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Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–965
_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. HAWAII, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2018]

CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the

Court.

Under  the  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act,  foreign
nationals  seeking  entry  into  the  United  States  undergo  a
vetting  process  to  ensure  that  they  satisfy  the  numerous
requirements for admission.  The Act also vests the Presi-
dent  with  authority  to  restrict  the  entry  of  aliens  when-
ever he finds that their entry “would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States.”  8 U. S. C. §1182(f).  Rely-
ing on that delegation, the President concluded that it was
necessary  to  impose  entry  restrictions  on  nationals  of
countries  that  do  not  share  adequate  information  for  an
informed  entry  determination,  or  that  otherwise  present
national  security  risks.    Presidential  Proclamation  No.
9645,  82  Fed.  Reg.  45161  (2017)  (Proclamation).    The
plaintiffs  in  this  litigation,  respondents  here,  challenged
the application of those entry restrictions to certain aliens
abroad.  We now decide whether the President had author-
ity  under  the  Act  to  issue  the  Proclamation, and  whether
the  entry  policy  violates  the  Establishment  Clause  of  the
First Amendment.
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Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

21

Opinion of the Court

those  regulating  employment  and  housing.    For  example,
we think it inappropriate to read §2 to impose a strict “ne-
cessity  requirement”  that  would  force  States  to  demon-
strate  that  their  legitimate  interests  can  be  accomplished
only by means of the voting regulations in question.  Steph-
anopoulos, Disparate  Impact,  Unified  Law,  128  Yale  L. J.
1566,  1617–1619  (2019)  (advocating  such  a  requirement).
Demanding such a tight fit would have the effect of invali-
dating  a  great  many  neutral  voting  regulations  with  long
pedigrees that are reasonable means of pursuing legitimate
interests.  It would also transfer much of the authority to
regulate election procedures from the States to the federal
courts.  For those reasons, the Title VII and Fair Housing
Act models are unhelpful in §2 cases.

D
  The  interpretation  set  out  above  follows  directly  from
what §2 commands: consideration of “the totality of circum-
stances” that have a bearing on whether a State makes vot-
ing “equally open” to all and gives everyone an equal “op-
portunity” to vote.  The dissent, by contrast, would rewrite
the text of §2 and make it turn almost entirely on just one
circumstance—disparate impact.
  That is a radical project, and the dissent strains mightily
to obscure its objective.  To that end, it spends 20 pages dis-
cussing  matters  that  have  little  bearing  on  the  questions
before us.  The dissent provides historical background that
all Americans should remember, see post, at 3–7 (opinion of
KAGAN, J.), but that background does not tell us how to de-
cide these cases.  The dissent quarrels with the decision in
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U. S. 529 (2013), see post, at
7–9, which concerned §§4 and 5 of the VRA, not §2.  It dis-
cusses  all  sorts  of  voting  rules  that  are  not  at  issue  here.
See post, at 9–12.  And it dwells on points of law that nobody
disputes: that §2 applies to a broad range of voting rules,
practices,  and  procedures;  that  an  “abridgement”  of  the
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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156

SMITH  v.  SPISAK

Opinion of Stevens, J.

standard in case involving a state court’s summary denial of
a  claim,  though  not  a  Strickland  claim,  and  without  full
brieﬁng  regarding  whether  or  how  § 2254(d)  applied  to  a
summary decision); Chadwick v.  Janecka, 312 F. 3d 597, 605–
606  (CA3  2002)  (Alito,  J.)  (relying  on  Weeks  in  holding  that
§ 2254(d)  applies  where  a  state  court  denies  a  claim  on  the
merits without giving any indication how it reached its deci
sion); see generally 2 R. Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas
Corpus  Practice  and  Procedure  § 32.2,  pp.  1574–1579  (5th
ed.  2005  and  2008  Supp.).  However,  we  need  not  decide
whether deference under § 2254(d)(1) is required here.  With
or without such deference, our conclusion is the same.

For  these  reasons,  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice  Stevens,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in

the judgment.

In my judgment the Court of Appeals correctly concluded
that  two  errors  that  occurred  during  Spisak’s  trial  violated
clearly  established  federal  law.  First,  the  jury  instructions
impermissibly  required  that  the  jury  unanimously  reject  a
death  sentence  before  considering  other  sentencing  options.
Second,  the  closing  argument  of  Spisak’s  counsel  was  so
egregious  that  it  was  constitutionally  deﬁcient  under  any
standard.  Nevertheless,  for  the  reasons  set  forth  in  Part
III of the Court’s opinion, ante, at 151–155, I agree that these
errors  did  not  prejudice  Spisak  and  thus  he  is  not  entitled
to relief.

I

The jury instructions given during Spisak’s penalty phase,
described in  the Court’s  opinion, ante,  at 146–148,  are fairly
read  to  require  the  jury  ﬁrst  to  consider  whether  the  death
penalty is  warranted—i. e., whether the  aggravating factors
outweigh  the  mitigating  factors—before  moving  on  to  con
sider whether instead a lesser penalty—i. e., one of two avail
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens in the case of Smith v. Spisak.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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18

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

JACKSON, J., dissenting

  For example, one does not know from today’s determina-
tion whether  a  noncitizen  must  actually  complete the  un-
derlying  offense  of  coming  to,  entering,  or  residing  in  the
United States (à la aiding and abetting) or whether comple-
tion is not a prerequisite for prosecution (à la solicitation).
This sort of uncertainty—the clarification of which, by the
way,  should  be  Congress’s  policy  prerogative—may  itself
dissuade people from engaging in protected speech.8  Thus,
regardless  of whether  a  potential speaker  has the  ability,
means, and time to track down and interpret this decision
(or hire a lawyer to do so) to understand what the law re-
quires, the known unknowns of the majority’s course por-
tend further chill.

B
  The  majority  attempts  to  downplay  the  encouragement
provision’s  threat  to  free  expression  by  highlighting  that
Hansen “fails to identify a single prosecution for ostensibly
protected expression in the 70 years since Congress enacted
clause (iv)’s immediate predecessor.”  Ante, at 17–18.  But
the purported lack of past prosecutions provides no comfort
for several reasons.
  The  first  is  that  we  have  already  said  as  much—this
Court  squarely  rejected  that  kind  of  argument  when  the
Government raised it in a prior overbreadth challenge.  In
Stevens,  the  Government  vigorously  asserted  that  it  had
never  brought  a  prosecution  implicating  the  kind  of  pro-
tected expression that the plain text of the statute in ques-
tion swept in, and that it did not intend to do so.  559 U. S.,
at 480.  The Government “hi[t] this theme hard, invoking
——————

8 The Government also struggled at oral argument before this Court to
articulate what scenarios the statute would (and would not) reach under
its theory.  But it notably represented that it did not believe it could val-
idly prosecute a son who reassures his noncitizen mother (who lives un-
lawfully in the United States with him and his family) that she is not a
burden  on  them  and  that  his  children  love  having  their  grandmother
around.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35.
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

OHIO ET AL. v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 16–1454.  Argued February 26, 2018—Decided June 25, 2018

Respondent  credit-card  companies  American  Express  Company  and
American  Express  Travel  Related  Services  Company  (collectively,
Amex) operate what economists call a “two-sided platform,” providing
services to two different groups (cardholders and merchants) who de-
pend on the platform to intermediate between them.  Because the in-
teraction  between  the  two  groups  is  a  transaction,  credit-card  net-
works  are  a  special  type  of  two-sided  platform  known  as  a
“transaction”  platform.    The  key  feature  of  transaction  platforms  is
that they cannot make a sale to one side of the platform without sim-
ultaneously making a sale to the other.  Unlike traditional markets,
two-sided  platforms  exhibit  “indirect  network  effects,”  which  exist
where  the  value  of  the  platform  to  one  group  depends  on  how  many
members  of  another  group  participate.    Two-sided  platforms  must
take these effects into account before making a change in price on ei-
ther side, or they risk creating a feedback loop of declining demand.
Thus, striking the optimal balance of the prices charged on each side
of  the  platform  is  essential  for  two-sided  platforms  to  maximize  the
value of their services and to compete with their rivals.

