<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Syllabus

requires  a  “significant  nexus”  between  the  wetland  and  its  adjacent
navigable waters, which exists when “the wetlands, either alone or in
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of those waters.
Id.,  at  779–780.    Following  Rapanos,  field  agents  brought  nearly  all
waters and wetlands under the risk of CWA jurisdiction by engaging
in fact-intensive “significant-nexus” determinations that turned on a
lengthy list of hydrological and ecological factors.

Under the agencies’ current rule, traditional navigable waters, in-
terstate  waters,  and  the  territorial  seas,  as  well  as  their  tributaries
and adjacent wetlands, are waters of the United States.  See 88 Fed.
Reg. 3143.  So too are any “[i]ntrastate lakes and ponds, streams, or
wetlands” that either have a continuous surface connection to categor-
ically included waters or have a significant nexus to interstate or tra-
ditional  navigable  waters.    Id.,  at  3006,  3143.    Finding  a  significant
nexus continues to require consideration of a list of open-ended factors.
Ibid.  Finally, the current rule returns to the agencies’ longstanding
definition of “adjacent.”  Ibid.  Pp. 6–12.

(2) Landowners  who  even  negligently  discharge  pollutants  into
navigable waters without a permit potentially face severe criminal and
civil penalties under the Act.  As things currently stand, the agencies
maintain that the significant-nexus test is sufficient to establish juris-
diction over “adjacent” wetlands.  By the EPA’s own admission, nearly
all waters and wetlands are potentially susceptible to regulation under
this test, putting a staggering array of landowners at risk of criminal
prosecution for such mundane activities as moving dirt.  Pp. 12–14.

(b) Next, the Court considers the extent of the CWA’s geographical

reach.  Pp. 14–22.

(1) To  make  sense  of  Congress’s  choice  to  define  “navigable  wa-
ters” as “the waters of the United States,” the Court concludes that the
CWA’s use of “waters” encompasses “only those relatively permanent,
standing  or  continuously  flowing  bodies  of  water  ‘forming  geo-
graphic[al]  features’  that  are  described  in  ordinary  parlance  as
‘streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes.’ ”  Rapanos, 547 U. S., at 739 (plu-
rality opinion).  This reading follows from the CWA’s deliberate use of
the plural “waters,” which refers to those bodies of water listed above,
and also helps to align the meaning of “the waters of the United States”
with the defined term “navigable waters.”  More broadly, this reading
accords with how Congress has employed the term “waters” elsewhere
in the CWA—see, e.g., 33 U. S. C. §§1267(i)(2)(D), 1268(a)(3)(I)—and
in other laws—see, e.g., 16 U. S. C. §§745, 4701(a)(7).  This Court has
understood CWA’s use of “waters” in the same way.  See, e.g., Riverside
Bayview, 474 U. S., at 133; SWANCC, 531 U. S., at 168–169, 172.

The EPA’s insistence that “water” is “naturally read to encompass
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the legal arguments and issues surrounding the Clean Water Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

and  benefits  are  important  political  issues,  but  that  is
generally not so in the private sector.”  Harris, 573 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 17).

Overlooking  the  importance  of  this  distinction,  “Abood

failed  to  appreciate  the  conceptual  difficulty  of  distin
guishing  in  public-sector  cases  between  union  expendi
tures that are made for collective-bargaining purposes and
those that are made to achieve political ends.”  Id., at ___
(slip  op.,  at  18).  Likewise,  “Abood  does  not  seem  to  have
anticipated  the  magnitude  of  the  practical  administrative
problems  that  would  result  in  attempting  to  classify
public-sector  union  expenditures  as  either  ‘chargeable’ . . . or
nonchargeable.”  Ibid.  Nor did Abood “foresee the practi
cal problems that would face objecting nonmembers.”  Id.,
at ___ (slip op., at 19).

In  sum,  as  detailed  in  Harris,  Abood  was  not  well

reasoned.25

B
Another  relevant  consideration  in  the  stare  decisis
calculus  is  the  workability  of  the  precedent  in  question,
Montejo v.  Louisiana,  556 U. S. 778, 792 (2009), and that
factor also weighs against Abood.

1
Abood’s  line  between  chargeable  and  nonchargeable
union  expenditures  has  proved  to  be  impossible  to  draw
with precision.  We tried to give the line some definition in
Lehnert.    There,  a  majority  of  the  Court  adopted  a  three-
part  test  requiring  that  chargeable  expenses  (1)  be  “ ‘ger
——————

25 Contrary  to  the  dissent’s  claim,  see  post,  at  19,  and  n. 4,  the  fact
that “[t]he rationale of [Abood] does not withstand careful analysis” is a
reason to overrule it, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 577 (2003).
And that is even truer when, as here, the defenders of the precedent do
not  attempt  to  “defend  [its  actual]  reasoning.”    Citizens  United  v.
Federal  Election  Comm’n,  558  U. S.  310,  363  (2010);  id.,  at  382–385
(ROBERTS, C. J., concurring).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees. It discusses the precedent set by Abood and its flaws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK

Opinion of the Court

need for sensitivity to “ ‘the legitimate demands of the ad-
versarial  system.’ ”    Taylor  v.  Illinois,  484  U. S.  400,  413
(1988) (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 241
(1975);  emphasis  deleted).  This  argument  falls  short  as
well.  Even  as  it  has  recognized  and  reaffirmed  the  vital
truth-seeking function of a trial, the Court has not allowed
such considerations to override the rights the Constitution
confers upon criminal defendants.

The State cites a series of cases in which this Court per-
mitted a State to impeach a defendant using evidence that
would normally be barred from use at trial.  Brief for Re-
spondent 32 (citing Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U. S. 586 (2009);
Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United
States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954)).  None of those cases, however,
involved  exceptions  to  constitutional  requirements.    Ra-
ther,  in  each  case,  the  Court  considered  the  appropriate
scope of a prophylactic rule designed to remedy “a violation
that ha[d] already occurred.”  Ventris, 556 U. S., at 593.  For
example, the Court distinguished violations of the Fourth
Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches or
seizures from the prophylactic rule designed to deter viola-
tions  of  that  guarantee  by  excluding  the  fruits  of  such
searches or seizures from trial.  Id., at 590–591.  Because
the prophylactic exclusionary rule is a “deterrent sanction”
rather than a “substantive guarantee,” the Court applied a
balancing test to allow States to impeach defendants with
the  fruits  of  prior  Fourth  Amendment  violations,  even
though the rule barred the admission of such fruits in the
State’s case-in-chief.  Id., at 591 (citing Walder, 347 U. S.,
at 65).

In contrast, the Court has not held that defendants can
“open the door” to violations of constitutional requirements
merely by making evidence relevant to contradict their de-
fense.  Thus, in New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450, 458–
459 (1979), the Court rejected a State’s effort to impeach a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to a case called "Hemphill v. New York."  The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

THOMAS, J., dissenting

view  B. L.’s  speech.    She  viewed  a  copy  of  that  speech  (a
screenshot)  created  by  another  student.  Ante,  at  2.  But,
the majority mentions none of this.  It simply, and uncriti-
cally, assumes that B. L.’s speech was off campus.  Because
it  creates  a  test  untethered  from  history,  it  bypasses  this
relevant inquiry.

*

*

*
The Court  transparently takes a common-law approach
to today’s decision.  In effect, it states just one rule: Schools
can regulate speech less often when that speech occurs off
campus.  It  then  identifies  this  case  as  an  “example”  and
“leav[es]  for  future  cases”  the  job  of  developing  this  new
common-law doctrine.  Ante, at 7–8.  But the Court’s foun-
dation is untethered from anything stable, and courts (and
schools) will almost certainly be at a loss as to what exactly
the Court’s opinion today means.

Perhaps there are good constitutional reasons to depart
from the historical rule, and perhaps this Court and lower
courts will identify and explain these reasons in the future.
But because the Court does not do so today, and because it
reaches the wrong result under the appropriate historical
test, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing as part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

decisions interpreting these provisions between the found-
ing  and  the  ratification  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment
almost uniformly construed the word “liberty” to refer only
to freedom from physical restraint.  See Warren, The New
“Liberty”  Under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  39  Harv.
L. Rev. 431, 441–445 (1926).  Even one case that has been
identified as a possible exception to that view merely used
broad  language  about  liberty  in  the  context  of  a  habeas
corpus  proceeding—a  proceeding  classically  associated
with obtaining freedom from physical restraint.  Cf. id., at
444–445.

