<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

lxii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1065
Scott, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116
Scott v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1019
Scott; Lukan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1100
Scott v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1070,1075
Scott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116
Scott; Whiting v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1067
Scott & White Mem. Hosp.; United States ex rel. Weddington v.
1070
Scribner; Chaidez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127
Scully, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112
Sealed Defendant 2 v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1065
Sebastian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1005,1095
Secretary of Army; Cowhig v.
Secretary of HHS; Chicago v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036
Secretary of HHS v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. . . . 1,1095
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095
Secretary of HHS; Silo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1066
Secretary of HUD; Ferrell v.
1037
. . . . . . .
Secretary of Interior; Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn. v.
728
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of Interior; Public Lands Council v.
1066
Secretary of Labor; McDougal-Saddler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036,1084
Secretary of State of Fla.; Chandler v.
1102
Secretary of Treasury; Din v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Canterbury v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1108
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Lampson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1069
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Malladi v.
1004
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Rodriguez v.
1059
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Spain v.
1084
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Winsett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003
Securities and Exchange Comm’n; Teicher v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054
Security Finance Corp. v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095
Security Paciﬁc Financial Services, Inc.; White v.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
1068
Seddio v. Michaels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1061
Seeley v. McCaughtry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1017
Seling v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1101
Selman v. Sanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037
Sequoyah County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. Muldrow . . . . . . . . .
1049
Sequoyah County Rural Water Dist. No. 7; Muldrow v.
. . . . . . . .
1016
Serrano, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113
Shabazz v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shalala; Chicago v.
1036
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . 1,1095
Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.
1095
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shalala; Silo v.
344
Shanklin; Norfolk Southern R. Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094
Shashaty v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court

“retain autonomy to establish their own governmental pro-
cesses.”  Id., at 816.

The  significant  point  for  present  purposes  is  that  the
Court  in  Arizona  State  Legislature  recognized  that  what-
ever authority was responsible for redistricting, that entity
remained subject to constraints set forth in the State Con-
stitution.  The Court embraced the core principle espoused
in Hildebrant and Smiley “that redistricting is a legislative
function,  to  be  performed  in  accordance  with  the  State’s
prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the refer-
endum and the Governor’s veto.”  576 U. S., at 808; see also
id.,  at  840–841  (ROBERTS,  C. J.,  dissenting)  (recognizing
that Hildebrant and Smiley support the imposition of “some
constraints on the legislature”).  The Court dismissed the
argument that the Elections Clause divests state constitu-
tions of the power to enforce checks against the exercise of
legislative  power:  “Nothing  in  [the  Elections]  Clause  in-
structs, nor has this Court ever held, that a state legislature
may prescribe regulations on the time, place, and manner
of holding federal elections in defiance of provisions of the
State’s constitution.”  576 U. S., at 817–818 (majority opin-
ion).

The reasoning we unanimously embraced in Smiley com-
mands our continued respect: A state legislature may not
“create  congressional  districts  independently  of ”  require-
ments imposed “by the state constitution with respect to the
enactment of laws.”  285 U. S., at 373.

B

The legislative defendants and the dissent both contend
that, because the Federal Constitution gives state legisla-
tures  the  power  to  regulate  congressional  elections,  only
that  Constitution  can  restrain  the  exercise  of  that  power.
Brief for Petitioners 22; post, at 17 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).
The  legislative  defendants  cite  for  support  Federalist
No. 78,  which  explains  that  the  wielding  of  legislative
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Moore v. Harper. It delves into the balance of power between state constitutions and the federal government regarding redistricting.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 11–556.  Argued November 26, 2012—Decided June 24, 2013

Under Title VII, an employer’s liability for workplace harassment may
depend  on  the  status  of  the  harasser.    If  the  harassing  employee  is
the victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent
in controlling working conditions.  In cases in which the harasser is a
“supervisor,” however, different rules apply.  If the supervisor’s har-
assment  culminates  in  a  tangible  employment  action  (i.e.,  “a  signifi-
cant  change  in  employment  status,  such  as  hiring,  firing,  failing  to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or
a  decision  causing  a  significant  change  in  benefits,”  Burlington  In-
dustries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742, 761), the employer is  strictly
liable.    But  if  no  tangible  employment  action  is  taken,  the  employer
may  escape  liability  by  establishing,  as  an  affirmative  defense,  that
(1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any
harassing  behavior  and  (2)  that  the  plaintiff  unreasonably  failed  to
take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the
employer  provided.  Faragher  v.  Boca  Raton,  524  U. S.  775,  807;
Ellerth, supra, at 765.

Petitioner Vance, an African-American woman, sued her employer,
Ball State University (BSU) alleging that a fellow employee, Saundra
Davis, created a racially hostile work environment in violation of Ti-
tle  VII.    The  District  Court  granted  summary  judgment  to  BSU.    It
held that BSU was not vicariously liable for Davis’ alleged actions be-
cause Davis, who could not take tangible employment actions against
Vance, was not a supervisor.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Held: An  employee  is  a  “supervisor”  for  purposes  of  vicarious  liability
under  Title  VII  only  if  he  or  she  is  empowered  by  the  employer  to
take tangible employment actions against the victim.  Pp. 9–30.

(a) Petitioner errs in relying on the meaning of “supervisor” in gen-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

ALITO, J., dissenting

of  that.  A  subpoena  duces  tecum  permits  a  subpoenaed
individual  to  conduct  the  search  for  the  relevant  docu-
ments  himself,  without  law  enforcement  officers  entering
his  home  or  rooting  through  his  papers  and  effects.    As a
result,  subpoenas  avoid  the  many  incidental  invasions  of
privacy  that  necessarily  accompany  any  actual  search.
And  it  was  those  invasions  of  privacy—which,  although
incidental, could often be extremely intrusive and damag-
ing—that led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.

Neither  this  Court  nor  any  of  the  parties  have  offered
the  slightest  bit  of  historical  evidence  to  support  the  idea
that the Fourth Amendment originally applied to subpoe-
nas  duces  tecum  and  other  forms  of  compulsory  process.
That  is  telling,  for  as  I  have  explained,  these  forms  of
compulsory  process  were  a  feature  of  criminal  (and  civil)
procedure  well  known  to  the  Founders.    The  Founders
would  thus  have  understood  that  holding  the  compulsory
production  of  documents  to  the  same  standard  as  actual
searches and seizures would cripple the work of courts in
civil  and  criminal  cases  alike.  It would  be  remarkable  to
think  that,  despite  that  knowledge,  the  Founders  would
have  gone  ahead  and  sought  to  impose  such  a  require-
ment.  It would be even more incredible to believe that the
Founders  would  have  imposed  that  requirement  through
the  inapt  vehicle  of  an  amendment  directed  at  different
concerns.  But it would blink reality entirely to argue that
this  entire  process  happened  without  anyone  saying  the
least thing about it—not during the drafting of the Bill of
Rights,  not  during  any  of  the  subsequent  ratification
debates, and not for most of the century that followed.  If
the  Founders  thought  the  Fourth  Amendment  applied  to
the compulsory production of documents, one would imag-
ine that there would be some founding-era evidence of the
Fourth  Amendment  being  applied  to  the  compulsory  pro-
duction of documents.  Cf. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company  Accounting  Oversight  Bd.,  561  U. S.  477,  505
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It delves into the legal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's application to subpoenas duces tecum.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

Syllabus

fect such a determination might have.  P. 16.

715 F. 3d 716, affirmed.

BREYER,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  KENNEDY,
GINSBURG,  ALITO,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined,  and  in  which
THOMAS, J., joined as to all  but Part I–A.  THOMAS, J., filed an opinion
concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  the  judgment.    SCALIA, J., filed  a
dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and the list of justices involved in the case. This type of information is generally not considered part of the main body text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Justice Participation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MANHATTAN COMMUNITY ACCESS CORP. ET AL. v.
HALLECK ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 17–1702.  Argued February 25, 2019—Decided June 17, 2019

New  York  state  law  requires  cable  operators  to  set  aside  channels  on
their cable systems for public access.  Those channels are operated by
the cable operator unless the local government chooses to itself oper-
ate  the  channels  or  designates  a  private  entity  to  operate  the  chan-
nels.    New  York  City  (the  City)  has  designated  a  private  nonprofit
corporation, petitioner Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN), to
operate the public access channels on Time Warner’s cable system in
Manhattan.    Respondents  DeeDee  Halleck  and  Jesus  Papoleto
Melendez produced a film critical of MNN to be aired on MNN’s pub-
lic access channels.  MNN televised the film.  MNN later suspended
Halleck and Melendez from all MNN services and facilities.  The pro-
ducers  sued,  claiming  that  MNN  violated  their  First  Amendment
free-speech rights when it restricted their access to the public access
channels  because  of  the  content  of  their  film.    The  District  Court
dismissed the claim on the ground that MNN is not a state actor and
therefore is not subject to First Amendment constraints on its edito-
rial  discretion.    Reversing  in  relevant  part,  the  Second  Circuit  con-
cluded  that  MNN  is  a  state  actor  subject  to  First  Amendment  con-
straints.

