<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

Constitution”).

This Court has recognized, for example, that no “purpose
in  ratifying  the  Bill  of  Rights  was  clearer  than  that  of
securing for the people of the United States much greater
freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and petition than
the  people  of  Great  Britain  had  ever  enjoyed.”    Bridges
v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 265 (1941).  Ratified as it was
“while the memory of many oppressive English restrictions
on  the  enumerated  liberties  was  still  fresh,”  the  Bill  of
Rights “cannot reasonably be taken as approving prevalent
English  practices.”
Ibid.;  see,  e.g.,  Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical  Lutheran  Church  and  School  v.  EEOC,  565
U. S.  171,  183  (2012)  (“Familiar  with  life  under  the
established  Church  of  England,  the  founding  generation
sought  to  foreclose  the  possibility  of  a  national  church”
through  the  First  Amendment’s  Establishment  Clause);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60 (1932) (right to counsel
under  the  Sixth  Amendment  reflected  America’s  rejection
of the English common law rule that a “person charged with
treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel”).3

——————

3 To be sure, as the Court’s cases reveal, pre-ratification English law
and practices may supply background for some constitutional provisions.
But the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, did not purport to take
English law or history wholesale and silently download it into the U. S.
Constitution.  See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 975 (1991)
(opinion  of  Scalia,  J.)  (“Unless  one  accepts  the  notion  of  a  blind
incorporation,  however,  the  ultimate  question  is  not  what  ‘cruell  and
unusuall punishments’ meant in the [English] Declaration of Rights, but
what  its  meaning  was  to  the  Americans  who  adopted  the  Eighth
Amendment”).  Therefore, reflexively resorting to English law or history
without careful analysis can sometimes be problematic because America
had fought a war—and would soon fight another in 1812—to free itself
from British law and practices and rid itself of tyrannical British rule.
See  The  Federalist  No.  45,  p.  289  (C.  Rossiter  ed.  1961)  (J.  Madison)
(“Was,  then,  the  American  Revolution  effected,  was  the  American
Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the
hard-earned  substance  of  millions  lavished,  not  that  the  people  of
America  should  enjoy  peace,  liberty,  and  safety,”  but  that  they  should
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It cites previous Supreme Court cases and discusses the historical context of the Bill of Rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1019

558 U. S.

November 9, 2009

No.  09–6964.  Porter  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  184.

No.  08–1410.  Handle  with  Care  Behavior  Management
System,  Inc.  v.  New  York  State  Division  for  Youth  et  al.
C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no
part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported
below:  546  F.  3d  230.

No. 09–312.  Greene v.  Hanover Direct, Inc., et al.  C.  A.
2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in
the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:
326  Fed.  Appx.  57.

No.  09–330.  Jin  Xin  Ye  v.  United  States  (Reported  below:
338  Fed.  Appx.  26);  and  Yunxia  Liu  et  al.  v.  United  States
(336 Fed. Appx. 106).  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Justice
Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this
petition.

No. 09–424.  Pannell v.  United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.
Appx.  51.

No.  09–6400.  Daigneault  v.  Eaton  Corp.  et  al.  C.  A.  2d
Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–6927.  Brown  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.
Appx.  57.

No.  09–7328  (09A428).  Muhammad  v.  Kelly,  Warden.  C.  A.
4th  Cir.  Application  for  stay  of  execution  of  sentence  of  death,
presented  to  The  Chief  Justice,  and  by  him  referred  to  the
Court,  denied.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d
359.

Statement of Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg
and Justice Sotomayor join, respecting the denial of the petition
for  writ  of  certiorari.

This  case  highlights  once  again  the  perversity  of  executing  in
mates  before  their  appeals  process  has  been  fully  concluded.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, not the actual content of a book. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
clii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

902

Vaughn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Vazquez; Ingram v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  903,1001,1144

Vazquez v. United States
925

Vazquez-Henriquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vazquez-Padilla v. United States
1053

Veale v. New Hampshire
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811

Veale v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968

Velarde, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

Velasco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1082

Velasquez-Martinez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Velazco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

Velazquez v. Lape  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  902,1102

948

Velez v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Velez v. United States
Venson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918

Ventimiglia v. St. Louis, Church of God, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  991,1092

Ventimiglia v. Twin Rivers Worship Center  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  991,1092

1007

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Verizon Wireless; Bennett v.
1153

Victoria v. Conway  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

Vidal v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1006

Vigil v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

Villafranca-Mendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Villarreal v. Smith
Villarreal v. Texas
992

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
975

Villatoro v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044

Ville v. United Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947

Villegas; Miller v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

Villegas-Martinez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Vilsack; American Crystal Sugar Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vilsack; Garcia v.
1158

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vilsack; McCarthy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  988,1116

932

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vilsack; Swisher International, Inc. v.
899

Vincent v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Vinnie v. Massachusetts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1156

Vinson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Violet; Ejikeme v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Violette; Ndukwe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Virginia; Allen v.
1111

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Virginia; Ayres v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  845,1065

1044

Virginia; Briscoe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
891

Virginia; Ferebee v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952

Virginia; Gaskins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Virginia v. Harris  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
978

Virginia; Hostetter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  887,1086
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

15

Opinion of the Court

receipt of state unemployment benefits.  Under FICA’s broad
definition,  these  severance  payments  constitute  taxable
wages.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit  is  reversed,  and  the  case  is  remanded  for  further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE  KAGAN  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or

decision of this case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the conclusion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, the court's decision, and a note on a justice's participation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

in Coker, which held that the Eighth Amendment prohib
its  the  imposition  of  the  death  penalty  for  the  rape  of  an
adult woman, the Court noted that only one State permit
ted that practice.  Id., at 595–596.  In Enmund, where the
Court  held  that  the  Eighth  Amendment  forbids  capital
punishment  for  ordinary  felony  murder,  both  federal  law
and  the  law  of  28  of  the  36  States  that  authorized  the
death  penalty  at  the  time  rejected  that  punishment.  458
U. S., at 789.

While  the  tally  in  these  early  cases  may  be  character
ized  as  evidence  of  a  national  consensus,  the  evidence
became  weaker  and  weaker  in  later  cases.    In  Atkins,
which  held  that  low-IQ  defendants  may  not  be  sentenced
to  death,  the  Court  found  an  anti–death-penalty  consen
sus even though more than half of the States that allowed
capital punishment permitted the practice.  See 536 U. S.,
at  342  (SCALIA,  J.,  dissenting)  (observing  that  less  than
half  of  the  38  States  that  permit  capital  punishment
have enacted legislation barring execution of the mentally
retarded).  The  Court  attempted  to  get  around  this  prob
lem by noting that there was a pronounced trend against
this  punishment.  See  id.,  at  313–315  (listing  18  States
that  had  amended  their  laws  since  1986  to  prohibit  the
execution of mentally retarded persons).

The  importance  of  trend  evidence,  however,  was  not
long  lived.  In  Roper, which  outlawed  capital  punishment
for defendants between the ages of 16 and 18, the lineup of
the  States  was  the  same  as  in  Atkins,  but  the  trend  in
favor  of  abolition—five  States  during  the  past  15  years—
was less impressive.  Roper, 543 U. S., at 564–565.  Never
theless, the Court held that the absence of a strong trend
in  support  of  abolition  did  not  matter.    See  id.,  at  566
(“Any difference between this case and Atkins with respect
to  the  pace  of  abolition  is  thus  counterbalanced  by  the
consistent direction of the change”).

In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court went further.  Hold
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It discusses the Court's history of using state practices and trends to determine the constitutionality of the death penalty.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

ALITO, J., dissenting

A
  The major theme of this part of the Court’s opinion is that
Alabama’s  argument,  in  effect,  is  that  “Gingles  must  be
overruled.”  Ante, at 25.  But as I wrote at the beginning of
this opinion, I would decide these cases under the Gingles
framework.  We should recognize, however, that the Gingles
framework is not the same thing as a statutory provision,
and it is a mistake to regard it as such.  National Pork Pro-
ducers Council v. Ross, 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (slip op., at
9) (“[T]he language of an opinion is not always to be parsed
as  though  we  were  dealing  with  language  of  a  statute”
(quoting  Reiter  v.  Sonotone  Corp.,  442  U. S.  330,  341
(1979))).  In applying that framework today, we should keep
in mind subsequent developments in our case law.
  One important development has been a sharpening of the
methodology used in interpreting statutes.  Gingles was de-
cided  at  a  time  when  the  Court’s  statutory  interpretation
decisions sometimes paid less attention to the actual text of
the statute than to its legislative history, and Gingles falls
into  that  category.    The  Court  quoted  §2  but  then  moved
briskly to the Senate Report.  See 478 U. S., at 36–37, 43,
and n. 7.  Today, our statutory interpretation decisions fo-
cus squarely on the statutory text.  National Assn. of Mfrs.
v. Department of Defense, 583 U. S. 109, 127 (2018); Puerto
Rico  v.  Franklin  Cal.  Tax-Free  Trust,  579  U. S.  115,  125
(2016); cf. Brnovich, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14).  And
as we held in Brnovich, “[t]he key requirement” set out in
the  text  of  §2  is  that  a  State’s  electoral  process  must  be
“ ‘equally open’ ” to members of all racial groups.  Id., at ___
(slip  op.,  at  15).    The  Gingles  framework  should  be  inter-
preted in a way that gives effect to this standard.
  Another development that we should not ignore concerns
our  case  law  on  racial  predominance.    Post-Gingles  deci-
sions like Miller, 515 U. S., at 920, Shaw II, 517 U. S., at
906–907,  and  Vera,  517  U. S.,  at  979  (plurality  opinion),
made  it  clear  that  it  is  unconstitutional  to  use  race  as  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Allen v. Milligan. It delves into the interpretation of the Gingles framework and its application to voting rights cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

29

KAGAN, J., dissenting

does not let the political system, with its mechanisms of ac-
countability,  operate  as  normal.    It  makes  itself  the  deci-
sionmaker  on,  of  all  things,  federal  student-loan  policy.
And  then,  perchance,  it  wonders  why  it  has  only  com-
pounded the “sharp debates” in the country?  Ibid.

