<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014)

17

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

APPENDIX7

——————

7 Source: United States Dept. of Labor, online at http://www.dol.gov/
ebsa/pdf/preventiveserviceseligibleorganizationcertificationform.pdf  (as
visited July 2, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a footnote citation and source information, likely part of a legal document.  It is not the main body text and is not meant to be read sequentially.
  </thinking>
  <category>Footnote/Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC

Opinion of the Court

two layers of tenure protection were unconstitutionally in-
sulated from presidential control.  The officials challenged,
though, were different.  They were members of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board—an agency regulat-
ing  the  accounting  industry  under  the  SEC’s  oversight.
When the Board opened an investigation of an accounting
firm’s auditing practices, the firm took its Article II claim
to district court.  This time we held that the court had ju-
risdiction of the action, based on the Thunder Basin factors.
We found that the Exchange Act provided no “meaningful
avenue of relief ” for the firm, given the separation between
the Board and the Commission.  561 U. S., at 490–491 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  Not every Board action,
we  explained,  culminates  in  Commission  action—which
alone  the statute  makes  reviewable  in a  court of  appeals.
And even supposing the SEC took up a matter arising from
the  Board’s  investigation,  the  firm’s  constitutional  chal-
lenge would be “collateral” to the subject of that proceeding.
The  firm, we observed, “object[s] to the Board’s existence,
not to any of its auditing standards.”  Id., at 490.  Finally,
we  held,  the  firm’s  claim  was  “outside  the  Commission’s
competence  and  expertise.”    Id.,  at  491.   It  raised  only  a
“standard” issue of administrative and constitutional law,
relating not at all to “considerations of agency policy.”  Ibid.
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

B

One  way  of  framing  the  question  we  must  decide  is
whether the cases before us are more like Thunder Basin
and Elgin or more like Free Enterprise Fund.  The answer
appears from 30,000 feet not very hard.  Recall our task: to
decide if a claim is “of the type” Congress thought belonged
within  a statutory  scheme.  Thunder  Basin,  510  U. S.,  at
212.  The claims here are of the same ilk as the one in Free
Enterprise  Fund.   There,  the  complaint  alleged  that  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to the constitutionality of certain agency structures.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

37

Opinion of the Court

the people of Kansas have been arraigned for keeping
and bearing them, and the Senator from South Caro
lina has had the face to say openly, on this floor, that
they should be disarmed—of course, that the fanatics
of  Slavery,  his  allies  and  constituents,  may  meet  no
impediment.”  The Crime Against Kansas, May 19–20,
1856,  in  American  Speeches:  Political  Oratory  from
the Revolution to the Civil War 553, 606–607 (2006).

We  have  found  only  one  early  19th-century  commenta
tor  who  clearly  conditioned  the  right  to  keep  and  bear
arms  upon  service  in  the  militia—and  he  recognized  that
the prevailing view was to the contrary.  “The provision of
the  constitution,  declaring  the  right  of  the  people  to  keep
and bear arms, &c. was probably intended to apply to the
right  of  the  people  to  bear  arms  for  such  [militia-related]
purposes  only,  and  not  to  prevent  congress  or  the  legisla
tures of the different states from enacting laws to prevent
the  citizens  from  always  going  armed.    A  different  con
struction  however  has  been  given  to  it.”    B.  Oliver,  The
Rights of an American Citizen 177 (1832).

2. Pre-Civil War Case Law
The  19th-century  cases  that  interpreted  the  Second

Amendment  universally  support  an  individual  right  un
connected  to  militia  service.    In  Houston  v.  Moore,  5
Wheat.  1,  24  (1820),  this  Court  held  that  States  have
concurrent power over the militia, at least where not pre
empted  by  Congress.  Agreeing  in  dissent  that  States
could  “organize,  discipline,  and  arm”  the  militia  in  the
absence of conflicting federal regulation, Justice Story said
that  the  Second  Amendment  “may  not,  perhaps,  be
thought to have any important bearing on this point.  If it
have, it confirms and illustrates, rather than impugns the
reasoning already suggested.”  Id., at 51–53.  Of course, if
the Amendment simply “protect[ed] the right of the people
of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the interpretation of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.

ALITO, J., concurring

these lines was that they “upset” some students (including
members of the cheerleading squad),24 caused students to
ask  some  questions  about  the  matter  during  an  algebra
class taught by a cheerleading coach,25 and put out “nega-
tivity . . . that could impact students in the school.”26  The
freedom of students to speak off-campus would not be worth
much if it gave way in the face of such relatively minor com-
plaints.    Speech  cannot  be  suppressed  just  because  it  ex-
presses thoughts or sentiments that others find upsetting,
and the algebra teacher had the authority to quell in-class
discussion  of  B. L.’s  messages  and  demand  that  the  stu-
dents concentrate on the work of the class.
  As for the messages’ effect on the morale of the cheerlead-
ing squad, the coach of a team sport may wish to take group
cohesion and harmony into account in selecting members of
the team, in assigning roles, and in allocating playing time,
but it is self-evident that this authority has limits.  (To take
an obvious example, a coach could not discriminate against
a  student  for  blowing  the  whistle  on  serious  misconduct.)
And here, the school did not simply take B. L.’s messages
into account in deciding whether her attitude would make
her effective in doing what cheerleaders are primarily ex-
pected  to  do:  encouraging  vocal  fan  support  at  the  events
where  they  appear.    Instead,  the  school  imposed  punish-
ment:  suspension  for  a  year  from  the  cheerleading  squad
despite B. L.’s apologies.
  There  is,  finally,  the  matter  of  B. L.’s  language.    There
are parents who would not have been pleased with B. L.’s
language and gesture, but whatever B. L.’s parents thought
about what she did, it is not reasonable to infer that they
gave the school the authority to regulate her choice of lan-
guage when she was off school premises and not engaged in

——————
24 App. 82.
25 Id., at 82–84.
26 Id., at 81.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito. It delves into the arguments surrounding student speech and its limitations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ARIZONA v. CALIFORNIA

ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BILL OF COMPLAINT

No. 150, Orig.  Decided February 24, 2020

The motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied.
 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  joins,  dis-

senting from denial of motion for leave to file complaint.

Today the Court denies Arizona leave to file a complaint
against California.  Although we have discretion to decline
review  in  other  kinds  of  cases,  see  28  U. S. C.  §§1254(1),
1257(a), we likely do not have discretion to decline review
in cases within our original jurisdiction that arise between
two or more States.

The Constitution establishes our original jurisdiction in
mandatory terms.  Article III states that, “[i]n all Cases . . .
in which a State shall be [a] Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction.”  §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  In
this circumstance, “[w]e have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given.”  Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404
(1821) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court).

Our  original  jurisdiction  in  suits  between  two  States  is
also “exclusive.”  §1251(a).  As I have previously explained,
“[i]f this Court does not exercise jurisdiction over a contro-
versy between two States, then the complaining State has
no judicial forum in which to seek relief.”  Nebraska v. Col-
orado, 577 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (opinion dissenting from de-
nial  of  motion  for  leave  to  file  complaint)  (slip  op.,  at  2).
Denying leave to file in a case between two or more States
is thus not only textually suspect, but also inequitable.

The  Court  has  provided  scant  justification  for  reading
“shall” to mean “may.”  It has invoked its “increasing duties
with  the  appellate  docket,”  Arizona  v.  New  Mexico,  425
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It cites legal precedent and discusses the Court's original jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
GINSBURG, J., dissenting

J., concurring) (“The accommodation works by requiring in-
surance companies to  cover . . . contraceptive coverage for
female employees who wish it.” (emphasis added)).  Under
the  self-certification  accommodation,  then,  the  objecting
employer is absolved of any obligation to provide the con-
traceptive  coverage  to  which  it  objects;  that  obligation  is
transferred to the insurer.  This arrangement “furthers the
Government’s interest [in women’s health] but does not im-
pinge on the [employer’s] religious beliefs.”  Ibid.; see supra,
at 18–19.

