<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

791

Stevens, J., dissenting

“We can perceive no reason for extending it so as to
exempt a business carried on by a state from the other-
wise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, all-
embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is
as capable of being obstructed by state as by individual
action. Language and objectives so plain are not to be
thwarted by resort to a rule of construction whose pur-
pose is but to resolve doubts, and whose application in
Id., at
the circumstances would be highly artiﬁcial.”
186–187.1

The False Claims Act is also all-embracing in scope,
national
in its purpose, and as capable of being violated
by state as by individual action.2
It was enacted during
the Civil War, shortly after a congressional committee

1 The difference between the post-1986 lens through which the Court
views sovereign immunity issues, on the one hand, and the actual intent
of Congress in statutes like the one before us today, on the other hand, is
well illustrated by the congressional rejection of the holdings in Hoffman
v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U. S. 96 (1989), and
In those cases,
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30 (1992).
the Court refused to ﬁnd the necessary unequivocal waiver of sovereign
immunity against both the States and the Federal Government in § 106(c)
of the Bankruptcy Code.

Congress, however, thought differently: “In enacting section 106(c), Con-
gress intended . . . to make the States subject to a money judgment. But
the Supreme Court in Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance, 492 U. S. 96 (1989), held [otherwise.]
In using such a nar-
row construction, the Court . . . did not ﬁnd in the text of the statute an
‘unmistakenly clear’ intent of Congress to waive sovereign immunity . . . .
The Court applied this reasoning in United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.”
See 140 Cong. Rec. 27693 (1994). Congress therefore overruled both of
those decisions by enacting the current version of 11 U. S. C. § 106.

2 It is thus at the opposite pole from the statute construed in Wilson v.
Omaha Tribe, 442 U. S. 653 (1979), which held that the term “white per-
son” did not include the State of Iowa because “it is apparent that in
adopting § 22 Congress had in mind only disputes arising in Indian country,
Id., at 668.
disputes that would not arise in or involve any of the States.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens. It includes legal citations, arguments, and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

company’s  agreement  to  reserve  such  channels  “to  the
reservation  of  a  public  easement,  or  a  dedication  of  land
for streets and parks, as part of a municipality’s approval
of a subdivision of land.”  Denver Area, 518 U. S., at 760–
761  (joined  by  Stevens  and  Souter,  JJ.).    And  Justice
Kennedy observed not only that an easement would be an
appropriate  analogy,  id.,  at  793–794  (opinion  concurring
in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in
part, joined by GINSBURG, J.), but also that “[p]ublic access
channels meet the definition of a public forum,” id., at 791,
“even  though  they  operate  over  property  to  which  the
cable operator holds title,” id., at 792; see also id., at 792–
793 (noting that the entire cable system’s existence stems
from  the  municipality’s  decision  to  grant  the  franchise).
What  those  five  Justices  suggested  in  1996  remains  true
today.
‘bun-
  “A  common
dle of sticks’—a  collection  of  individual  rights  which,  in
certain  combinations,  constitute  property.”    United  States
v. Craft, 535 U. S. 274, 278 (2002).  Rights to exclude and
to use are two of the most crucial sticks in the bundle.  See
id., at 283.  “State law determines . . . which sticks are in a
person’s  bundle,”  id.,  at  278,  and  therefore  defining  prop-
erty itself is a state-law exercise.4  As for whether there is
a  sufficient  property  interest  to  trigger  First  Amendment
forum analysis, related precedents show that there is.
  As noted above, there is no disputing that Time Warner
owns the wires themselves.  See Turner, 512 U. S., at 628.
If  the  wires  were  a  road,  it  would  be  easy  to  define  the
public’s right to walk on it as an easement.  See, e.g., In re
India  Street,  29  N. Y.  2d  97,  100–103,  272  N. E  2d  518,
——————

idiom  describes  property  as  a

4 The parties have not pointed this Court to any New York law defini-
tively  establishing  the  status  of  the  channels.    But  even  if  there  were
uncertainty about the status of the channels under New York law, that
would not be a reason to resolve the case against respondents (plaintiffs
below) at the motion to dismiss stage.  See infra, at 12, n. 9, 14.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 587 U.S. ____ (2019). It delves into legal arguments regarding property rights and First Amendment rights in the context of cable television channels.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

573

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

American law, such instances have been almost exclusively
conﬁned to two contexts: perjury, see Weiler v. United
States, 323 U. S. 606 (1945), and treason, see U. S. Const.,
Art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“No Person shall be convicted of Treason
unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt
Act, or on Confession in open Court.”). See generally Wig-
more, Required Numbers of Witnesses; A Brief History of
the Numerical System in England, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 100–
108 (1901).

The treason statute in effect at the time of John Fenwick’s
conspiracy, like the Treason Clause of our Constitution, em-
bodied just such a quantitative sufﬁciency rule: As long as
the accused traitor put the prosecution to its proof by plead-
ing not guilty, the sworn testimony of two witnesses was
necessary to support a conviction. The Court describes at
great length the attainder of Fenwick, which served as a
cautionary model for Justice Chase’s explication of the fourth
category in Calder. See ante, at 526–530.14 This excursion
into post-Restoration English history is diverting, but the
Court’s statement that “the circumstances of petitioner’s
case parallel those of Fenwick’s case 300 years earlier,” ante,
at 530, simply will not wash. The preamendment version of
Article 38.07 is nothing like the two-witness rule on which
Fenwick vainly relied.15

First, the preamendment version of Article 38.07, unlike
a two-witness rule, did not apply indifferently to all who
testify. Rather, it branded a particular class of witnesses—

14 Tellingly, the Court offers no evidence that anyone at the time of
the Framers considered witness corroboration requirements of the type
involved here to fall within the scope of the ex post facto prohibition.

15 When the Texas Legislature wants to enact a two-witness rule, it
knows how to do so. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 38.15 (Vernon
Supp. 2000) (“No person can be convicted of treason except upon the testi-
mony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or upon his own
confession in open court.”); Art. 38.18(a) (“No person may be convicted of
perjury or aggravated perjury if proof that his statement is false rests
solely upon the testimony of one witness other than the defendant.”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and historical references.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1032

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 16, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6756.  Tate  v.  Warren,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6758.  Jeanlouis  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–6761.  Owens  v.  Michigan.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6769.  Stanko  v.  Davis,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  744.

No.  09– 6772.  Fobbs  v.  Potter,  Postmaster  General.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.
Appx.  359.

No.  09–6793.  Martin  v.  Reynolds,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  176.

No.  09–6870.  Jamison  v.  Delaware.  Sup.  Ct.  Del.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  977  A.  2d  898.

No.  09–6908.  Hyde  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  996.

No.  09–6923.  Mark  v.  Bauer  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  771.

No.  09–6941.  Holstick  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6958.  Beckett  v.  Gansler,  Attorney  General  of
Maryland, et al.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported
below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  293.

No.  09–6963.  Haddad  v.  Hertz  Corp.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  475.

No.  09–6978.  Leatch  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  12.

No.  09–6979.  Kollar  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6981.  Morgan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  849.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. v. CHRISTIAN

Opinion of the Court

damages  and,  if  not,  whether  the  Act  requires  the  land-
owners to seek EPA approval for their restoration plan.

I

A
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 94 Stat.
2767, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §9601 et seq., also known as
the Superfund statute, to address “the serious environmen-
tal and health risks posed by industrial pollution,” Burling-
ton N. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 556 U. S. 599, 602
(2009).  The  Act  seeks  “to  promote  the  timely  cleanup  of
hazardous  waste  sites  and  to  ensure  that  the  costs  of
such cleanup efforts [are] borne by those responsible for the
contamination.”  CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U. S. 1, 4
(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Act directs EPA to compile and annually revise a pri-
oritized  list  of  contaminated  sites  for  cleanup,  commonly
known as Superfund sites.  42 U. S. C. §9605.1  EPA may
clean those sites itself or compel responsible parties to per-
form the cleanup.  §§9604, 9606, 9615.  If the Government
performs the cleanup, it may recover its costs from respon-
sible  parties.
§9607(a)(4)(A).    Responsible  parties  are
jointly and severally liable for the full cost of the cleanup,
but may seek contribution from other responsible parties.
§9613(f )(1).

Prior to selecting a cleanup plan, EPA conducts (or orders
a  private  party  to  conduct)  a  remedial  investigation  and
feasibility study to assess the contamination and evaluate
cleanup options.  40 CFR §300.430 (2019).  Section 122(e)(6)
of the Act provides that, once the study begins, “no poten-

——————

1 The Act vests powers and duties in the President, who has delegated
the  responsibilities  relevant  here  to  the  EPA  Administrator.    See  42
U. S. C. §9615; Exec. Order No. 12580, 3 CFR §193 (1988).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to a case involving the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

has  made  assumptions  defined  by  the  world  and  time  of
which  it  is  a  part.    This  was  evident  in  Baker  v.  Nelson,
409 U. S. 810, a one-line summary decision issued in 1972,
holding  the  exclusion  of  same-sex  couples  from  marriage
did not present a substantial federal question.

