers  adjacent  wetlands.
And  in  light  of  the  text  of  the  Act,  eight  consecutive
Presidential administrations have recognized that the Act
covers  adjacent  wetlands  and  that  adjacent  wetlands
include more than simply adjoining wetlands.  The Court’s
analysis  today  therefore  seems  stuck  in  a  bit  of  a  time
warp—relitigating  an  issue  that  Congress  settled  in  1977
and  that  this  Court  has  long  treated  as  settled:  The  Act
covers  adjacent  wetlands.  By  adopting  a  test  that
substitutes “adjoining” for “adjacent,” the Court today errs.
The  Court  also  invokes  federalism  and  vagueness
concerns.
The  Court  suggests  that  ambiguities  or
vagueness  in  federal  statutes  regulating  private  property
should  be  construed  in  favor  of  the  property  owner,
particularly given that States have traditionally regulated
private property rights.  See ante, at 23–25; see also Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty., 531 U. S., at 173–174.
To begin with, the Federal Government has long regulated
the  waters  of  the  United  States,  including  adjacent
wetlands.

In  any  event,  the  decisive  point  here  is  that  the  term
“adjacent”  in  this  statute  is  unambiguously  broader  than
the term “adjoining.”  On that critical interpretive question,
there  is  no  ambiguity.   We  should  not  create  ambiguity
where none exists.  And we may not rewrite “adjacent” to
mean  the  same  thing  as  “adjoining,”  as  the  Court  does
today.

Finally, contrary to the Court’s suggestion otherwise, the
analysis in this separate opinion centers on the “operative”
text, “waters of the United States.”  Ante, at 27.  To recap:
The  1972  Act  covered  “waters  of  the  United  States.”    In
1977,  when  Congress  allocated  permitting  authority,
Congress expressly included “adjacent” wetlands within the
“waters  of  the  United  States.”   Since  then,  the  Executive
Branch and this Court have recognized that “waters of the
United  States”  covers  “adjacent”  wetlands.    Based  on  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in a case regarding the Clean Water Act. It delves into the interpretation of the term "adjacent" in the context of wetland coverage under the Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

1

GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 17–1717 and 18–18
_________________

17–1717

THE AMERICAN LEGION, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION, ET AL.; AND

MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND
PLANNING COMMISSION, PETITIONER
v.
AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION, ET AL.

18–18

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2019]

  JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  joins,
concurring in the judgment.
  The  American  Humanist  Association  wants  a  federal
court to order the destruction of a 94 year-old war memo-
rial  because  its  members  are  offended.    Today,  the  Court
explains that the plaintiffs are not entitled to demand the
destruction  of  longstanding  monuments,  and  I  find  much
of  its  opinion  compelling.    In  my  judgment,  however,  it
follows  from  the  Court’s  analysis  that  suits  like  this  one
should  be  dismissed  for  lack  of  standing.    Accordingly,
while I concur in the judgment to reverse and remand the
court  of  appeals’  decision,  I  would  do  so  with  additional
instructions to dismiss the case.

*
  The  Association  claims  that  its  members  “regularly”
come into “unwelcome direct contact” with a World War I
memorial  cross  in  Bladensburg,  Maryland  “while  driving
in the area.”  874 F. 3d 195, 203 (CA4 2017).  And this, the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

907

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5504.  Jaquez  v.  Sandor,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5505.  Ailsworth  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  658.

No.  09– 5506.  Poland  v.  Pennsylvania.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  963  A.  2d  570.

No.  09–5507.  Meizlik  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  5th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  7  So.  3d  1117.

No.  09–5508.  Espinosa-Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  49.

No.  09–5509.  Nichols  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  240.

No.  09–5510.  Nieves  v.  Phelps,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5511.  Robinson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  676.

No.  09–5513.  Aponte  v.  Chamberlain,  Superintendent,
State  Correctional  Institution  at  Muncy,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5514.  Wright  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  800.

No. 09–5516.  Ervin v.  Horel, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5518.  Creusere  v.  Weaver  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5519.  Triplett  v.  Roy,  Warden.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  720.

No.  09–5520.  Trobee  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  551  F.  3d  835.

No. 09–5521.  Owens v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It contains case numbers, citations, and disposition information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BROWN, ACTING WARDEN v. DAVENPORT

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–826.  Argued October 5, 2021—Decided April 21, 2022

Ervine Davenport was convicted of first-degree murder following a jury
trial where, at times, he sat shackled at a table with a “privacy screen.”
On appeal, he argued that his conviction should be set aside in light of
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U. S. 622, in which this Court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause generally forbids shackling
a criminal defendant at trial absent “a special need.”  Id., at 626.  Find-
ing no “special need” articulated in the record, the Michigan Supreme
Court  agreed  that  a  Deck  violation  had  occurred  and  remanded  the
case to the trial court to determine under Chapman v. California, 386
U. S. 18, whether the prosecution could establish that the Deck error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  On remand, the trial court
conducted  an  evidentiary  hearing  at  which  jurors  testified  that  the
shackles  had  not  affected  their  verdict  and  concluded that  the  State
had carried its burden.  Mr. Davenport appealed again, and the Mich-
igan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.  The Michigan Supreme
Court declined review.

