<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

in  turn,  decides  whether  to  initiate  a  formal  hearing  be-
fore  a  state  Administrative  Law  Judge  (ALJ),  who  will
hear  evidence  and  argument  before  issuing  a  written
decision.  See §§24–34–306, 24–4–105(14).  The decision of
the ALJ may be appealed to the full Commission, a seven-
member  appointed  body.  The  Commission  holds  a  public
hearing and deliberative session before voting on the case.
If  the  Commission  determines  that  the  evidence  proves  a
CADA  violation,  it  may  impose  remedial  measures  as
provided by statute.  See §24–34–306(9).  Available reme-
dies  include,  among  other  things,  orders  to  cease-and-
desist  a  discriminatory  policy,  to  file  regular  compliance
reports  with  the  Commission,  and  “to  take  affirmative
action,  including  the  posting  of  notices  setting  forth  the
substantive  rights  of  the  public.”  §24–34–605.    Colorado
law  does  not  permit  the  Commission  to  assess  money
damages or fines.  §§24–34–306(9), 24–34–605.

C
Craig  and  Mullins  filed  a  discrimination  complaint
against  Masterpiece  Cakeshop  and  Phillips  in  September
2012, shortly after the couple’s visit to the shop.  App. 31.
The  complaint  alleged  that  Craig  and  Mullins  had  been
denied  “full  and  equal  service”  at  the  bakery  because  of
their  sexual  orientation,  id.,  at  35,  48,  and  that  it  was
Phillips’ “standard business practice” not to provide cakes
for same-sex weddings, id., at 43.

The Civil Rights Division opened an investigation.  The
investigator  found  that  “on  multiple  occasions,”  Phillips
“turned  away  potential  customers  on  the  basis  of  their
sexual orientation, stating that he could not create a cake
for  a  same-sex  wedding  ceremony  or  reception”  because
his religious beliefs prohibited it and because the potential
customers  “were  doing  something  illegal”  at  that  time.
Id.,  at  76.  The  investigation  found  that  Phillips  had  de-
clined  to  sell  custom  wedding  cakes  to  about  six  other
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically discussing the process of filing a complaint and the investigation that followed. It provides details about Colorado's anti-discrimination law and the steps taken by the Civil Rights Commission.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
70  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

stare decisis—and with good reason.  Does the dissent really
maintain that overruling Plessy was not justified until the
country had experienced more than a half-century of state-
sanctioned  segregation  and  generations  of  Black  school
children had suffered all its effects?  Post, at 44–45.

Here is another example.  On the dissent’s view, it must
have been wrong for West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,
319 U. S. 624, to overrule Minersville School Dist. v. Gobi-
tis,  310  U. S.  586,  a  bare  three  years  after  it  was  handed
down.  In  both  cases,  children  who  were  Jehovah’s  Wit-
nesses refused on religious grounds to salute the flag or re-
cite  the  pledge  of  allegiance.    The  Barnette  Court  did  not
claim that its reexamination of the issue was prompted by
any  intervening  legal  or  factual  developments,  so  if  the
Court had followed the dissent’s new version of stare deci-
sis, it would have been compelled to adhere to Gobitis and
countenance  continued  First  Amendment  violations  for
some unspecified period.

Precedents should be respected, but sometimes the Court
errs, and occasionally the Court issues an important deci-
sion that is egregiously wrong.  When that happens, stare
decisis is not a straitjacket.  And indeed, the dissent even-
tually  admits  that  a  decision  could  “be  overruled  just  be-
cause it is terribly wrong,” though the dissent does not ex-
plain when that would be so.  Post, at 45.

2
Even if the dissent were correct in arguing that an egre-
giously wrong decision should (almost) never be overruled
unless  its  mistake  is  later  highlighted  by  “major  legal  or
factual changes,” reexamination of Roe and Casey would be
amply justified.  We have already mentioned a number of
post-Casey  developments, see supra, at 33–34, 59–63, but
the most profound change may be the failure of the Casey
plurality’s call for “the contending sides” in the controversy
about abortion “to end their national division,” 505 U. S., at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of stare decisis and its application to overturning precedents like Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
960

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 13, 2009

558 U. S.

No. 09–6329.  Savoca v.  United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  802.

No. 09–6330.  Settle v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6331.  Rivera  v.  Nolan.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–6333.  Sullivan,  aka  Cathey,  aka  Edwards  v.
United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  445.

No.  09–6335.  Dickens  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6336.  Chester  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  597.

No.  09–6337.  Doyle  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  706.

No.  09–6340.  Jackson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6342.  Lewis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  951.

No.  09–6343.  Jackson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  569.

No.  09–6346.  Lirette  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6347.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  776.

No.  09–6348.  Alexander  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  388.

No.  09–6349.  Benitez-Avila  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  570  F.  3d  364.

No.  09–6350.  Konsavich  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  313.

No.  09–6354.  Bishawi  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, circuit courts, and whether certiorari was granted or denied.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Opinion of the Court

imposes  liability  on  corporations.    There  is  at  least  suffi-
cient  doubt  on  the  point  to  turn  to  Sosa’s  second  ques-
tion—whether  the  Judiciary  must  defer  to  Congress,
allowing it to determine in the first instance whether that
universal norm has been recognized and, if so, whether it
is prudent and necessary to direct its enforcement in suits
under the ATS.

B
1

Sosa  is  consistent  with  this  Court’s  general  reluctance
to  extend  judicially  created  private  rights  of  action.  The
Court’s  recent  precedents  cast  doubt  on  the  authority  of
courts to extend or create private causes of action even in
the realm of domestic law, where this Court has “recently
and  repeatedly  said  that  a  decision  to  create  a  private
right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in
the great majority of  cases.”   542 U. S., at 727 (citing Cor-
rectional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 68 (2001);
Alexander  v.  Sandoval,  532  U. S.  275,  286–287  (2001)).
That is because “the Legislature is in the better position to
consider if the public interest would be served by imposing
a  new  substantive  legal  liability.”  Ziglar  v.  Abbasi,  582
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2017)  (slip  op.,  at  12)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).  Thus, “if there are sound reasons to think
Congress  might  doubt  the  efficacy  or  necessity  of  a  dam-
ages  remedy,  . . .  courts  must  refrain  from  creating  the
remedy  in  order  to  respect  the  role  of  Congress.”    Id.,  at
___ (slip op., at 13).

This caution extends to the question whether the courts
should  exercise  the  judicial  authority  to  mandate  a  rule
that  imposes  liability  upon  artificial  entities  like  corpora-
tions.  Thus,  in  Malesko  the  Court  held  that  corporate
defendants  may  not  be  held  liable  in  Bivens  actions.  See
Bivens  v.  Six  Unknown  Fed.  Narcotics  Agents,  403  U. S.
388 (1971).  Allowing corporate liability would have been a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the issue of corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).  It cites relevant case law and legal principles, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

TRUMP v. NEW YORK

Per Curiam

6, 9 (opinion of BREYER, J.); see Reply Brief 6.

The impact on funding is no more certain.  According to
the Government, federal funds are tied to data derived from
the census, but not necessarily to the apportionment counts
addressed by the memorandum.  Brief for Appellants 19–
20.  Under that view, changes to the Secretary’s §141(b) re-
port or to the President’s §2a(a) statement will not inexora-
bly have the direct effect on downstream access to funds or
other resources predicted by the dissent.  Post, at 6–7.  How
that  question  will  be  addressed  by  the  Secretary  and  the
President is yet another fundamental uncertainty impeding
proper judicial consideration at this time.

