<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

Opinion of the Court

sequentially (per Congress’s design), the natural inference
is  that  §1604  operates  exclusively  in  civil  cases.  Section
1330(a) spells out a universe of civil (and only civil) cases
against  foreign  states  over  which  district  courts  have
jurisdiction,  and  §1604  then  clarifies  how  principles  of
immunity operate within that limited civil universe.

We  thus  decline  to  read  §1604’s  grant  of  immunity  to
apply in criminal proceedings—a category of cases beyond
the civil actions contemplated in §1330(a), the jurisdictional
grant  to  which  §1604  is  substantively  and  sequentially
linked.  Before making that leap, we would expect to find
some  express
indication  regarding  §1604’s
purportedly broader-than-civil scope.  But none exists.

textual

Moreover, Halkbank’s interpretation of §1604 is difficult
to  square  with  its  interpretation  of  §1605,  an  FSIA
provision  delineating  exceptions  to  the  immunity  granted
in §1604.  Halkbank reads §1604 to confer immunity in both
civil and criminal cases.  But Halkbank then turns around
and insists that the exceptions to that immunity specified
in §1605—exceptions which, per the statute, apply “in any
case”—attach  exclusively  in  civil  matters.    Brief  for
Petitioner 43.

In other words, Halkbank sees §1330 as operating only in
civil cases, §1604 in both civil and criminal cases, and §1605
only  in  civil  cases.  In  Halkbank’s  view,  the  FSIA’s  scope
awkwardly flip-flops from civil to civil-and-criminal back to
civil again in sequential provisions.  Congress did not write
such  a  mangled  statute.    The  better  and  more  natural
reading is that §§1330, 1604, and 1605 operate in tandem
within a single universe of civil matters.

The  FSIA’s  remaining  provisions  described  above—
namely, those detailing elaborate procedures and remedies
applicable exclusively in civil cases—strongly buttress the
conclusion  that  §1604  “lays  down  a  baseline  principle  of
foreign  sovereign  immunity  from  civil  actions,”  and  from
civil actions alone.  Cassirer, 596 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). It delves into the interpretation of specific sections of the FSIA, arguing for a limited scope of immunity in civil cases. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U40

[10-04-01 09:23:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 244 (2000)

249

Opinion of the Court

Clause, the court posited that the set of inmates affected
by the retroactive change—all prisoners serving life sen-
tences—is “bound to be far more sizeable than the set . . .
at issue in Morales”—inmates convicted of more than one
homicide.
Id., at 594. The Georgia law sweeps within its
coverage, the court continued, “many inmates who can ex-
pect at some point to be paroled,” ibid., and thus “seems
certain to ensure that some number of inmates will ﬁnd the
length of their incarceration extended in violation of the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution,” id., at 595.
“Eight years is a long time,” the court emphasized, and
“[m]uch can happen in the course of eight years to affect the
determination that an inmate would be suitable for parole.”
Ibid. The Court of Appeals recognized that the Parole
Board would set a new parole review date three years or
more into the future (up to eight years) only where it con-
cludes that “ ‘it is not reasonable to expect that parole would
be granted’ ” sooner.
Ibid. (quoting policy statement of Pa-
role Board). The court thought this policy insufﬁcient, how-
ever, because, unlike the statute in Morales, it does not re-
quire the Board “to make any particularized ﬁndings” and is
not “carefully tailored.” 164 F. 3d, at 594–595. The court
also recognized that the Board’s policy permitted it to recon-
sider any parole denials upon a showing of a “change in cir-
cumstance[s]” or upon the Board’s receipt of “new informa-
tion.” The court deemed the policy insufﬁcient, however,
stating that “[p]olicy statements, unlike regulations are un-
enforceable and easily changed, and adherence to them is a
matter of the Board’s discretion.”

Id., at 595.

We granted certiorari, 527 U. S. 1068 (1999), and we now

reverse.

II

The States are prohibited from enacting an ex post facto
law. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1. One function of the Ex
Post Facto Clause is to bar enactments which, by retroactive
operation, increase the punishment for a crime after its com-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the Ex Post Facto Clause and a case involving parole eligibility.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

29

Opinion of BREYER, J.

in New Orleans (where he did obtain privileges) because at-
titudes toward abortion there were less hostile than in Ba-
ton  Rouge,  so  the  doctors’  testimony  would  be  consistent
even under the Fifth Circuit’s view.  App. 1335–1336.  Once
again,  the  appeals  court’s  conclusion  cannot  be  squared
with  the  standard  of  review.  Cf.  Anderson,  470  U. S.,  at
575.

Doe 6

Finally,  the  District  Court  found  that,  notwithstanding
his good-faith efforts, Doe 6 would not be able to obtain ad-
mitting privileges within 30 miles of the clinic in New Or-
leans where he worked.  The Court of Appeals did not ques-
tion Doe 6’s decision not to apply to Tulane Hospital.  Nor
did it take issue with the District Court’s finding that his
application  to  East  Jefferson  Hospital  had  been  denied
de facto through no fault of his own.  250 F. Supp. 3d, at 77;
App. 54.  But the appeals court reversed the District Court’s
finding on the ground that Doe 6 should have (but did not)
apply  for  admitting  privileges  at  seven  other  hospitals  in
New Orleans, including Touro Hospital, which had granted
limited privileges to Doe 5.  905 F. 3d, at 809–810.

Doe  6  testified  that  he  did  not  apply  to  other  hospitals
because he did not admit a sufficient number of patients to
receive active admitting privileges.  App. 1310.  As we have
explained, supra, at 21–22, Doe 6 provides only medication
abortions  involving  no  surgical  intervention.  See  App.
1308.  The State’s own admitting-privileges expert, Dr. Rob-
ert Marier, testified that a doctor in Doe 6’s position would
“probably not” be able to obtain “active admitting and sur-
gical  privileges”  at  any  hospital.
Id.,  at  884;  see  250
F. Supp. 3d, at 44 (finding Dr. Marier “generally well qual-
ified” to express an opinion on “the issue of admitting priv-
ileges and hospital credentialing”).

The record contains the bylaws of four of the seven hospi-
tals to which the Court of Appeals referred.  All four directly
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *June Medical Services LLC v. Russo*.  It discusses the case of Doe 6, a doctor who provides medication abortions and was denied admitting privileges at hospitals. The text is sequential and provides relevant information about the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1573
_________________

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v.
ANGIE MORIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

[June 15, 2022]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.*
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the
Federal  Arbitration  Act  (FAA),  9  U. S. C.  §1  et seq.,
preempts a rule of California law that invalidates contrac-
tual waivers of the right to assert representative claims un-
der California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act
of 2004. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2698 et seq. (West 2022).

I
A
The California Legislature enacted the Labor Code Pri-
vate Attorneys General Act (PAGA) to address a perceived
deficit in the enforcement of the State’s Labor Code.  Cali-
fornia’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA)
had  the  authority  to  bring  enforcement  actions  to  impose
civil  penalties  on  employers  for  violations  of  many  of  the
code’s provisions.  But the legislature believed the LWDA
did not have sufficient resources to reach the appropriate
level of compliance, and budgetary constraints made it im-

——————

*THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins Parts I and III of this opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

753, 781 (1985).  The Bureau also provided land and fund-
ing to establish some of our Nation’s Historically Black Col-
leges  and  Universities  (HBCUs).    Ibid.;  see  also  Brief  for
HBCU Leaders et al. as Amici Curiae 13 (HBCU Brief ).  In
1867, for example, the Bureau provided Howard University
tens of thousands of dollars to buy property and construct
its campus in our Nation’s capital.  2 O. Howard, Autobiog-
raphy 397–401 (1907).  Howard University was designed to
provide “special opportunities for a higher education to the
newly enfranchised of the south,” but it was available to all
Black people, “whatever may have been their previous con-
dition.”  Bureau  Refugees,  Freedmen  and  Abandoned
Lands, Sixth Semi-Annual Report on Schools for Freedmen
60  (July  1,  1868).1   The  Bureau  also  “expended  a  total  of
$407,752.21 on black colleges, and only $3,000 on white col-
leges” from 1867 to 1870.  Schnapper, 71 Va. L. Rev., at 798,
n. 149.

