<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U39

[09-26-01 13:21:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN

234

BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. OF WIS. SYSTEM
v. SOUTHWORTH
Opinion of the Court

the extracurricular dimensions of its programs by using man-
datory student fees with viewpoint neutrality as the opera-
tional principle.

The parties have stipulated that the program the Uni-
versity has developed to stimulate extracurricular student
If
expression respects the principle of viewpoint neutrality.
the stipulation is to continue to control the case, the Univer-
sity’s program in its basic structure must be found consistent
with the First Amendment.

We make no distinction between campus activities and
the off-campus expressive activities of objectionable RSO’s.
Those activities, respondents tell us, often bear no relation-
ship to the University’s reason for imposing the segregated
fee in the ﬁrst instance, to foster vibrant campus debate
among students.
If the University shares those concerns,
it is free to enact viewpoint neutral rules restricting off-
campus travel or other expenditures by RSO’s, for it may
create what is tantamount to a limited public forum if the
principles of viewpoint neutrality are respected. Cf. id., at
829–830. We ﬁnd no principled way, however, to impose
upon the University, as a constitutional matter, a require-
ment to adopt geographic or spatial restrictions as a condi-
tion for RSOs’ entitlement to reimbursement. Universities
possess signiﬁcant interests in encouraging students to take
advantage of the social, civic, cultural, and religious opportu-
nities available in surrounding communities and throughout
the country. Universities, like all of society, are ﬁnding that
traditional conceptions of territorial boundaries are difﬁcult
to insist upon in an age marked by revolutionary changes
in communications, information transfer, and the means of
discourse.
If the rule of viewpoint neutrality is respected,
our holding affords the University latitude to adjust its ex-
tracurricular student speech program to accommodate these
advances and opportunities.

Our decision ought not to be taken to imply that in other
its agents or employees, or—of

instances the University,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section.  It discusses the University's program for extracurricular student expression and its constitutionality in relation to the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

Opinion of the Court

exclude were committed to agency discretion and therefore
unreviewable,  the  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  consider
whether the Service’s assessment of the costs and benefits
of  designation  was  flawed  in  a  way  that  rendered  the
resulting  decision  not  to  exclude  Unit  1  arbitrary,  capri-
cious,  or  an  abuse  of  discretion.    Accordingly,  we  remand
to the Court of Appeals to consider that question, if neces-
sary, in the first instance.

*

*
The  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Fifth
Circuit  is  vacated,  and  the  case  is  remanded  for  further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

*

It is so ordered.
 JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH  took  no  part  in  the  consideration

or decision of this case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the concluding section. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a statement about the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

13

ALITO, J., dissenting

unlawful  discrimination  with  the  observation  that  the
effects  of  the  discrimination  were  really  not  so  bad.    We
have  never  before  taken  the  view  that  a  little  viewpoint
discrimination  is  acceptable.  Nor  have  we  taken  this
approach in other discrimination cases.

C

Finally, I must comment on the majority’s emphasis on
funding.  According to the majority, CLS is “seeking what
is effectively a state subsidy,” ante, at 15, and the question
presented in this case centers on the “use of school funds,”
ante, at 1.  In fact, funding plays a very small role in this
case.  Most of what CLS sought and was denied—such as
permission  to  set  up  a  table  on  the  law  school  patio—
would have been virtually cost free.  If every such activity
is regarded as a matter of funding, the  First Amendment
rights  of  students  at  public  universities  will  be  at  the
mercy  of  the  administration.    As  CLS  notes,  “[t]o  univer-
sity  students,  the  campus  is  their  world.  The  right  to
meet on campus and use campus channels of communica-
tion is at least as important to university students as the
right to gather on the town square and use local communi-
cation forums is to the citizen.”  Reply Brief for Petitioner
13.

II
To  appreciate  how  far  the  Court  has  strayed,  it  is  in-
structive  to  compare  this  case  with  Healy  v.  James,  408
U. S.  169  (1972),  our  only  First  Amendment  precedent
involving  a  public  college’s  refusal  to  recognize  a  student
group.  The  group  in  Healy  was  a  local  chapter  of  the
Students  for  a  Democratic  Society  (SDS).    When  the  stu-
dents  who  applied  for  recognition  of  the  chapter  were
asked  by  a  college  committee  whether  they  would  “ ‘re-
spond to issues of violence as other S.D.S. chapters have,’ ”
their  answer  was  that  their  “ ‘action  would  have  to  be
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of ALITO, J.

here.  The question of state-court jurisdiction is only one of
many in this case, and the briefing and argument on that
issue left important questions without fully satisfactory an-
swers.  The Court tries to clear up what §113 means, but as
I will attempt to show, the Court’s interpretation presents
serious  problems.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  better
course  is  not  to  decide  this  perplexing  question  at  this
juncture.

II
A
CERCLA  §113  is  like  a  puzzle  with  pieces  that  are  ex-
ceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to fit together.  Here is
what these provisions say, with language that is not perti-
nent for present purposes omitted:

“(b) Jurisdiction; venue

“Except as provided in subsectio [n] . . . (h) of this sec-
tion  [and  another  provision  not  relevant  for  present
purposes], the United States district courts shall have
exclusive  original  jurisdiction  over  all  controversies
arising under this chapter, without regard to the citi-
zenship of the parties or the amount in controversy. . . .

.

 .

 .

 .

 .

 “(h) Timing of review

“No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Fed-
eral law other than under section 1332 of title 28 (re-
lating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or under
State law which is applicable or relevant and appropri-
ate under section 9621 of this title [CERCLA §121, 42
U. S. C.  §9621]  (relating  to  cleanup  standards)  to  re-
view any challenges to removal or remedial action se-
lected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any
order issued under section 9606(a) of this title [concern-
ing emergency measures ordered by the President], in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses jurisdictional issues related to CERCLA §113 and cites relevant sections of the law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

lxvi

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Summers; Din v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summers; Polyak v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summit Medical Associates, P. C.; Pryor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sundquist; Cutshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Suniga v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See name or

title of superintendent.

Page
1102
1094
1012
1053
1089

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Supreme Court of Wash.; Trapp v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Susquehanna Township Comm’rs; Gibson v.
Suthers; Cobbin v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Suthers; Yahweh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Swartz v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Swenson v. Washington Dept. of Social and Health Services . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Swift Transportation Co.; Levy v.
Swoopes; Sublett v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sydnor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Syvertson v. Fargo Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister; Mann v.
Tallakson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tally; Smith v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tambolleo v. Maine State Harness Racing Comm’n . . . . . . . . . . .
Tamer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tamiami Partners, LTD; Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v.
Tampa; Cole v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tang Xue Dan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Locke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taranto v. North Slope Borough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tarver v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tasby, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tate; Buchanan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tawalbeh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor v. Dees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor v. Painter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor; Walton v.
Taylor; Williams v.
Teicher v. Securities and Exchange Comm’n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tenaud v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tenenbaum; New York City v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tennessee; Cash v.

1062
1126
1057
1040
1015
1108
1055
1124
1030
1050
1008
1033
1028
1068
1127
1018,1125
1073
1103
89
1130
1063
1107
1093
1121
1088
1056,1145
1132
1058
1021
1075
1080,1081
1076
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362,420
1003
1094
1098
1005

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY v.
EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–601.  Argued October 12, 2021—Decided  March 3, 2022

EMW Women’s Surgical Center and two of its doctors filed a federal suit
seeking to enjoin enforcement of Kentucky House Bill 454, legislation
regulating the abortion procedure known as dilation and evacuation.
Named defendants in EMW’s lawsuit included two Commonwealth of-
ficials, the attorney general and the cabinet secretary for Health and
Family Services.  EMW agreed to dismiss claims against the attorney
general without prejudice.  The stipulation of dismissal specified that
the attorney general’s office reserved “all rights, claims, and defenses
. . . in any appeals arising out of this action” and agreed to be bound by
“any final judgment . . . subject to any modification, reversal or vaca-
tion of the judgment on appeal.”  App. 28–30.  The secretary remained
in the case and defended the challenged law.  After a bench trial, the
District Court held that HB 454 unconstitutionally burdens a woman’s
right  to  an  abortion  and  issued  a  permanent  injunction  against  the
law’s enforcement.
the  appeal  was
   The secretary filed a notice of appeal.    While
pending,  Kentucky  elected  a  new  attorney  general,  petitioner  David
Cameron, and elected the former attorney general, Andrew Beshear,
Governor.    Governor  Beshear  appointed  a  new  secretary  for  Health
and Family Services who continued the defense of HB 454 on appeal.
Prior  to  oral  argument  before  the  Sixth  Circuit,  Attorney  General
Cameron entered an appearance as counsel for the new secretary.  A
divided  Sixth  Circuit  panel  affirmed  the  District  Court’s  judgment.
The secretary then informed the attorney general’s office that the sec-
retary would not file a petition for rehearing en banc or a petition for
a writ of certiorari challenging the Sixth Circuit panel’s decision.  Two
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

BREYER, J., dissenting

more severe illness than previous strains in unvaccinated
persons”).  Absent  the  current  stay,  the  CDC  projects  a
strong  “likelihood  of  mass  evictions  nationwide”  with
public-health  consequences  that  would  be  “difficult  to  re-
verse.”  86 Fed. Reg. 43247, 43252.

