<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

Doubtless, the Ninth Circuit’s intervention in Martin was
well-intended.  But since the trial court entered its injunc-
tion against Grants Pass, the city shelter reports that utili-
zation of its resources has fallen by roughly 40 percent.  See
Brief for Grants Pass Gospel Rescue Mission as Amicus Cu-
riae  4–5.  Many  other  cities  offer  similar  accounts  about
their experiences after Martin, telling us the decision has
made it more difficult, not less, to help the homeless accept
shelter off city streets.  See Part I–B, supra (recounting ex-
amples).  Even when “policymakers would prefer to invest
in more permanent” programs and policies designed to ben-
efit  homeless  and  other  citizens,  Martin  has  forced  these
“overwhelmed jurisdictions to concentrate public resources
on temporary shelter beds.”  Cities Brief 25; see Oregon Cit-
ies Brief 17–20; States Brief 16–17.  As a result, cities re-
port, Martin has undermined their efforts to balance con-
flicting public needs and mired them in litigation at a time
when  the  homelessness  crisis  calls  for  action.  See  States
Brief 16–17.

All told, the Martin experiment is perhaps just what Jus-
tice Marshall anticipated ones like it would be.  The Eighth
Amendment provides no guidance to “confine” judges in de-
ciding  what  conduct  a  State  or  city  may  or  may  not  pro-
scribe.  Powell, 392  U. S., at 534.  Instead of encouraging
“productive  dialogue”  and  “experimentation”  through  our
democratic  institutions,  courts  have  frozen  in  place  their
own “formulas” by “fiat.”  Id., at 534, 537.  Issued by federal
courts  removed  from  realities  on  the  ground,  those  rules
have  produced  confusion.    And  they  have  interfered  with
“essential  considerations  of  federalism,”  taking  from  the
people  and  their  elected  leaders  difficult  questions  tradi-
tionally “thought to be the[ir] province.”  Id., at 535–536.7
——————

7 The  dissent  suggests  we  cite  selectively  to  the  amici  and  “see  only
what  [we]  wan[t]”  in  their  briefs.    Post,  at  24.  In  fact,  all  the  States,
cities, and counties listed above (n. 3, supra) asked us to review this case.
Among them all, the dissent purports to identify just two public officials
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the impact of a previous court decision (Martin) on cities' ability to address homelessness. It provides arguments and cites supporting evidence, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. ITALIAN COLORS
RESTAURANT
Opinion of the Court

The  “effective  vindication”  exception  to  which  respond-
ents  allude  originated  as  dictum  in  Mitsubishi  Motors,
where we expressed a willingness to invalidate, on “public
policy” grounds, arbitration agreements that “operat[e] . . .
as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statu-
tory remedies.”  473 U. S., at 637, n. 19 (emphasis added).
Dismissing  concerns  that  the  arbitral  forum  was  inade-
quate,  we  said  that  “so  long  as  the  prospective  litigant
effectively  may  vindicate  its  statutory  cause  of  action  in
the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both
its  remedial  and  deterrent  function.”    Id.,  at  637.    Subse-
quent  cases  have  similarly  asserted  the  existence  of  an
“effective  vindication”  exception,  see,  e.g.,  14  Penn  Plaza
LLC  v.  Pyett,  556  U. S.  247,  273–274  (2009);  Gilmer  v.
Interstate/Johnson  Lane  Corp.,  500  U. S.  20,  28  (1991),
but  have  similarly  declined  to  apply  it  to  invalidate  the
arbitration agreement at issue.2

And  we  do  so  again  here.    As  we  have  described,  the
exception finds its origin in the desire to prevent “prospec-
tive  waiver  of  a  party’s  right  to  pursue  statutory  reme-
dies,”  Mitsubishi  Motors,  supra,  at  637,  n. 19  (emphasis
added).  That  would  certainly  cover  a  provision  in  an
arbitration  agreement  forbidding  the  assertion  of  certain
statutory  rights.    And  it  would  perhaps  cover  filing  and
administrative  fees  attached  to  arbitration  that  are  so
high  as  to  make  access  to  the  forum  impracticable.    See
——————

2 Contrary  to  the  dissent’s  claim,  post,  at  8–9,  and  n.  3  (opinion  of
KAGAN,  J.),  the  Court  in  Mitsubishi  Motors  did  not  hold  that  federal
statutory claims are subject to arbitration so long as the claimant may
effectively  vindicate  his  rights  in  the  arbitral  forum.    The  Court  ex-
pressly  stated  that,  “at  this  stage  in  the  proceedings,”  it  had  “no  occa-
sion  to  speculate”  on  whether  the  arbitration  agreement’s  potential
deprivation of a claimant’s right to pursue federal remedies may render
that agreement unenforceable.  473 U. S., at 637, n. 19.  Even the Court
of Appeals in this case recognized the relevant language in Mitsubishi
Motors  as  dicta.  In re  American  Express  Merchants’  Litigation,  667
F. 3d 204, 214 (CA2 2012).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion discussing the "effective vindication" exception to arbitration agreements. It contains legal citations and arguments, indicating it's part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 30 (2009)

33

Per Curiam

der  only.  On  direct  appeal,  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  af
ﬁrmed  the  sentence  over  the  dissent  of  two  justices,  but
struck  the  heinous,  atrocious,  or  cruel  aggravating  factor.
Porter  v.  State,  564  So.  2d  1060  (1990)  (per  curiam).  The
court found the State had not carried its burden on that fac
tor because the “record is consistent with the hypothesis that
Porter’s was a crime of passion, not a crime that was meant
to be deliberately and extraordinarily painful.”  Id., at 1063
(emphasis deleted).  The two dissenting justices would have
reversed  the  penalty  because  the  evidence  of  drunkenness,
“combined  with  evidence  of  Porter’s  emotionally  charged,
desperate,  frustrated  desire  to  meet  with  his  former  lover,
is sufﬁcient to render the death penalty disproportional pun
ishment  in  this  instance.”  Id.,  at  1065–1066  (Barkett,  J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In  1995,  Porter  ﬁled  a  petition  for  postconviction  relief  in
state  court,  claiming  his  penalty-phase  counsel  failed  to  in
vestigate  and  present  mitigating  evidence.  The  court  con
ducted a 2-day evidentiary hearing, during which Porter pre
sented  extensive  mitigating  evidence,  all  of  which  was
apparently  unknown  to  his  penalty-phase  counsel.  Unlike
the  evidence  presented  during  Porter’s  penalty  hearing,
which left the jury knowing hardly anything about him other
than  the  facts  of  his  crimes,  the  new  evidence  described  his
abusive childhood, his heroic military service and the trauma
he suffered because of it, his long-term substance abuse, and
his impaired mental health and mental capacity.

The  depositions  of  his  brother  and  sister  described  the
abuse  Porter  suffered  as  a  child.  Porter  routinely  wit
nessed his father beat his mother, one time so severely that
she had to go to the hospital and lost a child.  Porter’s father
was violent every weekend, and by his siblings’ account, Por
ter was his father’s favorite target, particularly when Porter
tried to protect his mother.  On one occasion, Porter’s father
shot  at  him  for  coming  home  late,  but  missed  and  just  beat
Porter  instead.  According  to  his  brother,  Porter  attended
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the details of a case, including the defendant's sentence, the arguments made by the prosecution and defense, and the evidence presented.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Syllabus

means does not fit in context.  Coupling “from” with “to” is strong evi-
dence  that  Congress  was  referring  to  a  destination  (“navigable  wa-
ters”) and an origin (“any point source”).  That Maui’s reading would
create a serious loophole in the permitting regime also indicates that
it is unreasonable.  Pp. 10–11.

