<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

GORSUCH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 20–1199 and 21–707
_________________

20–1199

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF
HARVARD COLLEGE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.

21–707

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 29, 2023]

JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  joins,

concurring.

For many students, an acceptance letter from Harvard or
the  University  of  North  Carolina  is  a  ticket  to  a  brighter
future.  Tens of thousands of applicants compete for a small
number of coveted spots.  For some time, both universities
have decided which applicants to admit or reject based in
part on race.  Today, the Court holds that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not tolerate
this practice.  I write to emphasize that Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 does not either.

“[F]ew  pieces  of  federal  legislation  rank  in  significance

I
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch.  It includes citation information, case names, and the introduction to the Justice's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xliii

Page
934
Williams v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Williams v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923
Williams v. Carlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934
Williams v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Williams v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Williams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917,962
969
Williams Lewis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Willingham v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
Willingham v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Willis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Willoughby v. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,970
Wilshire Terrace Corp.; Pierson v.
937
Wilson v. Armstrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wilson v. Blackwell
944
Wilson v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
Wilson v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
Wilson v. Lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Windham v. Lowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962
Winﬁeld v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Wisconsin; Barbary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
381
Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Wisconsin Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Rel.; Peterson v.
929
Wolff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wood v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
Wood Motors, Inc.; Kearns v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,970
Woodruff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,956
955
Woolley v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Worthy v. Collagen Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Wright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Wronka v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
983
Wyoming v. Houghton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wyoming; Johnson v.
927
Yamaguchi; Levesque v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951
Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972
Yen v. National Labor Relations Bd.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
Yeo v. Lexington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
206
Yeskey; Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yinger v. Dearborn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
Young v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,941
Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . .
925
Ysui Yuan Tseng; El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,977
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,977
Yuan Tseng; El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

apply as well to the question whether physical presence is a requisite
for an out-of-state seller’s liability to remit sales taxes.  Other aspects
of the Court’s doctrine can better and more accurately address poten-
tial burdens on interstate commerce, whether or not Quill’s physical
presence rule is satisfied.
  Second,  Quill  creates  rather  than  resolves  market  distortions.    In
effect,  it  is  a  judicially  created  tax  shelter  for  businesses  that  limit
their physical presence in a State but sell their goods and services to
the  State’s  consumers,  something  that  has  become  easier  and  more
prevalent as technology has advanced.  The rule also produces an in-
centive to avoid physical presence in multiple States, affecting devel-
opment that might be efficient or desirable.

Third,  Quill  imposes  the  sort  of  arbitrary,  formalistic  distinction
that the Court’s modern Commerce Clause precedents disavow in fa-
vor  of  “a  sensitive,  case-by-case  analysis  of  purposes  and  effects,”
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 201.  It treats eco-
nomically  identical  actors  differently  for  arbitrary  reasons.    For  ex-
ample, a business that maintains a few items of inventory in a small
warehouse in a State is required to collect and remit a tax on all of its
sales  in  the  State,  while  a  seller  with  a  pervasive  Internet  presence
cannot  be  subject  to  the  same  tax  for  the  sales  of  the  same  items.
Pp. 10–14.

(2) When the day-to-day functions of marketing and distribution
in  the  modern  economy  are  considered,  it  becomes  evident  that
Quill’s physical presence rule is artificial, not just “at its edges,” 504
U. S.  at  315,  but  in  its  entirety.    Modern  e-commerce  does  not  align
analytically with a test that relies on the sort of physical presence de-
fined in Quill.  And the Court should not maintain a rule that ignores
substantial virtual connections to the State.  Pp. 14–15.

(3) The physical presence rule of Bellas Hess and Quill is also an
extraordinary imposition by the Judiciary on States’ authority to col-
lect taxes and perform critical public functions.  Forty-one States, two
Territories, and the District of Columbia have asked the Court to re-
ject Quill’s test.  Helping respondents’ customers evade  a lawful tax
unfairly  shifts  an  increased  share  of  the  taxes  to  those  consumers
who buy from competitors with a physical presence in the State.  It is
essential to public confidence in the tax system that the Court avoid
creating inequitable exceptions.  And it is also essential to the confi-
dence  placed  in  the  Court’s  Commerce  Clause  decisions.    By  giving
some  online  retailers  an  arbitrary  advantage  over  their  competitors
who  collect  state  sales  taxes,  Quill’s  physical  presence  rule  has  lim-
ited  States’  ability  to  seek  long-term  prosperity  and  has  prevented
market  participants  from  competing  on  an  even  playing  field.
Pp. 16–17.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It outlines the arguments against upholding the physical presence rule established in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:26] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1043

529 U. S.

March 27, 2000

No. 99–8217. Oliver v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 449.

No. 99–8222. White v. Ebie. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari de-

nied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 454.

No. 99–8258. Vandenburgh v. Moore, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–8259. Holguin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 166 F. 3d 1211.

No. 99–8269. Hartman v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8279. Elizondo Alvarez v. United States. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 518.

No. 99–8301. Cameron v. Ferrara et al. Sup. Ct. Va.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8323. Brumett v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton

County. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8343. Ramon-Perez v. United States. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 286.

No. 99–8355. Hashisaki v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 833.

No. 99–8359. Ferrer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 180 F. 3d 274.

No. 99–8362. Florez Hernandez v. United States. C. A.

4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 261.

No. 99–8363. Graves v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 827.

No. 99–8364. Haynes v. Illinois et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 273.

No. 99–8368. O’Toole v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 833.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document, not typical reading content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U47

[10-04-01 09:34:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

428

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

stay and a petition for a writ of mandamus and prohibition
in the Court of Appeals. The Commonwealth argued that
petitioner’s evidentiary hearing was prohibited by 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(e)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. III). A divided panel of the
Court of Appeals granted the emergency stay and remanded
for the District Court to apply the statute to petitioner’s
request for an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the District
Court vacated its order granting an evidentiary hearing and
dismissed the petition, having determined petitioner could
not satisfy § 2254(e)(2)’s requirements.
The Court of Appeals afﬁrmed.

It ﬁrst considered peti-
tioner’s argument that § 2254(e)(2) did not apply to his case
because he had been diligent in attempting to develop his
claims in state court. Citing its decision in Cardwell v.
Greene, 152 F. 3d 331 (CA4), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 1037
(1998), the Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner that
§ 2254(e)(2) would not apply if he had exercised diligence in
state court. The court held, however, that petitioner had
not been diligent and so had “failed to develop” in state court
the factual bases of his Brady, juror bias, and prosecutorial
misconduct claims. See 189 F. 3d 421, 426 (CA4 1999). The
Court of Appeals concluded petitioner could not satisfy the
statute’s conditions for excusing his failure to develop
the facts and held him barred from receiving an evidentiary
hearing. The Court of Appeals ruled in the alternative that,
even if § 2254(e)(2) did not apply, petitioner would be ineligi-
ble for an evidentiary hearing under the cause and prejudice
standard of pre-AEDPA law. See id., at 428.

Addressing petitioner’s claim of an undisclosed informal
agreement between the Commonwealth and Cruse, the
Court of Appeals rejected it on the merits under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(1) and, as a result, did not consider whether
§ 2254(e)(2) applied. See 189 F. 3d, at 429.

On October 18, 1999, petitioner ﬁled an application for stay
of execution and a petition for a writ of certiorari. On Octo-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Williams v. Taylor.  It contains legal arguments, citations to statutes and case law, and a summary of the lower court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of the Court

manner that would diminish the mutually binding nature
of the agreements.”  Scherk, 417 U. S., at 520, n. 15 (citing
G. Haight, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Summary Analysis of Record of
United  Nations  Conference,  May/June  1958,  pp.  24–28
(1958)).  Nothing in the drafting history suggests that the
Convention  sought  to  prevent  contracting  states  from  ap-
plying domestic law that permits nonsignatories to enforce
arbitration agreements in additional circumstances.

