<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
14

SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court

the  United  States’ ”  cannot  be  shared  with  the  other
branches.  Id., at 483 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418
U. S. 683, 704 (1974); alteration in original).  Or, as Alex-
ander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist Papers, “ ‘there is
no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers.’ ”  The Federalist No. 78,
at  466  (quoting  1  Montesquieu,  The  Spirit  of  Laws  181
(10th ed. 1773)).

On that basis, we have repeatedly explained that matters
concerning private rights may not be removed from Article
III courts.  Murray’s Lessee, 18 How., at 284; Granfinanci-
era, 492 U. S., at 51–52; Stern, 564 U. S., at 484.  A hall-
mark that we have looked to in determining if a suit con-
cerns  private  rights  is  whether  it  “is  made  of  ‘the  stuff  of
the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at
Westminster in 1789.’ ”  Id., at 484 (quoting Northern Pipe-
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 90
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)).  If a suit is
in the nature of an action at common law, then the matter
presumptively concerns private rights, and adjudication by
an Article III court is mandatory.  Stern, 564 U. S., at 484.
At  the  same  time,  our  precedent  has  also  recognized  a
class  of  cases  concerning  what  we  have  called  “public
rights.”  Such matters “historically could have been deter-
mined  exclusively  by  [the  executive  and  legislative]
branches,” id., at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted),
even when they were “presented in such form that the judi-
cial power [wa]s capable of acting on them,” Murray’s Les-
see, 18 How., at 284.  In contrast to common law claims, no
involvement by an Article III court in the initial adjudica-
tion is necessary in such a case.

The decision that first recognized the public rights excep-
tion was Murray’s Lessee.  In that case, a federal customs
collector  failed  to  deliver  public  funds  to  the  Treasury,  so
the  Government  issued  a  “warrant  of  distress”  to  compel
him  to  produce  the  withheld  sum.    18  How.,  at  274–275.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the separation of powers and the jurisdiction of Article III courts. It delves into the concepts of "private rights" and "public rights" in the context of legal disputes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

III
The Court today clarifies Bruen’s historical inquiry and
rejects the dissent’s exacting historical test.  I welcome that
development.  That being said, I remain troubled by Bruen’s
myopic  focus  on  history  and  tradition,  which  fails  to  give
full consideration to the real and present stakes of the prob-
lems  facing  our  society  today.    In  my  view,  the  Second
Amendment allows legislators “to take account of the seri-
ous problems posed by gun violence,” Bruen, 597 U. S., at
91 (Breyer, J., dissenting), not merely by asking what their
predecessors at the time of the founding or Reconstruction
thought, but by listening to their constituents and crafting
new  and  appropriately  tailored  solutions.  Under  the
means-end scrutiny  that this Court rejected in  Bruen but
“regularly use[s] . . . in cases involving other constitutional
provisions,” id., at 106, the constitutionality of §922(g)(8) is
even more readily apparent.*

To  start,  the  Government  has  a  compelling  interest  in
keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers.  A
woman who lives in a house with a domestic abuser is five
times more likely to be murdered if the abuser has access
to a gun.  See A. Kivisto & M. Porter, Firearm Use Increases
Risk of Multiple Victims in Domestic Homicides, 48 J. Am.
Acad. Psychiatry & L. 26 (2020).  With over 70 people shot
and killed by an intimate partner each month in the United
States, the seriousness of the problem can hardly be over-
stated.  See  Centers  for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention,

——————

*By “means-end scrutiny,” I refer to the mode of analysis that would
permit courts “to consider the State’s interest in preventing gun violence,
the effectiveness of the contested law in achieving that interest, the de-
gree to which the law burdens the Second Amendment right, and, if ap-
propriate,  any  less  restrictive  alternatives.”  Bruen,  597  U. S.,  at  131
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  Prior to Bruen, the Courts of Appeals would ap-
ply a level of means-end scrutiny “ ‘proportionate to the severity of the
burden that the law imposes on the right’: strict scrutiny if the burden is
severe, and intermediate scrutiny if it is not.”  Id., at 103.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding gun control and the Second Amendment, referencing the Bruen case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
INDEX

1245

FIRST  AMENDMENT.  See  Constitutional  Law,  II.

FLORIDA.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  7.

FORFEITURE  OF  PROPERTY.  See  Constitutional  Law,  I.

FOURTH  AMENDMENT.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  10.

FREEDOM  OF  SPEECH.  See  Constitutional  Law,  II.

HABEAS  CORPUS.

1.  Adequate and independent state-law grounds for judgment—Discre
tionary  procedural  rule.—A  state  procedural  rule  is  not  automatically
“inadequate” under adequate state grounds doctrine—and therefore unen
forceable on federal habeas corpus review—because that state rule is dis
cretionary rather than mandatory.  Beard v. Kindler, p. 53.

2.  Capital  murder—Misconduct  by  trial  ofﬁcials—Discovery  and  evi
dentiary hearing.—This  capital  case  is  remanded  for  Eleventh  Circuit  to
determine, in light of Cone  v.  Bell, 556 U. S. 449, whether petitioner’s alle
gations  of  judge,  jury,  and  bailiff  misconduct  warrant  discovery  and  an
evidentiary hearing.  Wellons v. Hall, p. 220.

3.  Capital murder—Mitigation evidence—Ineffective assistance of
counsel.—Because  Ohio  state-court  decisions  denying  Spisak’s  challenge
to his mitigation instruction and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
were not “contrary to, or . . .  an  unreasonable application of, clearly estab
lished  Federal law,”  28  U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1),  Sixth  Circuit  erred in  accept
ing them and ordering habeas relief.  Smith v. Spisak, p. 139.

4.  Capital  murder—Sentencing  phase—D isposal  of  unresolved
claims.—Where District Court granted Corcoran habeas relief based on a
Sixth Amendment violation and thus did not address his other challenges
to  his  death  sentence,  Seventh  Circuit  erred  when,  in  reversing  Sixth
Amendment  ruling,  it  disposed  of  unresolved  claims  without  explanation
rather  than permitting  District  Court to  consider them  on  remand or  ex
plaining  why  such  consideration  was  unnecessary.  Corcoran  v.  Levenha
gen, p. 1.

5.  Capital  murder—Sentencing  phase—Ineffective assistance  of  coun
sel.—Because  respondent’s  attorneys  met  constitutional  minimum  of
competence under correct standard, Sixth Circuit erred in granting habeas
relief  based  on  ground  that  respondent  had  not  received  effective  assist
ance of counsel during his capital murder trial’s sentencing phase.  Bobby
v. Van Hook, p. 4.

6.  Capital  murder—Sentencing  phase—Ineffective assistance  of  coun
sel.—Even if performance of Belmontes’ attorney during sentencing phase
of  his  capital  murder  trial  was  deﬁcient,  he  cannot  establish  prejudice
sufﬁcient to show that counsel’s assistance was constitutionally ineffective
under Strickland v.  Washington, 466 U. S. 668.  Wong v. Belmontes, p. 15.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index, not the actual content of the document. It provides a list of topics and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

A  final  piece  of  statutory  context  further  confirms  that
cargo loading is part of cross-border “commerce.”  The first
sentence  of  §1  of  the  FAA  defines  exempted  “maritime
transactions” to include, among other things, “agreements
relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs
to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign com-
merce.”
(Emphasis  added.)    The  use  of  “other”  in  the
catchall  provision  indicates  that  Congress  considered  the
preceding items to be “matters in foreign commerce.”  And
agreements related to the enumerated “matte[r] in foreign
commerce”  of  “wharfage,”  to  take  one  example,  included
agreements for mere access to a wharf—which is simply a
cargo-loading  facility.
See  Black’s  1226  (wharfage:
“[m]oney paid for landing wares at a wharf, or for shipping
or  taking  goods  into  a  boat  or  barge  from  thence”);  Web-
ster’s 2323 (similar); see also, e.g., Black’s 1226 (wharf: “A
perpendicular bank or mound . . . extending some distance
into the water, for the convenience of lading and unlading
ships and other vessels”).  It stands to reason, then, that if
payments  to  access  a  cargo-loading  facility  relate  to  a
“matte[r] in foreign commerce,” then an individual who ac-
tually  loads  cargo  on  foreign-bound  ships  docked  along  a
wharf is himself engaged in such commerce.  Likewise, any
class of workers that loads or unloads cargo on or off air-
planes bound for a different State or country is “engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce.”

In sum, text and context point to the same place: Work-
ers, like Saxon, who load cargo on and off airplanes belong
to a “class of workers in foreign or interstate commerce.”

