<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

15

Opinion of the Court

speaker  may  be  excluded  from”  a  limited  public  forum  “if
he  is  not  a  member  of  the  class  of  speakers  for  whose
especial benefit the forum was created.”).

An  example  sharpens  the  tip  of  this  point:  Schools,

including Hastings, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a, ordinar
ily,  and  without  controversy,  limit  official  student-group
recognition  to  organizations  comprising  only  students—
even  if  those  groups  wish  to  associate  with  nonstudents.
See,  e.g.,  Volokh,  Freedom  of  Expressive  Association  and
Government Subsidies, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1919, 1940 (2006).
The  same  ground  rules  must  govern  both  speech  and
association challenges in the limited-public-forum context,
lest  strict  scrutiny  trump  a  public  university’s  ability  to
“confin[e]  a  [speech]  forum  to  the  limited  and  legitimate
purposes  for  which  it  was  created.”    Rosenberger,  515
U. S., at 829.  See also Healy, 408 U. S., at 189 (“Associa
tional activities need not be tolerated where they infringe
reasonable campus rules.”).

Third,  this  case  fits  comfortably  within  the  limited
public-forum  category,  for  CLS,  in  seeking  what  is  effec
tively a state subsidy, faces only indirect pressure to mod
ify  its  membership  policies;  CLS  may  exclude  any  person
for any reason if it forgoes the benefits of official recogni
tion.13    The  expressive-association  precedents  on  which
CLS  relies,  in  contrast,  involved  regulations  that  com-
pelled  a  group  to  include  unwanted  members,  with  no
choice to opt out.  See, e.g., Dale, 530 U. S., at 648 (regula
tion  “forc[ed]  [the  Boy  Scouts]  to  accept  members  it  [did]
not  desire”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted));  Roberts,

——————

13 The fact that a university “expends funds to encourage a diversity
of views from private speakers,” this Court has held, does not justify it
in  “discriminat[ing]  based  on  the  viewpoint  of  private  persons  whose
speech it facilitates.”  Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 834.  Applying limited
public-forum  analysis  (which  itself  prohibits  viewpoint  discrimination)
to  CLS’s  expressive  association  claim,  we  emphasize,  does  not  upset
this principle.
  </content>
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This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the concept of limited public forums and their application to expressive association cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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1034

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 16, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–7026.  Hicks  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d  130.

No.  09–7027.  Harris  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  894.

No.  09–7028.  Porter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  300.

No.  09–7032.  Wylie  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  888.

No. 09–7034.  Rodriguez-Mendiola, aka Banuelos, aka Ba
nales,  aka  Herrera  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7036.  Karim-Panahi  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.

D.  C.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7037.  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  400.

No.  09–7038.  Muniz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  192.

No.  09–7039.  Morgan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  798.

No.  09–7041.  Calle-Ochoa  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7042.  Castro-Guevarra  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d  550.

No.  09–7044.  Adams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  417.

No. 09–7045.  Smith v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  350  Fed.  Appx.  320.

No.  09–7046.  Mackay  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  367.

No.  09–7049.  Hernandez  Suarez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7052.  Hernandez-Hernandez  v.  United  States.

C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
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This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the actual content of the cases.
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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xlii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

940

862

937

1148

819

879

1016

923

1137

1056

1074

1123

904

1005

900

976

1079

842

1056

1032

1015

866

1149

819

1123

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dede v. United States
Dee v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deeks v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deere & Co.; Hecker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deerﬁeld Beach; Gonzalez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deer’s Head Hospital Center; Morres v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DeFeo v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DeGarmo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
De George v. American Airlines, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
de Jesus v. Acevedo
de Johnson v. Holder
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DeKalb; Abbott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
De La Fe v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
De La Garza-Valles v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
De La O v. Thaler
Delapaz Vasquez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
De La Vega v. California
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Delaware; Abraham v.
Delaware; Hartmann v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Delaware; Jamison v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Delaware; Norman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Delaware; Ward v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Delaware County v. Federal Aviation Administration
Delaware Director of Revenue; Ford Motor Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
Del Castello v. Alameda County Transit Parking Enforcement
Del Castello v. Superior Court of Cal., Alameda County
. . . . . 899,1102

De Leon-Godinez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959

1079

Deleon-Puentes v. Sherry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Delgado v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099

Delgado-Hernandez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Del Gallo v. Parent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
864

DeLoy; Roten v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

Del Rio v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

Del Rio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1007

Delta Air Lines; Ad Hoc Comm. of Kenton Cty. Bondholders v.  . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  824,1064

Delta Air Lines; Mehen v.
Del Toro, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
813

898

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Del Valle v. United States
DeMarco, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1043,1107

948

Demarest v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

DeNictolis v. Clarke  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919

Denis v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Denney; Muldrow v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  834,1086

Dennis v. First Correctional Medical Services
  </content>
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1132

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–7779.  Lopez-Lopez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  417.

No. 09–7781.  Lopez v.  United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  314.

No.  09–7782.  Wilkins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  499.

No.  09–7783.  Randle  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7787.  Burley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  854.

No.  09–7788.  Blake  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  571  F.  3d  331.

No.  09–7792.  Rivera  Torres  v.  United  States;  and
No.  09–7834.  Rivera  Calderon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  578  F.  3d  78.

No.  09–7799.  Swain  v.  Bartleson.  Sup.  Ct.  Ohio.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  123  Ohio  St.  3d  125,  914  N.  E.
2d  403.

No.  09–7803.  Frank  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  581.

No. 09–7805.  Pakala v.  United States.  C. A. 1st Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  47.

No.  09–7806.  Miles  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  346  Fed.  Appx.  993.

No.  09–7807.  Orr  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  709.

No. 09–7810.  Wilson v. United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  134.

No.  09–7812.  Plummer  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  581  F.  3d  484.

No.  09–7814.  McClellon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  578  F.  3d  846.
  </content>
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This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
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  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
4

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

SCALIA, J., dissenting

“[T]he  Federal  Government,  through  our  history,  has
deferred  to  state-law  policy  decisions  with  respect  to
domestic relations.”11

But  we  need  not  speculate.    When  the  Fourteenth
Amendment  was  ratified  in  1868,  every  State  limited
marriage to one man and one woman, and no one doubted
the  constitutionality  of  doing  so.  That  resolves  these
cases.  When  it  comes  to  determining  the  meaning  of  a
vague  constitutional  provision—such  as  “due  process  of
law” or “equal protection of the laws”—it is unquestionable
that the People who ratified that provision did not under-
stand it to prohibit a practice that remained both univer-
sal  and  uncontroversial  in  the  years  after  ratification.12
We  have  no  basis  for  striking  down  a  practice  that  is  not
expressly prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment’s text,
and that bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open,
widespread,  and  unchallenged  use  dating  back  to  the
Amendment’s  ratification.  Since  there  is  no  doubt  what-
ever  that  the  People  never  decided  to  prohibit  the  limita-
tion of marriage to opposite-sex couples, the public debate
over same-sex marriage must be allowed to continue.

But  the  Court  ends  this  debate,  in  an  opinion  lacking
even a thin veneer of law.  Buried beneath the mummeries
and straining-to-be-memorable passages of the opinion is a
candid and startling assertion: No matter what it was the
People ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment protects those
rights  that  the  Judiciary,  in  its  “reasoned  judgment,”
thinks  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  ought  to  protect.13
That is so because “[t]he generations that wrote and rati-
fied the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did
not  presume  to  know  the  extent  of  freedom  in  all  of  its

——————

11 Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17).
12 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2014) (slip

op., at 7–8).

