<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

25

Opinion of the Court

“general proposition that courts are not free to impose upon
agencies specific procedural requirements that have no ba-
sis in the APA.”  LTV Corp., 496 U. S., at 654.  Rather than
adopting this test, we focus our inquiry on whether the De-
partments satisfied the APA’s objective criteria, just as we
have in previous cases.  We conclude that they did.

Section 553(b) obligated the Departments to provide ade-
quate notice before promulgating a rule that has legal force.
As explained supra, at 22–23, the IFRs provided sufficient
notice.  Aside  from  these  notice  requirements,  the  APA
mandates that agencies “give interested persons an oppor-
tunity to participate in the rule making through submission
of written data, views, or arguments,” §553(c); states that
the final rules must include “a concise general statement of
their basis and purpose,” ibid.; and requires that final rules
must  be  published  30  days  before  they  become  effective,
§553(d).

The Departments complied with each of these statutory
procedures.  They  “request[ed]  and  encourag[ed]  public
comments on all matters addressed” in the rules—i.e., the
basis  for  the  Departments’  legal  authority,  the  rationales
for  the  exemptions,  and  the  detailed  discussion  of  the  ex-
emptions’ scope.  82 Fed. Reg. 47813, 47854.  They also gave
interested  parties  60  days  to  submit  comments.  Id.,  at
47792, 47838.  The final rules included a concise statement
of their basis and purpose, explaining that the rules were
“necessary to protect sincerely held” moral and religious ob-
jections and summarizing the legal analysis supporting the
exemptions.  83  Fed.  Reg.  57592;  see  also  id.,  at  57537–
57538.  Lastly, the final rules were published on November
15,  2018,  but  did  not  become  effective  until  January  14,
2019—more  than  30  days  after  being  published.    Id.,  at
57536, 57592.  In sum, the rules fully complied with “ ‘the
maximum  procedural  requirements  [that]  Congress  was
willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conduct-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the procedural requirements met by the Departments in promulgating a rule. It contains legal citations, analysis of statutory requirements, and references to regulatory documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

867

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No. 08–11028.  Johnson v.  Wengler, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11029.  Kirkey  v.  Mize,  Superintendent,  Pendle
ton Correctional Facility.  C. A.  7th Cir.  Certiorari denied.

No.  08–11030.  Edwards  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  260.

No.  08–11031.  Davis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  587.

No.  08–11032.  Carter  v.  Pennsylvania.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  959  A.  2d  959.

No.  08–11033.  Johnson  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  12  So.  3d  220.

No. 08–11036.  Diaz v.  Florida.  Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–11037.  Steel v.  United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  455.

No.  08–11039.  Sanchez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  925.

No.  08–11040.  Gonzalez  Rivera  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
3d Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported below:  323 Fed.  Appx. 148.

No.  08–11041.  Sharpe  v.  State  Bar  of  California.  Sup.

Ct.  Cal.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11042.  Lewis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  1.

No. 08–11043.  Long v.  Illinois.  App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  378  Ill.  App.  3d  1122,  955  N.  E.
2d  184.

No.  08–11044.  Lindsey  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  238.

No.  08–11045.  Lugo  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  2  So.  3d  1.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, court names, and decisions (certiorari denied). This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is more suitable for indexing as metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:40] PAGES PGT: OPLG

564

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Breyer, J., dissenting

beneﬁts, and working conditions were a “quid pro quo” for
automation).

Others have reached similar conclusions. The Coal Com-

mission more recently said:

“Retired coal miners have legitimate expectations of
health care beneﬁts for life; that was the promise they
received during their working lives and that is how
they planned their retirement years. That commitment
should be honored.” Coal Comm’n Report 1, App.
(CA1) 1332.

And numerous supporters of the present law read the his-
tory as showing, for example, that the “miners went to work
each day under the assumption that their health beneﬁts
would be there when they retired.”
138 Cong. Rec. 20121
(1992) (Sen. Wofford); see also id., at 20118 (Sen. Rockefeller)
(Coal Act “will see to it that the promise of health care is
kept to tens of thousands of retired coal miners and their
families”); id., at 20119 (Sen. Byrd) (Coal Act will “assure . . .
retired coal miners . . . that promises made to them during
their working years are not now . . . reneged upon”); id., at
20120 (Sen. Ford) (Coal Act assures that “promise made to
[retirees] can be kept”); id., at 34001 (Conference Report on
Coal Act) (“Under [NBCWA’s], retirees and their dependents
have been promised lifetime health care beneﬁts”).

Further, the Federal Government played a signiﬁcant role
in developing the expectations that these “promises” created.
In 1946, as mentioned above, during a strike related to
health and pension beneﬁts, the Government seized the
mines and imposed the “Krug-Lewis Agreement,” which es-
tablished the basic health beneﬁts framework. Supra, at
561; see also 11 Fed. Reg. 5593 (1946) (President Truman’s
seizure order).
In 1948, during a strike related to pension
beneﬁts, the Government again intervened to ensure contin-
ued availability of these beneﬁts.
13 Fed. Reg. 1579 (1948)
(Executive Order creating board to inquire into strike); Kraj-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a dissenting opinion in a case. It discusses the history and context of promises made regarding health benefits to coal miners.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Snippet</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

Curiae 6 (Congress sought “to preserve the independence of
those conducting inter partes review”); Brief for US Inven-
tor  Inc.  as  Amicus  Curiae  22  (“[I]t  is  plainly  evident  that
Congress would not have enacted an APJ patentability trial
system  that  was  more  political  than  the  one  they  did  en-
act”); Brief for Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae 20 (It
was a “conscious congressional decision to provide individ-
uals with the power to adjudicate (and often destroy) vested
patent  rights  with  some  level  of  independence”).  All  of
which suggests that the majority’s severability analysis de-
fies,  rather  than  implements,  legislative  intent.  At  the
least, it is surely plausible that, if faced with a choice be-
tween  giving  the  power  to  cancel  patents  to  political  offi-
cials or returning it to courts where it historically resided,
a Congress so concerned with independent decisionmaking
might have chosen the latter option.

My  point  here  isn’t  that  I  profess  any  certainty  about
what Congress would have chosen; it’s that I confess none.
Asking what a past Congress would have done if confronted
with a contingency it never addressed calls for raw specu-
lation.  Speculation that, under traditional principles of ju-
dicial  remedies,  statutory  interpretation,  and  the  separa-
tion of powers, a court of law has no authority to undertake.

*
If  each  new  case  this  Court  entertains  about  the  AIA
highlights more and more problems with the statute, for me
the  largest  of  them  all  is  the  wrong  turn  we  took  in  Oil
States.  There, the Court upheld the power of the Executive
Branch to strip vested property rights in patents despite a
long  history  in  this  country  allowing  only  courts  that  au-
thority.  See 584 U. S., at ___–___ (GORSUCH, J., dissenting)
(slip op., at 8–10).  In the course of rejecting a separation-
of-powers challenge to this novel redistribution of historic
authority, the Court acknowledged the possibility that per-
mitting politically motivated executive officials to “cancel”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into legal arguments regarding the America Invents Act (AIA) and its implications for patent rights. The language is formal and uses legal terminology, suggesting it's part of a court decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

7

SCALIA, J., dissenting

from the elephant in the room: that the Government is not
forcing anyone to say  anything.  What Congress has done
here—requiring an ideological commitment relevant to the
Government  task  at  hand—is  approved  by  the  Constitu-
tion  itself.  Americans  need  not  support  the  Constitution;
they may be Communists or anarchists.  But “[t]he Sena-
tors  and  Representatives  . . .  ,  and  the  Members  of  the
several  State  Legislatures,  and  all  executive  and  judicial
Officers,  both  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  several
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
[the] Constitution.”  U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3.  The Fram-
ers  saw  the  wisdom  of  imposing  affirmative  ideological
commitments prerequisite to assisting in the government’s
work.  And so should we.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia. It presents an argument about the constitutionality of requiring ideological commitments for certain government roles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxxxvii

Page

1105

1061

922

Lnu; Sweed v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lnu v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lobato v. Nevada  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Local.  For labor union, see name of trade.

