<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

15

Opinion of the Court

only  a  small  number  of  cases  involving  filed  complaints.
See id., at 307–308.  California does not rely on Schedule
Bs  to  initiate  investigations,  and  in  all  events,  there  are
multiple alternative mechanisms through which the Attor-
ney General can obtain Schedule B information after initi-
ating an investigation.  The need for up-front collection is
particularly  dubious  given  that  California—one  of  only
three States to impose such a requirement, see id., at 420—
did  not  rigorously  enforce  the  disclosure  obligation  until
2010.  Certainly, this is not a regime “whose scope is in pro-
portion to the interest served.”  McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at
218 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In reality, then, California’s interest is less in investigat-
ing fraud and more in ease of administration.  This interest,
however,  cannot  justify  the  disclosure  requirement.    The
Attorney  General  may  well  prefer  to  have  every  charity’s
information close at hand, just in case.  But “the prime ob-
jective of the First Amendment is not efficiency.”  McCullen,
573  U. S.,  at  495.    Mere  administrative  convenience  does
not remotely “reflect the seriousness of the actual burden”
that the demand for Schedule Bs imposes on donors’ asso-
ciation rights.  Reed, 561 U. S., at 196 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

B
The  foregoing  discussion  also  makes  clear  why  a  facial
challenge is appropriate in these cases.  Normally, a plain-
tiff bringing a facial challenge must “establish that no set
of  circumstances  exists  under  which  the  [law]  would  be
valid,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987),
or  show  that  the  law  lacks  “a  plainly  legitimate  sweep,”
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party, 552 U. S. 442, 449 (2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  In  the  First  Amendment  context,  however,  we
have recognized “a second type of facial challenge, whereby
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of a disclosure requirement related to charities.  The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1049

558 U. S.

November 30, 2009

No.  09–297.  Ford  Motor  Co.  v.  Buell-Wilson  et  al.  Ct.

App.  Cal.,  4th  App.  Dist.,  Div.  1.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–331.  Harper,  Individually  and  as  Personal  Rep
resentative  of  the  Estate  of  Harper,  Deceased,  et  al.  v.
United  Services  Automobile  Assn.  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  302.

No.  09–340.  Powell  et  al.  v.  Carey  International,  Inc.,
et al.  C.  A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported  below: 323
Fed.  Appx.  829.

No.  09–345.  Gerard  v.  Board  of  Regents  of  Georgia
et al.  C.  A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported  below: 324
Fed.  Appx.  818.

No.  09–352.  Whitmore  v.  Pierce  County  Department  of
Community  Corrections  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  595.

No.  09–362.  Boston  Scientific  Corp.  et  al.  v.  Cordis

Corp.;  and

No. 09–365.  Cordis Corp. v.  Boston Scientific Corp. et al.
C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d
1319.

No. 09–363.  Cooper v.  Ayers, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  510  F.  3d  870.

No.  09–369.  Maggard  et  vir  v.  Ford  Motor  Co.  C.  A.  6th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  367.

No.  09–373.  Hallinan  et  al.  v.  Fraternal  Order  of  Po
lice,  Chicago  Lodge  7,  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  570  F.  3d  811.

No.  09–374.  Hoffman  v.  United  Airlines,  Inc.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  429.

No.  09–380.  Beltran  Lozano  v.  Holder,  Attorney  Gen
eral.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334
Fed.  Appx.  312.

No.  09– 381.  Constant  v.  California  Department  of
Transportation.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.  Dist.,  Div.  2.  Certio
rari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It includes case numbers, court names, and brief descriptions of the orders issued.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary/Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

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354

NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SHANKLIN

Opinion of the Court

Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the de-
vices.”

23 CFR § 646.214(b)(3)(i) (1999).

Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) therefore establish a stand-
ard of adequacy that “determine[s] the devices to be in-
stalled” when federal funds participate in the crossing im-
If a
provement project. Easterwood, 507 U. S., at 671.
crossing presents those conditions listed in (b)(3), the State
must install automatic gates and ﬂashing lights; if the (b)(3)
factors are absent, (b)(4) dictates that the decision as to what
devices to install is subject to FHWA approval. See id., at
670–671.
In either case, § 646.214(b)(3) or (4) “is applicable”
and determines the type of warning device that is “ade-
quate” under federal law. As a result, once the FHWA has
funded the crossing improvement and the warning devices
are actually installed and operating, the regulation “dis-
place[s] state and private decisionmaking authority by estab-
lishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective de-
Id., at 670.
vices be installed or federal approval obtained.”
Importantly, this is precisely the interpretation of
§§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) that the FHWA endorsed in Easter-
wood. Appearing as amicus curiae, the Government ex-
plained that § 646.214(b) “establishes substantive standards
for what constitutes adequate safety devices on grade cross-
ing improvement projects ﬁnanced with federal
funds.”
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in CSX Transp.,
Inc. v. Easterwood, O. T. 1992, Nos. 91–790 and 91–1206, p. 23.
As a result, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “cover the subject matter
of adequate safety devices at crossings that have been im-
Ibid. More speciﬁ-
proved with the use of federal funds.”
cally, the Government stated that § 646.214(b)

“requires gate arms in certain circumstances, and re-
quires FHWA approval of the safety devices in all other
circumstances. Thus, the warning devices in place at a
crossing improved with the use of federal funds have, by
deﬁnition, been speciﬁcally found to be adequate under a
regulation issued by the Secretary. Any state rule that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an excerpt from a court opinion. It contains legal citations, references to regulations, and discusses legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

Syllabus

games”  rather  than  any  cognizable  constitutional  law  principle.
Buckley, supra, at 241, 244 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).  Pp. 1–5.

ROBERTS, C. J., announced  the  judgment  of  the  Court  and  delivered
an opinion, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and ALITO, JJ., joined.  THOMAS,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.  BREYER, J., filed a dis-
senting  opinion,  in  which  GINSBURG,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case syllabus, which typically summarizes the arguments and holdings of a court decision.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION,
INC., ET AL. v. BRUEN, SUPERINTENDENT OF NEW
YORK STATE POLICE, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 20–843.  Argued November 3, 2021—Decided June 23, 2022

The State of New York makes it a crime to possess a firearm without a
license, whether inside or outside the home.  An individual who wants
to carry a firearm outside his home may obtain an unrestricted license
to “have and carry” a concealed “pistol or revolver” if he can prove that
“proper cause exists” for doing so.  N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §400.00(2)(f ).
An  applicant  satisfies  the  “proper  cause”  requirement  only  if  he  can
“demonstrate  a  special  need  for  self-protection  distinguishable  from
that of the general community.”  E.g., In re Klenosky, 75 App. Div. 2d
793, 428 N. Y. S. 2d 256, 257.

Petitioners Brandon Koch and Robert Nash are adult, law-abiding
New York residents who both applied for unrestricted licenses to carry
a handgun in public based on their generalized interest in self-defense.
The State denied both of their applications for unrestricted licenses,
allegedly because Koch and Nash failed to satisfy the “proper cause”
requirement.  Petitioners then sued respondents—state officials who
oversee the processing of licensing applications—for declaratory and
injunctive relief, alleging that respondents violated their Second and
Fourteenth  Amendment  rights  by  denying  their  unrestricted-license
applications for failure to demonstrate a unique need for self-defense.
The District Court dismissed petitioners’ complaint and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.  Both courts relied on the Second Circuit’s prior de-
cision in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F. 3d 81, which had
sustained New York’s proper-cause standard, holding that the require-
ment  was  “substantially  related  to  the  achievement  of an  important
governmental interest.”  Id., at 96.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

THOMAS, J., dissenting

The  majority  resists  this  conclusion,  suggesting  that
without access to the annotations, readers of Georgia law
will be unable to fully understand the true meaning of Geor-
gia’s statutory provisions, such as provisions that have been
undermined  or  nullified  by  court  decisions.  Ante,  at  17.
That is simply incorrect.  As the majority tacitly concedes,
a  person  seeking  information  about  changes  in  Georgia
statutory  law  can  find  that  information  by  consulting  the
original source for the change in the law’s status—the court
decisions themselves.  See ante, at 17.  The inability to ac-
cess the OCGA merely deprives a researcher of one specific
tool, not to the underlying factual or legal information sum-
marized in that tool.  See also post, at 4 (GINSBURG, J., dis-
senting).2