III
From  the  first  page  to  the  last,  today’s  opinion  departs
from the demands of judicial restraint.  At the behest of a
party  that  has  suffered  no  injury,  the  majority  decides  a
contested public policy issue properly belonging to the po-
litically  accountable  branches  and  the  people  they  repre-
sent.  In saying so, and saying so strongly, I do not at all
“disparage[ ]” those who disagree.  Ante, at 26.  The majority
is right to make that point, as well as to say that “[r]eason-
able minds” are found on both sides of this case.  Ante, at
25.  And  there  is  surely  nothing  personal  in  the  dispute
here.  But  Justices  throughout  history  have  raised  the
alarm when the Court has overreached—when it has “ex-
ceed[ed] its proper, limited role in our Nation’s governance.”
Supra, at 1.  It would have been “disturbing,” and indeed
damaging, if they had not.  Ante, at 25.  The same is true in
our own day.

The majority’s opinion begins by distorting standing doc-
trine to create a case fit for judicial resolution.  But there is
no  such  case  here,  by  any  ordinary  measure.  The  Secre-
tary’s  plan  has  not  injured  the  plaintiff-States,  however
much  they  oppose  it.  And  in  that  respect,  Missouri  is  no
different from any of the others.  Missouri does not suffer
any harm from a revenue loss to MOHELA, because the two
entities  are  legally  and  financially  independent.    And
MOHELA has chosen not to sue—which of course it could
have.  So no proper party is before the Court.  A court acting
like a court would have said as much and stopped.

The opinion ends by applying the Court’s made-up major-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion, citing concerns about judicial overreach and the lack of standing for the plaintiff-states.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

Opinion of the Court

governing student loans.  87 Fed. Reg. 61514.  The affected
statutory  provisions  granted  the  Secretary  the  power  to
“discharge  [a]  borrower’s  liability,”  or  pay  the  remaining
principal on a loan, under certain narrowly prescribed cir-
cumstances.  20  U. S. C.  §§1087, 1087dd(g)(1).    Those  cir-
cumstances were limited to a borrower’s death, disability,
or bankruptcy; a school’s false certification of a borrower or
failure  to  refund  loan  proceeds  as  required  by  law;  and  a
borrower’s  inability  to  complete  an  educational  program
due to closure of the school.  See §§1087(a)–(d), 1087dd(g).
The corresponding regulatory provisions detailed rules and
procedures  for  such  discharges.  They  also  defined  the
terms of the Government’s public service loan forgiveness
program and provided for discharges when schools commit
malfeasance.  See 34 CFR §§682.402, 685.212; 34 CFR pt.
674, subpt. D.

The  Secretary’s  new  “modifications”  of  these  provisions
were  not  “moderate”  or  “minor.”    Instead,  they  created  a
novel  and  fundamentally  different  loan  forgiveness  pro-
gram.  The new program vests authority in the Department
of Education to discharge up to $10,000 for every borrower
with  income  below  $125,000  and  up  to  $20,000  for  every
such borrower who has received a Pell Grant.  87 Fed. Reg.
61514.  No prior limitation on loan forgiveness is left stand-
ing.  Instead,  every  borrower  within  the  specified  income
cap automatically qualifies for debt cancellation, no matter
their  circumstances.    The  Department  of  Education  esti-
mates that the program will cover 98.5% of all borrowers.
See Dept. of Ed., White House Fact Sheet: The Biden Ad-
ministration’s Plan for Student  Debt Relief Could Benefit
Tens of Millions of Borrowers in All Fifty States (Sept. 20,
2022).  From a few narrowly delineated situations specified
by  Congress,  the  Secretary  has  expanded  forgiveness  to
nearly every borrower in the country.

The Secretary’s plan has “modified” the cited provisions
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Biden administration's student loan forgiveness plan and its legality. It analyzes the Secretary of Education's actions in relation to existing statutory provisions and regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1070

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

Thomas, J., concurring

558 U. S.

Although  the  Court  of  Appeals’ treatment  of  Johnson’s  claim  as
a  habeas  challenge  is  a  close  question,  its  decision  to  apply
§ 2244(b)(2)’s  successive  habeas  bar  is  not.  The  Sixth  Circuit’s
decision  has  the  curious  effect  of  forcing  Johnson  to  bring  a
Lackey  claim  prematurely,  possibly  at  a  time  before  it  is  ripe.3
Moreover,  construing  this  claim  as  the  functional  equivalent  of  a
habeas  action  also  has  the  unfortunate  effect  of  inviting  further
delay:  A  petitioner  would  be  compelled  to  return  to  state  court
to  exhaust  his  Lackey  claim  in  the  ﬁrst  instance  under  28  U. S. C.
§ 2254(b)(1).  For  these  reasons,  I  am  persuaded  that  a  Lackey
claim,  like  a  claim  that  one  is  mentally  incompetent  to  be  exe
cuted, should, at the very least, not accrue until an execution date
is set.  See Ceja v.  Stewart, 134 F. 3d 1368, 1371–1372 (CA9 1998)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting); cf. Panetti v.  Quarterman, 551 U. S. 930,
945  (2007).

When  I  ﬁrst  expressed  my  views  in  Lackey,  I  did  not  envision
such  procedural  obstacles  to  the  consideration  of  a  claim  that
nearly  three  decades  of  delay  on  death  row,  much  of  it  caused  by
the  State,  has  deprived  a  person  of  his  Eighth  Amendment  right
to  avoid  cruel  and  unusual  punishment.  One  does  not  need  to
accept  the  proposition  “that  the  imposition  of  the  death  penalty
represents  ‘the  pointless  and  needless  extinction  of  life  with  only
marginal  contributions  to  any  discernible  social  or  public  pur
poses,’ ” Baze v.  Rees, 553 U. S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concur
ring  in  judgment)  (quoting  Furman,  408  U. S.,  at  312  (White,  J.,
concurring)),  in  order  to  agree  that  the  imposition  of  the  death
penalty  on  these  extreme  facts  is  without  constitutional  justiﬁca
tion.  Most regrettably, a majority of this Court continues to ﬁnd
these  issues  not  of  sufﬁcient  weight  to  merit  our  attention.

Justice  Thomas,  concurring.
In 1981, the petitioner in this case was convicted and sentenced
to  death  for  three  brutal  murders  he  committed  in  the  course  of

3 The  State  argues,  and  the  courts  below  agreed,  that  Johnson  should  have
brought  his  Eighth  Amendment  claim  in  the  federal  habeas  proceeding  he
commenced  in  1999.  At  that  point  in  time,  Johnson  had  been  on  death  row
for  18  years.  This  was  one  year  longer  than  the  petitioner  in  Lackey.  Of
course,  by  1999,  the  Court  had  denied  certiorari  in  Lackey  and  in  Knight  v.
Florida,  528  U. S.  990  (1999),  which  involved  a  19-year  delay.  Therefore,
when  Johnson  ﬁled  his  federal  habeas  action,  he  had  reason  to  believe  that
an  18-year  delay  was  not  long  enough  to  trigger  Eighth  Amendment  con
cerns  and  that  any  Lackey-based  claim  was  premature.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal arguments related to the Eighth Amendment and the application of a specific legal precedent (Lackey).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

914

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 8, 1998

524 U. S.

practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable
within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not
be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

No. D–1962.

In re Disbarment of Neill. Denis Michael
Neill, of Bethesda, Md., is suspended from the practice of law in
this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re-
quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.

No. M–78. Doyle v. Dillon, District Attorney, Nassau
County. Motion to direct the Clerk to ﬁle petition for writ of
certiorari denied.

No. M–79. Panetti v. Texas. Motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis without an afﬁdavit of indigency executed by
petitioner granted.

No. 97–1418. Bank of America National Trust and Sav-
ings Assn. v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership. C. A.
7th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 523 U. S. 1106.] Motion of respond-
ent to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted
denied.

No. 97–8805. Haynes v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.
Petitioner is allowed until June 29, 1998, within which to pay the
docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in
compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

No. 97–1821.
No. 97–9092.
No. 97–9099.
corpus denied.