1114

Lock v. General Services Administration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919

Lockard v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  856,1065

Locke; Murray v.
974

Lockett v. Commissioner
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
67

Locomotive Eng’rs Gen. Comm. Adjustment; Union Pac. R. Co. v.
940

Locurto v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035

Loera v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Logan v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Loggins v. Cline  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

Lomax v. Mize  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
890

Lomax v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Lombardi; Duvall v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
867

Long v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
853

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Long v. United States
Long v. Wood Mizer Products Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  971,1140

916

Longoria v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035

Longstreet v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965

Lopez v. Holder
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Lopez v. Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Lopez v. Lewis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Lopez v. McKune  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lopez v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950

1057

Lopez v. Thurmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lopez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  852,900,1061,1101,1132

Lopez v. Wallace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  951,1066

935

Lopez-Ajuado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
976

Lopez-Castas v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128

Lopez-Frausto v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lopez-Garcia v. United States
993

Lopez-Leon v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132

Lopez-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
882

Lopez-Moldonado v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
983

Lopez Ortiz v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919

Loredo-Olivera v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Los Angeles; Metro Lights, L. L. C. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Social Services; Sandoval v.
1050

Louisiana v. Abshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

Louisiana; Birtha v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

Louisiana; Crandell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Louisiana; Diggs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

3
The majority’s interpretation—that criminality turns on
whether  there  is  a  single  exception  to  a  prohibition—also
leads to awkward results.  Under its reading, an employee
at a credit-card company who is forbidden to obtain the pur-
chasing history of clients violates the Act when he obtains
that data about his ex-wife—unless his employer tells him
he can obtain and transfer purchase history data when an
account  has  been  flagged  for  possible  fraudulent  activity.
The same is true of the person who, minutes before resign-
ing, deletes every file on a computer.  See Royal Truck &
Trailer Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Kraft, 974 F. 3d 756, 758 (CA6
2020).  So  long  as  an  employee  could  obtain or  alter  each
file in some hypothetical circumstance, he is immune.  But
the person who plays a round of solitaire is a criminal under
the majority’s reading if his employer, concerned about dis-
tractions,  categorically  prohibits  accessing  the  “games”
folder in Windows.  It is an odd interpretation to “stak[e] so
much”  on  the  presence  or  absence  of  a  single  exception.
Ante, at 20.

The majority’s interpretation is especially odd when ap-
plied to other clauses in the statute.  Section 1030(a)(1) pro-
hibits  “exceeding  authorized  access”  to  obtain  “restricted
data . . . with reason to believe that such information so ob-
tained could be used to the injury of the United States, or
to  the  advantage  of  any  foreign  nation,”  and  retaining  or
distributing that data.  The term “restricted data” is defined
to include “all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or
utilization of atomic weapons.”  42 U. S. C. §2014(y).  Under
the  majority’s  reading,  so  long  as  a  scientist  may  obtain
blueprints for atomic weapons in at least one circumstance,
he  would  be  immune  if  he  obtained  that  data  for  the  im-
proper purpose of helping an unfriendly nation build a nu-
clear  arsenal.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  force  this  provi-
sion—in  place  in  substantially  similar  form  since  1984—
has under the majority’s reading.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Van Buren v. United States*.  It argues against the majority's interpretation of a law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 89 (2000)

99

Opinion of the Court

that limit OPA 90’s preemptive effect.
(2) Portions of the
opinion that discuss the Coast Guard regulations are incon-
sistent with Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent.”
Id., at 1221. We granted certiorari and now reverse. 527
U. S. 1063 (1999).

II

The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area
where the federal interest has been manifest since the begin-
ning of our Republic and is now well established. The au-
thority of Congress to regulate interstate navigation, with-
out embarrassment from intervention of the separate States
and resulting difﬁculties with foreign nations, was cited in
the Federalist Papers as one of the reasons for adopting the
Constitution. E. g., The Federalist Nos. 44, 12, 64.
In 1789,
the First Congress enacted a law by which vessels with a
federal certiﬁcate were entitled to “the beneﬁts granted by
any law of the United States.” Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 55. The importance of maritime trade and the
emergence of maritime transport by steamship resulted in
further federal licensing requirements enacted to promote
trade and to enhance the safety of crew members and passen-
gers. See Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, 5 Stat. 304; Act of
Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 94, 5 Stat. 626.
In 1871, Congress enacted
a comprehensive scheme of regulation for steam powered
vessels,
including provisions for licensing captains, chief
mates, engineers, and pilots. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 100,
16 Stat. 440.

The Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Phila-
delphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How.
299 (1852), stated that there would be instances in which
state regulation of maritime commerce is inappropriate even
absent the exercise of federal authority, although in the case
before it the Court found the challenged state regulations
were permitted in light of
local needs and conditions.
Where Congress had acted, however, the Court had little
difﬁculty in ﬁnding state vessel requirements were pre-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 89 (2000). It contains legal citations, references to previous cases, and discusses the preemptive effect of federal law on state regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

The  first—“structural  immunity”—derives  from  the
structure of the Constitution.  See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.
v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 16).  Because
structural  immunity  is  a  constitutional  entitlement  of  a
sovereign State, it applies in both federal tribunals, Semi-
nole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 51–52 (1996), and
in state tribunals, Alden, 527 U. S., at 712.  And it applies
regardless of whether the plaintiff is a citizen of the same
State, Allen v. Cooper, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at
2), a citizen of a different State, or a non-citizen—like a for-
eign nation, Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S.
313, 330 (1934), or an Indian tribe, Blatchford v. Native Vil-
lage of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 781 (1991).  Structural im-
munity sounds in personal jurisdiction, so the sovereign can
waive that immunity by “consent” if it wishes.  Hyatt, 587
U. S.,  at  ___–___  (slip  op.,  at  6–7);  see  Wisconsin  Dept.  of
Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).

The second—what is properly termed “Eleventh Amend-
ment  immunity”—derives  from  the  text  of  the  Eleventh
Amendment.  In  light  of  its  swift  adoption  in  response  to
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), this Court has read
the  Eleventh  Amendment  as  pointing  to  the  structural
principle just discussed.  See Allen, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 4).  But the Eleventh Amendment can do two things
at once.  See Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina
Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743, 753 (2002).  In addition to
pointing us back to the States’ structural immunity, it also
provides an ironclad rule for a particular category of diver-
sity suits:

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

——————
is why this Court has found that state-law immunity provides an ade-
quate  and  independent  state  ground  for  affirming  a  state-court  judg-
ment.  E.g., Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Musgrove, 335 U. S. 900 (1949)
(per curiam); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U. S. 32, 34 (1918).  Because PennEast
sued in federal court, state-law immunity is not implicated here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Penneast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey. It discusses concepts of sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xxxiv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

1037

Clark; Glogower v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Clark; Gomez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Clark v. Jenkins  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1082

Clark v. Pennsylvania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  881,908,962,1081

Clark v. United States
885

Clark; Wilhelm v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

Clarke; DeNictolis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Clarke; Dyke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Clarke; Milwaukee Deputy Sheriff ’s Assn. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1026,1077

Clarke v. United States
Claudio-Pantojas v. United States
919

Clay v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  895,957

1093

Clayborn v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

Clayton v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Welfare  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clements v. United States
892

Clemmons v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clervil v. McNeil
1154

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cleveland v. Abernathy
1152

Cline; Loggins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1046

Cline v. Utah  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clinton v. DiGuglielmo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

Cluck, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,1108

Cluck v. Washington  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  984,1108

856

Clutter v. Ballard  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

CNF, Inc.; Paulsen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coastal Tank Cleaning; Nitschke v.
1053

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

Coats v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Cobb County Superior Court Judges; Spann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Cobble v. Owens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959

Cochran v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coffey; Hendrix v.
817

Coffey v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, L. P.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
803

Coffman; Penk v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1061

Coffman v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1043

Cohen v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1021

Cohen v. Syme  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cole v. Branker
820

Cole; Haeg v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1009

Cole; Randolph v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cole v. Texas
Coleman; Cotton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

Coleman; Dorsey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  841,1064

1053

Coleman v. Ott  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

27

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

1988, No. 88–603, p. 3 (Flint Amicus Brief ).  In McGirt, the
federal  government  once  more  acknowledged  that  States
cannot  prosecute  crimes  by  or  against  tribal  members
within still-extant tribal reservations.  See Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae in McGirt v. Oklahoma, O. T. 2019,
No.  18–9526,  p. 38.    In  this  case,  the  government  has  es-
poused the same view yet again.  See Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 4; see also Dept. of Justice, Criminal Re-
source Manual 685 (updated Jan. 22, 2020).9

In the past, even Oklahoma has more or less conceded the
point.  The last time Oklahoma was before us, it asked this
Court to usurp congressional authority and disestablish the
Creek Reservation because, otherwise, the State “would not
have jurisdiction over” “crimes committed against Indians”
within its boundaries.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. in McGirt v. Ok-
lahoma, No. 18–9526, O. T. 2019, p. 54; see also McGirt, 591
U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 37–38).  In 1991, Oklahoma’s
attorney  general  formally  resolved  that  major  “[c]rimes
committed by or against Indians . . . are under the exclusive
province of the United States,” while Tribes retain exclusive
jurisdiction  over  “minor  crimes  committed  by  Indians.”
Haney, 22 Okla. Opp. Atty. Gen. 71, 1991 WL 567868, *3.
And Oklahoma’s own courts have recently taken the same
position even in the face of vehement opposition from the
State’s  executive  branch.  See,  e.g.,  Spears,  485  P. 3d,  at
875, 877.

