<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. VAELLO MADERO

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 20–303.  Argued November 9, 2021—Decided April 21, 2022

The  Territory  Clause  of  the  United  States  Constitution—which  states
that Congress may “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory . . . belonging to the United States,” Art. IV, §3, cl. 2—
affords Congress broad authority to legislate with respect to the U. S.
Territories.    In  exercising  that  authority,  Congress  has  long  main-
tained different federal tax and benefits programs for residents of the
Territories than for residents of the 50 States.  For example, residents
of Puerto Rico are typically exempt from most federal income, gift, es-
tate, and excise taxes.  See 48 U. S. C. §734; see, e.g.,  26 U. S. C. §§933,
2209, 4081–4084.  But just as not every federal tax extends to residents
of  Puerto  Rico,  so  too  not  every  federal  benefits  program  extends  to
residents of Puerto Rico.  One such benefits program is Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), which by statute applies only to residents of the
50 States and the District of Columbia.  42 U. S. C. §1382c(a)(1)(B)(i).
The question presented is whether the equal-protection component of
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires Congress to make
Supplemental  Security  Income  benefits  available  to  residents  of
Puerto  Rico  to  the  same  extent  that  Congress  makes  those  benefits
available to residents of the States.

Here,  respondent  Jose  Luis  Vaello  Madero  received  SSI  benefits
while he was a resident of New York.  He then moved to Puerto Rico,
where he was no longer eligible to receive those benefits.  Unaware of
Vaello Madero’s new residence, the Government continued to pay him
SSI benefits.  The Government eventually sued Vaello Madero to re-
cover those errant payments, which totaled more than $28,000.  In re-
sponse,  Vaello  Madero  invoked  the  Constitution,  arguing  that  Con-
gress’s  exclusion  of  residents  of  Puerto  Rico  from  the  SSI  program
violated  the  equal-protection  component  of  the  Fifth  Amendment’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

Opinion of the Court

such [a] contradictory and absurd purpose,’ ” United States
v.  Bryan,  339  U. S.  323,  342  (1950),  particularly  where
doing so has no basis in the statutory text.

III
Straining  to  inject  ambiguity  into  the  statute,  the  Gov-
ernment  and  the  dissent  advance  several  overlapping
arguments.  None is persuasive.

A
First, the Government posits that §1229(a) “is not worded
in  the  form  of  a  definition”  and  thus  cannot  circum-
scribe what type of notice counts as a “notice to appear” for
purposes  of  the  stop-time  rule.  Brief  for  Respondent  32.
Section 1229(a), however, does speak in definitional terms,
at  least  with  respect  to  the  “time  and  place  at  which  the
proceedings  will  be  held”:  It  specifically  provides  that  the
notice  described  under  paragraph  (1)  is  “referred  to  as  a
‘notice  to  appear,’ ”  which  in  context  is  quintessential
definitional  language.8    It  then  defines  that  term  as  a

——————

that a notice to appear “can also be understood to serve primarily as a
charging document.”  Post, at 14–15.  But neither the Government nor
the  dissent  offers  any  convincing  basis,  much  less  one  rooted  in  the
statutory  text,  for  treating  time-and-place  information  as  any  less
crucial  than  charging  information  for  purposes  of  triggering  the  stop-
time  rule.    Furthermore,  there  is  no  reason  why  a  notice  to  appear
should  have  only  one  essential  function.    Even  if  a  notice  to  appear
functions as a “charging document,” that is not mutually exclusive with
the  conclusion  that  a  notice  to  appear  serves  another  equally  integral
function:  telling  a  noncitizen  when  and  where  to  appear.    At  bottom,
the  Government’s  self-serving  position  that  a  notice  to  appear  must
specify  charging  information,  but  not  the  time-and-place  information,
reveals the arbitrariness inherent in its atextual approach to the stop-
time rule.

8 Congress has employed similar definitional language in other statu-
tory  schemes.    See,  e.g.,  21  U. S. C.  §356(b)(1)  (creating  new  class  of
“fast track product[s]” by setting out drug requirements and providing:
“In  this  section,  such  a  drug  is  referred  to  as  a  ‘fast  track  product’ ”);
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis.  While it is important legal text, it is not the kind of content typically indexed for general reading purposes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1051

558 U. S.

November 30, 2009

No.  09–496.  Brown  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  571  F.  3d  492.

No.  09–5027.  McNeill  v.  Stamper  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  255.

No. 09–5035.  Smith v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5305.  Corines  v.  Broward  County  Sheriff’s  De
partment et al.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported
below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  493.

No.  09–5429.  Benally  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  546  F.  3d  1230.

No.  09–5434.  Abebe  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–5480.  Barrios-Beltran v. United States.  C. A. 5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  384.

No.  09–5496.  Abbey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  513.

No.  09–5542.  Shelton  v.  Roper,  Superintendent,  Potosi
Correctional Center.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Re
ported  below:  563  F.  3d  404.

No.  09–5547.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  890.

No.  09–5583.  Paracha  v.  Gates,  Secretary  of  Defense.

C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5597.  Garcia-Echaverria  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 323 Fed. Appx. 353.

No. 09–5615.  Oliver v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  550  F.  3d  734.

No.  09–5715.  Miranda  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  858.

No. 09–5728.  Hollis v.  United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  14.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the orders issued.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  566 U. S. ____ (2012)

7

Opinion of the Court

III
Nothing  in  the  Clean  Water  Act  expressly  precludes
judicial  review  under  the  APA  or  otherwise.    But  in  de
termining  “[w]hether  and  to  what  extent  a  particular
statute precludes judicial review,” we do not look “only [to]
its  express  language.”    Block  v.  Community  Nutrition
Institute,  467  U. S.  340,  345  (1984).    The  APA,  we  have
said,  creates  a  “presumption  favoring  judicial  review  of
administrative  action,”  but  as  with  most  presumptions,
this  one  “may  be  overcome  by  inferences  of  intent  drawn
from  the  statutory  scheme  as  a  whole.”    Id.,  at  349.  The
Government  offers  several  reasons  why  the  statutory
scheme of the Clean Water Act precludes review.

The  Government  first  points  to  33  U. S. C.  §1319(a)(3),
which provides that, when the EPA “finds that any person
is  in  violation”  of  certain  portions  of  the  Act,  the  agency
“shall  issue  an  order  requiring  such  person  to  comply
with  [the  Act],  or . . .  shall  bring  a  civil  action  [to  enforce
the Act].”  The Government argues that, because Congress
gave the EPA the choice between a judicial proceeding and
an  administrative  action,  it  would  undermine  the  Act  to
allow  judicial  review  of  the  latter.  But  that  argument
rests  on  the  question-begging  premise  that  the  relevant
difference between a compliance order and an enforcement
proceeding  is  that  only  the  latter  is  subject  to  judicial
review.  There  are  eminently  sound  reasons  other  than
insulation  from  judicial  review  why  compliance  orders
are  useful.  The  Government  itself  suggests  that  they
“provid[e] a means of notifying recipients of potential vio
lations  and  quickly  resolving  the  issues  through  volun-
tary compliance.”  Brief for Respondents 39.  It is entirely
consistent with this function to allow judicial review when
the recipient does not choose “voluntary compliance.”  The
Act does not guarantee the EPA that issuing a compliance
order will always be the most effective choice.

The  Government  also  notes  that  compliance  orders  are
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the issue of judicial review of administrative actions taken by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Water Act.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

pre-empt  all  design  defect  claims  against  vaccine  manu-
facturers  for  covered  vaccines,  the  majority’s  decision
leaves  a  regulatory  vacuum  in  which  no  one—neither  the
FDA  nor  any  other  federal  agency,  nor  state  and  federal
juries—ensures  that  vaccine  manufacturers  adequately
take account of scientific and technological advancements.
This  concern  is  especially  acute  with  respect  to  vaccines
that  have  already  been  released  and  marketed  to  the
public.  Manufacturers,  given  the  lack  of  robust  competi-
tion  in  the  vaccine  market,  will  often  have  little  or  no
incentive  to  improve  the  designs  of  vaccines  that  are  al-
ready  generating  significant  profit  margins.    Nothing  in
the text, structure, or legislative history remotely suggests
that Congress intended that result.

I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the implications of a decision regarding vaccine manufacturers' liability for design defects.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

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58

UNITED STATES v. BESTFOODS

Opinion of the Court

United States ﬁled this action under § 107 in 1989, nam-
ing ﬁve defendants as responsible parties: CPC, Aerojet,
Cordova/California, Cordova/Michigan, and Arnold Ott.6
(By that time, Ott I and Ott II were defunct.) After the
parties (and MDNR) had launched a ﬂurry of contribution
claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims, the District Court
consolidated the cases for trial in three phases: liability, rem-
edy, and insurance coverage. So far, only the ﬁrst phase has
been completed; in 1991, the District Court held a 15-day
bench trial on the issue of liability. Because the parties stip-
ulated that the Muskegon plant was a “facility” within the
meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 9601(9), that hazardous substances
had been released at the facility, and that the United States
had incurred reimbursable response costs to clean up the
site, the trial focused on the issues of whether CPC and
Aerojet, as the parent corporations of Ott II and the Cordova
companies, had “owned or operated” the facility within the
meaning of § 107(a)(2).