Visa and MasterCard—two  of the major players in the credit-card
market—have  significant  structural  advantages  over  Amex.    Amex
competes  with  them  by  using  a  different  business  model,  which  fo-
cuses on cardholder spending rather than cardholder lending.  To en-
courage cardholder spending, Amex provides better rewards than the
other  credit-card  companies.    Amex  must  continually  invest  in  its
cardholder rewards program to maintain its cardholders’ loyalty.  But
to fund those investments, it must charge merchants higher fees than
its rivals.   Although this business model  has stimulated competitive
innovations  in  the  credit-card  market,  it  sometimes  causes  friction
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
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<suitable>
  <content>
14  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

Roe’s and Casey’s different treatment of early and late abor-
tions.  Better, then, to move forward in time.  On the other
side  of  1868,  the  majority  occasionally  notes  that  many
States barred abortion up to the time of Roe.  See ante, at
24, 36.  That is convenient for the majority, but it is window
dressing.  As the same majority (plus one) just informed us,
“post-ratification adoption or acceptance of laws that are in-
consistent  with  the  original  meaning  of  the  constitutional
text  obviously  cannot  overcome  or  alter  that  text.”  New
York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc., 597 U. S., at ___–___
(slip op., at 27–28).  Had the pre-Roe liberalization of abor-
tion  laws  occurred  more  quickly  and  more  widely  in  the
20th century, the majority would say (once again) that only
the ratifiers’ views are germane.

The majority’s core legal postulate, then, is that we in the
21st century must read the Fourteenth Amendment just as
its ratifiers did.  And that is indeed what the majority em-
phasizes over and over again.  See ante, at 47 (“[T]he most
important historical fact [is] how the States regulated abor-
tion when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted”); see
also ante, at 5, 16, and n. 24, 23, 25, 28.  If the ratifiers did
not understand something as central to freedom, then nei-
ther can we.  Or said more particularly: If those people did
not understand reproductive rights as part of the guarantee
of  liberty  conferred  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  then
those rights do not exist.

As an initial matter, note a mistake in the just preceding
sentence.  We referred there to the “people” who ratified the
Fourteenth  Amendment:  What  rights  did  those  “people”
have in their heads at the time?  But, of course, “people” did
not ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.  Men did.  So it is
perhaps  not  so  surprising  that  the  ratifiers  were  not  per-
fectly attuned to the importance of reproductive rights for
women’s liberty, or for their capacity to participate as equal
members of our Nation.  Indeed, the ratifiers—both in 1868
and when the original Constitution was approved in 1788—
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It delves into the historical context and legal arguments surrounding abortion rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v.
CITY OF NEW YORK
ALITO, J., dissenting

licenses, ibid., does not suggest that the City regards viola-
tions as presenting a particularly significant threat to pub-
lic safety.

When  all  that  is  irrelevant  is  brushed  aside,  what  re-
mains are the three arguments noted earlier.  First, Inspector
Lunetta asserted that the travel restrictions discouraged li-
censees from taking their guns outside the home, but this
is a strange argument for several reasons.  It would make
sense only if it is less convenient or more expensive to prac-
tice at a range in the City, but that contradicts the City’s
argument that the seven ranges in the City provide ample
opportunity for practice.  And discouraging trips to a range
contradicts  the  City’s  own  rule  recommending  that  licen-
sees practice.  Once it is recognized that a reasonable op-
portunity to practice is part of the very right recognized in
Heller, what this justification amounts to is a repudiation
of part of what we held in that decision.

Second, Inspector Lunetta claimed that prohibiting trips
to out-of-city ranges helps prevent a person who is taking a
gun to a range from using it in a fit of rage after an auto
accident  or  some  other  altercation  that  occurs  along  the
way.  And to bolster this argument, Inspector Lunetta as-
serted that persons who have met the City’s demanding re-
quirements  for  obtaining  a  premises  license  are  just  as
likely as anyone else to use their guns in a fit of rage.  App.
77.  If that is so, it does not reflect well on the City’s inten-
sive vetting scheme, see supra, at 4–6, and in any event, the
assertion is dubious on its face.

More to the point, this argument does not explain why a
person  headed  for  a  range  outside  the  City  is  any  more
likely to engage in such conduct than a person whose desti-
nation is a range in the City.  There might be something to
the argument if ranges in the City were closer than those
just  outside  its  borders,  but  the  City  never  attempted  to
show that.  The courts below were incurious about the va-
  </content>
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This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–1059
_________________

BRIDGET ANNE KELLY, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[May 7, 2020]

 JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
For four days in September 2013, traffic ground to a halt
in Fort Lee, New Jersey.  The cause was an unannounced
realignment of 12 toll lanes leading to the George Washing-
ton Bridge, an entryway into Manhattan administered by
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.  For dec-
ades, three of those access lanes had been reserved during
morning rush hour for commuters coming from the streets
of  Fort  Lee.    But  on  these  four  days—with  predictable
consequences—only a single lane was set aside.  The public
officials who ordered that change claimed they were reduc-
ing the number of dedicated lanes to conduct a traffic study.
In  fact,  they  did  so  for  a  political  reason—to  punish  the
mayor of Fort Lee for refusing to support the New Jersey
Governor’s reelection bid.

Exposure of their behavior led to the criminal convictions
we review here.  The Government charged the responsible
officials  under  the  federal  statutes  prohibiting  wire  fraud
and fraud on a federally funded program or entity.  See 18
U. S. C. §§1343, 666(a)(1)(A).  Both those laws target fraud-
ulent schemes for obtaining property.  See §1343 (barring
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, the date, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
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  <content>
2

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

THOMAS, J., concurring

nonreligion.  As this Court stated in its first case applying
the  Establishment  Clause  to  the  States,  the  government
cannot “pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or  prefer  one  religion  over  another.”    Everson  v.  Board  of
Ed.  of  Ewing,  330  U. S.  1,  15  (1947);  see  also  post,  at  3
(BREYER, J., dissenting).  This “equality principle,” the the-
ory  goes,  prohibits  the  government  from  expressing  any
preference for religion—or even permitting any signs of re-
ligion  in  the  governmental  realm.    Thus,  when  a  plaintiff
brings a free exercise claim, the government may defend its
law, as Montana did here, on the ground that the law’s re-
strictions are required to prevent it from “establishing” re-
ligion.

This  understanding  of  the  Establishment  Clause  is  un-
moored from the original meaning of the First Amendment.
As I have explained in previous cases, at the founding, the
Clause  served  only  to  “protec[t]  States,  and  by  extension
their citizens, from the imposition of an established religion
by the Federal Government.”  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U. S. 639, 678 (2002) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (empha-
sis added); see also, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572
U. S. 565, 604–607 (2014) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part
and  concurring  in  judgment);  Elk  Grove  Unified  School
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 49–50 (2004) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring in judgment).  Under this view, the Clause resists
incorporation against the States.  See Town of Greece, 572
U. S., at 604 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).

There  is  mixed  historical  evidence  concerning  whether
the Establishment Clause was understood as an individual
right at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifica-
tion.  Id., at 607–608.  Even assuming that the Clause cre-
ates  a  right  and  that  such  a  right  could  be  incorporated,
however, it would only protect against an “establishment”
of religion as understood at the founding, i.e., “ ‘coercion of
religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law
and threat of penalty.’ ”  Id., at 608 (quoting Lee v. Weisman,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of *Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue*.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain factual information and legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
32

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

Opinion of BREYER, J.

found by the District Court.  The figures in parentheses in-
dicate the approximate number of abortions each physician
performed annually, according to the District Court.

Figure 1 — Distribution of Abortion Clinics and Providers
at the Time of the District Court’s Decision
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a court opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a figure caption.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GONZALES v. O CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE
UNIAO DO VEGETAL
Syllabus

