<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

BILSKI v. KAPPOS

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

important  clue,  an  investigative  tool,  for  determining
whether  some  claimed  inventions  are  processes  under
§101 ”).    Notwithstanding  this  internal  tension,  I  under-
stand the Court’s opinion to hold only that the machine-or-
transformation  test  remains  an  important  test  for  pat-
entability.  Few,  if  any,  processes  cannot  effectively  be
evaluated using these criteria.

Third, in its discussion of an issue not contained in the
questions  presented—whether  the  particular  series  of
steps  in  petitioners’  application  is  an  abstract  idea—the
Court  uses  language  that  could  suggest  a  shift  in  our
approach  to  that  issue.    Although  I  happen  to  agree  that
petitioners seek to patent an abstract idea, the Court does
not  show  how  this  conclusion  follows  “clear[ly],”  ante,  at
15, from our case law.  The patent now before us is not for
“[a]  principle,  in  the  abstract,”  or  a  “fundamental  truth.”
Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 589 (1978) (internal quota-
tion  marks  omitted).  Nor  does  it  claim  the  sort  of  phe-
nomenon of nature or abstract idea that was embodied by
the  mathematical  formula  at  issue  in  Gottschalk  v.  Ben-
son, 409 U. S. 63, 67 (1972), and in Flook.

The Court construes petitioners’ claims on processes for
pricing  as  claims  on  “the  basic  concept  of  hedging,  or
protecting  against  risk,”  ante,  at  14,  and  thus  discounts
the  application’s  discussion  of  what  sorts  of  data  to  use,
and  how  to  analyze  those  data,  as  mere  “token  postsolu-
tion  components,”  ante,  at  15.    In  other  words,  the  Court
artificially  limits  petitioners’  claims  to  hedging,  and  then
concludes  that  hedging  is  an  abstract  idea  rather  than  a
term  that  describes  a  category  of  processes  including
petitioners’  claims.  Why  the  Court  does  this  is  never
made  clear.  One  might  think  that  the  Court’s  analysis
means  that  any  process  that  utilizes  an  abstract  idea  is
itself  an  unpatentable,  abstract  idea.    But  we  have  never
suggested any such rule, which would undermine a host of
patentable  processes.  It  is  true,  as  the  Court  observes,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Stevens in the case of Bilski v. Kappos. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding patentability and the "machine-or-transformation" test.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

Our acceptance of race-based state action has been rare
for a reason.  “Distinctions between citizens solely because
of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality.”  Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U. S. 495, 517 (2000) (quot-
ing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943)).
That principle cannot be overridden except in the most ex-
traordinary case.

B
These cases involve whether a university may make ad-
missions  decisions  that  turn  on  an  applicant’s  race.  Our
Court first considered that issue in Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, which involved a set-aside admissions
program used by the University of California, Davis, medi-
cal  school.    438  U. S.,  at  272–276.    Each  year,  the  school
held 16 of its 100 seats open for members of certain minor-
ity groups, who were reviewed on a special admissions track
separate  from  those  in  the  main  admissions  pool.    Id.,  at

——————
Board  of  Education,  347  U. S.  483  (1954),  in  the  infamous  case  Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944).  There, the Court up-
held the internment of “all  persons of Japanese ancestry in prescribed
West Coast . . . areas” during World War II because “the military urgency
of the situation demanded” it.  Id., at 217, 223.  We have since overruled
Korematsu,  recognizing  that  it  was  “gravely  wrong  the  day  it  was  de-
cided.”  Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 38).  The
Court’s  decision  in  Korematsu  nevertheless  “demonstrates  vividly  that
even the most rigid scrutiny can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate
racial classification” and that “[a]ny retreat from the most searching ju-
dicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error occurring
in the future.”  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 236
(1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The principal dissent, for its part, claims that the Court has also per-
mitted  “the  use  of  race  when  that  use  burdens  minority  populations.”
Post, at 38–39 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).  In support of that claim, the
dissent cites two cases that have nothing to do with the Equal Protection
Clause.  See ibid. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873
(1975) (Fourth Amendment case), and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U. S. 543 (1976) (another Fourth Amendment case)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the use of race in university admissions. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 15 (2009)

27

Per Curiam

We  agree  with  the  state  court’s  characterization  of  the
murder, and simply cannot comprehend the assertion by the
Court  of  Appeals  that  this  case  did  not  involve  “needless
suffering.”  The  jury  saw  autopsy  photographs  showing
Steacy  McConnell’s  mangled  head,  her  skull  crushed  by  15
to 20 blows from a steel dumbbell bar the jury found to have
been wielded by Belmontes.  McConnell’s corpse showed nu
merous  “defensive  bruises  and  contusions  on  [her]  hands,
arms,  and  feet,”  id.,  at  839,  which  “plainly  evidenced  a  des
perate  struggle  for  life  at  [Belmontes’]  hands,”  Belmontes,
supra,  at  819,  755  P.  2d,  at  354.  Belmontes  left  McConnell
to  die,  but ofﬁcers  found  her  still  ﬁghting for  her  life  before
ultimately  succumbing  to  the  injuries  caused  by  the  blows
from  Belmontes.  Record  3.  The  jury  also  heard  that  this
savage murder was committed solely to prevent interference
with  a  burglary  that  netted  Belmontes  $100  he  used  to  buy
beer  and  drugs  for  the  night.  McConnell  suffered,  and  it
was clearly needless.

Some of the error below may be traced to confusion about
the  appropriate  standard  and  burden  of  proof.  While  the
Court of Appeals quoted the pertinent language from Strick
land,  that  court  elsewhere  suggested  it  might  have  applied
something different.  In explaining its prejudice determina
tion,  the  Ninth  Circuit  concluded  that  “[t]he  aggravating
evidence,  even  with  the  addition  of  evidence  that  Belmon
tes  murdered  Howard,  is  not  strong  enough,  in  light  of  the
mitigating  evidence  that  could  have  been  adduced,  to  rule
out  a  sentence  of  life  in  prison.”  529  F.  3d,  at  875.  But
Strickland  does  not  require  the  State  to  “rule  out”  a  sen
tence of life in prison to prevail.  Rather, Strickland places
the  burden  on  the  defendant,  not  the  State,  to  show  a  “rea
sonable  probability”  that  the  result  would  have  been  differ
ent.  466  U. S.,  at  694.  Under  a  proper  application  of  the
Strickland  standard,  Belmontes  cannot  carry  this  burden.
It  is  hard  to  imagine  expert  testimony  and  additional
facts  about  Belmontes’  difﬁcult  childhood  outweighing  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the case of Belmontes and the application of the Strickland standard in determining ineffective assistance of counsel.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ZF AUTOMOTIVE US, INC. v. LUXSHARE, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

declared Snoras insolvent.  The Fund for Protection of In-
vestors’  Rights  in  Foreign  States—a  Russian  corporation
and the assignee of the Russian investor—claims that Lith-
uania expropriated certain investments from Snoras along
the way.

The Fund initiated a proceeding against Lithuania under
a bilateral investment treaty between Lithuania and Rus-
sia (titled “Agreement Between the Government of the Rus-
sian  Federation  and  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of
Lithuania  on  the  Promotion  and  Reciprocal  Protection  of
the Investments”).  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 21–518, p.
56a.  The treaty seeks to promote “favourable conditions for
investments made by investors of one Contracting Party in
the territory of the other Contracting Party.”  Ibid.