——————

9 As sometimes happens when the government considers a legal ques-
tion over centuries, differing views have occasionally popped up.  In 1979,
the  Office  of  Legal  Counsel  opined—with  little  analysis—that  States
might be able to exercise concurrent criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands,
though it conceded the question was “exceedingly difficult.”  3 Op. OLC
111, 117, 120.  This kind of surface-level, hedged analysis is hardly ro-
bust evidence.  In any event, the Executive Branch reverted to its tradi-
tional position in short order.  That makes the Court’s repeated reliance
on this isolated opinion—and its failure to acknowledge the mountain of
contradictory evidence—especially bewildering.  See ante, at 12–16.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It cites legal precedents and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

THOMAS, J., dissenting

ciples of property law, the majority contends that its inter-
pretation is more harmonious with a separate clause in the
statute that forbids “access[ing] a computer without author-
ization.”  §1030(a)(2).  In the majority’s telling, this clause
requires  “a  gates-up-or-down  inquiry—one  either  can  or
cannot access a computer system,” so it makes sense to read
the “exceeds authorized access” clause in the same sentence
to include the same approach.  Ante, at 13–14.

I agree that the two clauses should be read harmoniously,
but there is no reason to believe that if the gates are up in
a  single  instance,  then  they  must  remain  up  indefinitely.
An employee who works with sensitive defense information
may  generally  have  authority  to  log  into  his  employer-is-
sued laptop while away from the office.  But if his employer
instructs him not to log in while on a trip to a country where
network  connections  cannot  be  trusted,  he  accesses  the
computer without authorization if he logs in anyway.  For
both clauses, discerning whether the gates are up or down
requires considering the circumstances that cause the gates
to move.

In fact, my reading harmonizes both clauses with estab-
lished concepts of property law.  Property law generally pro-
tects  against  both  unlawful  entry  and  unlawful  use  after
entry.  E.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §214, Comment
e, at 408–409; 8 C. J. S., Bailments §43, at 480–481.  The
same is true here.  The police department could protect in-
formation  by  prohibiting  officers  from  logging  in  with  an
improper purpose, but that would do little good if an officer
logged  in  at  the  start  of  his  shift  with  proper  intent  and
then,  hours  later  while  still  logged  in,  conducted  license-
plate searches in exchange for payment.  By including both
the  “without  authorization”  and  “exceeds  authorized  ac-
cess”  clauses,  Congress  ensured  protection  against  im-
proper login as well as misuse after proper login.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the interpretation of a statute related to computer access.  The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1143

1138

Thomas, J., dissenting

tory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufﬁciently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment
and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see 21 Cal. 4th, at 130 (plurality opinion)
(“California courts have adopted the [Harris] standard in evalu-
ating claims under the FEHA”).
It simply cannot be known in
advance whether a particular utterance will create (or recreate)
a hostile environment under this standard, and speculation simply
does not sufﬁce to rebut the heavy presumption against a prior
restraint. See Southeastern Promotions, supra, at 561; New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 725–726 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment tolerates abso-
lutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon
surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result”).
The alternative remedy of a money damages judgment for future
violations would solve the problem. Second, there has been no
showing that the prospect of a money damages judgment for
future violations would fall short of deterring petitioners from
recreating a hostile environment, especially when a second money
damages judgment might include hefty punitive damages and
attorney’s fees. See 21 Cal. 4th, at 194 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Indeed, it appears from the transcript of the injunction hearing
held in 1994 that Lawrence had not engaged in any harassing
speech or conduct since 1992. See App. to Brief in Opposition
A9. Third, the prohibition applies without regard to whether the
utterance is directed at, or within earshot of, respondents (or, for
that matter, any Latino employee), and contains no exception for
speech that might contribute to reasoned debate.

My colleagues are perhaps dissuaded from granting certiorari
by the paucity of lower court decisions addressing the First
Amendment implications of workplace harassment law, and by the
incomplete factual record in this case. Neither is a persuasive
reason to deny certiorari. First, we must remember that we deal
here with a claim at the core of the First Amendment—that the
State is suppressing speech that it dislikes. For the same reason
that we evaluate prior restraints under a heavy presumption
against their validity (the harm from delay), we should decide the
issue now. And the thorough treatment of the issues by the
several opinions below makes it especially unnecessary to await
a split in the lower courts. Second, while it is true that the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a dissenting judge. It discusses the First Amendment implications of workplace harassment law and cites relevant case law.  The language and structure suggest it is part of the main body of the legal document, not a preface or table of contents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
Opinion of the Court

. . .  court  filings  in  dozens  of  cases—encompassing  hun-
dreds of organizations.”  Id., at 47802; see also id., at 47806.
If the Departments did not look to RFRA’s requirements or
discuss RFRA at all when formulating their solution, they
would certainly be susceptible to claims that the rules were
arbitrary and capricious for failing to consider an important
aspect of the problem.12  Thus, respondents’ argument that
the Departments erred by looking to RFRA as a guide when
framing the religious exemption is without merit.

III
Because we hold that the Departments had authority to
promulgate the exemptions, we must next decide whether
the 2018 final rules are procedurally invalid.  Respondents
present two arguments on this score.  Neither is persuasive.

A
Unless  a  statutory  exception  applies,  the  APA  requires
agencies to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the
Federal Register before promulgating a rule that has legal
force.  See 5 U. S. C. §553(b).  Respondents point to the fact
that the 2018 final rules were preceded by a document en-
titled  “Interim  Final  Rules  with  Request  for  Comments,”
not a document entitled “General Notice of Proposed Rule-
making.”  They claim that since this was insufficient to sat-
isfy §553(b)’s requirement, the final rules were procedurally
invalid.  Respondents  are  incorrect.  Formal  labels  aside,

——————

12 Here, too, the Departments have consistently taken the position that
their rules had to account for RFRA in response to comments that the
rules would violate that statute.  See Dept. of Labor, FAQs About Afford-
able Care Act Implementation Part 36, pp. 4–5 (2017) (2016 Request for
Information); 78 Fed. Reg. 39886–39887 (2013 rule); 77 Fed. Reg. 8729
(2012 final rule).  As the 2017 IFR explained, the Departments simply
reached a different conclusion on whether the accommodation satisfied
RFRA.  See 82 Fed. Reg. 47800–40806 (summarizing the previous ways
in which the Departments accounted for RFRA and providing a lengthy
explanation for the changed position).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of a court ruling. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

23

Opinion of the Court

III
Having  made  the  constitutional  standard  endorsed  in
Heller  more  explicit,  we  now  apply  that  standard  to  New
York’s proper-cause requirement.

A
It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two or-
dinary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people”
whom  the  Second  Amendment  protects.  See  Heller,  554
U. S.,  at  580.    Nor  does  any  party  dispute  that  handguns
are  weapons  “in  common  use”  today  for  self-defense.  See
id.,  at  627;  see  also  Caetano,  577  U. S.,  at  411–412.    We
therefore  turn  to  whether  the  plain  text  of  the  Second
Amendment protects Koch’s and Nash’s proposed course of
conduct—carrying handguns publicly for self-defense.