In enacting the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
the Framers similarly chose to employ the “life, liberty, or
property”  formulation,  though  they  otherwise  deviated
substantially  from  the  States’  use  of  Magna  Carta’s  lan-
guage in the Clause.  See Shattuck, The True Meaning of
the  Term  “Liberty”  in  Those  Clauses  in  the  Federal  and
State  Constitutions  Which  Protect  “Life,  Liberty,  and
Property,” 4 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 382 (1890).  When read in
light  of  the  history  of  that  formulation,  it  is  hard  to  see
how  the  “liberty”  protected  by  the  Clause  could  be  inter-
preted  to  include  anything  broader  than  freedom  from
physical  restraint.  That  was  the  consistent  usage  of  the
time when “liberty” was paired with “life” and “property.”
See id., at 375.  And that usage avoids rendering superflu-
ous those protections for “life” and “property.”

If  the  Fifth  Amendment  uses  “liberty”  in  this  narrow
sense,  then  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  likely  does  as
well.  See  Hurtado  v.  California,  110  U. S.  516,  534–535
(1884).
Indeed,  this  Court  has  previously  commented,
“The  conclusion  is  . . .  irresistible,  that  when  the  same
phrase  was  employed  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  [as
was  used  in  the  Fifth  Amendment],  it  was  used  in  the
same  sense  and  with  no  greater  extent.”    Ibid.  And  this

——————

N. H. Const., pt. I, Art. XV (1784), in 4 id., at 2455.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the historical interpretation of the word "liberty" in the context of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

9

Opinion of the Court

discipline  the  victim.  E.g.,  646  F. 3d,  at  470;  Noviello  v.
Boston, 398 F. 3d 76, 96 (CA1 2005); Weyers v. Lear Opera-
tions  Corp.,  359  F. 3d  1049,  1057  (CA8  2004).    Other
courts  have  substantially  followed  the  more  open-ended
approach  advocated  by  the  EEOC’s  Enforcement  Guid
ance, which ties supervisor status to the ability to exercise
significant  direction  over  another’s  daily  work.    See,  e.g.,
Mack  v.  Otis  Elevator  Co.,  326  F. 3d  116,  126–127  (CA2
2003); Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F. 3d 231, 245–247 (CA4
2010); EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer
Liability for Unlawful  Harassment by Supervisors (1999),
1999 WL 33305874, *3 (hereinafter EEOC Guidance).

We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.  567 U. S.

___ (2012).

III
We  hold  that  an  employer  may  be  vicariously  liable  for
an  employee’s  unlawful  harassment  only  when  the  em
ployer  has  empowered  that  employee  to  take  tangible
employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a “sig
nificant  change  in  employment  status,  such  as  hiring,
firing,  failing  to  promote,  reassignment  with  significantly
different  responsibilities,  or  a  decision  causing  a  signifi
cant change in benefits.”  Ellerth, supra, at 761.  We reject
the nebulous definition of a “supervisor” advocated in the
EEOC  Guidance4  and  substantially  adopted  by  several
courts  of  appeals.  Petitioner’s  reliance  on  colloquial  uses

——————

4 The  United  States  urges  us  to  defer  to  the  EEOC  Guidance.    Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 26–29 (citing Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)).  But to do so would be proper only if the
EEOC Guidance has the power to persuade, which “depend[s] upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
[and]  its  consistency  with  earlier  and  later  pronouncements.”    Id.,  at
140.  For the reasons explained below, we do not find the EEOC Guid
ance persuasive.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal concept of vicarious liability for workplace harassment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

Syllabus

first adopted a geographical interpretation.  But the law has not been
settled  for  so  long  in  Wiley’s  favor.    The  Second  Circuit  in  this  case
was  the  first  Court  of  Appeals  to  adopt  a  purely  geographical  inter-
pretation.  Reliance on the “first sale” doctrine is also deeply embed-
ded in the practices of booksellers, libraries, museums, and retailers,
who  have  long  relied  on  its  protection.    And  the  fact  that  harm  has
proved  limited  so  far  may  simply  reflect  the  reluctance  of  copyright
holders to assert geographically based resale rights.  Thus, the prac-
tical  problems  described  by  petitioner  and  his  amici  are  too  serious,
extensive, and likely to come about to be dismissed as insignificant—
particularly  in  light  of  the  ever-growing  importance  of  foreign  trade
to America.  Pp. 19–24.

(c) Several  additional  arguments  that  Wiley  and  the  dissent  make
in support of a geographical interpretation are unpersuasive.  Pp. 24–
33.

654 F. 3d 210, reversed and remanded.

BREYER,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  KAGAN,
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.  GINSBURG, J.,
filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  KENNEDY, J.,  joined,  and  in  which
SCALIA, J., joined except as to Parts III and V–B–1.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and outcome of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

33

Opinion of the Court

the  1980  decision  City  of  Mobile,  a  case  about  districting.
And—as  the  dissent itself  acknowledges—“Congress  drew
§2(b)’s current operative language” from the 1973 decision
White v. Regester, post, at 4, n. 3 (opinion of THOMAS, J.), a
case that was also about districting (in fact, a case that in-
validated two multimember districts in Texas and ordered
them  redrawn  into  single-member  districts,  412  U. S.,  at
765).  This was not lost on anyone when §2 was amended.
Indeed, it was the precise reason that the contentious de-
bates over proportionality raged—debates that would have
made little sense if §2 covered only poll taxes and the like,
as the dissent contends.
  We also reject Alabama’s argument that §2 as applied to
redistricting
is  unconstitutional  under  the  Fifteenth
Amendment.  According to Alabama, that Amendment per-
mits Congress to legislate against only purposeful discrim-
ination by States.  See Brief for Alabama 73.  But we held
over 40 years ago “that, even if §1 of the [Fifteenth] Amend-
ment prohibits only purposeful discrimination, the prior de-
cisions of this Court foreclose any argument that Congress
may not, pursuant to §2 [of the Fifteenth Amendment] out-
law voting practices that are discriminatory in effect.”  City
of  Rome  v.  United  States,  446  U. S.  156,  173  (1980).    The
VRA’s “ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in
effect,”  we  emphasized,  “is  an  appropriate  method  of  pro-
moting the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment.”  Id., at
177.  As City of Rome recognized, we had reached the very
same  conclusion  in  South  Carolina  v.  Katzenbach,  a  deci-
sion issued right after the VRA was first enacted.  383 U. S.,
at  308–309,  329–337;  see  also  Brnovich,  594  U. S.,  at  ___
(slip op., at 3).
  Alabama  further  argues  that,  even  if  the  Fifteenth
Amendment authorizes the effects test of §2, that Amend-
ment does not authorize race-based redistricting as a rem-
edy  for  §2  violations.    But  for  the  last  four  decades,  this
Court and the lower federal courts have repeatedly applied
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Voting Rights Act and its application to redistricting. It cites previous Supreme Court cases and legal arguments, indicating it's part of the main body of the opinion and not a preliminary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.

Opinion of the Court

the  United  States  expressed  the  view  that  the  phrase
“may  require  only”  in  §1973gg–7(b)(1)  means  that  the
EAC  “shall  require  information  that’s  necessary,  but  may
only  require  that  information.”  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  52  (em-
phasis added); see also Brief for ITCA Respondents 46; Tr.
of  Oral  Arg.  37–39  (ITCA  Respondents’  counsel).    That  is
to  say,  §1973gg–7(b)(1)  acts  as  both  a  ceiling  and  a  floor
with respect to the contents of the Federal Form.  We need
not consider the Government’s contention that despite the
statute’s  statement  that  the  EAC  “may”  require  on  the
Federal Form information “necessary to enable the appro-
priate State election official to assess the eligibility of the
applicant,”  other  provisions  of  the  Act  indicate  that  such
action  is  statutorily  required.    That  is  because  we  think
that—by  analogy  to  the  rule  of  statutory  interpretation
that  avoids  questionable  constitutionality—validly  con-
ferred  discretionary  executive  authority  is  properly  exer-
cised  (as  the  Government  has  proposed)  to  avoid  serious
constitutional doubt.  That is to say, it is surely permissi-
ble  if  not  requisite  for  the  Government  to  say  that  neces-
sary information which may be required will be required.
Since, pursuant to the Government’s concession, a State
may  request  that  the  EAC  alter  the  Federal  Form  to  in-
clude information the State deems necessary to determine
eligibility, see §1973gg–7(a)(2); Tr. of Oral Arg. 55 (United
States),  and  may  challenge  the  EAC’s  rejection  of  that
request in a suit under the Administrative Procedure Act,
see  5  U. S.  C.  §701–706,  no  constitutional  doubt  is  raised
by  giving  the  “accept  and  use”  provision  of  the  NVRA  its
fairest  reading.  That  alternative  means  of  enforcing  its
constitutional  power  to  determine  voting  qualifications
remains  open  to  Arizona  here.    In  2005,  the  EAC  divided
2-to-2 on the request by Arizona to include the evidence-of-
citizenship  requirement  among  the  state-specific  instruc-
tions on the Federal Form, App. 225, which meant that no
action could be taken, see 42 U. S. C. §15328 (“Any action
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the interpretation of a statute (likely related to voting rights). It contains legal jargon and references to court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:26] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1041

529 U. S.

March 27, 2000

No. 99–7952. King v. Bell, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 479.

