<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
934

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–1556.  Thomas  v.  City  of  New  York,  New  York,
et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Breyer  and
Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision
of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  754.

No.  08–1562.  Sea  Hawk  Seafoods,  Inc.  v.  Exxon  Mobil
Corp.  et al.  C.  A. 9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice Alito
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.  Re
ported  below:  303  Fed.  Appx.  572.

No.  08–1589.  Dow  Chemical  Co.  v.  Tanoh  et  al.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Motions  of  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States  of
America  et  al.  and  Centerpoint  Energy  et  al.  for  leave  to  ﬁle
briefs  as  amici  curiae  granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  561  F.  3d  945.

No.  08–9348.  Henderson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  08–9899.  Bradley  v.  United  States;

No.  08–9990.  Hurell  v.  United  States;  and

No.  08–10019.  Watkins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  these  petitions.  Reported  below:  555  F.
3d  122.

No.  08–10089.  Zedner  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  555  F.
3d  68.

No.  08–10274.  Cole  v.  Branker,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.
Motions  of  North  Carolina  Conference  of  NAACP  Branches  and
Arc  of  North  Carolina  for  leave  to  ﬁle  briefs  as  amici  curiae
granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.
149.

No. 08–10277.  Kiley v.  American Society for the Preven
tion of Cruelty to Animals.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certiorari denied.
Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision
of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  296  Fed.  Appx.  107.

No.  08–10328.  Elgindy,  aka  Pacific,  aka  Velasco,  aka

Velazco  v.  United  States;  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Opinion of the Court

expression  are  subject  to  judicial  review  for  compliance
with the First Amendment.

Today, we consider whether two state laws regulating social-
media  platforms  and  other  websites  facially  violate  the
First Amendment.  The laws, from Florida and Texas, re-
strict  the  ability  of  social-media  platforms  to  control
whether and how third-party posts are presented to other
users.  Or otherwise put, the laws limit the platforms’ ca-
pacity to engage in content moderation—to filter, prioritize,
and  label  the  varied  messages,  videos,  and  other  content
their  users  wish  to  post.    In  addition,  though  far  less  ad-
dressed in this Court, the laws require a platform to provide
an individualized explanation to a user if it removes or al-
ters  her  posts.  NetChoice,  an  internet  trade  association,
challenged both laws on their face—as a whole, rather than
as  to  particular  applications.  The  cases  come  to  us  at  an
early  stage,  on  review  of  preliminary  injunctions.  The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld such an
injunction,  finding  that  the  Florida  law  was  not  likely  to
survive First Amendment review.  The Court of Appeals for
the  Fifth  Circuit  reversed  a  similar  injunction,  primarily
reasoning that the Texas law does not regulate any speech
and so does not implicate the First Amendment.

the

Today,  we  vacate  both  decisions  for  reasons  separate
from the First Amendment merits, because neither Court of
Appeals  properly  considered
facial  nature  of
NetChoice’s challenge.  The courts mainly addressed what
the parties had focused on.  And the parties mainly argued
these cases as if the laws applied only to the curated feeds
offered by the largest and most paradigmatic social-media
platforms—as  if,  say,  each  case  presented  an  as-applied
challenge brought by Facebook protesting its loss of control
over  the  content  of  its  News  Feed.    But  argument  in  this
Court revealed that the laws might apply to, and differently
affect, other kinds of websites and apps.  In a facial chal-
lenge,  that  could  well  matter,  even  when  the  challenge  is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It sets the stage for the case, outlining the legal issues and the parties involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

EGBERT v. BOULE

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–147.  Argued March 2, 2022—Decided June 8, 2022

Respondent  Robert  Boule  owns  a  bed-and-breakfast—the  Smuggler’s
Inn—in Blaine, Washington.  The inn abuts the international border
between Canada and the United States.  Boule at times helped federal
agents identify and apprehend persons engaged in unlawful cross-bor-
der  activity  on  or  near  his  property.    But  Boule  also  would  provide
transportation  and  lodging  to  illegal  border  crossers.    Often,  Boule
would  agree  to  help  illegal  border  crossers  enter  or  exit  the  United
States, only to later call federal agents to report the unlawful activity.
In 2014, Boule informed petitioner Erik Egbert, a U. S. Border Pa-
trol agent, that a Turkish national, arriving in Seattle by way of New
York, had scheduled transportation to Smuggler’s Inn.  When Agent
Egbert observed one of Boule’s vehicles returning to the inn, he sus-
pected that the Turkish national was a passenger and followed the ve-
hicle to the inn.  On Boule’s account, Boule asked Egbert to leave, but
Egbert refused, became violent, and threw Boule first against the ve-
hicle and then to the ground.  Egbert then checked the immigration
paperwork for Boule’s guest and left after finding everything in order.
The Turkish guest unlawfully entered Canada later that evening.

Boule filed a grievance with Agent Egbert’s supervisors and an ad-
ministrative  claim  with  Border  Patrol  pursuant  to  the  Federal  Tort
Claims Act (FTCA).  Egbert allegedly retaliated against Boule by re-
porting Boule’s “SMUGLER” license plate to the Washington Depart-
ment of Licensing for referencing illegal activity, and by contacting the
Internal  Revenue  Service  and  prompting  an  audit  of  Boule’s  tax  re-
turns.  Boule’s FTCA claim was ultimately denied, and Border Patrol
took no action against Egbert for his use of force or alleged acts of re-
taliation.  Boule then sued Egbert in Federal District Court, alleging
a Fourth Amendment violation for excessive use of force and a First
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

OHIO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.

BREYER, J., dissenting

switches inserted into auto bodies and tires used for cars.
I  have  already  explained  that,  ordinarily,  antitrust  law
will not group the two nonsubstitutable products together
for step 1 purposes.  Supra, at 10–11.

Neither  should  it  normally  matter  whether  a  company
sells  related,  or  complementary,  products,  i.e.,  products
which must both be purchased to have any function, such
as  ignition  switches  and  tires,  or  cameras  and  film.    It  is
well established that an antitrust court in such cases looks
at  the  product  where  the  attacked  restraint  has  an  anti
competitive  effect.  Supra,  at  9;  see  Eastman  Kodak,  504
U. S.,  at  463.  The  court  does  not  combine  the  customers
for  the  separate,  nonsubstitutable  goods  and  see  if  “over
all”  the  restraint  has  a  negative  effect.    See  ibid.;  2B
Areeda  &  Hovenkamp  ¶565a.    That  is  because,  as  I  have
explained,  the  complementary  relationship  between  the
products is irrelevant to the purposes of market-definition.
See supra, at 10–11.

The majority disputes my characterization of merchant-
related  and  shopper-related  services  as  “complements.”
See  ante,  at  14,  n. 8.    The  majority  relies  on an  academic
article which devotes one sentence to the question, saying
that  “a  two-sided  market  [is]  different  from  markets  for
complementary  products  [e.g.,  tires  and  gas],  in  which
both  products  are  bought  by  the  same  buyers,  who,  in
their  buying  decisions,  can  therefore  be  expected  to  take
into  account  both  prices.”  Filistrucchi,  Geradin,  Van
Damme,  &  Affeldt,  Market  Definition  in  Two-Sided  Mar
kets:  Theory  and  Practice,  10  J.  Competition  L.  &  Econ.
293,  297  (2014)  (Filistrucchi).
I  agree  that  two-sided
platforms—at  least  as  some  academics  define  them,  but
see  infra,  at  19–20—may  be  distinct  from  some  types  of
complements  in  the  respect  the  majority  mentions  (even
though  the  services  resemble  complements  because  they
must  be  used  together  for  either  to  have  value).  But  the
distinction  the  majority  mentions  has  nothing  to  do  with
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses antitrust law and market definition, referencing previous parts of the opinion and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

43

Opinion of the Court

made, as an “independent ground of affray,” the mere arm-
ing of oneself with firearms, the Tennessee Constitution’s
Second  Amendment  analogue  had  “completely  abrogated
it.”  Id., at 360.  At least in light of that constitutional guar-
antee, the court did not think that it could attribute to the
mere carrying of arms “a necessarily consequent operation
as terror to the people.”  Ibid.

