<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

Opinion of the Court

P.  2d  1051,  1054  (Okla.  1994);  Full  Faith  and  Credit  of
Tribal  Courts,  Okla.  State  Cts.  Network  (Apr.  18,  2019),
https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.
asp?CiteID=458214.

Maybe some of these changes happened for altruistic rea-
sons, maybe some for other reasons.  It seems, for example,
that at least certain Members of Congress hesitated about
disestablishment in 1906 because they feared any reversion
of the Creek lands to the public domain would trigger a stat-
utory commitment to hand over portions of these lands to
already powerful railroad interests.  See, e.g., 40 Cong. Rec.
2976 (1906) (Sen. McCumber); Id., at 3053 (Sen. Aldrich).
Many of those who advanced the reorganization efforts of
the  1930s  may  have  done  so  more  out  of  frustration  with
efforts  to  assimilate  Native  Americans  than  any  disaffec-
tion  with  assimilation as  the  ultimate  goal.    See  1  Cohen
§1.05; Scherer, Imperfect Victories, at 2–4.  But whatever
the  confluence  of  reasons,  in  all  this  history  there  simply
arrived no moment when any Act of Congress dissolved the
Creek Tribe or disestablished its reservation.  In the end,
Congress moved in the opposite direction.7

D
Ultimately,  Oklahoma  is  left  to  pursue  a  very  different
sort of argument.  Now, the State points to historical prac-
tices and demographics, both around the time of and long
after  the  enactment  of  all  the  relevant  legislation.    These
facts, the State submits, are enough by themselves to prove
disestablishment.    Oklahoma  even  classifies  and  catego-

——————

7 The  dissent  ultimately  concedes  what  Oklahoma  will  not:    that  no
“individual congressional action or piece of evidence, standing alone, dis-
established the Creek reservation.”  Post, at 9–10.  Instead we’re told we
must consider “all of the relevant Acts of Congress together, viewed in
light of contemporaneous and subsequent contextual evidence.”  Ibid.  So,
once again, the dissent seems to suggest that it’s the arguments in the
next section that will get us across the line to disestablishment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It cites legal precedents and discusses historical context related to the Creek Tribe and its reservation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

KAGAN, J., dissenting

pandemic), the clarity of a constitutional injury, and the ex-
tent  of  voter  disenfranchisement  threatened.    At  its  core,
Purcell  tells  courts  to  apply,  not  depart  from,  the  usual
rules of equity.  See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Resources De-
fense  Council,  Inc.,  555  U. S.  7,  24  (2008)  (“In  each  case,
courts  must  balance  the  competing  claims  of  injury  and
must  consider  the  effect  on  each  party  of  the  granting  or
withholding  of  the  requested  relief”  (internal  quotation
marks omitted)).  And that means courts must consider all
relevant factors, not just the calendar.  Yes, there is a dan-
ger that an autumn injunction may confuse voters and sup-
press voting.  But no, there is not a moratorium on the Con-
stitution  as  the  cold  weather  approaches.    Remediable
incursions  on  the  right  to  vote  can  occur  in  September  or
October as well as in April or May.
  And so the district court rightly held here.  It is hard to
see how the extension of a ballot-receipt deadline could con-
fuse  citizens  about  how  to  vote:  At  worst,  a  voter  not  in-
formed of the new deadline would (if she could) put her bal-
lot in the mail a few days earlier than needed.  Nor would
that measure discourage Wisconsin citizens from exercising
their right to the franchise.  To the contrary, it would pre-
vent the State from throwing away the votes of people ac-
tively  participating  in  the  democratic  process.    And  what
will  undermine  the  “integrity”  of  that  process  is  not  the
counting  but  instead  the  discarding  of  timely  cast  ballots
that, because of pandemic conditions, arrive a bit after Elec-
tion Day.  Purcell, 549 U. S., at 4.3  On the scales of both
constitutional justice and electoral accuracy, protecting the

——————

3 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH alleges that “suspicions of impropriety” will re-
sult if “absentee ballots flow in after election day and potentially flip the
results of an election.”  Ante, at 7.  But there are no results to “flip” until
all valid votes are counted.  And nothing could be more “suspicio[us]” or
“improp[er]” than refusing to tally votes once the clock strikes 12 on elec-
tion night.  To suggest otherwise, especially in these fractious times, is
to disserve the electoral process.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the legal principles at play in a case related to voting rights and ballot deadlines.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
982

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 20, 27 2009

558 U. S.

denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–5906.  Wheeler  v.  Kentucky.  Sup.  Ct.  Ky.  Motion
of  petitioner  to  defer  consideration  of  petition  for  writ  of  certio
rari  denied.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09– 5941.  Rodriguez  v.  Ercole,  Superintendent,
Green  Haven  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–5986.  Mendoza  v.  Marshall,  Superintendent,
Sing  Sing  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or decision  of this petition.  Reported  below: 330 Fed.  Appx. 215.
No.  09–6037.  Ruezga  v.  Yates,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Breyer  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.
Appx.  656.

No.  09–6077.  Saqib  v.  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation
et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor
took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–7104  (09A363).  McClain  v.  Upton,  Warden.  Super.
Ct.  Butts  County,  Ga.  Application  for  stay  of  execution  of  sen
tence  of  death,  presented  to  Justice  Thomas,  and  by  him  re
ferred  to  the  Court,  denied.  Certiorari  denied.

Rehearing  Denied

No.  09–5004  (09A338).  McClain  v.  Hall,  Warden,  ante,
p.  882.  Application  for  stay  of  execution  of  sentence  of  death,
presented  to  Justice Thomas,  and  by  him referred  to  the  Court,
denied.  Petition  for  rehearing  denied.

Miscellaneous  Order

October  27,  2009

No.  09–7210  (09A387).  In  re  Blanton.  Application  for  stay
of  execution  of  sentence  of  death,  presented  to  Justice  Scalia,
and  by  him  referred  to  the  Court,  denied.  Petition  for  writ  of
habeas  corpus  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal journal or database. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

173

Breyer, J., dissenting

have long wanted their products to produce those effects in
this way.

For example,

in 1972, a tobacco-industry scientist ex-
plained that “ ‘[s]moke is beyond question the most optimized
vehicle of nicotine,’ ” and “ ‘the cigarette is the most opti-
61 Fed. Reg. 44856 (1996)
mized dispenser of smoke.’ ”
(emphasis deleted). That same scientist urged company
executives to

“ ‘[t]hink of the cigarette pack as a storage container for
a day’s supply of nicotine. . . . Think of the cigarette as
a dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine [and] [t]hink of a
puff of smoke as the vehicle of nicotine.’ ”
Ibid. (Philip
Morris) (emphasis deleted).

That same year, other tobacco industry researchers told
their superiors that

“ ‘in different situations and at different dose levels, nic-
otine appears to act as a stimulant, depressant, tranquil-
izer, psychic energizer, appetite reducer, anti-fatigue
agent, or energizer. . . . Therefore, [tobacco] products
may, in a sense, compete with a variety of other products
with certain types of drug action.’ ”
Id., at 44669 (RJR)
(emphasis deleted).

A draft report prepared by authorities at Philip Morris said
that nicotine

“ ‘is a physiologically active, nitrogen containing sub-
stance [similar to] quinine, cocaine, atropine and mor-
phine.
[And] [w]hile each of these [other] substances
can be used to affect human physiology, nicotine has
a particularly broad range of
Id., at
44668–44669.

inﬂuence.’ ”

And a 1980 manufacturer’s study stated that

“ ‘the pharmacological response of smokers to nicotine is
believed to be responsible for an individual’s smoking
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer. It discusses the effects of nicotine and quotes various sources related to the tobacco industry.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

59

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

B
Consistency with other precedents.  Smith is also discord-
ant with other precedents.  Smith did not overrule Sherbert
or any of the other cases that built on Sherbert from 1963
to 1990, and for the reasons just discussed, Smith is tough
to harmonize with those precedents.

