<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

ALITO, J., dissenting

Appeals—incorrectly,  in  my  view—declined  to  decide
whether §48 is unconstitutional as applied to respondent’s
videos and instead reached out to hold that the statute is
facially  invalid.  Today’s  decision  does  not  endorse  the
Court  of  Appeals’  reasoning,  but  it  nevertheless  strikes
down  §48  using  what  has  been  aptly  termed  the  “strong
medicine”  of  the  overbreadth  doctrine,  United  States  v.
Williams,  553  U. S.  285,  293  (2008)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted), a potion that generally should be admin-
istered only as “a last resort.”  Los Angeles Police Dept. v.
United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U. S. 32, 39 (1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Instead of applying the doctrine of overbreadth, I would
vacate  the  decision  below  and  instruct  the  Court  of  Ap-
peals on remand to decide whether the videos that respon-
dent sold are constitutionally protected.  If the question of
overbreadth  is  to  be  decided,  however,  I  do  not  think  the
present  record  supports  the  Court’s  conclusion  that  §48
bans a substantial quantity of protected speech.

I
A  party  seeking  to  challenge  the  constitutionality  of  a
statute  generally  must  show  that  the  statute  violates  the
party’s own rights.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 767
(1982).  The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine carves
out  a  narrow  exception  to  that  general  rule.    See  id.,  at
768;  Broadrick  v.  Oklahoma,  413  U. S.  601,  611–612
(1973).  Because  an  overly  broad  law  may  deter  constitu-
tionally protected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows

——————

Respondent  55  (“Stevens’  speech  does  not  fit  within  any  existing
category of unprotected, prosecutable speech”); id., at 57 (“[T]he record
as  a  whole  demonstrates  that  Stevens’  speech  cannot  constitutionally
be  punished”).    Contrary  to  the  Court,  ante,  at  10–11,  n. 3  (citing  533
F. 3d  218,  231,  n. 13  (CA3  2008)  (en  banc)),  I  see  no  suggestion  in  the
opinion of the Court of Appeals that respondent did not preserve an as-
applied challenge.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of United States v. Stevens. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the constitutionality of a statute and the application of the overbreadth doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v.
JARKESY ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–859.  Argued November 29, 2023—Decided June 27, 2024

In  the  aftermath  of  the  Wall  Street  Crash  of  1929,  Congress  passed  a
suite of laws designed to combat securities fraud and increase market
transparency.  Three such statutes are relevant: The Securities Act of
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advis-
ers Act of 1940.  These Acts respectively govern the registration of se-
curities, the trading of securities, and the activities of investment ad-
visers.    Although  each  regulates  different  aspects  of  the  securities
markets, their pertinent provisions—collectively referred to by regula-
tors  as  “the  antifraud  provisions,”  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  73a,  202a—
target the same basic behavior: misrepresenting or concealing mate-
rial facts.
  To enforce these Acts, Congress created the Securities and Exchange
Commission.  The SEC may bring an enforcement action in one of two
forums.  It can file suit in federal court, or it can adjudicate the matter
itself.  The forum the SEC selects dictates certain aspects of the litiga-
tion.  In federal court, a jury finds the facts, an Article III judge pre-
sides, and the Federal Rules of Evidence and the ordinary rules of dis-
covery govern the litigation.  But when the SEC adjudicates the matter
in-house, there are no juries.  The Commission presides while its Divi-
sion of Enforcement prosecutes the case.  The Commission or its dele-
gee—typically an Administrative Law Judge—also finds facts and de-
cides discovery disputes, and the SEC’s Rules of Practice govern.
  One  remedy  for  securities  violations  is  civil  penalties.    Originally,
the SEC could only obtain civil penalties from unregistered investment
advisers in federal court.  Then, in 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  The Act au-
thorized the SEC to impose such penalties through its own in-house
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
68

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

Stormans, Inc., 794 F. 3d 1064, 1079 (2015).  Compare Stor-
mans, Inc., 579 U. S., at ___–___, and n. 3 (ALITO, J., joined
by ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (slip op., at 8–9, and n. 3) (questioning Ninth
Circuit’s finding).

Decisions of the lower courts on the issue of targeting re-
main in disarray.  Compare F. F. v. State, 66 Misc. 3d 467,
479–482, 114 N. Y. S. 3d 852, 865–867 (2019) (declining to
consider  individual  legislators’  comments);  Tenafly  Eruv
Assn., Inc. v. Tenafly, 309 F. 3d 144, 168, n. 30 (CA3 2002)
(declining to reach issue), with Commack Self-Service Ko-
sher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 680 F. 3d 194, 211 (CA2 2012)
(considering legislative history); St. John’s United Church
of Christ v. Chicago, 502 F. 3d 616, 633 (CA7 2007) (“[W]e
must look at . . . the ‘historical background of the decision
under  challenge’ ”  (quoting  Lukumi,  508  U. S.,  at  540));
Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle,
212  F. 3d  1084,  1090  (CA8  2000)  (targeting  can  be  evi-
denced by legislative history).

3

The nature and scope of exemptions.  There is confusion
about the meaning of Smith’s holding on exemptions from
generally applicable laws.  Some decisions apply this spe-
cial rule if multiple secular exemptions are granted.  See,
e.g.,  Horen  v.  Commonwealth,  23  Va.  App.  735,  743–744,
479  S. E.  2d  553,  557  (1997);  Rader  v.  Johnston,  924
F. Supp.  1540,  1551–1553  (Neb.  1996).    Others  conclude
that even one secular exemption is enough.  See, e.g., Mid-
rash Sephardi, Inc. v. Surfside, 366 F. 3d 1214, 1234–1235
(CA11 2004); Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No.
12 v. Newark, 170 F. 3d 359, 365 (CA3 1999).  And still oth-
ers have applied the rule where the law, although allowing
no exemptions on its face, was widely unenforced in cases
involving  secular  conduct.    See,  e.g.,  Tenafly  Eruv  Assn.,
309 F. 3d, at 167–168.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites other legal cases and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
46  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

racial diversity,” but supporting “tribalism and racial seg-
regation  on  their  campuses,”  including  through  “minority
only student organizations, separate minority housing op-
portunities, separate minority student centers, even sepa-
rate  minority-only  graduation  ceremonies.”    539  U. S.,  at
349  (opinion  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part).
This  trend  has  hardly  abated  with  time,  and  today,  such
programs are commonplace.  See Brief for Gail Heriot et al.
as Amici Curiae 9.  In fact, a recent study considering 173
schools found that 43% of colleges offered segregated hous-
ing  to  students  of  different  races,  46%  offered  segregated
orientation programs, and 72% sponsored segregated grad-
uation ceremonies.  D. Pierre & P. Wood, Neo-Segregation
at Yale 16–17 (2019); see also D. Pierre, Demands for Seg-
regated  Housing  at  Williams  College  Are  Not  News,  Nat.
Rev., May 8, 2019.  In addition to contradicting the univer-
sities’ claims regarding the need for interracial interaction,
see Brief for National Association of Scholars as Amicus Cu-
riae 4–12, these trends increasingly encourage our Nation’s
youth to view racial differences as important and segrega-
tion as routine.

Meanwhile,  these  discriminatory  policies  risk  creating
new prejudices and allowing old ones to fester.  I previously
observed that “[t]here can be no doubt” that discriminatory
affirmative action policies “injur[e] white and Asian appli-
cants  who  are  denied  admission  because  of  their  race.”
Fisher I, 570 U. S., at 331 (concurring opinion).  Petitioner
here  clearly  demonstrates  this  fact.    Moreover,  “no  social
science  has  disproved  the  notion  that  this  discrimination
‘engenders  attitudes  of  superiority  or,  alternatively,  pro-
vokes resentment among those who believe that they have
been wronged by the government’s use of race.’ ”  Grutter,
539 U. S., at 373 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (quoting Adarand,
515 U. S., at 241 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (alterations omit-
ted)).  Applicants denied admission to certain colleges may
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the topic of racial diversity in college admissions and the potential negative consequences of affirmative action policies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1129

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No.  09–7680.  Brown  v.  United  States  District  Court  for
the  Northern  District  of  Georgia.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–7681.  Bridges  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  241.

No.  09–7682.  Aldridge  et  ux.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  759.

No.  09–7684.  Davis  v.  United  States  et  al.;  and  Davis  v.
Kansas  State  Board  of  Indigent  Defense  Services  et  al.
C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7687.  Wilk  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  1229.

No.  09–7689.  Nelson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  215.

No.  09–7691.  Leasure  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  370.

No.  09–7695.  Banda  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  311.

No.  09–7700.  Gomez-Garcia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  349  Fed.  Appx.  2.

No.  09–7703.  Gatling  v.  United  States  (two  judgments).

Ct.  App.  D.  C.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7704.  Flores  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  386.

No.  09–7705.  Heald  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7708.  Jimenez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  361.