Held: MNN is not a state actor subject to the First Amendment.  Pp. 5–

16.

(a) The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment prohibits only
governmental,  not  private,  abridgment  of  speech.    See,  e.g.,  Denver
Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U. S. 727,
737.  This Court’s state-action doctrine distinguishes the government
from individuals and private entities.  Pp. 5–14.

(1) A  private  entity  may  qualify  as  a  state  actor  when,  as  rele-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning or content of the case. They are informational in nature and not meant to be indexed as part of the document's body.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

7

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

consuming  obstacle  to  their  search,  in  the  form  of  a  trip
to  the  hospital  and  perhaps  a  wait  to  see  a  medical  pro-
fessional.
In  this  case,  for  example,  approximately  25
minutes  elapsed  between  the  time  the  police  stopped
McNeely and the time his blood was drawn.  App. 36, 38.

As noted, the fact that alcohol dissipates gradually from
the bloodstream does not diminish the compelling need for
a  search—critical  evidence  is  still  disappearing.    But  the
fact that the dissipation persists for some time means that
the police—although they may not be able to do anything
about  it  right  away—may  still  be  able  to  respond  to  the
ongoing destruction of evidence later on.

There  might,  therefore,  be  time  to  obtain  a  warrant  in
many  cases.  As  the  Court  explains,  police  can  often  re-
quest  warrants  rather  quickly  these  days.    At  least  30
States  provide  for  electronic  warrant  applications.    See
ante,  at  10–12,  and  n. 4.    In  many  States,  a  police  officer
can call a judge, convey the necessary information, and be
authorized  to  affix  the  judge’s  signature  to  a  warrant.
See, e.g., Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.8(b) (2012–2013); Alaska
Stat.  §12.35.015  (2012);  Idaho  Code  §§19–4404,  19–4406
(Lexis  2004);  Minn.  Rules  Crim.  Proc.  36.01–36.08  (2010
and  Supp.  2013);  Mont.  Code  Ann.  §46–5–222  (2012);  see

——————

facility,  not  police  officers  doing  so  by  the  side  of  the  road.    See
Schmerber  v.  California,  384  U. S.  757,  771–772  (1966)  (“Petitioner’s
blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment according to
accepted medical practices.  We are thus not presented with the serious
questions  which  would  arise  if  a  search  involving  use  of  a  medical
technique, even of the most rudimentary sort, were made by other than
medical  personnel  or  in  other  than  a  medical  environment—for  exam-
ple,  if  it  were  administered  by  police  in  the  privacy  of  the  station-
house”);  Brief  for  Respondent  53,  and  n.  21  (describing  roadside  blood
draws in Arizona).  A plurality of the Court suggests that my approach
could  make  roadside  blood  draws  a  more  attractive  option  for  police,
but such a procedure would pose practical difficulties and, as the Court
noted  in  Schmerber,  would  raise  additional  and  serious  Fourth
Amendment concerns.  See ante, at 14–15.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case McNeely v. Minnesota. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it unsuitable for indexing as general content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

31

Opinion of the Court

notion  that  fee  title  is  somehow  inherently  incompatible
with reservation status.  Maxey v. Wright, 54 S. W. 807, 810
(Indian Terr. 1900).

By now, Oklahoma’s next move will seem familiar.  Seek-
ing  to  sow  doubt  around  express  treaty  promises,  it  cites
some  stray  language  from  a  statute  that  does  not  control
here, a piece of congressional testimony there, and the scat-
tered  opinions  of  agency  officials  everywhere  in  between.
See, e.g., Act of July 31, 1882, ch. 360, 22 Stat. 179 (refer-
ring to Creek land as “Indian country” as opposed to an “In-
dian reservation”); S. Doc. No. 143, 59th Cong., 1st. Sess.,
33 (1906) (Chief of Choctaw Nation—which had an arrange-
ment similar to the Creek’s—testified that both Tribes “ob-
ject to being classified with the reservation Indians”); Dept.
of Interior, Census Office, Report on Indians Taxed and In-
dians Not Taxed in the U. S. 284 (1894) (Creeks and neigh-
boring Tribes were “not on the ordinary Indian reservation,
but on lands patented to them by the United States”).  Ok-
lahoma stresses that this Court even once called the Creek
lands a “dependent Indian community,” though it used that
phrase in passing and only to show that the Tribe’s “prop-
erty  and  affairs  were  subject  to  the  control  and  manage-
ment of that government”—a point that would also be true
if the lands were a reservation.  Creek Nation, 295 U. S., at
109.  Unsurprisingly given the Creek Nation’s nearly 200-
year occupancy of these lands, both sides have turned up a
few clues suggesting the label “reservation” either did or did
not apply.  One thing everyone can agree on is this history
is long and messy.

But the most authoritative evidence of the Creek’s rela-
tionship to the land lies not in these scattered references; it
lies in the treaties and statutes that promised the land to
the Tribe in the first place.  And, if not for the Tribe’s fee
title to its land, no one would question that these treaties
and statutes created a reservation.  So the State’s argument
inescapably  boils  down  to  the  untenable  suggestion  that,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the legal status of land held by the Creek Nation. It delves into historical treaties, statutes, and legal precedents to argue against Oklahoma's claim that the land is not a reservation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

BILSKI v. KAPPOS

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

law,” Chakrabarty, 447 U. S., at 316.  It appears, however,
that  regardless  of  how  one  construes  the  term  “useful
arts,” business methods are not included.

Noah  Webster’s  first  American  dictionary26  defined  the
term “art”  as the “disposition or modification of  things  by
human skill, to answer the purpose intended,” and differ-
entiated  between  “useful  or  mechanic”  arts,  on  the  one
hand,  and  “liberal  or  polite”  arts,  on  the  other.    1  An
American  Dictionary  of  the  English  Language  (1828)
(facsimile  edition)  (emphasis  added).    Although  other
dictionaries  defined  the  word  “art”  more  broadly,27  Web-
ster’s  definition  likely  conveyed  a  message  similar  to  the
meaning of the word “manufactures” in the earlier English
statute.  And  we  know  that  the  term  “useful  arts”  was
used  in  the  founding  era  to  refer  to  manufacturing  and
similar  applied  trades.28    See  Coulter,  The  Field  of  the

——————

26 Some  scholars  suggest  that  Webster’s  “close  proximity  to  the  Con-
stitutional  Convention  coupled  with  his  familiarity  with  the  delegates
makes it likely that he played some indirect role in the development” of
the  Constitution’s  Intellectual  Property  Clause—a  Clause  that  estab-
lished  not  only  the  power  to  create  patents  but  also  copyrights,  a
subject in which Webster had great interest.  Donner, Copyright Clause
of  the  U. S.  Constitution:  Why  Did  the  Framers  Include  It  With
Unanimous  Approval?    36  Am.  J.  Legal.  Hist.  361,  372  (1992).    But
there is no direct evidence of this fact.  See Walterscheid, Background
and Origin 40–41.

27 See,  e.g.,  1  S.  Johnson,  Dictionary  of  the  English  Language  (1773)
(reprint  1978)  (listing  as  definitions  of  an  “art”:“[t]he  power  of  doing
something  not  taught  by  nature  and  instinct,”  “[a]  science;  as,  the
liberal arts,” “[a] trade,” “[a]rtfulness; skill; dexterity,” “[c]unning,” and
“[s]peculation”).    One  might  question  the  breadth  of  these  definitions.
This  same  dictionary  offered  as  an  example  of  “doing  something  not
taught by nature and instinct,” the art of “dance”; and as an example of
a “trade,” the art of “making sugar.”  Ibid.

