<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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20

BOND v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

“illustrates  how  a  criminal  law  like  this  may  effectively
displace a policy choice made by the State”).

As we have explained, “Congress has traditionally been
reluctant  to  define  as  a  federal  crime  conduct  readily
denounced as criminal by the States.”  Bass, 404 U. S., at
349.  There  is  no  clear  indication  of  a  contrary  approach
here.  Section 229 implements the Convention, but Bond’s
crime could hardly be more unlike the uses of mustard gas
on the Western Front or nerve agents in the Iran-Iraq war
that form the core concerns of that treaty.  See Kenyon &
Feakes 6.  There are no life-sized paintings of Bond’s rival
washing her thumb.  And there are no apparent interests
of the United States Congress or the community of nations
in seeing Bond end up in federal prison, rather than dealt
with (like virtually all other criminals in Pennsylvania) by
the State.  The Solicitor General acknowledged as much at
oral  argument.  See  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  47  (“I  don’t  think
anybody  would  say  [that]  whether  or  not  Ms.  Bond  is
prosecuted would give rise to an international incident”).

This  case  is  unusual,  and  our  analysis  is  appropriately
limited.  Our disagreement with our colleagues reduces to
whether section 229 is “utterly clear.”  Post, at 5 (SCALIA,
J., concurring in judgment).  We think it is not, given that
the  definition  of  “chemical  weapon”  in  a  particular  case
can  reach  beyond  any  normal  notion  of  such  a  weapon,
that  the  context  from  which  the  statute  arose  demon-
strates a much more limited prohibition was intended, and
that  the  most  sweeping  reading  of  the  statute  would  fun-
damentally  upset  the  Constitution’s  balance  between
national and local power.  This exceptional convergence of
factors gives us serious reason to doubt the Government’s
expansive reading of section 229, and calls for us to inter-
pret the statute more narrowly.

In  sum,  the  global  need  to  prevent  chemical  warfare
does not require the Federal Government to reach into the
kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault with a chemi-
  </content>
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This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court's opinion in the case of Bond v. United States. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute and its application to the case.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xliii

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  886,1039

Denny; Smith v.
1125

DeNoma v. Ohio  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Densmore; Maywood v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926

Denson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

DeOcampo v. Superior Court of Cal., Alameda County . . . . . . . . .
808

Department of Agriculture; Abercrombie v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113

Department of Agriculture; Arkansas Dairy Cooperative Assn. v.
970

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Army; Howard v.
821

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Army; Matthew v.
1042

Department of Defense v. American Civil Liberties Union . . . . . .
945

Department of Defense; Loving v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1050

Department of Defense; White v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Defense, Defense Logistics Agency; Washington v.
1050

Department of Ed.; Ruiz Rivera v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  878,1101

817

Department of Homeland Security; Sands v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Department of Housing and Urban Development; Dillehay v. . . . .
826

Department of Housing and Urban Development; Jolley v.  . . . . . .
863

Department of Housing and Urban Development; Sanders v.  . . . .
876

Department of Interior v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp. . . . . . . . .
Department of Justice; Young v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
805

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1023,1139

Department of Labor; GwanJun Kim v.
Department of Labor; Platone v.
1024

Department of State; Rouse v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  944,1052

1007

Department of Transportation; Filebark v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

Department of Treasury; Riser v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
864

Department of Veterans Affairs; Abrams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

Department of Veterans Affairs; Boctor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Veterans Affairs; Nghiem v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137

Deppisch; McFarland v.
896

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deputy v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1082

Derrickson v. District Attorney of Del. County
. . . . . . . . . . . .  998,1140

1028

Derringer v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DeSalvo v. Volhard  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  932,1066

824

DeSoto County; Cox v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Detroit; Leaphart v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1009

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  877,1065

Detroit Tigers, Inc.; Brocail v.
976

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DeVeaux v. United States
819

Devon Energy Corp. v. Salazar
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914

Devore v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

DeWeaver v. Runnels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

Dewey; Futch v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

Dexter; Beltran v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

Dexter; Husser v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
804

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dey v. California

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
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This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
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2

GOLAN v. SAADA

Opinion of the Court

make possible the safe return of a child” before denying re-
turn due to grave risk, even if the party petitioning for the
child’s return has not identified or argued for imposition of
ameliorative measures.  Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F. 3d 153,
163, n. 11 (CA2 2001) (Blondin II).

The Second Circuit’s categorical requirement to consider
all ameliorative measures is inconsistent with the text and
other express requirements of the Hague Convention.

I
A

The Hague Convention “was adopted in 1980 in response
to the problem of international child abductions during do-
mestic  disputes.”  Abbott  v.  Abbott,  560  U. S.  1,  8  (2010).
One  hundred  and  one  countries,  including  the  United
States and Italy, are signatories.  Hague Conference on Pri-
vate Int’l Law, Convention of 25 Oct. 1980 on the Civil As-
pects  of  Int’l  Child  Abduction,  Status  Table,  https://www.
hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24.
The Convention’s “core premise” is that “ ‘the interests of
children  . . .  in  matters  relating  to  their  custody’  are  best
served when custody decisions are made in the child’s coun-
try of ‘habitual residence.’ ”  Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U. S.
___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 2) (quoting Convention Pream-
ble, Treaty Doc., at 7).  Accordingly, the Convention gener-
ally  requires  the  “prompt  return”  of  a  child  to  the  child’s
country  of  habitual  residence  when  the  child  has  been
wrongfully removed to or retained in another country.  Art.
1(a), Treaty Doc., at 7; see also Art. 12, id., at 9.1  This re-
quirement  “ensure[s]  that  rights  of  custody  and  of  access

——————

1 The Convention defines a “wrongful” removal or retention as one that
breaches existing custody rights “under the law of the State in which the
child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or reten-
tion” if those rights “were actually exercised” or “would have been so ex-
ercised but for the removal or retention.”  Art. 3, Treaty Doc., at 7.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case GOLAN v. SAADA. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
6

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS

Opinion of the Court

The Union moved to dismiss Glacier’s tort claims on the
ground  that  the  NLRA  preempted  them.    In  the  Union’s
view, the NLRA at least arguably protected the drivers’ con-
duct, so the State was powerless to hold the Union account-
able for any of the strike’s consequences.

The trial court agreed with the Union.  After the appel-
late  court  reversed,  the  Washington  Supreme  Court  rein-
stated  the  trial  court’s  decision.    In  its  view,  “the  NLRA
preempts Glacier’s tort claims related to the loss of its con-
crete  product  because  that  loss  was  incidental  to  a  strike
arguably protected by federal law.”  198 Wash. 2d 768, 774,
500 P. 3d 119, 123 (2021).

We  granted  certiorari  to  resolve  whether  the  NLRA
preempts Glacier’s tort claims alleging that the Union in-
tentionally  destroyed  its  property  during  a  labor  dispute.
598 U. S. ___ (2022).

II

As the party asserting preemption, the Union bears the
burden  of  (1)  advancing  “an  interpretation  of  the  [NLRA]
that is not plainly contrary to its language and that has not
been ‘authoritatively rejected’ by the courts or the Board,”
and then (2) putting forth “enough evidence to enable the
court to find that” the NLRA arguably protects the drivers’
conduct.  Davis,  476  U. S.,  at  395.    The  Union  passes  the
first test but fails the second.

All agree that the NLRA protects the right to strike but
that this right is not absolute.  Brief for Petitioner 18; Brief
for Respondent 21, 46, n. 14.  The Board has long taken the
position—which  both  the  Union  and  Glacier  accept—that
the NLRA does not shield strikers who fail to take “reason-
able precautions” to protect their employer’s property from
foreseeable,  aggravated,  and  imminent  danger  due  to  the
sudden  cessation  of  work.  Bethany  Medical  Center,  328
N. L. R. B. 1094 (1999) (“concerted activity” is “indefensible
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically dealing with the preemption of state tort claims by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). It discusses the legal arguments and precedents related to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

37

ALITO, J., dissenting

What  today’s  decision  latches  onto  are  Oncale’s  com-
ments about whether “ ‘male-on-male sexual harassment’ ”
was on Congress’s mind when it enacted Title VII.  Ante, at
28 (quoting 523 U. S., at 79).  The Court in Oncale observed
that  this  specific  type  of  behavior  “was  assuredly  not  the
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted
Title VII,” but it found that immaterial because “statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover rea-
sonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legis-
lators by which we are governed.”  523 U. S., at 79 (empha-
sis added).

