<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Opinion of the Court

time was City of Mobile v. Bolden, which involved a claim
by black voters that the City’s at-large election system ef-
fectively excluded them from participating in the election of
city commissioners.  446 U. S. 55 (1980).  The commission
had  three  seats,  black  voters  comprised  one-third  of  the
City’s  population,  but  no  black-preferred  candidate  had
ever won election.
  The  Court  ruled  against  the  plaintiffs.    The  Fifteenth
Amendment—and  thus  §2—prohibits  States  from  acting
with a “racially discriminatory motivation” or an “invidious
purpose” to discriminate.  Id., at 61–65 (plurality opinion).
But it does not prohibit laws that are discriminatory only
in  effect.    Ibid.    The  Mobile  plaintiffs  could  “register  and
vote without hindrance”—“their freedom to vote ha[d] not
been  denied  or  abridged  by  anyone.”   Id.,  at  65.   The fact
that they happened to lose frequently was beside the point.
Nothing the City had done “purposeful[ly] exclu[ded]” them
“from participati[ng] in the election process.”  Id., at 64.
  Almost  immediately  after  it  was  decided,  Mobile  “pro-
duced  an  avalanche  of  criticism,  both  in  the  media  and
within the civil rights community.”  T. Boyd & S. Markman,
The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legisla-
tive  History,  40  Wash.  &  Lee  L.  Rev.  1347,  1355  (1983)
(Boyd & Markman).  The New York Times wrote that the
decision  represented  “the  biggest  step  backwards  in  civil
rights to come from the Nixon Court.”  N. Y. Times, Apr. 23,
1980, p. A22.  And the Washington Post described Mobile
as a “major defeat for blacks and other minorities fighting
electoral schemes that exclude them from office.”  Washing-
ton Post, Apr. 23, 1980, p. A5.  By focusing on discrimina-
tory intent and ignoring disparate effect, critics argued, the
Court  had  abrogated  “the  standard  used  by  the  courts  to
——————
prerequisite  to  voting,  or  standard,  practice,  or  procedure  shall  be im-
posed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color.”  42 U. S. C. §1973 (1970 ed.).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the case of City of Mobile v. Bolden and its implications for voting rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

Syllabus

equal protection or its nondelegation claims.  And although the indi-
vidual  petitioners  join  Texas’s  nondelegation  challenge  to  §1915(c),
they  raise  no  independent  arguments  about  why  they  would  have
standing to bring this claim.  Pp. 32–34.

994 F. 3d 249, affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated and remanded

in part.

 BARRETT,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ.,
joined.  GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and
JACKSON, JJ., joined as to Parts I and III.  KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concur-
ring opinion.  THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal case syllabus, containing information about the court's decision, the judges involved, and any concurring or dissenting opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

Opinion of the Court

Nevertheless, hanging and the firing squad were retained
in some States, see, e.g., 1961 Del. Laws ch. 309, §2 (hang-
ing);  1935  Kan.  Sess.  Laws  ch.  155,  §1  (hanging);  Utah
Code  Crim.  Proc.  §105–37–16  (1933)  (hanging  or  firing
squad),  and  electrocution  remained  the  predominant
method  of  execution  until  the  9-year  hiatus  in  executions
that  ended  with  our  judgment  in  Gregg  v.  Georgia,  428
U. S. 153 (1976).  See Baze, supra, at 42.

After  Gregg  reaffirmed  that  the  death  penalty  does  not
violate the Constitution, some States once again sought a
more  humane  way  to  carry  out  death  sentences.    They
eventually adopted lethal injection, which today is “by far
the  most  prevalent  method  of  execution  in  the  United
States.”  Baze,  supra,  at  42.    Oklahoma  adopted  lethal
injection in 1977, see 1977 Okla. Sess. Laws p. 89, and it
eventually  settled  on  a  protocol  that  called  for  the  use  of
three  drugs:  (1) sodium  thiopental,  “a  fast-acting  barbitu-
rate  sedative  that  induces  a  deep,  comalike  unconscious-
ness when given in the amounts used for lethal injection,”
(2) a paralytic agent, which “inhibits all muscular-skeletal
movements and, by paralyzing the diaphragm, stops respi-
ration,” and (3) potassium chloride, which “interferes with
the electrical signals that stimulate the contractions of the
heart,  inducing  cardiac  arrest.”  Baze,  supra,  at  44;  see
also  Brief  for  Respondents  9.    By  2008,  at  least  30  of  the
36 States that used lethal injection employed that particu-
lar three-drug protocol.  553 U. S., at 44.

While  methods  of  execution  have  changed  over  the
years, “[t]his Court has never invalidated a State’s chosen
procedure  for  carrying  out  a  sentence  of  death  as  the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.”  Id., at 48.  In
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 134–135 (1879), the Court
upheld  a  sentence  of  death  by  firing  squad.    In  In  re
Kemmler,  supra,  at  447–449,  the  Court  rejected  a  chal-
lenge  to  the  use  of  the  electric  chair.    And  the  Court  did
not retreat from that holding even when presented with a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion discussing the history and evolution of execution methods in the United States. It cites legal precedents and discusses specific details about lethal injection protocols.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

BARRETT, J., dissenting

of unprotected speech, public-figure defamation is the best
analog for true threats.  The reality is that recklessness is
not  grounded  in law, but  in  a  Goldilocks  judgment:  Reck-
lessness  is  not  too  much,  not  too  little,  but  instead  “just
right.”

III
Some may find Colorado’s statute harsh, and the Court’s
decision seems driven in no small part by the heavy ham-
mer of criminal punishment.  See ante, at 12; ante, at 14–
15, 20–21 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).  While an objective
test is “a familiar feature of civil liability in tort law,” the
“ ‘conventional  requirement  for  criminal  conduct’ ”
is
“ ‘awareness  of  some  wrongdoing.’ ”  Elonis,  575  U. S.,  at
737–738.  In  keeping  with  this  convention,  we  generally
presume that “federal criminal statutes that are silent on
the  required  mental  state”  nonetheless  impose  the  “mens
rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from
otherwise innocent conduct.”  Id., at 736 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  That is why we rejected an objective stand-
ard  for  the  federal  threat  prohibition,  18  U. S. C.  §875(c).
575 U. S., at 737–739.  It is “the threatening nature of the
communication” that “makes the conduct ‘wrongful’ ”; thus,
the statute is best interpreted to require that the defendant
be aware of the impact of his speech.  Id., at 737.

But this case is about the scope of the First Amendment,
not  the  interpretation  of  a  criminal  statute.    Accordingly,
the Court’s holding affects the civil consequences for true
threats just as much as it restricts criminal liability.  And
the civil context underscores the danger of adopting a Sul-
livan-style buffer zone for true threats.

Consider, for example, threat victims who seek restrain-
ing orders to protect themselves from their harassers.  See,
e.g., United States v. Elonis, 841 F. 3d 589, 593 (CA3 2016)
(defendant’s wife sought a restraining order after he wrote
on Facebook, “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments regarding the definition of "true threats" and the appropriate standard for determining their validity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
164

SMITH  v.  SPISAK

Opinion of Stevens, J.

to  relief.  As  the  Court’s  discussion  in  Part  III  makes  viv
idly  clear,  see  ante,  at  151–153,  Spisak’s  own  conduct  alien
ated and ostracized the jury, and his crimes were monstrous.
In  my  judgment  even  the  most  skillful  of  closing  argu
ments—even one befitting Clarence Darrow—would not
have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome
in  this  case.  Similarly,  in  light  of  Spisak’s  conduct  before
the jury and the gravity of the aggravating circumstances of
the  offense,  the  instructional  error  was  also  harmless  be
cause  it  did  not  have  a  substantial  and  injurious  effect  on
this record, Brecht v.  Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 623 (1993).
Accordingly,  I  concur  in  the  judgment  and  concur  in  the

Court’s discussion of prejudice in Part III of its opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice Stevens in the case of Smith v. Spisak.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

Opinion of the Court

Because the Second Circuit’s opinions leave us with suffi-
cient doubt on this score, we remand for further considera-
tion.3    On  remand,  the  Second  Circuit  must  take  into  ac-
count  all  record  evidence  relevant  to  price  impact,
regardless whether that evidence overlaps with materiality
or any other merits issue.