Perhaps  more  telling  was  the  North  Carolina  Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Huntly, 25 N. C. 418 (1843) (per
curiam).  Unlike the Tennessee Supreme Court in Simpson,
the Huntly court held that the common-law offense codified
by the Statute of Northampton was part of the State’s law.
See  25  N. C.,  at  421–422.    However,  consistent  with  the
Statute’s  long-settled  interpretation,  the  North  Carolina
Supreme Court acknowledged “that the carrying of a gun”
for a lawful purpose “per se constitutes no offence.”  Id., at
422–423.  Only carrying for a “wicked purpose” with a “mis-
chievous result . . . constitute[d a] crime.”  Id., at 423; see
also J. Haywood, The Duty and Office of Justices of Peace
10 (1800); H. Potter, The Office and Duties of a Justice of
the  Peace  39  (1816).15    Other  state  courts  likewise  recog-
nized that the common law did not punish the carrying of

——————

15 The dissent concedes that Huntly, 25 N. C. 418, recognized that citi-
zens were “ ‘at perfect liberty’  to carry for ‘lawful purpose[s].’ ”  Post, at
42 (quoting Huntly, 25 N. C., at 423).  But the dissent disputes that such
“lawful  purpose[s]”  included  self-defense,  because  Huntly  goes  on  to
speak  more  specifically  of  carrying  arms  for  “business  or  amusement.”
Id., at 422–423.  This is an unduly stingy interpretation of Huntly.  In
particular, Huntly stated that “the citizen is at perfect liberty to carry
his gun” “[f]or any lawful purpose,” of which “business” and “amusement”
were then mentioned.  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Huntly then contrasted
these  “lawful  purpose[s]”  with  the  “wicked  purpose  . . .  to  terrify  and
alarm.”  Ibid.  Because there is no evidence that Huntly considered self-
defense a “wicked purpose,” we think the best reading of Huntly would
sanction public carry for self-defense, so long as it was not “in such [a]
manner as naturally will terrify and alarm.”  Id., at 423.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing case law related to the right to carry arms. It contains legal citations, analysis of court decisions, and arguments related to constitutional interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court

serves that the North Carolina Supreme Court has now dis-
missed  the  plaintiffs’  claims  with  prejudice.    He  posits,
therefore,  that  the  legislative  defendants  “are  not  injured
by the judgment of Harper I.”  Post, at 5 (dissenting opin-
ion).  But the record before us belies that notion.  Harper I
enjoined the use of the 2021 maps in subsequent elections
in North Carolina.  Well after the time for seeking rehear-
ing as to that judgment passed, the legislative defendants
instead sought rehearing with respect to Harper II, a dis-
tinct decision concerning remedies.  The defendants stead-
fastly  maintained  in  rehearing  proceedings  before  the
North  Carolina  Supreme  Court  that  “overruling  Harper  I
[would] not negate the force of its order striking down the
2021 plans.”  Pet. for Rehearing 24; see also Legislative De-
fendants’  Supp.  Brief  on  Rehearing  in  Harper  v.  Hall,
No. 413PA21–2, p. 56 (N. C., Feb. 17, 2023) (“[T]he Court’s
dictate that the 2021 plans may not be used ‘in any future
elections’ would not be vacated.”).  With those concessions
on the record, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued its
decision  “overruling”  Harper  I,  and—by  contrast—“with-
draw[ing]” its decision in Harper II.  Harper, ___ N. C., at
___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 449.  And mirroring their representa-
tions before the North Carolina Supreme Court, the legis-
lative defendants now maintain in this Court that they con-
tinue to remain bound by the judgment in Harper I.

In an effort to cast doubt on these consistent representa-
tions by the injured party before us, JUSTICE THOMAS con-
tends that the legislative defendants have already received
complete  relief  because  nothing  now  prevents  the  imple-
mentation of the 2021 maps.  Post, at 15 (dissenting opin-
ion).  For the reasons stated above, that would come as a
surprise  to  both  the  legislative  defendants  and  the  North
Carolina Supreme Court.  The dissent also emphasizes that
several of the plaintiffs contest our jurisdiction.  Post, at 6.
But that has been their position from the very beginning,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the ongoing implications of a previous court case (Harper I). It's sequential text and provides context relevant to the legal arguments being made.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

KEMP v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–5726.  Argued April 19, 2022—Decided June 13, 2022

Petitioner Dexter Kemp and seven codefendants were convicted of vari-
ous drug and gun crimes.  The Eleventh Circuit consolidated their ap-
peals  and,  in  November  2013,  affirmed  their  convictions  and  sen-
tences.   In  April  2015,  Kemp  moved  the District  Court  to vacate  his
sentence  under  28  U. S. C.  §2255.    The  District  Court  dismissed
Kemp’s motion as untimely because it was not filed within one year of
“the  date  on  which  [his]  judgment  of  conviction  [became]  final.”
§2255(f)(1).  Kemp did not appeal.  Then, in June 2018, Kemp sought
to reopen his §2255 proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b), which authorizes a court to reopen a final judgment under cer-
tain enumerated circumstances.  As relevant here, a party may seek
relief within one year under Rule 60(b)(1) based on “mistake, inadvert-
ence,  surprise,  or  excusable  neglect.”   A  party  may  also  seek  relief
“within a reasonable time” under Rule 60(b)(6) for “any other reason
that  justifies  relief,”  but  relief  under  Rule  60(b)(6)  is  available  only
when  the  other  grounds  for  relief  specified  in  Rules  60(b)(1)–(5)  are
inapplicable.  Kemp’s motion to reopen his §2255 proceedings invoked
Rule 60(b)(6), but his motion sought reopening based on a “mistake”
covered  by  Rule  60(b)(1).    Specifically,  Kemp  argued  that  the  1-year
limitations period on his §2255 motion did not begin to run until his
codefendants’  rehearing  petitions  were  denied  in  May  2014,  making
his April 2015 motion timely.  The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Kemp
that  his  §2255  motion  was  timely  but  concluded  that  because  Kemp
alleged judicial mistake, his Rule 60(b) motion fell under Rule 60(b)(1),
was subject to Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period, and was therefore
untimely.

Held: The  term  “mistake”  in  Rule  60(b)(1)  includes  a  judge’s  errors  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of court opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text. They are often used for informational purposes and are not meant to be indexed as part of the full legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1007

529 U. S.

March 6, 2000

No. 99–7642. Falcon v. Richmond Police Department et
al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F.
3d 253.

No. 99–7643. Hibbert v. Terhune, Director, California
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–7644. Gaskin v. Ward, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–7645. Haynes et vir v. Mattina et al. C. A. 2d

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7646. Horsley v. Bush, Governor of Florida, et

al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7647. Francis v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 743 So. 2d 12.

No. 99–7653. Mathonican v. Texas et al. (two judgments).

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7655.

Jackson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 304 Ill. App. 3d 883, 711
N. E. 2d 360.

No. 99–7656. Frye v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7658. Fair v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 733 So. 2d 515.

No. 99–7660. Hines v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7662. Hyche v. Christensen et al. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7663. Franks v. Martin et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–7665. Durachko v. McCullough, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, courts, and decisions. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it is not the primary narrative content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

reasoned  that  Georgia—in  its  capacity  as  a  “quasi-
sovereign”—“has  an  interest  independent  of  and  behind
the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain.”  Id.,  at  237.  The  Court  explained  that  while
“[t]he  very  elements  that  would  be  relied  upon  in  a  suit
between  fellow-citizens  as  a  ground  for  equitable  relief
[were]  wanting,”  a  State  “is  not  lightly  to  be  required  to
give up quasi-sovereign rights for pay.”  Ibid.  Thus while
a complaining private litigant would have to make do with
a  legal  remedy—one  “for  pay”—the  State  was  entitled  to
equitable relief.  See id., at 237–238.

In contrast to the present case, there was no question in
Tennessee Copper about Article III injury.  See id., at 238–
239.  There  was  certainly  no  suggestion  that  the  State
could  show  standing  where  the  private  parties  could  not;
there  was  no  dispute,  after  all,  that  the  private  landown-
ers had “an action at law.”  Id., at 238.  Tennessee Copper
has since stood for nothing more than a State’s right, in an
original  jurisdiction  action,  to  sue  in  a  representative
capacity as  parens  patriae.  See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisi-
ana,  451  U. S.  725,  737  (1981).    Nothing  about  a  State’s
ability to sue in that capacity dilutes the bedrock require-
ment  of  showing  injury,  causation,  and  redressability  to
satisfy Article III.