It takes considerable audacity to read these comments as
committing  the  Court  to  a  position  on  deep  philosophical
questions about the meaning of language and their implica-
tions for the interpretation of legal rules.  These comments
are better understood as stating mundane and uncontrover-
sial truths.  Who would argue that a statute applies only to
the “principal evils” and not lesser evils that fall within the
plain scope of its terms?  Would even the most ardent “pur-
posivists”  and  fans  of  legislative  history  contend  that
congressional  intent  is  restricted  to  Congress’s  “principal
concerns”?
  Properly understood, Oncale does not provide the slight-
est  support  for  what  the  Court  has  done  today.    For  one
thing,  it  would  be  a  wild  understatement  to  say  that  dis-
crimination because of sexual orientation and transgender
status  was  not  the  “principal  evil”  on  Congress’s  mind  in
1964.  Whether we like to admit it now or not, in the think-
ing of Congress and the public at that time, such discrimi-
nation would not have been evil at all.

But  the  more  important  difference  between  these  cases
and Oncale is that here the interpretation that the Court
adopts does not fall within the ordinary meaning of the stat-
utory  text  as  it  would  have  been  understood  in  1964.  To
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal interpretation and the historical context of a law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

Opinion of the Court

Finally,  the  Union  points  out  that  the  drivers  returned
the trucks to Glacier’s facility.  And it maintains that all of
the  drivers  left  the  drums  of  their  trucks  rotating,  which
delayed  the  concrete’s  hardening  process.  In  the  Union’s
view, this establishes that the drivers took reasonable pre-
cautions to protect the trucks.  Brief for Respondent 28–30.
We  see  it  differently.  That  the  drivers  returned  the
trucks to Glacier’s facility does not do much for the Union—
refraining  from  stealing  an  employer’s  vehicles  does  not
demonstrate  that  one  took  reasonable  precautions  to  pro-
tect them.  And Glacier’s allegations do not support the Un-
ion’s assertion that all of the drivers left the drums rotating.
The Union relies on a vague remark by an unspecified Un-
ion  agent  to  another  unspecified  person  to  leave  a  truck
running.  See id., at 9, 30; Brief for Petitioner 8; App. 34.
This snippet does not show that all of the drivers left their
trucks  running,  and  even  if  it  did,  that  would  not  neces-
sarily mean that the delivery trucks’ drums continued ro-
tating.  In  any  event,  Glacier  alleged  that  if  concrete  re-
mains in a ready-mix truck for too long, it will harden and
cause significant damage to the truck.  The rotating drum
forestalls  that  hardening  for  a  time,  but  not  indefinitely.
And the Union concedes that the NLRA does not arguably
protect its actions if they posed a material risk of harm to
the trucks.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 78.3

——————

3 After the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Glac-
ier’s tort claims, the Board’s general counsel issued a complaint alleging
that Glacier engaged in unfair labor practices in relation to its labor dis-
pute with the drivers, including by disciplining some of those involved in
the strike.  The lower courts have not addressed the significance, if any,
of the Board’s complaint with respect to Garmon preemption.  We will
not do so in the first instance.  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718,
n. 7 (2005) (“[W]e are a court of review, not of first view”).  The Board’s
general counsel agrees that this issue is not properly before us.  See Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 28.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It presents legal arguments and analysis related to a labor dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

Opinion of the Court

To buttress his implicit intent argument, Castro-Huerta
seizes on the history of the General Crimes Act.  At the time
of  the  Act’s  earliest  iterations  in  1817  and  1834,  Indian
country  was separate from the States.  Therefore, at that
time,  state  law  did  not  apply  in  Indian  country—in  the
same way that New York law would not ordinarily have ap-
plied in New Jersey.  But territorial separation—not juris-
dictional preemption by the General Crimes Act—was the
reason that state authority did not extend to Indian country
at that time.

Because Congress operated under a different territorial
paradigm in 1817 and 1834, it had no reason at that time
to consider whether to preempt preexisting or lawfully as-
sumed state criminal authority in Indian country.  For pre-
sent purposes, the fundamental point is that the text of the
General Crimes Act does not preempt state law.  And this
Court  does  not  “rewrite  a  constitutionally  valid  statutory
text under the banner of speculation about what Congress
might have done had it faced a question that . . . it never
faced.”  Henson, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).  The history
of  territorial  separation  during  the  early  years  of  the  Re-
public is not a license or excuse to rewrite the text of the
General Crimes Act.

As  noted  above,  the  Worcester-era  understanding  of  In-
dian  country  as  separate  from  the  State  was  abandoned
later  in  the  1800s.    After  that  change,  Indian  country  in
each State became part of that State’s territory.  But Con-
gress did not alter the General Crimes Act to make federal
criminal  jurisdiction  exclusive  in  Indian  country.    To  this
day, the text of the General Crimes Act still does not make
federal jurisdiction exclusive or preempt state jurisdiction.
In  1882,  in  McBratney,  moreover,  this  Court  held  that
States have jurisdiction to prosecute at least some crimes
committed in Indian country.  Since 1882, therefore, Con-
gress has been specifically aware that state criminal laws
apply  to  some  extent  in  Indian  country.    Yet  since  then,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta*. It delves into the history and interpretation of the General Crimes Act and its implications for state jurisdiction in Indian country.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

21

Opinion of the Court

attenuated to support Article III standing.5

3
That leaves the medical associations’ argument that the
associations  themselves  have  organizational  standing.
Under  this  Court’s  precedents,  organizations  may  have
standing “to sue on their own behalf for injuries they have
sustained.”  Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363,
379, n. 19 (1982).  In doing so, however, organizations must
satisfy the usual standards for injury in fact, causation, and
redressability that apply to individuals.  Id., at 378–379.

According  to  the  medical  associations,  FDA  has
“impaired”  their  “ability  to  provide  services  and  achieve
their  organizational  missions.”    Brief  for  Respondents  43.
That argument does not work to demonstrate standing.

Like  an  individual,  an  organization  may  not  establish
standing  simply  based  on  the  “intensity  of  the  litigant’s
the
interest”  or  because  of  strong  opposition
government’s conduct, Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 486, “no
matter  how  longstanding  the  interest  and  no  matter  how
qualified  the  organization,”  Sierra  Club  v.  Morton,  405
U. S. 727, 739 (1972).  A plaintiff must show “far more than
simply  a  setback  to  the  organization’s  abstract  social
interests.”  Havens,  455  U. S.,  at  379.  The  plaintiff

to

——————

5 The  doctors  also  suggest  that  they  can  sue  in  a  representative
capacity to vindicate their patients’ injuries or potential future injuries,
even  if  the  doctors  have  not  suffered  and  would  not  suffer  an  injury
themselves.  This Court has repeatedly rejected such arguments.  Under
this  Court’s  precedents,  third-party  standing,  as  some  have  called  it,
allows a narrow class of litigants to assert the legal rights of others.  See
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 708 (2013).  But “even when we
have  allowed  litigants  to  assert  the  interests  of  others,  the  litigants
themselves still must have suffered an injury in fact, thus giving them a
sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute.”  Ibid.
(quotation  marks  and  alterations  omitted).    The  third-party  standing
doctrine does not allow doctors to shoehorn themselves into Article III
standing simply by showing that their patients have suffered injuries or
may suffer future injuries.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the concept of standing in legal cases and applies it to the arguments made by medical associations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

Guinea’s  military  to  commit  genocide),  vacated  and  re-
manded, 569 U. S. 945 (2013).

Petitioners contend that, instead of the TVPA, the most
analogous  statute  here  is  the  Anti-Terrorism  Act.    That
Act  does  permit  suits  against  corporate  entities.    See  18
U. S. C. §§ 2331(3), 2333(d)(2).  In fact, in these suits some
of  the  foreign  plaintiffs  joined  their  claims  to  those  of
United States nationals suing Arab Bank under the Anti-
Terrorism  Act.  But  the  Anti-Terrorism  Act  provides  a
cause  of  action  only  to  “national[s]  of  the  United  States,”
and  their  “estate,  survivors,  or  heirs.”  §2333(a).  In  con-
trast, the ATS is available only for claims brought by “an
alien.”  28 U. S. C. §1350.  A statute that excludes foreign
nationals (with the possible exception of foreign survivors
or  heirs)  is  an  inapt  analogy  for  a  common-law  cause  of
action that provides a remedy for foreign nationals only.

