<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

AMERICAN LEGION  v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting

aware,  “some  of  them  from  bitter personal experience,”
Engel,  370  U. S.,  at  429,  religion  is  “too  personal,  too
sacred, too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a
civil  magistrate,”  id.,  at  432  (quoting  Memorial  and Re-
monstrance).  The Establishment Clause, which preserves
the  integrity  of  both  church  and  state,  guarantees  that
“however . . . individuals worship, they will count as full
and equal American citizens.”  Town of Greece, 572 U. S.,
at  615  (KAGAN,  J., dissenting).  “If the aim of the Estab-
lishment  Clause  is  genuinely  to  uncouple  government
from church,” the Clause does “not permit . . . a display of
th[e]  character”  of  Bladensburg’s  Peace  Cross.    Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753,
817 (1995) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a dissenting opinion in a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and its implications for religious displays.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Snippet</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

3

Syllabus

JUSTICE BREYER, concluded in Parts III–B, III–C, and IV:

(a) The  Government’s  argument  that  this  case  is  governed  by  the
Court’s  subsidized-speech  cases  is  unpersuasive.    Those cases  all  in-
volved  cash  subsidies  or  their  equivalent,  e.g.,  funds  to  private  par-
ties  for  family  planning  services  in  Rust  v.  Sullivan,  500  U. S.  173,
and cash grants to artists in National Endowment for Arts v. Finley,
524 U. S. 569.  The federal registration of a trademark is nothing like
these programs.  The PTO does not pay money to parties seeking reg-
istration of a mark; it requires the payment of fees to file an applica-
tion  and  to  maintain  the  registration  once  it  is  granted.    The  Gov-
ernment  responds  that  registration  provides  valuable  non-monetary
benefits traceable to the Government’s resources devoted to register-
ing the marks, but nearly every government service requires the ex-
penditure of government funds.  This is true of services that benefit
everyone,  like  police  and  fire  protection,  as  well  as  services  that  are
utilized  by  only  some,  e.g.,  the  adjudication  of  private  lawsuits  and
the use of public parks and highways.  Pp. 18–20.

(b) Also  unpersuasive  is  the  Government’s  claim  that  the  dispar-
agement clause is constitutional under a “government-program” doc-
trine,  an  argument  which  is  based  on  a  merger  of  this  Court’s  gov-
ernment-speech  cases  and  subsidy  cases.    It  points  to  two  cases
involving  a  public  employer’s  collection  of  union  dues  from  its  em-
ployees,  Davenport  v.  Washington  Ed.  Assn.,  551  U. S.  177,  and  Ys-
ursa  v.  Pocatello  Ed.  Assn.,  555  U. S.  353,  but  these  cases  occupy  a
special  area  of  First  Amendment  case  law  that  is  far  removed  from
the registration of trademarks.  Cases in which government creates a
limited  public  forum  for  private  speech,  thus  allowing  for  some  con-
tent-  and  speaker-based  restrictions,  see,  e.g.,  Good  News  Club  v.
Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98, 106–107; Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 831, are potentially more
analogous.  But even in those cases, viewpoint discrimination is for-
bidden.    The  disparagement  clause  denies  registration  to  any  mark
that  is  offensive  to  a  substantial  percentage  of  the  members  of  any
group.  That  is  viewpoint  discrimination  in  the  sense  relevant  here:
Giving  offense  is  a  viewpoint.    The  “public  expression  of  ideas  may
not  be  prohibited  merely  because  the  ideas  are  themselves  offensive
to  some  of  their  hearers.”    Street  v.  New  York,  394  U. S.  576,  592.
Pp. 20–23.

(c) The  dispute  between  the  parties  over  whether  trademarks  are
commercial speech subject to the relaxed scrutiny outlined in Central
Hudson Gas & Elect. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557,
need  not  be  resolved  here  because  the  disparagement  clause  cannot
withstand  even  Central  Hudson  review.    Under  Central  Hudson,  a
restriction of speech must serve “a substantial interest” and be “nar-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the constitutionality of a trademark disparagement clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
28  MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

sever  the  PASPA  provisions  that  prohibit  a  private  actor
from  “sponsor[ing],”  “operat[ing],”  or  “promot[ing]”  sports
gambling schemes “pursuant to” state law.  §3702(2).  These
provisions  were  obviously  meant  to  work  together  with  the
provisions  in  §3702(1)  that  impose  similar  restrictions  on
governmental  entities.    If  Congress  had  known  that  the
latter  provisions  would  fall,  we  do  not  think  it  would  have
wanted the former to stand alone.

The present cases illustrate exactly how Congress must
have  intended  §3702(1)  and  §3702(2)  to  work.    If  a  State
attempted  to  authorize  particular  private  entities  to  en
gage  in  sports  gambling,  the  State  could  be  sued  under
§3702(1), and the private entity could be sued at the same
time  under  §3702(2).    The  two  sets  of  provisions  were
meant  to  be  deployed  in  tandem  to  stop  what  PASPA
aimed  to  prevent:  state  legalization  of  sports  gambling.
But  if,  as  we  now  hold,  Congress  lacks  the  authority  to
prohibit  a  State  from  legalizing  sports  gambling,  the
prohibition  of  private  conduct  under  §3702(2)  ceases  to
implement any coherent federal policy.

Under  §3702(2),  private  conduct  violates  federal  law
only  if  it  is  permitted  by  state  law.    That  strange  rule  is
exactly  the  opposite  of  the  general  federal  approach  to
gambling.  Under 18 U. S. C. §1955, operating a gambling
business violates federal law only if that conduct is illegal
under  state  or  local  law.  Similarly,  18  U. S. C.  §1953,
which  criminalizes  the  interstate  transmission  of  wager
ing  paraphernalia,  and  18  U. S. C.  §1084,  which  outlaws
the  interstate  transmission  of  information  that  assists  in
the  placing  of  a  bet  on  a  sporting  event,  apply  only  if  the
underlying  gambling  is  illegal  under  state  law.    See  also
18 U. S. C. §1952 (making it illegal to travel in interstate
commerce  to  further  a  gambling  business  that  is  illegal
under applicable state law).

These  provisions  implement  a  coherent  federal  policy:
They respect the policy choices of the people of each State
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA). It delves into the legal interpretation of specific sections and their implications. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

JACKSON, J., concurring

NRA does not contend that its (concededly unlawful) insur-
ance products offered through those business relationships
were themselves “speech,” akin to a billboard, a television
ad, or a book.  Nor does the complaint allege that Vullo pres-
sured  the  printer  of  American  Rifleman  (a  longstanding
NRA periodical) to stop printing the magazine, or coerced a
convention center into canceling the NRA’s annual meeting.
See  VDARE  Foundation  v.  Colorado  Springs,  11  F. 4th
1151, 1157 (CA10 2021).  In other words, the effect of Vullo’s
alleged coercion of regulated entities on the NRA’s speech
is significantly more attenuated here than in Bantam Books
or most decisions applying it.  It is, for instance, far from
obvious  that  Vullo’s  conduct  toward  regulated  entities es-
tablished  “a  system  of  prior  administrative  restraints”
against the NRA’s expression.  Bantam Books, 372 U. S., at
70.

Of course, as the majority correctly observes, none of that
means  that  Vullo  may  target  with  impunity  the  NRA’s
“ ‘nonexpressive’ ”  activity  if  she  is  doing  so  to  punish  the
NRA for its expression.  See ante, at 17.  But it does suggest
that our First Amendment retaliation cases might provide
a  better  framework  for  analyzing  these  kinds  of  allega-
tions—i.e., coercion claims that are not directly related to
the publication or distribution of speech.  And, fortunately
for the NRA, the complaint in this case alleges both censor-
ship  and  retaliation  theories  for  how  Vullo  violated  the
First  Amendment—theories  that,  in  my  opinion,  deserve
separate analyses.
  “ ‘[A]s a general matter,’ the First Amendment prohibits
government officials from subjecting individuals to ‘retalia-
tory actions’ after the fact for having engaged in protected
speech.”  Houston Community College System v. Wilson, 595
U. S. 468, 474 (2022) (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U. S.
391, 398 (2019)).  “[A] plaintiff pursuing a First Amendment
retaliation claim must show, among other things, that the
government  took  an  ‘adverse  action’  in  response  to  his
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Jackson in the case of National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the First Amendment and potential retaliation against the NRA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Syllabus

patent the Creek received somehow made their tribal sovereignty eas-
ier to divest.  Congress established a reservation, not a dependent In-
dian community, for the Creek Nation.  Pp. 28–31.

(d) Even assuming that the Creek land is a reservation, Oklahoma
argues  that  the  MCA  has  never  applied  in  eastern  Oklahoma.    It
claims  that  the  Oklahoma  Enabling  Act,  which  transferred  all  non-
federal  cases  pending  in  the  territorial  courts  to  Oklahoma’s  state
courts, made the State’s courts the successors to the federal territorial
courts’ sweeping authority to try Indians for crimes committed on res-
ervations.  That argument, however, rests on state prosecutorial prac-
tices that defy the MCA, rather than on the law’s plain terms.  Pp. 32–
36.