In re Bourie;
In re Cantu Martinez; and
In re Blackmon. Petitions for writs of habeas

No. 97–1705.
No. 97–8578.
No. 97–8617.
No. 97–8792.

In re Lonardo et al.;
In re Bradin;
In re Sidles; and
In re Cummins. Petitions for writs of manda-

mus denied.

No. 97–8610.

In re Whiteside. Petition for writ of manda-

mus and/or prohibition denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal journal or docket. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for indexing as it is.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–179
_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
HELAMAN HANSEN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2023]

  JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
  I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full.    I  write  separately  to
emphasize  how  far  afield  the  facial  overbreadth  doctrine
has carried the Judiciary from its constitutional role.  The
facial  overbreadth  doctrine  “purports  to  grant  federal
courts the power to invalidate a law” that is constitutional
as applied to the party before it “ ‘if a substantial number of
its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to
the  statute’s  plainly  legitimate  sweep.’ ”    Americans  for
Prosperity  Foundation  v.  Bonta,  594  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2021)
(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judg-
ment)  (slip  op.,  at  2)  (quoting  United  States  v.  Sineneng-
Smith,  590  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2020)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)
(slip  op.,  at  1)).    As  I  have  explained,  this  doctrine  “lacks
any basis in the text or history of the First Amendment, re-
laxes  the  traditional  standard  for  facial  challenges,”  and
distorts the judicial role.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9).
  There is no question that the First Amendment does not
shield  respondent’s  scheme  from  prosecution  under  8
U. S. C.  §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv),  which  prohibits  “encourag[ing]
or  induc[ing]  an  alien  to  come  to,  enter,  or  reside  in  the
United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact
that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in vio-
lation of law.”  Respondent defrauded nearly 500 aliens by
telling them that they could become U. S. citizens through
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1212

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

Rule 36.	  Custody of Prisoners in Habeas Corpus

Proceedings

1.  Pending  review  in  this  Court  of  a  decision  in  a  habeas
corpus  proceeding  commenced  before  a  court,  Justice,  or
judge of the United States, the person having custody of the
prisoner  may  not  transfer  custody  to  another  person  unless
the transfer is authorized under this Rule.

2.  Upon  application  by  a  custodian,  the  court,  Justice,  or
judge who entered the decision under review may authorize
transfer  and  the  substitution  of  a  successor  custodian  as  a
party.

3.  (a)  Pending  review  of  a  decision  failing  or  refusing  to
release  a  prisoner,  the  prisoner  may  be  detained  in  the  cus
tody  from  which  release  is  sought  or  in  other  appropriate
custody or may be enlarged on personal recognizance or bail,
as  may  appear  appropriate  to  the  court,  Justice,  or  judge
who  entered  the  decision,  or  to  the  court  of  appeals,  this
Court, or a judge or Justice of either court.

(b)  Pending  review  of  a  decision  ordering  release,  the
prisoner  shall  be  enlarged  on  personal  recognizance  or  bail,
unless the court, Justice, or judge who entered the decision,
or  the  court  of  appeals,  this  Court,  or  a  judge  or  Justice  of
either court, orders otherwise.

4.  An  initial  order  respecting  the  custody  or  enlargement
of  the  prisoner,  and  any  recognizance  or  surety  taken,  shall
continue in effect pending review in the court of appeals and
in  this  Court  unless  for  reasons  shown  to  the  court  of  ap
peals,  this  Court,  or  a  judge  or  Justice  of  either  court,  the
order is modiﬁed or an independent order respecting custody,
enlargement, or surety is entered.

Rule 37.	  Brief for an Amicus Curiae

1.  An  amicus  curiae  brief  that  brings  to  the  attention  of
the  Court  relevant  matter  not  already  brought  to  its  atten
tion by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court.
An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose bur
dens  the  Court,  and  its  ﬁling  is  not  favored.  An  amicus
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically from the Supreme Court. It outlines procedures related to custody of prisoners in habeas corpus proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

45

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

18–21, a heavy emphasis on grades and standardized test
scores disproportionately disadvantages underrepresented
racial minorities.  Stated simply, race is one small piece of
a much larger admissions puzzle where most of the pieces
disfavor  underrepresented  racial  minorities.    That  is  pre-
cisely why underrepresented  racial minorities remain un-
derrepresented.  The Court’s suggestion that an already ad-
vantaged  racial  group  is  “disadvantaged”  because  of  a
limited use of race is a myth.

The majority’s true objection appears to be that a lim-
ited use of race in college admissions does, in fact, achieve
what it is designed to achieve: It helps equalize opportunity
and  advances  respondents’  objectives  by  increasing  the
number  of  underrepresented  racial  minorities  on  college
campuses, particularly Black and Latino students.  This is
unacceptable,  the  Court  says,  because  racial  groups  that
are  not  underrepresented  “would  be  admitted  in  greater
numbers” without these policies.  Ante, at 28.  Reduced to
its  simplest  terms,  the  Court’s  conclusion  is  that  an  in-
crease in the representation of racial minorities at institu-
tions of higher learning that were historically reserved for
white Americans is an unfair and repugnant outcome that
offends the Equal Protection Clause.  It provides a license
to  discriminate  against  white  Americans,  the  Court  says,
which  requires  the  courts  and  state  actors  to  “pic[k]  the
right races to benefit.”  Ante, at 38.

Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment or its history sup-
ports the Court’s shocking proposition, which echoes argu-
ments made by opponents of Reconstruction-era laws and
this Court’s decision in Brown.  Supra, at 2–17.  In a society
where  opportunity  is  dispensed  along  racial  lines,  racial
equality cannot be achieved without making room for un-
derrepresented groups that for far too long were denied ad-
mission through the force of law, including at Harvard and
UNC.  Quite the opposite: A racially integrated vision of so-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision and provides legal reasoning to support its stance on affirmative action in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

BARRETT, J., concurring

fully altered,” S. Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Proce-
dure, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 777, 782 (2022).  So for an original-
ist, the history that matters most is the history surrounding
the  ratification  of  the  text;  that  backdrop  illuminates  the
meaning of the enacted law.  History (or tradition) that long
postdates  ratification does  not  serve  that  function.    To be
sure, postenactment history can be an important tool.  For
example, it can “reinforce our understanding of the Consti-
tution’s original meaning”; “liquidate ambiguous constitu-
tional provisions”; provide persuasive evidence of the origi-
nal  meaning;  and,  if  stare  decisis  applies,  control  the
outcome.  See Vidal v. Elster, 602 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024)
(BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–14).  But
generally  speaking,  the  use  of  postenactment  history  re-
quires some justification other than originalism simpliciter.
In Bruen, the Court took history beyond the founding era,
considering gun regulations that spanned the 19th century.
597  U. S.,  at  50–70.    I  expressed  reservations  about  the
scope of that inquiry but concluded that the timing question
did not matter to Bruen’s holding.  Id., at 81–83 (concurring
opinion).    It  bears  emphasis,  however,  that  my  questions
were about the time period relevant to discerning the Sec-
ond Amendment’s original meaning—for instance, what is
the post-1791 cutoff for discerning how the Second Amend-
ment was originally understood?  Id., at 82 (“How long after
ratification  may  subsequent  practice  illuminate  original
public meaning?”).  My doubts were not about whether “tra-
dition,” standing alone, is dispositive.  Id., at 83 (“[T]oday’s
decision should not be understood to endorse freewheeling
reliance  on  historical  practice  from  the  mid-to-late  19th
century  to  establish  the  original  meaning  of  the  Bill  of
Rights”).  As I have explained elsewhere, evidence of “tradi-
tion” unmoored from original meaning is not binding law.
Vidal,  602  U. S.,  at  ___–___  (BARRETT,  J.,  concurring  in
part) (slip op., at 13–15).  And scattered cases or regulations
pulled from history may have little bearing on the meaning
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Barrett. It delves into the interpretation of the Constitution, particularly regarding the use of historical context in determining original meaning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  ENDREW F. v. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. RE–1

Opinion of the Court

“[i]ndividualized

appropriate  in  light  of  the  child’s  circumstances  should
come as no surprise.  A focus on the particular child is at
the  core  of  the  IDEA.    The  instruction  offered  must  be
“specially  designed”  to  meet  a  child’s  “unique  needs”
through  an
education  program.”
§§1401(29),  (14)  (emphasis  added).    An  IEP  is  not  a  form
document.  It  is  constructed  only  after  careful  considera-
tion of the child’s present levels of achievement, disability,
and  potential
§§1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(IV),
(d)(3)(A)(i)–(iv).    As  we  observed  in  Rowley,  the  IDEA
“requires participating States to educate a wide spectrum
of  handicapped  children,”  and  “the  benefits  obtainable  by
children at one end of the spectrum will differ dramatically
from  those  obtainable  by  children  at  the  other  end,  with
infinite variations in between.”  458 U. S., at 202.

for  growth.