Third, the public interest is not favored by the spread of
disease or a court’s second-guessing of the CDC’s judgment.
The CDC has determined that “[a] surge in evictions could
lead  to  the  immediate  and  significant  movement  of  large
numbers  of  persons  from  lower  density  to  higher  density
housing. . . when the highly transmissible Delta variant is
driving COVID–19 cases at an unprecedented rate.”  Id., at
43248.  The  CDC  cites  models  showing  up  to  a  30%  in-
creased risk of contracting COVID–19 for some evicted peo-
ple and those who share housing with them after displace-
ment.  Ibid.  The  CDC  invokes  studies  finding  nationally
over 433,000 cases and over 10,000 deaths may be traced to
the lifting of state eviction moratoria.  Ibid.

The public interest strongly favors respecting the CDC’s
judgment  at  this  moment,  when  over  90%  of  counties  are
experiencing high transmission rates.  See CDC, COVD–19
Integrated  County  View,  https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-
tracker/#county-view.  That figure is the highest it has been
since at least last winter.  See CDC, COVID–19 State Pro-
file Report 372 (Aug. 20, 2021).  It was in the single digits
when we considered the CDC’s previous moratorium order
and denied applicants’ earlier motion.  See CDC, COVID–
19 State Profile Report 476 (June 25, 2021).

On  applicants’  last  trip  to  this  Court,  they  argued  that
the “downward trend in COVID–19 cases and the effective-
ness of vaccines” left “no . . . public-health rationale for the
[CDC’s then-operative eviction] moratorium.”  Application
in No. 20A169, p. 4.  These predictions have proved tragi-
cally untrue.  Today they show just how little we may pre-
sume to know about the course of this pandemic.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents, discusses public health concerns, and analyzes the CDC's actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

VIDAL v. ELSTER

BARRETT, J., concurring in part

A

First, the Court’s history.  It is true that “a tradition of
restricting  the  trademarking  of  names”  arose  in  the  late
19th century.  Ante, at 19.  As the Court says, a personal
name  by  itself,  without  any  accompanying  words  or  sym-
bols, did not typically qualify as a trademark.  See McLean
v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, 252–253 (1878); ante, at 13.  And
a  person  could  not  always  enforce  a  trademark  including
her own name against another with the same name.  See
Brown  Chemical  Co.  v.  Meyer,  139  U. S.  540,  542  (1891);
ante, at 14.3  The first federal trademark statute reflected
these principles, prohibiting the registration of a mark that
was “merely the name of a person, firm, or corporation only,
unaccompanied by a mark sufficient to distinguish it from
the same name when used by other persons.”  §79, 16 Stat.
211.  Today, the Lanham Act continues to bar the registra-
tion  of  a  mark  that  is  “primarily  merely  a  surname.”    15
U. S. C. §1052(e)(4).

But the Court also claims that the common law did not
afford protection to a person seeking a trademark including
another living person’s name (in other words, a rule akin to
the names clause).  Ante, at 14.  I am less sure.  In Thaddeus
Davids  Co.  v.  Davids  Mfg.  Co.,  233  U. S.  461  (1914),  this
Court  explained  that  the  1905  federal  trademark  statute
contained “a fairly complete list of the marks used by deal-
ers in selling their goods, which are not valid trademarks
at  common  law.”  Id.,  at  467  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  Notably, this statute did not include the names
clause or any rough equivalent.4  And if such a common-law

——————

3 By  the  early-20th  century, however,  courts  enforced  personal-name
marks even against “newcomer[s] with the same name when confusion
over source [was] the likely result.”  2 McCarthy §13:8; see L. E. Water-
man Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 235 U. S. 88, 94 (1914).

4 The Thaddeus Court referred specifically to the statute’s prohibition
on the registration of marks that “consis[t] merely of individual, firm or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from a judge named Barrett. It discusses trademark law and cites previous legal cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TRUMP v. VANCE

Syllabus

the one under investigation, but the President concedes that such in-
vestigations are permitted under Article II and the Supremacy Clause.
And the receipt of a subpoena would not seem to categorically magnify
the harm to the President’s reputation.  Additionally, in the grand jury
context longstanding secrecy rules aim to prevent the very stigma the
President anticipates.  Pp. 14–15.

(iii) Finally, the President argues that subjecting Presidents to state
criminal subpoenas will make them “easily identifiable target[s]” for
harassment.  Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 753.  The Court rejected a nearly
identical argument in Clinton, concluding that the risk posed by har-
assing civil litigation was not “serious” because federal courts have the
tools to deter and dismiss vexatious lawsuits.  520 U. S., at 708.  Har-
assing  state  criminal  subpoenas  could,  under  certain  circumstances,
threaten the independence or effectiveness of the Executive.  But here
again the law already seeks to protect against such abuse.  First, grand
juries are prohibited from engaging in “arbitrary fishing expeditions”
or  initiating  investigations  “out  of  malice  or  an  intent  to  harass,”
United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U. S. 292, 299, and federal
courts  may  intervene  in  state  proceedings  that  are  motivated  by  or
conducted in bad faith.  Second, because the Supremacy Clause pro-
hibits state judges and prosecutors from interfering with a President’s
official duties, any effort to manipulate a President’s policy decisions
or to retaliate against a President for official acts through issuance of
a subpoena would be an unconstitutional attempt to “influence” a su-
perior sovereign “exempt” from such obstacles, see McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 4 Wheat. 316, 417.  And federal law allows a President to chal-
lenge any such allegedly unconstitutional influence in a federal forum.
Pp. 15–17.

(2) A state grand jury subpoena seeking a President’s private pa-

pers need not satisfy a heightened need standard, for three reasons.
First, although a President cannot be treated as an “ordinary individ-
ual”  when  executive  communications  are  sought,  Burr  teaches  that,
with regard to private papers, a President stands in “nearly the same
situation with any other individual.”  25 F. Cas., at 191–192.  Second,
there  has  been  no  showing  here  that  heightened  protection  against
state subpoenas is necessary for the Executive to fulfill his Article II
functions.  Finally, absent a need to protect the Executive, the public
interest in fair and effective law enforcement cuts in favor of compre-
hensive access to evidence.
   Rejecting  a  heightened  need  standard  does  not  leave  Presidents
without recourse.  A President may avail himself of the same protec-
tions available to every other citizen, including the right to challenge
the  subpoena  on  any  grounds  permitted  by  state  law,  which usually
include bad faith and undue burden or breadth.  When the President
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus.  It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a subpoena issued to a President.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

Opinion of the Court

disadvantage”  to  their  exempt  peers.    States’  Application
21.  The States and the private applicants also stress that
complying with the FIP during the pendency of this litiga-
tion would require them to incur “hundreds of millions[,] if
not billions of dollars.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 96.  Those costs, the
applicants note, are “nonrecoverable.”  Thunder Basin Coal
Co. v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200, 220–221 (1994) (Scalia, J., con-
curring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment);  see,  e.g.,
States’ Application 24; Application for American Forest &
Paper Association et al. 25; see also Alabama Assn. of Real-
tors v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S.
758, 765 (2021) (per curiam).
  Because each side has strong arguments about the harms
they face and equities involved, our resolution of these stay
requests  ultimately  turns  on  the  merits  and  the  question
who  is  likely  to  prevail  at  the  end  of  this  litigation.    See
Nken, 556 U. S., at 434; Labrador, 601 U. S., at ___ (opinion
of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 4).

