<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY

Opinion of the Court

765  (2002)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  it  would
hardly  be  served  by  favoring  private  or  Government-
supported invasions of state-owned lands over judicial pro-
ceedings.

Perhaps  sensing  the  incongruity  of  such  a  result,  New
Jersey has taken the extreme stance that there is no consti-
tutional mechanism for Federal Government delegatees to
exercise the eminent domain power against the States.  See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 86.  This position is untenable.  “[J]ust as
permission to harvest the wheat on one’s land implies per-
mission to enter on the land for that purpose,” A. Scalia &
B. Garner, Reading Law 192 (2012), so too does authoriza-
tion  to  take  property  interests  imply  a  means  through
which those interests can be peaceably transferred.  An em-
inent  domain  power  that  is  incapable  of  being  exercised
amounts to no eminent domain power at all.  And that is
contrary to the plan of the Convention for the reasons dis-
cussed in Kohl, Stockton, Cherokee Nation, and Luxton.

The dissent, for its part, declines to say whether Congress
could  authorize  a  certificate  holder  to  take  possession  of
state property through upfront entry.  See post, at 7–8, and
n. 3.  The dissent gestures at other judicial and administra-
tive procedures that delegatees might be able to use to take
state  property.  See  post,  at  8,  n. 3.    But  such  procedures
would  almost  certainly  meet  the  same  fate  as  traditional
condemnation  actions  under  the  dissent’s  analysis.  See
Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina Ports Author-
ity, 535 U. S. 743, 760–761 (2002).

Furthermore, the respondents and the dissent prove too
much by emphasizing the historical absence of private con-
demnation suits against state-owned lands.  As a prelimi-
nary matter, they appear to cast doubt on the provenance
of the Federal Government’s ability to exercise its eminent
domain power within the States.  See post, at 6; Brief for
Respondent NCJF 40–42; Brief for Respondent New Jersey
et al. 16–18.  But we resolved in Kohl and its progeny that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of the federal government's eminent domain power against states.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Syllabus

A state rule imposing an expansive rule of joinder in the arbitral con-
text would defeat the ability of parties to control which claims are sub-
ject to arbitration by permitting parties to superadd new claims to the
proceeding,  regardless  of  whether  the  agreement  committed  those
claims  to  arbitration.    When  made  compulsory  by  way  of  Iskanian,
PAGA’s joinder rule functions in exactly this way.  The effect is to co-
Is-
erce  parties  into  withholding  PAGA  claims  from  arbitration.
kanian’s indivisibility rule effectively coerces parties to opt for a judi-
cial forum rather than “forgo[ing] the procedural rigor and appellate
review of the courts to realize the benefits of private dispute resolu-
tion.”  Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 685.  Pp. 17–19.

(c) Under  this  Courts  holding, Iskanian’s  prohibition  on  wholesale
waivers of PAGA claims is not preempted by the FAA.  But Iskanian’s
rule that PAGA actions cannot be divided into individual and non-in-
dividual claims is preempted, so Viking was entitled to  compel arbi-
tration of Moriana’s individual claim.  PAGA provides no mechanism
to  enable  a  court  to  adjudicate  non-individual  PAGA  claims  once  an
individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding.  And
under PAGA’s standing requirement, a plaintiff has standing to main-
tain  non-individual  PAGA  claims  in  an  action  only  by  virtue  of  also
maintaining an individual claim in that action.  As a result, Moriana
would lack statutory standing to maintain her non-individual claims
in court, and the correct course was to dismiss her remaining claims.
Pp. 20–21.

Reversed and remanded.

ALITO,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  BREYER,  SO-
TOMAYOR,  KAGAN,  and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,  joined,  in  which  ROBERTS,  C. J.,
joined as to Parts I and III, and in which KAVANAUGH and BARRETT, JJ.,
joined as to Part III.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.  BARRETT,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in
which KAVANAUGH, J., joined, and in which ROBERTS, C. J, joined as to
all but the footnote.  THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a condensed overview rather than the full text meant for reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xliv

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Zamora-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zankich v. Goodnow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zaragoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zeeland Bd. of Ed.; Bush v.
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zerebnick v. Beckwith Machinery Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zimmerman; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zollo Drum Co. v. B. F. Goodrich Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zuckerman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zuk; Cimino v.

Page
959
957
945
904
937
946
918
926
932
909
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases reported, which is a typical element found in legal documents. It is not the main body of the text and is not meant to be read sequentially.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

429

Opinion of the Court

ality of the Act. Subsection (a)(2) requires that copies of
any complaint ﬁled under subsection (a)(1) “shall be promptly
delivered” to both Houses of Congress, and that each House
shall have a right to intervene. Subsection (b) authorizes a
direct appeal to this Court from any order of the District
Court, and requires that the appeal be ﬁled within 10 days.
Subsection (c) imposes a duty on both the District Court and
this Court “to advance on the docket and to expedite to the
greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter
brought under subsection (a).” There is no plausible rea-
son why Congress would have intended to provide for such
special treatment of actions ﬁled by natural persons and to
have precluded entirely jurisdiction over comparable cases
brought by corporate persons. Acceptance of the Govern-
ment’s new-found reading of § 692 “would produce an absurd
and unjust result which Congress could not have intended.”
Grifﬁn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 574
(1982).14

We are also unpersuaded by the Government’s argument
that appellees’ challenge to the constitutionality of the Act
is nonjusticiable. We agree, of course, that Article III of the
Constitution conﬁnes the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
actual “Cases” and “Controversies,” and that “the doctrine
of standing serves to identify those disputes which are
appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” Whit-

14 Justice Scalia objects to our conclusion that the Government’s read-
ing of the statute would produce an absurd result. Post, at 454–455.
Nonetheless, he states that “ ‘the case is of such imperative public impor-
tance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require
immediate determination in this Court.’ ” Post, at 455 (quoting this
Court’s Rule 11). Unlike Justice Scalia, however, we need not rely on
our own sense of the importance of the issue involved; instead, the struc-
ture of § 692 makes it clear that Congress believed the issue warranted
expedited review and, therefore, that Congress did not intend the result
that the word “individual” would dictate in other contexts.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 417 (1998).  It discusses the interpretation of a statute and the standing of the parties involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

9

Opinion of the Court

771.  Testimony before the trial court in this case indicated
that  the  percentage  of  alcohol  in  an  individual’s  blood
typically decreases by approximately 0.015 percent to 0.02
percent per hour once the alcohol has been fully absorbed.
App.  47.  More  precise  calculations  of  the  rate  at  which
alcohol dissipates depend on various individual character
istics  (such  as  weight,  gender,  and  alcohol  tolerance)  and
the  circumstances  in  which  the  alcohol  was  consumed.
See Stripp, Forensic and Clinical Issues in Alcohol Analy
sis, in Forensic Chemistry Handbook 437–441 (L. Kobilin
sky ed. 2012).  Regardless of the exact elimination rate, it
is sufficient for our purposes to note that because an indi
vidual’s alcohol level gradually declines soon after he stops
drinking,  a  significant  delay  in  testing  will  negatively
affect  the  probative  value  of  the  results.    This  fact  was
essential  to  our  holding  in  Schmerber,  as  we  recognized
that,  under  the  circumstances,  further  delay  in  order  to
secure  a  warrant  after  the  time  spent  investigating  the
scene of the accident and transporting the injured suspect
to the hospital to receive treatment would have threatened
the destruction of evidence.  384 U. S., at 770–771.

But it does not follow that we should depart from careful
case-by-case  assessment  of  exigency  and  adopt  the  cate
gorical rule proposed by the State and its amici.  In those
drunk-driving  investigations  where  police  officers  can
reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be
drawn  without  significantly  undermining  the  efficacy  of
the  search,  the  Fourth  Amendment  mandates  that  they
do so.  See McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456
(1948)  (“We  cannot  . . .  excuse  the  absence  of  a  search
warrant  without  a  showing  by  those  who  seek  exemption
from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the
situation made [the search] imperative”).  We do not doubt
that  some  circumstances  will  make  obtaining  a  warrant
impractical  such  that  the  dissipation  of  alcohol  from  the
bloodstream will support an exigency justifying a properly
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal implications of blood alcohol testing in drunk driving investigations, referencing prior case law and scientific evidence about alcohol dissipation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
104

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation, likely part of a court document. Legal citations are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the main content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AUSTIN v. U. S. NAVY SEALS 1–26

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

U. S. 518, 530 (1988).  As the Court has long emphasized,
moreover, the “complex, subtle, and professional decisions
as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a
military  force  are  essentially  professional  military  judg-
ments.”  Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10 (1973).  There-
fore, it is “difficult to conceive of an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence.”  Ibid.

