<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

404 (1989).

None of these obstacles stopped the Smith majority from
adopting its new rule and displacing decades of precedent.
The majority feared that continued adherence to that case
law would “cour[t] anarchy” because it “would open the pro-
spect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from
civic  obligations  of  almost  every  conceivable  kind.”    494
U. S., at 888.  The majority recognized that its new inter-
pretation would place small religious groups at a “relative
disadvantage,” but the majority found that preferable to the
problems  it  envisioned  if  the  Sherbert  test  had  been  re-
tained.  494 U. S., at 890.

Four Justices emphatically disagreed with Smith’s rein-
terpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.  Justice O’Connor
wrote that this new reading “dramatically depart[ed] from
well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence” and was “in-
compatible with our Nation’s fundamental commitment to
individual religious liberty.”  494 U. S., at 891 (opinion con-
curring  in  judgment).    Justices  Brennan,  Marshall,  and
Blackmun  protested  that  the  majority  had  “mischarac-
teriz[ed]” and “discard[ed]” the Court’s free-exercise juris-
prudence on its way to “perfunctorily dismiss[ing]” the “set-
tled  and  inviolate  principle”  that  state  laws  burdening
religious freedom may stand only if “justified by a compel-
ling  interest  that  cannot  be  served  by  less  restrictive
means.”  Id., at 907–908 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).

Smith’s impact was quickly felt, and Congress was inun-
dated with reports of the decision’s consequences.26  In re-
sponse,  it  attempted  to  restore  the  Sherbert  test.  In  the

——————

26 A particularly heartbreaking example was a case in which a judge
felt compelled by Smith to reverse his previous decision holding the state
medical examiner liable for performing the autopsy of a young Hmong
man  who  had  been  killed  in  a  car  accident.    The  young  man’s  parents
were tortured by the thought that the autopsy would prevent their son
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the precedent set by the *Smith* case and the dissenting opinions against it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Syllabus

not implicated because getting an abortion is generally “unplanned ac-
tivity,” and “reproductive planning could take virtually immediate ac-
count of any sudden restoration of state authority to ban abortions.”
505  U. S.,  at  856.    Instead,  the  opinion  perceived  a  more  intangible
form of reliance, namely, that “people [had] organized intimate rela-
tionships and made choices that define their views of themselves and
their places in society . . . in reliance on the availability of abortion in
the  event  that  contraception  should  fail”  and  that  “[t]he  ability  of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Na-
tion has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives.”  Ibid.  The contending sides in this case make impassioned and
conflicting  arguments  about  the  effects  of  the  abortion  right  on  the
lives of women as well as the status of the fetus.  The Casey plurality’s
speculative attempt to weigh the relative importance of the interests
of the fetus and the mother represent a departure from the “original
constitutional  proposition”  that  “courts  do  not  substitute  their  social
and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.”  Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 729–730.

The Solicitor General suggests that overruling Roe and Casey would
threaten the protection of other rights under the Due Process Clause.
The  Court  emphasizes  that  this  decision  concerns  the  constitutional
right to abortion and no other right.  Nothing in this opinion should be
understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.
Pp. 63–66.

(c)  Casey  identified  another  concern,  namely,  the  danger  that  the
public will perceive a decision overruling a controversial “watershed”
decision, such as Roe, as influenced by political considerations or pub-
lic opinion.  505 U. S., at 866–867.  But the Court cannot allow its de-
cisions to be affected by such extraneous concerns.  A precedent of this
Court  is  subject  to  the  usual  principles  of  stare  decisis  under  which
adherence to precedent is the norm but not an inexorable command.  If
the rule were otherwise, erroneous decisions like Plessy would still be
the  law.  The Court’s  job  is  to  interpret  the  law,  apply  longstanding
principles of stare decisis, and decide this case accordingly.  Pp. 66–69.
(d) Under the Court’s precedents, rational-basis review is the appro-
priate standard to apply when state abortion regulations undergo con-
stitutional challenge.  Given that procuring an abortion is not a funda-
mental  constitutional  right,  it  follows  that  the  States  may  regulate
abortion for legitimate reasons, and when such regulations are chal-
lenged  under the  Constitution, courts  cannot  “substitute  their  social
and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.”  Ferguson,
372 U. S., at 729–730.  That applies even when the laws at issue con-
cern matters of great social significance and moral substance.  A law
regulating abortion, like other health and welfare laws, is entitled to a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court decision. It discusses legal precedents, constitutional arguments, and the standard of review for abortion regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. CAULKETT

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–1421.  Argued March 24, 2015—Decided June 1, 2015*

Respondent  debtors  each  filed  for  Chapter  7  bankruptcy,  and  each
owned a house encumbered with a senior mortgage lien and a junior
mortgage  lien,  the  latter  held  by  petitioner  bank.    Because  the
amount  owed  on  each  senior  mortgage  is  greater  than  each  house’s
current market value, the bank would receive nothing if the proper-
ties were sold today.  The junior mortgage liens were thus wholly un-
derwater.  The debtors sought to void their junior mortgage liens un-
der §506 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides, “To the extent that
a  lien  secures  a  claim  against  the  debtor  that  is  not  an  allowed  se-
cured claim, such lien is void.”  11 U. S. C. §506(d).  In each case, the
Bankruptcy  Court  granted  the  motion,  and  both  the  District  Court
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Held: A  debtor  in  a  Chapter  7  bankruptcy  proceeding  may  not  void  a
junior  mortgage  lien  under  §506(d)  when  the  debt  owed  on  a  senior
mortgage lien exceeds the current value of the collateral if the credi-
tor’s  claim  is  both  secured  by  a  lien  and  allowed  under  §502  of  the
Bankruptcy Code.  Pp. 2–7.

(a) The  debtors  here  prevail  only  if  the  bank’s  claims  are  “not  . . .
allowed secured claim[s].”  The parties do not dispute that the bank’s
claims are “allowed” under the Code.  Instead, the debtors argue that
the  bank’s  claims  are  not  “secured”  because  §506(a)(1)  provides  that
“[a]n allowed claim . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of
such creditor’s interest in . . . such property” and “an unsecured claim
to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is less than
the amount of such allowed claim.”  Because the value of the bank’s

——————

* Together  with  No.  14–163,  Bank  of  America,  N. A.  v.  Toledo-

Cardona, also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

853

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No. 08–10769.  Long v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.  Appx.  804.

No.  08–10770.  Jeffries  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  229.

No.  08–10771.  Pigford  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  157.

No.  08–10772.  Sandoval  v.  Ulibarri,  Warden.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  548  F.  3d  902.

No.  08–10773.  Stewart  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10774.  Stewart  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  554.

No.  08–10775.  Rodriguez-Duberney  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.
Appx.  430.

No.  08–10776.  Sims  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10777.  Williams  v.  Drew,  Warden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10778.  Crim  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 08–10779.  Crute, aka Griffin v.  United States.  C.  A.
4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 319 Fed. Appx. 239.

No.  08–10780.  Dittrich  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–10781.  Andrade  Calles  v.  Uribe,  Warden.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10782.  Cheek  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  302  Fed.  Appx.  816.

No.  08–10785.  Merced-Rodriguez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, court citations, and dates, but lacks continuous narrative text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Opinion of the Court

at  9.  Under  Article  13(b)  of  the  Convention,  however,  a
court “is not bound to order the return of the child” if the
court finds that the party opposing return has established
that return would expose the child to a “grave risk” of phys-
ical or psychological harm.  Id., at 10.  By providing that a
court “is not bound” to order return upon making a grave-
risk finding, Article 13(b) lifts the Convention’s return re-
quirement, leaving a court with the discretion to grant or
deny return.

