<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ENDREW F. v. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. RE–1

Syllabus

his circumstances.  Pp. 15–16.

798 F. 3d 1329, vacated and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case syllabus, which is not typically considered suitable for indexing as it provides a summary rather than the full text content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

982

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

September 29, 1998

524 U. S.

or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 29, 1998. This Court’s Rule
29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 711 So. 2d 1005.

No. 97–9217. Peguero v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be ﬁled with the
Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m., Tues-
day, November 10, 1998. Brief of respondent is to be ﬁled with
the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3 p.m.,
Tuesday, December 8, 1998. A reply brief, if any, is to be ﬁled
with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3
p.m., Tuesday, December 29, 1998. This Court’s Rule 29.2 does
not apply. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 430.

No. 98–18. Brooker v. Durocher Dock & Dredge et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be
ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be-
fore 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 10, 1998. Brief of respondents is
to be ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on
or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 8, 1998. A reply brief, if
any, is to be ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel
on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 29, 1998. This Court’s
Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 1390.

No. 98–84. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioner is to be
ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be-
fore 3 p.m., Tuesday, November 10, 1998. Brief of respondent is
to be ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on
or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 8, 1998. A reply brief, if
any, is to be ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel
on or before 3 p.m., Tuesday, December 29, 1998. This Court’s
Rule 29.2 does not apply. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 180.

No. 98–97. Anderson, Director, California Department
of Social Services, et al. v. Roe et al., on Behalf of Them-
selves and All Others Similarly Situated. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motions of United States Justice Foundation et al. and Washing-
ton Legal Foundation et al. for leave to ﬁle briefs as amici curiae
granted. Certiorari granted. Brief of petitioners is to be ﬁled
with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 3
p.m., Tuesday, November 10, 1998. Brief of respondents is to be
ﬁled with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or be-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their procedural details, likely from a legal publication. It's not the main body of text from a book and is more like a docket or calendar.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

JACKSON, J., dissenting

appeal succeeds, the pro-arbitration party gets its wish and
the dispute goes to arbitration.

Perhaps for those reasons, real-life parties do not agree
with the majority that an interlocutory arbitrability appeal
is pointless without an automatic stay.  No stay was issued
in this case, for example, yet Coinbase still pursued its in-
terlocutory appeal.  Nor did other parties stop bringing in-
terlocutory arbitrability appeals in the Circuits that had in-
terpreted §16 to impose no automatic stay.4

Yet this Court steps in to give the pro-arbitration party
the  additional  right  to  an  automatic  stay  that  Congress
withheld.  Now, any defendant that devises a non-frivolous
argument for arbitration can not only appeal, but also press
pause  on  the  case—leaving  plaintiffs  to  suffer  harm,  lose
evidence, and bleed dry their patience and funding in the
meantime.  To  confer  that  power  on  a  class  of  litigants,
based on blanket judgments resolving competing policy con-
cerns, is Congress’s domain, not ours.  And where Congress
is silent, the job of managing particular litigation, in light
of  the  concrete  circumstances  presented,  belongs  to  the
judge closest to a case.

——————

4 For over a decade, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have all held
that a §16(a) appeal triggers no mandatory general stay.  Motorola Credit
Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F. 3d 39, 53–54 (CA2 2004); Britton v. Co-op Banking
Group, 916 F. 2d 1405, 1412 (CA9 1990); Weingarten Realty Investors v.
Miller, 661 F. 3d 904, 907–910 (CA5 2011).  And those Circuits face no
shortage  of  interlocutory  §16(a)  appeals.    See,  e.g.,  Palacios  v.  Alifine
Dining, Inc., 2023 WL 2469765 (CA2, Mar. 13, 2023); Laurel v. Cintas
Corp., 2023 WL 2363686 (CA9, Mar. 6, 2023); NATS, Inc. v. Radiation
Shield Technologies, Inc., 2023 WL 2416160 (CA2, Mar. 9, 2023); Hill v.
Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC, 59 F. 4th 457 (CA9 2023); Johnson v. Walmart
Inc., 57 F. 4th 677 (CA9 2023); Noble Capital Fund Mgmt., LLC v. US
Capital Global Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 31 F. 4th 333 (CA5 2022); Forby v. One
Technologies, LP, 13 F. 4th 460 (CA5 2021); Soliman v. Subway Franchi-
see Adv. Fund Trust, Ltd., 999 F. 3d 828 (CA2 2021); Polyflow, LLC v.
Specialty RTP, LLC, 993 F. 3d 295 (CA5 2021).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the actual legal content of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

even considered doing so was in 1753, in Baker v. James,
PC2/103,  pp. 320–321.    After  Baker  v.  James,  the  Privy
Council  “divest[ed]  itself  of  its  functions”  in  ordinary
patent disputes, Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of
Letters Patent for Invention from the Restoration to 1794
(Pt.  II),  33  L.  Q.  Rev.  180,  194  (1917),  which  “thereafter
[were] adjudicated solely by the law courts, as opposed to
the  [crown’s]  prerogative  courts,”  Mossoff,  Rethinking  the
Development  of  Patents:  An  Intellectual  History,  1550–
1800,  52  Hastings  L. J.  1255,  1286–1287  (2001)  (Mossoff,
Rethinking Patents).2
  This  shift  to  courts  paralleled  a  shift  in  thinking.    Pa-
tents began as little more than feudal favors.  Id., at 1261.
The crown both issued and revoked them.  Lemley, Juries
1680–1681.  And they often permitted the lucky recipient
the exclusive right to do very ordinary things, like operate
a toll bridge or run a tavern.  Ibid.  But by the 18th century,
inventors  were  busy  in  Britain  and  invention  patents
came  to  be  seen  in  a  different  light.    They  came  to  be
viewed  not  as  endowing  accidental  and  anticompetitive
monopolies  on  the  fortunate  few  but  as  a  procompetitive
means to secure to individuals the fruits of their labor and
ingenuity; encourage others to emulate them; and promote

——————

(Nov.  6,  2017)

2 See also Brief for H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui et al. as Amici Curiae
6–37;  Brief
for  Alliacense  Limited  LLC  as  Amicus  Curiae
10–11;  Gómez-Arostegui  &  Bottomley,  Privy  Council  and  Scire  Facias
1700–1883,  p. 2
(Addendum),  https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3054989 (all Internet materials as last visited Apr. 20, 2018);
Observations on the Utility of Patents, and on the Sentiments of Lord
Kenyon  Respecting  That  Subject  23  (2d  ed.  1791)  (“If  persons  of  the
same  trade  find  themselves  aggrieved  by  Patents  taken  for  any  thing
already in use, their remedy is at hand.  It is by a writ of Scire Facias”);
Mancius  v.  Lawton,  10  Johns.  23,  24  (NY  Sup.  Ct.  1813)  (Kent,  C. J.)
(noting  the  “settled  English  course”  that  “[l]etters-patent  . . .  can  only
be avoided in chancery, by a writ of scire facias sued out on the part of
the  government,  or  by  some  individual  prosecuting  in  its  name”  (em-
phasis deleted)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It cites legal precedents and discusses the history of patents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U37

[09-26-01 08:37:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN

202

CORTEZ BYRD CHIPS, INC. v. BILL HARBERT
CONSTR. CO.
Opinion of the Court

ance with the terms of the agreement.” 9 U. S. C. § 3.
If
an arbitration were then held outside the district of that liti-
gation, under a restrictive reading of §§ 9–11 a subsequent
proceeding to conﬁrm, modify, or set aside the arbitration
award could not be brought in the district of the original
litigation (unless that also happened to be the chosen venue
in a forum selection agreement). We have, however, pre-
viously held that the court with the power to stay the action
under § 3 has the further power to conﬁrm any ensuing arbi-
tration award. Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S.
263, 275–276 (1932) (“We do not conceive it to be open to
question that, where the court has authority under the
statute . . . to make an order for arbitration, the court also
has authority to conﬁrm the award or to set it aside for irreg-
ularity, fraud, ultra vires or other defect”). Harbert in ef-
fect concedes this point, acknowledging that “the court en-
tering a stay order under § 3 retains jurisdiction over the
proceeding and does not ‘lose venue.’ ” Brief for Respond-
ent 29. But that concession saving our precedent still fails
to explain why Congress would have wanted to allow venue
liberally where motions to conﬁrm, vacate, or modify were
brought as subsequent stages of actions antedating the arbi-
tration, but would have wanted a different rule when arbi-
tration was not preceded by a suit between the parties.