In  this  case,  the  District  Court,  while  no  doubt  well-in-
tentioned, in effect inserted itself into the Navy’s chain of
command,  overriding  military  commanders’  professional
military judgments.  The Court relied on the Religious Free-
dom  Restoration  Act.  See  42  U. S. C.  §2000bb−1(b).  But
even  accepting  that  RFRA  applies  in  this  particular  mili-
tary context, RFRA does not justify judicial intrusion into
military affairs in this case.  That is because the Navy has
an extraordinarily compelling interest in maintaining stra-
tegic and operational control over the assignment and de-
ployment of all Special Warfare personnel—including con-
trol  over  decisions  about  military  readiness.  And  no  less
restrictive means would satisfy that interest in this context.
The Court “should indulge the widest latitude” to sustain
the  President’s  “function  to  command  the  instruments  of
national  force,  at  least  when  turned  against  the  outside
world for the security of our society.”  Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 645 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).  That fundamental principle applies here.  As
Admiral William Lescher, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
explained: “Sending ships into combat without maximizing
the crew’s odds of success, such as would be the case with
ship  deficiencies  in  ordnance,  radar,  working  weapons  or
the means to reliably accomplish the mission, is dereliction
of duty.  The same applies to ordering unvaccinated person-
nel into an environment in which they endanger their lives,
the lives of others and compromise accomplishment of es-
sential missions.”  App. to Application for Partial Stay 110a.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in the case of Austin v. U.S. Navy Seals. It delves into legal arguments regarding military judgment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the President's authority.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

19

BREYER, J., dissenting

in  concluding  that  the  Act  is  underinclusive,  ante,  at  15–
16.  But the key question is whether these exempt clinics
are significantly more likely than are the pro-life clinics to
tell  or  to  have  told  their  pregnant  patients  about  the
existence of these programs—in the absence of any statu-
tory compulsion.  If so, it may make sense—in terms of the
statute’s informational objective—to exempt them, namely
if  there  is  no  need  to  cover  them.    See  FACT  Act,  §1(d)
(suggesting in general terms that this is so).  But, if there
are  not  good  reasons  to  exempt  these  clinics  from  cover-
age,  i.e.,  if,  for  example,  they  too  frequently  do  not  tell
their  patients  about  the  availability  of  abortion  services,
the petitioners’ claim of viewpoint discrimination becomes
much stronger.

The  petitioners,  however,  did  not  develop  this  point  in
the  record  below.    They  simply  stated  in  their  complaint
that  the  Act  exempts  “facilities  which  provide  abortion
services,  freeing  them  from  the  Act’s  disclosure  require-
ments,  while  leaving  pro-life  facilities  subject  to  them.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 104a.  And in the District Court they
relied solely on the allegations of their complaint, provided
no  supporting  declarations,  and  contended  that  discovery
was unnecessary.  Id., at 47a, 50a, 68a.  The District Court
concluded  that  the  reason  for  the  Act’s  exemptions  was
that those clinics “provide the entire spectrum of services
required of the notice,” and that absent discovery, “there is
no evidence to suggest the Act burdens only” pro-life con-
duct.  Id.,  at  68a.  Similarly,  the  petitioners  pressed  the
claim in the Court of Appeals.  Id., at 20a–22a.  But they
did  not  supplement  the  record.  Consequently,  that  court
reached  the  same  conclusion.    Given  the  absence  of  evi-
dence in the record before the lower courts, the “viewpoint
discrimination”  claim  could  not  justify  the  issuance  of  a
preliminary injunction.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a statute and its exemptions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

and services.”  Id., at 572 (emphasis added).

Although  public-accommodations  laws  generally  regu
late  conduct,  particular  applications  of  them  can  burden
protected  speech.  When  a  public-accommodations  law
“ha[s]  the  effect  of  declaring  . . .  speech  itself  to  be  the
public accommodation,” the First Amendment applies with
full  force.  Id.,  at  573;  accord,  Boy  Scouts  of  America  v.
Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 657–659 (2000).  In Hurley, for exam
ple,  a  Massachusetts  public-accommodations  law  prohib-
ited  “ ‘any  distinction,  discrimination  or  restriction  on  ac
count  of  . . .  sexual  orientation  . . .  relative  to  the  admis
sion  of  any  person  to,  or  treatment  in  any  place  of  public
accommodation.’ ”  515  U. S.,  at  561  (quoting  Mass.  Gen.
Laws  §272:98  (1992);  ellipsis  in  original).    When  this  law
required  the  sponsor  of  a  St.  Patrick’s  Day  parade  to
include  a  parade  unit  of  gay,  lesbian,  and  bisexual  Irish-
Americans,  the  Court  unanimously  held  that  the  law
violated the sponsor’s right to free speech.  Parades are “a
form of expression,” this Court explained, and the applica
tion  of  the  public-accommodations  law  “alter[ed]  the  ex
pressive  content”  of  the  parade  by  forcing  the  sponsor  to
add a new unit.  515 U. S., at 568, 572–573.  The addition
of that unit compelled the organizer to “bear witness to the
fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual”; “suggest
. . .  that  people  of  their  sexual  orientation  have  as  much
claim  to  unqualified  social  acceptance  as  heterosexuals”;
and  imply  that  their  participation  “merits  celebration.”
Id., at 574.  While this Court acknowledged that the unit’s
exclusion  might  have  been  “misguided,  or  even  hurtful,”
ibid., it rejected the notion that governments can mandate
“thoughts  and  statements  acceptable  to  some  groups  or,
indeed, all people” as the “antithesis” of free speech, id., at
579; accord, Dale, supra, at 660–661.

The  parade  in  Hurley  was  an  example  of  what  this
Court has termed “expressive conduct.”  See 515 U. S., at
568–569.  This Court has long held that “the Constitution
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing case law and discussing legal principles. It is likely part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary or structural element.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U90

[09-15-00 14:33:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

374

PENNSYLVANIA BD. OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE v. SCOTT
Souter, J., dissenting

parolee’s apartment); see also Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
tion and Parole, Police Procedures in the Handling of Parol-
ees 16 (rev. 1974) (parole agent has a responsibility to inform
police in the area where parolee will be living and to provide
“full cooperation to the police”).

As these cases show, the police very likely do know a pa-
rolee’s status when they go after him, and (contrary to the
majority’s assumption) this fact is signiﬁcant for three rea-
sons. First, and most obviously, the police have reason for
concern with the outcome of a parole revocation proceeding,
which is just as foreseeable as the criminal trial and at least
as likely to be held. Police ofﬁcers, especially those em-
ployed by the same sovereign that runs the parole system,
therefore have every incentive not to jeopardize a recom-
mitment by rendering evidence inadmissible. See INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S., at 1043 (deterrence especially ef-
fective when law enforcement and prosecution are under one
government). Second, as I will explain below, the actual
likelihood of trial is often far less than the probability of a
petition for parole revocation, with the consequence that the
revocation hearing will be the only forum in which the evi-
dence will ever be offered. Often, therefore, there will be
nothing incremental about the signiﬁcance of evidence of-
fered in the administrative tribunal, and nothing “marginal”
about the deterrence provided by an exclusionary rule op-
erating there. Ante, at 368. Finally, the cooperation be-
tween parole and police ofﬁcers, as in the instances shown in
the cases cited above, casts serious doubt upon the aptness
of treating police ofﬁcers differently from parole ofﬁcers,
doubt that is conﬁrmed by the following attention to the
Court’s characterization of the position of the parole ofﬁcer.
The Court recalls our description of the police as “engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,”
which raises the temptation to cut constitutional corners
(which in turn requires the countervailing inﬂuence of the
exclusionary rule). United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 914.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and citations to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
Opinion of the Court

types of benefits is an interest “courts often are called upon
to protect.”  Chaney, 470 U. S., at 832.  See also Barnhart v.
Thomas, 540 U. S. 20 (2003) (reviewing eligibility determi-
nation for Social Security benefits).

Because the DACA program is more than a non-enforce-
ment  policy,  its  rescission  is  subject  to  review  under  the
APA.

B
The  Government  also  invokes  two  jurisdictional  provi-
sions  of  the  INA  as  independent  bars  to  review.    Neither
applies.

Section 1252(b)(9) bars review of claims arising from “ac-
tion[s]” or “proceeding[s] brought to remove an alien.”  66
Stat.  209,  as  amended,  8  U. S. C.  §1252(b)(9).    That  tar-
geted language is not aimed at this sort of case.  As we have
said  before,  §1252(b)(9)  “does  not  present  a  jurisdictional
bar” where those bringing suit “are not asking for review of
an order of removal,” “the decision . . . to seek removal,” or
“the process by which . . . removability will be determined.”
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (plu-
rality opinion) (slip op., at 10–11); id., at ___ (BREYER, J.,
dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  31).  And  it  is  certainly  not  a  bar
where, as here, the parties are not challenging any removal
proceedings.

