<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.

under Pike.  I respectfully disagree with that conclusion for
the  reasons  well  stated  in  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE’s  separate
opinion.1

I  add  this  opinion  to  point  out  that  state  economic
regulations  like  California’s  Proposition  12  may  raise
questions  not  only  under  the  Commerce  Clause,  but  also
under  the  Import-Export  Clause,  the  Privileges  and
Immunities Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

I

In the 1780s, the Framers in Philadelphia and the people
of the United States discarded the Articles of Confederation
and adopted a new Constitution.  They did so in order to,
among other things, create a national economic market and
overcome  state  restrictions  on  free  trade—and  thereby
promote the general welfare.  By the summer of 1787, when
the delegates met in Philadelphia, state interference with
interstate  commerce  was  cutting  off  the  lifeblood  of  the
Nation.  See Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assn. v.
Thomas, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 7).  For the
delegates, therefore, “removing state trade barriers was a
principal reason for the adoption of the Constitution.”  Ibid.
In the state ratifying conventions, moreover, “fostering free
trade among the States was prominently cited as a reason
for ratification.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8).

The Constitution crafted by the Framers contains several
provisions  protecting  free  trade  among  the  States.  The
Constitution’s protection of free trade among the States has
resulted in an extraordinary 234-year record of progress:  It
has facilitated robust economic activity within the United
States and has helped generate remarkable (albeit at times
uneven)  economic  prosperity  and  growth  in  America
relative to the other nations of the world.

This  case  involves  the  American  pork  industry,  which

——————

1 The Court also unanimously rejects plaintiffs’ separate claim under

Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U. S. 324 (1989).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring and dissenting opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in the case of National Pork Producers Council v. Ross. It delves into constitutional arguments related to state economic regulations and their impact on interstate commerce.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–1271
_________________

TIMOTHY K. MOORE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SPEAKER OF THE NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. REBECCA HARPER, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
NORTH CAROLINA

[June 27, 2023]

Ante,  at  26.

for  compliance  with

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full.    The  Court  today
correctly  concludes  that  state  laws  governing  federal
elections  are  subject  to  ordinary  state  court  review,
including
the  relevant  state
constitution.  Ante, at 15, 26, 29.  But because the Elections
Clause  assigns  authority  respecting  federal  elections  to
state  legislatures,  the  Court  also  correctly  concludes  that
“state  courts  do  not  have  free  rein”  in  conducting  that
review.
Therefore,  a  state  court’s
interpretation  of  state  law  in  a  case  implicating  the
Elections Clause is subject to federal court review.  Ante, at
26–30;  see  also  Bush  v.  Palm  Beach  County  Canvassing
Bd.,  531  U. S.  70,  76–78  (2000)  (unanimously  concluding
that a state court’s interpretation of state law in a federal
election  case  presents  a  federal  issue);  cf.  Democratic
National  Committee  v.  Wisconsin  State  Legislature,  592
U. S.  ___,  ___,  n. 1  (2020)  (KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring  in
denial  of  application  to  vacate  stay)  (slip  op.,  at  9,  n. 1).
Federal  court  review  of  a  state  court’s  interpretation  of
state  law  in  a  federal  election  case  “does  not  imply  a
disrespect  for  state  courts  but  rather  a  respect  for  the
constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures.”  Bush
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in a case concerning state laws governing federal elections.  It is sequential text and contains legal reasoning and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

947

524 U. S.

Certiorari Denied

June 24, 26, 1998

June 24, 1998

No. 97–8922 (A–978). Narvaiz v. Johnson, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of
death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the
Justice Stevens and Jus-
Court, denied. Certiorari denied.
tice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.
Reported below: 134 F. 3d 688.

June 26, 1998

Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded

No. 97–232. Eddy Potash, Inc. v. Harrison. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur-
ther consideration in light of Faragher v. Boca Raton, ante, p. 775.
Reported below: 112 F. 3d 1437.

No. 97–726. Reynolds v. CSX Transportation, Inc., et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case
remanded for further consideration in light of Faragher v. Boca
Raton, ante, p. 775. Reported below: 115 F. 3d 860.

No. 97–1058. Stewart, Director, Arizona Department
of Correction, et al. v. Falcone. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consid-
eration in light of Monge v. California, ante, p. 721. Reported
below: 120 F. 3d 1082.

No. 97–1777. B. C. Rogers Processors, Inc., et al. v. BOC
Group, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted, judg-
ment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in
light of Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,
523 U. S. 26 (1998). Reported below: 136 F. 3d 139.

No. 97–5760. Dickey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for
further consideration in light of Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320
(1997).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a list of Supreme Court orders. It includes case numbers, parties involved, court decisions, and citations to relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document: Supreme Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

522

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

ving, 481 U. S. 704, 716–718 (1987). Without addressing the
basis of this Court’s jurisdiction, we have also upheld similar
statutory schemes against Takings Clause challenges. See
Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction La-
borers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602, 641–
“While we are
647 (1993); Connolly, 475 U. S., at 221–228.
not bound by previous exercises of jurisdiction in cases in
which our power to act was not questioned but was passed
sub silentio, neither should we disregard the implications of
an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper” in
previous cases. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S.
294, 307 (1962) (citations omitted). Based on the nature of
the taking alleged in this case, we conclude that the declara-
tory judgment and injunction sought by petitioner constitute
an appropriate remedy under the circumstances, and that it
is within the district courts’ power to award such equitable
relief.

IV
A
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides:
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.” The aim of the Clause is to prevent
the government “from forcing some people alone to bear pub-
lic burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364
U. S. 40, 49 (1960).

This case does not present the “classi[c] taking” in which
the government directly appropriates private property for
its own use. See United States v. Security Industrial
Bank, 459 U. S. 70, 78 (1982). Although takings problems
are more commonly presented when “the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by gov-
ernment, than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the beneﬁts and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good,” Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978) (citation omitted),
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel*. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of the Takings Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

FDA v. ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE

Opinion of the Court

drugs by others may cause more visits to doctors.

And  if  we  were  now  to  invent  a  new  doctrine  of  doctor
standing, there would be no principled way to cabin such a
sweeping  doctrinal  change  to  doctors  or  other  healthcare
providers.  Firefighters  could  sue  to  object  to  relaxed
building codes that increase fire risks.  Police officers could
sue to challenge a government decision to legalize certain
activities  that  are  associated  with  increased  crime.
Teachers in border states could sue to challenge allegedly
lead  to  overcrowded
lax
classrooms.

immigration  policies  that

We  decline  to  start  the  Federal  Judiciary  down  that
uncharted path.  That path would seemingly not end until
virtually every citizen had standing to challenge virtually
every government action that they do not like—an approach
to  standing  that  this  Court  has  consistently  rejected  as
flatly inconsistent with Article III.

We recognize that many citizens, including the plaintiff
doctors here, have sincere concerns about and objections to
others  using  mifepristone  and  obtaining  abortions.  But
citizens  and  doctors  do  not  have  standing  to  sue  simply
because others are allowed to engage in certain activities—
at  least  without  the  plaintiffs  demonstrating  how  they
would  be  injured  by  the  government’s  alleged  under-
regulation of others.  See Coalition for Mercury-Free Drugs
v.  Sebelius,  671  F. 3d  1275,  1277  (CADC  2012).    Citizens
and doctors who object to what the law allows others to do
may  always  take  their  concerns  to  the  Executive  and
Legislative  Branches  and  seek  greater  regulatory  or
legislative restrictions on certain activities.

In sum, the doctors in this case have failed to establish
Article  III  standing.  The  doctors  have  not  shown  that
FDA’s actions likely will cause them any injury in fact.  The
asserted  causal  link  is  simply  too  speculative  or  too
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the section discussing why the plaintiffs lack standing. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U45

[09-26-01 10:03:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

352

NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SHANKLIN

Opinion of the Court

(same); Hester v. CSX Transp., Inc., 61 F. 3d 382 (CA5 1995)
(same), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 1093 (1996), with 173 F. 3d 386
(CA6 1999) (case below); Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 38 F. 3d
304 (CA7 1994) (no pre-emption until representative of Fed-
eral Government has determined that devices installed are
adequate for safety).

