<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,

HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ

Opinion of the Court

“The  parties  stipulate  that  Hastings  imposes  an
open  membership  rule  on  all  student  groups—all
groups  must  accept  all  comers  as  voting  members
even if those individuals disagree with the mission of
the group.  The conditions on recognition are therefore
viewpoint neutral and reasonable.  Truth v. Kent Sch.
Dist.,  542  F. 3d  634,  649–50  (9th  Cir.  2008).”    Chris-
tian  Legal  Soc.  Chapter  of  Univ.  of  Cal.  v.  Kane,  319
Fed. Appx. 645, 645–646 (CA9 2009).

We  granted  certiorari,  558  U. S.  ____  (2009),  and  now

affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

II

Before  considering  the  merits  of  CLS’s  constitutional
arguments,  we  must  resolve  a  preliminary  issue:  CLS
urges  us  to  review  the  Nondiscrimination  Policy  as  writ
ten—prohibiting  discrimination  on  several  enumerated
bases,  including  religion  and  sexual  orientation—and  not
as  a  requirement  that  all  RSOs  accept  all  comers.    The
written  terms  of  the  Nondiscrimination  Policy,  CLS  con
tends, “targe[t] solely those groups whose beliefs are based
on  religion or  that  disapprove  of  a  particular  kind  of  sex
ual  behavior,”  and  leave  other  associations  free  to  limit
membership  and  leadership  to  individuals  committed  to
the  group’s  ideology.  Brief  for  Petitioner  19  (internal
quotation  marks  omitted).    For  example,  “[a]  political  . . .
group can insist that its leaders support its purposes and
beliefs,”  CLS  alleges,  but  “a  religious  group  cannot.”    Id.,
at 20.

CLS’s  assertion  runs  headlong  into  the  stipulation  of
facts  it  jointly  submitted  with  Hastings  at  the  summary
judgment stage.  In that filing, the parties specified:

“Hastings  requires  that  registered  student  organiza
tions allow any student to participate, become a mem
ber,  or  seek  leadership  positions  in  the  organization,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction and a discussion of a preliminary issue. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2014)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–433
_________________

INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC.,

PETITIONER v. JESSE BUSK ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[December 9, 2014]

 JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE  KAGAN joins,

concurring.

I  concur  in  the  Court’s  opinion,  and  write  separately
only  to  explain  my  understanding  of  the  standards  the
Court applies.

The  Court  reaches  two  critical  conclusions.    First,  the
Court  confirms  that  compensable  “ ‘principal’ ”  activities
“ ‘includ[e]  .  .  .  those  closely  related  activities  which  are
indispensable  to  [a  principal  activity’s]  performance,’ ”
ante, at 6 (quoting 29 CFR §790.8(c)(2013)), and holds that
the  required  security  screenings  here  were  not  “integral
and  indispensable”  to  another  principal  activity  the  em-
ployees were employed to perform, ante, at 7.  I agree.  As
both  Department  of  Labor  regulations  and  our  precedent
make  clear,  an  activity  is  “indispensable”  to  another,
principal  activity  only  when  an  employee  could  not  dis-
pense with it without impairing his ability to perform the
principal activity safely and effectively.  Thus, although a
battery  plant  worker  might,  for  example,  perform  his
principal  activities  without  donning  proper  protective
gear, he could not do so safely, see Steiner v. Mitchell, 350
U.  S.  247,  250–253  (1956);  likewise,  a  butcher  might  be
able to cut meat without having sharpened his knives, but
he could not do so effectively, see Mitchell v. King Packing
Co.,  350  U.  S.  260,  262–263  (1956);  accord,  29  CFR
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor.  It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of the Court

In  addressing  that  narrower  question,  the  Court  need
not resort to Chevron deference, as some lower courts have
done, for Congress has supplied a clear and unambiguous
answer  to  the  interpretive  question  at  hand.    See  467
U. S., at 842–843 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must  give  effect  to  the  unambiguously  expressed  intent
of  Congress”).  A  putative  notice  to  appear  that  fails  to
designate  the  specific  time  or  place  of  the  noncitizen’s
removal  proceedings  is  not  a  “notice  to  appear  under
section  1229(a),”  and  so  does  not  trigger  the  stop-time
rule.

B

The  statutory  text  alone  is  enough  to  resolve  this  case.
Under  the  stop-time  rule,  “any  period  of  . . .  continuous
physical presence” is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is
served  a  notice  to  appear  under  section  1229(a).”    8
U. S. C.  §1229b(d)(1).    By  expressly  referencing  §1229(a),
the statute specifies where to look to find out what “notice
to  appear”  means.    Section  1229(a),  in  turn,  clarifies  that
the  type  of  notice  “referred  to  as  a  ‘notice  to  appear’ ”
throughout  the  statutory  section  is  a  “written  notice  . . .
specifying,”  as  relevant  here,  “[t]he  time  and  place  at
[removal]  proceedings  will  be  held.”
which
§1229(a)(1)(G)(i).  Thus,  based  on  the  plain  text  of  the
statute,  it  is  clear  that  to  trigger  the  stop-time  rule,  the
Government  must  serve  a  notice  to  appear  that,  at  the
very least, “specif[ies]” the “time and place” of the removal
proceedings.

the

It is true, as the Government and dissent point out, that
the  stop-time  rule  makes  broad  reference  to  a  notice  to

——————

tation is a permissible construction of the statute.  Post, at 10 (opinion

of ALITO, J.).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute and its application to a particular case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

BREYER, J., dissenting

Consider, too, interactions with police officers.  The pres-
ence of a gun in the hands of a civilian poses a risk to both
officers and civilians.  Amici prosecutors and police chiefs
tell us that most officers who are killed in the line of duty
are killed by firearms; they explain that officers in States
with high rates of gun ownership are three times as likely
to be killed in the line of duty as officers in States with low
rates of gun ownership.  Brief for Prosecutors Against Gun
Violence as Amicus Curiae 23–24; Brief for Former Major
City Police Chiefs as Amici Curiae 13–14, and n. 21, (citing
D.  Swedler,  M.  Simmons,  F.  Dominici,  &  D.  Hemenway,
Firearm Prevalence and Homicides of Law Enforcement Of-
ficers in the United States, 105 Am. J. Pub. Health 2042,
2045  (2015)).    They  also  say  that  States  with  the  highest
rates  of  gun  ownership  report  four  times  as  many  fatal
shootings of civilians by police officers compared to States
with the lowest rates of gun ownership.  Brief for Former
Major  City  Police  Chiefs  as  Amici  Curiae  16  (citing  D.
Hemenway, D. Azrael, A. Connor, & M. Miller, Variation in
Rates of Fatal Police Shootings Across US States: The Role
of Firearm Availability, 96 J. Urb. Health 63, 67 (2018)).

These  are  just  some  examples  of  the  dangers  that  fire-
arms pose.  There is, of course, another side to the story.  I
am not simply saying that “guns are bad.”  See ante, at 8
(ALITO, J., concurring).  Some Americans use guns for legit-
imate purposes, such as sport (e.g., hunting or target shoot-
ing), certain types of employment (e.g., as a private security
guard), or self-defense.  Cf. ante, at 4–6 (ALITO, J., concur-
ring).  Balancing these lawful uses against the dangers of
firearms  is  primarily  the  responsibility  of  elected  bodies,
such as legislatures.  It requires consideration of facts, sta-
tistics, expert opinions, predictive judgments, relevant val-
ues,  and  a  host  of  other  circumstances,  which  together
make  decisions  about  how,  when,  and  where  to  regulate
guns more appropriately legislative work.  That considera-
tion  counsels  modesty and  restraint  on  the  part  of  judges
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It discusses the dangers of firearms and cites statistics to support his argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

Opinion of the Court

This reference to barring review of discretionary decisions,
the Government says, implies that review of nondiscretion-
ary decisions is allowed.

Kucana’s  discussion  is  inapposite.  That  opinion  ad-
dressed  whether  the  Attorney  General  could  unilaterally
proscribe review of decisions “declared discretionary by the
Attorney General himself through regulation.”  Id., at 237.
In drawing the comparison between clauses (i) and (ii), we
thus focused on the fact that each form of relief identified
in clause (i) was entrusted to the Attorney General’s discre-
tion  by  statute.  Id.,  at  246.  We  neither  said  nor  implied
anything about review of eligibility decisions made in the
course of exercising that statutory discretion.

In short, the Government is wrong about both text and
context.  A “judgment” does not necessarily involve discre-
tion, nor does context indicate that only discretionary judg-
ments are covered by §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).