  Mr.  Davenport  petitioned  for  federal  habeas  relief.    The  District
Court found relief unwarranted under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, which limits the power of federal courts to
issue habeas relief to state prisoners.  See 28 U. S. C. §2254(d).  A di-
vided Sixth Circuit panel reversed, declining to analyze the case under
AEDPA.  Instead, the court held that its review was governed only by
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, which held that a state prisoner
seeking to challenge his conviction on the basis of a state court’s Chap-
man error must show that the error had a “ ‘substantial and injurious
effect or influence’ ” on the trial’s outcome, id., at 637.  Persuaded that
Mr. Davenport could satisfy Brecht, the Sixth Circuit granted federal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

509

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

1352–1353. Nonetheless, the 1950 W&R Fund continued to
provide beneﬁts on a “pay-as-you-go” basis, with the level of
beneﬁts fully subject to revision, until the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C.
§ 1001 et seq., introduced speciﬁc funding and vesting re-
quirements for pension plans. To comply with ERISA, the
UMWA and the BCOA entered into a new agreement, the
1974 NBCWA, which created four trusts, funded by royalties
on coal production and premiums based on hours worked by
miners, to replace the 1950 W&R Fund. See Robinson,
supra, at 566. Two of the new trusts, the UMWA 1950 Ben-
eﬁt Plan and Trust (1950 Beneﬁt Plan) and the UMWA 1974
Beneﬁt Plan and Trust (1974 Beneﬁt Plan), provided nonpen-
sion beneﬁts, including medical beneﬁts. Miners who re-
tired before January 1, 1976, and their dependents were cov-
ered by the 1950 Beneﬁt Plan, while active miners and those
who retired after 1975 were covered by the 1974 Beneﬁt
Plan.

The 1974 NBCWA thus was the ﬁrst agreement between
the UMWA and the BCOA to expressly reference health
beneﬁts for retirees; prior agreements did not speciﬁcally
mention retirees, and the scope of their beneﬁts was left to
the discretion of fund trustees. The 1974 NBCWA ex-
plained that it was amending previous medical beneﬁts to
provide a Health Services card for retired miners until their
death, and to their widows until their death or remarriage.
1974 NBCWA 99, 105 (Summary of Principal Provisions,
UMWA Health and Retirement Beneﬁts), App. (CA1) 755,
758. Despite the expanded beneﬁts, the 1974 NBCWA did
not alter the employers’ obligation to contribute only a ﬁxed
amount of royalties, nor did it extend employers’ liability be-
yond the life of the agreement. See id., Art. XX, § (d), App.
(CA1) 749.

As a result of the broadened coverage under the 1974
NBCWA, the number of eligible beneﬁt recipients jumped
dramatically. See 1977 Annual Report of the UMWA Wel-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal citations, case names, and discusses legal concepts related to pension and health benefits.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U78

[09-06-00 18:35:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

124

DOOLEY v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO.

Opinion of the Court

The comprehensive scope of DOHSA is conﬁrmed by its
survival provision, see supra, at 122, which limits the recov-
ery in such cases to the pecuniary losses suffered by surviv-
ing relatives. The Act thus expresses Congress’ “consid-
ered judgment,” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, supra, at
625, on the availability and contours of a survival action in
cases of death on the high seas. For this reason, it cannot be
contended that DOHSA has no bearing on survival actions;
rather, Congress has simply chosen to adopt a more limited
survival provision.
Indeed, Congress did so in the same
year that it incorporated into the Jones Act, which permits
seamen injured in the course of their employment to recover
damages for their injuries, a survival action similar to the
one petitioners seek here. See Act of June 5, 1920, § 33, 41
Stat. 1007 (incorporating survival action of the Federal Em-
ployers’ Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. § 59). Even in the exercise
of our admiralty jurisdiction, we will not upset the balance
struck by Congress by authorizing a cause of action with
which Congress was certainly familiar but nonetheless de-
clined to adopt.

In sum, Congress has spoken on the availability of a sur-
vival action, the losses to be recovered, and the beneﬁciaries,
in cases of death on the high seas. Because Congress has
chosen not to authorize a survival action for a decedent’s
pre-death pain and suffering, there can be no general mari-
time survival action for such damages.2 The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is

Afﬁrmed.

2 Accordingly, we need not decide whether general maritime law ever

provides a survival action.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from a court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

23

Opinion of the Court

Although  we  agree  with  petitioners’  interpretive  assump
tion  that  “militia”  means  the  same  thing  in  Article  I  and
the  Second  Amendment,  we  believe  that  petitioners  iden
tify  the  wrong  thing,  namely,  the  organized  militia.
Unlike  armies  and  navies,  which  Congress  is  given  the
power  to  create  (“to  raise  . . .  Armies”;  “to  provide  . . .  a
Navy,”  Art. I,  §8,  cls.  12–13),  the  militia  is  assumed  by
Article I already to be in existence.  Congress is given the
power  to  “provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia,”  §8,  cl.  15;
and the power not to create, but to “organiz[e]” it—and not
to  organize  “a”  militia,  which  is  what  one  would  expect  if
the  militia  were  to  be  a  federal  creation,  but  to  organize
“the” militia, connoting a body already in existence,  ibid.,
cl. 16.  This is fully consistent with the ordinary definition
of  the  militia  as  all  able-bodied  men.    From  that  pool,
Congress has plenary power to organize the units that will
make  up  an  effective  fighting  force.    That  is  what  Con
gress did in the first militia Act, which specified that “each
and  every  free  able-bodied  white  male  citizen  of  the  re
spective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the
age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years
(except  as  is  herein  after  excepted)  shall  severally  and
respectively  be  enrolled  in  the  militia.”    Act  of  May  8,
1792, 1 Stat. 271.  To be sure, Congress need not conscript
every able-bodied man into the militia, because nothing in
Article I suggests that in exercising its power to organize,
discipline, and arm the militia, Congress must focus upon
the entire body.  Although the militia consists of all able-
bodied men, the federally organized militia may consist of
a subset of them.