The  same  is  true  about  more  recent  decisions.    In  Ho-
sanna-Tabor  Evangelical  Lutheran  Church  and  School  v.
EEOC, 565 U. S. 171 (2012), the Court essentially held that
the First Amendment entitled a religious school to a special
exemption  from  the  requirements  of  the  Americans  with
Disabilities  Act  of  1990  (ADA),  104  Stat.  327,  42  U. S. C.
§12101 et seq.  When the school discharged a teacher, she
claimed that she had been terminated because of disability.
565  U. S.,  at  178–179.    Since  the  school  considered  her  a
“minister”  and  she  provided  religious  instruction  for  her
students, the school argued that her discharge fell within
the so-called “ministerial exception” to generally applicable
employment laws.  Id., at 180.  The Equal Employment Op-
portunity  Commission  maintained  that  Smith  precluded
recognition of this exception because “the ADA’s prohibition
on retaliation, like Oregon’s prohibition on peyote use, is a
valid and neutral law of general applicability.”  Id., at 190;
see id., at 189–190.  We nevertheless held that the excep-
tion applied.  Id., at 190.77  Similarly, in Our Lady of Gua-
dalupe  School  v.  Morrissey-Berru,  591  U. S.  ___,  ___–___
——————

77 Our strained attempt to square the ministerial exception with Smith
highlights the tension between the two decisions.  Smith held that a gen-
erally applicable law satisfies the First Amendment if “prohibiting the
exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [government action] but
merely the incidental effect.”  494 U. S., at 878.  But the ADA’s effect on
religion  in  Hosanna-Tabor  was  “incidental”  in  the  sense  in  which  the
term was used in Smith.  The opinion in Hosanna-Tabor tried to distin-
guish  Smith  as  involving  only  “outward  physical  acts”  instead  of  “the
faith and mission of the church itself.”  565 U. S., at 190.  But a prohibi-
tion of peyote use surely affected “the faith and mission” of the Native
American Church, which regards the ingestion of peyote as a sacrament.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and analyzes their relevance to the current case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

nonprofit organization founded in 2014 whose purpose is “to
defend human and civil rights secured by law, including the
right of individuals to equal protection under the law.”  980
F. 3d,  at  164  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    In  No-
vember  2014,  SFFA  filed  separate  lawsuits  against  Har-
vard College and the University of North Carolina, arguing
that their race-based admissions programs violated, respec-
tively, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252,
42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.2    See  397  F. Supp. 3d,  at
131–132; 567 F. Supp. 3d, at 585–586.  The District Courts
in both cases held bench trials to evaluate SFFA’s claims.
See 980 F. 3d, at 179; 567 F. Supp. 3d, at 588.  Trial in the
Harvard case lasted 15 days and included testimony from
30  witnesses,  after  which  the  Court  concluded  that  Har-
vard’s admissions program comported with our precedents
  See  397
on  the  use  of  race  in  college  admissions.
F. Supp. 3d,  at  132,  183.    The  First  Circuit  affirmed  that
determination.  See  980  F. 3d,  at  204.    Similarly,  in  the
UNC case, the District Court concluded after an eight-day
trial that UNC’s admissions program was permissible un-
der the Equal Protection Clause.  567 F. Supp. 3d, at 588,
666.

We granted certiorari in the Harvard case and certiorari

before judgment in the UNC case.  595 U. S. ___ (2022).

——————

2 Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  42 U. S. C.
§2000d.  “We have explained that discrimination that violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment committed by an insti-
tution that accepts federal funds also constitutes a violation of Title VI.”
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 276, n. 23 (2003).  Although JUSTICE
GORSUCH  questions  that  proposition,  no  party  asks  us  to  reconsider  it.
We accordingly evaluate Harvard’s admissions program under the stand-
ards of the Equal Protection Clause itself.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the case *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College*. It sets the context for the case, outlining the parties involved, the legal claims, and the procedural history.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SHOOP, WARDEN v. TWYFORD

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–511.  Argued April 26, 2022—Decided June 21, 2022

Respondent Raymond Twyford was convicted by an Ohio jury of aggra-
vated murder and other charges and was sentenced to death.  The Ohio
appellate courts affirmed his conviction and sentence.  Twyford then
sought state postconviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to present evidence of a head injury Twyford sus-
tained as a teenager.  The Ohio courts rejected his claim, concluding
that trial counsel had simply presented a competing psychological the-
ory for Twyford’s actions.  Twyford then filed a petition for federal ha-
beas relief.  The District Court dismissed most of Twyford’s claims as
procedurally defaulted but allowed a few to proceed.  He then moved
for an order compelling the State to transport him to a medical facility,
arguing that neurological testing would plausibly lead to the develop-
ment of evidence to support his claim that he suffers neurological de-
fects.  The District Court granted Twyford’s motion under the All Writs
Act,  which  authorizes  federal  courts  to  “issue  all  writs  necessary  or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.”  28 U. S. C. §1651(a).  The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed.  Both courts concluded that it was unnecessary to con-
sider the admissibility of any resulting evidence prior to ordering the
State to transport Twyford to gather it.

Held: A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new ev-
idence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court’s ad-
judication of a habeas corpus action when the prisoner has not shown
that  the  desired  evidence  would  be  admissible  in  connection  with  a
particular claim for relief.  Pp. 4–11.

(a) The State argues that the All Writs Act does not authorize the
issuance of transportation orders for medical testing at all.  The State
also  argues  that  the  order  issued  in  this  case  was  not  “necessary  or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the Court's decision and are not considered part of the actual opinion. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case and the Court's ruling for the convenience of readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 11-02-00 08:45:59
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3EV

Pagination Table: RULES1

1194

RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove con-

duct; exceptions; other crimes.

(a) Character evidence generally.—Evidence of a person’s
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a par-
ticular occasion, except:

(1) Character of accused.—Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prose-
cution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of char-
acter of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an
accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of
the same trait of character of the accused offered by
the prosecution;

(2) Character of alleged victim.—Evidence of a perti-
nent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of
the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homi-
cide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was
the ﬁrst aggressor;

(3) Character of witness.—Evidence of the character

of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.—Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the charac-
ter of a person in order to show action in conformity there-
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
with.
such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,
provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on
good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence
it intends to introduce at trial.

Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses.

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically the Rules of Evidence. It includes rule numbers, titles, and legal text. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it contains factual information and legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

39

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix B to opinion of BREYER, J.

B

Table 1: Donations to Support the Party

Base
Limit
(per
year)

$32,400

$10,000

National
Party
Committees

State Party
Committees

Total

Number
(committees)

Years

Total Contri-
butions (per 2-
year cycle)

3

50

2

2

$194,400

$1,000,000

$1,194,400

Source:  See 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(B), (D); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532.

Table 2(a): The $3.6 Million Check

Base
Limit
(per year/
election)

Number
(committees/
candidates)

Years
or Elec-
tions

$32,400

$10,000

$2,600

3

50

33

$2,600

435

2

2

2

2

Total
Contribu-
tions
(per 2-year
cycle)

$194,400

$1,000,000

$171,600

$2,262,000

$3,628,000

National
Party Com
mittees

State Party
Committees

Candidates
(Senate)

Candidates
(House)

Total

Source:  See 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(A), (B), (D); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content is a table and appears to be part of a legal document's appendix. Tables of contents, lists of questions, and copyright information are not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
60  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

other,  more  contemporaneous  historical  evidence.    Heller,
554 U. S., at 632.

Second, because these territorial laws were rarely subject
to judicial scrutiny, we do not know the basis of their per-
ceived  legality.    When  States  generally  prohibited  both
open and concealed carry of handguns in the late-19th cen-
tury, state courts usually upheld the restrictions when they
exempted  army  revolvers,  or  read  the  laws  to  exempt  at
least that category of weapons.  See, e.g., Haile v. State, 38
Ark.  564,  567  (1882);  Wilson  v.  State,  33  Ark.  557,  560
(1878); Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 461 (1876); State v. Wil-
burn, 66 Tenn. 57, 60 (1872); Andrews, 50 Tenn., at 187.30
Those state courts that upheld broader prohibitions with-
out  qualification  generally  operated  under  a  fundamental
misunderstanding of the right to bear arms, as expressed
in Heller.  For example, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld
a complete ban on public carry enacted by the city of Salina
in 1901 based on the rationale that the Second Amendment
protects  only  “the  right  to  bear  arms  as  a  member  of  the
state militia, or some other military organization provided
for by law.”  Salina v. Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230, 232, 83 P. 619,
620  (1905).  That  was  clearly  erroneous.    See  Heller,  554
U. S., at 592.

