<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.

MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

manded the case in light of Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus  Laboratories,  Inc.,  566  U. S.  ___  (2012).
See  Association  for  Molecular  Pathology  v.  Myriad  Genet-
ics, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012).

On  remand,  the  Federal  Circuit  affirmed  the  District
Court  in  part  and  reversed  in  part,  with  each  member  of
the  panel  writing  separately.    All  three  judges  agreed
that  only  petitioner  Ostrer  had  standing.    They  reasoned
that  Myriad’s  actions  against  him  and  his  stated  ability
and willingness to begin BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing if Myr-
iad’s patents were invalidated were sufficient for Article III
standing.  689  F. 3d,  at  1323;  id.,  at  1337  (opinion  of
Moore, J.); id., at 1348 (opinion of Bryson, J.).

With  respect  to  the  merits,  the  court  held  that  both
isolated DNA and cDNA were patent eligible under §101.
The  central  dispute  among  the  panel  members  was
whether  the  act  of  isolating  DNA—separating  a  specific
gene  or  sequence  of  nucleotides  from  the  rest  of  the
chromosome—is an inventive act that entitles the individ-
ual who first isolates it to a patent.  Each of the judges on
the  panel  had  a  different  view  on  that  question.    Judges
Lourie and Moore agreed that Myriad’s claims were patent
eligible under §101 but disagreed on the rationale.  Judge
Lourie  relied  on  the  fact  that  the  entire  DNA  molecule  is
held  together  by  chemical  bonds  and  that  the  covalent
bonds  at  both  ends  of  the  segment  must  be  severed  in
order to isolate segments of DNA.  This process technically
creates new molecules with unique chemical compositions.
See  id.,  at  1328  (“Isolated  DNA  . . .  is  a  free-standing
portion of a larger, natural DNA molecule.  Isolated DNA
has been cleaved (i.e., had covalent bonds in its backbone
chemically  severed)  or  synthesized  to  consist  of  just  a
fraction  of  a  naturally  occurring  DNA  molecule”).    Judge
Lourie  found  this  chemical  alteration  to  be  dispositive,
because  isolating  a  particular  strand  of  DNA  creates
a  nonnaturally  occurring  molecule,  even  though  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics. It delves into legal arguments and court decisions, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the core content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U50

[09-26-01 10:29:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

476

SLACK v. McDANIEL

Syllabus

subject, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 487, and states: “A second
or successive petition [alleging new and different grounds] may be dis-
missed if . . . the judge ﬁnds that the failure . . . to assert those grounds
in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.” The “second or
successive petition” phrase is a term of art given substance in, e. g.,
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S., at 510, which held that a district court must
dismiss habeas petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted
claims, but contemplated that the prisoner could return to federal court
after the requisite exhaustion, id., at 520–521. Thus, a petition ﬁled
after a mixed petition has been dismissed under Rose v. Lundy before
the district court adjudicated any claims is to be treated as any other
ﬁrst petition and is not a second or successive petition. Neither Rose
v. Lundy nor Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S. 637 (1998), sup-
ports the State’s contention that the prisoner, upon his return to federal
court, should be restricted to the claims made in his initial petition.
It
is instead more appropriate to treat the initial mixed petition as though
it had not been ﬁled, subject to whatever conditions the court attaches
to the dismissal. Accordingly, Slack’s 1995 petition should not have
been dismissed on the grounds that it was second or successive. To the
extent that the Court’s ruling might allow prisoners repeatedly to re-
turn to state court and thereby inject undue delay into the collateral
review process, the problem can be countered under the States’ power
to impose proper procedural bars and the federal courts’ broad powers
to prevent duplicative or unnecessary litigation. Pp. 485–489.

(b) Thus, Slack has demonstrated that reasonable jurists could con-
clude that the District Court’s abuse of the writ holding was wrong.
Whether Slack is otherwise entitled to the issuance of a COA is a ques-
tion to be resolved ﬁrst upon remand. Pp. 489–490.

Reversed and remanded.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Part I of which was
unanimous, Part II of which was joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Con-
nor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., and Parts III and IV of which
were joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ. Stevens, J., ﬁled an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 490. Scalia, J., ﬁled an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 490.

Michael Pescetta, by appointment of the Court, 526 U. S.
1049, argued and reargued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Timothy P. O’Toole.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the syllabus and the beginning of the opinion. It contains legal terminology and references to previous cases, indicating it's part of the actual legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of the Court

that Uzuegbunam’s discussion of his religion “arguably rose
to the level of ‘fighting words.’ ”  Id., at 155(a).  But the col-
lege officials quickly abandoned that strategy and instead
decided  to  get  rid  of  the  challenged  policies.   They  then
moved to dismiss, arguing that the suit was moot, because
of the policy change.  The students agreed that injunctive
relief was no longer available, but they disagreed that the
case was moot.  They contended that their case was still live
because they had also sought nominal damages.  The Dis-
trict  Court  dismissed  the  case,  holding  that  the  students’
claim for nominal damages was insufficient by itself to es-
tablish standing.

The  Eleventh  Circuit  affirmed.    781  Fed.  Appx.  824
(2019).  It stated that a request for nominal damages can
save a case from mootness in certain circumstances, such
as  where  a  person  pleads  but  fails  to  prove  an  amount  of
compensatory damages.  But, because the students did not
request  compensatory  damages,  their  plea  for  nominal
damages could not by itself establish standing.

We granted certiorari to consider whether a plaintiff who
sues over a completed injury and establishes the first two
elements of standing (injury and traceability) can establish
the third by requesting only nominal damages.  591 U. S.
___ (2020).  We now reverse.

II
To  satisfy  the  “ ‘irreducible  constitutional  minimum’ ”  of
Article  III  standing,  a  plaintiff  must  not  only  establish
(1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged conduct, but he must also seek (3) a remedy that is
likely  to  redress  that  injury.  Spokeo,  Inc.  v.  Robins,  578
U. S.  330,  338  (2016);  see  also  Gill  v.  Whitford,  585  U. S.
___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 13–14).  There is no dispute
that  Uzuegbunam  has  established  the  first  two  elements.
The only question is whether the remedy he sought—nom-
inal damages—can redress the constitutional violation that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the case of Uzuegbunam and the issue of mootness in legal proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U85

[09-14-00 16:49:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

244

HOHN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

judge.
If such a request is addressed to the court of
it shall be deemed addressed to the judges
appeals,
thereof and shall be considered by a circuit judge or
judges as the court deems appropriate.
If no express
request for a certiﬁcate is ﬁled, the notice of appeal shall
be deemed to constitute a request addressed to the
judges of the court of appeals.”

On its face, the Rule applies only to state, and not federal,
It is nonetheless instructive on the proper con-
prisoners.
struction of § 2253(c).

Rule 22(b) by no means prohibits application to an individ-
ual judge, nor could it, given the language of the statute.
There would be incongruity, nevertheless, were the same
ruling deemed in one instance the order of a judge acting
ex curia and in a second the action of the court, depending
upon the caption of the application or the style of the order.
Our conclusion is further conﬁrmed by Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 27(c).

It states:

“In addition to the authority expressly conferred by
these rules or by law, a single judge of a court of appeals
may entertain and may grant or deny any request for
relief which under these rules may properly be sought
by motion, except that a single judge may not dismiss
or otherwise determine an appeal or other proceeding,
and except that a court of appeals may provide by order
or rule that any motion or class of motions must be acted
upon by the court. The action of a single judge may be
reviewed by the court.”

As the Rule makes clear, even when individual judges are
authorized under the Rules to entertain certain requests for
relief, the court may review their decisions. The Eighth
Circuit’s Rules are even more explicit, speciﬁcally listing
grants of certiﬁcates of probable cause by an individual judge
as one of the decisions subject to revision by the court under
Federal Rule 27(c). Rule 27B(b)(2) (CA8 1998). The recog-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the interpretation of a rule and cites relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

15

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

of  supervisor  decreed  today,  the  Court  insists,  is  “clear,”
“readily  applied,”  and  “easily  workable,”  ante,  at  10,  20,
when  compared  to  the  EEOC’s  vague  standard,  ante,  at
22.