Finally,  the  adjective  “well-regulated”  implies  nothing
more than the imposition of proper discipline and training.
See  Johnson  1619  (“Regulate”:  “To  adjust  by  rule  or
method”);  Rawle  121–122;  cf.  Va.  Declaration  of  Rights
§13  (1776),  in  7  Thorpe  3812,  3814  (referring  to  “a  well-
regulated  militia,  composed  of  the  body  of  the  people,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of the Second Amendment and the term "militia."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CITY OF GRANTS PASS, OREGON v. JOHNSON ET AL.,
ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–175.  Argued April 22, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024

Grants  Pass,  Oregon,  is  home  to  roughly  38,000  people,  about  600  of
whom are estimated to experience homelessness on a given day.  Like
many  local  governments  across  the  Nation,  Grants  Pass  has  public-
camping  laws  that  restrict  encampments  on  public  property.   The
Grants Pass Municipal Code prohibits activities such as camping on
public  property  or  parking  overnight  in  the  city’s  parks.    See
§§5.61.030, 6.46.090(A)–(B).  Initial violations can trigger a fine, while
multiple  violations  can  result  in  imprisonment.  In  a  prior  decision,
Martin v. Boise, the Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel  and  Unusual  Punishments  Clause  bars  cities  from  enforcing
public-camping  ordinances  like  these  against  homeless  individuals
whenever the number of homeless individuals in a jurisdiction exceeds
the number of “practically available” shelter beds.  920 F. 3d 584, 617.
After  Martin,  suits  against  Western  cities  like  Grants  Pass  prolifer-
ated.

Plaintiffs (respondents here) filed a putative class action on behalf
of homeless people living in Grants Pass, claiming that the city’s ordi-
nances against public camping violated the Eighth Amendment.  The
district court certified the class and entered a Martin injunction pro-
hibiting Grants Pass from enforcing its laws against homeless individ-
uals in the city.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 182a–183a.  Applying Martin’s
reasoning, the district court found everyone without shelter in Grants
Pass  was  “involuntarily  homeless”  because  the  city’s  total  homeless
population outnumbered its “practically available” shelter beds.  App.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

37

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

cannot be limited to discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation  or  gender  identity.    The  decision  threatens  to
balkanize  the  market  and  to  allow  the  exclusion  of  other
groups  from  many  services.  A  website  designer  could
equally refuse to create a wedding website for an interracial
couple, for example.  How quickly we forget that opposition
to interracial marriage was often because “ ‘Almighty God
. . . did not intend for the races to mix.’ ”  Loving v. Virginia,
388 U. S. 1, 3 (1967).  Yet the reason for discrimination need
not  even  be  religious,  as  this  case  arises  under  the  Free
Speech Clause.  A stationer could refuse to sell a birth an-
nouncement for a disabled couple because she opposes their
having a child.  A large retail store could reserve its family
portrait services for “traditional” families.  And so on.16

Wedding  websites,  birth  announcements,  family  por-
traits,  epitaphs.  These  are  not  just  words  and  images.
They  are  the  most  profound  moments  in  a  human’s  life.
They are the moments that give that life personal and cul-
tural  meaning.  You  already  heard  the  story  of  Bob  and
Jack, the elderly gay couple forced to find a funeral home
more  than  an  hour  away.    Supra,  at  5–6,  and  n. 4.    Now
hear the story of Cynthia and Sherry, a lesbian couple of 13
years until Cynthia died from cancer at age 35.  When Cyn-
thia was diagnosed, she drew up a will, which authorized
Sherry to make burial arrangements.  Cynthia had asked
Sherry  to  include  an  inscription  on  her  headstone,  listing
the relationships that were important to her, for example,
“daughter, granddaughter, sister, and aunt.”  After Cynthia
——————

16 The potential implications of the Court’s logic are deeply troubling.
Would Runyon v. McCrary have come out differently if the schools had
argued that accepting Black children would have required them to create
original speech, like lessons, report cards, or diplomas, that they deeply
objected  to?  What  if  the  law  firm  in  Hishon  v.  King  &  Spalding  had
argued that promoting a woman to the partnership would have required
it to alter its speech, like letterhead or court filings, in ways that it would
rather not?  Once you look closely, “compelled speech” (in the majority’s
facile understanding of that concept) is everywhere.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority decision and provides examples of how the ruling could be used to discriminate against other groups.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
988

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

Solicitor  General  is  invited  to  ﬁle  briefs  in  these  cases  expressing
the  views  of  the  United  States.

No.  08–1498.  Holder,  Attorney  General,  et  al.  v.  Hu

manitarian  Law  Project  et  al.;  and

No.  09–89.  Humanitarian  Law  Project  et  al.  v.  Holder,
Attorney General, et al.  C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted,
557 U. S. 966.]  Motion of the parties to amend the brieﬁng sched
ule  granted.  Petitioners  in  No.  09–89  will  ﬁle  an  opening  brief,
not  to  exceed  18,000  words,  on  or  before  November  16,  2009.
Petitioners in  No. 08–1498 will  ﬁle a response  brief, not  to exceed
18,000  words,  on  or  before  December  22,  2009.  Petitioners  in
No.  09–89  will  ﬁle  a  reply  brief,  not  to  exceed  12,000  words,  on
or  before  January  21,  2010.  Petitioners  in  No.  08–1498  will  ﬁle  a
reply  brief,  not  to  exceed  12,000  words,  on  or  before  February
12,  2010.

