<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

KAGAN, J., dissenting

In each case, a statutory phrase has more than one reason-
able reading.  And Congress has not chosen among them: It
has  not,  in  any  real-world  sense,  “fixed”  the  “single,  best
meaning” at “the time of enactment” (to use the majority’s
phrase).  Ante, at 22.  A question thus arises: Who decides
which of the possible readings should govern?

This Court has long thought that the choice should usu-
ally fall to agencies, with courts broadly deferring to their
judgments.  For the last 40 years, that doctrine has gone by
the name of Chevron deference, after the 1984 decision that
formalized and canonized it.  In Chevron, the Court set out
a simple two-part framework for reviewing an agency’s in-
terpretation of a statute that it administers.  First, the re-
viewing  court  must  determine  whether  Congress  has  “di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue.”  467 U. S., at
842.  That inquiry is rigorous: A court must exhaust all the
“traditional tools of statutory construction” to divine statu-
tory meaning.  Id., at 843, n. 9.  And when it can find that
meaning—a “single right answer”—that is “the end of the
matter”: The court cannot defer because it “must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”  Kisor,
588 U. S., at 575 (opinion of the Court); Chevron, 467 U. S.,
at  842–843.  But  if  the  court,  after  using  its  whole  legal
toolkit, concludes that “the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue” in dispute—for any of the
not-uncommon  reasons  discussed  above—then  the  court
must cede the primary interpretive role.  Ibid.; see supra,
at 4–5.  At that second step, the court asks only whether the
agency  construction  is  within  the  sphere  of  “reasonable”
readings.  Chevron, 467 U. S., at 844.  If it is, the agency’s
interpretation of the statute that it every day implements
will control.

That rule, the Court has long explained, rests on a pre-
sumption  about  legislative  intent—about  what  Congress
wants when a statute it has charged an agency with imple-
menting contains an ambiguity or a gap.  See id., at 843–
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan. It delves into the legal doctrine of Chevron deference, explaining its two-part framework for reviewing agency interpretations of statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
78

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  42  U. S. C.  §2000e–3(b)  (Equal  Employment
Opportunities;  Other  Unlawful  Employment
Practices)

  42 U. S. C. §2000e–16(a) (Employment by Fed-

eral Government)

  42  U. S. C.  §2000e–16a(b)  (Government  Em-

ployee Rights Act of 1991)

  42  U. S. C.  §2000e–16b(a)(1)  (Discriminatory

Practices Prohibited)

  42 U. S. C. §2000h–2 (Intervention by Attorney
General; Denial of Equal Protection on Account
of Race, Color, Religion, Sex or National Origin)

  42  U. S. C.  §3123  (Discrimination  on  Basis  of
Sex Prohibited in Federally Assisted Programs)

  42  U. S. C.  §3604  (Fair Housing Act; Discrimi-
nation  in  the  Sale  or  Rental  of  Housing  and
Other Prohibited Practices)

  42  U. S. C.  §3605  (Fair Housing Act; Discrimi-
in  Residential  Real  Estate-Related

nation
Transactions)

  42  U. S. C.  §3606  (Fair Housing Act; Discrimi-
nation in the Provision of Brokerage Services)

  42 U. S. C. §3631 (Fair Housing Act; Violations;

Penalties)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal statutes cited in a legal document.  It is not sequential text and is likely not meant to be read as a narrative.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

ALITO, J., dissenting

contribution  to  the  exchange  of  ideas.    Accordingly,  I
would hold that hunting depictions fall comfortably within
the exception set out in §48(b).

I  do  not  have  the  slightest  doubt  that  Congress,  in  en-
acting  §48,  had  no  intention  of  restricting  the  creation,
sale, or possession of depictions of hunting.  Proponents of
the law made this point clearly.  See H. R. Rep. No. 106–
397,  p. 8  (1999)  (hereinafter  H. R.  Rep.)  (“[D]epictions  of
ordinary  hunting  and  fishing  activities  do  not  fall  within
the  scope  of  the  statute”);  145  Cong.  Rec.  25894  (Oct.  19,
1999)  (Rep.  McCollum)  (“[T]he  sale  of  depictions  of  legal
activities, such as hunting and fishing, would not be illegal
under  this  bill”);  id.,  at  25895  (Rep.  Smith)  (“[L]et  us  be
clear  as  to  what  this  legislation  will  not  do.    It  will  in no
way prohibit hunting, fishing, or wildlife videos”).  Indeed,
even  opponents  acknowledged  that  §48  was  not  intended
to  reach  ordinary  hunting  depictions.    See  ibid.  (Rep.
Scott); id., at 25897 (Rep. Paul).

For these reasons, I am convinced that §48 has no appli-
cation to depictions of hunting.  But even if §48 did imper-
missibly reach the sale or possession of depictions of hunt-
ing  in  a  few  unusual  situations  (for  example,  the  sale  in
Oregon  of  a  depiction  of  hunting  with  a  crossbow  in  Vir-
ginia  or  the  sale  in  Washington  State  of  the  hunting  of  a
sharp-tailed  grouse  in  Idaho,  see  ante,  at  14),  those  iso-
lated  applications  would  hardly  show  that  §48  bans  a
substantial amount of protected speech.

B
Although the Court’s overbreadth analysis rests primar-
ily  on  the  proposition  that  §48  substantially  restricts  the
sale  and  possession  of hunting  depictions,  the  Court  cites
a few additional examples, including depictions of methods
of slaughter and the docking of the tails of dairy cows.  See
ante, at 14–15.

Such examples do not show that the statute is substan-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of a law restricting depictions of hunting.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

had done just about everything one can do to a patent ex-
cept invent it.

Thryv responded by opening another new litigation front
of  its  own.    One  year  after  CTC  filed  its  federal  lawsuit,
Thryv lodged another administrative petition with the Pat-
ent Office, this time seeking inter partes review.  Echoing
some  of  the  same  arguments  that  led  to  its  push  for  an
ex parte  administrative  reexamination  nine  years  earlier,
and adding other arguments too, Thryv (again) asked the
agency to cancel Mr. DuVal’s patent on the grounds that it
lacked novelty and was obvious.  At the same time, Thryv
sought  to  stay  proceedings  in  CTC’s  infringement  suit.
Thryv  argued  that  the  district  court  should  defer  to  the
newly  initiated  inter  partes  review.    Like  many  district
courts  facing  the  prospect  of  parallel  administrative  pro-
ceedings, this one obliged.

Why at this late hour did Thryv prefer to litigate before
the  agency  rather  than  a  federal  district  court?    The
agency’s ex parte reexamination years earlier hadn’t helped
Thryv  much.    But  since  then,  Congress  had  adopted  the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), 35 U. S. C. §100
et seq.    That  law  created  the  inter  partes  review  process,
which provides a number of benefits to accused infringers
such  as  Thryv.    Like  federal  court  litigation,  inter  partes
review holds the advantage of allowing a private party at-
tacking a patent’s validity to participate in adversarial pro-
ceedings, rather than rely on the agency to direct its own
investigation  as  it  does  in  ex parte  reexamination.    Com-
pare  35  U. S. C.  §316  with  §§302,  304,  305.    Inter  partes
review also allows a party challenging a patent all manner
of discovery, including depositions and the presentation of
expert testimony.  §316; 37 CFR §§42.51–42.65 (2019).  At
the same time, the burden of proof is lower—requiring chal-
lengers like Thryv to prove unpatentability only by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, §316(e), rather than under the
clear and convincing standard that usually applies in court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It discusses the procedural history of the case, including the use of administrative review processes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C.

