<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

29

Opinion of the Court

the number of potential maps may be orders of magnitude
higher: “the universe of all possible connected, population-
balanced  districting plans  that satisfy  the  state’s  require-
ments,”  it  explains,  “is  likely  in  the  range  of  googols.”
Duchin & Spencer 768.  Two million maps, in other words,
is not many maps at all.  And Alabama’s insistent reliance
on that number, however powerful it may sound in the ab-
stract, is thus close to irrelevant in practice.  What would
the  next  million  maps  show?    The  next  billion?    The  first
trillion  of  the  trillion  trillions?    Answerless  questions  all.
See, e.g., Redistricting Brief 2 (“[I]t is computationally in-
tractable,  and  thus  effectively  impossible,  to  generate  a
complete  enumeration  of  all  potential  districting  plans.
[Even]  algorithms  that  attempt  to  create  a  manageable
sample of that astronomically large universe do not consist-
ently identify an average or median map.”); Duchin & Spen-
cer 768 (“[A] comprehensive survey of [all districting plans
within a State] is impossible.”).
  Section 2 cannot require courts to judge a contest of com-
puters when there is no reliable way to determine who wins,
or even where the finish line is.

3
 Alabama’s final contention with respect to the race-neu-
tral benchmark is that it requires plaintiffs to demonstrate
that  any  deviations  between  the  State’s  enacted plan  and
race-neutral  alternatives  “can  be  explained  only  by  racial
discrimination.”  Brief for Alabama 44 (emphasis added).
  We again find little merit in Alabama’s proposal.  As we
have already explained, our precedents and the legislative
compromise  struck  in  the  1982  amendments  clearly  re-
jected treating discriminatory intent as a requirement for
liability under §2.  See, e.g., Chisom, 501 U. S., at 403–404;
Shaw, 509 U. S., at 641; Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd.,
520 U. S. 471, 481–482 (1997).  Yet Alabama’s proposal is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the concept of race-neutral benchmarks in redistricting and the challenges of evaluating potential districting plans.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
60  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

race in college admissions to achieve racially diverse classes
is  critical  to  improving  cross-racial  understanding  and
breaking down racial stereotypes.  See supra, at 16.  Indeed,
the record shows that some Asian American applicants are
actually “advantaged by Harvard’s use of race,” Harvard II,
980  F. 3d,  at  191,  and  “eliminating  consideration  of  race
would significantly disadvantage at least some Asian Amer-
ican applicants,” Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d, at 194.  Race-
conscious holistic admissions that contextualize the racial
identity of each individual allow Asian American applicants
“who would be less likely to be admitted without a compre-
hensive understanding of their background” to explain “the
value  of  their  unique  background,  heritage,  and  perspec-
tive.”  Id., at 195.  Because the Asian American community
is not a monolith, race-conscious holistic admissions allow
colleges  and  universities  to  “consider  the  vast  differences
within [that] community.”  AALDEF Brief 4–14.  Harvard’s
application  files  show  that  race-conscious  holistic  admis-
sions allow Harvard to “valu[e ] the diversity of Asian Amer-
ican applicants’ experiences.”  Harvard College Brief 23.

Moreover, the admission rates of Asian Americans at in-
stitutions  with  race-conscious  admissions  policies,  includ-
ing at Harvard, have “been steadily increasing for decades.”
Harvard II, 980 F. 3d, at 198.39  By contrast, Asian Ameri-
can enrollment declined at elite universities that are pro-
hibited by state law from considering race.  See  AALDEF
Brief 27; Brief for 25 Diverse, California-Focused Bar As-
sociations et al. as Amici Curiae 19–20, 23.  At bottom, race-
conscious admissions benefit all students, including racial
minorities.  That includes the Asian American community.
Finally,  JUSTICE  THOMAS  belies  reality  by  suggesting
that “experts and elites” with views similar to those “that
——————

39 At  Harvard,  “Asian  American  applicants  are  accepted  at  the  same
rate as other applicants and now make up more than 20% of Harvard’s
admitted classes,” even though “only about 6% of the United States pop-
ulation is Asian American.”  Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d, at 203.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It argues in favor of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6  NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS v.

OSHA
GORSUCH, J., concurring

417 (CADC 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing  en  banc);  see  also  N.  Richardson,  Keeping  Big
Cases From Making Bad Law: The Resurgent Major Ques-
tions Doctrine, 49 Conn. L. Rev. 355, 359 (2016).

Whichever the doctrine, the point is the same.  Both serve
to  prevent  “government  by  bureaucracy  supplanting  gov-
ernment by the people.”  A. Scalia, A Note on the Benzene
Case,  American  Enterprise  Institute,  J.  on  Govt.  &  Soc.,
July–Aug. 1980, p. 27.  And both hold their lessons for to-
day’s  case.  On  the  one  hand,  OSHA  claims  the  power  to
issue a nationwide mandate on a major question but cannot
trace its authority to do so to any clear congressional man-
date.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  statutory  subsection  the
agency cites really did endow OSHA with the power it as-
serts, that law would likely constitute an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority.  Under OSHA’s reading,
the  law  would  afford  it  almost  unlimited  discretion—and
certainly  impose  no  “specific  restrictions”  that  “meaning-
fully constrai[n ]” the agency.  Touby v. United States, 500
U. S. 160, 166–167 (1991).  OSHA would become little more
than  a  “roving  commission  to  inquire  into  evils  and  upon
discovery correct them.”  A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J., con-
curring).  Either way, the point is the same one Chief Jus-
tice  Marshall  made  in  1825:    There  are  some  “important
subjects,  which  must  be  entirely  regulated  by  the  legisla-
ture itself,” and others “of less interest, in which a general
provision may be made, and power given to [others] to fill
up  the  details.”  Wayman  v.  Southard,  10  Wheat.  1,  43
(1825).  And on no one’s account does this mandate qualify
as some “detail.”

*
The question before us is not how to respond to the pan-
demic,  but  who  holds  the  power  to  do  so.  The  answer  is
clear:  Under the law as it stands today, that power rests
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

JONES v. HENDRIX

JACKSON, J., dissenting

(1952).  Such petitions sought judicial review of the legality
of the individual’s detention, and were filed in the district
where the person was incarcerated.  Ibid.  This led to some
problems: Districts that housed large federal prisons were
disproportionately burdened with habeas petitions.  Id., at
213–214.  Also, in many cases, the court deciding the peti-
tion was both unfamiliar with the underlying facts and far
away  from  the  relevant  record,  evidence,  and  witnesses.
Ibid.

Congress created §2255—an entirely new process for fed-
eral prisoners to use when seeking postconviction judicial
review—to  solve  these  practical  problems.  Ante,  at  5–6.
Under the procedures laid out in §2255, in lieu of filing a
traditional  habeas  petition,  federal  prisoners  must  file  a
§2255  motion.  And  any  such  motion  is  to  be  filed  in  the
sentencing  court,  not  in  the  district  of  confinement.
§2255(a) (2018 ed.); see Hayman, 342 U. S., at 219.

Congress  crafted  (what  is  now)  §2255(e)  to  ensure  that
the new §2255 procedure successfully ousted the outdated
habeas regime it replaced.  Per the first part of that provi-
sion, as a general matter, §2255 becomes the exclusive pro-
cedure  by  which  federal  prisoners  can  collaterally  attack
their convictions.  See §2255(e) (providing that “[a]n appli-
cation  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  . . .  shall  not  be  enter-
tained” where, in essence, the prisoner fails to bring an au-
thorized §2255 motion, or does so and is denied relief ).  Yet
Congress  also  specified  that,  in  a  circumstance  in  which
§2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention,” an individual could still file a habeas petition.
Ibid.

There are multiple ways in which §2255 might be “insuf-
ficient” or “[n]ot capable of performing the required work”
of  postconviction  review  of  federal  convictions.    Webster’s
New International Dictionary 1254, 1271 (2d ed. 1934) (de-
fining  “inadequate”  and  “ineffective”  in  this  manner);  see
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge named Jackson. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to statutes. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI

JACKSON, J., dissenting

court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously ana-
lyzing the same judgment.”  459 U. S., at 59.

The  Court  today  expands  Griggs  beyond  what  the  Con-
gress  that  enacted  §16  could  have  foreseen,  let  alone  si-
lently  incorporated.  Indeed,  the  majority  can  identify  no
other time this Court wielded Griggs to mandate a stay of
all  merits  proceedings  just  because  a  distinct  procedural
question was on appeal.

