<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 256 (2010)

277

Opinion of Roberts, C. J.

The result is literally unprecedented: Even though equita
ble apportionment actions are a signiﬁcant part of our origi
nal docket, this Court has never before granted intervention
in  such  a  case  to  an  entity  other  than  a  State,  the  United
States, or an Indian tribe.  Never.  That is because the ap
portionment  of  an  interstate  waterway  is  a  sovereign  dis
pute,  and  the  key  to  intervention  in  such  an  action  is  just
that—sovereignty.  The  Court’s  decision  to  permit  nonsov
ereigns to intervene in this case has the potential to alter in
a  fundamental  way  the  nature  of  our  original  jurisdiction,
transforming  it  from  a  means  of  resolving  high  disputes  be
tween  sovereigns  into  a  forum  for  airing  private  interests.
Given  the  importance  of  maintaining  the  proper  limits  on
that jurisdiction, I respectfully dissent.

I

Two  basic  principles  have  guided  the  exercise  of  our  con
stitutionally  conferred  original  jurisdiction.  The  ﬁrst  is
an  appreciation  that  our  original  jurisdiction,  “delicate  and
grave,”  Louisiana  v.  Texas,  176  U. S.  1,  15  (1900),  was
granted  to  provide  a  forum  for  the  peaceful  resolution  of
weighty  controversies  involving  the  States.  “The  model
case  for  invocation  of  this  Court’s  original  jurisdiction  is  a
dispute  between  States  of  such  seriousness  that  it  would
amount  to  casus  belli  if  the  States  were  fully  sovereign.”
Texas  v.  New  Mexico,  462  U. S.  554,  571,  n.  18  (1983).  In
determining whether to exercise original jurisdiction, we ac
cordingly  focus  on  “the  nature  of  the  interest  of  the  com
plaining  State,”  and  in  particular  the  “seriousness  and  dig
nity”  of  the  claim  asserted.  Mississippi  v.  Louisiana,  506
U. S. 73, 77 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Original  jurisdiction  is  for  the  resolution  of  state  claims,
not  private  claims.  To  invoke  that  jurisdiction,  a  State
“must,  of  course,  represent  an  interest  of  her  own  and  not
merely  that  of  her  citizens  or  corporations.”  Arkansas  v.
Texas, 346 U. S. 368, 370 (1953); see Kansas v.  Colorado, 533
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the concept of original jurisdiction and its application to a case involving water apportionment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v.
RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
BARRETT, J., dissenting

rather, it permits EPA to grant an “extension of the exemp-
tion under subparagraph (A).”  §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) (emphasis
added).  What is being “extended,” then, is “the exemption
under subparagraph (A)”—a discrete, time-limited period of
permissible noncompliance with the RFP.  And when used
in  this  context,  the  noun  “extension”  means  an  “addition
that  increases  the  . . .  operation  . . .  of  something,”  “a
stretching out or stretching forth: a carrying forward,” or “a
part that is added to something to enlarge or prolong it; a
continuation.”2    The  verb  “extend”  is  similarly  defined:  It
means  “[t]o  cause  (something)  to  be  or  last  longer,”  to
“lengthen,  elongate,  prolong,  protract,”  or  “[t]o  prolong  in
duration.”3

The Court acknowledges these definitions, yet still par-
rots HollyFrontier’s point that no definition of “extend” re-
quires  “unbroken  continuity.”    Ante,  at  6.  But  without
something that presently exists, there is nothing to “carr[y]
forward” or “prolong.”  The word “extension,” then, plainly
contemplates  a  “continuation  of  the  same”  thing  as  cur-
rently exists—in contrast to the term “renewal,” for exam-
ple, which refers to a “restoring” or “reestablishing” of some-
thing that used to exist.  Compare Black’s Law Dictionary
622 (8th ed. 2004), with id., at 1322.  Or, to put it slightly
differently,  the  word  “extension”  “ ‘[i]mports  the  continu-
ance of an existing thing.’ ”  Brief for Federal Respondent 21
(quoting W. Anderson, A Dictionary of Law 437 (1996)).

Common usage confirms as much.  Consider a hotel guest
who  decides  to  spend  a  few  more  days  on  vacation.    That
guest  likely  would  ask  to  “extend  [her]  visit.”    Random
House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 684 (2d ed. 2001)

——————

2 American  Heritage  Dictionary  628  (4th  ed.  2000);  Webster’s  Third
New International Dictionary 804 (2002); New Oxford American Diction-
ary 596 (2d ed. 2005).

3 American Heritage Dictionary, at 628; Webster’s Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary, at 804 (capitalization deleted); 5 Oxford English Dic-
tionary 594 (2d ed. 1989).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal dissenting opinion, focusing on the interpretation of the word "extend" in a specific statute. It uses legal terminology and cites dictionaries and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
42  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

BREYER, J., dissenting

that preventing public terror was one reason that the Stat-
ute of Northampton prohibited public carriage, but not an
element of the crime.  See supra, at 37–39.  And, consistent
with that understanding, American regulations modeled on
the  Statute  of  Northampton  appear  to  have  been  under-
stood to set forth a broad prohibition on public carriage of
firearms  without  any  intent-to-terrify  requirement.    See
Charles, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev., at 35, 37–41; J. Haywood, A
Manual  of  the  Laws  of  North-Carolina,  pt.  2,  p.  40  (3d
ed.1814); J. Ewing, The Office and Duty of a Justice of the
Peace 546 (1805).

The Court cites three cases considering common-law of-
fenses, ante, at 42–44, but those cases do not support the
view that only public carriage in a manner likely to terrify
violated American successors to the Statute of Northamp-
ton.  If anything, they suggest that public carriage of fire-
arms was not common practice.  At least one of the cases
the Court cites, State v. Huntly, wrote that the Statute of
Northampton  codified  a  pre-existing  common-law  offense,
which provided that “riding or going armed with dangerous
or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by
terrifying the good people of the land.”  25 N. C., at 420–421
(quoting  4  Blackstone,  Commentaries,  at  149;  emphasis
added).  Huntly added that “[a] gun is an ‘unusual weapon’ ”
and that “[n]o man amongst us carries it about with him, as
one of his every-day accoutrements—as a part of his dress—
and  never,  we  trust,  will  the  day  come  when  any  deadly
weapon will be worn or wielded in our peace-loving and law-
abiding State, as an appendage of manly equipment.”  25
N. C., at 422.  True, Huntly recognized that citizens were
nonetheless  “at  perfect  liberty”  to  carry  for  “lawful  pur-
pose[s]”—but  it  specified  that  those  purposes  were  “busi-
ness or amusement.”  Id., at 422–423.  New York’s law sim-
ilarly recognizes that hunting, target shooting, and certain
professional  activities  are  proper  causes  justifying  lawful
carriage of a firearm.  See supra, at 12–13.  The other two
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses historical legal precedents and arguments related to gun control.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

21

Opinion of the Court

the decision below as resting on state law grounds having
nothing  to  do  with  the  federal  Free  Exercise  Clause,  see
post, at 1, 6.

The descriptions are not accurate.  The Montana Legisla-
ture created the scholarship program; the Legislature never
chose  to  end  it,  for  policy  or  other  reasons.    The  program
was eliminated by a court, and not based on some innocuous
principle of state law.  Rather, the Montana Supreme Court
invalidated the program pursuant to a state law provision
that expressly discriminates on the basis of religious status.
The  Court  applied  that  provision  to  hold  that  religious
schools  were  barred  from  participating  in  the  program.
Then, seeing no other “mechanism” to make absolutely sure
that religious schools received no aid, the court chose to in-
validate  the  entire  program.    393  Mont.,  at  466–468,  435
P. 3d, at 613–614.