No.  09–7709.  Mathews  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7710.  Keith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  975.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

278 GEBSER v. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

remarks to the students, and he began to direct more of his
suggestive comments toward Gebser, including during the
substantial amount of time that the two were alone in his
classroom. He initiated sexual contact with Gebser in the
spring, when, while visiting her home ostensibly to give her
a book, he kissed and fondled her. The two had sexual in-
tercourse on a number of occasions during the remainder
of the school year. Their relationship continued through the
summer and into the following school year, and they often
had intercourse during class time, although never on school
property.

Gebser did not report the relationship to school ofﬁcials,
testifying that while she realized Waldrop’s conduct was
improper, she was uncertain how to react and she wanted
to continue having him as a teacher.
In October 1992, the
parents of two other students complained to the high school
principal about Waldrop’s comments in class. The principal
arranged a meeting, at which, according to the principal,
Waldrop indicated that he did not believe he had made offen-
sive remarks but apologized to the parents and said it would
not happen again. The principal also advised Waldrop to be
careful about his classroom comments and told the school
guidance counselor about the meeting, but he did not report
the parents’ complaint to Lago Vista’s superintendent, who
was the district’s Title IX coordinator. A couple of months
later, in January 1993, a police ofﬁcer discovered Waldrop
and Gebser engaging in sexual intercourse and arrested Wal-
drop. Lago Vista terminated his employment, and subse-
quently, the Texas Education Agency revoked his teaching
license. During this time, the district had not promulgated
or distributed an ofﬁcial grievance procedure for lodging sex-
ual harassment complaints; nor had it issued a formal anti-
harassment policy.

Gebser and her mother ﬁled suit against Lago Vista and
Waldrop in state court in November 1993, raising claims
against the school district under Title IX, Rev. Stat. § 1979,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the body text of a legal case, specifically the opinion of the court in the case of Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District. It details the events leading up to the lawsuit and the allegations against the school district.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

21

JACKSON, J., dissenting

attentive, consistently fulfilling their established role in our
constitutional  democracy,  and  thus  collectively  serving  as
the ultimate safeguard against any chaos spawned by this
Court’s decision.  For, like our democracy, our Constitution
is “the creature of their will, and lives only by their will.”
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 389 (1821).

For my part, I simply cannot abide the majority’s sense-
less discarding of a model of accountability for criminal acts
that  treats  every  citizen  of  this  country  as  being  equally
subject to the law—as the Rule of Law requires.  That core
principle has long prevented our Nation from devolving into
despotism.  Yet the Court now opts to let down the guard-
rails of the law for one extremely powerful category of citi-
zen:  any  future  President  who  has  the  will  to  flout  Con-
gress’s established boundaries.

In  short,  America  has traditionally  relied  on the  law  to
keep its Presidents in line. Starting today, however, Amer-
icans must rely on the courts to determine when (if at all)
the criminal laws that their representatives have enacted
to promote individual and collective security will operate as
speedbumps to Presidential action or reaction.  Once self-
regulating, the Rule of Law now becomes the rule of judges,
with courts pronouncing which crimes committed by a Pres-
ident have to be let go and which can be redressed as im-
permissible.  So,  ultimately,  this  Court  itself  will  decide
whether the law will be any barrier to whatever course of
criminality  emanates  from  the  Oval  Office  in  the  future.
The potential for great harm to American institutions and
Americans themselves is obvious.

*

*

*
The  majority  of  my  colleagues  seems  to  have  put  their
trust in our Court’s ability to prevent Presidents from be-
coming Kings through case-by-case application of the inde-
terminate standards of their new Presidential accountabil-
ity paradigm.  I fear that they are wrong.  But, for all our
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It expresses strong disagreement with the majority opinion and argues against the implications of their decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

47

Opinion of the Court

Surety Statutes.  In the mid-19th century, many jurisdic-
tions began adopting surety statutes that required certain
individuals to post bond before carrying weapons in public.
Although  respondents  seize  on  these  laws  to  justify  the
proper-cause  restriction,  their  reliance  on  them  is  mis-
placed.  These laws were not bans on public carry, and they
typically targeted only those threatening to do harm.

As discussed earlier, Massachusetts had prohibited rid-
ing or going “armed offensively, to the fear or terror of the
good  citizens  of  this  Commonwealth”  since  1795.  1795
Mass. Acts and Laws ch. 2, at 436, in Laws of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts.  In 1836, Massachusetts enacted
a new law providing:

“If  any  person  shall  go  armed  with  a  dirk,  dagger,
sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon,
without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other in-
jury, or violence to his person, or to his family or prop-
erty, he may, on complaint of any person having rea-
sonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace,
be required to find sureties for keeping the peace, for a
term  not  exceeding  six  months,  with  the  right  of  ap-
pealing as before provided.”  Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134,
§16.

In short, the Commonwealth required any person who was
reasonably likely to “breach the peace,” and who, standing
accused, could not prove a special need for self-defense, to
post  a  bond  before  publicly  carrying  a  firearm.    Between
1838 and 1871, nine other jurisdictions adopted variants of

——————
that were localized in the Western Territories, New Mexico’s prohibition
ended when the Territory entered the Union as a State in 1911 and guar-
anteed in its State Constitution that “[t]he people have the right to bear
arms for their security and defense, but nothing herein shall be held to
permit  the  carrying  of  concealed  weapons.”    N. M.  Const.,  Art.  II,  §6
(1911); see infra, at 61.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing historical context surrounding surety statutes and their relation to gun carry laws. It provides legal analysis and cites specific laws and historical events.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

17

Opinion of the Court

mon  household  substances.”  Brief  for  United  States  13,
n. 3.  That the statute would apply so broadly, however, is
the  inescapable  conclusion  of  the  Government’s  position:
Any  parent  would  be  guilty  of  a  serious  federal  offense—
possession  of  a  chemical  weapon—when,  exasperated  by
the  children’s  repeated  failure  to  clean  the  goldfish  tank,
he  considers  poisoning  the  fish  with  a  few  drops  of  vine-
gar.  We  are  reluctant  to  ignore  the  ordinary  meaning  of
“chemical  weapon”  when  doing  so  would  transform  a
statute passed to implement the international Convention
on Chemical Weapons into one that also makes it a federal
offense  to  poison  goldfish.    That  would  not  be  a  “realistic
assessment[ ] of congressional intent.”  Post, at 6 (SCALIA,
J., concurring in judgment).

In light of all of this, it is fully appropriate to apply the
background assumption that Congress normally preserves
“the  constitutional  balance  between  the  National  Govern-
ment and the States.”  Bond I, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
10).  That assumption is grounded in the very structure of
the Constitution.  And as we explained when this case was
first  before  us,  maintaining  that  constitutional  balance  is
not  merely  an  end  unto  itself.    Rather,  “[b]y  denying  any
one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns
of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individ-
ual from arbitrary power.”  Ibid.

The  Government’s  reading  of  section  229  would  “ ‘alter
sensitive federal-state relationships,’ ” convert an astonish-
ing amount of “traditionally local criminal conduct” into “a
matter for federal enforcement,” and “involve a substantial
extension  of  federal  police  resources.”  Bass,  404  U. S.,  at
349–350.  It  would  transform  the  statute  from  one  whose
core concerns are acts of war, assassination, and terrorism
into a massive federal anti-poisoning regime that reaches
the simplest of assaults.  As the Government reads section
229,  “hardly”  a  poisoning  “in  the  land  would  fall  outside
the federal statute’s domain.”  Jones, 529 U. S., at 857.  Of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It discusses the interpretation of a statute and its potential implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

13

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

investigation  or  proper  administration  of  any  matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States . . . or in relation to or contemplation of any
such matter,” not just to “an official proceeding.”5

The  Government  acknowledges  that,  under  its  reading,
§1519  and  §1512(c)(1)  “significantly  overlap.”  Brief  for
United States 49.  Nowhere does the Government explain
what  independent  function  §1512(c)(1)  would  serve  if  the
Government  is  right  about  the  sweeping  scope  of  §1519.
We  resist  a  reading  of  §1519  that  would  render  superflu-
ous an entire provision passed in proximity as part of the
same Act.6  See Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S.
___,  ___  (2013)  (slip  op.,  at  14)  (“[T]he  canon  against  sur-
plusage is strongest when an interpretation would render
superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.”).
The words immediately surrounding “tangible object” in
§1519—“falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or]
——————

5 Despite this sweeping “in relation to” language, the dissent remark-
ably  suggests  that  §1519  does  not  “ordinarily  operate  in  th[e]  context
[of]  federal  court[s],”  for  those  courts  are  not  “department[s]  or
agenc[ies].”  Post, at 10.  That suggestion, which, as one would expect,
lacks the Government’s endorsement, does not withstand examination.
The  Senate  Committee  Report  on  §1519,  on  which  the  dissent  else-
where relies, see post, at 6, explained that an obstructive act is within
§1519’s scope if “done ‘in contemplation’ of or in relation to a matter or
investigation.”    S. Rep.  107–146,  at  15.    The  Report  further  informed
that §1519 “is . . . meant to do away with the distinctions, which some
courts  have  read  into  obstruction  statutes,  between  court  proceedings,
investigations,  regulatory  or  administrative  proceedings  (whether
formal or not), and less formal government inquiries, regardless of their
title.”  Ibid.  If any doubt remained about the multiplicity of contexts in
which  §1519  was  designed  to  apply,  the  Report  added,  “[t]he  intent  of
the  provision  is  simple;  people  should  not  be  destroying,  altering,  or
falsifying documents to obstruct any government function.”  Ibid.

