<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.

ALITO, J., concurring

and therefore it is important that our opinion not be misun-
derstood.2

I
The  Court  holds—and  I  agree—that:  the  First  Amend-
ment  permits  public  schools  to  regulate  some  student
speech  that  does  not  occur  on  school  premises  during  the
regular school day;3 this authority is more limited than the
authority that schools exercise with respect to on-premises
speech;4 courts should be “skeptical” about the constitution-
ality of the regulation of off-premises speech;5 the doctrine
of in loco parentis “rarely” applies to off-premises speech;6
public school students, like all other Americans, have the
right  to  express  “unpopular”  ideas  on  public  issues,  even
when those ideas are expressed in language that some find

——————

All our other cases involving the free-speech rights of public school stu-
dents concerned speech in school or in a school-sponsored event or publi-
cation.  See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 677–678
(1986) (school assembly); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S.
260,  262  (1988)  (school  newspaper);  Morse  v.  Frederick,  551  U. S.  393,
397 (2007) (display of banner on street near school at school-sponsored
event).

2 This case does not involve speech by a student at a public college or
university.    For  several  reasons,  including  the  age,  independence,  and
living  arrangements  of  such  students,  regulation  of  their  speech  may
raise very different questions from those presented here.  I do not under-
stand the decision in this case to apply to such students.

3 See ante, at 5 (stating that a public school’s authority to regulate stu-
dent speech does not “always disappear” when the speech “takes place
off campus” (emphasis added)); ibid. (“The school’s regulatory interests
remain  significant  in  some  off-campus  circumstances”  (emphasis
added)).

4 See  ante,  at  8  (stating  that  schools  have  “diminished”  authority  to

regulate off-premises speech).

5 See ante, at 7 (“[C]ourts must be more skeptical of a school’s efforts to

regulate off-campus speech”).

6 See  ibid.  (“[A]  school,  in  relation  to  off-campus  speech,  will  rarely

stand in loco parentis”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito in a case involving the free speech rights of public school students. It delves into the legal arguments and precedents surrounding off-campus student speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

Opinion of the Court

access  each  carrier’s  deep  repository  of  historical  location
information at practically no expense.

In  fact,  historical  cell-site  records  present  even  greater
privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle we
considered  in  Jones.  Unlike  the  bugged  container  in
Knotts or the car in Jones, a cell phone—almost a “feature
of  human  anatomy,”  Riley,  573  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at
9)—tracks  nearly  exactly  the  movements  of  its  owner.
While  individuals  regularly  leave  their  vehicles,  they
compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time.  A
cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thor-
oughfares  and  into  private  residences,  doctor’s  offices,
political  headquarters,  and  other  potentially  revealing
locales.  See id., at ___ (slip op., at 19) (noting that “nearly
three-quarters  of  smart  phone  users  report  being  within
five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% admit-
ting  that  they  even  use  their  phones  in  the  shower”);
contrast  Cardwell  v.  Lewis,  417  U. S.  583,  590  (1974)
(plurality  opinion)  (“A  car  has  little  capacity  for  escaping
public  scrutiny.”).  Accordingly,  when  the  Government
tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect
surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the
phone’s user.

Moreover,  the  retrospective  quality  of  the  data  here
gives  police  access  to  a  category  of  information  otherwise
unknowable.    In  the  past,  attempts  to  reconstruct  a  per-
son’s  movements  were  limited  by  a  dearth  of  records  and
the  frailties  of  recollection.  With  access  to  CSLI,  the
Government  can  now  travel  back  in  time  to  retrace  a
person’s whereabouts, subject only to the retention polices
of the wireless carriers, which currently maintain records
for  up  to  five  years.    Critically,  because  location  infor-
mation  is  continually  logged  for  all  of  the  400  million
devices  in  the  United  States—not  just  those  belonging  to
persons who might happen to come under investigation—
this  newfound  tracking  capacity  runs  against  everyone.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in a case related to cell phone location data privacy. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the government's access to historical cell-site location information (CSLI).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR

THOMAS, J., dissenting

I
In  2002  and  2003,  Justin  Eugene  Taylor  was  a  middle-
man  in  the  Richmond,  Virginia,  marijuana  trade.    He
bought the drug wholesale and sold it to retail distributors.
On August 14, 2003, he offered to obtain marijuana for re-
tail distributor Martin Sylvester.  Taylor ultimately failed
to  procure  the  drug  but  still  aimed  to  purloin  Sylvester’s
cash.  To  that  end,  Taylor  contacted  a  co-conspirator  who
had a handgun.  The two met Sylvester in an alley, ostensi-
bly  for  the  sale.  They  brandished  the  handgun  and  de-
manded the money.  Sylvester resisted and was shot.  The
robbers  fled,  leaving  Sylvester  to  die.    979  F. 3d  203,  205
(CA4 2020).

Prosecutors  in  the  Eastern  District  of  Virginia  charged
Taylor with various drug and firearms offenses.  Most rele-
vant  here,  they  charged  him  with  violating  18  U. S. C.
§924(c), which punishes anyone who “uses or carries a fire-
arm”  “during  and  in  relation  to  any  crime  of  violence,”  or
who possesses a firearm “in furtherance of any such crime.”
Congress defined a “crime of violence” in one of two ways:
as  an  offense  that  has  “as  an  element  the  use,  attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
or  property  of  another”  (commonly  called  the  “elements
clause”), or as an offense that, “by its nature, involves a sub-
stantial risk that physical force against the person or prop-
erty of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense”
clause”).
§§924(c)(3)(A), (B).

(commonly

“residual

called

the

Prosecutors  predicated  Taylor’s  §924(c)  charge  on  his
commission of attempted Hobbs Act robbery.  Ante, at 1 (de-
scribing Hobbs Act robbery).  In 2009, in exchange for the
Government dropping most of the charges, Taylor pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and the
§924(c) charge—that is, using a firearm during and in rela-
tion to a crime of violence.  In doing so, he admitted to the
attempted robbery and the shooting.  He also admitted that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments, citations, and a description of the case events.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR

OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
BREYER, J., dissenting

ment-compelled distortion in the eyes of those foreign audi-
ences, as well as listeners here at home.  Ibid.  Yet in the
wake  of  our  ruling,  respondents  have  continued  to  suffer
that exact same First Amendment harm.

True,  respondents’  international  mission  sometimes  re-
quires that they convey their message through affiliates in-
corporated in far-off countries, rather than registered here
at  home.  But  so  what?  Audiences  everywhere  attribute
speech based on whom they perceive to be speaking, not on
corporate paperwork they will never see.  What mattered in
AOSI I was thus how “clearly identified” the affiliates were
with respondents, not the fact that the affiliates were incor-
porated as separate legal entities.  Ibid.  And what matters
now is once again how “clearly identified” the affiliates are
with respondents, not the fact that the affiliates were incor-
porated as foreign legal entities.

The First Amendment question therefore hinges, as it did
before, on what an objective observer sees, hears, and un-
derstands  when  respondents  speak  through  their  foreign
affiliates.  As to that, not even the Government meaning-
fully disputes that respondents and their foreign affiliates
are clearly identified with one another.  Their appearances
are the same.  Their goals are the same.  Their values are
the same.  Their message is the same.  Leveraging Congress’
spending  power  to  demand  speech  from  respondents’  for-
eign  affiliates  distorts  that  shared  message—and  violates
respondents’  First  Amendment  rights.    So  while  respond-
ents  and  their  clearly  identified  foreign  affiliates  may  be
technically  different  entities  with respect  to  such  matters
as contracts, taxes, and torts, they are constitutionally the
same speaker when it comes to the protected speech at is-
sue in this case.

This two-entities-one-speaker principle is an established
part of our First Amendment jurisprudence.  Take Regan.
To refresh, in that case we upheld a ban on engaging in cer-
tain  protected  speech  (lobbying)  that  the  federal  tax  code
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into First Amendment arguments related to compelled speech and the identification of speakers, particularly in the context of international organizations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
458  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of Stevens, J.