2
The Little Sisters, adopting the arguments made by reli-
gious organizations in Zubik, resist this conclusion in two
ways.  First, they urge that contraceptive coverage provided
by  an  insurer  under  the  self-certification  accommodation
forms  “part  of  the  same  plan  as  the  coverage  provided  by
the employer.”  Brief for Little Sisters 12 (internal quota-
tion  marks  omitted).  See  also  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  29  (Little
Sisters  object  “to  having  their  plan  hijacked”);  ante,  at  8
(ALITO,  J.,  concurring)  (Little  Sisters  object  to  “main-
tain[ing] and pay[ing] for a plan under which coverage for
contraceptives would be provided”).  This contention is con-
tradicted by the plain terms of the regulation establishing
that accommodation: To repeat, an insurance issuer “must
. . .  [e]xpressly  exclude  contraceptive  coverage  from  the
group  health  insurance  coverage  provided  in  connection
with  the  group  health  plan.”    45  CFR  §147.131(c)(2)(i)(A)
(2013) (emphasis added); see supra, at 6.25

——————

25 Religious organizations have observed that, under the self-certification
accommodation, insurers need not, and do not, provide contraceptive cov-
erage under a separate policy number.  Supp. Brief for Petitioners in Zu-
bik  v.  Burwell,  O.  T.  2015,  No.  14–1418,  p.  1.    This  objection  does  not
relate to a religious employer’s own conduct; instead, it concerns the in-
surer’s conduct.  See supra, at 18–19.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal jargon and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HERRERA v. WYOMING

CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF WYOMING,
SHERIDAN COUNTY

No. 17–532.  Argued January 8, 2019—Decided May 20, 2019

An  1868  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  the  Crow  Tribe  prom-
ised that in exchange for most of the Tribe’s territory in modern-day
Montana  and  Wyoming,  its  members  would  “have  the  right  to  hunt
on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be
found thereon . . . and peace subsists . . . on the borders of the hunt-
ing  districts.”    15  Stat.  650.    In  2014,  Wyoming  charged  petitioner
Clayvin Herrera with off-season hunting in Bighorn National Forest
and  being  an  accessory  to  the  same.    The  state  trial  court  rejected
Herrera’s argument that he had a protected right to hunt in the for-
est  pursuant  to  the  1868  Treaty,  and  a  jury  convicted  him.    On  ap-
peal,  the  state  appellate  court  relied  on  the  reasoning  of  the  Tenth
Circuit’s  decision  in  Crow  Tribe  of  Indians v.  Repsis,  73  F. 3d  982—
which  in  turn  relied  upon  this  Court’s  decision  in  Ward  v.  Race
Horse,  163  U. S.  504—and  held  that  the  treaty  right  expired  upon
Wyoming’s  statehood.    The  court  rejected  Herrera’s  argument  that
this Court’s subsequent decision in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa  Indians,  526  U. S.  172,  repudiated  Race  Horse  and  there-
fore undercut the logic of Repsis.  In any event, the court concluded,
Herrera  was  precluded  from  arguing  that  the  treaty  right  survived
Wyoming’s statehood because the Crow Tribe had litigated Repsis on
behalf of itself and its members.  Even if the 1868 Treaty right sur-
vived Wyoming’s statehood, the court added, it did not permit Herre-
ra  to  hunt  in  Bighorn  National  Forest  because  the  treaty  right  ap-
plies  only  on  unoccupied  lands  and  the  national  forest  became
categorically occupied when it was created.

Held:

1. The  Crow  Tribe’s  hunting  rights  under  the  1868  Treaty  did  not

expire upon Wyoming’s statehood.  Pp. 6–17.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UZUEGBUNAM ET AL. v. PRECZEWSKI ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–968.  Argued January 12, 2021—Decided March 8, 2021

Petitioners are former students of Georgia Gwinnett College who wished
to  exercise  their  religion  by  sharing  their  faith  on  campus  while  en-
rolled there.  In 2016, Chike Uzuegbunam talked with interested stu-
dents and handed out religious literature on campus grounds.  Uzueg-
bunam stopped after a campus police officer informed him that campus
policy prohibited distributing written religious materials outside areas
designated for that purpose.  A college official later explained to Uzueg-
bunam that he could speak about his religion or distribute materials
only  in  two  designated  speech  areas  on  campus,  and  even  then  only
after securing a permit.  But when Uzuegbunam obtained the required
permit and tried to speak in a free speech zone, a campus police officer
again asked him to stop, this time saying that people had complained
about his speech.  Campus policy at that time prohibited using the free
speech zone to say anything that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of
person(s).”  The officer told Uzuegbunam that his speech violated cam-
pus policy because it had led to complaints, and the officer threatened
Uzuegbunam with disciplinary action if he continued.  Uzuegbunam
again complied with the order to stop speaking.  Another student who
shares  Uzuegbunam’s  faith,  Joseph  Bradford,  decided  not  to  speak
about religion because of these events.  Both Uzuegbunam and Brad-
ford sued certain college officials charged with enforcement of the col-
lege’s  speech  policies,  arguing  that  these  policies  violated  the  First
Amendment.  As relevant here, the students sought injunctive relief
and nominal damages.  The college officials ultimately chose to discon-
tinue  the  challenged  policies  rather  than  to  defend  them,  and  they
sought dismissal on the ground that the policy change left the students
without  standing  to  sue.  The  parties  agreed  that  the  policy  change
rendered the students’ request for injunctive relief moot, but disputed
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are informational in nature and not suitable for indexing as part of the document's content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

891

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09– 5177.  Harvey  v.  Lynch,  Sheriff,  McLennan

County,  Texas.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5178.  Iswed  v.  Booker,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5179.  Graham  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.  Appx.  833.

No.  09–5180.  Floyd  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–5181.  Hill v.  United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  552  F.  3d  591.

No.  09–5182.  Ferebee  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5184.  Griffin  v.  Tennessee.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tenn.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5185.  Gonzalez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  881.

No.  09–5186.  Hernandez  v.  Cate,  Secretary,  California
Department  of  Corrections  and  Rehabilitation.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5187.  Hoffman  v.  Lincoln  General  Insurance
et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  303
Fed.  Appx.  77.

No.  09–5188.  Febles  v.  Rider,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5189.  Hayes  v.  Garcia,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  293  Fed.  Appx.  442.

No.  09–5191.  Saccoccia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  502.

No.  09–5193.  Thurman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  599.

No. 09–5196.  Johnson v.  Pinchak et al.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

404

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

ible with the requirements of the Constitution is a matter
Ibid. (emphasis
for independent federal determination.”
added).

That Justice Stevens would ﬁnd the new § 2254(d)(1) to
have no effect on the prior law of habeas corpus is remark-
able given his apparent acknowledgment that Congress
wished to bring change to the ﬁeld. See ante, at 386 (“Con-
gress wished to curb delays, to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal
habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the extent
possible under law”). That acknowledgment is correct and
signiﬁcant to this case.
It cannot be disputed that Congress
viewed § 2254(d)(1) as an important means by which its goals
for habeas reform would be achieved.

Justice Stevens arrives at his erroneous interpretation
by means of one critical misstep. He fails to give independ-
ent meaning to both the “contrary to” and “unreasonable ap-
plication” clauses of the statute. See, e. g., ante, at 384 (“We
are not persuaded that the phrases deﬁne two mutually ex-
clusive categories of questions”). By reading § 2254(d)(1) as
one general restriction on the power of the federal habeas
court, Justice Stevens manages to avoid confronting the
speciﬁc meaning of the statute’s “unreasonable application”
clause and its ramiﬁcations for the independent-review rule.
It is, however, a cardinal principle of statutory construction
that we must “ ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute.’ ” United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S.
528, 538–539 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S.
147, 152 (1883)). Section 2254(d)(1) deﬁnes two categories
of cases in which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas
relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in
state court. Under the statute, a federal court may grant a
writ of habeas corpus if the relevant state-court decision was
either (1) “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”
or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Williams v. Taylor*.  It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

318(a), 319.  So judicial review of the Director’s initial ap-
praisal of the merits isn’t really eliminated as much as it is
channeled toward the Board’s final decision on those mer-
its.  That process finds a ready analogue elsewhere in our
law.  Much  as  here,  an  indicted  criminal  defendant  un-
happy  with  a  grand  jury’s  finding  of  probable  cause  isn’t
permitted  to  challenge  that  preliminary  assessment,  but
may instead move the court for acquittal after the govern-
ment has presented all its evidence.  See Costello v. United
States,  350  U. S.  359,  363  (1956);  Fed.  Rule  Crim.  Proc.
29(a).