Relevant here, the treaty addresses the procedure for re-
solving  “any  dispute  between  one  Contracting  Party  and
[an] investor of the other Contracting Party concerning” in-
vestments in the first Contracting Party’s territory.  Id., at
64a.  It provides that if the parties cannot resolve their dis-
pute within six months, “the dispute, at the request of ei-
ther party and at the choice of an investor, shall be submit-
ted to” one of four specified forums.  Id., at 64a–65a.  The
Fund chose “an ad hoc arbitration in accordance with Arbi-
tration Rules of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL),” with each party select-
ing one arbitrator and those two choosing a third.  Id., at
65a; App. in No. 21–518, p. 159a.  Under the treaty, “[t]he
arbitral decision shall be final and binding on both parties
of the dispute.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 21–518, at 65a.
After initiating arbitration, but before the selection of ar-
bitrators,  the  Fund  filed  a  §1782  application  in  the  U. S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, seek-
ing  information  from  Freakley  and  AlixPartners  about
Freakley’s  role  as  temporary  administrator  of  Snoras.
AlixPartners resisted discovery, arguing that the ad hoc ar-
bitration panel was not a “foreign or international tribunal”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing a case involving international investment disputes and arbitration. It contains legal terminology and references to specific treaties and court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

GORSUCH, J., concurring

is not who could hypothetically receive a race-based tip.  It
is who actually receives one.  And on that score the lower
courts left no doubt.  The district court in the Harvard case
found that the school’s admissions policy “cannot . . . be con-
sidered  facially  neutral  from  a  Title  VI  perspective  given
that admissions officers provide [race-based] tips to African
American and Hispanic applicants, while white and Asian
American  applicants  are  unlikely  to  receive  a  meaningful
race-based tip.”  397 F. Supp. 3d, at 190, n. 56; see also id.,
at  189–190  (“Harvard’s  admissions  process  is  not  facially
neutral.”).  Likewise,  the  district  court  in  the  UNC  case
found  that  admissions  officers  “sometimes”  award  race-
based plusses to URM candidates—a category that excludes
Asian  American  and  white  students.    567  F.  Supp.  3d,  at
591–592, n. 7, 601.6

Nor could anyone doubt that these cases are about inten-
tional  discrimination  just  because  Harvard  in  particular
“ ‘does  not  explicitly  prioritize  any  particular  racial  group
over any other.’ ”  Post, at 32, n. 27 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR,
J.) (emphasis added).  Forget for a moment the universities’
concessions about how they deliberately consult race when
deciding whom to admit.  See supra, at 12–13.7  Look past

——————

6 The principal dissent suggests “some Asian American applicants are
actually  advantaged  by  Harvard’s  use  of race.”    Post, at  60  (opinion  of
SOTOMAYOR, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).  What is the dissent’s
basis for that claim?  The district court’s finding that “considering appli-
cants’ race may improve the admission chances of some Asian Americans
who  connect  their  racial  identities  with  particularly  compelling  narra-
tives.”  397 F. Supp. 3d, at 178 (emphasis added).  The dissent neglects
to mention those key qualifications.  Worse, it ignores completely the dis-
trict  court’s  further  finding that  “overall”  Harvard’s  race-conscious  ad-
missions policy “results in fewer Asian American[s] . . . being admitted.”
Ibid. (emphasis added).  So much for affording the district court’s “careful
factfinding” the “deference it [is] owe[d].”  Post, at 29–30, n. 25 (opinion
of SOTOMAYOR, J.).

7 See also, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 20–1199, at 67, 84, 91; Tr. of Oral

Arg. in No. 21–707, at 70–71, 81, 84, 91–92, 110.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in a case regarding affirmative action in college admissions. It delves into the specifics of the lower court rulings and refutes arguments made in the dissenting opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

883

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5018.  Baez  v.  Pennsylvania.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  759  A.  2d  936.

No.  09–5019.  Bennett  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  716.

No. 09–5020.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  494.

No.  09–5021.  Ramos  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  852.

No. 09–5023.  Maxwell v.  Arkansas.  Sup. Ct. Ark.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  2009  Ark.  125.

No.  09–5025.  Ambrose  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5026.  Banks v. Illinois.  App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.  App.  3d  1126,  970  N.  E.
2d  127.

No.  09–5028.  Olvis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  301  Fed.  Appx.  206.

No.  09–5030.  Van  Lilly  v.  Burtt,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.

4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5031.  Langon  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  996  So.  2d  212.

No.  09–5032.  Lee  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  298.

No. 09–5033.  Spencer v. Hofbauer, Warden.  C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5034.  Raby  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5036.  Savage  v.  Bonavitacola  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  191.

No. 09–5037.  Runyon v.  Ohio.  Ct. App. Ohio, Butler County.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for indexing as part of a document's main content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

Opinion of the Court

notations is under Georgia law an act of “legislative author-
ity,” Harrison Co., 244 Ga., at 330, 260 S. E. 2d, at 34, and
the annotations provide commentary and resources that the
legislature has deemed relevant to understanding its laws.
Georgia and JUSTICE GINSBURG  emphasize that the anno-
tations do not purport to provide authoritative explanations
of the law and largely summarize other materials, such as
judicial decisions and law review articles.  See post, at 3–4
(dissenting opinion).  But that does not take them outside
the exercise of legislative duty by the Commission and leg-
islature.  Just as we have held that the “statement of the
case and the syllabus or head note” prepared by judges fall
within the “work they perform in their capacity as judges,”
Banks,  128  U. S.,  at  253,  so  too  annotations  published  by
legislators alongside the statutory text fall within the work
legislators perform in their capacity as legislators.

In light of the Commission’s role as an adjunct to the leg-
islature  and  the  fact  that  the  Commission  authors  the
annotations in the course of its legislative responsibilities,
the  annotations  in  Georgia’s  Official  Code  fall  within  the
government edicts doctrine and are not copyrightable.

III
Georgia resists this conclusion on several grounds.  At the
outset,  Georgia  advances  two  arguments  for  why,  in  its
view,  excluding  the  OCGA  annotations  from  copyright
protection conflicts with the text of the Copyright Act.  Both
are unavailing.

First, Georgia notes that §101 of the Act specifically lists
“annotations”  among  the  kinds  of  works  eligible  for  copy-
right protection.  But that provision refers only to “annota-
tions  . . .  which  . . .  represent  an  original  work  of  author-
ship.”  17 U. S. C.  §101 (emphasis added).  The whole point
of the government edicts doctrine is that judges and legis-
lators cannot serve as authors when they produce works in
their official capacity.  While the reference to “annotations”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding the copyrightability of annotations in Georgia's Official Code.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21A772
_________________

DAVID RITTER v. LINDA MIGLIORI, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[June 9, 2022]

The application for stay presented to JUSTICE ALITO and
by him referred to the Court is denied.  The order heretofore
entered by JUSTICE ALITO is vacated.

JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  and
JUSTICE  GORSUCH  join,  dissenting  from  the  denial  of  the
application for stay.

This application for a stay pending certiorari involves the
counting of undated mail-in ballots in one state-court judi-
cial election.  A stay pending certiorari is appropriate only
if the Court is likely to grant review; certiorari is discretion-
ary; and the Court now denies the stay.  I would agree with
that decision were it not for concern about the effect that
the  Third  Circuit’s
interpretation  of  52  U. S. C.
§10101(a)(2)(B) may have in the federal and state elections
that will be held in Pennsylvania in November.

The Third Circuit’s interpretation broke new ground, and
at this juncture, it appears to me that that interpretation is
very likely wrong.  If left undisturbed, it could well affect
the outcome of the fall elections, and it would be far better
for us to address that interpretation before, rather than af-
ter, it has that effect.  I would therefore enter a stay pend-
ing certiorari and advise that any petition for certiorari and
brief in opposition should be filed expeditiously.  If that is
done, the Court will be in a position to grant review, set an
expedited briefing schedule, and if necessary, set the case
for argument in October.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It contains legal citations, case names, and arguments about the interpretation of a law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

KAGAN, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20A151
_________________

RITESH TANDON, ET AL. v. GAVIN NEWSOM,
GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

[April 9, 2021]

  JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  and
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting.
  I  would  deny  the  application  largely  for  the  reasons
stated in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,
592  U. S.  ___  (2021)  (KAGAN,  J.,  dissenting).    The  First
Amendment requires that a State treat religious conduct as
well as the State treats comparable secular conduct.  Some-
times  finding  the  right  secular  analogue  may  raise  hard
questions.  But not today.  California limits religious gath-
erings in homes to three households.  If the State also limits
all secular gatherings in homes to three households, it has
complied  with  the  First  Amendment.    And  the  State does
exactly  that:  It  has  adopted  a  blanket  restriction  on  at-
home  gatherings  of  all  kinds,  religious  and  secular  alike.
California need not, as the per curiam insists, treat at-home
religious gatherings the same as hardware stores and hair
salons—and  thus  unlike  at-home  secular  gatherings,  the
obvious comparator here.  As the per curiam’s reliance on
separate opinions  and unreasoned  orders  signals,  the  law
does not require that the State equally treat apples and wa-
termelons.
  And  even  supposing  a  court  should  cast  so  expansive  a
comparative net, the per curiam’s analysis of this case de-
fies  the  factual  record.    According  to  the  per  curiam,  “the
Ninth Circuit did not conclude that” activities like frequent-
ing stores or salons “pose a lesser risk of transmission” than
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Rites Tandon et al. v. Gavin Newsom et al.  It is part of the legal argument and therefore suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

ci

Page

1028

Mize; Lomax v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mize; Tyson v.
837