(e) Finally, Oklahoma warns of the potential consequences that will
follow a ruling against it, such as unsettling an untold number of con-
victions and frustrating the State’s ability to prosecute crimes in the
future.  This Court is aware of the potential for cost and conflict around
jurisdictional boundaries.  But Oklahoma and its tribes have proven
time and again that they can work successfully together as partners,
and  Congress  remains  free  to  supplement  its  statutory  directions
about the lands in question at any time.  Pp. 36–42.

Reversed.

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG,
BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dis-
senting  opinion,  in  which  ALITO  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined,  and  in
which THOMAS, J., joined, except as to footnote 9.  THOMAS, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

27

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Establishment Clause.  Id., at 599.5  In short, the endorse-
ment inquiry dictated by precedent is a measured, practi-
cal, and administrable one, designed to account for the com-
peting interests present within any given community.

Despite all of this authority, the Court claims that it “long
ago  abandoned”  both  the  “endorsement  test”  and  this
Court’s decision in Lemon 403 U. S. 602.  Ante, at 22.  The
Court chiefly cites the plurality opinion in American Legion
v. American Humanist Assn., 588 U. S. ___ (2019) to sup-
port this contention.  That plurality opinion, to be sure, crit-
icized Lemon’s effort at establishing a “grand unified theory
of the Establishment Clause” as poorly suited to the broad
“array” of diverse establishment claims.  588 U. S., at ___,
___ (slip op., at 13, 24).  All the Court in American Legion
ultimately  held,  however,  was  that  application  of  the
Lemon  test  to  “longstanding  monuments,  symbols,  and
practices” was ill-advised for reasons specific to those con-
texts.  588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16); see also id., at ___–
___ (slip op., at 16–21) (discussing at some length why the
Lemon test was a poor fit for those circumstances).  The only
categorical rejection of Lemon in American Legion appeared
in separate writings.  See 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1)
(KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring);  id.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  6)

——————

5 The notion that integration of religious practices into the workplace
may require compromise and accommodation is not unique to the public-
employer  context  where  Establishment  Clause  concerns  arise.    The
Court’s precedents on religious discrimination claims similarly recognize
that the employment context requires balancing employer and employee
interests, and that religious practice need not always be accommodated.
See Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op.,
at  6)  (ALITO, J.,  statement  respecting  denial  of  certiorari)  (noting  that
“Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of religion does not
require  an  employer  to  make  any  accommodation  that  imposes  more
than a de minimis burden”).  Surely, an employee’s religious practice that
forces a school district to engage in burdensome measures to stop spec-
tators from rushing onto a field and knocking people down imposes much
more than a de minimis burden.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It cites legal precedents and engages in legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

63

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

to vary simply with the number of constitutional rights that
the  plaintiff  asserts  have  been  violated”);  Knight  v.  Con-
necticut Dept. of Pub. Health, 275 F. 3d 156, 167 (CA2 2001);
Combs,  540  F. 3d,  at  247  (“Until  the  Supreme  Court  pro-
vides  direction,  we  believe  the  hybrid-rights  theory  to  be
dicta”).

A second camp holds that the hybrid-rights exception ap-
plies  only  when  a  free-exercise  claim  is  joined  with  some
other independently viable claim.  See Archdiocese of Wash-
ington v. WMATA, 897 F. 3d 314, 331 (CADC 2018) (A “hy-
brid  rights  claim  . . .  requires  independently  viable  free
speech  and  free  exercise  claims”);  Gary  S.  v.  Manchester
School Dist., 374 F. 3d 15, 19 (CA1 2004) (adopting District
Court’s reasoning that “the [hybrid-rights] exception can be
invoked only if the plaintiff has joined a free exercise chal-
lenge  with  another  independently  viable  constitutional
claim,” 241 F. Supp. 2d 111, 121 (NH 2003)); Brown v. Hot,
Sexy and Safer Productions, 68 F. 3d 525, 539 (CA1 1995).
But this approach essentially makes the free-exercise claim
irrelevant.  See  Axson-Flynn  v.  Johnson,  356  F. 3d  1277,
1296–1297  (CA10  2004)  (“[I]t  makes  no  sense  to  adopt  a
strict standard that essentially requires a successful com-
panion claim because such a test would make the free exer-
cise claim unnecessary”); see also Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 567
(opinion of Souter, J.) (making the same point).

The third group requires that the non-free-exercise claim
be “colorable.”  See Cornerstone Christian Schools v. Uni-
versity Interscholastic League, 563 F. 3d 127, 136, n. 8 (CA5
2009); San Jose Christian College v. Morgan Hill, 360 F. 3d
1024,  1032–1033  (CA9  2004);  Axson-Flynn,  356  F. 3d,  at
1295–1297.  But what that means is obscure.  See, e.g., id.,
at 1295 (referring to “helpful” analogies such as the “ ‘like-
lihood of success on the merits’ standard for preliminary in-
junctions”  or  the  pre-Antiterrorism  and  Effective  Death
Penalty Act standard for obtaining an evidentiary hearing,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 593 U.S. ____ (2021). It discusses different legal interpretations regarding the "hybrid-rights exception."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$71Z 02-16-99 22:29:48 PAGES OPINPGT

CASES ADJUDGED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

AT

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

UNITED STATES v. CABRALES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit

No. 97–643. Argued April 29, 1998—Decided June 1, 1998

An indictment returned in the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Missouri charged respondent Cabrales, as sole defend-
ant, with conspiracy under 18 U. S. C. § 371 to violate § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii)
(conducting a ﬁnancial transaction to avoid a transaction-reporting re-
quirement) (Count I), and with money laundering in violation of the
latter section (Count II) and § 1957 (engaging in a monetary transac-
tion in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000)
(Count III). The indictment alleged that, in January 1991, Cabrales
deposited $40,000 with the AmSouth Bank of Florida and, within a
week, made four separate $9,500 withdrawals from that bank. The
money deposited and withdrawn was traceable to illegal cocaine sales
in Missouri. Cabrales moved to dismiss the indictment in its entirety
for improper venue. The District Court denied the motion as to Count
I, the conspiracy count, but dismissed Counts II and III, the money-
laundering counts, because the money-laundering activity occurred en-
tirely in Florida.
In afﬁrming that dismissal, the Eighth Circuit noted
that the Constitution, Art. III, § 2, cl. 3, and Amdt. 6, as well as Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 18, requires that a person be tried
where the charged offense was committed. While recognizing that a
continuing offense “begun in one district and completed in another . . .
may be . . . prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun,
continued, or completed,” 18 U. S. C. § 3237(a), the court said that Ca-
brales was not accused of a continuing offense, but was charged with

1
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court case. It includes information about the case name, citation, and a brief description of the charges and the lower court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. PALOMAR-SANTIAGO

Syllabus

two requirements are not satisfied just because a noncitizen was re-
moved  for  an offense  that  should  not  have  rendered  him  removable.
The  substantive  validity  of  a  removal  order  is  quite  distinct  from
whether the noncitizen exhausted administrative remedies or was de-
prived of the opportunity for judicial review.  P. 5.

(b) Palomar-Santiago’s counterarguments are unpersuasive.  First,
he contends that further administrative review of a removal order is
not “available” for purposes of §1326(a) when a noncitizen will not rec-
ognize a substantive basis to challenge an immigration judge’s conclu-
sion that a prior conviction renders the noncitizen removable.  The im-
migration judge’s error on the merits does not excuse the noncitizen’s
failure to comply with a mandatory exhaustion requirement if further
administrative review, and then judicial review if necessary, could fix
that very error.  Ross, 578 U. S. 632, distinguished.

Second, Palomar-Santiago contends that §1326(d)’s prerequisites do
not apply when a defendant argues that a removal order was substan-
tively invalid.  There can be no “challenge” to or “collateral attack” on
the validity of substantively flawed orders, he reasons, because such
orders are invalid when entered.  This position ignores the plain mean-
ing of both “challenge” and “collateral attack.”

Lastly, Palomar-Santiago invokes the canon of constitutional avoid-
ance.  But this canon “has no application in the absence of statutory
ambiguity.”  United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative,
532  U. S.  483,  494.    Here,  the  text  of  §1326(d)  unambiguously  fore-
closes Palomar-Santiago’s interpretation.  Pp. 5–7.

813 Fed. Appx. 282, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the main body of the legal opinion and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

9

ALITO, J., dissenting

He  has  smoke  coming  from  his  nostrils  and  fire  from
his mouth!  How dumb was that?”  Id., at 3791.

In  light  of  this  evidence,  it  is  abundantly  clear  that
respondents,  going  far  beyond  commentary  on  matters  of
public  concern,  specifically  attacked  Matthew  Snyder
because (1) he was a Catholic and (2) he was a member of
the United States military.  Both Matthew and petitioner
were private figures,16 and this attack was not speech on a
matter of public concern.  While commentary on the Cath-
olic  Church  or  the  United  States  military  constitutes
speech  on  matters  of  public  concern,  speech  regarding
Matthew Snyder’s purely private conduct does not.