Matters  outside  §314  are  different.  Take  the  provision
before us, §315(b).  It promises that an inter partes review
“may not be instituted” more than a year after the initiation
of  litigation.    This  stands  as  an  affirmative  limit  on  the
agency’s authority.  Much like a statute of limitations, this
provision  supplies  an  argument  a  party  can  continue  to
press throughout the life of the administrative proceeding
and  on  appeal.  Nothing  in  §315(b)  speaks  of  a  “deter-
mination  by  the  Director,”  let  alone  suggests  that  the
agency’s initial ruling on a petition’s timeliness is “final and
nonappealable.”

To pretend otherwise would invite a linguistic nonsense.
We would have to read §314’s language speaking of “[t]he”
“determination” “under this section” to include not one de-
termination but two—and to include not only the determi-
nation actually made under “this section” but also a second
assessment  made  about  the  effect  of  an  entirely  different
section.

To  pretend  otherwise  would  invite  a  practical  nonsense
as  well.  Because  the  Director’s  initial  “reasonable  likeli-
hood” determination under §314(a) relates to the merits, it
will be effectively reviewed both by the Board and courts as
the case progresses.  But when does the Director’s applica-
tion of §315(b)’s time bar get another look?  Under Thryv’s
interpretation,  a  provision  that  reads  like  an  affirmative
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal arguments related to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and the review of its decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring

sovereignty was transferred to each of the 13 fully sovereign
States.  See Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410
(1842)  (“[W]hen  the  Revolution  took  place,  the  people  of
each state became themselves sovereign; and in that char-
acter hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters
and the soils under them for their own common use, subject
only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to
the  general  government”).    Thus,  today,  States  enjoy  pri-
mary  sovereignty  over  their  waters,  including  navigable
waters—stemming either from their status as independent
sovereigns following Independence, ibid., or their later ad-
mission to the Union on an equal footing with the original
States,  see  Lessee  of  Pollard  v.  Hagan,  3  How.  212,  230
(1845) (“The shores of navigable waters, and the soils under
them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United
States, but were reserved to the states respectively. . . . The
new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdic-
tion  over  this  subject  as  the  original  states”);  see  also  M.
Starr,  Navigable  Waters  of  the  United  States—State  and
National  Control,  35  Harv.  L. Rev.  154,  169–170  (1921).
The Federal Government therefore possesses no authority
over navigable waters except that granted by the Constitu-
tion.

The Federal Government’s authority over certain naviga-
ble waters is granted and limited by the Commerce Clause,
which grants Congress power to “regulate Commerce with
foreign  Nations,  and  among  the  several  States,  and  with
the Indian Tribes.”  Art. I, §8, cl. 3.  From the beginning, it
was understood that “[t]he power to regulate commerce, in-
cludes the power to regulate navigation,” but only “as con-
nected with the commerce with foreign nations, and among
the states.”  United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72, 78 (1838)
(Story,  J.,  for  the  Court);  accord,  Gibbons  v.  Ogden,  9
Wheat.  1,  190  (1824)  (“All  America  understands  . . .  the
word ‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation.  It was so un-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 598 U.S. ____ (2023). It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the sovereignty of states over navigable waters.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. v. AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS,
INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–631.  Argued May 6, 2020—Decided July 6, 2020

In  response  to  consumer  complaints,  Congress  passed  the  Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) to prohibit, inter alia, almost
all robocalls to cell phones.  47 U. S. C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii).  In 2015, Con-
gress amended the robocall restriction, carving out a new government-
debt exception that allows robocalls made solely to collect a debt owed
to or guaranteed by the United States.  129 Stat. 588.  The American
Association of Political Consultants and three other organizations that
participate in the political system filed a declaratory judgment action,
claiming  that  §227(b)(1)(A)(iii)  violated  the  First  Amendment.    The
District  Court  determined  that  the  robocall  restriction with  the gov-
ernment-debt exception was content-based but that it survived strict
scrutiny because of the Government’s compelling interest in collecting
debt.  The Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment, agreeing that the robo-
call  restriction  with  the  government-debt  exception  was  a  content-
based speech restriction, but holding that the law could not withstand
strict scrutiny.  The court invalidated the government-debt exception
and applied traditional severability principles to sever it from the ro-
bocall restriction.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

923 F. 3d 159, affirmed.

JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH,  joined  by  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE,  JUSTICE
THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO, concluded in Part II that the 2015 gov-
ernment-debt exception violates the First Amendment.  Pp. 6–9.

(a) The Free Speech Clause provides that government generally “has
no  power  to  restrict  expression  because  of  its  message,  its  ideas,  its
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

Opinion of the Court

07/a-brief-for-the-pigs-the-case-of-national-pork-producers-
council-v-ross/.  These  animals  may  receive  their  only  op-
portunity  for  exercise when  they  are  moved to  a  separate
barn to give birth and later returned for another 16 weeks
of  pregnancy  confinement—with  the  cycle  repeating  until
the  pigs  are  slaughtered.  Ibid.  Proponents  hoped  that
Proposition 12 would go a long way toward eliminating pork
sourced in this manner “from the California marketplace.”
A. Padilla, Cal. Secretary of State, California General Elec-
tion—Official  Voter  Information  Guide  70  (Nov.  6,  2018)
(Voter  Guide),  https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2018/general/pdf/
complete-vig.pdf.    Proponents  also  suggested  that  the  law
would have health benefits for consumers because “packing
animals in tiny, filthy cages increases the risk of food poi-
soning.”  Ibid.; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 201a–202a.

Opponents pressed their case in strong terms too.  They
argued  that  existing  farming  practices  did  a  better  job  of
protecting animal welfare (for example, by preventing pig-
on-pig aggression) and ensuring consumer health (by avoid-
ing  contamination)  than  Proposition  12  would.    Id.,  at
185a–187a; see also Voter Guide 70–71.  They also warned
voters that Proposition 12 would require some farmers and
processors to incur new costs.  Id., at 69.  Ones that might
be “passed through” to California consumers.  Ibid.

Shortly  after  Proposition  12’s  adoption,  two  organiza-
tions—the National Pork Producers Council and the Amer-
ican  Farm  Bureau  Federation  (collectively,  petitioners)—
filed this lawsuit on behalf of their members who raise and
process pigs.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 154a–155a.  Petitioners
alleged that Proposition 12 violates the U. S. Constitution
by  impermissibly  burdening  interstate  commerce.    Id.,  at
230a–232a.

In support of that legal claim, petitioners pleaded a num-
ber of facts.  They acknowledged that, in response to con-
sumer demand and the laws of other States, 28% of their
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a court opinion. It discusses the background of a case involving Proposition 12 and its impact on interstate commerce.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

25

Opinion of the Court

Taken  together,  these  two  elements—that  Goldsmith’s
photograph  and  AWF’s  2016  licensing  of  Orange  Prince
share substantially the same purpose, and that AWF’s use
of Goldsmith’s photo was of a commercial nature—counsel
against fair use, absent some other justification for copying.
That is, although a use’s transformativeness may outweigh
its commercial character, here, both elements point in the
same direction.14

The  foregoing  does  not  mean,  however,  that  derivative
works  borrowing  heavily  from  an  original  cannot  be  fair

——————
inquiry “should disregard Warhol’s creative contributions because he li-
censed his work”; or that an artist may not “market even a transforma-
tive follow-on work.”  Post, at 3, 19, 34 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  Instead,
consistent with the statute, “whether [a] use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit educational purposes” is one element of the first factor,
§107(1); it does not dispose of that factor, much less the fair use inquiry.
As this opinion makes clear, the commercial character of a secondary use
should be weighed against the extent to which the use is transformative
or otherwise justified.  Supra, at 18 (citing Campbell, 510 U. S., at 579–
580, 585); see also supra, at 12, 19–20, and n. 8, 25; infra, at 34–35.