A  claim  of  parens  patriae  standing  is  distinct  from  an
allegation of direct injury.  See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502
U. S.  437,  448–449,  451  (1992).    Far  from  being  a  substi-
tute  for  Article  III  injury,  parens  patriae  actions  raise  an
additional hurdle for a state litigant: the articulation of a
“quasi-sovereign  interest”  “apart  from  the  interests  of
particular private parties.”  Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto  Rico  ex  rel.  Barez,  458  U. S.  592,  607  (1982)  (em-
phasis  added)  (cited  ante,  at  16).    Just  as  an  association
suing on behalf of its members must show not only that it
represents  the  members  but  that  at  least  one  satisfies
Article  III  requirements,  so  too  a  State  asserting  quasi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Massachusetts v. EPA. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 89 (2000)

91

Syllabus

gress, in PWSA Title I, preserved state authority to regulate the peculi-
arities of local waters, such as depth and narrowness, if there is no
conﬂict with federal regulatory determinations, see 435 U. S., at 171–
172, 178, but further held that Congress, in PWSA Title II, mandated
uniform federal rules on the subjects or matters there speciﬁed, id., at
168. Thus, under Ray’s interpretation of the Title II provision now
found at 46 U. S. C. § 3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate
the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation,
equipping, personnel qualiﬁcation, and manning of tankers. The Court
today reafﬁrms Ray’s holding on this point. Congress has left no room
for state regulation of these matters. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141. Although the Ray Court acknowl-
edged that the existence of some overlapping coverage between the two
PWSA titles may make it difﬁcult to determine whether a pre-emption
question is controlled by conﬂict pre-emption principles, applicable gen-
erally to Title I, or by ﬁeld pre-emption rules, applicable generally to
Title II, the Court declined to resolve every question by the greater
pre-emptive force of Title II. Thus, conﬂict pre-emption will be appli-
cable in some, although not all, cases. Useful inquiries in determining
which title governs include whether the regulation in question is justi-
ﬁed by conditions unique to a particular port or waterway, see Ray, 435
U. S., at 175, or whether it is of limited extraterritorial effect, not requir-
ing the tanker to modify its primary conduct outside the speciﬁc body
of water purported to justify the local rule, see id., at 159–160, 171.
Pp. 103–112.

(c) The ﬁeld pre-emption rule surrounding PWSA Title II and 46
U. S. C. § 3703(a) and the superseding effect of additional federal stat-
utes are illustrated by the pre-emption of four of Washington’s tanker
regulations, the attempted reach of which is well demonstrated by the
briefs and record. First, the imposition of a series of training require-
ments on a tanker’s crew does not address matters unique to Washing-
ton waters, but imposes requirements that control the stafﬁng, opera-
tion, and manning of a tanker outside of those waters. The training
and drill requirements pertain to “operation” and “personnel qualiﬁ-
cations” and so are pre-empted by § 3703(a). That training is a ﬁeld
reserved to the Federal Government is further conﬁrmed by the cir-
cumstance that the STCW Convention addresses crew “training” and
“qualiﬁcation” requirements, and that the United States has enacted
crew training regulations. Second, the imposition of English language
proﬁciency requirements on a tanker’s crew is not limited to governing
local trafﬁc or local peculiarities.
It is pre-empted by § 3703(a) as a
“personnel qualiﬁcation” and by 33 U. S. C. § 1228(a)(7), which requires
that any vessel operating in United States waters have at least one
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal jargon, citations, and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–508
_________________

AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 22, 2021]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section  13(b)  of  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  Act
authorizes  the  Commission  to  obtain,  “in  proper  cases,”  a
“permanent  injunction”  in  federal  court  against  “any  per-
son,  partnership,  or  corporation”  that  it  believes  “is
violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law” that
the Commission enforces.  87 Stat. 592, 15 U. S. C. §53(b).
The question presented is whether this statutory language
authorizes the Commission to seek, and a court to award,
equitable  monetary  relief  such  as  restitution  or  disgorge-
ment.  We conclude that it does not.

I
Petitioner Scott Tucker controlled several companies that
provided  borrowers  with  short-term  payday  loans.  The
companies,  operating  online,  would  show  a  potential
customer a loan’s essential terms.  When the companies ex-
plained  those  terms,  they  misled  many  customers.    The
companies’  written  explanations  seemed  to  say  that  cus-
tomers could normally repay a loan by making a single pay-
ment.  And that payment would cost a person who, for ex-
ample, borrowed $300 an extra $90.  (The customer would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the title of the case, the date, and the name of the Justice delivering the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the actual legal reasoning and decision-making process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

ALITO, J., dissenting

otherwise interfering with the lawful work of federal agen-
cies, instrumentalities, and officers.5  The Court premised

——————
payment of which, if they are enforceable, would be required before exe-
cuting a function of government.  Such a requirement is prohibited  by
the supremacy clause”); Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341,
344 (1923) (holding that property owned by the United States is immune
from state taxation); see also Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet.
449, 469 (1829) (“The tax on government stock is thought by this Court
to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money on the
credit of the United States, and consequently to be repugnant to the con-
stitution”); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 867 (1824) (“If
the trade of the Bank be essential to its character, as a machine for the
fiscal operations of the government, that trade must be as exempt from
State control as the actual conveyance of the public money.  Indeed, a tax
bears upon the whole machine; as well upon the faculty of collecting and
transmitting the money of the nation, as on that of discounting the notes
of  individuals.
  No  distinction  is  taken  between  them”);  Dawson  v.
Steager, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 2) (surveying Court prece-
dent on intergovernmental tax immunity).

5 Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U. S. 174, 180 (1988) (“It is well
settled that the activities of federal installations are shielded by the Su-
premacy  Clause  from  direct  state  regulation  unless  Congress  provides
‘clear and unambiguous’ authorization for such regulation”); id., at 181
(concluding that “a federally owned facility performing a federal function
is shielded from direct state regulation, even though the federal function
is carried out by a private contractor, unless Congress clearly authorizes
such regulation”); Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S. 167, 178–179 (1976) (re-
jecting state agency’s bid to regulate a federal installation and surveying
doctrines that establish that “ ‘the federal function must be left free’ of
[state] regulation”); see also Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U. S. 187,
189–190 (1956) (per curiam) (concluding that federal contractors cannot
be forced to submit to state licensing procedures that would add to the
qualifications required to receive the federal contract); Johnson v. Mar-
yland,  254  U. S.  51,  57  (1920)  (concluding  that  federal  postal  officials
may not be required to get a state driver’s license to perform their duties
and  explaining  that  “the  immunity  of  the  instruments  of  the  United
States from state control in the performance of their duties extends to
. . . requirement[s] that they desist from performance until they satisfy
a state officer upon examination that they are competent for a necessary
part  of  them”);  In  re  Neagle,  135  U. S.  1,  75  (1890)  (concluding  that  a
federal official may not be “held in the state court to answer for an act
which he [or she] was authorized to do by the law of the United States”);
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It cites previous legal cases and discusses legal principles related to federal supremacy and state regulation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

in the Federal Government have no application to regulat-
ing the domestic child custody proceedings of U. S. citizens
living within the jurisdiction of States.

I  would  go  no  further.    But,  as  the  majority  notes,  the
Court’s  precedents  have  repeatedly  referred  to  a  “plenary
power” that Congress possesses over Indian affairs, as well
as a general “trust” relationship with the Indians.  I have
searched in vain for any constitutional basis for such a ple-
nary power, which appears to have been born of loose lan-
guage and judicial ipse dixit.  And, even taking the Court’s
precedents as given, there is no reason to extend this “ple-
nary  power”  to  the  situation  before  us  today:  regulating
state-court child custody proceedings of U. S. citizens, who
may never have even set foot on Indian lands, merely be-
cause the child involved happens to be an Indian.

I

State courts usually apply state law when resolving child
custody issues.  This would normally be true for most Indi-
ans, too.  Today, Indians are citizens of the United States;
the vast majority of them do not live on any reservation or
Indian lands, but live (as most citizens) on lands that are
wholly within a State’s jurisdiction.  See ch. 233, 43 Stat.
253; Dept. of Health and Human Services, Office of Minor-
ity  Health,  Profile:  American  Indian/Alaska  Native  (Feb.
24,
https://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/omh/browse
.aspx?lvl=3&lvlid=62 (87% live off Indian lands).  Thus, one
might expect that when a child custody issue regarding an
Indian child arises in a state court, that court would apply
the same laws that it would for any other citizen.

2023),

But  ICWA  displaces  the  normal  state  laws  governing
child custody when it comes to only one group of citizens:
Indian children.  ICWA defines “Indian child” capaciously:
It includes not only children who are members of an Indian
tribe,  but  also  those  children  who  are  merely  eligible  for
membership in a tribe and are the biological child of a tribal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and its application to child custody cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,

HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ

Opinion of the Court

crimination.  [Hasting’s]  policy  on  nondiscrimination
is to comply fully with applicable law.
“[Hastings]  shall  not  discriminate  unlawfully  on  the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry,
disability, age, sex or sexual orientation.  This nondis
crimination  policy  covers  admission,  access  and
treatment in Hastings-sponsored programs and activi
ties.”  Id., at 220.

