<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

course . . . Congress, like ‘Humpty Dumpty,’ has the power
to give words unorthodox meanings.”  Id., at 575.  Yet where
“the Government argues for a result that the English lan-
guage tells us not to expect, . . . we must be very wary of the
Government’s  position.”  Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).

The  title  suggests  identity  theft  is  at  the  core  of
§1028A(a)(1).  On the Government’s reading, however, eve-
ryday  overbilling  would  become  the  most  common  trigger
for §1028A(a)(1)’s severe penalty.  This would turn the core
of “worse or more serious” identity theft into something the
ordinary user of the English language would not consider
identity theft at all.

2
The title is, by definition, just the beginning.  A title does
not supplant the actual text of the provision, as the Govern-
ment  observes.  The  problem  for  the  Government  is  that
§1028A(a)(1)’s language points in the same direction as its
title.  In particular, Congress used a trio of verbs that reflect
an ordinary understanding of identity theft.

While  “uses”  is  indeterminate  in  isolation,  here  it  has
company.  Section  1028A(a)(1)  applies  when  a  defendant
“knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful au-
thority, a means of identification of another person,” “dur-
ing  and  in  relation  to”  any  predicate  offense.    (Emphasis
added.)  “Under the familiar interpretive canon noscitur a
sociis, ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’ ”  McDon-
nell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 568–569 (2016) (quot-
ing Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961)).
“[T]his canon is often wisely applied where a word is capa-
ble of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unin-
tended breadth to the Acts of Congress.”  McDonnell, 579
U. S., at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The  two  neighboring  verbs  here,  “transfers”  and  “pos-
sesses,”  are  most  naturally  read  in  the  context  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the interpretation of a specific law (likely related to identity theft). The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

decision in Caballes.  Caballes expressly anticipated that a
traffic  stop  could  be  reasonably  prolonged  for  officers  to
engage  in  a  dog  sniff.  We  explained  that  no  Fourth
Amendment violation had occurred in Caballes, where the
“duration  of  the  stop  . . .  was  entirely  justified  by  the
traffic  offense  and  the ordinary  inquiries  incident  to  such
a  stop,”  but  suggested  a  different  result  might  attend  a
case “involving a dog sniff that occurred during an unrea-
sonably  prolonged  traffic  stop.”    543  U. S.,  at  407–408
(emphasis  added).    The  dividing  line  was  whether  the
overall duration of the stop exceeded “the time reasonably
required to complete th[e] mission,” id., at 407, not, as the
majority  suggests,  whether  the  duration  of  the  stop  “in
fact”  exceeded  the  time  necessary  to  complete  the  traffic-
related inquiries, ante, at 8.

The majority’s approach draws an artificial line between
dog  sniffs  and  other  common  police  practices.    The  lower
courts have routinely confirmed that warrant checks are a
constitutionally permissible part of a traffic stop, see, e.g.,
United  States  v.  Simmons,  172  F. 3d  775,  778  (CA11
1999);  United  States  v.  Mendez,  118  F. 3d  1426,  1429
(CA10 1997); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F. 2d 431, 437
(CA5  1993),  and  the  majority  confirms  that  it  finds  no
fault  in  these  measures,  ante,  at  6.  Yet  its  reasoning
suggests the opposite.  Such warrant checks look more like
they are directed to “detecting evidence of ordinary crimi-
nal  wrongdoing”  than  to  “ensuring  that  vehicles  on  the
road  are  operated  safely  and  responsibly.”  Ante,  at  6
(internal  quotation  marks  and  alteration  omitted).    Per-
haps one could argue that the existence of an outstanding
warrant  might  make  a  driver  less  likely  to  operate  his
vehicle  safely  and  responsibly  on  the  road,  but  the  same
could  be  said  about  a  driver  in  possession  of  contraband.
A driver confronted by the police  in either case might try
to flee or become violent toward the officer.  But under the
majority’s analysis, a dog sniff, which is directed at uncov-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Rodriguez v. United States. It discusses the legality of a dog sniff during a traffic stop, referencing previous case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
444  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of Stevens, J.

The Bellotti Court confronted a dramatically different fac
tual  situation  from  the  one  that  confronts  us  in  this  case:  a
state statute that barred business corporations’ expenditures
on  some  referenda  but  not  others.  Speciﬁcally,  the  statute
barred a business corporation “from making contributions or
expenditures  ‘for  the  purpose  of  .  .  .  inﬂuencing  or  affecting
the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than
one  materially  affecting  any  of  the  property,  business  or
assets  of  the  corporation,’ ”  435  U. S.,  at  768  (quoting  Mass.
Gen.  Laws  Ann.,  ch.  55,  § 8  (West  Supp.  1977);  alteration  in
original), and it went so far as to provide that referenda re
lated  to  income  taxation  would  not  “ ‘be  deemed  materially
to  affect  the  property,  business  or  assets  of  the  corpora
tion,’ ”  435  U. S.,  at  768.  As  might  be  guessed,  the  legisla
ture  had  enacted  this  statute  in  order  to  limit  corporate
speech  on  a  proposed  state  constitutional  amendment  to
authorize  a  graduated  income  tax.  The  statute  was  a
transparent  attempt  to  prevent  corporations  from  spending
money  to  defeat  this  amendment,  which  was  favored  by  a
majority  of  legislators  but  had  been  repeatedly  rejected  by
the  voters.  See  id.,  at  769–770,  and  n.  3.  We  said  that
“where, as  here, the legislature’s suppression  of speech sug
gests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public ques
tion  an  advantage  in  expressing  its views  to  the  people,  the
First Amendment is plainly offended.”  Id., at 785–786 (foot
note omitted).

Bellotti thus involved a viewpoint-discriminatory statute,
created  to  effect  a  particular  policy  outcome.  Even  Justice
Rehnquist,  in  dissent,  had  to  acknowledge  that  “a  very  per
suasive  argument  could  be  made  that  the  [Massachusetts
Legislature],  desiring  to  impose  a  personal  income  tax  but
more  than  once  defeated  in  that  desire  by  the  combination
of  the  Commonwealth’s  referendum provision  and  corporate
expenditures  in  opposition  to  such  a  tax,  simply  decided  to
muzzle corporations on this sort of issue so that it could suc
ceed  in  its  desire.”  Id.,  at  827,  n.  6.  To  make  matters
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It delves into the court's reasoning and analysis of a previous case, Bellotti, which dealt with corporate spending in elections.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

17

KAGAN, J., dissenting

purpose  of  entrenching  their  own  party  in  power?    Here,
the  two  District  Courts  catalogued  the  overwhelming
direct  evidence  that  they  did.    To  remind  you  of  some
highlights, see supra, at 4–6:  North Carolina’s redistrict-
ing  committee  used  “Partisan  Advantage”  as  an  official
criterion  for  drawing  district  lines.    And  from  the  first  to
the last, that committee’s chair (along with his mapmaker)
acted  to  ensure  a  10–3  partisan  split,  whatever  the
statewide vote, because he thought that “electing Republi-
cans  is  better  than  electing  Democrats.”    For  their  part,
Maryland’s  Democrats—the  Governor,  senior  Congress-
man,  and  State  Senate  President  alike—openly  admitted
to  a  single  driving  purpose:  flip  the  Sixth  District  from
Republican  to  Democratic.  They  did  not  blanch  from
moving some 700,000 voters into new districts (when one-
person-one-vote  rules  required  relocating  just  10,000)  for
that reason and that reason alone.

The  majority’s  response  to  the  District  Courts’  purpose
analysis is discomfiting.  The majority does not contest the
lower courts’ findings; how could it?  Instead, the majority
says  that  state  officials’  intent  to  entrench  their  party  in
power  is  perfectly  “permissible,”  even  when  it  is  the  pre-
dominant factor in drawing district lines.  Ante, at 23.  But
that is wrong.  True enough, that the intent to inject “po-
litical  considerations”  into  districting  may  not  raise  any
constitutional  concerns.
In  Gaffney  v.  Cummings,  412
U. S.  735  (1973),  for  example,  we  thought  it  non-
problematic  when  state  officials  used  political  data  to
ensure rough proportional representation between the two
parties.  And true enough that even the naked purpose to
gain partisan advantage may not rise to the level of consti-
tutional notice when it is not the driving force in mapmak-
ing  or  when  the  intended  gain  is  slight.    See  Vieth,  541
U. S., at 286 (plurality opinion).  But when political actors
have a specific and predominant intent to entrench them-
selves  in  power  by  manipulating  district  lines,  that  goes
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the issue of gerrymandering and the intent of state officials in drawing district lines.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U99

[09-15-00 14:41:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

752

BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ELLERTH

Opinion of the Court

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
. . . sex.”