Section 1252(g) is similarly narrow.  That provision limits
review of cases “arising from” decisions “to commence pro-
ceedings,  adjudicate  cases,  or  execute  removal  orders.”
§1252(g).  We have previously rejected as “implausible” the
Government’s  suggestion  that  §1252(g)  covers  “all  claims
arising from deportation proceedings” or imposes “a general
jurisdictional  limitation.”    Reno  v.  American-Arab  Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 482 (1999).  The re-
scission, which revokes a deferred action program with as-
sociated  benefits,  is  not  a  decision  to  “commence  proceed-
ings,”  much  less  to  “adjudicate”  a  case  or  “execute”  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the legal basis for reviewing the rescission of the DACA program. It contains legal arguments, citations to case law, and statutory references.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE

Opinion of the Court

party’s advantage may be shown through sensitivity test-
ing:  probing  how  a  plan  would  perform  under  other  plau-
sible  electoral  conditions.”  Brief  for  Appellees  League  of
Women  Voters  of  North  Carolina  et al.  in  No.  18–422,
p. 55.  See also 318 F. Supp. 3d, at 885.  Experience proves
that  accurately  predicting  electoral  outcomes  is  not  so
simple,  either  because  the  plans  are  based  on  flawed
assumptions  about  voter  preferences  and  behavior  or
because demographics and priorities change over time.  In
our  two  leading  partisan  gerrymandering  cases  them-
selves, the predictions of durability proved to be dramati-
cally wrong.  In 1981, Republicans controlled both houses
of  the  Indiana  Legislature  as  well  as  the  governorship.
Democrats challenged the state legislature districting map
enacted  by  the  Republicans.    This  Court  in  Bandemer
rejected  that  challenge,  and  just  months  later  the  Demo-
crats  increased  their  share  of  House  seats  in  the  1986
elections.  Two  years  later  the  House  was  split  50–50
between  Democrats  and  Republicans,  and  the  Democrats
took  control  of  the  chamber  in  1990.  Democrats  also
challenged  the  Pennsylvania  congressional  districting
plan  at  issue  in  Vieth.  Two  years  after  that  challenge
failed, they gained four seats in the delegation, going from
a 12–7 minority to an 11–8 majority.  At the next election,
they flipped another Republican seat.

Even  the  most  sophisticated  districting  maps  cannot
reliably account for some of the reasons voters prefer one
candidate  over  another,  or  why  their  preferences  may
change.  Voters  elect  individual  candidates  in  individual
districts,  and  their  selections  depend  on  the  issues  that
matter  to  them,  the  quality  of  the  candidates,  the  tone of
the  candidates’  campaigns,  the  performance  of  an  incum-
bent, national events or local issues that drive voter turn-
out,  and  other  considerations.  Many  voters  split  their
tickets.  Others  never  register  with  a  political  party,  and
vote  for  candidates  from  both  major  parties  at  different
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text discussing the complexities of predicting electoral outcomes based on districting maps.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
Opinion of the Court

the  safety  or  health  of  other  individuals  would  be  endan-
gered.  §1396r(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  The exceptions to
the advance-notice requirement, too, turn (inter alia) on the
“resident’s health,” the “resident’s urgent medical needs,” or
the existence of threats to the safety or health of other indi-
viduals  in  the  nursing  home.  §§1396r(c)(2)(B)(ii)(I)–(III)
(emphasis added).

To be sure, these two provisions also establish who it is
that must respect and honor these statutory rights; namely,
the Medicaid-participant nursing homes in which these res-
idents  reside.    See,  e.g.,  §§1396a(a)(28),  1396r(c)(1)(A),
1396r(c)(2)(A);  see  also  §§1396r(c)(1)(B)(i)–(ii)  (requiring
nursing  homes  to  inform  nursing-home  residents  of  their
rights, orally and in writing, upon admission and upon re-
quest).  But that is not a material diversion from the neces-
sary  focus  on  the  nursing-home  residents,  contrary  to
HHC’s representations.  Indeed, it would be strange to hold
that a statutory provision fails to secure rights simply be-
cause it considers, alongside the rights bearers, the actors
that  might  threaten  those  rights  (and  we  have  never  so
held).12

The  unnecessary-restraint  and  predischarge-notice  pro-
visions thus stand in stark contrast to the statutory provi-
sions  that  failed  Gonzaga’s  test  in  Gonzaga  itself.  Those
provisions lacked “rights-creating language,” primarily di-
rected  the  Federal  Government’s  “distribution  of  public
funds,” and had “an aggregate, not individual, focus.”  536
U. S., at 290.  The opposite is true here.  The unnecessary-
restraint  and  predischarge-notice  provisions  use  clear
“rights-creating language,” speak “ ‘in terms of the persons
benefited,’ ” and have an “ ‘unmistakable focus on the bene-
fited class.’ ”  Id., at 284, 287, 290 (emphasis deleted).  Thus,
they  satisfy  Gonzaga’s  stringent  standard,  and  the  rights

——————

12 The Fourteenth Amendment hardly fails to secure §1983-enforceable

rights because it directs state actors not to deny equal protection.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the rights of nursing home residents under Medicaid. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

27

Opinion of the Court

We  have  established  a  procedure  for  trying  pattern-or-
practice cases that gives effect to these statutory require-
ments.  When the plaintiff seeks individual relief such as
reinstatement  or  backpay  after  establishing  a  pattern  or
practice  of  discrimination,  “a  district  court  must  usually
conduct additional proceedings . . . to determine the scope
of individual relief.”  Teamsters, 431 U. S., at 361.  At this
phase, the burden of proof will shift to the company, but it
will  have  the  right  to  raise  any  individual  affirmative
defenses  it  may  have,  and  to  “demonstrate  that  the  indi-
vidual  applicant  was  denied  an  employment  opportunity
for lawful reasons.”  Id., at 362.

The  Court  of  Appeals  believed  that  it  was  possible  to
replace such proceedings with Trial by Formula.  A sample
set  of  the  class  members  would  be  selected,  as  to  whom
liability for sex discrimination and the backpay owing as a
result would be determined in depositions supervised by a
master.  The  percentage  of  claims  determined  to  be  valid
would  then  be  applied  to  the  entire  remaining  class,  and
the  number  of  (presumptively)  valid  claims  thus  derived
would be multiplied by the average backpay award in the
sample set to arrive at the entire class recovery—without
further individualized proceedings.  603 F. 3d, at 625–627.
We  disapprove  that  novel  project.    Because  the  Rules
Enabling  Act  forbids  interpreting  Rule  23  to  “abridge,
enlarge  or  modify  any  substantive  right,”  28  U. S. C.
§2072(b);  see  Ortiz,  527  U. S.,  at  845,  a  class  cannot  be
certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled
to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.  And
because  the  necessity  of  that  litigation  will  prevent  back-
pay  from  being  “incidental”  to  the  classwide  injunction,
respondents’  class  could  not  be  certified  even  assuming,
monetary  relief  can  be
arguendo,  that  “incidental”
awarded to a 23(b)(2) class.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

*

*

*

Reversed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the procedures for handling pattern-or-practice discrimination cases and the limitations on class certification.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
44

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

THOMAS, J., dissenting

flagrant.  383 U. S., at 328; see also id., at 315–317 (describ-
ing the limited issues presented).  Fourteen years later, City
of  Rome  upheld  the  1975  Act  extending  §5’s  preclearance
provisions for another seven years.  See 446 U. S., at 172–
173.    The  majority’s  reliance  on  these  cases  to  validate  a
statutory  rule  not  there  at issue  could  make sense  only  if
we assessed the congruence and proportionality of the Vot-
ing Rights Act’s rules wholesale, without considering their
individual  features,  or  if  Katzenbach  and  City  of  Rome
meant that Congress has plenary power to enact whatever
rules  it  chooses  to  characterize  as  combating  “discrimina-
tory  . . .  effect[s].”    Ante,  at  33  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  Neither proposition makes any conceptual sense
or is consistent with our cases.  See, e.g., Shelby County, 570
U. S., at 550–557 (holding the 2006 preclearance coverage
formula  unconstitutional);  Northwest  Austin  Municipal
Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 203 (2009) (em-
phasizing the distinctness of §§2 and 5); City of Boerne, 521
U. S., at 533 (discussing City of Rome as a paradigm case of
congruence-and-proportionality review of remedial legisla-
tion); Miller, 515 U. S., at 927 (stressing that construing §5
to require “that States engage in presumptively unconstitu-
tional  race-based  districting”  would  raise  “troubling  and
difficult constitutional questions,” notwithstanding City of
Rome).
  In  fact,  the  majority’s  cases  confirm  the  very  limits  on
Congress’ enforcement powers that are fatal to the District
Court’s construction of §2.  City of Rome, for example, im-
mediately after one of the sentences quoted by the majority,
explained the remedial rationale for its approval of the 1975
preclearance  extension:  “Congress  could  rationally  have
concluded  that,  because  electoral  changes  by  jurisdictions
with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimi-
nation in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination,
it  was proper  to  prohibit  changes  that  have  a discrimina-
tory impact.”  446 U. S., at 177 (emphasis added; footnote
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Allen v. Milligan.  It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