B
  When it comes to that question, the parties agree on the
rules that guide our analysis.  The applicants argue that a
court is likely to hold EPA’s final FIP “arbitrary” or “capri-
cious” within the meaning of the Act and thus enjoin its en-
forcement  against  them.    42  U. S. C.  §7607(d)(9)(A);  see,
e.g.,  States’  Application  15–16;  Application  for  American
Forest  &  Paper  Association  et al.  14;  see  also  5  U. S. C.
§706(2)(A).  An agency action qualifies as “arbitrary” or “ca-
pricious” if it is not “reasonable and reasonably explained.”
FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U. S. 414, 423 (2021).
In  reviewing  an  agency’s  action  under  that  standard,  a
court  may  not  “ ‘substitute  its  judgment  for  that  of  the
agency.’ ”    FCC  v.  Fox  Television  Stations,  Inc.,  556  U. S.
502, 513 (2009).  But it must ensure, among other things,
that the agency has offered “a satisfactory explanation for
its  action[,]  including  a  rational  connection  between  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses the merits of a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
104

MOHAWK  INDUSTRIES,  INC.  v.  CARPENTER

Opinion of the Court

liams v.  Mohawk Indus., Inc., No. 4:04–cv–00003–HLM (ND
Ga.,  Jan.  6,  2004).  Company  ofﬁcials  directed  Carpenter  to
meet  with  the  company’s  retained  counsel  in  the  Williams
case, and counsel allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his
statements.  When  he  refused,  Carpenter  alleges,  Mohawk
ﬁred him under false pretenses.  App. 57a–64a.

After  learning  of  Carpenter’s  complaint,  the  plaintiffs  in
the  Williams  case  sought  an evidentiary  hearing  to  explore
Carpenter’s  allegations.  In  its  response  to  their  motion,
Mohawk described Carpenter’s accusations as “pure fantasy”
and  recounted  the  “true  facts”  of  Carpenter’s  dismissal.
App.  208a.  According  to  Mohawk,  Carpenter  himself  had
“engaged in blatant and illegal misconduct” by attempting to
have  Mohawk  hire  an  undocumented  worker.  Id.,  at  209a.
The company “commenced an immediate investigation,” dur
ing  which  retained  counsel  interviewed  Carpenter.  Id.,  at
210a.  Because Carpenter’s “efforts to cause Mohawk to cir
cumvent  federal  immigration  law”  “blatantly  violated  Mo
hawk policy,” the company terminated him.  Ibid.

As these events were unfolding in the Williams case, dis
covery  was  underway  in  Carpenter’s  case.  Carpenter  ﬁled
a motion to compel Mohawk to produce information concern
ing his meeting with retained counsel and the company’s ter
mination  decision.  Mohawk  maintained  that  the  requested
information  was  protected  by  the  attorney-client  privilege.
The District Court agreed that the privilege applied to the
requested information, but it granted Carpenter’s motion to
compel  disclosure  after  concluding  that  Mohawk  had  implic
itly  waived  the  privilege  through  its  representations  in  the
Williams  case.  See  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  51a.  The  court
declined  to  certify  its  order  for  interlocutory  appeal  under
28  U. S. C.  § 1292(b).  But,  recognizing  “the  seriousness  of
its [waiver] ﬁnding,” it stayed its ruling to allow Mohawk to
explore  other  potential  “avenues  to  appeal  .  .  .  ,  such  as  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing a case involving Mohawk Industries and Carpenter. It contains legal arguments, case citations, and details about the events leading up to a legal dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

ciii

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  946,1065

Morters v. Barr
854

Mosere v. Holder
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1109

Moses, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
882

Moses v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Mosley; Jordan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969

Mosley v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Mosley v. Upton  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927

Moss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Mottram v. Davis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

Mouling v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Mowatt v. Vail
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Mower v. Ballard  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908

Moya-Breteon v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

Moytez-Pineda v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

MSEJ, LLC v. Transit Casualty Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Mueller; Catledge v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
814

Muhammad, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Muhammad v. Kannrine  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1019

Muhammad v. Kelly  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967

Muhammad v. New Jersey  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Muhammad v. Sapp
1130

Muhammad v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mui v. McGrath
1109

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Muino v. Florida Power & Light Co.
954

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Muldrow v. Denney
Mullen v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  830,961

Mullins v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  896,1066

1120

Mulvey v. Naito  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1108

Municipal Revenue Collection Center; Triple-S Management v.  . .
1105

Muniz v. Marshall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
806

Muniz v. New Mexico  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Muniz v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  977,1034

832

Munoz v. Fortner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
860

Munoz-Mendez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Muraski v. Minnesota  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099

Murillo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938

Murphy v. Bryant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Murphy v. Ohio
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Murphy; Rhodes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

Murphy; Taylor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  906,1057,1060,1098,1131

Murphy v. United States
949

Murray v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Murray v. Locke  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  856,1065

1152

Murray v. Milwaukee County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

ALITO, J., dissenting

authority to regulate areas traditionally supervised by the
States’ police power”).

Second, consider the requirement that parties be given a
choice before being bound by Spending Clause conditions.
The Government’s interpretation purports to limit Idaho’s
choices about what conduct to criminalize.  But Idaho never
“agree[d]” to be bound by EMTALA,14 Cummings, 596 U. S.,
at 219, let alone to surrender its historic power to regulate
the  practice  of  medicine  or  the  performance  of  abortions
within its borders.

The  Idaho  Legislature  takes  its  argument  against
preemption even further.  It contends that EMTALA cannot
preempt the State’s abortion regulations because Idaho is
not a party to the agreement between the Federal Govern-
ment and the hospitals that take Medicare funds.  See Brief
for  Petitioners  in  No.  23–726,  pp.  50–51.  As  it  explains,
States cannot be bound by terms that they never accepted,
so it is hard to see how a third party’s agreement with the
Federal  Government  can  deprive  a  State  of  the  ability  to
enforce  its  criminal  laws.    Accord,  Talevski,  599  U. S.,  at
212  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting)  (“[E]ven  those  who  held  the
broadest conception of the spending power recognized that
it was only a power to spend, not a power to impose binding
requirements with the force of federal law”).

The potential implications of permitting preemption here
are far-reaching.  Under the Government’s view, Congress
could apparently pay doctors to perform not only emergency
abortions but also third-trimester elective abortions or eu-
genic abortions.  It could condition Medicare funds on hos-
pitals’ offering assisted suicide even in the vast majority of
States that ban the practice.  It could authorize the practice
of medicine by any doctor who accepts Medicare payments

——————

14 Only  one  state  psychiatric  hospital  accepts  Medicare  funds,  and  it

does not have an emergency room.  2 App. 531.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments regarding the Spending Clause and its implications for state regulations, particularly concerning abortion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1006

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 6, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–7603. Corey v. Health South Corporation of Ala-
bama et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 203 F. 3d 51.

No. 99–7605. Corey v. Florida State Division of Human
Services. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
203 F. 3d 51.

No. 99–7607. Corey v. Retchin, Judge, Superior Court of
the District of Columbia. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 203 F. 3d 51.

No. 99–7608. Corey v. Sidransky. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 51.

No. 99–7609. Corey v. Corey et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 51.

No. 99–7610. Corey v. Pamper et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 51.

No. 99–7611. Corey v. Dowling et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 51.

No. 99–7612. Abe v. Michigan State University. Ct. App.

Mich. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7622. McGilberry v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 So. 2d 894.

No. 99–7626.
tiorari denied.

Ioane v. Triplett et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

No. 99–7629. Britz v. Cowan, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 1101.

No. 99–7632. Thomas, aka Turner v. Johnson, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di-
vision. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7637. Hedgepeth v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 350 N. C. 776, 517 S. E.
2d 605.

