<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

Opinion of the Court

only one sex can undergo does not trigger heightened con-
stitutional  scrutiny  unless  the  regulation  is  a  “mere  pre-
tex[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimination against
members of one sex or the other.”  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U. S. 484, 496, n. 20 (1974).  And as the Court has stated,
the “goal of preventing abortion” does not constitute “invid-
iously discriminatory animus” against women.  Bray v. Al-
exandria  Women’s  Health  Clinic,  506  U. S.  263,  273–274
(1993)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  Accordingly,
laws  regulating  or  prohibiting  abortion  are  not  subject  to
heightened  scrutiny.  Rather,  they  are  governed  by  the
same  standard  of  review  as  other  health  and  safety
measures.18

With this new theory addressed, we turn to Casey’s bold
assertion that the abortion right is an aspect of the “liberty”
protected  by  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment.  505 U. S., at 846; Brief for Respondents 17;
Brief for United States 21–22.

2
The  underlying  theory  on  which  this  argument  rests—
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause pro-
vides substantive, as well as procedural, protection for “lib-
erty”—has long been controversial.  But our decisions have
held that the Due Process Clause protects two categories of
substantive rights.

The first consists of rights guaranteed by the first eight
Amendments.  Those Amendments originally applied only
to the Federal Government, Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor
of  Baltimore,  7  Pet.  243,  247–251  (1833)  (opinion  for  the
Court by Marshall, C. J.), but this Court has held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “incor-
porates” the great majority of those rights and thus makes
them equally applicable to the States.  See McDonald, 561

——————

18 We discuss this standard in Part VI of this opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal standard for reviewing abortion regulations and the constitutional basis for abortion rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23–939.  Argued April 25, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024

A federal grand jury indicted former President Donald J. Trump on four
counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the
November 2020 election.  The indictment alleged that after losing that
election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false
claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certi-
fying of the election results.  Trump moved to dismiss the indictment
based on Presidential immunity, arguing that a President has absolute
immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the
outer  perimeter  of  his  official  responsibilities,  and  that  the  indict-
ment’s allegations fell within the core of his official duties.  The District
Court  denied  Trump’s  motion  to  dismiss,  holding  that  former  Presi-
dents do not possess federal criminal immunity for any acts.  The D. C.
Circuit  affirmed.    Both  the  District  Court  and  the  D. C.  Circuit  de-
clined to decide whether the indicted conduct involved official acts.

Held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature
of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity
from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclu-
sive constitutional authority.  And he is entitled to at least presump-
tive  immunity  from  prosecution  for  all  his  official  acts.    There  is  no
immunity for unofficial acts.  Pp. 5–43.

(a) This case is the first criminal prosecution in our Nation’s history
of a former President for actions taken during his Presidency.  Deter-
mining  whether  and  under  what  circumstances  such  a  prosecution
may proceed requires careful assessment of the scope of Presidential
power under the Constitution.  The nature of that power requires that
a former President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for
official  acts  during  his  tenure  in  office.    At  least  with  respect  to  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the Court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1156

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 19, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–7987.  Fischer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  521.

No.  09–7988.  Goodman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  993.

No.  09–7989.  Garba  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  698.

No.  09–7994.  Jackson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  472.

No.  09–7996.  McMillan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  346  Fed.  Appx.  945.

No.  09–7997.  Hamdy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  28.

No. 09–7999.  Vinson v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  882.

No.  09–8004.  Reed  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  851.

No.  09–8008.  Wingo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  132.

No.  09–8009.  Singletary  v.  United States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  345  Fed.  Appx.  466.

No. 09–8010.  Roach v. United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  582  F.  3d  1192.

No.  09–8013.  Bride  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  581  F.  3d  888.

No.  09–8016.  Summage  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d  864.

No.  09–8017.  Roberson  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  961  A.  2d  1092.

No.  09–8025.  Cardona  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–8027.  Brewer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  947.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case citations from a legal document, likely a Supreme Court docket. It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

(CA5 1986); see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op.,
at 4) (collecting additional examples).  And no one suggests
this  suit  differs  from  those  cases  in  any  meaningful  way.
The truth is transparent:  The plaintiffs hardly try to carry
their burden of showing a hindrance because they can’t.

Separately and additionally, the abortion providers can-
not  claim  a  “close  relationship”  with  the  women  whose
rights they assert.  Normally, the fact that the plaintiffs do
not  even  know  who  those  women  are  would  be  enough  to
preclude third-party standing.  This Court has held, for ex-
ample, that a future “hypothetical attorney-client relation-
ship” (as opposed to an “existing” one) cannot confer third-
party standing.  Kowalski, 543 U. S., at 131.  Likewise, this
Court has held that a pediatrician lacks standing to defend
a  State’s  abortion  laws  on  the  theory  that  fetuses  are  his
future  potential  patients.  Diamond  v.  Charles,  476  U. S.
54, 66 (1986).  If standing isn’t present in cases like those,
it is hard to see how it might be present in this one.

Nor is that the end of the plaintiffs’ standing problems.
Even when a plaintiff can identify an actual and close rela-
tionship, this Court will normally refuse third-party stand-
ing if the plaintiff has a potential conflict of interest with
the person whose rights are at issue.  See Elk Grove Unified
School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 15, 17–18 (2004).  And
it’s pretty hard to ignore the potential for conflict here.  Af-
ter  all,  Louisiana’s  law  expressly  aims  to  protect  women
from  the  unsafe  conditions  maintained  by  at  least  some
abortion  providers  who,  like  the  plaintiffs,  are  either  un-
willing or unable to obtain admitting privileges.  Cf. ante,
at 25–27 (ALITO, J., dissenting).

Seeking to set all these difficulties aside, today’s decision
contends that Louisiana has waived its prudential standing
arguments.  But in doing so, today’s decision mistakes three
more legal principles.  First, what the plurality character-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments regarding standing in the context of abortion rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U85

[09-14-00 16:49:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 236 (1998)

257

Scalia, J., dissenting

any more than a “case or controversy” for purposes of initial
federal-court jurisdiction is created by a dispute over venue,
between parties who agree on everything else.1

As is true with most erroneous theories, a logical and con-
sistent application of the Court’s reasoning yields strange
If dispute over the propriety of granting a COA
results.
creates a “case,” the denial of a COA request that has been
unopposed (or, better yet, has been supported by the Govern-
ment) will be unreviewable, whereas denial of a request that
is vigorously opposed will be reviewed—surely an upside-
down result. And the “case” concerning the COA will sub-
sist even when the § 2255 suit has been mooted by the peti-
tioner’s release from prison. These bizarre consequences
follow inevitably from the Court’s “separate case” theory,
which has been fabricated in order to achieve a result that
is fundamentally at odds with the purpose of the statute.
For the Court insists upon assuming, contrary to the plain
import of the statute, that Congress wanted petitioner’s
§ 2255 action to proceed “in the ordinary course of the judi-
cial process” and to follow the “general rule” that permits an
If this were
appeal from a ﬁnal district court order, ibid.
Congress’s wish, there would have been no need for § 102 of
AEDPA. The whole point of that provision is to diverge
from the ordinary course of the judicial process and to keep
petitioner’s case against respondent out of the Court of Ap-
peals unless petitioner obtains a COA.
“The certiﬁcate is a
screening device, helping to conserve judicial (and prosecuto-
rial) resources.” Young v. United States, 124 F. 3d 794, 799

1 The Court has no response to this.

Its observation that a dispute over
venue is not unreviewable simply because it is preliminary, ante, at 248–
249, is accurate but irrelevant. The issue is not whether a venue dispute
may be reviewed at all, but whether it may be reviewed in isolation from
It may not, because a venue dispute,
some case of which it is a part.
standing alone—like a request for a COA, standing alone—lacks the requi-
site qualities of a case.
If the entire § 2255 proceeding was not “in” the
Court of Appeals, the COA request alone was not a “case” that § 1254
authorizes us to review.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia in the case 524 U.S. 236 (1998).  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction in a particular case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

306–308 (1880).  As a result, the Court has long held that
racial  classifications  by  the  government,  including  race-
based  affirmative  action  programs,  are  subject  to  strict
judicial scrutiny.

strict

racial

Under

scrutiny,

classifications  are
constitutionally  prohibited  unless  they  are  narrowly
tailored  to  further  a  compelling  governmental  interest.
Grutter, 539 U. S., at 326–327.  Narrow tailoring requires
courts  to  examine,  among  other  things,  whether  a  racial
classification is “necessary”—in other words, whether race-
neutral  alternatives  could  adequately  achieve
the
governmental interest.  Id., at 327, 339–340; Richmond v.
J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 507 (1989).