Hastings  interprets  the  Nondiscrimination  Policy,  as  it
relates to the RSO program, to mandate acceptance of all
comers:  School-approved  groups  must  “allow  any  student
to participate, become a member, or seek leadership posi
tions  in  the  organization,  regardless  of  [her]  status  or
beliefs.”  Id.,  at  221.2    Other  law  schools  have  adopted
similar  all-comers  policies.  See,  e.g.,  Georgetown  Univer
sity  Law  Center,  Office  of  Student  Life:  Student  Organi
zations,  available  at  http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
Internet
StudentLife/StudentOrgs/NewGroup.htm

(All

——————

2 “Th[is]  policy,”  Hastings  clarifies,  “does  not  foreclose  neutral  and
generally  applicable  membership  requirements  unrelated  to  ‘status  or
beliefs.’ ”  Brief for Hastings 5.  So long as all students have the oppor-
tunity to participate on equal terms, RSOs may require them, inter alia,
to pay dues, maintain good attendance, refrain from gross misconduct,
or  pass  a  skill-based  test,  such  as  the  writing  competitions  adminis
tered  by  law  journals.    See  ibid.    The  dissent  trumpets  these  neutral,
generally applicable membership requirements, arguing that, in truth,
Hastings has a “some-comers,” not an all-comers, policy.  Post, at 2, 3,
8–9,  10,  23–24,  32–33  (opinion  of  ALITO,  J.).    Hastings’  open-access
policy, however, requires only that student organizations open eligibil
ity  for  membership  and  leadership  regardless  of  a  student’s  status  or
beliefs;  dues,  attendance,  skill  measurements,  and  comparable  uni
formly  applied  standards  are  fully  compatible  with  the  policy.  The
dissent makes much of Hastings’ observation that groups have imposed
“even conduct requirements.”  Post, at 9, 23–24.  But the very example
Hastings  cites  leaves  no  doubt  that  the  Law  School  was  referring  to
boilerplate good-behavior standards, e.g., “[m]embership may cease . . .
if  the  member  is  found  to  be  involved  in  gross  misconduct,”  App.  173
(cited in Brief for Hastings 5).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the interpretation of a nondiscrimination policy at a law school. It discusses the school's stance on allowing all students to participate in student organizations, even with some membership requirements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 18–1334, 18–1475, 18–1496, 18–1514 and 18–1521
_________________

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT
BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, PETITIONER
v.
AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL.

18–1334

AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
18–1475

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, ET AL.

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS
OF ALL TITLE III DEBTORS OTHER
THAN COFINA, PETITIONER
v.
AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL.

18–1496

18–1514

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL.

18–1521

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA
ELÉCTRICA Y RIEGO, INC., PETITIONER
v.
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT
BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, ET AL.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and the introductory information for a Supreme Court opinion. It is not the main body of the text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation and Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

KAGAN, J., dissenting

the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 Colum. L.
Rev. 2143, 2145–2146 (2015).  Other States—Alabama, Vir-
ginia,  Mississippi—fell  like  dominoes,  adopting  measures
similarly vulnerable to preclearance review.  See ibid.  The
North  Carolina  Legislature,  starting  work  the  day  after
Shelby County, enacted a sweeping election bill eliminating
same-day  registration,  forbidding  out-of-precinct  voting,
and reducing early voting, including souls-to-the-polls Sun-
days.  (That law went too far even without Section 5: A court
struck it down because the State’s legislators had a racially
discriminatory  purpose.    North  Carolina  State Conference
of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F. 3d 204 (CA4 2016).)  States
and localities redistricted—drawing new boundary lines or
replacing neighborhood-based seats with at-large seats—in
ways  guaranteed  to  reduce  minority  representation.    See
Elmendorf, 115 Colum. L. Rev., at 2146.  And jurisdictions
closed  polling  places  in  mostly  minority  areas,  enhancing
an already pronounced problem.  See Brief for Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights et al. as Amici Cu-
riae 14–15 (listing closure schemes); Pettigrew, The Racial
Gap in Wait Times, 132 Pol. Sci. Q. 527, 527 (2017) (finding
that lines in minority precincts are twice as long as in white
ones, and that a minority voter is six times more likely to
wait more than an hour).2
  And  that  was  just  the  first  wave  of  post-Shelby  County

——————

2 Although  causation  is  hard  to  establish  definitively,  those  post-
Shelby County changes appear to have reduced minority participation in
the next election cycle.  The most comprehensive study available found
that in areas freed from Section 5 review, white turnout remained the
same, but “minority participation dropped by 2.1 percentage points”—a
stark  reversal  in  direction  from  prior  elections.    Ang,  Do  40-Year-Old
Facts Still Matter?, 11 Am. Econ. J.: Applied Economics, No. 3, pp. 1, 35
(2019).  The results, said the scholar who crunched the numbers, “provide
early evidence that the Shelby ruling may jeopardize decades of voting
rights progress.”  Id., at 36.  The election laws passed in Shelby County’s
wake “may have negated many of the gains made under preclearance.”
Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE. It discusses the impact of the Shelby County v. Holder decision on voting rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

Opinion of the Court

ing it a crime “to induce, assist, encourage, or solicit, or at-
tempt to induce, assist, encourage, or solicit the importation
or  migration  of  any  contract  laborer  . . .  into  the  United
States”).  Like “encourage,” the word “induce” carried solic-
itation and facilitation overtones at the time of this enact-
ment.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 617 (1891) (defining “in-
ducement”  to  mean  “that  which  leads  or  tempts  to  the
commission of crime”).  In fact, Congress had just recently
used the term in a catchall prohibition on criminal facilita-
tion.  See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, §332, 35 Stat. 1152 (“Whoever
. . .  aids,  abets,  counsels,  commands,  induces,  or  procures
[the  commission  of  an  offense],  is  a  principal”  (emphasis
added)).  And as with “encourage,” the meaning of “induce”
was clarified and narrowed by its statutory neighbors in the
1917 Act—“assist” and “solicit.”
  Congress enacted the immediate forerunner of the mod-
ern clause (iv) in 1952 and, in doing so, simplified the lan-
guage from the 1917 Act.  Most notably, the 1952 version
dropped the words “assist” and “solicit,” instead making it
a crime to “willfully or knowingly encourag[e] or induc[e],
or attemp[t] to encourage or induce, either directly or indi-
rectly, the entry into the United States of . . . any alien . . .
not  lawfully  entitled  to  enter  or  reside  within  the  United
States.”    Immigration  and  Nationality  Act,  §274(a)(4),  66
Stat. 229.  Three decades later, Congress brought 8 U. S. C.
§1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)  into  its  current  form—still  without  the
words “assist” or “solicit.”  Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, §112(a), 100 Stat. 3382 (making it a crime to
“encourag[e] or induc[e] an alien to come to, enter, or reside
in  the  United  States,  knowing  or  in  reckless  disregard  of
the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be
in violation of law”).
  On Hansen’s view, these changes dramatically broadened
the scope of clause (iv)’s prohibition on encouragement.  Be-
fore 1952, he says, the words “assist” and “solicit” may have
cabined  “encourage”  and  “induce,”  but  eliminating  them
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the interpretation of a law related to immigration. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is part of the body of the legal document meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CONCEPCION v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 20–1650.  Argued January 19, 2022—Decided June 27, 2022

Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to correct the wide dis-
parity between crack and powder cocaine sentencing.  Section 2 of that
Act increased the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger a 5-to-40-
year sentencing range from 5 grams to 28 grams.  §2(a)(2), 124 Stat.
2372.  The Fair Sentencing Act did not apply retroactively, but in 2011,
the  Sentencing  Commission  amended  the  Sentencing  Guidelines  to
lower the Guidelines range for crack-cocaine offenses and applied that
reduction  retroactively  for  some  defendants.    In  2018,  Congress  en-
acted  the  First  Step  Act,  authorizing  district  courts  to  “impose  a  re-
duced sentence” on defendants serving sentences for certain crack-co-
caine  offenses  “as  if  sections  2  and  3  of  the  Fair  Sentencing  Act  . . .
were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.”  Pub. L.
115–391, §404(b), 132 Stat. 5222.

In 2007, petitioner Carlos Concepcion pleaded guilty to one count of
distributing  five  or  more  grams  of  crack  cocaine  in  violation  of  21
U. S. C.  §841(a)(1),  and  he  was  sentenced  in  2009  to  19  years  (228
months) in prison.  When Concepcion was sentenced, he qualified for
sentencing as a “career offender.”  The career offender provision and
other  enhancements  increased  Concepcion’s  Sentencing  Guidelines
range from 57 to 71 months to 262 to 327 months. Because Concepcion
was sentenced as a career offender, he was not eligible for relief under
the Sentencing Commission’s 2011 amendment.

In 2019,  Concepcion filed a  pro se motion for a sentence reduction
under the First Step Act.  He argued that he was serving a sentence
for a “covered offense” because §2 of the Fair Sentencing Act “modified”
the statutory penalties for his conviction under 21 U. S. C. §841(a)(1).
Concepcion contended that retroactive application of the Fair Sentenc-
ing Act lowered his Guidelines range from 262 to 327 months to 188 to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are informational in nature and not meant to be indexed as part of the case's content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

BARRETT, J., dissenting

C

The  Court  concludes  with  an  appeal  to  consequences:
Construing (c)(2) broadly would “expos[e] activists and lob-
byists alike to decades in prison.”  Ante, at 14.  This fear is
overstated.