13 Ante, at 10.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia in the Obergefell v. Hodges case. It argues against the majority opinion's decision to legalize same-sex marriage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

GOLAN v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

cost.  By fully implementing Berne, Congress ensured that
most  works,  whether  foreign  or  domestic,  would  be  gov-
erned  by  the  same  legal  regime.    The  phenomenon  to
which  Congress  responded  is  not  new:  Distortions  of  the
same  order  occurred  with  greater  frequency—and  to  the
detriment  of  both  foreign  and  domestic  authors—when,
before  1891,  foreign  works  were  excluded  entirely  from
U. S.  copyright  protection.  See  Kampelman,  The  United
States and International Copyright, 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 406,
413  (1947)  (“American  readers  were  less  inclined  to  read
the novels of Cooper or Hawthorne for a dollar when they
could  buy  a  novel  of  Scott  or  Dickens  for  a  quarter.”).
Section  514  continued  the  trend  toward  a  harmonized
copyright  regime  by  placing  foreign  works  in  the  position
they  would  have  occupied  if  the  current  regime  had  been
in  effect  when  those  works  were  created  and  first  pub-
lished.  Authors once deprived of protection are spared the
continuing  effects  of  that  initial  deprivation;  §514  gives
them nothing more than the benefit of their labors during
whatever  time  remains  before  the  normal  copyright  term
expires.35

Unlike  petitioners,  the  dissent  makes  much  of  the  so-
called “orphan works” problem.  See post, at 11–14, 23–24.
We  readily  acknowledge  the  difficulties  would-be  users  of
copyrightable materials may face in identifying or locating
copyright  owners.    See  generally  U. S.  Copyright  Office,
Report on Orphan Works 21–40 (2006).  But as the dissent
concedes,  see  post,  at  13,  this  difficulty  is  hardly  peculiar
to  works  restored  under  §514.    It  similarly  afflicts,  for

——————

35 Persistently  deploring  “ ‘restored  copyright’  protection  [because  it]
removes material from the public domain,” post, at 14, the dissent does
not pause to consider when and why the material came to be lodged in
that domain.  Most of the works affected by §514 got there after a term
of zero or a term cut short by failure to observe U. S. formalities.  See
supra, at 9.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text discussing the implications of a particular section of copyright law. It is sequential text and provides meaningful content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–869
_________________

ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR THE VISUAL
ARTS, INC., PETITIONER v. LYNN
GOLDSMITH, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 18, 2023]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This copyright case involves not one, but two artists.  The
first, Andy Warhol, is well known.  His images of products
like  Campbell’s  soup  cans  and  of  celebrities  like  Marilyn
Monroe  appear  in  museums  around  the  world.    Warhol’s
contribution to contemporary art is undeniable.

The second, Lynn Goldsmith, is less well known.  But she
too  was  a  trailblazer.  Goldsmith  began  a  career  in  rock-
and-roll  photography  when  there  were  few  women  in  the
genre.  Her  award-winning  concert  and  portrait  images,
however,  shot  to  the  top.    Goldsmith’s  work  appeared  in
Life,  Time,  Rolling  Stone,  and  People  magazines,  not  to
mention the National Portrait Gallery and the Museum of
Modern Art.  She captured some of the 20th century’s great-
est rock stars: Bob Dylan, Mick Jagger, Patti Smith, Bruce
Springsteen, and, as relevant here, Prince.

In 1984, Vanity Fair sought to license one of Goldsmith’s
Prince  photographs  for  use  as  an  “artist  reference.”    The
magazine wanted the photograph to help illustrate a story
about  the  musician.  Goldsmith  agreed,  on  the  condition
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes the citation, notice, court information, case names, and the start of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Supreme Court Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

25

THOMAS, J., dissenting

with questions of peace and war plainly involved some sort
of  sovereign-to-sovereign  relationship.  See,  e.g.,  Treaty
with the Cherokees (1791), 7 Stat. 39.  And the early Trade
and Intercourse Acts regulated only the criminal conduct of
U. S. citizens on Indian lands.

This congruence—between the government’s actions and
the  Constitution’s  enumerated  powers—likely  reflects  the
fact that those powers, collectively, responded to the most
pressing  concerns  of  the  day:  that  Congress  could  not  en-
force its treaties with Indians, police the frontier, or regu-
late  unscrupulous  traders—all  of  which  caused  violence
and raised the specter of war with Indian tribes.  As noted,
when Congress tried to expand its domain in 1817 to regu-
late the criminal acts of Indians, one Justice of this Court
found it to be a palpable violation of Congress’ limited pow-
ers.  See Bailey, 24 F. Cas., at 938–940.  And, all the while,
States  continued  to  regulate  matters  relating  to  Indians
within  their  territorial  limits.    The  normal  federalist  dy-
namic thus extended to the domain of Indian affairs: The
Federal Government was supreme with respect to its enu-
merated powers, but States retained all residual police pow-
ers  within  their  territorial  borders.    See  id.,  at  938–939;
McCulloch,  4  Wheat.,  at  405.  And  the  Federal  Govern-
ment’s  enumerated  powers  were  not  unlimited,  but  con-
fined to their plain meaning and limits.

B

So  where  did  the  idea of  a  “plenary  power”  over  Indian
affairs  come  from?  As  it  turns  out,  little  more  than  ipse
dixit.  The story begins with loose dicta from Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831).  In that case, the Cherokee
Nation  petitioned  this  Court  for  an  injunction  to  prevent
Georgia from enforcing state laws in Cherokee territory and
from seizing Cherokee lands.  Id., at 11.  The Tribe asserted
——————
non-Indians from stealing Indian lands, circumventing Congress’ trade-
licensing scheme, and disrupting the peace with Indian tribes.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It discusses the historical development of federal power over Indian affairs, arguing against the concept of "plenary power." The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE v. ARGUS LEADER
MEDIA, DBA ARGUS LEADER

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–481.  Argued April 22, 2019—Decided June 24, 2019

Respondent  Argus  Leader  Media  filed  a  Freedom  of  Information  Act
(FOIA)  request  with  the  United  States  Department  of  Agriculture
(USDA),  seeking  the  names  and  addresses  of  all  retail  stores  that
participate  in  the  national  food-stamp  program—known  as  the  Sup-
plemental  Nutrition  Assistance  Program  (SNAP)—and  each  store’s
annual  SNAP  redemption  data  from  fiscal  years  2005  to  2010.   The
USDA  declined  to  disclose  the  store-level  SNAP  data,  invoking
FOIA’s Exemption 4, which shields from disclosure “trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and priv-
ileged  or  confidential,”  5  U. S. C.  §552(b)(4).    Argus  Leader  sued  the
USDA.  Following circuit precedent, the District Court employed the
“competitive harm” test, under which commercial information cannot
be deemed “confidential” unless disclosure is “likely . . . to cause sub-
stantial  harm  to  the  competitive  position  of  the  person  from  whom
the  information  was  obtained.”    The  court  agreed  that  revealing
store-level  SNAP  data  could  work  some  competitive  harm,  but  it
could  not  say  that  disclosure  would  cause  “substantial  competitive
harm,” and thus ordered disclosure.  Petitioner Food Marketing Insti-
tute,  a  trade  association  representing  grocery  retailers,  intervened
and filed an appeal.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Insti-
tute’s  argument  that  the  court  should  discard  the  “substantive  com-
petitive  harm”  test  in  favor  of  the  ordinary  public  meaning  of  the
statutory term “confidential.”

Held:

1. The Institute has standing to appeal.  Disclosure of the contested
data  would  cause  its  members  some  financial  injury  in  the  highly
competitive grocery industry; this concrete injury is directly traceable
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text. They are often released separately and do not contain the full legal reasoning or analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

the litigation should be handled does not make inadequate
the  representation  of  those  whose  interests  are  identical
with that of an existing party”); accord, Kaul, 942 F. 3d, at
810–811 (Sykes, J., concurring); Daggett v. Commission on
Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 172 F. 3d 104,
112 (CA1 1999).