2
“[T]he postratification understanding” of other contract-
ing states may also serve as an aid to our interpretation of
a  treaty’s  meaning.  Medellín,  552  U.  S.,  at  507  (internal
quotation marks omitted).  To discern this understanding,
we have looked to the “[d]ecisions of the courts of other Con-
vention signatories,” El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan
Tseng, 525 U. S. 155, 175 (1999), as well as the “postratifi-
cation conduct” of the governments of contracting states, Zi-
cherman, 516 U. S., at 227.

Here, the weight of authority from contracting states in-
dicates that the New York Convention does not prohibit the
application of domestic law addressing the enforcement of
arbitration agreements.  The courts of numerous contract-
ing states permit enforcement of arbitration agreements by
entities who did not sign an agreement.  See 1 G. Born, In-
ternational Commercial Arbitration §10.02, pp. 1418–1484
(2d ed. 2014) (compiling cases).  The United States identi-
fies at least one contracting state with domestic legislation
illustrating a similar understanding.  See Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 28 (discussing Peru’s national leg-
islation).  And GE Energy points to a recommendation is-
sued by the United  Nations Commission on International
Trade  Law  that,  although  not  directly  addressing  Article
II(3),  adopts  a  nonexclusive  interpretation  of  Article  II(1)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of international treaties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

21

THOMAS, J., dissenting

plained  that  surety  laws  merely  “provide  financial  incen-
tives for responsible arms carrying.”  597 U. S., at 59.  “[A]n
accused arms-bearer ‘could go on carrying without criminal
penalty’  so  long  as  he  ‘post[ed]  money  that  would  be  for-
feited if he breached the peace or injured others.’ ”  Id., at
56–57  (quoting  Wrenn  v.  District  of  Columbia,  864  F. 3d
650, 661 (CADC 2017); alteration in original).  As a result,
we held that surety laws were not analogous to New York’s
effective ban on public carry.  597 U. S., at 55.  That conclu-
sion  is  damning  for  §922(g)(8),  which  burdens  the  Second
Amendment right even more with respect to covered indi-
viduals.

Surety laws demonstrate that this case should have been
a  “straightforward”  inquiry.    Id.,  at  27.    The  Government
failed to produce a single historical regulation that is rele-
vantly similar to §922(g)(8).  Rather, §922(g)(8) addresses a
societal problem—the risk of interpersonal violence—“that
has  persisted  since  the  18th  century,”  yet  was  addressed
“through [the] materially different means” of  surety laws.
Id., at 26.

C

The  Court  has  two  rejoinders,  surety  and  affray  laws.
Neither is a compelling historical analogue.  As I have ex-
plained, surety laws did not impose a burden comparable to
§922(g)(8).  And, affray laws had a dissimilar burden and
justification.  The  Court  does  not  reckon  with  these  vital
differences,  asserting  that  the  disagreement  is  whether
surety and affray laws must be an exact copy of §922(g)(8).
Ante, at 16.  But, the historical evidence shows that those
laws are worlds—not degrees—apart from §922(g)(8).  For
this  reason,  the  Court’s  argument  requires  combining  as-
pects of surety and affray laws to justify §922(g)(8).  This
piecemeal approach is not what the Second Amendment or
our precedents countenance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and cites previous rulings, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

47

Opinion of the Court

This  elaborate  scheme  was  the  Court’s  own  brainchild.
Neither party advocated the trimester framework; nor did
either  party  or  any  amicus  argue  that  “viability”  should
mark the point at which the scope of the abortion right and
a  State’s  regulatory  authority  should  be  substantially
transformed.  See Brief for Appellant and Brief for Appellee
in Roe v. Wade, O. T. 1972, No. 70–18; see also C. Forsythe,
Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade 127,
141 (2012).

b
Not only did this scheme resemble the work of a legisla-
ture, but the Court made little effort to explain how these
rules  could  be  deduced  from  any  of  the  sources  on  which
constitutional  decisions  are  usually  based.  We  have  al-
ready discussed Roe’s treatment of constitutional text, and
the  opinion  failed  to  show  that  history,  precedent,  or  any
other cited source supported its scheme.
  Roe featured a lengthy survey of history, but much of its
discussion was irrelevant, and the Court made no effort to
explain why it was included.  For example, multiple para-
graphs were devoted to an account of the views and prac-
tices  of  ancient  civilizations  where  infanticide  was  widely
accepted.  See  410  U. S.,  at  130–132  (discussing  ancient
Greek and Roman practices).49  When it came to the most
important  historical  fact—how  the  States  regulated  abor-
tion  when  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  adopted—the
Court said almost nothing.  It allowed that States had tight-
ened their abortion laws “in the middle and late 19th cen-
tury,” id., at 139, but it implied that these laws might have

——————

49 See, e.g., C. Patterson, “Not Worth the Rearing”: The Causes of In-
fant  Exposure  in  Ancient  Greece,  115  Transactions  Am.  Philosophical
Assn. 103, 111–123 (1985); A. Cameron, The Exposure of Children and
Greek Ethics, 46 Classical Rev. 105–108 (1932); H. Bennett, The Expo-
sure of Infants in Ancient Rome, 18 Classical J. 341–351 (1923); W. Har-
ris, Child-Exposure in the Roman Empire, 84 J. Roman Studies 1 (1994).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Roe v. Wade case. It analyzes the Court's reasoning and cites sources.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1036

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 16, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–7091.  Puckett  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  817.

No.  09–7093.  Kiderlen  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  358.

No.  09–7095.  Laury  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  634.

No.  09–7100.  Turner  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  637.

No.  09–7101.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7105.  Canipe v.  United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  597.

No.  09–7107.  Osuna  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  147.

No.  09–7110.  Strahan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  1047.

No.  09–7111.  Scott  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  907.

No. 09–7113.  Akers v. United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  798.

No.  09–7115.  Anderson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  557.

No.  09–7118.  Blurton  v.  North  Dakota.  Sup.  Ct.  N.  D.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  770  N. W.  2d  231.

No.  09–7122.  Obasohan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  798.

No.  09–7124.  Montoya  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  573  F.  3d  1011.

No.  09–7126.  Martinez-Vasquez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7128.  Wallace  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  573  F.  3d  82.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their disposition (certiorari denied). It is not the actual content of a book and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U85

[09-14-00 16:49:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

262

HOHN v. UNITED STATES

Scalia, J., dissenting

this Court, see Act of Mar. 10, 1908, ch. 76, 35 Stat. 40.
In
1925, this requirement was extended to intermediate appel-
late proceedings, see Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, §§ 6(d), 13,
43 Stat. 940, 942. Before 1925, this Court readily concluded
it had no jurisdiction over appeals brought before it in the
absence of a certiﬁcate, see, e. g., Bilik v. Strassheim, 212
U. S. 551 (1908); Ex parte Patrick, 212 U. S. 555 (1908), and
House interpreted the 1925 amendment to produce the same
effect in the courts of appeals and, consequently, in this
Court under the predecessor to § 1254(1). Quite obviously,
with House on the books—neither overruled nor even cited
in the later opinions that the Court claims “disregarded” it—
Congress presumably anticipated that § 102 of AEDPA
would be interpreted in the same manner.3
In yet another
striking departure from our ordinary practice, the Court
qualiﬁes the rule that statutes are deemed to adopt the ex-
tant holdings of this Court, see Keene Corp. v. United States,
508 U. S. 200, 212 (1993): They will not be deemed to adopt
them, the Court says, when legal commentators “question

.

. for a writ of certiorari.”