III
Both Saxon and Southwest proffer arguments that disa-
gree  with  portions  of  our  analysis.  Neither  of  them  con-
vinces us to change course.

A
For  her  part,  Saxon  thinks  that  we  should  define  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the interpretation of a statute (FAA) and its implications for workers engaged in cargo loading. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

JESNER ET AL. v. ARAB BANK, PLC

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 16–499.  Argued October 11, 2017—Decided April 24, 2018

Petitioners filed suits under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), alleging that
they, or the persons on whose behalf they assert claims, were injured
or killed by terrorist acts committed abroad, and that those acts were
in part caused or facilitated by respondent Arab Bank, PLC, a Jorda-
nian  financial  institution  with  a  branch  in  New  York.   They  seek  to
impose liability on the bank for the conduct of its human agents, in-
cluding  high-ranking  bank  officials.    They  claim  that  the  bank  used
its  New  York  branch  to  clear  dollar-denominated  transactions  that
benefited terrorists through the Clearing House Interbank Payments
System (CHIPS) and to launder money for a Texas-based charity al-
legedly affiliated with Hamas.  While the litigation was pending, this
Court  held,  in  Kiobel  v.  Royal  Dutch  Petroleum  Co.,  569  U. S.  108,
that  the  ATS  does  not  extend  to  suits  against  foreign  corporations
when “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States,”
id., at 124, but it left unresolved the Second Circuit’s broader holding
in its Kiobel decision: that foreign corporations may not be sued un-
der  the  ATS.    Deeming  that  broader  holding  binding  precedent,  the
District Court dismissed petitioners’ ATS claims and the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

808 F. 3d 144, affirmed.

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts  I,  II–B–1,  and  II–C,  concluding  that  foreign  corporations  may
not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS.  Pp. 6–11, 18–19,
and 25–27.

(a) The  Judiciary  Act  of  1789  included  what  is  now  known  as  the
ATS, which provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered the main body of the opinion. They are not meant to be indexed as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the legal argument.
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  <content>
10

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part

about the severity of the jurisprudential or real-world con-
sequences caused by the erroneous decision and, therefore,
whether the decision is worth overruling.  In that regard,
some judges may think that the negative consequences can
be  addressed  by  narrowing  the  precedent  (or  just  living
with it) rather than outright overruling it.  Judges may also
disagree about how to measure the relevant reliance inter-
ests that might be affected by an overruling.  And on top of
all of that, judges may also disagree about how to weigh and
balance  all  of  those  competing  considerations  in  a  given
case.5

This case illustrates that point.  No Member of the Court
contends  that  the  result  in  Apodaca  is  correct.  But  the
Members of the Court vehemently disagree about whether
to overrule Apodaca.

II

Applying the three broad stare decisis considerations to
this  case,  I  agree  with  the  Court’s  decision  to  overrule
Apodaca.

First, Apodaca is egregiously wrong.  The original mean-
ing  and  this  Court’s  precedents  establish  that  the  Sixth
Amendment requires a unanimous jury.  Ante, at 6–7; see,
e.g.,  Patton  v.  United  States,  281  U. S.  276,  288  (1930);
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 351 (1898).  And the orig-
inal meaning and this Court’s precedents establish that the
Fourteenth  Amendment  incorporates  the  Sixth  Amend-

——————

5 To  be  clear,  the  stare  decisis  issue  in  this  case  is  one  of  horizontal
stare decisis—that is, the respect that this Court owes to its own prece-
dents and the circumstances under which this Court may appropriately
overrule a precedent.  By contrast, vertical stare decisis is absolute, as it
must be in a hierarchical system with “one supreme Court.”  U. S. Const.,
Art III, §1.  In other words, the state courts and the other federal courts
have  a  constitutional  obligation  to  follow  a  precedent  of  this  Court
unless and until it is overruled by this Court.  See Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the legal principles of stare decisis and applies them to the case at hand.
  </thinking>
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  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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24  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

carry) them in the home beyond moments of actual confron-
tation.  To  confine  the  right  to  “bear”  arms  to  the  home
would  nullify  half  of  the  Second  Amendment’s  operative
protections.

Moreover, confining the right to “bear” arms to the home
would make little sense given that self-defense is “the cen-
tral  component  of  the  [Second  Amendment]  right  itself.”
Heller, 554 U. S., at 599; see also McDonald, 561 U. S., at
767.  After all, the Second Amendment guarantees an “in-
dividual right to possess and carry weapons in case of con-
frontation,” Heller, 554 U. S., at 592, and confrontation can
surely take place outside the home.

Although we remarked in Heller that the need for armed
self-defense is perhaps “most acute” in the home, id., at 628,
we  did  not  suggest  that  the  need  was  insignificant  else-
where.  Many Americans hazard greater danger outside the
home than in it.  See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F. 3d 933, 937
(CA7 2012) (“[A] Chicagoan is a good deal more likely to be
attacked on a sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than in his
apartment on the 35th floor of the Park Tower”).  The text
of the Second Amendment reflects that reality.

The Second Amendment’s plain text thus presumptively
guarantees  petitioners  Koch  and  Nash  a  right  to  “bear”
arms in public for self-defense.

B
Conceding  that  the  Second  Amendment  guarantees  a
general right to public carry, contra, Young, 992 F. 3d, at
813, respondents instead claim that the Amendment “per-
mits  a  State  to  condition  handgun  carrying  in  areas  ‘fre-
quented  by  the  general  public’  on  a  showing  of  a  non-
speculative  need  for  armed  self-defense  in  those  areas,”
Brief  for  Respondents  19  (citation  omitted).8    To  support

——————

8 The  dissent  claims  that  we  cannot  answer  the  question  presented
without  giving  respondents  the  opportunity  to  develop  an  evidentiary
record fleshing out “how New York’s law is administered in practice, how
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

Green  Book:  Background  Material  and  Data  on  the  Pro-
grams Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways
and Means, App. A (24th ed. 2018).

But just as not every federal tax extends to residents of
Puerto Rico, so too not every federal benefits program ex-
tends to residents of Puerto Rico.  One example is the Sup-
plemental  Security  Income  program,  which  Congress
passed  and  President  Nixon  signed  into  law  in  1972.    86
Stat.  1465.  The  Supplemental  Security  Income  program
provides benefits for, among others, those who are age 65
or older and cannot financially support themselves.

To be eligible for Supplemental Security Income, an indi-
vidual must be a “resident of the United States,” 42 U. S. C.
§1382c(a)(1)(B)(i),  which  the  statute  defines  as  the  50
States and the District of Columbia, §1382c(e).  A later stat-
ute included residents of the Northern Mariana Islands in
the program.  Note following 48 U. S. C. §1801; 90 Stat. 268.
But  residents  of  Puerto  Rico  are  not  eligible  for  Supple-
mental Security Income.  Instead, the Federal Government
provides  supplemental  income  assistance  to  covered  resi-
dents of Puerto Rico through a different benefits program—
one that is funded in part by the Federal Government and
in part by Puerto Rico.  Notes following §§1381−1385.

The  dispute  in  this  case  concerns  a  claim  for  Supple-
mental  Security  Income  benefits  by  a  resident  of  Puerto
Rico  named  Jose  Luis  Vaello  Madero.    In  2013,  Vaello
Madero  moved  from  New  York  to  Puerto  Rico.    While  he
lived  in  New  York,  Vaello  Madero  received  Supplemental
Security  Income  benefits.  After  moving  to  Puerto  Rico,
Vaello Madero no longer was eligible for Supplemental Se-
curity Income benefits.  Yet for several years, the U. S. Gov-
ernment  remained  unaware  of  Vaello  Madero’s  new  resi-
dence and continued to pay him benefits.  The overpayment
totaled more than $28,000.

Seeking to recover those errant payments, the U. S. Gov-
ernment sued Vaello Madero for restitution.  In response,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the Opinion of the Court in a case concerning Supplemental Security Income benefits and residency in Puerto Rico. It sets the context for the case and introduces the relevant legal background.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

291

Opinion of O’Connor, J.