28 For examples of this usage, see Book of Trades or Library of Useful
Arts (1807) (describing in a three-volume work 68 trades, each of which
is  the  means  of  creating  a  product,  such  as  feather  worker  or  cork
cutter); 1 J. Bigelow, The Useful Arts Considered in Connexion with the
Applications  of  Science  (1840)  (surveying  a  history  of  what  we  would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case *Bilski v. Kappos*. It delves into the interpretation of "useful arts" in the context of patent law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

Opinion of the Court

without  shelter  in  Grants  Pass  was  “involuntarily  home-
less” because the city’s total homeless population outnum-
bered its “ ‘practically available’ ” shelter beds.  App. to Pet.
for Cert. 179a, 216a.  In fact, the court ruled, none of the
beds  at  Grants  Pass’s  charity-run  shelter  qualified  as
“available.”  They did not, the court said, both because that
shelter offers something closer to transitional housing than
“temporary  emergency  shelter,”  and  because  the  shelter
has rules requiring residents to abstain from smoking and
attend  religious  services.    Id.,  at  179a–180a.    The  Eighth
Amendment,  the  district  court  thus  concluded,  prohibited
Grants Pass from enforcing its laws against homeless indi-
viduals in the city.  Id., at 182a–183a.

A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant
part.  72 F. 4th, at 874–896.  The majority agreed with the
district  court  that  all  unsheltered  individuals  in  Grants
Pass qualify as “involuntarily homeless” because the city’s
homeless population exceeds “available” shelter beds.  Id.,
at 894.  And the majority further agreed that, under Mar-
tin,  the  homeless  there  cannot  be  punished  for  camping
with “rudimentary forms of protection from the elements.”
72 F. 4th, at 896.  In dissent, Judge Collins questioned Mar-
tin’s  consistency  with  the  Eighth  Amendment  and  la-
mented  its  “dire  practical  consequences”  for  the  city  and
others like it.  72 F. 4th, at 914 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

The  city  sought  rehearing  en  banc,  which  the  court  de-
nied over the objection of 17 judges who joined five separate
opinions.  Id., at 869, 924–945.  Judge O’Scannlain, joined
by  14  judges,  criticized  Martin’s  “jurisprudential  experi-
ment” as “egregiously flawed and deeply damaging—at war
with  the  constitutional  text,  history,  and  tradition.”    72
F. 4th, at 925, 926, n. 2.  Judge Bress, joined by 11 judges,
contended that Martin has “add[ed] enormous and unjusti-
fied complication to an  already extremely complicated set
of  circumstances.”  72  F. 4th,  at  945.    And  Judge  Smith,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Martin v. City of Boise. It delves into the legal arguments and court decisions regarding the Eighth Amendment and its application to homelessness.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 156 (1998)

165

Opinion of the Court

The rule that “interest follows principal” has been estab-
lished under English common law since at least the mid-
1700’s. Beckford v. Tobin, 1 Ves. Sen. 308, 310, 27 Eng. Rep.
1049, 1051 (Ch. 1749) (“[I]nterest shall follow the principal,
as the shadow the body”). Not surprisingly, this rule has
become ﬁrmly embedded in the common law of the various
States.5 The Court of Appeals in this case, two of the three

the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein,” it would
be improper for us sua sponte to raise and address the question answered
by Justice Souter.

5 E. g., Freeman v. Young, 507 So. 2d 109, 110 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (“The
earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and are
property just as the fund itself is property” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Pomona City School Dist. v. Payne, 9 Cal. App. 2d 510, 512, 50
P. 2d 822, 823 (1935) (“[O]bviously the interest accretions belong to such
owner”); Vidal Realtors of Westport, Inc. v. Harry Bennett & Assocs.,
Inc., 1 Conn. App. 291, 297–298, 471 A. 2d 658, 662 (1984) (“As long as
the attached fund is used for proﬁt, the proﬁt . . . is impounded for the
beneﬁt of the attaching creditor and is subject to the same ultimate dis-
position as the principal of which it is the incident” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Burnett v. Brito, 478 So. 2d 845, 849 (Fla. App. 1985)
(“[A]ny interest earned on interpleaded and deposited funds follows the
principal and shall be allocated to whomever is found entitled to the princi-
pal”); Morton Grove Park Dist. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 78
Ill. 2d 353, 362–363, 399 N. E. 2d 1295, 1299 (1980) (“The earnings on
the funds deposited are a mere incident of ownership of the fund itself ”);
B & M Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 501 N. E. 2d 401, 405 (Ind.
1986) (“[I]nterest earnings must follow the principal and be distributed
to the ultimate owners of the fund”); Uniﬁed School Dist. No. 490, Butler
County v. Board of County Commissioners of Butler County, 237 Kan. 6,
9, 697 P. 2d 64, 69 (1985) (“[I]nterest follows principal”); Pontiac School
Dist. v. City of Pontiac, 294 Mich. 708, 715–716, 294 N. W. 141, 144 (1940)
(“The generally understood and applied principles that interest is merely
an incident of the principal and must be accounted for”); State Highway
Comm’n v. Spainhower, 504 S. W. 2d 121, 126 (Mo. 1973) (“Interest earned
by a deposit of special funds is an increment accruing thereto” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Siroky v. Richland County, 271 Mont. 67, 74,
894 P. 2d 309, 313 (1995) (“[I]nterest earned belongs to the owner of the
funds that generated the interest”); Bordy v. Smith, 150 Neb. 272, 276, 34
N. W. 2d 331, 334 (1948) (“Once settled clearly and deﬁnitely whose money
the principal sum was, the interest necessarily belongs to that person as
an increment to the principal fund”); State ex rel. Board of County Com-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and excerpt from an opinion. It's likely part of a legal document and contains relevant legal information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

885

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5054.  Hooker  v.  Thurmer,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5056.  Flora  v.  Sheets,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5057.  Peterson  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  2  So.  3d  146.

No.  09–5058.  Patterson  v.  City  of  Chesapeake,  Virginia,
et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312
Fed.  Appx.  573.

No.  09–5059.  Harrod  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5060.  Fontenot  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5061.  Hakim  v.  Thomas,  Superintendent,  Lumber-
ton  Correctional  Institution.  Sup.  Ct.  N.  C.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5062.  Turner  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  880.

No.  09–5063.  Wilhelm  v.  Clark,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5064.  Toriola  v.  Appellate  Division,  Supreme
Court  of  New  York,  Second  Judicial  Department,  et  al.
App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.  N. Y.,  2d  Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  51  App.  Div.  3d  937,  856  N. Y.  S.  2d  874.

No.  09–5065.  Welch  v.  Charlan  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–5066.  Williams v.  McNeil, Secretary, Florida De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
No.  09–5067.  Watson  v.  Rozum,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional  Institution  at  Somerset.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5068.  Hallford  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

IANCU v. BRUNETTI

Opinion of BREYER, J.

clothing  line  that  includes  apparel  for  children  and  in-
fants.  Like  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  I  believe  the  answer  is
“yes,” though my reasons differ slightly from hers.

I
A

In  my  view,  a  category-based  approach  to  the  First
Amendment cannot adequately resolve the problem before
us.  I would place less emphasis on trying to decide whether
the  statute  at  issue  should  be  categorized  as  an  exam-
ple of “viewpoint discrimination,” “content discrimination,”
“commercial  speech,”  “government  speech,”  or  the  like.
Rather,  as  I  have  written  before,  I  believe  we  would  do
better to treat this Court’s speech-related categories not as
outcome-determinative  rules,  but  instead  as  rules  of
thumb.  See  Reed  v.  Town  of  Gilbert,  576  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2015) (opinion concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1).

After  all,  these  rules  are  not  absolute.  The  First
Amendment  is  not  the  Tax  Code.  Indeed,  even  when  we
consider a regulation that is ostensibly “viewpoint discrim-
inatory”  or  that  is  subject  to  “strict  scrutiny,”  we  some-
times find the regulation to be constitutional after weigh-
ing  the  competing  interests  involved.    See,  e.g.,  Morse  v.
Frederick,  551  U. S.  393,  397  (2007)  (“[S]chools  may  take
steps  to  safeguard  those  entrusted  to  their  care  from
speech  that  can  reasonably  be  regarded  as  encouraging
illegal drug use”); Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U. S.
433,  ___  (2015)  (slip  op.,  at  8)  (explaining  that  although
“ ‘it  is  the  rare  case’ ”  when  a  statute  satisfies  strict  scru-
tiny, “those cases do arise” (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504
U. S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion))).

Unfortunately,  the  Court  has  sometimes  applied  these
rules—especially  the  category  of  “content  discrimina-
tion”—too  rigidly.  In  a  number  of  cases,  the  Court  has
struck down what I believe are ordinary, valid regulations
that pose little or no threat to the speech interests that the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the case IANCU v. BRUNETTI. It delves into First Amendment considerations and the Court's approach to categorizing speech regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

354 (ED Ark. 1959).  It is thus unsurprising that the Court
found  that  Arkansas  teachers  would  feel  a  “constant  and
heavy”  pressure  “to  avoid  any  ties  which  might  displease
those  who  control  [their]  professional  destin[ies].”    Id.,  at
486; see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State
of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 604 (1967) (“When one must guess
what  conduct  or  utterance  may  lose  him  his  position,  one
necessarily will steer far wider of the [impermissible] zone”
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).    Because  Arkansas’s
purpose (ensuring teachers’ fitness) was “pursued by means
that  broadly  stifle  fundamental  personal  liberties,”  the
Court demanded that Arkansas “more narrowly achiev[e]”
its interest.  Shelton, 364 U. S., at 488.