6 Furthermore,  if  “tangible  object”  in  §1519  is  read  to  include  any
physical  object,  §1519  would  prohibit  all  of  the  conduct  proscribed  by
§2232(a), which imposes a maximum penalty of five years in prison for
destroying  or  removing  “property”  to  prevent  its  seizure  by  the  Gov-
ernment.  See supra, at 1–2.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 574 U.S. ____ (2015). It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute, §1519, and its relationship to another statute, §1512(c)(1).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 21–86 and 21–1239
_________________

21–86

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC., PETITIONER
v.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
MICHELLE COCHRAN

21–1239

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[April 14, 2023]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion in full because it correctly ap-
plies  precedent  to  determine  that  Axon  Enterprise’s  and
Michelle  Cochran’s  structural  constitutional  claims  need
not  be  channeled  through  the  administrative  review
schemes  at  issue.  I  write  separately,  however,  because  I
have  grave  doubts  about  the  constitutional  propriety  of
Congress vesting administrative agencies with primary au-
thority to adjudicate core private rights with only deferen-
tial judicial review on the back end.

I
A
The Court correctly notes that precedent allows Congress
to  replace  Article  III  district  courts  with  “an  alternative
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Opinion of the Court

first-come, first-served.  §§895.4(c)(4) and (6).  Under state
law, the cable operator operates the public access channels
unless  the  local  government  in  the  area  chooses  to  itself
operate  the  channels  or  designates  a  private  entity  to
operate the channels.  §895.4(c)(1).
  Time  Warner  (now  known  as  Charter)  operates  a  cable
system  in  Manhattan.    Under  state  law,  Time  Warner
must  set  aside  some  channels  on  its  cable  system  for
public access.  New York City (the City) has designated a
private  nonprofit  corporation  named  Manhattan  Neigh-
borhood Network, commonly referred to as MNN, to oper-
ate  Time  Warner’s  public  access  channels  in  Manhattan.
This case involves a complaint against MNN regarding its
management of the public access channels.

B
  Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss, we
accept  the  allegations  in  the  complaint  as true.   See Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678 (2009).
  DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez produced
public  access  programming  in  Manhattan.    They  made  a
film  about  MNN’s  alleged  neglect  of  the  East  Harlem
community.  Halleck submitted the film to MNN for airing
on  MNN’s  public  access  channels,  and  MNN  later  tele-
vised  the  film.    Afterwards,  MNN  fielded  multiple  com-
plaints  about  the  film’s  content.    In  response,  MNN  tem-
porarily  suspended  Halleck  from  using  the  public  access
channels.
  Halleck and Melendez soon became embroiled in another
dispute  with  MNN  staff.    In  the  wake  of  that  dispute,
MNN  ultimately  suspended  Halleck  and  Melendez  from
all MNN services and facilities.
  Halleck  and  Melendez  then  sued  MNN,  among  other
parties,  in  Federal  District  Court.    The  two  producers
claimed  that  MNN  violated  their  First  Amendment  free-
speech  rights  when  MNN  restricted  their  access  to  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" section. It sets the stage for the case by outlining the relevant legal background and the facts of the dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–7120.  Argued November 5, 2014—Reargued April 20, 2015—
Decided June 26, 2015

After petitioner Johnson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of
a  firearm,  see  18  U. S. C.  §922(g),  the  Government  sought  an  en-
hanced  sentence  under  the  Armed  Career  Criminal  Act,  which  im-
poses  an  increased  prison  term  upon  a  defendant  with  three  prior
convictions  for  a  “violent  felony,”  §924(e)(1),  a  term  defined  by
§924(e)(2)(B)’s  residual  clause  to  include  any  felony  that  “involves
conduct  that  presents  a  serious  potential  risk  of  physical  injury  to
another.”  The Government argued that Johnson’s prior conviction for
unlawful  possession  of  a  short-barreled  shotgun  met  this  definition,
making the third conviction of a violent felony.  This Court had pre-
viously pronounced upon the meaning of the residual clause in James
v. United States, 550 U. S. 192; Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137;
Chambers v. United States, 555 U. S. 122; and Sykes v. United States,
564  U. S.  1,  and  had  rejected  suggestions  by  dissenting  Justices  in
both  James  and  Sykes  that  the  clause  is  void  for  vagueness.    Here,
the  District  Court  held  that  the  residual  clause  does  cover  unlawful
possession  of  a  short-barreled  shotgun,  and  imposed  a  15-year  sen-
tence under ACCA.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Held: Imposing  an  increased  sentence  under  ACCA’s  residual  clause

violates due process.  Pp. 3–15.

(a) The Government violates the Due Process Clause when it takes
away  someone’s  life,  liberty,  or  property  under  a  criminal  law  so
vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it
punishes,  or  so  standardless  that  it  invites  arbitrary  enforcement.
Kolender  v.  Lawson,  461  U. S.  352,  357–358.    Courts  must  use  the
“categorical approach” when deciding whether an offense is a violent
felony, looking “only to the fact that the defendant has been convicted
  </content>
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This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case, not the actual content of the case. Syllabi provide a summary of the case and the Court's decision, but they are not part of the legal reasoning or the text that would be indexed for understanding the case's content.
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524US2

Unit: $U98

[09-06-00 19:40:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

736

MONGE v. CALIFORNIA

Stevens, J., dissenting

opinion for the Court in Burks v. United States, Chief Justice
Burger emphasized this critical difference, i. e., “between re-
versals due to trial error and those resulting from eviden-
tiary insufﬁciency.”
Id., at 15. He speciﬁcally noted “that
the failure to make this distinction has contributed substan-
tially to the present state of conceptual confusion existing in
this area of the law,” ibid., and concluded that in order to
hold, as we did, “that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes
a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evi-
dence legally insufﬁcient,” it was necessary to overrule sev-
eral prior cases, id., at 18. The Court’s opinion today re-
ﬂects the same failure to recognize the critical importance of
this distinction.

I agree that California’s decision to “implement procedural
safeguards to protect defendants who may face dramatic in-
creases in their sentences as a result of recidivism enhance-
ments,” ante, at 734, should not create a constitutional ob-
ligation that would not otherwise exist. But the fact
that so many States have done so—not just recently, but for
many years 5—is powerful evidence that they were simply
responding to the traditional understanding of fundamental
fairness that produced decisions such as In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 (1970),6 and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684

Court of Appeals may increase the sentence only if the trial court has
abused its discretion or employed unlawful procedures or made clearly
erroneous ﬁndings. The appellate court thus is empowered to correct
only a legal error” (emphasis added)); Bozza v. United States, 330 U. S.
160, 166–167 (1947) (error of law that infects a sentence may be corrected
on appeal).

5 See, e. g., cases cited in Annot., 58 A. L. R. 59–62 (1929); cases cited in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 256–257 (1998) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); see also ante, at 734 (“Many States have chosen to implement
procedural safeguards to protect defendants who may face dramatic in-
creases in their sentences as a result of recidivism enhancements”).

6 In Winship, despite the fact that the Court had never held “that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is either expressly or impliedly commanded by
any provision of the Constitution,” 397 U. S., at 377 (Black, J., dissenting),
the traditional importance of that standard that dated “at least from our
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens in the case of *Monge v. California*.  It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1036

1006

896

908

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,1050

Montoya v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montoya-Carmona v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montufar v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mooney v. United States
Moore v. Adventist Health System/Ga. Inc.
1053

Moore v. Arizona
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore v. Comaites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

Moore; Cummings v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1015,1159

1029

Moore; Darby v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

Moore; Derringer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Moore v. Doe
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

Moore v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore v. Lawler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

Moore v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  950,1140

Moore v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  927,1039

806

Moore v. Schuetzle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore v. Thaler
1154

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  836,856,908,918,923,926,957,963

812

Moore v. U. S. District Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Moore v. Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Welch v.
875

Moore v. Williamsburg Regional Hospital
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

Moorer v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Moorman v. Jowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moorman v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

833

Morales v. Marques
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887

Morales-Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1002

Morales-Pitones v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929

Morante v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morehouse v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
886

Moreno v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  865,872

1096

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morgan v. Chandler
816

Morgan; Family Dollar Stores, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morgan v. Ford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

Morgan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  854,1032,1034

819

Morley v. Smith  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Morres v. Deer’s Head Hospital Center
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
813

Morris, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morris v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948

Morris v. Lanpher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  970,1101

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  908,1006

Morris v. United States
812

Morrison, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1001

Morse v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

7

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J.

to the Commission’s administrative law judges even if the
judges  are  inferior  “officers  of  the  United  States”  for  pur-
poses of the Appointments Clause.  In my dissent in Free
Enterprise  Fund,  I  pointed  out  that  under  the  majority’s
analysis, the removal protections applicable to administra-
tive  law  judges—including  specifically  the  Commission’s
administrative  law  judges—would  seem  to  be  unconstitu-
tional.  Id.,  at  542,  587.    But  the  Court  disagreed,  saying
that  “none  of  the  positions  [my  dissent]  identifie[d]  are
similarly situated to the Board.”  Id., at 506.