B
Goldman also argues that the Second Circuit erred by re-
quiring Goldman, rather than Plaintiffs, to bear the burden
of persuasion on price impact at class certification.  Gold-
man  relies  exclusively  on  Federal  Rule  of  Evidence  301,
which provides in full:

“In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules
provide otherwise, the party against whom a presump-
tion is directed has the burden of producing evidence to
rebut the presumption.  But this rule does not shift the
burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who
had it originally.”

According to Goldman, Rule 301 applies to the Basic pre-
sumption at class certification, and, as a result, a plaintiff ’s
satisfaction of the  Basic prerequisites shifts only the bur-
den of production to the defendant.  Once a defendant dis-
charges that burden by producing any competent evidence
of a lack of price impact, Goldman says, the Basic presump-
tion is rebutted and the plaintiff must carry the burden of
persuasion to show price impact.

——————

3 Compare 955 F. 3d 254, 268 (2020) (“Whether alleged misstatements
are too general to demonstrate price impact has nothing to do with the
issue  of  whether common  questions  predominate  over  individual  ones”
(emphasis added)); id., at 270 (“The inflation-maintenance theory does
not discriminate between general and specific misstatements”), with 879
F. 3d 474, 485–486 (2018) (correctly requiring the District Court to con-
sider Goldman’s price impact evidence notwithstanding overlap with ma-
teriality).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to class certification in securities fraud cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
44  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

of D. C., 261 U. S. 525 (1923), and a whole line of cases be-
ginning with Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).  Ad-
kins had found a state minimum-wage law unconstitutional
because, in the Court’s view, the law interfered with a con-
stitutional  right  to  contract.    261  U. S.,  at  554–555.    But
then  the  Great  Depression  hit,  bringing  with  it  unparal-
leled  economic  despair.    The  experience  undermined—in
fact, it disproved—Adkins’s assumption that  a wholly un-
regulated market could meet basic human needs.  As Jus-
tice Jackson (before becoming a Justice) wrote of that time:
“The older world of laissez faire was recognized everywhere
outside the Court to be dead.”  The Struggle for Judicial Su-
premacy 85 (1941).  In West Coast Hotel, the Court caught
up, recognizing through the lens of experience the flaws of
existing legal doctrine.  See also ante, at 11 (ROBERTS, C. J.,
concurring  in  judgment).    The  havoc  the  Depression  had
worked on ordinary Americans, the Court noted, was “com-
mon  knowledge  through  the  length  and  breadth  of  the
land.”  300 U. S., at 399.  The laissez-faire approach had led
to “the exploiting of workers at wages so low as to be insuf-
ficient to meet the bare cost of living.”  Ibid.  And since Ad-
kins was decided, the law had also changed.  In several de-
cisions,  the  Court  had  started  to  recognize  the  power  of
States to implement economic policies designed to enhance
their citizens’ economic well-being.  See, e.g., Nebbia v. New
York,  291  U. S.  502  (1934);  O’Gorman  &  Young,  Inc.  v.
Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  282  U. S.  251  (1931).    The  state-
ments in those decisions, West Coast Hotel explained, were
“impossible  to  reconcile”  with  Adkins.  300  U. S.,  at  398.
There was no escaping the need for Adkins to go.

Brown v. Board of Education overruled Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), along with its doctrine of “sepa-
rate but equal.”  By 1954, decades of Jim Crow had made
clear what Plessy’s turn of phrase actually meant: “inher-
ent[ ] [in]equal[ity].”  Brown, 347 U. S., at 495.  Segregation
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the overruling of previous legal precedents, such as Adkins v. Children's Hospital and Plessy v. Ferguson, and the evolution of legal thinking on issues like minimum wage and segregation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

Opinion of the Court

carrying  of  arms  only  for  military  purposes,  one  simply
cannot add “for the purpose of killing game.”  The right “to
carry arms  in the militia for the purpose of killing game”
is worthy of the mad hatter.  Thus, these purposive quali
fying  phrases  positively  establish  that  “to  bear  arms”  is
not limited to military use.11

 JUSTICE  STEVENS  places  great  weight  on  James  Madi
son’s  inclusion  of  a  conscientious-objector  clause  in  his
original  draft  of  the  Second  Amendment:  “but  no  person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled
to render military service in person.”  Creating the Bill of
Rights  12  (H.  Veit,  K.  Bowling,  &  C.  Bickford  eds.  1991)
(hereinafter Veit).  He argues that this clause establishes
that the drafters of the Second Amendment intended “bear
Arms” to refer only to military service.  See post, at 26.  It
is  always  perilous  to  derive  the  meaning  of  an  adopted
provision  from  another  provision  deleted  in  the  drafting
process.12    In  any  case,  what  JUSTICE  STEVENS  would
conclude from the deleted provision does not follow.  It was
not  meant  to  exempt  from  military  service  those  who

——————

11 JUSTICE  STEVENS  contends,  post,  at  15,  that  since  we  assert  that
adding  “against”  to  “bear  arms”  gives  it  a  military  meaning  we  must
concede  that  adding  a  purposive  qualifying  phrase  to  “bear  arms”  can
alter  its  meaning.   But  the  difference  is  that  we  do  not  maintain  that
“against” alters the meaning of “bear arms” but merely that it clarifies
which  of  various  meanings  (one  of  which  is  military)  is  intended.
JUSTICE  STEVENS,  however,  argues  that  “[t]he  term  ‘bear  arms’  is  a
familiar  idiom;  when  used  unadorned  by  any  additional  words,  its
meaning  is  ‘to  serve  as  a  soldier,  do  military  service,  fight.’ ”  Post,  at
11.  He therefore must establish that adding a contradictory purposive
phrase can alter a word’s meaning.

12 JUSTICE  STEVENS  finds  support  for  his  legislative  history  inference
from  the  recorded  views  of  one  Antifederalist  member  of  the  House.
Post,  at  26  n.  25.  “The  claim  that  the  best  or  most  representative
reading  of  the  [language  of  the]  amendments  would  conform  to  the
understanding  and  concerns  of  [the  Antifederalists]  is  . . .  highly
problematic.”    Rakove,  The  Second  Amendment:  The  Highest  Stage  of
Originalism, Bogus 74, 81.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It delves into the interpretation of the Second Amendment and uses legal arguments and citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

Opinion of the Court

by the First Amendment can sometimes raise difficult ques-
tions.  But this case presents no complication of that kind.
The parties have stipulated that Ms. Smith seeks to engage
in  expressive  activity.    And  the  Tenth  Circuit  has  recog-
nized her services involve “pure speech.”  See supra, at 6, 9.
Nothing the dissent says can alter this—nor can it displace
the First Amendment protections that follow.

