<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SMITH v. ARIZONA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

A
Expert testimony presents a challenge for a legal system
like  ours  that  restricts  a  fact-finder’s  ability  to  consider
hearsay.  This is so because an expert’s opinion very often
is based on facts that are not proved in court.  As a modern
treatise puts it, the value of experts lies in their ability to
“brin[g] to bear a body of knowledge largely extraneous to
the facts of the particular case.”  D. Kaye, D. Bernstein, A.
Ferguson, M. Wittlin, & J. Mnookin, The New Wigmore: Ex-
pert  Evidence  §1.2.1,  p.  4  (3d  ed.  2021)  (Kaye).    Wigmore
made the same point when he wrote that “[n]o one profes-
sional man can know from personal observation more than
a minute fraction of the data which he must every day treat
as working truths.”  1 J. Wigmore, Evidence §665(3), p. 762
(1904) (Wigmore).  Instead, experts routinely “rel[y] on the
reported data of fellow-scientists, learned by perusing their
reports in books and journals.”  Id., at 762–763 (emphasis
deleted); see also Kaye §4.1, at 165 (“[P]art of an expert’s
very expertise inevitably derive[s] from hearsay”).

Despite  this  problem,  courts  in  Great  Britain  and  this
country long ago recognized the value of expert testimony
and  concluded  that  they  “must  . . .  accept  this  kind  of
knowledge from scientific men,” even if it meant allowing
testimony based on facts of which the expert did not have
firsthand knowledge.  See 1 Wigmore 763; 1 S. Greenleaf,
Evidence §430(l), p. 529 (rev. 16th ed. 1899) (“It would be
absurd  to  deny  judicial  standing  to  such  knowledge,  be-
cause all scientific data must be handed down from genera-
tion to generation by hearsay, and each student can hope to
test  only  a  trifling  fraction  of  scientific  truth  by  personal
experience”); Slocovich v. Orient Mut. Ins. Co., 108 N. Y. 56,
64, 14 N. E. 802, 805 (1888) (“An expert is qualified to give
evidence as to things which he has never seen.  He may base
an  opinion  upon  facts  proved  by  other  witnesses,  or  upon
facts assumed and embraced within the case”).

Recognizing this reality, a court in the late-18th century
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Smith v. Arizona. It discusses the challenges of expert testimony in a legal system that restricts hearsay.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

Opinion of the Court

“obvious practical advantages.”  Id., at 472, n. 13, 471.

Out of context, statements like these might suggest his-
torical practices or current demographics can suffice to dis-
establish or diminish reservations in the way Oklahoma en-
visions.  But, in the end, Solem itself found these kinds of
arguments provided “no help” in resolving the dispute be-
fore  it.  Id.,  at  478.  Notably,  too,  Solem  suggested  that
whatever utility historical practice or demographics might
have was “demonstrated” by this Court’s earlier decision in
Rosebud  Sioux  Tribe  v.  Kneip,  430  U. S.  584  (1977).    See
Solem, 465 U. S., at 470, n. 10.  And Rosebud Sioux hardly
endorsed the use of such sources to find disestablishment.
Instead, based on the statute at issue there, the Court came
“to the firm conclusion that congressional intent” was to di-
minish the reservation in question.  430 U. S., at 603.  At
that point, the Tribe sought to cast doubt on the clear im-
port of the text by citing subsequent historical events—and
the Court rejected the Tribe’s argument exactly because this
kind of evidence could not overcome congressional intent as
expressed in a statute.  Id., at 604–605.

This Court has already sought to clarify that extratextual
considerations  hardly  supply  the  blank  check  Oklahoma
supposes.  In Parker, for example, we explained that “[e]vi-
dence of the subsequent treatment of the disputed land . . .
has ‘limited interpretive value.’ ”  577 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 11) (quoting South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522
U. S. 329, 355 (1998)).8  Yankton Sioux called it the “least

——————

8 The dissent suggests Parker meant to say only that evidence of sub-
sequent treatment had limited interpretative value “in that case.”  Post,
at 12.  But the dissent includes just a snippet of the relevant passage.
Read in full, there is little room to doubt Parker invoked a general rule:
“This subsequent demographic history cannot overcome our conclusion
that Congress did not intend to diminish the reservation in 1882. And it
is not our rule to ‘rewrite’ the 1882 Act in light of this subsequent demo-
graphic history.  DeCoteau, 420 U. S., at 447.  After all, evidence of the
changing  demographics  of  disputed  land  is  ‘the  least  compelling’  evi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN.

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

purely executive powers of government must be within the
full  control  of  the  President.    The  Constitution  prescribes
that they all are”).

Given these structural distinctions between the branches,
it  is  no  surprise  that  judicial  interpretations  are  defini-
tive  in  cases  and  controversies  before  the  courts.    Courts
act  as  “an  intermediate  body  between  the  people  and  the
legislature,  in  order,  among  other  things,  to  keep  the
latter within the limits assigned to their authority.”  Fed-
eralist No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton).  The Legislature and
Executive  may  be  swayed  by  popular  sentiment  to  aban-
don the strictures of the Constitution or other rules of law.
But the Judiciary, insulated from both internal and exter-
nal sources of bias, is duty bound to exercise independent
judgment in applying the law.

Interpreting agency regulations calls for that exercise of
independent  judgment.    Substantive  regulations  have  the
force  and  effect  of  law.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Mead
Corp.,  533  U. S.  218,  231–232  (2001).4   Agencies  and  pri-

——————

4 These cases also raise constitutional questions about the distinction
in  administrative  law  between  “substantive”  (or  “legislative”)  and
interpretative rules.  The United States Court of Appeals for the D. C.
Circuit  has  defined  a  legislative  rule  as  “[a]n  agency  action  that  pur-
ports to impose legally binding obligations or prohibitions on regulated
parties”  and  an  interpretative  rule  as  “[a]n  agency  action  that  merely
interprets  a  prior  statute  or  regulation,  and  does  not  itself  purport  to
impose  new  obligations  or  prohibitions  or  requirements  on  regulated
parties.”  National  Mining  Assn.  v.  McCarthy,  758  F. 3d  243,  251–252
(2014).  And  our  precedents  make  clear  that  administrative  agencies
must  exercise  only  executive  power  in  promulgating  these  rules.
Arlington  v.  FCC,  569  U. S.  ___,  ___,  n. 4  (2013)  (slip  op.,  at  13,  n. 4).
But  while  it  is  easy  to  see  the  promulgation  of  interpretative  rules  as
an  “executive”  function—executive  officials  necessarily  interpret  the
laws  they  enforce—it  is  difficult  to  see  what  authority  the  President
has  “to  impose  legally  binding  obligations  or  prohibitions  on  regulated
parties.”  That definition suggests something much closer to the legisla-
tive  power,  which  our  Constitution  does  not  permit  the  Executive  to
exercise  in  this  manner.    Because  these  troubling  questions  are  not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association. It discusses the separation of powers between the branches of government and the role of the judiciary in interpreting agency regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

746

PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL v. BABBITT

Opinion of the Court

ness, bona ﬁde occupants or settlers.”
Ibid. And this stat-
utory language has been extremely important in practice.
See supra, at 734–735.

The ranchers nonetheless contend that the deletion of the
term “engaged in the livestock business” violates the statu-
tory limitation to “stock owners” in § 315b. The words
“stock owner,” they say, meant “commercial stock owner” in
1934, and a commercial stock owner is not simply one who
owns livestock, but one who engages in the business.
Hence, they argue, the Secretary lacks the authority to allow
those who are not engaged in the business to apply for
permits.