The final step in this line of reasoning eliminated the pro-
gram,  to  the  detriment  of  religious  and  non-religious
schools alike.  But the Court’s error of federal law occurred
at the beginning.  When the Court was called upon to apply
a  state  law  no-aid  provision  to  exclude  religious  schools
from the program, it was obligated by the Federal Consti-
tution  to  reject  the  invitation.    Had  the  Court  recognized
that this was, indeed, “one of those cases” in which applica-
tion of the no-aid provision “would violate the Free Exercise
Clause,” id., at 468, 435 P. 3d, at 614, the Court would not
have proceeded to find a violation of that provision.  And, in
the absence of such a state law violation, the Court would
have  had  no  basis  for  terminating  the  program.    Because
the  elimination  of  the  program  flowed  directly  from  the
Montana Supreme Court’s failure to follow the dictates of
federal law, it cannot be defended as a neutral policy deci-
sion, or as resting on adequate and independent state law
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the application of the Free Exercise Clause in a case involving a state scholarship program. It delves into the legal reasoning and arguments presented by the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 233 (2010)

247

Opinion of the Court

discretionary  by  legislation.13  The  clause  (i)  enumeration,
we  ﬁnd,  is  instructive  in  determining  the  meaning  of  the
clause (ii) catchall.  Read harmoniously, both clauses convey
that Congress barred court review of discretionary decisions
only when Congress itself set out the Attorney General’s dis
cretionary authority in the statute.  See Hall Street Associ
ates, L.  L. C.  v.  Mattel,  Inc.,  552  U. S.  576,  586  (2008)
(“[W]hen  a  statute  sets  out  a  series  of  speciﬁc  items  ending
with a general  term, that general term is  conﬁned to cover
ing subjects comparable to the speciﬁcs it follows.”).14

4

We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant the character of the decisions Con
gress  enumerated  in  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i),  thereby  insulating
them from judicial review.  As the Government explained at
oral argument, the determinations there listed are “substan
tive decisions . . . made by the Executive in the immigration
context  as  a  matter  of  grace,  things  that  involve  whether
aliens can stay in the country or not.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 14.15

13 Congress excepted from § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) “the granting of relief under
[§] 1158(a).”  Section  1158  concerns  applications for  asylum.  Absent  the
exception, asylum applicants might fall within § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s jurisdic
tional  bar  because  a  statutory  provision,  § 1158(b)(1)(A),  speciﬁes  that
“the  Attorney  General  may  grant  asylum.”
(Emphasis  added.)  See
Zadvydas v.  Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 697 (2001) (“ ‘may’ suggests discretion”).
14 Amicus  suggests  that  the  word  “any”  in  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  should  be
read  expansively  to  draw  in  decisions  made  discretionary  by  regulation.
Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below
21–23.  But  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  does  not  say  “any  decision”;  it  says  “any
other  decision.”  And  as  we  have  just  explained,  other  decisions  falling
within § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s compass are most sensibly understood to include
only decisions made discretionary by Congress.  See Brief for Respondent
19–20,  and  n.  11  (noting  that  “over  thirty  provisions  in  the  relevant  sub-
chapter  of the  INA .  .  . explicitly  grant  the Attorney  General .  .  . ‘discre
tion’ to make a certain decision”).

15 Counsel  offered  this  explanation  in  response  to  the  question:  “Why
would  Congress  want  to  exclude  review  for  discretionary  judgments  by
the Attorney General that are recited explicitly to be discretionary in the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 558 U.S. 233 (2010). It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute and its implications for judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Attorney General.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

465

Opinion of Scalia, J.

prohibits the Executive augmentation of congressional dis-
positions in the course of implementing statutes that author-
ize such augmentation—generally known as substantive
rulemaking. There are, to be sure, limits upon the former
just as there are limits upon the latter—and I am prepared
to acknowledge that the limits upon the former may be much
more severe. Those limits are established, however, not by
some categorical prohibition of Art. I, § 7, which our cases
conclusively disprove, but by what has come to be known
as the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority: When authorized Executive reduction or augmen-
tation is allowed to go too far, it usurps the nondelegable
function of Congress and violates the separation of powers.
It is this doctrine, and not the Presentment Clause, that
was discussed in the Field opinion, and it is this doctrine,
and not the Presentment Clause, that is the issue presented
by the statute before us here. That is why the Court is
correct to distinguish prior authorizations of Executive can-
cellation, such as the one involved in Field, on the ground
that they were contingent upon an Executive ﬁnding of fact,
and on the ground that they related to the ﬁeld of foreign
affairs, an area where the President has a special “ ‘degree
of discretion and freedom,’ ” ante, at 445 (citation omitted).
These distinctions have nothing to do with whether the de-
tails of Art. I, § 7, have been complied with, but everything
to do with whether the authorizations went too far by trans-
ferring to the Executive a degree of political, lawmaking
power that our traditions demand be retained by the Legis-
lative Branch.

I turn, then, to the crux of the matter: whether Congress’s
authorizing the President to cancel an item of spending gives
him a power that our history and traditions show must reside
exclusively in the Legislative Branch.
I may note, to begin
with, that the Line Item Veto Act is not the ﬁrst statute
to authorize the President to “cancel” spending items.
In
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986), we addressed the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 417 (1998). It discusses the Line Item Veto Act and its constitutionality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–157
_________________

EDWARD A. CANIGLIA, PETITIONER v.
ROBERT F. STROM, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

[May 17, 2021]

JUSTICE ALITO, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to ex-
plain my understanding of the Court’s holding and to high-
light some important questions that the Court does not de-
cide.

1.  The Court holds—and I entirely agree—that there is
no special Fourth Amendment rule for a broad category of
cases involving “community caretaking.”  As I understand
the term, it describes the many police tasks that go beyond
criminal  law  enforcement.    These  tasks  vary  widely,  and
there is no clear limit on how far they might extend in the
future.  The category potentially includes any non-law-en-
forcement  work  that  a  community  chooses  to  assign,  and
because of the breadth of activities that may be described
as community caretaking, we should not assume that the
Fourth  Amendment’s  command  of  reasonableness  applies
in the same way to everything that might be viewed as fall-
ing into this broad category.

The  Court’s  decision  in  Cady  v.  Dombrowski,  413  U. S.
433  (1973),  did  not  recognize  any  such  “freestanding”
Fourth Amendment category.  See ante, at 2, 4.  The opinion
merely used the phrase “community caretaking” in passing.
413 U. S., at 441.

2.  While there is no overarching “community caretaking”
doctrine,  it  does  not  follow  that  all  searches  and  seizures
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito. It sets the stage for his analysis of the Court's holding and raises some points of discussion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

23

Opinion of the Court

tribunals.3

The litigation in Atlas Roofing arose under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), a federal
regulatory  regime  created  to  promote  safe  working  condi-
tions.  Id., at 444–445.  The Act authorized the Secretary of
Labor to promulgate safety regulations, and it empowered
the  Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Review  Commission
(OSHRC) to adjudicate alleged violations.  Id., at 445–446.
If a party violated the regulations, the agency could impose
civil penalties.  Id., at 446.

Unlike the claims in Granfinanciera and this action, the
OSH Act did not borrow its cause of action from the common
law.  Rather,  it  simply  commanded  that  “[e]ach  employer
. . . shall comply with occupational safety and health stand-
ards  promulgated  under  this  chapter.”    84  Stat.  1593,  29
U. S. C.  §654(a)(2)  (1976  ed.).    These  standards  bring  no
common law soil with them.  Cf. Hansen, 599 U. S., at 778.
Rather  than  reiterate  common  law  terms  of  art,  they  in-
stead resembled a detailed building code.  For example, the
OSH Act regulations directed that a ground trench wall of
“Solid Rock, Shale, or Cemented Sand and Gravels” could
be constructed at a 90 degree angle to the ground.  29 CFR
§1926.652, Table P–1 (1976); see Atlas Roofing, 430 U. S.,
at  447  (discussing  Table  P–1).  But  a  wall  of  “Compacted
Angular Gravels” needed to be sloped at 63 degrees, and a
wall  of  “Well  Rounded  Loose  Sand”  at  26  degrees.
§1926.652, Table P–1.  The purpose of this regime was not
to  enable  the  Federal  Government  to  bring  or  adjudicate

——————

3 The dissent chides us for “leav[ing] open the possibility that Granfi-
nanciera might have overruled Atlas Roofing.”  Post, at 25, n. 8 (opinion
of  SOTOMAYOR,  J.).  But  the  author  of  Atlas  Roofing  certainly  thought
that Granfinanciera may have done so.  See Granfinanciera, 492 U. S.,
at 79 (White, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps . . . Atlas Roofing is no longer good
law after today’s decision.”); see also id., at 71, n. 1 (Granfinanciera “can
be read as overruling or severely limiting” Atlas Roofing).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

5

Opinion of the Court

agreements  on  an  equal  footing  with  other  contracts,
Buckeye  Check  Cashing,  Inc.  v.  Cardegna,  546  U. S.  440,
443 (2006), and enforce them according to their terms, Volt
Information  Sciences,  Inc.  v.  Board  of  Trustees  of  Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 478 (1989).