Finally, Harbert’s interpretation would create anomalous
results in the aftermath of arbitrations held abroad. Sec-
tions 204, 207, and 302 of the FAA together provide for
liberal choice of venue for actions to conﬁrm awards subject
to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the 1975 Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.3
9

3 Section 204 provides for venue in actions under the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards “in any such
court in which save for the arbitration agreement an action or proceeding
with respect to the controversy . . . could be brought, or in such court
for the district and division which embraces the place designated in the
agreement as the place of arbitration.” Section 207 states that “any party
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Federal Arbitration Act. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it is part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary section like a table of contents or introductory paragraph.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  546 U. S. ____ (2006)

3

Syllabus

accepted  safety  for  use  . . .  under  medical  supervision,”  21  U. S. C.
§812(b)(1), by itself precludes any consideration of individualized ex-
ceptions, and that the Act’s “closed” regulatory system, which prohib-
its all use of controlled substances except as the Act itself authorizes,
see  Gonzales  v.  Raich,  545  U. S.  ___,  ___,  cannot  function  properly  if
subjected to judicial exemptions.  Pp. 8–16.

(a) RFRA  and  its  strict  scrutiny  test  contemplate  an  inquiry
more focused than the Government’s categorical approach.  RFRA re-
quires  the  Government  to  demonstrate  that  the  compelling  interest
test is satisfied through application of the challenged law “to the per-
son”—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is be-
ing  substantially  burdened.    42  U. S. C.  §2000bb–1(b).  Section
2000bb(b)(1)  expressly  adopted  the  compelling  interest  test  of  Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205.
There, the Court looked beyond broadly formulated interests justify-
ing the general applicability of government mandates, scrutinized the
asserted  harms,  and  granted  specific  exemptions  to  particular  reli-
gious claimants.  Id., at 213, 221, 236; Sherbert, supra, at 410.  Out-
side  the  Free  Exercise  area  as  well,  the  Court  has  noted  that
“[c]ontext matters” in applying the compelling interest test, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 327, and has emphasized that strict scrutiny’s
fundamental  purpose  is  to  take    “relevant  differences”  into  account,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 228.  Pp. 9–10.

(b) Under  RFRA’s  more  focused  inquiry, the  Government’s  mere
invocation  of  the  general  characteristics  of  Schedule  I  substances
cannot carry the day.  Although Schedule I substances such as DMT
are  exceptionally  dangerous,  see,  e.g.,  Touby  v.  United  States,  500
U. S.  160,  162,  there  is  no  indication  that  Congress,  in  classifying
DMT,  considered  the  harms  posed  by  the  particular  use  at  issue.
That  question  was  litigated  below.    Before  the  District  Court  found
that the Government had not carried its burden of showing a compel-
ling  interest  in  preventing  such  harm,  the  court  noted  that  it  could
not  ignore  the  congressional  classification  and  findings.    But  Con-
gress’  determination  that  DMT  should  be  listed  under  Schedule  I
simply  does  not  provide  a  categorical  answer  that  relieves  the  Gov-
ernment  of  the  obligation  to  shoulder  its  RFRA  burden.    The  Con-
trolled  Substances  Act’s  authorization  to  the  Attorney  General  to
“waive the requirement for registration of certain manufacturers, dis-
tributors, or dispensers if he finds it consistent with the public health
and  safety,”  21  U. S. C.  §822(d),  reinforces  that  Congress’  findings
with  respect  to  Schedule  I  substances  should  not  carry  the  determi-
native  weight,  for  RFRA  purposes,  that  the  Government  would  as-
cribe  to  them.    Indeed,  despite  the  fact  that  everything  the  Govern-
ment says about the DMT in hoasca applies in equal measure to the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It discusses the case of a religious group seeking an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for the use of DMT in a religious ceremony. The text delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and its application to this specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Supreme Court Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–1501
_________________

CHARLES C. LIU, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 2020]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
The Court correctly declines to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s
decision upholding the District Court’s disgorgement order,
but  I  disagree  with  the  Court’s  decision  to  vacate  and  re-
mand  for  the  lower  courts  to  “limi[t]”  the  disgorgement
award.  Ante, at 1.  Disgorgement can never be awarded un-
der 15 U. S. C. §78u(d)(5).  That statute authorizes the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to seek only “eq-
uitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the
benefit of investors,” and disgorgement is not a traditional
equitable remedy.  Thus, I would reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.

I

The  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934,  as  amended  in
2005, allows the SEC to request “equitable relief ” in federal
district  court  against  those  who  violate  federal  securities
laws.  §78u(d)(5).  According to our usual interpretive con-
vention, “equitable relief ” refers to forms of equitable relief
available in the English Court of Chancery at the time of
the  founding.  Because  disgorgement  is  a  creation  of  the
20th century, it is not properly characterized as “equitable
relief,” and, hence, the District Court was not authorized to
award it under §78u(d)(5).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  It cites legal statutes and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

TRUMP v. VANCE

ALITO, J., dissenting

that  the  State  could  not  tax  it.    Marshall  recognized  that
the  States  retained  the  “sovereign”  power  to  tax  persons
and  entities  within  their  jurisdiction,  id.,  at  429,  but  this
power,  he  explained,  “is  subordinate  to,  and  may  be  con-
trolled by the constitution of the United States.”  Id., at 427.
Noting  the  potency  of  the  taxing  power  (“[a]  right  to  tax
without limit or control, is essentially a power to destroy,”
id., at 391), he concluded that a State’s power to tax had to
give way to Congress’s authority to charter the bank.  In his
words, the state power to tax could not be used to “defeat
the legitimate operations,” id., at 427, of the Federal Gov-
ernment  or  “to  retard,  impede,  burden,  or  in  any  manner
control” it, id., at 436.  Marshall thus held, not simply that
Maryland  was  barred  from  assessing  a  crushing  tax  that
threatened the bank’s ability to operate, but that the State
could not tax the bank at all.  He wrote:

“We are not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit
for the judicial department, what degree of taxation is
the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the
abuse of the power.  The attempt to use it on the means
employed  by  the  government  of  the  Union,  in  pursu-
ance of the constitution, is itself an abuse.”  Id., at 430.

Even a rule allowing a state tax that did not discriminate
between the federally chartered bank and state banks was
ruled  out.  Instead,  he  concluded  that  preservation  of  the
Constitution’s  federal  structure  demanded  that  any  state
effort to tax a federal instrumentality be nipped in the bud.
Building on this principle of federalism, two centuries of
case  law  prohibit  the  States  from  taxing,4  regulating,  or

——————

4 Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U. S. 110, 117 (1954) (noting that
“recognition of the constitutional immunity of the Federal Government
from  state  exactions  rests,  of  course,  upon  unquestioned  authority”);
Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 447 (1943) (“These inspection fees
are laid directly upon the United States. They are money exactions the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Trump v. Vance. It cites legal precedent and discusses the principles of federalism and state taxation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES

BREYER, J., dissenting

which,  and  the  circumstances  under  which  a  union  that
represents  nonmembers  in  collective  bargaining  can  re-
quire  those  nonmembers  to  help  pay  for  the  union’s  (con-
stitutionally  chargeable)  collective-bargaining  expenses.
Twenty-three  States  have  enacted  “right  to  work”  laws,
which,  in  effect,  prevent  unions  from  requiring  nonmem-
bers  to  pay  any  of  those  costs.    See  Dept.  of  Labor,  Wage
and Hour Division, State Right-to-Work Laws (Jan. 2009),
online  at  http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/righttowork.htm  (as
visited  June  18,  2012,  and  available  in  Clerk  of  Court’s
case  file).  Other  States  have  rejected  the  “right  to  work”
approach and permit unions to require contributions from
nonmembers,  while  protecting  those  nonmembers’  right
to  opt  out  of  supporting  the  union’s  political  activities.
E.g., Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §§3502.5(a), 3515.8.  Still others
have enacted compromise laws that assume a nonmember
does not wish to pay the nonchargeable portion of the fee
unless  he  or  she  affirmatively  indicates  a  desire  to  do  so.
See Wash. Rev. Code §42.17A.500 (2010) (providing that a
union  cannot  use  a  nonmember’s  agency  fee  for  political
purposes  “unless  affirmatively  authorized  by  the  individ-
ual”).  The debate about public unions’ collective-bargaining
rights is currently intense.