The remedy crafted by the District Court underscores the
contingent nature of the plaintiffs’ injuries.  Its injunction
prohibits the Secretary from informing the President in his
§141(b) report of the number of aliens without lawful sta-
tus.  In addition to implicating the President’s authority un-
der the Opinions Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, §2, cl. 1, the
injunction reveals that the source of any injury to the plain-
tiffs is the action that the Secretary or President might take
in the future to exclude unspecified individuals from the ap-
portionment  base—not  the  policy  itself  “in  the  abstract,”
Summers  v.  Earth  Island  Institute,  555  U. S.  488,  494
(2009).  Letting the Executive Branch’s decisionmaking pro-
cess run its course not only brings “more manageable pro-
portions” to the scope of the parties’ dispute, Lujan v. Na-
tional  Wildlife  Federation,  497  U. S.  871,  891  (1990),  but
also “ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in
policymaking properly left to elected representatives,” Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 700 (2013).  And in the
meantime  the  plaintiffs  suffer  no  concrete  harm  from  the
challenged policy itself, which does not require them “to do
anything or to refrain from doing anything.”  Ohio Forestry
Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U. S. 726, 733 (1998).

At the end of the day, the standing and ripeness inquiries
both lead to the conclusion that judicial resolution of this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the standing and ripeness of a case. It contains legal citations and arguments, typical of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

940

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 22, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–1845. Sanders v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1182.

No. 97–1849. Klopp v. United States et al. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 131.

No. 97–1852. Scheumann v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 37.

No. 97–1854. Pierson v. Wilshire Terrace Corp. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 910.

No. 97–1860. Kearns v. Wood Motors, Inc., et al. C. A.

Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 775.

No. 97–1861. Giaimo et ux. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1168.

No. 97–1871. Whatley v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 601.

No. 97–1901.

In re Caranchini. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 956 S. W. 2d 910.

No. 97–1903. Sudwisher v. Estate of Hoffpauir et al.
Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 705 So. 2d 724.
No. 97–6467. Spruill v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 114 F. 3d 1178.

No. 97–6915. Allah v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 33.

No. 97–7373. Epps v. West, Secretary of Veterans Af-
fairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 126
F. 3d 1464.

No. 97–7418. Hamilton v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 33.

No. 97–7956. Thomas, aka Gregory v. United States.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 919.
No. 97–8143. Washington v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 F. 3d 510.

No. 97–8279. Terry v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 138.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks the narrative flow and contextual information typical of the main body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases or Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–234
_________________

KEVIN R. GEORGE, PETITIONER v. DENIS R.
MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 15, 2022]

 JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  joins,
and with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins as to all but Part
II–C, dissenting.

A  young  recruit  to  the  United  States  Marines  left  the
ranks after military doctors found his service aggravated a
preexisting mental illness.  Eventually, he applied for ser-
vice-related benefits.  The Veterans Administration refused
his application.  It turns out the agency did so based on a
badly mistaken reading of the law.  On discovering the error
years later, the Marine petitioned the agency to revisit its
decision.  Congress has expressly allowed veterans to do ex-
actly that, providing that they may “at any time” petition
the agency to cure “clear and unmistakable error[s]” in its
past administrative decisions.  38 U. S. C. §§ 5109A, 7111.
Despite this statutory command, the agency refused to reo-
pen the case.  Today, the Court upholds the agency’s deci-
sion.  Respectfully, I would not.

I
When Kevin George enlisted in the Marines in 1975, doc-
tors conducted an entrance exam and found him fit to serve.
But shortly after training began, he was hospitalized and
diagnosed with an “Acute Schizophrenic Reaction” that oc-
curred  “[i]n  line  of  duty.”  Record  in  No.  16–2174
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It includes citations, case names, and the names of justices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

JACKSON, J., dissenting

B
History  speaks.    In  some  form,  it  can  be  heard  forever.
The race-based gaps that first developed centuries ago are
echoes from the past that still exist today.  By all accounts,
they are still stark.

Start  with  wealth  and  income.    Just  four  years  ago,  in
2019,  Black  families’  median  wealth  was  approximately
$24,000.46   For  White  families,  that  number  was  approxi-
mately  eight  times  as  much  (about  $188,000).47    These
wealth  disparities  “exis[t]  at  every  income  and  education
level,” so, “[o]n average, white families with college degrees
have over $300,000 more wealth than black families with
college degrees.”48  This disparity has also accelerated over
time—from  a  roughly  $40,000  gap  between  White  and
Black  household  median  net  worth  in  1993  to  a  roughly
$135,000 gap in 2019.49  Median income numbers from 2019
tell the same story: $76,057 for White households, $98,174
for  Asian  households,  $56,113  for  Latino  households,  and
$45,438 for Black households.50

These financial gaps are unsurprising in light of the link

——————

46 Dickerson  1086  (citing  data  from  2019  Federal  Reserve  Survey  of
Consumer  Finances);  see  also  Rothstein  184  (reporting,  in  2017,  even
lower median-wealth number of $11,000).

47 Dickerson 1086; see also Rothstein 184 (reporting even larger rela-

tive gap in 2017 of $134,000 to $11,000).

48 Baradaran 249; see also Dickerson 1089–1090; Oliver & Shapiro 94–

95, 100–101, 110–111, 197.

49 See Brief for National Academy of Education as Amicus Curiae 14–

15 (citing U. S. Census Bureau statistics).

50 Id., at 14 (citing U. S. Census Bureau statistics); Rothstein 184 (re-
porting similarly stark White/Black income gap numbers in 2017).  Early
returns suggest that the COVID–19 pandemic exacerbated these dispar-
ities.  See E. Derenoncourt, C. Kim, M. Kuhn, & M. Schularick, Wealth
of  Two  Nations:  The  U. S.  Racial  Wealth  Gap,  1860–2020,  p.  22  (Fed.
Reserve  Bank  of  Minneapolis,  Opportunity  &  Inclusive  Growth  Inst.,
Working Paper No. 59, June 2022) (Wealth of Two Nations); L. Bollinger
& G. Stone, A Legacy of Discrimination: The Essential Constitutionality
of Affirmative Action 103 (2023) (Bollinger & Stone).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses racial wealth and income disparities in the United States, citing statistics and referencing other legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. VAELLO MADERO

GORSUCH, J., concurring

cases, Justice White argued, only “fundamental” (if unspec-
ified)  aspects  of  the  Constitution  should  have  force.    Id.,
at 291.  In his judgment, Puerto Rico fell into this second
category  and  remained  “foreign  to  the  United  States”  be-
cause,  unlike  Territories  in  the  American  West,  Congress
had  not  done  enough to  indicate  its  intention  to  “incorpo-
rate” the island.  Id., at 341–342.  Still, it would be a mis-
take to overstate the gap between the theories advanced by
Justice White and Justice Brown.  At bottom, both rested
on a view about the Nation’s “right” to acquire and exploit
“an  unknown  island,  peopled  with  an  uncivilized  race  . . .
for commercial and strategic reasons”—a right that “could
not be practically exercised if the result would be to endow”
full constitutional protections “on those absolutely unfit to
receive [them].”  Id., at 306 (White, J., concurring).

In dissent, Chief Justice Fuller expressed astonishment
that Congress could “keep [a Territory], like a disembodied
shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence for
an indefinite period.”  Id., at 372.  Justice Harlan criticized
the Court for “engraft[ing] upon our republican institutions
a colonial system such as exists under monarchical govern-
ments.”  Id., at 380.  And Justice Harlan dismissed Justice
White’s  supposed  middle  ground,  which  he  could  find  no-
where in the Constitution’s terms:  “I am constrained to say
that  this  idea  of  ‘incorporation’  has  some  occult  meaning
which my mind does not apprehend.”  Id., at 391.

Later decisions blurred the line between Justice Brown’s
approach and Justice White’s even further.  Eventually, a
majority embraced Justice White’s “incorporation” theory,
including its suggestion that certain constitutional protec-
tions  are  “fundamental”  and  therefore  apply  even  in  far-
flung “unincorporated” possessions.  Dorr v. United States,
195 U. S. 138, 148–149 (1904).  At the same time, it became
clear that very few constitutional limits on the power of the
federal  government  could  be  relied  upon  in  the  newly  ac-
quired Territories absent a clear congressional statement.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to the application of the Constitution to territories.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v.
MORRISSEY-BERRU
THOMAS, J., concurring

to defer to religious organizations’ good-faith claims that a
certain employee’s position is “ministerial.”  See Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,
565 U. S. 171, 196 (2012) (THOMAS, J., concurring).