We have little difficulty concluding that it does.  Respond-
ents do not dispute this.  See Brief for Respondents 19.  Nor
could they.  Nothing in the Second Amendment’s text draws
a home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep
and bear arms.  As we explained in Heller, the “textual ele-
ments” of the Second Amendment’s operative clause— “the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed”—“guarantee  the  individual  right  to  possess  and
carry weapons in case of confrontation.”  554 U. S., at 592.
Heller further confirmed that the right to “bear arms” refers
to the right to “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or
in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being
armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case
of conflict with another person.”  Id., at 584 (quoting Mus-
carello  v.  United  States,  524  U. S.  125,  143  (1998)  (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting); internal quotation marks omitted).

This  definition  of  “bear”  naturally  encompasses  public
carry.  Most gun owners do not wear a holstered pistol at
their hip in their bedroom or while sitting at the dinner ta-
ble.    Although  individuals  often  “keep”  firearms  in  their
home, at the ready for self-defense, most do not “bear” (i.e.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen*. It discusses the Second Amendment and its application to public carry of handguns.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL. v.

COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF COLORADO

No. 16–111.  Argued December 5, 2017—Decided June 4, 2018

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., is a Colorado bakery owned and operated
by Jack Phillips, an expert  baker and devout Christian.  In 2012 he
told a same-sex couple that he would not create a cake for their wed-
ding celebration because of his religious opposition to same-sex mar-
riages—marriages that Colorado did not then recognize—but that he
would sell them other baked goods, e.g., birthday cakes.  The couple
filed  a  charge  with  the  Colorado  Civil  Rights  Commission  (Commis-
sion)  pursuant  to  the  Colorado  Anti-Discrimination  Act  (CADA),
which prohibits, as relevant here, discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation in a “place of business engaged in any sales to the public and
any place offering services . . . to the public.”  Under CADA’s admin-
istrative review system, the Colorado Civil Rights Division first found
probable  cause  for  a  violation  and  referred  the  case  to  the  Commis-
sion.  The Commission then referred the case for a formal hearing be-
fore  a  state  Administrative  Law  Judge  (ALJ),  who  ruled  in  the  cou-
ple’s favor.  In so doing, the ALJ rejected Phillips’ First Amendment
claims:  that  requiring  him  to  create  a  cake  for  a  same-sex  wedding
would  violate  his  right  to  free  speech  by  compelling  him  to  exercise
his artistic talents to express a message with which he disagreed and
would  violate  his  right  to  the  free  exercise  of  religion.    Both  the
Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The Commission’s actions in this case violated the Free Exercise

Clause.  Pp. 9–18.

(a) The laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must,
protect  gay  persons  and  gay  couples  in  the  exercise  of  their  civil
rights, but religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are
protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___, ___.  While it is unexceptional
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a Supreme Court syllabus, which provides a summary of the case and the Court's holding. It is not the actual content of the legal argument or the decision itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

3

Syllabus

sary to guard against that concern.  Pp. 25–26.

646 F. 3d 461, affirmed.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a con-
curring  opinion.  GINSBURG,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which
BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and a syllabus, which is typically not considered the main body of a legal document meant for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation and Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

29

ALITO, J., dissenting

lidity of Inspector Lunetta’s assertion, and given the loca-
tion of the City’s seven ranges, the assertion is more than
dubious.12

Inspector  Lunetta’s  final  justification  for  the  travel  re-
strictions was only marginally stronger.  It goes like this.
Suppose that a patrol officer stops a premises licensee and
finds  that  this  individual  is  carrying  a  gun,  and  suppose
that that the licensee says he is taking the gun to a range
to  practice  or  is  returning  from  a  range.    If  the  range  in
question is one in the City, the officer will be better able to
check the story than if the range is outside the officer’s ju-
risdiction.  App. 79–80.

How strong is this argument?  The City presumably has
access to records of cases in which licensees were cited for
unauthorized  possession  of  guns outside  the  home,  and  it
failed to provide any evidence that holders of target licenses
had  used  their  right  to  practice  at  out-of-city  ranges  as  a
pretext.  And it is dubious that it would be much harder for
an officer to check whether a licensee was really headed for
an out-of-city range as opposed to one in the City.  If a li-
censee claims to be headed for a range in the City, the of-
ficer can check whether the range is open and whether the
individual appears to be on a route that plausibly leads to
that range.  But how much more difficult would it be to do
the  same  thing  if  the  range  is  in  one  of  the  counties  that
border New York City or across the Hudson River in New
Jersey?  A  phone  call  would  be  enough  to  determine  the
range’s operating hours, and the route would still be easy

——————

12 Two  of  the  seven  City  ranges  (28%)  were  located  in  Staten  Island
(home to under 6% of the City’s residents), and the trip there from the
other  boroughs  is  not  quick.   Another  range  (the  only  one  open  to  the
public) was located in the north Bronx.  See Brief for Appellants in No.
15–638, p. 32 (CA2) (explaining that, for plaintiff Colantone, “traveling
from his home in Staten Island to the authorized range Olinville Arms
in the Bronx[ involves] a far longer drive” than to a shooting club in New
Jersey).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It delves into the reasoning behind a legal argument regarding travel restrictions for gun owners.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

termined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new haz-
ards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to
protect employees from such danger.”  §655(c)(1).

Acting  under  that  statutory  command,  OSHA  promul-
gated  the  emergency  temporary  standard  at  issue  here.
The Standard obligates employers with at least 100 employ-
ees  to  require  that  an  employee  either  (1) be  vaccinated
against COVID–19 or (2) take a weekly COVID–19 test and
wear  a  mask  at  work.    86  Fed.  Reg.  61551–61553.    The
Standard thus encourages vaccination, but permits employ-
ers to adopt a masking-or-testing policy instead.  (The ma-
jority obscures this choice by insistently calling the policy a
“vaccine mandate.”  Ante, at 1, 4, 7, 8.)  Further, the Stand-
ard does not apply in a variety of settings.  It exempts em-
ployees who are at a reduced risk of infection because they
work  from  home,  alone,  or  outdoors.  See  86  Fed.  Reg.
61551.  It makes exceptions based on religious objections or
medical  necessity.  See  id.,  at  61552.  And  the  Standard
does not constrain any employer able to show that its “con-
ditions,  practices,  means,  methods,  operations,  or  pro-
cesses” make its workplace equivalently “safe and health-
ful.”
29  U. S. C.  §655(d).    Consistent  with  statutory
requirements,  the  Standard  lasts  only  six  months.  See
§655(c)(3).

Multiple lawsuits challenging the Standard were filed in
the  Federal  Courts  of  Appeals.    The  applicants  asked  the
courts  to  stay  the  Standard’s  implementation  while  their
legal challenges were pending.  The lawsuits were consoli-
dated in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  See 28
U. S. C. §2112(a)(3).  That court dissolved a stay previously
entered,  thus  allowing  the  Standard  to  take  effect.  See
In re MCP No. 165, 2021 WL 5989357, ___ F. 4th ___ (2021).
The applicants now ask this Court to stay the Standard for
the duration of the litigation.  Today, the Court grants that
request, contravening clear legal principles and itself caus-
ing grave danger to the Nation’s workforce.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) emergency temporary standard regarding COVID-19 vaccinations in the workplace.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

omitted).

its  narrower

The  Court’s  “continuous  surface  connection”  test
disregards the ordinary meaning of “adjacent.”  The Court’s
mistake  is  straightforward:  The  Court  essentially  reads
“adjacent”  to  mean  “adjoining.”    As  a  result,  the  Court
excludes  wetlands  that  the  text  of  the  Clean  Water  Act
covers—and  that  the  Act  since  1977  has  always  been
interpreted to cover.
In  support  of

“continuous  surface
connection”  interpretation  of  covered  wetlands,  the  Court
emphasizes that the 1972 Act’s overarching statutory term
is “waters of the United States.”  Ante, at 19.  And the Court
suggests that the term “waters of the United States” cannot
be  interpreted  to  cover  “adjacent  wetlands”  but  only
“adjoining  wetlands.”  See  ante,  at  19–22.  But  in  1977,
Congress itself expressly made clear that the “waters of the
United States” include “adjacent” wetlands.  91 Stat. 1601.
And Congress would not have used the word “adjacent” in
1977  if  Congress  actually  meant  “adjoining,”  particularly
because  Congress  used  the  word  “adjoining”  in  several
other places in the Clean Water Act.  33 U. S. C. §§1321(b)–
(c), 1346(c); see also §§1254(n)(4), 2802(5).

