<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

held  most  clearly  a  matter  for  the  States”);  Construction
Workers  v.  Laburnum  Constr.  Corp.,  347  U. S.  656,  669
(1954)  (The  NLRA  does  not  allow  employees  to  “destroy
property without liability for the damage done”); Electrical
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U. S.
740, 748 (1942) (The NLRA “was not designed to preclude a
State” from regulating threats of property damage); see also
Linn  v.  Plant  Guard  Workers,  383  U. S.  53,  61–62  (1966)
(“ ‘[T]here is no ground for concluding that existing criminal
penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been elimi-
nated’ ”  by  the  NLRA);  Bill  Johnson’s  Restaurants,  Inc.  v.
NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, 741–742 (1983) (“It has . . . repeatedly
been held that an employer has the right to seek local judi-
cial  protection  from  tortious  conduct  during  a  labor  dis-
pute”).

Nothing  more  is  needed  to  resolve  this  case.    Glacier’s
complaint  alleges  that  the  Union  and  its  members  acted
“with the improper purpose to harm Glacier by causing [its]
batched concrete to be destroyed.”  App. 10; accord, id., at
14,  19–20.  As  the  Court  recognizes,  they  succeeded  by
“prompt[ing]  the  creation  of  the  perishable  product”  and
then ceasing work when the concrete was in a vulnerable
state.  Ante, at 10 (emphasis deleted); see App. 10–13.  Be-
cause  this  Court  has  long  rejected  the  Union’s  claim  that
this kind of conduct is protected, Garmon preemption does
not apply.  See Longshoremen v. Davis, 476 U. S. 380, 395
(1986).1

——————

1 The Court wisely declines to address the argument on which JUSTICE
JACKSON relies regarding the effect of the complaint before the NLRB on
this litigation.  See post, at 7–8.  That argument represents a striking
extension of Garmon preemption, which, as the Court notes, is already
an “unusual” doctrine.  See ante, at 3–4.  If the state courts on remand
dismiss this case on that ground, the decision, in my judgment, would be
a good candidate for a quick return trip here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito. It cites legal precedents and analyzes a case, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

9

Opinion of the Court

dispositive,  and  confined  Begay  to  “strict  liability,  negli
gence,  and  recklessness  crimes.”  564  U. S.,  at  ___–___
(slip op., at 10–11).

The  present  case,  our  fifth  about  the  meaning  of  the
residual  clause,  opens  a  new  front  of  uncertainty.    When
deciding  whether  unlawful  possession  of  a  short-barreled
shotgun is a violent felony, do we confine our attention to
the  risk  that  the  shotgun  will  go  off  by  accident  while  in
someone’s possession?  Or do we also consider the possibil
ity that the person possessing the shotgun will later use it
to  commit  a  crime?  The  inclusion  of  burglary  and  extor
tion among the enumerated offenses suggests that a crime
may qualify under the residual clause even if the physical
injury is remote from the criminal act.  But how remote is
too  remote?  Once  again,  the  residual  clause  yields  no
answers.

This  Court  is  not  the  only  one  that  has  had  trouble
making sense of the residual clause.  The clause has “cre
ated  numerous  splits  among  the  lower  federal  courts,”
where it has proved “nearly impossible to apply consistently.”
Chambers,  555  U. S.,  at  133  (ALITO,  J.,  concurring  in
judgment).    The  most  telling  feature  of  the  lower  courts’
decisions is not division about whether the residual clause
covers  this  or  that  crime  (even  clear  laws  produce  close
cases);  it  is,  rather,  pervasive  disagreement  about  the
nature  of  the  inquiry  one  is  supposed  to  conduct  and  the
kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.  Some judges
have  concluded  that  deciding  whether  conspiracy  is  a
violent  felony  requires  evaluating  only  the  dangers  posed
by the “simple act of agreeing [to commit a crime],” United
States  v.  Whitson,  597  F. 3d  1218,  1222  (CA11  2010)  (per
curiam);  others  have  also  considered  the  probability  that
the agreement will be carried out, United States v. White,
571  F. 3d  365,  370–371  (CA4  2009).    Some  judges  have
assumed  that  the  battery  of  a  police  officer  (defined  to
include the slightest touching) could “explode into violence
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of a legal clause and cites previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

Syllabus

 ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BREYER,
SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  BARRETT, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined, and in which
BREYER, J., joined as to all but the first paragraph.  ALITO, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ.,
joined.  GORSUCH,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment,  in
which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case syllabus, which typically summarizes the court's decision and reasoning.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

21

ALITO, J., dissenting

amending  the  list  of  enumerated  offenses  or  abandoning
the categorical approach would solve the problem that the
Court perceives.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a dissenting opinion. It's sequential and contains meaningful legal argument, suggesting it's part of the actual content meant to be read.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005)

21

STEVENS, J., dissenting

order  entered  for  her  special  protection,  rather  than  on  a
formal  contract,  does  not  provide  a  principled  basis  for
refusing  to  consider  it  “property”  worthy  of  constitutional
protection.20

V
Because  respondent  had  a  property  interest  in  the  en-

——————

20 According  to  JUSTICE  SOUTER, respondent  has  asserted  a  property
interest  in  merely  a  “state-mandated  process,”  ante,  at  3  (opinion
concurring in part and concurring in judgment), rather than in a state-
mandated “substantive guarantee,” ibid.  This misunderstands respon-
dent’s  claim.  Putting  aside  the  inartful  passage  of  respondent’s  brief
that JUSTICE SOUTER relies upon, ante, at 2, it is clear that respondent
is  in  fact  asserting  a  substantive  interest  in  the  “enforcement  of  the
restraining order.”  Brief for Respondent 10.  Enforcement of a restrain-
ing  order  is  a  tangible,  substantive  act.    If  an  estranged  husband
violates  a  restraining  order  by  abducting  children,  and  the  police
succeed in enforcing the order, the person holding the restraining order
has undeniably just received a substantive benefit.  As in other proce-
dural  due  process  cases,  respondent  is  arguing  that  the  police  officers
failed  to  follow  fair  procedures  in  ascertaining  whether  the  statutory
criteria  that  trigger  their  obligation  to  provide  enforcement—i.e.,  an
outstanding  order  plus  probable  cause  that  it  is  being  violated—were
satisfied in her case.  Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266–267 (1978)
(discussing  analytic  difference  between  the  denial  of  fair  process  and
the  denial  of  the  substantive  benefit  itself).    It  is  JUSTICE  SOUTER,  not
respondent,  who  makes  the  mistake  of  “collapsing  the  distinction
between property protected and the process that protects it,” ante, at 4.
JUSTICE SOUTER also errs in suggesting that respondent cannot have
a property interest in enforcement because she would not be authorized
to  instruct  the  police  to  refrain  from  enforcement  in  the  event  of  a
violation.  Ante, at 1.  The right to insist on the provision of a service is
separate from the right to refuse the service.  For example, compulsory
attendance  laws  deny  minors  the  right  to  refuse  to  attend  school.
Nevertheless, we have recognized that minors have a property interest
in  public  education  and  that  school  officials  must  therefore  follow  fair
procedures  when  they  seek  to  deprive  minors  of  this  valuable  benefit
through  suspension.    See  Goss,  419  U. S.  565.    In  the  end,  JUSTICE
SOUTER overlooks the core purpose of procedural due process—ensuring
that  a  citizen’s  reasonable  reliance  is  not  frustrated  by  arbitrary
government action.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments regarding property rights and due process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U92

[09-15-00 14:34:37] PAGES PGT: OPIN

410

SWIDLER & BERLIN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

sistent with the purposes of the privilege, see Glover, 165
U. S., at 407–408; United States v. Zolin, 491 U. S. 554, 562–
563 (1989), while a posthumous exception in criminal cases
appears at odds with the goals of encouraging full and frank
communication and of protecting the client’s interests. A
“no harm in one more exception” rationale could contribute
to the general erosion of the privilege, without reference to
common-law principles or “reason and experience.”