mescaline  in  peyote,  another  Schedule  I  substance,  both  the  Execu-
tive  and  Congress  have  decreed  an  exception  from  the  Controlled
Substances  Act  for  Native  American  religious  use  of  peyote,  see  21
CFR  §1307.31;  42  U. S. C.  §1996a(b)(1).    If  such  use  is  permitted  in
the  face  of  the  general  congressional  findings  for  hundreds  of  thou-
sands of Native Americans practicing their faith, those same findings
alone cannot preclude consideration of a similar exception for the 130
or  so  American  members  of  the  UDV  who  want  to  practice  theirs.
See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 547.
The  Government’s  argument  that  the  existence  of  a  congressional  ex-
emption for peyote does not indicate that the Controlled Substances Act
is amenable to judicially crafted exceptions fails because RFRA plainly
contemplates court-recognized exceptions, see §2000bb–1(c).  Pp. 11–13.
(c) The  peyote  exception  also  fatally  undermines  the  Govern-
ment’s broader contention that the Controlled Substances Act estab-
lishes a closed regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under
RFRA.  The  peyote  exception  has  been  in  place  since  the  Controlled
Substances Act’s outset, and there is no evidence that it has undercut
the  Government’s  ability  to  enforce  the  ban  on  peyote  use  by  non-
Indians.    The  Government’s  reliance  on  pre-Smith  cases  asserting  a
need for uniformity in rejecting claims for religious exemptions under
the Free Exercise Clause is unavailing.  Those cases did not embrace
the notion that a general interest in uniformity justified a substantial
burden  on  religious  exercise,  but  instead  scrutinized  the  asserted
need  and  explained  why  the  denied  exemptions  could  not  be  accom-
modated.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Lee,  455  U. S.  252,  258,  260.
They show that the Government can demonstrate a compelling inter-
est  in  uniform  application  of  a  particular  program  by  offering  evi-
dence  that  granting  the  requested  religious  accommodations  would
seriously compromise its ability to administer the program.  Here the
Government’s uniformity argument rests not so much on the particu-
lar  statutory  program  at  issue  as  on  slippery  slope  concerns  that
could be invoked in response to any RFRA claim for an exception to a
generally applicable law, i.e., “if I make an exception for you, I’ll have
to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.”  But RFRA operates by
mandating  consideration,  under  the  compelling  interest  test,  of  ex-
ceptions to “rule[s] of general applicability.”  §2000bb–1(a).  Congress’
determination  that  the  legislated  test  is  “workable  . . .  for  striking
sensible  balances between religious liberty and competing prior gov-
ernmental  interests,”  §200bb(a)(5),  finds  support  in  Sherbert,  supra,
at 407, and Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. ___, ___.  While there may
be instances where a need for uniformity precludes the recognition of
exceptions to generally applicable laws under RFRA, it would be sur-
prising to find that this was such a case, given the longstanding pe-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal arguments and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1241

STATE COURTS

Certiorari to review judgments of ............................  10

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.....................  47

Habeas corpus, exhaustion of remedies  ..................  20.4(a)

Mandate, issuance of.....................................................  45.2

Puerto Rico Supreme Court  ......................................  47

Rule

STAYS

Bond, supersedeas.........................................................  23.4
Considerations governing application .......................  23.3
Judgment, enforcement of ...........................................  23.2
Justices

—Authority to grant ............................................  23.1
—Presentation to individual Justices................  22.1
—Referral to Court ..............................................  22.5

Mandate

—Pending rehearing.............................................  45.2
—Pending review ..................................................  23.4

STIPULATIONS

Dismissal of appeal by parties....................................  18.5
Mandate, issuance of.....................................................  45.2

SUBSTITUTIONS

Counsel ............................................................................  9.2
Parties .............................................................................  35.1, 35.3
Public ofﬁcers  ...............................................................  35.3
Successor custodians, habeas corpus proceedings ..  36.2

SUMMONS

Form of process .............................................................  45.1
Service in original action.............................................  17.6

SUPERSEDEAS BONDS

Application to stay enforcement of judgment.........  23.4

TERM

Call of cases for argument ..........................................  27
Cases pending on docket at end of Term .................  3
Commencement of.........................................................  3

TIME REQUIREMENTS

Computation of time.....................................................  30.1
Documents ﬁled with Clerk  .......................................  29.2
Oral argument  ..............................................................  28.3
Substitution of parties  ................................................  35.1
Time to ﬁle

—Amicus curiae briefs  ......................................  37.2, 37.3
—Appeals................................................................  18.1
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a table of contents or an index for a legal document, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It lists various sections and sub-sections with corresponding rule numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

813

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5754.  In  re  Hernandez;
No.  09–5755.  In  re  Tapia-Fierro;
No.  09–5803.  In  re  Schmidt;
No.  09–5873.  In  re  Morris;
No.  09–5880.  In  re  Coppage;
No.  09–5882.  In  re  Neal-El;
No.  09–5907.  In  re  York;
No.  09–5912.  In  re  Butler;
No.  09–5948.  In  re  Del  Toro;
No.  09–5953.  In  re  Davies;
No.  09–6049.  In  re  Carter;
No.  09–6145.  In  re  Jackson;  and
No.  09–6189.  In  re  Bush.  Petitions  for  writs  of  habeas  cor

pus  denied.

No.  08–10784.  In  re  Smith;

No.  08–10886.  In  re  Alpine;

No.  09–5106.  In  re  Sinquefield;

No.  09–5122.  In  re  Sherratt;

No.  09–5768.  In  re  Miller;

No.  09–5814.  In  re  Treece;

No.  09–5945.  In  re  Williams;

No.  09–6154.  In  re  Millen;  and

No.  09–6233.  In  re  Cluck.  Motions  of  petitioners  for  leave

to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  petitions  for  writs  of
habeas  corpus  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–6291.  In  re  Bennett.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave
to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  petition  for  writ  of
habeas  corpus  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As  peti
tioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk  is
directed  not  to  accept  any  further  petitions  in  noncriminal  mat
ters  from  petitioner  unless  the  docketing  fee  required  by  Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506
U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See
id.,  at  4,  and  cases  cited  therein.

No.  08–1559.  In  re  Corrigan;
No.  08–10443.  In  re  Richard;
No.  08–10712.  In  re  Stonier;
No.  08–10759.  In  re  Manship;
No.  08–10927.  In  re  Roberts;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal case citations and their dispositions. It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

603

Souter, J., dissenting

falls within a spectrum of protected “speech” extending
outward from the core of overtly political declarations. Put
differently, art is entitled to full protection because our
“cultural
life,” just like our native politics, “rest[s] upon
[the] ideal” of governmental viewpoint neutrality. Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 641 (1994).
When called upon to vindicate this ideal, we characteristi-
cally begin by asking “whether the government has adopted
a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the mes-
sage it conveys. The government’s purpose is the control-
ling consideration.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, supra,
at 791 (citation omitted). The answer in this case is damn-
ing. One need do nothing more than read the text of the
statute to conclude that Congress’s purpose in imposing the
decency and respect criteria was to prevent the funding of
art that conveys an offensive message; the decency and
respect provision on its face is quintessentially viewpoint
based, and quotations from the Congressional Record merely
conﬁrm the obvious legislative purpose.
In the words of a
cosponsor of the bill that enacted the proviso, “[w]orks which
deeply offend the sensibilities of signiﬁcant portions of the
public ought not to be supported with public funds.”
136
Cong. Rec. 28624 (1990).2 Another supporter of the bill ob-
served that “the Endowment’s support for artists like Rob-
ert Mapplethorpe and Andre[s] Serrano has offended and an-
gered many citizens,” behooving “Congress . . . to listen to
these complaints about the NEA and make sure that exhibits
Indeed, if
like [these] are not funded again.”
there were any question at all about what Congress had in

Id., at 28642.

2 There is, of course, nothing whatsoever unconstitutional about this
view as a general matter. Congress has no obligation to support artistic
enterprises that many people detest. The First Amendment speaks up
only when Congress decides to participate in the Nation’s artistic life by
legal regulation, as it does through a subsidy scheme like the NEA.
If
Congress does choose to spend public funds in this manner, it may not
discriminate by viewpoint in deciding who gets the money.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter. It discusses the constitutionality of the NEA's decency and respect criteria, arguing that they are viewpoint-based and therefore unconstitutional.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1041

1039

Scalia, J., dissenting

that  preceded  the  decision  vacated,  see,  e. g.,  Grier  v.  United
States,  419  U. S.  989  (1974),  I  have  acquiesced  in  this  expansion
of “intervening-factor” GVRs only when (as in Grier) our decision
came  so  soon  before  the  judgment  in  question  “that  the  lower
court  might  have  been  unaware  of  it,”  Lawrence,  supra,  at  181
(Scalia,  J.,  dissenting).  This  is  not  such  a  case:  We  decided
Jimenez  on  January  13,  2009,  more  than  two  months  before  the
Fifth  Circuit  denied  the  certiﬁcate.  There  is  thus  no  basis  for
regarding  that  decision  as  an  “intervening”  factor—that  is,  one
that  the  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  have  before  it.

This  is  not,  of  course,  the  ﬁrst  time  the  Court  has  GVR’d  on
the basis of a case decided long before the Court of Appeals ruled,
see,  e. g.,  Robinson  v.  Story, 469  U. S.  1081  (1984)  (three  months),
nor  the  ﬁrst  time  I  have  protested,  see  Lawrence,  supra,  at  184
(Scalia,  J.,  dissenting)  (more  than  a  year).  This  practice  has
created  a  new  mode  of  disposition,  a  sort  of  ersatz  summary  re
versal.  We  do  not  say  that  the  judgment  below  was  wrong,  but
since  we  suspect  that  it  may be  wrong  and  do  not  want  to  waste
our  time  ﬁguring  it  out,  we  instruct  the  Court  of  Appeals  to  do
the  job  again,  with  a  particular  issue  prominently  in  mind.