Still, there are other, more instructive precedents.  This
Court’s  cases  have  expressed  constitutional  principles  of
broader reach.  In defining the right to marry these cases
have  identified  essential  attributes  of  that  right  based  in
history, tradition, and other constitutional liberties inher-
ent  in  this  intimate  bond.    See,  e.g.,  Lawrence,  539  U. S.,
at  574;  Turner,  supra,  at  95;  Zablocki,  supra,  at  384;
Loving,  supra,  at  12;  Griswold,  supra,  at  486.    And  in
assessing  whether  the  force  and  rationale  of  its  cases
apply  to  same-sex  couples,  the  Court  must  respect  the
basic  reasons  why  the  right  to  marry  has  been  long  pro-
tected.  See,  e.g.,  Eisenstadt,  supra,  at  453–454;  Poe,  su-
pra, at 542–553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

This  analysis  compels  the  conclusion  that  same-sex
couples may exercise the right to marry.  The four princi-
ples  and  traditions  to  be  discussed  demonstrate  that  the
reasons  marriage  is  fundamental  under  the  Constitution
apply with equal force to same-sex couples.

A first premise of the Court’s relevant precedents is that
the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent
in  the  concept  of  individual  autonomy.  This  abiding  con-
nection between marriage and liberty is why Loving inval-
idated  interracial  marriage  bans  under  the  Due  Process
Clause.  See  388  U. S.,  at  12;  see also  Zablocki,  supra,  at
384  (observing  Loving  held  “the  right  to  marry  is  of  fun-
damental  importance  for  all  individuals”).  Like  choices
concerning  contraception,  family  relationships,  procrea-
tion,  and  childrearing,  all  of  which  are  protected  by  the
Constitution,  decisions  concerning  marriage  are  among
the most intimate that an individual can make.  See Law-
rence, supra, at 574.  Indeed, the Court has noted it would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses precedents and legal arguments related to same-sex marriage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

25

Opinion of the Court

almost  9  million  pieces  of  “bullying  and  harassment  con-
tent.”  App. in No. 22–555, at 80a.  Similarly, YouTube de-
leted in one quarter more than 6 million videos violating its
Guidelines.  See id., at 116a.  And among those are the re-
movals the Texas law targets.  What is more, this Court has
already rightly declined to focus on the ratio of rejected to
accepted content.  Recall that in Hurley, the parade organ-
izers welcomed pretty much everyone, excluding only those
who  expressed  a  message  of  gay  pride.    See  supra,  at  18.
The  Court  held  that  the  organizers’  “lenient”  admissions
policy—and their resulting failure to express a “particular-
ized message”—did “not forfeit” their right to reject the few
messages  they  found  harmful  or  offensive.    515  U. S.,  at
569, 574.  So too here, though the excluded viewpoints dif-
fer.  That  Facebook  and  YouTube  convey  a  mass  of  mes-
sages does not license Texas to prohibit them from deleting
posts with, say, “hate speech” based on “sexual orientation.”
App. in No. 22–555, at 126a, 155a; see id., at 431a.  It is as
much an editorial choice to convey all speech except in se-
lect categories as to convey only speech within them.

Similarly,  the  major  social-media  platforms  do  not  lose
their First Amendment protection just because no one will
wrongly attribute to them the views in an individual post.
Contra, 49 F. 4th, at 462 (arguing otherwise).  For starters,
users may well attribute to the platforms the messages that
the posts convey in toto.  Those messages—communicated
by the feeds as a whole—derive largely from the platforms’
editorial  decisions  about  which  posts  to  remove,  label,  or
demote.  And because that is so, the platforms may indeed
“own” the overall speech environment.  In any event, this
Court has never hinged a compiler’s First Amendment pro-
tection  on  the  risk  of  misattribution.    The  Court  did  not
think in Turner—and could not have thought in Tornillo or
PG&E—that  anyone  would  view  the  entity  conveying  the
third-party  speech  at  issue  as  endorsing  its  content.    See
Turner I, 512 U. S., at 655 (“[T]here appears little risk” of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the First Amendment rights of social media platforms. It delves into the concept of editorial choices and the removal of content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

Opinion of the Court

Respondents  16.  First,  after  the  decision,  EPA  informed
the Court of Appeals that it does not intend to enforce the
Clean Power Plan because it has decided to promulgate a
new  Section  111(d)  rule.    Second,  on  EPA’s  request,  the
lower court stayed the part of its judgment that vacated the
repeal,  pending  that  new  rulemaking.    “These  circum-
stances,” says the Government, “have mooted the prior dis-
pute as to the CPP Repeal Rule’s legality.”  Id., at 17 (em-
phasis added).

That Freudian slip, however, reveals the basic flaw in the
Government’s argument: It is the doctrine of mootness, not
standing, that addresses whether “an intervening circum-
stance [has] deprive[d] the plaintiff of a personal stake in
the outcome of the lawsuit.”  Genesis HealthCare Corp. v.
Symczyk, 569 U. S. 66, 72 (2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw En-
vironmental  Services  (TOC),  Inc.,  528  U. S.  167,  189–192
(2000).  The distinction matters because the Government,
not petitioners, bears the burden to establish that a once-
live case has become moot.  Id., at 189; Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U. S. 216, 222 (2000) (per curiam).

That  burden  is  “heavy”  where,  as  here,  “[t]he  only  con-
ceivable basis for a finding of mootness in th[e] case is [the
respondent’s] voluntary conduct.”  Friends of the Earth, 528
U. S., at 189.  Although the Government briefly argues that
the lower court’s stay of its mandate extinguished the con-
troversy,  it  cites  no  authority  for  that  proposition,  and  it
does  not  make  sense:  Lower  courts  frequently  stay  their
mandates  when  notified  that  the  losing  party  intends  to
seek our certiorari review.  So the Government’s mootness
argument boils down to its representation that EPA has no
intention of enforcing the Clean Power Plan prior to prom-
ulgating a new Section 111(d) rule.

But “voluntary cessation does not moot a case” unless it
is  “absolutely  clear  that  the  allegedly  wrongful  behavior
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the concept of mootness in legal proceedings and applies it to a case involving the Clean Power Plan.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

Opinion of the Court

Ohio to Maryland, where same-sex marriage was legal.  It
was  difficult  for  Arthur  to  move,  and  so  the  couple  were
wed inside a medical transport plane as it remained on the
tarmac  in  Baltimore.    Three  months  later,  Arthur  died.
Ohio  law  does  not  permit  Obergefell  to  be  listed  as  the
surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate.  By statute,
they  must  remain  strangers  even  in  death,  a  state-
imposed separation Obergefell deems “hurtful for the rest
of time.”  App. in No. 14–556 etc., p. 38.  He brought suit
to  be  shown  as  the  surviving  spouse  on  Arthur’s  death
certificate.

April  DeBoer  and  Jayne  Rowse  are  co-plaintiffs  in  the
case from Michigan.  They celebrated a commitment cere-
mony  to  honor  their  permanent  relation  in  2007.    They
both work as nurses, DeBoer in a neonatal unit and Rowse
in  an  emergency  unit.    In  2009,  DeBoer  and  Rowse  fos-
tered and then adopted a baby boy.  Later that same year,
they  welcomed  another  son  into  their  family.    The  new
baby,  born  prematurely  and  abandoned  by  his  biological
mother, required around-the-clock  care.  The next year,  a
baby girl with special needs joined their family.  Michigan,
however,  permits  only  opposite-sex  married  couples  or
single individuals to adopt, so each child can have only one
woman as his or her legal parent.  If an emergency were to
arise,  schools  and  hospitals  may  treat  the  three  children
as if they had only one parent.  And, were tragedy to befall
either  DeBoer  or  Rowse,  the  other  would  have  no  legal
rights  over  the  children  she  had  not  been  permitted  to
adopt.  This couple seeks relief from the continuing uncer-
tainty their unmarried status creates in their lives.

Army  Reserve  Sergeant  First  Class  Ijpe  DeKoe  and  his
partner  Thomas  Kostura,  co-plaintiffs  in  the  Tennessee
case, fell in love.  In 2011, DeKoe received orders to deploy
to  Afghanistan.  Before  leaving,  he  and  Kostura  married
in New York.  A week later, DeKoe began his deployment,
which lasted for almost a year.  When he returned, the two
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of an opinion from the Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges. It sets up the cases of the plaintiffs and the legal issues at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Court Case Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:26] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1047

1045

Scalia, J., dissenting

housing stock.”
It is simply and
1 Appellants’ App., at 102.
obviously not true that the commission ignored petitioners’ re-
fusal to satisfy its fee demand.

