<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

23

ALITO, J., dissenting

is inseverable from the provisions that burden the States.
I  begin  with  the  question  whether  the  individual  man-
date falls within a power granted to Congress under Article
I of the Constitution.  The Constitution’s text and our prec-
edent compel the conclusion that it does not.

The  Federal  Government  “is  acknowledged  by  all  to  be
one  of  enumerated  powers.”    McCulloch  v.  Maryland,  4
Wheat. 316, 405 (1819) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court).  Ar-
ticle I of the Constitution does not give Congress “plenary
legislative power.”  Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic
Assn., 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 15).  Instead, it
enumerates  certain  legislative  powers  that,  while  “sizea-
ble,” are not “unlimited.”  Ibid.

When  the  constitutionality  of  the  individual  mandate
was  first  challenged  in  NFIB,  the  Government’s  primary
defense  was  that  it  represented  a  valid  exercise  of  Con-
gress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, but a major-
ity of the Court squarely rejected that argument.  See 567
U. S., at 572 (opinion of the Court) (“The Court today holds
that  our  Constitution  protects  us  from  federal  regulation
under the Commerce Clause so long as we abstain from the
regulated  activity”);  see  also  id.,  at  561  (opinion  of
ROBERTS,  C. J.)  (“The  commerce  power  thus  does  not  au-
thorize the mandate”); id., at 648 (joint dissent) (“The Act
before us here exceeds federal power . . . in mandating the
purchase of health insurance”).  Likewise, a majority of the
Court  rejected  the  Government’s  resort  to  the  Necessary
and  Proper  Clause.  See  id.,  at  560  (opinion  of  ROBERTS,
C. J.); id., at 655 (joint dissent).  I agreed with those hold-
ings at the  time, and that is still my view.  The mandate
cannot  be  sustained  under  the  Commerce  Clause  or  the
Necessary  and  Proper  Clause,  and  in  this  suit,  no  party
urges us to uphold it on those grounds.
  While  the  NFIB  Court  rejected  the  Government’s  Com-
merce Clause argument, a majority held that the mandate
represented  a  lawful  exercise  of  Congress’s  taxing  power,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in a case concerning the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate. It delves into constitutional arguments regarding Congress's powers and the validity of the mandate.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

allow the bank to charge higher fees.  But because Corner
Post  is  not  subject  to  the  Board’s  regulation,  it  could  not
contend  that  the  fee  cap  is  too  high  and  that  the  Board
should be enjoined from keeping the cap so high.  So Corner
Post  would  be  precluded  from  suing  even  though  the
allegedly  unlawful  regulation  is  causing  it  monetary
injury.4

III
Eliminating vacatur as a remedy would terminate entire
classes of administrative litigation that have traditionally
been brought by unregulated parties.5

One  example  is  the  wide  range  of  administrative  law
suits  in  which  businesses  target  the  allegedly  unlawful
under-regulation  of  other  businesses,  such  as  their

——————

4 Absent  vacatur,  the  remedy  for  a  regulated  plaintiff  would  not
automatically  extend  to  other  regulated  parties.    For  example,  if  a
district  court  issued  an  injunction  that  prevents  the  Board  from
enforcing the fee rule against one bank, the Board would still be able to
enforce the fee rule against other banks.  For those other banks to obtain
the same relief, they would need to either (i) file similar APA suits and
request  similar  injunctions  or  (ii)  wait  and  see  if  the  fee  rule  is
temporarily  enjoined  or  held  unlawful  by  either  the  relevant  court  of
appeals or this Court.  In that respect, eliminating the vacatur remedy
would  delay  relief  for  many  regulated  parties.    That  said,  in  light  of
vertical  stare  decisis,  the  consequences  for  regulated  parties  of
eliminating  vacatur  would  not  be  as  severe  as  the  consequences  for
unregulated  parties.  See  Labrador  v.  Poe,  601  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2024)
(KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring  in  grant  of  stay)  (slip  op.,  at  8–9);  cf.  W.
Baude & S. Bray, Proper Parties, Proper Relief, 137 Harv. L. Rev. 153,
183  (2023)  (when  the  Supreme  Court  “holds  a  statute  to  be
unconstitutional or a rule to be unlawful, it may be as good as vacated”).
5 This opinion focuses primarily on administrative litigation that arises
under the APA.  But Congress has also enacted special statutory review
provisions that similarly authorize federal courts to “set aside” specific
agency  actions.  See,  e.g.,  15  U. S. C.  §78y(a)  (orders  of  the  SEC);  16
U. S. C. §825l(b) (FERC); 28 U. S. C. §2342 (the FCC, the Atomic Energy
Commission, and other agencies).  By arguing that the APA’s use of “set
aside” does not authorize vacatur, the Government implies that vacatur
is also unavailable under those similar review provisions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding vacatur as a remedy in administrative litigation, particularly focusing on its impact on unregulated parties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

Opinion of the Court

behaves  much  like  a  one-sided  market  and  should  be
analyzed  as  such.    See  Filistrucchi  321;  Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 610 (1953).
But two-sided transaction platforms, like the credit-card
market, are different.  These platforms facilitate a single,
simultaneous transaction between participants.  For credit
cards,  the  network  can  sell  its  services  only  if  a  mer-
chant  and  cardholder  both  simultaneously  choose  to  use
the  network.    Thus,  whenever  a  credit-card  network  sells
one  transaction’s  worth  of  card-acceptance  services  to  a
merchant it also must sell one transaction’s worth of card-
payment  services  to  a  cardholder.    It  cannot  sell  transac-
tion services to either cardholders or merchants individu-
ally.  See Klein 583 (“Because cardholders and merchants
jointly  consume  a  single  product,  payment  card  transac-
tions,  their  consumption  of  payment  card  transactions
must  be  directly  proportional”).    To  optimize  sales,  the
network must find the balance of pricing that encourages
the greatest number of matches between cardholders and
merchants.

Because  they  cannot  make  a  sale  unless  both  sides  of
the  platform  simultaneously  agree  to  use  their  services,
two-sided  transaction  platforms  exhibit  more  pronounced
indirect  network  effects  and  interconnected  pricing  and
demand.  Transaction  platforms  are  thus  better  under-
stood  as  “suppl[ying]  only  one  product”—transactions.
Klein  580.  In  the  credit-card  market,  these  transactions
“are  jointly  consumed  by  a  cardholder,  who  uses  the  pay-
ment  card  to  make  a  transaction,  and  a  merchant,  who
accepts the payment card as a method of payment.”  Ibid.
Tellingly,  credit  cards  determine  their  market  share  by
measuring the volume of transactions they have sold.8

——————

8 Contrary  to  the  dissent’s  assertion,  post,  at  11–12,  merchant  ser-
vices  and  cardholder  services  are  not  complements.  See  Filistrucchi
297  (“[A]  two-sided  market  [is]  different  from  markets  for  complemen-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the nature of two-sided transaction platforms, using the credit card market as an example.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8  NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court

II

As discussed below, Vullo was free to criticize the NRA
and pursue the conceded violations of New York insurance
law.  She could not wield her power, however, to threaten
enforcement  actions  against  DFS-regulated  entities  in  or-
der to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advo-
cacy.    Because  the  complaint  plausibly  alleges  that  Vullo
did just that, the Court holds that the NRA stated a First
Amendment violation.

A
At  the  heart  of  the  First  Amendment’s  Free  Speech
Clause is the recognition that viewpoint discrimination is
uniquely  harmful  to  a  free  and  democratic  society.    The
Clause  prohibits  government  entities  and  actors  from
“abridging the freedom of speech.”  When government offi-
cials  are  “engaging  in  their  own  expressive  conduct,”
though, “the Free Speech Clause has no application.”  Pleas-
ant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467 (2009).  The
government can “ ‘say what it wishes’ ” and “select the views
that it wants to express.”  Id., at 467–468 (quoting Rosen-
berger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819,
833  (1995)).  That  makes  sense;  the  government  could
barely function otherwise.  “When a government entity em-
barks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a particular
viewpoint  and  rejects  others,”  and  thus  does  not  need  to
“maintain  viewpoint-neutrality  when  its  officers  and  em-
ployees speak about that venture.”  Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S.
218, 234 (2017).

