<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

921

524 U. S.

June 8, 1998

No. 97–8989. Branch v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 364.

No. 97–8991. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 140.

No. 97–8994. Ramirez-Morales v. United States. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125 F. 3d 860.

No. 97–8995. Sorto et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1161.

No. 97–8996. Belflower v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 1459.

No. 97–9001. Cole v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 97–9007. McClinton v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 1178.

No. 97–9008. Keyser v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 430.

No. 97–9010.

Johnson v. Corcoran, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 915.

No. 97–9012. Turner v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 361.

No. 97–9015. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 122 F. 3d 1075.

No. 97–9018. Willis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 138 F. 3d 955.

No. 97–9023. Moore et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 145 F. 3d 1343.

No. 97–9024. Crosslin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 368.

No. 97–9026. Chao Hui Lin v. United States. Ct. App.

D. C. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9034. Wright v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 1111.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Opinion of the Court

has  also  taken  on  a  secular  meaning.    Indeed,  there  are
instances  in  which  its  message  is  now  almost  entirely
secular.
  A  cross  appears  as  part  of many  registered  trademarks
held  by  businesses  and  secular  organizations,  including
Blue Cross Blue Shield, the Bayer Group, and some John-
son  &  Johnson  products.2    Many  of  these  marks  relate  to
health  care,  and  it  is  likely  that  the  association  of  the
cross with healing had a religious origin.  But the current
use of these marks is indisputably secular.
  The familiar symbol of the Red Cross—a red cross on a
white  background—shows  how  the  meaning  of  a  symbol
that  was  originally  religious  can  be  transformed.    The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) selected
that symbol in 1863 because it was thought to call to mind
the  flag  of  Switzerland,  a  country  widely  known  for  its
neutrality.3  The Swiss flag consists of a white cross on a
red background.  In an effort to invoke the message asso-
ciated with that flag, the ICRC copied its design with the
colors  inverted.    Thus,  the  ICRC  selected  this  symbol  for
an  essentially  secular  reason,  and  the  current  secular
message of the symbol is shown by its use today in nations
with  only  tiny  Christian  populations.4    But  the  cross  was
originally chosen for the Swiss flag for religious reasons.5

——————

2 See  Blue  Cross,  Blue  Shield,  https://www.bcbs.com;  The  Bayer  Group,
The  Bayer  Cross—Logo  and  Landmark,  https://www.bayer.com/en/logo-
history.aspx;  Band-Aid  Brand  Adhesive  Bandages,  Johnson  &  Johnson
All Purpose First Aid Kit, https://www.band-aid.com/products/first-aid-
kits/all-purpose (all Internet materials as last visited June 18, 2019).

3 International Committee of the Red Cross, The History of the Emblems,
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/emblem-history.htm.
4 For  example,  the  Indian  and  Japanese  affiliates  of  the  ICRC  and
Red  Crescent  Societies use  the symbol of  the  cross.   See Indian  Red Cross
Society,  https://www.indianredcross.org/ircs/index.php;  Japanese  Red  Cross
Society, http://www.jrc.or.jp/english /.

5 See  “Flag  of  Switzerland,”  Britannica  Academic,  https://academic.

eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/flag-of-Switzerland/93966.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the secular use of the cross symbol. It contains legal arguments and references to specific cases and organizations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
944

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 13, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09M27.  Wanzer  v.  Texas;
No.  09M28.  Hey  v.  Arlington  County  Department  of

Human  Services;  and

No.  09M31.  Sharkozy  v.  Allison.  Motions  to  direct  the
Clerk  to  ﬁle  petitions  for  writs  of  certiorari  out  of  time  denied.

No.  09M29.  Owens  v.  Providian  Financial  et  al.;  and
No.  09M33.  Oyague  v.  United  States  District  Court  for
the  Eastern  District  of  New  York.  Motions  to  direct  the
Clerk  to  ﬁle  petitions  for  writs  of  certiorari  out  of  time  denied.
Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision
of  these  motions.

No.  09M30.  Wahi  v.  Charleston  Area  Medical  Center
et  al.  Motion  for  leave  to  ﬁle  petition  for  writ  of  certiorari
under  seal  with  redacted  copies  for  the  public  record  granted.

No.  09M32.  Tyus  v.  Montgomery,  Sheriff,  Faulkner
County,  Arkansas,  et  al.  Motion  to  direct  the  Clerk  to  ﬁle
petition  for  writ  of  certiorari  out  of  time  under  this  Court’s  Rule
14.5  denied.

No.  132, Orig.  Alabama  et  al.  v.  North  Carolina.  Excep
tions  to  the  Report  of  the  Special  Master  are  set  for  oral  argu
[For earlier order herein, see 556 U. S. 1206.]
ment in due course.

No.  09–5713.  O’Dwyer  v.  Becnel  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.;
No.  09–5763.  James  v.  Oklahoma.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Okla.;
No.  09–6392.  Rouse  v.  Department  of  State  et  al.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.;  and

No.  09–6442.  In  re  Leaf.  Motions  of  petitioners  for  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied.  Petitioners  are  allowed  until
November  3,  2009,  within  which  to  pay  the  docketing  fees  re
quired  by  Rule  38(a)  and  to  submit  petitions  in  compliance  with
Rule  33.1  of  the  Rules  of  this  Court.

No.  09–6313.  In  re  Fredrick;
No.  09–6388.  In  re  Beverly;
No.  09–6414.  In  re  Ramirez;
No.  09–6448.  In  re  Dhurandhar;
No.  09–6529.  In  re  Ndoromo;  and
No.  09–6622.  In  re  Liles.  Petitions  for  writs  of  habeas  cor

pus  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their statuses, likely from a legal journal or docket. It's not sequential narrative text and focuses on legal proceedings rather than a story or informative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U60

[09-26-01 12:39:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 803 (2000)

845

Breyer, J., dissenting

the fact that Playboy, presumably aware of its own economic
interests, “is willing to incur the costs of an effective § 504.”
Ante, at 824. Yet that denial, as the majority admits, may
simply reﬂect Playboy’s knowledge that § 504, even with bet-
ter notice, will not work. Section 504 is not a similarly ef-
fective alternative to § 505 (in respect to the Government’s
interest in protecting children), unless more than a minimal
number of viewers actually use it; yet the economic evidence
shows that if more than 6% do so, Playboy’s programming
would be totally eliminated. The majority provides no an-
swer to this argument in its opinion—and this evidence is
sufﬁcient in and of itself to dispose of this case.

Of course, it is logically possible that “better notice” will
bring about near perfect parental knowledge (of what chil-
dren watch and § 504 opt-out rights), that cable operators
will respond rapidly to blocking requests, and that still 94%
of all informed parents will decided not to have adult chan-
nels blocked for free. But the probability that this remote
possibility will occur is neither a “draw” nor a “tie.” Ante,
at 819. And that fact is sufﬁcient for the Government to
have met its burden of proof.

All these considerations show that § 504’s opt-out, even
with the Court’s plan for “better notice,” is not similarly ef-
fective in achieving the legitimate goals that the statute was
enacted to serve.

IV

Section 505 raises the cost of adult channel broadcasting.
In doing so, it restricts, but does not ban, adult speech.
Adults may continue to watch adult channels, though less
conveniently, by watching at night, recording programs with
a VCR, or by subscribing to digital cable with better block-
ing systems. Cf. Renton, 475 U. S., at 53–55 (upholding zon-
ing rules that force potential adult theater patrons to travel
to less convenient locations). The Government’s justiﬁ-
cation for imposing this restriction—limiting the access of
children to channels that broadcast virtually 100% “sexu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the effectiveness of Section 504 of the Communications Decency Act in protecting children from adult content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

Opinion of the Court

decide it.  “[O]ne case” in more than “two centuries does not
afford  enough  experience”  to  definitively  and  comprehen-
sively  determine  the  President’s  scope  of  immunity  from
criminal prosecution.  Mazars, 591 U. S., at 871.