The Court of Appeal itself, after asserting that “San Francisco
did not demand anything” from petitioners, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at
569, in the next breath found it “somewhat disturbing that San
Francisco’s concerns about congestion, parking and preservation
of a neighborhood might have been overcome by payment of [a]
signiﬁcant sum of money,” ibid. (emphasis added). This observa-
tion makes no sense, of course, unless the court concluded from
the record that the commission might have rendered a different
decision if petitioners had been more generous.
It sought to
evade the natural consequence of that conclusion with the follow-
ing unelaborated assertion: “That the Planning Commission might
have granted the permit upon payment of $600,000 does not make
its refusal to issue the permit into a taking.”
Ibid. (emphasis
added).

There are three possible readings of the Court of Appeal’s opin-
ion. First, and most obviously, one might take at face value the
court’s factual ﬁnding that the fee played no role in the decision.
That would be a gross distortion of the record.

Secondly, one might ignore the court’s initial see-no-evil dis-
claimer, and assume that it accepted what the record undeniably
showed, that petitioners’ refusal to meet the fee demand was a
motivating force behind the commission’s decision. On that as-
sumption, the court’s refusal to apply Nollan and Dolan might
be thought to rest upon its determination that that factor was
irrelevant, since the commission also relied upon ordinary criteria
under the Planning Code. But it is always the case that if the
permit applicant does not yield to the extortionate demand, the
ordinary criteria will be invoked to deny his permit.
If indeed
unjustiﬁed denial can constitute a taking (the question presented
by the third basis for the decision, discussed below), Nollan and
Dolan can surely not be evaded by simply adding boilerplate
“ordinary criteria” language to the denial. The increasing com-
plexity of land-use permitting processes, and of the criteria by
which permit applications are judged, makes an “ordinary crite-
ria” claim almost always plausible. When there is uncontested
evidence of a demand for money or other property—and still as-
suming that denial of a permit because of failure to meet such a
demand constitutes a taking—it should be up to the permitting
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It argues against the majority opinion's conclusion that a denial of a permit was not a taking. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

HERRERA v. WYOMING

Syllabus

(a) This  case  is  controlled  by  Mille  Lacs,  not  Race  Horse.  Race
Horse  concerned  a  hunting  right  guaranteed  in  an  1868  treaty  with
the  Shoshone  and  Bannock  Tribes  containing  language  identical  to
that at issue here.  Relying on two lines of reasoning, the Race Horse
Court  held  that  Wyoming’s  admission  to  the  United  States  in  1890
extinguished the Shoshone-Bannock Treaty right.  First, the doctrine
that new States are admitted to the Union on an “equal footing” with
existing States led the Court to conclude that affording the Tribes  a
protected  hunting  right  lasting  after  statehood  would  conflict  with
the  power  vested  in  those  States—and  newly  shared  by  Wyoming—
“to  regulate  the  killing  of  game  within  their  borders.”    163  U.  S.,  at
514.  Second, the Court found no evidence in the Shoshone-Bannock
Treaty  itself  that  Congress  intended  the  treaty  right  to  continue  in
“perpetuity.”    Id.,  at  514–515.    Mille  Lacs  undercut  both  pillars  of
Race  Horse’s  reasoning.  Mille  Lacs  established  that  the  crucial  in-
quiry for treaty termination analysis is whether Congress has “clear-
ly  express[ed]”  an  intent  to  abrogate  an  Indian  treaty  right,  526
U. S., at 202, or whether a termination point identified in the treaty
itself has been satisfied, id., at 207.  Thus, while Race Horse “was not
expressly overruled” in Mille Lacs, it “retain[s] no vitality,” Limbach
v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U. S. 353, 361, and is repudiated to the
extent  it  held  that  treaty  rights  can  be  impliedly  extinguished  at
statehood.  Pp. 6–11.

(b) Repsis does not preclude Herrera from arguing that the 1868
Treaty right survived Wyoming’s statehood.  Even when the elements
of  issue  preclusion  are  met,  an  exception  may  be  warranted  if  there
has  been  an  intervening  “ ‘change  in  [the]  applicable  legal  context.’ ”
Bobby  v.  Bies,  556  U. S.  825,  834.    Here,  Mille  Lacs’  repudiation  of
Race Horse’s reasoning—on which Repsis relied—justifies such an ex-
ception.  Pp. 11–13.

(c) Applying Mille Lacs, Wyoming’s admission into the Union did
not  abrogate  the  Crow  Tribe’s  off-reservation  treaty  hunting  right.
First,  the  Wyoming  Statehood  Act  does  not  show  that  Congress
“clearly  expressed”  an  intent  to  end  the  1868  Treaty  hunting  right.
See  526  U. S.,  at  202.    There  is  also  no  evidence  in  the  treaty  itself
that  Congress  intended  the  hunting  right  to  expire  at  statehood,  or
that the Crow Tribe would have understood it to do so.  Nor does the
historical  record  support  such  a  reading  of  the  treaty.    The  State
counters that statehood, as a practical matter, rendered all the lands
in the State occupied.  Even assuming that Wyoming presents an ac-
curate historical picture, the State, by using statehood as a proxy for
occupation,  subverts  this  Court’s  clear  instruction  that  treaty-
protected rights “are not impliedly terminated upon statehood.”  Id.,
at  207.    To  the  extent  that  the  State  seeks  to  rely  on  historical  evi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus section outlining the court's reasoning. It presents legal arguments and cites previous cases, indicating it's part of the core legal content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
862

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10931.  Baines  v.  Folino,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional  Institution at  Greene.  C.  A. 3d  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–10933.  Blackmon  v.  McBride,  Warden.  Certiorari

denied.

No. 08–10934.  Bonner v. Thaler, Director, Texas Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10935.  Adamson  v.  Poorter  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10936.  Moore  v.  Comaites.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  08–10937.  Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  521.

No.  08–10938.  Martin  et  vir  v.  Select  Portfolio  Servic

ing  Holding  Corp.  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10939.  Dee  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  578.

No.  08–10943.  Young  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10944.  Urista  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10945.  Vasquez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10946.  Wilkerson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  192.

No.  08–10947.  Watley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  871.

No.  08–10948.  Stone  v.  McKee,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10949.  Cerf  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their disposition (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the narrative content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

JACKSON, J., dissenting

brings a claim that arose after the time in which the pris-
oner would or could have filed his first petition.  Ibid. (au-
thorizing successive petitions raising “newly discovered ev-
idence”  or  “a  new  rule  of  constitutional  law”  (emphasis
added)).

In light of this key observation, the majority’s assumption
that  §2255(h)  bars  Jones’s  claim  is  significantly  hobbled.
Jones’s  statutory  innocence  claim  is  also  “new”—in  the
sense that it was not available to him when his first §2255
petition was filed.9  And Jones’s claim shares other features
of the circumstances that Congress exempted from the “sec-
ond  or  successive”  general  prohibition  as  well—including
that  it  implicates  innocence,  see  §2255(h)(1),  and  stems
from a retroactively applicable Supreme Court opinion, see
§2255(h)(2).  Nor does the filing of Jones’s successive peti-
tion  implicate  any  anti-claim-splitting  rationale,  as  Jones
did not manipulatively withhold his legal innocence claim
during his initial §2255 proceedings.  Indeed, he could not
possibly have done so, since this Court did not decide Rehaif
v. United States, 588 U. S. ___ (2019), which provided the
basis  for  his  claim,  until  nearly  two  decades  after  Jones
filed his first petition.

In  short,  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  a  Congress  that  ex-
pressly  authorized  “new”  claims  involving  innocence  or
those that arise from developments in Supreme Court case

——————

9 Prior to this Court’s holding in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. ___
(2019),  well-established  Circuit  precedent  had  barred  Jones’s  claim.
United States v. Jones, 266 F. 3d 804, 810, n. 5 (CA8 2001) (citing United
States v. Kind, 194 F. 3d 900, 906 (CA8 1999)).  After Jones’s conviction
became final, this Court decided Rehaif, which interpreted the elements
of Jones’s crime of conviction more narrowly than some Courts of Appeals
had, and thereby recognized a potential basis for Jones and other similar
defendants to claim legal innocence.  And because Rehaif was a Supreme
Court ruling that changed the scope of a criminal statute, it applied ret-
roactively to individuals (like Jones) whose convictions had become final
at the time it was issued.  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 351–352
(2004); Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 620–621 (1998).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

502

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Syllabus

far in the past, and unrelated to any commitment that the employers
made or to any injury they caused. Pp. 529–537.