42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).

“Quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” do not ap-
pear in the statutory text. The terms appeared ﬁrst in the
academic literature, see C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment
of Working Women (1979); found their way into decisions of
the Courts of Appeals, see, e. g., Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d
897, 909 (CA11 1982); and were mentioned in this Court’s
decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S.
57 (1986). See generally E. Scalia, The Strange Career of
Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Policy 307 (1998).

In Meritor, the terms served a speciﬁc and limited pur-
pose. There we considered whether the conduct in question
constituted discrimination in the terms or conditions of em-
ployment in violation of Title VII. We assumed, and with
adequate reason, that if an employer demanded sexual favors
from an employee in return for a job beneﬁt, discrimination
with respect to terms or conditions of employment was ex-
plicit. Less obvious was whether an employer’s sexually de-
meaning behavior altered terms or conditions of employment
in violation of Title VII. We distinguished between quid
pro quo claims and hostile environment claims, see 477 U. S.,
at 65, and said both were cognizable under Title VII, though
the latter requires harassment that is severe or pervasive.
Ibid. The principal signiﬁcance of the distinction is to in-
struct that Title VII is violated by either explicit or con-
structive alterations in the terms or conditions of employ-
ment and to explain the latter must be severe or pervasive.
The distinction was not discussed for its bearing upon an
employer’s liability for an employee’s discrimination. On
this question Meritor held, with no further speciﬁcs, that
agency principles controlled.

Id., at 72.

Nevertheless, as use of the terms grew in the wake of
Meritor, they acquired their own signiﬁcance. The standard
of employer responsibility turned on which type of harass-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth. It discusses the legal concepts of "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" sexual harassment in the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code

are to the 1994 edition.

Cases reported before page 1001 are those decided with opinions of the
Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 1001 et seq. are
those in which orders were entered.

Abbey v. Robert Bosch GmbH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abbott v. Medgar Evers Houses Associates, L. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abbott Laboratories, Inc.; Free v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abboud; Krim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abdullah v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . .
Abe v. Michigan State Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abidekun, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abidekun v. Department of Ed.
Abouhalima v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abram v. Department of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abram v. Laxton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Okla. Housing Authority; Duke v. . . .
Accardi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. National Park Service . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Acosta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adams; Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams v. Driscoll
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adams v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adams USA, Inc.; Nelson v.
Adio-Mowo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.; Pereira v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Agard; Portuondo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.; Kemnitz v.
Aguilar; Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aguirre v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aiello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1009,1095
1130
333
1067
1066
1006
1121
1096
1064
1103
1077
1052,1131
1134
1005
1111
1112
1051
1129
1108
1075
1029,1123
460
1016
1030
1019
61
1040
1138
1040
1104

v
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases in alphabetical order with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

31

Opinion of the Court

  Finding  Hastings’  open-access  condition  on  RSO  status
reasonable  and  viewpoint  neutral,  we  reject  CLS’  free
speech and expressive-association claims.27

IV
In  its  reply  brief,  CLS  contends  that  “[t]he  peculiarity,
incoherence,  and  suspect  history  of  the  all-comers  policy
all point to pretext.”  Reply Brief 23.  Neither the District
Court  nor  the  Ninth  Circuit  addressed  an  argument  that
Hastings selectively enforces its all-comers policy, and this
Court is not the proper forum  to  air the issue in the first
instance.28    On  remand,  the  Ninth  Circuit  may  consider

——————

the  Law  School’s  regulation  by  dropping  access  barriers,  they  may

express  any  viewpoint  they  wish—including  a  discriminatory  one.    Cf.

Rumsfeld  v.  Forum  for  Academic  and  Institutional  Rights,  Inc.,  547

U. S.  47,  60  (2006)  (“As  a  general  matter,  the  Solomon  Amendment
regulates  conduct,  not  speech.    It  affects  what  law  schools  must  do—
afford  equal  access  to  military  recruiters—not  what  they  may  or  may
not  say.”).  Today’s  decision  thus  continues  this  Court’s  tradition  of
“protect[ing] the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’ ”  Post,
at  1  (ALITO, J.,  dissenting)  (quoting  United  States  v.  Schwimmer,  279
U. S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).

27 CLS briefly argues that Hastings’ all-comers condition violates the
Free  Exercise  Clause.    Brief  for  Petitioner  40–41.    Our  decision  in
Smith,  494  U. S.  872,  forecloses  that  argument.    In  Smith,  the  Court
held  that  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  does  not  inhibit  enforcement  of
otherwise  valid  regulations  of  general  application  that  incidentally
burden  religious  conduct.  Id.,  at  878–882.    In  seeking  an  exemption
from  Hastings’  across-the-board  all-comers  policy,  CLS,  we  repeat,
seeks  preferential,  not  equal,  treatment;  it  therefore  cannot  moor  its
request for accommodation to the Free Exercise Clause.

28 Finding the Ninth Circuit’s analysis cursory, the dissent repeatedly
urges us to resolve the pretext question.  See, e.g., post, at 2, 31–35, and
17, n. 2.  In doing so, the dissent forgets that “we are a court of review,
not of first view.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005).
When  the  lower  courts  have  failed  to  address  an  argument  that  de
served  their  attention,  our  usual  practice  is  to  remand  for  further
consideration,  not  to  seize  the  opportunity  to  decide  the  question
ourselves.  That is especially true when we agree to review an issue on
the  understanding  that  “[t]he  material  facts  . . .  are  undisputed,”  as
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, arguments, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1122

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 15, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–9021. Whitfield v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 657.

No. 99–9023. Young-Bey v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 Md. App. 797.

No. 99–9027. Parrott v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 824.

No. 99–9028. Cobb v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1328.

No. 99–9032. Bentley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 663.

No. 99–9034. Orcutt v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 208 F. 3d 204.

No. 99–9036. Duncan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 569.

No. 99–9041. Gutierrez-Gonzalez v. United States. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 438.

No. 99–9051. Corley v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 A. 2d 1029.

No. 99–9053. Roseboro v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1329.

No. 99–9054. Walker v. Conroy, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 825.

No. 99–9055. Varela v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 661.

No. 99–9060. Ray v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 173 F. 3d 853.

No. 99–9064. Maguire v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 A. 2d 589.

No. 99–9065. Montillo-Ontiveros v. United States. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 658.

No. 99–9076. Calas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 200 F. 3d 819.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 775 (1998)

809

Opinion of the Court

ﬂung locations could be effective without communicating
some formal policy against harassment, with a sensible com-
plaint procedure.

We have drawn this conclusion without overlooking two
possible grounds upon which the City might argue for the
opportunity to litigate further. There is, ﬁrst, the Court of
Appeals’s indulgent gloss on the relevant evidence: “There
is some evidence that the City did not effectively disseminate
among Marine Safety employees its sexual harassment pol-
icy.”
111 F. 3d, at 1539, n. 11. But, in contrast to the Court
of Appeals’s characterization, the District Court made an
explicit ﬁnding of a “complete failure on the part of the City
to disseminate said policy among Marine Safety Section
employees.”
864 F. Supp., at 1560. The evidence supports
the District Court’s ﬁnding and there is no contrary claim
before us.

The second possible ground for pursuing a defense was
asserted by the City in its argument addressing the possibil-
ity of negligence liability in this case.
It said that it should
not be held liable for failing to promulgate an antiharassment
policy, because there was no apparent duty to do so in the
1985–1990 period. The City purports to rest this argument
on the position of the EEOC during the period mentioned,
but it turns out that the record on this point is quite against
the City’s position. Although the EEOC issued regulations
dealing with promulgating a statement of policy and provid-
ing a complaint mechanism in 1990, see supra, at 806, ever
since 1980 its regulations have called for steps to prevent
violations, such as informing employees of their rights and
the means to assert them, ibid. The City, after all, adopted
an antiharassment policy in 1986.