Finally, the Independent Counsel, relying on cases such as
United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710 (1974), and Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (1972), urges that privileges be
strictly construed because they are inconsistent with the
paramount judicial goal of truth seeking. But both Nixon
and Branzburg dealt with the creation of privileges not rec-
ognized by the common law, whereas here we deal with one
of the oldest recognized privileges in the law. And we are
asked, not simply to “construe” the privilege, but to narrow
it, contrary to the weight of the existing body of case law.
It has been generally, if not universally, accepted, for well
over a century, that the attorney-client privilege survives
the death of the client in a case such as this. While the
arguments against the survival of the privilege are by no
means frivolous, they are based in large part on specula-
tion—thoughtful speculation, but speculation nonetheless—
as to whether posthumous termination of the privilege would
diminish a client’s willingness to conﬁde in an attorney.
In
an area where empirical information would be useful, it is
scant and inconclusive.

Rule 501’s direction to look to “the principles of the com-
mon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience” does not
mandate that a rule, once established, should endure for all
time. Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 381 (1933). But

vives—if attorneys were required as a matter of practice to testify or
provide notes in criminal proceedings, cases discussing that practice would
surely exist.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, which is suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON

Opinion of the Court

year.  Brief for Players Association of the National Football
League et al. as Amici Curiae 17.  Commissioners of the top
conferences take home between $2 to $5 million.  Ibid.  Col-
lege athletic directors average more than $1 million annu-
ally.  Ibid.  And  annual  salaries  for  top  Division  I  college
football  coaches  approach  $11  million,  with  some  of  their
assistants making more than $2.5 million.  Id., at 17–18.

B

The plaintiffs are current and former student-athletes in
men’s Division I FBS football and men’s and women’s Divi-
sion  I  basketball.    They  filed  a  class  action  against  the
NCAA and 11 Division I conferences (for simplicity’s sake,
we refer to the defendants collectively as the NCAA).  The
student-athletes  challenged  the  “current,  interconnected
set  of  NCAA  rules  that  limit  the  compensation  they  may
receive in exchange for their athletic services.”  D. Ct. Op.,
at  1062,  1065,  n. 5.  Specifically,  they  alleged  that  the
NCAA’s rules violate §1 of the Sherman Act, which prohib-
its  “contract[s],  combination[s],  or  conspirac[ies]  in  re-
straint of trade or commerce.”  15 U. S. C. §1.

After  pretrial  proceedings  stretching  years,  the  district
court conducted a 10-day bench trial.  It heard experts and
lay witnesses from both sides, and received volumes of evi-
dence  and  briefing,  all  before  issuing  an  exhaustive  deci-
sion.  In the end, the court found the evidence undisputed
on  certain  points.  The  NCAA  did  not  “contest  evidence
showing” that it and its members have agreed to compen-
sation limits on student-athletes;  the NCAA and its confer-
ences  enforce  these  limits  by  punishing  violations;  and
these  limits  “affect  interstate  commerce.”    D.  Ct.  Op.,  at
1066.

Based on these premises, the district court proceeded to
assess the lawfulness of the NCAA’s challenged restraints.
This Court has “long recognized that in view of the common
law and the law in this country when the Sherman Act was
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" section in a case involving the NCAA and athlete compensation.  It sets the stage for the legal arguments by outlining the background and the specific rules being challenged.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

JAM ET AL. v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 17–1011.  Argued October 31, 2018—Decided February 27, 2019

In  1945,  Congress  passed  the  International  Organizations  Immunities
Act  (IOIA),  which,  among  other  things,  grants  international  organi-
zations  the  “same  immunity  from  suit  .  .  .  as  is  enjoyed  by  foreign
governments.”    22  U. S. C.  §288a(b).    At  that  time,  foreign  govern-
ments were entitled to virtually absolute immunity as a matter of in-
ternational grace and comity.  In 1952, the State Department adopt-
ed  a  more  restrictive  theory  of  foreign  sovereign  immunity,  which
Congress subsequently codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §1602.  The FSIA gives foreign sovereign gov-
ernments presumptive immunity from suit, §1604, subject to several
statutory exceptions, including, as relevant here, an exception for ac-
tions  based  on  commercial  activity  with  a  sufficient  nexus  with  the
United States, §1605(a)(2).

Respondent  International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC),  an  IOIA  in-
ternational organization, entered into a loan agreement with Coastal
Gujarat Power Limited, a company based in India, to finance the con-
struction of a coal-fired power plant in Gujarat.  Petitioners sued the
IFC, claiming that pollution from the plant harmed the surrounding
air, land, and water.  The District Court, however, held that the IFC
was  immune  from  suit  because  it  enjoyed  the  virtually  absolute  im-
munity that foreign governments enjoyed when the IOIA was enact-
ed.  The D. C. Circuit affirmed in light of its decision in Atkinson v.
Inter-American Development Bank, 156 F. 3d 1335.

Held: The IOIA affords international organizations the same immunity
from  suit  that  foreign  governments  enjoy  today  under  the  FSIA.
Pp. 6–15.

(a) The  IOIA  “same  as”  formulation  is  best  understood  as  making
international organization immunity and foreign sovereign immunity
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21A272
_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES v. BENNIE G. THOMPSON, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED
STATES HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH
ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES
CAPITOL, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY OF MANDATE AND INJUNCTION
PENDING REVIEW

[January 19, 2022]

The application for stay of mandate and injunction pend-
ing review presented to THE CHIEF JUSTICE and by him re-
ferred to the Court is denied.  The questions whether and
in  what  circumstances  a  former  President  may  obtain  a
court order preventing disclosure of privileged records from
his  tenure  in  office,  in  the  face  of  a  determination  by  the
incumbent  President  to  waive  the  privilege,  are  unprece-
dented  and  raise  serious  and  substantial  concerns.    The
Court of Appeals, however, had no occasion to decide these
questions  because  it  analyzed  and  rejected  President
Trump’s privilege claims “under any of the tests [he] advo-
cated,” Trump v. Thompson, 20 F. 4th 10, 33 (CADC 2021),
without regard to his status as a former President, id., at
40–46.  Because the Court of Appeals concluded that Presi-
dent Trump’s claims would have failed even if he were the
incumbent,  his  status  as  a  former  President  necessarily
made no difference to the court’s decision.  Id., at 33 (noting
no “need [to] conclusively resolve whether and to what ex-
tent a court,” at a former President’s behest, may “second
guess the sitting President’s” decision to release privileged
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal document, specifically a Supreme Court case. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.  While it is important legal content, it is not the kind of text meant to be directly indexed for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Header/Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

93

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered the main body text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES

Syllabus

decrease  would  not  fully  recompense  nonmembers,  who  would  not
have  paid  to  support  the  special  assessment  if  given  the  choice.    In
any  event,  even  a  full  refund  would  not  undo  the  First  Amendment
violations, since the First Amendment does not permit a union to ex-
tract  a  loan  from  unwilling  nonmembers  even  if  the  money  is  later
paid back in full.  Pp. 14−17.

(d) The  SEIU’s  treatment  of  nonmembers  who  opted  out  when
the  initial  Hudson  notice  was  sent  also  ran  afoul  of  the  First
Amendment.    They  were  required  to  pay  56.35%  of  the  special  as-
sessment  even  though  all  the  money  was  slated  for  nonchargeable,
electoral  uses.    And  the  SEIU’s  claim  that  the  assessment  was  a
windfall because chargeable expenses turned out to be 66.26% is un-
persuasive.    First,  the  SEIU’s  understanding  of  the  breadth  of
chargeable expenses is so expansive that it is hard to place much re-
liance  on  its  statistics.    “Lobbying  the  electorate,”  which  the  SEIU
claims is chargeable, is nothing more than another term for support-
ing  political  causes  and  candidates.    Second,  even  if  the  SEIU’s  sta-
tistics are accurate, it does not follow that it was proper to charge ob-
jecting  nonmembers  any  particular  percentage  of  the  special
assessment.    If,  as  the  SEIU  argues,  it  is  not  possible  to  accurately
determine in advance the percentage of union funds that will be used
for an upcoming year’s chargeable purposes, there is  a  risk that un-
consenting  nonmembers  will  have  paid  too  much  or  too  little.    That
risk  should  be  borne  by  the  side  whose  constitutional  rights  are  not
at  stake.  If  the  nonmembers  pay  too  much,  their  First  Amendment
rights are infringed.  But, if they pay too little, no constitutional right
of  the  union  is  violated  because  it  has  no  constitutional  right  to  re-
ceive any payment from those employees.  Pp. 17−23.