II

We previously addressed the pre-emptive effect of the
FHWA’s regulations implementing the Crossings Program in
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S. 658 (1993).
In
that case, we explained that the language of the FRSA’s
pre-emption provision dictates that, to pre-empt state law,
the federal regulation must “cover” the same subject matter,
and not merely “ ‘touch upon’ or ‘relate to’ that subject mat-
ter.”
Id., at 664; see also 49 U. S. C. § 20106. Thus, “pre-
emption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially
subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law.” Eas-
terwood, supra, at 664. Applying this standard, we con-
cluded that the regulations contained in 23 CFR pt. 924
(1999), which “establish the general terms of the bargain be-
tween the Federal and State Governments” for the Cross-
ings Program, are not pre-emptive. 507 U. S., at 667. We
also held that § 646.214(b)(1), which requires that all trafﬁc
control devices installed under the program comply with the
MUTCD, does not pre-empt state tort actions.
Id., at 668–
670. The MUTCD “provides a description of, rather than
a prescription for, the allocation of responsibility for grade
crossing safety between Federal and State Governments and
between States and railroads,” and hence “disavows any
claim to cover the subject matter of that body of law.”
Id.,
at 669–670.

With respect to §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), however, we
reached a different conclusion. Because those regulations
“establish requirements as to the installation of particular
warning devices,” we held that “when they are applicable,
Id., at 670. Unlike the other
state tort law is pre-empted.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing previous cases and regulations. It delves into the legal interpretation of pre-emption related to railroad crossing safety.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

49

Opinion of the Court

*

*
Abood  was  wrongly  decided  and  is  now  overruled.    The
judgment  of  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the
Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

*

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the conclusion of a legal opinion, specifically the closing section with the overruling of a previous case and instructions for further proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

history,  post-ratification  history,  and  precedent  when
analyzing vague constitutional text.

A

Pre-ratification  history.  When

interpreting  vague
constitutional  text,  the  Court  typically  scrutinizes  the
stated intentions and understandings of the Framers and
Ratifiers  of  the  Constitution
(or,  as  relevant,  the
Amendments).  The Court also looks to the understandings
of the American people from the pertinent ratification era.
Those  intentions  and  understandings  do  not  necessarily
determine  meaning,  but  they  may  be  strong  evidence  of
meaning.  See  generally,  e.g.,  The  Federalist  (C.  Rossiter
ed.  1961);  Records  of  the  Federal  Convention  of  1787  (M.
Farrand ed. 1911); Debates on the Federal Constitution (J.
Elliot ed. 1836).

Especially  for  the  original  Constitution  and  the  Bill  of
Rights, the Court also examines the pre-ratification history
in  the  American  Colonies,  including  pre-ratification  laws
and practices.  And the Court pays particular attention to
the historical laws and practices in the United States from
Independence  in  1776  until  ratification  in  1788  or  1791.
Pre-ratification  American  history  can  shed  light  on
constitutional meaning in various ways.

For  example,  some  provisions  of  the  Constitution  use
language that appeared in the Articles of Confederation or
state  constitutional  provisions.  And  when  the  language
that  appeared  in  the  Articles  of  Confederation  or  in  state
constitutions is the same as or similar to the language in
the U. S. Constitution, the history of how people understood
the  language  in  the  Articles  or  state  constitutions  can
inform  interpretation  of  that  language  in  the  U. S.
Constitution.  See,  e.g.,  Moore  v.  Harper,  600  U. S.  1,  33
(2023) (the “Framers did not write the Elections Clause on
a blank slate—they instead borrowed from the Articles of
Confederation”  as  evidenced  by  their  use  of  “closely
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the use of pre-ratification history in interpreting vague constitutional text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

Years of Edward III, 108 Eng. Hist. Rev. 842, 850 (1993).  It
provided that, with some exceptions, Englishmen could not
“come before the King’s Justices, or other of the King’s Min-
isters doing their office, with force and arms, nor bring no
force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night
nor  by  day,  in  Fairs,  Markets,  nor  in  the  presence  of  the
Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon
pain to forfeit their Armour to the King, and their Bodies to
Prison at the King’s pleasure.”  2 Edw. 3 c. 3 (1328).

Respondents  argue  that  the  prohibition  on  “rid[ing]”  or
“go[ing]  . . .  armed”  was  a  sweeping  restriction  on  public
carry  of  self-defense  weapons  that  would  ultimately  be
adopted  in  Colonial  America  and  justify  onerous  public-
carry regulations.  Notwithstanding the ink the parties spill
over  this  provision,  the  Statute  of  Northampton—at  least
as  it  was  understood  during  the  Middle  Ages—has  little
bearing on the Second Amendment adopted in 1791.  The
Statute of Northampton was enacted nearly 20 years before
the  Black  Death,  more  than  200  years  before  the  birth  of
Shakespeare, more than 350 years before the Salem Witch
Trials,  more  than  450  years  before  the  ratification  of  the
Constitution,  and  nearly  550  years  before  the  adoption  of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Statute’s prohibition on going or riding “armed” ob-
viously did not contemplate handguns, given they did not
appear in Europe until about the mid-1500s.  See K. Chase,
Firearms: A Global History to 1700, p. 61 (2003).  Rather, it
appears to have been centrally concerned with the wearing
of armor.  See, e.g., Calendar of the Close Rolls, Edward III,
1330–1333,  p. 131  (Apr.  3,  1330)  (H.  Maxwell-Lyte  ed.
1898);  id.,  at  243  (May  28,  1331);  id.,  Edward  III,  1327–
1330, at 314 (Aug. 29, 1328) (1896).  If it did apply beyond
armor, it applied to such weapons as the “launcegay,” a 10-
to 12-foot-long lightweight lance.  See 7 Rich. 2 c. 13 (1383);
20 Rich. 2 c. 1 (1396).

The  Statute’s  apparent  focus  on  armor  and,  perhaps,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion discussing the historical context of gun laws. It cites a historical statute and analyzes its relevance to the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

Opinion of the Court

Crawford made clear.  “Where testimonial statements are
involved,”  that  Court  explained,  “the  Framers  [did  not
mean] to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the va-
garies of the rules of evidence.”  541 U. S., at 61.  JUSTICE
THOMAS reiterated the point in Williams: “[C]oncepts cen-
tral to the application of the Confrontation Clause are ulti-
mately  matters  of  federal  constitutional  law  that  are  not
dictated by state or federal evidentiary rules.”  567 U. S., at
105 (opinion concurring in judgment).  We therefore do not
“accept [a State’s] nonhearsay label at face value.”  Id., at
106; see id., at 132 (KAGAN, J., dissenting).  Instead, we con-
duct  an  independent  analysis  of  whether  an  out-of-court
statement  was  admitted  for  its  truth,  and  therefore  may
have compromised a defendant’s right of confrontation.

We did just that in Tennessee v. Street—and in so doing
showcased how an out-of-court statement can come into ev-
idence  for  a  non-truth-related  reason.    See  471  U. S.,  at
410–417.  Street was charged with murder, based mostly on
a stationhouse confession.  At trial, he claimed that the con-
fession was coerced, and in a peculiar way: The sheriff, he
said, had read aloud an accomplice’s confession and forced
him  to  repeat  it.  On  rebuttal,  the  State  introduced  the
other  confession  (through  the  sheriff ’s  testimony)  to
demonstrate  to  the  jury  all  the  ways  its  content  deviated
from Street’s.  We upheld that use as “nonhearsay.”  Id., at
413.  The  other  confession  came  in,  we  explained,  not  to
prove “the truth of [the accomplice’s] assertions” about how
the  murder  happened,  but  only  to  disprove  Street’s  claim
about how the sheriff elicited his own confession.  Ibid.  Or

——————
long-established understanding, then it might shed light on the histori-
cal meaning of the Confrontation Clause.  But that could not possibly be
said  of  Rule  703—the  rule Arizona  cites  to  support  the  introduction of
basis evidence.  On the contrary, that rule is a product of the late-20th
century, and was understood from the start to depart from past practice.
See Brief for Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae 17; Advisory Com-
mittee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 703, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 393.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. It cites previous Supreme Court cases and delves into legal arguments and interpretations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ANTONYUK v. NIGRELLI

Statement of ALITO, J.