Absent  any  evidence  explaining  why  these  unprece-
dented prohibitions on all public carry were understood to
comport  with  the  Second  Amendment,  we  fail  to  see  how
they inform “the origins and continuing significance of the
Amendment.”  Id., at 614; see also The Federalist No. 37,

——————

30 Many other state courts during this period continued the antebellum
tradition of upholding concealed carry regimes that seemingly provided
for open carry.  See, e.g., State v. Speller, 86 N. C. 697 (1882); Chatteaux
v. State, 52 Ala. 388 (1875); Eslava v. State, 49 Ala. 355 (1873); State v.
Shelby, 90 Mo. 302, 2 S. W. 468 (1886); Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99 (1872);
cf. Robertson v.  Baldwin,  165  U. S.  275, 281–282  (1897)  (remarking  in
dicta that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms . . . is not in-
fringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*. It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

to rights of same-sex intimacy and marriage.  See Lawrence
v.  Texas,  539  U. S.  558  (2003);  Obergefell  v.  Hodges,  576
U. S.  644  (2015).  They  are  all  part  of  the  same  constitu-
tional  fabric,  protecting  autonomous  decisionmaking  over
the most personal of life decisions.  The majority (or to be
more accurate, most of it) is eager to tell us today that noth-
ing it does “cast[s] doubt on precedents that do not concern
abortion.”  Ante, at 66; cf. ante, at 3 (THOMAS, J., concurring)
(advocating  the  overruling  of  Griswold,  Lawrence,  and
Obergefell).  But how could that be?  The lone rationale for
what the majority does today is that the right to elect an
abortion is not “deeply rooted in history”: Not until Roe, the
majority  argues,  did  people  think  abortion  fell  within  the
Constitution’s guarantee of liberty.  Ante, at 32.  The same
could  be  said,  though,  of  most  of  the  rights  the  majority
claims it is not tampering with.  The majority could write
just as long an opinion showing, for example, that until the
mid-20th century, “there was no support in American law
for a constitutional right to obtain [contraceptives].”  Ante,
at 15.  So one of two things must be true.  Either the major-
ity does not really believe in its own reasoning.  Or if it does,
all rights that have no history stretching back to the mid-
19th century are insecure.  Either the mass of the majority’s
opinion is hypocrisy, or additional constitutional rights are
under threat.  It is one or the other.

One piece of evidence on that score seems especially sa-
lient: The majority’s cavalier approach to overturning this
Court’s precedents.  Stare decisis is the Latin phrase for a
foundation  stone  of  the  rule  of  law:  that  things  decided
should stay decided unless there is a very good reason for
change.  It is a doctrine of judicial modesty and humility.
Those qualities are not evident in today’s opinion.  The ma-
jority has no good reason for the upheaval in law and society
it sets off.  Roe and Casey have been the law of the land for
decades,  shaping  women’s  expectations  of  their  choices
when an unplanned pregnancy occurs.  Women have relied
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis surrounding a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV.

Opinion of the Court

Feb.  2,  2013),  Dkt.  No.  380,  Exh.  1,  ¶1,  notwithstanding
the fact that the court in that case applied the definition of
“supervisor” that we adopt today, see EEOC v. CRST Van
Expedited, Inc., 679 F. 3d 657, 684 (CA8 2012).

In  any  event,  the  dissent  is  wrong  in  claiming  that  our
holding  would  preclude  employer  liability  in  other  cases
with  facts  similar  to  these.    Assuming  that  a  harasser  is
not a supervisor, a plaintiff could still prevail by showing
that  his  or  her  employer  was  negligent  in  failing  to  pre
vent  harassment  from  taking  place.    Evidence  that  an
employer did not monitor the workplace, failed to respond
to  complaints,  failed  to  provide  a  system  for  registering
complaints,  or  effectively  discouraged  complaints  from
being filed would be relevant.  Thus, it is not true, as the
dissent  asserts,  that  our  holding  “relieves  scores  of  em
ployers of responsibility” for the behavior of workers they
employ.  Post, at 14.

The standard we adopt is not untested.  It has been the
law for quite some time in the First, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits, see, e.g., Noviello v. Boston, 398 F. 3d 76, 96 (CA1
2005);  Weyers  v.  Lear  Operations  Corp.,  359  F. 3d  1049,
1057 (CA8 2004); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc.,
163  F. 3d  1027,  1033–1034,  and  n. 1  (CA7  1998)—i.e.,  in
Arkansas,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Maine,  Massachusetts,
Minnesota,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  New  Hampshire,  North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.  We
are aware of no evidence that this rule has produced dire
consequences in these 14 jurisdictions.

Despite  its  rhetoric,  the  dissent  acknowledges  that
Davis,  the  alleged  harasser  in  this  case,  would  probably
not  qualify  as  a  supervisor  even  under  the  dissent’s  pre
ferred  approach.    See  post,  at  20  (“[T]here  is  cause  to
anticipate  that  Davis  would  not  qualify  as Vance’s  super
visor”).  On  that  point,  we  agree.    Petitioner  did  refer  to
Davis as a “supervisor” in some of the complaints that she
filed,  App.  28;  id.,  at  45,  and  Davis’  job  description  does
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the definition of "supervisor" in the context of workplace harassment. It contains legal citations and arguments, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

elections  had  been  submitted  to  a  popular  vote,  resulting
in disapproval of the legislature’s measure.  State election
officials  asked  the  State’s  Supreme  Court  to  declare  the
referendum void.  That court rejected the request, holding
that  the  referendum  authorized  by  Ohio’s  Constitution,
“was  a  part  of  the  legislative  power  of  the  State,”  and
“nothing  in  [federal  statutory  law]  or  in  [the  Elections
Clause] operated to the contrary.”  241 U. S., at 567.  This
Court  affirmed  the  Ohio  Supreme  Court’s  judgment.  In
upholding  the  state  court’s  decision,  we  recognized  that
the referendum was “part of the legislative power” in Ohio,
ibid.,  legitimately  exercised  by  the  people  to  disapprove
the legislation creating congressional districts.  For redis
tricting  purposes,  Hildebrant  thus  established,  “the  Leg-
islature”  did  not  mean  the  representative  body  alone.
Rather, the word encompassed a veto power lodged in the
people.  See  id.,  at  569  (Elections  Clause  does  not  bar
“treating  the  referendum  as  part  of  the  legislative  power
for  the  purpose  of  apportionment,  where  so  ordained  by
the state constitutions and laws”).

Hawke v. Smith involved the Eighteenth Amendment to
the  Federal  Constitution.  Ohio’s  Legislature  had  ratified
the  Amendment,  and  a  referendum  on  that  ratification
was  at  issue.  Reversing  the  Ohio  Supreme  Court’s  deci
sion  upholding  the  referendum,  we  held  that  “ratification
by a State  of a constitutional amendment is not an act of
legislation within the proper sense of the word.”  253 U. S.,
at  229.
Instead,  Article  V  governing  ratification  had
lodged  in  “the  legislatures  of  three-fourths  of  the  several
States” sole authority to assent to a proposed amendment.
Id.,  at  226.    The  Court  contrasted  the  ratifying  function,
exercisable  exclusively  by  a  State’s  legislature,  with  “the
ordinary  business  of  legislation.”  Id.,  at  229.  Davis  v.
Hildebrant,  the  Court  explained,  involved  the  enactment
of  legislation,  i.e.,  a  redistricting  plan,  and  properly  held
that  “the  referendum  [was]  part  of  the  legislative  author-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt discussing the role of referendums in the legislative process. It cites previous cases (Davis v. Hildebrant and Hawke v. Smith) to support its arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

that a third party does not have “standing to challenge the
validity  of  a  death  sentence  imposed  on  a  capital  defend-
ant who has elected to forgo his right of appeal”).
  It’s not hard to see why this Court has refused suits like
these.  If individuals and groups could invoke the author-
ity of a federal court to forbid what they dislike for no more
reason  than  they  dislike  it,  we  would  risk  exceeding  the
judiciary’s  limited  constitutional  mandate  and  infringing
on  powers  committed  to  other  branches  of  government.
Courts would start to look more like legislatures, respond-
ing  to  social  pressures  rather  than  remedying  concrete
harms,  in  the  process  supplanting  the  right  of  the  people
and  their  elected  representatives  to  govern  themselves.
See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 408
(2013)  (“The  law  of  Article  III  standing, which  is  built  on
separation-of-powers  principles,  serves  to  prevent  the
judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the
political  branches”);  Warth  v.  Seldin,  422  U. S.  490,  500
(1975)  (without  standing  requirements  “courts  would  be
called  upon  to  decide  abstract  questions  of  wide  public
significance  even  though  other  governmental  institutions
may be more competent to address the questions”); Hein v.
Freedom  From  Religion  Foundation,  Inc.,  551  U. S.  587,
635–636  (2007)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment)  (“ ‘To
permit  a  complainant  who  has  no  concrete  injury  to  re-
quire a court to rule on important constitutional issues in
the  abstract  would  create  the  potential  for  abuse  of  the
judicial  process,  distort  the  role  of  the  Judiciary  in  its
relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open
the  Judiciary  to  an  arguable  charge  of providing  “govern-
ment by injunction” ’ ”).
  Proceeding  on  these  principles,  this  Court  has  held
offense  alone  insufficient  to  convey  standing  in  analo-
gous—and  arguably  more  sympathetic—circumstances.
Take  Allen  v.  Wright,  468  U. S.  737  (1984),  where  the
parents of African-American schoolchildren sued to compel
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the concept of standing in court and uses previous cases to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xciv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

894

McGee v. Higgins  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1103

McGhee; Pottawattamie County v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1001

McGhee v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1075

McGore v. Birkett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
802

McGowan v. Tennessee  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

McGrath v. Thaler
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

McGrath; Wai Mui v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
866

McGregory v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McGriggs v. Mississippi
844

McGuigan v. Hall
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

McGuireWoods LLP; Adair v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

McIntyre v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

McKee; Stone v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

McKeighan v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057

McKenna; Parmelee v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926

McKenzie v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

McKinney v. Ray  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McKinney v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  923,927

1097

McKnight v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1104

McKune; Kinnell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

McKune; Lopez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042

McKune; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1104

McMaster; Sanders v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McMath v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
881

1156

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McMillan v. United States
McMullen v. Tennis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  833,1038

928

McMullin v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  869,1144

McNeil; Adamson v.
1078

McNeil; Anderson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

McNeil; Anton v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Archer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

1007

McNeil v. Asay  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Asbell v.
McNeil; Balko v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  974,1102

McNeil; Beaver v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1074,1146

1055

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McNeil; Brower v.
848

McNeil; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

McNeil; Campbell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

McNeil; Carroll v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

McNeil; Clervil v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

McNeil; Collie v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903

McNeil; Concepcion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918

McNeil; Creed v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

McNeil; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

BREYER, J., dissenting

tion to those objectives—in a word, the details.  There are
no purely logical or conceptual answers to such questions.
All of which to say that to raise a self-defense question is
not to answer it.