2

the

Patel

Unlike

Government,

interprets
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i)  to  prohibit  review  of  only  the  ultimate
grant  or  denial  of  relief,  leaving  all  eligibility  determina-
tions reviewable.  That, Patel says, is because the provision
specifies the kind of judgment to which the bar applies: “any
judgment regarding the granting  of relief.”  Eligibility de-
terminations—which  Patel  characterizes  as  “first-step  de-
cisions”—are not judgments regarding the granting of relief
because eligibility is a necessary but insufficient condition
for relief.  The only judgment that can actually grant relief
is  what  Patel  describes  as  the  “second-step  decision”
whether to grant the applicant the “ ‘ “grace” ’ ” of relief from
removal.  Brief for Petitioners 20 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U. S.,
at 308).  So, Patel argues, that is the sole judgment to which
the bar applies.

Like the Government, Patel cannot square his interpre-
tation with the text of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  He claims that his
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute (likely §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1159

558 U. S.

January 19, 2010

respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  287.

No.  09–567.  Van  De  Berg  v.  Social  Security  Administra
tion  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  to  defer  con
sideration  of  petition  for  writ  of  certioriari  denied.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–7516.  Leight  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consider
ation  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  47
and  331  Fed.  Appx.  850.

Rehearing  Denied

No.  08–10000.  Huff  v.  Kentucky  Retirement  Systems,

ante,  p.  831;

No.  08–10781.  Andrade  Calles  v.  Uribe,  Warden,  ante,

p.  853;

No.  09–5031.  Langon  v.  Florida,  ante,  p.  883;
No.  09–5176.  Gordon  v.  Supreme  Court  of  Texas  et  al.,

ante,  p.  890;

No.  09–6411.  Whirty  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion,  ante,  p.  1027;

No.  09–6413.  Roth  v.  Pennsylvania,  ante,  p.  1027;
No.  09–6546.  Miller  v.  Friel,  Warden,  ante,  p.  1030;
No.  09–6569.  Burroughs,  By  and  Through  Her  Next
Friend  Burroughs  v.  Broadspire,  fka  Kemper  Insurance
Co.,  ante,  p.  1031;

No.  09–6637.  Cummings  v.  Moore  et  al.,  ante,  p.  1015;
No.  09–6777.  Herbert  v.  United  States  et  al.,  ante,

p.  1015;

No.  09–6980.  In  re  Lester,  ante,  p.  988;
No.  09–6999.  Jones  v.  Platteview  Apartments  et  al.,

ante,  p.  1033;

No.  09–7006.  In  re  Minneman,  ante,  p.  1023;
No.  09–7015.  Sanches  Montes  v.  United  States,  ante,

p.  1033;  and

No. 09–7348.  Beverly v. United States, ante, p. 1063.  Peti

tions  for  rehearing  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative and is primarily legal jargon.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Legal Document</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CHICAGO v. FULTON

Syllabus

filed.  Respondents’ alternative reading would create at least two seri-
ous problems.  First, reading §362(a)(3) to cover mere retention of prop-
erty would render §542’s central command—that an entity in posses-
sion  of  certain  estate  property  “shall  deliver  to  the  trustee  . . .  such
property”—largely  superfluous,  even  though  §542  appears  to  be  the
provision governing the turnover of estate property.  Second, respond-
ents’ reading would render the commands of §362(a)(3) and §542 con-
tradictory.    Section  542  carves  out  exceptions  to  the  turnover  com-
mand.    Under  respondents’  reading,  an  entity  would  be  required  to
turn over property under §362(a)(3) even if that property were exempt
from turnover under §542.  The history of the Bankruptcy Code con-
firms the better reading.  The Code originally included both §362(a)(3)
and §542(a), but the former provision lacked the phrase “or to exercise
control over property of the estate.”  When that phrase was later added
by amendment, Congress made no mention of transforming §362(a)(3)
into an affirmative turnover obligation.  It is unlikely that Congress
would  have  made  such  an  important  change  simply  by  adding  the
phrase  “exercise  control,”  rather  than  by  adding  a  cross-reference  to
§542(a) or some other indication that it was so transforming §362(a)(3).
Pp. 3–7.

 926 F. 3d 916, vacated and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except BARRETT, J., who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.
v. GOLDSMITH
KAGAN, J., dissenting

174.  And  as  before,  Warhol  converted  the  cropped  photo
into a higher-contrast image, incorporated into a silkscreen.
That image isolated and exaggerated the darkest details of
Prince’s head; it also reduced his “natural, angled position,”
presenting  him  in  a  more  face-forward  way.  Id.,  at  223.
Warhol  traced,  painted,  and  inked,  as  earlier  described.
See supra, at 5–6.  He also made a second silkscreen, based
on his tracings; the ink he passed through that screen left
differently  colored,  out-of-kilter  lines  around  Prince’s  face
and hair (a bit hard to see in the reproduction below—more
pronounced in the original).  Altogether, Warhol made 14
prints and two drawings—the Prince series—in a range of
unnatural, lurid hues.  See Appendix, ante, at 39.  Vanity
Fair chose the Purple Prince to accompany an article on the
musician.  Thirty-two  years  later,  just  after  Prince  died,
Condé Nast paid Warhol (now actually his foundation, see
supra, at 1, n. 1) to use the Orange Prince on the cover of a
special commemorative magazine.  A picture (or two), as the
saying  goes,  is  worth  a  thousand  words,  so  here  is  what
those magazines published:

Andy Warhol, Prince, 1984, synthetic paint and silkscreen ink on canvas
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion discussing the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith case. It describes Warhol's artistic process and the use of his Prince silkscreen in magazines.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

901

Stevens, J., dissenting

through gradual implementation of a passive restraint re-
quirement making airbags only one of a variety of systems
that a manufacturer could install in order to comply, rather
than through a requirement mandating the use of one partic-
ular system in every vehicle.
In its brief supporting Honda,
It argued
the United States agreed with this submission.
that if the manufacturers had known in 1984 that they might
later be held liable for failure to install airbags, that risk
“would likely have led them to install airbags in all cars,”
thereby frustrating the Secretary’s safety goals and interfer-
ing with the methods designed to achieve them. Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 25.

There are at least three ﬂaws in this argument that pro-
vide sufﬁcient grounds for rejecting it. First, the entire ar-
gument is based on an unrealistic factual predicate. What-
ever the risk of liability on a no-airbag claim may have been
prior to the promulgation of the 1984 version of Standard
208, that risk did not lead any manufacturer to install airbags
in even a substantial portion of its cars.
If there had been
a realistic likelihood that the risk of tort liability would have
that consequence, there would have been no need for Stand-
ard 208. The promulgation of that standard certainly did
not increase the pre-existing risk of liability. Even if the
standard did not create a previously unavailable pre-emption
defense, it likely reduced the manufacturers’ risk of liability
by enabling them to point to the regulation and their compli-
ance therewith as evidence tending to negate charges of neg-
ligent and defective design. See Part II, supra. Given
that the pre-1984 risk of liability did not lead to widespread
airbag installation, this reduced risk of liability was hardly
likely to compel manufacturers to install airbags in all cars—
or even to compel them to comply with Standard 208 during
the phase-in period by installing airbags exclusively.

Second, even if the manufacturers’ assessment of their risk
of liability ultimately proved to be wrong, the purposes of
In light of the inevi-
Standard 208 would not be frustrated.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous parts of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1097

529 U. S.

May 1, 2000

U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
id., at 4, and cases cited therein.

Justice Stevens dissents. See

No. 99–8206.

In re Holloman. Petition for writ of manda-

mus denied.

Certiorari Granted

No. 99–1132.

Illinois v. McArthur. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 304 Ill. App. 3d 395, 713
N. E. 2d 93.

No. 99–1295. Gitlitz et al. v. Commissioner of Internal
10th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported

Revenue. C. A.
below: 182 F. 3d 1143.

Certiorari Denied

No. 98–10002. Graham, aka Sankofa v. Johnson, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di-
vision. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 168
F. 3d 762.

No. 99–268. Middleton v. Kemna, Superintendent, Cross-
roads Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–1246. Dole Food Co., Inc., et al. v. United States
et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187
F. 3d 1362.

No. 99–1258. McDonnell Douglas Corp. et al. v. United
States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
182 F. 3d 1319.

No. 99–1281. O. S. C. & Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 187 F. 3d 1116.

No. 99–1332. Brokamp et ux. v. Mercy Hospital Anderson
et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 132 Ohio App. 3d 850, 726 N. E. 2d 594.

No. 99–1371. Gal-Oliver et ux. v. Coutts Bank (Switzer-
land) Ltd., fka Coutts & Co. AG. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 85.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (granted, denied, etc.). This type of information is generally not considered the primary content of a legal document and is more suitable for indexing in a legal database or case management system.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket or Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

to  represent  nonmembers  in  the  absence  of  agency  fees.    And  their
duty of fair representation is a necessary concomitant of the authori-
ty that a union seeks when it chooses to be the exclusive representa-
tive.  In any event, States can avoid free riders through less restric-
tive means than the imposition of agency fees.  Pp. 11–18.

(b) Respondents’ alternative justifications for Abood are similarly

unavailing.  Pp. 18–26.

