<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
56  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

failed  to  say  that  they  agreed  with  the  viability  rule;  in-
stead, they candidly acknowledged “the reservations [some]
of us may have in reaffirming [that] holding of Roe.”  Id., at
853.

The controlling opinion criticized and rejected  Roe’s tri-
mester  scheme,  505  U. S.,  at  872,  and  substituted  a  new
“undue burden” test, but the basis for this test was obscure.
And as we will explain, the test is full of ambiguities and is
difficult to apply.
  Casey, in short, either refused to reaffirm or rejected im-
portant aspects of Roe’s analysis, failed to remedy glaring
deficiencies  in  Roe’s  reasoning,  endorsed  what  it  termed
Roe’s  central  holding  while  suggesting  that  a  majority
might not have thought it was correct, provided no new sup-
port for the abortion right other than Roe’s status as prece-
dent, and imposed a new and problematic test with no firm
grounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent.

As discussed below, Casey also deployed a novel version
of the doctrine of stare decisis.  See infra, at 64–69.  This
new doctrine did not account for the profound wrongness of
the decision in Roe, and placed great weight on an intangi-
ble form of reliance with little if any basis in prior case law.
Stare decisis does not command the preservation of such a
decision.

C
Workability.  Our  precedents  counsel  that  another  im-
portant  consideration  in  deciding  whether  a  precedent
should be overruled is whether the rule it imposes is work-
able—that is, whether it can be understood and applied in
a consistent and predictable manner.  Montejo v. Louisiana,
556 U. S. 778, 792 (2009); Patterson v. McLean Credit Un-
ion, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.
v.  Mayacamas  Corp.,  485  U. S.  271,  283–284  (1988).    Ca-
sey’s “undue burden” test has scored poorly on the worka-
bility scale.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the section discussing the shortcomings of the precedent set by the Casey v. Planned Parenthood case.  It analyzes the workability of the "undue burden" test established in Casey.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

5

Opinion of the Court

entering class and was rejected.  She sued the University
and  various  University  officials  in  the  United  States  Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Texas.  She alleged
that  the  University’s  consideration  of  race  in  admissions
violated  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.  The  parties  cross-
moved for summary judgment.  The District Court granted
summary judgment to the University.  The United States
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Fifth  Circuit  affirmed.    It  held
that  Grutter  required courts  to  give  substantial  deference
to the University, both in the definition of the compelling
interest in diversity’s benefits and in deciding whether its
specific  plan  was  narrowly  tailored  to  achieve  its  stated
goal.  Applying  that  standard,  the  court  upheld  the  Uni-
versity’s admissions plan.  631 F. 3d 213, 217–218 (2011).

Over  the  dissent  of  seven  judges,  the  Court  of  Appeals
denied petitioner’s request for rehearing en banc.  See 644
F. 3d 301, 303 (CA5 2011) (per curiam).  Petitioner sought
a writ of certiorari.  The writ was granted.  565 U. S. ___
(2012).

B
Among  the  Court’s  cases  involving  racial  classifications
in  education,  there  are  three  decisions  that  directly  ad-
dress the question of considering racial minority status as
a  positive  or  favorable  factor  in  a  university’s  admissions
process, with the goal of achieving the educational benefits
of  a  more  diverse  student  body:  Bakke,  438  U. S.  265;
Gratz,  supra;  and  Grutter,  539  U. S.  306.    We  take  those
cases as given for purposes of deciding this case.

We begin with the principal opinion authored by Justice
Powell  in  Bakke,  supra.  In  Bakke,  the  Court  considered
a  system  used  by  the  medical  school  of  the  University  of
California  at  Davis.    From  an  entering  class  of  100  stu-
dents the school had set aside 16 seats for minority appli-
cants.  In  holding  this  program  impermissible  under  the
Equal  Protection  Clause  Justice  Powell’s  opinion  stated
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and delves into the legal arguments surrounding affirmative action in university admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 11-02-00 08:45:59
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3EV

Pagination Table: RULES1

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Supreme Court of the United States
washington, d. c.

April 17, 2000

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States of America in Congress Assembled:

By direction of the Supreme Court of the United States, I
have the honor to submit to the Congress the amendments
to the Federal Rules of Evidence that have been adopted by
the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to Section
2072 of Title 28, United States Code.

Accompanying these rules are excerpts from the report of
the Judicial Conference of the United States containing the
Committee Notes submitted to the Court for its consider-
ation pursuant to Section 331 of Title 28, United States Code.

Sincerely,

(Signed) William H. Rehnquist

Chief Justice of the United States

1190
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a letter of transmittal for amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence. It's not the main body of the legal text and likely provides context and background information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Letter of Transmittal</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

turns to remedy.  Because the challenged robocall ban un-
constitutionally infringes on their speech, I would hold that
the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction preventing its en-
forcement against them.  This is the traditional remedy for
proven violations of legal rights likely to work irreparable
injury  in  the  future.    Preventing  the  law’s  enforcement
against the plaintiffs would fully address their injury.  And
going this far, but no further, would avoid “short circuit[ing]
the democratic process” by interfering with the work of Con-
gress any more than necessary.  Washington State Grange
v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 451
(2008).

JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH’s  opinion  pursues  a  different
course.  Invoking  “severability  doctrine,”  it  declares  the
government-debt exception void and severs it from the stat-
ute.  As revised by today’s decision, the law prohibits nearly
all robocalls to cell phones, just as it did back in 1991.  In
support of this remedy, we are asked to consider cases in-
volving  equal  protection  violations,  where  courts  have
sometimes solved the problem of unequal treatment by lev-
eling others “down” to the plaintiff ’s status rather than by
leveling the plaintiff “up” to the status others enjoy.

I am doubtful of our authority to rewrite the law in this
way.  Many have questioned the propriety of modern sever-
ability  doctrine,*  and  today’s  case  illustrates  some  of  the
reasons why.  To start, it’s hard to see how today’s use of
severability doctrine qualifies as a remedy at all:  The plain-
tiffs  have  not  challenged  the  government-debt  exception,
they have not sought to have it severed and stricken, and
far from placing “unequal treatment” at the “heart of their

——————

*See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
ante, at 14–24 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Harrison,  Severability,  Remedies,  and  Constitutional  Adjudication,  83
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 56 (2014); see also Movsesian, Severability in Stat-
utes and Contracts, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 41, 41–42 (1995) (collecting academic
criticism of severability doctrine).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the constitutionality of a robocall ban and the application of the severability doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Opinion of the Court

threatened to use force against another person or his prop-
erty.  As the Model Penal Code explains with respect to the
Hobbs  Act’s  common-law  robbery  analogue,  “there  will  be
cases, appropriately reached by a charge of attempted rob-
bery,  where  the  actor  does  not  actually  harm  anyone  or
even  threaten  harm.”  ALI,  Model  Penal  Code  § 222.1,
p.  114  (1980).  “If,  for  example,  the  defendant  is  appre-
hended before he reaches his robbery victim and thus before
he has actually engaged in threatening conduct, proof of his
purpose to engage in such conduct” can “justify a conviction
of  attempted  robbery”  so  long  as  his  intention  and  some
other substantial step are present.  Id., at 115.

A hypothetical helps illustrate the point.  Suppose Adam
tells a friend that he is planning to rob a particular store on
a particular date.  He then sets about researching the busi-
ness’s security measures, layout, and the time of day when
its cash registers are at their fullest.  He buys a ski mask,
plots his escape route, and recruits his brother to drive the
getaway  car.    Finally,  he  drafts  a  note—“Your  money  or
your life”—that he plans to pass to the cashier.  The note is
a bluff, but Adam hopes its implication that he is armed and
dangerous will elicit a compliant response.  When the day
finally comes and Adam crosses the threshold into the store,
the  police  immediately  arrest  him.    It  turns  out  Adam’s
friend tipped them off.