The  insight  that  even  technically  independent  expendi
tures can be corrupting in much the same way as direct con
tributions is bolstered by our decision last year in Caperton
v.  A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. 868 (2009).  In that case,
Don Blankenship, the chief executive ofﬁcer of a corporation
with  a lawsuit  pending before  the West  Virginia high  court,
spent  large  sums  on  behalf  of  a  particular  candidate,  Brent
Benjamin,  running  for  a  seat  on  that  court.  “In  addition
to contributing the $1,000 statutory maximum to Benjamin’s
campaign  committee,  Blankenship  donated  almost  $2.5  mil
lion to ‘And For The Sake Of The Kids,’ ” a § 527 corporation
that  ran  ads  targeting  Benjamin’s  opponent.  Id.,  at  873.
“This was not all.  Blankenship spent, in addition, just over
$500,000  on  independent  expenditures  .  .  .  ‘  “to  support  .  .  .
Brent  Benjamin.” ’ ”  Ibid.  (second  alteration  in  original).
Applying its common sense, this Court accepted petitioners’
argument  that  Blankenship’s  “pivotal role  in  getting  Justice
Benjamin elected created a constitutionally intolerable prob
ability of actual bias” when Benjamin later declined to recuse
himself  from  the  appeal  by  Blankenship’s  corporation.  Id.,
at  882.  “Though  n[o]  . . . bribe or  criminal inﬂuence”  was
involved, we recognized that “Justice Benjamin would never
theless  feel  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  Blankenship  for  his  ex
traordinary  efforts  to  get  him  elected.”  Ibid.  “The  difﬁ
culties  of  inquiring  into  actual  bias,”  we  further  noted,
“simply  underscore  the  need  for  objective  rules,”  id.,  at
883—rules  which  will  perforce  turn  on  the  appearance  of
bias rather than its actual existence.

In  Caperton, then,  we  accepted  the  premise  that,  at  least
in  some  circumstances,  independent  expenditures  on  candi
date  elections  will  raise  an  intolerable  specter  of  quid  pro
quo  corruption.  Indeed,  this  premise  struck  the  Court  as
so  intuitive  that  it  repeatedly  referred  to  Blankenship’s
spending  on  behalf  of  Benjamin—spending  that  consisted  of

take  much  imagination  to  perceive  why  this  type  of  advocacy  might  be
especially apt to look like or amount to a deal or a threat.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It delves into the concept of corruption in political spending, drawing parallels to the Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

PATEL v. GARLAND

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

step two where the INA expressly vests the Attorney Gen-
eral with substantial discretion.  See St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at
307  (noting  the  traditional  and  longstanding  “distinction
between eligibility for discretionary relief, on the one hand,
and the favorable exercise of discretion, on the other hand”
(emphasis added)).

All of which leads us back to Mr. Patel’s case.  Before the
Eleventh Circuit, Mr.  Patel sought to challenge the BIA’s
step-one  determination  that  he  was  statutorily  ineligible
for adjustment of status, arguing that no reasonable adju-
dicator could have found the facts as the agency did.  The
INA  expressly  authorizes  courts  to  hear  claims  like  his.
8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  Unprompted, however, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) effectively undoes
this arrangement.  That court’s self-directed legal analysis
was mistaken.  Subparagraph (B)(i) only deprives courts of
jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s step-two dis-
cretionary  decision  to  grant  or  deny  relief,  not  the  BIA’s
step-one judgments regarding whether an individual is eli-
gible to be considered for such relief.

B
The majority, of course, offers a different view.  Following
the Eleventh Circuit’s lead, the majority contends that sub-
paragraph  (B)(i)’s  phrase  “any  judgment  regarding  the
granting of relief under § 1255” sweeps more broadly.  On
its account, the statute denies courts the power to correct
all agency decisions with respect to an adjustment-of-status
application under § 1255—both the agency’s step-one eligi-
bility  decisions  and  its  step-two  discretionary  decisions.
Ante,  at  8–9.    As  a  result,  no  court  may  correct  even  the
agency’s most egregious factual mistakes about an individ-
ual’s statutory eligibility for relief.  It is a novel reading of
a  25-year-old  statute.  One  at  odds  with  background  law
permitting judicial review.  And one even the government
disavows.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the interpretation of a specific statute (INA) and its implications for judicial review of immigration decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 139 (2010)

161

Opinion of Stevens, J.

The untenable choice Spisak describes is perfectly analogous
to the quandary, discussed above, that we described in Beck.
See  also  447  U. S.,  at  644  (“It  is  extremely  doubtful  that  ju
ries will understand the full implications of a mistrial or will
have  any  conﬁdence  that  their  choice  of  the  mistrial  option
will  ultimately  lead  to  the  right  result.  Thus,  they  could
have  no  assurance  that  a  second  trial  would  end  in  the
conviction  of  the  defendant  on  a  lesser  included  offense”
(footnote  omitted)).  Spisak  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  both
correctly  assailed  the  jury  instructions  at  issue  in  this  case,
but  in  my  view  Beck  provides  the  proper  basis  in  clearly
established  federal  law  to  conclude  the  instructions  were
unconstitutional.

II

Petitioner  defends  Spisak’s  counsel’s  closing  argument  as
a reasonable strategic decision “to draw the sting out of the
prosecution’s argument and gain credibility with the jury by
conceding  the  weaknesses  of  his  own  case.”  Brief  for  Peti
tioner  37.  I  agree  that  such  a  strategy  is  generally  a  rea
sonable one and, indeed, was a reasonable strategy under the
difﬁcult  circumstances  of  this  case.  Even  Spisak  concedes
that his counsel “faced an admittedly difﬁcult case in closing
argument  in  the  penalty  phase.”  Brief  for  Respondent  43.
But, surely, a strategy can be executed so poorly as to render
even the most reasonable of trial tactics constitutionally de
ﬁcient under Strickland v.  Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984).
And this is such a case.

It is difﬁcult to convey how thoroughly egregious counsel’s
closing  argument  was  without  reproducing  it  in  its  entirety.
The  Court’s  assessment  of  the  closing  as  “lengthy  and  ram
bling”  and  its  brief  description  of  its  content,  see  ante,  at
150, does not accurately capture the catastrophe of counsel’s
failed  strategy.  Sufﬁce  it  to  say  that  the  argument  shares
far  more  in  common  with  a  prosecutor’s  closing  than  with  a
criminal  defense  attorney’s.  Indeed,  the  argument  was  so
outrageous that it would have rightly subjected a prosecutor
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites legal precedents and discusses legal arguments.  While it is important legal content, it is not the kind of text that would typically be indexed for general reading purposes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

made  clear—just  as  Justice  Powell  had—that  the  law
school was limited in the means that it could pursue.  The
school  could  not  “establish  quotas  for  members  of  certain
racial groups or put members of those groups on separate
admissions tracks.”  Id., at 334.  Neither could it “insulate
applicants  who  belong  to  certain  racial  or  ethnic  groups
from the competition for admission.”  Ibid.  Nor still could
it  desire  “some  specified  percentage  of  a  particular  group
merely because of its race or ethnic origin.”  Id., at 329–330
(quoting Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
  These limits, Grutter explained, were intended to guard
against two dangers that all race-based government action
portends.  The first is the risk that the use of race will de-
volve into “illegitimate . . . stereotyp[ing].”  Richmond v. J.
A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Universities  were  thus  not  permitted  to  operate  their  ad-
missions programs on the “belief that minority students al-
ways (or even consistently) express some characteristic mi-
nority viewpoint on any issue.”  Grutter, 539 U. S., at 333
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The second risk is that
race would be used not as a plus, but as a negative—to dis-
criminate against those racial groups that were not the ben-
eficiaries of the race-based preference.  A university’s use of
race, accordingly, could not occur in a manner that “unduly
harm[ed] nonminority applicants.”  Id., at 341.

But  even  with  these  constraints  in  place,  Grutter  ex-
pressed marked discomfort with the use of race in college
admissions.  The Court stressed the fundamental principle
that “there are serious problems of justice connected with
the idea of [racial] preference itself.”  Ibid. (quoting Bakke,
438 U. S., at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.)).  It observed that
all “racial classifications, however compelling their goals,”
were “dangerous.”  Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342.  And it cau-
tioned that all “race-based governmental action” should “re-
mai[n] subject to continuing oversight to assure that it will
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion discussing the use of race in college admissions, specifically referencing the Grutter v. Bollinger case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

school case, “learning how to tolerate diverse expressive ac-
tivities  has  always  been  ‘part  of  learning  how  to  live  in  a
pluralistic  society’ ”  under  our  constitutional  tradition.
Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. ___, ___ (2022)
(slip op., at 29); cf. Khorrami v. Arizona, 598 U. S. ___, ___
(2022)  (GORSUCH,  J.,  dissenting  from  denial  of  certiorari)
(slip op., at 8) (collecting research showing that larger juries
are more likely to be racially diverse and “deliberate longer,
recall information better, and pay greater attention to dis-
senting voices”).

In  short,  for  more  than  four  decades,  it  has  been  this
Court’s settled law that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment authorizes a limited use of race in
college  admissions  in  service  of  the  educational  benefits
that  flow  from  a  diverse  student  body.    From  Brown  to
Fisher,  this  Court’s  cases  have  sought  to  equalize  educa-
tional opportunity in a society structured by racial segrega-
tion and to advance the Fourteenth Amendment’s vision of
an  America  where  racially  integrated  schools  guarantee
students of all races the equal protection of the laws.