The words “stock owner” and “stock owner engaged in the
livestock business,” however, are not obvious synonyms.
And we have found no convincing indication that Congress
intended that we treat them as such. Just two sentences
after using the words “stock owner,” Congress said that,
among those eligible for permits (i. e., stock owners), prefer-
ence should be given to “landowners engaged in the livestock
business, bona ﬁde occupants or settlers, or owners of water
or water rights.” § 315b (emphasis added). Why would
Congress add the words “engaged in the livestock business”
if (as the ranchers’ argument implies) they add nothing? Cf.
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 36 (1992)
(“[A] statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion
that every word has some operative effect”). The legisla-
tive history to which the ranchers point shows that Congress
expected that ordinarily permit holders would be ranchers,
who do engage in the livestock business, but does not show
any such absolute requirement. See, e. g., H. R. Rep.
No. 903, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934); Hearings on H. R. 2835
and H. R. 6462 before the House Committee on the Public
Lands, 73d Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 96 (1933–1934); Hearings
on H. R. 6462 before the Senate Committee on Public Lands
and Surveys, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 40 (1934). Nor does the
statute’s basic purpose require that the two sets of different
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case *Public Lands Council v. Babbitt*.  The language is formal and discusses legal arguments and interpretations of a statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

Opinion of the Court

Those differing approaches reflect nuanced state and local
policy judgments about when gifts expressing appreciation
to public officials for their past acts cross the line from the
innocuous to the problematic.

The carefully calibrated policy decisions that the States
and  local  governments  have  made  about  gratuities  would
be  gutted
if  we  were  to  accept  the  Government’s
interpretation of §666.  After all, §666 covers virtually all
state and local officials—about 19 million nationwide.  So
reading  §666  to  create  a  federal  prohibition  on  gratuities
would suddenly subject 19 million state and local officials
to a new and different regulatory regime for gratuities.  In
other  words,  a  county  official  could  meticulously  comply
with her county’s local gratuities rules—say, by declining a
$200 gift card but accepting a $100 gift card from a neighbor
as thanks for her diligent work on a new park—but still face
up  to  10  years  in  federal  prison  because  she  accepted  a
thing of value in connection with an official act.

We  should  hesitate  before  concluding  that  Congress
prohibited gratuities that state and local governments have
allowed  for  their  officials.  After  all,  Congress  does  not
lightly  override  state  and  local  governments  on  such  core
matters  of  state  and  local  governance.  And  the  principle
articulated by this Court in Sun-Diamond fits this case as
well:  A  “narrow,  rather  than  a  sweeping,  prohibition  is
more compatible with the fact that” this statute “is merely
one  strand  of  an  intricate  web  of  regulations,  both
administrative  and  criminal,  governing  the  acceptance  of
gifts  and  other  self-enriching  actions  by  public  officials.”
526 U. S., at 409.

In short, federalism principles weigh heavily in favor of
reading  §666  as  a  bribery  statute  and  not  as  a  gratuities
law.

Sixth is fair notice.  The Government’s interpretation of
the  statute would  create  traps  for unwary  state  and  local
officials.  Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S., at 411.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the interpretation of a statute (likely §666) and its implications for state and local officials accepting gifts. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BULLARD v. BLUE HILLS BANK, FKA HYDE PARK

SAVINGS BANK

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 14–116.  Argued April 1, 2015—Decided  May 4, 2015

After filing for Chapter 13  bankruptcy, petitioner Bullard submitted  a
proposed repayment plan to the Bankruptcy Court.  Respondent Blue
Hills  Bank,  Bullard’s  mortgage  lender,  objected  to  the  plan’s  treat-
ment of its claim.  The Bankruptcy Court sustained the Bank’s objec-
tion and declined to confirm the plan.  Bullard appealed to the First
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP).  The BAP concluded that
the  Bankruptcy  Court’s  denial  of  confirmation  was  not  a  final,  ap-
pealable order, see 28 U. S. C. §158(a)(1), but heard the appeal under
a provision permitting interlocutory appeals “with leave of the court,”
§158(a)(3), and agreed with the Bankruptcy Court that Bullard’s pro-
posed  plan  was  not  allowed.    Bullard  appealed  to  the  First  Circuit,
but it dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  It concluded that its jurisdic-
tion  depended  on  the  finality  of  the  BAP’s  order,  which  in  turn  de-
pended on the finality of the Bankruptcy Court’s order.  And it found
that the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying confirmation was not final
so long as Bullard remained free to propose another plan.

Held: A  bankruptcy  court’s  order  denying  confirmation  of  a  debtor’s
proposed repayment plan is not a final order that the debtor can im-
mediately appeal.  Pp. 4–12.

(a) Congress has long treated orders in bankruptcy cases as imme-
diately appealable “if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within
the  larger  case,”  Howard  Delivery  Service,  Inc.  v.  Zurich  American
Ins.  Co.,  547  U. S.  651,  657,  n. 3.    This  approach  is  reflected  in  the
current  statute,  which  provides  that  bankruptcy  appeals  as  of  right
may be taken not only from final judgments in cases but from “final
judgments,  orders,  and  decrees  . . .  in  cases  and  proceedings.”    28
U. S. C. §158(a).  Bullard argues that a bankruptcy court conducts a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically not indexed as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

7

Opinion of the Court

“[d]ismissal  payments  which  the  employer  is  not  legally
required  to  make.”  Social  Security  Act  Amendments  of
1939,  §606,  53  Stat.  1384  (codified  at  26  U.  S.  C.
§1426(a)(4) (1940 ed.)).

In  1950,  however,  Congress  repealed  that  exception.
Social  Security  Act  Amendments,  §203(a),  64  Stat.  525–
527.  “When  Congress  acts  to  amend  a  statute,  we  pre-
sume  it  intends  its  amendment  to  have  real  and  sub-
stantial  effect.”  Stone  v.  INS,  514  U. S.  386,  397  (1995).
Congress has not revisited its 1950 amendment; and since
that time, FICA has contained no exception for severance
payments.

B
The  next  question  is  whether  §3402(o)  of  the  Internal
Revenue  Code  relating  to  income-tax  withholding  is  a
limitation  on  the  meaning  of  “wages”  for  FICA  purposes.
Section 3402 provides:

“(o)  Extension  of  withholding  to  certain  pay-
ments other than wages.

“(1) General rule
“For purposes of this chapter (and so much of subti-

tle F as relates to this chapter)—

“(A) any supplemental unemployment compensation

benefit paid to an individual,
.

 .

 .

 .

 .

“shall be treated as if it were a payment of wages by an
employer to an employee for a payroll period.”

(Pursuant  to  stipulations  by  the  parties,  the  Court  of
Appeals  determined  that  the  severance  payments  consti-
tute  “supplemental  unemployment  compensation  bene-
fits,” or SUBs.  See §3402(o)(2)(A).  The Court assumes, for
purposes of this case, that this premise is correct.)