There is little question the government could win a lawful
conviction against Adam for attempted Hobbs Act robbery.
After all, he intended to take property against the cashier’s
will  by  threat  of  force,  and  his  actions  constituted  a  sub-
stantial step toward that goal.  At the same time, this ex-
ample helps show why attempted Hobbs Act robbery does
not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause.
Adam did not “use” physical force.  He did not “attempt” to
use  such  force—his  note  was  a  bluff  and  never  delivered.
And he never even got to the point of threatening the use of
force against anyone or anything.  He may have intended
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the elements of attempted robbery under the Hobbs Act. It provides legal analysis and examples, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

TRUMP v. HAWAII

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Proclamation
heightened standard.  See supra, at 10–13.

is  plainly  unconstitutional  under  that

But even under rational-basis review, the Proclamation

must  fall.  That  is  so  because  the  Proclamation  is  “ ‘di
vorced  from  any  factual  context  from  which  we  could
discern  a  relationship  to  legitimate  state  interests,’  and
‘its  sheer  breadth  [is]  so  discontinuous  with  the  reasons
offered for it’ ” that the policy is “ ‘inexplicable by anything
but  animus.’ ”    Ante,  at  33  (quoting  Romer  v.  Evans,  517
U. S.  620,  632,  635  (1996));  see  also  Cleburne  v.  Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 448 (1985) (recognizing
that  classifications  predicated  on  discriminatory  animus
can  never  be  legitimate  because  the  Government  has  no
legitimate interest in exploiting “mere negative attitudes,
or  fear”  toward  a  disfavored  group).    The  President’s
statements,  which  the  majority  utterly  fails  to  address  in
its legal analysis, strongly support the conclusion that the
Proclamation was issued to express hostility toward Mus
lims and exclude them from the country.  Given the over
whelming  record  evidence  of  anti-Muslim  animus,  it  sim
ply cannot be said that the Proclamation has a legitimate
basis.  IRAP  II,  883  F.  3d,  at  352  (Harris,  J.,  concurring)
(explaining that the Proclamation contravenes the bedrock
principle “that the government may not act on the basis of

——————

when individual liberties are at stake.”  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S.
507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion).  This Court’s Establishment Clause
precedents require that, if a reasonable observer would understand an
executive  action  to  be  driven  by  discriminatory  animus,  the  action  be
invalidated.  See  McCreary,  545  U. S.,  at  860.    That  reasonable-
observer  inquiry  includes  consideration  of  the  Government’s  asserted
justifications for its actions.  The Government’s invocation of a national-
security  justification,  however,  does  not  mean  that  the  Court  should
close its eyes to other relevant information.  Deference is different from
unquestioning acceptance.  Thus, what is “far more problematic” in this
case is the majority’s apparent willingness to throw the Establishment
Clause out the window and forgo any meaningful constitutional review
at the mere mention of a national-security concern.  Ante, at 32, n. 5.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Trump v. Hawaii. It delves into the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation and argues against its legitimacy based on potential discriminatory animus.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

17

Opinion of the Court

U. S. 138, 150 (1984).  The Court’s definitive statement in
Three Affiliated Tribes about Public Law 280 applies to both
civil and criminal jurisdiction.  And the Court’s statement
follows ineluctably from the statutory text:  Public Law 280
contains no language that preempts States’ civil or criminal
jurisdiction.

Castro-Huerta separately contends that the enactment of
Public Law 280 in 1953 would have been pointless surplus-
age  if  States  already  had  concurrent  jurisdiction  over
crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian
country.  So he says that, as of 1953, Congress must have
assumed that States did not already have concurrent juris-
diction over those crimes.  To begin with, assumptions are
not laws, and the fact remains that Public Law 280 contains
no language preempting state jurisdiction, as the Court al-
ready held in Three Affiliated Tribes.  Apart from that, Pub-
lic Law 280 encompasses far more than just non-Indian on
Indian crimes (the issue here).  Public Law 280 also grants
States jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians.  See
Conference of Western Attorneys General, American Indian
Law  Deskbook  §4.6,  p.  250–251  (2021  ed.);  cf.  Negonsott,
507 U. S., at 105–107.  Absent Public Law 280, state juris-
diction over those Indian-defendant crimes could implicate
principles  of  tribal  self-government.    See  White  Mountain
Apache  Tribe  v.  Bracker,  448  U. S.  136,  142–143  (1980);
Part III–B, infra.  So our resolution of the narrow jurisdic-
tional issue in this case does not negate the significance of
Public Law 280 in affording States broad criminal jurisdic-
tion over other crimes committed in Indian country, such as
crimes committed by Indians.4

——————

4 Castro-Huerta also points to several state-specific grants of jurisdic-
tion from 1940 through 1948.  See Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat.
1224 (New York); Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (Iowa); Act
of  May  31,  1946,  ch.  279,  60  Stat.  229  (North  Dakota);  Act  of  June  8,
1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (Kansas).  Those statutes operate similarly to
Public Law 280.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing Public Law 280 and its implications for state jurisdiction in Indian country. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of statutory text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting

infra, at 10–11, n. 10.  Just as a Star of David is not suit-
able to honor Christians who died serving their country, so
a cross is not suitable to honor those of other faiths who
died  defending  their  nation.    Soldiers  of  all  faiths  “are
united by their love of country, but they are not united by
the cross.”  Brief for Jewish War Veterans of the United
States  of  America,  Inc.,  as  Amicus  Curiae  3  (Brief  for
Amicus Jewish War Veterans).
  By  maintaining  the  Peace  Cross  on a public highway,
the  Commission  elevates  Christianity over other faiths,
and religion over nonreligion.  Memorializing the service
of American soldiers is an “admirable and unquestionably
secular” objective.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 715
(2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  But the Commission does
not serve that objective by displaying a symbol that bears
“a starkly sectarian message.”  Salazar v. Buono, 559 U. S.
700, 736 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

I
A
  The First Amendment commands that the government
“shall make no law” either “respecting an establishment of
religion”  or  “prohibiting  the free exercise thereof.”  See
Everson, 330 U. S., at 15.  Adoption of these complemen-
tary provisions followed centuries of “turmoil, civil strife,
and persecutio[n], generated in large part by established
sects determined to maintain their absolute political and
religious supremacy.”  Id, at 8–9.  Mindful of that history,
the fledgling Republic ratified the Establishment Clause,
in  the  words  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  to  “buil[d]  a  wall  of
separation between church and state.”  Draft Reply to the
Danbury  Baptist  Association,  in  36  Papers  of  Thomas
Jefferson 254, 255 (B. Oberg ed. 2009) (footnote omitted).
  This barrier “protect[s] the integrity of individual con-
science in religious matters.” McCreary County v. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U. S. 844, 876 (2005).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and its application to a specific memorial.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
106

MOHAWK  INDUSTRIES,  INC.  v.  CARPENTER

Opinion of the Court

II

A

By statute, courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals
from  all  ﬁnal  decisions  of  the  district  courts  of  the  United
States,  .  .  .  except  where  a  direct  review  may  be  had  in  the
Supreme  Court.”  28  U. S. C.  § 1291.  A  “ﬁnal  decisio[n]”  is
typically  one  “by  which  a  district  court  disassociates  itself
from a case.”  Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S.
35, 42 (1995).  This Court, however,  “has long given” § 1291
a  “practical  rather  than  a  technical  construction.”  Cohen,
337  U. S.,  at  546.  As  we  held  in  Cohen,  the  statute  encom
passes  not  only  judgments  that  “terminate  an  action,”  but
also  a  “small  class”  of  collateral  rulings  that,  although  they
do  not  end  the  litigation,  are  appropriately  deemed  “ﬁnal.”
Id.,  at  545–546.  “That  small  category  includes  only  deci
sions  that  are  conclusive,  that  resolve  important  questions
separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreview
able  on  appeal  from  the  ﬁnal  judgment  in  the  underlying
action.”  Swint, 514 U. S., at 42.