Properly  understood,  the  attorney  general’s  representa-
tion  of  state  respondents  satisfies  any  standard  of  ade-
quacy.  As the District Court explained, the attorney gen-
eral “actively and adequately defend[ed] this lawsuit.”  App.
to Pet. for Cert. 189.  He “consistently denied all substan-
tive  allegations  of  unconstitutionality  in  this  case.”  Ibid.
(internal quotation marks omitted).  And he moved to dis-
miss  the  suit  on  federalism  grounds,  filed  an  “expansive
brief ” opposing NAACP respondents’ motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction on the merits, and has moved for summary
judgment on all claims.  Ibid.

The  Court  faults  the  attorney  general  for  emphasizing
“administrative concerns” in his brief on the merits and for
not  offering  expert  reports  to  support  his  opposition  to  a
preliminary  injunction.  See  ante,  at  16.  Petitioners  also
take issue with the attorney general’s decision not to seek
a stay of the District Court’s preliminary injunction pend-
ing appeal.  Brief for Petitioners 12, 50.  But these are pre-
cisely the sort of strategic decisions that government attor-
neys  make  every  day;  in  fact,  petitioners  themselves
declined  to  seek  a  stay  in  the  parallel  litigation  in  state
court.  The  Court’s  retrospective  criticism  of  the  attorney
general’s litigation strategy is insufficient to establish that
state respondents inadequately represented the State’s in-
terests.  See  Saldano  v.  Roach,  363  F. 3d  545,  555  (CA5
2004) (“Simply because the [intervenor] would have made a
different decision does not mean that the Attorney General
is  inadequately  representing  the  State’s  interest—and
hence, the [intervenor’s] claimed interest—especially since
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of the litigation strategy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Per Curiam
THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

TIM SHOOP, WARDEN v. AUGUST CASSANO

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–679.  Decided June 21, 2022

The  motion  of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma
pauperis is granted.  The petition for a writ of certiorari is
denied.

JUSTICE  THOMAS, with  whom JUSTICE  ALITO  joins,  dis-

senting from denial of certiorari.

In  1997,  respondent  August  Cassano  was  serving  a  life
sentence  in  Ohio  for  aggravated  murder.    The  prison  as-
signed Cassano a new cellmate, Walter Hardy.  A few days
later, Cassano murdered Hardy by stabbing him 75 times
with  a  prison  shank.  An  Ohio  jury  convicted  Cassano  of
capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death.
Yet,  more  than  20  years  later,  the  Sixth  Circuit  granted
Cassano habeas relief because it thought that the state trial
court  had  ignored  Cassano  when  he  purportedly  invoked
his right to represent himself at trial.  In doing so, the Sixth
Circuit  failed  to  treat  the  state-court  adjudication  of  Cas-
sano’s  self-representation  claim  with  the  deference  de-
manded by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA).

To correct this manifest error, I would grant Ohio’s peti-
tion and summarily reverse the Sixth Circuit.  Therefore, I
respectfully dissent from denial of certiorari.

I

Cassano is no stranger to violence.  In 1976, he and an
accomplice shot bartender Donald Pinto through the heart
during a heist in Akron, Ohio.  An Ohio jury convicted Cas-
sano of aggravated murder and robbery, and he received a
life  sentence.    State  v.  Cassano,  1976  WL  188932,  *1–*2
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1154

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 19, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–7571.  Cleveland  v.  Abernathy,  Mayor,  Clemson,
South  Carolina,  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  39.

No.  09–7575.  Davis  v.  Eitel  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–7587.  Vinnie v.  Massachusetts.  Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  454  Mass.  1016,  910  N.  E.
2d  364.

No.  09–7593.  Anthony  v.  Third  Circuit  Court  of  Michi

gan  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7597.  Mason v. Illinois.  App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  388  Ill.  App.  3d  1138,  982  N.  E.
2d  287.

No.  09–7600.  Barnes  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7606.  Travaline  v.  Travaline.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7609.  Moore  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7610.  Dillehay  v.  Department  of  Housing  and
Urban Development et al.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.
Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  53.

No.  09–7611.  Diaz  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  7th  Dist.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7612.  Dupont  v.  Gerry,  Warden.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7616.  Johnson  v.  Cate,  Secretary,  California  De
partment of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al.  C.  A.
9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7617.  Matylinsky v.  Budge, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  1083  and  344
Fed.  Appx.  311.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents (or Case Summaries)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

27

THOMAS, J., dissenting

is  the  exact  sort  of  “regulatory  blank  check”  that  Bruen
warns against and the American people ratified the Second
Amendment to preclude.  597 U. S., at 30.

Neither the Court nor the Government identifies a single
historical regulation with a comparable burden and justifi-
cation  as  §922(g)(8).  Because  there  is  none,  I  would  con-
clude  that  the  statute  is  inconsistent  with  the  Second
Amendment.

IV

The Government, for its part, tries to rewrite the Second
Amendment to salvage its case.  It argues that the Second
Amendment allows Congress to disarm anyone who is not
“responsible”  and  “law-abiding.”  Not  a  single  Member  of
the  Court  adopts  the  Government’s  theory.  Indeed,  the
Court  disposes  of  it  in  half  a  page—and  for  good  reason.
Ante, at 17.  The Government’s argument lacks any basis in
our  precedents  and  would  eviscerate  the  Second  Amend-
ment altogether.

A

The Government’s position is a bald attempt to refashion
this Court’s doctrine.  At the outset of this case, the Govern-
ment contended that the Court has already held the Second
Amendment  protects  only  “responsible,  law-abiding”  citi-
zens.  Brief for United States 6, 11–12.  The plain text of
the  Second  Amendment  quashes  this  argument.  The
Amendment recognizes “the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms.”  (Emphasis added.)  When the Constitution re-
fers to “the people,” the term “unambiguously refers to all
members of the political community.”  Heller, 554 U. S., at
580;  see  also  id.,  at  581  (beginning  its  analysis  with  the
strong “presumption that the Second Amendment right . . .
belongs  to  all  Americans”).  The  Government’s  claim  that
the  Court  already  held  the  Second  Amendment  protects
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  556 U. S. ____ (2009)

1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 07–588, 07–589 and 07–597
_________________

07–588

ENTERGY CORPORATION, PETITIONER
v.
RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL.

07–589

PSEG FOSSIL LLC, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL.

07–597

UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP, PETITIONER
v.
RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[April 1, 2009]

 JUSTICE  STEVENS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SOUTER  and

JUSTICE GINSBURG join, dissenting.

Section  316(b)  of  the  Clean  Water  Act  (CWA),  33
U. S. C.  §1326(b),  which  governs  industrial  powerplant
water intake structures, provides that the Environmental
Protection  Agency  (EPA  or  Agency)  “shall  require”  that
such  structures  “reflect  the  best  technology  available  for
minimizing adverse environmental impact.”  The EPA has
interpreted  that  mandate  to  authorize  the  use  of  cost-
benefit  analysis
in  promulgating  regulations  under
§316(b).  For  instance,  under  the  Agency’s  interpretation,
technology that would otherwise qualify as the best avail-
able need not be used if its costs are “significantly greater
than the benefits” of compliance.  40 CFR §125.94(a)(5)(ii)
(2008).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens. It includes case citations, court information, and the beginning of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

1

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 17–1717 and 18–18
_________________

17–1717

THE AMERICAN LEGION, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION, ET AL.; AND

MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND
PLANNING COMMISSION, PETITIONER
v.
AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION, ET AL.