No. 99–7959. Anderson v. McClellan, Superintendent,
Southport Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 172 F. 3d 37.

No. 99–7960. Stevens v. Texas (two judgments). Ct. Crim.

App. Tex. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7964. Palaganas-Suarez v. Greene, District Di-
rector, Immigration and Naturalization Service, et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d
1135.

No. 99–7971. Palomino v. Stewart, Director, Arizona De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–7977. Gollehon v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 296 Mont. 6, 986 P. 2d 395.

No. 99–7978. Espinoza Rodriguez v. Johnson, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di-
vision. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7988.
tiorari denied.

Jones v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

No. 99–8020. King v. Walter, Superintendent, Airway
Heights Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 647.

No. 99–8021. Marcum v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 636.

No. 99–8040. Lattany v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8057. Crayon v. Roe, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8070. Steele v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and dates. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–783.  Argued November 30, 2020—Decided June 3, 2021

Former Georgia police sergeant Nathan Van Buren used his patrol-car
computer to access a law enforcement database to retrieve information
about a particular license plate number in exchange for money.  Alt-
hough  Van  Buren  used  his  own,  valid  credentials  to  perform  the
search, his conduct violated a department policy against obtaining da-
tabase information for non-law-enforcement purposes.  Unbeknownst
to Van Buren, his actions were part of a Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion sting operation.  Van Buren was charged with a felony violation
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), which subjects
to  criminal  liability  anyone  who  “intentionally  accesses  a  computer
without  authorization  or  exceeds  authorized  access.”    18  U. S. C.
§1030(a)(2).  The term “exceeds authorized access” is defined to mean
“to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to ob-
tain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not enti-
tled so to obtain or alter.”  §1030(e)(6).  A jury convicted Van Buren,
and the District Court sentenced him to 18 months in prison.  Van Bu-
ren  appealed  to  the  Eleventh  Circuit,  arguing  that  the  “exceeds  au-
thorized access” clause applies only to those who obtain information to
which their computer access does not extend, not to those who misuse
access  that  they  otherwise  have.    Consistent  with  Eleventh  Circuit
precedent, the panel held that Van Buren had violated the CFAA.

Held: An individual “exceeds authorized access” when he accesses a com-
puter with authorization but then obtains information located in par-
ticular  areas  of  the  computer—such  as  files,  folders,  or  databases—
that are off-limits to him. Pp. 5–20.

(a) (1) The parties agree that Van Buren “access[ed] a computer with
authorization” and “obtain[ed] . . . information in the computer.”  They
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
6

UNICOLORS, INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Moreover, as the Court recognizes, the other knowledge re-
quirements in the Copyright Act are satisfied by either kind
of knowledge.  See ante, at 6.  The Court points to no other
Copyright  Act  provision  that  is  satisfied  by  actual
knowledge alone.  That the Court reads §411(b)(1)(A) to be
the lone exception is dubious.  That the Court does so with-
out permitting any other court in the country to first con-
sider the question is unwise.

*

  *

  *
  I  would  dismiss  the  writ  of  certiorari  as  improvidently
granted because Unicolors has abandoned the question pre-
sented  and  instead  proposes  novel  questions  of  copyright
law that no other court addressed before today.  I respect-
fully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SNYDER v. PHELPS

BREYER, J., concurring

of  speech.  But  it  points  out  that  the  speech,  like  an  as-
sault,  seriously  harmed  a  private  individual.    Indeed,  the
state  tort  of  “intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress”
forbids only conduct that produces distress “so severe that
no  reasonable  man  could  be  expected  to  endure  it,”  and
which itself is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme
in  degree,  as  to  go  beyond  all  possible  bounds  of  decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community.”  Post, at 2–3 (opinion of ALITO, J.)
(quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 567, 571, 380 A. 2d
611,  614,  616  (1977);  internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
The dissent requires us to ask whether our holding unrea-
sonably  limits  liability  for  intentional  infliction  of  emo-
tional  distress—to  the  point  where  A  (in  order  to  draw
attention to his views on a public matter) might launch a
verbal assault upon B, a private person, publicly revealing
the most intimate details of B’s private life, while knowing
that  the  revelation  will  cause  B  severe  emotional  harm.
Does our decision leave the State powerless to protect the
individual against invasions of, e.g., personal privacy, even
in the most horrendous of such circumstances?

As I understand the Court’s opinion, it does not hold or
imply that the State is always powerless to provide private
individuals  with  necessary  protection.    Rather,  the  Court
has  reviewed  the  underlying  facts  in  detail, as  will  some-
times prove necessary where First Amendment values and
state-protected  (say,  privacy-related)  interests  seriously
conflict.  Cf.  Florida  Star  v.  B. J. F.,  491  U. S.  524,  533
(1989);  Bose  Corp.  v.  Consumers  Union  of  United  States,
Inc.,  466  U. S.  485,  499  (1984).    That  review  makes  clear
that  Westboro’s  means  of  communicating  its  views  con-
sisted  of  picketing  in  a  place  where  picketing  was  lawful
and in compliance with all police directions.  The picketing
could  not  be  seen  or  heard  from  the  funeral  ceremony
itself.  And Snyder testified that he saw no more than the
tops of the picketers’ signs as he drove to the funeral.  To
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Snyder v. Phelps. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding free speech and its potential harm to individuals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

903

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5418.  Berryman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  216.

No.  09–5420.  Concepcion  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5422.  Scott  v.  Parker,  Warden.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  758.

No.  09–5423.  Wiggins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  648.

No.  09–5424.  Oldbear  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  814.

No.  09–5425.  Vazquez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  923.

No.  09–5427.  Butler  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  780.

No.  09–5428.  Baker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  213.

No. 09–5431.  Belcher v.  Younger.  App. Ct. Conn.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  112  Conn.  App.  901,  963  A.  2d  114.
No. 09–5432.  Anuforo v.  Georgia.  Ct. App. Ga.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  293  Ga.  App.  1,  666  S.  E.  2d  50.

No. 09–5433.  Brito v. United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–5435.  Stone v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  855.

No.  09–5438.  Griffin  v.  Sebuliba.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5439.  Cornes  v.  Illinois.  Sup.  Ct.  Ill.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–5440.  Davis  v.  Lafler,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  441.

No.  09–5441.  Hill  v.  Hillier  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  614.
  </content>
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This appears to be a list of court case orders, including case numbers, citations, and disposition. It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6  PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V.

BREYER, J., dissenting

combination of “booking” and “.com” does not serve to “iden-
tify a particular characteristic or quality of some thing; it
connotes the basic nature of that thing”—the hallmark of a
generic term.  Blinded Veterans Assn. v. Blinded Am. Vet-
erans Foundation, 872 F. 2d 1035, 1039 (CADC 1989) (Gins-
burg, J. for the court) (emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted).

