<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

I N D E X

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS. See Social Security Act.

AD VALOREM TAXES. See Taxes.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION.

See Civil Rights Act of 1964.

AGENCY. See Civil Rights Act of 1964.

AIRPLANE ACCIDENT. See Maritime Law.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990.

1. Coverage of inmates in state prisons—“Public entity.”—Title II of
ADA, which prohibits a “public entity” from discriminating against a
“qualiﬁed individual with a disability” on account of that individual’s dis-
ability, covers inmates in state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Correc-
tions v. Yeskey, p. 206.

2. Human immunodeﬁciency virus.—Respondent’s asymptomatic HIV
infection is a “disability” under ADA, but First Circuit did not cite sufﬁ-
cient material to determine, as a matter of law, that treating her in peti-
tioner’s dental ofﬁce would not have posed a direct threat to others’ health
and safety. Bragdon v. Abbott, p. 624.

ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF

1996. See Jurisdiction, 3.

APPEALABILITY CERTIFICATES. See Jurisdiction, 3.

APPEALS. See Jurisdiction, 3; Social Security Act.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE.

Interview notes—Deceased client.—Attorney’s notes of his interview
with a client shortly before client’s death are protected by attorney-client
privilege from subpoena by Independent Counsel, who seeks to use notes
in a criminal investigation. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, p. 399.

ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS. See Attorney-Client Privilege; Con-

stitutional Law, IX, 2.

BREACH OF CONTRACT. See Communications Act of 1934.

CALIFORNIA. See Constitutional Law, I.

1305
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents from a legal document. It lists topics and corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

73

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  28 U. S. C. §994(d) (Duties of the United States

Sentencing Commission)

  28 U. S. C. §1862 (Trial by Jury; Discrimination

Prohibited)

  28 U. S. C. §1867(e) (Trial by Jury; Challenging

Compliance With Selection Procedures)

  29 U. S. C. §206(d)(1) (Equal Pay Act of 1963)

  29 U. S. C. §§2601(a)(6) and (b)(4) (Family and

Medical Leave; Findings and Purposes)

  29 U. S. C. §2651(a) (Family and Medical Leave;

Effect on Other Laws)

  29 U. S. C. §3248 (Workforce Development Op-

portunities; Nondiscrimination)

  30  U. S. C.  §1222(c)  (Research  Funds  to  Insti-

tutes)

  31 U. S. C. §732(f ) (Government Accountability

Office; Personnel Management System)

  31  U. S. C.  §6711  (Federal  Payments;  Prohib-

ited Discrimination)

  31 U. S. C. §6720(a)(8) (Federal Payments; Def-
initions, Application, and Administration)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a list of legal citations, likely referencing specific sections of the United States Code. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it is not part of the main narrative content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

JOHNSON, ACTING DIRECTOR OF U. S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ET
AL. v. ARTEAGA-MARTINEZ

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 19–896.  Argued January 11, 2022—Decided June 13, 2022

Respondent Antonio Arteaga-Martinez is a citizen of Mexico who was re-
moved  in  July  2012  and  reentered  the  United  States  in  September
2012.    U.  S.  Immigration  and  Customs  Enforcement  (ICE)  issued  a
warrant for Arteaga-Martinez’s arrest in 2018.  ICE reinstated Arte-
aga-Martinez’s earlier removal order and detained him pursuant to its
authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act.  See 8 U. S. C.
§1231(a).  Arteaga-Martinez applied for withholding of removal under
§1231(b)(3), as well as relief under regulations implementing the Con-
vention Against Torture, based on his fear that he would be persecuted
or tortured if he returned to Mexico.  An asylum officer determined he
had  established  a  reasonable  fear  of  persecution  or  torture,  and  the
Department of Homeland Security referred him for withholding-only
proceedings before an immigration judge.

After being detained for four months, Arteaga-Martinez filed a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus in District Court challenging, on both
statutory and constitutional grounds, his continued detention without
a  bond  hearing.    The  Government  conceded  that  Arteaga-Martinez
would be entitled to a bond hearing after six months of detention based
on circuit precedent holding that a noncitizen facing prolonged deten-
tion under §1231(a)(6) is entitled by statute to a bond hearing before
an  immigration  judge  and  must  be  released  unless  the  Government
establishes,  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence,  that  the  noncitizen
poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community.  The District Court
granted relief on Arteaga-Martinez’s statutory claim and ordered the
Government to provide Arteaga-Martinez a bond hearing.  The Third
Circuit  summarily  affirmed.    At  the  bond  hearing,  the  Immigration
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

As best I can tell, the Court’s first departure from those
principles was the development of the vagueness doctrine.
See Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 616–620 (2015)
(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (describing history of
vagueness doctrine).  Before and at the time of the found-
ing, American and English courts dealt with vague laws by
“simply refus[ing] to apply them in individual cases.”  Id.,
at 615.  After the unfortunate rise of “substantive” due pro-
cess, however, American courts began striking down stat-
utes  wholesale  as  “unconstitutionally  indefinite.”    Id.,  at
617.  This  Court  first  adopted  that  approach  in  1914, see
International  Harvester  Co.  of  America  v.  Kentucky,  234
U. S. 216, and has since repeatedly used the vagueness doc-
trine  “to  strike  down  democratically  enacted  laws”  in  the
name of substantive due process, Sessions v. Dimaya, 584
U. S. 148, 210 (2018) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see Johnson,
576  U. S.,  at  618–621  (opinion  of THOMAS,  J.).  As  I  have
explained, I doubt that “our practice of striking down stat-

——————
irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge
the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies”); Chicago & Grand
Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892) (explaining that ju-
dicial review of a statute’s constitutionality “is legitimate only in the last
resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital
controversy between individuals”); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S.
346, 357 (1911) (“[T]here [i]s no general veto power in the court upon the
legislation of Congress”); Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Jackson
Vinegar Co., 226 U. S. 217, 219 (1912) (rejecting argument that statute
was “void in toto,” because the Court “must deal with the case in hand
and  not  with  imaginary  ones”);  Dahnke-Walker  Milling  Co.  v.  Bondu-
rant, 257 U. S. 282, 289 (1921) (“[A] litigant can be heard to question a
statute’s  validity  only  when  and  so  far  as  it  is  being  or  is  about  to  be
applied  to  his  disadvantage”);  Massachusetts  v.  Mellon,  262  U. S.  447,
488 (1923) (Federal courts “have no power per se to review and annul acts
of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional.  That question
may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suf-
fered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon
such an act”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It cites previous cases and legal principles, making it part of the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TRUMP v. VANCE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE
COUNTY OF NEW YORK, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 19–635.  Argued May 12, 2020—Decided July 9, 2020

In 2019, the New York County District Attorney’s Office—acting on be-
half of a grand jury—served a subpoena duces tecum on Mazars USA,
LLP, the personal accounting firm of President Donald J. Trump, for
financial  records  relating  to  the  President  and  his  businesses.    The
President,  acting  in his  personal  capacity,  sued  the  district  attorney
and Mazars in Federal District Court to enjoin enforcement of the sub-
poena, arguing that a sitting President enjoys absolute immunity from
state criminal process under Article II and the Supremacy Clause.  The
District  Court  dismissed  the  case  under  the  abstention  doctrine  of
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, and, in the alternative, held that the
President was not entitled to injunctive relief.  The Second Circuit re-
jected  the  District  Court’s  dismissal  under  Younger  but  agreed  with
the court’s denial of injunctive relief, concluding that presidential im-
munity did not bar enforcement of the subpoena and rejecting the ar-
gument of the United States as amicus curiae that a state grand jury
subpoena  seeking  the  President’s  documents  must  satisfy  a  height-
ened showing of need.

Held: Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not categorically preclude,
or require a heightened standard for, the issuance of a state criminal
subpoena to a sitting President.  Pp. 3–22.