M. L. S. v. Missouri
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
807

Moberg; Wallace v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Modern, Inc. v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist.
. . . . . .
950

Moffett v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
977

Mohamed v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908

Mohammad-Omar v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
100

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter
991

Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

Mohiuddin v. Raytheon Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
829

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mohr v. United States
1150

Molina-Gazca v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
993

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Molinas v. United States
822

Molten USA, Inc.; Baden Sports, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004

Momah v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

Moment v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

Monacelli v. Edison State College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

Monacelli v. Enterprise Leasing Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monacelli v. Heartland Educational Consortium  . . . . .  897,1030,1066,1141

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1030,1141

Monacelli v. Lee County Ed. Assn.
1120

Monacelli v. Target Stores  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monacelli v. UPS Store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  837,1064

Moncion v. Power  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Mondragon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130

871

Mondragon-Santiago v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937

Mondry; American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

Mongane v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monroe v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  905,1001

1142

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monsanto Co.; Gilley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  823,1066

939

Monsif v. Commissioner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

Montague v. Carlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Montana; Allen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
892

Montana; Giddings v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

Montana; Hirt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montana; Lacey v.
911

Montana; Rose v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945

Montana; Wallace v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Montana v. Wyoming  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Monteagudo; Asociacion de Emp. del Estado Libre Asoc. de P. R. v.
Montes v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1033,1159

910

Monteverde v. California
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

Montgomery; Tyus v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

19

BREYER, J., dissenting

93.8 people/square mile, and some States have population
densities  as  low  as  1.3  (Alaska),  5.9  (Wyoming),  and  7.4
(Montana) people/square mile.  Ibid.  These numbers reflect
in part the fact that these “may issue” jurisdictions contain
some of the country’s densest and most populous urban ar-
eas,  e.g.,  New  York  City,  Los  Angeles,  San  Francisco,  the
District of Columbia, Honolulu, and Boston.  U. S. Census
Bureau, Urban Area Facts (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.census
. gov/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geo-areas/
urban-rural/ua-facts.html.  New York City, for example, has
a  population  of  about  8.5  million  people,  making  it  more
populous  than  38  States,  and  it  squeezes  that  population
into  just  over  300  square  miles.  Quick  Facts:  New  York
City; 2020 Population; Brief for City of New York as Amicus
Curiae 8, 22.

As  I  explained  above,  supra,  at  8–9,  densely  populated
urban  areas  face  different  kinds  and  degrees  of  dangers
from gun violence than rural areas.  It is thus easy to see
why the seven “may issue” jurisdictions might choose to reg-
ulate firearm carriage more strictly than other States.  See
Grossman 199 (“We find strong evidence that more urban
states  are  less  likely  to  shift  to  ‘shall  issue’  than  rural
states”).

New York and its amici present substantial data justify-
ing the State’s decision to retain a “may issue” licensing re-
gime.  The data show that stricter gun regulations are as-
sociated  with  lower  rates  of  firearm-related  death  and
injury.  See,  e.g.,  Brief  for  Citizens  Crime  Commission  of
New  York  City  as  Amicus  Curiae  9–11;  Brief  for  Former
Major City Police Chiefs as Amici Curiae 9–12; Brief for Ed-
ucational  Fund  25–28;  Brief  for  Social  Scientists  et al.  as
Amici Curiae 9–19.  In particular, studies have shown that
“may issue” licensing regimes, like New York’s, are associ-
ated  with  lower  homicide  rates  and  lower  violent  crime
rates than “shall issue” licensing regimes.  For example, one
study compared homicide rates across all 50 States during
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It cites data and legal arguments to support his position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

9

Opinion of the Court

litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered.”
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104,
107 (1991).

Although the idea of issue preclusion is straightforward,
it can be challenging to implement.  The Court, therefore,
regularly turns to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
for  a  statement  of  the  ordinary  elements  of  issue  preclu-
sion.  See,  e.g.,  Bobby  v.  Bies,  556  U. S.  825,  834  (2009);
New  Hampshire  v.  Maine,  532  U. S.  742,  748–749  (2001);
Baker  v.  General  Motors  Corp.,  522  U. S.  222,  233,  n.  5
(1998).  The  Restatement  explains  that  subject  to  certain
well-known exceptions, the general rule is that “[w]hen an
issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by
a  valid  and  final  judgment,  and  the  determination  is
essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive
in  a  subsequent  action  between  the  parties,  whether  on
the  same  or  a  different  claim.”    Restatement  (Second)  of
Judgments  §27,  p.  250  (1980);  see  also  id.,  §28,  at  273
(listing  exceptions  such  as  whether  appellate  review  was
available or whether there were “differences in the quality
or extensiveness of the procedures followed”).

Both this Court’s cases and the Restatement make clear
that  issue  preclusion  is  not  limited  to  those  situations  in
which the same issue is before two courts.  Rather, where
a  single  issue  is  before  a  court  and  an  administrative
agency,  preclusion  also  often  applies.    Indeed,  this  Court
has  explained  that  because  the  principle  of  issue  preclu-
sion  was  so  “well  established”  at  common  law,  in  those
situations  in  which  Congress  has  authorized  agencies  to
resolve  disputes,  “courts  may  take  it  as  given  that  Con-
gress has legislated with the expectation that the principle
[of  issue  preclusion]  will  apply  except  when  a  statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident.”  Astoria, supra, at 108.
This  reflects  the  Court’s  longstanding  view  that  “ ‘[w]hen
an  administrative  agency  is  acting  in  a  judicial  capacity
and  resolves  disputed  issues  of  fact  properly  before  it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the concept of issue preclusion in legal proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxlv

Page

1154

Thaler; Moore v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Mosley v.
952

Thaler; Olivarez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
983

Thaler; Ortiz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Thaler; Page v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  908,1011

Thaler; Perry v.
Thaler; Raby v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  883,1038

993

Thaler; Risley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Thaler; Rodriguez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  839,906,1139

Thaler; Rogers v.
1118

Thaler; Rush v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Thaler; Rutledge v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Simpson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039

850

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Singleton v.
Thaler; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  870,1118

857

Thaler; Sontchi v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Spivey v.
1054

Thaler; Starks v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Thomas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  950,1117

984

Thaler; Tibbs v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Thaler; Torres v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Thaler; Trump v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Tuley v.
Thaler; Varga v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

996

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Weiser v.
Thaler; Whirty v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1027,1159

909

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Wilson v.
1116

Thaler; Wion v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Wright v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

993

Tharp v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Tharps v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

Theiss v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133

Thielemann v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Third Circuit Court of Mich.; Anthony v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
832

Third Judicial District Court of Nev., Lyon County; Davis v.  . . . .
1147

Thomas, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas; Barber v.
1149

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas; Carnival Corp. v.
1149

Thomas; Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas; Elizares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1141

Thomas; Hakim v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  885,1102

997

Thomas v. Horel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Thomas v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Thomas v. Knowles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

569

Syllabus

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS et al.
v. FINLEY et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit

No. 97–371. Argued March 31, 1998—Decided June 25, 1998

.