C
The text of the Copyright Act supports my reading of the

——————

2 The  majority  contends  that,  rather  than  seeking  to  understand  the
origins of our precedents, we should simply accept the text of the opinions
that the Justices “voted on and committed to writing.”  Ante, at 16–17,
n. 4.  But that begs the question: What does the text of the relevant opin-
ions tell us?  The answer is not much.  It is precisely this lack of explica-
tion that makes it necessary to explore the “judicial consensus” and pub-
lic policy referred to in Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S. 244, 253 (1888).
Instead, the majority attempts to dissect the language of our prior opin-
ions in the same way it would interpret a statute, an approach we have
repeatedly cautioned against.  See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509
U. S. 502, 515 (1993); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 341 (1979).
The proper approach is to “read general language in judicial opinions . . .
as  referring  in  context  to  circumstances  similar  to  the  circumstances
then before the Court and not referring to quite different circumstances
that the Court was not then considering.”  Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U. S.
419,  424  (2004);  see  also  Cohens  v. Virginia,  6  Wheat.  264,  399  (1821)
(Marshall, C. J., for the Court) (“[G]eneral expressions, in every opinion,
are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions
are used.  If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought
not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is
presented for decision”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and cites previous cases, indicating it's part of the core legal content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

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[09-26-01 13:01:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 667 (2000)

681

Opinion of the Court

viders once services are rendered to patients. Payments
are made in a manner calculated to maintain provider
§ 413.5(b); Good Samaritan Hospital, 508 U. S.,
stability.
at 406.
Incentives are given for long-term improvements,
such as capital costs and education. §§ 413.85, 413.134(e),
413.153(b)(2)(iii). Subsidies, deﬁned as “special treatment,”
are awarded to certain providers.
In short,
provider organizations play a vital role and maintain a high
level of responsibility in carrying out the program’s pur-
poses. Medicare funds, in turn, provide beneﬁts extending
beyond isolated, point-of-sale treatment transactions. The
funds health care organizations receive for participating in
the Medicare program constitute “beneﬁts” within the mean-
ing of 18 U. S. C. § 666(b).

Id., pt. 412G.

Our discussion should not be taken to suggest that federal
funds disbursed under an assistance program will result in
coverage of all recipient fraud under § 666(b). Any receipt
of federal funds can, at some level of generality, be character-
ized as a beneﬁt. The statute does not employ this broad,
almost limitless use of the term. Doing so would turn al-
most every act of fraud or bribery into a federal offense,
upsetting the proper
federal balance. To determine
whether an organization participating in a federal assistance
program receives “beneﬁts,” an examination must be under-
taken of the program’s structure, operation, and purpose.
The inquiry should examine the conditions under which the
organization receives the federal payments. The answer
could depend, as it does here, on whether the recipient’s own
operations are one of the reasons for maintaining the pro-
gram. Health care organizations participating in the Medi-
care program satisfy this standard.

The Government has a legitimate and signiﬁcant interest
in prohibiting ﬁnancial fraud or acts of bribery being perpe-
trated upon Medicare providers. Fraudulent acts threaten
the program’s integrity. They raise the risk participating
organizations will lack the resources requisite to provide the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 667 (2000). It discusses the definition of "benefits" under 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) in the context of Medicare fraud.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1039

558 U. S.

November 16, 18, 19, 23, 30, 2009

No.  09–5086.  Smith  v.  Denny,  Warden,  ante,  p.  886;
No.  09–5237.  Greene  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De

partment  of  Corrections,  ante,  p.  893;

No.  09–5439.  Cornes  v.  Illinois,  ante,  p.  903;
No.  09–5793.  Brown  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  919;
No.  09–5847.  Ronwin  v.  Bayer  Corp.,  ante,  p.  921;  and
No.  09–6060.  Moore  v.  Merit  Systems  Protection  Board,

ante,  p.  927.  Petitions  for  rehearing  denied.

Certiorari  Denied

November  18,  2009

No.  09–7505  (09A472).  Simpson  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas
Department  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institu
tions Division.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Application for stay of execution
of  sentence  of  death,  presented  to  Justice  Scalia,  and  by  him
referred  to  the  Court,  denied.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Ste
vens,  Justice  Ginsburg,  and  Justice  Sotomayor  would  grant
the  application  for  stay  of  execution.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.
Appx.  68.

Certiorari  Denied

November  19,  2009

No.  09–7567  (09A466).  Thompson  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.
Tex.  Application  for  stay  of  execution  of  sentence  of  death,  pre
sented  to  Justice  Scalia,  and  by  him  referred  to  the  Court,
denied.  Certiorari  denied.

November  23,  2009

Dismissal  Under  Rule  46

No.  09–563.  Peters  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  dismissed  under  this  Court’s  Rule  46.1.

November  30,  2009

Certiorari Granted—Reversed and Remanded.

(See No. 08–10537,

ante,  p.  30.)

Certiorari  Granted—Vacated  and  Remanded

No.  08–10314.  Webster  v.  Cooper,  Warden.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal journal or database. It includes case numbers, dates, and brief descriptions of the actions taken by the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

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[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

66

PORTUONDO v. AGARD

Opinion of the Court

criminal defendants were brought to justice in 1791 largely
obviated the need for comments of the type the prosecutor
made here. Defendants routinely were asked (and agreed)
to provide a pretrial statement to a justice of the peace de-
tailing the events in dispute. See Moglen, The Privilege in
British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth
in The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Amendment,
109, 112, 114 (R. Helmholz et al. eds. 1997).
If their story
at trial—where they typically spoke and conducted their
defense personally, without counsel, see J. Goebel & T.
Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial New York: A Study
in Criminal Procedure (1664–1776), p. 574 (1944); A. Scott,
Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 79 (1930)—differed from
their pretrial statement, the contradiction could be noted.
See Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment and Its Critics,
19 Cardozo L. Rev. 821, 843 (1997). Moreover, what they
said at trial was not considered to be evidence, since they
were disqualiﬁed from testifying under oath. See 2 J. Wig-
more, Evidence § 579 (3d ed. 1940).

The pretrial statement did not begin to fall

into dis-
use until the 1830’s, see Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in
Historical Perspective,
in The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, supra, at 198, and the ﬁrst State to make
defendants competent witnesses was Maine, in 1864, see 2
In response to these devel-
Wigmore, supra, § 579, at 701.
opments, some States attempted to limit a defendant’s oppor-
tunity to tailor his sworn testimony by requiring him to tes-
tify prior to his own witnesses. See 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§§ 1841, 1869 (1904); Ky. Stat., ch. 45, § 1646 (1899); Tenn.
Code Ann., ch. 4, § 5601 (1896). Although the majority of
States did not impose such a restriction, there is no evidence
to suggest they also took the afﬁrmative step of forbidding
comment upon the defendant’s opportunity to tailor his testi-
mony. The dissent faults us for “call[ing] up no instance of
an 18th- or 19th-century prosecutor’s urging that a defend-
ant’s presence at trial facilitated tailored testimony.” Post,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the text of the opinion itself. It discusses historical practices related to pretrial statements and defendant testimony.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

961

Gallagos v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
977

Gallego v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1059

Galloway v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

Gamble v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Gang Song v. Turner
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Gansler; Beckett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Gansler; Lay v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
872

Gant v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930

Gantt v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1156

Garba v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

Garcell v. North Carolina  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

Garcia v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Garcia v. Cate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Garcia v. Felker  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
891

Garcia; Hayes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

Garcia v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Garcia; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garcia; Jointer v.
841

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garcia; Olivares v.
837

Garcia v. Ryan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . .  850,890,1005,1018,1033,1035,1134,1158

1158

Garcia v. Vilsack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Garcia v. Yarborough  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131

Garcia-Aguilar v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919

Garcia-Cardenas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garcia-Echaverria v. United States
1051

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057

Garcia-Gonzalez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887

Garcia-Gracia v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Garcia Nunez v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1062

Garcia-Salgado v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1017

Garcia-Sanchez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1084

Garcia-Villegas v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Garcon v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Gardner v. Norris  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
850

Gardner v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044

Gargano v. Liberty International Underwriters, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . .
1094

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garibay v. Lewis
1131

Garibay v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

Garland v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Garland v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
850

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garner v. Mitchell
1056

Garnett v. Uttecht  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Garnett; Ware v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Garnto v. Mekusker  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
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  <category>Table of Contents</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U99

[09-15-00 14:41:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

754

BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ELLERTH

Opinion of the Court

employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms
and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title
VII. For any sexual harassment preceding the employment
decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be se-
vere or pervasive. Because Ellerth’s claim involves only un-
fulﬁlled threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work
environment claim which requires a showing of severe or
pervasive conduct. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 81 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys-
tems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993). For purposes of this case,
we accept the District Court’s ﬁnding that the alleged con-
duct was severe or pervasive. See supra, at 749. The case
before us involves numerous alleged threats, and we express
no opinion as to whether a single unfulﬁlled threat is sufﬁ-
cient to constitute discrimination in the terms or conditions
of employment.