Now  consider  this  Court’s  approach  in  Reed.  Reed  in-
volved  a  facial  challenge  to  a  Washington  law  permitting
the public disclosure of referendum petitions that included
signatories’ names and addresses.  561 U. S.,  at 190–191.
The  Court  found  that  Washington  had  a  number  of  other
mechanisms  in  place  to  pursue  its  stated  interest  in  pre-
venting  fraudulent  referendum  signatures.    For  instance,
the secretary of state was charged with verifying and can-
vassing the names on referendum petitions, advocates and
opponents of a measure could observe the canvassing pro-
cess, and citizens could challenge the secretary’s actions in
court.  Id., at 198.  Publicly disclosing referendum signato-
ries  was  thus  a  mere  backstop,  giving  citizens  the  oppor-
tunity to catch the secretary’s mistakes.  Had Washington
been required to achieve its interests narrowly, as in Shel-
ton,  it  is  unlikely  the  disclosure  requirement  would  have
survived.4

——————

4 For instance, the Court did not ask whether the public disclosure of
signatories’  names  and  addresses  was  “in  proportion  to  the”  govern-
ment’s interest in policing fraud.  Ante, at 15 (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Nor did it feel any need to respond to the dissent’s description
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It cites previous cases and analyzes legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

823

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–1491.  Wagenknecht  v.  Levin,  Ohio  Tax  Commis
sioner.  Sup.  Ct.  Ohio.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
121  Ohio  St.  3d  13,  901  N.  E.  2d  772.

No.  08–1492.  Willett  v.  West  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  App.
W.  Va.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  223  W.  Va.  394,  674
S.  E.  2d  602.

No.  08–1493.  Babb  v.  Watson  et  al.,  Personal  Repre
sentatives  of  the  Estate  of  Watson,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  S.  C.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1495.  Dunn  v.  Indiana.  Ct.  App.  Ind.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  888  N.  E.  2d  858.

No.  08–1496.  Gladkihs  v.  Colorado.  Dist.  Ct.  Colo.,  Arapa

hoe  County.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1499.  Fisher  v.  Colorado.  Sup.  Ct.  Colo.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  202  P.  3d  1186.

No.  08–1502.  Sareen  v.  Sareen  et  al.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.
N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 51 App.
Div.  3d  765,  858  N. Y.  S.  2d  285.

No.  08–1503.  Argo  v.  Tennessee  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1504.  Bothe  v.  Hansen.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  2d  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  996  So.  2d  860.

No.  08–1505.  Roach  v.  Roach.  Ct.  App.  Ariz.  Certiorari

denied.

No. 08–1508.  Kyung  Suh Kim et  al. v.  Synod  of Southern
California  and  Hawaii  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d  App.  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1510.  Grijalva  v.  Merit  Systems  Protection
Board.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
306  Fed.  Appx.  607.

No.  08–1511.  Gilley  v.  Monsanto  Co.,  Inc.,  et  al.  C.  A.
11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.
362.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, parties involved, courts, and dates. This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is more suitable for indexing as metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summaries/Legal Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Statement of THOMAS, J.

targeting and recommending these writings to users . . . Fa-
cebook  is  acting  as  ‘the  publisher  of  . . .  information  pro-
vided by another information content provider.’ ”  Id., at 76–
77 (Katzmann, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting §230(c)(1)).

Other examples abound.  One court granted immunity on
a design-defect claim concerning a dating application that
allegedly  lacked  basic  safety  features  to  prevent  harass-
ment and impersonation.  Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 Fed.
Appx.  586,  591  (CA2  2019),  cert.  denied,  589  U. S.  ——
(2019).  Another granted immunity on a claim that a social
media company defectively designed its product by creating
a  feature  that  encouraged  reckless  driving.  Lemmon  v.
Snap, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1107, 1113 (CD Cal. 2020).
A  common  thread  through  all  these  cases  is  that  the
plaintiffs were not necessarily trying to hold the defendants
liable “as the publisher or speaker” of third-party content.
§230(c)(1).  Nor did their claims seek to hold defendants li-
able for removing content in good faith.  §230(c)(2).  Their
claims rested instead on alleged product design flaws—that
is,  the  defendant’s  own  misconduct.  Cf.  Accusearch,  570
F. 3d,  at  1204  (Tymkovich,  J.,  concurring)  (stating  that
§230 should not apply when the plaintiff sues over a defend-
ant’s  “conduct  rather  than  for  the  content  of  the  infor-
mation”).  Yet courts, filtering their decisions through the
policy argument that “Section 230(c)(1) should be construed
broadly,” Force, 934 F. 3d, at 64, give defendants immunity.

II
Paring back the sweeping immunity courts have read into
§230  would  not  necessarily  render  defendants  liable  for
online misconduct.  It simply would give plaintiffs a chance
to raise their claims in the first place.  Plaintiffs still must
prove  the  merits  of  their  cases,  and  some  claims  will  un-
doubtedly fail.  Moreover, States and the Federal Govern-
ment are free to update their liability laws to make them
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or case analysis, specifically focusing on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

19

Opinion of the Court

Article III.”  Stern, 564 U. S., at 484.

2
This is not the first time we have considered whether the
Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial “in
the face of Congress’ decision to allow a non-Article III tri-
bunal to adjudicate” a statutory “fraud claim.”  492 U. S., at
37,  50.  We  did  so  in  Granfinanciera,  and  the  principles
identified in that case largely resolve this one.

Granfinanciera involved a statutory action for fraudulent
conveyance.  As codified in the Bankruptcy Code, the claim
permitted a trustee to void a transfer or obligation made by
the  debtor  before  bankruptcy  if  the  debtor  “received  less
than  a  reasonably  equivalent  value  in  exchange  for  such
transfer or obligation.”  11 U. S. C. §548(a)(2)(A) (1982 ed.,
Supp.  V).  Actions  for  fraudulent  conveyance  were  well
known at common law.  492 U. S., at 43.  Even when Con-
gress added these claims to the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,
see 92 Stat. 2600, it preserved parties’ rights to a trial by
jury, 492 U. S., at 49–50.  In 1984, however, Congress des-
ignated  fraudulent  conveyance  actions  “core  [bankruptcy]
proceedings”  and  authorized  non-Article  III  bankruptcy
judges to hear them without juries.  Id., at 50.

The  issue  in  Granfinanciera  was  whether  this  designa-
tion  was  permissible  under  the  public  rights  exception.
Ibid.  We explained that it was not.  Although Congress had
assigned  fraudulent  conveyance  claims  to  bankruptcy
courts, that assignment was not dispositive.  See id., at 52.
What  mattered,  we  explained,  was  the  substance  of  the
suit.  “[T]raditional legal claims” must be decided by courts,
“whether  they  originate  in  a  newly  fashioned  regulatory
scheme  or  possess  a  long  line  of  common-law  forebears.”
Ibid.  To determine whether the claim implicated the Sev-
enth Amendment, the Court applied the principles distilled
in Tull.  We examined whether the matter was “from [its]
nature subject to ‘a suit at common law.’ ”  492 U. S., at 56
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a case. It discusses legal precedents and the application of the Seventh Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BILSKI v. KAPPOS

Syllabus

15.