Quality  Stores  argues  that  §3402(o)’s  instruction  that
SUBs  be  treated  “as  if ”  they  were  wages  for  purposes  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the legal interpretation of "wages" in the context of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and the treatment of severance payments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxi

Page

924

Otero v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

O’Toole; Barsch v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

Ott; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

OU Medical Center v. Shinn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Outlaw; Gatewood v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  993,1139

977

Overton v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Owen v. McNeil
1119

Owens; Cobble v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

Owens v. Grams  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

Owens v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Owens v. Michigan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

Owens v. Providian Financial  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  879,1065

Owens v. Steele
907

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Owens v. United States
994

Owens v. Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

Owens-Ill., Inc.; Whittington v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

Oyague, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

Oyague v. U. S. District Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

Ozmint; Odom v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Ozmint; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  953,1140

Ozmint; Torrence v.
1057

Pablo-Gonzalez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pace v. Johnson
870

Pace v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

Pacholke; Waldron-Ramsey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

Paciﬁc v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paciﬁc Gas & Electric Co.; United States ex rel. Grynberg v.  . . . .
880

1093

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paciﬁc Indemnity Co.; Cordell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  923,1131

Padilla v. United States
914

Padilla-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Page v. Thaler
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130

Paige v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132

Pakala v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Palazzo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

Palega v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
829

Palis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936

Palmer v. Ercole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

Palmer; Miller v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935

Palmer v. New York City  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

Palmer; Tucker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920

Palmer v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Palmer v. Waxahachie Independent School Dist.
1048

Palmetto State Transportation Co.; Wilkinson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Pandolﬁ v. Wall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Syllabus

(2) The burden then falls on respondents to show that New York’s
proper-cause  requirement  is  consistent  with  this  Nation’s  historical
tradition of firearm regulation.  To do so, respondents appeal to a va-
riety of historical sources from the late 1200s to the early 1900s.  But
when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is cre-
ated equal.  “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they
were understood to have when the people adopted them.”  Heller, 554
U. S., at 634–635.  The Second Amendment was adopted in 1791; the
Fourteenth  in  1868.    Historical  evidence  that  long  predates  or  post-
dates either time may not illuminate the scope of the right.  With these
principles in mind, the Court concludes that respondents have failed
to meet their burden to identify an American tradition justifying New
York’s proper-cause requirement.  Pp. 24–62.

(i) Respondents’  substantial  reliance  on  English  history  and
custom before the founding makes some sense given Heller’s statement
that the Second Amendment “codified a right ‘inherited from our Eng-
lish  ancestors.’ ”  554  U. S.,  at  599.    But  the  Court  finds  that  history
ambiguous  at  best  and  sees  little  reason  to  think  that  the  Framers
would have thought it applicable in the New World.  The Court cannot
conclude from this historical record that, by the time of the founding,
English law would have justified restricting the right to publicly bear
arms suited for self-defense only to those who demonstrate some spe-
cial need for self-protection.  Pp. 30–37.

(ii) Respondents next direct the Court to the history of the Col-
onies and early Republic, but they identify only three restrictions on
public carry from that time.  While the Court doubts that just three
colonial  regulations  could  suffice  to  show  a  tradition  of  public-carry
regulation, even looking at these laws on their own terms, the Court is
not convinced that they regulated public carry akin to the New York
law  at  issue.  The  statutes  essentially  prohibited  bearing  arms  in  a
way that spread “fear” or “terror” among the people, including by car-
rying  of  “dangerous  and  unusual  weapons.”    See  554  U. S.,  at  627.
Whatever  the  likelihood  that  handguns  were  considered  “dangerous
and unusual” during the colonial period, they are today “the quintes-
sential  self-defense  weapon.”  Id.,  at  629.    Thus,  these  colonial  laws
provide no justification for laws restricting the public carry of weapons
that are unquestionably in common use today.  Pp. 37–42.

(iii) Only  after  the  ratification  of  the  Second  Amendment  in
1791 did public-carry restrictions proliferate.  Respondents rely heav-
ily  on  these  restrictions,  which  generally  fell  into  three  categories:
common-law  offenses,  statutory  prohibitions,  and  “surety”  statutes.
None  of  these  restrictions  imposed  a  substantial  burden  on  public
carry  analogous  to  that  imposed  by  New  York’s  restrictive  licensing
regime.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It discusses the historical context and legal arguments surrounding a case involving firearm regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xvi

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Carlson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carmell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carpenter; Edwards v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carpenter v. Greiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carr v. Gates Health Care Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carrillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carroll; Mapoy v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carter v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carter v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carter v. Rayville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carter v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carver; Sanwick v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Casellas v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cash v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Casiano v. United States
Casselberry; Boss Capital, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cassidy; Mellon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Castaneda-Ceja v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Castillo v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Castro v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Castro v. Edwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Caterpillar Inc. v. New Hampshire Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . .
Catoe; Deal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Catoe; Lindsey v.
Cavanaugh, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CBT Group PLC v. San Mateo County Superior Court . . . . . . . .
Cecil v. National Labor Relations Bd.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Central Green Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Central W. Va. Development Corp. v. Fry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Century Clinic, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ceridian Corp. v. Barker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cervantes-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chae Ho Lee v. Ramirez-Palmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chaidez v. Scribner
Chaidez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chambers v. Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chambers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Champion v. Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Champion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chan v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chandler v. Chandler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chandler v. Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1127
513
446
1115
1068
1032
1018
1117
1093
1025
1121
1040
1107
1091
1005
1081
1020
1068
1123
1036
1005,1015,1064,1078,1086
1057
1022
1021
1008
1008,1145
1128
1087
1066
1017
1037
1019
1109
1056
1056
1070
1078
1074
1045
1057
1049
1080
1054,1144
1036,1084

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely found at the beginning of a legal document or case law compilation. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 728 (2000)

745

Opinion of the Court

B

The ranchers’ second challenge focuses upon a provision of
the Taylor Act that limits issuance of permits to “settlers,
residents, and other stock owners . . . .” 43 U. S. C. § 315b
In 1936, the Secretary, following this re-
(emphasis added).
issued a regulation that limited eligibility to
quirement,
those who “ow[n] livestock.”
2 App. 808 (Rules for Adminis-
tration of Grazing Districts (Mar. 2, 1936)). But in 1942, the
Secretary changed the regulation’s wording to limit eligibil-
ity to those “engaged in the livestock business,” 1942 Range
Code § 3(a), and so it remained until 1994. The new regula-
tion eliminates the words “engaged in the livestock busi-
ness,” thereby seeming to make eligible otherwise qualiﬁed
applicants even if they do not engage in the livestock busi-
ness. See 43 CFR § 4110.1(a) (1995).

The new change is not as radical as the text of the new
regulation suggests. The new rule deletes the entire phrase
“engaged in the livestock business” from § 4110.1, and seems
to require only that an applicant “own or control land or
water base property . . . .”
Ibid. But the omission, stand-
ing alone, does not render the regulation facially invalid, for
the regulation cannot change the statute, and a regulation
promulgated to guide the Secretary’s discretion in exercising
his authority under the Act need not also restate all related
statutory language. Ultimately it is both the Taylor Act and
the regulations promulgated thereunder that constrain the
Secretary’s discretion in issuing permits. The statute con-
tinues to limit the Secretary’s authorization to issue permits
to “bona ﬁde settlers, residents, and other stock owners.”
43 U. S. C. § 315b (emphasis added).

Nor will the change necessarily lead to widespread issu-
ance of grazing permits to “stock owners” who are not in the
livestock business. Those in the business continue to enjoy
a preference in the issuance of grazing permits. The same
section of the Taylor Act mandates that the Secretary accord
a preference to “landowners engaged in the livestock busi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Taylor Act and its regulations regarding grazing permits.  It delves into the interpretation of specific language within the Act and its regulations, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 14–7955
_________________

RICHARD E. GLOSSIP, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

KEVIN J. GROSS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[June 29, 2015]

JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SCALIA  joins,

concurring.