There is reason to doubt just how “clear” and “workable”
the Court’s definition is.  A supervisor, the Court holds, is
someone empowered to “take tangible employment actions
against  the  victim,  i.e.,  to  effect  a  ‘significant  change
in  employment  status,  such  as  hiring,  firing,  failing  to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsi-
bilities, or a decision causing a significant change in bene-
fits.’ ”  Ante,  at  9  (quoting  Ellerth,  524  U. S.,  at  761).
Whether reassignment authority makes someone a super-
visor  might  depend  on  whether  the  reassignment  carries
economic  consequences.  Ante,  at  16,  n. 9.    The  power  to
discipline  other  employees,  when  the  discipline  has  eco-
nomic consequences, might count, too.  Ibid.  So might the
power to initiate or make recommendations about tangible
employment  actions.    Ante,  at  15,  n. 8.    And  when  an
employer  “concentrates  all  decisionmaking  authority  in  a
few  individuals”  who  rely  on  information  from  “other
workers who actually interact with the affected employee,”
the other workers may rank as supervisors (or maybe not;
the  Court  does  not  commit  one  way  or  the  other).    Ante,
at 26.

Someone in search of a bright line might well ask, what
counts  as  “significantly  different  responsibilities”?  Can
any  economic  consequence  make  a  reassignment  or
disciplinary  action  “significant,”  or  is  there  a  minimum
threshold?  How  concentrated  must  the  decisionmaking
authority be to deem those not formally endowed with that
authority  nevertheless  “supervisors”?    The  Court  leaves
these  questions  unanswered,  and  its  liberal  use  of
“mights”  and  “mays,”  ante,  at  15,  n. 8,  16,  n. 9,  26,  dims
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It delves into the Court's definition of a "supervisor" in the context of employment discrimination law.  While it's important legal text, it's not the kind of straightforward narrative content typically suitable for indexing in a general document pipeline.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE

GORSUCH, J., concurring

several  States”  over  “all  causes  where  an  alien  sues  for  a
tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”  §9, 1 Stat. 77.  The law has hardly changed
since and it remains similarly succinct:  “The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an al-
ien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States.”  28 U. S. C. §1350.

Nothing  in  the  ATS  supplies  corporations  with  special
protections against suit.  The statute specifies which plain-
tiffs  may  sue  (“alien[s]”).  It  speaks  of  the  sort  of  claims
those plaintiffs can bring (“tort[s]” in “violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States”).  But nowhere
does it suggest that anything depends on whether the de-
fendant happens to be a person or a corporation.

Understandably  too.  Causes  of  action  in  tort  normally
focus  on  wrongs  and  injuries,  not  who  is  responsible  for
them.  When  the  First  Congress  passed  the  ATS,  a  “tort”
meant simply an “injury or wrong” whoever committed it.
G. Jacob, O. Ruffhead, & J. Morgan, A Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 1773).  Nothing has changed in the intervening centu-
ries.  See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1717 (10th ed. 2014)
(a tort is a “civil wrong . . . for which a remedy may be ob-
tained”).  Generally,  too,  the  law  places  corporations  and
individuals  on  equal  footing  when  it  comes  to  assigning
rights and duties.  Even before the ATS’s adoption, Black-
stone explained that, “[a]fter a corporation is so formed and
named, it acquires many powers, rights, capacities, and in-
capacities,” including “[t]o sue or be sued, implead or be im-
pleaded, grant or receive, by its corporate name, and do all
other acts as natural persons may.”  1 W. Blackstone, Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England 463 (1765).

If more evidence were necessary to prove the point, plenty
would  seem  available.  Case  after  case  makes  plain  that,
“[a]t a very early period, it was decided in Great Britain, as
well as in the United States, that actions might be main-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe. It delves into the interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and its applicability to corporations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–7451
_________________

JOHN L. YATES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[February 25, 2015]

 JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment.
This  case  can  and  should  be  resolved  on  narrow
grounds.  And  though  the  question  is  close,  traditional
tools of statutory construction confirm that John Yates has
the better of the argument.  Three features of 18 U. S. C.
§1519 stand out to me: the statute’s list of nouns, its list of
verbs,  and  its  title.    Although  perhaps  none  of  these  fea-
tures  by  itself  would  tip  the  case  in  favor  of  Yates,  the
three combined do so.

Start  with  the  nouns.    Section  1519  refers  to  “any  rec-
ord,  document,  or  tangible  object.”  The  noscitur  a  sociis
canon  instructs  that  when  a  statute  contains  a  list,  each
word  in  that  list  presumptively  has  a  “similar”  meaning.
See,  e.g.,  Gustafson  v.  Alloyd  Co.,  513  U. S.  561,  576
(1995).  A  related  canon,  ejusdem  generis   teaches  that
general  words  following  a  list  of  specific  words  should
usually  be  read  in  light  of  those  specific  words  to  mean
something  “similar.”  See,  e.g.,  Christopher  v.  SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 567 U. S. ___, ___  (2012) (slip op., at 18).
Applying  these  canons  to  §1519’s  list  of  nouns,  the  term
“tangible  object”  should  refer  to  something  similar  to
records or documents.  A fish does not spring to mind—nor
does  an  antelope,  a  colonial  farmhouse,  a  hydrofoil,  or  an
oil derrick.  All are “objects” that are “tangible.”  But who
wouldn’t  raise  an  eyebrow  if  a  neighbor,  when  asked  to
identify  something  similar  to  a  “record”  or  “document,”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito in the case of Yates v. United States.  It contains legal citations, case names, and discusses legal principles of statutory construction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

827

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–1576.  Linam  v.  Linam.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari  de

nied.  Reported  below:  2  So.  3d  982.

No. 08–1577.  Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v.  BPI Com
munications,  Inc.,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  572.

No. 08–1578.  Luke et al. v. Emergency Rooms, P. S., et al.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.
Appx.  496.

No.  08–1579.  Rector,  Wardens  and  Vestrymen  of  Saint
James Parish in Newport Beach, California, et al. v.  Prot
estant  Episcopal  Church  in  the  Diocese  of  Los  Angeles
et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  45
Cal.  4th  467,  198  P.  3d  66.

No.  08–1580.  Sandoval  v.  Los  Angeles  County  Depart
ment  of  Public  Social  Services  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d
App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  169  Cal.  App.
4th  1167,  87  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  334.

No.  08–1581.  Bilal  v.  Illinois  Attorney  Registration
and  Disciplinary  Commission.  Sup.  Ct.  Ill.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  08–1582.  Radwanski  v.  Ruiz  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  92.

No. 08–1583.  Quinn v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  780.

No.  08–1584.  ValuePest.com  of  Charlotte,  Inc.,  fka
Budget  Pest  Prevention,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  Bayer  Corp.  et  al.
C. A. 4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 561 F. 3d 282.

No.  08–1585.  Harris  v.  Standard  Insurance  Co.  et  al.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.
Appx.  583.

No.  08–1586.  Faltas  v.  Koon.  Sup.  Ct.  S.  C.  Certiorari  de

nied.  Reported  below:  379  S.  C.  150,  666  S.  E.  2d  230.

No.  08–1587.  Paull  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  551  F.  3d  516.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 598 (2000)

649

Souter, J., dissenting

“The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their iden-
tity with the people, and the inﬂuence which their con-
stituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many
other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war,
the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure
them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which
the people must often rely solely, in all representative
governments.” Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 197.

Politics as the moderator of the congressional employment
of the commerce power was the theme many years later in
Wickard, for after the Court acknowledged the breadth of
the Gibbons formulation it invoked Chief Justice Marshall
yet again in adding that “[h]e made emphatic the embracing
and penetrating nature of this power by warning that effec-
tive restraints on its exercise must proceed from political
rather than judicial processes.” Wickard, 317 U. S., at 120
(citation omitted). Hence, “conﬂicts of economic interest . . .
are wisely left under our system to resolution by Congress
under its more ﬂexible and responsible legislative process.
Such conﬂicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determi-
nation. And with the wisdom, workability, or fairness, of
the plan of regulation we have nothing to do.”
Id., at 129
(footnote omitted).

As with “conﬂicts of economic interest,” so with sup-
posed conﬂicts of sovereign political
interests implicated
by the Commerce Clause: the Constitution remits them to
politics. The point can be put no more clearly than the
Court put it the last time it repudiated the notion that
some state activities categorically deﬁed the commerce
power as understood in accordance with generally accepted
concepts. After conﬁrming Madison’s and Wilson’s views
with a recitation of the sources of state inﬂuence in the
structure of the National Constitution, Garcia, 469 U. S.,
at 550–552, the Court disposed of the possibility of identi-
fying “principled constitutional limitations on the scope of
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers over the States merely
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter. It discusses the Commerce Clause and the balance of power between the federal government and states.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

STEVENS, J., dissenting

“[K]eep  and  bear  arms”  thus  perfectly  describes  the  re
sponsibilities of a framing-era militia member.