(a) In 1807, John Marshall, presiding as Circuit Justice for Virginia
over the treason trial of Aaron Burr, granted Burr’s motion for a sub-
poena  duces  tecum  directed  at  President  Jefferson.    In  rejecting  the
prosecution’s argument that a President was not subject to such a sub-
poena, Marshall held that a President does not “stand exempt” from
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that the accused have compulsory
process  for  obtaining  witnesses  for  their  defense.    United  States  v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion.  It provides a summary of the case, the parties involved, and the Court's holding. Syllabi are not considered part of the main body of the opinion and are typically not indexed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–123
_________________

SHARONELL FULTON, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 17, 2021]

JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  and

JUSTICE ALITO join, concurring in the judgment.

The Court granted certiorari to decide whether to over-
rule Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v.
Smith,  494  U. S.  872  (1990).    As  JUSTICE  ALITO’s  opinion
demonstrates,  Smith  failed  to  respect  this  Court’s  prece-
dents, was mistaken as a matter of the Constitution’s orig-
inal  public meaning,  and  has  proven  unworkable  in  prac-
tice.  A majority of our colleagues, however, seek to sidestep
the  question.  They  agree  that  the  City  of  Philadelphia’s
treatment  of  Catholic  Social  Services  (CSS)  violates  the
Free Exercise Clause.  But, they say, there’s no “need” or
“reason”  to  address  the  error  of  Smith  today.    Ante,  at  5
(majority opinion); ante, at 2 (BARRETT, J., concurring).

On the surface it may seem a nice move, but dig an inch
deep and problems emerge.  Smith exempts “neutral” and
“generally  applicable”  laws  from  First  Amendment  scru-
tiny.  494 U. S., at 878–881.  The City argues that its chal-
lenged  rules  qualify  for  that  exemption  because  they  re-
quire  all  foster-care  agencies—religious  and  non-religious
alike—to recruit and certify same-sex couples interested in
serving  as  foster  parents.  For  its  part,  the  majority  as-
sumes (without deciding) that Philadelphia’s rule is indeed
“neutral” toward religion.  Ante, at 5.  So to avoid Smith’s
exemption and subject the City’s policy to First Amendment
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It cites legal precedent and discusses the arguments surrounding a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

ALITO, J., dissenting

as safeguards against oppression.  In Hurtado v. California,
110  U. S.  516,  538  (1884),  the  Court  held  that  the  Grand
Jury  Clause  does  not  bind  the  States  and  that  they  may
substitute  preliminary  hearings  at  which  the  decision  to
allow a prosecution to go forward is made by a judge rather
than a defendant’s peers.  That decision was based on rea-
soning that is not easy to distinguish from Justice Powell’s
in  Apodaca.  Hurtado  remains  good  law  and  is  critically
important  to  the  28  States  that  allow  a  defendant  to  be
prosecuted for a felony without a grand jury indictment.28
If we took the same approach to the Hurtado question that
the  majority  takes  in  this  case,  the  holding  in  that  case
could be called into question.

The majority’s only other reason for overruling Apodaca
is that it is inconsistent with related decisions and recent
legal developments.  Ante, at 21; ante, at 2 (SOTOMAYOR, J.,
concurring in part).  I agree that Justice Powell’s view on
incorporation is not in harmony with the bulk of our case
law,  but  the  majority’s  point  about  “recent  legal  develop-
ments”  is  an  exaggeration.  No  subsequent  Sixth  Amend-
ment  decision  has  undercut  the  plurality.  And  while
Justice  Powell’s  view  on  incorporation  has  been  further

——————

28 See Ariz. Const., Art. 2, §30; Ark. Const., Amdt. 21, §1; Cal. Const.,
Art. I, §14; Colo. Rev. Stat. §16–5–205 (2019); Conn. Gen. Stat. §54–46
(2017); Haw. Const., Art. I, §10; Idaho Const., Art. I, §8; Ill. Comp. Stat.,
ch. 725, §5/111–2(a) (West 2018); Ind. Code §35–34–1–1(a) (2019); Iowa
Ct.  Rule  2.5  (2020);  Kan.  Stat.  Ann.  §22–3201  (2007);  Md.  Crim.  Proc.
Code Ann. §§4–102, 4–103 (2018); Mich. Comp. Laws §767.1 (1979); Mo.
Const., Art. I, §17; Mont. Const., Art. II, §20(1); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29–1601
(2016); Nev. Const., Art. I, §8; N. M. Const., Art II, §14; N. D. Rule Crim.
Proc. 7(a) (2018–2019); Okla. Const., Art II, §17; Ore. Const. (amended),
Art. VII, §§5(3)–(5); Pa. Const., Art. I, §10 (providing that “[e]ach of the
several courts of common pleas may, with the approval of the Supreme
Court,  provide  for  the  initiation  of  criminal  proceedings  therein  by
information”—a condition that has now been met in all counties); see also
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §8931 (2015); S. D. Const., Art. VI, §10; Utah Const.,
Art. I, §13; Vt. Rule Crim. Proc. 7(a) (2018); Wash. Rev. Code §10.37.015
(2019); Wis. Stat. §967.05 (2015–2016); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §7–1–106(a) (2019).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to grand jury indictments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

845

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No. 08–10588.  Kor v.  Felker, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  297  Fed.  Appx.  610.

No. 08–10591.  Jones v.  United  States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  654.

No.  08–10592.  Tucker  v.  Palmer,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  541  F.  3d  652.

No.  08–10594.  Nichols  v.  Mills,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10597.  Meshell  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  2  So.  3d  132.

No.  08–10600.  Wright  v.  Zoeller,  Attorney  General  of

Indiana.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10603.  Babb v.  Drug Enforcement Administration
et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305
Fed.  Appx.  148.

No.  08–10606.  Aguilar  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  3  So.  3d  316.

No.  08–10607.  Bermudez  v.  Fischer,  Commissioner,  New
York  Department  of  Correctional  Services.  App.  Div.,
Sup.  Ct.  N.  Y.,  3d  Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  55  App.  Div.  3d  1099,  865  N. Y.  S.  2d  400.

No.  08–10612.  Stubl  v.  Place.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  08–10614.  Barnett  v.  Boatwright,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10616.  Burke  v.  Pennsylvania.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  931  A.  2d  41.

No.  08–10617.  Ayres  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  08–10618.  Bridgeford  v.  Maryland.  Ct.  Sp.  App.  Md.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  181  Md.  App.  735.

No.  08–10626.  Spencer  v.  Michigan  Department  of  Cor

rections.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's not the primary content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  546 U. S. ____ (2006)

9

Opinion of the Court

Controlled  Substances  Act  itself.  The  Government  con-
tends  that  the  Act’s  description  of  Schedule  I  substances
as  having  “a  high  potential  for  abuse,”  “no  currently  ac-
cepted medical use in treatment in the United States,” and
“a lack of accepted safety for use . . . under medical super-
vision,”  21  U. S. C.  §812(b)(1),  by  itself  precludes  any
consideration  of  individualized  exceptions  such  as  that
sought  by  the  UDV.  The  Government  goes  on  to  argue
that  the  regulatory  regime  established  by  the  Act—a
“closed”  system  that  prohibits  all  use  of  controlled  sub-
stances except as authorized by the Act itself, see Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 10)—“cannot
function with its necessary rigor and comprehensiveness if
subjected to judicial exemptions.”  Brief for Petitioners 18.
According  to  the  Government,  there  would  be  no  way  to
cabin religious exceptions once recognized, and “the public
will  misread”  such  exceptions  as  signaling  that  the  sub-
stance at issue is not harmful after all.  Id., at 23.  Under
the  Government’s  view,  there  is  no  need  to  assess  the
particulars  of  the  UDV’s  use  or  weigh  the  impact  of  an
exemption  for  that  specific  use,  because  the  Controlled
Substances  Act  serves  a  compelling  purpose  and  simply
admits of no exceptions.

A
RFRA,  and  the  strict  scrutiny  test  it  adopted,  contem-
plate  an  inquiry  more  focused  than  the  Government’s
categorical  approach.    RFRA  requires  the  Government  to
demonstrate  that  the  compelling  interest  test  is  satisfied
through  application  of  the  challenged  law  “to  the  per-
son”—the  particular  claimant  whose  sincere  exercise  of
religion  is  being  substantially  burdened.    42  U. S. C.
§2000bb–1(b).    RFRA  expressly  adopted  the  compelling
interest  test  “as  set  forth  in  Sherbert  v.  Verner,  374  U. S.
398 (1963) and  Wisconsin  v.  Yoder,  406  U. S.  205  (1972).”
42  U. S. C.  §2000bb(b)(1).    In  each  of  those  cases,  this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Controlled Substances Act and its application to religious use of a substance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1142

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Thomas, J., dissenting

1138

and the First Amendment Dog that Didn’t Bark, 1994 S. Ct. Rev.
1, 41, 47 (exception for speech that is reasonably designed or
intended to contribute to reasoned debate on issues of public
concern).