18–18

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI  TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2019]

  JUSTICE  GINSBURG,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR
joins, dissenting.
  An immense Latin cross stands on a traffic island at the
center  of  a  busy three-way intersection in Bladensburg,
Maryland.1  “[M]onumental, clear, and bold” by day, App.
914, the cross looms even larger illuminated against the
night-time sky.  Known as the Peace Cross, the monument
was  erected  by  private  citizens  in  1925  to  honor  local
soldiers who lost their lives in World War I.  “[T]he town’s
most  prominent symbol” was rededicated in 1985 and is
now said to honor “the sacrifices made [in] all wars,” id., at
868 (internal quotation marks omitted), by “all veterans,”
id., at 195.  Both the Peace Cross and the traffic island are
owned and maintained by the Maryland-National Capital
Park and Planning Commission (Commission), an agency
of the State of Maryland.
——————

1 A  photograph  of  the monument and a map showing its location are

reproduced in the Appendix, infra, at 19.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It includes citations, case names, and the formal structure typical of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

B
Congress’ power to build and maintain the Armed Forces
fits  PennEast’s  test.  The  Constitution’s  text,  its  history,
and this Court’s precedents show that “when the States en-
tered the federal system, they renounced their right” to in-
terfere with national policy in this area.  Id., at ___ (slip op.,
at 15).

For one thing, the Constitution’s text, across several Ar-
ticles, strongly suggests a complete delegation of authority
to the Federal Government to provide for the common de-
fense.  Unlike most of the powers given to the National Gov-
ernment, the Constitution spells out the war powers not in
a  single,  simple  phrase,  but  in  many  broad,  interrelated
provisions.  The Preamble makes the “common defence” one
of the document’s central projects.  Article I gives Congress
authority  to  “provide  for  th[at]  common  Defence”  in  six
numbered paragraphs: to “declare War”; “raise and support
Armies”; “provide and maintain a Navy”; “make Rules” for
the  Armed  Forces;  “provide  for  calling  forth  the  Militia”;
and “provide for [their] organizing, arming, and disciplin-
ing.”  §8, cls. 1, 11–16.  Article II makes the President the
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States.”  §2, cl. 1.
And the Federal Government is charged with “protect[ing]
each” State “against Invasion.”  Art. IV, §4.

The  Constitution  also  divests  the  States  of  like  power.
States may not “engage in War, unless actually invaded,”
“enter into any Treaty,” or “keep Troops, or Ships of War in
time of Peace.”  Art. I, §10, cls. 1, 3.  States retain a role in
“the Appointment of the Officers” to and the “training [of]
the Militia,” but that delegation is strictly cabined.  Art. I,
§8,  cl.  16.  States  must  do  so  “according  to  the  discipline
prescribed  by  Congress.”    Ibid.    These  substantial  limita-
tions  on  state  authority,  together  with  the  assignment  of
sweeping power to the Federal Government, provide strong
evidence  that  the  structure  of  the  Constitution  prevents
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Constitution's grant of power to the federal government regarding the military.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

13

Opinion of the Court

from  the  founding  period  either  includes  the  preposition
“against”  or  is  not  clearly  idiomatic.    See  Linguists’  Brief
18–23.  Without  the  preposition,  “bear  arms”  normally
meant  (as  it  continues  to  mean  today)  what  JUSTICE
GINSBURG’s opinion in Muscarello said.

In any event, the meaning of “bear arms” that petition
ers  and JUSTICE STEVENS propose is not even the (some
times)  idiomatic  meaning.    Rather,  they  manufacture  a
hybrid  definition,  whereby  “bear  arms”  connotes  the
actual  carrying  of  arms  (and  therefore  is  not  really  an
idiom) but only in the service of an organized militia.  No
dictionary  has  ever  adopted  that  definition,  and  we  have
been  apprised  of  no  source  that  indicates  that  it  carried
that  meaning  at  the  time of  the  founding.    But  it  is easy
to  see  why  petitioners  and  the  dissent  are  driven  to  the
hybrid definition.  Giving “bear Arms” its idiomatic mean
ing would cause the protected right to consist of the right
to  be  a  soldier  or  to  wage  war—an  absurdity  that  no
commentator  has  ever  endorsed.   See  L.  Levy,  Origins  of
the  Bill  of  Rights  135  (1999).  Worse  still,  the  phrase
“keep  and  bear  Arms”  would  be  incoherent.   The  word
“Arms”  would  have  two  different  meanings  at  once:
“weapons”  (as  the  object  of  “keep”)  and  (as  the  object  of
“bear”) one-half of an idiom.  It would be rather like say
ing  “He  filled  and  kicked  the  bucket”  to  mean  “He  filled
the bucket and died.”  Grotesque.

Petitioners justify their limitation of “bear arms” to the
military  context  by  pointing  out  the  unremarkable  fact
that  it  was  often  used  in  that  context—the  same  mistake
they  made  with  respect  to  “keep  arms.”    It  is  especially
unremarkable that the phrase was often used in a military
context  in  the  federal  legal  sources  (such  as  records  of
congressional debate) that have been the focus of petition
ers’ inquiry.  Those sources would have had little occasion
to use it except in discussions about the standing army and
the  militia.    And  the  phrases  used  primarily  in  those
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of the Second Amendment. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment

omitted)); id., at 473–474 (Roe “did not declare an unquali-
fied  constitutional  right  to  an  abortion,”  but  instead  pro-
tected  “the  woman  from  unduly  burdensome  interference
with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her preg-
nancy”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted));  Webster,  492
U. S., at 520 (plurality opinion) (Roe protects “the claims of
a woman to decide for herself whether or not to abort a fetus
she [is] carrying”); Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 146 (a State may
not “prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision
to terminate her pregnancy”).  If that is the basis for Roe,
Roe’s viability line should be scrutinized from the same per-
spective.  And  there  is  nothing  inherent  in  the  right  to
choose  that  requires  it  to  extend  to  viability  or  any  other
point, so long as a real choice is provided.  See Webster, 492
U. S., at 519 (plurality opinion) (finding no reason “why the
State’s  interest  in  protecting  potential  human  life  should
come into existence only at the point of viability”).

To be sure, in reaffirming the right to an abortion, Casey
termed the viability rule Roe’s “central holding.”  505 U. S.,
at 860.  Other cases of ours have repeated that language.
See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 145–146.  But simply de-
claring  it  does  not  make  it  so.    The  question  in  Roe  was
whether  there  was  any  right  to  abortion  in  the  Constitu-
tion.  See  Brief  for  Appellants  and  Brief  for  Appellees,  in
Roe v. Wade, O. T. 1971, No. 70–18.  How far the right ex-
tended  was  a  concern  that  was  separate  and  subsidiary,
and—not surprisingly—entirely unbriefed.

The Court in Roe just chose to address both issues in one
opinion: It first recognized a right to “choose to terminate
[a]  pregnancy”  under  the  Constitution,  see  410  U. S.,  at
129–159,  and  then,  having  done  so,  explained  that  a  line
should be drawn at viability such that a State could not pro-
scribe abortion before that period, see id., at 163.  The via-
bility  line  is  a  separate  rule  fleshing  out  the  metes  and
bounds of Roe’s core holding.  Applying principles of stare
decisis, I would excise that additional rule—and only that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. It delves into the legal reasoning and history surrounding Roe v. Wade and the viability line.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

JACKSON, J., dissenting

particular piece of purported child pornography with the in-
tent of initiating a transfer” is properly proscribed by fed-
eral statute.  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234,
253 (2002) (“The mere tendency of speech to encourage un-
lawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it”).