Importantly,  even  if  a  racial  classification  is  otherwise
narrowly  tailored  to  further  a  compelling  governmental
interest, a “deviation from the norm of equal treatment of
all  racial  and  ethnic  groups”  must  be  “a  temporary
matter”—or  stated  otherwise,  must  be  “limited  in  time.”
Id., at 510 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.); Grutter, 539
U. S., at 342.

In 1978, five Members of this Court held that race-based
affirmative  action  in  higher  education  did  not  violate  the
Equal Protection Clause or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
so  long  as  universities  used  race  only  as  a  factor  in
admissions  decisions  and  did  not  employ  quotas.  See
Regents  of  Univ.  of  Cal.  v.  Bakke,  438  U. S. 265,  325–326
(1978)  (joint  opinion  of  Brennan,  White,  Marshall,  and
Blackmun, JJ.); id., at 287, 315–320 (opinion of Powell, J.).
One  Member  of  the  Court’s  five-Justice  majority,  Justice
Blackmun, added that race-based affirmative action should
exist only as a temporary measure.  He expressed hope that
such programs would be “unnecessary” and a “relic of the
past” by 1988—within 10 years “at the most,” in his words—
although  he  doubted  that  the  goal  could  be  achieved  by
then.  Id., at 403 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).

In 2003, 25 years after Bakke, five Members of this Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the legal precedent and standards surrounding race-based affirmative action in higher education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1201

on  or  before  the  last  day  for  ﬁling  and  is  accompanied  by  a
notarized  statement  or  declaration  in  compliance  with  28
U. S. C. § 1746 setting out the date of deposit and stating that
ﬁrst-class  postage  has  been  prepaid.  If  the  postmark  is
missing  or  not  legible,  or  if  the  third-party  commercial  car
rier does not provide the date the document was received by
the  carrier,  the  Clerk  will  require  the  person  who  sent  the
document  to  submit  a  notarized  statement  or  declaration  in
compliance  with  28  U. S. C.  § 1746  setting  out  the  details  of
the ﬁling and stating that the ﬁling took place on a particular
date within the permitted time.

3.  Any  document  required  by  these  Rules  to  be  served
may  be  served  personally,  by  mail,  or  by  third-party  com
mercial  carrier  for  delivery  within  3  calendar  days  on  each
party  to  the  proceeding  at  or  before  the  time  of  ﬁling.  If
the  document  has  been  prepared  as  required  by  Rule  33.1,
three  copies  shall  be  served  on  each  other  party  separately
represented  in  the  proceeding.  If  the  document  has  been
prepared  as  required  by  Rule  33.2,  service  of  a  single  copy
on each other separately represented party sufﬁces.  If per
sonal service is made, it shall consist of delivery at the ofﬁce
of the counsel of record, either to counsel or to an employee
therein.  If service is by mail or third-party commercial car
rier,  it  shall  consist  of  depositing  the  document  with  the
United  States  Postal  Service,  with  no  less  than  ﬁrst-class
postage  prepaid,  or  delivery  to  the  carrier  for  delivery
within 3 calendar days, addressed to counsel of record at the
proper  address.  When  a  party  is  not  represented  by  coun
sel,  service  shall  be  made  on  the  party,  personally,  by  mail,
or  by  commercial  carrier.  Ordinarily,  service  on  a  party
must  be  by  a  manner  at  least  as  expeditious  as  the  manner
used to ﬁle the document with the Court.

4.  (a)  If  the  United  States  or  any  federal  department,  of
ﬁce, agency, ofﬁcer, or employee is a party to be served, serv
ice  shall  be  made  on  the  Solicitor  General  of  the  United
States, Room 5614, Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania
Ave.,  N.  W.,  Washington,  DC  20530-0001.  When  an  agency
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically regarding filing and service procedures. It outlines requirements for filing documents, including deadlines and methods of service.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules/Procedure</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

29

Opinion of the Court

Whatever his reasons,

of )  broad  language  with  wide-ranging  effect.   Not  neces-
sarily because he was interested in rooting out sex discrim-
ination in all its forms, but because he may have hoped to
scuttle the whole Civil Rights Act and thought that adding
language covering sex discrimination would serve as a poi-
son pill.  See C. Whalen & B. Whalen, The Longest Debate:
A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 115–118
(1985).  Certainly nothing in the meager legislative history
of this provision suggests it was meant to be read narrowly.
thanks  to  the  broad  language
Representative Smith  introduced, many, maybe most, ap-
plications of Title VII’s sex provision were “unanticipated”
at the time of the law’s adoption.  In fact, many now-obvious
applications  met  with  heated  opposition  early  on,  even
among those tasked with enforcing the law.   In the years
immediately  following  Title  VII’s  passage,  the  EEOC  offi-
cially opined that listing men’s positions and women’s posi-
tions separately in job postings was simply helpful rather
than discriminatory.  Franklin, 125 Harv. L. Rev., at 1340
(citing Press Release, EEOC (Sept. 22, 1965)).  Some courts
held that Title VII did not prevent an employer from firing
an  employee  for  refusing  his  sexual  advances.    See,  e.g.,
Barnes v. Train, 1974 WL 10628, *1 (D DC, Aug. 9, 1974).
And courts held that a policy against hiring mothers but not
fathers of young children wasn’t discrimination because of
sex.  See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F. 2d 1 (CA5
1969), rev’d, 400 U. S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).

Over time, though, the breadth of the statutory language
proved too difficult to deny.  By the end of the 1960s, the
EEOC  reversed  its  stance  on  sex-segregated  job  advertis-
ing.  See Franklin, 125 Harv. L. Rev., at 1345.  In 1971, this
Court  held  that  treating  women  with  children  differently
from  men  with  children  violated  Title  VII.  Phillips,  400
U. S., at 544.  And by the late 1970s, courts began to recog-
nize that sexual harassment can sometimes amount to sex
discrimination.  See, e.g., Barnes  v. Costle, 561 F. 2d 983,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the history and interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It delves into the evolution of understanding regarding sex discrimination under the law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

ALITO, J., dissenting

E
  An injunction pending appeal is warranted in this case.
Calvary Chapel’s First Amendment claims are very likely
to succeed.  Indeed, it can be said that its “legal rights . . .
are  indisputably  clear,”  Turner  Broadcasting System,  Inc.
v.  FCC,  507  U. S.  1301,  1303  (1993)  (Rehnquist,  C. J.,  in
chambers) (internal quotation marks omitted), and the eq-
uities also favor Calvary Chapel.  Preventing congregants
from  worshipping  will  cause  irreparable  harm,  and  the
State  has  made  no  effort  to  show  that  Calvary  Chapel’s
plans would create a serious public health risk.

*

  *

  *
  I  would  issue  an  injunction  barring  the  State,  pending
appeal, from interfering with worship services conducted at
Calvary Chapel in accordance with its stated plan and the
general facemask requirement.  I therefore respectfully dis-
sent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

Many cities further report that, rather than help allevi-
ate the homelessness crisis, Martin injunctions have inad-
vertently contributed to it.  The numbers of “[u]nsheltered
homelessness,”  they  represent,  have  “increased  dramati-
cally in the Ninth Circuit since Martin.”  Brief for League
of Oregon Cities et al. as Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 7
(boldface and capitalization deleted).  And, they say, Martin
injunctions have contributed to this trend by “weaken[ing]”
the ability of public officials “to persuade persons experienc-
ing  homelessness  to  accept  shelter  beds  and  [other]  ser-
vices.”  Brief for Ten California Cities as Amici Curiae on
Pet. for Cert. 2.  In Portland, for example, residents report
some unsheltered persons “often return within days” of an
encampment’s clearing, on the understanding that “Martin
. . .  and  its  progeny  prohibit  the  [c]ity  from  implementing
more  efficacious  strategies.”  Tozer  Brief  5;  Washington
Sheriffs  Brief  14  (Martin  divests  officers  of  the  “ability  to
compel  [unsheltered]  persons  to  leave  encampments  and
obtain  necessary  services”).    In  short,  they  say,  Martin
“make[s] solving this crisis harder.”  Cities Cert. Brief 3.