D

Today, the Court concludes that indifference to race is the
only  constitutionally  permissible  means  to  achieve  racial
equality in college admissions.  That interpretation of the
Fourteenth  Amendment  is  not  only  contrary  to  precedent
and the entire teachings of our history, see supra, at 2–17,
but  is  also  grounded  in  the  illusion  that  racial  inequality
was a problem of a different generation.  Entrenched racial
inequality remains a reality today.  That is true for society
writ large and, more specifically, for Harvard and the Uni-
versity  of  North  Carolina  (UNC),  two  institutions  with  a
long  history  of  racial  exclusion.   Ignoring  race  will  not
equalize a society that is racially unequal.  What was true
in the 1860s, and again in 1954, is true today: Equality re-
quires acknowledgment of inequality.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the use of race in college admissions and cites relevant precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007)

23

Opinion of the Court

that  developing  countries  such  as  China  and  India  are
poised to increase greenhouse gas emissions substantially
over  the  next  century:  A  reduction  in  domestic  emissions
would  slow  the  pace  of  global  emissions  increases,  no
matter what happens elsewhere.

We  moreover  attach  considerable  significance  to  EPA’s
“agree[ment] with the President that ‘we must address the
issue of global climate change,’ ” 68 Fed. Reg. 52929 (quot-
ing  remarks  announcing  Clear  Skies  and  Global  Climate
Initiatives, 2002 Public Papers of George W. Bush, Vol. 1,
Feb.  14,  p. 227  (2004)),  and  to  EPA’s  ardent  support  for
various  voluntary  emission-reduction  programs,  68  Fed.
Reg.  52932.  As  Judge  Tatel  observed  in  dissent  below,
“EPA  would  presumably  not  bother  with  such  efforts  if  it
thought  emissions  reductions  would  have  no  discernable
impact on future global warming.”  415 F. 3d, at 66.

In  sum—at  least  according  to  petitioners’  uncontested
affidavits—the  rise  in  sea  levels  associated  with  global
warming  has  already  harmed  and  will  continue  to  harm
Massachusetts.  The  risk  of  catastrophic  harm,  though
remote,  is  nevertheless  real.  That  risk  would  be  reduced
to some extent if petitioners received the relief they seek.
We  therefore  hold  that  petitioners  have  standing  to  chal-
lenge the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition.24

——————

to create a case or controversy—to take a suit out of the category of the
hypothetical—provided  of  course  that  the  relief  sought  would,  if
granted, reduce the probability”).

24 In his dissent, THE CHIEF JUSTICE expresses disagreement with the
Court’s  holding  in  United  States  v.  Students  Challenging  Regulatory
Agency  Procedures  (SCRAP),  412  U. S.  669,  687–688  (1973).    He  does
not,  however, disavow  this  portion  of  Justice  Stewart’s  opinion  for  the
Court:
“Unlike the specific and geographically limited federal  action of which
the  petitioner  complained  in  Sierra  Club  [v.  Morton,  405  U. S.  727
(1972)],  the  challenged  agency  action  in  this  case  is  applicable  to
substantially  all  of  the  Nation’s  railroads,  and  thus  allegedly  has  an
adverse  environmental  impact  on  all  the  natural  resources  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the issue of standing in environmental cases and cites relevant precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
852

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10751.  Jones  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  254  Fed.  Appx.  711.

No.  08–10752.  Salazar  Lopez,  aka  Salazar  v.  United
States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 315
Fed.  Appx.  660.

No.  08–10753.  Springer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  203.

No.  08–10754.  Harvey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  859.

No.  08–10755.  Jannuzzi  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10756.  Barrett  v.  Mississippi.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10757.  Brooks  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  858.

No.  08–10758.  Zapata  v.  Hartley,  Acting  Warden.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 318 Fed. Appx. 543.

No.  08–10761.  Lemus-Gonzalez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  88.

No.  08–10762.  Styles  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10763.  Scott  v.  South  Carolina.  Sup.  Ct.  S.  C.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10764.  Smith  v.  Cameron,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional  Institution  at  Cresson,  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Pa.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  600  Pa.  368,  966  A.  2d  546.

No.  08–10765.  Caston  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  774.

No.  08–10767.  Davis  v.  City  of  New  Bern,  North  Caro
lina,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  N.  C.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  189  N.  C.  App.  723,  659  S.  E.  2d  53.

No.  08–10768.  Tai  Wang  Mak  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Syllabus

tinguished  Service  Cross  and  the  Navy  Cross in 1918 and 1919, re-
spectively.    And  the  fallen  soldiers’ final resting places abroad were
marked  by  white crosses or Stars of David, a solemn image that be-
came inextricably linked with and symbolic of the ultimate price paid
by 116,000 soldiers.  This relationship between the cross and the war
may not have been the sole or dominant motivation for the design of
the many war memorials that sprang up across the Nation, but that
is all but impossible to determine today.  The passage of time means
that  testimony  from  the decisionmakers may not be available.  And
regardless  of  the  original  purposes  for  erecting  the  monument,  a
community may wish to preserve it for very different reasons, such as
the  historic  preservation and traffic-safety concerns noted here.  The
area  surrounding  a  monument like the Bladensburg Cross may also
have  been  altered  in ways that change its meaning and provide new
reasons for its preservation.  Even the AHA recognizes that the mon-
ument’s surroundings are important, as it concedes that the presence
of a cross monument in a cemetery is unobjectionable.  But a memo-
rial’s  placement  in  a  cemetery is not necessary to create the connec-
tion  to  those  it  honors.  Memorials took the place of gravestones for
those  parents  and  other relatives who lacked the means to travel to
Europe  to  visit  the  graves  of  their  war  dead  and  for  those  soldiers
whose  bodies  were  never  recovered.   Similarly, memorials and mon-
uments  honoring  important historical figures e.g., Dr. Martin Luther
King,  Jr.,  often  include  a  symbol  of  the  faith that was important to
the persons whose lives are commemorated.  Finally, as World War I
monuments  have  endured  through  the  years  and  become  a familiar
part  of  the  physical  and  cultural  landscape, requiring their removal
or  alteration  would  not  be  viewed  by  many  as  a  neutral  act.    Few
would say that California is attempting to convey a religious message
by  retaining  the  many  city  names,  like  Los  Angeles and San Diego,
given  by  the  original  Spanish  settlers.    But  it  would  be  something
else entirely if the State undertook to change those names.  Much the
same  is  true  about monuments to soldiers who sacrificed their lives
for this country more than a century  ago.  Pp. 21–24.

(c) Applying  these principles here, the Bladensburg Cross does not
violate  the  Establishment  Clause.   The image of the simple wooden
cross that originally marked the graves of American soldiers killed in
World War I became a symbol of their sacrifice, and the design of the
Bladensburg  Cross  must  be  understood  in  light of that background.
That  the  cross  originated  as  a  Christian  symbol  and  retains  that
meaning  in  many  contexts  does  not change the fact that the symbol
took on an added secular meaning when used in World War I memo-
rials.    The  Cross  has  also  acquired  historical  importance  with  the
passage of time, reminding the townspeople of the deeds and sacrific-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion or a section from a legal document, specifically discussing the Bladensburg Cross case and its relation to the Establishment Clause. It cites legal precedents and delves into the historical context and symbolism of the cross in war memorials.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Case Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U78

[09-06-00 18:35:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

122

DOOLEY v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO.

Opinion of the Court

child, or dependent relative,” ibid. The Act limits recovery
in such a suit to “a fair and just compensation for the pecuni-
ary loss sustained by the persons for whose beneﬁt the suit
is sought.”
§ 762. DOHSA also includes a limited survival
provision: In situations in which a person injured on the high
seas sues for his injuries and then dies prior to completion
of the suit, “the personal representative of the decedent may
be substituted as a party and the suit may proceed as a suit
under this chapter for the recovery of the compensation
provided in section 762.”
§ 765. Other sections establish a
limitations period, § 763a, govern actions under foreign law,
§ 764, bar contributory negligence as a complete defense,
§ 766, exempt the Great Lakes, navigable waters in the Pan-
ama Canal Zone, and state territorial waters from the Act’s
coverage, § 767, and preserve certain state-law remedies and
state-court jurisdiction, ibid. DOHSA does not authorize
recovery for the decedent’s own losses, nor does it allow
damages for nonpecuniary losses.