(1) The Union claims that Abood is supported by the First Amend-
ment’s original meaning.  But neither founding-era evidence nor dic-
tum in Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 143, supports the view that
the  First  Amendment  was  originally  understood  to  allow  States  to
force public employees to subsidize a private third party.  If anything,
the opposite is true.  Pp. 18–22.

(2)  Nor  does  Pickering  v.  Board  of  Ed.  of  Township  High  School
Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, provide a basis for Abood.  Abood
was not based on Pickering, and for good reasons.  First, Pickering’s
framework  was  developed  for  use  in cases  involving  “one  employee’s
speech  and  its  impact  on  that  employee’s  public  responsibilities,”
United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 467, while Abood
and  other  agency-fee  cases  involve  a  blanket  requirement  that  all
employees  subsidize  private  speech  with  which  they  may  not  agree.
Second, Pickering’s framework was designed to determine whether a
public  employee’s  speech  interferes  with  the  effective  operation  of  a
government  office,  not  what  happens  when  the  government  compels
speech or speech subsidies in support of third parties.  Third, the cat-
egorization  schemes  of  Pickering  and  Abood  do  not  line  up.    For  ex-
ample, under Abood, nonmembers cannot be charged for speech that
concerns  political  or  ideological  issues;  but  under  Pickering,  an  em-
ployee’s  free  speech  interests  on  such  issues  could  be  overcome  if
outweighed by the employer’s interests.  Pp. 22–26.

(c) Even  under  some  form  of  Pickering,  Illinois’  agency-fee  ar-

rangement would not survive.  Pp. 26–33.

(1) Respondents compare union speech in collective bargaining and
grievance proceedings to speech “pursuant to [an employee’s] official
duties,” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 421, which the State may
require  of  its  employees.    But  in  those  situations,  the  employee’s
words are really the words of the employer, whereas here the union is
speaking on behalf of the employees.  Garcetti therefore does not ap-
ply.  Pp. 26–27.

(2) Nor does the union speech at issue cover only matters of private
concern,  which  the  State  may  also  generally  regulate  under  Picker-
ing.  To  the  contrary,  union  speech  covers  critically  important  and
public matters such as the State’s budget crisis, taxes, and collective
bargaining issues related to education, child welfare, healthcare, and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus, which summarizes the court's reasoning.  It is sequential text and contains the substance of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

55

THOMAS, J., concurring

level the playing field for this new phase of racial subordi-
nation?  And then, out of whose lives should the debt owed
to those further victims be repaid?  This vision of meeting
social racism with government-imposed racism is thus self-
defeating, resulting in a never-ending cycle of victimization.
There is no reason to continue down that path.  In the wake
of  the  Civil  War,  the  Framers  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment charted a way out: a colorblind Constitution that re-
quires the government to, at long last, put aside its citizens’
skin color and focus on their individual achievements.

C

Universities’ recent experiences confirm the efficacy of a
colorblind rule.  To start, universities prohibited from en-
gaging in racial discrimination by state law continue to en-
roll racially diverse classes by race-neutral means.  For ex-
ample,  the  University  of  California  purportedly  recently
admitted  its  “most  diverse  undergraduate  class  ever,”  de-
spite California’s ban on racial preferences.  T. Watanabe,
UC Admits Largest, Most Diverse Class Ever, But It Was
Harder To Get Accepted, L. A. Times, July 20, 2021, p. A1.
Similarly, the University of Michigan’s 2021 incoming class
was “among the university’s most racially and ethnically di-
verse classes, with 37% of first-year students identifying as
persons of color.”  S. Dodge, Largest Ever Student Body at
University of Michigan This Fall, Officials Say, MLive.com
(Oct.  22,  2021),  https://www.mlive.com/news/ann-arbor/
2021/10/largest-ever-student-body-at-university-of-michigan-
this-fall-officials-say.html.  In fact, at least one set of stud-
ies suggests that, “when we consider the higher education
system  as  a  whole,  it  is  clear  that  the  vast  majority  of
schools would be as racially integrated, or more racially in-
tegrated,  under  a  system  of  no  preferences  than  under  a
system of large preferences.”  Brief for Richard Sander as
Amicus Curiae 26.  Race-neutral policies may thus achieve
the same benefits of racial harmony and equality without
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It delves into the topic of affirmative action and argues for a colorblind approach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

LUCIA v. SEC

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

easy to grasp; the second, less so.  To be sure, to exercise
“significant authority,” the person must wield considerable
powers in comparison to the average person who works for
the  Federal  Government.    As  this  Court  has  noted,  the
vast  majority  of  those  who  work  for  the  Federal  Govern-
ment  are  not  “Officers  of  the  United  States.”    See  Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Bd.,  561  U. S.  477,  506,  n.  9  (2010)  (indicating  that  well
over  90%  of  those  who  render  services  to  the  Federal
Government  and  are  paid  by  it  are  not  constitutional
officers).  But this Court’s decisions have yet to articulate
the types of powers that will be deemed significant enough
to constitute “significant authority.”

To  provide  guidance  to  Congress  and  the  Executive
Branch,  I  would  hold  that  one  requisite  component  of
“significant authority” is the ability to make final, binding
decisions  on  behalf  of  the  Government.    Accordingly,  a
person who merely advises and provides recommendations
to an officer would not herself qualify as an officer.

There is some historical support for such a requirement.
For  example,  in  1822,  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  of
Maine  opined  in  the  “fullest  early  explication”  of  the
meaning  of  an  “ ‘office,’ ”  that  “ ‘the  term  “office”  implies  a
delegation  of  a  portion  of  the  sovereign  power  to,  and
possession  of  it  by  the  person  filling  the  office,’ ”  that  “ ‘in
its  effects[,]  . . .  will  bind  the  rights  of  others.’ ”    31  Op.
OLC  83  (quoting  3  Greenl.  (Me.)  481,  482).    In  1899,  a
Report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives  noted  that  “the  creation  and  conferring  of  an
office  involves  a  delegation  to  the  individual  of  . . .  sover-
eign functions,” i.e., “the power to . . . legislate, . . . execute
law,  or  . . .  hear  and  determine  judicially  questions  sub-
mitted.”  1  A.  Hinds,  Precedents  of  the  House  of  Repre-
sentatives  of  the  United  States  607  (1907).    Those  who
merely  assist  others  in  exercising sovereign  functions  but
who  do  not  have  the  authority  to  exercise  sovereign  pow-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Lucia v. SEC. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SACKETT v. EPA

Syllabus

Spear,  520  U. S.  154,  178,  requiring  the  Sacketts  to  restore  their
property  according  to  an  agency-approved  plan  and  to  give  the  EPA
access.    Also,  “legal  consequences  . . .  flow”  from  the  order,  ibid.,
which, according to the Government’s litigating position, exposes the
Sacketts to double penalties in future enforcement proceedings.  The
order also severely limits their ability to obtain a permit for their fill
from  the  Army  Corps  of  Engineers,  see  33  U. S. C.  §1344;  33  CFR
§326.3(e)(1)(iv).  Further, the order’s issuance marks the “consumma-
tion” of the agency’s decisionmaking process, Bennett, supra, at 178,
for  the  EPA’s  findings  in  the  compliance  order  were  not  subject  to
further  agency  review.    The  Sacketts  also  had  “no  other  adequate
remedy in a court,” 5 U. S. C. §704.  A civil action brought by the EPA
under  33  U. S. C.  §1319  ordinarily  provides  judicial  review  in  such
cases,  but  the  Sacketts  cannot  initiate  that  process.    And  each  day
they wait, they accrue additional potential liability.  Applying to the
Corps of Engineers for a permit and then filing suit under the APA if
that  permit  is  denied  also  does  not  provide  an  adequate  remedy  for
the EPA’s action.  Pp. 4–6.

(b) The  Clean  Water  Act  is  not  a  statute  that  “preclude[s]  judicial
review”  under  the  APA,  5  U. S. C.  §701(a)(1).    The  APA  creates  a
“presumption  favoring  judicial  review  of  administrative  action.”
Block  v.  Community  Nutrition  Institute,  467  U. S.  340,  349.    While
this  presumption  “may  be  overcome  by  inferences  of  intent  drawn
from  the  statutory  scheme  as  a  whole,”  ibid.,  the  Government’s  ar-
guments do not support an inference that the Clean Water Act’s stat-
utory scheme precludes APA review.  Pp. 7–10.