the case.  Applicants should not be deterred by today’s order
from  again  seeking  relief  if  the  Second  Circuit  does  not,
within  a  reasonable  time,  provide  an  explanation  for  its
stay order or expedite consideration of the appeal.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document excerpt, specifically a statement from a judge. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

from withholding funding from a religious entity “solely be-
cause of its religious character,” id., at ___ (opinion of the
Court) (slip op., at 14), but retained authority to do so on
the basis that the funding would be put to religious uses.
Two  Terms  ago,  the  Court  reprised  and  extended  Trinity
Lutheran’s error to hold that a State could not limit a pri-
vate-school voucher program to secular schools.  Espinoza
v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip
op., at 9).  The Court, however, again refrained from extend-
ing Trinity Lutheran from funding restrictions based on re-
ligious status to those based on religious uses.  Espinoza,
591 U. S., at ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 9–12).
  As JUSTICE BREYER explains, see ante, at 8–9, this status-
use distinction readily distinguishes this case from Trinity
Lutheran  and  Espinoza.  I  warned  in  Trinity  Lutheran,
however, that the Court’s analysis could “be manipulated to
call for a similar fate for lines drawn on the  basis of reli-
gious use.”  582 U. S., at ___, n. 14 (dissenting opinion) (slip
op., at 25, n. 14).  That fear has come to fruition: The Court
now holds for the first time that “any status-use distinction”
is immaterial in both “theory” and “practice.”  Ante, at 17.
It  reaches  that  conclusion  by  embracing  arguments  from
prior separate writings and ignoring decades of precedent
affording governments flexibility in navigating the tension
between  the  Religion  Clauses.  As  a  result,  in  just  a  few
years, the Court has upended constitutional doctrine, shift-
ing from a rule that permits States to decline to fund reli-
gious organizations to one that requires States in many cir-
cumstances  to  subsidize  religious  indoctrination  with
taxpayer dollars.

Second,  the  consequences  of  the  Court’s  rapid  transfor-
mation  of  the  Religion  Clauses  must  not  be  understated.
From  a  doctrinal  perspective,  the  Court’s  failure  to  apply
the  play-in-the-joints  principle  here,  see  ante,  at  13–14
(BREYER, J., dissenting), leaves one to wonder what, if any-
thing, is left of it.  The Court’s increasingly expansive view
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, indicating it is part of the legal reasoning and analysis within the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1146

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 19, 2010

558 U. S.

ioral  Health  and  Developmental  Services,  et  al.  C.  A.
4th  Cir.  The  Solicitor  General  is  invited  to  ﬁle  a  brief  in  this
case  expressing  the  views  of  the  United  States.

No.  09–6554.  Plummer  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  1021]  denied.

No.  09–6764.  Royse  v.  Corning  Glass  Works,  Inc.  C.  A.
6th Cir.  Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying
leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  1046]  denied.

No.  09–6888.  Beaver  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment of Corrections.  Sup. Ct. Fla.  Motion of petitioner
for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma
pauperis  [ante,  p.  1074]  denied.

No.  09–6916.  Howard  v.  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio  et  al.
C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order
denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 1087] denied.

No.  09–7550.  Jones  v.  Liberty  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  et  al.
C. A. 5th Cir.  Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis  denied.  Petitioner  is  allowed  until  February  9,  2010,
within  which  to  pay  the  docketing  fee  required  by  Rule  38(a)  and
to  submit  a  petition  in  compliance  with  Rule  33.1  of  the  Rules  of
this  Court.

No.  09–7565.  Corines  v.  Killian,  Warden.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied.  Petitioner  is  allowed  until  February  9,  2010,  within  which
to  pay  the  docketing  fee  required  by  Rule  38(a)  and  to  submit  a
petition  in  compliance  with  Rule  33.1  of  the  Rules  of  this  Court.
Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision
of  this  motion.

No.  09–8096.  In  re  Walls;
No.  09–8190.  In  re  Gutierrez;
No.  09–8237.  In  re  Miller;  and
No.  09–8285.  In  re  Bartoli.  Petitions  for  writs  of  habeas

corpus  denied.

No.  09–7455.  In  re  Wilber.  Petition  for  writ  of  mandamus

denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP

Opinion of the Court

Court  was  obligated  to  abstain  from  deciding  the  case  on
international comity grounds.  Nor do we consider an alter-
native  argument  noted  by  the  heirs:  that  the  sale  of  the
Welfenschatz is not subject to the domestic takings rule be-
cause the consortium members were not German nationals
at the time of the transaction.  See Brief for Respondents
27–28; but see Brief for Petitioners 19, n. 7 (claiming that
the  heirs  forfeited  this  argument).    The  Court  of  Appeals
should direct the District Court to consider this argument,
including whether it was adequately preserved below.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit
is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the concluding section. It discusses the court's decision, the arguments considered, and the next steps in the legal process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1067

529 U. S.

April 17, 2000

No. 99–1313. Longman et al. v. Food Lion, Inc., et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 675.

No. 99–1319. United States ex rel. Weddington v.
Scott & White Memorial Hospital et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 264.

No. 99–1320. Campbell v. Sletten et al. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 249.

No. 99–1328. DiMa Corp. v. Town of Hallie. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 F. 3d 823.

No. 99–1329. Grayson, Administrator of the Estate of
Collins, Deceased v. Royer. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 692.

No. 99–1334. Foreman et al. v. Dallas County et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 314.

No. 99–1336.

Jones v. Lincoln Electric Co. et al. C. A.

7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 709.

No. 99–1340. Whelchel v. City of Covington et al. C. A.

11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1324.

No. 99–1345. DiLoreto v. Board of Education, Downey
Unified School District, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 958.

No. 99–1346. Krim et al. v. Abboud et al. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 264.

No. 99–1348. BVR Liquidating, Inc., fka Beaver Preci-
sion Products, Inc., et al. v. International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 190 F. 3d 768.

No. 99–1350. Souders v. Lucero et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 1040.

No. 99–1352. Brown v. New York City Police Department
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201
F. 3d 430.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and relevant circuit information. This type of content is generally not suitable for indexing as it is not the primary narrative content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

SCALIA, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 14–556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14–574
_________________

14–556

JAMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.;

14–562

VALERIA TANCO, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
BILL HASLAM, GOVERNOR OF
TENNESSEE, ET AL.;

14–571

APRIL DEBOER, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN,
ET AL.; AND

14–574

GREGORY BOURKE, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
STEVE BESHEAR, GOVERNOR OF
KENTUCKY

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2015]

 JUSTICE  SCALIA,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  joins,

dissenting.

I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion in full.  I write sepa-
rately  to  call  attention  to  this  Court’s  threat  to  American
democracy.

The  substance  of  today’s  decree  is  not  of  immense  per-
sonal  importance  to  me.    The  law  can  recognize  as  mar-
riage  whatever  sexual  attachments  and  living  arrange-
ments  it  wishes,  and  can  accord  them  favorable  civil
consequences, from tax treatment to rights of inheritance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia.  It includes citation information, case names, and the introduction of the dissenting opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

9

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

ing of the Treaty Power did not permit the President and
the  Senate  to  exercise  domestic  authority  commensurate
with their substantial power over external affairs.

C
The understanding that treaties are limited to, in Madi-
son’s  words,  “the  regulation  of  intercourse  with  foreign
nations,”  endured  in  the  years  after  the  Constitution  was
ratified.

In 1796, an extended debate regarding the proper scope
of the Treaty Power arose in the aftermath of a controver-
sial treaty  with Great  Britain that addressed the validity
of  prerevolutionary  debts  and  the  property  rights  of  Brit-
ish subjects.  Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation,
Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, T. S. No. 105.  When President
Washington  requested  appropriations  to  implement  that
so-called “Jay Treaty” (after its chief negotiator, John Jay),
the  House  of  Representatives  engaged  in  a  month-long
floor debate over its own role in the process of implement-
ing treaties.  See 5 Annals of Cong. 426 (1796); see gener-
ally  D.  Currie,  The  Constitution  in  Congress:  The  Fed-
eralist  Period  1789–1801,  pp.  211–217  (1997).    Some
Congressmen  argued  that  the  House  had  a  right  to  inde-
pendently  review  the  merits  of  the  treaty.   See,  e.g.,  5
Annals  of  Cong.  427–428  (remarks  of  Rep.  Livingston)
(“[T]he  House  w[as]  vested  with  a  discretionary  power  of
carrying  the  Treaty  into  effect,  or  refusing  it  their  sanc-
tion”).  Others  insisted  that  “if  the  Treaty  was  the  su-
preme  law  of  the  land,  then  there  was  no  discretionary
power in the House, except on the question of its constitu-
tionality.”  Id., at 436–437 (Rep. Murray).