(3) The Solicitor General argues that the proper interpretation of
the statute is the one reflected in EPA’s recent Interpretive Statement,
namely, that “all releases of pollutants to groundwater” are excluded
from the scope of the permitting program, “even where pollutants are
conveyed  to  jurisdictional  surface  waters  via  groundwater.”    84  Fed.
Reg. 16810, 16811.  That reading, which would open a loophole allow-
ing easy evasion of the statutory provision’s basic purposes, is neither
persuasive nor reasonable.  EPA is correct that Congress did not re-
quire a permit for all discharges to groundwater, and it did authorize
study and funding related to groundwater pollution.  But the most that
the study and funding provisions show is that Congress thought that
the problem of pollution in groundwater would primarily be addressed
by the States or perhaps by other federal statutes.  EPA’s new inter-
pretation  is  also  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  statute’s  reference  to
“any  addition”  of  a  pollutant  to  navigable  waters;  with  the  statute’s
inclusion of “wells” in the “point source” definition, since wells would
ordinarily discharge pollutants through groundwater; and with statu-
tory provisions that allow EPA to delegate its permitting authority to
a State only if the State, inter alia, provides “ ‘adequate authority’ ” to
“ ‘control the disposal of pollutants into wells,’ ” §402(b).  Pp. 11–13.

(4) Perhaps, as the dissents suggest, the statute’s language could
be narrowed by reading the statute to refer only to the pollutant’s im-
mediate  origin,  but  there  is  no  linguistic  basis  for  this  limitation.
Pp. 13–15.

(d) The statute’s words reflect Congress’ basic aim to provide federal
regulation of identifiable sources of pollutants entering navigable wa-
ters without undermining the States’ longstanding regulatory author-
ity over land and groundwater.  The reading of the statute that best
captures  Congress’  meaning,  reflected  in  the  statute’s  words,  struc-
ture, and purposes, is that a permit is required when there is a dis-
charge  from  a  point  source  directly  into  navigable  waters  or  when
there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge.  Many factors
may be relevant to determining whether a particular discharge is the
functional equivalent of one directly into navigable waters.  Time and
distance  will  be  the  most  important  factors  in  most  cases,  but  other
relevant factors may include, e.g., the nature of the material through
which  the  pollutant  travels  and  the  extent  to  which  the  pollutant  is
diluted or chemically changed as it travels.  Courts will provide addi-
tional guidance through decisions in individual cases.  The underlying
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section. It summarizes the court's reasoning and holding on a particular case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

19

Opinion of the Court

This  distinction  is  empty.    It  was  a  matter  of  happen
stance  that  the  laws  challenged  in  New  York  and  Printz
commanded “affirmative” action as opposed to imposing a
prohibition.    The  basic  principle—that  Congress  cannot
issue  direct  orders  to  state  legislatures—applies  in  either
event.

Here  is  an  illustration.   PASPA  includes  an  exemption
for  States  that  permitted  sports  betting  at  the  time  of
enactment,  §3704,  but  suppose  Congress  did  not  adopt
such  an  exemption.  Suppose  Congress  ordered  States
with legalized sports betting to take the affirmative step of
criminalizing  that  activity  and  ordered  the  remaining
States  to  retain  their  laws  prohibiting  sports  betting.
There  is  no  good  reason  why  the  former  would  intrude
more deeply on state sovereignty than the latter.

B

Respondents  and  the  United  States  claim  that  prior
decisions  of  this  Court  show  that  PASPA’s  anti-
authorization provision is constitutional, but they misread
those cases.  In none of them did we uphold the constitu
tionality  of  a  federal  statute  that  commanded  state  legis
latures to enact or refrain from enacting state law.

In  South  Carolina  v.  Baker,  485  U. S.  505  (1988),  the
federal  law  simply  altered  the  federal  tax  treatment  of
private  investments.  Specifically,  it  removed  the  federal
tax exemption for interest earned on state and local bonds
unless  they  were  issued  in  registered  rather  than  bearer
form.  This law did not order the States to enact or main
tain any existing laws.  Rather, it simply had the indirect
effect  of  pressuring  States  to  increase  the  rate  paid  on
their bearer bonds in order to make them competitive with
other bonds paying taxable interest.

In any event, even if we assume that removal of the tax
exemption  was  tantamount  to  an  outright  prohibition  of
the issuance of bearer bonds, see id., at 511, the law would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the constitutionality of a federal law and cites previous cases for support.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

New York’s does not mean that they cannot be an appropri-
ate analogue for a narrow one.

4
In  short,  we  have  no  trouble  concluding  that  Section
922(g)(8) survives Rahimi’s facial challenge.  Our tradition
of firearm regulation allows the Government to disarm in-
dividuals  who  present  a  credible  threat  to  the  physical
safety of others.  Section 922(g)(8) can be applied lawfully
to Rahimi.

The dissent reaches a contrary conclusion, primarily on
the  ground  that  the  historical  analogues  for  Section
922(g)(8) are not sufficiently similar to place that provision
in  our  historical  tradition.  The  dissent  does,  however,
acknowledge that Section 922(g)(8) is within that tradition
when it comes to the “why” of the appropriate inquiry.  The
objection  is  to  the  “how.”    See  post,  at  18  (opinion  of
THOMAS, J.).  For the reasons we have set forth, however,
we conclude that Section 922(g)(8) satisfies that part of the
inquiry  as  well.  See  supra,  at  7,  13–15.  As  we  said  in
Bruen, a “historical twin” is not required.  597 U. S., at 30.
For its part, the Fifth Circuit made two errors.  First, like
the dissent, it read Bruen to require a “historical twin” ra-
ther than a “historical analogue.”  Ibid. (emphasis deleted).
Second, it did not correctly apply our precedents governing
facial  challenges.  61  F. 4th,  at  453.    As  we  have  said  in
other  contexts,  “[w]hen  legislation  and  the  Constitution
brush up against each other, [a court’s] task is to seek har-
mony, not to manufacture conflict.”  United States v. Han-
sen,  599  U. S.  762,  781  (2023).    Rather  than  consider  the
circumstances in which Section 922(g)(8) was most likely to
be constitutional, the panel instead focused on hypothetical
scenarios  where  Section  922(g)(8)  might  raise  constitu-
tional concerns.  See 61 F. 4th, at 459; id., at 465–467 (Ho,
J.,  concurring).    That  error  left  the  panel  slaying  a  straw
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in a case titled "UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI".  It discusses the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(8) and references previous legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–915
_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ZACKEY RAHIMI

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2024]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
After New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen,
597 U. S. 1 (2022), this Court’s directive was clear: A fire-
arm regulation that falls within the Second Amendment’s
plain text is unconstitutional unless it is consistent with the
Nation’s  historical  tradition  of  firearm  regulation.  Not  a
single historical regulation justifies the statute at issue, 18
U. S. C. §922(g)(8).  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

I
Section 922(g)(8) makes it unlawful for an individual who
is subject to a civil restraining order to possess firearms or
ammunition.  To trigger §922(g)(8)’s prohibition, a restrain-
ing order must bear three characteristics.  First, the order
issues  after  a  hearing  where  the  accused  “received
actual  notice”  and  had  “an  opportunity  to  participate.”
§922(g)(8)(A).  Second, the order restrains the accused from
engaging in threatening behavior against an intimate part-
ner or child.  §922(g)(8)(B).  Third, the order has either “a
finding  that  [the  accused]  represents  a  credible  threat  to
the physical safety of [an] intimate partner or child,” or an
“explici[t]  prohibit[ion]”  on  “the  use,  attempted  use,  or
threatened use of physical force against [an] intimate part-
ner or child.”  §922(g)(8)(C).  If those three characteristics
are  present,  §922(g)(8)  automatically  bans  the  individual
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal code references, all hallmarks of legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

977

524 U. S.

September 9, 1998

No. 97–475. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan
Tseng. C. A. 2d Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 523 U. S. 1117.] Mo-
tion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argu-
ment as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.

No. 97–1235. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 523
U. S. 1045.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to partici-
pate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argu-
ment granted.

No. 97–1184. National Federation of Federal Employ-
ees, Local 1309 v. Department of the Interior et al.; and
No. 97–1243. Federal Labor Relations Authority v. De-
partment of the Interior et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
[Certiorari
granted, ante, p. 903.] Motion of petitioner National Federation
of Federal Employees, Local 1309, for divided argument granted
to be divided as follows: Federal Labor Relations Authority, 20
minutes; National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1309,
10 minutes.

No. 97–1230. City of West Covina v. Perkins et al. C. A.
9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 523 U. S. 1105.] Motion of Ohio for
leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for
divided argument granted.

No. 97–1337. Minnesota et al. v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
[Certiorari granted,
ante, p. 915.] Motion of Paciﬁc Legal Foundation for leave to ﬁle
a brief as amicus curiae granted.

