<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xlvi

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

McClellan; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McClellan v. Northern Trust Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McCoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McCray v. Hine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McCullough; Durachko v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McDaniel; Alfonso Jaime v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McDaniel; Slack v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McDaniel v. Wills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McDonald v. Meyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McDougal-Saddler v. Herman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McDowall v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McDowell; Calderon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McDowell v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McEnroy v. St. Meinrad School of Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McFadden v. Ford Motor Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McFall v. Department of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McGilberry v. Mississippi
McGill, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McGinnis; Casellas v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McGovern v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McGregor v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McGuire v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MCI Communications Corp. and Subsidiaries v. United States . . .
MCI Telecommunications Corp.; Labora v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McKay; Alvarado v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McKinney; Geary v.
McKinney v. Hanks
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McKinney v. State Employees’ Retirement System . . . . . . . . . . .
McKire v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McLaren v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McLaughlin v. Cotner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McLean v. Members of Va. Bd. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McLean v. Osborne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McLeod v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McMaster v. Michigan National Corp.
McMillian v. Endicott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeal; Trice v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil v. Corcoran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNew v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
M. C. Products v. AT&T Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McRae v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McSheffrey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1041
1069
1119
1091
1007
1118
473
1104
1113
1097
1066
1071
1082
1132
1068
1125
1012
1006
1085
1091
1101
1073
1062
1123
1123
1024,1125
1008
1042
1083
1040,1125
1109
1008
1134
1026
1092
1131
1104
1089
1135
1024
1079
1144
1031
1084
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, listing case names and their corresponding page numbers. It is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:49] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1102

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 1, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8488. Cowans v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de-

nied. Reported below: 87 Ohio St. 3d 68, 717 N. E. 2d 298.

No. 99–8503. Prystash v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 3 S. W. 3d 522.

No. 99–8532. Medina v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 7 S. W. 3d 633.

No. 99–8541. Martinez v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 984 P. 2d 813.

No. 99–8580. Bell v. Thomas, Sheriff, et al. C. A. 4th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 501.

No. 99–8583. Rebollar-Perez v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 833.

No. 99–8587. Feurtado v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 420.

No. 99–8595. Raulerson v. Reno, Attorney General, et

al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8636. Din v. Summers, Secretary of the Treasury.

C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8672. Hamilton v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 351 N. C. 14, 519 S. E. 2d
514.

No. 99–8766. Richards v. Sondalle, Warden. C. A. 7th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8770. Nyhuis v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Po-
tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 99–8820. Ross v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8823. Marcello v. Maine Department of Human

Services. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8836. Alberto-Genao v. United States. C. A. D. C.

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 53.

No. 99–8846. Monk v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 261.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

139

Opinion of the Court

economy may be . . . protected to the maximum extent con-
sistent with” consumers “be[ing] adequately informed about
any adverse health effects.” 15 U. S. C. § 1331. Congress’
decisions to regulate labeling and advertising and to adopt
the express policy of protecting “commerce and the national
economy . . . to the maximum extent” reveal its intent that
tobacco products remain on the market.
Indeed, the collec-
tive premise of these statutes is that cigarettes and smoke-
less tobacco will continue to be sold in the United States. A
ban of tobacco products by the FDA would therefore plainly
contradict congressional policy.

The FDA apparently recognized this dilemma and con-
cluded, somewhat ironically, that tobacco products are ac-
tually “safe” within the meaning of the FDCA.
In promul-
gating its regulations, the agency conceded that “tobacco
products are unsafe, as that term is conventionally under-
61 Fed. Reg. 44412 (1996). Nonetheless, the FDA
stood.”
reasoned that, in determining whether a device is safe under
the Act, it must consider “not only the risks presented by a
product but also any of the countervailing effects of use of
that product, including the consequences of not permitting
the product to be marketed.”
Id., at 44412–44413. Apply-
ing this standard, the FDA found that, because of the high
level of addiction among tobacco users, a ban would likely be
In particular, current tobacco
“dangerous.”
users could suffer from extreme withdrawal, the health care
system and available pharmaceuticals might not be able to
meet the treatment demands of those suffering from with-
drawal, and a black market offering cigarettes even more
dangerous than those currently sold legally would likely de-
velop.
Ibid. The FDA therefore concluded that, “while
taking cigarettes and smokeless tobacco off the market could
prevent some people from becoming addicted and reduce
death and disease for others, the record does not establish
that such a ban is the appropriate public health response
under the act.”

Id., at 44413.

Id., at 44398.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically the Opinion of the Court in a case. It discusses the FDA's stance on regulating tobacco products and the reasoning behind their decision not to ban them.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U53

[09-26-01 10:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

582

CHRISTENSEN v. HARRIS COUNTY

Opinion of the Court

at 247–251. We granted certiorari because the Courts of
Appeals are divided on the issue.2

528 U. S. 926 (1999).

II

Both parties, and the United States as amicus curiae, con-
cede that nothing in the FLSA expressly prohibits a State
or subdivision thereof from compelling employees to utilize
accrued compensatory time. Petitioners and the United
States, however, contend that the FLSA implicitly prohibits
such a practice in the absence of an agreement or under-
standing authorizing compelled use.3 Title 29 U. S. C.
§ 207(o)(5) provides:

“An employee . . .
“(A) who has accrued compensatory time off . . . , and
“(B) who has requested the use of such compensatory
time,
“shall be permitted by the employee’s employer to use
such time within a reasonable period after making the
request if the use of the compensatory time does not
unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency.”

Petitioners and the United States rely upon the canon ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius, contending that the ex-
press grant of control to employees to use compensatory
time, subject to the limitation regarding undue disruptions

2 Compare, e. g., Collins v. Lobdell, 188 F. 3d 1124, 1129–1130 (CA9 1999)
(upholding employer’s policy compelling compensatory time use), with
Heaton v. Moore, 43 F. 3d 1176, 1180–1181 (CA8 1994) (striking down pol-
icy compelling compensatory time use), cert. denied sub nom. Schriro v.
Heaton, 515 U. S. 1104 (1995).

3 We granted certiorari on the question “ ‘[w]hether a public agency gov-
erned by the compensatory time provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, 29 U. S. C. § 207(o), may, absent a preexisting agreement, re-
quire its employees to use accrued compensatory time?’ ” 528 U. S. 926,
927 (1999). As such, we decide this case on the assumption that no agree-
ment or understanding exists between the employer and employees on the
issue of compelled use of compensatory time.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Christensen v. Harris County*. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

pull of the trigger.
  Moreover,  bump  stocks  are  not  the  only  devices  that
transform  semiautomatic  rifles  into  weapons  capable  of
rapid fire with a single function of the trigger.  Recognizing
the creativity of gun owners and manufacturers, Congress
wrote  a  statute  “loaded  with  anticircumvention  devices.”
Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  68.    The  definition  of  “machinegun”  cap-
tures “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can
be  readily restored to shoot,  automatically more  than  one
shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the
trigger.”  §5845(b).  Not “more than four, five, or six shots,”
not “single pull” or “single push” of the trigger.”  Following
that  definition,  the  Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco,  Firearms
and Explosives (ATF) has reasonably classified many trans-
formative  devices  other  than  bump  stocks  as  “ma-
chinegun[s].”6  For instance, ATF has long classified “forced
reset  triggers”  as  machineguns.    See  Brief  for  Petitioners
28.  A forced reset trigger includes a device that forces the
trigger  back  downward  after  the  shooter’s  initial  pull,  re-
peatedly pushing the curved lever against the shooter’s sta-
tionary trigger finger.  See ibid.  To a shooter, a semiauto-
matic rifle equipped with a forced reset trigger feels much
like an M16.  He must pull the trigger only once and then
maintain pressure to achieve continuous fire.  See ibid.
  Gun owners themselves also have built motorized devices
that will repeatedly pull a semiautomatic firearm’s curved

——————

6 The majority emphasizes that ATF previously took the position that
certain bump-stock devices were not “machinegun[s]” under the statute.
See ante, at 3, 19.  ATF, however, has repeatedly classified other devices
that modify semiautomatic rifles by allowing a single activation of the
shooter to automate repeat fire as machineguns.  See, e.g., 83 Fed. Reg.
66518,  n. 4  (referencing  ATF  classifications  of  trigger  reset  devices);
Akins v. United States, 312 F. Appx. 197, 200–201 (CA11 2009) (per cu-
riam)  (upholding  classification  of  Akins  Accelerator,  a  spring-operated
bump stock); United States v. Camp, 343 F. 3d 743, 745 (CA5 2003) (up-
holding classification of fishing reel attached to a rifle trigger that, upon
activation, repeatedly operated the curved lever of the rifle).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal definition of "machinegun" and argues that bump stocks should be classified as such.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC.