When we assume discrimination can be proved, however,
the factors we discuss below, and not the categories quid pro
quo and hostile work environment, will be controlling on the
issue of vicarious liability. That is the question we must
resolve.

III

We must decide, then, whether an employer has vicarious
liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work environ-
ment by making explicit threats to alter a subordinate’s
terms or conditions of employment, based on sex, but does
not fulﬁll the threat. We turn to principles of agency law,
for the term “employer” is deﬁned under Title VII to include
“agents.”
42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b); see Meritor, supra, at 72.
In express terms, Congress has directed federal courts to
interpret Title VII based on agency principles. Given such
an explicit instruction, we conclude a uniform and predict-
able standard must be established as a matter of federal law.
We rely “on the general common law of agency, rather than
on the law of any particular State, to give meaning to these
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.  It discusses the legal framework for sexual harassment claims and vicarious liability of employers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.

Syllabus

work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of oth-
ers.”  393 U. S., at 513.  The special characteristics that give schools
additional license to regulate student speech do not always disappear
when  that  speech  takes  place  off  campus.    Circumstances  that  may
implicate a school’s regulatory interests include serious or severe bul-
lying or harassment targeting particular individuals; threats aimed at
teachers or other students; the failure to follow rules concerning les-
sons, the writing of papers, the use of computers, or participation in
other online school activities; and breaches of school security devices.
Pp. 4–6.

(b) But three features of off-campus speech often, even if not always,
distinguish  schools’  efforts  to  regulate  off-campus  speech.  First,  a
school will rarely stand in loco parentis when a student speaks off cam-
pus.  Second, from the student speaker’s perspective, regulations of off-
campus speech, when coupled with regulations of on-campus speech,
include  all  the  speech  a  student  utters  during  the  full  24-hour  day.
That means courts must be more skeptical of a school’s efforts to regu-
late off-campus speech, for doing so may mean the student cannot en-
gage in that kind of speech at all.  Third, the school itself has an inter-
est in protecting a student’s unpopular expression, especially when the
expression  takes  place  off  campus,  because  America’s  public  schools
are the nurseries of democracy.  Taken together, these three features
of much off-campus speech mean that the leeway the First Amendment
grants to schools in light of their special characteristics is diminished.
Pp. 6–8.

(c) The school violated B. L.’s First Amendment rights when it sus-

pended her from the junior varsity cheerleading squad.  Pp. 8–11.

(1) B. L.’s posts are entitled to First Amendment protection.  The
statements made in B. L.’s Snapchats reflect criticism of the rules of a
community of which B. L. forms a part.  And B. L.’s message did not
involve features that would place it outside the First Amendment’s or-
dinary protection.  Pp. 8–9.

(2) The circumstances of B. L.’s speech diminish the school’s inter-
est in regulation.  B. L.’s posts appeared outside of school hours from
a  location  outside  the  school.    She  did  not  identify  the  school  in  her
posts  or  target  any  member  of  the  school  community  with  vulgar  or
abusive  language.    B.  L.  also  transmitted  her  speech  through  a  per-
sonal cellphone, to an audience consisting of her private circle of Snap-
chat friends.  P. 9.

(3) The  school’s  interest  in  teaching  good  manners  and  conse-
quently in punishing the use of vulgar language aimed at part of the
school  community  is  weakened  considerably  by  the  fact  that  B.  L.
spoke outside the school on her own time.  B. L. spoke under circum-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, outlining the reasoning behind a court's decision. It is not the actual content of a book and is likely not meant to be read for enjoyment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CHRYSAFIS v. MARKS

BREYER, J., dissenting

2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 127, §§1, 2(2)(a).  Among other things,
TSHA  instructs  New  York  courts  to  entertain  a  COVID-
related hardship defense in eviction proceedings, assessing
a tenant’s income prior to COVID, income during COVID,
liquid assets, and ability to obtain government assistance.
§2(2)(b).  If the court finds the tenant “has suffered a finan-
cial hardship” during a statutorily-prescribed period, then
it “shall [not] issue a warrant of eviction or judgment of pos-
session.”  §2(1).
  JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  and
JUSTICE KAGAN  join,  dissenting  from  grant  of  application
for injunctive relief.
  The New York Legislature has passed two laws regulat-
ing evictions during the COVID–19 pandemic.  The first is
the  Tenant  Safe  Harbor  Act,  which  provides  tenants  who
have “suffered a financial hardship during the COVID–19
covered  period”  with  a  defense  in  eviction  proceedings.
2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 127, §2.2.(a) (McKinney).  The second
is the COVID–19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Pre-
vention Act of 2020 (CEEFPA).  CEEFPA simplifies the pro-
cess  for  tenants  to  invoke  financial  hardship  during  the
pandemic as a defense to eviction.  Tenants who wish to as-
sert  the defense must provide  a  sworn  attestation stating
that they are experiencing financial hardship or health im-
pacts as a result of the pandemic.  2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 381,
pt. A, §4.  The attestation pauses eviction proceedings until
the time that CEEFPA expires, namely the end of August
2021.    §§2,  4,  6,  8;  2021  N.  Y.  Laws  ch. 104  (establishing
CEEFPA’s August 31, 2021, expiration date).  Pending evic-
tion proceedings are stayed, new eviction proceedings can-
not  be  filed,  and outstanding  eviction  warrants  cannot  be
executed until that date.  2020 N. Y. Laws ch. 381, pt. A,
§§2, 4, 6, 8.  Eviction proceedings may resume after August
31, 2021.
  Only  CEEFPA  is  before  us.    Applicants,  five  New  York
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses New York laws related to evictions during the COVID-19 pandemic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

JACKSON, J., concurring

match its historical precursors . . . ‘still may be analogous
enough  to  pass  constitutional  muster.’ ”    Ibid.  (quoting
Bruen, 597 U. S., at 30).  Gun regulations need only “com-
port  with  the  principles  underlying  the  Second  Amend-
ment.”  Ante, at 7–8.  These clarifying efforts are welcome,
given the many questions Bruen left unanswered.

When this Court adopts a new legal standard, as we did
in Bruen, we do not do so in a vacuum.  The tests we estab-
lish  bind  lower  court  judges,  who  then  apply  those  legal
standards  to  the  cases  before  them.  In  my  view,  as  this
Court thinks of, and speaks about, history’s relevance to the
interpretation  of  constitutional  provisions,  we  should  be
mindful that our common-law tradition of promoting clarity
and consistency in the application of our precedent also has
a lengthy pedigree.  So when courts signal they are having
trouble with one of our standards, we should pay attention.
Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
469 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1985).