To begin with, the Court ignores that (c)(2) requires proof
that  a  defendant  acted  “corruptly.”    The  meaning  of  this
term is unsettled, but all of its possible definitions limit the
scope of liability.  On one proposed interpretation, a defend-
ant acts corruptly by “ ‘us[ing] unlawful means, or act[ing]
with an unlawful purpose, or both.’ ”  United States v. Rob-
ertson, 103 F. 4th 1, 8 (CADC 2023) (approving jury instruc-
tions for (c)(2)).  On another, a defendant acts “corruptly” if
he “act[s] ‘with an intent to procure an unlawful benefit ei-
ther for himself or for some other person.’ ”  64 F. 4th, at 352
(Walker, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(quoting  Marinello,  584  U. S.,  at  21;  alterations  omitted).
Under either, the “corruptly” element should screen out in-
nocent activists and lobbyists who engage in lawful activity.
And  if  not,  those  defendants  can  bring  as-applied  First
Amendment challenges.

The  Court  also  emphasizes  (c)(2)’s  20-year  maximum
penalty.  Ante,  at  14–15.    But  it  simultaneously  “glosses
over the absence of any prescribed minimum.”  Yates, 574
U. S., at 569 (KAGAN, J., dissenting).  “Congress presuma-
bly  enacts  laws  with  high  maximums  and  no  minimums
when it thinks the prohibited conduct may run the gamut
from major to minor.”  Ibid.  Indeed, given the breadth of
its terms, (c)(2) naturally encompasses actions that range
in severity.  Congress presumably trusted District Courts
to  impose  sentences  commensurate  with  the  defendant’s
particular conduct.

*

*

*

There is no getting around it: Section 1512(c)(2) is an ex-
pansive statute.  Yet Congress, not this Court, weighs the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute (Section 1512(c)(2)) and argues against the majority opinion's stance.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of judicial opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

176

PHILLIPS v. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

Souter, J., dissenting

That is not to say, of course, that we should resolve either
the taking or compensation issues here, for the Fifth Circuit
did not address them. Rather, we should determine here
whether either of the remaining issues might reasonably be
resolved against respondents; if so, we should not abstract
the property issue for resolution in their favor now, but
should return the case to the Court of Appeals to consider
all three issues before resolving the ﬁrst. Sufﬁce it to say
that both the taking and compensation questions are serious
ones for respondents.

First, as to a taking, we start with Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978), and its guidance
about certain sorts of facts that are of particular importance
in what is supposed to be an “ad hoc, factual” enquiry, id.,
at 124, into whether the government has “go[ne] too far.”
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922).
Attention should be paid to the nature of the government’s
action, its economic impact, and the degree of any inter-
ference with reasonable,
investment-backed expectations.
Penn Central, supra, at 124. Here it is enough to note the
possible signiﬁcance of the facts that there is no physical
occupation or seizure of tangible property, cf. Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 426 (1982)
(noting that physical intrusion is “unusually serious” in the
takings context); that there is no apparent economic im-
pact (since the client would have no net interest to go in his
pocket, IOLTA or no IOLTA); and that the facts present
neither anything resembling an investment nor (for the rea-
son just given) any apparent basis for reasonably expecting
to obtain net interest. While a court would certainly con-
sider any proposal that respondents might make for a depar-
ture from the Penn Central approach to vindicating the Fifth
Amendment in these circumstances, application of Penn Cen-
tral would not bode well for claimants like respondents.

Second, as to the just compensation requirement, the
client’s inability to earn net interest outside IOLTA, due to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter in the case of Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation. It delves into legal arguments regarding takings and just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

BREYER, J., dissenting

boundaries.

B
Since  the  kinds  of  corruption  that  can  destroy  the  link
between  public  opinion  and  governmental  action  extend
well  beyond  those  the  plurality  describes,  the  plurality’s
notion  of  corruption  is  flatly  inconsistent  with  the  basic
constitutional  rationale  I  have  just  described.    Thus,  it
should surprise no one that this Court’s case law (Citizens
United  excepted)  insists  upon  a  considerably  broader
definition.

In  Buckley,  for  instance,  the  Court  said  explicitly  that
aggregate  limits  were  constitutional  because  they  helped
“prevent  evasion  .  .  .  [through]  huge  contributions  to  the
candidate’s political party,”  424 U. S., at 26 (the contrary
to  what  the  plurality  today  seems  to  believe,  see  ante,  at
36–39).  Moreover,  Buckley  upheld  the  base  limits  in
significant  part  because  they  helped  thwart  “the  appear
ance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large indi-
vidual financial contributions.”  424 U. S., at 27 (emphasis
added).  And  it  said  that  Congress  could  reasonably  con
clude that criminal laws forbidding “the giving and taking
of  bribes”  did  not  adequately  “deal  with  the  reality  or
appearance  of  corruption.”    Id.,  at  28.  Bribery  laws,  the
Court  recognized,  address  “only  the  most  blatant  and
specific  attempts  of  those  with  money  to  influence  gov
ernmental  action.”
extends further.

Ibid.    The  concern  with  corruption

Other  cases  put  the  matter  yet  more  strongly.    In
Beaumont,  for  example,  the  Court  found  constitutional  a
ban on direct contributions by corporations because of the
need to prevent corruption, properly “understood not only
as  quid  pro  quo  agreements,  but  also  as  undue  influence
on  an  officeholder’s  judgment.”    Federal  Election  Comm’n
v.  Beaumont,  539  U. S.  146,  155–156  (2003).    In  Federal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the definition of corruption in the context of campaign finance law, citing previous Supreme Court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

vacy interests or for a corporation’s own books.5  The lone
exception,  of  course,  is  Miller,  where  the  Court’s  analysis
of the third-party subpoena merged with the application of
the  third-party  doctrine.    425  U. S.,  at  444  (concluding
that Miller lacked the necessary privacy interest to contest
the issuance of a subpoena to his bank).

JUSTICE  ALITO  overlooks  the  critical  issue.

  At  some
point, the dissent should recognize that CSLI is an entirely
different  species  of  business  record—something  that
implicates  basic  Fourth  Amendment  concerns  about  arbi-
trary  government  power  much  more  directly  than  corpo-
rate  tax  or  payroll  ledgers.    When  confronting  new  con-
cerns  wrought  by  digital  technology,  this  Court  has  been
careful not to uncritically extend existing precedents.  See
Riley,  573  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  10)  (“A  search  of
the  information  on  a  cell  phone  bears  little  resemblance
to  the  type  of  brief  physical  search  considered  [in  prior
precedents].”).

If the choice to proceed by subpoena provided a categori-
cal limitation on Fourth Amendment protection, no type of
record  would  ever  be  protected  by  the  warrant  require-
ment.  Under JUSTICE ALITO’s view, private letters, digital
contents  of  a  cell  phone—any  personal  information  re-
duced  to  document  form,  in  fact—may  be  collected  by

——————

5 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 14 (1973) (“No person can
have  a  reasonable  expectation  that  others  will  not  know  the  sound  of
his voice”); Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U. S. 408, 411, 415 (1984)
(payroll  and  sales  records);  California  Bankers  Assn.  v.  Shultz,  416
U. S.  21,  67  (1974)  (Bank  Secrecy  Act  reporting  requirements);  See  v.
Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 544 (1967) (financial books and records); United
States  v.  Powell,  379  U. S.  48,  49,  57  (1964)  (corporate  tax  records);
McPhaul  v.  United  States,  364  U. S.  372,  374,  382  (1960)  (books  and
records of an organization); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S.
632,  634,  651–653  (1950)  (Federal  Trade  Commission  reporting  re-
quirement); Oklahoma  Press  Publishing Co.  v.  Walling,  327  U. S.  186,
189, 204–208 (1946) (payroll records); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 45,
75 (1906) (corporate books and papers).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the part discussing the privacy implications of accessing business records.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

909

524 U. S.

June 1, 1998

No. 97– 8702. Longariello v. School Board of Dade
County, Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 707 So. 2d 1125.

No. 97–8706. Brown v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 330 Ark. xxii.

No. 97–8752. Williams v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th

App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8753. Kennedy v. Paramount Pictures Corp. et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 126.
No. 97–8770. Parks v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8781. Cimino v. Zuk et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 122 F. 3d 1055.

No. 97–8785. Turner v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 815.

No. 97–8793. Aljami v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 97–8795. Griffin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 918.

No. 97–8799. Godfrey v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8810. Karasek v. City of Dayton. Ct. App. Ohio,

Montgomery County. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8824. Kuku v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 1435.

No. 97–8841. Swain v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 919.