Opinion of the Court

The  regulations  permit  the  issuance  of  site-specific
variances  from  the  national  performance  standards  if  a
facility  can  demonstrate  either  that  the  costs  of  compli-
ance  are  “significantly  greater  than”  the  costs  considered
by  the  agency
in  setting  the  standards,  40  CFR
§125.94(a)(5)(i),  or  that  the  costs  of  compliance  “would  be
significantly  greater  than  the  benefits  of  complying  with
the  applicable  performance  standards,”  §125.94(a)(5)(ii).
Where a variance is warranted, the permit-issuing author-
ity  must  impose  remedial  measures  that  yield  results  “as
close  as  practicable  to  the  applicable  performance  stan-
dards.”  §125.94(a)(5)(i), (ii).

Respondents challenged the EPA’s Phase II regulations,
and  the  Second  Circuit  granted  their  petition  for  review
and  remanded  the  regulations  to  the  EPA.   The  Second
Circuit  identified  two  ways  in  which  the  EPA  could  per-
missibly  consider  costs  under  33  U. S. C.  §1326(b):  (1)  in
determining  whether  the  costs  of  remediation  “can  be
‘reasonably borne’ by the industry,” and (2) in determining
which  remedial  technologies  are  the  most  cost-effective,
that  is,  the  technologies  that  reach  a  specified  level  of
benefit at the lowest cost.  475 F. 3d, at 99–100.  See also
id.,  at  98,  and  n. 10.    It  concluded,  however,  that  cost-
benefit analysis, which “compares the costs and benefits of
various ends, and chooses the end with the best net bene-
fits,”  id.,  at  98,  is  impermissible  under  §1326(b),  id.,  at
100.

The  Court  of  Appeals  held  the  site-specific  cost-benefit
variance provision to be unlawful.  Id., at 114.  Finding it
unclear whether the EPA had relied on cost-benefit analy-
sis  in  setting  the  national  performance  standards,  or  had
only  used  cost-effectiveness  analysis,  it  remanded  to  the
agency  for  clarification  of  that  point.
Id.,  at  104–105.
(The  remand  was  also  based  on  other  grounds  which  are
not  at  issue  here.)    The  EPA  suspended  operation  of  the
Phase  II  rules  pending  further  rulemaking.   72  Fed.  Reg.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the opinion of the court. It discusses regulations, legal challenges, and court decisions related to environmental standards.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

jurisprudence is still in the relatively early innings, unlike
the  First,  Fourth,  and  Sixth  Amendments,  for  example.
That is because the Court did not have occasion to recognize
the  Second  Amendment’s  individual  right  until  recently.
See generally Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244,
1269–1296  (CADC  2011)  (Kavanaugh,  J.,  dissenting).
Deciding  constitutional  cases  in  a  still-developing  area  of
this Court’s jurisprudence can sometimes be difficult.  But
that is not a permission slip for a judge to let constitutional
analysis morph into policy preferences under the guise of a
balancing  test  that  churns  out  the  judge’s  own  policy
beliefs.

*

*

today,

constitutional

*
As  exemplified  by  Heller,  McDonald,  Bruen,  and  the
Court’s  opinion
interpretation
properly  takes  account  of  text,  pre-ratification  and  post-
ratification history, and precedent.  Those are the tools of
the trade for an American judge interpreting the American
Constitution.  Of course, difficult subsidiary questions can
arise about how to apply those tools, both generally and in
particular  cases.  And  in  some  cases,  text,  history,  and
precedent may point in somewhat different directions.  In
law as in life, nothing is perfect.  But in Second Amendment
cases  as  in  other  constitutional  cases,  text,  history,  and
precedent must remain paramount.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the interpretation of the Second Amendment and the importance of using text, history, and precedent in constitutional analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

15

Per  Curiam

WONG,  WARDEN  v.  BELMONTES

on	  petition  for  writ  of  certiorari  to  the  united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit

No. 08–1263.  Decided November 16, 2009

Respondent  Belmontes  was  convicted  of  murder  and  sentenced  to  death
in a California court.  Unsuccessful on direct appeal and state collateral
review,  he  sought  federal  habeas  relief,  claiming  that  his  counsel  was
constitutionally  ineffective  for  failing  to  investigate  and  present  sufﬁ
cient  mitigating  evidence  at  the  trial’s  sentencing  phase.  The  District
Court denied relief, concluding that Belmontes’ counsel had been ineffec
tive but that Belmontes could not establish prejudice under Strickland
v.  Washington,  466  U. S.  668.  The  Ninth  Circuit  reversed,  agreeing
that counsel’s  performance was defective  but disagreeing with  the Dis
trict Court’s prejudice ruling.

Held:  The  Ninth  Circuit  erred  in  concluding  that  Belmontes  was  preju
diced  by  his  counsel’s  alleged  deﬁcient  performance  during  sentencing.
To  establish  prejudice,  Belmontes  must  show  a  reasonable  probability
that  (1)  a  competent  attorney,  aware  of  the  available  mitigating  evi
dence, would have introduced it at sentencing, and (2) had the jury been
confronted with this mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probabil
ity that it would have returned with a different sentence.  In evaluating
this second question, it is necessary to consider all the relevant evidence
that the jury would have had before it—not just the mitigation evidence
that  could  have  been  presented  but  also  the  rebuttal  evidence  that  al
most certainly would have come with it.  Here, the additional evidence
that the Ninth Circuit concluded should have been introduced was either
cumulative of the substantial mitigation evidence already introduced or
would  have  opened  the  door  to  powerful  rebuttal  evidence  that  Bel
montes  was  responsible  for  not  one  but  two  murders.  Belmontes  can
not demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had it been presented all
of this evidence, the jury would have returned with a different sentence.

Certiorari granted; 529 F. 3d 834, reversed and remanded.

Per Curiam.
In  1981,  in  the  course  of  a  burglary,  Fernando  Belmontes
bludgeoned  Steacy  McConnell  to  death,  striking  her  in  the
head  15  to  20  times  with  a  steel  dumbbell  bar.  See  People
v.  Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 759–761, 755 P. 2d 310, 315–316
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes information about the case name, parties involved, the court's decision, and a brief description of the facts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U45

[09-26-01 10:03:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 344 (2000)

357

Opinion of the Court

The dissent contends that, under our holding, state law is
pre-empted even though “[n]o authority, federal or state, has
found that the signs in place” are “adequate to protect
safety.” Post, at 360 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). This pre-
supposes that States have not fulﬁlled their obligation to
comply with §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4). Those subsections es-
tablish a standard for adequacy that States are required to
follow in determining what devices to install when federal
funds are used. The dissent also argues that Easterwood
did not hold that federal funding of the devices is “sufﬁcient”
to effect pre-emption, and that “any statement as to the auto-
matic preemptive effect of federal funding should have re-
mained open for reconsideration in a later case.” Post,
at 361. But Easterwood did not, in fact, leave this question
open.
Instead, at the behest of the FHWA, the Court
clearly stated that §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) pre-empt state
tort claims concerning the adequacy of all warning devices
installed with the participation of federal funds.

Respondent also argues that pre-emption does not lie in
this particular case because the Oakwood Church Road
crossing presented several of the factors listed in
§ 646.214(b)(3), and because the TDOT did not install pave-
ment markings as required by the MUTCD. See Brief for
Respondent 20–22, 36; Brief in Opposition 6–8. This mis-
conceives how pre-emption operates under these circum-
stances. When the FHWA approves a crossing improve-
ment project and the State installs the warning devices
using federal funds, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) establish a fed-
eral standard for the adequacy of those devices that displaces
state tort law addressing the same subject. At that point,
the regulation dictates “the devices to be installed and the
means by which railroads are to participate in their selec-
tion.” Easterwood, supra, at 671.
It is this displacement
of state law concerning the devices’ adequacy, and not the
State’s or the FHWA’s adherence to the standard set out
in §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) or to the requirements of the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the pre-emption of state law by federal regulations regarding warning devices at railroad crossings.  It cites legal precedents and regulations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529IND

Unit: $UBV [10-03-01 07:01:03] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

1208

INDEX

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See also Criminal Law, 5; False Claims

Act.