Justice Kennedy concluded that application of the Coal Act to East-
ern would violate the proper bounds of settled due process principles.
Although the Court has been hesitant to subject economic legislation to
due process scrutiny as a general matter, this country’s law has har-
bored a singular distrust of retroactive statutes, and that distrust is
reﬂected in this Court’s due process jurisprudence. For example, in
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 15, the Court held
that due process requires an inquiry into whether a legislature acted in
an arbitrary and irrational way when enacting a retroactive law. This
formulation has been repeated in numerous recent cases, e. g., United
States v. Carlton, 512 U. S. 26, 31, which reﬂect the recognition that
retroactive lawmaking is a particular concern because of the legislative
temptation to use it as a means of retribution against unpopular groups
or individuals, Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 266. Be-
cause change in the legal consequences of transactions long closed can
destroy the reasonable certainty and security which are the very objects
of property ownership, due process protection for property must be un-
derstood to incorporate the settled tradition against retroactive laws of
great severity. The instant case presents one of those rare instances
where the legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by due process.
The Coal Act’s remedy bears no legitimate relation to the interest which
the Government asserts supports the statute. The degree of retroac-
tive effect, which is a signiﬁcant determinant in a statute’s constitution-
ality, e. g., United States v. Carlton, supra, at 32, is of unprecedented
scope here, since the Coal Act created liability for events occurring 35
years ago. While the Court has upheld the imposition of liability on
former employers based on past employment relationships when the re-
medial statutes were designed to impose an actual, measurable business
cost which the employer had been able to avoid in the past, e. g., Turner
Elkhorn, supra, at 19, the Coal Act does not serve this purpose. The
beneﬁciaries’ expectation of lifetime beneﬁts was created by promises
and agreements made long after Eastern left the coal business, and
Eastern was not responsible for the perilous condition of the 1950 and
1974 Plans which jeopardized the beneﬁts. Pp. 547–550.

O(cid:146)Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., ﬁled a concurring opinion, post, p. 538. Kennedy, J., ﬁled an
opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, post, p. 539.
Stevens, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 550. Breyer, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion,
in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 553.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus from the Supreme Court. It summarizes the case, the arguments, and the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring

I

In the 1860s, Congress proposed and the States ratified
the  Thirteenth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments.    And,  with
the  authority  conferred  by  these  Amendments,  Congress
passed  two  landmark  Civil  Rights  Acts.    Throughout  the
debates on each of these measures, their proponents repeat-
edly affirmed their view of equal citizenship and the racial
equality that flows from it.  In fact, they held this principle
so deeply that their crowning accomplishment—the Four-
teenth  Amendment—ensures  racial  equality  with  no  tex-
tual  reference  to  race  whatsoever.  The  history  of  these
measures’ enactment renders their motivating principle as
clear as their text: All citizens of the United States, regard-
less of skin color, are equal before the law.

I do not contend that all of the individuals who put forth
and  ratified  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  universally  be-
lieved this to be true.  Some Members of the proposing Con-
gress, for example, opposed the Amendment.  And, the his-
torical record—particularly with respect to the debates on
ratification in the States—is sparse.  Nonetheless, substan-
tial evidence suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was
passed to “establis[h] the broad constitutional principle of
full and complete equality of all persons under the law,” for-
bidding “all legal distinctions based on race or color.”  Supp.
Brief for United States on Reargument in Brown v. Board
of  Education,  O. T.  1953,  No.  1  etc.,  p. 115  (U. S.  Brown
Reargument Brief ).

This  was  Justice  Harlan’s  view  in  his  lone  dissent  in
Plessy, where he observed that “[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind.”  163 U. S., at 559.  It was the view of the Court in
Brown, which rejected “ ‘any authority . . . to use race as a
factor in affording educational opportunities.’ ”  Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
551 U. S. 701, 747 (2007).  And, it is the view adopted in the
Court’s opinion today, requiring “the absolute equality of all
citizens”  under  the  law.  Ante,  at  10  (internal  quotation
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the historical context and legal precedent surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment and its guarantee of racial equality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1193

lengthy,  their  citation  alone  sufﬁces  at  this  point,  and  their
pertinent  text,  if  not  already  set  out  in  the  petition  for  a
writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or an appendix to
either document, shall be set out in an appendix to the brief.
(g)  A  concise  statement  of  the  case,  setting  out  the  facts
material  to  the  consideration  of  the  questions  presented,
with appropriate references to the joint appendix, e. g., App.
12, or to the record, e. g., Record 12.

(h)  A  summary  of  the  argument,  suitably  paragraphed.
The  summary  should  be  a  clear  and  concise  condensation  of
the argument made in the body of the brief; mere repetition
of  the  headings  under  which  the  argument  is  arranged  is
not sufﬁcient.

(i)  The argument, exhibiting clearly the points of fact and
of  law  presented  and  citing  the  authorities  and  statutes  re
lied on.

( j)  A  conclusion  specifying  with  particularity  the  relief

the party seeks.

2.  A  brief  on  the  merits  for  a  respondent  or  an  appellee
shall  conform  to  the  foregoing  requirements,  except  that
items required by subparagraphs 1(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), and (g)
of  this  Rule  need  not  be  included  unless  the  respondent  or
appellee is dissatisﬁed with their presentation by the oppos
ing party.

3.  A  brief  on  the  merits  may  not  exceed  the  word  limita
tions  speciﬁed  in  Rule  33.1(g).  An appendix  to  a  brief  may
include only relevant material, and counsel are cautioned not
to  include  in  an  appendix  arguments  or  citations  that  prop
erly belong in the body of the brief.

4.  A  reply  brief  shall  conform  to  those  portions  of  this
Rule applicable  to the  brief for a  respondent or  an appellee,
but,  if  appropriately  divided  by  topical  headings,  need  not
contain a summary of the argument.

5.  A  reference  to  the  joint  appendix  or  to  the  record  set
out  in any  brief shall  indicate the  appropriate page  number.
If the reference is to an exhibit, the page numbers at which
the exhibit appears, at which it was offered in evidence, and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a set of rules for filing briefs with the Supreme Court. It outlines the structure and content requirements for different types of briefs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Rules and Regulations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

the people of Puerto Rico for approval.  Id., at 223.

In 1952, “both Puerto Rico and the United States ratified
Puerto  Rico’s  Constitution.”  Sánchez  Valle,  579  U. S.,  at
___ (BREYER, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 8).  The people of
Puerto Rico first approved the draft Constitution in a refer-
endum.  Congress  then  approved  the  draft  Constitution
with modifications, noting the caveat that it “shall become
effective” only when Puerto Rico “declare[s] in a formal res-
olution its acceptance.”  66 Stat. 327–328.  Finally, the peo-
ple  of  Puerto  Rico  approved  the  modified  Constitution  in
another referendum.  Thus, although the terms of the com-
pact provided for Congress’ approval, “when such constitu-
tion did go into effect pursuant to the resolution of approval
by the Congress, it became what the Congress called it, a
‘constitution’ under  which the people of Puerto Rico orga-
nized  a  government  of  their  own  adoption.”    Figueroa  v.
Puerto Rico, 232 F. 2d 615, 620 (CA1 1956) (citation omit-
ted).  “The Commonwealth’s power, the [Puerto Rico] Con-
stitution proclaims, ‘emanates from the people and shall be
exercised in accordance with their will, within the terms of
the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico
and the United States.’ ”  Sánchez Valle, 579 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 4).

With the passage of Public Law 600 and the adoption and
recognition  of  the  Puerto  Rico  Constitution,  “the  United
States  and  Puerto  Rico  . . .  forged  a  unique  political  rela-
tionship, built on the island’s evolution into a constitutional
democracy exercising local self-rule.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at
2); cf. Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 672 (noting with approval
the view that, after Public Law 600, Puerto Rico became “a
political entity created by the act and with the consent of
the  people  of  Puerto  Rico  and  joined  in  union  with  the
United States of America under the terms of the compact”
(quoting Mora v. Mejias, 206 F. 2d 377, 387 (CA1 1953))).

Of  critical  import  here,  the  Federal  Government  “relin-
quished  its  control  over  [Puerto  Rico’s]  local  affairs[,]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor in the case of FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC. It discusses the history of Puerto Rico's political status and the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MISSOURI, INC., FKA
GROUP HEALTH PLAN, INC. v. NEVILS

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

No. 16–149.  Argued March 1, 2017—Decided April 18, 2017

The Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA) authoriz-
es  the  Office  of  Personnel  Management  (OPM)  to  contract  with  pri-
vate  carriers  for  federal  employees’  health  insurance.    5  U. S. C.
§8902(a),  (d).
  FEHBA  contains  an  express-preemption  provision,
§8902(m)(1), which states that the “terms of any contract under this
chapter which relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or
benefits (including payments with respect to benefits) shall supersede
and preempt any State or local law . . . which relates to health insur-
ance or plans.”