III

I  therefore  begin  by  asking  a  process-based  question:
How is a court to determine whether a particular firearm
regulation (here, the District’s restriction on handguns) is
consistent  with  the  Second  Amendment?    What  kind  of
constitutional standard should the court use?  How high a
protective hurdle does the Amendment erect?

The  question  matters.    The  majority  is  wrong  when  it
says  that  the  District’s  law  is  unconstitutional  “[u]nder
any  of  the  standards  of  scrutiny  that  we  have  applied  to
enumerated constitutional rights.”  Ante, at 56.  How could
that be?  It certainly would not be unconstitutional under,
for example, a “rational basis” standard, which requires a
court  to  uphold  regulation  so  long  as  it  bears  a  “rational
relationship”  to  a  “legitimate  governmental  purpose.”
Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 320 (1993).  The law at issue
here, which in part seeks to prevent gun-related accidents,
at least bears a “rational relationship” to that “legitimate”
life-saving  objective.    And  nothing  in  the  three  19th-
century state cases to which the majority turns for support
mandates  the  conclusion  that  the  present  District  law
must fall.  See Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 177, 186–
187, 192 (1871) (striking down, as violating a state consti-
tutional  provision  adopted  in  1870,  a  statewide  ban  on  a
carrying a broad class of weapons, insofar as it applied to
revolvers);  Nunn v.  State, 1 Ga. 243, 246, 250–251 (1846)
(striking  down  similarly  broad  ban  on  openly  carrying
weapons, based on erroneous view that the Federal Second
Amendment  applied  to  the  States);  State  v.  Reid,  1  Ala.
612,  614–615,  622  (1840)  (upholding  a  concealed-weapon
ban against a state constitutional challenge).  These cases
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer in the case District of Columbia v. Heller.  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the constitutionality of firearm regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BARR v. EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

the  District  Court  to  consider  whether  additional  facts
would warrant a broader injunction.  2019 WL 3850928, *2–
*3.

The lower courts’ decisions warrant respect.  A stay pend-
ing  appeal  is  “extraordinary”  relief.    Williams  v.  Zbaraz,
442 U. S. 1309, 1311 (1979) (Stevens, J., in chambers); see
also  Maryland  v.  King,  567  U. S.  1301,  1302  (2012)
(ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers) (listing stay factors).  Given
the  District  Court’s  thorough  analysis,  and  the  serious
questions that court raised, I do not believe the Government
has carried its “especially heavy” burden.  Packwood v. Sen-
ate  Select  Comm.  on  Ethics,  510  U. S.  1319,  1320  (1994)
(Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers).  The rule here may be, as
the District Court concluded, in significant tension with the
asylum statute.  It may also be arbitrary and capricious for
failing to engage with the record evidence contradicting its
conclusions.  It is especially concerning, moreover, that the
rule  the  Government  promulgated  topples  decades  of  set-
tled asylum practices and affects some of the most vulnera-
ble people in the Western Hemisphere—without affording
the public a chance to weigh in.

Setting aside the merits, the unusual history of this case
also  counsels  against  our  intervention.    This  lawsuit  has
been proceeding on three tracks: In this Court, the parties
have litigated the Government’s stay request.  In the Ninth
Circuit, the parties are briefing the Government’s appeal.
And in the District Court, the parties recently participated
in  an  evidentiary  hearing  to  supplement  the  record.    In-
deed, just two days ago the District Court reinstated a na-
tionwide injunction based on new facts.  See East Bay Sanc-
tuary  Covenant  v.  Barr,  No.  4:19–cv–4073,  Doc.  73  (ND
Cal.,  Sept.  9,  2019).    Notably,  the  Government  moved  to
stay  the  newest  order  in  both  the  District  Court  and  the
Ninth  Circuit.    (Neither  court  has  resolved  that  request,
though the Ninth Circuit granted an administrative stay to
allow further deliberation.)  This Court has not considered
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to lower court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

be averted by first identifying and distinguishing four cate-
gories of laws: (1) laws that expressly discriminate against
religious  organizations;  (2)  laws  that  expressly  favor  reli-
gious organizations; (3) laws that do not classify on the ba-
sis of religion but apply to secular and religious organiza-
tions  alike;  and  (4)  laws  that  expressly  treat  religious
organizations  equally  to  some  secular  organizations  but
better or worse than other secular organizations.  As I will
explain,  this  case  involving  Nevada’s  reopening  plan  falls
into the fourth category.
  First  are  laws  that  expressly  discriminate  against  reli-
gious  organizations  because  of  religion.    The  recent  Espi-
noza  case  fell  into  that  category.    Espinoza  v.  Montana
Dept. of Revenue, ante, p. ___.  The State of Montana pro-
vided tax credits to those who contributed to private school
scholarship  organizations.    But  there  was  a  significant
catch:  Families  eligible  for  scholarship  funds  could  use
those funds only at secular private schools, not religious pri-
vate schools.  Cases like that are straightforward examples
of religious discrimination.  And as a general rule, laws that
discriminate against religion are, in the Court’s words, “odi-
ous  to  our  Constitution.”    Espinoza,  ante,  at  22  (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___ (2017); Good News
Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98 (2001); Rosen-
berger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819
(1995); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982); McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 629 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment); see also Murphy v. Collier, 587 U. S. ___ (2019)
(KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring  in  grant  of  application  for
stay); cf. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U. S. 520 (1993).
  Second are laws that expressly favor religious organiza-
tions  over  secular  organizations.    Examples  include  cases
where a legislature affords religious organizations certain
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It delves into legal arguments and precedents related to religious freedom and discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

51

Opinion of the Court

B

Mule Creek State Prison
Aug. 1, 2008

California Institution for Men
Aug. 7, 2006
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and possibly the beginning of a legal document. Legal citations and introductory information are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they don't contain the main body of the text meant for reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

HENRY SCHEIN, INC. v. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC.

Syllabus

That conclusion follows also from this Court’s precedent.  See AT&T
Technologies,  Inc.  v.  Communications  Workers,  475  U. S.  643,  649–
650.

Archer  &  White’s  counterarguments  are  unpersuasive.  First,  its
argument  that  §§3  and  4  of  the  Act  should  be  interpreted  to  mean
that  a  court  must  always  resolve  questions  of  arbitrability  has  al-
ready been addressed and rejected by this Court.  See, e.g., First Op-
tions  of  Chicago,  Inc.  v.  Kaplan,  514  U. S.  938,  944.    Second,  its  ar-
gument  that  §10  of  the  Act—which  provides  for  back-end  judicial
review  of  an  arbitrator’s  decision  if  an  arbitrator  has  “exceeded”  his
or  her  “powers”—supports  the  conclusion  that  the  court  at  the  front
end  should  also  be  able  to  say  that  the  underlying  issue  is  not  arbi-
trable is inconsistent with the way Congress designed the Act.  And it
is  not  this  Court’s  proper  role  to  redesign  the  Act.    Third,  its  argu-
ment that it would be a waste of the parties’ time and money to send
wholly groundless arbitrability questions to an arbitrator ignores the
fact  that  the  Act  contains  no  “wholly  groundless”  exception.    This
Court  may  not  engraft  its  own  exceptions  onto  the  statutory  text.
Nor is it likely that the exception would save time and money system-
ically even if it might do so in some individual cases.  Fourth, its ar-
gument that the exception is necessary to deter frivolous motions  to
compel arbitration overstates the potential problem.  Arbitrators are
already  capable  of  efficiently  disposing  of  frivolous  cases  and  deter-
ring  frivolous  motions,  and  such  motions  do  not  appear  to  have
caused  a  substantial  problem  in  those  Circuits  that  have  not  recog-
nized a “wholly groundless” exception.