That latter group relied in part on the observation that
the Treaty Power was limited by its nature, and thus the
Constitution’s  failure  to  specify  a  role  for  the  House  did
not  pose  a  mortal  threat  to  that  Chamber’s  legislative
prerogatives.  Representative James Hillhouse of Connect-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 572 U.S. ____ (2014). It delves into the historical understanding and interpretation of the Treaty Power.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:47] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

931

524 U. S.

June 15, 1998

No. 97–8839. Booher v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8872. Hauck v. Mills, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8875. Mosseri v. United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York (two judgments).
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8890. Harris v. Higgins, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8900. Troxell v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 97–8933. Craw v. Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1153.

No. 97–8948. Stewart v. Monroe, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 436.

No. 97–8961. Bradley v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 292 Ill. App. 3d 208, 685
N. E. 2d 426.

No. 97–8975. Castaphney, aka Castapheny v. White, Su-
perintendent, State Correctional Institution at Pitts-
burgh, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 142 F. 3d 427.

No. 97–9006. Campbell v. United States Postal Service.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d
778.

No. 97–9048. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1189.

No. 97–9050. Langley v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 918.

No. 97–9057. Branch v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 900.

No. 97–9058. Gianetta, aka Garcia v. United States.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d
913.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Case Summaries)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1181

with proof  of service.  Service shall  be as required  by Rule
29,  except  that  when  an  adverse  party  is  a  State,  service
shall  be  made  on  both  the  Governor  and  the  Attorney  Gen
eral of that State.

4.  The case  will be placed  on the docket when  the motion
for  leave  to  ﬁle  and  the  initial  pleading  are  ﬁled  with  the
Clerk.  The Rule 38(a) docket fee shall be paid at that time.
5.  No  more  than  60  days  after  receiving  the  motion  for
leave  to  ﬁle  and  the  initial  pleading,  an  adverse  party  shall
ﬁle  40  copies  of  any  brief  in  opposition  to  the  motion,  with
proof of service as required by Rule 29.  The Clerk will dis
tribute the ﬁled documents to the Court for its consideration
upon  receiving  an  express  waiver  of  the  right  to  ﬁle  a  brief
in opposition, or, if no waiver or brief is ﬁled, upon the expi
ration of the time allowed for ﬁling.  If a brief in opposition
is  timely  ﬁled,  the  Clerk  will  distribute  the  ﬁled  documents
to  the  Court  for  its  consideration  no  less  than  10  days  after
the  brief  in  opposition  is  ﬁled.  A  reply  brief  may  be  ﬁled,
but  consideration  of  the  case  will  not  be  deferred  pending
its  receipt.  The  Court  thereafter  may  grant  or  deny  the
motion,  set  it  for  oral  argument,  direct  that  additional
documents  be  ﬁled,  or  require  that  other  proceedings  be
conducted.

6.  A  summons  issued  out  of  this  Court  shall  be  served
on  the  defendant  60  days  before  the  return  day  speciﬁed
therein.  If  the  defendant  does  not  respond  by  the  return
day, the plaintiff may proceed ex parte.

7.  Process against a State issued out of this Court shall be
served  on  both  the  Governor  and  the  Attorney  General  of
that State.

Rule 18.  Appeal from a United States District Court

1.  When a direct appeal from a decision of a United States
district court is authorized by law, the appeal is commenced
by ﬁling a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court
within the time provided by law after entry of the judgment
sought  to  be  reviewed.  The  time  to  ﬁle  may  not  be  ex
tended.  The notice of appeal shall specify the parties taking
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a set of rules from a legal document, specifically the Supreme Court.  It outlines procedures for filing motions and appeals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U88

[09-06-00 16:44:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 308 (1998)

319

Thomas, J., dissenting

weapons possessions that are already illegal under state law.
And such a purpose is consistent with the statutory direction
that state law controls what constitutes a conviction for a
violent felony.

I believe that the plain meaning of the statute is that Mas-
sachusetts did not “expressly provid[e]” that petitioner “may
not . . . possess . . . ﬁrearms.” At the very least, this inter-
pretation is a plausible one.
Indeed, both the Government
and the Court concede as much. See Brief for United States
16 (“grammatically possible” to read statute to say that its
condition is not satisﬁed if the State does permit its felons
to possess some ﬁrearms); ante, at 316 (this “reading is not
plausible enough”). Accordingly, it is far from clear under
the statute that a prior state conviction counts as a violent
felony conviction for purposes of § 924(e) just because the
State imposes some restriction, no matter how slight, on
ﬁrearms possession by ex-felons. The rule of lenity must
therefore apply: “[T]he Court will not interpret a federal
criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places
on an individual when such an interpretation can be based
on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”
Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958). Ex-felons
cannot be expected to realize that a federal statute that
explicitly relies on state law prohibits behavior that state
law allows.

The Court rejects the rule of lenity in this case because
it thinks the purported statutory ambiguity rests on a
“grammatical possibility” and “an implausible reading of the
congressional purpose.” Ante, at 316. But the alleged am-
biguity does not result from a mere grammatical possibility;
it exists because of an interpretation that, for the reasons
I have described, both accords with a natural reading of
the statutory language and is consistent with the statutory
purpose.

The plain meaning of § 921(a)(20) is that Massachusetts
law did not “expressly provid[e] that [petitioner] may not . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

EGBERT v. BOULE

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental action af-
fecting property interests” and “across this enormous swath
of potential litigation would hover the difficulty of devising
a . . . standard that could guide an employee’s conduct and
a  judicial  factfinder’s  conclusion.”    551  U. S.,  at  561.    Be-
cause of the “elusiveness of a limiting principle” for claims
like  the  landowner’s,  id.,  at  561,  n. 11,  the  Court  decided
that courts were ill equipped to tailor an appropriate rem-
edy, id., at 562.

Boule’s First Amendment retaliation claim raises similar
concerns.  Unlike  the  constitutional  rights  this  Court  has
recognized  as  cognizable  under  Bivens,  First  Amendment
retaliation  claims  could  potentially  be  brought  against
many different federal officers, stretching substantially be-
yond  the  “common  and  recurrent  sphere  of  law  enforce-
ment” to reach virtually all federal employees.  Ziglar, 582
U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  11).  Under  such  circumstances,
this Court’s precedent holds that “ ‘evaluat[ing] the impact
of a new species of litigation’ ” on the efficiency of civil ser-
vice is a task for Congress, not the courts.  Wilkie, 551 U. S.,
at 562; see also Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13).  I
therefore concur in the judgment as to the Court’s reversal
of  the  Court  of  Appeals’  conclusion  that  Boule’s  First
Amendment Bivens action may proceed, not for the reasons
the Court identifies, ante, at 13–16, but because precedent
requires it.

III
If  the  legal  standard  the  Court  articulates  to  reject
Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim sounds unfamiliar, that
is  because  it  is.    Just  five  years  after  circumscribing  the
standard for allowing  Bivens  claims to proceed, a restless
and newly constituted Court sees fit to refashion the stand-
ard  anew  to  foreclose  remedies  in  yet  more  cases.  The
measures  the  Court  takes  to  ensure  Boule’s  claim  is  dis-
missed are inconsistent with governing precedent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the legal reasoning behind the Court's decision and presents a counter-argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

29

Opinion of the Court

this Court’s core dormant Commerce Clause teachings fo-
cused on discriminatory state legislation.  Instead, petition-
ers invite us to endorse two new theories of implied judicial
power.  They  would  have  us  recognize  an  “almost  per  se”
rule against the enforcement of state laws that have “extra-
territorial effects”—even though this Court has recognized
since Gibbons that virtually all state laws create ripple ef-
fects beyond their borders.  Alternatively, they would have
us prevent a State from regulating the sale of an ordinary
consumer good within its own borders on nondiscriminatory
terms—even though the Pike line of cases they invoke has
never  before  yielded  such  a  result.    Like  the  courts  that
faced this case before us, we decline both of petitioners’ in-
cautious invitations.