The District Court said that operator liability may attach
to a parent corporation both directly, when the parent itself
operates the facility, and indirectly, when the corporate veil
can be pierced under state law. See CPC Int’l, Inc. v.
Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 572 (WD Mich.
1991). The court explained that, while CERCLA imposes
direct liability in situations in which the corporate veil can-
not be pierced under traditional concepts of corporate law,
“the statute and its legislative history do not suggest that
CERCLA rejects entirely the crucial limits to liability that
Id., at 573. As the District
are inherent to corporate law.”
Court put it:

“a parent corporation is directly liable under section
107(a)(2) as an operator only when it has exerted power
or inﬂuence over its subsidiary by actively participating
in and exercising control over the subsidiary’s business

6 Arnold Ott settled out of court with the Government on the eve of trial.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the liability of parent corporations under CERCLA. It contains legal arguments, citations, and specific details about a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MURPHY, GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL. v.

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 16–476.  Argued December 4, 2017—Decided May 14, 2018*

The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) makes it
unlawful  for  a  State  or  its  subdivisions  “to  sponsor,  operate,  adver-
tise,  promote,  license,  or  authorize  by  law  or  compact  . . .  a  lottery,
sweepstakes,  or  other  betting,  gambling,  or  wagering  scheme  based
. . .  on”  competitive  sporting  events,  28  U. S. C.  §3702(1),  and  for  “a
person  to  sponsor,  operate,  advertise,  or  promote”  those  same  gam-
bling  schemes  if  done  “pursuant  to  the  law  or  compact  of  a  govern-
mental entity,” §3702(2).  But PASPA does not make sports gambling
itself a federal crime.  Instead, it allows the Attorney General, as well
as  professional  and  amateur  sports  organizations,  to  bring  civil  ac-
tions to enjoin violations.  §3703.  “Grandfather” provisions allow ex-
isting  forms  of  sports  gambling  to  continue  in  four  States,
§3704(a)(1)–(2),  and  another  provision  would  have  permitted  New
Jersey  to  set  up  a  sports  gambling  scheme  in  Atlantic  City  within  a
year of PASPA’s enactment, §3704(a)(3).

New Jersey did not take advantage of that option but has since had
a change of heart.  After voters approved an amendment to the State
Constitution  giving  the  legislature  the  authority  to  legalize  sports
gambling schemes in Atlantic City and at horseracing tracks, the leg-
islature  enacted  a  2012  law  doing  just  that.    The  NCAA  and  three
major  professional  sports  leagues  brought  an  action  in  federal  court
against  New  Jersey’s  Governor  and  other  state  officials  (hereinafter
New Jersey), seeking to enjoin the law on the ground that it violates

——————

* Together  with  No.  16–477,  New  Jersey  Thoroughbred  Horsemen’s
Assn., Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. et al., also on certiorari
to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U79

[09-08-00 13:44:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 125 (1998)

135

Opinion of the Court

preciable distance and, typically, by a customary or usual car-
rier agency”); see also Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms 141
(1942).
If Smith, for example, calls a parcel delivery service,
which sends a truck to Smith’s house to pick up Smith’s pack-
age and take it to Los Angeles, one might say that Smith
has shipped the package and the parcel delivery service has
transported the package. But only the truck driver has
“carried” the package in the sense of “carry” that we believe
Congress intended. Therefore, “transport” is a broader
category that includes “carry” but also encompasses other
activity.

The dissent refers to § 926A and to another statute where
Congress used the word “transport” rather than “carry” to
describe the movement of ﬁrearms. 18 U. S. C. § 925(a)
(2)(B); post, at 146–147. According to the dissent, had Con-
gress intended “carry” to have the meaning we give it, Con-
gress would not have needed to use a different word in these
provisions. But as we have discussed above, we believe the
word “transport” is broader than the word “carry.”

And,

if Congress intended “carry” to have the limited
deﬁnition the dissent contends, it would have been quite un-
necessary to add the proviso in § 926A requiring a person, to
be exempt from penalties, to store her ﬁrearm in a locked
container not immediately accessible. See § 926A (quoted in
full, post, at 146) (exempting from criminal penalties one who
transports a ﬁrearm from a place where “he may lawfully
possess and carry such ﬁrearm” but not exempting the
“transportation” of a ﬁrearm if it is “readily accessible or is
directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such
transporting vehicle”). The statute simply could have said
that such a person may not “carry” a ﬁrearm. But, of
course, Congress did not say this because that is not what
“carry” means.

As we interpret the statutory scheme, it makes sense.
Congress has imposed a variable penalty with no mandatory
minimum sentence upon a person who “transports” (or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of the word "carry" in a statute. It provides legal analysis and cites other relevant statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

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848

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

JONES v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit

No. 99–5739. Argued March 21, 2000—Decided May 22, 2000

Petitioner Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail into a home owned and occupied
by his cousin as a dwelling place for everyday family living. The ensu-
ing ﬁre severely damaged the home.
Jones was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court of violating, inter alia, 18 U. S. C. § 844(i), which makes it a
federal crime to “maliciously damag[e] or destro[y], . . . by means of ﬁre
or an explosive, any building . . . used in interstate or foreign commerce
or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” The Sev-
enth Circuit afﬁrmed, rejecting Jones’s contention that § 844(i), when
applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested
in Congress under the Commerce Clause.

Held: Because an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial
purpose does not qualify as property “used in” commerce or commerce-
affecting activity, arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal
prosecution under § 844(i). Pp. 852–859.

(a) In support of its argument that § 844(i) reaches the arson of an
owner-occupied private residence, the Government relies principally on
the breadth of the statutory term “affecting . . . commerce,” words that,
when unqualiﬁed, signal Congress’ intent to invoke its full Commerce
Clause authority. But § 844(i) contains the qualifying words “used in”
a commerce-affecting activity. The key word is “used.” Congress did
not deﬁne the crime as the explosion of a building whose damage or
destruction might affect interstate commerce, but required that the
damaged or destroyed property itself have been used in commerce or in
an activity affecting commerce. The proper inquiry, therefore, is into
the function of the building itself, and then into whether that function
affects interstate commerce. The Court rejects the Government’s ar-
gument that the Indiana residence involved in this case was constantly
“used” in at least three “activit[ies] affecting commerce”: (1) it was
“used” as collateral to obtain and secure a mortgage from an Oklahoma
lender, who, in turn, “used” it as security for the loan; (2) it was “used”
to obtain from a Wisconsin insurer a casualty insurance policy, which
safeguarded the interests of the homeowner and the mortgagee; and (3)
it was “used” to receive natural gas from sources outside Indiana. Sec-
tion 844(i)’s use-in-commerce requirement is most sensibly read to mean
active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of legal cases and are not typically considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

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142

MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

In sum, drug trafﬁckers will receive signiﬁcantly longer
sentences if they are caught traveling in vehicles in which
they have placed ﬁrearms. The question that divides the
Court concerns the proper reference for enhancement in the
cases at hand, the Guidelines or § 924(c)(1).

B

Unlike the Court, I do not think dictionaries,2 surveys of
press reports,3 or the Bible 4 tell us, dispositively, what “car-

from the basic congressionally-directed effort to rationalize sentencing.”
Id., at 468.

2 I note, however, that the only legal dictionary the Court cites, Black’s
Law Dictionary, deﬁnes “carry arms or weapons” restrictively. See ante,
at 130; supra, at 139–140.

3 Many newspapers, the New York Times among them, have published
stories using “transport,” rather than “carry,” to describe gun placements
resembling petitioners’. See, e. g., Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 27, 1998,
p. 9D, col. 2 (“House members last week expanded gun laws by allowing
weapons to be carried into restaurants or transported anywhere in
cars.”); Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1997, sports section, p. 13 (“Disabled
hunters with permission to hunt from a standing vehicle would be able to
transport a shotgun in an all-terrain vehicle as long as the gun is un-
loaded and the breech is open.”); Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph,
Aug. 4, 1996, p. C10 (British gun laws require “locked steel cases bolted
onto a car for transporting guns from home to shooting range.”); Detroit
News, Oct. 26, 1997, p. D14 (“It is unlawful to carry aﬁeld or transport a
riﬂe . . . or shotgun if you have buckshot, slug, ball loads, or cut shells in
possession except while traveling directly to deer camp or target range
with ﬁrearm not readily available to vehicle occupants.”); N. Y. Times,
July 4, 1993, p. A21, col. 2 (“[T]he gun is supposed to be transported un-
loaded, in a locked box in the trunk.”); Santa Rosa Press Democrat, Sept.
28, 1996, p. B1 (“Police and volunteers ask that participants . . . transport
[their guns] to the fairgrounds in the trunks of their cars.”); Worcester
Telegram & Gazette, July 16, 1996, p. B3 (“Only one gun can be turned in
per person. Guns transported in a vehicle should be locked in the
trunk.”) (emphasis added in all quotations).