The Fifth Circuit may address the question whether the contract at
issue in fact delegated the  arbitrability question to an arbitrator, as
well as other properly preserved arguments, on remand.  Pp. 4–8.

 878 F. 3d 488, vacated and remanded.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision and reasoning. It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a summary of the legal arguments and outcome.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BIDEN v. TEXAS

Syllabus

The District Court vacated the June 1 Memorandum and remanded to
DHS.  It  also  imposed  a  nationwide  injunction  ordering  the  Govern-
ment to “enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such a time
as it has been lawfully rescinded in compliance with the APA and until
such a time as the federal government has sufficient detention capac-
ity to detain all aliens subject to mandatory detention under [section
1225] without releasing any aliens because of a lack of detention re-
sources.”  Id., at 857 (emphasis in original).

While the Government’s appeal was pending, the Secretary released
the October 29 Memoranda, which again announced the termination
of MPP and explained anew his reasons for doing so.  The Government
then moved to vacate the injunction on the ground that the October 29
Memoranda had superseded the June 1 Memorandum.  But the Court
of Appeals denied the motion and instead affirmed the District Court’s
judgment in full.  With respect to the INA question, the Court of Ap-
peals  agreed  with  the  District  Court’s  analysis  that  terminating  the
program would violate the INA, concluding that the return policy was
mandatory  so  long  as  illegal  entrants  were  being  released  into  the
United States.  The Court of Appeals also held that “[t]he October 29
Memoranda did not constitute a new and separately reviewable ‘final
agency action.’ ”  20 F. 4th 928, 951.

Held: The Government’s rescission of MPP did not violate section 1225
of the INA, and the October 29 Memoranda constituted final agency
action.  Pp. 8–25.

(a) Beginning  with  jurisdiction,  the  injunction  that  the  District
Court entered in this case violated 8 U. S. C. §1252(f )(1).  See Garland
v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U. S. ___, ___.  But section 1252(f )(1) does not
deprive this Court of jurisdiction to reach the merits of an appeal even
where a lower court enters a form of relief barred by that provision.
Section 1252(f )(1) withdraws a district court’s “jurisdiction or author-
ity” to grant a particular form of relief.  It does not deprive lower courts
of  all  subject  matter  jurisdiction  over  claims  brought  under  sections
1221 through 1232 of the INA.

The text of the provision makes that clear.  Section 1252(f )(1) de-
prives courts of the power to issue a specific category of remedies: those
that “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” the relevant sections of the
statute.    And  Congress  included  that  language  in  a  provision  whose
title—“Limit on injunctive relief ”—makes clear the narrowness of its
scope.  Moreover, the provision contains a parenthetical that explicitly
preserves  this  Court’s  power  to  enter  injunctive  relief.    If  section
1252(f )(1) deprived lower courts of subject matter jurisdiction to adju-
dicate any non-individual claims under sections 1221 through 1232, no
such  claims  could  ever  arrive  at  this  Court,  rendering  the  specific
carveout for Supreme Court injunctive relief nugatory.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
176

NRG  POWER  MARKETING,  LLC  v.  MAINE  PUB.
UTIL.  COMM’N
Opinion of the Court

.

.

larly  those .
 critical  to  maintaining  reliability.”  115
FERC,  at  62,335.  A  presumption  applicable  to  contracting
parties  only,  and  inoperative  as  to  everyone  else—consum
ers,  advocacy  groups,  state  utility  commissions,  elected  ofﬁ
cials  acting  parens  patriae—could  scarcely  provide  the  sta
bility Mobile-Sierra aimed to secure.5

We  therefore  hold  that  the  Mobile-Sierra  presumption
does not depend on the identity of the complainant who seeks
FERC  investigation.  The  presumption  is  not  limited  to
challenges  to  contract  rates  brought  by  contracting  parties.
It applies, as well, to challenges initiated by third parties.

III

The objectors to the settlement appearing before us main
tain  that  the  rates  at  issue  in  this  case—the  auction  rates
and  the  transition  payments—are  prescriptions  of  general
applicability  rather  than  “contractually  negotiated  rates,”
hence Mobile-Sierra is inapplicable.  See Brief for Respond
ents  15–17,  and  n.  1  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
FERC agrees that the rates covered by the settlement “are
not themselves contract rates to which the Commission was
required  to  apply  Mobile-Sierra.”  Brief  for  FERC  15.
But, FERC urges, “the Commission had discretion to do so,”
id., at 28; furthermore, “[t]he court of appeals’ error in creat
ing  a  third-party  exception  to  the  Mobile-Sierra  presump
tion  is  a  sufﬁcient  basis  for  reversing  its  judgment,”  id.,
at  22.  Whether  the  rates  at  issue  qualify  as  “contract
rates,”  and,  if  not,  whether  FERC  had  discretion  to  treat
them  analogously  are  questions  raised  before,  but  not  ruled
upon  by,  the  Court  of  Appeals.  They  remain  open  for  that
court’s consideration on remand.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16.

5 The  FPA  authorizes  “[a]ny  person,  electric  utility,  State,  munici
pality,  or  State  commission”  to  complain.  16  U. S. C.  § 825e  (emphasis
added).  FERC regulations similarly permit “[a]ny person [to] ﬁle a com
plaint seeking Commission action.”  18 CFR § 385.206(a) (2009) (emphasis
added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Mobile-Sierra presumption in the context of FERC investigations. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific cases and regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH v. HETRONIC INT’L, INC.

Opinion of the Court

accord, Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 117 (asking whether Congress
“intends federal law to apply to conduct occurring abroad”);
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op.,
at 3).  If Congress has provided an unmistakable instruc-
tion that the provision is extraterritorial, then claims alleg-
ing exclusively foreign conduct may proceed, subject to “the
limits  Congress  has  (or  has  not)  imposed  on  the  statute’s
foreign application.”  RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337–338.
If a provision is not extraterritorial, we move to step two,
which  resolves  whether  the  suit  seeks  a  (permissible)  do-
mestic  or  (impermissible)  foreign application  of  the  provi-
sion.2    To  make  that  determination,  courts  must  start  by
identifying the “ ‘ “focus” of congressional concern’ ” underly-
ing the provision at issue.  Id., at 336.  “The focus of a stat-
ute is ‘the object of its solicitude,’ which can include the con-
duct  it  ‘seeks  to  “regulate,” ’  as  well  as  the  parties  and
interests it ‘seeks to “protect” ’ or vindicate.”  WesternGeco
LLC  v.  ION  Geophysical  Corp.,  585  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2018)
(slip op., at 6) (alterations omitted).

Step  two  does  not  end  with  identifying  statutory  focus.
We  have  repeatedly  and  explicitly  held  that  courts  must
“identif[y] ‘the statute’s “focus” ’ and as[k] whether the con-
duct relevant to that focus occurred in United States terri-
tory.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (emphasis added); accord,
e.g., RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337.  Thus, to prove that a
claim  involves  a  domestic  application  of  a  statute,  “plain-
tiffs must establish that ‘the conduct relevant to the statute’s
focus occurred in the United States.’ ”  Nestlé, 593 U. S., at
___–___ (slip op., at 3–4) (emphasis added); see, e.g., West-
ernGeco, 585 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–8) (holding that
a  claim  was  a  domestic  application  of  the  Patent  Act  be-
cause the infringing acts—the conduct relevant to the focus

——————

2 As we have noted, courts may take these steps in any order.  See, e.g.,
Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, 599 U. S. ___, ___–___, n. 2 (2023) (slip op., at 6–
7, n. 2).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the extraterritorial application of US law. It delves into legal precedent and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

Because  EPA  believes  that  Congress  did  not  intend  it  to
regulate substances that contribute to climate change, the
agency maintains that carbon dioxide is not an “air pollut-
ant” within the meaning of the provision.

The statutory text forecloses EPA’s reading.  The Clean
Air  Act’s  sweeping  definition  of  “air  pollutant”  includes
“any  air  pollution  agent  or  combination  of  such  agents,
including  any  physical,  chemical  . . .  substance  or  matter
which  is  emitted  into  or  otherwise  enters  the  ambient
air . . . .”    §7602(g)  (emphasis  added).  On  its  face,  the
definition  embraces  all  airborne  compounds  of  whatever
stripe,  and  underscores  that  intent  through  the  repeated
use of the word “any.”25  Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt “physi-
cal  [and]  chemical  . . .  substance[s]  which  [are]  emitted
into . . . the ambient air.”  The statute is unambiguous.26

Rather  than  relying  on  statutory  text,  EPA  invokes

——————

25 See  Department  of  Housing  and  Urban  Development  v.  Rucker,  535
U. S. 125,  131 (2002) (observing that “ ‘any’ . . . has  an  expansive  mean-
ing, that is, one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind” (some inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).