C
As for a President’s unofficial acts, there is no immunity.
The  principles  we  set  out  in  Clinton  v.  Jones  confirm  as
much.  When Paula Jones brought a civil lawsuit against
then-President Bill Clinton for acts he allegedly committed
prior  to  his  Presidency,  we  rejected  his  argument  that  he
enjoyed temporary immunity from the lawsuit while serv-
ing as President.  520 U. S., at 684.  Although Presidential
immunity is required for official actions to ensure that the
President’s decisionmaking is not distorted by the threat of
future litigation stemming from those actions, that concern
does  not  support  immunity  for  unofficial  conduct.  Id.,  at
694, and n. 19.  The “ ‘justifying purposes’ ” of the immunity
we recognized in Fitzgerald, and  the one we recognize to-
day, are not that the President must be immune because he
is the President; rather, they are to ensure that the Presi-
dent  can  undertake  his  constitutionally  designated  func-
tions effectively, free from undue pressures or distortions.
520 U. S., at 694, and n. 19 (quoting Fitzgerald, 457 U. S.,
at 755).  “[I]t [is] the nature of the function performed, not
the  identity  of  the  actor  who  perform[s]  it,  that  inform[s]
our immunity analysis.”  Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219,
229 (1988).  The separation of powers does not bar a prose-
cution predicated on the President’s unofficial acts.2

——————

2 Our  decision  in  Clinton  permitted  claims  alleging  unofficial  acts  to
proceed against the sitting President.  See 520 U. S., at 684.  In the crim-
inal context, however, the Justice Department “has long recognized” that
“the separation of powers precludes the criminal prosecution of a sitting
President.”  Brief for United States 9 (citing A Sitting President’s Ame-
nability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. OLC 222 (2000);
emphasis deleted); see Tr. for Oral Arg. 78.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the scope of presidential immunity from criminal prosecution, specifically focusing on the distinction between official and unofficial acts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

21

Opinion of the Court

Arg. 36.7  TransUnion contends that if an individual is ex-
posed to a risk of future harm, time will eventually reveal
whether the risk materializes in the form of actual harm.
If the risk of future harm materializes and the individual
suffers a concrete harm, then the harm itself, and not the
pre-existing risk, will constitute a basis for the person’s in-
jury and for damages.  If the risk of future harm does not
materialize, then the individual cannot establish a concrete
harm sufficient for standing, according to TransUnion.

Consider  an  example.   Suppose  that  a  woman  drives
home from work a quarter mile ahead of a reckless driver
who  is  dangerously  swerving  across  lanes.  The  reckless
driver has exposed the woman to a risk of future harm, but
the risk does not materialize and the woman makes it home
safely.  As counsel for TransUnion stated, that would ordi-
narily be cause for celebration, not a lawsuit.  Id., at 8.  But
if the reckless driver crashes into the woman’s car, the sit-
uation would be different, and (assuming a cause of action)
the woman could sue the driver for damages.

The  plaintiffs  note  that  Spokeo  cited  libel  and  slander
per se as examples of cases where, as the plaintiffs see it, a
mere  risk  of  harm  suffices  for  a  damages  claim.  But  as
Judge Tatel explained for the D. C. Circuit, libel and slan-
der per se “require evidence of publication.”  Owner-Opera-
tor,  879  F. 3d,  at  345.    And  for  those  torts,  publication  is

——————

7 For  example,  a  plaintiff ’s  knowledge  that  he  or  she  is  exposed  to  a
risk of future physical, monetary, or reputational harm could cause its
own current  emotional  or  psychological  harm.   We  take no  position  on
whether or how  such  an emotional or  psychological harm  could  suffice
for Article III purposes—for example, by analogy to the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.  See Reply Brief 14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 30.
The plaintiffs here have not relied on such a theory of Article III harm.
They have not claimed an emotional distress injury from the risk that a
misleading  credit  report  might  be  sent  to  a  third-party  business.    Nor
could they do so, given that the 6,332 plaintiffs have not established that
they were even aware of the misleading information in the internal credit
files maintained at TransUnion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of "risk of future harm" in the context of standing for a lawsuit.  It uses legal arguments and examples to illustrate its point.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
40  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

BREYER, J., dissenting

presented to us, are even roughly  correct, it is difficult to
see how the Court can believe that English history fails to
support legal restrictions on the public carriage of firearms.

B. The Colonies.
The  American  Colonies  continued  the  English  tradition
of regulating public carriage on this side of the Atlantic.  In
1686, the colony of East New Jersey passed a law providing
that  “no  person  or  persons  . . .  shall  presume  privately  to
wear any pocket pistol, skeines, stilladers, daggers or dirks,
or  other  unusual  or  unlawful  weapons  within  this  Prov-
ince.”  An  Act  Against  Wearing  Swords,  &c.,  ch.  9,  in
Grants,  Concessions,  and  Original  Constitutions  of  the
Province of New Jersey 290 (2d ed. 1881).  East New Jersey
also  specifically  prohibited  “planter[s]”  from  “rid[ing]  or
go[ing] armed with sword, pistol, or dagger.”  Ibid.  Massa-
chusetts Bay and New Hampshire followed suit in 1692 and
1771,  respectively,  enacting  laws  that,  like  the  Statute  of
Northampton, provided that those who went “armed Offen-
sively”  could  be  punished.  An  Act  for  the  Punishing  of
Criminal  Offenders,  1692  Mass.  Acts  and  Laws  no.  6,  pp.
11–12;  An  Act  for  the  Punishing  of  Criminal  Offenders,
1771 N. H. Acts and Laws ch. 6, §5, p. 17.

It is true, as the Court points out, that these laws were
only enacted in three colonies.  Ante, at 37.  But that does
not  mean  that  they  may  be  dismissed  as  outliers.    They
were successors to several centuries of comparable laws in
England, see supra, at 34–40, and predecessors to numer-
ous  similar  (in  some  cases,  materially  identical)  laws  en-
acted by the States after the founding, see infra, at 41–42.
And  while  it  may  be  true  that  these  laws  applied  only  to
“dangerous and unusual weapons,” see ante, at 38 (majority
opinion), that category almost certainly included guns, see
Charles, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev., at 34, n. 181 (listing 18th cen-
tury sources defining “ ‘offensive weapons’ ” to include “ ‘Fire
Arms’ ”  and  “ ‘Guns’ ”);  State  v.  Huntly,  25  N. C.  418,  422
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses historical legal precedents regarding firearm regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U92

[09-15-00 14:34:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 399 (1998)

413

O(cid:146)Connor, J., dissenting

“loss of crucial
information” will often result, see 24 C.
Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5498,
p. 484 (1986).

As the Court of Appeals observed, the costs of recognizing
an absolute posthumous privilege can be inordinately high.
See In re Sealed Case, 124 F. 3d 230, 233–234 (CADC 1997).
Extreme injustice may occur, for example, where a criminal
defendant seeks disclosure of a deceased client’s confession
to the offense. See State v. Macumber, 112 Ariz. 569, 571,
544 P. 2d 1084, 1086 (1976); cf. In the Matter of a John Doe
Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 486, 562 N. E. 2d
69, 72 (1990) (Nolan, J., dissenting).
In my view, the para-
mount value that our criminal justice system places on pro-
tecting an innocent defendant should outweigh a deceased
client’s interest in preserving conﬁdences. See, e. g., Schlup
v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 324–325 (1995); In re Winship, 397
Indeed, even
U. S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
petitioners acknowledge that an exception may be appro-
priate where the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant
are at stake. An exception may likewise be warranted in
the face of a compelling law enforcement need for the infor-
mation.
“[O]ur historic commitment to the rule of law . . .
is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that
the twofold aim of criminal justice is that guilt shall not es-
cape or innocence suffer.” Nixon, supra, at 709 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506
U. S. 390, 398 (1993). Given that the complete exclusion of
relevant evidence from a criminal trial or investigation may
distort the record, mislead the factﬁnder, and undermine the
central truth-seeking function of the courts, I do not believe
that the attorney-client privilege should act as an absolute
bar to the disclosure of a deceased client’s communications.
When the privilege is asserted in the criminal context, and
a showing is made that the communications at issue contain
necessary factual information not otherwise available, courts
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice O'Connor. It discusses the attorney-client privilege and its application in cases involving deceased clients.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. PALOMAR-SANTIAGO

Syllabus

two requirements are not satisfied just because a noncitizen was re-
moved  for  an offense  that  should  not  have  rendered  him  removable.
The  substantive  validity  of  a  removal  order  is  quite  distinct  from
whether the noncitizen exhausted administrative remedies or was de-
prived of the opportunity for judicial review.  P. 5.

(b) Palomar-Santiago’s counterarguments are unpersuasive.  First,
he contends that further administrative review of a removal order is
not “available” for purposes of §1326(a) when a noncitizen will not rec-
ognize a substantive basis to challenge an immigration judge’s conclu-
sion that a prior conviction renders the noncitizen removable.  The im-
migration judge’s error on the merits does not excuse the noncitizen’s
failure to comply with a mandatory exhaustion requirement if further
administrative review, and then judicial review if necessary, could fix
that very error.  Ross, 578 U. S. 632, distinguished.

Second, Palomar-Santiago contends that §1326(d)’s prerequisites do
not apply when a defendant argues that a removal order was substan-
tively invalid.  There can be no “challenge” to or “collateral attack” on
the validity of substantively flawed orders, he reasons, because such
orders are invalid when entered.  This position ignores the plain mean-
ing of both “challenge” and “collateral attack.”

Lastly, Palomar-Santiago invokes the canon of constitutional avoid-
ance.  But this canon “has no application in the absence of statutory
ambiguity.”  United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative,
532  U. S.  483,  494.    Here,  the  text  of  §1326(d)  unambiguously  fore-
closes Palomar-Santiago’s interpretation.  Pp. 5–7.