The  final  phrase  of  §2,  however,  permits  arbitration
agreements  to  be  declared  unenforceable  “upon  such
grounds  as  exist  at  law  or  in  equity  for  the  revocation  of
any  contract.”    This  saving  clause  permits  agreements  to
arbitrate  to  be  invalidated  by  “generally  applicable  con-
tract  defenses,  such  as  fraud,  duress,  or  unconscionabil-
ity,”  but  not  by  defenses  that  apply  only  to  arbitration  or
that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement
to  arbitrate  is  at  issue.    Doctor’s  Associates,  Inc.  v.
Casarotto,  517  U. S.  681,  687  (1996);  see  also  Perry  v.
Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 492–493, n. 9 (1987).  The question
in this case is whether §2 preempts California’s rule clas-
sifying  most  collective-arbitration  waivers  in  consumer
contracts  as  unconscionable.    We  refer  to  this  rule  as  the
Discover Bank rule.

Under  California  law,  courts  may  refuse  to  enforce  any
contract found “to have been unconscionable at the time it
was  made,”  or  may  “limit  the  application  of  any  uncon-
scionable  clause.”  Cal.  Civ.  Code  Ann.  §1670.5(a)  (West
1985).  A  finding  of  unconscionability  requires  “a  ‘proce-
dural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on
‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power,
the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.”  Armen-
dariz v. Foundation Health Pyschcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal.
4th  83,  114,  6  P. 3d  669,  690  (2000);  accord,  Discover
Bank, 36 Cal. 4th, at 159–161, 113 P. 3d, at 1108.

In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court applied
this  framework  to  class-action  waivers  in  arbitration
agreements and held as follows:

“[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and discusses legal principles related to arbitration agreements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2004

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TOWN OF CASTLE ROCK, COLORADO v. GONZALES,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT BEST FRIEND OF HER DECEASED
MINOR CHILDREN, GONZALES ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–278.  Argued March 21, 2005—Decided June 27, 2005

Respondent  filed  this  suit  under  42  U. S. C.  §1983  alleging  that  peti-
tioner  violated  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s  Due  Process  Clause
when  its  police  officers,  acting  pursuant  to  official  policy  or  custom,
failed to respond to her repeated reports over several hours that her
estranged husband had taken their three children in violation of her
restraining  order  against  him.    Ultimately,  the  husband  murdered
the  children.    The  District  Court  granted  the  town’s  motion  to  dis-
miss, but an en banc majority of the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding
that  respondent  had  alleged  a  cognizable  procedural  due  process
claim  because  a  Colorado  statute  established  the  state  legislature’s
clear intent to require police to enforce retraining orders, and thus its
intent  that  the  order’s  recipient  have  an  entitlement  to  its  enforce-
ment.  The  court  therefore  ruled,  among  other  things,  that  respon-
dent  had  a  protected  property  interest  in  the  enforcement  of  her  re-
straining order.

Held: Respondent  did  not,  for  Due  Process  Clause  purposes,  have  a
property  interest  in  police  enforcement  of  the  restraining  order
against her husband. Pp. 6–19.

(a) The  Due  Process  Clause’s  procedural  component  does  not  pro-
tect  everything  that  might  be  described  as  a  government  “bene-
fit”: “To  have  a  property  interest  in  a  benefit,  a  person  . . .  must  . . .
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”  Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577.  Such entitlements are created by
existing rules or understandings stemming from an independent source
such as state law.  E.g., ibid.  Pp. 6–7.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text. They are not meant to be indexed as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

628

BRAGDON v. ABBOTT

Opinion of the Court

ing Assistant Attorney General Lee, James A. Feldman,
Jessica Dunsay Silver, and Thomas E. Chandler.*

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
We address in this case the application of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 327, 42 U. S. C.
§ 12101 et seq., to persons infected with the human immuno-
deﬁciency virus (HIV). We granted certiorari to review,
ﬁrst, whether HIV infection is a disability under the ADA
when the infection has not yet progressed to the so-called
symptomatic phase; and, second, whether the Court of Ap-
peals, in afﬁrming a grant of summary judgment, cited sufﬁ-
cient material in the record to determine, as a matter of law,
that respondent’s infection with HIV posed no direct threat
to the health and safety of her treating dentist. 522 U. S.
991 (1997).

I

Respondent Sidney Abbott (hereinafter respondent) has
been infected with HIV since 1986. When the incidents we
recite occurred, her infection had not manifested its most
serious symptoms. On September 16, 1994, she went to the
ofﬁce of petitioner Randon Bragdon in Bangor, Maine, for a
dental appointment. She disclosed her HIV infection on the

*Ann Elizabeth Reesman ﬁled a brief for the Equal Employment Advi-

sory Council as amicus curiae urging reversal.

Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the City of Los
Angeles by James K. Hahn and David I. Schulman; for the AIDS Action
Council et al. by Chai R. Feldblum, Steven R. Shapiro, Matthew Coles,
and Robert A. Long, Jr.; for the American Medical Association by Carter
G. Phillips, Mark E. Haddad, Jack R. Bierig, Michael L. Ile, and Leonard
A. Nelson; for the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation by Lynn
E. Cunningham; for the Infectious Diseases Society of America et al.
by Catherine A. Hanssens, Heather C. Sawyer, Beatrice Dohrn, Daniel
Bruner, Elizabeth A. Seaton, and Laura M. Flegel; and for Senator
Harkin et al. by Arlene Mayerson.

Peter M. Sﬁkas ﬁled a brief for the American Dental Association as

amicus curiae.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case citations, the names of justices, and legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BROWN v. DAVENPORT

Opinion of the Court

hearing in which it heard from all 12 jurors.  Five remem-
bered  seeing  Mr.  Davenport’s  restraints;  the  remaining
seven did not.  All 12 testified that Mr. Davenport’s shack-
les did not enter into their deliberations or influence their
unanimous verdict.  Based on this evidence, the trial court
found that the State had carried its burden to show harm-
lessness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Again,  Mr.  Davenport  appealed.    This  time,  Michigan’s
appellate courts declined to disturb the judgment.  For its
part, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that “the prosecu-
tion proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling
error did not affect the verdict.”  People v. Davenport, 2012
WL 6217134, *3 (Dec. 13, 2012) (per curiam).  In doing so,
the court relied on both the jurors’ testimony and that “the
evidence  at  trial  overwhelmingly  established  defendant’s
guilt and belied his contention that he killed the 103-pound
victim in self-defense, a theory that was explicitly disputed
by expert medical testimony.”  Id., at *2, n. 2.  The Michigan
Supreme Court denied Mr. Davenport’s request for discre-
tionary  review.    People  v.  Davenport,  494  Mich.  875,  832
N. W. 2d 389, 390 (2013).

C
Mr. Davenport next sought relief in federal district court,
filing a habeas petition in the Western District of Michigan.
Under AEDPA, however, a federal court may disturb a final
state-court conviction in only narrow circumstances.  As rel-
evant  here,  the  statute  provides  that,  when  a  state  court
has already ruled on the merits of the habeas petitioner’s
claim, he must show that decision was either (1) “contrary
to” or an “unreasonable application of ” clearly established
federal law, as determined by the decisions of this Court, or
(2) based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts”
presented  in  the  state-court  proceeding.
28  U. S. C.
§ 2254(d).

The District Court found relief unwarranted under this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Brown v. Davenport. It delves into the legal arguments and procedural history of the case, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Reporter’s Note

The  next  page  is  purposely  numbered  801.  The  numbers  between  485
and 801 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the  orders  with  permanent  page  numbers,  thus  making  the  ofﬁcial  cita
tions  available  upon  publication  of  the  preliminary  prints  of  the  United
States Reports.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a reporter's note explaining the intentional omission of page numbers. It provides information about the publication process and is not part of the main text meant for reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Reporter's Note</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

125

Opinion of the Court

Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves one of the most troubling public health
problems facing our Nation today: the thousands of prema-
ture deaths that occur each year because of tobacco use.
In
1996, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), after having
expressly disavowed any such authority since its inception,
asserted jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. See 61
Fed. Reg. 44619–45318. The FDA concluded that nicotine is
a “drug” within the meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act (FDCA or Act), 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21
U. S. C. § 301 et seq., and that cigarettes and smokeless to-
bacco are “combination products” that deliver nicotine to the
61 Fed. Reg. 44397 (1996). Pursuant to this author-
body.
ity, it promulgated regulations intended to reduce tobacco
consumption among children and adolescents.
Id., at 44615–
44618. The agency believed that, because most tobacco
consumers begin their use before reaching the age of 18,
curbing tobacco use by minors could substantially reduce
the prevalence of addiction in future generations and thus
the incidence of tobacco-related death and disease.
Id., at
44398–44399.