B
  The  Government  does  not  dispute  that  the  encourage-
ment provision is unconstitutional as overbroad if it is read
according to its plain text, thereby reaching these various
fact  patterns.    This  point  is  worth  repeating:  Under  the
broad  interpretation  of  the  statute,  the  Government  does
not even attempt to argue that the unconstitutional appli-
cations in category one are not “substantial,” Stevens, 559
U. S., at 473, in relation to the constitutional applications
that fall in category two.2  Rather, the Government argues
that the statute can be saved from falling victim to today’s
overbreadth challenge by construing the broad terms of the
encouragement  provision  narrowly—and,  in  particular,
reading  them  as  authorizing  prosecution  only  for  solicita-
tion or facilitation.
  Citing this Court’s general duty “to seek harmony, not to
manufacture conflict,” when “legislation and the Constitu-
tion brush up against each other,” ante, at 16–17, the ma-
jority obliges.  But this Court also has a duty to refrain from
taking the legislative reins and revising the text of a stat-
ute.  It is well established that “[w]e will not rewrite a law
to conform it to constitutional requirements.”  Stevens, 559
U. S., at 481 (emphasis added; alterations and internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  Accordingly, and in the overbreadth

——————

2 There is accordingly no need to dwell on the contents of category two
here.  The majority discusses several examples, like “issuing fraudulent
Social Security numbers to noncitizens.”  Ante, at 17 (citing Edwards v.
Prime, Inc., 602 F. 3d 1276, 1295–1297 (CA11 2010)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

17

ALITO, J., concurring

hurtful remarks about other students.23  Bullying and se-
vere  harassment  are  serious  (and  age-old)  problems,  but
these concepts are not easy to define with the precision re-
quired  for  a  regulation  of  speech.   See,  e.g.,  Saxe  v.  State
College  Area  School  Dist.,  240  F. 3d  200,  206–207  (CA3
2001).

V
The present case does not fall into any of these categories.
Instead, it simply involves criticism (albeit in a crude man-
ner) of the school and an extracurricular activity.  Unflat-
tering speech about a school or one of its programs is differ-
ent  from  speech  that  criticizes  or  derides  particular
individuals, and for the reasons detailed by the Court and
by Judge Ambro in his separate opinion below, the school’s
justifications for punishing B. L.’s speech were weak.  She
sent the messages and image in question on her own time
while at a local convenience store.  They were transmitted
via a medium that preserved the communication for only 24
hours, and she sent them to a select group of “friends.”  She
did not send the messages to the school or to any adminis-
trator, teacher, or coach, and no member of the school staff
would  have  even  known  about  the  messages  if  some  of
B. L.’s “friends” had not taken it upon themselves to spread
the word.

The  school  did  not  claim  that  the  messages  caused  any
significant disruption of classes.  The most it asserted along

——————

23 See, e.g., S. J. W. v. Lee’s Summit R–7 School Dist., 696 F. 3d 771,
773–774  (CA8  2012)  (high  school  juniors  posted  a  variety  of  offensive,
racist,  and  sexually-explicit  comments  about  particular  female  class-
mates);  Kowalski  v.  Berkeley  County  Schools,  652  F. 3d  565,  567–568
(CA4 2011) (student created an online discussion group accusing another
student of having a sexually-transmitted disease); Dunkley v. Board of
Ed. of Greater Egg Harbor Regional High School Dist., 216 F. Supp. 3d
485, 487 (NJ 2016) (student used an anonymous Twitter account to insult
other students based on their appearances and athletic abilities).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in a case before the Supreme Court. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding freedom of speech in a school setting.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

Syllabus

When registration is opposed, there is good reason to think that both
sides  will  take  the  matter  seriously.  Congress’  creation  of  an  elabo-
rate  registration  scheme,  with  many  important  rights  attached  and
backed up by plenary review, confirms that registration decisions can
be weighty enough to ground issue preclusion.  Pp. 21–22.

716 F. 3d 1020, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and  KAGAN, JJ., joined.
GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion.  THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are typically summaries of legal cases and not the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

lxviii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Theriot v. Jefferson Parish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thibeaux v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thibodeaux v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. D. C. Ct. of App. Bd. on Pro. Respons.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. Earley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. Larned State Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. United States
Thomas & Betts Corp.; Noorily v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas-El v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas Jefferson Univ.; Michelfelder v.
Thompkins v. Hicks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thompson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thornburg v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thornton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tibbs v. Corcoran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tierney, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tillery; Transamerica Assurance Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tillis Trucking Co. v. Moses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Time Warner Cable; Allen v.
Tolbert v. KPHN Radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tomeo v. Honeywell International, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Torres v. United States
Town. See name of town.
Towne, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Townsend v. Booker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Townsend v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tracy Federal Bank; Tsu v.
Trani; DeBauche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Transamerica Assurance Co. v. Tillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trapp v. Supreme Court of Wash.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Travaglia v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Travelers Ins. Co.; Scheidly v.
Travis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Traylor, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trent; Farmer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trent; Ward v.
Trice v. McNeal
Trice v. Sikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trinidad v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Triplett; Ioane v.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1129
1113
1112
1014
1102
1073
1021
1085
1006,1025
1024
1076
1053
1057
1095
1116
1116
1113
1022
1034
1127
1066
1128
1114
1113
1083
1030,1081

1052
1119
1090
1023,1145
1033
1066
1062
1026
1054,1144
1035,1127
1083
1134
1055,1145
1089
1025,1084
1101
1006
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

sel[s] mutual respect and tolerance,” the Constitution’s vi-
sion  of  how  to  achieve  this  end  does  in  fact  involve  some
“singl[ing] out” of religious speech by the government.  Ante,
at 1.  This is consistent with “the lesson of history that was
and is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the les-
son that in the hands of government what might begin as a
tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to
indoctrinate and coerce.”  Lee, 505 U. S., at 591–592.

Second, the Court contends that the lower courts erred by
introducing a false tension between the Free Exercise and
Establishment  Clauses.    See  ante,  at  20–21.  The  Court,
however, has long recognized that these two Clauses, while
“express[ing] complementary values,” “often exert conflict-
ing pressures.”  Cutter, 544 U. S., at 719.  See also Locke v.
Davey, 540 U. S. 712, 718 (2004) (describing the Clauses as
“frequently  in  tension”).  The  “absolute  terms”  of  the  two
Clauses  mean  that  they  “tend  to  clash”  if  “expanded  to  a
logical extreme.”  Walz, 397 U. S., at 668–669.

The Court inaccurately implies that the courts below re-
lied  upon  a  rule  that  the  Establishment  Clause  must  al-
ways “prevail” over the Free Exercise Clause.  Ante, at 20.
In  focusing  almost  exclusively  on  Kennedy’s  free  exercise
claim,  however,  and  declining  to  recognize  the  conflicting
rights at issue, the Court substitutes one supposed blanket
rule for another.  The proper response where tension arises
between  the  two  Clauses  is  not  to  ignore  it,  which  effec-
tively silently elevates one party’s right above others.  The
proper response is to identify the tension and balance the
interests based on a careful analysis of “whether [the] par-
ticular acts in question are intended to establish or inter-
fere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of
doing so.”  Walz, 397 U. S., at 669.  As discussed above, that
inquiry leads to the conclusion that permitting Kennedy’s
desired religious practice at the time and place of his choos-
ing, without regard to the legitimate needs of his employer,
violates the Establishment Clause in the particular context
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

Opinion of the Court

state.”  Tr.  23.  A  few  moments  later,  the  commissioner
restated  the  same  position:  “[I]f  a  businessman  wants  to
do  business  in  the  state  and  he’s  got  an  issue  with  the—
the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to
look  at  being  able  to  compromise.”    Id.,  at  30.    Standing
alone,  these  statements  are  susceptible  of  different  inter-
pretations.  On  the  one  hand,  they  might  mean  simply
that a business cannot refuse to provide services based on
sexual  orientation,  regardless  of  the  proprietor’s  personal
views.  On the other hand, they might be seen as inappro-
priate  and  dismissive  comments  showing  lack  of  due
consideration  for  Phillips’  free  exercise  rights  and  the
dilemma he faced.  In view of the comments that followed,
the latter seems the more likely.