391 U. S., at 382.

As Justice Souter noted in Barnes, “on its face, the gov-
ernmental interest in combating prostitution and other crim-
inal activity is not at all inherently related to expression.”
501 U. S., at 585 (opinion concurring in judgment).
In that
sense, this case is similar to O’Brien. O’Brien burned his
draft registration card as a public statement of his antiwar
views, and he was convicted under a statute making it a
crime to knowingly mutilate or destroy such a card. This
Court rejected his claim that the statute violated his First
Amendment rights, reasoning that the law punished him for
the “noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for noth-
ing else.”
In other words, the Govern-
ment regulation prohibiting the destruction of draft cards
was aimed at maintaining the integrity of the Selective Serv-
ice System and not at suppressing the message of draft re-
sistance that O’Brien sought to convey by burning his draft
card. So too here, the ordinance prohibiting public nudity
is aimed at combating crime and other negative secondary
effects caused by the presence of adult entertainment es-
tablishments like Kandyland and not at suppressing the
erotic message conveyed by this type of nude dancing. Put
another way, the ordinance does not attempt to regulate the
primary effects of the expression, i. e., the effect on the audi-
ence of watching nude erotic dancing, but rather the second-
ary effects, such as the impacts on public health, safety, and
welfare, which we have previously recognized are “caused
by the presence of even one such” establishment. Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 47–48, 50 (1986); see
also Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 321 (1988).

Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged
that one goal of the ordinance was to combat the negative
secondary effects associated with nude dancing establish-
ments, the court concluded that the ordinance was never-
theless content based, relying on Justice White’s position in
dissent in Barnes for the proposition that a ban of this type
necessarily has the purpose of suppressing the erotic mes-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. It delves into First Amendment rights and the regulation of expressive conduct, using examples like O'Brien v. United States.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS

Opinion of the Court

U. S.  490,  498  (1975)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
An injury sufficient to satisfy Article III must be “concrete
and  particularized”  and  “actual  or  imminent,  not  ‘conjec-
tural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ”  Lujan, supra, at 560 (some inter-
nal  question  marks  omitted).  An  allegation  of  future
injury  may  suffice  if  the  threatened  injury  is  “certainly
impending,” or there is a “ ‘substantial risk’ that the harm
will occur.”  Clapper, 568 U. S., at ___, ___, n. 5 (slip op., at
10,  15,  n. 5)  (emphasis  deleted  and  internal  quotation
marks omitted).

“ ‘ The  party  invoking  federal  jurisdiction  bears  the
burden  of  establishing’  standing.”  Id.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at
12).  “[E]ach element must be supported in the same way
as  any  other  matter  on  which  the  plaintiff  bears  the  bur-
den of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence
required at the successive stages of the litigation.”  Lujan,
supra, at 561.

B
One  recurring  issue  in  our  cases  is  determining  when
the threatened enforcement of a law creates an Article III
injury.  When an individual is subject to such a threat, an
actual  arrest,  prosecution,  or  other  enforcement  action  is
not  a  prerequisite  to  challenging  the  law.    See  Steffel  v.
Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459 (1974) (“[I]t is not necessary
that  petitioner  first  expose  himself  to  actual  arrest  or
prosecution  to  be  entitled  to  challenge  a  statute  that  he
claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights”); see
also  MedImmune,  Inc.  v.  Genentech,  Inc.,  549  U. S.  118,
128–129 (2007) (“[W]here threatened action by government
is  concerned,  we  do  not  require  a  plaintiff  to  expose  him-
self  to  liability  before  bringing  suit  to  challenge  the  basis
Instead,  we  have  permitted  pre-
for  the  threat”).
enforcement  review  under  circumstances  that  render  the
threatened enforcement sufficiently imminent.  Specifically,
we  have  held  that  a  plaintiff  satisfies  the  injury-in-fact
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the concept of standing in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. It cites relevant case law and legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

960

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 26, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–9204. Clymore v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 164 F. 3d 617.

No. 97–9208. Proctor v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1164.

No. 97–9209. Pena v. United States; and
No. 97–9265. Ferreira v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 F. 3d 1149.

No. 97–9213. Snelling v. Housing Authority of St. Louis
County et al. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 956 S. W. 2d 323.

No. 97–9214. Silva v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–9218. White v. Internal Revenue Service. C. A.

3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 768.

No. 97–9220. Walter v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 145 F. 3d 360.

No. 97–9221. Cox v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 972.

No. 97–9223. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 138 F. 3d 955.

No. 97–9231. Marutz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 380.

No. 97–9236. MacKall v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 138 F. 3d 952.

No. 97–9246.

Juarez-Juarez v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 909.

No. 97–9247. Corn v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–9249. Morris v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 1136.

No. 97–9250. McClain v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 1191.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1237

NONCOMPLIANCE WITH RULES—See Rules

Rule

NOTICE

Appeals

—Docketing of .......................................................  18.3
—Filing with district court.................................  18.1
Certiorari, ﬁling of petition for writ .........................  12.3
Cross-petition for certiorari, docketing of  ..............  12.5
Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari............  16
Service.............................................................................  29.3–29.5

OPINIONS

Publication in United States Reports by Reporter

of Decisions.................................................................  41

Slip form  ........................................................................  41

When released ...............................................................  41

ORAL ARGUMENT—See Argument

ORIGINAL ACTIONS

Amicus briefs .................................................................  37.2(a)

Briefs in opposition to motions for leave to ﬁle

—Copies, number to be ﬁled  .............................  17.5

—Cover color .........................................................  33.1(g)(ii)

—Service  ...............................................................  17.5

—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  17.5

Distribution of documents to Court  .........................  17.5

Docketing........................................................................  17.4

Documents, format and general requirements .......  33, 34

Fee  ..................................................................................  17.4, 38(a)

Initial pleadings

—Briefs in support of motions for leave to ﬁle  17.3

—Clerk, ﬁled with.................................................  17.4

—Copies, number to be ﬁled ..............................  17.3

—Cover color .........................................................  33.1(g)(i)

—Leave to ﬁle  ......................................................  17.3

—Motions for leave to ﬁle ...................................  17.3

—Service  ...............................................................  17.3

—Word limits  ........................................................  33.1(g)(i)

Jurisdiction  ....................................................................  17.1

Pleadings and motions, form of  .................................  17.2

Process against State, service of  ..............................  17.7

Reply briefs ...................................................................  17.5

Summons  .......................................................................  17.6

PARENT CORPORATIONS—See Corporations
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a table of contents or a list of rules with corresponding rule numbers. It is not sequential text and does not appear to be the main body of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 374 (1979); Brown
v.  Illinois,  422  U. S.  590,  600  (1975);  Michigan  v.  Tucker,
417 U. S., at 439; and Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47, 53
(1973).2

C
After Miranda was handed down, the Court engaged in
the process of charting the dimensions of these new prophy-
lactic rules.  As  we would later spell out, this process en-
tailed a weighing of the benefits and costs of any clarifica-
tion of the rules’ scope.  See Shatzer, 559 U. S., at 106 (“A
judicially  crafted  rule  is  ‘justified  only  by  reference  to  its
prophylactic purpose,’ . . . and applies only where its bene-
fits outweigh its costs”).
  Some  post-Miranda  decisions  found  that  the  balance  of
interests  justified  restrictions  that  would  not  have  been
possible  if  Miranda  represented  an  explanation  of  the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment right as opposed to a set
of rules designed to protect that right.  For example, in Har-
ris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 224–226 (1971), the Court
held  that  a  statement  obtained  in  violation  of  Miranda
could be used to impeach the testimony of a defendant, even
though  an  involuntary  statement  obtained  in  violation  of
the Fifth Amendment could not have been employed in this
way.  See  Mincey  v.  Arizona,  437  U. S.  385,  398  (1978)

——————

2 Tekoh cites Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969), which characterized
the admission of an unwarned statement in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief
as a “flat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment as construed in Miranda.”  Id., at 326 (emphasis added); Brief for
Respondent 21, 29.  But the Court made this assertion in a three-para-
graph opinion without any additional analysis, and did not purport to go
beyond Miranda, which, as we have explained, does not support the prop-
osition that a Miranda violation equates to a Fifth Amendment violation.
See  Orozco,  394  U. S.,  at  327  (“We  do  not  . . .  expand  or  extend  to  the
slightest extent our Miranda decision”).  Likewise, the decision predates
the subsequent case law defining the scope of the Miranda rules.  See
infra, this page and 8–11.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It cites previous cases and delves into legal reasoning and interpretations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

39

Opinion of the Court

That is a remarkable view of the judicial role—remarka-
bly  wrong.  Lost  in  the  false  pretense  of  judicial  humility
that the dissent espouses is a claim to power so radical, so
destructive,  that  it  required  a  Second  Founding  to  undo.
“Justice Harlan knew better,” one of the dissents decrees.
Post, at 5 (opinion of JACKSON, J.).  Indeed he did:

“[I]n  view  of  the  Constitution,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling
class of citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our Constitu-
tion is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates clas-
ses among citizens.”  Plessy, 163 U. S., at 559 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).