The  dissent’s  treatment  of  precedent  parallels  its  han-
dling  of  the  facts.  Take  its  remarkable  suggestion  that  a
government  forcing  an  individual  to  create  speech  on
weighty issues with which she disagrees—all, as the Tenth
Circuit found, with the goal of “[e]liminating” views it does
not share, 6 F. 4th, at 1178—only “incidental[ly]” burdens
First Amendment liberties.  Post, at 26–35.  Far from em-
bracing a notion like that, our cases have rejected it time
after time—including in the context of public accommoda-
tions laws.  See Parts II–IV, supra; FAIR, 547 U. S., at 61–
64 (no government may affect a “speaker’s own message” by
“forc[ing]” her to “accommodate” views she does not hold);
Hurley, 515 U. S., at 563, 566 (using a public accommoda-
tions  law  to  compel  parade  organizers  to  include  speech
they  did  not  believe  was  no  mere  “ ‘incidental’ ”  infringe-
ment on First Amendment rights); Dale, 530 U. S., at 659
(employing a public accommodations law to require the Boy
Scouts to alter their admissions policies had more than “an
incidental effect on protected speech”).6

——————

6 The  dissent  observes  that  public  accommodations  laws  may  some-
times touch on speech incidentally as they work to ensure ordinary, non-
expressive goods and services are sold on equal terms.  Cf. post, at 24–27
(citing  Sorrell  v.  IMS  Health  Inc.,  564  U. S.  552  (2011);  Rumsfeld  v.
FAIR, 547 U. S. 47 (2006); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968)).
But as Hurley observed, there is nothing “incidental” about an infringe-
ment  on  speech  when  a  public  accommodations  law  is  applied  “pecu-
liar[ly]”  to  compel  expressive  activity.  Hurley  v.  Irish-American  Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 572 (1995).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the First Amendment implications of a case. It presents legal arguments and cites precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

cording to the Court, “Steele implicated both domestic con-
duct and a likelihood of domestic confusion,” so it offers no
guidance in resolving this case.  Ante, at 8.  No court of ap-
peals has read Steele that way, and for good reason: Steele
clearly  recognized  that  infringing  acts  consummated
abroad fall under the purview of the Lanham Act when they
generate consumer confusion in the United States.  See su-
pra, at 2–3, 6–7.5  Finding Steele “of little assistance” to its
blinkered approach, the majority reduces Steele to a “nar-
row” case with no application beyond its facts.  Ante, at 8.
Steele is no such thing.  It addressed the weighty question
whether the Lanham Act “extend[s] beyond the boundaries
of the United States,” 344 U. S., at 285, and has guided the
lower  courts’  extraterritoriality  analysis  for  more  than  70
years.  The Court should not “put aside” the Court’s prece-
dent merely because it is convenient to do so.  Ante, at 8.

Because  the  Court  cannot  ground  its  holding  in  prece-
dent, it turns to abstract policy considerations.  According
to the majority, the focus of the Lanham Act cannot center
on  consumer  confusion,  despite  Steele  and  the  statute’s
clear textual clues, because any focus other than conduct is
too  uncertain  and  “would  create  headaches  for  lower
courts.”  Ante,  at  11.  The  Court’s  conclusion,  however,  is
based on the incorrect assumption that “merely a likelihood
of  an  effect  in  this  country”  would  be  sufficient  to  hold  a
defendant liable under the Act.  Ante, at 12 (emphasis de-

——————

5 It is true that Steele involved domestic conduct insofar as the defend-
ant exported watch parts from the United States into Mexico in prepar-
ing to affix the infringing mark abroad.  See 344 U. S., at 286.  Yet the
act of exporting those watch parts with no affixed mark did not, without
more, constitute an “illegal ac[t] within the United States.”  Id., at 282,
287.  In contrast, the defendant committed infringing acts abroad: “[I]n
Mexico  City  [he]  stamped  his  watches  with  ‘Bulova’  and  sold  them  as
such.”  Id., at 285.  The Court also did not hold that domestic exportation
of unmarked product parts is necessary for the Lanham Act to cover for-
eign sales.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It cites legal precedent (Steele) and delves into the interpretation of the Lanham Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

TRUMP v. HAWAII

THOMAS, J., concurring

Injunctions  and  Nationwide  Harm,  131  Harv.  L. Rev.
Forum  49,  51,  54  (2017);  Malveaux,  Class  Actions,  Civil
Rights,  and  the  National  Injunction,  131  Harv.  L. Rev.
Forum 56, 57, 60–62 (2017).  But these arguments do not
explain  how  these  injunctions  are  consistent  with  the
historical  limits  on  equity  and  judicial  power.    They  at
best  “boi[l] down  to  a  policy  judgment”  about  how  powers
ought  to  be  allocated  among  our  three  branches  of  gov-
ernment.  Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. ___,
___ (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op.,
at 23).  But the people already made that choice when they
ratified the Constitution.

*

*
In sum, universal injunctions are legally and historically
dubious.  If  federal  courts  continue  to  issue  them,  this
Court is dutybound to adjudicate their authority to do so.

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It discusses the legal and historical basis for universal injunctions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U84

[09-06-00 20:39:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 214 (1998)

227

Opinion of the Court

36156 (CA9), p. 33. Respondent can no more obtain unlaw-
ful preferences under the cloak of a tort claim than it can by
contract.
“The rights as deﬁned by the tariff cannot be var-
ied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.”
Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 163
(1922); see also Maislin, 497 U. S., at 126.

The saving clause of the Communications Act, § 414, con-
trary to respondent’s reading of it, does not dictate a differ-
ent result. Section 414 copies the saving clause of the ICA,
and we have long held that the latter preserves only those
rights that are not inconsistent with the statutory ﬁled-tariff
requirements. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S.
491, 507 (1913). A claim for services that constitute unlaw-
ful preferences or that directly conﬂict with the tariff—the
basis for both the tort and contract claims here—cannot be
“saved” under § 414.
“Th[e saving] clause . . . cannot in rea-
son be construed as continuing in [customers] a common law

for our review (“Whether . . . the Ninth Circuit improperly allowed state-
law contract and tort claims based on a common carrier’s failure to honor
an alleged side agreement to give its customer better service than called
for by the carrier’s tariff ”) nor was raised by respondent as an alternative
ground in support of the judgment. Nor has respondent ever suggested
the need for a remand, even though the petition for certiorari sought not
merely reversal, but summary reversal.
In its brief on the merits, re-
spondent argued that the intentional tort claim was not pre-empted be-
cause AT&T’s willful breach of its contractual commitments was not pro-
tected by the ﬁled rate doctrine. There was no hint of an argument that,
even if that willful breach could not form the basis for an action, other
alleged intentional acts sufﬁced to support the judgment below. At no
point has respondent disputed the Magistrate Judge’s ﬁnding that the tort
claim is derivative of the contract claim, or the Ninth Circuit’s description
of its tort claim as based on the fact that “because COT had promised
certain beneﬁts of SDN to its customers, and because AT&T provided
competing services, any violation of AT&T’s contractual duties constituted
108
tortious interference with COT’s relationship with its customers.”
F. 3d 981, 988 (1997). Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we have no
obligation to search the record for the existence of a nonjurisdictional
point not presented, and to consider a disposition (remand instead of rever-
sal) not suggested by either side.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 214 (1998). It discusses the relationship between common carrier tariffs and state-law contract and tort claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
92

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation, likely part of a court case document. Legal citations are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the main content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1003

529 U. S.

March 6, 2000

pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until March 27, 2000,
within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and
to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of
this Court.

No. 99–8017.
No. 99–8109.
No. 99–8121.
No. 99–8139.
corpus denied.

In re Pares-Ramirez;
In re Underwood;
In re Jackson; and
In re Punchard. Petitions for writs of habeas

No. 99–8082.

In re Muhammad. Petition for writ of manda-

mus denied.

Certiorari Denied

No. 99–677. Waterview Management Co. v. Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 175.

No. 99–766. Consolidated Edison Company of New York
et al. v. Department of Energy et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied.

No. 99–782. Public Citizen et al. v. Carlin, Archivist of
the United States, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 184 F. 3d 900.

No. 99–785. Teicher et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 177 F. 3d 1016.

No. 99–812. Bridenbaugh v. O’Bannon, Governor of In-
diana. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185
F. 3d 796.

No. 99–922.

Ironworkers Local 386 v. Warshawsky & Co.
et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
182 F. 3d 948.

No. 99–978. Michaels, Executor of the Estate of Nel-
son, Deceased v. Bank of America N. T. & S. A. et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 474.