813 Fed. Appx. 282, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the main body of the legal opinion and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Opinion of the Court

See §§542(c), (d).  Reading §362(a)(3) to cover mere reten-
tion of property, as respondents advocate, would create at
least two serious problems.

First,  it  would  render  the  central  command  of  §542
largely  superfluous.
“The  canon  against  surplusage  is
strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous
another  part  of  the  same  statutory  scheme.”  Yates  v.
United States, 574 U. S. 528, 543 (2015) (plurality opinion;
internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).  Reading
“any  act  . . .  to  exercise  control”  in  §362(a)(3)  to  include
merely  retaining  possession  of  a  debtor’s  property  would
make  that  section  a  blanket  turnover  provision.    But  as
noted, §542 expressly governs “[t]urnover of property to the
estate,”  and  subsection  (a)  describes  the  broad  range  of
property that an entity “shall deliver to the trustee.”  That
mandate would be surplusage if §362(a)(3) already required
an entity affirmatively to relinquish control of the debtor’s
property at the moment a bankruptcy petition is filed.

Respondents and their amici contend that §542(a) would
still perform some work by specifying the party to whom the
property in question must be turned over and by requiring
that  an  entity  “account  for  . . .  the  value  of ”  the  debtor’s
property if the property is damaged or lost.  But that is a
small amount of work for a large amount of text in a section
that  appears  to  be  the  Code  provision  that  is  designed  to
govern the turnover of estate property.  Under this alterna-
tive interpretation, §362(a)(3), not §542, would be the chief
provision governing turnover—even though §362(a)(3) says
nothing expressly on that question.  And §542 would be re-
duced to a footnote—even though it appears on its face to
be the governing provision.  The better account of the two
provisions is that §362(a)(3) prohibits collection efforts out-
side the bankruptcy proceeding that would change the sta-
tus quo, while §542(a) works within the bankruptcy process
to draw far-flung estate property back into the hands of the
debtor or trustee.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of bankruptcy code sections. It delves into legal arguments and statutory analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

ness” by the laws challenged in these cases—no one.  Ante,
at 28.  At the same time, the laws in no way interfere with
the “right to be let alone.”

The  majority  also  relies  on  Justice  Harlan’s  influential
dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961).
As  the  majority  recounts,  that  opinion  states  that  “[d]ue
process has not been reduced to any formula.”  Id., at 542.
But  far  from  conferring  the  broad  interpretive  discretion
that the majority discerns, Justice Harlan’s opinion makes
clear  that  courts  implying  fundamental  rights  are  not
“free  to  roam  where  unguided  speculation  might  take
them.”  Ibid.    They  must  instead  have  “regard  to  what
history  teaches”  and  exercise  not  only  “judgment”  but
“restraint.”  Ibid.  Of particular relevance, Justice Harlan
explained  that  “laws  regarding  marriage  which  provide
both  when  the  sexual  powers  may  be  used  and  the  legal
and  societal  context  in  which  children  are  born  and
brought  up  . . .  form  a  pattern  so  deeply  pressed  into  the
substance  of  our  social  life  that  any  Constitutional  doc-
trine in this area must build upon that basis.”  Id., at 546.
In  sum,  the  privacy  cases  provide  no  support  for  the
majority’s  position,  because  petitioners  do  not  seek  pri-
vacy.  Quite  the  opposite,  they  seek  public  recognition  of
their  relationships,  along  with  corresponding  government
benefits.  Our  cases  have  consistently  refused  to  allow
litigants  to  convert  the  shield  provided  by  constitutional
liberties  into  a  sword  to  demand  positive  entitlements
from the State.  See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept.
of  Social  Servs.,  489  U. S.  189,  196  (1989);  San  Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35–37
(1973);  post,  at  9–13  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting).    Thus,
although the right to privacy recognized by our precedents
certainly plays a role in protecting the intimate conduct of
same-sex couples, it provides no affirmative right to rede-
fine  marriage  and  no  basis  for  striking  down  the  laws  at
issue here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges. It delves into legal arguments and precedents related to the right to privacy and marriage equality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
82

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.

D
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and part of a legal document. Legal citations and document structures are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they don't contain the main narrative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
GORSUCH, J., concurring

how much a recipient of federal funds discriminates.  It does
not scrutinize a recipient’s reasons or motives for discrimi-
nating.  Instead, the law prohibits covered institutions from
intentionally treating any individual worse even in part be-
cause  of  race.  So  yes,  of  course, the  universities  consider
many non-racial factors in their admissions processes too.
And perhaps they mean well when they favor certain can-
didates  over  others  based  on  the  color  of  their  skin.    But
even if all that is true, their conduct violates Title VI just
the same.  See Part I–A, supra; see also Bostock, 590 U. S.,
at ___, ___–___ (slip op., at 6, 12–15).

D
The principal dissent contends that this understanding of
Title VI is contrary to precedent.  Post, at 26–27, n. 21 (opin-
ion  of  SOTOMAYOR, J.).    But  the  dissent  does  not  dispute
that  everything  said  here  about  the  meaning  of  Title  VI
tracks this Court’s precedent in Bostock interpreting mate-
rially identical language in Title VII.  That raises two ques-
tions:  Do the dissenters think Bostock wrongly decided?  Or
do they read the same words in neighboring provisions of
the  same  statute—enacted  at  the  same  time  by  the  same
Congress—to mean different things?  Apparently, the fed-
eral government takes the latter view.  The Solicitor Gen-
eral insists that there is “ambiguity in the term ‘discrimi-
nation’ ”  in  Title  VI  but  no  ambiguity  in  the  term
“discriminate” in Title VII.  Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 21–707,
at 164.  Respectfully, I do not see it.  The words of the Civil
Rights  Act  of  1964  are  not  like  mood  rings;  they  do  not
change their message from one moment to the next.

Rather than engage with the statutory text or our prece-
dent in Bostock, the principal dissent seeks to sow confusion
about  the  facts.    It  insists  that  all  applicants  to  Harvard
and UNC are “eligible” to receive a race-based tip.  Post, at
32,  n. 27  (opinion  of  SOTOMAYOR,  J.);  cf.  post,  at  17
(JACKSON, J., dissenting).  But the question in these cases
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the context of affirmative action in university admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION

THOMAS, J., concurring

should be construed against the drafting party.  See, e.g.,
Patterson v. Jenks, 2 Pet. 216, 229 (1829); Worcester v. Geor-
gia, 6 Pet. 515, 552 (1832); The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737,
760 (1867); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §206 (1979);
Restatement (First) of Contracts §505 (1932).  These canons
then “jumped without discussion from the interpretation of
treaties to the interpretation of statutes” in the 20th cen-
tury.  A. Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency,
90  B.  U.  L. Rev.  109,  152  (2010).    To  this  day,  it  remains
unclear how the “trust relationship” could justify freestand-
ing pro-Indian canons that authorize courts to depart from
the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation.

Next, the Court has also suggested that the “trust rela-
tionship”  provides  the  Federal  Government  with  an  addi-
tional power, not enumerated in the Constitution, to “do all
that [is] required” to protect Indians.  Morton v. Mancari,
417 U. S. 535, 552 (1974) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Board of County Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U. S.
705, 715–716 (1943).  In doing so, the Court has apparently
used the trust relationship to feed into the so-called plenary
power that Congress supposedly enjoys over Indian affairs.
But the Court has also approved the use of that power to,
among other things, restrict tribal sovereignty and “elimi-
nate  tribal  rights.”    See  South  Dakota  v.  Yankton  Sioux
Tribe, 522  U. S. 329, 343 (1998); Washington  v. Confeder-
ated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 501
(1979); Haaland, 599 U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., dissenting)
(slip op., at 35).  Accordingly, it is difficult to see how such
a plenary power could be rooted in a trust relationship with
Indians.  And it seems at least slightly incongruous to use
Indians’  trust  in  the  Government  as  both  the  basis  for  a
power that can restrict tribal rights and canons of interpre-
tation that favor Indians.

The  influence  of  the  “trust  relationship”  idea  on  these
doctrinal  areas  is  troubling,  as  the  trust  relationship  ap-
pears to lack any real support in our constitutional system.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It delves into the interpretation of treaties and statutes, particularly concerning the "trust relationship" between the federal government and Native American tribes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

BREYER, J., dissenting

occurred.    In  Texas,  the  State  that  carries  out  the  most
executions, the number of executions fell from 40 in 2000
to 10 in 2014, and the number of death sentences fell from
48  in  1999  to  9  in  2013  (and  0  thus  far  in  2015).    DPIC,
Executions by State and Year, supra; BJS, T. Snell, Capi
tal Punishment, 1999, p. 6 (Table 5) (Dec. 2000) (hereinaf
ter BJS 1999 Stats); BJS 2013 Stats, at 19 (Table 16); von
Drehle,  Bungled  Executions,  Backlogged  Courts,  and
Three  More  Reasons  the  Modern  Death  Penalty  Is  a
Failed  Experiment,  Time,  June  8,  2015,  p.  26.    Similarly
dramatic  declines  are  present  in  Virginia,  Oklahoma,
Missouri, and North Carolina.  BJS 1999 Stats, at 6 (Table
5); BJS 2013 Stats, at 19 (Table 16).