This  reading  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  the  clause
protects  only  one  right,  rather  than  two.    It  does  not  de
scribe a right “to keep arms” and a separate right “to bear
arms.”  Rather,  the  single  right  that  it  does  describe  is
both a duty and a right to have arms available and ready
for military service, and to use them for military purposes
when  necessary.13    Different  language  surely  would  have
been  used  to  protect  nonmilitary  use  and  possession  of
weapons from regulation if such an intent had played any
role in the drafting of the Amendment.

*

*

*
When  each  word  in  the  text  is  given  full  effect,  the
Amendment is most naturally read to secure to the people
a right to use and possess arms in conjunction with service
in  a  well-regulated  militia.    So  far  as  appears,  no  more
than  that  was  contemplated  by  its  drafters  or  is  encom
passed  within  its  terms.    Even  if  the  meaning  of  the  text
were  genuinely  susceptible  to  more  than  one  interpreta
tion,  the  burden  would  remain  on  those  advocating  a
departure from the purpose identified in the preamble and

——————

same by him at all times, ready and fit for service, under the penalty of
two shillings and six pence for each neglect or default thereof on every
muster  day”  (second  emphasis  added));  1782  Conn.  Acts  590  (“And  it
shall be the duty of the Regional Quarter-Master to provide and keep a
sufficient  quantity  of  Ammunition  and  warlike  stores  for  the  use  of
their respective regiments, to be kept in such place or places as shall be
ordered by the Field Officers” (emphasis added)).

13 The  Court  notes  that  the  First  Amendment  protects  two  separate
rights  with  the  phrase  “the ‘right [singular]  of  the  people  peaceably  to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.’ ”
Ante, at 18.  But this only proves the point: In contrast to the language
quoted  by  the  Court,  the  Second  Amendment  does  not  protect  a  “right
to keep and to bear arms,” but rather a “right to keep and bear arms.”
The  state  constitutions  cited  by  the  Court  are  distinguishable  on  the
same ground.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It delves into the interpretation of the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1067

558 U. S.

November 30, December 2, 2009

denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or  decision  of  this  motion.

No. 09–5692.  Njoku v.  Holder, Attorney General, et al.,
ante,  p.  916.  Motion  for  leave  to  ﬁle  petition  for  rehearing
denied.

Certiorari  Denied

December  2,  2009

No.  09–7839  (09A521).  Johnson  v.  Bredesen,  Governor  of
Tennessee,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Application  for  stay  of  exe
cution  of  sentence  of  death,  presented  to  Justice  Stevens,  and
by  him  referred  to  the  Court,  denied.  Certiorari  denied.

Statement  of  Justice  Stevens,  with  whom  Justice  Breyer
joins,  respecting  the  denial  of  the  petition  for  writ  of  certiorari.
Petitioner Cecil Johnson, Jr., has been conﬁned to a solitary cell
awaiting  his  execution  for  nearly  29  years.1  Johnson  bears  little,
if  any,  responsibility  for  this delay.  After  his  execution  date  was
set  and  on  the  day  the  Governor  of  Tennessee  denied  him  clem
ency,  Johnson  brought  this  Eighth  Amendment  challenge  under
Rev.  Stat.  § 1979,  42  U. S. C.  § 1983,  to  enjoin  the  State  from  exe
cuting  him  after  this  lengthy  and  inhumane  delay.  See  Lackey
v.  Texas,  514  U. S.  1045,  1045–1046  (1995)  (Stevens,  J.,  statement
respecting denial of certiorari); see also Thompson v.  McNeil, 556
U. S.  1114, 1115–1116  (2009) (same);  id., at  1119–1120 (Breyer,  J.,
dissenting  from  denial  of  certiorari).  Because  I  remain  steadfast
in  my  view  “that  executing  defendants  after  such  delays  is  unac
ceptably  cruel,”  id.,  at  1116,  I  would  grant  the  stay  application
and  the  petition  for  certiorari.

Johnson  was  tried  and  convicted  of  three  counts  of  ﬁrst-degree
murder  in  1981.  He  continues  to  maintain  his  innocence.  Veri
ﬁed  Complaint  in  No.  3:09–1133  (MD  Tenn.),  ¶ 9,  App.  to  Pet.  for
Cert.  15.  There  was  no  physical  evidence  tying  Johnson  to  the
crime.  See  Johnson  v.  Bell,  525  F.  3d  466,  490  (CA6  2008)  (Cole,
J.,  dissenting).  In  1992  a  change  in  state  law  gave  Johnson  ac
cess,  for  the  ﬁrst  time,  to  substantial  evidence  undermining  key

1 “Inmates  who  are  under  a  sentence  of  death  shall  be  single-celled  and
housed  in  a  maximum  security  unit  separate  from  the  general  popula
tion.”  State  of  Tennessee,  Dept.  of  Correction,  Administrative  Policies  and
Procedures,  Index  #506.14(VI)(B)(2)  (2009),  online  at  http://www.state.tn.us/
correction/pdf/506-14.pdf  (as  visited  Dec.  1,  2009).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a section of Supreme Court orders. It includes case numbers, dates, and summaries of decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Supreme Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

959 F. 3d 159, affirmed.

Syllabus

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court case opinion.  It includes citation information and the name of the authoring Justice.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Supreme Court Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

with it.’ ”  Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Account-
ing Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 496–497 (2010) (quoting
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 712–713 (1997) (BREYER, J.,
concurring  in  judgment)).    The  Framers  recognized,  of
course, that “no single person could fulfill that responsibil-
ity alone, [and] expected that the President would rely on
subordinate officers for assistance.”  Seila Law LLC v. Con-
sumer  Financial  Protection  Bureau,  591  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2020) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 2).

Today, thousands of officers wield executive power on be-
half of the President in the name of the United States.  That
power acquires its legitimacy and accountability to the pub-
lic through “a clear and effective chain of command” down
from the President, on whom all the people vote.  Free En-
terprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 498.  James Madison extolled
this “great principle of unity and responsibility in the Exec-
utive  department,”  which  ensures  that  “the  chain  of  de-
pendence [will] be preserved; the lowest officers, the middle
grade, and the highest, will depend, as they ought, on the
President, and the President on the community.”  1 Annals
of Cong. 499 (1789).

The Appointments Clause provides:

“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice  and  Consent  of  the  Senate,  shall  appoint  Am-
bassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of  the  supreme  Court,  and  all  other  Officers  of  the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein oth-
erwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law: but Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of  such  inferior  Officers,  as  they  think  proper,  in  the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments.”  Art. II, §2, cl. 2.

Assigning the nomination power to the President guaran-
tees accountability for the appointees’ actions because the
“blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and discusses the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16  MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES v. PROMETHEUS

LABORATORIES, INC.
Opinion of the Court

  Finally,  in  Benson  the  Court  considered  the  patentabil
ity  of  a  mathematical  process  for  converting  binary-coded
decimal  numerals  into  pure  binary  numbers  on  a  general
purpose digital computer.  The claims “purported to cover
any use of the claimed method in a general-purpose digital
computer  of  any  type.”  409  U. S.,  at  64,  65.    The  Court
recognized that “ ‘a novel and useful structure created with
the aid of knowledge of scientific truth’ ” might be patent
able.  Id., at 67 (quoting Mackay Radio, 306 U. S., at 94).
But  it  held  that  simply  implementing  a  mathematical
principle  on  a  physical  machine,  namely  a  computer,  was
not  a  patentable  application  of  that  principle.  For  the
mathematical formula had “no substantial practical appli
cation  except  in  connection  with  a  digital  computer.”
Benson,  supra,  at  71.    Hence  the  claim  (like  the  claims
before  us)  was  overly  broad;  it  did  not  differ  significantly
from a claim that just said “apply the algorithm.”

3
The  Court  has  repeatedly  emphasized  this  last  men
tioned  concern,  a  concern  that  patent  law  not  inhibit
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of
laws  of  nature.    Thus,  in  Morse  the  Court  set  aside  as
unpatentable  Samuel  Morse’s  general  claim  for  “ ‘the  use
of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current . . .
however  developed,  for  making  or  printing  intelligible
characters, letters, or signs, at any distances,’ ” 15 How., at
86. 	 The Court explained:

“For aught that we now know some future inventor, in
the onward march of science, may discover a mode of
writing or printing at a distance by means of the elec
tric or galvanic current, without using any part of the
process or combination set forth in the plaintiff ’s spec
ification.  His invention may be less complicated—less
liable  to  get  out  of  order—less  expensive  in  construc
tion,  and  in  its  operation.    But  yet  if  it  is  covered  by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the patentability of mathematical processes. It cites previous court cases and provides legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

13

Opinion of the Court

chose to say it, is entitled to “special protection” under the
First Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome
by a jury finding that the picketing was outrageous.

