<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

27

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

liability in cases like this one.

Like  the  presumption  against  extraterritoriality,  judi-
cial caution under Sosa “guards against our courts trigger-
ing  . . .  serious  foreign  policy  consequences,  and  instead
defers  such  decisions,  quite  appropriately,  to  the  political
branches.”  Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 124.  If, in light of all the
concerns that must be weighed before imposing liability on
foreign corporations via ATS suits, the Court were to hold
that it has the discretion to make that determination, then
the cautionary language of Sosa would be little more than
empty rhetoric.  Accordingly, the Court holds that foreign
corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under
the ATS.

III
With  the  ATS,  the  First  Congress  provided  a  federal
remedy  for  a  narrow  category  of  international-law  viola-
tions committed by individuals.  Whether, more than two
centuries on, a similar remedy should be available against
foreign  corporations  is  similarly  a  decision  that  Congress
must make.

The political branches can determine, referring to inter-
national  law  to  the  extent  they  deem  proper,  whether  to
impose  liability  for  human-rights  violations  upon  foreign
corporations  in  this  Nation’s  courts,  and,  conversely,  that
courts  in  other  countries  should  be  able  to  hold  United
States corporations liable.  Congress might determine that
violations  of  international  law  do,  or  should,  impose  that
liability  to  ensure  that  corporations  make  every  effort  to
deter  human-rights  violations,  and  so  that,  even  when
those  efforts  cannot  be  faulted,  compensation  for  injured
persons  will  be  a  cost of  doing  business.   If Congress  and
the Executive were to determine that corporations should
be  liable  for  violations  of  international  law,  that  decision
would  have  special  power  and  force  because  it  would  be
made  by  the  branches  most  immediately  responsive  to,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in a case. It discusses the applicability of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) to foreign corporations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 183 (2010)

207

Breyer, J., dissenting

perience,  will  be  sufﬁcient  to  address  any  possible  harm,
either to the witnesses or to the integrity of the trial.

Fourth, no fair balancing of the equities (including harm to
the  public interest)  could support  issuance of  the stay.  See
Times-Picayune  Publishing  Corp.  v.  Schulingkamp,  419
U. S. 1301, 1305 (1974) (Powell,  J., in chambers) (recognizing
“signiﬁcant  public  and  private  interests  balanced  on  both
sides”  when  “present[ed  with]  a  fundamental  confrontation
between  the  competing  values  of  free  press  and  fair  trial”).
As  I  have  just  explained,  the  applicants’  equities  consist  of
potential harm to witnesses—harm that is either nonexistent
or that can be cured through protective measures by the Dis
trict  Court  as  the  circumstances  warrant.  The  competing
equities  consist  of  not  only  the  respondents’  interest  in  ob
taining the  courthouse-to-courthouse transmission  that they
desire,  but  also  the  public’s  interest  in  observing  trial  pro
ceedings to learn about this case and about how courts work.
See Nebraska Press Assn. v.  Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 587 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); see also Exh. 2, at 42,
App.  to  Pet.  (statement  of  Chief  Judge  Walker)  (“[I]f  the
public  could  see  how  the  judicial  process  works,  they  would
take  a  somewhat  different  view  of  it.”  “I  think  the  only
time that you’re going to draw sufﬁcient interest in the legal
process  is  when  you  have  an  issue  such  as  the  issues  here,
that  people  think  about,  talk  about,  debate  about  and  con
sider”).  With these considerations in the balance, the scales
tip heavily against, not in favor of, issuing the stay.

The  majority’s  action  today  is  unusual.  It  grants  a  stay
in  order  to  consider  a  mandamus  petition,  with  a  view  to
intervening  in  a  matter  of  local  court  administration  that  it
would  not  (and  should  not)  consider.  It  cites  no  precedent
for doing so.  It identiﬁes no real harm, let alone “irrepara
ble harm,” to justify its issuance of this stay.  And the public
interest  weighs  in  favor  of  providing  access  to  the  courts.
To  justify  this  extraordinary  intervention,  the  majority  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1009

529 U. S.

March 6, 2000

No. 99–7710. Mays v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7713.

Jennings v. Wyoming et al. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 477.

No. 99–7717. Crosby v. Lambert et al. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1326.

No. 99–7723. White v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7726. Wise v. Caddell Construction Co., Inc.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d
841.

No. 99–7736. Boulineau v. Garner, Commissioner, Geor-
gia Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 184 F. 3d 825.

No. 99–7737. Calhoun v. DeTella, Warden, et al. C. A.

7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7754. Abbey v. Robert Bosch GmbH et al. C. A.

Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 217 F. 3d 853.

No. 99–7819. Glass v. Terhune, Director, California De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 925.

No. 99–7871. Marsh v. Madrid, Attorney General of
New Mexico. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 198 F. 3d 258.

No. 99–7874. Mayeux v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–7905. Merritt v. Price, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7998. Flowers v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7999. Hiivala v. Lambert, Superintendent, Wash-
ington State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 195 F. 3d 1098.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

BARRETT, J., concurring

of the text.  Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 656–657
(2023) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part and  concurring in
judgment).
  “Original history”—i.e., the generally dispositive kind—
plays two roles in the Second Amendment context.  It eluci-
dates how contemporaries understood the text—for exam-
ple, the meaning of the phrase “bear Arms.”  See Heller, 554
U. S., at 582–592.  It also plays the more complicated role
of determining the scope of the pre-existing right that the
people  enshrined  in  our  fundamental  law.*    In  Rahimi’s
case,  the  Court  uses  history  in  this  latter  way.  Call  this
“original contours” history: It looks at historical gun regu-
lations to identify the contours of the right.

Courts have struggled with this use of history in the wake
of  Bruen.  One  difficulty  is  a  level  of  generality  problem:
Must the government produce a founding-era relative of the
challenged regulation—if not a twin, a cousin?  Or do found-
ing-era gun regulations yield concrete principles that mark
the borders of the right?

Many  courts,  including  the  Fifth  Circuit,  have  under-
stood Bruen to require the former, narrower approach.  But
Bruen emphasized that “analogical reasoning” is not a “reg-
ulatory straightjacket.”  597 U. S., at 30.  To be consistent
with historical limits, a challenged regulation need not be

——————

*To  my  mind,  this  use  of  history  walks  a  fine  line  between  original
meaning (which controls) and expectations about how the text would ap-
ply (which do not).  See Whittington 383 (“Specific expectations about the
consequences  of  a  legal  rule  are  distinct  from  the  meaning  of  the  rule
itself ”).  Contemporary  government  actors  might  have  been  “wrong
about the consequences of their own constitutional rule,” or they “might
not have fully and faithfully implemented the adopted constitutional rule
themselves.”  Id., at 384.  Thus, while early applications of a constitu-
tional rule can help illuminate its original scope, an interpreter must ex-
ercise care in considering them.  Id., at 385–386.  In the Second Amend-
ment context, particular gun regulations—even if from the ratification
era—do not themselves have the status of constitutional law.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Barrett. It delves into the interpretation of the Second Amendment and the use of historical context in legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.

v. GOLDSMITH
Opinion of the Court

the  common-law  doctrine  of  fair  use  in  §107,  which  pro-
vides: “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . ,
scholarship,  or  research,  is  not  an  infringement  of  copy-
right.”  To determine whether a particular use is “fair,” the
statute sets out four factors to be considered:

“(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether  such  use  is  of  a  commercial  nature  or  is  for
nonprofit educational purposes;

“(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
“(3)  the  amount  and  substantiality  of  the  portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
“(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market

for or value of the copyrighted work.”