In fact, the majority’s supercharged version of Griggs con-
tradicts its own account of Congress’s intent.  Consider the
statutes that the majority points to as models of how Con-
gress would reject a mandatory-general-stay rule.  Ante, at
6–7, and n. 6; see supra, at 4–5.  Under those statutes, the
majority  says,  Congress  intends  that  an  interlocutory  ap-
peal does “not . . . automatically stay district court proceed-
ings.”  Ante, at 7.  Yet, the majority also seemingly accepts
that  under  those  statutes,  “the  Griggs  principle  applies.”
Ante, at 5.  And per “the Griggs principle” as the majority
sees it, in some cases an interlocutory appeal does automat-
ically  stay  district  court  proceedings.    Ante,  at  3–4.  So  a
mandatory general stay is thus both prohibited (by the stat-
utory text) and required (by the majority’s view of Griggs).3
As this contradiction underscores, the majority’s holding is
untethered from any statute and any existing conception of

——————

3 This contradiction arises, for example, under 28 U. S. C. §1292(b), one
of the statutes that the majority cites as prohibiting mandatory general
stays.  See ante, at 7, n. 6 (citing Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85–919, 72
Stat. 1770 (codified at §1292(b))).  Section 1292(b) authorizes permissive
interlocutory appeals from a wide range of orders involving “controlling
question[s] of law”—including rulings on arbitrability.  Arbitrability ap-
peals  under  §1292(b)  were  commonplace  when  Congress  enacted  9
U. S. C. §16 in 1988.  See, e.g., Danford v. Schwabacher, 488 F. 2d 454,
457 (CA9 1973) (“Since 1958 interlocutory arbitration orders have been
reviewable in accordance with the procedures prescribed by 28 U. S. C.
§1292(b)”).  And in a §1292(b) arbitrability appeal, the majority’s reading
of §1292(b) would prohibit a mandatory general stay, while the majority’s
view of Griggs would require one.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 14–7955
_________________

RICHARD E. GLOSSIP, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

KEVIN J. GROSS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[June 29, 2015]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Prisoners  sentenced  to  death  in  the  State  of  Oklahoma
filed an action in federal court under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42
U. S. C.  §1983,  contending  that  the  method  of  execution
now  used  by  the  State  violates  the  Eighth  Amendment
because  it  creates  an  unacceptable  risk  of  severe  pain.
They argue that midazolam, the first drug employed in the
State’s  current  three-drug  protocol,  fails  to  render  a  per-
son insensate to pain.  After holding an evidentiary hear-
ing,  the  District  Court  denied  four  prisoners’  application
for  a  preliminary  injunction,  finding  that  they  had  failed
to  prove  that  midazolam  is  ineffective.  The  Court  of  Ap-
peals  for  the  Tenth  Circuit  affirmed  and  accepted  the
District  Court’s  finding  of  fact  regarding  midazolam’s
efficacy.

For two independent reasons, we also affirm.  First, the
prisoners failed to identify a known and available alterna-
tive method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain,
a  requirement  of  all  Eighth  Amendment  method-of-
execution claims.  See Baze v. Rees, 553 U. S. 35, 61 (2008)
(plurality  opinion).    Second,  the  District  Court  did  not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the name of the case, the court, and the beginning of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

not  prohibit  States  from  authorizing  or  licensing  such
schemes.    Deleting  the  alleged  “commandeering”  direc-
tions would free the statute to accomplish just what Con-
gress  legitimately  sought  to  achieve:  stopping  sports-
gambling regimes while making it clear that the stoppage
is  attributable  to  federal,  not  state,  action.    I  therefore
dissent from the Court’s determination to destroy PASPA
rather than salvage the statute.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

is needed.  The agency has thoroughly evaluated the risks
that the disease poses to workers across all sectors of the
economy.  It has considered the extent to which various pol-
icies will mitigate those risks, and the costs those policies
will entail.  It has landed on an approach that encourages
vaccination, but allows employers to use masking and test-
ing  instead.
It  has  meticulously  explained  why  it  has
reached its conclusions.  And in doing all this, it has acted
within  the  four  corners  of  its  statutory  authorization—or
actually  here,  its  statutory  mandate.    OSHA,  that  is,  has
responded in the way necessary to alleviate the “grave dan-
ger”  that  workplace  exposure  to  the  “new  hazard[ ]”  of
COVID–19  poses  to  employees  across  the  Nation.  29
U. S. C. §655(c)(1).  The agency’s Standard is informed by a
half century of experience and expertise in handling work-
place health and safety issues.  The Standard also has the
virtue of political accountability, for OSHA is responsible to
the President, and the President is responsible to—and can
be held to account by—the American public.

And then, there is this Court.  Its Members are elected
by,  and  accountable  to,  no  one.    And  we  “lack[]  the  back-
ground,  competence,  and  expertise  to  assess”  workplace
health  and  safety  issues.  South  Bay  United  Pentecostal
Church, 590 U. S., at ___ (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (slip
op., at 2).  When we are wise, we know enough to defer on
matters like this one.  When we are wise, we know not to
displace the judgments of experts, acting within the sphere
Congress  marked  out  and  under  Presidential  control,  to
deal with emergency conditions.  Today, we are not wise.  In
the  face  of  a  still-raging  pandemic,  this  Court  tells  the
agency charged with protecting worker safety that it may
not  do  so  in  all  the  workplaces  needed.  As  disease  and
death continue to mount, this Court tells the agency that it
cannot respond in the most effective way possible.  Without
legal basis, the Court usurps a decision that rightfully be-
longs to others.  It undercuts the capacity of the responsible
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court.  Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case, and are not the primary content meant to be read and understood by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BARR v. EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

federal appeals court narrowed the injunction to run only
circuit-wide, but denied the Government’s motion for a com-
plete stay.

Now the Government asks this Court to intervene and to
stay the preliminary decisions below.  This is an extraordi-
nary  request.  Unfortunately,  the  Court  acquiesces.  Be-
cause I do not believe the Government has met its weighty
burden for such relief, I would deny the stay.

The Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity  promulgated  the  rule  at  issue  here  on  July  16,  2019.
See 84 Fed. Reg. 33829.  In effect, the rule forbids almost
all  Central  Americans—even  unaccompanied  children—to
apply for asylum in the United States if they enter or seek
to enter through the southern border, unless they were first
denied asylum in Mexico or another third country.  Id., at
33835, 33840; see also 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 929–930 (ND
Cal. 2019).

The District Court found that the rule was likely unlaw-
ful for at least three reasons.  See id., at 938–957.  First,
the court found it probable that the rule was inconsistent
with  the  asylum  statute,  94  Stat.  105,  as  amended,  8
U. S. C. §1158.  See §1158(b)(2)(C) (requiring that any reg-
ulation like the rule be “consistent” with the statute).  Sec-
tion 1158 generally provides that any noncitizen “physi-
cally  present  in  the  United  States  or  who  arrives  in  the
United States . . . may apply for asylum.”  §1158(a)(1).  And
unlike  the  rule,  the  District  Court  explained,  the  statute
provides narrow, carefully calibrated exceptions to asylum
eligibility.  As  relevant  here,  Congress  restricted  asylum
based on the possibility that a person could safely resettle
in  a  third  country.  See  §1158(a)(2)(A),  (b)(2)(A)(vi).    The
rule, by contrast, does not consider whether refugees were
safe  or  resettled  in  Mexico—just  whether  they  traveled
through it.  That blunt approach, according to the District
Court,  rewrote  the  statute.    See  385  F. Supp.  3d,  at  939–
947, 959.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a rule regarding asylum applications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

judge the Constitution identifies.  See Art. II, §2, cl. 2.  So,
if inferior officers are all executive officers other than those
with special appointment processes laid out in the Consti-
tution, then administrative patent judges squarely fit.

Administrative patent judges also fall on the inferior-
officer side of the inferior-principal divide.  It is agreed that
administrative patent judges are not the heads of any de-
partment.  See ante, at 8; Brief for Arthrex, Inc., 5–6 (noting
that the Secretary of Commerce is the relevant “department
head”).  Thus,  to  the  extent  a  “principal  officer  . . .  is  the
equivalent of the head of department,” administrative pa-
tent judges are not one.  Germaine, 99 U. S., at 511.

And under the Madisonian tripartite system, administra-
tive patent judges would still be inferior.  These judges are
not heads of departments.  Nor are they “superior officers.”
An  administrative  patent  judge  is  not  “[h]igher”  than  or
“greater in dignity or excellence” to other officers inferior to
him.  2 Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language (de-
fining “Superiour”).  Tellingly, neither respondent nor the
majority identify a single officer lower in rank or subordi-
nate to administrative patent judges.  Surely if “[w]hether
one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a su-
perior,” then whether one is a superior officer depends on
whether he has an inferior.  Edmond, 520 U. S., at 662; see
also Morrison, 487 U. S., at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Of
course one is not a ‘superior officer’ without some supervi-
sory responsibility”).  In contrast, an administrative patent
judge is lower in rank and subordinate to both the Director
and the Secretary.