The question of how a nonmember indicates a desire not
to pay constitutes an important part of this debate.  Must
the union assume that the nonmember does not intend to
pay unless he affirmatively indicates his desire to pay, by
“opting in”?  Or, may the union assume that the nonmem-
ber  is  willing  to  pay  unless  the  nonmember  indicates  a
desire  not  to  pay,  by  “opting  out”?    Where,  as  here,  non-
chargeable political expenses are at issue, there may be a
significant number of represented nonmembers who do not
feel strongly enough about the union’s politics to indicate a
choice either way.  That being so, an “opt-in” requirement
can  reduce  union  revenues  significantly,  a  matter  of  con-
siderable  importance  to  the  union,  while  the  additional
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the legal framework surrounding "right to work" laws and agency fees for non-member employees in unions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

PORTER  v.  McCOLLUM

Per Curiam

classes  for  slow  learners  and  left  school  when  he  was  12
or 13.

To  escape  his  horrible  family  life,  Porter  enlisted  in  the
Army at age 17 and fought in the Korean War.  His company
commander,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Sherman  Pratt,  testiﬁed  at
Porter’s postconviction hearing.  Porter was with the 2d Di
vision,  which  had  advanced  above  the  38th  parallel  to
Kunu-ri  when  it  was  attacked  by  Chinese  forces.  Porter
suffered a gunshot wound to the leg during the advance but
was  with  the  unit  for  the  battle  at  Kunu-ri.  While  the  8th
Army was withdrawing, the 2d Division was ordered to hold
off  the  Chinese  advance,  enabling  the  bulk  of  the  8th  Army
to  live  to  ﬁght  another  day.  As  Colonel  Pratt  described  it,
the  unit “went  into  position there  in  bitter  cold night,  terri
bly worn out, terribly weary, almost like zombies because we
had been in constant—for ﬁve days we had been in constant
contact  with  the  enemy  ﬁghting  our  way  to  the  rear,  little
or  no  sleep,  little  or  no  food,  literally  as  I  say  zombies.”  1
Tr.  138  (Jan.  4,  1996).  The  next  morning,  the  unit  engaged
in  a  “ﬁerce  hand-to-hand  ﬁght  with  the  Chinese”  and  later
that  day  received  permission  to  withdraw,  making  Porter’s
regiment  the  last  unit  of  the  8th  Army  to  withdraw.  Id.,
at 139–140.

Less  than  three  months  later,  Porter  fought  in  a  second
battle,  at  Chip’yong-ni.  His  regiment  was  cut  off  from  the
rest  of  the  8th  Army  and  defended  itself  for  two  days  and
two  nights  under  constant  ﬁre.  After  the  enemy  broke
through  the  perimeter  and  overtook  defensive  positions  on
high  ground,  Porter’s  company  was  charged  with  retaking
those positions.  In the charge up the hill, the soldiers “were
under direct open ﬁre of the enemy forces on top of the hill.
They  immediately  came  under  mortar,  artillery,  machine
gun,  and  every  other  kind  of  ﬁre  you  can  imagine  and  they
were  just  dropping  like  ﬂies  as  they  went  along.”  Id.,  at
150.  Porter’s  company  lost  all  three  of  its  platoon  ser
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically describing the military service history of a person named Porter. It provides details about his battles in the Korean War, highlighting his bravery and the difficult conditions he faced.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

Syllabus

take  as  grammatical  objects  records,  documents,  or  things  used  to
record or preserve information, such as logbooks or hard drives.  See
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575.

Use  of  traditional  tools  of  statutory  interpretation  to  examine
markers  of  congressional  intent  within  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  and
§1519  itself  thus  call  for  rejection  of  an  aggressive  interpretation  of
“tangible object.”

Furthermore, the meaning of “record, document, or thing” in a pro-
vision of the 1962 Model Penal Code (MPC) that has been interpreted
to prohibit tampering with any kind of physical evidence is not a reli-
able  indicator  of  the  meaning  Congress  assigned  to  “record,  docu-
ment, or tangible object” in  §1519.  There are significant differences
between the offense described by the MPC provision and the offense
created by §1519.  Pp. 10–18.

(c) Finally, if recourse to traditional tools of statutory construction
leaves  any  doubt  about  the  meaning  of  “tangible  object”  in  §1519,  it
would be appropriate to invoke the rule of lenity.  Pp. 18–19.

JUSTICE  ALITO  concluded  that  traditional  rules  of  statutory  con-
struction  confirm  that  Yates  has  the  better  argument.    Title  18
U. S. C. §1519’s list of nouns, list of verbs, and title, when combined,
tip the case in favor of Yates.  Applying the canons noscitur a sociis
and  ejusdem  generis  to  the  list  of  nouns—“any  record,  document,  or
tangible object”—the term “tangible object” should refer to something
similar to records or documents.  And while many of §1519’s verbs—
“alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a
false  entry  in”—could  apply  to  far-flung  nouns  such  as  salamanders
or sand dunes, the term “makes a false entry in” makes no sense out-
side of filekeeping.  Finally, §1519’s title—“Destruction, alteration, or
falsification  of  records  in  Federal  investigations  and  bankruptcy”—
also points toward filekeeping rather than fish.  Pp. 1–4.

GINSBURG, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion,  in  which  ROBERTS,  C. J.,  and  BREYER  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,
joined.  ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.  KAGAN,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS,
JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. It summarizes the arguments and holdings of the case, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

THOMAS, J., dissenting

  Nor could such a plan be explained by supposed respect
for the Black Belt.  For present purposes, I accept the Dis-
trict Court’s finding that the Black Belt is a significant com-
munity of interest.  But the entire black population of the
Black Belt—some 300,000 black residents, see Supp. App.
33—is too small to provide a majority in a single congres-
sional district, let alone two.11  The black residents needed
to populate majority-black versions of Districts 2 and 7 are
overwhelmingly concentrated in the urban counties of Jef-
ferson (i.e., the Birmingham metropolitan area, with about
290,000 black residents), Mobile (about 152,000 black resi-
dents),  and  Montgomery  (about  134,000  black  residents).
Id., at 83.  Of the three, only Montgomery County is in the

——————
capture black Mobilians are visually striking and are easily recognized
as  a  racial  grab against  the backdrop  of  the  State’s  demography.    The
District 7 “finger,” which encircles the black population of the Birming-
ham metropolitan area in order to separate them from their white neigh-
bors and link them with black rural areas in the west of the State, also
stands out to the naked eye.  The District Court disregarded the “finger”
because it has been present in every districting plan since 1992, includ-
ing the State’s latest enacted plan.  Singleton v. Merrill, 582 F. Supp. 3d
924, 1011 (ND Ala. 2022) (per curiam).  But that reasoning would allow
plaintiffs to bootstrap one racial gerrymander as a reason for permitting
a second.  Because the question is not before us, I express no opinion on
whether existing District 7 is constitutional as enacted by the State.  It
is indisputable, however, that race predominated in the original creation
of the district, see n. 7, supra, and it is plain that the primary race-neu-
tral justification for the district today must be the State’s legitimate in-
terest  in  “preserving  the  cores  of  prior  districts”  and  the  fact  that  the
areas constituting District 7’s core have been grouped together for dec-
ades.  Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 740 (1983); see also id., at 758
(Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that residents of a political unit “of-
ten  develop  a  community  of  interest”).    The  plaintiffs’  maps,  however,
necessarily would require the State to assign little weight to core reten-
tion  with  respect  to other  districts.    There  could  then be  no  principled
race-neutral justification for prioritizing core retention only when it pre-
served  an  existing  majority-black  district,  while  discarding  it  when  it
stood in the way of creating a new one.