In  applying  Cohen’s  collateral  order  doctrine,  we  have
stressed that it must “never be  allowed to swallow the gen
eral  rule  that  a  party  is  entitled  to  a  single  appeal,  to  be
deferred  until  ﬁnal  judgment  has  been  entered.”  Digital
Equipment  Corp.  v.  Desktop  Direct,  Inc.,  511  U. S.  863,  868
(1994)  (citation  omitted);  see  also  Will  v.  Hallock,  546  U. S.
345, 350 (2006) (“emphasizing [the doctrine’s] modest scope”).
Our  admonition  reﬂects  a  healthy  respect  for  the  virtues  of
the  ﬁnal-judgment  rule.  Permitting  piecemeal,  prejudg
ment appeals, we have recognized, undermines “efﬁcient ju
dicial  administration”  and  encroaches  upon  the  prerogatives
of  district  court  judges,  who  play  a  “special  role”  in  manag
ing  ongoing  litigation.  Firestone  Tire  &  Rubber  Co.  v.
Risjord,  449  U. S.  368,  374  (1981);  see  also  Richardson-
Merrell  Inc.  v.  Koller,  472  U. S.  424,  436  (1985)  (“[T]he  dis
trict  judge  can  better  exercise  [his  or  her]  responsibility  [to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the "collateral order doctrine" and its application in appeals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

lxix

Page
1094
1091
1076
1031
1039
1118
1023,1145
1038
1024
1130
1008,1084
1006
1016,1061,1137
1016
1028
1053
1050
1003
1025
1059

Triplett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trippett; Larson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trudeau v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
True; Borelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
True; Ibarra v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Truitt v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tsu v. Tracy Federal Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tuckness v. Henderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tuesno v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tundra Taxi v. North Slope Borough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tunstall v. Kavanagh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Turner v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Turner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Turner v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Turnley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tuscaloosa; Stimpson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tuttle; Arlington County School Bd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Underwood, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Underwood v. Jeffcoat
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Underwood; Westfall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Union. For labor union, see name of trade.
United. For labor union, see name of trade.
United Parcel Service, Inc.; Davis v.
United States. See name of other party.
. . . .
U. S. Army Corps of Eng’rs; Waste Agcy. of N. Cook Cty. v.
U. S. Attorney’s Ofﬁce, Eastern Dist. of N. Y.; Gallo v.
. . . . . . . . .
United States Bakery, Inc. v. Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. Court of Appeals; Gonzalez v.
U. S. Court of Appeals; Shayesteh v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Alford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Coates v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Genco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Court; Johnson v.
U. S. District Court; Wai Chong Leung v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. District Judge; Flournoy v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.; Zharn v.
United States Lines; American S. S. Owners Prot. & Ind. Assn. v.
U. S. Parole Comm’n; Sallee v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. Postal Service; Cobbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U. S. Postal Service; Mack v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
University of Colo. Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
University of Dayton School of Law; Bello v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, Inc.; Nelson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Upshaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1090

1129
1060
1062
1008
1135
1134
1040
1145
1011
1120
1072
1105
1038
1106
1028,1105
1034
1130
1083
1109
1137
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

THOMAS, J., concurring

did  not  understand  how  the  payment  system  operated.”
Rappaport  110;  see  also  S.  Siegel,  The  Federal  Govern-
ment’s Power To Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Original-
ist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 477, 561 (1998).  Thus, while
this  legislation  appears  to  have  provided  a  discrete  race-
based  benefit,  its  aim—to  prohibit  race-based  exploita-
tion—may not have been possible at the time without using
a racial screen.  In other words, the statute’s racial classifi-
cations  may  well  have  survived  strict  scrutiny.    See  Rap-
paport  111–112.  Another  law,  passed  in  1867,  provided
funds for “freedmen or destitute colored people” in the Dis-
trict of Columbia.  Res. of Mar. 16, 1867, No. 4, 15 Stat. 20.
However,  when  a  prior  version  of  this  law  targeting  only
blacks  was  criticized  for  being  racially  discriminatory,  “it
was defended on the grounds that there were various places
in the city where former slaves . . . lived in densely popu-
lated  shantytowns.”    Rappaport  104–105  (citing  Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1507).  Congress thus may
have enacted the measure not because of race, but rather to
address  a  special  problem  in  shantytowns  in  the  District
where blacks lived.

These laws—even if targeting race as such—likely were
also constitutionally permissible examples of Government
action  “undo[ing]  the  effects  of  past  discrimination  in  [a
way]  that  do[es]  not  involve  classification  by  race,”  even
though they had “a racially disproportionate impact.”  Rich-
mond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 526 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  The government can plainly remedy a race-based in-
jury  that  it  has  inflicted—though  such  remedies  must  be
meant to further a colorblind government, not perpetuate
racial consciousness.  See id., at 505 (majority opinion).  In
that  way,  “[r]ace-based  government  measures  during  the
1860’s and 1870’s to remedy state-enforced slavery were . . .
not inconsistent with the colorblind Constitution.”  Parents
Involved, 551 U. S., at 772, n. 19 (THOMAS, J., concurring).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It discusses historical legal precedents and arguments related to race-based legislation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

MOORE v. HARPER

THOMAS, J., dissenting

and Harper I was no exception.5

Even if it were, we would still have no case or controversy
in front of us.  A freestanding “judgment” of statutory inval-
idation—neutralizing the 2021 Act in some manner trans-
cending  the  final  determination  of  the  parties’  respective
rights in this case—would not be a judicial action within the
meaning of Article III, and it could not be reviewed in this
Court.  See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210,
226–227 (1908).  “We sit as a court of law, not a council of
revision,” and “[o]ur powers of judicial review are judicial,
not legislative, in nature.”  Mackey, 401 U. S., at 697 (opin-
ion of Harlan, J.).  The only power that we ever could have
exercised here was to modify the adjudicated rights and li-
abilities of the parties with respect to the claims in this ac-
tion.  Because we plainly cannot do so, no matter what we
think about the Elections Clause, this proceeding is moot.

——————

5 Nor did Harper III, despite agreeing with petitioners in all other re-
spects, anywhere endorse their belief that some “order striking down the
2021 [Act]” would survive a decision overruling Harper I and dismissing
this lawsuit with prejudice.  Ante, at 5 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  To the extent that the majority imputes that idea to Harper III, it
again  seriously  misreads  that  decision.    See  n. 3, supra.  The  majority
states  that  Harper  III  “did  not  reinstate  the  2021  congressional  pla[n]
that Harper I had struck down.”  Ante, at 5 (citing Harper III, ___ N. C.,
at ___–___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 446–448).  But the part of Harper III that the
majority  cites  had  nothing  to  do  with  North  Carolina’s  congressional
plan.  Instead, it considered whether two state-constitutional provisions,
which require that state-legislature districting plans “remain unaltered”
until the next census after they have become “established,” N. C. Const.,
Art. II, §§3(4) and 5(4), prevented the Assembly from revising the 2021
state plans that Harper I had rejected.  See Harper III, ___ N. C., at ___–
___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 446–448.  In determining that the 2021 state plans
were never “established,” Harper III did not mean that Harper I some-
how still restrains those plans; rather, it indicated that those plans them-
selves do not restrain the Assembly going forward.  Absolutely nothing
in  Harper  III suggests  that  the  North  Carolina  Supreme  Court’s  judg-
ments  act  directly  upon  legislative  enactments—“striking  them  down”
today and “reinstating” them tomorrow—or that the 2021 congressional
map remains subject to any restraint left over from Harper I.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in a case called Moore v. Harper.  It delves into legal arguments regarding the Elections Clause and the power of the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

PATEL v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

this requirement.  Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) renders inad-
missible an “alien who falsely represents, or has falsely rep-
resented,  himself  or  herself  to  be  a  citizen  of  the  United
States  for  any  purpose  or  benefit  under”  state  or  federal
law.  The  Board  of  Immigration  Appeals  (BIA)  has  inter-
preted this provision to apply when a noncitizen (1) makes
a false representation of citizenship (2) that is material to a
purpose or benefit under the law (3) with the subjective in-
tent  of  obtaining  the  purpose  or  benefit.  Matter  of  Rich-
mond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 786–787 (2016).  Applying this
test,  USCIS
that  Patel  had  violated
§1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) and was therefore ineligible for status
adjustment.

concluded

Several  years  later,  DHS  initiated  removal  proceedings
against the Patels because they were present in the United
States without having been admitted—the same illegal en-
try that Patel had sought to remedy in his initial applica-
tion for adjustment of status.  See §1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Patel
conceded that he was removable on that ground but sought
relief from removal by repeating his request for discretion-
ary adjustment to lawful permanent resident status.

Now before an Immigration Judge, Patel’s request for re-
lief raised the same question that had been at issue in his
application  before  USCIS:  whether  the  misrepresentation
of  citizenship  on  his  driver’s  license  application  rendered
him  ineligible  for  discretionary  adjustment.    He  conceded
that he had checked the “citizen” box on that application.
But he argued that he had done so by accident—and there-
fore  without  the  subjective  intent that  the  BIA  has  inter-
preted §1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) to require.