*

*

*
To be clear, I do not purport to have exhausted all con-
temporaneous  debates,  sources,  and  writings.    Perhaps
there is some reason to believe that the inherent nature of
an inferior officer requires that all of their decisions be di-
rectly  appealable  to  a  Senate-confirmed  executive  officer.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge. It delves into the legal definition and classification of "inferior officers" within the context of the U.S. Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 16–1436 (16A1190) and 16–1540 (16A1191)
_________________

No. 16–1436 (16A1190)

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL.
v.
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
PROJECT, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL.
v.
HAWAII, ET AL.

No. 16–1540 (16A1191)

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2017]

 PER CURIAM.
These  cases  involve  challenges  to  Executive  Order  No.
13780,  Protecting  the  Nation  From  Foreign  Terrorist
Entry  Into  the  United  States.    The  order  alters  practices
concerning  the  entry  of  foreign  nationals  into  the  United
States  by,  among  other  things,  suspending  entry  of  na-
tionals  from  six  designated  countries  for  90  days.    Re-
spondents  challenged  the  order  in  two  separate  lawsuits.
They  obtained  preliminary  injunctions  barring  enforce-
ment  of  several  of  its  provisions,  including  the  90-day
suspension of entry.  The injunctions were upheld in large
measure by the Courts of Appeals.

The  Government  filed  separate  petitions  for  certiorari,
as well as applications to stay the preliminary injunctions
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal document, specifically the introduction to a Supreme Court case. It includes citations, case names, and a summary of the legal issues involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

Opinion of the Court

Rights, Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (2006).  Because we con-
clude  that  the  Secretary’s  plan  harms  MOHELA  and
thereby  directly  injures  Missouri—conferring  standing  on
that  State—we  need  not  consider  the  other  theories  of
standing raised by the States.

Missouri  created  MOHELA  as  a  nonprofit  government
corporation to participate in the student loan market.  Mo.
Rev. Stat. §173.360 (2016).  The Authority owns over $1 bil-
lion in FFELs.  MOHELA, FY 2022 Financial Statement 9
(Financial Statement).  It also services nearly $150 billion
worth  of  federal  loans,  having  been  hired  by  the  Depart-
ment  of  Education  to  collect  payments  and  provide  cus-
tomer service to borrowers.  Id., at 4, 8.  MOHELA receives
an administrative fee for each of the five million federal ac-
counts  it  services,  totaling  $88.9  million  in  revenue  last
year alone.  Ibid.

Under the Secretary’s plan, roughly half of all federal bor-
rowers would have their loans completely discharged.  App.
119.  MOHELA  could  no  longer  service  those  closed  ac-
counts, costing it, by Missouri’s estimate, $44 million a year
in fees that it otherwise would have earned under its con-
tract with the Department of Education.  Brief for Respond-
ents  16.  This  financial  harm  is  an  injury  in  fact  directly
traceable to the Secretary’s plan, as both the Government
and the dissent concede.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18; post, at 5
(KAGAN, J., dissenting).

The plan’s harm to MOHELA is also a harm to Missouri.
MOHELA  is  a  “public  instrumentality”  of  the  State.    Mo.
Rev. Stat. §173.360.  Missouri established the Authority to
perform the “essential public function” of helping Missouri-
ans  access student  loans  needed  to  pay  for  college.  Ibid.;
see Todd v. Curators of University of Missouri, 347 Mo. 460,
464, 147 S. W. 2d 1063, 1064 (1941) (“Our constitution rec-
ognizes higher education as a governmental function.”).  To
fulfill this public purpose, the Authority is empowered by
the State to invest in or finance student loans, including by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Biden v. Nebraska. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific statutes and case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

NASA v. NELSON

Opinion of the Court

relied  on  by  respondents  create  any  undue  risk  of  public
dissemination.  None of the authorized “routine use[s]” of
respondents’  background-check  information  allows  for
release  to  the  public.    71  Fed.  Reg.  45859–45860,  45862
(2006);  60  Fed.  Reg.  63084  (1995),  as  amended,  75  Fed.
Reg.  28307  (2010).  Rather,  the  established  “routine
use[s]”  consist  of  limited,  reasonable  steps  designed  to
complete the background-check process in an efficient and
orderly  manner.  See  Whalen,  supra,  at  602  (approving
disclosures to authorized New York Department of Health
employees  that  were  not  “meaningfully  distinguishable”
from  routine  disclosures  “associated  with  many  facets  of
health  care”).  One  routine  use,  for  example,  involves  a
limited  disclosure  to  persons  filling  out  Form  42  so  that
designated references can “identify the individual” at issue
and can understand the “nature and purpose of the inves-
tigation.”  App. 89.  Authorized JPL employees also review
each  completed  SF–85  to  verify  that  all  requested  infor-
mation has been provided.  Id., at 211.  These designated
JPL  employees  may  not  “disclose  any  information  con-
tained  in  the  form  to  anyone  else,”  ibid.,  and  Cal  Tech  is
not given access to adverse information uncovered during
the Government’s background check, id., at 207–208.  The
“remote  possibility”  of  public  disclosure  created  by  these
narrow  “routine  use[s]”  does  not  undermine  the  Privacy
Act’s  substantial  protections.  See  Whalen,  429  U. S.,  at
601–602  (“remote  possibility”  that  statutory  security
provisions  will  “provide  inadequate  protection  against
unwarranted disclosures” not a sufficient basis for striking
down statute).

Citing  past  violations  of  the  Privacy  Act,14  respondents

——————

14 E.g., GAO, Personal Information: Data Breaches are Frequent, but
Evidence  of  Resulting  Identity  Theft  is  Limited;  However,  the  Full
Extent Is Unknown 5, 20 (GAO 07–737, 2007) (over 3-year period, 788
data breaches occurred at 17 federal agencies).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Privacy Act and its application to background checks. It's part of a larger legal argument and contains legal terminology and citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

IV

Twenty years later, no end is in sight.  “Harvard’s view
about when [race-based admissions will end] doesn’t have a
date on it.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 20–1199, p. 85; Brief for
Respondent  in  No.  20–1199,  p.  52.    Neither  does  UNC’s.
567 F. Supp. 3d, at 612.  Yet both insist that the use of race
in their admissions programs must continue.

But  we  have  permitted  race-based  admissions  only
within the confines of narrow restrictions.  University pro-
grams must comply with strict scrutiny, they may never use
race as a stereotype or negative, and—at some point—they
must  end.  Respondents’  admissions  systems—however
well intentioned and implemented in good faith—fail each
of these criteria.  They must therefore be invalidated under
the  Equal  Protection  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment.4

A
Because “[r]acial discrimination [is] invidious in all con-
texts,”  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614,
619 (1991), we have required that universities operate their
race-based admissions programs in a manner that is “suffi-
ciently  measurable  to  permit  judicial  [review]”  under  the
rubric of strict scrutiny, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Aus-
tin, 579 U. S. 365, 381 (2016) (Fisher II).  “Classifying and
assigning” students based on their race “requires more than
. . . an amorphous end to justify it.”  Parents Involved, 551
U. S., at 735.

Respondents have fallen short of satisfying that burden.

——————

4 The United States as amicus curiae contends that race-based admis-
sions  programs  further  compelling  interests  at  our  Nation’s  military
academies.  No military academy is a party to these cases, however, and
none  of  the  courts  below  addressed  the  propriety  of  race-based  admis-
sions  systems  in  that  context.    This  opinion  also  does  not  address  the
issue, in light of the potentially distinct interests that military academies
may present.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court's opinion in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the legal framework surrounding race-based admissions and the Court's reasoning for invalidating Harvard and UNC's programs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

7

Opinion of the Court

lics,  Lutherans,  Mohammedans,  Baptists,  Jews,  Method-
ists,  Non-believers,  Presbyterians,  or  the  members  of  any
other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiv-
ing the benefits of public welfare legislation.”  Id., at 16.

Three  decades  later,  in  McDaniel  v.  Paty,  the  Court
struck down under the Free Exercise Clause a Tennessee
statute  disqualifying  ministers  from  serving  as  delegates
to  the  State’s  constitutional  convention.    Writing  for  the
plurality,  Chief  Justice  Burger  acknowledged  that  Ten-
nessee  had  disqualified  ministers  from  serving  as  legisla-
tors  since  the  adoption  of  its  first  Constitution  in  1796,
and  that  a  number  of  early  States  had  also  disqualified
ministers from legislative office.  This historical tradition,
however, did not change the fact that the statute discrimi-
nated  against  McDaniel  by  denying  him  a  benefit  solely
because  of  his  “status  as  a  ‘minister.’ ”    435  U. S.,  at  627.
McDaniel  could  not  seek  to  participate  in  the  convention
while  also  maintaining  his  role  as  a  minister;  to  pursue
the one, he would have to give up the other.  In this way,
said  Chief  Justice  Burger,  the  Tennessee  law  “effectively
penalizes  the  free  exercise  of  [McDaniel’s]  constitutional
liberties.”  Id.,  at  626  (quoting  Sherbert  v.  Verner,  374
U. S.  398,  406  (1963);  internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
Joined  by  Justice  Marshall  in  concurrence,  Justice  Bren-
nan added that “because the challenged provision requires
[McDaniel] to purchase his right to engage in the ministry
by sacrificing his candidacy it impairs the free exercise of
his religion.”  McDaniel, 435 U. S., at 634.