I. Commerce Clause.

Violence Against Women Act of 1994—Impact on interstate com-
merce.—Congress had no authority under Commerce Clause to enact 42
U. S. C. § 13981, which provides victims of gender-motivated violence a
federal civil remedy. United States v. Morrison, p. 598.

II. Due Process.

1. Attorney’s fees—Amendment of fee award.—Due process was vio-
lated when a District Court amended its attorney’s fees judgment for re-
spondent by joining petitioner—president and sole shareholder of defend-
ant—as a party and simultaneously making petitioner liable for fee award.
Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., p. 460.

2. Prosecutor’s comments on presence at trial.—A prosecutor’s com-
ments that respondent had an opportunity to hear all other witnesses be-
fore testifying and tailor his testimony accordingly did not violate his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Portuondo v. Agard, p. 61.

III. Enforcement Power.

Violence Against Women Act of 1994—Civil remedy against private in-
dividuals.—Congress had no authority under § 5 of Fourteenth Amendment
to enact 42 U. S. C. § 13981, which provides victims of gender-motivated
violence a federal civil remedy against private individuals. United States
v. Morrison, p. 598.

IV. Ex Post Facto Laws.

1. Extending intervals between parole considerations.—Retroactive
application of a Georgia law permitting extension of intervals between
parole considerations does not necessarily violate Ex Post Facto Clause,
but case is remanded for a determination whether Georgia law, in its
operation, violates Clause. Garner v. Jones, p. 244.

2. Sexual offenses—Repeal of corroboration requirement.—Retrospec-
tive application of a Texas statute repealing a corroboration requirement
for conviction of a defendant charged with certain sexual offenses violates
Ex Post Facto Clause. Carmell v. Texas, p. 513.

V. Freedom of Expression.

Banning public nudity.—Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s judgment in-
validating, on freedom of expression grounds, Erie’s ordinance banning
public nudity is reversed. Erie v. Pap’s A. M., p. 277.

VI. Freedom of Speech.

1. Public university—Funding student speech.—First Amendment per-
mits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document. It lists topics and provides brief summaries of relevant case law. Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and are not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007)

7

SCALIA, J., dissenting

mospheric concentrations of [GHGs] and aerosols and
(2) the so-called “feedbacks” that determine the sensi-
tivity of the climate system to a prescribed increase in
[GHGs].’  Id.

“The  science  of  climate  change  is  extraordinarily
complex and still evolving.  Although there have been
substantial advances in climate change science, there
continue  to  be  important  uncertainties  in  our  under-
standing of the factors that may affect future climate
change and how it should be addressed.  As the NRC
explained, predicting  future  climate  change  necessar-
ily  involves  a  complex  web  of  economic  and  physical
factors  including:  Our  ability  to  predict  future  global
anthropogenic  emissions  of  GHGs  and  aerosols;  the
fate  of  these  emissions  once  they  enter  the  atmos-
phere  (e.g.,  what  percentage  are  absorbed  by  vegeta-
tion  or  are  taken  up  by  the  oceans);  the  impact  of
those emissions that remain in the atmosphere on the
radiative  properties  of  the  atmosphere;  changes  in
critically important climate feedbacks (e.g., changes in
cloud  cover  and  ocean  circulation);  changes  in  tem-
perature  characteristics  (e.g.,  average  temperatures,
shifts in daytime and evening temperatures); changes
in  other  climatic  parameters  (e.g.,  shifts  in  precipita-
tion,  storms);  and  ultimately  the  impact  of  such
changes on human health and welfare (e.g., increases
or  decreases  in  agricultural  productivity,  human
health  impacts).  The  NRC  noted,  in  particular,  that
‘[t]he  understanding  of  the  relationships  between
weather/climate  and  human  health  is  in  its  infancy
and  therefore  the  health  consequences  of  climate
change  are  poorly  understood’  (p.  20).    Substantial
scientific uncertainties limit our ability to assess each
of these factors and to separate out those changes re-
sulting  from  natural  variability  from  those  that  are
directly  the  result  of  increases  in  anthropogenic
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It contains legal jargon and cites previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of the Court

to  remove  existent  knowledge  from  the  public  domain.”
Graham  v.  John  Deere  Co.  of  Kansas  City,  383  U. S.  1,  6
(1966).  So, like the PTO’s initial review, the Board’s inter
partes review protects “the public’s paramount interest in
seeing that patent monopolies are kept within their legit-
imate scope,” Cuozzo, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 16) (inter-
nal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  Thus, inter
partes review involves the same interests as the determi-
nation  to  grant  a  patent  in  the  first  instance.    See  Duell,
supra, at 586.
  The  primary  distinction  between  inter  partes  review
and the initial grant of a patent is that inter partes review
occurs  after  the  patent  has  issued.    But  that  distinction
does not make a difference here.  Patent claims are granted
subject  to  the  qualification  that  the  PTO  has  “the  au-
thority  to  reexamine—and  perhaps  cancel—a  patent
claim” in an inter partes review.  See Cuozzo, supra, at ___
(slip  op.,  at  3).    Patents  thus  remain  “subject  to  [the
Board’s] authority” to cancel outside of an Article III court.
Crowell, 285 U. S., at 50.
  This Court has recognized that franchises can be quali-
fied  in  this  manner.    For  example,  Congress  can  grant  a
franchise  that  permits  a  company  to  erect  a  toll  bridge,
but  qualify  the  grant  by  reserving  its  authority  to  revoke
or amend the franchise.  See, e.g., Louisville Bridge Co. v.
United States, 242 U. S. 409, 421 (1917) (collecting cases).
Even  after  the  bridge  is  built,  the  Government  can  exer-
cise  its  reserved  authority  through  legislation  or  an  ad-
ministrative proceeding.  See, e.g., id., at 420–421; Hanni-
bal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194, 205 (1911);
Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U. S. 470, 478–482 (1882).
The  same  is  true  for  franchises  that  permit  companies  to
build railroads or telegraph lines.  See, e.g., United States
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 160 U. S. 1, 24–25, 37–38 (1895).
  Thus,  the  public-rights  doctrine  covers  the  matter  re-
solved  in  inter  partes  review.    The  Constitution  does  not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal framework surrounding patent reviews and the public-rights doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

33

Opinion of the Court

tion.  Supra, at 30–31.  Without a reduction in overcrowd-
ing,  there  will  be  no  efficacious  remedy  for  the  unconsti-
tutional  care  of  the  sick  and  mentally  ill  in  California’s
prisons.

D

The  PLRA  states  that  no  prospective  relief  shall  issue
with  respect  to  prison  conditions  unless  it  is  narrowly
drawn,  extends  no  further  than  necessary  to  correct  the
violation  of  a  federal  right,  and  is  the  least  intrusive
means  necessary  to  correct  the  violation.    18  U. S. C.
§3626(a).  When determining whether these requirements
are  met,  courts  must  “give  substantial  weight  to  any  ad-
verse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal
justice system.”  Ibid.

1

The  three-judge  court  acknowledged  that  its  order  “is
likely  to  affect  inmates  without  medical  conditions  or
serious mental illness.”  Juris. App. 172a.  This is because
reducing California’s prison population will require reduc-
ing  the  number  of  prisoners  outside  the  class  through
steps  such  as  parole  reform,  sentencing  reform,  use  of
good-time credits, or other means to be determined by the
State.  Reducing  overcrowding  will  also  have  positive
effects  beyond  facilitating  timely  and  adequate  access  to
medical  care,  including  reducing  the  incidence  of  prison
violence  and  ameliorating  unsafe  living  conditions.    Ac-
cording  to  the  State,  these  collateral  consequences  are
evidence  that  the  order  sweeps  more  broadly  than
necessary.

