<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of the Court

the  pharmacy’s  acquisition  cost.

wholesaler, a PBM must increase its reimbursement rate to
  §17–92–
cover
507(c)(4)(C)(i)(b).  PBMs must also allow pharmacies to “re-
verse and rebill” each reimbursement claim affected by the
pharmacy’s  inability  to  procure  the  drug  from  its  typical
wholesaler at a price equal to or less than the MAC reim-
bursement  price.    §17–92–507(c)(4)(C)(iii).    Third,  and  fi-
nally, the Act permits a pharmacy to decline to sell a drug
to  a  beneficiary  if  the  relevant  PBM  will  reimburse  the
pharmacy at less than its acquisition cost.  §17–92–507(e).

B
  Respondent Pharmaceutical Care Management Associa-
tion  (PCMA)  is  a  national  trade  association  representing
the 11 largest PBMs in the country.  After the enactment of
Act 900, PCMA filed suit in the Eastern District of Arkan-
sas, alleging, as relevant here, that Act 900 is pre-empted
by ERISA.  See 29 U. S. C. §1144(a) (ERISA pre-empts “any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter re-
late to any employee benefit plan”).
  Before the District Court issued its opinion in response to
the  parties’  cross-motions  for  summary  judgment,  the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided, in a differ-
ent  case,  that  ERISA  pre-empts  a  similar  Iowa  statute.
Pharmaceutical Care Mgmt. Assn. v. Gerhart, 852 F. 3d 722
(2017).  The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Iowa statute
was  pre-empted  for  two  reasons.    First,  it  made  “implicit
reference”  to  ERISA  by  regulating  PBMs  that  administer
benefits for ERISA plans.  Id., at 729.  Second, it was im-
permissibly  “connected  with”  an  ERISA  plan  because,  by
requiring  an  appeal  process  for  pharmacies  to  challenge
PBM reimbursement rates and restricting the sources from
which PBMs could determine pricing, the law limited a plan
administrator’s  ability  to  control  the  calculation  of  drug
benefits.  Id., at 726, 731.  Concluding that Arkansas’ Act
900 contains similar features, the District Court held that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing a case related to pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and the Arkansas Act 900. It cites legal precedents and delves into the legal arguments surrounding the preemption of state law by ERISA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY

Opinion of the Court

cretion, use its sovereign powers, directly or through a cor-
poration created for that object, to construct bridges for the
accommodation of interstate commerce.”  Id., at 530.  These
powers, we noted, could be exercised “with or without a con-
current act of the State in which the lands lie.”  Ibid.

State property was not immune from the exercise of del-
egated eminent domain power.  In fact, this is not the first
time New Jersey has tried to thwart such a delegation.  In
Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co., 32 F. 9 (CC NJ 1887),
Justice  Bradley,  riding  circuit,  considered  a  challenge  by
New Jersey to an Act of Congress authorizing a New York
corporation to build a bridge on state-owned land.  Id., at
9–11; see Act of June 16, 1886, ch. 417, 24 Stat. 78.  The
Secretary of War had approved the plans for the bridge, as
required by the Act, and the corporation had begun prepar-
ing for construction.  32 F., at 11.  New Jersey sought an
injunction, arguing among other things that an out-of-state
corporation could not operate within its borders, and that
the corporation could not take its land without its consent.
Id., at 13, 17.  Justice Bradley dismissed these arguments,
reasoning that “if congress, in the execution of its powers,
chooses to employ the intervention of a proper corporation,
whether of the state, or out of the state, we see no reason
why it should not do so.”  Id., at 14.  Justice Bradley also
presciently  noted  that  New  Jersey’s  position,  if  accepted,
would give rise to the “dilemma of requiring the consent of
the state in almost every case of an interstate line of com-
munication by railroad, for hardly a case can arise in which
some property belonging to a state will not be crossed.”  Id.,
at 17.

Just a few years after Stockton, Justice Bradley’s views
were  adopted  by  the  full  Court.  In  Cherokee  Nation  v.
Southern  Kansas  R.  Co.,  135  U. S.  641  (1890),  the  Chero-
kees argued that a private railroad company could not ex-
ercise the federal eminent domain power pursuant to an Act
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the case of Penneast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey. It cites previous legal cases and analyzes their relevance to the current case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

21

Opinion of the Court

ture, see supra, at 6, invidious sex-based classifications in
marriage  remained  common  through  the  mid-20th  cen-
tury.  See App. to Brief for Appellant in Reed v. Reed, O. T.
1971, No. 70–4, pp. 69–88 (an extensive reference to laws
extant  as  of  1971  treating  women  as  unequal  to  men  in
marriage).  These  classifications  denied  the  equal  dignity
of  men  and  women.  One  State’s  law,  for  example,  pro-
vided in 1971 that “the husband is the head of the family
and  the  wife  is  subject  to  him;  her  legal  civil  existence  is
merged in the husband, except so far as the law recognizes
her  separately,  either  for  her  own  protection,  or  for  her
benefit.”  Ga. Code Ann. §53–501 (1935).  Responding to a
new  awareness,  the  Court  invoked  equal  protection  prin-
ciples to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on
marriage.  See,  e.g.,  Kirchberg  v.  Feenstra,  450  U. S.  455
(1981);  Wengler  v.  Druggists  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  446  U. S.  142
(1980);  Califano  v.  Westcott,  443  U. S.  76  (1979);  Orr  v.
Orr, 440 U. S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S.
199  (1977)  (plurality  opinion);  Weinberger  v.  Wiesenfeld,
420  U. S.  636  (1975);  Frontiero  v.  Richardson,  411  U. S.
677  (1973).  Like  Loving  and  Zablocki,  these  precedents
show  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  can  help  to  identify
and  correct  inequalities  in  the  institution  of  marriage,
vindicating  precepts  of  liberty  and  equality  under  the
Constitution.

Other  cases  confirm  this  relation  between  liberty  and
equality.  In  M.  L.  B.  v.  S. L. J.,  the  Court  invalidated
under  due  process  and  equal  protection  principles  a  stat-
ute  requiring  indigent  mothers  to  pay  a  fee  in  order  to
appeal  the  termination  of  their  parental  rights.    See  519
U. S.,  at  119–124.  In  Eisenstadt  v.  Baird,  the  Court  in-
voked  both  principles  to  invalidate  a  prohibition  on  the
distribution  of  contraceptives  to  unmarried  persons  but
not  married  persons.    See  405  U. S.,  at  446–454.    And  in
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the Court invali-
dated  under  both  principles  a  law  that  allowed  steriliza-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the history of sex-based classifications in marriage and how the Equal Protection Clause has been used to address them.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Framers  used  the  phrase  “the  people”  in  these  constitu
tional  provisions.    In  the  First  Amendment,  no  words
define the class of individuals entitled to speak, to publish,
or  to  worship;  in  that  Amendment  it  is  only  the  right
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances, that is described as a right of “the
people.”  These rights contemplate collective action.  While
the  right  peaceably  to  assemble  protects  the  individual
rights  of  those  persons  participating  in  the  assembly,  its
concern is with action engaged in by members of a group,
rather than any single individual.  Likewise, although the
act  of  petitioning  the  Government  is  a  right  that  can  be
exercised  by  individuals,  it  is  primarily  collective  in  na
ture.  For if they are to be effective, petitions must involve
groups of individuals acting in concert.

Similarly, the words “the people” in the Second Amend
ment  refer  back  to  the  object  announced  in  the  Amend
ment’s preamble.  They remind us that it is the collective
action of individuals having a duty to serve in the militia
that  the  text  directly  protects  and,  perhaps  more  impor
tantly,  that  the  ultimate  purpose  of  the  Amendment  was
to  protect  the  States’  share  of  the  divided  sovereignty
created by the Constitution.

As  used  in  the  Fourth  Amendment,  “the  people”  de
scribes  the  class  of  persons  protected  from  unreasonable
searches and seizures by Government officials.  It  is  true
that  the  Fourth  Amendment  describes  a  right  that  need
not be exercised in any collective sense.  But that observa
tion does not settle the meaning of the phrase “the people”
when  used  in  the  Second  Amendment.    For,  as  we  have
seen,  the  phrase  means  something  quite  different  in  the
Petition  and  Assembly  Clauses  of  the  First  Amendment.
Although the abstract definition of the phrase “the people”
could  carry  the  same  meaning  in  the  Second  Amendment
as in the Fourth Amendment, the preamble of the Second
Amendment  suggests  that  the  uses  of  the  phrase  in  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It delves into the interpretation of the phrase "the people" in the context of the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Per Curiam

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19A1016
_________________

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL. v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[April 6, 2020]

 PER CURIAM.
The  application

for  stay  presented

to  JUSTICE
KAVANAUGH and by him referred to the Court is granted.
The  District  Court’s  order  granting  a  preliminary  injunc-
tion  is  stayed  to  the  extent  it  requires  the  State  to  count
absentee ballots postmarked after April 7, 2020.