To the extent, furthermore, that the Anti-Terrorism Act
is  relevant  it  suggests  that  there  should  be  no  common-
law action under the ATS for allegations like petitioners’.
Otherwise,  foreign  plaintiffs  could  bypass  Congress’  ex-
press limitations on liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act
simply  by  bringing  an  ATS  lawsuit.    The  Anti-Terrorism
Act, as mentioned above, is part of a comprehensive statu-
tory  and  regulatory  regime  that  prohibits  terrorism  and
terrorism  financing.    The  detailed  regulatory  structures
prescribed  by  Congress  and  the  federal  agencies  charged
with  oversight  of  financial  institutions  reflect  the  careful
deliberation  of  the  political  branches  on  when,  and  how,
banks should be held liable for the financing of terrorism.
It  would  be  inappropriate  for  courts  to  displace  this  con-
sidered  statutory  and  regulatory  structure  by  holding
banks  subject  to  common-law  liability  in  actions  filed
under the ATS.

In  any  event,  even  if  the  Anti-Terrorism  Act  were  a
suitable  model  for  an  ATS  suit,  Congress’  decision  in  the
TVPA  to  limit  liability  to  individuals  still  demonstrates
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice Kennedy in the case of Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC.  It discusses the applicability of different legal statutes to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

13

BREYER, J., dissenting

F. 3d 370, 401 (2007) (case below); ante, at 57–58 (opinion
of  the  Court);  Brief  for  Respondent  52–54.    The  District
concedes  that  such  an  exception  exists.  See  Brief  for
Petitioners  56–57.  This  Court  has  final  authority  (albeit
not often used) to definitively interpret District law, which
is,  after  all,  simply  a  species  of  federal  law.    See,  e.g.,
Whalen  v.  United  States,  445  U. S.  684,  687–688  (1980);
see  also  Griffin  v.  United  States,  336  U. S.  704,  716–718
(1949).  And because I see nothing in the District law that
would preclude the existence of a background common-law
self-defense  exception,  I  would  avoid  the  constitutional
question  by  interpreting  the  statute  to  include  it.    See
Ashwander  v.  TVA,  297  U. S.  288,  348  (1936)  (Brandeis,
J., concurring).

I am puzzled by the majority’s unwillingness to adopt a
similar  approach.  It  readily  reads  unspoken  self-defense
exceptions into every colonial law, but it refuses to accept
the  District’s  concession  that  this  law  has  one.    Compare
ante, at 59–61, with ante, at 57–58.  The one District case
it  cites  to  support  that  refusal,  McIntosh  v.  Washington,
395  A. 2d  744,  755–756  (1978),  merely  concludes  that  the
District  Legislature  had  a  rational  basis  for  applying  the
trigger-lock  law  in  homes  but  not  in  places  of  business.
Nowhere  does  that  case  say  that  the  statute  precludes  a
self-defense  exception  of  the  sort  that  I  have  just  de-
scribed.  And  even  if  it  did,  we  are  not  bound  by  a  lower
court’s interpretation of federal law.

The  third  District  restriction  prohibits  (in  most  cases)
the registration of a handgun within the District.  See §7–
2502.02(a)(4).  Because  registration  is  a  prerequisite  to
firearm  possession,  see  §7–2502.01(a),  the  effect  of  this
provision  is  generally  to  prevent  people  in  the  District
from  possessing  handguns.    In  determining  whether  this
regulation  violates  the  Second  Amendment,  I  shall  ask
how  the  statute  seeks  to  further  the  governmental  inter-
ests  that  it  serves,  how  the  statute  burdens  the  interests
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to gun control laws in Washington D.C.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1059

529 U. S.

April 3, 2000

No. 99–8141. Spain v. West, Secretary of Veterans Af-
fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 217
F. 3d 858.

No. 99–8163. Derden v. Hargett et al. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 126.

No. 99–8193. Green v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8195. Doby v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8197. Harriman v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8225. Westfall v. Underwood, Governor of West
Virginia, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 201 F. 3d 439.

No. 99–8237.

Jordan v. Haunani-Henry, Warden. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1332.

No. 99–8272. Wabasha v. Weber, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8274. Broades v. Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–8277. Williams v. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 201 F. 3d 439.

No. 99–8291. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8297. Clayton v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 241.

No. 99–8298. Atraqchi et ux. v. Clinton, President of
the United States, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 203 F. 3d 51.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). This type of information is generally not considered the primary content of a legal document and is more like a summary or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

146

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Opinion of the Court

“smoking products” because, in light of the ﬁndings in the
Surgeon General’s report, such a “provision might well com-
pletely outlaw at least cigarettes. This would be contrary
to what, we understand, is intended or what, in the light of
our experience with the 18th amendment, would be accept-
able to the American people.” 1964 Hearings 18.

The FDA’s disavowal of jurisdiction was consistent with
the position that it had taken since the agency’s inception.
As the FDA concedes, it never asserted authority to regulate
tobacco products as customarily marketed until it promul-
gated the regulations at issue here. See Brief for Petition-
ers 37; see also Brief for Appellee (FDA) in Action on Smok-
ing and Health v. Harris, 655 F. 2d 236 (CADC 1980), in 9
Rec. in No. 97–1604 (CA4), Tab No. 4, pp. 14–15 (“In the 73
years since the enactment of the original Food and Drug Act,
and in the 41 years since the promulgation of the modern
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the FDA has repeatedly in-
formed Congress that cigarettes are beyond the scope of the
statute absent health claims establishing a therapeutic intent
on behalf of the manufacturer or vendor”).

The FDA’s position was also consistent with Congress’
speciﬁc intent when it enacted the FDCA. Before the Act’s
adoption in 1938, the FDA’s predecessor agency, the Bureau
of Chemistry, announced that it lacked authority to regulate
tobacco products under the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906,
ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, unless they were marketed with thera-
peutic claims. See U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Bureau of
Chemistry, 13 Service and Regulatory Announcements 24
(Apr. 1914) (Feb. 1914 Announcements ¶ 13, Opinion of Chief
of Bureau C. L. Alsberg).
In 1929, Congress considered and
rejected a bill “[t]o amend the Food and Drugs Act of June
30, 1906, by extending its provisions to tobacco and tobacco
products.” S. 1468, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1. See also 71
Cong. Rec. 2589 (1929) (remarks of Sen. Smoot). And, as the
FDA admits, there is no evidence in the text of the FDCA or
its legislative history that Congress in 1938 even considered
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the case FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. It contains legal arguments and citations, which are typical of legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xxi

Page

1132

Blake v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Blakeney v. Branker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blalock v. Wilson
1002

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blanco v. United States
1006

Blanks v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
982

Blanton, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
983

Blanton v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Blaxton v. Boca Grande Foods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

Blaylock v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926

Blaze v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Bledsoe v. Bruce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

Blie v. Artus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Block v. Shinseki
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962

Blocker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Blount v. Hardy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

Blue v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Cal.; Nordella v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex.; Edwards v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
992

Blum v. Federal Aviation Administration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
976

Bluntson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036

Blurton v. North Dakota
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

BNSF R. Co.; O’Dea v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962

Boam v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

Board of County Comm’rs of Arapahoe County; Reyes v.
. . . . . .
Board of Prof. Responsibility of Sup. Ct. Tenn.; Danner v.  . . . . . .
1112

Board of Regents of Ga.; Gerard v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Board of Regents of Univ. System of Ga.; Abreu-Velez v.  . . . .  1025,1139

1055

Board of Supervisors, Univ. of La.-Lafayette; Parker v.  . . . . . . . .
1111

Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala.; Ming Wei Liu v.  . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. at Chicago; Waivio v.
. . . . . . . .
845

Boatwright; Barnett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137

Bobadilla; Carlson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

Bobby; Cornwell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Bobby; Krzywkowski v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bobby v. Van Hook  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4

951

Boca Grande Foods; Blaxton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

Boctor v. Department of Veterans Affairs
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

Bodden v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Bodenstab v. Cook County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Bodison; Young v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

Bohol v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906

Boice v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Boim v. Salah  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
981

Bojonquez, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1140
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the book.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

company’s] speech in order to excise certain ideas or view-
points from the public dialogue.”  The State’s “very purpose
in seeking to apply its law,” in the majority’s view, is “the
coercive  elimination  of  dissenting  ideas  about  marriage.”
Ante,  at  10–11  (internal  quotation  marks  and  brackets
omitted).14    That  is  an  astonishing  view  of  the  law.    It  is
contrary to the fact that a law requiring public-facing busi-
nesses to accept all comers “is textbook viewpoint neutral,”
Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Col-
lege of Law v. Martinez, 561 U. S. 661, 695 (2010); contrary
to the fact that the Accommodation Clause and the State’s
application  of  it  here  allows  Smith  to  include  in  her  com-
pany’s goods and services whatever “dissenting views about
marriage”  she  wants;  and  contrary  to  this  Court’s  clear
holdings that the purpose of a public accommodations law,
as  applied  to  the  commercial  act  of  discrimination  in  the
sale  of  publicly  available  goods  and  services,  is  to  ensure
equal access to and equal dignity in the public marketplace,
supra, at 4–6.