4 The translator of the Good Book, it appears, bore responsibility for
determining whether the servants of Ahaziah “carried” his corpse to Jeru-
salem. Compare ante, at 129, with, e. g., The New English Bible, 2 Kings
9:28 (“His servants conveyed his body to Jerusalem.”); Saint Joseph Edi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. v.
MILLIGAN ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

No. 21–1086.  Argued October 4, 2022—Decided  June 8, 2023*

The issue presented is whether the districting plan adopted by the State
of Alabama for its 2022 congressional elections likely violated §2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 52 U. S. C. §10301.  As originally enacted in 1965,
§2  of  the  Act  tracked  the  language  of  the  Fifteenth  Amendment,
providing that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous con-
dition  of  servitude.”    In  City  of  Mobile  v.  Bolden,  446  U. S.  55,  this
Court  held  that  the  Fifteenth  Amendment—and  thus  §2—prohibits
States  from  acting  with  a  “racially  discriminatory  motivation”  or  an
“invidious purpose” to discriminate, but it does not prohibit laws that
are  discriminatory  only  in  effect.    Id.,  at  61–65  (plurality  opinion).
Criticism followed, with many viewing Mobile’s intent test as not suf-
ficiently protective of voting rights.  But others believed that adoption
of an effects test would inevitably require a focus on proportionality,
calling voting laws into question whenever a minority group won fewer
seats in the legislature than its share of the population.  Congress ul-
timately resolved this debate in 1982, reaching a bipartisan compro-
mise that amended §2 to incorporate both an effects test and a robust
disclaimer that “nothing” in §2 “establishes a right to have members
of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.”  §10301(b).

——————

*Together with No. 21–1087, Allen, Alabama Secretary of State, et al. v.
Caster et al., on certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are informational in nature and not meant to be indexed as part of the actual legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
Syllabus

tribes  sued.  The  District  Court  entered  summary  judgment  for  the
Treasury Department and the ANCs, but the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed.

Held: ANCs are “Indian tribe[s]” under ISDA and thus eligible for fund-

ing under Title V of the CARES Act.  Pp. 7–28.

(a) The ANCs argue that they fall under the plain meaning of ISDA’s
definition  of  “Indian  tribe.”    Respondents  ask  the  Court  to  adopt  a
term-of-art construction that equates being “recognized as eligible for
the special programs and services provided by the United States to In-
dians because of their status as Indians” with being a “federally recog-
nized tribe.”  Pp. 7–25.

(1) Under  the  plain  meaning  of  ISDA,  ANCs  are  Indian  tribes.
ANCs are “established pursuant to” ANCSA and thereby “recognized
as eligible” for that Act’s benefits.  ANCSA, which made ANCs eligible
to select tens of millions of acres of land and receive hundreds of mil-
lions of tax-exempt dollars, 43 U. S. C. §§1605, 1610, 1611, is a special
program provided by the United States to “Indians,” i.e., Alaska Na-
tives.  Given that ANCSA is the only statute ISDA’s “Indian tribe” def-
inition mentions by name, eligibility for ANCSA’s benefits satisfies the
definition’s final “recognized-as-eligible” clause.  Pp. 7–11.

(2) Respondents ask the Court to read ISDA’s “Indian tribe” defi-
nition as a term of art.  But respondents fail to establish that the lan-
guage of ISDA’s recognized-as-eligible clause was an accepted way of
saying “a federally recognized tribe” in 1975, when ISDA was passed.
Nor is the mere inclusion of the word “recognized” enough to import a
term-of-art meaning.  Respondents also fail to show that the language
of  the  recognized-as-eligible  clause  later  became  a  term  of  art  that
should be backdated to ISDA’s passage in 1975.  Pp. 11–18.

(3) Even if ANCs did not satisfy the recognized-as-eligible clause,
they  would  still  satisfy  ISDA’s  definition  of  an  “Indian  tribe.”    If  re-
spondents were correct that only a federally recognized tribe can sat-
isfy that clause, then the best way to read the “Indian tribe” definition
would be for the recognized-as-eligible clause not to apply to ANCs at
all.  Otherwise, despite being prominently “includ[ed]” in the “Indian
tribe” definition, 25 U. S. C. §5304(e), all ANCs would be excluded by
a federal-recognition requirement there is no reasonable prospect they
could ever satisfy.  Pp. 18–23.

(4) Respondents’ remaining arguments that ANCs are not Indian
tribes under ISDA are unpersuasive.  They first argue that the ANCs
misrepresent how meaningful a role they play under ISDA because the
actual  number  of  ISDA  contracts  held  by  ANCs  is  negligible.  This
point is largely irrelevant.  No one would argue that a federally recog-
nized  tribe  was  not  an  Indian  tribe  under  ISDA  just  because  it  had
never entered into an ISDA contract.  Respondents further argue that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the case, the arguments made, and the court's holding. This type of text is generally suitable for indexing as it contains the substance of a legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.

ALITO, J., concurring

claimed that their duties demand broader authority.21

Another common category involves speech that criticizes
or  derides  school  administrators,  teachers,  or  other  staff
members.22  Schools may assert that parents who send their
children to a public school implicitly authorize the school to
demand that the child exhibit the respect that is required
for orderly and effective instruction, but parents surely do
not relinquish their children’s ability to complain in an ap-
propriate  manner  about  wrongdoing,  dereliction,  or  even
plain  incompetence.    See  Brief  for  College  Athlete  Advo-
cates as Amicus Curiae 12–21; Brief for Student Press Law
Center et al. as Amici Curiae 10–11, 17–20, 30.

Perhaps the most difficult category involves criticism or

——————

21 See,  e.g.,  McNeil v. Sherwood  School Dist.  88J,  918  F. 3d  700,  704
(CA9 2019) (per curiam) (student created a “hit list” of students and drew
graphic images of violence); Wynar v. Douglas County School Dist., 728
F. 3d  1062,  1065–1066  (CA9  2013)  (student  spoke  about  committing  a
school shooting); Wisniewski v. Board of Ed., 494 F. 3d 34, 36 (CA2 2007)
(student sent a message depicting a pistol firing a bullet at his English
teacher’s head); Porter v. Ascension Parish School Bd., 393 F. 3d 608, 611
(CA5 2004) (student drew a picture showing his school under attack by
a gasoline tanker, missile launcher, helicopter, and armed individuals);
Doe v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 306 F. 3d 616, 619 (CA8 2002)
(en banc) (student drafted letters expressing a desire to molest, rape, and
murder  his  ex-girlfriend);  but  see  Conroy  v.  Lacey  Twp.  School  Dist.,
2020  WL  528896,  *1  (D  NJ,  Jan.  31,  2020)  (two  high  school  students
posted photos on Snapchat showing them with legally purchased guns at
a  shooting  range  on  a  Saturday,  which  another  student  claimed  made
him “ ‘nervous to come to school’ ”); see also Conroy v. Lacey Twp. School
Dist.,  No.  3:19–cv–09452  (D  NJ,  Aug.  25,  2020)  (order  dismissing  case
with  prejudice  after  settlement).  The  cases  cited  in  this  footnote  and
footnotes 22–23 are listed to show types of claims addressed by the lower
courts.  I do not express any view about the correctness of the decisions.
22 See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F. 3d 41, 45 (CA2 2008) (member
of  student  council  posted  a  message  on  her  personal  blog  complaining
about the administration and encouraging readers to call or e-mail the
school to complain); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367 (SD Fla.
2010) (student created a Facebook group “for students to voice their dis-
like” of their teacher).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito. It discusses the legal boundaries of student speech in schools.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1007

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

No. 08–1415.  Filebark et al. v.  Department of Transpor
tation  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Motion  of  National  Treasury
Employees  Union  et  al.  for  leave  to  ﬁle  a  brief  as  amici  curiae
out  of  time  granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555
F.  3d  1009.

No.  08–10982.  Basardh  v.  Gates,  Secretary  of  Defense,

et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  before  judgment  denied.

No.  09–28.  Easterday  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Certiorari denied.  Justice Breyer took no part in the consider
ation or decision of this petition.  Reported below: 564 F. 3d 1004.
No.  09–49.  Lazarenko  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Certiorari denied.  Justice Breyer took no part in the consider
ation or decision of this petition.  Reported below: 564 F. 3d 1026.
No. 09–74.  Smith, Warden v.  Mason.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Motion
of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  granted.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  543  F.  3d  766.