The  population  limit  imposed  by  the  three-judge  court
does  not  fail  narrow  tailoring  simply  because  it  will  have
positive  effects  beyond  the  plaintiff  class.    Narrow  tailor-
ing requires a “ ‘ “fit” between the [remedy’s] ends and the
means chosen to accomplish those ends.’ ”  Board of Trus-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and its application to a case involving prison overcrowding in California.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U49

[10-24-00 10:29:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 460 (2000)

469

Opinion of the Court

B

Adams strongly urges, however, that Nelson waived
his objections to the swift process of the District Court.
Adams ﬁrst maintains that Nelson waived arguments based
on personal jurisdiction and the absence of service of process
by failing to raise them promptly after being added as a
party. Brief for Respondents 32–41. Nelson’s winning ar-
gument, however, is based neither on personal jurisdiction
It rests on his right to have time
nor on service of process.
and opportunity to respond to the claim once Adams gained
leave to sue Nelson in his individual capacity, and thereby
to reach beyond OCP’s corporate till into Nelson’s personal
pocket. Waiver of arguments based on personal jurisdiction
and service of process is therefore beside the point.3

In a similar vein, and this time coming closer to the dis-
positive issue, Adams submits that the Federal Circuit
“did not address the ‘due process’ issues now sought to be
presented, . . . because these issues were never raised by
Petitioner” before that court.
Id., at 47 (emphasis deleted).
It is indeed the general rule that issues must be raised in
lower courts in order to be preserved as potential grounds
of decision in higher courts. But this principle does not
demand the incantation of particular words; rather, it re-
quires that the lower court be fairly put on notice as to the
substance of the issue. See, e. g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey, 488 U. S. 153, 174–175 (1988). And the general rule

3 We note that a waiver of service of process does not waive a party’s
right to time in which to respond to the substance of charges that, absent
the waiver, would have been included in a served document.
It would
make little sense to penalize a party’s waiver of process, which can help
streamline litigation, by barring such a party from stating its side of
the case.
Indeed, such waiver can sometimes extend a party’s time to
respond. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(a)(1)(B) (rather than having to re-
spond within 20 days of service, a party waiving service may respond at
any time within 60 days of the request for waiver).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal opinion text from a Supreme Court case. It discusses procedural issues and arguments related to a lawsuit.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 156 (1998)

173

Souter, J., dissenting

The afﬁrmative answer given by the Court and the Fifth
Circuit to the question whether IOLTA interest attributable
to a client’s funds is the client’s property states, in essence,
a proposition of state law, which is one source of property
interests entitled to federal constitutional protection, see
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577
(1972), and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U. S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
In this instance the relevant state
law is said to embrace the general principle that property in
interest income follows ownership of the principal on which
the interest is earned, ante, at 164–166, and n. 4, and the
Court treats any income generated by a client’s funds like
income that the client could derive directly through a method
of money management or investment that costs more than it
produced, ante, at 169–171.

In addressing only the issue of the property interest, leav-
ing the questions of taking and compensation for a later day
in the litigation of respondents’ action, the Court and the
Court of Appeals have, however, postponed consideration of
the most salient fact relied upon by petitioners in contesting
respondents’ Fifth Amendment claim: that the respondent
client would effectively be barred from receiving any net
interest on his funds subject to the state IOLTA rule by
the combination of an unchallenged federal banking statute
and regulation, 12 U. S. C. § 1832(a); 12 CFR § 204.130 (1997);
a separate, unchallenged Texas rule of attorney discipline,
Texas Bar Rules, Art. 10, § 9, Rule 1.14(b); and unchallenged
Internal Revenue Service interpretations of the Tax Code,
Rev. Rul. 81–209, 1981–2 Cum. Bull. 16; Rev. Rul. 87–2,
1987–1 Cum. Bull. 18. The argument for the view contrary
to the one taken by the Court would emphasize that salient
fact right now. The view that the client has no cognizable
property right in the IOLTA interest is said to rest not only
on a different understanding of the scope of the general prin-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter. It contains legal arguments, citations to case law and statutes, and discusses property rights in the context of IOLTA (Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

937

524 U. S.

June 22, 1998

No. 97–686. Wilson, Governor of California, et al. v.
Armstrong et al.; and California et al. v. Clark et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F. 3d
1019 (ﬁrst judgment); 123 F. 3d 1267 (second judgment).

No. 97–795. Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp.
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 118
F. 3d 1298.

No. 97–1399. Blumenthal, Attorney General of Con-
necticut v. Philip Morris, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 123 F. 3d 103.

No. 97–1427.

Judicial Council of the Fifth Judicial Cir-
cuit et al. v. McBryde, Judge, United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 117 F. 3d 208.

No. 97–1451. National Association of Home Builders of
the United States et al. v. Babbitt, Secretary of the In-
terior, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 130 F. 3d 1041.

No. 97–1488. Zeran v. America Online, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 327.

No. 97–1514.

Inner City Press/Community on the Move
et al. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 130 F. 3d 1088.

No. 97–1517. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Board. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 131 F. 3d 1026.

No. 97–1543. Lefcourt v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125 F. 3d 79.

No. 97–1550. Rojas v. Fitch et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 127 F. 3d 184.

No. 97–1641. United States v. Messino et al. C. A. 7th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 122 F. 3d 389.

No. 97–1660. Mann et ux. v. Missouri Highway and Trans-
portation Commission. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 954 S. W. 2d 503.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and relevant court information.
  </thinking>
  <category>List of court cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

“singly and absolutely” responsible for any members of the
Board.  The Federalist No. 77, p. 461 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
(A.  Hamilton)  (Appointments  Clause  ensures  that  “[t]he
blame  of  a  bad  nomination  . . .  fall[s]  upon  the  President
singly and absolutely”).  And with no exceptions, the Senate
fails to advise or consent to the President’s selections.

Despite  the  Board’s  wide-ranging,  veto-free  authority
over Puerto Rico, the solitary role PROMESA contemplates
for Puerto Rican-selected officials is this: The Governor of
Puerto Rico sits as an ex officio Board member without any
voting  rights.    §101(e)(3),  130  Stat.  555.  No  individual
within  Puerto  Rico’s  government  plays  any  part  in  deter-
mining which seven members now decide matters critical to
the island’s financial fate.

II
A
In concluding that the Board members are territorial of-
ficers  not  subject  to  the  strictures  of  the  Appointment
Clause,  the  Court  does  not  meaningfully  address  Puerto
Rico’s history or status.  Nor need it, as the parties do not
discuss the potential consequences that Congress’ recogni-
tion of complete self-government decades ago may have on
the Appointments Clause analysis.  But in my view, how-
ever one distinguishes territorial officers from federal offic-
ers (whether under the Court’s “primarily local” test, ante,
at  14,  or  some  other  standard),  the  longstanding  compact
between  the  Federal  Government  and  Puerto  Rico  raises

——————
Category B members, the majority leader for the Senate submits a list
for the two Category C members, the majority leader of the House sub-
mits  a  list  for  the  Category D  member,  and  the  minority  leader  of  the
Senate submits a list for the Category E member.  §101(e)(2)(A), id., at
554–555.  Finally, “the Category F member may be selected in the Pres-
ident’s sole discretion.”  §101(e)(2)(A)(vi), id., at 555.  Many other condi-
tions apply to the lists submitted and the individuals who may appear
on them.  See generally §§101(e)–(f ), id., at 554–556.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor in the case of FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC. It delves into the Appointments Clause and its application to the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

Opinion of the Court

from  using  this  critical  source  of  campaign  funding,  how-
ever, Section 304 raises a barrier to entry—thus abridging
political speech.

The dissent cannot and does not claim that Section 304
imposes  no  burden  on  candidate  speech.  See  post,  at  5
(opinion  of KAGAN, J.)  (“every  contribution  regulation  has
some kind of indirect effect on electoral speech”).  The dis-
sent instead dismisses that burden as minor and insignifi-
cant.  Post, at 4–6.  As just explained, the extent of the bur-
den  may  vary  depending  on  the  circumstances  of  a
particular candidate and particular election.  But there is
no doubt that the law does burden First Amendment elec-
toral speech, and any such law must at least be justified by
a permissible interest.  See McCutcheon v. Federal Election
Comm’n,  572  U. S.  185,  210  (2014)  (plurality  opinion)
(“When the Government restricts speech, the Government
bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its ac-
tions.”).