628 F. 3d 1115, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an
opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment,  in  which  GINSBURG,  J.,  joined.
BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal case syllabus, outlining the court's reasoning and decision. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC.,
DBA SEALTITE BUILDING FASTENERS ET AL., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–352.  Argued December 2, 2014—Decided March 24, 2015

Respondent Hargis Industries, Inc. (Hargis), tried to register its trade-
mark  for  SEALTITE  with  the  United  States  Patent  and  Trademark
Office pursuant to the Lanham Act.  Petitioner, B&B Hardware, Inc.
(B&B),  however,  opposed  registration,  claiming  that  SEALTITE  is
too  similar  to  B&B’s  own  SEALTIGHT  trademark.    The  Trademark
Trial  and  Appeal  Board  (TTAB)  concluded  that  SEALTITE  should
not  be  registered  because  of  the  likelihood  of  confusion.    Hargis  did
not seek judicial review of that decision.

Later,  in  an  infringement  suit  before  the  District  Court,  B&B  ar-
gued that Hargis was precluded from contesting the likelihood of con-
fusion because of the TTAB’s decision.  The District Court disagreed.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that preclusion was unwarrant-
ed because the TTAB and the court used different factors to evaluate
likelihood  of  confusion,  the  TTAB  placed  too  much  emphasis  on  the
appearance and sound of the two marks, and Hargis bore the burden
of persuasion before the TTAB while B&B bore it before the District
Court.

Held: So  long  as  the  other  ordinary  elements  of  issue  preclusion  are
met,  when  the  usages  adjudicated  by  the  TTAB  are  materially  the
same  as  those  before  a  district  court,  issue  preclusion  should  apply.
Pp. 8–22.

(a) An  agency  decision  can  ground  issue  preclusion.    The  Court’s
cases  establish  that  when  Congress  authorizes  agencies  to  resolve
disputes,  “courts  may  take  it  as  given  that  Congress  has  legislated
with the expectation that [issue preclusion] will apply except when a
statutory  purpose  to  the  contrary  is  evident.”  Astoria  Fed.  Sav.  &
Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108.  Constitutional avoidance
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC. v. ARKANSAS TEACHER

RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Opinion of the Court

requires  that  “questions  of  law  or  fact  common  to  class
members  predominate”  over  individualized  issues.    Fed.
Rule  Civ.  Proc.  23(b)(3).  Indeed,  without  the  Basic  pre-
sumption, individualized issues of reliance ordinarily would
defeat predominance and “preclude certification” of a secu-
rities-fraud class action.  Amgen, 568 U. S., at 462–463; see
Halliburton II, 573 U. S., at 281–282.

As a result, class-action plaintiffs must prove the Basic
prerequisites before class certification—with one exception.
In  Amgen,  we  held  that  materiality  should  be  left  to  the
merits stage because it does not bear on Rule 23’s predomi-
nance requirement.  568 U. S., at 466–468.  The remaining
Basic prerequisites—publicity, market efficiency, and mar-
ket  timing—“must  be  satisfied”  by  plaintiffs  “before  class
certification.”  Halliburton II, 573 U. S., at 276.

Satisfying those prerequisites, however, does not guaran-
tee class certification.  We held in Halliburton II that de-
fendants may rebut the Basic presumption at class certifi-
cation  by  showing  “that  an  alleged  misrepresentation  did
not  actually  affect  the  market  price  of  the  stock.”    Id.,  at
284.  If  a  misrepresentation  had  no  price  impact,  then
Basic’s fundamental premise “completely collapses, render-
ing class certification inappropriate.”  Id., at 283.

B
Respondents here—whom we’ll call Plaintiffs—are Gold-
man shareholders.  They brought this securities-fraud class
action  against  Goldman  in  the  Southern  District  of  New
York, alleging violations of §10(b) and Rule 10b–5.

The specific theory of securities fraud that Plaintiffs al-
lege is known as inflation maintenance.  Under this theory,
a misrepresentation causes a stock price “to remain inflated
by  preventing  preexisting  inflation  from  dissipating  from
Investor  Group  v.
FindWhat
the  stock  price.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the requirements for class certification in a securities fraud case. It cites legal precedents and outlines the relevant legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CALIFORNIA ET AL. v. TEXAS ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–840.  Argued November 10, 2020—Decided June 17, 2021*

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as enacted in 2010 re-
quired most Americans to obtain minimum essential health insurance
coverage and imposed a monetary penalty upon most individuals who
failed to do so.  Amendments to the Act in 2017 effectively nullified the
penalty by setting its amount to $0.  Subsequently, Texas (along with
over a dozen States and two individuals) brought suit against federal
officials, claiming that without the penalty the Act’s minimum essen-
tial coverage provision, codified at 26 U. S. C. §5000A(a), is unconsti-
tutional.  They sought a declaration that the provision is unconstitu-
tional,  a  finding  that  the  rest  of  the  Act  is  not  severable  from
§5000A(a),  and  an  injunction  against  enforcement  of  the  rest  of  the
Act.  The District Court determined that the individual plaintiffs had
standing.  It also found §5000A(a) both unconstitutional and not sev-
erable from the rest of the Act.  The Fifth Circuit agreed as to the ex-
istence of standing and the unconstitutionality of §5000A(a), but con-
cluded  that  the  District  Court’s  severability  analysis  provided
insufficient justification to strike down the entire Act.  Petitioner Cal-
ifornia and other States intervened to defend the Act’s constitutional-
ity and to seek further review.

Held: Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge §5000A(a)’s minimum
essential  coverage  provision  because  they  have  not  shown  a  past  or
future injury fairly traceable to defendants’ conduct enforcing the spe-
cific statutory provision they attack as unconstitutional.  Pp. 4–16.

(a) The  Constitution  gives  federal  courts  the  power  to  adjudicate

——————

* Together with No. 19–1019, Texas et al. v.  California et al., also on

certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically not indexed as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

commercial website.  The Board then ruled that “customers
would  understand  the  term  BOOKING.COM  primarily  to
refer to an online reservation service for travel, tours, and
lodgings.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, 176a.  Alternatively,
the Board held that even if “Booking.com” is descriptive, not
generic,  it  is  unregistrable  because  it  lacks  secondary
meaning.

Booking.com sought review in the U. S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, invoking a mode of review
that  allows  Booking.com  to  introduce  evidence  not  pre-
sented to the agency.  See §1071(b).  Relying in significant
part  on  Booking.com’s  new  evidence  of  consumer  percep-
tion, the District Court concluded that “Booking.com”—un-
like “booking”—is not generic.  The “consuming public,” the
court found, “primarily understands that BOOKING.COM
does not refer to a genus, rather it is descriptive of services
involving ‘booking’ available at that domain name.”  Book-
ing.com  B.V.  v.  Matal,  278  F. Supp.  3d  891,  918  (2017).
Having  determined  that  “Booking.com”  is  descriptive,  the
District  Court  additionally  found  that  the  term  has  ac-
quired secondary meaning as to hotel-reservation services.
For those services, the District Court therefore concluded,
Booking.com’s marks meet the distinctiveness requirement
for registration.