14 The  dissent  contends  that  the  Court  gives  “little  role”  to  “the  key
term ‘character.’ ”  Post, at 19 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  This is somewhat
puzzling, as the Court has previously employed “character” to encompass
exactly what the dissent downplays: “ ‘the commercial or nonprofit char-
acter of an activity.’ ”  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 448–449 (1984) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at
66); see also Campbell, 510 U. S., at 572, 584–585 (repeatedly referring
to  “commercial  character”).    Rather  than  looking  to  this  case  law,  the
dissent  looks  up  the word  “character”  in a  dictionary.  See post,  at  13.
But the dissent’s preferred definition—“a thing’s ‘main or essential na-
ture[,] esp[ecially] as strongly marked and serving to distinguish,’ ” post,
at  20  (quoting  Webster’s  Third  New  International  Dictionary  376
(1976))—helps Goldsmith, not AWF.  Even this definition does not sup-
port the implication that “character” is determined by any aesthetic dis-
tinctiveness, such as the addition of any new expression.  Instead, it is
the “main or essential nature” that must be “strongly marked and serv[e]
to distinguish.”  So return to Orange Prince on the cover of the Condé
Nast issue commemorating Prince, see fig. 5, supra, and ask, what is the
main or essential nature of the secondary use of Goldsmith’s photograph
in that context?
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the fair use doctrine in copyright law. It cites legal precedents and analyzes the factors involved in determining fair use.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005)

19

STEVENS, J., dissenting

education,  Goss  v.  Lopez,  419  U. S.  565  (1975);  utility  ser-
vices, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S.
1 (1978); government employment, Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v.
Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532 (1985); as well as in other enti-
tlements  that  defy  easy  categorization,  see,  e.g.,  Bell  v.
Burson,  402  U. S.  535  (1971)  (due  process  requires  fair
procedures before a driver’s license may be revoked pend-
ing  the  adjudication  of  an  accident  claim);  Logan,  455
U. S., at 431 (due process prohibits the arbitrary denial of
a  person’s  interest  in  adjudicating  a  claim  before  a  state
commission).

Police  enforcement  of  a  restraining  order  is  a  govern-
ment service that is no less concrete and no less valuable
than other government services, such as education.18  The
relative novelty of recognizing this type of property inter-
est  is  explained  by  the  relative  novelty  of  the  domestic
violence statutes creating a mandatory arrest duty; before
this  innovation,  the  unfettered  discretion  that  character-
ized  police  enforcement  defeated  any  citizen’s  “legitimate
claim of entitlement” to this service.  Novel or not, respon-
dent’s  claim  finds  strong  support  in  the  principles  that
underlie  our  due  process  jurisprudence.    In  this  case,
Colorado law guaranteed the provision of a certain service,
in  certain  defined  circumstances,  to  a  certain  class  of

——————

18 The  Court  mistakenly  relies  on  O’Bannon  v.  Town  Court  Nursing
Center,  447  U. S.  773  (1980),  in  explaining  why  it  is  “by  no  means
clear  that  an  individual  entitlement  to  enforcement  of  a  restraining
order  could  constitute  a  ‘property’  interest  for  purposes  of  the  Due
Process  Clause.”  Ante,  at  17.  In  O’Bannon,  the  question  was  essen-
tially  whether  certain  regulations  provided  nursing-home  residents
with an entitlement to continued residence in the home of their choice.
447 U. S., at 785.  The Court concluded that the regulations created no
such entitlement, but there was no suggestion that Congress could not
create one if it wanted to.  In other words, O’Bannon did not address a
situation  in  which  the  underlying  law  created  an  entitlement,  but  the
Court  nevertheless  refused  to  treat  that  entitlement  as  a  property
interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens. It cites previous legal cases and discusses legal principles related to due process and property interests.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

CRUZ v. ARIZONA

Opinion of the Court

Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner  John  Montenegro  Cruz,  a  defendant  sentenced
to  death,  argued  at  trial  and  on  direct  appeal  that  his  due
process  rights  had  been  violated  by  the  trial  court's  failure
to permit him to inform the jury that a life sentence in Ari-
zona would be without parole.  See Simmons v. South Caro-
lina,  512  U. S.  154,  161–162  (1994)  (plurality  opinion);  id.,  at
178 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).  Those courts re-
jected Cruz's Simmons argument, believing, incorrectly, that
Arizona's sentencing and parole scheme did not trigger appli-
cation  of  Simmons.  See  State  v.  Cruz,  218  Ariz.  149,  160,
181 P. 3d 196, 207 (2008).

After  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court  repeated  that  mistake
in  a  series  of  cases,  this  Court  summarily  reversed  the  Ari-
zona  Supreme  Court  in  Lynch  v.  Arizona,  578  U. S.  613
(2016)  (per  curiam),  and  held  that  it  was  fundamental  error
to  conclude  that  Simmons  “did  not  apply”  in  Arizona.  578
U. S., at 615.

Relying on Lynch, Cruz fled a motion for state postconvic-
tion relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g).
That Rule permits a defendant to bring a successive petition
if  “there  has  been  a  signifcant  change  in  the  law  that,  if
applicable  to  the  defendant's  case,  would  probably  overturn
the  defendant's  judgment  or  sentence.”  Ariz.  Rule  Crim.
Proc.  32.1(g)  (Cum.  Supp.  2022);  see  also  ibid.  (Cum.  Supp.
2017).

The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after concluding
that  Lynch  was  not  a  “signifcant  change  in  the  law.”  251
Ariz.  203,  207,  487  P.  3d  991,  995  (2021).  The  Arizona  Su-
preme  Court  reached  this  conclusion  despite  having  repeat-
edly  held  that  an  overruling  of  precedent  is  a  signifcant
change  in  the  law.  See  id.,  at  206,  487  P.  3d,  at  994  (The
“ `archetype of such a change occurs when an appellate court
overrules previously binding case law' ”).

The Court granted certiorari to address whether the Ari-
zona  Supreme  Court's  holding  that  Lynch  was  not  a  signif-

Page Proof Pending Publication
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the beginning of a legal opinion, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case called Cruz v. Arizona and the legal arguments surrounding it. The text is sequential and provides context for the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

NO:1, which codes for the typical BRCA1 gene.  689 F. 3d,
at  1326,  n. 9;  id.,  at  1337  (Moore,  J.,  concurring  in  part);
id., at 1356 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

Claim 5 of the ’282 patent claims a subset of the data in
claim 1.  In particular, it claims “[a]n isolated DNA having
at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1.”  App. 822.
The practical effect of claim 5 is to assert a patent on any
series  of  15  nucleotides  that  exist  in  the  typical  BRCA1
gene.  Because  the  BRCA1  gene  is  thousands  of  nucleo-
tides long, even BRCA1 genes with substantial mutations
are likely to contain at least one segment of 15 nucleotides
that  correspond  to  the  typical  BRCA1  gene.    Similarly,
claim 6 of the ’282 patent claims “[a]n isolated DNA hav-
ing  at  least  15  nucleotides  of  the  DNA  of  claim  2.”  Ibid.
This  claim  operates  similarly  to  claim  5,  except  that  it
references the cDNA-based claim 2.  The remaining claims
at issue are similar, though several list common mutations
rather  than  typical  BRCA1  and  BRCA2  sequences.    See
ibid. (claim 7 of the ’282 patent); id., at 930 (claim 1 of the
’473  patent);  id.,  at  1028  (claims  1,  6,  and  7  of  the  ’492
patent).