Indeed, contemporaries understood that the Freedmen’s
Bureau  Act  benefited  Black  people.    Supporters  defended
the law by stressing its race-conscious approach.  See, e.g.,
Cong. Globe 632 (statement of Rep. Moulton) (“[T]he true
object of this bill is the amelioration of the condition of the
colored people”); Joint Comm. Rep. 11 (reporting that “the
Union men of the south” declared “with one voice” that the
Bureau’s  efforts  “protect[ed]  the  colored  people”).    Oppo-
nents argued that the Act created harmful racial classifica-
tions that favored Black people and disfavored white Amer-
icans.  See, e.g., Cong. Globe 397 (statement of Sen. Willey)
(the  Act  makes  “a  distinction  on account  of  color  between
the two races”), 544 (statement of Rep. Taylor) (the Act is

——————

1 As  JUSTICE  THOMAS  acknowledges,  the  HBCUs,  including  Howard
University,  account  for  a  high  proportion  of  Black  college  graduates.
Ante, at 56–57 (concurring opinion).  That reality cannot be divorced from
the history of anti-Black discrimination that gave rise to the HBCUs and
the targeted work of the Freedmen’s Bureau to help Black people obtain
a higher education.  See HBCU Brief 13–15.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and historical context to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

SACKETT v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

from any possibly covered waters.

*

*
We  reverse  the  judgment  of  the  United  States  Court  of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

*

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of a legal opinion, specifically the conclusion and order of the court. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GOLAN v. SAADA

Opinion of the Court

rights under the Convention and not the merits of any un-
derlying  child  custody  claims.”    §9001(b)(4);  see  Art.  19,
Treaty Doc., at 11 (“A decision under this Convention con-
cerning  the  return  of  the  child  shall  not  be  taken  to  be  a
determination on the merits of any custody issue”).

Under ICARA, the party petitioning for the child’s return
bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the child was wrongfully removed or retained.
§9003(e)(1).  If the court finds the child was wrongfully re-
moved  or  retained,  the  respondent  opposing  return  of  the
child has the burden of establishing that an exception to the
return requirement applies.  §9003(e)(2).  A respondent ar-
guing that return would expose the child to a grave risk of
harm  must  establish  that  this  exception  applies  by  “clear
and convincing evidence.”  §9003(e)(2)(A).  Absent a finding
that an exception applies, a child determined to be wrong-
fully removed or retained must be “promptly returned” to
the child’s country of habitual residence.  §9001(a)(4).

B

Petitioner Narkis Golan is a citizen of the United States.
She met respondent Isacco Saada, an Italian citizen, while
attending a wedding in Milan, Italy, in 2014.  Golan soon
moved  to  Milan,  and  the  two  wed  in  August  2015.    Their
son, B. A. S., was born the next summer in Milan, where the
family lived for the first two years of B. A. S.’ life.

The  following  facts,  as  found  by  the  District  Court,  are
not in dispute.  Saada and Golan’s relationship was charac-
terized by violence from the beginning.  The two fought on
an almost daily basis and, during their arguments, Saada
would sometimes push, slap, and grab Golan and pull her
hair.  Saada also yelled and swore at Golan and frequently
insulted her and  called her names, often in front of other
people.  Saada once told Golan’s family that he would kill
her.  Much of Saada’s abuse of Golan occurred in front of his
son.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Golan v. Saada. It delves into the legal framework of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) and its application to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA

KENNEDY, J., concurring

And the history of the Act’s passage and its underinclusive
application  suggest  a  real  possibility  that  these  individu-
als were targeted because of their beliefs.

The California Legislature included in its official history
the  congratulatory  statement  that  the  Act  was  part  of
California’s legacy of “forward thinking.”  App. 38–39.  But
it  is  not  forward  thinking  to  force  individuals  to  “be  an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological
point  of  view  [they]  fin[d]  unacceptable.”    Wooley  v.
Maynard,  430  U. S.  705,  715  (1977).    It  is  forward  think-
ing to begin by reading the First Amendment as ratified in
1791;  to  understand  the  history  of  authoritarian  govern-
ment as the Founders then knew it; to confirm that history
since  then  shows  how  relentless  authoritarian  regimes
are  in  their  attempts  to  stifle  free  speech;  and  to  carry
those lessons onward as we seek to preserve and teach the
necessity of freedom of speech for the generations to come.
Governments  must  not  be  allowed  to  force  persons  to
express  a  message  contrary  to  their  deepest  convictions.
Freedom  of  speech  secures  freedom  of  thought  and  belief.
This law imperils those liberties.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kennedy. It delves into the First Amendment implications of the California law in question.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

LUCIA v. SEC

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J.

without cause.  The Court held in that case that the Exec-
utive Vesting Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, §1 (“[t]he
executive  Power  shall  be  vested  in  a  President  of  the
United States of America”), forbade Congress from provid-
ing members of the Board with “multilevel protection from
removal”  by  the  President.  Free  Enterprise  Fund,  561
U. S.,  at  484;  see  id.,  at  514  (“Congress  cannot  limit  the
President’s  authority”  by  providing  “two  levels  of  protec-
tion  from  removal  for  those  who  . . .  exercise  significant
executive  power”).  But  see  id.,  at  514–549  (BREYER,  J.,
dissenting).  Because,  in  the  Court’s  view,  the  relevant
statutes (1) granted the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sioners  protection  from  removal  without  cause,  (2)  gave
the  Commissioners  sole  authority  to  remove  Board  mem-
bers,  and  (3)  protected  Board  members  from  removal
without cause, the statutes provided Board members with
two  levels  of  protection  from  removal  and  consequently
violated the Constitution.  Id., at 495–498.

In  addressing  the  constitutionality  of  the  Board  mem-
bers’  removal  protections,  the  Court  emphasized  that  the
Board members were “executive officers”—more specifically,
“inferior  officers”  for  purposes  of  the  Appointments
Clause.  E.g., id., at 492–495, 504–505.  The significance of
that fact to the Court’s analysis is not entirely clear.  The
Court said:

“The  parties  here  concede  that  Board  members  are
executive ‘Officers’, as that term is used in the Consti-
tution.  We  do  not  decide  the  status  of  other  Govern-
ment  employees,  nor  do  we  decide  whether  ‘lesser
functionaries  subordinate  to  officers  of  the  United
States’ must be subject to the same sort of control as
those  who  exercise  ‘significant  authority  pursuant  to
the laws.’ ”  Id., at 506 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1, 126, and n. 162 (1976) (per curiam); citations
omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer in the case of Lucia v. SEC. It delves into the constitutional implications of removal protections for members of the SEC's administrative law judges.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

PATEL v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

jurisdictional bar is broad and subparagraph (D) is inappli-
cable, Patel and the Government say, USCIS decisions will
be wholly insulated from judicial review.