No.  09–104.  Ad  Hoc  Committee  of  Kenton  County  Bond
holders  v.  Delta  Air  Lines,  Inc.,  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Mo
tion  of  Professor  George  W.  Kuney  for  leave  to  ﬁle  a  brief  as
amicus  curiae  granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Soto-
mayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion
and  this  petition.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  455.

No.  09–141.  Bennett  v.  Verizon  Wireless.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  326
Fed.  Appx.  9.

No.  09–188.  Fisher  v.  Penn  Traffic  Co.  et  al.  C.  A.  2d
Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  319
Fed.  Appx.  34.

No.  09–216.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  Department  of
Corrections,  et  al.  v.  Asay.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Motion  of  re
spondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  granted.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No.  09–234.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  Department  of
Corrections  v.  Thomas.  C.  A. 11th  Cir.  Motion  of  respondent
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1048

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 30, 2009

558 U. S.

States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
560  F.  3d  616.

No.  09–70.  Modern,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  St.  Johns  River  Water
Management  District  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  330.

No.  09–86.  Boulware  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  971.

No.  09–98.  Scurlark  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  839.

No.  09–102.  Virginia  v.  Rudolph.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  277  Va.  209,  722  S.  E.  2d  527.

No.  09–106.  Pedernera  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.

C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–113.  Price  v.  United  States  Trustee  et  al.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  1052.

No.  09–222.  Matheny,  Individually  and  as  Surviving
Spouse  of  Matheny,  Deceased,  et  al.  v.  Tennessee  Valley
Authority.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
557  F.  3d  311.

No. 09–225.  Block et al. v. Shinseki, Secretary of Veter
ans  Affairs,  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  285.

No.  09–231.  Brown  et  al.  v.  Hovatter  et  al.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  357.

No. 09–241.  Wilkinson v.  Palmetto State Transportation
Co.  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  S.  C.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
382  S.  C.  295,  676  S.  E.  2d  700.

No.  09–242.  Pyke,  Individually  and  as  Personal  Repre
sentative of the Estate of Pyke, Deceased, et al. v. Cuomo
et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567
F.  3d  74.

No.  09–257.  Corder  v.  Lewis  Palmer  School  District
No. 38.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 566
F.  3d  1219.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, and the court where the case was heard.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

federal habeas case, Shinn, 596 U. S., at ___, and frustrate the “State’s
interest[ ] in finality,” Calderon, 523 U. S., at 556.  A federal court or-
der  requiring  a  State  to  transport  a  prisoner  to  a  public  setting  not
only delays resolution of his habeas case, but may also present serious
risks to public safety.  Commanding a State to take such risks so that
a prisoner can search for unusable evidence would not be a “necessary
or  appropriate”  means  of  aiding  a  federal  court’s  limited  habeas  re-
view.  Pp. 4–9.

(b) The District Court and Court of Appeals in this case concluded
that  directing  the  State  to  transport  Twyford  to  a  medical  facility
would aid the adjudication of his habeas petition, but they never de-
termined how this could aid his cause.  For the reasons discussed, that
was  error.  Applying  the  proper  standard  here  is  straightforward.
Twyford  never  explained  how  the  results  of  the  neurological  testing
could  be  admissible  in  his  habeas  proceedings,  and  it  is  hard  to  see
how they could be, since the District Court’s AEDPA review is limited
to “the record that was before the state court,” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at
181, and Twyford made no attempt to explain how that bar would be
inapplicable  in  his  case.   Twyford  suggested  that  the  results  of  his
brain testing could “plausibly” bear on the question whether to excuse
procedural  default,  but  he  did  not  identify  the  particular  defaulted
claims nor explain how the testing would allow him to resurrect those
claims.  Pp. 9–11.

11 F. 4th 518, reversed and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  BREYER, J., filed a dissent-
ing opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  GORSUCH, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus section of a Supreme Court opinion. It outlines the case's background, the legal issues, and the court's holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

951

558 U. S.

October 13, 2009

No.  09–5704.  Williams  v.  Norris,  Director,  Arkansas  De
partment  of  Correction.  Sup.  Ct.  Ark.  Certiorari  denied.
No.  09–5711.  Grant  v.  Oklahoma.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Okla.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  205  P.  3d  1.

No.  09–5716.  Bonner  v.  Marshall,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  596.

No.  09–5717.  Batiste  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5718.  Brooks v.  Dormire, Superintendent, Jeffer
son  City  Correctional  Center.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5720.  Baker  v.  Georgia.  Ct.  App.  Ga.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  295  Ga.  App.  162,  671  S.  E.  2d  206.

No.  09–5721.  Andrews  v.  Howes,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5723.  Shannon v.  Berghuis, Warden.  C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5724.  Robinson v.  LeBlanc, Warden.  C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5725.  Richardson v. Thomas et al.  Commw. Ct. Pa.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  964  A.  2d  61.

No. 09–5727.  McDaniel v.  Suthers, Attorney General of
Colorado, et al.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported
below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  734.

No. 09–5735.  Lopez v. Wallace et al.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  782.

No.  09–5740.  Brown  v.  United  States  Court  of  Appeals

for  the  Ninth  Circuit.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5741.  Blaxton  v.  Boca  Grande  Foods  et  al.  C.  A.

11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5742.  Aguilar  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  5th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal publication. It contains case numbers, court names, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

3

Opinion of the Court

historical weather pattern.”  Id., at 21.

The  patent  examiner  rejected  petitioners’  application,
explaining that it “ ‘is not implemented on a specific appa-
ratus  and  merely  manipulates  [an]  abstract  idea  and
solves a purely mathematical problem without any limita-
tion  to  a  practical  application,  therefore,  the  invention  is
not  directed  to  the  technological  arts.’ ”    App.  to  Pet.  for
Cert.  148a.  The  Board  of  Patent  Appeals  and  Interfer-
ences  affirmed,  concluding  that  the  application  involved
only  mental  steps  that  do  not  transform  physical  matter
and was directed to an abstract idea.  Id., at 181a–186a.

The  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Federal
Circuit  heard  the  case  en  banc  and  affirmed.    The  case
produced  five  different  opinions.    Students  of  patent  law
would be well advised to study these scholarly opinions.

Chief Judge Michel wrote the opinion of the court.  The
court  rejected  its  prior  test  for  determining  whether  a
claimed  invention  was  a  patentable  “process”  under
§101—whether it produces a “ ‘useful, concrete, and tangi-
ble  result’ ”—as  articulated  in  State  Street  Bank  &  Trust
Co.  v.  Signature  Financial  Group,  Inc.,  149  F. 3d  1368,
1373  (1998),  and  AT&T  Corp.  v.  Excel  Communications,
Inc.,  172  F. 3d  1352,  1357  (1999).    See  In re  Bilski,  545
F. 3d  943,  959–960,  and  n. 19  (CA  Fed.  2008)  (en  banc).
The  court  held  that  “[a]  claimed  process  is  surely  patent-
eligible under §101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine
or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a
different state or thing.”  Id., at 954.  The court concluded
this  “machine-or-transformation  test”  is  “the  sole  test
governing  §101  analyses,”  id.,  at  955,  and  thus  the  “test
for determining patent eligibility of a process under §101,”
id., at 956.  Applying the machine-or-transformation test,
the court held that petitioners’ application was not patent
eligible.  Id.,  at  963–966.  Judge  Dyk  wrote  a  separate
concurring  opinion,  providing  historical  support  for  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing a patent case. It cites legal precedents and outlines the court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring

Though digital instead of physical, they are at bottom com-
munications  networks,  and  they  “carry”  information  from
one user to another.  A traditional telephone company laid
physical wires to create a network connecting people.  Dig-
ital  platforms  lay  information  infrastructure  that  can  be
controlled in much the same way.  And unlike newspapers,
digital platforms hold themselves out as organizations that
focus on distributing the speech of the broader public.  Fed-
eral law dictates that companies cannot “be treated as the
publisher or speaker” of information that they merely dis-
tribute.  110 Stat. 137, 47 U. S. C. §230(c).

The analogy to common carriers is even clearer for digital
platforms  that  have  dominant  market  share.    Similar  to
utilities, today’s dominant digital platforms derive much of
their value from network size.  The Internet, of course, is a
network.  But these digital platforms are networks within
that  network.    The  Facebook  suite  of  apps  is  valuable
largely because 3 billion people use it.  Google search—at
90%  of  the  market  share—is  valuable  relative  to  other
search  engines  because  more  people  use  it,  creating  data
that Google’s algorithm uses to refine and improve search
results.  These network effects entrench these companies.
Ordinarily,  the  astronomical  profit  margins  of  these  plat-
forms—last  year,  Google  brought  in  $182.5  billion  total,
$40.3  billion  in  net  income—would  induce  new  entrants
into the market.  That these companies have no comparable
competitors  highlights  that  the  industries  may  have  sub-
stantial barriers to entry.