A government official can share her views freely and crit-
icize particular beliefs, and she can do so forcefully in the

——————
Second Circuit is free to revisit the qualified immunity question in light
of this Court’s opinion, the NRA still could obtain “ ‘effectual relief ’ ” on
remand.  Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013).  In such circum-
stances,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  resolution  of  the  First  Amendment
question is merely advisory.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the First Amendment implications of the case. It delves into the nuances of viewpoint discrimination and government speech, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xlii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Lehman v. MacFarlane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leininger v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LeMaire; Sibley v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LeMaster; Candelaria v.
LeMaster; Montoya v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leon v. Estrada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leone v. Kerley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lerman v. Randolph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lerro v. Board of Review, Dept. of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leslie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leung v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Levy v. Swift Transportation Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lewis v. Booker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lewis v. Donnelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lewis v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lewis v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lewis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leyva; Arizona v.
Lieberman; Haddad v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Liggins v. B. T. Ofﬁce Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lillibridge, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Limited, Inc.; American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . .
Limited, Inc.; U. S. ex rel. American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v.
Lin v. Lin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Linahan; Anderson v.
Lincoln Electric Co.; Jones v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lindsey v. Catoe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lingar v. Luebbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Linton v. Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Liquori v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lisasuain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Litscher; Rodriguez v.
Litten v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Livoti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lobo Exploration Co.; Amoco Production Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Local. For labor union, see name of trade.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lock; Chester v.
Lock; Evans v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lock; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lockaby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Locke; Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Locke; United States v.
Lockheed Martin; Kanazeh v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lodermeier v. Dooley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1106
1091
1019
1115
1121
1113
1076
1099
1034
1137
1120
1055
1073
1117
1113
1025
1031
1037
1099
1100
1107
1054
1054
1087
1114
1067
1008,1145
1039,1145
1100
1061
1079
1023
1031
1108
1124

1093
1072
1070
1092
89
89
1024
1055
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

KAGAN, J., dissenting

C. Davidson eds. 1992).  The crudest attempts to block vot-
ing  access,  like  literacy  tests  and  poll  taxes,  disappeared.
Legislatures often replaced those vote denial schemes with
new measures—mostly to do with districting—designed to
dilute the impact of minority votes.  But the Voting Rights
Act, operating for decades at full strength, stopped many of
those measures too.  See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S.
380  (1991);  Allen  v.  State  Bd.  of  Elections,  393  U. S.  544
(1969).  As a famed dissent assessed the situation about a
half-century  after  the  statute’s  enactment:  The  Voting
Rights Act had become “one of the most consequential, effi-
cacious, and amply justified exercises of federal legislative
power in our Nation’s history.”  Shelby County, 570 U. S.,
at 562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).1

B
  Yet  efforts  to  suppress  the  minority  vote  continue.    No
one would know this from reading the majority opinion.  It
hails  the  “good  news”  that  legislative  efforts  had  mostly
shifted by the 1980s from vote denial to vote dilution.  Ante,
at 7.  And then it moves on to other matters, as though the
Voting Rights Act no longer has a problem to address—as
though once literacy tests and poll taxes disappeared, so too
did efforts to curb minority voting.  But as this Court recog-
nized  about  a  decade  ago,  “racial  discrimination  and  ra-
cially polarized voting are not ancient history.”  Bartlett v.
Strickland, 556 U. S. 1, 25 (2009).  Indeed, the problem of
voting discrimination has become worse since that time—
in  part  because  of  what  this  Court  did  in  Shelby  County.

——————

1 The majority brands this historical account part of an “extended effort
at misdirection.”  Ante, at 22.  I am tempted merely to reply: Enough said
about the majority’s outlook on the statute before us.  But I will add what
should  be  obvious—that  no one  can  understand  the  Voting  Rights  Act
without recognizing what led Congress to enact it, and what Congress
wanted it to change.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history of voting rights legislation and argues that the majority opinion is misinformed about the continued need for such protections.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:40] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

565

Breyer, J., dissenting

cinovic 37–38.
In later years, but before 1965, Congress pro-
vided the W&R Fund with special tax beneﬁts, helped the
Fund to build hospitals, and established health and safety
standards. Brief for Respondents UMWA Combined Bene-
ﬁt Fund et al. 11–12 (citing relevant statutes and record ma-
terials). This kind of Government intervention explains
why the president of the Southern Coal Producers’ Associa-
tion said, in the 1950’s, that if beneﬁts were reduced, it was

“entirely conceivable that Congress [would] step in and
take over the mines, assuming responsibility for the wel-
fare collections and payment.” App. (CA1) 2000.

I repeat that the Federal Government’s words and deeds,
along with those of the pre-1965 industry, did not necessarily
create contractually binding promises (which, had they ex-
isted, might have eliminated the need for this legislation).
But in labor relations, as in human relations, one can create
promises and understandings which, even in the absence of
a legally enforceable contract, others reasonably expect will
be honored.
Indeed, in labor relations such industrywide
understandings may spell the difference between labor war
and labor peace, for the parties may look to a strike, not to a
court, for enforcement.
It is that kind of important, mutual
understanding that is at issue here. For the record shows
that pre-1965 statements and other conduct led management
to understand, and labor legitimately to expect, that health
care beneﬁts for retirees and their dependents would con-
tinue to be provided.

Finally, Eastern continued to obtain proﬁts from the coal
mining industry long after 1965, for it operated a wholly
owned coal-mining subsidiary, Eastern Associated Coal
Corp. (hereinafter EACC), until the late 1980’s. Between
1966 and 1987, Eastern effectively ran EACC, sharing ofﬁ-
cers, supervising management, and receiving 100% of
EACC’s approximately $100 million in dividends. Brief for
Petitioner 6, n. 13; App. (CA1) 2172 (afﬁdavit of T. Gallagher,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the history of healthcare benefits for retirees in the coal mining industry and argues that the government's actions created an expectation that these benefits would continue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

39

Opinion of the Court
Appendix to opinion of the Court

(which Google wrote for its Android API) that actually in-
structs the computer in the programmer’s application.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a citation and section heading from a legal document.  It is not the main body text and likely provides structural information rather than content meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Citation and Section Heading</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U79

[09-08-00 13:44:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

134

MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

drunken driver who has a “gun in his car.”
Id., at 21792
(Rep. Yates). Others describe the statute as criminalizing
gun “possession”—a term that could stretch beyond both the
“use” of a gun and the carrying of a gun on the person. See
id., at 21793 (Rep. Casey); id., at 22236 (Rep. Meskill); id., at
30584 (Rep. Collier); id., at 30585 (Rep. Skubitz).

C

We are not convinced by petitioners’ remaining arguments
to the contrary. First, they say that our deﬁnition of “carry”
makes it the equivalent of “transport.” Yet, Congress else-
where in related statutes used the word “transport” deliber-
ately to signify a different, and broader, statutory coverage.
The immediately preceding statutory subsection, for ex-
ample, imposes a different set of penalties on one who, with
an intent to commit a crime, “ships, transports, or receives
18 U. S. C. § 924(b).
a ﬁrearm” in interstate commerce.
Moreover, § 926A speciﬁcally “entitle[s]” a person “not other-
wise prohibited . . . from transporting, shipping, or receiving
a ﬁrearm” to “transport a ﬁrearm . . . from any place where
he may lawfully possess and carry” it to “any other place”
where he may do so. Why, petitioners ask, would Congress
have used the word “transport,” or used both “carry” and
“transport” in the same provision, if it had intended to oblit-
erate the distinction between the two?

The short answer is that our deﬁnition does not equate
“carry” and “transport.”
“Carry” implies personal agency
and some degree of possession, whereas “transport” does not
have such a limited connotation and, in addition, implies the
movement of goods in bulk over great distances. See Web-
ster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 343 (noting
that “carry” means “moving to a location some distance away
while supporting or maintaining off the ground” and “is a
natural word to use in ref. to cargoes and loads on trucks,
wagons, planes, ships, or even beasts of burden,” while
“transport refers to carriage in bulk or number over an ap-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in the case of Muscarello v. United States. It delves into the interpretation of the term "carry" within a specific statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

993

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

No.  09–5070.  Avila  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560
F.  3d  299.

No.  09–5089.  Gatewood  v.  Outlaw,  Warden.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  843.

No.  09–5144.  Risley  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5164.  Cruz v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  303  Fed.  Appx.  133.

No. 09–5242.  Jones v.  Illinois.  App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  384  Ill.  App.  3d  1087,  973  N.  E.
2d  1087.

