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  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

comment  k  had  long  required  manufacturers  invoking
the  defense  to  demonstrate  that  their  products  were  not
only “unavoidably unsafe” but also properly manufactured
and  labeled.7    By  requiring  “prope[r]  prepar[ation]”  and
“proper  directions  and  warnings”  in  §22(b)(1),  Congress
plainly  intended  to  incorporate  these  additional  comment
k requirements.

The  1986  Report  thus  confirms  petitioners’  interpreta-
tion of §22(b)(1).  The Report makes clear that “side effects
that  were  unavoidable”  in  §22(b)(1)  refers  to  side  effects
stemming from a vaccine’s design that were “unavoidable.”
By  explaining  what  Congress  meant  by  the  term  “un-
avoidable,”  moreover,  the  Report  also  confirms  that
whether  a  side  effect  is  “unavoidable”  for  purposes  of
§22(b)(1)  involves  a  specific  inquiry  in  each  case  as  to
whether  the  vaccine  “in  the  present  state  of  human  skill
and knowledge cannot be made safe,” 1986 Report 26—i.e.,
whether  a  feasible  alternative  design  existed  that  would
have  eliminated  the  adverse  side  effects  of  the  vaccine
without  compromising  its  cost  and  utility.    See  Brief  for
Kenneth W. Starr et al. as Amici Curiae 14–15 (“If a par-
ticular  plaintiff  could  show  that  her  injury  at  issue  was
avoidable  . . .  through  the  use  of  a  feasible  alternative
design  for  a  specific  vaccine,  then  she  would  satisfy  the
plain  language  of  the  statute,  because  she  would  have
demonstrated that the side effects were not unavoidable”).
Finally, the Report confirms that the “even though” clause
is properly read to establish two additional prerequisites—
proper  manufacturing  and  proper  labeling—to  qualify  for

——————

sion that “unavoidable” is a term of art.

7 See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F. 2d 652, 657
(CA1  1981);  Needham  v.  White  Labs.,  Inc.,  639  F. 2d  394,  402  (CA7
1981);  Reyes  v.  Wyeth  Labs.,  498  F. 2d  1264,  1274–1275  (CA5  1974);
Davis  v.  Wyeth  Labs.,  399  F. 2d  121,  127–129  (CA9  1968);  Feldman  v.
Lederle  Labs.,  97  N. J.  429,  448,  479  A. 2d  374,  384  (1984);  see  also
Toner v. Lederle Labs., 112 Idaho 328, 336, 732 P. 2d 297, 305 (1987).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 562 U.S. ____ (2011). It delves into the interpretation of a specific section of law and cites relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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6

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

whole.  See §1229(a).  Thus, Pereira essentially “wants to
cherry  pick  from  the  material  covered  by  the  statutory
cross-reference.  But  if  Congress  had  intended  to  refer  to
the  definition  in  [§1229(a)(1)]  alone,  it  presumably  would
have  done  so.”  Cyan,  Inc.  v.  Beaver  County  Employees
Retirement Fund, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 9).2

D
Statutory  history  also  strongly  supports  the  Govern-
ment’s argument that a notice to appear should trigger the
stop-time rule even if it fails to include the date and time
of the alien’s removal proceeding.  When Congress enacted
the  stop-time  rule,  it  decreed  that  the  rule  should  “apply
to notices to appear issued before, on, or after the date of
the  enactment  of  this  Act.”    Illegal  Immigration  Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, §309(c)(5), 110
Stat.  3009–627.    This  created  a  problem:  Up  until  that
point,  there  was  no such  thing  as a  “notice  to  appear,”  so
the  reference  to  “notices  to  appear  issued  before  . . .  this
Act”  made  little  sense.    When  Congress  became  aware  of
the problem, it responded by clarifying that the stop-time
rule should apply not only to notices to appear, but also “to
orders  to  show  cause  . . .  issued  before,  on,  or  after  the
date”  of  the  clarifying  amendment’s  enactment.    Nicara-
guan  Adjustment  and  Central  American  Relief  Act,
§203(1), 111 Stat. 2196, as amended 8 U. S. C. §1101 note.
That clarification sheds considerable light on the question
presented here because orders to show cause did not nec-
essarily include the date or location of proceedings (even if

——————

2 According  to  the  Court,  “the  broad  reference  to  §1229(a)  is  of  no
consequence,  because,  as  even  the  Government  concedes,  only  para-
graph  (1)  bears  on  the  meaning  of  a  ‘notice  to  appear.’ ”    Ante,  at  10.
But  that  is  precisely  the  point:  If  “only  paragraph  (1)  bears  on  the
meaning  of  a  ‘notice  to  appear,’ ”  then  Congress’s  decision  to  refer  to
§1229(a)  more  broadly  indicates  that  it  meant  to  do  something  other
than to pick up the substantive requirements of §1229(a)(1).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It contains legal arguments, citations to statutes and case law, and a distinct legal style.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
102  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court
Appendix B to opinion of the Court

and  imprisonment  at  hard  labor  not  more  than  two
years.”

Sec.  2.  “Where  means  of  causing abortion  are  used
for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, the sur-
geon or other person using such means is lawfully jus-
tified.”107

2.  Washington (1854):

Sec. 37.  “Every person who shall administer to any
woman  pregnant  with  a  quick  child,  any  medicine,
drug, or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any
instrument, or other means, with intent thereby to de-
stroy such child, unless the same shall have been nec-
essary to preserve the life of such mother, shall, in case
the  death  of  such  child  or  of  such  mother  be  thereby
produced,  on  conviction  thereof,  be  imprisoned  in  the
penitentiary not more than twenty years, nor less than
one year.”

Sec. 38.  “Every person who shall administer to any
pregnant woman, or to any woman who he supposes to
be  pregnant,  any  medicine,  drug,  or  substance  what-
ever, or shall use or employ any instrument, or other
means,  thereby  to  procure  the  miscarriage  of  such
woman,  unless  the  same  is  necessary  to  preserve  her
life,  shall  on  conviction  thereof,  be  imprisoned  in  the
penitentiary not more than five years, nor less than one
year, or be imprisoned in the county jail not more than
twelve months, nor less than one month, and be fined
in any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars.”108

3.  Colorado (1861):
——————

107 Haw. Penal Code, ch. 12, §§1–2 (1850) (emphasis added).  Hawaii
became  a  State  in  1959.    See  Presidential  Proclamation  No.  3309,  73
Stat. c74–c75.

108 Terr. of Wash. Stat., ch. 2, §§37–38, p. 81 (1854) (emphasis added).
Washington  became  a  State  in  1889.  See  Presidential  Proclamation
No. 8, 26 Stat. 1552–1553.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text, specifically excerpts from historical laws regarding abortion.  It is sequential and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Historical Context</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,

HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ

ALITO, J., dissenting

that  this  “accept-all-comers”  policy,  ante,  at  1,  is  both
viewpoint-neutral  and  consistent  with  Hastings’  pro-
claimed policy of fostering a diversity of viewpoints among
registered student groups.

The Court’s treatment of this case is deeply disappoint-
ing.  The  Court  does  not  address  the  constitutionality  of
the  very  different  policy  that  Hastings  invoked  when  it
denied  CLS’s  application  for  registration.    Nor  does  the
Court  address  the  constitutionality  of  the  policy  that
Hastings  now  purports  to  follow.    And  the  Court  ignores
strong  evidence  that  the  accept-all-comers  policy  is  not
viewpoint  neutral  because  it  was  announced  as  a  pretext
to justify viewpoint discrimination.  Brushing aside incon-
venient  precedent,  the  Court  arms  public  educational
institutions  with  a  handy  weapon  for  suppressing  the
speech of unpopular groups—groups to which, as Hastings
candidly puts it, these institutions “do not wish to . . . lend
their  name[s].”  Brief  for  Respondent  Hastings  College  of
Law 11; see also id., at 35.

I

The  Court  provides  a  misleading  portrayal  of  this  case.
As  related  by  the  Court,  (1)  Hastings,  for  the  past  20
years, has required any student group seeking registration
to admit any student who wishes to join, ante, at 5; (2) the
effects  of  Hastings’  refusal  to  register  CLS  have  been  of
questionable  importance,  see  ante,  at  24–25;  and  (3)  this
case is about CLS’s desire to obtain “a state subsidy,” ante,
at 15.  I begin by correcting the picture.

