<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

VEGA v. TEKOH

Syllabus

constitute federal “law” that can provide the ground for a §1983 claim
cannot succeed unless Tekoh can persuade the Court that this “law”
should  be  expanded  to  include  the  right  to  sue  for  damages  under
§1983.    “A  judicially  crafted”  prophylactic  rule  should  apply  “only
where its benefits outweigh its costs,” Shatzer, 559 U. S., at 106.  Here,
while the benefits of permitting the assertion of Miranda claims under
§1983 would be slight, the costs would be substantial.  For example,
allowing a claim like Tekoh’s would disserve “judicial economy,” Park-
lane  Hosiery Co.  v. Shore, 439  U. S.  322,  326,  by  requiring  a  federal
judge or jury to adjudicate a factual question (whether Tekoh was in
custody  when  questioned)  that  had  already  been  decided  by  a  state
court.  Allowing §1983 suits based on Miranda claims could also pre-
sent many procedural issues.  Miranda and its progeny provide suffi-
cient protection for the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination.  Pp. 13–16.

985 F. 3d 713, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and THOMAS, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  KAGAN,
J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  BREYER  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision and reasoning. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a condensed overview rather than the full textual content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE

GORSUCH, J., concurring

to “oblige the guilty to repair the damage” would have pro-
vided  just  cause  for  reprisals  or  worse.   1  E.  de  Vattel,
The Law of Nations, bk. II, §76, p. 145 (1760).  Founding-
era cases involving piracy seem to confirm the point too.  In-
jured  plaintiffs  routinely  brought  in  rem  proceedings
against  ships  involved  in  piracy  regardless  of  the  owner’s
personal  involvement  or  liability.   See,  e.g.,  Harmony  v.
United States, 2 How. 210, 233–234 (1844).  In fact, one of
the earliest ATS cases involved an action against a vessel.
See  Jansen  v.  The  Vrow  Christina  Magdalena,  13  F. Cas.
356,  358–359  (No.  7,216)  (SC  1794).    All  of  which  under-
scores  the  ATS  has  never  distinguished  between  defend-
ants.

II
The real problem with this lawsuit and others like it thus
isn’t whether the defendant happens to be a corporation.  To
my mind, it’s this:  Just as the ATS nowhere privileges cor-
porations, it nowhere deputizes the Judiciary to create new
causes of action.  Rather, the statute confers “jurisdiction”
on federal courts to adjudicate “tort” claims by aliens for vi-
olations “of the law of nations.”  Perhaps this language was
originally understood to furnish federal courts with author-
ity  to  entertain  a  limited  number  of  specific  and  existing
intentional tort claims that, if left unremedied, could give
rise to reprisals or war.  See Jesner, 584 U. S., at ___–___
(opinion of GORSUCH, J.); Bellia, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 515–
521.  Perhaps, too, the law affords federal courts jurisdic-
tion to hear any other tort claims Congress chooses to cre-
ate.  But nothing in the statute’s terse terms obviously au-
thorizes  federal  courts  to  invent  new  causes  of  action  on
their own.

Nor would I find such an extraordinary authority linger-
ing  latent  after  all  this  time.    This  Court  has  never—not
once in 230 years—invoked the ATS to create a new cause
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe. It delves into the interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and its applicability to corporate defendants.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

The majority suggests that Irwin stands for the proposi-
tion  that  a  condition  on  a  waiver  of  sovereign  immunity
must be strictly construed, but then goes on to argue that it
is not necessarily jurisdictional.  Ante, at 8.  However, our
decision in United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527 (1995),
decided five years after Irwin, demonstrates that statutes
of limitations in suits brought against the United States are
no less jurisdictional now than they were before Irwin.  In
Williams, the Court cited Dalm’s holding that failure to file
a  claim  against  the  Government  for  a  federal  tax  refund
within the statute-of-limitations period operates as a juris-
dictional bar to suit, and the Court reaffirmed that a stat-
ute  of  limitations  “narrow[s]  the  waiver  of  sovereign  im-
munity.”  514 U. S., at 534, n. 7 (citing 494 U. S., at 602).1
Irwin, thus, does not disrupt this Court’s long held under-
standing that conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity
are presumptively jurisdictional.

II
Regardless of whether conditions on waivers of sovereign
immunity  remain  jurisdictional  post-Irwin,  we  have  said
that, where the Court has offered a “definitive earlier inter-
pretation” of a statutory time bar as jurisdictional, we will
continue to treat it as jurisdictional unless and until Con-
gress  directs  otherwise.    John  R.  Sand  &  Gravel  Co.  v.
United  States,  552  U. S.  130,  137–138  (2008);  see  also
United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 416 (2015)

——————

1 I have previously noted that Irwin “does perhaps narrow the scope of
the sovereign immunity canon.”  Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401,
426 (2004) (dissenting opinion).  But, it “does so only in limited circum-
stances,” such as “where the Government is made subject to suit to the
same extent and in the same manner as private parties are.”  Ibid. (em-
phasis added).  This is not one of those circumstances.  The Quiet Title
Act’s  framework  exclusively  governs  actions  to  quiet  title  against  the
United States.  And, it includes a number of conditions favorable to the
Federal Government that would not apply in traditional quiet title ac-
tions among private litigants.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Opinion of the Court

the  Court  concluded  that  Congress  could  do  the  same  for
that benefits program.  446 U. S., at 651–652.

Those two precedents dictate the result here.  The defer-
ential rational-basis test applies.  And Puerto Rico’s tax sta-
tus—in particular, the fact that residents of Puerto Rico are
typically exempt from most federal income, gift, estate, and
excise taxes—supplies a rational basis for likewise distin-
guishing  residents  of  Puerto  Rico  from  residents  of  the
States  for  purposes  of  the  Supplemental  Security  Income
benefits program.  See Torres, 435 U. S., at 5, n. 7; Rosario,
446 U. S., at 652.  In devising tax and benefits programs, it
is  reasonable  for  Congress  to  take  account  of  the  general
balance  of  benefits  to  and  burdens  on  the  residents  of
Puerto Rico.  In doing so, Congress need not conduct a dol-
lar-to-dollar  comparison  of  how  its  tax  and  benefits  pro-
grams apply in the States as compared to the Territories,
either at the individual or collective level.  See Torres, 435
U. S., at 3–5, and n. 7; Rosario, 446 U. S., at 652.  Congress
need only have a rational basis for its tax and benefits pro-
grams.  Congress has satisfied that requirement here.

Moreover, Vaello Madero’s position would usher in poten-
tially far-reaching consequences.  For one, Congress would
presumably need to extend not just Supplemental Security
Income  but  also  many  other  federal  benefits  programs  to
residents of the Territories in the same way that those pro-
grams cover residents of the States.  And if this Court were
to  require  identical  treatment  on  the  benefits  side,  resi-
dents  of  the  States  could  presumably  insist  that  federal
taxes be imposed on residents of Puerto Rico and other Ter-
ritories  in  the  same  way  that  those  taxes  are  imposed  on
residents of the States.  Doing that, however, would inflict
significant  new  financial  burdens  on  residents  of  Puerto
Rico, with serious implications for the Puerto Rican people
and the Puerto Rican economy.  The Constitution does not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It cites previous cases and delves into the legal reasoning behind a decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. WISCONSIN

STATE LEGISLATURE
KAGAN, J., dissenting

COVID pandemic rages, the Court has failed to adequately
protect the Nation’s voters.

*

  *

  *
  For all these reasons, I would vacate the court of appeals’
stay.    The  facts,  as  found  by  the  district  court,  are  clear:
Tens  of  thousands  of  Wisconsinites,  through  no  fault  of
their own, may receive their mail ballots too late to return
them  by  Election  Day.   Without the district court’s  order,
they  must  opt  between  “brav[ing]  the  polls,”  with  all  the
risk that entails, and “los[ing] their right to vote.”  Repub-
lican National Committee, 589 U. S., at ___ (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 6).  The voters of Wisconsin deserve
a better choice.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically focusing on voting rights during the COVID-19 pandemic. It argues against a stay on a lower court's order that would have extended the deadline for mail-in ballots.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

915

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5656.  Hacker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  522.

No.  09–5657.  Saucedo-Martinez,  aka  Saucedo  v.  United
States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 323
Fed.  Appx.  373.

No. 09–5658.  Miller v. United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  362.

No.  09–5660.  Lechuga-Montalvo,  aka  Lechoga-Sanchez,
aka Lechuga-Sanchez v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  666.

No.  09–5662.  Jackson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  288.

No. 09–5666.  Harris v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  544.

No.  09–5667.  Grooms  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  385.

No.  09–5668.  Ibanez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  673.

No.  09–5669.  Smith  v.  Tallman  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  688.

No.  09–5670.  Vasquez-Garcia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  394.