This deference is necessary because, as the Court rightly
observes, judges lack the requisite “understanding and ap-
preciation of the role played by every person who performs
a particular role in every religious tradition.”  Ante, at 22.
What qualifies as “ministerial” is an inherently theological
question,  and  thus  one  that  cannot  be  resolved  by  civil
courts through legal analysis.  See Hosanna-Tabor, supra,
at 197 (THOMAS, J., concurring); see also Memorial and Re-
monstrance  Against  Religious  Assessments,  in  Selected
Writings  of  James  Madison  21,  24  (R.  Ketcham  ed.  2006)
(the idea that a “Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of
Religious truth” is “an arrogant pretension” that has been
“falsified”).  Contrary to the dissent’s claim, judges do not
shirk their judicial duty or provide a mere “rubber stamp”
when they defer to a religious organization’s sincere beliefs.
Post,  at  9  (opinion  of SOTOMAYOR,  J.).  Rather,  they  heed
the First Amendment, which “commands civil courts to de-
cide  [legal]  disputes  without  resolving  underlying  contro-
versies over religious doctrine.”  Presbyterian Church in U.
S.  v.  Mary  Elizabeth  Blue  Hull  Memorial  Presbyterian
Church, 393 U. S. 440, 449 (1969); see also ante, at 16, n. 10.
Moreover, because the application of the exception turns
on religious beliefs, the duties that a given religious organ-
ization will deem “ministerial” are sure to vary.  Although
the  functions  recognized  as  ministerial  by  the  Lutheran
school  in  Hosanna-Tabor  are  similar  to  those  considered
ministerial by the Catholic schools here, such overlap will
not  necessarily  exist  with  other  religious  organizations,
particularly those “outside of the ‘mainstream.’ ”  565 U. S.,
at 197 (THOMAS, J., concurring).  To avoid disadvantaging
these minority faiths and interfering in “a religious group’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v. MORRISSEY-BERRU.  It delves into the legal and theological considerations surrounding the "ministerial exception" in employment law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

120

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION et al. v. BROWN
& WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP. et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit

No. 98–1152. Argued December 1, 1999—Decided March 21, 2000

The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or Act), 21 U. S. C. § 301 et seq.,
grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as the designee of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), the authority to regu-
late, among other items, “drugs” and “devices,” §§ 321(g)–(h), 393.
In
1996, the FDA asserted jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products, con-
cluding that, under the FDCA, nicotine is a “drug” and cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco are “devices” that deliver nicotine to the body. Pur-
suant to this authority, the FDA promulgated regulations governing
tobacco products’ promotion, labeling, and accessibility to children and
adolescents. The FDA found that tobacco use is the Nation’s leading
cause of premature death, resulting in more than 400,000 deaths annu-
ally, and that most adult smokers begin when they are minors. The
regulations therefore aim to reduce tobacco use by minors so as to sub-
stantially reduce the prevalence of addiction in future generations, and
thus the incidence of tobacco-related death and disease. Respondents,
a group of tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and advertisers, ﬁled this
suit challenging the FDA’s regulations. They moved for summary
judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the FDA lacked jurisdiction
to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed, that is, without
manufacturer claims of therapeutic beneﬁt. The District Court upheld
the FDA’s authority, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that Con-
gress has not granted the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco prod-
ucts. The court concluded that construing the FDCA to include to-
bacco products would lead to several internal inconsistencies in the Act.
It also found that evidence external to the FDCA—that the FDA con-
sistently stated before 1995 that it lacked jurisdiction over tobacco, that
Congress has enacted several tobacco-speciﬁc statutes fully cognizant of
the FDA’s position, and that Congress has considered and rejected many
bills that would have given the agency such authority—conﬁrms this
conclusion.

Held: Reading the FDCA as a whole, as well as in conjunction with Con-
gress’ subsequent tobacco-speciﬁc legislation, it is plain that Congress
has not given the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products as
customarily marketed. Pp. 131–161.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi typically summarize the legal issues, arguments, and holdings of a case, and are not considered part of the main body of the legal opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2013

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MCCUTCHEON ET AL. v. FEDERAL ELECTION

COMMISSION

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 12–536.  Argued October 8, 2013—Decided April 2, 2014

The right to participate in democracy through political contributions is
protected  by  the  First  Amendment,  but  that  right  is  not  absolute.
Congress  may  regulate  campaign  contributions  to  protect  against
corruption  or  the  appearance  of  corruption.    See,  e.g.,  Buckley  v.
Valeo,  424  U. S.  1,  26–27.    It  may  not,  however,  regulate  contribu-
tions simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to restrict
the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative in-
fluence  of  others.    See,  e.g.,  Arizona  Free  Enterprise  Club’s  Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U. S. ___, ___.

The  Federal  Election  Campaign  Act  of  1971  (FECA),  as  amended
by  the  Bipartisan  Campaign  Reform  Act  of  2002  (BCRA),  imposes
two  types  of  limits  on  campaign  contributions.    Base  limits  restrict
how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or
committee  while  aggregate  limits  restrict  how  much  money  a  donor
may  contribute  in  total  to  all  candidates  or  committees.    2  U. S. C.
§441a.

In the 2011–2012 election cycle, appellant McCutcheon contributed
to 16 different federal candidates, complying with the base limits ap-
plicable to each.  He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him
from  contributing  to  12  additional  candidates  and  to  a  number  of
noncandidate political committees.  He also alleges that he wishes to
make  similar  contributions  in  the  future,  all  within  the  base  limits.
McCutcheon  and  appellant  Republican  National  Committee  filed  a
complaint before a three-judge District Court, asserting that the ag-
gregate  limits  were  unconstitutional  under  the  First  Amendment.
The  District  Court  denied  their  motion  for  a  preliminary  injunction
and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss.  Assuming that the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

919

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No. 09–5788.  Wilson v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  842.

No.  09–5791.  Renteria  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  1003.

No.  09–5792.  Browner  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  796.

No. 09–5793.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5795.  Denis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  872.

No.  09–5797.  Hines  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  754.

No.  09–5799.  Claudio-Pantojas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5802.  Garcia-Cardenas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  1049.

No.  09–5804.  Marinero-Revelo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 326 Fed. Appx. 753.
No.  09–5805.  Loredo-Olivera  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  349.

No.  09–5806.  Lockard  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5808.  Castillo-Valle  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  739.

No.  09–5809.  Simmons  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  769.

No.  09–5810.  Alexander  v.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  972.

No.  09–5811.  Robinson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  105.

No.  09–5817.  Yann  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  5th  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It includes case numbers, court citations, and dates.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

551

Opinion of the Court

competent to testify unless corroborated by another wit-
ness). Plainly, the imagined rule does not mean that Fen-
wick’s case is not an example of an ex post facto law. But if
that is so, why should it be any different for Article 38.07?
Just as we can imagine a witness competency rule that would
operate similarly to the statute in Fenwick’s case, the above
argument imagines a witness competency rule that operates
similarly to Article 38.07.
If the former does not change our
view of the law in Fenwick’s case, why should the latter
change our view in the present circumstances?

Moreover, the argument fails to account for what Calder’s
fourth category actually says, and tells only half the story of
what a witness competency rule does. As for what Calder
says, the fourth category applies to “[e]very law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required at the time of the commis-
sion of the offence, in order to convict the offender.” 3 Dall.,
at 390 (emphasis deleted). The last six words are crucial.
The relevant question is whether the law affects the quan-
tum of evidence required to convict; a witness competency
rule that (in certain instances at least) has the practical
effect of telling us what evidence would result in acquittal
does not really speak to Calder’s fourth category.