Opinion of the Court

B
  The panel also erred in its evaluation of the other factors
that bear on all applications for appellate intervention.  The
panel  found  that  the  attorney  general’s  motion  was  not
timely because it came after years of litigation in the Dis-
trict Court and after the panel had issued its decision, but
its  assessment of  timeliness was  mistaken.   Timeliness  is
an  important  consideration  in  deciding  whether  interven-
tion should be allowed, see, e.g., Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 24 (a)
and (b)(1), but “[t]imeliness is to be determined from all the
circumstances,”  and  “the  point  to  which  [a]  suit  has  pro-
gressed is . . . not solely dispositive,”  NAACP v. New York,
413 U. S. 345, 365–366 (1973).
  Here, the most important circumstance relating to time-
liness is that the attorney general sought to intervene “as
soon as it became clear” that the Commonwealth’s interests
“would  no longer  be  protected”  by  the parties in  the case.
United  Airlines,  Inc.  v.  McDonald,  432  U. S.  385,  394
(1977).  Our decision in McDonald addressed a similar sit-
uation.  There, a member of a putative plaintiff class moved
to  intervene  for  the  purpose  of  appealing  the  District
Court’s denial of class certification.  Id., at 396.  The District
Court  denied  that  request  because  the  class  member  had
not “seen fit to come in here and seek any relief from this
Court in any way” during “five years” of litigation.  Id., at
390.  We held, however, that the motion was timely because
it  was  filed  soon  after  the  movant  learned  that  the  class
representatives would not appeal.
  The same logic applies here.  The attorney general sought
to  intervene  two  days  after  learning  that  the  secretary
would not continue to defend HB 454.  The motion was also
——————
209 U. S. 123, 159–160 (1908).  The attorney general now seeks to inter-
vene not to defend a right to exercise enforcement powers under HB 454,
but in his role as the Commonwealth’s “chief law officer,” Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §15.020(1), who has the authority to defend Kentucky’s interests in
federal court when no other official is willing to do so.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the timeliness of an intervention in a case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific laws and court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

Syllabus

time to the stop.  Pp. 5–8.

2. The  determination  adopted  by  the  District  Court  that  deten-
tion for the dog sniff was not independently supported by individual-
ized suspicion was not reviewed by the Eighth Circuit.  That question
therefore remains open for consideration on remand.  P. 9.

741 F. 3d 905, vacated and remanded.

GINSBURG,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  SCALIA, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined.  KEN-
NEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.  THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opin-
ion,  in  which ALITO,  J.,  joined,  and  in  which  KENNEDY, J.,  joined  as  to
all but Part III.  ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are typically summaries of the court's decision and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

lvi

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Perinton; Nisco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Perkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Perry v. Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Perry; Woodward v.
Pesina; Kreps v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Peterson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pfeil v. Everett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philadelphia; Faulcon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philip Morris Inc. v. Engle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phillips v. CSX Transportation, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phillips; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philomena, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pierce v. Lucero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pierce County; DCR, Inc. v.
Pimentel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pimentel Feliz v. Elo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pitcher; Owens v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pitcher; Williams v.
Pitzer; Butler v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . .
PMA Ins. Co.; Patel v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Poe v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Poland, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Poland v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Poland v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Polk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Polyak v. Summers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Poole v. Mitchem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Poole; Ricchio Navarro v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Port of Portland v. Ronne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ports v. Dean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Portuondo v. Agard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pospisil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Postmaster General; Christian v.
Postmaster General; Tuckness v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Postmaster General; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Powell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Power Engineering Co. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prado-Perales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pratt v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pratt v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pravda v. Saratoga County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Presbyterian Health Services Corp.; Knight Publishing Co. v.
. . . .
Presbyterian Health Services Corp.; The Charlotte Observer v. . . .

Page
1111
1119
1071
1110
1072
1077
1056
1093
1144
1004
1075
1015
1111
1053,1124
1078
1074
1115
1071
1133
803
1056
1116
1013
1013
1013
1070,1076
1094
1113
1093
1086
1034
61
1089
1092
1038
1022
1116
1086
1104
1118
1083
1012
1033
1033
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

THOMAS, J., dissenting

“persons,  houses,  papers,  and  effects”  out  of  the  text.    At
its broadest formulation, the Katz test would find a search
“wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expecta
tion of privacy.’ ”  Terry, 392 U. S., at 9 (emphasis added).
The  Court  today,  for  example,  does  not  ask  whether  cell-
site  location  records  are  “persons,  houses,  papers,  [or]
effects”  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.8
Yet  “persons,  houses,  papers,  and  effects”  cannot  mean
“anywhere”  or  “anything.”  Katz’s  catchphrase  that  “the
Fourth  Amendment  protects  people,  not  places,”  is  not  a
serious  attempt  to  reconcile  the  constitutional  text.    See
Carter,  525  U. S.,  at  98,  n. 3  (opinion  of  Scalia,  J.).    The
Fourth Amendment obviously protects people; “[t]he ques
tion  . . .  is  what  protection  it  affords  to  those  people.”
Katz,  389  U. S.,  at  361  (Harlan,  J.,  concurring).  The
Founders decided to protect the people from unreasonable
searches  and  seizures  of  four  specific  things—persons,
houses,  papers,  and  effects.    They  identified  those  four
categories  as  “the  objects  of  privacy  protection  to  which
the  Constitution  would  extend,  leaving  further  expansion
to  the  good  judgment  . . .  of  the  people  through  their  rep
resentatives  in  the  legislature.”  Carter,  supra,  at  97–98
(opinion of Scalia, J.).

This  limiting  language  was  important  to  the  founders.
Madison’s  first  draft  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  used  a
different phrase: “their persons, their houses, their papers,
and  their  other  property.”  1  Annals  of  Cong.  452  (1789)

——————

8 The  answer  to  that  question  is  not  obvious.    Cell-site  location  rec
ords  are  business  records  that  mechanically  collect  the  interactions
between  a  person’s  cell  phone  and  the  company’s  towers;  they  are  not
private  papers  and  do  not  reveal  the  contents  of  any  communications.
Cf.  Schnapper,  Unreasonable  Searches  and  Seizures  of  Papers,  71  Va.
L. Rev.  869,  923–924  (1985)  (explaining  that  business  records  that  do
not  reveal  “personal  or  speech-related  confidences”  might  not  satisfy
the original meaning of “papers”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It delves into the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and the concept of reasonable expectation of privacy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TRUMP v. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
PROJECT

Per Curiam

entered  by  the  lower  courts.    We  grant  the  petitions  for
certiorari and grant the stay applications in part.

I

A

On January 27, 2017, President Donald J. Trump signed
Executive  Order  No.  13769,  Protecting  the  Nation  From
Foreign  Terrorist  Entry  Into  the  United  States.    82  Fed.
Reg.  8977  (EO–1).  EO–1  addressed  policies  and  proce-
dures  relating  to  the  entry  of  foreign  nationals  into  this
country.  Among  other  directives,  the  order  suspended
entry  of  foreign  nationals  from  seven  countries  identified
as  presenting  heightened  terrorism  risks—Iran,  Iraq,
Libya,  Somalia,  Sudan,  Syria,  and  Yemen—for  90  days.
§3(c).  Executive  officials  were  instructed  to  review  the
adequacy  of  current  practices  relating  to  visa  adjudica-
tions during this 90-day period.  §3(a).  EO–1 also modified
refugee  policy,  suspending  the  United  States  Refugee
Admissions  Program  (USRAP)  for  120  days  and  reducing
the number of refugees eligible to be admitted to the United
States during fiscal year 2017.  §§5(a), (d).

EO–1 was immediately challenged in court.  Just a week
after  the  order  was  issued,  a  Federal  District  Court  en-
tered  a  nationwide  temporary  restraining  order  enjoining
enforcement  of  several  of  its  key  provisions.    Washington
v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040 (WD Wash., Feb. 3, 2017).  Six
days  later,  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Ninth  Circuit
denied  the  Government’s  emergency  motion  to  stay  the
order  pending  appeal.  Washington  v.  Trump,  847  F.  3d
1151  (2017).  Rather  than  continue  to  litigate  EO–1,  the
Government announced that it would revoke the order and
issue a new one.