No.  09–5671.  Arriaga-Guerrero  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  721.

No.  09–5672.  Bohol  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  86.

No. 09–5675.  Hill v.  United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–5676.  Felder v.  Fischer,  Commissioner, New York
Department  of  Correctional  Services.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5677.  Holyfield  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  828.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C.

KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment

banc or Supreme Court review—that the (now new) attor-
ney  general  had  an  urgent reason  to  rejoin  the suit:  If  he
did not, the law would be invalidated.  The motion to inter-
vene, then, was not an attempt to escape the consequences
of failing to adhere to appellate deadlines, as in the hypo-
thetical offered above.  The motion was instead a response
to a major shift in the litigation, creating a new demand for
the  attorney  general’s  participation.    And  that  real-world
fact answers EMW’s argument.  Granting the motion would
not countenance an end-run around the timely-appeal rule
by giving the attorney general a do-over.  It would simply
recognize that only after the time for appeal had come and
gone had a need arisen for the attorney general to reenter
the suit.

II
  With  that  threshold  objection  answered,  the  issue  be-
comes how the factors bearing on intervention motions play
out.  I agree with much of what the Court says on that issue
(and  also  with  its  view  that  the  attorney  general’s  agree-
ment did not preclude his intervention).  But I see no reason
to cast the analysis, even partially, in constitutional terms.
See ante, at 7–9.  Our longstanding practice is to avoid un-
necessary discussion of constitutional questions.  See, e.g.,
Ashwander  v.  TVA,  297  U. S.  288,  345–348  (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).  And contra the majority, no in-
vocation of, or lofty observations about, the Constitution are
here  needed.    The  considerations  governing  intervention
motions—applying  equivalently  to  any  person  seeking  to
intervene,  including  the  attorney  general—show  why  the
Sixth Circuit went wrong in closing off the suit.  See gener-
ally Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24.
  Most  fundamentally,  the  attorney  general  had  a  strong
reason for intervening.  Once again, the secretary had de-
fended the challenged law as constitutional until the Sixth
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the attorney general's right to intervene in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

7

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

new marriage and to celebrate the couple.2

Accordingly,  Phillips’  creation  of  custom  wedding  cakes
is  expressive.  The  use  of  his  artistic  talents  to  create  a
well-recognized  symbol  that  celebrates  the  beginning  of  a
marriage  clearly  communicates  a  message—certainly
more  so  than  nude  dancing,  Barnes  v.  Glen  Theatre,  Inc.,
501  U. S.  560,  565–566  (1991),  or  flying  a  plain  red  flag,
Stromberg  v.  California,  283  U. S.  359,  369  (1931).3    By
forcing Phillips to create custom wedding cakes for same
——————

2 The Colorado Court of Appeals acknowledged that “a wedding cake,

in  some  circumstances,  may  convey  a  particularized  message  celebrat
ing  same-sex  marriage,”  depending  on  its  “design”  and  whether  it  has
“written  inscriptions.”  Craig  v.  Masterpiece  Cakeshop,  Inc.,  370  P. 3d
272,  288  (2015).    But  a  wedding  cake  needs  no  particular  design  or
written  words  to  communicate  the  basic  message  that  a  wedding  is
occurring, a marriage has  begun, and the couple should be celebrated.
Wedding  cakes  have  long  varied  in  color,  decorations,  and  style,  but
those differences do not prevent people from recognizing wedding cakes
as wedding cakes.  See Charsley, Interpretation and Custom: The Case
of  the  Wedding  Cake,  22  Man  93,  96  (1987).    And  regardless,  the
Commission’s  order  does  not  distinguish  between  plain  wedding  cakes
and  wedding  cakes  with  particular  designs  or  inscriptions;  it  requires
Phillips  to  make  any  wedding  cake  for  a  same-sex  wedding  that  he
would make for an opposite-sex wedding.

3 The  dissent  faults  Phillips  for  not  “submitting  . . .  evidence”  that
wedding  cakes  communicate  a  message.  Post,  at  2,  n. 1  (opinion  of
GINSBURG,  J.).  But  this  requirement  finds  no  support  in  our  prece
dents.  This  Court  did  not  insist  that  the  parties  submit  evidence
detailing the expressive nature of parades, flags, or nude dancing.  See
Hurley  v.  Irish-American  Gay,  Lesbian  and  Bisexual  Group  of  Boston,
Inc.,  515  U. S.  557,  568–570  (1995);  Spence,  418  U. S.,  at  410–411;
Barnes, 501 U. S., at 565–566.  And we do not need extensive evidence
here  to  conclude  that  Phillips’  artistry  is  expressive,  see  Hurley,  515
U. S., at 569, or that wedding cakes at least communicate the basic fact
that  “this  is  a  wedding,”  see  id.,  at  573–575.    Nor  does  it  matter  that
the couple also communicates a message through the cake.  More than
one  person can  be  engaged in  protected  speech  at  the  same  time.    See
id.,  at  569–570.    And  by  forcing  him  to  provide  the  cake,  Colorado  is
requiring Phillips to be “intimately connected” with the couple’s speech,
which  is  enough  to  implicate  his  First  Amendment  rights.    See  id.,  at
576.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It discusses the expressive nature of wedding cakes and the First Amendment rights of the baker.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1084

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 7, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–7429.  Garcia-Villegas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d  949.

No.  09–7430.  Hilliard  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  500.

No.  09–7431.  Henderson-El  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7432.  Holmes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  334.

No.  09–7434.  Hernandez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7437.  Gruber  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7438.  Higgins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  381.

No. 09–7439.  Griggs v.  United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  341.

No. 09–7440.  Nweke v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  237.

No. 09–7447.  Romero v.  United States Parole Commission.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.
Appx.  245.

No. 09–7449.  Porter v. United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7459.  Frauendorfer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7463.  Gainer v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7464.  Hunter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7465.  Carapia-Garcia v.  United States.  C.  A. 11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7473.  Medina  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  493.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, circuit courts, and disposition information. This type of information is not meant to be read sequentially like a narrative and is not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Syllabus

deference.  Similarly  unavailing  is  the  City’s  recent  contention  that
section 3.21 does not even apply to CSS’s refusal to certify same-sex
couples.  That contention ignores the broad sweep of section 3.21’s text,
as well as the fact that the City adopted the current version of section
3.21 shortly after declaring that it would make CSS’s obligation to cer-
tify same-sex couples “explicit” in future contracts.  Finally, because
state  law  makes  clear  that  the  City’s  authority  to  grant  exceptions
from section 3.21 also governs section 15.1’s general prohibition on sex-
ual orientation discrimination, the contract as a whole contains no gen-
erally applicable non-discrimination requirement.  Pp. 7–10.

(2) Philadelphia’s Fair Practices Ordinance, which as relevant for-
bids  interfering  with  the  public  accommodations  opportunities  of  an
individual based on sexual orientation, does not apply to CSS’s actions
here.  The Ordinance defines a public accommodation in relevant part
to include a provider “whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, ad-
vantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise
made available to the public.”  Phila. Code §9–1102(1)(w).  Certifica-
tion  is  not  “made  available  to  the  public”  in  the  usual  sense  of  the
words.  Certification as a foster parent is not readily accessible to the
public;  the  process  involves  a  customized  and  selective  assessment
that bears little resemblance to staying in a hotel, eating at a restau-
rant, or riding a bus.  The District Court’s contrary conclusion did not
take into account the uniquely selective nature of foster care certifica-
tion.  Pp. 10–13.

(b) The contractual non-discrimination requirement burdens CSS’s
religious exercise and is not generally applicable, so it is subject to “the
most rigorous of scrutiny.”  Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546.  A government
policy can survive strict scrutiny only if it advances compelling inter-
ests  and  is  narrowly  tailored  to  achieve  those  interests.    Ibid.  The
question is not whether the City has a compelling interest in enforcing
its non-discrimination policies generally, but whether it has such an
interest  in  denying  an  exception  to  CSS.    Under  the  circumstances
here, the City does not have a compelling interest in refusing to con-
tract with CSS.  CSS seeks only an accommodation that will allow it
to continue serving the children of Philadelphia in a manner consistent
with  its  religious  beliefs;  it  does  not  seek  to  impose  those  beliefs  on
anyone else.  The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the
provision  of  foster  care  services  unless  the  agency  agrees  to  certify
same-sex couples as foster parents cannot survive strict scrutiny and
violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  The Court
does  not  consider  whether  the  City’s  actions  also  violate  the  Free
Speech Clause.  Pp. 13–15.