The fair use doctrine “permits courts to avoid rigid appli-
cation of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to fos-
ter.”  Stewart v. Abend, 495 U. S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal
quotation marks omitted).  The Act’s fair use provision, in
turn,  “set[s]  forth  general  principles,  the  application  of
which requires judicial balancing, depending upon relevant
circumstances.”    Google  LLC  v.  Oracle  America,  Inc.,  593
U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 14).  Because those princi-
ples  apply  across  a  wide  range  of  copyrightable  material,
from books to photographs to software, fair use is a “flexi-
ble” concept, and “its application may well vary depending
on  context.”  Id.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  15).  For  example,  in
applying the fair use provision, “copyright’s protection may
be  stronger  where  the  copyrighted  material  . . .  serves  an
artistic rather than a utilitarian function.”  Ibid.

1
The first fair use factor is “the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”  §107(1).  This
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion discussing the fair use doctrine in copyright law. It cites relevant case law and statutory provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–637
_________________

DARRELL HEMPHILL, PETITIONER v. NEW YORK

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF NEW YORK

[January 20, 2022]

 JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH  joins,

concurring.

I agree with the Court’s conclusion that—assuming Mor-
ris’s statement was testimonial—its admission violated the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  I write sep-
arately to address the conditions under which a defendant
can be deemed to have validly waived the right to confront
adverse witnesses.

“The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed con-
stitutional right is, of course, a federal question controlled
by federal law.”  Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 4 (1966).
Waiver consists in the “intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege.”  Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938).  But a valid waiver need not be
express.  Implied  waiver  can  be  established  through  “ ‘a
course  of  conduct’ ”  even  “absent  formal  or  express  state-
ments  of  waiver.”    Berghuis  v.  Thompkins,  560  U. S.  370,
383–384 (2010) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S.
369, 373 (1979)).  In the prototypical case of implied waiver,
the relevant course of conduct signals an intention to relin-
quish the right at issue.  But “[a]s a general proposition, the
law can presume that an individual who, with a full under-
standing of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent
with  their  exercise  has  made  a  deliberate  choice  to  relin-
quish  the  protection  those  rights  afford.”  Berghuis,  560
U. S., at 385.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
ALITO, J., dissenting

B
When all is said and done, my disagreement with the ma-
jority is thus narrowly focused on how this standard applies
to  this  case.  In  my  view,  FNHRA  “foreclose[s]  a  private
cause  of  action”  even  though  it  “admittedly  create[s]  sub-
stantive private rights.”  Alexander, 532 U. S., at 290.  The
Act  creates  a  reticulated  remedial  regime  that  both  bal-
ances federal and state enforcement and channels disputes
through that regime.  Allowing §1983 suits will upend this
careful balance.

Consider the remedial provisions that the Act provides.
When  federal  officials  find  that  a  nursing  home  does  not
comply  with  FNHRA,  the  Act  enumerates  certain  limited
remedies  they  can  pursue,  such  as  withdrawing  federal
funding and imposing civil penalties “in an amount not to
exceed  $10,000
for  each  day  of  noncompliance.”
§1396r(h)(3)(C).  FNHRA obligates States to establish cer-
tain remedies for noncompliance (including civil penalties),
but  otherwise  leaves  them  free  to  “specify  criteria,  as  to
when and how each of [the required] remedies is to be ap-
plied, the amounts of any fines, and the severity of each of
these remedies, to be used in the imposition of such reme-
dies.”  §1396r(h)(2)(A).  It also empowers States to “provide
for other . . . remedies” as they see fit.  Ibid.  Finally, the
Act provides “[s]pecial rules where [s]tate and [federal offi-
cials]  do  not  agree  on  [a]  finding  of  noncompliance.”
§1396r(h)(6) (boldface deleted).

By specifying limited remedies for federal authorities and
tasking  States  with  otherwise  determining  the  conse-
quences for violations, the Act creates a clear division of au-
thority  that  ensures  States  retain  their  historical  control
over  nursing-home  regulation.  Allowing  §1983  suits  will
upset this balance by allowing any plaintiff to demand dam-
ages regardless of the remedial regime that States establish
pursuant to their explicit authority under the Act.  Moreo-
ver, whenever a plaintiff files suit, the determination about
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the application of a specific law (FNHRA) and its implications for private lawsuits. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

9

STEVENS, J., dissenting

text  that  even  mentions  civilian  uses  of  firearms,  the
Court proceeds to “find” its preferred reading in what is at
best an ambiguous text, and then concludes that its read
ing is not foreclosed by the preamble.  Perhaps the Court’s
approach to the text is acceptable advocacy, but it is surely
an unusual approach for judges to follow.

 “The right of the people”

The  centerpiece  of  the  Court’s  textual  argument  is  its

insistence that the words “the people” as used in the Sec
ond  Amendment  must  have  the  same  meaning,  and  pro
tect  the  same  class  of  individuals,  as  when  they  are  used
in  the  First  and  Fourth  Amendments.  According  to  the
Court,  in  all  three  provisions—as  well  as  the  Constitu
tion’s  preamble,  section  2  of  Article  I,  and  the  Tenth
Amendment—“the term unambiguously refers to all mem
bers  of  the  political  community,  not  an  unspecified  sub
set.”  Ante,  at  6.  But  the  Court  itself  reads  the  Second
Amendment  to  protect  a  “subset”  significantly  narrower
than the class of persons protected by the First and Fourth
Amendments;  when  it  finally  drills  down  on  the  substan
tive  meaning  of  the  Second  Amendment,  the  Court  limits
the  protected  class  to  “law-abiding,  responsible  citizens,”
ante, at 63.  But the class of persons protected by the First
and Fourth Amendments is not so limited; for even felons
(and  presumably  irresponsible  citizens  as  well)  may  in
voke  the  protections  of  those  constitutional  provisions.
The  Court  offers  no  way  to  harmonize  its  conflicting  pro
nouncements.

The Court also overlooks the significance of the way the

——————

enacting part is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms.”  2A N. Singer,

Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47.04, p. 146 (rev. 5th ed. 1992)

(emphasis  added).    Surely  not  even  the  Court  believes  that  the

Amendment’s  operative  provision,  which,  though  only  14  words  in

length, takes the Court the better part of 18 pages to parse, is perfectly

“clear and unambiguous.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's interpretation of the Second Amendment. The language is legal and analytical, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

RUTLEDGE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARKANSAS v.
PHARMACEUTICAL CARE MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–540.  Argued October 6, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020

Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) act as intermediaries between phar-
macies and prescription-drug plans.  In that role, they reimburse phar-
macies  for  the  cost  of  drugs  covered  by  prescription-drug  plans.    To
determine the reimbursement rate for each drug, PBMs develop and
administer maximum allowable cost (MAC) lists.  In 2015, Arkansas
passed Act 900, which effectively requires PBMs to reimburse Arkan-
sas  pharmacies  at  a  price  equal  to  or  higher  than  the  pharmacy’s
wholesale cost.  To accomplish this result, Act 900 requires PBMs to
timely  update  their  MAC  lists  when  drug  wholesale  prices  increase,
Ark.  Code  Ann.  §17–92–507(c)(2),  and  to  provide  pharmacies  an  ad-
ministrative appeal procedure to challenge MAC reimbursement rates,
§17–92–507(c)(4)(A)(i)(b).  Act 900 also permits Arkansas pharmacies
to refuse to sell a drug if the reimbursement rate is lower than its ac-
quisition cost.  §17–92–507(e).  Respondent Pharmaceutical Care Man-
agement Association (PCMA), which represents the 11 largest PBMs
in  the  country,  sued,  alleging,  as  relevant  here,  that  Act  900  is  pre-
empted  by  the  Employee  Retirement  Income  Security  Act  of  1974
(ERISA).    Following  Circuit  precedent  in  a  case  involving  a  similar
Iowa statute, the District Court held that ERISA pre-empts Act 900.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Held: Arkansas’ Act 900 is not pre-empted by ERISA.  Pp. 4–10.