Regardless of how serious the problem an administrative
agency seeks to address, however, it may not exercise its
authority “in a manner that is inconsistent with the adminis-
trative structure that Congress enacted into law.” ETSI
Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U. S. 495, 517 (1988). And
although agencies are generally entitled to deference in the
interpretation of statutes that they administer, a reviewing
“court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unam-

College of Chest Physicians by Raymond D. Cotton; and for Public Citizen,
Inc., et al. by Allison M. Zieve, Alan B. Morrison, and David C. Vladeck.
Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the Paciﬁc Legal
Foundation by Anne M. Hayes and M. Reed Hopper; for the Product Lia-
bility Advisory Council, Inc., by Kenneth S. Geller; and for the Washington
Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the FDA's attempt to regulate tobacco products and the legal challenges surrounding this authority.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cliii

Page

860

Virginia; Martin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Virginia; Moore v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Virginia; Ogunde v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Virginia; Owens v.
953

Virginia; Perkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Virginia; Perry v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

Virginia; Robinson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Virginia; Ross v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Virginia v. Rudolph
1122

Virginia; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Virginia Beach v. Tanner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Virginia Dept.of Corrections; Hartman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1145

Virginia Ofﬁce of Protection and Advocacy v. Reinhard  . . . . . . . .
1061

Virgin Islands; Donovan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Virgle v. Cate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Vision Infosoft; Laskey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

Vizcarra v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
886

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Voigt v. Wisconsin
808

Voinche v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  932,1066

Volhard; DeSalvo v.
975

Volland; Wright v.
926

Volt v. United States
Vons Cos.; Stevens v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  874,1065

975

Vores v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Voss; Babinski v.
843

Votta v. Massachusetts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vuyyuru v. Jadhav  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  875,1065

W. v. Knight  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

902

W. v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
801

Wachovia Bank N. A.; Boyd v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1060,1150

Wade v. United States
1151

Wadford v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Wagan v. Alameida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wagenknecht v. Levin
888

Waggoner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1109

Wagner, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Wagner; Epps v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wagner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  808,920,1011

1003

Wagoner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wahi v. Charleston Area Medical Center  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  944,1158

843

Wai Mui v. McGrath  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Waivio v. Advocate Health Care Network
942

Waivio v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. at Chicago . . . . . . . . .
1145

Wakeﬁeld; Bailey v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823,1064
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

requirement (that a state plan condition eligibility on a ben-
eficiary’s assignment of rights to payment).  Id., at 276, 281.
Ahlborn’s repeated recognition of the relationships between
these three provisions cannot be squared with Florida’s pri-
mary argument, which would sever the provisions and read
the  assignment  provision  to  eclipse  the  limitations  of  the
other two.

Moreover,  Medicaid  is  an  insurance  statute,  and  Ahl-
born’s discussion of the unfairness that would ensue from a
State’s “ ‘shar[ing] in damages for which it has provided no
compensation,’ ” id., at 288, n. 19, tracks background prin-
ciples of insurance law.  Under those principles, recovery by
an insurer against a third party “is generally limited to the
same  elements  as  those  for  which  [the  insurer]  has  made
payment,” absent contractual terms to the contrary.  16 S.
Plitt, D. Maldonado, J. Rogers, & J. Plitt, Couch on Insur-
ance §226:36 (3d ed. 2021); see Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 21–22.  This, too, supports a cohesive read-
ing of these provisions as allowing States to recover their
past  expenses  only  from  sources  that  compensate  for  the
care and services state plans actually have furnished.3

An  additional  absurdity  would  flow  from  an  overbroad
reading of the assignment provision decoupled from its com-
panions.  Florida maintains that the assignment provision’s
reference  to  “any  rights  . . .  to  payment  for  medical  care

——————

3 Much  as  an  insurer  might  modify  this  default  rule  under  contract,
Congress could do so by statute.  The parties agree that Congress did so
as to Medicare, which, in the parties’ view, permits a  broader scope of
recovery for services (both furnished and to be furnished) from a third
party’s  liability  in  tort.    See  Brief  for  Respondent  41;  Reply  Brief  8–9.
The difference, if any, between the two programs reflects Medicaid’s fo-
cus on the needy, as well as the fact that individuals may lose and regain
Medicaid eligibility over time based on changes in their circumstances,
whereas most Medicare enrollees are seniors entitled to coverage for the
rest of their lives.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the interpretation of Medicaid provisions related to assignment of rights and recovery from third parties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

JACKSON, J., dissenting

Government  was  “giving  away  land”  on  the western  fron-
tier, and with it “the opportunity for upward mobility and a
more secure future,” over the 1862 Homestead Act’s three-
quarter-century  tenure.19    Black  people  were  exceedingly
unlikely to be allowed to share in those benefits, which by
one  calculation  may  have  advantaged  approximately  46
million Americans living today.20

Despite these barriers, Black people persisted.  Their so-
called  Great  Migration  northward  accelerated  during  and
after the First World War.21  Like clockwork, American cit-
ies responded with racially exclusionary zoning (and simi-
lar policies).22  As a result, Black migrants had to pay dis-
proportionately  high  prices  for  disproportionately  subpar
housing.23  Nor did migration make it more likely for Black
people to access home ownership, as banks would not lend
to  Black  people,  and  in  the  rare  cases  banks  would  fund
home loans, exorbitant interest rates were charged.24  With
Black  people  still  locked  out  of  the  Homestead  Act  givea-
way, it is no surprise that, when the Great Depression ar-
rived,  race-based  wealth,  health,  and  opportunity  gaps
were the norm.25

Federal  and  State  Governments’  selective  intervention
further exacerbated the disparities.  Consider, for example,

——————

19 T.  Shanks,  The  Homestead  Act:  A  Major  Asset-Building  Policy  in
American History, in Inclusion in the American Dream: Assets, Poverty,
and Public Policy 23–25 (M. Sherraden ed. 2005) (Shanks); see also Bara-
daran 18.

20 Shanks 32–37; Oliver & Shapiro 37–38.
21 Wilkerson 8–10; Rothstein 155.
22 Id., at 43–50; Baradaran 90–92.
23 Ibid.; Rothstein 172–173; Wilkerson 269–271.
24 Baradaran 90.
25 I. Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold His-
tory  of  Racial  Inequality  in  Twentieth-Century  America  29–35  (2005)
(Katznelson).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses historical context related to racial disparities in land ownership and housing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

17

Opinion of the Court

ity of the State for [that] purpose.”  253 U. S., at 230.