3 The Court points to the fact that another provision of AEDPA, which
requires court of appeals authorization before a state prisoner can ﬁle a
second or successive habeas petition in district court, speciﬁcally states
that the denial of the authorization “shall not be appealable and shall not
28 U. S. C.
be the subject of a petition .
§ 2244(b)(3)(E) (1994 ed., Supp. II). This provision, the Court says, would
be rendered “superﬂuous” if we followed House, ante, at 249. That is
not so. Section 2244(b)(3) addresses whether there will be district-court
consideration of a second or successive petition at all, not whether the
district court’s consideration may be reviewed by an appellate court.
Only the latter is covered by the holding of House.
It is true enough that
the reasoning of House,
if carried over to the other question, would
produce the same result; but Congress’s speciﬁcation of that result when
there is no Supreme Court holding precisely in point would more ac-
Indeed, the greater
curately be described as cautious than superﬂuous.
relevance of § 2244(b)(3) to the question before us is this: It would be ex-
ceedingly strange to foreclose certiorari review of the denial of all federal
intervention, as that provision does, while according certiorari review of
the denial of appeal from the federal district court to the court of appeals.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia. The text includes legal citations, references to statutes, and arguments about legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
40  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

agree

Abood’s

Respondents

chargeable-
that
nonchargeable  line  suffers  from  “a  vagueness  problem,”
that  it  sometimes  “allows  what  it  shouldn’t  allow,”  and
that  “a  firm[er]  line  c[ould]  be  drawn.”    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.
47–48.  They  therefore  argue  that  we  should  “consider
revisiting”  this  part  of  Abood.  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  66;  see
Brief  for  Union  Respondent  46–47;  Brief  for  State  Re
spondents  30.  This  concession  only  underscores  the  real-
ity that  Abood has proved unworkable: Not even the par
ties  defending  agency  fees  support  the  line  that  it  has
taken this Court over 40 years to draw.

2

Objecting employees also face a daunting and expensive

task  if  they  wish  to  challenge  union  chargeability  deter
minations.  While  Hudson  requires  a  union  to  provide
nonmembers  with  “sufficient  information  to  gauge  the
propriety of the union’s fee,” 475 U. S., at 306, the Hudson
notice  in  the  present  case  and  in  others  that  have  come
before  us  do  not  begin  to  permit  a  nonmember  to  make
such a determination.

In  this  case,  the  notice  lists  categories  of  expenses  and
sets  out  the  amount  in  each  category  that  is  said  to  be
attributable  to  chargeable  and  nonchargeable  expenses.
Here are some examples regarding the Union respondent’s
expenditures:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees. It discusses the Abood case and the challenges non-members face in challenging union fee determinations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–1618.  Argued October 8, 2019—Decided June 15, 2020*

In each of these cases, an employer allegedly fired a long-time employee
simply for being homosexual or transgender.  Clayton County, Geor-
gia, fired Gerald Bostock for conduct “unbecoming” a county employee
shortly  after  he  began  participating  in  a  gay  recreational  softball
league.  Altitude Express fired Donald Zarda days after he mentioned
being gay.  And R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes fired Aimee Ste-
phens,  who  presented  as  a  male  when  she  was  hired,  after  she  in-
formed her employer that she planned to “live and work full-time as a
woman.”  Each employee sued, alleging sex discrimination under Title
VII  of  the  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1964.    The  Eleventh  Circuit  held  that
Title VII does not prohibit employers from firing employees for being
gay and so Mr. Bostock’s suit could be dismissed as a matter of law.
The  Second  and  Sixth  Circuits,  however,  allowed  the  claims  of  Mr.
Zarda and Ms. Stephens, respectively, to proceed.

Held: An  employer  who  fires  an  individual  merely  for  being  gay  or

transgender violates Title VII.  Pp. 4–33.

(a) Title VII makes it “unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or refuse
to  hire  or  to  discharge  any  individual,  or  otherwise  to  discriminate
against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, re-
ligion,  sex,  or  national  origin.”    42  U. S. C.  §2000e–2(a)(1).    The
straightforward application of Title VII’s terms interpreted in accord

——————

* Together  with  No.  17–1623,  Altitude  Express,  Inc.,  et al.  v.  Zarda
et al., as Co-Independent Executors of the Estate of Zarda, on certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and No. 18–
107, R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1117

529 U. S.

May 15, 2000

No. 99–8678. Miranda v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board of California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App. Dist. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–8713. Lewis v. Donnelly. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–8727. Olivo Rodriguez v. Walker, Superintend-
ent, Auburn Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–8734. Carter v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 200 F. 3d 815.

No. 99–8737. Benson v. Robinson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8743. Flanagan v. Arnaiz et al. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 830.

No. 99–8749. Westenburg v. Consolidated Freightways,

Inc. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8757. Fink v. Shedler et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 911.

No. 99–8765. Clements v. Florida Parole and Probation

Commission. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8778. Bybee v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8790.

Jackson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 264.

No. 99–8805. Williams v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 449.

No. 99–8806. Young v. Smeeks. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1343.

No. 99–8808. Smith v. Gilmore, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

19

ALITO, J., dissenting

district court decision; second, take a purportedly “new” ac-
tion that achieves the same result as the one previously set
aside; and third, while declining to seek vacatur of the ear-
lier judgment in the district court, ask the court of appeals
to vacate that judgment without reviewing its correctness
or the lawfulness of the second action.  The Court of Appeals
was correct to view this as an effort to thwart the normal
appellate process.

*

*

*
While I would affirm the Fifth Circuit if we reached the
merits, I agree with the majority that the District Court on
remand  should  consider  in  the  first  instance  whether  the
October  29  Memoranda  complied  with  §706  of  the  APA.
The  District  Court  should  assess,  among  other  things,
whether it is “arbitrary and capricious” for DHS to refuse
to use its contiguous-territory return authority to avoid vi-
olations of the statute’s clear detention mandate; whether
the deterrent effect that DHS found MPP produced in re-
ducing  dangerous  attempted  illegal  border  crossings,  as
well as MPP’s reduction of unmeritorious asylum claims, is
adequately accounted for in the agency’s new decision; and
whether DHS’s rescission of MPP is causing it to make pa-
role decisions on an unlawful categorical basis rather than
case-by-case, as the statute prescribes.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific statutes and court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ANIMAL SCIENCE PRODUCTS, INC. v.
HEBEI WELCOME PHARMACEUTICAL CO.
Opinion of the Court

determination of foreign law “must be treated as a ruling
on  a  question  of  law,”  rather  than  as  a  finding  of  fact.4
Correspondingly,  in  ascertaining  foreign  law,  courts  are
not limited to materials submitted by the parties; instead,
they  “may  consider  any  relevant  material  or  source  . . . ,
whether or not . . . admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.”  Ibid.  Appellate review, as is true of domestic
law  determinations,  is  de novo.    Advisory  Committee’s
Note,  at  892.    Rule  44.1  frees  courts  “to  reexamine  and
amplify  material  . . .  presented  by  counsel  in  partisan
fashion  or  in  insufficient  detail.”    Ibid.    The  “obvious”
purpose  of  the  changes  Rule  44.1  ordered  was  “to  make
the  process  of  determining  alien  law  identical  with  the
method  of  ascertaining  domestic  law  to  the  extent  that  it
is possible to do so.”  Wright & Miller §2444, at 338–342.
  Federal  courts  deciding  questions  of  foreign  law  under
Rule  44.1  are  sometimes  provided  with  the  views  of  the
relevant  foreign  government,  as  they  were  in  this  case
through the amicus brief of the Ministry.  See supra, at 2–
3.    As  the  Court  of  Appeals  correctly  observed,  Rule  44.1
does  not  address  the  weight  a  federal  court  determining
foreign  law  should  give  to  the  views  presented  by  the
foreign government.  See 837 F. 3d, at 187.  Nor does any
other rule or statute.  In the spirit of “international comity,”
Société  Nationale  Industrielle  Aérospatiale  v.  United
States  Dist.  Court  for  Southern  Dist.  of  Iowa,  482  U. S.
522, 543, and n. 27 (1987), a federal court should carefully
consider  a  foreign  state’s  views  about  the  meaning  of  its
own  laws.    See  United  States  v.  McNab,  331  F. 3d  1228,
1241  (CA11  2003);  cf.  Bodum  USA,  Inc.  v.  La  Cafetière,
Inc., 621 F. 3d 624, 638–639 (CA7 2010) (Wood, J., concur-
ring).  But the appropriate weight in each case will depend