In recent years, when this Court has rejected free exer-
cise  challenges,  the  laws  in  question  have  been  neutral
and  generally  applicable  without  regard  to  religion.    We
have been careful to distinguish such laws from those that
single out the religious for disfavored treatment.

For  example,  in  Lyng  v.  Northwest  Indian  Cemetery
Protective  Association,  485  U. S.  439  (1988),  we  held  that
the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the Government
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses precedents related to the Free Exercise Clause and religious discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1130

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–7712.  Martin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  353  Fed.  Appx.  140.

No.  09–7713.  Maxwell  v.  Internal  Revenue  Service

et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7715.  Platte v.  United States.  C. A. 1st Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  387.

No.  09–7716.  Perkins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  403.

No.  09–7717.  Pursley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  1204.

No. 09–7718.  Paige v. United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  804.

No.  09–7719.  Baker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  194.

No.  09–7720.  Breault  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  358.

No.  09–7721.  Bowie  v.  Thurmer,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  200.

No.  09–7723.  Puryear  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  291.

No.  09–7726.  Truette  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7727.  Truly  v.  Robert,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  347  Fed.  Appx.  231.

No.  09–7738.  Muhammad  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  349.

No.  09–7739.  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  566  F.  3d  410.

No.  09–7743.  Harrell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  965.

No.  09–7744.  Mondragon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

Opinion of BREYER, J.

previously  unaddressed,  credentialing  function  that  pro-
motes  the  wellbeing  of  women  seeking  abortion.”    Id.,  at
806.  The  majority  believed  that  the  process  of  obtaining
privileges would help to “verify an applicant’s surgical abil-
ity,  training,  education,  experience,  practice  record,  and
criminal history.”  Id., at 805, and n. 53.  And it accepted
the State’s argument that the law “brings the requirements
regarding outpatient abortion clinics into conformity with
the preexisting requirement that physicians at ambulatory
surgical centers (‘ASCs’) must have privileges at a hospital
within the community.”  Id., at 805.

Moving on to Act 620’s burdens, the appeals court wrote
that  “everything  turns  on  whether  the  privileges  require-
ment  actually  would  prevent  doctors  from  practicing  in
Louisiana.”  Id., at 807.  Although the State challenged the
District Court’s findings only with respect to Does 2 and 3,
the Court of Appeals went further.  It disagreed with nearly
every one of the District Court’s findings, concluding that
“the district court erred in finding that only Doe 5 would be
able  to  obtain  privileges  and  that  the  application  process
creates particular hardships and obstacles for abortion pro-
viders in Louisiana.”  Id., at 810.  The court noted that “[a]t
least  three  hospitals  have  proven  willing  to  extend  privi-
leges.”  Ibid.   It  thought  that  “only  Doe  1  has  put  forth  a
good-faith effort to get admitting privileges,” while “Doe 2,
Doe 5, and Doe 6 could likely obtain privileges,” ibid., and
“Doe 3’s personal choice to stop practicing cannot be legally
attributed to Act 620,” id., at 811.

Having rejected the District Court’s findings with respect
to all but one of the physicians, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded  that  “there  is  no  evidence  that  Louisiana  facilities
will close from Act 620.”  Id., at 810.  The appeals court al-
lowed that the Baton Rouge clinic where Doe 5 had not ob-
tained  privileges  would  close.    But  it  reasoned  that
“[b]ecause  obtaining  privileges  is  not  overly  burdensome,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO. It delves into the arguments and findings related to a law (Act 620) concerning abortion clinics and physician privileges.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

118

UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

Appendix to opinion of the Court

prevention plan, and all events that occur thereafter for
tankers that operate in Puget Sound.

“2. Operating Procedures—Watch Practices—[WAC 317–
21–200]. Requires tankers to employ speciﬁc watch and
lookout practices while navigating and when at anchor, and
requires a bridge resource management system that is the
‘standard practice throughout the owner’s or operator’s
ﬂeet,’ and which organizes responsibilities and coordinates
communication between members of the bridge.

“3. Operating Procedures—Navigation—WAC 317–21–
205. Requires tankers in navigation in state waters to re-
cord positions every ﬁfteen minutes, to write a comprehen-
sive voyage plan before entering state waters, and to make
frequent compass checks while under way.

“4. Operating Procedures—Engineering—WAC 317–21–
210. Requires tankers in state waters to follow speciﬁed
engineering and monitoring practices.

“5. Operating Procedures—Prearrival Tests and Inspec-
tions—WAC 317–21–215. Requires tankers to undergo a
number of tests and inspections of engineering, navigation
and propulsion systems twelve hours or less before entering
or getting underway in state waters.

“6. Operating Procedures—Emergency Procedures—
WAC 317–21–220. Requires tanker masters to post written
crew assignments and procedures for a number of ship-
board emergencies.

“7. Operating Procedures—Events—WAC 317–21–225.
Requires that when an event transpires in state waters, such
as a collision, allision or near-miss incident, the operator is
prohibited from erasing, discarding or altering the position
plotting records and the comprehensive written voyage plan.
“8. Personnel Policies—Training—WAC 317–21–230. Re-
quires operators to provide a comprehensive training pro-
gram for personnel that goes beyond that necessary to obtain
a license or merchant marine document, and which includes
instructions on a number of speciﬁc procedures.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of regulations or requirements for tankers operating in Puget Sound, likely extracted from a legal document or regulatory code.  It is not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a list of rules.
  </thinking>
  <category>Regulations/Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of the Court

court concluded that requiring Phillips to comply with the
statute  did  not  violate his  free exercise  rights.    The  Colo-
rado Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

Phillips  sought  review  here,  and  this  Court  granted
certiorari.  582 U. S. ___ (2017).  He now renews his claims
under  the  Free  Speech  and  Free  Exercise  Clauses  of  the
First Amendment.

II

A

Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons
and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as
inferior  in  dignity  and  worth.    For  that  reason  the  laws
and  the  Constitution  can,  and  in  some  instances  must,
protect  them  in  the  exercise  of  their  civil  rights.    The
exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be
given great weight and respect by the courts.  At the same
time,  the  religious  and  philosophical  objections  to  gay
marriage  are  protected  views  and  in  some  instances  pro-
tected  forms  of  expression.    As  this  Court  observed  in
Obergefell  v.  Hodges,  576  U. S.  ___  (2015),  “[t]he  First
Amendment  ensures  that  religious  organizations  and
persons  are  given  proper  protection  as  they  seek  to  teach
the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their
lives and faiths.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 27).  Nevertheless,
while  those  religious  and  philosophical  objections  are
protected,  it  is  a  general  rule  that  such  objections  do  not
allow  business  owners  and  other  actors  in  the  economy
and  in  society  to  deny  protected  persons  equal  access  to
goods and services under a neutral and generally applica-
ble  public  accommodations  law.  See  Newman  v.  Piggy
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402, n. 5 (1968) (per
curiam);  see  also  Hurley  v.  Irish-American  Gay,  Lesbian
and  Bisexual  Group  of  Boston,  Inc.,  515  U. S.  557,  572
(1995)  (“Provisions  like  these  are  well  within  the  State’s
usual  power  to  enact  when  a  legislature  has  reason  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites previous cases and discusses legal principles related to free speech and free exercise rights in the context of same-sex marriage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

THOMAS, J., dissenting

debtors and rely on the Treaty to defeat any state law de-
fenses.”  B. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Na-
ture of the Union, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1817, 1910 (2010).  And
when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted “to restore the
original constitutional design” after Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
Dall. 419 (1793), Alden, 527 U. S., at 722, Congress refused
“to make an exception for cases arising under treaties made
under the authority of the United States,” id., at 721 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  “Congress’ refusal to modify
the text of the Eleventh Amendment to create an exception
to sovereign immunity for cases arising under treaties” sug-
gests  that  the  States’  immunity  from  private-party  litiga-
tion extended even to treaty-based claims.  Id., at 735; see
also D. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federal-
ist Period 1789–1801, p. 197 (1997).

Early  congressional  practice  accords  with  the  Framers’
assumption that Congress could not use any Article I power
to  subject  the  States  to  private  damages  actions  in  their
own  courts.  In  fact,  we  already  have  “discovered  no  in-
stance in which [early Congresses] purported to authorize
suits  against  nonconsenting  States  in  [state  courts].”
Alden, 527 U. S., at 744.  Contrasted against the numerous
statutes  authorizing  other  federal  suits  in  state  courts,  it
“appears  early  Congresses  did  not  believe  they  had  the
power to authorize private suits against the States in their
own courts.”  Ibid.