The  PTO  appealed  only  the  District  Court’s  determina-
tion that “Booking.com” is not generic.  Finding no error in
the District Court’s assessment of how consumers perceive
the  term  “Booking.com,”  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the
Fourth  Circuit  affirmed  the  court  of  first  instance’s  judg-
ment.    In  so  ruling,  the  appeals  court  rejected  the  PTO’s
contention  that  the  combination  of  “.com”  with  a  generic
term like “booking” “is necessarily generic.”  915 F. 3d 171,
184 (2019).  Dissenting in relevant part, Judge Wynn con-
cluded  that  the  District  Court  mistakenly  presumed  that
“generic.com” terms are usually descriptive, not generic.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing a case and outlining the court's reasoning. It is sequential text and contains relevant information about a legal dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. SEALE

Statement of STEVENS, J.

tionality  of  death  penalty  laws  nationwide,  Furman  v.
Georgia,  408  U. S.  238  (per  curiam).  Following  Furman,
Congress  repealed  the  death  penalty  clause  of  §1201,  see
Act  for  the  Protection  of  Foreign  Officials  and  Official
Guests of the United States, Pub. L. 92–539, §201, 86 Stat.
1072,  which  had  the  effect  of  changing  the  applicable
statute of limitations from §3281 to §3282.

In this case, the District Court held that the 1972 repeal
did not retroactively change the character of a violation of
§1201  as  a  capital  offense  within  the  meaning  of  §3281—
and  therefore  that  the  prosecution  of  Seale  could  go  for-
ward—but  a panel of the Court of Appeals reversed.  542
F. 3d  1033  (CA5  2008).   In  response  to  the  Government’s
petition  for  rehearing  en  banc,  the  full  court  vacated  the
panel  decision  and,  by  an  equally  divided  9-to-9  vote,
affirmed  the  District  Court’s  ruling  on  the  limitations
defense.  570  F. 3d  650  (CA5  2009)  (per  curiam);  see  also
id.,  at  651  (DeMoss,  J.,  dissenting)  (noting  the  affir-
mance’s  “nominal”  nature  in  light  of  the  deadlock).    Fol-
lowing  the  procedure  authorized  by  Congress  in  28
U. S. C. §1254(2) and by this Court’s Rule 19, a majority of
the  members  of  the  en  banc  court  voted  to  certify  this
question of law to us for decision.

The  question  is  narrow,  debatable,  and  important.    I
recognize that the question reaches us in an interlocutory
posture,  as  Seale  appealed  his  conviction  on  numerous
grounds,  and  that  “[i]t  is  primarily  the  task  of  a  Court  of
Appeals to reconcile its internal difficulties,” Wisniewski v.
United States, 353 U. S. 901, 902 (1957) (per curiam).  Yet
I  see  no  benefit  and  significant  cost  to  postponing  the
question’s  resolution.  A  prompt  answer  from  this  Court
will  expedite  the  termination  of  this  litigation  and  deter-
mine  whether  other  similar  cases  may  be  prosecuted.    In
these  unusual  circumstances,  certification  can  serve  the
interests not only of legal clarity but also of prosecutorial
economy and “the proper administration and expedition of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the statement of Justice Stevens in the case of United States v. Seale. It delves into the legal complexities surrounding the death penalty and statute of limitations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1219

court is allowed at the same rate that similar judgments bear
interest  in  the  courts  of  the  State  in  which  judgment  is  di
rected to be entered.  Interest in cases arising in a court of
the  United  States  is  allowed  at  the  interest  rate  authorized
by law.

2.  When  a  petition  for  a  writ  of  certiorari,  an  appeal,
or  an  application  for  other  relief  is  frivolous,  the  Court
may  award  the  respondent  or  appellee  just  damages,  and
single  or  double  costs  under  Rule  43.  Damages  or  costs
may  be  awarded  against  the  petitioner,  appellant,  or  ap
plicant,  against  the  party’s  counsel,  or  against  both  party
and counsel.

Rule 43.  Costs

1.  If the Court afﬁrms a judgment, the petitioner or appel

lant shall pay costs unless the Court otherwise orders.

2.  If  the  Court  reverses  or  vacates  a  judgment,  the  re
spondent or appellee shall pay costs unless the Court other
wise orders.

3.  The  Clerk’s  fees  and  the  cost  of  printing  the  joint  ap
pendix are the only taxable items in this Court.  The cost of
the  transcript  of  the  record  from  the  court  below  is  also  a
taxable item, but shall be taxable in that court as costs in the
case.  The expenses of printing briefs, motions, petitions, or
jurisdictional statements are not taxable.

4.  In a case involving a certiﬁed question, costs are equally
divided unless the Court otherwise orders, except that if the
Court decides the whole matter in controversy, as permitted
by  Rule  19.2,  costs  are  allowed  as  provided  in  paragraphs  1
and 2 of this Rule.

5.  To  the  extent  permitted  by  28  U. S. C.  § 2412,  costs
under this Rule are allowed for or against the United States
or  an  ofﬁcer  or  agent  thereof,  unless  expressly  waived  or
unless the Court otherwise orders.

6.  When  costs  are  allowed  in  this  Court,  the  Clerk  will
insert an itemization of the costs in the body of the mandate
or  judgment  sent  to  the  court  below.  The  prevailing  side
may not submit a bill of costs.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It outlines procedures related to costs and damages in legal proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

ing authority to use it in a particular way, uses it in a dif-
ferent way.”  8 C. J. S., Bailments §43, pp. 480–481 (2017)
(footnote  omitted).  A  computer  technician  may  have  au-
thority to access a celebrity’s computer to recover data from
a crashed hard drive, but not to use his access to copy and
leak to the press photos stored on that computer.

The majority makes no attempt to square its interpreta-
tion with this familiar principle.  Instead, it sweeps away
this context by stating that Congress did not include in this
statute any common-law terms.  Ante, at 8, n. 4.  But the
statute  does  use  words  like  “exceed”  and  “authority”  that
are common to other property contexts.  And the majority
never  identifies  any  particular  property-law  buzzwords
that it thinks Congress was obliged to include.

The majority next says that relying on pre-existing con-
cepts of property law is “ill advised” because Congress en-
acted  this  law  in  light  of  a  “failure  of  pre-existing  law  to
capture  computer  crime.”    Ante,  at  2,  8,  n. 4  (citing  Kerr,
Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authoriza-
tion” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1596
(2003)).  Yet the reasons why pre-existing law was consid-
ered inadequate undermine the majority’s position.  First,
state laws were used to cover conduct like Van Buren’s, but
doing so “require[d] considerable creativity” because those
laws  typically  required  either  “physical”  entry  (which  fit
poorly with computers) or “depriv[ing]” a victim of property
(which fit poorly where a person “merely copied” data or en-
gaged  in  forbidden  “personal  uses”).    Id.,  at  1607–1608,
1610–1611.  Second, the fit was even more awkward for fed-
eral laws, which were “more limited in scope.”  Id., at 1608.
Congress did not enact this law to eliminate the established
principle  that  entitlements  to  use  property  are  circum-
stance specific, but instead to eliminate the deprivation and
physical-entry requirements.