To be sure, much activity on the Internet derives value
from network effects.  But dominant digital platforms are
different.  Unlike decentralized digital spheres, such as the
e-mail protocol, control of these networks is highly concen-
trated.  Although  both  companies  are  public,  one  person
controls Facebook (Mark Zuckerberg), and just two control
Google  (Larry  Page  and  Sergey  Brin).  No  small  group  of
people controls e-mail.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a section from a legal document. It contains citations, legal terminology, and a formal tone.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

SACKETT v. EPA

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

text of the statute, as well as 45 years of consistent agency
practice and this Court’s precedents, I respectfully disagree
with the Court’s decision to interpret “waters of the United
States” to include only adjoining wetlands and not adjacent
wetlands.

IV

The difference between “adjacent” and “adjoining” in this
context  is  not  merely  semantic  or  academic.    The  Court’s
rewriting  of  “adjacent”  to  mean  “adjoining”  will  matter  a
great deal in the real world.  In particular, the Court’s new
and overly narrow test may leave long-regulated and long-
accepted-to-be-regulable  wetlands  suddenly  beyond  the
scope  of  the  agencies’  regulatory  authority,  with  negative
consequences for waters of the United States.  For example,
the Mississippi River features an extensive levee system to
prevent  flooding.  Under  the  Court’s  “continuous  surface
levees  (the
connection”  test,  the  presence  of  those
equivalent  of  a  dike)  would  seemingly  preclude  Clean
Water Act coverage of adjacent wetlands on the other side
of the levees, even though the adjacent wetlands are often
an important part of the flood-control project.  See Brief for
Respondents  30.  Likewise,  federal  protection  of  the
Chesapeake Bay might be less effective if fill can be dumped
into  wetlands  that  are  adjacent  to  (but  not  adjoining)  the
bay and its covered tributaries.  See id., at 35.  Those are
just two of many examples of how the Court’s overly narrow
view of the Clean Water Act will have concrete impact.

As  those  examples  reveal,  there  is  a  good  reason  why
Congress  covered  not  only  adjoining  wetlands  but  also
adjacent  wetlands.  Because  of  the  movement  of  water
between adjacent wetlands and other waters, pollutants in
wetlands often end up in adjacent rivers, lakes, and other
waters.  Natural barriers such as berms and dunes do not
block  all  water  flow  and  are  in  fact  evidence  of  a  regular
connection between a water and  a wetland.   85 Fed. Reg.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in the case Sackett v. EPA. It discusses the interpretation of the Clean Water Act and the implications of the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1066

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 30, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–5087.  Greene  v.  Finger  Lakes  Developmental

Disabilities  Service  Office  et  al.,  ante,  p.  886;

No.  09–5145.  Brown  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  889;
No.  09–5198.  Gorman  v.  National  Transportation  Safety

Board  et  al.,  ante,  p.  892;

No.  09–5235.  Harris  v.  Florida,  ante,  p.  893;
No. 09–5238.  Hunt v.  Wolfenbarger, Warden, ante, p. 894;
No.  09–5282.  Best  v.  GEICO  Casualty  Co.,  ante,  p.  896;
No.  09–5287.  Mullins  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  896;
No.  09–5312.  Monacelli  v.  Heartland  Educational  Con

sortium  et  al.,  ante,  p.  897;

No.  09–5328.  Holland  v.  Holland,  ante,  p.  898;
No.  09–5359.  Tompkins  v.  Mitchell,  Correctional  Admin
istrator  IV,  Mountain  View  Correctional  Institution,
ante,  p.  900;

No.  09–5406.  Powell  v.  San  Diego  County  Health  and

Human  Services  Agency,  ante,  p.  902;

No.  09–5438.  Griffin  v.  Sebuliba,  ante,  p.  903;
No.  09–5518.  Creusere  v.  Weaver  et  al.,  ante,  p.  907;
No.  09–5552.  Tatum  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  909;
No.  09–5582.  Phillips  v.  Missouri,  ante,  p.  911;
No. 09–5643.  Hanks v.  Wright, Warden, et al., ante, p. 914;
No.  09–5707.  White  v.  Supreme  Court  of  New  Jersey

et  al.,  ante,  p.  916;

No.  09–5735.  Lopez  v.  Wallace  et  al.,  ante,  p.  951;
No.  09–5770.  Antonsson  v.  Kast,  ante,  p.  952;
No.  09–5921.  Haque  v.  Immigration  and  Customs  En

forcement  et  al.,  ante,  p.  955;  and

No.  09–5979.  Ramirez-Ponce  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Flor
ida  Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  924.  Peti
tions  for  rehearing  denied.

No. 08–1354.  DeSalvo v.  Volhard et al., ante, p. 932.  Peti
tion  for  rehearing  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in
the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  08–1511.  Gilley  v.  Monsanto  Co.,  Inc.,  et  al.,  ante,
p.  823.  Motion  of  petitioner  to  defer  consideration  of  petition  for
rehearing  denied.  Petition  for  rehearing  denied.

No.  08–8135.  Sims  v.  City  of  New  York, New  York,  et  al.,
556  U. S.  1110.  Motion  for  leave  to  ﬁle  petition  for  rehearing
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case citations and motions related to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is not the actual content of a legal case but rather a procedural record.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Docket/Procedural Record</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

Last, the federal respondents raised for the first time a
novel alternative theory of standing on behalf of the indi-
vidual plaintiffs in their merits brief.  (The dissent, alone,
puts forward a similar novel theory on behalf of the state
plaintiffs.)  That  theory  was  not  directly  argued  by  the
plaintiffs in the courts below, see 945 F. 3d, at 385–386, and
n. 29, and was nowhere presented at the certiorari stage.
We  accordingly  decline  to  consider  it.  Cf.  Adarand  Con-
structors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U. S. 103, 109–110 (2001) (per
curiam);  see  also  Cutter  v.  Wilkinson,  544  U. S.  709,  718,
n. 7 (2005).

B
Next,  we turn to the state plaintiffs.  We conclude that
Texas and the other state plaintiffs have similarly failed to
show that they have alleged an “injury fairly traceable to
the  defendant’s  allegedly  unlawful  conduct.”    Cuno,  547
U. S., at 342 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis
added).  They claim two kinds of pocketbook injuries.  First,
they allege an indirect injury in the form of the increased
use of (and therefore cost to) state-operated medical insur-
ance programs.  Second, they claim a direct injury resulting
from a variety of increased administrative and related ex-
penses required, they say, by the minimum essential cover-
age provision, along with other provisions of the Act that,
they add, are inextricably “ ‘interwoven’ ” with it.  Brief for
Respondent-Cross Petitioner States 39.

1
First, the state plaintiffs claim that the minimum essen-
tial coverage provision has led state residents subject to it
to  enroll  in  state-operated  or  state-sponsored  insurance
programs such as Medicaid, see 42 U. S. C. §§1396–1396w,
the  Children’s  Health  Insurance  Program  (CHIP),  see
§1397aa, and health insurance programs for state employ-
ees.  The state plaintiffs say they must pay a share of the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *California v. Texas*. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

776

FARAGHER v. BOCA RATON

Syllabus

tems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21–22, its cases have established few deﬁnitive
rules for determining when an employer will be liable for a discrimina-
tory environment that is otherwise actionably abusive. The Court’s
only discussion to date of the standards of employer liability came in
Meritor, supra, where the Court held that traditional agency principles
were relevant for determining employer liability. Although the Court
cited the Restatement §§ 219–237 with general approval, the Court cau-
tioned that common-law agency principles might not be transferable in
all their particulars. Pp. 786–792.