These  circumstances  perhaps  reflect  the  fact  that  a
majority of Americans, when asked to choose between the
death  penalty  and  life  in  prison  without  parole,  now
choose the latter.  Wilson, Support for Death Penalty Still
High, But Down, Washington Post, GovBeat, June 5, 2014,
online  at  www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/
2014/06/05/support-for-death-penalty-still-high-but-down;
see also ALI, Report of the Council to the Membership on
the  Matter  of  the  Death  Penalty  4  (Apr.  15,  2009)  (with
drawing Model Penal Code section on capital punishment
section  from  the  Code,  in  part  because  of  doubts  that  the
American  Law  Institute  could  “recommend  procedures
that  would” address  concerns about the administration of
the  death  penalty);  cf.  Gregg,  428  U. S.,  at  193–194  (joint
opinion  of  Stewart,  Powell,  and  Stevens,  JJ.)  (relying  in
part  on  Model  Penal  Code  to  conclude  that  a  “carefully
drafted  statute”  can  satisfy  the  arbitrariness  concerns
expressed in Furman).

I  rely  primarily  upon  domestic,  not  foreign  events,  in
pointing to changes and circumstances that tend to justify
the  claim  that  the  death  penalty,  constitutionally  speak
ing,  is  “unusual.”    Those  circumstances  are  sufficient  to
warrant our reconsideration of the death penalty’s consti
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses statistics on executions and public opinion on the death penalty, arguing that these factors warrant reconsideration of its constitutionality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1121

529 U. S.

May 15, 2000

No. 99–8984. Reed v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8986. Boston v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Po-
tosi Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 1001.

No. 99–8987. Carter v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 659.

No. 99–8990. Covington v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 823.

No. 99–8991. Milloway v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 261.

No. 99–8993. Montoya v. LeMaster, Warden, et al. C. A.

10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 282.

No. 99–8996. Olguin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 833.

No. 99–8997. Nario Soto et al. v. United States. C. A.

4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 261.

No. 99–8998. Prince v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1021.

No. 99–9004. Beavers v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 206 F. 3d 706.

No. 99–9011. Dawkins v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 711.

No. 99–9015. Farah v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 661.

No. 99–9018. White v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–9019. Tawalbeh v. United States;
No. 99–9071. Abed v. United States;
No. 99–9072. Abed v. United States; and
No. 99–9074. Abed v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 822.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document, not typical book content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

an action in [federal court] to enjoin violations of [subsec-
tion (a)].”  101 Stat. 669.  Put differently, subsection (c) al-
ready precludes state courts and state agencies from exer-
cising jurisdiction over violations of subsection (a).  To make
any sense of the statute, subsection (b) must do something
besides repeat that work.

Stepping back, a full look at the statute’s structure sug-
gests a set of simple and coherent commands.  In subsec-
tion (a),  Congress  effectively  federalized  and  applied  to
tribal lands those state laws that prohibit or absolutely ban
a  particular  gaming  activity.  In  subsection  (b),  Congress
explained  that  it  was  not  authorizing  the  application  of
Texas’s  gaming  regulations  on  tribal  lands.    In  subsec-
tion (c), Congress granted federal courts jurisdiction to en-
tertain claims by Texas that the Tribe has violated subsec-
tion  (a).  Texas’s  competing  interpretation  of  the  law
renders  individual  statutory  terms  duplicative  and  whole
provisions without work to perform.1

Even if fair questions remain after a look at the ordinary

B

——————

1 The dissent offers a surplusage argument of its own, arguing that the
Court’s reading of § 107 duplicates the work done by § 105(f ).  See post,
at  12.  That  is  mistaken.    Section  105(f )  does  not  specifically  address
tribal gaming, but instead broadly extends Public Law 280 and its asso-
ciated jurisdictional rules to the Tribe’s reservation.  By contrast, § 107
speaks only and specifically to gaming.  And while it does extend much
of the Public Law 280 regime to tribal gaming, it also departs from that
framework  in  at  least  two  significant  ways.    First,  § 107  incorporates
Texas’s  criminal  gaming  prohibitions  as  surrogate  federal  law,  while
Public Law 280 allows particular States to apply their own laws directly
to tribal lands.  Second, it establishes unique jurisdictional rules for ju-
dicial  review  of  alleged  violations  of  Texas’s  gaming  prohibitions.    See
post, at 13.  Where Public Law 280 grants state courts jurisdiction over
violations of state criminal prohibitory laws, subsection (c) grants federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over alleged violations of § 107, “[n]otwith-
standing section 105(f ).”  There is no superfluity here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in a case involving the Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo tribe and the state of Texas. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute related to gaming on tribal lands.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES

Syllabus

(b) A  benefit  is  not  a  protected  entitlement  if  officials  have  discre-
tion  to  grant  or  deny  it.  See,  e.g.,  Kentucky  Dept.  of  Corrections  v.
Thompson, 490 U. S. 454, 462–463.  It is inappropriate here to defer
to the Tenth Circuit’s determination that Colorado law gave respon-
dent  a  right  to  police  enforcement  of  the  restraining  order.    This
Court therefore proceeds to its own analysis.  Pp. 7–9.

(c) Colorado law has not created a personal entitlement to enforce-
ment  of  restraining  orders.    It  does  not  appear  that  state  law  truly
made  such  enforcement  mandatory.  A  well-established  tradition  of
police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest
statutes.    Cf.  Chicago  v.  Morales,  527  U. S.  41,  47,  n. 2,  62,  n. 32.
Against that backdrop, a true mandate of police action would require
some stronger indication than the Colorado statute’s direction to “use
every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order” or even to “ar-
rest . . . or . . . seek a warrant.”  A Colorado officer would likely have
some discretion to determine that—despite probable cause to believe
a  restraining  order  has  been  violated—the  violation’s  circumstances
or competing duties counsel decisively against enforcement in a par-
ticular instance.  The practical necessity for discretion is particularly
apparent  in  a  case  such  as  this,  where  the  suspected  violator  is  not
actually present and his whereabouts are unknown.  In such circum-
stances,  the  statute  does  not  appear  to  require  officers  to  arrest  but
only  to  seek  a  warrant.    That,  however,  would  be  an  entitlement  to
nothing  but  procedure,  which  cannot  be  the  basis  for  a  property  in-
terest.  Pp. 9–15.

(d) Even if the statute could be said to make enforcement “manda-
tory,” that would not necessarily mean  that respondent has  an enti-
tlement to enforcement.  Her alleged interest stems not from common
law or contract, but only from a State’s statutory scheme.  If she was
given a statutory entitlement, the Court would expect to see some in-
dication  of  that  in  the  statute  itself.    Although  the  statute  spoke  of
“protected person[s]” such as respondent, it did so in connection with
matters  other  than  a  right  to  enforcement.    Most  importantly,  it
spoke  directly  to  the  protected  person’s  power  to  “initiate”  contempt
proceedings if the order was issued in a civil action, which contrasts
tellingly with its conferral of a power merely to “request” initiation of
criminal contempt proceedings—and even more dramatically with its
complete  silence  about  any  power  to  “request”  (much  less  demand)
that an arrest be made.  Pp. 15–17.

(e) Even  were  the  Court  to  think  otherwise  about  Colorado’s  crea-
tion of an entitlement, it is not clear that an individual entitlement to
enforcement  of  a  restraining  order  could  constitute  a  “property”  in-
terest  for  due  process  purposes.    Such  a  right  would  have  no  ascer-
tainable monetary value and would arise incidentally, not out of some
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal reasoning and holdings of a court decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

21

JACKSON, J., dissenting

seems to have “ ‘lost sight of the fact that’ ” federally incar-
cerated  individuals  “ ‘can  raise  federal  statutory  claims  in
their collateral attacks.’ ”  Chazen, 938 F. 3d, at 863 (quot-
ing Hart & Wechsler 1362; emphasis added); Chazen, 938
F. 3d,  at  863  (suggesting  that  the  omission  of  legal  inno-
cence claims from §2255(h) was due to “congressional over-
sight”); Reply Brief for Respondent 15.

To me, this contextual revelation rocks the foundation of
the  majority’s  negative  inference.    That  is,  it  is  plausible
(and perhaps even likely) that Congress did not appreciate
fully that the modeled-after language establishing a succes-
sive-petition bar did not capture the full scope of available
claims for federal prisoners.10  And, of course, if Congress
simply  overlooked  statutory  innocence  claims  when  it
crafted §2255(h), then the omitted language that the major-
ity puts so much stock in is not actually indicative of Con-
gress having “chosen finality” with respect to statutory in-
nocence  claims.  Ante,  at  12.  Instead,  the  absence  of  any
textual  reference  to  statutory  innocence  would  be  wholly
unremarkable.