Smiley  v.  Holm  raised  the  question  whether  legislation
purporting  to  redistrict  Minnesota  for  congressional  elec
tions  was  subject  to  the  Governor’s  veto.    The  Minnesota
Supreme Court had held that the Elections Clause placed
redistricting  authority  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  the
State’s  legislature,  leaving  no  role  for  the  Governor.    We
reversed  that  determination  and  held,  for  the  purpose  at
hand,  Minnesota’s  legislative  authority  includes  not  just
the two houses of the legislature; it includes, in addition, a
make-or-break role for the Governor.  In holding that the
Governor’s  veto  counted,  we  distinguished  instances  in
which  the  Constitution  calls  upon  state  legislatures  to
exercise  a  function  other  than  lawmaking.  State  legisla
tures, we pointed out, performed an “electoral” function “in
the  choice  of  United  States  Senators  under  Article  I,  sec
tion  3,  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Seventeenth  Amend
ment,”16  a  “ratifying”  function  for  “proposed  amendments
to  the  Constitution  under  Article  V,”  as  explained  in
Hawke  v.  Smith,  and  a  “consenting”  function  “in  relation
to  the  acquisition  of  lands  by  the  United  States  under
Article I, section 8, paragraph 17.”  285 U. S., at 365–366.
In contrast to those other functions, we observed, redis
tricting  “involves  lawmaking  in  its  essential  features  and
Id.,  at  366.  Lawmaking,  we
most  important  aspect.”
further  noted,  ordinarily  “must  be  in  accordance  with  the
method  which  the  State  has  prescribed  for  legislative
enactments.”  Id., at 367.  In Minnesota, the State’s Con
stitution  had  made  the  Governor  “part  of  the  legislative
process.”  Id.,  at  369.  And  the  Elections  Clause,  we  ex
plained, respected the State’s choice to include the Gover
nor  in  that  process,  although  the  Governor  could  play  no
part when the Constitution assigned to “the Legislature” a

——————

16 The Seventeenth Amendment provided for election of Senators “by

the people” of each State.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing a previous case (Smiley v. Holm) and referencing constitutional clauses. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

x

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Brown v. Rubin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. San Diego Police Dept.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown; Southeastern Maritime Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. Superior Court of Cal., San Diego County . . . . . . . . . .
Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brown & Williamson; Kessler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bryan v. Clayton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bryan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bryant v. Caddo Parish School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bryant v. Speckard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Buck v. Boeing Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Buck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.
Bunker Group, Inc. v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burge v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burlington Industries, Inc.; Ellerth v.
Burnham; Federation of Conn. Taxpayer Organizations v.
. . . . . .
Burns v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burton; Wilson v.
Bush v. Zeeland Bd. of Ed.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Butler v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Buzzetti v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Byas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Byrd v. Gillis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians; S. Cal. Off-Track Wagering v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cabrales; United States v.
Caddo Parish School Bd.; Bryant v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp.
Cain; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Caine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calderon v. Ashmus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calderon; Bittaker v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calderon; Cooper v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calderon; Thompson v.
Cale v. State Retirement and Pension System of Md.
. . . . . . . . .
California; AT&T Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Brincat v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Butler v.
California; Chavez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
968
941
906
951
941
911
936
933
184
938
907
943
962
. . . . . 949,975
952
913
742
951
938
910
944
904
955
924
910
943
918
926
926
1
938
952
934
929
968
906
963
965
908
949
919
955
955
937
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, not the main body text of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

19

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

  To see more clearly the difference between the cases on
which  the  majority  fixates  and  the  present  case,  leave
aside the majority’s private comedy club.  Imagine instead
that  a  state  college  runs  a  comedy  showcase  each  year,
renting  out  a  local  theater  and,  pursuant  to  state  regula-
tions  mandating  open  access  to  certain  kinds  of  student
activities,  allowing  students  to  sign  up  to  perform  on  a
first-come,  first-served  basis.    Cf.  Rosenberger  v.  Rector
and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995).  After a
few years, the college decides that it is tired of running the
show, so it hires a performing-arts nonprofit to do the job.
The  nonprofit  prefers  humor  that  makes  fun  of  a  certain
political party, so it allows only student acts that share its
views  to  participate.    Does  the  majority  believe  that  the
nonprofit is indistinguishable, for purposes of state action,
from a private comedy club opened by local entrepreneurs?
  I  hope  not.    But  two  dangers  lurk  here  regardless.    On
the one hand, if the City’s decision to outsource the chan-
nels  to  a  private  entity  did  render  the  First  Amendment
irrelevant,  there  would  be  substantial  cause  to  worry
about the potential abuses that could follow.  Can a state
university  evade  the  First  Amendment  by  hiring  a  non-
profit to apportion funding to student groups?  Can a city
do the same by appointing a corporation to run a munici-
pal theater?  What about its parks?
  On  the  other  hand,  the  majority  hastens  to  qualify  its
decision,  see  ante,  at  7,  n. 1,  15,  and  to  cabin  it  to  the
specific  facts  of  this  case,  ante,  at  15.    Those  are  prudent
limitations.  Even so, the majority’s focus on Jackson still
risks sowing confusion among the lower courts about how
and when government outsourcing will render any abuses
that follow beyond the reach of the Constitution.
  In any event, there should be no confusion here.  MNN

——————

is  immaterial,  so  long  as  they  have  not  accepted  the  government’s
request to fulfill the government’s duties on its behalf.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing as part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U33

[10-04-01 09:21:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

60

UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

18 U. S. C. § 3553(a).

rectional treatment.”
In the instant
case, the transition assistance ordered by the trial court re-
quired respondent, among other conditions, to avoid possess-
ing or transporting ﬁrearms and to participate in a drug de-
pendency treatment program. These conditions illustrate
that supervised release, unlike incarceration, provides indi-
viduals with postconﬁnement assistance. Cf. Gozlon-Peretz,
supra, at 407 (describing “[s]upervised release [a]s a unique
method of postconﬁnement supervision invented by the
Congress for a series of sentencing reforms”). The Court
of Appeals erred in treating respondent’s time in prison as
interchangeable with his term of supervised release.

There can be no doubt that equitable considerations of
great weight exist when an individual is incarcerated be-
yond the proper expiration of his prison term. The statu-
tory structure provides a means to address these concerns
in large part. The trial court, as it sees ﬁt, may modify an
individual’s conditions of supervised release. § 3583(e)(2).
Furthermore, the court may terminate an individual’s super-
vised release obligations “at any time after the expiration of
one year . . . if it is satisﬁed that such action is warranted
by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of
justice.”
§ 3583(e)(1). Respondent may invoke § 3583(e)(2)
in pursuit of relief; and, having completed one year of super-
vised release, he may also seek relief under § 3583(e)(1).

The statute, by its own necessary operation, does not re-
duce the length of a supervised release term by reason of
excess time served in prison. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

SACKETT v. EPA

THOMAS, J., concurring

Stat. 1151 (codified, as amended, at 33 U. S. C. §403).  In
addition, §13 of the Act, sometimes referred to as the “Re-
fuse  Act,”  prohibits  throwing,  discharging,  or  depositing
“any  refuse  matter  . . .  into  any  navigable  water  of  the
United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water
from which the same shall float or be washed into such nav-
igable  water.”  30  Stat.  1152  (codified,  as  amended,  at  33
U. S. C. §407).  Section 13 also prohibits depositing mate-
rial “on the bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of
any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall
be  liable  to  be  washed  into  such  navigable  water  . . .
whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed.”
Ibid.

Three  things  stand  out  about  these  provisions.    First,
they use the terms “navigable water,” “water of the United
States,” and “navigable water of the United States” inter-
changeably.  33 U. S. C. §§403 and 407; see also V. Albrecht
& S. Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC Be Right? A New Look
at the Legislative History of the Clean Water Act, 32 Env.
L. Rev. 11042, 11044 (2002) (Albrecht & Nickelsburg).  As
a result, courts have done the same in decisions interpret-
ing the River and Harbor Acts.  See, e.g., United States v.
Stoeco  Homes,  Inc.,  498  F. 2d  597,  608–609  (CA3  1974);
New  England  Dredging  Co.  v.  United  States,  144  F.  932,
933–934 (CA1 1906); Blake v. United States, 181 F. Supp.
584, 587–588 (ED Va. 1960).

Second, Congress asserted its authority only to the extent
that obstructions or refuse matter could impede navigation
or navigable capacity.  Thus, in United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690 (1899), this Court rec-
ognized that any “act sought to be enjoined” under the 1890
Act must be “one which fairly and directly tends to obstruct
(that is, interfere with or diminish) the navigable capacity
of a stream.”  Id., at 709; accord, Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern R. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 365, 369 (1897) (holding
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Sackett v. EPA. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of the Clean Water Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

Syllabus

agency shop,” Harris, 573 U. S., at ___–___, but experience has shown
otherwise.  It  was  also  decided  when  public-sector  unionism  was  a
relatively  new  phenomenon.    Today,  however,  public-sector  union
membership  has  surpassed  that  in  the  private  sector,  and  that  as-
cendency  corresponds  with  a  parallel  increase  in  public  spending.
Abood  is  also  an  anomaly  in  the  Court’s  First  Amendment  jurispru-
dence,  where  exacting  scrutiny,  if  not  a  more  demanding  standard,
generally applies.  Overruling Abood will also end the oddity of allow-
ing public employers to compel union support (which is not supported
by any tradition) but not to compel party support (which is supported
by tradition), see, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347.  Pp. 42–44.