I  agree  with  the  Court  that  petitioners’  Eighth  Amend-
ment  claim  fails.  That  claim  has  no  foundation  in  the
Eighth Amendment, which prohibits only those “method[s]
of  execution”  that  are  “deliberately  designed  to  inflict
pain.”  Baze  v.  Rees,  553  U. S.  35,  94  (2008)  (THOMAS, J.,
concurring  in  judgment).    Because  petitioners  make  no
allegation  that  Oklahoma  adopted  its  lethal  injection
protocol “to add elements of terror, pain, or disgrace to the
death  penalty,”  they  have  no  valid  claim.    Id.,  at  107.
That should have been the end of this case, but our prece-
dents  have  predictably  transformed  the  federal  courts
“into boards of inquiry charged with determining the ‘best
practices’  for  executions,”  id.,  at  101  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted),  necessitating  the  painstaking  factual
inquiry the Court undertakes today.  Although I continue
to  believe  that  the  broader  interpretation  of  the  Eighth
Amendment  advanced  in  the  plurality  opinion  in  Baze  is
erroneous,  I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full  because  it
correctly  explains  why  petitioners’  claim  fails  even  under
that controlling opinion.

I  write  separately  to  respond  to  JUSTICE  BREYER’s  dis-
sent questioning the constitutionality of the death penalty
generally.  No more need be said about the constitutional
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lv

Page

873

Freeman v. Norfolk Southern Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Freeman v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Freeman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  826,914

1116

Frehly v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932

Freightliner LLC; Adcock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947

French v. Lemery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

French; Prevatte v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912

French v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

Friedland v. TIC-The Industrial Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1030,1159

Friel; Miller v.
925

Frink v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089

Frommert; Conkright v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

Frost v. Toney
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1059

Frost v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916

Frye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Fuentes Rios v. Cate
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

Fuller v. Bergh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Fuller v. Kentucky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
890

Fuller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fullerblack, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  988,1087

906

Fults v. Upton  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Fultz v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fuqua; Graber v.
831

Furnish v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Futch v. Dewey
994

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
G. v. Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services  . . . . . .  878,1139
898

G. v. Oregon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Gaber v. Henderson
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1033

Gable v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

Gaddy; Menke v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Gaddy v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

Gaetz; Carter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Gaetz; Hernandez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1016

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gaetz; Johnson v.
1119

Gaffney; Orsello v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Gagnon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

Gahagan v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1084

Gainer v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gaines v. McNeil
925

Gaines v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

Galache v. Kenan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

Galaza; Cook v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

Galindo-Cruz v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Gallagher & Co.; Babcock v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC.

GORSUCH, J., concurring

stare decisis, or defended as misbranded products of feder-
alism  or  antidiscrimination  imperatives  flowing  from
Article  IV’s  Privileges  and  Immunities  Clause  are  ques-
tions  for  another  day.  See  Energy  &  Environment  Legal
Inst. v. Epel, 793 F. 3d 1169, 1171 (CA10 2015); Comptrol-
ler  of  Treasury  of  Md.  v.  Wynne,  575  U. S.  ___,  ___–___
(2015)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  1–3);  Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S.
564,  610–620  (1997)  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting).  Today  we
put  Bellas  Hess  and  Quill  to  rest  and  rightly  end  the
paradox  of  condemning  interstate  discrimination  in  the
national economy while promoting it ourselves.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

9

Opinion of the Court

We largely agree.  Although §2’s saving clause preserves
generally  applicable  contract  defenses,  nothing  in  it  sug-
gests  an  intent  to  preserve  state-law  rules  that  stand  as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.
Cf. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 872
(2000);  Crosby  v.  National  Foreign  Trade  Council,  530
U. S.  363,  372–373  (2000).    As  we  have  said,  a  federal
statute’s saving clause “ ‘cannot in reason be construed as
[allowing] a common law right, the continued existence of
which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions
of  the  act.
In  other  words,  the  act  cannot  be  held  to
destroy  itself.’ ”    American  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.  v.
Central  Office  Telephone,  Inc.,  524  U. S.  214,  227–228
(1998)  (quoting  Texas  &  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Abilene  Cotton
Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446 (1907)).

We differ with the Concepcions only in the application of
this analysis to the matter before us.  We do not agree that
rules  requiring  judicially  monitored  discovery  or  adher-
ence  to  the  Federal  Rules  of  Evidence  are  “a  far  cry  from
this  case.”  Brief  for  Respondents  32.  The  overarching
purpose  of  the  FAA,  evident  in  the  text  of  §§2,  3,  and  4,
is  to  ensure  the  enforcement  of  arbitration  agreements
according  to  their  terms  so  as  to  facilitate  streamlined
proceedings.  Requiring  the  availability  of  classwide  arbi-
tration  interferes  with  fundamental  attributes  of  arbitra-
tion and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.

B
The  “principal  purpose”  of  the  FAA  is  to  “ensur[e]  that
private  arbitration  agreements  are  enforced  according  to

——————

sion.  It says that to its knowledge “we have not . . . applied the Act to
strike down a state statute that treats arbitrations on par with judicial
and administrative proceedings,” post, at 10 (opinion of BREYER, J.), and
that  “we  should  think  more  than  twice  before  invalidating  a  state  law
that . . . puts agreements to arbitrate and agreements to litigate ‘upon
the same footing’ ” post, at 4–5.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and its application to state laws regarding arbitration. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

25

JACKSON, J., dissenting

and for all time, his right to rely on any new retroactive Su-
preme  Court  opinion  that  suggests  he  is  incarcerated  for
noncriminal behavior.  There is no indication that Congress
meant for Jones and other prisoners in his position to have
to  choose  between  pursing  an  ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim and a claim of legal innocence.

*

*

*
Despite  all  this,  the  majority  clings  to  its  “straightfor-
ward” negative inference and interprets §2255(h) as a bar
to a court’s consideration of Jones’s legal innocence claim.
My point is that, with so many contextual indicators that
Congress did not really mean for §2255(h) to be read to pre-
clude new claims of statutory innocence, the Court should
have simply determined that Jones’s petition, which asserts
such a claim, was not plainly barred by §2255(h), and could
thus proceed in a successive §2255 petition.

B
Instead  of  drawing  an  inference  about  the  operation  of
§2255(h),  the  most  “straightforward”  way  of  determining
whether Jones’s legal innocence claim is precluded by stat-
ute, ante, at 12, would have been to apply our clear-state-
ment rule to today’s interpretation.

1

A “longstanding rule” of this Court, INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U. S. 289, 298 (2001), the clear-statement rule directs that,
before interpreting a congressional enactment as “ ‘clos[ing
the  Court’s]  doors  to  a  class  of  habeas  petitioners,’ ”  the
Court  must  search  for  a  “ ‘clear  indication  that  such  was
Congress’ intent,’ ” Panetti, 551 U. S., at 946 (quoting Cas-
tro, 540 U. S., at 381).  This principle recognizes that Con-
gress must “speak unambiguously when it seeks to effect a
result  that,  although  constitutional,  would  undermine  a
constitutionally  derived  value.”  J.  Manning,  Textualism
and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 121–
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, which is suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 183 (2010)

203

Breyer, J., dissenting

the  Court  believe  necessary,  particularly  when  the  statutes
themselves  authorize  the  local  court  to  put  a  new  rule  into
effect  “without”  receiving  any  “comments”  before  doing  so
when that local “court determines that there is an immediate
need”  to  do  so  (and  to  receive  comments  later)?  And  more
importantly,  what  is  the  legal  source  of  the  Court’s  demand
for  additional  comment  time  in  respect  to  a  rule  change  to
conform to Judicial Council policy?

Second, this legal question is not the kind of legal question
that  this  Court  would  normally  grant  certiorari  to  consider.
There is no conﬂict among the state or federal courts regard
ing the procedures by which a district court changes its local
rules.  Cf. this Court’s Rules 10(a)–(b).  The technical valid
ity  of  the  procedures  followed  below  does  not  implicate  an
open  “important  question  of  federal  law.”  Cf.  Rule  10(c).
Nor do the procedures below clearly conﬂict with any prece
dent from this Court.  Cf. ibid.