It  surely  suggests  something  is  amiss  that  this  case  would  be
over,  and  petitioner  would  be  worse  off,  if  he  had  asked  us  to
reverse  the  judgment  below  on  the  basis  of  Jimenez.  Since  he
did not argue that ground to the Court of Appeals, and since that
court  did  not  address  it,  we  would  almost  certainly  deny  certio
rari.  See  Adarand  Constructors,  Inc.  v.  Mineta,  534  U. S.  103,
108–109  (2001)  (per  curiam)  (dismissing  a  writ  as  improvidently
granted because the question at issue was not raised or considered
below).  Have  we  established  a  new  system  in  which  a  party’s
repetition  before  this  Court  of  his  failure  below  (here,  the  failure
to  invoke  Jimenez)  cures—and  causes  us  to  reward—his  earlier
failure?  Or  perhaps  we  are  developing  a  new  system  in  which
all  arguably  valid  points  not  raised  and  not  discussed  below—
whether  or  not  belatedly  raised  here—will  be  sent  back  for  a
redo  by  the  Court  of  Appeals.  And  if  we  can  apply  this  failure-
friendly  practice  to  a  neglected  precedent  two  months  old,  there
is  no  reason  in  principle  not  to  apply  it  to  a  neglected  precedent
two  years  old.

In  my  view  we  have  no  power  to  set  aside  the  duly  recorded
judgments  of  lower  courts  unless  we  ﬁnd  them  to  be  in  error,  or
unless  they  are  cast  in  doubt  by  a  factor  arising  after  they  were
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It argues against the practice of granting a writ of certiorari (GVR) based on a precedent decided long before the Court of Appeals ruled.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

BARRETT, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–954
_________________

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. TEXAS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 30, 2022]

 JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE
ALITO, and JUSTICE GORSUCH join as to all but the first sen-
tence, dissenting.

I agree with the Court’s analysis of the merits—but not
with  its  decision  to  reach  them.    The  lower  courts  in  this
case concluded that 8 U. S. C. §1252(f )(1), a provision of the
Immigration  and  Nationality  Act  sharply  limiting  federal
courts’  “jurisdiction  or  authority  to  enjoin  or  restrain  the
operation of ”  certain  immigration  laws, did  not  present  a
jurisdictional bar.  Just two weeks ago, however, we repu-
diated their reasoning in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596
U. S. ___ (2022).  Because we are a court of review and not
first view, I would vacate and remand for the lower courts
to reconsider their assertion of jurisdiction in light of Ale-
man Gonzalez.

*

*

*
  Section 1252(f )(1) provides that “no court (other than the
Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to en-
join or restrain the operation of ” specified immigration pro-
visions,  except  as  applied  to  “an  individual  alien  against
whom proceedings under [those provisions] have been initi-
ated.”  Some  lower  courts  have  narrowly  interpreted  this
provision, holding that it does not bar relief that a plaintiff
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Biden v. Texas*.  It cites relevant case law and legal statutes, indicating it is part of the core legal argument of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

the unconstitutional 10-person and 25-person caps.  More-
over,  issuing  the  injunctions  now  rather  than  a  few  days
from now not only will ensure that the applicants’ constitu-
tional  rights  are  protected,  but  also  will  provide  some
needed clarity for the State and religious organizations.

*

*

*
On  this  record,  the  applicants  have  shown:  a  likelihood
that the Court would grant certiorari and reverse; irrepa-
rable harm; and that the equities favor injunctive relief.  I
therefore  vote  to  grant  the  applications  for  temporary  in-
junctive relief until the Court of Appeals in December, and
then this Court as appropriate, can more fully consider the
merits.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses legal arguments and the justification for granting injunctive relief.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U80

[09-06-00 20:24:32] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 151 (1998)

153

Per Curiam

that respondent ﬂed Ohio because of fear that his parole
would be revoked without due process, and that he would be
thereafter returned to prison where he faced the threat of
bodily injury. This “duress” negated his status as a fugitive
under Article IV.

These are serious charges, unrebutted by any evidence at
the hearing in the state trial court.
It may be noted, how-
ever, that the State of Ohio was not a party at that hearing,
and the State of New Mexico, which was defending the Gov-
ernor’s action, is at a considerable disadvantage in producing
testimony, even in afﬁdavit form, of occurrences in the State
of Ohio. Very likely Ohio was aware of our statement in
Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U. S. 86, 89–90 (1952), that the
“scheme of interstate rendition, as set forth in both the Con-
stitution and the statutes which Congress has enacted to im-
plement the Constitution, . . . do[es] not contemplate an ap-
pearance by [the demanding State] in respondent’s asylum
to defend against the claimed abuses of its prison system”
(footnotes omitted).

We accept, of course, the determination of the Supreme
Court of New Mexico that respondent’s testimony was credi-
ble, but this is simply not the kind of issue that may be tried
in the asylum State.
In case after case we have held that
claims relating to what actually happened in the demanding
State, the law of the demanding State, and what may be ex-
pected to happen in the demanding State when the fugitive
returns are issues that must be tried in the courts of that
State, and not in those of the asylum State. Drew v. Thaw,
235 U. S. 432 (1914); Sweeney v. Woodall, supra; Michigan v.
Doran, supra; Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U. S. 86 (1980) (per
curiam). As we said in Pacileo:

“Once the Governor of California issued the warrant for
arrest and rendition in response to the request of the
Governor of Arkansas, claims as to constitutional defects
in the Arkansas penal system should be heard in the
‘ To allow
courts of Arkansas, not those of California.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the opinion section of a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xxxi

Page

815

Caruso; Bazzetta v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Caruso; Hawthorne v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Carver v. Vail  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carvlin; Beras v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1022,1109

1027

Caskey; Edmond v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
992

Casner; Chapman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Cassell v. Adam Toler Memorial Funeral Home, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . .
971

Cassell v. White  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1085

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cassens Transport Co. v. Brown
983

Castaneda; Henneford v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
983

Castaneda; Migliaccio v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
890

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Castaneda v. United States
946

Castel v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Castillo v. Guidry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  802,1089

1057

Castillo; Nailor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Castillo v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037

Castillo-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919

Castillo-Valle v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852

Caston v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
993

Castro-Coello v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034

Castro-Guevarra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042

Cate; Baumer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Cate; Bottomley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Cate; Fuentes Rios v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Cate; Garcia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
891

Cate; Hernandez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cate; Jacobs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Cate; Jenkins v.
847

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Cate; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Cate; Martin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Cate; Romandetta v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cate; Tilton v.
1094

Cate; Virgle v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960

Cathey v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Catledge v. Mueller
1077

Catlett v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Catron, Catron & Pottow, P. A.; Van Auken v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  819,1064

872

Caughman v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916

Cayce; Medows v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

Cedeno-Perez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1005

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Celedon v. United States
1136

. . . . . . . . .
Centauri Shipping Ltd. v. Western Bulk Carriers KS
1097

Century 21 Chamberlain & Associates; Haberman v.  . . . . . . . . . .
862

Cerf v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART  I.  THE  COURT

Page

Rule 1.  Clerk..............................................................................................  1165

Rule 2.  Library..........................................................................................  1165

Rule 3.  Term..............................................................................................  1166

Rule 4.  Sessions and Quorum.................................................................  1166

PART  II.  ATTORNEYS  AND  COUNSELORS

Rule 5.  Admission to the Bar .................................................................  1166

Rule 6.  Argument Pro Hac Vice ...........................................................  1168

Rule 7.  Prohibition Against Practice....................................................  1168

Rule 8.  Disbarment and Disciplinary Action ......................................  1168

Rule 9.  Appearance of Counsel ..............................................................  1169

PART  III.  JURISDICTION  ON  WRIT  OF  CERTIORARI

Rule 10.  Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari.................  1169

Rule 11.  Certiorari  to  a  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  Before

Judgment..................................................................................  1170

Rule 12.  Review on Certiorari: How Sought; Parties .........................  1170

Rule 13.  Review on Certiorari: Time for Petitioning..........................  1173

Rule 14.  Content of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari......................  1174

Rule 15.  Briefs in Opposition; Reply Briefs; Supplemental Briefs...  1177

Rule 16.  Disposition of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari ................  1180

PART  IV.  OTHER  JURISDICTION

Rule 17.  Procedure in an Original Action .............................................  1180

Rule 18.  Appeal from a United States District Court ........................  1181

Rule 19.  Procedure on a Certiﬁed Question..........................................  1186

Rule 20.  Procedure on a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ............  1187

PART  V.  MOTIONS  AND  APPLICATIONS

Rule 21.  Motions to the Court .................................................................  1189

1163
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

3

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

business does not qualify as a “process” under §101.