All acknowledge “[h]omelessness is a complex and serious
social issue that cries out for effective . . . responses.”  Ibid.
But  many  States  and  cities  believe  “it  is  crucial”  for  local
governments to “have the latitude” to experiment and find
effective responses.  Id., at 27; States Brief 13–17.  “Injunc-
tions and the threat of federal litigation,” they insist, “im-
pede  this  democratic  process,”  undermine  local  govern-
ments,  and  do  not  well  serve  the  homeless  or  others  who
live in the Ninth Circuit.  Cities Cert. Brief 27–28.

C

The case before us arises from a Martin injunction issued
against the city of Grants Pass.  Located on the banks of the
Rogue  River  in  southwestern  Oregon,  the  city  is  home  to
roughly 38,000 people.  Among them are an estimated 600
individuals  who  experience  homelessness  on  a  given  day.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the impact of Martin injunctions on homelessness. It provides arguments from both sides and sets the context for the case at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

17

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting

of those faith and beliefs.16
  Recognizing  that  a  Latin  cross  does  not  belong  on  a
public highway or building does not mean the monument
must be “torn down.”  Ante, at 2 (BREYER, J., concurring);
ante,  at  1  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).17
“[L]ike  the  determination  of  the  violation  itself,”  the
“proper remedy . . . is necessarily context specific.”  Buono,
559 U. S., at 755, n. 11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In some
instances,  the  violation  may  be  cured  by  relocating  the
monument to private land or by transferring ownership of
the land and monument to a private party.

*

  *

  *

  In 1790, President Washington visited Newport, Rhode
Island,  “a  longtime  bastion  of  religious  liberty  and  the
home of one of the first communities of American Jews.”
Town  of  Greece  v.  Galloway,  572  U. S.  565,  636  (2014)
(KAGAN, J., dissenting).  In a letter thanking the congrega-
tion  for  its  warm  welcome,  Washington  praised  “[t]he
citizens of the United States of America” for “giv[ing] to
mankind  . . .  a  policy  worthy  of  imitation”:  “All  possess
alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship.”
Letter to Newport Hebrew Congregation (Aug. 18, 1790),
in 6 Papers of George Washington 284, 285 (D. Twohig ed.
1996).    As  Washington  and  his  contemporaries  were

——————

16 As to the Argonne Cross Memorial and the Canadian Cross of Sac-
rifice in Arlington National Cemetery, visitors to the cemetery “expec[t]
to  view  religious  symbols,  whether  on  individual  headstones  or  as
standalone monuments.”  Brief for Amicus  Jewish War V eterans 17.

17 The Court asserts that the Court of Appeals “entertained” the pos-
sibility of “amputating the arms of the cross.”  Ante, at 24.  The appeals
court,  however,  merely  reported  Plaintiffs’  “desired  injunctive  relief,”
namely,  “removal  or  demolition  of  the  Cross,  or  removal  of  the  arms
from  the  Cross ‘to form a non-religious slab or obelisk.’ ”  874 F. 3d, at
202,  n. 7.    See also id., at 212, n. 19 (noting that the parties remained
“free  to  explore  alternative  arrangements  that  would  not  offend  the
Constitution”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and references to previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

341

Opinion of the Court

standing,  and  respect  for  the  speaker’s  voice.  The  Govern
ment may not by these means deprive the public of the right
and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speak
ers are worthy of consideration.  The First Amendment pro
tects speech and speaker, and the ideas that ﬂow from each.
The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions
that  operate  to  the  disadvantage  of  certain  persons,  but
these rulings  were based on  an interest in  allowing govern
mental entities to perform their functions.  See, e. g., Bethel
School Dist. No. 403 v.  Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 683 (1986) (pro
tecting  the  “function  of  public  school  education”);  Jones  v.
North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U. S. 119,
129 (1977) (furthering “the legitimate penological objectives
of  the  corrections  system”  (internal  quotation  marks  omit
ted));  Parker  v.  Levy,  417  U. S.  733,  759  (1974)  (ensuring
“the  capacity  of  the  Government  to  discharge  its  [military]
responsibilities”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted));  Civil
Service Comm’n v.  Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 557 (1973)
(“[F]ederal  service  should  depend  upon  meritorious  per
formance  rather  than  political  service”).  The  corporate  in
dependent expenditures at issue in this case, however, would
not interfere with governmental functions, so these cases are
inapposite.  These precedents stand only for the proposition
that  there  are  certain  governmental  functions  that  cannot
operate  without  some  restrictions  on  particular  kinds  of
speech.  By contrast, it is inherent in the nature of the polit
ical  process  that  voters  must  be  free  to  obtain  information
from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their
votes.  At  least  before  Austin,  the  Court  had  not  allowed
the  exclusion  of  a  class  of  speakers  from  the  general  public
dialogue.

We ﬁnd no basis for the proposition that, in the context of
political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on
certain disfavored speakers.  Both history and logic lead us
to this conclusion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the First Amendment and restrictions on political speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

These  crimes  are  punishable  by  thousands  of  dollars  in
fines and up to one year in prison.  §51.03(b).

Once  Texas  charges  a  noncitizen  under  S.  B.  4,  a  state
judge may, with the consent of the noncitizen, enter an or-
der that “require[s] the person to return to the foreign na-
tion from which the person entered or attempted to enter”
before  any  conviction.    Tex.  Code  Crim.  Proc.  Ann.,  Art.
5B.002(a)–(c) (Vernon 2024).  Once a noncitizen is convicted
under  S.  B.  4,  however,  the  judge  “shall  enter”  an  “order
requiring  the  person  to  return  to  the  foreign  nation  from
which  the  person  entered  or  attempted  to  enter”  after  he
completes his state prison sentence.  Art. 5B.002(d).  Fail-
ure to comply with these state removal orders is a second-
degree felony punishable by up to 20 years in prison.  Tex.
Penal  Code  Ann.  §§51.04,  12.21.    Strikingly,  state  judges
must explicitly disregard any parallel federal immigration
proceedings.  Tex.  Code  Crim.  Proc.  Ann.,  Art.  5B.003  (“A
court may not abate the prosecution of [the relevant S. B. 4
offense] on the basis that a federal determination regarding
the immigration status of the defendant is pending or will
be initiated”).

C
The  United  States,  two  private  organizations,  and  the
County of El Paso challenged S. B. 4.  In a thorough 114-
page opinion, the District Court granted a preliminary in-
junction,  which  it  then  declined  to  stay  pending  appeal.
The District Court concluded that “the Supremacy Clause
and  Supreme  Court  precedent  affirm  that  states  may  not
exercise immigration enforcement power except as author-
ized by the federal government,” and it concluded that “SB
4 conflicts with key provisions of federal immigration law,
to the detriment of the United States’ foreign relations and
treaty obligations.”  2024 WL 861526, *1.  Therefore, “to al-
low  Texas  to  permanently  supersede  federal directives  on
the  basis  of  an  invasion  would  amount  to  nullification  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case United States v. Texas. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a state law (S.B. 4) and its conflict with federal immigration law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. TED CRUZ FOR
SENATE ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 21–12.  Argued January 19, 2022—Decided May 16, 2022

During his 2018 Senate reelection campaign and consistent with federal
law, see 11 CFR §110.10; 52 U. S. C. §30101(9)(A)(i), appellee Ted Cruz
loaned  $260,000  to  his  campaign  committee,  Ted  Cruz  for  Senate
(Committee).    To  repay  these  and  other  campaign  debts,  campaigns
may continue to receive contributions after election day.  See 11 CFR
§110.1(b)(3)(i).  Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA) restricts the use of post-election contributions by limiting
the  amount  that  a  candidate  may  be  repaid  from  such  funds  to
$250,000.  52 U. S. C. §30116(j).  Relevant here, the Federal Election
Commission  (FEC)  has  promulgated  regulations  establishing  three
rules to implement that limitation: First, a campaign may repay up to
$250,000 in candidate loans using contributions made “at any time.”
11 CFR §116.12(a).  Second, to the extent the loans exceed $250,000, a
campaign  may use  pre-election  funds  to repay  the  portion  exceeding
$250,000 only if the repayment occurs “within 20 days of the election.”
§116.11(c)(1).  Third, when the 20-day post-election deadline expires,
the campaign must treat any portion above $250,000 as a contribution
to the campaign, precluding later repayment.  §116.11(c)(2).