(a) ERISA pre-empts state laws that “relate to” a covered employee
benefit plan.  29 U. S. C. §1144(a).  “[A] state law relates to an ERISA
plan if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”  Egelhoff
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

27

Opinion of the Court

the Seventh Amendment would become nothing more than
a  game,  where  the  Government  need  only  identify  some
slight advantage to the public from agency adjudication to
strip  its  target  of  the  protections  of  the  Seventh  Amend-
ment.

The novel claims in Atlas Roofing had never been brought
in an Article III court.  By contrast, law courts have dealt
with fraud actions since before the founding, and Congress
had authorized the SEC to bring such actions in Article III
courts and still authorizes the SEC to do so today.  See 3
Blackstone 41–42; §§77t, 78u, 80b–9.  Given the judiciary’s
long history of handling fraud claims, it cannot be argued
that the courts lack the capacity needed to adjudicate such
actions.
  In short, Atlas Roofing does not conflict with our conclu-
sion.  When  a  matter  “from  its  nature,  is  the  subject  of  a
suit at the common law,” Congress may not “withdraw [it]
from judicial cognizance.”  Murray’s Lessee, 18 How., at 284.

*

*

*

A defendant facing a fraud suit has the right to be tried
by a jury of his peers before a neutral adjudicator.  Rather
than  recognize  that  right,  the  dissent  would  permit  Con-
gress to concentrate the roles of prosecutor, judge, and jury
in the hands of the Executive Branch.  That is the very op-
posite of the separation of powers that the Constitution de-
mands.  Jarkesy and Patriot28 are entitled to a jury trial in
an Article III court.  We do not reach the remaining consti-
tutional issues and affirm the ruling of the Fifth Circuit on
the Seventh Amendment ground alone.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and its application to a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

768

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a private individ-
ual may bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United
States against a State (or state agency) under the False
Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729–3733.

I

Originally enacted in 1863, the False Claims Act (FCA) is
the most frequently used of a handful of extant laws creating
a form of civil action known as qui tam.1 As amended, the

R. Bierig, Paul E. Kalb, Michael L. Ile, Anne M. Murphy, and Leonard
A. Nelson; for the American Petroleum Institute by Donald B. Craven,
Clarence T. Kipps, Jr., Alan I. Horowitz, and Peter B. Hutt II; for FMC
Corporation by Donald B. Ayer, Gregory G. Katsas, and John B. Kennedy;
for the National Governors’ Association et al. by Richard Ruda and James
I. Crowley; for the Orleans Parish School Board et al. by Sam A. LeBlanc
III and Robert Markle; for the Regents of the University of Minnesota
et al. by Mark B. Rotenberg and Mark A. Bohnhorst.

Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the National
WhistleBlower Center by Stephen M. Kohn, Michael D. Kohn, and David
K. Colapinto; and for Taxpayers Against Fraud by Evan H. Caminker
and Jonathan S. Massey.

Briefs of amici curiae were ﬁled for the Aerospace Industries Associa-
tion of America, Inc., by Charles G. Cole, Jerald S. Howe, Jr., and Shannen
W. Cofﬁn; for the American Clinical Laboratory Association by Hope S.
Foster; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
et al. by Herbert L. Fenster, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; for
the Federation of American Health Systems by Walter E. Dellinger and
Charles R. Work; for Friends of the Earth et al. by James S. Chandler, Jr.,
Bruce J. Terris, and Carolyn Smith Pravlik; for the National Employment
Lawyers Association by Frederick M. Morgan, Jr., James B. Helmer, Jr.,
and Paula A. Brantner; for the Project on Government Oversight by
Charles Tiefer and Jonathan W. Cuneo; and for Taxpayers Against Fraud
by Evan H. Caminker and Vicki C. Jackson.

1 Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam
pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means “who pursues this action
on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.” The phrase dates from
at least the time of Blackstone. See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *160.
Three other qui tam statutes, all also enacted over 100 years ago, re-
main on the books. See 25 U. S. C. § 81 (providing cause of action and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes the case name, the justices involved, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1071

529 U. S.

April 17, 2000

No. 99–8095. King v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 So. 2d 1097.

No. 99–8097. Mitchell v. Roach et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8100. McDowall v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8102. Muhammad v. Storr et al. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 129.

No. 99–8104.

Johnson v. Louisiana. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–8106. Curtis v. Kemna, Superintendent, Cross-
roads Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 249.

No. 99–8108. Henderson v. Virginia Employment Commis-

sion et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8111. Washington v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d

App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8113. Williams v. Pitcher, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8114. Ware v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 467.

No. 99–8123. Perry v. Files et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–8128. A’Ku v. Motorola, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 272.

No. 99–8131. Skyers v. District of Columbia et al. C. A.

D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8134. Walker v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8137. Coleman v. John Thomas Batts, Inc. C. A.

6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 506.
  </content>
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This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks the narrative flow and contextual information typical of a book's main content.
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  <category>Table of Cases or Court Docket</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

720

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Breyer, J., dissenting

day’s immunity means more potentially imprisonable citizens
remain at liberty. This is a price that the Amendment ex-
tracts where government wishes to compel
incriminating
testimony; and it is difﬁcult to see why that price should not
be paid where there is a real threat of prosecution, but it
is foreign.

*

*

*

In sum, I see no reason why the Court should resurrect
the pale shadow of Murdock’s “same sovereign” rule, a rule
that Murphy demonstrated was without strong historical
foundation and that would serve no more valid a purpose in
today’s world than it did during Murphy’s time. Murphy
supports recognizing the privilege where there is a real and
substantial threat of prosecution by a foreign government.
Balsys is among the few to have satisﬁed this threshold.
The basic values that this Court has said underlie the Fifth
Amendment’s protections are each diminished if the priv-
ilege may not be claimed here. And surmountable practi-
cal concerns should not stand in the way of constitutional
principle.

For these and related reasons elaborated by the Second

Circuit, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS

Syllabus

only genuine “Cases” and “Controversies.”  Art. III, §2.  To have stand-
ing, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the de-
fendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief.”  DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 342.
No plaintiff has shown such an injury “fairly traceable” to the “alleg-
edly unlawful conduct” challenged here.  Pp. 4–5.

(b) The  two  individual  plaintiffs  claim  a  particularized  individual
harm in the form of past and future payments necessary to carry the
minimum essential coverage that §5000A(a) requires.  Assuming this
pocketbook injury satisfies the injury element of Article III standing,
it is not “fairly traceable” to any “allegedly unlawful conduct” of which
the plaintiffs complain, Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751.  Without a
penalty for noncompliance, §5000A(a) is unenforceable.  The individu-
als have not shown that any kind of Government action or conduct has
caused  or  will  cause  the  injury  they  attribute  to  §5000A(a).    The
Court’s cases have consistently spoken of the need to assert an injury
that  is  the  result  of  a  statute’s  actual  or  threatened  enforcement,
whether today or in the future.  See, e.g., Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442
U. S. 289, 298.  Here, there is only the statute’s textually unenforcea-
ble language.