The message that lower courts are sending now in Second
Amendment cases could not be clearer.  They say there is
little method to Bruen’s madness.1  It isn’t just that Bruen’s

——————

1See, e.g., Barris v. Stroud Twp., ___ Pa. ___, ___, 310 A. 3d 175, 190
(2024) (“[M]ore guidance in this challenging and ever-shifting area of the
law  is  welcome”);  State  v.  Wilson,  154  Haw.  8,  21,  543  P. 3d  440,  453
(2024) (“[B]y turning the test into history and nothing else, [Bruen] dis-
mantles workable methods to interpret firearms laws”); United States v.
Dubois, 94 F. 4th 1284, 1293 (CA11 2024) (“We require clearer instruc-
tion from the Supreme Court before we may reconsider the constitution-
ality of [18 U. S. C. §]922(g)(1)”); United States v. Daniels, 77 F. 4th 337,
358 (CA5 2023) (Higginson, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts, operating in good
faith, are struggling at every stage of the Bruen inquiry.  Those struggles
encompass numerous, often dispositive, difficult questions”); Atkinson v.
Garland, 70 F. 4th 1018, 1024 (CA7 2023) (“[T]he historical analysis re-
quired by Bruen will be difficult and no doubt yield some measure of in-
determinancy”); id., at 1036 (Wood, J., dissenting) (“As other courts have
begun to apply Bruen, [the] need for further research and further guid-
ance has become clear”); Gonyo v. D. S., 210 N. Y. S. 3d 612, 615, 2024
N. Y. Slip Op. 24018 (Jan. 19, 2024) (“Interpretations and applications of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Jackson in a case titled "United States v. Rahimi".  It delves into the interpretation and application of the Second Amendment following the Supreme Court's decision in Bruen.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MERRILL v. MILLIGAN

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

progeny  have  engendered  considerable  disagreement  and
uncertainty regarding the nature and contours of a vote di-
lution  claim.    See  Gingles,  478  U. S.,  at  97  (O’Connor,  J.,
concurring  in  judgment)  (characterizing  the  Court’s  ap-
proach  at  the  outset  as  “inconsistent  with  . . .  §2’s  dis-
claimer of a right to proportional representation”); Johnson
v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1028 (1994) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment) (warning that
“placing undue emphasis upon proportionality risks defeat-
ing the goals underlying the Voting Rights Act”); Gonzalez
v. Aurora, 535 F. 3d 594, 597 (CA7 2008) (Easterbrook, J.)
(referring to section 2’s “famously elliptical” language).  See
also J. Chen & N. Stephanopoulos, The Race-Blind Future
of Voting Rights, 130 Yale L. J. 862, 871 (2021) (describing
section 2 vote dilution doctrine as “an area of law notorious
for  its  many  unsolved  puzzles”);  C.  Elmendorf,  Making
Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elec-
tions, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 377,
389 (2012) (noting the lack of any “authoritative resolution
of  the  basic  questions  one  would  need  to  answer  to  make
sense of the results test”).
  In order to resolve the wide range of uncertainties arising
under Gingles, I would note probable jurisdiction in Milli-
gan and grant certiorari before judgment in Caster, setting
the cases for argument next Term.  But I would not grant a
stay.  As noted, the analysis below seems correct as Gingles
is  presently  applied,  and  in  my  view  the  District  Court’s
analysis  should  therefore  control  the  upcoming  election.
The practical effect of this approach would be that the 2022
election would take place in accord with the judgment of the
District Court, but subsequent elections would be governed
by this Court’s decision on review.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Chief Justice. It delves into legal arguments and precedents related to voting rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Syllabus

immunity  as  to  the  federal  eminent  domain  power  pursuant  to  the
“plan of the Convention.”  The Court then granted Torres’ petition for
certiorari  to  determine  whether,  in  light  of  that  intervening  ruling,
USERRA’s damages remedy against state employers is constitutional.

Held: By ratifying the Constitution, the States agreed their sovereignty
would  yield  to  the  national  power  to  raise  and  support  the  Armed
Forces.  Congress may exercise this power to authorize private dam-
ages suits against nonconsenting States, as in USERRA.  Pp. 3–16.

(a) While courts generally may not hear private suits against non-
consenting States, see Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S.
775, 779, the States remain subject to suit in certain circumstances.
States may consent to suit, see Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 284;
Congress  may  abrogate  States’  immunity  under  the  Fourteenth
Amendment, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456; and, as rele-
vant here, States may be sued if they agreed their sovereignty would
yield to the exercise of a particular federal power as part of the “plan
of the Convention,” PennEast, 594 U. S., at ___—that is, if “the struc-
ture of the original Constitution itself” reflects a waiver of States’ im-
munity, Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 728.

Consistent  with  these  principles,  the  Court  long  ago  found  struc-
tural  waiver  as  to  suits  between  States,  see  South  Dakota  v.  North
Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, and suits by the United States against a State,
see United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621.  A century later, in Central
Va.  Community  College  v.  Katz,  546  U. S.  356,  the  Court  recognized
another structural waiver, holding that Congress may authorize pri-
vate suits against States under the Bankruptcy Clause.  For several
years, both before and after Katz, the Court declined to acknowledge
additional  waivers  of  sovereign  immunity  under  Congress’  Article  I
powers or to find Article I authority to abrogate immunity.  See, e.g.,
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44; Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary  Ed.  Expense  Bd.  v.  College  Savings  Bank,  527  U. S.  627.
Last Term, in PennEast, the Court considered whether Congress could,
pursuant to its eminent domain power, authorize private suits against
States to enforce federally approved condemnations necessary to build
interstate  pipelines.    PennEast  held  that  Congress  could  authorize
such suits because, upon entering the federal system, the States im-
plicitly agreed their “eminent domain power would yield to that of the
Federal Government.”   594 U. S., at ___.  PennEast defined the test
for structural waiver as whether the federal power is “complete in it-
self, and the States consented to the exercise of that power—in its en-
tirety—in the plan of the Convention.”  Id., at ___.  Pp. 4–6.

(b)   Congress’  power  to  build  and  maintain  the  Armed  Forces  fits
PennEast’s test, as the Constitution’s text, its history, and this Court’s
precedents show.  To begin, the Constitution’s text strongly suggests a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, outlining the background and holding of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a summary of a legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

bears little resemblance to any ordinary meaning of “iden-
tity  theft.”    Consider  again  an  unlicensed  doctor  who  fills
out a prescription actually requested by a patient; no one
would  call  that  identity  theft.  Even  judges  below  who
agreed with the Government’s reading of §1028A(a)(1), and
ultimately  the  Government  itself,  acknowledged  that  its
reading of §1028A(a)(1) does not fairly capture the ordinary
meaning of identity theft.  Nor is the difference just around
the  edges;  the  Government’s  reading  would,  in  practice,
place garden-variety overbilling at the core of §1028A.

Instead, “identity theft” has a focused meaning.  One dic-
tionary defines identity theft as “the fraudulent appropria-
tion and use of another person’s identifying data or docu-
ments, as a credit card.”  Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary
xi (2d ed. 2001) (Webster’s).  Another similarly offers “[t]he
unlawful taking and use of another person’s identifying in-
formation for fraudulent purposes; specif[ically] a crime in
which  someone  steals personal  information  about  and  be-
longing  to  another,  such  as  a  bank-account  number  or
driver’s-license  number,  and  uses  the  information  to  de-
ceive others.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 894 (11th ed. 2019)
(Black’s) (defining “identity theft”).6

This supports a reading of “in relation to” where use of
the means of identification is at the crux of the underlying
criminality.  These definitions refer to offenses built around
what the defendant does with the means of identification in
particular.  In other words, the means of identification spe-
cifically is a key mover in the criminality.  This central role
played by the means of identification, which serves to des-
ignate a specific person’s identity, explains why we say that
the “identity” itself has been stolen.  See, e.g., Spears, 729
F. 3d, at 756 (“identity theft” occurs when someone’s “iden-

——————

6 “Steal[ing]”  can,  of  course,  include  situations  where  something  was

initially lawfully acquired.  See Black’s 1710 (defining “steal”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the definition of "identity theft" in the context of a legal case. It delves into dictionary definitions and legal interpretations, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–111
_________________

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

COLORADO

[June 4, 2018]

 JUSTICE  GINSBURG,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR

joins, dissenting.