C
Constitutional  structure  also  cuts  decisively  against  in-
ferring a surrender of state sovereign immunity in this con-
text.  See id., at 748–754.

First  and  most  fundamentally,  all  private  suits  against
nonconsenting States present “ ‘the indignity of subjecting
a State  to the coercive  process of judicial tribunals at the
instance  of  private  parties.’ ”    Id.,  at  749  (quoting  In re
Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 505 (1887)).  USERRA’s cause of action
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a case called Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety. It delves into the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment and its implications for private lawsuits against states.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

TRUMP v. HAWAII

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

In  the  intervening  years  since  Korematsu,  our  Nation
has done much to leave its sordid legacy behind.  See, e.g.,
Civil  Liberties  Act  of  1988,  50  U. S. C.  App.  §4211  et seq.
(setting  forth  remedies  to  individuals  affected  by  the
executive order at issue in Korematsu); Non-Detention Act
of 1971, 18 U. S. C. §4001(a) (forbidding the imprisonment
or detention by the United States of any citizen absent an
Act  of  Congress).    Today,  the  Court  takes  the  important
step  of  finally  overruling  Korematsu,  denouncing  it  as
“gravely wrong the day it was decided.”  Ante, at 38 (citing
Korematsu,  323  U. S.,  at  248  (Jackson,  J.,  dissenting)).
This  formal  repudiation  of  a  shameful  precedent  is  laud
able and long overdue.  But it does not make the majority’s
decision here acceptable or right.  By blindly accepting the
Government’s misguided invitation to sanction a discrimi
natory policy motivated by animosity toward a disfavored
group,  all  in  the  name  of  a  superficial  claim  of  national
security,  the  Court  redeploys  the  same  dangerous  logic
underlying  Korematsu  and  merely  replaces  one  “gravely
wrong” decision with another.  Ante, at 38.

Our Constitution demands, and our country deserves, a
Judiciary  willing  to  hold  the  coordinate  branches  to  ac
count when they defy our most sacred legal commitments.
Because  the  Court’s  decision  today  has  failed  in  that
respect, with profound regret, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Trump v. Hawaii. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

AMERICAN LEGION  v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

Syllabus

es of their predecessors as it stands among memorials to veterans of
later  wars.   It has thus become part of the community.  It would not
serve that role had its design deliberately disrespected area soldiers,
but  there  is  no  evidence that the names of any area Jewish soldiers
were  either  intentionally  left  off  the  memorial’s  list  or  included
against  the  wishes  of  their  families.    The  AHA  tries  to connect the
Cross and the American Legion with anti-Semitism and the Ku Klux
Klan,  but  the  monument,  which  was  dedicated  during  a  period  of
heightened racial and religious animosity, includes the names of both
Black  and White soldiers; and both Catholic and Baptist clergy par-
ticipated  in  the  dedication.    It  is also natural and appropriate for a
monument commemorating the death of particular individuals to in-
voke  the  symbols  that  signify  what  death  meant  for  those  who  are
memorialized.    Excluding  those  symbols  could  make  the  memorial
seem incomplete.  This explains why Holocaust memorials invariably
feature  a  Star  of  David  or  other  symbols  of  Judaism  and  why  the
memorial at issue features the same symbol that marks the graves of
so many soldiers near the battlefields where they fell.  Pp. 28–30.

(d) The  fact  that  the  cross  is  undoubtedly  a  Christian  symbol
should  not  blind  one  to  everything  else  that  the Bladensburg Cross
has  come  to  represent:  a  symbolic  resting  place  for  ancestors  who
never  returned  home, a place for the community to gather and honor
all  veterans  and  their  sacrifices  for  this  Nation,  and  a  historical
landmark.    For  many, destroying or defacing the Cross would not be
neutral and would not further the ideals of respect and tolerance em-
bodied in the First Amendment.  P. 31.
  JUSTICE  ALITO,  joined  by  THE  CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BREYER, and
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH,  concluded  in Parts II–A and II–D:

(a) Lemon  ambitiously  attempted  to  fashion  a  test  for  all  Estab-
lishment Clause cases.  The test called on courts to examine the pur-
poses  and  effects  of  a  challenged  government  action,  as well as any
entanglement with religion that it might entail.  The expectation of a
ready framework has not been met, and the Court has many times ei-
ther  expressly  declined  to  apply  the  test  or  simply  ignored  it.   See,
e.g.,  Zobrest  v.  Catalina  Foothills  Sch.  Dist.,  509  U. S.  1;  Town  of
Greece  v. Galloway,  572 U. S. 565.  Pp. 12–16.

(b) The Lemon Court ambitiously attempted to find a grand unified
theory of the Establishment Clause, but the Court has since taken a
more  modest  approach  that  focuses  on  the  particular issue at hand
and  looks  to  history  for  guidance.  The cases involving prayer before
legislative sessions are illustrative.  In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S.
783, the Court upheld a State Legislature’s practice of beginning each
session with a prayer by an official chaplain, finding it highly persua-
sive that Congress for over 200 years had opened its sessions with a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court case opinion. It includes citations, legal arguments, and mentions of justices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
80

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  42  U. S. C.  §9918(c)(1)  (Community  Services
Block  Grant  Program;  Limitations  on  Use  of
Funds)

  42  U. S. C.  §10406(c)(2)(B)(i)  (Family  Violence
Prevention  and  Services;  Formula  Grants  to
States)

  42 U. S. C. §11504(b) (Enterprise Zone Develop-
ment;  Waiver  of  Modification  of  Housing  and
Community  Development  Rules  in  Enterprise
Zones)

  42 U. S. C. §12635(a)(1) (National and Commu-
nity Service State Grant Program; Nondiscrim-
ination)

  42  U. S. C.  §12832  (Investment  in  Affordable

Housing; Nondiscrimination)

  43 U. S. C. §1747(10) (Loans to States and Po-
litical Subdivisions; Discrimination Prohibited)

  43 U. S. C. §1863 (Outer Continental Shelf Re-
source  Management;  Unlawful  Employment
Practices; Regulations)

  47  U. S. C.  §151  (Federal  Communications

Commission)

  47  U. S. C.  §398(b)(1)  (Public  Broadcasting;

Equal Opportunity Employment)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely from a court opinion.  Legal citations are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U76

[09-06-00 18:29:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 88 (1998)

93

Opinion of the Court

preme Court followed Clemons, independently reweighed
the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, and reaf-
ﬁrmed respondent’s sentences. State v. Reeves, 239 Neb.
419, 476 N. W. 2d 829 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 837 (1992).
Respondent then ﬁled a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus in Federal District Court. He raised 44 claims, includ-
ing a claim that the trial court’s failure to give his requested
instructions was unconstitutional under Beck. The District
Court rejected the Beck claim but granted relief on an un-
related ground.
871 F. Supp. 1182, 1202, 1205–1206 (Neb.
1994). After the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed the latter determination and remanded the case,
76 F. 3d 1424, 1427–1431 (1996), the District Court again
granted respondent’s petition, ﬁnding a due process viola-
tion arising out of the reafﬁrmance of his sentences by the
Nebraska Supreme Court. See 928 F. Supp. 941, 959–965
(Neb. 1996).

On the State’s appeal, the Court of Appeals held that al-
though respondent was not entitled to relief on his due proc-
ess claim, the Nebraska trial court had committed constitu-
tional error in failing to give the requested second-degree
murder and manslaughter instructions.
102 F. 3d 977
(1997). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the constitu-
tional error was the same as that in Beck, despite the fact
that there are no lesser included homicide offenses to felony
murder under Nebraska law: In both cases, state law “pro-
hibited instructions on noncapital murder charges in cases
102
where conviction made the defendant death-eligible.”
F. 3d, at 983 (emphasis in original). Because respondent
“could have been convicted and sentenced for either second
degree murder or manslaughter,” the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that he was constitutionally entitled to his proposed
instructions. See id., at 984.
It further stated that denial
of the instructions could not be justiﬁed by the fact that fel-
ony murder in Nebraska does not require a culpable mental
state with respect to the killing, because in Enmund v. Flor-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal citations, case names, and discusses legal arguments and precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

THOMAS, J., concurring

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  are  citizens  of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No  State  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law  which  shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” §1.

status,

invoking

citizenship

As enacted, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides a firm statement of equality before the law.  It begins
by  guaranteeing
the
“longstanding political and legal tradition that closely asso-
ciated the status of citizenship with the entitlement to legal
equality.”  Vaello  Madero,  596  U. S.,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  It  then  confirms  that  States  may  not  “abridge  the
rights  of  national  citizenship,  including  whatever  civil
equality  is  guaranteed  to  ‘citizens’  under  the  Citizenship
Clause.”  Id., at ___, n. 3 (slip op., at 13, n. 3).  Finally, it
pledges that even noncitizens must be treated equally “as
individuals,  and  not  as  members  of  racial,  ethnic,  or  reli-
gious groups.”  Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U. S. 70, 120–121
(1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring).

The drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
focused on this broad equality idea, offering surprisingly lit-
tle explanation of which term was intended to accomplish
which part of the Amendment’s overall goal.  “The available
materials . . . show,” however, “that there were widespread
expressions of a general understanding of the broad scope
of  the  Amendment  similar  to  that  abundantly  demon-
strated in the Congressional debates, namely, that the first
section of the Amendment would establish the full constitu-
tional  right  of  all  persons  to  equality  before  the  law  and
would  prohibit  legal  distinctions  based  on  race  or  color.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It discusses the Fourteenth Amendment and its guarantee of equality before the law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

35

Opinion of the Court

Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (2014) (quoting Dickerson v. United
States,  530  U. S.  428,  443  (2000)).    That  is  not  enough  to
justify overruling a statutory precedent.

*

*

*

The  dissent  ends  by  quoting  Chevron:  “ ‘Judges  are  not
experts in the field.’ ”  Post, at 31 (quoting 467 U. S., at 865).
That depends, of course, on what the “field” is.  If it is legal
interpretation, that has been, “emphatically,” “the province
and duty of the judicial department” for at least 221 years.
Marbury,  1  Cranch,  at  177.    The  rest  of  the  dissent’s  se-
lected epigraph is that judges “ ‘are not part of either politi-
cal  branch.’ ”    Post,  at  31  (quoting  Chevron,  467  U. S.,  at
865).  Indeed.  Judges have always been expected to apply
their  “judgment”  independent  of  the  political  branches
when interpreting the laws those branches enact.  The Fed-
eralist No. 78, at 523.  And one of those laws, the APA, bars
judges  from  disregarding  that  responsibility  just  because
an Executive Branch agency views a statute differently.

Chevron  is  overruled.  Courts  must  exercise  their  inde-
pendent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted
within its statutory authority, as the APA requires.  Careful
attention to the judgment of the Executive Branch may help
inform that inquiry.  And when a  particular statute dele-
gates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional
limits, courts must respect the delegation, while ensuring
that the agency acts within it.  But courts need not and un-
der the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of
the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.

Because the D. C. and First Circuits relied on Chevron in
deciding whether to uphold the Rule, their judgments are
vacated,  and  the  cases  are  remanded  for  further  proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the overruling of the Chevron doctrine and the role of courts in interpreting agency actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–463
_________________

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
AUSTIN REEVE JACKSON, JUDGE, DISTRICT
COURT OF TEXAS, 114TH DISTRICT, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[December 10, 2021]

  JUSTICE  THOMAS,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in
part.
  I join all but Part II–C of the Court’s opinion.  In my view,
petitioners may  not  maintain suit  against  any  of the  gov-
ernmental  respondents  under  Ex  parte  Young,  209  U. S.
123 (1908).1  I would reverse in full the District Court’s de-
nial  of  respondents’  motions  to  dismiss  and  remand  with
instructions  to  dismiss  the  case  for  lack  of  subject-matter
jurisdiction.

——————

1 I also would hold that petitioners lack Article III standing.  As I have
explained elsewhere, abortion providers lack standing to assert the pu-
tative constitutional rights of their potential clients.  See June Medical
Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (dissenting opin-
ion) (slip op., at 12–14).  Third-party standing aside, petitioners also have
not  shown  injury  or  redressability  for  many  of  the  same  reasons  they
cannot  satisfy  Ex parte  Young.    For  injury,  petitioners  have  shown  no
likelihood of enforcement by any respondent, let alone that enforcement
is “certainly impending.”  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398,
410  (2013)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    For  redressability,  we
held last Term that a party may not “attack an unenforceable statutory
provision,” because this Court may not issue “an advisory opinion with-
out the possibility of any judicial relief.”  California v. Texas, 593 U. S.
___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 9) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 361 (1911).  Likewise here, pe-
titioners seek a declaration that S. B. 8 is unlawful even though no re-
spondent can or will enforce it.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ALLEN v. COOPER

BREYER, J., concurring in judgment

port a federal law providing that, when proven to have pi-
rated intellectual property, States must pay for what they
plundered.  Ante, at 6–10.  To subject nonconsenting States
to private suits for copyright or patent infringement, says
the Court, Congress must endeavor to pass a more “tailored
statute” than the one before us, relying not on the Intellec-
tual Property Clause, but on §5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  Ante, at 16.  Whether a future legislative effort along
those  lines  will  pass  constitutional  muster  is  anyone’s
guess.  But faced with the risk of unfairness to authors and
inventors  alike,  perhaps  Congress  will  venture  into  this
great constitutional unknown.

That  our  sovereign-immunity  precedents  can  be  said  to
call  for  so  uncertain  a  voyage  suggests  that  something  is
amiss.  Indeed, we went astray in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996), as I have consistently main-
tained.  See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 699–701 (1999)
(dissenting  opinion);  Federal  Maritime  Comm’n  v.  South
Carolina  Ports  Authority,  535  U. S.  743,  787–788  (2002)
(same).  We erred again in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed.  Expense  Bd.  v.  College  Savings  Bank,  527  U. S.  627
(1999),  by  holding  that  Congress  exceeded  its  §5  powers
when it passed a patent counterpart to the copyright stat-
ute at issue here.  See id., at 652–664 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).  But  recognizing  that  my  longstanding  view  has  not
carried  the  day,  and  that  the  Court’s  decision  in  Florida
Prepaid controls this case, I concur in the judgment.  See
ante,  9–10,  15–16;  Kimble  v.  Marvel  Entertainment,  LLC,
576  U. S.  446,  455–456  (2015);  Franchise  Tax  Board  of
California v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (BREYER, J.,
dissenting).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Allen v. Cooper. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

23

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

than money damages” based on an allegation that federal
officials have “acted or failed to act” as the law requires.  5
U. S. C. §702.

This  Court’s  decisions have  long  recognized  that  claims
for equitable relief in federal district court operate under a
distinct framework than claims for money damages brought
in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Acts.  In
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II ),
for  example,  the  United  States  argued  that  the  Court
should not allow an action for damages under the Tucker
Acts to proceed because the plaintiffs could have brought a
separate “actio[n] for declaratory, injunctive, or mandamus
relief against the Secretary” in federal district court.  Id., at
227.  This Court agreed with the government’s assessment
that  the  plaintiffs  could  have  brought  a  claim  like  that—
even  as  it  went  on  to  hold  that  they  were  free  to  bring  a
damages action under the Tucker Acts framework too.  Ibid.
Lower courts have appreciated all this as well.  As they
have observed, nothing in the Tucker Acts or our decisions
applying them “impl[ies] that [Tribes] are not [separately]
entitled  to  declaratory  or  injunctive  relief ”  under  other
laws  or  treaties  and  the  traditional  framework  described
above.  Cobell v. Norton, 240 F. 3d 1081, 1101 (CADC 2001);
see also Loudner v. United States, 108 F. 3d 896, 899 (CA8
1997).  Consistent with this approach, they have frequently
allowed Tribes to bring freestanding claims seeking to en-
force treaty obligations—including water-related ones.  See,
e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354
F. Supp. 252, 256 (DC 1973) (requiring the Secretary of the
Interior  to  “justify  any  diversion  of  water  from  the  Tribe
with  precision”);  see  also  Northwest  Sea  Farms,  Inc.  v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 931 F. Supp. 1515,
1520 (WD Wash. 1996) (“In carrying out its fiduciary duty,
it is the government’s . . . responsibility to ensure that In-
dian  treaty  rights  are  given  full  effect”).    The  cases  the
Court relies on simply do not enter the picture.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal citations, arguments, and references to previous court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S
ENERGY GROUP, LLC
Opinion of the Court

Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”  §1.
Consequently,  Congress  cannot  “confer  the  Government’s
‘judicial  Power’  on  entities  outside  Article  III.”    Stern  v.
Marshall,  564  U. S.  462,  484  (2011).    When  determining
whether  a  proceeding  involves  an  exercise  of  Article  III
judicial power, this Court’s precedents have distinguished
between  “public  rights”  and  “private  rights.”    Executive
Benefits  Ins.  Agency  v.  Arkison,  573  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2014)
(slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Those
precedents  have  given  Congress  significant  latitude  to
assign  adjudication  of  public  rights  to  entities  other  than
Article III courts.  See ibid.; Stern, supra, at 488–492.
  This  Court  has  not  “definitively  explained”  the  distinc-
tion  between  public  and  private  rights,  Northern  Pipeline
Constr.  Co.  v.  Marathon  Pipe  Line  Co.,  458  U. S.  50,  69
(1982),  and  its  precedents  applying  the  public-rights  doc-
trine have “not been entirely consistent,” Stern, 564 U. S.,
at  488.    But  this  case  does  not  require  us  to  add  to  the
“various formulations” of the public-rights doctrine.  Ibid.
Our  precedents  have  recognized  that  the  doctrine  covers
matters  “which  arise  between  the  Government  and  per-
sons  subject  to  its  authority  in  connection  with  the  per-
formance of the constitutional functions of the executive or
legislative departments.”  Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22,
50  (1932).    In  other  words,  the  public-rights  doctrine  ap-
plies  to  matters  “ ‘arising  between  the  government  and
others,  which  from  their  nature  do  not  require  judicial
determination and yet  are susceptible of it.’ ”  Ibid. (quot-
ing  Ex  parte  Bakelite  Corp.,  279  U. S.  438,  451  (1929)).
Inter  partes  review  involves  one  such  matter:  reconsid-
eration  of  the  Government’s  decision  to  grant  a  public
franchise.