No.  09–34.  Pfizer  Inc.  v.  Abdullahi  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
The Solicitor General is invited to ﬁle a brief in this case express
ing  the  views  of  the  United  States.  The  Chief  Justice  and
Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision
of  this  petition.

No.  09–5371.  McCarthy  v.  Vilsack,  Secretary  of  Agri

culture,  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.;

No.  09–6083.  Pryor  v.  Wolfe  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.;
No.  09–6103.  Augustin  v.  Chase  Home  Finance  LLC.

C.  A.  1st  Cir.;  and

No.  09–6241.  Vadde  v.  Georgia.  Ct.  App.  Ga.  Motions  of
petitioners  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied.  Peti
tioners  are  allowed  until  November  23,  2009,  within  which  to  pay
the  docketing  fees  required  by  Rule  38(a)  and  to  submit  petitions
in  compliance  with  Rule  33.1  of  the  Rules  of  this  Court.

No.  09–6773.  In  re  Fullerblack;
No.  09–6802.  In  re  Grinker;
No.  09–6899.  In  re  Singleton;  and
No.  09–6980.  In  re  Lester.  Petitions  for  writs  of  habeas

corpus  denied.

No.  09–6157.  In  re  McCorvey;
No.  09–6268.  In  re  Carter;
No.  09–6434.  In  re  Telfair;  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their statuses, including scheduling information and decisions. It's not the typical narrative content found within a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 20–1199 and 21–707
_________________

20–1199

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF
HARVARD COLLEGE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.

21–707

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 29, 2023]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
In the wake of the Civil War, the country focused its at-
tention  on  restoring  the  Union  and  establishing  the  legal
status  of  newly  freed  slaves.  The  Constitution  was
amended to abolish slavery and proclaim that all persons
born in the United States are citizens, entitled to the privi-
leges or immunities of citizenship and the equal protection
of the laws.  Amdts. 13, 14.  Because of that second found-
ing,  “[o]ur  Constitution  is  color-blind,  and  neither  knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens.”  Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

This  Court’s  commitment  to  that  equality  principle  has
ebbed and flowed over time.  After forsaking the principle
for  decades,  offering  a  judicial  imprimatur  to  segregation
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It cites relevant legal precedents and discusses historical context related to equality and the Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

YATES v. UNITED STATES

KAGAN, J., dissenting

means, as the plurality says, that the dictionary definition
of  a  disputed  term  cannot  control.    See,  e.g.,  Bloate  v.
United States, 559 U. S. 196, 205, n. 9 (2010).  But this is
not  such  an  occasion,  for  here  the  text  and  its  context
point  the  same  way.  Stepping  back  from  the  words  “tan-
gible object” provides only further evidence that Congress
said what it meant and meant what it said.

Begin  with  the  way  the  surrounding  words  in  §1519
reinforce  the  breadth  of  the  term  at  issue.    Section  1519
refers to “any” tangible object, thus indicating (in line with
that  word’s  plain  meaning)  a  tangible  object  “of  whatever
kind.”  Webster’s  Third  New  International  Dictionary  97
(2002).  This  Court  has  time  and  again  recognized  that
“any”  has  “an  expansive  meaning,”  bringing  within  a
statute’s  reach  all  types  of  the  item  (here,  “tangible  ob-
ject”) to which the law refers.  Department of Housing and
Urban  Development  v.  Rucker,  535  U.  S.  125,  131  (2002);
see,  e.g.,  Republic  of  Iraq  v.  Beaty,  556  U.  S.  848,  856
(2009);  Ali  v.  Federal  Bureau  of  Prisons,  552  U.  S.  214,
219–220 (2008).  And the adjacent laundry list of verbs in
§1519  (“alters,  destroys,  mutilates,  conceals,  covers  up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry”) further shows that Con-
gress wrote a statute with a wide scope.  Those words are
supposed to ensure—just as “tangible object” is meant to—
that §1519 covers the whole world of evidence-tampering,
in all its prodigious variety.  See United States v. Rodgers,
466  U.  S.  475,  480  (1984)  (rejecting  a  “narrow,  technical
definition”  of  a  statutory  term  when  it  “clashes  strongly”
with “sweeping” language in the same sentence).

Still  more,  “tangible  object”  appears  as  part  of  a  three-
noun  phrase  (including  also  “records”  and  “documents”)
common  to  evidence-tampering  laws  and  always  under-
stood  to  embrace  things  of  all  kinds.    The  Model  Penal
Code’s  evidence-tampering  section,  drafted  more  than  50
years  ago,  similarly  prohibits  a  person  from  “alter[ing],
destroy[ing],  conceal[ing]  or  remov[ing]  any  record,  docu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. The language is formal and discusses legal precedent and statutory interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

fulness  of  challenged  practices.    Legal  Aspects  of  Buying
and  Selling  §10:12  (P.  Zeidman  ed.  2014–2015).  This
amorphous  standard  requires  the  reviewing  court  to  con-
sider  “a  variety  of  factors,  including  specific  information
about the relevant business, its condition before and after
the  restraint  was  imposed,  and  the  restraint’s  history,
nature, and effect.”  State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 10
(1997).  Far from authorizing across-the-board application
of  a  uniform  requirement,  therefore,  the  Court’s  decision
will  invite  state  antitrust  courts  to  engage  in  targeted
regulation of the natural-gas industry.