Rowley  sheds  light  on  what  appropriate  progress  will
look like in many cases.  There, the Court recognized that
the  IDEA  requires  that  children  with  disabilities  receive
education  in  the  regular  classroom  “whenever  possible.”
Ibid.  (citing  §1412(a)(5)).  When  this  preference  is  met,
“the system itself monitors the educational progress of the
child.”  Id., at 202–203.  “Regular examinations are admin-
istered,  grades  are  awarded,  and  yearly  advancement  to
higher  grade  levels  is  permitted  for  those  children  who
attain an adequate knowledge of the course material.”  Id.,
at 203.  Progress through this system is what our society
generally  means  by  an  “education.”  And  access  to  an
“education” is what the IDEA promises.  Ibid.  Accordingly,
for  a  child  fully  integrated  in  the  regular  classroom,  an
IEP  typically  should,  as  Rowley  put  it,  be  “reasonably
calculated  to  enable  the  child  to  achieve  passing  marks
and advance from grade to grade.”  Id., at 203–204.

This guidance is grounded in the statutory definition of
a  FAPE.  One  of  the  components  of  a  FAPE  is  “special
education,”  defined  as  “specially  designed  instruction  . . .
to  meet  the  unique  needs  of  a  child  with  a  disability.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and its requirements for providing a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). It delves into the concept of "appropriate" education and how it should be tailored to individual children's needs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

180

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Breyer, J., dissenting

once interpreted this language as requiring it to ban any food
additive, no matter how small the amount, that appeared in
any food product if that additive was ever found to induce
cancer in any animal, no matter how large a dose needed to
induce the appearance of a single carcinogenic cell. See
H. R. Rep. No. 95–658, p. 7 (1977) (discussing agency’s view).
The FDA believed that the statute’s ban mandate was abso-
lute and prevented it from establishing a level of “safe use”
or even to judge whether “the beneﬁts of continued use out-
weigh the risks involved.”
Id., at 5. This interpretation—
which in principle could have required the ban of everything
from herbal teas to mushrooms—actually led the FDA to
ban saccharine, see 42 Fed. Reg. 19996 (1977), though this
extremely controversial regulatory response never took ef-
fect because Congress enacted, and has continually renewed,
a law postponing the ban. See Saccharin Study and Label-
ing Act, Pub. L. 95–203, § 3, 91 Stat. 1452; e. g., Pub. L. 102–
142, Tit. VI, 105 Stat. 910.

The Court’s interpretation of the statutory language be-
fore us risks Delaney-type consequences with even less lin-
guistic reason. Even worse, the view the Court advances
undermines the FDCA’s overall health-protecting purpose
by placing the FDA in the strange dilemma of either banning
completely a potentially dangerous drug or device or doing
nothing at all. Saying that I have misunderstood its conclu-
sion, the majority maintains that the FDA “may clearly reg-
ulate many ‘dangerous’ products without banning them.”
Ante, at 142. But it then adds that the FDA must ban—
rather than otherwise regulate—a drug or device that “can-
not be used safely for any therapeutic purpose.”
If I
misunderstand, it is only because this linchpin of the majori-
ty’s conclusion remains unexplained. Why must a widely
used but unsafe device be withdrawn from the market when
that particular remedy threatens the health of many and is
thus more dangerous than another regulatory response?
It
is, indeed, a perverse interpretation that reads the FDCA

Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the interpretation of a law and its potential consequences.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

to understand the court of appeals’ authority to “order oth-
erwise” to include the authority to make a different alloca-
tion.

Subdivision (e), which concerns appellate costs that are
taxed in the district court, points in the same direction.  It
refers to “the party entitled to costs under this rule.”  Rule
39(e) (emphasis added).  Thus, if a party is awarded costs
under subdivision (a), it is “entitled” to those costs—i.e., has
a right to obtain them and not merely to seek them—when
a  proper  application  is  made  in  the  district  court.  See
Black’s Law Dictionary 626 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (“In its usual
sense, to entitle is to give a right or title”); see also Estate of
Cowart  v.  Nicklos  Drilling  Co.,  505  U. S.  469,  477  (1992)
(“Both in legal and general usage, the normal meaning of
entitlement includes a right or benefit for which a person
qualifies”).

Read properly, then, Rule 39 gives discretion over the al-
location  of  appellate  costs  to  the  courts  of  appeals.    With
that settled, it is easy to see why district courts cannot ex-
ercise a second layer of discretion.  Suppose that a court of
appeals, in a case in which the district court’s judgment is
affirmed, awards the prevailing appellee 70% of its costs.  If
the district court, in an exercise of its own discretion, later
reduced those costs by half, the appellee would receive only
35% of its costs—in direct violation of the court of appeals’
directions.  Or suppose that the court of appeals, believing
that the decision below was plainly wrong, awards the pre-
vailing appellant 100% of its costs.  It would subvert that
allocation if the district court declined to tax costs or sub-
stantially reduced them because it thought that there was
at least a very strong argument in favor of the decision that
the  court  of  appeals  had  reversed—which,  of  course,  was
the district court’s own decision.  In short, the court of ap-
peals’ determination that a party is “entitled” to costs would
mean  little  if,  as  San  Antonio  believes,  the  district  court
could take a second look at the equities.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the allocation of appellate costs and the authority of courts of appeals versus district courts in this matter.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 321 (1998)

331

Opinion of the Court

malum in se. . . . [T]he practice has been, and so this
Court understand the law to be, that the proceeding in
rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by
any criminal proceeding in personam.” The Palmyra,
12 Wheat., at 14–15.

Traditional in rem forfeitures were thus not considered
punishment against the individual for an offense. See id., at
14; Dobbins’s Distillery v. United States, supra, at 401; Van
Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465, 467–468 (1926); Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 683–684 (1974);
Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 197, 210 (1845) (opinion of
Story, J.) (laws providing for in rem forfeiture of goods im-
ported in violation of customs laws, although in one sense
“imposing a penalty or forfeiture[,] . . . truly deserve to be
called, remedial”); see also United States v. Ursery, 518 U. S.
267, 293 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[C]ivil in rem
forfeiture is not punishment of the wrongdoer for his crimi-
nal offense”). Because they were viewed as nonpunitive,
such forfeitures traditionally were considered to occupy a
place outside the domain of the Excessive Fines Clause.
Recognizing the nonpunitive character of such proceedings,
we have held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar
the institution of a civil, in rem forfeiture action after the
criminal conviction of the defendant. See id., at 278.6

The forfeiture in this case does not bear any of the hall-
marks of traditional civil in rem forfeitures. The Govern-

6 It does not follow, of course, that all modern civil in rem forfeitures are
nonpunitive and thus beyond the coverage of the Excessive Fines Clause.
Because some recent federal forfeiture laws have blurred the traditional
distinction between civil in rem and criminal in personam forfeiture, we
have held that a modern statutory forfeiture is a “ﬁne” for Eighth Amend-
ment purposes if it constitutes punishment even in part, regardless of
whether the proceeding is styled in rem or in personam. See Austin v.
United States, supra, at 621–622 (although labeled in rem, civil forfeiture
of real property used “to facilitate” the commission of drug crimes was
punitive in part and thus subject to review under the Excessive Fines
Clause).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal concept of in rem forfeiture and its relationship to the Excessive Fines Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of the Court

the  United  States.”  For  that  reason,  the  Appointments
Clause does not dictate how the Board’s members must be
selected.

I
A
In  2006,  tax  advantages  that  had  previously  led  major
businesses  to  invest  in  Puerto  Rico  expired.  See  Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, §1601, 110 Stat. 1827.
Many industries left the island.  Emigration increased.  And
the public debt of Puerto Rico’s government and its instru-
mentalities soared, rising from $39.2 billion in 2005 to $71
billion in 2016.  See Dept. of Treasury, Puerto Rico’s Eco-
nomic  and  Fiscal  Crisis  1,  3,  https://www.treasury.gov/
connect/blog/Documents/Puerto_Ricos_fiscal_challenges.pdf;
GAO, U. S. Territories: Public Debt Outlook 12 (GAO–18–
160, 2017).

Puerto Rico found that it could not service that debt.  Yet
Puerto  Rico  could  not  easily  restructure  it.    The  Federal
Bankruptcy Code’s municipality-related Chapter 9 did not
apply to Puerto Rico (or to the District of Columbia).  See
11 U. S. C. §§109(c), 101(52).  But at the same time, federal
bankruptcy law invalidated Puerto Rico’s own local “debt-
restructuring” statutes.  Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-
Free  Trust,  579  U. S.  ___  (2016).    In  2016,  in  response  to
Puerto  Rico’s  fiscal  crisis,  Congress  enacted  PROMESA.
130 Stat. 549, 48 U. S. C. §2101 et seq.

PROMESA allows Puerto Rico and its entities to file for
federal  bankruptcy  protection.    See  §§301,  302,  130  Stat.
577, 579; cf. 11 U. S. C. §901 (related to bankruptcies of lo-
cal  governments).  The  filing  and  subsequent  proceedings
are to take place in the United States District Court for the
District  of  Puerto  Rico,  before  a  federal  judge  selected  by
the Chief Justice of the United States.  PROMESA §§307–
308, 130 Stat. 582.  PROMESA also created the Financial
Oversight  and  Management  Board—with  seven  members
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
ORDERS

1073

558 U. S.

December 2, 3, 7, 2009

delays  Justice  Stevens  laments.  There  are,  of  course,  alterna
tives.  As  Blackstone  observed,  the  principle  that  “punishment
should  follow  the  crime  as  early  as  possible”  found  expression  in
a  “statute[,]  25  Geo.  II.  c.  37,”  decreeing  that  “in  case  of  murder,
the  judge  shall  in  his  sentence  direct  execution  to  be  performed
on the next day but one after sentence passed.”  4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  England  397  (1769).  I  have  no
doubt that such a system would avoid the diminishing justiﬁcation
problem  Justice  Stevens  identiﬁes,  but  I  am  equally  conﬁdent
that such a system would ﬁnd little support from this Court.  See
Knight,  supra,  at 990,  n.  1  (Thomas,  J.,  concurring).  I  thus  con
cur  in  the  denial  of  certiorari.