A second order followed on March 6, 2017.  See Protect-
ing  the  Nation  From  Foreign  Terrorist  Entry  Into  the
United States, Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209
(EO–2).  EO–2 describes “conditions in six of the . . . coun-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary or opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a description of events related to a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

mally  empowered  to  take  tangible  employment  actions.
The  limitation  the  Court  decrees  diminishes  the  force  of
Faragher and Ellerth, ignores the conditions under which
members of the work force labor, and disserves the objec-
tive  of  Title  VII  to  prevent  discrimination  from  infecting
the Nation’s workplaces.  I would follow the EEOC’s Guid-
ance  and  hold  that  the  authority  to  direct  an  employee’s
daily  activities  establishes  supervisory  status  under  Title
VII.

I

A

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for
an employer” to “discriminate against any individual with
respect to” the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”  42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a).  The creation
of  a  hostile  work  environment  through  harassment,  this
Court has long recognized, is a form of proscribed discrim-
ination.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523
U. S. 75, 78 (1998); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U. S. 57, 64–65 (1986).

What  qualifies  as  harassment?  Title  VII  imposes  no
“general  civility  code.”  Oncale,  523  U. S.,  at  81.    It  does
not reach “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace,” for
example,  “sporadic  use  of  abusive  language”  or  generally
boorish conduct.  B. Lindemann & D. Kadue, Sexual Har-
assment  in  Employment  Law  175  (1992).    See  also  1  B.
Lindemann  &  P.  Grossman,  Employment  Discrimination
Law  1335–1343  (4th  ed.  2007)  (hereinafter  Lindemann  &
Grossman).  To  be  actionable,  charged  behavior  need  not
drive the victim from her job, but it must be of such sever-
ity or pervasiveness as to pollute the working environment,
thereby  “alter[ing]  the  conditions  of  the  victim’s  employ-
ment.”  Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21–
22 (1993).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case of Vance v. Ball State University. It discusses the legal definition of harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1024

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 16, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–47.  United  States  Aviation  Underwriters,  Inc.,
et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  1297.

No.  09–55.  Platone  v.  Department  of  Labor.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  548  F.  3d  322.

No. 09–108.  Davis v.  Tarrant County, Texas, et al.  C.  A.

5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  214.

No.  09–187.  Elliott  v.  White  Mountain  Apache  Tribal
Court  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  566  F.  3d  842.

No.  09–198.  Medela  AG  et  al.  v.  Kinetic  Concepts,  Inc.,
et al.  C. A. Fed. Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 554
F.  3d  1010.

No.  09–207.  J.  R.  Y.,  Individually  and  as  the  Administra
tor  of  the  Estate  of  B.  M.  Y.,  et  al.  v.  Woodmen  of  the
World  Life  Insurance  Society.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  216.

No.  09–208.  Wrinn  v.  Johnson  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  560.

No.  09–220.  Whisenhant  v.  Allen,  Commissioner,  Ala
bama  Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  1198.

No.  09–265.  Independence  Institute  v.  Buescher,  Secre
tary of State of Colorado.  Ct. App. Colo.  Certiorari denied.
Reported  below:  209  P.  3d  1130.

No.  09–280.  Obiajulu  v.  Professional,  Clerical  and  Mis
cellaneous  Employees,  Teamsters  Local  Union  No.  995,
et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320
Fed.  Appx.  794.

No. 09–303.  Smith v. United States Court of Appeals for
the  Tenth  Circuit.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  805.

No.  09–304.  Rothman  et  al.  v.  Target  Corp.  et  al.  C.  A.

Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  1310.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, circuit courts, and citations to reported decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

Opinion of the Court

no  disciplinary  infractions  over  his  last  fourteen  years  in
prison” and that the movant would no longer be considered
a career offender based on an intervening change of law).

Likewise, when deciding whether to grant First Step Act
motions  and  in  deciding  how  much  to  reduce  sentences,
courts have looked to postsentencing evidence of violence or
prison infractions as probative.  See, e.g., United States v.
Rose, 841 Fed. Appx. 328, 329 (CA2 2021) (affirming partial
denial of motion where the district court relied on the mo-
vant’s  “lengthy  history  of  prison  disciplinary  infractions,
which  included  many  recent  violent  infractions”);  United
States v. Barlow, 544 F. Supp. 3d 491, 505 (NJ 2021) (con-
sidering,  in  denying  motion,  that  the  movant  was  disci-
plined in prison seven times, including “three times for pos-
sessing  a  dangerous  weapon,”  “once
for  possessing
marijuana,”  and  “once  for  fighting”);  United  States  v.
Slutzkin, 2019 WL 5696122, *8 (Conn., Nov. 4, 2019) (con-
sidering in denying motion the movant’s “behavior once in-
carcerated [as] perhaps the greatest concern to the Court,”
in light of “25 disciplinary citations while in state incarcer-
ation and six more in federal prison”).7

Moreover, when raised by the parties, district courts have
considered nonretroactive Guidelines amendments to help
inform whether to reduce sentences at all, and if so, by how
much.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Coachman,  2020  WL
6939890, *3 (ND Fla., June 22, 2020) (considering that the
movant “would not qualify for career offender status” at the
time of his sentence modification hearing); United States v.

——————

7 In the dissent’s view, each of these District Courts erred in consider-
ing evidence outside of the original sentencing record.  See post, at 1–2.
Instead, the dissent’s interpretation would require a district court adju-
dicating a First Step Act motion to decide whether, and by how much, to
reduce  a  sentence  based  only  on  the  original  sentencing  record.  But
again, the text of the First Step Act does not require that counterfactual
procedure.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the consideration of post-sentencing evidence in First Step Act motions. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC

Opinion of the Court

adverse side effects; and indicates how soon after vaccina-
tion  those  side  effects  should  first  manifest  themselves.17
Claimants  who  show  that  a  listed  injury  first  manifested
itself  at  the  appropriate  time  are  prima  facie  entitled  to
compensation.18  No showing of causation is necessary; the
Secretary  bears  the  burden  of  disproving  causation.19  A
claimant may also recover for unlisted side effects, and for
listed  side  effects  that  occur  at  times  other  than  those
specified  in  the  Table,  but  for  those  the  claimant  must
prove  causation.20    Unlike  in  tort  suits,  claimants  under
the  Act  are  not  required  to  show  that  the  administered
vaccine  was  defectively  manufactured,  labeled,  or  de-
signed.

Successful  claimants  receive  compensation  for  medical,
rehabilitation,  counseling,  special  education,  and  voca-
tional  training  expenses;  diminished  earning  capacity;
pain  and  suffering;  and  $250,000  for  vaccine-related
deaths.21    Attorney’s  fees  are  provided,  not  only  for  suc-
cessful cases, but even for unsuccessful claims that are not
frivolous.22  These awards are paid out of a fund created by
an excise tax on each vaccine dose.23
  The  quid  pro  quo  for  this,  designed  to  stabilize  the
vaccine  market,  was  the  provision  of  significant  tort-
liability  protections  for  vaccine  manufacturers.    The  Act
requires claimants to seek relief through the compensation
program before filing suit for more than $1,000.24  Manu-
facturers  are  generally  immunized  from  liability  for  fail-

——————

17 See  §300aa–14(a);  42  CFR  §100.3  (2009)  (current  Vaccine  Injury

Table).

18 See 42 U. S. C. §§300aa–11(c)(1), 300aa–13(a)(1)(A).
19 See §300aa–13(a)(1)(B).
20 See §300aa–11(c)(1)(C)(ii).
21 See §300aa–15(a).
22 See §300aa–15(e).
23 See §300aa–15(i)(2); 26 U. S. C. §§4131, 9510.
24 See 42 U. S. C. §300aa–11(a)(2).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. It delves into the specifics of how claims are handled, the burden of proof, and the types of compensation available.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

SACKETT v. EPA

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

  In 2023, under President Biden, the Army Corps and
EPA  once  again  issued  a  new  rule  that  defined
“adjacent”  wetlands  to  include  wetlands  “separated
from  other  waters  of  the  United  States  by  man-made
dikes  or  barriers,  natural  river  berms,  beach  dunes,
and the like.”  88 Fed. Reg. 3143–3144.