Wisconsin  has  decided  to  proceed  with  the  elections
scheduled for Tuesday, April 7.  The wisdom of that decision
is not the question before the Court.  The question before
the Court is a narrow, technical question about the absen-
tee ballot process.  In this Court, all agree that the deadline
for the municipal clerks to receive absentee ballots has been
extended from Tuesday, April 7, to Monday, April 13.  That
extension,  which  is  not  challenged  in  this  Court,  has  af-
forded Wisconsin voters several extra days in which to mail
their absentee ballots.  The sole question before the Court
is whether absentee ballots now must be mailed and post-
marked  by  election  day,  Tuesday,  April  7,  as  state  law
would  necessarily  require,  or  instead  may  be  mailed  and
postmarked after election day, so long as they are received
by Monday, April 13.  Importantly, in their preliminary in-
junction motions, the plaintiffs did not ask that the District
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the court's name, the case name, and the date.  This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

Opinion of the Court

determine  whether  [racial]  discrimination  existed  . . . :
Whether  such  discrimination  existed.”    It’s  Results  That
Count, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 3, 1982, p. 8–A.
  But  Mobile  had its  defenders,  too.   In their  view,  aban-
doning the intent test in favor of an effects test would inev-
itably  require  a  focus  on  proportionality—wherever  a  mi-
nority  group  won  fewer  seats  in  the  legislature  than  its
share of the population, the charge could be made that the
State law had a discriminatory effect.  That, after all, was
the type of claim brought in Mobile.  But mandating racial
proportionality in elections was regarded by many as intol-
erable.  Doing so, wrote Senator Orrin Hatch in the Wash-
ington Star, would be “strongly resented by the American
public.”  Washington Star, Sept. 30, 1980, p. A–9.  The Wall
Street  Journal  offered  similar  criticism.    An  effects  test
would generate “more, not less, racial and ethnic polariza-
tion.”  Wall Street Journal, Jan. 19, 1982, p. 28.
  This sharp debate arrived at Congress’s doorstep in 1981.
The  question  whether to  broaden §2  or keep  it  as  is, said
Hatch—by then Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee be-
fore which §2 would be debated—“involve[d] one of the most
substantial  constitutional  issues  ever  to  come  before  this
body.”  2 Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Consti-
tution  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  97th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 1 (1982).
  Proceedings in Congress mirrored the disagreement that
had  developed  around  the  country.    In  April  1981,  Con-
gressman Peter W. Rodino, Jr.—longtime chairman of the
House  Judiciary  Committee—introduced  a  bill  to  amend
the VRA, proposing that the words “to deny or abridge” in
§2 be replaced with the phrase “in a manner which results
in  a  denial  or  abridgement.”    H. R.  3112,  97th  Cong.,  1st
Sess., 2 (as introduced) (emphasis added).  This was the ef-
fects test that Mobile’s detractors sought.
  But  those  wary  of  proportionality  were  not  far  behind.
Senator Hatch argued that the effects test “was intelligible
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case *Allen v. Milligan*. It contains legal arguments and references to other sources.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

85

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered the main body text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

Opinion of the Court

methamphetamine,” three “[c]ontained a usable quantity of
marijuana,” and one “[c]ontained a usable quantity of can-
nabis.”  Id., at 86a–87a.  The State originally planned for
Rast to testify about those matters at Smith’s trial.

But with three weeks to go, the State called an audible,
replacing  Rast  with  a  different  DPS  analyst  as  its  expert
witness.  In  the  time  between  testing  and  trial,  Rast  had
stopped working at the lab, for unexplained reasons.  And
the State chose not to rely on the now-former employee as
a witness.  So the prosecutors filed an amendment to their
“final pre-trial conference statement” striking out the name
Elizabeth Rast and adding “Greggory Longoni, forensic sci-
entist  (substitute  expert).”    Id.,  at  26a.  Longoni  had  no
prior  connection  to  the  Smith  case,  and  the  State  did  not
claim  otherwise.  Its  amendment  simply  stated  that  “Mr.
Longoni  will  provide  an  independent  opinion  on  the  drug
testing performed by Elizabeth Rast.”  Ibid.  And it contin-
ued: “Ms. Rast will not be called.  [Mr. Longoni] is expected
to have the same conclusion.”  Ibid.

And  he  did  come  to  the  same  conclusion,  in reliance  on
Rast’s  records.    Because  he  had  not  participated  in  the
Smith case, Longoni prepared for trial by reviewing Rast’s
report and notes.  And when Longoni took the stand, he re-
ferred  to  those  materials  and  related  what  was  in  them,
item by item by item.  As to each, he described the specific
“scientific  method[s]”  Rast  had  used  to  analyze  the  sub-
stance  (e.g.,  a  microscopic  examination,  a  chemical  color
test, a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer test).  Id., at
41a; see id., at 42a, 46a–48a.  And as to each, he stated that
the  testing  had  adhered  to  “general  principles  of  chemis-
try,” as well as to the lab’s “policies and practices,” id., at
47a–48a; see id., at 40a; so he noted, for example, that Rast
had  run  a  “blank”  to  confirm  that  testing  equipment  was
not  contaminated,  id.,  at  42a,  47a.    After  thus  telling  the
jury what Rast’s records conveyed about her testing of the
items,  Longoni  offered  an  “independent  opinion”  of  their
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically describing the testimony of a forensic scientist in a criminal trial. It details the circumstances surrounding the substitution of expert witnesses and the methodology used in drug analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

307

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

reference to the lower court’s adverse judgment.
It was
careful to note—however illogical that might have been, see
id., at 635—that the parties “remain[ed] adverse,” and that
jurisdiction was proper only so long as the “requisites of a
case or controversy are also met,” id., at 619, 624. Today
the Court would appear to drop even this ﬁg leaf.4
In con-
cluding that the injury to Erie is “sufﬁcient” to keep this
case alive, the Court performs the neat trick of identifying
a “case or controversy” that has only one interested party.

II

For the reasons set forth above, I would dismiss this case
for want of jurisdiction. Because the Court resolves the
threshold mootness question differently and proceeds to ad-
dress the merits, I will do so brieﬂy as well.
I agree that
the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court must be re-
versed, but disagree with the mode of analysis the Court
has applied.

The city of Erie self-consciously modeled its ordinance on
the public nudity statute we upheld against constitutional
challenge in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560 (1991),
calculating (one would have supposed reasonably) that the
courts of Pennsylvania would consider themselves bound by
In
our judgment on a question of federal constitutional law.
Barnes, I voted to uphold the challenged Indiana statute
“not because it survives some lower level of First Amend-
ment scrutiny, but because, as a general law regulating con-
duct and not speciﬁcally directed at expression, it is not

4 I say “appear” because although the Court states categorically that
“the availability of . . . relief [from the judgment below] is sufﬁcient to
prevent the case from being moot,” it follows this statement, in the next
sentence, with the assertion that Pap’s, the state-court plaintiff, retains a
“concrete stake in the outcome of this case.” Ante, at 288. Of course, if
the latter were true a classic case or controversy existed, and resort to
the exotic theory of “standing by virtue of adverse judgment below” was
entirely unnecessary.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia in the case 529 US 277.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

BREYER, J., dissenting

death penalty’s constitutionality.

For one thing, delays have helped to make application of
the death penalty more reliable.  Recall the case of Henry
Lee  McCollum,  whom  DNA  evidence  exonerated  30  years
after his conviction.  Katz & Eckholm, N. Y. Times, at A1.
If McCollum had been executed earlier, he would not have
lived  to  see  the  day  when  DNA  evidence  exonerated  him
and implicated another man; that man is already serving
a  life  sentence  for  a  rape  and  murder  that  he  committed
just a few weeks after the murder McCollum was convicted
of.  Ibid.  In  fact,  this  Court  had  earlier  denied  review
of  McCollum’s  claim  over  the  public  dissent  of  only  one
Justice.  McCollum  v.  North  Carolina,  512  U. S.  1254
(1994).  And  yet  a  full  20  years  after  the  Court  denied
review,  McCollum  was  exonerated  by  DNA  evidence.
There  are  a  significant  number  of  similar  cases,  some  of
which  I  have  discussed  earlier.  See  also  DPIC  Innocence
List,  supra  (Nathson  Fields,  23  years;  Paul  House,  23
years;  Nicholas  Yarris,  21  years;  Anthony  Graves,  16
years; Damon Thibodeaux, 15 years; Ricky Jackson, Wiley
Bridgeman,  and  Kwame  Ajamu,  all  exonerated  for  the
same crime 39 years after their convictions).