There is much in the Court’s opinion with which I agree.
“[I]t  is  a  general  rule  that  [religious  and  philosophical]
objections  do  not  allow  business  owners  and  other  actors
in  the  economy  and  in  society  to  deny  protected  persons
equal  access  to  goods  and  services  under  a  neutral  and
generally applicable public accommodations law.”  Ante, at
9.  “Colorado  law  can  protect  gay  persons,  just  as  it  can
protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever
products and services they choose on the same terms and
conditions as  are  offered  to  other members  of  the  public.”
Ante, at 10.  “[P]urveyors of goods and services who object
to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons [may not]
put  up  signs  saying  ‘no  goods  or  services  will  be  sold  if
they  will  be  used  for  gay  marriages.’  ”  Ante,  at  12.  Gay
persons  may  be  spared  from  “indignities  when  they  seek
goods  and  services  in  an  open  market.”  Ante,  at  18.1  I

——————

1 As JUSTICE THOMAS observes, the Court does not hold that wedding
cakes are speech or expression entitled to First Amendment protection.
See ante, at 1 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Nor could it, consistent with our First Amendment precedents.  JUSTICE
THOMAS  acknowledges  that  for  conduct  to  constitute  protected  expres-
sion,  the  conduct  must  be  reasonably  understood  by  an  observer  to  be
communicative.    Ante,  at  4  (citing  Clark  v.  Community  for  Creative
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual legal reasoning and arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

case  for  federal  pre-emption  is  particularly  weak  where
Congress  has  indicated  its  awareness  of  the  operation  of
state law in a field of federal interest, and has nonetheless
decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever
tension there is between them.”  (internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted)).

III

In  enacting  the  Vaccine  Act,  Congress  established  a
carefully  wrought  federal  scheme  that  balances  the  com-
peting  interests  of  vaccine-injured  persons  and  vaccine
manufacturers.  As  the  legislative  history  indicates,  the
Act  addressed  “two  overriding  concerns”:  “(a)  the  inade-
quacy—from  both  the  perspective  of  vaccine-injured  per-
sons  as  well  as  vaccine  manufacturers—of  the  current
approach  to  compensating  those  who  have  been  damaged
by a vaccine; and (b) the instability and unpredictability of
the  childhood  vaccine  market.”  1986  Report  7.  When
viewed  in  the  context  of  the  Vaccine  Act  as  a  whole,
§22(b)(1)  is  just  one  part  of  a  broader  statutory  scheme
that  balances  the  need  for  compensating  vaccine-injured
children with added liability protections for vaccine manu-
facturers to ensure a stable childhood vaccine market.

The  principal  innovation  of  the  Act  was  the  creation  of
the  no-fault  compensation  program—a  scheme  funded
entirely through an excise tax on vaccines.22  Through that

——————

that  Congress  intended  sub  silentio  to  displace  a  longstanding  species
of  state  tort  liability  where,  as  here,  Congress  specifically  included  an
express  saving  clause  preserving  state  law,  there  is  a  long  history  of
state-law  regulation  of  vaccine  design,  and  pre-emption  of  state  law
would  leave  an  important  regulatory  function—i.e.,  ensuring  optimal
vaccine design—entirely unaddressed by the congressional substitute.

22 The  majority’s  suggestion  that  “vaccine  manufacturers  fund  from
their  sales”  the  compensation  program  is  misleading.    Ante,  at  15.
Although the manufacturers nominally pay the tax, the amount of the
tax  is  specifically  included  in  the  vaccine  price  charged  to  purchasers.
See  CDC  Vaccine  Price  List  (Feb.  15,  2011),  http://www.cdc.gov/
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

463

Opinion of Stevens, J.

empirical  case  for  skepticism,  as  the  Court’s  failure  to  cite
any empirical research attests.  Nor does the legislative his
tory  give  reason  for  concern.  Congress  devoted  years  of
careful study to the issues underlying BCRA; “[f]ew legisla
tive  proposals  in  recent  years  have  received  as  much  sus
tained public commentary or news coverage”; “[p]olitical sci
entists  and  academic  experts  .  .  .  with  no  self-interest  in
incumbent  protectio[n]  were  central  ﬁgures  in  pressing  the
case  for  BCRA”;  and  the  legislation  commanded  bipartisan
support  from  the  outset.  Pildes,  The  Supreme  Court  2003
Term  Foreword:  The  Constitutionalization  of  Democratic
Politics,  118  Harv.  L.  Rev.  28,  137  (2004).  Finally,  it  is  im
portant  to  remember  just  how  incumbent-friendly  congres
sional races were prior to BCRA’s passage.  As the Solicitor
General aptly  remarked at the  time, “the  evidence supports
overwhelmingly that incumbents were able to get re-elected
under the old system just ﬁne.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. in McCon
nell  v.  FEC,  O.  T.  2003,  No.  02–1674,  p.  61.  “It  would  be
hard  to  develop  a  scheme  that  could  be  better  for  incum
bents.”  Id., at 63.

In  this  case,  then,  “there  is  no  convincing  evidence  that
th[e]  important  interests  favoring  expenditure  limits  are
fronts  for  incumbency  protection.”  Randall,  548  U. S.,  at
279  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting).  “In  the  meantime,  a  legisla
tive  judgment  that  ‘enough  is  enough’  should  command  the
greatest  possible  deference  from  judges  interpreting  a  con
stitutional  provision  that,  at  best,  has  an  indirect  relation
ship  to  activity  that  affects  the  quantity . . . of  repetitive
speech  in  the  marketplace  of  ideas.”  Id.,  at  279–280.  The
majority cavalierly ignores Congress’ factual ﬁndings and its
constitutional judgment:  It acknowledges the  validity of the
interest in preventing corruption, but it effectively discounts
the  value  of  that  interest  to  zero.  This  is  quite  different
from  conscientious  policing  for  impermissibly  anticompeti
tive motive or effect in a sensitive First Amendment context.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in the case McConnell v. FEC. It delves into the arguments surrounding campaign finance regulations and the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

Opinion of the Court

of Congress—either a specific one targeted at the President
or  a  generally  applicable  one—may  not  criminalize  the
President’s  actions  within  his  exclusive  constitutional
power.  Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal pros-
ecution that examines such Presidential actions.  We thus
conclude  that  the  President  is  absolutely  immune  from
criminal  prosecution  for  conduct  within  his  exclusive
sphere of constitutional authority.

B
But  of  course  not  all  of  the  President’s  official  acts  fall
within his “conclusive and preclusive” authority.  As Justice
Robert  Jackson  recognized  in  Youngstown,  the  President
sometimes “acts pursuant to an express or implied author-
ization of Congress,” or in a “zone of twilight” where “he and
Congress  may  have  concurrent  authority.”    343  U. S.,  at
635, 637 (concurring opinion).  The reasons that justify the
President’s  absolute  immunity  from  criminal  prosecution
for acts within the scope of his exclusive authority therefore
do  not  extend  to  conduct  in  areas  where  his  authority  is
shared with Congress.

We recognize that only a limited number of our prior de-
cisions guide determination of the President’s immunity in
this context.  That is because proceedings directly involving
a President have been uncommon in our Nation, and “deci-
sions of the Court in this area” have accordingly been “rare”
and “episodic.”  Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 661
(1981).  To resolve the matter, therefore, we look primarily
to the Framers’ design of the Presidency within the separa-
tion of powers, our precedent on Presidential immunity in
the civil context, and our criminal cases where a President
resisted prosecutorial demands for documents.