The Committee began repaying Cruz’s loans after the 20-day post-
election  window  for  repaying  amounts  over  $250,000  had  closed.    It
accordingly repaid Cruz only $250,000, leaving $10,000 of his personal
loans  unpaid.    Cruz  and  the  Committee  filed  this  action  in  Federal
District  Court,  alleging  that  Section  304  of  BCRA  violates  the  First
Amendment and raising challenges to the FEC’s implementing regu-
lation, §116.11.  The District Court granted Cruz and his Committee
summary  judgment  on  their  constitutional  claim,  holding  that  the
loan-repayment limitation burdens political speech without sufficient
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 13–1041 and 13–1052
_________________

THOMAS E. PEREZ, SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION ET AL.

13–1041

13–1052

JEROME NICKOLS, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[March 9, 2015]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
I  concur  in  the  Court’s  holding  that  the  doctrine  first
announced  in  Paralyzed  Veterans  of  America  v.  D. C.
Arena  L.  P.,  117  F. 3d  579  (CADC  1997),  is  inconsistent
with  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act  (APA),  5  U. S. C.
§551 et seq., and must be rejected.  An agency’s substantial
revision  of  its  interpretation  of  a  regulation  does  not
amount to an “amendment” of the regulation as that word
is used in the statute.

I write separately because these cases call into question
the  legitimacy  of  our  precedents  requiring  deference  to
administrative interpretations of regulations.  That line of
precedents,  beginning  with  Bowles  v.  Seminole  Rock  &
Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410 (1945), requires judges to defer to
agency  interpretations  of  regulations,  thus,  as  happened
in  these  cases,  giving  legal  effect  to  the  interpretations
rather  than  the  regulations  themselves.    Because  this
doctrine effects a transfer of the judicial power to an exec-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

17

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

functionally compelled by the demands of modern life, and
in that way the fact that we store data with third parties
may  amount  to  a  sort  of  involuntary  bailment  too.    See
ante,  at  12–13  (majority  opinion);  Riley  v.  California,  573
U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 9).
  Third,  positive  law  may  help  provide  detailed  guidance
on  evolving  technologies  without  resort  to  judicial  intui-
tion.  State (or sometimes federal) law often creates rights
in both tangible and intangible things.  See Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1001 (1984).  In the context
of  the  Takings  Clause  we  often  ask  whether  those  state-
created rights are sufficient to make something someone’s
property  for  constitutional  purposes.    See  id.,  at  1001–
1003;  Louisville  Joint  Stock  Land  Bank  v.  Radford,  295
U. S.  555,  590–595  (1935).  A  similar  inquiry  may  be
appropriate  for  the  Fourth  Amendment.    Both  the  States
and federal government are actively legislating in the area
of  third  party  data  storage  and  the  rights  users  enjoy.
See,  e.g.,  Stored  Communications  Act,  18  U. S. C.  §2701
et seq.;  Tex.  Prop.  Code  Ann.  §111.004(12)  (West  2017)
(defining  “[p]roperty”  to  include  “property  held  in  any
digital  or  electronic  medium”).  State  courts  are  busy
expounding  common  law  property  principles  in  this  area
as well.  E.g., Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 478 Mass. 169, 170,
84  N. E.  3d  766,  768  (2017)  (e-mail  account  is  a  “form  of
property  often  referred  to  as  a  ‘digital  asset’ ”);  Eysoldt  v.
ProScan Imaging, 194 Ohio App. 3d 630, 638, 2011–Ohio–
2359,  957  N. E.  2d  780,  786  (2011)  (permitting  action  for
conversion of web account as intangible property).  If state
legislators or state courts say that a digital record has the
attributes  that  normally  make  something  property,  that
may  supply  a  sounder  basis  for  judicial  decisionmaking
than judicial guesswork about societal expectations.

Fourth, while positive law may help establish a person’s
Fourth  Amendment  interest  there  may  be  some  circum-
stances  where  positive  law  cannot  be  used  to  defeat  it.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments regarding the Fourth Amendment and digital data storage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

and equal enjoyment’ of certain public facilities to ‘all citi-
zens,’ ‘regardless of race, color or previous condition of ser-
vitude.’ ”  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U. S., at ___–___ (slip
op., at 4–5) (quoting 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws p. 132).  “A dec-
ade later, the [State] expanded the requirement to apply to
‘all  other  places  of  public  accommodation.’ ”    584  U. S.,  at
___ (slip op., at 5) (quoting 1895 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 61, p.
139).  Congress,  too,  passed  the  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1875,
which established “[t]hat all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment  of  the  accommodations,  advantages,  facilities,
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water,
theaters, and other places of public amusement . . . applica-
ble  alike  to  citizens  of  every  race  and  color,  regardless  of
any previous condition of servitude.”  Act of Mar. 1, 1875,
§1, 18 Stat. 336.

This Court, however, struck down the federal Civil Rights
Act  of  1875  as  unconstitutional.  Civil  Rights  Cases,  109
U. S. 3, 25 (1883).  Southern States repealed public accom-
modations statutes and replaced them with Jim Crow laws.
And state courts construed any remaining right of access in
ways that furthered de jure and de facto racial segregation.7
Full  and  equal  enjoyment  came  to  mean  “separate  but
equal” enjoyment.  The result of this backsliding was “the
replacement of a general right of access with a general right
to  exclude  . . .  in  order  to  promote  a  racial  caste  system.”
Singer 1295.

——————

7 Compare, e.g., Chesapeake, O. & S. R. Co. v. Wells, 85 Tenn. 613, 615,
4 S. W. 5 (1887) (rejecting Ida B. Wells’s claim that she was denied “ ‘ac-
commodations equal in all respects,’ ” when she tried to enter a train car
“set  apart  for  white  ladies  and  their  gentlemen”  on  account  of  tobacco
smoke in her car, and was forcibly removed), with Memphis & C. R. Co.
v. Benson, 85 Tenn. 627, 632, 4 S. W. 5, 7 (1887) (accepting that a white
man would be permitted to ride standing in the ladies’ car on account of
tobacco smoke in his car).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses historical context regarding civil rights and public accommodations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

987

558 U. S.

November 2, 2009

Miscellaneous  Orders

No.  09A265.  Giannone  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.
Application  for  bail,  addressed  to  Justice  Sotomayor  and  re
ferred  to  the  Court,  denied.

No.  09M36.  Riser  v.  Department  of  the  Treasury;
No.  09M37.  Burnes  v.  United  States;
No.  09M40.  McCoy  v.  Ercole,  Superintendent,  Green

Haven  Correctional  Facility;

No.  09M41.  Barnes  v.  Harrison-Belk  et  al.;  and
No.  09M42.  Manns  v.  University  of  Arkansas  Medical
Center  et  al.  Motions  to  direct  the  Clerk  to  ﬁle  petitions  for
writs  of  certiorari  out  of  time  denied.

No.  09M38.  In re  Al-Ghizzawi.  Motion for  leave  to proceed
in  forma  pauperis  without  an  afﬁdavit  of  indigency  executed  by
petitioner  granted.  Motion  for  leave  to  ﬁle  petition  for  writ  of
habeas  corpus  under  seal  granted.

No.  09M39.  Nitro  Distributing,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  Alticor,
Inc., et al.  Motion for leave to ﬁle petition for writ of certiorari
under  seal  with  redacted  copies  for  the  public  record  granted.

No.  08–861.  Free  Enterprise  Fund  et  al.  v.  Public  Com
pany  Accounting  Oversight  Board  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.
[Certiorari  granted,  556  U. S.  1234.]  Motion  of  the  Solicitor  Gen
eral  for  divided  argument  granted.

No. 08–1134.  United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.  Espinosa.
C.  A. 9th  Cir.
[Certiorari  granted, 557  U. S.  903.]  Motion of  the
Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as ami
cus  curiae  and  for  divided  argument  granted.