The National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965 vests
the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) with substantial discretion
to award ﬁnancial grants to support the arts; it identiﬁes only the broad-
est funding priorities, including “artistic and cultural signiﬁcance, giving
emphasis to .
. creativity and cultural diversity,” “professional ex-
cellence,” and the encouragement of “public . . . education . . . and ap-
preciation of the arts.” See 20 U. S. C. §§ 954(c)(1)–(10). Applications
for NEA funding are initially reviewed by advisory panels of experts in
the relevant artistic ﬁeld. The panels report to the National Council
on the Arts (Council), which, in turn, advises the NEA Chairperson.
In 1989, controversial photographs that appeared in two NEA-funded
exhibits prompted public outcry over the agency’s grant-making proce-
dures. Congress reacted to the controversy by inserting an amend-
ment into the NEA’s 1990 reauthorization bill. The amendment became
§ 954(d)(1), which directs the Chairperson to ensure that “artistic excel-
lence and artistic merit are the criteria by which [grant] applications
are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.” The
NEA has not promulgated an ofﬁcial interpretation of the provision, but
the Council adopted a resolution to implement § 954(d)(1) by ensuring
that advisory panel members represent geographic, ethnic, and esthetic
diversity. The four individual respondents are performance artists who
applied for NEA grants before § 954(d)(1) was enacted. An advisory
panel recommended approval of each of their projects, but the Council
subsequently recommended disapproval, and funding was denied. They
ﬁled suit for restoration of the recommended grants or reconsideration
of their applications, asserting First Amendment and statutory claims.
When Congress enacted § 954(d)(1), respondents, now joined by the Na-
tional Association of Artists’ Organizations, amended their complaint to
challenge the provision as void for vagueness and impermissibly view-
point based. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor
of respondents on their facial constitutional challenge to § 954(d)(1).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court case. It includes information about the case name, citation, parties involved, and a brief overview of the legal issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL ET AL. v.
ROSS, SECRETARY OF THE CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–468.  Argued October 11, 2022—Decided May 11, 2023

This case involves a challenge to a California law known as Proposition
12, which as relevant here forbids the in-state sale of whole pork meat
that comes from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are
“confined  in  a  cruel  manner.”    Cal.  Health  &  Safety  Code  Ann.
§25990(b)(2).    Confinement  is  “cruel”  if  it  prevents  a  pig  from  “lying
down,  standing  up,  fully  extending  [its]  limbs,  or  turning  around
freely.”  §25991(e)(1).  Prior to the vote on Proposition 12, proponents
suggested the law would benefit animal welfare and consumer health,
and opponents claimed that existing farming practices did better than
Proposition 12 protecting animal welfare (for example, by preventing
pig-on-pig aggression) and ensuring consumer health (by avoiding con-
tamination).    Shortly  after  Proposition  12’s  adoption,  two  organiza-
tions—the National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm
Bureau Federation (petitioners)—filed this lawsuit on behalf of their
members who raise and process pigs alleging that Proposition 12 vio-
lates  the  U. S.  Constitution  by  impermissibly  burdening  interstate
commerce.    Petitioners  estimated  that  the  cost  of  compliance  with
Proposition 12 will increase production costs and will fall on both Cal-
ifornia and out-of-state producers.  But because California imports al-
most  all  the  pork  it  consumes,  most  of  Proposition  12’s  compliance
costs will be borne by out-of-state firms.  The district court held that
petitioners’  complaint  failed  to  state  a  claim  as  a  matter  of  law  and
dismissed the case.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held: The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is affirmed.

6 4th 1021, affirmed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered the main body of the opinion. They are often released separately and are not meant to be indexed as part of the full text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
834

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No. 08–10211.  Romandetta v. Cate, Secretary, California
Department  of  Corrections  and  Rehabilitation,  et  al.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  302  Fed.
Appx.  663.

No.  08–10214.  Wilson  v.  Belleque,  Superintendent,  Ore
gon  State  Penitentiary.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  554  F.  3d  816.

No.  08–10215.  Atienza  Wagan  v.  Alameida.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10216.  Conner  v.  American  Arbitration  Assn.
et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310
Fed.  Appx.  611.

No.  08–10219.  Lay  v.  Shefferman.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  08–10221.  Castillo  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  3d  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10225.  Shabazz, aka Dennis v.  First Correctional

Medical  Services  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10230.  Hunter v.  Florida.  Sup. Ct. Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  29  So.  3d  256.

No.  08–10234.  Rich  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  881.

No.  08–10235.  Arnold  v.  Lamarque,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10237.  Toliver  v.  Hartley,  Acting  Warden,  et  al.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  298  Fed.
Appx.  682.

No.  08–10244.  Hermelo  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–10246.  Greer  v.  Berghuis,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, courts, and whether certiorari was granted or denied.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

(slip op., at 4–5, 13); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155,
171 (2015); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 418 (2006);
Church  of  Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508  U. S.
520,  546  (1993);  Sherbert  v.  Verner,  374  U. S. 398,  403
(1963).  We begin by examining whether Mr. Kennedy has
discharged  his  burdens,  first  under  the  Free  Exercise
Clause, then under the Free Speech Clause.

A
The Free Exercise Clause provides that “Congress shall
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.
Amdt. 1.  This Court has held the Clause applicable to the
States  under  the  terms  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.
Cantwell  v.  Connecticut,  310  U. S.  296,  303  (1940).    The
Clause protects not only the right to harbor religious beliefs
inwardly and secretly.  It does perhaps its most important
work  by  protecting  the  ability  of  those  who  hold  religious
beliefs  of  all  kinds  to  live  out  their  faiths  in  daily  life
through “the performance of (or abstention from) physical
acts.”  Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore.
v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877 (1990).

Under this Court’s precedents, a plaintiff may carry the
burden of proving a free exercise violation in various ways,
including  by  showing  that  a  government  entity  has  bur-
dened  his  sincere  religious  practice  pursuant  to  a  policy
that is not “neutral” or “generally applicable.”  Id., at 879–
881.  Should a plaintiff make a showing like that, this Court
will  find  a  First  Amendment  violation  unless  the  govern-
ment  can  satisfy  “strict  scrutiny”  by  demonstrating  its
course was justified by a compelling state interest and was
narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest.  Lukumi, 508
U. S., at 546.1

——————

1 A plaintiff may also prove a free exercise violation by showing that
“official expressions of hostility” to religion accompany laws or policies
burdening religious exercise; in cases like that we have “set aside” such
policies without further inquiry.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. It contains legal citations, analysis of the Free Exercise Clause, and mentions relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
58  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

bear arms for defense” in public.  554 U. S., at 632.

5
Finally, respondents point to the slight uptick in gun reg-
ulation  during  the  late-19th  century—principally  in  the
Western Territories.  As we suggested in Heller, however,
late-19th-century  evidence  cannot  provide  much  insight
into the meaning of the Second Amendment when it contra-
dicts earlier evidence.  See id., at 614; supra, at 28.28  Here,
moreover, respondents’ reliance on late-19th-century laws
has several serious flaws even beyond their temporal dis-
tance from the founding.

The vast majority of the statutes that respondents invoke
come from the Western Territories.  Two Territories prohib-
ited  the  carry  of  pistols  in  towns,  cities,  and  villages,  but
seemingly permitted the carry of rifles and other long guns
everywhere.    See  1889  Ariz.  Terr.  Sess.  Laws  no.  13,  §1,
p. 16; 1869 N. M. Laws ch. 32, §§1–2, p. 72.29  Two others
prohibited the carry of all firearms in towns, cities, and vil-
lages, including long guns.  See 1875 Wyo. Terr. Sess. Laws
ch. 52, §1; 1889 Idaho Terr. Gen. Laws §1, p. 23.  And one
Territory completely prohibited public carry of pistols eve-
rywhere,  but  allowed  the  carry  of  “shot-guns  or  rifles”  for
certain purposes.  See 1890 Okla. Terr. Stats., Art. 47, §§1–
2, 5, p. 495.

These  territorial  restrictions  fail  to  justify  New  York’s

——————

28 We  will  not  address  any  of  the  20th-century  historical  evidence
brought to bear by respondents or their amici.  As with their late-19th-
century  evidence,  the  20th-century  evidence  presented  by  respondents
and their amici does not provide insight into the meaning of the Second
Amendment when it contradicts earlier evidence.

29 The New Mexico restriction allowed an exception for individuals car-
rying for “the lawful defence of themselves, their families or their prop-
erty, and the same being then and there threatened with danger.”  1869
Terr. of N. M. Laws ch. 32, §1, p. 72.  The Arizona law similarly exempted
those who have “reasonable ground for fearing an unlawful attack upon
his person.”  1889 Ariz. Terr. Sess. Laws no. 13, §2, p. 17.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it unsuitable for indexing as it is not general readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

understanding  of  the  “liberty”  protected  by  that  clause,
and  distorts  the  principles  on  which  this  Nation  was
founded.  Its  decision  will  have  inestimable  consequences
for  our  Constitution  and  our  society.
I  respectfully
dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

17

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

who  commit  genocide  are  now  fairly  viewed,  like  pirates,
as “common enemies of all mankind.”  Id., at 131 (internal
quotation  marks  omitted).    On  remand,  the  Court  of  Ap
peals would decide whether the financiers of terrorism are
the same.  The fact that few norms have overcome Sosa’s
high  hurdle  is  strong  evidence  that  the  carefully  consid
ered  standard  set  forth  in  that  case  is  generating  exactly
the kind of “judicial caution” the Court stressed as neces
sary.  See 542 U. S., at 725.