On  July  25,  2014,  the  Commission  met  again.    This
meeting,  too,  was  conducted  in  public  and  on  the  record.
On  this  occasion  another  commissioner  made  specific
reference to the previous meeting’s discussion but said far
more  to  disparage  Phillips’  beliefs.    The  commissioner
stated:

“I  would  also  like  to  reiterate  what  we  said  in  the
hearing or the last meeting.  Freedom of religion and
religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimi-
nation  throughout  history,  whether  it  be  slavery,
whether  it  be  the  holocaust,  whether  it  be—I  mean,
we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom
of  religion  has  been  used  to  justify  discrimination.
And  to  me  it  is  one  of  the  most  despicable  pieces  of
rhetoric  that  people  can  use  to—to  use  their  religion
to hurt others.”  Tr. 11–12.

To  describe  a  man’s  faith  as  “one  of  the  most  despicable
pieces  of  rhetoric  that  people  can  use”  is  to  disparage  his
religion  in  at  least  two  distinct  ways:  by  describing  it  as
despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely rhetori-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the statements made by a commissioner during a hearing. The language is formal and legalistic, referencing transcripts and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

Opinion of the Court

his  own  voice  and  of  his  own  creation.    As  Phillips  would
see  the  case,  this  contention  has  a  significant  First
Amendment  speech  component  and  implicates  his  deep
and  sincere  religious  beliefs.  In  this  context  the  baker
likely found it difficult to find a line where the customers’
rights  to  goods  and  services  became  a  demand  for  him  to
exercise the right of his own personal expression for their
message,  a  message  he  could  not  express  in  a  way  con-
sistent with his religious beliefs.

Phillips’  dilemma  was  particularly  understandable
given  the  background  of  legal  principles  and  administra-
tion of the law in Colorado at that time.  His decision and
his actions leading to the refusal of service all occurred in
the  year  2012.    At  that  point,  Colorado  did  not  recognize
the  validity  of  gay  marriages  performed  in  its  own  State.
See Colo. Const., Art. II, §31 (2012); 370 P. 3d, at 277.  At
the  time  of  the  events  in  question,  this  Court  had  not
issued its decisions either in United States v. Windsor, 570
U. S.  744  (2013),  or  Obergefell.  Since  the  State  itself  did
not  allow  those  marriages  to  be  performed  in  Colorado,
there is some force to the argument that the baker was not
unreasonable  in  deeming  it  lawful  to  decline  to  take  an
action  that  he  understood  to  be  an  expression  of  support
for their validity when that expression was contrary to his
sincerely  held  religious  beliefs,  at  least  insofar  as  his
refusal  was  limited  to  refusing  to  create  and  express  a
message  in  support  of  gay  marriage,  even  one  planned  to
take place in another State.

At  the  time,  state  law  also  afforded  storekeepers  some
latitude  to  decline  to  create  specific  messages  the  store-
keeper  considered  offensive.    Indeed,  while  enforcement
proceedings  against  Phillips  were  ongoing,  the  Colorado
Civil  Rights  Division  itself  endorsed  this  proposition  in
cases involving other bakers’ creation of cakes, concluding
on  at  least  three  occasions  that  a  baker  acted  lawfully  in
declining  to  create  cakes  with  decorations  that  demeaned
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It delves into the baker's arguments based on his religious beliefs and the legal landscape at the time.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

ALITO, J., dissenting

But many important decisions currently regarded as prece-
dents were decided without an opinion of the Court.18  Does
the majority mean to suggest that all such precedents are
fair game?

The majority’s primary reason for overruling Apodaca is
the  supposedly  poor  “quality”  of  Justice  White’s  plurality
opinion and Justice Powell’s separate opinion.  Ante, at 19–
21.  The  majority  indicts  Justice  White’s  opinion  on  five
grounds: (1) it “spent almost no time grappling with the his-
torical  meaning  of  the  Sixth  Amendment’s  jury  trial
right,”19 (2) it did not give due weight to the “Court’s long-
repeated statements that [the right] demands unanimity,”20
(3)  it  did  not  take  into  account  “the  racist  origins  of  [the]
Louisian[a] and Orego[n] laws,”21 (4) it looked to the func-
tion of the jury-trial right,22 and (5) it engaged in “a breezy
cost-benefit  analysis”  that,  in  any  event,  did  not  properly

——————
do  not  join  Part  IV–A,  but  each  of  these  Justices  takes  a  position  not
embraced by portions of the principal opinion that they join.  See ante, at
2  (SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  concurring  in  part)  (disavowing  principal  opinion’s
criticism of Justice White’s Apodaca opinion as “functionalist”); ante, at
15–17 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part) (opining that the decision in
this  case  does  not  apply  on  collateral  review).    And  JUSTICE  THOMAS
would decide the case on entirely different grounds and thus concurs only
in the judgment.  See ante, at 1.

18 See,  e.g.,  National  Federation  of  Independent  Business v.  Sebelius,
567 U. S. 519 (2012); Williams v. Illinois, 567 U. S. 50 (2012); J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U. S. 873 (2011); McDonald v. Chicago,
561 U. S. 742 (2010); Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 559 U. S. 393 (2010); Baze v. Rees, 553 U. S. 35 (2008); Crawford
v.  Marion  County  Election  Bd.,  553  U. S.  181  (2008);  Hamdan  v.
Rumsfeld,  548  U. S.  557  (2006); Medtronic,  Inc. v.  Lohr,  518  U. S.  470
(1996); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989); Bakke, 438
U. S. 265; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976) (joint opinion of Stew-
art, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).

19 Ante, at 20.
20 Ante, at 21.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U47

[10-04-01 09:34:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

420

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR, WARDEN

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit

No. 99–6615. Argued February 28, 2000—Decided April 18, 2000

After petitioner was convicted of two capital murders and other crimes,
he was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Virginia afﬁrmed
on direct appeal and later dismissed petitioner’s state habeas corpus
petition. He then sought federal habeas relief, requesting, among other
things, an evidentiary hearing on three constitutional claims, which he
had been unable to develop in the state-court proceedings. Those
claims were that (1) the prosecution had violated Brady v. Maryland,
373 U. S. 83, in failing to disclose a report of a pretrial psychiatric exami-
nation of Jeffrey Cruse, petitioner’s accomplice and the Commonwealth’s
main witness against petitioner; (2) the trial was rendered unfair by the
seating of a juror who at voir dire had not revealed possible sources of
bias; and (3) a prosecutor committed misconduct in failing to reveal his
knowledge of the juror’s possible bias. The District Court granted an
evidentiary hearing on, inter alia, the latter two claims, but denied a
hearing on the Brady claim. Before any hearing could be held, how-
ever, the Fourth Circuit granted the Commonwealth’s requests for an
emergency stay and for a writ of mandamus and prohibition, which were
based on the argument that an evidentiary hearing was prohibited by
28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). On remand, the District Court
vacated its order granting an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the
petition, having determined petitioner could not satisfy § 2254(e)(2)’s re-
quirements.
In afﬁrming, the Fourth Circuit agreed with petitioner’s
argument that the statute would not apply if he had exercised diligence
in state court, but held, among other things, that he had not been dili-
gent and so had “failed to develop the factual basis of [his three] claim[s]
in State court,” § 2254(e)(2). The court concluded that petitioner could
not satisfy the statute’s conditions for excusing his failure to develop
the facts and held him barred from receiving an evidentiary hearing.

Held: Under § 2254(e)(2), as amended by AEDPA, a “fail[ure] to develop”
a claim’s factual basis in state-court proceedings is not established un-
less there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the
prisoner or his counsel. The statute does not bar the evidentiary hear-
ing petitioner seeks on his juror bias and prosecutorial misconduct
claims, but bars a hearing on his Brady claim because he “failed to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case *Williams v. Taylor*.  It summarizes the case and the legal issues involved.  While it is important legal information, it is not the primary content of the case itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

SHURTLEFF v. BOSTON

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

speech.  Rosenberger,  515  U. S.,  at  829;  see  also  Perry  Ed.
Assn.  v.  Perry  Local  Educators’  Assn.,  460  U. S.  37,  49
(1983) (“Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the
right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject
matter and speaker identity”).  Had the City restricted use
of the flagpoles to these subject matters, it could have relied
on  the  forum’s  topical  limitations  to  deny  applications  to
host events.  But it could not have employed viewpoint-dis-
criminatory criteria to bar otherwise-eligible speakers from
expressing their own views on those subjects.