No.  09–5285.  Johnson  v.  Nevada  Department  of  Correc

tions  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5321.  Collier  v.  Sears,  Roebuck  &  Co.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  213.

No.  09–5347.  Tharp  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  478.

No.  09– 5533.  Castro-Coello,  aka  Molinas  v.  United
States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 323
Fed.  Appx.  354.

No. 09–5546.  Lerma-Velez v. United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  352.

No.  09–5550.  Lopez-Leon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  367.

No. 09–5589.  Erazo-Villatoro v.  United States.  C. A. 5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  383.

No.  09–5619.  Eldridge  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
325  Fed.  Appx.  322.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the orders issued.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

THOMAS, J., dissenting

must  be  “a  hypothetical,  undiluted  plan,”  Bossier  Parish
School Bd., 520 U. S., at 480, and the first precondition at
least requires plaintiffs to identify some hypothetical alter-
native plan.  Yet that alternative plan need only be “reason-
ably  configured,”  and—as  explained  above—to  say  that  a
plan is reasonable is a far cry from establishing an objective
standard of fairness.
  That leaves only the Gingles framework’s final stage: the
totality-of-circumstances  determination  whether  a  State’s
“political process is equally open to minority voters.”  478
U. S., at 79.  But this formulation is mere verbiage unless
one  knows  what  an  “equally  open”  system  should  look
like—in  other  words,  what  the  benchmark  is.    And,  our
cases offer no substantive guidance on how to identify the
undiluted benchmark at the totality stage.  The best they
have to offer is a grab bag of amorphous “factors”—widely
known  as  the  Senate  factors,  after  the  Senate  Judiciary
Committee Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to
§2—that  Gingles  said  “typically  may  be  relevant  to  a  §2
claim.”  See id., at 44–45.  Those factors, however, amount
to no more than “a list of possible considerations that might
be consulted by a court attempting to develop a gestalt view
of the political and racial climate in a jurisdiction.”  Holder,
512  U. S.,  at  938  (opinion  of  THOMAS,  J.).    Such  a  gestalt
view  is  far  removed  from  the  necessary  benchmark  of  a
hypothetical, undiluted districting plan.
  To  see  this,  one  need  only  consider  the  District  Court’s
use  of  the  Senate  factors  here.    See  582  F. Supp.  3d,  at
1018–1024.  The court began its totality-stage analysis by
reiterating what nobody disputes: that voting in Alabama
is racially polarized, with black voters overwhelmingly pre-
ferring Democrats and white voters largely preferring Re-
publicans.  To rebut the State’s argument that this pattern
is  attributable  to  politics,  not  race  per se,  the  court  noted
that Donald Trump (who is white) prevailed over Ben Car-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Allen v. Milligan. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding voting rights and districting plans.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC.

Opinion of the Court

C

The  physical  presence  rule  as  defined  and  enforced  in

Bellas  Hess  and  Quill  is  not  just  a  technical  legal  prob
lem—it is an extraordinary imposition by the Judiciary on
States’  authority  to  collect  taxes  and  perform  critical
public  functions.  Forty-one  States,  two  Territories,  and
the  District  of  Columbia  now  ask  this  Court  to  reject  the
test  formulated  in  Quill.  See  Brief  for  Colorado  et al.  as
Amici  Curiae.  Quill’s  physical  presence  rule  intrudes  on
States’  reasonable  choices  in  enacting  their  tax  systems.
And that it allows remote sellers to escape an obligation to
remit a lawful state tax is unfair and unjust.  It is unfair
and  unjust  to  those  competitors,  both  local  and  out  of
State, who must remit the tax; to the consumers who pay
the tax; and to the States that seek fair enforcement of the
sales  tax,  a  tax  many  States  for  many  years  have  consid
ered an indispensable source for raising revenue.

In  essence,  respondents  ask  this  Court  to  retain  a  rule
that  allows  their  customers  to  escape  payment  of  sales
taxes—taxes  that  are  essential  to  create  and  secure  the
active  market  they  supply  with  goods  and  services.    An
example may suffice.  Wayfair offers to sell a vast selection
of furnishings.  Its advertising seeks to create an image of
beautiful,  peaceful  homes,  but  it  also  says  that  “ ‘[o]ne  of
the  best  things  about  buying  through  Wayfair  is  that  we
do not have to charge sales tax.’ ”  Brief for Petitioner 55.
What  Wayfair  ignores  in  its  subtle  offer  to  assist  in  tax
evasion  is  that  creating  a  dream  home  assumes  solvent
state  and  local  governments.  State  taxes  fund  the  police
and  fire  departments  that  protect  the  homes  containing
their  customers’  furniture  and  ensure  goods  are  safely
delivered;  maintain  the  public  roads  and  municipal  ser
vices  that  allow  communication  with  and  access  to  cus
tomers;  support  the  “sound  local  banking  institutions  to
support  credit  transactions  [and]  courts  to  ensure  collec
tion of the purchase price,” Quill, 504 U. S., at 328 (opin
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the opening of the "Opinion of the Court" section in the case of South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.  It argues against the physical presence rule established in previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

THOMAS, J., dissenting

laws  would  take  care  of  criminal  offenses,  the  provisions’
proponents did not reply that state laws were disabled on
this  point—they  instead  noted  that  citizens  might  go  be-
yond the limits of States and commit crimes.  See 3 Annals
of Cong. 751.  And notably, Congress’ early statutes did not
purport to regulate Indians either on or off Indian lands—
they  instead  regulated  and  penalized  only  U.  S.  citizens
who  were  trading  with  Indians  or  committing  acts  on  In-
dian lands that threatened the peace with the tribes.

Those statutory lines reflected the early dynamic of fed-
eral-Indian relations, with Indian affairs counting as both
a  matter  of  quasi-foreign  affairs  and  of  state  jurisdiction.
For example, the early Trade and Intercourse Acts only de-
manded  satisfaction  from  Indian  tribes  if  an  Indian  went
onto  a  State’s  land  and  committed  a  crime.  E.g.,  1  Stat.
472–473.  Under that regime, the Federal Government as-
serted  no  authority  over  the  acts  of  Indians  who  lived  on
tribal  lands—much  less  over  Indians  who  lived  off  tribal
lands and within a State’s sole jurisdiction.

That  general  jurisdictional  line  held  until  1817,  when
Congress first enacted a statute to impose penalties on an-
yone who committed a crime against a U. S. citizen while
on Indian lands.  See 3 Stat. 383.  But Justice McLean, rid-
ing circuit, held that statute unconstitutional in 1834—at
least as it applied to Indian lands located within the terri-
torial  limits  of  a  State.    See  United  States  v.  Bailey,  24
F. Cas. 937 (No. 14,495) (CC Tenn.).  As Justice McLean ex-
plained,  “[t]hat  the  federal  government  is  one  of  limited
powers, is a principle so obvious as not to admit of contro-
versy.”  Id., at 938.  Yet the Indian lands at issue were not
located within a federal territory, and there had not been
“any cession of jurisdiction by the state of Tennessee.”  Id.,
at 939.5  Nor was the criminal statute in any way related to

——————

5 This decision thus was consistent with one issued 12 years later by
this Court—which upheld the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act’s criminal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses historical legal precedents and arguments related to federal jurisdiction over Native American tribes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

KAGAN, J., dissenting

rooting  bystander.    MOHELA  was  “not  involved  with  the
decision  of  the  Missouri  Attorney  General’s  Office”  to  file
this suit.  Letter from Appellees in No. 22–3179 (CA8), p. 3
(Nov. 1, 2022).  And MOHELA did not cooperate with the
Attorney  General’s  efforts.  When  the  AG  wanted  docu-
ments relating to MOHELA’s loan-servicing contract, to aid
him in putting forward the State’s standing theory, he had
to  file  formal  “sunshine  law”  demands  on  the  entity.    See
id., at 3–4.  MOHELA had no interest in assisting voluntar-
ily.