(e) Because  petitioners’  patent  application  can  be  rejected  under
the  Court’s  precedents  on  the  unpatentability  of  abstract  ideas,  the
Court  need  not  define  further  what  constitutes  a  patentable  “proc-
ess,”  beyond  pointing  to  the  definition  of  that  term  provided  in
§100(b)  and  looking  to  the  guideposts  in  Benson,  Flook,  and  Diehr.
Nothing  in  today’s  opinion  should  be  read  as  endorsing  the  Federal
Circuit’s past interpretations of §101.  See, e.g., State Street, 49 F. 3d,
at 1373.  The appeals court may have thought it needed to make the
machine-or-transformation  test  exclusive  precisely  because  its  case
law  had  not  adequately  identified  less  extreme  means  of  restricting
business  method  patents.    In  disapproving  an  exclusive  machine-or-
transformation  test,  this  Court  by  no  means  desires  to  preclude  the
Federal  Circuit’s  development  of  other  limiting  criteria  that  further
the  Patent  Act’s  purposes  and  are  not  inconsistent  with  its  text.
P. 16.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except for Parts II–
B–2 and II–C–2.  ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined the
opinion in full, and SCALIA, J., joined except for Parts II–B–2 and II–C–
2.  STEVENS, J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment,  in  which
GINSBURG,  BREYER,  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,  joined.    BREYER,  J.,  filed  an
opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment,  in  which  SCALIA,  J.,  joined  as  to
Part II.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the syllabus and the beginning of the opinion. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

Syllabus

  In 1992, §2 litigation challenging the State of Alabama’s then-exist-
ing districting map resulted in the State’s first majority-black district
and, subsequently, the State’s first black Representative since 1877.
Alabama’s congressional map has remained remarkably similar since
that litigation.  Following the 2020 decennial census, a group of plain-
tiffs led by Alabama legislator Bobby Singleton sued the State, arguing
that the State’s population growth rendered the existing congressional
map  malapportioned  and  racially  gerrymandered  in  violation  of  the
Equal  Protection  Clause.    While  litigation  was  proceeding,  the  Ala-
bama Legislature’s Committee on Reapportionment drew a new dis-
tricting map that would reflect the distribution of the prior decade’s
population growth across the State.  The resulting map largely resem-
bled the 2011 map on which it was based and similarly produced only
one  district  in  which  black  voters  constituted  a  majority.    That  new
map was signed into law as HB1.
  Three groups of Alabama citizens brought suit seeking to stop Ala-
bama’s Secretary of State from conducting congressional elections un-
der HB1.  One group (Caster plaintiffs) challenged HB1 as invalid un-
der §2.  Another group (Milligan plaintiffs) brought claims under §2
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  And
a third group (the Singleton plaintiffs) amended the complaint in their
ongoing litigation to challenge HB1 as a racial gerrymander under the
Equal Protection Clause.  A three-judge District Court was convened,
and the Singleton and Milligan actions were consolidated before that
District  Court  for  purposes  of  preliminary  injunction  proceedings,
while  Caster  proceeded  before  one  of  the  judges  on  a  parallel  track.
After an extensive hearing, the District Court concluded in a 227-page
opinion  that  the  question  whether  HB1  likely  violated  §2  was  not
“close.”  The Court preliminarily enjoined Alabama from using HB1 in
forthcoming elections.  The same relief was ordered in Caster.

Held: The  Court  affirms  the District  Court’s  determination  that  plain-
tiffs  demonstrated  a  reasonable  likelihood  of  success  on  their  claim
that HB1 violates §2.  Pp. 9–22, 25–34.

(a) The District Court faithfully applied this Court’s precedents in

concluding that HB1 likely violates §2.  Pp. 9–15.

(1) This  Court  first  addressed  the  1982  amendments  to  §2  in
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, and has for the last 37 years eval-
uated §2 claims using the Gingles framework.  Gingles described the
“essence of a §2 claim” as when “a certain electoral law, practice, or
structure  interacts  with  social  and  historical  conditions  to  cause  an
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters.”  Id.,
at 47.  That occurs where an “electoral structure operates to minimize
or cancel out” minority voters’ “ability to elect their preferred candi-
dates.”  Id., at 48.  Such a risk is greatest “where minority and majority
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case, providing a summary of the case and its legal issues.  It is a structured legal document and not the main body of the case opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court

(some internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 43–50.
A survey of English cases showed that “actions to recover
. . . fraudulent transfers were often brought at law in late
18th-century England.”  Id., at 43.  The remedy the trustee
sought was also one “traditionally provided by law courts.”
Id., at 49.  Fraudulent conveyance actions were thus “quin-
tessentially suits at common law.”  Id., at 56.

We  also  considered  whether  these  actions  were  “closely
intertwined” with the bankruptcy regime.  Id., at 54.  Some
bankruptcy  claims,  such  as  “creditors’  hierarchically  or-
dered claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res,” id.,
at 56, are highly interdependent and require coordination.
Resolving such claims fairly is only possible if they are all
submitted at once to a single adjudicator.  Otherwise, par-
ties with lower priority claims can rush to the courthouse
to seek payment before higher priority claims exhaust the
estate, and an orderly disposition of a bankruptcy is impos-
sible.  Other claims, though, can be brought in standalone
suits, because they are neither prioritized nor subordinated
to related claims.  Since fraudulent conveyance actions fall
into  that  latter  category,  we  concluded  that  these  actions
were not “closely intertwined” with the bankruptcy process.
Id., at 54.  We also noted that Congress had already author-
ized jury trials for certain bankruptcy matters, demonstrat-
ing that jury trials were not generally “incompatible” with
the overall regime.  Id., at 61–62 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

We accordingly concluded that fraudulent conveyance ac-
tions were akin to “suits at common law” and were not in-
separable from the bankruptcy process.  Id., at 54, 56.  The
public rights exception therefore did not apply, and a jury
was required.

3
Granfinanciera effectively decides this case.  Even when
an  action  “originate[s]  in  a  newly  fashioned  regulatory
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text from a court opinion, specifically discussing the applicability of a jury trial in a fraudulent conveyance action.  It cites legal precedent and analyzes the nature of the action in relation to bankruptcy law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

Opinion of the Court

States has explained in the past, “recognition of concurrent
state  jurisdiction”  could  “facilitate  effective  law  enforce-
ment  on  the  Reservation,  and  thereby  further  the  federal
and tribal interests in protecting Indians and their property
against the actions of non-Indians.”  Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae in Arizona v. Flint, O. T. 1988, No. 603,
p. 6.  The situation might be different if state jurisdiction
ousted federal jurisdiction.  But because the State’s juris-
diction  would  be  concurrent  with  federal  jurisdiction,  a
state prosecution would not preclude an earlier or later fed-
eral prosecution and would not harm the federal interest in
protecting Indian victims.

Third, the State has a strong sovereign interest in ensur-
ing  public  safety  and  criminal  justice  within  its  territory,
and in protecting all crime victims.  See Dibble, 21 How., at
370.  The State also has a strong interest in ensuring that
criminal  offenders—especially  violent  offenders—are  ap-
propriately punished and do not harm others in the State.
The State’s interest in protecting crime victims includes
both  Indian  and  non-Indian  victims.    If  his  victim  were  a
non-Indian,  Castro-Huerta  could  be  prosecuted  by  the
State,  as  he  acknowledges.  But  because  his  victim  is  an
Indian, Castro-Huerta says that he is free from state pros-
ecution.  Castro-Huerta’s  argument  would  require  this
Court to treat Indian victims as second-class citizens.  We
decline to do so.7

——————

7 Castro-Huerta notes that many tribes were enemies of States in the
1700s and 1800s.  The theory appears to be that States (unlike the Fed-
eral Government) cannot be trusted to fairly and aggressively prosecute
crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in 2022.  That theory
is misplaced for at least two reasons.  First, the State’s jurisdiction would
simply be concurrent with, not exclusive of, the Federal Government’s.
If concurrent state jurisdiction somehow poses a problem, Congress can
seek to alter it.  Second, many tribes were also opposed to the Federal
Government  at  least  as  late  as  the  Civil  War.    Indeed,  some  of  those
tribes, including the Cherokees, held black slaves and entered into trea-
ties with the Confederate government.  A. Gibson, Native Americans and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in the case of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
50  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

Aug. 13, 1853)); see E. Ruben & S. Cornell, Firearm Region-
alism and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case
Law in Context, 125 Yale L. J. Forum 121, 130, n. 53 (2015).
And one scholar who canvassed 19th-century newspapers—
which  routinely  reported  on  local  judicial  matters—found
only a handful of other examples in Massachusetts and the
District  of  Columbia,  all  involving  black  defendants  who
may have been targeted for selective or pretextual enforce-
ment.  See  R.  Leider,  Constitutional  Liquidation,  Surety
Laws, and the Right To Bear Arms 15–17, in New Histories
of Gun Rights and Regulation (J. Blocher, J. Charles, & D.
Miller eds.) (forthcoming); see also Brief for Professor Rob-
ert Leider et al. as Amici Curiae 31–32.  That is surely too
slender a reed on which to hang a historical tradition of re-
stricting the right to public carry.25