The Free Enterprise Fund Court gave three reasons why
administrative  law  judges  were  distinguishable  from  the
Board members at issue in that case.  First, the Court said
that “[w]hether administrative law judges are necessarily
‘Officers  of  the  United  States’  is  disputed.”    Id.,  at  507,
n. 10.  Second, the Court said that “unlike members of the
Board, many administrative law judges of course perform
adjudicative  rather  than  enforcement  or  policymaking
functions, see [5 U. S. C.] §§554(d), 3105, or possess purely
recommendatory  powers.”    Ibid.   And,  third,  the  Court
pointed out that the civil service “employees” and adminis-
trative law judges to whom I referred in my dissent do not
“enjoy  the  same  significant  and  unusual  protections  from
Presidential  oversight  as  members  of  the  Board.”    Id.,  at
506.  The Court added that the kind of “for cause” protec-
tion  the  statutes  provided  for  Board  members  was  “un-
usually high.”  Id., at 503.

The  majority  here  removes  the  first  distinction,  for  it
holds that the Commission’s administrative law judges are
inferior  “Officers  of  the  United  States.”  Ante,  at  1.  The
other two distinctions remain.  See, e.g., Wiener v. United
States,  357  U. S.  349,  355–356  (1958)  (holding  that  Con-
gress is free to protect bodies tasked with “ ‘adjudicat[ing]
according  to  law’  . . .  ‘from  the  control  or  coercive  influ-
ence,  direct  or  indirect,’  . . .  of  either  the  Executive  or
Congress”) (quoting Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring and dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the Appointments Clause and the removal protections of administrative law judges.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

19

Opinion of the Court

Brief  for  Union  Respondent  47–57.  Taking  away  free
speech  protection  for  public  employees  would  mean
overturning  decades  of  landmark  precedent.    Under  the
Union’s  theory,  Pickering  v.  Board  of  Ed.  of  Township
High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563 (1968), and
its progeny would fall.  Yet Pickering, as we will discuss, is
now  the  foundation  for  respondents’  chief  defense  of
Abood.  And indeed, Abood itself would have to go if public
employees  have  no  free  speech  rights,  since  Abood  holds
that the First Amendment prohibits the exaction of agency
fees for political or ideological purposes.  431 U. S., at 234–
235 (finding it “clear” that “a government may not require
an  individual  to  relinquish  rights  guaranteed  him  by  the
First  Amendment  as  a  condition  of  public  employment”).
Our political patronage cases would be doomed.  See, e.g.,
Rutan  v.  Republican  Party  of  Ill.,  497  U. S.  62  (1990);
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427
U. S. 347 (1976).  Also imperiled would be older precedents
like  Wieman  v.  Updegraff,  344  U. S.  183  (1952)  (loyalty
oaths), Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960) (disclosure
of  memberships  and  contributions),  and  Keyishian  v.
Board  of  Regents  of  Univ.  of  State  of  N.  Y.,  385  U. S.  589
(1967) (subversive speech).  Respondents presumably want
none  of  this,  desiring
instead  that  we  apply  the
Constitution’s  supposed  original  meaning  only  when  it
suits them—to retain the part of Abood that they like.  See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 56–57.  We will not engage in this halfway
originalism.

Nor, in any event, does the First Amendment’s original
meaning  support  the  Union’s  claim.    The  Union  offers  no
persuasive  founding-era  evidence  that  public  employees
were understood to lack free speech protections.  While it
observes  that  restrictions  on  federal  employees’  activities
have existed since the First Congress, most of its historical
examples  involved  limitations  on  public  officials’  outside
business  dealings,  not  on  their  speech.    See  Ex  parte
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the precedent set by the case *Abood* and its relation to free speech rights of public employees.  It cites other relevant legal cases and argues against the Union's position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1109

529 U. S.

May 15, 2000

No. 99–1456. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc. v.
Damon et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 196 F. 3d 1354.

No. 99–1466. Grassini v. DuPage Township et al. App.
Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 304 Ill.
App. 3d 1092, ––– N. E. 2d –––.

No. 99–1473. Louisiana, Through Foster, Governor, et
al. v. Penn et al. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 751 So. 2d 823.

No. 99–1475. Stonier et al. v. Digital Equipment Corp.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 234.
No. 99–1477. Hearn v. Board of Public Education for
the City of Savannah and the County of Chatham. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 1329.
No. 99–1485. Corcoran, Executrix of the Estate of Cor-
coran, Deceased v. New York Power Authority et al.; and
Corcoran, Executrix of the Estate of Corcoran, De-
ceased v. Sinclair et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 202 F. 3d 530 (ﬁrst judgment); 201 F. 3d 430
(second judgment).

No. 99–1488. Pacific Eternity, S. A., et al. v. Deiulemar
Compagnia Di Navigazione, S. p. A. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 473.

No. 99–1499. Baumgard et ux. v. United States. C. A.

Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 217 F. 3d 853.

No. 99–1503. Nelson v. UNUM Life Insurance Company

of America, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1506. Ceridian Corp., Individually and as Succes-
sor in Interest to Control Data Corp. v. Barker et al.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 976.
No. 99–1510. McLaren v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 9th Dist.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 996 S. W. 2d 404.

No. 99–1512. Angelo, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Gee, Debtor, Deceased v. Gee. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1115.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, parties involved, courts, and citations. This type of information is not typically considered suitable for indexing as it is not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

adopted  in  Lochner.    See  198  U. S.,  at  61  (“We  do  not
believe  in  the  soundness  of  the  views  which  uphold  this
law,”  which  “is  an  illegal  interference  with  the  rights  of
individuals  . . .  to  make  contracts  regarding  labor  upon
such terms as they may think best”).

The  majority  recognizes  that  today’s  cases  do  not  mark
“the  first  time  the  Court  has  been  asked  to  adopt  a  cau-
tious approach to recognizing and protecting fundamental
rights.”  Ante, at 25.  On that much, we agree.  The Court
was  “asked”—and  it  agreed—to  “adopt  a  cautious  ap-
proach”  to  implying  fundamental  rights  after  the  debacle
of  the  Lochner  era.    Today,  the  majority  casts  caution
aside and revives the grave errors of that period.

One  immediate  question  invited  by  the  majority’s  posi-
tion  is  whether  States  may  retain  the  definition  of  mar-
riage as a union of two people.  Cf. Brown v. Buhman, 947
F. Supp.  2d  1170  (Utah  2013),  appeal  pending,  No.  14-
4117 (CA10).  Although the majority randomly inserts the
adjective “two” in various places, it offers no reason at all
why the two-person element of the core definition of mar-
riage  may  be  preserved  while  the  man-woman  element
may not.  Indeed, from the standpoint of history and tradi-
tion,  a  leap  from  opposite-sex  marriage  to  same-sex  mar-
riage is much greater than one from a two-person union to
plural  unions,  which  have  deep  roots  in  some  cultures
around the world.  If the majority is willing to take the big
leap, it is hard to see how it can say no to the shorter one.

It  is  striking  how  much  of  the  majority’s  reasoning
would apply with equal force to the claim of a fundamental
right to plural marriage.  If “[t]here is dignity in the bond
between two men or two women who seek to marry and in
their  autonomy  to  make  such  profound  choices,”  ante,  at
13,  why  would  there  be  any  less  dignity  in  the  bond  be-
tween  three  people  who,  in  exercising  their  autonomy,
seek to make the profound choice to marry?  If a same-sex
couple has the constitutional right to marry because their
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically focusing on the arguments against same-sex marriage. It delves into historical context and legal precedents, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
40

GOLAN v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

“(B)  on  such  date  of  enactment  is,  or  after  such  date
of  enactment  becomes,  a  nation  adhering  to  the  Berne
Convention;

“(C) adheres to the WIPO Copyright Treaty;
“(D)  adheres  to  the  WIPO  Performances  and  Phono-

grams Treaty; or

“(E) after such date of enactment becomes subject to a

proclamation under subsection (g).