If all that makes you suspect that MOHELA is distinct
from the State, you would be right.  And that is so as a mat-
ter of law and financing alike.  Yes, MOHELA is a creature
of  state  statute,  a  public  instrumentality  established  to
serve  a  public  function.    §173.360.  But  the  law  sets  up
MOHELA as a corporation—a so-called “body corporate”—
with a “[s]eparate legal personality.”  Ibid.; First Nat. City
Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U. S.
611,  625  (1983)  (Bancec).  Or  said  a  bit  differently,
MOHELA is—like the lion’s share of corporations, whether
public or private—a “separate legal [entity] with distinct le-
gal rights and obligations” from those belonging to its crea-
tor.  Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for Open Soci-
ety  Int’l  Inc.,  591  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2020)  (slip  op.,  at  5).
MOHELA,  for  example,  has  the  power  to  contract  with
other entities, which is how it entered into a loan-servicing
contract  with  the  Department  of  Education.
See
§173.385.1(15).    MOHELA’s  assets,  including  the  fees
gained from that contract, are not “part of the revenue of
the  [S]tate”  and  cannot  be  “used  for  the  payment  of  debt
incurred by the [S]tate.”  §§173.386, 173.425.  On the other
side of the ledger, MOHELA’s debts are MOHELA’s alone;
Missouri cannot be liable for them.  §173.410.  And as noted
earlier, MOHELA has the power to “sue and be sued” inde-
pendent of Missouri, so it can both “prosecute and defend”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Biden v. Nebraska. It discusses the legal status and separation of MOHELA from the State of Missouri.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

133

Opinion of the Court

context”).
It is a “fundamental canon of statutory construc-
tion that the words of a statute must be read in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S.
803, 809 (1989). A court must therefore interpret the stat-
ute “as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,”
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 569 (1995), and “ﬁt, if
possible, all parts into an harmonious whole,” FTC v. Mandel
Brothers, Inc., 359 U. S. 385, 389 (1959). Similarly, the
meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, partic-
ularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more
speciﬁcally to the topic at hand. See United States v. Estate
of Romani, 523 U. S. 517, 530–531 (1998); United States v.
Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 453 (1988).
In addition, we must be
guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in
which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such
economic and political magnitude to an administrative
agency. Cf. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 231 (1994).

With these principles in mind, we ﬁnd that Congress has
directly spoken to the issue here and precluded the FDA’s
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.

A

Viewing the FDCA as a whole, it is evident that one of the
Act’s core objectives is to ensure that any product regulated
by the FDA is “safe” and “effective” for its intended use.
See 21 U. S. C. § 393(b)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. III) (deﬁning the
FDA’s mission); More Information for Better Patient Care:
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 83 (1996) (statement of
FDA Deputy Comm’r Schultz) (“A fundamental precept of
drug and device regulation in this country is that these prod-
ucts must be proven safe and effective before they can be
sold”). This essential purpose pervades the FDCA. For
instance, 21 U. S. C. § 393(b)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. III) deﬁnes
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 120 (2000). It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
898

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5317.  Arias  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  439.

No.  09–5318.  Berger  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  553  F.  3d  1107.

No.  09–5319.  Okoro  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5320.  Duvall  v.  Lombardi,  Director,  Missouri  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5323.  Hernandez-Lopez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5324.  Hernandez-Luna  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 321 Fed. Appx. 377.
No.  09–5325.  Gonzalez  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5326.  E.  L.  G.  v.  Oregon.  Ct.  App.  Ore.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  221  Ore.  App.  507,  190  P.  3d  1239.

No.  09–5328.  Holland  v.  Holland.  Sup.  Ct.  S.  C.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5329.  Gil-Hernandez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  566.

No.  09–5331.  Field  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  386.

No.  09–5333.  Matheson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  808.

No.  09–5334.  Spikes  v.  Connecticut.  App.  Ct.  Conn.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  111  Conn.  App.  543,  961  A.
2d  426.

No.  09–5335.  Rhodes  v.  Murphy,  Commissioner,  Connecti
cut  Department  of  Correction.  App.  Ct.  Conn.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  111  Conn.  App.  903,  959  A.  2d  1094.

No.  09–5336.  Del  Valle  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  125.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for indexing as part of a book's content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

25

Opinion of the Court

under”  ISDA  and  requiring  authorizing  resolutions  from
“[v]illages, as the smallest tribal units under” ANCSA).

Respondents also warn that blessing ANCs’ status under
ISDA will give them ammunition to press for participation
in the many statutes besides the CARES Act that incorpo-
rate  ISDA’s  “Indian  tribe”  definition.    See,  e.g.,  Indian
Health Care Improvement Act, §4(d), 90 Stat. 1401; Native
American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act
of 1996, §4(12)(B), 110 Stat. 4019–4020; Indian Tribal En-
ergy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005, [Ti-
tle V of the Energy Policy Act of 2005], §503(a), 119 Stat.
764–765.

As  the  Government  notes,  however,  there  may  well  be
statutes  that  incorporate  ISDA’s  “Indian  tribe”  definition
but  exclude  ANCs  from  participation  in  other  ways.    See
Brief  for  Federal  Petitioner  33–34  (citing,  e.g.,  7  U. S. C.
§§1639o(2), 1639p(a)(1) (defining “Indian tribe” to incorpo-
rate the ISDA definition, but also requiring participants to
exercise “ ‘regulatory authority over . . . territory of the In-
dian  tribe’ ”)).    Moreover,  this  concern  cuts  both  ways.  If
respondents’ reading prevailed, ANCs would presumably be
excluded from all other statutes incorporating ISDA’s defi-
nition, even those under which ANCs have long benefited.
That includes the Indian Tribal Energy Development and
Self-Determination Act of 2005, under which ANCs have re-
ceived millions of dollars of energy assistance.  See Brief for
Federal  Petitioner  33.    That  also  includes  NAHASDA,
which, as discussed, creates a housing block grant program
under which the regional ANCs are some of the biggest re-
cipients  in  Alaska.  See  supra,  at  17–18.  Currently,  over
10,000  Alaskans  live  in  housing  units  built,  improved,  or
managed by these regional authorities.  See Brief for Asso-
ciation of Alaska Housing Authorities as Amicus Curiae 15.
All told, the Court’s decision today does not “vest ANCs
with  new  and  untold  tribal  powers,”  as  respondents  fear.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It cites legal precedents and discusses the implications of a court decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ

THOMAS, J., dissenting

___ (same); see also Muransky, 979 F. 3d, at 970–972 (Jor-
dan, J., dissenting); Huff v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 923 F. 3d
458, 469 (CA6 2019) (“Article III standing may draw a line
between  private  and  public  rights”);  Bryant  v.  Compass
Group  USA,  Inc.,  958  F. 3d,  617,  624  (CA7  2020)  (the
Spokeo concurrence “drew a useful distinction between two
types of injuries”).

The  majority  today,  however,  takes  the  road  less  trav-
eled: “[U]nder Article III, an injury in law is not an injury
in fact.”  Ante, at 11; but see Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 29
F. Cas. 506, 508 (No. 17,322) (CC Me. 1838) (“The law tol-
erates no farther inquiry than whether there has been the
violation of a right”).  No matter if the right is personal or
if the legislature deems the right worthy of legal protection,
legislatures are constitutionally unable to offer the protec-
tion  of  the  federal  courts  for  anything  other  than  money,
bodily  integrity,  and  anything  else  that  this  Court  thinks
looks close enough to rights existing at common law.  See
ante,  at  9.    The  1970s  injury-in-fact  theory  has  now  dis-
placed the traditional gateway into federal courts.

This approach is remarkable in both its novelty and ef-
fects.  Never before has this Court declared that legal injury
is inherently insufficient to support standing.5  And never
before has this Court declared that legislatures are consti-
tutionally precluded from creating legal rights enforceable
in  federal  court  if  those  rights  deviate  too  far  from  their

——————

5 See,  e.g.,  Lujan  v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504  U. S.  555,  578  (1992)
(“Nothing  in  this  contradicts  the  principle  that  the  injury  required  by
Art. III may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing” (internal quotation marks, brackets,
and ellipsis omitted)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 514 (1975) (“Con-
gress may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation
of which can confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have
suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute”); Linda
R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617, n. 3 (1973) (“Congress may enact
statutes  creating  legal  rights,  the  invasion  of  which  creates  standing,
even though no injury would exist without the statute”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge named Thomas. It cites other legal cases and discusses legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

CONCEPCION v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

any relevant materials at an initial sentencing or in modi-
fying that sentence are those set forth by Congress in a stat-
ute or by the Constitution.  See Pepper, 562 U. S., at 489,
n. 8 (“Of course, sentencing courts’ discretion . . . is subject
to  constitutional  constraints”);  Mistretta  v.  United  States,
488 U. S. 361, 364 (1989) (“[T]he scope of judicial discretion
with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional con-
trol”).