I

Although  the  Court  provides  a  brief  statement  of  facts,
ante, at 1–4, a more complete explication may be useful for
those  unfamiliar  with  petitioners’  patent  application  and
this case’s procedural history.

Petitioners’ patent application describes a series of steps
for managing risk amongst buyers and sellers of commodi-
ties.  The  general  method,  described  in  Claim  1,  entails
“managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold
by a commodity provider at a fixed price,” and consists of
the following steps:

“(a)  initiating a series of transactions between said
commodity provider and consumers of said commodity
wherein  said  consumers  purchase  said  commodity  at
a  fixed  rate  based  upon  historical  averages,  said
fixed  rate  corresponding  to  a  risk  position  of  said
consumers;

“(b)  identifying  market  participants  for  said  com-
modity having a counter-risk position to said consum-
ers; and

“(c)  initiating a series of transactions between said
commodity provider and said market participants at a
second fixed rate such that said series of market par-
ticipant transactions balances the risk position of said
series of consumer transactions.”  App. 19–20.

Although  the  patent  application  makes  clear  that  the
“method  can  be  used  for  any  commodity  to  manage  con-
sumption  risk  in  a  fixed  bill  price  product,”  id.,  at  11,  it
includes  specific  applications  of  the  method,  particularly
in the field of energy, as a means of enabling suppliers and
consumers  to  minimize  the  risks  resulting  from  fluctua-
tions in demand during specified time periods.  See id., at
20–22.  Energy  suppliers  and  consumers  may  use  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 561 U.S. ____ (2010). It delves into the specifics of a patent application and its legal interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of the Court

SOTOMAYOR, J.).2

In a second set of decisions, the Court has drawn a line
between  what  a  person  keeps  to  himself  and  what  he
shares with others.  We have previously held that “a per-
son has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
he  voluntarily  turns  over  to  third  parties.”    Smith,  442
U. S.,  at  743–744.    That  remains  true  “even  if  the  infor-
mation is revealed on the assumption that it will be used
only  for  a  limited  purpose.”  United  States  v.  Miller,  425
U. S.  435,  443  (1976).  As  a  result,  the  Government  is
typically free to obtain such information from the recipient
without triggering Fourth Amendment protections.

This  third-party  doctrine  largely  traces  its  roots  to
Miller.    While  investigating  Miller  for  tax  evasion,  the
Government  subpoenaed  his  banks,  seeking  several
months  of  canceled  checks,  deposit  slips,  and  monthly
statements.  The  Court  rejected  a  Fourth  Amendment
challenge  to  the  records  collection.  For  one,  Miller  could
“assert  neither  ownership  nor  possession”  of  the  docu-
ments;  they  were  “business  records  of  the  banks.”  Id., at
440.  For  another,  the  nature  of  those  records  confirmed
Miller’s limited expectation of privacy, because the checks
were  “not  confidential  communications  but  negotiable
instruments  to  be  used  in  commercial  transactions,”  and
the  bank  statements  contained  information  “exposed  to

——————

2 JUSTICE  KENNEDY  argues  that  this  case  is  in  a  different  category
from Jones and the dragnet-type practices posited in Knotts because the
disclosure of the cell-site records was subject to “judicial authorization.”
Post, at 14–16.  That line of argument conflates the threshold question
whether  a  “search”  has  occurred  with  the  separate  matter  of  whether
the  search  was  reasonable.    The  subpoena  process  set  forth  in  the
Stored  Communications  Act  does  not  determine  a  target’s  expectation
of  privacy.  And  in  any  event,  neither  Jones  nor  Knotts  purported  to
resolve the question of what authorization may be required to conduct
such  electronic  surveillance  techniques.    But  see  Jones,  565  U. S.,  at
430  (ALITO,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment)  (indicating  that  longer  term
GPS tracking may require a warrant).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the third-party doctrine and its application to cell-site location information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

Opinion of the Court

Id., at 936.2
  Four days later, on January 28, Alabama moved in this
Court  for  a  stay  of  the  District  Court’s  injunction.    This
Court granted a stay and scheduled the cases for argument,
noting probable jurisdiction in Milligan and granting certi-
orari before judgment in Caster.  595 U. S. ___ (2022).

II
  The District Court found that plaintiffs demonstrated a
reasonable likelihood of success on their claim that HB1 vi-
olates §2.  We affirm that determination.

A
  For  the  past  forty  years,  we  have  evaluated  claims
brought  under  §2  using  the  three-part  framework  devel-
oped  in  our  decision  Thornburg  v.  Gingles,  478  U. S.  30
(1986).  Gingles concerned a challenge to North Carolina’s
multimember  districting  scheme,  which  allegedly  diluted
the vote of its black citizens.  Id., at 34–36.  The case pre-
sented the first opportunity since the 1982 amendments to
address how the new §2 would operate.
  Gingles  began  by  describing  what  §2  guards  against.
“The essence of a §2 claim,” the Court explained, “is that a
certain  electoral  law,  practice,  or  structure  interacts  with
social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters.”  Id., at 47.
That occurs where an “electoral structure operates to mini-
mize  or  cancel  out”  minority  voters’  “ability  to  elect  their
preferred  candidates.”   Id.,  at  48.   Such  a  risk  is  greatest

——————

2 Judge Manasco, presiding in Caster, also preliminarily enjoined Ala-
bama from using HB1.  Her opinion was based on the same evidentiary
record as was before the three-judge Court, and it adopted in full that
Court’s  “recitation  of  the  evidence,  legal  analysis,  findings  of  fact  and
conclusions  of  law.”    1  App.  to  Emergency  Application  for  Stay  in  No.
2:21–cv–1536, p. 4; see also 582 F. Supp. 3d, at 942–943, and n. 4.  Any
reference  to  the  “District  Court”  in  this  opinion  applies  to  the  Caster
Court as well as to the three-judge Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, case names, and a discussion of legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

Club’s  Freedom  Club  PAC  v.  Bennett,  564  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2011) (slip op., at 24–25).

Many  people  might  find  those  latter  objectives  attrac-
tive: They would be delighted to see fewer television com-
mercials touting a candidate’s accomplishments or dispar-
aging  an  opponent’s  character.  Money  in  politics  may  at
times  seem  repugnant  to  some,  but  so  too  does  much  of
what  the  First  Amendment  vigorously  protects.    If  the
First  Amendment  protects  flag  burning,  funeral  protests,
and  Nazi  parades—despite  the  profound  offense  such
spectacles  cause—it  surely  protects  political  campaign
speech despite popular opposition.  See Texas v. Johnson,
491  U. S.  397  (1989);  Snyder  v.  Phelps,  562  U. S.  ___
(2011); National Socialist Party of America v.  Skokie, 432
U. S.  43  (1977)  (per  curiam).  Indeed,  as  we  have  empha-
sized,  the  First  Amendment  “has  its  fullest  and  most
urgent  application  precisely  to  the  conduct  of  campaigns
for  political  office.”  Monitor  Patriot  Co.  v.  Roy,  401  U. S.
265, 272 (1971).

In  a  series  of  cases  over  the  past  40  years,  we  have
spelled  out  how  to  draw  the  constitutional  line  between
the permissible goal of avoiding corruption in the political
process and the impermissible desire simply to limit polit-
ical  speech.    We  have  said  that  government  regulation
may not target the general gratitude a candidate may feel
toward those who support him or his allies, or the political
access  such  support  may  afford.  “Ingratiation  and  access
. . .  are  not  corruption.”    Citizens  United  v.  Federal  Elec-
tion  Comm’n,  558  U. S.  310,  360  (2010).    They  embody  a
central  feature  of  democracy—that  constituents  support
candidates  who  share  their  beliefs  and  interests,  and
candidates  who  are  elected  can  be  expected  to  be  respon-
sive to those concerns.

Any regulation must instead target what we have called
“quid  pro  quo”  corruption  or  its  appearance.  See  id.,  at
359.  That  Latin  phrase  captures  the  notion  of  a  direct
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N. It discusses the First Amendment's protection of political campaign speech and the limits of government regulation in this area.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

immediately  south  of  the  Crow  Tribe’s  reservation.    The
Act  creating  the  Territory  provided  that  “nothing  in  this
act  shall  be  construed  to  impair  the  rights  of  person  or
property  now  pertaining  to  the  Indians  in  said  Territory,
so  long  as  such  rights  shall  remain  unextinguished  by
treaty between the United States and such Indians.”  Act
of July 25, 1868, ch. 235, 15 Stat. 178.  Twenty-two years
later, Congress admitted Wyoming as a State “on an equal
footing  with  the  original  States  in  all  respects  whatever.”
Act of July 10, 1890, ch. 664, 26 Stat. 222.  The following
year, Congress passed an Act empowering the President to
“set apart and reserve” tracts of public lands owned by the
United States as forest reservations.  Act of Mar. 3, 1891,
ch.  561,  §24,  26  Stat.  1103.  Exercising  that  authority,
President  Cleveland  designated  some  lands  in  Wyoming
that  remained  under  federal  ownership  as  a  forest  reser-
vation.  Presidential  Proclamation  No.  30,  29  Stat.  909.
Today, those lands make up the Bighorn National Forest.
Bighorn  abuts  the  Crow  Reservation  along  the  border
between  Wyoming  and  Montana  and  includes  land  that
was previously part of the Crow Tribe’s hunting district.