To  bolster  its  unorthodox  statutory  interpretation,  the
Court resorts to a formula:  “A minus B, which includes C.”
Ante, at 19.  That just seems to be a fancier way of arguing
(against  all
indications  of  ordinary  meaning)  that
“adjacent”  means  “adjoining.”  But  again  the  Court  is
imposing a restriction nowhere to be found in the text.  In
the  end,  the  Court  has  no  good  answer  for  why  Congress
used  the  term  “adjacent”  instead  of  “adjoining”  when
Congress enacted §1344(g) in 1977.1

——————

1 Perhaps  recognizing  the  difficulty  of  reading  the  Act  to  mean
“adjoining”  when  it  actually  says  “adjacent,”  the  Court  at  one  point
suggests that “adjoining” is equivalent to “adjacent.”  Ante, at 19–20.  As
a  matter  of  ordinary  meaning,  as  explained  at  length  above,  that  is
incorrect.  Adjoining wetlands are a subset of adjacent wetlands, not the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in a case concerning the Clean Water Act. It delves into the interpretation of the term "adjacent" as it relates to wetlands covered under the Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

GOLAN v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

  “(1)  ENFORCEMENT  OF  COPYRIGHT  IN  RESTORED  WORKS
IN  THE  ABSENCE  OF  A  RELIANCE  PARTY.—As  against  any
party who is not a reliance party, the remedies provided in
chapter  5  of  this  title  shall  be  available  on  or  after  the
date  of  restoration  of  a  restored  copyright  with  respect
to an act of infringement of the restored copyright that is
commenced on or after the date of restoration.
  “(2)  ENFORCEMENT  OF  COPYRIGHT  IN  RESTORED  WORKS
AS  AGAINST  RELIANCE  PARTIES.—As  against  a  reliance
party, except to the extent provided in paragraphs (3) and
(4), the remedies provided in chapter 5 of this title shall be
available,  with  respect  to  an  act  of  infringement  of  a  re-
stored  copyright,  on  or  after  the  date  of  restoration  of
the restored copyright if the requirements of either of the
following subparagraphs are met:

“(A)(i) The owner of the restored copyright (or such
owner’s  agent)  or  the  owner  of  an  exclusive  right  therein
(or  such  owner’s  agent)  files  with  the  Copyright  Office,
during  the  24-month  period  beginning  on  the  date  of  res-
toration,  a  notice  of  intent  to  enforce  the  restored  copy-
right; and

“(ii)(I) the act of infringement commenced after the
end of the 12-month period beginning on the date of publi-
cation of the notice in the Federal Register;

“(II)  the  act  of  infringement  commenced  before  the
end of the 12-month period described in subclause (I) and
continued after the end of that 12-month period, in which
case  remedies  shall  be  available  only  for  infringement
occurring after the end of that 12-month period; or

“(III)  copies  or  phonorecords  of  a  work  in  which
copyright  has  been  restored  under  this  section  are  made
after  publication  of  the  notice  of  intent  in  the  Federal
Register.

“(B)(i) The owner of the restored copyright (or such
owner’s  agent)  or  the  owner  of  an  exclusive  right  therein
(or  such  owner’s  agent)  serves  upon  a  reliance  party  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text, specifically from a court opinion. It outlines the legal framework for enforcing copyright in restored works.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12 MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

context.  See, e.g., Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Con-
sulting, Inc., 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 11) (stat-
utory interpretation “begins with the text”).  The first sign
that the statute imposed an obligation is its mandatory lan-
guage: “shall.”  “Unlike the word ‘may,’ which implies dis-
cretion,  the  word  ‘shall’  usually  connotes  a  requirement.”
Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U. S.
___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 9); see also Lexecon Inc. v. Mil-
berg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35 (1998)
(observing that “ ‘shall’ ” typically “creates an obligation im-
pervious  to  . . .  discretion”).  Section  1342  uses  the  com-
mand three times: The HHS Secretary “shall establish and
administer” the Risk Corridors program from 2014 to 2016,
“shall  provide”  for  payments  according  to  a  precise  statu-
tory formula, and “shall pay” insurers for losses exceeding
the statutory threshold.  §§1342(a), (b)(1), 114 Stat. 211, 42
U. S. C. §§18062(a), (b)(1).

Section  1342’s  adjacent  provisions  also  underscore  its
mandatory nature.  In §1341 (a reinsurance program) and
§1343 (a risk-adjustment program), the Affordable Care Act
differentiates  between  when  the  HHS  Secretary  “shall”
take  certain  actions  and  when  she  “may”  exercise  discre-
tion.
See  §1341(b)(2),  124  Stat.  209,  42  U. S. C.
§18061(b)(2) (“[T]he Secretary . . . shall include” a formula
that  “may  be  designed”  in  multiple  ways);  §1343(b),  124
Stat.  212,  42  U. S. C.  §18063(b)  (“The  Secretary  . . .  shall
establish” and “may utilize” certain criteria).  Yet Congress
chose mandatory terms for §1342.  “When,” as is the case
here, Congress “distinguishes between ‘may’ and ‘shall,’ it
is  generally  clear  that  ‘shall’  imposes  a  mandatory  duty.”
Kingdomware, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).

Nothing in §1342 requires the Risk Corridors program to
be budget neutral, either.  Nor does the text suggest that
the Secretary’s payments to unprofitable plans pivoted on
profitable plans’ payments to the Secretary, or that a par-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the interpretation of a specific section of the Affordable Care Act. The language is formal and discusses legal precedents, statutory interpretation, and the meaning of specific words within the law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

GORSUCH, J., concurring

tory texts, and, more particularly, [by] giving narrow con-
structions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be
thought to be unconstitutional.”  Mistretta v. United States,
488 U. S. 361, 373, n. 7 (1989).  In fact, this Court applied
the major questions doctrine in “all corners of the adminis-
trative  state,”  whether  the  issue  at  hand  involved  an
agency’s asserted power to regulate tobacco products, ban
drugs used in physician-assisted suicide, extend Clean Air
Act regulations to private homes, impose an eviction mora-
torium, or enforce a vaccine mandate.  Ante, at 17; see FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 160
(2000); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 267 (2006); Util-
ity Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324 (2014);
Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Hu-
man Servs., 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (per curiam) (slip op.,
at  6);  National  Federation  of  Independent  Business  v.
OSHA,  595  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2022)  (per curiam)  (slip  op.,
at 6).3

The  Court  has  applied  the  major  questions  doctrine  for
the  same  reason  it  has  applied  other  similar  clear-state-
ment rules—to ensure that the government does “not inad-
vertently cross constitutional lines.”  Barrett 175.  And the
constitutional  lines  at  stake  here  are  surely  no  less  im-
portant than those this Court has long held sufficient to jus-
tify  parallel  clear-statement  rules.  At  stake  is  not  just  a
question of retroactive liability or sovereign immunity, but
basic questions about self-government, equality, fair notice,

——————

3 At times, this Court applied the major questions doctrine more like
an  ambiguity  canon.   See  FDA  v. Brown &  Williamson  Tobacco  Corp.,
529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000).  Ambiguity canons merely instruct courts on
how to “choos[e] between equally plausible interpretations of ambiguous
text,” and are thus weaker than clear-statement rules.  Barrett 109.  But
our  precedents  have  usually  applied  the  doctrine  as  a  clear-statement
rule, and the Court today confirms that is the proper way to apply it.  See
ante, at 19–20, 28.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of West Virginia v. EPA. It delves into the application of the major questions doctrine in administrative law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

KENNEDY, J., dissenting

cannot  claim  that  his  ‘property’  was  invaded”).    The  rec-
ords were the business entities’ records, plain and simple.
The defendants had no reason to believe the records were
owned  or  controlled  by  them  and  so  could  not  assert  a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the records.

The second principle supporting Miller and Smith is the
longstanding  rule  that  the  Government  may  use  compul-
sory  process  to  compel  persons  to  disclose  documents  and
other  evidence  within  their  possession  and  control.    See
United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 709 (1974) (it is an
“ancient proposition of law” that “the public has a right to
every  man’s  evidence”  (internal  quotation  marks  and
alterations  omitted)).  A  subpoena  is  different  from  a
warrant in its force and intrusive power.  While a warrant
allows  the  Government  to  enter  and  seize  and  make  the
examination itself, a subpoena simply requires the person
to whom it is directed to make the disclosure.  A subpoena,
moreover,  provides  the  recipient  the  “opportunity  to  pre-
sent objections” before complying, which further mitigates
the intrusion.  Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U. S. 186, 195 (1946).