No. 97–1396. Lopez et al. v. Monterey County et al.
D. C. N. D. Cal.
[Probable jurisdiction noted, 523 U. S. 1093.]
Motion of Paciﬁc Legal Foundation for leave to ﬁle a brief as
amicus curiae granted.

No. 97–1472. Haddle v. Garrison et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 523 U. S. 1136.] Motions of Lawyers Com-
mittee for Civil Rights Under Law and National Employment
Lawyers Association et al. for leave to ﬁle briefs as amici curiae
granted. Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate
in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument
granted.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and related information, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and focuses on legal proceedings rather than a story or informative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
72  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

decisis analysis, and the factors that our doctrine instructs
us to consider like reliance and workability are different for
these cases than for our abortion jurisprudence.

B
1
We now turn to the concurrence in the judgment, which
reproves us for deciding whether Roe and Casey should be
retained or overruled.  That opinion (which for convenience
we will call simply “the concurrence”) recommends a “more
measured course,” which it defends based on what it claims
is  “a  straightforward  stare  decisis  analysis.”  Post,  at  1
(opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.).  The concurrence would “leave
for another day whether to reject any right to an abortion
at all,” post, at 7, and would hold only that if the Constitu-
tion  protects  any  such  right,  the  right  ends  once  women
have had “a reasonable opportunity” to obtain an abortion,
post, at 1.  The concurrence does not specify what period of
time  is  sufficient  to  provide  such  an  opportunity,  but  it
would hold that 15 weeks, the period allowed under Missis-
sippi’s  law,  is  enough—at  least  “absent  rare  circum-
stances.”  Post, at 2, 10.

There are serious problems with this approach, and it is
revealing that nothing like it was recommended by either
party.  As we have recounted, both parties and the Solicitor
General  have  urged  us  either  to  reaffirm  or  overrule  Roe
and Casey.  See supra, at 4–5.  And when the specific ap-
proach advanced by the concurrence was broached at oral
argument, both respondents and the Solicitor General em-
phatically rejected it.  Respondents’ counsel termed it “com-
pletely unworkable” and “less principled and less workable
than viability.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 54.  The Solicitor General
argued  that  abandoning  the  viability  line  would  leave
courts and others with “no continued guidance.”  Id., at 101.
What is more, the concurrence has not identified any of the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. It discusses legal precedent,  stare decisis, and the arguments presented by different parties involved in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Justice  Harlan,  four  years  after  penning  his  concurrence
in Katz, confessed that the test encouraged “the substitu
tion  of  words  for  analysis.”  United  States  v.  White,  401
U. S. 745, 786 (1971) (dissenting opinion).

After 50 years, it is still unclear what question the Katz
test is even asking.  This Court has steadfastly declined to
elaborate  the  relevant  considerations  or  identify  any
meaningful  constraints.  See,  e.g.,  ante,  at  5  (“[N]o  single
rubric  definitively  resolves  which  expectations  of  privacy
are  entitled  to  protection”);  O’Connor  v.  Ortega,  480  U. S.
709, 715 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“We have no talisman
that  determines  in  all  cases  those  privacy  expectations
that  society  is  prepared  to  accept  as  reasonable”);  Oliver,
466 U. S., at 177 (“No single factor determines whether an
individual  legitimately  may  claim  under  the  Fourth
Amendment  that  a  place  should  be  free  of  government
intrusion”).

Justice  Harlan’s  original  formulation  of  the  Katz  test
appears  to  ask  a  descriptive  question:  Whether  a  given
expectation  of  privacy  is  “one  that  society  is  prepared  to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”  389 U. S., at 361.  As written,
the Katz test turns on society’s actual, current views about
the reasonableness of various expectations of privacy.

But  this  descriptive  understanding  presents  several
problems.  For  starters,  it  is  easily  circumvented.    If,  for
example, “the Government were suddenly to announce on
nationwide  television  that  all  homes  henceforth  would  be
subject to warrantless entry,” individuals could not realis
tically expect privacy in their homes.  Smith, 442 U. S., at
740, n. 5; see also Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s

——————

James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment,

80  Notre  Dame  L.  Rev.  1451,  1500  (2005);  Rakas  v.  Illinois,  439  U. S.

128, 165 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the

Constitution:  The  Supreme  Court,  Technology,  and  the  Fourth

Amendment, 72 Miss. L. J. 5, 7 (2002).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the interpretation of the Katz test regarding privacy expectations.  The text is sequential and coherent, indicating it's part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

3

Opinion of the Court

amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–1 et seq.1

Betty  Dukes  began  working  at  a  Pittsburg,  California,
Wal-Mart  in  1994.  She  started  as  a  cashier,  but  later
sought and received a promotion to customer service man-
ager.  After  a  series  of  disciplinary  violations,  however,
Dukes  was  demoted  back  to  cashier  and  then  to  greeter.
Dukes concedes she violated company policy, but contends
that  the  disciplinary  actions  were  in  fact  retaliation  for
invoking  internal  complaint  procedures  and  that  male
employees  have  not  been  disciplined  for  similar  infrac-
tions.  Dukes  also  claims  two  male  greeters  in  the  Pitts-
burg store are paid more than she is.

Christine  Kwapnoski  has  worked  at  Sam’s  Club  stores
in Missouri and California for most of her adult life.  She
has  held  a  number  of  positions,  including  a  supervisory
position.  She  claims  that  a  male  manager  yelled  at  her
frequently  and  screamed  at  female  employees,  but  not  at
men.  The  manager  in  question  “told  her  to  ‘doll  up,’  to
wear  some  makeup,  and  to  dress  a  little  better.”    App.
1003a.

The  final  named  plaintiff,  Edith  Arana,  worked  at  a
Wal-Mart  store  in  Duarte,  California,  from  1995  to  2001.
In 2000, she approached the store manager on more than
one occasion about management training, but was brushed
off.  Arana concluded she was being denied opportunity for
advancement  because  of  her  sex.    She  initiated  internal
complaint  procedures,  whereupon  she  was  told  to  apply
directly  to  the  district  manager  if  she  thought  her  store
manager  was  being  unfair.    Arana,  however,  decided
against  that  and  never  applied  for  management  training
again.  In  2001,  she  was  fired  for  failure  to  comply  with
Wal-Mart’s timekeeping policy.

These  plaintiffs,  respondents  here,  do  not  allege  that

——————

1 The  complaint  included  seven  named  plaintiffs,  but  only  three  re-

main part of the certified class as narrowed by the Court of Appeals.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and a summary of the plaintiffs' claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

ADOPTED JANUARY 12, 2010

EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 16, 2010

The following are the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States
as  revised  on  January  12,  2010.  See  post,  p.  1162.  The  amended  Rules
became effective February 16, 2010, as provided in Rule 48, post, p. 1223.
For previous revisions of the Rules of the Supreme Court see 346 U. S.
949,  388  U. S.  931,  398  U. S.  1013,  445  U. S.  985,  493  U. S.  1099,  515  U. S.
1197, 519 U. S. 1161, 525 U. S. 1191, 537 U. S. 1249, 544 U. S. 1073, and 551
U. S. 1195.

1161
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the introductory section of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. It provides information about the revision date, effective date, and references to previous revisions. This type of information is generally not considered part of the main body of the text and is more suitable for a preface or introduction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Preface/Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

601

Souter, J., dissenting

mental rule of the First Amendment that viewpoint discrimi-
nation in the exercise of public authority over expressive ac-
tivity is unconstitutional. The Court’s conclusions that the
proviso is not viewpoint based, that it is not a regulation, and
that the NEA may permissibly engage in viewpoint-based
discrimination, are all patently mistaken. Nor may the
question raised be answered in the Government’s favor on
the assumption that some constitutional applications of the
statute are enough to satisfy the demand of facial constitu-
tionality, leaving claims of the proviso’s obvious invalidity
to be dealt with later in response to challenges of speciﬁc
applications of the discriminatory standards. This assump-
tion is irreconcilable with our longstanding and sensible
doctrine of facial overbreadth, applicable to claims brought
under the First Amendment’s speech clause.
I respectfully
dissent.