But even assuming that some pure speech in the workplace
may be proscribed consistent with the First Amendment when it
violates a workplace harassment law, special First Amendment
problems are presented when, as here, the proscription takes the
form of a prior restraint. We have, since Near v. Minnesota ex
rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), evaluated injunctions against
speech as prior restraints, which entails the strictest scrutiny
known to our First Amendment jurisprudence. As we have
explained:

“The presumption against prior restraints is heavier—and
the degree of protection broader—than that against limits on
expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the dis-
tinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society
prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after
they break the law than to throttle them and all others be-
forehand.
It is always difﬁcult to know in advance what
an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and
illegitimate speech is often so ﬁnely drawn that the risks of
freewheeling censorship are formidable.” Southeastern Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 558–559 (1975).

The instant injunction is insufﬁciently tailored in at least three
respects, raising serious doubts concerning whether “the chal-
lenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than
necessary to serve a signiﬁcant government interest.” Madsen
v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 765 (1994).2

First, the injunction prohibits even a single utterance of a pro-
hibited word. Yet a hostile environment for purposes of FEHA
only arises “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discrimina-

2 Although a content-neutral injunction is not treated as a prior restraint,
see Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y., 519 U. S. 357, 372
(1997); Madsen, 512 U. S., at 763–764, n. 2, the instant injunction is indisput-
ably content based. See 21 Cal. 4th 121, 164 (1999) (Werdegar, J., concur-
ring); id., at 172 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
I apply the Madsen standard here
because,
if the injunction fails the Madsen standard for content-neutral
injunctions, a fortiori it fails whatever standard applies to content-based
injunctions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It cites legal precedents and discusses the First Amendment implications of a workplace harassment injunction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

ble for wheelchair use.”  Brief for Disability Rights Educa-
tion and Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae 2 (Disability
Rights Brief ).

B
States  and  cities  responding  to  the  homelessness  crisis
face the difficult task of addressing the underlying causes
of homelessness while also providing for public health and
safety.  This includes, for example, dealing with the hazards
posed by encampments, such as “a heightened risk of dis-
ease  associated  with  living  outside  without  bathrooms  or
wash  basins,”  “deadly  fires”  from  efforts  to  “prepare  food
and create heat sources,” violent crime, and drug distribu-
tion and abuse.  California Brief 12.

Local  governments  need  flexibility  in  responding  to
homelessness with effective and thoughtful solutions.  See
infra, at 19–21.  Almost all of these policy solutions are be-
yond  the  scope  of  this  case.  The  only  question  here  is
whether  the  Constitution  permits  criminalizing  sleeping
outside when there is nowhere else to go.  That question is
increasingly  relevant  because  many  local  governments
have  made  criminalization  a  frontline  response  to  home-
lessness.  “[L]ocal measures to criminalize ‘acts of living’ ”
by “prohibit[ing] sleeping, eating, sitting, or panhandling in
public spaces” have recently proliferated.  U. S. Interagency
Council  on  Homelessness,  Searching  Out  Solutions  1
(2012).

Criminalizing  homelessness  can  cause  a  destabilizing
cascade  of  harm.  “Rather  than  helping  people  to  regain
housing,  obtain  employment,  or  access  needed  treatment
and services, criminalization creates a costly revolving door
that circulates individuals experiencing homelessness from
the street to the criminal justice system and back.”  Id., at
6.  When a homeless person is arrested or separated from
their property, for example, “items frequently destroyed in-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis, making it unsuitable for indexing as it is not the primary content meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

THRYV, INC. v. CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP

Opinion of the Court

Judicial review of §315(b) rulings, moreover, would do lit-
tle to serve other statutory goals.  The purpose of §315(b),
all agree, is to minimize burdensome overlap between inter
partes review and patent-infringement litigation.  Brief for
Petitioner 24; Brief for Federal Respondent 36; Brief for Re-
spondent Click-to-Call 37.  Judicial review after the agency
proceedings  cannot  undo  the  burdens  already  occasioned.
Nor are §315(b) appeals necessary to protect patent claims
from wrongful invalidation, for patent owners remain free
to appeal final decisions on the merits.  §319.

IV

Click-to-Call advances a narrower reading of §314(d).  In
Click-to-Call’s view, which the dissent embraces, post, at 6–
18, the bar on judicial review applies only to the agency’s
threshold  determination  under  §314(a)  of  the  question
whether the petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of pre-
vailing.  Section 314(d) addresses the “determination by the
Director whether to institute inter partes review under this
section”  (emphasis  added),  and,  Click-to-Call  maintains,
§314(a) contains “the only substantive determination refer-
enced in” the same section as §314(d).  Brief for Respondent
Click-to-Call 16.  This interpretation, Click-to-Call argues,
supplies a clear rule consonant with the presumption favor-
ing judicial review.  Cf. supra, at 4–5 (Federal Circuit’s en
banc Wi-Fi One decision).

Cuozzo is fatal to Click-to-Call’s interpretation.  Section
314(d)’s review bar is not confined to the agency’s applica-
tion  of  §314(a),  for  in  Cuozzo  we  held  unreviewable  the
agency’s  application  of  §312(a)(3).   579  U. S.,  at  ___–___
(slip  op.,  at  7–8).  Far  from  limiting  the  appeal  bar  to
§314(a) and “nothing else” as Click-to-Call urges, Brief for
Respondent  29,  the  Court’s  opinion  in  Cuozzo  explained
that the bar extends to challenges grounded in “statutes re-
lated to” the institution decision.  579 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 11).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the reviewability of decisions under Section 315(b) of the America Invents Act.  It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

472

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Breyer, J., dissenting

disputes arising under federal dock workers’ compensation
statute). See generally, e. g., OPP Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Ad-
ministrator of Wage and Hour Div., Dept. of Labor, 312 U. S.
126, 145 (1941) (“In an increasingly complex society Congress
obviously could not perform its functions” without delegat-
ing details of regulatory scheme to executive agency);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (Constitution permits “in-
terdependence” and ﬂexible relations between branches in
order to secure “workable government”); J. W. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928) (Taft,
C. J.) (“[T]he extent and character of . . . assistance [between
the different branches] must be ﬁxed according to common
sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-
ordination”); Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 53 (“[R]egard must
be had” in cases “where constitutional limits are invoked,
not to mere matters of form but to the substance of what
is required”).

Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall, in a well-known passage,

explained,

“To have prescribed the means by which government
should, in all future time, execute its powers, would
have been to change, entirely, the character of the in-
It
strument, and give it the properties of a legal code.
would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by im-
mutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all,
must have been seen dimly, and which can be best pro-
vided for as they occur.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 415 (1819).

This passage, like the cases I have just mentioned, calls at-
tention to the genius of the Framers’ pragmatic vision, which
this Court has long recognized in cases that ﬁnd constitu-
tional room for necessary institutional innovation.

Third, we need not here referee a dispute among the other

two branches. And, as the majority points out:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and quotes from legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–255
_________________

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, PETITIONER v.
B. L., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HER FATHER,
LAWRENCE LEVY AND HER MOTHER,
BETTY LOU LEVY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2021]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, con-

curring.