For  those  reasons  this  Court  has  held  that  a  subpoena
for  records,  although  a  “constructive”  search  subject  to
Fourth Amendment constraints, need not comply with the
procedures applicable to warrants—even when challenged
by  the  person  to  whom  the  records  belong.    Id.,  at  202,
208.  Rather,  a  subpoena  complies  with  the  Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement so long as it is
“ ‘sufficiently  limited  in  scope,  relevant  in  purpose,  and
specific  in  directive  so  that  compliance  will  not  be  unrea-
sonably  burdensome.’ ”    Donovan  v.  Lone  Steer,  Inc.,  464
U. S.  408,  415  (1984).    Persons  with  no  meaningful  inter-
ests in the records sought by a subpoena, like the defend-
ants  in  Miller  and  Smith,  have  no  rights  to  object  to  the
records’  disclosure—much  less  to  assert  that  the  Govern-
ment  must  obtain  a  warrant  to  compel  disclosure  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kennedy. It delves into legal arguments regarding the Fourth Amendment and the use of subpoenas for business records.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
Syllabus

 THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.  ALITO, J., filed a con-
curring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.  KAGAN, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which BREYER, J., joined.  GINSBURG, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case syllabus, which typically summarizes the arguments and holdings of a court case.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

settled in Tennessee, where DeKoe works full-time for the
Army  Reserve.    Their  lawful  marriage  is  stripped  from
them  whenever  they  reside  in  Tennessee,  returning  and
disappearing as they travel across state lines.  DeKoe, who
served  this  Nation  to  preserve  the  freedom  the  Constitu-
tion protects, must endure a substantial burden.

The cases now before the Court involve other petitioners
as  well,  each  with  their  own  experiences.    Their  stories
reveal that they seek not to denigrate marriage but rather
to  live  their  lives,  or  honor  their  spouses’  memory,  joined
by its bond.

B

The  ancient  origins  of  marriage  confirm  its  centrality,
but it has not stood in isolation from developments in law
and society.  The history of marriage is one of both conti-
nuity  and  change.  That  institution—even  as  confined  to
opposite-sex relations—has evolved over time.

For example, marriage was once viewed as an arrange-
ment  by  the  couple’s  parents  based  on  political,  religious,
and  financial  concerns;  but  by  the  time  of  the  Nation’s
founding  it  was  understood  to  be  a  voluntary  contract
between a man and a woman.  See N. Cott, Public Vows: A
History  of  Marriage  and  the  Nation  9–17  (2000);  S.
Coontz, Marriage, A History 15–16 (2005).  As the role and
status  of  women  changed,  the  institution  further  evolved.
Under  the  centuries-old  doctrine  of  coverture,  a  married
man  and  woman  were  treated  by  the  State  as  a  single,
male-dominated  legal  entity.    See  1  W.  Blackstone,  Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England 430 (1765).  As women
gained legal, political, and property rights, and as society
began  to  understand  that  women  have  their  own  equal
dignity, the law of coverture was abandoned.  See Brief for
Historians of Marriage et al. as Amici Curiae 16–19.  These
and  other  developments  in  the  institution  of  marriage  over
the  past  centuries  were  not  mere  superficial  changes.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the history and evolution of marriage, setting the stage for a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

UNITED STATES v. PALOMAR-SANTIAGO

Opinion of the Court

is not “available” when an immigration judge erroneously
informs a noncitizen that his prior conviction renders him
removable.  Noncitizens, the argument goes, cannot be ex-
pected to know that the immigration judge might be wrong.
Because noncitizens will not recognize a substantive basis
for  appeal  to  the  BIA,  that  administrative  review  is  not
practically “available” under §1326(d)(1).3

Palomar-Santiago  looks  to  Ross  v.  Blake  for  support.
That  case  addressed  the  Prison  Litigation  Reform  Act,
which requires that prisoners exhaust “such administrative
remedies as are available” before suing in federal court.  42
U. S. C. §1997e(a).  Ross held that whether such remedies
are “available” turns on “the real-world workings of prison
grievance systems,” and it acknowledged that there are “cir-
cumstances  in  which  an  administrative  remedy,  although
officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.”
578 U. S., at 643.  Nothing in Ross, however, suggests that
the  substantive  complexity  of  an  affirmative  defense  can
alone render further review of an adverse decision “unavail-
able.”  Administrative review of removal orders exists pre-
cisely so noncitizens can challenge the substance of immi-
gration judges’ decisions.  The immigration judge’s error on
the merits does not excuse the noncitizen’s failure to comply
with  a  mandatory  exhaustion  requirement  if  further  ad-
ministrative review, and then judicial review if necessary,
could fix that very error.

Second,  Palomar-Santiago  contends  that  the  §1326(d)
prerequisites apply only when a defendant argues that his
——————
but  the  Court  declines  to  address  his  arguments,  which  were  neither
raised  below  nor  fairly  encompassed  by  the  question  presented  to  this
Court.  See Brownback v. King, 592 U. S. ___, ___, n. 4 (2021) (slip op., at
5, n. 4).

3 On this theory, the unavailability of administrative review before the
BIA would also mean that noncitizens like Palomar-Santiago do not have
the “opportunity” for judicial review under §1326(d)(2), because they may
not seek review of a removal order in federal court without first appeal-
ing the order to the BIA.  See 8 U. S. C. §1252(d)(1).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of *United States v. Palomar-Santiago*. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the availability of administrative review in immigration cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

5

Opinion of the Court

sion  manufactured  and  sold  with  Wiley’s  permission:  (1)
an  American  version  printed  and  sold  in  the  United
States,  and  (2)  a  foreign  version  manufactured  and  sold
abroad.  And Wiley makes certain that copies of the second
version  state  that  they  are  not  to  be  taken  (without  per
mission) into the United States.  Ibid.

Petitioner,  Supap  Kirtsaeng,  a  citizen  of  Thailand,
moved  to  the  United  States  in  1997  to  study  mathemat-
ics  at  Cornell  University.  Ibid.  He  paid  for  his  educa-
tion with the help of a Thai Government scholarship which
required  him  to  teach  in  Thailand  for  10  years  on  his
return.  Brief  for  Petitioner  7.    Kirtsaeng  successfully
completed  his  undergraduate  courses  at  Cornell,  success
fully  completed  a  Ph.  D.  program  in  mathematics  at  the
University of Southern California, and then, as promised,
returned to Thailand to teach.  Ibid.  While he was study
ing in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked his friends and
family in Thailand to buy copies of foreign edition English
language textbooks at Thai book shops, where they sold at
low  prices,  and  mail  them  to  him  in  the  United  States.
Id.,  at  7–8.    Kirtsaeng  would  then  sell  them,  reimburse
his family and friends, and keep the profit.  App. to Pet. for
Cert. 48a–49a.

B
In  2008  Wiley  brought  this  federal  lawsuit  against
Kirtsaeng  for  copyright  infringement.    654  F. 3d,  at  213.
Wiley  claimed  that  Kirtsaeng’s  unauthorized  importation
of  its  books  and  his  later  resale  of  those  books  amounted
to  an  infringement of Wiley’s  §106(3) exclusive  right  to dis
tribute  as  well  as  §602’s  related  import  prohibition.    17
U. S. C.  §§106(3)  (2006  ed.),  602(a)  (2006  ed.,  Supp.  V).
See also §501 (2006 ed.) (authorizing infringement action).
App.  204–211.    Kirtsaeng  replied  that  the  books  he  had
acquired were “ ‘lawfully made’ ” and that he had acquired
them  legitimately.  Record  in  No.  1:08–CV–7834–DCP
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the beginning of an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
386  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Scalia, J., concurring

tempts  this  demonstration,  however,  in  splendid  isolation
from the text of the First Amendment.  It never shows why
“the  freedom  of  speech”  that  was  the  right  of  Englishmen
did not include the freedom to speak in association with other
individuals, including association in the corporate form.  To
be sure, in 1791 (as now) corporations could pursue only the
objectives  set  forth  in  their  charters;  but  the  dissent  pro
vides  no  evidence  that  their  speech  in  the  pursuit  of  those
objectives could be censored.