The City points to nothing that might justify a conclusion
by the District Court on remand that the City had exercised
reasonable care. Nor is there any reason to remand for con-
sideration of Faragher’s efforts to mitigate her own damages,
since the award to her was solely nominal.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to a sexual harassment case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SAN ANTONIO v. HOTELS.COM, L. P.

Syllabus

the outcome of an appeal and provides that these default rules apply
unless the court “orders otherwise.”  Nothing in the broad language of
Rule 39(a) suggests that a court of appeals may not divide up costs in
such an order.  Quite the opposite, Rule 39(a)(4) suggests that a court
of appeals may apportion costs based on each party’s relative success
when the results of the appeal are something other than complete af-
firmance  or  reversal.    Rule 39(e)  points  in  the  same  direction;  it  ad-
dresses appellate costs taxable in the district court for the benefit of
“the party entitled to costs” under the rule (not to a party entitled to
seek costs).  The court of appeals’ determination that a party is “enti-
tled” to a certain percentage of costs would mean little if the district
court could take a second look at the equities.  San Antonio contends
that the plain text of subsection (e) providing for costs “taxable in the
district court” vests district courts with discretion over cost allocations,
but that interpretation reads too much into the term “taxable” and ig-
nores the history of the Rule.  The real work done by the phrase “tax-
able in the district court” is in specifying the court in which these costs
are to be taxed.  Pp. 5–9.

(b) The Court is not persuaded that applying the plain text of Rule
39 will create the problems that San Antonio envisions.  First, award-
ing  costs  incurred  prior  to  appeal  is  different  from  taxing  appellate
costs.  Limiting a district court’s discretion to allocate appellate costs
will  not  cause  confusion  with  the  equitable  discretion  district  courts
exercise with respect to certain costs incurred in the district court that
are  customarily  taxed  under  Federal  Rule  of  Civil  Procedure  54(d).
Second,  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  appellate  courts  have
struggled to allocate appellate costs due to factual disputes better han-
dled by the district court.  And nothing in the Court’s decision should
be read to cast doubt on the approach taken by some courts of appeals
to delegate this responsibility to the district court.  See, e.g., Emmeneg-
ger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 324 F. 3d 616, 626.  Third, it makes sense
for the district court to tax the costs in Rule 39(e) because those costs
relate to events in that court.  This process requires more than a “min-
isterial order,” as San Antonio would have it, because the district court
will ensure that the amount of appellate costs requested is “correct,”
28 U. S. C. §1924, and that the cost submissions otherwise comply with
the  relevant rules  and  statutes.    Finally,  that  the  current  rules  and
relevant statutes could specify more clearly the procedure that a party
should follow to obtain review of their objections to Rule 39(e) costs in
the court of appeals does not mean that a district court can reallocate
those costs.  A simple motion “for an order” under Rule 27 should suf-
fice to seek an order under Rule 39(a), and the Court does not foreclose
parties from raising their arguments through other procedural vehi-
cles.  Pp. 9–13.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal case syllabus, outlining the court's reasoning and decision. It is sequential text and provides legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SHURTLEFF ET AL. v. CITY OF BOSTON ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 20–1800.  Argued January 18, 2022—Decided May 2, 2022

Just outside the entrance to Boston City Hall, on City Hall Plaza, stand
three flagpoles.  Boston flies the American flag from the first pole and
the flag of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from the second.  Bos-
ton  usually  flies  the  city’s  own  flag  from  the  third  pole.  But  Boston
has, for years, allowed groups to hold ceremonies on the plaza during
which participants may hoist a flag of their choosing on the third pole
in place of the city’s flag.  Between 2005 and 2017, Boston approved
the raising of about 50 unique flags for 284 such ceremonies.  Most of
these  flags  were  other  countries’,  but  some  were  associated  with
groups or causes, such as the Pride Flag, a banner honoring emergency
medical  service  workers,  and  others.    In  2017,  Harold  Shurtleff,  the
director of an organization called Camp Constitution, asked to hold an
event on the plaza to celebrate the civic and social contributions of the
Christian  community;  as  part  of  that  ceremony,  he  wished  to  raise
what he described as the “Christian flag.”  The commissioner of Bos-
ton’s  Property  Management  Department  worried  that  flying  a  reli-
gious  flag  at  City  Hall  could  violate  the  Establishment  Clause  and
found no past instance of the city’s having raised such a flag.  He there-
fore told Shurtleff that the group could hold an event on the plaza but
could not raise their flag during it.  Shurtleff and Camp Constitution
(petitioners) sued, claiming that Boston’s refusal to let them raise their
flag violated, among other things, the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause.  The District Court held that flying private groups’ flags from
City Hall’s third flagpole amounted to government speech, so Boston
could  refuse  petitioners’  request  without  running  afoul  of  the  First
Amendment.  The First Circuit affirmed.  This Court granted certiorari
to decide whether the flags Boston allows others to fly express govern-
ment  speech,  and  whether  Boston  could,  consistent  with  the  Free
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are typically used for informational purposes and are not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the core content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CASSIRER v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION
FOUNDATION
Opinion of the Court

just as any other actor would.

And in so doing, Section 1606 also dictates the selection
of  a  choice-of-law  rule:  It,  too,  must  mirror  the  rule  that
would apply in a similar suit between private parties.  For
only the same choice-of-law rule can guarantee use of the
same substantive law—and thus (see above) guarantee the
same liability.  See Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civ. Avi-
ation of People’s Republic of China, 923 F. 2d 957, 959–960
(CA2 1991) (“[T]he same choice of law analysis” is needed
to  “apply[ ]  identical  substantive  laws,”  and  so  to  “ensure
identity of liability” between a foreign state and a private
individual).  Consider two suits seeking recovery of a paint-
ing—one suit against a foreign-state-controlled museum (as
here), the other against a private museum.  If the choice-of-
law rules in the two suits differed, so might the substantive
law in fact chosen.  And if the substantive law differed, so
might  the  suits’  outcomes.  In  one  case,  say,  the  plaintiff
would  recover  the  art,  and  in  the  other  not.    Contrary  to
Section 1606, the two museums would not be “liable in the
same manner and to the same extent.”

In this case, then, Section 1606 requires the use of Cali-
fornia’s choice-of-law rule—because that is the rule a court
would  use  in  comparable  private  litigation.    Consider  the
just-hypothesized suit against a private museum for return
of a piece of art, brought as this case was in California.  The
claims asserted (again, as in this case) turn only on state or
foreign  property  law,  with  no  substantive  federal  compo-
nent.  If the private suit were filed in state court, Califor-
nia’s choice-of-law rule would of course govern.  And if the
private suit were filed in federal court, under diversity-of-
citizenship jurisdiction, the same would be true.  According
to long-settled precedent, a federal court sitting in diversity
borrows  the  forum  State’s  choice-of-law  rule.    See  Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496 (1941).  So
the private-museum suit would begin with the application
of California’s choice-of-law rule, to decide on the governing
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of choice-of-law rules in a case involving a foreign state-controlled museum.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005)

3

STEVENS, J., dissenting

defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an  independent  source  such  as  state  law—rules  or  under-
standings  that  secure  certain  benefits  and  that  support
claims of entitlement to those benefits”).

There was a time when our tradition of judicial restraint
would have led this Court to defer to the judgment of more
qualified  tribunals  in  seeking  the  correct  answer  to  that
difficult  question  of  Colorado  law.    Unfortunately,  al-
though the majority properly identifies the “central state-
law  question”  in  this  case  as  “whether  Colorado  law  gave
respondent a right to police enforcement of the restraining
order,” ante, at 8, it has chosen to ignore our settled prac-
tice by providing its own answer to that question.  Before
identifying the flaws in the Court’s ruling on the merits, I
shall briefly comment on our past practice.