In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618 (1978),
we considered whether, in a case of death on the high seas,
a decedent’s survivors could recover damages under general
maritime law for their loss of society. We held that they
could not, and thus limited to territorial waters those cases
in which we had permitted loss of society damages under
Id., at 622–624; see n. 1, supra. For
general maritime law.
deaths on the high seas, DOHSA “announces Congress’
considered judgment on such issues as the beneﬁciaries, the
limitations period, contributory negligence, survival, and
damages.”
436 U. S., at 625. We thus noted that while
we could “ﬁl[l] a gap left by Congress’ silence,” we were
not free to “rewrit[e] rules that Congress has afﬁrmatively
Ibid. Because “Congress ha[d]
and speciﬁcally enacted.”
struck the balance for us” in DOHSA by limiting the avail-
able recovery to pecuniary losses suffered by surviving rela-
tives, id., at 623, we had “no authority to substitute our
views for those expressed by Congress,” id., at 626. Hig-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA). It contains legal citations, case references, and analysis of legal statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Per Curiam

all  the  reasons  why  it  thought  Jones  “could  have”  been  a
viable alternative suspect.  E.g., id., at 938–942.  And ra-
ther than engage with the “dissent[’s] recount[ing of] th[e]
evidence” against Hines, the majority simply promised that
it  had  “carefully  considered”  this  proof  before  summarily
dismissing it as “not overwhelming.”  Id., at 939.
  Had the Sixth Circuit properly considered the entire rec-
ord,  it would  have  had little trouble deferring to the  Ten-
nessee court’s conclusion that Hines suffered no prejudice
regarding  his  conviction  or  sentence.    Again,  the  critical
question was not whether the Sixth Circuit itself could see
a  “ ‘substantial’  . . .  likelihood  of  a  different  result”  had
Hines’  attorney  taken  a  different  approach.    Cullen,  563
U. S., at 189.  All that mattered was whether the Tennessee
court, notwithstanding its substantial “latitude to reasona-
bly determine that a defendant has not [shown prejudice],”
still managed to blunder so badly that every fairminded ju-
rist would disagree.  Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U. S. 111,
123 (2009).
  It did not.  The Tennessee court reasonably looked to the
substantial  evidence  of  Hines’  guilt.    Hines,  2004  WL
1567120,  *27–*28.
  And  it  reasonably  rejected  the
“ ‘farfetched’ ” possibility that Jones committed and self-re-
ported a gruesome murder, in the presence of a witness, at
a place where he was well known to the staff.  Ibid.  In light
of  this  straightforward,  commonsense  analysis,  the  Sixth
Circuit had no license to hypothesize an alternative theory
of the crime in which Jones became a suspect 35 years after
the fact—much less rely on that fanciful theory to grant re-
lief.*

——————

*Even on its own terms, there is little merit to the Sixth Circuit’s spec-
ulation that a jury who heard Jones’ full story might have blamed him
instead of Hines.  After all, the story Jones told at trial was in many ways
more suspicious than the truth.  According to his initial account, Jones
fortuitously stopped by the motel, hung around outside, and then stum-
bled upon the body.  All without a witness to verify his actions.  The jury
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the part where the court is critiquing the reasoning of a lower court. It contains legal jargon and analysis of evidence, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GARLAND v. CARGILL

Opinion of the Court

fired on a crowd attending an outdoor music festival in Las
Vegas, killing 58 people and wounding over 500 more.  The
gunman equipped his weapons with bump stocks, which al-
lowed him to fire hundreds of rounds in a matter of minutes.
  This  tragedy  created  tremendous  political  pressure  to
outlaw bump stocks nationwide.  Within days, Members of
Congress proposed bills to ban bump stocks and other de-
vices “designed . . . to accelerate the rate of fire of a semiau-
tomatic rifle.”  S. 1916, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (2017); see
also H. R. 3947, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017); H. R. 3999,
115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017).  None of these bills became
law.  Similar proposals in the intervening years have also
stalled.  See, e.g., H. R. 396, 118th Cong., 1st Sess. (2023);
S. 1909,  118th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  (2023);  H. R.  5427,  117th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2021).
  While the first wave of bills was pending, ATF began con-
sidering whether to reinterpret §5845(b)’s definition of “ma-
chinegun” to include bump stocks.  It proposed a rule that
would amend its regulations to “clarify” that bump stocks
are machineguns.  83 Fed. Reg. 13442 (2018).  ATF’s about-
face  drew  criticism  from  some  observers,  including  those
who  agreed that  bump stocks should  be banned.   Senator
Dianne  Feinstein,  for  example,  warned  that  ATF  lacked
statutory  authority  to  prohibit  bump  stocks,  explaining
that the proposed regulation “ ‘hinge[d] on a dubious analy-
sis’ ”  and  that  the  “ ‘gun  lobby  and  manufacturers  [would]
have a field day with [ATF’s] reasoning’ ” in court.  State-
ment on Regulation To Ban Bump Stocks (Mar. 23, 2018).
She asserted that “ ‘legislation is the only way to ban bump
stocks.’ ”  Ibid.
  ATF  issued  its  final  Rule  in 2018.   83  Fed.  Reg.  66514.
The agency’s earlier regulations simply restated §5845(b)’s
statutory definition.  Ibid.  The final Rule amended those
regulations by adding the following language:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion discussing the regulation of bump stocks. It cites relevant legislation and legal precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U61

[11-02-00 07:34:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 848 (2000)

857

Opinion of the Court

Were we to adopt the Government’s expansive interpreta-
tion of § 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall out-
side the federal statute’s domain. Practically every building
in our cities, towns, and rural areas is constructed with sup-
plies that have moved in interstate commerce, served by util-
ities that have an interstate connection, ﬁnanced or insured
by enterprises that do business across state lines, or bears
some other trace of interstate commerce. See, e. g., FERC
v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 (1982) (observing that elec-
tric energy is consumed “in virtually every home” and that
“[n]o State relies solely on its own resources” to meet its
inhabitants’ demand for the product).
If such connections
sufﬁced to trigger § 844(i), the statute’s limiting language,
“used in” any commerce-affecting activity, would have no of-
ﬁce. See United States v. Monholland, 607 F. 2d 1311, 1316
(CA10 1979) (ﬁnding in § 844(i) no indication that Congress
“Judges
intended to include “everybody and everything”).
should hesitate .
. to treat statutory terms in any set-
ting [as surplusage], and resistance should be heightened
when the words describe an element of a criminal offense.”
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 140–141 (1994); ac-
cord, Bailey, 516 U. S., at 145.

.

III

Our reading of § 844(i) is in harmony with the guiding prin-
ciple that “where a statute is susceptible of two construc-
tions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional
questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.” United States ex
rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S.
366, 408 (1909), quoted in Jones v. United States, 526 U. S.
227, 239 (1999); see also DeBartolo, 485 U. S., at 575; Ash-
wander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring).
In Lopez, this Court invalidated the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, former 18 U. S. C. § 922(q) (1988 ed., Supp. V),
which made it a federal crime to possess a ﬁrearm within
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 848 (2000). It discusses the interpretation of a statute and its potential constitutional implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

49

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

the  latter  according  to  his  religion”  (emphasis  deleted));
Commonwealth  v.  Wolf,  3  Serg.  &  Rawle  47,  50,  51  (Pa.
1817) (“[T]he Jewish Talmud . . . asserts no such doctrine”
and  the  objection  was  made  “out  of  mere  caprice”).    That
reasoning is contrary to a principle that Smith reaffirmed:
“Repeatedly  and  in  many  different  contexts,  we  have
warned that courts must not presume to determine . . . the
plausibility of a religious claim.”  494 U. S., at 887.

A  third  Sunday  closing  law  decision  appears  to  rest  at
least in part on a similar ground.  See Specht v. Common-
wealth, 8 Pa. 312 (1848).  The court observed that the mer-
chant’s conscience rights might have been violated if his re-
ligion  actually  required  him  to  work  on  Sunday,  but  the
court  concluded  that  the  commandment  to  keep  holy  the
Sabbath had never been understood to impose “an impera-
tive obligation to fill up each day of the other six with some
worldly employment.”  Id., at 326.

Other cases cited as denying exemptions were decided on
nebulous grounds.  In Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213 (Pa.
1793), a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the
case report in its entirety states: “In this cause (which was
tried on Saturday,  the 5th of April) the defendant offered
Jonas  Phillips,  a  Jew,  as  a  witness;  but  he  refused  to  be
sworn, because it was his Sabbath.  The Court, therefore,
fined him £10; but the defendant, afterwards, waving the
benefit of his testimony, he was discharged from the fine.”
(Emphasis deleted.)  What can be deduced from this cryptic
summary?    Was  the  issue  mooted  when  the  defendant
waived the benefit of Phillips’s testimony?  Who can tell?

In Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161 (1818), the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts summarily affirmed
the  conviction  of  a  criminal  defendant  who  was  convicted
after  the  trial  court  admitted  the  testimony  of  his  fellow
church members before whom he had confessed.  The State
argued that the defendant had voluntarily confessed, that
his confession was not required by any “ecclesiastical rule,”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites other legal cases and discusses legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

right  to  lend,  rent,  sell,  or  otherwise  dispose  of  the  print
without first obtaining the copyright owner’s permission”).
See  also  Platt  &  Munk  Co.  v.  Republic  Graphics,  Inc.,
315 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA2 1963) (Friendly, J.) (pointing out
predecessor statute’s leasing problem)).