The Immigration Judge concluded otherwise.  The judge
explained that Patel was evasive when asked exactly how
he had made a mistake.  And though Patel testified that he
had provided his alien registration number on his applica-
tion, which would have identified him as a noncitizen, the
actual application showed that he had not.  The judge also
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in the case of Patel v. Garland. It contains legal arguments, citations, and a summary of the case proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

STEVENS, J., dissenting

not  establish  a  general  right  of  all  persons,  or  even  of  all
Protestants,  to  possess  weapons.  Rather,  the  right  was
qualified  in  two  distinct  ways:  First,  it  was  restricted  to
those of adequate social and economic status (“suitable to
their  Condition”);  second,  it  was  only  available  subject  to
regulation by Parliament (“as allowed by Law”).31

The  Court  may  well  be  correct  that  the  English  Bill  of
Rights protected the right of some English subjects to use
some  arms  for  personal  self-defense  free  from  restrictions
by  the  Crown  (but  not  Parliament).    But  that  right—
adopted  in  a  different  historical  and  political  context  and
framed  in  markedly  different  language—tells  us  little
about the meaning of the Second Amendment.

Blackstone’s Commentaries

The  Court’s  reliance  on  Blackstone’s  Commentaries  on
the Laws of England is unpersuasive for the same reason
as its reliance on the English Bill of Rights.  Blackstone’s
invocation  of  “ ‘the  natural  right  of  resistance  and  self-
preservation,’ ”  ante,  at  20,  and  “ ‘the  right  of  having  and
using  arms  for  self-preservation  and  defence’ ”  ibid.,  re
ferred  specifically  to  Article  VII  in  the  English  Bill  of
Rights.  The excerpt from Blackstone offered by the Court,
therefore, is, like Article VII itself, of limited use in inter
preting  the  very  differently  worded,  and  differently  his
torically situated, Second Amendment.
  What  is  important  about  Blackstone  is  the  instruction
he  provided  on  reading  the  sort  of  text  before  us  today.
Blackstone  described  an  interpretive  approach  that  gave
far  more  weight  to  preambles  than  the  Court  allows.

——————

31 Moreover, it was the Crown, not Parliament, that was bound by the
English  provision;  indeed,  according  to  some  prominent  historians,
Article VII is best understood not as announcing any individual right to
unregulated  firearm  ownership  (after  all,  such  a  reading  would  fly  in
the face of the text), but as an assertion of the concept of parliamentary
supremacy.  See Brief for Jack N. Rakove et al. as Amici Curiae 6–9.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from Justice Stevens in the District of Columbia v. Heller case. It delves into the historical context and interpretation of the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1066

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 17, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1144. McDougal-Saddler v. Herman, Secretary
of Labor. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
184 F. 3d 207.

No. 99–1162. Abdullah et al. v. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 184 F. 3d 158.

No. 99–1163. Ferrell et al. v. Cuomo, Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 F. 3d 805.

No. 99–1169. New Prime, dba Prime, Inc., et al. v. Owner
Operators Independent Drivers Assn., Inc., et al. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 778.

No. 99–1171. Greater New York Metropolitan Food
Council, Inc., et al. v. Giuliani, Mayor of the City of New
York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
195 F. 3d 100.

No. 99–1172. Federation of Advertising Industry Rep-
resentatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago. C. A. 7th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 633.

No. 99–1173. Cecil v. National Labor Relations Board
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194
F. 3d 1311.

No. 99–1181. Zucker et al. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 192 F. 3d 1323.

No. 99–1183. Shultz v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 138 Wash. 2d 638, 980 P. 2d 1265.
No. 99–1192. Bullock v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 982 S. W. 2d 579.

No. 99–1196. Transamerica Assurance Co. et al. v. Til-
lery et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 198 F. 3d 259.

No. 99–1305. Elkay Manufacturing Co. v. Ebco Manufac-
turing Co. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 192 F. 3d 973.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and reporting information. This type of content is generally not suitable for indexing as it's a structured list rather than narrative text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

BREYER, J., dissenting

where the defendant failed to raise that  claim in  his first
habeas  proceeding  only  because  his  first  habeas  counsel
was  also  constitutionally inadequate?  See  Purkey,  supra,
at ___ (BREYER, J., dissenting from grant of vacatur) (slip
op., at 3).  Does the Federal Government have to follow state
requirements  for  how much  advance  notice  an  inmate re-
ceives for her execution?  See Rosen  v.  Montgomery, ante,
p. ___.  These  are  but  a  few  of  the  many  death-penalty-
related  questions  (some  technical,  some  not)  that  courts
must consider, even though the result of this consideration
is  often  delay—perhaps  for  many  years.  See  Glossip  v.
Gross, 576 U. S. 863, 926–929 (2015) (BREYER, J., dissent-
ing).

None  of  these  legal  questions  is  frivolous.  What  are
courts to do when faced with legal questions of this kind?
Are they simply to ignore them?  Or are they, as in this case,
to “hurry up, hurry up”?  That is no solution.  Higgs’ case
illustrates this dilemma.  The District Court ruled against
the  Government  and  the  Government  appealed.    The
Fourth  Circuit  denied  the  Government’s  request  to  dis-
pense with oral argument “in light of the novel legal issues
presented” and set oral argument for January 27.  App. to
Pet. for  Cert.  29a.  The Circuit then stayed  the  execution
pending further order.  Order in No. 20–18 (Jan. 13, 2021).
The Government now seeks certiorari before judgment, an
extraordinary  remedy  that  is  to  be  granted  only  upon  a
showing  that  “the  case  is  of  such  imperative  public  im-
portance as to justify deviation from normal appellate prac-
tice.”  This Court’s Rule 11.  Given the finality and severity
of a death sentence, it is particularly important that judges
consider  and  resolve  challenges  to  an  inmate’s  conviction
and sentence.  How just is a legal system that would execute
an individual without consideration of a novel or significant
legal question that he has raised?

Yet, to consider these questions, some of which (such as
mental competency) may not arise until a few weeks before
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal arguments and the importance of considering them in death penalty cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xxiii

Page
Bradley v. Mississippi  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  851,1101

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934
Bradley v. United States
947
. . . . . . . . . . .
Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, LLP; Whitehead v.
832
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Braley v. California
1031
Bramit v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Branch; Simba v.
876
Brandywine Chesapeake Housing Corp.; Marshall v.
. . . . . . . . . .
888
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Branigan v. United States
997
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Branker; Blakeney v.
934
Branker; Cole v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971
Branker; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953
Branker; Larry v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122
Branker; Stephens v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842
Brannon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133
Brantley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878
Braquet v. Commissioner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112
Braverman; O’Boyle v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
814
Bravo, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
886
Brazelton v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130
Breault v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874
Bredesen; Jelovsek v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1067
Bredesen; Johnson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
846
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brent v. Anglin
829
Brent v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brewer; Abdullah v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Brewer v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  887,900,1005,1156

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1140

Brewer; Yoder v.
Brewster v. United States
963

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938

Briarpatch Ltd., LP v. Geisler Roberdeau, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1156

Bride v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bridgeford v. Maryland
845

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .  808,991

Bridgeport Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New York Times
1114

Bridgeport Port Auth. v. Bridgeport & Port Jefferson S. S. Co. . .
1114

Bridgeport &  Port Jefferson  S. S.  Co.; Bridgeport Port  Auth. v.
1129

Bridges v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Bridgestone Firestone Tire Co.; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945

Bridgewater; Kafka v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Brigham v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

Bright v. O’Flaherty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

Bright v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

Brinda v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058

Briones v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1063

Brisco v. Ercole
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044

Briscoe v. Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

ALITO, J., dissenting

a legitimate medical need and is medically reasonable even
in the face of medical and scientific uncertainty.  Gonzales
v.  Carhart,  550  U. S.  124,  163  (2007);  Mazurek  v.  Arm-
strong, 520 U. S. 968, 973 (1997) (per curiam); Akron v. Ak-
ron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 458
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[L]egislatures are better
suited”  than  courts  “to  make  the  necessary  factual  judg-
ments in this area”); accord, Barsky v. Board of Regents of
Univ. of N. Y., 347 U. S. 442, 451 (1954) (State has “legiti-
mate  concern  for  maintaining  high  standards  of  profes-
sional conduct” in the practice of medicine).  Louisiana eas-
ily satisfied this standard.