I

The  majority’s  decision  to  plunge  ahead  with  its  own
analysis  of  Colorado  law  imprudently  departs  from  this
Court’s  longstanding  policy  of  paying  “deference  [to]  the
views of a federal court as to the law of a State within its
jurisdiction.”  Phillips  v.  Washington  Legal  Foundation,
524  U. S.  156,  167  (1998);  see  also  Bishop  v.  Wood,  426
U. S.  341,  346,  and  n. 10  (1976)  (collecting  cases).    This
policy  is  not  only  efficient,  but  it  reflects  “our  belief  that
district  courts  and  courts  of  appeal  are  better  schooled  in
and  more  able  to  interpret  the  laws  of  their  respective
States.”  Brockett  v.  Spokane  Arcades,  Inc.,  472  U. S.  491,
500–501  (1985);  Hillsborough  v.  Cromwell,  326  U. S.  620,
629–630 (1946) (endorsing “great deference to the views of
the judges of those courts ‘who are familiar with the intri-
cacies and trends of local law and practice’ ”).  Accordingly,
we  have  declined  to  show  deference  only  in  rare  cases  in
which  the  court  of  appeal’s  resolution  of  state  law  was
“clearly  wrong”  or  otherwise  seriously  deficient.    See
Brockett, 472 U. S., at 500, n. 9; accord, Leavitt v. Jane L.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases, which are all hallmarks of suitable content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

Syllabus

tinued constitutionality.  See Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist.
No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193.

Petitioner  Shelby  County,  in  the  covered  jurisdiction  of  Alabama,
sued the Attorney General in Federal District Court in Washington,
D. C., seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and 5 are fa-
cially  unconstitutional,  as  well  as  a  permanent  injunction  against
their  enforcement.    The  District  Court  upheld  the  Act,  finding  that
the  evidence  before  Congress  in  2006  was  sufficient  to  justify  reau-
thorizing §5 and continuing §4(b)’s coverage formula.  The D. C. Cir-
cuit affirmed.  After surveying the evidence in the record, that court
accepted  Congress’s  conclusion  that  §2  litigation  remained  inade-
quate  in  the  covered  jurisdictions  to  protect  the  rights  of  minority
voters,  that  §5  was  therefore  still  necessary,  and  that  the  coverage
formula continued to pass constitutional muster.

Held: Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional; its formula
can  no  longer  be  used  as  a  basis  for  subjecting  jurisdictions  to  pre-
clearance.  Pp. 9–25.

(a) In  Northwest  Austin,  this  Court  noted  that  the  Voting  Rights
Act “imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs”
and  concluded  that  “a  departure  from  the  fundamental  principle  of
equal  sovereignty  requires  a  showing  that  a  statute’s  disparate  geo-
graphic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”
557 U. S., at 203.  These basic principles guide review of the question
presented here.  Pp. 9–17.

(1) State  legislation  may  not  contravene  federal  law.    States  re-
tain broad autonomy, however, in structuring their governments and
pursuing  legislative  objectives.  Indeed,  the  Tenth  Amendment  re-
serves to the States all powers not specifically granted to the Federal
Government, including “the power to regulate elections.”  Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461–462.  There is also a “fundamental prin-
ciple  of  equal  sovereignty”  among  the  States,  which  is  highly  perti-
nent  in  assessing  disparate  treatment  of  States.  Northwest  Austin,
supra, at 203.

The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles.
It requires States to beseech the Federal Government for permission
to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact
and  execute  on  their  own.   And  despite  the  tradition  of  equal  sover-
eignty, the Act applies to only nine States (and additional counties).
That is why, in 1966, this Court described the Act as “stringent” and
“potent,” Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308, 315, 337.  The Court nonethe-
less  upheld  the  Act,  concluding  that  such an  “uncommon  exercise  of
congressional  power”  could  be  justified  by  “exceptional  conditions.”
Id., at 334.  Pp. 9–12.

(2) In  1966,  these  departures  were  justified  by  the  “blight  of  ra-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case, specifically Shelby County v. Holder. Syllabi are summaries of legal cases and are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the primary content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1093

529 U. S.

April 24, 2000

No. 99–8621.
tiorari denied.

Isaacs v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

No. 99–8627. Chester v. Lock, Superintendent, Central
Missouri Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1345.

No. 99–8631. Ricchio Navarro v. Poole, Warden, et al.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8642. Legette v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8650. Davidson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 402.

No. 99– 8651. Graves v. United States. C. A. Armed

Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 M. J. 375.

No. 99–8668. Aytch v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 303 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 747 N. E.
2d 1104.

No. 99–8694. Buchanan v. Tate, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8695. Carter v. Morgan, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8700. Naugle v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Stark County.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8750. Faulcon v. City of Philadelphia et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 F. 3d 861.

No. 99–8767. Palacio v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 286.

No. 99–8769. Monroe v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1330.

No. 99–8777. Anthony v. Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–8780. Cohen v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks the narrative flow and contextual information typical of a book's main content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases or Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring
THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–465
_________________

PETER B. CHIAFALO, LEVI JENNET GUERRA,
AND ESTHER VIRGINIA JOHN, PETITIONERS
v. WASHINGTON

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF WASHINGTON

[July 6, 2020]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins as

to Part II, concurring in the judgment.

The  Court  correctly  determines  that  States  have  the
power to require Presidential electors to vote for the candi-
date chosen by the people of the State.  I disagree, however,
with  its  attempt  to  base  that  power  on  Article  II.    In  my
view, the Constitution is silent on States’ authority to bind
electors in voting.  I would resolve this case by simply rec-
ognizing  that  “[a]ll  powers  that  the  Constitution  neither
delegates  to  the  Federal  Government  nor  prohibits  to  the
States  are  controlled  by  the  people  of  each  State.”    U. S.
Term  Limits,  Inc.  v.  Thornton,  514  U. S.  779,  848  (1995)
(THOMAS, J., dissenting).

I
A
The Constitution does not address—expressly or by nec-
essary implication—whether States have the power to re-
quire that Presidential electors vote for the candidates cho-
sen  by  the  people.  Article  II,  §1,  and  the  Twelfth
Amendment  provide  for  the  election  of  the  President
through a body of electors.  But neither speaks directly to a
State’s power over elector voting.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas.  It cites legal precedents and discusses the Constitution's silence on a particular issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

17

Opinion of the Court

E
The  Board  does  not  contend  in  this  Court  that  its  anti
competitive  conduct  was  actively  supervised  by  the  State
or that it should receive Parker immunity on that basis.

By  statute,  North  Carolina  delegates  control  over  the
practice of dentistry to the Board.  The Act, however, says
nothing  about  teeth  whitening,  a  practice  that  did  not
exist when it was passed.  After receiving complaints from
other dentists about the nondentists’ cheaper services, the
Board’s  dentist  members—some  of  whom  offered  whiten
ing services—acted to expel the dentists’ competitors from
the market.  In so doing the Board relied upon cease-and
desist  letters  threatening  criminal  liability,  rather  than
any  of  the  powers  at  its  disposal  that  would  invoke  over
sight  by  a  politically  accountable  official.    With  no  active
supervision by the State, North Carolina officials may well
have  been  unaware  that  the  Board  had  decided  teeth
whitening  constitutes  “the  practice  of  dentistry”  and
sought  to  prohibit  those  who  competed  against  dentists
from participating in the teeth whitening market.  Whether
or not the Board exceeded its powers under North Carolina
law, cf. Omni, 499 U. S., at 371–372, there is no evidence
here of any decision by the State to initiate or concur with
the Board’s actions against the nondentists.