Unable to square its interpretation with established prin-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Van Buren v. United States. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of the relevant statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Syllabus

and traveling to one’s assigned precinct are also modest when consid-
ering Arizona’s “political processes” as a whole.  The State offers other
easy ways to vote, which likely explains why out-of-precinct votes on
election day make up such a small and apparently diminishing portion
of overall ballots cast.
  Next, the racial disparity in burdens allegedly caused by the out-of-
precinct policy is small in absolute terms.  Of the Arizona counties that
reported  out-of-precinct  ballots  in  the  2016  general  election,  a  little
over 1% of Hispanic voters, 1% of African-American voters, and 1% of
Native American voters who voted on election day cast an out-of-pre-
cinct  ballot.    For  non-minority  voters,  the  rate  was  around  0.5%.    A
procedure that appears to work for 98% or more of voters to whom it
applies—minority and non-minority alike—is unlikely to render a sys-
tem unequally open.
  Appropriate weight must be given to the important state interests
furthered by precinct-based voting.  It helps to distribute voters more
evenly among polling places; it can put polling places closer to voter
residences; and it helps to ensure that each voter receives a ballot that
lists only the candidates and public questions on which he or she can
vote.  Precinct-based voting has a long pedigree in the United States,
and the policy of not counting out-of-precinct ballots is widespread.
  The  Court  of  Appeals  discounted  the  State’s  interests  because  it
found no evidence that a less restrictive alternative would threaten the
integrity of precinct-based voting.  But §2 does not require a State to
show that its chosen policy is absolutely necessary or that a less re-
strictive  means  would  not  adequately  serve  the  State’s  objectives.
Considering the modest burdens allegedly imposed by Arizona’s out-
of-precinct policy, the small size of its disparate impact, and the State’s
justifications, the rule does not violate §2.  Pp. 25–30.

(2) Arizona’s  HB  2023  also  passes  muster  under  §2.    Arizonans
can submit early ballots by going to a mailbox, a post office, an early
ballot drop box, or an authorized election official’s office.  These options
entail the “usual burdens of voting,” and assistance from a statutorily
authorized proxy is also available.  The State also makes special pro-
vision for certain groups of voters who are unable to use the early vot-
ing system.  See §16–549(C).  And here, the plaintiffs were unable to
show the extent to which HB 2023 disproportionately burdens minor-
ity voters.
  Even if the plaintiffs were able to demonstrate a disparate burden
caused by HB 2023, the State’s “compelling interest in preserving the
integrity of its election procedures” would suffice to avoid §2 liability.
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 4.  The Court of Appeals viewed the
State’s justifications for HB 2023 as tenuous largely because there was
no evidence of early ballot fraud in Arizona.  But prevention of fraud
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a section of a Supreme Court syllabus. It outlines the legal arguments and reasoning behind a decision regarding voting procedures in Arizona.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Supreme Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

II

We  have  not  always  been  vigilant  about  protecting  the
structure  of  our  Constitution.    Although  this  Court  has
repeatedly  invoked  the  “separation  of  powers”  and  “the
constitutional  system  of  checks  and  balances”  as  core
principles  of  our  constitutional  design,  essential  to  the
protection of individual liberty, see, e.g., Stern v. Marshall,
564 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2011) (slip op., at 16–17) (internal
quotation  marks  omitted),  it  has  also  endorsed  a  “more
pragmatic,  flexible  approach”  to  that  design  when  it  has
seemed more convenient to permit the powers to be mixed,
see,  e.g.,  Nixon  v.  Administrator  of  General  Services,  433
U. S. 425, 442 (1977).  As the history shows, that approach
runs
the  risk  of  compromising  our  constitutional
structure.

A
The Constitution’s particular blend of separated powers
and  checks  and  balances  was  informed  by  centuries  of
political  thought  and  experiences.  See  M.  Vile,  Constitu-
tionalism  and  the  Separation  of  Powers  38,  168–169  (2d
ed. 1998) (Vile).  Though the theories of the separation of
powers and checks and balances have roots in the ancient
world,  events  of  the  17th  and  18th  centuries  played  a
crucial  role  in  their  development  and  informed  the  men
who crafted and ratified the Constitution.

Over  a  century  before  our  War  of  Independence,  the
English Civil War catapulted the theory of the separation
of powers to prominence.  As political theorists of the day
witnessed  the  conflict  between  the  King  and  Parliament,
and  the  dangers  of  tyrannical  government  posed  by  each,
they began to call for a clear division of authority between
the  two.  Id.,  at  44–45,  48–49.  A  1648  work  titled  The
Royalist’s  Defence  offered  perhaps  the  first  extended
account  of  the  theory  of  the  separation  of  powers:
“[W]hilst  the  Supreamacy,  the  Power  to  Judge  the  Law,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the separation of powers and checks and balances within the US Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–899
_________________

JASON SMITH, PETITIONER v. ARIZONA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE

[June 21, 2024]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The  Sixth  Amendment’s  Confrontation  Clause  guaran-
tees  a  criminal  defendant  the  right  to  confront  the  wit-
nesses against him.  The Clause bars the admission at trial
of “testimonial statements” of an absent witness unless she
is  “unavailable  to  testify,  and  the  defendant  ha[s]  had  a
prior opportunity” to cross-examine her.  Crawford v. Wash-
ington,  541  U. S.  36,  53–54  (2004).    And  that  prohibition
applies in full to forensic evidence.  So a prosecutor cannot
introduce an absent laboratory analyst’s testimonial out-of-
court  statements  to  prove  the  results  of  forensic  testing.
See  Melendez-Diaz  v.  Massachusetts,  557  U. S.  305,  307,
329 (2009).

The question presented here concerns the application of
those  principles  to  a  case  in  which  an  expert  witness  re-
states an absent lab analyst’s factual assertions to support
his  own  opinion  testimony.    This  Court  has  held  that  the
Confrontation Clause’s requirements apply only when the
prosecution  uses  out-of-court  statements  for  “the  truth  of
the  matter  asserted.”  Crawford,  541  U. S.,  at  60,  n. 9.
Some state courts, including the court below, have held that
this condition is not met when an expert recites another an-
alyst’s statements as the basis for his opinion.  Today, we
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U99

[09-15-00 14:41:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

742

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ELLERTH

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit

No. 97–569. Argued April 22, 1998—Decided June 26, 1998

Respondent Kimberly Ellerth quit her job after 15 months as a salesper-
son in one of petitioner Burlington Industries’ many divisions, allegedly
because she had been subjected to constant sexual harassment by one
of her supervisors, Ted Slowik. Slowik was a midlevel manager who
had authority to hire and promote employees, subject to higher ap-
proval, but was not considered a policymaker. Against a background
of repeated boorish and offensive remarks and gestures allegedly made
by Slowik, Ellerth places particular emphasis on three incidents where
Slowik’s comments could be construed as threats to deny her tangible
job beneﬁts. Ellerth refused all of Slowik’s advances, yet suffered no
tangible retaliation and was, in fact, promoted once. Moreover, she
never informed anyone in authority about Slowik’s conduct, despite
In ﬁling
knowing Burlington had a policy against sexual harassment.
this lawsuit, Ellerth alleged Burlington engaged in sexual harassment
and forced her constructive discharge, in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The District Court
granted Burlington summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit en banc
reversed in a decision that produced eight separate opinions and no con-
sensus for a controlling rationale. Among other things, those opinions
focused on whether Ellerth’s claim could be categorized as one of quid
pro quo harassment, and on whether the standard for an employer’s
liability on such a claim should be vicarious liability or negligence.

Held: Under Title VII, an employee who refuses the unwelcome and
threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse,
tangible job consequences, may recover against the employer without
showing the employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for the super-
visor’s actions, but the employer may interpose an afﬁrmative defense.
Pp. 751–766.

(a) The Court assumes an important premise yet to be established: A
trier of fact could ﬁnd in Slowik’s remarks numerous threats to retaliate
against Ellerth if she denied some sexual liberties. The threats, how-
ever, were not carried out. Cases based on carried-out threats are re-
ferred to often as “quid pro quo” cases, as distinct from bothersome
attentions or sexual remarks sufﬁcient to create a “hostile work environ-
ment.” Those two terms do not appear in Title VII, which forbids only
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a summary of the case rather than the full text of the legal arguments and decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–472
_________________

HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC,
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. RENEWABLE
FUELS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[June 25, 2021]

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress requires most domestic refineries to blend a cer-
tain amount of ethanol and other renewable fuels into the
transportation  fuels  they  produce.    But  when  it  first
adopted  these  mandates,  Congress  temporarily  exempted
small refineries across the board.  Looking beyond that ini-
tial period, Congress authorized individual small refineries
to apply for additional hardship “extensions” from the fed-
eral government “at any time.”  The question before us is
whether a small refinery that manages to comply with re-
newable fuel mandates in one year is forever forbidden from
applying for an “extension” in any future year.