So it is dispiriting to read the majority suggest that this
case  resembles  West  Virginia  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Barnette,  319
U. S. 624 (1943).  A content-neutral equal-access policy is
“a far cry” from a mandate to “endorse” a pledge chosen by
the Government.  FAIR, 547 U. S., at 62.  This Court has
said  “it  trivializes  the  freedom  protected  in  Barnette”  to
equate the two.  Ibid.  Requiring Smith’s company to abide
by  a  law  against  invidious  discrimination  in  commercial
sales to the public does not conscript her into espousing the
government’s message.  It does not “invad[e]” her “sphere of
intellect” or violate her constitutional “right to differ.”  Ante,
at  2,  7  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    All  it  does  is

——————

14 The majority’s repeated invocation of this Orwellian thought policing
is revealing of just how much it misunderstands this case.  See ante, at
10–12, 19–20, 24–25 (claiming that the State seeks to “eliminate ideas”
and  that  it  will  punish  Smith  unless  she  “conforms  her  views  to  the
State’s”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

589

Opinion of the Court

on any “First Amendment” activities in an airport); Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 499
(1982) (“prohibitory and stigmatizing effect” of a “quasi-
criminal” ordinance relevant to the vagueness analysis);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S., at 108 (requiring
clear lines between “lawful and unlawful” conduct). We rec-
ognize, as a practical matter, that artists may conform their
speech to what they believe to be the decisionmaking criteria
in order to acquire funding. See Statement of Charlotte
Murphy, Executive Director of NAAO, reprinted in App. 21–
22. But when the Government is acting as patron rather
than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision are not
constitutionally severe.

In the context of selective subsidies, it is not always feasi-
ble for Congress to legislate with clarity.
Indeed, if this
statute is unconstitutionally vague, then so too are all Gov-
ernment programs awarding scholarships and grants on the
basis of subjective criteria such as “excellence.” See, e. g.,
2 U. S. C. § 802 (establishing the Congressional Award Pro-
gram to “promote initiative, achievement, and excellence
among youths in the areas of public service, personal devel-
opment, and physical and expedition ﬁtness”); 20 U. S. C.
§ 956(c)(1) (providing funding to the National Endowment for
the Humanities to promote “progress and scholarship in the
humanities”); § 1134h(a) (authorizing the Secretary of Educa-
tion to award fellowships to “students of superior ability se-
lected on the basis of demonstrated achievement and excep-
tional promise”); 22 U. S. C. § 2452(a) (authorizing the award
of Fulbright grants to “strengthen international cooperative
relations”); 42 U. S. C. § 7382c (authorizing the Secretary of
Energy to recognize teachers for “excellence in mathematics
or science education”). To accept respondents’ vagueness
argument would be to call into question the constitutionality
of these valuable Government programs and countless others
like them.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of a statute and uses legal precedent to support its arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

25

Opinion of the Court

Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and the conclusion of a court opinion.  It is not the main body of text meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation/Court Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

THOMPSON v. CLARK

ALITO, J., dissenting

cause.  Id., at 268, 275 (plurality opinion); id., at 282 (opin-
ion  of  Kennedy,  J.);  id.,  at  286  (Souter,  J.,  concurring  in
judgment).  That is all that Albright actually decided.

The terse plurality opinion did make comments about the
Fourth  Amendment  and  malicious  prosecution,  and  those
comments have led to confusion in the lower courts.  But a
careful reading of the plurality opinion shows that it in no
way  suggested  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  protects
against malicious prosecution.

When  the  plurality  commented  on  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment,  it  was  addressing  Albright’s  prosecution-without-
probable-cause  claim,  not  malicious  prosecution.  And  in
connection  with  the  prosecution-without-probable-cause
claim, the plurality made the following two points.  First,
the plurality noted that “[w]here a particular Amendment
‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protec-
tion’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substan-
tive  due  process,”  must  be  the  guide  for  analyzing  [the]
claims.’ ”  Id., at 273.  Second, the plurality observed that
the Fourth Amendment is the constitutional provision that
deals with “pretrial deprivations of liberty.”  Id., at 274.

What this discussion suggested was that if any provision
of  the  Constitution  provided  a  home  for  Albright’s  prosecu-
tion-without-probable-cause claim, the Fourth Amendment
was  a  better  bet  than  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s  Due
Process Clause.  But the plurality did not conclude or even
suggest  that  a  prosecution-without-probable-cause  claim
could be brought under the Fourth Amendment.  See id., at
274–275 (expressly declining to express a view on the ques-
tion).  Indeed, the plurality expressly reiterated that “the
accused is not ‘entitled to judicial oversight or review of the
decision to prosecute,’ ” suggesting instead that the harm to
Albright—if  any—was  that  he  was  “not  merely  charged”
but also “submitted himself to arrest.”  Id., at 274 (quoting
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis of a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GEORGIA v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.

Opinion of the Court

a  legislative  body  vested  with  the  authority  to  make  law.
Because  Georgia’s  annotations  are  authored  by  an  arm
of the legislature in the course of its legislative duties, the
government edicts doctrine puts them outside the reach of
copyright protection.

I
A

The State of Georgia has one official code—the “Official
Code  of  Georgia  Annotated,”  or  OCGA.    The  first  page  of
each volume of the OCGA boasts the State’s official seal and
announces to readers that it is “Published Under Authority
of the State.”

The  OCGA  includes  the  text  of  every  Georgia  statute
currently  in  force,  as  well  as  various  non-binding  supple-
mentary materials.  At issue in this case is a set of annota-
tions  that  appear  beneath  each  statutory  provision.    The
annotations  generally  include  summaries  of  judicial  deci-
sions  applying  a  given  provision, summaries of  any  perti-
nent opinions of the state attorney general, and a list of re-
lated  law  review  articles  and  similar  reference  materials.
In  addition,  the  annotations  often  include  editor’s  notes
that provide information about the origins of the statutory
text, such as whether it derives from a particular judicial
decision or resembles an older provision that has been con-
strued by Georgia courts.  See, e.g., OCGA §§51–1–1, 53–4–
2 (2019).

The OCGA is assembled by a state entity called the Code
Revision  Commission.    In  1977,  the  Georgia  Legislature
established the Commission to recodify Georgia law for the
first time in decades.  The Commission was (and remains)
tasked with consolidating disparate bills into a single Code
for reenactment by the legislature and contracting with a
third party to produce the annotations.  A majority of the
Commission’s 15 members must be members of the Georgia
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the copyright status of annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. It provides context and background information about the code and its annotations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
96