“(4) The term “reliance party” means any person who—
“(A) with respect to a particular work, engages in acts,
before the source country of that work becomes an eligible
country,  which  would  have  violated  section  106  if  the
restored  work  had  been  subject  to  copyright  protection,
and  who,  after  the  source  country  becomes  an  eligible
country, continues to engage in such acts;

“(B)  before  the  source  country  of  a  particular  work
becomes an eligible country, makes or acquires 1 or more
copies or phonorecords of that work; or

“(C)  as  the  result  of  the  sale  or  other  disposition  of  a
derivative work covered under subsection (d)(3), or signifi-
cant  assets  of  a  person  described  in  subparagraph  (A)  or
(B), is a successor, assignee, or licensee of that person.

“(5) The term “restored copyright” means copyright in a

restored work under this section.

“(6) The term “restored work” means an original work of

authorship that—

“(A) is protected under subsection (a);
“(B)  is  not  in  the  public  domain  in  its  source  country

through expiration of term of protection;

“(C) is in the public domain in the United States due

to—

“(i)  noncompliance  with  formalities  imposed  at  any
time  by  United  States  copyright  law,  including  failure  of
renewal,  lack  of  proper  notice,  or  failure  to  comply  with
any manufacturing requirements;

“(ii)  lack  of  subject  matter  protection  in  the  case  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically excerpts from a court opinion. It contains legal terminology and citations, suggesting it's part of a legal document rather than general readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1113

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No.  09–485.  Grisham  v.  Brooks,  Superintendent,  Albion
State  Correctional  Institution,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No.  09–487.  Arkansas  Dairy  Cooperative  Assn.  et  al.  v.
Department of Agriculture  et al.  C. A. D.  C. Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  573  F.  3d  815.

No.  09–501.  Danner  v.  Commission  on  Continuing  Legal
Education  and  Specialization  of  the  Tennessee  Supreme
Court  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  228.

No.  09–502.  Giampa  v.  Giampa.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–503.  Hense v.  Hense.  Ct. App.  N. Y.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  12  N. Y.  3d  897,  912  N.  E.  2d  1058.

No.  09–505.  480.00 Acres  of  Land et  al.  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d
1297.

No.  09–506.  Children’s  Fund  et  al.  v.  Springfield  Hold
ing  Co.  Ltd.  LLC  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  699.

No.  09–507.  Hargis  Industries,  Inc.,  dba  Sealtite  Build
ing  Fasteners  et  al.  v.  B&B  Hardware,  Inc.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  383.

No.  09–509.  Jones  v.  Burdette.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  599.

No. 09–511.  Shepherd  v.  Shepherd.  Ct.  App. Ore.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–515.  Weiss  v.  Speer  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.

Dist.,  Div.  3.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–516.  Northwest Louisiana Fish & Game Preserve
Commission  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  574  F.  3d  1386.

No.  09–522.  Novak  et  ux.  v.  Jablonski,  Individually  and
as  Administratrix  of  the  Estate  of  Jablonski,  Deceased.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the orders.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 15–1293
_________________

JOSEPH MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED

STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

PETITIONER v. SIMON SHIAO TAM

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 19, 2017]

 JUSTICE  ALITO  announced  the  judgment  of  the  Court
and  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court  with  respect  to
Parts I, II, and III–A, and an opinion with respect to Parts
III–B,  III–C,  and  IV,  in  which  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE,
JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE BREYER join.

This  case  concerns  a  dance-rock  band’s  application  for
federal  trademark  registration  of  the  band’s  name,  “The
Slants.”  “Slants” is a derogatory term for persons of Asian
descent,  and  members  of  the  band  are  Asian-Americans.
But the band members believe that by taking that slur as
the  name  of  their  group,  they  will  help  to  “reclaim”  the
term and drain its denigrating force.

The  Patent  and  Trademark  Office  (PTO)  denied  the
application based on a provision of federal law prohibiting
the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or
bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living
or  dead.”  15  U. S. C.  §1052(a).    We  now  hold  that  this
provision  violates  the  Free  Speech  Clause  of  the  First
Amendment.  It offends a bedrock First Amendment prin-
ciple:  Speech  may  not  be  banned  on  the  ground  that  it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes the citation, case name, court information, and the introduction to the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U44

[09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 334 (2000)

343

Breyer, J., dissenting

forcement ofﬁcers searching for drugs near borders from
using even the most nonintrusive touch to help investigate
publicly exposed bags. At the same time, the ubiquity of
non-governmental pushes, prods, and squeezes (delivered by
driver, attendant, passenger, or some other stranger) means
that this decision cannot do much to protect true privacy.
Rather, the traveler who wants to place a bag in a shared
overhead bin and yet safeguard its contents from public
touch should plan to pack those contents in a suitcase with
hard sides, irrespective of the Court’s decision today.

For these reasons, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

740

PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL v. BABBITT

Opinion of the Court

provision in the Taylor Act stating that “grazing privi-
leges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately
safeguarded . . . .” 43 U. S. C. § 315b. Before 1995 the reg-
ulations deﬁned the term “grazing preference” in terms of
the AUM-denominated amount of grazing privileges that
a permit granted. The regulations then deﬁned “grazing
preference” as

“the total number of animal unit months of livestock
grazing on public lands apportioned and attached to base
property owned or controlled by a permittee or lessee.”
43 CFR § 4100.0–5 (1994).

The 1995 regulations changed this deﬁnition, however, so
that it now no longer refers to grazing privileges “appor-
tioned,” nor does it speak in terms of AUMs. The new
deﬁnition deﬁnes “grazing preference” as

“a superior or priority position against others for
the purpose of receiving a grazing permit or lease.
This priority is attached to base property owned or
controlled by the permittee or lessee.” 43 CFR
§ 4100.0–5 (1995).

60 Fed. Reg. 9921 (1995).

The new deﬁnition “omits reference to a speciﬁed quantity
of forage.”
It refers only to a
priority, not to a speciﬁc number of AUMs attached to a base
property. But at the same time the new regulations add a
new term, “permitted use,” which the Secretary deﬁnes as

“the forage allocated by, or under the guidance of, an
applicable land use plan for livestock grazing in an al-
lotment under a permit or lease and is expressed in
AUMs.”

43 CFR § 4100.0–5 (1995).

This new “permitted use,” like the old “grazing preference,”
is deﬁned in terms of allocated rights, and it refers to AUMs.
But this new term as deﬁned refers, not to a rancher’s forage
priority, but to forage “allocated by, or under the guidance
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing changes in regulations regarding grazing preferences on public lands. It includes legal citations, definitions of terms, and analysis of the impact of these changes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

Opinion of the Court

it is far from clear that §§1396a(a)(25)(A) and (B) refer only
to past expenses the State has already paid.  The relevant
language—“pay[ment] for care and services available under
the plan”—could just as readily refer to payment for medi-
cal care “available” in the future.  Regardless, even if this
language means what Gallardo says it does, Congress did
not use this language to define the scope of an assignment
under §1396k(a)(1)(A), implying again that the provisions
should not be interpreted the same way.  See supra, at 7.
fact  that
This
§1396k(a)(1)(A)  was  enacted  after  §§1396a(a)(25)(A)  and
(B).  It would have been easy for Congress to use the exist-
ing  language  in  §§1396a(a)(25)(A)  and  (B)  to  define  the
scope of the mandatory assignment.  But it did not.4

is  strengthened  by  the

implication

Finally, Gallardo relies on two policy arguments for her
preferred interpretation.  First, citing a footnote from Ahl-
born, she contends that it would be “ ‘absurd and fundamen-
tally unjust’ ” for a State to “ ‘share in damages for which it
has  provided  no  compensation.’ ”    547  U. S.,  at  288,  n. 19
(quoting  Flanigan  v.  Department  of  Labor  and  Industry,
123 Wash. 2d 418, 426, 869 P. 2d 14, 17 (1994)).  Although
Ahlborn noted possible unfairness if States were given “ab-
solute priority” to collect from the entirety of a tort settle-
ment, 547 U. S., at 288, our holding there was dictated by
the Medicaid Act’s “text,” not by our sense of fairness, id.,
at 280.  Had the text of the Medicaid Act authorized “abso-
lute priority,” Ahlborn would have been decided differently.
Second,  Gallardo  speculates  that  our  reading  of
§1396k(a)(1)(A)  would  authorize  a  “lifetime  assignment”
covering not only the rights an individual has while he is a
Medicaid beneficiary but also any rights he acquires in the
future when he is no longer a Medicaid beneficiary.  Brief
——————

4 That Congress required States’ compliance with §1396k(a)(1)(A) via
a separate paragraph—§1396a(a)(45)—rather than subordinating it un-
der §1396a(a)(25), supports our conclusion that they need not be inter-
preted in lockstep.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of sections within the Medicaid Act. It presents legal arguments and cites previous case law, indicating it's part of the core legal content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

In an effort to mitigate at least some of these problems,
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH suggests that the ban on government-
debt collection calls announced today might be applied only
prospectively.  See ante, at 22, n. 13.  But prospective deci-
sionmaking has never been easy to square with the judicial
power.  See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,
501 U. S. 529, 548–549 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(judicial power is limited to “discerning what the law is, ra-
ther than decreeing . . . what it will tomorrow be”).  And a
holding that shields only government-debt collection callers
from  past  liability  under  an  admittedly  unconstitutional
law would wind up endorsing the very same kind of content
discrimination we say we are seeking to eliminate.