3
Given the purpose and history of §2255(h) as I have just
described  them,  I  find  quite  compelling  the Government’s
observation that “[n]othing in AEDPA [actually] justifies an

——————

10 The rushed and emotionally charged manner in which AEDPA came
into fruition makes Congress’s lack of attention to this detail a very re-
alistic possibility.  AEDPA was passed in reaction to the Oklahoma City
bombing, and President Clinton had “demand[ed]” its passage by the 1-
year  anniversary  of  that  event.   J.  Liebman,  An  “Effective  Death  Pen-
alty”? AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev.
411, 413 (2011); see also Stevenson, 77 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 701.  Both this
Court and commentators have observed that, likely as a result, AEDPA
is “shoddily crafted and poorly cohered.”  L. Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility
and Habeas Corpus, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 329, 342 (2010); see also Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 336 (1997) (“[I]n a world of silk purses and pigs’
ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. v. CARGILL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–976.  Argued February 28, 2024—Decided June 14, 2024

The  National  Firearms  Act  of  1934  defines  a  “machinegun”  as  “any
weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored
to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading,
by a single function of the trigger.”  26 U. S. C. §5845(b).  With a ma-
chinegun, a shooter can fire multiple times, or even continuously, by
engaging  the  trigger  only  once.    This  capability  distinguishes  a  ma-
chinegun from a semiautomatic firearm.  With a semiautomatic fire-
arm, the shooter can fire only one time by engaging the trigger.  Using
a technique called bump firing, shooters can fire semiautomatic fire-
arms at rates approaching those of some machineguns.  A shooter who
bump fires a rifle uses the firearm’s recoil to help rapidly manipulate
the  trigger.    Although  bump  firing  does  not  require  any  additional
equipment, a “bump stock” is an accessory designed to make the tech-
nique easier.  A bump stock does not alter the basic mechanics of bump
firing, and the trigger still must be released and reengaged to fire each
additional shot.
   For many years, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Ex-
plosives (ATF) consistently took the position that semiautomatic rifles
equipped  with  bump  stocks  were  not  machineguns  under  §5845(b).
ATF  abruptly  changed  course  when  a  gunman  using  semiautomatic
rifles equipped with bump stocks fired hundreds of rounds into a crowd
in Las Vegas, Nevada, killing 58 people and wounding over 500 more.
ATF subsequently proposed a rule that would repudiate its previous
guidance and amend its regulations to “clarify” that bump stocks are
machineguns.    83  Fed.  Reg.  13442.    ATF’s  Rule  ordered  owners  of
bump stocks either to destroy or surrender them to ATF to avoid crim-
inal prosecution.
   Michael Cargill surrendered two bump stocks to ATF under protest,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

tion  sector,  which  represent  less  than  one-third  of  this
country’s total carbon dioxide emissions, the United States
would  still  rank  as  the  third-largest  emitter  of  carbon
dioxide in the world, outpaced only by the European Union
and China.22  Judged by any standard, U. S. motor-vehicle
emissions  make  a  meaningful  contribution  to  greenhouse
gas  concentrations  and  hence,  according  to  petitioners,  to
global warming.

The Remedy

While  it  may  be  true  that  regulating  motor-vehicle
emissions will not by itself reverse global warming, it by no
means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether
EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.  See also
Larson  v.  Valente,  456  U. S.  228,  244,  n. 15  (1982)  (“[A]
plaintiff  satisfies  the  redressability  requirement  when  he
shows  that  a  favorable  decision  will  relieve  a  discrete
injury  to  himself.    He  need  not  show  that  a  favorable
decision  will  relieve  his  every  injury”).  Because  of  the
enormity  of  the  potential  consequences  associated  with
man-made  climate  change,  the  fact  that  the  effectiveness
of a remedy might be delayed during the (relatively short)
time  it  takes  for  a  new  motor-vehicle  fleet  to  replace  an
older  one  is  essentially  irrelevant.23    Nor  is  it  dispositive
——————

22 See UNFCCC, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period
1990–2004 and Status of Reporting 14 (2006) (hereinafter Inventory Data)
(reflecting emissions from Annex I countries); UNFCCC, Sixth Compilation
and  Synthesis  of  Initial  National  Communications  from  Parties  not  In-
cluded in Annex I to the Convention 7–8 (2005) (reflecting emissions from
non-Annex  I  countries);  see  also  Dept.  of  Energy,  Energy  Information
Admin., International Energy Annual 2004, H.1co2 World Carbon Dioxide
Emissions  from  the  Consumption  and  Flaring  of  Fossil  Fuels,  1980–2004
(Table), http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tableh1co2.xls.

23 See  also  Mountain  States  Legal  Foundation  v.  Glickman,  92  F. 3d
1228, 1234 (CADC 1996) (“The more drastic the injury that government
action  makes  more  likely,  the  lesser  the  increment  in  probability  to
establish  standing”);  Village  of  Elk  Grove  Village  v.  Evans,  997  F. 2d
328,  329 (CA7 1993) (“[E]ven a small  probability of  injury is sufficient
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the section discussing the remedy and the significance of regulating motor vehicle emissions. It is sequential text and provides relevant information about the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
66  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

schools.  Brief for Massachusetts et al. as Amici Curiae 15–
17; see Brief for American Federation of Teachers as Ami-
cus Curiae 8 (“[T]here are few professions with broader so-
cial  impact  than  teaching”).    A  diverse  pipeline  of  college
graduates  also  ensures  a  diverse  legal  profession,  which
demonstrates that “the justice system serves the public in
a fair and inclusive manner.”  Brief for American Bar Asso-
ciation  as  Amicus  Curiae  18;  see  also  Brief  for  Law  Firm
Antiracism Alliance as Amicus Curiae 1, 6 (more than 300
law firms in all 50 States supporting race-conscious college
admissions in light of the “influence and power” that law-
yers wield “in the American system of government”).

Examples of other industries and professions that benefit
from race-conscious college admissions abound.  American
businesses  emphasize  that  a  diverse  workforce  improves
business  performance,  better  serves  a  diverse  consumer
marketplace,  and  strengthens  the  overall  American  econ-
omy.  Brief  for  Major  American  Business  Enterprises  as
Amici Curiae 5–27.  A diverse pipeline of college graduates
also  improves  research  by  reducing  bias  and  increasing
group  collaboration.  Brief  for  Individual  Scientists  as
Amici Curiae 13–14.  It creates a more equitable and inclu-
sive media industry that communicates diverse viewpoints
and  perspectives.  Brief  for  Multicultural  Media,  Telecom
and Internet Council, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 6.  It also
drives  innovation  in  an  increasingly  global  science  and
technology industry.  Brief for Applied Materials, Inc., et al.
as Amici Curiae 11–20.

Today’s decision further entrenches racial inequality by
making these pipelines to leadership roles less diverse.  A
college degree, particularly from an elite institution, carries
with it the benefit of powerful networks and the opportunity
for socioeconomic mobility.  Admission to college is there-
fore often the entry ticket to top jobs in workplaces where
important decisions are made.  The overwhelming majority
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the importance of diversity in various fields and argues that the court's decision will negatively impact diversity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 18–1023, 18–1028 and 18–1038
_________________

MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS,
PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES

18–1023

18–1028

MODA HEALTH PLAN, INC., PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES

BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF NORTH
CAROLINA, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES

LAND OF LINCOLN MUTUAL HEALTH INSURANCE
COMPANY, AN ILLINOIS NONPROFIT MUTUAL
INSURANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES

18–1038

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[April 27, 2020]

 JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting.
Twice this Term, we have made the point that we have
basically gotten out of the business of recognizing private
rights of action not expressly created by Congress.  Just a
month  ago  in  Comcast  Corp.  v.  National  Assn.  of  African
American-Owned Media, 589 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip
op., at 5–6), after noting a 1975 decision1 inferring a private

——————

1 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 459 (1975).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Alito. It includes citation information, case names, and the introductory statement of the dissent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
I N D E X

ADEQUATE  STATE  GROUNDS  DOCTRINE.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  1.

ALABAMA.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  8.

APPEALABILITY  OF  DISCLOSURE  ORDERS.  See  Jurisdiction.

ARBITRATION.  See  Railway  Labor  Act.

ASSISTANCE  OF  COUNSEL.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  5,  6,  7,  8.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT  PRIVILEGE.  See  Jurisdiction.

BAILIFF’S  MISCONDUCT  AT  TRIAL.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  2.

BIPARTISAN  CAMPAIGN  REFORM  ACT  OF  2002.  See  Constitu

tional  Law,  II.

BROADCAST  OF  FEDERAL  TRIALS.  See  Stays.

CALIFORNIA.  See  Stays.