No. 97–8842. McCabe v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 149.

No. 97–8845. Barnes v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 908.

No. 97–8847. Pickering v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 138 F. 3d 952.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is likely part of a legal document or database and not the main body of text meant for reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CONCEPCION v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

First Step Act motion must, may, or may not consider inter-
vening changes of law or fact.2  This Court granted certio-
rari to resolve this disagreement.  594 U. S. ___ (2021).

II
“From the beginning of the Republic, federal judges were
entrusted with wide sentencing discretion.”  K. Stith & J.
Cabranes,  Fear  of  Judging:  Sentencing  Guidelines  in  the
Federal Courts 9 (1998) (Stith & Cabranes).  Federal courts
historically have exercised this broad discretion to consider
all  relevant  information  at  an  initial  sentencing  hearing,
consistent  with  their  responsibility  to  sentence  the  whole
person before them.  That discretion also carries forward to
later  proceedings  that  may  modify  an  original  sentence.
Such discretion is bounded only when Congress or the Con-
stitution expressly limits the type of information a district
court may consider in modifying a sentence.

A
There is a “long” and “durable” tradition that sentencing
judges  “enjo[y]  discretion  in  the  sort  of  information  they
may consider” at an initial sentencing proceeding.  Dean v.
United States, 581 U. S. 62, 66 (2017).3  This history dates

——————

2 Compare  United  States v.  Collington,  995 F. 3d  347,  355,  360  (CA4
2021) (must consider changed law and facts); United States v. Easter, 975
F. 3d 318, 325–327 (CA3 2020) (same); United States v. Brown, 974 F. 3d
1137, 1144–1145 (CA10 2020) (must consider intervening Circuit prece-
dent); United States v. White, 984 F. 3d 76, 93 (CADC 2020) (must con-
sider changed facts), with United States v. Maxwell, 991 F. 3d 685, 689
(CA6 2021) (may consider); United States v. Moore, 975 F. 3d 84, 92, n.
36 (CA2 2020) (same); United States v. Harris, 960 F. 3d 1103, 1106 (CA8
2020) (same); United States v. Shaw, 957 F. 3d 734, 741–742 (CA7 2020)
(same), with United States v. Denson, 963 F. 3d 1080, 1089 (CA11 2020)
(may not consider); United States v. Kelley, 962 F. 3d 470, 475 (CA9 2020)
(same);  United  States  v.  Hegwood,  934  F. 3d  414,  418–419  (CA5  2019)
(same).

3 The dissent invokes another background principle: the importance of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses sentencing discretion and relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010)

19

ALITO, J., dissenting

“The  abused  dogs  used  in  fights  endure  physical  tor-
ture  and  emotional  manipulation  throughout  their
lives  to  predispose  them  to  violence;  common  tactics
include feeding the animals hot peppers and gunpow-
der,  prodding  them  with  sticks,  and  electrocution.
Dogs are conditioned never to give up a fight, even if
they  will  be  gravely  hurt  or  killed.    As  a  result,  dog-
fights  inflict  horrific  injuries  on  the  participating
animals,  including  lacerations,  ripped  ears,  puncture
wounds and broken bones.  Losing dogs are routinely
refused treatment, beaten further as ‘punishment’ for
the loss, and executed by drowning, hanging, or incin-
eration.”  Id., at 5–6 (footnotes omitted).

For  these  dogs,  unlike  the  animals  killed  in  crush  vid-
eos,  the  suffering  lasts  for  years  rather  than  minutes.  As
with  crush  videos,  moreover,  the  statutory  ban  on  com-
merce  in  dogfighting  videos  is  also  supported  by  compel-
ling  governmental  interests  in  effectively  enforcing  the
Nation’s  criminal  laws  and  preventing  criminals  from
profiting from their illegal activities.  See Ferber, supra, at
757–758; Simon & Schuster, 502 U. S., at 119.

In sum, §48 may validly be applied to at least two broad
real-world categories of expression covered by the statute:
crush videos and dogfighting videos.  Thus, the statute has
a  substantial  core  of  constitutionally  permissible  applica-
tions.  Moreover,  for  the  reasons  set  forth  above,  the  re-
cord does not show that §48, properly interpreted, bans a
substantial amount of protected speech in absolute terms.
A  fortiori,  respondent  has  not  met  his  burden  of  demon-
strating that any impermissible applications of the statute
are  “substantial”  in  relation  to  its  “plainly  legitimate
sweep.”  Williams, 553 U. S., at 292.  Accordingly, I would
reject  respondent’s  claim  that  §48  is  facially  unconstitu-
tional under the overbreadth doctrine.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the constitutionality of a specific statute (likely related to animal cruelty) and cites previous legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v.
VULLO

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 22–842.  Argued March 18, 2024—Decided May 30, 2024

Petitioner  National  Rifle  Association  (NRA)  sued  respondent  Maria
Vullo—former superintendent of the New York Department of Finan-
cial Services (DFS)—alleging that Vullo violated the First Amendment
by  coercing  DFS-regulated  parties  to  punish  or  suppress  the  NRA’s
gun-promotion advocacy.  The Second Circuit held that Vullo’s alleged
actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate law
enforcement.    The  Court  granted  certiorari  to  address  whether  the
NRA’s complaint states a First Amendment claim.

The NRA’s “well-pleaded factual allegations,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U. S. 662, 678–679, are taken as true at this motion-to-dismiss stage.
DFS regulates insurance companies and financial services institutions
doing business in New York, and has the power to initiate investiga-
tions and civil enforcement actions, as well as to refer matters for crim-
inal prosecution.  The NRA contracted with DFS-regulated entities—
affiliates of Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton)—to administer insur-
ance polices the NRA offered as a benefit to its members, which Chubb
Limited  (Chubb)  and  Lloyd’s  of  London  (Lloyd’s)  would  then  under-
write.  In 2017, Vullo began investigating one of these affinity insur-
ance policies—Carry Guard—on a tip passed along from a gun-control
advocacy group.  The investigation revealed that Carry Guard insured
gun  owners  from  intentional  criminal  acts  in  violation  of  New  York
law,  and  that  the  NRA  promoted  Carry  Guard  without  the  required
insurance  producer  license.    Lockton  and  Chubb  subsequently  sus-
pended Carry Guard.  Vullo then expanded her investigation into the
NRA’s other affinity insurance programs.

On February 27, 2018, Vullo met with senior executives at Lloyd’s,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

the  Constitution.  But  there  is  no  “ ‘separation  of  powers
clause’ ” either.  Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 227.  Yet that doc-
trine is undoubtedly carved into the Constitution’s text by
its three articles separating powers and vesting the Execu-
tive  power  solely  in  the  President.  See  ibid.    And  the
Court’s prior decisions, such as Nixon and Fitzgerald, have
long recognized that doctrine as mandating certain Presi-
dential privileges and immunities, even though the Consti-
tution contains no explicit “provision for immunity.”  Post,
at 4; see Part II–B–1, supra.  Neither the dissents nor the
Government disavow any of those prior decisions.  See Tr.
of Oral Arg. 76–77.

The principal dissent then cites the Impeachment Judg-
ment Clause, arguing that it “clearly contemplates that a
former President may be subject to criminal prosecution.”
Post, at 6.  But that Clause does not indicate whether a for-
mer President may, consistent with the separation of pow-
ers, be prosecuted for his official conduct in particular.  See
supra, at 32–33.  And the assortment of historical sources
the principal dissent cites are unhelpful for the same rea-
son.  See post, at 6–8.  As the Court has previously noted,
relevant historical evidence on the question of Presidential
immunity is of a “fragmentary character.”  Fitzgerald, 457
U. S., at 752, n. 31; see also Clinton, 520 U. S., at 696–697;
cf. Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(noting “the poverty of really useful and unambiguous au-
thority  applicable  to  concrete  problems  of  executive
power”).
“[T]he  most  compelling  arguments,”  therefore,
“arise from the Constitution’s separation of powers and the
Judiciary’s historic understanding of that doctrine.”  Fitz-
gerald, 457 U. S., at 752, n. 31.

The Court’s prior admonition is evident in the principal
dissent’s citations.  Some of its cherry-picked sources do not
even discuss the President in particular.  See, e.g., post, at
7–8 (citing 2 Debates on the Constitution 177 (J. Elliot ed.
1836); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case *Trump v. United States*. It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases, indicating it is part of the core content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

Opinion of the Court

they recognize are presumptively enforceable under §1983.