B
With  those First  Amendment  costs  in  mind, we  turn  to
whether  the  loan-repayment  limitation  is  justified.    The
parties  debate  whether  strict  or  “closely  drawn”  scrutiny
should  apply  in  answering  that  question.  Buckley,  424
U. S., at 25.  We need not resolve this dispute because, un-
der either standard, the Government must prove at the out-
set  that  it  is  in  fact  pursuing  a  legitimate  objective.  See
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 210.  It has not done so here.

1

This  Court  has  recognized  only  one  permissible  ground
for restricting political speech: the prevention of “quid pro
quo” corruption or its appearance.  See id., at 207; see also
Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985).  We have consist-
ently rejected attempts to restrict campaign speech based
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses campaign finance regulations and the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

Syllabus

 JUSTICE  GORSUCH  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  except  as  to
Parts IV–B, IV–C, and IV–D, rejecting petitioners’ theories that would
place  Proposition  12  in  violation  of  the  dormant  Commerce  Clause
even  though  petitioners  do  not  allege  the  law  purposefully  discrimi-
nates against out-of-state economic interests.  Pp 5–17, 27–29.

(a) The  Constitution  vests  Congress  with  the  power  to  “regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.”  Art. I, §8, cl. 3.  Although
Congress  may  seek  to  exercise  this  power  to  regulate  the  interstate
trade of pork, and many pork producers have urged Congress to do so,
Congress has yet to adopt any statute that might displace Proposition
12 or laws regulating pork production in other States.  Petitioners’ lit-
igation  theory  thus  rests  on  the  dormant  Commerce  Clause  theory,
pursuant to which the Commerce Clause not only vests Congress with
the power to regulate interstate trade, but also “contain[s] a further,
negative command,” one effectively forbidding the enforcement of “cer-
tain state [economic regulations] even when Congress has failed to leg-
islate on the subject.”  Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,
514  U. S.  175,  179.    This  Court  has  held  that  state  laws  offend  this
dormant  aspect  of  the  Commerce  Clause  when  they  seek  to  “build
up . . . domestic commerce” through “burdens upon the industry and
business of other States.”  Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 443.  At the
same time, though, the Court has reiterated that, absent purposeful
discrimination, “a State may exclude from its territory, or prohibit the
sale therein of any articles which, in its judgment, fairly exercised, are
prejudicial to” the interests of its citizens.  Ibid.

jurisprudence.

The antidiscrimination principle lies at the “very core” of the Court’s
dormant  Commerce  Clause
Camps  New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 581.  This
Court has said that the Commerce Clause prohibits the enforcement
of state laws “driven by . . . ‘economic protectionism—that is, regula-
tory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by bur-
dening out-of-state competitors.’ ”  Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Da-
vis,  553  U. S.  328,  337–338  (quoting  New  Energy  Co.  of  Ind.  v.
Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 273–274).  Petitioners here disavow any dis-
crimination-based  claim,  conceding  that  Proposition  12  imposes  the
same  burdens  on  in-state  pork  producers  that  it  imposes  on  out-of-
state pork producers.  Pp 5–8.

(b) Given petitioners’ concession that Proposition 12 does not impli-
cate  the  antidiscrimination  principle,  petitioners  first  invoke  what
they  call  the  “extraterritoriality  doctrine.”    They  contend  that  the
Court’s  dormant  Commerce  Clause  cases  suggest  an  additional  and
“almost per se” rule forbidding enforcement of state laws that have the
“practical effect of controlling commerce outside the State,” even when
those laws do not purposely discriminate against out-of-state interests.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It discusses legal concepts like the dormant Commerce Clause and provides a summary of the Court's arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

obviously cannot overcome or alter that text.”  Heller, 670
F. 3d, at 1274, n. 6 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Es-
pinoza  v.  Montana  Dept.  of  Revenue,  591  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2020) (slip op., at 15).

As we recognized in Heller itself, because post-Civil War
discussions of the right to keep and bear arms “took place
75  years  after  the  ratification  of  the  Second  Amendment,
they do not provide as much insight into its original mean-
ing as earlier sources.”  554 U. S., at 614; cf. Sprint Com-
munications Co., 554 U. S., at 312 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting)
(“The belated innovations of the mid- to late-19th-century
courts come too late to provide insight into the meaning of
[the Constitution in 1787]”).  And we made clear in Gamble
that Heller’s interest in mid- to late-19th-century commen-
tary was secondary.  Heller considered this evidence “only
after surveying what it regarded  as a wealth of authority
for  its  reading—including  the  text  of  the  Second  Amend-
ment  and  state  constitutions.”  Gamble,  587  U. S.,  at  ___
(majority  opinion)  (slip  op.,  at  23).  In  other  words,  this
19th-century evidence was “treated as mere confirmation of
what  the  Court  thought  had  already  been  established.”
Ibid.

A final word on historical method: Strictly speaking, New
York is bound to respect the right to keep and bear arms
because  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  not  the  Second.
See,  e.g.,  Barron  ex rel.  Tiernan  v.  Mayor  of  Baltimore,  7
Pet. 243, 250–251 (1833) (Bill of Rights applies only to the
Federal  Government).  Nonetheless,  we  have  made  clear
that individual rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights and
made applicable against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment  have  the  same  scope  as  against  the  Federal
Government.  See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___,
___ (2020) (slip op., at 7); Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. ___,
___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 2–3); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S.
1, 10–11 (1964).  And we have generally assumed that the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of constitutional law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH

Opinion of the Court

“under the law that Congress looked to when codifying” it.
Reply Brief 2, 4; see West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v.
Casey,  499  U. S.  83,  92,  n. 5  (1991)  (terms  of  art  “depart
from ordinary meaning”).  To the extent they diverge, the
historical meaning controls.

More modestly, George seeks to distinguish the statutory
meaning from the prior practice on just one point.  Because
Congress  did  not  expressly  enact  the  specific  regulatory
principle barring collateral relief for subsequent changes in
interpretation,  he  insists  that  the  principle  did  not  carry
over  to  the  statute.  But  this  argument,  too,  misses  the
mark.  The point of the old-soil principle is that “when Con-
gress  employs  a  term  of  art,”  that  usage  itself  suffices  to
“ ‘adop[t] the cluster of ideas that were attached to each bor-
rowed word’ ” in the absence of indication to the contrary.
FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 292 (2012).  Here, the govern-
ing statute “is silent” on a host of matters ranging from the
definition  of  clear  and  unmistakable  error  to  “the  specific
procedures  that  govern  a  [collateral]  claim.”  Disabled
American Veterans, 234 F. 3d, at 694, 696 (citing 38 U. S. C.
§7111).  And we take the statutory “silence” on the details
of prior regulatory practice to “l[eave] the matter where it
was  pre-[codification].”  Kucana  v.  Holder,  558  U. S.  233,
250 (2010).  We decline George’s invitation to gerrymander
out this one feature of the prior practice.

*

*
The invalidation of a VA regulation after a veteran’s ben-
efits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for col-
lateral  relief  based  on  clear  and  unmistakable  error.    We
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

*

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" from a case titled "GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH".  It delves into legal arguments and interpretations related to collateral relief and the application of prior regulatory practice.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

CALVARY CHAPEL DAYTON VALLEY v. SISOLAK

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

and gyms—entail people congregating in large groups or re-
maining in close proximity for extended periods of time.  In
any event, the State has not yet supplied a sufficient justi-
fication for its counterintuitive distinction.

*

*

*
  The  Constitution  “protects  religious  observers  against
unequal  treatment.”    Trinity  Lutheran,  582  U. S.,  at  ___
(slip  op.,  at  6)  (internal  quotation  marks  and  alterations
omitted).  Nevada’s 50-person attendance cap on religious
worship  services  puts  praying  at  churches,  synagogues,
temples, and mosques on worse footing than eating at res-
taurants, drinking at bars, gambling at casinos, or biking
at gyms.  In other words, Nevada is discriminating against
religion.  And because the State has not offered a sufficient
justification  for  doing  so,  that  discrimination  violates  the
First Amendment.  I would grant the Church’s application
for a temporary injunction.  I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V.

