<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

Opinion of the Court

(2008);  American  Ins.  Assn.  v.  Garamendi,  539  U. S.  396
(2003).  And  the  Constitution  indirectly  restricts  the
States by granting certain legislative powers to Congress,
see  Art.  I,  §8,  while  providing  in  the  Supremacy  Clause
that federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land . . . any
Thing  in  the  Constitution  or  Laws  of  any  State  to  the
Contrary notwithstanding,” Art. VI, cl. 2.  This means that
when  federal  and  state  law  conflict,  federal  law  prevails
and state law is preempted.

The  legislative  powers  granted  to  Congress  are  sizable,
but  they  are  not  unlimited.  The  Constitution  confers  on
Congress  not  plenary  legislative  power  but  only  certain
enumerated powers.  Therefore, all other legislative power
is  reserved  for  the  States,  as  the  Tenth  Amendment  con
firms.  And  conspicuously  absent  from  the  list  of  powers
given to Congress is the power to issue direct orders to the
governments  of  the  States.  The  anticommandeering  doc
trine  simply  represents  the  recognition  of  this  limit  on
congressional authority.

Although  the  anticommandeering  principle  is  simple
and  basic,  it  did  not  emerge  in  our  cases  until  relatively
recently,  when  Congress  attempted  in  a  few  isolated  in
stances  to  extend  its  authority  in  unprecedented  ways.
The  pioneering  case  was  New  York  v.  United  States,  505
U. S.  144  (1992),  which  concerned  a  federal  law  that  re
quired  a  State,  under  certain  circumstances,  either  to
“take title” to low-level radioactive waste or to “regulat[e]
according to the instructions of Congress.”  Id., at 175.  In
enacting  this  provision,  Congress  issued  orders  to  either
the  legislative  or  executive  branch  of  state  government
(depending on the branch authorized by state law to take
the  actions  demanded).  Either  way,  the  Court  held,  the
provision  was  unconstitutional  because  “the  Constitution
does  not  empower  Congress  to  subject  state  governments
to this type of instruction.”  Id., at 176.

Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court traced this rule
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the anticommandeering doctrine, which prevents Congress from directly ordering state governments to take specific actions. The text cites previous cases and constitutional provisions to support its arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

817

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–1300.  Gunderson  et  al.  v.  Liberty  Mutual  Insur
ance  Co.  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  170.

No.  08–1306.  Hendrix  et  al.  v.  Coffey  et  al.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  495.

No.  08–1309.  Hill  Dermaceuticals,  Inc.  v.  Rx  Solutions
et al.  C.  A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported  below: 306
Fed.  Appx.  450.

No.  08–1317.  Eman  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.  C.  A.
4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 288 Fed. Appx. 125.

No.  08–1321.  New  York  v.  Romeo.  Ct.  App.  N. Y.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  12  N. Y.  3d  51,  876  N.  E.  2d  666.

No.  08–1325.  Barr  et  al.  v.  Lafon,  Individually  and  in
His  Official  Capacity  as  Principal  of  William  Blount
High  School,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  538  F.  3d  554.

No.  08–1328.  Greenwell  v.  Parsley.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  541  F.  3d  401.

No. 08–1330.  Sands v.  Department of Homeland Security
et al.  C.  A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported  below: 308
Fed.  Appx.  418.

No.  08–1337.  Knight  v.  Chicago  Tribune  Co.  et  al.  App.
Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.
App.  3d  347,  895  N.  E.  2d  1007.

No.  08–1340.  Wiggenhorn  et  al.  v.  AXA  Equitable  Life
Insurance  Co.  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  722.

No.  08–1346.  Acosta  v.  Campbell  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  315.

No.  08–1348.  Railsback  v.  Washington.  Ct.  App.  Wash.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1349.  Coffey  et  al.  v.  Southwestern  Bell  Tele
phone,  L.  P.,  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  544  F.  3d  1101.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, including case numbers, citations, and the disposition (certiorari denied). This type of information is generally not considered the primary content of a document and is more suitable for legal databases or indexes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

TRUMP v. NEW YORK

BREYER, J., dissenting

Framers’  understanding  of  that  field,  his  treatise  simply
cannot bear the weight the Government puts on it.  Vattel’s
work  discussed  international  law,  not  the  United  States’
scheme for apportionment among the States, an issue not
intrinsically related to the law of nations nor one for which
founding-era thinkers drew on Vattel.  The Apportionment
Clause emerged from an extensive and uniquely American
debate  over  both  State  representation  and  taxation.    The
final language tied the two together, such that the burdens
of taxation would flow in proportion to the benefits of rep-
resentation.  See Brief for Historians of the Census as Amici
Curiae  6–11.  And  however  influential  Vattel  may  have
been for other topics, the Federal Government did not begin
to  restrict  immigration  into  the  United  States  until  after
the  Civil  War.  See  Brief  for  State  of  California  et al.  as
Amicus  Curiae  17.    While  the  Government  offers  isolated
works from a different body of law—regarding a word that
does not appear in the constitutional text—the better guide
to the Constitution’s meaning is the specific historical evi-
dence about domestic apportionment, as well as the decades
of consistent practice that comports with the Clause’s plain
terms.

Second, and more importantly for this case, the Framers’
intent is not our focus.  Instead, the question is the meaning
of the statute enacted in 1929.  Even if the Government’s
sources  evince  some  ambiguity  over  the  meaning  of  the
Constitution’s census provisions in 1787 or 1868—a doubt-
ful proposition—the historical record had resolved it by the
time of the 1929 Act.  There is simply no basis for thinking
that when Congress enacted the statute that mirrored the
constitutional language it was intending to depart so fun-
damentally from the procedures that had been consistently
applied up to that point.

Apart  from  the  historical  evidence,  the  Government  of-
fers  little  more  than  its  assertion  that  excluding  aliens
without  lawful  status  makes  good  policy  sense.  As  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Trump v. New York. It delves into the historical interpretation of the Apportionment Clause and argues against the government's position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

124

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Counsel

tine N. Kohl, Margaret Jane Porter, Karen E. Schifter, and
Patricia J. Kaeding.

Richard M. Cooper argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief for respondent R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. was Steven M. Umin. Andrew S. Krulwich, Bert W.
Rein, Thomas W. Kirby, and Michael L. Robinson ﬁled a
brief for respondent Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
Larry B. Sitton ﬁled a brief for respondents United States
Tobacco Co. et al. William C. MacLeod ﬁled a brief for re-
spondents National Association of Convenience Stores et al.
Peter T. Grossi, Jr., Arthur N. Levine, Jeff Richman, Rich-
ard A. Merrill, and Herbert Dym ﬁled a brief for respond-
ents Philip Morris Inc. et al.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the State of Min-
nesota et al. by Mike Hatch, Attorney General of Minnesota, James S.
Alexander, Assistant Attorney General, Louise H. Renne, and by the At-
torneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho
of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, Bill
Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of
Connecticut, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii,
Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Jeffrey A. Modisett of
Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Andrew
Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly
of Massachusetts, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mis-
sissippi, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana,
Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hamp-
shire, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Patricia A. Madrid of New
Mexico, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota,
Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma,
Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Sheldon
Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, John Cornyn
of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Christine
O. Gregoire of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia,
James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and Gay Woodhouse of Wyoming; for Action
on Smoking and Health by John F. Banzhaf III and Kathleen E. Scheg;
for the American Cancer Society, Inc., by Russell E. Brooks, David R.
Gelfand, Charles W. Westland, and William J. Dalton; for the American
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the counsel section of a case. It lists the attorneys representing each party involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Counsel Section</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF GORSUCH, J.