No. 99–1012. Scarfo v. Ginsberg et al. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 175 F. 3d 957.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, petition types, and rulings. This type of information is not typically considered suitable for general indexing as it is highly specialized and not meant for casual reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION

Opinion of the Court

The  question  in  this  suit  concerns  “reserved  water
rights”—a  shorthand  for  the  water  rights  implicitly
reserved  to  accomplish  the  purpose  of  the  reservation.
Cappaert  v.  United  States,  426  U. S.  128,  138  (1976);  see
also  Winters  v.  United  States,  207  U. S.  564,  576–577
(1908).  The  Navajos’  claim  is  not  that  the  United  States
has interfered with their water access.  Instead, the Navajos
contend that the treaty requires the United States to take
affirmative  steps  to  secure  water  for  the  Navajos—for
example, by assessing the Tribe’s water needs, developing
a plan to secure the needed water, and potentially building
pipelines,  pumps,  wells,  or  other  water  infrastructure—
either to facilitate better access to water on the reservation
or to transport off-reservation water onto the reservation.
In  light  of  the  treaty’s  text  and  history,  we  conclude  that
the treaty does not require the United States to take those
affirmative  steps.  And  it  is  not  the  Judiciary’s  role  to
rewrite  and  update  this  155-year-old  treaty.    Rather,
Congress  and  the  President  may  enact—and  often  have
enacted—laws to assist the citizens of the western United
States, including the Navajos, with their water needs.

I

The  Navajo  Tribe  is  one  of  the  largest  in  the  United
States, with more than 300,000 enrolled members, roughly
170,000  of  whom  live  on  the  Navajo  Reservation.  The
Navajo  Reservation  is  the  geographically  largest  in  the
United States, spanning more than 17 million acres across
the States of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah.  To put it in
perspective,  the  Navajo  Reservation  is  about  the  size  of
West Virginia.

Two treaties between the United States and the Navajo
Tribe led to the establishment of the Navajo Reservation.
After the Mexican-American War ended in 1848, the United
States  acquired  control  over  massive  new  territory
throughout  what  is  now  the  western  United  States—
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically regarding a case about water rights for the Navajo Nation. It sets the context of the case and outlines the arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”  Ibid.  But our prec-
edents  since  Sosa  have  clarified  that  courts  must  refrain
from  creating  a  cause  of  action  whenever  there  is  even  a
single sound reason to defer to Congress.  See, e.g., Hernán-
dez,  589  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  8).    Tellingly,  we  have
never created a cause of action under the ATS.  Even with-
out reexamining Sosa, our existing precedents prohibit us
from creating a cause of action here.

A

Originally passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the
ATS provides jurisdiction to hear claims brought “by an al-
ien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States.”  28 U. S. C. §1350.
If, for example, a treaty adopted by the United States cre-
ates a tort-related duty, federal district courts have juris-
diction to hear claims by aliens for breach of that duty.

But the statute on its own does not empower aliens to sue.
We have been clear that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute
creating no new causes of action.”  Sosa, 542 U. S., at 724.
Aliens harmed by a violation of international law must rely
on  legislative  and  executive  remedies,  not  judicial  reme-
dies, unless provided with an independent cause of action.
In more than 200 years, Congress has established just one:
the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.  That Act creates
a private right of action for victims of torture and extraju-
dicial  killings  in  violation  of  international  law.  106  Stat.
73, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350.

Because  that  cause  of  action  does  not  apply  here,  re-
spondents ask us to create a new one.  They suggest that a
plaintiff is entitled to a judicially created cause of action ab-
sent  compelling  reasons  to  withhold  one.   But  our  prece-
dents demand precisely the opposite rule.

In  Sosa, we “assume[d]” that the First Congress,  which
enacted the  ATS,  believed  that federal  courts, under  gen-
eral common law, “would recognize private causes of action
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically an excerpt from the Supreme Court case Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and references to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

whether petitioners have an equitable interest in their re-
tirement plan’s assets even though their pension payments
are fixed.

They do.  ERISA expressly required the creation of a trust
in which petitioners are the beneficiaries: “[A]ll assets” of
the plan “shall be held in trust” for petitioners’ “exclusive”
benefit.  29 U. S. C. §§1103(a), (c)(1); see also §1104(a)(1).2
These requirements exist regardless whether the employer
establishes a defined-benefit or defined-contribution plan.
§1101(a).  Similarly, the Plan Document governing petition-
ers’ defined-benefit plan states that, at “ ‘all times,’ ” all plan
assets “ ‘shall’ ” be in a “ ‘trust fund’ ” managed for the par-
ticipants’ and beneficiaries’ “ ‘exclusive benefit.’ ”  App. 60–
61.  The  Plan  Document  also  gives  petitioners  a  residual
interest in the trust fund’s assets: It instructs that, “[u]pon
termination of the Plan, each Participant [and] Beneficiary”
shall look to “the assets of the [trust f]und” to “provide the
benefits otherwise apparently promised in this Plan.”  Rec-
ord in No. 13–cv–2687 (D Minn.), Doc. 107–1, p. 75.  This
arrangement confers on the “participants [and] beneficiar-
ies” of a defined-benefit plan an equitable stake, or a “com-
mon interest,” in “the financial integrity of the plan.”  Mas-
sachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, 142,
n. 9 (1985).

Petitioners’ equitable interest finds ample support in tra-
ditional  trust  law.  “The  creation  of  a  trust,”  like  the  one
here,  provides  beneficiaries  “an  equitable  interest  in  the
subject  matter  of  the  trust.”  Restatement  (Second)  of

——————

2 Generally, “a trust is created when one person (a ‘settlor’ or ‘grantor’)
transfers property to a third party (a ‘trustee’) to administer for the ben-
efit of another (a ‘beneficiary’).”  North Carolina Dept. of Revenue v. Kim-
berley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip
op., at 2); see also Restatement (Second) of Trusts §2 (1957).  Neither the
Court nor respondents dispute that petitioners’ pension fund meets these
elements.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A.*. It delves into the legal arguments regarding the petitioners' equitable interest in their retirement plan's assets.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xxxv

Page
Coleman v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  840,931,961,1017
1157
Colin-Lujan v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
Collamore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835,1038
Colleen F. v. Riverside County Dept. of Public Social Services
1029
Collie v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Collier v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
993
Collins v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  835,963
900
Colman v. Thaler
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965
Colon v. Holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Medley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1001,1141

Colorado; Bowman v.
823

Colorado; Fisher v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

Colorado; Gladkihs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colorado; Gosselin v.
998

Colorado; Perez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Colorado; Rodgers v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088

Colorado; Swendra v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colson v. United States
1005

Coltrane v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

Columbia Univ.; Agron v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Columbia Venture, LLC v. Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency  . .
850

Columna-Romero v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

Comaites; Moore v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Comedy Club, Inc.; Improv West Associates v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
989

Commerce Energy, Inc.; Levin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088

Commercial Appeal; Millen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commissioner; Arensdorf v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Commissioner; Braquet v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878

877

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commissioner; Davis v.
1012

Commissioner; Hennessy v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
881

Commissioner; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

Commissioner; Lockett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939

Commissioner; Monsif v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

Commissioner; Murtagh v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Commissioner; Schneider v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
829

Commissioner; Sklar v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

Commissioner; Smith v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commissioner; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937

Commissioner of Internal Revenue.  See Commissioner.

Commission on Continuing Legal Ed. of Tenn.; Danner v.
. . . . . .
Commission  on  Human  Rights  and  Opportunities;  Richardson  v.
Committee on Prof. Stds., App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.; Rosenthal v.
Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commonwealth.  See name of Commonwealth.

1113

932

820

1091
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

Eventually, she found a position at a small company called
The  Hall  Group.    Soon,  however,  she  discovered  that  the
owner, David Hall, was not just abrasive but dishonest.  At
one point, he even added Ms. Cochran’s name to the firm’s
business license without her permission, all to facilitate his
idea of rebranding his company as “The Hall Group CPAs.”
When Ms. Cochran protested, Mr. Hall offered her a choice:
become a nonequity partner with no increase in pay so that
he could use the new name or leave the firm.  Ms. Cochran
chose to quit and put the whole ordeal behind her.