These  enactments  did  not  end  legal  conflicts  between
the white settlers and Indians.  Almost immediately after
Wyoming’s  admission  to  the  Union,  this  Court  had  to
determine  the  extent  of  the  State’s  regulatory  power  in
light of a tribe’s reserved hunting rights.  A member of the
Shoshone-Bannock  Tribes  named  Race  Horse  had  been
arrested by Wyoming officials for taking elk in violation of
state  hunting  laws.  Race  Horse,  supra,  at  506.  The
Shoshone-Bannock  Tribes,  like  the  Crow,  had  accepted  a
reservation while retaining the right to hunt in the lands
previously  within  their  hunting  district.  Their  treaty
reserves  the  same  right,  using  the  same  language,  as  the
Crow Tribe’s treaty.1  Race Horse argued that he had the

——————

1 The  Shoshone-Bannock  Treaty  reserved  “ ‘the  right  to  hunt  on  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in a case involving the Crow Tribe's hunting rights. It provides historical context and legal arguments related to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Syllabus

v.  Wyeth  LLC,  562  U. S.  223,  233–235.    Alternatively,  the  company
suggests  that  Congress  effectively  ratified  its  understanding  of  the
term  “confidential”  by  enacting  similar  phrases  in  other  statutes  in
the years since National Parks was decided.  But the ratification canon
applies  when  Congress  re-enacts  the  same  statute  using  the  same
language, and Congress has never re-enacted Exemption 4.  Finally,
Argus  Leader  urges  the  Court  to  adopt  a  “substantial  competitive
harm” requirement as a matter of policy because it believes FOIA ex-
emptions should be narrowly construed.  But the Court cannot arbi-
trarily constrict Exemption 4 by adding limitations found nowhere in
its terms.  Pp. 10–12.

 889 F. 3d 914, reversed and remanded.

GORSUCH, J., delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.  BREYER,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
GINSBURG and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus, which summarizes the case and the Court's decision.  It is not the main body of the text and is not meant to be read as such.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

17

Opinion of the Court

moment,  over  several  years.    Such  a  chronicle  implicates
privacy concerns far beyond those considered in Smith and
Miller.

Neither does the second rationale underlying the third-
party  doctrine—voluntary  exposure—hold  up  when  it
comes  to  CSLI.  Cell  phone  location  information  is  not
truly “shared” as one normally understands  the term.  In
the  first  place,  cell  phones  and  the  services  they  provide
are “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that
carrying  one  is  indispensable  to  participation  in  modern
society.  Riley, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).  Second, a
cell  phone  logs  a  cell-site  record  by  dint  of  its  operation,
without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering  up.    Virtually  any  activity  on  the  phone  gener-
ates  CSLI,  including  incoming  calls,  texts,  or  e-mails  and
countless  other  data  connections  that  a  phone  automati-
cally  makes  when  checking  for  news,  weather,  or  social
media updates.  Apart from disconnecting the phone from
the  network,  there  is  no  way  to  avoid  leaving  behind  a
trail of location data.  As a result, in no meaningful sense
does  the  user  voluntarily  “assume[ ]  the  risk”  of  turning
over  a  comprehensive  dossier  of  his  physical  movements.
Smith, 442 U. S., at 745.

We  therefore  decline  to  extend Smith  and  Miller  to  the
collection of CSLI.  Given the unique nature of cell phone
location  information,  the  fact  that  the  Government  ob-
tained  the  information  from  a  third  party  does  not  over-
come Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.
The Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records was a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

*

*
Our decision today is a narrow one.  We do not express a
view  on  matters  not  before  us:  real-time  CSLI  or  “tower
dumps” (a download of information on all the devices that
connected  to  a  particular  cell  site  during  a  particular

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal implications of cell phone location information (CSLI) and its protection under the Fourth Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

11

Opinion of the Court

tion  guide  and  discipline  this  inquiry  but  do  not  set  its
outer  boundaries.  See  Lawrence,  supra,  at  572.  That
method  respects  our  history  and  learns  from  it  without
allowing the past alone to rule the present.

The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it
in our own times.  The generations that wrote and ratified
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not
presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimen-
sions, and so they entrusted to future generations a char-
ter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we
learn  its  meaning.    When  new  insight  reveals  discord
between  the  Constitution’s  central  protections  and  a  re-
ceived legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.
Applying  these  established  tenets,  the  Court  has  long
held  the  right  to  marry  is  protected  by  the  Constitution.
In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967), which invali-
dated bans on interracial unions, a unanimous Court held
marriage  is  “one  of  the  vital  personal  rights  essential  to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”  The Court
reaffirmed  that  holding  in  Zablocki  v.  Redhail,  434  U. S.
374,  384  (1978),  which  held  the  right  to  marry  was  bur-
dened  by  a  law  prohibiting  fathers  who  were  behind  on
child  support  from  marrying.    The  Court  again  applied
this principle in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987),
which held the right to marry was abridged by regulations
limiting  the  privilege  of  prison  inmates  to  marry.    Over
time  and  in  other  contexts,  the  Court  has  reiterated  that
the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process
Clause.  See,  e.g.,  M.  L.  B.  v.  S. L. J.,  519  U. S.  102,  116
(1996);  Cleveland  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  LaFleur,  414  U. S.  632,
639–640 (1974); Griswold, supra, at 486; Skinner v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923).

It  cannot  be  denied  that  this  Court’s  cases  describing
the  right  to  marry  presumed  a  relationship  involving
opposite-sex partners.  The Court, like many institutions,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the right to marry and its historical context. It cites previous Supreme Court cases and uses legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
54  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Grutter, according to the majority, requires that universi-
ties identify a specific “end point” for the use of race.  Ante,
 JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH,  for  his  part,  suggests  that
at  33.
Grutter itself automatically expires in 25 years, after either
“the  college  class  of  2028”  or  “the  college  class  of  2032.”
Ante, at 7, n. 1.  A faithful reading of this Court’s precedents
reveals that Grutter held nothing of the sort.

True,  Grutter  referred  to  “25  years,”  but  that  arbitrary
number simply reflected the time that had elapsed since the
Court “first approved the use of race” in college admissions
in  Bakke.  Grutter,  539  U. S.,  at  343.    It  is  also  true  that
Grutter remarked that “race-conscious admissions policies
must be limited in time,” but it did not do so in a vaccum,
as the Court suggests.  Id., at 342.  Rather than impose a
fixed  expiration  date,  the  Court  tasked  universities  with
the  responsibility  of  periodically  assessing  whether  their
race-conscious programs “are still necessary.”  Ibid.  Grutter
offered  as  examples  sunset  provisions,  periodic  reviews,
and experimenting with “race-neutral alternatives as they
develop.”  Ibid.  That is precisely how this Court has previ-
ously  interpreted  Grutter’s  command.    See  Fisher  II,  579
U. S.,  at  388  (“It  is  the  University’s  ongoing  obligation  to
engage in constant deliberation and continued reflection re-
garding its admissions policies”).

Grutter’s  requirement  that  universities  engage  in  peri-
odic reviews so the use of race can end “as soon as practica-
ble” is well grounded in the need to ensure that race is “em-
ployed  no  more  broadly  than  the  interest  demands.”    539
U. S., at 343.  That is, it is grounded in strict scrutiny.  By
contrast, the Court’s holding is based on the fiction that ra-
cial inequality has a predictable cutoff date.  Equality is an
ongoing project in a society where racial inequality persists.
See supra, at 17–25.  A temporal requirement that rests on
the fantasy that racial inequality will end at a predictable
hour is illogical and unworkable.  There is a sound reason
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites previous cases (Grutter and Fisher II) and argues against the majority's position on the use of race in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

The Court also incorrectly concludes that a test that fo-
cuses  on  domestic  consumer  confusion  conflicts  with  the
territoriality principle of trademark law.  See ante, at 12–
14.  That principle recognizes that a trademark has sepa-
rate legal existence in each country where the mark “is reg-
istered or legally recognized.”  5 McCarthy §29:1, at 29–5;
see Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U. S. 541, 544 (1927) (not-
ing that a trademark secured in one country “depend[s] for
its  protection”  there  and  “confer[s]  no  rights”  elsewhere).
Thus,  to  obtain  the  benefits  that  flow  from  trademark
rights,  such  as  the  “right  to  a  non-confused  public,”  the
plaintiff  must  secure  those  rights  in  the  country  where  it
wants protection.  1 McCarthy §2:10, at 2–24.