A
The  Court  bases  all  of  its  analysis  on  the  proposition
that  the  relevant  Hastings’  policy  is  the  so-called  accept-
all-comers  policy.  This  frees  the  Court  from  the  difficult
task of defending the constitutionality of either the policy
that  Hastings  actually—and  repeatedly—invoked  when  it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a case involving a Christian legal society and a university's policy on student groups.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxxxviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

897

Louisiana; Evans v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932

Louisiana; Holmes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Lay v.
856

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Logan v.
869

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Luna v.
877

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Odomes v.
1079

Louisiana; O’Dwyer v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1105

Louisiana; Parker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Louisiana; Pedroso v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Louisiana; Reeves v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; St. Amant v.
849

Louisiana; Schexnayder v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Louisiana; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana Dept. of Ed.; Price v.
963

Love v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

Lovely v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
871

Lovett v. McNeil
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945

Loving v. Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058

Lowe v. Mathy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
863

Lowe v. Ohio
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878

Lowell; Karagiannopoulos v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Lowery v. Utah
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Loya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
892

Loya-Sotello v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lozano v. Holder
961

Lu Baccam v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lucas v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  868,925

Lucas v. University of Colo., Health Sciences Center  . . . . . . . . . .
818

864

Lucente v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044

Ludwig; Yancey v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
867

Lugo v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lugo v. United States
1060

Lugo Luna v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Luke v. Alabama
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

Luke v. Emergency Rooms, P. S.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lumsden v. United States
869

Luna v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Luna v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Luna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  966,1060

875

Luna-Hernandez v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Lundeby v. Bruinsma  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lundy v. United States
965

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Luo v. Hempstead
1122

Luoma; Martin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
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This is a table of contents for a legal case collection.
  </thinking>
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529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

41

Thomas, J., dissenting

been activated by such a “challeng[e] to the validity of the
Secretary’s . . . regulatio[n].” 476 U. S., at 680.9

But it is one thing to conclude that the result in Ringer
would have been different had we applied Michigan Acade-
my’s § 1395ii analysis to that case; it is quite another to de-
clare that Michigan Academy effected a sub silentio over-
ruling of Ringer. Contrary to the majority’s representation,
ante, at 18, my approach entails only the former, and there-
fore does not offend stare decisis principles as a sub silentio
overruling would. As noted, supra, at 35, our opinion in
Ringer did not expressly decide the meaning of § 1395ii, as-
suming instead (as the parties had done) that § 1395ii func-
tions as a garden variety incorporating reference, i. e., that
§ 1395ii
incorporates § 405(h) in every case involving the
Medicare Act. Accordingly, “[t]he most that can be said is
that the point was in the cas[e] if anyone had seen ﬁt to
raise it. Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither
brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are
not to be considered as having been so decided as to consti-
tute precedents.” Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511 (1925).
See also, e. g., Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U. S. 266, 281
(1999) (“[T]his Court is not bound by its prior assumptions”);
United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S.
33, 38 (1952).
In other words, Michigan Academy could
not have overruled Ringer (sub silentio or otherwise) on a

9 While I readily agree with the majority’s observation that my reading
of Michigan Academy implies a different result in Ringer, I fail to com-
prehend the majority’s assertion that my view of Michigan Academy
also implies a different result in Weinberger v. Salﬁ, 422 U. S. 749 (1975).
See ante, at 18–19. As noted, supra, at 34, Salﬁ was a Social Security
case, and so § 405(h) applied of its own force.

Our post-Michigan Academy cases are entirely consistent with my
reading of Michigan Academy. For example, in Your Home Visiting
Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U. S. 449 (1999), the challenge was
directed to a particular determination of reimbursement beneﬁts, and
we held that § 405(h), as incorporated into the Medicare Act by § 1395ii,
precluded resort to general federal-question jurisdiction.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.  It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of statutory language.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

5

STEVENS, J., dissenting

course  of  bricks  on  the  secure  foundation  of  the  courses
laid  by  others  who  had  gone  before  him.”  The  Nature  of
the Judicial Process 149 (1921).

In  this  dissent  I  shall  first  explain  why  our  decision  in
Miller  was  faithful  to  the  text  of  the  Second  Amendment
and  the  purposes  revealed  in  its  drafting  history.    I  shall
then  comment  on  the  postratification  history  of  the
Amendment,  which  makes  abundantly  clear  that  the
Amendment  should  not  be  interpreted  as  limiting  the
authority of Congress to regulate the use or possession of
firearms for purely civilian purposes.

I
The text of the Second Amendment is brief.  It provides:
“A  well  regulated  Militia,  being  necessary  to  the  security
of  a  free  State,  the  right  of  the  people  to  keep  and  bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.”

Three  portions  of  that  text  merit  special  focus:  the  in
troductory  language  defining  the  Amendment’s  purpose,
the class of persons encompassed within its reach, and the
unitary nature of the right that it protects.

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State”
The  preamble  to  the  Second  Amendment  makes  three
It  identifies  the  preservation  of  the
important  points.
militia  as  the  Amendment’s  purpose;  it  explains  that  the
militia  is  necessary  to  the  security  of  a  free  State;  and  it
recognizes that the militia must be “well regulated.”  In all
three  respects  it  is  comparable  to  provisions  in  several
State  Declarations  of  Rights  that  were  adopted  roughly
contemporaneously with the Declaration of Independence.5

——————

5 The  Virginia  Declaration  of  Rights  ¶13  (1776),  provided:  “That  a
well-regulated  militia,  composed  of  the  body  of  the  people,  trained  to
arms,  is  the  proper,  natural,  and  safe  defence  of  a  free  State;  that
Standing Armies, in time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It contains legal arguments, citations, and textual analysis of the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
Opinion of the Court

B
1
HHC attempts to sow renewed doubt about §1983’s tex-
tually unqualified sweep by proffering “historical evidence.”
Brief for Petitioners 3; see also id., at 2 (asserting that “[f]or
most of this nation’s history, individuals did not have a rec-
ognized  private  right  to  enforce  obligations  prescribed  by
federal statutes”).  As background for our evaluation of the
particulars of HHC’s Spending Clause-based argument re-
garding  §1983’s  meaning,  see  Part  II–B–2,  infra,  a  fuller
picture  of  the  relevant  historical  context  is  warranted.
United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 91 U. S. 72, 79 (1875);
accord, Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes,
J., for the Court).

Before the Civil War, few direct federal protections for in-
dividual  rights  against  state  infringements  existed.  The
Thirteenth,  Fourteenth,  and  Fifteenth  Amendments
worked a sea change in this regard.  See McDonald v. Chi-
cago,  561  U. S.  742,  754  (2010);  Fitzpatrick  v.  Bitzer,  427
U. S. 445, 453–456 (1976); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339,
344–345 (1880).  Still, neither these Civil War Amendments
nor the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1866 successfully pre-
vented postbellum state actors from continuing to deprive
American citizens of federally protected rights.  Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 240 (1972).

In early 1871, a Senate Select Committee produced and
distributed  a  Report  that  ran  hundreds  of  pages  and  re-
counted  pervasive  state-sanctioned  lawlessness  and  vio-
lence against the freedmen and their White Republican al-
lies.  Monroe  v.  Pape,  365  U. S.  167,  174  (1961)  (citing  S.
Rep. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1871)).4  After reading the
——————

4 Encapsulating the Report, victim testimony, and press accounts for
his colleagues, one Congressman (as Monroe noted) lamented that “ ‘mur-
der is stalking abroad in disguise, . . . whippings and lynchings and ban-
ishment have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, [and] the
local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court. It discusses historical context surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment

(2017).  Almost all know by the end of the first trimester.
Pregnancy  Recognition  39.  Safe  and  effective  abortifa-
cients,  moreover,  are  now  readily  available,  particularly
during those early stages.  See I. Adibi et al., Abortion, 22
Geo. J. Gender & L. 279, 303 (2021).  Given all this, it is no
surprise that the vast majority of abortions happen in the
first trimester.  See Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention,  Abortion  Surveillance—United  States  1  (2020).
Presumably  most  of  the  remainder  would  also  take  place
earlier if later abortions were not a legal option.  Ample ev-
idence thus suggests that a 15-week ban provides sufficient
time, absent rare circumstances, for a woman “to decide for
herself ” whether to terminate her pregnancy.  Webster, 492
U. S., at 520 (plurality opinion).*

III
Whether  a  precedent  should  be  overruled  is  a  question
“entirely within the discretion of the court.”  Hertz v. Wood-
man, 218 U. S. 205, 212 (1910); see also Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991) (stare decisis is a “principle of pol-
icy”).  In my respectful view, the sound exercise of that dis-
cretion should have led the Court to resolve the case on the
narrower  grounds  set  forth  above,  rather  than  overruling
Roe and Casey entirely.  The Court says there is no “princi-
pled  basis”  for  this  approach,  ante,  at  73,  but  in  fact  it  is
firmly grounded in basic principles of stare decisis and judi-
cial restraint.