C

Myriad’s  patents  would,  if  valid,  give  it  the  exclusive
right  to  isolate  an  individual’s  BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes
(or any strand of 15 or more nucleotides within the genes)
by  breaking  the  covalent  bonds  that  connect  the  DNA  to
the  rest  of  the  individual’s  genome.    The  patents  would
also give Myriad the exclusive right to synthetically create
BRCA cDNA.  In Myriad’s view, manipulating BRCA DNA
in  either  of  these  fashions  triggers  its  “right  to  exclude
others  from  making”  its  patented  composition  of  matter
under  the  Patent  Act.    35  U. S. C.  §154(a)(1);  see  also
§271(a)  (“[W]hoever  without  authority  makes  . . .  any
patented invention . . . infringes the patent”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion discussing patent claims related to BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. It delves into the specifics of the claims and their potential implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
974

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 20, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6136.  Nesbitt  v.  Circuit  Court  of  Illinois,  Cook

County.  Sup.  Ct.  Ill.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6180.  Barrett  v.  Lamarque,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  131.

No.  09–6181.  Balko  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No. 09–6198.  Montague v. Carlton, Warden.  C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6199.  Williams v.  Quinn, Superintendent, Monroe
Correctional  Complex.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  364.

No.  09–6229.  Stamos  v.  New  Jersey.  Super.  Ct.  N.  J.,  App.

Div.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09– 6238.  Little  v.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–6260.  Owens  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
No.  09–6273.  Okafor  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  426.

No.  09–6277.  Leftwich  v.  West  Virginia.  Cir.  Ct.  Raleigh

County,  W. Va.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6306.  Stogner  v.  Cain,  Warden.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6327.  Wiegand  v.  Zavares,  Executive  Director,
Colorado  Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  10th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  837.
No.  09–6332.  Sabino-Morales  v.  United  States;  and
No. 09–6599.  Flores-De-Jesus v.  United States.  C. A. 1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  8.

No. 09–6383.  Lockett et ux. v.  Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
306  Fed.  Appx.  464.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1015

529 U. S.

March 20, 2000

No. D–2133.

In re Disbarment of Philomena. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1071.]

No. D–2135.

In re Disbarment of Kuhlman. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1072.]

No. D–2136.

In re Disbarment of Miller. Disbarment en-

tered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1072.]

No. D–2138.

In re Disbarment of Jones. Disbarment en-

tered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1112.]

No. D–2139.

In re Disbarment of Hencke. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 528 U. S. 1112.]
No. 99M72. Swartz v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-

ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division;

No. 99M73. Clendenin v. Virginia Department of Social

Services; and
No. 99M74.

Iacobucci v. Boulter. Motions to direct the
Clerk to ﬁle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 8, Orig. Arizona v. California et al. Motion of the
[For earlier
for divided argument granted.

Solicitor General
order herein, see, e. g., 528 U. S. 1147.]

No. 105, Orig. Kansas v. Colorado. Motion of the Special
Master for fees and reimbursement of expenses granted, and the
Special Master is awarded a total of $112,783.95 for the period
March 3, 1999, through January 28, 2000, to be paid equally by
[For earlier order herein, see, e. g., 526 U. S. 1048.]
the parties.
No. 99–658. Castillo et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 528 U. S. 1109.] Motion of Law En-
forcement Alliance of America for leave to ﬁle a brief as amicus
curiae granted. Motion of petitioner Brad Eugene Branch for
leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Mo-
tion for appointment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that
Richard G. Ferguson, of Waco, Tex., be appointed to serve as
counsel for petitioner Brad Eugene Branch. Request for ex-
penses and attorney’s fees denied without prejudice. Motion of
petitioner Renos Lenny Avraam for leave to proceed further
herein in forma pauperis granted. Motion for appointment of
counsel granted, and it is ordered that John F. Carroll, Esq., of
San Antonio, Tex., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal cases and their dispositions from a court docket. It is not a continuous narrative and lacks the context of a typical book chapter or section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HUSTED, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE v. A. PHILIP
RANDOLPH INSTITUTE ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 16–980.  Argued January 10, 2018—Decided June 11, 2018

The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) addresses the removal of
ineligible voters from state voting rolls, 52 U. S. C. §20501(b), includ-
ing  those  who  are  ineligible  “by  reason  of”  a  change  in  residence,
§20507(a)(4).    The  Act  prescribes  requirements  that  a  State  must
meet  in  order  to  remove  a  name  on  change-of-residence  grounds,
§§20507(b), (c), (d).  The most relevant of these are found in subsec-
tion  (d),  which  provides  that  a  State  may  not  remove  a  name  on
change-of-residence grounds unless the registrant either (A) confirms
in  writing  that  he  or  she  has  moved  or  (B)  fails  to  return  a  pread-
dressed,  postage  prepaid  “return  card”  containing  statutorily  pre-
scribed content and then fails to vote in any election during the peri-
od covering the next two general federal elections.
  In addition to these specific change-of-residence requirements, the
NVRA also contains a general “Failure-to-Vote Clause,” §20507(b)(2),
consisting  of  two  parts.    It  first  provides  that  a  state  removal  pro-
gram  “shall  not  result  in  the  removal  of  the  name  of  any  per-
son . . . by reason of the person’s failure to vote.”  Second, as added by
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), it specifies that “nothing
in [this prohibition] may be construed to prohibit a State from using
the  procedures”  described  above—sending  a  return  card  and  remov-
ing registrants who fail to return the card and fail to vote for the req-
uisite time.  Since one of the requirements for removal under subsec-
tion (d) is the failure to vote, the explanation added by HAVA makes
clear  that  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause’s  prohibition  on  removal  “by
reason of the person’s failure to vote” does not categorically preclude
using  nonvoting  as  part  of  a  test  for  removal.    Another  provision
makes  this  point  even  more  clearly  by  providing  that  “no  registrant
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

Opinion of the Court

Whether DACA is illegal is, of course, a legal determina-
tion, and therefore a question for the Attorney General.  But
deciding how best to address a finding of illegality moving
forward  can  involve  important  policy  choices,  especially
when the finding concerns a program with the breadth of
DACA.  Those policy choices are for DHS.

Acting Secretary Duke plainly exercised such discretion-
ary  authority  in  winding  down  the  program.  See  App.  to
Pet. for Cert. 117a–118a (listing the Acting Secretary’s de-
cisions on eight transition issues).  Among other things, she
specified that those DACA recipients whose benefits were
set  to  expire  within  six  months  were  eligible for  two-year
renewals.  Ibid.

But Duke did not appear to appreciate the full scope of
her  discretion,  which  picked  up  where  the  Attorney  Gen-
eral’s  legal  reasoning  left  off.  The  Attorney  General  con-
cluded that “the DACA policy has the same legal . . . defects
that the courts recognized as to DAPA.”  App. 878.  So, to
understand those defects, we look to the Fifth Circuit, the
highest  court  to  offer  a  reasoned  opinion  on  the  legality
of DAPA.  That court described the “core” issue before it as
the “Secretary’s decision” to grant “eligibility for benefits”—
including  work  authorization,  Social  Security,  and
Medicare—to  unauthorized  aliens  on  “a  class-wide  basis.”
Texas, 809 F. 3d, at 170; see id., at 148, 184.  The Fifth Cir-
cuit’s focus on these benefits was central to every stage of
its analysis.  See id., at 155 (standing); id., at 163 (zone of
interest); id., at 164 (applicability of §1252(g)); id., at 166
(reviewability); id., at 176–177 (notice and comment); id., at
184 (substantive APA).  And the Court ultimately held that
DAPA  was  “manifestly  contrary  to  the  INA”  precisely  be-
cause  it  “would  make  4.3  million  otherwise  removable  al-
iens”  eligible  for  work  authorization  and  public  benefits.
Id., at 181–182 (internal quotation marks omitted).5

——————

5 As the Fifth Circuit noted, DAPA recipients were eligible for Social
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding DACA's legality and the discretionary authority of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in managing the program.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

927

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–6060.  Moore  v.  Merit  Systems  Protection  Board.
C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.
Appx.  905.

No.  09–6063.  Thomas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  442.