No. 99–7641. Fee v. Borgert, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1312.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal document or database. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and disposition information. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

Opinion of the Court

(1977) (per curiam) (upholding free-speech rights of partic-
ipants  in  a  Nazi  parade);  Snyder,  562  U. S.,  at  456–457
(same for protestors of a soldier’s funeral).3

Failing all else, Colorado suggests that this Court’s deci-
sion in FAIR supports affirmance.  See also post, at 25–26
(opinion  of  SOTOMAYOR, J.)  (making  the  same  argument).
In  FAIR,  a  group  of  schools  challenged  a  law  requiring
them,  as  a condition  of  accepting  federal  funds,  to  permit
military  recruiters  space  on  campus  on  equal  terms  with
other  potential  employers.    547  U. S.,  at  51–52,  58.  The
only  expressive  activity  required  of  the  law  schools,  the
Court found, involved the posting of logistical notices along
these lines:  “ ‘The U. S. Army recruiter will meet interested
students in Room 123 at 11 a.m.’ ”  Id., at 61–62.  And, the
Court  reasoned,  compelled  speech  of  this  sort  was  “inci-
dental” and a “far cry” from the speech at issue in our “lead-
ing  First  Amendment  precedents  [that]  have  established
the principle that freedom of speech prohibits the govern-
ment  from  telling  people  what  they  must  say.”    Ibid.;  see
also NIFLA, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8).

It is a far cry from this case too.  To be sure, our cases
have  held  that  the  government  may  sometimes  “requir[e]

——————

3 The dissent labels the distinction between status and message “amus-
ing” and “embarrassing.”  Post, at 32.  But in doing so, the dissent ignores
a fundamental feature of the Free Speech Clause.  While it does not pro-
tect  status-based  discrimination  unrelated  to  expression,  generally  it
does protect a speaker’s right to control her own message—even when we
may disapprove of the speaker’s motive or the message itself.  The dis-
sent’s derision is no answer to any of this.  It ignores, too, the fact that
Colorado  itself  has,  in  other  contexts,  distinguished  status-based  dis-
crimination  (forbidden)  from  the  right  of  a  speaker  to  control  his  own
message  (protected).    See  App.  131,  137,  140,  143–144,  149,  152,  154.
(Truth  be  told,  even  the  dissent  acknowledges  “th[is]  distinction”  else-
where in its opinion.  Post, at 31, n. 11.)  Nor is the distinction unusual
in societies committed both to nondiscrimination rules and free expres-
sion.  See, e.g., Lee v. Ashers Baking Co. Ltd., [2018] UKSC 49, p. 14 (“The
less favourable treatment was afforded to the message not to the man.”).
Does the dissent really find all that amusing and embarrassing?
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the case of 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. It delves into First Amendment rights, specifically focusing on compelled speech and the distinction between status-based discrimination and the right to control one's message.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

Opinion of the Court

midazolam  for  petitioners,  and  Dr.  Roswell  Evans,  a
for
doctor  of  pharmacy,  provided  expert  testimony
respondents.

After  reviewing  the  evidence,  the  District  Court  issued
an  oral  ruling  denying  the  motion  for  a  preliminary  in-
junction.  The  District  Court  first  rejected  petitioners’
challenge under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,  509  U. S.  579  (1993),  to  the  testimony  of  Dr.  Evans.
It concluded that Dr. Evans, the Dean of Auburn Universi-
ty’s School of Pharmacy, was well qualified to testify about
midazolam’s  properties  and  that  he  offered  reliable  testi-
mony.  The District Court then held that petitioners failed
to  establish  a  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits  of  their
claim  that  the  use  of  midazolam  violates  the  Eighth
Amendment.  The court provided two independent reasons
for  this  conclusion.  First,  the  court  held  that  petitioners
failed to identify a known and available method of execu-
tion that presented a substantially less severe risk of pain
than the method that  the State  proposed to use.  Second,
the court found that petitioners failed to prove that Okla-
homa’s protocol “presents a risk that is ‘sure or very likely
to cause serious illness and needless suffering,’ amounting
to ‘an objectively intolerable risk of harm.’ ”  App. 96 (quot-
ing Baze, 553 U. S., at 50).  The court emphasized that the
Oklahoma protocol featured numerous safeguards, includ-
ing the establishment of two IV access sites, confirmation
of the viability of those sites, and monitoring of the offend-
er’s level of consciousness throughout the procedure.

The  District  Court  supported  its  decision  with  findings
of  fact  about  midazolam.    It  found  that  a  500-milligram
dose of midazolam “would make it a virtual certainty that
any individual will be at a sufficient level of unconscious-
ness  to  resist  the  noxious  stimuli  which  could  occur  from
the  application  of  the  second  and  third  drugs.”    App.  77.
Indeed,  it  found  that  a  500-milligram  dose  alone  would
likely cause death by respiratory arrest within 30 minutes
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the use of midazolam in executions. It delves into expert testimony, legal precedents (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals), and the Eighth Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Michigan

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of ALITO, J.

provisions of chapter 32 [Wildlife, Parks and
Recreation] or chapter 47 [Livestock and Do-
mestic Animals] of the Kansas Statutes Anno-
tated”)
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§525.130(2)(a), (e) (Lexis
2008) (“Nothing in this section shall apply to the
killing of animals . . . [p]ursuant to a license to
hunt, fish, or trap . . . [or] [f]or purposes relating
to sporting activities”), §525.130(3) (“Activities
of animals engaged in hunting, field trials, dog
training other than training a dog to fight for
pleasure or profit, and other activities author-
ized either by a hunting license or by the De-
partment of Fish and Wildlife shall not consti-
tute a violation of this section”)
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:102.1(C)(1) (West Supp.
2010) (“This Section shall not apply to . . . [t]he
lawful hunting or trapping of wildlife as pro-
vided by law”)
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §1031(1)(G) (West
Supp. 2009) (providing that hunting and trap-
ping an animal is not a form of prohibited
animal cruelty if “permitted pursuant to” parts
of state code regulating the shooting of large
game, inland fisheries, and wildlife)
Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §10–603(3) (Lexis
2002) (“Sections 10–601 through 10–608 of this
subtitle do not apply to . . . an activity that may
cause unavoidable physical pain to an animal,
including . . . hunting, if the person performing
the activity uses the most humane method
reasonably available”)
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§750.50(11)(a), (b)
(West Supp. 2009) (“This section does not pro-
hibit the lawful killing or other use of an ani-
mal, including . . . [f]ishing . . . [h]unting, [or]
trapping [as regulated by state law]”),
§750.50b(9)(a), (b) (“This section does not pro-
hibit the lawful killing or other use of an ani-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically focusing on statutes related to animal cruelty and hunting exemptions. It's part of a legal argument and not the main body of text meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Statutory Reference</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

ments are convincing.  First, the Government and the concurrence cor-
rectly  note  that  the  statutory  clauses  in  the  cases  just  described  set
forth elements of an offense.  Here, the Government and the concur-
rence say, §841’s “[e]xcept as authorized” clause does not set forth an
element of the offense.  In support, they point to a separate statutory
provision—§885.  Section 885 says that the Government need not “neg-
ative any exemption or exception . . . in any complaint, information,
indictment, or other pleading or in any trial,” and that “the burden of
going forward with the evidence with respect to any such exemption or
exception shall be upon the person claiming its benefit,” not upon the
prosecution.  But even assuming that lack of authorization is unlike
an  element  in  these  two  ways,  §885  has  little  or  nothing  to  do  with
scienter requirements.  Section 885 simply absolves the Government
of having to allege, in an indictment, the inapplicability of every stat-
utory exception in each Controlled Substances Act prosecution.  Sec-
tion 885 also shifts the burden of production—but not the burden of
persuasion—regarding statutory exceptions to the defendant, thereby
relieving the Government of having to disprove, at the outset of every
prosecution, the inapplicability of all exceptions.