Opinion of the Court

control  officers,

probation officers, human resource directors, police officers,
librarians, snow plow drivers, court clerks, prison guards,
high  school  basketball  coaches,  mayors,  zoning  board
members,  animal
social  workers,
firefighters, city planners, and the entire army of 19 million
state and local officials to know what is acceptable and what
is criminalized by the Federal Government?  They cannot.
The Government’s so-called guidance would leave state and
local officials entirely at sea to guess about what gifts they
are allowed to accept under federal law, with the threat of
up  to  10  years  in  federal  prison  if  they  happen  to  guess
wrong.  That is not how federal criminal law works.5

Responding  to  the  legitimate  concern  that  the  federal
lines  are  unknown  and  unknowable  to  state  and  local
officials,  the  Government  advances  the  familiar  plea  that
federal  prosecutors  can  be  trusted  not  to  enforce  this
statute against small-time violators.  But as this Court has
said time and again, the Court “cannot construe a criminal
statute on the assumption that the Government will use it
responsibly.”    McDonnell,  579  U. S.,  at  576  (quotation
marks omitted); see Percoco v. United States, 598 U. S. 319
(2023);  Ciminelli  v.  United  States,  598  U. S.  306  (2023);
Kelly  v.  United  States,  590  U. S.  391  (2020);  Skilling  v.
United States, 561 U. S. 358 (2010).

The  lack  of  fair  notice  for  state  and  local  officials  is
highlighted  by  comparing
federal
gratuities  guidance  given  to  state  and  local  officials  with
——————

the  non-existent

5 The  Government’s  interpretation  seems  all  the  more  unbelievable
because  §666  applies  to  the  gift-givers  as  well  as  the  state  and  local
officials  accepting  the  gifts.    Specifically,  §666(a)(2)  makes  it  a  crime
punishable by 10 years’ imprisonment for someone to “corruptly” offer or
give  “anything  of  value”  to  state  and  local  officials  “with  intent  to
influence  or  reward.”  So  under  the  Government’s  approach,  families,
students, constituents, and other members of the public would be forced
to guess whether they could even offer (much less actually give) thank-
you gift cards, steak dinners, or Fever tickets to their garbage collectors,
professors, or school board members, for example.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a federal statute. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

  As  for  Guernsey,  that  case  is  fully  consistent  with—
indeed,  confirms—what  the  text  of  the  APA  makes  plain:
“Interpretive  rules  do  not  require  notice  and  comment.”
514 U. S., at 99.  Sidestepping this inconvenient language,
MBA instead quotes a portion of the Court’s opinion stat-
ing  that  “APA  rulemaking  would  still  be  required  if  [an
agency]  adopted  a  new  position  inconsistent  with  . . .
existing  regulations.”    Id.,  at  100.  But  the  statement  on
which MBA relies is dictum.  Worse, it is dictum taken out
of context.   The “regulations” to which the  Court referred
were  two  provisions  of  the  Medicare  reimbursement
scheme.  And it is apparent from the Court’s description of
these regulations in Part II of the opinion that they were
legislative  rules,  issued  through  the  notice-and-comment
process.  See id., at 91–92 (noting that the disputed regu-
lations  were  codified  in  the  Code  of  Federal  Regulations).
Read  properly,  then,  the  cited  passage  from  Guernsey
merely means that “an agency may only change its inter-
pretation  if  the  revised  interpretation  is  consistent  with
the  underlying  regulations.”  Brief  for  Petitioners  in  No.
13–1052, p. 44.

B
In  the  main,  MBA  attempts  to  justify  the  Paralyzed
Veterans  doctrine  on  practical  and  policy  grounds.    MBA
contends  that  the  doctrine  reinforces  the  APA’s  goal  of
“procedural  fairness”  by  preventing  agencies  from  unilat-
erally  and  unexpectedly  altering  their  interpretation  of
important regulations.  Brief for Respondent 16.

There  may  be  times  when  an  agency’s  decision  to  issue
an  interpretive  rule,  rather  than  a  legislative  rule,  is
driven  primarily  by  a  desire  to  skirt  notice-and-comment
provisions.  But  regulated  entities  are  not  without  re-
course  in  such  situations.  Quite  the  opposite.  The  APA
contains  a  variety  of  constraints  on  agency  decisionmak-
ing—the  arbitrary  and  capricious  standard  being  among
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN.* It delves into the interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the distinction between interpretive rules and legislative rules.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
802

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10168.  Herships  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  6th
App.  Dist.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma
pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.

No.  08–10266.  Hobley  v.  District  of  Columbia.  Ct.  App.
D.  C.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pau
peris  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.  As  petitioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,
the  Clerk  is  directed  not  to  accept  any  further  petitions  in  non
criminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required
by  Rule  38(a)  is  paid  and  the  petition  is  submitted  in  compliance
with  Rule  33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of
Appeals,  506  U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dis
sents.  See  id.,  at  4,  and  cases  cited  therein.

No. 08–10401.  Harris v.  Walker, Warden, et al.  C. A. 9th
Cir.  Motion of  petitioner for leave  to proceed in  forma pauperis
denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  08–10457.  Castillo  v.  Guidry.  Ct.  App.  La.,  5th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Re
ported  below:  995  So.  2d  50.

No.  08–10490.  McCright  v.  Evans,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Re
ported  below:  299  Fed.  Appx.  743.

No.  08–10543.  Karnofel  v.  Girard  Police  Department
et  al.  Ct.  App.  Ohio,  Trumbull  County.  Motion  of  petitioner
for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari
dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  08–10578.  Wells  v.  Vasquez,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  08–10595.  McGowan  v.  Tennessee.  Ct.  Crim.  App.
Tenn.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pau
peris  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.  As  petitioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,
the  Clerk  is  directed  not  to  accept  any  further  petitions  in  non
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

and  arrive  too  late  to  be  counted.2    Indeed,  in  2012  and
2016, the States rejected more than 70,000 ballots in each
election  because  the  ballots  missed  the  deadlines.    U. S.
Election  Assistance  Commission,  2012  Election  Admin-
istration and Voting Survey 42 (2013); U. S. Election Assis-
tance Commission, 2016 Election Administration and Vot-
ing Survey 11, 25 (2017).  But moving a deadline would not
prevent ballots from arriving after the newly minted dead-
line any more than moving first base would mean no more
close plays.  And more to the point, the fact that some bal-
lots will be late in any system with deadlines does not make
Wisconsin’s widely used deadline facially unconstitutional.
See Crawford, 553 U. S., at 202–203.
  Put  another  way,  the  relevant  question  is  not  whether
any voter would ever miss the deadlines.  After all, in every
deadline case, the answer would always be yes, and no elec-
tion deadline would ever be permissible.  The proper ques-
tion under the Constitution is whether the deadline is rea-
sonable  under  the circumstances.   See  Rosario,  410  U. S.,
at 760.  Again, Wisconsin’s deadline is the same as that in
about 30 other States for the November election and is rea-
sonable, for the reasons I have explained.
  In any event, if a Wisconsin voter does not receive an ab-
sentee ballot in time to cast it, the voter still has the option
of voting in person.  And Wisconsin, like many other States,
demonstrated  in  the  April  and  August  primary  elections
that it can run an in-person election in a way that is rea-
sonably  safe  for  Wisconsin  voters,  with  socially  distanced
——————

2 In Wisconsin, a voter can track his or her ballot online.  MyVote Wis-
consin, Track My Ballot, https://myvote.wi.gov/en-us/TrackMyBallot.  If
a voter is concerned that the ballot may not be received in time, the voter
can cancel the absentee ballot and request a new one or vote in person,
as long as the voter meets the deadlines set by the municipality for doing
so,  which  typically  fall  a  few  days  before  election  day.    Memorandum
from M. Wolfe, Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, to
Wisconsin County Clerks et al. (Oct. 19, 2020) (online source archived at
www.supremecourt.gov).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in a case related to voting deadlines. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

Opinion of the Court

actions of the many departments and agencies within the
Executive  Branch.    He  also  plays  a  role  in  lawmaking  by
recommending  to  Congress  the  measures  he  thinks  wise
and signing or vetoing the bills Congress passes.  See Art.
I, §7, cl. 2; Art. II, §3.