No.  09–6065.  Hines  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–6067.  Wilson v. United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6069.  Crawford  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  368.

No.  09–6070.  Grant  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  912.

No.  09–6073.  Almonte  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6074.  Armenta-Alcantar  v.  United  States  (Re
ported  below:  286  Fed.  Appx.  469);  Pizarro-Montes  v.  United
States;  and  Contreras-Bracamonte  et  al.  v.  United  States
(338  Fed.  Appx.  620).  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6076.  Parker v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  436.

No.  09–6080.  Marshall  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  739.

No.  09–6082.  Paul  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  919.

No.  09–6087.  Moss  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  210.

No.  09–6088.  McKinney  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6090.  Davis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  469.

No.  09–6091.  Camacho-Jimenez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 330 Fed. Appx. 654.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxxiii

Page
206
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
Percival v. Stine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976,977
Perkins; West Covina v.
972
Perlman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Perry v. Missouri
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
Peters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Peterson v. Wisconsin Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Rel.
918
Peterson v. Zimmerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,975
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.
958
Phenix v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Philadelphia; Laessig v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
Philip Morris, Inc.; Blumenthal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948
Phillips, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Phillips v. Harvey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
Phillips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
156
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
Phonometrics, Inc. v. Northern Telecom, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Pickering v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Pierce v. Caruso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pierce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
Pierson v. Wilshire Terrace Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,970
918
Pikitus v. Shenandoah Borough Council
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp.
Pinckney, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973
Pizzo v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,972
964
Plath v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Plato, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Plaut; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,970
Poindexter; Blackmon v.
954
Pollin v. Oregon Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Pomona Fairplex; Shephard v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967
Post, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Postmaster General; Said v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947
Potash, Inc. v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Powell v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952
. .
Practice Mgmt. Information Corp.; American Medical Assn. v.
President of U. S. v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
417
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,969
President of U. S.; Turkowski v.
912
President of U. S.; United States v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967
Priamos, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
975
Price, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Princeton Baptist Medical Center; Walton v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prince William County; Hetzel v.
946
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prochaska; Toegemann v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U55

[09-26-01 13:01:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 667 (2000)

671

Opinion of the Court

argument, the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit afﬁrmed the convictions. 168 F. 3d 1273 (1999).
It held that funds received by an organization constitute
“beneﬁts” within the meaning of § 666(b) if the source of the
funds is a federal program, like Medicare, which provides aid
Id., at 1276–
or assistance to participating organizations.
1277. Entities receiving federal funding under ordinary
commercial contracts, the court stated, fall outside the stat-
Ibid. (citing and discussing United States v.
ute’s coverage.
Copeland, 143 F. 3d 1439 (CA11 1998) (holding that federal
funds received under a contract to construct military aircraft
did not constitute “beneﬁts” within the meaning of § 666(b))).
The court added that its construction furthered “the stat-
ute’s purpose of protecting from fraud, theft, and undue
inﬂuence by bribery the money distributed to health care
providers, and WVHA in particular, through the federal
Medicare program and other similar federal assistance pro-
grams.”
It rejected the view that the
Medicare program provides beneﬁts only to its “targeted re-
cipients,” the qualifying patients.
Id., at 1278 (disagreeing
with United States v. LaHue, 998 F. Supp. 1182 (Kan. 1998),
aff ’d, 170 F. 3d 1026 (CA10 1999)).

168 F. 3d, at 1277.

We granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 962 (1999), and we afﬁrm.

II
A

The nature and purposes of the Medicare program give
us essential instruction in resolving the present controversy.
Established in 1965 as part of the Social Security Act, 42
U. S. C. § 1395 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III), Medicare is a
federally funded medical insurance program for the elderly
In ﬁscal 1997 some 38.8 million individuals
and disabled.
were enrolled in the program, and over 6,100 hospitals were
authorized to provide services to them. U. S. Dept. of
Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing Admin-
istration, 1998 Data Compendium 45, 75 (Aug. 1998). Medi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 667 (2000). It discusses the interpretation of a statute related to federal funding and fraud.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

25

THOMAS, J., dissenting

tion provided a bevy of protections during that process—in-
cluding  a  right  to  a  jury  trial,  counsel,  and  protections
against double jeopardy.  See Amdts. 5, 6.

The  imposition  of  §922(g)(8)’s  burden,  however,  has  far
fewer  hurdles  to  clear.    There  is  no  requirement  that  the
accused has actually committed a crime; instead, he need
only be prohibited from threatening or using force, or pose
a  “credible  threat”  to  an  “intimate  partner  or  child.”
§922(g)(8)(C).  Section  922(g)(8)  thus  revokes  a  person’s
Second  Amendment  right  based  on  the  suspicion  that  he
may  commit  a  crime  in  the  future.    In  addition,  the  only
process required before that revocation is a hearing on the
underlying  court  order.   §922(g)(8)(A).  During  that  civil
hearing—which is not even about §922(g)(8)—a person has
fewer  constitutional  protections  compared  to  a  criminal
prosecution  for  affray.  Gone  are  the  Sixth  Amendment’s
panoply of rights, including the rights to confront witnesses
and have assistance of counsel, as well as the Fifth Amend-
ment’s  protection  against  double  jeopardy.    See  Turner  v.
Rogers, 564 U. S. 431, 441 (2011) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment
does not govern civil cases”); Hudson v. United States, 522
U. S. 93, 99 (1997) (“The [Double Jeopardy] Clause protects
only  against  the  imposition  of  multiple  criminal  punish-
ments for the same offense”).  Civil proceedings also do not
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and some States
even set aside the rules of evidence, allowing parties to rely
on  hearsay.  See,  e.g.,  Wash.  Rule  Evid.  1101(c)(4)  (2024)
(providing the state rules of evidence “need not be applied”
to applications for protection orders (boldface and capitali-
zation deleted)); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §527.6(i) (West
Supp. 2024) (judge “shall receive any testimony that is rel-
evant” and issue order based on clear and convincing evi-
dence).  The differences between criminal prosecutions and
civil hearings are numerous and consequential.

Affray  laws  are  wide  of  the  mark.    While  the  Second
Amendment does not demand a historical twin, it requires
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the Second Amendment and a specific law (§922(g)(8)). The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

KENNEDY, J., dissenting

Miller and Smith, the Government may not use compulsory
process to acquire cell-site records from cell phone service
providers.

There  is  no  merit  in  this  argument.    Cell-site  records,
like  all  the  examples  just  discussed,  are  created,  kept,
classified,  owned,  and  controlled  by  cell  phone  service
providers,  which  aggregate  and  sell  this  information  to
third parties.  As in Miller, Carpenter can “assert neither
ownership  nor  possession”  of  the  records  and  has  no  con-
trol over them.  425 U. S., at 440.

Carpenter argues that he has Fourth Amendment inter-
ests in the cell-site records because they are in essence his
personal  papers  by  operation  of  47  U. S. C.  §222.  That
statute imposes certain restrictions on how providers may
use  “customer  proprietary  network  information”—a  term
that  encompasses  cell-site  records.    §§222(c),  (h)(1)(A).
The statute in general prohibits providers from disclosing
personally  identifiable  cell-site  records  to  private  third
parties.  §222(c)(1).  And  it  allows  customers  to  request
cell-site records from the provider.  §222(c)(2).