The Bunker Hill Flag

The Camp Constitution Flag

Source: App. to Pet. for Cert. 132a

Source: App. to Pet. for Cert. 146a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of references or citations, likely for legal documents. It lacks continuous narrative text and is more akin to a footnote or bibliography.
  </thinking>
  <category>Footnotes/Bibliography</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–1272
_________________

HENRY SCHEIN, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
ARCHER AND WHITE SALES, INC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[January 8, 2019]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, parties to a contract
may  agree  that  an  arbitrator  rather  than  a  court  will
resolve  disputes  arising  out  of  the  contract.  When  a  dis-
pute  arises,  the  parties  sometimes  may  disagree  not  only
about the merits of the dispute but also about the thresh-
old  arbitrability  question—that  is,  whether  their  arbitra-
tion  agreement  applies  to  the  particular  dispute.    Who
decides  that  threshold  arbitrability  question?    Under  the
Act  and  this  Court’s  cases,  the  question  of  who  decides
arbitrability is itself a question of contract.  The Act allows
parties to agree by contract that an arbitrator, rather than
a  court,  will  resolve  threshold  arbitrability  questions  as
well  as  underlying  merits  disputes.  Rent-A-Center,  West,
Inc.  v.  Jackson,  561  U. S.  63,  68−70  (2010);  First  Options
of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 943−944 (1995).

Even  when  a  contract  delegates  the  arbitrability  ques-
tion to an arbitrator, some federal courts nonetheless will
short-circuit the process and decide the arbitrability ques-
tion  themselves  if  the  argument  that  the  arbitration
agreement  applies  to  the  particular  dispute  is  “wholly
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the name of the case, the date, and the name of the Justice delivering the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxiii

Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dickerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dickinson; Lai v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diehl v. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Digital Equipment Corp.; Stonier v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dike v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dillingham Ship Repair; Siler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DiLoreto v. Board of Ed., Downey Uniﬁed School Dist.
. . . . . . . .
DiMa Corp. v. Hallie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Din v. Summers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dinning; Walker v.
DiPaolo; Bui v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title

of director.

Distelrath v. Honey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
District Court. See U. S. District Court.
District Court of Nev., Clark County; Guesman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
District Director, Exec. Ofﬁce for Immig. Rev.; Arizaga Ramos v. . .
District Judge. See U. S. District Judge.
District of Columbia; Jerry M. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
District of Columbia; Skyers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment; Robinson v.
. . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
District of Columbia Ct. of App.; Sofaer v.
District of Columbia Ct. of App.; Stanton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
District of Columbia Ct. of App. Bd. on Pro. Respons.; Thomas v.
Dixon v. Heard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dixon v. State Bar of Cal.
Dixon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. L. S., Inc. v. Chattanooga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. M.; Pennsylvania v.
Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Doby v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Doe; Buchanan v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Doe; Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Doe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dole Food Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dominguez v. Kuhlmann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dominguez-Carmona v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dones v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Donnelly; Lewis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dooley; Lodermeier v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dormire; Couteee v.
Dormire; Kemper v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dorrough, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1031
1052
1099
1074
1109
1078
1083
1067
1067
1102
1025
1086

1054

1069
1108

1118
1071
1055
1053
1130
1021
1073
1042
1081
1052
1126
1019
1059
1126
1002
1079
1097
1133
1082
1022
1117
1055
1134
1027
1012
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

809

Preslesnik; Watson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
209

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Presley v. Georgia
Presley; Young v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  844,1038

830

Prevatte v. French  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Price v. Louisiana Dept. of Ed.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Price v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  892,913

1048

Price v. United States Trustee  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prince v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  901,921

999

Prince George’s County Child Protective Services; Cargyle S. v.
1099

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pritchett v. United States
970

Probate Court of Mobile; Abner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  809,1010

Proctor Hospital; Staub v.
1024

Professional Employees; Obiajulu v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Pro-Football, Inc.; Harjo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .  968,1078

Progressive Express Ins. Co.; GwanJun Kim v.
1099

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prophet v. United States
888

Propst v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

Prosper; Wick v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

Protestant Episcopal Church in L. A.; Rector of St. James Parish v.
944

Providian Financial; Owens v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
984

Province; Jackson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Province; Knowles v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prudente v. United States
937

Prudenti; Maddox v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

Pruitt v. Schoﬁeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pryor v. Wolfe
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  988,1116

P. S. v. Franklin County Children Services
1108

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.; Free Enterprise Fund v.  . .
1036

Puckett v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

Puerto Rico Court of First Instance; Calderon-Lopez v. . . . . . . . .
Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136

1035

Pulliam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000

Purkett; Taylor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Purpura v. Bushkin, Gaimes, Gains, Jonas & Stream  . . . . . . . .  840,1020

1130

Pursley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130

Puryear v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Pyke v. Cuomo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

Pyle; Keenan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Qazza v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

QHG of Springdale, Inc.; Pichoff v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quality Engineering Products; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1026

1127

Quenga v. Lanier
959

Quezada-Enriquez v. United States

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

21

Opinion of the Court

sought to be imposed by the people of a State.”  Ibid.

But the legislature in Leser performed a ratifying func-
tion rather than engaging in traditional lawmaking.  The
provisions at issue in today’s case—like the provisions ex-
amined in Hildebrant and Smiley—concern a state legisla-
ture’s exercise of lawmaking power.  And as we held in Smi-
ley, when state legislatures act pursuant to their Elections
Clause authority, they engage in lawmaking subject to the
typical constraints on the exercise of such power.  285 U. S.,
at  367.  We  have  already  distinguished  Leser  on  those
grounds.  Smiley, 285 U. S., at 365–366.  In addition, Leser
cited  for  support  our  decision  in  Hawke  v.  Smith,  which
sharply separated ratification “from legislative action” un-
der  the  Elections  Clause.    253  U. S.,  at  228.    Lawmaking
under the Elections Clause, Hawke explained, “is entirely
different from the requirement of the Constitution as to the
expression of assent or dissent to a proposed amendment to
the Constitution.”  Id., at 231.
  Hawke and Smiley delineated the various roles that the
Constitution assigns to state legislatures.  Legislatures act
as “Consent[ing]” bodies when the Nation purchases land,
Art. I, §8, cl. 17; as “Ratif[ying]” bodies when they agree to
proposed Constitutional amendments, Art. V; and—prior to
the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment—as “electoral”
bodies  when  they  choose  United  States  Senators,  Smiley,
285 U. S., at 365; see also Art. I, §3, cl. 1; Amdt. 17 (provid-
ing for the direct election of Senators).