That longstanding and consistent agency interpretation
reflects and reinforces the ordinary meaning of the statute.
The  eight  administrations  since  1977  have  maintained
dramatically  different  views  of  how  to  regulate  the
environment, including under the Clean Water Act.  Some
of
those  administrations  promulgated  very  broad
interpretations  of  adjacent  wetlands.    Others  adopted  far
narrower  interpretations.    Yet  all  of  those  eight  different
administrations have recognized as a matter of law that the
Clean  Water  Act’s  coverage  of  adjacent  wetlands  means
more than adjoining wetlands and also includes wetlands
separated  from  covered  waters  by  man-made  dikes  or
barriers,  natural  river  berms,  beach  dunes,  or  the  like.
That consistency in interpretation is strong confirmation of
the ordinary meaning of adjacent wetlands.

III
The  Act  covers  “adjacent”  wetlands.    And  adjacent
wetlands  is  a  broader  category  than  adjoining  wetlands.
But  instead  of  adhering  to  the  ordinary  meaning  of
“adjacent”  wetlands,  to  the  45  years  of  consistent  agency
practice,  and  to  this  Court’s  precedents,  the  Court  today
adopts a test under which a wetland is covered only if the
wetland has a “continuous surface connection” to a covered
water—in other words, if it adjoins a covered water.  Ante,
at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court says
that  the  wetland  and  the  covered  water  must  be
“indistinguishable”  from  one  another—in  other  words,
there must be no “clear demarcation” between wetlands and
covered  waters.  Ante,  at  21  (internal  quotation  marks
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh in the case of Sackett v. EPA. It discusses the interpretation of "adjacent wetlands" under the Clean Water Act and the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xc

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

852

Mak v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

Maldonado v. Iwasaki  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Mallinckrodt, Inc.; Rodriguez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Malone v. Campbell
962

Malone v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maltsev v. Albany County Probation Dept.
1079

Management Cleaning Controls; Millen v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Manigault v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011

Manning v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Manns v. University of Ark. Medical Center
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,1101

Manship, In re
1107

Mantilla v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
977

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Manzo v. United States
969

Marberry; Burkey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marberry; Warman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  955,1140

Marcus; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  945,1074

924

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marcusse v. United States
1148

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maremont Corp. v. St. John
962

Marguet-Pillado v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919

Marinero-Revelo v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939

Marino v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Mark v. Bauer
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

Marley v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Marple Newton School Dist.; Busch v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

814

Marquardt v. Sebelius
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Marques; Morales v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
895

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marquez v. Connecticut
1099

Marquez-Mendoza v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marr v. Hughes
909

Marr v. Worthy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

Marshall v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Marshall; Bonner v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
876

Marshall v. Brandywine Chesapeake Housing Corp. . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Marshall; Bussey v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937

Marshall; Edwards v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
982

Marshall; Mendoza v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1105

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marshall; Muniz v.
1137

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marshall; Nicholas v.
957

Marshall; Paredes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marshall v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  882,905,914,926,927

1080

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marshner v. Maryland
826

Marti v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  804,997

Martin v. California
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

7

Opinion of the Court

law in the course of obtaining it?  Not likely.  And again,
the  same  is  true  with  respect  to  naturalization.  Suppose
that  an  applicant  for  citizenship  fills  out  the  necessary
paperwork  in  a  government  office  with  a  knife  tucked
away in her handbag (but never mentioned or used).  She
has  violated  the  law—specifically,  a  statute  criminalizing
the  possession  of  a  weapon  in  a  federal  building.    See  18
U. S. C.  §930.    And  she  has  surely  done  so  “in  the  course
of ” procuring citizenship.  But would you say, using Eng-
lish as you ordinarily would, that she has “procure[d]” her
citizenship  “contrary  to  law”  (or,  as  you  would  really
speak,  “illegally”)?  Once  again,  no.  That  is  because  the
violation  of  law  and  the  acquisition  of  citizenship  are  in
that  example  merely  coincidental:  The  one  has  no  causal
relation to the other.

The Government responds to such examples by seeking
to define them out of the statute, but that effort falls short
for  multiple  reasons.    According  to  the  Government,  the
laws to which §1425(a) speaks are only laws “pertaining to
naturalization.”  Brief for United States 20.  But to begin
with, that claim fails on its own terms.  The Government’s
proposed limitation has no basis in §1425(a)’s text (which
refers  to  “law”  generally);  it  is  a  deus  ex  machina—
rationalized only by calling it “necessary,” Tr. of Oral Arg.
39, and serving only to get the Government out of a tight
interpretive spot.  Indeed, the Government does not really
buy its own argument: At another point, it asserts that an
applicant for citizenship can violate §1425(a) by bribing a
government  official,  see  Brief  for  United  States  16—even
though  the  law  against  that  conduct  has  nothing  in  par-
ticular  to  do  with  naturalization.
See  18  U. S. C.
§201(b)(1).    And  still  more  important,  the  Government’s
(sometime)  carve-out  does  nothing  to  alter  the  linguistic
understanding  that  gives  force  to  the  examples  the  Gov-
ernment  would  exclude—and  that  applies  just  as  well  to
every  application  that  would  remain.  Laws  pertaining  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a law related to naturalization. It uses legal terminology and presents arguments based on statutory language and examples.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

708

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Breyer, J., dissenting

Campbell, 1 Ves. sen. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749);
Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. sen. 243, 28 Eng. Rep.
157 (Ch. 1750). Those cases said nothing about whether
or not the law of Calcutta, church law, and English law
all emanate from a single sovereign. But Murdock had
cited a famous later English case, King of Two Sicilies
v. Willcox, 1 Sim. (N. S.) 301, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch.
1851), as standing for the “same sovereign” principle.

It is true that one of the English judges in that case,
Lord Cranworth, said that the privilege involves only
“matters [made] penal by [English] . . . law.”
Id., at 329,
61 Eng. Rep., at 128. But Lord Cranworth immediately
qualiﬁed that conclusion by restating the conclusion in
terms of its rationale, namely, that the privilege applies
“to matters as to which, if disclosed, the Judge would be
able to say, as matter of law, whether it could or could
Ibid. And, 16 years
not entail penal consequences.”
later, the English courts sustained a claim of privilege
involving a threatened forfeiture in America. United
States of America v. McRae, 3 L. R. Ch. 79 (1867).
In
doing so, the McRae court said both that Lord Cran-
worth’s statement in King of the Two Sicilies “la[id]
down . . . a proposition” that was “broad[er]” than neces-
sary to “support the judgment,” and that the true rea-
son the privilege had not applied in the earlier case was
because the judge did not “know . . . with certainty . . .
the [foreign law, hence] whether the acts . . . had ren-
dered [the defendants] amenable to punishment” and
“it was doubtful whether the Defendants would ever
be within the reach of a prosecution, and their being so
depended on their voluntary return to [Sicily].” United
States of America v. McRae, supra, at 85, 87.

Thus, the true English rule as of the time of Murdock,
insofar as any of these cases reveal that rule, was not a
“same sovereign” rule, but a rule that the privilege did
not apply to prosecutions by another sovereign where
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It cites legal precedents and discusses legal arguments related to a case involving the United States and Balsys.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CHIAVERINI v. CITY OF NAPOLEON

Opinion of the Court

sale, and asked Chiaverini to return their property.  Chia-
verini said no, so the owners contacted the police.  Two of-
ficers,  on  a  later  visit  to  the  store,  directed  Chiaverini  to
surrender  the  ring  to  its  owners.    But  Chiaverini  refused
their request too, saying that it contradicted a letter he had
just received from the police department telling him to re-
tain the ring as evidence.  And when repeating his refusal
to  another  officer  the  next  day,  Chiaverini  suggested  (for
reasons unclear) that he was operating his store without a
license.  The result of that (shall we say, unprofitable) ex-
change was that the police turned their attention from the
original theft to Chiaverini’s business.