(4) Reliance  on  Abood  does  not  carry  decisive  weight.    The  uncer-
tain status of Abood, known to unions for years; the lack of clarity it
provides;  the  short-term  nature  of  collective-bargaining  agreements;
and the ability of unions to protect themselves if an agency-fee provi-
sion  was  crucial  to  its  bargain  undermine  the  force  of  reliance.
Pp. 44–47.

3. For these reasons, States and public-sector unions may no longer
extract  agency  fees  from  nonconsenting  employees.    The  First
Amendment  is  violated  when  money  is  taken  from  nonconsenting
employees  for  a  public-sector  union;  employees  must  choose  to  sup-
port the union before anything is taken from them.  Accordingly, nei-
ther  an  agency  fee  nor  any other  form  of payment  to  a  public-sector
union may be deducted from an employee, nor may any other attempt
be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively
consents to pay.  Pp. 48–49.

851 F. 3d 746, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and, GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed
a  dissenting  opinion.  KAGAN,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which
GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case. It outlines the case's background, the Court's reasoning for overturning a previous precedent, and the implications of the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

569

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

ther did Justice Washington’s opinion in Ogden v. Saunders,
12 Wheat. 213 (1827), which is quoted extensively by the
Court, ante, at 532.
In fact, the Court has never until today
relied on the fourth Calder category to invalidate the appli-
cation of a statute under the Ex Post Facto Clause.

It is true that the Court has on two occasions struck down
as ex post facto the retroactive application of rules governing
the functioning of the criminal trial process—but both deci-
In Kring v. Missouri, 107
sions have since been overruled.
U. S. 221 (1883), the Court held that Missouri was forbidden
to apply retroactively a state constitutional amendment pro-
viding that a plea of guilty to second-degree murder would
not automatically serve on retrial as an acquittal of the
charge of ﬁrst-degree murder. And in Thompson v. Utah,
170 U. S. 343 (1898), the Court held that a change in state
law reducing the number of petit jurors in criminal trials
from 12 to 8 was ex post facto because it deprived the de-
fendant of “a substantial right involved in his liberty.”
Id., at 352. The Court in Collins overruled both Kring and
Thompson v. Utah, concluding that neither decision was
“consistent with the understanding of the term ‘ex post facto
law’ at the time the Constitution was adopted.” Collins, 497
U. S., at 47, 50, 51–52.

The Court today offers a different reading of Collins.
It
concludes that Collins overruled Kring and Thompson v.
Utah because those cases improperly construed the Ex Post
Facto Clause to cover all “substantial protections,” and
that the fourth Calder category consequently remains intact.

and not future acts,” id., at 327, for only those who had aided the Confeder-
acy would be unable to take the expurgatory oath. The Court held that
the amendments violated Calder’s ﬁrst category by retroactively creating
new offenses, 4 Wall., at 327–328, and violated the third category by retro-
actively imposing new punishments, id., at 328. As for Calder’s fourth
category, the Court said only that the amendments “subvert[ed] the pre-
sumptions of innocence” by “assum[ing] that the parties [we]re guilty.”
4 Wall., at 328. As already discussed, supra, at 561, that analysis is of no
help to Carmell here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case 529 U.S. 513 (2000).  It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to the Ex Post Facto Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–1459.  Argued December 7, 2021—Decided June 21, 2022

For his participation in an unsuccessful robbery during which his accom-
plice shot a man, respondent Justin Taylor faced charges of violating
the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. §1951(a), and of committing a “crime of vio-
lence” under §924(c).  The Hobbs Act makes it a federal crime to com-
mit, attempt to commit, or conspire to commit a robbery with an inter-
state  component.    §1951(a).    Section 924(c)  authorizes  enhanced
punishments for those who use a firearm in connection with a “crime
of violence” as defined in either §924(c)(3)(A)—known as the elements
clause—or  §924(c)(3)(B)—known  as  the  residual  clause.    Before  the
District Court, the government argued that Taylor’s Hobbs Act offense
qualified  as  a  “crime  of  violence”  under  §924(c).    Taylor  ultimately
pleaded guilty to one count each of violating the Hobbs Act and §924(c).
The District Court sentenced Taylor to 30 years in federal prison—a
decade more than the maximum sentence for his Hobbs Act conviction
alone.  Taylor  later  filed  a  federal  habeas  petition  focused  on  his
§924(c) conviction, which was predicated on his admission that he had
committed  both  conspiracy  to  commit  Hobbs  Act  robbery  and  at-
tempted Hobbs Act robbery.  Taylor argued neither Hobbes Act offense
qualified as a “crime of violence” for purposes of §924(c) after United
States  v.  Davis,  588  U. S.  ___.
In  Davis,  this  Court  held  that
§924(c)(3)(B)’s  residual  clause  was  unconstitutionally  vague.  Id.,  at
___–___.  In  his  habeas  proceeding,  Taylor  asked  the  court  to  apply
Davis  retroactively  and  vacate  his  §924(c)  conviction  and  sentence.
The government maintained that Taylor’s §924(c) conviction and sen-
tence remained sound because his crime of attempted Hobbs Act rob-
bery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause.  The
Fourth Circuit held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify
as a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A).  The Fourth Circuit vacated
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Photograph of J. Kennedy standing in group of kneeling players.

room  prior  to  games,  before  Kennedy  was  hired,  but  that
Kennedy subsequently began leading those prayers too.

While the District’s inquiry was pending, its athletic di-
rector  attended  BHS’  September  11,  2015,  football  game
and told Kennedy that he should not be conducting prayers
with  players.    After  the  game,  while  the  athletic  director
watched,  Kennedy  led  a  prayer  out  loud,  holding  up  a
player’s helmet as the players kneeled around him.  While
riding  the  bus  home  with  the  team,  Kennedy  posted  on
Facebook that he thought he might have just been fired for
praying.

On September 17, the District’s superintendent sent Ken-
nedy a letter informing him that leading prayers with stu-
dents  on  the  field  and  in  the  locker  room  would  likely  be
found  to  violate  the  Establishment  Clause,  exposing  the
District to legal liability.  The District acknowledged that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a court opinion. It includes citations, names of legal figures, and discusses legal concepts like the Establishment Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
260

SOUTH  CAROLINA  v.  NORTH  CAROLINA

Opinion of the Court

requires any  person seeking  to transfer  more than  2 million
gallons of water per day (mgd) from the Catawba River basin
to  obtain  a  permit  from  the  North  Carolina  Environmental
Management Commission.  See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 143–
215.22L(a)(1)  (Lexis  2007);  § 143–215.22G(1)(h).  Through
that agency, the complaint alleges, North Carolina has issued
at  least  two  such  permits,  one  to  Charlotte  for  the  transfer
of up to 33 mgd, and one to the North Carolina cities of Con
cord and Kannapolis for the transfer of 10 mgd.  In addition,
the  complaint  alleges,  North  Carolina’s  permitting  statute
“grandfathers”  a  5  mgd  transfer  by  the  CRWSP,  and  “im
plicitly  authorize[s]”  an  unknown  number  of  transfers  of
less  than  2  mgd.  Complaint  ¶¶ 18,  21,  22.  South  Carolina
claims  that  the  net  effect  of  these  upstream  transfers  is  to
deprive South Carolina of its equitable share of the Catawba
River’s water, particularly during periods of drought or low
river ﬂow.