When  a  website  uses  an  inherently  distinctive  second-
level  domain,  it  is  obvious  that  adding  “.com”  merely  de-
notes a website associated with that term.  Any reasonably
well-informed  consumer  would  understand  that  “post-
it.com” is the website associated with Post-its.  See Minne-
sota Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005
(Minn. 1998).  Likewise, “plannedparenthood.com” is obvi-
ously just the website of Planned Parenthood.  See Planned
Parenthood  Federation  of  Am.,  Inc.  v.  Bucci,  1997  WL
133313, *8 (SDNY, Mar. 24, 1997).  Recognizing this feature
of domain names, courts generally ignore the top-level do-
main  when  analyzing  likelihood  of  confusion.
See
Brookfield  Communications, Inc.  v. West Coast Entertain-
ment Corp., 174 F. 3d 1036, 1055 (CA9 1999).

Generic  second-level  domains  are  no  different.  The
meaning conveyed by “Booking.com” is no more and no less
than a website associated with its generic second-level do-
main, “booking.”  This will ordinarily be true of any generic
term plus “.com” combination.  The term as a whole is just
as  generic  as  its  constituent  parts.    See  1  McCarthy
§7:17.50; 2 id., §12:39.50.

There may be exceptions to this rule in rare cases where
the top-level domain interacts with the generic second-level
domain in such a way as to produce meaning distinct from
that of the terms taken individually.  See ante, at 8, n. 4.
Likewise, the principles discussed above may apply differ-
ently to the newly expanded universe of top-level domains,
such as “.guru,” “.club,” or “.vip,” which may “conve[y] infor-
mation  concerning  a  feature,  quality,  or  characteristic”  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the legal concept of trademarks and domain names, analyzing the case of PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,

HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ

STEVENS, J., concurring

the  rules,  the  RSO  sponsor  need  not  admit  that  group  at
the  cost  of  undermining  the  program  and  the  values  re-
flected therein.  On many levels, a university administra-
tor has a “greater interest in the content of student activi-
ties  than  the  police  chief  has  in  the  content  of  a  soapbox
oration.”  Widmar  v.  Vincent,  454  U. S.  263,  280  (1981)
(STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).

In  this  case,  petitioner  excludes  students  who  will  not
sign its Statement of Faith or who engage in “unrepentant
homosexual  conduct,”  App.  226.    The  expressive  associa-
tion  argument  it  presses,  however,  is  hardly  limited  to
these  facts.  Other  groups  may  exclude  or  mistreat  Jews,
blacks,  and  women—or  those  who  do  not share  their  con-
tempt  for  Jews,  blacks,  and  women.  A  free  society  must
tolerate  such  groups.    It  need  not  subsidize  them,  give
them its official imprimatur, or grant them equal access to
law school facilities.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a portion of one, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Stevens. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding expressive association and the rights of student groups.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

 ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
ALITO,  GORSUCH,  KAVANAUGH,  and  JACKSON,  JJ.,  joined.    JACKSON,  J.,
filed  a  concurring  opinion.  BARRETT,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in
which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case syllabus, which typically provides a summary of the case and the court's decision.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

GE ENERGY POWER CONVERSION FRANCE SAS
v. OUTOKUMPU STAINLESS USA, LLC
Opinion of the Court

[Chapter 1] is not in conflict with this chapter or the Con-
vention.”  §208.

III
We must determine whether the equitable estoppel doc-
trines permitted under Chapter 1 of the FAA, see supra, at
3–4, “conflict with . . . the Convention.”  §208.  Applying fa-
miliar tools of treaty interpretation, we conclude that they
do not conflict.

A
“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of
a statute, begins with its text.”  Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S.
491, 506 (2008).  The text of the New York Convention does
not  address  whether  nonsignatories  may  enforce  arbitra-
tion agreements under domestic doctrines such as equitable
estoppel.  The  Convention  is  simply  silent  on the  issue  of
nonsignatory  enforcement,  and  in  general,  “a  matter  not
covered is to be treated as not covered”—a principle “so ob-
vious that it seems absurd to recite it,” A. Scalia & B. Gar-
ner,  Reading  Law:  The  Interpretation  of  Legal  Texts  93
(2012).

This  silence  is  dispositive  here  because  nothing  in  the
text of the Convention could be read to otherwise prohibit
the  application  of  domestic  equitable  estoppel  doctrines.
Only  one  Article  of  the  Convention  addresses  arbitration
agreements—Article II—and only one provision of Article II
addresses  the  enforcement  of  those  agreements—Article
II(3).  The text of Article II(3) states that courts of a con-
tracting  state  “shall  . . .  refer  the  parties  to  arbitration”
when the parties to an action entered into a written agree-
ment to arbitrate and one of the parties requests referral to
arbitration.  The provision, however, does not restrict con-
tracting states from applying domestic law to refer parties
to arbitration in other circumstances.  That is, Article II(3)
provides  that  arbitration  agreements  must  be  enforced  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of equitable estoppel doctrines in arbitration agreements under the New York Convention.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Opinion of the Court

the Tribe’s land.  Ibid.  Taylor emphasized that the Tribe
would  have  “the  right  to  hunt  upon”  the  land  it  ceded  to
the Federal Government “as long as the game lasts.”  Ibid.
At  the  convening,  Tribe  leaders  stressed  the  vital  im-
portance of preserving their hunting traditions.  See id., at
88 (Black Foot: “You speak of putting us on a reservation
and teaching us to farm. . . . That talk does not please us.
We  want  horses  to  run  after  the  game,  and  guns  and
ammunition  to  kill  it.    I  would  like  to  live  just  as  I  have
been raised”); id., at 89 (Wolf Bow: “You want me to go on
a  reservation  and  farm.    I  do  not  want  to  do  that.    I  was
not  raised  so”).  Although  Taylor  responded  that  “[t]he
game  w[ould]  soon  entirely  disappear,”  he  also  reassured
tribal  leaders  that  they  would  “still  be  free  to  hunt”  as
they did at the time even after the reservation was created.
Id., at 90.

The  following  spring,  the  Crow  Tribe  and  the  United
States  entered  into  the  treaty  at  issue  in  this  case:  the
1868 Treaty.  15 Stat. 649.  Pursuant to the 1868 Treaty,
the Crow Tribe ceded over 30 million acres of territory  to
the  United  States.    See  Montana,  450  U. S.,  at  547–548;
Art. II,  15  Stat.  650.  The  Tribe  promised  to  make  its
“permanent  home”  a  reservation  of  about  8  million  acres
in  what  is  now  Montana  and  to  make  “no  permanent
settlement elsewhere.”  Art. IV, 15 Stat. 650.  In exchange,
the  United  States  made  certain  promises  to  the  Tribe,
such as agreeing to construct buildings on the reservation,
to provide the Tribe members with seeds and implements
for  farming,  and  to  furnish  the  Tribe  with  clothing  and
other  goods.  1868  Treaty,  Arts. III–XII,  id.,  at  650–652.
Article IV of the 1868 Treaty memorialized Commissioner
Taylor’s  pledge  to  preserve  the  Tribe’s  right  to  hunt  off-
reservation, stating:

“The  Indians  . . .  shall  have  the  right  to  hunt  on  the
unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses a treaty between the United States and the Crow Tribe, focusing on the Tribe's hunting rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part

Laws of England 69 (1765).  The Framers of our Constitu-
tion understood that the doctrine of stare decisis is part of
the “judicial Power” and rooted in Article III of the Consti-
tution.  Writing in Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton em-
phasized the importance of stare decisis: To “avoid an arbi-
trary  discretion  in  the  courts,  it  is  indispensable”  that
federal  judges  “should  be  bound  down  by  strict  rules  and
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty
in every particular case that comes before them.”  The Fed-
eralist No. 78, p. 529 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).  In the words of
THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE,  stare  decisis’  “greatest  purpose  is  to
serve  a  constitutional  ideal—the  rule  of  law.”  Citizens
United  v.  Federal  Election  Comm’n,  558  U. S.  310,  378
(2010) (concurring opinion).

This  Court  has  repeatedly  explained  that  stare  decisis
“promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent de-
velopment of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial de-
cisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integ-
rity of the judicial process.”  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S.
808, 827 (1991).  The doctrine “permits society to presume
that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than
in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to
the  integrity  of  our  constitutional  system  of  government,
both  in  appearance  and  in  fact.”  Vasquez  v.  Hillery,  474
U. S. 254, 265–266 (1986).