Respondents also argue that surety statutes were severe
restrictions  on  firearms  because  the  “reasonable  cause  to
fear”  standard  was  essentially  pro forma,  given  that
“merely carrying firearms in populous areas breached the
peace” per se.  Brief for Respondents 27.  But that is a coun-
terintuitive reading of the language that the surety statutes
actually used.  If the mere carrying of handguns breached
the peace, it would be odd to draft a surety statute requiring
a complainant to demonstrate “reasonable cause to fear an
injury,  or  breach  of  the  peace,”  Mass.  Rev.  Stat.,  ch.  134,
§16,  rather  than  a  reasonable  likelihood  that  the  arms-
bearer carried a covered weapon.  After all, if it was the na-
ture  of  the  weapon  rather  than  the  manner  of  carry  that

——————

25 The dissent speculates that the absence of recorded cases involving
surety laws may simply “show that these laws were normally followed.”
Post, at 45.  Perhaps.  But again, the burden rests with the government
to  establish  the  relevant  tradition  of  regulation,  see supra,  at  15,  and,
given all of the other features of surety laws that make them poor ana-
logues to New York’s proper-cause standard, we consider the barren rec-
ord of enforcement to be simply one additional reason to discount their
relevance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing historical context and legal precedents related to firearm regulations. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xliv

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Luna v. San Bernardino County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lynas v. Lynas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
M. v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
M.; Pennsylvania v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MacDonald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Macemon v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MacFarlane; Lehman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mack v. Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mack v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mack v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mackay v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Madden v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maddock; Kikuyama v.
Madrid; Marsh v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mafrige v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maguire v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mahon v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mahoney; Byers v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mahoney v. Gollehon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mahoney; Gollehon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maine Bureau of Ins.; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maine Dept. of Human Services; Marcello v.
Maine State Harness Racing Comm’n; Tambolleo v. . . . . . . . . . . .
Mainini, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Majors v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maldonado-Olivas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Malgoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Malladi v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maloney; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maloney; DeNictolis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Malowney v. Butterworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mamaroneck; Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mancillas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mangiardi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mann v. Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mann v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mansilla-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mantello; Mitchell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Manthei v. Bogan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Manzanares v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mapoy v. Carroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marcello v. Maine Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
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1106
1104
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1027
1079,1145
1134
1009
1053
1122
1132
1075
1124
1126
1042
1102
1068
1085
1137
1061
1044
1069
1075
1074
1055
1094
1005
1060
1083
1008
1011
1137
1040
1132
1026
1018
1102
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely found at the beginning of a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U85

[09-14-00 16:49:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 236 (1998)

261

Scalia, J., dissenting

Of course even if one accepts that the two factors the
Court alludes to (procedural ruling plus absence of full
brieﬁng or argument) reduce House’s stare decisis effect, one
must still acknowledge that its stare decisis effect is in-
creased by the fact that it was a statutory holding. The
Court does not contend that stare decisis is utterly inappli-
cable, and so it must come up with some reason for ignoring
it.
Its reason is that we have “disregarded” House in prac-
tice. Ante, at 252. The opinions it cites for this proposi-
tion, however, not only fail to mention House; they fail to
mention the jurisdictional issue to which House pertains.
And “we have repeatedly held that the existence of unad-
dressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect.”
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 352, n. 2 (1996) (emphasis
added). Surely it constitutes “precedential effect” to reduce
the stare decisis effect of one of the Court’s holdings.
It is
signiﬁcant, moreover, that when Members of the Court have
discussed House or the jurisdictional effect of a COA denial,
they have agreed that jurisdiction is not available under
§ 1254. See Davis v. Jacobs, 454 U. S. 911, 912 (1981) (Ste-
vens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); id., at 916–917
(Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Powell, J., dis-
senting); Jeffries v. Barksdale, 453 U. S. 914, 915–916 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Powell, J., dis-
senting). The Court’s new approach to unaddressed juris-
dictional defects is perhaps the second point for which the
present opinion will be remembered.

While there is scant reason for denying stare decisis effect
to House, there is special reason for according it: the reliance
of Congress upon an unrepudiated decision central to the
procedural scheme it was creating. Section 102 of AEDPA
continues a long tradition of provisions enacted by Congress
that limit appellate review of petitions.
In 1908, Congress
required a certiﬁcate of probable cause in habeas corpus
cases involving state prisoners before an appeal would lie to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia in the case 524 U.S. 236 (1998).  It discusses the legal precedent set by the case of House and its relevance to the current case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

THOMAS, J., dissenting

to  legislate  in  respect  to  Indian  tribes,”  United  States  v.
Lara, 541 U. S. 193, 200 (2004).  Although Seminole Tribe
recognized  that  States  had  been  “divested  of  virtually  all
authority  over  Indian  commerce  and  Indian  tribes,”  517
U. S., at 62, the Court nonetheless held that “state sover-
eign immunity . . . is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when
the subject of the suit is an area . . . that is under the exclu-
sive  control  of  the  Federal  Government,”  id.,  at  72.  That
“the  Constitution  vests  in  Congress  complete  lawmaking
authority  over  a  particular  area,”  we  explained,  does  not
implicitly  authorize  Congress  to  abrogate  immunity  with
respect to that power.  Ibid.5

Nor is the answer different when the exclusive federal ex-
ercise of a particular power is reinforced by an explicit di-
vestment of state authority under Article I, §10.  Our prec-
edents  teach  that  whenever  a  power
is  “exercised
exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken
from  the  State  Legislatures,  as  if  they  had  been  expressly
forbidden to act on it.”  Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat.
122,  193  (1819)  (Marshall,  C. J.,  for  the  Court)  (emphasis
added).  Whether or not a prohibition on state power also
appears  in  Article  I,  §10,  is  irrelevant  when  deciding
whether  the  Constitution  has  granted  Congress  power  to
subject nonconsenting States to private suits.

Second, even if express textual divestment of state power
were  relevant,  Torres  and  the  Court  incorrectly  conclude
that the specific divestments listed in Article I, §10, “pro-
vide strong evidence” supporting “a complete delegation of
authority to the Federal Government to provide for the com-
mon defense.”  Ante, at 7.  States obviously have no author-
ity to take certain actions specified in Article I, §10.  They

——————

5 It  is  true  that  Seminole  Tribe  purportedly  addressed  congressional
abrogation  of  sovereign  immunity,  rather  than  plan-of-the-Convention
waiver.  But its logic applies equally to the latter context, especially given
the murky line that our precedents draw between the two concepts.  See
supra, at 4.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to state sovereignty and federal power.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

fixed payments is not a trust because the promise “will not
change, regardless of how well or poorly the [trust] is man-
aged.”  Ante, at 4.  That does not follow (a promise of pay-
ment differs from an actual payment) and it does not dis-
prove a trust.  Trusts vary in their terms, to be sure.  See
Bogert & Bogert §181 (“The settlor has great freedom in the
selection of the beneficiaries and their interests”).  But re-
gardless whether a trust creates a “present interest” in “im-
mediate enjoyment” of the trust property or “a future inter-
est” in “receiv[ing] trust assets or benefits at a later time,”
the beneficiary “always” has an “equitable” stake.  Ibid.

Second, the Court states that “the employer, not plan par-
ticipants, receives any surplus left over after all of the ben-
efits are paid” and “the employer, not plan participants, is
on the hook for plan shortfalls.”  Ante, at 4; see also ante,
at 7  (noting  that  “the  federal  Pension  Benefit  Guaranty
Corporation  is  required  by  law  to  pay”  some  benefits  if  a
plan  fails).   But  that  does  not  distinguish  ERISA  from
standard  trust  law,  either.    It  does  not  matter  that  other
parties besides beneficiaries may have a residual stake in
trust assets; a beneficiary with a life-estate interest in pay-
ments  from  a  trust  still  has  an  equitable  interest.    See
Bogert  &  Bogert  §706.    Even  life-beneficiaries  may  “re-
quir[e]” the trustee “to pay the trust the amount necessary
to place the trust account in the position in which it would
have  been,  had  the  [trustee’s  fiduciary]  duty  been  per-
formed.”  Ibid.  If anything, petitioners’ equitable interests
are stronger than those of their common-law counterparts;
the Plan Document provides petitioners a residual interest
in the pension fund’s assets even after the trust terminates.
See Record in No. 13–cv–2687, Doc. 107–1, at 75.

Nor  is  it  relevant  whether  additional  parties  (including
an insurance carrier) are “on the hook” for plan shortfalls
after a loss occurs.  Cf. ante, at 4, 6, 7, 8, n. 2.  The Court
appears to conclude that insurance (or other protections to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the classification of a specific type of retirement plan.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

RUCHO ET AL. v. COMMON CAUSE ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 18–422.  Argued March 26, 2019—Decided June 27, 2019*

Voters and other plaintiffs in North Carolina and Maryland filed suits
challenging  their  States’  congressional  districting  maps  as  unconsti-
tutional  partisan  gerrymanders.    The  North  Carolina  plaintiffs
claimed that the State’s districting plan discriminated against Demo-
crats,  while  the  Maryland  plaintiffs  claimed  that  their  State’s  plan
discriminated  against  Republicans.    The  plaintiffs  alleged  violations
of  the  First  Amendment,  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  of  the  Four-
teenth Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, §2.  The Dis-
trict Courts in both cases ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the de-
fendants appealed directly to this Court.