The  Court  also  stresses  the  “ ‘long  history’ ”  of  state
antitrust regulation.  Ante, at 14.  Again, quite beside the
point.  States have long regulated public utilities, yet the
Natural  Gas  Act  precludes  them  from  using  that  estab-
lished power to fix gas wholesale prices.  United Fuel, 317
U. S.,  at  468.    States  also  have  long  enacted  laws  to  con-
serve  natural  resources,  yet  the  Act  precludes  them  from
deploying  that  power  to  control  purchases  made  by  gas
pipelines.  Northern  Natural,  372  U. S.,  at  93–94.    The
Court’s  invocation  of  the  pedigree  of  state  antitrust  law
rests on air.

One  need  not  launch  this  unbounded  inquiry  into  the
features  of  state  law  in  order  to  preserve  the  States’  au-
thority  to  apply  “tax  laws,”  “disclosure  laws,”  and  “blue
sky laws” to natural-gas companies, ante, at 12.  One need
only  stand  by  the  principle  that  if  the  Commission  has
authority  over  a  subject,  the  States  lack  authority  over
that subject.  The Commission’s authority to regulate gas
pipelines  “in  the  public  interest,”  §717a,  is  a  power  to
address  matters  that  are  traditionally  the  concern  of
utility  regulators,  not  “a  broad  license  to  promote  the
general public welfare,” NAACP v. FPC, 425 U. S. 662, 669
(1976).  We have explained that the Commission does not,
for  example,  have  power  to  superintend  “employment
discrimination”  or  “unfair  labor  practices.”  Id.,  at  670–
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia. It delves into legal arguments and precedents related to antitrust law and the regulation of the natural gas industry.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CARSON, AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF O. C., ET AL. v.
MAKIN

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 20–1088.  Argued December 8, 2021—Decided June 21, 2022

Maine has enacted a program of tuition assistance for parents who live
in school districts that neither operate a secondary school of their own
nor contract with a particular school in another district.  Under that
program, parents designate the secondary school they would like their
child  to  attend,  and  the  school  district  transmits  payments  to  that
school to help defray the costs of tuition.  Participating private schools
must meet certain requirements to be eligible to receive tuition pay-
ments, including either accreditation from the New England Associa-
tion of Schools and Colleges (NEASC) or approval from the Maine De-
partment  of  Education.    But  they  may  otherwise  differ  from  Maine
public schools in various ways.  Since 1981, however, Maine has lim-
ited tuition assistance payments to “nonsectarian” schools.

Petitioners sought tuition assistance to send their children to Ban-
gor  Christian  Schools  (BCS)  and  Temple  Academy.   Although  both
BCS and Temple Academy are accredited by NEASC, the schools do
not qualify as “nonsectarian” and are thus ineligible to receive tuition
payments under Maine’s tuition assistance program.  Petitioners sued
the commissioner of the Maine Department of Education, alleging that
the “nonsectarian” requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause and
the  Establishment  Clause  of  the  First  Amendment,  as  well  as  the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The District
Court rejected petitioners’ constitutional claims and granted judgment
to the commissioner.  The First Circuit affirmed.

Held: Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally avail-
able  tuition  assistance  payments  violates  the  Free  Exercise  Clause.
Pp. 6–18.

(a) The  Free  Exercise  Clause  of  the  First  Amendment  protects
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the full legal reasoning and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xlix

Molina; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monaco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monongahela Power Co.; Renahan v.
Monroe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monroe; Valhalla Cemetery Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montana; Gollehon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montanya v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monterey County; United States ex rel. A–1 Ambulance Serv. v.
Montes-Rangel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montgomery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montgomery County Public Schools v. Eisenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montillo-Ontiveros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montoya v. LeMaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montoya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Baque v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Blitchington v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Blue v.
Moore; Bunney v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore v. Calumet City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Duer v.
Moore; Fair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Francis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; King v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; McCallum v.
Moore; McKire v.
Moore v. Molina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Morse v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore v. Relin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Rodriguez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Smith v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Steele v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Truitt v.
Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Vandenburgh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Vinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Weeks v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Williams v.
Moore; Woodard v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moorman; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mora v. United States

Page
1110
1028,1077
1102
1069
1093
1022
1041
1111
1042,1125
1099
1079
1119
1019
1122
1121
1032
1063,1126,1127
1024
1101
1074
1058
1068
1074
1007
1007
1027
1027
1040,1125
1110
1133
1011
1116
1012
1095
1041
1118
1031,1076,1104,1112
1043
1104
1125
1040,1091
1118
1072
1079

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

will “increase production costs per pig by over $13 dollars
per head, a 9.2% cost increase at the farm level.”  Ibid.

Separate  and  apart  from  those  costs,  petitioners  assert
harms  to  the  interstate  market  itself.    The  complaint  al-
leges that the interstate pork market is so interconnected
that producers will be “forced to comply” with Proposition
12, “even though some or even most of the cuts from a hog
are sold in other States.”  Id., at 213a; id., at 239a.  Propo-
sition 12 may not expressly regulate farmers operating out
of State.  But due to the nature of the national pork market,
California has enacted rules that carry implications for pro-
ducers as far flung as Indiana and North Carolina, whether
or  not  they  sell  in  California.    The  panel  below  acknowl-
edged petitioners’ allegation that, “[a]s a practical matter,
given the interconnected nature of the nationwide pork in-
dustry, all or most hog farmers will be forced to comply with
California requirements.”  6 F. 4th, at 1028.