Instead  of  taking  this  straightforward  approach  to  deter
mining the Amendment’s meaning, the dissent embarks on a
detailed exploration of the Framers’ views about the “role of
corporations in society.”  Post, at 426.  The Framers did not
like corporations, the dissent concludes, and therefore it fol
lows  (as  night  the  day)  that  corporations  had  no  rights  of
free  speech.  Of  course  the  Framers’  personal  affection  or
disaffection for corporations is relevant only insofar as it can
be thought  to be reﬂected  in the understood meaning  of the
text  they  enacted—not,  as  the  dissent  suggests,  as  a  free
standing  substitute  for  that  text.  But  the  dissent’s  distor
tion  of  proper  analysis  is  even  worse  than  that.  Though
faced with a constitutional text that makes no distinction be
tween  types  of  speakers,  the  dissent  feels  no  necessity  to
provide even an isolated statement from the founding era to
the  effect  that  corporations  are  not  covered,  but  places  the
burden  on  appellant  to  bring  forward  statements  showing
that  they  are.  Ibid.  (“[T]here  is  not  a  scintilla  of  evidence
to support the notion that anyone believed [the First Amend
ment]  would  preclude  regulatory  distinctions  based  on  the
corporate form”).

Despite  the  corporation-hating  quotations  the  dissent  has
dredged  up,  it  is  far  from  clear  that  by  the  end  of  the  18th
century  corporations  were  despised.  If  so,  how  came  there
to be  so many of  them?  The dissent’s statement  that there
were  few  business  corporations  during  the  18th  century—
“only a few hundred during all of the 18th century”—is mis
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It delves into the interpretation of the First Amendment and its application to corporations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Syllabus

Held: A  naturally  occurring  DNA  segment  is  a  product  of  nature  and
not patent eligible merely because it has  been isolated,  but cDNA is
patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.  Pp. 10–18.

(a) The  Patent  Act  permits  patents  to  be  issued  to  “[w]hoever  in-
vents  or  discovers  any  new  and  useful  . . .  composition  of  matter,”
§101,  but  “laws  of  nature,  natural  phenomena,  and  abstract  ideas”
“ ‘are basic tools of scientific and technological work’ ” that lie beyond
the  domain  of  patent  protection,  Mayo,  supra,  at  ___.  The  rule
against  patents  on  naturally  occurring  things  has  limits,  however.
Patent protection strikes a delicate balance between creating “incen-
tives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery” and “imped[ing]
the  flow  of  information  that  might  permit,  indeed  spur,  invention.”
Id., at ___.  This standard is used to determine whether Myriad’s pa-
tents  claim  a  “new  and  useful  . . .  composition  of  matter,”  §101,  or
claim naturally occurring phenomena.  Pp. 10–11.

(b) Myriad’s  DNA  claim  falls  within  the  law  of  nature  exception.
Myriad’s  principal  contribution  was  uncovering  the  precise  location
and genetic sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.  Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, is central to the patent-eligibility inquiry
whether  such  action  was  new  “with  markedly  different  characteris-
tics from any found in nature,” id., at 310.  Myriad did not create or
alter  either  the  genetic  information  encoded  in  the  BCRA1  and
BCRA2  genes  or  the  genetic  structure  of  the  DNA.    It  found  an  im-
portant  and  useful  gene,  but  groundbreaking,  innovative,  or  even
brilliant  discovery  does  not  by  itself  satisfy  the  §101  inquiry.   See
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127.  Finding
the  location  of  the  BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes  does  not  render  the
genes patent eligible “new . . . composition[s] of matter,” §101.  Myri-
ad’s  patent  descriptions  highlight  the  problem  with  its  claims:  They
detail the extensive process of discovery, but extensive effort alone is
insufficient to satisfy §101’s demands.  Myriad’s claims are not saved
by  the  fact  that  isolating  DNA  from  the  human  genome  severs  the
chemical  bonds  that  bind  gene  molecules  together.    The  claims  are
not  expressed  in  terms  of  chemical  composition,  nor  do  they  rely  on
the chemical changes resulting from the isolation of a particular DNA
section.  Instead, they focus on the genetic information encoded in the
BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes.    Finally,  Myriad  argues  that  the  Patent
and Trademark Office’s past practice of awarding gene patents is en-
titled to deference, citing J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int’l, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, a case where Congress had endorsed a PTO
practice in subsequent legislation.  There has been no such endorse-
ment here, and the United States argued in the Federal Circuit and
in  this  Court  that  isolated  DNA  was  not  patent  eligible  under  §101.
Pp. 12–16.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing the key points of a Supreme Court case (Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.). It outlines the legal reasoning behind the court's decision regarding the patentability of isolated DNA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
40

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

ald, 457 U. S., at 758, n. 41.  Like everyone else, the Presi-
dent is subject to prosecution in his unofficial capacity.  But
unlike  anyone  else,  the  President  is  a  branch  of  govern-
ment, and the Constitution vests in him sweeping powers
and duties.  Accounting for that reality—and ensuring that
the President may exercise those powers forcefully, as the
Framers  anticipated  he  would—does  not  place  him  above
the law; it preserves the basic structure of the Constitution
from which that law derives.

The dissents’ positions in the end boil down to ignoring
the  Constitution’s  separation  of  powers  and  the  Court’s
precedent  and  instead  fear  mongering  on  the  basis  of  ex-
treme  hypotheticals  about  a  future  where  the  President
“feels empowered to violate federal criminal law.”  Post, at
18 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); see post, at 26, 29–30; post,
at 8–9, 10, 12, 16, 20–21 (opinion of JACKSON, J.).  The dis-
sents  overlook  the  more  likely  prospect  of  an  Executive
Branch that cannibalizes itself, with each successive Presi-
dent free to prosecute his predecessors, yet unable to boldly
and fearlessly carry out his duties for fear that he may be
next.  For instance, Section 371—which has been charged
in this case—is a broadly worded criminal statute that can
cover  “ ‘any  conspiracy  for  the  purpose  of  impairing,  ob-
structing  or  defeating  the  lawful  function  of  any  depart-
ment of Government.’ ”  United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S.
169, 172 (1966) (quoting Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 479
(1910)).  Virtually every President is criticized for insuffi-
ciently enforcing some aspect of federal law (such as drug,
gun, immigration, or environmental laws).  An enterprising
prosecutor in a new administration may assert that a pre-
vious  President  violated  that  broad  statute.    Without  im-
munity,  such  types  of  prosecutions  of  ex-Presidents  could
quickly become routine.  The enfeebling of the Presidency
and our Government that would result from such a cycle of
factional  strife  is  exactly  what  the  Framers  intended  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Trump v. United States*. It discusses the issue of presidential immunity from prosecution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

21

Opinion of the Court

to  Donohue.  The  single  statewide  measure  of  partisan
advantage  delivered  by  the  efficiency  gap  treats  Whitford
and  Donohue  as  indistinguishable,  even  though  their
individual situations are quite different.

That  shortcoming  confirms  the  fundamental  problem
with the plaintiffs’ case as presented on this record.  It is a
case  about  group  political  interests,  not  individual  legal
rights.  But  this  Court  is  not  responsible  for  vindicating
generalized  partisan  preferences.  The  Court’s  constitu
tionally prescribed role is to vindicate the individual rights
of the people appearing before it.

III
In cases where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate Article III
standing, we usually direct the dismissal of the plaintiff ’s
claims.  See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S.
332, 354 (2006).  This is not the usual case.  It concerns an
unsettled  kind  of  claim  this  Court  has  not  agreed  upon,
the  contours  and  justiciability  of  which  are  unresolved.
Under  the  circumstances,  and  in  light  of  the  plaintiffs’
allegations that Donohue, Johnson, Mitchell, and Wallace
live  in  districts  where  Democrats  like  them  have  been
packed or cracked, we decline to direct dismissal.