By  fulfilling  their  constitutional  duty  to  craft  the  rules
governing  federal  elections,  state  legislatures  do  not  con-
sent, ratify, or elect—they make laws.  Elections are com-
plex affairs, demanding rules that dictate everything from
the date on which voters will go to the polls to the dimen-
sions and font of individual ballots.  Legislatures must “pro-
vide a complete code for congressional elections,” including
regulations “relati[ng] to notices, registration, supervision
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the role of state legislatures in setting election rules and distinguishes between lawmaking and other constitutional functions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1001

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

No.  09–6584.  Bowman  v.  Colorado.  Ct.  App.  Colo.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6601.  Trotter  v.  Gates,  Secretary  of  Defense.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  288  Fed.
Appx.  398.

No. 09–6604.  Evans v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6607.  Campbell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6608.  Cao v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  687.

No.  09–6626.  Currie  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  158.

No.  09–6635.  Morse  v.  Maine.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–6638.  Bryce  v.  Martinez,  Warden.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  759.

No.  09–6640.  Walker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  230.

No.  09–6643.  McGhee  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6644.  Vazquez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  644.

No.  09–6646.  Walls  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  546  F.  3d  728.

No.  09–6652.  Daubon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  167.

No.  09–6653.  Dolamore  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6655.  Monroe  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  703.

No.  09–6656.  Duncan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  270.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–1008
_________________

CORNER POST, INC., PETITIONER v. BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2024]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
I  agree  with  the  Court  that  a  claim  under  the
Administrative Procedure Act accrues when the plaintiff is
injured by the challenged agency rule.  I also agree with the
Court  that  today’s  decision  vindicates  the  APA’s  “ ‘basic
presumption’ that anyone injured by agency action should
have access to judicial review.”  Ante, at 21 (quoting Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967)).

I  write  separately  to  explain  a  crucial  additional  point:
Corner Post can obtain relief in this case only because the
APA authorizes vacatur of agency rules.

Corner Post challenged an agency rule that regulates the
fees that banks may charge.  But Corner Post is not a bank
regulated  by  the  rule.  Rather,  it  is  a  business  that  must
pay the fees charged by the banks who are regulated by the
rule.  Corner  Post  complains  that  the  agency  rule  allows
banks to charge fees that are unreasonably high.

Corner Post’s suit is a typical APA suit.  An unregulated
plaintiff such as Corner Post often will sue under the APA
to  challenge  an  allegedly  unlawful  agency  rule  that
regulates  others  but  also  has  adverse  downstream  effects
on the plaintiff.  In those cases, an injunction barring the
agency from enforcing the rule against the plaintiff would
not help the plaintiff, because the plaintiff is not regulated
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxxiv

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
960
Proctor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Professional Pilots Federation v. Federal Aviation Administration
911
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.; Shephard v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prudential Home Mortgage Co.; Hinchliffe v.
939
Pruitt v. Waco Independent School Dist.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
Pyle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Pyles v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
Queen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Ramirez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Ramirez-Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
Ratelle; Sinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Raulerson v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970
Rawles v. Herzog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Rayborn v. Hatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
Raytheon Aerospace, Inc. v. Greenwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
Redd; Tal-Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
151
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reed; New Mexico v.
910
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reed v. United States
Reeves v. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,968
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88,968
Reeves; Hopkins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,970
Reis; Egbert v.
952
Rendish v. Tacoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee . . . . . . .
928
Reyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947
Reynolds v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Reynolds v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Reynolds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Rhett v. Carnegie Center Associates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Rhode Island; Vingi v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
Richard v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richardson v. Turtle Wax, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
927
Richmond; Childress v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ricketts v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,969
944
Riebold v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Riley; Camp v.
915
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rivera, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,969
978
Rivera v. Allin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Rivera v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
Rivero-Cabanas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rivers; Parks v.
952
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Riverside v. National Environmental Waste Corp.
Riverside; National Environmental Waste Corp. v.
952
. . . . . . . . . . .
Roberts v. Battelle Memorial Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,972
915
Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE

Opinion of the Court

I
A
  Like  other  States,  Ohio  requires  voters  to  reside  in  the
district  in  which  they  vote.    Ohio  Rev.  Code  Ann.
§3503.01(A) (West Supp. 2017); see National Conference of
State  Legislatures,  Voting  by  Nonresidents  and  Non-
citizens  (Feb.  27,  2015).    When  voters  move  out  of  that
district,  they  become  ineligible  to  vote  there.
  See
§3503.01(A).  And since more than 10% of Americans move
every year,1 deleting the names of those who have moved
away is no small undertaking.
  For  many  years,  Congress  left  it  up  to  the  States  to
maintain  accurate  lists  of  those  eligible  to  vote  in  federal
elections, but in 1993, with the enactment of the National
Voter Registration Act (NVRA), Congress intervened.  The
NVRA  “erect[s]  a  complex  superstructure  of  federal  regu-
lation  atop  state  voter-registration  systems.”    Arizona  v.
Inter  Tribal  Council  of  Ariz.,  Inc.,  570  U. S.  1,  5  (2013).
The Act has two main objectives: increasing voter registra-
tion and removing ineligible persons from the States’ voter
registration  rolls.    See  §2,  107  Stat.  77,  52  U. S. C.
§20501(b).
  To achieve the latter goal, the NVRA requires States to
“conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort
to  remove  the  names”  of  voters  who  are  ineligible  “by
reason  of ”  death  or  change  in  residence.    §20507(a)(4).

——————

1 United  States  Census  Bureau,  CB16–189,  Americans  Moving  at
Historically  Low  Rates  (Nov.  16,  2016),  available  at  https://www.
census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-189.html  (all  Internet
materials  as  last  visited  June  8,  2018).    States  must  update  the  ad-
dresses of even those voters who move within their county of residence,
for  (among  other  reasons)  counties  may  contain  multiple  voting  dis-
tricts.  Cf. post, at 12 (BREYER, J., dissenting).  For example, Cuyahoga
County  contains  11  State  House  districts.    See  House  District  Map,
Ohio  House  Districts  2012–2022,  online  at  http://www.ohiohouse.gov/
members/district-map.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the "Opinion of the Court" in the case of Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1090

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 14, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  08–10783.  Smith  v.  Charleston  County  School  Dis
trict et al.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Motion of petitioner for reconsider
ation  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,
p.  803]  denied.

No.  09–291.  Thompson  v.  North  American  Stainless,  LP.
C.  A.  6th  Cir.  The  Solicitor  General  is  invited  to  ﬁle  a  brief  in
this  case  expressing  the  views  of  the  United  States.