The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is

Affirmed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it is part of the main body of the legal document and not a preliminary or supplementary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–12
_________________

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, APPELLANT v.
TED CRUZ FOR SENATE, ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[May 16, 2022]

CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the

Court.

In  order  to  jumpstart  a  fledgling  campaign  or  finish
strong in a tight race, candidates for federal office often loan
money to their campaign committees.  A provision of federal
law regulates the repayment of such loans.  Among other
things, it bars campaigns from using more than $250,000 of
funds raised after election day to repay a candidate’s per-
sonal loans.  This limit on the use of post-election funds in-
creases the risk that candidate loans over $250,000 will not
be  repaid  in  full,  inhibiting  candidates  from  making  such
loans  in  the  first  place.    The  question  is  whether  this  re-
striction violates the First Amendment rights of candidates
and their campaigns to engage in political speech.

I
A

Candidates for federal office may, consistent with federal
law, use various sources to fund their campaigns.  A candi-
date may spend an unlimited amount of his own money in
support of his campaign.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1,
52–54  (1976)  (per  curiam).  His  campaign—a  legal  entity
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the introductory section of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Syllabus

THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined except as to Part III–C.  GORSUCH, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined as to Parts I, II, III,
and IV.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a citation and a heading from a legal document, likely a Supreme Court case. It's not the main body of the text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

33

Opinion of the Court
Appendix A to opinion of the Court

Varnum v. Brien, 763 N. W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009)

Griego  v.  Oliver,  2014–NMSC–003,  ___  N.  M.  ___,  316

P. 3d 865 (2013)

Garden  State  Equality  v.  Dow,  216  N. J.  314,  79  A. 3d

1036 (2013)

Ex parte  State  ex rel.  Alabama  Policy  Institute,  ___  So.

3d ___, 2015 WL 892752 (Ala., Mar. 3, 2015)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely from an opinion or legal document.  Legal citations are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

that  supported  racial  integration  in  higher  education  and
public  transportation.    Id.,  at  452.  In  response,  NAACP
members were threatened with economic reprisals and vio-
lence.  Id., at 462.  As part of an effort to oust the organiza-
tion from the State, the Alabama Attorney General sought
the group’s membership lists.  Id., at 452–453.  We held that
the First Amendment prohibited such compelled disclosure.
Id., at 466.  We explained that “[e]ffective advocacy of both
public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,” id., at
460, and we noted “the vital relationship between freedom
to associate and privacy in one’s associations,” id., at 462.
Because NAACP members faced a risk of reprisals if their
affiliation  with  the  organization  became  known—and  be-
cause  Alabama  had  demonstrated  no  offsetting  interest
“sufficient to justify the deterrent effect” of disclosure, id.,
at 463—we concluded that the State’s demand violated the
First Amendment.

B
1
NAACP v. Alabama did not phrase in precise terms the
standard of review that applies to First Amendment chal-
lenges to compelled disclosure.  We have since settled on a
standard  referred  to  as  “exacting  scrutiny.”  Buckley  v.
Valeo,  424  U. S.  1,  64  (1976)  (per  curiam).  Under  that
standard, there must be “a substantial relation between the
disclosure  requirement  and  a  sufficiently  important  gov-
ernmental interest.”  Doe v. Reed, 561 U. S. 186, 196 (2010)
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    “To  withstand  this
scrutiny, the strength of the governmental interest must re-
flect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amend-
ment  rights.”  Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
Such scrutiny, we have held, is appropriate given the “de-
terrent  effect  on  the  exercise  of  First  Amendment  rights”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the precedent set by NAACP v. Alabama and the standard of review applied to compelled disclosure cases under the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

913

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5616.  Price  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  985.

No.  09–5617.  Stover  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  292  Fed.  Appx.  755.

No. 09–5618.  Allen v.  United States.  Ct. App. D. C.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  973  A.  2d  734.

No. 09–5620.  Jones v. Florida.  Sup. Ct. Fla.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  13  So.  3d  468.

No.  09–5621.  Jensen  v.  Missouri.  Sup.  Ct.  Mo.  Certiorari

denied.

No. 09–5622.  Diallo v.  Holder, Attorney General.  C.  A.
4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 312 Fed. Appx. 536.
No.  09– 5623.  Charles  v.  Pentagon  Federal  Credit

Union.  Ct.  App.  Colo.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5624.  Yates  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  277.

No.  09–5625.  Thomas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  863.

No.  09–5626.  Thorward  v.  Knowles,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  568.

No.  09–5627.  Thompson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  365.

No.  09–5628.  Soto-Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  330.

No.  09–5629.  McDonald  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  667.

No.  09–5631.  Frasure  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  695.

No.  09–5632.  Goodson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  222.

No.  09–5633.  Reed  v.  West  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  App.  W.  Va.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  223  W.  Va.  312,  674  S.  E.
2d  18.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, including case numbers, citations, and disposition. It is not sequential narrative text and is likely not meant to be read as a continuous story.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 256 (2010)

261

Opinion of the Court

This  negotiated  ﬁgure  may  prove  unattainable.  Accord
ing to the complaint, natural conditions and periodic ﬂuctua
tions  have  caused  the  Catawba  River’s  ﬂow  to  fall  below
1,100 cubic feet per second.  Duke Energy, which generates
hydroelectric  power  from  a  series  of  reservoirs  on  the  Ca
tawba  River,  developed  a  model  to  estimate  the  river’s
ﬂow  if  the  river  were  not  impounded.  Id.,  ¶¶ 8,  16.  The
complaint notes that according to Duke Energy’s model, the
Catawba  River—even  in  its  natural  state—often  would  not
deliver  into  South  Carolina  a  minimum  average  daily  ﬂow
of  1,100  cubic  feet  per  second.  Id.,  ¶ 16;  App.  to  Motion  of
State  of  South  Carolina  for  Leave  To  File  Complaint,  Com
plaint,  and  Brief  in  Support  of  its  Motion  for  Leave  To  File
Complaint  18.  South  Carolina  contends  that  North  Caroli
na’s  authorization  of  large  transfers  of  water  from  the  Ca
tawba River basin has exacerbated these conditions.

Shortly after we granted leave to ﬁle the complaint, two of
the entities named in the complaint—the CRWSP and Duke
Energy—ﬁled  motions  for  leave  to  intervene  as  parties.
The CRWSP sought leave to intervene as a party-defendant,
asserting  its  interest  as  a  “riparian  user  of  the  Catawba
River”  and  claiming  that  this  interest  was  not  adequately
represented  because  of  the  CRWSP’s  “interstate  nature.”
Motion of CRWSP for Leave To Intervene and Brief in Sup
port  of  Motion  8,  9.  Speciﬁcally,  the  CRWSP  noted  that  it
is a bistate entity that is jointly owned and regulated by, and
supplies water to, North Carolina’s Union County and South
Carolina’s  Lancaster  County.  Id.,  at  9.  Duke  Energy
sought  leave  to  intervene  and  ﬁle  an  answer,  asserting  an
interest  as  the  operator  of  11  dams  and  reservoirs  on  the
Catawba River that control the river’s ﬂow, as the holder of
a  50-year  license 1  governing  Duke  Energy’s  hydroelectric

1 The  license  was  issued  in  1958  to  Duke  Energy’s  predecessor  by  the
Federal  Power  Commission,  a  predecessor  of  the  FERC.  For  conven
ience, we will refer to Duke Energy’s “FERC license” herein.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal jargon, citations, and discusses a legal case involving water rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

THRYV, INC. v. CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP

Syllabus

least “where the grounds for attacking the decision to institute inter
partes review consist of questions that are closely tied to the applica-
tion and interpretation of statutes related to the Patent Office’s deci-
sion to initiate inter partes review.”  Id., at ___.  Pp. 6–7.