Miscellaneous  Order

December  3,  2009

No.  09–7843  (09A524).  In  re  Woods.  Application  for  stay  of
execution of  sentence of  death, presented  to Justice Scalia,  and
by him referred to the Court, denied.  Petition for writ of habeas
corpus  denied.

Certiorari  Denied

No.  09–7879  (09A533).  Woods  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.
Application  for  stay  of  execution  of  sentence  of  death,  presented
to  Justice  Scalia,  and  by  him  referred  to  the  Court,  denied.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice Sotomayor  would grant  the applica
tion  for  stay  of  execution.  Reported  below:  296  S. W.  3d  587.

No.  09–7880  (09A535).  Woods  v.  Livingston,  Executive  Di
rector,  Texas  Department  of  Criminal  Justice.  C.  A.  5th
Cir.  Application  for  stay  of  execution  of  sentence  of  death,  pre
sented  to  Justice  Scalia,  and  by  him  referred  to  the  Court,
denied.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 354 Fed. Appx. 863.

December  7,  2009

Certiorari  Granted—Reversed  and  Remanded.

(See  No.  09–91,

ante,  p.  45.)

Certiorari  Dismissed

No. 09–6768.  Staley v. Hall, Warden.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.
  </content>
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This appears to be a list of court orders, including case numbers, dates, and brief descriptions of the actions taken. It lacks a continuous narrative and is structured like a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
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  <content>
12  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
GORSUCH, J., concurring

recounted  above.  See,  e.g.,  397  F. Supp. 3d,  at  146  (“if  at
some  point  in  the  admissions  process  it  appears  that  a
group  is  notably  underrepresented  or  has  suffered  a  dra-
matic  drop  off  relative  to  the  prior  year,  the  [committee]
may decide to give additional attention to applications from
students within that group”); cf. ante, at 31–32, n. 7 (opin-
ion for the Court).

C

Throughout  this  litigation,  the  parties  have  spent  less

time contesting these facts than debating other matters.

For example, the parties debate how much of a role race
plays in admissions at Harvard and UNC.  Both schools in-
sist that they consider race as just one of many factors when
making admissions decisions in their self-described “holis-
tic” review of each applicant.  SFFA responds with trial ev-
idence showing that, whatever label the universities use to
describe  their  processes,  they  intentionally  consult  race
and, by design, their race-based tips and plusses benefit ap-
plicants of certain groups to the detriment of others.  See
Brief for Petitioner 20–35, 40–45.

The parties also debate the reasons both schools consult
race.  SFFA  observes  that,  in  the  1920s,  Harvard  began
moving  away  from  “test  scores”  and  toward  “plac[ing]
greater emphasis on character, fitness, and other subjective
criteria.”  Id., at 12–13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Harvard made this move, SFFA asserts, because President
A.  Lawrence  Lowell  and  other  university  leaders  had  be-
come “alarmed by the growing number of Jewish students
who were testing in,” and they sought some way to cap the
number  of  Jewish  students  without  “ ‘stat[ing]  frankly’ ”
that they were “ ‘directly excluding all [Jews] beyond a cer-
tain percentage.’ ”  Id., at 12; see also 3 App. in No. 20–1199,
pp. 1131–1133.  SFFA contends that Harvard’s current “ho-
listic”  approach  to  admissions  works  similarly  to  disguise
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific facts and evidence presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

29

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

ment”);  Tennessee  v.  Lane,  541  U. S.  509,  530–534  (2004)
(Title  II  of  the  ADA  is  constitutional  “as  it  applies  to  the
class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access
to the courts”); Raines, 362 U. S., at 24–26 (federal statute
proscribing deprivations of the right to vote based on race
was  constitutional  as  applied  to  the  state  officials  before
the  Court,  even  if  it  could  not  constitutionally  be  applied
to other parties).  A similar approach is warranted here.9

The  VRA’s  exceptionally  broad  severability  provision
makes it particularly inappropriate for the Court to allow
Shelby County to mount a facial challenge to §§4(b) and 5
of the VRA, even though application of those provisions to
the county falls well within the bounds of Congress’ legis
lative authority.  The severability provision states:

“If  any  provision  of  [this  Act]  or  the  application
thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid,
the  remainder  of  [the  Act]  and  the  application  of  the
provision  to  other  persons  not  similarly  situated  or
to  other  circumstances  shall  not  be  affected  thereby.”
42 U. S. C. §1973p.

In other words, even if the VRA could not constitutionally
be applied to certain States—e.g., Arizona and Alaska, see
ante, at 8—§1973p calls for those unconstitutional applica
tions  to  be  severed,  leaving  the  Act  in  place  for  juris
dictions  as  to  which  its  application  does  not  transgress
constitutional limits.

——————

9 The Court does not contest that Alabama’s history of racial discrim
ination provides a sufficient basis for Congress to require Alabama and
its  political  subdivisions  to  preclear  electoral  changes.    Nevertheless,
the  Court  asserts  that  Shelby  County  may  prevail  on  its  facial  chal
lenge to §4’s coverage formula because it is subject to §5’s preclearance
requirement  by  virtue  of  that  formula.  See  ante,  at  22  (“The  county
was  selected  [for  preclearance]  based  on  th[e]  [coverage]  formula.”).
This  misses  the  reality  that  Congress  decided  to  subject  Alabama  to
preclearance  based  on  evidence  of  continuing  constitutional  violations
in that State.  See supra, at 28, n. 8.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

21

Opinion of the Court

Seventh-day Adventists “trace the importance of educa-
tion back to the Garden of Eden.”24  Seventh-day Adventist
formation “restore[s] human beings into the image of God
as revealed by the life of Jesus Christ” and focuses on the
development  of  “knowledge,  skills,  and  understandings  to
serve God and humanity.”25

This brief survey does not do justice to the rich diversity
of religious education in this country, but it shows the close
connection  that  religious  institutions  draw  between  their
central purpose and educating the young in the faith.

2
When  we  apply  this  understanding  of  the  Religion
Clauses to the cases now before us, it is apparent that Mor-
rissey-Berru and Biel qualify for the exemption we recog-
nized  in  Hosanna-Tabor.  There  is  abundant  record  evi-
dence  that  they  both  performed  vital  religious  duties.
Educating and forming students in the Catholic faith lay at
the core of the mission of the schools where they taught, and
their employment agreements and faculty handbooks spec-
ified in no uncertain terms that they were expected to help
the schools carry out this mission and that their work would
be evaluated to ensure that they were fulfilling that respon-
sibility.  As  elementary  school  teachers  responsible  for
providing  instruction  in  all  subjects,  including  religion,
they  were  the  members  of  the  school  staff  who  were  en-
trusted  most  directly  with  the  responsibility  of  educating
their  students  in  the  faith.  And  not  only  were  they  obli-
gated  to  provide  instruction  about  the  Catholic  faith,  but
they  were  also  expected  to  guide  their  students,  by  word
and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in accordance
with the faith.  They prayed with their students, attended

——————

24 Brief  for  General  Conference  of  Seventh-day  Adventists  et al.  as

Amici Curiae 9.

25 Seventh-day Adventist Church, About Us, https://adventisteducation.

org/abt.html.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the role of religious education and applies it to the cases at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

Syllabus

and  resolving  legal  questions  important  enough  to  be  addressed  im-
mediately.  Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 111.
Pp. 8–12.

752 F. 3d 483, affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and summary. It's not the main body of the text and likely provides context for the legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1125

529 U. S.

May 15, 2000

No. 99–1013. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida
et al. v. Tamiami Partners, LTD, By and Through Its Gen-
eral Partner, Tamiami Development Corp., ante, p. 1018;

No. 99–1260. Weldon et ux. v. Farm Credit Services of

Michigan’s Heartland, PCA, ante, p. 1021;

No. 99–1297. Mensah v. St. Joseph County Family Inde-

pendence Agency et al., ante, p. 1038;

No. 99–5134. Howland v. Texas, 528 U. S. 887;
No. 99–7157. Rasten v. Department of Labor, 528 U. S.