No.  09–5577.  Richardson  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia
Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Motion  of  peti
tioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in
forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  984]  denied.

No. 09–5713.  O’Dwyer v. Becnel et al.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  944]  denied.

No.  09–6188.  In  re  Alpine.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[ante,  p.  989]  denied.

No.  09–6595.  Schmitz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  968]  denied.

No.  09–7899.  Quintanilla  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  to  expedite  consideration  of  petition  for  writ
of  certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7634.  In  re  Cain;  and
No. 09–7688.  In re Truax.  Petitions for writs of habeas cor

pus  denied.

Certiorari  Granted

No.  08–1332.  City  of  Ontario,  California,  et  al.  v.  Quon
et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Reported  below:
529  F.  3d  892.

No. 08–6261.  Robertson v.  United States ex rel. Watson.
Ct. App. D. C.  Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis  granted.  Certiorari  granted  limited  to  the  following
question:  “Whether  an  action  for  criminal  contempt  in  a  congres
sionally  created  court  may  constitutionally  be  brought  in  the
name  and  pursuant  to  the  power  of  a  private  person,  rather  than
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their statuses, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket or Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

41

KAGAN, J., dissenting

be  considering  any  old  piece  of  legislation—say,  the  Lan-
ham Act or ERISA.
  But then, at least, the majority should treat the Voting
Rights Act as if it were ordinary legislation.  The Court al-
ways says that it must interpret a statute according to its
text—that  it  has  no  warrant  to  override  congressional
choices.    But  the  majority  today  flouts  those  choices  with
abandon.    The  language  of  Section  2 is  as  broad  as  broad
can be.  It applies to any policy that “results in” disparate
voting  opportunities  for  minority  citizens.    It  prohibits,
without any need to show bad motive, even facially neutral
laws that make voting harder for members of one race than
of another, given their differing life circumstances.  That is
the  expansive  statute  Congress  wrote,  and  that  our  prior
decisions have recognized.  But the majority today lessens
the law—cuts Section 2 down to its own preferred size.  The
majority creates a set of extra-textual exceptions and con-
siderations to sap the Act’s strength, and to save laws like
Arizona’s.  No matter what Congress wanted, the majority
has other ideas.
  This Court has no right to remake Section 2.  Maybe some
think that vote suppression is a relic of history—and so the
need for a potent Section 2 has come and gone.  Cf. Shelby
County, 570 U. S., at 547 (“[T]hings have changed dramati-
cally”).  But Congress gets to make that call.  Because it has
not  done  so,  this  Court’s  duty  is  to  apply  the  law  as  it  is
written.  The law that confronted one of this country’s most
enduring wrongs; pledged to give every American, of every
race, an equal chance to participate in our democracy; and
now  stands  as  the  crucial  tool  to  achieve  that  goal.    That
law,  of  all  laws,  deserves  the  sweep  and  power  Congress
gave it.  That law, of all laws, should not be diminished by
this Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  It argues against the majority opinion and focuses on the interpretation of the Voting Rights Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HOLT, AKA MUHAMMAD v. HOBBS, DIRECTOR,

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–6827.  Argued October 7, 2014—Decided January 20, 2015

Section  3  of  the  Religious  Land  Use  and  Institutionalized  Persons  Act
of 2000 (RLUIPA) provides that “[n]o government shall impose a sub
stantial burden on the religious exercise” of an institutionalized per
son unless the government demonstrates that the burden “is the least
restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.”
42 U. S. C. §2000cc–1(a).

Petitioner  is  an  Arkansas  inmate  and  devout  Muslim  who  wishes

to grow a ½-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs.   Re
spondent Arkansas Department of Correction (Department) prohibits
its prisoners from growing beards, with the single exception that in
mates with diagnosed skin conditions may grow ¼-inch beards.  Peti
tioner sought an exemption on religious grounds and, although he be
lieves  that  his  faith  requires  him  not  to  trim  his  beard  at  all,  he
proposed a compromise under which he would be allowed to maintain
a  ½-inch  beard.    Prison  officials  denied  his  request,  and  petitioner
sued  in  Federal  District  Court.   At  an  evidentiary  hearing  before  a
Magistrate  Judge,  Department  witnesses  testified  that  beards  com
promised prison safety because they could be used to hide contraband
and because an inmate could quickly shave his beard to disguise his
identity.  The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing petitioner’s
complaint, emphasizing that prison officials are entitled to deference
on security matters and that the prison permitted petitioner to exer
cise  his  religion  in  other  ways.    The  District  Court  adopted  the  rec
ommendation  in  full,  and  the  Eighth  Circuit  affirmed,  holding  that
the Department had satisfied its  burden of showing that the groom
ing policy was the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling
security  interests,  and  reiterating  that  courts  should  defer  to  prison
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 321 (1998)

339

Opinion of the Court

(Nov. 1994). Such penalties conﬁrm a minimal
culpability.14

level of

The harm that respondent caused was also minimal. Fail-
ure to report his currency affected only one party, the Gov-
ernment, and in a relatively minor way. There was no fraud
on the United States, and respondent caused no loss to the
public ﬁsc. Had his crime gone undetected, the Government
would have been deprived only of the information that
$357,144 had left the country. The Government and the dis-
sent contend that there is a correlation between the amount
forfeited and the harm that the Government would have suf-
fered had the crime gone undetected. See Brief for United
States 30 (forfeiture is “perfectly calibrated”); post, at 344 (“a
ﬁne calibrated with this accuracy”). We disagree. There is
no inherent proportionality in such a forfeiture.
It is impos-
sible to conclude, for example, that the harm respondent
caused is anywhere near 30 times greater than that caused
by a hypothetical drug dealer who willfully fails to report
taking $12,000 out of the country in order to purchase drugs.
Comparing the gravity of respondent’s crime with the
$357,144 forfeiture the Government seeks, we conclude that
such a forfeiture would be grossly disproportional to the

14 In considering an offense’s gravity, the other penalties that the Legis-
lature has authorized are certainly relevant evidence. Here, as the Gov-
ernment and the dissent stress, Congress authorized a maximum ﬁne of
$250,000 plus ﬁve years’ imprisonment for willfully violating the statutory
reporting requirement, and this suggests that it did not view the reporting
offense as a trivial one. That the maximum ﬁne and Guideline sentence
to which respondent was subject were but a fraction of the penalties au-
thorized, however, undercuts any argument based solely on the statute,
because they show that respondent’s culpability relative to other potential
violators of the reporting provision––tax evaders, drug kingpins, or money
launderers, for example––is small indeed. This disproportion is telling
notwithstanding the fact that a separate Guideline provision permits
forfeiture if mandated by statute, see post, at 350–351. That Guideline,
moreover, cannot override the constitutional requirement of proportional-
ity review.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" portion. It discusses the proportionality of a forfeiture penalty in relation to the crime committed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE

Opinion of the Court

est in voting.”  348 F. Supp. 3d, at 523–524.