Held: Partisan  gerrymandering  claims  present  political  questions  be-

yond the reach of the federal courts.  Pp. 6–34.

(a) In these cases, the Court is asked to decide an important ques-
tion of constitutional law.  Before it does so, the Court “must find that
the  question  is  presented  in  a  ‘case’  or  ‘controversy’  that  is  . . .  ‘of  a
Judiciary  Nature.’ ”  DaimlerChrysler  Corp.  v.  Cuno,  547  U. S.  332,
342.  While it is “the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, some-
times the law is that the Judiciary cannot entertain a claim because
it  presents  a  nonjusticiable  “political  question,”  Baker  v.  Carr,  369
U. S.  186,  217.    Among  the  political  question  cases  this  Court  has
identified are those that lack “judicially discoverable and manageable
standards  for  resolving  [them].”  Ibid.  This  Court’s  partisan  gerry-
mandering  cases  have  left  unresolved  the  question  whether  such
claims  are  claims  of  legal  right,  resolvable  according  to  legal  princi-

——————

*Together with No. 18–726, Lamone et al. v. Benisek et al., on appeal

from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview for readers and are not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the full text of the court's analysis.
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

School, 533 U. S. 98, 106 (2001).
  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  contexts  that  do  not  fall
under  the  “forum”  rubric.    For  one,  there  are  contexts  in
which  the  government  is  simply  engaging  in  its  own
speech and thus has freedom to select the views it prefers.
See, e.g., Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veter-
ans,  Inc.,  576  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2015)  (slip  op.,  at  6–7)
(specialty license plates); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
555  U. S.  460,  467–469,  481  (2009)  (privately  donated
permanent  monuments  in  a  public  park).1    In  addition,
there  are  purely  private  spaces,  where  the  First  Amend-
ment  is  (as  relevant  here)  inapplicable.    The  First
Amendment leaves a private store owner (or homeowner),
for  example,  free  to  remove  a  customer  (or  dinner  guest)
for  expressing  unwanted  views.    See,  e.g.,  Lloyd  Corp.  v.
Tanner, 407 U. S. 551, 569–570 (1972).  In these settings,
there  is  no  First  Amendment  right  against  viewpoint
discrimination.
  Here,  respondents  alleged  viewpoint  discrimination.
App. 39.  So a key question in this case concerns what the
Manhattan  public-access  channels  are:  a  public  forum  of
some kind, in which a claim alleging viewpoint discrimina-
tion  would  be  cognizable,  or  something  else,  such  as  gov-
ernment speech or purely private property, where picking
favored  viewpoints  is  appropriately  commonplace.2    Nei-
ther  MNN  nor  the  majority  suggests  that  this  is  an  in-
——————

1 That  does  not  mean  that no  restrictions  apply at  all  to  the  govern-
ment’s expression in such spaces, but it does mean that the government
can  pick  and  choose  among different  views.    See  Walker,  576  U. S.,  at
___, ___–___ (slip op., at 6, 17–18); Summum, 555 U. S., at 468.

2 The channels are not, of course, a physical place.  Under the Court’s
precedents, that makes no difference: Regardless of whether something
“is  a  forum  more  in  a  metaphysical  than  in  a  spatial  or  geographic
sense,  . . .  the  same  principles  are  applicable.”    Rosenberger  v.  Rector
and  Visitors  of  Univ.  of  Va.,  515  U. S.  819,  830  (1995)  (treating  “Stu-
dent Activities Fund” as the forum at issue and citing cases in which a
school’s mail system and a charity drive were the relevant forums).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and delves into legal arguments regarding viewpoint discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

The upshot of these directions for our case is straightfor-
ward.  No one questions that a state court’s harmless-error
determination  qualifies  as  an  adjudication  on  the  merits
under  AEDPA.  See  Davis  v.  Ayala,  576  U. S.  257,  269
(2015);  Fry  v.  Pliler,  551  U. S.  112,  119  (2007);  Early  v.
Packer, 537 U. S. 3, 10–11 (2002) (per curiam).  No one dis-
putes that such a decision exists here.  Nor does Mr. Dav-
enport pursue any claim to relief under § 2254(d)(2).  From
this,  it  follows  that  he  must  satisfy  § 2254(d)(1)  to  secure
federal  habeas  relief.    To  be  sure,  where  Brecht  is  impli-
cated a federal court must also ensure a habeas petitioner
has carried his burden under its terms before granting re-
lief.  But in cases like ours satisfying Brecht is only a nec-
essary, not a sufficient, condition to relief.  AEDPA too must
be satisfied.  The Sixth Circuit erred in holding otherwise.

A

Some background helps explain this arrangement.  From
the  founding,  Congress  authorized  federal  courts  to  issue
habeas writs to federal custodians.  § 14, 1 Stat. 81–82.  Af-
ter the Civil War, Congress extended this authority, allow-
ing federal courts to issue habeas writs to state custodians
as well.  See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
But these statutes used permissive rather than mandatory
language; federal courts had the “power to” grant writs of
habeas corpus in certain circumstances.  That same struc-
ture lives on in contemporary statutes, which provide that
federal courts “may” grant habeas relief “as law and justice
require.”  28  U. S. C.  §§ 2241,  2243;  Wright  v.  West,  505
U. S. 277, 285 (1992) (plurality opinion).

Over  the  centuries,  a  number  of  writs  of  habeas  corpus
evolved at common law to serve a number of different func-
tions.  See Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 97–98 (1807); 3
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 129–
131 (1768).  But the most notable among these writs was
that  of  habeas  corpus  ad  subjiciendum,  often  called  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to habeas corpus petitions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

95

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered the main body text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

at 614.  Because no secondary school (secular or sectarian)
is eligible for benefits, the state court’s ruling neither treats
petitioners differently based on religion nor burdens their
religious exercise.  See ante, at 2–6 (GINSBURG, J., dissent-
ing).  Petitioners remain free to send their children to the
religious school of their choosing and to exercise their faith.
To be sure, petitioners may want to apply for scholarships
and  would  prefer  that  Montana  subsidize  their  children’s
religious education.  But this Court had never before held
unconstitutional  government  action  that  merely  failed  to
benefit religious exercise.  “The crucial word in the consti-
tutional text is ‘prohibit’: ‘For the Free Exercise Clause is
written in terms of what the government cannot do to the
individual,  not  in  terms  of  what  the  individual  can  exact
from  the  government.’ ”    Lyng,  485  U. S.,  at  451  (quoting
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).    Put  another  way,  the  Constitution  does  not
compel Montana to create or maintain a tax subsidy.

Notably, petitioners did not allege that the no-aid provi-
sion itself caused their harm or that invalidating the entire
tax-credit scheme would create independent constitutional
concerns.  Even now, petitioners disclaim a facial challenge
to the no-aid provision.  Reply Brief 8, 20–22.  Petitioners
thus have no cognizable as-applied claim arising from the
disparate treatment of religion, because there is no longer
a program to which Montana’s no-aid provision can apply.
Nor  is  it  enough  that  petitioners might  wish  that  Mon-
tana’s no-aid provision were no longer good law.  Petitioners
identify no disparate treatment traceable to the state con-
stitutional  provision  that  they  challenge  because  the  tax-
credit program no longer operates.  See  Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41–42, 44–
46 (1976).1  Short of ordering Montana to create a religious

——————

1 To  revive  their  as-applied  challenge,  petitioners  rely  on  Griffin  v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in a case before the Supreme Court of the United States.  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a state's tax credit program and its implications for religious schools.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 165 (2010)

167

Opinion of the Court

Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, ar
gued the cause for respondents.  With him on the brief were
John S. Wright and Michael C. Wertheimer, Assistant Attor
neys General, Jesse S. Reyes, Assistant Attorney General of
Massachusetts,  Mary  E.  Grover,  Lisa  Fink,  and  Stephen  L.
Teichler.*

Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
The  Federal  Power  Act  (FPA  or  Act),  41  Stat.  1063,  as
amended,  16  U. S. C.  § 791a  et  seq.,  authorizes  the  Federal
Energy  Regulatory  Commission  (FERC  or  Commission)  to
superintend  the  sale  of  electricity  in  interstate  commerce
and  provides  that  all  wholesale-electricity  rates  must  be
“just  and  reasonable, ”  § 824d(a).  Under  this  Court’s
Mobile-Sierra doctrine, FERC must presume that a rate set
by  “a  freely  negotiated  wholesale-energy  contract”  meets
the  statutory  “just  and  reasonable”  requirement.  Morgan
Stanley  Capital  Group  Inc.  v.  Public  Util.  Dist.  No.  1  of
Snohomish  Cty.,  554  U. S.  527,  530  (2008).  “The  presump
tion  may  be  overcome  only  if  FERC  concludes  that  the
contract seriously harms the public interest.”  Ibid.