——————

4 Federal  Rule  of  Criminal  Procedure  26.1  establishes  “substantially
the same” rule for criminal cases.  Advisory Committee’s 1966 Note on
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 26.1, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 709.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the determination of foreign law in US courts. It's part of a larger legal argument and contains legal citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

13

Opinion of the Court

III

The structure of the NCVIA and of vaccine regulation in
general  reinforces  what  the  text  of  §300aa–22(b)(1)  sug-
gests.  A  vaccine’s  license  spells  out  the  manufacturing
method  that  must  be  followed  and  the  directions  and
warnings  that  must  accompany  the  product.50   Manufac-
turers ordinarily must obtain the Food and Drug Admini-
stration’s  (FDA)  approval  before  modifying  either.51    De-
viations from the license thus provide objective evidence of
manufacturing  defects  or  inadequate  warnings.    Further
objective  evidence  comes  from  the  FDA’s  regulations—
more  than  90  of  them52—that  pervasively  regulate  the
manufacturing  process,  down  to  the  requirements  for
plumbing  and  ventilation  systems  at  each  manufacturing
facility.53    Material  noncompliance  with  any  one  of  them,
or with any other FDA regulation, could cost the manufac-
turer its regulatory-compliance defense.54

Design  defects,  in  contrast,  do  not  merit  a  single  men-
tion  in  the  NCVIA  or  the  FDA’s  regulations.    Indeed,  the
FDA has never even spelled out in regulations the criteria
it uses to decide whether a vaccine is safe and effective for
its intended use.55  And the decision is surely not an easy
one.  Drug  manufacturers  often  could  trade  a  little  less
efficacy for a little more safety, but the safest design is not
always  the  best  one.  Striking  the  right  balance  between
safety  and  efficacy  is  especially  difficult  with  respect  to
vaccines, which affect  public as well as individual health.
Yet  the  Act,  which  in  every  other  respect  micromanages
manufacturers,  is  silent  on  how  to  evaluate  competing
designs.  Are  manufacturers  liable  only  for  failing  to  em-
——————

50 See 42 U. S. C. §262(a), ( j); 21 CFR §§601.2(a), 314.105(b) (2010).
51 See §601.12.
52 See §§211.1 et seq., 600.10–600.15, 600.21–600.22, 820.1 et seq.
53 See §§211.46, 211.48.
54 See 42 U. S. C. §300aa–22(b)(2).
55 Hutt, Merrill, & Grossman, Food and Drug Law, at 685, 891.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA) and vaccine liability. It delves into the legal framework surrounding vaccine manufacturing defects versus design defects.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY
GENERAL, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 12–96.  Argued February 27, 2013—Decided June 25, 2013

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to address entrenched racial
discrimination in voting, “an insidious and pervasive evil which had
been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting
and  ingenious  defiance  of  the  Constitution.”    South  Carolina  v. Kat-
zenbach,  383  U. S.  301,  309.    Section  2  of  the  Act,  which  bans  any
“standard,  practice,  or  procedure”  that  “results  in  a  denial  or
abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race
or color,” 42 U. S. C. §1973(a), applies nationwide, is permanent, and
is not at issue in this case.  Other sections apply only to some parts of
the country.  Section 4 of the Act provides the “coverage formula,” de-
fining  the  “covered  jurisdictions”  as  States  or  political  subdivisions
that  maintained  tests  or  devices  as  prerequisites  to  voting,  and  had
low  voter  registration  or  turnout,  in  the  1960s  and  early  1970s.
§1973b(b).  In those covered jurisdictions, §5 of the Act provides that
no  change  in  voting  procedures  can  take  effect  until  approved  by
specified  federal  authorities  in  Washington,  D. C.    §1973c(a).  Such
approval is known as “preclearance.”

The coverage formula and preclearance requirement were initially
set to expire after five years, but the Act has been reauthorized sev-
eral  times.    In  2006,  the  Act  was  reauthorized  for  an  additional  25
years,  but  the  coverage  formula  was  not  changed.    Coverage  still
turned  on  whether  a  jurisdiction  had  a  voting  test  in  the  1960s  or
1970s, and had low voter registration or turnout at that time.  Short-
ly  after  the  2006  reauthorization,  a  Texas  utility  district  sought  to
bail  out  from  the  Act’s  coverage  and,  in  the  alternative,  challenged
the  Act’s  constitutionality.    This  Court  resolved  the  challenge  on
statutory grounds, but expressed serious doubts about the Act’s con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

JONES v. HENDRIX

JACKSON, J., dissenting

At the very least, this take on early habeas practice ap-
pears  contradicted  by  United  States  v.  Bainbridge,  24  F.
Cas. 946 (No. 14,497) (CC Mass. 1816) (Story, J.).  There,
Justice Story considered a statutory innocence claim on the
merits  even  though  the  individual  had  already  pleaded
guilty.  Id.,  at  949,  951–952.  And  the  postconviction/pre-
conviction distinction also runs headlong into other prece-
dents that have looked back on history and do not subscribe
to  such  a  narrow  view.  St.  Cyr,  533  U. S.,  at  302  (“[T]he
issuance of the writ was not limited to challenges to the ju-
risdiction of the custodian”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 404
(1963) (“Nor is it true  that at common law habeas corpus
was available only to inquire into the jurisdiction, in a nar-
row sense, of the committing court” (citing Bushell’s Case,
Vaughn. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1670))).
  Thus, assuming, arguendo, that the historical grounding
of the particular type of claim Jones sought to bring even
matters, the majority is mistaken when it contends that a
statutory innocence claim (including one brought in a suc-
cessive petition) is not sufficiently historical to warrant ap-
plication of our clear-statement rule.

*

*

*
If the majority had applied the clear-statement rule, as it
should have, to determine whether §2255(h) precludes suc-
cessive postconviction petitions that assert statutory inno-
cence claims, today’s interpretive task would have merely
involved answering one simple question: Is there an unam-
biguous sign in the text of §2255 that Congress meant for
§2255(h) to strip an incarcerated individual of any oppor-
tunity to raise a new claim of legal innocence in a motion
brought in federal court?  No such sign exists.23  Therefore,

——————

23 The majority does not appear to dispute this conclusion, as it only
engages with the clear-statement rule to categorically reject its applica-
bility.    Ante,  at  23–25.    The  majority  does  not—and  cannot—establish
that, if applied here, the clear-statement rule is satisfied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge. It cites legal precedents and argues a point of law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1094

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 14, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6933.  McQuirter  v.  Michigan.  Cir.  Ct.  Jackson

County,  Mich.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6936.  Kennedy  v.  Reese.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6939.  Entler  v.  Washington.  Sup.  Ct.  Wash.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6947.  Hall  v.  New  Jersey.  Super.  Ct.  N.  J.,  App.

Div.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6949.  Garibay  v.  Lewis,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  568.

No.  09–6951.  Garcia  v.  Cate,  Secretary,  California  De
partment  of  Corrections  and  Rehabilitation.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6952.  Finfrock  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  5th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  4  So.  3d  33.

No.  09–6953.  Finfrock  v.  Crist,  Governor  of  Florida,

et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6954.  Virgle  v.  Cate,  Secretary,  California  De
partment  of  Corrections  and  Rehabilitation.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  534.

No. 09–6956.  Kinney v.  McQuiggin, Warden.  C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6957.  Hickox  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  1st

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  7  So.  3d  1101.

No.  09–6959.  Albright-Lazzari  et  vir  v.  Connecticut.
Sup.  Ct.  Conn.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  287  Conn.
925,  951  A.  2d  573.