——————

*The majority contends that “nothing like [my approach] was recom-
mended by either party.”  Ante, at 72.  But as explained, Mississippi in
fact pressed a similar argument in its filings before this Court.  See Pet.
for Cert. 15–26; Brief for Petitioners 5, 38–48 (urging the Court to reject
the viability rule and reverse); Reply Brief 20–22 (same).  The approach
also finds support in prior opinions.  See Webster, 492 U. S., at 518–521
(plurality opinion) (abandoning “key elements” of the Roe framework un-
der stare decisis while declining to reconsider Roe’s holding that the Con-
stitution protects the right to an abortion).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. It discusses the legal reasoning behind the decision and cites previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

246,  263  (1952).    And  that’s  exactly  what  happened  here.
Before  Congress  enacted  subparagraph  (B)(i),  courts  re-
viewed  both  first-step  “eligibility”  determinations  and
second-step  “discretionary”  determinations.  Foti  v.  INS,
375  U. S.  217,  228–230,  and  n. 15  (1963)  (holding  second-
step judgments reviewable “for arbitrariness and abuse of
discretion”).  By adding subparagraph (B)(i) in 1996, Con-
gress clearly altered that regime.  Yet Congress did so care-
fully.  In  precluding  review  of  judgments  “regarding  the
granting of relief,” Congress used language very similar to
the language this Court had long used to describe second-
step  discretionary  determinations.
See,  e.g.,  INS  v.
Doherty, 502 U. S. 314, 323 (1992) (distinguishing “the dis-
cretionary grant of relief ” from prima facie eligibility); id.,
at 333 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting  in  part)  (distinguishing  “the  Attorney  General’s
power to grant . . . relief ” from judgments of “statutory in-
eligibility”); INS v. Abudu, 485 U. S. 94, 105 (1988) (distin-
guishing “the ultimate grant of relief ” from prima facie eli-
gibility  in  adjustment-of-status  cases  specifically);  INS  v.
Bagamasbad, 429 U. S. 24, 26 (1976) (per curiam) (statute
authorized “the Attorney General in his discretion to grant
relief,”  but  only  “if  certain  eligibility  requirements  are
met”).  All of which provides still one more strong indication
that Congress used the phrase “regarding the granting  of
relief ” to target step-two discretionary decisions alone.

B
Not only does the majority ignore most of these contex-
tual  clues.    Its  own  arguments  from  statutory  context  do
more to hurt than help its cause.  The majority first directs
us to § 1252(a)(2)(D).  That provision says that “[n]othing in
subparagraph  (B)  or  (C),  or  in  any  other  provision  of  this
chapter . . . which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall
be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims
or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and analyzes statutory language.  The content is sequential and focuses on a legal argument, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

296 GEBSER v. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.

Stevens, J., dissenting

Because these constructions of the statute have been ac-
cepted by Congress and are unchallenged here, they have
the same legal effect as if the private cause of action seeking
damages had been explicitly, rather than implicitly, author-
ized by Congress. We should therefore seek guidance from
the text of the statute and settled legal principles rather
than from our views about sound policy.

II

We have already noted that the text of Title IX should
be accorded “ ‘a sweep as broad as its language.’ ” North
Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting
United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787 (1966)). That sweep is
broad indeed.
“No person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, . . .
be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal ﬁnancial assistance . . . .”
20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). As Judge Rovner has correctly ob-
served, the use of passive verbs in Title IX, focusing on
the victim of the discrimination rather than the particu-
lar wrongdoer, gives this statute broader coverage than
Title VII. See Smith v. Metropolitan School Dist. Perry
Twp., 128 F. 3d 1014, 1047 (CA7 1997) (dissenting opinion).5

5 “Unlike Title VII . . . , which focuses on the discriminator, making it
unlawful for an employer to engage in certain prohibited practices (see 42
U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)), Title IX is drafted from the perspective of the per-
son discriminated against. That statute names no actor, but using passive
verbs, focuses on the setting in which the discrimination occurred.
In
effect, the statute asks but a single question—whether an individual was
subjected to discrimination under a covered program or activity. . . . And
because Title IX as drafted includes no actor at all, it necessarily follows
that the statute also would not reference ‘agents’ of that non-existent
actor.” Smith v. Metropolitan School Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F. 3d, at
1047; see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 691–693
(1979) (recognizing that Congress drafted Title IX “with an unmistakable
focus on the beneﬁted class,” and did not “writ[e] it simply as a ban on
discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. The language is formal and legalistic, discussing the interpretation of Title IX.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

17

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

an  independent  food  seller  who  just  happens to  be  highly
regulated by the restaurant’s owners.
  The  majority  also  relies  on  the  Court’s  statements  that
its  “public  function”  test  requires  that  a  function  have
been  “traditionally  and  exclusively  performed”  by  the
government.    Ante,  at  6  (emphasis  deleted);  see  Jackson,
419  U. S.,  at  352.    Properly  understood,  that  rule  cabins
liability in cases, such as Jackson, in which a private actor
ventures  of  its  own  accord  into  territory  shared  (or  regu-
lated)  by  the  government  (e.g.,  by  opening  a  power  com-
pany or a shopping center).  The Court made clear in West
that  the  rule  did  not  reach  further,  explaining  that  “the
fact  that  a  state  employee’s  role  parallels  one  in  the  pri-
vate  sector”  does  not  preclude  a  finding  of  state  action.
487 U. S., at 56, n. 15.
  When  the  government  hires  an  agent,  in  other  words,
the question is not whether it hired the agent to do some-
thing that can be done in the private marketplace too.  If
that  were  the  key  question,  the  doctor  in  West  would  not
have been a state actor.  Nobody thinks that orthopedics is
a function “traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,”
Jackson, 419 U. S., at 352.
  The majority consigns West to a footnote, asserting that
its  “scenario  is  not  present  here  because  the  government
has  no  [constitutional]  obligation  to  operate  public  access
channels.”    Ante,  at  7,  n. 1.    The  majority  suggests  that
West  is  different  because  “the  State  was  constitutionally
obligated to provide medical care to prison inmates.”  Ante,
at 7, n. 1.  But what the majority ignores is that the State
in West had no constitutional obligation to open the prison
or incarcerate the prisoner in the first place; the obligation
to  provide  medical  care  arose  when  it  made  those  prior
choices.
  The  City  had  a  comparable  constitutional  obligation
here—one brought about by its own choices, made against
a state-law backdrop.  The City, of course, had no constitu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

27

Opinion of the Court

not share that purpose.  Rather, the Soup Cans series uses
Campbell’s copyrighted work for an artistic commentary on
consumerism,  a  purpose  that  is  orthogonal  to  advertising
soup.  The use therefore does not supersede the objects of
the advertising logo.15

Moreover,  a  further  justification  for  Warhol’s  use  of
Campbell’s logo is apparent.  His Soup Cans series targets
the logo.  That is, the original copyrighted work is, at least
in part, the object of Warhol’s commentary.  It is the very
nature of Campbell’s copyrighted logo—well known to the
public, designed to be reproduced, and a symbol of an every-
day item for mass consumption—that enables the commen-
tary.  Hence, the use of the copyrighted work not only serves
a  completely  different  purpose,  to  comment  on  consumer-
ism rather than to advertise soup, it also “conjures up” the
original  work  to  “she[d]  light”  on  the  work  itself,  not  just
the subject of the work.  Campbell, 510 U. S., at 579, 588.16
Here,  by  contrast,  AWF’s  use  of  Goldsmith’s  photograph
does  not  target  the  photograph,  nor  has  AWF  offered  an-
other compelling justification for the use.  See infra, at 34–
35, and nn. 20–21.