922 F. 3d. 140, reversed and remanded.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case. It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a condensed overview.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
THOMAS, J., dissenting

State could not be injured because the Act was not a direct
legal regulation.  Rather, it was a mere offer to bargain—it
“imposed” no “burden . . . upon the States” and did not re-
quire them “to do or to yield anything” of its own force.  Id.,
at 482.  The State could not seek judicial redress because
the  contractual  nature  of  the  Act’s  provisions  meant  that
States could vindicate their own rights “by the simple expe-
dient  of  not  yielding.”    Ibid.;  see  also  Corwin,  36  Harv.
L. Rev.,  at  579  (noting  that  the  Maternity  Act  adhered  to
the traditional requirements of state consent and the “gen-
eral  caveat  against  jurisdictional  rights  following  in  the
wake of appropriations”). “[T]he Justices in Mellon under-
stood that Congress’ power to spend money is not a legisla-
tive power.”  Engdahl, 52 S. D. L. Rev., at 498 (emphasis in
original).

Cases involving New Deal spending programs teach the
same  lesson.    For  example,  United  States  v.  Butler,  297
U. S. 1 (1936), concerned the constitutionality of the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act, which offered subsidies to farmers
not to sell crops.  The Government defended the Act on the
ground that it did not regulate any private or state party.
Instead, “[a]ny commands or restrictions in the Act [were]
imposed only upon the use by [federal] administrative offi-
cials  of  the  money  granted.”  Brief  for  United  States  in
United States v. Butler, O. T. 1935, No. 401, p. 264.  In line
with the traditional distinction between mere spending and
regulatory  commands,  the  Government  urged  that  “Con-
gress ha[d] not gone beyond its power of authorizing an ex-
penditure” precisely because “[i]t ha[d] not sought to force
or  command  citizens  to  receive  the  money  offered  and  to
perform the conditions upon which the funds are to be dis-
bursed.”  Id., at 265.  The Government expressly relied on
the  contractual  nature  of  the  Act’s  conditions,  as  distinct
from any “exercise of sovereign regulation”:

“It would be most unusual to suppose that a contract
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge named Thomas. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to the constitutionality of a spending program.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

Syllabus

GINSBURG, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., and GORSUCH,
J., filed concurring opinions.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the citation and a summary of opinions for a Supreme Court case. It is not the main body of the legal text and is likely part of a case summary or legal database entry.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summary/Opinion Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 775 (1998)

785

Opinion of the Court

ual harassment by the existence of the agency relationship
with his employer because his responsibilities include close
proximity to and regular contact with the victim,” the court
held that traditional agency law does not employ so broad a
concept of aid as a predicate of employer liability, but re-
quires something more than a mere combination of agency
relationship and improper conduct by the agent.
Ibid. Be-
cause neither Terry nor Silverman threatened to ﬁre or
demote Faragher, the court concluded that their agency
relationship did not facilitate their harassment.

Ibid.

The en banc court also afﬁrmed the panel’s ruling that the
City lacked constructive knowledge of the supervisors’ har-
assment. The court read the District Court’s opinion to rest
on an erroneous legal conclusion that any harassment perva-
sive enough to create a hostile environment must a fortiori
also sufﬁce to charge the employer with constructive knowl-
Id., at 1538. Rejecting this approach, the court re-
edge.
viewed the record and found no adequate factual basis to
conclude that the harassment was so pervasive that the City
should have known of it, relying on the facts that the harass-
ment occurred intermittently, over a long period of time, and
at a remote location.
In footnotes, the court also
rejected the arguments that the City should be deemed to
have known of the harassment through Gordon, id., at 1538,
n. 9, or charged with constructive knowledge because of its
failure to disseminate its sexual harassment policy among
the lifeguards, id., at 1539, n. 11.

Ibid.

Since our decision in Meritor, Courts of Appeals have
struggled to derive manageable standards to govern em-
ployer liability for hostile environment harassment perpe-
trated by supervisory employees. While following our ad-
monition to ﬁnd guidance in the common law of agency, as
embodied in the Restatement, the Courts of Appeals have
adopted different approaches. Compare, e. g., Harrison v.
Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F. 3d 1437 (CA10 1997), vacated, post,
p. 947; 111 F. 3d 1530 (CA11 1997) (case below); Gary v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court in the case 524 U.S. 775 (1998). It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to employer liability for hostile work environment harassment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529BV$TITL 08-17-01 12:59:25

UNITED STATES REPORTS

VOLUME 529

CASES ADJUDGED

IN

THE SUPREME COURT

AT

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

February 29 Through May 25, 2000

FRANK D. WAGNER

reporter of decisions

WASHINGTON : 2001

Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper

For sale by the U. S. Government Printing Ofﬁce
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be metadata and copyright information found at the beginning of a legal document (United States Reports). It is not the actual content meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Copyright and Publication Information</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

This  state  of  affairs  sparked  efforts  to  eliminate  hypo-
thetical questions as a requirement.  See, e.g., 1 Wigmore
2d §686, at 1094 (“The Hypothetical Question must go, as a
requirement.    Its  abuses  have  become  so  obstructive  and
nauseous that no remedy short of extirpation will suffice”
(emphasis  deleted)).    Change  began  first  in  the  courts,
which allowed experts to sit through trial and then provide
their  opinion  “ ‘upon  the  evidence.’ ”    3  C.  Chamberlayne,
Modern  Law  of  Evidence  §§2482,  2483,  pp.  3343–3346
(1912).

More formalized rule changes soon followed.  In 1937, the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws incorporated a pro-
vision in their Model Expert Testimony Act that permitted
experts to give their opinions without preliminarily disclos-
ing  their  underlying  facts  or  data.    Advisory  Committee’s
Notes to Fed. Rule Evid. 705.  In quick succession, both the
Model Code of Evidence, issued by the American Law Insti-
tute in 1942, and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, approved
by  the  American  Bar  Association  in  1953,  recommended
abandonment  of  hypothetical  questions.    See  ALI,  Model
Code of Evidence Rule 409, Comment b, p. 211 (the hypo-
thetical  question  “has  been  so  grossly  abused  as  to  be  al-
most a scandal”); Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 58, Com-
ment,  p.  194  (“This  rule  does  away  with  the  necessity  of
following  the  practice  (grossly  abused)  of  using  the  hypo-
thetical question”).  In 1972, the Federal Rules of Evidence
followed  suit  with  Rules  703  and  705,  and  many  States
made similar changes.

B
What replaced hypotheticals was the procedure exempli-
fied by the Federal Rules of Evidence.1  Rule 703 provides

——————

1 I  refer  to  the  Federal  Rules  to  illustrate  the  consequences  of  the
Court’s opinion.  The witness in this case testified in an Arizona state
court,  and  his  testimony  was  therefore  governed  by  the  relevant  state
rules, which are virtually identical to the Federal Rules.  Of course, the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito. It discusses the history and evolution of hypothetical questions in expert testimony, citing legal precedents and rule changes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

Opinion of the Court

Kingdom  had,  through  a  Nigerian  subsidiary,  aided  and
abetted the Nigerian Government in human-rights abuses.
Id., at 123.  In Kiobel, the Court of Appeals held that the
ATS does not extend to suits against corporations.  Id., at
120.  This  Court  granted  certiorari  in  Kiobel.  565  U. S.
961 (2011).

After additional briefing and reargument in Kiobel, this
Court held that, given all the circumstances, the suit could
not be maintained under the ATS.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum  Co.,  569  U. S.  108,  114,  124–125  (2013).    The
rationale  of  the  holding,  however,  was  not  that  the  ATS
does not extend to suits against foreign corporations.  That
question  was  left  unresolved.  The  Court  ruled,  instead,
that “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United
States.”  Id., at 124.  Dismissal of the action was required
based on the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion of statutes.

So  while  this  Court  in  Kiobel  affirmed  the  ruling  that
the  action  there  could  not  be  maintained,  it  did  not  ad-
dress  the  broader  holding  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  that
dismissal  was  required  because  corporations  may  not  be
sued under the ATS.  Still, the courts of the Second Circuit
deemed that broader holding to be binding precedent.  As
a  consequence,  in  the  instant  case  the  District  Court  dis-
missed petitioners’ ATS claims based on the earlier Kiobel
holding  in  the  Court  of  Appeals;  and  on  review  of  the
dismissal order the Court of Appeals, also adhering to its
earlier holding, affirmed.  In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort
Statute  Litigation,  808  F. 3d  144  (2015).    This  Court
granted  certiorari  in  the  instant  case.    581  U. S.  ___
(2017).

Since the Court of Appeals relied on its Kiobel holding in
the instant case, it is instructive to begin with an analysis
of  that  decision.  The  majority  opinion  in  Kiobel,  written
by  Judge  Cabranes,  held  that  the  ATS  does  not  apply  to
alleged international-law violations by a corporation.  621
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases (Kiobel) and discusses legal arguments related to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1012

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 9, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–235.  Macerich  Management  Co.  et  al.  v.  United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America Local
586  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
540  F.  3d  957.

No. 09–278.  Rivas v. Ohio.  Sup. Ct. Ohio.  Certiorari denied.