This  objective  perfectly  well  explains  the  new  language
of  the  present  version,  including  the  five  words  here  at
issue.  Section  109(a)  now  makes  clear  that  a  lessee  of
a  copy  will  not  receive  “first  sale”  protection  but  one  who
owns a copy will receive “first sale” protection, provided, of
course,  that  the  copy  was  “lawfully  made”  and  not  pi-
rated.    The  new  language  also  takes  into  account  that  a
copy may be “lawfully made under this title” when the copy,
say  of  a  phonorecord,  comes  into  its  owner’s  possession
through  use  of  a  compulsory  license,  which  “this  title”
provides for elsewhere, namely, in §115.  Again, for those
who find legislative history useful, the relevant legislative
report  makes  this  clear.    H. R.  Rep.  No.  94–1476,  p.  79
(1976)  (“For  example,  any  resale  of  an  illegally  ‘pirated’
phonorecord would be an infringement, but the disposition
of  a  phonorecord  legally  made  under  the  compulsory  li
censing provisions of section 115 would not”).

Other  provisions  of  the  present  statute  also  support

a nongeographical interpretation.  For one thing, the stat
ute  phases  out  the  “manufacturing  clause,”  a  clause  that
appeared  in  earlier  statutes  and  had  limited  importation
of  many  copies  (of  copyrighted  works)  printed  outside  the
United States.  §601, 90 Stat. 2588 (“Prior to July 1, 1982
. . .  the  importation  into  or  public  distribution  in  the
United States of copies of a work consisting preponderantly
of  nondramatic  literary  material  . . .  is  prohibited  unless
the portions consisting of such material have been manufac-
tured in the United States or Canada”).  The phasing out
of this clause sought to equalize treatment of copies manu
factured in America and copies manufactured abroad.  See
H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 165–166.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing copyright law and specifically the "first sale" doctrine. It delves into the legislative history and interpretation of relevant sections of the Copyright Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS

Opinion of the Court

is necessary for the suit but irrelevant to the statute of lim-
itations.2  We disagree.  A right of action “accrues” when the
plaintiff has a “complete and present cause of action”—i.e.,
when she has the right to “file suit and obtain relief.”  Green
v.  Brennan,  578  U. S.  547,  554  (2016)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).  An APA plaintiff does not have a complete
and present cause of action until she suffers an injury from
final  agency  action,  so  the  statute  of  limitations  does  not
begin to run until she is injured.

III
Congress enacted §2401(a) in 1948, two years after it en-
acted the APA.  See 62 Stat. 971.  Section 2401(a)’s prede-
cessor was the statute-of-limitations provision for the Little
Tucker Act, which gave district courts jurisdiction over non-
tort  monetary  claims  not  exceeding  $10,000  against  the
United States.  See §24, 36 Stat. 1093 (“That no suit against
the Government of the United States shall be allowed under
this  paragraph  unless  the  same  shall  have  been  brought
within six years after the right accrued for which the claim
is made”); Brief for Professor Aditya Bamzai et al. as Amici
Curiae 5–6.  When Congress revised and recodified the Ju-
dicial Code in 1948, it converted the Little Tucker Act’s stat-
ute of limitations into a general statute of limitations for all

——————

2 The Board leaves open the possibility that someone could bring an as-
applied challenge to a rule when the agency relies on that rule in enforce-
ment proceedings against that person, even if more than six years have
passed since the rule’s promulgation.  But Corner Post, as a merchant
rather than a payment network, is not regulated by Regulation II—so it
will never be the target of an enforcement action in which it could chal-
lenge that rule.  JUSTICE KAVANAUGH asserts that “Corner Post can ob-
tain relief in this case only because the APA authorizes vacatur of agency
rules.”  Post, at 1 (concurring opinion).  Whether the APA authorizes va-
catur has been subject to thoughtful debate by Members of this Court.
See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Texas,  599  U. S.  670,  693–702  (2023)
(GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment).  We took this case only to decide
how §2401(a)’s statute of limitations applies to APA claims.  We therefore
assume without deciding that vacatur is available under the APA.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the statute of limitations for APA claims. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific cases and statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

907

524 U. S.

June 1, 1998

No. 97–8489. Slezak v. Moore, Director, South Carolina
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 1260.

No. 97–8495. Warren v. United States et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 122 F. 3d 1076.

No. 97–8507. Evans v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8509. DuBuc v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97– 8511. Bryant v. Speckard, Superintendent,
Groveland Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 1076.

No. 97–8518. Huffman v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th

App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8520. Frejomil v. Goord, Commissioner, New York
Department of Correctional Services, et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8527. Walker v. Thomas et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 41.

No. 97–8533. Nowik v. North Dakota et al. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 143.

No. 97–8534. Tataii v. Cayetano. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 120 F. 3d 269.

No. 97–8540. Bates v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 973 S. W. 2d 615.

No. 97–8547. Haley v. Ferguson et al. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 33.

No. 97–8556. Bowen v. Gundy et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 32.

No. 97–8561. Tal-Mason v. Redd et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,

1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 705 So. 2d 903.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

HENRY SCHEIN, INC. v. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

Fourth,  Archer  and  White  asserts  another  policy  argu-
ment: that the “wholly groundless” exception is necessary
to  deter  frivolous  motions  to  compel  arbitration.    Again,
we  may  not  rewrite  the  statute  simply  to  accommodate
that policy concern.  In any event, Archer and White over-
states  the  potential  problem.  Arbitrators  can  efficiently
dispose of frivolous cases by quickly ruling that a claim is
not  in  fact  arbitrable.    And  under  certain  circumstances,
arbitrators may be able to respond to frivolous arguments
for  arbitration  by  imposing  fee-shifting  and  cost-shifting
sanctions, which in turn will help deter and remedy frivo-
lous motions to compel arbitration.  We are not aware that
frivolous  motions  to  compel  arbitration  have  caused  a
substantial problem in those Circuits that have not recog-
nized a “wholly groundless” exception.

In  sum,  we  reject  the  “wholly  groundless”  exception.
The  exception  is  inconsistent  with  the  statutory  text  and
with  our  precedent.  It  confuses  the  question  of  who  de-
cides  arbitrability  with  the  separate  question  of  who  pre-
vails  on  arbitrability.  When  the  parties’  contract  dele-
gates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts
must  respect  the  parties’  decision  as  embodied  in  the
contract.

We express no view about whether the contract at issue
in  this  case  in  fact  delegated  the  arbitrability  question  to
an  arbitrator.  The  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  decide  that
issue.    Under  our  cases,  courts  “should  not  assume  that
the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is
clear  and  unmistakable  evidence  that  they  did  so.”    First
Options,  514  U. S.,  at  944  (alterations  omitted).    On  re-
mand, the Court of Appeals may address that issue in the
first instance, as well as other arguments that Archer and
White has properly preserved.

The  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  is  vacated,  and
the  case  is  remanded  for  further  proceedings  consistent
with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from a court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL. v.

COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF COLORADO

No. 16–111.  Argued December 5, 2017—Decided June 4, 2018

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., is a Colorado bakery owned and operated
by Jack Phillips, an expert  baker and devout Christian.  In 2012 he
told a same-sex couple that he would not create a cake for their wed-
ding celebration because of his religious opposition to same-sex mar-
riages—marriages that Colorado did not then recognize—but that he
would sell them other baked goods, e.g., birthday cakes.  The couple
filed  a  charge  with  the  Colorado  Civil  Rights  Commission  (Commis-
sion)  pursuant  to  the  Colorado  Anti-Discrimination  Act  (CADA),
which prohibits, as relevant here, discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation in a “place of business engaged in any sales to the public and
any place offering services . . . to the public.”  Under CADA’s admin-
istrative review system, the Colorado Civil Rights Division first found
probable  cause  for  a  violation  and  referred  the  case  to  the  Commis-
sion.  The Commission then referred the case for a formal hearing be-
fore  a  state  Administrative  Law  Judge  (ALJ),  who  ruled  in  the  cou-
ple’s favor.  In so doing, the ALJ rejected Phillips’ First Amendment
claims:  that  requiring  him  to  create  a  cake  for  a  same-sex  wedding
would  violate  his  right  to  free  speech  by  compelling  him  to  exercise
his artistic talents to express a message with which he disagreed and
would  violate  his  right  to  the  free  exercise  of  religion.    Both  the
Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The Commission’s actions in this case violated the Free Exercise

Clause.  Pp. 9–18.