26 In  dissent,  JUSTICE  SCALIA  maintains  that  because  greenhouse
gases permeate the world’s atmosphere rather than a limited area near
the  earth’s  surface,  EPA’s  exclusion  of  greenhouse  gases  from  the
category of air pollution “agent[s]” is entitled to deference under Chev-
ron  U. S. A.  Inc.  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc.  467  U. S.
837  (1984).    See  post,  at  11–13.    EPA’s  distinction,  however,  finds  no
support in the text of the statute, which uses the phrase “the ambient
air” without distinguishing between atmospheric layers.  Moreover, it is
a  plainly  unreasonable  reading  of  a  sweeping  statutory  provision
designed  to  capture  “any  physical,  chemical  . . .  substance  or  matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”  42 U. S. C.
§7602(g).  JUSTICE SCALIA does not (and cannot) explain why Congress
would  define  “air  pollutant”  so  carefully  and  so  broadly,  yet  confer  on
EPA  the  authority  to  narrow  that  definition  whenever  expedient  by
asserting that a particular substance is not an “agent.”  At any rate, no
party  to  this  dispute  contests  that  greenhouse  gases  both  “ente[r]  the
ambient  air”  and  tend  to  warm  the  atmosphere.    They  are  therefore
unquestionably “agent[s]” of air pollution.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in the case of Massachusetts v. EPA. It presents legal arguments and analysis of the Clean Air Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment

U. S. C. §706(2)(A).  Because the courts below found for the
States on the first question, they declined to reach the sec-
ond.  That issue is now ready for resolution, unaffected by
today’s decision.  An agency acting within its sphere of del-
egated authority can of course flunk the test of “reasoned
decisionmaking.”    Michigan  v.  EPA,  576  U. S.  743,  750
(2015).  The agency does so when it has not given “a satis-
factory  explanation  for  its  action”—when  it  has  failed  to
draw  a  “rational  connection”  between  the  problem  it  has
identified  and  the  solution  it  has  chosen,  or  when  its
thought process reveals “a clear error of judgment.”  Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  Assessed against that standard of
reasonableness,  the  exemptions  HRSA  and  the  Depart-
ments issued give every appearance of coming up short.2

Most striking is a mismatch between the scope of the re-
ligious exemption and the problem the agencies set out to
address.  In  the  Departments’  view,  the  exemption  was
“necessary  to  expand  the  protections”  for  “certain  entities
and  individuals”  with  “religious  objections”  to  contracep-
tion.  83 Fed. Reg. 57537 (2018).  Recall that under the old
system, an employer objecting to the contraceptive mandate
for religious reasons could avail itself of the “self-certifica-
tion accommodation.”  Ante, at 6.  Upon making the certifi-
cation,  the  employer  no  longer  had  “to  contract,  arrange,
[or]  pay”  for  contraceptive  coverage;  instead,  its  insurer
would  bear  the  services’  cost.    78  Fed.  Reg.  39874  (2013).
That device dispelled some employers’ objections—but not
all.  The Little Sisters, among others, maintained that the
accommodation  itself  made  them  complicit  in  providing
contraception.  The measure thus failed to “assuage[ ]” their

——————

2 I  speak  here  only  of  the  substantive  validity  of  the  exemptions.
I
agree  with  the  Court  that  the  final  rules  issuing  the  exemptions  were
procedurally valid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania. It delves into the legal reasoning surrounding religious exemptions from the contraceptive mandate.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  556 U. S. ____ (2009)

7

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Powerful evidence of Congress’ decision not to authorize
cost-benefit analysis in the BTA standard lies in the series
of  standards  adopted  to  regulate  the  outflow,  or  effluent,
from industrial powerplants.  Passed at the same time as
the  BTA  standard  at  issue  here,  the  effluent  limitation
standards  imposed  increasingly  strict  technology  require-
ments  on  industry.  In  each  effluent  limitation  provision,
Congress distinguished its willingness to allow the EPA to
consider  costs  from  its  willingness  to  allow  the  Agency  to
conduct  a  cost-benefit  analysis.    And  to  the  extent  Con-
gress permitted cost-benefit analysis, its use was intended
to be temporary and exceptional.

The first tier of technology standards applied to existing
plants—facilities  for  which  retrofitting  would  be  particu-
larly  costly.    Congress  required  these  plants  to  adopt
“effluent  limitations  . . .  which  shall  require  the  applica-
tion  of  the  best  practicable  control  technology  currently
available.”  33 U. S. C. §1311(b)(1)(A).  Because this “best
practicable,” or “BPT,” standard was meant to ease indus-
try’s  transition  to  the  new  technology-based  regime,  Con-
gress  gave  BPT  two  unique  features:  First,  it  would  be
temporary,  remaining  in  effect  only  until  July  1,  1983.6
Second,  it  specified  that  the  EPA  was  to  conduct  a  cost-
benefit analysis in setting BPT requirements by consider-
ing  “the  total  cost  of  application  of  technology  in  relation
to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such
application.”7    §1314(b)(1)(B).    Permitting  cost-benefit
——————

second  step  reflects  the  Court’s  reluctance  to  consider  the  possibility,
which  it  later  laments  is  “more  complex,”  ante,  at  9,  that  Congress’
silence may have meant to foreclose cost-benefit analysis.

6 Congress later extended the deadline to March 31, 1989.
7 Senator Muskie, the Senate sponsor of the legislation, described the
cost-benefit analysis permitted under BPT as decidedly narrow, assert-
ing that “[t]he balancing test between total cost and effluent reduction
benefits  is  intended  to  limit  the  application  of  technology  only  where
the additional degree of effluent reduction is wholly out of proportion to
the costs of achieving such marginal level of reduction for any class or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 556 U.S. ____ (2009). It delves into the legislative history and intent behind the BTA standard, arguing against the majority opinion's interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

B, supra.6

The absence of evidence of coercion in this record leaves
the District to its final redoubt.  Here, the District suggests
that  any  visible  religious  conduct  by  a  teacher  or  coach
should be deemed—without more and as a matter of law—
impermissibly coercive on students.  In essence, the District
asks us to adopt the view that the only acceptable govern-
ment  role  models  for  students  are  those  who  eschew  any
visible  religious  expression.    See  also  post,  at  16–17
(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).  If the argument sounds famil-
iar, it should.  Really, it is just another way of repackaging
the  District’s  earlier  submission  that  government  may
script everything a teacher or coach says in the workplace.
See Part III–B, supra.  The only added twist here is the Dis-
trict’s  suggestion  not  only  that  it  may  prohibit  teachers
from engaging in any demonstrative religious activity, but
that it must do so in order to conform to the Constitution.

Such a rule would be a sure sign that our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence had gone off the rails.  In the name of
protecting religious liberty, the District would have us sup-
press it.  Rather than respect the First Amendment’s double
protection for religious expression, it would have us prefer-
ence secular activity.  Not only could schools fire teachers
for praying quietly over their lunch, for wearing a yarmulke
to  school,  or  for  offering  a  midday  prayer  during  a  break
before practice.  Under the District’s rule, a school would be
required to do so.  It is a rule that would defy this Court’s
traditional understanding that permitting private speech is
——————

6 The dissent expresses concern that looking to “histor[y] an[d] tradi-
tion” to guide Establishment Clause inquiries will not afford “school ad-
ministrators” sufficient guidance.  Post, at 30.  But that concern supplies
no excuse to adorn the Constitution with rules not supported by its terms
and the traditions undergirding them.  Nor, in any event, is there any
question that the District understands that coercion can be a hallmark
of an Establishment Clause violation.  See App. 105.  The District’s prob-
lem isn’t a failure to identify coercion as a crucial legal consideration; it
is a lack of evidence that coercion actually occurred.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in the case Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the case, focusing on the District's claim that any visible religious conduct by a teacher is inherently coercive.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

norm-specific inquiry, not a categorical one, it is irrelevant
to the categorical question presented here.  Assuming the
prohibition  against  financing  of  terrorism  is  sufficiently
“specific, universal, and obligatory” to satisfy the first step
of Sosa, a question on which I would remand to the Court
of Appeals, nothing in international law suggests a corpo
ration may not violate it.2

——————

2 At  present,  the  norm-specific  query  contemplated  by  footnote  20  is
likely  resolved  simply  by  considering  whether  the  given  international-
law  norm  binds  only  state  actors  or  state  and  nonstate  actors  alike,
because  there  does  not  appear  to  be  an  international-law  norm  that
contemplates  a  finer  distinction  between  types  of  private  actors.    See
Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  in  Kiobel  v.  Royal  Dutch
Petroleum Co., O. T. 2012, No. 10–1491, p. 20 (“At the present time, the
United States is not aware of any international-law norm, accepted by
civilized nations and defined with the degree of specificity required by
Sosa, that requires, or necessarily contemplates, a distinction between
natural  and  juridical  actors”);  Dodge,  Corporate  Liability  Under  Cus
tomary International Law, 43 Geo. J. Int’l L. 1045, 1050 (2012) (“None
of  the  norms  that  are  actionable  under  Sosa  distinguish  between
natural and juridical persons”).