ALVAREZ  v.  SMITH

Opinion of the Court

issues in those six cases were issues solely of state substan
tive law: Were the cars and the cash forfeitable or not?  And
court  docket  sheets  suggest  that  the  six  state  cases  termi
nated on substantive grounds in the ordinary course of such
state proceedings.  In the three automobile cases, the State
voluntarily dismissed the proceedings and returned the cars
between 11 and 40 months after the seizures, a long enough
time  for  the  State  to  have  investigated  the  matters  and  to
have determined (after the termination of any related crimi
nal proceedings) for evidentiary reasons that it did not wish
to  claim  the  cars.  See  Dockets  in  People  v.  2004  Chevrolet
Impala,  No.  2006–COFO–000296  (Cir.  Ct.  Cook  Cty.,  Ill.)
(Brunston’s  car  returned  on  July  27,  2009);  People  v.  Smith,
No. 2006–COFO–000036 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill.) (Smith’s car
returned on May 5, 2008); and People v.  1999 Chevrolet Mal
ibu, No. 2006–COFO–000288 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill.) (Perez’s
car  returned  on  Jan.  29,  2007).  In  the  remaining  contested
case, involving cash, the State voluntarily dismissed the pro
ceedings  after  14  months,  again  a  long  enough  time  for  the
State to have weighed the evidence and found a compromise
settlement appropriate on the merits.  See Docket in People
v.  $1,500 in U. S. Currency, No. 2006–COFO–000201 (Cir. Ct.
Cook  Cty.,  Ill.)  (Waldo’s  cash  returned  on  Mar.  19,  2007).
The  disparate  dates  at  which  the  plaintiffs’  forfeiture  pro
ceedings terminated—11, 14, 27, and 40 months after the sei
zures—indicate that  the State’s Attorney  did not coordinate
the resolution of the plaintiffs’ state-court cases, either with
each  other  or  with  the  plaintiffs’  federal  civil  rights  case.
Cf. Munsingwear, supra, at 39–40 (stating that a lower court
judgment would have been vacated even though an action of
the  party  seeking  review  had  brought  about  the  mootness
because that action—a commodity being decontrolled by Ex
ecutive Order—was basically unrelated); see also Fleming v.
Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F. 2d 125, 127 (CA8 1947).

For  these  reasons,  we  believe  that  the  presence  of  this
federal  case  played  no  signiﬁcant  role  in  the  termination  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Alvarez v. Smith. It delves into the details of state-level forfeiture proceedings and their potential connection to a federal civil rights case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

11

ALITO, J., dissenting

to covered individuals.  Section 6056 similarly requires cer-
tain large employers to report to both the IRS and employ-
ees  about  whether  they  offer  health  insurance  coverage.
The States plainly have demonstrated standing to seek re-
lief from these burdensome reporting obligations.

Start with injury in fact.  The States have offered undis-
puted evidence documenting the ongoing financial costs of
complying with these reporting requirements.  Missouri, for
example,  offered  a  declaration  attesting  to  spending
$185,061 in fiscal year 2016 on Forms 1094 and 1095.  App.
163.  That  declaration  also  attested  to  costs  or  projected
costs of more than $45,000 for each fiscal year from 2017
through  2021.    Ibid.  South  Dakota  provided  evidence  of
“ongoing”  reporting  costs  totaling  $100,000.  Id.,  at  187.
Kansas offered evidence of more than $100,000 in reporting
costs.  Id., at 142.  These are just a few examples.  See also,
e.g., id., at 103 (Texas); id., at 350–351 (Georgia).  There is
no question that these undisputed, ongoing financial costs
qualify  as  injuries  in  fact.    See  Jevic  Holding  Corp.,  580
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11).

Now  turn  to  traceability.  Are  these  financial  injuries
“fairly  traceable  to  the  challenged  conduct”?  Hol-
lingsworth,  570  U. S.,  at  704.    The  answer  is  clearly  yes.
The  reporting  requirements  in  §§6055  and  6056  are  en-
forceable  by  the  Federal  Government,  and  noncompliance
may result in heavy penalties.  Section 6721(a)(1) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, for example, provides “a penalty” for
the failure to complete an “information return,” which in-
cludes reports required by §§6055(a) and 6056(a).  See 26
U. S. C. §§6724(d)(1)(B)(xxiv), (xxv).  And §6722(a)(1) pro-
vides  “a  penalty”  for  the  failure  to  issue  a  “payee  state-
ment,”  which  includes  the  reports  required  by  §§6055(c)
and 6056(c).  See §§6724(d)(2)(GG), (HH).  These penalties
can  amount  to  at  least  $280  per  infraction,  and  they  can
quickly  run  up  into  the  millions  of  dollars.   See  §§6721,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the financial burden of reporting requirements on states and argues that these requirements are enforceable by the federal government.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Syllabus

the scope of unconstitutional patent infringement as intentional con-
duct for which there is no adequate state remedy.  527 U. S., at 642–
643, 645.  Because Congress failed to identify a pattern of unconstitu-
tional  patent  infringement  when  it  enacted  the  Patent  Remedy  Act,
the Court held that the Act swept too far.  Given the identical scope of
the CRCA and Patent Remedy Act, this case could be decided differ-
ently only if the CRCA responded to  materially stronger evidence of
unconstitutional infringement.  But as in Florida Prepaid, the legisla-
tive record contains thin evidence of infringement.  Because this record
cannot support Congress’s choice to strip the States of their sovereign
immunity in all copyright infringement cases, the CRCA fails the “con-
gruence and proportionality” test.  Pp. 10–16.

895 F. 3d 337, affirmed.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, GORSUCH,  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ., joined,  and  in
which THOMAS, J., joined except for the final paragraph in Part II–A and
the final paragraph in Part II–B.  THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment.  BREYER, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

493

Breyer, J., dissenting

§ 315(a), 42 Stat. 941–942. The Court also upheld this dele-
gation against constitutional attack. See J. W. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).

These statutory delegations resemble today’s Act more
closely than one might at ﬁrst suspect. They involve a duty
on imports, which is a tax. That tax in the last century was
as important then as the income tax is now, for it provided
most of the Federal Government’s revenues. See U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of
the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, pt. 2, at 1106 (in
1890, when Congress passed the statute at issue in Field,
tariff revenues were 57% of the total receipts of the Federal
Government). And the delegation then thus affected a far
higher percentage of federal revenues than the tax-related
delegation over extremely “limited” tax beneﬁts here. See
supra, at 487.

The standards at issue in these earlier laws, such as “un-
reasonable,” were frequently vague and without precise
meaning. See, e. g., Act of Oct. 1, 1890, § 3, 26 Stat. 612.
Indeed, the word “equalize” in the 1922 statute, 42 Stat. 942,
could not have been administered as if it offered the preci-
sion it seems to promise, for a tariff that literally “equalized”
domestic and foreign production costs would, because of
transport costs, have virtually ended foreign trade.

Nor can I accept the majority’s effort to distinguish these
examples. The majority says that these statutes imposed a
speciﬁc “duty” upon the President to act upon the occurrence
of a speciﬁed event. See ante, at 443. But, in fact, some of
the statutes imposed no duty upon the President at all. See,
e. g., Act of Dec. 19, 1806, ch. 1, 2 Stat. 411 (President “au-
thorized” to “suspend the operation of ” a customs law “if in
his judgment the public interest should require it”). Others
imposed a “duty” in terms so vague as to leave substantial
discretion in the President’s hands. See Act of Oct. 1, 1890,
26 Stat. 612 (President’s “duty” to suspend tariff law was
triggered “whenever” and “so often as” he was “satisﬁed”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It cites previous legal cases and discusses the constitutionality of a particular Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SACKETT v. EPA

KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment

‘adjacent.’ ”  Post, at 9.  The majority thus alters—more pre-
cisely, narrows the scope of—the statute Congress drafted.
And  make  no  mistake:  Congress  wrote  the  statute  it
meant to.  The Clean Water Act  was a landmark piece  of
environmental legislation, designed to address a problem of
“crisis proportions.”  R. Adler, J. Landman, & D. Cameron,
The  Clean Water  Act:  20  Years  Later  5  (1993).    How  bad
was water pollution in 1972, when the Act passed?  Just a
few  years  earlier,  Ohio’s  Cuyahoga  River  had  “burst  into
flames,  fueled  by  oil  and  other  industrial  wastes.”    Ibid.
And  that  was  merely  one  of  many  alarms.  Rivers,  lakes,
and  creeks  across  the  country  were  unfit  for  swimming.
Drinking water was full of hazardous chemicals.  Fish were
dying in record numbers (over 40 million in 1969); and those
caught  were  often  too  contaminated  to  eat  (with  mercury
and DDT far above safe levels).  See id., at 5–6.  So Congress
embarked on what this Court once understood as a “total
restructuring and complete rewriting” of existing water pol-
lution law.  Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 317 (1981)
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    The  new  Act  estab-
“all-
“a  self-consciously  comprehensive”  and
lished
encompassing program of water pollution regulation.”  Id.,
at 318–319.  Or said a bit differently, the Act created a pro-
gram broad enough to achieve the codified objective of “res-
tor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and bio-
logical integrity of the Nation’s waters.”  §1251(a).  If you’ve
lately  swum  in  a  lake,  happily  drunk  a  glass  of  water
straight from the tap, or sat down to a good fish dinner, you
can appreciate what the law has accomplished.