1124;

No. 99–7179. Zimbovsky v. Massachusetts, 528 U. S. 1125;
No. 99–7282. Sirbaugh v. Elo, Warden, 528 U. S. 1165;
No. 99–7363. Randon v. Hubbard, Warden, 528 U. S. 1167;
No. 99–7409. Lane v. National Data Corp., ante, p. 1023;
No. 99–7525. Weeks v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-

partment of Corrections, 528 U. S. 1171;

No. 99–7572. McFadden v. Ford Motor Co. et al., 528

U. S. 1192;

No. 99–7717. Crosby v. Lambert et al., ante, p. 1009;
No. 99–7762. Robinson v. Luker et al., ante, p. 1024;
No. 99–7775. Alvarado v. McKay et al., ante, p. 1024;
No. 99–7798. Bradley v. United States, 528 U. S. 1193;
In re Davage, 528 U. S. 1187;
No. 99–7814.
No. 99–7927. McKire v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-

partment of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 1040;

No. 99–8021. Marcum v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. et al.,

ante, p. 1041;

No. 99–8143. Montanya v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division,
ante, p. 1042;

No. 99–8226. Wallace v. Florida, ante, p. 1030; and
No. 99–8241. Bostedt v. Wisconsin, ante, p. 1031. Petitions

for rehearing denied.

No. 99–835. Stewart v. United States, 528 U. S. 1063;
No. 99–1213. Williams et al. v. Michigan et al., ante,

p. 1020; and

No. 99–5771. Hart et ux. v. Elder et al., 528 U. S. 953.

Motions for leave to ﬁle petitions for rehearing denied.

No. 99–1224. Lefkowitz v. United States, 528 U. S. 1190.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed further herein in forma
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal journal or database. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal index or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Opinion of the Court

ple, 8 of the 10 Federal Courts of Appeals to have consid-
ered  the  question  have  applied  Flores-Ortega’s  presump-
tion  of  prejudice  even  when  a  defendant  has  signed  an
appeal waiver.3  162 Idaho, at 795, 405 P. 3d, at 580.

We  granted  certiorari  to  resolve  the  split  of  authority.

585 U. S. ___ (2018).  We now reverse.

II
A
The  Sixth  Amendment  guarantees  criminal  defendants
“the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for [their]
defence.”  The  right  to  counsel  includes  “ ‘the  right  to  the
effective  assistance  of  counsel.’ ”    Strickland  v.  Washing-
ton,  466  U. S.  668,  686  (1984)  (quoting  McMann  v.  Rich-
ardson,  397  U. S.  759,  771,  n.  14  (1970)).    Under  Strick-
land,  a  defendant  who  claims  ineffective  assistance  of
counsel  must  prove  (1)  “that  counsel’s  representation  fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 466 U. S.,
at 687–688, and (2) that any such deficiency was “prejudi-
cial to the defense,” id., at 692.

“In certain Sixth Amendment contexts,” however, “prej-
udice  is  presumed.”  Ibid.   For  example,  no  showing  of
prejudice is necessary “if the accused is denied counsel at
a  critical  stage  of  his  trial,”  United  States  v.  Cronic,  466
——————

3 Compare Campbell v. United States, 686 F. 3d 353, 359 (CA6 2012);
Watson v. United States, 493 F. 3d 960, 964 (CA8 2007); United States
v.  Poindexter,  492  F. 3d  263,  273  (CA4  2007);  United  States  v.  Tapp,
491 F. 3d 263, 266 (CA5 2007); Campusano v. United States, 442 F. 3d
770, 775 (CA2 2006); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F. 3d 788, 791–
794  (CA11  2005);  United  States  v.  Sandoval-Lopez,  409  F. 3d  1193,
1195–1199 (CA9 2005); United States v. Garrett, 402 F. 3d 1262, 1266–
1267  (CA10  2005),  with  Nunez  v.  United  States,  546  F. 3d  450,  455
(CA7 2008); United States v. Mabry, 536 F. 3d 231, 241 (CA3 2008).  At
least two state courts have declined to apply Flores-Ortega in the face of
appeal  waivers.    See  Buettner  v.  State,  382  Mont.  410,  363  P. 3d  1147
(2015) (Table); Stewart v. United States, 37 A. 3d 870, 877 (D. C. 2012);
see  also  Kargus  v.  State,  284  Kan.  908,  922,  928,  169  P. 3d  307,  316,
320 (2007).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the presumption of prejudice in cases where a defendant's right to counsel is violated.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

451

Kennedy, J., concurring

branch to inﬂuence basic political decisions. Quoting Mon-
tesquieu, the Federalist Papers made the point in the follow-
ing manner:

“ ‘When the legislative and executive powers are united
in the same person or body,’ says he, ‘there can be no
liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to exe-
cute them in a tyrannical manner.’ Again: ‘Were the
power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary con-
trol, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were
it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with all the violence of an oppressor.’ ” The Federalist
No. 47, supra, at 303.

It follows that if a citizen who is taxed has the measure of
the tax or the decision to spend determined by the Executive
alone, without adequate control by the citizen’s Representa-
tives in Congress, liberty is threatened. Money is the in-
strument of policy and policy affects the lives of citizens.
The individual loses liberty in a real sense if that instrument
is not subject to traditional constitutional constraints.

The principal object of the statute, it is true, was not to
enhance the President’s power to reward one group and pun-
ish another, to help one set of taxpayers and hurt another,
to favor one State and ignore another. Yet these are its
undeniable effects. The law establishes a new mechanism
which gives the President the sole ability to hurt a group
that is a visible target, in order to disfavor the group or to
extract further concessions from Congress. The law is the
functional equivalent of a line item veto and enhances the
President’s powers beyond what the Framers would have
endorsed.

It is no answer, of course, to say that Congress surren-
dered its authority by its own hand; nor does it sufﬁce to
point out that a new statute, signed by the President or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy. It discusses the separation of powers and the potential for abuse of power by the Executive branch through a specific law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MOORE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
ET AL. v. HARPER ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 21–1271.  Argued December 7, 2022—Decided June 27, 2023

The Elections Clause of the Federal Constitution requires “the Legisla-
ture” of each State to prescribe the rules governing federal elections.
Art.  I,  §4,  cl.  1.    This  case  concerns  the  claim  that  the  Clause  vests
state  legislatures  with  authority  to  set  rules  governing  federal  elec-
tions  free  from  restrictions  imposed  under  state  law.    Following  the
2020 decennial census, North Carolina’s General Assembly drafted a
new federal congressional map, which several groups of plaintiffs chal-
lenged as an impermissible partisan gerrymander in violation of the
North  Carolina  Constitution.    The  trial  court  found  partisan  gerry-
mandering claims nonjusticiable under the State Constitution, but the
North  Carolina  Supreme  Court  reversed.  Harper  v.  Hall,  380  N. C.
317, 868 S. E. 2d 499 (Harper I).  While acknowledging that partisan
gerrymandering  claims  are  outside  the  reach  of  federal  courts,  see
Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U. S. ___, ___, the State Supreme Court
held that such questions were not beyond the reach of North Carolina
courts.  The court  also  rejected  the  argument  that  the  Federal  Elec-
tions Clause vests exclusive and independent authority in state legis-
latures  to  draw  federal  congressional  maps.    The  court  enjoined  the
use of the maps and remanded the case to the trial court for remedial
proceedings.  The legislative defendants then filed an emergency ap-
plication  in  this  Court,  citing  the  Elections  Clause  and  requesting  a
stay of the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision.  This Court de-
clined to issue a stay, but later granted certiorari.

After  this  Court  granted  certiorari,  the  North  Carolina  Supreme
Court issued a decision addressing a remedial map adopted by the trial
court.  Harper v. Hall, 383 N. C. 89, 125, 881 S. E. 2d 156, 181 (Harper
II).  The North Carolina Supreme Court then granted the legislative
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP

THOMAS, J., dissenting

460 (Rep. Gallatin).

Other evidence from the 1790s confirms that the power
to  investigate  includes  the  power  to  demand  documents.
When the House of Representatives sought documents re-
lated to the Jay Treaty from President George Washington,
he refused to provide them on the ground that the House
had no legislative powers relating to the ratification of trea-
ties.  5 Annals of Cong. 760–762 (1796).  But he carefully
noted that “[i]t does not occur that the inspection of the pa-
pers asked for can be relative to any purpose under the cog-
nizance of the House of Representatives, except that of an
impeachment; which the resolution has not expressed.”  Id.,
at 760.  In other words, he understood that the House can
demand documents as part of its power to impeach.

This  Court  has  also  long  recognized  the  power  of  the
House  to  demand  documents.    Even  as  it  questioned  the
power to issue legislative subpoenas, the Court in Kilbourn
acknowledged the ability to “compel the attendance of wit-
nesses,  and  their  answer  to  proper  questions”  when  “the
question of . . . impeachment is before either body acting in
its appropriate sphere on that subject.”  103 U. S., at 190.
I express no view today on the boundaries of the power to
demand  documents  in  connection  with  impeachment  pro-
ceedings.  But  the  power  of  impeachment  provides  the
House with authority to investigate and hold  accountable
Presidents who commit high crimes or misdemeanors.  That
is the proper path by which the Committees should pursue
their demands.

IV

For nearly two centuries, until the 1970s, Congress never
attempted to subpoena documents to investigate wrongdo-
ing  by  the  President  outside  the  context  of  impeachment.
Congress  investigated  Presidents  without  opening  im-
peachment proceedings.  See, e.g., 2 Hinds §1596, at 1043–
1045 (President James Buchanan).   But it never issued a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP. It cites historical examples and legal precedents to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
804

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506
U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See
id.,  at  4,  and  cases  cited  therein.