VI

For  the  reasons  provided  above,  the  Harvard  and  UNC
admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guaran-
tees  of  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.  Both  programs  lack
sufficiently focused and measurable objectives warranting
the use of race, unavoidably employ race in a negative man-
ner,  involve  racial  stereotyping,  and  lack  meaningful  end
points.  We have never permitted admissions programs to
work in that way, and we will not do so today.

At  the  same  time,  as  all  parties  agree,  nothing  in  this
opinion  should  be  construed  as  prohibiting  universities
from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race af-
fected his or her life, be it through discrimination, inspira-
tion, or otherwise.  See, e.g., 4 App. in No. 21–707, at 1725–
1726,  1741;  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  in  No.  20–1199,  at  10.    But,
despite the dissent’s assertion to the contrary, universities
may  not  simply  establish  through  application  essays  or
other means the regime we hold unlawful today.  (A dissent-
ing opinion is generally not the best source of legal advice
on how to comply with the majority opinion.)  “[W]hat can-
not be done directly cannot be done indirectly.  The Consti-
tution deals with substance, not shadows,” and the prohibi-
tion against racial discrimination is “levelled at the thing,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of affirmative action in university admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005)

15

Opinion of the Court

identity of the alleged entitlement is vague.  See Roth, 408
U. S., at 577 (considering  whether “certain benefits” were
“secure[d]” by rule or understandings); cf. Natale v. Ridge-
field,  170  F. 3d  258,  263  (CA2  1999)  (“There  is  no  reason
. . . to restrict the ‘uncertainty’ that will preclude existence
of  a  federally  protectable  property  interest  to  the  uncer-
tainty  that  inheres  in  the  exercise  of  discretion”).    The
dissent, after suggesting various formulations of the enti-
tlement in question,10 ultimately contends that the obliga-
tions under the statute were quite precise: either make an
arrest  or  (if  that  is  impractical)  seek  an  arrest  warrant,
post,  at  14.  The  problem  with  this  is  that  the  seeking  of
an arrest warrant would be an entitlement to nothing but
procedure—which  we  have  held  inadequate  even  to  sup-
port standing, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S.
555  (1992);  much  less  can  it  be  the  basis  for  a  property
interest.    See  post,  at  3–4  (SOUTER,  J.,  concurring).   After
the warrant is sought, it remains within the discretion of a
judge whether to grant it, and after it is granted, it remains
within  the  discretion  of  the  police  whether  and  when  to
execute it.11  Respondent would have been assured nothing
but the seeking of a  warrant.  This is not the sort of  “enti-
tlement” out of which a property interest is created.

Even if the statute could be said to have made enforce-
ment  of  restraining  orders  “mandatory”  because  of  the
——————

10 See  post,  at  1  (“entitlement  to  police  protection”); post,  at  2  (“enti-
tlement  to  mandatory  individual  protection  by  the  local  police  force”);
ibid.  (“a  right  to  police  assistance”);  post,  at  8  (“a  citizen’s  interest  in
the government’s commitment to provide police enforcement in certain
defined  circumstances”);  post,  at  18  (“respondent’s  property  interest  in
the  enforcement  of  her restraining  order”); post,  at  20  (the  “service”  of
“protection  from  her  husband”);  post,  at  21–22  (“interest  in  the  en-
forcement of the restraining order”).

11 The  dissent  asserts  that  the  police  would  lack  discretion  in  the
execution  of  this  warrant,  post,  at  13–14,  n. 12,  but  cites  no  statute
mandating immediate execution.  The general Colorado statute govern-
ing  arrest  provides  that  police  “may  arrest”  when  they  possess  a  war-
rant “commanding” arrest.  Colo. Rev. Stat. §16–3–102(1) (Lexis 1999).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the interpretation of a statute and its implications for property rights. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS

Syllabus

the  dispute  is  “traditionally  thought  to  be  capable  of  resolution
through the judicial process.”  Ibid.  Here, the States cite no precedent,
history, or tradition of federal courts entertaining lawsuits of this kind.
On the contrary, this Court has previously ruled that a plaintiff lacks
standing to bring such a suit “when he himself is neither prosecuted
nor threatened with prosecution.”  See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
U. S. 614, 619.  The Linda R. S. Article III standing principle remains
the law today, and the States have pointed to no case or historical prac-
tice holding otherwise.  Pp. 3–6.

(b) There are good reasons why federal courts have not traditionally
entertained lawsuits of this kind.  For one, when the Executive Branch
elects  not  to  arrest  or  prosecute,  it  does  not  exercise  coercive  power
over  an  individual’s  liberty  or  property,  and  thus  does  not  infringe
upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect.  Moreover,
such  lawsuits  run  up  against  the  Executive’s  Article  II  authority  to
decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions
against defendants who violate the law.”  TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
594 U. S. ___, ___.  The principle of Executive Branch enforcement dis-
cretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration con-
text.    Courts  also  generally  lack  meaningful  standards  for  assessing
the propriety of enforcement choices in this area, which are invariably
affected by resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety
and public-welfare needs.  That is why this Court has recognized that
federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims
that  the  Executive  Branch  should  make  more  arrests  or  bring  more
prosecutions.  Pp. 6–9.

(c) This holding does not suggest that federal courts may never en-
tertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make
more arrests or bring more prosecutions.  First, the Court has adjudi-
cated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause
in which a plaintiff typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecu-
tion.  Second, the standing analysis might differ when Congress ele-
vates  de facto  injuries  to  the  status  of  legally  cognizable  injuries  re-
dressable  by  a  federal  court.    Third,  the  standing  calculus  might
change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory respon-
sibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions.  Fourth, a challenge to
an  Executive  Branch  policy  that  involves  both  arrest  or  prosecution
priorities and the provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead
to a different standing analysis.  Fifth, policies governing the contin-
ued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably
might  raise  a  different  standing  question  than  arrest  or  prosecution
policies.  But this case presents none of those scenarios.  Pp. 9–12.

(d) The discrete standing question raised by this case rarely arises
because federal statutes that purport to require the Executive Branch
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically outlining the reasoning behind a court's decision in the case of *United States v. Texas*.  It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of the Court

218, 241 (1832).  The courts would make the initial deter-
mination  of  patent  validity  in  a  subsequent  judicial  pro-
ceeding, such as an infringement suit.  See 1 Stat. 322.  This
scheme unsurprisingly resulted in the Executive Branch is-
suing many invalid patents and the Judicial Branch having
to  decide  many  infringement  cases.  See  S. Doc.  No.  338,
24th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1836).  Judge William Van Ness—
who before taking the bench had served as second to Aaron
Burr in his duel with Alexander Hamilton—lamented that
Congress  had  left  the  door  “open  and  unguarded”  for  im-
posters to secure patents, with the consequences of “litiga-
tion and endless trouble, if not total ruin, to the true inven-
tor.”  Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1041–1042 (No.
13,957) (CC SDNY 1826).  Congress heeded such concerns
by  returning  the  initial  determination  of  patentability  to
the  Executive  Branch,  see  5  Stat.  117–118,  where  it  re-
mains today.

The  present  system  is  administered  by  the  Patent  and
Trademark  Office  (PTO),  an  executive  agency  within  the
Department of Commerce “responsible for the granting and
issuing  of  patents”  in  the  name  of  the  United  States.    35
U. S. C.  §§1(a),  2(a)(1).    Congress  has  vested  the  “powers
and duties” of the PTO in a sole Director appointed by the
President  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.
§3(a)(1).  As agency head, the Director “provid[es] policy di-
rection and management supervision” for PTO officers and
employees.  §3(a)(2)(A).

This suit centers on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB), an executive adjudicatory body within the PTO es-
tablished by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011.
125  Stat.  313.    The  PTAB  sits  in  panels  of  at  least  three
members drawn from the Director, the Deputy Director, the
Commissioner  for  Patents,  the  Commissioner  for  Trade-
marks,  and  more  than  200  Administrative  Patent  Judges
(APJs).  35 U. S. C. §§6(a), (c).  The Secretary of Commerce
appoints the members of the PTAB (except for the Director),
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the history and structure of the patent system in the US, focusing on the role of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

Opinion of the Court

court  declined  to  enter  a  stay  of  the  rule,  the  challengers
sought the same relief from this Court.  We granted a stay,
preventing  the  rule  from  taking  effect.    West  Virginia  v.
EPA,  577  U. S.  1126  (2016).    The  Court  of  Appeals  later
heard argument on the merits en banc.  But before it could
issue a decision, there was a change in Presidential admin-
istrations.  The new administration requested that the liti-
gation be held in abeyance so that EPA could reconsider the
Clean Power Plan.  The D. C. Circuit obliged, and later dis-
missed the petitions for review as moot.