For  all  these  reasons,  the  jury  verdict  imposing  tort
liability on Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional
distress must be set aside.

III

The  jury  also  found  Westboro  liable  for  the  state  law
torts of intrusion upon seclusion and civil conspiracy.  The
Court  of  Appeals  did  not  examine  these  torts  independ-
ently of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort.
Instead,  the  Court  of  Appeals  reversed  the  District  Court
wholesale, holding  that  the  judgment  wrongly  “attache[d]
tort  liability  to  constitutionally  protected  speech.”    580
F. 3d, at 226.

Snyder  argues  that  even  assuming  Westboro’s  speech
is  entitled  to  First  Amendment  protection  generally,  the
church is not immunized from liability for intrusion upon
seclusion because Snyder was a member of a captive audi-
ence  at  his son’s  funeral.    Brief  for  Petitioner  45–46.  We
do  not  agree.    In  most  circumstances,  “the  Constitution
does  not  permit  the  government  to  decide  which  types  of
otherwise  protected  speech  are  sufficiently  offensive  to
require  protection  for  the  unwilling  listener  or  viewer.
Rather,  . . .  the  burden  normally  falls  upon  the  viewer  to
avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by
averting  [his]  eyes.”  Erznoznik  v.  Jacksonville,  422  U. S.
205,  210–211  (1975)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
As  a  result,  “[t]he  ability  of  government,  consonant  with
the  Constitution,  to  shut  off  discourse  solely  to  protect
others  from  hearing  it  is  . . .  dependent  upon  a  showing
that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner.”  Cohen v. California, 403
U. S. 15, 21 (1971).

As  a  general  matter,  we  have  applied  the  captive  audi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case of Snyder v. Phelps. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis of the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI

BREYER, J., dissenting

the Court wrote that,

“where  federally  protected  rights  have  been  invaded,
it  has  been  the  rule  from  the  beginning  that  courts
will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief.”

See  also  Bivens,  403  U. S.,  at  392  (citing  opinions  of  Jus-
tices Cardozo and Holmes to similar effect).

The  Bivens  Court  reiterated  these  principles  and  con-
firmed that the appropriate remedial “adjust[ment]” in the
case before it was an award of money damages, the “reme-
dial mechanism normally available in the federal courts.”
Id., at 392, 397.  Justice Harlan agreed, adding that, since
Congress’  “general”  statutory  “grant  of  jurisdiction”  au-
thorized  courts  to  grant  equitable  relief  in  cases  arising
under federal jurisdiction, courts likewise had the author-
ity to award damages—the “traditional remedy at law”—in
order to “vindicate the interests of the individual” protected
by  the  Bill  of  Rights.    Id.,  at  405–407  (opinion  concur-
ring in judgment).

Second, our cases have recognized that Congress’ silence
on the subject indicates a willingness to leave this matter
to the courts.  In Bivens, the Court noted, as an argument
favoring its conclusion, the absence of an “explicit congres-
sional  declaration  that  persons  injured  by  a  federal  of-
ficer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover
money damages from the agents.”  Id., at 397.  Similarly,
in  Davis  v.  Passman,  the  Court  stressed  that  there  was
“no  evidence  . . .  that  Congress  meant  . . .  to  foreclose”  a
damages remedy.  442 U. S., at 247.  In Carlson, the Court
went  further,  observing  that  not  only  was  there  no  sign
“that  Congress  meant  to  pre-empt  a  Bivens  remedy,”  but
there was also “clear” evidence that Congress intended to
preserve it.  446 U. S., at 19–20.
  Third,  our  Bivens  cases  acknowledge  that  a  constitu-
tional  tort  may  not  lie  when  “special  factors  counse[l]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It cites previous legal cases and discusses legal principles related to remedies for violations of federally protected rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1073

529 U. S.

April 17, 2000

No. 99–8209. Davidson v. New Hampshire. C. A. 1st Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8210. Gaines v. Dallas County et al. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 519.

No. 99–8212. DeLeon v. Garcia, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8218. Bargas v. Burns, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 179 F. 3d 1207.

No. 99–8220. Crawford v. Hill et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 629.

No. 99–8228. Utley v. Bell, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 639.

No. 99–8229. Thomas v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8230. VanDorsten v. LeCureux, Warden. C. A.

6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8232. Murray v. Varner, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Retreat. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied.

No. 99–8236. Lewis v. Booker, Superintendent, Missis-
sippi State Penitentiary. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 99–8239. McGregor v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8240. Cole v. City of Tampa, Florida. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1322.

No. 99–8250. Frazier v. Lea County District Court.

Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8251. Hartline v. Stewart et al. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8252. Dixon v. Heard, Warden, et al. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 899.

No. 99–8253. Daniels v. Galaza, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document, not typical readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

23

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

As discussed above, this Court has long endorsed statu-
tory schemes authorizing agency adjudicators to find viola-
tions and award civil penalties to the Government.  See su-
pra,  at  9–12.    Long  before  Atlas  Roofing,  this  Court  held
that the Constitution permits Congress to enact statutory
obligations and then “sanction their enforcement by reason-
able money penalties” by government officials “without the
necessity of invoking the judicial power.”  Stranahan, 214
U. S., at 339; see id., at 338–339 (collecting cases).  That the
SEC imposed civil penalties on respondents therefore has
little, if any, bearing on the resolution of this case.

Again,  even  if  over  a  century  of  precedent  did  not  fore-
close the majority’s argument, it fails on its own terms.  The
majority  relies  almost  entirely  on  Tull,  which  held  that
statutory claims for civil penalties were “a type of remedy
at  common  law”  that  entitled  a  defendant  to  a  jury  trial.
481 U. S., at 422; see id., at 425.  Critically, however, the
Tull Court’s analysis took place in an entirely different con-
text: federal court.  See ante, at 8–9 (“In [Tull], the Govern-
ment sued a real estate developer for civil penalties [under
the Clean Water Act]  in federal court” (emphasis added)).
Tull did not present the question at issue in Atlas Roofing
and  other  cases  involving  non-Article  III  adjudication  of
Government  claims  in  the  first  instance.  Rather,  Tull
stands  for  the  unremarkable  proposition  that,  when  the
Government sues an entity for civil penalties in federal dis-
trict court, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant
“to a jury trial to determine his liability on the legal claims.”
481 U. S., at 425.

That conclusion says nothing about the constitutionality
of the SEC’s in-house adjudicative scheme.  Atlas Roofing
and  its  predecessors  could  not  have  been  clearer  on  this
point: Congress can assign the enforcement of a statutory
obligation  for  in-house  adjudication  to  executive  officials,
“even  if  the  Seventh  Amendment  would  have  required  a
jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned to a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites previous cases and legal precedents, demonstrating a clear focus on legal argumentation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

elections are taking place.
  It  is  unsurprising  in  light  of  the  history  of  such  purge
programs  that  numerous  amici  report  that  the  Supple-
mental  Process  has  disproportionately  affected  minority,
low-income, disabled, and veteran voters.  As one example,
amici point to an investigation that revealed that in Ham-
ilton  County,  “African-American-majority  neighborhoods
in  downtown  Cincinnati  had  10%  of  their  voters  removed
due  to  inactivity”  since  2012,  as  “compared  to  only  4%  of
voters in a suburban, majority-white neighborhood.”  Brief
for  National  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Colored
People et al. as Amici Curiae 18–19.  Amici also explain at
length how low voter turnout rates, language-access prob-
lems,  mail  delivery  issues,  inflexible  work  schedules,  and
transportation  issues,  among  other  obstacles,  make  it
more  difficult  for  many  minority,  low-income,  disabled,
homeless,  and  veteran  voters  to  cast  a  ballot  or  return  a
notice,  rendering  them  particularly  vulnerable  to  unwar-
ranted  removal  under  the  Supplemental  Process.    See
Brief  for  Asian  Americans  Advancing  Justice  |  AAJC  et
al.  as  Amici  Curiae  15–26;  Brief  for  National  Disability
Rights  Network  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  17,  21–24,  29–31;
Brief  for  VoteVets  Action  Fund  as  Amicus  Curiae  23–30.
See  also  Brief  for  Libertarian  National  Committee  as
Amicus Curiae 19–22 (burdens on principled nonvoters).
  Neither the majority nor Ohio meaningfully dispute that
the  Supplemental  Process  disproportionately  burdens
these  communities.    At  oral  argument,  Ohio  suggested
that  such  a  disparate  impact is  not  pertinent to  this  case
because  respondents  did  not  challenge  the  Supplemental
Process  under  §20507(b)(1),  which  requires  that  any  re-
moval  program  “be  uniform,  nondiscriminatory,  and  in
compliance  with  the  Voting  Rights  Act.”    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.
23.  The fact that respondents did not raise a claim under
§20507(b)(1),  however,  is  wholly  irrelevant  to  our  assess-
ment  of  whether,  as  a  matter  of  statutory  interpretation,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute*. It delves into the disproportionate impact of voter purge programs on minority and disadvantaged communities.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1014

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 9, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6351.  Byrd  v.  North  Carolina.  Ct.  App.  N.  C.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6352.  Bynum  v.  Levenhagen,  Superintendent,  In
diana  State  Prison.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  560  F.  3d  678.