I

“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society ﬁnds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S.
397, 414 (1989).
“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message [or] its ideas,” Police Dept. of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95 (1972), which is to say that “[t]he
principle of viewpoint neutrality .
. underlies the First
Amendment,” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 505 (1984). Because this principle
applies not only to afﬁrmative suppression of speech, but also
to disqualiﬁcation for government favors, Congress is gener-
ally not permitted to pivot discrimination against otherwise
protected speech on the offensiveness or unacceptability of
the views it expresses. See, e. g., Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995) (public univer-
sity’s student activities funds may not be disbursed on
viewpoint-based terms); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches

.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter. It discusses the First Amendment and viewpoint discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
40

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

Opinion of BREYER, J.

plaintiff ’s burden in a challenge to an abortion regulation
is  to  show  that  the  regulation’s  “purpose  or  effect”  is  to
“plac[e] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seek-
ing an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”  505 U. S., at 877 (plu-
rality opinion); see Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at ___
(slip  op.,  at  8);  Gonzales,  550  U. S.,  at  156;  Stenberg,  530
U. S., at 921; Mazurek, 520 U. S., at 971.

Finally,  the  State  makes  several  arguments  about  the
standard  of  review  that  it  would  have  us  apply  in  cases
where  a  regulation  is  found  not  to  impose  a  substantial
obstacle to a woman’s choice.  Brief for Respondent 60–66.
That, however, is not this case.  The record here establishes
that  Act  620’s  admitting-privileges  requirement  places  a
substantial obstacle in the path of a large fraction of those
women  seeking  an  abortion  for  whom  it  is  a  relevant
restriction.

*

*
This  case  is  similar  to,  nearly  identical  with,  Whole
Woman’s Health.  And the law must consequently reach a
similar conclusion.  Act 620 is unconstitutional.  The Court
of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous.  It is

*

Reversed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the constitutionality of a law regarding admitting privileges for abortion providers. It contains legal arguments, citations, and a conclusion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

7

ALITO, J., dissenting

counsel,  and  the  legislature  made  any  “notice  or
statement  of  charges  against  any  licensee”  a  public
record under state law.  §§ 90–41(d)–(g).

  The  legislature  empowered  the  Board  “to  enact  rules
and  regulations  governing  the  practice  of  dentistry
within  the  State,”  consistent  with  relevant  statutes.
§90–48.  It  has  required  that  any  such  rules  be  in-
cluded in the Board’s annual report, which the Board
must  file  with  the  North  Carolina  secretary  of  state,
the state attorney general, and the legislature’s Joint
Regulatory  Reform  Committee.    §93B–2.  And  if  the
Board  fails  to  file  the  required  report,  state  law  de-
mands  that  it  be  automatically  suspended  until  it
does so.  Ibid.

As  this  regulatory  regime  demonstrates,  North  Caro-
lina’s Board of Dental Examiners is unmistakably a state
agency  created  by  the  state  legislature  to  serve  a  pre-
scribed  regulatory  purpose  and  to  do  so  using  the  State’s
power in cooperation with other arms of state government.
The Board is not a private or “nonsovereign” entity that
the  State  of  North  Carolina  has  attempted  to  immunize
from federal antitrust scrutiny.  Parker made it clear that
a State may not “ ‘give immunity to those who violate the
Sherman  Act  by  authorizing  them  to  violate  it,  or  by  de-
claring  that  their  action  is  lawful.’ ”  Ante,  at  7  (quoting
Parker, 317 U. S., at 351).  When the Parker Court disap-
proved  of  any  such  attempt,  it  cited  Northern  Securities
Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904), to show what it
had  in  mind.    In  that  case,  the  Court  held  that  a  State’s
act of chartering a corporation did not shield the corpora-
tion’s  monopolizing  activities  from  federal  antitrust  law.
Id., at 344–345.  Nothing similar is involved here.  North
Carolina did not authorize a private entity to enter into an
anticompetitive  arrangement;  rather,  North  Carolina
created  a  state  agency  and  gave  that  agency  the  power  to
regulate  a  particular  subject  affecting  public  health  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites legal precedents and discusses the legal arguments surrounding a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

Opinion of the Court

the District Court’s judgment, we obviate the need to grant
the  interim  relief  the Department  requests  in  its  applica-
tion in No. 22A489.  We therefore deny the application as
moot.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the concluding portion. It's sequential text and contains the court's decision, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court

Were we to reverse the judgment in Harper I—a step not
taken  by  the  North  Carolina  Supreme  Court—the  2021
plans  enacted  by  the  legislative  defendants  would  again
take effect.  The parties accordingly continue to have a “per-
sonal  stake  in  the  ultimate  disposition  of  the  lawsuit.”
Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).

A North Carolina statute with specific application to this
proceeding confirms that the controversy before us remains
live.  Under  state  law,  if  “the  United  States  Supreme
Court . . . reverses” the decision in Harper I, the 2021 maps
will again become “effective.”  2022 N. C. Sess. Laws p. 10,
§2.  We have previously found such trigger provisions—in
North Carolina, no less—sufficient to avoid mootness under
Article III.  See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541, 546, n. 1
(1999)  (“Because  the  State’s  1998  law  provides  that  the
State will revert to the 1997 districting plan upon a favora-
ble decision of this Court . . . this case is not moot.”).

We also have jurisdiction to review the judgment in Har-
per I under 28 U. S. C. §1257(a).  That statute provides for
this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over “[f]inal judgments
or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which
a decision could be had.”  Ibid.  We have, however, “recur-
ringly encountered situations in which the highest court of
a State has finally determined the federal issue present in
a particular case, but in which there are further proceed-
ings in the lower state courts to come.”  Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 477 (1975).

Cox Broadcasting delineated “at least four categories of
such cases in which the Court has treated the decision on
the federal issue as a final judgment for the purposes of 28
U. S. C. §1257,” despite “additional proceedings anticipated
in  the  lower  state  courts.”  Ibid.  As  relevant,  the  second
category  includes  those  “cases . . . in  which  the  federal  is-
sue, finally decided by the highest court in the State, will
survive  and  require  decision  regardless  of  the  outcome  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically discussing the case of Moore v. Harper. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the case's jurisdiction and the potential impact of a reversal of the lower court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

Opinion of the Court

nursing facilities, and must require “any nursing facility re-
ceiving payments under” the plan to satisfy certain FNHRA
mandates.  §1396a(a)(28).  The  HHS  Secretary  must  also
“assure that” approved state plans—and “the enforcement
of [plan] requirements”—are, inter alia, “adequate” to “pro-
tect  the  health,  safety,  welfare,  and  rights  of  [nursing-
home] residents.”  §1396r(f )(1).

The  FNHRA  also  establishes  a  detailed  administrative
scheme  for  government  inspections  of  nursing  facilities.
§1396r(g).  “Surveys”  (in  the  statute’s  parlance)  must  be
conducted to detect nursing homes that are falling short of
the  FNHRA’s  minimum  standards,  and  state  and  federal
officials must periodically file certifications, based on these
see
surveys,
§1396r(g)(1)(A).  In addition, the statute authorizes govern-
ment actors to sanction and correct noncompliant facilities,
or, if appropriate, exclude them from the Medicaid program
entirely.  §1396r(h); see also Health Law 56–63.

regarding  nursing-home

compliance,

B
1
Although  federal  statutes  have  the  potential  to  create
§1983-enforceable rights, they do not do so as a matter of
course.  For Spending Clause legislation in particular, we
have recognized that “ ‘the typical remedy for state noncom-
pliance  with  federally  imposed  conditions  is not  a  private
cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the
Federal  Government  to  terminate  funds  to  the  State.’ ”
Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 280 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U. S.,
at 28).  The parties here thus dispute whether this is the
atypical  case;  that  is,  whether  the  unnecessary-restraint
and predischarge-notice provisions of the FNHRA “unam-
biguously  confe[r]”  individual  rights,  making  those  rights
“presumptively  enforceable”  under  §1983.    536  U. S.,  at
283–284.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses the interpretation of federal law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

869

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–11064.  Gatewood  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.  App.  3d  1128,  970
N.  E.  2d  128.

No.  08–11066.  Shiraishi  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  587.

No.  08–11067.  Stamps  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.  App.  3d  1132,  970
N.  E.  2d  130.

No.  08–11068.  Bowman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  215.

No.  08–11069.  Boyd  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  415.

No.  08–11071.  Luna  v.  Louisiana.  Sup.  Ct.  La.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  994  So.  2d  14.