No.  08–10930.  Brown  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  08–10954.  Asemani  v.  Maryland  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Re
ported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  244.

No. 08–10969.  Asemani v. Fisher et al.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported
below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  210.

No.  08–10986.  Strong  v.  Illinois  Department  of  Human
Services.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  pro
ceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See
this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported  below:  299  Fed.  Appx.  577.

No.  08–10989.  Dade  v.  United  States  District  Court  for
the District of Idaho.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Motion of petitioner for
leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dis
missed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  08–11013.  Asemani  v.  Smith  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported
below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  336.

No.  08–11035.  Dey  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Motion  of
petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and
certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  08–11118.  Francis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–5029.  Martin  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Motion
of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and
certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case summaries from a court docket. It includes case numbers, parties involved, circuit courts, and disposition information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
88

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and part of a legal document. Legal citations and document headers are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they don't contain the main textual content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

BREYER, J., dissenting

tal  punishment  by  definition  does  not  rehabilitate.
It
does,  of  course,  incapacitate  the  offender.  But  the  major
alternative  to  capital  punishment—namely,  life  in  prison
without possibility of parole—also incapacitates.  See Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 615 (2002) (BREYER, J., concur
ring in judgment).

Thus,  as  the  Court  has  recognized,  the  death  penalty’s
penological rationale in fact rests almost exclusively upon
a  belief  in  its  tendency  to  deter  and  upon  its  ability  to
satisfy  a  community’s  interest  in  retribution.    See,  e.g.,
Gregg, 428  U. S., at 183 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.).  Many studies have examined the death
penalty’s deterrent effect; some have found such an effect,
whereas others have found a lack of evidence that it deters
crime.  Compare ante, at 5 (SCALIA, J., concurring) (collect
ing  studies  finding  deterrent  effect),  with  e.g.,  Sorensen,
Wrinkle,  Brewer,  &  Marquart,  Capital  Punishment  and
Deterrence: Examining the Effect of Executions on Murder
in Texas, 45 Crime & Delinquency 481 (1999) (no evidence
of  a  deterrent  effect);  Bonner  &  Fessenden,  Absence  of
Executions: A Special Report, States With No Death Pen
alty  Share  Lower  Homicide  Rates,  N.  Y.  Times,  Sept.  22,
2000,  p.  A1  (from  1980–2000,  homicide  rate  in  death-
penalty States was 48% to 101% higher than in non-death
penalty  States);  Radelet  &  Akers,  Deterrence  and  the
Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87 J. Crim. L. &
C.  1,  8  (1996)  (over  80%  of  criminologists  believe  existing
research fails to support deterrence justification); Donohue
& Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the
Death  Penalty  Debate,  58  Stan.  L. Rev.  791,  794  (2005)
(evaluating  existing  statistical  evidence  and  concluding
that there is “profound uncertainty” about the existence of
a deterrent effect).

Recently,  the  National  Research  Council  (whose  mem
bers are drawn from the councils of the National Academy
of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the arguments against the death penalty, focusing on its lack of rehabilitative value and the debate surrounding its deterrent effect.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MATAL v. TAM

Opinion of the Court

Government’s  contention  that  federal  registration  is  a
form of government subsidy.  See id., at 1339–1355.  And
the majority opined that even if the disparagement clause
were  analyzed  under  this  Court’s  commercial  speech
cases,  the  clause  would  fail  the  “intermediate  scrutiny”
that those cases prescribe.  See id., at 1355–1357.

Several  judges  wrote  separately,  advancing  an  assort-
ment of theories.  Concurring, Judge O’Malley agreed with
the  majority’s  reasoning  but  added  that  the  disparage-
ment clause is unconstitutionally vague.  See id., at 1358–
1363.  Judge Dyk concurred in part and dissented in part.
He  argued  that  trademark  registration  is  a  government
subsidy  and  that  the  disparagement  clause  is  facially
constitutional, but he found the clause unconstitutional as
applied  to  THE  SLANTS  because  that  mark  constitutes
“core  expression”  and  was  not  adopted  for  the  purpose  of
disparaging  Asian-Americans.  See  id.,  at  1363–1374.  In
dissent,  Judge  Lourie  agreed  with  Judge  Dyk  that  the
clause is facially constitutional but concluded for a variety
of  reasons  that  it  is  also  constitutional  as  applied  in  this
case.  See id., at 1374–1376.  Judge Reyna also dissented,
maintaining  that  trademarks  are  commercial  speech  and
that  the  disparagement  clause  survives  intermediate
scrutiny  because  it  “directly  advances  the  government’s
substantial interest in the orderly flow of commerce.”  See
id., at 1376–1382.

The Government filed a petition for certiorari, which we
granted  in  order  to  decide  whether  the  disparagement
clause “is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment.”  Pet. for Cert. i; see sub. nom. Lee
v. Tam, 579 U. S. ___ (2016).

II
Before  reaching  the  question  whether  the  disparage-
ment  clause  violates  the  First  Amendment,  we  consider
Tam’s argument that the clause does not reach marks that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the constitutionality of a disparagement clause in trademark law. It delves into the arguments made by various judges and the Supreme Court's decision to review the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

CARSON v. MAKIN

Opinion of the Court

preventing religious organizations from putting aid to reli-
gious  uses.”  Ibid.  (emphasis  added).  And  we  noted  that
nothing  in  our  analysis  was  “meant  to  suggest  that  we
agree[d] with [Montana] that some lesser degree of scrutiny
applies to discrimination against religious uses of govern-
ment aid.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12).

Maine’s argument, however—along with the decision be-
low  and  JUSTICE  BREYER’s  dissent—is  premised  on  pre-
cisely  such  a  distinction.  See  Brief  for  Respondent  44
(“Maine has not broadly excluded private schools simply be-
cause  they  are  affiliated  with  or  controlled  by  a  religious
organization.  Rather,  a  school  is  excluded  only  if  it  pro-
motes  a  particular  faith  and  presents  academic  material
through the lens of that faith.”); 979 F. 3d, at 40 (Maine pro-
vision “does not bar schools from receiving funding simply
based on their religious identity” but instead “based on the
religious use that they would make of it in instructing chil-
dren.”); post, at 9 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (“[U]nlike the cir-
cumstances present in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, it is
religious activity, not religious labels, that lies at the heart
of this case.”).

That  premise,  however,  misreads  our  precedents.    In
Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, we held that the Free Ex-
ercise Clause forbids discrimination on the basis of religious
status.  But those decisions never suggested that use-based
discrimination  is  any  less  offensive  to  the  Free  Exercise
Clause.  This case illustrates why. “[E]ducating young peo-
ple  in  their  faith,  inculcating  its  teachings,  and  training
them to live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the
very core of the mission of a private religious school.”  Our
Lady  of  Guadalupe  School  v.  Morrissey-Berru,  591  U. S.
___,  ___  (2020)  (slip  op.,  at  18);  see  also  Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical  Lutheran  Church  and  School  v.  EEOC,  565
U. S. 171, 192 (2012).

Any attempt to give effect to such a distinction by scruti-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in a case called Carson v. Makin. It delves into legal arguments and precedents related to religious freedom and government aid.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

Opinion of the Court

instrumentalities  at  the  time  of  the  FSIA’s  enactment  in
1976  was  civil,  the  Executive  Branch  occasionally
attempted to subject foreign-government-owned entities to
federal  criminal  investigation.  See  In re  Grand  Jury
Investigation of Shipping Industry, 186 F. Supp. 298, 318–
320 (DC 1960); In re Investigation of World Arrangements,
13 F. R. D. 280, 288–291 (DC 1952).  Given that history, it
becomes even more unlikely that Congress sought to codify
foreign  sovereign  immunity  from  criminal  proceedings
without saying a word about such proceedings.

Congress’s  determination  about  the  FSIA’s  precise
location  within  the  U. S.  Code  bolsters  that  inference.
Congress expressly decided to house each provision of the
FSIA  within  Title  28,  which  mostly  concerns  civil
procedure.  See 90 Stat. 2891.  But the FSIA did not alter
Title 18, which addresses crimes and criminal procedure.

Finally,  this  Court’s  decision  in  Samantar  supports  the
conclusion  that  the  FSIA  does  not  apply  to  criminal
proceedings.
In  Samantar,  we  considered  whether  the
FSIA’s  immunity  provisions  applied  to  a  suit  against  an
individual  foreign  official  based  on  actions  taken  in  his
official  capacity.    560  U. S.,  at  308.    Analyzing  the  Act’s
“text, purpose, and history,” the Court determined that the
FSIA’s  “comprehensive  solution  for  suits  against  states”
does not “exten[d] to suits against individual officials.”  Id.,
at 323, 325.