Nothing  in  the  Convention’s  text  either  forbids  or  re-
quires consideration of ameliorative measures in exercising
this  discretion.  The  Convention  itself  nowhere  mentions
ameliorative  measures.  Nor  does  ICARA,  which,  as  rele-
vant, instructs courts to “decide the case in accordance with
the  Convention”  and  accordingly  leaves  undisturbed  the
discretion  recognized  in  the  Convention.    22  U. S. C.
§9003(d).  The  longstanding  interpretation  of  the  Depart-
ment of State offers further support for the view that the
Convention  vests  a  court  with  discretion  to  determine
whether to order return if an exception to the return man-
date  applies.  See  51  Fed.  Reg.  10510  (1986)  (explaining
that  “a  court  in  its  discretion  need  not  order  a  child  re-
turned” upon a finding of grave risk); see also Abbott, 560
U. S., at 15 (explaining that the Executive Branch’s inter-
pretation of the Convention “is entitled to great weight” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).

Unable  to  point  to  any  explicit  textual  mandate  that
courts consider ameliorative measures, Saada’s primary ar-
gument is that this requirement is implicit in the Conven-
tion’s command that the court make a determination as to
whether a grave risk of harm exists.  Essentially, Saada ar-
gues that determining whether a grave risk of harm exists
necessarily requires considering whether any ameliorative
measures are available.

The question whether there is a grave risk, however, is
separate from the question whether there are ameliorative
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the consideration of ameliorative measures when determining if returning a child would pose a "grave risk" of harm.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

972

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

August 12, 13, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–8840. Roberts v. Battelle Memorial Institute,

ante, p. 957;

No. 97–8846. Pizzo v. Louisiana, ante, p. 919;
No. 97–8864.
No. 97–8907. DeLoach v. General Dynamics Corp., ante,

In re Betka, ante, p. 950;

p. 919;

No. 97–9033. Valdes v. United States, ante, p. 923;
No. 97–9182. Bieri v. United States, ante, p. 959; and
No. 97–9237.

In re Ijemba, ante, p. 950. Petitions for rehear-

ing denied.

No. 97–679. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Central Office Telephone, Inc., ante, p. 214. Petition for
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consid-
rehearing denied.
eration or decision of this petition.

No. 97–1770. Yen v. National Labor Relations Board
et al., 523 U. S. 1139. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
further herein in forma pauperis granted. Petition for rehear-
ing denied.

No. 97–8287. Ceminchuk v. Cohen, Secretary of Defense,

et al., 523 U. S. 1099; and

No. 97–8434. DeYoung v. Georgia, 523 U. S. 1141. Motions

for leave to ﬁle petitions for rehearing denied.

Miscellaneous Orders

August 13, 1998

No. D–1948.

In re Disbarment of Perlman. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see 523 U. S. 1104.]

No. D–1963.

In re Disbarment of Marshall. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 924.]

No. D–1964.

In re Disbarment of Green. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 924.]

No. D–1967.

In re Disbarment of Pahl. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 935.]

No. D–1969.

In re Disbarment of Barkin. Disbarment

entered.

[For earlier order herein, see ante, p. 935.]

No. D–1980.

In re Disbarment of Foley. Thomas M.
Foley, of Honolulu, Haw., having requested to resign as a member
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and orders, likely from a legal journal or database. It includes case numbers, titles, dates, and brief descriptions of actions taken. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's more of a navigational or reference guide than narrative text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

have  been  charged  with  rigidity  had  it  afforded  covered
jurisdictions  no  way  out  or  ignored  jurisdictions  that
needed superintendence.  Congress, however, responded to
this  concern.  Critical  components  of  the  congressional
design  are  the  statutory  provisions  allowing  jurisdictions
to  “bail  out”  of  preclearance,  and  for  court-ordered  “bail
ins.”  See  Northwest  Austin,  557  U. S.,  at  199.    The  VRA
permits  a  jurisdiction  to  bail  out  by  showing  that  it  has
complied  with  the  Act  for  ten  years,  and  has  engaged  in
efforts  to  eliminate  intimidation  and  harassment  of  vot
ers.  42 U. S. C. §1973b(a) (2006 ed. and Supp. V).  It also
authorizes  a  court  to  subject  a  noncovered  jurisdiction  to
federal  preclearance  upon  finding  that  violations  of  the
Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth  Amendments  have  occurred
there.  §1973a(c) (2006 ed.).

Congress  was  satisfied  that  the  VRA’s  bailout  mecha
nism  provided  an  effective  means  of  adjusting  the  VRA’s
coverage  over  time.  H. R.  Rep.  No.  109–478,  at  25  (the
success  of  bailout  “illustrates  that:  (1)  covered  status  is
neither  permanent  nor  over-broad;  and  (2)  covered  status
has  been  and  continues  to  be  within  the  control  of  the
jurisdiction such that those jurisdictions that have a genu
inely  clean  record  and  want  to  terminate  coverage  have
the  ability  to  do  so”).    Nearly  200  jurisdictions  have  suc
cessfully  bailed  out  of  the  preclearance  requirement,  and
DOJ has consented to every bailout application filed by an
eligible  jurisdiction  since  the  current  bailout  procedure
became effective in 1984.  Brief for Federal Respondent 54.
The bail-in mechanism has also worked.  Several jurisdic
tions  have  been  subject  to  federal  preclearance  by  court
orders, including the States of New Mexico and Arkansas.
App. to Brief for Federal Respondent 1a–3a.

This  experience  exposes  the  inaccuracy  of  the  Court’s
portrayal  of  the  Act  as  static,  unchanged  since  1965.
Congress designed the VRA to be a dynamic statute, capa
ble  of  adjusting  to  changing  conditions.    True,  many  cov
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case of Shelby County v. Holder. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and its provisions for jurisdictions to "bail out" of preclearance requirements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ___ (2015)

9

KAGAN, J., dissenting

chapter’s  pre-existing  sections.    And  with  the  first  18
numbers of the chapter already taken (starting with §1501
and continuing through §1518), the law naturally took the
19th  place.    That  is  standard  operating  procedure.    Prior
to  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  all  of  Chapter  73  was
ordered  chronologically:  Section  1518  was  later  enacted
than  §1517,  which  was  later  enacted  than  §1516,  which
was . . . well, you get the idea.  And after Sarbanes-Oxley,
Congress has continued in the same vein.  Section 1519 is
thus right where you would expect it (as is the contempo-
raneously  passed  §1520)—between  §1518  (added  in  1996)
and §1521 (added in 2008).2

The  plurality’s  third  argument,  relying  on  the  surplus-
age  canon,  at  least  invokes  a  known  tool  of  statutory
construction—but  it  too  comes  to  nothing.    Says  the  plu-
rality: If read naturally, §1519 “would render superfluous”
§1512(c)(1),  which  Congress  passed  “as  part  of  the  same
act.”  Ante,  at  13.    But  that  is  not  so:  Although  the  two
provisions  significantly  overlap,  each  applies  to  conduct
the other does not.  The key difference between the two is
that  §1519  protects  the  integrity  of  “matter[s]  within  the
jurisdiction of any [federal] department or agency” whereas
§1512(c)(1)  safeguards  “official  proceeding[s]”  as  defined
in  §1515(a)(1)(A).  Section  1519’s  language  often  applies
more  broadly  than  §1512(c)(1)’s,  as  the  plurality  notes.

——————

2 The  lonesome  exception  to  Chapter  73’s  chronological  order  is
§1514A,  added  in  Sarbanes-Oxley  to  create  a  civil  action  to  protect
whistleblowers.  Congress decided to place that provision right after the
only other section in Chapter 73 to authorize a civil action (that one to
protect  victims  and  witnesses).    The  plurality,  seizing  on  the  §1514
example, says it likewise “would have made more sense for Congress to
codify the substance of §1519 within §1512 or in a new §1512A.”  Ante,
at 12, n. 4.  But §1512 is titled “Tampering with a witness, victim, or an
informant,” and its provisions almost all protect witnesses from intimi-
dation and harassment.  It makes perfect sense that Congress wanted a
broad  ban  on  evidence-spoliation  to  stand  on  its  own  rather  than  as
part of—or an appendage to—a witness-tampering provision.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and statutory interpretation, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

3

Opinion of the Court

forth in §262(k).