——————

15 The situation might be different if AWF licensed Warhol’s Soup Cans
to a soup business to serve as its logo.  That use would share much the
same purpose of Campbell’s logo, even though Soup Cans has some new
meaning  or  message.    This hypothetical,  though  fanciful,  is  parallel  to
the  situation  here:  Both  Goldsmith  and  AWF  sold  images  of  Prince
(AWF’s copying Goldsmith’s) to magazines to illustrate stories about the
celebrity, which is the typical use made of Goldsmith’s photographs.

16 The dissent either does not follow, or chooses to ignore, this analysis.
The point is not simply that the Soup Cans series comments on consumer
culture, similar to how Warhol’s celebrity images comment on celebrity
culture.  Post,  at  15  (opinion  of  KAGAN,  J.).  Rather,  as  the  discussion
makes clear, the degree of difference in purpose and character between
Campbell’s  soup  label  and  Warhol’s  painting  is  nearly  absolute.    Plus,
Warhol’s  use  targets  Campbell’s  logo,  at  least  in  part.    These  features
(which are absent in this case) strengthen Warhol’s claim to fairness in
copying that logo in a painting.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Andy Warhol's use of Campbell's Soup Cans in his artwork. It delves into copyright law and the concept of fair use.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

v. United States, 562 U. S. 476, 501–502, n. 14 (2011).  As
relevant here, Congress has made clear that courts may re-
duce “an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent” such
a reduction is “expressly permitted by statute.”  18 U. S. C.
§3582(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

The First Step Act states that the district court “may . . .
impose  a  reduced  sentence  as  if ”  the  lower  sentencing
ranges for crack-cocaine offenses “were in effect at the time
the  covered  offense  was  committed.”    §404(b),  132  Stat.
5222.  By its terms, the First Step Act authorizes consider-
ation only of the lower sentencing ranges for crack-cocaine
offenses.  The First Step Act does not authorize considera-
tion of unrelated intervening legal or factual changes.  In-
deed, the relevant provision of the First Step Act does not
mention changes other than the lower sentencing ranges for
crack-cocaine offenses.  Therefore, the First Step Act does
not  “expressly  permi[t]”  reductions  based  on  those  unre-
lated intervening changes.  18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(B).

In  support  of  its  conclusion  that  district  courts  in  First
Step  Act  sentence-modification  proceedings  may  consider
other unrelated changes, the Court cites Pepper and similar
decisions.  See ante, at 8–9.  But those decisions involved
resentencings, not sentence-modification proceedings.  See
Pepper, 562 U. S., at 486–487.  Those cases therefore do not
support  the  Court’s  approach  here.    To  reiterate,  for  sen-
tence-modification proceedings, Congress has declared that
courts may reduce a sentence only as “expressly permitted
by statute.”  18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(B).  And the First Step
Act does not authorize consideration of unrelated interven-
ing legal or factual changes since the original sentencing.
The Court’s disregard of the text of the First Step Act and
§3582(c)(1)(B) will create significant and inexplicable sen-
tencing inequities.  Consider the following.  First Step Act
sentence-modification proceedings are available only for of-
fenders  who  were  sentenced  before  August  3,  2010.  So  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and statutes, making it relevant content for indexing in a legal database.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

That  action  evinces  disregard  for  even  the  newest  of  this
Court’s  precedents  and  undermines  confidence  in  this
institution.

Even  if  one  accepts  Wheaton’s  view  that  the  self-
certification  procedure  violates  RFRA,  that  would  not
justify  the  Court’s  action  today.  The  Court  grants
Wheaton a form of relief as rare as it is extreme: an inter-
locutory  injunction  under  the  All  Writs  Act,  28  U. S. C.
§1651,  blocking  the  operation  of  a  duly  enacted  law  and
regulations,  in  a  case  in  which  the  courts  below  have  not
yet adjudicated the merits of the applicant’s claims and in
which  those  courts  have  declined  requests  for  similar
injunctive  relief.
Injunctions  of  this  nature  are  proper
only  where  “the  legal  rights  at  issue  are  indisputably
clear.”  Turner  Broadcasting  System,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  507
U. S.  1301,  1303  (1993)  (Rehnquist,  C.  J.,  in  chambers)
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Yet  the  Court  today
orders  this  extraordinary  relief  even  though  no  one  could
credibly  claim  Wheaton’s  right  to  relief  is  indisputably
clear.

The  sincerity  of  Wheaton’s  deeply  held  religious  beliefs
is beyond refute.  But as a legal matter, Wheaton’s appli-
cation  comes  nowhere  near  the  high  bar  necessary  to
warrant  an  emergency  injunction  from  this  Court.    For
that reason, I respectfully dissent.

I

A

The  Affordable  Care  Act  requires  certain  employer
group health insurance plans to cover a number of preven-
tative-health services without cost sharing.  These services
include “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration . . . approved
contraceptive  methods,  sterilization  procedures,  and  pa-
tient  education  and  counseling  for  all  women  with  repro-
ductive  capacity,  as  prescribed  by  a  provider.”    77  Fed.
Reg.  8725  (2012)  (brackets  and  internal  quotation  marks
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Wheaton College v. Burwell. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER
Syllabus

than  Missouri’s  preference  for  skating  as  far  as  possible  from  reli-
gious  establishment  concerns.    In  the  face  of  the  clear  infringement
on free exercise before the Court, that interest cannot qualify as com-
pelling.  Pp. 14–15.

788 F. 3d 779, reversed and remanded.

ROBERTS,  C. J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  except  as  to  foot-
note  3.   KENNEDY,  ALITO,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined  that  opinion  in  full,
and THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined except as to footnote 3.  THOMAS,
J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  part,  in  which  GORSUCH,  J.,  joined.
GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which THOMAS, J.,
joined.  BREYER,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment.    SO-
TOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, which typically summarizes the key points of a court decision. It is not the main body of the text and is not meant to be read sequentially.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U72

[09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

26

FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. AKINS

Opinion of the Court

Finally, the FEC argues that we should deny respondents
standing because this case involves an agency’s decision not
to undertake an enforcement action—an area generally not
subject to judicial review. Brief for Petitioner 23, 29.
In
Heckler, this Court noted that agency enforcement decisions
“ha[ve] traditionally been ‘committed to agency discretion,’ ”
and concluded that Congress did not intend to alter that tra-
dition in enacting the APA.
470 U. S., at 832; cf. 5 U. S. C.
§ 701(a) (courts will not review agency actions where “stat-
utes preclude judicial review,” or where the “agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law”). We deal here
with a statute that explicitly indicates the contrary.

In sum, respondents, as voters, have satisﬁed both pru-
dential and constitutional standing requirements. They
may bring this petition for a declaration that the FEC’s
dismissal of their complaint was unlawful. See 2 U. S. C.
§ 437g(a)(8)(A).

III

The second question presented in the FEC’s petition for
certiorari is whether an organization that otherwise satisﬁes
the Act’s deﬁnition of a “political committee,” and thus is
subject to its disclosure requirements, nonetheless falls out-
side that deﬁnition because “its major purpose” is not “the
nomination or election of candidates.” The question arises
because this Court, in Buckley, said:

“To fulﬁll the purposes of the Act [the term ‘political
committee’] need only encompass organizations that are
under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of
which is the nomination or election of a candidate.” 424
U. S., at 79.

The Court reiterated in Federal Election Comm’n v. Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 252, n. 6 (1986):

“[A]n entity subject to regulation as a ‘political commit-
tee’ under the Act is one that is either ‘under the control
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins*.  It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

33

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

8–184.34  to  8–184.35;  2  Goldstein  §7.6.1.2(a),  at 7:141;  4
Patry §§13:22, 13:44, 13:44.10.

Rather than adopting the very international-exhaustion
rule  the  United  States  has  consistently  resisted  in
international-trade  negotiations,  I  would  adhere  to  the
national-exhaustion  framework  set  by  the  Copyright
Act’s  text  and  history.    Under  that  regime,  codified  in
§602(a)(1),  Kirtsaeng’s  unauthorized  importation  of  the
foreign-made  textbooks  involved  in  this  case  infringed
Wiley’s  copyrights.  I  would  therefore  affirm  the  Second
Circuit’s judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It includes citations to legal sources and discusses legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
Syllabus

U. S. ___, the Court opted to remand without deciding the RFRA ques-
tion in cases challenging the self-certification accommodation so that
the  parties  could  develop  an  approach  that  would  accommodate  em-
ployers’ concerns while providing women full and equal coverage.