In  addition  to  those  who  are  exonerated  on  the  ground
that  they  are  innocent,  there  are  other  individuals  whose
sentences  or  convictions  have  been  overturned  for  other
reasons (as discussed above, state and federal courts found
error  in  68%  of  the  capital  cases  they  reviewed  between
1973  and  1995).  See  Part  I,  supra.    In  many  of  these
cases,  a  court  will  have  found  that  the  individual  did  not
merit  the  death  penalty  in  a  special  sense—namely,  he
failed to receive all the procedural protections that the law
requires for the death penalty’s application.  By eliminat
ing  some  of  these  protections,  one  likely  could  reduce
delay.  But  which  protections  should  we  eliminate?
Should we eliminate the trial-related protections we have
established  for  capital  defendants:  that  they  be  able  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion regarding the death penalty. It discusses the issue of delays in capital cases and provides examples of wrongful convictions that were later overturned.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

Opinion of the Court

in  Their  Civil  Rights,”  which  guaranteed  “full  and  equal
enjoyment”  of  certain  public  facilities  to  “all  citizens,”
“regardless  of  race,  color  or  previous  condition  of  servi-
tude.”  1885 Colo. Sess. Laws pp. 132–133.  A decade later,
the General Assembly expanded the requirement to apply
to  “all  other  places  of  public  accommodation.”    1895  Colo.
Sess. Laws ch. 61, p. 139.

Today,  the  Colorado  Anti-Discrimination  Act  (CADA)
carries forward the state’s tradition of prohibiting discrim-
ination  in  places  of  public  accommodation.  Amended  in
2007  and  2008  to  prohibit  discrimination  on  the  basis  of
sexual  orientation  as  well  as  other  protected  characteris-
tics, CADA in relevant part provides as follows:

“It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a per-
son, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or
deny to an individual or a group, because of disability,
race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital sta-
tus, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal en-
joyment  of  the  goods,  services,  facilities,  privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of a place of public ac-
commodation.”  Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §24–34–601(2)(a)
(2017).

The Act defines “public accommodation” broadly to include
any  “place  of  business  engaged  in  any  sales  to  the  public
and  any  place  offering  services  . . .  to  the  public,”  but
excludes “a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that
is principally used for religious purposes.”  §24–34–601(1).
CADA  establishes  an  administrative  system  for  the
resolution  of  discrimination  claims.    Complaints  of  dis-
crimination in violation of CADA are addressed in the first
instance by the Colorado Civil Rights Division.  The Divi-
sion investigates each claim; and if it finds probable cause
that  CADA  has  been  violated,  it  will  refer  the  matter  to
the  Colorado  Civil  Rights  Commission.  The  Commission,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the history and provisions of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

light of voting discrimination in Shelby County, the county
cannot  complain  about  the  provisions  that  subject  it  to
preclearance.  Post, at 23–30.  But that is like saying that
a  driver  pulled  over  pursuant  to  a  policy  of  stopping  all
redheads cannot complain about that policy, if it turns out
his license has expired.  Shelby County’s claim is that the
coverage  formula  here  is  unconstitutional  in  all  its  appli-
cations,  because  of  how  it  selects  the  jurisdictions  sub-
jected to preclearance.  The county was selected based on
that formula, and may challenge it in court.

D
The  dissent  proceeds  from  a  flawed  premise.    It  quotes
the  famous  sentence  from  McCulloch  v.  Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 421 (1819), with the following emphasis: “Let
the  end  be  legitimate,  let  it  be  within  the  scope  of  the
constitution,  and  all  means  which  are  appropriate,  which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but  consist  with  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  constitution,
are constitutional.”  Post, at 9 (emphasis in dissent).  But
this  case  is  about  a  part  of  the  sentence  that  the  dissent
does not emphasize—the part that asks whether a legisla-
tive means is “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the
constitution.”  The dissent states that “[i]t cannot tenably
be  maintained”  that  this  is  an  issue  with  regard  to  the
Voting  Rights  Act,  post,  at  9,  but  four  years  ago,  in  an
opinion  joined  by  two  of  today’s  dissenters,  the  Court
expressly  stated  that  “[t]he  Act’s  preclearance  require-
ment and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional
questions.”  Northwest Austin, supra, at 204.  The dissent
does  not  explain  how  those  “serious  constitutional  ques-
tions” became untenable in four short years.

The  dissent  treats  the  Act  as  if  it  were  just  like  any
other  piece  of  legislation,  but  this  Court  has  made  clear
from the beginning that the Voting Rights Act is far from
ordinary.  At  the  risk  of  repetition,  Katzenbach  indicated
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Voting Rights Act. It presents legal arguments and cites previous cases, indicating it's part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary or supplementary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–7120
_________________

SAMUEL JAMES JOHNSON, PETITIONER v. UNITED
STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2015]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
I  agree  with  the  Court  that  Johnson’s  sentence  cannot
stand.  But  rather  than  use  the  Fifth  Amendment’s  Due
Process  Clause  to  nullify  an  Act  of  Congress,  I  would
resolve  this  case  on  more  ordinary  grounds.    Under  con-
ventional  principles  of  interpretation  and  our  precedents,
the  offense  of  unlawfully  possessing  a  short-barreled
shotgun  does  not  constitute  a  “violent  felony”  under  the
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
The majority wants more.  Not content to engage in the
usual business of interpreting statutes, it holds this clause
to  be  unconstitutionally  vague,  notwithstanding  the  fact
that  on  four  previous  occasions  we  found  it  determinate
enough  for  judicial  application.    As  JUSTICE  ALITO  ex-
plains,  that  decision  cannot  be  reconciled  with  our  prece-
dents concerning the vagueness doctrine.  See post, at 13–
17  (dissenting  opinion).  But  even  if  it  were  a  closer  case
under  those  decisions,  I  would  be  wary  of  holding  the
residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague.  Although I
have  joined  the  Court  in  applying  our  modern  vagueness
doctrine  in  the  past,  see  FCC  v.  Fox  Television  Stations,
Inc.,  567  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2012)  (slip  op.,  at  16–17),  I
have  become  increasingly  concerned  about  its  origins  and
application.  Simply put, our vagueness doctrine shares an
uncomfortably  similar  history  with  substantive  due  pro-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

effectual  relief  whatever  to  the  prevailing  party,”  Chafin,
568  U. S.,  at  172  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  the
case is moot, and the court has no power to decide it, see
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 18 (1998).  To decide a moot
case  would  be  to  give  an  advisory  opinion,  in  violation  of
“the  oldest  and  most  consistent  thread  in  the  federal  law
of  justiciability.”  Flast  v.  Cohen,  392  U. S.  83,  96  (1968)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

By insisting that judges be able to provide meaningful re-
dress to litigants, Article III ensures that federal courts ex-
ercise their authority only “as a necessity in the determina-
tion  of  real,  earnest  and  vital  controversy  between
individuals.”  Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman,
143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892); see Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege  v.  Americans  United  for  Separation  of  Church  and
State,  Inc.,  454  U. S.  464,  471  (1982)  (“The  constitutional
power of federal courts cannot be defined, and indeed has
no substance, without reference to the necessity ‘to adjudge
the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.’ ” (quot-
ing Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Com-
missioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885))).  When
plaintiffs like Uzuegbunam and Bradford allege neither ac-
tual damages nor the prospect of future injury, an award of
nominal damages does not change their status or condition
at all.  Such an award instead represents a judicial deter-
mination  that  the  plaintiffs’  interpretation  of  the  law  is
correct—nothing more.  The court in such a case is acting
not  as  an  Article  III  court,  but  as  a  moot  court,  deciding
cases  “in  the  rarified  atmosphere  of  a  debating  society.”
Director,  Office  of  Workers’  Compensation  Programs  v.
Perini  North  River  Associates,  459  U. S.  297,  305  (1983)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

II
The Court sees no problem with turning judges into ad-
vice  columnists.  In  its  view,  the  common  law  and  (to  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It delves into legal arguments regarding mootness and the role of federal courts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U91

[09-06-00 17:16:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 381 (1998)

383

Opinion of the Court

David E. Lasker argued the cause and ﬁled a brief for

respondent.*

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether defendants in a case
ﬁled in a state court, with claims “arising under” federal law,
can remove that case to federal court—where some claims,
made against a State, are subject to an Eleventh Amend-
ment bar. We conclude that the defendants can remove the
case to a federal court and that the court can decide the
nonbarred claims.