(b) The question here is whether a challenge based on §315(b) ranks
as an appeal of the agency’s decision “to institute an inter partes re-
view.”  §314(d).  There is no need to venture beyond Cuozzo’s holding
that §314(d) bars review at least of matters “closely tied to the appli-
cation  and  interpretation  of  statutes  related  to”  the  institution  deci-
sion, 579 U. S., at ___.  A §315(b) challenge easily meets that measure-
ment.  Section 315(b), setting forth a circumstance in which “[a]n inter
partes review may not be instituted,” expressly governs institution and
nothing more.  Pp. 7–8.

(c) This  conclusion  is  strongly  reinforced  by  the  statute’s  purpose
and  design.    Congress  designed  inter  partes  review  to  weed  out  bad
patent  claims  efficiently.    Allowing  §315(b)  appeals,  however,  would
unwind agency proceedings determining patentability and leave bad
patents enforceable.  Pp. 8–10.

(d) In Click-to-Call’s view, §314(d)’s bar on judicial review is limited
to the agency’s threshold determination under §314(a) of the question
whether  the  petitioner  has  a  reasonable  likelihood  of  prevailing.
Cuozzo is fatal to that interpretation, for the Court in that case held
unreviewable  the  agency’s  application  of  a  provision  other  than
§314(a).  Contrary to Click-to-Call’s contention, §314(d)’s text does not
limit the review bar to §314(a).  Rather than borrowing language from
related provisions that would have achieved Click-to-Call’s preferred
meaning,  Congress  used  broader  language  in  §314(d).    Click-to-Call
also insists that Congress intended judicial supervision of the agency’s
application of §315(b), but the statute instead reflects a choice to en-
trust that issue to the agency.  Finally, SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 584
U. S.  ___,  offers  Click-to-Call  no  assistance.    Unlike  the  appeal  held
reviewable in SAS Institute, Click-to-Call’s appeal challenges not the
manner  in  which  the  agency’s  review  proceeds  once  instituted,  but
whether the agency should have instituted review at all.  Pp. 10–13.

(e) Click-to-Call argues in the alternative that its §315(b) objection
is  authorized  as  an  appeal  from  the  Board’s  final  written  decision,
which addressed the §315(b) issue.  Even labeled that way, Click-to-
Call’s appeal is still barred by §314(d) because Click-to-Call’s conten-
tion remains, essentially, that the agency should have refused to insti-
tute inter partes review.  P. 14.

899 F. 3d 1321, vacated and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  BREYER,  KAGAN, and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined,  and  in  which
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It discusses legal arguments and interpretations of statutes related to patent review.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1135

529 U. S.

May 22, 2000

No. 99–8885. Sledge v. North Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 822.

No. 99–8960. Atamian v. Gorkin. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 746 A. 2d 275.

No. 99–9010. Garcia v. Henry. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 382.

No. 99–9012. Fletcher v. North Carolina Department of
Revenue et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 203 F. 3d 820.

No. 99–9046. Paul v. Department of the Navy. C. A. Fed.

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 217 F. 3d 860.

No. 99–9059. Shayesteh v. United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–9066. Martin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 658.

No. 99–9082. McNeil v. Corcoran, Warden, et al. C. A.

4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 821.

No. 99–9093. Perez-De Angel v. United States. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 658.

No. 99–9094. Romero-Cruz v. United States. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 374.

No. 99–9106. Anciso v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 385.

No. 99–9109. Bollman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9125. Norfleet v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 270.

No. 99–9129. Walker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9132. Brocamonte v. United States. C. A. 10th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 836.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document, not typical reading content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

879

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No. 09–123.  Kodrin et vir v.  State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314
Fed.  Appx.  671.

No.  09–124.  Morres  v.  Deer’s  Head  Hospital  Center
et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324
Fed.  Appx.  216.

No. 09–125.  Piers v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  69.

No.  09–126.  Tandiono  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.

C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–127.  Burnett v.  General  Motors  Corp. et  al.  Ct.

App.  Mich.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–128.  Covalt  et  al.  v.  Allstate  Insurance  Co.
C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.
Appx.  717.

No.  09–129.  American  Crystal  Sugar  Co.  v.  Vilsack,  Sec
retary  of  Agriculture,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  822.

No.  09–130.  Owens  v.  Steele,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  549  F.  3d  399.

No.  09–131.  Pannell  v.  Burnette,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–132.  Davis  v.  Georgia.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.  Certiorari  de

nied.  Reported  below:  285  Ga.  343,  676  S.  E.  2d  215.

No.  09–134.  Ripley  v.  Wyoming  Medical  Center  et  al.
C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d
1119.

No.  09–135.  Green  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  853.

No.  09–136.  Martin  v.  City  of  San  Antonio,  Texas,  et  al.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.
Appx.  669.

No.  09–137.  Gowan  v.  Ward  County  Commission.  Sup.  Ct.

N.  D.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  764  N. W.  2d  425.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the orders.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

Opinion of the Court

Georgia  minimizes  the  OCGA  annotations  as  non-bind-
ing and non-authoritative, but that description undersells
their practical significance.  Imagine a Georgia citizen in-
terested in learning his legal rights and duties.  If he reads
the  economy-class  version  of  the  Georgia  Code  available
online, he will see laws requiring political candidates to pay
hefty qualification fees (with no indigency exception), crim-
inalizing  broad  categories  of  consensual  sexual  conduct,
and  exempting  certain  key  evidence  in  criminal  trials
from  standard  evidentiary  limitations—with  no  hint
that important aspects of those laws have been held uncon-
stitutional  by  the  Georgia  Supreme  Court.  See  OCGA
§§21–2–131,  16–6–2,  16–6–18,  16–15–9  (available  at
www.legis.ga.gov).  Meanwhile,  first-class  readers  with
access  to  the  annotations  will  be  assured  that  these  laws
are, in crucial respects, unenforceable relics that the legis-
lature has not bothered to narrow or repeal.  See §§21–2–
131,  16–6–2,  16–6–18,  16–15–9  (available  at  https://store.
lexisnexis.com/products/official-code-of-georgia-annotated-
skuSKU6647 for $412.00).

If  everything  short  of  statutes  and  opinions  were  copy-
rightable, then States would be free to offer a whole range
of premium legal works for those who can afford the extra
benefit.  A State could monetize its entire suite of legislative
history.  With  today’s  digital  tools,  States  might  even
launch a subscription or pay-per-law service.

There is no need to assume inventive or nefarious behav-
ior  for  these  concerns  to  become  a  reality.    Unlike  other
forms of intellectual property, copyright protection is both
instant and automatic.  It vests as soon as a work is cap-
tured in a tangible form, triggering a panoply of exclusive
——————
creating binding materials from qualifying as an “author.”  Regardless,
it is more “[ ]consistent with the judicial role” to  apply the reasoning and
results the Court voted on and committed to writing than to speculate
about  what  practical  considerations  our  predecessors  “may  have  had
. . . in  mind,”  what  history  “may  [have] suggest[ed],”  or  what  constitu-
tional concerns “may have animated” our government edicts precedents.
Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically discussing the implications of copyright law on state annotations to legal codes. It delves into the potential for states to create tiered access to legal information, with premium annotations available for a fee.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

911

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5574.  Carrasco-Flores  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 324 Fed. Appx. 366.
No.  09–5575.  Lauer  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5578.  Spano  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5579.  Rose  v.  Montana.  Sup.  Ct.  Mont.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  348  Mont.  291,  202  P.  3d  749.

No.  09–5580.  Uscanga-Mora  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  1289.

No. 09–5581.  Troup v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  869.

No.  09–5582.  Phillips  v.  Missouri.  Ct.  App.  Mo.,  Southern

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5584.  Layton  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  330.

No.  09–5585.  Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  834.

No.  09–5586.  Kern  v.  Shinseki,  Secretary  of  Veterans

Affairs.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5587.  Jackson  v.  Minnesota.  Ct.  App.  Minn.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5588.  Dudley  v.  New  York.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.
N.  Y.,  1st  Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  59
App.  Div.  3d  200,  873  N. Y.  S.  2d  42.

No.  09–5590.  Zied-Campbell  v.  Richman  et  al.  C.  A.  3d

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  247.

No.  09–5592.  Hess  v.  Pennsylvania  Department  of  Cor
rections  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Pa.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  600  Pa.  375,  966  A.  2d  550.