OPM’s contracts have long required private carriers to seek subro-
gation  and  reimbursement.    Accordingly,  OPM’s  regulations  make  a
carrier’s “right to pursue and receive subrogation and reimbursement
recoveries . . . a condition of and a limitation on the nature of benefits
or benefit payments and on the provision of benefits under the plan’s
coverage.”  5 CFR §890.106(b)(1).  In 2015, OPM published a new rule
confirming  that  a  carrier’s  subrogation  and  reimbursement  rights
and  responsibilities  “relate  to  the  nature,  provision,  and  extent  of
coverage  or  benefits  (including  payments  with  respect  to  benefits)
within  the  meaning  of ”  §8902(m)(1),  and  “are . . .  effective  notwith-
standing any state or local law, or any regulation issued thereunder,
which relates to health insurance or plans.”  §890.106(h).

Respondent Jodie Nevils was insured under a FEHBA plan offered
by petitioner Coventry Health Care of Missouri.  When Nevils was in-
jured in an automobile accident, Coventry paid his medical expenses.
Coventry subsequently asserted a lien against part of the settlement
Nevils recovered from the driver who caused his injuries.  Nevils sat-
isfied the lien, then filed a class action in Missouri state court, alleg-
ing  that,  under  Missouri  law,  which  does  not  permit  subrogation  or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

30

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Stevens, J., dissenting

No action against the United States, the Commissioner
of Social Security, or any ofﬁcer or employee thereof
shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to
recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.”

42 U. S. C. § 1395ii provides:

“The provisions of sections 406 and 416( j) of this title,
and of subsections (a), (d), (e), (h), (i), ( j), (k), and (l)
of section 405 of this title, shall also apply with respect
to this subchapter to the same extent as they are ap-
plicable with respect to subchapter II of this chapter,
except that, in applying such provisions with respect
to this subchapter, any reference therein to the Commis-
sioner of Social Security or the Social Security Admin-
istration shall be considered a reference to the Secre-
tary or the Department of Health and Human Services,
respectively.”

28 U. S. C. § 1331 provides:

“Federal question. The district courts shall have orig-
inal jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

Justice Stevens, dissenting.
While I join Justice Thomas’ lucid dissent without quali-
ﬁcation, I think it worthwhile to identify a signiﬁcant dis-
tinction between cases like Weinberger v. Salﬁ, 422 U. S.
749 (1975), and Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602 (1984), on
the one hand, and cases like Bowen v. Michigan Academy
of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667 (1986), and this case,
on the other hand.
In the former group, the issue con-
cerned the plaintiffs’ entitlement to beneﬁts; in the latter
two, the issue concerns providers’ eligibility for reimburse-
ment. The distinction between those two types of issues
mirrors a critical distinction between the Social Security
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405, and the Medicare Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1395ii.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens. It includes legal citations, statutes, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

431

Opinion of the Court

dollar damages claim. Even if the outcome of the second
trial is speculative, the reversal, like the President’s cancella-
tion, causes a signiﬁcant immediate injury by depriving the
defendant of the beneﬁt of a favorable ﬁnal judgment. The
revival of a substantial contingent liability immediately and
directly affects the borrowing power, ﬁnancial strength, and
ﬁscal planning of the potential obligor.16

We also reject the Government’s argument that New
York’s claim is advanced by the wrong parties because the
claim belongs to the State of New York, and not appellees.
Under New York statutes that are already in place, it is clear
that both the City of New York 17 and the appellee health
care providers 18 will be assessed by the State for substantial
portions of any recoupment payments that the State may
have to make to the Federal Government. To the extent of
such assessments, they have the same potential liability as
the State does.19

16 Because the cancellation of the legislative equivalent of a favorable
ﬁnal judgment causes immediate injury, the Government’s reliance on
Anderson v. Green, 513 U. S. 557 (1995) (per curiam), is misplaced. That
case involved a challenge to a California statute that would have imposed
limits on welfare payments to new residents during their ﬁrst year of
residence in California. The statute could not become effective without
a waiver from HHS. Although such a waiver had been in effect when the
action was ﬁled, it had been vacated in a separate proceeding and HHS
had not sought review of that judgment. Accordingly, at the time the
Anderson case reached this Court, the plaintiffs were receiving the same
beneﬁts as long-term residents; they had suffered no injury. We held that
the case was not ripe because, unless and until HHS issued a new waiver,
Id., at 559 (“The parties [i. e.,
any future injury was purely conjectural.
the plaintiffs and California, but not HHS] have no live dispute now, and
whether one will arise in the future is conjectural”). Unlike New York in
this case, they were not contingently liable for anything.

17 App. 106–107.
18 See n. 10, supra.
19 The Government relies on Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), to
support its argument that the State, and not appellees, should be bringing
this claim.
In Warth we held, inter alia, that citizens of Rochester did
not have standing to challenge the exclusionary zoning practices of an-
other community because their claimed injury of increased taxation turned
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" portion. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it's part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

9

Opinion of the Court

II

  In  Northwest  Austin,  we  stated  that  “the  Act  imposes
current  burdens  and  must  be  justified  by  current  needs.”
557  U. S.,  at  203.    And  we  concluded  that  “a  departure
from  the  fundamental  principle  of  equal  sovereignty  re-
quires  a  showing  that  a  statute’s  disparate  geographic
coverage  is  sufficiently  related  to  the  problem  that  it
targets.”  Ibid.  These basic principles guide our review of
the question before us.1

A

The Constitution and laws of the United States are “the
supreme  Law  of  the  Land.”    U. S.  Const.,  Art.  VI,  cl. 2.
State  legislation  may  not  contravene  federal  law.    The
Federal  Government  does  not,  however,  have  a  general
right  to  review  and  veto  state  enactments  before  they  go
into  effect.  A  proposal  to  grant  such  authority  to  “nega-
tive”  state  laws  was  considered  at  the  Constitutional
Convention, but rejected in favor of allowing state laws to
take effect, subject to later challenge under the Supremacy
Clause.  See 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
pp. 21,  164–168  (M.  Farrand  ed.  1911);  2  id.,  at  27–29,
390–392.

Outside  the  strictures  of  the  Supremacy  Clause,  States
retain  broad  autonomy  in  structuring  their  governments
and pursuing legislative objectives.  Indeed, the Constitu-
tion provides that all powers not specifically granted to the
Federal Government are reserved to the States or citizens.
Amdt. 10.  This “allocation of powers in our federal system
preserves  the  integrity,  dignity,  and  residual  sovereignty
of  the  States.”  Bond  v.  United  States,  564  U. S.  ___,  ___

——————

1 Both  the  Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth  Amendments  were  at  issue  in
Northwest Austin, see Juris. Statement i, and Brief for Federal Appel-
lee 29–30, in Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
O.  T.  2008,  No.  08–322,  and  accordingly  Northwest  Austin  guides  our
review under both Amendments in this case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and discusses the principles of federalism and the Supremacy Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

105

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they don't contain the main body of the text meant for reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

BARRETT, J., dissenting

(EPA can “issue an order to reduce, for up to a 60-day pe-
riod,  the  quantity  of  biomass-based  diesel  required . . .  ”).
Elsewhere, the statute authorizes EPA to “waive, in whole
or  in  part,  the  renewable  fuel  requirement[s]”  following  a
finding  that  compliance  would  have  a  significant  adverse
impact  on  consumers  at  the  outset  of  the  program.
§7545(o)(8)(D)(i).

Together,  these  nearby  RFP  provisions  show  that  Con-
gress had an “easy way” to delegate standalone waiver au-
thority when it wished.  Advocate Health Care Network v.
Stapleton, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 8).  Yet Con-
gress  “did  not  adopt  that  ready  alternative”  in  subpara-
graph (B)(i)—it instead used “language whose most natural
reading” does not contemplate freestanding waiver author-
ity.  Ibid.  See also ante, at 8 (looking to “the absence of any
parallel . . . language” as an interpretive “clue”).