To  begin,  there  are  no  restrictions  on  speech,  associa-
tion,  or  any  other  First  Amendment  activities  in  the  dis-
tricting plans at issue.  The plaintiffs are free to engage in
those activities no matter what the effect of a plan may be
on their district.

The plaintiffs’ argument is that partisanship in district-
ing  should  be  regarded  as  simple  discrimination  against
supporters  of  the  opposing  party  on  the  basis  of  political
viewpoint.  Under that theory, any level of partisanship in
districting would constitute an infringement of their First
Amendment  rights.    But  as  the  Court  has  explained,  “[i]t
would  be  idle  . . .  to  contend  that  any  political  considera-
tion  taken  into  account  in  fashioning  a  reapportionment
plan  is  sufficient  to  invalidate  it.”    Gaffney,  412  U. S.,  at
752.  The  First  Amendment  test  simply  describes  the  act
of  districting  for  partisan  advantage.    It  provides  no
standard  for  determining  when  partisan  activity  goes  too
far.

As  for  actual  burden,  the  slight  anecdotal  evidence
found  sufficient  by  the  District  Courts  in  these  cases
shows that this too is not a serious standard for separating
constitutional  from  unconstitutional  partisan  gerryman-
dering.  The  District  Courts  relied  on  testimony  about
difficulty drumming up volunteers and enthusiasm.  How
much of a decline in voter engagement is enough to consti-
tute a First Amendment burden?  How many door knocks
must  go  unanswered?    How  many  petitions  unsigned?
How  many  calls  for  volunteers  unheeded?    The  Common
Cause  District  Court  held  that  a  partisan  gerrymander
places an unconstitutional burden on speech if it has more
than a “de minimis” “chilling effect or adverse impact” on
any  First  Amendment  activity.    318  F. Supp.  3d,  at  930.
The court went on to rule that there would be an adverse
effect “even if the speech of [the plaintiffs] was not in fact
chilled”; it was enough that the districting plan “makes it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case *Rucho v. Common Cause*. It delves into the First Amendment implications of partisan gerrymandering.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xi

Page

1078

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anderson v. McNeil
906

Anderson v. Southland Bank
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anderson v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
851

Anderson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . .  906,920,928,1008,1036,1060,1102

946

Anderson v. Vanguard Car Rental USA Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anderson-Tully Co. v. McDaniel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1050

Andrade Calles v. Uribe  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  853,1159

951

Andrews v. Howes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

Andrews v. Seattle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Andrews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1016,1098

846

Anglin; Brent v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1063

Angulo-Hernandez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811

Aniskovich; Burke v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Ansel v. Superior Court of Cal., Sacramento County  . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Anthony v. Third Circuit Court of Mich.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935

Antoine v. Patterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anton v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Antonsson v. Kast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  952,1066

903

Anuforo v. Georgia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878

Aon Corp.; HCA, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907

Aponte v. Chamberlain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Apotex, Inc. v. Sanoﬁ-Synthelabo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Appellate Division, Sup. Ct. N. Y., Second Jud. Dept.; Toriola v.  885,1102

880

Appleby v. Geren  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aragon; Cordova v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Araujo-Contreras v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912

836

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Archer v. McNeil
835

Ardley v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004

Arellano-Ochos v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Arensdorf v. Commissioner
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Arensdorf v. Geithner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Argentina v. Capital Ventures International
823

Argo v. Tennessee
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Arguelles-Olivares v. Holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909

Argueta-Lopez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Arias v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Arizona; Dann v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Arizona; Holguin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

Arizona; Karr v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

Arizona; May v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

Arizona; Moore v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

Arizona; Ruelas v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Arizona; Valverde v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Arizona State Land Comm’r; Mayer Uniﬁed School Dist. v.  . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxvii

Page

825

1084

942

947

817

1076

983

1012

1113

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1015,1159

1010

834

813

891

860

1015

949

1106

1052

985

838

Henderson; Zdun v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Henderson-El v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hendrickson v. Washington
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hendrix; Bennett v.
Hendrix v. Coffey  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Henley v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Henneford v. Castaneda  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hennessy v. Commissioner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hense v. Hense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Herbert v. United States
Herman; Hoffart v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hermelo v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez v. Cate
Hernandez v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez v. Gaetz
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez; Henderson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez; Hon Lau v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez; Kilpatrick v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez; Naddi v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez v. Ollison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez v. United States
1092

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez-Carrera v. United States
872

Hernandez-Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez-Curiel v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1098

Hernandez-Garay v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

1034

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez-Hernandez v. United States
898

Hernandez-Lopez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Hernandez-Luna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez Suarez v. United States
858

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez Torres v. United States
872

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez-Zuniga v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  888,1034,1059

Herrera v. United States
888

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Herrera-Miranda v. United States
1033

Herring v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

Herrod v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
802

Herships v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Hertz v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Hertz Corp.; Haddad v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  861,1101

Hertzig; Lynch v.
911

Hess v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

Hetzel; Cutts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922

Hewitt v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

. . . . . . . . . . .
Hey v. Arlington County Dept. of Human Services

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,875,912,1084
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:26] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1045

529 U. S.

March 27, 2000

No. 99–8430. Browne v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 247.

No. 99–8431. Zapata v. Purdy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1116.

No. 99–8434. Chambers v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 465.

No. 99–8443. Rosas-Davila v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 462.

No. 99–8448. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1307.

No. 99–697. Lambert et ux. v. City and County of San
Francisco et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari
denied.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Kennedy and Justice

Thomas join, dissenting.

Petitioners Claude and Micheline Lambert own the Cornell
Hotel in San Francisco. The hotel has 24 residential units and
34 tourist units. After experiencing difﬁculty renting the hotel’s
residential units, petitioners applied to the San Francisco Plan-
ning Commission for a conditional use permit to convert those
units to tourist use.* That request implicated two bodies of San
Francisco’s land-use law: the Planning Code and the Residential
Hotel Unit Conversion and Demolition Ordinance (HCO). The
Planning Code provides that a tourist hotel may not be “signiﬁ-
cantly altered, enlarged, or intensiﬁed, except upon approval of a
new conditional use application.” S. F. Planning Code, Art. 1.7,
§ 178(c) (2000). The HCO prohibits the issuance of a permit for
the conversion of units from residential to tourist use unless the
proprietor agrees to provide either one-to-one replacement for
those units or to pay a portion of the replacement costs. See
S. F. Admin. Code, ch. 41, § 41.13 (2000).

*When petitioners ﬁrst sought to convert their residential units to tourist
use, the hotel contained 31 residential units. Petitioners were successful,
however, in convincing the San Francisco Board of Permit Appeals to reclas-
sify seven of those as tourist units, producing the hotel’s conﬁguration noted
in the text.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary from a court document. It includes case numbers, citations, and a brief description of the case and the dissenting opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1076

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 7, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6854.  In  re  Oyague.  Petition  for  writ  of  mandamus
denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or  decision  of  this  petition.