(a) The laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must,
protect  gay  persons  and  gay  couples  in  the  exercise  of  their  civil
rights, but religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are
protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___, ___.  While it is unexceptional
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a Supreme Court syllabus, which provides a summary of the case and the Court's holding. It is not the actual content of the legal argument or the decision itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

constitutional  rights  of  women  seeking  abortion  care  in
Texas.  For the second time, the Court declines to act im-
mediately to protect these women from grave and irrepara-
ble harm.
  The Court is right to calendar this application for argu-
ment and to grant certiorari before judgment in both this
case and Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, No. 21–463, in
recognition  of  the  public  importance  of  the  issues  these
cases raise.  The promise of future adjudication offers cold
comfort, however, for Texas women seeking abortion care,
who are entitled to relief now.  These women will suffer per-
sonal harm from delaying their medical care, and as their
pregnancies  progress,  they  may  even  be  unable  to  obtain
abortion care altogether.  Because every day the Court fails
to  grant  relief  is  devastating,  both  for  individual  women
and for our constitutional system as a whole, I dissent from
the  Court’s  refusal to stay  administratively  the  Fifth  Cir-
cuit’s order.

I
  Texas Senate Bill 8 (S. B. 8 or the Act) imposes a near-
categorical  ban  on  abortions  beginning  six  weeks  after  a
woman’s  last  menstrual  period,  before  many  women  even
realize they are pregnant.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Jack-
son, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).
This is patently unconstitutional.  See, e.g., June Medical
Services  L.  L.  C.  v.  Russo,  591  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2020)
(ROBERTS,  C. J.,  concurring
judgment);  Planned
Parenthood  of  Southeastern  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U. S.  833
(1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973).  Rather than au-
thorizing state officials to enforce this illegal law, the Act
deputizes  ordinary  citizens  as  bounty  hunters,  offering
$10,000 in damages (plus attorney’s fees and costs) to any-
one who sues a person who provides an abortion in violation
of  S.  B.  8,  “aids  or  abets”  such  an  abortion,  or  intends  to
engage in such conduct.  Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of United States v. Texas.  It discusses the constitutionality of Texas Senate Bill 8 and the harm it inflicts on women seeking abortion care.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

KAGAN, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 19–1257 and 19–1258
_________________

MARK BRNOVICH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
ARIZONA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL.

19–1257

ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL.

19–1258

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2021]

  JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  and
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting.
  If a single statute represents the best of America, it is the
Voting Rights Act.  It marries two great ideals: democracy
and racial equality.  And it dedicates our country to carry-
ing them out.  Section 2, the provision at issue here, guar-
antees that members of every racial group will have equal
voting  opportunities.  Citizens  of  every race will  have  the
same shot to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives  of  their  choice.   They  will  all  own  our  de-
mocracy  together—no  one  more  and  no  one  less  than  any
other.
  If a single statute reminds us of the worst of America, it
is the Voting Rights Act.  Because it was—and remains—so
necessary.    Because  a  century  after  the  Civil  War  was
fought, at the time of the Act’s passage, the promise of po-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It sets the stage for the argument by highlighting the importance of the Voting Rights Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

57

Opinion of the Court

military-style  weapons  but  rather  all  arms  “as  are  com-
monly kept, according to the customs of the people, and are
appropriate for open and manly use in self-defense.”  Id., at
458.  On that understanding, the court recognized that, in
addition to “holster pistol[s],” the right to bear arms covered
the carry of “such pistols at least as are not adapted to being
carried  concealed.”  Id.,  at  458–459.    Nonetheless,  after
expanding the scope of firearms that warranted state con-
stitutional protection, Duke held that requiring any pistol-
bearer to have “ ‘reasonable grounds fearing an unlawful at-
tack  on  [one’s]  person’ ”  was  a  “legitimate  and  highly
proper” regulation of handgun carriage.  Id., at 456, 459–
460.  Duke thus concluded that the 1871 statute “appear[ed]
to  have  respected  the  right  to  carry  a  pistol  openly  when
needed for self-defense.”  Id., at 459.

We acknowledge that the Texas cases support New York’s
proper-cause  requirement,  which  one  can  analogize  to
Texas’ “reasonable grounds” standard.  But the Texas stat-
ute, and the rationales set forth in English and Duke, are
outliers.
In  fact,  only  one  other  State,  West  Virginia,
adopted a similar public-carry statute before 1900.  See W.
Va. Code, ch. 148, §7 (1887).  The West Virginia Supreme
Court upheld that prohibition, reasoning that no handguns
of  any  kind  were  protected  by  the  Second  Amendment,  a
rationale endorsed by no other court during this period.  See
State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 371–374, 14 S. E. 9, 11
(1891).  The Texas decisions therefore provide little insight
into how postbellum courts viewed the right  to carry pro-
tected arms in public.

In the end, while we recognize the support that postbel-
lum Texas provides for respondents’ view, we will not give
disproportionate weight to a single state statute and a pair
of state-court decisions.  As in Heller, we will not “stake our
interpretation of the Second Amendment upon a single law,
in effect in a single [State], that contradicts the overwhelm-
ing weight of other evidence regarding the right to keep and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the historical context of the Second Amendment and its interpretation regarding the right to carry firearms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Per Curiam

dispute is premature.  Consistent with our determination
that standing has not been shown and that the case is not
ripe, we express no view on the merits of the constitutional
and related statutory claims presented.  We hold only that
they are not suitable for adjudication at this time.

The  judgment  of  the  District  Court  is  vacated,  and  the
case is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of ju-
risdiction.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the concluding portion. It focuses on procedural matters (standing, ripeness, jurisdiction) rather than the substance of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$82Z 02-22-99 22:42:40 PAGES OPINPGT

186

BRYAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor
General Dreeben, and John F. De Pue.*

Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was convicted of “willfully” dealing in ﬁre-
arms without a federal license. The question presented is
whether the term “willfully” in 18 U. S. C. § 924(a)(1)(D) re-
quires proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was
unlawful, or whether it also requires proof that he knew of
the federal licensing requirement.

I

In 1968 Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act.
In Title IV of that Act
Congress made ﬁndings concerning the impact of the trafﬁc
in ﬁrearms on the prevalence of lawlessness and violent
crime in the United States 1 and amended the Criminal Code

82 Stat. 197–239.

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the Gun Owners
Foundation by James H. Jeffries III and James H. Wentzel; and for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Barbara Bergman
and Stephen P. Halbrook.

1 “Sec. 901.
(a) The Congress hereby ﬁnds and declares—
“(1) that there is a widespread trafﬁc in ﬁrearms moving in or otherwise
affecting interstate or foreign commerce, and that the existing Federal
controls over such trafﬁc do not adequately enable the States to control
this trafﬁc within their own borders through the exercise of their police
power;

“(2) that the ease with which any person can acquire ﬁrearms other than
a riﬂe or shotgun (including criminals, juveniles without the knowledge
or consent of their parents or guardians, narcotics addicts, mental defec-
tives, armed groups who would supplant the functions of duly consti-
tuted public authorities, and others whose possession of such weapons
is similarly contrary to the public interest) is a signiﬁcant factor in the
prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States;

“(3) that only through adequate Federal control over interstate and for-
eign commerce in these weapons, and over all persons engaging in the
businesses of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in them, can this grave
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the beginning of the Bryan v. United States case. It includes citations, legal jargon, and the structure of a court opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

21

THOMAS, J., concurring

special  treatment—rather,  all  citizens  were  meant  to  be
treated  the  same  as  those  who,  at  the  time,  had  the  full
rights of citizenship.  Other provisions of the 1866 Act rein-
force  this  view,  providing  for  equality  in  civil  rights.    See
Rappaport 97.  Most notably, §14 stated that the basic civil
rights  of  citizenship  shall  be  secured  “without  respect  to
race  or  color.”  14  Stat.  176–177.    And,  §8  required  that
funds  from  land  sales  must  be  used  to  support  schools
“without distinction of color or race, . . . in the parishes of ”
the area where the land had been sold.  Id., at 175.

In addition to these federal laws, Harvard also points to
two  state  laws:  a  South  Carolina  statute  that  placed  the
burden of proof on the defendant when a “colored or black”
plaintiff  claimed  a  violation,  1870  S. C.  Acts  pp. 387–388,
and Kentucky legislation that authorized a county superin-
tendent to aid “negro paupers” in Mercer County, 1871 Ky.
Acts  pp. 273–274.    Even  if  these  statutes  provided  race-
based  benefits,  they  do  not  support  respondents’  and
JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR’s  view  that  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment was contemporaneously understood to permit differ-
ential treatment based on race, prohibiting only caste leg-
islation  while  authorizing  antisubordination  measures.
Cf., e.g., O. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,
5 Philos. & Pub. Aff. 107, 147 (1976) (articulating the anti-
subordination view); R. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordi-
nation  and  Anticlassification  Values  in  Constitutional
Struggles Over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1473, n. 8
(2004) (collecting scholarship).  At most, these laws would
support  the  kinds  of  discrete  remedial  measures  that  our
precedents have permitted.