It is particularly inadvisable for this Court to consider this
kind of question because it involves local rules and local judi
cial  administration.  Here,  for  example,  the  Court  decides
just  how  a  district  court  should  modify  its  own  local  rules;
in  a  word,  this  Court  micromanages  district  court  adminis
trative  procedures  in  the  most  detailed  way.  And,  without
brieﬁng,  the  Court  imposes  limitations  on  the  judicial  coun
cils’  ability  to  implement  policy  decisions,  ante,  at  194–195
(suggesting council policy does not abrogate local rules), with
consequences  we  cannot  predict.  The  district  councils,  the
circuit councils, the Judicial Conference of the United States,
and  The  Chief  Justice  bear  responsibility  for  judicial
administration,  not  this  Court.  See  28  U. S. C.  §§ 331–332.
And  those  bodies  have  adequate  authority  to  resolve  dis
agreements  about  how  to  promulgate  and  apply  local  rules,
and, particularly, about the use of cameras in the courtroom.
For  the  past  80  years,  local  judicial  administration  has
been left to the exclusive province of the circuit judicial coun
cils, and this Court lacks their institutional experience.  See
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments regarding the procedures for changing local court rules and the Court's role in such matters.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

UNITED STATES v. VAELLO MADERO

GORSUCH, J., concurring

people,  McCulloch  v.  Maryland,  4  Wheat.  316,  404–405
(1819),  and  is  empowered  to  act  only  in  accord  with  the
terms of the written Constitution the people have approved,
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176–177 (1803).  Em-
pires  and  duchies  in  Europe  may  have  subscribed  to  the
“doctrine . . . that the people were made for kings, not kings
for the people.”  The Federalist No. 45, p. 289 (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961) (J. Madison).  “Monarchical and despotic govern-
ments” may possess the power to act “unrestrained by writ-
ten constitutions.”  Downes, 182 U. S., at 380 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).  But our Nation’s government “has no existence
except by virtue of the Constitution,” and it may not ignore
that charter in the Territories any more than it may in the
States.  Id., at 382.

The  Insular  Cases’  departure  from  the  Constitution’s
original  meaning  has  never  been  much  of  a  secret.    Even
commentators at the time understood that the notion of ter-
ritorial incorporation was a thoroughly modern invention.1
The Insular Cases deviated, too, from this Court’s prior and
longstanding understanding of the Constitution.  In 1898,
the  very  same  year  as  the  Spanish-American  War,  a  lop-
sided  majority  of  this  Court  judged  it  “beyond  question”
that  the  Constitution’s  jury-trial  guarantees  reached  “the
territories  of  the  United  States.”  Thompson  v.  Utah,  170
U. S. 343, 346–347 (1898) (Harlan, J.).  Nearly 80 years be-
fore that, the Court held that the Constitution’s Tax Uni-
formity  Clause  constrained  legislation  governing  the  Dis-
trict  of  Columbia.    Loughborough  v.  Blake,  5  Wheat.  317,
319 (1820) (Marshall, C. J.).  In between, this Court reached

——————

1 See C. Littlefield, The Insular Cases, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 169, 169–170
(1901); F. Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorpo-
ration, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 823, 832 (1926) (Coudert); see also M. Ramsey,
Originalism and Birthright Citizenship, 109 Geo. L. J. 405, 435 (2020);
Lawson & Seidman 196–197.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the Insular Cases and their departure from the Constitution's original meaning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

EGBERT v. BOULE

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

may not proceed under Bivens, but for reasons grounded in
precedent rather than this Court’s newly announced test.

I
This  case  comes  to  the  Court  following  the  District
Court’s grant of summary judgment to Agent Egbert.  The
Court is therefore bound to draw all reasonable factual in-
ferences in favor of Boule.  See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U. S.
650, 656–657 (2014) (per curiam).  Because the Court fails
to do so, the factual record is described below in some detail,
in the light our precedent requires.

A
Boule is a U. S. citizen who owns, operates, and lives in a
small  bed-and-breakfast  called  the  Smuggler’s  Inn  in
Blaine, Washington.  The property line of the land on which
the inn is located touches the U. S.-Canada border.  Shortly
after purchasing the property in 2000, Boule became aware
that people used his property to cross the border illegally in
both directions.  Boule began serving as a paid, confidential
informant  for  Customs  and  Border  Protection  (CBP)  in
2003 and for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
in  2008.  At  the  time  of  the  events  at  issue  in  this  case,
Boule was still serving as an informant for ICE.  ICE would
coordinate with CBP and other agencies based on the infor-
mation Boule provided.  Over the years, Boule provided in-
formation leading to numerous arrests.

On  the  morning  of  March  20,  2014,  petitioner  Erik  Eg-
bert,  a  CBP  agent,  twice  stopped  Boule  while  Boule  was
running  errands  in  town.  Agent  Egbert  knew  that  Boule
was a long-time informant for ICE and that he had previ-
ously worked as an informant for CBP.  Agent Egbert asked
Boule about guests at the inn, and Boule advised him of a
guest  he  expected  to  arrive  that  day  from  New  York  who
had flown in from Turkey the day before.  Boule explained
that two of his employees were en route to pick the guest up
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It sets the context of the case and introduces the parties involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2010

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SNYDER v. PHELPS ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09–751.  Argued October 6, 2010—Decided March 2, 2011

For the past 20 years, the congregation of the Westboro Baptist Church
has  picketed  military  funerals  to  communicate  its  belief  that  God
hates  the  United  States  for  its  tolerance  of  homosexuality,  particu-
larly  in  America’s  military.    The  church’s  picketing  has  also  con-
demned  the  Catholic  Church  for  scandals  involving  its  clergy.    Fred
Phelps, who founded the church, and six Westboro Baptist parishion-
ers (all relatives of Phelps) traveled to Maryland to picket the funeral
of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who was killed in Iraq in
the  line  of  duty.  The  picketing  took  place  on  public  land  approxi-
mately 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held, in ac-
cordance  with  guidance  from  local  law  enforcement  officers.    The
picketers  peacefully  displayed  their  signs—stating,  e.g.,  “Thank  God
for  Dead  Soldiers,”  “Fags  Doom  Nations,”  “America  is  Doomed,”
“Priests  Rape  Boys,”  and  “You’re  Going  to  Hell”—for  about  30  min-
utes before the funeral began.  Matthew Snyder’s father (Snyder), pe-
titioner here, saw the tops of the picketers’ signs when driving to the
funeral, but did not learn what was written on the signs until watch-
ing a news broadcast later that night.

Snyder filed a diversity action against Phelps, his daughters—who
participated in the picketing—and the church (collectively Westboro)
alleging, as relevant here, state tort claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy.  A
jury held Westboro liable for millions of dollars in compensatory and
punitive damages.  Westboro challenged the verdict as grossly exces-
sive and sought judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the
First  Amendment  fully  protected  its  speech.    The  District  Court  re-
duced the punitive damages award, but left the verdict otherwise in-
tact.  The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that Westboro’s state-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of the Court

plan was unconstitutional because its consciously political
design  was  “nothing  less  than  a  gigantic  political  gerry
mander.”  Id., at 752.  This Court rejected that claim.  We
reasoned that it would be “idle” to hold that “any political
consideration  taken  into  account  in  fashioning  a  reappor
tionment  plan  is  sufficient  to  invalidate  it,”  because  dis
tricting  “inevitably  has  and  is  intended  to  have  substan
tial political consequences.”  Id., at 752–753.