Certiorari  Granted

No.  08–1371.  Christian  Legal  Society  Chapter  of  the
University  of  California,  Hastings  College  of  the  Law,
aka  Hastings  Christian  Fellowship  v.  Martinez  et  al.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.
Appx.  645.

No.  09–6338.  Dillon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Mo
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari  granted.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  146.

Certiorari  Denied

No.  08–10760.  Mouling  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  658.

No. 09–270.  Marley v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  1030.
No.  09–341.  D’Aria  v.  Glass  et  al.;  and
No.  09–410.  Evans  v.  Glass  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  452.

No.  09–396.  Hudson  v.  Georgia.  Ct.  App.  Ga.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  296  Ga.  App.  758,  675  S.  E.  2d  603.

No.  09–397.  Henley  v.  Georgia.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  285  Ga.  500,  678  S.  E.  2d  884.

No. 09–401.  Fieger v.  Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Sup.  Ct.  S.  C.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–403.  Jones  v.  City  of  Franklin,  Tennessee.  C.  A.
6th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 309 Fed. Appx. 938.
No.  09–404.  YMCA  of  Metropolitan  Chicago  et  al.  v.
U.  S.  Bank,  Trustee  of  the  Roe  Ann  Lockhart  OBRA  ‘93
Trust,  et  al.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  409  Ill.  App.  3d  548,  946  N.  E.  2d  850.

No.  09–405.  United  States  ex  rel.  Darian  v.  Accent

Builders,  Inc.,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (granted, denied, etc.) from a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010)

3

Syllabus

___, ___.  Nothing suggests that Congress intended §2679(b) to repeal
§233(a)’s more comprehensive immunity.  P. 10.

(4) Respondents’ contention that other features of §233 show that
§233(a) does not make the FTCA remedy exclusive of all other actions
against  PHS  personnel  is  rejected.    Neither  §233(c)  nor  §233(f)  indi-
cates that an injured party may maintain a Bivens action against an
individual  PHS  officer  or  employee  in  these  circumstances.    Pp. 10–
12.

546 F. 3d 682, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal case, specifically the syllabus section of a Supreme Court opinion.  It contains citations, case names, and a summary of the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

sible basis for the Fifth Circuit panel to delay the resump-
tion of proceedings in the District Court.  Of course, “Texas
courts and not this one are the final arbiters of the meaning
of  state  statutory  directions.”  Whole  Woman’s  Health  II,
595 U. S., at ___ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 13).
And, in appropriate cases and upon timely request, certifi-
cation is a valuable tool.  It was not appropriate or timely
here.  This Court had already “h[e]ld th[e] case may proceed
past the motion to dismiss stage” against the licensing offi-
cials based on the arguments before it.  Id., at ___ (slip op.,
at 17).  Texas, meanwhile, never asked for certification of
the question at any point before this Court decided it, de-
spite being on notice from the moment suit was filed that
the scope of the licensing officials’ state-law duties would be
at issue.  Neither Texas nor the panel identify a single case
in  which  a  lower  federal  court  has  certified  a  question  in
such a posture.  Under the circumstances at hand, Texas’
belated request was a transparent effort to impede adjudi-
cation of the merits of the petitioners’ claims.  By blessing
this  tactic,  the  panel  ignored  this  Court’s  clear  message
that this case should proceed—and proceed expeditiously.

Nevertheless,  the  Court  now  denies  mandamus  relief.
This decision is especially troubling in view of the panel’s
misreading of Whole Woman’s Health II.  As to the licensing
officials, the eight-Justice majority agreed: Suit could “pro-
ceed past the motion to dismiss stage” because, based on the
arguments presented, the licensing officials had sufficient
authority to enforce S. B. 8.  Ibid.; see also id., at ___ (opin-
ion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (slip op., at 2) (“agree[ing]” and citing
the state statute on which the principal opinion had relied).
Despite  this  express  consensus,  the  panel  incorrectly  in-
sisted  that  there  was  “no  majority  rationale.”  2022  WL
142193, *3.  Straying further still, the panel described itself
as “bound” in part by the views of the lone dissent on this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  It contains legal arguments and references to other court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 12–398
_________________

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY,

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MYRIAD

GENETICS, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 13, 2013]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent  Myriad  Genetics,  Inc.  (Myriad),  discovered
the  precise  location  and  sequence  of  two  human  genes,
mutations of which can substantially increase the risks of
breast  and  ovarian  cancer.    Myriad  obtained  a  number
of  patents  based  upon  its  discovery.    This  case  involves
claims  from  three  of  them  and  requires  us  to  resolve
whether a naturally occurring segment of deoxyribonucleic
acid  (DNA)  is  patent  eligible  under  35  U. S. C.  §101  by
virtue of its isolation from the rest of the human genome.
We  also  address  the  patent  eligibility  of  synthetically
created DNA known as complementary DNA (cDNA), which
contains  the  same  protein-coding  information  found  in
a  segment  of  natural  DNA  but  omits  portions  within  the
DNA  segment  that  do  not  code  for  proteins.    For  the  rea-
sons  that  follow,  we  hold  that  a  naturally  occurring  DNA
segment  is  a  product  of  nature  and  not  patent  eligible
merely  because  it  has  been  isolated,  but  that  cDNA  is
patent  eligible  because  it  is  not  naturally  occurring.    We,
therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

805

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5055.  Fenlon  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed
in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this
Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–5074.  Wakefield  v.  Cordis  Corp.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Re
ported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  804.

No.  09–5078.  Jerry  v.  Pennsylvania.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As  peti
tioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk  is
directed  not  to  accept  any  further  petitions  in  noncriminal  mat
ters  from  petitioner  unless  the  docketing  fee  required  by  Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506
U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See
id., at  4, and  cases cited  therein.  Reported below:  964 A.  2d 943.
No.  09–5096.  Howard  v.  Industrial  Commission  of  Ohio
et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Ohio.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed
in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this
Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported  below:  122  Ohio  St.  3d  1417,  908
N.  E.  2d  428.

No.  09–5099.  Young  v.  Department  of  Justice  et  al.
C. A. 10th Cir.  Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  764.

No.  09–5111.  Simmons  v.  California  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–5142.  Redford  v.  Redford.  Ct.  App.  Ga.  Motion  of
petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and
certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–5146.  Asemani  v.  Ahmadinejad,  President  of  the
Islamic  Republic  of  Iran.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner
for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari
dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case summaries, likely from a legal publication.  It is sequential text and contains relevant legal information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

23

Opinion of the Court

drew no distinction between “procedural” and “substantive”
restraints on lawmaking.  It turned on the view that state
constitutional provisions apply to a legislature’s exercise of
lawmaking authority under the Elections Clause, with no
concern  about  how  those  provisions  might  be  categorized.
285  U. S.,  at  367–368;  see  also  Hildebrant,  241  U. S.,  at
569–570.