No.  09–5593.  Dean  v.  Tennessee.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tenn.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxiii

Page
Paul v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  828,927

827
Paull v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111
Paulsen v. CNF, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083
Payan-Carrill v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836
Payne v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Payne v. Tinsley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  941,1141

Peace v. Astrue
947

PeaceHealth; Richmond v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947

PeaceHealth Medical Group; Richmond v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Pearson v. Bestcare
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Pedernera v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Pedroso v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
886

Peer v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1062

Peguero v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
899

Pelch v. Yarborough  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Pelletier v. Gerry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Pelullo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Pena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
870

Pena-Gomez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

Pena-Hernandez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1150

Pendleton v. Ballard  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088

Penfold; Pannell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
803

Penk v. Coffman  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Penk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
860

859

Penney; McNulty v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
883

Pennsylvania; Baez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Pennsylvania; Baumhammers v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

Pennsylvania; Burke v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
867

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pennsylvania; Carter v.
1082

Pennsylvania; Clark v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Pennsylvania; Common Cause of Pa. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pennsylvania; Diodoro v.
954

Pennsylvania; Dortch v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

Pennsylvania; Ede v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914

Pennsylvania; Hallman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Pennsylvania; Hauman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pennsylvania; Hawkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

Pennsylvania; Jerry v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  805,1022

829

Pennsylvania; Jones v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

Pennsylvania; McCulligan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Pennsylvania; Miller v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907

Pennsylvania; Poland v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pennsylvania; Reyes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
850

Pennsylvania; Roth v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1027,1159
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

19

JACKSON, J., dissenting

type  of  palm  greasing  that  the  statute  plainly  covers  and
that  one  might  reasonably  expect  Congress  to  care  about
when targeting graft in state, local, and tribal governments.
After today, however, the ability of the Federal Government
to  prosecute  such  obviously  wrongful  conduct  is  left  in
doubt.

It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the  prosecutions  that  Snyder
describes  as  proof  of  the  Government’s  “not  reassuring”
track record, Reply Brief 18–19, look nothing like the acts
of gratitude that worry the majority.  The “city building in-
spector  [who]  solicit[ed]  donations  for  his  favorite  youth
sports league”?  Id., at 18.  Well, he admitted to receiving
illegal gratuities from an engineer who worked with clients
seeking  building  permits  in  San  Francisco.  The  engineer
knew  that  the  inspector  was  a  volunteer  coach  and  sup-
porter of “a San Francisco non-profit adult and youth ath-
letic  organization,”  and  the  engineer  arranged  for  his  cli-
ents  to  donate  to  that  organization  in  connection  with
inspections of their properties.  Press Release, U. S. Attor-
ney’s  Office,  ND  Cal.,  San  Francisco  Senior  Building  In-
spector Pleads Guilty to Accepting Illegal Gratuities (Dec.
9, 2022).  “[I]n several instances, the engineer advised [the
inspector] of a client’s donation while asking for a final per-
mit or inspection on the client’s property.”  Ibid.  That same
inspector also accepted $30,000 in debt forgiveness from a
longtime  San  Francisco  real-estate  developer  and  friend.
Ibid.

And  the  “county  contractor  [who]  donat[ed]  $2,000  for
plaques  and  food  at  a  luncheon  honoring  female  judges”?
Reply Brief 18.  He was the owner of a debt collection com-
pany that had a nonexclusive contract with Cook County,
Illinois, to perform debt collection work.  A significant part
of the contract was the chance to collect fines owed on un-
paid traffic tickets.  An official in the Circuit Court of Cook
County Clerk’s Office—the entity responsible for doling out
the traffic debt work—gave his firm half of those collections.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses a legal issue and provides arguments against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
814

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10974.  In  re  Shelton;
No.  08–11007.  In  re  Brown;
No.  08–11123.  In  re  Winns;
No.  09–211.  In  re  Fleming  et  ux.;
No.  09–5332.  In  re  Robinson;
No.  09–5487.  In  re  Vann;  and
No.  09–5876.  In  re  Daley.  Petitions  for  writs  of  mandamus

denied.

No.  09–5612.  In  re  Bravo.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of manda
mus  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As  petitioner  has
repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk  is  directed  not
to  accept  any  further  petitions  in  noncriminal  matters  from  peti
tioner  unless  the docketing  fee  required  by  Rule  38(a) is  paid  and
the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1.  See Mar
tin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506  U. S.  1  (1992)
(per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See  id.,  at  4,  and
cases  cited  therein.

No.  08–1549.  In  re  Birks;
No.  08–11003.  In  re  Singletary;
No.  08–11070.  In  re  Augustin;  and
No.  09–5411.  In  re  Arnold.  Petitions  for  writs  of  manda

mus  and/or  prohibition  denied.

No.  08–10356.  In  re  Alpine;
No.  08–10732.  In  re  Alpine;
No.  08–10846.  In  re  Michalski;
No.  09–5098.  In  re  Foose;
No.  09–5442.  In  re  Hill;  and
No.  09–5595.  In  re  Muhammad.  Motions  of  petitioners  for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petitions for writs
of mandamus and/or prohibition dismissed.  See this Court’s Rule
39.8.

No.  08–10941.  In  re  Telemaque.  Petition  for  writ  of  prohi

bition  denied.

Certiorari  Denied

No.  08–1048.  Marquardt  v.  Sebelius,  Secretary  of
Health  and  Human  Services.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  294  Fed.  Appx.  112.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

That crime carries a 10-year maximum prison sentence.  §666(a).

This  case  involves  James  Snyder,  who  is  the  former  mayor  of
Portage, Indiana.  In 2013, while Snyder was mayor, Portage awarded
two  contracts  to  a  local  truck  company,  Great  Lakes  Peterbilt,  and
ultimately  purchased  five  trash  trucks  from  the  company  for  about
$1.1 million.  In 2014, Peterbilt cut a $13,000 check to Snyder.  The
FBI  and  federal  prosecutors  suspected  that  the  payment  was  a
gratuity for the City’s trash truck contracts.  But Snyder said that the
payment was for his consulting services as a contractor for Peterbilt.
A  federal  jury  ultimately  convicted  Snyder  of  accepting  an  illegal
gratuity  in  violation  of  §666(a)(1)(B).    The  District  Court  sentenced
Snyder to 1 year and 9 months in prison.  On appeal, Snyder argued
that §666 criminalizes only bribes, not gratuities.  The Seventh Circuit
affirmed Snyder’s conviction.

Held: Section 666 proscribes bribes to state and local officials but does
not make it a crime for those officials to accept gratuities for their past
acts.  Pp. 7–16.

(a) Six reasons, taken together, lead the Court to conclude that §666
is  a  bribery  statute  and  not  a  gratuities  statute—text,  statutory
history,  statutory  structure,  statutory  punishments,  federalism,  and
fair notice.  Pp. 7–14.

(1) The statutory text strongly suggests that §666—like §201(b)—
is a bribery statute, not a gratuities statute.  The dividing line between
§201(b)’s  bribery  provision  and  §201(c)’s  gratuities  provision  is  that
bribery  requires  an  official  to  have  a  corrupt  state  of  mind  and  to
accept (or agree to accept) a payment intending to be influenced in an
official act.  Section 666 shares the defining characteristics of §201(b)’s
bribery  provision.
  By  contrast,  §666  bears  little  resemblance  to
§201(c), which contains no express mens rea requirement.  Pp. 7–8.

(2) The  statutory  history  reinforces  that  result.    When  enacted,
§666 borrowed language from §201(c), the gratuities statute for federal
officials.  Two years later, Congress amended §666 to model it instead
on §201(b), the bribery statute.  It would be strange to interpret §666,
as the Government suggests, to mean the same thing now that it did
before the amendment.  Pp. 8–9.

(3) Statutory structure reinforces that §666 is  a bribery statute,
not  a  two-for-one  bribery-and-gratuities  statute  as  the  Government
posits.  The Government identifies no other provision in the U. S. Code
that prohibits bribes and gratuities in the same provision.  And §201
does  not  do  so.    That  is  because  bribery  and  gratuities  are  “two
separate crimes” with “two different sets of elements.”  United States
v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U. S. 398, 404.  P. 9.