Thirteen years later came Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S.
109 (1986).  Unlike the bipartisan gerrymander at issue in
Gaffney,  the  allegation  in  Bandemer  was  that  Indiana
Republicans  had  gerrymandered  Indiana’s
legislative
districts  “to  favor  Republican  incumbents  and  candidates
and to disadvantage Democratic voters” through what the
plaintiffs  called  the  “stacking”  (packing)  and  “splitting”
(cracking)  of  Democrats.    478  U. S.,  at  116–117  (plurality
opinion).  A  majority  of  the  Court  agreed  that  the  case
before it was justiciable.  Id., at 125, 127.  The Court could
not, however, settle on a standard for what constitutes an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.

Four Justices would have required the Bandemer plain
tiffs  to  “prove  both  intentional  discrimination  against  an
identifiable  political  group  and  an  actual  discriminatory
effect on that group.”  Id., at 127.  In that plurality’s view,
the  plaintiffs  had  failed  to  make  a  sufficient  showing  on
the  latter  point  because  their  evidence  of  unfavorable
election  results  for  Democrats  was  limited  to  a  single
election cycle.  See id., at 135.

Three Justices, concurring in the judgment, would have
held  that  the  “Equal  Protection  Clause  does  not  supply
judicially  manageable  standards  for  resolving  purely
political  gerrymandering  claims.”    Id.,  at  147  (opinion  of
O’Connor, J.).  Justice  O’Connor  took issue, in particular,
with  the  plurality’s  focus  on  factual  questions  concerning
“statewide  electoral  success.”    Id.,  at  158.  She  warned
that  allowing  district  courts  to  “strike  down  apportion
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, likely from the Supreme Court case cited at the beginning. It discusses previous cases related to partisan gerrymandering and the challenges of establishing legal standards for addressing it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AMERICAN LEGION  v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

THOMAS,  J., concurring  in judgment
THOMAS,  J., concurring  in judgment

Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 49–51 (2004)
(opinion concurring in judgment); Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U. S. 677, 692–693 (2005) (concurring opinion); Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris,  536  U. S.  639,  677–680  (2002)  (same).
In  Everson  v.  Board  of  Ed.  of  Ewing,  330  U. S.  1,  15
(1947), the Court “casually” incorporated the Clause with
a declaration that because the Free Exercise Clause had
been  incorporated,  “ ‘[t]here  is  every  reason  to  give  the
same application and broad interpretation to the “estab-
lishment of religion” clause.’ ”  Town of Greece, 572 U. S.,
at 607, n. 1 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).  The Court apparently
did  not  consider  that  an  incorporated  Establishment
Clause would prohibit exactly what the text of the Clause
seeks to protect: state establishments of religion.  See id.,
at 605–606.
  The Court’s “inattention” to the significant question of
incorporation “might be explained, although not excused,
by  the  rise  of  popular  conceptions  about  ‘separation  of
church  and  state’  as an ‘American’ constitutional right.”
Id., at 608, n. 1; see P. Hamburger, Separation of Church
and State 454–463 (2002); see also id., at 391–454 (tracing
the role of nativist sentiment in the rise of “the modern
myth of separation” as an American ideal).  But an ahis-
torical generalization is no substitute for careful constitu-
tional  analysis.    We  should  consider  whether  any
longstanding  right  of  citizenship restrains the States in
the  establishment  context.    See  generally  McDonald  v.
Chicago,  561  U. S.  742,  805–858,  and  n. 20  (2010)
(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in
judgment).
  Further confounding the incorporation question is the
fact that the First Amendment by its terms applies only to
“law[s]” enacted by “Congress.”  Obviously, a memorial is
not a law.  And respondents have not identified any speci-
fic law they challenge as unconstitutional, either on its face
or  as applied.  Thus, respondents could prevail on their
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It cites other legal cases and delves into constitutional analysis regarding the Establishment Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

tects against “indirect coercion or penalties on the free ex-
ercise  of  religion,  not  just  outright  prohibitions.”    Lyng  v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439,
450 (1988).  In particular, we have repeatedly held that a
State  violates  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  when  it  excludes
religious  observers  from  otherwise  available  public  bene-
fits.  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404 (1963) (“It
is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion
and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing
of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.”); see also Everson
v.  Board  of  Ed.  of  Ewing,  330  U. S.  1,  16  (1947)  (a  State
“cannot exclude” individuals “because of their faith, or lack
of  it,  from  receiving  the  benefits  of  public  welfare  legisla-
tion”).  A State may not withhold unemployment benefits,
for instance, on the ground that an individual lost his job
for refusing to abandon the dictates of his faith.  See Sher-
bert, 374 U. S., at 399–402 (Seventh-day Adventist who re-
fused to work on the Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment  Security  Div.,  450  U. S.  707,  709,  720  (1981)
(Jehovah’s  Witness  who  refused  to  participate  in  the  pro-
duction of armaments).

We have recently applied these principles in the context
of two state efforts to withhold otherwise available public
benefits from religious organizations.  In Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), we
considered a Missouri program that offered grants to qual-
ifying  nonprofit  organizations  that  installed  cushioning
playground surfaces made from recycled rubber tires.  The
Missouri Department of Natural Resources maintained an
express  policy  of  denying  such  grants  to  any  applicant
owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious en-
tity.  The Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center
applied for a grant to resurface its gravel playground, but
the Department denied funding on the ground that the Cen-
ter was operated by the Church.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and its application to cases involving public benefits and religious organizations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. ET AL. v. ITALIAN COLORS
RESTAURANT ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 12–133.  Argued February 27, 2013—Decided June 20, 2013

An agreement between petitioners, American Express and a subsidiary,
and respondents, merchants who accept American Express cards, re-
quires all of their disputes to be resolved by arbitration and provides
that  there  “shall  be  no  right  or  authority  for  any  Claims  to  be  arbi-
trated on a class action basis.”  Respondents nonetheless filed a class
action, claiming that petitioners violated §1 of the Sherman Act and
seeking treble damages for the class under §4 of the Clayton Act.  Pe-
titioners  moved  to  compel  individual  arbitration  under  the  Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), but respondents countered that the cost of ex-
pert  analysis  necessary  to  prove  the  antitrust  claims  would  greatly
exceed  the  maximum  recovery  for  an  individual  plaintiff.    The  Dis-
trict Court granted the motion and dismissed the lawsuits.  The Se-
cond Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that because of the pro-
hibitive  costs  respondents  would  face  if  they  had  to  arbitrate,  the
class-action waiver was unenforceable and arbitration could not pro-
ceed.  The Circuit stood by its reversal when this Court remanded in
light  of  Stolt-Nielsen  S. A.  v.  AnimalFeeds  International  Corp.,  559
U. S. 662, which held that a party may not be compelled to submit to
class arbitration absent an agreement to do so.

Held: The FAA does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiv-
er  of  class  arbitration  on  the  ground  that  the  plaintiff’s  cost  of  indi-
vidually  arbitrating  a  federal  statutory  claim  exceeds  the  potential
recovery.  Pp. 3–10.

(a) The FAA reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a
matter  of  contract.    See  Rent-A-Center,  West,  Inc.  v.  Jackson,  561
U. S.  ___,  ___.    Courts  must  “rigorously  enforce”  arbitration  agree-
ments  according  to  their  terms,  Dean  Witter  Reynolds,  Inc.  v.  Byrd,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text. They are typically used for informational purposes and do not contain the actual legal arguments or holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 20–543 and 20–544
_________________

20–543

JANET L. YELLEN, SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY, PETITIONER
v.
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS
RESERVATION, ET AL.