This  case  stems  from  New  England’s  difﬁculties  in  main
taining the reliability of its energy grid.  In 2006, after sev
eral  attempts  by  the  Commission  and  concerned  parties  to

*Briefs  of  amici  curiae  urging  reversal  were  ﬁled  for  the  Electric
Power  Supply  Association  et  al.  by  Paul  D.  Clement,  Ashley  C.  Parrish,
David G. Tewksbury, David B. Johnson, Barry Russell, Timm Abendroth,
Peter  W.  Brown,  and  Daniel  W.  Douglass;  for  Morgan  Stanley  Capital
Group,  Inc.,  et  al.  by  Walter  Dellinger,  Sri  Srinivasan,  and  Kathryn  E.
Tarbert;  and  for  Colin  C.  Blaydon  et  al.  by  Richard  P.  Bress,  Michael  J.
Gergen, and Stephanie S. Lim.

Briefs  of  amici  curiae  urging  afﬁrmance  were  ﬁled  for  the  American
Public Power Association et al. by Scott H. Strauss, Susan N. Kelly, Wal
lace  F.  Tillman,  and  Richard  Meyer;  for  Public  Citizen,  Inc.,  et  al.  by
Scott  L.  Nelson,  Lynn  Hargis,  and  Barbara  Jones;  and  for  the  California
Public Utilities Commission by Kevin K. Russell, Frank R. Lindh, Eliza
beth M. McQuillan, and Karen P. Paull.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the names of justices involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

GORSUCH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–842
_________________

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,
PETITIONER v. MARIA T. VULLO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 30, 2024]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring.
I  write  separately  to  explain  my  understanding  of  the
Court’s opinion, which I join in full.  Today we reaffirm a
well-settled principle:  “A government official cannot coerce
a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on
her  behalf.”  Ante,  at  11.  As  the  Court  mentions,  many
lower courts have taken to analyzing this kind of coercion
claim under a four-pronged “multifactor test.”  Ibid.  These
tests, the Court explains, might serve “as a useful, though
nonexhaustive,  guide.”  Ante,  at  12.  But  sometimes  they
might not.  Cf. Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, 598 U. S. 175,
205–207 (2023) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment).  In-
deed, the Second Circuit’s decision to break up its analysis
into discrete parts and “tak[e] the [complaint’s] allegations
in  isolation”  appears  only  to  have  contributed  to  its  mis-
taken conclusion that the National Rifle Association failed
to state a claim.  Ante, at 15.  Lower courts would therefore
do well to heed this Court’s directive:  Whatever value these
“guideposts”  serve,  they  remain  “just”  that  and  nothing
more.  Ante,  at  12.  “Ultimately,  the  critical”  question  is
whether the plaintiff has “plausibly allege[d] conduct that,
viewed in context, could be reasonably understood to convey
a threat of adverse government action in order to punish or
suppress the plaintiff ’s speech.”  Ante, at 12, 19.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the legal principle of government coercion regarding speech and critiques the lower court's application of a multifactor test in a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U50

[09-26-01 10:29:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 473 (2000)

485

Opinion of the Court

nents, one directed at the underlying constitutional claims
and one directed at the district court’s procedural holding.
Section 2253 mandates that both showings be made before
the court of appeals may entertain the appeal. Each compo-
nent of the § 2253(c) showing is part of a threshold inquiry,
and a court may ﬁnd that it can dispose of the application in
a fair and prompt manner if it proceeds ﬁrst to resolve the
issue whose answer is more apparent from the record and
arguments. The recognition that the “Court will not pass
upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground
upon which the case may be disposed of,” Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), allows and
encourages the court to ﬁrst resolve procedural issues. The
Ashwander rule should inform the court’s discretion in this
regard.

In this case, Slack did not attempt to make a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right, instead ar-
guing only that the District Court’s procedural rulings were
wrong. We will not attempt to determine whether Slack
could make the required showing of constitutional error, for
the issue was neither briefed nor presented below because
of the view that the CPC, rather than COA, standards ap-
plied.
It will be necessary to consider the matter upon any
remand for further proceedings. We will, however, address
the second component of the § 2253(c) inquiry, whether ju-
rists of reason could conclude that the District Court’s dis-
missal on procedural grounds was debatable or incorrect.
The issue has been discussed in the briefs presented to us; it
is the question upon which we granted certiorari; and its
resolution would end the case, were we to decide the matter
in the State’s favor.

The District Court dismissed claims Slack failed to raise
in his 1991 petition based on its conclusion that Slack’s 1995
petition was a second or successive habeas petition. This
conclusion was wrong. A habeas petition ﬁled in the district
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses procedural matters related to a habeas petition and cites relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

23

Opinion of the Court

it does its best to push aside all but one of the circumstances
we discuss.  It entirely rejects three of them: the size of the
burden imposed by a challenged rule, see post, at 22–23, the
landscape of voting rules both in 1982 and in the present,
post, at 24–25,15 and the availability of other ways to vote,
post, at 23–24.  Unable to bring itself to completely reject
consideration  of the  state interests  that  a  challenged  rule
serves, the dissent tries to diminish the significance of this
circumstance as much as possible.  See post, at 26–29.  Ac-
cording to the dissent, an interest served by a voting rule,
no matter how compelling, cannot support the rule unless a
State  can  prove  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  courts  that  this
interest could not be served by any other means.  Post, at
17–18, 26–29.  Such a requirement has no footing in the text
of §2 or our precedent construing it.16

——————

15 The dissent objects to consideration of the 1982 landscape because
even rules that were prevalent at that time are invalid under §2 if they,
well, violate §2.  Post, at 24.  We of course agree with that tautology.  But
the  question  is  what  it  means to  provide  equal opportunity,  and  given
that every voting rule imposes some amount of burden, rules that were
and are commonplace are useful comparators when considering the to-
tality  of  circumstances.    Unlike  the  dissent,  Congress  did  not  set  its
sights on every facially neutral time, place, or manner voting rule in ex-
istence.  See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 97–417, at 10, n. 22 (describing what the
Senate  Judiciary  Committee  viewed  as  “blatant  direct  impediments  to
voting”).

16 For support, the dissent offers a baseless reading of one of our vote-
dilution decisions.  In Houston Lawyers’ Assn., 501 U. S. 419, we consid-
ered a §2 challenge to an electoral scheme wherein all trial judges in a
judicial district were elected on a district-wide basis.  Id., at 422.  The
State asserted that it had a strong interest in district-wide judicial elec-
tions on the theory that they make every individual judge at least partly
accountable to minority voters in the jurisdiction.  Id., at 424, 426.  That
unique  interest,  the  State  contended,  should  have  “automatically”  ex-
empted the electoral scheme from §2 scrutiny altogether.  Id., at 426.  We
disagreed, holding that the State’s interest was instead “a legitimate fac-
tor  to  be  considered  by  courts  among  the  ‘totality  of  circumstances’  in
determining  whether  a §2  violation has occurred.”    Ibid.   To illustrate
why an “automati[c]” exemption from §2’s coverage was inappropriate,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the dissent's arguments in a case and the majority's response.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
890

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5157.  Fuller  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  859.

No. 09–5158.  Jones v.  United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  827.

No.  09–5160.  Lomax  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  646.

No.  09–5161.  Thomas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  753.

No.  09–5163.  Leonor  v.  Houston.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5165.  Cannedy  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  2d

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  5  So.  3d  676.

No.  09–5166.  Castaneda  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  564.

No. 09–5167.  Cowan v.  Office of Personnel Management.
C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.
Appx.  916.

No.  09–5169.  Kittrell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5170.  Flood  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  356.

No.  09–5172.  Flanders  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5173.  Garcia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  705.

No.  09–5174.  Hatton  v.  Minnesota.  Ct.  App.  Minn.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5175.  Hutchinson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  137.

No.  09–5176.  Gordon  v.  Supreme  Court  of  Texas  et  al.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.
Appx.  702.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>