Reported  below:  121  Ohio  St.  3d  469,  905  N.  E.  2d  618.

No.  09–292.  Martini  v.  Godaddy.com  Inc.  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–300.  Avery  v.  First  Resolution  Management
Corp.  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  568  F.  3d  1018.

No. 09–311.  HCA Health Services of Oklahoma, Inc., dba
OU  Medical  Center,  dba  Children’s  Hospital,  et  al.  v.
Shinn, a Minor, By and  Through His Parents Shinn et vir.
Ct.  Civ.  App.  Okla.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–361.  Pirincci  v.  United  Parcel  Service.  Sup.  Ct.

Fla.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  12  So.  3d  220.

No.  09–371.  Hutzler  v.  West  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  App.
W. Va.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  223  W. Va.  461,  677
S.  E.  2d  655.

No.  09–387.  Davis  v.  Curry,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  370.

No.  09–390.  Laber  v.  Geren,  Secretary  of  the  Army.
C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.
Appx.  266.

No.  09–408.  Pole  v.  Randolph,  Acting  Warden.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  570  F.  3d  922.

No.  09–413.  Husband  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  170.

No.  09–414.  Hennessy  et  ux.  v.  Commissioner  of  Inter

nal  Revenue.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–422.  Murtagh  v.  Commissioner  of  Internal  Reve

nue.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 15 (2009)

23

Per Curiam

tive attributes, Schick should have produced testimony about
Belmontes’ “strong character as a child in the face of adver
sity.”  Ibid.  Schick should have illustrated that Belmontes
was “kind, responsible, and likeable”; that he “got along well
with  his  siblings”  and  was  “respectful  towards  his  grand
parents  despite  their  disapproval  of  his  mixed  racial  back
ground”;  and  that  he  “participated  in  community  activities,
kept up in school and got along with his teachers before [an]
illness, and made friends easily.”  Ibid.

But as recounted above and recognized by the state courts
and, originally, this very panel, Schick did put on substantial
mitigation evidence, much of it targeting the same “humaniz
ing”  theme  the  Ninth  Circuit  highlighted.  Compare,  e. g.,
ibid.  with  Record  2317  (death  of  10-month-old  sister);  id.,
at  2319,  2325  (difﬁcult  childhood);  id.,  at  2314–2315  (family
member’s  addictions);  id.,  at  2314–2315,  2324–2325  (family
strife  and  abuse);  id.,  at  2317,  2319,  2347–2348,  2397  (strong
character  as  a  child);  id.,  at  2326–2327  (close  relationship
with  siblings);  id.,  at  2317–2319  (close  relationship  with
grandparents); id., at 2348–2351 (participation in community
religious  events);  see  also,  e. g.,  Belmontes’  Traverse  to  Re
spondent’s  Return  to  Pet.  for  Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus  in
No. S–89–0736–EJG–JFM (ED Cal.), p. 64 (“[C]ounsel’s pres
entation  was  arguably  adequate  only  with  respect  to  [evi
dence]  of  ‘humanizing’  petitioner”).  The  sentencing  jury
was thus “well acquainted” with Belmontes’ background and
potential  humanizing  features.  Schriro  v.  Landrigan,  550
U. S.  465,  481  (2007).  Additional  evidence  on  these  points
would have offered an insigniﬁcant beneﬁt, if any at all.

The Ninth Circuit also determined that both the evidence
Schick  presented  and  the  additional  evidence  it  proposed
would  have  carried  greater  weight  if  Schick  had  submitted
expert testimony.  Such testimony could “make connections
between  the  various  themes  in  the  mitigation  case  and  ex
plain to the jury how they could have contributed to Belmon
tes’s  involvement  in  criminal  activity.”  529  F.  3d,  at  853.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, focusing on the arguments regarding mitigating evidence presented during a sentencing. It's part of a legal discussion and not the primary content meant to be read and understood by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of the Court

backed pledge law designed to keep the State’s electors in
line with its voting citizens.  As all States now do, Washing-
ton  requires  political  parties  fielding  presidential  candi-
dates to nominate a slate of electors.  See Wash. Rev. Code
§29A.56.320(1).  On Election Day, the State gives voters a
See
ballot  listing  only  the  candidates  themselves.
§29A.56.320(2).  When  the  vote  comes  in,  Washington
moves toward appointing the electors chosen by the party
whose candidate won the statewide count.  See ibid.  But
before the appointment can go into effect, each elector must
“execute [a] pledge” agreeing to “mark [her] ballots” for the
presidential (and vice presidential) candidate of the party
nominating her.  §29A.56.084.  And the elector must comply
with that pledge, or else face a sanction.  At the time rele-
vant here, the punishment was a civil fine of up to $1,000.
See §29A.56.340 (2016).3

This  case  involves  three  Washington  electors  who  vio-
lated their pledges in the 2016 presidential election.  That
year, Washington’s voters chose Hillary Clinton over Don-
ald Trump for President.  The State thus appointed as its
electors the nominees of the Washington State Democratic
Party.  Among those Democratic electors were petitioners
Peter  Chiafalo,  Levi  Guerra,  and  Esther  John  (the  Elec-
tors).  All  three  pledged  to  support  Hillary  Clinton  in  the
Electoral  College.  But  as  that  vote  approached,  they  de-
cided to cast their ballots for someone else.  The three hoped
they  could  encourage  other  electors—particularly  those
from States Donald Trump had carried—to follow their ex-
ample.  The idea was to deprive him of a majority of elec-
toral votes and throw the election into the House of Repre-
sentatives.  So the three Electors voted for Colin Powell for
President.  But  their  effort  failed.    Only  seven  electors

——————

3 Since the events in this case, Washington has repealed the fine.  It
now enforces pledges only by removing and replacing faithless electors.
See Wash. Rev. Code §29A.56.090(3) (2019).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in the case of *Chiafalo v. Washington*. It sets the context for the case, describing Washington's "backed pledge law" and the actions of three electors who violated their pledges.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MELLOULI v. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–1034.  Argued January 14, 2015—Decided June 1, 2015

Petitioner  Moones  Mellouli,  a  lawful  permanent  resident,  pleaded
guilty to a misdemeanor offense under Kansas law, the possession of
drug  paraphernalia  “to  . . .  store  [or]  conceal  . . .  a  controlled  sub-
stance.”    Kan.  Stat.  Ann.  §21–5709(b)(2).    The  sole  “paraphernalia”
Mellouli  was  charged  with  possessing  was  a  sock  in  which  he  had
placed  four  unidentified  orange  tablets.    Citing  Mellouli’s  misde-
meanor  conviction,  an  Immigration  Judge  ordered  him  deported  un-
der  8  U. S. C.  §1227(a)(2)(B)(i),  which  authorizes  the  deportation
(removal) of an alien “convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regu-
lation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).”  Section
802, in turn, limits the term “controlled substance” to a “drug or oth-
er  substance”  included  in  one  of  five  federal  schedules.    21  U. S. C.
§802(6).  Kansas defines “controlled substance” as any drug included
on  its  own  schedules,  without  reference  to  §802.    Kan.  Stat.  Ann.
§21–5701(a).  At the time of Mellouli’s conviction, Kansas’ schedules
included at least nine substances not on the federal lists.  The Board
of  Immigration  Appeals  (BIA)  affirmed  Mellouli’s  deportation  order,
and the Eighth Circuit denied his petition for review.

Held: Mellouli’s  Kansas  conviction  for  concealing  unnamed  pills  in  his

sock did not trigger removal under §1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Pp. 5–14.

(a) The  categorical  approach  historically  taken  in  determining
whether  a  state  conviction  renders  an  alien  removable  looks  to  the
statutory definition of the offense of conviction, not to the particulars
of the alien’s  conduct.  The state conviction triggers removal only if,
by definition, the underlying crime falls within a category of remova-
ble  offenses  defined  by  federal  law.    The  BIA  has  long  applied  the
categorical  approach  to  assess  whether  a  state  drug  conviction  trig-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the full legal reasoning and arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1113

529 U. S.

May 15, 2000

No. 99–8482. Pennington v. Caggiano et al. Dist. Ct.
App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 So.
2d 931.

No. 99–8484. Orbe v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 258 Va. 390, 519 S. E. 2d 808.

No. 99–8485. Williams v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 706 N. E. 2d 149.

No. 99–8486. Webb v. Evans, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 284.

No. 99–8493. Thornburg v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App.

Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 985 P. 2d 1234.

No. 99– 8497. McDonald v. Meyers, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Rockview, et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8499. Martin v. Perez et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1114.

No. 99–8500. Lewis v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 301 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 746 N. E.
2d 338.

No. 99–8502. Poole v. Mitchem, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8504. Shabazz v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App.
W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 206 W. Va. 555, 526
S. E. 2d 521.