Unenforceable statutory language alone is not sufficient to establish
standing, as the redressability requirement makes clear.  Whether an
injury is redressable depends on the relationship between “the judicial
relief requested” and the “injury” suffered.  Allen, 468 U. S. at 753, n.
19.  The only relief sought regarding the minimum essential coverage
provision  is  declaratory  relief,  namely,  a  judicial  statement  that  the
provision challenged is unconstitutional.  But just like suits for every
other type of remedy, declaratory-judgment actions must satisfy Arti-
cle  III’s  case-or-controversy  requirement.    See  MedImmune,  Inc.  v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 126–127.  Article III standing requires
identification  of  a  remedy  that  will  redress  the  individual  plaintiffs’
injuries.  Id., at 127.  No such remedy exists here.  To find standing to
attack  an  unenforceable  statutory  provision  would  allow  a  federal
court to issue what would amount to an advisory opinion without the
possibility of an Article III remedy.  Article III guards against federal
courts assuming this kind of jurisdiction.  See Carney v. Adams, 592
U. S. ___, ___ .  The Court also declines to consider Federal respond-
ents’ novel alternative theory of standing first raised in its merits brief
on behalf the individuals, as well as the dissent’s novel theory on be-
half  of  the  states,  neither  of  which  was  directly  argued  by  plaintiffs
below nor presented at the certiorari stage.  Pp. 5–10.

(c) Texas and the other state plaintiffs have similarly failed to show
that the pocketbook injuries they allege are traceable to the Govern-
ment’s  allegedly  unlawful  conduct.    DaimlerChrysler  Corp.  v.  Cuno,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically from the Supreme Court case *California v. Texas*.  It outlines the reasoning behind the Court's decision regarding standing in the case.  Legal syllabi are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are summaries of legal arguments and not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxxxiii

Page

1051

Shelton v. Roper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918

Shelton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113

Shepherd v. Shepherd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
813

Sherratt, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930

Sherrer v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000

Sherrod; Boyd v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sherry; Deleon-Puentes v.
1012

Shinn; Children’s Hospital v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

Shinn; HCA Health Services of Okla., Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

Shinn; OU Medical Center v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Shinnecock Smoke Shop v. Cuomo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

Shinnecock Smoke Shop v. Kappos  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Shinseki; Block v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shinseki; Camillo v.
1055

Shinseki; Groves v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1134

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shinseki; Holman v.
1022

Shinseki; Jackson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shinseki; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1022,1109

911

Shinseki; Kern v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011

Shinseki; Laroche v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shinseki; Merritt v.
1050

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shinseki; Patrick v.
1050

Shinseki; Thomas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shiraishi v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  869,1065

Shishkin v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936

Shropshire v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.
822

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1105

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shumsky; Hon Chung Lau v.
848

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shumye v. Felleke
943

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sibley v. Florida Bar
808

Sibley v. Grievance Committee of Seventh Judicial Dist.  . . . . . . .
Sibley v. U. S. Court of Appeals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  943,966

1043

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Siciliano, In re
870

Sigala-Trejo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042

Sikora v. Clandestine Attackers/Assailants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Sikorski v. Okemo Mountain, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044

Silbermann; Myers v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

Silva v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

Silva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Silverman v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.
. . . . . . . . . . .
918

Simba v. Branch  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

Simek v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Simien; Ballard v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

Simmons, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

Simmons v. Bazzle
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
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  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1144

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 19, 2010

558 U. S.

ther consideration in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor
General  in  her  brief  for  the  United  States  ﬁled  on  November  25,
2009.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  1188.

No.  09–5370.  Vazquez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  granted,  judgment  vacated,  and  case  re
manded  for  further  consideration  in  light  of  the  position  asserted
by  the  Solicitor  General  in  her  brief  for  the  United  States  ﬁled
on  November  16,  2009.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  1224.

No.  09–5995.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  granted,  judgment  vacated,  and  case  re
manded  for  further  consideration  in  light  of  Abuelhawa  v.  United
States,  556  U. S.  816  (2009).  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  864.

No.  09–7408.  Linton  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Mo
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for fur
ther  consideration  in  light  of  United  States  v.  Booker,  543  U. S.
220  (2005).

Certiorari  Dismissed

No.  09–7452.  Slezak  v.  Glover  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported
below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  236.

No. 09–7461.  Ghee v.  Target National Bank.  Ct. App. Ga.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–7498.  Hon  Lau  v.  Brown,  Attorney  General  of
California.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed.  See
this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–7499.  Hon  Lau  v.  Adams,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–7537.  Adamson  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  1st  Dist.  Mo
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal journal or database. It's not sequential narrative text and focuses on legal proceedings rather than a story or informative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES v. PROMETHEUS

LABORATORIES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

at 14) (“[T]he prohibition against patenting abstract ideas
‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of
the  formula  to  a  particular  technological  environment’  or
adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity’ ” (quoting Diehr,
supra, at 191–192)).

We  find  that  the  process  claims  at  issue  here  do  not
satisfy  these  conditions.  In  particular,  the  steps  in  the
claimed  processes  (apart  from  the  natural  laws  them
selves)  involve  well-understood,  routine,  conventional
activity  previously engaged in by researchers in the field.
At  the  same  time,  upholding  the  patents  would  risk  dis
proportionately  tying  up  the  use  of  the  underlying  nat-
ural  laws,  inhibiting  their  use  in  the  making  of  further
discoveries.

I

A

The  patents  before  us  concern  the  use  of  thiopurine
drugs  in  the  treatment  of  autoimmune  diseases,  such  as
Crohn’s  disease  and  ulcerative  colitis.    When  a  patient
ingests  a  thiopurine  compound,  his  body  metabolizes  the
drug,  causing  metabolites  to  form  in  his  bloodstream.
Because  the  way  in  which  people  metabolize  thiopurine
compounds  varies,  the  same  dose  of  a  thiopurine  drug
affects different people differently, and it has been difficult
for doctors to determine whether for a particular patient a
given dose is too high, risking harmful side effects, or too
low, and so likely ineffective.

At  the  time  the  discoveries  embodied  in  the  patents
were  made,  scientists  already  understood  that  the  levels
in  a  patient’s  blood  of  certain  metabolites,  including,  in
particular,  6-thioguanine  and  its  nucleotides  (6–TG)  and
6-methyl-mercaptopurine  (6–MMP),  were  correlated  with
the  likelihood  that  a  particular  dosage  of  a  thiopurine
drug  could  cause  harm  or  prove  ineffective.    See  U. S.
Patent  No. 6,355,623,  col.  8,  ll.  37–40,  2  App.  10.  (“Previ
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing patent law related to medical treatments. It contains legal jargon and cites previous cases, indicating it's not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

23

KAGAN, J., dissenting

dismiss  all  the  newness  Warhol  added  just  because  he  li-
censed his portrait to Condé Nast?  And why does the ma-
jority  insist  more  generally  that  in  a  commercial  context
“convey[ing] a new meaning or message” is “not enough for
the first factor to favor fair use”?  Ante, at 35.

Certainly not because of our precedent—which conflicts
with nearly all the majority says.  As explained earlier, this
Court has decided two important cases about factor 1.  See
supra, at 14–16.  In each, the copier had built on the origi-
nal  to  make  a  product  for  sale—so  the  use  was  patently
commercial.  And in each, that fact made no difference, be-
cause the use was also transformative.  The copier, we held,
had  made  a  significant  creative  contribution—had  added
real value.  So in Campbell, we did not ask whether 2 Live
Crew and Roy Orbison both meant to make money by “in-
cluding a catchy song about women on a record album.”  But
cf. ante, at 12–13 (asking whether Warhol and Goldsmith
both  meant  to  charge  for  “depict[ing]  Prince  in  magazine
stories  about  Prince”).    We  instead  asked  whether  2  Live
Crew  had  added  significant  “new  expression,  meaning,
[and] message”; and because we answered yes, we held that
the group’s rap song did not “merely supersede the objects
of the original creation.”  510 U. S., at 579 (internal quota-
tion  marks  and  alteration  omitted).  Similarly,  in  Google,
we took for granted that Google (the copier) and Sun (the
original author) both meant to market software platforms
facilitating  the  same  tasks—just  as  (in  the  majority’s  re-
frain) Warhol and Goldsmith both wanted to market images
depicting the same subject.  See 593 U. S., at ___, ___ (slip
op., at 25, 27).  “So what?” was our basic response.  Google’s
copying had enabled the company to make a “highly crea-
tive and innovative tool,” advancing “creative progress” and
thus  serving  “the  basic  constitutional  objective  of  copy-
right.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 25) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Search today’s opinion high and low, you will see
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to copyright law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH

Syllabus

of mind with respect to their actions and the tortious conduct (even if
not always the particular terrorist act).  Finally, the Ninth Circuit ap-
pears to have regarded Halberstam’s six substantiality factors as a se-
quence of disparate, unrelated considerations without a common con-
ceptual core.  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit focused primarily on the
value  of  defendants’  platforms  to  ISIS,  rather  than  whether  defend-
ants culpably associated themselves with ISIS’ actions.  Pp. 27–29.