The reviewability of such decisions is not before us, and
we do not decide it.  But it is possible that Congress did, in
fact,  intend  to  close  that  door.3    The  post-St.  Cyr  amend-
ments  expressly  extended  the  jurisdictional  bar  to  judg-
ments  made  outside  of  removal  proceedings  at  the  same
time that they preserved review of legal and constitutional
See
questions  made  within  removal  proceedings.
§§1252(a)(2)(B), (D).  And foreclosing judicial review unless
and until removal proceedings are initiated would be con-
sistent with Congress’ choice to reduce procedural protec-
tions  in  the  context  of  discretionary  relief.  See  Lee  v.
USCIS, 592 F. 3d 612, 620 (CA4 2010) (“To the extent Con-
gress decided to permit judicial review of a constitutional or
legal issue bearing upon the denial of adjustment of status,
it intended for the issue to be raised to the court of appeals
during  removal  proceedings”).    So  it  would  be  difficult  to
maintain that this consequence conflicts with the statutory
structure,  and  neither  Patel  nor  the  Government  goes  so
far.  Instead, they urge us to interpret §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to
avoid the risk of this result.  Yet we inevitably swerve out
of our lane when we put policy considerations in the driver’s
seat.  As  we  have  emphasized  many  times  before,  policy
concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of the statu-
tory text.  See, e.g., Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. ___,
___ (2021) (slip op., at 15); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 357

——————

3 The  parties  do  not  address  the  independent  question  whether  a
USCIS denial of adjustment of status made before the initiation of re-
moval  proceedings  satisfies  threshold  finality  and  exhaustion  require-
ments for review.  There appears to be disagreement on this question in
the courts of appeals.  Compare Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F. 3d 512, 517–518
(CA5 2000); McBrearty v. Perryman, 212 F. 3d 985, 987 (CA7 2000), with
Pinho  v.  Gonzales,  432  F. 3d  193,  200–202  (CA3  2005);  Cabaccang  v.
USCIS, 627 F. 3d 1313, 1317 (CA9 2010).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in the case of Patel v. Garland. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it is part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  566 U. S. ____ (2012)

21

Opinion of the Court

“obvious in light of prior art,” §103, and that it be “full[y],
clear[ly],  concise[ly],  and  exact[ly]”  described,  §112—can
perform  this  screening  function.  In  particular,  it  argues
that these claims likely fail for lack of novelty under §102.
This approach, however, would make the “law of nature”
exception  to  §101  patentability  a  dead  letter.  The  ap
proach  is  therefore  not  consistent  with  prior  law.  The
relevant  cases  rest  their  holdings  upon  section  101,  not
later  sections.  Bilski,  561  U. S.  ___;  Diehr,  supra;  Flook,
supra; Benson, 409 U. S. 63.  See also H. R. Rep. No. 1923,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952) (“A person may have ‘invent
ed’  a  machine  or  a  manufacture,  which  may  include  any
thing  under  the  sun  that  is  made  by  man,  but  it  is  not
necessarily patentable  under section 101 unless the condi
tions of the title are fulfilled” (emphasis added)).

We  recognize  that,  in  evaluating  the  significance  of
additional  steps,  the  §101  patent-eligibility  inquiry  and,
say,  the  §102  novelty  inquiry  might  sometimes  overlap.
But  that  need  not  always  be  so.    And  to  shift  the  patent
eligibility  inquiry  entirely  to  these  later  sections  risks
creating  significantly  greater  legal  uncertainty,  while
assuming  that  those  sections  can  do  work  that  they  are
not equipped to do.

What role would laws of nature, including newly discov
ered  (and  “novel”)  laws  of  nature,  play  in  the  Govern
ment’s suggested “novelty” inquiry?  Intuitively, one would
suppose  that  a  newly  discovered  law  of  nature  is  novel.
The  Government,  however,  suggests  in  effect  that  the
novelty of a component law of nature may be disregarded
when  evaluating  the  novelty  of  the  whole.  See  Brief  for
United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  27.  But  §§102  and  103
say nothing about treating laws of nature as if they were
part  of  the  prior  art  when  applying  those  sections.    Cf.
Diehr,  450  U. S.,  at  188  (patent  claims  “must  be  consid
ered  as  a  whole”).  And  studiously  ignoring  all  laws  of
nature when evaluating a patent application under §§102
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the patentability of inventions involving laws of nature and cites relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

MURTHY v. MISSOURI

Opinion of the Court

key issues,” while “the government has engaged in a years-
long pressure campaign” to ensure that the platforms sup-
press those viewpoints.  83 F. 4th, at 370.  The platforms’
“censorship decisions”—including those affecting the plain-
tiffs—were thus “likely attributable at least in part to the
platforms’ reluctance to risk” the consequences of refusing
to “adhere to the government’s directives.”  Ibid.

We  reject  this  overly  broad  assertion.    As  already  dis-
cussed, the platforms moderated similar content long before
any  of  the  Government  defendants  engaged  in  the  chal-
lenged  conduct.
In  fact,  the  platforms,  acting  inde-
pendently,  had  strengthened  their  pre-existing  content-
moderation policies before the Government defendants got
involved.  For instance, Facebook announced an expansion
of its COVID–19 misinformation policies in early February
2021,  before  White  House  officials  began  communicating
with the platform.  And the platforms continued to exercise
their  independent  judgment  even  after  communications
with the defendants began.  For example, on several occa-
sions,  various  platforms  explained  that  White  House  offi-
cials had flagged content that did not violate company pol-
icy.  Moreover,  the  platforms  did  not  speak  only  with  the
defendants  about  content  moderation;  they  also  regularly
consulted with outside experts.

This evidence indicates that the platforms had independ-
ent incentives to moderate content and often exercised their
own judgment.  To be sure, the record reflects that the Gov-
ernment  defendants  played  a  role  in  at  least  some  of  the
platforms’ moderation choices.  But the Fifth Circuit, by at-
tributing every platform decision at least in part to the de-
fendants, glossed over complexities in the evidence.4

——————

4 The Fifth Circuit relied on the District Court’s factual findings, many
of  which  unfortunately  appear  to  be  clearly  erroneous.    The  District
Court found that the defendants and the platforms had an “efficient re-
port-and-censor relationship.”  Missouri v. Biden, 680 F. Supp. 3d 630,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court's opinion in the case MURTHY v. MISSOURI. It delves into the platforms' content moderation practices and the government's potential influence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U85

[09-14-00 16:49:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 236 (1998)

253

Souter, J., concurring

main binding precedent until we see ﬁt to reconsider them,
regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts
about their continuing vitality. Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989).
Once we have decided to reconsider a particular rule, how-
ever, we would be remiss if we did not consider the consist-
ency with which it has been applied in practice. Swift & Co.
v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 116 (1965); see also Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 307 (1962). This consid-
eration, when combined with our analysis of the legal issue
in question, convinces us the contrary holding of House v.
Mayo cannot stand.

We hold this Court has jurisdiction under § 1254(1) to re-
view denials of applications for certiﬁcates of appealability
by a circuit judge or a panel of a court of appeals. The por-
tion of House v. Mayo holding this Court lacks statutory cer-
tiorari jurisdiction over denials of certiﬁcates of probable
cause is overruled.
In light of the position asserted by the
Solicitor General in the brief for the United States ﬁled Au-
gust 18, 1997, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is va-
cated, and the case is remanded for further consideration
consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Souter, concurring.

I would be content to decide this case on the authority of
House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1945) (per curiam), that
common-law certiorari is available to review the denial of
the certiﬁcate, leaving House’s precarious future for another
day when its precedential value might have to be faced
squarely. But that course would command no more than a
minority of one, and there is good reason to deny it even that
support. House’s holding on what may be “ ‘in’ the court of
appeals,” id., at 44, was virtually unreasoned, and the Court
correctly notes our subsequent practice of honoring this rule
in the breach. Given the weakness of the precedent, the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Souter in a case. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and a statement of the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

CARSON v. MAKIN

Opinion of the Court

answer the question in this case; it simply restates it.

Indeed, were we to accept Maine’s argument, our decision
in Espinoza would be rendered essentially meaningless.  By
Maine’s logic, Montana could have obtained the same result
that we held violated the First Amendment simply by rede-
fining its tax credit for sponsors of generally available schol-
arships as limited to “tuition payments for the rough equiv-
alent  of  a  Montana  public  education”—meaning  a  secular
education.  But our holding in Espinoza turned on the sub-
stance  of  free  exercise  protections,  not  on  the  presence  or
absence of magic words.  That holding applies fully whether
the prohibited discrimination is in an express provision like
§2951(2)  or  in  a  party’s  reconceptualization  of  the  public
benefit.

Maine may provide a strictly secular education in its pub-
lic schools.  But BCS and Temple Academy—like numerous
other recipients of Maine tuition assistance payments—are
not public schools.  In order to provide an education to chil-
dren who live in certain parts of its far-flung State, Maine
has decided not to operate schools of its own, but instead to
offer tuition assistance that parents may direct to the public
or private schools of their choice.  Maine’s administration of
that benefit is subject to the free exercise principles govern-
ing any such public benefit program—including the prohi-
bition on denying the benefit based on a recipient’s religious
exercise.