Carpenter’s  argument  is  unpersuasive,  however,  for
§222 does not grant cell phone customers any meaningful
interest  in  cell-site  records.  The  statute’s  confidentiality
protections  may  be  overridden  by  the  interests  of  the
providers or the Government.  The providers may disclose
the  records  “to  protect  the[ir]  rights  or  property”  or  to
“initiate,  render,  bill,  and  collect  for  telecommunications
services.”  §§222(d)(1),  (2).  They  also  may  disclose  the
records “as required by law”—which, of course, is how they
were disclosed in this case.  §222(c)(1).  Nor does the stat-
ute  provide  customers  any  practical  control  over  the  rec-
ords.  Customers  do  not  create  the  records;  they  have  no
say in whether or for how long the records are stored; and
they  cannot  require  the  records  to  be  modified  or  de-
stroyed.  Even their right to request access to the records
is limited, for the statute “does not preclude a carrier from
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Fourth Amendment implications of accessing cell-site location data.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xxxix

Page

877

Cuesta; Williams Controls, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

Cuevas; Tung v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Culbero v. New York  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930

Culberson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133

Cullison v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Culver v. Alabama  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Culver City; Harris v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

Culverhouse v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cummings v. Moore  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1015,1159

818

Cundiff v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

Cunniff v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
832

Cunningham; Anderson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967

Cuomo; DiGianni v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Cuomo; Pyke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Cuomo; Shinnecock Smoke Shop v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Cuomo; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
850

Cuong Tan Huynh v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Curiel; Wilson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1001

Currie v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
992

Curry v. Alaska
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

Curry; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952

Curry; Joseph v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

Curry; Piazza v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Curry; Powell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Curry; Scott v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Curry v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968

Curtis, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Curtis v. Napolitano  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Curtis v. Oregon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  832,1141

Curtis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  922,1141

Curto v. Siwek  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  806,1045

Cutaia v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  994,1140

917

Cuthbert v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Cutter v. Northwest Administrators, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116

Cutter v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

Cutts v. Hetzel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

Dade v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
804

Dade v. U. S. District Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Daewoo  Engineering  &  Construction  Co.,  Ltd.  v.  United  States
1029

Dahl v. Thaler
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035

Dahler v. Holinka  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940

Daigneault v. Connecticut Judicial Branch  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  938,1019

Daigneault v. Eaton Corp.
847

Dale v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxix

Page

918

Holder; Batavichus v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Holder; Beltran Lozano v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

Holder; Calderon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Holder; Carachuri-Rosendo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Holder; Cardenas Negrete v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

Holder; Castel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

Holder; Ciptanagara v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1043

Holder; Cohen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965

Holder; Colon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Holder; Connection Distributing Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074

Holder; de Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913

Holder; Diallo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Holder; Eman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Holder; Felix v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Holder; Gomis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Holder; Gumbs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
988

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
988

Holder; Humanitarian Law Project v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Holder; Hung Lin Wu v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
881

Holder; Jao v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Holder; Jinghai Li v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Holder; Joseph v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Holder; Khalil v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Holder; Khan v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

Holder; Koloay v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holder; Kristiadi v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Holder; Kucana v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  233,810

Holder; Kurji v.
945

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  955,1140

Holder; Linton v.
Holder; Lopez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965

875

Holder; Luna-Hernandez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Holder; Marmolejo-Campos v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holder; Martin v.
1111

Holder; Martinez-Madera v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Holder; Martinez-Rodriguez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Holder; Martini v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Holder; Massis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Holder; Mendez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Holder; Mensah v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Holder; Midi v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

Holder; Mongane v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Holder; Mosere v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Holder; Ndongo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941

Holder; Nichols v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Opinion of the Court

506.

The treatises of that era agreed that a favorable termina-
tion occurred so long as the prosecution ended without con-
viction.  Cooley’s tort-law treatise stated, for example, that
“the reasonable rule seems to be, that the technical prereq-
uisite is only that the particular prosecution be disposed of
in such a manner that this cannot be revived, and the pros-
ecutor,  if  he  proceeds  further,  will  be  put  to  a  new  one.”
Cooley 186; see also Newell 343 (expressing approval of the
rule); Hilliard 453, and n. 5 (recognizing the rule).

The  parties  to  this  case  have  identified  only  one  court
that required something more, such as an acquittal or a dis-
missal accompanied by some affirmative indication of inno-
cence.  In 1863, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded,
“with reluctance,” that “ ‘the termination must be such as to
furnish  prima  facie  evidence  that  the  action  was  without
foundation.’ ”  Rounds v. Humes, 7 R. I. 535, 537 (1863).  But
Rhode  Island  stood  as  an  outlier  on  that  question.    The
other American courts to consider the issue did not require
some affirmative indication of innocence in order for a ma-
licious prosecution tort claim to proceed.  The courts simply
required that the prosecution ended in the defendant’s fa-
vor.  As Chief Judge Pryor explained in his comprehensive
opinion  for  the  Eleventh  Circuit  in  Laskar  v.  Hurd,  972
F. 3d, at 1287: “The clear majority of American courts did
not limit favorable terminations to those that suggested the
accused’s innocence.”

Against that body of precedent and historical practice, re-
spondent Clark contends that American courts as of 1871
had  not  settled  on  any  particular  favorable  termination
rule.  But the cases and treatises that respondent latches
onto addressed a separate issue—not whether the prosecu-
tion had terminated in the defendant’s favor, but whether
the prosecution had terminated at all.  In particular, courts
divided over whether a prosecutor’s dismissal without dis-
charge by a judge in fact terminated a prosecution.  Some
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the historical understanding of "favorable termination" in malicious prosecution cases. It cites legal precedents and treatises, demonstrating a clear legal context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Opinion of the Court

U. S. ___ (2023).  As a result of this Court’s stay, Mifeprex
and  generic  mifepristone  have  remained  available  as
allowed by FDA’s relaxed 2016 and 2021 requirements.

A  few  months  later,  the  Court  of  Appeals  issued  its
decision  on  the  merits  of  the  District  Court’s  order,
affirming in part and vacating in part.  78 F. 4th 210, 222–
223 (CA5 2023).  The Court of Appeals first concluded that
the individual doctors and the pro-life medical associations
had  standing.  The  Court  of  Appeals  next  concluded  that
plaintiffs  were  not  likely  to  succeed  on  their  challenge  to
FDA’s  2000  approval  of  Mifeprex  and  2019  approval  of
generic mifepristone.  So the Court of Appeals vacated the
District Court’s order as to those agency actions.  But the
Court  of  Appeals  agreed  with  the  District  Court  that
plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that FDA’s 2016
and 2021 actions were unlawful.

The Court of Appeals’ merits decision did not alter this
Court’s  stay  of  the  District  Court’s  order  pending  this
Court’s  review.    This  Court  then  granted  certiorari  with
respect to the 2016 and 2021 FDA actions held unlawful by
the Court of Appeals.  601 U. S. ___ (2023).

“bedrock

III  standing

II
The  threshold  question  is  whether  the  plaintiffs  have
standing  to  sue  under  Article  III  of  the  Constitution.
Article
constitutional
is  a
requirement  that  this  Court  has  applied  to  all  manner  of
important disputes.”  United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670,
675 (2023).  Standing is “built on a single basic idea—the
idea  of  separation  of  powers.”    Ibid.  (quotation  marks
omitted).
Importantly,  separation  of  powers  “was  not
simply  an  abstract  generalization  in  the  minds  of  the
Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted
in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.”  TransUnion LLC
v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 422–423 (2021) (quotation marks
omitted).  Therefore, we  begin  as  always  with  the  precise
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the concept of standing in legal cases and cites relevant precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

TRUMP v. HAWAII

Opinion of the Court

individualized  approach  for  determining  admissibility.
The  INA  sets  forth  various  inadmissibility  grounds  based
on connections to terrorism and criminal history, but those
provisions  can  only  work  when  the  consular  officer  has
sufficient  (and  sufficiently  reliable)  information  to  make
that determination.  The Proclamation promotes the effec-
tiveness  of  the  vetting  process  by  helping  to  ensure  the
availability of such information.

Plaintiffs suggest that the entry restrictions are unnec-
essary  because  consular  officers  can  simply  deny  visas  in
individual cases when an alien fails to carry his burden of
proving  admissibility—for  example,  by  failing  to  produce
certified  records  regarding  his  criminal  history.    Brief  for
Respondents  48.  But  that  misses  the  point:  A  critical
finding  of  the  Proclamation  is  that  the  failure  of  certain
countries  to  provide  reliable  information  prevents  the
Government  from  accurately  determining  whether  an
alien  is  inadmissible  or  poses  a  threat.    Proclamation
§1(h).  Unless  consular  officers  are  expected  to  apply
categorical  rules  and  deny  entry  from  those  countries
across  the  board,  fraudulent  or  unreliable  documentation
may  thwart  their  review  in  individual  cases.    And  at  any
rate,  the  INA  certainly  does  not  require  that  systemic
problems  such  as  the  lack  of  reliable  information  be  ad-
dressed only in a progression of case-by-case admissibility
determinations.  One  of  the  key  objectives  of  the  Procla-
mation  is  to  encourage  foreign  governments  to  improve
their practices, thus facilitating the Government’s vetting
process overall.  Ibid.