No. 08–11072.  Wright v.  Southwest Airlines et al.  C.  A.
4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 319 Fed. Appx. 232.

No. 08–11073.  Westbrook v.  Illinois.  App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  375  Ill.  App.  3d  1143,  945
N.  E.  2d  697.

No.  08–11074.  Bruce  v.  Ohio.  Ct.  App.  Ohio,  Fairﬁeld

County.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–11075.  Baker v. United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–11076.  Works  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.  App.  3d  1134,  970
N.  E.  2d  131.

No.  08–11077.  Boutte  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  342.

No.  08–11078.  Adamson  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No. 08–11079.  Dixon v. Florida.  Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  16  So.  3d  136.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, parties involved, courts, and disposition information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

929

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–6116.  Knighton  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6117.  Windrix  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  629.

No.  09–6122.  Conarte  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  972  A.  2d  327.

No.  09–6124.  Hoffman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  601.

No.  09–6126.  Greenstein,  aka  Dinunzio  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.
Appx.  259.

No.  09–6128.  Harris,  aka  Suluki  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.
244.

No.  09–6129.  Greenwood,  aka  Grimes  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.
Appx.  693.

No.  09–6131.  Figueroa-Cuevas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 312 Fed. Appx. 843.

No.  09–6137.  Graham  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  786.

No.  09–6138.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  859.

No.  09–6140.  Morante  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  957.

No.  09–6141.  Jarrett  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6142.  Matthews  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  364.

No.  09–6143.  Jones  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  767.

No. 09–6150.  Hall v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  203.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and disposition information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

cases in which defendants charged with nonviolent crimes
agree  to  appear  for  arraignment  and  are  then  released
pending trial on their own recognizance.  These defendants
. . . may bring a common-law suit for malicious prosecution
. . . , but they are not seized.”  Thompson, 596 U. S., at 52–
53.  And, “since a malicious-prosecution claim does not re-
quire a seizure, it obviously does not require proof that the
person  bringing  suit  was  seized  without  probable  cause.”
Id., at 53.

Malicious prosecution is therefore not an appropriate tort
analog for a §1983 claim alleging a seizure in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.  The Court has never provided a
fulsome  explanation  for  why  it  has  concluded  otherwise.
When  the  Court  first  recognized  a  malicious-prosecution
claim under the Fourth Amendment in Thompson, it essen-
tially adopted the holdings of certain lower courts.  Id., at
43.  The Court offered two meager sentences to justify doing
so.  It reasoned that “the gravamen of the Fourth Amend-
ment claim for malicious prosecution . . . is the wrongful in-
itiation of charges without probable cause.  And the wrong-
ful initiation of charges without probable cause is likewise
the  gravamen  of  the  tort  of  malicious  prosecution.”  Ibid.
That  is  incorrect.  A  malicious-prosecution  claim  protects
against the malicious initiation of charges, but the Fourth
Amendment  protects  against  unreasonable  searches  and
seizures—it does not matter whether the official acted with
malice or charges are ever initiated.  See id., at 54–55 (opin-
ion of ALITO, J.).  Today, the Court rests solely on Thomp-
son’s  mistaken  reasoning  to  conclude  that  Chiaverini  can
raise his claim.  See ante, at 4–5.

The Court’s decision to forge ahead with combining the
malicious-prosecution and Fourth Amendment frameworks
will  inevitably  create  confusion.    As  I  have  explained,  an
unreasonable  seizure  under  the  Fourth  Amendment  re-
quires  a  seizure;  a  malicious-prosecution  claim  does  not.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a case, referencing prior rulings and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xciii

Page

1056

McCall v. Crosthwait  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

McCall; Nall v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

McCann; Austin v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

McCann; Walker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McCargo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965

McCarthy v. Jenkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  893,1086

McCarthy v. Unknown  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

McCarthy v. Vilsack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  988,1116

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  992,1139

McCaughtry; Heimermann v.
McClain v. Hall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  882,982

982

McClain v. Upton  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
863

McClain v. Warren  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

McClaren v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

McClaren v. Wisconsin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132

McClellon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

McCloud v. Kentucky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30

McCollum; Porter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1023

McComb v. Crehan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

McCorkle v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
988

McCorvey, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1100

McCourty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

McCoy v. Ercole  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

McCray v. Glass  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McCreary v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

McCree v. Harry
846

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
802

McCright v. Evans  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991

McCrory v. Can Do, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

McCulligan v. Pennsylvania
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

McCullough v. Norris  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1050

McDaniel; Anderson-Tully Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
120

McDaniel v. Brown  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

McDaniel; Ennis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
886

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McDaniel; Jones v.
938

McDaniel v. Sechrest
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

McDaniel v. Suthers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McDaniel v. Texas
1089

McDonald v. Chicago
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913

McDonald v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

McDonald; Vang v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McFadden v. United States
896

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

McFarland v. Deppisch  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McFarland v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  950,1140

829

McFarlin v. United States
1028

McGee v. Florida

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

53

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

cisis protection.28  This unprecedented assertion is, at bot-
tom, a radical claim to power.  By disclaiming any need to
consider  broad  swaths  of  individuals’  interests,  the  Court
arrogates to itself the authority to overrule established le-
gal principles without even acknowledging the costs of its
decisions for the individuals who live under the law, costs
that this Court’s stare decisis doctrine instructs us to privi-
lege when deciding whether to change course.

The  majority  claims  that  the  reliance  interests  women
have in Roe and Casey are too “intangible” for the Court to
consider, even if it were inclined to do so.  Ante, at 65.  This
is  to  ignore  as  judges  what  we  know  as  men  and  women.
The interests women have in Roe and Casey are perfectly,
viscerally concrete.  Countless women will now make differ-
ent  decisions  about  careers,  education,  relationships,  and
whether  to  try  to  become  pregnant  than  they  would  have
when  Roe  served  as  a  backstop.  Other  women  will  carry
pregnancies to term, with all the costs and risk of harm that
involves, when they would previously have chosen to obtain
an  abortion.  For  millions  of  women,  Roe  and  Casey  have
been critical in giving them control of their bodies and their
lives.  Closing our eyes to the suffering today’s decision will
impose will not make that suffering disappear.  The major-
ity cannot escape its obligation to “count[ ] the cost[s]” of its
decision  by  invoking  the  “conflicting  arguments”  of  “con-
tending sides.”  Casey, 505 U. S., at 855; ante, at 65.  Stare
decisis requires that the Court calculate the costs of a deci-
sion’s repudiation on those who have relied on the decision,

——————

28 The  majority’s  sole  citation  for  its  “concreteness”  requirement  is
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991).  But Payne merely discounted
reliance interests in cases involving “procedural and evidentiary rules.”
Id., at 828.  Unlike the individual right at stake here, those rules do “not
alter primary conduct.”  Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 252 (1998).
Accordingly, they generally “do not implicate the reliance interests of pri-
vate  parties”  at  all.    Alleyne  v.  United  States,  570  U. S.  99,  119  (2013)
(SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically focusing on the overturning of Roe v. Wade. It delves into the legal and societal impacts of the decision, highlighting the reliance interests of women and the potential harm caused by the change in legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

1

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 12–158
_________________

CAROL ANNE BOND, PETITIONER v. UNITED

STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[June 2, 2014]

 JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment.
As  explained  in  Part  I  of  JUSTICE  SCALIA’s  concurring
opinion,  which  I  join,  petitioner’s  conduct  violated  18
U. S. C. §229, the federal criminal statute under which she
was  convicted.    I  therefore  find  it  necessary  to  reach  the
question  whether  this  statute  represents  a  constitutional
exercise of federal power, and as the case comes to us, the
only  possible  source  of  federal  power  to  be  considered  is
the treaty power.

For  the  reasons  set  out  in  Parts  I–III  of  JUSTICE
THOMAS’  concurring  opinion,  which  I  join,  I  believe  that
the  treaty  power  is  limited  to  agreements  that  address
matters  of  legitimate  international  concern.    The  treaty
pursuant to which §229 was enacted, the Chemical Weap-
ons  Convention,  is  not  self-executing,  and  thus  the  Con-
vention  itself  does  not  have  domestic  effect  without  con-
gressional  action.    The  control  of  true  chemical  weapons,
as  that  term  is  customarily  understood,  is  a  matter  of
great international concern, and therefore the heart of the
Convention clearly represents a valid exercise of the treaty
power.  But  insofar  as  the  Convention  may  be  read  to
obligate  the  United  States  to  enact  domestic  legislation
criminalizing  conduct  of  the  sort  at  issue  in  this  case,
which  typically  is  the  sort  of  conduct  regulated  by  the
States,  the  Convention  exceeds  the  scope  of  the  treaty
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
854

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10786.  Joseph  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.
Appx.  495.