No. 99–8506. Richardson v. Luebbers, Superintendent,
Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 973.

No. 99–8507. Leon v. Estrada et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1340.

No. 99–8511. Tolbert v. KPHN Radio et al. C. A. 10th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1321.

No. 99–8514. Thibeaux v. Jackson et al. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1338.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 11–1425
_________________

MISSOURI, PETITIONER v. TYLER G. MCNEELY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

MISSOURI

[April 17, 2013]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
This  case  requires  the  Court  to  decide  whether  the
Fourth  Amendment  prohibits  an  officer  from  obtaining  a
blood  sample  without  a  warrant  when  there  is  probable
cause to believe that a suspect has been driving under the
influence  of  alcohol.  Because  the  body’s  natural  meta
bolization  of  alcohol  inevitably  destroys  evidence  of  the
crime, it constitutes an exigent circumstance.  As a result, I
would hold that a warrantless blood draw does not violate
the Fourth Amendment.

I

A

The  Fourth  Amendment  states  that  “[t]he  right  of  the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreason
able  searches  and  seizures,  shall  not  be  violated,  and  no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”  Before a
search  occurs,  “a  warrant  must  generally  be  secured,”
Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 5),
but  “this  presumption  may  be  overcome  in  some  circum
stances  because  ‘[t]he  ultimate  touchstone  of  the  Fourth
Amendment  is  “reasonableness.”  ’ ”  Ibid.  (quoting  Brig
ham  City  v.  Stuart,  547  U. S.  398,  403  (2006);  alteration
in original).

The  presence  of  “exigent  circumstances”  is  one  such
exception  to  the  warrant  requirement.  Exigency  applies
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual legal reasoning and arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

MILLER v. ALABAMA

Opinion of the Court

III

Alabama  and  Arkansas  offer  two  kinds  of  arguments
against  requiring  individualized  consideration  before  sen-
tencing  a  juvenile  to  life  imprisonment  without  possi-
bility of parole.  The States (along with the dissents) first
contend  that  the  rule  we  adopt  conflicts  with  aspects  of
our  Eighth  Amendment  caselaw.    And  they  next  assert
that  the  rule  is  unnecessary  because  individualized  cir-
cumstances  come  into  play  in  deciding  whether  to  try  a
juvenile  offender  as  an  adult.    We  think  the  States  are
wrong on both counts.

A
The States (along with JUSTICE THOMAS) first claim that
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957 (1991), precludes our
holding.  The  defendant  in  Harmelin  was  sentenced  to  a
mandatory  life-without-parole  term  for  possessing  more
than  650  grams  of  cocaine.  The  Court  upheld  that  pen-
alty, reasoning that “a sentence which is not otherwise cruel
and  unusual”  does  not  “becom[e]  so  simply  because  it  is
‘mandatory.’ ”  Id., at 995.  We recognized that a different
rule,  requiring  individualized  sentencing,  applied  in  the
death  penalty  context.    But  we  refused  to  extend  that
command  to  noncapital  cases  “because  of  the  qualitative
difference  between  death  and  all  other  penalties.”  Ibid.;
see  id.,  at  1006  (KENNEDY,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and
concurring  in  judgment).    According  to  Alabama,  invali-
dating  the  mandatory  imposition  of  life-without-parole
terms  on  juveniles  “would  effectively  overrule  Harmelin.”
Brief  for  Respondent  in  No.  10–9646,  p.  59  (hereinafter
Alabama Brief); see Arkansas Brief 39.

We think that argument myopic.  Harmelin had nothing
to  do  with children  and  did  not  purport  to  apply  its  hold-

——————

fendants  and  crimes.    By  contrast,  the  sentencing  schemes  that  the

dissents find permissible altogether preclude considering these factors.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in the case of Miller v. Alabama. It discusses the Eighth Amendment and the Court's reasoning for requiring individualized consideration before sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

915

Grooms v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
989

Grosdidier v. Chairman, Broadcasting Bd. of Governors . . . . . . . .
950

Gross v. Knight
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Groves v. Shinseki  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gruber v. Buescher
1084

Gruber v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gruff v. Wilson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  884,1139

893

Grumbles v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Grund v. Sprinkle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Grynberg v. Paciﬁc Gas & Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Guadarrama v. Tilton  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Guerra v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guerrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  892,936,1062

892

Guerrero-Robledo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931

Guevara-Vielma v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gueye v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School
1016

Guibilo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guidry; Castillo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  802,1089

1017

Guillory v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Gumbs v. Holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Gunderson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Gunnett v. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
871

Gunter v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gurnsey v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  955,1140

Guthria; Wilson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

806

Guthrie; Butcher v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1146

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gutierrez, In re
848

Gutierrez; Brown v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Gutierrez v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004

Gutierrez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Gutzmore v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guzdek; Mason v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  940,1102

815

Guzman; J. L. Spoons, Inc. v.
GwanJun Kim v. Department of Labor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1023,1139

GwanJun Kim v. Progressive Express Ins. Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  968,1078

859

GwanJun Kim v. Wernette  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

Haberman v. Century 21 Chamberlain & Associates
. . . . . . . . . .
857

Haburn v. Kilby  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

Hacker v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811

Haddad, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Haddad v. Hertz Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917

Hadley v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Haeg v. Cole  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948

Hafterson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists the cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

556

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Breyer, J., dissenting

taking occurs “whenever legislation requires one person to
Id., at 223.
use his or her assets for the beneﬁt of another.”
The second case basically followed the analysis of the ﬁrst
case. Concrete Pipe, 508 U. S., at 641–647. And both cases
rejected the claim of a Takings Clause violation.
Id., at 646–
647; Connolly, supra, at 227–228.

The dearth of Takings Clause authority is not surprising,
for application of the Takings Clause here bristles with con-
If the Clause applies when the govern-
ceptual difﬁculties.
ment simply orders A to pay B, why does it not apply when
the government simply orders A to pay the government, i. e.,
when it assesses a tax? Cf. In re Leckie Smokeless Coal
Co., 99 F. 3d 573, 583 (CA4 1996) (characterizing “reachback”
liability payments as a “tax”), cert. denied, 520 U. S. 1118
(1997); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F. 3d 478, 498 (CA2 1995)
(same), cert. denied sub nom. LTV Steel Co., Inc. v. Shalala,
516 U. S. 913 (1995). Would that Clause apply to some or to
all statutes and rules that “routinely creat[e] burdens for
some that directly beneﬁt others”? Connolly, supra, at 223.
Regardless, could a court apply the same kind of Takings
Clause analysis when violation means the law’s invalidation,
rather than simply the payment of “compensation?” See
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 315 (1987) (“[The Tak-
ings Clause] is designed not to limit the governmental inter-
ference with property rights per se, but rather to secure
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking”).

We need not face these difﬁculties, however, for there is
no need to torture the Takings Clause to ﬁt this case. The
question involved—the potential unfairness of retroactive
liability—ﬁnds a natural home in the Due Process Clause,
a Fifth Amendment neighbor. That Clause says that no
person shall be “deprive[d] . . . of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1.
It
safeguards citizens from arbitrary or irrational legislation.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Takings Clause and its applicability to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

Syllabus

Id.,  at  ___.  Here,  the  application  of  Montana’s  no-aid  provision  ex-
cludes religious schools from public benefits solely because of religious
status.  As a result, strict scrutiny applies.  Pp. 6–12.

(b) Contrary  to  the  Department’s  contention,  this  case  is  not  gov-
erned  by  Locke  v.  Davey,  540  U. S.  712.    The  plaintiff  in  Locke  was
denied  a  scholarship  “because  of  what  he  proposed  to  do—use  the
funds to prepare for the ministry,” an essentially religious endeavor.
Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___.  By contrast, Montana’s no-aid pro-
vision does not zero in on any essentially religious course of instruction
but rather bars aid to a religious school “simply because of what it is”—
a religious school.  Id., at ___.  Locke also invoked a “historic and sub-
stantial” state interest in not funding the training of clergy, 540 U. S.,
at  725,  but  no  comparable  tradition  supports  Montana’s  decision  to
disqualify religious schools from government aid.  Pp. 12–16.

(c) The proposed alternative approach involving a flexible case-by-
case analysis is inconsistent with Trinity Lutheran.  The protections of
the Free Exercise Clause do not depend on a varying case-by-case anal-
ysis  regarding  whether  discrimination  against  religious  adherents
would serve ill-defined interests.  Pp. 16–18.