The same goes for the Court’s decision in Arizona State
Legislature.  The defendants attempt to cabin that case by
arguing that the Court did not address substantive limits
on the regulation of federal elections.  But as in Smiley, the
Court’s decision in Arizona State Legislature discussed no
difference between procedure and substance.

The dissent reads Smiley and Arizona State Legislature
in a different light.  JUSTICE THOMAS thinks those cases say
nothing about whether a State can impose “substantive lim-
its”  on  the  legislature’s  exercise  of  power  under  the  Elec-
tions  Clause.    Post,  at  21.  But  in  Smiley,  we  addressed
whether “the conditions which attach to the making of state
laws” apply to legislatures exercising authority under the
Elections Clause.  285 U. S., at 365.  We held that they do.
“Much that is urged in argument with regard to the mean-
ing of the term ‘Legislature,’ ” we explained, “is beside the
point.”  Ibid.  And we concluded in straightforward terms
that  legislatures  must  abide  by  “restriction[s]  imposed  by
state  constitutions . . . when  exercising  the  lawmaking
power”  under  the  Elections  Clause.    Id.,  at  369.    Arizona
State Legislature said much the same, emphasizing that, by
its text, nothing in the Elections Clause offers state legisla-
tures carte blanche to act “in defiance of provisions of the
State’s constitution.”  576 U. S., at 818.

The defendants and JUSTICE THOMAS do not in any event
offer a defensible line between procedure and substance in
this context.  “The line between procedural and substantive
law  is  hazy.”  Erie  R. Co.  v.  Tompkins,  304  U. S.  64,  92
(1938) (Reed, J., concurring in part); see also Shady Grove
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court. It cites previous cases (Smiley and Arizona State Legislature) and delves into legal arguments regarding the scope of state constitutional provisions in relation to a legislature's power under the Elections Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

amendments.  See generally Amdt. 9; Amdt. 10; Art. I, §8;
Art.  V;  J.  Sutton,  51  Imperfect  Solutions:  States  and  the
Making  of  American  Constitutional  Law  7−21,  203−216
(2018);  A.  Amar,  America’s  Constitution:  A  Biography
285−291, 315−347 (2005).

The Constitution does not grant the nine unelected Mem-
bers  of  this  Court  the  unilateral  authority  to  rewrite  the
Constitution to create new rights and liberties based on our
own  moral  or  policy  views.    As  Justice  Rehnquist  stated,
this Court has not “been granted a roving commission, ei-
ther by the Founding Fathers or by the framers of the Four-
teenth  Amendment,  to  strike  down  laws  that  are  based
upon  notions  of  policy  or  morality  suddenly  found  unac-
ceptable by a majority of this Court.”  Furman v. Georgia,
408 U. S. 238, 467 (1972) (dissenting opinion); see Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720–721 (1997); Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 292–293 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).

This Court therefore does not possess the authority either
to declare a constitutional right to abortion or to declare a
constitutional prohibition of abortion.  See Casey, 505 U. S.,
at 953 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part); id., at 980 (opinion of Scalia, J.); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 177 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissent-
ing).

In sum, the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abor-
tion and allows the people and their elected representatives
to address the issue through the democratic process.  In my
respectful view, the Court in Roe therefore erred by taking
sides on the issue of abortion.

II
The more difficult question in this case is stare decisis—

that is, whether to overrule the Roe decision.

The  principle  of  stare  decisis  requires  respect  for  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in a case concerning abortion. It cites legal precedents and argues against the existence of a constitutional right to abortion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

have repeatedly confirmed, “the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’ ”  Brigham City v.
Stuart,  547  U. S.  398,  403  (2006).    We  have  defined  rea-
sonableness  “in  objective  terms  by  examining  the  totality
of  the  circumstances,”  Ohio  v.  Robinette,  519  U. S.  33,  39
(1996),  and  by  considering  “the  traditional  protections
against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  afforded  by
the  common  law  at  the  time  of  the  framing,”  Atwater  v.
Lago  Vista,  532  U. S.  318,  326  (2001)  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted).  When  traditional  protections  have  not
provided  a  definitive  answer,  our  precedents  have  “ana-
lyzed  a  search  or  seizure  in  light  of  traditional  standards
of  reasonableness  by  assessing,  on  the  one  hand,  the  de-
gree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and,
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the pro-
motion  of  legitimate  governmental  interests.”    Virginia  v.
Moore,  553  U. S.  164,  171  (2008)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).

Although  a  traffic  stop  “constitutes  a  ‘seizure’  of  ‘per-
sons’  within  the  meaning  of  [the  Fourth  Amendment],”
such  a  seizure  is  constitutionally  “reasonable  where  the
police  have  probable  cause  to  believe  that  a  traffic  viola-
tion has occurred.”  Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806,
809–810 (1996).  But “a seizure that is lawful at its incep-
tion  can  violate  the  Fourth  Amendment  if  its  manner  of
execution  unreasonably  infringes  interests  protected  by
the Constitution.”  Caballes, supra, at 407.

Because Rodriguez does not dispute that Officer Struble
had  probable  cause  to  stop  him,  the  only  question  is
whether  the  stop  was  otherwise  executed  in  a  reasonable
manner.  See  Brief  for  Appellant  in  No.  13–1176  (CA8),
p. 4, n. 2.  I easily conclude that it was.  Approximately 29
minutes  passed  from  the  time  Officer  Struble  stopped
Rodriguez  until  his  narcotics-detection  dog  alerted  to  the
presence  of  drugs.    That  amount  of  time  is  hardly  out  of
the ordinary for a traffic stop by a single officer of a vehi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Rodriguez v. United States*. It discusses the Fourth Amendment and the reasonableness of a traffic stop.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxxi

Page
Nevada; Phenix v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Nevada Dept. of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety; Evans v.
. . . .
916
Newark; Cross v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
New Hampshire; Cookish v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917,971
New Image Industries v. High Tech Medical Instrumentation . . .
953
New Jersey; Dreher v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
New Jersey v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing; Pecaro v.
. . . . . . . . .
916
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Mexico; Scott v.
958
New Mexico; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925
New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
151
Newmont Mining Corp.; Pinal Creek Group v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
New York; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New York; Jackson v.
946
New York; New Jersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
New York City; Amsterdam Video, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
966
New York City; Buzzetti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New York City; Clinton v.
417
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New York City; Cozy Cabin v.
924
New York City; D’Amico v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
New York City; Tonia B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
New York City Health and Hospital Corp.; Bernard v. . . . . . . . . .
969
. . . . . .
Nghiem v. Toshiba America Electronic Components, Inc.
971
Nimmagadda; Krishnamurthy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Nocon v. Landress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
Nohara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norris; Henderson v.
964
Norris; Mitchell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919
North Dakota; Nowik v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,971
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Northern Telecom, Inc.; Phonometrics v.
936
North Lawrence Community School Corp. v. Mary M.
. . . . . . . . .
952
970
Norwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nowik v. North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,971
933
Noyes; Gleason v.
976
NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.
923
O’Brien; Smith v.
. . . . . . . . . 963,970
Octel Communications Corp.; Theis Research, Inc. v.
932
Ofﬁce of Personnel Management; Francisco v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953
Oglebay Norton Co. v. Jenson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Beverly v.
969
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; Dever v.
930
Ohio; Reynolds v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Oistead; Bowen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oklahoma; DuBuc v.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

350

UNITED STATES v. BAJAKAJIAN

Kennedy, J., dissenting

(1996). Most forfeitures of proceeds, as a consequence, are
not ﬁnes at all, let alone excessive ﬁnes. Hence, the lawful-
ness of the money shows at most that the forfeiture was a
ﬁne; it cannot at the same time prove that the ﬁne was
excessive.