Or  so  she  thought.  Years  later,  in  2016,  Ms.  Cochran
learned that the SEC had initiated an enforcement proceed-
ing against Mr. Hall, another of his former employees, and
herself.  The SEC charged Ms. Cochran with violating “Rule
2–02(b)(1) of Regulation S-X and Section 13(a) of the Secu-
rities  Exchange  Act  of 1934  and  Rules  13a–1 and  13a–13
thereunder,” as well as “aid[ing] and abett[ing] . . . Rule 2–
02(b)(1) violations.”  In re Hall, SEC Release No. 3–17228,
p. 1 (2017).  In English, the SEC alleged that Ms. Cochran
had failed to complete auditing checklists, leaving certain
sections of certain forms “blank.”  Id., at 12–13.  The agency
brought these charges even though there was “no evidence”
that the incomplete paperwork had resulted in any “mone-
tary harm to clients or investors.”  Id., at 28.

The SEC elected to proceed against Ms. Cochran before
its  own  internal  tribunal  rather  than  (as  it  could  have)  a
court  of  law.   The  agency  assigned  the  case  to  one  of  its
hearing  officers  (an  “administrative  law  judge”  or  “ALJ”).
Reportedly,  that  ALJ made  a  practice  of  warning  defend-
ants during settlement discussions that he had “never ruled
against the agency’s enforcement division.”  J. Eaglesham,
SEC Judges’ Fairness Is in Spotlight, Wall St. J., Nov. 23,
2015, p. C6.  It seems, though, Ms. Cochran didn’t take the
hint.  She refused to settle and sought to represent herself
in the hearing that followed.  It did not go well.  Just as her
hearing was about to start, her former boss settled his own
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, likely part of a court opinion. It discusses a case involving the SEC and Ms. Cochran, outlining the allegations against her and the procedural context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Statement of ALITO, J.

sponse to Application for Stay in No. 20A53 etc., p. 9.  In-
stead of doing what either party sought, the Court simply
denied the stay.  Although there were four votes to enter a
stay, the application failed by an equally divided vote.  Now,
in a last ditch attempt to prevent the election in Pennsylva-
nia  from  being  conducted  under  a  cloud,  we  have  been
asked to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari, to expedite
review,  and  to  decide  the  constitutional  question  prior  to
the election.
  It would be highly desirable to issue a ruling on the con-
stitutionality of the State Supreme Court’s decision before
the  election.   That  question  has  national  importance,  and
there is a strong likelihood that the State Supreme Court
decision violates the Federal Constitution.  The provisions
of the Federal Constitution conferring on state legislatures,
not state courts, the authority to make rules governing fed-
eral  elections  would  be  meaningless  if  a  state  court  could
override  the  rules  adopted  by  the  legislature  simply  by
claiming  that  a  state  constitutional  provision  gave  the
courts the authority to make whatever rules it thought ap-
propriate for the conduct of a fair election.  See Art. I, §4,
cl. 1; Art. II, §1, cl. 2.
  For  these reasons,  the question  presented  by  the  Penn-
sylvania  Supreme  Court’s  decision  calls  out  for  review  by
this Court—as both the State Republican and Democratic
Parties  agreed when  the former  applied  for  a stay.   But  I
reluctantly conclude that there is simply not enough time
at this late date to decide the question before the election.
  That does not mean, however, that the state court deci-
sion  must  escape  our  review.    Although  the  Court  denies
the motion  to  expedite,  the petition for  certiorari remains
before us, and if it is granted, the case can then be decided
under a shortened schedule.  In addition, the Court’s denial
of the motion to expedite is not a denial of a request for this
Court  to  order  that  ballots  received  after  election  day  be
segregated so that if the State Supreme Court’s decision is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a statement from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses a case, legal arguments, and the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxxxiv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page
Langon v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  883,1159

994
Langosh v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127
Lanier; Quenga v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
989
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lanning; Hamilton v.
Lanpher; Morris v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  970,1101

Lanza v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
864

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  902,1102

Lape; Velazquez v.
981

Lapetina v. Carlsen
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1105

Lara; Eline v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

Larkins; Thorne v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Laroche v. Shinseki
953

Larry v. Branker
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

Larson v. Gonzalez  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

Larson v. Minnesota  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Larson v. Williams  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Laskey v. Charles Industries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  864,1086

Laskey v. United Online, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  866,1086

1155

Laskey v. Vision Infosoft  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

Las Vegas; Burwell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
832

Laswell; Bacon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Latchin v. United States
973

Latham v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144

Lau v. Adams  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144

Lau v. Brown  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lau v. Evans
1106

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074

Lau v. Giurbina
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1106

Lau v. Hernandez  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1105

Lau v. Shumsky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131

Lauderdale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

Lauer v. Thaler
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036

Laury v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935

Lavayen v. Rock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Lawler; Crisostomos v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lawler; Cruz v.
896

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lawler; Mine v.
896

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lawler; Mingo v.
889

Lawler; Moore v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
808

Lawrence; Danser v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Lawrence v. Goldberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
876

Lawrence v. Welch  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lay v. Gansler
953

Lay v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Lay v. Shefferman
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

Layton v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

unlawful,  the  court  must  vacate  that  order.  Around  the
time  when  Congress  enacted  the  APA,  the  phrase  “set
aside” the agency order meant vacate that order.  See, e.g.,
United  States  v.  L.  A.  Tucker  Truck  Lines,  Inc.,  344  U. S.
33, 38 (1952).  And because federal courts must “set aside”
agency  rules  in  the  same  way  that  they  set  aside  agency
orders,  successful  challenges  to  agency  rules  must  award
the same remedy.  See M. Sohoni, The Power To Vacate a
Rule,  88  Geo.  Wash.  L. Rev.  1121,  1131–1134  (2020).    In
short, to “set aside” a rule is to vacate it.

Longstanding  precedent  reinforces  the  text.    Over  the
decades,  this  Court  has  affirmed  countless  decisions  that
vacated  agency  actions,  including  agency  rules.    See,  e.g.,
Department  of  Homeland  Security  v.  Regents  of  Univ.  of
Cal., 591 U. S. 1, 36, and n. 7 (2020); Whitman v. American
Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 486 (2001); Board of
Governors,  FRS  v.  Dimension  Financial  Corp.,  474  U. S.
361,  364–365  (1986).
Those  decisions  vacated  the
challenged  agency  rules  rather  than  merely  providing
injunctive  relief  that  enjoined  enforcement  of  the  rules
against the specific plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 591 U. S., at 9 (holding that the rescission of a major
federal  program  “must  be  vacated”).    And  the  D. C.
Circuit—which  handles  the  lion’s  share  of  the  country’s
administrative  law  cases—has  likewise  long  recognized
vacatur as the usual relief when a court holds that agency
rules  are  unlawful.    See,  e.g.,  National  Mining  Assn.  v.
United  States  Army  Corps  of  Engineers,  145  F. 3d  1399,
1409  (CADC  1998).  In  the  words  of  the  D. C.  Circuit:
“When  a  reviewing  court  determines
that  agency
regulations  are  unlawful,  the  ordinary  result  is  that  the
rules  are  vacated—not  that  their  application  to  the
individual  petitioners
Harmon  v.
Thornburgh, 878 F. 2d 484, 495, n. 21 (CADC 1989).

is  proscribed.”

Importantly,  as  Corner  Post’s  lawsuit  shows,  the
availability of vacatur determines not only the extent of the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the legal implications of "setting aside" agency orders and rules, arguing that it means vacating them. The text cites legal precedents and case law to support this argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip
op., at 4); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 689
(2004).

In  1952,

the  State  Department  announced

the
“restrictive”  theory  of  foreign  sovereign  immunity,  under
which immunity was typically afforded in cases involving a
foreign  state’s  public  acts,  but  not  its  strictly  commercial
acts.  Rubin, 583 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 4–5).  In the
ensuing years, the process by which the Executive Branch
submitted statements regarding a foreign state’s immunity
sometimes led to inconsistency, particularly in light of the
case-by-case diplomatic pressure that the Executive Branch
received from foreign nations.  Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 487.
And when foreign states did not ask the State Department
to weigh in, courts were left to render immunity rulings on
their own, generally by reference to prior State Department
decisions.  Opati  v.  Republic  of  Sudan,  590  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2020) (slip op., at 2); Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 487.