The doctrine of stare decisis does not mean, of course, that
the Court should never overrule erroneous precedents.  All
Justices now on this Court agree that it is sometimes ap-
propriate for the Court to overrule erroneous decisions.  In-
deed, in just the last few Terms, every current Member of
this  Court  has  voted  to  overrule  multiple  constitutional
precedents.  See, e.g., Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S.
___ (2019); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. ___
(2019); Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees,
585 U. S. ___ (2018); Hurst v. Florida, 577 U. S. ___ (2016);
Obergefell  v.  Hodges,  576  U. S.  644  (2015);  Johnson  v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the doctrine of stare decisis and its importance in the legal system.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–877
_________________

FREDERICK L. ALLEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ROY
A. COOPER, III, GOVERNOR OF NORTH
CAROLINA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[March 23, 2020]

 JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In  two  basically  identical  statutes  passed  in  the  early
1990s, Congress sought to strip the States of their sovereign
immunity  from  patent  and  copyright  infringement  suits.
Not long after, this Court held in Florida Prepaid Postsec-
ondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S.
627 (1999), that the patent statute lacked a valid constitu-
tional basis.  Today, we take up the copyright statute.  We
find that our decision in Florida Prepaid compels the same
conclusion.

I

In  1717,  the  pirate  Edward  Teach,  better  known  as
Blackbeard, captured a French slave ship in the West In-
dies  and  renamed  her  Queen  Anne’s  Revenge.  The  vessel
became  his  flagship.    Carrying  some  40  cannons  and  300
men, the Revenge took many prizes as she sailed around the
Caribbean and up the North American coast.  But her reign
over  those  seas  was  short-lived.    In  1718,  the  ship  ran
aground on a sandbar a mile off Beaufort, North Carolina.
Blackbeard  and  most  of  his  crew  escaped  without  harm.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

dominant,  ruling  class  of  citizens”  in  the  eyes  of  the  law.
Id., at 559.  In that context, Justice Harlan thus announced
his view that “[o]ur constitution is color-blind.”  Ibid.

It was not until half a century later, in Brown, that the
Court honored the guarantee of equality in the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and Justice Harlan’s vision of a Constitution
that “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”
Ibid.  Considering the “effect[s] of segregation” and the role
of education “in the light of its full development and its pre-
sent place in American life throughout the Nation,” Brown
overruled Plessy.  347 U. S., at 492–495.  The Brown Court
held  that  “[s]eparate  educational  facilities  are  inherently
unequal,” and that such racial segregation deprives Black
students “of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id., at 494–495.  The Court
thus ordered segregated schools to transition to a racially
integrated  system  of  public  education  “with  all  deliberate
speed,”  “ordering  the  immediate  admission  of  [Black  chil-
dren]  to  schools  previously  attended  only  by  white  chil-
dren.”  Brown  v.  Board  of  Education,  349  U. S.  294,  301
(1955).

Brown was a race-conscious decision that emphasized the
importance  of  education  in  our  society.  Central  to  the
Court’s holding was the recognition that, as Justice Harlan
emphasized in Plessy, segregation perpetuates a caste sys-
tem wherein Black children receive inferior educational op-
portunities “solely because of their race,” denoting “inferi-
ority as to their status in the community.”  347 U. S., at 494,
and n. 10.  Moreover, because education is “the very foun-
dation of good citizenship,” segregation in public education
harms “our democratic society” more broadly as well.  Id.,
at 493.  In light of the harmful effects of entrenched racial
subordination  on  racial  minorities  and  American  democ-
racy, Brown recognized the constitutional necessity of a ra-
cially  integrated  system  of  schools  where  education  is
“available to all on equal terms.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It cites previous cases (Plessy and Brown v. Board of Education) and discusses legal arguments related to racial segregation in education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

916

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 8, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–1631. Windham v. City of Lowell et al. C. A. 8th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 924.

No. 97–1634. Evans v. Nevada Department of Motor Ve-
hicles and Public Safety. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 114 Nev. 41, 952 P. 2d 958.

No. 97–1651. Brown v. Ford Motor Co. Ct. App. La., 1st

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 700 So. 2d 932.

No. 97–1661. Teamsters Brewery & Soft Drink Workers
Local Union 896, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, AFL(cid:150)CIO v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 127.

No. 97–1667. Powell et al. v. Florida et al. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 677.

No. 97–1681. Lyon Metal Products, Inc. v. California
Board of Equalization. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 58 Cal. App. 4th 906, 68 Cal. Rptr.
2d 285.

No. 97–1682. Davis v. Baptist Memorial Hospital System,
dba Baptist Medical Center Hospital. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 137.

No. 97–1746.

Irby v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 291 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 716 N. E.
2d 877.

No. 97–1752. Missourians for Tax Justice Education
Project, Inc., et al. v. Holden, Missouri State Treasurer,
et al. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 959
S. W. 2d 100.

No. 97–1769. Pecaro v. New Jersey Council on Afford-
able Housing. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 135 F. 3d 765.

No. 97–1794.

Jeppsen v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 128
F. 3d 1410.

No. 97–1809. DiMartini v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1181.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and reporting information. This type of content is generally not suitable for indexing as it's a structured list rather than narrative text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

975

524 U. S.

August 27, 1998

No. D–1974.

In re Disbarment of Brauer. David P.
Brauer, of Dover, Mass., having requested to resign as a member
of the Bar of this Court, it is ordered that his name be stricken
from the roll of attorneys admitted to the practice of law before
this Court. The rule to show cause, issued on July 28, 1998 [ante,
p. 966], is discharged.

No. D–1988.

In re Disbarment of Price. Walter J. Price,
Jr., of Huntsville, Ala., is suspended from the practice of law in
this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re-
quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.

No. 97–475. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan
Tseng. C. A. 2d Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 523 U. S. 1117.] Mo-
tions of Air Transport Association of America and International
Air Transport Association for leave to ﬁle briefs as amici cu-
riae granted.

No. 97–930. Buckley, Secretary of State of Colorado v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., et al.
C. A. 10th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 522 U. S. 1107.] Motion of
American Civil Liberties Union et al. for leave to ﬁle a brief as
amici curiae granted. Motion of Kerry S. Hada, Esq., to permit
Paul Grant, Esq., to present oral argument pro hac vice denied.
Motion of respondents for divided argument denied. Motion of
respondent Bill Orr for leave to ﬁle a supplemental brief granted.
No. 97–1121. City of Chicago v. Morales et al. Sup. Ct.
[Certiorari granted, 523 U. S. 1071.] Motion of Ohio et al.
Ill.
for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for
divided argument denied.

No. 97–1130. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. C. A. Fed.
[Certiorari granted, 523 U. S. 1003.] Motion of the Solicitor
Cir.
General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus cu-
riae and for divided argument granted.

No. 97–1147. Minnesota v. Carter; and Minnesota v.
Johns. Sup. Ct. Minn.
[Certiorari granted, 523 U. S. 1003.]
Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral
argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 97–1418. Bank of America National Trust and Sav-
ings Assn. v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership. C. A.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a list of court orders. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and the actions taken by the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
GORSUCH, J., concurring

how much a recipient of federal funds discriminates.  It does
not scrutinize a recipient’s reasons or motives for discrimi-
nating.  Instead, the law prohibits covered institutions from
intentionally treating any individual worse even in part be-
cause  of  race.  So  yes,  of  course, the  universities  consider
many non-racial factors in their admissions processes too.
And perhaps they mean well when they favor certain can-
didates  over  others  based  on  the  color  of  their  skin.    But
even if all that is true, their conduct violates Title VI just
the same.  See Part I–A, supra; see also Bostock, 590 U. S.,
at ___, ___–___ (slip op., at 6, 12–15).

D
The principal dissent contends that this understanding of
Title VI is contrary to precedent.  Post, at 26–27, n. 21 (opin-
ion  of  SOTOMAYOR, J.).    But  the  dissent  does  not  dispute
that  everything  said  here  about  the  meaning  of  Title  VI
tracks this Court’s precedent in Bostock interpreting mate-
rially identical language in Title VII.  That raises two ques-
tions:  Do the dissenters think Bostock wrongly decided?  Or
do they read the same words in neighboring provisions of
the  same  statute—enacted  at  the  same  time  by  the  same
Congress—to mean different things?  Apparently, the fed-
eral government takes the latter view.  The Solicitor Gen-
eral insists that there is “ambiguity in the term ‘discrimi-
nation’ ”  in  Title  VI  but  no  ambiguity  in  the  term
“discriminate” in Title VII.  Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 21–707,
at 164.  Respectfully, I do not see it.  The words of the Civil
Rights  Act  of  1964  are  not  like  mood  rings;  they  do  not
change their message from one moment to the next.