EPA  eventually  repealed  the  rule  in  2019,  concluding
that the Clean Power Plan had been “in excess of its statu-
tory authority” under Section 111(d).  84 Fed. Reg. 32523
(2019).  Specifically, the Agency concluded that generation
shifting  should  not  have  been  considered  as  part  of  the
BSER.  The Agency interpreted Section 111 as “limit[ing]
the BSER to those systems that can be put into operation
at  a  building,  structure,  facility,  or  installation,”  such  as
“add-on  controls”  and  “inherently  lower-emitting  pro-
cesses/practices/designs.”  Id., at 32524.  It then explained
that the Clean Power Plan, rather than setting the stand-
ard “based on the application of equipment and practices at
the level of an individual facility,” had instead based it on
“a shift in the energy generation mix at the grid level,” id.,
at 32523—not the sort of measure that has “a potential for
application to an individual source.”  Id., at 32524.

The Agency determined that “the interpretative question
raised” by the Clean Power Plan—“i.e., whether a ‘system
of  emission  reduction’  can  consist  of  generation-shifting
measures”—fell  under  the  “major  question  doctrine.”  Id.,
at 32529.  Under that doctrine, EPA explained, courts “ex-
pect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an
agency  decisions  of  vast  economic  and  political  signifi-
cance.”  Ibid. (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
573 U. S. 302, 324 (2014) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).  The Agency concluded that the Clean Power Plan was
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Clean Power Plan and its legal challenges. It cites legal precedents and delves into the interpretation of specific regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

310

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Opinion of Souter, J.

Moreover, even were I to conclude that the city of Erie
had speciﬁcally singled out the activity of nude dancing,
I still would not ﬁnd that this regulation violated the First
Amendment unless I could be persuaded (as on this record I
cannot) that it was the communicative character of nude
dancing that prompted the ban. When conduct other than
speech itself is regulated,
it is my view that the First
Amendment is violated only “[w]here the government pro-
hibits conduct precisely because of its communicative attri-
butes.” Barnes, 501 U. S., at 577 (emphasis deleted). Here,
even if one hypothesizes that the city’s object was to sup-
press only nude dancing, that would not establish an intent
to suppress what (if anything) nude dancing communicates.
I do not feel the need, as the Court does, to identify some
“secondary effects” associated with nude dancing that the
city could properly seek to eliminate.
(I am highly skepti-
cal, to tell the truth, that the addition of pasties and
G-strings will at all reduce the tendency of establishments
such as Kandyland to attract crime and prostitution, and
hence to foster sexually transmitted disease.) The tradi-
tional power of government to foster good morals (bonos
mores), and the acceptability of the traditional judgment (if
Erie wishes to endorse it) that nude public dancing itself is
immoral, have not been repealed by the First Amendment.

Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in

part.

I join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion and agree with
the analytical approach that the plurality employs in decid-
ing this case. Erie’s stated interest in combating the sec-
ondary effects associated with nude dancing establishments
is an interest unrelated to the suppression of expression
under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), and the
city’s regulation is thus properly considered under the
O’Brien standards.
I do not believe, however, that the cur-
rent record allows us to say that the city has made a sufﬁ-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Souter in the case of Erie v. Pap's A.M.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

5

BREYER, J., dissenting

upon  such  grounds  as  exist  at  law  or  in  equity  for  the
revocation of any contract,” 9 U. S. C. §2.

Thus, insofar as we seek to implement Congress’ intent,
we  should  think  more  than  twice  before  invalidating  a
state  law  that  does  just  what  §2  requires,  namely,  puts
agreements  to  arbitrate  and  agreements  to  litigate  “upon
the same footing.”

III
The majority’s contrary view (that Discover Bank stands
as an “obstacle” to the accomplishment of the federal law’s
objective,  ante,  at  9–18)  rests  primarily  upon  its  claims
that  the  Discover  Bank  rule  increases  the  complexity  of
arbitration  procedures,  thereby  discouraging  parties  from
entering  into  arbitration  agreements,  and  to  that  extent
discriminating  in  practice  against  arbitration.    These
claims are not well founded.

For one thing, a state rule of law that would sometimes
set  aside  as  unconscionable  a  contract  term  that  forbids
class arbitration is not (as the majority claims) like a rule
that  would  require  “ultimate  disposition  by  a  jury”  or
“judicially  monitored  discovery”  or  use  of  “the  Federal
Rules  of  Evidence.”  Ante,  at  8,  9.  Unlike  the  majority’s
examples,  class  arbitration  is  consistent  with  the  use  of
arbitration.  It is a form of arbitration that is well known
in California and followed elsewhere.  See, e.g., Keating v.
Superior Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 492 (App. 1980) (officially
depublished);  American  Arbitration  Association  (AAA),
(2003),
Supplementary  Rules
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936  (as  visited  Apr.  25,
2011,  and  available  in  Clerk  of  Court’s  case  file);  JAMS,
The  Resolution  Experts,  Class  Action  Procedures  (2009).
Indeed,  the  AAA  has  told  us  that  it  has  found  class  ar
bitration  to  be  “a  fair,  balanced,  and  efficient  means  of
resolving class disputes.”  Brief for AAA as Amicus Curiae
in  Stolt-Nielsen  S. A.  v.  AnimalFeeds  Int’l  Corp.,  O.  T.

for  Class  Arbitrations
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It contains legal citations, arguments, and references to other legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

KAGAN, J., dissenting

bilities  of  an  exclusive  representative—or,  in  the  worst
case, to perform them at all.  The result is to frustrate the
interests  of  every  government  entity  that  thinks  a  strong
exclusive-representation scheme will promote stable labor
relations.

Of course, not all public employers will share that view.
Some  would  rather  not  bargain  with  an  exclusive  repre-
sentative.  Others  would  prefer  that  representative  to  be
poorly funded—to serve more as a front than an effectual
bargaining partner.  But as reflected in the number of fair-
share statutes and contracts across the Nation, see supra,
at 2, many government entities think that effective exclu-
sive  representation  makes  for  good  labor  relations—and
recognize,  just  as  Abood  did,  that  representation  of  that
kind  often  depends  on  agency  fees.    See,  e.g.,  Harris,  573
U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  24)  (KAGAN,  J.,  dissenting)  (de-
scribing  why  Illinois  thought  that  bargaining  with  an
adequately  funded  exclusive  representative  of  in-home
caregivers  would  enable  the  State  to  better  serve  its  dis-
abled citizens).  Abood respected that state interest; today’s
majority  fails  even  to  understand  it.    Little  wonder  that
the  majority’s  First  Amendment  analysis,  which  involves
assessing  the  government’s  reasons  for  imposing  agency
fees, also comes up short.

B
1
In  many  cases  over  many  decades,  this  Court  has  ad-
dressed  how  the  First  Amendment  applies  when  the  gov-
ernment,  acting  not  as  sovereign  but  as  employer,  limits
its  workers’  speech.    Those  decisions  have  granted  sub-
stantial  latitude  to  the  government,  in  recognition  of  its
significant  interests  in  managing  its  workforce  so  as  to
best serve the public.  Abood fit neatly with that caselaw,
in  both  reasoning  and  result.  Indeed,  its  reversal  today
creates  a  significant  anomaly—an  exception,  applying  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

listed in a later subsection, “knowingly transfers, possesses,
or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification
of another person shall, in addition to the punishment pro-
vided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment of 2 years.”  §1028A(a)(1).  Today, the Court sets out
to determine what conduct that law reaches.  It is, as the
Court  acknowledges,  no  easy  task.    Both  the  term  “us[e]”
and the phrase “in relation to” can support a multitude of
possible  meanings.  Ante,  at  5–7.  They  of  course  “ ‘imply
action and implementation.’ ”  Ante, at 6 (quoting Bailey v.
United States, 516 U. S. 137, 145 (1995)).  Beyond that “gen-
eral  concept,”  however,  we  must  fend  for  ourselves  based
only on limited contextual clues.  Ante, at 5–7.

The  United  States  offers  up  a  rapacious  interpretation
that would require only “the use of th[e] means of identifi-
cation [to] ‘facilitat[e] or furthe[r]’ the predicate offense in
some  way.”    Brief  for  United  States  10  (emphasis  added).
Admittedly, this reading “fall[s] within the range” of plau-
sible meanings the statute could support.  Ante, at 7.  But
so too do other readings—ones that require a more demand-
ing “nexus” between the “means of identification” and the
underlying misconduct.  Ante, at 7–8.  For many of the rea-
sons  the  Court  gives  (and  more  besides),  I  agree  that  we
must adhere to those more restrained offerings.  The United
States’ maximalist approach has simplicity on its side, yes;
an everybody-is-guilty standard is no challenge to adminis-
ter.  But the Constitution prohibits the Judiciary from re-
solving reasonable doubts about a criminal statute’s mean-
ing by rounding up to the most punitive interpretation its
text and context can tolerate.  See Wooden v. United States,
595 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring  in
judgment) (slip op., at 6–9).  That insight alone means Mr.
Dubin’s §1028A(a)(1) conviction cannot stand.