JUSTICE  BREYER  provides  an  apt  analogy  to  a  case  in
which the First Amendment would permit recovery in tort
for a verbal attack:

“[S]uppose that A were physically to assault B, know-
ing that the assault (being newsworthy) would provide
A  with  an  opportunity  to  transmit  to  the  public  his
views  on  a  matter  of  public  concern.    The  constitu-
tionally  protected  nature  of  the  end  would  not  shield
A’s use of unlawful, unprotected means.  And in some
circumstances  the  use  of  certain  words  as  means
would  be  similarly  unprotected.”  Ante,  at  1  (concur-
ring opinion).

This  captures  what  respondents  did  in  this  case.    In-
deed,  this  is  the  strategy  that  they  have  routinely  em-
ployed—and  that  they  will  now  continue  to  employ—
inflicting  severe  and  lasting  emotional  injury  on  an  ever
growing list of innocent victims.

IV
The  Court  concludes  that  respondents’  speech  was
protected  by  the  First  Amendment  for  essentially  three

——————

16 See 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (Md. 2008).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues that the speech in question, while potentially on a matter of public concern, was specifically targeted at a private individual and caused severe emotional harm.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

State  Legislature  v.  Arizona  Independent  Redistricting
Comm’n, 576 U. S. 787, 829 (2015) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissent-
ing);  cf.  Scialabba  v.  Cuellar  de  Osorio,  573  U. S.  41,  60
(2014) (KAGAN, J., for the Court) (“ ‘[W]ords repeated in dif-
ferent  parts  of  the  same  statute  generally  have  the  same
meaning’ ”  (quoting  Law  v.  Siegel,  571  U. S.  415,  422
(2014)).  While terms may not always have the exact same
meaning  throughout  the  Constitution,  here  we  are  inter-
preting  the  same  word  (“Manner”)  in  two  provisions  that
the  Court  has  already  stated  impose  “paralle[l]”  duties—
setting the “ ‘Manner of holding Elections’ ” and setting the
“ ‘Manner’ ” of “ ‘appoint[ing] a Number of Electors.’ ”  U. S.
Term  Limits,  514  U. S.,  at  804–805  (majority  opinion).
Nothing in the Constitution’s text or history indicates that
the Court should take the strongly disfavored step of con-
cluding that the term “Manner” has two different meanings
in these closely aligned provisions.

All the Court can point to in support of its position is a
single sentence in Ray v. Blair, 343 U. S. 214 (1952), which
suggested  that  a  State’s  power  to  impose  a  requirement
that electors pledge to vote for their party’s nominee comes
from Article II, §1, id., at 227.  But this statement is simply
made  in  passing  in  response  to  one  of  the  parties’  argu-
ments.  It is curiously bereft of reasoning or analysis of Ar-
ticle II.  We generally look to the text to govern our analysis
rather  than  insouciantly  follow  stray,  “incomplete”  state-
ments in our prior opinions, see Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call
Technologies, LP, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 13).
In my view, we should be guided by the text here.

2

Even accepting the Court’s broad interpretation of Clause
2 of Article II, §1, I cannot agree with its determination that
this Clause expressly authorizes the Washington law at is-
sue  here.  In  an  attempt  to  tie  Washington’s  law  to  the
State’s  “power  to  appoint  an  elector,”  see  ante,  at  9,  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and delves into the interpretation of the Constitution, particularly Article II, Section 1.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

31

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

State except Connecticut had a constitutional provision pro-
tecting religious liberty.  McConnell, Origins 1455.  In fact,
the Free Exercise Clause had more analogs in State Consti-
tutions  than  any  other  individual  right.  See  Calabresi,
Agudo, & Dore, State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What
Individual  Rights  Are  Really  Deeply  Rooted  in  American
History and Tradition? 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1451, 1463–1464,

——————
other  act  or  thing,  contrary  to  their  religious  persuasion”);  Concession
and Agreement of the Lords Proprietors of the Province of New Caesarea,
or New-Jersey (1664), in id., at 23 (declaring the right of all persons to
“freely and fully have and enjoy . . . their Judgments and Consciences in
matters of Religion throughout the said Province” and ensuring “[t]hat
no person . . . at any Time shall be any ways molested, punished, disqui-
eted  or  called  in  question  for  any  Difference  in  Opinion  or  Practice  in
matter of Religious Concernments, who do not actually disturb the civil
Peace of the said Province”); Concessions and Agreements of West New-
Jersey, ch. XVI (1676), in id., at 24 (providing that “no Person . . . shall
be any ways upon any pretence whatsoever, called in Question, or in the
least  punished  or  hurt,  either  in  Person,  Estate,  or  Priviledge,  for  the
sake of his Opinion, Judgment, Faith or Worship towards God in Matters
of Religion”); Laws of West New-Jersey, Art. X (1681), ibid. (“That Lib-
erty of Conscience in Matters of Faith and Worship towards God, shall
be  granted  to  all  People  within  the  Province  aforesaid;  who  shall  live
peacably  and  quietly  therein”);  Fundamental  Constitutions  for  East
New-Jersey,  Art.  XVI  (1683),  ibid.  (“All  Persons  living  in  the  Province
who  confess  and  acknowledge  the  one  Almighty  and  Eternal  God,  and
holds themselves obliged in Conscience to live peacably and quietly in a
civil Society, shall in no way be molested or prejudged for their Religious
Perswasions and Exercise in matters of Faith and Worship”); New York
Act Declaring . . . Rights & Priviledges (1691), in id., at 25 (“That no Per-
son . . . shall at any time be any way molested, punished, disturbed, dis-
quieted or called in question for any Difference in Opinion, or matter of
Religious Concernment, who do not under that pretence disturb the Civil
Peace of the Province”); Charter of Privileges Granted by William Penn
(1701), in id., at 31–32 (declaring that “no Person . . . who shall confess
and  acknowledge  One  almighty  God  . . .  and  profess  . . .  themselves
obliged to live quietly under the Civil Government, shall be in any Case
molested  or  prejudiced  . . .  because  of  . . .  their  consciencious  [sic]  Per-
suasion  or  Practice,  nor  . . .  suffer  any  other  Act  or  Thing,  contrary  to
their religious Persuasion”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 593 U.S. ____ (2021). It cites historical examples of state constitutional provisions protecting religious liberty.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U55

[09-26-01 13:01:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

674

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

bursements received for depreciation costs and other cash
into sinking funds called “funded depreciation accounts.”
§ 413.134(e).
Investment income earned on these funds does
not operate to reduce a provider’s interest expense,
§ 413.153(b)(2)(iii), creating incentives to maintain modern
medical equipment and facilities.

The Medicare regulations, furthermore, afford certain pro-
vider organizations “special treatment,” intended to ensure
the ongoing availability of medical services for qualifying
patients. See 42 CFR pt. 412G (1999). Providers qualify-
ing as “Medicare-dependent, small rural hospital[s],” for in-
stance, are entitled to additional, “lump sum” payments to
compensate for signiﬁcant declines in demand for patient
care.
§ 412.108. The additional funds enable a provider to
“maintai[n] [its] necessary core staff and services” and to sat-
isfy its “ﬁxed (and semi-ﬁxed) costs.” §§ 412.108(d)(3)(A),
(B). So too does the Medicare program authorize “special
treatment” for, among other providers, “sole community hos-
pitals,” “renal transplantation centers,” and “hospitals that
serve a disproportionate share of low-income patients.” See
§§ 412.92, 412.100, 412.106. The subsidies assist providers in
satisfying those ﬁnancial obligations necessary to continue as
going concerns in accordance with the program’s require-
ments. See, e. g., § 412.92(d)(2).

In the normal course Medicare disbursements occur on a
periodic basis, often in advance of a provider’s rendering
services, 42 U. S. C. § 1395g(a); 42 CFR §§ 413.60, 413.64
(1999). The payment system serves to “protect providers’
liquidity,” Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S.
402, 406 (1993), thereby assisting in the ongoing provision of
services.
42 CFR § 413.5(b)(1) (1999) (requiring reimburse-
ment method to “result in current payment so that institu-
tions will not be disadvantaged, as they sometimes are under
other arrangements, by having to put up money for the pur-
chase of goods and services well before they receive reim-
bursement”); § 413.5(b)(6) (reimbursement system must oper-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, likely from a court opinion. The presence of case citations, legal terminology ("§"), and a structured format suggests this is part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1117

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No.  09–6239.  Patterson  v.  Georgia.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  285  Ga.  597,  679  S.  E.  2d  716.

No.  09–6241.  Vadde  v.  Georgia.  Ct.  App.  Ga.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  296  Ga.  App.  405,  674  S.  E.  2d  323.

No.  09–6394.  Hale  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  6th  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6465.  Blalock  v.  Wilson,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  396.

No. 09–6491.  Wilson v. United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  1059.