(d) To satisfy strict scrutiny, government action “must advance ‘in-
terests of the highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit
of those interests.”  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U. S.  520,  546.    Montana’s  interest  in  creating  greater separation  of
church and State than the Federal Constitution requires “cannot qual-
ify as compelling” in the face of the infringement of free exercise here.
Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___.  The Department’s argument that
the no-aid provision actually promotes religious freedom is unavailing
because an infringement of First Amendment rights cannot be justi-
fied by a State’s alternative view that the infringement advances reli-
gious liberty.  The Department’s argument is especially unconvincing
because  the  infringement  here  broadly  burdens  not  only  religious
schools but also the families whose children attend them.  The Depart-
ment suggests that the no-aid provision safeguards public education
by ensuring that government support is not diverted to private schools,
but that interest does not justify a no-aid provision that requires only
religious private schools to bear its weight.  Pp. 18–20.

(e) Because the Free Exercise Clause barred the application of the
no-aid provision here, the Montana Supreme Court had no authority
to invalidate the program on the basis of that provision.  The Depart-
ment argues that the invalidation of the entire program prevented a
free exercise violation, but the Department overlooks the Montana Su-
preme Court’s threshold error of federal law.  Had the Montana Su-
preme  Court  recognized  that  the  application  of  the  no-aid  provision
was barred by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court would have had no
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It is not the actual content of a book and is likely not meant to be read for enjoyment or information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
70

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  20  U. S. C.  §1087–2(e)  (Student  Loan  Market-

ing Association)

  20 U. S. C. §1087–4 (Discrimination in Second-

ary Markets Prohibited)

  20 U. S. C. §1087tt(c) (Discretion of Student Fi-

nancial Aid Administrators)

  20  U. S. C.  §1231e(b)(2)  (Education  Programs;

Use of Funds Withheld)

  20  U. S. C.  §1681  (Title  IX  of  the  Education

Amendments of 1972)

  20 U. S. C. §1701(a)(1) (Equal Educational Op-
portunities;  Congressional  Declaration  of  Pol-
icy)

  20 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1) (Equal Educational Op-

portunities; Congressional Findings)

  20 U. S. C. §1703 (Denial of Equal Educational

Opportunity Prohibited)

  20 U. S. C. §1705 (Assignment on Neighborhood
Basis Not a Denial of Equal Educational Oppor-
tunity)

  20 U. S. C. §1715 (District Lines)

  20 U. S. C. §1720 (Equal Educational Opportu-

nities; Definitions)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely from a legal document.  It is not sequential text and does not appear to be part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 183 (2010)

199

Breyer, J., dissenting

III

The  District  Court  attempted  to  change  its  rules  at  the
eleventh hour to treat this case differently from other trials
in  the  district.  Not  only  did  it  ignore  the  federal  statute
that  establishes  the  procedures  by  which  its  rules  may  be
amended, its express purpose was to broadcast a high-proﬁle
trial  that  would  include  witness  testimony  about  a  conten
tious issue.  If courts are to require that others follow regu
lar procedures, courts must do so as well.  The Court grants
the  application  for  a  stay  of  the  District  Court’s  order  of
January  7,  2010,  pending  the  timely  ﬁling and disposition  of
a petition for a writ of certiorari or the ﬁling and disposition
of a petition for a writ of mandamus.

It is so ordered.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice

Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting.

The  Court  today  issues  an  order  that  will  prevent  the
transmission  of  proceedings  in  a  nonjury  civil  case  of  great
public  interest  to  ﬁve  other  federal  courthouses  located  in
Seattle,  Pasadena,  Portland,  San  Francisco,  and  Brooklyn.
The  Court  agrees  that  it  can  issue  this  extraordinary  legal
relief  only  if  (1)  there  is  a  fair  chance  the  District  Court
was wrong about the underlying legal question, (2) that legal
question  meets  this  Court’s  certiorari  standards,  (3)  refusal
of the relief would work “irreparable harm,” (4) the balance
of  the  equities  (including,  the  Court  should  say,  possible
harm  to  the  public  interest)  favors  issuance,  (5)  the  party’s
right  to  the  relief  is  “clear  and  undisputable,”  and  (6)  the
“question  is  of  public  importance”  (or  otherwise  “peculiarly
appropriate”  for  such  action).  See  ante,  at  190;  Rostker  v.
Goldberg,  448  U. S.  1306,  1308  (1980)  (Brennan,  J.,  in  cham
bers)  (stay  standard);  Cheney  v.  United  States  Dist.  Court
for  D.  C.,  542  U. S.  367,  380  (2004)  (noting  that  mandamus
is  a  “drastic  and  extraordinary  remedy  reserved  for  really
extraordinary  causes”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the court's decision to stay a lower court's order and outlines the legal reasoning behind the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

ment would not, however, present an uncommon or insur-
mountable barrier to true-threats prosecutions.3  Nonethe-
less, under such a standard, there will be some speech that
some  find  threatening  that  will  not  and  should  not  land
anyone in prison.

III
These high First Amendment stakes are further reason
for caution when delineating the boundaries of what consti-
tutes a true threat.  In undertaking that analysis, the Court
and I part ways on the order of operations.  The Court be-
gins by defining true threats as all objectively threatening
speech,  entirely  independent  of  whether  the  speaker  in-
tended  to  be  threatening,  ante,  at  6,  and  the  lead  dissent
agrees, post, at 2–3 (opinion of BARRETT, J.).  The Court gets
there by relying on this Court’s interpretation of the word
“threat”  in  a  federal  statute.    Ante,  at  6  (citing  Elonis  v.
United  States,  575  U. S.  723,  733  (2015)).    The  Court  de-
clares all such speech categorically unprotected, and then
asks what “buffer zone” is needed in order to protect other,
unthreatening speech.  See ante, at 4–7.

Respectfully, I see the analysis differently.  The first step
in the analysis should instead be to ask about the scope of
the well-defined and narrow category of “true threats” as a
constitutional  matter.  This  Court  has  already  warned
about the danger of creating new categories of “unprotected
speech” exempt from the ordinary First Amendment frame-
work for balancing our society’s commitment to free expres-
sion  with  other  interests.  Stevens,  559  U. S.,  at  470.  If
courts were at liberty to redefine what counts as a “threat”

——————

3 Intent  requirements  are  common,  including  for  incitement  that  re-
sults in actual violence, not just the threat of it.  See infra, at 15–17.  For
that  reason  there  are  longstanding  frameworks  for  determining  when
someone is not guilty by reason of insanity, and when delusions do (and
do not) defeat a showing of intent.  See, e.g., 1 W. LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law §§7.1(a), (b) (3d ed. 2018); 2 id., §9.2.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Counterman v. Colorado. It delves into the legal definition of "true threats" and the First Amendment implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS

ALITO, J., dissenting

hunting rights, but the Bands argued that (A) one portion
of the Executive Order purported to extinguish their hunt-
ing rights; (B) a different portion of the Executive Order—
the “removal order,” which had nothing to do with hunting
rights—was  unlawful;  and  (C)  the  hunting  rights  revoca-
tion was inseverable from the removal order and thus inef-
fective.  The Court entertained this argument on the merits
and granted relief.  It first assumed “that the severability
standard for statutes also applies to Executive Orders.”  Id.,
at 191.  Then it determined that there was “no statutory or
constitutional authority” for the removal order and that the
“Executive  Order  was  insufficient  to  [revoke  hunting
rights]  because  it  was  not  severable  from  the  invalid  re-
moval order.”  Id., at 193, 195.  In other words, the Bands
obtained  relief  with  the  same  type  of  argument  the  state
plaintiffs press here.

In New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 186 (1992),
the  State  of  New  York  challenged  three  provisions  of  the
Low-Level  Radioactive  Waste  Policy  Amendments  Act  of
1985, 99 Stat. 1842, 42 U. S. C. §2021b et seq.  Significant
for present purposes, the Court accepted New York’s chal-
lenge to one of those provisions, 505 U. S., at 174–177, and
rejected its challenges to two others, id., at 171–174, 183–
186.  But the Court did not stop there.  Instead, it went on
to consider whether New York nonetheless could obtain re-
lief from the other two provisions on the ground that those
provisions  were  inseverable  from  the  unlawful  provision
and  thus  unenforceable.    Id.,  at  186–187;  see  Printz  v.
United  States,  521  U. S.  898,  935  (1997)  (explaining  that
New York “address[ed] severability where remaining provi-
sions at issue affected the plaintiffs”).  In other words, the
Court  considered  whether  New  York  could  obtain  relief
from the enforcement of independently constitutional pro-
visions  where  a  statute  contained  (A)  two  independently
constitutional provisions; (B) an unconstitutional provision;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to severability of provisions in a law or executive order.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  566 U. S. ____ (2012)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–1150
_________________

MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES, DBA MAYO

MEDICAL LABORATORIES, ET AL., PETITION-

ERS v. PROMETHEUS LABORATORIES, INC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[March 20, 2012]

 JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patentable subject

matter.  It says:

“Whoever  invents  or  discovers  any  new  and  useful
process,  machine,  manufacture,  or  composition  of
matter,  or  any  new  and  useful  improvement  thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.”  35 U. S. C. §101.