(b) Restatement § 219(1) provides that “a master is subject to liability
for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.” Although Title VII cases in the Courts of Appeals have
typically held, or assumed, that supervisory sexual harassment falls out-
side the scope of employment because it is motivated solely by individual
desires and serves no purpose of the employer, these cases appear to be
in tension with others deﬁning the scope of the employment broadly to
hold employers vicariously liable for employees’ intentional torts, includ-
ing sexual assaults, that were not done to serve the employer, but were
deemed to be characteristic of its activities or a foreseeable consequence
of its business. This tension is the result of differing judgments about
the desirability of holding an employer liable for his subordinates’ way-
ward behavior. The proper analysis here, then, calls not for a mechani-
cal application of indeﬁnite and malleable factors set forth in the Re-
statement, but rather an enquiry into whether it is proper to conclude
that sexual harassment is one of the normal risks of doing business
the employer should bear. An employer can reasonably anticipate the
possibility of sexual harassment occurring in the workplace, and this
might justify the assignment of the costs of this behavior to the em-
ployer rather than to the victim. Two things counsel in favor of the
contrary conclusion, however. First, there is no reason to suppose that
Congress wished courts to ignore the traditional distinction between
acts falling within the scope of employment and acts amounting to what
the older law called frolics or detours from the course of employment.
Second, the lower courts, by uniformly judging employer liability for
co-worker harassment under a negligence standard, have implicitly
treated such harassment outside the scope of employment.
It is un-
likely that such treatment would escape efforts to render them obsolete
if the Court held that harassing supervisors necessarily act within the
scope of their employment. The rationale for doing so would apply
when the behavior was that of coemployees, because the employer gen-
erally beneﬁts from the work of common employees as from the work
of supervisors. The answer to this argument might be that the scope
of supervisory employment may be treated separately because super-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It contains legal jargon and discusses a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

has national security implications.”  Id., at ___.  That reasoning applies
with full force here.  The Court of Appeals disagreed because it viewed
Boule’s  Fourth  Amendment  claim  as  akin  to  a  “conventional”  exces-
sive-force claim, as in Bivens, and less like the cross-border shooting
in Hernández.  But that does not bear on the relevant point: Permitting
suit against a Border Patrol agent presents national security concerns
that  foreclose  Bivens  relief.    Further,  the  Court  of  Appeals’  analysis
betrays the pitfalls of applying the special-factors analysis at too gran-
ular a level.  A court should not inquire whether Bivens relief is appro-
priate in light of the balance of circumstances in the “particular case.”
United  States  v.  Stanley,  483  U. S.  669,  683.    Rather,  it  should  ask
“[m]ore  broadly”  whether  there  is  any  reason  to  think  that  “judicial
intrusion” into a given field might be “harmful” or “inappropriate,” id.,
at  681.    The  proper  inquiry  here  is  whether  a  court  is  competent  to
authorize a damages action not just against Agent Egbert, but against
Border Patrol agents generally.  The answer is no.  Pp. 9–12.

(2) Second,  Congress  has  provided  alternative  remedies  for  ag-
grieved  parties  in  Boule’s  position  that  independently  foreclose  a
Bivens  action  here.    By  regulation,  Border  Patrol  must  investigate
“[a]lleged  violations”  and  accept  grievances  from  “[a]ny  persons.”    8
CFR §§287.10(a)–(b).  Boule claims that this regulatory grievance pro-
cedure  was  inadequate,  but  this  Court  has  never held  that  a Bivens
alternative  must  afford  rights  such  as  judicial  review  of  an  adverse
determination.  Bivens “is concerned solely with deterring the uncon-
stitutional acts of individual officers.”  Correctional Services Corp. v.
Malesko,  534  U. S.  61,  71.  And,  regardless,  the  question  whether  a
given remedy is  adequate  is  a  legislative  determination.   As  in Her-
nández, this Court has no warrant to doubt that the consideration of
Boule’s grievance secured adequate deterrence and afforded Boule an
alternative remedy.  See 589 U. S., at ___.  Pp. 12–13.

(c) There is no Bivens cause of action for Boule’s First Amendment
retaliation claim.  That claim presents a new Bivens context, and there
are many reasons to think that Congress is better suited to authorize
a damages remedy.  Extending Bivens to alleged First Amendment vi-
olations would pose an acute “risk that fear of personal monetary lia-
bility and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the dis-
charge of their duties.”  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 638.  In
light of these costs, “Congress is in a better position to decide whether
or not the public interest would be served” by imposing a damages ac-
tion.  Bush, 462 U. S., at 389.  The Court of Appeals’ reasons for ex-
tending Bivens in this context—that retaliation claims are “well-estab-
lished” and that Boule alleges that Agent Egbert “was not carrying out
official duties” when the retaliation occurred—lack merit.  Also lacking
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It outlines the Court's reasoning for denying a Bivens action in a case involving a Border Patrol agent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS

JACKSON, J., dissenting

vested them with authority to set the ground rules for the
individuals and entities that participate in the our economy
and our society.  It is utterly inconceivable that §2401(a)’s
statute of limitations was meant to permit fresh attacks on
settled regulations from all new comers forever.  Yet, that
is what the majority holds today.

But Congress still has a chance to address this absurdity
and  forestall  the  coming  chaos.  It  can  opt  to  correct  this
Court’s mistake by clarifying that the statutes it enacts are
designed to facilitate the functioning of agencies, not to hob-
ble them.  In particular, Congress can amend §2401(a), or
enact  a  specific  review  provision  for  APA  claims,  to  state
explicitly what any such rule must mean if it is to operate
as  a  limitations  period  in  this  context:  Regulated  entities
have six years from the date of the agency action to bring a
lawsuit  seeking  to  have  it  changed  or  invalidated;  after
that, facial challenges must end.  By doing this, Congress
can make clear that lawsuits bringing facial claims against
agencies  are  not  personal  attack  vehicles  for  new  entities
created just for that purpose. So, while the Court has made
a mess of this pivotal statute, and the consequences are pro-
found, “the ball is in Congress’ court.”  Ledbetter v. Good-
year  Tire  &  Rubber  Co.,  550  U. S.  618,  661  (2007)  (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

Because  territorial  governments  “are  not  organized  un-
der the Constitution,” they are not “subject to its complex
distribution of the powers of government.”  Ibid.  Congress
may give Territories “a legislative, an executive, and a judi-
ciary, with such powers as it has been their will to assign.”
Sere, 6 Cranch, at 337.  And, since the founding, Congress
has done so in ways that do not comport with the Constitu-
tion’s restrictions on the National Government.  For exam-
ple, Congress has delegated Article IV legislative authority
to territorial officials and legislatures,2 which it could not
——————
579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 15) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  Congress is the source of the “entire dominion and sovereignty” of
a Territory, Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162, 168 (1899), and therefore
all territorial laws, whether congressionally enacted or territorially en-
acted, derive from Article IV, Sánchez Valle, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
15) (recognizing that the “most immediate source of [the] authority” does
not change the nature of the power exercised).

2 See, e.g., Act of Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 51, and n. (a) (Northwest Terri-
tory); Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, §1, 1 Stat. 123 (Southwest Territory);
Act of Apr. 7, 1798, §3, 1 Stat. 550 (Mississippi); Act of May 7, 1800, §§2,
4, 2 Stat. 59 (Indiana); Act of Mar. 26, 1804, §4, 2 Stat. 284 (Louisiana);
Act of Jan. 11, 1805, ch. 5, §2, 2 Stat. 309 (Michigan); Act of Mar. 2, 1805,
§§1, 2, 2 Stat. 322 (Orleans); Act of Feb. 3, 1809, §§2, 4, 2 Stat. 515 (Illi-
nois); Act of June 4, 1812, §4, 2 Stat. 744 (Missouri); Act of Mar. 3, 1817,
§4, 3 Stat. 372 (Alabama); Act of Mar. 2, 1819, §5, 3 Stat. 494 (Arkansas);
Act of Mar. 30, 1822,  §5, 3 Stat. 655 (Florida); Act of Mar. 3, 1823, §5, 3
Stat. 751 (Florida); Act of Apr. 20, 1836, §4, 5 Stat. 12 (Wisconsin); Act
of June 12, 1838, §4, 5 Stat. 236 (Iowa); Act of Aug. 14, 1848, §4, 9 Stat.
324  (Oregon);  Act  of  Mar.  3,  1849,  §4,  9  Stat.  404  (Minnesota);  Act  of
Sept. 9, 1850, §5, 9 Stat. 448 (New Mexico); Act of Sept. 9, 1850, §4, 9
Stat. 454 (Utah); Act of Mar. 2, 1853, §4, 10 Stat. 173 (Washington); Act
of May 30, 1854, §§4–6, 22–24, 10 Stat. 278–279, 284–285 (Nebraska and
Kansas); Act of Feb. 28, 1861, §4, 12 Stat. 173 (Colorado); Act of Mar. 2,
1861, §4, 12 Stat. 210–211 (Nevada); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, §4, 12 Stat. 240
(Dakota); Act of Feb. 24, 1863, ch. 56, §2, 12 Stat. 665 (Arizona); Act of
Mar. 3, 1863, §4, 12 Stat. 809 (Idaho); Act of May 26, 1864, §4, 13 Stat.
87 (Montana); Act of July 25, 1868, §4, 15 Stat. 179 (Wyoming); Act of
May 2, 1890, §4, 26 Stat. 83 (Oklahoma); Act of Apr. 12, 1900, §27, 31
Stat. 82 (Puerto Rico); Act of Apr. 30, 1900, §12, 31 Stat. 144 (Hawaii);
Act of July 1, 1902, §7, 32 Stat. 693–694 (Philippines); Act of Aug. 24,
1912, §4, 37 Stat. 513 (Alaska); Act of June 22, 1936, §5, 49 Stat. 1808
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case *FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC*.  It delves into the legal framework surrounding territorial governments and their relationship to Congress.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

780

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court

and virtual coincidence of scope makes it possible, and indeed
appropriate, to decide the statutory issue ﬁrst. We there-
fore begin (and will end) with the statutory question.