Rather than engage with the statutory text or our prece-
dent in Bostock, the principal dissent seeks to sow confusion
about  the  facts.    It  insists  that  all  applicants  to  Harvard
and UNC are “eligible” to receive a race-based tip.  Post, at
32,  n. 27  (opinion  of  SOTOMAYOR,  J.);  cf.  post,  at  17
(JACKSON, J., dissenting).  But the question in these cases
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the context of affirmative action in university admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDER ADOPTING REVISED RULES

OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

IT  IS  ORDERED  that  the  revised  Rules  of  this  Court,
approved  by  the  Court  and  lodged  with  the  Clerk,  shall  be
effective  February  16,  2010,  and  be  printed  as  an  appendix
to the United States Reports.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Rules promulgated
October  1,  2007,  see  551  U. S.  1195,  shall  be  rescinded  as  of
February  15,  2010,  and  that  the  revised  Rules  shall  govern
all  proceedings  in  cases  commenced  after  that  date  and,  to
the extent feasible and just, cases then pending.

1162
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal order from the Supreme Court, outlining the adoption of revised rules. It's not the typical narrative content one would expect in a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Order</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

Opinion of the Court

D. Bernstein, A. Ferguson, M. Wittlin, & J. Mnookin, The
New Wigmore: Expert Evidence §5.4.1, p. 271 (3d ed. 2021).
If  believed  true,  that  basis  evidence  will  lead  the  jury  to
credit the opinion; if believed false, it will do the opposite.
See Williams, 567 U. S., at 106, and n. 1 (THOMAS, J., con-
curring in judgment); id., at 126–127 (KAGAN, J., dissent-
ing).  But  that  very  fact  is  what  raises  the  Confrontation
Clause problem.  For the defendant has no opportunity to
challenge the veracity of the out-of-court assertions that are
doing much of the work.

And if  that explanation seems a bit abstract, then take
this case as its almost-too-perfect illustration.  Recall that
Rast tested eight seized items before she disappeared from
the scene.  At trial, the prosecutor asked the State’s “sub-
stitute expert” Longoni to testify about four of them (with
the rest dropping out of the case).  App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a.
A  recap  of  their  exchange  about  one  item  will  be  enough;
the rest followed the same pattern.  Remember as you read
that Longoni, though familiar with the lab’s general prac-
tices, had no personal knowledge about Rast’s testing of the
seized items.  Rather, as his testimony makes clear, what
he knew on that score came only from reviewing Rast’s rec-
ords.  With that as background:

Q Turn your attention to Item 26.  I’m going to hand
you what’s  been marked as State’s Exhibit 98 [Rast’s
notes]. . . .  Did you review how [Item] 26 was tested in
this case?
A Yes.
Q  When  you  reviewed  it,  did  you  notice  whether  the
[standard lab] policies and practices that you have just
described were followed?
A Yes.
Q Were they followed?
A Yes.
.

 .

 .

 .

 .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the admissibility of expert testimony. It includes citations, legal arguments, and a detailed example from a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL
CONSULTANTS, INC.
Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.

to make political robocalls to cell phones.  Invoking the First
Amendment, they argue that the 2015 government-debt ex-
ception  unconstitutionally  favors  debt-collection  speech
over political and other speech.  As relief from that uncon-
stitutional law, they urge us to invalidate the entire 1991
robocall  restriction,  rather  than  simply  invalidating  the
2015 government-debt exception.

Six Members of the Court today conclude that Congress
has impermissibly favored debt-collection speech over polit-
ical and other speech, in violation of the First Amendment.
See infra, at 6–9; post, at 1–2 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
in judgment); post, at 1, 3 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).  Applying traditional
severability  principles,  seven  Members  of  the  Court  con-
clude that the entire 1991 robocall restriction should not be
invalidated, but rather that the 2015 government-debt ex-
ception must be invalidated and severed from the remain-
der  of  the  statute.  See  infra,  at  10–25;  post,  at  2
(SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment);  post,  at  11–12
(BREYER, J., concurring in judgment with respect to sever-
ability and dissenting in part).  As a result, plaintiffs still
may  not  make  political  robocalls  to  cell  phones,  but  their
speech is now treated equally with debt-collection speech.
The judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit is affirmed.

I
A
In  1991,  Congress  passed  and  President  George  H.  W.
Bush signed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.  The
Act  responded  to  a  torrent  of  vociferous  consumer  com-
plaints about intrusive robocalls.  A growing number of tel-
emarketers were using equipment that could automatically
dial a telephone number and deliver an artificial or prere-
corded voice message.  At the time, more than 300,000 so-
licitors  called  more  than  18  million  Americans  every  day.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the introductory part. It sets the context for the case, outlines the arguments, and summarizes the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

BREYER, J., dissenting

be) unconstitutional if “inflicted in an arbitrary and capri
cious  manner.”  Gregg,  428  U. S.,  at  188  (joint  opinion  of
Stewart,  Powell,  and  Stevens,  JJ.);  see  also  id.,  at  189
(“[W]here  discretion  is  afforded  a  sentencing  body  on  a
matter so grave as the determination of whether a human
life  should  be  taken  or  spared,  that  discretion  must  be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of
wholly  arbitrary  and  capricious  action”);  Godfrey  v.  Geor
gia, 446 U. S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (similar).
The Court has consequently sought to make the applica
tion  of  the  death  penalty  less  arbitrary  by  restricting  its
use to those whom Justice Souter called “ ‘the worst of the
worst.’ ”    Kansas  v.  Marsh,  548  U. S.,  at  206  (dissenting
opinion);  see  also  Roper  v.  Simmons,  543  U. S.  551,  568
(2005)  (“Capital  punishment  must  be  limited  to  those
offenders who commit a narrow category of the most seri
ous crimes and whose extreme culpability makes them the
most  deserving  of  execution”  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted)); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U. S. 407, 420 (2008)
(citing Roper, supra, at 568).
  Despite the Gregg Court’s hope for fair administration of
the death penalty, 40 years of further experience make it
increasingly clear that the death penalty is imposed arbi
trarily,  i.e.,  without  the  “reasonable  consistency”  legally
necessary  to  reconcile  its  use  with  the  Constitution’s
commands.  Eddings  v.  Oklahoma,  455  U. S.  104,  112
(1982).

Thorough  studies  of  death  penalty  sentences  support
this conclusion.  A recent study, for example, examined all
death  penalty  sentences  imposed  between  1973  and  2007
in Connecticut, a State that abolished the death penalty in
2012.  Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecti
cut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful
Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities? 11 J. Empiri
cal  Legal  Studies  637  (2014).    The  study  reviewed  treat
ment of all homicide defendants.  It found 205 instances in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of the death penalty and cites previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ___ (2015)

7

KAGAN, J., dissenting

a  statute  designed  to  close  a  loophole”  is  “illogical  and
disrespectful of . . . congressional purpose”).

As  Congress  recognized  in  using  a  broad  term,  giving
immunity to those who destroy non-documentary evidence
has no sensible basis in penal policy.  A person who hides
a  murder  victim’s  body  is  no  less  culpable  than  one  who
burns  the  victim’s  diary.    A  fisherman,  like  John  Yates,
who  dumps  undersized  fish  to  avoid  a  fine  is  no  less
blameworthy  than  one  who  shreds  his  vessel’s  catch  log
for the same reason.  Congress thus treated both offenders
in  the  same  way.    It  understood,  in  enacting  §1519,  that
destroying evidence is destroying evidence, whether or not
that evidence takes documentary form.

II

A

The  plurality  searches  far  and  wide  for  anything—
anything—to  support  its  interpretation  of  §1519.    But  its
fishing expedition comes up empty.

The  plurality’s  analysis  starts  with  §1519’s  title:  “De-
struction,  alteration,  or  falsification  of  records  in  Federal
investigations  and  bankruptcy.”  See  ante,  at  10;  see  also
ante,  at  3–4  (opinion  of  ALITO,  J.).    That’s  already  a  sign
something is amiss.  I know of no other case in which we
have  begun  our  interpretation  of  a  statute  with  the  title,
or  relied  on  a  title  to  override  the  law’s  clear  terms.    In-
stead,  we  have  followed  “the  wise  rule  that  the  title  of  a
statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain
meaning  of  the  text.”  Trainmen  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio
R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528–529 (1947).