South  Carolina  seeks  relief  in  the  form  of  a  decree  that
equitably  apportions  the  Catawba  River  between  the  two
States, enjoins North Carolina from authorizing transfers of
water from the Catawba River exceeding that State’s equita
ble  share,  and  declares  North  Carolina’s  permitting  statute
invalid to the extent it is used to authorize transfers of water
from  the  Catawba  River  that  exceed  North  Carolina’s  equi
table  share.  See  generally  Complaint,  Prayer  for  Relief
¶¶ 1–3.  The  complaint  does  not  specify  a  minimum  ﬂow  of
water  that  would  satisfy  South  Carolina’s  equitable  needs,
but  it  does  offer  a  point  of  reference.  In  a  recent  “multi
stakeholder  negotiation  process”  involving  the  Federal  En
ergy Regulatory Commission (hereinafter FERC), Duke En
ergy,  and  various  groups  from  both  States,  it  was  agreed,
according  to  the  complaint,  that  South  Carolina  should  re
ceive  from the  Catawba River  a  continuous ﬂow  of water  of
no  less  than  1,100  cubic  feet  per  second,  or  about  711  mgd.
Complaint ¶ 14.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the beginning of an opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses a water rights dispute between South Carolina and North Carolina. The text is sequential and provides context for the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN

868

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Opinion of the Court

disagreement. That provision, a “saving” clause, says that
“[c]ompliance with” a federal safety standard “does not ex-
empt any person from any liability under common law.” 15
U. S. C. § 1397(k) (1988 ed.). The saving clause assumes that
there are some signiﬁcant number of common-law liability
cases to save. And a reading of the express pre-emption
provision that excludes common-law tort actions gives actual
meaning to the saving clause’s literal language, while leaving
adequate room for state tort law to operate—for example,
where federal law creates only a ﬂoor, i. e., a minimum safety
standard. See, e. g., Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae 21 (explaining that common-law claim that a vehicle is
defectively designed because it lacks antilock brakes would
not be pre-empted by 49 CFR § 571.105 (1999), a safety
standard establishing minimum requirements for brake per-
formance). Without the saving clause, a broad reading of
the express pre-emption provision arguably might pre-empt
those actions, for, as we have just mentioned, it is possible
to read the pre-emption provision, standing alone, as apply-
ing to standards imposed in common-law tort actions, as well
as standards contained in state legislation or regulations.
And if so, it would pre-empt all nonidentical state standards
established in tort actions covering the same aspect of per-
formance as an applicable federal standard, even if the fed-
eral standard merely established a minimum standard. On
that broad reading of the pre-emption clause little, if any,
potential “liability at common law” would remain. And few,
if any, state tort actions would remain for the saving clause
to save. We have found no convincing indication that Con-
gress wanted to pre-empt, not only state statutes and regula-
tions, but also common-law tort actions,
in such circum-
stances. Hence the broad reading cannot be correct. The
language of the pre-emption provision permits a narrow
reading that excludes common-law actions. Given the pres-
ence of the saving clause, we conclude that the pre-emption
clause must be so read.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" portion. It discusses the interpretation of a federal safety standard and its relationship to common law liability.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

TURNER v. ROGERS

THOMAS, J., dissenting

that  Turner  challenges  in  this  case  is  the  failure  of  the
family court to appoint counsel”); Brief for Respondents 62
(declining to address the Government’s argument because
it  is  not  “properly  before  this  Court”  (capitalization  and
boldface type deleted).  Finally, as here, a party may even
oppose  the  position  taken  by  its  allegedly  supportive
amicus.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7–12, 14–15 (Turner’s coun-
sel  rejecting  the  Government’s  argument  that  any  proce-
dures  short  of  a  categorical  right  to  appointed  counsel
could  satisfy  due  process);  Reply  Brief  for  Petitioner  14–
15.

Accordingly, it is the wise and settled general practice of
this  Court  not  to  consider  an  issue  in  the  first  instance,
much less one raised only by an amicus.  See this Court’s
Rule 14.1(a) (“Only the questions set out in the petition, or
fairly  included  therein,  will  be  considered  by  the  Court”);
Adarand  Constructors,  Inc.  v.  Mineta,  534  U. S.  103,  110
(2001)  (per  curiam)  (“[T]his  is  a  court  of  final  review  and
not first view” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United
Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 60, n. 2 (1981)
(declining  to  consider  an  amicus’  argument  “since  it  was
not raised by either of the parties here or below” and was
outside the grant of certiorari).  This is doubly true when
we review the decision of a state court and triply so when
the new issue is a constitutional matter.  See McGoldrick
v.  Compagnie  Generale  Transatlantique,  309  U. S.  430,
434 (1940) (“[I]t is only in exceptional cases, and then only
in  cases  coming  from  the  federal  courts,  that  [this  Court]
considers questions urged by a petitioner or appellant not
pressed or passed upon in the courts below”); Cardinale v.
Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969) (“[T]he Court will not
decide federal constitutional issues raised here for the first
time on review of state court decisions”).

The  majority  errs  in  moving  beyond  the  question  that
was litigated below, decided by the state courts, petitioned
to this Court, and argued by the parties here, to resolve a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Turner v. Rogers. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

MILLER v. ALABAMA

Opinion of the Court

Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting
5 (2011).

Even  when  States  give  transfer-stage  discretion  to
judges,  it  has  limited  utility.    First,  the  decisionmaker
typically  will  have  only  partial  information  at  this  early,
pretrial  stage  about  either  the  child  or  the  circumstances
of  his  offense.    Miller’s  case  provides  an  example.    As
noted  earlier,  see  n. 3,  supra,  the  juvenile  court  denied
Miller’s  request  for  his  own  mental-health  expert  at  the
transfer  hearing,  and  the  appeals  court  affirmed  on  the
ground that Miller was not then entitled to the protections
and  services  he  would  receive  at  trial.    See  No.  CR–03–
0915, at 3–4 (unpublished memorandum).  But by then, of
course,  the  expert’s  testimony  could  not  change  the  sen-
tence;  whatever  she  said  in  mitigation,  the  mandatory
life-without-parole prison term would kick in.  The key mo-
ment for the exercise of discretion is the transfer—and as
Miller’s  case  shows,  the  judge  often  does  not  know  then
what she will learn, about the offender or the offense, over
the course of the proceedings.

Second and still more important, the question at trans-
fer  hearings  may  differ  dramatically  from  the  issue  at  a
post-trial  sentencing.  Because  many  juvenile  systems
require that the offender be released at a particular age or
after  a  certain  number  of  years,  transfer  decisions  often
present a choice between extremes: light punishment as a
child or standard sentencing as an adult (here, life without
parole).  In many States, for example, a child convicted in
juvenile court must be released from custody by the age of
21.  See, e.g., Ala. Code §12–15–117(a) (Cum. Supp. 2011);
see generally 2006 National Report 103 (noting limitations
on  the  length  of  juvenile  court  sanctions).    Discretionary
sentencing in adult court would provide different options:
There,  a  judge  or  jury  could  choose,  rather  than  a  life-
without-parole  sentence,  a  lifetime  prison  term  with  the
possibility of parole or a lengthy term of years.  It is easy
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Miller v. Alabama case and the implications of transfer laws for juveniles. It delves into the limitations of judicial discretion in transfer hearings and contrasts it with the sentencing options available in adult court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 775 (1998)

791

Opinion of the Court

Grossman 776 (noting that courts hold employers “automati-
cally liable” in quid pro quo cases because the “supervisor’s
actions, in conferring or withholding employment beneﬁts,
are deemed as a matter of law to be those of the employer”).
Other courts have suggested that vicarious liability is proper
because the supervisor acts within the scope of his authority
when he makes discriminatory decisions in hiring, ﬁring, pro-
motion, and the like. See, e. g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913
F. 2d 398, 405 (CA7 1990) (“[A] supervisory employee who
ﬁres a subordinate is doing the kind of thing that he is au-
thorized to do, and the wrongful intent with which he does
it does not carry his behavior so far beyond the orbit of his
responsibilities as to excuse the employer” (citing Restate-
ment § 228)). Others have suggested that vicarious liability
is appropriate because the supervisor who discriminates in
this manner is aided by the agency relation. See, e. g., Nich-
ols v. Frank, 42 F. 3d 503, 514 (CA9 1994). Finally, still
other courts have endorsed both of the latter two theories.
See, e. g., Harrison, 112 F. 3d, at 1443; Henson, 682 F. 2d,
at 910.

The soundness of the results in these cases (and their con-
tinuing vitality), in light of basic agency principles, was con-
ﬁrmed by this Court’s only discussion to date of standards of
employer liability, in Meritor, supra, which involved a claim
of discrimination by a supervisor’s sexual harassment of a
subordinate over an extended period.
In afﬁrming the
Court of Appeals’s holding that a hostile atmosphere result-
ing from sex discrimination is actionable under Title VII, we
also anticipated proceedings on remand by holding agency
principles relevant in assigning employer liability and by re-
jecting three per se rules of liability or immunity.
477 U. S.,
at 70–72. We observed that the very deﬁnition of employer
in Title VII, as including an “agent,” id., at 72, expressed
Congress’s intent that courts look to traditional principles of
the law of agency in devising standards of employer liability
in those instances where liability for the actions of a super-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the concept of vicarious liability in employment discrimination cases. It cites legal precedents and delves into the rationale behind applying agency principles in determining employer liability.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

VIDAL v. ELSTER

Syllabus

has long recognized that a trademark protects the markholder’s repu-
tation, and the connection is even stronger when the mark contains a
person’s name.