I

In  2005  and  2007,  Congress  created  the  renewable  fuel
program  (RFP).
§§201,  202(a)(1),  121  Stat.  1519,  42
U. S. C. §7545(o)(1)(J), (o)(1)(L), (o)(2)(A)(i).  For 2006, Con-
gress ordained the inclusion of 4 billion gallons of renew-
able  fuel  in  the  Nation’s  fuel  supply.    §7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I).
By 2022, the number will climb to 36 billion gallons.  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, the date, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

11

Opinion of the Court

to resolve.  For example, a party might suggest that taxing
costs  against  it  would  be  unjust  because  of  its  precarious
financial  position,  and  an  opposing  party  might  dispute
that contention on factual grounds.  San Antonio also con-
tends that it will be difficult to allocate appellate costs eq-
uitably before the amount of those costs is known.

These concerns are overblown.  Most appellate costs are
readily  estimable,  rarely  disputed,  and  frankly  not  large
enough to engender contentious litigation in the great ma-
jority of cases.  We recognize that supersedeas bond premi-
ums are a bit of an outlier in that they can grow quite large.
See, e.g., The Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 568 F. 3d
1077 (CA9 2009) (more than $60 million).  But the underly-
ing supersedeas bonds will often have been negotiated by
the parties, as happened here.  They will in any event have
been approved by the district court, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
62(b), and their premiums will have been paid by one of the
parties to the appeal.  There is no reason to think that liti-
gants and courts will be forced to operate without any sense
of the magnitude of the costs at issue.  Indeed, San Antonio
admits that it was largely aware of the costs of the bonds in
this case when they were approved, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 18.
Nor  is  there  reason  to  think  that  factual  disputes  will
pose  a  recurring  problem.    Experience  proves  the  point.
Rule 39’s basic structure has been in place for more than 50
years.  Compare  Fed.  Rule  App.  Proc. 39  with  Rule  39
(1968).  And the courts of appeals resolve tens of thousands
of cases each year.  Admin. Office of the U. S. Courts, Sta-
tistical  Tables  for  the  Federal  Judiciary,  Table  B–1  (Dec.
31,  2020)  (counting  46,788  appeals  terminated  in  2020).
Yet San Antonio has not identified any substantial number
of  cases  where  cost  allocations  under  Rule  39(a)  have  im-
posed real difficulties.  In sum, we see no evidence that ap-
pellate courts have struggled to allocate costs in the past,
and we have no reason to anticipate new problems in the
future.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the section where the court addresses and refutes San Antonio's arguments against taxing appellate costs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

931

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–6187.  Coleman  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  948  A.  2d  534.

No. 09–6190.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6191.  Balleza-Cortez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  174.

No.  09–6193.  Billups  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  249.

No.  09–6195.  Duarte  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  528.

No.  09–6196.  Declouet  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  535.

No. 09–6210.  Guevara-Vielma  v.  United States.  C.  A. 5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  486.

No. 09–6212.  Tejada v.  United States.  C. A. 1st Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–6214.  Lewis v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  595.

No.  09–6220.  Bowman  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6221.  Arzate v. United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  363.

No.  09–6222.  Alander  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  913.

No.  09–6223.  Atwell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  538.

No.  08–1103.  Michigan  v.  Williams.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Mo
tion  of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1159.  Texas  v.  Martinez.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Mo
tion  of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  272  S. W.  3d  615.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, including case numbers, citations, and disposition. It's not sequential narrative text and likely not meant to be read as a continuous story.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

528

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

180, 194. Though his contrived ploy for leniency was un-
successful in that respect, it proved successful in another:
during the delay, Fenwick’s wife had succeeded in bribing
Goodman, the other witness against him, to leave the coun-
try.

Id., at 194–195.16

Without a second witness, Fenwick could not be con-
victed of high treason under the statute mentioned earlier.
For all his plotting, however, Fenwick was not to escape.
After Goodman’s absence was discovered, the House of
Commons met and introduced a bill of attainder against
Fenwick to correct the situation produced by the combi-
nation of bribery and the two-witness law.
Id., at 198–199.
A lengthy debate ensued, during which the Members repeat-
edly discussed whether the two-witness rule should apply.17
Ultimately, the bill passed by a close vote of 189 to 156,
id., at 210, notwithstanding the objections of Members who
(foreshadowing Calder’s fourth category) complained that
Fenwick was being attainted “upon less Evidence” than

16 This time, Fenwick’s wife handled the bribe with a deftness lacking
in the ﬁrst attempt. Not only was Goodman (popularly called “Scum
Goodman,” see 9 Macaulay 32) an easier target, but Lady Fenwick’s agent
gave Goodman an offer he couldn’t refuse: abscond and be rewarded, or
Id., at 195. Goodman’s instinct for self-
have his throat cut on the spot.
preservation prevailed, and the agent never parted company with him
until they both safely reached France.

Ibid.

17 See, e. g., The Proceedings Against Sir John Fenwick Upon a Bill
of Attainder for High Treason 40 (1702) (hereinafter Proceedings) (“ ’Tis
Extraordinary that you bring Sir John Fenwick, here to Answer for Trea-
son, when . . . you have but one Witness to that Treason . . . . Treason
be not Treason unless it be proved by two Witnesses . . .”); id., at 103
(“It hath been objected, That there ought to be two Witnesses, by the
late Statute”); id., at 227 (“I do take it to be part of the Law of the Land,
That no Man should be condemned for Treason without two Witnesses”);
id., at 256–257 (“[I]f we sit here to Judge, we sit to Judge him according
to the Law of England . . . . Will you set up a Judgment . . . upon one
Witness, when the Law says you shall have two; and after all, say ’tis a
reasonable Proceeding?”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or transcript, containing excerpts from a historical case. It includes legal terminology, citations, and a narrative of events.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Transcript</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

Syllabus

parting from the statute’s clear text.  In a final attempt to salvage its
atextual interpretation, the Government turns to the alleged statuto-
ry  purpose  and  legislative  history  of  the  stop-time  rule.    Even  for
those who consider statutory purpose and legislative history, howev-
er,  neither  supports  the  Government’s  position.    Requiring  the  Gov-
ernment to furnish time-and-place information in a notice to appear
is  entirely  consistent  with  Congress’  stated  objective  of  preventing
noncitizens  from  exploiting  administrative  delays  to  accumulate
lengthier periods of continuous precedent.   Pp. 13–20.

 866 F. 3d 1, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH,
JJ., joined.    KENNEDY, J., filed  a  concurring  opinion.   ALITO,  J.,  filed  a
dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision and the reasoning behind it.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxxviii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1091
Johnson; Kubica v.
1101
Johnson; Larch v.
1071,1114
Johnson v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.
1009
Johnson; Mays v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; McBay v.
1026
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Mendoza v.
1083
Johnson; Mitchell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042,1125
Johnson; Montanya v.
1023
Johnson; Ortiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Ott v.
1106
Johnson; Patterson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092
Johnson v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116
Johnson; Poe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1145
Johnson; Richardson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1060
Johnson; Roane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097
Johnson; Sankofa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1033
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Smith v.
1056,1145
Johnson; Solis Sosa v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1101
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Stell v.
1015
Johnson; Swartz v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1006,1025
Johnson; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Thomas-El v.
1116
Johnson; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Turner v.
1006
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 694,1077,1123
53
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; United States v.
1011
Johnson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1101
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Valdez Ortiz v.
1062
Johnson; Valenzuela Flores v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118
Johnson v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1071
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Walker v.
1071
Johnson; Ware v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1145
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Watts v.
1133
Johnson; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058
Johnstone v. Bayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1071
John Thomas Batts, Inc.; Coleman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1060
Joiner v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015,1086
Jones, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089
Jones v. Apfel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123
Jones v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132
Jones v. Commissioner of Labor of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088
Jones v. Frank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
244
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jones; Garner v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

GOLAN v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

C

Petitioners’ ultimate argument as to the  Copyright and
Patent  Clause  concerns  its  initial  words.    Congress  is
empowered to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts” by enacting systems of copyright and patent protec-
tion.  U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8.  Perhaps counterintui-
tively  for  the  contemporary  reader,  Congress’  copyright
authority  is  tied  to  the  progress  of  science;  its  patent
authority, to the progress of the useful arts.  See Graham,
383  U. S.,  at  5,  and  n. 1;  Evans,  8  F. Cas.,  at  873
(Marshall, J.).