Congress  is  not  shy  about  placing  such  limits  where  it
deems  them  appropriate.  At  an  initial  sentencing,  Con-
gress has provided generally that “[n]o limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, char-
acter, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense” when
deciding what sentence to impose.  18 U. S. C. §3661.  Con-
gress has, however, expressly prohibited a district court in
crafting an initial sentence from considering a defendant’s
need for rehabilitation in support of a prison sentence.  See
§3582(a); Tapia v. United States, 564 U. S. 319, 328 (2011).
In  other  aspects  of  sentencing,  Congress  also  has  ex-
pressly  limited  district  courts  to  considering  only  certain
factors.  For example, in determining whether to include a
term of supervised release, and the length of any such term,
Congress has expressly precluded district courts from con-
sidering the need for retribution.  See §3583(c); id., at 326.
Congress  has  further  imposed  express  statutory  limita-
tions  on  one  type  of  sentencing  modification  proceeding.
Section 3582(c)(2) provides that

“in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to
a  term  of  imprisonment  based  on  a  sentencing  range
that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission . . . the court may reduce the term of im-
prisonment,  after  considering  the  factors  set  forth  in
section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,
if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the limits Congress places on sentencing considerations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

PATEL v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

for purposes of subparagraph (D).  Id., at ___–___ (slip op.,
at 3–4).  In holding that it does, we explained that subpar-
agraph  (D)  “will  still  forbid  appeals  of  factual  determina-
tions” themselves under subparagraph (C).  Id., at ___–___
(slip op., at 12–13).  Had we thought otherwise, we would
simply  have  said  that  questions  of  fact,  like  questions  of
law, are reviewable—end of story.
  Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ___ (2020), addresses Patel’s
situation even more directly.  There, we held that a court
has  jurisdiction  to  review  a  factual  challenge  to  an  order
denying  relief  under  the  Convention  Against  Torture,  be-
cause that order falls outside of subparagraph (C)’s prohi-
bition  on  reviewing  final  orders  of  removal.    In  reaching
that  conclusion,  we  emphasized  that  our  decision  would
have “no effect” on those orders that do fall within a juris-
diction-stripping provision—including “orders denying dis-
cretionary relief ” under §1252(a)(2)(B).  Id., at ___ (slip op.,
at 12).  And so, we explained, a noncitizen “may not bring a
factual challenge to orders denying discretionary relief, in-
cluding . . . adjustment of status.”  Ibid.  We adhere to that
view today.

B
  In  contrast  to  amicus’  straightforward  interpretation,
both  the  Government’s  and  Patel’s  arguments  read  like
elaborate efforts to avoid the most natural meaning of the
text.

1
  We  begin  with  the  Government’s  argument  that  “judg-
ment” refers exclusively to a “discretionary” decision, which
the Government describes as a decision that is “subjective
or evaluative.”  Brief for Respondent 12.  According to the
Government, this requirement is evident in definitions like
this one: “ ‘the mental or intellectual process of forming an
opinion  or  evaluation  by  discerning  and  comparing,’ ”  or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of specific laws and precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
46

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

THOMAS, J., dissenting

IV
  These  cases  are  not  close.    The  plaintiffs  did  not  prove
that Alabama’s districting plan “impose[s] or applie[s]” any
“voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure” that effects “a denial or abridgement
of  the[ir]  right  . . .  to  vote  on  account  of  race  or  color.”
§10301(a).    Nor  did  they  prove  that  Alabama’s  congres-
sional  districts  “are  not  equally  open  to  participation”  by
black Alabamians.  §10301(b).  The plaintiffs did not even
prove that it is possible to achieve two majority-black dis-
tricts without resorting to a racial gerrymander.  The most
that  they can  be said to  have  shown  is  that  sophisticated
mapmakers can proportionally allocate Alabama’s congres-
sional districts based on race in a way that exceeds the Fed-
eral Judiciary’s ability to recognize as a racial gerrymander
with the naked eye.  The District Court held that this show-
ing, plus racially polarized voting and its gestalt view of Al-
abama’s racial climate, was enough to require the State to
redraw its districting plan on the basis of race.  If that is
the benchmark for vote dilution under §2, then §2 is noth-
ing more than a racial entitlement to roughly proportional
control  of  elective  offices—limited  only  by  feasibility—
wherever different racial groups consistently prefer differ-
ent candidates.
  If that is what §2 means, the Court should hold that it is
unconstitutional.  If that is not what it means, but §2 ap-
plies  to  districting,  then  the  Court  should  hold  that  vote-
dilution challenges require a race-neutral benchmark that
bears  no  resemblance  to  unconstitutional  racial  registers.
On the other hand, if the Court believes that finding a race-
neutral benchmark is as impossible as much of its rhetoric
suggests, it should hold that §2 cannot be applied to single-
member  districting  plans  for  want  of  an  “objective  and
workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark.”
Holder, 512 U. S., at 881 (plurality opinion).  Better yet, it
could adopt the correct interpretation of §2 and hold that a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

who ordered it.  In addition to creating and delivering the
cake—a  focal  point  of  the  wedding  celebration—Phillips
sometimes  stays  and  interacts  with  the  guests  at  the
wedding.  And the guests often recognize his creations and
seek  his  bakery  out  afterward.    Phillips  also  sees  the
inherent symbolism in wedding cakes.  To him, a wedding
cake  inherently  communicates  that  “a  wedding  has  oc
curred,  a  marriage  has  begun,  and  the  couple  should  be
celebrated.”  App. 162.

Wedding  cakes  do,  in  fact,  communicate  this  message.
A  tradition  from  Victorian  England  that  made  its  way  to
America  after  the  Civil  War,  “[w]edding  cakes  are  so
packed  with  symbolism  that  it  is  hard  to  know  where  to
begin.”  M. Krondl, Sweet Invention: A History of Dessert
321 (2011) (Krondl); see also ibid. (explaining the symbol
ism  behind  the  color,  texture,  flavor,  and  cutting  of  the
cake).  If an average person walked into a room and saw a
white, multi-tiered cake, he would immediately know that
he had stumbled upon a wedding.  The cake is “so stand
ardised  and  inevitable  a  part  of  getting  married  that  few
ever  think  to  question  it.”    Charsley,  Interpretation  and
Custom:  The  Case  of  the  Wedding  Cake,  22  Man  93,  95
(1987).  Almost  no  wedding,  no  matter  how  spartan,  is
missing the cake.  See id., at 98.  “A whole series of events
expected in the context of a  wedding would be impossible
without it: an essential photograph, the cutting, the toast,
and the distribution of both cake and favours at the wed
ding and afterwards.”  Ibid.  Although the cake is eventu
ally eaten, that is not its primary purpose.  See id., at 95
(“It  is  not  unusual  to  hear  people  declaring  that  they  do
not like wedding cake, meaning that they do not like to eat
it.  This includes people who are, without question, having
such  cakes  for  their  weddings”);  id.,  at  97  (“Nothing  is
made  of  the  eating  itself ”);  Krondl  320–321  (explaining
that  wedding  cakes  have  long  been  described  as  “inedi
ble”).  The  cake’s  purpose  is  to  mark  the  beginning  of  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the symbolism of wedding cakes in the context of a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 67 (2009)

75

Opinion of the Court

tained  a  monetary  award  against  a  carrier  could  sue  to  en
force  it,  and  the  court  could  either  enforce  the  award  or  set
it  aside.  Price,  360  U. S.,  at  616;  45  U. S. C.  § 153  First
(p) (1934 ed.).  In addition to that limited role, some Courts
of Appeals,  we noted  in Price,  reviewed awards  “claimed to
result from a denial of due process of law.”  360 U. S., at 616
(citing Ellerd v.  Southern Paciﬁc R. Co., 241 F. 2d 541 (CA7
1957); Barnett v.  Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 245
F. 2d 579, 582 (CA3 1957)).