Second,  the  concurrence  suggests  that  federal  courts
may  lack  jurisdiction  to  entertain  suits  between  aliens
based  solely  on  a  violation  of  the  law  of  nations.    It  con
tends that ATS suits between aliens fall under neither the
federal  courts’  diversity  jurisdiction  nor  our  federal  ques
tion  jurisdiction.  The  Court  was  not  unaware  of  this
argument  when  it  decided  Sosa.  As  noted,  that  case  in
volved an ATS suit brought by a citizen of Mexico against
a  citizen  of  Mexico,  and  various  amici  argued  that  the
Court  lacked  Article  III  jurisdiction  over  such  suits.    See
Brief  for  National  Foreign  Trade  Counsel  et al.  as  Amici
Curiae  in  Sosa  v.  Alvarez-Machain,  O. T.  2003,  No.  03–
339, pp. 24–25; see also Brief for Washington Legal Foun
dation  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  in  No.  03–339,  pp.  14–21.
The Court nonetheless proceeded to decide the case, which
it  could  not  have  done  had  it  been  concerned  about  its
Article  III  power  to  do  so.    See  Arbaugh  v.  Y  &  H  Corp.,
546  U. S.  500,  514  (2006).    That  decision  forecloses  the
argument the concurrence now makes, as Sosa authorized
courts  to  “recognize  private  claims  under  federal  common
law  for  violations  of ”  certain  international  law  norms.
542  U. S.,  at  732  (emphasis  added);  see  also  id.,  at  729–
730  (explaining  that,  post-Erie  R.  Co.  v.  Tompkins,  304
U. S. 64 (1938), there are “limited enclaves in which federal
courts may derive from substantive law in a common law
way,”  including  the  law  of  nations,  and  that  “it  would  be
unreasonable  to  assume  that  the  First  Congress  would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, indicating it is part of the body of the legal text and not a preface, table of contents, or other non-sequential element.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2011

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GOLAN ET AL. v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10–545.  Argued October 5, 2011—Decided January 18, 2012

The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(Berne),  which  took  effect  in  1886,  is  the  principal  accord  governing
international  copyright  relations.    Berne’s  164  member  states  agree
to  provide  a  minimum  level  of  copyright  protection  and  to  treat  au-
thors  from  other  member  countries  as  well  as  they  treat  their  own.
Of central importance in this case, Article 18 of Berne requires coun-
tries  to  protect  the  works  of  other  member  states  unless  the  works’
copyright term has expired in either the country where protection is
claimed or the country of origin.  A different system of transnational
copyright protection long prevailed in this country.  Throughout most
of  the  20th  century,  the  only  foreign  authors  eligible  for  Copyright
Act  protection  were  those  whose  countries  granted  reciprocal  rights
to  American  authors  and  whose  works  were  printed  in  the  United
States.  Despite  Article  18,  when  the  United  States  joined  Berne  in
1989,  it  did  not  protect  any  foreign  works  lodged  in  the  U. S.  public
domain, many of them works never protected here.  In 1994, howev-
er, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights mandated implementation of Berne’s first 21 articles, on pain
of enforcement by the World Trade Organization.

In  response,  Congress  applied  the  term  of  protection  available  to
U. S. works to preexisting works from Berne member countries.  Sec-
tion 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) grants copy-
right  protection  to  works  protected  in  their  country  of  origin,  but
lacking protection in the United States for any of three reasons: The
United States did not protect works from the country of origin at the
time  of  publication;  the  United  States  did  not  protect  sound  record-
ings  fixed  before  1972;  or  the  author  had  not  complied  with  certain
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

13

Opinion of the Court

the duties of APJs “partake of a Judiciary quality as well as
Executive,”  APJs  are  still  exercising  executive  power  and
must remain “dependent upon the President.”  1 Annals of
Cong., at 611–612 (J. Madison); see Oil States, 584 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 8).  The activities of executive officers may
“take ‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ forms, but they are exercises
of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be
exercises  of—the  ‘executive  Power,’ ”  for  which  the  Presi-
dent is ultimately responsible.  Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S.
290, 305, n. 4 (2013) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 1).

Given the insulation of PTAB decisions from any execu-
tive  review,  the  President  can  neither  oversee  the  PTAB
himself nor “attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he
can oversee.”  Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 496.  APJs
accordingly exercise power that conflicts with the design of
the Appointments Clause “to preserve political accountabil-
ity.”  Edmond, 520 U. S., at 663.

The  principal  dissent  dutifully  undertakes  to  apply  the
governing test from Edmond, see post, at 5–10 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.), but its heart is plainly not in it.  For example,
the dissent rejects any distinction between “inferior-officer
power”  and  “principal-officer  power,”  post,  at  12,  but  Ed-
mond calls for exactly that: an appraisal of how much power
an officer exercises free from control by a superior.  The dis-
sent pigeonholes this consideration as the sole province of
the Vesting Clause, post, at 14–15, but Edmond recognized
the Appointments Clause as a “significant structural safe-
guard[ ]” that “preserve[s] political accountability” through
direction and supervision of subordinates—in other words,
through a chain of command.  520 U. S., at 659, 663.  The
dissent would have the Court focus on the location of an of-
ficer in the agency “organizational chart,” post, at 1, but as
we explained in Edmond, “[i]t is not enough that other of-
ficers  may  be  identified  who  formally  maintain  a  higher
rank,  or  possess  responsibilities  of  a  greater  magnitude,”
520 U. S., at 662–663.  The dissent stresses that “at least
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Appointments Clause of the Constitution and its application to administrative law judges (ALJs).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 89 (2000)

107

Opinion of the Court

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 385 (1992);
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Ofﬁce Tele-
phone, Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 227–228 (1998).

From the text of OPA and the long-established under-
standing of the appropriate balance between federal and
state regulation of maritime commerce, we hold that the
pre-emptive effect of the PWSA and regulations promul-
gated under it are not affected by OPA. We doubt Congress
will be surprised by our conclusion, for the Conference
Report on OPA shared our view that the statute “does not
disturb the Supreme Court’s decision in Ray v. Atlantic
Richﬁeld Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978).” H. R. Conf. Rep.
No. 101–653, p. 122 (1990). The holding in Ray also survives
the enactment of OPA undiminished, and we turn to a de-
tailed discussion of that case.

As we mentioned above, the Ray Court confronted a claim
by the operator of a Puget Sound reﬁnery that federal law
precluded Washington from enforcing laws imposing certain
substantive requirements on tankers. The Ray Court pref-
aced its analysis of the state regulations with the following
observation:

“The Court’s prior cases indicate that when a State’s
exercise of its police power is challenged under the Su-
premacy Clause, ‘we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be su-
perseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.’ Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947).” 435 U. S.,
at 157.

The fragmentary quote from Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U. S. 218 (1947), does not support the scope given
to it by the Court of Appeals or by respondents.

Ray quoted but a fragment of a much longer paragraph
found in Rice. The quoted fragment is followed by exten-
sive and careful qualiﬁcations to show the different ap-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal precedents, indicating its suitability for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

17

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

renders 13 words of the statute entirely superfluous.  See
ante, at 12 (“The intervening passage (‘the injury or death
resulted  from  side  effects  that  were  unavoidable  even
though’) is unnecessary.  True enough”).  Nevertheless, the
majority contends that “the rule against giving a portion of
text  an  interpretation  which  renders  it  superfluous  . . .
applies only if verbosity and prolixity can be eliminated by
giving the offending passage, or the remainder of the text,
a competing interpretation.”  Ibid.  According to the major-
ity,  petitioners’  reading  of  §22(b)(1)  renders  the  “even
though”  clause  superfluous  because,  to  reach  petitioners’
desired outcome, “[i]t would suffice to say ‘if the injury or
death  resulted  from  side  effects  that  were  unavoidable’—
full  stop.”  Ibid.   As  explained  above,  however,  the  “even
though”  clause  establishes  two  additional  prerequisites—
proper  manufacturing  and  proper  labeling—to  qualify  for
§22(b)(1)’s  exemption  from  liability.  Contrary  to  the  ma-
jority’s  contention,  then,  the  “even  though”  clause  serves
an  important  function  by  limiting  the  scope  of  the  pre-
emption afforded by the preceding “if ” clause.14