No.  08–10788.  Little  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.  Appx.  286.

No. 08–10789.  Plump v. United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10790.  McCaleb  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  552  F.  3d  1053.

No.  08–10791.  Rooks  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  1145.

No.  08–10792.  Pinkston  v.  North  Carolina.  Gen.  Ct.  Jus

tice,  Super.  Ct.  Div.,  Stanly  County,  N.  C.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10793.  Elasali  v.  Mayer.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.

Dist.,  Div.  1.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10794.  Brooks  v.  Johnson  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  247.

No.  08–10795.  Mosere  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.
C. A. 4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 552 F. 3d 397.

No.  08–10796.  Harley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  437.

No.  08–10797.  Hernandez-Garay  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 312 Fed. Appx. 687.

No.  08–10798.  Nunez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  236.

No.  08–10800.  Morgan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10801.  Nabried  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  529.

No. 08–10802.  Mowatt v. Vail, Secretary, Washington De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and the court that heard the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

control or interference by the Congress in respect of inter-
nal government and administration”).

Based on those explicit representations, the United Na-
tions General Assembly declared that the people of Puerto
Rico “ha[d] been invested with attributes of political sover-
eignty which clearly identify the status of self-government
attained  . . .  as  that  of  an  autonomous  political  entity.”
G. A. Res. 748, U. N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U. N.
Doc. A/2630 (Nov. 27, 1953).  And consistent with that dec-
laration,  the  Federal  Government  promptly  stopped  com-
plying with the Charter’s reporting obligations with respect
to Puerto Rico (and has never since recommenced).  Thus,
in  the  eyes  of  the  international  community  looking  in,  as
well as of the Federal Government looking out, Puerto Rico
has long enjoyed autonomous reign over its internal affairs.
Indeed, were the Federal Government’s representations to
the United Nations merely aspirational, the United States’
compliance with its international legal obligations would be
in substantial doubt.  See Lawson & Sloane, The Constitu-
tionality of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto
Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 Boston College L. Rev.
1123, 1127 (2009) (arguing that if Puerto Rico remains “just
another territory subject to Congress’ plenary power under
the Territories Clause,” “the United States . . . is in viola-
tion  of  its  international  legal  obligations  vis-à-vis  Puerto
Rico”).

There  can  be  little  question,  then,  that  the  compact  al-
tered  the  relationship  between  the  Federal  Government
and Puerto Rico.  At a minimum, the post-compact develop-
ments, including this Court’s precedents, indicate that Con-
gress  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  Puerto  Rican  people  the
authority to establish their own government, replete with
officers  of  their  own  choosing,  and  that  this  grant  of  self-
government  was  not  an  empty  promise.  That  history
prompts  serious  questions  as  to  whether  the Board  mem-
bers may be territorial officers of Puerto Rico when they are
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the history of Puerto Rico's political status and the implications for the case at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC.

Syllabus

matters pre-empted by the Natural Gas Act.  Pp. 10–16.

(a) The  Act  “was  drawn  with  meticulous  regard  for  the  continued
exercise of state power.”  Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public
Serv.  Comm’n  of  Ind.,  332  U. S.  507,  517–518.    Where,  as  here,  a
practice  affects  nonjurisdictional  as  well  as  jurisdictional  sales,  pre-
emption can be found only where a detailed examination convincingly
demonstrates  that  a  matter  falls  within  the  pre-empted  field  as  de-
fined  by  this  Court’s  precedents.    Those  precedents  emphasize  the
importance  of  considering  the  target  at  which  the  state-law  claims
aim.  See,  e.g.,  Northern  Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  State  Corporation
Comm’n  of  Kan.,  372  U. S.  84;  Northwest  Central  Pipeline  Corp.  v.
State Corporation Comm’n of Kan., 489 U. S. 493.  Here, respondents’
claims are aimed at practices affecting retail prices, a matter “firmly
on the States’ side of [the] dividing line.”  Id., at 514.

Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U. S. 293, is not to the con-
trary.   That  opinion  explains  that  the  Act  does  not  pre-empt  “tradi-
tional” state regulation, such as blue sky laws.  Id., at 308, n. 11.  An-
titrust  laws,  like  blue  sky  laws,  are  not  aimed  at  natural-gas
companies  in  particular,  but  rather  all  businesses  in  the  market-
place.  The broad applicability of state antitrust laws supports a find-
ing of no pre-emption here.

So, too, does the fact that States have long provided “common-law
and statutory remedies against monopolies and unfair business prac-
tices,” California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 101.  As noted
earlier,  the  Act  circumscribes  FERC’s  powers  and  preserves  tradi-
tional areas of state authority.  §717(b).  Pp. 10–14.

(b) Neither  Mississippi  Power  &  Light  Co.  v.  Mississippi  ex  rel.
Moore,  487  U. S.  354,  nor  FPC  v.  Louisiana  Power  &  Light  Co.,  406
U. S.  621,  supports  petitioners’  position.  Mississippi  Power  is  best
read as a conflict pre-emption case, not a field pre-emption case.  In
any event, the state inquiry in Mississippi Power was pre-empted be-
cause  it  was  directed  at  jurisdictional  sales  in  a  way  that  respond-
ents’ state antitrust suits are not.  Louisiana Power is also a conflict
pre-emption  case,  and  thus  does  not  significantly  help  petitioners’
field pre-emption argument.  Pp. 14–15.

(c) Because the parties have not argued conflict pre-emption, ques-
tions involving conflicts between state antitrust proceedings and the
federal rate-setting process are left for the lower courts to resolve in
the first instance.  Pp. 15–16.

(d) While  petitioners  and  the  Government  argue  that  this  Court
should defer to FERC’s determination that field pre-emption bars re-
spondents’ claims, they fail to point to a specific FERC determination
that  state  antitrust  claims  fall  within  the  field  pre-empted  by  the
Natural  Gas  Act.    Thus,  this  Court  need  not  consider  what  legal  ef-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a court case. It outlines the court's reasoning and decisions regarding preemption of state antitrust laws by the Natural Gas Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TRUMP ET AL. v. MAZARS USA, LLP, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 19–715.  Argued May 12, 2020—Decided July 9, 2020*

In  April  2019,  three  committees  of  the  U. S.  House  of  Representatives
issued four subpoenas seeking information about the finances of Pres-
ident  Donald  J.  Trump,  his  children,  and  affiliated  businesses.    The
House Committee on Financial Services issued a subpoena to Deutsche
Bank seeking any document related to account activity, due diligence,
foreign transactions, business statements, debt schedules, statements
of  net  worth,  tax  returns,  and  suspicious  activity  identified  by
Deutsche Bank.  It issued a second subpoena to Capital One for similar
information.  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued
a subpoena  to Deutsche Bank that mirrored the subpoena issued by
the  Financial  Services  Committee.   And  the  House  Committee  on
Oversight and Reform issued a subpoena to the President’s personal
accounting firm, Mazars USA, LLP, demanding information related to
the President and several affiliated businesses.  Although each of the
committees sought overlapping sets of financial documents, each sup-
plied different justifications for the requests, explaining that the infor-
mation  would  help  guide  legislative  reform  in  areas  ranging  from
money laundering and terrorism to foreign involvement in U. S. elec-
tions.  Petitioners—the President in his personal capacity, along with
his children and affiliated businesses—contested the subpoena issued
by  the  Oversight  Committee  in  the  District  Court  for  the  District  of
Columbia (Mazars, No. 19–715) and the subpoenas issued by the Fi-
nancial Services and Intelligence Committees in the Southern District
of New York (Deutsche Bank, No. 19–760).  In both cases, petitioners
contended that the subpoenas lacked a legitimate legislative purpose