If services had been given only to white persons up to the
Fourteenth  Amendment’s  adoption,  then  providing  those
same  services  only  to  previously  excluded  black  persons
would work to equalize treatment against a concrete base-
line of government-imposed inequality.  It thus may have
been  the  case  that  Kentucky’s  county-specific,  race-based
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in a case before the Supreme Court. It discusses the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and cites relevant legal precedents and historical context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

Opinion of the Court

1086 etc., p. 253 (MSA).  The plaintiffs adduced eleven il-
lustrative maps—that is, example districting maps that Al-
abama could enact—each of which contained two majority-
black  districts  that  comported  with  traditional  districting
criteria.  With respect to compactness, for example, the Dis-
trict  Court  explained  that  the  maps  submitted  by  one  of
plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Moon Duchin, “perform[ed] generally
better on average than” did HB1.  582 F. Supp. 3d, at 1009.
A map offered by another of plaintiffs’ experts, Bill Cooper,
produced districts roughly as compact as the existing plan.
Ibid.  And none of plaintiffs’ maps contained any “tentacles,
appendages, bizarre shapes, or any other obvious irregular-
ities that would make it difficult to find” them sufficiently
compact.  Id., at 1011.  Plaintiffs’ maps also satisfied other
traditional districting criteria.  They contained equal popu-
lations,  were  contiguous,  and  respected  existing  political
subdivisions,  such  as  counties,  cities,  and  towns.    Id.,  at
1011, 1016.  Indeed, some of plaintiffs’ proposed maps split
the same number of county lines as (or even fewer county
lines than) the State’s map.  Id., at 1011–1012.  We agree
with the District Court, therefore, that plaintiffs’ illustra-
tive  maps  “strongly  suggest[ed]  that  Black  voters  in  Ala-
bama” could constitute a majority in a second, reasonably
configured, district.  Id., at 1010.
  The State nevertheless argues that plaintiffs’ maps were
not  reasonably  configured  because  they  failed  to  keep  to-
gether a traditional community of interest within Alabama.
See, e.g., id., at 1012.  A “community of interest,” according
to Alabama’s districting guidelines, is an “area with recog-
nized similarities of interests, including but not limited to
ethnic, racial, economic, tribal, social, geographic, or histor-
ical identities.”  Ibid.  Alabama argues that the Gulf Coast
region in the southwest of the State is such a community of
interest,  and  that  plaintiffs’  maps  erred  by  separating  it
into two different districts.  Ibid.
  We  do  not  find  the  State’s  argument  persuasive.    Only
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing a case called ALLEN v. MILLIGAN. It delves into the specifics of districting maps and their adherence to legal criteria.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–315
_________________

JOSE SANTOS SANCHEZ, ET UX., PETITIONERS v.
ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 7, 2021]

 JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Jose Santos Sanchez entered this country un-
lawfully from El Salvador.  Years later, because of unsafe
living conditions in that country, the Government granted
him  Temporary  Protected  Status  (TPS),  entitling  him  to
stay and work in the United States for as long as those con-
ditions persist.  Sanchez now wishes to become a lawful per-
manent resident (LPR) of the United States.  The question
here is whether the conferral of TPS enables him to obtain
LPR status despite his unlawful entry.  We hold that it does
not.

I

Section 1255 of the immigration laws provides a way for
a  “nonimmigrant”—a  foreign  national  lawfully  present  in
this country on a designated, temporary basis—to obtain an
“[a]djustment  of  status”  making  him  an  LPR.    8  U. S. C.
§1255 (boldface deleted); see §1101(a)(15) (listing classes of
nonimmigrants, such as students and tourists).  Under that
section, a nonimmigrant’s eligibility for such an adjustment
to permanent status depends (with exceptions not relevant
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes the case citation, the court's opinion, and the name of the justice delivering the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Syllabus

speech  are  subject  to  strict  scrutiny,  that  the  Telephone  Consumer
Protection Act’s rule against cellphone robocalls is a content-based re-
striction, and that this rule fails strict scrutiny and therefore cannot
be constitutionally enforced.  Pp. 1–4.

KAVANAUGH,  J.,  announced  the  judgment  of  the  Court  and  delivered
an opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined, and in which
THOMAS, J., joined as to Parts I and II.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment.  BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in
the  judgment  with  respect  to  severability  and  dissenting  in  part,  in
which GINSBURG and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion
concurring  in  the  judgment  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part,  in  which
THOMAS, J., joined as to Part II.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi typically summarize the case and the opinions of the justices, and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–5924
_________________

EVANGELISTO RAMOS, PETITIONER v. LOUISIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF LOUISIANA, FOURTH CIRCUIT

[April 20, 2020]

 JUSTICE GORSUCH announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts
I, II–A, III, and IV–B–1, an opinion with respect to Parts
II–B, IV–B–2, and V, in which JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE
BREYER, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, and an opinion with
respect  to  Part  IV–A,  in  which  JUSTICE  GINSBURG  and
JUSTICE BREYER join.

Accused  of  a  serious  crime,  Evangelisto  Ramos  insisted
on his innocence and invoked his right to a jury trial.  Even-
tually, 10 jurors found the evidence against him persuasive.
But a pair of jurors believed that the State of Louisiana had
failed to prove Mr. Ramos’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
they voted to acquit.

In 48 States and federal court, a single juror’s vote to ac-
quit is enough to prevent a conviction.  But not in Louisi-
ana.  Along with Oregon, Louisiana has long punished peo-
ple based on 10-to-2 verdicts like the one here.  So instead
of  the  mistrial  he  would  have  received  almost  anywhere
else, Mr. Ramos was sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole.

Why do Louisiana and Oregon allow nonunanimous con-
victions?  Though it’s hard to say why these laws persist,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the court's name, the case name, and the date of the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
Opinion of the Court

Alaska  Natives  were  instructed  to  “incorporate  under  the
laws of Alaska a Regional Corporation to conduct business
for  profit.”  §1606(d).  To  form  the  village  ANCs,  the  Act
identified  approximately  200  Alaska  “Native  villages,”  a
term  encompassing  any  community  of  25  or  more  Alaska
Natives  living  together  as  of  the  1970  census.  §§1602(c),
1610(b), 1615(a).  For each Alaska Native village, ANCSA
ordered the “Native residents” to create an accompanying
village corporation to “hold, invest, manage and/or distrib-
ute lands, property, funds, and other rights and assets for
and on behalf ” of the village.  §§1602(j), 1607(a).  ANCSA
then  directed  the  Secretary  to  prepare  a  roll  showing  the
region and, if applicable, village to which each living Alaska
Native belonged.  §1604.  Enrolled Alaska Natives then re-
ceived shares in their respective ANCs.  §§1606(g), 1607.

B
In 1975, four years after ANCSA’s enactment, Congress
passed ISDA.  25 U. S. C. §5301 et seq.  ISDA answered the
call for a “new national policy” of “autonomy” and “control”
for Native Americans and Alaska Natives.  H. R. Doc. No.
91–363,  p. 3  (1970);  see  also  Menominee  Tribe  of  Wis.  v.
United States, 577 U. S. 250, 252 (2016) (“Congress enacted
[ISDA] in 1975 to help Indian tribes assume responsibility
for aid programs that benefit their members”).

ISDA decentralized the provision of federal Indian bene-
fits away from the Federal Government and toward Native
American  and  Alaska  Native  organizations.   ISDA  allows
any “Indian tribe” to request that the Secretary of the Inte-
rior enter into a self-determination contract  with a  desig-
nated “tribal organization.”  §5321(a)(1).  Under such a con-
tract,  the  tribal  organization  delivers  federally  funded
economic,  infrastructure,  health,  or  education  benefits  to
the tribe’s membership.

As originally drafted, ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition did
not mention ANCs.  H. R. 6372, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §1(a)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the relationship between the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). It delves into the legal definitions and implications of these acts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

27

BREYER, J., dissenting

sides of the [credit-card] platform.”  Id., at 231–232.  The
majority  evidently  rejects  these  factual  findings,  even
though no one has challenged them as clearly erroneous.

Similarly,  the  majority  refers  to  the  nondiscrimination

provisions  as  preventing  “free  riding”  on  American  Ex
press’  “investments  in  rewards”  for  cardholders.    Ante,  at
19–20;  see  also  ante,  at  7  (describing  steering  in  terms
suggestive  of  free  riding).    But  as  the  District  Court  ex
plained,  “[p]lainly  . . .  investments  tied  to  card  use  (such
as  Membership  Rewards  points,  purchase  protection,  and
the  like)  are  not  subject  to  free-riding,  since  the  network
does  not  incur  any  cost  if  the  cardholder  is  successfully
steered  away  from  using  his  or  her  American  Express
card.”  88 F. Supp. 3d, at 237.  This, I should think, is an
unassailable  conclusion:  American  Express  pays  rewards
to  cardholders  only  for  transactions  in  which  cardholders
use  their  American  Express  cards,  so  if  a  steering  effort
succeeds, no rewards are paid.  As for concerns about free
riding  on  American  Express’  fixed  expenses,  including  its
investments in its brand, the District Court acknowledged
that free-riding was in theory possible, but explained that
American  Express  “ma[de]  no  effort  to  identify  the  fixed
expenses  to  which  its  experts  referred  or  to  explain  how
they are subject to free riding.”  Ibid.; see also id., at 238
(American  Express’  own  data  showed  “that  the  network’s
ability  to  confer  a  credentialing  benefit  trails  that  of  its
competitors, casting doubt on whether there is in fact any
particular  benefit  associated  with  accepting  [American
Express] that is subject to free riding”).  The majority does
not  even  acknowledge,  much  less  reject,  these  factual
findings, despite coming to the contrary conclusion.