The relevant provision of the FCA, 31 U. S. C. § 3729(a),
subjects to liability “[a]ny person” who, inter alia, “know-
ingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an ofﬁcer or
employee of the United States Government .
. a false
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” We must
apply to this text our longstanding interpretive presumption
that “person” does not include the sovereign. See United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604 (1941); United
States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 275 (1947).9 The

.

9 The dissent claims that, “[a]lthough general statutory references to
‘persons’ are not normally construed to apply to the enacting sover-
eign, when Congress uses that word in federal statutes enforceable by the
Federal Government or by a federal agency, it applies to States and state
agencies as well as to private individuals and corporations.” Post, at 790
(citation omitted). The dissent cites three cases in support of this asser-
tion. None of them, however, involved a statutory provision authorizing
private suit against a State. California v. United States, 320 U. S. 577
(1944), disregarded the presumption in a case brought against a State
by the Federal Government (and under a statutory provision authoriz-
ing suit only by the Federal Government). See id., at 585–586. United
States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), found the presumption over-
come in similar circumstances—and with regard to a statute that used not
the word “person,” but rather the phrase “common carrier.” See id., at
186–187. And Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159 (1942), held that the pre-
sumption was overcome when, if a State were not regarded as a “person”
for purposes of bringing an action under § 7 of the Sherman Act, it would
be left “without any redress for injuries resulting from practices outlawed
by that Act.”

Id., at 162.

The dissent contends that “[t]he reason for presuming that an enacting
sovereign does not intend to authorize litigation against itself simply
does not apply to federal statutes that apply equally to state agencies and
private entities.” Post, at 798. That is true enough, but in the Ameri-
can system there is a different reason, equally valid. While the States do
not have the immunity against federally authorized suit that international
law has traditionally accorded foreign sovereigns, see National City Bank
of N. Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U. S. 356, 358–359 (1955), they are sover-
eigns nonetheless, and both comity and respect for our federal system
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of a statute and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY

Opinion of the Court

___ (2019) (slip op., at 3) (contrasting “direct condemnation”
with “inverse condemnation”).

When the Constitution and Bill of Rights were ratified,
they did not include the words “eminent domain.”  The Tak-
ings  Clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  (“nor  shall  private
property  be  taken  for  public  use,  without  just  compensa-
tion”)  nevertheless  recognized  the  existence  of  such  a
power.  Shortly after the founding, the Federal Government
began  exercising  its  eminent  domain  authority  in  areas
subject  to  exclusive  federal  jurisdiction.  See,  e.g.,  Act  of
Mar. 3, 1809, 2 Stat. 539 (authorizing construction of turn-
pike  road  in  the  District  of  Columbia);  see  also  Custiss  v.
Georgetown  &  Alexandria  Turnpike  Co.,  6  Cranch  233
(1810)  (suit  by  one  of  Martha  Washington’s  grandsons  to
quash inquisition into value of land pursuant to Act).

By  the  second  half  of  the  19th  century,  however,  this
Court confirmed that federal eminent domain extended to
property within state boundaries as well.  In Kohl v. United
States, 91 U. S. 367 (1876), we held that the United States
could condemn land in Ohio to construct a federal building.
We reasoned that “[t]he powers vested by the Constitution
in the general government demand for their exercise the ac-
quisition of  lands  in  all  the  States.”   Id.,  at  371.    And  we
noted that “[t]he right of eminent domain was one of those
means well known when the Constitution was adopted, and
employed to obtain lands for public uses.”  Id., at 372.  The
federal eminent domain power, we said, “can neither be en-
larged nor diminished by a State.  Nor can any State pre-
scribe the manner in which it must be exercised.”  Id., at
374.  And to avoid any doubt, we added that “[t]he consent
of a State can never be a condition precedent to [the] enjoy-
ment” of federal eminent domain.  Ibid.
  While Kohl involved the condemnation of private land, we
have since explained that federal eminent domain applies
to  state  property  interests  as  well.    In  Oklahoma  ex  rel.
Phillips  v.  Guy  F.  Atkinson  Co.,  313  U. S.  508  (1941),  we
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the concept of eminent domain and its application by the federal government. It provides historical context and cites relevant Supreme Court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

15

Opinion of the Court

The  government  of  Puerto  Rico  pays  the  Board’s  ex-
penses,  including  the  salaries  of  its  employees  (the  mem-
bers serve without pay).  §107, id., at 562; see §101(g), id.,
at 556.  The Board possesses investigatory powers.  It can
hold hearings.  §104(a), id., at 558.  It can issue subpoenas,
subject to Puerto Rico’s limits on personal jurisdiction and
enforceable under Puerto Rico’s laws.  §104(f ), id., at 559.
And it can enforce those subpoenas in (and only in) Puerto
Rico’s courts.  §§104(f )(2), 106(a), id., at 559, 562.

From  its  own  offices  in  or  outside  of  Puerto  Rico,  the
Board works with the elected government of Puerto Rico to
develop a fiscal plan that provides “a method to achieve fis-
cal  responsibility  and  access  to  the  capital  markets.”
§201(b), id., at 564.  If it finds it necessary, the Board can
develop its own budget for Puerto Rico which is “deemed . . .
approved”  and  becomes  the  operative  budget.    §202(e)(3),
id.,  at  568.    It  can  ensure  compliance  with  the  plan  and
budget by reviewing the Puerto Rico government’s laws and
spending  and  by  “direct[ing]”  corrections  or  taking  “such
[other]  actions  as  it  considers  necessary,”  including  pre-
venting a law from  taking effect.  §§203(d), 204(a),  id., at
569, 571.  The Board controls the issuance of new debt for
Puerto Rico.  §207, id., at 575.

The Board also may initiate bankruptcy proceedings for
Puerto Rico or its instrumentalities.  §304(a), id., at 579.  It
may take any related “action necessary on behalf of,” and it
serves as “the representative of,” Puerto Rico or its instru-
mentalities.  §315, id., at 584.  These proceedings take place
in the U. S. District Court for Puerto Rico.  §307, id., at 582.
To repeat: The Board has broad investigatory powers: It
can administer oaths, issue subpoenas, take evidence and
demand  data  from  governments  and  creditors  alike.  But
these powers are backed by Puerto Rican, not federal, law:
Subpoenas are governed by Puerto Rico’s personal jurisdic-
tion statute; false testimony is punishable under the law of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It describes the powers and functions of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating its suitability for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

5

BREYER, J., dissenting

Nonetheless  this  kind  of  system  enjoys  an  offsetting
It  bases  fees  upon  audited  ac-
administrative  virtue.
counts,  thereby  avoiding  the  difficulties  and  disagree-
ments  that  would  surround  an  effort  to  determine  the
relevant proportions by  trying to measure union expendi-
tures as they occur or by trying to make predictions about
the  nature  of  future  expenditures.    It  consequently  gives
workers  reliable  information.    It  gives  workers  advance
notice of next year’s payable charge.  It gives nonmembers
a “reasonably prompt” opportunity to object.  Hudson, 475
U. S.,  at  310.    And,  where  the  chargeable  share  of  next
year’s expenses (Year Two) turns out to be lower than last
year’s  (Year  One),  it  provides  offsetting  compensation  in
the  form  of  a  lower  payable  share  for  the  following  year
(Year Three).

In  any  event,  these  features  are  characteristic  of  an
administrative  system  that  “calculat[es]”  shares  of  a  un-
ion’s fee “on the basis of its expenses during the preceding
year.”  Id.,  at  307,  n. 18.    Hudson  stated  specifically  that
the  “[u]nion  cannot  be  faulted  for  calculating  its  fee”  on
that  basis.  Ibid.    And  no  party  here  has  challenged  the
constitutional validity of that basic administrative system.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 13.

III
If  the  union’s  basic  administrative  system  does  not
violate  the  Constitution,  then  how  could  its  special  as-
sessment have done so?  In my view, it did not violate the
Constitution,  and  I  shall  explain  my  basis  for  thinking
so  by  considering  separately  (1)  those  nonmembers  who
objected initially to the 2005 Hudson notice, and (2) those
nonmembers who did not initially object.

A
The  special  assessment  as  administered  here  has
worked  no  constitutional  harm  upon  those  nonunion  em-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 567 U.S. ____ (2012). It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

SACKETT v. EPA

Syllabus

falls short of establishing the sort of “overwhelming evidence of acqui-
escence” necessary to support its argument in the face of Congress’s
failure  to  amend  §1362(7).    Finally,  the  EPA’s  various  policy  argu-
ments  about  the  ecological  consequences  of  a  narrower  definition  of
“adjacent” are rejected.  Pp. 25–27.