The  majority’s  only  other  textual  argument  is  based  on

——————

14 In this manner, the “even though” clause functions in a “concessive
subordinat[ing]” fashion, ante, at 11, in accord with normal grammati-
cal usage.  According to the majority, however, the “even though” clause
“clarifies  the  word  that  precedes  it”  by  “delineat[ing]”  the  conditions
that  make  a  side  effect  “unavoidable”  under  the  statute.    Ante,  at  7.
The  majority’s  interpretation  hardly  treats  the  clause  as  “concessive,”
and  indeed  strains  the  meaning  of  “even  though.”    In  the  majority’s
view, proper manufacturing and labeling are the sole prerequisites that
render  a  vaccine’s  side  effects  unavoidable.    Thus,  an  injurious  side
effect  is  unavoidable  because  the  vaccine  was  properly  prepared  and
labeled, not “even though” it was.  The two conjunctions are not equiva-
lent: The sentence “I am happy even though it is raining” can hardly be
read to mean that “I am happy because it is raining.”  In any event, the
more  fundamental  point  is  that  petitioners’  interpretation  actually
gives  meaning  to  the  words  “even  though,”  whereas  the  majority
concedes  that  its  interpretation  effectively  reads  those  words  entirely
out of the statute.  See supra this page.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute and argues against the majority's reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

23

Opinion of the Court

§1912—the  notice  requirement,  expert  witness  require-
ment,  and  evidentiary  standards—we  doubt  that  require-
ments  placed  on  a  State  as  litigant  implicate  the  Tenth
Amendment.  But  in  any  event,  these  provisions,  like
§1912(d), apply to both private and state actors, so they too
pose no anticommandeering problem.

B
Petitioners  also  raise  a  Tenth  Amendment  challenge  to
§1915,  which  dictates  placement  preferences  for  Indian
children.  According  to  petitioners,  this  provision  orders
state agencies to perform a “diligent search” for placements
that  satisfy  ICWA’s  hierarchy.    Brief  for  Petitioner  Texas
63; Reply Brief for Texas 24; see also Brief for Individual
Petitioners 67–68.  Petitioners assert that the Department
of  the  Interior  understands  §1915  this  way,  25  CFR
§23.132(c)(5), and the Tribes who intervene in proceedings
governed by ICWA share that understanding—for example,
“the Librettis’ adoption of Baby O was delayed because the
Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Tribe demanded that county officials
exhaustively  search  for  a  placement  with  the  Tribe  first.”
Reply Brief for Texas 24–25.  Just as Congress cannot com-
pel state officials to search databases to determine the law-
fulness of gun sales, Printz, 521 U. S., at 902–904, petition-
ers argue, Congress cannot compel state officials to search
for a federally preferred placement.

As an initial matter, this argument encounters the same
problem that plagues petitioners with respect to §1912: Pe-
titioners have not shown that the “diligent search” require-
ment, which applies to both private and public parties, de-
mands  the  use  of  state  sovereign  authority.    But  this
argument fails for another reason too: Section 1915 does not
require anyone, much less the States, to search for alterna-
tive  placements.  As  the  United  States  emphasizes,  peti-
tioners’ interpretation “cannot be squared with this Court’s
decision in Adoptive Couple,” which held that “ ‘there simply
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). It delves into the Tenth Amendment implications of certain provisions within the Act, particularly regarding placement preferences for Indian children. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1075

529 U. S.

April 17, 2000

No. 99–8299. Cameron v. Samarra, Chief of Police, City

of Alexandria, et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8302. Taylor v. Painter, Warden. Cir. Ct. Berkeley

County, W. Va. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8303. Wells v. Phillips, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8306. Smith v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–8311. Adams v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8336. Moran Ramos et ux. v. Immigration and Nat-

uralization Service. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8339. Rajkovic v. Immigration and Naturalization

Service. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8345. Barnes v. Maloney, Commissioner, Massa-
chusetts Department of Correction. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–8347. Whitford v. Boglino et al. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 276.

No. 99–8379. Hudson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8384. Byers v. Mahoney, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 830.

No. 99–8388. Cancassi v. Robinson. Super. Ct. N. J., App.

Div. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8399. Nasim v. Meisner et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 184 F. 3d 815.

No. 99–8403. Scott v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51 M. J. 326.

No. 99–8404. Cochran v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 258 Va. 604, 521 S. E. 2d 287.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their outcomes (certiorari denied). This type of information is generally not considered the primary content of a book and is more suitable for a legal database or journal.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

ALITO, J., concurring

ical  influence  of  immigrants  and  Catholics,”  gaining  hun-
dreds of seats in Federal and State Government.3

Catholics were considered by such groups not as citizens
of  the  United  States,  but  as  “soldiers  of  the  Church  of
Rome,”4 who “would attempt to subvert representative gov-
ernment.”5  Catholic education was a particular concern.  As
one series of newspaper articles argued, “ ‘Popery is the nat-
ural  enemy  of  general  education. . . .  If  it  is  establishing
schools, it is to make them prisons of the youthful intellect
of the country.’ ”  C. Glenn, The Myth of the Common School
69  (1988)  (Glenn)  (quoting  S.  Morse,  Foreign  Conspiracy
Against the Liberties of the United States (1835)).  With a
Catholic school breaking ground in New York City, the New
York  Times  ran  an  article  titled  “Sectarian  Education.
Anti-Public School Crusade.  Aggressive Attitude of the Ro-
man  Catholic  Clergy—The  Terrors  of  the  Church  Threat-
ened.”  N. Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1873, p. 8.  The project, the
article concluded, would cause “intense anxiety by all who
are interested in upholding the admirable system of public
school education.”  Ibid.

The feelings of the day are perhaps best encapsulated by
this famous cartoon, published in Harper’s Weekly in 1871,
which depicts Catholic priests as crocodiles slithering hun-
grily toward American children as a public school crumbles
in the background:

——————

3 Id., at 127–128, 135.
4 Id., at 110 (emphasis deleted).
5 P. Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 206 (2002).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito. It discusses historical anti-Catholic sentiment in the United States, citing examples from newspapers and a cartoon.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
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278

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Syllabus

law, and could again decide to operate a nude dancing establishment in
Erie. Moreover, Pap’s failed, despite its obligation to the Court, to
mention the potential mootness issue in its brief in opposition, which
was ﬁled after Kandyland was closed and the property sold. See Board
of License Comm’rs of Tiverton v. Pastore, 469 U. S. 238, 240.
In any
event, this is not a run of the mill voluntary cessation case. Here it is
the plaintiff who, having prevailed below, seeks to have the case de-
clared moot. And it is the defendant city that seeks to invoke the fed-
eral judicial power to obtain this Court’s review of the decision. Cf.
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 617–618. The city has an ongo-
ing injury because it is barred from enforcing the ordinance’s public
nudity provisions.
If the ordinance is found constitutional, then Erie
can enforce it, and the availability of such relief is sufﬁcient to prevent
the case from being moot. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United
States, 506 U. S. 9, 13. And Pap’s still has a concrete stake in the case’s
outcome because, to the extent it has an interest in resuming operations,
it has an interest in preserving the judgment below. This Court’s inter-
est in preventing litigants from attempting to manipulate its jurisdiction
to insulate a favorable decision from review further counsels against a
ﬁnding of mootness. See, e. g., United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345
U. S. 629, 632. Pp. 287–289.

Justice O’Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Ken-

nedy, and Justice Breyer, concluded in Parts III and IV that:

1. Government restrictions on public nudity such as Erie’s ordinance
should be evaluated under the framework set forth in United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic
speech. Although being “in a state of nudity” is not an inherently ex-
pressive condition, nude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive
conduct that falls within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s pro-
tection. See, e. g., Barnes, supra, at 565–566 (plurality opinion). What
level of scrutiny applies is determined by whether the ordinance is re-
lated to the suppression of expression. E. g., Texas v. Johnson, 491
U. S. 397, 403.
If the governmental purpose in enacting the ordinance
is unrelated to such suppression, the ordinance need only satisfy the
“less stringent,” intermediate O’Brien standard. E. g., Johnson, supra,
at 403.
If the governmental interest is related to the expression’s con-
tent, however, the ordinance falls outside O’Brien and must be justiﬁed
under the more demanding, strict scrutiny standard. Johnson, supra,
at 403. An almost identical public nudity ban was held not to violate
the First Amendment in Barnes, although no ﬁve Members of the Court
agreed on a single rationale for that conclusion. The ordinance here,
like the statute in Barnes, is on its face a general prohibition on public
It does not target
nudity. By its terms, it regulates conduct alone.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case synopsis, specifically the syllabus section of a Supreme Court case. It summarizes the legal arguments and issues presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP

Opinion of the Court

The domestic takings rule has deep roots not only in in-
ternational  law  but  also  in  United  States  foreign  policy.
Secretary  of  State  Cordell  Hull  most  famously  expressed
the principle in a 1938 letter to the Mexican Ambassador
following  that  country’s  nationalization  of  American  oil
fields.  The Secretary conceded “the right of a foreign gov-
ernment  to  treat  its  own  nationals  in  this  fashion  if  it  so
desires.  This is a matter of domestic concern.”  Letter from
C. Hull to C. Nájera (July 21, 1938), reprinted in 5 Foreign
Relations  of  the  United  States  Diplomatic  Papers  677
(1956).  The United States, however, could not “accept the
idea”  that  “these  plans  can  be  carried  forward  at  the  ex-
pense of our citizens.”  Ibid.