To  obtain  approval  through  the  BPCIA’s  abbreviated
process, the manufacturer of a biosimilar (applicant) does
not  need  to  show  that  the  product  is  “safe,  pure,  and  po-
tent.”  Instead, the applicant may piggyback on the show-
ing  made  by  the  manufacturer  (sponsor)  of  a  previously
licensed biologic (reference product).  See §262(k)(2)(A)(iii).
An  applicant  must  show  that  its  product  is  “highly  simi-
lar”  to  the  reference  product  and  that  there  are  no  “clini-
cally meaningful differences” between the two in terms of
“safety,  purity,  and  potency.”  §§262(i)(2)(A),  (B);  see  also
§262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I).  An applicant may not submit an appli-
cation  until  4  years  after  the  reference  product  is  first
licensed,  and  the  FDA  may  not  license  a  biosimilar  until
12  years  after  the  reference  product  is  first  licensed.
§§262(k)(7)(A), (B).  As a result, the manufacturer of a new
biologic  enjoys  a  12-year  period  when  its  biologic  may  be
marketed without competition from biosimilars.

B
A  sponsor  may  hold  multiple  patents  covering  the  bio-
logic, its therapeutic uses, and the processes used to man-
ufacture  it.  Those  patents  may  constrain  an  applicant’s
ability to market its biosimilar even after the expiration of
the 12-year exclusivity period contained in §262(k)(7)(A).

The  BPCIA  facilitates  litigation  during  the  period  pre-
ceding  FDA  approval  so  that  the  parties  do  not  have  to
wait  until  commercial  marketing  to  resolve  their  patent
It  enables  the  parties  to  bring  infringement
disputes.
actions at certain points in the application process, even if
the  applicant  has  not  yet  committed  an  act  that  would
traditionally  constitute  patent  infringement.
See  35
U. S. C.  §271(a)  (traditionally  infringing  acts  include
making,  using,  offering  to  sell,  or  selling  any  patented
invention within the United States without authority to do
so).  Specifically, it provides that the mere submission of a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) and its provisions related to biosimilars.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

SEC v. JARKESY

Syllabus

the bounds of federal jurisdiction,” an Article III court must decide it,
with a jury if the Seventh Amendment applies.  Stern v. Marshall, 564
U. S. 462, 484.  On that basis, this Court has repeatedly explained that
matters concerning private rights may not be removed from Article III
courts.  See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee, 18 How., at 284.  If a suit is in the
nature  of  an  action  at  common  law,  then  the  matter  presumptively
concerns  private  rights,  and  adjudication  by  an  Article  III  court  is
mandatory.  Stern, 564 U. S., at 484.

The Court also recognizes a class of cases concerning “public rights.”
Such matters “historically could have been determined exclusively by
[the executive and legislative] branches.”  Id., at 493 (internal quota-
tion  marks  omitted).    No  involvement  by  an  Article  III  court  in  the
initial adjudication of public rights claims is necessary.  Certain cate-
gories  that  have  been  recognized  as  falling  within  the  exception  in-
clude matters concerning: the collection of revenue; aspects of customs
law; immigration law; relations with Indian tribes; the administration
of public lands; and the granting of public benefits.  The Court’s opin-
ions governing this exception have not always spoken in precise terms.
But “even with respect to matters that arguably fall within the scope
of the ‘public rights’ doctrine, the presumption is in favor of Article III
courts.”  Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U. S. 50, 69, n. 23 (plurality opinion).  Pp. 13–18.

(2) In  Granfinanciera,  this Court  previously  considered  whether
the  Seventh  Amendment  guarantees  the  right  to  a  jury trial  “in  the
face of Congress’ decision to allow a non-Article III tribunal to adjudi-
cate” a statutory “fraud claim.”  492 U. S., at 37, 50.  There the issue
was whether Congress’s designation of fraudulent conveyance actions
as  “core  [bankruptcy]  proceedings”  authorized  non-Article  III  bank-
ruptcy judges to hear them without juries.  Id., at 50.  The Court held
that the designation was not permissible, even under the public rights
exception.  To  determine  whether  the  claim  implicated  the  Seventh
Amendment, the Court applied the principles distilled in Tull.  Sur-
veying English cases and considering the remedy these suits provided,
the  Court  concluded  that  fraudulent  conveyance  actions  were  “quin-
tessentially suits at common law.”  Granfinanciera, 492 U. S., at 56.
Because these actions were akin to “suits  at common law” and were
not “closely intertwined” with the bankruptcy process, the Court held
that the public rights exception did not apply, and a jury was required.
Id., at 54, 56.  Pp. 19–20.

(3) Granfinanciera effectively decides this case.  The action here
was brought under the “anti-fraud provisions” of the federal securities
laws and provide civil penalties that can “only be enforced in courts of
law.”  Tull, 481 U. S., at 422.  They target the same basic conduct as
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically discussing the application of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in cases involving securities fraud. It delves into the distinction between "public rights" and "private rights" in the context of federal jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

BROWN v. DAVENPORT

Opinion of the Court

AEDPA’s terms.  Instead, it usually represents “a decision
by the state supreme court not to hear the appeal—that is,
not  to  decide  at  all.”  Greene,  565  U. S.,  at  40;  cf.  Ylst  v.
Nunnemaker, 501 U. S. 797, 805–806 (1991) (“[T]he discre-
tionary denial of review on direct appeal by the California
Supreme Court is not even a ‘judgment’ ”).

In this respect, the Michigan Supreme Court follows a fa-
miliar practice.  “The denial of a writ of certiorari” in this
Court “imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of
the  case.”  United  States  v.  Carver,  260  U. S.  482,  490
(1923).  And  the  Michigan  Supreme  Court  has  long  de-
scribed its denials of applications for leave to appeal in the
same terms.  See, e.g., Malooly v. York Heating & Ventilat-
ing  Corp.,  270  Mich.  240,  246–247,  258  N. W.  622,  624
(1935); see also Mich. Ct. Rules 7.303(B)(1), 7.305(B)(1)–(3)
(2021).  In the past, too, this Court has treated lower Mich-
igan  court  decisions  as  the  relevant  AEDPA  adjudication
despite  discretionary  denials  of  review  by  the  State  Su-
preme Court.  Woods v. Donald, 575 U. S. 312, 314–315, 317
(2015) (per curiam); Burt v. Titlow, 571 U. S. 12, 20 (2013);
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 156, 161, 173 (2012).

Turning to the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals,
Mr. Davenport principally argues that it was contrary to or
an  unreasonable  application  of  this  Court’s  decision  in
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560 (1986).  But it is hard to
see how that could be the case.  For one thing, Holbrook was
a  decision  about  whether  a  constitutional  trial  error  oc-
curred at all, not whether the alleged error was prejudicial.
For another, Holbrook rejected the defendant’s claim that
he “was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial whe[n]
. . .  the  customary  courtroom  security  force  was  supple-
mented by four uniformed state troopers sitting in the first
row of the spectator’s section.”  Id., at 562.  Nothing in that
analysis is inconsistent with the Michigan Court of Appeals’
disposition of Mr. Davenport’s shackling claim.

Unable to make use of Holbrook’s holding, Mr. Davenport
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of precedent and the arguments made by the appellant. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

ALITO, J., dissenting

this is clear: The District Court ignored a factor of the ut-
most importance, the incentives of the doctors in question.
When the District Court made its assessment of the doc-
tors’ “good faith,” enforcement of Act 620 had been prelimi-
narily enjoined, and the doctors surely knew that enforce-
ment  would  be  permanently  barred  if  the  lawsuit  was
successful.  Thus,  the  doctors  had  everything  to  lose  and
nothing  to  gain  by  obtaining  privileges.7    Two  of  the  doc-
tors—Does 1 and 2—are petitioners and cross-respondents
in this Court.  Two others, Does 5 and 6, were plaintiffs ear-
lier  but  dropped  out  for  unexplained  reasons.  See  App.
1327.  And Doe 3, although not a plaintiff, is the medical
director of June Medical, a party to this case.  Id., at 186,
206, 245.