20–544

ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGE CORPORATION
ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS
RESERVATION, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[June 25, 2021]

  JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  and
JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
  The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(CARES Act) directed trillions of dollars to various recipi-
ents across the Nation to help them address the COVID–19
pandemic.  Our case focuses on $8 billion Congress set aside
for “Tribal governments.”  The question we must answer is
whether  Alaska’s  for-profit  Alaska  Native  Corporations
(ANCs)  qualify  as  “Tribal  governments.”    If  they  do,  they
may receive approximately $450 million of the earmarked
funds; if not, the money will go to tribes across the country.
The Court  of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
wrote  a  thoughtful  and  unanimous  opinion  holding  that
ANCs are not “Tribal governments.”  Today, the Court dis-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes case citations, the names of the justices involved, and a summary of the case at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xxxviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1056

Court of Appeals of Wis., District I; Alston v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

Couvillion; Emerson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Covalt v. Allstate Ins. Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Covarrubias Ruezga v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1016

Covington v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
890

Cowan v. Ofﬁce of Personnel Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cox v. California
824

Cox v. DeSoto County
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

Cox v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058

Cox v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Coyle; Hawkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936

Craig v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908

Crain; Smithback v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

Crain v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

Crandell v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Cravener; Oguagha v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Craver v. Franco
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137

Crawford v. TRW Automotive U. S. LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927

Crawford v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Crazy Horse Too v. Cook County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918

Creed v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1023

Crehan; McComb v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Cresswell v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  907,1066

Creusere v. Weaver
Crews v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Crim v. United States
853

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Crisostomos v. Lawler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crist; Finfrock v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Crites; Bisby v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  990,1138

1056

Crosthwait; McCall v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1002

Croto v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Crowe; Borcsok v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
899

Crowe v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908

Crum v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
984

Crutcher v. U. S. District Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
807

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crutcher v. Williams
1121

Crutchﬁeld v. Florida Dept. of Corrections
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
853

Crute v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cruz v. Lawler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Cruz v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  936,993,1015,1158

917

Cruz-Barrientos v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1033

Cruz-Gramajo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Cruz-Meza v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

CSX Corp.; Beal v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection.  It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA

BREYER, J., dissenting

The  Court  has  taken  this  same  respectful  approach  to
economic  and  social  legislation  when  a  First  Amendment
claim  like  the  claim  present  here  is  at  issue.    See,  e.g.,
Zauderer  v.  Office  of  Disciplinary  Counsel  of  Supreme
Court  of  Ohio,  471  U. S.  626,  651  (1985)  (upholding  rea-
sonable  disclosure  requirements  for  attorneys);  Milavetz,
Gallop  &  Milavetz,  P. A.  v.  United  States,  559  U. S.  229,
252–253  (2010)  (same);  cf.  Central  Hudson  Gas  &  Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 563–
564  (1980)  (applying  intermediate  scrutiny  to  other  re-
strictions  on  commercial  speech);  In re  R. M. J.,  455  U. S.
191,  203  (1982)  (no  First  Amendment  protection  for  mis-
leading  or  deceptive  commercial  speech).  But  see  Sorrell
v.  IMS  Health  Inc.,  564  U. S.  552  (2011)  (striking  down
regulation of pharmaceutical drug-related information).

Even  during  the  Lochner  era,  when  this  Court  struck
down numerous economic regulations concerning industry,
this  Court  was  careful  to  defer  to  state  legislative  judg-
ments concerning the medical profession.  The Court took
the view that a State  may condition the practice of medi-
cine  on  any  number  of  requirements,  and  physicians,  in
exchange  for  following  those  reasonable  requirements,
could receive a license to practice medicine from the State.
Medical  professionals  do  not,  generally  speaking,  have  a
right  to  use  the  Constitution  as  a  weapon  allowing  them
rigorously to control the content of those reasonable condi-
tions.  See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (1889)
(upholding  medical  licensing  requirements);  Hawker  v.
New  York,  170  U. S.  189  (1898)  (same);  Collins  v.  Texas,
223  U. S.  288,  297–298  (1912)  (recognizing  the  “right  of
the  State  to  adopt  a  policy  even  upon  medical  matters
concerning  which  there  is  difference  of  opinion  and  dis-
pute”);  Lambert  v.  Yellowley,  272  U. S.  581,  596  (1926)
(“[T]here  is  no  right  to  practice  medicine  which  is  not
subordinate  to  the  police  power  of  the  States”);  Graves  v.
Minnesota, 272 U. S. 425, 429 (1926) (statutes “regulating
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to First Amendment rights and regulations on the medical profession.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

BARRETT, J., dissenting

the game,
“shall be suspended.”

While the specific verbs in the first clause involve actions
directed at an opposing player, the second clause is a sepa-
rate prohibition with an entirely different object.  Imagine
that, just before the opposing team’s kicker attempts a field
goal, players leave the sidelines and storm the field, some
tackling referees in the process.  Those players have surely
“interrupt[ed],  hinder[ed],  or  interfer[ed]  with  the  game,”
even though they have not physically injured any opponent.
This  hypothetical,  not  the  Court’s,  is  analogous  to
§1512(c)—and it supports the Government’s interpretation.

2

The  Court  next  recruits  help  from  Begay,  which  inter-
prets an “otherwise” clause in the Armed Career Criminal
Act.  Ante, at 6; 553 U. S., at 140.  The ACCA defines a “vi-
olent felony” as a felony that “is burglary, arson, or extor-
tion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves con-
duct  that  presents  a  serious  potential  risk  of  physical
injury.”  18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Begay holds that the
example crimes limit the catchall clause to “crimes that are
roughly similar . . . to the examples themselves.”  553 U. S.,
at 143.  So too here, the Court reasons, the list of crimes in
(c)(1) limits the “otherwise” clause in (c)(2).

But §1512(c) is structured differently than the statute in
Begay.  While §1512(c) contains two distinct criminal pro-
hibitions—(c)(1) and (c)(2)—the statutory definition in Be-
gay contained a list of examples followed immediately by a
residual clause.  The latter structure more readily supports
interpreting  the  general  clause  in  light  of  the  specifics,
much like a statute to which the ejusdem canon would ap-
ply.  Moreover, the residual clause at issue in Begay called
out  for  a  limiting  principle—what  is  a  “serious  potential
risk of physical injury?”  The breadth itself was a cue that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis of a statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 100 (2009)

107

Opinion of the Court

police  the  prejudgment  tactics  of  litigants]  if  the  appellate
courts do not repeatedly intervene to second-guess prejudg
ment rulings”).

The  justiﬁcation  for  immediate  appeal  must  therefore  be
sufﬁciently  strong  to  overcome  the  usual  beneﬁts  of  defer
ring  appeal  until  litigation  concludes.  This  requirement
ﬁnds expression in two of the three traditional Cohen condi
tions.  The  second  condition  insists  upon  “important  ques
tions  separate  from  the  merits.”  Swint,  514  U. S.,  at  42
(emphasis  added).  More  signiﬁcantly,  “the  third  Cohen
question, whether a right is ‘adequately vindicable’ or ‘effec
tively  reviewable,’  simply  cannot  be  answered  without  a
judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost
through  rigorous  application  of  a  ﬁnal  judgment  require
ment.”  Digital  Equipment,  511  U. S.,  at  878–879.  That  a
ruling  “may  burden  litigants  in  ways  that  are  only  imper
fectly reparable by appellate reversal of a ﬁnal district court
judgment . . . has never sufﬁced.”  Id., at 872.  Instead, the
decisive  consideration  is  whether  delaying  review  until  the
entry  of  ﬁnal  judgment  “would  imperil  a  substantial  public
interest”  or  “some  particular  value  of  a  high  order.”  Will,
546 U. S., at 352–353.