Unable  to  solve  the  problems  associated  with  its  pre-
ferred severance remedy, today’s decision seeks at least to
identify  “harm[s]”  associated  with  mine.  Cf.  ante,  at  24
(opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).  In particular, we are reminded
that  granting  an  injunction  in  this  case  would  allow  the
plaintiffs’ (unpopular) speech, and that could induce others
to seek injunctions of their own, resulting in still more (un-
popular) speech.  But this “harm” is hardly comparable to
the  problems  associated  with  using  severability  doctrine:
Having to tolerate unwanted speech imposes no cognizable
constitutional  injury  on  anyone;  it  is  life  under  the  First
Amendment,  which  is  almost  always  invoked  to  protect
speech some would rather not hear.

*
In the end, I agree that 47 U. S. C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii) vio-
lates  the  First  Amendment,  though  not  for  the  reasons
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH offers.  Nor am I able to support the
remedy  the  Court  endorses  today.   Respectfully,  if  this  is
what modern “severability doctrine” has become, it seems
to me all the more reason to reconsider our course.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to the constitutionality of a law and the appropriate remedy for its violation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MILLER v. ALABAMA

ALITO, J., dissenting

ing that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punish
ment  for  the  brutal  rape  of  a  12-year-old  girl,  the  Court
disregarded a nascent legislative trend in favor of permit-
ting  capital  punishment  for  this  narrowly  defined  and
heinous  crime.  See  554  U. S.,  at  433  (explaining  that,
although  “the  total  number  of  States  to  have  made  child
rape a capital offense . . . is six,” “[t]his is not an indication
of  a  trend  or  change  in  direction  comparable  to  the  one
supported  by  data  in  Roper”).  The  Court  felt  no  need  to
see  whether  this  trend  developed  further—perhaps  be
cause true moral evolution can lead in only one direction.
And  despite  the  argument  that  the  rape  of  a  young  child
may  involve  greater  depravity  than  some  murders,  the
Court  proclaimed  that  homicide  is  categorically  different
from  all  (or  maybe  almost  all)  other  offenses.    See  id.,
at  438  (stating  that  nonhomicide  crimes,  including  child
rape, “may  be devastating in their harm . . . but in terms
of  moral  depravity  and  of  the  injury  to  the  person  and
to the public, they cannot be compared to murder in their
severity  and  irrevocability”  (internal  quotation  marks
and  citation  omitted)).  As  the  Court  had  previously  put
it,  “death  is  different.”  Ford,  supra,  at  411  (plurality
opinion).

Two  years  after  Kennedy,  in  Graham  v.  Florida,  any
pretense of heeding a legislative consensus was discarded.
In  Graham,  federal  law  and  the  law  of  37  States  and  the
District of Columbia permitted a minor to be sentenced to
life  imprisonment  without  parole  for  nonhomicide  crimes,
but  despite  this  unmistakable  evidence  of  a  national  con
sensus,  the  Court  held  that  the  practice  violates  the
Eighth  Amendment.    See  560  U. S.,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 1–3).  The Court, however, drew a
distinction  between  minors  who  murder  and  minors  who
commit  other  heinous  offenses,  so  at  least  in  that  sense
the principle that death is different lived on.

Today, that principle is entirely put to rest, for here we
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Miller v. Alabama. It discusses the Court's stance on capital punishment for certain crimes, particularly the rape of a child. The text is sequential and provides a coherent argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
INDEX

1247

JURISDICTION.  See  also  Railway  Labor  Act.

Federal Courts of Appeals—Collateral-order doctrine—Disclosure
orders  implicating  attorney-client  privilege.—Disclosure  orders  adverse
to  attorney-client  privilege  do  not  qualify  for  immediate  appeal  under
collateral-order  doctrine.  Mohawk  Industries,  Inc.  v.  Carpenter,  p.  100.

JURY  MISCONDUCT  AT  TRIAL.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  2.

JURY  SELECTION.  See  Constitutional  Law,  III.

LOCAL  FEDERAL  COURT  RULES.  See  Stays.

MICHIGAN.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  10.

MISCONDUCT  BY  TRIAL  OFFICIALS.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  2.

MITIGATION  EVIDENCE.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  3,  7,  8.

MOBILE-SIERRA  DOCTRINE.  See  Federal  Power  Act.

MOOTNESS.  See  Constitutional  Law,  I.

NATIONAL  RAILROAD  ADJUSTMENT  BOARD.  See  Railway

Labor  Act.

NORTH  CAROLINA.  See  Suits  Between  States.

OHIO.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  3.

POLITICAL  SPEECH.  See  Constitutional  Law,  II.

POWER  RATE  SETTING.  See  Federal  Power  Act.

PROPERTY  FORFEITURE.  See  Constitutional  Law,  I.

PROSPECTIVE  JURORS.  See  Constitutional  Law,  III.

PUBLIC  BROADCAST  OF  FEDERAL  TRIALS.  See  Stays.

PUBLIC  TRIALS.  See  Constitutional  Law,  III.

RAILWAY  LABOR  ACT.

Labor  dispute  arbitration—National  Railroad  Adjustment  Board  ju
risdiction.—By  refusing  to  adjudicate  railroad  employees’  grievances  on
false  premise  that  it  lacked  “jurisdiction”  to  hear  them,  a  National  Rail
road Adjustment Board panel failed “to conform, or conﬁne itself, to mat
ters  [Congress  placed]  within  the  scope  of  [NRAB]  jurisdiction,”  45
U. S. C.  § 153  First  (q).  Union  Paciﬁc  R.  Co.  v.  Locomotive  Engineers,
p. 67.

RIGHT  TO  PUBLIC  TRIAL.  See  Constitutional  Law,  III.

RIVERS.  See  Suits  Between  States.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index, not the actual content of a document. Indexes list topics and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

GALLARDO v. MARSTILLER

Opinion of the Court

provision falls within the “exception to the anti-lien provi-
sion.”  Ahlborn, 547 U. S., at 284.2

B
Gallardo nevertheless argues that §1396k(a)(1)(A) has a
different  meaning,  largely  by  discounting  the  text  of
§1396k(a)(1)(A)  and  then  relying  on  other  differently
worded provisions or on policy arguments, none of which we
find convincing.

Insofar as she confronts §1396k(a)(1)(A) itself, Gallardo
largely focuses on its prefatory clause, which provides that
the “purpose” of the assignment provision is to “assis[t] in
the collection of medical support payments and other pay-
ments for medical care owed to recipients of medical assis-
tance under the State plan.”  §1396k(a).  Gallardo construes
this  language  to  limit  the  assignment  provision  to  pay-
ments that are already “owed” for “past medical care pro-
vided under the [state] plan.”  Brief for Petitioner 30.

Gallardo’s  argument  misreads  the  statutory  text.    The
prefatory clause does not refer to payments “owed” “under
the State plan,” but rather to “payments owed to recipients
of medical assistance under the State plan.”  §1396k(a) (em-
phasis added).  In other words, the prefatory language Gal-
lardo invokes defines to whom the third-party payments are
“owed”—“recipients of medical assistance under the State

——————

2 According  to  the  dissent,  our  conclusion  conflicts  with  the  “back-
ground principl[e] of insurance law” that an insurer’s third-party recov-
ery is limited “ ‘to the same elements as those for which [the insurer] has
made  payment.’ ”  Post,  at  9  (opinion  of  SOTOMAYOR,  J.)  (quoting  16  S.
Plitt, D. Maldonado, J. Rogers, & J. Plitt, Couch on Insurance §226:36
(3d ed. 2021)).  But even assuming this principle is relevant as the dis-
sent  supposes,  the  dissent  concedes  that  it  gives  way  if  a  “contractual
ter[m]”—an  assignment  provision,  for  example—permits  a  broader  re-
covery.  Post, at 9; see also, e.g., 16 Couch on Insurance §222:63 (citing
examples).    Here,  §1396k(a)(1)(A)  mandates  an  assignment  provision
that does just that.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Gallardo v. Marstiller. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis of a specific statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 30 (2009)

35

Per Curiam

geants, and almost all of the ofﬁcers were wounded.  Porter
was again wounded, and his company sustained the heaviest
losses of any troops in the battle, with more than 50% casual
ties.  Colonel  Pratt  testiﬁed  that  these  battles  were  “very
trying,  horrifying  experiences,”  particularly  for  Porter’s
company  at  Chip’yong-ni.  Id.,  at  152.  Porter’s  unit  was
awarded  the  Presidential  Unit  Citation  for  the  engagement
at  Chip’yong-ni,  and  Porter  individually  received  two  Pur
ple  Hearts  and  the  Combat  Infantryman  Badge,  along  with
other decorations.