We  have  found  such  sweeping  extraterritorial  effects,
even if not considered as a per se invalidation, to be perti-
nent in applying Pike.  In Edgar, we assessed the constitu-
tionality of an Illinois corporate takeover statute that au-
thorized  the  secretary  of  state  to  scrutinize  tender  offers,
even  for  transactions  occurring  wholly  beyond  the  State’s
borders.  As  the  majority  explains,  only  a  plurality  of  the
Court  in  Edgar  concluded  that  the  Illinois  statute  consti-
tuted a per se violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
See  ante,  at  14,  n. 1.    But  a  majority  in  Edgar  analyzed
those  same  extraterritorial  effects  under  our  approach  in
Pike, concluding that the “nationwide reach” of Illinois’s law
constituted  an  “obvious  burden  . . .  on  interstate  com-
merce.”  457 U. S., at 643.  The Ninth Circuit did not con-
sider whether, by effectively requiring compliance by farm-
ers  who  do  not  even  wish  to  ship  their  product  into
California, Proposition 12 has a “nationwide reach” similar
to the regulation at issue in Edgar.

The  complaint  further  alleges  other  harms  that  cannot
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the extraterritorial effects of Proposition 12 and its potential impact on interstate commerce. It cites legal precedents and delves into the constitutional implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

25

Opinion of the Court

op.,  at  16).    That  Alabama  and  Arkansas  can  count  to  29
by  including  these  possibly  (or  probably)  inadvertent
legislative  outcomes  does  not  preclude  our  determination
that  mandatory  life  without  parole  for  juveniles  violates
the Eighth Amendment.

B
Nor does the presence of discretion in some jurisdictions’
transfer  statutes  aid  the  States  here.    Alabama  and  Ar-
kansas  initially  ignore  that  many  States  use  mandatory
transfer  systems:  A  juvenile  of  a  certain  age  who  has
committed  a  specified  offense  will  be  tried  in  adult  court,
regardless  of  any  individualized  circumstances.    Of  the
29  relevant  jurisdictions,  about  half  place  at  least  some
juvenile  homicide  offenders  in  adult  court  automatically,
with  no  apparent  opportunity  to  seek  transfer  to  juvenile
court.15  Moreover, several States at times lodge this deci-
sion  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  prosecutors,  again  with
no  statutory  mechanism  for  judicial  reevaluation.16    And
those  “prosecutorial  discretion  laws  are  usually  silent
regarding  standards,  protocols,  or  appropriate  considera-
tions for decisionmaking.”  Dept. of Justice, Office of Juve-
nile  Justice  and  Delinquency  Prevention,  P.  Griffin,  S.
Addie,  B.  Adams,  &  K.  Firestine,  Trying  Juveniles  as
——————

15 See  Ala.  Code  §12–15–204(a)  (Cum.  Supp.  2011);  Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.
Ann.  §13–501(A)  (West  Cum.  Supp.  2011);  Conn.  Gen.  Stat.  §46b–127
(2011);  Ill.  Comp.  Stat.  ch.  705,  §§405/5–130(1)(a),  (4)(a)  (West  2010);
La. Child. Code Ann., Art. 305(A) (West Cum. Supp. 2012); Mass. Gen.
Laws,  ch.  119,  §74  (West  2010);  Mich.  Comp.  Laws  Ann.  §712A.2(a)
(West 2002); Minn. Stat. Ann. §260B.007, subd. 6(b) (West Cum. Supp.
2011), §260B.101, subd. 2 (West 2007); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§211.021(1), (2)
(2011);  N.  C.  Gen.  Stat.  Ann.  §§7B–1501(7),  7B–1601(a),  7B–2200
(Lexis  2011);  N.  H.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §169–B:2(IV)  (West  Cum.  Supp.
2011),  §169–B:3  (West  2010);  Ohio  Rev.  Code  Ann.  §2152.12(A)(1)(a)
(Lexis  2011);  Tex.  Family  Code  Ann.  §51.02(2);  Va.  Code  Ann.  §§16.1–
241(A), 16.1–269.1(B), (D) (Lexis 2010).

16 Fla.  Stat.  Ann.  §985.557(1)  (West  Supp.  2012);  Mich.  Comp.  Laws

Ann. §712A.2(a)(1); Va. Code Ann. §§16.1–241(A), 16.1–269.1(C), (D).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Eighth Amendment and mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

909

Stevens, J., dissenting

Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U. S. 572, 583 (1987); see
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc., 471 U. S., at 717–718 (noting that too easily implying
pre-emption “would be inconsistent with the federal-state
balance embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence,”
and stating that “because agencies normally address prob-
lems in a detailed manner and can speak through a variety
of means,
interpretive
including regulations, preambles,
statements, and responses to comments, we can expect that
they will make their intentions clear if they intend for their
regulations to be exclusive”); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S., at 154 (noting that pre-
emption inquiry is initiated “[w]hen the administrator pro-
mulgates regulations intended to pre-empt state law”).
This expectation, which is shared by the Executive Branch,24
serves to ensure that States will be able to have a dialog

would like. Our cases ﬁrmly establish that conﬂict and ﬁeld pre-emption
are alike in that both are instances of implied pre-emption that by deﬁni-
tion do “not [turn] on an express statement of pre-emptive intent.” Ante,
at 884; see, e. g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S. 280, 287 (1995)
(quoted supra, at 899); English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79–80,
and n. 5 (1990) (noting that ﬁeld pre-emption rests on an inference of
congressional intent to exclude state regulation and that it “may be un-
derstood as a species of conﬂict pre-emption”); Fidelity Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982). Given that our
speciﬁcity requirement was adopted in cases involving implied pre-
emption, the Court cannot persuasively claim that the requirement is in-
compatible with our implied pre-emption jurisprudence in the federal reg-
ulatory context.