No  matter  the  context,  the  President’s  authority  to  act
necessarily “stem[s] either from an act of Congress or from
the Constitution itself.”  Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 585.  In
the latter case, the President’s authority is sometimes “con-
clusive  and  preclusive.”  Id.,  at  638  (Jackson,  J.,  concur-
ring).  When the President exercises such authority, he may
act  even  when  the  measures  he  takes  are  “incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”  Id., at 637.
The exclusive constitutional authority of the President “dis-
abl[es] the Congress from acting upon the subject.”  Id., at
637–638.  And  the  courts  have  “no  power  to  control  [the
President’s] discretion” when he acts pursuant to the pow-
ers invested exclusively in him by the Constitution.  Mar-
bury, 1 Cranch, at 166.

If the President claims authority to act but in fact exer-
cises  mere  “individual  will”  and  “authority  without  law,”
the courts may say so.  Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 655 (Jack-
son, J., concurring).  In Youngstown, for instance, we held
that President Truman exceeded his constitutional author-
ity when he seized most of the Nation’s steel mills.  See id.,
at  582–589  (majority  opinion).    But  once  it  is  determined
that  the  President  acted  within  the  scope of his  exclusive
authority, his discretion in exercising such authority cannot
be subject to further judicial examination.

The Constitution, for example, vests the “Power to Grant
Reprieves  and  Pardons  for  Offences  against  the  United
States” in the President.  Art. II, §2, cl. 1.  During and after
the Civil War, President Lincoln offered a full pardon, with
restoration of property rights, to anyone who had “engaged
in the rebellion” but agreed to take an oath of allegiance to
the Union.  United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 139–141
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the President's constitutional authority and the limits of judicial review in cases where the President acts within that authority.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

MILLER v. ALABAMA

Opinion of the Court

dictions  (28  States  and  the  Federal  Government)  make
a  life-without-parole  term  mandatory  for  some  juveniles
convicted of murder in adult court.9  The States argue that
this number precludes our holding.

We do not agree; indeed, we think the States’ argument
on this score weaker than the one we rejected in Graham.
For  starters,  the  cases  here  are  different  from  the  typical
one in which we have tallied legislative enactments.  Our
decision  does  not  categorically  bar  a  penalty  for  a  class
of  offenders  or  type  of  crime—as,  for  example,  we  did  in
Roper  or  Graham.  Instead,  it  mandates  only  that  a  sen-
tencer  follow  a  certain  process—considering  an  offender’s
youth  and  attendant  characteristics—before  imposing  a
particular penalty.  And in so requiring, our decision flows
straightforwardly  from  our  precedents:  specifically,  the
principle  of  Roper,  Graham,  and  our  individualized  sen-
tencing  cases  that  youth  matters  for  purposes  of  meting
out  the  law’s  most  serious  punishments.    When  both  of
those  circumstances  have  obtained  in  the  past,  we  have
not  scrutinized  or  relied  in  the  same  way  on  legislative

——————

9 The  States  note  that  26  States  and  the  Federal  Government  make
life  without  parole  the  mandatory  (or  mandatory  minimum)  punish-
ment for some form of murder, and would apply the relevant provision
to  14-year-olds  (with  many  applying  it  to  even  younger  defendants).
See Alabama Brief 17–18.  In addition, life without parole is mandatory
for older juveniles in Louisiana (age 15 and up) and Texas (age 17).  See
La.  Child.  Code  Ann.,  Arts.  857(A),  (B)  (West  Supp.  2012);  La.  Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§14:30(C), 14:30.1(B) (West Supp. 2012); Tex. Family Code
Ann.  §§51.02(2)(A),  54.02(a)(2)(A)  (West  Supp.  2011);  Tex.  Penal  Code
Ann. §12.31(a) (West 2011).  In many of these jurisdictions, life without
parole  is  the  mandatory  punishment  only  for  aggravated  forms  of
murder.  That distinction makes no difference to our analysis.  We have
consistently  held  that  limiting  a  mandatory  death  penalty  law  to
particular kinds of murder cannot cure the law’s “constitutional vice” of
disregarding  the  “circumstances  of  the  particular  offense  and  the
character  and  propensities  of  the  offender.”    Roberts  v. Louisiana,  428
U. S.  325,  333  (1976)  (plurality  opinion);  see  Sumner  v.  Shuman,  483
U. S. 66 (1987).  The same analysis applies here, for the same reasons.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case Miller v. Alabama. It discusses the legal reasoning behind a decision regarding sentencing juveniles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS

JACKSON, J., dissenting

persons, premises, and equipment that might otherwise be
caused by their sudden cessation of work.

The  Board  first  applied  this  “reasonable  precautions”
principle to rank-and-file employees in Marshall Car Wheel
&  Foundry  Co.,  Inc.,  107  N. L. R. B.  314,  315  (1953),  enf.
denied on other grounds, 218 F. 2d 409 (CA5 1955).  There,
employees at a foundry walked off the job at a time when
the foundry’s furnace was full of hot molten iron, threaten-
ing severe damage to the employer’s plant and equipment.
107 N. L. R. B., at 315.  The Board concluded that the em-
ployees’ strike conduct was not protected by the NLRA, be-
cause the employees had a “duty to take reasonable precau-
tions  to  protect  the  employer’s  physical  plant  from  such
imminent damage as for[e]seeably would result from their
sudden cessation of work.”  Ibid.

The Board has also applied this principle in other similar
cases.  It determined, for example, that strikers who walked
out of a certain kind of chemical plant—a plant that han-
dled “extremely hazardous” chemicals that were “a hazard
not only to employees but also to individuals living in the
vicinity”—without  shutting  down  the  equipment  had  en-
gaged in unprotected conduct.  General Chemical Corp., 290
N. L. R. B. 76, 77, 83 (1988).  Similarly, the Board held that
the  strike  conduct  of  security  guards  whose  walkout  ex-
posed a federal building’s occupants to “imminent” danger
was  not  protected  by  the  NLRA.    International  Protective
Servs., Inc., 339 N. L. R. B. 701, 703 (2003).

But  the  narrow  duty  that  Marshall  Car  Wheel  and  its
progeny  impose  does  not—and  cannot—displace  the  gen-
eral  rule  that  labor  strikes  are  protected  even  when  the
workers’ withdrawal of their labor inflicts economic harm
on the employer.  So the Board has also repeatedly held that
employees  have  no  duty  to  prevent  the  loss  of  perishable
goods caused by their sudden cessation of work.

In a leading case, employees at a raw poultry plant de-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses labor law and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  While it deals with a legal topic, it's likely part of the main body of the legal argument and not a separate section like a table of contents or introductory paragraph.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

17

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

involving facts substantially identical to those in Bivens it-
self.  Supra, at 8–9.3

B

The  Court’s  application  of  its  new  standard  to  Boule’s
Fourth Amendment claim underscores just how novel that
standard is.  Even assuming the claim presents a new con-
text, the Court’s insistence that national-security concerns
bar  the  claim  directly  contravenes  Ziglar.  Moreover,  the
Court’s  holding  that  a  nonbinding  administrative  investi-
gation process, internal to the agency and offering no mean-
ingful  protection  of  the  constitutional  interests  at  stake,
constitutes an alternative remedy that forecloses Bivens re-
lief blinks reality.

1

The Court acknowledges the force of the Court of Appeals’
conclusion that Bivens and this case present “ ‘almost par-
allel  circumstances,’ ”  but  it  nonetheless  concludes  that  a
most  unlikely  special  factor  counsels  hesitation:  the
“national-security context.”  Ante, at 10.  By the Court’s tell-
ing,  Hernández  declined  to  recognize  a  Bivens  action  “be-
cause  ‘regulating  the  conduct  of  agents  at  the  border  un-
questionably  has  national  security  implications,’  and  the
‘risk of undermining border security provides reason to hes-
itate  before  extending  Bivens  into  this  field.’ ”    Ante,  at  9
——————

3 The  Court  supports  its  decision  not  to  recognize  an  action  under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), by
observing that we have declined to recognize a Bivens-style cause of ac-
tion for other constitutional violations.  Ante, at 1.  What the Court fails
to acknowledge, however, is that each of those cases presented a mean-
ingfully new context and/or raised special factors counseling hesitation
that are not present in this case.  See supra, at 6, 9–10, 13–14, 15–16;
infra, at 21–22.  The one exception is Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U. S. 799,
808 (2010), in which the Court did not have to conduct this analysis be-
cause  it  held  the  FTCA’s  comprehensive  remedial  scheme,  which  pro-
vided  both  a  cause  of  action  and  an  exclusive  damages  remedy  for  the
claim at issue, clearly precluded a Bivens claim.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1119

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No.  09–7092.  Pinkston  v.  Indiana.  Ct.  App.  Ind.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  906  N.  E.  2d  284.