Opinion of the Court

v.  Stroh  Brewing  Co.,  124  F. 3d  137,  149  (CA2  1997);
Blinded  Veterans  Assn.  v.  Blinded  Am.  Veterans  Founda-
tion, 872 F. 2d 1035, 1042–1048 (CADC 1989).  But federal
trademark  registration  would  offer  Booking.com  greater
protection.    See,  e.g.,  Genesee  Brewing,  124  F. 3d,  at  151
(unfair-competition law would oblige competitor at most to
“make more of an effort” to reduce confusion, not to cease
marketing its product using the disputed term); Matal, 582
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (federal registration confers val-
uable benefits); Brief for Respondent 26 (expressing inten-
tion to seek protections available to trademark owners un-
der  the  Anticybersquatting  Consumer  Protection  Act,  15
U. S. C. §1125(d)); Brief for Coalition of .Com Brand Own-
ers  as  Amici  Curiae  14–19  (trademark  rights  allow  mark
owners to stop domain-name abuse through private dispute
resolution  without  resorting  to  litigation).    We  have  no
cause to deny Booking.com the same benefits Congress ac-
corded other marks qualifying as nongeneric.

*

  *

  *
  The PTO challenges the judgment below on a sole ground:
It  urges  that,  as  a  rule,  combining  a  generic  term  with
“.com” yields a generic composite.  For the above-stated rea-
sons, we decline a rule of that order, one that would largely
disallow  registration  of  “generic.com”  terms  and  open  the
door to cancellation of scores of currently registered marks.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit regarding eligibility for trademark registra-
tion is

Affirmed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is part of a legal opinion, specifically the conclusion of the case. It discusses the legal reasoning behind the court's decision and does not contain extraneous information like tables of contents, copyright notices, or lists of questions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Atwood v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Auborg v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Audio Entertainment Network, Inc. v. AT&T Corp. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Austin; Goode v.
Austin; Mr. Bones BBQ v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Austin v. Southwestern Bell Video Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Austin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Auto Care, Inc.; Hukill v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Automobile Workers; BVR Liquidating, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Automobile Workers; Keeler Die Cast v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Avila-Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Aguilar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ayele v. Allright Boston Parking, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ayers; Hogue v.
Ayers v. Memphis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ayers; Sanchez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aytch v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aziz v. Blueﬁeld State College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Babbitt; Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Babbitt; Public Lands Council v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baca v. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Badger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bailey; Norfolk Southern R. Co. v.
Baisden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baker, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baker v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bakst; Hemmerle v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baldwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Balfour Beatty Bahamas Ltd. v. Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BankBoston, N. A. v. Suarez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bank of America N. T. & S. A.; Michaels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bank One, Utah; Foster v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Banks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bannerman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. A. Properties, Inc.; Ioane v.
Baptist v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baque v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barbosa v. Alejandro Buitrago Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bardella, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barefoot Dreams; Comfort Silkie Company Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . .
Bargas v. Burns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barker; Ceridian Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barkley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

Page
1091
1119
1144
1124
1124
1082
1119
1116
1067
1018
1078
1138
1026
1090
1133
1057
1093
1004
1037
728
1020
1060
1110
1080
1085
1094
1029
1034
1056
1017
1106
1003
1087
1077
1032
1083
1133
1024
1128
1065
1019
1073
1109
1028
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.  It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

U. S. Const., Art. IV, §3, cl. 2, the purported source of legis-
lative authority for enacting PROMESA, see §101(b)(2), 130
Stat.  553;  ante,  at  5.  May  Congress  ever  simply  cede  its
power under that Clause to legislate for the Territories, and
did it do so nearly 60 years ago with respect to Puerto Rico?
If so, is PROMESA itself invalid, at least insofar as it holds
itself  out  as  an  exercise  of  Territories  Clause  authority?
This  Court  has  never  squarely  addressed  such  questions,
except perhaps to acknowledge that Congress’ authority un-
der  the  Territories  Clause  may  “continu[e]  until  granted
away.”  National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U. S. 129,
133  (1880);  cf.  Cincinnati  Soap  Co.  v.  United  States,  301
U. S. 308, 319 (1937) (recognizing that a statute preparing
the  Philippine  Islands  for  independence  from  the  United
States  “brought  about  a  profound  change  in  the  status  of
the islands and in their relations to the United States,” such
that  “the  power  of  the  United  States  has  been  modified,”
even while “it has not been abolished”).

After  all,  the  Territories  Clause  provides  Congress  not
only the power to “make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territor[ies],” but also the power to “dispose
of ” them, which necessarily encompasses the power to re-
linquish authority to legislate for them.  U. S. Const., Art.
IV, §3, cl. 2.  And some have insisted that the power to cede
authority  exists  no  less  in  the  absence  of  full  “dispos[al]”
through independence or Statehood.  See Aleinikoff, Sem-
blances of Sovereignty, at 77 (“It has been strongly argued
that”  with  “the  establishment  of  commonwealth  status,”
“Congress lost general power to regulate the internal affairs
of Puerto Rico”).

Still, the parties here do not dispute Congress’ ability to
enact PROMESA under the Territories Clause in the first
place; nor does it seem strictly necessary to call that matter
into question to resolve the Appointments Clause concern pre-
sented here.  Despite the “full measure of self-government”
the  island  supposedly  enjoys,  U. N.  Charter,  Art.  73;  see
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the constitutionality of PROMESA, focusing on the Territories Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 233 (2010)

253

Alito, J., concurring in judgment

IIRIRA, it did not delegate to the Executive authority to do
so.  Action on motions to reopen, made discretionary by the
Attorney  General  only,  therefore  remain  subject  to  judicial
review.

*

*

*

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Seventh  Circuit  is  reversed,  and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment.
I  agree  that  the  Court  of  Appeals  had  jurisdiction  to  re
view the denial of petitioner’s motion to reopen his removal
proceeding,  but  I  would  decide  this  case  on  narrower
grounds.  The  controlling  statutory  provision,  8  U. S. C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii),  states  that  “no  court  shall  have  jurisdic
tion to  review . . .  any . .  .  decision  .  .  .  of  the  Attorney
General  .  .  .  the  authority  for  which  is  speciﬁed  under  this
subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.”
(Emphasis  added.)  The phrase  “under this  subchapter” re
fers  to  Subchapter  II  of  Chapter  12  of  Title  8,  8  U. S. C.
§§ 1151–1381,  see  ante,  at  239,  n.  3,  and,  as  the  Court  notes,
no provision of Subchapter II confers discretionary authority
on  the  Attorney  General  to  decide  motions  to  reopen,  see
ante, at  242–243, 249–250.  The Court  of Appeals, however,
held  that  the  Attorney  General’s  decision  in  this  case  was
unreviewable because a regulation, 8 CFR § 1003.2(a) (2009),
made that decision discretionary.

If  this  regulation  had  been  promulgated  pursuant  to  au
thority conferred by a provision of Subchapter II, we would
have  to  confront  the  question  that  the  opinion  of  the  Court
addresses.  But  it  seems  clear  that  § 1003.2,  at  least  insofar
as  it  gave  the  Attorney  General  the  discretionary  authority
that he exercised in this case, is grounded on authority con
ferred under Subchapter I of Chapter 12 of Title 8, 8 U. S. C.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in a case decided by the Supreme Court. It discusses the legal basis for judicial review of the Attorney General's decisions on motions to reopen removal proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

Opinion of the Court

created  with  an  expectation  of  compensation.  Nor,  this
Court  has  held,  do  speakers  shed  their  First  Amendment
protections by employing the corporate form to disseminate
their speech.  This fact underlies our cases involving every-
thing from movie producers to book publishers to newspa-
pers.  See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U. S., at 497–503;
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Vic-
tims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 114–116 (1991); Grosjean v. Amer-
ican Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 240–241, 249 (1936).