No.  09–6353.  Atkins  v.  Vadlamudi  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6362.  Brooks  v.  Hubert,  Warden.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6365.  Stafford  v.  Astrue,  Commissioner  of  Social

Security.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6366.  Seaman  v.  Astrue,  Commissioner  of  Social
Security.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
321  Fed.  Appx.  134.

No.  09–6391.  Rodriguez  v.  Evans,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  692.

No.  09–6416.  Rodgers  v.  Hedgpeth,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  815.

No.  09–6461.  Rodriguez-Montelvo  v.  United  States  (Re
ported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  834);  and  Mendez-Monroy  v.
United  States  (333  Fed.  Appx.  840).  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6470.  Evans  v.  Cartledge,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  152.

No.  09–6497.  Alfredo-Cardenas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 332 Fed. Appx. 965.

No. 09–6509.  Williams v.  Thurmer, Warden.  C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  740.

No.  09–6510.  Robinson  v.  Cain,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  282.

No. 09–6557.  Daniels  v.  California.  Ct. App. Cal.,  2d App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

I
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate
because of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42
U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1).2  As enacted in 1964, Title VII did
not  prohibit  other  forms  of  employment  discrimination,
such  as  age  discrimination,  disability  discrimination,  or
sexual orientation discrimination.

Over  time,  Congress  has  enacted  new  employment  dis-
crimination laws.  In 1967, Congress passed and President
Johnson signed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
81  Stat.  602.    In  1973,  Congress  passed  and  President
Nixon  signed  the  Rehabilitation  Act,  which  in  substance
prohibited disability discrimination against federal and cer-
tain  other  employees.    87  Stat.  355.    In  1990,  Congress
passed and President George H. W. Bush signed the com-
prehensive Americans with Disabilities Act.  104 Stat. 327.
To prohibit age discrimination and disability discrimina-
tion, this Court did not unilaterally rewrite or update the

——————

2 In full, the statute provides:
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
“(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or

“(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his sta-
tus as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”  42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a) (emphasis added).

As the Court today recognizes, Title VII contains an important exemp-
tion for religious organizations.  §2000e–1(a); see also §2000e–2(e).  The
First Amendment also safeguards the employment decisions of religious
employers.  See  Hosanna-Tabor  Evangelical  Lutheran  Church  and
School  v.  EEOC,  565  U. S.  171,  188–195  (2012).    So  too,  the  Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 exempts employers from federal laws
that substantially burden the exercise of religion, subject to limited ex-
ceptions.  §2000bb–1.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal statutes and previous court cases, indicating it is part of a legal argument and not a general introductory or navigational text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TURNER v. ROGERS

Opinion of the Court

The judge added that Turner would not receive good-time
or  work  credits,  but  “[i]f  you’ve  got  a  job,  I’ll  make  you
eligible for work release.”  Ibid.  When Turner asked why
he  could  not  receive  good-time  or  work  credits,  the  judge
said, “[b]ecause that’s my ruling.”  Ibid.

The  court  made  no  express  finding  concerning  Turner’s
ability  to  pay  his  arrearage  (though  Turner’s  wife  had
voluntarily  submitted  a  copy  of  Turner’s  application  for
disability benefits, cf. post, at 7, n. 3 (THOMAS, J., dissent-
ing); App. 135a–136a).  Nor did the judge ask any followup
questions  or  otherwise  address  the  ability-to-pay  issue.
After  the  hearing,  the  judge  filled  out  a  prewritten  form
titled  “Order  for  Contempt  of  Court,”  which  included  the
statement:

“Defendant (was) (was not) gainfully employed and/or
(had) (did not have) the ability to make these support
payments when due.”  Id., at 60a, 61a.

But  the  judge  left  this statement  as  is  without  indicating
whether Turner was able to make support payments.

C
While  serving  his  12-month  sentence,  Turner,  with  the
help  of  pro  bono  counsel,  appealed.    He  claimed  that
the Federal Constitution entitled him to counsel at his con-
tempt  hearing.  The  South  Carolina  Supreme  Court  de-
cided Turner’s appeal after he had completed his sentence.
And  it  rejected  his  “right  to  counsel”  claim.    The  court
pointed  out  that  civil  contempt  differs  significantly  from
criminal  contempt.  The  former  does  not  require  all  the
“constitutional safeguards” applicable in criminal proceed-
ings.  387 S. C., at 145, 691 S. E. 2d, at 472.  And the right
to government-paid counsel, the Supreme Court held, was
one of the “safeguards” not required.  Ibid.

Turner  sought  certiorari.  In  light  of  differences  among
state courts (and some federal courts) on the applicability
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the opinion of the court in the case of Turner v. Rogers. It contains legal arguments, citations, and a summary of the case proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH

Syllabus

for failure to state a claim, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.

Held: Plaintiffs’ allegations that these social-media companies aided and
abetted ISIS in its terrorist attack on the Reina nightclub fail to state
a claim under 18 U. S. C. §2333(d)(2).  Pp. 6–31.

(a) In 2016, Congress enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Ter-
rorism Act (JASTA) to impose secondary civil liability on anyone “who
aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who
conspires with the person who committed such an act of international
terrorism.”  §2333(d)(2).  The question here is whether the conduct of
the social-media company defendants gives rise to aiding-and-abetting
liability for the Reina nightclub attack.  Pp. 6–8.

(b) The text of JASTA begs two questions: What does it mean to “aid
and abet”?  And, what precisely must the defendant have “aided and
abetted”?  Pp. 8–21.

(1) Nothing in the statute defines any of the critical terms in the
phrase  “aids  and  abets,  by  knowingly  providing  substantial  assis-
tance.”  The term “aids and abets,” however, is a familiar common-law
term  and  thus  presumably  “brings  the  old  soil”  with  it.  Sekhar  v.
United States, 570 U. S. 729, 733.  Congress also provided additional
context in JASTA by pointing to Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F. 2d 472,
as “provid[ing] the proper legal framework” for “civil aiding and abet-
ting  and  conspiracy  liability.”  130  Stat.  852.  Halberstam’s  legal
framework, viewed in context of the common-law tradition from which
it arose, confirms that “aids and abets” in §2333(d)(2) refers to a con-
scious, voluntary, and culpable participation in another’s wrongdoing.
Pp. 9–17.

(i) In Halberstam, the D. C. Circuit undertook an extensive sur-
vey of the common law with respect to aiding and abetting and synthe-
sized the surveyed cases as resting on three main elements: (1) there
must  be  a  wrongful  act  causing  an  injury  performed  by  the  person
whom  the  defendant  aided;  (2)  at  the  time  assistance  was  provided,
the defendant must have been “generally aware of his role as part of
an overall illegal or tortious activity;” and (3) the defendant must have
“knowingly and substantially assist[ed] the principal violation.”  705
F. 2d, at 477.  The court then articulated six factors to help determine
whether a defendant’s assistance was “substantial.”  They are (1) “the
nature of the act assisted,” (2) the “amount of assistance” provided, (3)
whether the defendant was “present at the time” of the principal tort,
(4) the defendant’s “relation to the tortious actor,” (5) the “defendant’s
state of mind,” and (6) the “duration of the assistance” given.  Id., at
488 (emphasis deleted).  Halberstam also clarified that those who aid
and abet “a tortious act may be liable” not only for the act itself but
also “for other reasonably foreseeable acts done in connection with it.”
Id., at 484.  Finally, the court warned that its formulations should “not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus from a legal case, outlining the issues and holdings. It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a summary for informational purposes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

BARRETT, J., concurring in part

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–704
_________________

KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PETITIONER
v. STEVE ELSTER

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 13, 2024]

JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, with
whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins as to Parts I, II, and III–
B, and with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins as to Parts I and
II, concurring in part.