Section 885 thus does not provide a basis for inferring that Congress
intended to do away with, or weaken, ordinary and longstanding sci-
enter requirements.  At the same time, the factors discussed above—
the  language  of  §841;  the  crucial  role  authorization  plays  in  distin-
guishing  morally  blameworthy  conduct  from  socially  necessary  con-
duct; the serious nature of the crime and its penalties; and the vague,
highly general regulatory language defining the scope of prescribing
authority—all support applying normal scienter principles to the “ex-
cept as authorized” clause.  And the Government does not deny that,
once a defendant satisfies his burden of production under §885 by in-
voking the authorization exception, the Government must then prove
lack of authorization by satisfying the ordinary criminal law burden of
proof—beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Government also offers a substitute mens rea standard.  Instead
of applying the statute’s “knowingly or intentionally” language to the
authorization clause, the Government instead asserts that the statute
implicitly contains an “objectively reasonable good-faith effort” or “ob-
jective  honest-effort  standard.”    Brief  for  United  States  16–17.  But
§841 uses the words “knowingly or intentionally,” not “good faith,” “ob-
jectively,”  “reasonable,”  or  “honest  effort.”    And  the  Government’s
standard  would  turn  a  defendant’s  criminal  liability  on  the  mental
state of a hypothetical “reasonable” doctor, rather than on the mental
state of the defendant himself or herself.  The Court has rejected anal-
ogous  suggestions  in  other  criminal  contexts.    See  Elonis  v.  United
States, 575 U. S. 723.  And the Government is wrong to assert that the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting or concurring opinion. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute (likely related to controlled substances) and argues against the majority's interpretation regarding the required mens rea (guilty mind) for a violation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

KAGAN, J., concurring

belief.*

I  read  the  Court’s  opinion  as  fully  consistent  with  that
view.  The Court limits its analysis to the reasoning of the
state  agencies  (and  Court  of  Appeals)—“quite  apart  from
whether the [Phillips and Jack] cases should ultimately be
distinguished.”  Ante, at 15.  And the Court itself recognizes
the  principle  that  would  properly  account  for  a  difference
in  result  between  those  cases.    Colorado  law,  the  Court
——————

* JUSTICE  GORSUCH  disagrees.    In  his  view,  the  Jack  cases  and  the
Phillips case must be treated the same because the bakers in all those
cases “would not sell the requested cakes to anyone.”  Post, at 4.  That
description perfectly fits  the Jack cases—and explains  why the bakers
there did not engage in unlawful discrimination.  But it is a surprising
characterization of the Phillips case, given that Phillips routinely sells
wedding cakes to opposite-sex couples.  JUSTICE GORSUCH can make the
claim  only  because  he  does  not  think  a  “wedding  cake”  is  the  relevant
product.  As JUSTICE GORSUCH sees it, the product that Phillips refused
to sell here—and would refuse to sell to anyone—was a “cake celebrat-
ing same-sex marriage.”  Ibid.; see post, at 3, 6, 8–9.  But that is wrong.
The  cake  requested  was  not  a  special  “cake  celebrating  same-sex
marriage.”  It  was  simply  a  wedding cake—one  that  (like  other  stand-
ard  wedding  cakes)  is  suitable  for  use  at  same-sex  and  opposite-sex
weddings  alike.  See  ante,  at  4  (majority  opinion)  (recounting  that
Phillips did not so much as discuss the cake’s design before he refused
to make it).  And contrary to JUSTICE GORSUCH’S view, a wedding cake
does  not  become  something  different  whenever  a  vendor  like  Phillips
invests  its  sale  to  particular  customers  with  “religious  significance.”
Post, at 11.  As this Court has long held, and reaffirms today, a vendor
cannot escape a public accommodations law because his religion disap-
proves  selling  a  product  to  a  group  of  customers,  whether  defined  by
sexual  orientation,  race,  sex,  or  other  protected  trait.    See  Newman  v.
Piggie  Park  Enterprises,  Inc.,  390  U. S.  400,  402,  n. 5  (1968)  (per
curiam)  (holding  that  a  barbeque  vendor  must  serve  black  customers
even  if  he  perceives  such  service  as  vindicating  racial  equality,  in
violation  of  his  religious  beliefs);  ante,  at  9.  A  vendor  can  choose  the
products  he  sells,  but  not  the  customers  he  serves—no  matter  the
reason.  Phillips sells wedding cakes.  As to that product, he unlawfully
discriminates:  He  sells  it  to  opposite-sex  but  not  to  same-sex  couples.
And  on  that  basis—which  has  nothing  to  do  with  Phillips’  religious
beliefs—Colorado could have distinguished Phillips from the bakers  in
the Jack cases, who did not engage in any prohibited discrimination.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a concurring opinion from Justice Kagan in a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal reasoning and distinctions made by the Court regarding a specific case involving a baker refusing to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Court Document</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS

Opinion of the Court

stating that he had voted for “taxpayer-funded abortion.”2
Because  Driehaus  filed  his  complaint  29  days  before  the
general  election,  a  Commission  panel  held  an  expedited
hearing.  On  October  14,  2010,  the  panel  voted  2  to  1  to
find  probable  cause  that  a  violation  had  been  committed.
The  full  Commission  set  a  hearing  date  for  10  business
days
later,  and  the  parties  commenced  discovery.
Driehaus  noticed  depositions  of  three  SBA  employees  as
well as individuals affiliated with similar advocacy groups.
He  also  issued  discovery  requests  for  all  evidence  that
SBA would rely on at the Commission hearing, as well as
SBA’s  communications  with  allied  organizations,  political
party  committees,  and  Members  of  Congress  and  their
staffs.

On  October  18,  2010—after  the  panel’s  probable-cause
determination,  but  before  the  scheduled  Commission
hearing—SBA  filed  suit  in  Federal  District  Court,  seek-
ing  declaratory  and  injunctive  relief  on  the  ground  that
§§3517.21(B)(9) and (10) violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments  of  the  United  States  Constitution.    The
District Court stayed the action under Younger v. Harris,
401 U. S. 37 (1971), pending completion of the Commission
proceedings.  The Sixth Circuit denied SBA’s motion for an
injunction pending appeal.  Driehaus and SBA eventually
agreed to postpone the full Commission hearing until after
the election.

When  Driehaus  lost  the  election  in  November  2010,  he
moved  to  withdraw  his  complaint  against  SBA.  The
Commission granted the motion with SBA’s consent.  Once
the Commission proceedings were terminated, the District
Court lifted the stay and SBA amended its complaint.  As
——————

2 The dispute about the falsity of SBA’s speech concerns two different
provisions  of  the  ACA:  (1)  the  subsidy  to  assist  lower  income  individ-
uals in paying insurance premiums, and (2) the direct appropriation of
federal  money  for  certain  health  programs  such  as  community  health
centers.  See Brief for Petitioners 4–5.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus. It provides a factual summary of the events leading up to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

13

THOMAS, J., dissenting

carceration  is  a  policy  judgment  for  state  and  federal
lawmakers,  as  is  the  entire  question  of  government  in-
volvement in the area of child support.  See Elrod & Dale,
Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody,
42  Fam.  L. Q.  381,  382  (2008)  (observing  the  “federaliza-
tion  of  many  areas  of  family  law”  (internal  quotation
marks omitted)).  This and other repercussions of the shift
away from the nuclear family are ultimately the business
of the policymaking branches.  See, e.g., D. Popenoe, Fam-
ily in Decline in America, reprinted in War Over the Fam-
ily  3,  4  (2005)  (discussing  “four  major  social  trends”  that
emerged  in  the  1960’s  “to  signal  a  widespread  ‘flight’ ”
from  the  “nuclear  family”);  Krause,  Child  Support  Reas-
sessed,  24  Fam.  L. Q.  1,  16  (1990)  (“Easy-come,  easy-go
marriage and casual cohabitation and procreation are on a
collision  course  with  the  economic  and  social  needs  of
children”); M. Boumil & J. Friedman, Deadbeat Dads 23–
24 (1996) (“Many [children of deadbeat dads] are born out
of  wedlock  . . . .    Others  have  lost  a  parent  to  divorce  at
such a young age that they have little conscious memory of
it”).

*

*

*

I  would  affirm  the  judgment  of  the  South  Carolina
Supreme  Court  because  the  Due  Process  Clause  does  not
provide  a  right  to  appointed  counsel  in  civil  contempt
hearings  that  may  lead  to  incarceration.  As  that  is  the
only issue properly before the Court, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and cites relevant sources.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

within a few years of birth.  States may even argue that a
prohibition on abortion need make no provision for protect-
ing a woman from risk of death or physical harm.  Across a
vast array of circumstances, a State will be able to impose
its moral choice on a woman and coerce her to give birth to
a child.

Enforcement of all these draconian restrictions will also
be left largely to the States’ devices.  A State can of course
impose criminal penalties on abortion providers, including
lengthy  prison  sentences.    But  some  States  will  not  stop
there.  Perhaps, in the wake of today’s decision, a state law
will criminalize the woman’s conduct too, incarcerating or
fining her for daring to seek or obtain an abortion.  And as
Texas  has  recently  shown,  a  State  can  turn  neighbor
against  neighbor,  enlisting  fellow  citizens  in  the  effort  to
root  out  anyone  who  tries  to  get  an  abortion,  or  to  assist
another in doing so.