24 See Exec. Order No. 12612, § 4(e), 3 CFR 252, 255 (1988) (“When an
Executive department or agency proposes to act through adjudication or
rule-making to preempt State law, the department or agency shall provide
all affected States notice and an opportunity for appropriate participation
in the proceedings”); Exec. Order No. 13132, § 4(e), 64 Fed. Reg. 43255,
43257 (1999) (same); cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 496 (1996)
(discussing 21 CFR § 808.5 (1995), an FDA regulation allowing a State
to request an advisory opinion regarding whether a particular state-law
requirement is pre-empted, or exempt from pre-emption, under the Medi-
cal Device Amendments of 1976).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. It includes citations to other legal cases and discusses legal principles related to preemption.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC. v. ARKANSAS TEACHER

RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Opinion of the Court

We disagree.  We have held that Rule 301 “in no way re-
stricts the authority of a court . . . to change the customary
burdens  of  persuasion”  pursuant  to  a  federal  statute.
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U. S. 393,
404, n. 7 (1983).  And we have at times exercised that au-
thority to reassign the burden of persuasion to the defend-
ant upon a prima facie showing by the plaintiff.  See, e.g.,
Teamsters  v.  United  States,  431  U. S.  324,  359,  and  n. 45
(1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747, 772–
773 (1976).

Goldman does not ask us to revisit these precedents.  So
the threshold question here is not whether we have the au-
thority  to  assign  defendants  the  burden  of  persuasion  to
prove a lack of price impact, but instead whether we already
exercised  that  authority  in  establishing  the  Basic  frame-
work  pursuant  to  the  securities  laws.    We  conclude  that
Basic and Halliburton II did just that.

Basic held that defendants may rebut the presumption of
reliance if they “show that the misrepresentation in fact did
not lead to a distortion of price.”  485 U. S., at 248 (empha-
sis  added).   To  do  so,  Basic  said,  defendants  may  make
“[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged mis-
representation  and  . . .  the  price  received  (or  paid)  by  the
plaintiff.”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Similarly, Halliburton
II held that defendants may rebut the Basic presumption
at  class  certification  “by  showing  . . .  that  the  particular
misrepresentation at issue did not affect the stock’s market
price.”  573 U. S., at 279 (emphasis added).

Goldman and JUSTICE GORSUCH argue that these refer-
ences  to  a  defendant’s  “showing”  refer  to  the  defendant’s
burden  of  production.  Post,  at  6–8  (dissenting  opinion)
(hereinafter the dissent).  On this reading, Basic and Halli-
burton II require a defendant merely to offer “evidence that,
if believed, would support a finding” of a lack of price im-
pact.  Post, at 5.  But Basic and Halliburton II plainly re-
quire more:  The defendant must “in fact” “seve[r] the link”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedents and the burden of proof in securities fraud cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1010

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 6, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8005. Hayes v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 438.

No. 99–8013.

Ifabiyi, aka DeBrown, aka Bell, aka Bello
v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 194 F. 3d 1308.

No. 99–8032. Sanjurjo v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 239.

No. 99–8033. Reynolds v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 241.

No. 99–8038. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 445.

No. 99–8041. Long v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8045. Cox v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 181 F. 3d 104.

No. 99–8051. Rogers v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 429.

No. 99–8052. Morales et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 F. 3d 74.

No. 99–8056. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 454.

No. 99–8058. Armendariz-Mata v. United States. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8059. Cortinas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 523.

No. 99–8062. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 262.

No. 99–8065. Cabana v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 127 Md. App. 778.

No. 99–8067. Shue v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 433.

No. 99–8074. Mikalajunas v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 F. 3d 490.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

COUNTY OF MAUI, HAWAII v. HAWAII WILDLIFE
FUND ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–260.  Argued November 6, 2019—Decided April 23, 2020

The Clean Water Act forbids “any addition” of any pollutant from “any
point  source”  to  “navigable  waters”  without  an  appropriate  permit
from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  §§ 301(a), 502(12),
86 Stat. 844, 886.  The Act defines “pollutant” broadly, §502(6); defines
a “point source” as “ ‘any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance
. . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged,’ ” including, e.g.,
any “ ‘container,’ ” “ ‘pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,’ ” or “ ‘well,’ ”
§502(14); and defines the term “discharge of a pollutant” as “ ‘any ad-
dition  of  any  pollutant  to  navigable  waters  [including  navigable
streams, rivers, the ocean, or coastal waters] from any point source,’ ”
§502(12).    It  then  uses  those  terms  in  making  “unlawful”  “ ‘the  dis-
charge of any pollutant by any person’ ” without an appropriate permit.
§301.