As  in  Samantar,  we  conclude  here  that  the  FSIA’s
provisions concerning suits against foreign states and their
instrumentalities  do  not  extend  to  a  discrete  context—in
this  case,  criminal  proceedings.
The  Act’s  “careful
calibration”  of  jurisdiction,  procedures,  and  remedies  for
civil  litigation  confirms  that  Congress  did  not  “cover”
criminal proceedings.  Id., at 319.  Put simply, immunity in
criminal  proceedings  “was  not  the  particular  problem  to
which Congress was responding.”  Id., at 323.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and its application to criminal proceedings. The language is formal and legalistic, citing case law and statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

sonable observer would think he is merely complying with
Colorado’s  public-accommodations  law.  This  argument
would  justify  any  law  that  compelled  protected  speech.
And,  this  Court  has  never  accepted  it.  From  the  begin
ning,  this  Court’s  compelled-speech  precedents  have  re
jected arguments that “would resolve every issue of power
in favor of those in authority.”  Barnette, 319 U. S., at 636.
Hurley,  for  example,  held  that  the  application  of  Massa
chusetts’  public-accommodations
[the
organizers]  to  alter  the  expressive  content  of  their  pa
rade.”  515 U. S., at 572–573.  It did not hold that reason
able  observers  would  view  the  organizers  as  merely  com
plying with Massachusetts’ public-accommodations law.

law  “requir[ed]

The  decisions  that  the  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  cited
for this proposition are far afield.  It cited three decisions
where  groups  objected  to  being  forced  to  provide  a  forum
for  a  third  party’s  speech.    See  FAIR,  supra,  at  51  (law
school  refused  to  allow  military  recruiters  on  campus);
Rosenberger,  supra,  at  822–823  (public  university  refused
to provide funds to a religious student paper); PruneYard,
supra, at 77 (shopping center refused to allow individuals
to  collect  signatures  on  its  property).    In  those  decisions,
this  Court  rejected  the  argument  that  requiring  the
groups  to  provide  a  forum  for  third-party  speech  also
required them to endorse that speech.  See FAIR, supra, at
63–65; Rosenberger, supra, at 841–842; PruneYard, supra,
at  85–88.  But  these  decisions  do  not  suggest  that  the
government can force speakers to alter their own message.
See Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U. S., at 12 (“Notably absent
from  PruneYard  was  any  concern  that  access  . . .  might
affect  the  shopping  center  owner’s  exercise  of  his  own
right to speak”); Hurley, supra, at 580 (similar).

The  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  also  noted  that  Master
piece is a “for-profit bakery” that “charges its customers.”
370 P. 3d, at 287.  But this Court has repeatedly rejected
the  notion  that  a  speaker’s  profit  motive  gives  the  gov
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding compelled speech and the application of public accommodations laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

management and regulation of the Indian affairs.”  Letter
to the Citizens of the State of New York (June 13–14, 1788),
in 20 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Con-
stitution 1153, 1158 (J. Kaminski et al. eds. 2004).

Consistent with that view, “the Washington Administra-
tion insisted that the federal government enjoyed exclusive
constitutional  authority”  over  tribal  relations.    Ablavsky
1019.  The new Administration understood, too, that Tribes
remained  otherwise  free  to  govern  their  internal  affairs
without  state  interference.  See  id.,  at  1041–1042,  1065–
1067.  In  a  letter  to  the  Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  Presi-
dent Washington stated curtly that “the United States . . .
posses[es]  the  only  authority  of  regulating  an  intercourse
with [the Indians], and redressing their grievances.”  Letter
to T. Mifflin (Sept. 4, 1790), in 6 Papers of George Washing-
ton:  Presidential  Series  396  (D.  Twohig  ed.  1996).  Even
Thomas Jefferson, the great defender of the States’ powers,
agreed  that  “under  the  present  Constitution”  no  “State
[has] a right to Treat with the Indians without the consent
of the General Government.”  Letter to H. Knox (Aug. 10,
1791), in 22 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 27 (C. Cullen, E.
Sheridan, & R Lester eds. 1986).

Nor was this view confined to the Executive Branch.  Con-
gress quickly exercised its new constitutional authority.  In
1790, it enacted the first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act,
which  pervasively  regulated  commercial  and  social  ex-
changes  among  Indians  and  non-Indians.    Ch.  33,  1  Stat.
137.  Congress  also  provided  for  federal  jurisdiction  over
crimes  by  non-Indians  against  Indians  on  tribal  lands.
§§ 5–6, id., at 138.  States, too, recognized their lack of au-
thority.  See Ablavsky 1019, 1043.  In 1789, South Carolina
Governor  Charles  Pinckney  acknowledged  to  Washington
that “the sole management of India[n ] affairs is now com-
mitted” to “the general Government.”  Letter to G. Wash-
ington (Dec. 14), in 4 Papers of George Washington: Presi-
dential Series 401, 404 (D. Twohig ed. 1993).  Initially, even
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites historical documents and legal precedents to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  556 U. S. ____ (2009)

3

Opinion of the Court

regulation.  The EPA’s initial attempt at such a regulation
came to nought when the Fourth Circuit determined that
the agency had failed to adhere to the procedural require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act.  Appalachian
Power  Co.  v.  Train,  566  F. 2d  451,  457  (1977).    The  EPA
withdrew  the  regulation,  44  Fed.  Reg.  32956  (1979),  and
instead  published  “draft  guidance”  for  use  in  implement-
ing  §1326(b)’s  requirements  via  site-specific  permit  deci-
sions under §1342.  See EPA, Office of Water Enforcement
Permits Div., {Draft} Guidance for Evaluating the Adverse
Impact of Cooling Water Intake Structures on the Aquatic
Environment:  Section  316(b)  P. L.  92–500,  (May  1,  1977),  at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b/files/1977AEIguid.pdf,
(all Internet materials as visited Mar. 30, 2009, and avail-
able  in  Clerk  of  Court’s  case  file);  69  Fed.  Reg.  41584
(describing system of case-by-case permits under the draft
guidance).

In  1995,  the  EPA  entered  into  a  consent  decree  which,
as  subsequently  amended,  set  a  multiphase  timetable  for
the  EPA  to  promulgate  regulations  under  §1326(b).    See
Riverkeeper,  Inc.  v.  Whitman,  No.  93  Civ.  0314  (AGS),
2001 WL 1505497, *1 (SDNY, Nov. 27, 2001).  In the first
phase the EPA adopted regulations governing certain new,
large cooling water intake structures.  66 Fed. Reg. 65256
(2001)  (Phase  I  rules);  see  40  CFR  §§125.80(a),  125.81(a)
(2008).  Those  rules  require  new  facilities  with  water-
intake  flow  greater  than  10  million  gallons  per  day  to,
among  other  things,  restrict  their  inflow  “to  a  level  com-
mensurate  with  that  which  can  be  attained  by  a  closed-
cycle  recirculating  cooling  water  system.”2   §125.84(b)(1).
New  facilities  with  water-intake  flow  between  2  million
——————

2 Closed-cycle  cooling  systems  recirculate  the  water  used  to  cool  the
facility,  and  consequently  extract  less  water  from  the  adjacent  water-
way,  proportionately
impingement  and  entrainment.
Riverkeeper,  Inc.  v.  EPA,  358  F. 3d  174,  182,  n. 5  (CA2  2004);  69  Fed.
Reg. 41601, and n. 44 (2004).

reducing
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses a specific regulation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

“may be regulated by the States” even “in the absence of all
congressional legislation.”  Id., at 320.

Eventually, the Court cashed out these warnings, holding
that  state  laws  offend  the  Commerce  Clause  when  they
seek to “build up . . . domestic commerce” through “burdens
upon the industry and business of other States,” regardless
of  whether  Congress  has  spoken.    Guy  v.  Baltimore,  100
U. S. 434, 443 (1880).  At the same time, though, the Court
reiterated  that,  absent  discrimination,  “a  State  may  ex-
clude from its territory, or prohibit the sale therein of any
articles which, in its judgment, fairly exercised, are preju-
dicial to” the interests of its citizens.  Ibid.

Today, this antidiscrimination principle lies at the “very
core”  of  our  dormant  Commerce  Clause  jurisprudence.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U. S. 564, 581 (1997).  In its “modern” cases, this Court has
said that the Commerce Clause prohibits the enforcement
of state laws “driven by . . . ‘economic protectionism—that
is,  regulatory  measures  designed  to  benefit  in-state  eco-
nomic  interests  by  burdening  out-of-state  competitors.’ ”
Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U. S. 328, 337–
338 (2008) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486
U. S.  269,  273–274  (1988));  see  also  Tennessee  Wine  and
Spirits Retailers Assn. v. Thomas, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019)
(slip  op.,  at  9)  (observing  that  this  Court’s  cases  operate
principally  to  “safeguard  against  state  protectionism”);
Northwest  Airlines,  Inc.  v.  County  of  Kent,  510  U. S.  355,
373,  n. 18  (1994)  (describing  “a  violation  of  the  dormant
Commerce  Clause”  as  “discrimination  against  interstate
commerce”).

Admittedly, some “Members of the Court have authored
vigorous and thoughtful critiques of this interpretation” of
the  Commerce  Clause.  Tennessee  Wine,  588  U. S.,  at  ___
(slip  op.,  at  7)  (citing  cases).    They  have  not  necessarily
quarreled with the antidiscrimination principle.  But they
have suggested that it may be more appropriately housed
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the dormant Commerce Clause. It cites previous cases and presents legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>