For  these  reasons,  both  the  plurality  and  THE  CHIEF
JUSTICE err in concluding that the admitting-privileges re-
quirement serves no valid purpose.

III
They also err in their assessment of Act 620’s likely effect
on access to abortion.  They misuse the doctrine of stare de-
cisis  and  the  standard  of  appellate  review  for  findings  of
fact.

A
Stare decisis is a major theme in the plurality opinion and
that of THE CHIEF JUSTICE.  Both opinions try to create the
impression  that  this  case  is  the  same  as  Whole  Woman’s
Health and that stare decisis therefore commands the same
result.  In truth, however, the two cases are very different.
While it is certainly true that the Texas and Louisiana stat-
utes are largely the same, the two cases are not.  The deci-
sion in Whole Woman’s Health was not based on the face of
the  Texas  statute,  but  on  an  empirical  question,  namely,
the effect of the statute on access to abortion in that State.
579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 24).  The Court’s answer to that
question  depended  on  numerous  factors  that  may  differ
from State to State, including the demand for abortions, the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and argues against the majority opinion.  While it is legal text, it is part of the judicial process and not the primary content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of BREYER, J.

judge considers his claim that he will be persecuted or tor-
tured if he  is returned to Mexico.  Ante, at 2–3.  There is
less reason, not more, to detain Arteaga-Martinez without
bail.
  Second,  Zadvydas  provided  for  outright  release,  533
U. S., at 699–700; this case involves a bail hearing.  Again,
the  Government  has  less  reason  to  detain  a  person  when
the alternative is a bail hearing (where the Government has
an opportunity to show that that person might pose a dan-
ger to the community or a flight risk) than when the alter-
native is simply release.

The Government argues that a later case, Jennings v. Ro-
driguez, 583 U. S. ___ (2018), dictates the result here, ra-
ther than Zadvydas.  Not at all.  That later case involved
detention under statutes other than the one at issue here
and in Zadvydas.  Jennings, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5)
(“The  primary  issue  is  the  proper  interpretation  of
§§1225(b),  1226(a),  and  1226(c)”).   The  Court  in  Jennings
did not modify or overrule Zadvydas, but rather explicitly
distinguished  that  case.  Jennings,  583  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip
op., at 17).  It did so on multiple grounds, including the fact
that  almost  all  of  the  statutes  at  issue  in  Jennings  used
words  that  mandated  detention,  such  as  “shall,”  rather
than words of discretion, such as “may.”  Id., at ___, ___ (slip
op., at 16, 19).  In Zadvydas, the word “may” created ambi-
guity that permitted the Court to interpret §1231(a)(6) (the
statute  before  us)  in  a  manner  that  avoided  the  constitu-
tional problem that indefinite detention could have created.
533 U. S., at 697.  The majority in Jennings held that the
statutory provisions at issue there were not similarly am-
biguous, and therefore did not permit the Court to reach a
similar interpretation.  583 U. S., at ___, ___–___ (slip op.,
at 17, 22–23).

It is true that one of the statutes interpreted in Jennings,
§1226(a), said that the Attorney General “may . . . arres[t]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of Justice Breyer's opinion in a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases (Zadvydas and Jennings v. Rodriguez) and analyzes legal statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

897

Stevens, J., dissenting

amendment that “[n]o requirement or prohibition . . . shall
be imposed under State law” did include certain common-law
Id., at 548–549 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment
claims.
in part and dissenting in part).13
In CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Easterwood, where the pre-emption clause of the Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970 expressly provided that federal
railroad safety regulations would pre-empt any incompatible
state “ ‘law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to
railroad safety,’ ” 14 we held that a federal regulation govern-
ing maximum train speed pre-empted a negligence claim that
a speed under the federal maximum was excessive. And in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, we recognized that the statutory
reference to “any requirement” imposed by a State or its
political subdivisions may include common-law duties. 518
U. S., at 502–503 (plurality opinion); id., at 503–505 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at
509–512 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

The statutes construed in those cases differed from the
Safety Act in two signiﬁcant respects. First, the language
in each of those pre-emption provisions was signiﬁcantly
broader than the text of § 1392(d). Unlike the broader lan-
guage of those provisions, the ordinary meaning of the term
“safety standard” includes positive enactments, but does not
include judicial decisions in common-law tort cases.

Second, the statutes at issue in Cipollone, CSX, and Med-
tronic did not contain a saving clause expressly preserving
common-law remedies. The saving clause in the Safety Act

13 The full text of the 1969 provision read: “ ‘No requirement or prohibi-
tion based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
505
which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.’ ”
U. S., at 515 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 84
Stat. 88).

14 507 U. S., at 664 (quoting § 205, 84 Stat. 972, as amended, 45 U. S. C.

§ 434 (1988 ed. and Supp. II)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. It cites previous cases and delves into legal arguments regarding preemption.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

ALITO, J., dissenting

entirely nugatory in the military context the guarantees of
the First Amendment.” Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S.
503, 507 (1986).  “This Court has never held . . . that mili-
tary personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts
for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military
service.”  Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 304 (1983).

Here, the Navy treated service members who applied for
medical exemptions more favorably than those who sought
religious exemptions.  For one thing, requests for medical
exemptions were seriously considered, and quite a few were
granted, at least on a temporary basis.  Application 7–8; 27
F. 4th, at ___, App. 20a (“[T]he Navy acknowledges that it
has  granted  hundreds  of  medical  exemptions  from  the
COVID–19  vaccine,  at  least  17  of  which  were  temporary
medical  exemptions  for  those  in  Naval  Special  Warfare”).
In addition, service personnel with medical exemptions are
not restricted as severely as respondents will be under the
Court’s order.  App. 42a.  Indeed, the District Court found
that under Navy policy those participating in clinical trials
and  those  with  medical  contraindications  and  allergies  to
vaccines  remained  deployable,  unlike  those  seeking  reli-
gious accommodations.  Id., at 50a (citing ECF Doc. 17–2,
at 66).  The Navy has no interest in different treatment for
accommodation  requests  that  produce  otherwise  identical
outcomes.  I  would  therefore  specify  in  the  Court’s  order
that the Navy must provide equal treatment for all unvac-
cinated service members.

III
Today,  the  Court  brushes  aside  respondents’  First
Amendment  and  RFRA  rights.  But  yesterday,  the  Court
handed  down  another  decision  that  illustrates  the  strong
protection  for  religious  liberty  that  is  provided  by  the
framework  that  applies  under  RFRA  and  strict  scrutiny.
The decision in question, Ramirez v. Collier, involved a con-
victed  murderer  awaiting  execution  and  his  rights  under
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and discusses the application of the First Amendment and RFRA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

37

BREYER, J., dissenting

population/censusdata/table-4.pdf (of the 3,929,214 Ameri-
cans  in  1790,  only  201,655—about  5%—lived  in  urban
areas).  Insofar  as  the  Framers  focused  at  all  on  the  tiny
fraction of the population living in large cities, they would
have  been  aware  that  these  city  dwellers  were  subject  to
firearm restrictions that their rural counterparts were not.
See supra, at 4–7.  They are unlikely then to have thought
of  a  right  to  keep  loaded  handguns  in  homes  to  confront
intruders  in  urban  settings  as  central.    And  the  subse-
quent  development  of  modern  urban  police  departments,
by  diminishing  the  need  to  keep  loaded  guns  nearby  in
case  of  intruders,  would  have  moved  any  such  right  even
further  away  from  the  heart  of  the  amendment’s  more
basic  protective  ends.  See,  e.g.,  Sklansky,  The  Private
Police,  46  UCLA  L. Rev.  1165,  1206–1207  (1999)  (profes-
sional  urban  police  departments  did  not  develop  until
roughly the mid-19th century).