In  1976,  Congress  entered  the  fray  and  sought  to
standardize the judicial process with respect to immunity
for foreign sovereign entities in civil cases.  Congress passed
and  President  Ford  signed  the  Foreign  Sovereign
Immunities Act.  The FSIA prescribed a “comprehensive set
of  legal  standards  governing  claims  of  immunity  in  every
civil action against a foreign state.”  Id., at 488.

To  that  end,  the  FSIA  codifies  a  baseline  principle  of
immunity for foreign states and their instrumentalities.  28
U. S. C. §1604.  The FSIA then sets out exceptions to that
for
principle—including,
commercial activities.  §§1605–1607.

for  example,  the  exception

The  FSIA  defines  a  “foreign  state”  to  encompass
instrumentalities of a foreign state—including entities that
are  directly  and  majority-owned  by  a  foreign  state.
§§1603(a)–(b); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468,
473–474 (2003).  (In this case, the United States does not
contest  Halkbank’s  status  as  an  instrumentality  of  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). It contains legal citations and discusses legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

Syllabus

likely to suffer “serious emotional or physical damage” if the parent or
Indian custodian retains custody.  §§1912(d), (e).  Even for voluntary
proceedings, a biological parent who gives up an Indian child cannot
necessarily choose the child’s foster or adoptive parents.  The child’s
tribe has “a right to intervene at any point in [a] proceeding” to place
a child in foster care or terminate parental rights, as well as a right to
collaterally  attack  the  state  court’s  custody  decree.    §§1911(c),  1914.
The tribe thus can sometimes enforce ICWA’s placement preferences
against  the  wishes  of  one  or  both  biological  parents,  even  after  the
child is living with a new family.  Finally, the States must keep certain
records related to child placements, see §1915(e), and transmit to the
Secretary of the Interior all final adoption decrees and other specified
information, see §1951(a).

Petitioners—a  birth  mother,  foster  and  adoptive  parents,  and  the
State  of  Texas—filed  this  suit  in  federal  court  against  the  United
States and other federal parties.  Several Indian Tribes intervened to
defend the law alongside the federal parties.  Petitioners challenged
ICWA  as  unconstitutional  on  multiple  grounds.   They  asserted  that
Congress  lacks  authority  to  enact  ICWA and  that  several  of  ICWA’s
requirements  violate  the  anticommandeering  principle  of  the  Tenth
Amendment.  They  argued  that  ICWA  employs  racial  classifications
that unlawfully hinder non-Indian families from fostering or adopting
Indian children.  And they challenged §1915(c)—the provision that al-
lows tribes to alter the prioritization order—on the ground that it vio-
lates the nondelegation doctrine.

The  District  Court  granted  petitioners’  motion  for  summary  judg-
ment on their constitutional claims, and the en banc Fifth Circuit af-
firmed in part and reversed in part.  The Fifth Circuit concluded that
ICWA does not exceed Congress’s legislative power, that §1915(c) does
not violate the nondelegation doctrine, and that some of ICWA’s place-
ment preferences satisfy the guarantee of equal protection.  The Fifth
Circuit was evenly divided as to whether ICWA’s other preferences—
those prioritizing “other Indian families” and “Indian foster home[s]”
over non-Indian families—unconstitutionally discriminate on the ba-
sis  of  race,  and  thus  affirmed  the  District  Court’s  ruling  that  these
preferences are unconstitutional.  As to petitioners’ Tenth Amendment
arguments,  the  Fifth  Circuit  held  that  §1912(d)’s  “active  efforts”  re-
quirement, §1912(e)’s and §1912(f)’s expert witness requirements, and
§1915(e)’s recordkeeping requirement unconstitutionally commandeer
the States.  And because it divided evenly with respect to other chal-
lenged  provisions  (§1912(a)’s  notice  requirement,  §1915(a)  and
§1915(b)’s  placement  preferences,  and  §1951(a)’s  recordkeeping  re-
quirement), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding that
these requirements violate the Tenth Amendment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U45

[09-26-01 10:03:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 344 (2000)

347

Opinion of the Court

Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves an action for damages against a railroad
due to its alleged failure to maintain adequate warning
devices at a grade crossing in western Tennessee. After
her husband was killed in a crossing accident, respondent
brought suit against petitioner, the operator of the train in-
volved in the collision. Respondent claimed that the warn-
ing signs posted at the crossing, which had been installed
using federal funds, were insufﬁcient to warn motorists of
the danger posed by passing trains. The speciﬁc issue we
must decide is whether the Federal Railroad Safety Act of
1970, 84 Stat. 971, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20101 et seq.,
in conjunction with the Federal Highway Administration’s
regulation addressing the adequacy of warning devices in-
stalled with federal funds, pre-empts state tort actions such
as respondent’s. We hold that it does.

I
A

In 1970, Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act
(FRSA) “to promote safety in every area of railroad opera-
tions and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.”
49 U. S. C. § 20101. The FRSA grants the Secretary of
Transportation the authority to “prescribe regulations and
issue orders for every area of railroad safety,” § 20103(a), and
directs the Secretary to “maintain a coordinated effort to
develop and carry out solutions to the railroad grade crossing
problem,” § 20134(a). The FRSA also contains an express
pre-emption provision, which states:

“Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad
safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent prac-
ticable. A State may adopt or continue in force a law,
regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the
Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the beginning of the Court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 30 (2009)

31

Per Curiam

sel failed to discover or present during the penalty phase of
his trial in 1988.

In  this  federal  postconviction  proceeding,  the  District
Court held  that Porter’s lawyer’s  failure to adduce  that evi
dence  violated  his  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  counsel  and
granted  his  application  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  The
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Eleventh  Circuit  reversed,  on  the
ground that the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that
Porter  was  not  prejudiced  by  any  deﬁcient  performance  by
his  counsel  was  a  reasonable  application  of  Strickland  v.
Washington,  466  U. S.  668  (1984).  Like  the  District  Court,
we  are  persuaded  that  it  was  objectively  unreasonable  to
conclude  there  was  no  reasonable  probability  the  sentence
would  have  been  different  if  the  sentencing  judge  and  jury
had  heard  the  signiﬁcant  mitigation  evidence  that  Porter’s
counsel  neither  uncovered  nor  presented.  We  therefore
grant the petition for certiorari in part and reverse the judg
ment of the Court of Appeals.1

I

Porter was convicted of two counts of ﬁrst-degree murder
for  the  shooting  of  his  former  girlfriend,  Evelyn  Williams,
and  her  boyfriend,  Walter  Burrows.  He  was  sentenced  to
death on the ﬁrst count but not the second.

In July 1986, as his relationship with Williams was ending,
Porter  threatened  to  kill  her  and  then  left  town.  When  he
returned to Florida three months later, he attempted to see
Williams, but her mother told him that Williams did not want
to  see  him.  He  drove  past  Williams’  house  each  of  the  two
days  prior  to  the  shooting,  and  the  night  before  the  murder
he visited Williams, who called the police.  Porter then went
to  two  cocktail  lounges  and  spent  the  night  with  a  friend,
who  testiﬁed Porter  was  quite drunk  by  11 p.m.  Early  the
next  morning, Porter  shot Williams  in her  house.  Burrows

1 We deny the petition insofar as it challenges his conviction.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

3

Syllabus

be used for prohibited purposes.  The Policy Requirement thus must
be doing something more—and it is.  By demanding that funding re-
cipients  adopt  and  espouse,  as  their  own,  the  Government’s  view  on
an issue of public concern, the Policy Requirement by its very nature
affects  “protected  conduct  outside  the  scope  of  the  federally  funded
program.”    Rust,  supra,  at  197.    A  recipient  cannot  avow  the  belief
dictated  by  the  condition  when  spending  Leadership  Act  funds,  and
assert  a  contrary  belief  when  participating  in  activities  on  its  own
time and dime.