In 1966, Congress again amended the scheme, this time to
state  grounds  on  which  both  employees  and  railroads  could
seek judicial review of NRAB orders.  The governing provi
sion,  still  in  force,  allows  parties  aggrieved  by  an  NRAB
panel  order  to  petition  for  court  review.  45  U. S. C.  § 153
First (q) (2006 ed.).  The provision instructs that

“[o]n  such  review,  the  ﬁndings and  order  of  the  division
shall  be  conclusive  on  the  parties,  except  that  the
order  .  .  .  may  be  set  aside,  in  whole  or  in  part,  or  re
manded  .  .  .  ,  for  failure  of  the  division  to  comply  with
the  requirements  of  [the  RLA],  for  failure  of  the  order
to conform, or conﬁne itself, to matters within the scope
of  the  division’s  jurisdiction,  or  for  fraud  or  corruption
by a member of the division making the order.”

Courts  of  Appeals  have  divided  on  whether  this  provision
precludes judicial review of NRAB proceedings for due proc
ess  violations.  Compare,  e. g.,  Shaﬁi  v.  PLC  British  Air
ways, 22 F. 3d 59, 64 (CA2 1994) (review available), and Edel
man v.  Western Airlines, Inc., 892 F. 2d 839, 847 (CA9 1989)
(same), with Kinross v.  Utah R. Co., 362 F. 3d 658, 662 (CA10
2004) (review precluded).4

4 The  disagreement  stems  from  this  Court’s  per  curiam  opinion  in
Union  Paciﬁc R.  Co.  v.  Sheehan,  439 U. S.  89  (1978).  That case  involved
an NRAB decision turning on a time limitation contained in the governing
CBA.  Based on that limitation, the Board dismissed an employee’s claim.
The  Tenth  Circuit  remanded  the  case  to  the  NRAB  on  the  ground  that
the Board had failed to consider the employee’s equitable tolling argument
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history of judicial review of National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) orders and cites relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

has  it  shown  what  kinds  of  content  appear  across  the  di-
verse array of regulated platforms.

Social-media  platforms  are  diverse,  and  each  may  be
unique in potentially significant ways.  On the present rec-
ord, we are ill-equipped to account for the many platform-
specific  features  that  allow  users  to  do  things  like  sell  or
purchase goods,35 live-stream events,36 request a ride,37 ar-
range a date,38 create a discussion forum,39 wire money to
friends,40  play  a  video  game,41  hire  an  employee,42  log  a
run,43 or agree to watch a  dog.44  The challenged laws may
apply  differently  to  these  different  functions,  which  may
present different First Amendment issues.  A court cannot
invalidate the challenged laws if it has to speculate about
their applications.

3
Third, NetChoice has not established how websites mod-
erate content.  NetChoice alleges that “[c]overed websites”
generally use algorithms to organize and censor content ap-
pearing in “search results, comments, or in feeds.”  Brief for
Petitioners in No. 22–555, at 4, 6.  But at this stage and on
this record, we have no way of confirming whether all of the
regulated platforms use algorithms to organize all of their
content,  much  less  whether  these  algorithms  are  expres-
sive.  See Hurley, 515 U. S., at 568.  Facebook and Reddit,
for  instance,  both  allow  their  users  to  post  about  a  wide

——————

35 E.g., Facebook Marketplace, Etsy.
36 E.g., X Live, Twitch.
37 E.g., Uber, Lyft.
38 E.g., Facebook Dating, Tinder.
39 E.g., Reddit, Quora.
40 E.g., Meta Pay, Venmo, PayPal.
41 E.g., Metaverse, Discord.
42 E.g., Indeed, LinkedIn.
43 E.g., Strava.
44 E.g., Rover.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Moody v. NetChoice. It discusses the diversity of social media platforms and the challenges in applying laws to them due to their varied functions and content moderation practices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1025

529 U. S.

March 20, 2000

No. 99–7778. Crawford v. Yukins, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7783. Underwood v. Jeffcoat et al. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 437.

No. 99–7784. Trice v. Sikes, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–7785. Thomas v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7786. Zoglauer v. Zoglauer et al. App. Ct. Ill.,
2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 302 Ill. App. 3d
1101, 746 N. E. 2d 914.

No. 99–7787. Walker v. Dinning. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–7795. Nubine v. Martin, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 478.

No. 99–7797. Lewis v. Jones et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–7799. Carter v. City of Rayville et al. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 520.

No. 99–7800. Smith v. Garcia, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1333.

No. 99–7803. Gonzales v. New Mexico. Sup. Ct. N. M.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 128 N. M. 44, 989 P. 2d 419.
No. 99–7804. Hakim v. Jacob et al. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 459 Mich. 992, 595 N. W. 2d 846.
No. 99–7805. Foster v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7806. Hughes v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 336 S. C. 585, 521 S. E. 2d
500.

No. 99–7812. DeCloud v. Bowersox, Superintendent,
Potosi Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-
rari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

THOMAS, J., dissenting

member.  See 25 U. S. C. §1903(4).  If the child resides on
Indian tribal lands, then the Indian tribal court has juris-
diction.  §1911(a).  But, if the child resides within a State,
ICWA requires state courts to transfer any proceedings to
a tribal court, absent “good cause to the contrary,” upon pe-
tition by the child’s parent, custodian, or tribe.  §1911(b).

Even when the state court retains the proceedings, ICWA
replaces state law with a strict set of federal rules.  For ex-
ample, if the State fears that a child is suffering physical or
sexual abuse, it must clear a set of hurdles before placing
the child in foster care or terminating the parent’s rights.
§§1912(a)–(e).    If  the  parent  wishes  to  voluntarily  relin-
quish his or her rights and facilitate an adoption, the child’s
tribe has a right to intervene “at any point” and to collater-
ally attack the court’s decree.  §§1911(c), 1914.  Moreover,
it appears that tribes can enroll children unilaterally, with-
out the parent’s consent.  Accordingly, even if the biological
parents, the child, the adoptive parents, and the court all
agree on what is best for the child, the tribe can intervene
at the eleventh hour, without any consent from the parents
or child, and block the proceedings.  In fact, that is exactly
what happened here—the children were unilaterally desig-
nated  as  tribal  members  by  tribes,  which  then  sought  to
block adoptions that everyone else thought were best for the
children  involved.    And,  even  though  some  of  those  adop-
tions have now been finalized, it appears that the tribes can
collaterally  attack  them  for  an  indefinite  period  of  time.
§1914.

Besides  these  procedural  hurdles,  ICWA  dictates  the
preferences a court must adhere to when deciding where to
place the child.  In the typical case, the primary considera-
tion  would  be  the  best  interests  of  that  child.    E.g.,  Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. §153.002 (West 2014); American Law In-
stitute,  Principles  of  the  Law  of  Family  Dissolution  §2.02
(2002);  Friederwitzer  v.  Friederwitzer,  55  N. Y.  2d  89,  92,
432 N. E. 2d 765, 767 (1982); Karner v. McMahon, 433 Pa.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and its implications in a specific case.  The content is sequential and provides legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

thwarted investigation, qualification for citizenship is a complete de-
fense to a prosecution under §1425(a).  Pp. 10–15.

3. Measured against this analysis, the jury instructions in this case
were  in  error.    The  jury  needed  to  find  more  than  an unlawful  false
statement.  However, it was not asked to—and so did not—make any
of  the  necessary  determinations.    The  Government’s  assertion  that
any instructional error was harmless is left for resolution on remand.
Pp. 15–16.

821 F. 3d 675, vacated and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  KENNEDY,  GINSBURG,  BREYER,  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,  joined.    GOR-
SUCH,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  the
judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined.  ALITO, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision.  It is not the main body of the text and likely not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

CALVARY CHAPEL DAYTON VALLEY v. SISOLAK

ALITO, J., dissenting

yet discriminatory treatment of places of worship.

II
  Calvary Chapel argues that the Governor’s directive vio-
lates  both  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  and  the  Free  Speech
Clause of the First Amendment, and I agree that Calvary
Chapel  has  a  very  high  likelihood  of  success  on  these
claims.