Third, note that when assessing petitions for an “exten-
sion of the exemption,” EPA must consider “the findings of
the  study  under  subparagraph  (A)(ii)”—i.e.,  the  Depart-
ment  of  Energy  study  to  be  completed  by  2008.  See
§§7545(o)(9)(B)(i)–(ii).    The  Court’s  reading  will  require
EPA  to  examine  the  2008  study  when  evaluating  “exten-
sion” petitions filed decades from now—say, in 2050—even
though the refinery may have had long stretches of compli-
ance in the interim.  If Congress intended exemption “ex-
tension[s]”—or  waivers,  as  the  Court  treats  them—to  re-
main  available  for  decades,  why  would  it  instruct  EPA  to
keep evaluating them in light of a 2008 study?  Respond-
ents’ reading makes more sense of this instruction because
it embraces the possibility, even the likelihood, that exemp-
tions would not be available forever.  Funneling refineries
toward  compliance  means  that  it  would  be  surprising  ra-
ther than expected for EPA to be considering a 2008 study
in 2050.

Fourth,  other  provisions  help  ease  the  burden  on  small
refineries  in  times  of  economic  hardship.    To  ensure  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal statutes and precedents, making it suitable for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

argued, the Fifth Circuit was clear in Ysleta I that the Res-
toration  Act  forbids  the  Tribe  from  defying  any  of  the
State’s gaming regulations.  And, Texas stressed, under its
laws  bingo  remains  permissible  today  only  for  charitable
purposes and only subject to a broad array of regulations.

Finding itself bound by Ysleta I, the District Court sided
with Texas and enjoined the Tribe’s bingo operations.  But
the court also chose to stay its injunction pending appeal.
The  court  did  so  because  it  thought  that  either  the  Fifth
Circuit or this Court might wish to reconsider Ysleta I.  See
2019 WL 5589051, *1 (WD Tex., Mar. 28, 2019).  After all,
the Restoration Act effectively federalizes only those state
laws that prohibit gaming activities.  The statute expressly
states that nothing in it may be read as authorizing Texas
to enforce criminal or civil regulations on tribal lands.  And
when  it  comes  to  bingo,  the  State  permits  at  least  some
forms  of  the  game  subject  to  regulation.    In  the  District
Court’s judgment, “the Tribe [had] a sufficient likelihood of
success on the merits” under the terms of the Restoration
Act  “to  support  a  stay.”    Ibid.   The  District  Court  further
found that, without a stay, the injury to the Tribe would be
“truly  irreparable.”    Id.,  at  *2.    Speaking  Rock’s  revenues
account  for  60  percent  of  the  Tribe’s  operating  budget,
which supports “significant educational, governmental, and
charitable initiatives.”  Ibid; Brief for Petitioners 17.  And
when Speaking Rock closed due to one of the many previous
disputes,  tribal  unemployment  rose  from  3  to  28  percent.
See id., at 18.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit “re-reaffirm[ed]” Ysleta I and
held that the decision “resolve[d] this dispute.”  955 F. 3d
408,  414,  417  (2020).  Ysleta  I  expressly  held  that  all  of
“Texas’ gaming laws and regulations . . . operate as surro-
gate federal law on the Tribe’s reservation.”  955 F. 3d, at
414 (emphasis deleted).  And because the Tribe’s bingo op-
erations  did  not  conform  to  the  State’s  bingo  regulations,
the court held, they were impermissible.  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing a case involving tribal gaming rights and the interpretation of the Restoration Act. It delves into legal precedents, specific regulations, and the potential impact on the tribe's operations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

Opinion of the Court

effect,  HHS  employed  option  2  but  did  not  differentiate
340B  hospitals  from  other  hospitals—an  agency  practice
that was known in the wider hospital industry and in Con-
gress.

If HHS believes that this Medicare reimbursement pro-
gram overpays 340B hospitals, it may conduct a survey of
hospitals’ acquisition costs to determine whether and how
much the data justify varying the reimbursement rates by
hospital  group—for  example,  reducing  reimbursement
rates paid to 340B hospitals as compared to other hospitals.
Or if the statute’s requirement of an acquisition cost survey
is  bad  policy  or  is  working  in  unintended  ways,  HHS  can
ask Congress to change the law.

Of  course,  if  HHS  went  to  Congress,  the  agency  would
presumably  have  to  confront  the  other  side  of  the  policy
story  here:  340B  hospitals  perform  valuable  services  for
low-income and rural communities but have to rely on lim-
ited federal funding for support.  As amici before this Court,
many 340B hospitals contend that the Medicare reimburse-
ment payments at issue here “help offset the considerable
costs” that 340B providers “incur by providing health care
to the uninsured, underinsured, and those who live far from
hospitals and clinics.”  Brief for 37 State and Regional Hos-
pital Associations as Amici Curiae 7.  As the 340B hospitals
see it, the “net effect” of HHS’s 2018 and 2019 rules is “to
redistribute  funds  from  financially  strapped,  public  and
nonprofit  safety-net  hospitals  serving  vulnerable  popula-
tions—including patients without any insurance at all—to
facilities and individuals who are relatively better off.”  967
F. 3d, at 840 (Pillard, J., dissenting).  In other words, in the
view of those hospitals, HHS’s new rates eliminate the fed-
eral subsidy that has helped keep 340B hospitals afloat.  All
of which is to say that the 340B story may be more compli-
cated than HHS portrays it.  In all events, this Court is not
the forum to resolve that policy debate.

In sum, after employing the traditional tools of statutory
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the policy implications of a Medicare reimbursement program and the arguments surrounding it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

11

ALITO, J., concurring

B
The degree to which enrollment in a public school can be
regarded  as  a  delegation  of  authority  over  off-campus
speech depends on the nature of the speech and the circum-
stances under which it occurs.  I will not attempt to provide
a  complete  taxonomy  of  off-premises  speech,  but  relevant
lower court cases tend to fall into a few basic groups.  And
with respect to speech in each of these groups, the question
that  courts  must  ask  is  whether  parents  who  enroll  their
children in a public school can reasonably be understood to
have delegated to the school the authority to regulate the
speech in question.

One  category  of  off-premises  student  speech falls  easily
within the scope of the authority that parents implicitly or
explicitly provide.  This category includes speech that takes
place during or as part of what amounts to a temporal or
spatial extension of the regular school program, e.g., online
instruction  at  home,  assigned  essays  or  other  homework,
and transportation to and from school.  Also included are
statements  made  during  other  school  activities  in  which
students  participate  with  their  parents’  consent,  such  as
school trips, school sports and other extracurricular activi-
ties  that  may  take  place  after  regular  school  hours  or  off
school  premises,  and  after-school  programs  for  students
who would otherwise be without adult supervision during
that time.  Abusive speech that occurs while students are
walking to and from school may also fall into this category
on the theory that it is school attendance that puts students
on that route and in the company of the fellow students who
engage in the abuse.  The imperatives that justify the reg-
ulation of student speech while in school—the need for or-
derly and effective instruction and student protection—ap-
ply more or less equally to these off-premises activities.

Most of the specific examples of off-premises speech that
the Court mentions fall into this category.  See ante, at 6
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in a case before the Supreme Court. It discusses the boundaries of a school's authority to regulate student speech that occurs off-campus.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

BOECHLER v. COMMISSIONER

Opinion of the Court

makes this case less like Brockamp and more like Holland
v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631 (2010), in which we applied equi-
table tolling to a deadline with a single statutory exception.
See id., at 647–648.  And it bears emphasis that Brockamp
does not control simply because it also dealt with a statute
relating to tax collection.  In this case, any concerns about
the  administrability  of  applying  equitable  tolling  to
§6330(d)(1)  pale  in  comparison  to  those  at  issue  in
Brockamp, which dealt with a central provision of tax law.
The deadline here serves a far more limited and ancillary
role  in  the  tax  collection  system.  If  anything,  the  differ-
ences  between  the  statute  at  issue  in  Brockamp  and  this
one underscore the reasons why equitable tolling applies to
§6330(d)(1).

The  Commissioner  protests  that  if  equitable  tolling  is
available,  the  IRS  will  not  know  whether  it  can  proceed
with a collection action after §6330(d)(1)’s deadline passes.
The  Commissioner  acknowledges  that  the  deadline  is  al-
ready  subject  to  tolling  provisions  found  elsewhere  in  the
Tax Code—for example, tolling is available to taxpayers lo-
cated  in  a  combat  zone  or  disaster  area.  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.
37–40.  But he says that the IRS can easily account for these
contingencies  because  it  continuously  monitors  whether
any  taxpayer  is  in  a  combat  zone  or  disaster  area.  Ibid.
Tolling  the  §6330(d)(1)  deadline  outside  these  circum-
stances, the Commissioner insists, would create much more
uncertainty.  Id., at 37–38.