No.  09–6961.  Hardison  v.  Davis,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09– 6962.  Ivy  v.  Illinois.  Sup.  Ct.  Ill.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–6965.  Flores  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–234
_________________

KEVIN R. GEORGE, PETITIONER v. DENIS R.
MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 15, 2022]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting.
I  join  all  but  Part  II–C  of  JUSTICE  GORSUCH’s  dissent.
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) clearly and unmis-
takably violated a statutory command in its decision deny-
ing petitioner Kevin George’s application for service-related
benefits.  As JUSTICE GORSUCH explains, in the context of
this  specific  statutory  framework,  the  mere  fact  that  the
Board relied on a plainly invalid regulation does not shield
its final decision from review based on clear and unmistak-
able error.1

The Court thinks otherwise.  In support of its holding, the
Court notes that Congress, when it enacted the clear-and-
unmistakable-error statutes in 1997, codified a pre-existing
regulatory doctrine under which clear and unmistakable er-
ror did not encompass a subsequent “change in interpreta-
tion of law.”  38 CFR §3.105 (Cum. Supp. 1963); see ante, at
5–6.  I agree that Congress incorporated this pre-existing
——————

1 In my view, some invalid Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regu-
lations might not be erroneous enough for reliance on them to constitute
clear and unmistakable error.  After all, by definition, not every error is
clear  and  unmistakable.    The  Board’s  1977  decision  in  George’s  case,
however,  meets  this  demanding  standard.    The  presumption-of-sound-
ness  regulation  the  Board  applied  was  clearly  and  unmistakably  con-
trary  to  the  unambiguous  terms  of  38  U. S. C.  §1111,  as  even  the  VA
eventually conceded.  See post, at 2–3 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Such  a  break  with  precedent  would  mark  a  radical
mistake.  The Establishment Clause protects both religion
and  government  from  the  dangers  that  result  when  the
two  become  entwined,  “not  by  providing  every  religion
with an equal opportunity (say, to secure state funding or
to  pray  in  the  public  schools),  but  by  drawing  fairly  clear
lines  of  separation  between  church  and  state—at  least
where  the  heartland  of  religious  belief,  such  as  primary
religious  [worship],  is  at  issue.”  Zelman  v.  Simmons-
Harris,  536  U. S.  639,  722–723  (2002)  (BREYER,  J.,
dissenting).

III
Even assuming the absence of an Establishment Clause
violation  and  proceeding  on  the  Court’s  preferred  front—
the  Free  Exercise  Clause—the  Court  errs.  It  claims  that
the  government  may  not  draw  lines  based  on  an  entity’s
religious  “status.”  But  we  have  repeatedly  said  that  it
can.  When confronted with government action that draws
such  a  line,  we  have  carefully  considered  whether  the
interests  embodied  in  the  Religion  Clauses  justify  that
line.  The  question  here  is  thus  whether  those  interests
support the line drawn in Missouri’s Article I, §7, separat-
ing  the  State’s  treasury  from  those  of  houses  of  worship.
They unquestionably do.

A
The Establishment Clause prohibits laws “respecting an
establishment  of  religion”  and  the  Free  Exercise  Clause
prohibits  laws  “prohibiting  the  free  exercise  thereof.”
——————

Program  ranks  more  highly  those  applicants  who  agree  to  generate
media  exposure  for  Missouri  and  its  program  and  who  receive  the
endorsement  of  local  solid  waste  management  entities.    That  is,  it
prefers  applicants  who  agree  to  advertise  that  the  government  has
funded  it  and  who  seek  out  the  approval  of  government  agencies.    To
ignore this result is to ignore the type of state entanglement with, and
endorsement of, religion the Establishment Clause guards against.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Opinion of the Court

Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be
absolutely  and  totally  contradictory  and  repugnant.”    The
Federalist No. 32, p. 200 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in
original); see id., No. 81, at 548–549 (A. Hamilton).

Consistent  with  these  principles,  this  Court  has  found
structural waiver as to suits between States, in South Da-
kota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904), and suits by
the United States against a State, in United States v. Texas,
143 U. S. 621 (1892).  The States, we said, must have rec-
ognized that these waivers of immunity from suit were “a
necessary feature of the formation of a more perfect Union”
and thus “inherent in the constitutional plan.”  Principality
of  Monaco  v.  Mississippi,  292  U. S.  313,  329  (1934).    The
alternative to consenting to litigation between sovereigns,
after all, could be civil war.

A  century  later,  in  Central  Va.  Community  College  v.
Katz,  546  U. S.  356,  the  Court  recognized  another  struc-
tural waiver.  We held that States could not assert sover-
eign immunity to block suits by private parties pursuant to
federal bankruptcy laws.  Id., at 359.  There, too, we based
our holding on the constitutional structure.  We noted the
text’s insistence on “uniform Laws on the subject of Bank-
ruptcies,”  U. S.  Const.,  Art.  I,  §8,  cl. 4,  the  Framers’  con-
cerns  about  States’  passing  patchwork  legislation  and  re-
fusing  to  discharge  the  debts  of  noncitizens  (as  had
happened under the Articles of Confederation), and the his-
tory of habeas laws related to bankruptcy.  See 546 U. S.,
at 368–377.  All that evidence led us to conclude that, by
ratifying the Constitution, the States had agreed that their
sovereignty  would  yield  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  na-
tional bankruptcy policy.  See id., at 379.

For several years, both before and after Katz, the Court
declined to acknowledge additional waivers of sovereign im-
munity under Congress’ Article I powers or to find Article I
authority to abrogate immunity.  See, e.g., Seminole Tribe
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the concept of "structural waiver" of sovereign immunity, citing previous cases and constitutional provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

534

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

a profound unfairness in Parliament’s retrospectively alter-
ing the very rules it had established, simply because those
rules prevented the conviction of the traitor—notwithstand-
ing the fact that Fenwick could not truly claim to be “inno-
(At least one historian has concluded that his guilt
cent.”
was clearly established, see 9 Macaulay 203–204, and the de-
bate in the House of Commons bears out that conclusion,
see, e. g., Proceedings 219, 230, 246, 265, 289.) Moreover, the
pertinent rule altered in Fenwick’s case went directly to
the general issue of guilt, lowering the minimum quantum
of evidence required to obtain a conviction. The Framers,
quite clearly, viewed such maneuvers as grossly unfair, and
adopted the Ex Post Facto Clause accordingly.24

VI

The United States as amicus asks us to revisit the ac-
curacy of the fourth category as an original matter. None
of its reasons for abandoning the category is persuasive.

24 Fenwick’s case also illustrates how such ex post facto laws can op-
erate similarly to retrospective increases in punishment by adding to the
coercive pressure to accept a plea bargain. When Fenwick was ﬁrst
brought before the Lord Justices, he was given an opportunity to make
a confession to the King. Though he squandered the opportunity by au-
thoring a plain contrivance, Fenwick could have reasonably assumed that
a sincere confession would have been rewarded with leniency—the func-
tional equivalent of a plea bargain. See 9 Macaulay 125. When the bill
of attainder was taken up by the House of Commons, there is evidence
that this was done to pressure Fenwick into making the honest confession
he had failed to make before. See, e. g., Proceedings 197 (“ ’Tis a Matter
of Blood, ’tis true, but I do not aim at this Gentleman’s Life in it . . . all
I Propose by it, is to get his Confession”); id., at 235 (“[W]e do not aim at
Sir John Fenwick’s Blood, (God forbid we should) but at his Confession”);
id., at 255 (“Why, give me leave to say to you, ’tis a new way not known
in England, that you will Hang a Man unless he will Confess or give
Evidence . . .”). And before the House of Lords, Fenwick was explicitly
threatened that unless he confessed, they would proceed to consider the
bill against him.

9 Macaulay 218.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically an opinion from a court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and historical references.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1153

558 U. S.

January 19, 2010

No.  09–7512.  Bedford  v.  Webb,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7517.  Perez  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  13th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7524.  Reese  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  10th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7525.  Waldie  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.
Dist.,  Div.  2.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  173  Cal.  App.
4th  358,  92  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  688.

No.  09–7526.  Trump  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7528.  Villarreal  v.  Smith,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7534.  Victoria v.  Conway, Superintendent, Attica

Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7538.  Bronson  v.  Kelchner,  Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, et al.  C.  A.
3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7540.  Ivanova,  aka  Ivanova-Warner  v.  Michigan.