1
The President “occupies a unique position in the consti-
tutional scheme,” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 749, as “the only
  </content>
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This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a Supreme Court case.  It discusses the topic of Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxviii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Frank; Flood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frank; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frank v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Franklin v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Franks v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frank’s Casing & Rental Tools v. Marine Drilling Mgmt. Co.
. . .
Fratta v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frazer v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frazier v. Lea County District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Free v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
French; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
French; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frese, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Friedler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Friend v. Reno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fripp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fry; Central W. Va. Development Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frye v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fry’s Food Stores of Ariz., Inc. v. Snyder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fuller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fulton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gaines v. Dallas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gainor v. Douglas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Galaza; Daniels v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Galaza v. Nino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Galaza; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Gallo v. U. S. Attorney’s Ofﬁce, Eastern Dist. of N. Y.
Galloway, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gal-Oliver v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gamble; Conway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gammon; Armstrong v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gammon; Jackson v.
Gangi Bros. Packing Co. v. Cargill, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gann v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garcia; DeLeon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garcia v. Henry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garcia; Smith v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garcia-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garcia Larrinaga v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gardner v. Neal
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gardner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garner; Boulineau v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garner v. Jones
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garrett; Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
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1039
1007
1098
1023
1108
1073
333
1051
1051
1085
1127
1083
1077
1037
1007
1110
1138
1079
1073
1072
1073
1104
1116
1060
1128
1097
1123
1092
1111
1037
1090
1073
1135
1025
1082
1090
1079
1070
1009
244
1001,1065
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MURTHY, SURGEON GENERAL, ET AL. v. MISSOURI
ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–411.  Argued March 18, 2024—Decided June 26, 2024

Under their longstanding content-moderation policies, social-media plat-
forms have taken a range of actions to suppress certain categories of
speech, including speech they judge to be false or misleading.  In 2020,
with  the  outbreak  of  COVID–19,  the  platforms  announced  that  they
would enforce these policies against users who post false or misleading
content  about  the  pandemic.    The  platforms  also  applied  misinfor-
mation policies during the 2020 election season.  During that period,
various  federal  officials  regularly  spoke  with  the  platforms  about
COVID–19 and election-related misinformation.  For example, White
House  officials  publicly  and  privately  called  on  the  platforms  to  do
more  to  address  vaccine  misinformation.    Surgeon  General  Vivek
Murthy issued a health advisory that encouraged the platforms to take
steps to prevent COVID–19 misinformation “from taking hold.”  The
Centers for  Disease  Control  and Prevention  alerted  the platforms  to
COVID–19  misinformation  trends  and  flagged  example  posts.    The
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency communicated with the platforms about election-re-
lated misinformation in advance of the 2020 Presidential election and
the 2022 midterms.

Respondents are two States and five individual social-media users
who sued dozens of Executive Branch officials and agencies, alleging
that the Government pressured the platforms to censor their speech in
violation of the First Amendment.  Following extensive discovery, the
District Court issued a preliminary injunction.  The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed in part and reversed in part.  The court held that both the state
plaintiffs and the individual plaintiffs had Article III standing to seek
injunctive relief.  On the merits, the court held that the Government
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

A  more  searching  review  reveals  that  schools  historically
could  discipline  students  in  circumstances  like  those  pre-
sented here.  Because the majority does not attempt to ex-
plain why we should not apply this historical rule and does
not attempt to tether its approach to anything stable, I re-
spectfully dissent.

I
A
While the majority entirely ignores the relevant history,
I  would  begin  the  assessment  of  the  scope  of  free-speech
rights incorporated against the States by looking to “what
‘ordinary  citizens’  at  the  time  of  [the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment’s] ratification would have understood” the right to en-
compass.  McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 813 (2010)
(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judg-
ment).  Cases and treatises from that era reveal that public
schools  retained  substantial  authority  to  discipline  stu-
dents.  As I have previously explained, that authority was
near plenary while students were at school.  See Morse v.
Frederick,  551  U. S.  393,  419  (2007)  (concurring  opinion).
Authority also extended to when students were traveling to
or from school.  See, e.g., Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 120
(1859).  And,  although  schools  had  less  authority  after  a
student  returned  home,  it  was  well  settled  that  they  still
could discipline students for off-campus speech or conduct
that had a proximate tendency to harm the school environ-
ment.

Perhaps the most familiar example applying this rule is
a case where a student, after returning home from school,
used “disrespectful language” against a teacher—he called
the teacher “old”—“in presence of the [teacher] and of some
of his fellow pupils.”  Id., at 115 (emphasis deleted).  The
Vermont Supreme Court held that the teacher could disci-
pline a student for this speech because the speech had “a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses historical context and legal precedent related to free speech rights in schools.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment

at  2)  (citing  Casey,  505  U. S.,  at  878  (plurality  opinion)).3
Because  Louisiana’s  admitting  privileges  requirement
would restrict women’s access to abortion to the same de-
gree as Texas’s law, it also cannot stand under our prece-
dent.4

To begin, the two laws are nearly identical.  Prior to en-
actment of the Texas law, abortion providers were required
either  to  possess  local  hospital  admitting  privileges  or  to
have a transfer agreement with a physician who had such
privileges.  Tex.  Admin.  Code,  tit.  25,  §139.56(a)  (2009).
The new law, adopted in 2013, eliminated the option of hav-
ing  a  transfer  agreement.    Providers  were  required  to
“[h]ave active admitting privileges at a hospital . . . located
not  further  than  30  miles  from  the  location  at  which  the
abortion  is  performed.”  Tex.  Health  &  Safety  Code  Ann.
§171.0031(a)(1)(A).

Likewise,  Louisiana  law  previously  required  abortion
providers to have either admitting privileges or a transfer
agreement.  La.  Admin.  Code,  tit.  48,  pt.  I,  §4407(A)(3)

——————

3 JUSTICE GORSUCH considers this is a “nonexistent ruling” nowhere to
be found in Whole Woman’s Health.  Post, at 19 (dissenting opinion).  I
disagree.  Whole Woman’s Health first surveyed the benefits of Texas’s
admitting privileges requirement.  579 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 23–
24).  The Court then transitioned to examining the law’s burdens: “At the
same  time,  the  record  evidence  indicates  that  the  admitting-privileges
requirement  places  a  substantial  obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  woman’s
choice.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 24) (internal quotation  marks omitted;
emphasis added).  And the Court made clear that a law which has the
purpose or effect of placing “a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability” imposes an “undue
burden” and therefore violates the Constitution.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at
1) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted).  Thus the dis-
cussion  of  benefits  in  Whole  Woman’s  Health  was  not  necessary  to  its
holding.

4 For the reasons the plurality explains, ante, at 11–16, I agree that the
abortion providers in this case have standing to assert the constitutional
rights of their patients.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case *June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo*. It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

9

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

a  referendum  vote.  The  necessity  of  the  amendment  to
accomplish the purpose of popular election is shown in the
adoption  of  the  amendment.”).
In  fact,  as  the  decades
rolled  by  without  an  amendment,  28  of  the  45  States
settled for the next best thing by holding a popular vote on
candidates  for  Senate,  then  pressuring  state  legislators
into  choosing  the  winner.    See,  e.g.,  Abstract  of  Laws
Relating to the Election of United States Senators, S. Doc.
No.  393,  59th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  (1907).    All  agreed  that
cutting  the  state  legislature  out  of  senatorial  selection
entirely  would  require  nothing  less  than  to  “Strike  out”
the original words in the Constitution and “insert, ‘elected
by  the  people’ ”  in  its  place.  Cong.  Globe,  31st  Cong.,  1st
Sess., 88 (1849) (proposal of Sen. Jeremiah Clemens).

Yet that is precisely what the majority does to the Elec-
tions  Clause  today—amending  the  text  not  through  the
process  provided  by  Article  V,  but  by  judicial  decision.
The  majority’s  revision  renders  the  Seventeenth  Amend-
ment  an  86-year  waste  of  time,  and  singles  out  the  Elec-
tions  Clause  as  the  only  one  of  the  Constitution’s  seven-
teen provisions referring to “the Legislature” that departs
from the ordinary meaning of the term.

The Commission had no answer to this point.  See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 42 (JUSTICE ALITO: “Is there any other provision
where legislature means anything other than the conven-
tional  meaning?”  Appellee:  “I  don’t  know  the  answer  to
that question.”).