We are not convinced that the possibility of equitable toll-
ing for the relatively small number of petitions at issue in
this  case  will  appreciably  add  to  the  uncertainty  already
present in the process.  To take the most obvious example,
petitions for review are considered filed when mailed.  26
U. S. C. §7502(a)(1).  The 30-day deadline thus may come
and  go  before  a  petition  “filed”  within  that  time  comes  to
the IRS’s attention.  Presumably, the IRS does not monitor
when petitions for review are mailed.  So it is not as if the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of equitable tolling to a deadline in tax law. It contains legal arguments, citations to case law, and references to specific statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

303 CREATIVE LLC ET AL. v. ELENIS ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–476.  Argued December 5, 2022—Decided June 30, 2023

Lorie Smith wants to expand her graphic design business, 303 Creative
LLC,  to  include  services  for  couples  seeking  wedding  websites.    But
Ms. Smith worries that Colorado will use the Colorado Anti-Discrimi-
nation Act to compel her—in violation of the First Amendment—to cre-
ate  websites  celebrating  marriages  she  does  not  endorse.    To  clarify
her rights, Ms. Smith filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction to prevent
the  State  from  forcing  her  to  create  websites  celebrating  marriages
that  defy  her  belief  that  marriage  should  be  reserved  to  unions  be-
tween one man and one woman.

CADA prohibits all “public accommodations” from denying “the full
and equal enjoyment” of its goods and services to any customer based
on  his  race,  creed,  disability,  sexual  orientation,  or  other  statutorily
enumerated trait.  Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(2)(a).  The law defines
“public accommodation” broadly to include almost every public-facing
business in the State.  §24–34–601(1).  Either state officials or private
citizens  may  bring  actions  to  enforce  the  law.    §§24–34–306,  24–34–
602(1).  And a variety of penalties can follow any violation.

Before  the  district  court,  Ms.  Smith  and  the  State  stipulated  to  a
number of facts:  Ms. Smith is “willing to work with all people regard-
less of classifications such as race, creed, sexual orientation, and gen-
der” and “will gladly create custom graphics and websites” for clients
of  any  sexual  orientation;  she  will  not  produce  content  that  “contra-
dicts biblical truth” regardless of who orders it; Ms. Smith’s belief that
marriage is a union between one man and one woman is a sincerely
held conviction; Ms. Smith provides design services that are “expres-
sive” and her “original, customized” creations “contribut[e] to the over-
all  message”  her  business  conveys  “through  the  websites”  it  creates;
the wedding websites she plans to create “will be expressive in nature,”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

cleanup duties with the federal government.

They are hardly that.  When interpreting a statute, this
Court applies the law’s ordinary public meaning at the time
of the statute’s adoption, here 1980.  See Wisconsin Central
Ltd. v. United States, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at
9).  To  be  “potentially  responsible”  for  something  meant
then, as it does today, that a person could possibly be held
accountable  for  it;  the  outcome  is  capable  of  happening.
American Heritage Dictionary 1025 (1981); Webster’s New
Collegiate  Dictionary  893  (1980).   And  there  is  simply  no
way the landowners here are potentially, possibly, or capa-
ble of being held liable by the federal government for any-
thing.  In the first place, the federal government never no-
tified  the  landowners  that  they  might  be  responsible
parties, as it must under §122(e)(1).  Additionally, everyone
admits  that  the  period  allowed  for  bringing  a  CERLCA
long  since  passed  under
claim  against  them  has
§113(g)(2)(B).  On any reasonable account, the landowners
are  potentially  responsible  to  the  government  for  exactly
nothing.

Statutory  context  is  of  a  piece  with  the  narrow  text.
Nothing in §122 affects the rights of strangers to the federal
government’s settlement process.  Everything in the section
speaks to the details of that process.  The section requires
the government to provide all potentially responsible par-
ties with notice that they might be held responsible for re-
medial measures.  §9622(e)(1).  It instructs the government
to give a potentially responsible party a list of everyone else
so  designated.  Ibid.  It  specifies  procedures  for  sharing
proposals  and  counterproposals  among
this  group.
§§9622(e)(2)–(3).  It allows the government to release from
federal liability those who agree to settle and clean up haz-
ardous sites.  See §§9622(a)–(c).  And because parties who
settle with the federal government may seek cleanup costs
they incurred prior to settlement from other potentially re-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of a statute related to environmental cleanup.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

HUI v. CASTANEDA

Opinion of the Court

does the provision’s inclusive reference to all civil proceed-
ings  arising  out  of  “the  same  subject-matter.”    We  have
previously  cited  §233(a)  to  support  the  contention  that
“Congress follows the practice of explicitly stating when it
means to make FTCA an exclusive remedy.”  Carlson, 446
U. S.,  at  20.    The  meaning  of  §233(a)  has  become  no  less
explicit since we last made that observation.

Our  reading  of  §233(a)’s  text  is  not  undermined  by  the
fact  that  the  provision  preceded  our  decision  in  Bivens.
Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, that a Bivens
remedy  had  not  yet  been  recognized  when  §233(a)  was
enacted does not support the conclusion that Congress, in
making  the  remedy  provided  by  the  FTCA  “exclusive  of
any  other  civil  action,”  did  not  mean  what  it  said.    Lan-
guage  that  broad  easily  accommodates  both  known  and
unknown causes of action.

The  later  enacted  Federal  Employees  Liability  Reform
and  Tort  Compensation  Act  of  1988  (Westfall  Act),  102
Stat. 4563, further supports this understanding of §233(a).
The  Westfall  Act  amended  the  FTCA  to  make  its  remedy
against  the  United  States  the  exclusive  remedy  for  most
claims against Government employees arising out of their
official  conduct.5    In  providing  this  official  immunity,
Congress  used  essentially  the  same  language  as  it  did  in
§233(a), stating that the remedy against the United States
is  “exclusive  of  any  other  civil  action  or  proceeding,”
§2679(b)(1).  Notably, Congress also provided an exception
for constitutional violations.  Pursuant to §2679(b)(2), the
immunity granted by §2679(b)(1) “does not extend or apply
to  a  civil  action  against  an  employee  of  the  Government

——————

5 Prior to the Westfall Act amendments, the FTCA authorized substi-
tution  of  the  United  States  as  a  defendant  in  suits  against  federal
employees for harms arising out of conduct undertaken in the scope of
their employment, see 28 U. S. C. §1346(b) (1982 ed.), but it made that
remedy  “exclusive”  only  for  harms  resulting  from  a  federal  employee’s
operation of a motor vehicle, §2679(b).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and its implications. It delves into the interpretation of specific sections and their relationship to other legal remedies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

9

Opinion of the Court

§109(a) says nothing about geography.  The word “under”
can  mean  “[i]n  accordance  with.”    18  Oxford  English  Dic
tionary 950 (2d ed. 1989).  See also Black’s Law Dictionary
1525 (6th ed. 1990) (“according  to”).  And a nongeograph
ical  interpretation  provides  each  word  of  the  five-word
phrase with a distinct purpose.  The first two words of the
phrase,  “lawfully  made,”  suggest  an  effort  to  distinguish
those copies that were made lawfully from those that were
not,  and  the  last  three  words,  “under  this  title,”  set  forth
the  standard  of  “lawful[ness].”  Thus,  the  nongeograph-
ical  reading  is  simple,  it  promotes  a  traditional  copyright
objective  (combatting  piracy),  and  it  makes  word-by-word
linguistic sense.

The  geographical  interpretation,  however,  bristles  with
linguistic  difficulties.  It  gives  the  word  “lawfully”  little,
if any, linguistic work to do.  (How could a book be unlaw
fully “made under this title”?)  It imports geography into a
statutory  provision  that  says  nothing  explicitly  about  it.
And it is far more complex than may at first appear.

To  read  the  clause  geographically,  Wiley,  like  the  Sec
ond  Circuit  and  the  Solicitor  General,  must  first  empha
size  the  word  “under.”    Indeed,  Wiley  reads  “under  this
title”  to  mean  “in  conformance  with  the  Copyright  Act
where the Copyright Act is applicable.”  Brief for Respond
ent 15.  Wiley must then take a second step, arguing that
the  Act  “is  applicable”  only  in  the  United  States.    Ibid.
And the Solicitor General must do the same.  See Brief for
United States 6 (“A copy is ‘lawfully made under this title’
if Title 17 governs the copy’s creation and the copy is made
in  compliance  with  Title  17’s  requirements”).  See  also
post,  at  7  (GINSBURG,  J.,  dissenting)  (“under”  describes
something “governed or regulated by another”).

One  difficulty  is  that  neither  “under”  nor  any  other
word  in  the  phrase  means  “where.”  See,  e.g.,  18  Oxford
English  Dictionary,  supra,  at  947–952  (definition  of  “un
der”).  It might mean “subject to,” see post, at 6, but as this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a legal statute. It delves into the meaning of specific words and phrases within the statute, analyzing their potential interpretations and linguistic implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GEORGIA ET AL. v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–1150.  Argued December 2, 2019—Decided April 27, 2020

The Copyright Act grants monopoly protection for “original works of au-
thorship.”  17 U. S. C. §102(a).  Under the government edicts doctrine,
officials empowered to speak with the force of law cannot be the au-
thors of the works they create in the course of their official duties.