Under Zubik’s direction and in light of Hobby Lobby’s holding, the
Departments  promulgated  two  interim  final  rules  (IFRs).    The  first
significantly expanded the church exemption to include  an employer
that  “objects  . . .  based  on  its  sincerely  held  religious  beliefs,”  “to  its
establishing, maintaining, providing, offering, or arranging [for] cov-
erage or payments for some or all contraceptive services.”  82 Fed. Reg.
47812.  The second created a similar “moral exemption” for employers
with sincerely held moral objections to providing some or all forms of
contraceptive  coverage.    The  Departments  requested  post-promulga-
tion comments on both IFRs.

Pennsylvania  sued,  alleging  that  the  IFRs  were  procedurally  and
substantively invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
After the Departments issued final rules, responding to post-promul-
gation  comments  but  leaving  the  IFRs  largely  intact,  New  Jersey
joined Pennsylvania’s suit.  Together they filed an amended complaint,
alleging  that  the  rules  were  substantively  unlawful  because  the  De-
partments lacked statutory authority under either the ACA or RFRA
to promulgate the exemptions.  They also argued that the rules were
procedurally defective because the Departments failed to comply with
the APA’s notice and comment procedures.  The District Court issued
a preliminary nationwide injunction against the implementation of the
final rules, and the Third Circuit affirmed.

Held:

1. The Departments had the authority under the ACA to promulgate

the religious and moral exemptions.  Pp. 14–22.

(a) As  legal  authority  for  both  exemptions,  the  Departments  in-
voke §300gg–13(a)(4), which states that group health plans must pro-
vide women with “preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for
in  comprehensive  guidelines  supported  by  [HRSA].”  The  pivotal
phrase, “as provided for,” grants sweeping authority to HRSA to define
the  preventive  care  that  applicable  health  plans  must  cover.    That
same grant of authority empowers it to identify and create exemptions
from its own Guidelines.  The “fundamental principle of statutory in-
terpretation  that  ‘absent  provision[s]  cannot  be  supplied  by  the
courts,’ ” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U. S. ___, ___ applies not only to add-
ing terms not found in the statute, but also to imposing limits on an
agency’s discretion that are not supported by the text, see Watt v. En-
ergy  Action  Ed.  Foundation,  454  U.  S.  151,  168.  Concerns  that  the
exemptions thwart Congress’ intent by making it significantly harder
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

Opinion of the Court

See  40  F. 4th  1049,  1057–1058  (2022).    Correctly  inter-
preted, he explained, clause (iv) reaches only criminal solic-
itation and aiding and abetting.  Ibid.  On that reading, the
provision raises no overbreadth problem because, “[e]ven if
§1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) somehow reaches protected speech, that
reach is far outweighed by the provision’s broad legitimate
sweep.”  Id., at 1072.
  We granted certiorari.  598 U. S. ___ (2022).

II
  The  First  Amendment  provides  that  “Congress  shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”  Wisely,
Hansen does not claim that the First Amendment protects
the communications for which he was prosecuted.  Cf. Illi-
nois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538
U. S.  600,  612  (2003)  (“[T]he  First  Amendment  does  not
shield fraud”).  Instead, he raises an overbreadth challenge:
He  argues  that  clause  (iv)  punishes  so  much  protected
speech that it cannot be applied to anyone, including him.
Brief for Respondent 9–10.
  An overbreadth challenge is unusual.  For one thing, liti-
gants  typically  lack  standing  to  assert  the  constitutional
rights of third parties.  See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S.
400,  410  (1991).    For  another,  litigants  mounting  a  facial
challenge to a statute normally “must establish that no set
of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be
valid.”  United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987)
(emphasis added).  Breaking from both of these rules, the
overbreadth doctrine instructs a court to hold a statute fa-
cially  unconstitutional  even  though  it  has  lawful  applica-
tions, and even at the behest of someone to whom the stat-
ute can be lawfully applied.
  We have justified this doctrine on the ground that it pro-
vides breathing room for free expression.  Overbroad laws
“may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech,” and
if  would-be  speakers  remain  silent,  society  will  lose  their
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the First Amendment and an overbreadth challenge to a specific statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1109

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No. 09–6389.  Beras v. Carvlin et al.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Motion
of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed
in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  1022]  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor
took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  motion.

No.  09–6412.  In  re  Alpine.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[ante,  p.  1023]  denied.

No. 09–6610.  Johnson v.  Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsidera
tion  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,
p.  1022]  denied.

No.  09–6682.  Hill  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.;

No.  09–7108.  Muino  v.  Florida  Power  &  Light  Co.  et  al.

C.  A.  11th  Cir.;

No.  09–7275.  Jones  v.  Shaw  Group  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.;
No.  09–7294.  Solomon  v.  Pioneer  Adult  Rehabilitation

Center.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.;  and

No.  09–7306.  Asbury  v.  City  of  Roanoke,  Virginia.  C.  A.
4th  Cir.  Motions  of  petitioners  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma
pauperis  denied.  Petitioners  are  allowed  until  February  1,  2010,
within  which  to  pay  the  docketing  fees  required  by  Rule  38(a)
and  to  submit  petitions  in  compliance  with  Rule  33.1  of  the  Rules
of  this  Court.

No.  09–6692.  Struck  v.  Cook  County  Public  Guardian.
App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration
of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,
p.  1009]  denied.

No.  09–644.  In  re  Moses;
No.  09–7836.  In  re  Totaro;
No.  09–7960.  In  re  Williams;  and
No. 09–8019.  In re Singleton.  Petitions for writs of habeas

corpus  denied.

No.  09–7659.  In  re  Chekkouri.  Motion  of  petitioner  to  un
seal  pleadings  before  this  Court  denied.  Petition  for  writ  of  ha
beas  corpus  denied.

No.  09–7961.  In  re  Wagner.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave
to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  petition  for  writ  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, detailing motions and decisions related to various cases. It's not sequential narrative text and focuses on legal proceedings rather than a story or informative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

law, ante, at 13, the plurality fundamentally misconceives
how  international  law  works  and  so  misapplies  the  first
step of Sosa.

A
In Sosa, the Court considered whether a Mexican citizen

could  recover  under  the  ATS  for  a  claim  of  arbitrary  de
tention by a Mexican national who had been hired by the
Drug  Enforcement  Administration  to  seize  and  transport
him to the United States.  See 542 U. S., at 697–698.  The
Court  held that  the  ATS  permits  federal  courts  to  “recog
nize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of
the  law  of  nations,”  id.,  at  724,  without  the  need  for  any
“further congressional action,” id., at 712.  The Court then
articulated  a  two-step  framework  to  guide  that  inquiry.
First,  a  court  must  determine  whether  the  particular
international-law  norm  alleged  to  have  been  violated  is
“accepted  by  the  civilized  world  and  defined  with  a  speci
ficity comparable to the features of the 18th-century para
digms,” i.e., “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”  Id., at 724–725.  Only
if  the  norm  is  “ ‘specific,  universal,  and  obligatory’ ”  may
federal courts recognize a cause of action for its violation.
Kiobel  v.  Royal  Dutch  Petroleum  Co.,  569  U. S.  108,  117
(2013)  (quoting  Sosa,  542  U. S.,  at  732).    Second,  if  that
threshold  hurdle  is  satisfied,  a  court  should  consider
whether allowing a particular case to proceed is an appro
priate  exercise  of  judicial  discretion.  Sosa,  542  U. S.,  at
727–728,  732–733,  738.    Applying  that  framework,  Sosa
held  that  the  alleged  arbitrary  detention  claim  at  issue
failed at step one because “a single illegal detention of less
than  a  day,  followed  by  the  transfer  of  custody  to  lawful
authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of
customary international law so well defined as to support
the creation of a federal remedy.”  Id., at 738.

Sosa’s  norm-specific  first  step  is  inapposite  to  the  cate
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC. It discusses the Sosa framework for determining whether a cause of action exists under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for violations of international law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

KENNEDY, J., dissenting

circular geographic area around the site.  It has three (or
sometimes  six)  separate  antennas  pointing  in  different
directions.  Each  provides  cell  service  for  a  different  120-
degree (or 60-degree) sector of the cell site’s circular cover-
age area.  So a cell phone activated on the north side of a
cell  site  will  connect  to  a  different  antenna  than  a  cell
phone on the south side.