——————

* Together with  19–760,  Trump  et al.  v.  Deutsche  Bank AG et al.,  on

certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. ITALIAN COLORS

RESTAURANT
KAGAN, J., dissenting

meritorious  federal  claims.  Those  provisions  might  deny
entry  to  the  forum  in  the  first  instance.    Or  they  might
deprive  the  claimant  of  any  remedy.    Or  they  might  pre-
vent  the  claimant  from  offering  the  necessary  proof  to
prevail,  as  in  my  “no  economic  testimony”  hypothetical—
and in the actual circumstances of this case.  See supra, at
3.  The variations matter not at all.  Whatever the precise
mechanism, each “operate[s] . . . as a prospective waiver of
a party’s [federal] right[s]”—and so confers immunity on a
wrongdoer.  Mitsubishi, 473 U. S., at 637, n. 19.  And that
is what counts under our decisions.4

Nor can the majority escape the principle we have estab-
lished  by  observing,  as  it  does  at  one  point,  that  Amex’s
agreement  merely  made  arbitration  “not  worth  the  ex-
pense.”  Ante, at 7.  That suggestion, after all, runs smack
into Randolph, which likewise involved an allegation that
arbitration,  as  specified  in  a  contract,  “would  be  prohibi-
tively  expensive.”    531  U. S.,  at  92.    Our  decision  there
made clear that a provision raising a plaintiff ’s costs could
foreclose consideration of federal claims, and so run afoul
of  the  effective-vindication  rule.  The  expense  at  issue  in
Randolph came from a filing fee combined with a per-diem
payment  for  the  arbitrator.  But  nothing  about  those
particular costs is distinctive; and indeed, a rule confined
to them would be weirdly idiosyncratic.  Not surprisingly,
then, Randolph gave no hint of distinguishing among the
different ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim

——————

4 Gilmer and Vimar Seguros, which the majority relies on, see ante, at
8,  fail  to  advance  its  argument.    The  plaintiffs  there  did  not  claim,  as
Italian  Colors  does,  that  an  arbitration  clause  altogether  precluded
them  from  vindicating  their  federal  rights.    They  averred  only  that
arbitration  would  be  less  convenient  or  effective  than  a  proceeding  in
court.  See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 31–
32  (1991);  Vimar  Seguros  y  Reaseguros,  S.  A.  v.  M/V  Sky  Reefer,  515
U. S.  528,  533  (1995).    As  I  have  explained,  that  kind  of  showing  does
not meet the effective-vindication rule’s high bar.  See supra, at 6.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

ment Clause forbids anything a reasonable observer would
view as an endorsement of religion, then such an observer
must be able to sue.  Moore v. Bryant, 853 F. 3d 245, 250
(CA5  2017).    Here  alone,  lower  courts  concluded,  though
never  with  this  Court’s  approval,  an  observer’s  offense
must  “suffice  to  make  an  Establishment  Clause  claim
justiciable.”  Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F. 3d 1083, 1086
(CA4 1997).
  As today’s plurality rightly indicates in Part II–A, how-
ever,  Lemon  was  a  misadventure.    It  sought  a  “grand
unified  theory”  of  the  Establishment  Clause  but  left  us
only  a  mess.    See  ante,  at  24  (plurality  opinion).    How
much “purpose” to promote religion is too much (are Sun-
day  closing  laws  that  bear  multiple  purposes,  religious
and  secular,  problematic)?    How  much  “effect”  of  advanc-
ing  religion  is  tolerable  (are  even  incidental  effects  disal-
lowed)?    What  does  the  “entanglement”  test  add  to  these
inquiries?    Even  beyond  all  that,  how  “reasonable”  must
our “reasonable observer” be, and what exactly qualifies as
impermissible  “endorsement”  of  religion  in  a  country
where “In God We Trust” appears on the coinage, the eye
of  God  appears  in  its  Great  Seal,  and  we  celebrate
Thanksgiving as a national holiday (“to Whom are thanks
being given”)?  Harris v. Zion, 927 F. 2d 1401, 1423 (CA7
1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).  Nearly half a century
after  Lemon  and,  the  truth  is,  no  one  has  any  idea  about
the  answers  to  these  questions.    As  the  plurality  docu-
ments,  our  “doctrine  [is]  in  such  chaos”  that  lower  courts
have  been  “free  to  reach  almost  any  result  in  almost  any
case.”    McConnell,  Religious  Participation  in  Public  Pro-
grams:  Religious  Freedom  at  a  Crossroads,  59  U.  Chi.
L. Rev.  115,  119  (1992).    Scores  of  judges  have  pleaded
with  us to  retire  Lemon,  scholars  of  all  stripes  have  criti-
cized  the  doctrine,  and  a  majority  of  this  Court  has  long
done the same.  Ante, at 14–15 (plurality opinion).  Today,
not  a  single  Member  of  the  Court  even  tries  to  defend
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the complexities of the Establishment Clause and criticizes the Lemon test, arguing for its retirement.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18  NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON

Opinion of the Court

(and in fact do) harm competition.  See D. Ct. Op., at 1067.
Unlike customers who would look elsewhere when a small
van company raises its prices above market levels, the dis-
trict court found (and the NCAA does not here contest) that
student-athletes have nowhere else to sell their labor.  Even
if the NCAA is a joint venture, then, it is hardly of the sort
that would warrant quick-look approval for all its myriad
rules and restrictions.

Nor does the NCAA’s status as a particular type of ven-
ture categorically exempt its restraints from ordinary rule
of reason review.  We do not doubt that some degree of co-
ordination between competitors within sports leagues can
be  procompetitive.  Without  some  agreement  among  ri-
vals—on things like how many players may be on the field
or  the  time  allotted  for  play—the  very  competitions  that
consumers value would not be possible.  See Board of Re-
gents, 468 U. S., at 101 (quoting R. Bork, The Antitrust Par-
adox  278  (1978)).  Accordingly,  even  a  sports  league  with
market power might see some agreements among its mem-
bers win antitrust approval in the “ ‘twinkling of an eye.’ ”
American Needle, 560 U. S., at 203.

But  this  insight  does  not  always  apply.    That  some  re-
straints are necessary to create or maintain a league sport
does not mean all “aspects of elaborate interleague cooper-
ation are.”  Id., at 199, n. 7.  While a quick look will often
be enough to approve the restraints “necessary to produce
a game,” ibid., a fuller review may be appropriate for oth-
ers.  See, e.g., Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership
v. National Basketball Assn., 95 F. 3d 593, 600 (CA7 1996)
(“Just as the ability of McDonald’s franchises to coordinate
the release of a new hamburger does not imply their ability
to  agree  on  wages  for  counter  workers,  so  the  ability  of
sports teams to agree on a TV contract need not imply an
ability to set wages for players”).

The NCAA’s rules fixing wages for student-athletes fall
on the far side of this line.  Nobody questions that Division
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the NCAA's rules regarding student-athlete compensation. It delves into antitrust arguments and precedents, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
ORDERS

899

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5337.  Franco-Flores  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  978.

No.  09–5338.  Simpson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  270.

No. 09–5339.  Thomas v.  Parker, Warden, et al.  C. A. 10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  626.

No. 09–5340.  Wilson v. United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–5341.  Ross v. United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.  Appx.  386.

No.  09–5342.  Prater  v.  Rubitschun  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5343.  Darty  v.  Superior  Drive  Source.  C.  A.  6th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5344.  Crowe  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5345.  Vincent  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  275.

No.  09–5348.  Jones  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5349.  Merriweather  v.  Reynolds,  Warden,  et  al.

C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5350.  Pelch v. Yarborough, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  607.

No.  09–5351.  Donzo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  191.

No. 09–5353.  Del Castello v.  Superior Court of Califor

nia,  Alameda  County.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5354.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  943.

No. 09–5357.  Rasmussen v.  Frakes, Superintendent, Coy
ote  Ridge  Corrections  Center.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  500.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

7

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

6,

p. 6

(Nov.