I

In 1993, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections dis-
missed Keith Schacht, a prison guard, for stealing items from
the Oakhill Correctional Institution, a state prison.
In Jan-
uary 1996, Schacht ﬁled a complaint in state court against
the Department and several of its employees, both in their
“personal” and in their “ofﬁcial” capacities. The complaint,
in several different claims, alleged that the Department and
its employees had deprived Schacht of “liberty” and “prop-
erty” without “due process of law,” thereby violating the
Federal Constitution and civil rights laws. U. S. Const.,

*A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was ﬁled for the State of
Indiana et al. by Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, and
Jon Laramore, Geoffrey Slaughter, and Anthony Scott Chinn, Deputy
Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona,
Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Mar-
gery S. Bronster of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of Illinois, J. Joseph Curran,
Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley
of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Mon-
tana, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Frankie Sue Del Papa
of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Heidi Heitkamp of North
Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, John Knox Walkup of Tennes-
see, Dan Morales of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, William H. Sorrell
of Vermont, and William U. Hill of Wyoming.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the introduction of the legal issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO

BARRETT, J., dissenting

soaked  in  blood  and  dying  from  all  the  little  cuts”).    Civil
orders can also keep individuals away from particular geo-
graphic areas.  Imagine someone who threatens to bomb an
airport, State v. Johnston, 156 Wash. 2d 355, 358–359, 127
P. 3d  707,  708–709  (2006),  or  “shoot  up  [a]  courthous[e],”
State  v.  Draskovich,  2017  S. D.  76,  ¶3,  904  N. W.  2d  759,
761.  The speaker might well end up barred from the loca-
tion in question—for good reason.  Yet after today, such or-
ders  cannot  be  obtained  without  proof—not  necessarily
easy to secure—that the person who issued the threat an-
ticipated that it would elicit fear.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 92–
93.

The government can also opt to counteract true threats
by  means  of  civil  enforcement  actions.  For  instance,  18
U. S. C. §248 prohibits “threat[s] of force” against any per-
son “obtaining or providing reproductive health services” or
“seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious
freedom  at a  place  of  religious  worship.”    The  statute  im-
poses a range of civil penalties, and it allows enforcement
suits by both private persons and government officials.  See,
e.g.,  United  States  v.  Dillard,  795  F. 3d  1191,  1196–1197
(CA10  2015)  (Government  brought  §248  action  after  de-
fendant warned a health provider, “[y]ou will be checking
under your car everyday—because maybe today is the day
someone places an explosive under it”); McCullen v. Coak-
ley,  573  U. S.  464,  491  (2014)  (noting  that  several  States
have similar laws).  After today, these civil enforcement ac-
tions face a higher constitutional hurdle.

In  addition,  employers  and  school  administrators  often
discipline individuals who make true threats.  Consider the
student  who  was  expelled  after  “draft[ing]  two  violent,
misogynic, and obscenity-laden rants expressing a desire to
molest, rape, and murder” his ex-girlfriend.  Doe v. Pulaski
Cty. Special School Dist., 306 F. 3d 616, 619 (CA8 2002) (en
banc).  Or the one who was suspended after “ ‘talking about
taking  a  gun  to  school’  to  ‘shoot  everyone  he  hates.’ ”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the legal implications of true threats and how they are handled through civil orders and other means.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Opinion of the Court

(“Every federal appellate court has an obligation to satisfy
itself  not  only  of  its  own  jurisdiction,  but  also  that  of  the
lower courts in a cause under review, even though the par-
ties are prepared to concede it.” (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted)).

Absent section 1252(f )(1), the District Court clearly had
federal question jurisdiction over respondents’ suit, which
asserted claims arising under two federal statutes, the INA
and  the  APA.  See  28  U. S. C.  §1331  (“The  district  courts
shall  have  original  jurisdiction  of  all  civil  actions  arising
under  the  Constitution,  laws,  or  treaties  of  the  United
States.”).  The question, then, is whether section 1252(f )(1)
strips  the  lower  courts  of  subject  matter  jurisdiction  over
these  claims.  The  parties  agree  that  the  answer  to  that
question  is  no,  and  so  do  we.  That  is  because  section
1252(f )(1) withdraws  a district  court’s “jurisdiction or au-
thority” to grant a particular form of relief.  It does not de-
prive the lower courts of all subject matter jurisdiction over
claims  brought  under  sections  1221  through  1232  of  the
INA.

The  text  of  the  provision  makes  that  clear.    Section
1252(f )(1)  deprives  courts  of  the  power  to  issue  a  specific
category of remedies: those that “enjoin or restrain the op-
eration of ” the relevant sections of the statute.  A limitation
on  subject  matter  jurisdiction,  by  contrast,  restricts  a
court’s “power to adjudicate a case.”  United States v. Cot-
ton, 535 U. S. 625, 630 (2002).  Section 1252(f )(1) bears no
indication that lower courts lack power to hear any claim
brought under sections 1221 through 1232.  If Congress had
wanted the provision to have that effect, it could have said
so in words far simpler than those that it wrote.  But Con-
gress instead provided that lower courts would lack juris-
diction to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” the relevant
provisions,  and  it  included  that  language  in  a  provision
whose title—“Limit on injunctive relief ”—makes clear the
narrowness of its scope.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of a specific section of law (section 1252(f )(1)) and its implications for jurisdiction in immigration cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U38

[09-26-01 08:44:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN

212 WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. SAMARA BROTHERS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

petitioner manufactured and sold green-gold dry-cleaning
press pads. After respondent began selling pads of a simi-
lar color, petitioner brought suit under § 43(a), then added
a claim under § 32 after obtaining registration for the
color of its pads. We held that a color could be protected
as a trademark, but only upon a showing of secondary mean-
ing. Reasoning by analogy to the Abercrombie & Fitch test
developed for word marks, we noted that a product’s color is
unlike a “fanciful,” “arbitrary,” or “suggestive” mark, since
it does not “almost automatically tell a customer that [it]
refer[s] to a brand,” 514 U. S., at 162–163, and does not
“immediately . . . signal a brand or a product ‘source,’ ” id.,
at 163. However, we noted that, “over time, customers
may come to treat a particular color on a product or its
packaging .
Ibid. Because a
color, like a “descriptive” word mark, could eventually “come
to indicate a product’s origin,” we concluded that it could be
protected upon a showing of secondary meaning.

. as signifying a brand.”

Ibid.

.

It seems to us that design, like color, is not inherently
distinctive. The attribution of inherent distinctiveness to
certain categories of word marks and product packaging
derives from the fact that the very purpose of attaching a
particular word to a product, or encasing it in a distinctive
packaging, is most often to identify the source of the product.
Although the words and packaging can serve subsidiary
functions—a suggestive word mark (such as “Tide” for laun-
dry detergent), for instance, may invoke positive connota-
tions in the consumer’s mind, and a garish form of packaging
(such as Tide’s squat, brightly decorated plastic bottles for
its liquid laundry detergent) may attract an otherwise indif-
ferent consumer’s attention on a crowded store shelf—their
predominant function remains source identiﬁcation. Con-
sumers are therefore predisposed to regard those symbols
as indication of the producer, which is why such symbols
“almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a
brand,” id., at 162–163, and “immediately . . . signal a brand
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing trademark law related to color and design. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

Opinion of the Court

op., at 10).  States may “protect gay persons, just as [they]
can protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring what-
ever products and services they choose on the same terms
and conditions as are offered to other members of the pub-
lic.  And there are no doubt innumerable goods and services
that  no  one  could  argue  implicate the  First  Amendment.”
Ibid.;  see  also  Hurley,  515  U. S.,  at  571–572;  6  F. 4th,  at
1203 (Tymkovich, C. J., dissenting).  Consistent with all of
this, Ms. Smith herself recognizes that Colorado and other
States are generally free to apply their public accommoda-
tions  laws,  including  their  provisions  protecting  gay  per-
sons, to a vast array of businesses.  Reply Brief 15; see Tr.
of Oral Arg. 45–46.

At the same time, this Court has also recognized that no
public accommodations law is immune from the demands of
the Constitution.  In particular, this Court has held, public
accommodations statutes can sweep too broadly when de-
ployed to compel speech.  In Hurley, the Court commented
favorably  on  Massachusetts’  public  accommodations  law,
but made plain it could not be “applied to expressive activ-
ity” to compel speech.  515 U. S., at 571, 578.  In Dale, the
Court  observed  that  New  Jersey’s  public  accommodations
law had many lawful applications but held that it could “not
justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to
freedom of expressive association.”  530 U. S., at 659.  And,
once  more,  what  was  true  in  those  cases  must  hold  true
here.  When  a  state  public  accommodations  law  and  the
Constitution collide, there can be no question which must
prevail.  U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.