Vital to the Clean Water Act’s project is the protection of
wetlands—both  those  contiguous  to  covered  waters  and
others nearby.  As this Court (again, formerly) recognized,
wetlands “serve to filter and purify water draining into ad-
jacent bodies of water, and to slow the flow of surface runoff
into lakes, rivers, and streams.”  United States v. Riverside
Bayview  Homes,  Inc.,  474  U. S.  121,  134  (1985)  (citation
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kagan in the case of Sackett v. EPA. It discusses the history and purpose of the Clean Water Act, emphasizing the importance of wetlands protection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v.
WALL-STREET.COM, LLC
Opinion of the Court

how the statute uses the word “registration” in a particu-
lar prescription, one must “look to the specific context” in
which  the  term  is  used.    Brief  for  Petitioner  29.    As  ex-
plained  supra,  at  4–7,  the  “specific  context”  of  §411(a)
permits  only  one  sensible  reading:  The  phrase  “registra-
tion . . . has been made” refers to the Copyright Office’s act
granting  registration,  not  to  the  copyright  claimant’s
request for registration.

Fourth  Estate’s  contrary  reading  of  §411(a)  stems  in
part  from  its  misapprehension  of  the  significance  of  cer-
tain 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act.  Before that year,
§411(a)’s  precursor  provided  that  “[n]o  action  or  proceed-
ing  shall  be  maintained  for  infringement  of  copyright  in
any  work  until  the  provisions  of  this  title  with  respect  to
the  deposit  of  copies  and  registration  of  such  work  shall
have  been  complied  with.”  17  U. S. C.  §13  (1970  ed.).
Fourth  Estate  urges  that  this  provision  posed  the  very
question  we  resolve  today—namely,  whether  a  claimant’s
application alone effects registration.  The Second Circuit
addressed  that  question,  Fourth  Estate  observes,  in
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus
Watch  Co.,  260  F. 2d  637  (1958).  Brief  for  Petitioner  32–
34.  In  that  case,  in  an  opinion  by  Judge  Learned  Hand,
the  court  held  that  a  copyright  owner  who  completed  an
application  could  not  sue  for  infringement  immediately
upon the Copyright Office’s refusal to register.  Vacheron,
260  F. 3d,  at  640–641.  Instead,  the  owner  first  had  to
obtain  a  registration  certificate  by  bringing  a  mandamus
action against the Register.  The Second Circuit dissenter
would have treated the owner’s application as sufficient to
permit commencement of an action for infringement.  Id.,
at 645.

Fourth Estate sees Congress’ 1976 revision of the regis-
tration  requirement  as  an  endorsement  of  the  Vacheron
dissenter’s  position.  Brief  for  Petitioner  34–36.    We  dis-
agree.  The  changes  made  in  1976  instead  indicate  Con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a copyright law statute. It delves into legal precedent and legislative history, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ESPINOZA ET AL. v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA

No. 18–1195.  Argued January 22, 2020—Decided June 30, 2020

The Montana Legislature established a program that grants tax credits
to those who donate to organizations that award scholarships for pri-
vate school tuition.  To reconcile the program with a provision of the
Montana  Constitution  that  bars  government  aid  to  any  school  “con-
trolled  in  whole  or  in  part  by  any  church,  sect,  or  denomination,”
Art. X, §6(1), the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated “Rule
1,” which prohibited families from using the scholarships at religious
schools.  Three mothers who were blocked by Rule 1 from using schol-
arship funds for their children’s tuition at Stillwater Christian School
sued the Department in state court, alleging that the Rule discrimi-
nated on the basis of their religious views and the religious nature of
the school they had chosen.  The trial court enjoined Rule 1.  Reversing,
the  Montana  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  program,  unmodified  by
Rule 1, aided religious schools in violation of the Montana Constitu-
tion’s no-aid provision.  The Court further held that the violation re-
quired invalidating the entire program.

Held: The application of the no-aid provision discriminated against reli-
gious schools and the families whose children attend or hope to attend
them in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion.  Pp. 6–22.

(a) The  Free  Exercise  Clause  “protects  religious  observers  against
unequal treatment” and against “laws that impose special disabilities
on the basis of religious status.”  Trinity Lutheran Church of Colum-
bia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___, ___.  In Trinity Lutheran, this Court
held that disqualifying otherwise eligible recipients from a public ben-
efit “solely because of their religious character” imposes “a penalty on
the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered the primary content of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page
1145
New York v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New York; Knox v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011
New York; Letizia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  896,1139
1029
New York; Meehan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952
New York; O’Diah v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821
New York; Quinones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817
New York v. Romeo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
New York; Sonachansingh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013
New York; Spillman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116
New York; Stewart v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847
New York; Watson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889
New York; Zabala v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877
New York City; Chen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1100
New York City; Global Network Communications, Inc. v. . . . . . . .
967
New York City; Hemi Group, LLC v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New York City; Palmer v.
1066
New York City; Sims v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934
New York City; Thomas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New York City; Wubayeh v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1008
New York City Bd. of Ed.; Raheim v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  941,1087

881

New York City Dept. of Env. Prot.; Ming Yen Hou v.  . . . . . . . . . .
New York State Dept. of Ed.; Falchenberg v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136

1019

New York State Div. for Youth; Handle with Care Behav. Mgmt. v.
New York Times; Bridgeport Catholic Diocesan Corp. v.  . . . . . .  808,991

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

Nga Trinh; Dufrene Boats, Inc. v.
1137

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nghiem v. Department of Veterans Affairs
1003

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
N. G. S. C.; R. T.v.
Nguyen v. Superior Court of Cal., Orange County  . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

N. I. v. Orange County Social Services Agency
990

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
977

Niblock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

Niceley v. Kentucky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Nicholas v. Boyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137

Nicholas v. Marshall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941

Nichols v. Holder
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nichols v. Mills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

Nichols v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  907,924

1147

Nickels v. Grand Trunk Western R. Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

Nicoloudakis v. Abraham  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907

Nieves v. Phelps  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nika v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Nitro Distributing, Inc. v. Alticor, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  987,1114

1053

Nitschke v. Coastal Tank Cleaning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nixon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  916,1067

Njoku v. Holder
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, not the actual content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of the Court

than the presidential candidate who won his State’s popu-
lar vote.  We hold that a State may do so.

I

Our Constitution’s method of picking Presidents emerged
from an eleventh-hour compromise.  The issue, one delegate
to the Convention remarked, was “the most difficult of all
[that] we have had to decide.”  2 Records of the Federal Con-
vention of 1787, p. 501 (M. Farrand rev. 1966) (Farrand).
Despite long debate and many votes, the delegates could not
reach an agreement.  See generally N. Peirce & L. Longley,
The People’s President 19–22 (rev. 1981).  In the dying days
of summer, they referred the matter to the so-called Com-
mittee of Eleven to devise a solution.  The Committee re-
turned with a proposal for the Electoral College.  Just two
days later, the delegates accepted the recommendation with
but a few tweaks.  James Madison later wrote to a friend
that the “difficulty of finding an unexceptionable [selection]
process” was “deeply felt by the Convention.”  Letter to G.
Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), in 3 Farrand 458.  Because “the final
arrangement of it took place in the latter stage of the Ses-
sion,” Madison continued, “it was not exempt from a degree
of  the  hurrying  influence  produced  by  fatigue  and  impa-
tience in all such Bodies: tho’ the degree was much less than
usually prevails in them.”  Ibid.  Whether less or not, the
delegates soon finished their work and departed for home.
The provision they approved about presidential electors

is fairly slim.  Article II, §1, cl. 2 says:

“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Leg-
islature  thereof  may  direct,  a  Number  of  Electors,
equal to the whole Number of Senators and Represent-
atives to which the State may be entitled in the Con-
gress:  but  no  Senator  or  Representative,  or  Person
holding  an  Office  of  Trust  or  Profit  under  the  United
States, shall be appointed an Elector.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in a case called "CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON".  It discusses the history and origins of the Electoral College.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