1700–1883,

effort  to  override  a  patent  on  munitions  during  wartime,
no  doubt  in  an  effort  to  increase  their  supply.    But  even
then  appealing  to  the  Privy  Council  was  seen  as  a  last
resort.    The  1779  petition  (the  last  Privy  Council  revoca-
tion  ever)  came  only  after  the  patentee  twice  refused
instructions  to  litigate  the  patent’s  validity  in  a  court  of
law.    Gómez-Arostegui  &  Bottomley,  Privy  Council  and
Scire  Facias
2017)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3054989  (citing  Board  of  Ord-
nance  v.  Wilkinson,  PC2/123  (1779),  and  PC1/11/150
(1779)).  The Council did not act on the 1782 petition but
instead  referred  it  to  the  Attorney  General  where  it  ap-
pears  to  have  been  abandoned.    Gómez-Arostegui  &  Bot-
tomley,  Privy  Council  and  Scire  Facias,  supra,  at  17–18.
Meanwhile, in  response  to  the  1810  petition the  Attorney
General admitted that scire facias was the “usual manner”
of  revoking  a  patent  and  so  directed  the  petitioner  to
proceed  at  law  even  as  he  suggested  the  Privy  Council
might  be  available  in  the  event  of  a  “very  pressing  and
imminent”  danger  to  the  public.    Id.,  at  20  (citing
PC1/3919 (1810)).
  In  the  end,  these  cases  do  very  little  to  support  the
Court’s  holding.    At  most,  they  suggest  that  the  Privy
Council  might  have  possessed  some  residual  power  to
revoke  patents  to  address  wartime  necessities.    Equally,
they might serve only as more unfortunate evidence of the
maxim  that  in  time  of  war,  the  laws  fall  silent.5    But
——————

Scottish  Lord  Advocate  “ ‘was  of  opinion,  that  the  question  should  be
tried  in  a  court  of  law.’ ”    Gómez-Arostegui  &  Bottomley,  Addendum,
supra, at 23 (citing Petition of William Cunningham, p. 5, Cunningham
v. Simpson, Signet Library Edinburgh, Session Papers 207:3 (Ct. Sess.
Feb. 23, 1796)).

5 After all, the English statute of monopolies appeared to require the
“force and validitie” of all patents to be determined only by “the Comon
Lawes of this Realme & not otherwise.”  21 Jac. 1, c. 3, §2 (1624).  So
the  Privy  Council  cases  on  which  the  Court  relies  may  not  reflect  the
best understanding of the British constitution.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and discusses legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

Opinion of the Court

. . . , it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the prod-
uct of the right to call an article by its name.”  Abercrombie
&  Fitch  Co.  v.  Hunting  World,  Inc.,  537  F. 2d  4,  9  (CA2
1976).  That  principle  presupposes  that  a  generic  term
is at issue.  But the PTO’s only legal basis for deeming
“generic.com”  terms  generic  is  its  mistaken  reliance  on
Goodyear.

While  we  reject  the  rule  proffered  by  the  PTO  that
“generic.com” terms are generic names, we do not embrace
a rule automatically classifying such terms as nongeneric.
Whether any given “generic.com” term is generic, we hold,
depends on whether consumers in fact perceive that term
as the name of a class or, instead, as a term capable of dis-
tinguishing among members of the class.6

B
The  PTO,  echoed  by  the  dissent,  post,  at  10–12,  objects
that  protecting  “generic.com”  terms  as  trademarks  would

——————

6 Evidence informing that inquiry can include not only consumer sur-
veys, but also dictionaries, usage by consumers and competitors, and any
other  source  of  evidence  bearing  on  how  consumers  perceive  a  term’s
meaning.  Surveys can be helpful evidence of consumer perception but
require care in their design and interpretation.  See Brief for Trademark
Scholars  as  Amici  Curiae  18–20  (urging  that  survey  respondents  may
conflate the fact that domain names are exclusive with a conclusion that
a given “generic.com” term has achieved secondary meaning).  Moreover,
difficult questions may be presented when a term has multiple concur-
rent meanings to consumers or a meaning that has changed over time.
See, e.g., 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition §12:51 (5th
ed. 2019) (discussing terms that are “a generic name to some, a trade-
mark to others”); id., §12:49 (“Determining the distinction between ge-
neric and trademark usage of a word . . . when there are no other sellers
of  [the  good  or  service]  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  areas  of  trademark
law.”).  Such issues are not here entailed, for the PTO does not contest
the  lower  courts’  assessment  of  consumer perception  in this  case.    See
Pet. for Cert. I; Brief for Petitioners 17–18.  For the same reason, while
the dissent questions the evidence on which the lower courts relied, post,
at 7–8, 9, we have no occasion to reweigh that evidence.  Cf. post, at 1–2
(SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U51

[09-26-01 10:31:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

506

BECK v. PRUPIS

Opinion of the Court

ently wrongful under RICO. The speciﬁc type of act that is
analogous to an act of a tortious character may depend on
the underlying substantive violation the defendant is alleged
to have committed.9 However, respondents’ alleged overt
act in furtherance of their conspiracy is not independently
wrongful under any substantive provision of the statute.
Injury caused by such an act is not, therefore, sufﬁcient to
give rise to a cause of action under § 1964(c).10

Petitioner challenges this view of the statute under the
longstanding canon of statutory construction that terms in a
statute should not be construed so as to render any provision
of that statute meaningless or superﬂuous. He asserts that
under our view of the statute, any person who had a claim
for a violation of § 1962(d) would necessarily have a claim
for a violation of § 1962(a), (b), or (c). However, contrary to
petitioner’s assertions, our interpretation of § 1962(d) does
not render it mere surplusage. Under our interpretation, a
plaintiff could, through a § 1964(c) suit for a violation of

9 For example, most courts of appeals have adopted the so-called invest-
ment injury rule, which requires that a plaintiff suing for a violation of
§ 1962(a) allege injury from the defendant’s “use or invest[ment]” of income
derived from racketeering activity, see § 1962(a). See, e. g., Crowe v.
Henry, 43 F. 3d 198, 205 (CA5 1995); Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F. 3d
129, 132 (CA6) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1017 (1994). Al-
though we express no view on this issue, arguably a plaintiff suing for a
violation of § 1962(d) based on an agreement to violate § 1962(a) is required
to allege injury from the “use or invest[ment]” of illicit proceeds.

10 Respondents argue that a § 1962(d) claim must be predicated on an
actionable violation of §§ 1962(a)–(c). However, the merit of this view is
a different (albeit related) issue from the one on which we granted certio-
rari, namely, whether a plaintiff can bring a § 1962(d) claim for injury ﬂow-
ing from an overt act that is not an act of racketeering. Therefore, con-
trary to Justice Stevens’ suggestion, see post, at 511–512, we do not
resolve whether a plaintiff suing under § 1964(c) for a RICO conspiracy
must allege an actionable violation under §§ 1962(a)–(c), or whether it is
sufﬁcient for the plaintiff to allege an agreement to complete a substantive
violation and the commission of at least one act of racketeering that caused
him injury.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Beck v. Prudential*.  It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxxi

Page

839

Rekow v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1142

Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.; Hardt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

Reliford v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

REMAX of Atlanta; Udoinyion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133

Rene E. v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Renico v. Lett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1047,1145

846

Renneke v. Nebraska Dept. of Health and Human Services  . . . . .
1142

Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919

Renteria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938

Republic of Argentina v. Capital Ventures International  . . . . . . .
991

Republic of Peru; Amorrortu v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Restituto Embuscado v. DC Comics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Reust v. Alaska
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044

Rex v. Federal Aviation Administration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

Reyes v. Board of County Comm’rs of Arapahoe County  . . . . . . .
850

Reyes v. Pennsylvania
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1064

Reyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
860

Rey-Gonzalez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1006

Reyna v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reynolds; Martin v.
1010

Reynolds; Merck & Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reynolds; Merriweather v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  899,1086

1088

Reynoso v. Rock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rheault v. United States
866

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rhine v. Deaton  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811

847

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rhodes; Link v.
898

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rhodes v. Murphy
865

Rials v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Ricci v. Kamienski
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

Ricci; Sharrieff v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Rice v. Davis
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Rich v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
813

Richard, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richards; Smith v.
826

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Richards; Turay v.
932

Richardson  v.  Commission  on  Human  Rights  and  Opportunities
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  984,1090

Richardson v. Johnson
1124

Richardson v. Michigan State Treasurer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Richardson v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1082

Richardson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

Richman; Zied-Campbell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947

Richmond v. PeaceHealth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947

Richmond v. PeaceHealth Medical Group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
891

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rider; Febles v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
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  <should_index>false</should_index>
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