I  join  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  write  separately  to
explain  my  understanding  of  the  Court’s  decision  and
the  framework  within  which  I  think  cases  like  this
should  be  analyzed.  This  is  the  first  case  in  which  we
have  considered  the  constitutionality  of  a  public  school’s
attempt  to  regulate  true  off-premises  student  speech,1

——————

1 In  Tinker  v.  Des  Moines  Independent  Community  School  Dist.,  393
U. S. 503 (1969), not only did the speech occur on school grounds during
the regular school day, but our opinion was specifically directed at on-
premises  speech.  See id., at 506 (“It can  hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or  expression  at  the  schoolhouse  gate”  (emphasis  added));  ibid.  (“First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school  environment,  are  available  to  teachers  and  students”  (emphasis
added)); id., at 507 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for
affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school offi-
cials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe
and  control  conduct  in  the  schools”  (emphasis  added));  id.,  at  512–513
(referring to speech that occurs “in the classroom,” “in the cafeteria, or
on  the  playing  field,  or  on  the  campus  during  the  authorized  hours”).
Tinker  makes  no  reference  whatsoever  to  speech  that  takes  place  off
premises and outside “authorized hours.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the name of the case, and the name of the Justice writing the concurring opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:25:22
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CV

Pagination Table: RULES1

1176

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule E. Actions in rem and quasi in rem: general

provisions.
.

.

(3) Process.

.

.

.

(a) In admiralty and maritime proceedings process in
rem or of maritime attachment and garnishment may be
served only within the district.

(b) In forfeiture cases process in rem may be served
within the district or outside the district when author-
ized by statute.

(c) Issuance and delivery.—Issuance and delivery of
process in rem, or of maritime attachment and garnish-
ment, shall be held in abeyance if the plaintiff so
requests.
.

.

.

.

.

(7) Security on counterclaim.

(a) When a person who has given security for dam-
ages in the original action asserts a counterclaim that
arises from the transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject of the original action, a plaintiff for whose beneﬁt
the security has been given must give security for dam-
ages demanded in the counterclaim unless the court, for
cause shown, directs otherwise. Proceedings on the
original claim must be stayed until this security is given,
unless the court directs otherwise.

(b) The plaintiff is required to give security under
Rule E(7)(a) when the United States or its corporate
instrumentality counterclaims and would have been re-
quired to give security to respond in damages if a pri-
vate party but is relieved by law from giving security.

(8) Restricted appearance.—An appearance to defend
against an admiralty and maritime claim with respect to
which there has issued process in rem, or process of attach-
ment and garnishment, may be expressly restricted to the
defense of such claim, and in that event is not an appearance
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically Rule E of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It outlines provisions related to actions in rem and quasi in rem.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 666 (1998)

667

Syllabus

the possibility of foreign prosecution as a premise for claiming the privi-
lege. Pp. 672–674.

(c) In the precursors of this case, the Court concluded that prosecu-
tion in a state jurisdiction not bound by the Self-Incrimination Clause
is beyond the purview of the privilege. United States v. Murdock, 284
U. S. 141. United States v. Saline Bank of Va., 1 Pet. 100, and Ball-
mann v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 186, distinguished. The Court’s precedent
turned away from this proposition once, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S.
1, 3, where it applied the Fourteenth Amendment due process incorpora-
tion to the Self-Incrimination Clause, so as to bind the States as well as
It immediately said, in Murphy
the National Government by its terms.
v. Waterfront Comm’n of N. Y. Harbor, 378 U. S. 52, 57, that Malloy
necessitated a reconsideration of Murdock’s rule. After Malloy, the
Fifth Amendment limitation was no longer framed for one jurisdiction
alone, each jurisdiction having instead become subject to the same privi-
lege claim ﬂowing from the same source. Since fear of prosecution in
the one jurisdiction now implicated the very privilege binding upon the
other, the Murphy opinion sensibly recognized that if a witness could
not assert the privilege in such circumstances, the witness could be
“whipsawed” into incriminating himself under both state and federal
law, even though the privilege was applicable to each. Such whipsaw-
ing is possible because the privilege against self-incrimination can be
exchanged by the government for an immunity to prosecutorial use of
any compelled inculpatory testimony. Kastigar v. United States, 406
U. S. 441, 448–449. Such an exchange by the government is permissible
only when it provides immunity as broad as the privilege. After Mal-
loy had held the privilege binding on the state jurisdictions as well
as the National Government, it would have been intolerable to allow a
prosecutor in one or the other jurisdiction to eliminate the privilege by
offering immunity less complete than the privilege’s dual jurisdictional
reach. To the extent that the Murphy Court undercut Murdock’s ra-
tionale on historical grounds, its reasoning that English cases supported
a more expansive reading of the Clause is ﬂawed and cannot be accepted
now. Pp. 674–690.

(d) Murphy discusses a catalog of “Policies of the Privilege,” which
could suggest a concern broad enough to encompass foreign prose-
cutions. However, the adoption of such a revised theory would rest on
Murphy’s treatment of English cases, which has been rejected as an
indication of the Clause’s meaning. Moreover, although Murphy cata-
logs aspirations furthered by the Clause, its discussion does not weigh
the host of competing policy concerns that would be raised in a le-
gitimate reconsideration of the Clause’s scope. Contrary to Balsys’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the syllabus section. It outlines the legal arguments and precedents surrounding the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause and its application to foreign prosecutions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1005

529 U. S.

March 6, 2000

No. 99–1262. Razzaq v. Old Dominion University et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181 F. 3d 90.
No. 99–1267. Schlamer v. United States. C. A. Armed

Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 M. J. 80.

No. 99–1271. Qualls v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–1286. Accardi et ux. v. United States. C. A. 7th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 781.

No. 99–1293. Briscoe v. International Business Ma-
chines Corp. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
199 F. 3d 1321.

No. 99–1311. Cash v. Tennessee. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–1322. Cowhig v. Caldera, Secretary of the Army.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181 F. 3d 79.
No. 99–1326. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 827.

No. 99–1327. Hines v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 632.

No. 99–1355. Smith v. Texas et al. Ct. App. Tex., 10th Dist.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–6626. Mancillas v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 183 F. 3d 682.

No. 99–6789. Ebert v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 178 F. 3d 1287.

No. 99–6921. Castillo v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 519.

No. 99–6925. Weathers v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 186 F. 3d 948.

No. 99–7310. White v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 194 Ariz. 344, 982 P. 2d 819.

No. 99–7324. Earp v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 20 Cal. 4th 826, 978 P. 2d 15.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document section rather than the main body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases or Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

3

Syllabus

clude  Arizona’s  concrete-evidence  requirement  on  the  Federal  Form.
Pp. 13–17.

677 F. 3d 383, affirmed.

SCALIA,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and  KAGAN, JJ.,  joined,  and
in which KENNEDY, J., joined in part.  KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment.  THOMAS, J., and ALITO,
J., filed dissenting opinions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi typically summarize the case and the court's decision, and are not considered part of the main body of the legal opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC.

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

it  in  a  totally  different  era.  The  Constitution  gives  Con-
gress  the  power  “[t]o  regulate  Commerce  . . .  among  the
several  States.”    Art. I,  §8.    I  would  let  Congress  decide
whether  to  depart  from  the  physical-presence  rule  that
has governed this area for half a century.

I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
clvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

Watson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1059,1126

855

Watt v. Roth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1033

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Watters v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  841,1086

Watts v. Runnels
Watts v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  855,1143

1155

Watts v. Wilson
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

Waxahachie Independent School Dist.; Palmer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878

Wayne County; Kirkland v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  846,950

Wayne County; McNeill v.
991

Wayne-Dalton Corp. v. Amarr Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weatherspoon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1060

914

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weatherton v. United States
Weaver; Creusere v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  907,1066

855

Weaver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Webb; Bedford v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Weber; Finker v.
846

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weber; Raymond v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1141

Weber; Smith v.
1039

Webster v. Cooper
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  886,1065

Weeks v. White’s Mill Colony, Inc.
857

Wehr v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

Wei Liu v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
808

Weinshienk; Childs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weinstock v. Walker  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136

Weiser v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

1113

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weiss v. Speer
885

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Welch v. Charlan
876

Welch; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Welch v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

935

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Welch v. Selsky
Welch v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1082,1133

220

Wellons v. Hall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wells v. Carro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  866,1020

964

Wells; DTD Enterprises, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Wells v. Michigan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
964

Wells; Together v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
964

Wells; Together-Clark v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
964

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wells; Together Dating Service v.
959

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wells v. United States
Wells v. Vasquez  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  802,1045

1030

Wells v. Washington  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
867

Wengler; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  863,1086

Wengler; Rojas-Barrera v.
859

Wernette; GwanJun Kim v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28  ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.

v. GOLDSMITH
Opinion of the Court

B

AWF contends, however, that the purpose and character
of its use of Goldsmith’s photograph weighs in favor of fair
use because Warhol’s silkscreen image of the photograph,
like the Campbell’s Soup Cans series, has a new meaning
or  message.  The  District  Court,  for  example,  understood
the  Prince  Series  works  to  portray  Prince  as  “an  iconic,
larger-than-life figure.”  382 F. Supp. 3d, at 326.  AWF also
asserts that the works are a comment on celebrity.  In par-
ticular, “Warhol’s Prince Series conveys the dehumanizing
nature of celebrity.”  Brief for Petitioner 44.  According to
AWF, that new meaning or message, which the Court of Ap-
peals  ignored,  makes  the  use  “transformative”  in  the  fair
use sense.  See id., at 44–48.  We disagree.