Cir.  Ct.  Kent  County,  Mich.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7542.  Gruber  v.  Buescher,  Secretary  of  State  of

Colorado,  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Colo.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7557.  Perry  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–7566.  Erickson  v.  Massachusetts.  App.  Ct.  Mass.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  74  Mass.  App.  172,  905
N.  E.  2d  127.

No.  09–7569.  Felix  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.  C.  A.
4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 330 Fed. Appx. 440.
No.  09–7570.  Major-Davis  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
342  Fed.  Appx.  952.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks the sequential narrative structure of typical book content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Legal Document</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

772

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court

499 (1975) (emphasis added); see also Sierra Club v. Morton,
It would perhaps sufﬁce to
405 U. S. 727, 734–735 (1972).
say that the relator here is simply the statutorily designated
agent of the United States, in whose name (as the statute
provides, see 31 U. S. C. § 3730(b)) the suit is brought—and
that the relator’s bounty is simply the fee he receives out
of the United States’ recovery for ﬁling and/or prosecuting a
successful action on behalf of the Government. This analy-
sis is precluded, however, by the fact that the statute gives
the relator himself an interest in the lawsuit, and not merely
the right to retain a fee out of the recovery. Thus, it pro-
vides that “[a] person may bring a civil action for a viola-
tion of section 3729 for the person and for the United States
Government,” § 3730(b) (emphasis added); gives the relator
“the right to continue as a party to the action” even when
the Government itself has assumed “primary responsibility”
for prosecuting it, § 3730(c)(1); entitles the relator to a hear-
ing before the Government’s voluntary dismissal of the suit,
§ 3730(c)(2)(A); and prohibits the Government from settling
the suit over the relator’s objection without a judicial de-
termination of “fair[ness], adequa[cy] and reasonable[ness],”
§ 3730(c)(2)(B). For the portion of the recovery retained by
the relator, therefore, some explanation of standing other
than agency for the Government must be identiﬁed.

There is no doubt, of course, that as to this portion of the
recovery—the bounty he will receive if the suit is success-
ful—a qui tam relator has a “concrete private interest in
the outcome of [the] suit.” Lujan, supra, at 573. But the
same might be said of someone who has placed a wager upon
the outcome. An interest unrelated to injury in fact is insuf-
ﬁcient to give a plaintiff standing. See Valley Forge Chris-
tian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 486 (1982); Sierra Club, supra,
at 734–735. The interest must consist of obtaining com-
pensation for, or preventing, the violation of a legally pro-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt. It contains legal jargon and cites previous cases, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
THOMAS, J., dissenting

A
At the outset, while Congress undoubtedly possesses the
power  to  direct  the  expenditure  of  federal  funds,  it  is  im-
portant to note that the Constitution contains no “spending
clause.”  From the beginning, some have located the spend-
ing power in the General Welfare Clause, and that view has
generally  been  accepted  by  this  Court’s  modern  doctrine.
See Engdahl, 44 Duke L. J., at 53, and n. 220 (describing
Alexander  Hamilton’s  views);  South  Dakota  v.  Dole,  483
U. S. 203, 206 (1987).  Yet, there are serious problems with
that view.

The General Welfare Clause is simply part of the Taxing
Clause, which reads in relevant part: “The Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common De-
fence and general Welfare of the United States.”  Art. 1, §8,
cl. 1.  By its terms, the only authority vested by this text is
a power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Ex-
cises.”  This power is then qualified by the Debts and Gen-
eral Welfare Clauses, which limit the objects for which Con-
gress can exercise that power.  The General Welfare Clause
is thus most naturally  read as a qualification on the sub-
stantive taxing power.

Consider also that the General Welfare Clause references
not  only  the  “general  Welfare”  but  also  “the  common  De-
fence.”  If the Clause were construed as an affirmative grant
of power to spend for the common defense, it would make
redundant Congress’ powers to “raise and support Armies”
and to “provide and maintain a Navy,” also found in Article
I, §8,  cls. 12–13.  Thus, “[i]f the reference to ‘common De-
fence’  spending  simply  alludes  to  power  conferred  else-
where,” then it seems illogical to consider the terms “gen-
eral Welfare” as the source of a freestanding power to spend
for whatever purposes.  D. Engdahl, The Basis of the Spend-
ing Power, 18 Seattle U. L. Rev. 215, 222 (1995).

The  Taxing  Clause  is  also  a  strange  candidate  for  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the constitutionality of Congress' spending power.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

GORSUCH, J., concurring

so, the Court returns judges to interpretive rules that have
guided federal courts since the Nation’s founding.  I write
separately to address why the proper application of the doc-
trine of stare decisis supports that course.

I
A
Today, the phrase “common law judge” may call to mind
a judicial titan of the past who brilliantly devised new legal
rules on his own.  The phrase “stare decisis” might conjure
up a sense that judges who come later in time are strictly
bound to follow the work of their predecessors.  But neither
of those intuitions fairly describes the traditional common-
law understanding of the judge’s role or the doctrine of stare
decisis.

At common law, a judge’s charge to decide cases was not
usually understood as a license to make new law.  For much
of England’s early history, different rulers and different le-
gal systems prevailed in different regions.  As England con-
solidated into a single kingdom governed by a single legal
system, the judge’s task was to examine those pre-existing
legal traditions and apply in the disputes that came to him
those legal rules that were “common to the whole land and
to all Englishmen.”  F. Maitland, Equity, Also the Forms of
Action at Common Law 2 (1929).  That was “common law”
judging.

This view of the judge’s role had consequences for the au-
thority due judicial decisions.  Because a judge’s job was to
find  and  apply  the  law,  not  make  it,  the  “opinion  of  the
judge” and “the law” were not considered “one and the same
thing.”  1  W.  Blackstone,  Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of
England  71  (1765)  (Blackstone)  (emphasis  deleted).  A
judge’s decision might bind the parties to the case at hand.
M. Hale, The History and Analysis of the Common Law of
England 68 (1713) (Hale).  But none of that meant the judge
had the power to “make a Law properly so called” for society
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the historical understanding of common law judging and the doctrine of stare decisis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

Opinion of the Court

broadly to include “the employment and consumption, as of
time or labor,” or the “disbursing of money”).  Though these
definitions are capacious enough to include attorney’s fees,
the  mere  failure  to  foreclose  a  fee  award  “neither  specifi-
cally nor explicitly authorizes courts to shift [fees].”  Baker
Botts, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).

Reading  the  term  “expenses”  alongside  neighboring
words  in  the  statute,  however,  supports  a  conclusion  ex-
cluding  legal  fees  from  the  scope  of  §145.  The  complete
phrase “expenses of the proceeding” is similar to the Latin
expensæ litis, or “expenses of the litigation.”  This term has
long referred to a class of expenses commonly recovered in
litigation to which attorney’s fees did not traditionally be-
long.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 461 (1891) (defining “ex-
pensæ litis” to mean “generally allowed” costs); 1 J. Bouvier,
Law Dictionary 392 (1839) (defining the term to mean the
“costs which are generally allowed to the successful party”);
id., at 244 (excluding from the definition of “costs” the “ex-
traordinary fees [a party] may have paid counsel”).  These
definitions suggest that the use of “expenses” in §145 would
not  have  been  commonly  understood  to  include  attorney’s
fees at its enactment.

Finally, the modifier “all” does not expand §145’s reach to
include  attorney’s  fees.  Although  the  word  conveys
breadth, it cannot transform “expenses” to reach an outlay
it  would  not  otherwise  include.  Cf.  Rimini  Street,  Inc.  v.
Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at
6–7)  (“The  adjective  ‘full’  in  §505  therefore  does  not  alter
the meaning of the word ‘costs.’  Rather, ‘full costs’ are all
the ‘costs’ otherwise available under law”).