Unfortunately, our opinion cannot end there.  Having told
lower courts how not to read the statute, we owe them some
guidance as to how they should read it.  That is where the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Dubin v. United States. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute (18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)) and argues against a broad interpretation by the government.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2011

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

KNOX ET AL. v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES

INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1000

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 10–1121.  Argued January 10, 2012—Decided June 21, 2012

California  law permits public-sector employees in a bargaining unit to
decide  by  majority  vote  to  create  an  “agency  shop”  arrangement  un-
der  which  all  the  employees  are  represented  by  a  union.    Even  em-
ployees  who  do  not  join  the  union  must  pay  an  annual  fee  for
“chargeable expenses,” i.e., the cost of nonpolitical union services re-
lated to collective bargaining.  Under Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431
U. S.  209,  a  public-sector  union  can  bill  nonmembers  for  chargeable
expenses but may not require them to fund its political or ideological
projects.  Teachers  v.  Hudson,  475  U. S.  292,  302–311,  sets  out  re-
quirements  that  a  union  must  meet  in  order  to  collect  regular  fees
from nonmembers without violating their rights.

In  June  2005,  respondent,  a  public-sector  union  (SEIU),  sent  to
California  employees  its  annual  Hudson  notice,  setting  and  capping
monthly dues and estimating that 56.35% of its total expenditures in
the coming year would be chargeable expenses.  A nonmember had 30
days to object to full payment of dues but would still have to pay the
chargeable portion.  The notice stated that the fee was subject to in-
crease without further notice.  That same month, the Governor called
for a special election on, inter alia, two ballot propositions opposed by
the SEIU.  After the 30-day objection period ended, the SEIU sent a
letter  to  unit  employees  announcing  a  temporary  25%  increase  in
dues  and  a  temporary  elimination  of  the  monthly  dues  cap,  billing
the move as an “Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Politi-
cal  Fight-Back  Fund.”    The  purpose  of  the  fund  was  to  help  achieve
the  union’s  political  objectives  in  the  special  election  and  in  the  up-
coming  November  2006  election.    The  union  noted  that  the  fund
would be used “for a broad range of political expenses, including tele-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of court opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are informational in nature and not meant to be indexed as part of the actual legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

concrete injur[y] under Article III.”  TransUnion, 594 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 9); see also Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski,
592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 11).  Indeed, this Court
has  allowed  other  States  to  challenge  other  Executive
Branch  policies  that  indirectly  caused  them  monetary
harms.  See, e.g., Department of Commerce v. New York, 588
U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  9–10).    So  why  are
these States now forbidden from doing the same?

Next,  the  Court  contends  that,  “when  the  Executive
Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise
coercive  power  over  an  individual’s  liberty  or  property.”
Ante, at 6.  Here again, in principle, I agree.  But if an ex-
ercise of coercive power matters so much to the Article III
standing inquiry, how to explain decisions like Massachu-
setts v. EPA?  There the Court held that Massachusetts had
standing to challenge the federal government’s decision not
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehi-
cles.  See  549  U. S.,  at  516–526.    And  what  could  be  less
coercive than a decision not to regulate?  In Massachusetts
v. EPA, the Court chose to overlook this difficulty in part
because  it  thought  the  State’s  claim  of  standing  deserved
“special solicitude.”  Id., at 520.  I have doubts about that
move.  Before Massachusetts v. EPA, the notion that States
enjoy relaxed standing rules “ha[d] no basis in our jurispru-
dence.”  Id., at 536 (ROBERTS,  C. J., dissenting).  Nor has
“special solicitude” played a meaningful role in this Court’s
decisions in the years since.  Even so, it’s hard not to wonder
why  the  Court  says  nothing  about  “special  solicitude”  in
this case.  And it’s hard not to think, too, that lower courts
should just leave that idea on the shelf in future ones.

Finally, the Court points to the fact that Article II vests
in the President considerable enforcement discretion.  Ante,
at 6–8.  So much so that “courts generally lack meaningful
standards  for  assessing  the  propriety  of  [the  Executive
Branch’s] enforcement choices.”  Ante, at 7.  But almost as
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice GorSUCH. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

Opinion of the Court

Adoption of T. A. W., 186 Wash. 2d 828, 835–837, 850–851,
383 P. 3d 492, 494–495, 501–502 (2016) (en banc) (mother
and stepfather); J. W. v. R. J., 951 P. 2d 1206, 1212–1213
(Alaska 1998) (same).  Indeed, Texas’s own family code per-
mits certain private parties to initiate suits for the termi-
nation of parental rights.  Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §102.003(a)
(West Cum. Supp. 2022); see Reply Brief for Texas 27.  And
while petitioners treat “active efforts” as synonymous with
“government programs,” state courts have applied the “ac-
tive efforts” requirement in private suits too.  See, e.g., In
re  Adoption  of  T. A. W.,  186  Wash. 2d,  at  851–852,  383
P. 3d, at 502–503; S. S. v. Stephanie H., 241 Ariz. 419, 424,
388  P. 3d  569,  574  (App.  2017);  In  re  N. B.,  199  P. 3d  16,
23–24  (Colo.  App.  2007).    That  is  consistent  with  ICWA’s
findings, which describe the role that both public and pri-
vate actors played in the unjust separation of Indian chil-
dren from their families and tribes.  §1901.  Given all this,
it is implausible that §1912(d) is directed primarily, much
less exclusively, at the States.6

Legislation that applies “evenhandedly” to state and pri-
vate actors does not typically implicate the Tenth Amend-
ment.  Murphy, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20).  In South

——————

6 To bolster their claim that the “active efforts” requirement is aimed
at the States, petitioners point to a statement from the Department of
the Interior asserting that the reference to “active efforts” reflects Con-
gress’s intent “to require States to affirmatively provide Indian families
with substantive services and not merely make the services available.”
81 Fed. Reg. 38791 (emphasis added).  This statement does not move the
needle.  Neither §1912(d) nor the regulations limit themselves to States;
moreover,  the  regulations  plainly  contemplate  that  services  will  come
from private organizations as well as the government.  25 CFR §23.102
(“Agency means a nonprofit, for-profit, or governmental organization . . .
that performs, or provides services to biological parents, foster parents,
or adoptive parents to assist in the administrative and social work nec-
essary  for  foster,  preadoptive,  or  adoptive  placements”).    The  Depart-
ment’s  statement  is  thus  consistent  with  the  plain  language  of  §1912,
which applies to both private and state actors.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the "active efforts" requirement in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). It cites legal precedents and statutes, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

BIDEN v. TEXAS

ALITO, J., dissenting

That reading ignores “the statutory structure” of the INA,
ante,  at  14,  and  wrongly  “confine[s]  itself  to  examining  a
particular statutory provision in isolation.”  FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 132 (2000).  We
have an obligation to read the INA as a “coherent regula-
tory scheme.”  Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 569
(1995); see also FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U. S. 385,
389 (1959); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___, ___
(2018) (slip op., at 10); A. Scalia & G. Garner, Reading Law
180  (2012)  (describing  the  “harmonious-reading  canon”).
And  if  we  follow  that  canon,  the  majority’s  interpretation
collapses.

Read as a whole, the INA gives DHS discretion to choose
from  among  only  three  options  for  handling  the  relevant
category of inadmissible aliens.  The Government must ei-
ther: (1) detain them, (2) return them to a contiguous for-
eign nation, or (3) parole them into the United States on an
individualized, case-by-case basis.  These options operate in
a hydraulic relationship: When it is not possible for the Gov-
ernment to comply with the statutory mandate to detain in-
admissible aliens pending further proceedings, it must re-
sort  to  one  or  both  of  the  other  two  options  in  order  to
comply with the detention requirement to the greatest ex-
tent possible.