11 The  equal-population  baseline  for  Alabama’s  seven  districts  is

717,154 persons per district.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and cites previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

Opinion of the Court

Fourth, the Tribe argues that, in 1868, the Navajos would
have understood the treaty to mean that the United States
must take affirmative steps to secure water for the Tribe.
But the text of the treaty says nothing to that effect.  And
the  historical  record  does  not  suggest  that  the  United
States  agreed  to  undertake  affirmative  efforts  to  secure
water  for  the  Navajos—any  more  than  the  United  States
agreed to farm land, mine minerals, harvest timber, build
roads, or construct bridges on the reservation.  The record
of the treaty negotiations makes no mention of any water-
related obligations of the United States at all.  See Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe
of Indians With a Record of the Discussions That Led to Its
Signing.4

*

*

*
The 1868 treaty reserved necessary water to accomplish
the  purpose  of  the  Navajo  Reservation.    See  Winters  v.
United  States,  207  U. S.  564,  576–577  (1908).  But  the
treaty did not require the United States to take affirmative
steps  to  secure  water  for  the  Tribe.  We  reverse  the
judgment  of  the  U. S.  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Ninth
Circuit.

It is so ordered.

——————
Nation 33, 40.  But as already explained, the Tribe has failed to identify
any such duty in the 1868 treaty.

4 The  intervenor  States  separately  argue  that  the  Navajo  Tribe’s
claimed  remedies  with  respect  to  the  Lower  Colorado  River  would
interfere with this Court’s decree in Arizona v. California, 547 U. S. 150
(2006).  The  question  of  whether  certain  remedies  would  violate  the
substance of this Court’s 2006 decree is a merits question, not a question
of  subject-matter  jurisdiction.    Because  we  conclude  that  the  treaty
imposes no duty on the United States to take affirmative steps to secure
water  in  the  first  place,  we  need  not  reach  the  question  of  whether
particular remedies would conflict with this Court’s 2006 decree.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of a treaty and its implications for water rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1033

558 U. S.

November 16, 2009

No.  09–6984.  Daniels  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  201.

No.  09–6989.  Garcia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6990.  White  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  484.

No.  09–6996.  Jeffers  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  370  F.  3d  557.

No.  09–6999.  Jones v.  Platteview Apartments  et al.  Ct.

App.  Neb.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7002.  Watters  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  479.

No.  09–7005.  Wise  v.  Floyd,  Judge,  United  States  Dis
trict  Court  for  the  District  of  South  Carolina,  et  al.
C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.
Appx.  908.

No. 09–7008.  Allen v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  796.

No. 09–7010.  Cain v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7011.  Cruz-Gramajo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  570  F.  3d  1162.

No. 09–7015.  Sanches Montes v.  United States.  C. A. 9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7020.  Kindsfather v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7022.  Knight v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  137.

No.  09–7024.  Herring  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  431.

No.  09–7025.  Gable  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  576.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
924

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5957.  Chaudhry  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  119.

No.  09–5958.  Jenkins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  566  F.  3d  160.

No. 09–5959.  Lam  v.  United States.  C. A.  9th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  730.

No.  09–5961.  Marcusse  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  265  Fed.  Appx.  434.

No. 09–5964.  Otero v. United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  1127.

No. 09–5967.  Jordan v. United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5968.  Roberge  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  1005.

No. 09–5969.  Busby v.  United States.  Ct. App. D. C.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  963  A.  2d  167.

No.  09–5970.  Bevers  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  518.

No.  09–5971.  Balderas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  55.

No.  09–5975.  Bolanos-Renteria  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5978.  Robinson  v.  United  States  District  Court
for  the District  of  the Virgin  Islands.  C.  A. 3d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  171.

No.  09–5979.  Ramirez-Ponce  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Flor
ida Department of Corrections, et al.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5985.  Sisney  v.  Best,  Inc.,  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  S.  D.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  769  N. W.  2d  456.

No.  09–5987.  Nichols  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  186.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP

Opinion of the Court

part of a defense of America’s free enterprise system.  Sab-
batino, 376 U. S., at 430.

Given that the FSIA “largely codifies” the restrictive the-
ory, however, we take seriously the Act’s general effort to
preserve a dichotomy between private and public acts.  Nel-
son, 507 U. S., at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted).
It would destroy that distinction were we to subject all man-
ner of sovereign public acts  to judicial scrutiny under the
FSIA by transforming the expropriation exception into an
all-purpose  jurisdictional  hook  for  adjudicating  human
rights violations.  See Helmerich, 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 9) (rejecting the suggestion that Congress intended the
expropriation exception to operate as a “radical departure”
from the “basic principles” of the restrictive theory).

C

Other provisions of the FSIA confirm Germany’s position.
The heirs’ approach, for example, would circumvent the re-
ticulated boundaries Congress placed in the FSIA with re-
gard to human rights violations.  Where Congress did tar-
get injuries associated with such acts, including torture or
death, it did so explicitly and with precision.  The noncom-
mercial tort exception provides jurisdiction over claims “in
which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property,”
but  only  where  the  relevant  conduct  “occurr[ed]  in  the
United  States.”  §1605(a)(5).    Similarly,  the  terrorism  ex-
ception eliminates sovereign immunity for state sponsors of
terrorism but only for certain human rights claims, brought
by certain victims, against certain defendants.  §§1605A(a),
(h).

These  restrictions  would  be  of  little  consequence  if  hu-
man rights abuses could be packaged as violations of prop-
erty  rights  and  thereby  brought  within  the  expropriation
exception to sovereign immunity.  And there is no reason to
suppose Congress thought acts of genocide or other human
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and its application to human rights violations.  The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Syllabus

processes,”  courts  must  consider  the  opportunities  provided  by  a
State’s entire system of voting when assessing the burden imposed by
a challenged provision.  Thus, where a State provides multiple ways to
vote, any burden associated with one option cannot be evaluated with-
out also taking into account the other available means.  P. 18.

(E) The  strength  of  the  state  interests—such  as  the  strong
and  entirely  legitimate  state  interest  in  preventing  election  fraud—
served by a challenged voting rule is an important factor.  Ensuring
that every vote is cast freely, without intimidation or undue influence,
is also a valid and important state interest.  In determining whether a
rule goes too far “based on the totality of circumstances,” rules that are
supported by strong state interests are less likely to violate §2.  Pp.
18–19.

(ii) Some  factors identified  in  Thornburg  v.  Gingles,  478  U. S.
30, were designed for use in vote-dilution cases and are plainly inap-
plicable in a case that involves a challenge to a facially neutral time,
place, or manner voting rule.  While §2(b)’s “totality of circumstances”
language permits consideration of certain other Gingles factors, their
only relevance in cases involving neutral time, place, and manner rules
is to show that minority group members suffered discrimination in the
past and that effects of that discrimination persist.  The disparate-im-
pact  model  employed  in  Title  VII  and  Fair  Housing  Act  cases is  not
useful here.  Pp. 19–21.

(4) Section 2(b) directs courts to consider “the totality of circum-
stances,” but the dissent would make §2 turn almost entirely on one
circumstance: disparate impact.  The dissent also would adopt a least-
restrictive means requirement that would force a State to prove that
the interest served by its voting rule could not be accomplished in any
other less burdensome way.  Such a requirement has no footing in the
text of §2 or the Court’s precedent construing it and would have the
potential to invalidate just about any voting rule a State adopts.  Sec-
tion 2 of the VRA provides vital protection against discriminatory vot-
ing rules, and no one suggests that discrimination in voting has been
extirpated or that the threat has been eliminated.  Even so, §2 does
not  transfer  the  States’  authority  to  set  non-discriminatory  voting
rules to the federal courts.  Pp. 21–25.

(c) Neither  Arizona’s  out-of-precinct  policy  nor  its  ballot-collection

law violates §2 of the VRA.  Pp. 25–34.

(1) Having to identify one’s polling place and then travel there to
vote  does  not  exceed  the  “usual  burdens  of  voting.”    Crawford,  553
U. S., at 198.  In addition, the State made extensive efforts to reduce
the impact of the out-of-precinct policy on the number of valid votes
ultimately cast, e.g., by sending a sample ballot to each household that
includes a voter’s proper polling location.  The burdens of identifying
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the legal reasoning and holdings of the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1069

529 U. S.

April 17, 2000

No. 99–1411. Van Sickle v. Ford Motor Co. et al. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 516.