The dissents are wrong to say that under our decision to-
day  Maine  “must”  fund  religious  education.    Post,  at  7
(BREYER, J., dissenting).  Maine chose to allow some par-
ents to direct state tuition payments to private schools; that
decision was not “forced upon” it.  Post, at 4 (SOTOMAYOR,
J.,  dissenting).  The  State  retains  a  number  of  options:  it
could expand the reach of its public school system, increase
the  availability  of  transportation,  provide  some  combina-
tion of tutoring, remote learning, and partial attendance, or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in the case Carson v. Makin. It presents legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

HENRY SCHEIN, INC. v. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

stay  litigation  “upon  being  satisfied  that  the  issue”  is
“referable  to  arbitration”  under  the  “agreement.”    Section
4  says  that  a  court,  in  response  to  a  motion  by  an  ag-
grieved  party,  must  compel  arbitration  “in  accordance
with the terms of the agreement” when the court is “satis-
fied  that  the  making  of  the  agreement  for  arbitration  or
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue.”

Archer  and  White  interprets  those  provisions  to  mean,
in  essence,  that  a  court  must  always  resolve  questions  of
arbitrability and that an arbitrator never may do so.  But
that ship has sailed.  This Court has consistently held that
parties  may  delegate  threshold  arbitrability  questions  to
the arbitrator, so long as the parties’ agreement does so by
“clear  and  unmistakable”  evidence.  First  Options,  514
U. S., at 944 (alterations omitted); see also Rent-A-Center,
561  U. S.,  at  69,  n.  1.    To  be  sure,  before  referring  a  dis-
pute  to  an  arbitrator,  the  court  determines  whether  a
valid arbitration agreement exists.  See 9 U. S. C. §2.  But
if a valid agreement exists, and if the agreement delegates
the  arbitrability  issue  to  an  arbitrator,  a  court  may  not
decide the arbitrability issue.
  Second,  Archer  and  White  cites  §10  of  the  Act,  which
provides  for  back-end  judicial  review  of  an  arbitrator’s
decision  if  an  arbitrator  has  “exceeded”  his  or  her  “pow-
ers.”  §10(a)(4).  According to Archer and White, if a court
at the back end can say that the underlying issue was not
arbitrable, the court at the front end should also be able to
say  that  the  underlying  issue  is  not  arbitrable.    The  dis-
positive  answer  to  Archer  and  White’s  §10  argument  is
that Congress designed the Act in a specific way, and it is
not  our  proper  role  to  redesign  the  statute.    Archer  and
White’s §10 argument would mean, moreover, that courts
presumably  also  should  decide  frivolous  merits  questions
that  have  been  delegated  to  an  arbitrator.  Yet  we  have
already  rejected  that  argument:  When  the  parties’  con-
tract  assigns  a  matter  to  arbitration,  a  court  may  not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the arbitrability of disputes. It contains legal jargon and cites relevant case law, indicating it's part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

U. S.,  at  313).  Racially  integrated  schools  improve  cross-
racial understanding, “break down racial stereotypes,” and
ensure that students obtain “the skills needed in today’s in-
creasingly  global  marketplace  . . .  through  exposure  to
widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”  539
U. S., at 330.  More broadly, inclusive institutions that are
“visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every
race  and  ethnicity”  instill  public  confidence  in  the  “legiti-
macy” and “integrity” of those institutions and the diverse
set  of  graduates  that  they  cultivate.  Id.,  at  332.    That  is
particularly true in the context of higher education, where
colleges and universities play a critical role in “maintaining
the fabric of society” and serve as “the training ground for
a large number of our Nation’s leaders.”  Id., at 331–332.  It
is thus an objective of the highest order, a “compelling in-
terest” indeed, that universities pursue the benefits of ra-
cial diversity and ensure that  “the diffusion of knowledge
and opportunity” is available to students of all races.  Id.,
at 328–333.

This  compelling  interest  in  student  body  diversity  is
grounded not only in the Court’s equal protection jurispru-
dence  but  also  in  principles  of  “academic  freedom,”  which
“ ‘long [have] been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment.’ ”    Id.,  at  324  (quoting  Bakke,  438  U. S.,  at
312).  In light of “the important purpose of public education
and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associ-
ated with the university environment,” this Court’s prece-
dents  recognize  the  imperative  nature  of  diverse  student
bodies  on  American  college  campuses.    539  U. S.,  at  329.
Consistent with the First Amendment, student body diver-
sity allows universities to promote “th[e] robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection. ”
Bakke,  438  U. S.,  at  312  (internal  quotation  marks  omit-
ted).  Indeed, as the Court recently reaffirmed in another
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the importance of racial diversity in higher education and cites legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CASSIRER ET AL. v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA
COLLECTION FOUNDATION

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–1566.  Argued January 18, 2022—Decided April 21, 2022

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §1602
et seq., governs whether a foreign state or instrumentality is amenable
to suit in an American court.  The question in this case is what choice-
of-law rule a court should use to determine the applicable substantive
law in an FSIA suit raising non-federal claims.  That issue arises in a
dispute  concerning  the  ownership  of  an  Impressionist  painting:  Ca-
mille  Pissarro’s  Rue  Saint-Honoré  in  the  Afternoon,  Effect  of  Rain.
Lilly Cassirer inherited the painting, which a family member had pur-
chased from Pissarro’s agent in 1900.  After the Nazis came to power
in Germany, Lilly surrendered Rue Saint-Honoré to them to obtain an
exit visa.  Lilly and her grandson, Claude, eventually ended up in the
United States.  The family’s post-war search for Rue Saint-Honoré was
unsuccessful.  In the early 1990s, the painting was purchased by the
Thyssen-Bornemisza  Collection  Foundation,  an  entity  created  and
controlled  by  the  Kingdom  of  Spain.    Claude  learned  several  years
later that Rue Saint-Honoré was listed in a catalogue of the Founda-
tion’s museum.

Claude sued the Foundation, asserting various property-law claims
based on the allegation that he owned Rue Saint-Honoré and was en-
titled to its return.  Because the Foundation is an “instrumentality” of
the Kingdom of Spain, the complaint invoked the FSIA to establish the
court’s jurisdiction.  See §1603(b).  The FSIA provides foreign states
and their instrumentalities with immunity from suit unless the claim
falls within a specified exception.  See §§1605–1607.  The courts below
held that the Nazi confiscation of Rue Saint-Honoré brought Claude’s
suit  against  the  Foundation  within  the  FSIA  exception  for  expropri-
ated property.  See §1605(a)(3).  That meant the Cassirer family’s suit
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1227

Rule

ARGUMENT—Continued

Motions............................................................................  21.3

Party for whom no brief has been ﬁled....................  28.6

Pro hac vice ...................................................................  6

Rehearing .......................................................................  44.1, 44.2

Time allowed..................................................................  28.3

ATTORNEYS—See also Admission to Bar; Criminal

Justice Act of 1964

Appearance of counsel..................................................  9
Appointment as counsel for indigent party .............  39.6, 39.7
Argument pro hac vice ................................................  6
Compensation

—Criminal Justice Act of 1964...........................  39.7
—Travel  expenses  when  representing  indi

gent party .......................................................  39.6
Costs awarded against .................................................  42.2
Counsel of record ..........................................................  9, 34.1(f)
Damages awarded against...........................................  42.2
Disbarment.....................................................................  8.1
Discipline of attorneys

—Conduct unbecoming member of Bar............  8.2
—Failure  to  comply  with  this  Court’s  Rules  8.2

Employees  of  Court,  prohibition  against  practice  7
Foreign attorneys, permission to argue ...................  6.2
Substitution of counsel .................................................  9.2
Suspension from practice.............................................  8.1
Use of Court’s Library  ...............................................  2.1

BAIL

Applications to individual Justices ............................  22.5
Habeas corpus proceedings .........................................  36.3

BOND—See Stays
BRIEFS—See Amicus Curiae; Appeals; Briefs on

Merits; Certiﬁed Questions; Certiorari; Original
Actions

BRIEFS ON MERITS

Abridgment of time to ﬁle  .........................................  25.5

Application to exceed word limits  ............................  33.1(d)