No.  09–6521.  Whorley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  550  F.  3d  326.

No.  09–6549.  Thomas  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6659.  Sanchez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  75.

No.  09–6673.  Bowling  v.  Kentucky.  Sup.  Ct.  Ky.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6755.  Skrzypek  et  ux.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  117.

No.  09–6834.  Thomas  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335
Fed.  Appx.  386.

No. 09–6925.  Pope v. United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  598.

No.  09–7013.  Hunt  v.  Houston,  Director,  Nebraska  De
partment  of Correctional  Services.  C. A.  8th Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  695.

No. 09–7031.  Lemons v.  Atlantic City Police Department
et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  347
Fed.  Appx.  722.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is more of a legal docket than readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

31

Opinion of the Court

(1888).  But this Court has long cautioned that the English
common law “is not to be taken in all respects to be that of
America.”  Van  Ness  v.  Pacard,  2  Pet.  137,  144  (1829)
(Story, J., for the Court); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet.
591, 659 (1834); Funk, 290 U. S., at 384.  Thus, “[t]he lan-
guage of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely ex-
cept by reference to the common law and to British institu-
tions  as  they  were  when  the  instrument  was  framed  and
adopted,” not as they existed in the Middle Ages.  Ex parte
Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 108–109 (1925) (emphasis added);
see also United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 363 (1852).

We  interpret  the  English  history  that  respondents  and
the United States muster in light of these interpretive prin-
ciples.  We find that history ambiguous at best and see little
reason to think that the Framers would have thought it ap-
plicable in the New World.  It is not sufficiently probative
to defend New York’s proper-cause requirement.

To  begin,  respondents  and  their  amici  point  to  several
medieval  English  regulations  from  as  early  as  1285  that
they say indicate a longstanding tradition of restricting the
public  carry  of  firearms.  See  13  Edw.  1,  102.    The  most
prominent is the 1328 Statute of Northampton (or Statute),
passed shortly after Edward II was deposed by force of arms
and his son, Edward III, took the throne of a kingdom where
“tendency to turmoil and rebellion was everywhere appar-
ent throughout the realm.”  N. Trenholme, The Risings in
the English Monastic Towns in 1327, 6 Am. Hist. Rev. 650,
651 (1901).  At the time, “[b]ands of malefactors, knights as
well as those of lesser degree, harried the country, commit-
ting  assaults  and  murders,”  prompted  by  a  more  general
“spirit  of  insubordination”  that  led  to  a  “decay  in  English
national  life.”  K.  Vickers,  England  in  the  Later  Middle
Ages 107 (1926).

The Statute of Northampton was, in part, “a product of
. . . the acute disorder that still plagued England.”  A. Ver-
duyn,  The  Politics  of  Law  and  Order  During  the  Early
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing historical context and legal precedents. It discusses the English common law and its relevance to the interpretation of the US Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting

labels.  If the employer’s objection to the male employee is
characterized as attraction to men, it seems that he is just
like the woman in all respects except sex and that the em-
ployer’s disparate treatment must be based on that one dif-
ference.  On the other hand, if the employer’s objection is
sexual orientation or homosexuality, the two employees dif-
fer in two respects, and it cannot be inferred that the dis-
parate treatment was due even in part to sex.

The Court insists that its label is the right one, and that
presumably is why it makes such a point of arguing that an
employer cannot escape liability under Title VII by giving
sex discrimination some other name.  See  ante, at 14, 17.
That  is  certainly  true,  but  so  is  the  opposite.  Something
that is not sex discrimination cannot be converted into sex
discrimination by slapping on that label.  So the Court can-
not prove its point simply by labeling the employer’s objec-
tion  as  “attract[ion]  to  men.”  Ante,  at  9–10.  Rather,  the
Court needs to show that its label is the correct one.

And a labeling standoff would not help the Court because
that  would  mean  that  the  bare  text  of  Title  VII  does  not
unambiguously show that its interpretation is right.  The
Court would have no justification for its stubborn refusal to
look any further.

As it turns out, however, there is no standoff.  It can eas-
ily  be  shown  that  the  employer’s  real  objection  is  not  “at-
tract[ion] to men” but homosexual orientation.

In an effort to prove its point, the Court carefully includes
in its example just two employees, a homosexual man and
a heterosexual woman, but suppose we add two more indi-
viduals, a woman who is attracted to women and a man who
is attracted to women.  (A large employer will likely have
applicants and employees who fall into all four categories,
and a small employer can potentially have all four as well.)
We now have the four exemplars listed below, with the dis-
charged employees crossed out:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the interpretation of Title VII and its application to cases of alleged discrimination based on sexual orientation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

3

Opinion of the Court

mated to have been caused by chemicals . . . , a large part
following  the  introduction  of  mustard  gas  in  1917.”    Ken-
yon,  Why  We  Need  a  Chemical  Weapons  Convention  and
an  OPCW,  in  The  Creation  of  the  Organisation  for  the
Prohibition  of  Chemical  Weapons  1,  4  (I.  Kenyon  &  D.
Feakes  eds.  2007)  (Kenyon  &  Feakes).  The  atrocities  of
that  war  led  the  community  of  nations  to  adopt  the  1925
Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of chemicals as
a method of warfare.  Id., at 5.

Up  to  the  1990s,  however,  chemical  weapons  remained
in use both in and out of wartime, with devastating conse-
quences.
Iraq’s  use  of  nerve  agents  and  mustard  gas
during its war with Iran in the 1980s contributed to inter-
national  support  for  a  renewed,  more  effective  chemical
weapons  ban.  Id.,  at  6,  10–11.  In  1994  and  1995,  long-
held  fears  of  the  use  of  chemical  weapons  by  terrorists
were  realized  when  Japanese  extremists  carried  out  two
attacks  using  sarin  gas.    Id.,  at  6.   The  Convention  was
conceived  as  an  effort  to  update  the  Geneva  Protocol’s
protections  and  to  expand  the  prohibition  on  chemical
weapons  beyond  state  actors  in  wartime.  Convention
Preamble,  1974  U.  N.  T.  S.  318  (the  State  Parties  are
“[d]etermined  for  the  sake  of  all  mankind,  to  exclude
completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons,
. . . thereby complementing the obligations assumed under
the  Geneva  Protocol  of  1925”).  The  Convention  aimed  to
achieve  that  objective  by  prohibiting  the  development,
stockpiling, or use of chemical weapons by any State Party
or  person  within  a  State  Party’s  jurisdiction.    Arts.  I,  II,
VII.
It  also  established  an  elaborate  reporting  process
requiring State Parties to destroy chemical weapons under
their  control  and  submit  to  inspection  and  monitoring  by
an  international  organization  based  in  The  Hague,  Neth-
erlands.  Arts. VIII, IX.

The Convention provides:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It cites legal precedents and discusses the history and purpose of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

170

PHILLIPS v. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

Opinion of the Court

Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982), we held that a property right
was taken even when infringement of that right arguably
increased the market value of the property at issue.
Id.,
at 437, n. 15. Our conclusion in this regard was premised
on our longstanding recognition that property is more than
economic value, see id., at 435; it also consists of “the group
of rights which the so-called owner exercises in his domin-
ion of the physical thing,” such “as the right to possess, use
and dispose of it,” General Motors, supra, at 380. While
the interest income at issue here may have no economically
realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and dis-
position are nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the
property. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704, 715 (1987) (not-
ing that “the right to pass on” property “is itself a valuable
right”). The government may not seize rents received by
the owner of a building simply because it can prove that the
costs incurred in collecting the rents exceed the amount
collected.

The United States, as amicus curiae, additionally argues
that “private property” is not implicated by the IOLTA pro-
gram because the interest income generated by funds held in
IOLTA accounts is “government-created value.” Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 20. We disagree. As an
initial matter, this argument is factually erroneous. The in-
terest income transferred to the TEAJF is not the product
of increased efﬁciency, economies of scale, or pooling of funds
by the government.
Indeed, as noted above, the State has
conceded at oral argument that if an attorney could in any
way (such as pooling of client funds) earn interest for a client,
he is ethically obligated to do so rather than place the funds
in an IOLTA account.
Interest income is economically real-
izable by IOLTA primarily because: (1) the Federal Govern-
ment imposes tax reporting costs only on those who attempt
to exercise control over the interest their funds generate, see
Rev. Rul. 81–209, 1981–2 Cum. Bull. 16; Rev. Rul. 87–2,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation*.  It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES

Opinion of the Court

Light,  Gas  &  Water  Div.  v.  Craft,  436  U. S.  1,  9  (1978)
(emphasis added) (quoting Roth, supra, at 577); cf. United
States  ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 279 (1943).
Resolution  of  the  federal  issue  begins,  however,  with  a
determination of what it is that state law provides.  In the
context of the present case, the central state-law question
is whether Colorado law gave respondent a right to police
enforcement  of  the  restraining  order.    It  is  on  this  point
that respondent’s call for deference to the Tenth Circuit is
relevant.