Soon afterward, the officers launched a criminal proceed-
ing against Chiaverini in municipal court.  They filed three
complaints,  each  charging  him  with  a  separate  offense.
Two  were  misdemeanors:  receiving  stolen  property  and
dealing in precious metals without a license.  The third was
a felony: money laundering.  To support their accompany-
ing application for an arrest warrant, the officers submitted
an affidavit making the case for probable cause on all three
charges, but focusing on the felony.  See App. 16–17.  For
that charge to succeed, Chiaverini must have known when
he  bought  the  ring  that  the  transaction  involved  the  pro-
ceeds  of  unlawful  activity.    See  Ohio  Rev.  Code  Ann.
§1315.55(a)(1) (Lexis 2016).  In support of that element, the
officers averred that Chiaverini always suspected the ring
was stolen.  The judge issued the requested warrant, and
the  officers  arrested  Chiaverini.    He  remained  in  custody
for three days, until his arraignment.  At a later prelimi-
nary hearing, the judge heard testimony about the evidence
supporting  the  officers’  probable-cause  allegations.    See
App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a–7a.  The officers maintained that
Chiaverini  had  admitted  in  their  interview  to  suspecting
the  ring  was  stolen;  Chiaverini  denied  making  any  such
statement.  At  the  hearing’s  conclusion,  the  judge  again
found probable cause, and set the three charges for trial.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the opinion of the court. It presents a narrative of events leading up to criminal charges against an individual named Chiaverini.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Per Curiam

new hazards,” and (2) that the “emergency standard is nec-
essary to protect employees from such danger.”  Ibid.  Prior
to the emergence of COVID–19, the Secretary had used this
power just nine times before (and never to issue a rule as
broad as this one).  Of those nine emergency rules, six were
challenged in court, and only one of those was upheld in full.
See  BST  Holdings,  L.L.C.  v.  Occupational  Safety  and
Health Admin., 17 F. 4th 604, 609 (CA5 2021).

B
On  September  9,  2021,  President  Biden  announced  “a
new plan to require more Americans to be vaccinated.”  Re-
marks on the COVID–19 Response and National Vaccina-
tion Efforts, 2021 Daily Comp. of Pres. Doc. 775, p. 2.  As
part of that plan, the President said that the Department
of Labor would issue an emergency rule requiring all em-
ployers with at least 100 employees “to ensure their work-
forces are fully vaccinated or show a negative test at least
once a week.”  Ibid.  The purpose of the rule was to increase
vaccination rates at “businesses all across America.”  Ibid.
In tandem with other planned regulations, the administra-
tion’s goal was to impose “vaccine requirements” on “about
100 million Americans, two-thirds of all workers.”  Id., at 3.
After a 2-month delay, the Secretary of Labor issued the
promised emergency standard.  86 Fed. Reg. 61402 (2021).
Consistent with President Biden’s announcement, the rule
applies to all who work for employers with 100 or more em-
ployees.  There are narrow exemptions for employees who
work  remotely  “100  percent  of  the  time”  or  who  “work
exclusively outdoors,” but those exemptions are largely il-
lusory.  Id., at 61460.  The Secretary has estimated, for ex-
ample,  that  only  nine  percent  of
landscapers  and
groundskeepers qualify as working exclusively outside.  Id.,
at 61461.  The regulation otherwise operates as a blunt in-
strument.  It  draws  no  distinctions  based  on  industry  or
risk of exposure to COVID–19.  Thus, most lifeguards and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses a specific case (likely related to COVID-19 vaccination mandates).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA

INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

The  majority  draws  attention  to  the  minority  report  in
Baldwin.  Ante, at 29.  Under the present circumstances, I
take  some  comfort  in  the  Court’s  willingness  to  consider
dissenting  views.  Still,  the  minority  report  does  not  di-
minish the force of Baldwin.  The report cites a Michigan
Supreme  Court  precedent  that  allegedly  reached  a  con-
trary result, but that case turned entirely on state constitu-
tional questions arising from a state election—not federal
constitutional  questions  arising  from  a  federal  election.
See  People  ex rel.  Twitchell  v.  Blodgett,  13  Mich.  127
(1865).  The majority also contends that Baldwin “appears
in  tension  with”  an  earlier  House  Elections  Committee
precedent.  Ante,  at  29.    By  its  own  terms,  however,  that
earlier precedent did not involve a conflict between a state
legislative  act  and  a  state  constitutional  provision.    See
Shiel v. Thayer, 1 Bartlett Contested Election Cases, H. R.
Misc.  Doc.  No.  57,  38th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  350  (1861)  (“the
two branches of the legislature differed upon the question
. . . and so the bill never became a law”).  In any event, to
the  degree  that  the  two  precedents  are  inconsistent,  the
later decision in Baldwin should govern.3

The  next  relevant  precedent  is  this  Court’s  decision  in
McPherson  v.  Blacker,  146  U. S.  1  (1892).    That  case  in-
volved  a  constitutional  provision  with  considerable  simi-
larity  to  the  Elections  Clause,  the  Presidential  Electors
Clause  of  Article  II:  “Each  State  shall  appoint,  in  such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors  . . . .”    §1,  cl. 2  (emphasis  added).  The  question
was whether the state legislature, as a body of representa-
tives,  could  divide  authority  to  appoint  electors  across
each  of  the  State’s  congressional  districts.    The  Court

——————

3 The  majority’s  suggestion  that  Baldwin  should  be  dismissed  as  an
act  of  partisanship  appears  to  have  no  basis,  unless  one  is  willing  to
regard as tainted every decision in favor of a candidate from the same
party as a majority of the Elections Committee.  Ante, at 29–30.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n. It cites legal precedents and argues against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1098

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 1, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1407. Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc.
v. Marine Drilling Management Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 873.

No. 99–1413. Calkins et ux., dba Indio Grocery Outlet v.
National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 1080.

No. 99–1418. Ter Maat et al. v. Browning-Ferris Indus-
tries of Illinois, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 953.

No. 99–1419. City of New York et al. v. Tenenbaum et
ux., Individually and on Behalf of Tenenbaum, an In-
fant. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193
F. 3d 581.

No. 99–1424. Wilson, Director, Missouri Department of
Revenue v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 984.

No. 99–1425. Borodaty et al. v. West Penn Power Co.,
Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203
F. 3d 816.

No. 99–1428. Westendorp, a Minor, By and Through His
Parents and Natural Guardians, Westendorp et vir,
et al. v. Ventura, Governor of Minnesota, et al. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 829.

No. 99–1430. Lunney, an Infant, by His Father and Nat-
ural Guardian, Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co. Ct. App.
N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 94 N. Y. 2d 242, 723
N. E. 2d 539.

No. 99–1437. Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Northeast Dairy

Compact Commission et al.; and

No. 99–1438. New York State Dairy Foods, Inc., et al. v.
Northeast Dairy Compact Commission et al. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 1.