Clerk, ﬁled with  ...........................................................  29.1, 29.2

Cross-petitions  ..............................................................  25.4

Electronic version  ........................................................  25.9

Extension of time to ﬁle ..............................................  25.5, 30.4

Petitioners and appellants

—Contents..............................................................  24.1
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of the Rules of the Supreme Court, specifically outlining sections related to Attorneys, Bail, and Briefs.  It is not the main body of text meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Rule Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

KAGAN, J., dissenting

It does not take an art expert to see a transformation—
but in any event, all those offering testimony in this case
agreed there was one.  The experts explained, in far greater
detail than I have, the laborious and painstaking work that
Warhol put into these and other portraits.  See 1 App. 160–
185,  212–216,  222–224.    They  described,  in  ways  I  have
tried  to  suggest,  the  resulting  visual  differences  between
the photo and the silkscreen.  As one summarized the mat-
ter: The two works are “materially distinct” in “their com-
position,  presentation,  color  palette,  and  media”—i.e.,  in
pretty much all their aesthetic traits.  Id., at 227.3  And with
the change in form came an undisputed change in meaning.
Goldsmith’s focus—seen in what one expert called the “cor-
poreality and luminosity” of her depiction—was on Prince’s
“unique human identity.”  Id., at 176, 227.  Warhol’s focus
was more nearly the opposite.  His subject was “not the pri-
vate person but the public image.”  Id., at 159.  The artist’s
“flattened, cropped, exotically colored, and unnatural depic-
tion of Prince’s disembodied head” sought to “communicate
a message about the impact of celebrity” in contemporary
life.  Id.,  at  227.   On Warhol’s  canvas,  Prince  emerged  as
“spectral, dark, [and] uncanny”—less a real person than a
“mask-like simulacrum.”  Id., at 187, 249.  He was reframed
as a “larger than life” “icon or totem.”  Id., at 257.  Yet he
was also reduced: He became the product of a “publicity ma-
chine” that “packages and disseminates commoditized im-
ages.”  Id., at 160.  He manifested, in short, the dehuman-
izing  culture  of  celebrity  in  America.    The  message  could

——————

3 The majority attempts to minimize the visual dissimilarities between
Warhol’s silkscreen and Goldsmith’s photograph by rotating the former
image and then superimposing it on the latter one.  See ante, at 9 (fig. 6);
see also Brief for Goldsmith 17 (doing the same thing).  But the majority
is trying too hard: Its manipulated picture in fact reveals the significance
of the cropping and facial reorientation that went into Warhol’s image.
And  the  majority’s  WarGold  combo  of  course  cannot  obscure  the  other
differences, of color and presentation, between the two works.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

3

BREYER, J., concurring

murder  doctrine  traditionally  attributes  death  caused  in
the  course  of  a  felony  to  all  participants  who  intended  to
commit  the  felony,  regardless  of  whether  they  killed  or
intended  to  kill.  See  2  W.  LaFave,  Substantive  Criminal
Law  §§14.5(a)  and  (c)  (2d  ed.  2003).    This  rule  has  been
based  on  the  idea  of  “transferred  intent”;  the  defendant’s
intent  to  commit  the  felony  satisfies  the  intent  to  kill
required  for  murder.  See  S.  Kadish,  S.  Schulhofer,  &  C.
Steiker, Criminal Law  and  Its  Processes  439  (8th  ed.
2007); 2 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law §147 (15th ed.
1994).

But  in  my  opinion,  this  type  of  “transferred  intent”  is
not  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  intent  to  murder  that  could
subject a juvenile to a sentence of life without parole.  As
an  initial  matter,  this  Court  has  made  clear  that  this
artificially  constructed  kind  of  intent  does  not  count  as
intent for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.  We do not
rely on transferred intent in determining if an adult may
receive the death penalty.  Thus, the Constitution forbids
imposing capital punishment upon an aider and abettor in
a robbery, where that individual did not intend to kill and
simply was “in the car by the side of the road . . . , waiting
to  help  the robbers  escape.”    Enmund,  supra,  at  788.  Cf.
Tison,  supra,  at  157–158  (capital  punishment  permissi-
ble  for  aider  and  abettor  where  kidnaping  led  to  death
because  he  was  “actively  involved”  in  every  aspect  of  the
kidnaping  and  his  behavior  showed  “a  reckless  disregard
for  human  life”).    Given  Graham,  this  holding  applies  to
juvenile  sentences  of  life  without  parole  a fortiori.  See
ante, at 12–13.  Indeed, even juveniles who meet the Tison
standard of “reckless disregard” may not be eligible for life
without parole.  Rather, Graham dictates a clear rule: The
only  juveniles  who  may  constitutionally  be  sentenced  to
life without parole are those convicted of homicide offenses
who  “kill  or  intend  to  kill.”  560  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,
at 18).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Breyer in a case concerning juvenile sentencing for homicide. It delves into the legal doctrine of transferred intent and its application to murder charges against juveniles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

THOMAS, J., concurring

sought to “make illegal all distinctions on account of color”
because  “there  should  be  no  distinction  recognized  by  the
laws of the land.”  Id., at 819; see also 3 Cong. Rec., at 956
(statement  of  Rep.  Cain)  (“[M]en  [are]  formed  of  God
equally . . . .  The civil-rights bill simply declares this: that
there  shall  be  no  discriminations  between  citizens  of  this
land so far as the laws of the land are concerned”).  The view
of  the  Legislature  was  clear:  The  Constitution  “neither
knows  nor  tolerates  classes  among  citizens.”  Plessy,  163
U. S., at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

D

The  earliest  Supreme  Court  opinions  to  interpret  the
Fourteenth Amendment did so in colorblind terms.  Their
statements  characterizing  the  Amendment  evidence  its
commitment  to  equal  rights  for  all  citizens,  regardless  of
the color of their skin.  See ante, at 10–11.
  In  the  Slaughter-House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36  (1873),  the
Court identified the “pervading purpose” of the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments as “the freedom of the slave race, the se-
curity and firm establishment of that freedom, and the pro-
tection  of  the  newly-made  freeman  and  citizen  from  the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited
dominion over him.”  Id., at 67–72.  Yet, the Court quickly
acknowledged  that  the  language  of  the  Amendments  did
not suggest “that no one else but the negro can share in this
protection.”  Id., at 72.  Rather, “[i]f Mexican peonage or the
Chinese  coolie  labor  system  shall  develop  slavery  of  the
Mexican  or  Chinese  race  within  our  territory,  [the  Thir-
teenth Amendment] may safely be trusted to make it void.”
Ibid.  And,  similarly,  “if  other  rights  are  assailed  by  the
States which properly and necessarily fall within the pro-
tection of these articles, that protection will apply, though
the party interested may not be of African descent.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1072

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 17, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8140. Peachlum v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 A. 2d 1149.

No. 99–8145. Kreps v. Pesina et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 268.

No. 99–8150. Featherstone v. Eufinger et al. C. A. 6th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 268.

No. 99– 8153. Flournoy v. Moskowitz, Judge, United
States District Court for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8156. Ford v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8157. Ellis v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 296 Ill. App. 3d 862, 696 N. E.
2d 1.

No. 99–8160. Evans v. Lock, Superintendent, Central
Missouri Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 1000.

No. 99–8161. Gill v. New York State Board of Law Exam-
iners. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 257 App. Div. 2d 659, 682 N. Y. S. 2d 909.
No. 99–8170. Steele v. Moorman. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 289.

No. 99–8192. Gainor v. Douglas County, Georgia, et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d
486.

No. 99–8196. Foye v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 335 S. C. 586, 518 S. E. 2d 265.
No. 99–8200. Grant v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8207. Salcedo Gonzales v. California. Sup. Ct.