Colonel  Pratt  testiﬁed  that  Porter  went  absent  without
leave  (AWOL)  for  two  periods  while  in  Korea.  He  ex
plained  that  this  was  not  uncommon,  as  soldiers  sometimes
became disoriented and separated from the unit, and that the
commander  had  decided  not  to  impose  any  punishment  for
the  absences.  In  Colonel  Pratt’s  experience,  an  “awful  lot
of  [veterans]  come  back  nervous  wrecks.  Our  [veterans’]
hospitals today are ﬁlled with people mentally trying to sur
vive the perils and hardships [of] . . . the Korean War,” par
ticularly  those  who  fought  in  the  battles  he  described.  Id.,
at 153.

When  Porter  returned  to  the  United  States,  he  went
AWOL  for  an  extended  period  of  time.3  He  was  sentenced
to  six  months’  imprisonment  for  that  infraction,  but  he  re
ceived an  honorable discharge.  After  his discharge,  he suf
fered  dreadful  nightmares  and  would  attempt  to  climb  his
bedroom  walls  with  knives  at  night.4  Porter’s  family  even

3 Porter  explained  to  one  of  the  doctors  who  examined  him  for  compe
tency  to  stand  trial  that  he  went  AWOL  in  order  to  spend  time  with  his
son.  Record 904.

4 Porter’s  expert  testiﬁed  that  these  symptoms  would  “easily”  warrant
a  diagnosis  of  posttraumatic  stress  disorder  (PTSD).  2  Tr.  233  (Jan.  5,
1996).  PTSD  is  not  uncommon  among  veterans  returning  from  combat.
See  Hearing  on  Fiscal  Year  2010  Budget  for  Veterans’  Programs  before
the  Senate  Committee  on  Veterans’  Affairs,  111th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  63
(2009) (uncorrected copy) (testimony of Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of Vet
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a recounting of events related to a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
264

SOUTH  CAROLINA  v.  NORTH  CAROLINA

Opinion of the Court

presence of the non-state entity would advance the ‘full
exposition’ of the issues.”  Id., at 20–21.

Applying  this  broad  rule,  the  Special  Master  found  that
each proposed intervenor had a sufﬁciently compelling inter
est  to  justify  intervention.  The  Special  Master  rejected
South Carolina’s proposal to limit intervention to the remedy
phase  of  this  litigation  and  recommended  that  this  Court
grant the motions to intervene.

II
A

Participation  by  nonstate  parties  in  actions  arising  under
our  original  jurisdiction  is  not  a  new  development.  Article
III, § 2, of the Constitution expressly contemplates suits “be
tween a State and Citizens of another State” as falling within
our  original  jurisdiction,  see,  e. g.,  Georgia  v.  Brailsford,  2
Dall.  402  (1792),  and  for  more  than  two  centuries  the  Court
has exercised that jurisdiction over nonstate parties in suits
between  two  or  more  States,  see  New  York  v.  Connecticut,
4  Dall.  1  (1799);  Missouri  v.  Illinois,  180  U. S.  208,  224–225
(1901).  Nonstate  entities  have  even  participated  as  parties
in  disputes  between  States,  such  as  the  one  before  us  now,
where  the  States  were  seeking  equitable  apportionment  of
water resources.  See, e. g., Arizona v.  California, 460 U. S.
605,  608,  n.  1  (1983);  Texas  v.  New  Mexico,  343  U. S.  932
(1952); New Jersey v.  City of New York, 279 U. S. 823 (1929)
(per  curiam).  It  is,  thus,  not  a  novel  proposition  to  accord
party status to a citizen in an original action between States.
This  Court  likewise  has  granted  leave,  under  appropriate
circumstances,  for  nonstate  entities  to  intervene  as  parties
in original actions between States for nearly 90 years.  See
Maryland v.  Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 745, n. 21 (1981).  In
Oklahoma v.  Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 581, 598 (1922), a boundary
dispute  that  threatened  to  erupt  in  armed  hostilities,  the
Court allowed individual and corporate citizens to intervene
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the participation of non-state entities in original jurisdiction cases between states.  It provides legal precedent and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

19

Opinion of the Court

material  to  an  ongoing  investigation.”
18  U. S. C.
§2703(d).  That  showing  falls  well  short  of  the  probable
cause required for a warrant.  The Court usually requires
“some  quantum  of
individualized  suspicion”  before
a  search  or  seizure  may  take  place.    United  States  v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 560–561 (1976).  Under the
standard in the Stored Communications Act, however, law
enforcement  need  only  show  that  the  cell-site  evidence
might be pertinent to an ongoing investigation—a “gigan-
tic”  departure  from  the  probable  cause  rule,  as  the  Gov-
ernment  explained  below.  App.  34.    Consequently,  an
order  issued  under  Section  2703(d)  of  the  Act  is  not  a
permissible  mechanism  for  accessing  historical  cell-site
records.  Before compelling a wireless carrier to turn over
a  subscriber’s  CSLI,  the  Government’s  obligation  is  a
familiar one—get a warrant.

JUSTICE  ALITO  contends  that  the  warrant  requirement
simply  does  not  apply  when  the  Government  acquires
records  using  compulsory  process.    Unlike  an  actual
search,  he  says,  subpoenas  for  documents  do  not  involve
the direct taking of evidence; they are at most a “construc-
tive search” conducted by the target of the subpoena.  Post,
at  12.  Given  this  lesser  intrusion  on  personal  privacy,
JUSTICE  ALITO  argues  that  the  compulsory  production  of
records  is  not  held  to  the  same  probable  cause  standard.
In his view, this Court’s precedents set forth a categorical
rule—separate  and  distinct  from  the  third-party  doc-
trine—subjecting  subpoenas  to  lenient  scrutiny  without
regard  to  the  suspect’s  expectation  of  privacy  in  the  rec-
ords.  Post, at 8–19.

But this Court has never held that the Government may
subpoena  third  parties  for  records  in  which  the  suspect
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Almost all of the
examples JUSTICE ALITO cites, see post, at 14–15, contem-
plated  requests  for  evidence  implicating  diminished  pri-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal standard for accessing historical cell-site location information (CSLI) and argues against the use of subpoenas under the Stored Communications Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

most  people  either  because  they  already  have  them  or  do
not need them; these are protections against exclusion from
an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors
that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.”  Romer
v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 631 (1996).  LGBT  people do not
seek any special treatment.  All they seek is to exist in pub-
lic.  To inhabit public spaces on the same terms and condi-
tions as everyone else.

C
Yet for as long as public accommodations laws have been
around,  businesses  have  sought  exemptions  from  them.
The civil rights and women’s liberation eras are prominent
examples of this.  Backlashes to race and sex equality gave
rise  to  legal  claims  of  rights  to  discriminate,  including
claims based on First Amendment freedoms of expression
and association.  This Court was unwavering in its rejection
of those claims, as invidious discrimination “has never been
accorded affirmative constitutional protections.”  Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U. S.  455, 470 (1973).  In particular, the
refusal to deal with or to serve a class of people is not an
expressive interest protected by the First Amendment.

1

Opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 objected that
the  law  would  force  business  owners  to  defy  their  beliefs.
Cf. ante, at 3.  They argued that the Act would deny them
“any freedom to speak or to act on the basis of their religious
convictions or their deep-rooted preferences for associating
or  not  associating  with  certain  classifications  of  people.”
110 Cong. Rec. 7778 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Tower).  Con-
gress rejected those arguments.  Title II of the Act, in par-
ticular, did not invade “rights of privacy [or] of free associ-
ation,”  Congress  concluded,  because  the  establishments
covered by the law were “those regularly held open to the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against a particular ruling and cites previous cases to support its position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Opinion of ALITO, J.

reflects  an  international  law  norm  that  is  “ ‘specific,  uni-
versal and obligatory.’ ”  Id., at 732.  Second, if a suitable
norm  is  identified,  federal  courts  should  decide  whether
there  is  any  other  reason  to  limit  “the  availability  of  re-
lief.”  Id., at 733, n. 21.