Finally, the majority reasons that the nondiscrimination
provisions  “do  not  prevent  Visa,  MasterCard,  or  Discover
from  competing  against  [American  Express]  by  offering
lower merchant fees or promoting their broader merchant
acceptance.”    Ante,  at  20.    But  again,  the  District  Court’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion, citing factual findings and legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Syllabus

to make arrests or bring prosecutions are rare.  This case is different
from those in which the Federal Judiciary decides justiciable cases in-
volving  statutory requirements  or  prohibitions  on  the  Executive,  be-
cause it implicates the Executive Branch’s enforcement discretion and
raises the distinct question of whether the Federal Judiciary may in
effect  order  the  Executive  Branch  to  take  enforcement  actions.    The
Court’s decision does not indicate any view on whether the Executive
is complying with its statutory obligations.  Nor does the Court’s nar-
row holding signal any change in the balance of powers between Con-
gress and the Executive.  Pp. 12–14.

606 F. Supp. 3d 437, reversed.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined.  GORSUCH, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS and BAR-
RETT, JJ., joined.  BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.  ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not typically considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

750

PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL v. BABBITT

O’Connor, J., concurring

sion relating to “ownership” simply provides for compensa-
tion by some future permit holder in the event that the Sec-
retary decides to grant title.

As detailed above, the Secretary did grant ownership
rights to range improvements under certain circumstances
prior to 1995. We see nothing in the statute that prevents
him from changing his mind in respect to the future. And
the Secretary has now changed his mind for reasons of ad-
ministrative convenience and because what he takes as the
original purpose of this provision (assuring that, in 1934,
ranchers would pay compensation to nomadic sheep herders)
is no longer important.
In any event, the provision retains
even the “contemplation of ownership” meaning stressed by
the ranchers, for permit holders may still “own” removable
range improvements, such as “corrals, creep feeders, and
loading chutes, and temporary structural improvements such
as troughs for hauled water,” 43 CFR § 4120.3–3(b) (1995),
which could be transferred to a new permit holder and thus
compel compensation under § 315f.

In short, we ﬁnd nothing in the statute that denies the
Secretary authority reasonably to decide when or whether
to grant title to those who make improvements. And any
such person remains free to negotiate the terms upon which
he will make those improvements irrespective of where title
formally lies, including how he might be compensated in the
future for the work he had done, either by the Government
directly or by those to whom the Government later grants
a permit. Cf. 43 U. S. C. § 1752(g) (requiring the United
States to pay compensation to a permittee for his “interest”
in range improvements if it cancels a permit).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Afﬁrmed.

Justice O’Connor, with whom Justice Thomas joins,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion.

I write separately to make the

following observations concerning the Court’s decision.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor in the case of Public Lands Council v. Babbitt.  It is sequential text and contains relevant legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017)

11

Opinion of the Court

particular  linguistic  formulation  when  preempting  state
law, Nevils’ Supremacy Clause challenge fails.5

*

*
For  the  reasons  stated,  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme
Court  of  Missouri  is  reversed,  and  the  case  is  remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

*

It is so ordered.
 JUSTICE  GORSUCH  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or

decision of this case.

——————

§8989 (same for vision); §9005(a) (same for long-term care); 10 U. S. C.
§1103(a)  (certain  state  laws  “shall  not  apply  to  any  contract  entered
into pursuant to this chapter”).

5 Nevils’ speculation about the Government’s outsourcing preemption
to  private  entities,  see  Brief  for  Respondent  24,  is  far  afield  from  the
matter before us.  This case involves only Congress’ preemption of state
insurance  laws  to  ensure  that  the  terms  in  contracts  negotiated  by
OPM, a federal agency, operate free from state interference.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the part concluding the opinion and mentioning Justice Gorsuch's absence.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014)

13

Opinion of the Court

future prosecution was “wholly conjectural.”  Ibid.

Here,  by  contrast,  petitioners’  speech  focuses  on  the
broader  issue  of  support  for  the  ACA,  not  on  the  voting
record of a single candidate.  See Reply Brief 4–5 (identify-
ing  other  elected  officials  who  plan  to  seek  reelection  as
potential objects of SBA’s criticisms).  Because petitioners’
alleged  future  speech  is  not  directed  exclusively  at
Driehaus,  it  does  not  matter  whether  he  “may  run  for
office again.”  Brief for Respondents 33 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  As long as petitioners continue to engage
in  comparable  electoral  speech  regarding  support  for  the
ACA,  that  speech  will  remain  arguably  proscribed  by
Ohio’s false statement statute.

Respondents,  echoing  the  Sixth  Circuit,  contend  that
SBA’s  fears  of  enforcement  are  misplaced  because  SBA
has  not  said  it  “ ‘plans  to  lie  or  recklessly  disregard  the
veracity of its speech.’ ”  Id., at 15 (quoting 525 Fed. Appx.,
at  422).  The  Sixth  Circuit  reasoned  that  because  SBA
“can  only  be  liable  for making  a  statement  ‘knowing’  it  is
false,”  SBA’s  insistence  that  its  speech  is  factually  true
“makes  the  possibility  of  prosecution  for  uttering  such
statements exceedingly slim.”  Id., at 422.

The  Sixth  Circuit  misses  the  point.    SBA’s  insistence
that the allegations in its press release were true did not
prevent  the  Commission  panel  from  finding  probable
cause  to  believe  that  SBA  had  violated  the  law  the  first
time  around.  And,  there  is  every  reason  to  think  that
similar speech in the future will result in similar proceed-
ings, notwithstanding SBA’s belief in the truth of its alle-
gations.  Nothing  in  this  Court’s  decisions  requires  a
plaintiff who wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a
law  to  confess  that  he  will  in  fact  violate  that  law.  See,
e.g.,  Babbitt,  442  U. S.,  at  301  (case  was  justiciable  even
though  plaintiffs  disavowed  any  intent  to  “propagate
untruths”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court is analyzing the arguments made by the respondents.  It discusses the constitutionality of a law and the potential for its application to the petitioner's speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE

KAGAN, J., dissenting

And partisan gerrymandering can make it meaningless.
At  its  most  extreme—as  in  North  Carolina  and  Mary-
land—the practice amounts to “rigging elections.”  Vieth v.
Jubelirer,  541  U. S.  267,  317  (2004)  (Kennedy,  J.,  concur-
ring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted).  By
drawing  districts  to  maximize  the  power  of  some  voters
and minimize the power of others, a party in office at the
right  time  can  entrench  itself  there  for  a  decade  or  more,
no  matter  what  the  voters  would  prefer.    Just  ask  the
people of North Carolina and Maryland.  The “core princi-
ple of republican government,” this Court has recognized,
is “that the voters should choose their representatives, not
the  other  way  around.”  Arizona  State  Legislature  v.  Ari-
zona Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U. S. ___, ___
(2015) (slip op., at 35) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Partisan  gerrymandering  turns  it  the  other  way  around.
By  that  mechanism,  politicians  can  cherry-pick  voters  to
ensure their reelection.  And the power becomes, as Madi-
son put it, “in the Government over the people.”  4 Annals
of Cong. 934.

The majority disputes none of this.  I think it important
to  underscore  that  fact:  The  majority  disputes  none  of
what  I  have  said  (or  will  say)  about  how  gerrymanders
undermine  democracy.    Indeed,  the  majority  concedes
(really, how could it not?) that gerrymandering is “incom-
patible  with  democratic  principles.”  Ante,  at  30  (quoting
Arizona State Legislature, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1)).
And  therefore  what?  That  recognition  would  seem  to
demand  a  response.  The  majority  offers  two  ideas  that
might  qualify  as  such.  One  is  that  the  political  process
can deal with the problem—a proposition so dubious on its
face  that  I  feel  secure  in  delaying  my  answer  for  some
time.  See  ante,  at  31–33;  infra,  at  29–31.  The  other  is
that  political  gerrymanders  have  always  been  with  us.
See  ante,  at  8,  24.    To  its  credit,  the  majority  does  not
frame that point as an originalist constitutional argument.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically focusing on the issue of partisan gerrymandering. It presents a legal argument and cites previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>