Nor is it any answer, as the Tenth Circuit seemed to sup-
pose,  that Ms.  Smith’s  services  are  “unique.”   6  F. 4th,  at

——————
(West 2019); Ore. Rev. Stat. §659A.403 (2021); R. I. Gen. Laws §11–24–
2 (2002); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 9, §4502(a) (2020); Va. Code Ann. §2.2–3904
(2022);  Wash.  Rev.  Code  §49.60.215  (2022);  Wis.  Stat.  §106.52  (2019–
2020).    See  also  Brief  for  Local  Governments  et  al.  as  Amici  Curiae  5
(noting that many local governments have enacted similar rules).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the intersection of public accommodations laws and First Amendment rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

Opinion of the Court

ery, Greene’s Energy also petitioned the Board to institute
inter  partes  review.    It  argued  that  two  of  the  patent’s
claims  were  unpatentable  because  they  were  anticipated
by  prior  art  not  mentioned  by  Oil  States  in  its  original
patent  application.    Oil  States  filed  a  response  opposing
review.  The Board found that Greene’s Energy had estab-
lished  a  reasonable  likelihood  that  the  two  claims  were
unpatentable and, thus, instituted inter partes review.
  The proceedings before the District Court and the Board
progressed  in  parallel.    In  June  2014,  the  District  Court
issued  a  claim-construction  order.    The  order  construed
the  challenged  claims  in  a  way  that  foreclosed  Greene’s
Energy’s arguments about the prior art.  But a few months
later, the Board issued a final written decision concluding
that  the  claims  were  unpatentable.    The  Board  acknowl-
edged the District  Court’s contrary decision, but nonethe-
less  concluded  that  the  claims  were  anticipated  by  the
prior art.
  Oil  States  sought  review  in  the  Federal  Circuit.    In
addition  to  its  arguments  about  patentability,  Oil  States
challenged  the  constitutionality  of  inter  partes  review.
Specifically, it argued that actions to revoke a patent must
be  tried  in  an  Article  III  court  before  a  jury.    While  Oil
States’  case  was  pending,  the  Federal  Circuit  issued  an
opinion  in  a  different  case,  rejecting  the  same  constitu-
tional arguments.  MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard
Co.,  812  F. 3d  1284,  1288–1293  (2015).    The  Federal  Cir-
cuit summarily affirmed the Board’s decision in this case.
639 Fed. Appx. 639 (2016).
  We granted certiorari to determine whether inter partes
review  violates  Article  III  or  the  Seventh  Amendment.
582 U. S. ___ (2017).  We address each issue in turn.

III
  Article III vests the judicial power of the United States
“in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

on  attendance  at  religious  services.    And  New  York’s  re-
strictions discriminate against religion by treating houses
of  worship  significantly  worse  than  some  secular  busi-
nesses.

For those reasons, I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that
New York’s “[n]umerical capacity limits of 10 and 25 people
. . . seem unduly restrictive” and that “it may well be that
such  restrictions  violate  the  Free  Exercise  Clause.”    Post,
at 1.  I part ways with THE CHIEF JUSTICE on a narrow pro-
cedural point regarding the timing of the injunctions.  THE
CHIEF JUSTICE would not issue injunctions at this time.  As
he  notes,  the  State  made  a  change  in  designations  a  few
days  ago,  and  now  none  of  the  churches  and  synagogues
who are applicants in these cases are located in red or or-
ange zones.  As I understand it, THE CHIEF JUSTICE would
not issue an injunction unless and until a house of worship
applies for an injunction and is still in a red or orange zone
on  the  day  that  the  injunction  is  finally  issued.  But  the
State has not withdrawn or amended the relevant Execu-
tive Order.  And the State does not suggest that the appli-
cants lack standing to challenge the red-zone and orange-
zone  caps  imposed  by  the  Executive  Order,  or  that  these
cases are moot or not ripe.  In other words, the State does
not deny that the applicants face an imminent injury today.
In particular, the State does not deny that some houses of
worship, including the applicants here, are located in areas
that likely will be classified as red or orange zones in the
very near future.  I therefore see no jurisdictional or pru-
dential barriers to issuing the injunctions now.

There also is no good reason to delay issuance of the in-
junctions, as I see it.  If no houses of worship end up in red
or orange zones, then the Court’s injunctions today will im-
pose no harm on the State and have no effect on the State’s
response to COVID–19.  And if houses of worship end up in
red  or  orange  zones,  as  is  likely,  then  today’s  injunctions
will ensure that religious organizations are not subjected to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in a case regarding religious services during the COVID-19 pandemic. It delves into the legal arguments and reasoning behind the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1184

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

placed on this Court’s docket within the time prescribed for
docketing,  the  district  court  may  dismiss  the  appeal  on  the
appellee’s  motion,  with  notice  to  all  parties,  and  may  make
any  just  order  with  respect  to  costs.  If  the  district  court
has  denied  the  appellee’s  motion  to  dismiss  the  appeal,  the
appellee may move this Court to docket and dismiss the ap
peal by ﬁling an original and 10 copies of a motion presented
in  conformity  with  Rules  21  and  33.2.  The  motion  shall  be
accompanied by proof of service as required by Rule 29, and
by a certiﬁcate from the clerk of the district court, certifying
that  a  notice  of  appeal  was  ﬁled  and  that  the  appellee’s  mo
tion to dismiss was denied.  The appellant may not thereaf
ter ﬁle a jurisdictional statement without special leave of the
Court, and the  Court may allow costs  against the appellant.
6.  Within  30  days  after  the  case  is  placed  on  this  Court’s
docket,  the  appellee  may  ﬁle  a  motion  to  dismiss,  to  afﬁrm,
or  in  the  alternative  to  afﬁrm  or  dismiss.  Forty  copies  of
the motion shall be ﬁled, except that an appellee proceeding
in forma pauperis under Rule 39, including an inmate of an
institution, shall ﬁle the number of copies required for a peti
tion  by  such  a  person  under  Rule  12.2,  together  with  a  mo
tion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a copy of which
shall  precede  and  be  attached  to  each  copy  of  the  motion  to
dismiss,  to  afﬁrm,  or  in  the  alternative  to  afﬁrm  or  dismiss.
The motion shall follow, insofar as applicable, the form for a
brief  in  opposition  prescribed  by  Rule  15,  and  shall  comply
in all respects with Rule 21.

7.  The Clerk will distribute the jurisdictional statement to
the  Court  for  its  consideration  upon  receiving  an  express
waiver of the right to ﬁle a motion to dismiss or to afﬁrm or,
if  no  waiver  or  motion  is  ﬁled,  upon  the  expiration  of  the
time  allowed  for  ﬁling.  If  a  motion  to  dismiss  or  to  afﬁrm
is  timely  ﬁled,  the  Clerk  will  distribute  the  jurisdictional
statement, motion, and any brief opposing the motion to the
Court  for  its  consideration  no  less  than  10  days  after  the
motion is ﬁled.

8.  Any appellant may ﬁle a brief opposing a motion to dis
miss  or  to  afﬁrm,  but  distribution  and  consideration  by  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of rules from a legal document, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court.  It outlines procedures for appealing cases to the Supreme Court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules/Procedure</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

CRUZ v. ARIZONA

Barrett, J., dissenting

the  Alabama  Supreme  Court's  decision  unmistakably  re-
vealed its hostility toward the NAACP's federal rights.  See
also  Ford  v.  Georgia,  498  U. S.  411,  425  (1991)  (Georgia  Su-
preme  Court  decision  was  inadequate  because  it  applied
precedent that was inapplicable “by its own terms”); Barr v.
City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 146, 149–150 (1964) (South Caro-
lina  Supreme  Court  ruling  was  inadequate  because  that
court  had  proceeded  differently  in  an  “identical”  case  a  few
weeks later).

Today's  Court,  while  admitting  that  the  novelty  prong  of
inadequacy is “reserved for the rarest of situations,” ante, at
26,  concludes  that  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court's  application
I
of  Rule  32.1(g)  falls  in  the  same  category  as  Patterson.
respectfully  disagree.  Unlike  the  state  courts  in  cases  like
Patterson, the Arizona Supreme Court did not contradict its
own  settled  law.  Instead,  it  confronted a  new  question  and
gave an answer reasonably consistent with its precedent.

The  ordinary  rule  in  Arizona  is  that  criminal  defendants
must  present  any  constitutional  challenges  on  direct  review
or  in  a  timely  postconviction-review  petition.  Ariz.  Rules
Crim. Proc. 32.2(a), 32.4(b)(3)(A) (2020).  Rule 32.1(g) allows
a  second  or  delayed  bite  at  the  postconviction-relief  apple
when “there has been a signifcant change in the law that, if
applicable  to  the  defendant's  case,  would  probably  overturn
the defendant's judgment or sentence.”