The  Court  has  long  held  that  this  provision  contains  an
important  implicit  exception.    “[L]aws  of  nature,  natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable.   Dia-
mond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 185 (1981); see also Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5); Diamond
v.  Chakrabarty,  447  U. S.  303,  309  (1980);  Le  Roy  v.  Tat-
ham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853); O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How.
62,  112–120  (1854);  cf.  Neilson  v.  Harford,  Webster’s
Patent  Cases  295,  371  (1841)  (English  case  discussing
same).  Thus,  the  Court  has  written  that  “a  new  mineral
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is
not  patentable  subject  matter.  Likewise,  Einstein  could
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion. Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain factual information and legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

17

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

ing  what  is  effectively  a  state  subsidy,  faces  only  indirect
pressure . . . ”); Velazquez, 531 U. S., at 544 (“As this suit
involves  a  subsidy,  limited  forum  cases  . . .  may  not  be
controlling  in  a  strict  sense,  yet  they  do  provide  some
instruction”).

Whichever label one chooses here, the federal system of
trademark registration fits: It is, in essence, an opportun-
ity to include one’s trademark on a list and thereby secure
the  ancillary  benefits  that  come  with  registration.11   Just
as  in  the  limited-forum  and  government-program  cases,
some  speakers  benefit,  but  no  speakers  are  harmed.
Brunetti, for example, can use, own, and enforce his mark
regardless of whether it has been registered.  Whether he
may  register  his  mark  can  therefore  turn  on  reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral content regulations.12

C

Prohibiting  the  registration  of  obscene,  profane,  or
vulgar  marks  qualifies  as  reasonable,  viewpoint-neutral,
content-based  regulation.  Apart  from  any  interest  in
regulating commerce itself, the Government has an inter-
est  in  not  promoting  certain  kinds  of  speech,  whether
because  such  speech  could  be  perceived  as  suggesting
governmental  favoritism  or  simply  because  the  Govern-
ment  does  not  wish  to  involve  itself  with  that  kind  of
speech.  See, e.g., Ysursa, 555 U. S., at 359–360; Cornelius,
473  U. S.,  at  809.  While  “there  is  no  evidence  that  the

——————

11 Not  every  registration  system  would  necessarily  fit  the  same  bill,
whether because not every such system invites expressive content like
trademarks or simply because other forms of registration may not be so
ancillary as to qualify solely as a “benefit.”

12 Though I do not address the constitutionality of provisions not be-
fore  the  Court,  I  note  as  well  that  the  “scandalous”  bar  in  §1052(a)  is
hardly  the  only  provision  in  §1052  that  could  be  characterized  as
content  discriminatory.    See,  e.g.,  §1052(b)  (no  flags  or  insignias);
§1052(c)  (no  unapproved  markers  of  deceased  U. S.  Presidents  during
the lives of their spouses).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Iancu v. Brunetti*. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

714

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

Kennedy, J., concurring in part

as the court speciﬁes. This was the convincing analysis
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
reaching the same conclusion, and it sufﬁces to resolve the
case. See United States v. O’Neil, 11 F. 3d 292 (1993). The
analysis, moreover, is no less fair than Justice Scalia’s,
post, at 722, n. 5 (dissenting opinion), which, after explaining
at length that the only possible meaning of “revoke a term”
is “ ‘to annul’ ” it, post, at 715, to “ ‘cancel’ ” it, post, at 716,
and to treat it “as though it had never existed,” post, at 717,
explains away the statute’s later inconvenient reference to
“the term of supervised release” as “describ[ing] the length
of the permitted imprisonment by reference to that now-
defunct term of supervised release,” post, at 721. This, of
course,
Indeed, for support
Justice Scalia turns to Congress’ use of “terminate” in
§ 3583(g)—which Justice Scalia elsewhere concedes “was
a mistake.” Post, at 718, n. 2. Faced with a choice between
two difﬁcult readings of what all must admit is not optimal
statutory text, the Court is correct to adopt the interpreta-
tion that makes the most sense.

is not what the text says.

I would not go on to suggest, as the Court does, that a
court could extend a term of supervised release pursuant
to § 3583(e)(2) prior to revoking the term under § 3583(e)(3).
Ante, at 712. The subparts of § 3583(e) are phrased in the
disjunctive; and § 3583(e)(3) must stand on its own. This
suggests the term of imprisonment plus any further term of
supervised release imposed under § 3583(e)(3) may not ex-
ceed the original term of supervised release that had been
imposed and then violated.

Nor would I invoke 18 U. S. C. § 3583(a), ante, at 708, which
raises more issues than it resolves, not the least of which is
the description of the District Court’s action as “imposing a
sentence.” Petitioner’s sentence was imposed upon convic-
tion. What is at issue in this case is the appropriate adjust-
ment to make to that sentence when the prisoner has vio-
lated the conditions of supervised release.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy. It contains legal analysis, citations to case law, and discussion of statutory interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

Opinion of the Court

B
This suit was brought by three mothers whose children
attend  Stillwater  Christian  School  in  northwestern  Mon-
tana.  Stillwater  is  a  private  Christian  school  that  meets
the statutory criteria for “qualified education providers.”  It
serves  students  in  prekindergarten  through  12th  grade,
and  petitioners  chose  the  school  in  large  part  because  it
“teaches  the  same  Christian  values  that  [they]  teach  at
home.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 152; see id., at 138, 167.  The
child  of  one  petitioner  has  already  received  scholarships
from Big Sky, and the other petitioners’ children are eligible
for scholarships and planned to apply.  While in effect, how-
ever,  Rule  1  blocked  petitioners  from  using  scholarship
funds for tuition at Stillwater.  To overcome that obstacle,
petitioners  sued  the  Department  of  Revenue  in  Montana
state court.  Petitioners claimed that Rule 1 conflicted with
the statute that created the scholarship program and could
not be justified on the ground that it was compelled by the
Montana  Constitution’s  no-aid  provision.    Petitioners  fur-
ther  alleged  that  the  Rule  discriminated  on  the  basis  of
their religious views and the religious nature of the school
they had chosen for their children.

The trial court enjoined Rule 1, holding that it was based
on a mistake of law.  The court explained that the Rule was
not required by the no-aid provision, because that provision
prohibits  only  “appropriations”  that  aid  religious  schools,
“not tax credits.”  Id., at 94.

The injunctive relief freed Big Sky to award scholarships
to students regardless of whether they attended a religious
or secular school.  For the school year beginning in fall 2017,
Big  Sky  received  59  applications  and  ultimately  awarded
44  scholarships  of  $500  each.  The  next  year,  Big  Sky  re-
ceived 90 applications and awarded 54 scholarships of $500
each.  Several  families,  most  with  incomes  of  $30,000  or
less, used the scholarships to send their children to Stillwa-
ter Christian.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of *Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue*. It sets the context of the case, outlining the plaintiffs' situation and the legal arguments involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

admissions officers may, but need not, consider a student’s
self-reported racial identity when assigning overall ratings.
Id., at 166, 169, 180.  Even after so many layers of compet-
itive  review,  Harvard  typically  ends  up  with  about  2,000
tentative admits, more students than the 1,600 or so that
the  university  can  admit.  Id.,  at  170.  To  choose  among
those highly qualified candidates, Harvard considers “plus
factors,” which can help “tip an applicant into Harvard’s ad-
mitted class.”  Id., at 170, 191.  To diversify its class, Har-
vard awards “tips” for a variety of reasons, including geo-
graphic  factors,  socioeconomic  status,  ethnicity,  and  race.
Ibid.

There is “no evidence of any mechanical use of tips.”  Id.,
at  180.  Consistent  with  the  Court’s  precedents,  Harvard
properly  “considers  race  as  part  of  a  holistic  review  pro-
cess,” “values all types of diversity,” “does not consider race
exclusively,” and “does not award a fixed amount of points
to applicants because of their race.”  Id., at 190.27  Indeed,
Harvard’s admissions process is so competitive and the use
of race is so limited and flexible that, as “SFFA’s own ex-
pert’s  analysis”  showed,  “Harvard  rejects  more  than  two-
thirds of Hispanic applicants and slightly less than half of
all  African-American  applicants  who  are  among  the  top
10% most academically promising applicants.”  Id., at 191.
The courts below correctly rejected SFFA’s view that Har-
vard’s  use  of  race  is  unconstitutional  because  it  impacts
overall Hispanic and Black student representation by 45%.
See  Brief  for  Petitioner  79.  That  45%  figure  shows  that

——————

27 JUSTICE GORSUCH suggests that only “applicants of certain races may
receive a ‘tip’ in their favor.”  Ante, at 9.  To the extent JUSTICE GORSUCH
means  that  some  races  are  not  eligible  to  receive  a  tip  based  on  their
race, there is no evidence in the record to support this statement.  Har-
vard “does not explicitly prioritize any particular racial group over any
other and permits its admissions officers to evaluate the racial and eth-
nic identity of every student in the context of his or her background and
circumstances.”  Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 190, n. 56 (Mass. 2019).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses Harvard's admissions process and the use of race as a factor.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WILKINS ET AL. v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–1164.  Argued November 30, 2022—Decided March 28, 2023

Petitioners  Larry  Steven  Wilkins  and  Jane  Stanton  own  properties  in
rural Montana that border a road for which the United States has held
an easement since 1962.  The Government claims that the easement
includes public access, which petitioners dispute.  In 2018, petitioners
sued  the  Government  under  the  Quiet  Title  Act,  which  allows  chal-
lenges to the United States’ rights in real property.  The Government
moved to dismiss on the ground that petitioners’ claim is barred by the
Act’s 12-year time bar.  28 U. S. C. §2409a(g).  Petitioners countered
that  §2409a(g)’s  time  limit  is  a  nonjurisdictional  claims-processing
rule.  The District Court agreed with the Government and dismissed
the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The Ninth Circuit held
that §2409a(g) had already been interpreted as jurisdictional in Block
v.  North  Dakota  ex  rel.  Board  of  Univ.  and  School  Lands,  461  U. S.
273, and affirmed.