622 F. 3d 1139, reversed and remanded.

SCALIA, J.,  delivered  the  opinion  for  a  unanimous  Court.    GINSBURG,

J., and ALITO, J., filed concurring opinions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the case summary and arguments presented in the Sackett v. EPA case.  It is not the actual content of the legal document itself, but rather a summary and analysis of it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

3

Syllabus

“internal operation,” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367
U. S. 886, 896, it has a much freer hand than when it regulates as to
citizens generally.  The questions respondents challenge are part of a
standard  background  check  of  the  sort  used  by  millions  of  private
employers.  The Government has been conducting employment inves-
tigations  since  the  Republic’s  earliest  days,  and  the  President  has
had  statutory  authority  to  assess  an  applicant’s  fitness  for  the  civil
service  since  1871.    Standard  background  investigations  similar  to
those  at  issue  became  mandatory  for  federal  civil-service  candidates
in 1953, and the investigations challenged here arose from a decision
to  extend  that  requirement  to  federal  contract  employees.    This  his-
tory shows that the Government has an interest in conducting basic
background checks in order to ensure the security of its facilities and
to  employ  a  competent,  reliable  workforce  to  carry  out  the  people’s
business.  The interest is not diminished by the fact that respondents
are contract employees.  There are no meaningful distinctions in the
duties of NASA’s civil-service and contractor employees, especially at
JPL,  where  contract  employees  do  work  that  is  critical  to  NASA’s
mission  and  that  is  funded  with  a  multibillion  dollar  taxpayer  in-
vestment.  Pp. 12–15.

(2) The  challenged  questions  on  SF–85  and  Form  42  are  rea-
sonable, employment-related inquiries that further the Government’s
interests in managing its internal operations.  SF–85’s “treatment or
counseling”  question  is  a  followup  question  to  a  reasonable  inquiry
about illegal-drug use.  In context, the drug-treatment inquiry is also
a  reasonable,  employment-related  inquiry.  The  Government,  recog-
nizing  that  illegal-drug  use  is  both  a  criminal  and  medical  issue,
seeks  to  separate  out  those  drug  users  who  are  taking  steps  to  ad-
dress  and  overcome  their  problems.    Thus,  it  uses  responses  to  the
drug-treatment  question  as  a  mitigating  factor  in  its  contractor  cre-
dentialing  decisions.    The  Court  rejects  the  argument  that  the  Gov-
ernment  has  a  constitutional  burden  to  demonstrate  that  its  em-
ployment  background  questions  are  “necessary”  or  the
least
restrictive means of furthering its interests.  So exacting a standard
runs directly contrary to Whalen.  See 429 U. S., at 596–597.  Pp. 16–
18.

(3) Like  SF–85’s  drug-treatment  question,  Form  42’s  open-
ended questions are reasonably aimed at identifying capable employ-
ees  who  will  faithfully  conduct  the  Government’s  business.    Asking
an  applicant’s  designated  references  broad  questions  about  job  suit-
ability  is  an  appropriate  tool  for  separating  strong  candidates  from
weak  ones.    The  reasonableness  of  such  questions  is  illustrated  by
their pervasiveness in the public and private sectors.  Pp. 18–19.

(b) In addition to being reasonable in light of the Government in-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the arguments and reasoning behind the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

31

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

Amdt.  14,  §3:  “No  person  shall  be  a  Senator  or  Repre-
sentative  in  Congress,  or  elector  of  President  and  Vice
President,  or  hold  any  office,  civil  or  military,  under  the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature,
or  as  an  executive  or  judicial  officer  of  any  State,  to  sup-
port  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  shall  have
engaged  in  insurrection  or  rebellion  against  the  same,  or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.  But Congress
may  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  each  House,  remove  such
disability.”

Amdt. 17, cl. 1: “The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the
people thereof, for six years; and  each Senator shall have
one vote.  The electors in each State shall have the qualifi-
cations requisite for electors of the most numerous branch
of the State legislatures.”

Amdt. 17, cl. 2: “When vacancies happen in the represen-
tation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority
of  such  State  shall  issue  writs  of  election  to  fill  such  va-
cancies:  Provided,  That  the  legislature  of  any  State  may
empower  the  executive  thereof  to  make  temporary  ap-
pointments  until  the  people  fill  the  vacancies  by  election
as the legislature may direct.”

Amdt.  18,  §3:  “This  article  shall  be  inoperative  unless  it
shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitu-
tion  by  the  legislatures  of  the  several  States,  as  provided
in  the  Constitution,  within  seven  years  from  the  date  of
the  submission  hereof  to  the  States  by  the  Congress.”
(Superseded by Amdt. 21.)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically excerpts from the U.S. Constitution Amendments. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

13

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

charged with enforcing “other laws that regulate . . . abor-
tion.”    Consider,  for  example,  Texas  Occupational  Code
§164.055,  titled  “Prohibited  Acts  Regarding  Abortion.”
That provision states that the Texas Medical Board “shall
take an appropriate disciplinary action against a physician
who violates . . . Chapter 171, Health and Safety Code,” a
part of Texas statutory law that includes S. B. 8.  Accord-
ingly, it appears Texas law imposes on the licensing-official
defendants a duty to enforce a law that “regulate[s] or pro-
hibit[s]  abortion,”  a  duty  expressly  preserved  by  S. B. 8’s
saving clause.  Of course, Texas courts and not this one are
the  final  arbiters  of  the  meaning  of  state  statutory  direc-
tions.    See  Railroad  Comm’n  of  Tex.  v.  Pullman  Co.,  312
U. S. 496, 500 (1941).  But at least based on the limited ar-
guments put to us at this stage of the litigation, it appears
that the licensing defendants do have authority to enforce
S. B. 8.4
  In the face of this conclusion, JUSTICE THOMAS advances
an  alternative  argument.    He  stresses  that  to  maintain  a
suit consistent with this Court’s Ex parte Young and Article
III precedents, “it is not enough that petitioners ‘feel inhib-
ited’ ”  or  “ ‘chill[ed]’ ”  by  the  abstract  possibility  of  an  en-
forcement action against them.  Post, at 6–7.  Rather, they
must  show  at  least  a  credible  threat  of  such  an  action
against them.  Post, at 7.  Again, we agree with these obser-
vations in principle and disagree only on their application

——————

4 Tending to confirm our understanding of the statute is the fact that
S. B. 8  expressly  prohibits  “enforcement  of  Chapters  19  and  22,  Penal
Code, in response to violations of this subchapter.”  Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. §171.207(a).  This language suggests that the Texas Legisla-
ture knew how to prohibit collateral enforcement mechanisms when it
adopted S. B. 8, and understood that it was necessary to do so.  To read
S. B. 8 as barring any collateral enforcement mechanisms without a spe-
cific exclusion would thus threaten to render this statutory language su-
perfluous.    See  Kallinen  v.  Houston,  462  S.  W.  3d  25,  28  (Tex.  2015)
(courts  should  avoid  treating  any  statutory  language  as  surplusage);
Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759, 778 (1988) (same).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a case and cites relevant statutes and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U47

[10-04-01 09:34:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

426

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

maining property and the .357 revolver into the Rappahan-
nock River and set ﬁre to the jeep.

Pursuing a lead from Verena James, the police interviewed
Cruse about the ﬁre at the Kellers’ home. Petitioner had
ﬂed to Florida. Cruse provided no useful information until
the police discovered the bodies of the victims, at which point
Cruse consulted counsel.
In a plea bargain Cruse agreed to
disclose the details of the crimes in exchange for the Com-
monwealth’s promise not to seek the death penalty against
him. Cruse described the murders but made no mention of
his own act of rape. When the Commonwealth discovered
the omission, it revoked the plea agreement and charged
Cruse with capital murder.

Petitioner was arrested and charged with robbery, abduc-
tion, rape, and the capital murders of the Kellers. At trial
in January 1994, Cruse was the Commonwealth’s main wit-
ness. He recounted the murders as we have just described.
Cruse testiﬁed petitioner raped Mrs. Keller, shot Mr. Keller
at least twice, and shot Mrs. Keller several times after she
had been felled by Cruse’s bullet. He also described peti-
tioner as the mastermind of the murders. The circum-
stances of the ﬁrst plea agreement between the Common-
wealth and Cruse and its revocation were disclosed to the
jury.
Id., at 158–159. Testifying on his own behalf, peti-
tioner admitted he was the ﬁrst to shoot Mr. Keller and it
was his idea to rob the store and set ﬁre to the house. He
denied, however, raping or shooting Mrs. Keller, and claimed
to have shot Mr. Keller only once. Petitioner blamed Cruse
for the remaining shots and disputed some other parts of
Cruse’s testimony.

The jury convicted petitioner on all counts. After consid-
ering the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented
during the sentencing phase, the jury found the aggravating
circumstances of future dangerousness and vileness of the
crimes and recommended a death sentence. The trial court
imposed the recommended sentence. The Supreme Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the text discussing the case of Williams v. Taylor. It contains legal terminology, a summary of events, and details about the trial proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

Opinion of the Court

reading.  That language requires a permit for a “discharge.”
A “discharge” is “any addition” of a pollutant to navigable
waters “from any point source.”  And a “point source” is “any
discernible,  confined  and  discrete  conveyance”  (such  as  a
pipe, ditch, well, etc.).  Reading “from” and “conveyance” to-
gether,  Maui  argues  that  the  statutory  meaning  of  “from
any  point  source”  is  not  about  where  the  pollution  origi-
nated, but about how it got there.  Under what Maui calls
the  means-of-delivery  test,  a  permit  is  required  only  if  a
point source itself ultimately delivers the pollutant to nav-
igable waters.  Under this view, if the pollutant must travel
through groundwater to reach navigable waters, then it is
the groundwater, not the pipe, that is the conveyance.