If these doctors had secured privileges, that would have
tended to defeat the lawsuit.  Not only that, acquiring priv-
ileges would have subjected all the doctors to the previously
described hospital monitoring, as well as any other obliga-
tions  that  a  hospital  imposed  on  doctors  with  privileges,
such as providing unpaid care for the indigent.  See infra,
at 21.  Thus, in light of the situation at the time when the
doctors made their attempts to get privileges, they had an
incentive to do as little as they thought the District Court
would demand, not as much as they would if they stood to
benefit from success.

——————

7 Petitioners maintain that an unsuccessful admitting privileges appli-
cation  is  a  “stain”  on  a  doctor’s  medical  record,  because  the  rejection
could  appear  in  a  federal  database  and  would  need  to  be  disclosed  on
future applications for admitting privileges.  Brief for Petitioners in No.
18–1323, p. 41, n. 7.  As the record in this case shows, there is reason to
doubt  that  the  prospect  of  rejection  provides  a  sufficient  incentive  for
doctors  to  pursue  privileges  vigorously.    See  infra,  at  15–23.    Perhaps
that  is  because  only  rejections  for  lack  of  “professional  competence  or
professional conduct” need to be disclosed to the relevant federal data-
base.  45 CFR §§60.12, 60.3 (2019).  Petitioners also have not explained
how a non-competence-based rejection would have any bearing on future
applications for privileges.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case June Medical Services LLC v. Russo. It delves into the motivations of doctors involved in the case and argues against the majority opinion's assessment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U79

[09-08-00 13:44:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

144

MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

That one small head could carry all he knew.”
O. Goldsmith, The Deserted Village, ll. 215–216, in The
Poetical Works of Oliver Goldsmith 30 (A. Dobson ed.
1949).
“There’s a Legion that never was ’listed,
That carries no colours or crest.”
R. Kipling, The Lost Legion, st. 1, in Rudyard Kipling’s
Verse, 1885–1918, p. 222 (1920).
“There is a homely adage which runs, ‘Speak softly and
carry a big stick; you will go far.’ ” T. Roosevelt,
Speech at Minnesota State Fair, Sept. 2, 1901, in J. Bart-
lett, Familiar Quotations 575:16 (J. Kaplan ed. 1992).6

These and the Court’s lexicological sources demonstrate viv-
idly that “carry” is a word commonly used to convey various
messages. Such references, given their variety, are not reli-
able indicators of what Congress meant, in § 924(c)(1), by
“carries a ﬁrearm.”

C

Noting the paradoxical statement, “ ‘I use a gun to protect
my house, but I’ve never had to use it,’ ” the Court in Bailey,
516 U. S., at 143, emphasized the importance of context—
the statutory context.
Just as “uses” was read to mean not
simply “possession,” but “active employment,” so “carries,”
correspondingly, is properly read to signal the most danger-

6 Popular ﬁlms and television productions provide corroborative illustra-
tions.
In “The Magniﬁcent Seven,” for example, O’Reilly (played by
Charles Bronson) says: “You think I am brave because I carry a gun; well,
your fathers are much braver because they carry responsibility, for you,
your brothers, your sisters, and your mothers.” See http://us.imdb.com/
M/search_quotes?for=carry. And in the television series “M*A*S*H,”
Hawkeye Pierce (played by Alan Alda) presciently proclaims: “I will not
carry a gun. . . . I’ll carry your books, I’ll carry a torch, I’ll carry a tune,
I’ll carry on, carry over, carry forward, Cary Grant, cash and carry, carry
me back to Old Virginia, I’ll even ‘hari-kari’ if you show me how, but
I will not carry a gun!” See http://www.geocities.com/Hollywood/8915/
mashquotes.html.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It includes quotations and analysis of the word "carry" in the context of a legal statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19A1016
_________________

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL. v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY

[April 6, 2020]

JUSTICE  GINSBURG,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER,
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
The  District  Court,  acting  in  view  of  the  dramatically
evolving  COVID–19  pandemic,  entered  a  preliminary  in-
junction to safeguard the availability of absentee voting in
Wisconsin’s spring election.  This Court now intervenes at
the  eleventh  hour  to  prevent  voters  who  have  timely  re-
quested absentee ballots from casting their votes.  I would
not disturb the District Court’s disposition, which the Sev-
enth Circuit allowed to stand.

I
A
Wisconsin’s  spring  election  is  scheduled  for  tomorrow,
Tuesday, April 7, 2020.  At issue are the presidential pri-
maries, a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, three seats
on  the  Wisconsin  Court  of  Appeals,  over  100  other  judge-
ships,  over  500  school  board  seats,  and  several  thousand
other positions.  Democratic National Committee v. Bostel-
mann, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, 2020 WL 1638374, *3 (WD
Wis., Apr. 2, 2020).

In  the  weeks  leading up  to  the  election,  the  COVID–19
pandemic has become a “public health crisis.”  Id., at ___,
2020 WL 1638374, *1.  As of April 2, Wisconsin had 1,550
confirmed cases of COVID–19 and 24 deaths attributable to
the  disease,  “with  evidence  of  increasing  community
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg.  It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxxii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
1077
Hall v. Calbone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027
Hall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1067
Hallie; DiMa Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079
Hallstead v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079
Hallsted v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012
Halye; Pennsylvania v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031
Hames v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1102
Hamilton v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026
Hamilton v. Stegall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029
Hamlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079
Hammond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034
Hampton v. Luebbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hanks; James v.
1042
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hanks; McKinney v.
1130
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hanover Ins. Co.; Davis v.
193
Harbert Construction Co.; Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . .
1114
Harding; Bitterman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1059
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hargett; Derden v.
1031
Harley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1038
Harmon; Kansas City v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074
Harrell v. Mitchem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1059
Harriman v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1016,1129
Harris, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074
Harris v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036,1084
Harris; Chandler v.
1083
Harris v. Cook County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091
Harris v. Florida Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053
Harris v. Jackson Road Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031,1044,1136
Harris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
576
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harris County; Christensen v.
1038
Harris County; Smith v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088
Harrison v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030,1044
Harrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1051
Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc.
. .
1125
Hart v. Elder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1073
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hartline v. Stewart
1043
Hartman v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1070
Hartsel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1043
Hashisaki v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078
Hatala v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1059
Haunani-Henry; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042
Hawkins v. Maine Bureau of Ins.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1022
Hawkins v. Texas Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1068
Hayden v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
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  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–50
_________________

JASCHA CHIAVERINI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. CITY OF NAPOLEON, OHIO, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2024]

JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  joins,  dis-

senting.

Jascha Chiaverini sued several city officials for damages
under 42 U. S. C. §1983.  He alleged that they violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a malicious
prosecution.  I continue to adhere to my belief that a “mali-
cious  prosecution  claim  cannot  be  based  on  the  Fourth
Amendment.”  Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. 357, 378 (2017)
(ALITO, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissenting).  Accordingly,
I would affirm the dismissal of Chiaverini’s claim.