While I agree with the Court that the names clause does
not violate the First Amendment, I disagree with some of
its reasoning.  The Court claims that “history and tradition”
settle the constitutionality of the names clause, rendering
it unnecessary to adopt a standard for gauging whether a
content-based  trademark  registration  restriction  abridges
the right to free speech.  That is wrong twice over.  First,
the  Court’s  evidence,  consisting  of  loosely  related  cases
from the late-19th and early-20th centuries, does not estab-
lish a historical analogue for the names clause.  Second, the
Court never explains why hunting for historical forebears
on a restriction-by-restriction basis is the right way to ana-
lyze the constitutional question.  I would adopt a standard,
grounded  in  both  trademark  law  and  First  Amendment
precedent,  that  reflects  the  relationship  between  content-
based trademark registration restrictions and free speech.
In my view, such restrictions, whether new or old, are per-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Barrett.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal reasoning and analysis of a court decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–5924
_________________

EVANGELISTO RAMOS, PETITIONER v. LOUISIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF LOUISIANA, FOURTH CIRCUIT

[April 20, 2020]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that petitioner Evangelisto Ramos’
felony conviction by a nonunanimous jury was unconstitu-
tional.  I write separately because I would resolve this case
based  on  the  Court’s  longstanding  view  that  the  Sixth
Amendment  includes  a  protection  against  nonunanimous
felony guilty verdicts, without undertaking a fresh analysis
of  the  meaning  of  “trial  . . .  by  an  impartial  jury.”  I  also
would make clear that this right applies against the States
through  the  Privileges  or  Immunities  Clause  of  the  Four-
teenth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause.

I
I begin with the parties’ dispute as to whether the Sixth
Amendment  right  to  a  trial  by  jury  includes  a  protection
against nonunanimous felony guilty verdicts.  On this ques-
tion, I do not write on a blank slate.  As the Court acknowl-
edges, our decisions have long recognized that unanimity is
required.  See ante, at 6–7.  Because this interpretation is
not  demonstrably  erroneous,  I  would  resolve  the  Sixth
Amendment question on that basis.

A
This Court first decided that the Sixth Amendment pro-
tected a right to unanimity in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S.
343  (1898).  The  Court  reasoned  that  Thompson,  a  Utah
prisoner,  was  protected  by  the  Sixth  Amendment  when
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1022

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 20, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1303. Williams v. Henderson, Postmaster Gen-
eral. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194
F. 3d 1324.

No. 99–1312. Valhalla Cemetery Co., Inc. v. Monroe,
Commissioner, Alabama Department of Revenue. Ct. Civ.
App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 749 So. 2d 470.

No. 99–1315. Fizzano Brothers Concrete Products, Inc.
v. Santerian et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 737 A. 2d 1283.

No. 99–1323. Hawkins v. Texas Commission for Lawyer
Discipline. Ct. App. Tex., 8th Dist. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 988 S. W. 2d 927.

No. 99–1341. Van Ness Associates, Ltd. v. Mitsubishi
Bank, Ltd., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–1357. Hughes et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 1317.

No. 99–1365. Nicolas v. Panama Canal Commission. C. A.

D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1366. Kaplan v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–1382. Thornton v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 241.

No. 99–1384. Castro v. Edwards, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1400. Cranford v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 453.

No. 99–1405. Kuhn v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–6558. Battle v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 173 F. 3d 1343.

No. 99–6684. Dones v. Johnson, Superintendent, Orleans
Correctional Facility; and Glaude v. Artuz, Superintend-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and dates. This type of information is not the primary content meant to be read and understood by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

527

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

Ibid.

interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the governmental action—we determined that
Id., at 225.
the MPPAA did not violate the Takings Clause.
The governmental action at issue in Connolly was not
a physical
it “safe-
invasion of employers’ assets; rather,
guard[ed] the participants in multiemployer pension plans by
requiring a withdrawing employer to fund its share of the
plan obligations incurred during its association with the
In addition, although the amounts assessed
plan.”
under the MPPAA were substantial, we found it important
that “[t]he assessment of withdrawal liability [was] not made
in a vacuum, . . . but directly depend[ed] on the relationship
between the employer and the plan to which it had made
contributions.”
Ibid. Further, “a signiﬁcant number of
provisions in the Act . . . moderate[d] and mitigate[d] the
economic impact of an individual employer’s liability.”
Id.,
at 225–226. Accordingly, we found “nothing to show that
the withdrawal liability actually imposed on an employer
w[ould] always be out of proportion to its experience with
the plan.”
Id., at 226. Nor did the MPPAA interfere with
employers’ reasonable investment-backed expectations, for,
by the time of the MPPAA’s enactment, “[p]rudent employ-
ers . . . had more than sufﬁcient notice not only that pension
plans were currently regulated, but also that withdrawal it-
Id., at
self might trigger additional ﬁnancial obligations.”
227. For those reasons, we determined that “fairness and
justice” did not require anyone other than the withdrawing
employers and the remaining parties to the pension agree-
ments to bear the burden of funding employees’ vested bene-
ﬁts.

Ibid.

We once more faced challenges to the MPPAA under the
Due Process and Takings Clauses in Concrete Pipe & Prod-
ucts of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust
for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602 (1993).
In that case, the
employer focused on the fact that its contractual commitment
to the multiemployer plan did not impose withdrawal liabil-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA) and its constitutionality.  The text is sequential and contains legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC, ET AL.
v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–472.  Argued April 27, 2021—Decided June 25, 2021

When  Congress  created  the  renewable  fuel  program  (RFP)  requiring
most domestic refineries to blend renewable fuels into the transporta-
tion  fuels  they  produce,  see  42  U. S. C.  §7545(o)(1)(J),  (o)(1)(L),
(o)(2)(A)(i), it added features designed to lessen the impact of the pro-
gram’s mandates on small refineries.  At the outset, Congress created
a blanket exemption from RFP obligations for all small refineries until
2011.    §7545(o)(9)(A)(i).  Congress  also  directed  the  Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to “extend the exemption under clause (i)” for
at least two years if the RFP obligations would impose “a dispropor-
tionate
refinery.
§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii).  Finally, Congress offered the possibility of further
relief in future years by providing that “[a] small refinery may at any
time  petition  . . .  for  an  extension  of  the  exemption  under  subpara-
graph  (A)  for  the  reason  of  disproportionate  economic  hardship.”
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i).

economic  hardship”

on  a

small

given

Here, three small refineries initially received an exemption, saw it
lapse for a period, and then again petitioned for an exemption under
subparagraph (B)(i).  EPA granted the exemptions, and a group of re-
newable fuel producers objected.  The Tenth Circuit vacated EPA’s de-
cisions, concluding that the small refineries were ineligible for an “ex-
tension” under subparagraph (B)(i) because they had allowed previous
exemptions to lapse.

Held: A  small  refinery  that  previously  received  a  hardship  exemption
may obtain an “extension” under §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) even if it saw a lapse
in exemption coverage in a previous year.  Pp. 4–16.