1

Campbell did describe a transformative use as one that
“alter[s] the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or
message.”  510 U. S., at 579; see also Google, 593 U. S., at
___  (slip  op.,  at  24).    That  description  paraphrased  Judge
Leval’s  law  review  article,  which  referred  to  “new  infor-
mation, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.”
Leval  1111.   (Judge  Leval  contrasted  such  additions  with
secondary  uses  that  “merely  repackag[e]”  the  original.
Ibid.)  But Campbell cannot be read to mean that §107(1)
weighs in favor of any use that adds some new expression,
meaning, or message.

Otherwise, “transformative use” would swallow the copy-
right  owner’s  exclusive  right  to  prepare  derivative  works.
Many  derivative  works,  including  musical  arrangements,
film and stage adaptions, sequels, spinoffs, and others that
“recast, transfor[m] or adap[t]” the original, §101, add new
expression,  meaning  or  message,  or  provide  new  infor-
mation, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.
That is an intractable problem for AWF’s interpretation of
transformative  use.    The  first  fair  use  factor  would  not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of "transformative use" in copyright law. It delves into the interpretation of this legal principle and its application to Andy Warhol's artwork.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

MOORE v. HARPER

THOMAS, J., dissenting

sought  to  be  imposed  by  the  people  of  a  State.”    Leser  v.
Garnett, 258 U. S. 130, 137 (1922).

The second premise is that regulating the times, places,
and manner of congressional elections “ ‘is no original pre-
rogative of state power,’ ” so that “such power ‘had to be del-
egated  to,  rather  than  reserved  by,  the  States.’ ”    Cook  v.
Gralike, 531 U. S. 510, 522 (2001) (first quoting 1 J. Story,
Commentaries  on  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States
§627 (3d ed. 1858) (Story); then quoting U. S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 804 (1995)).  This premise
is firmly supported by this Court’s precedents, which have
also held that the Elections Clause is “the exclusive delega-
tion of ” such power, as “[n]o other constitutional provision
gives  the  States  authority  over  congressional  elections.”
Cook, 531 U. S., at 522–523; see also United States v. Clas-
sic, 313 U. S. 299, 315 (1941) (“While, in a loose sense, the
right to vote for representatives in Congress is sometimes
spoken of as a right derived from the states, this statement
is true only in the sense that the states are authorized by
the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by
[the Elections Clause]” (citations omitted)).

The third premise is that “the Legislature thereof ” does
not mean the people of the State or the State as an undif-
ferentiated body politic, but, rather, the lawmaking power
as it exists under the State Constitution.  This premise com-
ports with the usual constitutional meanings of the words
“State”  and  “Legislature,”  as  well  as  this  Court’s  prece-
dents.  “A state, and the legislature of a state, are quite dif-
ferent political beings.”  Story §628.  “A state, in the ordi-
nary sense of the Constitution, is a political community of
free citizens . . . organized under a government sanctioned
and  limited  by  a  written  constitution.”    Texas  v.  White,  7
Wall. 700, 721 (1869).  “ ‘Legislature,’ ” on the other hand,
generally  means  “ ‘the  representative  body  which  ma[kes]
the laws of the people.’ ”  Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 365
(1932) (quoting Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221, 227 (1920)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into constitutional arguments regarding the regulation of congressional elections.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C.

Opinion of the Court

and the panel had already decided the appeal; second, that
no  “ ‘substantial  legal  interest’ ”  was  at  stake  because  the
attorney  general  was  pursuing  “ ‘extraordinary’ ”  forms  of
review (rehearing en banc and certiorari) to which litigants
are  not  generally  entitled;  and  third,  that  allowing  inter-
vention would prejudice respondents because the attorney
general’s rehearing petition included an argument (that re-
spondents lacked third-party standing) that the secretary’s
briefs  had  not  raised.3    EMW  Women’s  Surgical  Center,
P.S.C.  v.  Friedlander,  831  Fed.  Appx.  748,  749–753  (CA6
2020).
  We granted certiorari limited to the question whether the
Sixth Circuit should have permitted the attorney general to
intervene.  592 U. S. ___ (2021).

II
  In considering this question, we begin with respondents’
contention that the attorney general’s motion to intervene
was  jurisdictionally  barred.   Respondents  never  advanced
this argument below, and the Sixth Circuit did not consider
it.    Nevertheless,  we  must  assure  ourselves  that  jurisdic-
tional requirements are met at all stages of the cases that
come before us for review, see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U. S. 500, 506 (2006).

A
  Respondents’ argument is narrow and somewhat compli-
cated.    While  implicitly  conceding  that  a  court  of  appeals
generally has jurisdiction to consider a non-party’s motion
to intervene in a pending appeal, they claim that one nar-
row sub-set of non-parties is jurisdictionally barred: those
non-parties that are bound by the district court judgment.

——————

3 In  the  District  Court,  an  attorney  representing  the  secretary  had
raised the issue during argument on the secretary’s motion for a directed
verdict, but the District Court refused to consider the issue on the ground
that it should have been raised much earlier.  Tr. 105 (Nov. 15, 2018).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses the case of Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center and the Sixth Circuit's decision to allow the attorney general to intervene.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

afford it.  The Affordable Care Act did this by, among other
things, providing tax credits to help people buy insurance
and establishing online marketplaces where insurers could
sell  plans.    To  encourage  insurers  to  enter  those  market-
places, the Act created several programs to defray the car-
riers’ costs and cabin their risks.

Among  these  initiatives  was  the  “Risk  Corridors”  pro-
gram, a temporary framework meant to compensate insur-
ers for unexpectedly unprofitable plans during the market-
places’ first three years.  The since-expired Risk Corridors
statute, §1342, set a formula for calculating payments un-
der  the  program:  If  an  insurance  plan  loses  a  certain
amount of money, the Federal Government “shall pay” the
plan; if the plan makes a certain amount of money, the plan
“shall pay” the Government.  See §1342, 124 Stat. 211–212
(codified at 42 U. S. C. §18062).  Some plans made money
and paid the Government.  Many suffered losses and sought
reimbursement.  The Government, however, did not pay.

These cases are about whether petitioners—insurers who
claim  losses  under  the  Risk  Corridors  program—have  a
right  to  payment  under  §1342  and  a  damages  remedy  for
the unpaid amounts.  We hold that they do.  We conclude
that §1342 of the Affordable Care Act established a money-
mandating obligation, that Congress did not repeal this ob-
ligation, and that petitioners may sue the Government for
damages in the Court of Federal Claims.

I
A
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable  Care  Act,  124  Stat.  119,  seeking  to  improve  na-
tional  health-insurance  markets  and  extend  coverage  to
millions of people without adequate (or any) health insur-
ance.  To  that  end,  the  Affordable  Care  Act  called  for  the
creation  of  virtual  health-insurance  markets,  or  “Health
Benefit Exchanges,” in each State.  42 U. S. C. §18031(b)(1).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Risk Corridors program within the Affordable Care Act. It sets the context for the case and outlines the central legal question.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS

Opinion of the Court

initiated the strike before Glacier’s trucks were full of wet
concrete—say, by instructing drivers to refuse to load their
trucks  in  the  first  place.    Once  the  strike  was  underway,
nine  of  the  Union’s  drivers  abandoned  their  fully  loaded
trucks without telling anyone—which left the trucks on a
path to destruction unless Glacier saw them in time to un-
load  the  concrete.  Yet  the  Union did  not  take  the  simple
step  of  alerting  Glacier  that  these  trucks  had  been  re-
turned.  Nor, after the trucks were in the yard, did the Un-
ion direct its drivers to follow Glacier’s instructions to facil-
itate  a  safe  transfer  of  equipment.  To  be  clear,  the
“reasonable precautions” test does not mandate any one ac-
tion in particular.  But the Union’s failure to take even min-
imal precautions illustrates its failure to fulfill its duty.