39

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

cated pregnancy imposes significant strain on the body, un-
avoidably involving significant physiological change and ex-
cruciating  pain.    For  some  women,  pregnancy  and  child-
birth  can  mean  life-altering  physical  ailments  or  even
death.  Today, as noted earlier, the risks of carrying a preg-
nancy to term dwarf those of having an abortion.  See supra,
at 22.  Experts estimate that a ban on abortions increases
maternal mortality by 21 percent, with white women facing
a  13  percent  increase  in  maternal  mortality  while  black
women face a 33 percent increase.13  Pregnancy and child-
birth may also impose large-scale financial costs.  The ma-
jority briefly refers to arguments about changes in laws re-
lating  to  healthcare  coverage,  pregnancy  discrimination,
and family leave.  See ante, at 33–34.  Many women, how-
ever, still do not have adequate healthcare coverage before
and after pregnancy; and, even when insurance coverage is
available, healthcare services may be far away.14  Women
also continue to face pregnancy discrimination that inter-
feres with their ability to earn a living.  Paid family leave
remains  inaccessible  to  many  who  need  it  most.  Only  20
percent of private-sector workers have access to paid family
leave, including a mere 8 percent of workers in the bottom

——————

13 See L. Harris, Navigating Loss of Abortion Services—A Large Aca-
demic Medical Center Prepares for the Overturn of Roe v. Wade, 386 New
England J. Med. 2061, 2063 (2022).  This projected racial disparity re-
flects existing differences in maternal mortality rates for black and white
women.  Black women are now three to four times more likely to die dur-
ing or after childbirth than white women, often from preventable causes.
See Brief for Howard University School of Law Human and Civil Rights
Clinic as Amicus Curiae 18.

14 See  Centers  for  Medicare  and  Medicaid  Services,  Issue  Brief:  Im-
proving Access to Maternal Health Care in Rural Communities 4, 8, 11
(Sept.  2019),  https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/
OMH/equity-initiatives/rural-health/09032019-Maternal-Health-Care-in-
Rural-Communities.pdf.    In  Mississippi,  for  instance,  19  percent  of
women of reproductive age are uninsured and 60 percent of counties lack
a single obstetrician-gynecologist.  Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically focusing on the health and financial risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U76

[09-06-00 18:29:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 88 (1998)

91

Opinion of the Court

conclude that such instructions are not constitutionally re-
quired, and we therefore reverse the contrary judgment of
the Court of Appeals.

I

In the early morning hours of March 29, 1980, police re-
ceived an emergency call from the Religious Society of
Friends meetinghouse in Lincoln, Nebraska. Responding to
the call, they found Janet Mesner, the live-in caretaker, lying
on the ﬂoor in the rear of the house with seven stab wounds
in her chest. When an ofﬁcer asked who had stabbed her,
Mesner gave respondent’s name. The ofﬁcers then went to
an upstairs bedroom and found the partially clad dead body
of Victoria Lamm, a friend of Mesner who had been visiting
the meetinghouse. She had been stabbed twice, the ﬁrst
blow penetrating the main pulmonary artery of her heart
and the second her liver. A billfold containing respondent’s
identiﬁcation was lying near Lamm’s body. The police found
underwear, later identiﬁed as respondent’s, in the middle of
the blood-soaked sheets of the bed; subsequent examination
of the underwear revealed semen of respondent’s blood type.
Near the bed, the police found a serrated kitchen knife with
Mesner’s blood on it. Before dying, Mesner told an ofﬁcer
that respondent had raped her. Shortly thereafter, the po-
lice arrested respondent, who told them that although he
could not remember much about the murders due to severe
intoxication, he did recall stabbing and raping Mesner.

The State proceeded against respondent for both murders
on a felony-murder theory. Under Nebraska law, felony
murder is a form of ﬁrst-degree murder and is deﬁned as
murder committed “in the perpetration of or attempt to per-
petrate” certain enumerated felonies, including sexual as-
sault or attempt to commit sexual assault in the ﬁrst degree.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28–303 (1995). When proceeding on such a
theory, Nebraska prosecutors do not need to prove a culpable
mental state with respect to the murder because intent to
kill is conclusively presumed if the State proves intent to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It provides a factual summary of a case and sets the stage for the court's legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

with communicating with students, was speech as a govern-
ment  employee.”  991  F. 3d,  at  1015.  Like  the  District
Court, the Ninth Circuit further reasoned that, “even if we
were  to  assume  . . .  that  Kennedy  spoke  as  a  private  citi-
zen,” the District had an “adequate justification” for its ac-
tions.  Id., at 1016.  According to the court, “Kennedy’s on-
field religious activity,” coupled with what the court called
“his pugilistic efforts to generate publicity in order to gain
approval of those on-field religious activities,” were enough
to lead an “objective observer” to conclude that the District
“endorsed Kennedy’s religious activity by not stopping the
practice.”  Id.,  at  1017–1018.  And  that,  the  court  held,
would amount to a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Ibid.

The Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Kennedy’s free exercise
claim for similar reasons.  The District “concede[d]” that its
policy that led to Mr. Kennedy’s suspension was not “neu-
tral and generally applicable” and instead “restrict[ed] Ken-
nedy’s  religious  conduct  because  the  conduct  [was]  reli-
gious.”  Id., at 1020.  Still, the court ruled, the District “had
a compelling state interest to avoid violating the Establish-
ment Clause,” and its suspension was narrowly tailored to
vindicate that interest.  Id., at 1020–1021.

Later, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear the
case en banc over the dissents of 11 judges.  4 F. 4th 910,
911 (2021).  Among other things, the dissenters argued that
the panel erred by holding that a failure to discipline Mr.
Kennedy would have led the District to violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.  Several dissenters noted that the panel’s
analysis  rested  on  Lemon  v.  Kurtzman,  403  U. S.  602
(1971), and its progeny for the proposition that the Estab-
lishment Clause is implicated whenever a hypothetical rea-
sonable observer could conclude the government endorses
religion.  4  F.  4th,  at  945–947  (opinion  of  R.  Nelson,  J.).
These  dissenters  argued  that  this  Court  has  long  since
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. It delves into the court's reasoning and the dissenting opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 23A349, 23A350, 23A351 and 23A384
_________________

23A349

OHIO, ET AL.
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

23A350

KINDER MORGAN, INC., ET AL.
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

23A351

AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER ASSOCIATION, ET AL.
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

23A384

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION
v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAY

[June 27, 2024]

  JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The Clean Air Act envisions States and the federal gov-
ernment  working  together  to  improve  air  quality.    Under
that  law’s  terms,  States  bear  “primary  responsibility”  for
developing  plans  to  achieve  air-quality  goals.    42  U. S. C.
§7401(a)(3).  Should a State fail to prepare a legally compli-
ant plan, however, the federal government may sometimes
step  in  and  assume  that  authority  for  itself.    §7410(c)(1).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, case names, and the start of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE

GORSUCH, J., concurring

that goal while advancing this country’s foreign policy in-
terests—poses “delicate” and “complex” questions involving
“large elements of prophecy . . . for which the Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.”   Chicago  &
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S.
103, 111 (1948) (Jackson, J., for the Court).  Were we to cre-
ate new causes of action, we would risk doing exactly what
Congress adopted the ATS to avoid:  complicating or even
rupturing  this  Nation’s  foreign  relationships.    When  it
comes to responsibility in this area, the Constitution could
not be clearer.  It invests Congress with the power to “define
and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations” and to
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”  Art. I, §8.  To
the President belongs the responsibility of resolving diplo-
matic disputes and commanding the Armed Forces.  Art. II,
§§2–3.  The Judiciary is assigned no comparable role.  See
Jesner, 584 U. S., at ___ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.).  Respect-
ing all this, the Court has never purported to create a new
cause of action under the guise of the ATS.  Now would be
an exceedingly strange time to start.

Admitting this much would make cases like the one be-
fore  us  easy.  The  plaintiffs  seek  a  new  cause  of  action.
There may be compelling reasons for adopting one, or per-
haps some diplomatic concern militating against it.  But no
one suggests that the plaintiffs’ cause of action was among
those the ATS was originally understood to allow.  Nor does
anyone suggest that Congress has authorized it.  To know
that  should  be  enough  to  know  that  any  debate  over  the
plaintiffs’ proposed cause of action belongs before lawmak-
ers, not judges.