No. 99–1450. Green, Individually and as Administrator
of the Estate of Green, Deceased, et al. v. Stelly et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 437.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and relevant court information. This type of content is generally not suitable for indexing as it's a structured list rather than narrative text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxxxii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Patrick v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Thomas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Securities and Exchange Comm’n; Gottlieb v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Securities and Exchange Comm’n; Harley v.
Segundo v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Segura Moreno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Select Portfolio Servicing Holding Corp.; Martin v.  . . . . . . . . . . .
Selensky v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Selsky; Welch v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sengvong v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Senior Judge, U. S. District Court; Childs v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Senior Status Judge, Circuit Court of Mercer Cty., W. Va.; J. W. v.
Sepulveda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Serna v. Goodno  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Serrano v. United States
Serrano-Rangel v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sessoms v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Setser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Settle v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Setts v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shabazz v. California
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shabazz v. First Correctional Medical Services
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shaﬁer; Michigan v.
Shah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shamsud-Din v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision
Shannon v. Berghuis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shannon v. Congress Plaza Hotel & Convention Center  . . . . . . . .
Shannon v. 520 South Mich. Ave. Associates, Ltd.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Shareef v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sharkozy v. Allison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sharpe v. Runnels
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sharpe v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sharrieff v. Ricci
Shaw v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shaw Group; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shearin; Ellis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sheehan, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sheehan v. Jackson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sheets; Flora v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shefferman; Lay v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shell Oil Products Co. LLC v. Mac’s Shell Service, Inc.  . . . . . . . .
Shell Oil Products Co. LLC; Mac’s Shell Service, Inc. v.
. . . . . . .
Shelton, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shelton v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

1050

1050

1008

1050

828

865

862

809

935

857

808

970

904

972

1017

922

876

963

960

836

803

. . . . . . . . . . . .  834,1086

992

849

901

951

874

874

1082

944

1013

867

1120

1135

1109

1000

1044

1137

885

834

1010

1010

814

1079
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

Opinion of the Court

Maine amended its law a decade later to permit the former
owner to recover the surplus.  1848 Me. Laws p. 56, §4.  And
Mississippi’s highest court promptly struck down its law for
violating the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Mis-
sissippi Constitution.  See Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 424,
439,  451–452  (Ct.  Err.  &  App.  1860).    Louisiana’s  statute
remained on the books, but the County cites no case show-
ing  that  the  statute  was  actually  enforced  against  a  tax-
payer to take his entire property.

The minority rule then remains the minority rule today:
Thirty-six States and the Federal Government require that
the excess value be returned to the taxpayer.

C
Our precedents have also recognized the principle that a
taxpayer  is  entitled  to  the  surplus  in  excess  of  the  debt
owed.  In United States v. Taylor, 104 U. S. 216 (1881), an
Arkansas taxpayer whose property had been sold to satisfy
a tax debt sought to recover the surplus from the sale.  A
nationwide  tax  had  been  imposed  by  Congress  in  1861  to
raise funds for the Civil War.  Under that statute, if a tax-
payer did not pay, his property would be sold and “the sur-
plus  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  [would]  be  paid  to  the
owner.”  Act of Aug. 5, 1861, §36, 12 Stat. 304.  The next
year, Congress added a 50 percent penalty in the rebelling
States, but made no mention of the owner’s right to surplus
after a tax sale.  See Act of June 7, 1862, §1, 12 Stat. 422.
Taylor’s property had been sold for failure to pay taxes un-
der the 1862 Act, but he sought to recover the surplus under
the 1861 Act.  Though the 1862 Act “ma[de] no mention of
the  right  of  the  owner  of  the  lands  to  receive  the  surplus
proceeds of their sale,” we held that the taxpayer was enti-
tled  to  the  surplus  because  nothing  in  the  1862  Act  took

——————
unregistered “swamp lands,” 1842 N. C. Sess. Laws p. 64, §1, but other-
wise  continued  to  follow  the  majority  rule,  see  1792  N. C.  Sess.  Laws
p. 23, §5.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the legal precedent surrounding the return of surplus funds after a tax sale. It contains legal citations, case names, and references to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

519

Opinion of the Court

that amendment was critical. The “outcry or corrobora-
tion” requirement was not satisﬁed for those convictions; 4
they rested solely on the victim’s testimony. Accordingly,
the verdicts on those four counts stand or fall depending
on whether the child victim exception applies. Under the
old law, the exception would not apply, because the victim
was more than 14 years old at the time of the alleged of-
fenses. Under the new law, the exception would apply, be-
In
cause the victim was under 18 years old at that time.
short, the validity of four of petitioner’s convictions depends
on whether the old or new law applies to his case, which, in
turn, depends on whether the Ex Post Facto Clause pro-
hibits the application of the new version of Article 38.07 to
his case.

As mentioned, only 4 of petitioner’s 15 total convictions
are implicated by the amendment to Article 38.07; the other
11 counts—including the 2 convictions for which petitioner
received life sentences—are uncontested. Six counts are
uncontested because they were committed when the victim
was under 14 years old, so his convictions stand even under
the old law; the other ﬁve uncontested counts were com-
mitted after the new Texas law went into effect, so there
could be no ex post facto claim as to those convictions. See

Sess., ch. 900, § 12.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3765, 3766, and Act of May 10,
1993, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 200, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 387, 388.

4 The victim did not make an outcry until March 1995, more than six
months after the alleged offenses. Although the 1993 amendment to Arti-
cle 38.07 extended the outcry period from six months to one year, see n. 3,
supra, the victim’s outcry did not come within that time period either.
Accordingly, that change in the outcry provision is immaterial to this case.
The State argues that there is evidence corroborating the victim’s testi-
mony, so it does not help petitioner even if the old law applies. See Brief
for Respondent 4, n. 2. Before the state court, however, petitioner ar-
gued that “there was nothing to corroborate [the victim’s] version of
events,” 963 S. W. 2d 833, 836 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998), and that court accepted
the contention as correct for the purposes of its decision. We do the
same here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the application of a legal statute (Article 38.07) to a petitioner's case. It delves into the nuances of ex post facto law and the impact of amendments on the petitioner's convictions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

PETER v. NANTKWEST, INC.

Opinion of the Court

B
“The record of statutory usage” also illustrates how the
term “expenses” alone does not authorize recovery of attor-
ney’s fees.  See West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,
499 U. S. 83, 88 (1991) (looking to statutory usage to deter-
mine whether attorney’s fees and expert fees were distinct
expenses in the fee-shifting context).

That “expenses” and “attorney’s fees” appear in tandem
across  various  statutes  shifting  litigation  costs  indicates
that Congress understands the two terms to be distinct and
not  inclusive  of  each  other.  See,  e.g.,  898  F. 3d,  at  1188
(quoting  11  U. S. C.  §363(n)  (allowing  trustee  to  recover
“any  costs,  attorneys’  fees,  or  expenses  incurred”);  12
U. S. C.  §1786(p)  (permitting  courts  to  “allow  to  any  such
party  such  reasonable  expenses  and  attorneys’  fees  as  it
deems just and proper”); 25 U. S. C. §1401(a) (allowing dis-
tribution of funds after payment of “attorney fees and liti-
gation  expenses”);  26  U. S. C.  §6673(a)(2)(A)  (authorizing
recovery of “costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees” against an
attorney  who  “unreasonably  and  vexatiously”  multiplies
proceedings); 31 U. S. C. §3730(d)(1) (permitting recovery of
“reasonable  expenses  . . .  plus  reasonable  attorneys’  fees
and  costs”);  38  U. S. C.  §4323(h)(2)  (allowing  courts  to
award “reasonable attorney fees, expert  witness fees, and
other  litigation  expenses”)  (all  internal  quotation  marks
omitted)).

While  some  other  statutes  refer  to  attorney’s  fees  as  a
subset of expenses, they show only that “expenses” can in-
clude attorney’s fees when so defined.  See, e.g., 28 U. S. C.
§361  (authorizing  “reasonable  expenses,  including  attor-
neys’  fees”);  §1447(c)  (“An  order  remanding  the  case  may
require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, in-
cluding attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal”);
29  U. S. C.  §1370(e)(1)  (“[T]he  court  in  its  discretion  may
award all or a portion of the costs and expenses incurred in
connection with such action including reasonable attorney’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of the term "expenses" in legal contexts. It contains legal citations and arguments, indicating it's part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18  MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

See  New  York,  supra,  at  168–169;  Printz,  supra,  at  929–
930.

Third,  the  anticommandeering  principle  prevents  Con
gress from shifting the costs of regulation to the States.  If
Congress  enacts  a  law  and  requires  enforcement  by  the
Executive Branch, it must appropriate the funds needed to
administer  the  program.
It  is  pressured  to  weigh  the
expected benefits of the program  against its costs.  But  if
Congress  can  compel  the  States  to  enact  and  enforce  its
program, Congress need not engage in any such analysis.
See, e.g., E. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46
Vill. L. Rev. 1349, 1360–1361 (2001).