Colorado next urges us to focus on the reason Ms. Smith
refuses to offer the speech it seeks to compel.  She refuses,
the State insists, because she objects to the “protected char-
acteristics” of certain customers.  Brief for Respondents 16;
see  also  post,  at  26–27,  31–32  (opinion  of  SOTOMAYOR, J.)
(reciting the same argument).  But once more, the parties’
stipulations speak differently.  The parties agree that Ms.
Smith “will gladly create custom graphics and websites for
gay, lesbian, or bisexual clients or for organizations run by
gay,  lesbian,  or  bisexual  persons  so  long  as  the  custom
graphics and websites” do not violate her beliefs.  App. to
Pet.  for  Cert.  184a.  That  is  a  condition,  the  parties
acknowledge,  Ms.  Smith  applies  to  “all  customers.”    Ibid.
Ms. Smith stresses, too, that she has not and will not create
expressions that defy any of her beliefs for any customer,
whether that involves encouraging violence, demeaning an-
other person, or promoting views inconsistent with her re-
ligious commitments.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18–20.  Nor, in
any  event,  do  the  First  Amendment’s  protections  belong
only to speakers whose motives the government finds wor-
thy;  its  protections  belong  to  all,  including  to  speakers
whose  motives  others  may  find  misinformed  or  offensive.
See  Federal  Election  Comm’n  v.  Wisconsin  Right  to  Life,
Inc.,  551  U. S.  449,  468–469  (2007)  (opinion  of  ROBERTS,
C. J.) (observing that “a speaker’s motivation is entirely ir-
relevant” (internal quotation marks omitted)); National So-
cialist  Party  of  America  v.  Skokie,  432  U. S.  43,  43–44
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the First Amendment rights of a speaker who refuses to create certain types of content based on her beliefs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

17

Opinion of the Court

1997,  No.  97–282,  p.  24  (“Supervisors  typically  exercise
broad  discretionary  powers  over  their  subordinates,  de
termining  many  of  the  terms  and  conditions  of  their
employment,  including  their  raises  and  prospects  for  pro-
motion  and  controlling  or  greatly  influencing  whether
they are to be dismissed”).

For these reasons, we have no difficulty rejecting petition-
er’s  argument  that  the  question  before  us  in  the  present
case  was  effectively  settled  in  her  favor  by  our  treatment
of the alleged harassers in Ellerth and Faragher.11

The  dissent  acknowledges  that  our  prior  cases  do  “not
squarely  resolve  whether  an  employee  without  power  to
take tangible employment actions may nonetheless qualify
as  a  supervisor,”  but  accuses  us  of  ignoring  the  “all-too
plain  reality”  that  employees  with  authority  to  control
their subordinates’ daily work are aided by that authority
in perpetuating a discriminatory work environment.  Post,
at  8  (opinion  of  GINSBURG,  J.).    As  Ellerth  recognized,
however, “most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accom
plishing  their  tortious  objective  by  the  existence  of  the
agency  relation,”  and  consequently  “something  more”  is
required in order to warrant vicarious liability.  524 U. S.,
at  760.  The  ability  to  direct  another  employee’s  tasks  is
——————

11 According to the dissent, the rule that we adopt is also inconsistent
with our decision in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U. S. 129
(2004).    See  post,  at  7–8.  The  question  in  that  case  was  “whether  a
constructive  discharge  brought  about  by  supervisor  harassment  ranks
as  a  tangible  employment  action  and  therefore  precludes  assertion  of
the  affirmative  defense  articulated  in  Ellerth  and  Faragher.”  Suders,
supra,  at  140.    As  the  dissent  implicitly  acknowledges,  the  supervi
sor  status  of  the  harassing  employees  was  not  before  us  in  that  case.
See  post,  at  8.  Indeed,  the  employer  conceded  early  in  the  litigation
that  the  relevant  employees  were  supervisors,  App.  in  Pennsylvania
State  Police  v.  Suders,  O.  T.  2003,  No.  03–95,  p. 20  (Answer  ¶29),
and  we  therefore  had  no  occasion  to  question  that  unchallenged
characterization.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically citing previous cases and arguments. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
18

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

2
When  Congress  enacted  the  MCA  in  1885,  it  proceeded
once more against the “backdrop” rule that only tribal crim-
inal law applies on tribal lands, that States enjoy no inher-
ent  authority  to  prosecute  cases  on  tribal  lands,  and  that
only Congress may displace tribal power.  Nor, once more,
did  Congress’s  new  legislation  purport  to  allow  States  to
prosecute crimes on tribal lands.  In response to concerns
with  how  tribal  authorities  were  handling  major  crimes
committed by tribal members, in the MCA Congress took a
step beyond the GCA and instructed that, in the future, the
federal  government  would  have  “exclusive  jurisdiction”  to
prosecute  certain  crimes  by  Indian  defendants  on  tribal
lands.  18 U. S. C. § 1153(a); see also Part I–B, supra.  Here
again, Congress’s work hardly would have been necessary
or made sense if States already possessed jurisdiction to try
crimes by or against Indians on tribal reservations.  Plainly,
Congress’s “purpose” in adopting the MCA was to answer
the  “objection”  that  major  crimes  by  tribal  members  on
tribal  lands  would  otherwise  be  subject  to  prosecution  by
tribal  authorities  alone.    See  Kagama,  118  U. S.,  at  383–
385.

3
Consider  next  the  Treaty  of  New  Echota  and  the  Okla-
homa Enabling Act.  In 1835, the United States entered into
a  treaty  with  the  Cherokee.    In  that  treaty,  the  Nation
promised that, within a new reservation in what was to be-
come Oklahoma, the Tribe would enjoy the right to govern
itself  and  remain  forever  free  from  “State  sovereignties”
and “the jurisdiction of any State.”  Treaty with the Chero-
kee, Preamble, 7 Stat. 478.  This Court has instructed that
tribal treaties must be interpreted as they “would naturally
be  understood  by  the  Indians”  at  ratification.    Herrera  v.
Wyoming, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 19) (internal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta.  It sets the stage for the legal arguments by discussing the history of federal law regarding jurisdiction on tribal lands.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

KAGAN, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–869
_________________

ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR THE VISUAL
ARTS, INC., PETITIONER v. LYNN
GOLDSMITH, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 18, 2023]

JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE  joins,

dissenting.

Today,  the  Court  declares  that  Andy  Warhol’s  eye-pop-
ping  silkscreen  of  Prince—a  work  based  on  but  dramati-
cally  altering  an  existing  photograph—is  (in  copyright
lingo) not “transformative.”  Still more, the Court decides
that even if Warhol’s portrait were transformative—even if
its  expression  and  meaning  were  worlds  away  from  the
photo—that  fact  would  not  matter.   For  in  the  majority’s
view, copyright law’s first fair-use factor—addressing “the
purpose and character” of “the use made of a work”—is un-
interested  in  the  distinctiveness  and  newness  of  Warhol’s
portrait.  17 U. S. C. §107.  What matters under that factor,
the  majority  says,  is instead  a  marketing  decision: In  the
majority’s  view,  Warhol’s  licensing  of  the  silkscreen  to  a
magazine precludes fair use.1

You’ve probably heard of Andy Warhol; you’ve probably
seen  his  art.  You  know  that  he  reframed  and  reformu-
lated—in a word, transformed—images created first by oth-
ers.  Campbell’s soup cans and Brillo boxes.  Photos of ce-
lebrity  icons:  Marilyn,  Elvis,  Jackie,  Liz—and,  as  most
——————

1 By the time of the licensing, Warhol had died and the Warhol Foun-
dation had stepped into his shoes.  But for ease of exposition, I will refer
to both the artist and his successor-in-interest as Warhol.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Kagan.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain factual information and legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U40

[10-04-01 09:23:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 244 (2000)

257

Scalia, J., concurring in part in judgment

ing inmates’ requests for early review. See 514 U. S., at
for Petitioner, O. T. 1994,
512–513 (citing Reply Brief
No. 93–1462, p. 3, n. 1). The policy statement here, by con-
trast, is a formal, published statement as to how the Board
intends to enforce its Rule.
It follows a fortiori from Mo-
rales that the Court of Appeals should not have disregarded
the policy. Absent any demonstration to the contrary from
respondent, we respect the Board’s representation that in-
mates, upon making a showing of a “change in their circum-
stance[s]” or upon the Board’s receipt of “new information,”
may request expedited consideration. App. 56.

The Court of Appeals’ analysis failed to reveal whether the
amendment to Rule 475–3–.05(2), in its operation, created
a signiﬁcant risk of increased punishment for respondent.
Respondent claims he has not been permitted sufﬁcient dis-
covery to make this showing. The matter of adequate dis-
covery is one for the Court of Appeals or, as need be, for the
District Court in the ﬁrst instance. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia, concurring in part in the judgment.

I would agree with the Court’s opinion if we were faced
with an amendment to the frequency of parole-eligibility de-
terminations prescribed by the Georgia Legislature. Since
I do not believe, however, that a change in frequency pre-
scribed by the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles
(Board) would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause even if
it did pose a sufﬁcient “risk” of decreasing the likelihood
of parole, I would reverse the decision of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit without the necessity of remand.