A  focus  on  consumer  confusion  in  the  United  States  is
consistent  with  that  international  system.  That  focus
properly cabins the Act’s reach to foreign conduct that re-
sults in infringing products causing consumer confusion do-
mestically  while  “leaving  to  foreign  jurisdictions  the  au-
thority  to  remedy  confusion  within  their  territories.”
United States Brief 25–26; see Brief for European Commis-
sion on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus Curiae 6
(“The test for infringement in the European Union, includ-
ing in Germany, like the United States, assesses whether
there  is  a  likelihood  of  consumer  confusion”).  In  other
words, applying the Lanham Act to domestic consumer con-
fusion  promotes  the  benefits  of  U. S.  trademark  rights  in
the territory of the United States.

The Court’s approach, by contrast, would absolve from li-
ability  those  defendants  who  sell  infringing  products
abroad that reach the United States and confuse consumers
here.  That  resulting  consumer  confusion  in  the  United
States, however, falls squarely within the scope of the in-
terests that the Lanham Act seeks to protect.7

——————

7 In  today’s  increasingly  global  marketplace,  where  goods  travel
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in a case before the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the interpretation of the Lanham Act and its application to trademark infringement involving foreign conduct.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of the Court

Amendment and seeking to bar the Government from en-
forcing  the  Policy  Requirement  against  plaintiffs’  legally
distinct foreign affiliates.  The U. S. District Court for the
Southern  District  of  New  York  agreed  with  plaintiffs  and
prohibited  the  Government  from  enforcing  the  Policy  Re-
quirement  against  plaintiffs’  foreign  affiliates.    The  U. S.
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Second  Circuit  affirmed.    Judge
Straub dissented.  He described as “startling” the proposi-
tion that the First Amendment could extend to foreign or-
ganizations  operating  abroad.    911  F. 3d  104,  112  (2018).
The  Second  Circuit’s  decision  was  stayed  pending  this
Court’s  review,  meaning  that  foreign  organizations  cur-
rently remain subject to the Policy Requirement.

We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ___ (2019), and now re-
verse the judgment of the Second Circuit.  Plaintiffs’ posi-
tion runs headlong into two bedrock principles of American
law.

First, it is long settled as a matter of American constitu-
tional law that foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not
possess  rights  under  the  U. S.  Constitution.    Plaintiffs  do
not  dispute  that  fundamental  principle.    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.
58–59; see, e.g., Boumediene  v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 770–
771  (2008);  Hamdi  v.  Rumsfeld,  542  U. S.  507,  558–559
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez,  494  U. S.  259,  265–275  (1990);  Johnson  v.  Eisen-
trager,  339  U. S.  763,  784  (1950);  United  States  ex  rel.
Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 292 (1904); U. S. Const.,
Preamble.

As  the  Court  has  recognized,  foreign  citizens  in  the
United  States  may  enjoy  certain  constitutional  rights—to
take just one example, the right to due process in a criminal
trial.  See,  e.g.,  Verdugo-Urquidez,  494  U. S.,  at  270–271;
Plyler  v.  Doe,  457  U. S.  202,  210–213  (1982);  Kwong  Hai
Chew  v.  Colding,  344  U. S.  590,  596  (1953);  Bridges  v.
Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 148 (1945); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U. S.  356,  369  (1886);  cf.  Bluman  v.  Federal  Election
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the applicability of the First Amendment to foreign organizations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

11

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

base limit.  Id., at 38.  The Court determined that circum-
vention could occur when an individual legally contributes
“massive  amounts  of  money  to  a  particular  candidate
through the use of unearmarked contributions” to entities
that  are  themselves  likely  to  contribute  to  the  candidate.
Ibid.  For  that  reason,  the  Court  upheld  the  $25,000  ag-
gregate limit.

Although  Buckley  provides  some  guidance,  we  think
that  its  ultimate  conclusion  about  the  constitutionality  of
the aggregate limit in place under FECA does not control
here.  Buckley  spent  a  total  of  three  sentences  analyzing
that limit; in fact, the opinion pointed out that the consti-
tutionality of the aggregate limit “ha[d] not been separately
addressed  at  length  by  the  parties.”    Ibid.  We  are  now
asked to address appellants’ direct challenge to the aggre-
gate  limits  in  place  under  BCRA.   BCRA  is  a  different
statutory  regime,  and  the  aggregate  limits  it  imposes
operate against a distinct legal backdrop.

Most  notably,  statutory  safeguards  against  circumven-
tion  have  been  considerably  strengthened  since  Buckley
was  decided,  through  both  statutory  additions  and  the
introduction of a comprehensive regulatory scheme.  With
more targeted anticircumvention measures in place today,
the  indiscriminate  aggregate  limits  under  BCRA  appear
particularly heavy-handed.

The  1976  FECA  Amendments,  for  example,  added  an-
other  layer  of  base  contribution  limits.    The  1974  version
of  FECA  had  already  capped  contributions  from  political
committees  to  candidates,  but  the  1976  version  added
limits  on  contributions  to  political  committees.  This
change was enacted at least “in part to prevent circumven-
tion  of  the  very  limitations  on  contributions  that  this
Court  upheld  in  Buckley.”  California  Medical  Assn.  v.
Federal  Election  Comm’n,  453  U. S.  182,  197–198  (1981)
(plurality  opinion);  see  also  id.,  at  203  (Blackmun,  J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  Because
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case _McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission_.  It discusses campaign finance laws and the constitutionality of aggregate contribution limits.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–50
_________________

JASCHA CHIAVERINI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. CITY OF NAPOLEON, OHIO, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2024]

JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  joins,  dis-

senting.

Jascha Chiaverini sued several city officials for damages
under 42 U. S. C. §1983.  He alleged that they violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a malicious
prosecution.  I continue to adhere to my belief that a “mali-
cious  prosecution  claim  cannot  be  based  on  the  Fourth
Amendment.”  Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. 357, 378 (2017)
(ALITO, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissenting).  Accordingly,
I would affirm the dismissal of Chiaverini’s claim.

To raise a successful claim under §1983, a plaintiff must
allege the deprivation of “rights, privileges, or immunities
secured” to him by the Constitution.  42 U. S. C. §1983.  “In
order  to  flesh  out  the  elements  of  th[e  alleged]  constitu-
tional tort,” the Court generally analogizes to common-law
torts.  Manuel, 580 U. S., at 378 (opinion of ALITO, J.); see
also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 483–484 (1994).  In
this  case,  Chiaverini  claims  that  he  was  seized  without
probable  cause  in  violation  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.
Chiaverini  principally  relies  on  this  Court’s  decision  in
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U. S. 36 (2022), to argue that the
appropriate tort analog for this claim is malicious prosecu-
tion.  In Thompson, the Court held that malicious prosecu-
tion,  a  tort  addressing  “the  wrongful  initiation  of  charges
without  probable  cause,”  is  most  analogous  to  a  Fourth
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual content of a legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

healthcare  workers  to  the  choice  of  their  jobs  or  an  irre-
versible medical treatment.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It's sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1055

529 U. S.

April 3, 2000

No. 99–1356. Levy et ux. v. Swift Transportation Co.
et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194
F. 3d 1320.

No. 99–1373. Fowler v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 339 Ark. 207, 5 S. W. 3d 10.

No. 99–1381. Kobayashi v. Spencer et al. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 278.

No. 99–1385. Lodermeier v. Dooley, Warden. C. A. 8th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 250.

No. 99–1398. Malowney v. Butterworth, Attorney Gen-
eral of Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 193 F. 3d 1342.

No. 99–1402. Robinson et al. v. District of Columbia
Board of Zoning Adjustment et al. Ct. App. D. C. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–1432. Ortiz-Miranda et al. v. United States.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 166 F. 3d 19.

No. 99–1433. Colon-Munoz v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 210.

No. 99–1452. Daniele v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 249.

No. 99–1454. Savage v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 454.

No. 99–1458. Glassman et ux. v. Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 198 F. 3d 253.

No. 99–1461. Blakeney v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 451.

No. 99–1467. Brown v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 440.