The Government suggests that if funding recipients could promote
or condone prostitution using private funds, “it would undermine the
government’s  program  and  confuse  its  message  opposing  prostitu-
tion.”  Brief for Petitioners 37.  But the Policy Requirement goes be-
yond  preventing  recipients  from  using  private  funds  in  a  way  that
would undermine the federal program.  It requires them to pledge al-
legiance to the Government’s policy of eradicating prostitution.  That
condition on funding violates the First Amendment.  Pp. 11–15.

651 F. 3d 218, affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.  SCALIA, J., filed
a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  THOMAS, J.,  joined.    KAGAN, J.,  took  no
part in the consideration or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section. It summarizes the case and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1105

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No.  09–7060.  Eline  v.  Lara  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Motion
of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and
certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–7112.  Jackson  v.  Minnesota.  Ct.  App.  Minn.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–7143.  Sweed  v.  Lnu  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Motion
of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and
certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As  petitioner
has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk  is  directed
not  to  accept  any  further  petitions  in  noncriminal  matters  from
petitioner  unless  the  docketing  fee  required  by  Rule  38(a)  is  paid
and  the  petition  is  submitted  in  compliance  with  Rule  33.1.  See
Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506  U. S.  1
(1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See  id.,  at  4,
and  cases  cited  therein.

No.  09–7147.  Muniz  v.  Marshall,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  N.  M.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As
petitioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat
ters  from  petitioner  unless  the  docketing  fee  required  by  Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506
U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See
id.,  at  4,  and  cases  cited  therein.

No.  09–7186.  Hon  Chung  Lau  v.  Shumsky.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No. 09–7220.  Plummer v.  Sullivan, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Re
ported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  633.

No.  09–7266.  Parker  v.  Louisiana.  Sup.  Ct.  La.  Motion  of
petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and
certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As  petitioner
has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk  is  directed
not  to  accept  any  further  petitions  in  noncriminal  matters  from
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of petitions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissals of certiorari. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it is procedural and not part of the main body of legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

I
A
Included in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS gave fed-
eral courts “cognizance . . . of all causes where an alien sues
for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States.”  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, §9, 1 Stat. 77.
The ATS does not list the torts that fall within its purview.
Rather,  the  statute  was  “ ‘enacted  on  the  understanding
that [federal] common law would provide a cause of action
for [a] modest number of international law violations.’ ”  Ki-
obel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 115 (2013)
(quoting Sosa, 542 U. S., at 724; some alterations in origi-
nal).  Three such torts were “probably on minds of the men
who drafted the ATS”: “violation of safe conducts, infringe-
ment of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”  Id., at 715
(citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of Eng-
land 68 (1769)).

Unsurprisingly,  the  domestic  and  international  legal
landscape has changed in the two centuries since Congress
enacted the ATS.  On the one hand, this Court in Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), “denied the existence
of  any federal  ‘general’ common  law.”  Sosa,  542  U. S.,  at
726  (quoting  304  U. S.,  at  78).  Erie  thus  foiled  the  First
Congress’ expectation “that the common law would,” of its
own accord, “provide a cause of action for the modest num-
ber of international law violations,” 542 U. S., at 724, that
qualify as “tort[s] . . . in violation of the law of nations,” 28
U. S. C.  §1350.    On  the  other  hand,  the  class  of  law-of-
nations torts has grown “with the evolving recognition . . .
that certain acts constituting crimes against humanity are
in violation of basic precepts of international law.”  Jesner
v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 9).
Like the pirates of the 18th century, today’s torturers, slave
traders,  and  perpetrators  of  genocide  are  “ ‘hostis  humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind.’ ”  Sosa, 542 U. S., at 732.
The  Court  reconciled  these  two  legal  developments  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It discusses the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and its application to modern-day international law violations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

Courts must heed the ordinary meaning of the phrase as a
whole,  not  just  the  meaning  of  the  words  in  the  phrase.
That is because a phrase may have a more precise or con-
fined  meaning  than  the  literal  meaning  of  the  individual
words  in  the  phrase.    Examples  abound.  An  “American
flag” could literally encompass a flag made in America, but
in  common  parlance  it  denotes  the  Stars  and  Stripes.  A
“three-pointer” could literally include a field goal in football,
but in common parlance, it is a shot from behind the arc in
basketball.  A “cold war” could literally mean any winter-
time  war,  but  in  common  parlance  it  signifies  a  conflict
short of open warfare.  A “washing machine” could literally
refer to any machine used for washing any item, but in eve-
ryday speech it means a machine for washing clothes.

This Court has often emphasized the importance of stick-
ing  to  the  ordinary  meaning  of  a  phrase,  rather  than  the
meaning of words in the phrase.  In FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562
U. S. 397 (2011), for example, the Court explained:

“AT&T’s argument treats the term ‘personal privacy’
as simply the sum of its two words: the privacy of a per-
son. . . .  But two words together may assume a more
particular meaning than those words in isolation.  We
understand a golden cup to be a cup made of or resem-
bling gold.  A golden boy, on the other hand, is one who
is charming, lucky, and talented.  A golden opportunity
is one not to be missed.  ‘Personal’ in the phrase ‘per-
sonal privacy’ conveys more than just ‘of a person.’  It
suggests  a  type  of  privacy  evocative  of  human  con-
cerns—not  the  sort  usually  associated  with  an  entity
like, say, AT&T.”  Id., at 406.

——————
opinion uses “discriminate because of sex” as shorthand for “discriminate
. . . because of . . . sex.”  Also, the plaintiffs do not dispute that the ordi-
nary meaning of the statutory phrase “discriminate” because of sex is the
same as the statutory phrase “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual” because of sex.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the importance of considering the ordinary meaning of phrases in legal interpretation, providing examples to illustrate the point.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

SACKETT v. EPA

THOMAS, J., concurring

II
This history demonstrates that Congress was not writing
on a blank slate in the CWA, which defines federal jurisdic-
tion  using  the  same  terms  used  in  the  River  and  Harbor
Acts:  “navigable  waters”  and  “the  waters  of  the  United
States,” 33 U. S. C. §§1311(a), 1362(7), (12).  As explained
above, courts and Congress had long used the terms “navi-
gable water,” “navigable water of the United States,” and
“the waters of the United States” interchangeably to signify
those waters to which the traditional channels-of-commerce
authority extended.  See supra, at 6.  The terms “navigable
waters” and “waters of the United States” shared a core re-
quirement  that  the  water  be  a  “highway  over  which  com-
merce is or may be carried,” with the term “of the United
States” doing the independent work of requiring that such
commerce “be carried on with other States or foreign coun-
tries.”  The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall., at 563.  The text of the
CWA thus reflects the traditional balance between federal
and state authority over navigable waters, as set out by The
Daniel Ball.  It would be strange indeed if Congress sought
to effect a fundamental transformation of federal jurisdic-
tion over water through phrases that had been in use to de-
scribe the traditional scope of that jurisdiction for well over
a century and that carried a well-understood meaning.5

——————

5 In  fact,  when  Congress  has  wished  to  depart  from  this  traditional
meaning, it has done so expressly, as in parts of the Federal Power Act,
§23,  41  Stat.  1075  (requiring  approval  for  dam  construction  “across,
along, over, or in any stream or part thereof, other than those defined
herein this chapter as navigable waters”); the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, ch. 758, §2(a), 62 Stat. 1155 (as amended, 86 Stat. 816) (au-
thorizing federal-state cooperation to abate water pollution in “interstate
waters”  and  their  tributaries);  and  the  Water  Quality  Act  of  1965,  79
Stat.  905–906  (authorizing  grants  to  research  abatement  of  pollution
into “any waters”); see Hardy Salt Co. v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co.,
501  F.  2d  1156,  1168  (CA10  1974)  (noting  that  Congress  only  departs
from  the  expanded  Daniel  Ball  test  by  using  “clear  and  explicit  lan-
guage,” as it did in parts of the Federal Power Act).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Sackett v. EPA. It delves into the history and interpretation of the Clean Water Act, referencing previous legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

326

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Stevens, J., dissenting

citations to Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U. S. 288 (1984), and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U. S. 781 (1989), ante, at 293–295, neither of which involved
secondary effects. The plurality cannot have its cake and
eat it too—either Erie’s ordinance was not aimed at speech
and the plurality may attempt to justify the regulation under
the incidental burdens test, or Erie has aimed its law at the
secondary effects of speech, and the plurality can try to jus-
tify the law under that doctrine. But it cannot conﬂate the
two with the expectation that Erie’s interests aimed at sec-
ondary effects will be rendered unrelated to speech by virtue
of this doctrinal polyglot.