A
  Under the Free Exercise Clause, restrictions on religious
exercise that are not “neutral and of general applicability”
must  survive  strict  scrutiny.    Church  of  Lukumi  Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 531 (1993).  “[T]he min-
imum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discrimi-
nate on its face,” id., at 533, and “[t]he Free Exercise Clause
bars even ‘subtle departures from neutrality’ on matters of
religion.”    Masterpiece  Cakeshop,  Ltd.  v.  Colorado  Civil
Rights  Comm’n,  584  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2018)  (slip  op.,  at  17)
(quoting Church of Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 534).  Here, the
departure is hardly subtle.  The Governor’s directive specif-
ically treats worship services differently from other activi-
ties  that  involve  extended,  indoor  gatherings  of  large
groups of people.
  The face of the directive provides many examples.  While
“houses of worship” may admit “no more than fifty persons,”
ECF Doc. 38–2, §11, many favored facilities that host indoor
activities may operate at 50% capacity.  Privileged facilities
include  bowling  alleys,  §20,  breweries,  §26,  fitness  facili-
ties, §28, and most notably, casinos, which have operated at
50%  capacity  for  over  a  month,  §35;  ECF  Doc.  38–3,  p. 5,
sometimes featuring not only gambling but live circus acts
and shows.
  For  Las  Vegas  casinos,  50%  capacity  often means  thou-
sands  of  patrons,  and  the  activities  that  occur  in  casinos
frequently  involve  far  less  physical  distancing  and  other
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment in the context of a case involving restrictions on religious gatherings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

JACKSON, J., dissenting

sat on the Portage Board of Works and Public Safety, the
entity  that  managed  public  bidding  on  city  contracts.
Snyder put one of his friends, Randy Reeder, in charge of
the bidding process, despite Reeder’s lack of experience in
administering public bids.  Evidence presented at Snyder’s
trial showed that Reeder tailored bid specifications for two
different  city  contracts  to  favor  Great  Lakes  Peterbilt,  a
truck dealership owned by brothers Robert Buha and Ste-
phen Buha.  Evidence also showed that during the bidding
process, Snyder was in contact with the Buha brothers, but
no other bidders.

Snyder had campaigned on a platform that included au-
tomating trash collection, and by December 2012, the city
was looking to buy three garbage trucks.  It issued an invi-
tation to bid on the contract, listing specific requirements
for the trucks.  Reeder testified that he crafted some speci-
fications, including delivery within 150 days, knowing they
would  favor  Great  Lakes  Peterbilt.    The  board  of  works
voted  to  award  Great  Lakes  Peterbilt  the  contract.    Evi-
dence at trial showed that the city could have saved about
$60,000 had it not prioritized expedited delivery.

In January 2013, the manager of Great Lakes Peterbilt
asked Reeder whether the city might want to buy another
truck—an unused, 2012 model that had been sitting outside
on the dealership’s lot over two winters.  Snyder first tried
to  buy  the  truck  outright,  but  Portage’s  city  attorney  in-
formed him he had to go through the public bidding process.
So  the  board  of  works  issued  another  invitation  to  bid  in
November 2013.  This invitation sought two more garbage
trucks.  Reeder again tweaked certain specifications to fa-
vor  Great  Lakes  Peterbilt—this  time  to  help  it  move  the
older truck sitting on its lot.  The board of works voted to
award  Great  Lakes  Peterbilt  this  contract  too.  Together,
the two contracts that Great Lakes Peterbilt “won” totaled
some $1.125 million.

Shortly  after  the  second  contract  was  awarded,  Snyder
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, likely a court opinion or transcript. It presents factual details about a case involving alleged bid rigging. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

55

Opinion of the Court

Justice White complained that the Court was engaging in
“unrestrained  imposition  of  its  own  extraconstitutional
value preferences.”  Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 794 (dissent-
ing opinion).  And the United States as amicus curiae asked
the  Court  to  overrule  Roe  five  times  in  the  decade  before
Casey, see 505 U. S., at 844 (joint opinion), and then asked
the Court to overrule it once more in Casey itself.

2
When Casey revisited Roe almost 20 years later, very lit-
tle of Roe’s reasoning was defended or preserved.  The Court
abandoned  any  reliance  on  a  privacy  right  and  instead
grounded  the  abortion  right  entirely  on  the  Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  505 U. S., at 846.  The
Court did not reaffirm Roe’s erroneous account of abortion
history.  In fact, none of the Justices in the majority said
anything about the history of the abortion right.  And as for
precedent, the Court relied on essentially the same body of
cases that Roe had cited.  Thus, with respect to the standard
grounds  for  constitutional  decisionmaking—text,  history,
and precedent—Casey did not attempt to bolster Roe’s rea-
soning.

The Court also made no real effort to remedy one of the
greatest  weaknesses  in  Roe’s  analysis:  its  much-criticized
discussion  of  viability.  The  Court  retained  what  it  called
Roe’s “central holding”—that a State may not regulate pre-
viability abortions for the purpose of protecting fetal life—
but  it  provided  no  principled  defense  of  the  viability  line.
505  U. S.,  at  860,  870–871.    Instead,  it  merely  rephrased
what Roe had said, stating that viability marked the point
at which “the independent existence of a second life can in
reason  and  fairness  be  the  object  of  state  protection  that
now overrides the rights of the woman.”  505 U. S., at 870.
Why  “reason  and  fairness”  demanded  that  the  line  be
drawn at viability the Court did not explain.  And the Jus-
tices  who  authored  the  controlling  opinion  conspicuously
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Supreme Court cases Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It analyzes the reasoning and holdings of these cases, particularly regarding the viability standard.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

Syllabus

Amendment.  Pp. 11–29.

(a) To  obtain  a  preliminary  injunction,  petitioners  must  establish,
among  other  things,  a  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits  of  their
claim.  See  Winter  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc.,  555
U. S.  7,  20.  To  succeed  on  an  Eighth  Amendment  method-of-
execution claim, a prisoner must establish that the method creates a
demonstrated  risk  of  severe  pain  and  that  the  risk  is  substantial
when  compared  to  the  known  and  available  alternatives.    Baze,  su-
pra, at 61 (plurality opinion).  Pp. 11–13.

(b) Petitioners  failed  to  establish  that  any  risk  of  harm  was  sub-
stantial when compared to a known and available alternative method
of  execution.  Petitioners  have  suggested  that  Oklahoma  could  exe-
cute them using sodium thiopental or pentobarbital, but the District
Court did not commit a clear error when it found that those drugs are
unavailable to the State.  Petitioners argue that the Eighth Amend-
ment does not require them to identify such an alternative, but their
argument is inconsistent with the controlling opinion in Baze, which
imposed  a requirement that the Court now follows.  Petitioners also
argue that the requirement to identify an alternative is inconsistent
with  the  Court’s  pre-Baze  decision  in  Hill  v.  McDonough,  547  U. S.
573, but they misread that decision.  Hill concerned a question of civ-
il  procedure,  not  a  substantive  Eighth  Amendment  question.    That
case  held  that  §1983  alone  does  not  require  an  inmate  asserting  a
method-of-execution  claim  to  plead  an  acceptable  alternative.    Baze,
on the other hand, made clear that the Eighth Amendment requires a
prisoner  to  plead  and  prove  a  known  and  available  alternative.
Pp. 13–16.

(c) The District Court did not commit clear error when it found that
midazolam is likely to render a person unable to feel pain associated
with  administration  of  the  paralytic  agent  and  potassium  chloride.
Pp. 16–29.

(1) Several  initial  considerations  bear  emphasis.    First,  the  Dis-
trict  Court’s  factual  findings  are  reviewed  under  the  deferential
“clear  error”  standard.    Second,  petitioners  have  the  burden  of  per-
suasion  on  the  question  whether  midazolam  is  effective.    Third,  the
fact that numerous courts have concluded that midazolam is likely to
render  an  inmate  insensate  to  pain  during  execution  heightens  the
deference owed to the District Court’s findings.  Finally, challenges to
lethal  injection  protocols  test  the  boundaries  of  the  authority  and
competency of federal courts, which should not embroil themselves in
ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise.  Baze, supra,
at 51.  Pp. 16–18.

(2) The State’s expert presented persuasive testimony that a 500-
milligram  dose  of  midazolam  would  make  it  a  virtual  certainty  that
  </content>
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This appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the legal arguments and the court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007)

13

SCALIA, J., dissenting

unreasonable as to be unworthy of Chevron deference.