Petitioner County of Maui’s wastewater reclamation facility collects
sewage  from  the  surrounding  area,  partially  treats  it,  and  each  day
pumps  around  4  million  gallons  of  treated  water  into  the  ground
through  four  wells.    This  effluent  then  travels  about  a  half  mile,
through groundwater, to the Pacific Ocean.  Respondent environmen-
tal groups brought a citizens’ Clean Water Act suit, alleging that Maui
was “discharg[ing]” a “pollutant” to “navigable waters” without the re-
quired  permit.  The  District  Court  found  that  the  discharge  from
Maui’s wells into the nearby groundwater was “functionally one into
navigable water,” 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 998, and granted summary judg-
ment to the environmental groups.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, stat-
ing that a permit is required when “pollutants are fairly traceable from
the point source to a navigable water.”  886 F. 3d 737, 749.

Held: The statutory provisions at issue require a permit when there is a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

op.,  at  6–7).  At  bottom,  the  six  unelected  members  of  to-
day’s majority upend the status quo based on their policy
preferences about what race in America should be like, but
is not, and their preferences for a veneer of colorblindness
in a society where race has always mattered and continues
to matter in fact and in law.

A
1

A limited use of race in college admissions is consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment and this Court’s broader
equal  protection  jurisprudence.  The  text  and  history  of
the Fourteenth Amendment make clear that the Equal
Protection Clause permits race-conscious measures.  See
supra, at 2–9.  Consistent with that view, the Court has ex-
plicitly held that “race-based action” is sometimes “within
constitutional constraints.”  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 237 (1995).  The Court has thus upheld
the use of race in a variety of contexts.  See, e.g., Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No.
1, 551 U. S. 701, 737 (2007) (“[T]he obligation to disestab-
lish  a  school  system  segregated  by  law  can  include  race-
conscious remedies—whether or not a court had issued an
order to that effect”); Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499,
512 (2005) (use of race permissible to further prison’s inter-
est in “ ‘security’ ” and “ ‘discipline’ ”); Cooper v. Harris, 581
U. S.  285,  291–293  (2017)  (use  of  race  permissible  when
drawing voting districts in some circumstances).30

Tellingly,  in  sharp  contrast  with  today’s  decision,  the
Court has  allowed the use of race when that  use burdens
minority populations.  In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,

——————

30 In the context of policies that “benefit rather than burden the minor-
ity,” the Court has adhered to a strict scrutiny framework despite multi-
ple Members of this Court urging that “the mandate of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause” favors applying a less exacting standard of review.  Schuette,
572 U. S., at 373–374 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the use of race in college admissions and cites relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

3

Syllabus

(c) cDNA is not a “product of nature,” so it is patent eligible under
§101.  cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentability as
naturally  occurring,  isolated  DNA  segments.    Its  creation  results  in
an exons-only molecule, which is not naturally occurring.  Its order of
the exons may be dictated by nature, but the lab technician unques-
tionably  creates  something  new  when  introns  are  removed  from  a
DNA sequence to make cDNA.  Pp. 16–17.

(d) This  case,  it  is  important  to  note,  does  not  involve  method
claims,  patents  on  new  applications  of  knowledge  about  the  BRCA1
and BRCA2 genes, or the patentability of DNA in which the order of
the naturally occurring nucleotides has been altered.  Pp. 17–18.

689 F. 3d 1303, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN,
JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined in part.  SCALIA, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus, which summarizes the court's holdings.  It is sequential text and provides legal reasoning, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AMERICAN LEGION v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

KAGAN, J., concurring in part

endeavor  to  achieve  inclusivity  and  nondiscrimination,
and a recognition of the important role that religion plays
in  the  lives  of  many  Americans.”    Ante,  at  28.    Here,  as
elsewhere, the opinion shows sensitivity to and respect for
this  Nation’s  pluralism,  and  the  values  of  neutrality  and
inclusion that the First Amendment demands.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kagan. It discusses the importance of inclusivity and religious freedom in the context of the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. v. CHRISTIAN

Opinion of ALITO, J.

the district courts cannot entertain the same claims.  And
not only that.  Because §113(b)’s grant of jurisdiction to the
federal district courts is exclusive, the state courts cannot
entertain those claims either.

It  is  hard  to  fathom  why  Congress  might  have  wanted
such a scheme.  Congress might have wanted all the state-
law claims covered by §113(b) to be heard exclusively in fed-
eral court in order to prevent state courts and juries from
unduly favoring home-state interests.  But having granted
the federal district courts jurisdiction to hear these claims
in §113(b), why would Congress take away that jurisdiction
in cases where the parties happen not to be diverse?  And
why would Congress go further and prevent the state courts
from hearing these claims?  The Government and petitioner
provide no answer, and none is apparent.

III
The Court gives three reasons for resolving the question
of  state-court  jurisdiction.    See  ante,  at  9,  n. 3.    None  is
compelling.

First,  the  Court  explains  that  “Atlantic  Richfield  seeks
more than a remand,” namely, it seeks a remand with in-
structions to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.  Ibid.  But
Atlantic Richfield presented its §122(e)(6) theory as an al-
ternate ground for reversal, and has prevailed on that ba-
sis.  As Atlantic Richfield’s counsel stated at argument, the
§122(e)(6)  ruling  is  “sufficient  to  resolve  the  case.”    Tr.  of
Oral Arg. 17–18.

Second, the Court says, “leaving the [§113] question un-
answered  . . .  would  leave  the  parties  in  a  state  of  uncer-
tainty.”  Ante, at 9, n. 3.  But, as described above, there ap-
pears to be a slim chance that this case will, at least in its
current state, “procee[d]” in the Montana courts.  Ibid.

——————
standards).”  §113(h).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Alito.  It discusses the jurisdictional issues in the case and argues against the majority's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>