No.  08–1322.  Astrue,  Commissioner  of  Social  Security
v.  Ratliff.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.
[Certiorari  granted,  557  U. S.  965.]
Motion of the Solicitor General to dispense with printing the joint
appendix  granted.

No.  08–1438.  Sossamon  v.  Texas  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.;
No.  09–109.  Cardinal  v.  Metrish,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.;

and

No.  09–115.  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States
of  America  et  al.  v.  Candelaria  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal publication. It contains case numbers, parties involved, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP.

Opinion of the Court

question  a  capacious  construction,  effectively  echoing  the
Courts  of  Appeals  mentioned  above.    On  this  view,
“clothes” encompasses the entire outfit that one puts on to
be ready for work.  That interpretation is, to be sure, more
readily  administrable,  but  it  is  even  more  devoid  of  a
textual  foundation  than  petitioners’  offering.  Congress
could have declared bargainable under §203(o) “time spent
in  changing  outfits,”  or  “time  spent  in  putting  on  and  off
all the items needed for work.”  For better or worse, it used
the narrower word “clothes.”  “The role of this Court is to
apply  the  statute  as  it  is  written—even  if  we  think  some
other approach might accord with good policy.”  Burrage v.
United  States,  ante  at  14  (internal  quotation  marks  and
brackets omitted).

B. “Changing”
Having  settled  upon  the  meaning  of  “clothes,”  we  must
now  consider  the  meaning  of  “changing.”  Petitioners
assert that when used with certain objects—such as “tire,”
“diaper,” or, indeed, “clothes”—the term “changing” connotes
substitution.  That  is  undoubtedly  true.  See  Webster’s
Second  448  (defining  “change”  as  “to  make  substitution
of,  for,  or  among,  often  among  things  of  the  same  kind
. . . ; as, to change one’s clothes”).  One would not normally
say  he  has changed  clothes  when he  puts  on an  overcoat.
Petitioners conclude from this that items of protective gear
that  are  put  on  over  the  employee’s  street  clothes  are  not
covered by §203(o).

We disagree.  Although it is true that the normal mean-
ing of “changing clothes” connotes substitution, the phrase
is  certainly  able  to  have  a  different  import.    The  term
“changing”  carried  two  common  meanings  at  the  time  of
§203(o)’s  enactment:  to  “substitute”  and  to  “alter.”    See,
e.g.,  2  Oxford  English  Dictionary  268  (defining  “change,”
among  other  verb  forms,  as  “to  substitute  another  (or
others) for, replace by another (or others)” and “[t]o make
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute. It delves into the meaning of specific words within the statute and provides legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1024

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 20, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–7739. Smith v. Barrios. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–7743. Baque v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Depart-

ment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7751. Tuesno v. Cain, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 242.

No. 99–7752. Thomas v. Larned State Hospital et al. Ct.
App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 26 Kan. App. 2d
–––, 983 P. 2d 288.

No. 99–7753. Bayon v. Cisek et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–7755. Colarte v. LeBlanc, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7756. Stephens v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 Wash. App. 1055.

No. 99–7762. Robinson v. Luker et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 437.

No. 99–7763.

Johnson v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
175 F. 3d 1014.

No. 99–7766. Morton v. Tessmer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7767. Kanazeh v. Lockheed Martin et al. C. A.

4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 502.

No. 99–7768. McNeil v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 350 N. C. 657, 518 S. E. 2d
486.

No. 99–7769. Morganherring v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct.
N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 350 N. C. 701, 517
S. E. 2d 622.

No. 99–7775. Alvarado v. McKay et al. Ct. App. Minn.

Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names, citations, and information about certiorari decisions. This type of information is generally not considered the primary content of a legal document and is more like a table of contents or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1000

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6437.  Yoder  v.  Brewer,  Governor  of  Arizona,

et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6440.  Perez  Gonzalez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  840.

No.  09–6449.  Williams,  aka  Stewart  v.  Rozum,  Superin
tendent,  State  Correctional  Institution  at  Somerset,
et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6512.  Smith v. Weber, Warden.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6527.  Ball  v.  Houston,  Warden.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  890.

No.  09–6535.  Peterson  v.  Roe,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  658.

No.  09–6537.  Taylor  v.  Purkett,  Superintendent,  East
ern  Reception,  Diagnostic  and  Correctional  Center.
C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6540.  Asbell  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6552.  Jones  v.  Carlson,  Warden.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6558.  Ellis  v.  Shearin,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  212.

No.  09–6562.  Elizares  v.  Thomas,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6572.  Wheeler v.  Miller.  Ct. App. Md.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  408  Md.  151,  968  A.  2d  1066.

No.  09–6574.  Boyd  v.  Sherrod,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6576.  Albright-Lazzari  et  vir  v.  Connecticut.

App.  Ct.  Conn.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6581.  Corral  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  387.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't represent the typical content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxv

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

Peterson v. Roe
1000

Peterson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  975,978

923

Petties v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961

Pettiette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1059

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pettiford v. United States
876

Peyton v. Fred’s Stores of Ark., Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
988

Pﬁzer Inc. v. Abdullahi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Pﬁzer Inc. v. Dotson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pﬁzer Inc.; Dotson v.
861

Pharm v. Bartow
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961

Phasung Lu Baccam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phelps; Alameida v.
Phelps; Flowers v.
998

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phelps; Nieves v.
1077

Phengsengkham v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philadelphia; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  999,1078

809

Philadelphia Newspapers; Solomon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phillips v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  952,1140

880

Phillips v. Gates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Phillips v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phillips v. Missouri  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  911,1066

882

Phillips v. Phillips
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1100

Phillips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

Philpot v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

Piazza v. Curry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pichoff v. Northwest Health System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

828

Pichoff v. Northwest Medical Center of Wash. County  . . . . . . . . .
828

Pichoff v. QHG of Springdale, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Pickens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930

Pickett v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Piedmont Environmental Council; Edison Electric Institute v.  . . .
846

Pierce v. Mississippi  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Pierce v. San Diego Uniﬁed Port Dist.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Pierce v. U. S. District Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Pierce County Dept. of Community Corrections; Whitmore v.  . . .
879

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Piers v. United States
853

Pigford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
984

Piggie v. Robertson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pignard v. United States
904

Pina-Garcia v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
891

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pinchak; Johnson v.
905

Pine v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957

Pine v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

Pineda v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

BOND v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

must  relate  to  intercourse  with  other  nations.    The  Jay
Treaty,  for  example,  altered  state  property  law,  but  only
with respect to British subjects, who could hold and devise
real  property  in  the  United  States  “in  like  manner  as  if
they  were  natives.”    Art. IX,  8  Stat.  122.    An  1815  treaty
with  Great  Britain  was  held  to  pre-empt  a  state  law  au-
thorizing the seizure of “ ‘free negroes or persons of color’ ”
at  ports  in  part  because  the  state  law  applied  to  British
sailors.  See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 495 (No.
4,  366)  (CC  SC  1823)  (Johnson,  Circuit  Justice).    And
treaties with China and Japan, which afforded subjects of
those  countries  the  same  rights  and  privileges  as  citizens
of  other  nations,  were  understood  to  pre-empt  state  laws
that discriminated against Chinese and Japanese subjects.
See,  e.g.,  Baker  v.  Portland,  2  F. Cas.  472,  474  (No.  777)
(CC Ore. 1879).  Cf. Brief for United States 29, 33–38.

The  postratification  theory  and  practice  of  treaty-
making  accordingly  confirms  the  understanding  that
treaties  by  their  nature  relate  to  intercourse  with  other
nations (including their people and property), rather than
to purely domestic affairs.

III
The  original  understanding  that  the  Treaty  Power  was
limited  to  international  intercourse  has  been  well  repre-
sented  in  this  Court’s  precedents.    Although  we  have  not
had  occasion  to  define  the  limits  of  the  power  in  much
detail,  we  have  described  treaties  as  dealing  in  some
  See,  e.g.,
manner  with  intercourse  between  nations.
Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 569 (1840) (“The power to
make  treaties  . . .  was  designed  to  include  all  those  sub-
jects,  which  in  the  ordinary  intercourse  of  nations  had
——————

apply  to  Congress’s  legislative  powers”),  with  Golove  1077  (arguing
treaties  can  address  “subjects  that  are  otherwise  beyond  Congress’s
legislative powers”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case BOND v. UNITED STATES. It discusses the Treaty Power and its limitations, referencing historical treaties and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–280
_________________

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION,
INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF
NEW YORK, NEW YORK, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[April 27, 2020]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, and
with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins except for Part IV–B, dis-
senting.