No. 99–1414. Holmes et ux. v. Daybrook Fisheries, Inc.
Ct. App. La., 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730
So. 2d 1006.

No. 99–1423. Stillo et ux. v. Illinois State Retirement
Systems, Judges’ Retirement System. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 305 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 714
N. E. 2d 11.

No. 99–1441. Gutenkauf et al. v. Maricopa County et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 277.
No. 99–1444. Brown v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 830.

No. 99–1446. McClellan v. Northern Trust Co. App. Ct.

Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1448. Miller v. United States; and
No. 99–1518. Wohlleber v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 1312.

No. 99–1451. Guesman v. District Court of Nevada,
Clark County (Nevada, Real Party in Interest). Sup. Ct.
Nev. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1463.

Junior v. West Virginia et al. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 237.

No. 99–1469. Brost v. Illinois et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1472. Renahan v. Allegheny Power System, dba
Monongahela Power Co., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1305.

No. 99–1487. Fidelity Warranty Services, Inc. v. Kidd.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d
1262.

No. 99–1491. Malladi v. West, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
193 F. 3d 524.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Opinion of the Court

(c)(2) could well have a narrower scope if Congress designed
it  with  the  focused  language  of  (c)(1)  in  mind.  Subsection
(c)(1)  would  then  prohibit  particular  types  of  obstructive
conduct  and  (c)(2)  would  fill  any  inadvertent  gaps  that
might exist.

One way to discern the reach of an “otherwise” clause is
to look for  guidance from whatever examples come before
it. Two general principles are relevant. First, the canon of
noscitur a sociis teaches that a word is “given more precise
content  by  the  neighboring  words  with  which  it  is  associ-
ated.”  United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008).
That  “ avoid[s]  ascribing  to  one  word  a  meaning  so  broad
that it is inconsistent with” “the company it keeps.”  Gus-
tafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995). And under
the related canon of ejusdem generis, “a ‘general or collec-
tive term’ at the end of a list of specific items” is typically
“ ‘controlled and defined by reference to’ the specific classes
. . . that precede it.”  Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596
U. S. 450, 458 (2022) (quoting first Ali v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 225 (2008); then Circuit City Stores,
Inc.  v.  Adams,  532  U. S.  105,  115  (2001));  accord,  Bis-
sonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U. S. 246,
252  (2024).  These  approaches  to  statutory  interpretation
track the common sense intuition that Congress would not
ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaning-
less the specific text that accompanies it.

To see why, consider a straightforward example.  A zoo
might post a sign that reads, “do not pet, feed, yell or throw
objects at the animals, or otherwise disturb them.”  If a vis-
itor  eats  lunch  in  front  of  a  hungry  gorilla,  or  talks  to  a
friend  near  its  enclosure,  has  he  obeyed  the  regulation?
Surely yes.  Although the smell of human food or the sound
of voices might well disturb gorillas, the specific examples
of impermissible conduct all involve direct interaction with
and harassment of the zoo animals.  Merely eating or talk-
ing is so unlike the examples that the zoo provided that it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute. It provides legal analysis and cites relevant case law, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA

BREYER, J., dissenting

provide “services for the care and treatment of patients for
whom the clinic accepts responsibility” with the “direction
or  supervision”  of  each  “service”  undertaken  “by  a  person
licensed, certified or registered to provide such service”).

The  statute  requires  these  facilities  to  post  a  notice  in

their waiting rooms telling their patients:

“California has public programs that provide immedi-
ate  free  or  low-cost  access  to  comprehensive  family
planning  services  (including  all  FDA-approved  meth-
ods  of  contraception),  prenatal  care,  and  abortion  for
eligible  women.  To  determine  whether  you  qualify,
contact  the  county  social  services  office  at  [insert  the
telephone number].”  §123472(a)(1).

The  petitioners  here,  a  group  of  covered  medical  facili-
ties  that  object  to  abortion  for  religious  reasons,  brought
this case seeking an injunction against enforcement of the
California  Reproductive  Freedom,  Accountability,  Com-
prehensive  Care,  and  Transparency  Act  on  the  ground
that  it  violates  the  First  Amendment  on  its  face.    The
District  Court  denied  a  preliminary  injunction,  and  the
Court of Appeals affirmed.  The majority now reverses the
Court  of  Appeals  on  the  ground  that  the  petitioners  have
shown  a  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits,  i.e.,  that  the
statute  likely  violates  the  petitioners’  free  speech  rights
and is unconstitutional on its face.

A
Before turning to the specific law before us, I focus upon
the  general  interpretation  of  the  First  Amendment  that
the  majority  says  it  applies.  It  applies  heightened  scru-
tiny  to  the  Act  because  the  Act,  in  its  view,  is  “content
based.”  Ante, at 6–7.  “By compelling individuals to speak
a  particular  message,”  it  adds,  “such  notices  ‘alte[r]  the
content  of  [their]  speech.’ ”    Ante,  at  7  (quoting  Riley  v.
National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA. It delves into the interpretation of the First Amendment and its application to a California law regarding reproductive healthcare.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

875

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–25.  Diodoro  v.  Pennsylvania.  Sup.  Ct.  Pa.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  601  Pa.  6,  970  A.  2d  1100.

No.  09–27.  Hernandez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  937  and  321
Fed.  Appx.  606.

No.  09–30.  Moore  v.  Williamsburg  Regional  Hospital
et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560
F.  3d  166.

No.  09–31.  Reyes  v.  Board  of  County  Commissioners  of
the  County  of  Arapahoe,  Colorado,  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  113.

No.  09–33.  Lin  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  502.

No.  09–37.  Santoso  et  ux.  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.
Appx.  569.

No.  09–39.  Dufrene  Boats,  Inc.  v.  Nga  Trinh,  Individu
ally  and  on  Behalf  of  Hao  Tran  et  al.  Ct.  App.  La.,  1st
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  6  So.  3d  830.

No.  09–40.  Illinois  Investment  Trust  No.  92–7163  v.
American Grading Co.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Re
ported  below:  562  F.  3d  824.

No.  09–41.  Luna-Hernandez  v.  Holder,  Attorney  Gen
eral.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  301
Fed.  Appx.  691.

No.  09–42.  Butler  v.  Greif,  Inc.,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  748.

No.  09–43.  Pannell  v.  Hall,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–44.  Cano  v.  Industrial  Commission  of  Arizona

et  al.  Ct.  App.  Ariz.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–46.  United  States  ex  rel.  Vuyyuru  v.  Jadhav
et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555
F.  3d  337.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 120 (2010)

123

Per Curiam

witnesses  saw  a  man  dressed  in  dark  jeans,  a  cowboy  hat,
and  a  black  satin  jacket  stumbling  in  the  road  between  the
two trailers shortly after 1 a.m.

The bedroom where the rape occurred was dark, and Jane
was  unable  to  conclusively  identify  her  assailant.  When
asked  whom  he  reminded  her  of,  she  mentioned  both  Troy
and  his  brother  Trent.  Several  days  after  the  rape,  she
identiﬁed a man she saw on television (Troy) as her assailant
but then stated that the man who had sent ﬂowers attacked
her.  It was Trent and Raquel who had sent her ﬂowers, not
Troy.  She  was  unable  to  identify  Troy  as  her  assailant  out
of a photo lineup, and she could not identify her assailant at
trial.  The night of the rape, however, she said her attacker
was  wearing  dark jeans,  a  black  jacket  with a  zipper,  boots,
and  a  watch.  She  also  vividly  remembered  that  the  man
“stunk  real,  real  bad”  of  “cologne,  or  some  beer  or  puke  or
something.”  Id., at 172–173.