Cell  phone  service  providers  create  records  each  time  a
cell  phone  connects  to  an  antenna  at  a  cell  site.    For  a
phone  call,  for  example,  the  provider  records  the  date,
time, and duration of the call; the phone numbers making
and  receiving  the  call;  and,  most  relevant  here,  the  cell
site used to make the call, as well as the specific antenna
that made the connection.  The cell-site and antenna data
points, together with the date and time of connection, are
known as cell-site location information, or cell-site records.
By  linking  an  individual’s  cell  phone  to  a  particular  120-
or  60-degree  sector  of  a  cell  site’s  coverage  area  at  a  par-
ticular time, cell-site records reveal the general location of
the cell phone user.

The location information revealed by cell-site records is
imprecise,  because  an  individual  cell-site  sector  usually
covers a large geographic area.  The FBI agent who offered
expert  testimony  about  the  cell-site  records  at  issue  here
testified  that  a  cell  site  in  a  city  reaches  between  a  half
mile  and  two  miles  in  all  directions.  That  means  a  60-
degree  sector  covers  between  approximately  one-eighth
and two square miles (and a 120-degree sector twice that
area).  To put that in perspective, in urban areas cell-site
records often would reveal the location of a cell phone user
within  an  area  covering  between  around  a  dozen  and
several  hundred  city  blocks.    In  rural  areas  cell-site  rec-
ords can be up to 40 times more imprecise.  By contrast, a
Global  Positioning  System  (GPS)  can  reveal  an  individ-
ual’s location within around 15 feet.

Major cell phone service providers keep cell-site records
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal case, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Kennedy. It discusses the technical aspects of cell phone technology and the limitations of cell-site location information (CSLI) as evidence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

165

Syllabus

NRG  POWER  MARKETING,  LLC,  et al.  v.  MAINE

PUBLIC  UTILITIES  COMMISSION  et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit

No. 08–674.  Argued November 3, 2009—Decided January 13, 2010

The Mobile-Sierra doctrine—see United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.  Mobile Gas
Service  Corp.,  350  U. S.  332,  and  FPC  v.  Sierra  Paciﬁc  Power  Co.,
350  U. S.  348—requires  the  Federal  Energy  Regulatory  Commission
(FERC)  to  presume  that  an  electricity  rate  set  by  a  freely  negotiated
wholesale-energy contract meets the Federal Power Act’s “just and rea
sonable”  prescription,  16  U. S. C.  § 824d(a);  the  presumption  may  be
overcome only if FERC concludes that the contract seriously harms the
public  interest.  Morgan  Stanley  Capital  Group  Inc.  v.  Public  Util.
Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U. S. 527, 530.

For  many  years,  New  England’s  supply  of  electricity  capacity  was
barely  sufﬁcient  to  meet  the  region’s  demand.  FERC  and  New  Eng
land’s generators, electricity providers, and power customers made sev
eral attempts to address the problem.  This case arises from the latest
effort to design a solution.  Concerned parties reached a comprehensive
settlement  agreement  (Agreement)  that,  inter  alia,  established  rate-
setting  mechanisms  for  sales  of  energy  capacity  and  provided  that  the
Mobile-Sierra  public  interest  standard  would  govern  rate  challenges.
FERC approved the Agreement, ﬁnding that it presents a just and rea
sonable  outcome  that  is  consistent  with  the  public  interest.  Objectors
to  the  settlement  sought  review  in  the  D.  C.  Circuit,  which  largely  re
jected their efforts to overturn FERC’s approval order, but agreed with
them that when a challenge to a contract rate is brought by noncontract
ing  third  parties,  Mobile-Sierra’s  public  interest  standard  does  not
apply.

Held:  The Mobile-Sierra presumption does not depend on the identity of
the  complainant  who  seeks  FERC  investigation.  The  presumption  is
not  limited  to  challenges  to  contract  rates  brought  by  contracting
parties.  It  applies,  as  well,  to  challenges  initiated  by  noncontracting
parties.  Pp. 171–177.

(a)  Morgan  Stanley  did  not  reach  the  question  presented  here,  but
its  reasoning  strongly  suggests  that  the  D.  C.  Circuit’s  holding  misper
ceives the aim, and diminishes the force, of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.
Announced three months after the Court of Appeals’ disposition in this
case,  Morgan  Stanley  reafﬁrmed  Mobile-Sierra’s  instruction  to  FERC
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary. It includes information about the case name, court, citation, and a brief overview of the legal issue and the court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

to  Pet.  for  Cert.  in  No.  18–587,  at  104a  (DACA  and  ex-
panded DACA); 8 CFR §214.11(j)(3) (T visas); §214.14(d)(2)
(U  visas);  62  Fed.  Reg.  63249,  63253  (1997)  (discussing
Exec.  Order  No.  12711  for  certain  citizens  of  the  People’s
Republic of China).  The Government has made clear time
and again that, because “deferred action is not an immigra-
tion status, no alien has the right to deferred action.  It is
used solely in the discretion of the [Government] and con-
fers no protection or benefit upon an alien.”  DHS Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement Office of Detention and Re-
moval,  Detention  and  Deportation  Officers’  Field  Manual
§20.8 (Mar. 27, 2006); see also Memorandum from D. Meiss-
ner,  Comm’r,  INS,  to  Regional  Directors  et al.,  pp. 11–12
(Nov. 17, 2000); Memorandum from W. Yates, Assoc. Direc-
tor  of  Operations,  DHS,  Citizenship  and  Immigration
Servs., to Director, Vt. Serv. Center, p. 5 (2003).  Thus, con-
trary to the majority’s unsupported assertion, ante, at 23,
this longstanding administrative treatment of deferred ac-
tion provides strong evidence and authority for the proposi-
tion that an agency need not consider reliance interests in
this context.16

Finally, it is inconceivable to require DHS to study reli-
ance interests before rescinding DACA considering how the
program  was  previously  defended.    DHS  has  made  clear
since DACA’s inception that it would not consider such re-
liance interests.  Contemporaneous with the DACA memo,
DHS stated that “DHS can terminate or renew deferred ac-
tion at any time at the agency’s discretion.”  Consideration

——————

16 The majority’s approach will make it far more difficult to change
deferred-action programs going forward, which is hardly in keeping with
this  Court’s  own  understanding  that  deferred  action  is  an  “exercise  in
administrative discretion” used for administrative “convenience.”  Reno
v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 484 (1999).
Agencies will likely be less willing to grant deferred action knowing that
any attempts to undo it will require years of litigation and time-consuming
rulemakings.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the legal arguments surrounding the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

23

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

expanded,  bringing  in  individuals  formerly  excluded.    In
that way, the constitutional values of liberty and equality
go hand in hand; they do not inhabit the hermetically sealed
containers the majority portrays.  Compare Obergefell, 576
U. S., at 672–675, with ante, at 10–11.  So before Roe and
Casey,  the  Court  expanded  in  successive  cases  those  who
could claim the right to marry—though their relationships
would  have  been  outside  the  law’s  protection  in  the  mid-
19th century.  See, e.g., Loving, 388 U. S. 1 (interracial cou-
ples); Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987) (prisoners); see
also, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651–652 (1972)
(offering constitutional protection to untraditional “family
unit[s]”).  And after Roe and Casey, of course, the Court con-
tinued  in  that  vein.  With  a  critical  stop  to  hold  that  the
Fourteenth  Amendment  protected  same-sex  intimacy,  the
Court  resolved  that  the  Amendment  also  conferred  on
same-sex  couples  the  right  to  marry.    See  Lawrence,  539
U. S.  558;  Obergefell,  576  U. S.  644.    In  considering  that
question,  the  Court  held,  “[h]istory  and  tradition,”  espe-
cially as reflected in the course of our precedent, “guide and
discipline [the] inquiry.”  Id., at 664.  But the sentiments of
1868 alone do not and cannot “rule the present.”  Ibid.