Indeed,  far  from  taking  reasonable  precautions  to  miti-
gate foreseeable danger to Glacier’s property, the Union ex-
ecuted the strike in a manner designed to compromise the
safety  of  Glacier’s  trucks  and  destroy  its  concrete.    Such
conduct  is  not  “arguably  protected”  by  the  NLRA;  on  the
contrary, it goes well beyond the NLRA’s protections.  See
NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F. 2d 409,
411,  413  (CA5  1955)  (strike  unprotected  when  employees
abandoned their posts without warning “when molten iron
in the plant cupola was ready to be poured off,” even though
“a  lack  of  sufficient  help  to  carry  out  the  critical  pouring
operation might well have resulted in substantial property
damage”).

Thus,  accepting  the  complaint’s  allegations  as  true,  the
Union did not take reasonable precautions to protect Glac-
ier’s  property  from  imminent  danger  resulting  from  the
drivers’  sudden  cessation  of  work.    The  state  court  thus
erred  in  dismissing  Glacier’s  tort  claims  as  preempted  on
the pleadings.

III
The  Union  resists  this  conclusion.    First,  it  emphasizes
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing a case involving a labor dispute and property damage. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the union's actions during a strike and whether they fulfilled their duty to protect the company's property.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

Syllabus

with their ordinary public meaning at the time of their enactment re-
solves these cases.  Pp. 4–12.

(1) The parties concede that the term “sex” in 1964 referred to the
biological  distinctions  between  male  and  female.    And  “the  ordinary
meaning of ‘because of’ is ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account of,’ ” University
of  Tex.  Southwestern  Medical  Center  v.  Nassar,  570  U. S.  338,  350.
That term incorporates the but-for causation standard, id., at 346, 360,
which, for Title VII, means that a defendant cannot avoid liability just
by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employ-
ment action.  The term “discriminate” meant “[t]o make a difference in
treatment or favor (of one as compared with others).”  Webster’s New
In  so-called  “disparate  treatment”
International  Dictionary  745.
cases, this  Court has held that the difference in treatment based on
sex must be intentional.  See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U. S. 977, 986.  And the statute’s repeated use of the term “indi-
vidual”  means  that  the  focus  is  on  “[a]  particular  being  as  distin-
guished  from  a  class.”    Webster’s  New  International  Dictionary,  at
1267.  Pp. 4–9.

(2) These terms generate the following rule: An employer violates
Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in
part on sex.  It makes no difference if other factors besides the plain-
tiff’s  sex  contributed  to  the  decision  or  that  the  employer  treated
women  as  a  group  the  same  when  compared  to  men  as  a  group.    A
statutory violation occurs if an employer intentionally relies in part on
an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee.
Because discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender
status requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employ-
ees differently because of their sex, an employer who intentionally pe-
nalizes an employee for being homosexual or transgender also violates
Title  VII.  There  is  no  escaping  the  role  intent  plays:  Just  as  sex  is
necessarily  a  but-for  cause  when  an  employer  discriminates  against
homosexual or transgender employees, an employer who discriminates
on these grounds inescapably intends to rely on sex in its decisionmak-
ing.  Pp. 9–12.

(b) Three leading precedents confirm what the statute’s plain terms
suggest.  In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U. S. 542, a com-
pany  was  held  to  have  violated  Title  VII  by  refusing  to  hire  women
with young children, despite the fact that the discrimination also de-
pended on being a parent of young children and the fact that the com-
pany favored hiring women over men.  In Los Angeles Dept. of Water
and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, an employer’s policy of requiring
women to make larger pension fund contributions than men because
women tend to live longer was held to violate Title VII, notwithstand-
ing the policy’s evenhandedness between men and women as groups.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision.  Legal syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they are summaries and not the primary content of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxlvii

Page

Time Warner Telecom of Ore., LLC v. Portland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Timley v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1060

Timothy v. Skolnik  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tinsley; Payne v.
1121

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tipton v. Carlton
908

Tjong v. Holder
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Tlatenchi-Enriquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887

Toaz v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908

Tobin; Spechler v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Todd v. Federal Correctional Institution, Memphis
. . . . . . . . . . .
958

Together v. Wells  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
964

Together-Clark v. Wells  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
964

Together Dating Service v. Wells  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
964

847

Toler Memorial Funeral Home, Inc.; Cassell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Toliver v. Hartley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tompkins v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  900,1066

818

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tomu Development Co.; Carlstadt v.
1078

Toney; Frost v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Torain v. Ameritech Advanced Data Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  968,1093

Toriola v. Appellate Division, Sup. Ct. N. Y., Second Jud. Dept.  885,1102

1110

Torrance, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Torrence v. Ozmint  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  953,1140

Torres v. Amerada Hess Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  808,1028

1052

Torres v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  858,1132

Torres v. United States
Torres-Tontle v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

1035

Torres-Torres v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Torricellas v. Davidson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Totaro, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1109

Town.  See also name of town.

Town Bd. of Brookhaven; East End Property Co. #1, LLC v.  . . . .
Townsend v. Knowles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Townsend v. Minnesota
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Townsend v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tradin Organics USA, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . .
Traditional Baking; Bakery Machinery & Fabrications v.  . . . . . . .
Trainor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trancoso; Daniel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trani; Santana v.
Transit Casualty Co.; MSEJ, LLC v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Transportation Deputy Sheriff I; Young v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trans Union Consumer Reporting; Daniel v.
Trans Union, LLC; Ward v.
Travaline v. Travaline

821

871

1015

1038

1063

1147

849

886

1003

880

1096

1021

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  990,1139

1154

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

discrimination because of “sex” still means what it has al-
ways meant.  But the Court is not deterred by these consti-
tutional niceties.  Usurping the constitutional authority of
the other branches, the Court has essentially taken  H. R.
5’s  provision  on  employment  discrimination  and  issued  it
under the guise of statutory interpretation.4  A more brazen
abuse of our authority to interpret statutes is hard to recall.
The Court tries to convince readers that it is merely en-
forcing  the  terms  of  the  statute,  but  that  is  preposterous.
Even as understood today, the concept of discrimination be-
cause  of  “sex”  is  different  from  discrimination  because  of
“sexual orientation” or “gender identity.”  And in any event,
our duty is to interpret statutory terms to “mean what they
conveyed  to  reasonable  people  at  the  time  they  were  writ-
ten.”  A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpreta-
tion  of  Legal  Texts  16  (2012)  (emphasis  added).  If  every
single living American had been surveyed in 1964, it would
have been hard to find any who thought that discrimination
because of sex meant discrimination because of sexual ori-
entation––not  to  mention  gender  identity,  a  concept  that
was essentially unknown at the time.

The Court attempts to pass off its decision as the inevita-
ble product of the textualist school of statutory interpreta-
tion championed by our late colleague Justice Scalia, but no
one should be fooled.  The Court’s opinion is like a pirate
ship.  It sails under a textualist flag, but what it actually
represents is a theory of statutory interpretation that Jus-
tice Scalia excoriated––the theory that courts should “up-
date” old statutes so that they better reflect the current val-
ues of society.  See A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 22

——————

4 Section 7(b) of H. R. 5 strikes the term “sex” in 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2
and  inserts:  “SEX  (INCLUDING  SEXUAL  ORIENTATION  AND
GENDER IDENTITY).”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's interpretation of a statute related to discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1145

529 U. S.

May 22, 23, 2000

No. 99–6978. Mitchell v. United States, 528 U. S. 1056;
No. 99–7177. Ward v. Trent, Warden, ante, p. 1055;
No. 99–7178. Tsu et ux. v. Tracy Federal Bank et al.,

ante, p. 1023;

No. 99–7322. Watts v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, 528 U. S.
1166;

No. 99–7676. Lindsey v. Catoe, Director, South Carolina

Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 1008;

No. 99–7825. Solis Sosa v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division,
ante, p. 1056;

No. 99–7860. Klumpp v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Po-

tosi Correctional Center, ante, p. 1039;

No. 99–7872. Lingar v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi

Correctional Center, ante, p. 1039;

No. 99–7982. Taylor v. California, ante, p. 1056;
No. 99–8013.