The  majority  tries  to  hide  the  geographically  expansive
effects of its holding.  Today’s decision, the majority says,
permits “each State” to address abortion as it pleases.  Ante,
at 79.  That is cold comfort, of course, for the poor woman
who cannot get the money to fly to a distant State for a pro-
cedure.  Above  all  others,  women  lacking  financial  re-
sources will suffer from today’s decision.  In any event, in-
terstate  restrictions  will  also  soon  be  in  the  offing.  After
this decision, some States may block women from traveling
out of State to obtain abortions, or even from receiving abor-
tion medications from out of State.  Some may criminalize
efforts, including the provision of information or funding, to
help women gain access to other States’ abortion services.
Most  threatening  of  all,  no  language  in  today’s  decision
stops  the  Federal  Government  from  prohibiting  abortions
nationwide, once again from the moment of conception and
without exceptions for rape or incest.  If that happens, “the
views  of  [an  individual  State’s]  citizens”  will  not  matter.
Ante, at 1.  The challenge for a woman will be to finance a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court, focusing on the potential negative consequences of overturning Roe v. Wade. It is sequential text and expresses a clear argument, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

TRUMP v. ANDERSON

Per Curiam

others  might  require  a  heightened  showing.  Certain  evi-
dence  (like  the  congressional  Report  on  which  the  lower
courts relied here) might be admissible in some States but
inadmissible hearsay in others.  Disqualification might be
possible  only  through  criminal  prosecution,  as  opposed  to
expedited civil proceedings, in particular States.  Indeed, in
some States—unlike Colorado (or Maine, where the secre-
tary of state recently issued an order excluding former Pres-
ident Trump from the primary ballot)—procedures for ex-
cluding  an  ineligible  candidate  from  the  ballot  may  not
exist at all.  The result could well be that a single candidate
would be declared ineligible in some States, but not others,
based on the same conduct (and perhaps even the same fac-
tual record).

The “patchwork” that would likely result from state en-
forcement  would  “sever  the  direct  link  that  the  Framers
found so critical between the National Government and the
people of the United States” as a whole.  U. S. Term Limits,
514 U. S., at 822.  But in a Presidential election “the impact
of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast”—
or,  in  this  case,  the  votes  not allowed  to  be  cast—“for  the
various candidates in other States.”  Anderson, 460 U. S.,
at  795.  An  evolving  electoral  map  could  dramatically
change the behavior of voters, parties, and States across the
country, in different ways and at different times.  The dis-
ruption would be all the more acute—and could nullify the
votes of millions and change the election result—if Section
3 enforcement were attempted after the Nation has voted.
Nothing in the Constitution requires that we endure such
chaos—arriving  at  any  time  or  different  times,  up  to  and
perhaps beyond the Inauguration.

*

*
For the reasons given, responsibility for enforcing Section
3  against  federal  officeholders  and  candidates  rests  with
Congress and not the States.  The judgment of the Colorado

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or court decision excerpt. It discusses the interpretation and application of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, specifically regarding disqualification of individuals from holding federal office. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of such documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Court Decision Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1044

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 30, 2009

558 U. S.

in  this  Court,  and  a  rule  will  issue,  returnable  within  40  days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the  practice  of  law  in  this  Court.

No. D–2460.  In re Discipline of Berman.  Jeffrey Neil Ber
man,  of  Newton  Center,  Mass.,  is  suspended  from  the  practice  of
law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the  practice  of  law  in  this  Court.

No.  D–2461.  In  re  Discipline  of  Finnerty.  Thomas  E.
Finnerty,  of  South  Boston,  Mass.,  is  suspended  from  the  practice
of  law  in  this  Court,  and  a  rule  will  issue,  returnable  within  40
days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred
from  the  practice  of  law  in  this  Court.

No.  D–2462.  In  re  Discipline  of  Sheehan.  Stafford  Shee
han,  of  Fall  River,  Mass.,  is  suspended  from  the  practice  of  law
in  this  Court,  and  a  rule  will  issue,  returnable  within  40  days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the  practice  of  law  in  this  Court.

No. D–2463.  In re Discipline of Sachar.  Bruce N. Sachar,
of  Lynn,  Mass.,  is  suspended  from  the  practice  of  law  in  this
Court,  and  a  rule  will  issue,  returnable  within  40  days,  requiring
him  to  show  cause  why  he  should  not  be  disbarred  from  the
practice  of  law  in  this  Court.

No.  09M51.  Ville  v.  United  Airlines,  Inc.;
No. 09M52.  Gargano et al. v.  Liberty International Un

derwriters,  Inc.,  et  al.;

No.  09M53.  Alvarez-Ocanegra  v.  United  States;
No.  09M54.  Rex  v.  Federal  Aviation  Administration

et  al.;

No.  09M55.  Yancey  v.  Ludwig,  Trustee;  and
No.  09M56.  Myers  v.  Silbermann  et  al.  Motions  to  direct
the Clerk to ﬁle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No.  07–11191.  Briscoe  et  al.  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.
[Certiorari  granted,  557  U. S.  933.]  Motion  of  the  Solicitor  Gen
eral  for  leave  to  participate  in  oral  argument  as  amicus  curiae
and  for  divided  argument  granted.

No.  08–1224.  United  States  v.  Comstock  et  al.  C.  A.  4th
[Certiorari  granted,  557  U. S.  918.]  Motion  of  Kansas  et  al.

Cir.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their statuses, likely from a legal journal or docket. It's not sequential narrative text and focuses on legal proceedings rather than a story or informative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

ing from severe but not life-threatening conditions, experi-
ence prolonged illness and unnecessary pain.

B

These  conditions  are  the  subject  of  two  federal  cases.
The  first  to  commence,  Coleman  v.  Brown,  was  filed  in
1990.  Coleman involves the class of seriously mentally ill
persons in California prisons.  Over 15 years ago, in 1995,
after  a  39-day  trial,  the  Coleman  District  Court  found
“overwhelming  evidence  of  the  systematic  failure  to  de-
liver necessary care to  mentally ill inmates” in California
prisons.  Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (ED
Cal.).  The prisons were “seriously and chronically under-
staffed,”  id.,  at  1306,  and  had  “no  effective  method  for
ensuring  . . .  the  competence  of  their  staff,”  id.,  at  1308.
The  prisons  had  failed  to  implement  necessary  suicide-
prevention procedures, “due in large measure to the severe
understaffing.”  Id.,  at  1315.  Mentally  ill  inmates  “lan-
guished  for  months,  or  even  years,  without  access  to  nec-
essary care.”  Id., at 1316.  “They suffer from severe hallu-
cinations,  [and]  they  decompensate  into  catatonic  states.”
Ibid.    The  court  appointed  a  Special  Master  to  oversee
development  and  implementation  of  a  remedial  plan  of
action.

In  2007,  12  years  after  his  appointment,  the  Special

——————

(hereinafter 2009 Death Reviews).

The three-judge court did not have access to statistics for 2008, but in
that  year  the  number  of  preventable  or  possibly  preventable  deaths
held  steady  at  66.    California  Prison  Health  Care  Receivership  Corp.,
K. Imai, Analysis of Year 2008 Death Reviews 9 (Dec. 2009).  In 2009,
the  number  of  preventable  or  possibly  preventable  deaths  dropped  to
46.  2009 Death Reviews 11, 13.  The three-judge court could not have
anticipated  this  development,  and  it  would  be  inappropriate  for  this
Court  to  evaluate  its  significance  for  the  first  time  on  appeal.    The
three-judge  court  should,  of  course,  consider  this  and  any  other  evi-
dence  of  improved  conditions  when  considering  future  requests  by  the
State for modification of its order.  See infra, at 45–48.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" section in a case called BROWN v. PLATA.  It discusses a previous case, Coleman v. Brown, and the conditions found in California prisons.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