On this record, however, the only viable inference is that
the City had no policy restricting access to the forum apart
from the modest access conditions articulated in the appli-
cation materials.  Having created a forum with those char-
acteristics, the City could not reject Shurtleff ’s application
on account of the religious viewpoint he intended to express.
For that reason, I agree with the Court’s ultimate conclu-
sion and concur in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Shurtleff v. Boston. It discusses the First Amendment right to free speech and the City's restrictions on flagpole use.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

KAGAN, J., dissenting

use.  That answer comports with the copyright statute, its
underlying  policy,  and  our  precedent  concerning  the  two.
Under established copyright law (until today), Warhol’s ad-
dition  of  important  “new  expression,  meaning,  [and]  mes-
sage” counts in his favor in the fair-use inquiry.  Campbell,
510 U. S., at 579.

Start by asking a broader question: Why do we have “fair
use” anyway?  The majority responds that while copyrights
encourage the making of creative works, fair use promotes
their “public availability.”  Ante, at 13 (internal quotation
marks  omitted).    But  that  description  sells  fair  use  far
short.  Beyond promoting “availability,” fair  use itself ad-
vances creativity and artistic progress.  See Campbell, 510
U. S., at 575, 579 (fair use is “necessary to fulfill copyright’s
very purpose”—to “promote science and the arts”).  That is
because creative work does not happen in a vacuum.  “Noth-
ing  comes  from  nothing,  nothing  ever  could,”  said  song-
writer Richard Rodgers, maybe thinking not only about love
and marriage but also about how the Great American Song-
book  arose  from  vaudeville,  ragtime,  the  blues,  and  jazz.4
This Court has long understood the point—has gotten how
new art, new invention, and new knowledge arise from ex-
isting works.  Our seminal opinion on fair use quoted the
illustrious Justice Story:

“In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are,
and  can  be,  few,  if  any,  things,  which  . . .  are  strictly

——————

4 In  the  spirit  of  this  opinion,  I  might  have  quoted  that  line  without
further ascription.  But lawyers believe in citations, so I will tell you that
the Rodgers lyric (which is, of course, from the Sound of Music) is used—
to make the same point I do—in Rob Kapilow’s Listening for America:
Inside  the  Great  American  Songbook  From  Gershwin  to  Sondheim
(2019).  One of that book’s themes is that even the most “radically new”
music builds on existing works—or as Irving Berlin put the point, “songs
make  history,  and  history  makes  songs.”  Id.,  at  xv,  2.   And  so  too  for
every other form of art.  See infra, at 26–34 (making this point at greater
length—and with pictures!).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the concept of "fair use" in copyright law and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 467 (1972) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
  I  have  the  greatest,  and  unyielding,  respect  for  my  col-
leagues  and  for  their  good  faith.    But  when  this  Court
usurps the role of Congress, as it does today, the public un-
derstandably becomes confused about who the policymak-
ers really are in our system of separated powers, and inev-
itably  becomes  cynical  about  the  oft-repeated  aspiration
that judges base their decisions on law rather than on per-
sonal preference.  The best way for judges to demonstrate
that we are deciding cases based on the ordinary meaning
of the law is to walk the walk, even in the hard cases when
we might prefer a different policy outcome.

*

  *

  *
  In judicially rewriting Title VII, the Court today cashiers
an ongoing legislative process, at a time when a new law to
prohibit  sexual  orientation  discrimination  was  probably
close at hand.  After all, even back in 2007—a veritable life-
time ago in American attitudes about sexual orientation—
the House voted 235 to 184 to prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination in employment.  H. R. 3685, 110th Cong., 1st
Sess.  In 2013, the Senate overwhelmingly approved a sim-
ilar bill, 64 to 32.  S. 815, 113th Cong., 1st Sess.  In 2019,
the House voted 236 to 173 to amend Title VII to prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.  H. R. 5, 116th Cong., 1st Sess.  It was therefore easy
to envision a day, likely just in the next few years, when the
House and Senate took historic votes on a bill that would
prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.  It was easy to picture a massive and celebra-
tory Presidential signing ceremony in the East Room or on
the South Lawn.
  It is true that meaningful legislative action takes time—
often too much time, especially in the unwieldy morass on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically Justice Kavanaugh's dissent in Bostock v. Clayton County. It argues against the majority opinion's interpretation of Title VII.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

any speech compulsion was “plainly incidental to the Solo-
mon Amendment’s regulation of conduct.”  Ibid.

2
The same principle resolves this case.  The majority tries
to  sweep  under  the  rug  petitioners’  challenge  to  CADA’s
Communication Clause, so I will start with it.  Recall that
Smith wants to post a notice on her company’s homepage
that the company will refuse to sell any website for a same-
sex  couple’s  wedding.  This  Court,  however,  has  already
said that “a ban on race-based hiring may require employ-
ers to remove ‘White Applicants Only’ signs.”  Sorrell, 564
U. S., at 567 (quoting FAIR, 547 U. S., at 62; some internal
quotation marks omitted); see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh  Comm’n  on  Human  Relations,  413  U. S.  376,  389
(1973).  So petitioners concede that they are not entitled to
an exemption from the Communication Clause unless they
are also entitled to an exemption from the Accommodation
Clause.  Brief for Petitioners 34–35.  That concession is all
but  fatal  to  their  argument,  because  it  shows  that  even
“pure speech” may be burdened incident to a valid regula-
tion of conduct.10

CADA’s Accommodation Clause and its application here
are  valid  regulations  of  conduct.    It  is  well  settled  that  a
public accommodations law like the Accommodation Clause
does not “target speech or discriminate on the basis of its
content.”  Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572.  Rather, “the focal point
of  its  prohibition”  is  “on  the  act  of  discriminating  against

——————

10 The majority appears to find this discussion of the Communication
Clause upsetting.  See ante, at 20–21, and n. 5.  It is easy to understand
why: The Court’s prior First Amendment cases clearly explain that a ban
on discrimination may require a business to take down a sign that ex-
presses the business owner’s intent to discriminate.  See, e.g., FAIR, 547
U. S., at 62.  This principle is deeply inconsistent with the majority’s po-
sition.  Thus, a “straight couples only” notice, like the one the Court today
allows, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 188a–189a, is itself a devastating indict-
ment of the majority’s logic.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of a specific law (CADA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

53

Opinion of the Court

made to disarm blacks); id., at 845–847 (THOMAS, J., con-
curring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment);  see  also  S.
Exec. Doc. No. 43, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1866) (“Pistols,
old  muskets,  and  shotguns  were  taken  away  from  [freed
slaves] as such weapons would be wrested from the hands
of lunatics”).

In the years before the 39th Congress proposed the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Freedmen’s Bureau regularly kept
it  abreast  of  the  dangers  to  blacks  and  Union  men  in  the
postbellum South.  The reports described how blacks used
publicly  carried  weapons  to  defend  themselves  and  their
communities.  For  example,  the  Bureau  reported  that  a
teacher from a Freedmen’s school in Maryland had written
to  say  that,  because  of  attacks  on  the  school,  “[b]oth  the
mayor  and  sheriff  have  warned  the  colored  people  to  go
armed to school, (which they do,)” and that the “[t]he super-
intendent of schools came down and brought [the teacher]
a revolver” for his protection.  Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess.,  658  (1866);  see  also  H. R.  Exec.  Doc.  No.  68,  39th
Cong., 2d Sess., 91 (1867) (noting how, during the New Or-
leans  riots,  blacks  under  attack  “defended  themselves  . . .
with such pistols as they had”).