Sosa  itself  supports  the  proposition  that  international  law  does  not
distinguish  between  types  of  private  actors,  but  rather  treats  natural
persons  and  corporations  alike.    Footnote  20  groups  corporations  and
individuals together under the larger category of “private actor.”  Sosa,
542  U. S.,  at  732,  n. 20  (“if  the  defendant  is  a  private  actor  such  as  a
corporation or an individual”); see  also id., at  760 (BREYER, J., concur
ring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment)  (“The  norm  must  extend
liability  to  the  type  of  perpetrator  (e.g.,  a  private  actor)  the  plaintiff
seeks  to  sue”  (citing  id.,  at  732,  n. 20)).    Sosa  also  describes  the  two
Court  of  Appeals  decisions  on  which  it  relies  as  having  considered
whether  there  was  sufficient  consensus  that  particular  conduct—
torture or genocide—“violates international law” when undertaken “by
private  actors.”    Id.,  at  732,  n. 20  (discussing  Tel-Oren  v.  Libyan  Arab
Republic,  726  F. 2d  774,  791–795  (CADC  1984)  (Edwards,  J.,  concur
ring), and Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F. 3d 232, 239–241 (CA2 1995)).  Even
though  the  defendant  in  Kadic  was  a  natural  person,  see  id.,  at  237,
and the defendants in Tel-Oren were juridical entities, see 726 F. 2d, at
775–776, Sosa refers to them all as “private actors,” 542 U. S., at 732,
n. 20.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding corporate liability under international law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 20–512 and 20–520
_________________

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
PETITIONER
v.
SHAWNE ALSTON, ET AL.

20–512

AMERICAN ATHLETIC CONFERENCE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
SHAWNE ALSTON, ET AL.

20–520

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2021]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
The NCAA has long restricted the compensation and ben-
efits that student athletes may receive.  And with surpris-
ing success, the NCAA has long shielded its compensation
rules from ordinary antitrust scrutiny.  Today, however, the
Court holds that the NCAA has violated the antitrust laws.
The  Court’s  decision  marks  an  important  and  overdue
course correction, and I join the Court’s excellent opinion in
full.

But this case involves only a narrow subset of the NCAA’s
compensation  rules—namely,  the  rules  restricting  the
education-related  benefits  that  student  athletes  may  re-
ceive,  such  as  post-eligibility  scholarships  at  graduate  or
vocational schools.  The rest of the NCAA’s compensation
rules  are  not  at  issue  here  and  therefore  remain  on  the
books.  Those remaining compensation rules generally re-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual content of a legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxxvii

Page
Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living . . . . . . 915,974
944
Sentenn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Service Employees; Washington v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
Settles v. Penilla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Shahbaz; Hadji-Elias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shalala; University Health Services, Inc. v.
925
Shalala; Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . .
962
Shannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
Shaw v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
Shelby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
Shenandoah Borough Council; Pikitus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Shephard v. Pomona Fairplex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Shephard v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
Sheppard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
Sherwood v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Shoemaker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
Shong-Ching Tong v. Hunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Shown v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shreves; Crosby v.
927
Shuttle, Inc.; May v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Siddall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920
Sidles, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,971
Sikora v. Higley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 941,971
960
Silva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910
Sindram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935
Singer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Singletary; Boatwright v.
906
Singletary; Brown v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Singletary; Davis v.
969
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956,971
Singletary; Dougan v.
943
Singletary; Harold v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971
Singletary; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
Sinn v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
Slezak v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Smith; Baruch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Smith v. Jarvis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951
Smith v. Metropolitan School Dist. Perry Township . . . . . . . . . . .
982
Smith; National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. O’Brien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923
Smith v. Supreme Court of Colo.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,970
946
Smith v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,959
915
Smith Barney; Painters Local Union No. 109 Pension Fund v.
. . .
922
Smithsonian Inst., Hirshhorn Museum & Sculpture Garden; Dong v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
36

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Opinion of the Court

early mail-in voting.  Ibid.22
  That  debate,  the  District  Court  concluded,  was  sincere
and led to the passage of HB 2023 in 2016.  Proponents of
the bill repeatedly argued that mail-in ballots are more sus-
ceptible to fraud than in-person voting.  Ibid.  The bill found
support from a few minority officials and organizations, one
of which expressed concern that ballot collectors were tak-
ing  advantage  of  elderly  Latino  voters.    Ibid.    And  while
some opponents of the bill accused Republican legislators of
harboring  racially  discriminatory  motives,  that  view  was
not uniform.  See ibid.  One Democratic state senator pith-
ily  described  the  “ ‘problem’ ” HB  2023  aimed  to  “ ‘solv[e]’ ”
as  the  fact  that  “ ‘one  party  is  better  at  collecting  ballots
than  the  other  one.’ ”    Id.,  at  882  (quoting  Tr.  Exh.  25,  at
35).
  We are more than satisfied that the District Court’s in-
terpretation of the evidence is permissible.  The spark for
the debate over mail-in voting may well have been provided
by  one  Senator’s  enflamed  partisanship,  but partisan  mo-
tives are not the same as racial motives.  See Cooper v. Har-
ris, 581 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at 19–20).  The
District Court noted that the voting preferences of members
of a racial group may make the former look like the latter,
but  it  carefully  distinguished  between  the  two.    See  329
F. Supp. 3d, at 879, 882.  And while the District Court rec-
ognized that the “racially-tinged” video helped spur the de-
bate  about  ballot  collection,  it  found  no  evidence  that  the
legislature as a whole was imbued with racial motives.  Id.,
at 879–880.

——————

22 The District Court also noted prior attempts on the part of the Ari-
zona Legislature to regulate or limit third-party ballot collection in 2011
and 2013.  It reasonably concluded that any procedural irregularities in
those attempts had less probative value for inferring the purpose behind
HB 2023 because the bills were passed “during different legislative ses-
sions  by  a  substantially  different  composition  of  legislators.”    329
F. Supp. 3d, at 881.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the court's interpretation of evidence related to a voting law. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
214

PRESLEY  v.  GEORGIA

Per Curiam

“[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance
an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the
closure  must  be  no  broader  than  necessary  to  protect
that  interest,  the  trial  court  must  consider  reasonable
alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make
ﬁndings adequate to support the closure.”  Id., at 48.

In  upholding  exclusion  of  the  public  at  juror  voir  dire  in
the  instant  case,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia  concluded,
despite  our  explicit  statements  to  the  contrary,  that  trial
courts  need  not  consider  alternatives  to  closure  absent  an
opposing  party’s  proffer  of  some  alternatives.  While  the
Supreme Court of Georgia concluded this was an open ques
tion  under  this  Court’s  precedents,  the  statement  in  Waller
that  “the  trial  court  must  consider  reasonable  alternatives
to  closing  the  proceeding”  settles  the  point.  Ibid.  If  that
statement  leaves  any  room  for  doubt,  the  Court  was  more
explicit in Press-Enterprise I:

“Even  with  ﬁndings  adequate  to  support  closure,  the
trial court’s orders denying access to voir dire testimony
failed to consider whether alternatives were available to
protect  the  interests  of  the  prospective  jurors  that  the
trial  court’s  orders  sought  to  guard.  Absent  consider
ation of alternatives to closure, the trial court could not
constitutionally  close  the  voir  dire.”  464  U. S.,  at  511.

The  conclusion  that  trial  courts  are  required  to  consider
alternatives to closure even when they are not offered by the
parties is clear not only from this Court’s precedents but also
from the premise that “[t]he process of juror selection is itself
a matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but to
the criminal justice system.”  Id., at 505.  The public has a
right  to  be  present  whether  or  not  any  party  has  asserted
the  right.  In  Press-Enterprise  I,  for  instance,  neither  the
defendant nor  the prosecution requested  an open courtroom
during  juror  voir  dire  proceedings;  in  fact,  both  speciﬁcally
argued  in  favor  of  keeping  the  transcript  of  the  proceed
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the legal precedent regarding the closure of court proceedings, specifically during jury selection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

entirely new programmatic exemption.