As for relating only half the story, the dissent’s argument
rests on the assertion that sometimes a witness competency
rule will result in acquittals in the same instances in which
Article 38.07 would also demand an acquittal. That may be
conceded, but it is only half the story—and, as just noted,
not the most relevant half. The other half concerns what a
witness competency rule has to say about the evidence
“required . . . in order to convict the offender.” The answer
is, nothing at all. As mentioned earlier, see supra, at 546–
547, prosecutors may satisfy all the requirements of any
number of witness competency rules, but this says absolutely
nothing about whether they have introduced a quantum of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court is analyzing and responding to an argument made by the dissenting opinion.  The language is formal and legalistic, discussing concepts like "ex post facto laws," "witness competency rules," and legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U60

[09-26-01 12:39:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 803 (2000)

823

Opinion of the Court

the Government has failed to establish a pervasive, nation-
wide problem justifying its nationwide daytime speech ban.
Nor did the District Court err in its second conclusion.
The Government also failed to prove § 504 with adequate no-
tice would be an ineffective alternative to § 505. Once again,
the District Court invited the Government to produce its
proof. See 945 F. Supp., at 781 (“If the § 504 blocking option
is not being promoted, it cannot become a meaningful alter-
native to the provisions of § 505. At the time of the perma-
nent injunction hearing, further evidence of the actual and
predicted impact and efﬁcacy of § 504 would be helpful
to us”). Once again, the Government fell short. See 30
F. Supp. 2d, at 719 (“[The Government’s argument that § 504
is ineffective] is premised on adequate notice to subscribers.
It is not clear, however, from the record that notices of the
provisions of § 504 have been adequate”). There is no evi-
dence that a well-promoted voluntary blocking provision
would not be capable at least of informing parents about sig-
nal bleed (if they are not yet aware of it) and about their
rights to have the bleed blocked (if they consider it a problem
and have not yet controlled it themselves).

The Government ﬁnds at least two problems with the con-
clusion of the three-judge District Court. First, the Gov-
ernment takes issue with the District Court’s reliance, with-
out proof, on a “hypothetical, enhanced version of Section
504.” Brief for Appellants 32.
It was not the District
Court’s obligation, however, to predict the extent to which
It was for
an improved notice scheme would improve § 504.
the Government, presented with a plausible, less restrictive
alternative, to prove the alternative to be ineffective, and
§ 505 to be the least restrictive available means.
Indeed, to
the extent the District Court erred, it was only in attempting
to implement the less restrictive alternative through judicial
decree by requiring Playboy to provide for expanded notice
in its cable service contracts. The appropriate remedy was
not to repair the statute, it was to enjoin the speech restric-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a case and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

23

Opinion of the Court

two.  Ibid.  According to the Government, “It was not arbi-
trary and capricious for DHS to view deferred action and its
collateral benefits as importantly linked.”  Ibid.  Perhaps.
But that response misses the point.  The fact that there may
be a valid reason not to separate deferred action from ben-
efits does not establish that DHS considered that option or
that such consideration was unnecessary.

The lead dissent acknowledges that forbearance and ben-
efits are legally distinct and can be decoupled.  Post, at 21–
22, n. 14 (opinion of THOMAS, J).  It contends, however, that
we should not “dissect” agency action “piece by piece.”  Post,
at 21.  The dissent instead rests on the Attorney General’s
legal  determination—which  considered  only  benefits—“to
supply the ‘reasoned analysis’ ” to support rescission of both
benefits and forbearance.  Post, at 22 (quoting State Farm,
463  U. S.,  at  42).    But  State  Farm  teaches  that  when  an
agency  rescinds  a  prior  policy  its  reasoned  analysis  must
consider the “alternative[s]” that are “within the ambit of
the existing [policy].”  Id., at 51.  Here forbearance was not
simply “within the ambit of the existing [policy],” it was the
centerpiece  of  the  policy:  DACA,  after  all,  stands  for  “De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.”  App. to Pet. for Cert.
111a  (emphasis  added).  But  the  rescission  memorandum
contains no discussion of forbearance or the option of retain-
ing forbearance without benefits.  Duke “entirely failed to
consider  [that]  important  aspect  of  the  problem.”  State
Farm, 463 U. S., at 43.

That omission alone renders Acting Secretary Duke’s de-
cision arbitrary and capricious.  But it is not the only defect.
Duke also failed to address whether there was “legitimate
reliance” on the DACA Memorandum.  Smiley v. Citibank
(South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 742 (1996).  When an
agency changes course, as DHS did here, it must “be cogni-
zant that longstanding policies may have ‘engendered seri-
ous  reliance  interests  that  must  be  taken  into  account.’ ”
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the reasoning behind a court's decision. It cites legal precedents and analyzes the actions of a government agency.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MILLER v. ALABAMA

THOMAS, J., dissenting

treated  no  differently.
“[M]andatory  death  sentences
abounded  in  our  first  Penal  Code”  and  were  “common  in
the  several  States—both  at  the  time  of  the  founding  and
throughout  the  19th  century.”    Harmelin,  501  U. S.,  at
994–995;  see  also  Woodson,  supra,  at  289  (plurality  opin-
ion)  (“At  the  time  the  Eighth  Amendment  was  adopted
in  1791,  the  States  uniformly  followed  the  common-law
practice  of  making  death  the  exclusive  and  mandatory
sentence  for  certain  specified  offenses”).  Accordingly,  the
idea  that  the  mandatory  imposition  of  an  otherwise-
constitutional  sentence  renders  that  sentence  cruel  and
unusual  finds  “no  support  in  the  text  and  history  of  the
Eighth Amendment.”  Harmelin, supra, at 994.

Moreover,  mandatory  death  penalty  schemes  were  “a
perfectly  reasonable  legislative  response  to  the  concerns
expressed  in  Furman”  regarding  unguided  sentencing
discretion,  in  that  they  “eliminat[ed]  explicit  jury  discre-
tion  and  treat[ed]  all  defendants  equally.”  Graham  v.
Collins,  506  U. S.  461,  487  (1993)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concur-
ring).  And, as Justice White explained more than 30 years
ago,  “a  State  is  not  constitutionally  forbidden  to  provide
that  the  commission  of  certain  crimes  conclusively  estab-
lishes that a criminal’s character is such that he deserves
death.”  Roberts, supra, at 358 (dissenting opinion).  Thus,
there  is  no  basis  for  concluding  that  a  mandatory  capi-
tal  sentencing  scheme  is  unconstitutional.  Because  the
Court’s  cases  requiring  individualized  sentencing  in  the
capital context are wrongly decided, they cannot serve as a
valid  foundation  for  the  novel  rule  regarding  mandatory
life-without-parole  sentences  for  juveniles  that  the  Court
announces today.

B
In any event, this Court has already declined to extend
its  individualized-sentencing  rule  beyond  the  death  pen-
alty context.  In Harmelin, the defendant was convicted of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Miller v. Alabama. It delves into the constitutionality of mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles, drawing comparisons to the history and precedent surrounding mandatory death sentences.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

Syllabus

Amendment at all, e.g., smuggling noncitizens into the country.  Be-
cause these types of cases are heartland clause (iv) prosecutions, the
“plainly legitimate sweep” of the provision is extensive.  To the extent
clause (iv) reaches any speech, it stretches no further than speech in-
tegral to unlawful conduct, which is unprotected.  See, e.g., Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 502.  Hansen, on the other
hand, fails to identify a single prosecution for ostensibly protected ex-
pression in the 70 years since Congress enacted clause (iv)’s immediate
predecessor.  Instead, he offers a string of hypotheticals, all premised
on  the  expansive  ordinary  meanings  of  “encourage”  and  “induce.”
None of these examples are filtered through the traditional elements
of  solicitation  and  facilitation—most  importantly,  the  requirement
that a defendant intend to bring about a specific result.  Because clause
(iv)  does  not  have  the  scope  Hansen  claims,  it  does  not  produce  the
horribles he parades.  Hansen also resists the idea that Congress can
criminalize speech that solicits or facilitates a civil violation, and some
immigration violations are only civil.  But even assuming that clause
(iv) reaches some protected speech, and even assuming that its appli-
cation to all of that speech is unconstitutional, the ratio of unlawful-
to-lawful applications is not lopsided enough to justify facial invalida-
tion for overbreadth.  Pp. 17–20.