The  “Progress  of  Science,”  petitioners  acknowledge,
refers  broadly  to  “the  creation  and  spread  of  knowledge
and  learning.”    Brief  for  Petitioners  21;  accord  post,  at  1.
They  nevertheless  argue  that  federal  legislation  cannot
serve  the  Clause’s  aim  unless  the  legislation  “spur[s]  the
creation of . . . new works.”  Brief for Petitioners 24; accord
post, at 1–2, 8, 17.  Because §514 deals solely with works
already created, petitioners urge, it “provides no plausible
incentive  to  create  new  works”  and  is  therefore  invalid.
Reply Brief 4.25

The  creation  of  at  least  one  new  work,  however,  is  not
the sole way Congress may promote knowledge and learn-
ing.  In Eldred,  we  rejected  an  argument  nearly  identical
to  the  one  petitioners  rehearse.    The  Eldred  petitioners
urged  that  the  “CTEA’s  extension  of  existing  copyrights
categorically fails to ‘promote the Progress of Science,’ . . .
because  it  does  not  stimulate  the  creation  of  new  works.”
537  U. S.,  at  211–212.    In  response  to  this  argument,  we

——————

25 But see Brief for Motion Picture Association of America as Amicus
Curiae  27  (observing  that  income  from  existing  works  can  finance  the
creation and publication of new works); Eldred, 537 U. S., at 208, n. 15
(noting  that  Noah  Webster  “supported  his  entire  family  from  the
earnings  on  his  speller  and  grammar during  the  twenty  years  he  took
to complete his dictionary” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment

entirely  the  right  to  choose  whether  to  terminate  a  preg-
nancy: “To be clear, the questions presented in this petition
do not require the Court to overturn Roe or Casey.”  Id., at
5.  Mississippi  tempered  that  statement  with  an  oblique
one-sentence  footnote  intimating  that,  if  the  Court  could
not  reconcile  Roe  and  Casey  with  current  facts  or  other
cases, it “should not retain erroneous precedent.”  Pet. for
Cert. 5–6, n. 1.  But the State never argued that we should
grant review for that purpose.

After  we  granted  certiorari,  however,  Mississippi
changed course.  In its principal brief, the State bluntly an-
nounced that the Court should overrule Roe and Casey.  The
Constitution does not protect a right to an abortion, it ar-
gued, and a State should be able to prohibit elective abor-
tions if a rational basis supports doing so.  See Brief for Pe-
titioners 12–13.

The Court now rewards that gambit, noting three times
that the parties presented “no half-measures” and argued
that “we must either reaffirm or overrule Roe and Casey.”
Ante, at 5, 8, 72.  Given those two options, the majority picks
the latter.

This framing is not accurate.  In its brief on the merits,
Mississippi in fact argued at length that a decision simply
rejecting the viability rule would result in a judgment in its
favor.  See Brief for Petitioners 5, 38–48.  But even if the
State had not argued as much, it would not matter.  There
is no rule that parties can confine this Court to disposing of
their  case  on  a  particular  ground—let  alone  when  review
was sought and granted on a different one.  Our established
practice is instead not to “formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it
is to be applied.”  Washington State Grange v. Washington
State Republican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 450 (2008) (quoting
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)); see also United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17,
21 (1960).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It delves into the legal arguments and reasoning surrounding the overturning of Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
4

TRUMP v. HAWAII

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

decisionmaker.    Lukumi,  508  U. S.,  at  540  (opinion  of
KENNEDY,  J.);  McCreary,  545  U. S.,  at  862  (courts  must
evaluate  “text,  legislative  history,  and  implementation
. . . ,  or  comparable  official  act”  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted)).  At  the  same  time,  however,  courts  must  take
care  not  to  engage  in  “any  judicial  psychoanalysis  of  a
drafter’s heart of hearts.”  Id., at 862.

B
1

Although  the  majority  briefly  recounts  a  few  of  the
statements  and  background  events  that  form  the  basis  of
plaintiffs’  constitutional  challenge,  ante,  at  27–28,  that
highly  abridged  account  does  not  tell  even  half  of  the
story.  See  Brief  for  The  Roderick  &  Solange  MacArthur
Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 5–31 (outlining President
Trump’s  public  statements  expressing  animus  toward
Islam).  The  full  record  paints  a  far  more  harrowing  pic
ture,  from  which  a  reasonable  observer  would  readily
conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by hostility
and animus toward the Muslim faith.

During  his  Presidential  campaign,  then-candidate  Don
ald Trump pledged that, if elected, he would ban Muslims
from  entering  the  United  States.  Specifically,  on  Decem
ber  7,  2015,  he  issued  a  formal  statement  “calling  for  a
total  and  complete  shutdown  of  Muslims  entering  the
United  States.”    App.  119.    That  statement,  which  re
mained  on  his  campaign  website  until  May  2017  (several
months into his Presidency), read in full:

“Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until
our  country’s  representatives  can  figure  out  what  is
going  on.  According  to  Pew  Research,  among  others,
there  is  great  hatred  towards  Americans  by  large
segments of the Muslim population.  Most recently, a
poll from the Center for Security Policy released data
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the motivations behind a presidential proclamation and cites legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

23

THOMAS, J., concurring

state or foreign commerce.”  40 CFR §230.3(s)(3) (2008) (em-
phasis  added).  To  leave  no  doubt  that  the  agencies  have
entirely broken from traditional navigable waters, they give
several  examples  of  qualifying  waters:  those  that  “are  or
could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recrea-
tional or other purposes,” those “[f]rom which fish or shell-
fish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign
commerce,” those that “are used or could be used for indus-
trial  purposes  by  industries  in  interstate  commerce,”
“[t]ributaries of ” any such waters, and “[w]etlands adjacent
to” any such waters.  §§230.3(s)(3)(i)–(iii), (5), (7).  This def-
inition and others like it are premised on the fallacy repu-
diated in SWANCC: that the text of the CWA expands fed-
eral  jurisdiction  beyond  Congress’  traditional  “commerce
power over navigation.”  531 U. S., at 168, n. 3.

Nonetheless, under these boundless standards, the agen-
cies have “asserted jurisdiction over virtually any parcel of
land  containing  a  channel  or  conduit  . . .  through  which
rainwater  or  drainage  may  occasionally  or  intermittently
flow,” including “storm drains, roadside ditches, ripples of
sand in the desert that may contain water once a year, and
lands that are covered by floodwaters once every 100 years.”
Rapanos, 547 U. S., at 722 (plurality opinion).  The agen-
cies’  definition  “engulf[s]  entire  cities  and  immense  arid
wastelands” alike.  Ibid.  Indeed, because “the entire land
area of the United States lies in some drainage basin, and
an  endless network  of  visible  channels  furrows  the  entire
surface,” “any plot of land containing such a channel may
potentially be regulated.”  Ibid.