No. 09–7096.  Lemons v.  Cain, Warden.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  494.

No.  09–7097.  Williams  v.  Jabe  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  317.

No.  09–7098.  Thomas  v.  Knowles,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7102.  Drake  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7114.  Bottomley  v.  Cate,  Secretary,  California
Department  of  Corrections  and  Rehabilitation.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7116.  Byrd  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7119.  Bussey  v.  Marshall,  Superintendent,  Sing
Sing Correctional Facility.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certiorari denied.
Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  54.

No.  09–7121.  Orsello  v.  Gaffney  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Minn.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7125.  Jackson  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–7130.  Cobble v. Owens, Commissioner, Georgia De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
No.  09–7134.  Miller  v.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  Depart
ment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–7136.  Daniel  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7140.  Robenson  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  18  So.  3d  529.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

GORSUCH, J., concurring

criticisms  of  Chevron.  Buffington,  598  U. S.,  at  ___–___
(slip op., at 14–15) (collecting examples).  A number of state
courts  did,  too,  refusing  to  import  Chevron  deference  into
their own administrative law jurisprudence.  See 598 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 15).

Even if all that and everything else laid out above is true,
the government suggests we should retain Chevron defer-
ence  because  judges  simply  cannot  live  without  it;  some
statutes are just too “technical” for courts to interpret “in-
telligently.”  Post,  at  9,  32  (dissenting  opinion).    But  that
objection is no answer to Chevron’s inconsistency with Con-
gress’s directions in the APA, so much surrounding law, or
the challenges its multistep regime have posed in practice.
Nor does history counsel such defeatism.  Surely, it would
be a mistake to suggest our predecessors before Chevron’s
rise in the mid-1980s were unable to make their way intel-
ligently  through  technical  statutory  disputes.    Following
their lead, over the past eight years this Court has managed
to resolve even highly complex cases without Chevron def-
erence, and done so even when the government sought def-
erence.  Nor, as far as I am aware, did any Member of the
Court suggest Chevron deference was necessary to an intel-
ligent resolution of any of those matters.7  If anything, by
affording  Chevron  deference  a  period  of  repose  before  ad-
dressing whether it should be retained, the Court has ena-
bled its Members to test the propriety of that precedent and
reflect more deeply on how well it fits into the broader ar-
chitecture  of  our  law.  Others  may  see  things  differently,
see post, at 26–27 (dissenting opinion), but the caution the

——————

7 See,  e.g.,  Becerra  v.  Empire  Health  Foundation,  for  Valley  Hospital
Medical Center, 597 U. S. 424, 434 (2022) (resolving intricate Medicare
dispute by reference solely to “text,” “context,” and “structure”); see also
Sackett v. EPA, 598 U. S. 651 (2023) (same in a complex Clean Water Act
dispute); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523 (2021) (same in tech-
nical immigration case).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the Chevron deference doctrine and its potential inconsistency with other legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529IND

Unit: $UBV [10-03-01 07:01:03] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

1214

INDEX

PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT. See Jurisdiction.

PUBLIC EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Fair Labor Standards

Act of 1938.

PUBLIC NUDITY. See Constitutional Law, V.

PUBLIC RANGELANDS. See Taylor Grazing Act.

QUI TAM SUITS. See False Claims Act.

RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT.

Conspiracy—Overt act.—A person injured by an overt act done in fur-
therance of a RICO conspiracy does not have a civil cause of action under
18 U. S. C. § 1964(c) unless overt act is an act of racketeering or otherwise
wrongful under RICO. Beck v. Prupis, p. 494.

RAILROAD CROSSING WARNING DEVICES. See Pre-emption of

State Law, 1.

RANGELANDS. See Taylor Grazing Act.

REGULATIONS FOR SUPREME COURT BUILDING.

Text of Regulations, p. 1199.

REIMPRISONMENT. See Criminal Law, 5.

RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAWS. See Constitutional

Law, IV, 2.

RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT. See Constitutional Law, VII.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. See Constitutional Law, X.

SELF-INCRIMINATION. See Constitutional Law, VII.

SEXUALLY ORIENTED CABLE PROGRAMMING. See Constitu-

tional Law, VI, 2.

SEXUAL OFFENSES. See Constitutional Law, IV, 2.

SIXTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, VIII; IX.

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT. See Jurisdiction.

STANDING. See False Claims Act.

STOP AND FRISK. See Constitutional Law, X, 2.

STUDENT SPEECH. See Constitutional Law, VI, 1.

SUCCESSIVE HABEAS PETITIONS. See Habeas Corpus, 3.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document. Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and provide a guide to the document's contents rather than the actual content itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U72

[09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 11 (1998)

27

Opinion of the Court

of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomi-
nation or election of a candidate.’ ”

The FEC here interpreted this language as narrowing the
scope of the statutory term “political committee,” wherever
applied. And, as we have said, the FEC’s General Coun-
sel found that AIPAC fell outside that deﬁnition because
the nomination or election of a candidate was not AIPAC’s
“major purpose.” App. 146.

The en banc Court of Appeals disagreed with the FEC.
It read this Court’s narrowing construction of the term “po-
litical committee” as turning on the First Amendment prob-
lems presented by regulation of “independent expenditures”
(i. e., “an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a clearly identiﬁed candidate which is
made without cooperation or consultation with any candi-
date,” § 431(17)).
101 F. 3d, at 741. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the language in this Court’s prior decisions
narrowing the deﬁnition of “political committee” did not
apply where the special First Amendment “independent
expenditure” problem did not exist.

Id., at 742–743.

The Solicitor General argues that this Court’s narrowing
deﬁnition of “political committee” applies not simply in the
context of independent expenditures, but across the board.
We cannot squarely address that matter, however, because
of the unusual and complex circumstances in which this case
arises. As we previously mentioned, supra, at 16–17, the
FEC considered a related question, namely, whether AIPAC
was exempt from § 441b’s prohibition of corporate campaign
expenditures, on the grounds that the so-called “expendi-
tures” involved only AIPAC’s communications with its mem-
bers. The FEC held that the statute’s exception to the “ex-
penditure” deﬁnition for communications by a “membership
organization” did not apply because many of the persons who
belonged to AIPAC were not “members” as deﬁned by FEC
regulation. The FEC acknowledged, however, that this was
a “close question.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a; see also App.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 11 (1998). It discusses the interpretation of the term "political committee" and its application to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Per Curiam

advance of the winter flu season would significantly reduce
COVID–19 infections, hospitalizations, and deaths, 86 Fed.
Reg.  61584–61586,  constitutes  the  “something  specific,”
post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), required to forgo notice and
comment.  And we cannot say that in this instance the two
months  the  agency  took  to  prepare  a  73-page  rule  consti-
tutes  “delay”  inconsistent  with  the  Secretary’s  finding  of
good  cause.  Second,  we  agree  with  the  Secretary  that  he
was not required to “consult with appropriate State agen-
cies,” 42 U. S. C. §1395z, in advance of issuing the interim
rule.  Consistent with the existence of the good cause excep-
tion, which was properly invoked here, consultation during
the deferred notice-and-comment period is permissible.  We
similarly concur with the Secretary that he need not pre-
pare a regulatory impact analysis discussing a rule’s effect
on small rural hospitals when he acts through an interim
final rule; that requirement applies only where the Secre-
tary proceeds on the basis of a “notice of proposed rulemak-
ing,” §1302(b)(1), followed by a “final version of [the] rule,”
§1302(b)(2).  Lastly, the rule does not run afoul of the di-
rective in §1395 that federal officials may not “exercise any
supervision or control over the . . . manner in which medical
services are provided, or over the selection [or] tenure . . . of
any officer or employee of ” any facility.  That reading of sec-
tion 1395 would mean that nearly every condition of partic-
ipation the Secretary has long insisted upon is unlawful.

*

*

*
The challenges posed by a global pandemic do not allow a
federal agency to exercise power that Congress has not con-
ferred upon it.  At the same time, such unprecedented cir-
cumstances provide no grounds for limiting the exercise of
authorities  the  agency  has  long  been  recognized  to  have.
Because the latter principle governs in these cases, the ap-
plications  for  a  stay  presented  to  JUSTICE  ALITO  and
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH and by them referred to the Court are
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a portion of one, specifically the Per Curiam section. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION

BREYER, J., dissenting

2009,  No.  08–1198,  p. 25  (hereinafter  AAA  Amicus  Brief).
And  unlike  the  majority’s  examples,  the  Discover  Bank
rule  imposes  equivalent  limitations  on  litigation;  hence
it  cannot  fairly  be  characterized  as  a  targeted  attack  on
arbitration.