Some  evidence  besides  Jane’s  inconsistent  identiﬁcation
did  not  inculpate  Troy.  Jane  testiﬁed  that  she  thought  she
had  bitten  her  assailant,  but  Troy  did  not  have  any  bite
marks  on  his  hands  when  examined  by  a  police  ofﬁcer  ap
proximately  four  hours  after  the  attack.  Jane  stated  that
her  assailant’s  jacket  had  a  zipper  (Troy’s  did  not)  and  that
he  wore  a  watch  (Troy  claimed  he  did  not).  Additionally,
there was conﬂicting testimony as to when Troy left the Pea
cock  and  when  Pam  received  Jane’s  call  reporting  the  rape.
The  witnesses  who  saw  a  man  stumbling  between  the  two
trailers  reported  a  bright  green  logo  on  the  back  of  the
jacket,  but  Troy’s  jacket  had  a  yellow  and  orange  logo.  Fi
nally, because Jane thought she had left a night light on when
she  went  to  bed,  the  police  suspected  the  assailant  had
turned off the light.  The only usable ﬁngerprint taken from
the  light  did  not  match  Troy’s,  and  the  police  did  not  ﬁnd
Troy’s ﬁngerprints in the trailer.

Other  physical  evidence,  however,  pointed  to  Troy.  The
police recovered semen from Jane’s underwear and from the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically focusing on the evidence presented against a suspect named Troy. It details witness testimonies, physical evidence, and inconsistencies in the victim's identification.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

districting plan in Beens were different from the effects of
the  plan  now  before  us  because  the  former  concerned  the
legislature’s internal operations.  See ante, at 10–11.  But
even  if  the  imposition  of  the  court-ordered  plan  in  this
case would not affect the internal operations of the House
(and that is by no means clear), it is very strange to think
that changes to such things as “committee structures” and
“voting  rules,”  see  ante,  at  10,  are  more  important  than
changes in legislative output.
  In  short,  the  invalidation  of  the  House’s  redistricting
plan and its replacement with a court-ordered map would
cause  the  House  to  suffer  a  “concrete”  injury.    And  as
Article III demands, see Spokeo, 578 U. S., at ___–___ (slip
op.,  at  6–7),  that  injury  would  also  be  “particularized”
(because  it  would  target  the  House);  “imminent”  (because
it  would  certainly  occur  if  this  appeal  is  dismissed);
“traceable”  to  the  imposition  of  the  new,  court-ordered
plan;  and  “redress[able]”  by  the  relief  the  House  seeks
here.  Ibid.

II
  Although  the  opinion  of  the  Court  begins  by  citing  the
three  fundamental  Article  III  standing  requirements  just
discussed,  see  ante,  at  3,  it  is  revealing  that  the  Court
never  asserts  that  the  effect  of  the  court-ordered  plan  at
issue  would  not  cause  the  House  “concrete”  harm.    In-
stead,  the  Court  claims  only  that  any  harm  would  not  be
“ ‘judicially  cognizable,’ ”  ante,  at  7;  see  also  ante,  at  11.
The  Court  lifts  this  term  from  Raines  v.  Byrd,  521  U. S.
811,  819  (1997),  where  the  Court  held  that  individual
Members  of  Congress  lacked  standing  to  challenge  the
constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act.  But the deci-
sion  in  Raines  rested  heavily  on  federal  separation-of-
powers concerns, which  are  notably  absent  here.    See  id.,
at  819–820,  826–829;  id.,  at  832–835  (Souter,  J.,  concur-
ring in judgment).  And although the Court does not say so
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It discusses the legal standing of the House of Representatives to challenge a court-ordered redistricting plan. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

35

Opinion of the Court

which  [it]  lacks  command  and  control  of  its  territory.”
Proclamation §2(h)(i).  As for Iraq, the Secretary of Home-
land Security determined that entry restrictions were not
warranted  in  light  of  the  close  cooperative  relationship
between  the  U. S.  and  Iraqi  Governments  and  the  coun-
try’s key role in combating terrorism in the region.  §1(g).
It  is,  in  any  event,  difficult  to  see  how  exempting  one  of
the largest predominantly Muslim countries in the region
from  coverage  under  the  Proclamation  can  be  cited  as
evidence of animus toward Muslims.

The  dissent  likewise  doubts  the  thoroughness  of  the
multi-agency  review  because  a  recent  Freedom  of  Infor-
mation Act request shows that the final DHS report “was
a  mere  17  pages.”    Post,  at  19.  Yet  a  simple  page  count
offers  little  insight  into  the  actual  substance  of  the  final
report,  much  less  predecisional  materials  underlying  it.
See 5 U. S. C. §552(b)(5) (exempting deliberative materials
from FOIA disclosure).

More  fundamentally,  plaintiffs  and  the  dissent  chal-
lenge the entry suspension based on their perception of its
effectiveness and wisdom.  They suggest that the policy is
overbroad  and  does  little  to  serve  national  security  inter-
ests.  But we cannot substitute our own assessment for the
Executive’s  predictive  judgments  on  such  matters,  all  of
which “are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy.”  Chicago  &  Southern  Air  Lines,  Inc.  v.  Water-
man S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 111 (1948); see also Regan
v.  Wald,  468  U. S.  222,  242–243  (1984)  (declining  invita-
tion  to  conduct  an  “independent  foreign  policy  analysis”).
While  we  of  course  “do  not  defer  to  the  Government’s
reading of the First Amendment,” the Executive’s evalua-
tion  of  the  underlying  facts  is  entitled  to  appropriate
weight,  particularly  in  the  context  of  litigation  involving
“sensitive  and  weighty  interests  of  national  security  and
foreign affairs.”  Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S., at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the rationale behind a presidential proclamation restricting travel from certain countries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

members,  see  Steele  v.  Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  Co.,  323
U. S.  192,  202–203  (1944),  but  the  union’s  bargaining
latitude would be little different if state law simply prohib
ited  public  employers  from  entering  into  agreements  that
discriminate in that way.  And for that matter, it is ques
tionable  whether  the  Constitution  would  permit  a  public-
sector  employer  to  adopt  a  collective-bargaining  agree
ment that discriminates against nonmembers.  See id., at
198–199,  202  (analogizing  a  private-sector  union’s  fair-
representation duty to the duty “the Constitution imposes
upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests
of those for whom it legislates”); cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic  and  Institutional  Rights,  Inc.,  547  U. S.  47,  69
(2006)  (recognizing  that  government  may  not  “impose
penalties  or  withhold  benefits  based  on  membership  in  a
disfavored group” where doing so “ma[kes] group member
ship  less  attractive”).    To  the  extent  that  an  employer
would  be  barred  from  acceding  to  a  discriminatory  agree
ment anyway, the union’s duty not to ask for one is super
fluous.  It is noteworthy that neither respondents nor any
of  the  39  amicus  briefs  supporting  them—nor  the  dis
sent—has  explained  why  the  duty  of  fair  representation
causes  public-sector  unions  to  incur  significantly  greater
expenses  than  they  would  otherwise  bear  in  negotiating
collective-bargaining agreements.

What about the representation of nonmembers in griev
ance  proceedings?  Unions  do  not  undertake  this  activity
solely  for  the  benefit  of  nonmembers—which  is  why  Illi
nois  law  gives  a  public-sector  union  the  right  to  send  a
representative  to  such  proceedings  even  if  the  employee
declines union representation.  §315/6(b).  Representation
of  nonmembers  furthers  the  union’s  interest  in  keeping
control  of  the  administration  of  the  collective-bargaining
agreement,  since  the  resolution  of  one  employee’s  griev
ance  can  affect  others.    And  when  a  union  controls  the
grievance process, it may, as a practical matter, effectively
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the duty of fair representation for public-sector unions, specifically regarding their treatment of non-members. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating its suitability for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
60  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

race in college admissions to achieve racially diverse classes
is  critical  to  improving  cross-racial  understanding  and
breaking down racial stereotypes.  See supra, at 16.  Indeed,
the record shows that some Asian American applicants are
actually “advantaged by Harvard’s use of race,” Harvard II,
980  F. 3d,  at  191,  and  “eliminating  consideration  of  race
would significantly disadvantage at least some Asian Amer-
ican applicants,” Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d, at 194.  Race-
conscious holistic admissions that contextualize the racial
identity of each individual allow Asian American applicants
“who would be less likely to be admitted without a compre-
hensive understanding of their background” to explain “the
value  of  their  unique  background,  heritage,  and  perspec-
tive.”  Id., at 195.  Because the Asian American community
is not a monolith, race-conscious holistic admissions allow
colleges  and  universities  to  “consider  the  vast  differences
within [that] community.”  AALDEF Brief 4–14.  Harvard’s
application  files  show  that  race-conscious  holistic  admis-
sions allow Harvard to “valu[e ] the diversity of Asian Amer-
ican applicants’ experiences.”  Harvard College Brief 23.