To raise a successful claim under §1983, a plaintiff must
allege the deprivation of “rights, privileges, or immunities
secured” to him by the Constitution.  42 U. S. C. §1983.  “In
order  to  flesh  out  the  elements  of  th[e  alleged]  constitu-
tional tort,” the Court generally analogizes to common-law
torts.  Manuel, 580 U. S., at 378 (opinion of ALITO, J.); see
also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 483–484 (1994).  In
this  case,  Chiaverini  claims  that  he  was  seized  without
probable  cause  in  violation  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.
Chiaverini  principally  relies  on  this  Court’s  decision  in
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U. S. 36 (2022), to argue that the
appropriate tort analog for this claim is malicious prosecu-
tion.  In Thompson, the Court held that malicious prosecu-
tion,  a  tort  addressing  “the  wrongful  initiation  of  charges
without  probable  cause,”  is  most  analogous  to  a  Fourth
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual content of a legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

to  apply  Mandel’s  “narrow  standard  of  review”  and  “as
sume[s] that we may look behind the face of the Proclama
tion.”    Ante,  at  31–32.  In  doing  so,  however,  the  Court,
without  explanation  or  precedential  support,  limits  its
review  of  the  Proclamation  to  rational-basis  scrutiny.
Ibid.  That  approach  is  perplexing,  given  that  in  other
Establishment  Clause  cases,  including  those  involving
claims  of  religious  animus  or  discrimination,  this  Court
has applied a more stringent standard of review.  See, e.g.,
McCreary,  545  U. S.,  at  860–863;  Larson,  456  U. S.,  at
246; Presbyterian Church in U. S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull  Memorial  Presbyterian  Church,  393  U. S.  440,  449–
452  (1969);  see  also  Colorado  Christian  Univ.  v.  Weaver,
534 F. 3d 1245, 1266 (CA10 2008) (McConnell, J.) (noting
that,  under  Supreme  Court  precedent,  laws  “involving
discrimination  on  the  basis  of  religion,  including  interde
nominational  discrimination,  are  subject  to  heightened
scrutiny  whether  they  arise  under  the  Free  Exercise
Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Equal Protection
Clause”  (citations  omitted)).6    As  explained  above,  the

——————

6 The  majority  chides  as  “problematic”  the  importation  of  Establish
ment Clause jurisprudence “in the national security and foreign affairs
context.”    Ante,  at  32–33,  n. 5.    As  the  majority  sees  it,  this  Court’s
Establishment  Clause  precedents  do  not  apply  to  cases  involving
“immigration  policies,  diplomatic  sanctions,  and  military  actions.”
Ante,  at  32,  n. 5.    But  just  because  the  Court  has  not  confronted  the
precise situation at hand does not render these cases (or the principles
they  announced)  inapplicable.    Moreover,  the  majority’s  complaint
regarding  the  lack  of  direct  authority  is  a  puzzling  charge,  given  that
the majority itself fails to cite any “authority for its proposition” that a
more  probing  review  is  inappropriate  in  a  case  like  this  one,  where
United  States  citizens  allege  that  the  Executive  has  violated  the
Establishment Clause by issuing a sweeping executive order motivated
by animus.  Ante, at 33 n. 5; see supra, at 14,  and n. 5.  In any event,
even  if  there  is  no  prior  case  directly  on  point,  it  is  clear  from  our
precedent  that  “[w]hatever  power  the  United  States  Constitution
envisions  for  the  Executive”  in  the  context  of  national  security  and
foreign affairs, “it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedents and argues against the majority opinion's approach to reviewing the Proclamation.
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  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA

Opinion of the Court

Creek.  But, just as plainly, they left the Tribe with signifi-
cant sovereign functions over the lands in question.  For ex-
ample, the Creek Nation retained the power to collect taxes,
operate  schools,  legislate  through  tribal  ordinances,  and,
soon,  oversee  the  federally  mandated  allotment  process.
§§39, 40, 42, id., at 871–872; Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947,
949–950,  953–954  (CA8  1905).    And,  in  its  own  way,  the
congressional incursion on tribal legislative processes only
served  to  prove  the  power:  Congress  would  have  had  no
need  to  subject  tribal  legislation  to  Presidential  review  if
the Tribe lacked any authority to legislate.  Grave though
they  were,  these  congressional  intrusions  on  pre-existing
treaty rights fell short of eliminating all tribal interests in
the land.

Much  more  ominously,  the  1901  allotment  agreement
ended  by  announcing  that  the  Creek  tribal  government
“shall  not  continue”  past  1906,  although  the  agreement
quickly qualified that statement, adding the proviso “sub-
ject  to  such  further  legislation  as  Congress  may  deem
proper.”  §46, 31 Stat. 872.  Thus, while suggesting that the
tribal government might end in 1906, Congress also neces-
sarily  understood  it  had  not  ended  in  1901.    All  of  which
was  consistent  with  the  Legislature’s  general  practice  of
taking allotment as a first, not final, step toward disestab-
lishment and dissolution.

When  1906  finally  arrived,  Congress  adopted  the  Five
Civilized  Tribes  Act.  But  instead  of  dissolving  the  tribal
government  as  some  may  have  expected,  Congress
“deem[ed] proper” a different course, simply cutting away
further at the Tribe’s autonomy.  Congress empowered the
President to remove and replace the principal chief of the
Creek, prohibited the tribal council from meeting more than
30 days a year, and directed the Secretary of the Interior to
assume control of tribal schools.  §§6, 10, 28, 34 Stat. 139–
140,  148.  The  Act  also  provided  for  the  handling  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the history of the Creek Nation's sovereignty and the impact of various Congressional acts. It is sequential text and provides relevant information about the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

tively,  deeply  rooted  in  this  Nation’s  history  and  tradi-
tion,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that  neither  liberty  nor  justice  would  exist  if  they  were
sacrificed.”  Glucksberg,  521  U. S.,  at  720–721  (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Although  the  Court  articulated  the  importance  of  his-
tory and tradition to the fundamental rights inquiry most
 precisely in Glucksberg, many other cases both before and
after  have  adopted  the  same  approach.  See,  e.g.,  District
Attorney’s  Office  for  Third  Judicial  Dist.  v.  Osborne,  557
U. S. 52, 72 (2009); Flores, 507 U. S., at 303; United States
v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 751 (1987); Moore v. East Cleve-
land, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); see also
id.,  at  544  (White,  J.,  dissenting)  (“The  Judiciary,  includ-
ing  this  Court,  is  the  most  vulnerable  and  comes  nearest
to  illegitimacy  when  it  deals  with  judge-made  constitu-
tional  law  having  little  or  no  cognizable  roots  in  the  lan-
guage  or  even  the  design  of  the  Constitution.”);  Troxel  v.
Granville,  530  U. S.  57,  96–101  (2000)  (KENNEDY,  J.,
dissenting) (consulting “ ‘[o]ur Nation’s history, legal tradi-
tions,  and  practices’ ”  and  concluding  that  “[w]e  owe  it  to
the  Nation’s  domestic  relations  legal  structure  . . .  to
proceed  with  caution”  (quoting  Glucksberg,  521  U. S.,  at
721)).

Proper  reliance  on  history  and  tradition  of  course  re-
quires looking beyond the individual law being challenged,
so that every restriction on liberty does not supply its own
constitutional justification.  The Court is right about that.
Ante, at 18.  But given the few “guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking  in  this  unchartered  area,”  Collins,  503
U. S.,  at  125,  “an  approach  grounded  in  history  imposes
limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any
based on [an] abstract formula,” Moore, 431 U. S., at 504,
n. 12 (plurality opinion).  Expanding a right suddenly and
dramatically  is  likely  to  require  tearing  it  up  from  its
roots.  Even a sincere profession of “discipline” in identify-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges. It discusses the importance of history and tradition in determining fundamental rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL. v. KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT
INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 20–197.  Decided April 5, 2021

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.  The judg-
ment  is  vacated,  and  the  case  is  remanded  to  the  United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with instruc-
tions to dismiss the case as moot.  See United States v. Mun-
singwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
When a person publishes a message on the social media
platform Twitter, the platform by default enables others to
republish (retweet) the message or respond (reply) to it or
other  replies  in  a  designated  comment  thread.    The  user
who generates the original message can manually “block”
others from republishing or responding.

Donald  Trump,  then  President  of  the  United  States,
blocked several users from interacting with his Twitter ac-
count.  They sued.  The Second Circuit held that the com-
ment  threads  were  a  “public  forum”  and  that  then-Presi-
dent  Trump  violated  the  First  Amendment  by  using  his
control  of  the  Twitter  account  to  block  the  plaintiffs  from
accessing the comment threads.  Knight First Amdt. Inst. at
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F. 3d 226 (2019).  But Mr.
Trump,  it  turned  out,  had  only  limited  control  of  the  ac-
count; Twitter has permanently removed the account from
the platform.