We  therefore  remand  the  case  to  the  District  Court  so

that  the  plaintiffs  may  have  an  opportunity  to  prove  con
crete  and  particularized  injuries  using  evidence—unlike
the  bulk  of  the  evidence  presented  thus  far—that  would
tend  to  demonstrate  a  burden  on  their  individual  votes.
Cf.  Alabama  Legislative  Black  Caucus,  575  U. S.,  at  ___
(slip op., at 8) (remanding for further consideration of the
plaintiffs’  gerrymandering  claims  on  a  district-by-district
basis).  We express no view on the merits of the plaintiffs’
case.  We  caution,  however,  that  “standing  is  not  dis
pensed in gross”: A plaintiff ’s remedy must be tailored to
redress  the  plaintiff ’s  particular  injury.    Cuno,  547  U. S.,
at 353.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the concept of standing in legal cases and applies it to a gerrymandering case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS v. FULTON ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–357.  Argued October 13, 2020—Decided January 14, 2021

The filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code automatically “cre-
ates an estate” that, with some exceptions, comprises “all legal or eq-
uitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the  case.”    11  U. S. C.  §541(a).    Section  541  is  intended  to  include
within the estate any property made available by other provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 542 is one such provision, as it provides
that an entity in possession of property of the bankruptcy estate “shall
deliver to the trustee, and account for” that property.  The filing of a
petition also automatically “operates as a stay, applicable to all enti-
ties,” of efforts to collect prepetition debts outside the bankruptcy fo-
rum, §362(a), including “any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property
of  the  estate,”  §362(a)(3).    Here,  each  respondent  filed  a  bankruptcy
petition and requested that the city of Chicago (City) return his or her
vehicle, which had been impounded for failure to pay fines for motor
vehicle infractions.  In each case, the City’s refusal was held by a bank-
ruptcy  court  to  violate  the  automatic  stay.    The  Seventh  Circuit  af-
firmed, concluding that by retaining possession of the vehicles the City
had acted “to exercise control over” respondents’ property in violation
of §362(a)(3).

Held: The  mere  retention  of  estate  property  after  the  filing  of  a  bank-
ruptcy  petition  does  not  violate  §362(a)(3)  of  the  Bankruptcy  Code.
Under that provision, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a
“stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate.
Taken  together,  the  most  natural  reading  of  these  terms  is  that
§362(a)(3) prohibits affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo
of  estate  property  as  of  the  time  when  the  bankruptcy  petition  was
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal arguments and holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Syllabus

the agency.  See Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402; NLRB v. Hearst Publi-
cations,  Inc.,  322  U. S.  111.    But  such  deferential  review,  which  the
Court was far from consistent in applying, was cabined to factbound
determinations.    And  the  Court  did  not  purport  to  refashion  the
longstanding  judicial  approach  to  questions  of  law.    It  instead  pro-
claimed that “[u]ndoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation . . .
are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment
of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute.”
Id., at 130–131.  Nothing in the New Deal era or before it thus resem-
bled the deference rule the Court would begin applying decades later
to  all  varieties  of  agency  interpretations  of  statutes  under  Chevron.
Pp. 7–13.

(b) Congress in 1946 enacted the APA “as a check upon administra-
tors whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not con-
templated in legislation creating their offices.”  Morton Salt, 338 U. S.,
at 644.  The APA prescribes procedures for agency action and deline-
ates the basic contours of judicial review of such action.  And it codifies
for agency cases the unremarkable, yet elemental proposition reflected
by  judicial  practice  dating  back  to  Marbury:  that  courts  decide  legal
questions by applying their own judgment.  As relevant here, the APA
specifies that courts, not agencies, will decide “all relevant questions
of law” arising on review of agency action, 5 U. S. C. §706 (emphasis
added)—even those involving ambiguous laws.  It prescribes no defer-
ential  standard  for  courts  to  employ  in  answering  those  legal  ques-
tions, despite mandating deferential judicial review of agency policy-
making and factfinding.  See §§706(2)(A), (E).  And by directing courts
to “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions” without differen-
tiating between the two, §706, it makes clear that agency interpreta-
tions of statutes—like agency interpretations of the Constitution—are
not entitled to deference.  The APA’s history and the contemporaneous
views of various respected commentators underscore the plain mean-
ing of its text.

Courts exercising independent judgment in determining the mean-
ing  of  statutory  provisions,  consistent  with  the  APA,  may—as  they
have from the start—seek aid from the interpretations of those respon-
sible for implementing particular statutes.  See Skidmore, 323 U. S.,
at  140.    And  when  the  best  reading  of  a  statute  is  that  it  delegates
discretionary  authority  to  an  agency,  the role  of  the  reviewing  court
under  the  APA  is,  as  always,  to  independently  interpret  the  statute
and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits.  The
court fulfills that role by recognizing constitutional delegations, fixing
the  boundaries  of  the  delegated  authority,  and  ensuring  the  agency
has engaged in “ ‘reasoned decisionmaking’ ” within those boundaries.
Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. 743, 750 (quoting Allentown Mack Sales &
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a section from one. It contains legal citations, discusses legal precedents, and analyzes statutory interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
916

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5680.  Houston  v.  Hathaway,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5682.  Inman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  742.

No.  09–5685.  Johnson  v.  Adams,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  538.

No.  09–5687.  Longoria  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5688.  Jones  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  916.

No.  09–5690.  Gordon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  212.

No.  09–5691.  Nelson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  209.

No.  09–5692.  Njoku  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General,  et  al.
C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.
Appx.  179.

No.  09–5699.  Medows  v.  City  of  Cayce,  South  Carolina,
et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314
Fed.  Appx.  611.

No.  09–5702.  Ramirez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5703.  Singala  v.  United  States  et  al.  C.  A.  1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5705.  Wright  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  257.

No.  09–5706.  White  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  652.

No.  09–5707.  White  v.  Supreme  Court  of  New  Jersey
et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319
Fed.  Appx.  171.

No.  09–5709.  Frye  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  267.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

11

Opinion of the Court

(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed. 1998)).  We
think  that  JUSTICE  GINSBURG  accurately  captured  the
natural  meaning  of  “bear  arms.”  Although  the  phrase
implies that the carrying of the weapon is for the purpose
of  “offensive  or  defensive  action,”  it  in  no  way  connotes
participation in a structured military organization.

From  our  review  of  founding-era  sources,  we  conclude
that  this  natural  meaning  was  also  the  meaning  that
“bear  arms”  had  in  the  18th  century.    In  numerous  in
stances,  “bear  arms”  was  unambiguously  used  to  refer  to
the  carrying  of  weapons  outside  of  an  organized  militia.
The  most  prominent  examples  are  those  most  relevant  to
the  Second  Amendment:  Nine  state  constitutional  provi
sions written in the 18th century or the first two decades
of  the  19th,  which  enshrined  a  right  of  citizens  to  “bear
arms in defense of themselves and the state” or “bear arms
in defense of himself and the state.” 8  It is clear from those
formulations that “bear arms”  did not refer only to carry
——————

8 See  Pa.  Declaration  of  Rights  §XIII,  in  5  Thorpe  3083  (“That  the
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the
state. . . ”);  Vt.  Declaration  of  Rights  §XV,  in  6  id.,  at  3741  (“That  the
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the
State. . .”);  Ky.  Const.,  Art.  XII,  cl.  23  (1792),  in  3  id.,  at  1264,  1275
(“That  the  right  of  the  citizens  to  bear  arms  in  defence  of  themselves
and  the  State  shall  not  be  questioned”);  Ohio  Const.,  Art.  VIII,  §20
(1802),  in  5  id.,  at  2901,  2911  (“That  the  people  have  a  right  to  bear
arms for the defence of themselves and the State . . . ”); Ind. Const., Art.
I,  §20  (1816),  in  2  id.,  at  1057,  1059  (“That  the  people  have  a  right  to
bear  arms  for  the  defense  of  themselves  and  the  State. . . ”);  Miss.
Const.,  Art.  I,  §23  (1817),  in  4  id.,  at  2032,  2034  (“Every  citizen  has  a
right to bear arms, in defence of himself and the State”); Conn. Const.,
Art. I, §17 (1818), in 1 id., at 536, 538 (“Every citizen has a right to bear
arms  in  defence  of  himself  and  the  state”);  Ala.  Const.,  Art.  I,  §23
(1819),  in  1  id.,  at  96,  98  (“Every  citizen  has  a  right  to  bear  arms  in
defence of himself and the State”); Mo. Const., Art. XIII, §3 (1820), in 4
id., at 2150, 2163 (“[T]hat their right to bear arms in defence of them
selves  and  of  the  State  cannot  be  questioned”).    See  generally  Volokh,
State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 Tex. Rev. L. &
Politics 191 (2006).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of the Second Amendment. It contains legal citations, analysis of historical context, and quotes from legal sources.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>