IV
The  Board  does  not  claim  that  the  State  exercised  ac
tive, or indeed any, supervision over its conduct regarding
nondentist  teeth  whiteners;  and,  as  a  result,  no  specific
supervisory  systems  can  be  reviewed  here.    It  suffices  to
note that the inquiry regarding active supervision is flexi
ble  and  context-dependent.    Active  supervision  need  not
entail day-to-day involvement in an agency’s operations or
micromanagement of its every decision.  Rather, the ques
tion  is  whether  the  State’s  review  mechanisms  provide
“realistic  assurance”  that  a  nonsovereign  actor’s  anticom
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Board's actions and whether they qualify for Parker immunity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–10.  Argued February 27, 2023—Decided June 8, 2023

Petitioner  David  Dubin  was  convicted  of  healthcare  fraud  under  18
U. S. C.  §1347  after  he  overbilled  Medicaid  for  psychological  testing
performed  by  the  company  he  helped  manage.  The  question  is
whether,  in  defrauding  Medicaid,  he  also  committed  “[a]ggravated
identity theft” under §1028A(a)(1).  Section 1028A(a)(1) applies when
a defendant, “during and in relation to any [predicate offense, such as
healthcare  fraud],  knowingly  transfers,  possesses,  or  uses,  without
lawful  authority,  a  means  of  identification  of  another  person.”    The
Government argued below that §1028A(a)(1) was automatically satis-
fied because Dubin’s fraudulent Medicaid billing included the patient’s
Medicaid reimbursement number—a “means of identification.”  Bound
by Fifth Circuit precedent, the District Court allowed Dubin’s convic-
tion for aggravated identity theft to stand, even though, in the District
Court’s view, the crux of the case was fraudulent billing, not identity
theft.  The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc affirmed in a fractured deci-
sion, with five concurring judges acknowledging that under the Gov-
ernment’s reading of §1028A(a)(1), “the elements of [the] offense are
not captured or even fairly described by the words ‘identity theft.’ ”  27
F. 4th 1021, 1024 (opinion of Richman, C. J.).

Held: Under §1028A(a)(1), a defendant “uses” another person’s means of
identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when the use is at the
crux of what makes the conduct criminal.  Pp. 4–21.

(a) This case turns on the scope of two of §1028A(a)(1)’s elements:
Dubin  was  convicted  under  §1028A(a)(1)  for  “us[ing]”  a  patient’s
means of identification “in relation to” healthcare fraud.  On the Gov-
ernment’s view, a defendant “uses” a means of identification “in rela-
tion  to”  a  predicate  offense  if  the  defendant  employs  that  means  of
identification to facilitate or further the predicate offense in some way.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

GORSUCH, J., concurring

may have meant to codify the centralized approach the Brit-
ish had pursued.  But the “byzantine” document the draft-
ers  created,  Ablavsky  2015,  at  1034,  came  with  a  pair  of
easily exploited loopholes.  First, the language of its Indian
affairs  clause  allowed  some  to  claim  that  various  Tribes
were  “ ‘members’ ”  of  the  States  and  thus  “exclusively  or
principally  subject  to  state  legislative  control.”    Clinton
1995, at 1103, 1150.  Second, owing to a fear that the phrase
“sole  and  exclusive”  could  give  the  misimpression  that
States lacked power to manage their own affairs, the Arti-
cles’ drafters added another clause stipulating that “the leg-
islative right of any [S]tate within its own limits be not in-
fringed or violated.”  Art IX.  Taken literally, that provision
meant only that the Articles left to States what belonged to
the States and to the Tribes what belonged to the Tribes.
But some States saw in that language too an opportunity to
assert their own control.  See Clinton 1995, at 1103, 1107,
1113–1118, 1128–1131.

The result?  A season of conflict brought about by state
and private encroachments on tribal authority.  G. Ablav-
sky,  The  Savage  Constitution,  63  Duke  L. J.  999,  1035–
1036  (2014)  (Ablavsky  2014).    By  the  time  the  Constitu-
tional Convention rolled around, “Indian uprisings had oc-
curred  . . .  in  the  Ohio  River  Valley  and  Virginia,”  “the
Creeks and Georgia were on the brink of open warfare,” and
there  was  significant  turmoil  “on  the  western  frontier.”
Clinton 1995, at 1147.  Those events were not lost on the
framers.  As  they  debated  how  to  broker  enduring  peace,
two predominant schools of thought emerged.  Madison and
his followers favored preventing intrusions on Indian land
and interests; Hamilton and his adherents favored resort to
military might.  Ablavsky 2014, at 1035–1038.  Both sides,
however, found agreement on the “need for a stronger fed-
eral  government”  presence,  without  the  impediment  of
state interference.  Id., at 1038.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the historical context of tribal sovereignty and the Articles of Confederation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

to  [the  federal]  question,”  Capital  City  Dairy  Co.  v.  Ohio,
183  U. S.  238,  248  (1902);  see  also  Marvin  v.  Trout,  199
U. S. 212, 223 (1905).  Put simply, there must have been a
“real contest . . . upon” the federal claim in state court.  Mor-
rison v. Watson, 154 U. S. 111, 115 (1894); accord, Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 222–223 (1983).

Here, there was no contest upon any federal claim in the
New  York  Court  of  Appeals.  In  his  briefing  before  that
court, Hemphill asserted that the “only issue before [that]
Court [was] whether the defense opened the door to Mor-
ris’s testimonial hearsay.”  App. 385 (emphasis added).  To
that end, Hemphill argued that his defense’s presentation
of evidence was not “misleading” under Massie, Reid, and
other  cases.  See  App.  386–387.  Of  course,  whether
Hemphill triggered New York’s “substantive principle of ev-
idence,” ante, at 10, is a question of state law “not subject to
review  here,”  Moore  v.  Illinois,  408  U. S.  786,  799  (1972);
see also Hiawassee River Power Co. v. Carolina-Tennessee
Power Co., 252 U. S. 341, 343 (1920).  Federal law does not
govern  whether  a  defendant’s  presentation  of  his  case  is
“misleading.”  Thus,  Hemphill  pressed  only  a  state-law
claim in the New York Court of Appeals.

True,  Hemphill  cited  one  Sixth  Amendment  precedent,
Crawford  v.  Washington,  541  U. S.  36  (2004),  and  stated
that “the introduction of Morris’s guilty plea minutes vio-
lated  [his]  Sixth  Amendment  right.”    App. 385.    But
Hemphill reached that conclusion not because there was a
“real contest . . . upon” the constitutionality of the Reid rule,
Morrison,  154  U. S.,  at  115,  but  rather  because  the  trial
court  misapplied  Reid  and  thus  improperly  admitted  un-
confronted  testimonial  hearsay.
Put  another  way,
Hemphill  never  argued  that  evidence  that  complied  with
Reid  violated  the  Confrontation  Clause.  To  the  contrary,
Hemphill  understood  Reid  to  be  constitutional.  As
Hemphill explained, “both the trial judge and the Appellate
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites legal precedents and discusses the application of legal rules to a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM

Statement of GORSUCH, J.

for too much time.  Yet, California does not limit its citizens
to  running  in  and  out  of  other  establishments;  no  one  is
barred from lingering in shopping malls, salons, or bus ter-
minals.  Nor, yet again, has California explained why more
narrowly  tailored  options,  like  a  reasonable  limit  on  the
length of indoor religious gatherings, would fail to meet its
concerns.
  When it comes to each of the first three factors, California
singles out religion for worse treatment than many secular
activities.  At the same time, the State fails to explain why
narrower  options  it  finds  sufficient  in  secular  contexts  do
not  satisfy  its  legitimate  interests.    Recently,  this  Court
made  it  abundantly  clear  that  edicts  like  California’s  fail
strict  scrutiny  and  violate  the  Constitution.    See  Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, ante, at ___ (per cu-
riam).  Today’s order should have been needless; the lower
courts  in  these  cases  should  have  followed  the  extensive
guidance this Court already gave.1
  If I have a quibble with the Court’s order, it is with how
it  addresses  California’s  final  factor,  singing.    While  the
Court’s order requires California to allow churches to open,
it also permits California to enforce, for now, a categorical
ban on singing during services.  This much might seem un-
derstandable.    California  has  sensibly  expressed  concern
that singing may be a particularly potent way to transmit
the  disease,  and  it  has  banned  singing  not  just  at  indoor
worship services, but at indoor private gatherings, schools,
and restaurants too.
  But,  on  further  inspection,  the  singing  ban  may  not  be

——————

1 While today’s case concerns the total ban on indoor worship found in
“Tier  1,”  nothing  in  our  order  precludes  future  challenges  to  the  other
disparate occupancy caps applicable to places of worship, particularly in
“Tiers” 2 through 4.  See App. to Emergency Application for Writ of In-
junction, App. G–3.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding restrictions on indoor religious gatherings in California, referencing previous court rulings and California's justifications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

Opinion of the Court

8–9).  APJs  do  so  when  reconsidering  an  issued  patent,  a
power that (the Court has held) involves the adjudication of
public rights that Congress may appropriately assign to ex-
ecutive officers rather than to the Judiciary.  See Oil States,
584 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 8–9).