Because of the change in Presidential administration, the
Court correctly vacates the Second Circuit’s decision.  See
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).  I
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas.  It includes case citations, the names of the parties involved, and a summary of the case's background.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1080

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 17, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8659. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 248.

No. 99–8661. Walker v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 326.

No. 99–8663. Remache v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 433.

No. 99–8666. Bryant et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 261.

No. 99–8676. Zepeda-Contreras v. United States. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1118.

No. 99–8677. Martinez-Ruiz v. United States. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1116.

No. 99–8682. Baisden v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 523.

No. 99–8685. Coleman v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8688. Atwell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 200 F. 3d 819.

No. 99–8691. Crosby v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 215 F. 3d 1322.

No. 99–8692. Chan v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–8697. Ruiz-Suarez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 280.

No. 99–8699. Soler v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 433.

No. 99–8702. Kellum v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 213 F. 3d 302.

No. 99–8704. Loughridge v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 255.

No. 99–8705.

Jennings v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1117.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names, circuit courts, and certiorari decisions. This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a legal document and is more like a table of contents or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
GORSUCH, J., concurring

and three others) argued that Title VI is coterminous with
the Equal Protection Clause.  Put differently, they read Ti-
tle  VI  to  prohibit  recipients  of  federal  funds  from  doing
whatever the Equal Protection Clause prohibits States from
doing.  Justice Powell and Justice Brennan then proceeded
to evaluate racial preferences in higher education directly
under the Equal Protection Clause.  From there, however,
their  paths  diverged.  Justice  Powell  thought  some  racial
preferences might be permissible but that the admissions
program at issue violated the promise of equal protection.
438 U. S., at 315–320.  Justice Brennan would have given a
wider  berth  to  racial  preferences  and  allowed  the  chal-
lenged program to proceed.  Id., at 355–379.

Justice  Stevens  (also writing  for  himself  and  three  oth-
ers)  took  an  altogether  different  approach.  He  began  by
noting the Court’s “settled practice” of “avoid[ing] the deci-
sion of a constitutional issue if a case can be fairly decided
on a statutory ground.”  Id., at 411.  He then turned to the
“broad prohibition” of Title VI, id., at 413, and summarized
his  views  this  way:  “The  University  . . .  excluded  Bakke
from participation in its program of medical education be-
cause of his race.  The University also acknowledges that it
was, and still is, receiving federal financial assistance.  The
plain language of the statute therefore requires” finding a
Title VI violation.  Id., at 412 (footnote omitted).

In the years following Bakke, this Court hewed to Justice
Powell’s  and  Justice  Brennan’s  shared  premise  that  Title
VI and the Equal Protection Clause mean the same thing.
See  Gratz  v.  Bollinger,  539  U. S.  244,  276,  n. 23  (2003);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 343 (2003).  Justice Ste-
vens’s  statute-focused  approach  receded  from  view.    As  a
result, for over four decades, every case about racial prefer-
ences in school admissions under Title VI has turned into a
case about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

And what a confused body of constitutional law followed.
For  years,  this  Court  has  said  that  the  Equal  Protection
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College*. It delves into the interpretation of Title VI and its relationship to the Equal Protection Clause in the context of racial preferences in higher education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 12–133
_________________

AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. ITALIAN COLORS RESTAURANT ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2013]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full.  I  write  separately  to
note  that  the  result  here  is  also  required  by  the  plain
meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act.  In AT&T Mobil-
ity  LLC  v.  Concepcion,  563  U. S.  ___  (2011),  I  explained
that “the FAA requires that an agreement to arbitrate be
enforced  unless  a  party  successfully  challenges  the  forma-
tion of the arbitration agreement, such as by proving fraud
or  duress.”
Id.,  at  ___  (concurring  opinion)  (slip  op.,
at 1–2).  In this case, Italian Colors makes two arguments
to  support  its  conclusion  that  the  arbitration  agreement
should  not  be  enforced.    First,  it  contends  that  enforcing
the  arbitration  agreement  “would  contravene  the  policies
of the antitrust laws.”  Ante, at 4.  Second, it contends that
a  court  may  “invalidate  agreements  that  prevent  the  ‘ef-
fective vindication’ of a federal statutory right.”  Ante, at 6.
Neither  argument  “concern[s]  whether  the  contract  was
properly  made,”  Concepcion,  supra,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,
concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  5–6).    Because  Italian  Colors
has  not  furnished  “grounds  . . .  for  the  revocation  of  any
contract,”  9  U. S. C.  §2,  the  arbitration  agreement  must
be enforced.  Italian Colors voluntarily entered into a con-
tract  containing  a  bilateral  arbitration  provision.    It  can-
not now escape its obligations merely because the claim it
wishes to bring might be economically infeasible.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of American Express Company v. Italian Colors Restaurant.  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the enforceability of an arbitration agreement.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

PAVAN v. SMITH

Per Curiam

times,  however,  the  Arkansas  Department  of  Health
issued certificates bearing only the birth mother’s name.

The  department’s  decision  rested  on  a  provision  of  Ar-
kansas  law,  Ark.  Code  §20–18–401  (2014),  that  specifies
which individuals will appear as parents on a child’s state-
issued  birth  certificate.    “For  the  purposes  of  birth  regis-
tration,” that statute says, “the mother is deemed to be the
woman who gives birth to the child.”  §20–18–401(e).  And
“[i]f the mother was married at the time of either concep-
tion or birth,” the statute instructs that “the name of [her]
husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of
the  child.”  §20–18–401(f)(1).  There  are  some  limited
exceptions  to  the  latter  rule—for  example,  another  man
may  appear  on  the  birth  certificate  if  the  “mother”  and
“husband” and “putative father” all file affidavits vouching
for the putative father’s paternity.  Ibid.  But as all parties
agree,  the  requirement  that  a  married  woman’s  husband
appear  on  her  child’s  birth  certificate  applies  in  cases
where  the  couple  conceived  by  means  of  artificial  insemi-
nation  with  the  help  of  an  anonymous  sperm  donor.    See
Pet.  for  Cert.  4;  Brief  in  Opposition  3–4;  see  also  Ark.
Code  §9–10–201(a)  (2015)  (“Any  child  born  to  a  married
woman  by  means  of  artificial  insemination  shall  be
deemed the legitimate natural child of the woman and the
woman’s  husband  if  the  husband  consents  in  writing  to
the artificial insemination”).

The Jacobses and Pavans brought this suit in Arkansas
state  court  against  the  director  of  the  Arkansas  Depart-
ment  of  Health—seeking,  among  other  things,  a  declara-
tion  that  the  State’s  birth-certificate  law  violates  the
Constitution.  The  trial  court  agreed,  holding  that  the
relevant  portions  of  §20–18–401  are  inconsistent  with
Obergefell  because  they  “categorically  prohibi[t]  every
same-sex  married  couple  . . .  from  enjoying  the  same
spousal benefits which are available to every opposite-sex
married couple.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a.  But a divided
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a birth certificate law in Arkansas and its potential conflict with Obergefell v. Hodges.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

13

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

mation of petitioners’ reading of §22(b)(1).

In sum, the text, structure, and legislative history of the
Vaccine  Act  are  fully  consistent  with  petitioners’  reading
of  §22(b)(1).    Accordingly,  I  believe  §22(b)(1)  exempts
vaccine  manufacturers  from  tort  liability  only  upon  a
showing by the manufacturer in each case that the vaccine
was properly manufactured and labeled, and that the side
effects stemming from the vaccine’s design could not have
been prevented by a feasible alternative design that would
have  eliminated  the  adverse  side  effects  without  compro-
mising the vaccine’s cost and utility.