(a) The  key  term  here—“extension”—is  not  defined  in  the  statute.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

55

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

why this Court’s precedents have never imposed the major-
ity’s strict deadline: Institutions cannot predict the future.
Speculating about a day when consideration of race will be-
come  unnecessary  is  arbitrary  at  best  and  frivolous  at
worst.  There  is  no  constitutional  duty  to  engage  in  that
type of shallow guesswork.37

Harvard and UNC engage in the ongoing review that the
Court’s precedents demand.  They “use [their] data to scru-
tinize the fairness of [their] admissions program[s]; to as-
sess whether changing demographics have undermined the
need for a race-conscious policy; and to identify the effects,
both  positive  and  negative,  of  the  affirmative-action
measures [they] dee[m] necessary.”  Fisher II, 579 U. S., at
388.  The Court holds, however, that respondents’ attention
to  numbers  amounts  to  unconstitutional  racial  balancing.
Ante, at 30–32.  But “ ‘[s]ome attention to numbers’ ” is both
necessary and permissible.  Grutter, 539 U. S., at 336 (quot-
ing Bakke, 438 U. S., at 323).  Universities cannot blindly
operate  their  limited  race-conscious  programs  without  re-
gard for any quantitative information.  “Increasing minor-
ity enrollment [is] instrumental to th[e] educational bene-
fits” that respondents seek to achieve, Fisher II, 579 U. S.,
at 381, and statistics, data, and numbers “have some value

——————

37 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH’s reading, in particular, is quite puzzling.  Un-
like  the  majority,  which  concludes  that  respondents’  programs  should
have an end point, JUSTICE KAVANAUGH suggests that Grutter itself has
an expiration date.  He agrees that racial inequality persists, ante, at 7–
8, but at the same time suggests that race-conscious affirmative action
was only necessary in “another generation,” ante, at 4.  He attempts to
analogize expiration dates of court-ordered injunctions in desegregation
cases, ante, at 5, but an expiring injunction does not eliminate the un-
derlying  constitutional  principle.    His  musings  about  different  college
classes,  ante,  at  7,  n. 1,  are  also  entirely  beside  the  point.    Nothing  in
Grutter’s analysis turned on whether someone was applying for the class
of 2028 or 2032.  That reading of Grutter trivializes the Court’s precedent
by reducing it to an exercise in managing academic calendars.  Grutter
is no such thing.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision and cites previous precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH

Opinion of the Court

regulation based on a new interpretation of the “sound con-
dition” provision.  We express no view on the merits of that
change in interpretation, which are not before us.  But be-
cause it is a change, it cannot support a claim of clear and
unmistakable error in the Board’s routine 1977 application
of the prior regulation.  Put differently, the correct applica-
tion of a binding regulation does not constitute “clear and
unmistakable error” at the time a decision is rendered, even
if that regulation is subsequently invalidated.

B
1
George offers several responses.  He generally concedes
the premise that the 1997 statute codified the longstanding
regulatory  practice  defining  “clear  and  unmistakable  er-
ror.”  He takes issue primarily with the conclusion that this
practice  forbids  his  claim.    In  George’s  view,  the  VA  has
“distorted”  its  own  history  by  glossing  over  a  handful  of
“pre-legislation  Veterans  Court  opinions”  that  he  claims
“point in [his] direction.”  Brief for Petitioner 26, 41.  But
across a century of review for clear and unmistakable error,
George  can  muster  only  one  case  sustaining  a  claim  that
arguably resembles his.  See Look v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App.
157 (1992) (approving collateral relief on two grounds, in-
cluding  a  later  invalidated  regulation,  without  discussing
the change-in-interpretation principle).  And even that case
is ambiguous, as portions of the opinion may instead “sug-
gest that the [subsequent] invalidation of regulations does
not  have  retroactive  effect  in  ‘finally’  disallowed  claims.”
VA Op. 9–94, ¶5, p. 4 (emphasis added) (citing Look, 2 Vet.
App., at 164).  Regardless, the case remains an outlier that
“no court has cited” on this point “[i]n the 30 years since,”
as  the  Government  notes  without  rebuttal  from  George.
Brief for Respondent 38.

This is thin stuff.  One uncertain outlier does not come
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case *George v. McDonough*.  It discusses the legal standard for "clear and unmistakable error" in VA decisions and analyzes a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
306

WOOD  v.  ALLEN

Stevens, J., dissenting

Wood’s claim the state court also had to reasonably conclude
that  such  a  decision  was  borne  of  strategy.  And  whether
counsel’s  decision  was  the  product  of  strategy  is  a  question
of fact for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(2).1  Cf. Wiggins
v.  Smith,  539  U. S.  510,  526–527  (2003)  (observing  that  “the
‘strategic  decision’  the  state  courts  and  respondents  all  in
voke  to  justify  counsel’s  limited  pursuit  of  mitigating  evi
dence  resembles  more  a  post  hoc  rationalization  of  counsel’s
conduct  than  an  accurate  description  of  their  deliberations
prior to sentencing”); Carr  v.  Schoﬁeld, 364 F. 3d 1246, 1264
(CA11  2004)  (identifying  “whether  counsel’s  decisions  were
tactical  or  strategic”  as  a  question  of  fact  (citing  Horton  v.
Zant, 941 F. 2d 1449, 1462 (CA11 1991))); 2  Berryman v.  Mor
ton, 100 F. 3d 1089, 1095 (CA3 1996) (same).  In other words,
the  Court  correctly  concludes  that  the  record  reasonably
supports  a  ﬁnding  that  counsel  decided  not  to  investigate
Wood’s mental retardation further, but the Court fails to en
gage with the requisite second question: Does the record rea
sonably support ﬁnding that counsel’s  decision was a strate
gic  one?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  unequivocally  no.
Before petitioner’s trial, his counsel learned that Wood had
an  “IQ  in  the  borderline  range  of  intellectual  functioning,”

1 The  Court  explains:  “Whether  the  state  court  reasonably  determined
that there was a strategic decision under § 2254(d)(2) is a different question
from  whether  the  strategic  decision  itself  was  a  reasonable  exercise  of
professional  judgment  under  Strickland  or  whether  the  application  of
Strickland  was  reasonable  under  § 2254(d)(1).”  Ante,  at  304.  I  agree
with  the  majority  that  whether  a  particular  strategic  decision  is  reason
able or not is the Strickland question we would address were we review
ing Wood’s claim for habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1).

2 Indeed,  the  law  in  the  Eleventh  Circuit  on  this  point  is  well  settled:
“ ‘The question of whether an attorney’s actions were actually the product
of a tactical or strategic decision is an issue of fact . . . .’ ”   Fotopoulos v.
Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 516 F. 3d 1229, 1233 (CA11 2008) (quoting
Provenzano v.  Singletary, 148 F. 3d 1327, 1330 (CA11 1998)); see also La
marca  v.  Secretary,  Dept.  of  Corrections,  568  F.  3d  929,  938  (CA11  2009)
(same).  Thus, it is quite understandable that Wood framed the questions
presented in his petition for certiorari as arising under § 2254(d)(2).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens. The text discusses legal arguments and precedents related to a case called "Wood v. Allen."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Syllabus

unheralded power representing a transformative expansion of its reg-
ulatory  authority  in  the  vague  language  of  a  long-extant,  but  rarely
used,  statute  designed  as  a  gap  filler.    That  discovery  allowed  it  to
adopt a regulatory program that Congress had conspicuously declined
to  enact  itself.    Given  these  circumstances,  there  is  every  reason  to
“hesitate before concluding that Congress” meant to confer on EPA the
authority  it  claims  under  Section  111(d).  Brown  &  Williamson,  529
U. S., at 160.

Prior  to  2015,  EPA  had  always  set  Section  111  emissions  limits
based on the application of measures that would reduce pollution by
causing the regulated source to operate more cleanly, see, e.g., 41 Fed.
Reg. 48706—never by looking to a “system” that would reduce pollu-
tion  simply  by  “shifting”  polluting  activity  “from  dirtier  to  cleaner
sources.”  80 Fed. Reg. 64726.  The Government quibbles with this his-
tory, pointing to the 2005 Mercury Rule as one Section 111 rule that it
says relied upon a cap-and-trade mechanism to reduce emissions.  See
70  Fed.  Reg.  28616.    But  in  that  regulation,  EPA  set  the  emissions
limit—the “cap”—based on the use of “technologies [that could be] in-
stalled  and  operational  on  a  nationwide  basis”  in  the  relevant
timeframe.  Id., at 28620–28621.  By contrast, and by design, there are
no particular controls a coal plant operator can install and operate to
attain the emissions limits established by the Clean Power Plan.  In-
deed,  the  Agency  nodded  to  the  novelty  of  its  approach  when  it  ex-
plained that it was pursuing a “broader, forward-thinking approach to
the design” of Section 111 regulations that would “improve the overall
power  system,”  rather  than  the  emissions  performance  of  individual
sources, by forcing a shift throughout the power grid from one type of
energy source to another.  80 Fed. Reg. 64703 (emphasis added).  This
view of EPA’s authority was not only unprecedented; it also effected a
“fundamental  revision  of  the  statute,  changing  it  from  [one  sort  of]
scheme  of  . . . regulation”  into  an  entirely  different  kind.    MCI  Tele-
communications  Corp.  v.  American  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.,  512
U. S. 218, 231.