Cal. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8208. Hebert v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 3d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 So. 2d 63.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, court levels, and dates. This type of information is not meant to be read sequentially like a narrative and is more suitable for a legal database or research tool.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  556 U. S. ____ (2009)

9

Opinion of the Court

requires the EPA to set “effluent limitations [which] shall
require  the  elimination  of  discharges  of  all  pollutants  if
the Administrator finds . . . that such elimination is tech-
nologically  and  economically  achievable,”  §1311(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis  added).
  See  also  §1316(a)(1)  (mandating
“where  practicable,  a  standard  [for  new  point  sources]
permitting  no  discharge  of  pollutants”  (emphasis  added)).
Section  1326(b)’s  use  of  the  less  ambitious  goal  of  “mini-
mizing adverse environmental impact” suggests, we think,
that  the  agency  retains  some  discretion  to  determine  the
extent  of  reduction  that  is  warranted  under  the  circum-
stances.  That  determination  could  plausibly  involve  a
consideration  of  the  benefits  derived  from  reductions  and
the costs of achieving them.  Cf. 40 CFR §125.83 (defining
“minimize”  for  purposes  of  the  Phase  I  regulations  as
“reduc[ing]  to  the  smallest  amount,  extent,  or  degree
reasonably  possible”).  It  seems  to  us,  therefore,  that  the
phrase  “best  technology  available,”  even  with  the  added
specification  “for  minimizing  adverse  environmental  im-
pact,”  does  not  unambiguously  preclude  cost-benefit
analysis.5

Respondents’ alternative (and, alas, also more complex)
argument rests upon the structure of the Clean Water Act.
The  Act  provided  that  during  its  initial  implementation
period existing “point sources”—discrete conveyances from
which  pollutants  are  or  may  be  discharged,  33  U. S. C.
§1362(14)—were subject to “effluent limitations . . . which
shall require the application of the best practicable control
technology  currently  available.”    §1311(b)(1)(A)  (emphasis

——————

5 Respondents  concede  that  the  term  “available”  is  ambiguous,  as  it
could mean either technologically feasible or economically feasible.  But
any ambiguity in the term “available” is largely irrelevant.  Regardless
of the criteria that render a technology “available,” the EPA would still
have to determine which available technology is the “best” one.  And as
discussed  above,  that  determination  may  well  involve  consideration  of
the technology’s relative costs and benefits.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Clean Water Act and the interpretation of "best technology available." It contains legal citations, statutory references, and arguments about the EPA's authority.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA

Opinion of the Court

2
In  addition  to  disclosure  requirements  under  Zauderer,
this  Court  has  upheld  regulations  of  professional  conduct
that incidentally burden speech.  “[T]he First Amendment
does  not  prevent  restrictions  directed  at  commerce  or
conduct  from  imposing  incidental  burdens  on  speech,”
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 567 (2011), and
professionals  are  no  exception  to  this  rule,  see  Ohralik,
supra,  at  456.    Longstanding  torts  for  professional  mal-
practice,  for  example,  “fall  within  the  traditional  purview
of  state  regulation  of  professional  conduct.”    NAACP  v.
Button,  371  U. S.  415,  438  (1963);  but  cf.  id.,  at  439  (“[A]
State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional
misconduct, ignore constitutional rights”).  While drawing
the line between speech and conduct can be  difficult, this
Court’s  precedents  have  long  drawn  it,  see,  e.g.,  Sorrell,
supra,  at  567;  Giboney  v.  Empire  Storage  &  Ice  Co.,  336
U. S. 490, 502 (1949), and the line is “ ‘long familiar to the
bar,’ ”  United  States  v.  Stevens,  559  U. S.  460,  468  (2010)
(quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y State
Crime  Victims  Bd.,  502  U. S.  105,  127  (1991)  (KENNEDY,
J., concurring in judgment)).

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, for
example,  this  Court  upheld  a  law  requiring  physicians  to
obtain  informed  consent  before  they  could  perform  an
abortion.  505  U. S.,  at  884  (joint  opinion  of  O’Connor,
KENNEDY,  and  Souter,  JJ.).  Pennsylvania  law  required
physicians  to  inform  their  patients  of  “the  nature  of  the
procedure, the health risks of the abortion and childbirth,
and  the  ‘probable  gestational  age  of  the  unborn  child.’ ”
Id.,  at  881.    The  law  also  required  physicians  to  inform
patients  of  the  availability  of  printed  materials  from  the
State,  which  provided  information  about  the  child  and
various forms of assistance.  Ibid.

The  joint  opinion  in  Casey  rejected  a  free-speech  chal-
lenge to this informed-consent requirement.  Id., at 884.  It
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra*. It discusses precedents and legal arguments related to free speech and regulations of professional conduct.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

21

KAGAN, J., dissenting

Republicans (2014).  In what was once a party stronghold,
Republicans  now  have  little  or  no  chance  to  elect  their
preferred  candidate.    The  District  Court  thus  found  that
the  gerrymandered  Maryland  map  substantially  dilutes
Republicans’ votes.  See Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d, at 519–
520.

The  majority  claims  all  these  findings  are  mere  “prog-
nostications” about the future, in which no one “can have
any  confidence.”  Ante,  at  23  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  But  the  courts  below  did  not  gaze  into  crystal
balls,  as  the  majority  tries  to  suggest.  Their  findings
about  these  gerrymanders’  effects  on  voters—both  in  the
past  and  predictably  in  the  future—were  evidence-based,
data-based, statistics-based.  Knowledge-based, one might
say.  The  courts  did  what  anyone  would  want  a  deci-
sionmaker  to  do  when  so  much  hangs  in  the  balance.
They  looked  hard  at  the  facts,  and  they  went  where  the
facts  led  them.  They  availed  themselves  of  all  the  infor-
mation  that  mapmakers  (like  Hofeller  and  Hawkins)  and
politicians  (like  Lewis  and  O’Malley)  work  so  hard  to
amass  and  then  use  to  make  every  districting  decision.
They refused to content themselves with unsupported and
out-of-date  musings  about  the  unpredictability  of  the
American  voter.  See  ante,  at  24–25;  but  see  Brief  for
Political Science Professors as Amici Curiae 14–20 (citing
chapter  and  verse  to  the  contrary).    They  did  not  bet
America’s future—as today the majority does—on the idea
that maps constructed with so much expertise and care to
make  electoral  outcomes  impervious  to  voting  would
somehow  or  other  come  apart.    They  looked  at  the  evi-
dence—at  the  facts  about  how  these  districts  operated—
and they could reach only one conclusion.  By substantially
diluting  the  votes  of  citizens  favoring  their  rivals,  the
politicians  of  one  party  had  succeeded  in  entrenching
themselves in office.  They had beat democracy.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion, citing evidence and data to support the claim that the gerrymandered map dilutes Republican votes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
996

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6153.  Harris  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.  App.  3d  1129,  970
N.  E.  2d  128.

No.  09–6156.  Chavez  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  12  So.  3d  199.

No.  09–6160.  Fleitas  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  3d

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  3  So.  3d  351.

No.  09–6166.  Judd  v.  New  Mexico.  Ct.  App.  N.  M.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6168.  Walsh  v.  United  States  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  806.

No.  09–6169.  Theiss  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  4th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6170.  Weiser  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6173.  Himmelberger  v.  Ayers,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6177.  Brown  v.  American  Institute  for  Research
in  the  Behavioral  Sciences,  Inc.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  614.

No.  09–6184.  Davie  v.  Mitchell,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  547  F.  3d  297.

No.  09–6185.  Jones  v.  California.  App.  Div.,  Super.  Ct.

Cal.,  County  of  Modoc.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6194.  Doyle  v.  Ritter,  Governor  of  Colorado,
et al.  C.  A. 10th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported  below: 334
Fed.  Appx.  164.

No. 09–6197.  Newman v.  California.  Sup. Ct. Cal.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6201.  Tilton  v.  Cate,  Secretary,  California  De
partment of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al.  C.  A.
9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case citations from a legal document, likely a Supreme Court docket.  It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Syllabus

tariness test has created intolerable uncertainty for them.  By extend-
ing Robinson beyond the narrow class of pure status crimes, the Ninth
Circuit has created a right that has proven “impossible” for judges to
delineate except “by fiat.”  Powell, 392 U. S., at 534.  As Justice Mar-
shall  anticipated  in  Powell,  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  rules  have  produced
confusion  and  they  have  interfered  with  “essential  considerations  of
federalism,” by taking from the people and their elected leaders diffi-
cult  questions  traditionally  “thought  to  be  the[ir]  province.”    Id.,  at
535–536.  Pp. 24–34.