II
In  contrast  to  the  interpretation  of  §22(b)(1)  set  forth
above, the majority’s interpretation does considerable vio-
lence  to  the  statutory  text,  misconstrues  the  legislative
history,  and  draws  the  wrong  conclusions  from  the  struc-
ture  of  the  Vaccine  Act  and  the  broader  federal  scheme
regulating vaccines.

A
As  a  textual  matter,  the  majority’s  interpretation  of
§22(b)(1)  is  fundamentally  flawed  in  three  central  re-
spects.  First, the majority’s categorical reading rests on a
faulty  and  untenable  premise.    Second,  its  reading  func-
tionally excises 13 words from the statutory text, including
the  key  term  “unavoidable.”  And  third,  the  majority  en-
tirely  ignores  the  Vaccine  Act’s  default  rule  preserving
state tort law.

To  begin,  the  majority  states  that  “[a]  side  effect  of  a
vaccine  could  always  have  been  avoidable  by  use  of  a
differently  designed  vaccine  not  containing  the  harmful
element.”  Ante,  at  7.  From  that  premise,  the  majority
concludes  that  the  statute  must  mean  that  “the  design  of
the  vaccine  is  a  given,  not  subject  to  question  in  the  tort
action,”  because  construing  the  statute  otherwise  would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case, specifically focusing on the interpretation of a section of the Vaccine Act. It delves into legal arguments, textual analysis, and legislative history, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$82Z 02-22-99 22:42:40 PAGES OPINPGT

184

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

BRYAN v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit

No. 96–8422. Argued March 31, 1998—Decided June 15, 1998

The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act (FOPA) added 18 U. S. C. § 924(a)
(1)(D) to the Criminal Code to prohibit anyone from “willfully” violating,
inter alia, § 922(a)(1)(A), which forbids dealing in ﬁrearms without a
federal license. The evidence at petitioner’s unlicensed dealing trial
was adequate to prove that he was dealing in ﬁrearms and that he knew
his conduct was unlawful, but there was no evidence that he was aware
of the federal licensing requirement. The trial judge refused to in-
struct the jury that he could be convicted only if he knew of the federal
licensing requirement, instructing, instead, that a person acts “willfully”
if he acts with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, but that
he need not be aware of the speciﬁc law that his conduct may be vio-
lating. The jury found petitioner guilty. The Second Circuit afﬁrmed,
concluding that the instructions were proper and that the Government
had elicited “ample proof ” that petitioner had acted willfully.

Held: The term “willfully” in § 924(a)(1)(D) requires proof only that the
defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, not that he also knew of the
federal licensing requirement. Pp. 191–200.

(a) When used in the criminal context, a “willful” act is generally one
undertaken with a “bad purpose.” See, e. g., Heikkinen v. United
States, 355 U. S. 273, 279.
In other words, to establish a “willful” vio-
lation of a statute, the Government must prove that the defendant
acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful. Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U. S. 135, 137. The Court rejects petitioner’s argument
that, for two principal reasons, a more particularized showing is re-
quired here. His ﬁrst contention—that the “knowingly” requirement
in §§ 924(a)(1)(A)–(C) for three categories of acts made unlawful by
§ 922 demonstrates that the Government must prove knowledge of
the law—is not persuasive because “knowingly” refers to knowledge
of the facts constituting the offense, as distinguished from knowledge
of the law, see, e. g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U. S. 394, 408. With
respect to the three § 924 “knowingly” categories, the background pre-
sumption that every citizen knows the law makes it unnecessary to
adduce speciﬁc evidence to prove an evil-meaning mind. As regards
the “willfully” category here at issue, however, the jury must ﬁnd that
the defendant acted with such a mind, i. e., with knowledge that his
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court decision. It includes case name, citation, and a brief overview of the legal issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Syllabus

granted respondents’ motion to dismiss on the ground that the claim
was foreclosed by Abood.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Held:

1. The  District  Court  had  jurisdiction  over  petitioner’s  suit.    Peti-
tioner was undisputedly injured in fact by Illinois’ agency-fee scheme
and  his injuries can  be redressed  by a favorable court decision.  For
jurisdictional  purposes,  the  court  permissibly  treated  his  amended
complaint  in  intervention  as  the  operative  complaint  in  a  new  law-
suit.  United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233
U. S. 157, distinguished.  Pp. 6–7.

2. The State’s extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-
sector employees violates the First Amendment.  Abood erred in con-
cluding  otherwise,  and  stare  decisis  cannot  support  it.    Abood  is
therefore overruled.  Pp. 7–47.
is

inconsistent  with  standard  First

(a) Abood’s  holding
Amendment principles.  Pp. 7–18.

(1) Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they
find  objectionable  raises  serious  First  Amendment  concerns.    E.g.,
West  Virginia  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Barnette,  319  U. S.  624,  633.    That  in-
cludes  compelling  a  person  to  subsidize  the  speech  of  other  private
speakers.  E.g.,  Knox  v.  Service  Employees,  567  U. S.  298,  309.    In
Knox and Harris v. Quinn, 573 U. S. ___, the Court applied an “exact-
ing” scrutiny standard in judging the constitutionality of agency fees
rather  than  the  more  traditional  strict  scrutiny.    Even  under  the
more permissive standard, Illinois’ scheme cannot survive.  Pp. 7–11.
(2) Neither of Abood’s two justifications for agency fees passes mus-
ter under this standard.  First, agency fees cannot be  upheld on the
ground  that  they  promote  an  interest  in  “labor  peace.”    The  Abood
Court’s fears of conflict and disruption if employees were represented
by more than one union have proved to be unfounded: Exclusive rep-
resentation of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of agency
fees are not inextricably linked.  To the contrary, in the Federal Gov-
ernment  and  the  28  States  with  laws  prohibiting  agency  fees,  mil-
lions  of  public  employees  are  represented  by  unions  that  effectively
serve as the exclusive representatives of all the employees.  Whatever
may have been the case 41  years ago when Abood was decided, it is
thus  now  undeniable  that  “labor  peace”  can  readily  be  achieved
through less restrictive means than the assessment of agency fees.

Second, avoiding “the risk of ‘free riders,’ ” Abood, supra, at 224, is
not a compelling state interest.  Free-rider “arguments . . . are gener-
ally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections,” Knox, su-
pra,  at  311,  and  the  statutory  requirement  that  unions  represent
members and nonmembers alike does not justify different treatment.
As is evident in non-agency-fee jurisdictions, unions are quite willing
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus and the beginning of the opinion for the Supreme Court case Janus v. AFSCME.  It is sequential text and contains the legal reasoning and arguments of the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S., AKA HALKBANK v.
UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 21–1450.  Argued January 17, 2023—Decided April 19, 2023

The United States indicted Halkbank, a bank owned by the Republic of
Turkey, for conspiring to evade U. S. economic sanctions against Iran.
Halkbank moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that as an
instrumentality of a foreign state, Halkbank is immune from criminal
prosecution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.  The
District Court denied the motion.  The Second Circuit affirmed after
first  determining  that  the  District  Court  had  subject  matter
jurisdiction  over  Halkbank’s  criminal  prosecution  under  18  U. S. C.
§3231.  The Second Circuit further held that even assuming the FSIA
confers  immunity  in  criminal  proceedings,  Halkbank’s  charged
conduct fell within the FSIA’s exception for commercial activities.

Held:

1. The District Court has jurisdiction under §3231 over this criminal
prosecution of Halkbank.  Section 3231 grants district courts original
jurisdiction of “all offenses against the laws of the United States,” and
Halkbank does not dispute that §3231’s text as written encompasses
the  charged  offenses.    Halkbank  instead  argues  that  because  §3231
does  not  mention  foreign  states  or  their  instrumentalities,  §3231
implicitly excludes them.  The Court declines to graft such an atextual
limitation  onto  §3231’s  broad  jurisdictional  grant.    The  scattered
express references to foreign states and instrumentalities in unrelated
U. S.  Code  provisions  to  which  Halkbank  points  do  not  shrink  the
textual  scope of  §3231.    And  the  Court’s precedents  interpreting  the
Judiciary Act of 1789 do not support Halkbank, as the Court has not
interpreted the jurisdictional provisions in the 1789 Act to contain an
implicit exclusion for foreign state entities.  Pp. 3–5.