(3) There  is  also  one  set  of  allegations  specific  to  Google:  that
Google  reviewed  and  approved  ISIS  videos  on  YouTube  as  part  of  a
revenue-sharing system and thereby shared advertising revenue with
ISIS.  But  the  complaint  here  alleges  nothing  about  the  amount  of
money  that  Google  supposedly  shared  with  ISIS,  the  number  of  ac-
counts approved for revenue sharing, or the content of the videos that
were approved.  Nor does it give any other reason to view Google’s rev-
enue sharing as substantial assistance.  Without more, plaintiffs thus
have not plausibly alleged that Google knowingly provided substantial
assistance  to  the  Reina  attack,  let  alone  (as  their  theory  of  liability
would require) every single terrorist act committed by ISIS.  Pp. 29–
30.

(d) The concepts of aiding and abetting and substantial assistance
do not lend themselves to crisp, bright-line distinctions.  Applying the
guideposts  provided  by  the  common  law  and  Halberstam,  the  nexus
between defendants and the Reina attack is far removed.  As alleged
by  plaintiffs,  defendants  designed  virtual  platforms  and  knowingly
failed to do “enough” to remove ISIS-affiliated users and ISIS-related
content from their platforms.  Yet, plaintiffs have failed to allege that
defendants intentionally provided any substantial aid to the Reina at-
tack  or  otherwise  consciously  participated  in  it—much  less  that  de-
fendants  so  pervasively  and  systemically  assisted  ISIS  as  to  render
them liable for every ISIS attack.  Plaintiffs accordingly have failed to
state a claim under §2333(d)(2).  Pp. 30–31.

2 F. 4th 871, reversed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  JACKSON, J.,

filed a concurring opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a court case. It is not the main body of the text and focuses on legal arguments and decisions rather than narrative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

33

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

litigation,  it  has  identified  nothing  to  support  its  conclu
sion  that  “foreign  corporate  defendants  create  unique
problems”  that  necessitate  a  categorical  rule  barring  all
foreign corporate liability.  Ante, at 26.

Absent any reason to believe that the corporate form in
itself raises serious foreign-policy concerns, and given the
repeated urging from the Executive Branch and Members
of  Congress  that  the  Court  need  not  and  should  not  fore
close corporate liability, I would reverse the decision of the
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Second  Circuit  and  remand  for
further  proceedings,  including  whether  the  allegations
here sufficiently touch and concern the United States, see
Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 124–125, and whether the international-
law  norms  alleged  to  have  been  violated  by  Arab  Bank—
the  prohibitions  on  genocide,  crimes  against  humanity,
and  financing  of  terrorism—are  of  sufficiently  definite
content and universal acceptance to give rise to a cause of
action under the ATS.

III
In categorically barring all suits against foreign corpora
tions under the ATS, the Court ensures that foreign corpo
rations—entities capable of wrongdoing under our domes
tic  law—remain  immune  from  liability  for  human  rights
abuses, however egregious they may be.

Corporations can be and often are a force for innovation
and growth.  Many of their contributions to society should
be  celebrated.  But  the  unique  power  that  corporations
wield can be used both for good and for bad.  Just as cor
porations can increase the capacity for production, so, too,
some can increase the capacity for suffering.  Consider the
genocide that took upwards of 800,000 lives in Rwanda in
1994,  which  was  fueled  by  incendiary  rhetoric  delivered
via a private radio station, the Radio Télévision Libre des
Mille Collines (RTLM).  Men spoke the hateful words, but
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

LORA v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

(a) Sections 924(c) and 924(j) criminalize the use, carrying, and pos-
session of firearms in connection with certain crimes.  Subsection (c)
lays  out  a  set  of  offenses  and  their  corresponding  penalties.   It  also
mandates  that  a  “term  of  imprisonment  imposed  on  a  person  under
this  subsection”  must  run  consecutively  with  other  sentences.
§924(c)(1)(D)(ii).  Subsection (j) likewise lays out offense elements and
corresponding penalties.  Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) contains
no consecutive-sentence mandate.  Pp. 3–4.

(b) Subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate applies only to the
terms  of  imprisonment  prescribed  within  subsection  (c).  A  sentence
imposed under subsection (j) does not qualify.  Subsection (j) is located
outside subsection (c) and does not call for imposing any sentence from
subsection (c).  And while subsection (j) references subsection (c), that
reference is limited to offense elements, not penalties.   Pp. 4–5.

(c) Congress  did  not,  as  the  Government  maintains,  incorporate
§924(c) as a whole into §924(j) such that a §924(j) defendant faces sub-
section (j)’s penalties plus subsection (c)’s penalties.  Subsection (j) no-
where  mentions—let  alone  incorporates—subsection  (c)’s  penalties.
Moreover, as subsections (c) and (j) are written, a sentencing court can-
not always obey both sets of penalties.  To avert potential conflict be-
tween subsections (c) and (j), the Government points to another provi-
sion, §924(c)(5), as a model.  But assuming without deciding whether
§924(c)(5) operates as the Government says, Congress did not imple-
ment that design in subsection (j).  Equally unavailing is the Govern-
ment’s argument that, under double jeopardy principles, a defendant
cannot receive both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences for the
same conduct.  That view of double jeopardy can easily be squared with
the conclusion that subsection (j) neither incorporates subsection (c)’s
penalties nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate.  Pp. 5–8.

(d) It is not “implausible,” as the Government asserts, for Congress
to have imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate under sub-
section  (c)  but  not  subsection  (j),  which  covers  more  serious  offense
conduct.  That result is consistent with the statute’s design.  Unlike
subsection (c), subsection (j) generally eschews mandatory penalties in
favor of sentencing flexibility.  Of a piece, subsection (j) permits flexi-
bility to choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences.  Con-
gress chose a different approach to punishment in subsection (j) than
in subsection (c), and the Court must implement the design Congress
chose.  Pp. 8–10.

Vacated and remanded.

JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the court's reasoning in the case of LORA v. UNITED STATES. It summarizes the legal arguments and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

season  ended  in  November,  the  District  gave  him  a  poor
performance  evaluation.  Kennedy  v.  Bremerton  School
Dist.,  869  F. 3d  813,  820  (CA9  2017).    The  evaluation  ad-
vised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the grounds that he
“ ‘failed to follow district policy’ ” regarding religious expres-
sion  and  “ ‘failed  to  supervise  student-athletes  after
games.’ ”    Ibid.    Mr.  Kennedy  did  not  return  for  the  next
season.  Ibid.

II
A
After these events, Mr. Kennedy sued in federal court, al-
leging that the District’s actions violated the First Amend-
ment’s Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.  App. 145,
160–164.  He  also  moved  for  a  preliminary  injunction  re-
quiring  the  District  to  reinstate  him.    The  District  Court
denied  that  motion,  concluding  that  a  “reasonable  ob-
server . . .  would  have  seen  him  as  . . .  leading  an  orches-
trated session of faith.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 303.  Indeed,
if the District had not suspended him, the court agreed, it
might  have  violated  the  Constitution’s  Establishment
Clause.  See id., at 302–303.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.  Kennedy, 869 F. 3d, at 831.