There is nothing strange about this interpretation of how
the relevant provisions of the INA work together.  Consider
this  example.  Suppose  a  state  law  provides  that  every
school  district  “shall”  provide  a  free  public  education  to
every  student  from  kindergarten  through  the  12th  grade
and that another statute says that a district “may” arrange
for its students to attend high school in an adjacent district.
A small district refuses to operate its own high school be-
cause it lacks the necessary funds, and this district also de-
clines  to  arrange  for  its  students  to  attend  a  school  in  an
adjacent district because the law says only that a district
“may” take that course of action.  Refusing to exercise this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Biden v. Texas. It delves into the interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and argues against the majority's reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

Opinion of the Court

of programming) is itself expressive, and intrusion into that
activity must be specially justified under the First Amend-
ment.

The capstone of those precedents came in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
515  U. S.  557  (1995),  when  the  Court  considered  (of  all
things) a parade.  The question was whether Massachusetts
could require the organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day parade
to admit as a participant a gay and lesbian group seeking
to convey a message of “pride.”  Id., at 561.  The Court held
unanimously  that  the  First  Amendment  precluded  that
compulsion.  The  “selection  of  contingents  to  make  a  pa-
rade,” it explained, is entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion, no less than a newspaper’s “presentation of an edited
compilation of [other persons’] speech.”  Id., at 570 (citing
Tornillo, 418 U. S., at 258).  And that meant the State could
not  tell  the  parade  organizers  whom  to  include.    Because
“every  participating  unit  affects  the  message,”  said  the
Court, ordering the group’s admittance would “alter the ex-
pressive content of the[ ] parade.”  Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572–
573.  The  parade’s  organizers  had  “decided  to  exclude  a
message [they] did not like from the communication [they]
chose to make,” and that was their decision alone.  Id., at
574.

On two other occasions, the Court distinguished Tornillo
and its progeny for  the flip-side reason—because in those
cases  the  compelled  access  did  not  affect  the  complaining
party’s own expression.  First, in PruneYard Shopping Cen-
ter v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), the Court rejected a shop-
ping mall’s First Amendment challenge to a California law
requiring  it  to  allow  members  of  the  public  to  distribute
handbills  on  its  property.    The  mall  owner  did  not  claim
that he (or the mall) was engaged in any expressive activity.
Indeed,  as  the  PG&E  Court  later  noted,  he  “did  not  even
allege  that  he  objected  to  the  content  of  the  pamphlets”
passed  out  at  the  mall.    475  U. S.,  at  12.  Similarly,  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in the case of Moody v. NetChoice, LLC. It delves into First Amendment jurisprudence, citing precedents like Tornillo and Hurley.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1020

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 9, 2009

558 U. S.

Under  our  normal  practice,  Muhammad’s  timely  petition  for  cer
tiorari would have been reviewed at our Conference on November
24,  2009.  Virginia  has  scheduled  his  execution  for  November  10,
however,  so  we  must  resolve  the  petition  on  an  expedited  basis
unless we grant a temporary stay.  By denying Muhammad’s stay
application, we have allowed Virginia  to truncate our deliberative
process  on  a  matter—involving  a  death  row  inmate—that  de
mands  the  most  careful  attention.  This  result  is  particularly  un
fortunate  in  light  of  the  limited  time  Muhammad  was  given  to
make  his  case  in  the  District  Court.

I  continue  to  believe  that  the  Court  would  be  wise  to  adopt  a
practice  of  staying  all  executions  scheduled  in  advance  of  the
completion  of  our  review  of  a  capital  defendant’s  ﬁrst  application
for  a  federal  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  See,  e. g.,  Emmett  v.  Kelly,
552 U. S. 942 (2007) (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., respect
ing denial of certiorari); Breard v.  Greene, 523 U. S. 371, 379 (1998)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  Such a practice would give meaningful
effect  to  the  distinction  Congress  has  drawn  between  ﬁrst  and
successive  habeas  petitions.  See  28  U. S. C.  § 2244(b).  It  would
also  serve  the  interests  of  avoiding  irreversible  error,  facilitating
the efﬁcient management of our  docket, and preserving basic fair
ness  by  ensuring  death  row  inmates  receive  the  same  procedural
safeguards  that  ordinary  inmates  receive.

Having  reviewed  petitioner’s  claims,  I  do  not  dissent  from  the
Court’s decision to deny certiorari.  “I do, however, remain ﬁrmly
convinced  that  no  State  should  be  allowed  to  foreshorten  this
 ﬁrst-time  habeas  petition[s]  by
.
Court’s  orderly  review  of .
executing  prisoners  before  that  review  can  be  completed.”  Em
mett,  552  U. S.,  at  943.

.

Rehearing  Denied

No.  08–9884.  Cooper  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  830;
No. 08–10450.  Purpura v.  Bushkin, Gaimes, Gains, Jonas &

Stream  et  al.,  ante,  p.  840;  and

No.  08–11025.  Wells  v.  Carro,  Judge,  Supreme  Court  of
New  York,  New  York  County,  ante,  p.  866.  Petitions  for  re
hearing  denied.

No.  08–608.  Flipping  et  al.  v.  Reilly,  555  U. S.  1170.  Mo

tion  for  leave  to  ﬁle  petition  for  rehearing  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case involving a death row inmate and the Court's practice of reviewing petitions for certiorari.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1164

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

Page

Rule 22.  Applications to Individual Justices .........................................  1190

Rule 23.  Stays .............................................................................................  1191

PART  VI.  BRIEFS  ON  THE  MERITS  AND  ORAL  ARGUMENT

Rule 24.  Briefs on the Merits: In General.............................................  1192

Rule 25.  Briefs on the Merits: Number of Copies and Time to File  1194

Rule 26.  Joint Appendix ............................................................................  1195

Rule 27.  Calendar .......................................................................................  1198

Rule 28.  Oral Argument............................................................................  1199

PART  VII.  PRACTICE  AND  PROCEDURE

Rule 29.  Filing  and  Service  of  Documents;  Special  Notiﬁcations;

Corporate Listing ...................................................................  1200

Rule 30.  Computation and Extension of Time......................................  1204

Rule 31.  Translations .................................................................................  1205

Rule 32.  Models, Diagrams, Exhibits, and Lodgings ..........................  1205

Rule 33.  Document  Preparation:  Booklet  Format;  81⁄2- by  11-Inch

Paper Format ..........................................................................  1205

Rule 34.  Document Preparation: General Requirements ...................  1209

Rule 35.  Death, Substitution, and Revivor; Public Ofﬁcers ...............  1211

Rule 36.  Custody of Prisoners in Habeas Corpus Proceedings.........  1212

Rule 37.  Brief for an Amicus Curiae.....................................................  1212

Rule 38.  Fees ...............................................................................................  1215

Rule 39.  Proceedings In Forma Pauperis ............................................  1216

Rule 40.  Veterans, Seamen, and Military Cases...................................  1217

PART  VIII.  DISPOSITION  OF  CASES

Rule 41.  Opinions of the Court ................................................................  1218

Rule 42.  Interest and Damages ...............................................................  1218

Rule 43.  Costs..............................................................................................  1219

Rule 44.  Rehearing.....................................................................................  1220

Rule 45.  Process; Mandates ......................................................................  1221

Rule 46.  Dismissing Cases ........................................................................  1222

PART  IX.  DEFINITIONS  AND  EFFECTIVE  DATE

Rule 47.  Reference to “State Court” and “State Law” ......................  1222

Rule 48.  Effective Date of Rules.............................................................  1223
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a table of contents for a document outlining the Rules of the Supreme Court. It lists the rules with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

The only provision in the Constitution that arguably ad-
dresses a State’s power over Presidential electors is Clause
2 of Article II, §1.  That Clause provides, in relevant part,
that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Leg-
islature  thereof  may  direct,  a  Number  of  Electors.”    As  I
have  previously  explained,  this  language  “imposes  an  af-
firmative obligation on the States” to establish the manner
for appointing electors.  U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 864
(dissenting opinion).  By using the term “shall,” “the Clause
expressly requires action by the States.”  Id., at 862 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also Maine Community
Health Options v. United States, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020)
(slip op., at 12) (“The first sign that the statute imposed an
obligation is its mandatory language: ‘shall’ ”); Lexecon Inc.
v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35
(1998) (recognizing that “ ‘shall’ [n]ormally creates an obli-
gation”).  This obligation to provide the manner of appoint-
ing electors does not expressly delegate power to States; it
simply imposes an affirmative duty.  See U. S. Term Limits,
supra, at 862–863 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

B
In a somewhat cursory analysis, the Court concludes that
the States’ duty to appoint electors “in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct,” Art. II, §1, cl. 2, provides
an express grant of “power to appoint an elector.”  Ante, at
9.  As explained above, this interpretation erroneously con-
flates the imposition of a duty with the granting of a power.
But even setting that issue aside, I cannot agree with the
Court’s analysis.  The Court appears to misinterpret Article
II, §1, by overreading its language as authorizing the broad
power to impose and enforce substantive conditions on ap-
pointment.  The  Court  then  misconstrues  the  State  of
Washington’s law as enforcing a condition of appointment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Chiafalo v. Washington. It delves into the interpretation of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the US Constitution regarding the appointment of electors.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

145

Opinion of the Court

Commission (FTC) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking,
see 29 Fed. Reg. 530–532 (1964), and in June 1964, the FTC
promulgated a ﬁnal rule requiring cigarette manufacturers
“to disclose, clearly and prominently, in all advertising and
on every pack, box, carton or other container . . . that ciga-
rette smoking is dangerous to health and may cause death
from cancer and other diseases,” id., at 8325. The rule was
to become effective January 1, 1965, but, on a request from
Congress, the FTC postponed enforcement for six months.
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 513–514
(1992).