If this interpretation were correct, the only prudent move
for any landowner in America would be to ask the Federal
Government for permission before undertaking any kind of
development.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 86, 116–117.  This regime
turns Congress’ traditionally limited navigation authority
on its head.  The baseline under the Constitution, the CWA,
and the Court’s precedents is state control of waters.  See
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 598 U.S. ____ (2023). It delves into the interpretation of the Clean Water Act and its jurisdictional reach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

322

UNITED STATES v. BAJAKAJIAN

Syllabus

States, 509 U. S. 602, 609–610. Forfeitures––payments in kind––are
thus “ﬁnes” if they constitute punishment for an offense. Section
982(a)(1) currency forfeitures do so. The statute directs a court to
order forfeiture as an additional sanction when “imposing sentence on a
person convicted of ” a willful violation of § 5316’s reporting require-
ment. The forfeiture is thus imposed at the culmination of a criminal
proceeding and requires conviction of an underlying felony, and it cannot
be imposed upon an innocent owner of unreported currency. Cf. id., at
619. The Court rejects the Government’s argument that such forfeit-
ures serve important remedial purposes—by deterring illicit move-
ments of cash and giving the Government valuable information to inves-
tigate and detect criminal activities associated with that cash—because
the asserted loss of information here would not be remedied by conﬁs-
cation of respondent’s $357,144. The Government’s argument that the
§ 982(a)(1) forfeiture is constitutional because it falls within a class of
In so
historic forfeitures of property tainted by crime is also rejected.
arguing, the Government relies upon a series of cases involving tradi-
tional civil in rem forfeitures that are inapposite because such forfeit-
ures were historically considered nonpunitive. See, e. g., The Palmyra,
12 Wheat. 1, 14–15. Section 982(a)(1) descends from a different histori-
cal tradition: that of in personam criminal forfeitures. Similarly, the
Court declines to accept the Government’s contention that the forfeit-
ure here is constitutional because it involves an “instrumentality” of
respondent’s crime. Because instrumentalities historically have been
treated as a form of “guilty property” forfeitable in civil in rem proceed-
ings, it is irrelevant whether respondent’s currency is an instrumental-
ity; the forfeiture is punitive, and the test for its excessiveness involves
solely a proportionality determination. Pp. 327–334.

(b) A punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is
grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense that it is designed
to punish. Although the proportionality principle has always been the
touchstone of the inquiry, see, e. g., Austin, supra, at 622–623, the
Clause’s text and history provide little guidance as to how dispropor-
tional a forfeiture must be to be “excessive.” Until today, the Court
has not articulated a governing standard.
In deriving the standard,
the Court ﬁnds two considerations particularly relevant. The ﬁrst, pre-
viously emphasized in cases interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause, is that judgments about the appropriate punishment be-
long in the ﬁrst instance to the legislature. See, e. g., Solem v. Helm,
463 U. S. 277, 290. The second is that any judicial determination re-
garding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently
imprecise. Because both considerations counsel against requiring strict
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, which is not the primary content meant to be read and understood by the general public. It summarizes legal arguments and precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
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</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

THOMAS, J., dissenting

to  review  state-court  decisions.    For  most  of  our  history,
that requirement was unfailingly understood to be jurisdic-
tional.  And our cases have since departed from this princi-
ple without squaring that departure with §1257’s unquali-
fied text.  Accordingly, I would hold that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear a federal claim on review from a state
court  where  a  petitioner,  like  Hemphill,  fails  to  properly
present his claim to the court below.

III
That the Court decides this case despite Hemphill’s fail-
ure to present his claim to the New York Court of Appeals
is  not  a  mere  academic  defect.    “Federal  nullification  of  a
state statute,” or any state rule, “is a grave matter.”  Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 135 (1986); see also Abbott v. Perez,
585 U. S. ___, ___, n. 17 (2018) (slip op., at 21, n. 17) (“the
inability to enforce its duly enacted plans clearly inflicts ir-
reparable harm on the State”).  And it is “unseemly in our
dual system of government to disturb the finality of state
judgments on a federal ground that the state court did not
have occasion to consider.”  Adams, 520 U. S., at 90 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, it is “important that
state courts be given the first opportunity to  consider the
applicability of state [rules],” particularly “in light of con-
stitutional challenge, since the [rules] may be construed in
a way which saves their constitutionality.”  Cardinale, 394
U. S., at 439.  A state court’s interest in deciding “whether
to  . . .  amend  [its]  rules  to  avoid  potential  constitutional
challenges” is “undeniable.”  Adams, 520 U. S., at 90.

Today, the Court disregards these important “[p]rinciples
of comity.”  Webb v. Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 499 (1981).  In the
Court of Appeals, Hemphill argued that state law required
“an affirmative attempt to mislead the jury . . . before the
door  can  be  opened  to  otherwise  inadmissible  evidence.”
App. 386.  Hemphill maintained that “[t]he doctrine is not
so capacious as to allow the admission of any evidence made
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Court's jurisdiction and the importance of comity between state and federal courts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
4

NASA v. NELSON

Syllabus

terests  at  stake,  SF–85  and  Form  42  are  also  subject  to  substantial
protections  against  disclosure  to  the  public.    Whalen  and  Nixon  rec-
ognized  that  a  “statutory  or  regulatory  duty  to  avoid  unwarranted
disclosures” generally allays privacy concerns created by government
“accumulation”  of  “personal  information”  for  “public  purposes.”
Whalen,  supra,  at  605.    Respondents  attack  only  the  Government’s
collection  of  information,  and  here,  as  in  Whalen  and  Nixon,  the  in-
formation  collected  is  shielded  by  statute  from  unwarranted  disclo-
sure.  The  Privacy  Act—which  allows  the  Government  to  maintain
only those records “relevant and necessary to accomplish” a purpose
authorized by law, 5 U. S. C. §552a(e)(1); requires written consent be-
fore  the  Government  may  disclose  an  individual’s  records,  §552a(b);
and  imposes  criminal  liability  for  willful  violations  of  its  nondisclo-
sure obligations, §552a(i)(1)—“evidence[s] a proper concern” for indi-
vidual  privacy.  Whalen,  supra,  at  605;  Nixon,  supra,  at  458–459.
Respondents’ claim that the statutory exceptions to the Privacy Act’s
disclosure bar, see §§552a(b)(1)–(12), leave its protections too porous
to supply a meaningful check against unwarranted disclosures.  But
that  argument  rests  on  an  incorrect  reading  of  Whalen,  Nixon,  and
the Privacy Act.  Pp. 19–23.

530 F. 3d 865, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.  SCALIA,
J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment,  in  which  THOMAS, J.,
joined.  THOMAS, J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment.    KA-
GAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, not the main body of the text. Syllabi summarize legal cases and are not meant to be read as continuous narrative.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

902

Pinero v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Pinkston v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Pinkston v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pinnick v. Corboy & Demetrio, P. C.
902

Pinnock v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1109

Pioneer Adult Rehabilitation Center; Solomon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pirant v. U. S. Postal Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

1012

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pirincci v. United Parcel Service
Pirtle v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1060,1134

1059

Pita v. United States
Pitcher v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1037,1137

1063

Pitkins v. Hummel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pitts v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957

927

Pizarro-Montes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Pizzonia v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Place; Stubl v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  832,845

1143

Plata; California State Republican Legislator Intervenors v.  . . . .
1143

Plata; Schwarzenegger v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

Platone v. Department of Labor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130

Platte v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1033,1159

Platteview Apartments; Jones v.
Pleaze v. Kerestes
912

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133

Pliego v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Plumlee v. United States
871

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Plummer v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1021,1146

1105

Plummer v. Sullivan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  923,1132

Plummer v. United States
854

Plump v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

Poe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
978

Poindexter v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1016

Poindexter v. Zavares
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035

Polak v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907

Poland v. Pennsylvania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

Pole v. Randolph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Policy Studies, Inc.; Cottingham v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1108

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Polk v. Dunckle
838

Polk; Ford v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

Pollard; Almond v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Pollard; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957

Pollino v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pollitt; Health Care Service Corp. v.
1031

Polonczyk v. Arkansas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Poly-America Medical and Dental Beneﬁts Plan; Franke v.  . . . . .
963

Pomales-Pizarro v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
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