By  incorrectly  dismissing  this  case  as  moot,  the  Court
permits our docket to be manipulated in a way that should
not  be  countenanced.    Twelve  years  ago  in  District  of  Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008), we held that the Sec-
ond Amendment protects the right of ordinary Americans
to  keep  and  bear  arms.  Two  years  later,  our  decision  in
McDonald  v.  Chicago,  561  U. S.  742  (2010),  established
that this right is fully applicable to the States.  Since then,
the  lower  courts  have  decided  numerous  cases  involving
Second Amendment challenges to a variety of federal, state,
and local laws.  Most have failed.  We have been asked to
review many of these decisions, but until this case, we de-
nied all such requests.

On January 22, 2019, we granted review to consider the
constitutionality  of  a  New  York  City  ordinance  that  bur-
dened the right recognized in Heller.  Among other things,
the ordinance prohibited law-abiding New Yorkers with a
license to keep a handgun in the home (a “premises license”)
from taking that weapon to a firing range outside the City.
Instead, premises licensees wishing to gain or maintain the
ability to use their weapons safely were limited to the seven
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court dissenting opinion. It includes case citations, the name of the justice, and the introduction to their argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the facts under-
lying  the  prior  convictions.”  Taylor  v.  United  States,  495  U. S.  575,
600.   Deciding  whether  the  residual  clause  covers  a  crime  thus  re-
quires a court to picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves
in  “the  ordinary  case,”  and  to  judge  whether  that  abstraction  pre-
sents  a  serious  potential  risk  of  physical  injury.    James,  supra,  at
208.  Pp. 3–5.

(b) Two  features  of  the  residual  clause  conspire  to  make  it  uncon-
stitutionally vague.  By tying the judicial assessment of risk to a judi-
cially  imagined  “ordinary  case”  of  a  crime  rather  than  to  real-world
facts or statutory elements, the clause leaves grave uncertainty about
how to estimate the risk posed by a crime.  See James, supra, at 211.
At  the  same  time,  the  residual  clause  leaves  uncertainty  about  how
much  risk  it  takes  for  a  crime  to  qualify  as  a  violent  felony.    Taken
together, these uncertainties produce more unpredictability and arbi-
trariness  than  the  Due  Process  Clause  tolerates.   This  Court’s  re-
peated failure to craft a principled standard out of the residual clause
and the lower courts’ persistent inability to apply the clause in a con-
sistent way confirm its hopeless indeterminacy.  Pp. 5–10.

(c) This Court’s cases squarely contradict the theory that the resid-
ual  clause  is  constitutional  merely  because  some  underlying  crimes
may clearly pose a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  L.  Cohen  Grocery  Co.,  255  U. S.  81,  89.
Holding  the  residual  clause  void  for  vagueness  does  not  put  other
criminal laws that use terms such as “substantial risk” in doubt, be-
cause  those  laws  generally  require  gauging  the  riskiness  of  an  indi-
vidual’s conduct on a particular occasion, not the riskiness of an ide-
alized ordinary case of the crime.  Pp. 10–13.

(d) The  doctrine  of  stare  decisis  does  not  require  continued  adher-
ence to James and Sykes.  Experience leaves no doubt about the una-
voidable  uncertainty  and  arbitrariness  of  adjudication  under  the  re-
sidual clause.  James and Sykes opined about vagueness without full
briefing  or  argument.    And  continued  adherence  to  those  decisions
would undermine, rather than promote, the goals of evenhandedness,
predictability, and consistency served by stare decisis.  Pp. 13–15.

526 Fed. Appx. 708, reversed and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  KENNEDY,
J., and THOMAS, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment.  ALITO, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a summary of the legal issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC.

Opinion of the Court

See

browsers.  See 830 Code Mass. Regs. 64H.1.7 (2017).  Ohio
recently  adopted  a  similar  standard.  See  Ohio Rev. Code
Ann.  §5741.01(I)(2)(i)  (Lexis  Supp.  2018).  Some  States
have  enacted  so-called  “click  through”  nexus  statutes,
which  define  nexus  to  include  out-of-state  sellers  that
contract  with  in-state  residents  who  refer  customers  for
compensation.
e.g.,  N. Y.  Tax  Law  Ann.
§1101(b)(8)(vi)  (West  2017);  Brief  for  Tax  Foundation  as
Amicus  Curiae  20–22  (listing  21  States  with  similar  stat
utes).  Others still, like Colorado, have imposed notice and
reporting  requirements  on  out-of-state  retailers  that  fall
just short of actually collecting and remitting the tax.  See
Direct Marketing, 814 F. 3d, at 1133 (discussing Colo. Rev.
Stat.  §39–21–112(3.5));  Brief  for  Tax  Foundation  24–26
(listing nine States with similar statutes).  Statutes of this
sort are likely to embroil courts in technical and arbitrary
disputes about what counts as physical presence.

Reliance  interests  are  a  legitimate  consideration  when

the Court weighs adherence to an earlier but flawed prec
edent.  See  Kimble  v.  Marvel  Entertainment,  LLC,  576
U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2015)  (slip  op.,  at  9–10).    But  even  on
its  own  terms,  the  physical  presence  rule  as  defined  by
Quill is no longer a clear or easily applicable standard, so
arguments for reliance based on its clarity are misplaced.
And,  importantly,  stare  decisis  accommodates  only  “legit
imate  reliance  interest[s].”  United  States  v.  Ross,  456
U. S. 798, 824 (1982).  Here, the tax distortion created by
Quill exists in large part because consumers regularly fail
to comply with lawful use taxes.  Some remote retailers go
so  far  as  to  advertise  sales  as  tax  free.  See  S.  B.  106,
§8(3); see also Brief for Petitioner 55.  A business “is in no
position  to  found  a  constitutional  right  on  the  practical
opportunities for tax avoidance.”  Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 312 U. S. 359, 366 (1941).

Respondents argue that “the physical presence rule has
permitted start-ups and small businesses to use the Inter
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Quill Corp. precedent and its implications for sales tax collection. It's part of a larger legal argument and contains legal terminology and citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

THRYV, INC. v. CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

out of hand.  But the Court today will not say whether man-
damus is available where the §314(d) bar applies, and the
Federal  Circuit  has  cast  doubt  on  that  possibility.    In re
Power Integrations, Inc., 899 F. 3d 1316, 1319 (2018) (“We
have  held  that  the  statutory  prohibition  on  appeals  from
decisions not to institute inter partes review cannot be side-
stepped simply by styling the request for review as a peti-
tion for mandamus”); In re Procter & Gamble Co., 749 F. 3d
1376  (2014);  In  re  Dominion  Dealer  Solutions,  LLC.,  749
F. 3d 1379 (2014).  Even assuming mandamus is available,
it is a “drastic [remedy], to be invoked only in extraordinary
situations.”  Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern
Dist. of Cal., 426 U. S. 394, 402 (1976).  To be eligible for
this  discretionary  relief,  a  petitioner  must  first  show  a
“clear and indisputable” right.  Id., at 403 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  But how often could a litigant show
such  a  “clear  and  indisputable”  right  in  an  area  where
courts shirk their duty to say what the law is in the first
place?  And how would a court find the will to call a situa-
tion  “extraordinary”  once  the  agency  has  been  free  for  so
long to ignore the limits on its power?  If the case before us
doesn’t qualify as “extraordinary,” and if the Board’s admit-
ted flouting of §315(b) isn’t “clear and indisputable,” then
what  extralegal  act  wouldn’t  be  just  another  day  at  the
office?

*
Two  years  ago,  this  Court  sanctioned  a  departure  from
the constitutional plan, one in which the Executive Branch
assumed responsibilities long reserved to the Judiciary.  In
so doing, we denied inventors the right to have their claims
tried before independent judges and juries.  Today we com-
pound  that  error,  not  only  requiring  patent  owners  to  try
their  disputes  before  employees  of  a  political  branch,  but
limiting their ability to obtain judicial review  when those
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case. It discusses the availability of mandamus and the limits of judicial review in patent disputes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

warrant is required only in the rare case where the suspect has a le-
gitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.  And even
though  the  Government  will  generally  need  a  warrant  to  access
CSLI,  case-specific  exceptions—e.g.,  exigent  circumstances—may
support a warrantless search.  Pp. 18–22.