Congress  sometimes  adopts  less  common  meanings  of
common words, but this esoteric definition of “from,” as con-
noting a means, does not remotely fit in this context.  The
statute couples the word “from” with the word “to”—strong
evidence that Congress was referring to a destination (“nav-
igable waters”) and an origin (“any point source”).  Further
underscoring that Congress intended this every day mean-
ing is that the object of “from” is a “point source”—a source,
again, connoting an origin.  That Maui’s proffered interpre-
tation would also create a serious loophole in the permitting
regime also indicates it is an unreasonable one.

C
The  Solicitor  General  agrees  that,  as  a  general  matter,
the permitting requirement applies to at least some addi-
tions of pollutants to navigable waters that come indirectly
from point sources.  See Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae  33–35.    But  the  Solicitor  General  argues  that  the
proper interpretation of the statute is the one reflected in
EPA’s recent Interpretive Statement.  After receiving more
than 50,000 comments from the public, and after the Ninth
Circuit  released  its  opinion  in  this  case,  EPA  wrote  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court's opinion on the case of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund. It delves into the interpretation of the Clean Water Act and its permitting requirements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Opinion of the Court

district court denies a party’s motion to compel arbitration,
that party may take an interlocutory appeal.  Section 16(a)
creates  a  rare  statutory  exception  to  the  usual  rule  that
parties may not appeal before final judgment.  See Mohawk
Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 108–109 (2009).
Notably,  Congress  provided  for  immediate  interlocutory
appeals  of  orders  denying—but  not  of  orders  granting—
motions to compel arbitration.

The sole question before this Court is whether a district
court  must  stay  its  proceedings  while  the  interlocutory
appeal on arbitrability is ongoing.  The answer is yes.

Section  16(a)  does  not  say  whether  the  district  court
proceedings must be stayed.  But Congress enacted §16(a)
against  a  clear  background  principle  prescribed  by  this
Court’s precedents:  An appeal, including an interlocutory
appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those
aspects  of  the  case  involved  in  the  appeal.”  Griggs  v.
Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 58 (1982).
That  Griggs  principle  reflects  a  longstanding  tenet  of
American  procedure.  See  Hovey  v.  McDonald,  109  U. S.
150, 157 (1883); see also Price v. Dunn, 587 U. S. ___, ___
(2019)  (THOMAS,  J.,  joined  by  ALITO  and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 7) (describing
Griggs  principle  as  “well  settled”);  Marrese  v.  American
Academy  of  Orthopaedic  Surgeons,  470  U. S.  373,  379
(1985)  (“In  general,  filing  of  a  notice  of  appeal  confers
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district
court  of  control  over  those  aspects  of  the  case  involved  in
the appeal”).

The  Griggs  principle  resolves  this  case.  Because  the
question  on  appeal  is  whether  the  case  belongs  in
arbitration or instead in the district court, the entire case
is essentially “involved in the appeal.”  459 U. S., at 58.  As
Judge  Easterbrook  cogently  explained,  when  a  party
appeals  the  denial  of  a  motion  to  compel  arbitration,
whether “the litigation may go forward in the district court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal principle of staying district court proceedings while an interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxxx

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1125

Keller; Hammond v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967

Keller; Powell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926

Keller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Kelley; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
870

Kelley; Cotton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

Kelley v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Kelley v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037

Kelly; Elliott v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kelly; Fowler v.
838

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kelly; Gaskin v.
Kelly; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  909,1102,1152

876

Kelly; Mitrano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1019

Kelly; Muhammad v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

Kelly; Rushing v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  835,860

Kelly v. United States
949

Kemna; Hill v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

Kenan; Galache v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

Kendall v. State Bar of Mich.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kendrick v. Frank
997

Kennedy; Lopez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Kennedy v. Reese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925

Kennedy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

Kentucky; Bowling v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906

Kentucky; Carneal v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

Kentucky; Fields v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kentucky; Flick v.
1081

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kentucky; Fuller v.
Kentucky; Furnish v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Kentucky; McCloud v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

994

Kentucky; Niceley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057

Kentucky; Powell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Kentucky; Rouse v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

Kentucky; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kentucky; Taylor v.
982

Kentucky; Wheeler v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .  878,1139

Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services; T. G. v.
Kentucky Retirement Systems; Huff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  831,1159

Kenyon v. Wyoming Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  846,1086

999

Kerestes; Armstrong v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957

Kerestes; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912

Kerestes; Pleaze v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

Kern v. Shinseki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

Kern v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923

Kerns v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

765

Syllabus

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit

No. 98–1828. Argued November 29, 1999—Decided May 22, 2000

Under the False Claims Act (FCA), a private person (the relator) may
bring a qui tam civil action “in the name of the [Federal] Government,”
31 U. S. C. § 3730(b)(1), against “[a]ny person” who, inter alia, “know-
ingly presents . . . to . . . the . . . Government . . . a false or fraudulent
claim for payment,” § 3729(a). The relator receives a share of any pro-
ceeds from the action. §§ 3730(d)(1)–(2). Respondent Stevens brought
such an action against petitioner state agency, alleging that it had
submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency in con-
nection with federal grant programs the EPA administered. Petitioner
moved to dismiss, arguing that a State (or state agency) is not a “per-
son” subject to FCA liability and that a qui tam action in federal court
against a State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District
Court denied the motion, and petitioner ﬁled an interlocutory appeal.
Respondent United States intervened in the appeal in support of re-
spondent Stevens. The Second Circuit afﬁrmed.

Held: A private individual may not bring suit in federal court on behalf
of the United States against a State (or state agency) under the FCA.
Pp. 771–788.

(a) A private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court
on behalf of the United States under the FCA. Stevens meets the re-
In particular,
quirements necessary to establish Article III standing.
he has demonstrated “injury in fact”—a harm that is both “concrete”
and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155. He contends he is suing to remedy
injury in fact suffered by the United States—both the injury to its
sovereignty arising from violation of its laws and the proprietary in-
jury resulting from the alleged fraud. The concrete private interest
that Stevens has in the outcome of his suit, in the form of the bounty
he will receive if the suit is successful, is insufﬁcient to confer stand-
ing, since that interest does not consist of obtaining compensation for,
or preventing, the violation of a legally protected right. An adequate
basis for Stevens’ standing, however, is found in the doctrine that the
assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by
the assignor. Because the FCA can reasonably be regarded as effect-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court case. It includes information about the case name, citation, parties involved, and a brief description of the legal issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.
v. GOLDSMITH
Syllabus

needed.  Copying the photograph because doing so was merely helpful
to convey a new meaning or message is not justification enough.  Pp.
28–37.

(c) Goldsmith’s original works, like those of other photographers, are
entitled to copyright protection, even against famous artists.  Such pro-
tection includes the right to prepare derivative works that transform
the original.  The use of a copyrighted work may nevertheless be fair
if,  among  other  things,  the  use  has  a  purpose  and  character  that  is
sufficiently  distinct  from  the  original.   In  this  case,  however,  Gold-
smith’s  photograph  of  Prince,  and  AWF’s  copying  use  of  the  photo-
graph  in  an  image  licensed  to  a  special  edition  magazine  devoted  to
Prince, share substantially the same commercial purpose.  AWF has
offered no other persuasive justification for its unauthorized use of the
photograph.  While the Court has cautioned that the four statutory fair
use  factors  may  not  “be  treated  in  isolation,  one  from  another,”  but
instead all must be “weighed together, in light of the purposes of copy-
right,”  Campbell,  510  U. S.,  at  578,  here  AWF  challenges  only  the
Court of Appeals’ determinations on the first fair use factor, and the
Court agrees the first factor favors Goldsmith.  P. 38.

11 F. 4th 26, affirmed.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which  THOMAS,
ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined.  GOR-
SUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which JACKSON, J., joined.  KAGAN,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal syllabus, summarizing a court case. It is not the actual content of a book and is not meant to be read for enjoyment or information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1124

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–7352.  Davis  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  46  Cal.  4th  539,  208  P.  3d  78.

No.  09–7353.  Powell  v.  City  of  Chicago  Human  Rights
Commission  et  al.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  389  Ill.  App.  3d  45,  906  N.  E.  2d  24.

No.  09–7354.  Alexander  v.  Illinois.  Sup.  Ct.  Ill.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7357.  Schrader  v.  Turner  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  761.