17

Opinion of the Court

fact, there was no way to be certain about the motivations
of  the  men  who  were  responsible  for  the  creation  of  the
monument.    And  this  is  often  the  case  with  old  monu-
ments,  symbols,  and  practices.    Yet  it  would  be  inappro-
priate  for  courts  to  compel  their  removal  or  termination
based on supposition.
  Second, as time goes by, the purposes associated with an
established monument, symbol, or practice often multiply.
Take the example of Ten Commandments monuments, the
subject  we  addressed  in  Van  Orden,  545  U. S.  677,  and
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky.,
545  U. S.  844 (2005).    For  believing  Jews  and  Christians,
the  Ten  Commandments  are  the  word  of  God  handed
down to Moses on  Mount  Sinai,  but the  image  of  the  Ten
Commandments has also been used to convey other mean-
ings.  They have historical significance as one of the foun-
dations  of  our  legal  system,  and  for  largely  that  reason,
they  are  depicted  in  the  marble  frieze  in  our  courtroom
and  in  other  prominent  public  buildings  in  our  Nation’s
capital.  See Van Orden, supra, at 688–690.  In Van Orden
and McCreary, no Member of the Court thought that these
depictions are unconstitutional.  545 U. S., at 688–690; id.,
at  701  (opinion  of  BREYER,  J.);  id.,  at  740  (Souter,  J.,
dissenting).
  Just  as  depictions  of  the  Ten  Commandments  in  these
public  buildings  were  intended  to  serve  secular  purposes,
the  litigation  in  Van  Orden  and  McCreary  showed  that
secular  motivations  played  a  part  in  the  proliferation  of
Ten  Commandments  monuments  in  the  1950s.    In  1946,
Minnesota  Judge  E.  J.  Ruegemer  proposed  that  the  Ten
Commandments be widely disseminated as a way of com-
bating  juvenile  delinquency.17    With  this  prompting,  the

——————

17 See  Bravin,  When  Moses’  Laws  Run  Afoul  of  the  U. S.’s,  Get  Me
Cecil B. deMille—Ten Commandment Memorial Has Novel Defense in
Suit, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 18, 2001, p. A1.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the context and purpose of monuments, using the Ten Commandments as an example. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U55

[09-26-01 13:01:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

670

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

tion which performed billing audits for health care organiza-
In 1993 petitioner, on QMC’s behalf, negotiated a $1.2
tions.
million loan from West Volusia Hospital Authority (WVHA),
a municipal agency responsible for operating two hospitals
located in West Volusia County, Florida. Both hospitals
participate in the Medicare program, and in 1993 WVHA
received between $10 and $15 million in Medicare funds.

A February 1994 audit of WVHA’s ﬁnancial affairs raised
questions about the QMC loan. An investigation revealed
QMC used the loan proceeds to repay creditors and to raise
the salaries of its ﬁve owner-employees, including petitioner.
It was determined that petitioner had arranged for QMC to
advance at least $100,000 to a private company owned by an
individual who had assisted QMC in securing a letter of
credit in connection with the WVHA loan. QMC, at peti-
tioner’s directive, also committed portions of the loan pro-
ceeds to speculative securities. These investments yielded
losses of almost $400,000. The investigation further uncov-
ered use of the loan proceeds to pay, through an intermediate
transfer, a $10,000 kickback to WVHA’s chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer,
the individual with whom petitioner had negotiated the loan
in the ﬁrst instance. QMC defaulted on its obligation to
WVHA and ﬁled for bankruptcy.

In 1996 petitioner was indicted by a federal grand jury on
13 counts, including charges of defrauding an organization
which receives beneﬁts under a federal assistance program,
18 U. S. C. § 666(a)(1)(A), and of paying a kickback to one of
its agents, § 666(a)(2). A jury convicted petitioner on all
counts charged, and the District Court sentenced him to 65
imprisonment and a 3-year term of supervised
months’
release. Petitioner,
in addition, was ordered to pay $1.2
million in restitution.

On appeal petitioner argued that the Government failed to
prove WVHA, as the organization affected by his wrongdo-
ing, received “beneﬁts in excess of $10,000 under a Federal
program,” as required by 18 U. S. C. § 666(b). Rejecting the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" in a case called "Fischer v. United States".  It lays out the background of the case and the charges against the petitioner.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

798

FARAGHER v. BOCA RATON

Opinion of the Court

pervasively hostile work environment of sexual harassment
is never (one would hope) authorized, but the supervisor is
clearly charged with maintaining a productive, safe work en-
vironment. The supervisor directs and controls the conduct
of the employees, and the manner of doing so may inure to
the employer’s beneﬁt or detriment, including subjecting the
111 F. 3d, at 1542 (opinion
employer to Title VII liability.”
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
It is by now well
recognized that hostile environment sexual harassment by
supervisors (and, for that matter, coemployees) is a persist-
ent problem in the workplace. See Lindemann & Kadue 4–5
(discussing studies showing prevalence of sexual harass-
ment); Ellerth, 123 F. 3d, at 511 (Posner, C. J., concurring
and dissenting) (“[E]veryone knows by now that sexual har-
assment is a common problem in the American workplace”).
An employer can, in a general sense, reasonably anticipate
the possibility of such conduct occurring in its workplace,
and one might justify the assignment of the burden of the
untoward behavior to the employer as one of the costs of
doing business, to be charged to the enterprise rather than
the victim. As noted, supra, at 796–797, developments like
this occur from time to time in the law of agency.

Two things counsel us to draw the contrary conclusion.
First, there is no reason to suppose that Congress wished
courts to ignore the traditional distinction between acts fall-
ing within the scope and acts amounting to what the older
law called frolics or detours from the course of employment.
Such a distinction can readily be applied to the spectrum of
possible harassing conduct by supervisors, as the following
examples show. First, a supervisor might discriminate ra-
cially in job assignments in order to placate the prejudice
Instances of this variety of the
pervasive in the labor force.
heckler’s veto would be consciously intended to further the
employer’s interests by preserving peace in the workplace.
Next, supervisors might reprimand male employees for
workplace failings with banter, but respond to women’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's decision. It contains legal arguments, citations, and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.

ALITO, J., dissenting

at  9.  But  when  read  in  context,  that  provision  simply
identifies  the  time  within  which  a  State  must  process
registration  applications;  it  says  nothing  about  whether
a  State  may  require  the  submission  of  supplemental  in-
formation.    The  Court’s  more  expansive  interpretation  of
§1973gg–6(a)(1)(B)  sneaks  in  a  qualification  that  is  no-
where  to  be  found  in  the  text.    The  Court  takes  pains  to
say  that  a  State  need  not  register  an  applicant  who
properly  completes  and  submits  a  federal  form  but  is
known  by  the  State  to  be  ineligible.    See  ante,  at  12–13.
But  the  Court  takes  the  position  that  a  State  may  not
demand  that  an  applicant  supply  any  additional  infor-
mation to confirm voting eligibility.  Nothing in §1973gg–
6(a)(1)(B)  supports this distinction.

What is a State to do if it has reason to doubt an appli-
cant’s  eligibility  but  cannot  be  sure  that  the  applicant  is
ineligible?    Must  the  State  either  grant  or  deny  registra-
tion  without  communicating  with  the  applicant?  Or  does
the  Court  believe  that  a  State  may  ask  for  additional
information  in  individual  cases  but  may  not  impose  a
categorical  requirement  for  all  applicants?    If  that  is  the
Court’s  position,  on  which  provision  of  the  NVRA  does  it
rely?  The  Court’s  reading  of  §1973gg–6(a)(1)(B)  is  atex-
tual and makes little sense.

*

*
Properly  interpreted,  the  NVRA  permits  Arizona  to
require applicants for federal voter registration to provide
proof of eligibility.  I therefore respectfully dissent.

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a dissenting opinion from a legal case. It argues against the majority opinion's interpretation of a specific section of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

7

SCALIA, J., dissenting

every  State  violated  the  Constitution  for  all  of  the  135
years  between  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s  ratification
and  Massachusetts’  permitting  of  same-sex  marriages  in
2003.20   They  have  discovered  in  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment  a  “fundamental  right”  overlooked  by  every  person
alive  at  the  time  of  ratification,  and  almost  everyone  else
in  the  time  since.  They  see  what  lesser  legal  minds—
minds like  Thomas Cooley, John Marshall Harlan, Oliver
Wendell  Holmes,  Jr.,  Learned  Hand,  Louis  Brandeis,
William  Howard  Taft,  Benjamin  Cardozo,  Hugo  Black,
Felix  Frankfurter,  Robert  Jackson,  and  Henry  Friendly—
could  not.  They  are  certain  that  the  People  ratified  the
Fourteenth  Amendment  to  bestow  on  them  the  power  to
remove  questions  from  the  democratic  process  when  that
is called for by their “reasoned judgment.”  These Justices
know that limiting marriage to one man and one woman is
contrary to reason; they know that an institution as old as
government itself, and accepted by every nation in history
until  15  years  ago,21  cannot  possibly  be  supported  by
anything  other  than  ignorance  or  bigotry.  And  they  are
willing  to  say  that  any  citizen  who  does  not  agree  with
that,  who  adheres  to  what  was,  until  15  years  ago,  the
unanimous  judgment  of  all  generations  and  all  societies,
stands against the Constitution.