The reason for that “wise rule” is easy to see: A title is,
almost  necessarily,  an  abridgment.    Attempting  to  men-
tion  every  term  in  a  statute  “would  often  be  ungainly  as
well  as  useless”;  accordingly,  “matters  in  the  text  . . .  are
frequently unreflected in the headings.”  Id., at 528.  Just
last  year,  this  Court  observed  that  two  titles  in  a  nearby
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

These  inconsistencies  and  inaccuracies  go  to  the  very
heart  of  Dr.  Evans’  expert  opinion,  as  they  were  the  key
components of his professed belief that one can extrapolate
from what is known about midazolam’s effect at low doses
to  conclude  that  the  drug  would  “paralyz[e]  the  brain”  at
Oklahoma’s  planned  dose.    Id.,  at  314.    All  three  experts
recognized that there had been no scientific testing on the
use of this amount of midazolam in conjunction with these
particular lethal injection drugs.  See ante, at 19; App. 176
(Lubarsky),  243–244  (Sasich),  327  (Evans).    For  this  rea
son,  as  the  Court  correctly  observes,  “extrapolation  was
reasonable.”    Ante,  at  20.  But  simply  because  extrapola
tion  may  be  reasonable  or  even  required  does  not  mean
that  every  conceivable  method  of  extrapolation  can  be
credited,  or  that  all  estimates  stemming  from  purported
extrapolation  are  worthy  of  belief.    Dr.  Evans’  view  was
that because 40 milligrams of midazolam could be used to
induce unconsciousness, App. 294, and because more drug
will  generally  produce  more  effect,  a  significantly  larger
dose of 500 milligrams would not just induce unconscious
ness but allow for its maintenance in the face of extremely
painful stimuli, and ultimately even cause death itself.  In
his words: “[A]s you increase the dose of midazolam, it’s a
linear  effect,  so  you’re  going  to  continue  to  get  an  impact
from  higher  doses  of  the  drug.”    Id.,  at  332.  If,  however,
there is a ceiling with respect to midazolam’s effect on the
brain—as  petitioners’  experts  established  there  is—then
such simplistic logic is not viable.  In this context, more is
not necessarily better, and Dr. Evans was plainly wrong to
presume it would be.

If Dr. Evans had any other basis for the “extrapolation”
that  led  him  to  conclude  500  milligrams  of  midazolam
would  “paralyz[e]  the  brain,”  id.,  at  314,  it  was  even  fur
ther  divorced  from  scientific  evidence  and  logic.    Having
emphasized  that  midazolam  had  been  known  to  cause
approximately  80  deaths,  Dr.  Evans  asserted  that  his
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the scientific evidence and expert opinions surrounding a particular case, likely involving lethal injection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xiv

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
905
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cramer; Armenis v.
956
Cranston School Committee; Jo-Ann G. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Craw v. Horn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950
Crawford & Co. v. Sonnier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971
Crist; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cromartie; Hunt v.
980
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crooms, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,971
903
Crosby v. Shreves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Cross v. Newark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Crosslin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Crow Tribe of Indians; Montana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
983
Cruz v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McDaniel
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CSX Transportation, Inc.; Reynolds v.
945
Cummings; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Cummings v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Cummins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
Cunningham v. Nazario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Curran; Carter v.
963
Cuthbert v. District Court of Appeal of Fla., Fifth Dist.
. . . . . . .
942
Cyars v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
Dallas Independent School Dist.; Marsh v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dalton; Arshal v.
908
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dalton; Darden v.
971
Dameron Hospital Assn.; Mason-Neubarth v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
D’Amico v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910
Daniels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923
Darden, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Darden v. Alameda County Network of Mental Health Clients . .
908
Darden v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
Darling v. Savers Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
Darne v. Juntunen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Davis v. Baptist Medical Center Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Davis v. Baptist Memorial Hospital System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Davis v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
980
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed.
Davis v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,919,928
950
Day; Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Day v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Dayton; Karasek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dayton; Mays v.
926
Dearborn; Yinger v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923
Decker v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

906

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Stevens, J., dissenting

pre-emption of state laws that allegedly frustrate federal
purposes: it has not demonstrated that allowing a common-
law no-airbag claim to go forward would impose an obligation
on manufacturers that directly and irreconcilably contradicts
any primary objective that the Secretary set forth with clar-
ity in Standard 208. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Man-
agement Assn., 505 U. S., at 110 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); id., at 111 (“A freewheel-
ing judicial inquiry into whether [state law] is in tension with
federal objectives would undercut the principle that it is
Congress [and federal agencies,] rather than the courts[,]
that pre-emp[t] state law”). Furthermore, it is important to
note that the text of Standard 208 (which the Court does not
even bother to quote in its opinion), unlike the regulation we
reviewed in Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta,
458 U. S., at 158, does not contain any expression of an intent
to displace state law. Given our repeated emphasis on the
importance of the presumption against pre-emption, see,
e. g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S., at 663–664;
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947),
this silence lends additional support to the conclusion that
the continuation of whatever common-law liability may exist
in a case like this poses no danger of frustrating any of the
Secretary’s primary purposes in promulgating Standard 208.
See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labora-
tories, Inc., 471 U. S., at 721; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U. S., at 251 (“It is difﬁcult to believe that [the Secretary]
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial re-
course for those injured by illegal conduct”).

The Court apparently views the question of pre-emption
in this case as a close one. Ante, at 883 (relying on Secre-
tary’s interpretation of Standard 208’s objectives to bolster
its ﬁnding of pre-emption). Under “ordinary experience-
proved principles of conﬂict pre-emption,” ante, at 874,
therefore, the presumption against pre-emption should con-
Instead, the Court simply ignores the presumption,
trol.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the legal concept of pre-emption and its application to a case involving car safety standards.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1088

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 14, 2009

558 U. S.

rari dismissed.  See this Court’s Rule 39.8.  Justice Sotomayor
took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–6943.  Humphrey  v.  Onondaga  County  Sheriff’s
Department  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for
leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dis
missed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As  petitioner  has  repeat
edly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk  is  directed  not  to
accept  any  further  petitions  in  noncriminal  matters  from  peti
tioner  unless  the docketing  fee  required  by  Rule  38(a) is  paid  and
the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1.  See Mar
tin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506  U. S.  1  (1992)
(per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See  id.,  at  4,  and
cases  cited  therein.

No.  09–7123.  Pannell  v.  Penfold  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Ind.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–7149.  Millen  v.  National  Collegiate  Athletic
Assn.  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed.  See
this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No. 09–7160.  Millen v.  Commercial Appeal.  C. A. 6th Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As
petitioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat
ters  from  petitioner  unless  the  docketing  fee  required  by  Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506
U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See
id.,  at  4,  and  cases  cited  therein.

No.  09–7260.  Reynoso  v.  Rock,  Superintendent,  Great
Meadow  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Motion  of
petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and
certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No. 09–7398.  Swendra v.  Colorado.  Ct. App. Colo.  Motion
of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and
certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case summaries from a legal document, likely the Supreme Court's docket. It contains case numbers, court information, and brief descriptions of the decisions made.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

Syllabus

activities.    See,  e.g.,  Widmar  v.  Vincent,  454  U. S.  263,  269,  n. 6.    A
plaintiff  must  demonstrate  an  infringement  of  his  rights  under  the
Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses.  If the plaintiff carries his or
her burden, the defendant must show that its actions were nonetheless
justified and appropriately tailored.  Pp. 11–30.