 819 F. 3d 880, reversed and remanded.

ROBERTS,  C. J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  GINS-
BURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  KENNEDY, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.  ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
THOMAS, J., joined.  GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal case syllabus, containing case name, citation, and a summary of the court's decision.  It is not the main body of the legal text and likely not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxxv

Page

918

Rosado v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1098

Rosales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

Rosch v. Whatcom County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

Rose v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887

Rose v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rosenbaum v. United States
820

Rosenthal v.  Committee on Prof. Stds., App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.
Ross v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  899,930,1005,1018,1127

1015

Ross v. Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Rossaty v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Rosser v. Scribner
864

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roten v. DeLoy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1027,1159

Roth v. Pennsylvania
855

Roth; Watt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

Rothery v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

Rothman v. Target Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  944,1052

Rouse v. Department of State
848

Rouse v. Kentucky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Rowell v. Nevada  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Roy v. Minnesota  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907

Roy; Triplett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Royal Oak; Royal Oak Entertainment, L. L. C. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

1092

Royal Oak Entertainment, L. L. C. v. Royal Oak  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Royer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935

Royse v. Corning Glass Works, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1046,1146

1053

Rozum; Edwards v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914

Rozum; Graves v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000

Rozum; Stewart v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
885

Rozum; Watson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000

Rozum; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
R. T. v. N. G. S. C.
899

Rubitschun; Prater v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rucker v. Illinois Dept. of Children and Family Services  . . . .  1046,1151

950

Rucker v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Rudolph; Virginia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

Ruelas v. Arizona  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Ruezga v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
982

Ruezga v. Yates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Ruiz v. Birkett  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Ruiz v. Hofbauer
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

Ruiz; Maisano v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ruiz; Radwanski v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

892

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ruiz-Arriaga v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  878,1101

Ruiz Rivera v. Department of Ed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

THOMAS, J., concurring

this  factor  to  be evidence  of  arbitrariness.    See  ibid.    The
constitutional  provisions  just  quoted,  which  place  such
decisions  in  the  hands  of  jurors  and  trial  courts  located
where “the crime shall have been committed,” seem delib-
erately designed to introduce that factor.

In any event, the results of these studies are inherently
unreliable  because  they  purport  to  control  for  egregious-
ness  by  quantifying  moral  depravity  in  a  process  that  is
itself  arbitrary,  not  to  mention  dehumanizing.    One  such
study’s explanation of how the author assigned “depravity
points”  to  identify  the  “worst  of  the  worst”  murderers
proves the point well.  McCord, Lightning Still Strikes, 71
Brooklyn  L. Rev.  797,  833–834  (2005).    Each  aggravating
factor  received  a  point  value  based  on  the  “blame-
worth[iness]” of the action associated with it.  Id., at 830.
Killing  a  prison  guard,  for  instance,  earned  a  defendant
three  “depravity  points”  because  it  improved  the  case  for
complete  incapacitation,  while  killing  a  police  officer
merited  only  two,  because,  “considered  dispassionately,”
such  acts  do  “not  seem  be  a  sine  qua  non  of  the  worst
criminals.”  Id.,  at  834–836.    (Do  not  worry,  the  author
reassures  us,  “many  killers  of  police  officers  accrue  de-
pravity points in other ways that clearly put them among
the  worst  criminals.”  Id.,  at  836.)    Killing  a  child  under
the  age  of  12  was  worth  two  depravity  points,  because
such  an  act  “seems  particularly  heartless,”  but  killing
someone over the age of 70 earned the murderer only one,
for although “elderly victims tug at our hearts,” they do so
“less”  than  children  “because  the  promise  of  a  long  life  is
less.”  Id.,  at  836,  838.    Killing  to  make  a  political  state-
ment  was  worth  three  depravity  points;  killing  out  of
racial  hatred,  only  two.  Id.,  at  835,  837.  It  goes  on,  but
this  small  sample  of  the  moral  judgments  on  which  this
study rested shows just how unsuitable this evidence is to
serve as a basis for a judicial decision declaring unconsti-
tutional  a  punishment  duly  enacted  in  more  than  30
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the arguments surrounding the constitutionality of a particular punishment, citing studies and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1034

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 20, 21, 22, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–6743. DeAngelis v. Widener University School

of Law et al., 528 U. S. 1053;

No. 99–6768. Wilkins v. Oklahoma, 528 U. S. 1086;
No. 99–6783. Hemmerle v. Bakst, 528 U. S. 1087;
No. 99–6825. Canterbury v. West, Secretary of Veter-

ans Affairs, 528 U. S. 1088;

No. 99–6939. Tibbs v. Corcoran, Warden, 528 U. S. 1120;
No. 99–6964. Larry v. Texas, 528 U. S. 1120;
No. 99–7051. Davage v. United States, 528 U. S. 1093;
No. 99–7119. Ports v. Dean, Superintendent, Lake Cor-

rectional Institution, et al., 528 U. S. 1140;

No. 99–7184. WuChang et al. v. City of Redwood City

et al., 528 U. S. 1141;

No. 99–7285. Lerro v. Board of Review, Department of

Labor, et al., 528 U. S. 1126;

No. 99–7350. Vaile v. Walter, Superintendent, Airway

Heights Corrections Center, 528 U. S. 1142; and

In re LeGrande, 528 U. S. 1113. Petitions for

No. 99–7512.
rehearing denied.

No. 99–5682. Mack v. United States Postal Service, 528
U. S. 914. Motion for leave to ﬁle petition for rehearing denied.

Miscellaneous Order

March 21, 2000

No. 99A783. Hampton, By and Through Pincus, as Next
Friend v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional
Center. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court,
denied.

Miscellaneous Order

March 22, 2000

No. 99A786. Bell, Warden v. Coe. Application to vacate
stay of execution of sentence of death entered by the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee on
March 22, 2000, presented to Justice Stevens, and by him re-
ferred to the Court, denied.

Certiorari Denied

No. 99–8681 (99A767). Coe v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn.
Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, likely a list of court cases and their dispositions (granted, denied, etc.). It includes case numbers, citations, and dates.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

is permissible, then “ ‘the Seventh Amendment poses no in-
dependent bar to the adjudication of that action by a non-
jury factfinder’ ” (quoting Granfinanciera, 492 U. S., at 53–
54));  see  W.  Baude,  Adjudication  Outside  Article  III,  133
Harv.  L. Rev.  1511,  1571  (2020)  (“The  Article  III  analysis
should be conducted first, on its own.  And then . . . if the
non-Article  III  adjudication  is  permissible,  the  Seventh
Amendment should be ignored”).  When executive power is
at  stake,  Congress  does  not  violate  Article  III  or  the  Sev-
enth Amendment by authorizing a nonjury factfinder to ad-
judicate the dispute.

So, the critical issue in this type of case is whether Con-
gress  can  assign  a  particular  matter  to  a  non-Article  III
factfinder.

B
For more than a century and a half, this Court has an-
swered that Article III question by pointing to the distinc-
tion between “private rights” and “public rights.”  See Mur-
ray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How.
272, 284 (1856) (recognizing public-rights exception).  The
distinction  is  helpful  because  public  rights  always  can  be
assigned outside of Article III.  They “ ‘do not require judi-
cial  determination’ ”  under  the  Constitution,  even  if  they
“ ‘are susceptible of it.’ ”  Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 50
(1932) (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 451
(1929)).

The  majority  says  that  aspects  of  the  public-rights  doc-
trine have been confusing.  See ante, at 17.  That might be
true for cases involving wholly private disputes, but not for
cases where the Government is a party.3  It has long been

——————

3 Every case  that  has  expressed  consternation  about  the precise  con-
tours of the public-rights doctrine, including those cited by the majority,
involve only private disputes—or, more precisely, “disputes to which the
Federal  Government  is  not  a  party  in  its  sovereign  capacity.”    Granfi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal concepts of Article III and the Seventh Amendment, discussing their application to cases involving executive power and non-jury factfinders.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1014

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 15, 16, 20, 2000

529 U. S.

and Justice Breyer would grant the application for stay of
execution.