CAMPAIGN  SPENDING.  See  Constitutional  Law,  II.

CAPITAL  MURDER.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8.

CASES  AND  CONTROVERSIES.  See  Constitutional  Law,  I.

COLLATERAL-ORDER  DOCTRINE.  See  Jurisdiction.

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW.

I.  Cases  and  Controversies.

Mootness—Effect  of  underlying  state-court  cases  on  federal  case.—
Where  respondents  ﬁled  a  federal  civil  rights  action—claiming  that  Illi
nois’  failure  to  provide  a  speedy  hearing  under  a  state  law  permitting
warrantless  seizure  of  personal  property  used  to  facilitate  a  drug  crime
violated  Due  Process  Clause—and  parties  resolved  underlying  property
disputes  in  their  respective  state-court  cases,  federal  case  is  moot.  Al
varez v. Smith, p. 87.

II.  Freedom  of  Speech.

Bipartisan  Campaign  Reform  Act  of  2002—Restrictions  on  corporate
independent expenditures—Disclaimer and notice requirements.—Title 2
U. S. C.  § 441b’s  restrictions  on  corporate  independent  expenditures  for

1243
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, not the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

1
After more than a century of government policies enforc-
ing racial segregation by law, society remains highly segre-
gated.  About half of all Latino and Black students attend a
racially homogeneous school with at least 75% minority stu-
dent enrollment.4  The share of intensely segregated minor-
ity schools (i.e., schools that enroll 90% to 100% racial mi-
norities)  has  sharply  increased.5    To  this  day,  the  U.  S.
Department of Justice continues to enter into desegregation
decrees with schools that have failed to “eliminat[e] the ves-
tiges of de jure segregation.” 6

Moreover,  underrepresented  minority  students  are
more  likely  to  live  in  poverty  and  attend  schools  with  a
high concentration of poverty.7  When combined with resi-
dential  segregation  and  school  funding  systems  that  rely
heavily on local property taxes, this leads to racial minority
students attending schools with fewer resources.  See San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1,
72–86 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting school fund-
ing disparities that result from local property taxation).8  In

——————

4 See GAO, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Education and La-
bor, House of Representatives, K–12 Education: Student Population Has
Significantly Diversified, but Many Schools Remain Divided Along Ra-
cial, Ethnic, and Economic Lines 13 (GAO–22–104737, June 2022) (here-
inafter GAO Report).

5 G. Orfield, E. Frankenberg, & J. Ayscue, Harming Our Common Fu-

ture: America’s Segregated Schools 65 Years After Brown 21 (2019).

6 E.g., Bennett v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Ed., No. 5:63–CV–613 (ND Ala.,
July 5, 2022), ECF Doc. 199, p. 19; id., at 6 (requiring school district to
ensure “the participation of black students” in advanced courses).

7 GAO Report 6, 13 (noting that 80% of predominantly Black and La-
tino  schools  have  at  least  75%  of  their  students  eligible  for  free  or
reduced-price lunch—a proxy for poverty).

8 See  also  L.  Clark,  Barbed  Wire  Fences:  The  Structural  Violence  of
Education  Law,  89  U.  Chi.  L. Rev.  499,  502,  512–517  (2022);  Albert
Shanker Institute, B. Baker, M. DiCarlo, & P. Greene, Segregation and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the history of racial segregation in the US and its ongoing impact on education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 18–1323 and 18–1460
_________________

18–1323

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
STEPHEN RUSSO, INTERIM SECRETARY,
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HOSPITALS

STEPHEN RUSSO, INTERIM SECRETARY,
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HOSPITALS, PETITIONER
v.
JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C., ET AL.

18–1460

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 29, 2020]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, with
whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins except as to Parts III–C and
IV–F,  and  with  whom  JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH  joins  as  to
Parts I, II, and III, dissenting.

The majority bills today’s decision as a facsimile of Whole
Woman’s  Health  v.  Hellerstedt,  579  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2016),
and it’s true they have something in common.  In both, the
abortion right recognized in this Court’s decisions is used
like a bulldozer to flatten legal rules that stand in the way.
In Whole Woman’s Health, res judicata and our standard
approach  to  severability  were  laid  low.    Even  Planned
Parenthood  of  Southeastern  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U. S.  833
(1992), was altered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the names of justices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GARLAND v. CARGILL

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

ordinary meaning of the statutory text and unsupported by
context  or  purpose.    When  I  see  a  bird  that  walks  like  a
duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, I call that
bird  a  duck.    A  bump-stock-equipped  semiautomatic  rifle
fires  “automatically  more  than  one  shot,  without  manual
reloading, by a single function of the trigger.”  §5845(b).  Be-
cause  I,  like  Congress,  call  that  a  machinegun,  I  respect-
fully dissent.

I
A
  Machineguns were originally developed in the 19th cen-
tury as weapons of war.  See J. Ellis, The Social History of
the Machine Gun 21–45 (1986) (Ellis).  Smaller and lighter
submachine guns were not commercially available until the
1920s.  See Brief for Patrick J. Charles as Amicus Curiae 5
(Charles  Brief ).    Although  these  weapons  were  originally
marketed to law enforcement, they inevitably made it into
the  hands  of  gangsters.  See  id.,  at  8–9;  Ellis  149–165.
Gangsters like Al Capone used machineguns to rob banks,
ambush the police, and murder rivals.  See Ellis 153–154,
157–158.  Newspaper headlines across the country flashed
“ ‘Gangsters Use Machine Guns,’ ” “ ‘Machine Gun Used in
Bank Hold-Up,’ ” and “ ‘Machine Gun Thugs Kill Postal Em-
ployee.’ ”  Charles Brief 9.
  Congress responded in 1934 by sharply restricting civil-
ian ownership of machineguns.  See National Firearms Act
of 1934, §§3–6, 48 Stat. 1236, 1237–1238.  The Senate Re-
port explaining the 1934 Act emphasized that the “gangster
as  a  law  violator must be  deprived  of  his most  dangerous
weapon, the machine gun.”  S. Rep. No. 1444, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., 1–2.  “[W]hile there is justification for permitting the
citizen  to  keep  a  pistol  or  revolver  for  his  own  protec-
tion . . . , there is no reason why anyone except a law officer
should have a machine gun.”  Id., at 2.
  These  early  machineguns  allowed  a  shooter  to  fire  in  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Garland v. Cargill. It discusses the history and context of machine guns and their regulation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 666 (1998)

701

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

little, if any, impact on the fairness of trials conducted in
other countries. Whether or not that suggestion is accu-
rate, I do not believe our Bill of Rights was intended to have
any effect on the conduct of foreign proceedings.
If, how-
ever, we were to accept respondent’s interpretation of the
Clause, we would confer power on foreign governments to
impair the administration of justice in this country. A law
enacted by a foreign power making it a crime for one of its
citizens to testify in an American proceeding against another
citizen of that country would immunize those citizens from
being compelled to testify in our courts. Variants of such a
hypothetical law are already in existence. See Socie´te´ Na-
tionale Industrielle Ae´rospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U. S. 522, 526, n. 6
(1987); see also id., at 544–545, n. 29. Of course, the Court
might craft exceptions for such foreign criminal laws, but it
seems far wiser to adhere to a clear limitation on the cover-
age of the Fifth Amendment, including its privilege against
self-incrimination. That Amendment prescribes rules of
conduct that must attend any deprivation of life, liberty, or
property in our Nation’s courts.

Justice Ginsburg, dissenting.

The privilege against self-incrimination, “closely linked
historically with the abolition of torture,” is properly re-
garded as a “landmar[k] in man’s struggle to make himself
civilized.” E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 7
(1955); see id., at 8 (Fifth Amendment expresses “one of the
fundamental decencies in the relation we have developed
between government and man”).
In my view, the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prescribes a
rule of conduct generally to be followed by our Nation’s ofﬁ-
cialdom.
It counsels ofﬁcers of the United States (and of
any State of the United States) against extracting testimony
when the person examined reasonably fears that his words
would be used against him in a later criminal prosecution.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg in a case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

KAGAN, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–111
_________________

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

COLORADO

[June 4, 2018]

 JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  joins,

concurring.

“[I]t  is  a  general  rule  that  [religious  and  philosophical]
objections  do  not  allow  business  owners  and  other  actors
in  the  economy  and  in  society  to  deny  protected  persons
equal  access  to  goods  and  services  under  a  neutral  and
generally applicable public accommodations law.”  Ante, at
9.  But  in  upholding  that  principle,  state  actors  cannot
show  hostility  to  religious  views;  rather,  they  must  give
those  views  “neutral  and  respectful  consideration.”    Ante,
at  12.    I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full  because  I  believe
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not satisfy that
obligation.    I  write  separately  to  elaborate  on  one  of  the
bases for the Court’s holding.