Witnesses before the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
also described the depredations visited on Southern blacks,
and the efforts they made to defend themselves.  One Vir-
ginia music professor related that when “[t]wo Union men
were attacked . . . they drew their revolvers and held their
assailants at bay.”  H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, p. 110 (1866).  An assistant commissioner to the Bu-
reau from Alabama similarly reported that men were “rob-
bing and disarming negroes upon the highway,” H. R. Exec.
Doc.  No.  70,  39th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  297  (1866),  indicating
that  blacks  indeed  carried  arms  publicly  for  their  self-
protection, even if not always with success.  See also H. R.
Exec. Doc. No. 329, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1868) (describ-
ing a Ku Klux Klan outfit that rode “through the country
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically citing historical context and evidence related to the carrying of arms by Black people in the post-Civil War South.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Historical Context</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–50
_________________

JASCHA CHIAVERINI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. CITY OF NAPOLEON, OHIO, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2024]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves what is often called a Fourth Amend-
ment malicious-prosecution claim under 42 U. S. C. §1983.
To  succeed  on  such  a  claim,  a  plaintiff  must  show  that  a
government  official  charged  him  without  probable  cause,
leading  to  an  unreasonable  seizure  of  his  person.    See
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U. S. 36, 43, and n. 2 (2022).  The
question presented here arises when the official brings mul-
tiple charges, only one of which lacks probable cause.  Do
the valid charges insulate the official from a Fourth Amend-
ment  malicious-prosecution  claim  relating  to  the  invalid
charge?  The answer is no: The valid charges do not create
a categorical bar.  We leave for another day the follow-on
question  of  how  to  determine  in  those  circumstances
whether the baseless charge caused the requisite seizure.

I
This dispute began with a set of peculiar interactions be-
tween a jewelry store owner and police officers in Napoleon,
Ohio.  See generally App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a–7a.  The jew-
eler, Jascha Chiaverini, bought a ring for $45 from a (petty)
jewel thief.  The ring’s rightful owners found out about the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS

Syllabus

thereunder.”  Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298.  Pp. 7–11.
(b) Petitioners have alleged a credible threat of enforcement of the

Ohio law.  Pp. 11–17.

(1) Petitioners have alleged “an intention to engage in a course of
conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest” by pleading
specific  statements  they  intend  to  make  in  future  election  cycles.
Pp. 11–12.

(2) Petitioners’ intended future conduct is also “arguably . . . pro-
scribed  by  [the]  statute.”    The  Ohio  false  statement  statute  sweeps
broadly, and a panel of the Ohio Elections Commission already found
probable  cause  to  believe  that  SBA  violated  the  law  when  it  made
statements  similar  to  those  petitioners  plan  to  make  in  the  future.
Golden  v.  Zwickler,  394  U. S.  103,  is  distinguishable;  the  threat  of
prosecution under an electoral leafletting ban in that case was wholly
conjectural  because  the  plaintiff’s  “sole  concern”  related  to  a  former
Congressman who was unlikely to run for office again.  Here, by con-
trast,  petitioners’  speech  focuses  on  the  broader  issue  of  support  for
the  ACA,  not  on  the  voting  record  of  a  single  candidate.    Nor  does
SBA’s  insistence  that  its  previous  statements  were  true  render  its
fears of enforcement misplaced.  After all, that insistence did not pre-
vent the Commission from finding probable cause for a violation the
first time.  Pp. 12–13.

(3) Finally,  the  threat  of  future  enforcement  is  substantial.
There  is  a  history  of  past  enforcement  against  petitioners.    Past  en-
forcement against the same conduct is good evidence that the threat
of  enforcement  is  not  “ ‘chimerical.’ ”    Steffel  v.  Thompson,  415  U. S.
452, 459.  The credibility of that threat is bolstered by the fact that a
complaint  may  be  filed  with  the  State  Commission  by  “any  person,”
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.153(A), not just a prosecutor or agency.

The  threatened  Commission  proceedings  are  of  particular  concern
because of the burden they impose on electoral speech.  Moreover, the
target of a complaint may be forced to divert significant time and re-
sources to hire legal counsel and respond to discovery requests in the
crucial  days  before  an  election.    But  this  Court  need  not  decide
whether the threat of Commission proceedings standing alone is suf-
ficient; here, those proceedings are backed by the additional threat of
criminal prosecution.  Pp. 14–17.

(c) The  Sixth  Circuit  separately  considered  two  other  “prudential
factors”:  “fitness”  and  “hardship.”  This  Court  need  not  resolve  the
continuing vitality of the prudential ripeness doctrine in this case be-
cause those factors are easily satisfied here.  See Lexmark Int’l, Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U. S. ___.  Pp. 17–18.

525 Fed. Appx. 415, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the book and is more of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxix

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
Michigan; Cyars v.
942
Michigan; Seaton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,971
930
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Solomon v.
923
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan v. United States
924
Michigan Dept. of Environmental Quality v. Bestfoods . . . . . . . . .
963
Michigan Public Service Comm’n; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan State Housing Development Authority; Toth v.
954
. . . . . . .
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians; Minnesota v. . . . . . . . . . . 915,977
927
Miller v. Department of Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919
Miller; Fludd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mills; Hauck v.
943
Miner v. Missouri
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
975
Minnesota v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924
Minnesota; Coleman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Minnesota v. Johns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
975
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians . . . . . . . . . . 915,977
942
Minnesota; Sutherlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Mississippi; Bankhead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
Mississippi v. Roderick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Mississippi State Senate; Horton v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971
Missouri; Billemeyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Missouri; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Missouri; Miner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Missouri; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Missouri; Rousan v.
961
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Missouri; Schleeper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,969
916
Missourians for Tax Justice Ed. Project, Inc. v. Holden . . . . . . . .
937
Missouri Highway and Transportation Comm’n; Mann v.
. . . . . . .
916
Missouri State Treasurer; Missourians for Tax Justice Project v.
Mitchell v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919
Mitchell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,925,932
904
Mizuno v. Salisbury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962
Modrak v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
721
Monge v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Monlyn v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Monroe; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
980
Monroe County Bd. of Ed.; Davis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901
Montague, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
977
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.
Monterey County; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,977
903
Montgomery, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967
Moore, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

Opinion of BREYER, J.

We  held  in  Whole  Woman’s  Health  that  the  trial  court
faithfully applied these standards.  It “considered the evi-
dence in the record—including expert evidence, presented
in stipulations, depositions, and testimony.”  579 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 21).  It “then weighed the asserted benefits”
of the law “against the burdens” it imposed on abortion ac-
cess.  Ibid.  And it concluded that the balance tipped against
the  statute’s  constitutionality.  The  District  Court  in  this
suit did the same.

B
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court,
not so much in respect to the legal standards that we have
just set forth, but because it did not agree with the factual
findings on which the District Court relied in assessing both
the  burdens  that  Act  620  imposes  and  the  health-related
benefits it might bring.  Compare, e.g., supra, at 6–9, with
supra, at 9–11.  We have consequently reviewed the record
in detail ourselves.  In doing so, we have applied well-estab-
lished legal standards.

We start from the premise that a district court’s findings
of fact, “whether based on oral or other evidence, must not
be  set  aside  unless  clearly  erroneous,  and  the  reviewing
court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity
to  judge  the  witnesses’  credibility.”  Fed.  Rule  Civ.  Proc.
52(a)(6).  In “ ‘applying [this] standard to the findings of a
district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must
constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide
factual  issues  de  novo.’ ”  Anderson  v.  Bessemer  City,  470
U. S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazel-
tine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 123 (1969)).  Where “the
district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light
of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may
not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting
as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence dif-
ferently.”  Anderson, 470 U. S., at 573–574.  “A finding that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the application of legal standards and the review of factual findings by lower courts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>