25 F. 4th 1103, reversed and remanded.

  BARRETT,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion.  JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus.  Syllabi are summaries of legal cases and are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they do not contain the full text of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxxxiv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

Simmons v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  805,1045

Simmons v. Flecker
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  803,1045

Simmons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  919,1008

958

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simms v. United States
838

Simon v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

Simpkins v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011

Simplicity Mfg., Inc. v. Berrier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Simpson v. Alabama Dept. of Human Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

Simpson v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039

Simpson v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simpson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
899

Simpson; Wilson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  846,1065

Sims v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1066

Sims v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  853,1100

909

Sinclair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Singala v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916

Singletary, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  814,1038

1156

Singletary v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  988,1109

Singleton, In re
876

Singleton v. Florida Dept. of Juvenile Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Singleton v. Johnson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
850

Singleton v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
813

Sinqueﬁeld, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sirmons v. Williams  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

906

Sirmons; Young v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924

Sisney v. Best, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Sisto; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Siwek; Curto v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  806,1045

859

Six; Adkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sjolund; Hrusovsky v.
945

Skilling v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Skinner v. Oklahoma
829

Sklar v. Commissioner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

Skolnik; Timothy v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
876

Skropits v. Ohio  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

Skrzypek v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Slade v. Pennsylvania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938

Slater v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Slaughter v. Epps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144

Slezak v. Glover  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1002

Slinger v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

Small v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

Small v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
803

Small; Swain v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection.  It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

500

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Syllabus

2. The Coal Act’s allocation of liability to Eastern violates the Takings

Clause. Pp. 522–537.

(a) Economic regulation such as the Coal Act may effect a taking.
United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U. S. 70, 78. The party
challenging the government action bears a substantial burden, for not
every destruction or injury to property by such action is a constitutional
taking. A regulation’s constitutionality is evaluated by examining the
governmental action’s “justice and fairness.” See Andrus v. Allard,
444 U. S. 51, 65. Although that inquiry does not lend itself to any set
formula, three factors traditionally have informed this Court’s regu-
latory takings analysis: “[T]he economic impact of the regulation, its
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the
character of the governmental action.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U. S. 164, 175. Pp. 522–524.

(b) The analysis in this case is informed by previous decisions con-
sidering the constitutionality of somewhat similar legislative schemes:
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1 (Black Lung Beneﬁts
Act of 1972); Connolly v. Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation, 475
U. S. 211 (Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980); and
Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pen-
sion Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602 (same). Those opinions
make clear that Congress has considerable leeway to fashion economic
legislation, including the power to affect contractual commitments be-
tween private parties; and that it may impose retroactive liability to
some degree, particularly where it is “ ‘conﬁned to short and limited
periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation,’ ”
Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U. S.
717, 731. The decisions, however, have left open the possibility that
legislation might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive lia-
bility on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the
liability, and if the extent of that liability is substantially disproportion-
ate to the parties’ experience. Pp. 524–529.

(c) The Coal Act’s allocation scheme, as applied to Eastern, pre-
sents such a case, when the three traditional factors are considered. As
to the economic impact, Eastern’s Coal Act liability is substantial, and
the company is clearly deprived of the $50 to $100 million it must pay
to the Combined Fund. An employer’s statutory liability for multiem-
ployer plan beneﬁts should reﬂect some proportionality to its experience
with the plan. Concrete Pipe, supra, at 645. Eastern contributed to
the 1947 and 1950 W&R Funds, but ceased its coal mining operations in
1965 and neither participated in negotiations nor agreed to make contri-
butions in connection with the Beneﬁt Plans established under the 1974,
It is the latter agreements, however,
1978, or subsequent NBCWA’s.
that ﬁrst suggest an industry commitment to funding lifetime health
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal case, specifically the syllabus outlining the legal arguments and reasoning. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–1150
_________________

GEORGIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[April 27, 2020]

JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  joins,  and
with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  joins  as  to  all  but  Part  II–A
and footnote 6, dissenting.

According to the majority, this Court’s 19th-century “gov-
ernment edicts” precedents clearly stand for the proposition
that  “judges  and  legislators  cannot  serve  as  authors  [for
copyright purposes] when they produce works in their offi-
cial capacity.”  Ante, at 11.  And, after straining to conclude
that the Georgia Code Revision Commission (Commission)
is an arm of the Georgia Legislature, ante, at 9–10, the ma-
jority concludes that Georgia cannot hold a copyright in the
annotations that are included as part of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (OCGA).  This ruling will likely come as
a shock to the 25 other jurisdictions—22 States, 2 Territo-
ries,  and  the  District  of  Columbia—that  rely  on  arrange-
ments similar to Georgia’s to produce annotated codes.  See
Brief for State of Arkansas et al. as Amici Curiae 15, and
App. to id., at 1.  Perhaps these jurisdictions all overlooked
this  Court’s  purportedly  clear  guidance.    Or  perhaps  the
widespread  use  of  these  arrangements  indicates  that  to-
day’s decision extends the government edicts doctrine to a
new  context,  rather  than  simply  “confirm[ing]”  what  the
precedents have always held.  See ante, at 5.  Because I be-
lieve  we  should  “leave  to  Congress  the  task  of  deciding
whether  the  Copyright  Act  needs  an  upgrade,”  American
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual legal reasoning and arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
Opinion of the Court

(statutory “remedial devices” that are “sufficiently compre-
hensive . . . may suffice” to show implicit preclusion).  But
when  a  particular  comprehensive  remedial  scheme  dis-
charges the defendant’s burden, it does so because the ap-
plication of ordinary interpretive tools reveals incompatibil-
ity,  i.e.,  it  demonstrates  that  “Congress  intended  [that]
statute’s  remedial  scheme  to  be  the  ‘exclusive  avenue
through which a plaintiff may assert [his] claims.’ ”  Fitzger-
ald, 555 U. S., at 252.

Nothing  in  the  FNHRA  indicates  the  incompatibility
evinced in our three prior cases finding implicit preclusion.
Rancho  Palos  Verdes,  544  U. S.,  at  120–123,  127;  Smith,
468 U. S., at 1008–1013; Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 6–7,
19–21.  Rancho  Palos  Verdes,  Smith,  and  Sea  Clammers
concerned  statutes  with  self-contained  enforcement
schemes  that  included  statute-specific  rights  of  action.
Rancho  Palos  Verdes,  544  U. S.,  at  120–123;  Smith,  468
U. S., at 1008–1012; Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 6–7, 17,
and n. 27, 19–21.  Each such statute required plaintiffs to
“comply with particular procedures and/or to exhaust par-
ticular  administrative  remedies”  under  the  statute’s  en-
forcement scheme before suing under its dedicated right of
action.  Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 254.  And each statute-spe-
cific right of action offered fewer benefits than those avail-
able under §1983.  Ibid., and n. 1.  Thus, in all three cases,
§1983’s operation would have thwarted Congress’s scheme
coming and going: It would have “circumvented” the stat-
utes’ presuit procedures, and would have also “given plain-
tiffs access to tangible benefits” as remedies that were “un-
available  under  the  statutes.”
Id.,  at  254.  Those
“ ‘comprehensive enforcement scheme[s]’ ” were “ ‘incompat-
ible with individual enforcement under §1983.’ ”  Id., at 252
(quoting Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 120).

HHC  has  identified  no  equivalent  sign  in  the  FNHRA;
nor has JUSTICE ALITO, see post, at 1, 3–5 (dissenting opin-
ion).  In focusing on what the FNHRA contains, they ignore
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of the FNHRA (Fair Housing Notice and Reporting Act) and its potential incompatibility with §1983. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

BREYER, J., dissenting

43251.

The CDC issued this modified moratorium order (like its
prior  moratorium  order)  pursuant  to  its  powers  under
§361(a)  of  the  Public  Health  Service  Act.    That  provision
“authorize[s]” the CDC:

“[T]o make and enforce such regulations as in [its] judg-
ment are necessary to prevent the introduction, trans-
mission,  or  spread  of  communicable  diseases  [inter-
state].  For purposes of carrying out and enforcing such
regulations, the Surgeon General may provide for such
inspection,  fumigation,  disinfection,  sanitation,  pest
extermination, destruction of animals or articles found
to  be  so  infected  or  contaminated  as  to  be  sources  of
dangerous  infection  to  human  beings,  and  other
measures,  as  in  his  judgment  may  be  necessary.”
42 U. S. C. §264(a).