At the outset, Congress clearly knows how to provide for
classwide deferred action when it wishes to do so.  On mul-
tiple  occasions,  Congress  has  used  express  language  to
make certain classes of individuals eligible for deferred ac-
tion.  See 8 U. S. C. §§1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV) (certain indi-
viduals covered under the Violence Against Women Act are
“eligible for deferred action”); Victims of Trafficking and Vi-
olence Protection Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 1522 (“ ‘Any individ-
ual  described  in  subclause  (I)  is  eligible  for  deferred  ac-
tion’ ”);  Uniting  and  Strengthening  America  by  Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Ter-
rorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, §423(b), 115 Stat.
361 (“Such spouse, child, son, or daughter may be eligible
for  deferred  action”);  National  Defense  Authorization  Act
for  Fiscal  Year  2004,  §§1703(c)(1)(A),  (2),  117  Stat.  1694–
1695 (“Such spouse or child shall be eligible for deferred ac-
tion”).6  Congress has failed to provide similar explicit pro-
visions for DACA recipients, and the immigration laws con-
tain  no  indication  that  DHS  can,  at  will,  create  its  own
categorical policies for deferred action.

Other  provisions  pertaining  to  relief  from  removal  fur-
ther demonstrate that DHS lacked the delegated authority

——————

6 In  the  DAPA  litigation,  DHS  noted  that  some  deferred-action  pro-
grams have been implemented by the Executive Branch without explicit
legislation.    But  “ ‘past  practice  does  not,  by  itself,  create  [executive]
power.’ ”  Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 532 (2008) (quoting Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 686 (1981)).  If any of these programs had
been challenged, it would seem that they would be legally infirm for the
same reasons as DACA.  Moreover, if DHS had the authority to create
new categories of aliens eligible for deferred action, then all of Congress’
deferred-action  legislation  was  but  a  superfluous  exercise.  Duncan  v.
Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001).  Finally, whereas some deferred-action
programs were followed by legislation, DACA has existed for eight years,
and Congress is no closer to a legislative solution than it was in 2012.
See, e.g., American Dream and Promise Act of 2019, H. R. 6, 116th Cong.,
1st Sess.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the legal arguments surrounding the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

11

Opinion of the Court

III

As  was  our  approach  in  Whalen,  we  will  assume  for
present  purposes  that  the  Government’s  challenged  in-
quiries  implicate  a  privacy  interest  of  constitutional  sig-
nificance.  429  U. S.,  at  599,  605.10   We  hold,  however,

——————

10 The  opinions  concurring  in  the  judgment  disagree  with  this  ap-
proach  and  would  instead  provide  a  definitive  answer  to  the  question
whether  there  is  a  constitutional  right  to  informational  privacy.  Post,
at 6–7 (opinion of SCALIA, J.); post, at 1 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).  One of
these  opinions  expresses  concern  that  our failure  to  do  so  will  “har[m]
our image, if not our self-respect,” post, at 7 (SCALIA, J.), and will cause
practical problems, post, at 8–9.  There are sound reasons for eschewing
the concurring opinions’ recommended course.

“The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not
sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially
as  arbiters  of  legal  questions  presented  and  argued  by  the  parties
before  them.”  Carducci  v.  Regan,  714  F. 2d  171,  177  (CADC  1983)
(opinion for the court by Scalia, J.).  In this case, petitioners did not ask
us to hold that there is no constitutional right to informational privacy,
and  respondents  and  their  amici  thus  understandably  refrained  from
addressing  that  issue  in  detail.  It  is  undesirable  for  us  to  decide  a
matter of this importance in a case in which we do not have the benefit
of briefing by the parties and in which potential amici had little notice
that  the  matter  might  be  decided.      See  Pet.  for  Cert.  15  (“no  need  in
this  case”  for  broad  decision  on  “the  scope  of  a  constitutionally-based
right to privacy for certain information”).  Particularly in cases like this
one,  where  we  have  only  the  “scarce  and  open-ended”  guideposts  of
substantive  due  process  to  show  us  the  way,  see  Collins  v.  Harker
Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992), the Court has repeatedly recognized
the  benefits  of  proceeding  with  caution.    E.g.,  Herrera  v.  Collins,  506
U. S.  390,  417  (1993)  (joined  by  SCALIA,  J.)  (assuming  “for  the  sake  of
argument . . . that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of
‘actual  innocence’ ”  made  after  conviction  would  render  execution
unconstitutional);  Cruzan  v.  Director,  Mo.  Dept.  of  Health,  497  U. S.
261,  279  (1990)  (joined  by  SCALIA,  J.)  (“[W]e  assume  that  the  United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition”); Regents of
Univ.  of  Mich.  v.  Ewing,  474  U. S.  214,  222–223  (1985)  (“assum[ing],
without deciding, that federal courts can review an academic decision of
a  public  educational  institution  under  a  substantive  due  process  stan-
dard”); Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U. S. 78, 91–
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses privacy rights and the Court's approach to deciding cases involving such rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 624 (1998)

653

Opinion of the Court

issue of material fact. Evidence which was merely colorable
or not signiﬁcantly probative would not have been sufﬁcient.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 249–250
(1986).

We acknowledge the presence of other evidence in the rec-
ord before the Court of Appeals which, subject to further
arguments and examination, might support afﬁrmance of the
trial court’s ruling. For instance, the record contains sub-
stantial testimony from numerous health experts indicating
that it is safe to treat patients infected with HIV in dental
ofﬁces. App. 66–68, 88–90, 264–266, 268. We are unable to
determine the import of this evidence, however. The record
does not disclose whether the expert testimony submitted by
respondent turned on evidence available in September 1994.
See id., at 69–70 (expert testimony relied in part on materi-
als published after September 1994).

There are reasons to doubt whether petitioner advanced
evidence sufﬁcient to raise a triable issue of fact on the
signiﬁcance of the risk. Petitioner relied on two principal
points: First, he asserted that the use of high-speed drills
and surface cooling with water created a risk of airborne
HIV transmission. The study on which petitioner relied
was inconclusive, however, determining only that “[f]urther
work is required to determine whether such a risk exists.”
Johnson & Robinson, Human Immunodeﬁciency Virus-1
(HIV–1) in the Vapors of Surgical Power Instruments, 33 J.
of Medical Virology 47 (1991). Petitioner’s expert witness
conceded, moreover, that no evidence suggested the spray
could transmit HIV. His opinion on airborne risk was based
on the absence of contrary evidence, not on positive data.
App. 166. Scientiﬁc evidence and expert testimony must
have a traceable, analytical basis in objective fact before it
may be considered on summary judgment. See General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U. S. 136, 144–145, 146 (1997).
Second, petitioner argues that, as of September 1994, CDC
had identiﬁed seven dental workers with possible occupa-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court from a case. It contains legal citations, discusses evidence and legal arguments, and uses legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

BREYER, J., dissenting

presents  evidence  in  favor  of  the  former  proposition,  does
not, because it cannot, convincingly show that the Second
Amendment  seeks  to  maintain  the  latter  in  pristine,  un-
regulated form.

To  the  contrary,  colonial  history  itself  offers  important
examples  of  the  kinds  of  gun  regulation  that  citizens
would  then  have  thought  compatible  with  the  “right  to
keep  and  bear  arms,”  whether  embodied  in  Federal  or
State Constitutions, or the background common law.  And
those  examples  include  substantial  regulation  of  firearms
in urban areas, including regulations that imposed obsta-
cles to the use of firearms for the protection of the home.

Boston,  Philadelphia,  and  New  York  City,  the  three
largest cities in America during that period, all restricted
the  firing  of  guns  within  city  limits  to  at  least  some  de-
gree.  See  Churchill,  Gun  Regulation,  the  Police  Power,
and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America, 25 Law &
Hist. Rev. 139, 162 (2007); Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
Census,  C.  Gibson,  Population  of  the  100  Largest  Cities
and  Other  Urban  Places  in  the  United  States:  1790  to
1990  (1998)  (Table  2),  online  at  http://www.census.gov/
population/documentation/twps0027/tab02.txt  (all  Inter-
net  materials  as  visited  June  19,  2008,  and  available  in
Clerk of Court’s case file).  Boston in 1746 had a law pro-
hibiting the “discharge” of “any Gun or Pistol charged with
Shot or Ball in the Town” on penalty of 40 shillings, a law
that was later revived in 1778.  See Act of May 28, 1746,
ch.  10;  An  Act  for  Reviving  and  Continuing  Sundry  Laws
that are Expired, and Near Expiring, 1778 Massachusetts
Session Laws, ch. 5, pp. 193, 194.  Philadelphia prohibited,
on penalty of 5 shillings (or two days in jail if the fine were
not paid), firing a gun or setting off fireworks in Philadel-
phia  without  a  “governor’s  special  license.”    See  Act  of
Aug.  26,  1721,  §4,  in  3  Mitchell,  Statutes  at  Large  of
Pennsylvania  253–254.    And  New  York  City  banned,  on
penalty  of  a  20-shilling  fine,  the  firing  of  guns  (even  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It discusses historical gun regulations and their relevance to the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>