The State of Georgia has one official code—the Official Code of Geor-
gia Annotated (OCGA).  That Code includes the text of every Georgia
statute currently in force, as well as a set of non-binding annotations
that appear beneath each statutory provision.  The annotations typi-
cally include summaries of judicial opinions construing each provision,
summaries of pertinent opinions of the state attorney general, and a
list of related law review articles and other reference materials.  The
OCGA is assembled by the Code Revision Commission, a state entity
composed mostly of legislators, funded through legislative branch ap-
propriations, and staffed by the Office of Legislative Counsel.

The annotations in the current OCGA were produced by Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc., a division of the LexisNexis Group, pursuant to a
work-for-hire agreement with the Commission.  Under the agreement,
Lexis drafts the annotations under the supervision of the Commission,
which specifies what the annotations must include in exacting detail.
The agreement also states that any copyright in the OCGA vests in the
State of Georgia, acting through the Commission.
  Respondent Public.Resource.Org (PRO), a nonprofit dedicated to fa-
cilitating  public  access  to  government  records  and  legal  materials,
posted  the  OCGA  online  and  distributed  copies  to  various  organiza-
tions and Georgia officials.  After sending PRO several cease-and-de-
sist letters, the Commission sued PRO for infringing its copyright in
the  OCGA  annotations.  PRO  counterclaimed,  seeking  a  declaratory
judgment that the entire OCGA, including the annotations, fell in the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of court opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case and its holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

910

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 1, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–8848. Reed v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 1328.

No. 97–8850. Byas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1155.

No. 97–8854. Walker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 442.

No. 97–8858. Luna-Madellaga v. United States. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 1293.

No. 97–8860. Capaldi v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 307.

No. 97–8863. Burns v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8867. Daniels, aka Davis v. United States. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 379.

No. 97–8870. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 120 F. 3d 269.

No. 97–8878. McClellan v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 706 A. 2d 542.

No. 97–8879. Sindram v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 919.

No. 97–8882. Knupp v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8885. Scott v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 121 F. 3d 722.

No. 97–8892. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States. C. A.

1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 6.

No. 97–8893. Gilmartin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8905. Houser v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 867.

No. 97–8908. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 140.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal index or docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE

BREYER, J., dissenting

  Subsection  (d)(2)  then  goes  on  to  describe  (in  consider-
able detail) the “last chance” notice the State must send to
the  registrant.    In  particular,  the  notice  must  be  sent  by
forwardable  mail  so  that  the  notice  will  reach  the  regis-
trant  even  if  the  registrant  has  changed  addresses.    It
must  include  a  postage-prepaid,  preaddressed  “return
card”  that  the  registrant  may  send  back  to  the  State  to
confirm  or  correct  the  State’s  record  of  his  or  her  current
address.    And,  the  notice  must  warn  the  registrant  that
unless the card is returned, if the registrant does not vote
in the next two federal elections, then his or her name will
be removed from the list of eligible voters.

  In sum, §8 tells States the following:

*

  *

  *

•

In  general,  establish  a  removal-from-registration
program that “makes a reasonable effort” to remove
voters  who  become  ineligible  because  they  change
residences.

•  Do  not  target  registered  voters  for  removal  from
the  registration  roll  because  they  have  failed  to
vote.  However, “using the procedures described in
subsections  (c)  and  (d)  to  remove  an  individual”
from  the  federal  voter  roll  is  permissible  and  does
not violate the Failure-to-Vote prohibition.

•  The procedures described in subsections (c) and (d)
consist  of  a  two-step  removal  process  in  which  at
step  1,  the  State  uses  change-of-address  infor-
mation  (which  the  State  may  obtain,  for  instance,
from  the  Postal  Service)  to  identify  registrants
whose  addresses  may  have  changed;  and  then  at
step  2,  the  State  must  use  the  mandatory  “last
chance”  notice  procedure  described  in  subsection
(d) to confirm the change of address.

•  The “last chance” confirmation notice must be sent
by forwardable mail.  It must also include a postage-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses a specific section of law (likely related to voter registration) and its implications. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it's not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

11

Opinion of the Court

Clause legislation, “so far as it extends and conflicts with
the regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them.”
100 U. S., at 384.  There is good reason for treating Elec-
tions  Clause  legislation  differently:  The  assumption  that
Congress  is  reluctant  to  pre-empt  does  not  hold  when
Congress  acts  under  that  constitutional  provision,  which
empowers Congress to “make or alter” state election regu-
lations.  Art.  I,  §4,  cl. 1.    When  Congress  legislates  with
respect  to  the  “Times,  Places  and  Manner”  of  holding
congressional  elections,  it  necessarily  displaces  some
element  of  a  pre-existing  legal  regime  erected  by  the
States.6  Because the power the Elections Clause confers is

——————

“With it thus clearly established that the policy of Congress for so
great  a  part  of  our  constitutional  life  has  been,  and  now  is,  to
leave the conduct of the election of its members to state laws, ad-
ministered by state officers, and that whenever it has assumed to
regulate  such  elections  it  has  done  so  by  positive  and  clear  stat-
utes,  such  as  were  enacted  in  1870,  it  would  be  a  strained  and
unreasonable construction to apply to such elections this §37, orig-
inally  a  law  for  the  protection  of  the  revenue  and  for  now  fifty
years  confined  in  its  application  to  ‘Offenses  against  the  Opera-
tions  of  the  Government’  as  distinguished  from  the  processes  by
which men are selected to conduct such operations.”  243 U. S., at
485.

Gradwell  says  nothing  at  all  about  pre-emption,  or  about  how  to  con-
strue  statutes  (like  the  NVRA)  in  which  Congress  has  indisputably
undertaken “to regulate such elections.”  Ibid.

6 The dissent counters that this is so “whenever Congress legislates in
an  area  of  concurrent  state  and  federal  power.”    Post,  at  5  (opinion  of
ALITO, J.).  True, but irrelevant: Elections Clause legislation is unique
precisely because it always falls within an area of concurrent state and
federal  power.  Put  differently,  all  action  under  the  Elections  Clause
displaces  some  element  of  a  pre-existing  state  regulatory  regime,
because the text of the Clause confers the power to do exactly (and only)
that.  By  contrast,  even  laws  enacted  under  the  Commerce  Clause
(arguably the other enumerated power whose exercise is most likely to
trench on state regulatory authority) will not always implicate concur-
rent  state  power—a  prohibition  on  the  interstate  transport  of  a  com-
modity, for example.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing case law and discussing the Elections Clause of the US Constitution. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

drugs were made at those discounted prices.  And, accord-
ing to petitioners, 88% of Safeway’s 2014 cash sales for its
top 20 generic drugs were at discounted rates.

Petitioners contend that those discounted prices were ac-
tually  respondents’  “usual  and  customary”  prices—and
that,  rather  than  submitting  those  lower  prices  for  reim-
bursement, respondents instead reported their higher, non-
discounted prices.  For example, petitioners have presented
evidence that Safeway charged just $10 for 94% of its cash
sales for a 90-day supply of a cholesterol drug between 2008
and 2012.  Yet Safeway apparently reported prices as high
as $108 as “usual and customary” during that time.  And
petitioners presented evidence that, at least at some times
and for some drugs, SuperValu made more than 80% of its
cash sales for prices less than what it disclosed as its “usual
and customary” price.

To be sure, the phrase “usual and customary” on its face
appears somewhat open to interpretation.  But petitioners
contend that respondents were informed that their lower,
discounted prices were their “usual and customary” prices,
believed their discounted prices were their “usual and cus-
tomary”  prices,  and  tried  to  hide  their  discounted  prices
from  regulators  and  contractors.
  Petitioners  have  pre-
sented evidence that they claim supports that theory.  For
example, both SuperValu and Safeway received a notice in
2006  from  a  pharmacy  benefit  manager  stating  that  the
phrase “usual and customary” refers to discounted prices;
Safeway apparently received the same message from state
Medicaid  agencies.  And  executives  at  both  companies
raised  concerns  about  letting  state  agencies  or  pharmacy
benefit managers find out about their discounted prices.

For example, some emails between SuperValu executives
described their discount program as a “stealthy approach”
and noted concern for the “integrity” of their “U&C price”
claims.  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 21–1326, p. 67a (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).    An  executive  at  Safeway
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the pricing practices of pharmaceutical companies. It contains legal arguments, citations, and specific examples.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>