The statute’s first sentence grants the CDC authority to
design measures that, in the agency’s judgment, are essen-
tial  to  contain  disease  outbreaks.    The  provision’s  plain
meaning includes eviction moratoria necessary to stop the
spread of diseases like COVID–19.  When Congress enacted
§361(a),  public  health  agencies  intervened  in  the  housing
market by regulation, including eviction moratoria, to con-
tain infection by preventing the movement of people.  See,
e.g., 5,589 New Cases in One Day Break Influenza Record,
N. Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1920, section 1, pp. 1–2, col. 1 (“ ‘[T]he
Health Department . . . instruct[s] all landlords that no per-
son  suffering  from  [influenza  and  pneumonia]  can  be  re-
moved under any condition whatever without the sanction
of the Health Department . . . ’ ”).  If Congress had meant to
exclude these types of measures from its broad grant of au-
thority, it likely would have said so.

Section 361(a)’s second sentence is naturally read to ex-
pand  the  agency’s  powers  by  providing  congressional  au-
thorization to act on personal property when necessary.  See
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 594 U.S. ____ (2021). It delves into the interpretation of §361(a) of the Public Health Service Act and its application to eviction moratoria during the COVID-19 pandemic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

second  step  have  sometimes  considered  whether  an  em-
ployee’s speech interests are outweighed by “ ‘the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.’ ”  Id., at
417 (quoting Pickering, 391 U. S., at 568).

Both sides ask us to employ at least certain aspects of this
Pickering–Garcetti  framework  to  resolve  Mr.  Kennedy’s
free speech claim.  They share additional common ground
too.  They  agree  that  Mr.  Kennedy’s  speech  implicates  a
matter  of  public  concern.  See  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  183;
Brief  for  Respondent  44.  They  also  appear  to  accept,  at
least for argument’s sake, that Mr. Kennedy’s speech does
not raise questions of academic freedom that may or may
not  involve  “additional”  First  Amendment  “interests”  be-
yond those captured by this framework.  Garcetti, 547 U. S.,
at 425; see also Keyishian v.  Board of Regents of Univ. of
State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Brief for Petitioner
26, n. 2.  At the first step of the Pickering–Garcetti inquiry,
the  parties’  disagreement  thus  turns  out  to  center  on one
question alone:  Did Mr. Kennedy offer his prayers in his
capacity as a private citizen, or did they amount to govern-
ment speech attributable to the District?

Our cases offer some helpful guidance for resolving this
question.  In Garcetti, the Court concluded that a prosecu-
tor’s internal memorandum to a supervisor was made “pur-
suant to [his] official duties,” and thus ineligible for First
Amendment protection.  547 U. S., at 421.  In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on the fact that the prosecutor’s
speech “fulfill[ed] a responsibility to advise his supervisor
about how best to proceed with a pending case.”  Ibid.  In
other  words,  the  prosecutor’s  memorandum  was  govern-
ment speech because it was speech the government “itself
ha[d]  commissioned  or  created”  and  speech  the  employee
was expected to deliver in the course of carrying out his job.
Id., at 422.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. It delves into the legal framework surrounding free speech rights of public employees, referencing previous cases like Pickering and Garcetti.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1022

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 16, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09M47.  Ogedengbe  v.  United  States;  and
No.  09M50.  Ogedengbe  v.  United  States.  Motions  for
leave  to  ﬁle  petitions  for  writs  of  certiorari  under  seal  with  re
dacted  copies  for  the  public  record  granted.

No.  09M48.  Ahmed  v.  Gates,  Secretary  of  Defense.  Mo
tion  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  without  an  afﬁdavit
of  indigency  executed  by  petitioner  granted.

No.  09M49.  Jackson  v.  Shinseki,  Secretary  of  Veterans

Affairs.  Motion  for  leave  to  proceed  as  a  veteran  denied.

No.  08–1569.  United  States  v.  O’Brien  et  al.  C.  A.  1st
Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 557 U. S. 966.]  Motions of Arthur Bur
gess  and  Martin  O’Brien  for  appointment  of  counsel  granted.
Leslie  Feldman-Rumpler,  Esq.,  of  Boston,  Mass.,  is  appointed  to
serve  as  counsel  for  respondent  Arthur  Burgess  in  this  case.
Timothy  P.  O’Connell,  Esq.,  of  Charlestown,  Mass.,  is  appointed
to  serve  as  counsel  for  respondent  Martin  O’Brien  in  this  case.
No.  08–10846.  In  re  Michalski.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  re
consideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pau
peris  [ante,  p.  814]  denied.

No.  08–10886.  In  re  Alpine.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[ante,  p.  813]  denied.

No.  09–1.  Holy  See  v.  Doe.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  The  Solicitor
General  is  invited  to  ﬁle  a  brief  in  this  case  expressing  the  views
of  the  United  States.

No.  09–5078.  Jerry  v.  Pennsylvania.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  805]  denied.

No.  09–5398.  Jaffe  v.  US  Airways,  Inc.,  et  al.  Ct.  App.
Ariz.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying
leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  806]  denied.

No.  09–6389.  Beras  v.  Carvlin  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.;  and
No. 09–6610.  Johnson v.  Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Motions  of  petitioners  for  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied.  Petitioners  are  allowed  until
December 7, 2009, within which to pay the docketing fees required
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their associated motions, likely from a legal journal or docket. It's not sequential narrative text and contains legal jargon.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

168

PHILLIPS v. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

Opinion of the Court

States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 377–378 (1945)
(property “denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citi-
zen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to . . . dispose
of it”). Similarly, the Texas rules governing the distribution
of marital assets have a historical pedigree tracing back to
the marital property laws adopted by the Texas Congress
only four years after Texas became an independent republic.
W. McClanahan, Community Property Law in the United
States § 3:23, pp. 123–124 (1982). But petitioners point to no
“background principles” of property law, Lucas, supra, at
1030, that would lead one to the conclusion that the owner of
a fund temporarily deposited in an attorney trust account
may be deprived of the interest the fund generates.

Petitioners further contend that “interest follows princi-
pal” is an incomplete explication of the Texas rule. Reply
Brief for Petitioners 11. Petitioners explain that interest
follows principal in Texas only if the interest is “allowed
by law or ﬁxed by the parties.” Cavnar v. Quality Control
Parking, Inc., 696 S. W. 2d 549, 552 (Tex. 1985). We fail
to see how this assists petitioners’ cause. We agree that
the government has great latitude in regulating the cir-
cumstances under which interest may be earned. As we
explained in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 66 (1979), “an-
ticipated gains ha[ve] traditionally been viewed as less
compelling than other property-related interests.” But
petitioners do not argue that the payment of interest on cli-
ent funds deposited in an attorney trust account is not “al-
lowed by law” in Texas. Rather, they argue that interest
actually “earned” by funds held in IOLTA accounts, Texas
IOLTA Rule 9, is not the private property of the owner of
the principal. However, regardless of whether the owner of
the principal has a constitutionally cognizable interest in the
anticipated generation of interest by his funds, any interest
that does accrue attaches as a property right incident to the
ownership of the underlying principal.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion discussing property rights related to interest earned on client funds held in an attorney trust account.  It cites legal precedents and discusses relevant Texas law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

702

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Breyer, J., dissenting

As a restraint on compelling a person to bear witness against
himself, the Amendment ordinarily should command the
respect of United States interrogators, whether the pros-
ecution reasonably feared by the examinee is domestic or
foreign. Cf. DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for
International Development, 887 F. 2d 275, 307–308 (CADC
1989) (R. B. Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“just as our ﬂag carries its message . . . both at
home and abroad, so does our Constitution and the values it
expresses”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
United States v. Tiede, 86 F. R. D. 227 (U. S. Court for Berlin
1979) (foreign national accused of hijacking Polish aircraft
abroad was tried under German substantive law in Berlin in
a court created by United States; U. S. court held foreign
national entitled to jury trial as a matter of constitutional
right). On this understanding of the “fundamental de-
cenc[y]” the Fifth Amendment embodies, “its expression of
our view of civilized governmental conduct,” Griswold,
supra, at 8, 9, I join Justice Breyer(cid:146)s dissenting opinion.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,

dissenting.