Nor,  for  that  matter,  am  I  aware  of  any  evidence  that
handguns  in  particular  were  central  to  the  Framers’  con-
ception  of  the  Second  Amendment.  The  lists  of  militia-
related  weapons  in  the  late  18th-century  state  statutes
appear  primarily  to  refer  to  other  sorts  of  weapons,  mus-
kets  in  particular.  See  Miller,  307  U. S.,  at  180–182  (re-
producing colonial militia laws).  Respondent points out in
his  brief  that  the  Federal  Government  and  two  States  at
the  time  of  the  founding  had  enacted  statutes  that  listed
handguns  as  “acceptable”  militia  weapons.    Brief  for  Re-
spondent  47.  But  these  statutes  apparently  found  them
“acceptable” only for certain special militiamen (generally,
certain soldiers on horseback), while requiring muskets or
rifles for the general infantry.  See Act of May 8, 1792, ch.
XXXIII,  1  Stat.  271;  Laws  of  the  State  of  North  Carolina
592  (1791);  First  Laws  of  the  State  of  Connecticut  150
(1784);  see  also  25  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,
pp. 1774–1789 741–742 (1922).

Third,  irrespective  of  what  the  Framers  could  have
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically focusing on the interpretation of the Second Amendment. It delves into historical context and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

JACKSON, J., dissenting

with the events of January 6, 2021, for example, the major-
ity admits that the “alleged conduct cannot be neatly cate-
gorized,” and that “[t]he analysis therefore . . . may prove to
be challenging.”  Ante, at 28–29.  With that, at least, I could
not agree more.

This much is clear: Before today, none of these kinds of
inquiries was necessary for criminal liability to be fairly as-
sessed with respect to persons accused of having engaged in
criminal  conduct.  And,  frankly,  none  is  needed  now—ex-
cept as relates to the President under the new paradigm the
majority has crafted.

Perhaps even more troubling, while Congress (the branch
of our Government most accountable to the People) is the
entity  our  Constitution  tasks  with  deciding,  as  a  general
matter, what conduct is on or off limits, the Court has now
arrogated  that  power  unto  itself  when  that  question  per-
tains to the President.  In essence, the Court has now im-
posed its own preclearance requirement on the application
of  Congress’s  laws  to  a  former  President  alleged  to  have
committed crimes while in office.  Who will be responsible
for drawing the crucial “ ‘line between [the President’s] per-
sonal and official affairs’ ”?  Ante, at 29.  To ask the question
is to know the answer.  A majority of this Court, applying
an indeterminate test, will pick and choose which laws ap-
ply  to  which  Presidents,  by  labeling  his  various  allegedly
criminal acts as “core,” “official,” or “manifestly or palpably”
beyond the President’s authority.

Ironically, then, while purportedly seeking to transcend
politics,  see  ante,  at  41–42,  the  Court  today  displaces  the
independent judgments of the political branches about the
circumstances under which the criminal law should apply.
Effectively, the Court elbows out of the way both Congress
and prosecutorial authorities within the Executive Branch,
making  itself  the  indispensable  player  in  all  future  at-
tempts to hold former Presidents accountable to generally
applicable criminal laws.  “The Framers, however, did not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing as part of the document's content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.

Syllabus
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and a brief summary of the case. It's not the main body of the text and likely provides metadata about the case rather than its content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
36

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

and  the  case  is  remanded  for  further  proceedings  in  con-
formity with this opinion.

 JUSTICE BARRETT took no part in the consideration or de-

cision of this case.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal opinion, specifically the closing section. It includes information about the court's decision, a mention of a justice not participating, and the standard closing phrase "It is so ordered."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

Opinion of the Court

In contrast, if §1028A(a)(1)’s verbs do not track identity
theft and if the means of identification need only facilitate
the predicate offense, the other two verbs threaten to leave
“uses” without “virtually any function.”  Bailey, 516 U. S.,
at 146.  Return to a definition of “in relation to” that just
means  “ ‘facilitates  or  furthers’  the  predicate  offense  in
some way.”  Brief for United States 10.  In virtually all cases
where a defendant employs a means of identification to fa-
cilitate a crime, the defendant will also possess or transfer
the  means  of  identification  in  a  way  that  facilitates  the
crime.  For example, petitioner’s possession of the patient’s
means  of  identification  facilitated  the  fraud,  as  did  peti-
tioner’s transfer of the patient’s means of identification to
Medicaid.  It is hard to imagine when “uses” would not sim-
ilarly  be  covered  by,  at  least,  one  of  the  two  other  verbs.
This risk of superfluity suggests giving §1028A(a)(1) a more
precise reading.

In sum, §1028A(a)(1)’s title and text are mutually rein-
forcing.  Both point toward requiring the means of identifi-
cation to be at the crux of the criminality.

D
Section 1028A’s list of predicate offenses points to yet an-
other stumbling block for the Government’s broad reading.
Section 1028A(a)(1) is an enhancement, and a severe one at
that.  It adds a 2-year mandatory prison sentence onto un-
derlying  offenses  that  do  not  impose  a  mandatory  prison
sentence of any kind.  See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §1035 (“[f]alse
statements relating to health care matters,” setting no min-
imum sentence).  This prevents sentencing judges from con-
sidering the severity of the offense, even if the amount of
money involved was quite small or there are other mitigat-
ing factors.  Interpretation of §1028A(a)(1) should thus re-
flect the “distinction between” the aggravated identity theft
crimes that “Congress sought to distinguish for heightened
punishment and other crimes.”  Leocal, 543 U. S., at 11.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute (likely related to identity theft). It contains legal jargon and arguments about statutory construction, making it suitable for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–1008
_________________

CORNER POST, INC., PETITIONER v. BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2024]

 JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
The  default  statute  of  limitations  for  suits  against  the
United  States  requires  “the  complaint  [to  be]  filed  within
six years after the right of action first accrues.”  28 U. S. C.
§2401(a).  We must decide when a claim brought under the
Administrative Procedure Act “accrues” for purposes of this
provision.  The answer is straightforward.  A claim accrues
when the plaintiff has the right to assert it in court—and in
the case of the APA, that is when the plaintiff is injured by
final agency action.

I

Corner Post is a truckstop and convenience store located
in  Watford  City,  North  Dakota.  It  was  incorporated  in
2017, and in 2018, it opened for business.  Like most mer-
chants,  Corner  Post  accepts  debit  cards  as  a  form  of  pay-
ment.  While  convenient  for  customers,  debit  cards  are
costly  for  merchants:  Every  transaction  requires  them  to
pay an “interchange fee” to the bank that issued the card.
The amount of the fee is set by the payment networks, like
Visa and Mastercard, that process the transaction between
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the name of the court, the case name, and the beginning of the opinion itself. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

JONES v. HENDRIX

Syllabus

access  to  needed  evidence  and  “aggravated”  by  the  concentration  of
federal prisoners in certain judicial districts that therefore faced “an
inordinate number of habeas corpus actions.”  United States v.  Hay-
man, 342 U. S. 205, 212–214, 219.  To make this change effective, Con-
gress  generally  barred  federal  prisoners  “authorized”  to  file  a  §2255
motion  from  filing  a  petition  under  §2241.  But—in  a  provision  of
§2255(e) now known as the saving clause—Congress preserved access
to §2241 in cases where “the remedy by motion is inadequate or inef-
fective to test the legality of [a prisoner’s] detention.”

Congress later enacted AEDPA, which, as relevant here, barred sec-
ond or successive §2255 motions unless based on either “newly discov-
ered  evidence,”  §2255(h)(1),  or  “a  new  rule  of  constitutional  law,”
§2255(h)(2).  Some courts faced with AEDPA’s second-or-successive re-
strictions held that §2255 was “inadequate and ineffective” under the
saving clause when AEDPA’s restrictions barred a prisoner from seek-
ing relief based on a new interpretation of a criminal statute that cir-
cuit precedent had foreclosed at the time of the prisoner’s trial, appeal,
and first §2255 motion.

Section  2255(e)’s  saving  clause  does  not  authorize  that  end-run
around AEDPA.  The clause preserves recourse to §2241 in cases where
unusual circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to seek re-
lief in the sentencing court, as well as for challenges to detention other
than collateral attacks on a sentence.  But §2255(h) specifies the two
limited conditions in which federal prisoners may bring second or suc-
cessive collateral attacks on their sentences.  The inability of a pris-
oner with a statutory claim to satisfy §2255(h) does not mean that the
prisoner may bring the claim in a §2241 petition.  Pp. 3–12.

(b) Jones and the United States each advance unpersuasive theories
of when and why §2255(h)’s exclusion of statutory claims sometimes
renders  §2255  inadequate  or  ineffective  for  purposes  of  the  saving
clause.  Pp. 12–25.