C
Even  if  a  statutory  provision  unambiguously  secures
rights,  a  defendant  “may  defeat  t[he]  presumption  by
demonstrating that Congress did not intend” that §1983 be
available to enforce those rights.  Rancho Palos Verdes, 544
U. S., at 120.13  For evidence of such intent, we have looked
to “the statute creating the right.”  Ibid.  A statute could, of
course, expressly forbid §1983’s use.  Fitzgerald, 555 U. S.,
at 252; Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 120.  Absent such
a  sign,  a  defendant  must  show  that  Congress  issued  the
same  command  implicitly,  by  creating  “a  ‘comprehensive
enforcement  scheme  that  is  incompatible  with  individual
enforcement  under  §1983.’ ”    Id.,  at  120.  Only  the  latter
path is at issue here.

1
Our precedent outlines what HHC must show to traverse
the implicit-preclusion path.  “ ‘The crucial consideration’ ”
is whether “Congress intended a statute’s remedial scheme
to  ‘be  the  exclusive  avenue  through  which  a  plaintiff  may
assert [his] claims.’ ”  Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 252 (quoting
Smith  v.  Robinson,  468  U. S.  992,  1009,  1012  (1984)  (em-
phasis added)); Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 252 (framing “ ‘[t]he

——————

13 The “ ‘rebuttable presumption’ ” that our cases describe, Rancho Pa-
los  Verdes,  544  U. S.,  at  120,  is  not  an  artificially  onerous  court-made
hurdle.  It merely reflects what §1983’s plain text commands: The §1983
remedy is available to vindicate federal individual rights “secured by . . .
la[w].”  In  other  words,  the  presumption  recognizes  that,  even  where
Congress  has  unambiguously  secured  certain  federal  individual  rights
by law, it may have simultaneously given good reason (detectable with
ordinary  interpretive  tools)  to  conclude  that  the  §1983  remedy  is  not
available for those rights, even though it “generally” is.  Gonzaga, 536
U. S., at 284, and n. 4.  And it also recognizes that it is the defendant’s
burden to show that a right otherwise secured by law is not §1983 en-
forceable.  Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 120; Gonzaga, 536 U. S.,
at 284, and n. 4.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, discusses legal precedent, and uses legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

examine how the free-exercise right was understood when
the First Amendment was adopted.

By that date, the right to religious liberty already had a
long, rich, and complex history in this country.  What ap-
pears to be the first “free exercise” provision was adopted in
1649.  Prompted by Lord Baltimore,35 the Maryland Assem-
bly enacted a provision protecting the right of all Christians
to engage in “the free exercise” of religion.36  Rhode Island’s
1663  Charter  extended  the  right  to  all.    See  Charter  of
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1663), in Cogan
34.  Early  colonial  charters  and  agreements  in  Carolina,
Delaware,  New  Jersey,  New  York,  and  Pennsylvania  also
recognized the right to free exercise,37 and by 1789, every

——————
Polygamy:  The  Relevance  of  Nineteenth-Century  Cases  and  Commen-
taries  for  Contemporary  Debates  About  Free  Exercise  Exemptions,  85
Ore. L. Rev. 369 (2006) (Lombardi, Free Exercise); Muñoz, The Original
Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence From the First Con-
gress, 31 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1083 (2008) (Muñoz, Original Mean-
ing); Nestor, Note, The Original Meaning and Significance of Early State
Provisos to the Free Exercise of Religion, 42 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 971
(2019)  (Nestor);  M.  Nussbaum,  Liberty  of  Conscience  120–130  (2008);
Walsh,  The  First  Free  Exercise  Case,  73  Geo.  Wash.  L.  Rev.  1  (2004)
(Walsh).

35  McConnell,  Origins  1425  (describing  Lord  Baltimore’s  directive  to
the new Protestant governor and councilors of Maryland to refrain from
interfering  with  the  “free  exercise”  of  Christians,  particularly  Roman
Catholics).

36  Act  Concerning  Religion  (1649),  in  Cogan  17;  see  also  McConnell,

Origins 1425.

37 See Second Charter of Carolina (1665), in Cogan 27–28 (recognizing
the right of persons to “freely and quietly have and enjoy . . . their Judg-
ments and Consciences, in Matters of Religion” and declaring that “no
Person . . . shall be in any way molested, punished, disquieted, or called
in Question, for any Differences in Opinion, or Practice in Matters of re-
ligious  Concernments,  who  do  not  actually  disturb  the  Civil  Peace”);
Charter of Delaware, Art. I (1701), in id., at 15 (ensuring “[t]hat no per-
son . . . who shall confess and acknowledge One Almighty God . . . shall
be in any case molested or prejudiced, in his . . . person or estate, because
of his . . . consciencious persuasion or practice, nor . . . to do or suffer any
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito in the case of Fulton v. Philadelphia.  It discusses the history of religious liberty in the United States.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

(2010); Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 905 (1997).
Yet none has been brought to our attention.

C
Of  course,  our  jurisprudence  has  not  stood  still  since
1791.  We now evaluate subpoenas duces tecum and other
forms  of  compulsory  document  production  under  the
Fourth Amendment, although we employ a reasonableness
standard that is less demanding than the requirements for
a warrant.  But the road to that doctrinal destination was
anything  but  smooth,  and  our  initial  missteps—and  the
subsequent  struggle  to  extricate  ourselves  from  their
consequences—should  provide  an  object  lesson  for  today’s
majority about the dangers of holding compulsory process
to the same standard as actual searches and seizures.

For almost a century after the Fourth Amendment was
enacted, this Court said and did nothing to indicate that it
might  regulate  the  compulsory  production  of  documents.
But  that  changed  temporarily  when  the  Court  decided
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), the first—and,
until  today,  the  only—case  in  which  this  Court  has  ever
held the compulsory production of documents to the same
standard as actual searches and seizures.

The  Boyd  Court  held  that  a  court  order  compelling  a
company  to  produce  potentially  incriminating  business
records  violated  both  the  Fourth  and  the  Fifth  Amend-
ments.  The Court acknowledged that “certain aggravating
incidents  of  actual  search  and  seizure,  such  as  forcible
entry  into  a  man’s  house  and  searching  amongst  his  pa-
pers,  are  wanting”  when  the  Government  relies  on  com-
pulsory process.  Id., at 622.  But it nevertheless asserted
that  the  Fourth  Amendment  ought  to  “be  liberally  con-
strued,” id., at 635, and further reasoned that compulsory
process  “effects  the  sole  object  and  purpose  of  search  and
seizure”  by  “forcing  from  a  party  evidence  against  him-
self,”  id.,  at  622.    “In  this  regard,”  the  Court  concluded,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal citations and arguments, indicating it is part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary section like a table of contents or copyright information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

Opinion of the Court

“authori[zed] under state law to represent the State’s inter-
ests” in federal court could defend state laws there as par-
ties.  484 U. S. 72, 75, 81–82 (1987).

These  principles  and  precedents  are  dispositive  here.
North  Carolina  has  expressly  authorized  the  legislative
leaders to defend the State’s practical interests in litigation
of this sort.  State law provides that “[t]he Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore
of the Senate, as agents of the State, by and through coun-
sel of their choice,” “shall jointly have standing to intervene
on behalf of the General Assembly as a party in any judicial
proceeding challenging a North Carolina statute or provi-
sion of the North Carolina Constitution.”  N. C. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 1–72.2(b).  Even beyond these instructions, the State
has made plain that it considers the leaders of the General
Assembly “necessary parties” to suits like this one.  § 120–
32.6(b).

Tellingly, the Board seems to agree that, if North Caro-
lina law authorizes participation by the legislative leaders
on behalf of the State, a federal court should find the inter-
est requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) satisfied.  Brief for State
Respondents 20, 28.  The Board submits only that, in fact,
North Carolina law does not afford the legislative leaders
that authority.  Id., at 49–50.  But while we are hardly the
final arbiters of North Carolina law, the Board’s argument
seems more than a little difficult to square with the express
statutory language above.  One of these provisions is even
entitled, “General Assembly Acting on Behalf of the State
of  North  Carolina  in  Certain  Actions.”    § 120–32.6(b).    It
provides that the legislative leaders may defend state laws
“as agents of the State.”  Ibid.

Retreating, the Board argues alternatively that the stat-
utes authorizing the legislative leaders to participate here
violate the State Constitution by usurping authority vested
in the executive branch.  Brief for State Respondents 50–
55; N. C. Const., Art. I, § 6.  But the Board’s logic is hard to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the authority of legislative leaders to defend state laws in court. It cites relevant statutes and constitutional provisions, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

such  out-of-pocket  costs  as  copays  or  deductibles.2    Those
enumerated services did not, in the original draft bill, in-
clude  preventive  care  specific  to  women.  “To  correct  this
oversight,  Senator  Barbara  Mikulski
introduced  the
Women’s  Health  Amendment,”  now  codified  at  §300gg–
13(a)(4).  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682,
741  (2014)  (GINSBURG,  J.,  dissenting);  see  also  155  Cong.
Rec. 28841.  This provision was designed “to promote equal-
ity  in  women’s  access  to  health  care,”  countering  gender-
based discrimination and disparities in such access.  Brief
for  186  Members  of  the  United  States  Congress  as  Amici
Curiae 6 (hereinafter Brief for 186 Members of Congress).
Its proponents noted, inter alia, that “[w]omen paid signifi-
cantly more than men for preventive care,” and that “cost
barriers  operated  to  block  many  women  from  obtaining
needed  care  at  all.”  Hobby  Lobby,  573  U. S.,  at  742
(GINSBURG, J., dissenting); see, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. 28844
(statement of Sen. Hagan) (“When . . . women had to choose
between feeding their children, paying the rent, and meet-
ing other financial obligations, they skipped important pre-
ventive  screenings  and  took  a  chance  with  their  personal
health.”).