The domestic takings rule endured even as international
law increasingly came to be seen as constraining how states
interacted not just with other states but also with individ-
uals, including their own citizens.  The United Nations Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and Convention on the
Prevention  of  Genocide  became  part  of  a  growing  body  of
human rights law that made “how a state treats individual
human beings . . . a matter of international concern.”  Brad-
ley, supra, at 832 (quoting Restatement (Third), pt. VII, In-
troductory  Note,  at  144–145).    These  human  rights  docu-
ments  were  silent,  however,  on  the  subject  of  property
rights.  See Friedman, supra, at 107.  International tribu-
nals therefore continued to maintain that international law
governed  “confiscation  of  the  property  of  foreigners,”  but
“measures taken by a State with respect to the property of
its own nationals are not subject to these principles.”  Gud-
mundsson  v.  Iceland,  Appl.  No.  511/59,  1960  Y.  B.  Eur.
Conv. on H. R. 394, 423–424 (decision of the European Com-
mission on Human Rights).

Some criticized the treatment of property rights under in-
ternational law, but they did so on the ground that all sov-
ereign takings were outside the scope of international law,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the "domestic takings rule" in international law. It cites historical examples and legal precedents, indicating it's part of the main body of the text and not a separate section like a table of contents or introduction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2013

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST ET AL. v. DRIEHAUS ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–193.  Argued April 22, 2014—Decided June 16, 2014

Respondent  Driehaus,  a  former  Congressman,  filed  a  complaint  with
the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that petitioner Susan B. An-
thony List (SBA) violated an Ohio law that criminalizes certain false
statements  made during the course of a political campaign.  Specifi-
cally, Driehaus alleged that SBA violated the law when it stated that
his  vote  for  the  Patient  Protection  and  Affordable  Care  Act  (ACA)
was  a  vote  in  favor  of  “taxpayer  funded  abortion.”    After  Driehaus
lost his re-election bid, the complaint was dismissed, but SBA contin-
ued  to  pursue  a  separate  suit  in  Federal  District  Court  challenging
the law on First Amendment grounds.  Petitioner Coalition Opposed
to  Additional  Spending  and  Taxes  (COAST)  also  filed  a  First
Amendment  challenge  to  the  Ohio  law,  alleging  that  it  had  planned
to disseminate materials presenting a similar message but refrained
due to the proceedings against SBA.  The District Court consolidated
the  two  lawsuits  and  dismissed  them  as  nonjusticiable,  concluding
that neither suit presented a sufficiently concrete injury for purposes
of  standing  or  ripeness.    The  Sixth  Circuit  affirmed  on  ripeness
grounds.

Held: Petitioners have alleged a sufficiently imminent injury for Article

III purposes.  Pp. 7–18.

(a) To  establish  Article  III  standing,  a  plaintiff  must  show,  inter
alia, an “injury in fact,” which must be “concrete and particularized”
and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ”  Lujan v.
Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504  U. S.  555,  560.    When  challenging  a  law
prior  to  its  enforcement,  a  plaintiff  satisfies  the  injury-in-fact  re-
quirement  where  he  alleges  “an  intention  to  engage  in  a  course  of
conduct  arguably  affected  with  a  constitutional  interest,  but  pro-
scribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

GORSUCH, J., concurring

our  colleagues  save  the  Commission.    It  is  no  answer,  for
example,  to  observe  that  Mr.  Jack  requested  a  cake  with
text on it while Mr. Craig and Mr. Mullins sought a cake
celebrating  their  wedding  without  discussing  its  decora-
tion,  and  then  suggest  this  distinction  makes  all  the  dif-
ference.  See post, at 4–5, and n. 4 (GINSBURG, J., dissent-
ing).  It  is  no  answer  either  simply  to  slide  up  a  level  of
generality  to  redescribe  Mr.  Phillips’s  case  as  involving
only  a  wedding  cake  like  any  other,  so  the  fact  that  Mr.
Phillips  would  make  one  for  some  means  he  must  make
them for all.  See ante, at 2–3, and n. (KAGAN, J., concur-
ring).  These  arguments,  too,  fail  to  afford  Mr.  Phillips’s
faith neutral respect.

Take  the  first  suggestion  first.    To  suggest  that  cakes
with words convey a message but cakes without words do
not—all  in  order  to  excuse  the  bakers  in  Mr.  Jack’s  case
while penalizing Mr. Phillips—is irrational.  Not even the
Commission  or  court  of  appeals  purported  to  rely  on  that
distinction.  Imagine Mr. Jack asked only for a cake with a
symbolic  expression  against  same-sex  marriage  rather
than  a  cake  bearing  words  conveying  the  same  idea.
Surely  the  Commission  would  have  approved  the  bakers’
intentional  wish  to  avoid  participating  in  that  message
too.  Nor  can  anyone  reasonably  doubt  that  a  wedding
cake without words conveys a message.  Words or not and
whatever the exact design, it celebrates a wedding, and if
the  wedding  cake  is  made  for  a  same-sex  couple  it  cele-
brates a same-sex wedding.  See 370 P. 3d, at 276 (stating
that  Mr.  Craig  and  Mr.  Mullins  “requested  that  Phillips
design  and  create  a  cake  to  celebrate  their  same-sex  wed-
ding”) (emphasis added).  Like “an emblem or flag,” a cake
for a same-sex wedding is a symbol that serves as “a short
cut  from  mind  to  mind,”  signifying  approval  of  a  specific
“system, idea, [or] institution.”  West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette,  319  U. S.  624,  632  (1943).    It  is  precisely  that
approval that Mr. Phillips intended to withhold in keeping
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.  It delves into the arguments made in the case, focusing on the issue of religious freedom and whether a baker can refuse to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA

Opinion of the Court

medical care from licensed professionals.”  2015 Cal. Legis.
Serv., §1(e).  At oral argument, however, California denied
that  the  justification  for  the  FACT  Act  was  that  women
“go  into  [crisis  pregnancy  centers]  and  they  don’t  realize
what  they  are.”    See  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  at  44–45.    Indeed,
California  points  to  nothing  suggesting  that  pregnant
women do not already know that the covered facilities are
staffed  by  unlicensed  medical  professionals.    The  services
that trigger the unlicensed notice—such as having “volun-
teers who collect health information from clients,” “adver-
tis[ing]  . . .  pregnancy  options  counseling,”  and  offering
over-the-counter  “pregnancy  testing,”  §123471(b)—do  not
require a medical license.  And California already makes it
a  crime  for  individuals  without  a  medical  license  to  prac-
tice medicine.  See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. §2052.  At
this  preliminary  stage  of  the  litigation,  we  agree  that
petitioners  are  likely  to  prevail  on  the  question  whether
California  has  proved  a  justification  for  the  unlicensed
notice.4

Even  if  California  had  presented  a  nonhypothetical
justification for the unlicensed notice, the FACT Act unduly
burdens protected speech.  The unlicensed notice imposes
a  government-scripted,  speaker-based  disclosure  require-
ment  that  is  wholly  disconnected  from  California’s  infor-
mational  interest.    It  requires  covered  facilities  to  post
California’s  precise  notice,  no  matter  what  the  facilities
say  on  site  or  in  their  advertisements.    And  it  covers  a
curiously  narrow  subset  of  speakers.    While  the  licensed
notice  applies  to  facilities  that  provide  “family  planning”
services  and  “contraception  or  contraceptive  methods,”
§123471(a),  the  California  Legislature  dropped  these
triggering  conditions  for  the  unlicensed  notice.    The  unli-

——————

4 Nothing  in  our  opinion  should  be  read  to  foreclose  the  possibility
that  California  will  gather  enough  evidence  in  later  stages  of  this
litigation.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case *National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra*.  It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a California law requiring certain pregnancy resource centers to provide notice about the availability of abortion services.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
80  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court
Appendix A to opinion of the Court

destructive  substance  or  liquid,  with  an  intention  to
cause the death of such person, or to procure the mis-
carriage of any woman, then being with child, and shall
thereof  be  duly  convicted,  shall  be  imprisoned  for  a
term not exceeding three years, and be fined in a sum
not exceeding one thousand dollars.” 70

3.  New York (1828):

Sec.  9.  “Every  person  who  shall  administer  to  any
woman  pregnant  with  a  quick  child,  any  medicine,
drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any
instrument or other means, with intent thereby to de-
stroy such child, unless the same shall have been nec-
essary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have
been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such
purpose, shall, in case the death of such child or of such
mother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of man-
slaughter in the second degree.”