No.  09–7360.  Bunche  v.  North  Carolina.  Gen.  Ct.  Justice,

Super.  Ct.  Div.,  Wake  County,  N.  C.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7363.  Steppe  v.  California  Insurance  Commis

sioner.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7365.  Smith  v.  Bridgestone  Firestone  Tire  Co.
et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328
Fed.  Appx.  874.

No.  09–7366.  Smith  v.  Strength,  Sheriff,  Richmond

County,  Georgia,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7367.  Richardson  v.  Michigan  State  Treasurer.

C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7377.  Crisostomos  v.  Lawler,  Superintendent,
State  Correctional  Institution  at  Huntingdon,  et  al.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7381.  Miller  v.  Rock  Hill  City  Police  Depart
ment.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333
Fed.  Appx.  703.

No.  09–7383.  Chatman  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  387  Ill.  App.  3d  1177,  981
N.  E.  2d  536.

No.  09–7388.  Gaw  v.  Missouri.  Sup.  Ct.  Mo.  Certiorari  de

nied.  Reported  below:  285  S. W.  3d  318.

No.  09–7390.  Houston  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  9th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  286  S. W.  3d  604.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

profits  above  a  certain  threshold  would  pay  the  Govern-
ment, while plans with losses below that threshold would
receive  payments  from  the  Government.    §1342(b),  124
Stat. 211.  Specifically, §1342 stated that the eligible prof-
itable plans “shall pay” the Secretary of the Department of
Health  and  Human  Services  (HHS),  while  the  Secretary
“shall pay” the eligible unprofitable plans.  Ibid.2

When  it  enacted  the  Affordable  Care  Act  in  2010,  Con-
gress  did  not  simultaneously  appropriate  funds  for  the
yearly payments the Secretary could potentially owe under
the Risk Corridors program.  Neither did Congress limit the
amounts that the Government might pay under §1342.  Nor
did  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO)  “score”—that
is,  calculate  the  budgetary  impact  of—the  Risk  Corridors
program.

In  later  years,  the  CBO  noted  that  the  Risk  Corridors
statute did not require the program to be budget neutral.
The  CBO  reported  that,  “[i]n  contrast”  to  the  Act’s  other
risk-mitigation programs, “risk corridor collections (which
will be recorded as revenues) will not necessarily equal risk
corridor payments, so that program can have net effects on
the budget deficit.”  CBO, The Budget and Economic Out-
look: 2014 to 2024, p. 59 (2014).  The CBO thus recognized
that “[i]f insurers’ costs exceed their expectations, on aver-
age, the risk corridor program will impose costs on the fed-
eral budget.”  Id., at 110.

Like the CBO, the federal agencies charged with imple-
menting  the  program  agreed  that  §1342  did  not  require
——————

2 If  a  health  insurance  plan  made  (or  lost)  up  to  3  percentage  points
more  than  expected  in  a  plan  year,  the  plan  would  keep  the  gains  (or
losses).    If  the  plan  made  (or  lost)  between  3  and  8  percentage  points
more than predicted, it would give up half of the earnings (or would be
compensated for half of the shortfalls) exceeding the 3 percentage-point
threshold.  If the gains (or losses) exceeded predictions by eight percent-
age points, the insurers would pay (or receive) 80 percent of the gains (or
losses) exceeding the 8 percentage-point mark.  See §1342(b), 124 Stat.
211, 42 U. S. C. §18062(b).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Risk Corridors program within the Affordable Care Act. It delves into the statutory language, budgetary implications, and interpretations by the CBO and implementing agencies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

development,”  Kyllo,  533  U. S.,  at  36,  and  the  accuracy  of  CSLI  is
rapidly approaching GPS-level precision.  Pp. 12–15.

(2) The  Government  contends  that  the  third-party  doctrine
governs this case, because cell-site records, like the records in Smith
and  Miller,  are  “business  records,”  created  and  maintained  by  wire-
less  carriers.  But  there  is  a  world  of  difference  between  the  limited
types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the
exhaustive  chronicle  of  location  information  casually  collected  by
wireless carriers.

The third-party doctrine partly stems from the notion that an indi-
vidual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly
shared with another.  Smith and Miller, however, did not rely solely
on the act of sharing.  They also considered “the nature of the partic-
ular  documents  sought”  and  limitations  on  any  “legitimate  ‘expecta-
tion of privacy’ concerning their contents.”  Miller, 425 U. S., at 442.
In  mechanically  applying  the  third-party  doctrine  to  this  case  the
Government fails to appreciate the lack of comparable limitations on
the revealing nature of CSLI.

Nor  does  the  second  rationale  for  the  third-party  doctrine—
voluntary exposure—hold up when it comes to CSLI.  Cell phone lo-
cation  information  is  not  truly  “shared”  as  the  term  is  normally  un-
derstood.  First, cell phones and the services they provide are “such a
pervasive  and  insistent  part  of  daily  life”  that  carrying  one  is  indis-
pensable to participation in modern society.  Riley, 573 U. S., at ___.
Second,  a  cell  phone  logs  a  cell-site  record  by  dint  of  its  operation,
without  any  affirmative  act  on  the  user’s  part  beyond  powering  up.
Pp. 15–17.

(d) This decision is narrow.  It does not express a view on matters
not  before  the  Court;  does  not  disturb  the  application  of  Smith  and
Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and
tools, such as security cameras; does not address other business rec-
ords that might incidentally reveal location information; and does not
consider  other  collection  techniques  involving  foreign  affairs  or  na-
tional security.  Pp. 17–18.

2.  The Government did not obtain a warrant supported by proba-
ble  cause  before  acquiring  Carpenter’s  cell-site  records.    It  acquired
those records pursuant to a court order under the Stored Communi-
cations  Act,  which  required  the  Government  to  show  “reasonable
grounds” for believing that the records were “relevant and material to
an  ongoing  investigation.”    18  U. S. C.  §2703(d).    That  showing  falls
well short of the probable cause required for a warrant.  Consequent-
ly, an order issued under §2703(d) is not a permissible mechanism for
accessing  historical  cell-site  records.    Not  all  orders  compelling  the
production of documents will require a showing of probable cause.  A
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to cell-site location information (CSLI) and privacy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

SHOOP v. TWYFORD

Opinion of the Court

reasons just discussed, that was error.

Reviewing  Twyford’s  request  for  transportation  under
the proper standard is straightforward, because his motion
sheds no light on how he might persuade a court to consider
the results of his testing, given the limitations AEDPA im-
poses  on  presenting  new  evidence.    He  argued  that  it  is
“plausible  that  the  testing  to  be  administered  is  likely  to
reveal evidence in support of ” his claims of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel and expert witness, lack of competency
to  stand  trial,  and  the  involuntariness  of  his  confession.
Motion to Transport 8.  Whether or not that is true, Twyford
never explained how the results of the neurological testing
could be admissible in his habeas proceeding, and it is hard
to see how they could be.  The Ohio courts already adjudi-
cated and rejected most of these claims on the merits, and
the District Court’s AEDPA review will therefore be limited
to “the record that was before the state court.”  Pinholster,
563 U. S., at 181.  As for the claims that the state courts did
not consider, Twyford never argued that he could clear the
bar in §2254(e)(2) for expanding the state court record, or
that the bar was somehow inapplicable.

Twyford  asserted  in  passing  that  the  desired  evidence
could  “plausibly”  bear  on  the  question  whether  to  excuse
procedural default.  Motion to Transport 8.  By way of back-
ground,  a  federal  court  may  not  review  a  claim  a  habeas
petitioner failed to adequately present to state courts, un-
less he shows “cause to excuse his failure to comply with the
state  procedural  rule  and  actual  prejudice  resulting  from
the alleged constitutional violation.”  Davila v. Davis, 582
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2017)  (slip  op.,  at  5)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).  Twyford suggested that the results of his
brain testing could help make that showing.  But he did not
identify the particular defaulted claims he hopes to resur-
rect, nor did he explain how the testing would matter to his
ability to do so.  And in any event, this Court has already
held  that,  if  §2254(e)(2)  applies  and  the  prisoner  cannot
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's reasoning in the case of Shoop v. Twyford. It discusses the petitioner's request for transportation for neurological testing and the legal limitations on presenting new evidence in a habeas proceeding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF
OKLAHOMA

No. 21–429.  Argued April 27, 2022—Decided June 29, 2022

In  2015,  respondent  Victor  Manuel  Castro-Huerta  was  charged  by  the
State of Oklahoma for child neglect.  Castro-Huerta was convicted in
state court and sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment.  While Castro-
Huerta’s state-court appeal was pending, this Court decided McGirt v.
Oklahoma, 591 U. S. ___.  There, the Court held that the Creek Na-
tion’s reservation in eastern Oklahoma had never been properly dises-
tablished  and  therefore  remained  “Indian  country.”    Id.,  at  ___.  In
light of McGirt, the eastern part of Oklahoma, including Tulsa, is rec-
ognized  as  Indian  country.    Following  this  development,  Castro-
Huerta argued that the Federal Government had exclusive jurisdiction
to prosecute him (a non-Indian) for a crime committed against his step-
daughter (a Cherokee Indian) in Tulsa (Indian country), and that the
State therefore lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him.  The Oklahoma
Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  agreed  and  vacated  his  conviction.    This
Court granted certiorari to determine the extent of a State’s jurisdic-
tion to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in
Indian country.