Moreover, the admission rates of Asian Americans at in-
stitutions  with  race-conscious  admissions  policies,  includ-
ing at Harvard, have “been steadily increasing for decades.”
Harvard II, 980 F. 3d, at 198.39  By contrast, Asian Ameri-
can enrollment declined at elite universities that are pro-
hibited by state law from considering race.  See  AALDEF
Brief 27; Brief for 25 Diverse, California-Focused Bar As-
sociations et al. as Amici Curiae 19–20, 23.  At bottom, race-
conscious admissions benefit all students, including racial
minorities.  That includes the Asian American community.
Finally,  JUSTICE  THOMAS  belies  reality  by  suggesting
that “experts and elites” with views similar to those “that
——————

39 At  Harvard,  “Asian  American  applicants  are  accepted  at  the  same
rate as other applicants and now make up more than 20% of Harvard’s
admitted classes,” even though “only about 6% of the United States pop-
ulation is Asian American.”  Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d, at 203.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It argues in favor of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U85

[09-14-00 16:49:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 236 (1998)

251

Opinion of the Court

§ 1651(a). Our rule permits us to carry out our normal func-
tion of reviewing possible misapplications of law by the
courts of appeals without having to resort to extraordinary
remedies.

Our decision, we must acknowledge, is in direct conﬂict
with the portion of our decision in House v. Mayo, 324 U. S.
42, 44 (1945) (per curiam), holding that we lack statutory
certiorari jurisdiction to review refusals to issue certiﬁcates
of probable cause. Given the number and frequency of the
cases, and the difﬁculty of reconciling our practice with a
requirement that only an extraordinary writ can be used to
address them, we do not think stare decisis concerns require
Its conclusion was erroneous,
us to adhere to that decision.
and it should not be followed.

Stare decisis is “the preferred course because it promotes
the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judi-
cial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991).
“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area
of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of
constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is impli-
cated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have
done.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164,
172–173 (1989).

We have recognized, however, that stare decisis is a “prin-
ciple of policy” rather than “an inexorable command.”
Payne, supra, at 828. For example, we have felt less con-
strained to follow precedent where, as here, the opinion was
rendered without full brieﬁng or argument. Gray v. Missis-
sippi, 481 U. S. 648, 651, n. 1 (1987) (questioning the prece-
dential value of Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122 (1976) (per
curiam)). The role of stare decisis, furthermore, is “some-
what reduced . . . in the case of a procedural rule . . . which
does not serve as a guide to lawful behavior.” United States
v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 521 (1995) (citing Payne, supra, at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal principle of stare decisis and its application in this case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

a  statute  is  valid  on  its  face,  a  court  must  determine  the
statute’s  scope.    If  a  state  court  has  yet  to  determine  the
scope of its statute (a common occurrence with facial chal-
lenges), the federal court must do so in the first instance.
Facial challenges thus increase the likelihood that federal
courts must interpret novel state-law questions—a role typ-
ically and appropriately reserved for state courts.

B
In addition to their constitutional infirmities, facial chal-
lenges also create practical problems.  The case-or-controversy
requirement  serves  as  the  foundation  of  our  adversarial
system.  Rather  than  “ ‘sit[ting]  as  self-directed  boards  of
legal inquiry and research,’ ” federal courts serve as “ ‘arbi-
ters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties
before them.’ ”   NASA v. Nelson,  562 U. S. 134, 147, n. 10
(2011)  (quoting  Carducci  v.  Regan,  714  F. 2d  171,  177
(CADC 1983) (opinion for the court by Scalia, J.)).  This sys-
tem  “assure[s]  that  the  legal  questions  presented  to  the
court will be resolved . . . in a concrete factual context con-
ducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of ju-
dicial action.”  Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S.
464, 472 (1982).

Facial challenges disrupt the adversarial system and in-
crease the risk of judicial error as a result.  A plaintiff rais-
ing a facial challenge need not have any direct knowledge
of how the statute applies to others.  In fact, since a facial
challenge  may  be  brought  before  a  statute  has  been  en-
forced against anyone, a plaintiff often can only guess how
the statute operates—even in his own case.  For this reason,
“[c]laims  of  facial  invalidity  often  rest  on  speculation,”
Washington State Grange, 552 U. S., at 450, and “factually
barebones records,” Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 600,
609 (2004).  Federal courts are often called to give “prema-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal concept of facial challenges to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

WONG  v.  BELMONTES

Per Curiam

clear  that  it  would  come  in  for  certain  rebuttal  purposes,
id., at 2256, 2332–2334.  When Schick elicited testimony that
Belmontes was not violent, for example, the judge ordered it
stricken and warned Schick that he would admit the Howard
murder  evidence—to  let  the  prosecution  “go  into  the  whole
background”—if Schick pressed forward.  Id., at 2334.

In  balancing  the  mitigating  factors  against  the  aggrava
tors, the Court of Appeals repeatedly referred to the aggra
vating  evidence  the  State  presented  as  “scant.”  529  F.  3d,
at  870,  873,  874,  875,  878.  That  characterization  misses
Strickland’s point that the reviewing court must consider all
the evidence—the good and the bad—when evaluating preju
dice.  See Strickland, 466 U. S., at 695–696, 700.  Here, the
worst  kind  of  bad  evidence  would  have  come  in  with  the
good.  The  only  reason  it  did  not  was  because  Schick  was
careful  in  his  mitigation  case.  The  State’s  aggravation  evi
dence  could  only  be  characterized  as  “scant”  if  one  ignores
the  “elephant  in  the  courtroom”—Belmontes’  role  in  the
Howard  murder—that  would  have  been  presented  had
Schick  submitted  the  additional  mitigation  evidence.  Bel
montes v.  Ayers, 551 F. 3d 864, 867 (CA9 2008) (Callahan, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

Even  on  the  record  before  it—which  did  not  include  the
Howard murder—the state court determined that Belmontes
“was  convicted  on  extremely  strong  evidence  that  he  com
mitted  an  intentional  murder  of  extraordinary  brutality.”
Belmontes, 45  Cal. 3d, at 819,  755 P. 2d, at  354.  That court
also  noted  that  “[t]he  properly  admitted  aggravating  evi
dence  in  this  case—in  particular,  the  circumstances  of  the
crime—was simply overwhelming.”  Id., at 809, 755 P. 2d, at
348  (citation  omitted).  The  Ninth  Circuit  saw  the  murder
differently.  It  viewed  the  circumstances  of  the  crime  as
only “conceivably signiﬁcant” as an aggravating factor.  529
F. 3d, at 871.  In particular, the Court of Appeals concluded
that “[t]he crime  here did not involve .  . . needless suffering
on the part of the victim.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, focusing on the arguments surrounding the admissibility of evidence and the sentencing of a defendant named Belmontes.  It contains legal terminology and references to court proceedings, suggesting it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

25

JACKSON, J., dissenting

an impediment to racial progress—that its own conception
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s  Equal  Protection  Clause
leaves it no other option—has a wholly self-referential, two-
dimensional  flatness.    The  majority  and  concurring  opin-
ions rehearse this Court’s idealistic vision of racial equality,
from Brown forward, with appropriate lament for past in-
discretions.  See, e.g., ante, at 11.  But the race-linked gaps
that the law (aided by this Court) previously founded and
fostered—which  indisputably  define  our  present  reality—
are strangely absent and do not seem to matter.

With let-them-eat-cake obliviousness, today, the majority
pulls the ripcord and announces “colorblindness for all” by
legal  fiat.  But  deeming  race  irrelevant  in  law  does  not
make it so in life.  And having so detached itself from this
country’s  actual  past  and  present  experiences,  the  Court
has now been lured into interfering with the crucial work
that UNC and other institutions of higher learning are do-
ing to solve America’s real-world problems.