The starting point for each party’s analysis is our opinion
in Edmond.  There we explained that “[w]hether one is an
‘inferior’  officer  depends  on  whether  he  has  a  superior”
other  than  the  President.    520  U. S.,  at  662.   An  inferior
officer  must  be  “directed  and  supervised  at  some  level  by
others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with
the advice and consent of the Senate.”  Id., at 663.

In Edmond, we applied this test to adjudicative officials
within  the  Executive  Branch—specifically,  Coast  Guard
Court of Criminal Appeals judges appointed by the Secre-
tary of Transportation.  See id., at 658.  We held that the
judges were inferior officers  because they were effectively
supervised  by  a  combination  of  Presidentially  nominated
and  Senate  confirmed  officers  in  the  Executive  Branch:
first, the Judge Advocate General, who “exercise[d] admin-
istrative oversight over the Court of Criminal Appeals” by
prescribing rules of procedure and formulating policies for
court-martial  cases,  and  could  also  “remove  a  Court  of
Criminal Appeals judge from his judicial assignment with-
out cause”; and second, the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces, an executive tribunal that could review the judges’
decisions  under  a  de novo  standard  for  legal  issues  and  a
deferential  standard  for  factual  issues.    Id.,  at  664–665.
“What  is  significant,”  we  concluded,  “is  that  the  judges  of
the Court of Criminal Appeals have no power to render a
final decision on behalf of the United States unless permit-
ted to do so by other Executive officers.”  Id., at 665.

Congress structured the PTAB differently, providing only
half  of  the  “divided”  supervision  to  which  judges  of  the
Court of Criminal Appeals were subject.  Id., at 664.  Like
the  Judge  Advocate  General,  the  PTO  Director  possesses
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and delves into legal arguments regarding the classification of administrative patent judges (APJs).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
ET AL. v. BOOKING.COM B. V.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–46.  Argued May 4, 2020—Decided June 30, 2020

A generic name—the name of a class of products or services—is ineligible
for federal trademark registration.  Respondent Booking.com, an en-
terprise  that  maintains  a  travel-reservation  website  by  the  same
name, sought federal registration of marks including the term “Book-
ing.com.”  Concluding that “Booking.com” is a generic name for online
hotel-reservation  services,  the  U.  S.  Patent  and  Trademark  Office
(PTO) refused registration.  Booking.com sought judicial review, and
the  District  Court  determined  that  “Booking.com”—unlike  the  term
“booking”  standing  alone—is  not  generic.    The  Court  of  Appeals  af-
firmed, finding no error in the District Court’s assessment of how con-
sumers perceive the term “Booking.com.”  The appellate court also re-
jected the PTO’s contention that, as a rule, combining a generic term
like “booking” with “.com” yields a generic composite.

Held: A term styled “generic.com” is a generic name for a class of goods
or services only if the term has that meaning to consumers.  Pp. 6–14.
(a) Whether a compound term is generic turns on whether that term,
taken as a whole, signifies to consumers a class of goods or services.
The  courts  below  determined,  and  the  PTO  no  longer  disputes,  that
consumers  do  not  in  fact  perceive  the  term  “Booking.com”  that  way.
Because “Booking.com” is not a generic name to consumers, it is not
generic.  Pp. 6–7.

(b) Opposing that determination, the PTO urges a nearly per se rule:
When  a  generic  term  is  combined  with  a  generic  Internet-domain-
name suffix like “.com,” the resulting combination is generic.  The rule
the PTO proffers is not borne out by the PTO’s own past practice and
lacks support in trademark law or policy.  Pp. 7–14.

(1) The PTO’s proposed rule does not follow from Goodyear’s India
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case.  Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010)

23

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of ALITO, J.

Idaho Code §25–3515 (Lexis 2000) (“No part of
this chapter shall be construed as interfering
with, negating or preempting any of the laws or
rules of the department of fish and game of this
state . . . or to interfere with the right to kill,
slaughter, bag or take all animals used for food”)
Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 510, §70/13 (West 2006) (“In
case of any alleged conflict between this Act . . .
and the ‘Wildlife Code of Illinois’ or ‘An Act to
define and require the use of humane methods
in the handling, preparation for slaughter, and
slaughter of livestock for meat or meat products
to be offered for sale’, . . . the provisions of those
Acts shall prevail”), §70/3.03(b)(1) (“For the
purposes of this Section, ‘animal torture’ does
not include any death, harm, or injury caused to
any animal by . . . any hunting, fishing, trap-
ping, or other activity allowed under the Wild-
life Code, the Wildlife Habitat Management
Areas Act, or the Fish and Aquatic Life Code”
(footnotes omitted))
Ind. Code §35–46–3–5(a) (West 2004) (subject to
certain exceptions not relevant here, “this
chapter [prohibiting “Offenses Relating to
Animals”] does not apply to . . . [f]ishing, hunt-
ing, trapping, or other conduct authorized under
[Ind. Code §]14–22”)
Iowa Code §717B.2(5) (2009) (“This section
[banning “animal abuse”] shall not apply to . . .
[a] person taking, hunting, trapping, or fishing
for a wild animal as provided in chapter 481A”),
§717B.3A(2)(e) (“This section [banning “animal
torture”] shall not apply to . . . [a] person taking,
hunting, trapping, or fishing for a wild animal
as provided in chapter 481A”)
Kan. Stat. Ann. §21–4310(b)(3) (2007) (“The
provisions of this section shall not apply to . . .
killing, attempting to kill, trapping, catching or
taking of any animal in accordance with the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically citing state laws related to animal cruelty and hunting/fishing regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PATEL ET AL. v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–979.  Argued December 6, 2021—Decided May 16, 2022

In 2007, Pankajkumar Patel, who had entered the United States illegally
with his wife Jyotsnaben in the 1990s, applied to United States Citi-
zenship  and  Immigration  Services  (USCIS)  for  discretionary  adjust-
ment of status under 8 U. S. C. §1255, which would have made Patel
and his wife lawful permanent residents.  Because USCIS was aware
that Patel had previously checked a box on a Georgia driver’s license
application falsely stating that he was a United States citizen, it de-
nied Patel’s application for failure to satisfy the threshold requirement
that the noncitizen be statutorily admissible for permanent residence.
§1255(i)(2)(A); see also §1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (rendering inadmissible a
noncitizen “who falsely represents . . . himself or herself to be a citizen
of the United States for any purpose or benefit under” state or federal
law).

Years later, the Government initiated removal proceedings against
Patel and his wife due to their illegal entry.  Patel sought relief from
removal by renewing his adjustment of status request.  Patel argued
before an Immigration Judge that he had mistakenly checked the “cit-
izen” box on the state application and thus lacked the subjective intent
necessary to violate the federal statute.  The Immigration Judge disa-
greed, denied Patel’s application for adjustment of status, and ordered
that  Patel  and  his  wife  be  removed  from  the  country.   The  Board  of
Immigration Appeals dismissed Patel’s appeal.

Patel  petitioned  the  Eleventh  Circuit  for review,  where  a  panel  of
that court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his claim.  Fed-
eral  law  prohibits  judicial  review  of  “any  judgment  regarding  the
granting  of  relief”  under  §1255.
  But  see
§1252(a)(2)(D) (exception where the judgment concerns “constitutional
claims”  or  “questions  of  law”).    The  panel  reasoned  that  the  factual

  §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

15 C. B. N. S. 621, 143 Eng. Rep. 929 (C. P. 1864) (action for
damages),  or  involved  prospective  harm  to  the  plaintiff ’s
reputation, see Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B. & Ad. 415, 420,
109 Eng. Rep. 842, 844 (K. B. 1830) (bank’s failure to timely
pay  “was  injurious  to  the  character  of  the  plaintiff  in  his
trade”); see also C. Addison, Law of Torts 46–47 (1860) (def-
amation actionable without proof of damage).