II
For  the  reasons  articulated  by  Justice  Scalia  in  Sosa
and  by  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  today,  I  am  not  certain  that
Sosa was correctly decided.  See id., at 739–751 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting);  post,  at  2–5  (GORSUCH, J.,  concurring  in  part
and  concurring  in  judgment).  But  even  taking  that  deci-
sion on its own terms, this Court should not create causes
of action under the ATS against foreign corporate defend-
ants.  As part of Sosa’s second step, a court should decline
to create a cause of action as a matter of federal common
law  where  the  result  would  be  to  further,  not  avoid,  dip-
lomatic  strife.    Properly  applied,  that  rule  easily  resolves
the question presented by this case.*

Sosa interpreted the ATS to authorize the federal courts
to  create  causes  of  action  as  a  matter  of  federal  common
law.  We  have  repeatedly  emphasized  that  “in  fashioning
federal  [common  law]  principles to  govern  areas  left  open
by  Congress,  our  function  is  to  effectuate  congressional
policy.”  United  States  v.  Kimbell  Foods,  Inc.,  440  U. S.
715,  738  (1979).  Fidelity  to  congressional  policy  is  not
only  prudent  but  necessary:  Going  beyond  the  bounds  of
Congress’s  authorization  would  mean  unconstitutionally
usurping  part  of  the  “legislative  Powers.”    U. S.  Const.,
Art.  I,  §1.    Accordingly,  the  objective  for  courts  in  every
case requiring the creation of federal common law must be

——————

* Because this case involves a foreign corporation, we have no need to
reach the question whether an alien may sue a United States corpora-
tion under the ATS.  And since such a suit may generally be brought in
federal  court  based  on  diversity  jurisdiction,  28  U. S. C.  §1332(a)(2),  it
is unclear why ATS jurisdiction would be needed in that situation.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and its application to foreign corporate defendants. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

Opinion of the Court

III
The  debtors  do  not  ask  us  to  overrule  Dewsnup,†  but
instead request that we limit that decision to partially—as
opposed to wholly—underwater liens.  We decline to adopt
this distinction.  The debtors offer several reasons why we
should cabin Dewsnup in this manner, but none of them is
compelling.

To start, the debtors rely on language in Dewsnup stat-
ing  that  the  Court  was  not  addressing  “all  possible  fact
situations,”  but  was  instead  “allow[ing]  other  facts  to
await their legal resolution on another day.”  Id., at 416–
417.  But  this  disclaimer  provides  an  insufficient  founda-
tion  for  the  debtors’  proposed  distinction.  Dewsnup  con-
sidered  several  possible  definitions  of  the  term  “secured
claim”  in  §506(d).  See  id.,  at  414–416.    The  definition  it
settled on—that a claim is “secured” if it is  “secured by a
lien” and “has been fully allowed pursuant to §502,” id., at
417—does  not  depend  on  whether  a  lien  is  partially  or
wholly  underwater.  Whatever  the  Court’s  hedging  lan-
guage  meant,  it  does  not  provide  a  reason  to  limit
Dewsnup in the manner the debtors propose.

The debtors next contend that the term “secured claim”

——————

† From  its  inception,  Dewsnup  v.  Timm,  502  U. S.  410  (1992),  has
been  the  target  of  criticism.  See,  e.g.,  id.,  at  420–436  (SCALIA,  J.,
dissenting);  In re  Woolsey,  696  F. 3d  1266,  1273–1274,  1278  (CA10
2012); In re Dever, 164  B. R. 132,  138, 145 (Bkrtcy. Ct.  CD Cal.  1994);
Carlson,  Bifurcation  of  Undersecured  Claims  in  Bankruptcy,  70  Am.
Bankr. L. J. 1, 12–20 (1996); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, The Immovable
Object  Versus  the  Irresistible  Force:  Rethinking  the  Relationship
Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2234,
2305–2307 (1997); see also Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Assn.
v.  203  North  LaSalle  Street  Partnership,  526  U. S.  434,  463,  and  n.  3
(1999)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment)  (collecting  cases  and
observing that “[t]he methodological confusion created by Dewsnup has
enshrouded  both  the  Courts  of  Appeals  and  . . .  Bankruptcy  Courts”).
Despite  this  criticism,  the  debtors  have  repeatedly  insisted  that  they
are not asking us to overrule Dewsnup.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the case of Dewsnup v. Timm and the interpretation of "secured claim" in bankruptcy law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CHIAVERINI v. CITY OF NAPOLEON

Opinion of the Court

starkest  possible  example.  A  person  is  detained  on  two
charges—a drug offense supported by probable cause and a
gun offense built on lies.  The prosecutor, for whatever rea-
son, drops the (valid) drug charge, leaving the person in jail
on the (invalid) gun charge alone.  The inclusion of the base-
less charge—though brought along with a good charge—has
thus caused a constitutional violation, by unreasonably ex-
tending the pretrial detention.  Even the Napoleon officers
agree, offering a similar example.  See Brief for Officers 25;
see also Brief for United States 17–18.  So the bringing of
one valid charge in a criminal proceeding should not cate-
gorically preclude a claim based on the Fourth Amendment.
And  the  same  conclusion  follows  from  the  common-law
principles  governing  malicious-prosecution  suits  when
§1983  was  enacted.  As  noted  above,  a  plaintiff  in  such  a
suit had to show that an official initiated a charge without
probable cause.  See Thompson, 596 U. S., at 44; supra, at
4–5.  He did not have to show, however, that every charge
brought  against  him  lacked  an  adequate  basis.    Rather,
courts in that era assessed probable cause charge by charge.
“[I]f groundless charges” are “coupled with others which are
well  founded,”  explained  one  State  Supreme  Court,  the
groundless ones could still “constitute a valid cause of ac-
tion.”  Boogher  v.  Bryant,  86  Mo.  42,  49  (1885).    Another
agreed: It was no “defen[s]e that there was probable cause
for part of the prosecution.”  Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189,
198 (1858).  Or as a leading treatise from the era summa-
rized the rule: “It is not necessary that the whole proceed-
ings  be  utterly  groundless.”    2  S.  Greenleaf,  Law  of  Evi-
dence 400 (10th ed. 1868); see 1 F. Hilliard, Law of Torts or
Private Wrongs §1, p. 435, n. (b) (4th ed. 1874).  One bad
charge, even if joined with good ones, was enough to satisfy
the  malicious-prosecution  tort’s  “without  probable  cause”
element.

All that dooms the Sixth Circuit’s categorical rule barring
a  Fourth  Amendment  malicious-prosecution  claim  if  any
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment.  It cites legal precedents and analyzes the common law principles surrounding malicious prosecution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

15

Opinion of the Court

*

*
For  these  reasons,  we  reverse  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  judg-
ment, and we remand the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.

*

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the conclusion of a legal opinion, specifically the closing section with the reversal of the Ninth Circuit's judgment and a statement for further proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

ALITO, J., dissenting

viewed as that position taken by those Members who con-
curred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”  Id., at
193 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This rule ascribes
precedential  status  to  decisions  made  without  majority
agreement on the underlying rationale, and it is therefore
squarely contrary to the argument of the three Justices who
regard Apodaca as non-precedential.

The Marks rule is controversial, and two Terms ago, we
granted review in a case that implicated its meaning.  See
Hughes v. United States, 584 U. S. ___ (2018).  But we ulti-
mately  decided  the  case  on  another  ground  and  left  the
Marks  rule intact.  As long as that rule stands, it refutes
the argument that Apodaca is not binding because a major-
ity did not agree on a common rationale.

Finally, our three colleagues contend that treating Apo-
daca as a precedent would require the Court “to embrace a
new and dubious proposition: that a single Justice writing
only for himself has the authority to bind this Court to prop-
ositions  it  has  already  rejected.”  Ante,  at  16.    This  argu-
ment  appears  to  weave  together  three  separate  questions
relating  to  the  precedential  effect  of  decisions  in  which
there is no majority opinion.  I will therefore attempt to un-
tangle these questions and address each in turn.

An initial question is whether, in a case where there is no
opinion of the Court, the position taken by a single Justice
in the majority can constitute the binding rule for which the
decision  stands.    Under  Marks,  the  clear  answer  to  this
question is yes.  The logic of Marks applies equally no mat-
ter what the division of the Justices in the majority, and I
am aware of no case holding that the Marks rule is inappli-
cable when the narrowest ground is supported by only one
Justice.  Certainly the lower courts have understood Marks
to apply in that situation.14

——————

14 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 321 (2003) (discussing lower
court’s treatment of Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into the legal precedent set by a previous case (Apodaca) and the interpretation of the Marks rule regarding precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.

MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

limited to such applications.”  689 F. 3d, at 1349.

Nor  do  we  consider  the  patentability  of  DNA  in  which
the  order  of  the  naturally  occurring  nucleotides  has  been
altered.  Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a
different  inquiry,  and  we  express  no  opinion  about  the
application  of  §101  to  such  endeavors.  We  merely  hold
that genes and the information they encode are not patent
eligible under §101 simply because they have been isolated
from the surrounding genetic material.

*

*

*

For  the  foregoing  reasons,  the  judgment  of  the  Federal

Circuit is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the conclusion of the court. Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain factual information and legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>