Were Aloyzas Balsys to face even a theoretical possibility
that his testimony could lead a State to prosecute him for
murder, the Fifth Amendment would prohibit the Federal
Government from compelling that testimony. The Court
concludes, however, that the Fifth Amendment does not pro-
hibit compulsion here because Balsys faces a real and sub-
stantial danger of prosecution not, say, by California, but by
a foreign nation. The Fifth Amendment, however, provides
that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5 (em-
phasis added). This Court has not read the words “any
criminal case” to limit application of the Clause to only fed-
eral criminal cases. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of
N. Y. Harbor, 378 U. S. 52 (1964). That precedent, as well
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

5

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting

592.    The  display  fails  this  requirement  if it objectively
“convey[s] a message that religion or a particular religious
belief is favored or preferred.”  Id., at 593 (internal quota-
tion  marks  omitted;  emphasis  deleted).3    To  make  that
determination, a court must consider “the pertinent facts
and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its place-
ment.”    Buono,  559  U. S.,  at  721  (plurality  opinion);  id.,
at  750–751  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)  (quoting  plurality
opinion).4
  As I see it, when a cross is displayed on public property,
the government may be presumed to endorse its religious
content.    The  venue is surely associated with the State;
the symbol and its meaning are just as surely associated
exclusively with Christianity.  “It certainly is not common
for property owners to open up their property [to] monu-
ments that convey a message with which they do not wish
to  be  associated.”   Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
U. S.  460,  471  (2009).    To  non-Christians,  nearly  30%  of
the population of the United States, Pew Research Center,
America’s  Changing  Religious  Landscape  4  (2015),  the

——————

3 JUSTICE  GORSUCH’s  “no  standing”  opinion  is  startling  in view of the
many  religious-display  cases  this  Court  has  resolved  on  the  merits.
E.g.,  McCreary  County,  545  U. S. 844; Van Orden, 545 U. S. 677; Stone
v.  Graham,  449  U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).  And, if JUSTICE  GORSUCH
is  right,  three  Members  of  the Court were out of line when they recog-
nized  that  “[t]he  [Establishment]  Clause  forbids  a  city  to  permit  the
permanent  erection  of  a  large  Latin  cross  on  the  roof  of  city  hall,”
Buono,  559  U. S.,  at  715  (opinion  of  Kennedy,  J.,  joined  by  ROBERTS,
C.J.,  and  ALITO,  J.)  (quoting  County  of  Allegheny,  492  U. S.,  at  661
(second  alteration  in  original),  for  no  one,  according  to  JUSTICE
GORSUCH,  should  be  heard  to  complain  about  such  a  thing.    But  see
Brief  for  Law  Professors  as  Amici  Curiae  (explaining  why  offended
observer standing is necessary and proper).

4 This  inquiry  has  been  described  by  some Members of the Court as
the  “reasonable  observer”  standard.    See,  e.g.,  Capitol  Square  Review
and  Advisory  Bd.  v.  Pinette,  515  U.  S.  753,  806  (1995)  (Stevens,  J.,
dissenting);  County  of  Allegheny,  492  U. S.,  at  630–631  (O’Connor,  J.,
concurring  in part and concurring  in judgment).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the legal interpretation of the Establishment Clause and the display of religious symbols on public property.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Syllabus

on social media is critical to their work as scientists, pundits, and ac-
tivists.  But they do not point to any specific instance of content mod-
eration  that  caused  them  identifiable  harm.    They  have  therefore
failed to establish an injury that is sufficiently “concrete and particu-
larized.”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560.  The state
plaintiffs assert a sovereign interest in hearing from their citizens on
social media, but they have not identified any specific speakers or top-
ics that they have been unable to hear or follow.  And States do not
have third-party “standing as parens patriae to bring an action against
the  Federal  Government”  on  behalf  of  their  citizens  who  have  faced
social-media  restrictions.    Haaland  v.  Brackeen,  599  U. S.  255,  295.
Pp. 27–28.

83 F. 4th 350, reversed and remanded.

BARRETT,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  SOTOMAYOR,  KAGAN,  KAVANAUGH,  and  JACKSON,  JJ.,  joined.
ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It summarizes the arguments and holdings of the case, and includes information about the justices who participated.  This type of text is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it is not the primary content of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

736

PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL v. BABBITT

Opinion of the Court

with 43 U. S. C. § 315f, and later the land use planning man-
dated by 43 U. S. C. § 1712 (discussed infra, at 737–738), was
authorized to reclassify and withdraw land from grazing
altogether and devote it to a more valuable or suitable use.
See, e. g., 43 CFR § 160.22 (1938); 1942 Range Code § 6(c)(4);
43 CFR § 161.6(c)(5) (1955); 43 CFR §§ 4111.4–2(f), 4115.2–
1(e)(6) (1964); 43 CFR §§ 4111.4–3(f), 4115.2–1(e)(6) (1977);
43 CFR § 4110.4–2(a) (1994); 43 CFR § 4110.4–2(a) (1998).
Third, in the event of range depletion, the Secretary main-
tained a separate authority, not to take areas of land out of
grazing use altogether as above, but to reduce the amount of
grazing allowed on that land, by suspending AUMs of graz-
ing privileges “in whole or in part,” and “for such time as
necessary.”
43 CFR § 4115.2–1(e)(5) (1964); see also 43 CFR
§ 160.30 (1938) (reservation (b)); 1942 Range Code § 6(c)(8);
43 CFR § 161.4(8) (1955); 43 CFR §§ 4111.4–3, 4115.2–1(e)(5)
(1977); 43 CFR § 4110.3–2 (1994); 43 CFR § 4110.3–2 (1998).
Indeed, the Department so often reduced individual per-
mit AUM allocations under this last authority that by 1964
the regulations had introduced the notion of “active AUMs,”
i. e., the AUMs that a permit initially granted minus the
AUMs that the department had “suspended” due to dimin-
ished range capacity. Thus, three ranchers who had initially
received, say, 3,000, 2,000, and 1,000 AUMs respectively,
might ﬁnd that they could use only two-thirds of that number
because a 33% reduction in the district’s grazing capacity had
led the Department to “suspend” one-third of each allocation.
The “active/suspended” system assured each rancher, how-
ever, that any capacity-related reduction would take place
proportionately among permit holders, see 43 CFR § 4111.4–
2(a)(3) (1964), and that the Department would try to restore
grazing privileges proportionately should the district’s ca-
pacity later increase, see § 4111.4–1.

In practice, active grazing on the public range declined
dramatically and steadily (from about 18 million to about
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion discussing grazing rights on public lands. It cites legal codes and regulations, making it likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
324  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

of  50,000  registered  voters—but  not  “infants,  pre-teens,  or
otherwise  electorally  ineligible  recipients”—would  be  a  re
quired  determination,  subject  to  judicial  challenge  and  re
view, in any case where the issue was in doubt.  Id., at 6.

In  our  view  the  statute  cannot  be  saved  by  limiting  the
reach of  2 U. S. C. § 441b  through this  suggested interpreta
tion.  In addition to the costs and burdens of litigation, this
result would require a calculation as to the number of people
a particular communication is likely to reach, with an inaccu
rate  estimate  potentially  subjecting  the  speaker  to  criminal
sanctions.  The First Amendment does not permit laws that
force  speakers  to  retain  a  campaign  ﬁnance  attorney,  con
duct  demographic  marketing  research,  or  seek  declaratory
rulings  before  discussing  the  most  salient  political  issues  of
our  day.  Prolix  laws  chill  speech  for  the  same  reason  that
vague laws chill speech: People “of common intelligence must
necessarily  guess  at  [the  law’s]  meaning  and  differ  as  to  its
application.”  Connally v.  General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385,
391 (1926).  The Government may not render a ban on politi
cal speech constitutional by carving out a limited exemption
through an amorphous regulatory interpretation.  We must
reject  the  approach  suggested  by  the  amici.  Section  441b
covers Hillary.