Ifabiyi, aka DeBrown, aka Bell, aka Bello

v. United States, ante, p. 1010;

No. 99–8029. Kipkirwa v. Santa Clara County, Califor-

nia, et al., ante, p. 1057;

No. 99–8048. Arrington v. Broward Community College,

South Campus, ante, p. 1058;

No. 99–8072. Mendoza et al. v. Pennington et al., ante,

p. 1042; and

No. 99–8644. Madden v. United States, ante, p. 1079. Peti-

tions for rehearing denied.

Certiorari Denied

May 23, 2000

No. 99–9269. Richardson v. Johnson, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of
death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the
Justice Stevens and Jus-
Court, denied. Certiorari denied.
tice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.
Reported below: 203 F. 3d 827.
  </content>
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This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal journal or database. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be a typical part of a book's content.
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529US1

Unit: $U38

[09-26-01 08:44:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 205 (2000)

215

Opinion of the Court

interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts,
bright colors, paintings and murals,” 505 U. S., at 765 (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted), could be protected
under § 43(a) without a showing of secondary meaning, see
id., at 776. Two Pesos unquestionably establishes the legal
principle that trade dress can be inherently distinctive, see,
e. g., id., at 773, but it does not establish that product-design
trade dress can be. Two Pesos is inapposite to our holding
here because the trade dress at issue, the de´ cor of a restau-
rant, seems to us not to constitute product design.
It was
either product packaging—which, as we have discussed, nor-
mally is taken by the consumer to indicate origin—or else
some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and has
no bearing on the present case.

Respondent replies that this manner of distinguishing
Two Pesos will force courts to draw difﬁcult lines between
product-design and product-packaging trade dress. There
will indeed be some hard cases at the margin: a classic glass
Coca-Cola bottle, for instance, may constitute packaging for
those consumers who drink the Coke and then discard the
bottle, but may constitute the product itself for those con-
sumers who are bottle collectors, or part of the product itself
for those consumers who buy Coke in the classic glass bottle,
rather than a can, because they think it more stylish to drink
from the former. We believe, however, that the frequency
and the difﬁculty of having to distinguish between product
design and product packaging will be much less than the
frequency and the difﬁculty of having to decide when a prod-
uct design is inherently distinctive. To the extent there are
close cases, we believe that courts should err on the side of
caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product de-
sign, thereby requiring secondary meaning. The very close-
ness will suggest the existence of relatively small utility in
adopting an inherent-distinctiveness principle, and relatively
great consumer beneﬁt in requiring a demonstration of sec-
ondary meaning.
  </content>
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This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the legal concept of trade dress and its application in a particular case, referencing prior legal precedents like Two Pesos.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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2

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Syllabus

Held: A  naturally  occurring  DNA  segment  is  a  product  of  nature  and
not patent eligible merely because it has  been isolated,  but cDNA is
patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.  Pp. 10–18.

(a) The  Patent  Act  permits  patents  to  be  issued  to  “[w]hoever  in-
vents  or  discovers  any  new  and  useful  . . .  composition  of  matter,”
§101,  but  “laws  of  nature,  natural  phenomena,  and  abstract  ideas”
“ ‘are basic tools of scientific and technological work’ ” that lie beyond
the  domain  of  patent  protection,  Mayo,  supra,  at  ___.  The  rule
against  patents  on  naturally  occurring  things  has  limits,  however.
Patent protection strikes a delicate balance between creating “incen-
tives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery” and “imped[ing]
the  flow  of  information  that  might  permit,  indeed  spur,  invention.”
Id., at ___.  This standard is used to determine whether Myriad’s pa-
tents  claim  a  “new  and  useful  . . .  composition  of  matter,”  §101,  or
claim naturally occurring phenomena.  Pp. 10–11.

(b) Myriad’s  DNA  claim  falls  within  the  law  of  nature  exception.
Myriad’s  principal  contribution  was  uncovering  the  precise  location
and genetic sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.  Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, is central to the patent-eligibility inquiry
whether  such  action  was  new  “with  markedly  different  characteris-
tics from any found in nature,” id., at 310.  Myriad did not create or
alter  either  the  genetic  information  encoded  in  the  BCRA1  and
BCRA2  genes  or  the  genetic  structure  of  the  DNA.    It  found  an  im-
portant  and  useful  gene,  but  groundbreaking,  innovative,  or  even
brilliant  discovery  does  not  by  itself  satisfy  the  §101  inquiry.   See
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127.  Finding
the  location  of  the  BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes  does  not  render  the
genes patent eligible “new . . . composition[s] of matter,” §101.  Myri-
ad’s  patent  descriptions  highlight  the  problem  with  its  claims:  They
detail the extensive process of discovery, but extensive effort alone is
insufficient to satisfy §101’s demands.  Myriad’s claims are not saved
by  the  fact  that  isolating  DNA  from  the  human  genome  severs  the
chemical  bonds  that  bind  gene  molecules  together.    The  claims  are
not  expressed  in  terms  of  chemical  composition,  nor  do  they  rely  on
the chemical changes resulting from the isolation of a particular DNA
section.  Instead, they focus on the genetic information encoded in the
BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes.    Finally,  Myriad  argues  that  the  Patent
and Trademark Office’s past practice of awarding gene patents is en-
titled to deference, citing J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int’l, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, a case where Congress had endorsed a PTO
practice in subsequent legislation.  There has been no such endorse-
ment here, and the United States argued in the Federal Circuit and
in  this  Court  that  isolated  DNA  was  not  patent  eligible  under  §101.
Pp. 12–16.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing the key points of a Supreme Court case (Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.). It outlines the legal reasoning behind the court's decision regarding the patentability of isolated DNA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

GORSUCH, J., concurring

1
Start  with  a  look  to  how  our  predecessors  traditionally
understood the judicial role in disputes over a law’s mean-
ing.  From the Nation’s founding, they considered “[t]he in-
terpretation  of  the  laws”  in  cases  and  controversies  “the
proper and peculiar province of the courts.”  The Federalist
No. 78, p. 467 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).  Perhaps
the  Court’s  most  famous  early  decision  reflected  exactly
that view.  There, Chief Justice Marshall declared it “em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is.”  Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177.  For
judges  “have  neither  FORCE  nor  WILL  but  merely  judg-
ment”—and  an  obligation  to  exercise  that  judgment  inde-
pendently.  The Federalist No. 78, at 465.  No matter how
“disagreeable  that  duty  may  be,”  this  Court  has  said,  a
judge “is not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.”  United
States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 162 (1841) (Story, J.).  This
duty  of  independent  judgment  is  perhaps  “the  defining
characteristi[c] of Article III judges.”  Stern v. Marshall, 564
U. S. 462, 483 (2011).

To be sure, this Court has also long extended “great re-
spect” to the “contemporaneous” and consistent views of the
coordinate branches about the meaning of a statute’s terms.
Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210 (1827); see
also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819); Stu-
art v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309 (1803).4  But traditionally,
that did not mean a court had to “defer” to any “reasonable”

——————

4 Accord, National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 145–146
(1920) (affording “great weight” to a “contemporaneous construction” by
the executive that had “been long continued”); Jacobs v. Prichard, 223
U. S. 200, 214 (1912) (“find[ing] no ambiguity in the act” but also finding
“strength”  for  the  Court’s  interpretation  in  the  executive’s  “immediate
and continued construction of the act”); Schell’s Executors v. Fauché, 138
U. S. 562, 572 (1891) (treating as “controlling” a “contemporaneous con-
struction”  of  a  law  endorsed  “not  only  [by]  the  courts  but  [also  by]  the
departments”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the traditional understanding of the judicial role in interpreting laws, citing historical precedents and legal doctrines.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
6

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

KENNEDY, J., dissenting

And, of course, it was urgent that the Government take all
necessary  steps  to  stop  the  ongoing  and  dangerous  crime
spree.