Held: Section 2409a(g) is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule.  Pp.

3–12.

(a) Jurisdiction is a word of many meanings.  This Court has empha-
sized the distinction between “the classes of cases a court may enter-
tain  (subject-matter  jurisdiction)”  and  “nonjurisdictional  claim-pro-
cessing rules, which seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation
by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain
specified times.”  Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U. S. ___, ___.  Non-
jurisdictional  claim-processing  rules  generally  include  a  range  of
“threshold requirements that claimants must complete, or exhaust, be-
fore filing a lawsuit.”  Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154,
166.  Jurisdictional  bars—which  may  be  raised  by  any  party  at  any
time during the proceedings and which are required to be raised by a
court sua sponte—run  the  risk  of  disrupting  the  “orderly  progress  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a brief overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$71P 02-16-99 22:29:48 PAGES OPINPGT

8

UNITED STATES v. CABRALES

Opinion of the Court

facilitated the ﬁrst or made it proﬁtable by impeding its de-
tection, see id., at 14. But the question here is the place
appropriate to try the “after the fact” actor. As the Gov-
ernment recognizes,
it is immaterial whether that actor
knew where the ﬁrst crime was committed. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 5–6. The money launderer must know she is dealing
with funds derived from “speciﬁed unlawful activity,” here,
drug trafﬁcking, but the Missouri venue of that activity is, as
the Eighth Circuit said, “of no moment.” 109 F. 3d, at 472.2
Money laundering, the Court of Appeals acknowledged,
arguably might rank as a “continuing offense,” triable in
more than one place, if the launderer acquired the funds in
Id., at 473.
one district and transported them into another.
But that is tellingly not this case.
In the counts at issue,
the Government indicted Cabrales “for transactions which
began, continued, and were completed only in Florida.”
Id.,
at 472. Under these circumstances, venue in Missouri is
improper.

The Government identiﬁed Hyde v. United States, 225
U. S. 347 (1912), and In re Palliser, 136 U. S. 257 (1890), as
the two best cases for its position that money launderers can
in all cases be prosecuted at the place where the funds they
handled were generated. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Neither
decision warrants the ruling the Government here seeks.

In Hyde, the defendants were convicted in the District
of Columbia of conspiracy to defraud the United States.
Although none of the defendants had entered the District as
part of the conspiracy, venue was nevertheless appropriate,
the Court ruled, based on the overt acts of a co-conspirator
there.
225 U. S., at 363. By contrast, the counts at issue
in this case allege no conspiracy. They describe activity in
which Cabrales alone, untied to others, engaged.

2 Cf. United States v. Lanoue, 137 F. 3d 656, 661 (CA1 1998) (stating that
crime of being a felon in possession of a ﬁrearm, in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 922(g)(1), occurs only where the ﬁrearm is actually possessed).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's decision. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and discusses the specifics of a legal case (United States v. Cabrales).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

MURTHY v. MISSOURI

Opinion of the Court

Friends  of  the  Earth,  Inc.  v.  Laidlaw  Environmental  Ser-
vices (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 190 (2000).  At the prelim-
inary injunction stage, the plaintiffs must show that they
are likely to succeed in carrying that burden.  See Winter,
555 U. S., at 22.  But without proof of an ongoing pressure
campaign, it is entirely speculative that the platforms’ fu-
ture moderation decisions will be attributable, even in part,
to the defendants.

The plaintiffs treat the defendants as a monolith, claim-
ing  broadly  that  “ ‘the  governmen[t]’ ”  continues  to  com-
municate with the platforms about “ ‘content-moderation is-
sues.’ ”  Brief for Respondents 29 (quoting 83 F. 4th, at 369).
But we must confirm that each Government defendant con-
tinues to engage in the challenged conduct, which is “coer-
cion” and “significant encouragement,” not mere “communi-
cation.”  Plus, the plaintiffs have only explicitly identified
an  interest  in  speaking  about  COVID–19  or  elections—so
the  defendants’  discussions  about  content-moderation  is-
sues must focus on those topics.

We begin with the plaintiffs who have not pointed to any
past restrictions likely traceable to the Government defend-
ants.  This failure to establish traceability for past harms—
which can serve as evidence of expected future harm—“sub-
stantially  undermines  [the  plaintiffs’]  standing  theory.”
Clapper, 568 U. S., at 411.  These plaintiffs (i.e., everyone
other than Hines) are thus particularly ill suited to the task
of establishing their standing to seek forward-looking relief.
Take Hoft, the only plaintiff who has expressed interest
in speaking about elections (and thus the only plaintiff with
potential  standing  to  sue  the  FBI  and  CISA).  The  FBI’s
challenged  conduct  was  ongoing  at  the  time  of  the  com-
plaint, as the agency worked with the platforms during the
2022  midterm  election  season.  Still,  Hoft  must  rely  on  a
“speculative chain of possibilities” to establish a likelihood
of future harm traceable to the FBI.  Id., at 414.  Hoft’s fu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of MURTHY v. MISSOURI. It delves into legal arguments regarding standing and traceability of harm in the context of government communication with social media platforms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC. v. BUSK

Syllabus

§251(a); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321
U. S.  590,  598.    The  Portal-to-Portal  Act  exempted  employers  from
FLSA  liability  for  claims  based  on  “activities  which  are  preliminary
to or postliminary to” the performance of the principal activities that
an employee is employed to perform.  §254(a)(2).  Under this Court’s
precedents,  the  term  “principal  activities”  includes  all  activities
which are an “integral and indispensable part of the principal activi-
ties.”  Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U. S. 247, 252–253.  An activity is “in-
tegral  and  indispensable”  if  it  is  an  intrinsic  element  of  the  employ-
ee’s  principal  activities  and  one  with  which  the  employee  cannot
dispense  if  he  is  to  perform  his  principal  activities.    This  Court  has
identified several activities that satisfy this test—see, e.g., id., at 249,
251;  Mitchell  v.  King  Packing  Co.,  350  U. S.  260,  262—and  Depart-
ment  of  Labor  regulations  are  consistent  with  this  approach,  see  29
CFR §§790.8(c), 790.7(g).  Pp. 3–7.

(b) The  security  screenings  at  issue  are  noncompensable  postlimi-
nary activities.  To begin with, the screenings were not the principal
activities the employees were employed to perform—i.e., the workers
were  employed  not  to  undergo  security  screenings  but  to  retrieve
products  from  warehouse  shelves  and  package  them  for  shipment.
Nor  were  they  “integral  and  indispensable”  to  those  activities.    This
view  is  consistent  with  a  1951  Department  of  Labor  opinion  letter,
which  found  noncompensable  under  the  Portal-to-Portal  Act  both  a
preshift  screening  conducted  for  employee  safety  and  a  postshift
search conducted to prevent employee theft.  The Ninth Circuit’s test,
which focused on whether the particular activity was required by the
employer rather than whether it was tied to the productive work that
the  employee  was  employed  to  perform,  would  sweep  into  “principal
activities”  the  very  activities  that  the  Portal-to-Portal  Act  was  de-
signed  to  exclude  from  compensation.    See,  e.g.,  IBP,  supra,  at  41.
Finally,  respondents’  claim  that  the  screenings  are  compensable  be-
cause Integrity Staffing could have reduced the time to a de minimis
amount is properly presented at the bargaining table, not to a court
in an FLSA claim.  Pp. 7–9.

713 F. 3d 525, reversed.

THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  for  a  unanimous  Court.    SO-

TOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined.
  </content>
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This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a court case.  It outlines the legal arguments and the court's decision, but it is not the actual content of the book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
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