Applying these principles, the Court has also recognized that a party
has no First Amendment right to piggyback off the goodwill another
entity has built in its name.  See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U. S. 522, 528.  By protecting a
person’s use of his name, the names clause “secur[es] to the producer
the benefits of [his] good reputation.”  Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park
& Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198.  Pp. 12–19.

(2) A tradition of restricting the trademarking of names has coex-
isted with the First Amendment, and the names clause fits within that
tradition.  The names clause reflects the common-law tradition by pro-
hibiting  a  person  from  obtaining  a  trademark  of  another  living  per-
son’s name without consent, thereby protecting the other’s reputation
and goodwill.  A firm grounding in traditional trademark law is suffi-
cient  to  justify  the  content-based  trademark  restriction  here,  but  a
case presenting a content-based trademark restriction without a his-
torical analog may require a different approach.  In this case, the Court
sees no reason to disturb this longstanding tradition, which supports
the restriction of the use of another’s name in a trademark.  P. 19–20.
(d) This decision is narrow.  It does not set forth a comprehensive
framework for judging whether all content-based but viewpoint-neu-
tral trademark restrictions are constitutional.  Nor does it suggest that
an  equivalent  history  and  tradition  is  required  to  uphold  every  con-
tent-based trademark restriction.  The Court holds only that history
and tradition establish that the particular restriction here, the names
clause in §1052(c), does not violate the First Amendment.  P. 22.

26 F. 4th 1328, reversed.

THOMAS, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion  of  the  Court,  except  as  to  Part  III.   ALITO  and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,
joined that opinion in full; ROBERTS, C. J., and KAVANAUGH, J., joined all
but Part III; and BARRETT, J., joined Parts I, II–A, and II–B.  KAVANAUGH,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined.
BARRETT,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  part,  in  which  KAGAN,  J.,
joined, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III–B, and in
which JACKSON, J., joined as to Parts I and II.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the key points of a Supreme Court decision.  It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather an overview.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

159

Opinion of the Court

FDA Comm’r Goyan (Nov. 25, 1980), id., at 67 (“Insofar as
rulemaking would relate to cigarettes or attached ﬁlters as
customarily marketed, we have concluded that FDA has no
jurisdiction”). Thus, what Congress ratiﬁed was the FDA’s
plain and resolute position that the FDCA gives the agency
no authority to regulate tobacco products as customarily
marketed.

C

Finally, our inquiry into whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue is shaped, at least
in some measure, by the nature of the question presented.
Deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a
statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a
statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from
Congress to the agency to ﬁll in the statutory gaps. See
Chevron, supra, at 844.
In extraordinary cases, however,
there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Con-
gress has intended such an implicit delegation. Cf. Breyer,
Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin.
L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986) (“A court may also ask whether the
legal question is an important one. Congress is more likely
to have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while
leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the
course of the statute’s daily administration”).

This is hardly an ordinary case. Contrary to its represen-
tations to Congress since 1914, the FDA has now asserted
jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a signiﬁcant
In fact, the FDA con-
portion of the American economy.
tends that, were it to determine that tobacco products pro-
vide no “reasonable assurance of safety,” it would have the
authority to ban cigarettes and smokeless tobacco entirely.
See Brief for Petitioners 35–36; Reply Brief for Petitioners
14. Owing to its unique place in American history and soci-
ety, tobacco has its own unique political history. Congress,
for better or for worse, has created a distinct regulatory
scheme for tobacco products, squarely rejected proposals to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous legislation and court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

provide care.”  Shah Decl. 44, ¶56.  But as we have already
seen,  Maine  does  not  dispute  that  unvaccinated  religious
objectors and unvaccinated medical objectors are equally at
risk for contracting COVID–19 or spreading it to their col-
leagues.  Nor is it any answer to say that, if the State re-
quired vaccination for medical objectors, they might suffer
side  effects  resulting  in  fewer  medical  staff  available  to
treat  patients.  If  the  State  refuses  religious  exemptions,
religious workers will be fired for refusing to violate their
faith, which will also mean fewer healthcare workers avail-
able to care for patients.  Slice it how you will, medical ex-
emptions and religious exemptions are on comparable foot-
ing when it comes to the State’s asserted interests.

The Court of Appeals found Maine’s rule neutral and gen-
erally applicable due to an error this Court has long warned
against—restating  the  State’s  interests  on  its  behalf,  and
doing so at an artificially high level of generality.  According
to the court below, Maine’s regulation sought to “protec[t]
the  health  and  safety  of  all  Mainers,  patients,  and
healthcare workers alike.”  Does 1–6 v. Mills, ___ F. 4th ___,
___, 2021 WL 4860328, *6 (CA1, Oct. 19, 2021).  But when
judging whether a law treats a religious exercise the same
as comparable secular activity, this Court has made plain
that  only  the  government’s  actually  asserted  interests  as
applied to the parties before it count—not post-hoc reimag-
inings  of  those  interests  expanded  to  some  society-wide
level of generality.  Fulton, 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6);
Tandon, 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2); Lukumi, 508 U. S.,
at  544–545.  “At  some  great  height,  after  all,  almost  any
state action might be said to touch on ‘. . . public health and
safety’  . . . and measuring a highly particularized and indi-
vidual  interest”  in  the  exercise  of  a  civil  right  “ ‘directly
against . . . these rarified values inevitably makes the indi-
vidual interest appear the less significant.’ ”  Yellowbear v.
Lampert,  741  F. 3d  48,  57  (CA10  2014)  (quoting  J.  Clark,
Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 Harv. L. Rev.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding religious exemptions from vaccination mandates.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

public aid law was necessary because that particular county
was not providing certain services to local poor blacks.  Sim-
ilarly, South Carolina’s burden-shifting framework (where
the  substantive  rule  being  applied  remained  notably  race
neutral) may have been necessary to streamline litigation
around the most commonly litigated type of case: a lawsuit
seeking to remedy discrimination against a member of the
large  population  of  recently  freed  black  Americans.    See
1870  S. C.  Acts,  at  386  (documenting  “persist[ent]”  racial
discrimination by state-licensed entities).

Most  importantly,  however,  there  was  a  wide  range  of
federal and state statutes enacted at the time of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s adoption and during the period there-
after  that  explicitly  sought  to  discriminate  against  blacks
on the basis of race or a proxy for race.  See Rappaport 113–
115.  These laws, hallmarks of the race-conscious Jim Crow
era, are precisely the sort of enactments that the Framers
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  sought  to  eradicate.    Yet,
proponents of an antisubordination view necessarily do not
take those laws as evidence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
true meaning.  And rightly so.   Neither those laws, nor a
small number of laws that appear to target blacks for pre-
ferred  treatment,  displace  the  equality  vision  reflected  in
the  history  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s  enactment.
This  is  particularly  true  in  light  of  the  clear  equality  re-
quirements  present  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s  text.
See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597
U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2022)  (slip  op.,  at  26–27)  (noting  that
text controls over inconsistent postratification history).

II
Properly  understood,  our  precedents  have  largely  ad-
hered  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s  demand  for  color-
blind laws.4  That is why, for example, courts “must subject
——————

4 The Court has remarked that Title VI is coextensive with the Equal
Protection  Clause.    See  Gratz  v.  Bollinger,  539  U. S.  244,  276,  n. 23
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the history and interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly in relation to race-conscious policies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
910

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5559.  Harrell  v.  Idaho.  Sup.  Ct.  Idaho.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5560.  Greene  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5561.  George  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  897.

No.  09–5562.  Green  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5563.  Granger  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  525.

No.  09–5564.  Ferguson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  1060.

No.  09–5565.  Harris  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  893.

No.  09–5566.  Fluellen  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5567.  Gill v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  319.

No.  09–5568.  Hannah  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–5569.  Kilbourne  v.  Michigan.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5570.  Fortner  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  853.

No.  09–5571.  Fearon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5572.  Oliver  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  824.

No. 09–5573.  Monteverde v.  California.  Ct. App. Cal., 6th

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>