We have said that a “presumption of deference [is] given
the views of a federal court as to the law of a State within
its  jurisdiction.”  Phillips,  supra,  at  167.  That  presump-
tion can be overcome, however, see Leavitt v. Jane L., 518
U. S. 137, 145 (1996) (per curiam), and we think deference
inappropriate  here.    The  Tenth  Circuit’s  opinion,  which
reversed the Colorado District Judge, did not draw upon a
deep well of state-specific expertise, but consisted primarily
of  quoting  language  from  the  restraining  order,  the  statu-
tory text, and a state-legislative-hearing transcript.  See 366
F. 3d,  at  1103–1109.    These  texts,  moreover,  say  nothing
distinctive  to  Colorado,  but  use  mandatory  language  that
(as  we  shall  discuss)  appears  in  many  state  and  federal
statutes.    As  for  case  law:  the  only  state-law  cases  about
restraining  orders  that  the  Court  of  Appeals  relied  upon
were decisions of Federal District Courts in Ohio and Penn-
sylvania and state courts in New Jersey, Oregon, and Ten-
nessee.  Id., at 1104–1105, n. 9, 1109.4  Moreover, if we were

——————

4 Most  of  the  Colorado-law  cases  cited  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  ap-
peared  in  footnotes  declaring  them  to  be  irrelevant  because  they
involved only substantive due process (366 F. 3d, at 1100–1101, nn. 4–
5),  only  statutes  without  restraining  orders  (id.,  at  1101,  n. 5),  or
Colorado’s  Government  Immunity  Act,  which  the  Court  of  Appeals
concluded applies “only to . . . state tort law claims” (id., at 1108–1109,
n. 12).  Our analysis is likewise unaffected by the Immunity Act or by
the way that Colorado has dealt with substantive due process or cases
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Castle Rock v. Gonzales*. The text includes citations to other legal cases and statutes, indicating its legal context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS,
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT

No. 20–603.  Argued March 29, 2022—Decided June 29, 2022

Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o raise and
support  Armies”  and  “[t]o  provide  and  maintain  a  Navy.”    §8,  cls.  1,
12–13.  Pursuant to that authority, Congress enacted the Uniformed
Services  Employment  and  Reemployment  Rights  Act  of  1994
(USERRA), which gives returning servicemembers the right to reclaim
their prior jobs with state employers and authorizes suit if those em-
ployers  refuse  to  accommodate  veterans’  service-related  disabilities.
See 38 U. S. C. §4301 et seq. Petitioner Le Roy Torres enlisted in the
Army Reserves in 1989.  In 2007, he was called to active duty and de-
ployed to Iraq.  While serving, Torres was exposed to toxic burn pits, a
method of garbage disposal that sets open fire to all manner of trash,
human waste, and military equipment.  Torres received an honorable
discharge.  But he returned home with constrictive bronchitis, a res-
piratory condition that narrowed his airways and made breathing dif-
ficult.  These ailments, Torres says, left him unable to work his old job
as  a  state  trooper.    Torres  asked  his  former  employer,  respondent
Texas Department of Public Safety (Texas), to accommodate his condi-
tion by reemploying him in a different role.  Texas refused.  So Torres
sued  Texas  in  state  court  to  enforce  his  rights  under  USERRA.
§4313(a)(3).  Texas tried to dismiss the suit by invoking sovereign im-
munity.  The trial court denied the State’s motion.  An intermediate
appellate court reversed, reasoning that, under this Court’s case law,
Congress  could  not  authorize  private  suits  against  nonconsenting
States pursuant to its Article I powers except under the Bankruptcy
Clause, citing Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356.
The Supreme Court of Texas denied discretionary review.  After the
decision below, this Court issued PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey,
594 U. S. ___.  PennEast held that the States waived their sovereign
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

5

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

“scandalous”  to  do?    A  logical  answer  is  that  Congress
meant for “scandalous” to target a third and distinct type
of offensiveness: offensiveness in the mode of communica-
tion  rather  than  the  idea.  The  other  two  words  cover
marks that are offensive because of the ideas they express;
the  “scandalous”  clause  covers  marks  that  are  offensive
because of the mode of expression, apart from any particu-
lar message or idea.

To be sure, there are situations in which it makes sense
to treat adjoining words as expressing the same or highly
similar  concepts  (even  at  the  risk  of  some  redundancy).
Cf. Swearingen v. United States, 161 U. S. 446, 450 (1896)
(construing  “ ‘obscene,  lewd  or  lascivious’ ”  to  have  a  uni-
fied  meaning).  That  is  essentially  the  approach  that  the
majority  takes.    See  ante,  at  6.2  But  that  is  not  the  ap-
proach that Congress appears to have intended here.  For
example, “scandalous” does not serve as a broader catchall
at  the  end  of  a  list  of  similar  words  that  all  point  in  one
direction.  E.g.,  Washington  State  Dept.  of  Social  and
Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U. S.
371,  384  (2003).  Nor  is  “scandalous”  simply  grouped
among a number of closely related terms that help define
its meaning.  E.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561,
575 (1995).

The  text  of  §1052,  instead,  is  a  grab  bag:  It  bars  the
registration  of  marks  featuring  “immoral,  deceptive,  or
scandalous  matter,”  as  well  as,  inter  alia,  disparaging
marks,  flags,  insignias,  mislabeled  wines,  and  deceased
Presidents.  See §§1052(a)–(e).  This is not, in other words,
a situation in which Congress was simply being “verbos[e]

——————

2 That  interpretive  move  appears  to  accord  with  the  Federal  Circuit
and  the  PTO’s  past  practice.  Ante,  at  2–3.  Nevertheless,  it  is  by  no
means  the  only  reasonable  way  to  read  this  text,  and  indeed  some
courts  have  suggested  that  “scandalous”  can  and  should  be  applied
independently  of  “immoral,”  see,  e.g.,  In  re  McGinley,  660  F. 2d  481,
485, n. 6 (CCPA 1981).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the interpretation of the word "scandalous" in trademark law. It delves into legal precedents and arguments regarding the meaning and application of this term.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

ALITO, J., dissenting

n. 24.  See  also  Williams,  supra,  at  307  (STEVENS,  J.,
concurring)  (“[T]o  the  extent  the  statutory  text  alone  is
unclear, our duty to avoid constitutional objections makes
it especially appropriate to look beyond the text in order to
ascertain the intent of its drafters”).

Applying  this  canon,  I  would  hold  that  §48  does  not
apply to depictions of hunting.  First, because §48 targets
depictions  of  “animal  cruelty,”  I  would  interpret  that
term to apply only to depictions involving acts of animal
cruelty  as defined  by applicable state  or  federal  law,  not
to depictions of acts that happen to be illegal for reasons
having  nothing  to  do  with  the  prevention  of  animal  cru-
elty.  See ante, at 12–13 (interpreting “[t]he text of §48(c)”
to  ban  a  depiction  of  “the  humane  slaughter  of  a  stolen
cow”).  Virtually all state laws prohibiting animal cruelty
either  expressly  define  the  term  “animal”  to  exclude
wildlife or else specifically exempt lawful hunting activi-
ties,3  so the statutory prohibition set forth in §48(a) may
reasonably  be  interpreted  not  to  reach  most  if  not  all
hunting depictions.

Second, even if the hunting of wild animals were other-
wise  covered  by  §48(a),  I  would  hold  that  hunting  depic-
tions fall within the exception in §48(b) for depictions that
have  “serious”  (i.e.,  not  “trifling”4)  “scientific,”  “educa-

——————

3 See Appendix, infra (citing statutes); B. Wagman, S. Waisman, & P.
Frasch, Animal Law: Cases and Materials 92 (4th ed. 2010) (“Most anti-
cruelty  laws  also  include  one  or  more  exemptions,”  which  often  “ex-
clud[e]  from  coverage  (1)  whole  classes  of  animals,  such  as  wildlife  or
farm  animals,  or  (2)  specific  activities,  such  as  hunting”);  Note,  Eco-
nomics  and  Ethics  in  the  Genetic  Engineering  of  Animals,  19  Harv.
J. L. & Tech. 413, 432 (2006) (“Not  surprisingly, state laws relating to
the  humane  treatment  of  wildlife,  including  deer,  elk,  and  waterfowl,
are virtually non-existent”).