The  Court  partly  relies  on  the  “disparate  consideration
of  Phillips’  case  compared  to  the  cases  of  [three]  other
bakers”  who  “objected  to  a  requested  cake  on  the  basis  of
conscience.”  Ante, at 14, 18.  In the latter cases, a customer
named  William  Jack  sought  “cakes  with  images  that
conveyed  disapproval  of  same-sex  marriage,  along  with
religious text”; the bakers whom he approached refused to
make  them.  Ante,  at  15;  see  post,  at  3  (GINSBURG,  J.,
dissenting)  (further  describing  the  requested  cakes).
Those  bakers  prevailed  before  the  Colorado  Civil  Rights
Division and Commission, while Phillips—who objected for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kagan.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

174

PHILLIPS v. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

Souter, J., dissenting

ciple and its place in state law,1 but also upon the very reg-
ulatory framework that would prevent a client from obtain-
ing any net interest on funds now subject to IOLTA, even
if IOLTA did not exist.2
It is not, of course, that the fed-
eral and state regulatory combination includes some rule
that is facially inconsistent with the general principle that
interest follows principal; the components of the regulatory
structure do not even directly address the question of who
Indeed, the most obvious relevance of the
owns interest.
regulatory provisions and their effects is to the issues of
whether IOLTA results in a taking of the client’s property
and whether any such taking requires compensation. And
yet by this route the regulatory structure becomes relevant
to the property issue as well, simply because the way we
may ultimately resolve the taking and compensation issues
bears on the way we ought to resolve the property issue.
If it should turn out that within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment, the IOLTA scheme had not taken the property
recognized today, or if it should turn out that the “just com-
pensation” for any taking was zero, then there would be no
practical consequence for purposes of the Fifth Amendment
in recognizing a client’s property right in the interest in the
ﬁrst place; any such recognition would be an inconsequential

1 The highest court of Texas has not understood the general principle
that a property right in interest always follows property in principle in a
way that supports respondents in this IOLTA challenge. See Sellers v.
Harris County, 483 S. W. 2d 242, 243 (Tex. 1972) (owner of principal is
entitled to interest, less administrative and accounting costs). Webb’s
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155 (1980), is not on
point precisely because it dealt with interest actually in the hands of the
ﬁduciary, net of any administrative expense.

2 These unchallenged state and federal rules clearly fall within the gen-
eral category of relevant law deﬁning property subject to constitutional
protection, see Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564,
577 (1972) (“Property interests” are “created and their dimensions are
deﬁned by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text from a dissenting opinion. It discusses the legal principles surrounding interest on client funds held in IOLTA accounts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

SHURTLEFF v. BOSTON

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

that the Establishment Clause even justifies, much less re-
quires,  a  refusal  to  extend  free  speech  rights  to  religious
speakers  who  participate  in  broad-reaching  government
programs  neutral  in  design.”    Rosenberger,  515  U. S.,  at
839;  see  also  Good  News  Club,  533  U. S.,  at  112;  Lamb’s
Chapel  v.  Center  Moriches  Union  Free  School  Dist.,  508
U. S. 384 (1993).  Indeed, excluding religious messages from
public forums that are open to other viewpoints is a “denial
of the right of free speech” indicating “hostility to religion”
that  would  “undermine  the  very  neutrality  the  Establish-
ment Clause requires.” Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 845–846;
see also Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist.
66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality opinion).
Although developments in City policy postdating the de-
nial of Shurtleff ’s application are not relevant to whether
that act constituted a First Amendment violation, it should
be emphasized that the City’s adoption of a written policy
in October 2018 did not to convert the flag displays into gov-
ernment speech.  The policy’s principal provision specified
that the City will not “display flags deemed to be inappro-
priate or offensive in nature or those supporting discrimi-
nation, prejudice, or religious” viewpoints.  App. in No. 20–
1158 (CA1), p. 570 (App).4  That provision did not identify a

——————

4 The  policy  included  six  other  rules  specifying  that:  (1) flag  raisings
must occur on “a normal business work day, generally between the hours
of 10:00 am and 3:00 pm”; (2) flag raisings must be open to the public and
“[g]uests must adhere to the City of Boston policy not to discriminate on
the basis of sex, race, religion, etc.”; (3) guests must deliver the “guest
flag” to City personnel before the raising and retrieve it after; (4) events
must be consistent with the City’s “sustainability” policy; (5) flags may
be lowered to comply with the U. S. Flag Code; and (6) flags will normally
be flown for 24 hours or fewer.  App. 570.  These criteria do not suggest
purposeful communication of a government message.  The policy also re-
served “sole and complete discretion” to refuse to fly any flag.  Id., at 569.
But this reservation unbridled discretionary control over access to a gov-
ernment-owned  medium  of  expression  cannot  establish  that  a  speaker
permitted to speak through the medium is speaking for the government.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Shurtleff v. Boston. It cites previous legal cases and discusses the First Amendment implications of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

reached only factual errors.  Courts of Appeals have well-established
tests for distinguishing between these Rules.  And should such overlap
ever create an irreconcilable conflict, courts may then resort to ordi-
nary  interpretive  rules  to  determine  which  Rule  to  apply.    As  for
Kemp’s  worry  that  the  Court’s  interpretation  would  allow  parties  to
evade other time limits by, for example, repackaging a tardy motion
under Rule 59(e), the risk Kemp identifies would exist even under his
own interpretation.  And, in any event, the alleged specter of litigation
gamesmanship  and  strategic  delay  is  overstated  because  a  Rule
60(b)(1) motion, like all Rule 60(b) motions, must be made “within a
reasonable time.”  Finally, Kemp protests that this Court’s reading is
inconsistent with the history of Rule 60(b).  But his argument is based
on the mistaken notions that Rule 60(b)(1)’s list of grounds for reopen-
ing was understood to be a “term of art” when adopted, and that Rule
60(b)(6) alone was intended to afford relief for judicial legal errors that
had previously been remedied by bills of review.  Pp. 6–10.

857 Fed. Appx. 573, affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ.,
joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.  GORSUCH, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision and reasoning. It includes citations, case names, and a brief overview of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
66

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

appeal  or  attractiveness  of.  Often  used  with  up  [Middle
English < Latin sexus.]

C

Statutes Prohibiting Sex Discrimination

  2  U. S. C.  §658a(2)  (Congressional  Budget  and

Fiscal Operations; Federal Mandates)

  2 U. S. C. §1311(a)(1) (Congressional Accounta-
bility; Extension of Rights and Protections)

  2  U. S. C.  §1503(2)  (Unfunded  Mandates  Re-

form)

  3 U. S. C. §411(a)(1) (Presidential Offices; Em-

ployment Discrimination)

  5 U. S. C. §2301(b)(2) (Merit System Principles)

  5  U. S. C.  §2302(b)(1)  (Prohibited  Personnel

Practices)

  5  U. S. C.  §7103(a)(4)(A)  (Labor-Management

Relations; Definitions)

  5  U. S. C.  §7116(b)(4)  (Labor-Management  Re-

lations; Unfair Labor Practices)

  5  U. S. C.  §7201(b)  (Antidiscrimination  Policy;

Minority Recruitment Program)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a section of a dissenting opinion with citations to relevant statutes.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
Opinion of the Court

responsibility  to  delineate  and  protect  fundamental  liber
ties.”).  Cognizant  that  judges  lack  the  on-the-ground
expertise  and  experience  of  school  administrators,  how
ever,  we  have  cautioned  courts  in  various  contexts  to
resist  “substitut[ing]  their  own  notions  of  sound  educa
tional policy for those of the school authorities which they
review.”  Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School
Dist.,  Westchester  Cty.  v.  Rowley,  458  U. S.  176,  206
(1982).  See  also,  e.g.,  Hazelwood  School  Dist.  v.  Kuhl-
meier, 484 U. S. 260, 273 (1988) (noting our “oft-expressed
view that the education of the Nation’s youth is primarily
the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local
school  officials,  and  not  of  federal  judges”);  Healy,  408
U. S.,  at  180  (“[T]his  Court  has  long  recognized  ‘the  need
for  affirming  the  comprehensive  authority  of  the  States
and of school officials, consistent with fundamental consti
tutional  safeguards,  to  prescribe  and  control  conduct  in
the  schools.’ ”  (quoting  Tinker  v.  Des  Moines  Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507 (1969))).

A  college’s  commission—and  its  concomitant  license  to
choose  among  pedagogical  approaches—is  not  confined  to
the  classroom,  for  extracurricular  programs  are,  today,
essential  parts  of  the  educational  process.    See  Board  of
Ed.  of  Independent  School  Dist.  No.  92  of  Pottawatomie
Cty. v. Earls, 536 U. S. 822, 831, n. 4 (2002) (involvement
in  student  groups  is  “a  significant  contributor  to  the
breadth and quality of the educational experience” (inter
nal  quotation  marks  omitted)).  Schools,  we  have  empha
sized,  enjoy  “a  significant  measure  of  authority  over  the
type  of  officially  recognized  activities  in  which  their  stu
dents  participate.”  Board  of  Ed.  of  Westside  Community
Schools  (Dist.  66)  v.  Mergens,  496  U. S.  226,  240  (1990).
We  therefore  “approach  our  task  with  special  caution,”
Healy, 408 U. S., at 171, mindful that Hastings’ decisions
about  the  character  of  its  student-group  program  are  due
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the authority of educational institutions in managing student groups.  It cites relevant case law and demonstrates legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

BROWN v. PLATA

Syllabus

ments  are  made  with  the  objective  of  releasing  the  fewest  possible
prisoners consistent with an efficacious remedy.  Pp. 42–44.