(1) Mr. Kennedy discharged his burden under the Free Exercise
Clause.    The  Court’s  precedents  permit  a  plaintiff  to  demonstrate  a
free exercise violation multiple ways, including by showing that a gov-
ernment entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to
a  policy  that  is  not  “neutral”  or  “generally  applicable.”    Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 879–
881.  Failing either the neutrality or general applicability test is suffi-
cient  to  trigger  strict  scrutiny,  under  which  the  government  must
demonstrate its course was justified by a compelling state interest and
was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest.  See, e.g., Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546.
   Here, no one questions that Mr. Kennedy seeks to engage in a sin-
cerely  motivated  religious  exercise  involving  giving  “thanks  through
prayer” briefly “on the playing field” at the conclusion of each game he
coaches.  App. 168, 171.  The contested exercise here does not involve
leading prayers with the team; the District disciplined Mr. Kennedy
only for his decision to persist in praying quietly without his students
after three games in October 2015.  In forbidding Mr. Kennedy’s brief
prayer, the District’s challenged policies were neither neutral nor gen-
erally applicable.  By its own admission, the District sought to restrict
Mr. Kennedy’s actions at least in part because of their religious char-
acter.  Prohibiting a religious practice was thus the District’s unques-
tioned “object.”  The District explained that it could not allow an on-
duty employee to engage in religious conduct even though it allowed
other on-duty employees to engage in personal secular conduct.  The
District’s  performance  evaluation  after  the  2015  football  season  also
advised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the ground that he failed to
supervise student-athletes after games, but any sort of postgame su-
pervisory  requirement  was  not  applied  in  an  evenhanded  way.
Pp. 12–14.    The  District  thus  conceded  that  its  policies  were  neither
neutral nor generally applicable.

(2) Mr.  Kennedy  also  discharged  his  burden  under  the  Free
Speech Clause.  The First Amendment’s protections extend to “teach-
ers and students,” neither of whom “shed their constitutional rights to
freedom  of  speech  or  expression  at  the  schoolhouse  gate.”    Tinker  v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506.
But teachers and coaches are also government employees paid in part
to speak on the government’s behalf and to convey its intended mes-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, outlining the arguments and reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It is not the actual content of a book and is likely not meant to be read for enjoyment or information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

ALITO, J., dissenting

said.  See, e.g., Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks,
430 U. S. 73, 84 (1977) (quoting United States v. Alcea Band
of Tillamooks, 329 U. S. 40, 54 (1946) (plurality opinion)).
But the formulation’s pedigree cannot make up for its vacu-
ity.  The term “plenary” is defined in one dictionary after
another as “absolute.”  See, e.g., New Oxford American Dic-
tionary 1343 (3d ed. 2010); Webster’s Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary 1739 (2002); The Random House Diction-
ary  of  the  English  Language  1486  (2d  ed.  1987).    If  we
accept these definitions, what the Court says is that abso-
lute ≠ absolute and plenary ≠ plenary, violating one of the
most basic laws of logic.  Surely we can do better than that.
We need not map the outer bounds of Congress’s Indian
affairs authority to hold that  the  challenged provisions of
ICWA lie outside it.  We need only acknowledge that even
so-called plenary powers cannot override foundational con-
stitutional constraints.  By attempting to control state judi-
cial proceedings in a field long-recognized to be the virtually
exclusive province of the States, ICWA violates the funda-
mental structure of our constitutional order.

In reaching this conclusion, I do not question the propo-
sition that Congress has broad power to regulate Indian af-
fairs.  We have “consistently described” Congress’s “powers
to legislate in respect to Indian tribes” as “ ‘plenary and ex-
clusive.’ ”  United States v. Lara, 541 U. S. 193, 200 (2004)
(collecting cases).  Reflecting this understanding, we have
sanctioned a wide range of enactments that bear on Indian
tribes and their members, sometimes (regrettably) without
tracing  the  source  of  Congress’s  authority  to  a  particular
enumerated power.  See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Mar-
tinez, 436 U. S. 49, 56–58 (1978) (modifying tribal govern-
ments’ powers of self-government); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187  U. S.  553,  565–566  (1903)  (transferring  tribal  land).
Nor do I dispute the notion that Congress has undertaken
responsibilities that have been roughly analogized to those
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Haaland v. Brackeen.  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and Congress's authority over Indian affairs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xix

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Colorado; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colorado; Kansas v.
Colorado; Mendez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colvin-El v. Nuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Comfort Silkie Company Corp. v. Barefoot Dreams . . . . . . . . . . .
Comfort Silkie Company Corp. v. Siefert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commissioner; Gitlitz v.
Commissioner; Glassman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commissioner; O. S. C. & Associates, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner.
Commissioner of Labor of N. Y.; Jones v.
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks; Mackay v.
Commissioner of Social Security; Kutschke v.
Commonwealth. See name of Commonwealth.
Conley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Connecticut; Brown v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Connecticut; Coleman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Connecticut; Green v.
Connecticut; Shashaty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Connelly; Bierley v.
Conroy; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Department of Energy . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Consolidated Freightways, Inc.; Westenburg v.
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Wightman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conti; Wisniewski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conway v. Gamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cook; Chambers v.
Cook v. Gralike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cook v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cook; Snipes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cook County; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cook Group, Inc. v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coombs v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Copper v. Fargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corcoran; McNeil v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corcoran v. New York Power Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corcoran v. Sinclair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corcoran; Snead v.
Corcoran; Tibbs v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cordoba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corey v. Corey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corey v. Dowling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corey v. Florida State Division of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corey v. Health South Corp. of Ala.

Page
1123
1015
1070
1088
1019
1019
1097,1128
1055
1097

1132
1027
1064

1017
1060
1061
1136
1094
1050,1107
1122
1003
1117
1012
1070
1123
1074
1065
1058
1042
1083
1082
1008,1095
1017
1135
1109
1109
1060
1034
1081
1006
1006
1006
1006
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

No. 20–1573.  Argued March 30, 2022—Decided June 15, 2022

The  question  for  decision  is  whether  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act,  9
U. S. C. §1 et seq., preempts a rule of California law that invalidates
contractual waivers of the right to assert representative claims under
California’s  Labor  Code  Private  Attorneys  General  Act  of  2004,  Cal.
Lab. Code §2698 et seq.  PAGA enlists employees as private attorneys
general to enforce California labor law.  By its terms, PAGA authorizes
any  “aggrieved  employee”  to  initiate  an  action  against  a  former  em-
ployer “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former em-
ployees” to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been re-
covered  only  by  the  State  in  an  enforcement  action  brought  by
California’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA).  Cal-
ifornia precedent holds that a PAGA suit is a “ ‘representative action’ ”
in  which  the  employee  plaintiff  sues  as  an  “ ‘agent  or  proxy’ ”  of  the
State.  Iskanian  v.  CLS  Transp.  Los  Angeles,  LLC,  59  Cal.  4th  348,
380.  California precedent also interprets the statute to contain what
is effectively a rule of claim joinder—allowing a party to unite multiple
claims against an opposing party in a single action.  An employee with
PAGA standing may “seek any civil penalties the state can, including
penalties for violations involving employees other than the PAGA liti-
gant herself.”  ZB, N. A. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 5th 175, 185.

Respondent Angie Moriana filed a PAGA action against her former
employer Viking River Cruises, alleging a California Labor Code vio-
lation.  She also asserted a wide array of other violations allegedly sus-
tained  by  other  Viking  employees.  Moriana’s  employment  contract
with Viking contained a mandatory arbitration agreement.  Important
here, that agreement contained both a “Class Action Waiver”—provid-
ing that the parties could not bring any dispute as a class, collective,
or  representative  action  under  PAGA—and  a  severability  clause—
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the detailed content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

GOLAN v. SAADA

Opinion of the Court

ingly, it is appropriate to follow the ordinary course and al-
low the District Court to apply the proper legal standard in
the first instance.  Cf. Monasky, 589 U. S., at ___–___ (slip
op., at 16–17) (declining to follow the “[o]rdinar[y]” course
of  ordering  remand  where  the  determination  in  question
was  nondiscretionary  and  there  was  no  “reason  to  antici-
pate that the District Court’s judgment would change on a
remand”).

Remand will as a matter of course add further delay to a
proceeding that has already spanned years longer than it
should have.  The delay that has already occurred, however,
cannot be undone.  This Court trusts that the District Court
will move as expeditiously as possible to reach a final deci-
sion without further unnecessary delay.  The District Court
has ample evidence before it from the prior proceedings and
has made extensive factual findings concerning the risks at
issue.  Golan  argues  that  the  ameliorative  measures  or-
dered intrude too greatly on custodial determinations and
that they are inadequate to protect B. A. S.’ safety given the
District Court’s findings that Saada is unable to control or
take  responsibility  for  his  behavior.    The  District  Court
should determine whether the measures in question are ad-
equate  to  order  return  in  light  of  its  factual  findings  con-
cerning the risk to B. A. S., bearing in mind that the Con-
vention sets as a primary goal the safety of the child.

*

*

*

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the concluding portion of a court's decision. It discusses the case, the arguments made, and the court's final ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>