4 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2073 (1976); Random
House Dictionary of the English Language 1303 (1966).  While the term
“serious”  may  also  mean  “weighty”  or  “important,”  ibid.,  we  should
adopt the former definition if necessary to avoid unconstitutionality.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of United States v. Stevens. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute (§48) and its application to depictions of hunting.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

19

Opinion of the Court

ing  to  the  sentencing  of  juvenile  offenders.    We  have  by
now  held  on  multiple  occasions  that  a  sentencing  rule
permissible for adults may not be so for children.  Capital
punishment,  our  decisions  hold,  generally  comports  with
the  Eighth  Amendment—except  it  cannot  be  imposed  on
children.  See  Roper,  543  U. S.  551;  Thompson,  487  U. S.
815.  So too, life without parole is permissible for nonhom-
icide  offenses—except,  once  again,  for  children.    See  Gra-
ham,  560  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  24).  Nor  are  these
sentencing decisions an oddity in the law.  To the contrary,
“ ‘[o]ur  history  is  replete  with  laws  and  judicial  recogni-
tion’  that  children  cannot  be  viewed  simply  as  miniature
adults.”  J.  D.  B.,  564  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  10–11)
(quoting  Eddings,  455  U. S.,  at  115–116,  citing  examples
from criminal, property, contract,  and tort law).  So if (as
Harmelin  recognized)  “death  is  different,”  children  are
different too.  Indeed, it is the odd legal rule that does not
have some form of exception for children.  In that context,
it is no surprise that the law relating to society’s harshest
punishments  recognizes  such  a  distinction.    Cf.  Graham,
560 U. S., at ___ (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment)
(slip op., at 7) (“Graham’s age places him in a significantly
different category from the defendan[t] in . . . Harmelin”).
Our ruling thus neither overrules nor undermines nor con-
flicts with Harmelin.

Alabama  and  Arkansas  (along  with  THE  CHIEF  JUS-
TICE and JUSTICE ALITO) next contend that because many
States impose mandatory life-without-parole sentences on
juveniles,  we  may  not  hold  the  practice  unconstitutional.
In  considering  categorical  bars  to  the  death  penalty  and
life without parole, we ask as part of the analysis whether
“ ‘objective  indicia  of  society’s  standards,  as  expressed  in
legislative  enactments  and  state  practice,’ ”  show  a  “na-
tional consensus” against a sentence for a particular class
of  offenders.  Graham,  560  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  10)
(quoting Roper, 543 U. S., at 563).  By our count, 29 juris-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the constitutionality of mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

eral Circuit in Wagner later held that the agency’s regula-
tions “clear[ly]” defied its statutory charge from Congress.
370 F. 3d, at 1094.  But, on the Court’s view today, that de-
cision represented a change in governing law.  See ante, at
7, 9.

A clear and unmistakable agency error cannot be made
to  vanish  so  easily.  Even  if  an  agency’s  unlawful  regula-
tions may bind its own employees until a court says other-
wise, that does not mean its decisions applying those regu-
lations to others are error-free.  The regulations on which
the VA relied in this case always defied Congress’s express
command  in  § 1111.    In  that  sense,  they  were  always  a
“ ‘nullity.’ ”  Dixon, 381 U. S., at 74.  Nor does it make a dif-
ference  that  Wagner  recognized  as  much  only  some  time
later.  Once  more,  when  a  court  interprets  a  statute  and
declares contrary regulations invalid, it cannot and does not
change the law; it can only explain what the law has “al-
ways meant.”  Rivers, 511 U. S., at 313, n. 12.  The Court
today  errs  badly  by  excusing  an  obvious  error  simply  be-
cause it was once enshrined by the agency in a statutorily
defiant regulation.

What  is  more,  the  Court’s  reading  is  at  odds  with  the
plain  terms  of  §§ 5109A  and  7111.    Under  those  statutes,
an  initial  administrative  ruling  denying  benefits  “is  sub-
ject” to later “revision . . . [i]f evidence establishes the [clear
and unmistakable] error.”  §§ 5109A(a), 7111(a) (emphasis
added).  Notice  the  tense.    The  law  does  not  ask  if  the
agency’s error was “clear and unmistakable” at the time of
its  original  decision.  Instead,  it  commands  the  agency  to
correct any clear and unmistakable error presently estab-
lished.  The same statutes further instruct that a petition
“to determine whether clear and unmistakable error exists
in a case may be instituted” in various ways.  §§ 5109A(c),
7111(c) (emphasis added).  More present tense.  Congress
easily  could  have  said  that  a  decision  is  reviewable  only
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of statutes, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TANDON v. NEWSOM

Per Curiam

the State has not shown that “public health would be im-
periled”  by  employing  less  restrictive  measures.    Roman
Catholic Diocese, 592 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5).  Accord-
ingly, applicants are entitled to an injunction pending ap-
peal.
  This  is  the fifth time the  Court  has  summarily  rejected
the  Ninth  Circuit’s  analysis  of  California’s  COVID  re-
strictions on religious exercise.  See Harvest Rock Church
v. Newsom, 592 U. S. ___ (2020); South Bay, 592 U. S. ___;
Gish  v.  Newsom,  592  U. S.  ___  (2021);  Gateway  City,  592
U. S. ___.  It is unsurprising that such litigants are entitled
to relief.  California’s Blueprint System contains myriad ex-
ceptions  and  accommodations  for  comparable  activities,
thus requiring the application of strict scrutiny.  And his-
torically, strict scrutiny requires the State to further “inter-
ests  of  the  highest  order”  by  means  “narrowly  tailored  in
pursuit of those interests.”  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  That standard “is not watered down”;
it “really means what it says.”  Ibid. (quotation altered).
  THE CHIEF JUSTICE would deny the application.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a per curiam opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses the case of Tandon v. Newsom and the Court's decision to grant an injunction pending appeal.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–915.  Argued November 7, 2023—Decided June 21, 2024

Respondent Zackey Rahimi was indicted under 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8), a
federal statute that prohibits individuals subject to a domestic violence
restraining order from possessing a firearm.  A prosecution under Sec-
tion 922(g)(8) may proceed only if the restraining order meets certain
statutory criteria.  In particular, the order must either contain a find-
ing  that  the  defendant  “represents  a  credible  threat  to  the  physical
safety”  of  his  intimate  partner  or  his  or  his  partner’s  child,
§922(g)(8)(C)(i),  or  “by  its  terms  explicitly  prohibit[ ]  the  use,”  at-
tempted use, or threatened use of “physical force” against those indi-
viduals, §922(g)(8)(C)(ii).  Rahimi concedes here that the restraining
order against him satisfies the statutory criteria, but argues that on
its face Section 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment.  The District
Court  denied  Rahimi’s  motion  to  dismiss  the  indictment  on  Second
Amendment  grounds.    While  Rahimi’s  case  was  on  appeal,  the  Su-
preme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen,
597 U. S. 1 (2022).  In light of Bruen, the Fifth Circuit reversed, con-
cluding that the Government had not shown that Section 922(g)(8) “fits
within our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”  61 F.
4th 443, 460 (CA5 2023).

Held: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible
threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be tempo-
rarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.  Pp. 5–17.

(a) Since the Founding, the Nation’s firearm laws have included reg-
ulations to stop individuals who threaten physical harm to others from
misusing firearms.  As applied to the facts here, Section 922(g)(8) fits
within this tradition.

The right to keep and bear arms is among the “fundamental rights
necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”  McDonald v. Chicago, 561
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

947

558 U. S.

October 13, 2009

No.  09–149.  Walker  v.  GEICO  General  Insurance  Co.
et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558
F.  3d  1025.

No.  09–161.  Miller,  Commissioner,  Indiana  Bureau  of
Motor  Vehicles  v.  Villegas  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Ind.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  894  N.  E.  2d  249.

No.  09–164.  Richmond,  Personal  Representative  of  the
Estate of Richmond, Deceased v.  PeaceHealth, dba Peace-
Health  Medical  Group,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Ore.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  224  Ore.  App.  477,  200  P.  3d  180.

No. 09–165.  Whitehead v.  Bradley, Arant, Rose & White,
LLP, et al.  Sup. Ct. Ala.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
54  So.  3d  966.

No.  09–171.  Halliwell  et  al.  v.  Superior  Court  of  Cali
fornia,  Sonoma  County,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st  App.  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–172.  Halliwell  et  al.  v.  Superior  Court  of  Cali
fornia,  Sonoma  County,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st  App.  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–177.  Bennett  et  al.  v.  Hendrix,  Individually  and
in His Official Capacity as Sheriff, Forsyth County, Geor
gia, et al.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
325  Fed.  Appx.  727.

No.  09–179.  Hofmeister  et  ux.  v.  Cincinnati  Insurance

Co.  Ct.  App.  Ky.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–180.  Tyler Hill  Corp. v.  Yakin.  C. A.  2d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  566  F.  3d  72.

No.  09–196.  Ward  v.  International  Union  of  Operating
Engineers,  Local  150,  AFL–CIO.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  276.

No.  09–210.  Frazier  v.  Sebelius,  Secretary  of  Health
and  Human  Services.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  879.

No.  09–226.  French  v.  Lemery.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  644.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, including case numbers, citations, and disposition. It is not the main body of text from a document and is likely a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

GOLAN v. HOLDER

BREYER, J., dissenting

Moviecraft Inc.) (testifying against restoration on grounds
similar to those set out, supra, at 10–13).

This  argument,  whatever  its  intrinsic  merits,  is  an  ar
gument  that  directly  concerns  a  private  benefit:  how  to
obtain more money from the sales of existing products.  It
is not an argument about a public benefit, such as how to
promote or to protect the creative process.