Nor is there a conflict between the Proclamation and the
Visa Waiver Program.  The Program allows travel without
a  visa  for  short-term  visitors  from  38  countries  that  have
entered  into  a  “rigorous  security  partnership”  with  the
United States.  DHS,  U. S.  Visa  Waiver Program (Apr.  6,
2016),  http://www.dhs.gov/visa-waiver-program  (as  last
visited  June  25,  2018).  Eligibility  for  that  partnership
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Trump v. Hawaii case. It delves into the rationale behind the Proclamation and its relationship to visa processes and the Visa Waiver Program.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

1

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 08–964
_________________

BERNARD L. BILSKI AND RAND A. WARSAW,

PETITIONERS v. DAVID J. KAPPOS, UNDER

SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR INTEL-

LECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR,

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 28, 2010]

JUSTICE  STEVENS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG,
JUSTICE  BREYER,  and  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  join,  concur-
ring in the judgment.

In the area of patents, it is especially important that the
law remain stable and clear.  The only question presented
in  this  case
is  whether  the  so-called  machine-or-
transformation  test  is  the  exclusive  test  for  what  consti-
tutes  a  patentable  “process”  under  35  U. S. C.  §101.    It
would be possible to answer that question simply by hold-
ing,  as  the  entire  Court  agrees,  that  although  the  ma-
chine-or-transformation test is reliable in most cases, it is
not the exclusive test.

I  agree  with  the  Court  that,  in  light  of  the  uncertainty
that currently pervades this field, it is prudent to provide
further  guidance.    But  I  would  take  a  different  approach.
Rather  than  making  any  broad  statements  about  how  to
define  the  term  “process”  in  §101  or  tinkering  with  the
bounds  of  the  category  of  unpatentable,  abstract  ideas,  I
would  restore  patent  law  to  its  historical  and  constitu-
tional moorings.

For centuries, it was considered well established that a
series  of  steps  for  conducting  business  was  not,  in  itself,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case, specifically a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citations, case names, and the beginning of a Justice's concurring opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. v. CHRISTIAN

Syllabus

measures found necessary to protect human health and the environ-
ment by EPA.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the land-
owners  on  the  issue  of  whether  the  Act  precluded  their  restoration
damages claim and allowed the lawsuit to continue.  After granting a
writ of supervisory control, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, re-
jecting Atlantic Richfield’s argument that §113 stripped the Montana
courts of jurisdiction over the landowners’ claim and concluding that
the landowners were not potentially responsible parties (or PRPs) pro-
hibited  from  taking  remedial  action  without  EPA  approval  under
§122(e)(6).

Held:

1. This  Court  has  jurisdiction  to  review  the  Montana  Supreme
Court’s decision.  To qualify as a final judgment subject to review un-
der 28 U. S. C. §1257(a), a state court judgment must be “an effective
determination of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory or in-
termediate steps therein.”  Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U. S. 75,
81.  Under Montana law, a supervisory writ proceeding is a self-con-
tained  case,  not  an  interlocutory  appeal.  Mont.  Const.,  Art.  VII,
§§2(1)–(2);  Mont.  Rules  App.  Proc.  6(6),  14(1),  14(3).    Thus,  the  writ
issued in this case is a “final judgment” within this Court’s jurisdiction.
Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U. S.
382, 385, n. 7.  P. 8.

2. The Act does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over this
lawsuit.    Section  113(b)  of  the  Act  provides  that  “the  United  States
district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all contro-
versies  arising  under  this  chapter,”  so  state  courts  lack  jurisdiction
over such actions.  The use of  “arising under” in §113(b) echoes Con-
gress’s more familiar use of that phrase in granting federal courts ju-
risdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.”  28 U. S. C. §1331.  In the mine run
of cases, “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”
American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257, 260.
The  landowners’  common  law  nuisance,  trespass,  and  strict  liability
claims arise under Montana law and not under the Act.

Atlantic  Richfield  mistakenly  argues  that  §113(h)—which  states
that “[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law . . .
to review any challenges to removal or remedial action” selected under
the Act—implicitly broadens the scope of actions precluded from state
court  jurisdiction  under  §113(b).    But  §113(h)  speaks  of  “Federal
court[s],” not state courts.  There is no textual basis for Atlantic Rich-
field’s argument that Congress precluded state courts from hearing a
category of cases in §113(b) by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction
over those cases in §113(h).  Often the simplest explanation is the best:
Section 113(b) deprives state courts of jurisdiction over cases “arising
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the legal issues at hand and the Court's jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
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2

HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v.
RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN.
BARRETT, J., dissenting

To start, Congress in subparagraph (A)(i) gave all small
refineries—including petitioners (HollyFrontier)—a “[t]em-
porary  exemption”  from  the  program’s  renewable-fuel  re-
quirements; the exemption ran from the RFP’s passage in
2005 until 2011.  42 U. S. C. §7545(o)(9)(A)(i).  Then, in sub-
paragraph (A)(ii), Congress directed the Department of En-
ergy to conduct a study—to be completed no later than the
end  of  2008—to  determine  whether  compliance  with  the
RFP “would impose a disproportionate economic hardship
on small refineries.”  §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I).  If so, the statute
provides,  EPA  “shall  extend  the  exemption”  initially  en-
joyed by all small refineries “for a period of not less than 2
additional years.”  §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II).

Congress also provided small refineries an avenue to pe-
tition for an “extension” of these initial exemptions.  This is
the provision at the heart of this case:

“A small refinery may at any time petition [EPA] for
an extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A)
for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship.”
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i).

Deciding that this subparagraph uses “extension” to mean
“continuation”  should  be  an  easy  call.  Following  Holly-
Frontier’s lead, however, the Court forgoes the obvious answer.

A
HollyFrontier lays its cards on the table.  It does not dis-
pute that when used to refer to “an increase in the length of
time,”  the  word  “extension”  can—and  commonly  does—
refer to something that is prolonged without interruption.
Brief for Petitioners 29.  Yet, HollyFrontier insists, the term
“extension” is not always used that way.  Instead, it might
sometimes refer to a “non-continuous extension”—in other
words, an extension of something that used to exist but no
longer  does.  Ibid.  Because  there  is  “nothing  unnatural”
about reading the term this way, HollyFrontier urges us to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge. It contains legal jargon, citations, and arguments about the interpretation of a statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1566
_________________

DAVID CASSIRER, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. THYSSEN-
BORNEMISZA COLLECTION FOUNDATION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 21, 2022]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under  the  Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act  of  1976
(FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §1602 et seq., a foreign state or instru-
mentality is amenable in specified circumstances to suit in
an American court.  In this case, the plaintiffs brought such
a suit to recover expropriated property.  The question pre-
sented is what choice-of-law rule the court should use to de-
termine  the  applicable  substantive  law.  The  answer  is:
whatever choice-of-law rule the court would use if the de-
fendant were not a foreign-state actor, but instead a private
party.  Here, that means applying the forum State’s choice-
of-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law.

I

Although  the  legal  issue  before  us  is  prosaic,  the  case’s
subject matter and background are anything but.  At issue
is  the  ownership  of  an  Impressionist  painting  depicting  a
Paris streetscape: Camille Pissarro’s Rue Saint-Honoré in
the Afternoon, Effect of Rain (shown in this opinion’s appen-
dix).  Pissarro’s agent sold the painting in 1900 to Paul Cas-
sirer, a member of a prominent German Jewish family own-
ing  an  art  gallery  and  publishing  house.    Some  quarter
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion itself. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>