Held: The Federal Government and the State have concurrent jurisdic-
tion to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in
Indian country.  Pp. 4–25.

(a) The jurisdictional dispute in this case arises because Oklahoma’s
territory includes Indian country.  In the early Republic, the Federal
Government sometimes treated Indian country as separate from state
territory.  See Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515.  But that view has long
since been abandoned. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S.
60, 72.  And the Court has specifically held that States have jurisdic-
tion to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indi-
ans in Indian country.  United States v. McBratney, 104 U. S. 621; see
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the Court's decision and are not considered part of the actual opinion. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case and the Court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

Opinion of the Court

held it was immaterial that members of the same sex as the
victim committed the alleged discrimination.  Nor did the
Court concern itself with whether men as a group were sub-
ject to discrimination or whether something in addition to
sex  contributed  to  the  discrimination,  like  the  plaintiff ’s
“[A]ssuredly,”  the  case
conduct  or  personal  attributes.
didn’t  involve  “the  principal  evil  Congress  was  concerned
with when it enacted Title VII.”  Id., at 79.  But, the Court
unanimously explained, it is “the provisions of our laws ra-
ther than the principal concerns of our legislators by which
we are governed.”  Ibid.  Because the plaintiff alleged that
the  harassment  would  not  have  taken  place  but  for  his
sex—that is, the plaintiff would not have suffered similar
treatment if he were female—a triable Title VII claim ex-
isted.

The lessons these cases hold for ours are by now familiar.
First, it’s irrelevant what an employer might call its dis-
criminatory practice, how others might label it, or what else
might motivate it.  In Manhart, the employer called its rule
requiring women to pay more into the pension fund a “life
expectancy” adjustment necessary to achieve sex equality.
In Phillips, the employer could have accurately spoken of
its policy as one based on “motherhood.”  In much the same
way, today’s employers might describe their actions as mo-
tivated  by  their  employees’  homosexuality  or  transgender
status.  But just as labels and additional intentions or mo-
tivations didn’t make a difference in Manhart or Phillips,
they  cannot  make  a  difference  here.  When  an  employer
fires an employee for being homosexual or transgender, it
necessarily and intentionally discriminates against that in-
dividual in part because of sex.  And that is all Title VII has
ever demanded to establish liability.

Second, the plaintiff ’s sex need not be the sole or primary
cause of the employer’s adverse action.  In Phillips, Man-
hart, and Oncale, the defendant easily could have pointed
to  some  other,  nonprotected  trait  and  insisted  it  was  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion discussing the case of Bostock v. Clayton County. It delves into the legal reasoning and precedents surrounding sex discrimination under Title VII.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

portance  of  leaving  buyers  of  goods  free  to  compete  with
each  other  when  reselling  or  otherwise  disposing  of  those
goods.  American law too has generally thought that com
petition,  including  freedom  to  resell,  can  work  to  the  ad
vantage of the consumer.  See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather
Products,  Inc.  v.  PSKS,  Inc.,  551  U. S.  877,  886  (2007)
(restraints  with  “manifestly  anticompetitive  effects”  are
per se  illegal;  others  are  subject  to  the  rule  of  reason
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted));  1  P.  Areeda  &  H.
Hovenkamp,  Antitrust  Law  ¶100,  p. 4  (3d  ed.  2006)
(“[T]he principal objective of antitrust policy is to maximize
consumer  welfare  by  encouraging
firms  to  behave
competitively”).

The  “first  sale”  doctrine  also  frees  courts  from  the  ad
ministrative  burden  of  trying  to  enforce  restrictions  upon
difficult-to-trace, readily movable goods.  And it avoids the
selective enforcement inherent in any such effort.  Thus, it
is not surprising that for at least a century the “first sale”
doctrine  has  played  an  important  role  in  American  copy
right law.  See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339
(1908); Copyright Act of 1909, §41, 35 Stat. 1084.  See also
Copyright  Law  Revision,  Further  Discussions  and  Com
ments  on  Preliminary  Draft  for  Revised  U. S.  Copyright
Law,  88th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  pt.  4,  p.  212  (Comm.  Print
1964) (Irwin Karp of Authors’ League of America express
ing  concern  for  “the  very  basic  concept  of  copyright  law
that,  once  you’ve  sold  a  copy  legally,  you  can’t  restrict  its
resale”).

The  common-law  doctrine  makes  no  geographical  dis
tinctions;  nor  can  we  find  any  in  Bobbs-Merrill  (where
this  Court  first  applied  the  “first  sale”  doctrine)  or  in
§109(a)’s predecessor provision, which Congress enacted a year
later.  See  supra,  at  12.  Rather,  as  the  Solicitor  General
acknowledges,  “a  straightforward  application  of  Bobbs-
Merrill”  would  not  preclude  the  “first  sale”  defense  from
applying  to  authorized  copies  made  overseas.    Brief  for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion discussing the "first sale" doctrine in copyright law. It cites legal precedents and discusses the rationale behind the doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014)

15

Opinion of the Court

Brief for Petitioners 46, and respondents do not deny that
the  Commission  frequently  fields  complaints  alleging
violations  of  the  false  statement  statute.  Cf.  Humani-
tarian Law Project, 561 U. S., at 16 (noting that there had
been  numerous  prior  prosecutions  under  the  challenged
statute).  Moreover,  respondents  have  not  disavowed
enforcement if petitioners make similar statements in the
future.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29–30; see also Humanitarian
Law  Project,  supra,  at  16  (“The  Government  has  not  ar-
gued to this Court that plaintiffs will not be prosecuted if
they do what they say they wish to do”).  In fact, the spec-
ter of enforcement is so substantial that the owner of the
billboard refused to display SBA’s message after receiving
a  letter  threatening  Commission  proceedings.    On  these
facts, the prospect of future enforcement is far from “imag-
inary or speculative.”  Babbitt, supra, at 298.

We  take  the  threatened  Commission  proceedings  into
account  because  administrative  action,  like  arrest  or
prosecution, may give rise to harm sufficient to justify pre-
enforcement  review.    See  Ohio  Civil  Rights  Comm’n  v.
Dayton  Christian  Schools,  Inc.,  477  U. S.  619,  625–626,
n. 1 (1986) (“If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a
ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the
administrative  action  threatening  sanctions  in  this  case
does not”).  The burdens that Commission proceedings can
impose on electoral speech are of particular concern here.
As the Ohio Attorney General himself notes, the “practical
effect”  of  the  Ohio  false  statement  scheme  is “to  permit  a
private  complainant  . . .  to  gain  a  campaign  advantage
without  ever  having  to  prove  the  falsity  of  a  statement.”
DeWine Brief 7.  “[C]omplainants may time their submis-
sions  to  achieve  maximum  disruption  of  their  political
opponents  while  calculating  that  an  ultimate  decision  on
the  merits  will  be  deferred  until  after  the  relevant  elec-
tion.”  Id., at 14–15.  Moreover, the target of a false state-
ment  complaint  may  be  forced  to  divert  significant  time
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the potential harm of enforcement actions related to a false statement statute. It provides legal arguments and cites relevant case law, indicating it's part of the core content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

named  “exacting  scrutiny.”    See  ante,  at  7–8  (opinion  of
ROBERTS, C. J.).

Exacting scrutiny requires two things: first, there must
be “ ‘a “substantial relation” between the disclosure require-
ment and a “sufficiently important” government interest,’ ”
and  second,  “ ‘the  strength  of  the  governmental  interest
must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First
Amendment  rights.’ ”    Reed,  561  U. S.,  at  196.    Exacting
scrutiny  thus  incorporates  a  degree  of  flexibility  into  the
means-end analysis.  The more serious the burden on First
Amendment rights, the more compelling the government’s
interest must be, and the tighter must be the fit between
that  interest  and  the  government’s  means  of  pursuing  it.
By  contrast,  a  less  substantial  interest  and  looser  fit  will
suffice  where  the  burden  on  First  Amendment  rights  is
weaker  (or  nonexistent).    In  other  words,  to  decide  how
closely  tailored  a  disclosure  requirement  must  be,  courts
must ask an antecedent question: How much does the dis-
closure requirement actually burden the freedom to associ-
ate?