Following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, Mr. Kennedy sought
certiorari in this Court.  The Court denied the petition.  But
JUSTICE ALITO, joined by three other Members of the Court,
issued a statement stressing that “denial of certiorari does
not signify that the Court necessarily agrees with the deci-
sion  . . .  below.”    Kennedy  v.  Bremerton  School  Dist.,  586
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  1).    JUSTICE  ALITO  ex-
pressed concerns with the lower courts’ decisions, including
the possibility that, under their reasoning, teachers might
be “ordered not to engage in any ‘demonstrative’ conduct of
a  religious  nature”  within  view  of  students,  even  to  the
point of being forbidden from “folding their hands or bowing
Id.,  at  ___
their  heads

in  prayer”  before

lunch.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. and the legal arguments surrounding religious expression in public schools.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

21

Opinion of the Court

simply  the  individual  contribution  limits,  which  are  now
more than ten times higher than the gift limit: $2,900 per
election.  And Section 304 allows over 86 such “gifts” before
a campaign hits the Act’s $250,000 cap.  Either the Govern-
ment is openly tolerating a significant number of “gifts” far
more generous than what it would normally think fit to al-
low,  or  post-election  contributions that  go  toward  retiring
campaign debt are in  no real sense “gifts”  to a candidate.
We find the latter answer more persuasive.

As a final argument, the Government claims that if the
matter is otherwise in doubt, we should defer to Congress’s
“legislative judgment” that Section 304 furthers an anticor-
ruption  goal.    Brief  for  Appellant  39;  see  also  post,  at  8
(KAGAN, J., dissenting) (also arguing that we have no “rea-
son  to  second-guess  Congress’s  experience-based  judg-
ment”).  Such  deference,  the  Government  contends,  is
grounded “in part on the understanding that Congress ‘is
far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evalu-
ate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative ques-
tions.’ ”  Brief for Appellant 40 (quoting Turner Broadcast-
ing  System,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  520  U. S.  180,  195  (1997)  (some
internal quotation marks omitted)).  But as explained, the
evidence here is scant, and Congress’s judgment is hardly
based  on  “vast  amounts  of  data.”  Id.,  at  195.    Moreover,
deference  to  Congress  would  be  especially  inappropriate
where, as here, the legislative act may have been an effort
to “insulate[ ] legislators from effective electoral challenge.”
Shrink  Missouri  Government  PAC,  528  U. S.,  at  404
(BREYER,  J.,  concurring);  see  also  Randall  v.  Sorrell,  548
U. S. 230, 248–249 (2006) (plurality opinion).

In the end, it remains our role to decide whether a partic-
ular legislative choice is constitutional.  See Sable Commu-
nications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 129 (1989); see
also Randall, 548 U. S., at 248–249 (stressing need for “the
exercise of independent judicial judgment” in case raising
concern  that  “contribution  limits  that  are  too  low  [may]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses campaign finance laws and the constitutionality of certain provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

21

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

Second,  the  Little  Sisters  assert  that  “tak[ing]  affirma-
tive steps to execute paperwork . . . necessary for the provi-
sion  of  ‘seamless’  contraceptive  coverage  to  their  employ-
ees” implicates them in providing contraceptive services to
women in violation of their religious beliefs.  Little Sisters
Reply Brief 7.  At the same time, however, they have been
adamant that they do not oppose merely “register[ing] their
objections”  to  the  contraceptive-coverage  requirement.
Ibid.  See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 29, 42–43 (Little Sisters have
“no objection to objecting”); ante, at 8 (ALITO, J., concurring)
(Little Sisters’ “concern was not with notifying the Govern-
ment that they wished to be exempted from complying with
the mandate per se”).  These statements, taken together, re-
veal  that  the  Little  Sisters  do  not  object  to what  the  self-
certification  accommodation  asks  of  them,  namely,  attest-
ing to their religious objection to contraception.  See supra,
at 6.  They object, instead, to the particular use insurance
issuers  make  of  that  attestation.    See  supra,  at  18–19.26
But that use originated from the ACA and its once-imple-
menting  regulation,  not  from  religious  employers’  self-
certification or alternative notice.

*

*
The blanket exemption for religious and moral objectors
to contraception formulated by the IRS, EBSA, and CMS is
inconsistent with the text of, and Congress’ intent for, both
the ACA and RFRA.  Neither law authorizes it.27  The orig-

*

——————

26 JUSTICE ALITO asserts that the Little Sisters’ “situation [is] the same
as  that  of  the  conscientious  objector  in  Thomas  [v.  Review  Bd.  of  Ind.
Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 715 (1981)].”  Ante, at 9–10.  I
disagree.  In  Thomas,  a  Jehovah’s  Witness  objected  to  “work[ing]  on
weapons,” 450 U. S., at 710, which is what his employer required of him.
As above stated, however, the Little Sisters have no objection to object-
ing, the only other action the self-certification accommodation requires
of them.

27 Given this conclusion, I need not address whether the exemption is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the contraceptive coverage mandate and its implications for religious organizations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI

Opinion of the Court

and extent of federal-court jurisdiction under Article III.

In  a  related  way,  if  there  is  an  alternative  remedial
structure  present  in  a  certain  case,  that  alone  may  limit
the  power  of  the  Judiciary  to  infer  a  new  Bivens  cause  of
action.  For  if  Congress  has  created  “any  alternative,
existing  process  for  protecting  the  [injured  party’s]  inter-
est”  that  itself  may  “amoun[t]  to  a  convincing  reason  for
the  Judicial  Branch  to  refrain  from  providing  a  new  and
freestanding  remedy  in  damages.”  Wilkie,  supra,  at  550;
see  also  Bush,  supra,  at  385–388  (recognizing  that  civil-
service  regulations  provided  alternative  means  for  relief);
Malesko,  534  U. S.,  at  73–74  (recognizing  that  state  tort
law provided alternative means for relief); Minneci, supra,
at 127–130 (same).

III
It  is  appropriate  now  to  turn  first  to  the  Bivens  claims
challenging  the  conditions  of  confinement  imposed  on
respondents pursuant to the formal policy adopted by the
Executive  Officials  in  the  wake  of  the  September  11  at-
tacks.  The Court will refer to these claims as the “deten-
tion policy claims.”  The detention policy claims allege that
petitioners  violated  respondents’  due  process  and  equal
protection rights by holding them in restrictive conditions
of confinement; the claims further allege that the Wardens
violated  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Amendments  by  subjecting
respondents to frequent strip searches.  The term “deten-
tion  policy  claims”  does  not  include  respondents’  claim
alleging  that  Warden  Hasty  allowed  guards  to  abuse  the
detainees.  That  claim  will  be  considered  separately,  and
further,  below.  At  this  point,  the  question  is  whether,
having considered the relevant special factors in the whole
context  of  the  detention  policy  claims,  the  Court  should
extend a Bivens-type remedy to those claims.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the applicability of Bivens actions in a particular case. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to due process, equal protection, and Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

I

A

Petitioner  Samuel  Johnson  (unlike  his  famous  name
sake) has led a life of crime and violence.  His presentence
investigation report sets out a résumé of petty and serious
crimes,  beginning  when  he  was  12  years  old.    Johnson’s
adult record includes convictions for, among other things,
robbery, attempted robbery, illegal possession of a sawed-
off shotgun, and a drug offense.