The Court treats this case as a mere variation on the Mo-
rales theme, whereas in reality it contains a critical differ-
ence: In Morales, the frequency of parole suitability hearings
had been ﬁxed by law, and a legislative change had given
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

21

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of GINSBURG,  J.

The Korea-Vietnam Veterans Memorial in
Veterans Memorial Park.  App. 894.

Headstones in the Henri-Chappelle American
Cemetery and Memorial in Belgium.  American
Battle Monuments Commission, Henri-Chappelle
American Cemetery and Memorial 16 (1986).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a citation and a list of references, likely from a legal document.  It is not sequential narrative text and is therefore not suitable for indexing as the main content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Footnotes or Bibliography</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U79

[09-08-00 13:44:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

128

MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

“carries a ﬁrearm.” Because they essentially agree that
Congress intended the phrase to convey its ordinary, and not
some special legal, meaning, and because they argue the lin-
guistic point at length, we too have looked into the matter
in more than usual depth. Although the word “carry” has
many different meanings, only two are relevant here. When
one uses the word in the ﬁrst, or primary, meaning, one can,
as a matter of ordinary English, “carry ﬁrearms” in a wagon,
car, truck, or other vehicle that one accompanies. When one
uses the word in a different, rather special, way, to mean, for
example, “bearing” or (in slang) “packing” (as in “packing a
gun”), the matter is less clear. But, for reasons we shall set
out below, we believe Congress intended to use the word in
its primary sense and not in this latter, special way.

Consider ﬁrst the word’s primary meaning. The Oxford
English Dictionary gives as its ﬁrst deﬁnition “convey, origi-
nally by cart or wagon, hence in any vehicle, by ship, on
horseback, etc.”
2 Oxford English Dictionary 919 (2d ed.
1989); see also Webster’s Third New International Diction-
ary 343 (1986) (ﬁrst deﬁnition: “move while supporting (as in
a vehicle or in one’s hands or arms)”); Random House Dic-
tionary of the English Language Unabridged 319 (2d ed.
1987) (ﬁrst deﬁnition: “to take or support from one place to
another; convey; transport”).

The origin of the word “carries” explains why the ﬁrst, or
basic, meaning of the word “carry” includes conveyance in a
vehicle. See Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology 146 (1988)
(tracing the word from Latin “carum,” which means “car” or
“cart”); 2 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 919 (tracing
the word from Old French “carier” and the late Latin “carri-
care,” which meant to “convey in a car”); Oxford Dictionary
of English Etymology 148 (C. Onions ed. 1966) (same); Barn-
hart Dictionary of Etymology, supra, at 143 (explaining that
the term “car” has been used to refer to the automobile
since 1896).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the meaning of the phrase "carries a firearm" in a legal context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
Opinion of the Court

(slip op., at 9) (quoting Fox Television, 556 U. S., at 515).  “It
would be arbitrary and capricious to ignore such matters.”
Id., at 515.  Yet that is what the Duke Memorandum did.

For its part, the Government does not contend that Duke
considered potential reliance interests; it counters that she
did not need to.  In the Government’s view, shared by the
lead dissent, DACA recipients have no “legally cognizable
reliance interests” because the DACA Memorandum stated
that the program “conferred no substantive rights” and pro-
vided benefits only in two-year increments.  Reply Brief 16–
17; App. to Pet. for Cert. 125a. See also post, at 23–24 (opin-
ion of THOMAS, J).  But neither the Government nor the lead
dissent cites any legal authority establishing that such fea-
tures automatically preclude reliance interests, and we are
not aware of any.  These disclaimers are surely pertinent in
considering the strength of any reliance interests, but that
consideration must be undertaken by the agency in the first
instance, subject to normal APA review.  There was no such
consideration in the Duke Memorandum.

Respondents and their amici assert that there was much
for DHS to consider.  They stress that, since 2012, DACA
recipients have “enrolled in degree programs, embarked on
careers,  started  businesses,  purchased  homes,  and  even
married and had children, all in reliance” on the DACA pro-
gram.  Brief for Respondent Regents of Univ. of California
et al. in No. 18–587, p. 41 (Brief for Regents).  The conse-
quences  of  the  rescission,  respondents  emphasize,  would
“radiate  outward”  to  DACA  recipients’  families,  including
their  200,000  U. S.-citizen  children,  to  the  schools  where
DACA recipients study and teach, and to the employers who
have invested time and money in training them.  See id., at
41–42; Brief for Respondent State of New York et al. in No.
18–589, p. 42 (Brief for New York).  See also Brief for 143
Businesses as Amici Curiae 17 (estimating that hiring and
training  replacements  would  cost  employers  $6.3  billion).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Department of Homeland Security's rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. It delves into legal arguments regarding reliance interests and the agency's consideration of these in the rescission process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION ET AL. v.
ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–235.  Argued March 26, 2024—Decided June 13, 2024*

In  2000,  the  Food  and  Drug  Administration  approved  a  new  drug
application for mifepristone tablets marketed under the brand name
Mifeprex  for  use  in  terminating  pregnancies  up  to  seven  weeks.    To
help ensure that Mifeprex would be used safely and effectively, FDA
placed  additional  restrictions  on  the  drug’s  use  and  distribution,  for
example requiring doctors to prescribe or to supervise prescription of
Mifeprex,  and  requiring  patients  to  have  three  in-person  visits  with
the  doctor  to  receive  the  drug.    In  2016,  FDA  relaxed  some  of  these
restrictions: deeming Mifeprex safe to terminate pregnancies up to 10
weeks; allowing healthcare providers, such as nurse practitioners, to
prescribe Mifeprex; and approving a dosing regimen that required just
one  in-person  visit  to  receive  the  drug.    In  2019,  FDA  approved  an
application for generic mifepristone.  In 2021, FDA announced that it
would no longer enforce the initial in-person visit requirement.  Four
pro-life medical associations and several individual doctors moved for
a  preliminary  injunction  that  would  require  FDA  either  to  rescind
approval of mifepristone or to rescind FDA’s 2016 and 2021 regulatory
actions.  Danco Laboratories, which sponsors Mifeprex, intervened to
defend FDA’s actions.

The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs and in effect enjoined
FDA’s approval of mifepristone, thereby ordering mifepristone off the
market.  FDA  and  Danco  appealed  and  moved  to  stay  the  District
Court’s order pending appeal.  As relevant here, this Court ultimately

——————

*Together with No. 23–236, Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. Alliance for
Hippocratic  Medicine,  also  on  certiorari  to  the  United  States  Court  of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

Opinion of the Court

Sometimes  small  gestures  can  have  unexpected  conse-
quences.  Major initiatives practically guarantee them.  In
our  time,  few  pieces  of  federal  legislation  rank  in  signifi-
cance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  There, in Title VII,
Congress outlawed discrimination in the workplace on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  Today,
we  must  decide  whether  an  employer  can  fire  someone
simply for being homosexual or transgender.  The answer
is clear.  An employer who fires an individual for being ho-
mosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or ac-
tions it would not have questioned in members of a different
sex.  Sex  plays  a  necessary  and  undisguisable  role  in  the
decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.

Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have
anticipated their work would lead to this particular result.
Likely, they weren’t thinking about many of the Act’s con-
sequences  that  have  become  apparent  over  the  years,  in-
cluding its prohibition against discrimination on the basis
of motherhood or its ban on the sexual harassment of male
employees.  But the limits of the drafters’ imagination sup-
ply no reason to ignore the law’s demands.  When the ex-
press terms of a statute give us one answer and extratex-
tual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest.  Only
the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to
its benefit.

I

Few facts are needed to appreciate the legal question we
face.  Each  of  the  three  cases  before  us  started  the  same
way:  An employer fired a long-time employee shortly after
the  employee  revealed  that  he  or  she  is  homosexual  or
transgender—and  allegedly  for  no  reason  other  than  the
employee’s homosexuality or transgender status.

Gerald Bostock worked for Clayton County, Georgia, as a
child  welfare  advocate.   Under  his  leadership,  the  county
won national awards for its work.  After a decade with the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introductory portion. It sets the stage for the case by discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the legal question at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>