(4) For  federal  officials,  Congress  has  separated  bribery  and
gratuities  into  two  distinct  provisions  of  §201  for  good  reason:    The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case, outlining the legal issues and the Court's holding.  It is a summary of the case and not the actual content meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

19

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

That  said,  I  emphasize  that  Brunetti’s  challenge  is  a
facial  one.  That  means  that  he  must  show  that  “ ‘a  sub-
stantial  number  of  [the  scandalous-marks  provision’s]
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the
[provision’s]  plainly  legitimate  sweep.’ ”    United  States  v.
Stevens,  559  U. S.  460,  473  (2010).    With  “scandalous”
narrowed  to  reach  only  obscene,  profane,  and  vulgar  con-
tent, the provision would not be overly broad.  Cf. Frisby,
487 U. S., at 488 (rejecting a facial challenge after adopt-
ing a limiting construction); Boos, 485 U. S., at 331 (same).
Even  so,  hard  cases  would  remain,  and  I  would  expect
courts to take seriously as-applied challenges demonstrat-
ing  a  danger  that  the  provision  had  been  used  to  restrict
speech based on the views expressed rather than the mode
of expression.14  Cf. Finley, 524 U. S., at 587 (reserving the
possibility of as-applied challenges).

Freedom  of  speech  is  a  cornerstone  of  our  society,  and
the  First  Amendment  protects  Brunetti’s  right  to  use
words  like  the  one  at  issue  here.    The  Government  need
not, however, be forced to confer on Brunetti’s trademark
(and  some  more  extreme)  the  ancillary  benefit  of  trade-
mark  registration,  when  “scandalous”  in  §1052(a)  can
reasonably  be  read  to  bar  the  registration  of  only  those
marks  that  are  obscene,  vulgar,  or  profane.    Though  I
concur as to the unconstitutionality of the term “immoral”
in §1052(a), I respectfully dissent as to the term “scandal-
ous”  in  the  same  statute  and  would  instead  uphold  it
under the narrow construction discussed here.

——————

Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 504–507 (1985); see also Tam, 582 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 26) (striking down only the disparagement clause).

14 The  majority  adverts  to  details  in  the  record  that  could  call  into
question whether the PTO engaged in viewpoint discrimination in this
very case.  See ante, at 3.  Because a facial challenge is the only chal-
lenge  before  the  Court,  I  do  not  address  whether  an  as-applied  chal-
lenge could have merit here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case Brunetti v. United States Patent and Trademark Office. It delves into the constitutionality of the "scandalous" provision in trademark law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

TRUMP v. HAWAII

Opinion of the Court

the  Proclamation  exceeds  the  President’s  authority  under
In  its  view,  that  provision  authorizes  only  a
§1182(f ).
“temporary”  suspension  of  entry  in  response  to  “exigen-
cies”  that  “Congress  would  be  ill-equipped  to  address.”
878 F. 3d 662, 684, 688 (2017).  The court further reasoned
that  the  Proclamation  “conflicts  with  the  INA’s  finely
reticulated  regulatory  scheme”  by  addressing  “matters  of
immigration  already  passed  upon  by  Congress.”  Id.,  at
685, 690.  The Ninth Circuit then turned to §1152(a)(1)(A)
and determined that the entry restrictions also contravene
the prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the
issuance  of  immigrant  visas.    The  court  did  not  reach
plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim.

We granted certiorari.  583 U. S. ___ (2018).

II
Before  addressing  the  merits  of  plaintiffs’  statutory
claims,  we  consider  whether  we  have  authority  to  do  so.
The  Government  argues  that  plaintiffs’  challenge  to  the
Proclamation under the INA is not justiciable.  Relying on
the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, the Government
contends  that  because  aliens  have  no  “claim  of  right”  to
enter the United States, and because exclusion of aliens is
“a fundamental act of sovereignty” by the political branches,
review of an exclusion decision “is not within the province
of any court, unless expressly authorized by law.”  United
States  ex  rel.  Knauff  v.  Shaughnessy,  338  U. S.  537,  542–
543  (1950).  According  to  the  Government,  that  principle
barring  review  is  reflected  in  the  INA,  which  sets  forth  a
comprehensive framework for review of orders of removal,
but  authorizes  judicial  review  only  for  aliens  physically
present in the United States.  See Brief for Petitioners 19–
20 (citing 8 U. S. C. §1252).

The  justiciability  of  plaintiffs’  challenge  under  the  INA
presents  a  difficult  question.  The  Government  made
similar arguments that no judicial review was available in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" section in a case. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding the case and the court's jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Syllabus

specifying that if the waiver was found invalid, such a dispute would
presumptively be litigated in court.  Under the severability clause, any
“portion” of the waiver that remained valid would be “enforced in arbi-
tration.”  Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana’s individual
PAGA claim and to dismiss her other PAGA claims.  Applying Califor-
nia’s  Iskanian  precedent,  the  California  courts  denied  that  motion,
holding that categorical waivers of PAGA standing are contrary to Cal-
ifornia policy and that PAGA claims cannot be split into arbitrable “in-
dividual”  claims  and  nonarbitrable  “representative”  claims.    This
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the FAA preempts the Cal-
ifornia rule.

Held: The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes di-
vision  of  PAGA  actions  into  individual  and  non-individual  claims
through an agreement to arbitrate.  Pp. 7–21.

(a) Based on the principle that “[a]rbitration is strictly ‘a matter of
consent,’ ” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 299, this Court
has held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding
that the party agreed to do so,” Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 684.  Because class-action arbitration mandates
procedural changes that are inconsistent with the individualized and
informal mode of bilateral arbitration contemplated by the FAA, see
AT&T  Mobility  LLC  v.  Concepcion,  563  U. S.  333,  347,  class  proce-
dures  cannot  be  imposed  by  state  law  without  presenting  unwilling
parties with an unacceptable choice between being compelled to arbi-
trate using such procedures and forgoing arbitration all together.
Viking contends that the Court’s FAA precedents require enforcement
of contractual provisions waiving the right to bring PAGA actions be-
cause PAGA creates a form of class or collective proceeding.  If this is
correct, Iskanian’s prohibition on PAGA waivers presents parties with
an impermissible choice: Either arbitrate disputes using a form of class
procedures,  or  do  not  arbitrate  at  all.    Moriana  maintains  that  any
conflict between Iskanian and the FAA is illusory because PAGA cre-
ates nothing more than a substantive cause of action.

This Court disagrees with both characterizations of the statute.  Mo-
riana’s premise that PAGA creates a unitary private cause of action is
irreconcilable with the structure of the statute and the ordinary legal
meaning of the word “claim.”  A PAGA action asserting multiple viola-
tions under California’s Labor Code affecting a range of different em-
ployees does not constitute “a single claim” in even the broadest possi-
ble  sense.  Viking’s  position,  on  the  other  hand,  elides  important
structural  differences  between  PAGA  actions  and  class  actions.    A
class-action plaintiff can raise a multitude of claims because he or she
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case *Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana*.  It outlines the background of the case and the central issue before the Court. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a summary rather than the full content of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

that did not interfere with his duties or risk perceptions of
endorsement.    Stressing  that  “[d]evelopment  of  accommo-
dations  is  an  interactive  process,”  it  invited  Kennedy  to
reach out to discuss accommodations that might be mutu-
ally satisfactory, offering proposed accommodations and in-
viting Kennedy to raise others.  Id., at 93–94.  The District
noted, however, that “further violations of [its] directives”
would be grounds for discipline or termination.  Id., at 95.
Kennedy  did  not  directly  respond  or  suggest  a  satisfac-
tory accommodation.  Instead, his attorneys told the media
that he would accept only demonstrative prayer on the 50-
yard line immediately after games.  During the October 23
and  October  26  games,  Kennedy  again  prayed  at  the  50-
yard line immediately following the game, while postgame
activities were still ongoing.  At the October 23 game, Ken-
nedy  kneeled  on  the  field  alone  with  players  standing
nearby.  At  the  October  26  game,  Kennedy  prayed  sur-
rounded  by  members  of  the  public,  including  state  repre-
sentatives who attended the game to support Kennedy.  The
BHS players, after singing the fight song, joined Kennedy
at midfield after he stood up from praying.

Photograph of J. Kennedy in prayer circle (Oct. 26, 2015).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor in the case Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. It details the events leading up to the legal dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

99

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered the main body text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>