Making this clear would have other virtues too.  It would
get this Court out of the business of having to parse out ever
more convoluted reasons why it declines to exercise its as-
sumed  discretion  to  create  new  ATS  causes  of  action.  It
would  absolve  future  parties  from  years  of  expensive  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the appropriate role of the judiciary in defining causes of action related to international law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

TRUMP v. VANCE

ALITO, J., dissenting

the most exceptional cases.’ ”  Id., at 692.  There is no ques-
tion that a criminal prosecution holds far greater potential
for  distracting  a  President  and  diminishing  his  ability  to
carry  out  his  responsibilities  than  does  the  average  civil
suit.

*

*

*
The subpoena at issue here is unprecedented.  Never be-
fore has a local prosecutor subpoenaed the records of a sit-
ting  President.    The  Court’s  decision  threatens  to  impair
the functioning of the Presidency and provides no real pro-
tection against the use of the subpoena power by  the Na-
tion’s 2,300+ local prosecutors.  Respect for the structure of
Government created by the Constitution demands greater
protection  for  an  institution  that  is  vital  to  the  Nation’s
safety and well-being.

I therefore respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Trump v. Vance.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

the right of the people to choose their own officers for gov-
ernmental administration, and pass their own laws in vir-
tue of the legislative power reposed in representative bod-
ies,  whose  legitimate  acts  may  be  said  to  be  those  of  the
people themselves.”  In re Duncan, 139 U. S. 449, 461 (1891)
(discussing the republican governments of the States); see
also  Pacific  States  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Oregon,
223 U. S. 118, 149 (1912) (same).

Thus, whatever authority the Federal Government exer-
cised to select territorial officers for Puerto Rico before Con-
gress  recognized  Puerto  Rico’s  republican  form  of  govern-
ment, the authority “to choose [Puerto Rico’s] own officers
for  governmental  administration”  now  seems  to  belong  to
the people of Puerto Rico.  Duncan, 139 U. S., at 461.  In-
deed, however directly responsible the Federal Government
was  for  Puerto  Rico’s  local  affairs  before  Public  Law  600,
those matters might be said to “now procee[d]” in the first
instance “from the Puerto Rico Constitution as ‘ordain[ed]
and establish[ed]’ by ‘the people.’ ”  Cf. Sánchez Valle, 579
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15) (quoting P. R. Const., Preamble)
(acknowledging “that the Commonwealth’s power to enact
and enforce criminal law now proceeds . . . from the Puerto
Rico Constitution,” “mak[ing] the Puerto Rican populace . . .
the most immediate source of such authority”).

The  developments  of  the  early  1950s  were  not  merely
symbolic  either;  this  Court  has  recognized  that  the  para-
digm shift in relations between Puerto Rico and the Federal
Government carried legal consequences.  In Calero-Toledo,
for  instance,  this  Court  held  that  the  “enactments  of  the
Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico”  were  “ ‘State  statute[s]’ ”
within the meaning of a federal law requiring a three-judge
court panel to consider any action seeking to enjoin a “‘State
statute.’ ”  416 U. S., at 675–676.  The Court reasoned that
Puerto Rico was entitled to similar treatment as the States
under the federal law, due to “significant changes in Puerto
Rico’s governmental structure” in the early 1950s.  See id.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the history of Puerto Rico's relationship with the Federal Government and the implications of Puerto Rico's republican form of government.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

VEGA v. TEKOH

Syllabus

by  now-familiar  warnings  and  disallowing  the  use  of  statements  ob-
tained in violation of these new rules by the prosecution in its case-in-
chief.  384 U. S., at 444, 479.  Miranda did not hold that a violation of
the rules it established necessarily constitute a Fifth Amendment vio-
lation.  That makes sense, as an un-Mirandized suspect in custody may
make  self-incriminating  statements  without  any  hint  of  compulsion.
The Miranda Court stated that the Constitution did not itself require
“adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of
the interrogation process” and that its decision “in no way create[d] a
constitutional straitjacket.”  Id., at 467.  Since Miranda, the Court has
repeatedly described Miranda rules as “prophylactic.”  Pp. 4–7.

(2) After Miranda, the Court engaged in the process of charting the
dimensions of these new prophylactic rules, and, in doing so, weighed
the  benefits  and  costs  of  any  clarification  of  the  prophylactic  rules’
scope.  See  Maryland  v.  Shatzer,  559  U. S.  98,  106.    Some  post-Mi-
randa  decisions  found  that  the  balance  of  interests  justified  re-
strictions that would not have been possible if Miranda described the
Fifth Amendment right as opposed to a set of rules designed to protect
that right.  For example, in Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 224–
226, the Court held that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda
could be used to impeach the testimony of a defendant, even though an
involuntary statement obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment
could not have been employed in this way.  In Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U. S.  443,  450–452,  n.  26,  the  Court  held  that  the  “fruits”  of  an  un-
Mirandized statement can be admitted.  In doing so, the Court distin-
guished police conduct that “abridge[s] [a person’s] constitutional priv-
ilege  against  compulsory  self-incrimination”  from  conduct  that  “de-
part[s]  only  from  the  prophylactic  standards  later  laid  down  by  this
Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.”  417 U. S., at 445–446.
Similarly, in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, the Court, following the
reasoning  in Tucker,  refused  to  exclude  a  signed  confession  and  em-
phasized that an officer’s error “in administering the prophylactic Mi-
randa procedures . . . should not breed the same irremediable conse-
quences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.”  Id., at
309.

While  many  of  the  Court’s  decisions  imposed  limits  on  Miranda’s
prophylactic rules, other decisions found that the balance of interests
called for expansion.  For example, in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, the
Court held that silence following a Miranda warning cannot be used
to  impeach.    The  Court  acknowledged  that  Miranda  warnings  are
“prophylactic,” 426 U. S., at 617, but it found that allowing the use of
post-warning silence would undermine the warnings’ implicit promise
that  silence  would  not  be  used  to  convict.  Id.,  at  618.  Likewise,  in
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, the Court rejected an attempt to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal excerpt discussing the Miranda warning and its application in court cases. It analyzes various Supreme Court decisions that have shaped the interpretation and scope of Miranda rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$82Z 02-22-99 22:42:40 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 524 U. S. 184 (1998)

185

Syllabus

conduct was unlawful. Also rejected is petitioner’s second argument:
that § 924(a)(1)(D) must be read to require knowledge of the law in light
of this Court’s adoption of a similar interpretation in cases concerned
with willful violations of the tax laws, see, e. g., Cheek v. United States,
498 U. S. 192, 201, and the willful structuring of cash transactions to
avoid a bank reporting requirement, see Ratzlaf, 510 U. S., at 138, 149.
Those cases are readily distinguishable because they involved highly
technical statutes that threatened to ensnare individuals engaged in
apparently innocent conduct. That danger is not present here because
the jury found that this petitioner knew that his conduct was unlawful.
Pp. 191–196.

(b) Petitioner’s additional arguments based on his reading of congres-
sional intent are rejected. FOPA’s legislative history is too ambigu-
ous to offer him much assistance, since his main support lies in state-
ments made by opponents of the bill. See, e. g., Schwegmann Brothers
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394. His next argument—
that, at the time FOPA was passed, the “willfulness” requirements in
§§ 923(d)(1)(C)–(D) had uniformly been interpreted to require knowl-
edge of the law—is inaccurate because a number of courts had reached
different conclusions. Moreover, the cases adopting petitioner’s view
support the notion that disregard of a known legal obligation is sufﬁ-
cient to establish a willful violation, but in no way make it necessary.
Petitioner’s ﬁnal argument—that § 922(b)(3), which is governed by
§ 924(a)(1)(D), indicates that Congress intended “willfully” to include
knowledge of the law—fails for a similar reason. Pp. 196–199.

(c) The trial court’s misstatement of law in a jury instruction given
after the correct instructions were given—speciﬁcally, a sentence as-
serting that “the government [need not] prove that [petitioner] had
knowledge that he was breaking the law”—does not provide a basis
for reversal because (1) petitioner did not effectively object to that
sentence; (2) in the context of the entire instructions, it seems unlikely
that the jury was misled; (3) petitioner failed to raise this argument in
the Second Circuit; and (4) this Court’s grant of certiorari was limited
to the narrow legal question hereinbefore decided. Pp. 199–200.

122 F. 3d 90, afﬁrmed.

Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O(cid:146)Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., ﬁled
a concurring opinion, post, p. 200. Scalia, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion,
in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 200.

Roger Bennet Adler argued the cause for petitioner.

With him on the briefs was Martin B. Adelman.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus. It summarizes the court's decision and reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>