(e) Homelessness is complex.  Its causes are many.  So may be the
public policy responses required to address it.  The question this case
presents is whether the Eighth Amendment grants federal judges pri-
mary responsibility for assessing those causes and devising those re-
sponses.  A handful of federal judges cannot begin to “match” the col-
lective wisdom the American people possess in deciding “how best to
handle” a pressing social question like homelessness.  Robinson, 370
U. S., at 689 (White, J., dissenting).  The Constitution’s Eighth Amend-
ment serves many important functions, but it does not authorize fed-
eral judges to wrest those rights and responsibilities from the Ameri-
can people and in their place dictate this Nation’s homelessness policy.
Pp. 34–35.

72 F. 4th 868, reversed and remanded.

GORSUCH,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  THOMAS,  ALITO,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus. It summarizes the case and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xx

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

968

Berry, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Berry v. Cain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Berry; Fields v.
1054

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Berry v. Porterﬁeld
Berry v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  860,906,1150

Berryman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903

Bert v. Comptroller of Treasury of Md.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  948,1086

Best v. GEICO Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  896,1066

942

Bestcare; Pearson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924

Best, Inc.; Sisney v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

Bethany v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Bethel v. Daphne
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bethune; Christopher v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1092,1101

Betts v. United States
Beverly, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1063,1159

Beverly v. United States
924

Bevers v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bexar County; Hale v.
850

Bhatia v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1016

Bibb v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

Bibbs v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bilal  v.  Illinois  Attorney  Registration  and  Disciplinary  Comm’n
827

1058

Billue v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Billups v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  859,931

990

Biltmore Forest Broadcasting FM, Inc. v. United States  . . . . . . .
Bing Yu v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Birdsong v. United States
957

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1075

Birkett; McGore v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Birkett; Ruiz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943

Birkett; Soto v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Birks, In re
814

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1085,1087

Biros v. Strickland
Birtha v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

Bisby v. Crites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  990,1138

960

Bishawi v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

Bishop v. Terry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Bitner; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1075

Bivens, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Blacketter; Haynes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blackmon v. McBride  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  863,1065

Blackshear v. Dowling
Blackwell v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
860

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  953,1102

Blaisdell; Dean v.
1138

Blake v. Potter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v.
CITY OF NEW YORK
ALITO, J., dissenting

that the licensee claimed to be headed to a range or compe-
tition outside the City.3

The District Court denied petitioners’ motions for prelim-
inary  injunction  and  summary  judgment  and  granted  the
City’s cross-motion for summary judgment.  86 F. Supp. 3d
249, 261–263 (2015).  The District Court deemed any bur-
den on petitioners’ Second Amendment right “minimal or,
at most, modest.”  Id., at 260.  And the court credited the
City’s public safety rationale, citing the Lunetta declaration
approvingly and discussing the importance of the travel re-
strictions in limiting the movement of licensees with their
handguns.  See id., at 262.

The Second Circuit affirmed.  The panel derided the ordi-
nance’s burdens on petitioners’ Second Amendment right as
“trivial” and expressly credited Lunetta’s explanation of the
public safety purposes served by the travel restriction.  883
F. 3d 45, 63–64 (2018).

When petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, the City
opposed review, contending, among other things, that the
travel restriction promoted public safety, as demonstrated
by  Lunetta’s  declaration  (which  the  City  cited  six  times).
Brief in Opposition 9, 21–23.  We nevertheless granted re-
view  on  January  22,  2019,  and  this,  as  noted,  apparently
led the City to reconsider whether the travel restriction was
actually needed for public safety purposes.

C
On April 12, the NYPD published a proposed amendment
to  the  travel  restriction  that  was  admittedly  spurred  at
——————

3 In  one  case,  the  violation  charged  was  transporting  a  loaded  gun.
People  v.  Schumann,  133  Misc.  2d  499,  507  N. Y. S.  2d  349  (Crim.  Ct.
1986).  In another case, the gun was not in a locked container.  People v.
Thompson, 92 N. Y. 2d 957, 705 N. E. 2d 1200 (1998); see also People v.
Lap, 150 Misc. 2d 724, 570 N. Y. S. 2d 258 (Crim. Ct. 1991) (loaded and
unlocked).  In the other two, there is no mention of an out-of-city range.
Lugo v. Safir, 272 App. Div. 2d 216, 708 N. Y. S. 2d 618 (2000); People v.
Ocasio, 108 Misc. 2d 211, 441 N. Y. S. 2d 148 (1981).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses a case involving gun control laws and cites legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

21

Opinion of the Court

work the least harm possible to other innocent persons com-
Id.,  at  341  (internal  quotation
peting  for  the  benefit.”
marks omitted).

To  manage  these  concerns,  Grutter  imposed  one  final
limit on race-based admissions programs.  At some point,
the Court held, they must end.  Id., at 342.  This require-
ment  was  critical,  and  Grutter  emphasized  it  repeatedly.
“[A]ll  race-conscious  admissions  programs  [must]  have  a
termination point”; they “must have reasonable durational
limits”;  they  “must  be  limited  in  time”;  they  must  have
“sunset  provisions”;  they  “must  have  a  logical  end  point”;
their “deviation from the norm of equal treatment” must be
“a  temporary  matter.”
Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  The  importance  of  an  end  point  was  not  just  a
matter of repetition.  It was the reason the Court was will-
ing to dispense temporarily with the Constitution’s unam-
biguous  guarantee  of  equal  protection.  The  Court  recog-
nized as much: “[e]nshrining a permanent justification for
racial preferences,” the Court explained, “would offend this
fundamental equal protection principle.”  Ibid.; see also id.,
at 342–343 (quoting N. Nathanson & C. Bartnik, The Con-
stitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority Appli-
cants  to  Professional  Schools,  58  Chi.  Bar  Rec.  282,  293
(May–June 1977), for the proposition that “[i]t would be a
sad day indeed, were America to become a quota-ridden so-
ciety, with each identifiable minority assigned proportional
representation in every desirable walk of life”).

Grutter thus concluded with the following caution: “It has
been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of
race to further an interest in student body diversity in the
context  of  public  higher  education.  . . .  We  expect  that  25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer
be necessary to further the interest approved today.”  539
U. S., at 343.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Grutter v. Bollinger case and its implications for race-based admissions programs. It delves into the Court's reasoning and limitations placed on such programs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of the Court

We therefore discarded our usual rule—which Allen accepts
as  applying  here—that  Congress  must  speak,  and  indeed
speak  unequivocally,  to  abrogate  sovereign  immunity.
Compare  id.,  at  378–379  (“[O]ur  decision  today”  does  not
“rest[ ] on any statement Congress ha[s] made on the sub-
ject of state sovereign immunity”), with supra, at 5 (our or-
dinary rule).  Our decision, in short, viewed bankruptcy as
on  a  different  plane,  governed  by  principles  all  its  own.
Nothing in that understanding invites the kind of general,
“clause-by-clause” reexamination of Article I that Allen pro-
poses.  See supra, at 7.  To the contrary, it points to a good-
for-one-clause-only holding.