Cell-site records were uniquely suited to this task.  The
geographic dispersion of the robberies meant that, if Car-
penter’s  cell  phone  were  within  even  a  dozen  to  several
hundred city blocks of one or more of the stores when the
different  robberies  occurred,  there  would  be  powerful
circumstantial  evidence  of  his  participation;  and  this
would  be  especially  so  if  his  cell  phone  usually  was  not
located  in  the  sectors  near  the  stores  except  during  the
robbery times.

To  obtain  these  records,  the  Government  applied  to
federal magistrate judges for disclosure orders pursuant to
§2703(d)  of  the  Stored  Communications  Act.    That  Act
authorizes a  magistrate  judge  to  issue  an order  requiring
disclosure  of  cell-site  records  if  the  Government  demon-
strates  “specific  and  articulable  facts  showing  that  there
are  reasonable  grounds  to  believe”  the  records  “are  rele-
vant  and  material  to  an  ongoing  criminal  investigation.”
18  U. S. C.  §§2703(d),  2711(3).    The  full  statutory  provi-
sion is set out in the Appendix, infra.

From  Carpenter’s  primary  service  provider,  MetroPCS,
the Government obtained records from between December
2010 and April 2011, based on its understanding that nine
robberies  had  occurred  in  that  timeframe.    The  Govern-
ment  also  requested  seven  days  of  cell-site  records  from
Sprint,  spanning  the  time  around  the  robbery  in  Warren,
Ohio.  It obtained two days of records.

These records confirmed that Carpenter’s cell phone was
in the general vicinity of four of the nine robberies, includ-
ing the one in Ohio, at the times those robberies occurred.

The first Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

II
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kennedy in the Carpenter v. United States case. It discusses the use of cell-site records as evidence in a criminal investigation and the Fourth Amendment implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

17

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

said to promote “a government where laws reflect the very
thoughts,  views,  ideas,  and  sentiments,  the  expression  of
which the First Amendment protects.”  Post, at 7.

But  there  are  compelling  reasons  not  to  define  the
boundaries of the First Amendment by reference to such a
generalized  conception  of  the  public  good.  First,  the  dis-
sent’s “collective speech” reflected in laws is of course the
will  of  the  majority,  and  plainly  can  include  laws  that
restrict free speech.  The whole point of the First Amend-
ment  is  to  afford  individuals  protection  against  such  in-
fringements.  The  First  Amendment  does  not  protect
the  government,  even  when  the  government  purports  to
act  through  legislation  reflecting  “collective  speech.”    Cf.
United  States  v.  Alvarez,  567  U. S.  ___  (2012);  Wooley  v.
Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).

Second,  the  degree  to  which  speech  is  protected  cannot
turn on a legislative or judicial determination that partic-
ular speech is useful to the democratic process.  The First
Amendment  does  not  contemplate  such  “ad hoc  balancing
of  relative  social  costs  and  benefits.”    United  States  v.
Stevens,  559  U. S.  460,  470  (2010);  see  also  United  States
v.  Playboy  Entertainment  Group,  Inc.,  529  U. S.  803,  818
(2000)  (“What  the  Constitution  says  is  that”  value  judg-
ments  “are  for  the  individual  to  make,  not  for  the  Gov-
ernment to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a
majority”).

Third,  our  established  First  Amendment  analysis  al-
ready  takes  account  of  any  “collective”  interest  that  may
justify  restrictions  on  individual  speech.    Under  that
accepted  analysis,  such  restrictions  are  measured  against
the  asserted  public  interest  (usually  framed  as  an  im-
portant  or  compelling  governmental  interest).    As  ex-
plained  below,  we  do  not  doubt  the  compelling  nature  of
the  “collective”  interest  in  preventing  corruption  in  the
electoral process.  But we permit Congress to pursue that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the First Amendment and its application to campaign finance laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

25

Opinion of the Court

sidered  in  determining  whether  the  employer  was  negli
gent.  The  nature  and  degree  of  authority  possessed  by
harassing  employees  varies  greatly,  see  post,  9–11  (offer
ing  examples),  and  as  we  explained  above,  the  test  pro
posed by petitioner and the United States is ill equipped to
deal  with  the  variety  of  situations  that  will  inevitably
arise.  This variety presents no problem for the negligence
standard, which is thought to provide adequate protection
for  tort  plaintiffs  in  many  other  situations.    There  is  no
reason  why  this  standard,  if  accompanied  by  proper  in
structions, cannot provide the same service in the context
at issue here.

D

The  dissent  argues  that  the  definition  of  a  supervisor
that  we  now  adopt  is  out  of  touch  with  the  realities  of
the workplace, where individuals with the power to assign
daily  tasks  are  often  regarded  by  other  employees  as
supervisors.  See post, at 5, 8–12.  But in reality it is the
alternative  that  is  out  of  touch.    Particularly  in  modern
organizations  that  have  abandoned  a  highly  hierarchical
management  structure,  it  is  common  for  employees  to
have overlapping authority with respect to the assignment
of  work  tasks.    Members  of  a  team  may  each  have  the
responsibility for taking the lead with respect to a particu
lar aspect of the work and thus may have the responsibil
ity to direct each other in that area of responsibility.

Finally, petitioner argues that tying supervisor status to
the  authority  to  take  tangible  employment  actions  will
encourage  employers  to  attempt  to  insulate  themselves
from  liability  for  workplace  harassment  by  empowering
only a handful of individuals to take tangible employment
actions.  But a broad definition of “supervisor” is not nec
essary to guard against this concern.

As  an  initial  matter,  an  employer  will  always  be  liable
when its negligence leads to the creation or continuation of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
8

MILLER v. ALABAMA

Opinion of the Court

To  start  with  the  first  set  of  cases:  Roper  and  Graham
establish  that  children  are  constitutionally  different  from
adults for purposes of sentencing.  Because juveniles have
diminished  culpability  and  greater  prospects  for  reform,
we  explained,  “they  are  less  deserving  of  the  most  severe
punishments.”  Graham, 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17).
Those cases relied on three significant gaps between juve-
niles and adults.  First, children have a “ ‘lack of maturity
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ ” leading to
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.  Roper,
543  U. S.,  at  569.    Second,  children  “are  more  vulner-
able  . . .  to  negative  influences  and  outside  pressures,”
including  from  their  family  and  peers;  they  have  limited
“contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability
to  extricate  themselves  from  horrific,  crime-producing
settings.  Ibid.    And  third,  a  child’s  character  is  not  as
“well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and
his  actions  less  likely  to  be  “evidence  of  irretrievabl[e]
deprav[ity].”  Id., at 570.

Id.,  at  569.

Our  decisions  rested  not  only  on  common  sense—on
what  “any  parent  knows”—but  on  science  and  social  sci-
ence  as  well.
In  Roper,  we  cited  studies
showing that “‘[o]nly a relatively small proportion of adoles-
cents’ ” who engage in illegal activity “ ‘develop entrenched
patterns of problem behavior.’ ”  Id., at 570 (quoting Stein-
berg  &  Scott,  Less  Guilty  by  Reason  of  Adolescence:  De-
velopmental  Immaturity,  Diminished  Responsibility,  and
the  Juvenile  Death  Penalty,  58  Am.  Psychologist  1009,

——————

the  majority’s  reasoning  in  Graham,  which  is  the  foundation  stone  of
our analysis.  See Graham, 560 U. S., at ___ (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
in  judgment)  (slip  op.,  at  1);  id.,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,  joined  by  SCALIA
and  ALITO,  JJ.,  dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  1–25);  id.,  at  ___  (ALITO,  J.,
dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  1).  While  the  dissents  seek  to  relitigate  old
Eighth Amendment battles, repeating many arguments this Court has
previously  (and  often)  rejected,  we  apply  the  logic  of  Roper,  Graham,
and our individualized sentencing decisions to these two cases.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Miller v. Alabama*. It delves into the reasoning behind previous rulings on juvenile sentencing, highlighting the differences between juveniles and adults in terms of culpability and potential for rehabilitation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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