Sec. 21.  “Every person who shall willfully adminis-
ter to any pregnant  woman, any  medicine, drug, sub-
stance  or  thing  whatever,  or  shall  use  or  employ  any
instrument  of  other  means  whatever,  with  intent
thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman,
unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve
the life of such woman, or shall have been advised by
two physicians to be necessary for that purpose; shall,
upon  conviction,  be  punished  by  imprisonment  in  a
county jail not more than one year, or by fine not ex-
ceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.”71

——————

70 Ill.  Rev.  Code  §46  (1827)  (emphasis  added);  see  also  Ill.  Rev.  Code
§46 (1833) (same); 1867 Ill. Laws p. 89 (extending liability to abortions
“by means of any instrument[s]” and raising penalties to imprisonment
“not less than two nor more than ten years”).

71 N. Y. Rev. Stat., pt. 4, ch. 1, Tit. 2, §9 (emphasis added); Tit. 6, §21
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text, specifically excerpts from historical abortion laws.  It is sequential and likely part of the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
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248

HOHN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

tive agency. Automobile Workers v. Scoﬁeld, 382 U. S. 205,
208–209 (1965); see also Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki
Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27, 30 (1993) (per
curiam). Together these decisions foreclose the proposition
that the failure to satisfy a threshold prerequisite for court
of appeals jurisdiction, such as the issuance of a certiﬁcate
of appealability, prevents a case from being in the court of
appeals for purposes of § 1254(1).

It would have made no difference had the Government de-
clined to oppose Hohn’s application for a certiﬁcate of appeal-
ability.
In Scoﬁeld, we held that § 1254(1) gave us jurisdic-
tion to review the Court of Appeals’ denial of a motion for
leave to intervene despite the fact that neither the agency
nor any of the other parties opposed intervention.
382 U. S.,
at 207.
In the same manner, petitions for certiorari to this
Court are often met with silence or even acquiescence; yet
no one would suggest this deprives the petitions of the ad-
versity needed to constitute a case. Assuming, of course,
the underlying action satisﬁes the other requisites of a case,
including injury in fact, the circumstance that the question
before the court is a preliminary issue, such as the denial of
a certiﬁcate of appealability or venue, does not oust appellate
courts of the jurisdiction to review a ruling on the matter.
For instance, a case does not lack adversity simply because
the remedy sought from a particular court is dismissal for
improper venue rather than resolution of the merits. Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) speciﬁcally permits a
party to move to dismiss for improper venue before joining
issue on any substantive point through the ﬁling of a respon-
sive pleading, and we have long treated appeals of dismissals
for improper venue as cases in the courts of appeals, see,
e. g., Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 151
(1976); Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries,
Inc., 406 U. S. 706, 707 (1972); Schnell v. Peter Eckrich &
Sons, Inc., 365 U. S. 260, 261 (1961); Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 223 (1957); Mis-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a court case. It contains legal jargon and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
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692

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Opinion of the Court

these values were reliable guides to the actual scope of pro-
tection under the Clause, they would be seen to demand a
very high degree of protection indeed: “inviolability” is, after
all, an uncompromising term, and we know as well from
Fourth Amendment law as from a layman’s common sense
that breaches of privacy are complete at the moment of illicit
intrusion, whatever use may or may not later be made of
their fruits. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U. S. 259, 264 (1990) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414
U. S. 338, 354 (1974); United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897,
906 (1984)).

The Fifth Amendment tradition, however, offers no such
If the Government is ready to provide
degree of protection.
the requisite use and derivative use immunity, see Kastigar,
406 U. S., at 453; see also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70,
84 (1973), the protection goes no further: no violation of per-
sonality is recognized and no claim of privilege will avail.13
One might reply that the choice of the word “inviolability”
was just unfortunate; while testimonial integrity may not be
inviolable, it is sufﬁciently served by requiring the Govern-
ment to pay a price in the form of use (and derivative use)
immunity before a refusal to testify will be overruled. But
that answer overlooks the fact that when a witness’s re-
sponse will raise no fear of criminal penalty, there is no pro-
tection for testimonial privacy at all. See United States v.
Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248–255 (1980).

Thus, what we ﬁnd in practice is not the protection of per-
sonal testimonial inviolability, but a conditional protection of
testimonial privacy subject to basic limits recognized before

by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defend-
ants. Although conduct by law enforcement ofﬁcials prior to trial may
ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial”
(citation omitted)).

13 The practice of exchanging silence for immunity is unchallenged here
and presumably invulnerable, being apparently as old as the Fifth Amend-
ment itself. See Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 445, and n. 13.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court in the case of United States v. Balsys.  It contains legal arguments and citations to other legal cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

389

Scalia, J., concurring

I have discussed, the practice of incorporation only expanded
in the United States.  Both corporations and voluntary asso
ciations  actively  petitioned  the  Government  and  expressed
their views in newspapers and pamphlets.  For example: An
antislavery  Quaker  corporation  petitioned  the  First  Con
gress, distributed pamphlets, and communicated through the
press  in  1790.  W.  diGiacomantonio,  “For  the  Gratiﬁcation
of  a Volunteering  Society”: Antislavery  and Pressure  Group
Politics  in  the  First  Federal  Congress,  15  J.  Early  Republic
169  (1995).  The  New  York  Sons  of  Liberty  sent  a  circu
lar  to  Colonies  farther  south  in  1766.  P.  Maier,  From  Re
sistance  to  Revolution  79–80  (1972).  And  the  Society  for
the  Relief  and  Instruction  of  Poor  Germans  circulated  a
biweekly  paper  from  1755  to  1757.  Adams,  The  Colonial
German-language  Press  and  the  American  Revolution,  in
The  Press  &  the  American  Revolution  151,  161–162  (B.  Bai
lyn & J. Hench eds. 1980).  The dissent offers no evidence—
none  whatever—that  the  First  Amendment’s  unqualiﬁed
text was originally understood to exclude such associational
speech from its protection.5

5 The  best  the  dissent  can  come  up  with  is  that  “[p]ostratiﬁcation  prac
tice”  supports  its  reading  of  the  First  Amendment.  Post,  at  431,  n.  56.
For  this  proposition,  the  dissent  cites  Justice  White’s  statement  (in  dis
sent) that “[t]he common law was generally interpreted as prohibiting cor
porate  political  participation,”  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Boston  v.  Bellotti,  435
U. S. 765, 819 (1978).  The sole authority Justice White cited for this prop
osition,  id.,  at  819,  n.  14,  was  a  law-review  note  that  made  no  such  claim.
To  the  contrary,  it  stated  that  the  cases  dealing  with  the  propriety  of
corporate  political  expenditures  were  “few.”  Note,  Corporate  Political
Affairs Programs, 70 Yale L. J. 821, 852 (1961).  More speciﬁcally, the note
cites only two holdings to that effect, one by a Federal District Court, and
one  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Montana.  Ibid.,  n.  197.  Of  course  even  if
the common law was “generally interpreted” to prohibit corporate political
expenditures  as  ultra  vires,  that  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  whether
political  expenditures  that  were  authorized  by  a  corporation’s  charter
could constitutionally be suppressed.

As  additional  “[p]ostratiﬁcation  practice,”  the  dissent  notes  that  the
Court  “did  not  recognize  any  First  Amendment  protections  for  corpora
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Scalia in a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the history of corporate political speech and the interpretation of the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>