No. 99–7177. Ward v. Trent, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 505.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court

tion of habitual criminals.  See 316 U. S., at 538–543.

In  Lawrence  the  Court  acknowledged  the  interlocking
nature of these constitutional safeguards in the context of
the legal treatment of gays and lesbians.  See 539 U. S., at
575.  Although Lawrence elaborated its holding under the
Due  Process  Clause,  it  acknowledged,  and  sought  to  rem-
edy,  the  continuing  inequality  that  resulted  from  laws
making intimacy in the lives of gays and lesbians a crime
against  the  State.  See  ibid.  Lawrence  therefore  drew
upon  principles  of  liberty  and  equality  to  define  and  pro-
tect  the  rights  of  gays  and  lesbians,  holding  the  State
“cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”  Id., at 578.

This  dynamic  also  applies  to  same-sex  marriage.    It  is
now  clear  that  the  challenged  laws  burden  the  liberty  of
same-sex  couples,  and  it  must  be  further  acknowledged
that  they  abridge  central  precepts  of  equality.    Here  the
marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence
unequal:  same-sex  couples  are  denied  all  the  benefits
afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exer-
cising  a  fundamental  right.    Especially  against  a  long
history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to
same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and
continuing harm.  The imposition of this disability on gays
and  lesbians  serves  to  disrespect  and  subordinate  them.
And  the  Equal  Protection  Clause,  like  the  Due  Process
Clause,  prohibits  this  unjustified  infringement  of  the
fundamental right to marry.  See, e.g., Zablocki, supra, at
383–388; Skinner, 316 U. S., at 541.

These  considerations  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the
right  to  marry  is  a  fundamental  right  inherent  in  the
liberty  of  the  person,  and  under  the  Due  Process  and
Equal  Protection  Clauses  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right
and  that  liberty.    The  Court  now  holds  that  same-sex
couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.  No
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the right to same-sex marriage. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38

BILSKI v. KAPPOS

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

that the 1999 Congress would never have enacted §273 if
it had foreseen that this Court would rely on the provision
as  a  basis  for  concluding  that  business  methods  are  pat-
entable.  Section 273 is a red herring; we should be focus-
ing our attention on §101 itself.

VI

The  constitutionally  mandated  purpose  and  function  of
the  patent  laws  bolster  the  conclusion  that  methods  of
doing business are not “processes” under §101.

The  Constitution  allows  Congress  to  issue  patents  “[t]o
promote  the  Progress  of  . . .  useful  Arts,”  Art. I,  §8,  cl. 8.
This  clause  “is  both  a  grant  of  power  and  a  limitation.”
Graham, 383 U. S., at 5.  It “reflects a balance between the
need  to  encourage  innovation  and  the  avoidance  of  mo-
nopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant
advance  in  the  ‘Progress  of  Science  and  useful  Arts.’ ”
Bonito  Boats,  489  U. S.,  at  146.    “This  is  the  standard
expressed  in  the  Constitution  and  it  may  not  be  ignored.
And  it  is  in  this  light  that  patent  validity  ‘requires  refer-
ence  to  [the]  standard  written  into  the  Constitution.’ ”
Graham, 383 U. S., at 6 (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea  Co.  v.  Supermarket  Equipment  Corp.,  340  U. S.  147,
154  (1950)  (Douglas,  J.,  concurring)  (emphasis  deleted));
see  also  Grant  v.  Raymond,  6  Pet.  218,  241–242  (1832)
(explaining  that  patent  “laws  which  are  passed  to  give
effect  to  this  [constitutional]  purpose  ought,  we  think,  to
be  construed  in  the  spirit  in  which  they  have  been
made”).44
——————

44 See  also  Quanta  Computer,  Inc.  v.  LG  Electronics,  Inc.,  553  U. S.
617,  626  (2008)  (“ ‘[T]he  primary  purpose  of  our  patent  laws  is  not  the
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is “to promote
the  progress  of  science  and  useful  arts” ’ ”  (quoting  Motion  Picture
Patents  Co.  v.  Universal  Film  Mfg.  Co.,  243  U. S.  502,  511  (1917)));
Pfaff  v.  Wells  Electronics,  Inc.,  525  U. S.  55,  63  (1998)  (“[T]he  patent
system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the
creation  and  the  public  disclosure  of  new  and  useful  advances  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Stevens in the case of Bilski v. Kappos. It delves into the constitutional basis for patent law and argues against the patentability of business methods.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of the Court

registrant is sent and fails to mail back a return card and
then fails to vote for an additional four years.

B
  Respondents  argue  (and  the  Sixth  Circuit  held)  that,
even  if  Ohio’s  process  complies  with  subsection  (d),  it
nevertheless  violates  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause—the
clause  that  generally  prohibits  States  from  removing
people  from  the  rolls  “by  reason  of  [a]  person’s  failure  to
vote.”  §20507(b)(2); see also §21083(a)(4)(A).  Respondents
point out that Ohio’s Supplemental Process uses a person’s
failure to vote twice: once as the trigger for sending return
cards  and  again  as  one  of  the  requirements  for  removal.
Respondents conclude that this use of nonvoting is illegal.
  We  reject  this  argument  because  the  Failure-to-Vote
Clause,  both  as  originally  enacted  in  the  NVRA  and  as
amended by HAVA, simply forbids the use of nonvoting as
the sole criterion for removing a registrant, and Ohio does
not  use  it  that  way.    Instead,  as  permitted  by  subsection
(d),  Ohio  removes  registrants  only  if  they  have  failed  to
vote and have failed to respond to a notice.
  When  Congress  clarified  the  meaning  of  the  NVRA’s
Failure-to-Vote  Clause  in  HAVA,  here  is  what  it  said:
“[C]onsistent  with  the  [NVRA],  . . .  no  registrant  may  be
to  vote.”
removed  solely  by  reason  of  a
§21083(a)(4)(A)  (emphasis  added).    The  meaning  of  these
words  is  straightforward.    “Solely”  means  “alone.”    Web-
ster’s  Third  New  International  Dictionary  2168  (2002);
American  Heritage  Dictionary  1654  (4th  ed.  2000).    And
“by reason of ” is a “quite formal” way of saying “[b]ecause
of.”    C.  Ammer,  American  Heritage  Dictionary  of  Idioms
67  (2d  ed.  2013).    Thus,  a  State  violates  the  Failure-to-
Vote  Clause  only  if  it  removes  registrants  for  no  reason
other than their failure to vote.
  This  explanation  of  the  meaning  of  the  Failure-to-Vote
Clause  merely  makes  explicit  what  was  implicit  in  the

failure
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the "Failure-to-Vote Clause" and how it applies to Ohio's voter registration process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

CARSON v. MAKIN

BREYER, J., dissenting

to  worship  God  in  their  own  way  and  to  teach  their  chil-
dren” in that way.  C. Radcliffe, The Law & Its Compass 71
(1960).  We  have  historically  interpreted  the  Religion
Clauses  with  these  basic  principles  in  mind.    See,  e.g.,
Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 771–772, 794–796; Walz, 397 U. S., at
668–670; Engel, 370 U. S., at 429–432.

And in applying these Clauses, we have often said that
“there is room for play in the joints” between them.  Walz,
397 U. S., at 669; see, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S.
455, 469 (1973); Cutter, 544 U. S., at 719; Locke, 540 U. S.,
at 718–719; Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
6); Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).  This doctrine
reflects the fact that it may be difficult to determine in any
particular case whether the Free Exercise Clause requires
a  State  to  fund  the  activities  of  a  religious  institution,  or
whether the Establishment Clause prohibits the State from
doing so.  Rather than attempting to draw a highly reticu-
lated  and  complex  free-exercise/establishment  line  that
varies  based  on  the  specific  circumstances  of  each  state-
funded  program,  we  have  provided  general  interpretive
principles that apply uniformly in all Religion Clause cases.
At the same time, we have made clear that States enjoy a
degree of freedom to navigate the Clauses’ competing pro-
hibitions.  See, e.g., Cutter, 544 U. S., at 713, 719–720.  This
includes  choosing  not  to  fund  certain  religious  activity
where  States  have  strong,  establishment-related  reasons
for  not  doing  so.  See,  e.g.,  Locke,  540  U. S.,  at  719–722.
And,  States  have  freedom  to  make  this  choice  even  when
the Establishment Clause does not itself prohibit the State
from funding that activity.  Id., at 719 (“[T]here are some
state  actions  permitted  by  the  Establishment  Clause  but
not required by the Free Exercise Clause”).  The Court to-
day nowhere mentions, and I fear effectively abandons, this
longstanding doctrine.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Carson v. Makin. It contains legal arguments and references to previous cases, indicating it is part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>