Miscellaneous Order

March 16, 2000

No. 99A750. Hunt, Governor of North Carolina, et al.

v. Cromartie et al.; and

No. 99A757. Smallwood et al. v. Cromartie et al. Appli-
cations for stay of judgment of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, case No. 4:96–CV–
104–BO(3), entered March 8, 2000, presented to The Chief Jus-
tice, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending the
timely docketing of the appeals in this Court. Should the juris-
dictional statements be timely ﬁled, this order shall remain in
If the appeals
effect pending this Court’s action on the appeals.
are dismissed or the judgment afﬁrmed, this order shall terminate
automatically.
In the event jurisdiction is noted or postponed,
this order will remain in effect pending the sending down of the
judgment of this Court.

Certiorari Dismissed

March 20, 2000

No. 99–7818. Ford v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.

No. 99–8071. Kowalski v. Oregon State Bar. Sup. Ct. Ore.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis de-
nied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.

Miscellaneous Orders

No. D–2127.

In re Disbarment of Thomas. Disbarment en-

tered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1043.]

No. D–2129.

In re Disbarment of Horn. Disbarment en-

tered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1071.]

No. D–2131.

In re Disbarment of Zeegers. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1071.]

No. D–2132.

In re Disbarment of Grindle. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1071.]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal case summaries from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case numbers, dates, and brief descriptions of the court's actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

23

Opinion of the Court

evaluating  the  agency’s  contemporaneous  explanation  in
light of the existing administrative record.”  Department of
Commerce, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 23).  Department of
Commerce  involved  a  “narrow  exception  to  th[at]  general
rule” that applies where the challengers to the agency’s ac-
tion  make  a  “strong  showing  of  bad  faith  or  improper  be-
havior” on the part of the agency.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 24)
(quoting  Citizens  to  Preserve  Overton  Park,  Inc.  v.  Volpe,
401 U. S. 402, 420 (1971)).  We held that exception satisfied
by  an  accumulation  of  “unusual  circumstances”  that
demonstrated an “explanation for agency action that [was]
incongruent  with  what  the  record  reveal[ed]  about  the
agency’s  priorities  and  decisionmaking  process.”    Depart-
ment of Commerce, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 28).

The circumstances in this case do not come close to those
in  Department  of  Commerce.  Nothing  in  this  record  sug-
gests a “significant mismatch between the decision the Sec-
retary made and the rationale he provided.”  Id., at ___ (slip
op., at 26).   Respondents direct us instead to  the Govern-
ment’s litigation conduct.  But the examples of misconduct
to which respondents refer—such as a failure to timely com-
plete the administrative record, Brief for Respondents 42—
have no bearing on the legal status of the October 29 Mem-
oranda.  And in any event, they fall well short of the “strong
showing of bad faith or improper behavior,” Overton Park,
401 U. S., at 420, that we require before deviating from our
normal rule that “[t]he grounds upon which an administra-
tive order must be judged are those upon which the record
discloses that its action was based,” SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U. S. 80, 87 (1943).

The Court of Appeals leveled the related but more modest
charge  that  the  Secretary  failed  to  proceed  with  a  suffi-
ciently open mind.  See, e.g., 20 F. 4th, at 955 (agency pro-
ceeded “without a hint of an intention to put the Termina-
tion  Decision  back  on  the  chopping  block  and  rethink
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and discusses legal arguments and precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

Syllabus

them to apply the placement preferences in making custody determi-
nations.  §§1915(a), (b).  But Congress can require state courts, unlike
state executives and legislatures, to enforce federal law.  See New York
v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 178–179.  Petitioners draw a distinc-
tion between requiring state courts to entertain federal causes of ac-
tion and requiring them to apply federal law to state causes of action,
but this argument runs counter to the Supremacy Clause.  When Con-
gress enacts a valid statute, “state law is naturally preempted to the
extent of any conflict with a federal statute.”  Crosby v. National For-
eign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372.  That a federal law modifies a
state law cause of action does not limit its preemptive effect.  See, e.g.,
Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U. S. 483, 493–494 (federal law establishing
order  of  precedence  for  life  insurance  beneficiaries  preempted  state
law).  Pp. 23–25.

(c) Finally,  petitioners  insist  that  Congress  cannot  force  state
courts to maintain or transmit records of custody proceedings involv-
ing Indian children.  But the anticommandeering doctrine applies “dis-
tinctively” to a state court’s adjudicative responsibilities.  Printz, 521
U. S.,  at  907.    The  Constitution  allows  Congress  to  require  “state
judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions
relat[e] to matters appropriate for the judicial power.”  Ibid. (emphasis
deleted).  In Printz, the Court indicated that this principle may extend
to tasks that are “ancillary” to a “quintessentially adjudicative task”—
such as “recording, registering, and certifying” documents.  Id., at 908,
n. 2.  Printz described numerous historical examples of Congress im-
posing  recordkeeping  and  reporting  requirements  on  state  courts.
These early congressional enactments demonstrate that the Constitu-
tion does not prohibit the Federal Government from imposing adjudi-
cative tasks on state courts.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 723.  The
Court now confirms what Printz suggested: Congress may impose an-
cillary recordkeeping requirements related to state-court proceedings
without violating the Tenth Amendment.  Here, ICWA’s recordkeeping
requirements are comparable to the historical examples.  The duties
ICWA imposes are “ancillary” to the state court’s obligation to conduct
child custody proceedings in compliance with ICWA.  Printz, 521 U. S.,
at 908, n. 2.  Pp. 25–29.

3. The Court does not reach the merits of petitioners’ two additional
claims—an  equal  protection  challenge  to  ICWA’s  placement  prefer-
ences and a nondelegation challenge to §1915(c), the provision allow-
ing tribes to alter the placement preferences—because no party before
the Court has standing to raise them.  Pp. 29–34.

(a) The  individual  petitioners  argue  that  ICWA’s  hierarchy  of
preferences injures them by placing them on unequal footing with In-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It summarizes the legal arguments and the Court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

AMERICAN LEGION v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

cases  has  its  own  principles  based  on  history,  tradition,
and  precedent.    And  the  cases  together  lead  to  an  over-
arching  set  of  principles:  If  the  challenged  government
practice is not coercive and if it (i) is rooted in history and
tradition;  or  (ii)  treats  religious  people,  organizations,
speech,  or  activity  equally  to  comparable  secular  people,
organizations,  speech,  or  activity;  or  (iii)  represents  a
permissible  legislative  accommodation  or  exemption  from
a  generally  applicable  law,  then  there  ordinarily  is  no
Establishment Clause violation.*
  The  practice  of  displaying  religious  memorials,  particu-
larly  religious  war  memorials,  on  public  land  is  not  coer-
cive  and  is  rooted  in  history  and  tradition.    The  Bladens-
burg Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause.  Cf.
Town of Greece, 572 U. S. 565.

II
  The  Bladensburg  Cross  commemorates  soldiers  who
gave their lives for America in World War I.  I agree with
the Court that the Bladensburg Cross is constitutional.  At
the  same  time,  I  have  deep  respect  for  the  plaintiffs’  sin-
cere  objections  to  seeing  the  cross  on  public  land.    I  have
great respect for the Jewish war veterans who in an ami-
cus brief say that the cross on public land sends a message
of exclusion.  I recognize their sense of distress and aliena-
tion.    Moreover,  I  fully  understand  the  deeply  religious
nature  of  the  cross.    It  would  demean  both  believers  and
nonbelievers  to  say  that  the  cross  is  not  religious,  or  not
all  that  religious.    A  case  like  this  is  difficult  because  it
represents  a  clash  of  genuine  and  important  interests.
Applying  our  precedents,  we  uphold  the  constitutionality
of  the  cross.    In  doing  so,  it  is  appropriate  to  also  restate
this  bedrock  constitutional  principle:  All  citizens  are
——————

*That  is  not  to say  that  challenged  government  actions outside  that
safe  harbor  are  unconstitutional.    Any  such  cases  must  be  analyzed
under the relevant Establishment Clause principles and precedents.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in the case AMERICAN LEGION v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN. It outlines the legal principles used to determine the constitutionality of the Bladensburg Cross.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>