In  2010,  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI)
began  monitoring  Johnson  because  of  his  involvement
with
the  National  Socialist  Movement,  a  white-
supremacist  organization  suspected  of  plotting  acts  of
terrorism.  In  June  of  that  year,  Johnson  left  the  group
and formed his own radical organization, the Aryan Liber
ation Movement, which he planned to finance by counter
feiting  United  States  currency.  In  the  course  of  the  Gov
ernment’s investigation, Johnson “disclosed to undercover
FBI  agents  that  he  manufactured  napalm,  silencers,  and
other explosives for” his new organization.  526 Fed. Appx.
708,  709  (CA8  2013)  (per  curiam).    He  also  showed  the
agents an AK–47 rifle, a semiautomatic rifle, a semiauto
matic pistol, and a cache of approximately 1,100 rounds of
ammunition.  Later,  Johnson  told  an  undercover  agent:
“You  know  I’d  love  to  assassinate  some  . . .  hoodrats  as
much  as  the  next  guy,  but  I  think  we  really  got  to  stick
with  high  priority  targets.”    Revised  Presentence  Investi
gation  Report  (PSR)  ¶15.    Among  the  top  targets  that  he
mentioned  were  “the  Mexican  consulate,”  “progressive
bookstores,”  and  individuals  he  viewed  as  “liberals.”
PSR ¶16.

In April 2012, Johnson was arrested, and he was subse
quently  indicted  on  four  counts  of possession of  a  firearm
by a felon and two counts of possession of ammunition by
a felon, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§922(g) and §924(e).  He
pleaded guilty to one of the firearms counts, and the Dis
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It provides background information about the defendant and the charges against him.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

to criminal possession of a weapon.  But rather than having
Morris  plead  to  the  charge  in  the  existing  indictment  for
possession of a 9-millimeter handgun, the State filed a new
charge alleging that Morris had possessed a .357-magnum
revolver, a different type of firearm than the one used to kill
the victim.  In exchange for this plea, the prosecution rec-
ommended a sentence of time served.  The State and Mor-
ris’ counsel agreed that there was insufficient evidence of
Morris’ possession of a .357-magnum revolver to obtain an
indictment absent Morris’ willingness to admit to the alle-
gations.  Morris did so, against his attorney’s advice, to se-
cure his release that day.

In 2011, the State learned that Hemphill’s DNA matched
a sample from a blue sweater that police had recovered in a
search of Gilliam’s apartment shortly after the crime.  Eye-
witnesses had described the shooter as wearing a blue shirt
or sweater.  In 2013, Hemphill was arrested and indicted
for the murder.

B
At trial, Hemphill pursued a third-party  culpability de-
fense  by  blaming  Morris  for  the shooting.    In  his  opening
statement,  Hemphill’s  counsel  noted  that  officers  had  re-
covered 9-millimeter ammunition from Morris’ nightstand
hours  after  a  9-millimeter  bullet  killed  the  victim.  The
State did not object, but later contended that Hemphill’s ar-
gument  had  been  misleading  because  officers  also  had
found  .357-caliber  bullets  on  the  nightstand  and  because
Morris  ultimately  pleaded  guilty  to  possessing  a  .357  re-
volver.

Morris, however, was unavailable to testify at Hemphill’s
trial.  As  a  result,  the  State  sought  to  introduce  the  tran-
script of Morris’ plea allocution to suggest that he had pos-
sessed  only  a  .357  revolver.    Hemphill’s  counsel  objected,
arguing that the plea allocution was “clearly hearsay” and
that Hemphill was being “deprived of an opportunity [for]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing a case involving a murder trial and the use of a prior plea allocution as evidence.  It is sequential text and relevant to the content of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

YELLEN, SECRETARY OF TREASURY v.
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS
RESERVATION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 20–543.  Argued April 19, 2021—Decided June 25, 2021*

Title V of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)
Act allocates $8 billion to “Tribal governments” to compensate for un-
budgeted  expenditures  made  in  response  to  COVID–19.  42  U. S. C.
§801(a)(2)(B).  The question in these cases is whether Alaska Native
Corporations (ANCs) are eligible to receive any of that $8 billion.  Un-
der the CARES Act, a “Tribal government” is the “recognized govern-
ing body of an Indian tribe” as defined in the Indian Self-Determina-
tion and Education Assistance Act (ISDA).  §§801(g)(5), (1).  ISDA, in
turn, defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or
other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native vil-
lage or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pur-
suant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [(ANCSA),] which
is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided
by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.”  25
U. S. C. §5304(e).

Consistent with the Department of the Interior’s longstanding view
that ANCs are Indian tribes under ISDA, the Department of the Treas-
ury determined that ANCs are eligible for relief under Title V of the
CARES  Act,  even  though  ANCs  are  not  “federally  recognized  tribes”
(i.e.,  tribes  with  which  the  United  States  has  entered  into  a  govern-
ment-to-government relationship).  A number of federally recognized

——————

*Together  with  No.  20–544,  Alaska  Native  Village  Corp.  Association
et al.  v.  Confederated  Tribes  of  the  Chehalis  Reservation  et al.,  also  on
certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

31

ALITO, J., dissenting

any serious form of scrutiny would have questioned the ab-
sence of evidence, but no substantiation was provided or de-
manded below.

In  sum,  the  City’s  travel  restriction  burdened  the  very
right recognized in Heller.  History provides no support for
a  restriction  of  this  type.    The  City’s  public  safety  argu-
ments were weak on their face, were not substantiated in
any way, and were accepted below with no serious probing.
And once we granted review in this case, the City’s public
safety concerns evaporated.

We are told that the mode of review in this case is repre-
sentative  of  the  way  Heller  has  been  treated  in  the  lower
courts.  If that is true, there is cause for concern.

*

*

*
This case is not moot.  The City violated petitioners’ Sec-
ond Amendment right, and we should so hold.  I would re-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the
case  to  the  District  Court  to  provide  appropriate  relief.   I
therefore respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. v. CHRISTIAN

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

ran everything.  And, let’s be honest, the implication here
is that property owners cannot be trusted to clean up their
lands without causing trouble (especially for Atlantic Rich-
field).  Nor, we are told, should Montanans worry so much:
The  restrictions  Atlantic  Richfield  proposes  aren’t  really
that draconian because homeowners would still be free to
do things like build sandboxes for their grandchildren (pro-
vided,  of  course,  they  don’t  scoop  out  too  much  arsenic  in
the process).

But, as in so many cases that come before this Court, the
policy arguments here cut both ways.  Maybe paternalistic
central planning cannot tolerate  parallel state law efforts
to  restore  state  lands.    But  maybe,  too,  good  government
and  environmental  protection  would  be  better  served  if
state  law  remedies  proceeded  alongside  federal  efforts.
State and federal law enforcement usually work in just this
way,  complementing  rather  than  displacing  one  another.
And, anyway, how long would Atlantic Richfield have us en-
force what amounts to a federal easement requiring land-
owners  to  house  toxic  waste  on  their  lands?    The  govern-
ment has been on site since 1983; work supposedly finished
around  the  landowners’  homes  in  2016;  the  completion  of
“primary” cleanup efforts is “estimated” to happen by 2025.
So, yes, once a Superfund site is “delisted,” the restrictions
on potentially responsible parties fade away.  But this pro-
ject is well on its way to the half-century mark and still only
a “preliminary” deadline lies on the horizon.  No one before
us will even hazard a guess when the work will finish and
a “delisting” might come.  On Atlantic Richfield’s view, gen-
erations have come and gone and more may follow before
the plaintiffs can clean their land.