The  Court  also  appeals  to  “categorical”  and  “definitive”
statements  by  Lord  Chief  Justice  Holt  and  Justice  Story,
that  “every  injury  imports  a  damage,”  Ashby  v.  White,  2
Raym. Ld. 938, 955, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137 (K. B. 1703), and
that  “[t]he  law  tolerates  no  farther  inquiry  than  whether
there has been the violation of a right,” Webb v. Portland
Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 506, 508 (No. 17,322) (CC Me. 1838).
Ante, at 8–9.  These statements, however, bear less weight
than the Court suggests.  Lord Holt was alone in dissent in
Ashby (no shame there), and although his opinion has been
cited  favorably  by  subsequent  cases  and  commentary,  his
colleagues disagreed with him.  The Court writes that “the
House of Lords overturned the majority decision, thus vali-
dating  Lord  Holt’s  position,”  ante,  at  6,  but  the  House  of
Lords likely paid scant attention to Lord Holt’s analysis.  It
appears instead that the majority decision was reversed as
collateral damage in a Whig-Tory political dispute, and “lit-
tle weight was given to reasoning or eloquence.”  2 J. Camp-
bell,  Lives  of  the  Chief  Justices  of  England  160  (1849).
(Ashby had tried to vote for a Whig candidate, and his ballot
had been rejected as part of a Tory election-rigging scheme.
Id., at 156–157.)  Regardless, the House of Lords held that
Ashby “should recover his damages assessed by the jury” at
trial, suggesting that the fact of injury alone did not  “im-
port” them.  Ashby v. White, 1 Bro. P. C. 62, 64, 1 Eng. Rep.
417, 418 (1703).

Justice Story is no more helpful to the Court—despite the
supposedly “definitive” nature of his statement in Webb—
as he took the position elsewhere in his writings that a legal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and analyzes their relevance to the case at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
42  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

——————
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 530 (1985) (rejecting the
principle that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to en-
force requirements, such as minimum wage laws, against the States “ ‘in
areas  of  traditional  governmental  functions’ ”),  overruling  National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S.
213  (1983)  (the  Fourth  Amendment  requires  a  totality  of  the  circum-
stances approach for determining whether an informant’s tip establishes
probable cause), overruling Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969); United States v. Scott, 437
U. S. 82 (1978) (the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to Govern-
ment appeals from orders granting defense motions to terminate a trial
before verdict), overruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (1975);
Craig  v.  Boren,  429  U. S.  190  (1976)  (gender-based  classifications  are
subject  to  intermediate  scrutiny  under  the  Equal  Protection  Clause),
overruling Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U. S. 522 (1975) (jury system which operates to exclude women from
jury service violates the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
right  to  an  impartial  jury),  overruling  Hoyt  v.  Florida,  368  U. S.  57
(1961); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (the mere
advocacy of violence is protected under the First Amendment unless it is
directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action), overruling Whit-
ney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.
347,  351  (1967)  (Fourth  Amendment  “protects  people,  not  places,”  and
extends  to  what  a  person  “seeks  to  preserve  as  private”),  overruling
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United
States, 316 U. S. 129 (1942); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966)
(procedural safeguards to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination),  overruling  Crooker  v.  California,  357  U. S.  433
(1958), and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504 (1958); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U. S. 1 (1964) (the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by
the States), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), and
Adamson  v.  California,  332  U. S.  46  (1947);  Wesberry  v.  Sanders,  376
U. S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (congressional districts should be apportioned so that
“as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is
to  be  worth  as  much  as  another’s”),  overruling  in  effect  Colegrove  v.
Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963)
(right to counsel for indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution in state
court under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments), overruling Betts v.
Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962) (federal
courts have jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to state re-
districting plans), effectively overruling in part Colegrove, 328 U. S. 549;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a section of a Supreme Court opinion citing previous cases. It's likely part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary section like a table of contents or introduction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

THOMAS, J., dissenting

must ensure that its districting plan includes that number of
majority-minority districts “or something quite close.”20  582
F. Supp. 3d, at 1033.  Thus construed and applied, §2 is not
congruent and proportional to any provisions of the Recon-
struction Amendments.
  To  determine  the  congruence  and  proportionality  of  a
measure, we must begin by “identify[ing] with some preci-
sion the scope of the constitutional right at issue.”  Board of
Trustees  of  Univ.  of  Ala.  v.  Garrett,  531  U. S.  356,  365
(2001).  The Reconstruction Amendments “forbi[d], so far as
civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination . . .
against any citizen because of his race,” ensuring that “[a]ll
citizens  are  equal  before  the  law.”    Gibson  v.  Mississippi,
162 U. S. 565, 591 (1896) (Harlan, J.).  They dictate “that
the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as
simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class.”  Miller, 515 U. S., at 911 (internal quotation marks
omitted).    These  principles  are  why  the  Constitution  pre-
sumptively forbids race-predominant districting, “even for
remedial purposes.”  Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 657.
  These  same  principles  foreclose  a  construction  of  the
Amendments that would entitle members of racial minori-
ties,  qua  racial  minorities,  to  have  their  preferred  candi-
dates  win  elections.    Nor  do  the  Amendments  limit  the
rights of members of a racial majority to support their pre-
ferred candidates—regardless of whether minorities prefer
different candidates and of whether “the majority, by virtue
of  its  numerical  superiority,”  regularly  prevails.    Gingles,
478 U. S., at 48.  Nor, finally, do the Amendments establish
a norm of proportional control of elected offices on the basis
of race.  See Parents Involved, 551 U. S., at 730–731 (plu-
rality opinion); Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 657.  And these notions
——————

20 This formulation does not specifically account for the District Court’s
findings under the Senate factors, which, as I have explained, lack any
traceable logical connection to the finding of a districting wrong or the
need for a districting remedy.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Allen v. Milligan. It delves into the interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments and their application to redistricting.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

19

GORSUCH, J., concurring

of the Laws of England §212, *141a.  Yet, under the Chev-
ron regime, all that means little, for executive agencies may
effectively judge the scope of their own lawful powers.  See,
e.g., Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 290, 296–297 (2013).

Traditionally,  as  well,  courts  have  sought  to  construe
statutes as a reasonable reader would “when the law was
made.”  Blackstone 59; see United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch
358,  386  (1805).  Today,  some  call  this  “textualism.”    But
really  it’s  a  very  old  idea,  one  that  constrains  judges  to  a
lawfinding  rather  than  lawmaking  role  by  focusing  their
work on the statutory text, its linguistic context, and vari-
ous canons of construction.  In that way, textualism serves
as an essential guardian of the due process promise of fair
notice.  If a judge could discard an old meaning and assign
a new one to a law’s terms, all without any legislative revi-
sion, how could people ever be sure of the rules that bind
them?  New  Prime  Inc.  v.  Oliveira,  586  U. S.  105,  113
(2019).  Were the rules otherwise, Blackstone warned, the
people  would  be  rendered  “slaves  to  their  magistrates.”
4 Blackstone 371.

Yet, replace “magistrates” with “bureaucrats,” and Black-
stone’s  fear  becomes  reality  when  courts  employ  Chevron
deference.  Whenever we confront an ambiguity in the law,
judges do not seek to resolve it impartially according to the
best evidence of the law’s original meaning.  Instead, we re-
sort to a far cruder heuristic: “The reasonable bureaucrat
always wins.”  And because the reasonable bureaucrat may
change  his  mind  year-to-year  and  election-to-election,  the
people can never know with certainty what new “interpre-
tations” might be used against them.  This “fluid” approach
to statutory interpretation is “as much a trap for the inno-
cent as the ancient laws of Caligula,” which were posted so
high  up  on  the  walls  and  in  print  so  small  that  ordinary
people  could  never  be  sure  what  they  required.  United
States v. Cardiff, 344 U. S. 174, 176 (1952).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into legal arguments about statutory interpretation, specifically contrasting textualism with Chevron deference.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

rights—i.e., privileges or immunities—attributable to that
status,”  the  Court  has  interpreted  the  Clause  “quite  nar-
rowly.”  McDonald, 561 U. S., at 808 (opinion of THOMAS,
J.).  Perhaps to compensate for this limited view of the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause, it has incorporated individual
rights against the States through the Due Process Clause.
Id., at 809.