Casey similarly recognized the need to extend the consti-
tutional  sphere  of  liberty  to  a  previously  excluded  group.
The Court then understood, as the majority today does not,
that the men who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and
wrote the state laws of the time did not view women as full
and equal citizens.  See supra, at 15.  A woman then, Casey
wrote, “had no legal existence separate from her husband.”
505 U. S., at 897.  Women were seen only “as the center of
home and family life,” without “full and independent legal
status under the Constitution.”  Ibid.  But that could not be
true any longer: The State could not now insist on the his-
torically dominant “vision of the woman’s role.”  Id., at 852.
And equal citizenship, Casey realized, was inescapably con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues that the majority opinion is wrong to restrict access to abortion based on historical precedent, citing other cases where the Court expanded rights to previously excluded groups.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Syllabus

limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by
this chapter, including the establishment of additional prerequisites to
the  exercise  of  any  such  right  or  the  receipt  of  any  such  benefit.”
§4302(b).  Neither Seminole Tribe nor Alden compels a different result.
Congress’  commerce  powers,  at  issue  in  Seminole  Tribe,  are  distin-
guishable  from  its  war  powers  under  PennEast’s  “complete  in  itself”
inquiry.  And in Alden, the Court expressly embraced “ ‘the postulate
that States . . . shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save
where there has been “a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the
convention.” ’ ”  527 U. S., at 730 (emphasis added).  That “save where”
proviso recognizes exceptions for structural waivers, supplying the ba-
sis for the Court’s decisions in PennEast and Katz, as well as the deci-
sion today.   Finally, the idea that PennEast and Katz involved in rem
actions  and  the  fact  that  USERRA  suits  lack  a  certain  founding-era
pedigree do not make a difference under PennEast’s basic reasoning.

The Court therefore holds that, in joining together to form a Union,
the States agreed to sacrifice their sovereign immunity for the good of
the common defense.  Pp. 12–16.

583 S. W. 3d 221, reversed and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.  KAGAN, J., filed a
concurring  opinion.  THOMAS,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which
ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision and reasoning.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–659
_________________

LARRY THOMPSON, PETITIONER v.
PAGIEL CLARK, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[April 4, 2022]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Larry Thompson was charged and detained in state crim-
inal  proceedings,  but  the  charges  were  dismissed  before
trial  without  any  explanation  by  the  prosecutor  or  judge.
After the dismissal, Thompson alleged that the police offic-
ers who initiated the criminal proceedings had “maliciously
prosecuted”  him  without  probable  cause.  App.  33–34.
Thompson sued and sought money damages from those of-
ficers  in  federal  court.    As  relevant  here,  he  advanced  a
Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U. S. C. §1983 for ma-
licious prosecution.

To maintain that Fourth Amendment claim under §1983,
a  plaintiff  such  as  Thompson  must  demonstrate,  among
other things, that he obtained a favorable termination of the
underlying  criminal  prosecution.  Cf.  Heck  v.  Humphrey,
512 U. S. 477, 484, and n. 4 (1994).  This case requires us to
flesh out what a favorable termination entails.  Does it suf-
fice  for  a  plaintiff  to  show  that  his  criminal  prosecution
ended  without  a  conviction?  Or  must  the  plaintiff  also
demonstrate that the prosecution ended with some affirm-
ative indication of his innocence, such as an acquittal or a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes case citations, the name of the court, the parties involved, and the date of the opinion. This type of content is highly suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE

BREYER, J., dissenting

who  have  probably  moved.    But  more  often  than  not,  the
State  fails  to  receive  anything  back  from  the  registrant,
and  the  fact  that  the  State  hears  nothing  from  the  regis-
trant essentially proves nothing at all.
  Anyone  who  doubts  this  last  statement  need  simply
consult  figures  in  the  record  along  with  a  few  generally
available  statistics.    As  a  general  matter,  the  problem
these  numbers  reveal  is  as  follows:  Very  few  registered
voters  move  outside  of  their  county  of  registration.    But
many registered voters fail to vote.  Most registered voters
who  fail  to  vote  also  fail  to  respond  to  the  State’s  “last
chance”  notice.    And the  number  of  registered voters  who
both  fail  to  vote  and  fail  to  respond  to  the  “last  chance”
notice  exceeds  the  number  of  registered  voters  who  move
outside of their county each year.
  Consider the following facts.  First, Ohio tells us that a
small number of Americans—about 4% of all Americans—
move outside of their county each year.  Record 376.  (The
majority suggests the relevant number is 10%, ante, at 2,
but  that  includes  people  who  move  within  their  county.)
At the same time, a large number of American voters fail
to vote, and Ohio voters are no exception.  In 2014, around
59% of Ohio’s registered voters failed to vote.  See Brief for
League  of  Women  Voters  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  16,  and
n. 12 (citing Ohio Secretary of State, 2014 Official Election
Results).
  Although many registrants fail to vote and only a small
number move, under the Supplemental Process, Ohio uses
a registrant’s failure to vote to identify that registrant as a
person  whose  address  has  likely  changed.    The  record
shows that in 2012 Ohio identified about 1.5 million regis-
tered  voters—nearly  20%  of  its  8  million  registered  vot-
ers—as likely ineligible to remain on the federal voter roll
because they changed their residences.  Record 475.  Ohio
then sent those 1.5 million registered voters subsubsection
(d)  “last  chance”  confirmation  notices.    In  response  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the Supplemental Process used in Ohio to identify potentially ineligible voters.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CARSON v. MAKIN

BREYER, J., dissenting

thereof.”  Each  Clause,  linguistically  speaking,  is  “cast  in
absolute terms.”  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York,
397 U. S. 664, 668 (1970).  The first Clause, the Establish-
ment Clause, seems to bar all government “sponsorship, fi-
nancial support, [or] active involvement . . . in religious ac-
tivity,” while the second Clause, the Free Exercise Clause,
seems to bar all “governmental restraint on religious prac-
tice.”  Id., at 668, 670.  The apparently absolutist nature of
these  two  prohibitions  means  that  either  Clause,  “if  ex-
panded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other.”  Id., at 668–669.  Because of this, we have said, the
two  Clauses  “are  frequently  in  tension,”    Locke  v.  Davey,
540 U. S. 712, 718 (2004), and “often exert conflicting pres-
sures” on government action, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S.
709, 719 (2005).

On  the  one  hand,  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  “ ‘protect[s]
religious  observers  against  unequal  treatment.’ ”  Trinity
Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (quoting Church
of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 542
(1993);  alteration  in  original).  We  have  said  that,  in  the
education context, this means that States generally cannot
“ba[r] religious schools from public benefits solely because
of the religious character of the schools.”  Espinoza v. Mon-
tana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at
9); see Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at
9–10).

On the other hand, the Establishment Clause “commands
a separation of church and state.”  Cutter, 544 U. S., at 719.
A State cannot act to “aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another.”  Everson v. Board of Ed.
of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1947).  This means that a State
cannot use “its public school system to aid any or all reli-
gious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines
and  ideals.”  Illinois  ex  rel.  McCollum  v.  Board  of  Ed.  of
School  Dist.  No.  71,  Champaign  Cty.,  333  U. S.  203,  211
(1948).  Nor may a State “adopt programs or practices in its
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Carson v. Makin. It delves into the interpretation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Rahimi presented a credible threat and prohibited him from
using physical force against C. M., the order automatically
triggered  §922(g)(8)’s  firearms  ban.    A  year  later,  officers
discovered  firearms  in  Rahimi’s  home.  Rahimi  pleaded
guilty to violating §922(g)(8).

Before his guilty plea, Rahimi challenged his conviction
under  the  Second  Amendment.    He  pointed  to  District  of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008), which held that
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep
and bear firearms.  Section 922(g)(8), Rahimi argued, vio-
lates that right by penalizing firearms possession.  The Dis-
trict  Court  rejected  Rahimi’s  claim.    At  that  time,  the
Courts  of  Appeals,  including  the  Fifth  Circuit,  applied  a
form of means-end scrutiny to Second Amendment claims.
See, e.g., United States v. McGinnis, 956 F. 3d 747, 753–754
(2020).  Applying  Circuit  precedent,  the  Fifth  Circuit  af-
firmed the District Court.  2022 WL 2070392 (2022).

Roughly two weeks later, this Court issued its opinion in
New  York  State  Rifle  &  Pistol  Assn.,  Inc.  v.  Bruen.  The
Court  rejected  the  means-end-scrutiny  approach  and  laid
out the appropriate framework for assessing whether a fire-
arm regulation is constitutional.  Bruen, 597 U. S., at 17–
19.  That framework requires the Government to prove that
the “regulation is part of the historical tradition that delim-
its  the  outer  bounds  of  the  right  to  keep  and  bear  arms.”
Id., at 19.  The Fifth Circuit withdrew its opinion to apply
the correct framework to Rahimi’s claim.  Relying on Bruen,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Government failed to
present historical evidence that §922(g)(8) “fits within our
Nation’s  historical  tradition  of  firearm  regulation.”    61  F.
4th 443, 460 (2023).  The Fifth Circuit, accordingly, vacated
Rahimi’s conviction.  We granted certiorari.  600 U. S. ___
(2023).