On  several  occasions,  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court  has  ad-
dressed  whether  an  intervening judicial  decision  constitutes
a “signifcant change in the law” for purposes of Rule 32.1(g).
For instance, it has considered whether this Court's decisions
signifcantly changed the content of federal law.  E. g., State
v.  Bigger,  251  Ariz.  402,  412,  492  P.  3d  1020,  1030  (2021)  (a
decision  that  “affrmed  the  Supreme  Court's  jurisprudence”
was  not  a  signifcant  change);  State  v.  Valencia,  241  Ariz.
206,  209,  386  P.  3d  392,  395  (2016);  see  also  State  v.  Poblete,
227  Ariz.  537,  540,  260  P.  3d  1102,  1105  (App.  2011).  It  has
also  analyzed whether  intervening state-court  decisions sig-

Page Proof Pending Publication
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Barrett in the case of Cruz v. Arizona. It discusses the Arizona Supreme Court's application of a specific rule and argues that it is not an inadequate application warranting federal intervention.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
856

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10821.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  541  F.  3d  1087.

No.  08–10822.  Tarkington  v.  Superior  Court  of  Califor
nia,  Los  Angeles  County,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d  App.  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10824.  Jones v.  United  States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  296  Fed.  Appx.  352.

No.  08–10825.  Logan  v.  Louisiana.  Ct.  App.  La.,  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  986  So.  2d  772.

No.  08–10826.  Sotero  Menzor  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.
276.

No.  08–10828.  Medina-Vargas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10829.  Murray v.  Locke, State Medical Examiner,

et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10830.  Moore  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10831.  Baumruk  v.  Missouri.  Sup.  Ct.  Mo.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  280  S. W.  3d  600.

No.  08–10832.  Backey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10833.  Benham  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10834.  Barbee  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10835.  Jacobs  v.  Cate,  Secretary,  California  De
partment  of  Corrections  and  Rehabilitation.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  42.

No. 08–10836.  Clutter v.  Ballard, Warden.  C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  154.

No.  08–10837.  Daley  v.  Cain,  Warden.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

650

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Souter, J., dissenting

by relying on a priori deﬁnitions of state sovereignty,” id.,
at 548.

It concluded that

“the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which
special restraints on federal power over the States in-
hered principally in the workings of the National Gov-
ernment itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the
objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests,
then, are more properly protected by procedural safe-
guards inherent in the structure of the federal system
than by judicially created limitations on federal power.”
Id., at 552.

The Garcia Court’s rejection of “judicially created limi-
tations” in favor of the intended reliance on national poli-
tics was all the more powerful owing to the Court’s explicit
recognition that in the centuries since the framing the rela-
tive powers of the two sovereign systems have markedly
changed. Nationwide economic integration is the norm,
the national political power has been augmented by its vast
revenues, and the power of the States has been drawn down
by the Seventeenth Amendment, eliminating selection of
senators by state legislature in favor of direct election.

The Garcia majority recognized that economic growth
and the burgeoning of federal revenue have not amended
the Constitution, which contains no circuit breaker to pre-
clude the political consequences of these developments. Nor
is there any justiﬁcation for attempts to nullify the natural
impact of the particular amendment that was
political
adopted. The signiﬁcance for state political power of ending
state legislative selection of senators was no secret in 1913,
and the amendment was approved despite public comment
on that very issue. Representative Franklin Bartlett, after
quoting Madison’s Federalist No. 62, as well as remarks by
George Mason and John Dickinson during the Constitu-
tional Convention, concluded, “It follows, therefore, that the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. The text includes legal citations, case names, and arguments about constitutional interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS v. FTC

Syllabus

the Court holds today that a state board on which a controlling num-
ber  of  decisionmakers  are  active  market  participants  in  the  occupa-
tion the board regulates must satisfy  Midcal’s active supervision re-
quirement  in  order  to  invoke  state-action  antitrust  immunity.
Pp. 12–14.

(4) The  State  argues  that  allowing  this  FTC  order  to  stand  will
discourage  dedicated  citizens  from  serving  on  state  agencies  that
regulate  their  own  occupation.  But  this  holding  is  not  inconsistent
with  the  idea  that  those  who  pursue  a  calling  must  embrace  ethical
standards  that  derive  from  a  duty  separate  from  the  dictates  of  the
State.  Further, this case does not offer occasion to address the ques-
tion  whether  agency  officials,  including  board  members,  may,  under
some  circumstances,  enjoy  immunity  from  damages  liability.    Of
course,  States  may  provide  for  the  defense  and  indemnification  of
agency  members  in  the  event  of  litigation,  and  they  can  also  ensure
Parker  immunity  is  available  by  adopting  clear  policies  to  displace
competition and providing active supervision.  Arguments against the
wisdom  of  applying  the  antitrust  laws  to  professional  regulation  ab-
sent compliance with the prerequisites for invoking Parker immunity
must be rejected, see Patrick v. Burget, 486 U. S. 94, 105–106, partic-
ularly in light of the risks licensing boards dominated by market par-
ticipants may pose to the free market.  Pp. 14–16.

(5) The Board does not contend in this Court that its anticompet-
itive  conduct  was  actively  supervised  by  the  State  or  that  it  should
receive  Parker  immunity  on  that  basis.    The  Act  delegates  control
over  the  practice  of  dentistry  to  the  Board,  but  says  nothing  about
teeth whitening.  In acting to expel the dentists’ competitors from the
market,  the  Board  relied  on  cease-and-desist  letters  threatening
criminal  liability,  instead  of  other  powers  at  its  disposal  that  would
have invoked oversight by a politically accountable official.  Whether
or not the Board exceeded its powers under North Carolina law, there
is no evidence of any decision by the State to initiate or concur with
the Board’s actions against the nondentists.  P. 17.

(c) Here, where there are no specific supervisory systems to  be re-
viewed,  it  suffices  to  note  that  the  inquiry  regarding  active  supervi-
sion  is  flexible  and  context-dependent.    The  question  is  whether  the
State’s  review  mechanisms  provide  “realistic  assurance”  that  a  non-
sovereign  actor’s  anticompetitive  conduct  “promotes  state  policy,  ra-
ther than merely the party’s individual interests.”  Patrick, 486 U. S.,
100–101.  The Court has identified only a few constant requirements
of  active  supervision:  The  supervisor  must  review  the  substance  of
the anticompetitive decision, see id., at 102–103; the supervisor must
have the power to veto or modify particular decisions to ensure they
accord  with  state  policy,  see  ibid.;  and  the  “mere  potential  for  state
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically outlining the Court's reasoning in the case of NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL EXAMINERS v. FTC. It summarizes the legal arguments and the Court's decision regarding state-action antitrust immunity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxlviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1137

Travis; Almeyda v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

Travis v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

Travis v. Park City Municipal Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Traylor, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  968,1046

Treece, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,1046

1111

Treesh v. DirecTV, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trenkler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128

838

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trevino v. Evans
Tribeca Lending Corp.; Haywood v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  884,1065

1055

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trimble v. Ohio
875

Trinh; Dufrene Boats, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Trinity Health; Grain v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1108

Triple-S Management v. Municipal Revenue Collection Center
. .
907

Triplett v. Roy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Tristano; Brzowski v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Triumph v. Connecticut
1050

Trivedi v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trobee v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  907,1102

1136

Trogdon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Trombley; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trotter v. Gates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1001,1141

859

Trotter v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

Troup v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Troxelle v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  956,1087

Truax, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1090

Truette v. United States
1130

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Truly v. Robert
1153

Trump v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137

TRW Automotive U. S. LLC; Crawford v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Trybulski; Day v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Tseng v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tucker v. Chipla College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  904,1102

841

Tucker v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Tucker v. Hardin County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

Tucker v. Palmer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
872

Tucker v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

Tuley v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

Tung v. Cuevas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Turay v. Richards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

Turner; Chism v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Turner; Gang Song v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Turner v. Jackson Park Hospital
1030

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Turner v. Runnels
1124

Turner; Schrader v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

893

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5219.  Torres-Tontle  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  873.

No.  09–5223.  Pineda  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  5th  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5224.  Cardosa-Ferreira  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 322 Fed. Appx. 372.
No.  09–5225.  Travis  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.  App.  3d  1133,  970
N.  E.  2d  130.

No.  09–5227.  Soy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–5228.  McCarthy v.  Jenkins et al.  Ct. App. Cal., 2d

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5229.  Hailey  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5230.  Hoffman  v.  New  Jersey  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5231.  Farra  v.  Carlton,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5232.  Holbach  v.  North  Dakota.  Sup.  Ct.  N.  D.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  763  N. W.  2d  761.

No.  09–5233.  Giddens  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia  De
partment  of  Corrections.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5234.  Gaines  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5235.  Harris  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  1  So.  3d  178.