In making this determination, we do not engage in an “in
dividualized  jurisdictional  inquiry.”  Coopers  &  Lybrand  v.
Livesay,  437  U. S.  463,  473  (1978).  Rather,  our  focus  is  on
“the  entire  category  to  which  a  claim  belongs.”  Digital
Equipment, 511 U. S., at 868.  As long as the class of claims,
taken  as  a  whole,  can  be  adequately  vindicated  by  other
means,  “the  chance  that  the  litigation  at  hand  might  be
speeded,  or  a  ‘particular  injustic[e]’  averted,”  does  not  pro
vide a basis for jurisdiction under § 1291.  Ibid. (quoting Van
Cauwenberghe  v.  Biard,  486  U. S.  517,  529  (1988);  alteration
in original).

B

In  the  present  case,  the  Court  of  Appeals  concluded  that
the District Court’s privilege-waiver order satisﬁed the ﬁrst
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the standards for immediate appeal of certain rulings. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

141

Opinion of the Court

“(B) with respect to the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling of the de-
vice, and

“(C) weighing any probable beneﬁt to health from the
use of the device against any probable risk of injury or
illness from such use.”

A straightforward reading of this provision dictates that the
FDA must weigh the probable therapeutic beneﬁts of the
device to the consumer against the probable risk of injury.
Applied to tobacco products, the inquiry is whether their
purported beneﬁts—satisfying addiction, stimulation and
sedation, and weight control—outweigh the risks to health
from their use. To accommodate the FDA’s conception of
safety, however, one must read “any probable beneﬁt to
health” to include the beneﬁt to public health stemming from
adult consumers’ continued use of tobacco products, even
though the reduction of tobacco use is the raison d’eˆtre of
the regulations.
In other words, the FDA is forced to con-
tend that the very evil it seeks to combat is a “beneﬁt to
health.” This is implausible.

The FDA’s conception of safety is also incompatible with
the FDCA’s misbranding provision. Again, § 352( j) pro-
vides that a product is “misbranded” if “it is dangerous to
health when used in the dosage or manner, or with the fre-
quency or duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested
in the labeling thereof.” According to the FDA’s under-
standing, a product would be “dangerous to health,” and
therefore misbranded under § 352( j), when, in comparison to
leaving the product on the market, a ban would not produce
“adverse health consequences” in aggregate. Quite simply,
these are different inquiries. Although banning a particular
product might be detrimental to public health in aggregate,
the product could still be “dangerous to health” when used
as directed. Section 352( j) focuses on dangers to the con-
sumer from use of the product, not those stemming from the
agency’s remedial measures.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the FDA's regulations on tobacco products. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xxix

Page

1049

California Dept. of Transportation; Constant v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

California Dept. of Veterans Affairs; Martin’s Estate v.  . . . . . . . .
1124

California Ins. Comm’r; Steppe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1143

. . . .
California State Republican Legislator Intervenors v. Plata
California Western School of Law; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

1034

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calle-Ochoa v. United States
Calles v. Uribe  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  853,1159

839

Calvert County Public Schools; Hodge v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Camacho v. United States
927

Camacho-Jimenez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cameron; Childress v.
852

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cameron; Smith v.
Cameron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  930,1035

1122

Camillo v. Shinseki  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Campbell; Acosta v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Campbell; Malone v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

Campbell v. McNeil
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Campbell v.  Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority (SEPTA)
Campbell v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1001

987

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Candelaria; Chamber of Commerce of U. S. v.
Candia v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  848,1139

991

Can Do, Inc.; McCrory v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036

Canipe v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
890

Cannedy v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

Cannon; Walls v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cano v. Industrial Comm’n of Ariz.
Cantrell v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
895

Cantu v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  959,1035

1001

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cao v. United States
819

Capistrano Uniﬁed School Dist.; L. M. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938

Capital Ventures International; Republic of Argentina v.  . . . . . . .
1091

Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1084

Carapia-Garcia v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968

Carbin, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943

Carbin v. Bennett  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

Cardenas v. Figueroa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Cardenas Negrete v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

Cardinal v. Metrish
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1156

Cardona v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

Cardosa-Ferreira v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

Cardoza-Puente v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Carey; Cooper v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035

Carey v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1065
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

600

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Syllabus

Assuming that there has been gender-based disparate treatment by
state authorities in these cases, it would not be enough to save § 13981’s
civil remedy, which is directed not at a State or state actor but at in-
dividuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.
Section 13981 visits no consequence on any Virginia public ofﬁcial in-
volved in investigating or prosecuting Brzonkala’s assault, and it is
thus unlike any of the § 5 remedies this Court has previously upheld.
See, e. g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301. Section 13981
is also different from previously upheld remedies in that it applies uni-
formly throughout the Nation, even though Congress’ ﬁndings indicate
that the problem addressed does not exist in all, or even most, States.
In contrast, the § 5 remedy in Katzenbach was directed only to those
States in which Congress found that there had been discrimination.
Pp. 619–627.

169 F. 3d 820, afﬁrmed.

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-
nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., ﬁled a
concurring opinion, post, p. 627. Souter, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion,
in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 628.
Breyer, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, and in
which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined as to Part I–A, post, p. 655.

Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the
United States in No. 99–5. With him on the briefs were
Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor
General Underwood, Barbara McDowell, Mark B. Stern,
Alisa B. Klein, and Anne Murphy. Julie Goldsheid argued
the cause for petitioner in No. 99–29. With her on the briefs
were Martha F. Davis, Eileen N. Wagner, Carter G. Phillips,
Richard D. Bernstein, Katherine L. Adams, Jacqueline Ger-
son Cooper, and Paul A. Hemmersbaugh.

Michael E. Rosman argued the cause for respondents in
both cases. With him on the brief for respondent Morrison
were Hans F. Bader and W. David Paxton. Joseph Graham
Painter, Jr., ﬁled a brief for respondent Crawford.†

†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the State of
Arizona et al. by Janet Napolitano, Attorney General of Arizona, Eliot
Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Preeta D. Bansal, Solicitor Gen-
eral, Jennifer K. Brown, Assistant Attorney General, and Paula S. Bick-
ett, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as fol-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus from the Supreme Court of the United States. It summarizes the case and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part

Those three considerations together provide a structured
methodology and roadmap for determining whether to over-
rule an erroneous constitutional precedent.  The three con-
siderations correspond to the Court’s historical practice and
encompass the various individual factors that the Court has
applied over the years as part of the stare decisis calculus.
And they are consistent with the Founding understanding
and, for example, Blackstone’s shorthand description that
overruling is warranted when (and only when) a precedent
is “manifestly absurd or unjust.”  1 Blackstone, Commen-
taries on the Laws of England, at 70.

Taken together, those three considerations set a high (but
not  insurmountable)  bar  for  overruling  a  precedent,  and
they  therefore  limit  the  number  of  overrulings  and  main-
tain stability in the law.4  Those three considerations also
constrain judicial discretion in deciding when to overrule an
erroneous precedent.  To be sure, applying those considera-
tions is not a purely mechanical exercise, and I do not claim
otherwise.  I  suggest  only  that  those  three  considerations
may better structure how to consider the many traditional
stare decisis factors.

It is inevitable that judges of good faith applying the stare
decisis considerations will sometimes disagree about when
to  overrule  an  erroneous  constitutional  precedent,  as  the
Court does in this case.  To begin with, judges may disagree
about whether a prior decision is wrong in the first place—
and importantly, that disagreement is sometimes the real
dispute when judges joust over stare decisis.  But even when
judges agree that a prior decision is wrong, they may dis-
agree about whether the decision is so egregiously wrong as
to  justify  an  overruling.  Judges  may  likewise  disagree

——————

4 Another important factor that limits the number of overrulings is that
the  Court  typically  does  not  overrule  a  precedent  unless  a  party
requests  overruling,  or  at  least  unless  the  Court  receives  briefing  and
argument on the stare decisis question.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the principles of stare decisis (the legal principle of following precedent) and the factors to consider when overruling a precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>