The  opinion  is  couched  in  a  style  that  is  as  pretentious
as its content is egotistic.  It is one thing for separate con-
curring  or  dissenting  opinions  to  contain  extravagances,
even  silly  extravagances,  of  thought  and  expression;  it  is
something  else  for  the  official  opinion  of  the  Court  to  do
so.22  Of course the opinion’s showy profundities are often

——————

20 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N. E.

2d 941 (2003).

21 Windsor, 570 U. S., at ___ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 7).
22 If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opin-
ion  for  the  Court  that  began:  “The  Constitution  promises  liberty  to  all
within  its  reach,  a  liberty  that  includes  certain  specific  rights  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It expresses strong disagreement with the majority opinion and uses highly charged language.  While it is part of a legal document, its argumentative and opinionated nature makes it less suitable for straightforward indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SANDOZ INC. v. AMGEN INC.

Syllabus

scope of both phases of litigation.

Failure to comply with these procedural requirements may lead to
two consequences relevant here.  Under §262(l)(9)(C), if an applicant
fails to provide its application and manufacturing information to the
sponsor under §262(l)(2)(A), then the sponsor, but not the applicant,
may  immediately  bring  an  action  “for  a  declaration  of  infringement,
validity,  or  enforceability  of  any  patent  that  claims  the  biological
product or a use of the biological product.”  And under §262(l)(9)(B), if
an applicant provides the application and manufacturing information
but  fails  to  complete  a  subsequent  step  in  the  process,  the  sponsor,
but not the applicant, may bring a declaratory-judgment action with
respect  to  any  patent  included  on  the  sponsor’s  list  of  relevant  pa-
tents.
  Neupogen  is  a  filgrastim  product  marketed  by  Amgen,  which
claims  to  hold  patents  on  methods  of  manufacturing  and  using  fil-
grastim.    Sandoz  sought  FDA  approval  to  market  a  biosimilar  fil-
grastim product under the brand name Zarxio, with Neupogen as the
reference product.  A day after the FDA informed Sandoz that its ap-
plication had been accepted for review, Sandoz notified Amgen that it
had  submitted  an  application  and  that  it  intended  to  market  Zarxio
immediately upon receiving FDA approval.  It later informed Amgen
that  it  did  not  intend  to  provide  the  application  and  manufacturing
information  required  by  §262(l)(2)(A)  and  that  Amgen  could  sue  im-
mediately for infringement under §262(l)(9)(C).

Amgen sued Sandoz for patent infringement and also asserted that
Sandoz engaged in “unlawful” conduct in violation of California’s un-
fair competition law.  This latter claim was predicated on two alleged
violations  of  the  BPCIA:  Sandoz’s  failure  to  provide  its  application
and manufacturing information under §262(l)(2)(A), and its provision
of notice of commercial marketing under §262(l)(8)(A) prior to obtain-
ing  licensure  from  the  FDA.    Amgen  sought  injunctions  to  enforce
both  BPCIA  requirements.    Sandoz  counterclaimed  for  declaratory
judgments that the asserted patent was invalid and not infringed and
that it had not violated the BPCIA.

While the case was pending, the FDA licensed Zarxio, and Sandoz
provided Amgen a further notice of commercial marketing.  The Dis-
trict  Court  subsequently  granted  partial  judgment  on  the  pleadings
to Sandoz on its BPCIA counterclaims and dismissed Amgen’s unfair
competition  claims  with  prejudice.    The  Federal  Circuit  affirmed  in
part, vacated in part, and remanded.  The court affirmed the dismis-
sal of Amgen’s state-law claim based on Sandoz’s alleged violation of
§262(l)(2)(A),  holding  that  Sandoz  did  not  violate  the  BPCIA  in  fail-
ing  to  disclose  its  application  and  manufacturing  information  and
that the BPCIA provides the exclusive remedies for failure to comply
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus section of a court opinion. It outlines the procedural background and legal issues involved in the case of Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6  MARIETTA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEE HEALTH

BENEFIT PLAN v. DAVITA INC.
Opinion of the Court

supplies  an  objective  benchmark  or  comparator  against
which to measure a plan’s coverage for outpatient dialysis.
Absent  some  benchmark  or  comparator,  courts  would
have  great  difficulty  trying  to  make  an  apples-to-
apples comparison of a plan’s coverage for outpatient dialy-
sis  against  its  coverage  for  other  services.    Group  health
plans cover services for many different health issues at var-
ied rates.  Those rates may reflect negotiations with third
parties, the needs of a particular plan’s beneficiaries, and
other factors such as geography.  Courts would be entirely
at sea in trying to determine an appropriate benchmark or
comparator  for  outpatient  dialysis.    Put  simply,  DaVita’s
approach  is  a  prescription  for  judicial  and  administrative
chaos,  and  further  demonstrates  that  DaVita’s  disparate-
impact theory is not a correct interpretation of the statute.2
DaVita’s position would ultimately require group health
plans to maintain some (undefined) minimum level of ben-
efits  for  outpatient  dialysis.  But  this  statutory  provision
simply  coordinates  payments  between  group  health  plans
and Medicare.  As the Government itself acknowledges, the
statute does not dictate any particular level of dialysis cov-
erage by a group health plan.  See Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 13.  If Congress wanted to mandate that
group health plans provide particular benefits, or to require
that  group  health  plans  ensure  parity  between  different
kinds of benefits, Congress knew how to write such a law.
It did not do so in this statute.  To the extent that Congress
——————

2 DaVita’s related proxy theory—that singling out outpatient dialysis
is simply a proxy for singling out individuals with end-stage renal dis-
ease because those individuals disproportionately receive outpatient di-
alysis—likewise finds no support in the statutory text.  The statute re-
quires  that  a  plan  provide  the  same  dialysis  benefits  regardless  of
whether  an  individual  has  end-stage  renal  disease.    If  a plan  provides
the same benefits to all individuals, the plan does not “differentiate in
the benefits it provides” to individuals with and without end-stage renal
disease.  §1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii) (emphasis added).  This statute is a coordi-
nation-of-benefits statute, not a traditional antidiscrimination statute.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the interpretation of a statute related to health insurance coverage for dialysis. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

OHIO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.

BREYER, J., dissenting

reason” analysis.  See also infra, at 24.

One  critical  point  that  the  majority’s  argument  ignores
is  that  proof  of  actual  adverse  effects  on  competition  is,
a fortiori, proof of market power.  Without such power, the
restraints  could  not  have  brought  about  the  anticompeti
tive effects that the plaintiff proved.  See Indiana Federa-
tion  of  Dentists,  supra,  at  460  (“[T]he  purpose  of  the  in
quiries  into  market  definition  and  market  power  is
to  determine  whether  an  arrangement  has  the  potential
for  genuine  adverse  effects  on  competition”  (emphasis
added)).  The  District  Court’s  findings  of  actual  anticom
petitive  harm  from  the  nondiscrimination  provisions  thus
showed  that,  whatever  the  relevant  market  might  be,
American  Express  had  enough  power  in  that  market  to
cause that harm.  There is no reason to require a separate
showing  of  market  definition  and  market  power  under
such  circumstances.    And  so  the  majority’s  extensive
discussion of market definition is legally unnecessary.

D

The  majority’s  discussion  of  market  definition  is  also
wrong.  Without raising any objection in general with the
longstanding  approach  I  describe  above,  supra,  at  10–11,
the  majority  agrees  with  the  Court  of  Appeals  that  the
market  for  American  Express’  card  services  is  special
because  it  is  a  “two-sided  transaction  platform.”    Ante,  at
2–5,  12–15.  The  majority  explains  that  credit-card  firms
connect two distinct groups of customers: First, merchants
who accept credit cards, and second, shoppers who use the
cards.  Ante, at 2; accord, 838 F. 3d, at 186.  The majority
adds that “no credit-card transaction can occur unless both
the merchant and the cardholder simultaneously agree to
use  to  the  same  credit-card  network.”   Ante,  at  3.  And  it
explains  that  the  credit-card  market  involves  “indirect
network effects,” by which it means that shoppers want a
card  that  many  merchants  will  accept  and  merchants
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding market power and its relevance to antitrust cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>