*

*

*

The Court’s alarm over global warming may or may not
be  justified,  but  it  ought  not  distort  the  outcome  of  this
litigation.  This  is  a  straightforward  administrative-law
case,  in  which  Congress  has  passed  a  malleable  statute
giving  broad  discretion,  not  to  us  but  to  an  executive
agency.  No  matter  how  important  the  underlying  policy
issues at stake, this Court has no business substituting its
own  desired  outcome  for  the  reasoned  judgment  of  the
responsible agency.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it unsuitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ALLEN v. COOPER

Syllabus

the States’ immunity from suit, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U. S. 44, 56, and some constitutional provision allows Congress to have
thus encroached on the States’ sovereignty.  Congress used clear lan-
guage to abrogate the States’ immunity from copyright infringement
suits  in  the  CRCA.  Allen  contends  that  Congress’s  constitutional
power to do so arises either from the Intellectual Property Clause, Art.
I, §8, cl. 8, or from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which au-
thorizes  Congress  to  “enforce”  the  commands  of  the  Due  Process
Clause.  Each contention is foreclosed by precedent.  Pp. 4–6.

(b) The Intellectual Property Clause enables Congress to grant both
copyrights and patents.  In Allen’s view, Congress’s authority to abro-
gate sovereign immunity from copyright suits naturally follows, in or-
der  to  “secur[e]”  a  copyright  holder’s  “exclusive  Right”  as  against  a
State’s  intrusion.    But  that  theory  was  rejected  in  Florida  Prepaid.
That case considered the constitutionality of the Patent Remedy Act,
which, like the CRCA, attempted to put  “States on the same footing
as private parties” in patent infringement lawsuits.  527 U. S., at 647,
648.  Florida Prepaid acknowledged that Congress’s goal of providing
uniform remedies in infringement cases was a “proper Article I con-
cern,” but held that Seminole Tribe precluded Congress from using its
Article  I  powers  “to  circumvent”  the  limits  sovereign  immunity
“place[s] upon federal jurisdiction,” 517 U. S., at 73.  For the same rea-
son, Article I cannot support the CRCA.  Allen reads Central Va. Com-
munity College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356 to have replaced Seminole Tribe’s
general rule with a clause-by-clause approach to evaluating whether a
particular constitutional provision allows the abrogation of sovereign
immunity.  But Katz rested on the unique history of the Bankruptcy
Clause.  546 U. S., at 369, n. 9.  And even if the limits of Katz’s holding
were not so clear, Florida Prepaid, together with stare decisis, would
doom Allen’s argument.  Overruling Florida Prepaid would require a
“special  justification,”  over  and  above  the  belief  “that  the  precedent
was wrongly decided,” Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573
U. S. 258, 266, which Allen does not offer.  Pp. 6–10.

(c) Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to ab-
rogate  the  States’  immunity  as  part  of  its  power  “to  enforce”  the
Amendment’s substantive prohibitions.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U. S. 507, 519.  For Congress’s action to fall within its Section 5 au-
thority, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury  to  be  prevented  or  remedied  and  the  means  adopted  to  that
end.”  Id., at 520.  This test requires courts to consider the nature and
extent  of  state  conduct  violating  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  and  to
examine the scope of Congress’s response to that injury.  Florida Pre-
paid again serves as the critical precedent.  There, the Court defined
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, outlining the arguments and reasoning behind a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a summary of legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xv

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Frazer v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Frye v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Guzman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Hudson v.
California; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Kukes v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Kulka v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Lee v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Marchan Moreno v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; McDowall v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; McGovern v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Salcedo Gonzales v.
California; Scarborough v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Smithey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Taylor v.
California; Trinidad v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Trudeau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Valadez v.
California; Washington v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; White v.
California; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Woods v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California Dept. of Social Services; Steele v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California State Bar; Warden v.
Calkins v. National Labor Relations Bd.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Callicutt v. Panola County Jail
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calumet City; Moore v.
Cameron v. Ferrara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cameron v. Samarra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Camoscio v. DeMinico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Campbell v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Campbell v. Sletten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cancassi v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cancassi v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Candelaria v. LeMaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Canterbury v. West
Capital Skiing Corp.; Cherokee Corp. of Linden, Va., Inc. v.
. . . .
Caprotti v. Woodstock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carey; Brown v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carey v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cargill, Inc.; Gangi Bros. Packing Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carhart; Stenberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carlin; Public Citizen v.

Page
1108
1007
1100
1075
1057
1063
1008
1040
1114
1071
1101
1072
1120
1026
1056,1145
1101
1076
1008
1071
1009
1042
1023
1064
1020
1098
1078
1068
1043
1075
1002
1092
1067
1028
1075
1115
1019
1034
1087
1108
1083
1058
1037
1002,1016,1051,1086
1003

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

the lower courts, bound by Smith, will reject that argument;
and CSS will file a new petition in this Court challenging
Smith.  What is the point of going around in this circle?

Not  only  is  the  Court’s  decision  unlikely  to  resolve  the
present dispute, it provides no guidance regarding similar
controversies  in  other  jurisdictions.    From  2006  to  2011,
Catholic  Charities  in  Boston,  San  Francisco,  Washington,
D. C., and Illinois ceased providing adoption or foster care
services  after  the  city  or  state  government  insisted  that
they  serve  same-sex  couples.    Although  the  precise  legal
grounds for these actions are not always clear, it appears
that they were based on laws or regulations generally pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.22
And  some  jurisdictions  have  adopted  anti-discrimination
rules that expressly target adoption services.23  Today’s de-

——————

22 See 102 Code Mass. Regs. 1.03(1) (1997) (prohibiting discrimination
on  the  basis  of  sexual  orientation  as  a  condition  of  receiving  the  state
license  required  to  provide  adoption  services);  San  Francisco  Admin.
Code §12B.1(a) (2021) (requiring that all contracts with the city include
a provision “obligating the contractor not to discriminate on the basis of ”
sexual orientation and noting that the code section was last amended in
2000); D. C. Code §§ 2–1401.02(24), 2–1402.31 (2008) (prohibiting, on the
basis of sexual orientation, the direct or indirect denial of “the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of any place of public accommodations,” defined to
include “establishments dealing with goods or services of any kind”); Ill.
Comp.  Stat.,  ch.  775,  §§5/1–103(O–1),  (Q),  5/5–101(A),  5/5–102  (2011)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in a “place
of public accommodation,” defined by a list of non-exclusive examples).
23 See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. §16013(a) (West 2018) (declar-
ing that “all persons engaged in providing care and services to foster chil-
dren, including . . . foster parents [and] adoptive parents . . . shall have
fair  and  equal  access  to  all  available  programs,  services,  benefits,  and
licensing processes, and shall not be subjected to discrimination . . . on
the basis of . . . sexual orientation”); D. C. Munic. Regs., tit. 29, §6003.1(d)
(2018) (providing that foster parents are “[t]o not be subject to discrimi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in a case before the Supreme Court. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

526

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

III

As mentioned earlier, Justice Chase and Wooddeson both
cited several examples of ex post facto laws, and, in particu-
lar, cited the case of Sir John Fenwick as an example of the
fourth category. To better understand the type of law that
falls within that category, then, we turn to Fenwick’s case
for preliminary guidance.

Those who remained loyal to James II after he was de-
posed by King William III in the Revolution of 1688 thought
their opportunity for restoration had arrived in 1695, fol-
lowing the death of Queen Mary. 9 T. Macaulay, History of
England 31 (1899) (hereinafter Macaulay). Sir John Fen-
wick, along with other Jacobite plotters including George
Porter and Cardell Goodman, began concocting their scheme
in the spring of that year, and over the next several months
the original circle of conspirators expanded in number.
Id.,
at 32, 47–48, 109–110. Before the conspirators could carry
out their machinations, however, three members of the
group disclosed the plot to William.
Id., at 122–125. One
by one, the participants were arrested, tried, and convicted
Id., at 127–142. Fenwick, though, remained in
of treason.
hiding while the rest of the cabal was brought to justice.
During that time, the trials of his accomplices revealed that
there were only two witnesses among them who could
prove Fenwick’s guilt, Porter and Goodman.
Id., at 170–
171. As luck would have it, an act of Parliament proclaimed
that two witnesses were necessary to convict a person of
high treason. See An Act for Regulateing of Tryals in

(1829) (Johnson, J., concurring); Stoddart v. Smith, 5 Binn. 355, 370
(Pa. 1812) (Brackenridge, J.), was absent with respect to the four cate-
gories. Although Justice Chase’s opinion may have somewhat dampened
the appetite for further debate in the courts, that consideration would not
necessarily have an effect on scholarly discourse, nor does it explain why
judges would be reluctant to express criticism of the four categories, yet
harbor no compunction when it came to criticizing the actual holding of
the Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Sir John Fenwick. It provides historical context and legal analysis, which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>