Due  process  incorporation  is  a  demonstrably  erroneous
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  As I have ex-
plained before, “[t]he notion that a constitutional provision
that guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of
life, liberty, or property could define the substance of those
rights  strains  credulity  for  even  the  most  casual  user  of
words.”  Id., at 811.  The unreasonableness of this interpre-
tation is underscored by the Court’s struggle to find a “guid-
ing principle to distinguish ‘fundamental’ rights that war-
rant  protection  from  nonfundamental  rights  that  do  not,”
ibid., as well as its many incorrect decisions based on this
theory, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19
How. 393 (1857).

I “decline to apply the legal fiction” of due process incor-
poration.  Timbs  v.  Indiana,  586  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)
(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  As a result, I part ways with
the Court on both its affirmative argument about the Four-
teenth Amendment and its treatment of Apodaca, in which
five Justices agreed the Sixth Amendment included a right
to  unanimity  but  a  different  majority  concluded  that  the
right did not apply to the States.  See ante, at 7–11.

I would accept petitioner’s invitation to decide this case
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  The Court con-
spicuously avoids saying which clause it analyzes.  See, e.g.,
ante,  at  3,  7.  But  one  assumes  from  its  silence  that  the
Court is either following our due process incorporation prec-
edents or believes that “nothing in this case turns on” which
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into legal arguments regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, due process incorporation, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

give the State any claim to the beneficiary’s property.  In
other words, Medicaid is not a loan.  If a Medicaid benefi-
ciary’s  financial  circumstances  change  and  a  beneficiary
gains the ability to pay for his or her own medical expenses,
the beneficiary is not obligated to repay the State for past
expenses, no matter the magnitude of the change in circum-
stances.  Rather, the ordinary consequence is that the indi-
vidual  simply  becomes  ineligible  for  benefits  moving  for-
ward.1
  In Ahlborn, this Court held that the Medicaid provisions
enabling the State to seek reimbursement from third par-
ties liable for a beneficiary’s medical care (discussed in de-
tail below) establish a narrow exception to the anti-lien pro-
vision.  The exception applies where the beneficiary directly
sues a tortfeasor for payment of medical costs.2  As a thresh-
old matter, the Court held that a beneficiary’s settlement
proceeds  qualified  as  beneficiary  “property”  protected  by
the anti-lien provision unless an exception to that provision
applied.  Id., at 285–286.  The Court further held that Med-
icaid’s assignment to the State of rights to reimbursement
from  third  parties  “carved  out”  an  “exception  to  the  anti-

——————

1 Petitioner Gianinna Gallardo has continued to receive Medicaid ben-
efits, despite the proceeds from her tort settlement, because those pro-
ceeds were transferred into a congressionally authorized Special Needs
Trust, a narrow exception to Medicaid’s asset limits.  See Reply Brief 22,
n. 6.  Such a trust exists to pay expenses not covered by Medicaid, which
may include, for example, certain home nursing care or a home ramp for
a wheelchair.  Upon a beneficiary’s death, all trust assets are transferred
to the State until the State is fully reimbursed for all medical assistance
it has furnished.  See §1396p(d)(4)(A); Brief for American Justice Associ-
ation et al. as Amici Curiae 4–7.

2 The  Ahlborn  Court  “assume[d]”  without  deciding  “that  a  State  can
fulfill its obligations under the federal third-party liability provisions by
. . .  placing  a  lien  on  . . .  the  settlement  that  a  Medicaid  recipient  pro-
cures on her own.”  Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Servs. v. Ahl-
born, 547 U. S. 268, 280, n. 9 (2006); see also id., at 281 (“assuming” that
one of these provisions, §1396k(b), “applies in cases where the State does
not actively participate in the litigation”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

21

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

limits  remain  the  primary  means  of  regulating  campaign
contributions—the obvious explanation for why the aggre-
gate  limits  received  a  scant  few  sentences  of  attention  in
Buckley.7

B
“When  the  Government  restricts  speech,  the  Govern-
ment  bears  the  burden  of  proving  the  constitutionality
of  its  actions.”  United  States  v.  Playboy  Entertainment
Group,  Inc.,  529  U. S.,  at  816.    Here,  the  Government
seeks  to  carry  that  burden  by  arguing  that  the  aggregate
limits further the permissible objective of preventing quid
pro quo corruption.

The  difficulty  is  that  once  the  aggregate  limits  kick  in,
they ban all contributions of any amount.  But Congress’s
selection  of  a  $5,200  base  limit  indicates  its  belief  that
contributions  of  that  amount  or  less  do  not  create  a  cog-
nizable  risk  of  corruption.    If  there  is  no  corruption  con-
cern  in  giving  nine  candidates  up  to  $5,200  each,  it  is
difficult  to  understand  how  a  tenth  candidate  can  be  re-
garded  as  corruptible  if  given  $1,801,  and  all  others  cor-

——————

at  31–38  (appendix  A  to  opinion  of  BREYER,  J.)  (excerpts  from
McConnell  record  discussing  unregulated  “soft  money”).    Our  holding
about  the  constitutionality  of  the  aggregate  limits  clearly  does  not
overrule McConnell’s holding about “soft money.”

7 It would be especially odd to regard aggregate limits as essential to
enforce  base  limits  when  state  campaign  finance  schemes  typically
include base limits but not aggregate limits.  Just eight of the 38 States
that  have  imposed  base  limits  on  contributions  from  individuals  to
candidates  have  also  imposed  aggregate  limits  (excluding  restrictions
on a specific subset of donors).  See Conn. Gen. Stat. §9–611(c) (2013);
Me.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.,  Tit.  21–A,  §1015(3)  (Supp.  2013);  Md.  Elec.  Law
Code  Ann.  §13–226(b)  (Lexis  Supp.  2013);  Mass.  Gen.  Laws,  ch.  55,
§7A(a)(5)  (West  2012);  N. Y.  Elec.  Law  Ann.  §14–114(8)  (West  Supp.
2013);  R. I.  Gen.  Laws  §17–25–10.1(a)(1)  (Lexis  2013);  Wis.  Stat.
§11.26(4)  (2007–2008);  Wyo.  Stat.  Ann.  §22–25–102(c)(ii)  (2013).    The
Government presents no evidence concerning the circumvention of base
limits from the 30 States with base limits but no aggregate limits.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case _McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission_. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it unsuitable for indexing as it is not general readable text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

334

UNITED STATES v. BAJAKAJIAN

Opinion of the Court

the excessiveness of a punitive forfeiture involves solely
a proportionality determination. See infra this page and
335–337.9

III

Because the forfeiture of respondent’s currency constitutes
punishment and is thus a “ﬁne” within the meaning of
the Excessive Fines Clause, we now turn to the question
whether it is “excessive.”

A

The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The
amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the
gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. See
Austin v. United States, 509 U. S., at 622–623 (noting Court
of Appeals’ statement that “ ‘the government is exacting too
high a penalty in relation to the offense committed’ ”); Alex-
ander v. United States, 509 U. S. 544, 559 (1993) (“It is in
the light of the extensive criminal activities which petitioner
apparently conducted . . . that the question whether the for-
feiture was ‘excessive’ must be considered”). Until today,
however, we have not articulated a standard for determining
whether a punitive forfeiture is constitutionally excessive.
We now hold that a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive
Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of
a defendant’s offense.

9 The currency in question is not an instrumentality in any event. The
Court of Appeals reasoned that the existence of the currency as a “precon-
dition” to the reporting requirement did not make it an “instrumentality”
of the offense. See 84 F. 3d 334, 337 (CA9 1996). We agree; the currency
is merely the subject of the crime of failure to report. Cash in a suitcase
does not facilitate the commission of that crime as, for example, an auto-
mobile facilitates the transportation of goods concealed to avoid taxes.
See, e. g., J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, supra, at 508.
In the latter instance, the property is the actual means by which the crimi-
nal act is committed. See Black’s Law Dictionary 801 (6th ed. 1990) (“In-
strumentality” is “[s]omething by which an end is achieved; a means,
medium, agency”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court in the case of United States v. Bajakajian. It discusses the Excessive Fines Clause and its application to punitive forfeitures.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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