A
  Inter  partes  review  falls  squarely  within  the  public-
rights  doctrine.    This  Court  has  recognized,  and  the  par-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of the public-rights doctrine in the context of inter partes review. It delves into legal precedents and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 274 (1998)

297

Stevens, J., dissenting

Moreover, because respondent assumed the statutory duty
set out in Title IX as part of its consideration for the receipt
of federal funds, that duty constitutes an afﬁrmative under-
taking that is more signiﬁcant than a mere promise to obey
the law.

Both of these considerations are reﬂected in our decision
in Franklin. Explaining why Title IX is violated when a
teacher sexually abuses a student, we wrote:

“Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett
County Public Schools the duty not to discriminate on
the basis of sex, and ‘when a supervisor sexually har-
asses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex,
that supervisor “discriminate[s]” on the basis of sex.’
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 64
(1986). We believe the same rule should apply when a
teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student. Con-
gress surely did not intend for federal moneys to be ex-
pended to support the intentional actions it sought by
503 U. S., at 75 (emphasis added).
statute to proscribe.”

Franklin therefore stands for the proposition that sexual
harassment of a student by a teacher violates the duty—
assumed by the school district in exchange for federal
funds—not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and that a
student may recover damages from a school district for such
a violation.

Although the opinion the Court announces today is not en-
tirely clear, it does not purport to overrule Franklin. See
ante, at 281 (“Franklin thereby establishes that a school dis-
trict can be held liable in damages in cases involving a teach-
er’s sexual harassment of a student”). Moreover, I do not
understand the Court to question the conclusion that an in-
tentional violation of Title IX, of the type we recognized in

against the disbursement of public funds to educational institutions en-
gaged in discriminatory practices”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to Title IX and sexual harassment in schools.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$75Z 02-18-99 19:35:21 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 524 U. S. 74 (1998)

75

Syllabus

off his COBRA coverage under § 1162(2)(D)(i)’s plain meaning. Moore’s
contrary reading—that, for a beneﬁciary covered under a pre-existing
plan, the ﬁrst moment of coverage on the day following the election is
the moment of ﬁrst being covered after the date of election—ignores
the condition that the beneﬁciary must “ﬁrst becom[e]” covered after
election, robbing the modiﬁer “ﬁrst” of any consequence, thereby equat-
ing “ﬁrst becomes . . . covered” with “remains covered.” Pp. 82–83.

(b) Moore argues that the plain reading should be rejected because it
would permit a beneﬁciary to claim continuation coverage even if he has
obtained entirely new group coverage between the qualifying event and
the election. The statute, however, is not cast expressly in terms of
preserving the status quo of the beneﬁciary’s health care coverage as of
the date of the qualifying event.
In addition, there is no reason to
assume that a beneﬁciary with pre-existing coverage receives a windfall
as a result of his ability to elect COBRA coverage. Since a beneﬁciary
must pay for whatever COBRA coverage he obtains, there is no reason
to think he will make an election for coverage he does not need. Even
Moore would permit a beneﬁciary with coverage under a group health
plan to elect COBRA coverage whenever there is a “signiﬁcant gap”
between the coverage offered by the employer’s group health plan and
that offered by the beneﬁciary’s other group health plan. This “signiﬁ-
cant gap” approach to § 1162(2)(D)(i) is plagued with difﬁculties, how-
ever, beginning with the sheer absence of any statutory support for it.
Furthermore, this approach requires courts to make policy judgments
about the adequacy of the coverage provided by the beneﬁciary’s other
group health plan. This sort of inquiry is so far unsuitable for the
courts that this Court would expect a clear mandate before inferring
that Congress meant to foist it on the judiciary. Pp. 83–87.

114 F. 3d 1458, vacated and remanded.

Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

S. Sheldon Weinhaus argued the cause for petitioner.

With him on the briefs was Marc A. Greidinger.

James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Gary R.
Allen, and Teresa E. McLaughlin.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus. It summarizes the case and the Court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

dergo a far more invasive abortion procedure does not im-
pose an undue burden on women’s right to abortion.  In sup-
port,  the  Government  points  to  Gonzales  v.  Carhart,  550
U. S. 124 (2007), in which this Court held that a ban on a
rare,  second-trimester  abortion  procedure  was  not  uncon-
stitutional,  in  part  because  “the  vast  majority”  of  second-
trimester abortions remained available.  Id., at 156.  This
Court has never held that the Government can ban one of
the  most  common  and  safest  early  abortion  procedures
without  running  into  constitutional  problems.    Indeed,  in
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914 (2000), this Court con-
cluded that a state ban on dilation and evacuation abortion,
“the most commonly used method for performing previabil-
ity second trimester abortions,” imposed an undue burden
on the right to choose abortion itself.  Id., at 945–946.  The
same reasoning extends to a regulation that, when applied
in the context of a deadly pandemic, prevents women from
accessing  the  most  commonly  used  and  safest  method  for
early abortions.
  The Government also argues that the pandemic has not
caused the FDA’s regulation to impose a meaningful burden
on  women  seeking  medication  abortions  because  in  two
States that independently require in-person visits for med-
ication abortions (Indiana and Nebraska), there were more
abortions in 2020 than in 2019.  This comparison, however,
provides little insight.  For one, the Government does not
compare Indiana and Nebraska to States where the in-per-
son  requirements  for  medication  abortion  have  been  sus-
pended,  which  may  have  seen  even  larger  increases  over
2019.  Second, the Government provides data for just two
years,  so  it  impossible  to  know  whether  the  two  States
simply saw an unusually low number of abortions in 2019.
Finally, the data does not distinguish between medication
and surgical abortions.  For all anyone can tell, then, Indi-
ana and Nebraska may have seen a large increase in surgi-
cal abortions and a reduction in medication abortions.  For
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to abortion access during a pandemic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 61 (2000)

75

Opinion of the Court

on to say that if he chose the former option what he said
It is possible to believe that this
could be used against him.
contained an implicit promise that his choice of the option of
silence would not be used against him.
It is not possible,
we think, to believe that a similar promise of impunity is
implicit in a statute requiring the defendant to be present
at trial.

Respondent contends that this case contains an element of
unfairness even worse than what existed in Doyle: Whereas
the defendant in that case had the ability to avoid impair-
ment of his case by choosing to speak rather than remain
silent, the respondent here (he asserts) had no choice but to
be present at the trial. Though this is far from certain, see,
e. g., People v. Aiken, 45 N. Y. 2d 394, 397, 380 N. E. 2d 272,
274 (1978) (“[A] defendant charged with a felony not punish-
able by death may, by his voluntary and willful absence from
trial, waive his right to be present at every stage of his
trial”), we shall assume for the sake of argument that it is
true. There is, however, no authority whatever for the
proposition that the impairment of credibility, if any, caused
If the
by mandatory presence at trial violates due process.
ability to avoid the accusation (or suspicion) of tailoring were
as crucial a factor as respondent contends, one would expect
criminal defendants—in jurisdictions that do not have
compulsory attendance requirements—frequently to absent
themselves from trial when they intend to give testimony.
But to our knowledge, a criminal trial without the defendant
present is a rarity. Many long established elements of crim-
inal procedure deprive a defendant of advantages he would
otherwise possess—for example, the requirement that he
plead to the charge before, rather than after, all the evidence
is in. The consequences of the requirement that he be pres-
ent at trial seem to us no worse.