The  Court’s  response  is  not  much  better.    The  majority
observes  that  “the  Legislature”  of  a  State  may  perform
different  functions  under  different  provisions  of  the  Con-
stitution.  Under  Article  I,  §3,  for  example,  “the  Legisla-
ture”  performed  an  “electoral”  function  by  choosing  Sena-
tors.  The  “Legislature”  plays  a  “consenting”  function
under  Article  I,  §8,  and  Article  IV,  §3;  a  “ratifying”  func-
tion  under  Article  V;  and  a  “lawmaking”  function  under
the Elections Clause.  Ante, at 19, and n. 17.  All true.  The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's interpretation of the Elections Clause and cites historical examples to support its position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxx

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Glazer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Glover v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Godwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gold v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Goldstein; Nagy v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gollehon v. Mahoney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gollehon; Mahoney v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gollehon v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gomez Salazar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gonzales v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gonzales v. Kerrville . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gonzales v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gonzalez v. Askins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gonzalez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gonzalez v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gonzalez-Miranda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Good v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Goode v. Austin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Goodwin v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Goord; Mojica v.
Gorkin; Atamian v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gorod v. Provanzano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Goulding, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Government Employees v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Governor of Fla.; Horsley v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Governor of Ind.; Bridenbaugh v.
Governor of La. v. Penn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Governor of Minn.; Westendorp v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Governor of N. Y.; Farrell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Governor of N. C. v. Cromartie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Governor of Tenn.; Cutshall v.
Governor of Wash.; Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
Governor of Wash.; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Governor of W. Va.; Westfall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gracia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Graham v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Graham v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Graham v. United States
Gralike; Cooke v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grand Rapids Plastics, Inc. v. Lakian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grant v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grant v. Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1085
1108
1138
1068
1084
1126
1124
1041
1079
1011
1072
1130
1025
1115
1008
1008
1082
1053
1124
1078
1039
1135
1019
1016
1018
1007
1003
1109
1098
1091
1014,1035
1053
89
89
1059
1030
1097
1091
1044,1136
1065
1037
1072
1040
1081
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely found at the beginning of a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

Opinion of BREYER, J.

mate conclusion that, “[e]ven if Act 620 could be said to fur-
ther women’s health to some marginal degree, the burdens
it imposes far outweigh any such benefit, and thus the Act
imposes an unconstitutional undue burden.”  250 F. Supp.
3d, at 88.

IV
The District Court’s Substantial-Obstacle Determination
The  District  Court  found  that  enforcing  the  admitting-
privileges requirement would “result in a drastic reduction
in the number and geographic distribution of abortion pro-
viders.”  Id., at 87.  In light of demographic, economic, and
other  evidence,  the  court  concluded  that  this  reduction
would make it impossible for “many women seeking a safe,
legal  abortion  in  Louisiana  . . .  to  obtain  one”  and  that  it
would  impose  “substantial  obstacles”  on  those  who  could.
Id., at 88.  We consider each of these findings in turn.

A
Act 620’s Effect on Abortion Providers
We begin with the District Court’s findings in respect to
Act 620’s impact on abortion providers.  As we have said,
the court found that the Act would prevent Does 1, 2, and 6
from providing abortions.  And it found that the Act would
bar  Doe  5  from  working  in  his  Baton  Rouge-based  clinic,
relegating him to New Orleans.  See supra, at 7–8.

1
In  Whole  Woman’s  Health,  we  said  that,  by  presenting
“direct testimony” from doctors who had been unable to se-
cure privileges, and “plausible inferences to be drawn from
the timing of the clinic closures” around the law’s effective
date, the plaintiffs had “satisfied their burden” to establish
that  the  Texas  admitting-privileges  requirement  caused
the closure of those clinics.  579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26).
We wrote that these inferences were bolstered by the sub-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citations, legal jargon, and a discussion of a specific case (Act 620).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

153

Opinion of the Court

requires expansion, that is the job of Congress.” Action on
In 1980,
Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F. 2d, at 243.
the FDA also denied a request by ASH to commence rule-
making proceedings to establish the agency’s jurisdiction to
regulate cigarettes as devices. See Letter to ASH Execu-
tive Director Banzhaf from FDA Comm’r Goyan (Nov. 25,
1980), App. 50–51. The agency stated that “[i]nsofar as
rulemaking would relate to cigarettes or attached ﬁlters as
customarily marketed, we have concluded that FDA has no
jurisdiction under section 201(h) of the Act [21 U. S. C.
§ 321(h)].”

Id., at 67.

In 1983, Congress again considered legislation on the
subject of smoking and health. HHS Assistant Secretary
Brandt testiﬁed that, in addition to being “a major cause of
cancer,” smoking is a “major cause of heart disease” and
other serious illnesses, and can result in “unfavorable preg-
nancy outcomes.” 1983 House Hearings 19–20. He also
stated that it was “well-established that cigarette smok-
ing is a drug dependence, and that smoking is addictive for
many people.”
Id., at 20. Nonetheless, Assistant Secre-
tary Brandt maintained that “the issue of regulation of
tobacco . . . is something that Congress has reserved to itself,
and we do not within the Department have the authority to
regulate nor are we seeking such authority.”
Id., at 74. He
also testiﬁed before the Senate, stating that, despite the evi-
dence of tobacco’s health effects and addictiveness, the De-
partment’s view was that “Congress has assumed the respon-
sibility of regulating . . . cigarettes.” Smoking Prevention
and Education Act: Hearings on S. 772 before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., 56 (1983) (hereinafter 1983 Senate Hearings).

Against this backdrop, Congress enacted three additional
tobacco-speciﬁc statutes over the next four years that incre-
mentally expanded its regulatory scheme for tobacco prod-
ucts.
In 1983, Congress adopted the Alcohol and Drug
Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. 98–24, 97 Stat. 175 (codiﬁed at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 120 (2000). It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses congressional actions related to tobacco regulation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

61

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

motivated Dred Scott and Plessy” are the ones who support
race  conscious  admissions.  Ante,  at  39.  The  plethora  of
young  students  of  color  who  testified  in  favor  of  race-
consciousness proves otherwise.   See supra,  at 46–47; see
also infra, at 64–67 (discussing numerous amici from many
sectors of society supporting respondents’ policies).  Not a
single student—let alone any racial minority—affected by
the  Court’s  decision  testified  in  favor  of  SFFA  in  these
cases.

C
In its “radical claim to power,” the Court does not even
acknowledge  the  important  reliance  interests  that  this
Court’s precedents have generated.  Dobbs, 597 U. S., at ___
(dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 53).  Significant rights and
expectations  will  be  affected  by  today’s  decision  nonethe-
less.  Those interests supply “added force” in favor of stare
decisis.  Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n,
502 U. S. 197, 202 (1991).

Students of all backgrounds have formed settled expecta-
tions  that  universities  with  race-conscious  policies  “will
provide diverse, cross-cultural experiences that will better
prepare  them  to  excel  in  our  increasingly  diverse  world.”
Brief  for  Respondent-Students  in  No.  21–707,  at  45;  see
Harvard College Brief 6–11 (collecting student testimony).
Respondents  and  other  colleges  and  universities  with
race-conscious  admissions  programs  similarly  have  con-
crete reliance interests because they have spent significant
resources  in  an  effort  to  comply  with  this  Court’s  prece-
dents.  “Universities  have  designed  courses  that  draw  on
the benefits of a diverse student body,” “hired faculty whose
research is enriched by the diversity of the student body,”
and “promoted their learning environments to prospective
students  who  have  enrolled  based  on  the  understanding
that they could obtain the benefits of diversity of all kinds.”
Brief  for  Respondent  in  No.  20–1199,  at  40–41  (internal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion and provides legal reasoning and cites precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Syllabus

§2 may impermissibly elevate race in the allocation of political power
within the States.  Instead, the Court simply holds that a faithful ap-
plication of precedent and a fair reading of the record do not bear those
concerns out here.  Pp. 30–34.

Nos. 21–1086, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, and 21–1087, affirmed.

  ROBERTS,  C. J.,  delivered  the  opinion of  the  Court,  except  as  to  Part
III–B–1.  SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and JACKSON, JJ., joined that opinion in
full, and KAVANAUGH, J., joined except for Part III–B–1.  KAVANAUGH, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in all but Part III–B–1.  THOMAS, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined, in which BARRETT, J.,
joined as to Parts II and III, and in which ALITO, J., joined as to Parts II–
A and II–B.  ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus and the list of justices' opinions.  It is not the main body of the text and is likely not meant to be read independently.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Syllabus and Opinion Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

27

Opinion of the Court

submitted a declaration to the Court of Appeals criticizing
Dr.  Evans’  reference  to  drugs.com,  that  declaration  does
not  identify  a  single  fact  from  that  site’s  discussion  of
midazolam that was materially inaccurate.