Third,  the  majority  points  out  that  the  statute  “gives
[authors]  nothing  more  than  the  benefit  of  their  labors
during whatever time remains before the normal copyright
term expires.”  Ante, at 30.  But insofar as it suggests that
copyright  should  in  general  help  authors  obtain  greater
monetary rewards than needed to elicit new works, it rests
upon  primarily  European,  but  not  American,  copyright
concepts.  See supra, at 5–6.

Fourth,  the  majority  argues  that  this  statutory  provi
sion  is  necessary  to  fulfill  our  Berne  Convention  obliga
tions.  Ante,  at  4–8.  The  Treaty,  in  Article  18,  says  that
the  “Convention  shall  apply  to  all  works  which,  at  the
moment  of  its  coming  into  force  [i.e.,  1989  in  the  case  of
the  United  States]  have  not  yet  fallen  into  the  public
domain  in  the  country  of  origin  through  the  expiry  of  the
term  of  protection.”  Berne  Convention  for  the  Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 18(1), Sept. 9, 1886, as
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 828 U. N. T. S. 221,
251.  The  majority  and  Government  say  that  this  means
we  must  protect  the  foreign  works  at  issue  here.    And
since  the  Berne  Convention,  taken  as  a  whole,  provides
incentives  for  the  creation  of  new  works,  I  am  willing  to
speculate,  for  argument’s  sake,  that  the  statute  might
indirectly  encourage  production  of  new  works  by  making
the  United  States’  place  in  the  international  copyright
regime more secure.

Still,  I  cannot  find  this  argument  sufficient  to  save  the

statute.  For  one  thing,  this  is  a  dilemma  of  the  Govern
ment’s  own  making.    The  United  States  obtained  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from Justice Breyer. It delves into arguments regarding copyright law and the Berne Convention.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–1712
_________________

JAMES J. THOLE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
U. S. BANK N. A., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 1, 2020]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,

concurring.

I agree with the Court’s opinion, which correctly applies
our  precedents  and  concludes  that  petitioners  lack  stand-
ing.  I also agree that “[c]ourts sometimes make standing
law  more  complicated  than  it  needs  to  be.”  Ante,  at  8.  I
write separately to observe that by requiring us to engage
with petitioners’ analogies to trust law, our precedents un-
necessarily complicate this case.

The historical restrictions on standing provide a simpler
framework.    Article  III  vests  “[t]he  judicial  Power  of  the
United  States”  in  the  federal  courts  and  specifies  that  it
shall extend to enumerated categories of “Cases” and “Con-
troversies.”  §§1, 2.  “To understand the limits that standing
imposes on ‘the judicial Power,’ . . . we must ‘refer directly
to the traditional, fundamental limitations upon the powers
of common-law courts.’ ”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S.
___,  ___  (2016)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  2)
(quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305, 340 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting));  see  also  Muskrat  v.  United  States,  219  U. S.
346,  356–357  (1911)  (observing  that  the  “judicial  power
with the right to determine ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ ” has
long referred to “suit[s] instituted according to the regular
course of judicial procedure”).

“Common-law  courts  imposed  different  limitations  on  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

961

524 U. S.

June 26, 1998

No. 97–9252.

Johns v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 437.

No. 97–9253. Luna-Herrera v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 909.

No. 97–9254. King v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 918.

No. 97–9257. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 951.

No. 97–9258. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1150.

No. 97–9260. Gallant v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 1246.

No. 97–9261. Fortes, aka Brookshire v. United States.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1.

No. 97–9266. Horton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 138 F. 3d 952.

No. 97–9267. Sapp v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 138 F. 3d 952.

No. 97–9268. Peters v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 933.

No. 97–9269. Rousan v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 961 So. 2d 831.

No. 97–9270.

Jiles v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 137 F. 3d 1355.

No. 97–9271.

Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 894.

No. 97–9272.

J. A. J., a Male Juvenile v. United States.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 905.

No. 97–9277. Bond v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 1247.

No. 97–9278. Cotton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 899.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

THOMAS, J., dissenting

the  Court  should  at  least  do  more  to  identify  the  circum-
stances in which the Government may keep the money.  In-
stead, the Court asks lower courts to improvise a solution.
If past is prologue, this uncertainty is sure to create oppor-
tunities for the SEC to continue exercising unlawful power.

*

*

*
I would reverse for the straightforward reason that dis-
gorgement  is not “equitable relief ” within the meaning of
§78u(d)(5).  Because the majority acquiesces in the contin-
ued use of disgorgement under that statute, I respectfully
dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 591 U.S. ____ (2020).  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

LUCIA v. SEC

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J.

scheme.  See  Ramspeck  v.  Federal  Trial  Examiners  Con-
ference,  345  U. S.  128,  130  (1953);  Wong  Yang  Sung  v.
McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 46 (1950).  Before the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, hearing examiners “were in a depend-
ent  status”  to  their  employing  agency,  with  their  classifi-
cation, compensation, and promotion all dependent on how
the  agency  they  worked  for  rated  them.  Ramspeck,  345
U. S.,  at  130.  As  a  result  of  that  dependence,  “[m]any
complaints were voiced against the actions of the hearing
examiners,  it  being  charged  that  they  were  mere  tools  of
the agency concerned and subservient to the agency heads
in  making  their  proposed  findings  of  fact  and  recommen-
dations.”  Id.,  at  131.    The  Administrative  Procedure  Act
responded  to  those  complaints  by  giving  administrative
law  judges  “independence  and  tenure  within  the  existing
Civil  Service  system.”  Id.,  at  132;  cf.  Wong  Yang  Sung,
supra, at 41–46 (referring to removal protections as among
the  Administrative  Procedure  Act’s  “safeguards  . . .  in-
tended to ameliorate” the  perceived “evils” of commingling
of adjudicative and prosecutorial functions in agencies).

If  the  Free  Enterprise  Fund  Court’s  holding  applies
equally to the administrative law judges—and I stress the
“if ”—then  to  hold  that  the  administrative  law  judges  are
“Officers  of  the  United  States”  is,  perhaps,  to  hold  that
their  removal  protections  are  unconstitutional.    This
would  risk  transforming  administrative  law  judges  from
independent  adjudicators  into  dependent  decisionmakers,
serving  at  the  pleasure  of  the  Commission.    Similarly,  to
apply  Free  Enterprise  Fund’s  holding  to  high-level  civil
servants  threatens  to  change  the  nature  of  our  merit-
based civil service as it has existed from the time of Presi-
dent Chester Alan Arthur.  See Free Enterprise Fund, 561
U. S., at 540–542 (BREYER, J., dissenting).

I  have  stressed  the  words  “if ”  and  “perhaps”  in  the
previous  paragraph  because  Free  Enterprise  Fund’s  hold-
ing may not invalidate the removal protections applicable
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring and dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the implications of the Free Enterprise Fund case on the removal protections of administrative law judges and high-level civil servants.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

Third Circuit made little effort to explain how its interpre-
tation  can  be  reconciled  with  the  language  of  the  statute.
In my view, however, it appears that elements 2 and 5 are
clearly not met.1

I will start with element 2.  When a mail-in ballot is not
counted because it was not filled out correctly, the voter is
not denied “the right to vote.”  Rather, that individual’s vote
is not counted because he or she did not follow the rules for
casting a ballot.  “Casting a vote, whether by following the
directions for using a voting machine or completing a paper
ballot, requires compliance with certain rules.”  Brnovich v.
Democratic National Committee, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021)
(slip op., at 16).  A registered voter who does not follow the
rules may be unable to cast a vote for any number of rea-
sons.  A voter may go to the polling place on the wrong day
or after the polls have closed.  A voter may go to the wrong
polling place and may not have time to reach the right place
before it is too late.  A voter who casts a mail-in ballot may
send it to the wrong address.  A State’s refusal to count the
votes  of  these  voters  does  not  constitute  a  denial  of  “the
right to vote.”  Even the most permissive voting rules must
contain some requirements, and the failure to follow those
rules constitutes the forfeiture of the right to vote, not the
denial of that right.