IV

A

The  PASPA  provision  at  issue  here—prohibiting  state
authorization  of  sports  gambling—violates  the  anticom
mandeering  rule.  That  provision  unequivocally  dictates
what a state legislature may and may not do.  And this is
true  under  either  our  interpretation  or  that  advocated  by
respondents and the United States.  In either event, state
legislatures  are  put  under  the  direct  control  of  Congress.
It is as if federal officers were installed in state legislative
chambers  and  were  armed  with  the  authority  to  stop
legislators from voting on any offending proposals.  A more
direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to imagine.

Neither  respondents  nor  the  United  States  contends
that Congress can compel a State to enact legislation, but
they say that prohibiting a State from enacting new laws
is another matter.  See Brief for Respondents 19; Brief for
United States 12.  Noting that the laws challenged in New
York and Printz “told states what they must do instead of
what  they  must  not  do,”  respondents  contend  that  com
mandeering  occurs  “only  when  Congress  goes  beyond
precluding  state  action  and  affirmatively  commands  it.”
Brief for Respondents 19 (emphasis deleted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Opinion of the Court

matter of state sovereignty, a State has jurisdiction over all
of its territory, including Indian country.  See U. S. Const.,
Amdt. 10.  As this Court has phrased it, a State is generally
“entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the ter-
ritory within her limits.”  Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How.
212, 228 (1845).

In  the  early  years  of  the  Republic,  the  Federal  Govern-
ment  sometimes  treated  Indian  country  as  separate  from
state  territory—in  the  same  way  that,  for  example,  New
Jersey  is  separate  from  New  York.    Most  prominently,  in
the 1832 decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561,
this Court held that Georgia state law had no force in the
Cherokee Nation because the Cherokee Nation “is a distinct
community occupying its own territory.”

But  the  “general  notion  drawn  from  Chief  Justice  Mar-
shall’s  opinion  in  Worcester  v.  Georgia”  “has  yielded  to
closer  analysis.”  Organized  Village  of  Kake  v.  Egan,  369
U. S. 60, 72 (1962).  “By 1880 the Court no longer viewed
reservations as distinct nations.”  Ibid.  Since the latter half
of the 1800s, the Court has consistently and explicitly held
that Indian reservations are “part of the surrounding State”
and subject to the State’s jurisdiction “except as forbidden
by federal law.”  Ibid.

To  take  a  few  examples:    In  1859,  the  Court  stated:
States retain “the power of a sovereign over their persons
and property, so far as” “necessary to preserve the peace of
the Commonwealth.”  New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 21
How. 366, 370 (1859).

In  1930:  “[R]eservations  are  part  of  the  State  within
which  they  lie  and  her  laws,  civil  and  criminal,  have  the
same force therein as elsewhere within her limits, save that
they  can  have  only  restricted  application  to  the  Indian
wards.”  Surplus  Trading  Co.  v.  Cook,  281  U. S.  647,  651
(1930).

In 1946:  “[I]n the absence of a limiting treaty obligation
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the historical evolution of the relationship between state sovereignty and Indian country.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Opinion of the Court

eradication  of  the  frog’s  habitat  sent  the  species  into  se-
vere  decline.  By  2001,  the  known  wild  population  of  the
dusky  gopher  frog  had  dwindled  to  a  group  of  100  at  a
single  pond  in  southern  Mississippi.    That  year,  the  Fish
and  Wildlife  Service,  which  administers  the  Endangered
Species Act of 1973 on behalf of the Secretary of the Inte-
rior,  listed  the  dusky  gopher  frog  as  an  endangered  spe-
cies.  Final  Listing  62993–62995;  see  87  Stat.  886,  16
U. S. C. §1533(a)(1).

B

When  the  Secretary  lists  a  species  as  endangered,  he
must  also  designate  the  critical  habitat  of  that  species.
§1533(a)(3)(A)(i).  The ESA defines “critical habitat” as:

“(i)  the  specific  areas  within  the  geographical  area
occupied  by  the  species  . . .  on  which  are  found  those
physical or biological features (I) essential to the con-
servation  of  the  species  and  (II)  which  may  require
special management considerations or protection; and
“(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area oc-
cupied by the species . . . upon a determination by the
Secretary that such areas are essential for the conser-
vation of the species.”  §1532(5)(A).

Before  the  Secretary  may  designate  an  area  as  critical
habitat, the ESA requires him to “tak[e] into consideration
the  economic  impact”  and  other  relevant  impacts  of  the
designation.  §1533(b)(2).  The statute goes on to authorize
him to “exclude any area from critical habitat if he deter-
mines  that  the  benefits  of  such  exclusion  outweigh  the
benefits of [designation],” unless exclusion would result in
extinction of the species.  Ibid.

A critical-habitat designation does not directly limit the
rights of private landowners.  It instead places conditions
on the Federal Government’s authority to effect any physi-
cal  changes  to  the  designated  area,  whether  through
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the Endangered Species Act and the concept of critical habitat.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

923

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5927.  Kerns  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  916.

No.  09–5930.  McKinney  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  180.

No.  09–5932.  Roberts  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  436.

No.  09–5933.  Stallard  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  383.

No.  09–5934.  Burt  v.  Yarborough,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  23.

No. 09–5936.  Moore, aka Roberts v.  United States.  C.  A.
8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 327 Fed. Appx. 674.

No.  09–5937.  Plummer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5939.  Flagler  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  551.

No. 09–5940.  Smith v.  United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  650.

No.  09–5942.  Rinaldi  v.  Sniezek,  Warden.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  302  Fed.  Appx.  125.

No. 09–5946.  Thongsophaporn v.  United States.  C. A. 1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5947.  Thompson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  745.

No. 09–5950.  Padilla v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  131.

No.  09–5951.  Petties  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  786.

No.  09–5954.  DeGarmo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  928.

No.  09–5955.  Eason  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

cover “all cases where any person may be restrained of his
or  her  liberty  in  violation  of  the  constitution,  or  of  any
treaty or law of the United States.”  Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
For most of our Nation’s history, a federal prisoner “claim-
ing the right to be released,” §2255(a), in a collateral attack
on his sentence would have relied on these Acts and their
successors.

That changed with the 1948 recodification and reorgani-
zation of the Judiciary Code.  See generally 62 Stat. 869.  In
enacting  the  present  Title  28  of  the  United  States  Code,
Congress largely recodified the federal courts’ pre-existing
habeas authority in §§2241 and 2243, which, respectively,
confer  the  power  to  grant  the  writ  and  direct  the  issuing
court to “dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”
Id., at 964–965.  At the same time, however, Congress cre-
ated  §2255  as  a  separate  remedial  vehicle  specifically  de-
signed for federal prisoners’ collateral attacks on their sen-
tences.1  Id., at 967–968.

The  “sole  purpose”  of  this  innovation,  as  this  Court
acknowledged a few years later, “was to minimize the diffi-
culties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording
the  same  rights  in  another  and  more  convenient  forum.”
United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 219 (1952); see also
Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 343 (1974) (“[Section]
2255  was  intended  to  afford  federal  prisoners  a  remedy
identical in scope to federal habeas corpus”); accord, United
States v. Addonizio, 442 U. S. 178, 185 (1979); Hill v. United
——————

1 As first enacted, §2255 applied to any “prisoner in custody under sen-
tence of a court of the United States.”  62 Stat. 967.  In 1949, Congress
substituted “court established by Act of Congress” for “court of the United
States,” making no other changes.  §114, 63 Stat. 105 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  Section 2255 was not again amended until AEDPA, and
the  only  post-AEDPA  amendment  simply  added  the  current  lettering
and  numbering  to  what  were  previously  undesignated  paragraphs.
Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, §511, 121 Stat. 2545.  For sim-
plicity,  we  use  §2255’s  current  internal  designations  throughout  this
opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

BARRETT, J., concurring

sive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individ-
ual  enforcement  under  §1983.’ ”    Gonzaga,  536  U. S.,  at
284–285, n. 4.