B
1

In assessing whether there is a gross disproportion, the
majority concedes, we must grant “ ‘substantial deference’ ”
to Congress’ choice of penalties. Ante, at 336 (quoting
Solem, supra, at 290). Yet, ignoring its own command, the
Court sweeps aside Congress’ reasoned judgment and substi-
tutes arguments that are little more than speculation.

Congress considered currency smuggling and nonre-
porting a serious crime and imposed commensurate pen-
alties.
It authorized punishments of ﬁve years’ imprison-
ment, a $250,000 ﬁne, plus forfeiture of all the undeclared
cash.
31 U. S. C. § 5322(a); 18 U. S. C. § 982(a)(1). Congress
found the offense standing alone is a serious crime, for the
same statute doubles the ﬁnes and imprisonment for failures
to report cash “while violating another law of the United
States.”
31 U. S. C. § 5322(b). Congress experimented
with lower penalties on the order of one year in prison plus a
$1,000 ﬁne, but it found the punishments inadequate to deter
lucrative money laundering. See President’s Commission on
Organized Crime, The Cash Connection: Organized Crime,
Financial Institutions, and Money Laundering 27, 60 (Oct.
1984). The Court today rejects this judgment.

The Court rejects the congressional judgment because, it
says, the Sentencing Guidelines cap the appropriate ﬁne at
$5,000. See ante, at 338–339, and n. 14. The purpose of the
Guidelines, however, is to select punishments with precise
proportion, not to opine on what is a gross disproportion.
In
addition, there is no authority for elevating the Commission’s
judgment of what is prudent over the congressional judg-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Kennedy. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

207–208  (1979).    This  Court  created  an  exception  to  that
rule in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), permitting “police
officers  who  suspect  criminal  activity  to  make  limited
intrusions  on  an  individual’s  personal  security  based  on
less than probable cause,” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S.
692,  698  (1981).  Reasonable  suspicion  is  the  justification
for such seizures.  Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U. S.
___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 3).

Traffic stops can be initiated based on probable cause or
reasonable suspicion.  Although the Court has commented
that a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called
‘Terry  stop’  than  to  a  formal  arrest,”  it  has  rejected  the
notion  “that  a  traffic  stop  supported  by  probable  cause
may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment
on  the  scope  of  a  Terry  stop.”  Berkemer  v.  McCarty,  468
U. S. 420, 439, and n. 29 (1984) (citation omitted).

Although  all  traffic  stops  must  be  executed  reasonably,
our  precedents  make  clear  that  traffic  stops  justified  by
reasonable  suspicion  are  subject  to  additional  limitations
that  those  justified  by  probable  cause  are  not.    A  traffic
stop  based  on  reasonable  suspicion,  like  all  Terry  stops,
must be “justified at its inception” and “reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interfer-
ence in the first place.”  Hiibel, 542 U. S., at 185 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  It also “cannot continue for an
excessive  period  of  time  or  resemble  a  traditional  arrest.”
Id.,  at  185–186  (citation  omitted).    By  contrast,  a  stop
based  on  probable  cause  affords  an  officer  considerably
more leeway.  In such seizures, an officer may engage in a
warrantless  arrest  of  the  driver,  Atwater,  532  U. S.,  at
354, a warrantless search incident to arrest of the driver,
Riley v. California, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 5),
and a warrantless search incident to arrest  of the vehicle
if it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest might be found there, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S.
332, 335 (2009).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal standards for traffic stops, differentiating between those based on probable cause and those based on reasonable suspicion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
420  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of Stevens, J.

The  case on  which  it relies  for this  proposition  is First  Nat.
Bank  of  Boston  v.  Bellotti,  435  U. S.  765  (1978).  As  I  shall
explain,  infra,  at  442–446,  the  holding  in  that  case  was  far
narrower than  the Court implies.  Like its  paeans to unfet
tered  discourse,  the  Court’s  denunciation  of  identity-based
distinctions  may  have  rhetorical  appeal  but  it  obscures
reality.

“Our  jurisprudence  over  the  past  216  years  has  rejected
an absolutist interpretation” of the First Amendment.
WRTL,  551  U. S.,  at  482  (opinion  of  Roberts,  C.  J.).  The
First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  Apart
perhaps  from  measures  designed  to  protect  the  press,  that
text  might seem  to permit  no distinctions  of any  kind.  Yet
in  a  variety  of  contexts,  we  have  held  that  speech  can  be
regulated  differentially  on  account  of  the  speaker’s  identity,
when  identity  is  understood  in  categorical  or  institutional
terms.  The  Government  routinely  places  special  restric
tions on the speech rights of students,41  prisoners,42  members
of the Armed Forces,43  foreigners,44  and its own employees.45

41 See,  e. g.,  Bethel  School  Dist.  No.  403  v.  Fraser,  478  U. S.  675,  682
(1986)  (“[T]he  constitutional  rights  of  students  in  public  school  are  not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”).

42 See,  e. g.,  Jones  v.  North  Carolina  Prisoners’  Labor  Union,  Inc.,  433
U. S. 119, 129 (1977) (“In a prison context, an inmate does not retain those
First Amendment rights that are inconsistent with his status as a prisoner
or  with  the  legitimate  penological  objectives  of  the  corrections  system”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

43 See,  e. g.,  Parker  v.  Levy,  417  U. S.  733,  758  (1974)  (“While  the  mem
bers  of  the  military  are  not  excluded  from  the  protection  granted  by
the  First  Amendment,  the  different  character  of  the  military  community
and  of  the  military  mission  requires  a  different  application  of  those
protections”).

44 See,  e. g.,  2  U. S. C.  § 441e(a)(1)  (foreign  nationals  may  not  directly  or
indirectly  make  contributions  or  independent  expenditures  in  connection
with a U. S. election).

45 See, e. g., Civil Service Comm’n v.  Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 550
(1973)  (upholding  statute  prohibiting  Executive  Branch  employees  from
taking  “an  active  part  in  political  management  or  in  political  campaigns”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It discusses the First Amendment and its application to corporate speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>