Where  does  the  majority  get  its  contrary  idea—that
individual,  rather  than  class,  arbitration  is  a  “fundamen
tal  attribut[e]”  of  arbitration?    Ante,  at  9.  The  majority
does not explain.  And it is unlikely to be able to trace its
present view to the history of the arbitration statute itself.
When Congress enacted the Act, arbitration procedures
had  not  yet  been  fully  developed.    Insofar  as  Congress
considered detailed forms of arbitration at all, it may well
have  thought  that  arbitration  would  be  used  primarily
where  merchants  sought  to  resolve  disputes  of  fact,  not
law,  under  the  customs  of  their  industries,  where  the
parties  possessed  roughly  equivalent  bargaining  power.
See Mitsubishi Motors, supra, at 646 (Stevens, J., dissent
ing);  Joint  Hearings  on  S.  1005  and  H. R.  646  before  the
Subcommittees  of  the  Committees  on  the  Judiciary,  68th
Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1924); Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214
before  a  Subcommittee  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the
Judiciary,  67th  Cong.,  4th  Sess.,  9–10  (1923);  Dept.  of
Commerce,  Secretary  Hoover  Favors  Arbitration—Press
Release (Dec. 28, 1925), Herbert Hoover Papers—Articles,
Addresses,  and  Public  Statements  File—No.  536,  p. 2
(Herbert  Hoover  Presidential  Library);  Cohen  &  Dayton,
The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 Va. L. Rev. 265, 281
(1926); AAA, Year Book on Commercial Arbitration in the
United  States  (1927).    This  last  mentioned  feature  of  the
history—roughly  equivalent  bargaining  power—suggests,
if  anything,  that  California’s  statute  is  consistent  with,
and  indeed  may  help  to  further,  the  objectives  that  Con
gress had in mind.

Regardless,  if  neither  the  history  nor  present  practice
suggests  that  class  arbitration  is  fundamentally  incom
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. It delves into the history and interpretation of arbitration statutes, arguing against the majority's view on class arbitration.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
Opinion of the Court

in  turn,  decides  whether  to  initiate  a  formal  hearing  be-
fore  a  state  Administrative  Law  Judge  (ALJ),  who  will
hear  evidence  and  argument  before  issuing  a  written
decision.  See §§24–34–306, 24–4–105(14).  The decision of
the ALJ may be appealed to the full Commission, a seven-
member  appointed  body.    The  Commission  holds  a  public
hearing and deliberative session before voting on the case.
If  the  Commission  determines  that  the  evidence  proves  a
CADA  violation,  it  may  impose  remedial  measures  as
provided by statute.  See §24–34–306(9).  Available reme-
dies  include,  among  other  things,  orders  to  cease-and-
desist  a  discriminatory  policy,  to  file  regular  compliance
reports  with  the  Commission,  and  “to  take  affirmative
action,  including  the  posting  of  notices  setting  forth  the
substantive  rights  of  the  public.”    §24–34–605.    Colorado
law  does  not  permit  the  Commission  to  assess  money
damages or fines.  §§24–34–306(9), 24–34–605.

C
  Craig  and  Mullins  filed  a  discrimination  complaint
against  Masterpiece  Cakeshop  and  Phillips  in  September
2012, shortly after the couple’s visit to the shop.  App. 31.
The  complaint  alleged  that  Craig  and  Mullins  had  been
denied  “full  and  equal  service”  at  the  bakery  because  of
their  sexual  orientation,  id.,  at  35,  48,  and  that  it  was
Phillips’ “standard business practice” not to provide cakes
for same-sex weddings, id., at 43.
  The Civil Rights Division opened an investigation.  The
investigator  found  that  “on  multiple  occasions,”  Phillips
“turned  away  potential  customers  on  the  basis  of  their
sexual orientation, stating that he could not create a cake
for  a  same-sex  wedding  ceremony  or  reception”  because
his religious beliefs prohibited it and because the potential
customers  “were  doing  something  illegal”  at  that  time.
Id.,  at  76.    The  investigation  found  that  Phillips  had  de-
clined  to  sell  custom  wedding  cakes  to  about  six  other
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically discussing the procedures and findings related to a discrimination complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop. It provides context about the legal framework and the specific allegations made against the bakery.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

regulatory  action  by  prohibiting  the  States  from  “author-
iz[ing]”  and  “licens[ing]”  sports-gambling  schemes,  28
U. S. C. §3702(1), two federal edicts should remain intact.
First,  PASPA  bans  States  themselves  (or  their  agencies)
from  “sponsor[ing],  operat[ing],  advertis[ing],  [or]  pro-
mot[ing]” sports-gambling schemes.  Ibid.  Second, PASPA
stops  private  parties  from  “sponsor[ing],  operat[ing],  ad-
vertis[ing],  or  promot[ing]”  sports-gambling  schemes  if
state law authorizes them to do so.  §3702(2).1  Nothing in
these §3702(1) and §3702(2) prohibitions commands States
to do anything other than desist from conduct federal law
proscribes.2    Nor  is  there  any  doubt  that  Congress  has
power to regulate gambling on a nationwide basis, author-
ity Congress exercised in PASPA.  See Gonzales v. Raich,
545  U. S.  1,  17  (2005)  (“Our  case  law  firmly  establishes
Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are
part  of  an  economic  ‘class  of  activities’  that  have  a  sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.”).
  Surely, the accountability concern that gave birth to the
anticommandeering  doctrine  is  not  implicated  in  any
federal proscription other than the bans on States’ author-
izing and licensing sports-gambling schemes.  The concern
triggering  the  doctrine  arises  only  “where  the  Federal
Government  compels  States  to  regulate”  or  to  enforce
federal  law,  thereby  creating  the  appearance  that  state
officials  are  responsible  for  policies  Congress  forced  them
to  enact.    New  York  v.  United  States,  505  U. S.  144,  168
(1992).    If  States  themselves  and  private  parties  may  not

——————

1

 PASPA was not designed to eliminate any and all sports gambling.
The  statute  targets  sports-gambling  schemes,  i.e.,  organized  markets
for  sports  gambling,  whether  operated  by  a  State  or  by  a  third  party
under state authorization.

2

 In  lieu  of  a  flat  ban,  PASPA  prohibits  third  parties  from  operating
sports-gambling  schemes  only  if  state  law  permits  them  to  do  so.    If
a  state  ban  is  in  place,  of  course,  there  is  no  need  for  a  federal
proscription.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) and its constitutionality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

596 U. S. ___ (2022).  For the reasons explained below, we
affirm the Seventh Circuit’s judgment.

II
A

As relevant here, §1983 provides that

“[e]very  person  who,  under  color  of  any  statute,  ordi-
nance,  regulation,  custom,  or  usage,  of  any  State  or
Territory  or  the  District  of  Columbia,  subjects,  or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or  other  person  within  the  jurisdiction  thereof  to  the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.”

That  is,  any  person  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United
States  may  invoke  this  cause  of  action  against  any  other
person who, acting “under color of ” state law, has deprived
them  of  “any  rights,  privileges,  or  immunities  secured  by
the Constitution and laws” of the United States.

We  have  been  asked  before  to  narrow  the  scope  of  this
express authorization, i.e., to read “laws” to mean only “civil
rights or equal protection laws.”  Thiboutot, 448 U. S., at 6.
We declined to do so, reasoning that a straightforward read-
ing of the “plain language” of §1983 is required.  Id., at 4.
That should have been no surprise; “Congress attached no
modifiers to the phrase [‘and laws’].”  Ibid.
  Since Thiboutot, we have crafted a test for determining
whether a particular federal law actually secures rights for
§1983 purposes.  See Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 283–285; Part
III–B, infra.  But we have not previously doubted that any
federal law can do so.

——————
35.1. Subsequent references to Talevski encompass both Talevskis inso-
far as Ivanka is advancing Gorgi’s interests.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and delves into the interpretation of a specific law (Section 1983).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

43

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

tion after 12 to 14 weeks, but they often have liberal excep-
tions  to  those  time  limits,  including  to  prevent  harm  to  a
woman’s physical or mental health.  See id., at 24–27; Brief
for  European  Law  Professors  as  Amici  Curiae  16–17,  Ap-
pendix.  They also typically make access to early abortion
easier,  for  example,  by  helping  cover  its  cost.21   Perhaps
most notable, more than 50 countries around the world—in
Asia,  Latin  America,  Africa,  and  Europe—have  expanded
access to abortion in the past 25 years.  See Brief for Inter-
national and Comparative Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae
28–29.  In light of that worldwide liberalization of abortion
laws, it is American States that will become international
outliers after today.