No  one  benefits  from  ignorance.  Although  formal  race-
linked legal barriers are gone, race still matters to the lived
experiences of all Americans in innumerable ways, and to-
day’s ruling makes things worse, not better.  The best that
can be said of the majority’s perspective is that it proceeds
(ostrich-like)  from  the  hope  that  preventing  consideration
of  race  will  end  racism.  But  if  that  is  its  motivation,  the
majority proceeds in vain.  If the colleges of this country are
required to ignore a thing that matters, it will not just go
away.  It will take longer for racism to leave us.  And, ulti-
mately, ignoring race just makes it matter more.103

——————

103 JUSTICE THOMAS’s prolonged attack, ante, at 49–55 (concurring opin-
ion), responds to a dissent I did not write in order to assail an admissions
program that is not the one UNC has crafted.  He does not dispute any
historical  or  present  fact  about  the  origins  and  continued  existence  of
race-based disparity (nor could he), yet is somehow persuaded that these
realities  have  no  bearing  on  a  fair  assessment  of  “individual  achieve-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision, claiming it ignores the reality of racial disparities and will ultimately hinder progress on racial equality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

lix

Rich v. Woodford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richards, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richards v. Sondalle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richardson v. America Online . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richardson v. Bell Atlantic Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richardson v. Broad Lane, Inc.
Richardson v. First National Bank of Md.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richardson; Howe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richardson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richardson v. Luebbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richardson v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richardson v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richardson v. Say . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richardson v. Sprint PCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richmond Police Dept.; Falcon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ridenbaugh v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Riley v. Lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Riley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rivas Suniga v. Texas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rivera, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rivers; Champion v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rivers; Grant v.
Riverside School Dist.; Killino v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roach; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roane v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robaczewski; Mustafa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robedeaux v. Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robert Bosch GmbH; Abbey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roberts v. Langley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roberts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robins; Medical Society of N. J. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robinson; Benson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robinson; Cancassi v.
Robinson v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment
. . . .
Robinson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robinson; Hopper v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robinson v. Luker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robinson v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Robison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rochon v. Exxon Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rodia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rodriguez v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1013
1100
1016
1102
1131
1131
1133
1131
1021
1145
1113
1036
1131
1100
1131
1007
1032
1070
1017
1089
1107
1057
1040
1068
1071
1060
1060
1027
1009,1095
1115
1108
1004
1117
1075
1055
1057
1130
1024,1125
1092
1012
1011
1090
1131
1041
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, listing case names and corresponding page numbers. It is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U99

[09-15-00 14:41:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

774

BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ELLERTH

Thomas, J., dissenting

But as the Court acknowledges, this is the one result that it
is clear Congress did not intend. See ante, at 763; Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S., at 72.

The Court’s holding does guarantee one result: There will
be more and more litigation to clarify applicable legal rules
in an area in which both practitioners and the courts have
long been begging for guidance.
It thus truly boggles the
mind that the Court can claim that its holding will effect
“Congress’ intention to promote conciliation rather than liti-
gation in the Title VII context.” Ante, at 764. All in all,
today’s decision is an ironic result for a case that generated
eight separate opinions in the Court of Appeals on a funda-
mental question, and in which we granted certiorari “to as-
sist in deﬁning the relevant standards of employer liability.”
Ante, at 751.

*

*

*

Popular misconceptions notwithstanding, sexual harass-
ment is not a freestanding federal tort, but a form of employ-
ment discrimination. As such, it should be treated no differ-
ently (and certainly no better) than the other forms of
harassment that are illegal under Title VII.
I would restore
parallel treatment of employer liability for racial and sexual
harassment and hold an employer liable for a hostile work
I there-
environment only if the employer is truly at fault.
fore respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.  It is sequential text and contains relevant legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

to do so.  Texas can now immediately enforce its own law
imposing criminal liability on thousands of noncitizens and
requiring  their  removal  to  Mexico.  This  law  will  disrupt
sensitive foreign relations, frustrate the protection of indi-
viduals fleeing persecution, hamper active federal enforce-
ment efforts, undermine federal agencies’ ability to detect
and monitor imminent security threats, and deter nonciti-
zens from reporting abuse or trafficking.

The Court gives a green light to a law that will upend the
longstanding federal-state balance of power and sow chaos,
when the only court to consider the law concluded that it is
likely unconstitutional.  This law implicates serious issues
that  are  subject  to  ongoing  political  debate,  and  Texas’s
novel scheme requires careful and reasoned consideration
in the courts to determine which provisions may be uncon-
stitutional.  Although the Court today expresses no view on
whether Texas’s law is constitutional, and instead defers to
a lower court’s management of its docket, the Court of Ap-
peals abused its discretion by entering an unreasoned and
indefinite administrative stay that altered the status quo.
This Court stands idle.  Because I cannot, I dissent.

I
A
“The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  broad,  un-
doubted power over the subject of immigration and the sta-
tus  of  [noncitizens].”  Arizona  v.  United  States,  567  U. S.
387, 394 (2012).  That power is near exclusive when it comes
to  the  admission  and  removal  of  noncitizens,  and  it  pre-
cludes States from regulating entry and removal in a patch-
work  across  the  Nation.  “It  is  fundamental  that  foreign
countries concerned about the status, safety, and security
of their nationals in the United States must be able to con-
fer and communicate on this subject with one national sov-
ereign, not the 50 separate States.”  Id., at 395.  Congress
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

THOMAS, J., dissenting

States, private parties, and legal researchers who relied on
the previously bright-line rule.  Perhaps, to the detriment
of  all,  many  States  will  stop  producing  annotated codes
altogether.  Were  that  to  occur,  the  majority’s  fear  of  an
“economy-class” version of the law will truly become a real-
ity.  See ante, at 17.  As Georgia explains, its contract ena-
bles the OCGA to be sold at a fraction of the cost of compet-
ing  annotated  codes.  For  example,  Georgia  asserts  that
Lexis sold the OCGA for $404 in 2016, while West Publish-
ing’s  competing  annotated  code  sold  for  $2,570.  Should
state annotated codes disappear, those without the means
to  pay  the  competitor’s  significantly  higher  price  tag  will
have  a  valuable  research  tool  taken  away  from  them.
Meanwhile, this Court, which is privileged to have access to
numerous  research  resources,  will  scarcely  notice.  These
negative  practical  ramifications  are  unfortunate  enough
when  they  reflect  the  deliberative  legislative  choices  that
we as judges are bound to respect.  They are all the more
regrettable when they are the result of our own meddling.
Fortunately,  as  the  majority  and  I  agree,  “ ‘critics  of  [to-
day’s]  ruling  can  take  their  objections  across  the  street,
[where] Congress can correct any mistake it sees.’ ”  Ante, at
13  (quoting  Kimble  v.  Marvel  Entertainment,  LLC,  576
U. S. 446, 456 (2015)).

We  have  “stressed  . . . that  it  is  generally  for  Congress,
not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright
Clause’s objectives,” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186, 212
(2003), because “it is Congress that has been assigned the
task  of  defining  the  scope  of  the  limited  monopoly  that
should  be  granted  to  authors,”  Sony  Corp.  of  America  v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 429 (1984).  Be-
cause  the  majority  has  strayed  from  its  proper  role,  I  re-
spectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 22–277 and 22–555
_________________

ASHLEY MOODY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
FLORIDA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
NETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL.

22–277

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

22–555

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2024]

 JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  and

JUSTICE GORSUCH join, concurring in the judgment.

The holding in these cases is narrow:  NetChoice failed to
prove that the Florida and Texas laws they challenged are
facially unconstitutional. Everyt hing else in the opinion of
the Court is nonbinding dicta.

I agree with the bottom line of the majority’s central hold-
ing. But its description of the Florida and Texas laws, as
well  as  the  litigation  that  shaped  the  question  before  us,
leaves much to be desired.  Its summary of our legal prece-
dents is incomplete.  And its broader ambition of providing
guidance on whether one part of the Texas law is unconsti-
tutional as applied to two features of two of the many plat-
forms that it reaches—namely, Facebook’s News Feed and
YouTube’s homepage—is unnecessary and unjustified.

But given the incompleteness of this record, there is no
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito.  It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology.  While it is important legal text, it is not the main body of the content that would be indexed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

BREYER, J., dissenting

theran, lead me to believe that Montana’s differential treat-
ment of religious schools is constitutional.  “If any room ex-
ists  between  the  two  Religion  Clauses,  it  must  be  here.”
Locke, 540 U. S., at 725.  For these reasons, I respectfully
dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It is sequential and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>