(1) Jones argues that §2255 is necessarily “inadequate or ineffec-
tive to test” a prisoner’s claim if the §2255 court fails to apply the cor-
rect substantive law.  But the saving clause is concerned with the ad-
equacy  or  effectiveness  of  the  remedial  vehicle  (“the  remedy  by
motion”), not  any court’s asserted errors of law.  Next, Jones argues
that courts of equity would afford relief from “inadequate” legal reme-
dies  in  a  broad  range  of  circumstances;  to  the  extent  relevant  to
§2255(e), this proves at most that a variety of practical obstacles might
trigger the saving clause, cf. Hayman, 342 U. S., at 215, n. 23, not that
the clause offers an exemption from AEDPA’s limits on second or suc-
cessive  collateral  attacks.    Jones  further  argues  that  the  saving
clause’s use of the present tense (“is inadequate or ineffective”) means
that §2241 is available whenever a prisoner is presently unable to file
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal framework surrounding habeas corpus petitions and the limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U45

[09-26-01 10:03:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

344

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. v. SHANKLIN,
individually and as next friend of SHANKLIN

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit

No. 99–312. Argued March 1, 2000—Decided April 17, 2000

The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA) authorizes the Secre-
tary of Transportation to promulgate regulations and issue orders for
railroad safety, and it requires the Secretary to maintain a coordinated
effort to solve railroad grade crossing problems. The FRSA also has
an express pre-emption provision. One regulation promulgated by
the Secretary, through the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA),
addresses the adequacy of warning devices installed under the Federal
Railway-Highway Crossings Program (Crossings Program). That pro-
gram provides funds to States for the construction of such devices pur-
suant to the Highway Safety Act of 1973. According to the regula-
tion, adequate warning devices installed using federal funds, where
any of several conditions are present, are automatic gates and ﬂashing
lights.
23 CFR § 646.214(b)(3). For crossings where those conditions
are not present, a State’s decision about what devices to install is sub-
ject to FHWA approval.
§ 646.214(b)(4). Respondent’s husband was
killed when petitioner’s train hit his vehicle at a crossing with advance
warning signs and reﬂectorized crossbucks that the Tennessee Depart-
ment of Transportation (TDOT) had installed using federal funds under
the Crossings Program. The signs were installed and fully compliant
with applicable federal standards. Respondent brought a diversity
wrongful death action in federal court, alleging that petitioner was
negligent in, among other things, failing to maintain adequate warning
devices at the crossing. The District Court denied petitioner’s sum-
mary judgment motion, holding that the FRSA did not pre-empt re-
spondent’s inadequate warning device claim. After a trial, the jury
awarded respondent damages on this and other negligence issues. The
Sixth Circuit afﬁrmed.

Held: The FRSA, in conjunction with §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), pre-empts
state tort claims concerning a railroad’s failure to maintain adequate
warning devices at crossings where federal funds have participated in
the devices’
In CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507
U. S. 658, 670, this Court held that, because §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “es-
tablish requirements as to the installation of particular warning de-
vices,” “when they are applicable, state tort law is pre-empted.” Thus,

installation.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin. Syllabi are typically summaries of legal cases and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV.

Opinion of the Court

tor, supra, at 72; Ellerth, supra, at 755.

Under  the  Restatement,  “masters”  are  generally  not
liable  for  the  torts  of  their  “servants”  when  the  torts  are
committed outside the scope of the servants’ employment.
See  1  Restatement  (Second)  of  Agency  §219(2),  p.  481
(1957)  (Restatement).    And  because  racial  and  sexual
harassment are unlikely to fall within the scope of a serv
ant’s  duties,  application  of  this  rule  would  generally  pre
clude  employer  liability  for  employee  harassment.    See
Faragher,  supra,  at  793–796;  Ellerth,  supra,  at  757.    But
in  Ellerth  and  Faragher,  we  held  that  a  provision  of  the
Restatement provided the basis for an exception.  Section
219(2)(d)  of  that  Restatement  recognizes  an  exception  to
the  general  rule  just  noted  for  situations  in  which  the
servant was “aided in accomplishing the tort by the exist
ence  of  the  agency  relation.”2    Restatement  481;  see  Far-
agher,  supra, at 802–803; Ellerth, supra, at 760–763.

Adapting  this  concept  to  the  Title  VII  context,  Ellerth

and Faragher identified two situations in which the aided
in-the-accomplishment  rule  warrants  employer  liability
even in the absence of negligence, and both of these situa
tions involve harassment by a “supervisor” as opposed to a
co-worker.  First, the Court held that an employer is vicar
iously  liable  “when  a  supervisor  takes  a  tangible  employ
ment  action,”  Ellerth,  supra,  at  762;  Faragher,  supra,  at
790—i.e., “a significant change in employment status, such
as  hiring,  firing,  failing  to  promote,  reassignment  with

——————

2 The  Restatement  (Third)  of  Agency  disposed  of  this  exception  to
liability,  explaining  that  “[t]he  purposes  likely  intended  to  be  met  by
the ‘aided in accomplishing’ basis are satisfied by a more fully elaborat
ed treatment of apparent authority and by the duty of reasonable care
that  a  principal  owes  to  third  parties  with  whom  it  interacts  through
employees  and  other  agents.”    2  Restatement  (Third)  §7.08,  p.  228
(2005).    The  parties  do  not  argue  that  this  change  undermines  our
holdings in Faragher and Ellerth.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the concept of employer liability for employee harassment. It cites legal precedents and uses legal terminology, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

17

GORSUCH, J., concurring

U. S. 134 (1944), the Court returned to its time-worn path.
Echoing themes that had run throughout our law from its
start,  Justice  Robert  H.  Jackson  wrote  for  the  Court  in
Skidmore.  There,  he  said,  courts  may  extend  respectful
consideration to another branch’s interpretation of the law,
but the weight due those interpretations must always “de-
pend upon the[ir] thoroughness . . . , the validity of [their]
reasoning,  [their]  consistency  with  earlier  and  later  pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give [them] power
to persuade.”  Id., at 140.  In another case the same year,
and again writing for the Court, Justice Jackson expressly
rejected a call for a judge-made doctrine of deference much
like  Chevron,  offering  that,  “[i]f  Congress  had  deemed  it
necessary or even appropriate” for courts to “defe[r] to ad-
ministrative construction[,] . . . it would not have been at a
loss for words to say so.”  Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles,
321 U. S. 144, 156 (1944).

To the extent proper respect for precedent demands, as it
always  has,  special  respect  for  longstanding  and  main-
stream decisions, Chevron scores badly.  It represented not
a continuation of a long line of decisions but a break from
them.  Worse, it did not merely depart from our precedents.
More nearly, Chevron defied them.

2
Consider next how uneasily Chevron deference sits along-
side so many other settled aspects of our law.  Having wit-
nessed  first-hand  King  George’s  efforts  to  gain  influence
and  control  over  colonial  judges,  see  Declaration  of  Inde-
pendence ¶ 11, the framers made a considered judgment to
build judicial independence into the Constitution’s design.
They vested the judicial power in decisionmakers with life
tenure.  Art. III, §1.  They placed the judicial salary beyond
political  control  during  a  judge’s  tenure.  Ibid.    And  they
rejected any proposal that would subject judicial decisions
to review by political actors.  The Federalist No. 81, at 482;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It cites previous cases and legal principles, demonstrating its relevance to legal analysis and interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MARIETTA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEE
HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN ET AL. v. DAVITA INC. ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–1641.  Argued March 1, 2022—Decided June 21, 2022

Petitioner Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan is
an employer-sponsored group health plan that offers all of its partici-
pants the same limited coverage for outpatient dialysis.  Respondent
DaVita—a  major  provider  of  dialysis  services—sued  the  Marietta
Plan, arguing that the Plan’s limited coverage for outpatient dialysis
violated  the  Medicare  Secondary  Payer  statute.    The  statute  makes
Medicare  a  “secondary”  payer  to  an  individual’s  existing  insurance
plan  for  certain  medical  services,  including  dialysis,  when  that  plan
already covers the same services.  42 U. S. C. §§1395y(b)(1)(C), (2), (4).
To  prevent  plans  from  circumventing  their  primary-payer  obligation
for  end-stage  renal  disease  treatment,  the  statute  imposes  two  con-
straints relevant here.  First, a plan “may not differentiate in the ben-
efits  it  provides  between  individuals  having  end  stage  renal  disease
and other individuals covered by such plan on the basis of the existence
of end stage renal disease, the need for renal dialysis, or in any other
manner.”   §1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii).   Second,  a  plan  “may  not  take  into  ac-
count that an individual is entitled to or eligible for” Medicare due to
end-stage renal disease.  §1395y(b)(1)(C)(i); see §426–1.  The District
Court dismissed DaVita’s claims that the Marietta Plan violated both
statutory constraints.  A divided panel of the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed.  Among other things, the Court of Ap-
peals ruled that the statute authorized disparate-impact liability and
that the limited payments for dialysis treatment had a disparate im-
pact on individuals with end-stage renal disease.