Due to the Women’s Health Amendment, the preventive
health services that group health plans must cover include,
“with  respect  to  women,”  “preventive  care  and  screenings
. . . provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by

——————

2 This requirement does not apply to employers with fewer than 50 em-
ployees,  26  U. S. C.  §4980H(c)(2),  or  “grandfathered  health  plans”—
plans in existence on March 23, 2010 that have not thereafter made spec-
ified changes in coverage, 42 U. S. C. §18011(a), (e); 45 CFR §147.140(g)
(2018). “Federal statutes often include exemptions for small employers,
and  such  provisions  have  never  been  held  to  undermine  the  interests
served by these statutes.”  Hobby Lobby, 573 U. S., at 763 (GINSBURG, J.,
dissenting).    “[T]he  grandfathering  provision,”  “far  from  ranking  as  a
categorical exemption, . . . is temporary, intended to be a means for grad-
ually  transitioning  employers  into  mandatory  coverage.”    Id.,  at  764
(internal quotation marks omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedents and discusses the legislative history of a specific amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 256 (2010)

263

Opinion of the Court

B

The  Special  Master  held  a  hearing  and  issued  an  order
granting all three motions for leave to intervene.  At South
Carolina’s request, the Special Master  set forth her ﬁndings
and decision as a First Interim Report, and it is this Report
to which South Carolina now presents exceptions.

The  Special  Master  recognized  that  this  Court  has  exer
cised  jurisdiction  over  nonstate  parties  in  original  actions
between  two  or  more  States.  She  also  recognized  that  in
New Jersey v.  New York, 345 U. S. 369, the Court considered
the  “appropriate  standard”  for  a  nonstate  entity’s  motion  to
intervene  in  an  original  action.  First  Interim  Report  of
Special Master, O. T. 2008, No. 138, Orig., p. 12 (First Interim
Rept.).  But  in  attempting  to  give  context  to  our  standard,
she  looked  beyond  intervention  and  considered  original  ac
tions in which the Court has allowed nonstate entities to be
named as defendants by the complaining State.  From those
examples,  the  Special  Master  “distilled  the  following  rule”
governing  motions  to  intervene  in  original  actions  by  non-
state entities:

“Although  the  Court’s  original  jurisdiction  presump
tively is reserved for disputes between sovereign states
over  sovereign  matters,  non-state  entities  may  become
parties to such original disputes in appropriate and com
pelling  circumstances,  such  as  where  the  non-state  en
tity  is  the  instrumentality  authorized  to  carry  out  the
wrongful  conduct  or  injury  for  which  the  complaining
state  seeks relief,  where  the non-state  entity  has an  in
dependent  property  interest  that  is  directly  implicated
by  the  original  dispute  or  is  a  substantial  factor  in  the
dispute,  where  the  non-state  entity otherwise  has  a  ‘di
rect stake’ in the outcome of the action within the mean
ing  of  the  Court’s  cases  discussed  above,  or  where,  to
gether with one or more of the above circumstances, the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the criteria for non-state entities to intervene in original actions between states. It provides legal analysis and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
846

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10629.  Brown  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10631.  Brent  v.  Anglin,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10632.  McCree  v.  Harry,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10634.  Pierce  v.  Mississippi.  Ct.  App.  Miss.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  2  So.  3d  641.

No.  08–10635.  Atwater  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  6  So.  3d  51.

No.  08–10636.  Wilson  v.  Simpson,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  515  F.  3d  682.

No.  08–10639.  Jackson  v.  Benton,  Warden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  788.

No.  08–10640.  Wollstein  v.  Mary  Washington  Hospital
et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310
Fed.  Appx.  568.

No.  08–10641.  Davis  v.  North  Carolina.  Sup.  Ct.  N.  C.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10643.  Kenyon v. Wyoming Department of Correc
tions  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  250.

No.  08–10644.  Jackson  v.  Almager,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10646.  Raymond  v.  Weber,  Warden.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  552  F.  3d  680.

No.  08–10652.  Renneke  v.  Nebraska  Department  of
Health  and  Human  Services.  Sup.  Ct.  Neb.  Certiorari
denied.

No. 08–10658.  McNeill v.  Wayne County, Michigan, et al.
C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.
Appx.  358.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not represent the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–1496.  Argued February 22, 2023—Decided May 18, 2023

In  2017,  Abdulkadir  Masharipov  carried  out  a  terrorist  attack  on  the
Reina nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey, on behalf of the Islamic State of
Iraq  and  Syria  (ISIS),  a  designated  Foreign  Terrorist  Organization.
Masharipov  killed  Nawras  Alassaf  and  38  others.    Alassaf’s  family
then brought this suit under 18 U. S. C. §2333, an Antiterrorism Act
(ATA) provision that permits U. S. nationals who have been “injured
. . . by reason of an act of international terrorism” to file a civil suit for
damages.  Instead of suing ISIS directly under §2333(a), the plaintiffs
(respondents here) invoked §2333(d)(2) to sue three of the largest so-
cial-media  companies  in  the  world—Facebook,  Twitter  (petitioner
here),  and  Google  (which  owns  YouTube)—for  aiding  and  abetting
ISIS.

The parties today agree on the basic aspects of these platforms: Bil-
lions  of  people  from  around  the  world  have  signed  up  for  them  and
upload massive amounts of content each day.  Defendants profit from
that content by placing advertisements on or near it and use “recom-
mendation” algorithms that match content, advertisements, and users
based on information about the use, advertisement, and content being
viewed.  As the parties represent things, the algorithms here match
any content with any user who is more likely to view that content, and
the platforms perform little to no front-end screening on any content
before it is uploaded.

Plaintiffs, however, allege that for several years the companies have
knowingly allowed ISIS and its supporters to use their platforms and
“recommendation” algorithms as tools for recruiting, fundraising, and
spreading propaganda; plaintiffs further allege that these companies
have, in the process, profited from the advertisements placed on ISIS’
tweets, posts, and videos.  The District Court dismissed the complaint
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

THOMAS, J., concurring

  The Daniel Ball test, with minor variations, marked the
limits  of  federal  jurisdiction  over  waters  up  to  the  enact-
ment of the CWA.  For instance, in Economy Light & Power
Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113 (1921), the Court applied
The Daniel Ball but expanded it to hold that the River and
Harbor  Act of 1899 reaches waters that are  not currently
capable  of  supporting  interstate  commerce,  though  they
once did.  256 U. S., at 123–124.  And, in United States v.
Appalachian  Elec.  Power  Co.,  311  U. S.  377  (1940),  the
Court applied The Daniel Ball to reach waters that could be
made navigable with reasonable and feasible improvement.
311  U. S.,  at  408–409.    While  these  cases  expanded  the
outer boundaries of the term, creating an expanded form of
the Daniel Ball test, they reflect the Court’s longstanding
view that the statutory term “navigable water” required ap-
plication of the Daniel Ball test.

2
In the New Deal era, as is well known, this Court adopted
a  greatly  expanded  conception  of  Congress’  commerce  au-
thority by permitting Congress to regulate any private in-
trastate  activity  that  substantially  affects  interstate  com-
merce,  either  by  itself  or  when  aggregated  with  many
similar activities.  See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111,
127–129 (1942); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U. S.
100, 119 (1941).  Yet, this expansion did not fundamentally
change the Court’s understanding that the term “navigable
waters”  referred  to  waters  used  for  interstate  commerce.
Thus,  in  Appalachian  Elec.,  the  Court  continued  to  apply
the concept of navigability to determine the scope of Con-
gress’ Commerce Clause authority to require licenses under

——————
See, e.g., Swamp Land Act of 1850, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519; see also S. John-
son,  Wetlands  Law:  A  Course  Source  25–26  (2d  ed.  2018).    Wetlands
preservation only gained traction due, in large part, to advances in fire-
arms technology that made waterfowl hunting feasible.  G. Baldassarre
& E. Bolen, Waterfowl Ecology and Management 10–14 (1994).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It cites previous cases and discusses the evolution of the legal interpretation of "navigable waters."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>