In sum, the majority can point to neither legal nor factual
developments in support of its decision.  Nothing that has
happened in this country or the world in recent decades un-
dermines the core insight of Roe and Casey.  It continues to
be true that, within the constraints those decisions estab-
lished,  a  woman,  not  the  government,  should  choose
whether she will bear the burdens of pregnancy, childbirth,
and parenting.

2
In support of its holding, see ante, at 40, the majority in-
vokes two watershed cases overruling prior constitutional
precedents: West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish and Brown v.
Board of Education.  But those decisions, unlike today’s, re-
sponded to changed law and to changed facts and attitudes
that  had  taken  hold  throughout  society.    As  Casey  recog-
nized,  the  two  cases  are  relevant  only  to  show—by  stark
contrast—how  unjustified  overturning  the  right  to  choose
is.  See 505 U. S., at 861–864.

West Coast Hotel overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital

——————

21 See D. Grossman, K. Grindlay, & B. Burns, Public Funding for Abor-
tion Where Broadly Legal, 94 Contraception 451, 458 (2016) (discussing
funding of abortion in European countries).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent and arguments against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

21

Opinion of the Court

U. S. C. §551(4); see 20 F. 4th, at 950–951 (“The States are
challenging  the  Termination  Decision—not  the  June  1
Memorandum,  the  October  29  Memoranda,  or  any  other
memo.”).  To  the  extent  that  the  Court  of  Appeals  under-
stood itself to be reviewing an abstract decision apart from
specific agency action, as defined in the APA, that was er-
ror.  It was not the case that the June 1 Memorandum and
the October 29 Memoranda “simply explained DHS’s deci-
sion,” while only the decision itself “had legal effect.”  Id.,
at 951.  To the contrary, the June 1 Memorandum and the
October  29  Memoranda  were  themselves  the  operative
agency actions, each of them an “agency statement . . . de-
signed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”
5 U. S. C. §551(4).

Second, and relatedly, respondents characterized the Oc-
tober  29  Memoranda  as  post hoc  rationalizations  of  the
June 1 Memorandum under our decision in Regents.  Brief
for  Respondents  40  (“[T]he  [October  29]  Memoranda  are
nothing  more  than  improper,  post hoc  rationalizations  for
terminating MPP.”); see also 20 F. 4th, at 961 (questioning
how the October 29 Memoranda “[could] be anything more
than  post hoc  rationalizations  of  the  Termination  Deci-
sion”).  But  Regents  involved  the  exact  opposite  situation
from this one.  There, as here, DHS had attempted to re-
scind a prior administration’s immigration policy, but a Dis-
trict  Court  found  the  rescission  inadequately  explained.
Faced  with  the  same  two  options  outlined  above,  then-
Secretary  Nielsen  elected  the  first  option  rather  than  the
second.  That is, she chose to “rest on the [original] Memo-
randum while elaborating on [her] prior reasoning,” rather
than “issue a new rescission bolstered by new reasons ab-
sent  from  the  [original]  Memorandum.”  591  U. S.,  at  ___
(slip  op.,  at  14).   As  such,  her  elaboration  “was  limited  to
the agency’s original reasons,” and was “ ‘viewed critically’
to ensure that the rescission [was] not upheld on the basis
of impermissible ‘post hoc rationalization.’ ”  Id., at ___–___
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the reasoning behind a court's decision. It cites legal precedents and statutes, making it relevant content for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

JACKSON, J., concurring

This very case provides a prime example of the pitfalls of
Bruen’s approach.  Having been told that a key marker of a
constitutional gun regulation is “a well-established and rep-
resentative  historical  analogue,”  Bruen,  597  U. S.,  at  30
(emphasis deleted), Rahimi argued below that “there is lit-
tle  or  no  historical  evidence  suggesting  disarmament  for
those  who  committed  domestic  violence;  and  there  is  cer-
tainly no tradition of disarming people subject to a no-con-
tact order related to domestic violence.”  Supp. Brief for Ap-
pellant  in  No.  21–11001  (CA5),  p. 15  (emphasis  deleted).
The  Government  then  proffered  what  it  maintained  were
sufficient historical analogues to 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8), in-
cluding surety and going armed laws.  Supp. Brief for Ap-
pellee in No. 21–11001 (CA5), pp. 23, n. 2, 27–31.  But the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the federal statute was uncon-
stitutional  because  the  Government’s  analogues  were  not
“ ‘relevantly similar.’ ”  61 F. 4th 443, 460–461 (2023).

Neither the parties nor the Fifth Circuit had the benefit
of today’s decision, in which we hold that the Government
had in fact offered “ample evidence that the Second Amend-
ment  permits  the  disarmament  of  individuals  who  pose  a
credible threat to the physical safety of others.”  Ante, at 8.
But even setting aside whether the historical examples the
Government  found  were  sufficiently  analogous,  just  can-
vassing the universe of historical records and gauging the
sufficiency of such evidence is an exceedingly difficult task.3

——————
not ordinarily have the specialized education, knowledge, or training of
professional historians) to engage in this kind of assessment.  And dutiful
legislators are not the only stakeholders who are far outside their depth:
Bruen also conscripts parties and judges into service as amateur histori-
ans, casting about for similar historical circumstances.

3 The mad scramble for historical records that Bruen requires also sug-
gests that only those solutions that States implemented in the distant
past  comport  with  the  Constitution.    That  premise  is  questionable  be-
cause,  given  the  breadth  of  some  of  the  Constitution’s  provisions,  it  is
likely that the Founders understood that new solutions would be needed
over  time,  even  for  traditional  problems,  and  that  the  principles  they
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Jackson. It delves into the complexities of the Bruen case and its implications for constitutional gun regulations.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of judicial opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSN. v. BECERRA

Syllabus

it could vary the reimbursement rates by hospital group under its op-
tion 2 authority to “adjust” the price-based reimbursement rates.  The
District Court rejected HHS’s argument that the statute precluded ju-
dicial review, concluded that HHS had acted outside its statutory au-
thority,  and  remanded  the  case  to  HHS  to  consider  an  appropriate
remedy.  The D. C. Circuit, however, reversed.  The court ruled that
the statute did not preclude judicial review, and upheld HHS’s reduced
reimbursement rates for 340B hospitals.

Held:

1. The statute does not preclude judicial review of HHS’s reimburse-
ment  rates.  Judicial  review  of  final  agency  action  is  traditionally
available unless “a statute’s language or structure” precludes it, Mach
Mining,  LLC  v.  EEOC,  575  U. S.  480,  486,  and  this  Court  has  long
recognized  a  “strong  presumption”  in  its  favor,  Weyerhaeuser  Co.  v.
United  States  Fish  and  Wildlife  Serv.,  586  U. S.  ___,  ___.    Here,  no
provision in the Medicare statute precludes judicial review of the 2018
and 2019 reimbursement rates.  HHS cites two nearby provisions that
preclude  review  of  the  general  payment  methodology  that  HHS  em-
ploys  to  set  rates  for  other  Medicare  outpatient  services.    See
§§1395l(t)(12)(A), (C).  But HHS sets rates for outpatient prescription
drugs using a different payment methodology.  HHS also argues that
other statutory requirements would make allowing judicial review of
the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates impractical.  Regardless, such
arguments cannot override the text of the statute and the traditional
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.  Pp.
7–9.

2. Absent a survey of hospitals’ acquisition costs, HHS may not vary
the  reimbursement  rates  only  for  340B  hospitals;  HHS’s  2018  and
2019 reimbursement rates for 340B hospitals were therefore unlawful.
The text and structure of the statute make this a straightforward case.
Because HHS did not conduct a survey of hospitals’ acquisition costs,
HHS acted unlawfully by reducing the reimbursement rates for 340B
hospitals.  HHS maintains that even when it does not conduct a sur-
vey, the agency still may “adjus[t]” the average price “as necessary.”
§1395l(t)(14)(A)(iii)(II).  But HHS’s power to increase or decrease the
price is distinct from its power to set different rates for different groups
of hospitals.  Moreover, HHS’s interpretation would make little sense
given the statute’s overall structure.  Under HHS’s interpretation, the
agency would never need to conduct a survey of acquisition costs if it
could proceed under option 2 and then do everything under option 2
that it could do under option 1.  That not only would render irrelevant
the survey prerequisite for varying reimbursement rates by hospital
group,  but  also  would  render  largely  irrelevant  the  provision  of  the
statute that precisely details the requirements for surveys of hospitals’
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. It outlines the case's background, the issues presented, and the Court's holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
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