This approach reflects the longstanding principle that the
requisite level of scrutiny should be commensurate to the
burden  a  government  action  actually  imposes  on  First
Amendment rights.  See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S.
428, 434 (1992) (“[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry . . . de-
pends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation bur-
dens” First Amendment rights); Board of Trustees of State
Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 477 (1989) (“[C]ommer-
cial speech enjoys a limited measure of protection, commen-
surate  with  its  subordinate  position  in  the  scale  of  First
Amendment values, and is [thus] subject to modes of regu-
lation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncom-
mercial expression” (internal quotation marks and altera-
tions  omitted));  see also  Fulton  v.  Philadelphia,  593  U. S.
___, ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2) (not-
ing the “nuanced” approach the Court generally takes in the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 594 U.S. ____ (2021). It delves into the legal standard of "exacting scrutiny" applied to First Amendment rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MURTHY v. MISSOURI

Syllabus

entities  and  officials,  by  “coerc[ing]”  or  “significantly  encourag[ing]”
the platforms’ moderation decisions, transformed those decisions into
state action.  The court then modified the District Court’s injunction
to state that the defendants shall not coerce or significantly encourage
social-media  companies  to  suppress  protected  speech  on  their  plat-
forms.

Held: Neither the individual nor the state plaintiffs have established Ar-
ticle III standing to seek an injunction against any defendant.  Pp. 8–
29.

(a) Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement is “fundamental”
to  the  “proper  role”  of  the  Judiciary.  Raines  v. Byrd,  521  U. S.  811,
818.  A proper case or controversy exists only when at least one plain-
tiff “establish[es] that [she] ha[s] standing to sue,” ibid.—i.e., that she
has suffered, or will suffer, an injury that is “concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
redressable by a favorable ruling,” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U. S. 398, 409.  Here, the plaintiffs’ theories of standing depend on the
platforms’  actions—yet  the  plaintiffs  do  not  seek  to  enjoin  the  plat-
forms  from  restricting  any  posts  or  accounts.  Instead,  they  seek  to
enjoin  the  Government  agencies  and  officials  from  pressuring  or  en-
couraging the platforms to suppress protected speech in the future.

The one-step-removed, anticipatory nature of the plaintiffs’ alleged
injuries presents two particular challenges.  First, it is a bedrock prin-
ciple that a federal court cannot redress “injury that results from the
independent action of some third party not before the court.”  Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41–42.  Sec-
ond,  because  the  plaintiffs  request  forward-looking  relief,  they  must
face “a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.”  O’Shea v. Lit-
tleton, 414 U. S. 488, 496.  Putting these requirements together, the
plaintiffs must show a substantial risk that, in the near future, at least
one platform will restrict the speech of at least one plaintiff in response
to the actions of at least one Government defendant.  Here, at the pre-
liminary injunction stage, they must show that they are likely to suc-
ceed in carrying that burden.  On the record in this case, that is a tall
order.  Pp. 8–10.

(b) The plaintiffs’ primary theory of standing involves their “direct

censorship injuries.”  Pp. 10–26.

(1) The Court first considers whether the plaintiffs have demon-
strated traceability for their past injuries.  Because the plaintiffs are
seeking only forward-looking relief, the past injuries are relevant only
for their predictive value.  The primary weakness in the record of past
restrictions is the lack of specific causation findings with respect to any
discrete instance of content moderation.  And while the record reflects
that the Government defendants played a role in at least some of the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the case's background, the issues presented, and the Court's holding.  While it is important legal information, it is not the primary content meant to be read and understood by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxxxi

Page
880
Secretary of Army; Appleby v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012
Secretary of Army; Laber v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1022
Secretary of Defense; Ahmed v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077
Secretary of Defense; Al Libbi v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093
Secretary of Defense; Al-Nashiri v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077
Secretary of Defense; Al Uzayti v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1007
Secretary of Defense; Basardh v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1051
Secretary of Defense; Paracha v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880
Secretary of Defense; Phillips v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of Defense; Trotter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1001,1141

Secretary of Defense; White v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  976,1102

Secretary of Health and Human Services; Dinkins v.  . . . . . . . .  844,1065

. . . . . . . .  947,1086

Secretary of Health and Human Services; Frazier v.
814

Secretary of Health and Human Services; Marquardt v.  . . . . . . . .
1147

Secretary of Homeland Security; Aronov v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Secretary of Homeland Security; Bosse v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Secretary of Homeland Security; Curtis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1103

Secretary of Homeland Security; Robinson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Secretary of Homeland Security; Sonuga v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Secretary of Interior; Adam v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
810

Secretary of Interior v. Buono  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

Secretary of Interior; Devon Energy Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Secretary of Interior; Orion Reserves Ltd. Partnership v.  . . . . . .
1050

Secretary of Labor; Brookens v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Secretary of Navy; Hungate v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Secretary of Navy; Katz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of Navy; Stoyanov v.
Secretary of State of Colo.; Gruber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Secretary of State of Colo.; Independence Institute v.  . . . . . . . . .
1024

803

Secretary of State of Colo.; Penk v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of State of Ill.; Choose Life Ill., Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Secretary of State of Wash.; Doe v.
Secretary of Treasury; Arensdorf v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Secretary of Treasury; Wiley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  948,1086

1057

Secretary of Treasury; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Block v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Camillo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Groves v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1134

Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Holman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Jackson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1022

Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1022,1109

911

Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Kern v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011

Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Laroche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Merritt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,1142
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U55

[09-26-01 13:01:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

686

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

Thomas, J., dissenting

nually to individuals entitled to beneﬁts under part A or part
B of this subchapter and when an individual applies for bene-
ﬁts under part A of this subchapter or enrolls under part B
of this subchapter”); § 1395b–4(a) (“health insurance cover-
age to individuals who are eligible to receive beneﬁts under
this subchapter”); § 1395b–4(b)(2)(A)(i) (“information that
may assist individuals in obtaining beneﬁts”).
In contrast,
the Act commonly refers to “payments” to providers of medi-
cal services. See, e. g., § 1395g(a) (“no such payments shall
be made to any provider unless it has furnished such infor-
mation as the Secretary may request”); § 1395f(a) (“payment
for services furnished an individual may be made only to
providers of services”); § 1395n(a) (1994 ed. and Supp. III)
(“payment for services . . . furnished an individual may be
made only to providers of services which are eligible”).
This terminology, and the Medicare regulations deﬁning al-
lowable costs, reﬂect the fact that Medicare is a program for
providing “ﬁnancial help” to individual elderly and disabled
patients rather than to the health care providers who treat
them. Medicare’s provisions for reimbursing providers’
costs do nothing more than establish a market exchange of
payment for services, and so cannot be said to provide “bene-
ﬁts” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 666(b).

II

Although the statutory provisions and regulations cited
above demonstrate that Medicare operates as a reimburse-
ment scheme with respect to health care providers, and not
as a means of providing them “useful aid” or “ﬁnancial help,”
the Court ﬁnds in the statute and regulations evidence that
health care providers are, along with the individual elderly
and disabled patients, also target beneﬁciaries of the pro-
gram.
I think that the Court’s reasoning is both unpersua-
sive and boundless; any funds ﬂowing from a federal assist-
ance program could be deemed “beneﬁts” under the Court’s
rationale, notwithstanding the Court’s concluding disclaimer
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the interpretation of Medicare as a "benefit" program under 18 U.S.C. § 666(b).  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of judicial opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U38

[09-26-01 08:44:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 205 (2000)

211

Opinion of the Court

ently distinctive. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., 537 F. 2d 4, 10–11 (CA2 1976). Second, a mark
has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently dis-
tinctive, if it has developed secondary meaning, which occurs
when, “in the minds of the public, the primary signiﬁcance
of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather
than the product itself.”
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 851, n. 11 (1982).*

The judicial differentiation between marks that are inher-
ently distinctive and those that have developed secondary
meaning has solid foundation in the statute itself. Section 2
requires that registration be granted to any trademark “by
which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from
the goods of others”—subject to various limited exceptions.
15 U. S. C. § 1052.
It also provides, again with limited ex-
ceptions, that “nothing in this chapter shall prevent the reg-
istration of a mark used by the applicant which has become
distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce”—that is,
which is not inherently distinctive but has become so only
through secondary meaning. § 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 1052(f).
Nothing in § 2, however, demands the conclusion that every
category of mark necessarily includes some marks “by which
the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others” without secondary meaning—that in every
category some marks are inherently distinctive.

Indeed, with respect to at least one category of mark—
colors—we have held that no mark can ever be inherently
In Qualitex,
distinctive. See Qualitex, supra, at 162–163.

*The phrase “secondary meaning” originally arose in the context of
word marks, where it served to distinguish the source-identifying meaning
from the ordinary, or “primary,” meaning of the word.
“Secondary mean-
ing” has since come to refer to the acquired, source-identifying meaning
It is often a misnomer in that context, since
of a nonword mark as well.
nonword marks ordinarily have no “primary” meaning. Clarity might
well be served by using the term “acquired meaning” in both the word-
mark and the nonword-mark contexts—but in this opinion we follow what
has become the conventional terminology.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of trademark distinctiveness. It cites legal precedents and delves into the statutory basis for trademark protection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>