8 F. 4th 1075, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  THOMAS,  GORSUCH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined.    THOMAS,  J.,  filed  a
concurring  opinion,  in  which  GORSUCH,  J.,  joined.    KAGAN,  J.,  filed  an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON,
JJ., joined.  KAVANAUGH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
in which SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision and the opinions of the justices. It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

7

BREYER, J., dissenting

Objecting nonmembers therefore paid 56% of normal fees,
even  though  the  chargeable  share  that  year  was  69%.
That  is  to  say,  they  paid  less  than  what  the  Constitution
considers  to  be  their  fair  share.    See  Abood,  431  U. S.,  at
236–237.

Even  were  the  underlying  facts  different,  I  can  find  no
constitutional  basis  for  charging  an  objecting  nonmember
less  than  the  56%  that  the  preceding  year’s  audit  showed
was  appropriate.  In  general,  any  effort  to  send  a  new
notice  and  then  apply  special  percentages  to  a  special
midyear  assessment  fee  runs  into  administrative  difficul-
ties that, as explained above, are avoided with a retrospec-
tive system.  See supra, at 6.  And, of course, requiring the
use of some special proportion based on predicted expendi-
tures  would  contradict  Hudson’s  determination  that  prior
year, not present year, expenditures can form the basis for
the determination of that proportion.  See Hudson, supra,
at 307, n. 18.

In the particular example before us these general prob-
lems are camouflaged by the fact that the union itself said
that the assessment was to be used for political purposes.
Hence  it  is  tempting  to  say  that  100%  of  the  assessment
is  not  chargeable.  But  future  cases  are  most  unlikely  to
be so clear; disputes will arise over union predictions (say,
that  only  20%  of  the  special  assessment  will  be  used  for
political  purposes);  and  the  Court  will  then  perhaps  un-
derstand  the  wisdom  of  Hudson’s  holding.    In  any  event,
we have made clear in other cases that money is fungible.
Retail  Clerks  v.  Schermerhorn,  373  U. S.  746,  753  (1963).
Whether  a  particular  expenditure  was  funded  by  regular
dues  or  the  special  assessment  is  “of  bookkeeping  signifi-
cance only  rather than a matter of real substance.”  Ibid.
And,  the  Court’s  focus  on  the  announced  purposes  of  the
special assessment, rather than yearly expenditures taken
as a whole, is beside the point.

The Court’s response to these problems, particularly the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 567 U.S. ____ (2012). It delves into the constitutional aspects of union fees and how they are charged to objecting nonmembers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

177

Breyer, J., dissenting

directions when regulated so as to render it as harmless as
possible. And surely the agency can determine that a sub-
stance is comparatively “safe” (not “dangerous”) whenever it
would be less dangerous to make the product available (sub-
ject to regulatory requirements) than suddenly to withdraw
it from the market. Any other interpretation risks substan-
tial harm of the sort that my sleeping pill example illus-
trates. See supra, at 174–175. And nothing in the statute
prevents the agency from adopting a view of “safety” that
would avoid such harm.
Indeed, the FDA already seems to
have taken this position when permitting distribution of
toxic drugs, such as poisons used for chemotherapy, that are
dangerous for the user but are not deemed “dangerous to
health” in the relevant sense. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44413 (1996).
The tobacco companies point to another statutory provi-
sion which says that if a device “would cause serious, adverse
health consequences or death, the Secretary shall issue” a
cease distribution order. 21 U. S. C. § 360h(e)(1) (emphasis
added). But that word “shall” in this context cannot mean
that the Secretary must resort to the recall remedy when-
ever a device would have serious, adverse health effects.
Rather, that language must mean that the Secretary “shall
issue” a cease distribution order in compliance with the sec-
tion’s procedural requirements if the Secretary chooses in
her discretion to use that particular subsection’s recall rem-
edy. Otherwise, the subsection would trump and make
meaningless the same section’s provision of other lesser rem-
edies such as simple “notice” (which the Secretary similarly
can impose if, but only if, she ﬁnds that the device “presents
an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public”).
§ 360h(a)(1). And reading the statute to compel the FDA to
“recall” every dangerous device likewise would conﬂict with
that same subsection’s statement that the recall remedy
“shall be in addition to [the other] remedies provided” in the
statute.

§ 360h(e)(3) (emphasis added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer. It discusses the FDA's authority to regulate potentially dangerous products and the interpretation of relevant statutory provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

relief for subsequent changes in interpretation does not mean that the
principle did not carry over to the statute.  Statutory “silence” on the
details  of  prior  regulatory  practice  indicates  that  Congress  “left  the
matter where it was pre-[codification].”  Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S.
233, 250.  Pp. 8–12.

991 F. 3d 1227, affirmed.

BARRETT, J., delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  THOMAS,  ALITO,  KAGAN,  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.  SO-
TOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.  GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined, and in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined
as to all but Part II–C.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are typically summaries of the court's decision and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

Opinion of the Court

plaintiffs had not described any concrete plans to visit those
habitats, nor had they said when they would do so.  Id., at
563–564.  The  Court  said  that  the  organizations  had  set
forth only “ ‘some day’ intentions.”  Id., at 564.  And “some
day intentions” do “not support a finding of the ‘actual or
imminent’ injury that our cases require.”  Ibid.

For another thing, arguably similar cases in which this
Court has found standing all contained more evidence that
the plaintiff was “able and ready” than Adams has provided
here.  In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200
(1995),  for  example,  a  subcontractor  challenging  a  race-
based program for allocating contracts established standing
by showing that it “bids on every guardrail project in Colo-
rado,” that the defendant “is likely to let contracts involving
guardrail work . . . at least once per  year in Colorado,” and
that  the  plaintiff  “is  very  likely  to  bid  on  each  such  con-
tract.”  Id., at 212.

In  Associated  Gen.  Contractors,  508  U. S.,  at  666,  the
Court held that an association of contractors had standing
to  attack  as  unlawful  a  race-based  set-aside  program  for
awarding contracts.  The contractors showed that they were
“able and ready to bid on [future] contracts,” for it was un-
disputed that they had “regularly bid on construction con-
tracts in Jacksonville, and that they would have bid on con-
tracts set aside pursuant to the city’s ordinance were they
so able.”  Id., at 666, 668.  The Court noted that it “must
assume that [these allegations] are true” because they were
not challenged in any way.  Id., at 668–669.

In Gratz, 539 U. S., at 262, we held that a plaintiff had
standing to attack as unlawful a university’s affirmative ac-
tion admissions policy.  The plaintiff had applied for admis-
sion to the university as a freshman applicant in the recent
past and been rejected.  Ibid.  He said he intended to apply
to transfer to the university in the near future, should the
university cease using affirmative action in its transfer ad-
missions process.  Ibid.  And the university had a “rolling”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of standing in court. It cites previous cases and analyzes their relevance to the current case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

13

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

cherry-picked a less helpful quote.  By its own terms, Shel-
ton held that an end must be “more narrowly achieved” only
if  the  means  “broadly  stifle”  First  Amendment  liberties,
that is, only if the means impose a severe burden on associ-
ational rights.5

In any event, the Court need not read a few isolated sen-
tences from that opinion to divine Shelton’s meaning.  As
described, see Part II–B–1, supra, the Court in Shelton con-
cluded that a reasonable “fear of public disclosure” and an
asymmetric  power  dynamic  with  hiring  authorities  would
result  in  a  “constant  and  heavy”  pressure  on  teachers  “to
avoid  any  ties  which  might  displease  those  who  control
[their] professional destin[ies].”  364 U. S., at 486.  Recall
that a witness had testified that his white supremacist or-
ganization  would  seek  to  obtain  the  identities  of  teachers
working  on  civil  rights  issues  in  order  to  eradicate  them
from the school system, and that just a year after Arkansas
enacted its disclosure law, it enacted a law prohibiting the
hiring of members of the NAACP as public school teachers.
The problem was not the breadth of the inquiry; it was the
significant risk that teachers would face serious repercus-
sions for their disclosed associations.6

——————

5 The  Court  claims  that  “broadly  stifle”  refers  “to  the  scope  of  chal-
lenged restrictions” rather than “the severity of any demonstrated bur-
den.”  Ante, at 11.  That reading ignores the verb “stifle” and its object,
“fundamental  personal  liberties.”    The  Court  wishes  the  sentence  said
that  a  government  interest  “cannot  be  pursued  by  [broad]  means.”    It
does not.

The Court also finds meaning in the fact that Shelton criticized Arkan-
sas’ challenged disclosure regime for not being narrowly tailored.  Ante,
at 11.  But the Shelton Court had already explained why the failure to
narrowly tailor was problematic: because the statute significantly bur-
dened Arkansas teachers’ associational rights.  See Shelton, 364 U. S., at
485–487.    In  no  way  did  the  Court  suggest  that  narrow  tailoring  was
necessary in the absence of a significant burden on associational rights.
6 The statement the Court cites from Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401
U. S. 1, 6 (1971) (plurality opinion), must be read in a similar context.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing as part of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>