Correct analysis of the issue in this case should begin with
the proposition that nude dancing is a species of expressive
conduct that is protected by the First Amendment. As
Chief Judge Posner has observed, nude dancing ﬁts well
within a broad, cultural tradition recognized as expressive
in nature and entitled to First Amendment protection. See
904 F. 2d, at 1089–1104; see also Note, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1844
(1997). The nudity of the dancer is both a component of the
protected expression and the speciﬁc target of the ordinance.
It is pure sophistry to reason from the premise that the regu-
lation of the nudity component of nude dancing is unrelated
to the message conveyed by nude dancers.
Indeed, both the
text of the ordinance and the reasoning in the plurality’s
opinion make it pellucidly clear that the city of Erie has pro-
hibited nude dancing “precisely because of its communica-
tive attributes.” Barnes, 501 U. S., at 577 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in judgment) (emphasis in original); see id., at 596
(White, J., dissenting).

III

The censorial purpose of Erie’s ordinance precludes reli-
ance on the judgment in Barnes as sufﬁcient support for the
Court’s holding today. Several differences between the Erie
ordinance and the statute at issue in Barnes belie the plural-
ity’s assertion that the two laws are “almost identical.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the First Amendment implications of a nude dancing ordinance. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1056

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 30, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6803.  Hrusovsky  v.  Sjolund.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  965  A.  2d  309.

No.  09–6806.  McCall  v.  Crosthwait  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  871.

No. 09–6830.  Merritt v. Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
337  Fed.  Appx.  897.

No.  09–6877.  Jardine  v.  Nevada.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  124  Nev.  1481,  238  P.  3d  826.

No.  09–6883.  Craver  v.  Franco.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  690.

No.  09–6890.  Burnes  v.  Rogers,  Warden.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6924.  Krzywkowski  v.  Bobby,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6948.  Gomez v. Clark, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6968.  Hartmann  v.  Delaware.  Sup.  Ct.  Del.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  970  A.  2d  256.

No.  09–6986.  Alston  v.  Court  of  Appeals  of  Wisconsin,
District  I.  Sup.  Ct.  Wis.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
319  Wis.  2d  216,  775  N. W.  2d  104.

No.  09–6993.  Slaughter  v.  Epps,  Commissioner,  Missis
sippi  Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  731.

No.  09–7017.  Wright  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–7062.  de  Jesus  v.  Acevedo,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  941.

No.  09–7069.  Garnett  v.  Uttecht,  Superintendent,
Washington  State  Penitentiary.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  671.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

1472–1473 (2012).  In all of those State Constitutions, free-
dom of religion enjoyed broad protection, and the right “was
universally  said  to  be  an  unalienable  right.”    McConnell,
Origins 1456.38

——————

38 See infra, at 34, and n. 43; N. J. Const., Art. XVIII (1776), in Cogan
25 (“THAT no Person shall ever within this Colony be deprived of the in-
estimable Privilege of worshipping Almighty GOD in a Manner agreeable
to the Dictates of his own Conscience; nor under any Pretence whatso-
ever compelled to attend any Place of Worship contrary to his own Faith
and Judgment”); N. C. Decl. of Rights §XIX (1776), in id., at 30 (“That all
Men have a natural and unalienable Right to worship Almighty God ac-
cording to the Dictates of their own Conscience”); Pa. Const., Declaration
of Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Pa., Art. II (1776), in id., at
32 (“That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Al-
mighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and under-
standing: And that no man ought to or of right can be compelled to attend
any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or main-
tain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent:
Nor  can  any  man,  who  acknowledges  the  being  of  a  God,  be  justly  de-
prived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his reli-
gious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship: And that no au-
thority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever,
that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner controul, the right
of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship”); Va. Declaration
of Rights, Art. XVI (1776), in id., at 44 (“THAT religion, or the duty which
we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed
only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence, and therefore all
men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates  of  conscience;  and  that  it  is  the  mutual  duty  of  all  to  practise
Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards each other”); see also
Vt. Const., ch. 1, §3 (1777), in id., at 41 (“THAT all Men have a natural
and unalienable Right to worship ALMIGHTY GOD according to the Dic-
tates of their own Consciences and Understanding . . . and that no Man
ought or of Right can be compelled to attend any religious Worship, or
erect,  or  support  any  Place  of  Worship,  or  maintain  any  Minister  con-
trary to the Dictates of his Conscience; nor can any Man who professes
the Protestant Religion, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil Right,
as a Citizen, on Account of his religious Sentiment, or peculiar Mode of
religious Worship, and that no Authority can, or ought to be vested in, or
assumed by any Power whatsoever, that shall in any Case interfere with,
or in any Manner control the Rights of Conscience, in the free Exercise
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Fulton v. Philadelphia. It cites legal precedents and historical documents related to freedom of religion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

REPUBLICAN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA
20–542
v.
VERONICA DEGRAFFENREID, ACTING SECRETARY
OF PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.

20–574

JAKE CORMAN, ET AL.
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, MIDDLE DISTRICT

Nos. 20–542 and 20–574.  Decided February 22, 2021

  The  motions  of  Donald  J.  Trump  for  President,  Inc.  for
leave to intervene as petitioner are dismissed as moot.  The
motions of Thomas J. Randolph, et al. for leave to intervene
as respondents are dismissed as moot.  The motion of Hon-
est Elections Project for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae
in  No.  20–542  is  granted.    The  motion  of  White  House
Watch Fund, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae in
No. 20–574 is granted.  The petitions for writs of certiorari
are denied.
  JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
  The Constitution gives to each state legislature authority
to determine the “Manner” of federal elections.  Art. I, §4,
cl. 1; Art. II, §1, cl. 2.  Yet both before and after the 2020
election,  nonlegislative  officials  in  various  States  took  it
upon themselves to set the rules instead.  As a result, we
received an unusually high number of petitions and emer-
gency applications contesting those changes.  The petitions
here present a clear example.  The Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture  established  an  unambiguous  deadline  for  receiving
mail-in  ballots:  8  p.m.  on  election  day.    Dissatisfied,  the
Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court  extended  that  deadline  by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and the beginning of the Justice's argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES v. PROMETHEUS

LABORATORIES, INC.

Syllabus

gardless  of  whether  he  changes  his  dosage  in  the  light  of  the  infer-
ence  he  draws  using  the  correlations.    And  they  threaten  to  inhibit
the  development  of  more  refined  treatment  recommendations  that
combine  Prometheus’  correlations  with  later  discoveries.    This  rein-
forces the conclusion that the processes at issue are not patent eligi-
ble, while eliminating any temptation to depart from case law prece-
dent.  Pp. 16–19.

(c) Additional  arguments  supporting  Prometheus’  position—that
the process is patent eligible because it passes the “machine or trans-
formation  test”;  that,  because  the  particular  laws  of  nature  that  the
claims embody are narrow and specific, the patents should be upheld;
that  the  Court  should  not  invalidate  these  patents  under  §101  be-
cause  the  Patent  Act’s  other  validity  requirements  will  screen  out
overly broad patents; and that a principle of law denying patent cov-
erage here will discourage investment in discoveries of new diagnos-
tic laws of nature—do not lead to a different conclusion.  Pp. 19–24.

628 F. 3d 1347, reversed.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus section.  It outlines the arguments and the court's decision in the case Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>