Held: Section 1395y(b)(1)(C) does not authorize disparate-impact liabil-
ity, and the Marietta Plan’s coverage terms for outpatient dialysis do
not violate §1395y(b)(1)(C) because those terms apply uniformly to all
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a brief overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK

No. 20–637.  Argued October 5, 2021—Decided January 20, 2022

In April 2006, a stray 9-millimeter bullet killed a 2-year-old child after a
street fight in the Bronx.  Eyewitnesses described the shooter as wear-
ing a blue shirt or sweater.  Police officers determined Ronnell Gilliam
was involved and that Nicholas Morris had been at the scene.  A search
of Morris’ apartment revealed a 9-millimeter cartridge and three .357-
caliber bullets.  Gilliam initially identified Morris as the shooter, but
he subsequently said that Darrell Hemphill, Gilliam’s cousin, was the
shooter.  Not crediting Gilliam’s recantation, the State charged Morris
with the child’s murder and possession of a 9-millimeter handgun.  In
a subsequent plea deal, the State agreed to dismiss the murder charges
against Morris if he pleaded guilty to a new charge of possession of a
.357 revolver, a weapon that had not killed the victim.  Years later, the
State  indicted  Hemphill  for  the  child’s  murder  after  learning  that
Hemphill’s DNA matched a blue sweater found in Morris’ apartment
shortly  after  the  murder.    At  his  trial,  Hemphill  elicited  undisputed
testimony from a prosecution witness that police had recovered 9-mil-
limeter ammunition from Morris’ apartment, thus pointing to Morris
as the culprit.  Morris was not available to testify at Hemphill’s trial
because he was outside the United States.  Relying on People v. Reid,
19 N. Y. 3d 382, 388, 971 N. E. 2d 353, 357, and over the objection of
Hemphill’s counsel, the trial court allowed the State to introduce parts
of the transcript of Morris’ plea allocution to the .357 gun possession
charge as evidence to rebut Hemphill’s theory that Morris committed
the  murder.  The  court  reasoned  that  although  Morris’  out-of-court
statements  had  not  been  subjected  to  cross-examination,  Hemphill’s
arguments and evidence had “opened the door” and admission of the
statements  was  reasonably  necessary  to  correct  the  misleading  im-
pression  Hemphill  had  created.  The  State,  in  its  closing  argument,
cited Morris’ plea allocution and emphasized that possession of a .357
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a brief overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting

the genes and organs of either biological sex may identify
with a different gender.9

Using  slightly  different  terms,  the  Court  asserts  again
and again that discrimination because of sexual orientation
or gender identity inherently or necessarily entails discrim-
 See ante, at 2 (When an employer
ination because of sex.
“fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender,”
“[s]ex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the deci-
sion”); ante, at 9 (“[I]t is impossible to discriminate against
a person for being homosexual or transgender without dis-
criminating against that individual based on sex”); ante, at
11 (“[W]hen an employer discriminates against homosexual
or  transgender  employees,  [the]  employer  . . .  inescapably
intends  to  rely  on  sex  in  its  decisionmaking”);  ante,  at  12
(“For an employer to discriminate against employees for be-
ing homosexual or transgender, the employer must inten-
tionally discriminate against individual men and women in
part because of sex”); ante, at 14 (“When an employer fires
an employee for being homosexual or transgender, it neces-
sarily and intentionally discriminates against that individ-
ual in part because of sex”); ante, at 19 (“[D]iscrimination
based on homosexuality or transgender status necessarily
entails discrimination based on sex”).  But repetition of an
assertion does not make it so, and the Court’s repeated as-
sertion is demonstrably untrue.

Contrary  to  the  Court’s  contention,  discrimination  be-
cause  of  sexual  orientation  or  gender  identity  does  not  in
——————
Sadock,  V.  Sadock,  &  P.  Ruiz,  Comprehensive  Textbook  of  Psychiatry
2061 (9th ed. 2009); see also American Heritage Dictionary 1607 (5th ed.
2011) (defining “sexual orientation” as “[t]he direction of a person’s sex-
ual interest, as toward people of the opposite sex, the same sex, or both
sexes”); Webster’s New College Dictionary 1036 (3d ed. 2008) (defining
“sexual  orientation”  as  “[t]he  direction  of  one’s  sexual  interest  toward
members of the same, opposite, or both sexes”).

9 See n. 6, supra; see also Sadock, supra, at 2063 (“transgender” refers
to  “any  individual  who  identifies  with  and  adopts  the  gender  role  of  a
member of the other biological sex”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1004

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

No. 09–6736.  Aronja-Inda v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  151.

No. 09–6737.  Arellano-Ochos v.  United States.  C. A. 9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  163.

No.  09–6739.  Keen  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6743.  Holmes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  750.

No.  09–6745.  Gonzalez-Ramirez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  22.

No. 09–6746.  Mayle v.  Sabol, Warden.  C. A. 1st Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6747.  Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6749.  Nash  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  386.

No.  09–6753.  Young  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  477.

No.  09–6757.  Jimenez-Alvarado  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 322 Fed. Appx. 479.
No.  09–6759.  Kinchion  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  743.

No.  09–6762.  Burney  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  885.

No.  09–6763.  Scott  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  930.

No. 09–6766.  Momah v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  470.

No. 09–6770.  Hurt v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  295  Fed.  Appx.  541.

No.  09–6778.  Gutierrez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, circuit courts, and disposition information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

Opinion of the Court

the  Jones  Act  that  Public  Law  600  retained  were  several
related to Puerto Rico’s public debt.  Congress retained, for
example,  the  triple-tax-exempt  nature  of  Puerto  Rican
bonds.  Jones Act, §3, 39 Stat. 953.  It also retained a (later
repealed) cap on the amount of public debt Puerto Rico or
its subdivisions could accumulate.  Ibid.  In a public refer-
endum,  the  citizens  of  Puerto  Rico  approved  Public  Law
600—including the limits on debt in §3 of the Federal Rela-
tions  Act—and  then  began  the  constitution-making  pro-
cess.  Pub.  L.  600,  §§2,  3,  64  Stat.  319;  see  Act  of  July  3,
1952, 66 Stat. 327; A. Fernós-Isern, Original Intent in the
Constitution of Puerto Rico 13 (2d ed. 2002).

Puerto Rico’s popularly ratified Constitution, which Con-
gress accepted with a few fairly minor changes, does not in-
volve the President or the Senate in the appointment pro-
cess for local officials.  That Constitution provides for the
election of Puerto Rico’s Governor and legislators.  Art. III,
§1; Art. IV, §1.  And it provides for gubernatorial appoint-
ment (and Puerto Rican Senate confirmation) of cabinet of-
ficers.  Art. IV, §5.

The  upshot  is  that  Puerto  Rico’s  history  reflects  long-
standing use of various methods for selecting officials with
primarily local responsibilities.  This history is consistent
with the history of other entities that fall within the scope
of Article IV and with the history of the District of Colum-
bia.  See supra, at 10–11.  And it comports with our prece-
dents,  which  have  long  acknowledged  that  Congress  may
structure local governments under Article IV and Article I
in ways that do not precisely mirror the constitutional blue-
print for the National Government.  See, e.g., Benner v. Por-
ter, 9 How. 235, 242 (1850).  Cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U. S.  530,  546  (1962)  (plurality  opinion)  (recognizing  that
local governments created by Congress could, like govern-
ments of the States, “dispense with protections deemed in-
herent  in  a  separation  of  governmental  powers”).    Some-
times Congress has specified the use of methods that would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the history of Puerto Rico's political status and the methods used to select local officials.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>