Second,  petitioners  argue  that  Dr.  Evans’  expert  report
contained  a  mathematical  error,  but  we  find  this  argu-
ment insignificant.  Dr. Evans stated in his expert report
that  the  lowest  dose  of  midazolam  resulting  in  human
deaths,  according  to  an  MSDS,  is  0.071  mg/kg  delivered
intravenously.  App.  294.    Dr.  Lubarsky  agreed  with  this
statement.  Specifically,  he  testified  that  fatalities  have
occurred in doses ranging from 0.04 to 0.07 mg/kg, and he
stated that Dr. Evans’ testimony to that effect was “a true
statement”  (though  he  added  those  fatalities  occurred
among  the  elderly).  Id.,  at  217.  We  do  not  understand
petitioners to dispute the testimony of Dr. Evans and their
own expert that 0.071 mg/kg is a potentially fatal dose of
midazolam.  Instead, they make much of the fact that the
MSDS attached to Dr. Evans’ report apparently contained
a typographical error and reported the lowest toxic dose as
71  mg/kg.  That  Dr.  Evans  did  not  repeat  that  incorrect
figure  but  instead  reported  the  correct  dose  supports
rather than undermines his testimony.  In any event, the
alleged  error  in  the  MSDS  is  irrelevant  because  the  Dis-
trict  Court  expressly  stated  that  it  did  not  rely  on  the
figure in the MSDS.  See id., at 75.

Third,  petitioners  argue  that  there  is  no  consensus
among  the  States  regarding  midazolam’s  efficacy  because
only  four  States  (Oklahoma,  Arizona,  Florida,  and  Ohio)
have used midazolam as part of an execution.  Petitioners
rely on the plurality’s statement in Baze that “it is difficult
to regard a practice as ‘objectively intolerable’ when it is in
fact widely tolerated,” and the plurality’s emphasis on the
fact  that  36  States  had  adopted  lethal  injection  and  30
States  used  the  particular  three-drug  protocol  at  issue  in
that case.  553 U. S., at 53.  But while the near-universal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the arguments made by the petitioners in a case. It delves into the details of expert testimony and the use of midazolam in executions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NASA v. NELSON

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

federal  and  state  statutes,  Rules  of  Evidence  from  four
states,  two  Executive  Orders,  a  House  Report,  and  even
more  exotic  sources  of  law,  such  as  two  reports  of  the
Government Accountability Office and an EEOC document
concerning  “Enforcement  Guidance.”    And  yet  it  contains
not  a  single  citation  of  the  sole  document  we  are  called
upon  to  construe:  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.
The  body  of  the  brief  includes  a  single,  fleeting  reference
to  the  Due  Process  Clause,  buried  in  a  citation  of  the
assuredly  inapposite  Lawrence  v.  Texas,  539  U. S.  558
(2003), Brief for Respondents 42; but no further attempt is
made  to  argue  that  NASA’s  actions  deprived  respondents
of liberty without due process of law.  And this legal strat-
egy was not limited to respondents’ filing in this Court; in
the  Ninth  Circuit  respondents  asserted  in  a  footnote  that
“courts  have  grounded  the  right  to  informational  privacy
in various provisions of the Constitution,” Brief for Appel-
lants in No. 07–56424, p. 25, n. 18, but declined to identify
which ones applied here.

To  tell  the  truth,  I  found  this  approach  refreshingly
honest.  One  who  asks  us  to  invent  a  constitutional  right
out  of  whole  cloth  should  spare  himself  and  us  the  pre-
tense  of  tying  it  to  some  words  of  the  Constitution.  Re-
grettably,  this  Lincolnesque  honesty  evaporated  at  oral
argument, when counsel asserted, apparently for the first
time  in  this  litigation,  that  the  right  to  informational
privacy emerged from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  28–29.    That  counsel  in-
voked  the  infinitely  plastic  concept  of  “substantive”  due
process  does  not  make  this  constitutional  theory  any  less
invented.

This  case  is  easily  resolved  on  the  simple  ground  that
the  Due  Process  Clause  does  not  “guarante[e]  certain
(unspecified)  liberties”;  rather,  it  “merely  guarantees
certain  procedures  as  a  prerequisite  to  deprivation  of
liberty.”  Albright  v.  Oliver,  510  U.  S.  266,  275  (1994)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia. It discusses the legal arguments presented in a case involving NASA and the concept of informational privacy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

Taylor  Court  feared  that  a  conduct-specific  approach
would  unduly  burden  the  courts,  experience  has  shown
that  application  of  the  categorical  approach  has  not  al
ways  been  easy.  Indeed,  the  Court’s  main  argument  for
overturning  the  statute  is  that  this  approach  is  unman
ageable in residual clause cases.

As  for  the  notion  that  the  categorical  approach  is  more
forgiving  to  defendants,  there  is  a  strong  argument  that
the  opposite  is  true,  at  least  with  respect  to  the  residual
clause.  Consider two criminal laws:  Injury occurs in 10%
of cases involving the violation of statute A, but in 90% of
cases  involving  the  violation  of  statute  B.  Under  the
categorical approach, a truly dangerous crime under stat
ute A might not qualify as a violent felony, while a crime
with  no  measurable  risk  of  harm  under  statute  B  would
count  against  the  defendant.    Under  a  conduct-specific
inquiry,  on  the  other  hand,  a  defendant’s  actual  conduct
would  determine  whether  ACCA’s  mandatory  penalty
applies.

It is also significant that the allocation of the burden of
proof  protects  defendants.    The  prosecution  bears  the
burden  of  proving  that  a  defendant  has  convictions  that
qualify  for  sentencing  under  ACCA.    If  evidentiary  defi
ciencies,  poor  recordkeeping,  or  anything  else  prevents
the  prosecution  from  discharging  that  burden  under  the
conduct-specific  approach,  a  defendant  would  not  receive
an ACCA sentence.

Nor would a conduct-specific inquiry raise constitutional
problems of its own.  It is questionable whether the Sixth
Amendment creates a right to a jury trial in this situation.
See  Almendarez-Torres  v.  United  States,  523  U. S.  224
(1998).  But  if  it  does,  the  issue  could  be  tried  to  a  jury,
and  the  prosecution  could  bear  the  burden  of  proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s prior crimes
involved conduct that presented a serious potential risk of
injury to another.  I would adopt this alternative interpre
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the categorical approach versus a conduct-specific inquiry in sentencing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC.

Opinion of the Court

vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and the end of an opinion. It's likely not the main body of text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1123

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No. 09–7293.  Crews v.  Florida.  Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  11  So.  3d  401.

No. 09–7297.  Preciado v.  Runnels, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  234.

No.  09–7302.  Brzowski  v.  Tristano  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7305.  Johns  v.  Michigan  Department  of  Correc

tions  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7308.  Bing Yu v. Washington.  Ct. App. Wash.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  145  Wash.  App.  1035.

No.  09–7309.  Wright  v.  Georgia.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  285  Ga.  428,  677  S.  E.  2d  82.

No.  09–7311.  Del  Castello  v.  Alameda  County  Transit
Parking  Enforcement  Center.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–7313.  Grontkowski  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–7320.  Haygood  et  ux.  v.  Tilley.  Ct.  App.  Ga.  Cer
tiorari denied.  Reported below: 295 Ga. App. 90, 670 S. E. 2d 800.

No.  09–7325.  Gaddy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  333.

No.  09–7330.  Wells  v.  Michigan.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7333.  Johnson  v.  Sisto,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  19.

No.  09–7338.  Williams  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  287.

No.  09–7347.  Abbott  v.  DeKalb  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Ore.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  346  Ore.  306,  211  P.  3d  246.

No. 09–7350.  Ennis v.  McDaniel, Warden, et al.  C. A. 9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, court names, and decisions (certiorari denied). This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>