No.  09–5236.  Grumbles  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5237.  Greene  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

450

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Kennedy, J., concurring

478 U. S. 714, 736 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 944–
945, 958–959 (1983); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 73–74 (1982). The latter
premise, too, is ﬂawed. Liberty is always at stake when one
or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation
of powers.

Separation of powers was designed to implement a funda-
mental insight: Concentration of power in the hands of a sin-
gle branch is a threat to liberty. The Federalist states the
axiom in these explicit terms: “The accumulation of all pow-
ers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands
. . . may justly be pronounced the very deﬁnition of tyranny.”
The Federalist No. 47, p. 301 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). So con-
vinced were the Framers that liberty of the person inheres
in structure that at ﬁrst they did not consider a Bill of Rights
necessary. The Federalist No. 84, pp. 513, 515; G. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787, pp. 536–543
(1969).
It was at Madison’s insistence that the First Con-
gress enacted the Bill of Rights. R. Goldwin, From Parch-
ment to Power 75–153 (1997).
It would be a grave mistake,
however, to think a Bill of Rights in Madison’s scheme then
or in sound constitutional theory now renders separation of
powers of lesser importance. See Amar, The Bill of Rights
as a Constitution, 100 Yale L. J. 1131, 1132 (1991).

In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty
as deﬁned by that word in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments and as illuminated by the other provisions of the Bill
of Rights. The conception of liberty embraced by the Fram-
ers was not so conﬁned. They used the principles of separa-
tion of powers and federalism to secure liberty in the funda-
mental political sense of the term, quite in addition to the
idea of freedom from intrusive governmental acts. The idea
and the promise were that when the people delegate some
degree of control to a remote central authority, one branch
of government ought not possess the power to shape their
In
destiny without a sufﬁcient check from the other two.
this vision, liberty demands limits on the ability of any one
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy in the case of Clinton v. City of New York. It discusses the importance of separation of powers as a safeguard for liberty.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J.

§314(a).  Given the technical nature of patents, the need for
expertise, and the importance of avoiding political interfer-
ence,  Congress  chose  to  grant  the  APJs  a  degree  of  inde-
pendence.  These considerations set forth a reasonable leg-
islative  objective  sufficient  to  justify  the  restriction  upon
the  Director’s  authority  that  Congress  imposed.    And,  as
JUSTICE THOMAS thoroughly explains, there is no reason to
believe this scheme will prevent the Director from exercis-
ing policy control over the APJs or will break the chain of
accountability that is needed to hold the President respon-
sible for bad nominations.  Post, at 7–10 (dissenting opin-
ion).

The Court does not take these realities into account.  In-
stead, for the first time, it examines the APJs’ office func-
tion by function and finds, in Edmond, a judicially created
rule: “Only an officer properly appointed to a principal office
may issue a final decision binding the Executive Branch in
[inter partes review] proceeding[s].”  Ante, at 19.  As an in-
itial  matter,  I  agree  with  JUSTICE  THOMAS  that  this  rule
has no foundation in Edmond or our Appointments Clause
precedents.  Post, at 10–11.

More broadly, I see the Court’s decision as one part of a
larger shift in our separation-of-powers jurisprudence.  The
Court  applied  a  similarly  formal  approach  in  Free  Enter-
prise  Fund  v.  Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Bd.,
561 U. S. 477 (2010), where it considered the constitutional
status of the members of an accounting board appointed by
the Securities and Exchange Commission.  It held that Con-
gress could not limit the SEC’s power to remove those mem-
bers without cause.  The Court also applied a formalist ap-
proach in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, 591 U. S. ___ (2020), where it held that Congress
could  not  protect  from  removal  without  cause  the  (single)
head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  My dis-
sent  in  the first  case  and  JUSTICE KAGAN’s  dissent  in  the
second explain in greater detail why we believed that this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring and dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 594 U.S. ____ (2021). It delves into the Appointments Clause and the independence of administrative patent judges (APJs).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

51

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

the proposal,67 others opposed it,68 and in the end, after add-
ing the words “in person” at the end of the clause, the House
adopted  it.69   The  Senate,  however,  rejected  the  proposal
(for reasons not provided on the public record), id., at 1116,
and the House acceded to the deletion.

Those who claim that this episode supports Smith argue
that the House would not have found it necessary to include
this  proviso  in  the  Second  Amendment  if  it  had  thought
that the Free Exercise Clause already protected conscien-
tious objectors from conscription, Muñoz, Original Meaning
1120, but that conclusion is unfounded.  Those who favored
Madison’s  language  might  have  thought  it  necessary,  not
because the free-exercise right never required religious ex-
emptions but because they feared that exemption from mil-
itary  service  would  be  held  to  fall  into  the  free-exercise
right’s carveout for conduct that threatens public safety.70
And of course, it could be argued that the willingness of the
House to constitutionalize this exemption despite its poten-
tial effect on national security shows the depth of the Mem-
bers’ commitment to the concept of religious exemptions.

As for the Senate’s rejection of the proviso, we have often
warned against drawing inferences from Congress’s failure
to adopt a legislative proposal.  See Schneidewind v. ANR
Pipeline Co., 485 U. S. 293, 306 (1988) (“This Court gener-
ally is reluctant to draw inferences from Congress’ failure
to  act”);  Brecht  v.  Abrahamson,  507  U. S.  619,  632–633
(1993)  (collecting  cases).  And  in  this  instance,  there  are

——————

67 Hamburger, Religious Exemption 928, and n. 56 (quoting the state-

ment of Rep. Boudinot).

68 Id., at 928, and n. 57 (quoting the statement of Rep. Benson).
69 Muñoz, Original Meaning 1115.
70 Several State Constitutions contained both Free Exercise Clause an-
alogs and provisions protecting conscientious objectors, and this has been
cited as evidence that the free-exercise analogs did not confer any right
to exemptions.  See id., at 1118–1119.  This argument is unpersuasive
for the reasons explained above.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 593 U.S. ____ (2021). It delves into the historical context and interpretation of the Second Amendment, particularly regarding religious exemptions from conscription.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

Judiciary,  109th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  pp.  964–1124  (2005)
(hereinafter  Impact  and  Effectiveness).    Because  the  pri
vate  right  of  action  authorized  by  §2  of  the  VRA  applies
nationwide,  a  comparison  of  §2  lawsuits  in  covered  and
noncovered jurisdictions provides an appropriate yardstick
for measuring differences between covered and noncovered
jurisdictions.  If differences in the risk of voting discrimi
nation  between  covered  and  noncovered  jurisdictions  had
disappeared,  one  would  expect  that  the  rate  of  successful
§2 lawsuits would be roughly the same in both areas.6  The
study’s  findings,  however,  indicated  that  racial  discrimi
nation in voting remains “concentrated in the jurisdictions
singled out for preclearance.”  Northwest Austin, 557 U. S.,
at 203.

Although  covered  jurisdictions  account  for  less  than  25
percent  of  the  country’s  population,  the  Katz  study  re
vealed  that  they  accounted  for  56  percent  of  successful
§2  litigation  since  1982.    Impact  and  Effectiveness  974.
Controlling for population, there were nearly four times as
many successful §2 cases in covered jurisdictions as there
were  in  noncovered  jurisdictions.    679  F. 3d,  at  874.    The
Katz study further found that §2 lawsuits are more likely
to  succeed  when  they  are  filed  in  covered  jurisdictions
than  in  noncovered  jurisdictions.    Impact  and  Effective
ness  974.  From  these  findings—ignored  by  the  Court—
Congress reasonably concluded  that the coverage formula
continues to identify the jurisdictions of greatest concern.

The  evidence  before  Congress,  furthermore,  indicated
that  voting  in  the  covered  jurisdictions  was  more  racially
polarized  than  elsewhere  in  the  country.  H. R.  Rep.  No.
109–478,  at  34–35.  While  racially  polarized  voting  alone
——————

6 Because preclearance occurs only in covered jurisdictions and can be
expected to stop the most obviously objectionable measures, one would
expect  a  lower  rate  of  successful  §2  lawsuits  in  those  jurisdictions  if
the risk of voting discrimination there were the same as elsewhere in the
country.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case of Shelby County v. Holder. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and the effectiveness of preclearance requirements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BULLARD v. BLUE HILLS BANK

Syllabus

separate proceeding each time it reviews a proposed plan, and there-
fore  a  court’s  order  either  confirming  or  denying  a  plan  terminates
the proceeding and is final and immediately appealable.  But the rel-
evant  proceeding  is  the  entire  process  of  attempting  to  arrive  at  an
approved  plan  that  would  allow  the  bankruptcy  case  to  move  for-
ward.  Only  plan  confirmation,  or  case  dismissal,  alters  the  status
quo  and  fixes  the  parties’  rights  and  obligations;  denial  of  confirma-
tion  with  leave  to  amend  changes  little  and  can  hardly be  described
as  final.    Additional  considerations—that  the  statute  defining  core
bankruptcy  proceedings  lists  “confirmations  of  plans,”  §157(b)(2)(L),
but omits any reference to denials; that immediate appeals from de-
nials  would  result  in  delays  and  inefficiencies  that  requirements  of
finality are designed to constrain; and that a debtor’s inability to im-
mediately appeal a denial encourages the debtor to work with credi-
tors  and  the  trustee  to  develop  a  confirmable  plan—bolster  the  con-
clusion that the relevant proceeding is the entire process culminating
in confirmation or dismissal.  Pp. 4–8.