In response to the Surgeon General’s report and the FTC’s
proposed rule, Congress convened hearings to consider legis-
lation addressing “the tobacco problem.” 1964 Hearings 1.
During those deliberations, FDA representatives testiﬁed
before Congress that the agency lacked jurisdiction under
the FDCA to regulate tobacco products. Surgeon General
Terry was asked during hearings in 1964 whether HEW had
the “authority to brand or label the packages of cigarettes or
to control the advertising there.”
Id., at 56. The Surgeon
General stated that “we do not have such authority in exist-
ing laws governing the . . . Food and Drug Administration.”
Ibid. Similarly, FDA Deputy Commissioner Rankin testi-
ﬁed in 1965 that “[t]he Food and Drug Administration has no
jurisdiction under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act over
tobacco, unless it bears drug claims.” Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising—1965: Hearings on H. R. 2248 before the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., 193 (hereinafter 1965 Hearings). See also
Letter to Directors of Bureaus, Divisions and Directors of
Districts from FDA Bureau of Enforcement (May 24, 1963),
in 1972 Hearings 240 (“[T]obacco marketed for chewing or
smoking without accompanying therapeutic claims, does not
meet the deﬁnitions in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for
food, drug, device or cosmetic”).
In fact, HEW Secretary
Celebrezze urged Congress not to amend the FDCA to cover
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically the opinion of the court in a case. It discusses the history of regulations regarding cigarette advertising and the FDA's stance on its jurisdiction over tobacco products.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

SACKETT v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

Fed. Reg. 3143.  So are any “[i]ntrastate lakes and ponds,
streams, or wetlands” that either have a continuous surface
connection to categorically included waters or have a signif-
icant  nexus  to  interstate  or  traditional  navigable  waters.
Id.,  at  3006,  3143.  Like  the  post-Rapanos  guidance,  the
rule states that a significant nexus requires consideration
of a list of open-ended factors.  88 Fed. Reg. 3006, 3144.  Fi-
nally, the rule returns to the broad pre-2020  definition of
“adjacent.”  Ibid.;  see  supra,  at  7.    Acknowledging  that
“[f ]ield work is often necessary to confirm the presence of a
wetland”  under  these  definitions,  the  rule  instructs  local
agents to continue using the Corps’ Wetlands Delineation
Manual.  88 Fed. Reg. 3117.

B
With the benefit of a half century of practice under the
CWA, it is worth taking stock of where things stand.  The
agencies maintain that the significant-nexus test has been
and remains sufficient to establish jurisdiction over “adja-
cent” wetlands.  And by the EPA’s own admission, “almost
all waters and wetlands” are potentially susceptible to reg-
ulation  under  that  test.    80  Fed.  Reg.  37056.    This  puts
many property owners in a precarious position because it is
“often  difficult  to  determine  whether  a  particular  piece  of
property  contains  waters  of  the  United  States.”    Hawkes
Co., 578 U. S., at 594; see 40 CFR §230.3(t) (2008).  Even if
a  property  appears  dry,  application  of  the  guidance  in  a
complicated manual ultimately decides whether it contains
wetlands.  See  88  Fed.  Reg.  3117;  Wetlands  Delineation
Manual  84–85  (describing  “not  . . .  atypical”  examples  of
wetlands  that  periodically  lack  wetlands  indicators);  see
also Hawkes Co. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
782 F. 3d 994, 1003 (CA8 2015) (Kelly, J., concurring) (“This
is a unique aspect of the CWA; most laws do not require the
hiring of expert consultants to determine if they even apply
to you or your property”).  And because the CWA can sweep
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Clean Water Act and its interpretation regarding wetlands jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

SAN ANTONIO v. HOTELS.COM, L. P.

Opinion of the Court

*

*

*

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and the court's decision. It's likely part of a legal document and not the main narrative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

857

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10838.  Rodriguez-Marrero  v.  United  States.

C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10839.  Randle  v.  Woods.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  299  Fed.  Appx.  466.

No.  08–10840.  Rowell  v.  Nevada.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  08–10841.  Samuel  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  662.

No.  08–10842.  Sontchi  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10843.  Jones v.  Trombley.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  931.

No. 08–10848.  Riley v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  296.

No.  08–10849.  Sengvong  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  2d

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  4  So.  3d  1235.

No.  08–10850.  Reed  v.  Swilley  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  266  Fed.  Appx.  336.

No.  08–10851.  Scott  v.  Curry,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10852.  Jackson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  635.

No. 08–10853.  Haburn et al. v.  Kilby et al.  C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  580.

No. 08–10854.  Wehr  v.  United States.  C. A.  5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  821.

No.  08–10855.  McKeighan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10856.  Cooper  v.  Carey,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  566.

No.  08–10857.

J.  R.  v.  Mental  Health  Board  of  the
Fourth  Judicial  District  (Reported  below:  277  Neb.  362,  762
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case citations, likely from a legal publication.  It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xcvii

Page

1138

Mejia-Zapata v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1157

Mejio-Rios v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Mekusker; Garnto v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Melﬁ v. WMC Mortgage Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Melson v. Allen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  900,1046

952

Memphis; Chumpia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Mendez v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

Mendez v. Knowles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Mendez-Monroy v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
900

Mendez-Sanchez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
982

Mendoza v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

Mendoza v. Steele . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
870

Mendoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mendoza Alcala v. United States
973

Mendoza-Powers; Oliphant v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
870

Mendoza-Sandoval v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957

Mendoza-Zaragoza v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

Menke v. Gaddy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Mensah v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

. . . . . . . . . . .
Mental Health Bd. of Fourth Judicial Dist.; J. R. v.
858

Mental Health Bd. of Fourth Judicial Dist.; O. S. v.  . . . . . . . . . . .
Mentor Township; Hoy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  878,1101

856

Menzor v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1002

Mercado v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Merced-Rodriguez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
853

843

Mercer v. South Carolina  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1010

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Merck & Co. v. Reynolds
1155

Mercy Medical Center; Evans v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meredith v. Erath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

823

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Grijalva v.
Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Moore v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  927,1039

956

Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Tate v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
975

Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Vores v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
850

Mero v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Merrill; Martin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Merrill Lynch & Co.; Feigenbaum v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Merritt v. Shinseki  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Merritt v. United Parcel Service, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  899,1086

Merriweather v. Reynolds
845

Meshell v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

Metrish; Cardinal v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Metrish v. Newman
1091

Metro Lights, L. L. C. v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Metro/State Newspaper; Bryant v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
954

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 13, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09– 5860.  Ewing  v.  Bergeron,  Superintendent,
Bridgewater  State  Hospital.  App.  Ct.  Mass.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  74  Mass.  App.  1106,  904  N.  E.  2d  494.

No.  09– 5862.  Dortch  v.  Pennsylvania.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  964  A.  2d  940.

No.  09–5864.  Miller  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–5865.  Muldrow  v.  Denney,  Warden.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09– 5866.  Benson  v.  Luttrell,  Sheriff,  Shelby
County,  Tennessee,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
No.  09–5867.  Davis  v.  Vanderville  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5869.  Hearns  v.  New  Hampshire  State  Prison.

C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5872.  Peoples  v.  Williams  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5874.  Guadarrama  v.  Tilton  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5877.  Campbell  v.  Southeastern  Pennsylvania
Transportation  Authority  (SEPTA).  Sup.  Ct.  Pa.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  599  Pa.  463,  961  A.  2d  1228.

No. 09–5883.  Young v.  Holderness et al.  Ct. Sp. App. Md.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  183  Md.  App.  764,  772.

No.  09–5891.  Ruiz  v.  Hofbauer,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  427.

No.  09–5892.  Rohden  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5902.  Griffin  v.  Ortiz  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Colo.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5903.  Harris  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  5th  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not the actual content of a book and is likely a legal document or court docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>