And even if Katz’s confines were not so clear, Florida Pre-
paid,  together  with  stare  decisis,  would  still  doom  Allen’s
argument.  As Allen recognizes, if the Intellectual Property
Clause permits the CRCA’s abrogation, it also would permit
the Patent Remedy Act’s.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9 (predicting
that if his position prevailed, “ultimately, the Patent Rem-
edy Act would be revisited and properly upheld as a valid
exercise of Congress’s Article I power”).  Again, there is no
difference  between  copyrights  and  patents  under  the
Clause, nor any material difference between the two stat-
utes’ provisions.  See supra, at 3, and n. 1, 6.  So we would
have to overrule Florida Prepaid if we were to decide this
case Allen’s way.  But stare decisis, this Court has under-
stood, is a “foundation stone of the rule of law.”  Michigan
v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 798 (2014).
To reverse a decision, we demand a “special justification,”
over and above the belief “that the precedent was wrongly
decided.”  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573
U. S. 258, 266 (2014).  Allen offers us nothing special at all;
he contends only that if the Court were to use a clause-by-
clause approach, it would discover that Florida Prepaid was
wrong (because, he says again, the decision misjudged Con-
gress’s  authority  under  the  Intellectual  Property  Clause).
See Brief for Petitioners 37; supra, at 6–7.  And with that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to sovereign immunity and the Intellectual Property Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24 MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

A
The United States is immune from suit unless it unequiv-
ocally consents.  United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U. S.
287, 289 (2009).  The Government has waived immunity for
certain  damages  suits  in  the  Court  of  Federal  Claims
through the Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505.  See United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 212 (1983).  That statute permits
“claim[s] against the United States founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied con-
tract  with  the  United  States,  or  for  liquidated  or  unliqui-
dated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”  28 U. S. C.
§1491(a)(1).

The  Tucker  Act,  however,  does  not  create  “substantive
rights.”  Navajo Nation, 556 U. S., at 290.  A plaintiff rely-
ing on the Tucker Act must premise her damages action on
“other sources of law,” like “statutes or contracts.”  Ibid.  For
that reason, “[n]ot every claim invoking the Constitution, a
federal  statute,  or  a  regulation  is  cognizable  under  the
Tucker  Act.”  Mitchell,  463  U. S.,  at  216.    Nor  will  every
“failure to perform an obligation . . . creat[e] a right to mon-
etary  relief ”  against  the  Government.    United  States  v.
Bormes, 568 U. S. 6, 16 (2012).

To determine whether a statutory claim falls within the
Tucker Act’s immunity waiver, we typically employ a “fair
interpretation” test.  A statute creates a “right capable of
grounding a claim within the waiver of sovereign immunity
if, but only if, it ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating com-
pensation by the Federal Government for the damage sus-
tained.’ ”    United  States  v.  White  Mountain  Apache  Tribe,
537  U. S.  465,  472  (2003)  (quoting  Mitchell,  463  U. S.,  at
217)); see also Navajo Nation, 556 U. S., at 290 (“The other
source  of  law  need  not  explicitly  provide  that  the  right  or
duty it creates is enforceable through a suit for damages”).
Satisfying this rubric is generally both necessary and suffi-
cient to permit a Tucker Act suit for damages in the Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of an opinion for the case *24 MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES*. It delves into the legal principles of sovereign immunity and the Tucker Act, outlining the conditions under which the United States can be sued for damages.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–1195
_________________

KENDRA ESPINOZA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
MONTANA

[June 30, 2020]

CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the

Court.

The Montana Legislature established a program to pro-
vide tuition assistance to parents who send their children
to private schools.  The program grants a tax credit to any-
one  who  donates  to  certain  organizations  that  in  turn
award  scholarships  to  selected  students  attending  such
schools.  When petitioners sought to use the scholarships at
a religious school, the Montana Supreme Court struck down
the program.  The Court relied on the “no-aid” provision of
the State Constitution, which prohibits any aid to a school
controlled by a “church, sect, or denomination.”  The ques-
tion presented is whether the Free Exercise Clause of the
United  States  Constitution  barred  that  application  of  the
no-aid provision.

I
A
In 2015, the Montana Legislature sought “to provide pa-
rental and student choice in education” by enacting a schol-
arship  program  for  students  attending  private  schools.
2015  Mont.  Laws  p.  2168,  §7.  The  program  grants  a  tax
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Brief for Respondent 56; App. 70.  Ultimately this factual
tiff  is  beside  the  point;  the  spotty  evidence  regarding
timing  itself  illustrates  the  fact  that  delays  in  obtaining
warrants  are  unpredictable  and  potentially  lengthy.    A
rule  that  requires  officers  (and  ultimately  courts)  to  bal
ance  transportation  delays,  hospital  availability,  and  ac-
cess to magistrates is not a workable rule for cases where
natural  processes  inevitably  destroy  the  evidence  with
every passing minute.

The  availability  of  telephonic  warrant  applications  is
not  an  answer  to  this  conundrum.    See  ante,  at  10–12,
and  n. 4.  For  one  thing,  Missouri  still  requires  written
warrant  applications  and  affidavits,  Mo.  Ann.  Stat.
§§542.276.2(1),  542.276.2.3  (West  Supp.  2012),  rendering
the Court’s 50-State survey irrelevant to the actual dispo
sition of this case.  Ante, at 11, n. 4.  But even if telephonic
applications were available in Missouri, the same difficul
ties  would  arise.    As  the  majority  correctly  recognizes,
“[w]arrants  inevitably  take  some  time  for  police  officers
or  prosecutors  to  complete  and  for  magistrate  judges  to
review.”  Ante,  at  12.    During  that  time,  evidence  is  de
stroyed,  and  police  who  have  probable  cause  to  believe  a
crime  has  been  committed  should  not  have  to  guess  how
long it will take to secure a warrant.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

*

*

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Missouri v. McNeely.  It argues against the majority opinion's stance on warrantless blood draws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

949

558 U. S.

October 13, 2009

No.  09–5012.  Murray  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  3  So.  3d  1108.

No.  09–5090.  Hyde  v.  Alabama.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Ala.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  13  So.  3d  997.

No.  09–5192.  Upton  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  3.

No.  09–5251.  Roach  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  303  Fed.  Appx.  332.

No.  09–5269.  Murphy  v.  Ohio.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  551  F.  3d  485.

No.  09–5636.  Henderson  v.  Hernandez,  Warden.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5637.  Hill v.  Kemna, Superintendent, Crossroads

Correctional  Center.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5639.  Hudson  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332
Fed.  Appx.  209.

No.  09–5641.  Haynes  v.  Blacketter  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Ore.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  225  Ore.  App.  376,  201  P.
3d  940.

No.  09–5642.  Gunnett  v.  Wood,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5645.  Green  v.  Pollard,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5651.  Roach  v.  Mississippi.  Sup.  Ct.  Miss.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  7  So.  3d  911.

No.  09–5663.  Warlick  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–5664.  Warlick  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, court names, and disposition information. This type of data is not meant to be read sequentially like a typical book chapter.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

Facial  challenges  ask  courts  to  issue  holdings  that  are
rarely, if ever, required to resolve a single case or contro-
versy.  The only way a plaintiff gets into a federal court is
by showing that he “personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal con-
duct  of  the  defendant.”  Blum  v.  Yaretsky,  457  U. S.  991,
999  (1982)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    And,  the
only remedy a plaintiff should leave a federal court with is
one “limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in
fact that the plaintiff has established.”  Lewis v. Casey, 518
U. S.  343,  357  (1996).    Accordingly,  once  a  court  decides
whether a statute can be validly enforced against the plain-
tiff who challenges it, that case or controversy is resolved.
Either the court remedies the plaintiff ’s injury, or it deter-
mines  that  the  statute  may  be  constitutionally  applied  to
the plaintiff.

Proceeding to decide the merits of possible constitutional
challenges that could be brought by other plaintiffs is not
necessary to resolve that case.  Instead, any holding with
respect to potential future plaintiffs would be “no more than
an advisory opinion—which a federal court should never is-
sue at all, and especially should not issue with regard to a
constitutional question, as to which we seek to avoid even
nonadvisory opinions.”  Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 77
(1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

Unsurprisingly,  facial  challenges  are  at  odds  with  doc-
trines enforcing the case-or-controversy requirement.  Pur-
suant  to  standing  doctrine,  for  example,  a  plaintiff  can
maintain a suit in a federal court—and thus invoke judicial
power—only if he has suffered an “injury” with a “traceable
connection” to the “complained-of conduct of the defendant.”
Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 103.  Facial challenges significantly
relax those rules.  Start with the injury requirement.  Fa-
cial challenges allow a plaintiff to challenge applications of
a statute that have not injured him.  But see Acheson Ho-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 603 U.S. ____ (2024). It delves into the legal concept of facial challenges and their compatibility with established doctrines like standing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>