The  Government  attempts  to  downplay  matters,  noting  that  the
Agency must limit the magnitude of generation shift it demands to a
level that will not be “exorbitantly costly” or “threaten the reliability
of the grid.”  Brief for Federal Respondents 42.  This argument does
not limit the breadth of EPA’s claimed authority so much as reveal it:
On EPA’s view of Section 111(d), Congress implicitly tasked it, and it
alone, with balancing the many vital considerations of national policy
implicated in the basic regulation of how Americans get their energy.
There is little reason to think Congress did so.  EPA has admitted that
issues  of  electricity  transmission,  distribution,  and  storage  are  not
within its traditional expertise.  And this Court doubts that “Congress
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, likely an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the EPA's authority under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Power Plan. The language is formal and legalistic, with citations to legal precedents and regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON

Opinion of the Court

he  disregards  Ex parte  Young’s  express  teaching  against
enjoining the “machinery” of courts.  209 U. S., at 163.
  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR seems to admit at least part of the
problem.  She concedes that older “wooden” authorities like
Ex parte Young appear to prohibit suits against state-court
clerks.    Post,  at  7.    Still,  she  insists,  we  should  disregard
those  cases  in favor  of more  “modern”  case law.   Ibid.   In
places, THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion seems to pursue much
the same line of argument.  See post, at 4.  But even over-
looking  all  the  other  problems  attending  our  colleagues’
“clerks-only” theory, the authorities they cite do not begin
to do the work attributed to them.
  Most prominently, our colleagues point to Pulliam.  But
that case had nothing to do with state-court clerks, injunc-
tions against them, or the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Instead, the Court faced only the question whether the suit
before it could proceed against a judge consistent with the
distinct  doctrine  of  judicial  immunity.    466  U. S.,  at  541–
543.  As well, the plaintiff sought an injunction only to pre-
vent  the  judge  from  enforcing  a  rule  of  her  own  creation.
Id.,  at  526.   No one  asked  the  Court  to  prevent  the  judge
from  processing  the  case  consistent  with  state  statutory
law, let alone undo Ex parte Young’s teaching that federal
courts lack such power under traditional equitable princi-
ples.  Tellingly, our colleagues do not read Pulliam to au-
thorize claims against state-court judges in this case.  And
given that, it is a mystery how they might invoke the case
as authority for claims against (only) state-court clerks, of-
ficials Pulliam never discussed.
  If  anything,  the  remainder  of  our  colleagues’  cases  are
even further afield.  Mitchum v. Foster did not involve state-
court clerks, but a judge, prosecutor, and sheriff.  See 315
F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (ND Fla. 1970) (per curiam).  When it
came  to  these  individuals,  the  Court  held  only  that  the
Anti-Injunction Act did not bar suit against them.  407 U. S.
225, 242–243 (1972).  Once more, the Court did not purport
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting or concurring opinion. It cites legal precedents and engages in legal argumentation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  MANHATTAN COMMUNITY ACCESS CORP. v. HALLECK

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

responsibilities  to  a  private  entity,  that  entity—in  agree-
ing to take on the job—becomes a state actor for purposes
of §1983.8
  Not  all  acts  of  governmental  delegation  necessarily
trigger  constitutional  obligations,  but  this  one  did.    New
York State regulations required the City to secure public-
access  channels  if  it  awarded  a  cable  franchise.    16  N. Y.
Codes,  Rules  &  Regs.  §895.4(b)(1).    The  City  did  award  a
cable franchise.  The State’s regulations then required the
City to make the channels it obtained available on a “first-
come, first-served, nondiscriminatory basis.”9  §895.4(c)(4).

——————

8 Governments  are,  of  course,  not  constitutionally  required  to  open
prisons  or  public  forums,  but  once  they  do  either  of  these  things,
constitutional obligations attach.  The rule that a government may not
evade  the  Constitution  by  substituting a  private administrator,  mean-
while, is not a prison-specific rule.  More than 50 years ago, for exam-
ple,  this  Court  made  clear  in  Evans  v.  Newton,  382  U. S.  296  (1966),
that  the  city  of  Macon,  Georgia,  could  not  evade  the  Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by handing off control of a park
to  a  group  “of  ‘private’  trustees.”    Id.,  at  301.    Rather,  “the  public
character of [the] park require[d] that it be treated as a public institu-
tion subject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless
of who ha[d] title under state law.”  Id., at 302.

9 Accordingly,  this  is  not  a  case  in  which  a  private  entity  has  been
asked  to  exercise  standardless  discretion.    See,  e.g.,  American  Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U. S. 40, 52 (1999).  Had New York law
left MNN free to choose its favorite submissions, for example, a differ-
ent result might well follow.

MNN has suggested to this Court that its contract with Time Warner
allows  it  “to  curate  content,  to  decide  to  put  shows  together  on  one  of
our channels or a different channel.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 6; see Reply Brief
9.  But MNN’s contract cannot defeat New York law’s “first-come, first-
served,  nondiscriminatory”  scheduling  requirement,  16  N. Y.  Codes,
Rules & Regs. §895.4(c)(4), and the discretion MNN asserts seems to be
at  most  some  limited  authority  to  coordinate  the  exact  placement  and
timing of the content it is obliged to accept indiscriminately, see Tr. of
Oral Arg. 25–26.  That seems akin to the authority to make reasonable
time,  place,  and  manner  provisions,  which  is  consistent with  adminis-
tering any public forum.  See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S.
781, 791 (1989).  As for any factual assertions about how the channels
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments and precedents related to state action and constitutional obligations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO. v. APPLE INC.

Syllabus

only  a  component  of  a  multicomponent  product,  see,  e.g.,  Ex  parte
Adams,  84  Off.  Gaz.  Pat.  Office  311;  Application  of  Zahn,  617  F. 2d
261,  268  (CCPA).    This  reading  is  also  consistent  with  the  Court’s
reading  of  the  term  “manufacture”  in  §101,  which  makes  “any  new
and useful . . . manufacture” eligible for utility patent protection.  See
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 308.  Pp. 4–7.

(b) Because  the  term  “article  of  manufacture”  is  broad  enough  to
embrace both a product sold to a consumer and a component of that
product,  whether  sold  separately  or  not,  the  Federal  Circuit’s  nar-
rower reading cannot be squared with §289’s text.  Absent adequate
briefing by the parties, this Court declines to resolve whether the rel-
evant  article  of  manufacture  for  each  design  patent  at  issue  here  is
the  smartphone  or  a  particular  smartphone  component.    Doing  so  is
not necessary to resolve the question presented, and the Federal Cir-
cuit may address any remaining issues on remand.  Pp. 7–8.

786 F. 3d 983, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they summarize the case rather than providing the full text of the legal arguments and decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

decisis, the concurrence refuses to follow the all-things-con-
sidered balancing test that decision employed when strik-
ing down Texas’s admitting privileges law.  In the process,
the concurrence rightly recounts many of the problems with
raw balancing tests.  But then, switching directions again,
the concurrence insists we are bound by an alternative hold-
ing  in  Whole  Woman’s  Health.    According  to  the  concur-
rence, this alternative holding declared that the Texas law
imposed  an  impermissible  “substantial  obstacle”  to  abor-
tion access in light only of the burdens the law imposed—
“independent  of  [any]  discussion  of  [the  law’s]  benefits.”
Ante, at 11 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment).  And,
the  concurrence  concludes,  because  the  facts  of  this  suit
look like those in Whole Woman’s Health, we must find an
impermissible substantial obstacle here too.

But in this footwork lie at least two missteps.  For one,
the facts of this suit cannot be so neatly reduced to Whole
Woman’s Health redux.  See ante, at 2–5; ante, at 9–11, 15–
24  (ALITO,  J.  dissenting).    For  another,  Whole  Woman’s
Health nowhere issued the alternative holding on which the
concurrence pins its argument.  At no point did the Court
hold that the burdens imposed by the Texas law alone—di-
vorced from any consideration of the law’s benefits—could
suffice to establish a substantial obstacle.  To the contrary,
Whole Woman’s Health insisted that the substantial obsta-
cle test “requires that courts consider the burdens a law im-
poses  on  abortion  access  together  with  the  benefits  th[e]
la[w]  confer[s].”  578  U. S.,  at  ___–___  (emphasis  added)
(slip op., at 19–20).  And whatever else respect for stare de-
cisis might suggest, it cannot demand allegiance to a non-
existent  ruling  inconsistent  with  the  approach  actually
taken by the Court.

The  concurrence’s  fallback  argument  doesn’t  solve  the
problem either.  So what if Whole Woman’s Health rejected
the  benefits-free  version  of  the  “substantial  obstacle”  test
the concurrence endorses?  The concurrence assures us that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and engages in legal argumentation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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