The  real  problem,  of  course,  is  that  Congress,  not  this
Court, is supposed to make judgments between competing
policy arguments like these.  And, as we’ve seen, Congress
has offered its judgment repeatedly and clearly.  CERCLA
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian. It presents legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
Opinion of the Court

Respondents maintain that this explanation is deficient
for three reasons.  Their first and second arguments work
in tandem, claiming that the Duke Memorandum does not
adequately explain the conclusion that DACA is unlawful,
and  that  this  conclusion  is,  in  any  event,  wrong.    While
those arguments carried the day in the lower courts, in our
view they overlook an important constraint on Acting Sec-
retary Duke’s decisionmaking authority—she was bound by
the Attorney General’s legal determination.

The same statutory provision that establishes the Secre-
tary of Homeland Security’s authority to administer and en-
force  immigration  laws  limits  that  authority,  specifying
that, with respect to “all questions of law,” the determina-
tions  of  the  Attorney  General  “shall  be  controlling.”  8
U. S. C.  §1103(a)(1).    Respondents  are  aware  of  this  con-
straint.  Indeed they emphasized the point in the reviewa-
bility  sections  of  their  briefs.  But  in  their  merits  argu-
ments,  respondents  never  addressed  whether  or  how  this
unique statutory provision might affect our review.  They
did not discuss whether Duke was required to explain a le-
gal conclusion that was not hers to make.  Nor did they dis-
cuss  whether  the  current  suits  challenging  Duke’s  rescis-
sion decision, which everyone agrees was within her legal
authority under the INA, are proper vehicles for attacking
the Attorney General’s legal conclusion.

Because of these gaps in respondents’ briefing, we do not
evaluate  the  claims  challenging  the  explanation  and  cor-
rectness of the illegality conclusion.  Instead we focus our
attention on respondents’ third argument—that Acting Sec-
retary  Duke  “failed  to  consider  . . .  important  aspect[s]  of
the  problem”  before  her.  Motor  Vehicle  Mfrs.  Assn.  of
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,
463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983).

——————
carried any independent weight.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of the court in a case involving the Department of Homeland Security and the Regents of the University of California.  It discusses the arguments presented by the respondents and the court's approach to evaluating them.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1090

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 24, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8344. Townsend v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8349. Wingate v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8350. Wilson v. Ratelle, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8354. Davis v. United Parcel Service, Inc., et al.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8356. Gann v. Alabama Department of Correc-

tions et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8357. Geary v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 115 Nev. 79, 977 P. 2d 344.

No. 99–8360. Greene v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 139 Wash. 2d 64, 984 P. 2d 1024.
No. 99–8365. Fields v. Jackson. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–8367. Hogue v. Ayers, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8369. Rochon v. Exxon Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 827.

No. 99–8373.

Johnson v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8374. Garcia Larrinaga v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App.

Tex. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8375. McWeeney v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 156 Ore. App. 397, 972 P. 2d 1228.

No. 99–8376. Bays v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari de-

nied. Reported below: 87 Ohio St. 3d 15, 716 N. E. 2d 1126.

No. 99–8378. Del Valle Hernandez v. New York City
Law Department Corporation Counsel et al. App. Div.,
Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 258 App. Div. 2d 390, 685 N. Y. S. 2d 674.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

THOMAS, J., concurring

rights not just against the Federal Government but also the
government of the citizen’s State of residence.  Unlike the
Civil  Rights  Act,  however,  the  Amendment  employed  a
wholly  race-neutral  text,  extending  privileges  or  immuni-
ties to all “citizens”—even if its practical effect was to pro-
vide all citizens with the same privileges then enjoyed by
whites.  That citizenship guarantee was often linked with
the  concept  of  equality.  Vaello  Madero,  596  U. S.,  at  ___
(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  10).    Combining  the
citizenship  guarantee  with  the  Privileges  or  Immunities
Clause  and  the  Equal  Protection  Clause,  the  Fourteenth
Amendment ensures protection for all equal citizens of the
Nation without regard to race.  Put succinctly, “[o]ur Con-
stitution is color-blind.”  Plessy, 163 U. S., at 559 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).

C
In  the  period  closely  following  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment’s  ratification,  Congress  passed  several  statutes  de-
signed to enforce its terms, eliminating government-based
Black  Codes—systems  of  government-imposed  segrega-
tion—and  criminalizing  racially  motivated  violence.    The
marquee  legislation  was  the  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1875,  ch.
114, 18 Stat. 335–337, and the justifications offered by pro-
ponents of that measure are further evidence for the color-
blind view of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Civil Rights Act of 1875 sought to counteract the sys-
tems  of  racial  segregation  that  had  arisen  in  the  wake  of
the  Reconstruction  era.  Advocates  of  so-called  separate-
but-equal  systems,  which  allowed  segregated  facilities  for
blacks and whites, had argued that laws permitting or re-
quiring  such  segregation  treated  members  of  both  races
precisely alike: Blacks could not attend a white school, but
symmetrically, whites could not attend a black school.  See
Plessy, 163 U. S., at 544 (arguing that, in light of the social
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It discusses the Fourteenth Amendment and its interpretation, referencing historical context and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1077

558 U. S.

December 7, 2009

No.  09–406.  United  States  ex  rel.  Darian  v.  Pasternak
et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342
Fed.  Appx.  254.

No.  09–423.  Stacey,  Executor  of  the  Estate  of  Stacey,
Deceased  v.  Tierney.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d  App.  Dist.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–452.  Fastov  v.  Christie’s  International  PLC
et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
324  Fed.  Appx.  10.

No.  09–488.  Thomas  Kinkade  Co.,  LLC,  et  al.  v.  Hazle
wood  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  629.

No. 09–512.  Smith v.  Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.
Appx.  607.

No.  09–514.  Clarke  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  1158.

No.  09–526.  Phengsengkham  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  423.

No. 09–534.  Catlett v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  681.

No.  09–552.  Ledingham  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  150.

No.  09–5076.  Kincaid-Chauncey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  923.

No. 09–5515.  Quinn v. United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  293.

No.  09–5694.  Bolden  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  545  F.  3d  609.

No. 09–5708.  Al Uzayti, aka Al Libbi v.  Gates, Secretary

of  Defense.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5734.  Luster  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  224.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is more of a legal document summary than readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT

The  flagpoles  outside  Boston  City  Hall  fly  the  American  flag,  the  Commonwealth  of

Massachusetts flag, and the city flag, side by side, on an ordinary day.

Source:  Preservation  Priorities,  Boston  Preservation  Alliance  (Feb.  3,  2022),  https://boston-preservation.
org/news-item/preservation-priorities-letter-mayor-wu
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from an appendix to a legal opinion, likely providing context or additional information related to the main opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Appendix</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
936
Hines; Pearson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
Hobbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hoffpauir’s Estate; Sudwisher v.
929
Hogan v. Kaiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
236
Hohn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Holden; Missourians for Tax Justice Ed. Project, Inc. v. . . . . . . . .
922
Holt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Home Savings of America v. Maynard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Honduras v. Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd.
952
Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd.; Government of Honduras v.
. .
922
Honeycutt v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
Hooker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Hooper v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hoovler v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Hopkins v. Reeves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88,968
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,968
Hopkins; Reeves v.
908
Hopkins; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Horn; Craw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Horton v. Mississippi State Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
Horton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
983
Houghton; Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910
Houser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960
Housing Authority of St. Louis County; Snelling v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
958
Howell v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
979
Hubbard; Grenada v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
Huffman v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hui Lin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Humana Inc. v. Forsyth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,976
930
Humphreys v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Hung Thanh Le v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
980
Hunt v. Cromartie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
Hunt; Shong-Ching Tong v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hunter v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Hynes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,974
908
Ignacio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ijemba, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,972
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
Illinois; Anderson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Illinois; Bower v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Illinois; Bradley v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Illinois; Cloutier v.
971
Illinois; Dumas v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
978
Illinois; Ellis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923
Illinois; Enoch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>