Element  5  weighs  even  more  heavily  against  the  Third
Circuit’s interpretation.  This element requires that the er-
ror or omission be “material in determining whether such
individual is qualified under State law to vote in such elec-
tion.”  There is no reason why the requirements that must
be met in order to register (and thus be “qualified”) to vote
should be the same as the requirements that must be met
in  order  to  cast  a  ballot  that  will  be  counted.    Indeed,  it

——————

1 Elements 1 and 3 are satisfied, but for the reasons explained below,
see n. 2, infra, the Third Circuit’s interpretation is not consistent with
the most natural reading of element 4.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute and its application to voting rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES

BREYER, J., dissenting

administrative  calculation  problems,  is  apparently  to  de-
part  yet  further  from  the  Court’s  earlier  holdings.    It
seems  to  say  that  an  objector  can  withhold  100%,  not
simply of a special assessment made for political purposes,
but  of  any  special  assessment  whatsoever,  including  an
assessment made solely for the purpose of paying for extra
chargeable  costs,  such  as  extended  contract  negotiations,
pension  plan  experts,  or  newly  assessed  contributions  to
replenish  a  national  union’s  collective-bargaining  assis-
tance  funds.   See  ante,  at  21–22.    Although  this  rule  is
comparatively  simple  to  administer,  it  cannot  be  recon-
ciled  with  the  Court’s  previous  constitutional  holdings.
Abood,  along  with  every  related  case  the  Court  has  ever
decided, makes clear that the Constitution allows a union
to  assess  nonmembers  a  pro  rata  share  of  fees  insofar
as  they  are  used  to  pay  for  these  kinds  of  collective-
bargaining  expenses.    See  431  U. S.,  at  234–236;  see  also
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507, 524 (1991);
Machinists  v.  Street,  367  U. S.  740,  760  (1961);  Ellis,  466
U. S.,  at  447;  Davenport  v.  Washington  Ed.  Assn.,  551
U. S. 177, 181 (2007); Locke v. Karass, 555 U. S. 207, 210
(2009).  How could the majority now hold to the contrary?

If  there  are  good  reasons  for  requiring  departure  from
the  basic  Hudson-approved  administrative  system,  they
are  not  the  reasons  the  Court  provides.  It  suggests  that
the  basic  Hudson  administrative  system  gives  the  union
the freedom to misclassify, arguing, for example, that the
union  has  adopted  an  overly  broad  definition  of  charge-
ability.  See ante, at 20–21.  The 2005 proportion, however,
rested  upon  audited  2004  accounts.    While  petitioners
argue  in  this  Court  that  the  union  misclassified  parts
of  the  special  assessment  (which  was  not  imposed  until
2005),  no  brief  filed  in  this  case  (and  certainly  no  court
below)  has challenged the  accuracy  of  the  2004  figures  or
the  resulting  chargeable/nonchargeable  allocation.    In-
deed,  the  2004  accounts  were  audited  before  the  special
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of union fees and the administrative process for determining which fees are chargeable to non-members.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

955

524 U. S.

June 26, 1998

No. 97–1907. Doucette v. San Diego Unified Port Dis-
trict et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 125 F. 3d 858.

No. 97–1908. Chavez-Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 149.

No. 97–1913. Sherwood et ux. v. Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 138 F. 3d 953.

No. 97–1932. Gagliardi et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 1255.

No. 97–5745. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–6813. Chavez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–7420. Gavin et al. v. Branstad et al. C. A. 8th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 122 F. 3d 1081.

No. 97–7558. Marsh v. Dallas Independent School Dis-
trict et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 129 F. 3d 612.

No. 97–7829. Blodgett v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 1.

No. 97–7876. Butler v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–7890. Washington v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 549 Pa. 12, 700 A. 2d 400.

No. 97–7996. Elliott v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 549 Pa. 132, 700 A. 2d 1243.

No. 97–8093. Woolley v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 178 Ill. 2d 175, 687 N. E. 2d 979.

No. 97–8094. Thomas v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 178 Ill. 2d 215, 687 N. E. 2d 892.

No. 97–8097. Hickey v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 178 Ill. 2d 256, 687 N. E. 2d 910.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks the narrative flow and contextual information typical of a book's main content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases or Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$86Z 02-17-99 18:23:51 PAGES OPINPGT

266

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

FORNEY v. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit

No. 97–5737. Argued April 22, 1998—Decided June 15, 1998

Petitioner Forney sought judicial review of a Social Security Administra-
tion ﬁnal determination denying her disability beneﬁts. When the Dis-
trict Court found that determination inadequately supported by the evi-
dence and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U. S. C. § 405(g), Forney appealed, con-
tending that the agency’s denial of beneﬁts should be reversed outright.
The Ninth Circuit, however, decided that she did not have the legal
right to appeal. Before this Court, both Forney and the Solicitor Gen-
eral agree that she had the right to appeal, so an amicus has been
appointed to defend the Ninth Circuit’s decision.

Held: A Social Security disability claimant seeking court reversal of an
agency decision denying beneﬁts may appeal a district court order re-
manding the case to the agency for further proceedings pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U. S. C. § 405(g). This Court has previously held
that the language of the Social Security Act’s “judicial review” provi-
sion—“district courts” (reviewing, for example, agency denials of dis-
ability claims) “have the power to enter . . . a judgment afﬁrming, modi-
fying or reversing [an agency] decision . . . with or without remanding
the cause for a rehearing,” and such “judgment . . . shall be ﬁnal except
that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as” other civil
action judgments, 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) (emphases added)—means that a
district court order remanding a Social Security disability claim to the
agency for further proceedings is a “ﬁnal judgment” appealable under
28 U. S. C. § 1291. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U. S. 617. Finkelstein
differs from this case in that it involved an appeal by the Government.
However, Finkelstein’s logic makes that feature irrelevant here. That
case reasoned, primarily from § 405(g)’s language, that a district court
judgment remanding a Social Security disability case fell within the
“class of orders” that are appealable under § 1291. Neither the statute
nor Finkelstein suggests that such an order could be ﬁnal for purposes
of an appeal by the Government, but not a claimant, or permits an infer-
ence that ﬁnality turns on the order’s importance, or the availability
of an avenue for appeal from the agency determination that might
emerge after remand. The Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that For-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus from a Supreme Court case.  It provides a summary of the case, the parties involved, and the court's holding.  While it is important legal information, it is not the main body of the court's opinion and is not meant to be read as the primary content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

THOMAS,  J., concurring  in judgment
THOMAS,  J., concurring  in judgment

However, the court below “s[aw] fit to apply Lemon.”  874
F. 3d  195,  205  (CA4  2017).    It  is  our job to say what the
law  is,  and  because  the  Lemon  test  is  not  good law, we
ought to say so.

*

  *

  *

  Regrettably, I cannot join the Court’s opinion because it
does not adequately clarify the appropriate standard for
Establishment Clause cases.  Therefore, I concur only in
the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It contains legal citations and arguments, indicating it's part of the actual legal text and not a preface or metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of the Court

“selectively  remove[s]  a  prohibition  on  sports  wagering  in
a manner that permissively channels wagering activity to
particular  locations  or  operators.”  Id.,  at  397,  401.  The
court  disavowed  some  of  the  reasoning  in  the  Christie  I
opinion, finding its discussion of “the relationship between
a  ‘repeal’  and  an  ‘authorization’  to  have  been  too  facile.”
832 F. 3d, at 401.  But the court declined to say whether a
repeal  that  was  more  complete  than  the  2014  Act  would
still amount to an authorization.  The court observed that
a  partial  repeal  that  allowed  only  “de  minimis  wagers
between friends and family would not have nearly the type
of authorizing effect” that it found in the 2014 Act, and it
added: “We need not . . . articulate a line whereby a partial
repeal of a sports wagering ban amounts to an authoriza
tion under PASPA, if indeed such a line could be drawn.”
Id., at 402 (emphasis added).

Having found that the 2014 Act violates PASPA’s prohi
bition  of  state  authorization  of  sports  gambling  schemes,
the  court  went  on  to  hold  that  this  prohibition  does  not
contravene  the  anticommandeering  principle  because  it
“does  not  command  states  to  take  affirmative  actions.”
Id., at 401.

We granted review to decide the important constitutional
question  presented  by  these  cases,  sub nom.  Christie  v.
National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 582 U. S. ___ (2017).

II
Before  considering  the  constitutionality  of  the  PASPA
provision  prohibiting  States  from  “author[izing]”  sports
gambling,  we  first  examine  its  meaning.    The  parties
advance  dueling  interpretations,  and  this  dispute  has  an
important  bearing  on  the  constitutional  issue  that  we
must decide.  Neither  respondents nor the United States,
appearing  as  an  amicus  in  support  of  respondents,  con
tends that the provision at issue would be constitutional if
petitioners’  interpretation  is  correct.    Indeed,  the  United
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and delves into the interpretation of a specific law (PASPA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

917

524 U. S.

June 8, 1998

No. 97–1813. Ashton v. Grievance Committee for the
Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts of New York.
App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–1815. Cash v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–7368. McClain v. Clark, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F. 3d 204.

No. 97–7724. Willingham v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–7754. Doherty v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 126 F. 3d 769.

No. 97–8160. Gallego v. McDaniel, Warden, et al. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F. 3d 1065.

No. 97–8176. Carr v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 32.

No. 97–8189. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 46.

No. 97–8390. Tonia B. v. City of New York. App. Div., Sup.
Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 239
App. Div. 2d 572, 658 N. Y. S. 2d 91.

No. 97–8559. Kell v. Hatcher, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 927.

No. 97–8563. Markland v. Floyd, Superintendent, Dade
Correctional Institution and Work Camp. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 121 F. 3d 721.

No. 97–8564. Marquez v. Florida Department of Correc-

tions et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8570. Cookish v. New Hampshire. Super. Ct. N. H.,

Merrimack County. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8571. Adelman v. Colonial Park Apartments.
Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698 A. 2d
659.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). This is likely part of a legal document and not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>