Section 145’s plain text thus does not overcome the Amer-
ican Rule’s presumption against fee shifting to permit the
PTO to recoup its legal personnel salaries as “expenses of
the proceedings.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute (likely related to patent law). It delves into legal precedent and textual analysis to argue against the inclusion of attorney's fees as "expenses of the proceedings."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16  MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

to the basic structure of government established under the
Constitution.  The  Constitution,  she  noted,  “confers  upon
Congress  the  power  to  regulate  individuals,  not  States.”
Id., at 166.  In this respect, the Constitution represented a
sharp  break  from  the  Articles  of  Confederation.    “Under
the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked the author
ity in most respects to govern the people directly.”  Id., at
163.  Instead,  Congress  was  limited  to  acting  “ ‘only  upon
the States.’ ”  Id., at 162 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 7
Wall.  71,  76  (1869)).    Alexander  Hamilton,  among  others,
saw this as “ ‘[t]he great and radical vice in . . . the existing
Confederation.’ ”  505 U. S., at 163 (quoting The Federalist
No. 15, at 108).  The Constitutional Convention considered
plans that would have preserved this basic structure, but
it rejected them in favor of a plan under which “Congress
would  exercise  its  legislative  authority  directly  over  indi
viduals rather than over States.”  505 U. S., at 165.

As  to  what  this  structure  means  with  regard  to  Con
gress’s  authority  to  control  state  legislatures,  New  York
was  clear  and  emphatic.    The  opinion  recalled  that  “no
Member  of  the  Court  ha[d]  ever  suggested”  that  even  “a
particularly  strong  federal  interest”  “would  enable  Con
gress to command a state government to enact state regu
lation.”
“We  have
Id.,  at  178  (emphasis  in  original).
always  understood  that  even  where  Congress  has  the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting  certain  acts,  it  lacks  the  power  directly  to
compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”  Id., at
166.  “Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legisla
tive processes of the States by directly compelling them to
enact  and  enforce  a  federal  regulatory  program.’ ”  Id.,  at
161  (quoting  Hodel  v.  Virginia  Surface  Mining  &  Recla-
mation  Assn.,  Inc.,  452  U. S.  264,  288  (1981)).    “Where  a
federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to
legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state
governments as its agents.”  505 U. S., at 178.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the relationship between federal and state power. It's part of a larger legal argument and contains legal citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

KAGAN, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 23–726 and 23–727
_________________

MIKE MOYLE, SPEAKER OF THE IDAHO HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES

23–726

23–727

IDAHO, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 27, 2024]

JUSTICE K AGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE S OTOMAYOR joins,
and with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins as to Part II, con-
curring.

An Idaho law prohibits abortions unless necessary to pre-
vent a pregnant woman’s death; the law makes no excep-
tion for abortions necessary to prevent grave harms to the
woman’s health, like the loss of her fertility.  Before the law
could  take  effect,  the Federal  Government  sued  the  State
under  the  Emergency  Medical  Treatment  and  Labor  Act
(EMTALA).  That law requires a Medicare-funded hospital
to  provide  essential  care  to  patients  experiencing  medical
emergencies. The  Governme nt’s  suit  contended  that
EMTALA  preempts  the  Idaho  abortion  law  in  a  narrow
class of cases: when the state law bars a hospital from per-
forming  an  abortion  needed  to  prevent  serious  health
harms.

The District Court, believing the Government was likely
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the names of the justices involved. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the legal reasoning and decision-making process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

GORSUCH, J., concurring

at home with loved ones.  The law, too, sometimes distin-
guishes  between  intended  and  foreseeable  effects.    See,
e.g.,  ALI,  Model  Penal  Code  §§1.13,  2.02(2)(a)(i)  (1985);  1
W.  LaFave,  Substantive  Criminal  Law  §5.2(b),  pp.  460–
463 (3d ed. 2018).  Other times, of course, the law proceeds
differently,  either  conflating  intent  and  knowledge  or
presuming  intent  as  a  matter  of  law  from  a  showing  of
knowledge.    See,  e.g.,  Restatement  (Second)  of  Torts  §8A
(1965); Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17, 45 (1954).

The  problem  here  is  that  the  Commission  failed  to  act
neutrally  by  applying  a  consistent  legal  rule.
In  Mr.
Jack’s case, the Commission chose to distinguish carefully
between  intended  and  knowingly  accepted  effects.    Even
though the bakers knowingly denied service to someone in
a  protected  class,  the  Commission  found  no  violation
because  the  bakers  only  intended  to  distance  themselves
from  “the  offensive  nature  of  the  requested  message.”
Craig  v.  Masterpiece  Cakeshop,  Inc.,  370  P. 3d  272,  282,
n. 8 (Colo. App. 2015); App. 237, 247, 256; App. to Pet. for
Cert.  326a–331a;  see  also  Brief  for  Respondent  Colorado
Civil  Rights  Commission  52  (“Businesses  are  entitled  to
reject orders for any number of reasons, including because
they deem a particular product requested by a customer to
be  ‘offensive’ ”).    Yet,  in  Mr.  Phillips’s  case,  the  Commis-
sion  dismissed  this  very  same  argument  as  resting  on  a
“distinction  without  a  difference.”    App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.
69a.  It  concluded  instead  that  an  “intent  to  disfavor”  a
protected  class  of  persons  should  be  “readily  . . .  pre-
sumed”  from  the  knowing  failure  to  serve  someone  who
belongs  to  that  class.  Id.,  at  70a.    In  its  judgment,  Mr.
Phillips’s  intentions  were  “inextricably  tied  to  the  sexual
orientation  of  the  parties  involved”  and  essentially  “irra-
tional.”  Ibid.

Nothing  in  the  Commission’s  opinions  suggests  any
neutral  principle  to  reconcile  these  holdings.  If  Mr.  Phil-
lips’s  objection  is  “inextricably  tied”  to  a  protected  class,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It discusses the legal concepts of intent and knowledge in the context of discrimination claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–956
_________________

GOOGLE LLC, PETITIONER v.
ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[April 5, 2021]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  joins,  dis-

senting.

Oracle  spent  years  developing  a  programming  library
that  successfully  attracted  software  developers,  thus  en-
hancing  the  value  of  Oracle’s  products.1    Google  sought  a
license to use the library in Android, the operating system
it was developing for mobile phones.  But when the compa-
nies could not agree on terms, Google simply copied verba-
tim  11,500  lines  of  code  from  the  library.    As  a  result,  it
erased 97.5% of the value of Oracle’s partnership with Am-
azon,  made  tens  of  billions  of  dollars,  and  established  its
position as the owner of the largest mobile operating system
in the world.  Despite this, the majority holds that this cop-
ying was fair use.

The Court reaches this unlikely result in large part be-
cause it bypasses the antecedent question clearly before us:
Is  the  software  code  at  issue  here  protected  by  the  Copy-
right Act?  The majority purports to assume, without decid-
ing, that the code is protected.  But its fair-use analysis is
wholly  inconsistent  with  the  substantial  protection  Con-
gress  gave  to  computer  code.    By  skipping  over  the  copy-

——————

1 A  different  company,  Sun,  created  the  library.  But  because  Oracle

later purchased Sun, for simplicity I refer to both companies as Oracle.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites legal precedents, names parties involved in a case, and outlines the dissenting justice's argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 139 (2010)

141

Opinion of the Court

Richard  Cordray,  Attorney  General  of  Ohio,  argued  the
cause for petitioner.  With him on the briefs were Benjamin
C.  Mizer,  Solicitor  General,  Alexandra  T.  Schimmer,  Chief
Deputy Solicitor General, and Kimberly A. Olson and David
M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitors.

Michael  J.  Benza,  by  appointment  of  the  Court,  557  U. S.
965, argued the cause for respondent.  With him on the brief
was Alan Rossman.*

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.