As  the  Court  notes,  the  presence of  an  “express  private
judicial right of action” typically demonstrates that a §1983
suit  is  not  also  available.    Ante,  at  19;  see  Rancho  Palos
Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113, 121 (2005) (express cause
of action “is ordinarily an indication that Congress did not
intend  to  leave  open  a  more  expansive  remedy  under
§1983”).  When the statutory cause of action restricts avail-
able  remedies  or  imposes  procedural  hurdles  to  obtaining
relief,  the  inference  is  even  stronger.    See  Fitzgerald  v.
Barnstable School Comm., 555 U. S. 246, 254 (2009) (con-
sidering  whether  a  §1983  suit  “would  have  circumvented
these procedures and given plaintiffs access to tangible ben-
efits—such  as  damages,  attorney’s  fees,  and  costs—that
were  unavailable  under  the  statut[e]”);  Rancho  Palos
Verdes, 544 U. S., at 122–123 (similar).

But an actual clash—one private judicial remedy against
another,  more  expansive  remedy—is  not  required  to  find
that a statute forecloses recourse to §1983.  Our cases have
looked  to  a  wide  range  of  contextual  clues,  like  “enforce-
ment provisions” that “confe[r] authority to sue . . . on gov-
ernment officials,” Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 13, 20, and
any  “administrative  remedies”  that  the  statute  offers,
Smith  v.  Robinson,  468  U. S.  992,  1012  (1984).    We  have
noted the relevance of a centralized review mechanism that
would  be  undermined  by  piecemeal  litigation.  Gonzaga,
536 U. S., at 289–290 (statute directed the Secretary of Ed-
ucation to establish a review board to investigate and adju-
dicate alleged violations).  And we have regularly taken ac-
count  of  the  overall  comprehensiveness  of  the  statute’s
enforcement scheme.  The more comprehensive the scheme,
the less likely that it leaves the door open for §1983 suits.
Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 20 (“When the remedial devices
provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Barrett. It contains legal citations, analysis of legal precedent, and arguments related to a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xcii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1154

Mason v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1007

Mason; Smith v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Massachusetts; Erickson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
801

Massachusetts; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Massachusetts; Vinnie v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Massachusetts; Votta v.
1030

Massachusetts; Watkins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991

Masseri; Martinez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Massie v. McNeil
1047

Massis v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

Mata-Carillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Matheny v. Tennessee Valley Authority  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Matheson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1129

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mathews v. United States
1082

Mathis v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
977

Mathurin v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058

Mathy; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Matthew v. Department of Army  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Matthews; Reddy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Matthews v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  929,976,1134,1135

1154

Matylinsky v. Budge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912

Mauldin v. U. S. Probation Ofﬁce  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Mauney; Ballenger v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maxwell, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1023

Maxwell v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  883,1139

Maxwell v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130

1031

Maxwell v. Talley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939

Maxwell v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

May v. Arizona  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1085

Mayberry v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Mayer; Elasali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
860

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mayer v. United States
824

Mayer Uniﬁed School Dist. v. Arizona State Land Comm’r
. . . . .
1004

Mayle v. Sabol
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Mayor, Clemson, S. C.; Cleveland v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Mays v. Dinwiddie  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Maywood v. Densmore  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
810

Mazda Motor of America, Inc.; Williamson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1059

McAffee v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

McBride; Blackmon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

McBride; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

McBride; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037

McCabe; Levine v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

McCaleb v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1096

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 14, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6998.  Machado  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7000.  Larson  v.  Williams  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7001.  Malone  v.  Campbell,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7004.  Price  et  vir  v.  Louisiana  Department  of
Education et al.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported
below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  559.

No.  09–7009.  Van  Dang  v.  Evans,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7014.  Morgan v.  Chandler, Warden.  C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7016.  Young  v.  Transportation  Deputy  Sheriff  I
et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340
Fed.  Appx.  368.

No. 09–7040.  Effler v.  Iowa.  Sup. Ct. Iowa.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  769  N. W.  2d  880.

No.  09–7085.  Knight  v.  Belleque,  Superintendent,  Ore

gon  State  Penitentiary.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7170.  Carmona  v.  Astrue,  Commissioner  of  Social

Security.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7223.  Sumner  v.  Davis,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  937.

No. 09–7243.  Elmore v.  Ohio.  Sup. Ct. Ohio.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  122  Ohio  St.  3d  472,  912  N.  E.  2d  582.

No.  09–7281.  Anton  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–7339.  Bosse  v.  Napolitano,  Secretary  of  Home
land  Security,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  633.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, and the court that heard the case. This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is more like a table of contents or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U73

[09-06-00 17:32:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 38 (1998)

47

Opinion of the Court

Such a case was Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589 (1891),
in which the plaintiff alleged that judgment had been taken
against her in the underlying action as a result of a forged
document. The Court said:

“According to the averments of the original petition for
injunction . . . the judgments in question would not have
been rendered against Mrs. Marshall but for the use in
evidence of the letter alleged to be forged. The case
evidently intended to be presented by the petition is one
where, without negligence, laches or other fault upon
the part of petitioner, [respondent] has fraudulently ob-
tained judgments which he seeks, against conscience, to
enforce by execution.”

Id., at 596.

The sense of these expressions is that, under the Rule, an
independent action should be available only to prevent a
In this case, it should be obvi-
grave miscarriage of justice.
ous that respondents’ allegations do not nearly approach this
demanding standard. Respondents allege only that the
United States failed to “thoroughly search its records and
make full disclosure to the Court” regarding the Boudreau
grant. App. 23. Whether such a claim might succeed
under Rule 60(b)(3), we need not now decide; it surely would
work no “grave miscarriage of justice,” and perhaps no mis-
carriage of justice at all, to allow the judgment to stand.
We therefore hold that the Court of Appeals erred in con-
cluding that this was a sufﬁcient basis to justify the reopen-
ing of the judgment in the Adams litigation.4

The Court of Appeals did not, however, merely reopen the
Adams litigation.
It also directed the District Court to
quiet title to the property in respondents’ favor. The Court
of Appeals believed that the QTA, 28 U. S. C. § 2409a, pro-
vided jurisdiction to do this. The QTA permits “plaintiffs

4 We therefore need not address the additional requirement that evi-
dence of the Boudreau grant would have changed the outcome of the origi-
nal action. See, e. g., Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U. S. 651, 657 (1912).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 38 (1998). It discusses the case of Marshall v. Holmes and applies its principles to the current case.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
106

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
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This appears to be a legal citation, likely part of a court document. Legal citations are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the main content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
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</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

951

524 U. S.

June 26, 1998

Certiorari Granted

No. 97–1642. Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 121 F. 3d
1357.

Certiorari Denied

No. 97–799. Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 123 F. 3d 490.

No. 97– 801. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United
States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
112 F. 3d 1569.

No. 97–884. Gecas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 120 F. 3d 1419.

No. 97–1278.

Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail et al.
v. Rouse, Sheriff, Suffolk County, et al. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 649.

No. 97–1394. Southeastern Maritime Co. et al. v. Brown
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 121
F. 3d 648.

No. 97–1404. Malpeso v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 115 F. 3d 155.

No. 97–1440. Gurney et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed.

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 1462.

No. 97–1443. Mausolf et al. v. Babbitt, Secretary of the
Interior, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 125 F. 3d 661.

No. 97–1444. McLaughlin et al. v. United States. C. A.

3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 126 F. 3d 130.

No. 97–1535. General Media Communications, Inc., et al.
v. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 273.

No. 97–1541. Smith et al. v. Metropolitan School Dis-
trict Perry Township et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 128 F. 3d 1014.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their status (granted or denied) regarding certiorari. This type of information is generally not considered the main body text of a legal document and is more like a summary or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>