(b) The  Solicitor  General  suggests  that  because  bankruptcy  dis-
putes  are  generally  classified  as  either  “adversary  proceedings”  or
“contested matters,” and because an order denying confirmation and
an order granting confirmation both resolve a contested matter, both
should be considered final.  This argument simply assumes that con-
firmation  is  appealable  because  it  resolves  a  contested  matter,  and
that therefore anything else that resolves the contested matter must
also be appealable.  But one could just as easily contend that confir-
mation is appealable because it resolves the entire plan consideration
process,  while  denial  is  not  because  it  does  not.    Any  asymmetry  in
denying the debtor an immediate appeal from a denial while allowing
a  creditor  an  immediate  appeal  from  a  confirmation  simply  reflects
the  fact  that  confirmation  allows  the  bankruptcy  to  go  forward  and
alters  the  legal  relationships  among  the  parties,  while  denial  lacks
such  significant  consequences.    Nor  is  it  clear  that  the  asymmetry
will  always  advantage  creditors.    Finally,  Bullard  contends  that  un-
less  denial  orders  are  final,  a  debtor  will  be  required  to  choose  be-
tween two untenable options: either accept dismissal of the case and
then  appeal,  or  propose  an  amended  but  unwanted  plan  and  appeal
its confirmation.  These options will often be unsatisfying, but our lit-
igation  system  has  long  accepted  that  certain  burdensome  rulings
will be “only imperfectly reparable” by the appellate process.  Digital
Equipment  Corp.  v.  Desktop  Direct,  Inc.,  511  U. S.  863,  872.    That
prospect is made tolerable by the Court’s confidence that bankruptcy
courts rule correctly most of the time and by the existence of several
mechanisms  for  interlocutory  review,  e.g.,  §§158(a)(3),  (d)(2),  which
“serve as useful safety valves for promptly correcting serious errors”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically discussing the appealability of bankruptcy plan denials. It presents a legal argument and cites relevant statutes and case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017)

7

Opinion of the Court

because  subrogation  and  reimbursement  rights  yield  just
such  payments.  When  a  carrier  exercises  its  right  to
either  reimbursement  or  subrogation,  it  receives  from
either  the  beneficiary  or  a  third  party  “payment”  respect-
ing  the  benefits  the  carrier  had  previously  paid.    The
carrier’s  very  provision  of  benefits  triggers  the  right  to
payment.  See  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  31;  Helfrich,  804  F. 3d,  at
1106; Bell, 823 F. 3d, at 1204.

Congress’ use of the expansive phrase “relate to” shores
up  that  understanding.    We  have  “repeatedly  recognized”
that  the  phrase  “relate  to”  in  a  preemption  clause  “ex-
press[es] a broad pre-emptive purpose.”  Morales v. Trans
World  Airlines,  Inc.,  504  U. S.  374,  383  (1992);  accord
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (2014)
(slip op., at 5, 9).  Congress characteristically employs the
phrase to reach any subject that has “a connection with, or
reference to,” the topics the statute enumerates.  Morales,
504  U. S.,  at  384.    The  phrase  therefore  weighs  against
Nevils’  effort  to  narrow  the  term  “payments”  to  exclude
payments  that  occur  “long  after”  a  carrier’s  provision  of
benefits  (Brief  for  Respondent  27  (quoting  McVeigh,  547
U. S., at 697)).  See Nevils I, 418 S. W. 3d, at 460 (Wilson,
J.,  concurring);  cf.  Hillman  v.  Maretta,  569  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2013)  (slip  op.,  at  10)  (in  the  Federal  Employees’  Group
Life  Insurance  Act  context,  it  “makes  no  difference”
whether state law withholds benefits in the first instance
or  instead  takes  them  away  after  they  have  been  paid).
Given  language  notably  “expansive  [in]  sweep,”  Morales,
504  U. S.,  at  384  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),
Nevils’ argument that Congress intended to preempt only
state  coverage  requirements  (e.g.,  for  acupuncture  and
chiropractic  services,  see  Brief  for  Respondent  36)  also
miscarries.

The statutory context and purpose reinforce our conclu-
sion.  FEHBA  concerns  “benefits  from  a  federal  health
insurance  plan  for  federal  employees  that  arise  from  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute (likely FEHBA). The language is formal and legalistic, with citations to legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

equal  opportunity  will  make  it  safe  to  sunset
affirmative action.”  Id., at 346 (concurring opinion).

In  allowing  race-based  affirmative  action  in  higher
education  for  another  generation—and  only  for  another
generation—the  Court  in  Grutter  took  into  account
competing  considerations.  The  Court  recognized  the
barriers that some minority applicants to universities still
faced as of 2003, notwithstanding the progress made since
Bakke.  See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 343.  The Court stressed,
however,  that  “there  are  serious  problems  of  justice
connected  with  the  idea  of  preference  itself.”  Id.,  at  341
(internal quotation marks omitted).  And the Court added
that a “core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
do  away  with  all  governmentally  imposed  discrimination
based on race.”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Grutter Court also emphasized the equal protection
principle  that  racial  classifications,  even  when  otherwise
permissible, must be a “ ‘temporary matter,’ ”  and “must be
limited in time.”  Id., at 342 (quoting Croson, 488 U. S., at
510 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.)).  The requirement of
a  time  limit  “reflects  that  racial  classifications,  however
compelling  their  goals,  are  potentially  so  dangerous  that
they  may  be  employed  no  more  broadly  than  the  interest
demands.  Enshrining a permanent justification for racial
preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection
principle.”  Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342.
  Importantly, the Grutter Court saw “no reason to exempt
race-conscious admissions programs from the requirement
that all governmental use of race must have a logical end
point.”  Ibid.  The  Court  reasoned  that  the  “requirement
that  all  race-conscious  admissions  programs  have  a
termination  point  assures  all  citizens  that  the  deviation
from  the  norm  of  equal  treatment  of  all  racial  and  ethnic
groups  is  a  temporary  matter,  a  measure  taken  in  the
service  of  the  goal  of  equality  itself.”    Ibid.  (internal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the legal precedent set by the Grutter v. Bollinger case regarding affirmative action in higher education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010)

5

Opinion of the Court

in  which  the  violation  occurred.    After  further  concluding
that  no  special  factors  militate  against  finding  a  remedy
available  in  these  circumstances,  the  court  held  that
respondents’ Bivens action could proceed.

As  the  Ninth  Circuit  recognized,  its  holding  conflicts
with  the  Second  Circuit’s  decision  in  Cuoco  v.  Moritsugu,
222  F. 3d  99  (2000),  which  construed  §233(a)  to  foreclose
Bivens actions against PHS personnel.  We granted certio-
rari to resolve this conflict.  557 U. S. ___ (2009).

II

A

Our inquiry in this case begins and ends with the text of
§233(a).  See  Harris  Trust  and  Sav.  Bank  v.  Salomon
Smith Barney Inc., 530 U. S. 238, 254 (2000).  The statute
provides in pertinent part that:

“[t]he  remedy  against  the  United  States  provided  by
sections  1346(b)  and  2672  of  title  28  . . .  for  damage
for  personal  injury,  including  death,  resulting  from
the  performance  of  medical,  surgical,  dental,  or  re-
lated functions, including the conduct of clinical stud-
ies  or  investigation,  by  any  commissioned  officer  or
employee  of  the  Public  Health  Service  while  acting
within the scope of his office or employment, shall be
exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by rea-
son  of  the  same  subject-matter  against  the  officer  or
employee  (or  his  estate)  whose  act  or  omission  gave
rise to the claim.”  §233(a) (emphasis added).

Section  233(a)  grants  absolute  immunity  to  PHS  officers
and  employees  for  actions  arising  out  of  the  performance
of  medical  or  related  functions  within  the  scope  of  their
employment  by  barring  all  actions  against  them  for  such
conduct.  By  its  terms,  §233(a)  limits  recovery  for  such
conduct to suits against the United States.  The breadth of
the  words  “exclusive”  and  “any”  supports  this  reading,  as
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites case law and legal statutes, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>