2. The FSIA’s comprehensive scheme governing claims of immunity
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion.  Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

17

Opinion of the Court

satisfied  in  Plata  by  approval  of  a  consent  decree  and
stipulated injunction in 2002.  Both orders were intended
to  remedy  the  constitutional  violations.    Both  were  given
ample  time  to  succeed.  When  the  three-judge  court  was
convened,  12  years  had  passed  since  the  appointment  of
the Coleman Special Master, and 5 years had passed since
the  approval  of  the Plata  consent  decree.  The  State  does
not  claim  that  either  order  achieved  a  remedy.  Although
the  PLRA  entitles  a  State  to  terminate  remedial  orders
such  as  these  after  two  years  unless  the  district  court
finds  that  the  relief  “remains  necessary  to  correct  a
current  and  ongoing  violation  of  the  Federal  right,”
§3626(b)(3),  California  has  not  attempted  to  obtain  relief
on this basis.

The State  claims instead that  the second condition, the
reasonable time requirement of §3626(a)(3)(A)(ii), was not
met because other, later remedial efforts should have been
given more time to succeed.  In 2006, the Coleman District
Judge  approved  a  revised  plan  of  action  calling  for  con-
struction  of  new  facilities,  hiring  of  new  staff,  and  im-
plementation  of  new  procedures.    That  same  year,  the
Plata District Judge selected and appointed a Receiver to
oversee  the  State’s  ongoing  remedial  efforts.    When  the
three-judge  court  was  convened,  the  Receiver  had  filed  a
preliminary  plan  of  action  calling  for  new  construction,
hiring of additional staff, and other procedural reforms.

Although both the revised plan of action in Coleman and
the appointment of the Receiver in Plata were new devel-
opments  in  the  courts’  remedial  efforts,  the  basic  plan  to
solve  the  crisis  through  construction,  hiring,  and  proce-
dural  reforms  remained  unchanged.    These  efforts  had
been ongoing for years; the failed consent decree in  Plata
had  called  for  implementation  of  new  procedures  and
hiring of additional staff; and the Coleman Special Master
had  issued over  70  orders  directed  at  achieving  a  remedy
through construction, hiring, and procedural reforms.  The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Plata case and the State of California's efforts to remedy constitutional violations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PEREZ, SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL. v. MORTGAGE
BANKERS ASSOCIATION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 13–1041.  Argued December 1, 2014—Decided March 9, 2015*

The  Administrative  Procedure  Act  (APA)  establishes  the  procedures
federal administrative agencies use for “rule making,” defined as the
process  of  “formulating,  amending,  or  repealing  a  rule.”    5  U. S. C.
§551(5).  The APA distinguishes between two types of rules: So-called
“legislative  rules”  are  issued  through  notice-and-comment  rulemak-
ing, see §§553(b), (c), and have the “force and effect of law,” Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 302–303.  “Interpretive rules,” by con-
trast, are “issued . . . to advise the public of the agency’s construction
of the statutes and rules which it administers,” Shalala v. Guernsey
Memorial  Hospital,  514  U. S.  87,  99,  do  not  require  notice-and-
comment  rulemaking,  and  “do  not  have  the  force  and  effect  of  law,”
ibid.

In 1999 and 2001, the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Divi-
sion issued letters opining that mortgage-loan officers do not qualify
for the administrative exemption to overtime pay requirements under
the  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act  of  1938.    In  2004,  the  Department  is-
sued  new  regulations  regarding  the  exemption.    Respondent  Mort-
gage  Bankers  Association  (MBA)  requested  a  new  interpretation  of
the revised regulations as they applied to mortgage-loan officers, and
in 2006, the Wage and Hour Division issued an opinion letter finding
that  mortgage-loan  officers  fell  within  the  administrative  exemption
under  the  2004  regulations.    In  2010,  the  Department  again  altered
its interpretation of the administrative exemption.  Without notice or
an  opportunity  for  comment,  the  Department  withdrew  the  2006

——————

* Together  with  No.  13–1052,  Nickols  et  al.  v.  Mortgage Bankers  As-

sociation, also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1095

558 U. S.

December 14, 2009

No.  09–6966.  Israel  v.  Ridley-Turner  et  al.  Ct.  App.

Ind.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  906  N.  E.  2d  283.

No.  09–6967.  Haynes  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6970.  Garcia  v.  Felker,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6972.  Hollis  v.  Runnels,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6973.  Hutchins  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6974.  Harris  v.  City  of  Culver  City,  California,

et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d  App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6975.  Freeman  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
324  Fed.  Appx.  446.

No.  09–6976.  Debose  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6987.  Bundrant  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6988.  Bundrant  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6991.  Mejia v.  Adams, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6995.  Riggins  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6997.  Mays  v.  Dinwiddie,  Warden.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  580  F.  3d  1136.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, court names, and decisions. This type of information is not typically considered suitable for indexing as it's not the main body of text from a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
x

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1126

Allison v. Ryan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

Allison; Sharkozy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Allmond v. Akal Security, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Allstate Ins. Co.; Covalt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
846

Almager; Jackson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137

Almeyda v. Travis
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

Almond v. Pollard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927

Almonte v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Al-Nashiri v. Gates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alphapharm Pty., Ltd. v. Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd.  . . . . .
821

Alpine, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,814,989,1022,1023,1045,1090,1109

Alston v. Court of Appeals of Wis., District I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  987,1114

Alticor, Inc.; Nitro Distributing, Inc. v.
1077

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Al Uzayti v. Gates
87

Alvarez v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1017

Alvarez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044

Alvarez-Ocanegra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
882

Alvaro F. v. Connecticut  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991

Amarr Co.; Wayne-Dalton Corp. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Amason v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

Ambraco, Inc. v. M/V Clipper Faith  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ambrose v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
883

897

Amelo-Rodriguez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Amerada Hess Corp.; Torres v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  808,1028

American Airlines, Inc.; De George v.
1137

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
American Arbitration Assn.; Conner v.
834

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042

American Civil Liberties Union; Department of Defense v.  . . . . .
1023

American  Civil  Liberties  Union  of  Fla.  v.  Miami-Dade  School  Bd.
879

American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Vilsack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

American Express Business Finance Corp.; Anapoell v.  . . . . . . . .
1013

American Express Co.; Every Penny Counts, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . .
937

American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mondry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

American  Grading  Co.;  Illinois  Investment  Trust  No.  92–7163  v.
996

American Inst. for Research in Behavioral Sciences; Brown v.
. .
991

American Ins. Co. v. AstenJohnson, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League  . . . . . . . . . . .
American  Society  for  Prevention  of  Cruelty  to  Animals;  Kiley  v.
934

Ameritech Advanced Data Services; Torain v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  968,1093

991

Amorrortu v. Republic of Peru  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099

Amponsah v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Amreya v. United States
877

Anapoell v. American Express Business Finance Corp.  . . . . . . . .
832

Anderson v. Cunningham  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969

Anderson v. Iowa City Development Bd.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 100 (2009)

119

Opinion of Thomas, J.

are better left to the “collective experience of bench and bar”
and  the  “opportunity  for  full  airing”  that  rulemaking  pro
vides.  Ante,  at  114.  This  determination  is  entitled  to  our
full  respect,  in  deed  as  well  as  in  word.  Accordingly,
I  would  leave  the  value  judgments  the  Court  makes  in  its
opinion to the rulemaking process, and in so doing take this
opportunity  to  limit—effectively,  predictably,  and  in  a  way
we  should  have  done  long  ago—the  doctrine  that,  with  a
sweep  of  the  Court’s  pen,  subordinated  what  the  appellate
jurisdiction  statute  says  to  what  the  Court  thinks  is  a  good
idea.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal jargon and references to prior rulings, making it unsuitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>