Frank  G.  Spisak,  Jr.,  the  respondent,  was  convicted  in  an
Ohio  trial  court  of  three  murders  and  two  attempted  mur
ders.  He was sentenced to death.  He ﬁled a habeas corpus
petition  in  federal  court,  claiming  that  constitutional  errors
occurred  at  his  trial.  First,  Spisak  claimed  that  the  jury
instructions at the penalty phase unconstitutionally required
the  jury  to  consider  in  mitigation  only  those  factors  that
the  jury  unanimously  found  to  be  mitigating.  See  Mills
v.  Maryland,  486  U. S.  367  (1988).  Second,  Spisak  claimed
that  he  suffered  signiﬁcant  harm  as  a  result  of  his  coun
sel’s inadequate closing argument at the penalty phase of the
proceeding.  See  Strickland  v.  Washington,  466  U. S.  668
(1984).  The Federal Court of Appeals accepted these argu

*A  brief  of  amici  curiae  urging  reversal  was  ﬁled  for  the  Common
wealth of Pennsylvania et al. by Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General
of Pennsylvania, and Amy Zapp, Chief Deputy Attorney General, by Rich
ard  S.  Gebelein,  Chief  Deputy  Attorney  General  of  Delaware,  and  by  the
Attorneys  General  for  their  respective  States  as  follows:  Troy  King  of
Alabama, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., of California,
John  Suthers  of  Colorado,  Lawrence  G.  Wasden  of  Idaho,  Lisa  Madigan
of  Illinois,  Steve  Six  of  Kansas,  Jack  Conway  of  Kentucky,  Steve  Bullock
of  Montana,  Catherine  Cortez  Masto  of  Nevada,  W.  A.  Drew  Edmondson
of Oklahoma, Henry D. McMaster of South Carolina, Lawrence E. Long of
South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William
C. Mims of Virginia, and Bruce A. Salzburg of Wyoming.

Roy T. Englert, Jr., ﬁled a brief for Steven Lubet et al. as amici curiae.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the citation and introductory section. It's not the main body of the text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation and Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

GEORGIA v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

“merge” prior to publication in the “official” code, the very
provision calling for that merger makes clear that the an-
notations serve as commentary, not law.

As additional evidence that the annotations do not repre-
sent the will of the people, the General Assembly does not
enact  statutory  annotations  under  its  legislative  power.
See Ga. Const., Art. III, §1, ¶1 (vesting the legislative power
in the General Assembly).  To enact state law, Georgia em-
ploys a process of bicameralism and presentment similar to
that embodied in the United States Constitution.  See Ga.
Const., Art. III, §5; Art. V, §2, ¶4.  The annotations do not
go through this process, a fact that even the majority must
acknowledge.    Ante,  at  10;  Ga.  S.  52,  Reg.  Sess.,  §54(b)
(2019–2020) (“Annotations . . . except as otherwise provided
in the Code . . . are not enacted as statutes by the provisions
of this Act”).

Second, unlike judges and legislators, the creators of an-
notations are incentivized by the copyright laws to produce
a desirable product that will eventually earn them a profit.
And  though  the  Commission  may  require  Lexis  to  follow
strict guidelines, the independent synthesis, analysis, and
creative drafting behind the annotations makes them anal-
ogous to other copyrightable materials.  See Brief for Mat-
thew Bender & Co., Inc., as Amicus Curiae 4–7.

Lastly, the annotations do not impede fair notice of the
laws.  As just stated, the annotations do not carry the bind-
ing  force  of  law.  They  simply  summarize  independent
sources  of  legal  information  and  consolidate  them  in  one
place.  Thus, OCGA annotations serve a similar function to
other copyrighted research tools provided by private parties
such as the American Law Reports and Westlaw, which also
contain information of great “practical significance.”  Ante,
at 17.  Compare, e.g., OCGA §34–9–260 (annotation for Cho
Carwash Property, L. L. C. v. Everett, 326 Ga. App. 6, 755
S.  E.  2d  823  (2014))  with  Ga.  Code  Ann.  §34–9–260
(Westlaw’s annotation for the same).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the copyright status of annotations in the Georgia Code.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

5

SCALIA, J., dissenting

infringe  the  right.”  461  U. S.,  at  549.    Today’s  opinion,
ante,  at  9,  stresses  the  fact  that  these  nonprofits  were
permitted  to  use  a  separate  §501(c)(4)  affiliate  for  their
lobbying—but  that  fact,  alluded  to  in  a  footnote,  Regan,
461  U. S.,  at  545,  n. 6,  was  entirely  nonessential  to  the
Court’s  holding.    Indeed,  that  rationale  prompted  a  sepa-
rate  concurrence  precisely  because  the  majority  of  the
Court did not rely upon it.  See id., at 551–554 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).  As for FCC v. League of Women Voters of
Cal.,  468  U. S.  364  (1984),  the  ban  on  editorializing  at
issue  there  was  disallowed  precisely  because  it  did  not
further a relevant, permissible policy of the Federal Com-
munications  Act—and  indeed  was  simply  incompatible
with the Act’s “affirmativ[e] encourage[ment]” of the “vig-
orous  expression  of  controversial  opinions”  by  licensed
broadcasters.  Id., at 397.

The  Court  makes  a  head-fake  at  the  unconstitutional
conditions  doctrine,  ante,  at  12,  but  that  doctrine  is  of  no
help.  There is no case of ours in which a condition that is
relevant  to  a  statute’s  valid  purpose  and  that  is  not  in
itself unconstitutional (e.g., a religious-affiliation condition
that  violates  the  Establishment  Clause)  has  been  held  to
violate the doctrine.*  Moreover, as I suggested earlier, the
contention  that  the  condition  here  “coerces”  respondents’
speech is on its face implausible.  Those organizations that
wish  to  take  a  different  tack  with  respect  to  prostitution
“are as unconstrained now as they were before the enact-
ment  of  [the  Leadership  Act].”  National  Endowment  for
Arts  v.  Finley,  524  U. S.  569,  595  (1998)  (SCALIA,  J.,  con-
curring in judgment).  As the Court acknowledges, “[a]s a
general  matter,  if  a  party  objects  to  a  condition  on  the
——————

* In  Legal  Services  Corporation  v.  Velazquez,  531  U. S.  533  (2001),
upon which the Court relies, the opinion specified that “in the context of
this statute there is no programmatic message of the kind recognized in
Rust  and  which  sufficed  there  to  allow  the  Government  to  specify  the
advice deemed necessary for its legitimate objectives,” id., at 548.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing as part of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

BREYER, J., dissenting

threat.  And  that  fact  would  help  to  rebut  the  First
Amendment claim that the Proclamation rests upon anti-
Muslim bias rather than security need.  Finally, of course,
the  very  fact  that  Muslims  from  those  countries  would
enter  the  United  States  (under  Proclamation-provided
exemptions  and  waivers)  would  help  to  show  the  same
thing.

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Government  is  not  applying
the system of exemptions and waivers that the Proclama-
tion  contains,  then  its  argument  for  the  Proclamation’s
lawfulness  becomes  significantly  weaker.    For  one  thing,
the  relevant  precedents—those  of  Presidents  Carter  and
Reagan—would  bear  far  less  resemblance  to  the  present
Proclamation.  Indeed,  one  might  ask,  if  those  two  Presi-
dents  thought  a  case-by-case  exemption  system  appropri-
ate,  what  is  different  about  present  circumstances  that
would justify that system’s absence?

For  another  thing,  the  relevant  statute  requires  that
there  be  “find[ings]”  that  the  grant  of  visas  to  excluded
persons  would  be  “detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the
United  States.”  §1182(f ).    Yet  there  would  be  no  such
findings  in  respect  to  those  for  whom  the  Proclamation
itself  provides  case-by-case  examination  (followed  by  the
grant of a visa in appropriate cases).

And,  perhaps  most  importantly,  if  the  Government  is
not  applying  the  Proclamation’s  exemption  and  waiver
system,  the  claim  that  the  Proclamation  is  a  “Muslim
ban,”  rather  than  a  “security-based”  ban,  becomes  much
stronger.  How  could  the  Government  successfully  claim
that  the  Proclamation  rests  on  security  needs  if  it  is  ex-
cluding  Muslims  who  satisfy  the  Proclamation’s  own
terms?  At  the  same  time,  denying  visas  to  Muslims  who
meet the Proclamation’s own security terms would support
the  view  that  the  Government  excludes  them  for  reasons
based upon their religion.

Unfortunately  there  is  evidence  that  supports  the  sec-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a presidential proclamation, likely related to immigration.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>