II
The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case of *Rahimi v. United States*. It discusses the Second Amendment, relevant case law (including *Heller* and *Bruen*), and the specific legal arguments made in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring

381 U. S. 479 (1965) (right of married persons to obtain con-
traceptives)*; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (right
to engage in private, consensual sexual acts); and Oberge-
fell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to same-sex mar-
riage),  are  not  at  issue.    The  Court’s  abortion  cases  are
unique,  see  ante,  at  31–32,  66,  71–72,  and  no  party  has
asked us to decide “whether our entire Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence must be preserved or revised,” McDon-
ald, 561 U. S., at 813 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).  Thus, I agree
that  “[n]othing  in  [the  Court’s]  opinion  should  be  under-
stood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abor-
tion.”  Ante, at 66.

For that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider all
of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, includ-
ing Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell.  Because any sub-
stantive due process decision is “demonstrably erroneous,”
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (THOMAS, J.,
concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7), we have a duty to
“correct the error” established in those precedents, Gamble
v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring) (slip op., at 9).  After overruling these demonstra-
bly  erroneous  decisions,  the  question  would  remain
whether other constitutional provisions guarantee the myr-
iad rights that our substantive due process cases have gen-
erated.  For example, we could consider whether any of the
rights  announced  in  this  Court’s  substantive  due  process
cases are “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States”  protected  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.    Amdt.
——————

*Griswold  v.  Connecticut  purported  not  to  rely  on  the  Due  Process
Clause,  but  rather  reasoned  “that  specific  guarantees  in  the  Bill  of
Rights”—including rights enumerated in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and  Ninth  Amendments—“have  penumbras,  formed  by  emanations,”
that  create  “zones  of  privacy.”    381  U. S.,  at  484.    Since  Griswold,  the
Court, perhaps recognizing the facial absurdity of Griswold’s penumbral
argument,  has  characterized  the  decision  as  one  rooted  in  substantive
due process.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 663 (2015);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720 (1997).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It cites previous cases and argues for reconsidering substantive due process precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1131

529 U. S.

May 22, 2000

No. 99–1610. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Laney et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 281.

No. 99–1617. McMaster v. Michigan National Corp. et al.
Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 459 Mich.
989, 595 N. W. 2d 823.

No. 99–1661. Rennert v. United States; Miller v. United
States; and Jensen v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 255.

No. 99–1670. Webb et ux. v. Mendenhall et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 388.

No. 99–1703. Choe v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 833.

No. 99–1712. Benavides v. Gerver et ux. Sup. Ct. App.
W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 W. Va. 228, 530
S. E. 2d 701.

No. 99–6879. Marlow v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 644.

No. 99–7908. Rodia v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 465.

No. 99–7918. Williams v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1324.

No. 99–7958. Dewberry v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 4 S. W. 3d 735.

No. 99–8016. Abram v. Laxton et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 249.

No. 99–8244. Richardson v. Richardson;
No. 99–8245. Richardson v. America Online;
No. 99–8246. Richardson v. Sprint PCS;
No. 99– 8247. Richardson v. First National Bank of

Maryland; and

No. 99–8287. Richardson v. Bell Atlantic Corp. C. A.

4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1327.

No. 99–8271. Burton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 461.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for indexing as part of a typical document's content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
990

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  08–10337.  Bisby  v.  Crites,  Assistant  Warden,  et  al.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.
Appx.  631.

No.  08–10666.  Yost  v.  West  Virginia.  Cir.  Ct.  Raleigh

County,  W. Va.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10723.  N.  I.  v.  Orange  County  Social  Services
Agency  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.  Dist.,  Div.  3.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–10827.  Musick  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  291  Fed.  Appx.  706.

No.  08–10845.  Ogunde  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  08–11065.  Gutierrez  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.
Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 45 Cal. 4th 789, 200 P. 3d 847.

No.  09– 3.  Daewoo  Engineering  &  Construction  Co.,
Ltd.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  1332.

No.  09–77.  Martinez-Rodriguez  v.  Holder,  Attorney
General.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
313  Fed.  Appx.  154.

No.  09–88.  Biltmore  Forest  Broadcasting  FM,  Inc.  v.
United  States.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  555  F.  3d  1375.

No.  09–95.  Grenada  Stamping  &  Assembly  Inc.  v.  Na
tional  Labor  Relations  Board.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  404.

No.  09–117.  Apotex,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  Sanofi-Synthelabo
et al.  C. A. Fed. Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 550
F.  3d  1075.

No.  09–202.  Ward  v.  Trans  Union,  LLC.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  613.

No.  09–212.  Lenham  v.  Disabled  American  Veterans

et  al.  Ct.  App.  N.  M.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case summaries from a legal document, likely a Supreme Court docket. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for indexing as it is.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

The Seventh Circuit’s decision conflicted with an earlier
decision of the Fifth Circuit.  See Eastus v. ISS Facility Ser-
vices, Inc., 960 F. 3d 207 (2020).  We granted certiorari to
resolve the disagreement.  595 U. S. ___ (2021).

II
In this case, we must decide whether Saxon falls within
a  “class  of  workers  engaged  in  foreign  or  interstate  com-
merce.”  9 U. S. C. §1.  We interpret this language according
to its “ ‘ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’ ”  San-
difer v. United States Steel Corp., 571 U. S. 220, 227 (2014)
(quoting Perrin v.  United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979));
see also New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. ___, ___–___
(2019) (slip op., at 6–7).  To discern that ordinary meaning,
those words “ ‘must be read’ ” and interpreted “ ‘in their con-
text,’ ”  not  in  isolation.  Parker  Drilling  Management  Ser-
vices, Ltd. v. Newton, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at
5) (quoting Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 U. S. 93,
101 (2012)).

We  begin  by  defining  the  relevant  “class  of  workers”  to
which  Saxon  belongs.   Then,  we  determine  whether  that
class  of  workers  is  “engaged  in  foreign  or  interstate  com-
merce.”

A
First, the parties dispute how to define the relevant “class
of workers.”  Saxon argues that because air transportation
“[a]s an industry” is engaged in interstate commerce, “air-
line employees” constitute a “ ‘class of workers’ ” covered by
§1.  Brief for Respondent 17.  Southwest, by contrast, main-
tains  that  §1  “exempts  classes  of  workers  based  on  their
conduct, not their employer’s,” and the relevant class there-
fore includes only those airline employees who are actually
engaged  in interstate  commerce  in  their  day-to-day  work.
Reply Brief 4.  The Court of Appeals rejected Saxon’s indus-
trywide approach, see 993 F. 3d, at 497, and so do we.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, legal jargon, and discusses a specific case and legal interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

vii

Page
214
AT&T Co. v. Central Ofﬁce Telephone, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
AT&T Corp. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
AT&T Corp.; Hassan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903
Attorney General v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.
937
Attorney General of Conn. v. Philip Morris, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Attorney General of Md.; Carter v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
Avery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Ayala v. Speckard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950
Ayars, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
B. v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Babbitt; Mausolf v.
937
Babbitt; National Assn. of Home Builders of U. S. v.
. . . . . . . . . .
950
Baez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
321
Bajakajian; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
Baksh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
666
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Balsys; United States v.
946
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bankhead v. Mississippi
Bank of America Nat. Tr. & Sav. Assn. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship 914,975
916
Baptist Medical Center Hospital; Davis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Baptist Memorial Hospital System; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952
Barandiaran v. TCW Special Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Barbary v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Barbir v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barcena v. Illinois Dept. of Public Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Barker v. Leeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,970
Barkin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935,972
909
Barnes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barnett; Abrams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913,954
Barnett; Bialczak v.
933
Barrier v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barrier v. Marin General Hospital
906
Bartlett; Walton v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
Bartley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Baruch v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
Bates v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,971
Batista; Adames v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957,972
Battelle Memorial Institute; Roberts v.
953
Bauchman v. West High School
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Bayer v. Stanford Univ. School of Medicine/Medical Center . . . . .
953
Bazzetta v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947
B. C. Rogers Processors, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Beckwith Machinery Co.; Zerebnick v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Beggerly; United States v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report.  It lists the cases in order of appearance and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>