*

*

*

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

17

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

well as a variety of patents issued for methods of synthe-
sizing substances or building mechanical devices.9

Although it is difficult to derive a precise understanding
of  what  sorts  of  methods  were  patentable  under  English
law, there is no basis in the text of the Statute of Monopo-
lies, nor in pre-1790 English precedent, to infer that busi-
ness  methods  could  qualify.10    There  was  some  debate
throughout the relevant time period about what processes
could  be  patented.  But  it  does  not  appear  that  anyone
seriously  believed  that  one  could  patent  “a  method  for
organizing  human  activity.”  545  F. 3d,  at  970  (Dyk,  J.,
concurring).11

There  were  a  small  number  of  patents  issued  between
1623 and 1790 relating to banking or lotteries and one for
a  method  of  life  insurance,12  but  these  did  not  constitute

——————

9 See,  e.g.,  Roebuck  and  Garbett  v.  William  Stirling  &  Son  (H.  L.
1774), reprinted in 1 T. Webster, Reports and Notes of Cases on Letters
Patent  for  Inventions  45  (1844)  (“method  of  making  acid  spirit  by
burning  sulphur  and  saltpetre,  and  collecting  the  condensed  fumes”);
id.,  at  77  (“ ‘method  of  producing  a  yellow  colour  for  painting  in  oil  or
water,  making  white  lead,  and  separating  the  mineral  alkali  from
common  salt,  all  to  be  performed  in  one  single  process’ ”);  see  also  C.
MacLeod,  Inventing  the  Industrial  Revolution:  The  English  Patent
System,  1660–1800,  pp.  84–93,  100–104,  109–110,  152–155  (1988)
(listing patents) (hereinafter MacLeod).

10 Some English cases made reference to the permissibility of patents
over new “trades.”  But so far as I can tell, the term “trade” referred not
to the methods of conducting business but rather to methods of making
and using physical items or to the object of the trade.  See, e.g., Cloth-
workers  of  Ipswich  Case,  78  Eng.  Rep.  147,  148  (K.  B.  1603)  (“[I]f  a
man  hath  brought  in  a  new  invention  and  a  new  trade  within  the
kingdom . . . [the King] may grant by charter unto him”).

11 See  also  Pollack,  The  Multiple  Unconstitutionality  of  Business
Method  Patents:  Common  Sense,  Congressional  Consideration,  and
Constitutional  History,  28  Rutgers  Computer  &  Tech.  L. J.  61,  94–96
(2002) (hereinafter Pollack) (describing English practice).

12 See  id.,  at  95;  B.  Woodcroft,  Alphabetical  Index  of  Patentees  of
Inventions,  from  March  2,  1617  (14  James  I)  to  October  1,  1852  (16
Victoriae) 383, 410 (2d ed. 1969) (hereinafter Woodcroft).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Stevens in a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the history of patent law and the patentability of business methods.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 17–1618, 17–1623 and 18–107
_________________

GERALD LYNN BOSTOCK, PETITIONER
v.

17–1618

CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

17–1623

ALTITUDE EXPRESS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MELISSA ZARDA AND WILLIAM ALLEN MOORE, JR.,
CO-INDEPENDENT EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF
DONALD ZARDA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

R.G. & G.R. HARRIS FUNERAL HOMES, INC.,
PETITIONER
18–107
v.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 15, 2020]

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citation information, notice about potential revisions, the court's name, case numbers, and the names of the parties involved. This is likely a formal legal document and not the main body of text meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MATAL v. TAM

Opinion of the Court

or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”  §1052(a).2  This
clause  appeared  in  the  original  Lanham  Act  and  has  re-
mained the same to this day.  See §2(a), 60 Stat. 428.

When deciding whether a trademark is disparaging, an
examiner  at  the  PTO  generally  applies  a  “two-part  test.”
The  examiner  first  considers  “the  likely  meaning  of  the
matter in question, taking into account not only dictionary
definitions,  but  also  the  relationship  of  the  matter  to  the
other  elements  in  the  mark,  the  nature  of  the  goods  or
services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the
marketplace  in  connection  with  the  goods  or  services.”
Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure §1203.03(b)(i)
(Apr.  2017),  p.  1200–150,  http://tmep.uspto.gov.  “If  that
meaning  is  found  to  refer  to  identifiable  persons,  institu-
tions, beliefs or national symbols,” the examiner moves to
the  second  step,  asking  “whether  that  meaning  may  be
disparaging  to  a  substantial  composite3  of  the  referenced
group.”  Ibid.  If  the  examiner  finds  that  a  “substantial
composite,  although  not  necessarily  a  majority,  of  the
referenced  group  would  find  the  proposed  mark  . . .  to  be
disparaging  in  the  context  of  contemporary  attitudes,”  a
prima  facie  case  of  disparagement  is  made  out,  and  the
burden shifts to the applicant to prove that the trademark
is  not  disparaging.  Ibid.  What  is  more,  the  PTO  has
specified that “[t]he fact that an applicant may be a mem-
ber of that group or has good intentions underlying its use
of  a  term  does  not  obviate  the  fact  that  a  substantial
composite  of  the  referenced  group  would  find  the  term
objectionable.”  Ibid.

D

Simon  Tam  is  the  lead  singer  of  “The  Slants.”    In  re
Tam,  808  F. 3d  1321,  1331  (CA  Fed.  2015)  (en  banc),  as
——————

2 The  disparagement  clause  also  prevents  a  trademark  from  being

registered on the supplemental register.  §1091(a).

3 By “composite,” we assume the PTO means component.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the Lanham Act and trademark disparagement. It provides context and details about the legal test used by the PTO to determine if a trademark is disparaging.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012)

23

Opinion of the Court

progress  of  science).28    Congress  determined  that  exem-
plary adherence to Berne would serve the objectives of the
Copyright  Clause.    We  have  no  warrant  to  reject  the  ra-
tional judgment Congress made.

III

A

We  next  explain  why  the  First  Amendment  does  not
inhibit  the  restoration  authorized  by  §514.    To  do  so,  we
first  recapitulate  the  relevant  part  of  our  pathmarking
decision  in  Eldred.  The  petitioners  in  Eldred,  like  those
here,  argued  that  Congress  had  violated  not  only  the
“limited  Times”  prescription  of  the  Copyright  Clause.  In
independently,  the  Eldred  petitioners
addition,  and
charged,  Congress  had  offended  the  First  Amendment’s
freedom  of  expression  guarantee.    The  CTEA’s  20-year
enlargement  of  a  copyright’s  duration,  we  held  in  Eldred,
offended neither provision.

Concerning  the  First  Amendment,  we  recognized  that
some  restriction  on  expression  is  the  inherent  and  in-
tended effect of every grant of copyright.  Noting that the
“Copyright Clause and the First Amendment were adopted
close  in  time,”  537  U. S.,  at  219,  we  observed  that  the
Framers  regarded  copyright  protection  not  simply  as  a
limit  on  the  manner  in  which  expressive  works  may  be
used.  They  also  saw  copyright  as  an  “engine  of  free  ex-
pression[:] By establishing a marketable right to the use of

——————

28 The  dissent  suggests  that  the  “utilitarian  view  of  copyrigh[t]”  em-
braced  by  Jefferson,  Madison,  and  our  case  law  sets  us  apart  from
continental  Europe  and  inhibits  us  from  harmonizing  our  copyright
laws with those of countries in the civil-law tradition.  See post, at 5–6,
22.  For persuasive refutation of that suggestion, see Austin, Does the
Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism? 26 Colum. J. L. & Arts 17, 59
(2002)  (cautioning  against  “an  isolationist  reading  of  the  Copyright
Clause  that  is  in  tension  with  . . .  America’s  international  copyright
relations over the last hundred or so years”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments and citations, which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

1306

INDEX

CERTIFICATES OF APPEALABILITY. See Jurisdiction, 3.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.

1. Title VII—Sexual harassment—Employer’s vicarious liability—
Afﬁrmative defense.—An employer is vicariously liable for discrimination
caused by a supervisor, but subject to an afﬁrmative defense looking to
reasonableness of employer’s and victim’s conduct. Faragher v. Boca
Raton, p. 775.

2. Title VII—Sexual harassment—Job consequences—Afﬁrmative de-
fense.—An employee who refuses a supervisor’s sexual advances, yet suf-
fers no adverse, tangible job consequences, may recover against employer
without showing that employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for su-
pervisor’s actions; but employer may interpose an afﬁrmative defense
looking to reasonableness of employer’s and victim’s conduct. Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, p. 742.

CIVIL RIGHTS RESTORATION. See Criminal Law, 2.

CLIENT FUNDS. See Constitutional Law, IX, 2.

COAL INDUSTRY RETIREE HEALTH BENEFIT ACT OF 1992. See

Constitutional Law, II, 1; IX, 1.

COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934.

Filed-tariff requirements—Pre-emption of state-law claims.—Act’s
ﬁled-tariff requirements pre-empt state-law claims of respondent, a re-
seller of long-distance services, against petitioner, a long-distance service
provider, for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Ofﬁce Telephone, Inc.,
p. 214.

COMPREHENSIVE ENV IRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSA-

TION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980.

Polluting facility—Parent corporation’s liability.—Unless corporate
veil may be pierced, a parent corporation that simply participated in, and
exercised control over, its subsidiary’s operations may not be held liable
under CERCLA as an “operator” of subsidiary’s polluting facility; but a
parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over, facility’s
operations may be held directly liable in its own right. United States v.
Bestfoods, p. 51.

COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION. See Constitutional Law,

VII.

CONSOLIDATED OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF
1985. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document. It lists topics and corresponding page numbers.  Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and provide a guide to the document's contents rather than the content itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
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