(c) The three-judge court did not err in providing a 2-year dead-
line  for  relief,  especially  in  light  of  the  State’s  failure  to  contest  the
issue at trial.  The State has not asked this Court to extend the dead-
line,  but  the  three-judge  court  has  the  authority,  and  responsibility,
to amend its order as warranted by the exercise of sound discretion.
Proper  respect  for  the  State  and  for  its  governmental  processes  re-
quire that court to exercise its jurisdiction to accord the State consid-
erable  latitude  to  find  mechanisms  and  make  plans  that  will
promptly and effectively correct the violations consistent with public
safety.  The court may, e.g., grant a motion to extend the deadline if
the  State  meets  appropriate  preconditions  designed  to  ensure  that
the  plan  will  be  implemented  without  undue  delay.    Such  observa-
tions reflect the fact that the existing order, like all ongoing equitable
relief, must remain open to appropriate modification, and are not in-
tended  to  cast  doubt  on  the  validity  of  the  order’s  basic  premise.
Pp. 44–48.

Affirmed.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG,
BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  SCALIA, J., filed a dissent-
ing  opinion,  in  which  THOMAS, J.,  joined.    ALITO, J.,  filed  a  dissenting
opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus section of a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the case's background, the court's decision, and the opinions of the justices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
UNITED  STATES  REPORTS

VOLUME  558

CASES  ADJUDGED

IN

THE  SUPREME  COURT

AT

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

Beginning of Term

October 5, 2009, Through January 21, 2010

FRANK D. WAGNER

reporter of decisions

WASHINGTON  :  2015

Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Ofﬁce
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the front matter of a legal report, containing information about the volume, cases, term, reporter, and publication details. This type of information is not typically considered part of the main body text meant for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Front Matter/Legal Report Metadata</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

17

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

years,  leaving  that  district  without  representation
on  the  city  council  while  the  neighboring  majority
white  district  would  have  three  representatives.    1
Section  5  Hearing  744.    DOJ  blocked  the  proposal.
The  county  then  sought  to  move  a  polling  place
from  a  predominantly  black  neighborhood  in  the
city  to  an  inaccessible  location  in  a  predominantly
white neighborhood outside city limits.  Id., at 816.

	  In 2004, Waller County, Texas, threatened to prose

cute two black students after they announced their
intention  to  run  for  office.    The  county  then  at
tempted to reduce the availability of early voting in
that  election  at  polling  places  near  a  historically
black university.  679 F. 3d, at 865–866.

	  In  1990,  Dallas  County,  Alabama,  whose  county
seat  is  the  City  of  Selma,  sought  to  purge  its  voter
rolls of many black voters.  DOJ rejected the purge
as discriminatory, noting that it would have disquali
fied  many  citizens  from  voting  “simply  because
they  failed  to  pick  up  or  return  a  voter  update
form,  when  there  was  no  valid  requirement  that
they do so.”  1 Section 5 Hearing 356.

These  examples,  and  scores  more  like  them,  fill  the
pages  of  the  legislative  record.    The  evidence  was  indeed
sufficient  to  support  Congress’  conclusion  that  “racial
discrimination  in  voting  in  covered  jurisdictions  [re
mained] serious and pervasive.”  679 F. 3d, at 865.5

——————

5 For  an  illustration  postdating  the  2006  reauthorization,  see  South

Carolina  v.  United  States,  898  F. Supp.  2d  30  (DC  2012),  which  in
volved  a  South  Carolina  voter-identification  law  enacted  in  2011.
Concerned  that  the  law  would  burden  minority  voters, DOJ  brought  a
§5 enforcement action to block the law’s implementation.  In the course
of  the  litigation,  South  Carolina  officials  agreed  to  binding  interpreta
tions that made it “far easier than some might have expected or feared”
for  South  Carolina  citizens  to  vote.    Id.,  at  37.    A  three-judge  panel
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically Justice Ginsburg's dissent. It provides legal arguments and cites examples of voting discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

C
Our country’s history also points to an established under-
standing,  shared  by  both  Presidents  and  the  Justice  De-
partment,  that  former  Presidents  are  answerable  to  the
criminal law for their official acts.  Cf. Chiafalo v. Washing-
ton, 591 U. S. 578, 592–593 (2020) (“ ‘Long settled and es-
tablished practice’ may have ‘great weight in a proper in-
terpretation  of  constitutional  provisions’ ”  (quoting  The
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 689 (1929))).  Consider Wa-
tergate,  for  example.    After  the  Watergate  tapes  revealed
President  Nixon’s  misuse  of  official  power  to  obstruct  the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s investigation of the Wa-
tergate  burglary,  President  Ford  pardoned  Nixon.  Both
Ford’s pardon and Nixon’s acceptance of the pardon neces-
sarily “rested on the understanding that the former Presi-
dent  faced  potential  criminal  liability.”    Brief  for  United
States 15; see also Public Papers of the Presidents, Gerald
R. Ford, Vol. 1, Sept. 8, 1974, p. 103 (1975) (granting former
President Nixon a “full, free, and absolute pardon . . . for all
offenses  against  the  United  States  which  he . . .  has  com-
mitted or may have committed or taken part in during” his
Presidency);  R.  Nixon,  Statement  by  Former  President
Richard  Nixon  to  P.  Buchen,  Counsel  to  President  Ford,
p. 1 (Sept. 8, 1974) (accepting “full and absolute pardon for
any charges which might be brought against me for actions
taken  during  the  time  I  was  President  of  the  United
States”).

Subsequent special counsel and independent counsel in-
vestigations have also operated on the assumption that the
Government can criminally prosecute former Presidents for
their official acts, where they violate the criminal law.  See,
e.g., 1 L. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel
for  Iran/Contra  Matters:  Investigations  and  Prosecutions
445  (1993)  (“[B]ecause  a  President,  and  certainly  a  past
President, is subject to prosecution . . . the conduct of Pres-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the historical precedent and legal understanding of former Presidents being subject to criminal prosecution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court

As  alleged,  Vullo’s  communications  with  Lloyd’s  can  be
reasonably understood as a threat or as an inducement.  Ei-
ther of those can be coercive.  As Vullo concedes, the “threat
need not be explicit,” Brief for Respondent 47, and as the
Solicitor General explains, “[t]he Constitution does not dis-
tinguish between ‘comply or I’ll prosecute’ and ‘comply and
I’ll look the other way,’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 18, n. 7.  So, whether analyzed as a threat or as an
inducement, the conclusion is the same: Vullo allegedly co-
erced Lloyd’s by saying she would ignore unrelated infrac-
tions  and  focus  her  enforcement  efforts  on  NRA-related
business alone, if Lloyd’s ceased underwriting NRA policies
and disassociated from gun-promotion groups.

The reaction from Lloyd’s further confirms the communi-
cations’  coercive  nature.    Cf.  Bantam  Books,  372  U. S.,  at
63, 68 (noting that the distributor’s “reaction on receipt of a
notice was to take steps to stop further circulation of copies
of  the  listed  publications”).  At  the  meeting  itself,  Lloyd’s
“agreed that it would instruct its syndicates to cease under-
writing  firearm-related  policies  and  would  scale  back  its
NRA-related  business.”    App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  223,  Com-
plaint ¶69.  Minutes from a subsequent board of directors’
meeting reveal that Lloyd’s thought “the DFS investigation
had  transformed  the  gun  issue  into  ‘a  regulatory,  legal[,]
and  compliance  matter.’ ”   2  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  29
(Sealed).  That reaction is consistent with Lloyd’s public an-
nouncement  that  it  had  directed  its  syndicates  to  “termi-
nate  all  insurance  related  to  the  NRA  and  not  to  provide
any insurance to the NRA in the future.”  App. to Pet. for
Cert. 224, Complaint ¶72; accord, id., at 306, ¶20 (consent
decree  memorializing  commitment  not  to  underwrite,  or
participate in, NRA-endorsed programs).

Other allegations, viewed in context, reinforce the NRA’s
First Amendment claim.  Consider the April 2018 Guidance
Letters  and  accompanying  press  release,  which  Vullo  is-
sued on official letterhead.  Cf. Bantam Books, 372 U. S., at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing a case involving the National Rifle Association and potential coercion by a state regulator. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific events and documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>