B

Citizens United next argues that § 441b may not be applied
to Hillary under the approach taken in WRTL.  McConnell
decided  that  § 441b(b)(2)’s  deﬁnition  of  an  “electioneering
communication”  was  facially  constitutional  insofar  as  it  re
stricted  speech  that  was  “the  functional  equivalent  of  ex
press  advocacy”  for  or  against  a  speciﬁc  candidate.  540
U. S., at 206.  WRTL then found an unconstitutional applica
tion  of  § 441b  where  the  speech  was  not  “express  advocacy
or  its  functional  equivalent.”  551  U. S.,  at  481  (opinion  of
Roberts,  C.  J.).  As  explained  by  The  Chief  Justice’s
controlling  opinion  in  WRTL,  the  functional-equivalent  test
is  objective:  “[A]  court  should  ﬁnd  that  [a  communication]  is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, ET AL. v.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–508.  Argued January 13, 2021—Decided April 22, 2021

The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against Scott Tucker
and his companies alleging deceptive payday lending practices in vio-
lation  of  §5(a)  of  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  Act.    The  District
Court granted the Commission’s request pursuant to §13(b) of the Act
for a permanent injunction to prevent Tucker from committing future
violations of the Act, and relied on the same authority to direct Tucker
to pay $1.27 billion in restitution and disgorgement.  On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker’s argument that §13(b) does not author-
ize the award of equitable monetary relief.

Held: Section 13(b) does not authorize the Commission to seek, or a court
to  award,  equitable  monetary  relief  such  as  restitution  or  disgorge-
ment.  Pp. 3–15.

(a) Congress granted the Commission authority to enforce the Act’s
prohibitions  on  “unfair  or  deceptive  acts  or  practices,”  15  U.  S.  C.
§§45(a)(1)–(2), by commencing administrative proceedings pursuant to
§5 of the Act.  Section 5(l) of the Act authorizes the Commission, fol-
lowing completion of the administrative process and the issuance of a
final cease and desist order, to seek civil penalties, and permits district
courts to “grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further eq-
uitable relief as they deem appropriate in the enforcement of such final
orders of the Commission.”  §45(l).  Section 19 of the Act further au-
thorizes district courts (subject to various conditions and limitations)
to grant “such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to
consumers,” §57b(b), in cases where someone has engaged in unfair or
deceptive conduct with respect to which the Commission has issued a
final cease and desist order applicable to that person, see §57b(a)(2).
Here, the Commission responded to Tucker’s payday lending practices
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the actual opinion. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case and the court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

29

JACKSON, J., dissenting

The Court has come to rest on the bottom-line conclusion
that racial diversity in higher education is only worth po-
tentially preserving insofar as it might be needed to prepare
Black  Americans  and  other  underrepresented  minorities
for success in the bunker, not the boardroom (a particularly
awkward place to land, in light of the history the majority
opts  to  ignore).106  It  would  be  deeply  unfortunate  if  the
Equal Protection Clause actually demanded this perverse,
ahistorical, and counterproductive outcome.  To impose this
result in that Clause’s name when it requires no such thing,
and to thereby obstruct our collective progress toward the
full realization of the Clause’s promise, is truly a tragedy
for us all.

——————
potential consequences of the [majority’s] approach, as measured against
the Constitution’s objectives . . . provides further reason to believe that
the [majority’s] approach is legally unsound.”  Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 858 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  I fear that the Court’s folly brings our Nation to
the brink of coming “full circle” once again.  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 402 (1978) (opinion of Marshall, J.).

106 Compare ante, at 22, n. 4, with ante, at 22–30, and supra, at 3–4,

and nn. 2–3.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It expresses the judge's disagreement with the majority opinion and provides legal arguments to support their stance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

11

KAGAN, J., dissenting

too  costly  to  bring.
Its  rationale  applies  whenever  an
agreement makes the vindication of federal claims impos-
sibly  expensive—whether  by  imposing  fees  or  proscribing
cost-sharing or adopting some other device.

That  leaves  the  three  last  sentences  in  the  majority’s
core  paragraph.    Here,  the  majority  conjures  a  special
reason to exclude “class-action waiver[s]” from the effective-
vindication  rule’s  compass.  Ante,  at  7–8,  and  n.  4.
Rule  23,  the  majority  notes,  became  law  only  in  1938—
decades after the Sherman Act.  The majority’s conclusion:
If  federal  law  in  the  interim  decades  did  not  eliminate  a
plaintiff ’s  rights  under  that  Act,  then  neither  does  this
agreement.

But that notion, first of all, rests on a false premise: that
this case is only about a class-action waiver.  See ante, at
7,  n. 4  (confining  the  case  to  that  issue).  It  is  not,  and
indeed  could  not  sensibly  be.  The  effective-vindication
rule  asks  whether  an  arbitration  agreement  as  a  whole
precludes  a  claimant  from  enforcing  federal  statutory
rights.  No single provision is properly viewed in isolation,
because an agreement can close off one avenue to pursue a
claim while leaving others open.  In this case, for example,
the  agreement  could  have  prohibited  class  arbitration
without  offending  the  effective-vindication  rule  if  it  had
provided  an  alternative  mechanism  to  share,  shift,  or
reduce  the  necessary  costs.    The  agreement’s  problem  is
that  it  bars  not  just  class  actions,  but  also  all  mecha-
nisms—many existing long before the Sherman Act, if that
matters—for  joinder  or  consolidation  of  claims,  informal
coordination  among  individual  claimants,  or  amelioration
of arbitral expenses.  See supra, at 7.  And contrary to the
majority’s  assertion,  the  Second  Circuit  well  understood
that  point:  It  considered,  for  example,  whether  Italian
Colors  could  shift  expert  expenses  to  Amex  if  its  claim
prevailed (no) or could join with merchants bringing simi-
lar  claims  to  produce  a  common  expert  report  (no  again).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding an arbitration agreement and its impact on the ability to enforce federal statutory rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxx

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

Holder; Njoku v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  916,1067

1048

Holder; Pedernera v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Holder; Ramos Armando v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holder; Rossaty v.
875

Holder; Santoso v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Holder; Saquic-Sacche v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

Holder; Silva v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

Holder; Spence v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holder; Sunarto v.
945

Holder; Sungwook Kim v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Holder; Tandiono v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Holder; Tjong v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Holder; Vasquez-Ochoa v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holderness; Young v.
1054

Holguin v. Arizona  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holinka; Dahler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035

1112

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hollady v. Michigan
Holland v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  945,1075

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  898,1066

Holland v. Holland
Hollingsworth v. Perry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  183,1107

1095

Hollis v. Runnels
Hollis v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1051

1134

Holman v. Shinseki  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP; Redstone Resources, Inc. v.  . . . . .
932

Holmes v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holmes v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1004,1062,1084

Holstick v. United States
1032

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Holt v. Obama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1062

Holycross v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

Holyﬁeld v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1022

Holy See v. Doe  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holy See; O’Bryan v.
973

Hon v. Cosmos Jewelry, Ltd.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074

Hon Chung Lau v. Giurbina  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1105

Hon Chung Lau v. Shumsky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Honda Engineering North America, Inc.; Adams v.  . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Honken v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144

Hon Lau v. Adams  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144

Hon Lau v. Brown
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1106

Hon Lau v. Evans  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1106

Hon Lau v. Hernandez  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hood v. United States
885

Hooker v. Thurmer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Hooks v. Bruton  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–309
_________________

JOHN C. CARNEY, GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE,
PETITIONER v. JAMES R. ADAMS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[December 10, 2020]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring.
I agree that respondent Adams did not demonstrate Ar-
ticle III standing to bring this suit.  Because the constitu-
tional  questions  in  this  case  will  likely  be  raised  again,  I
write separately to highlight two important considerations
that may inform their answers.

First, there are potentially material differences between
two  separate  rules  the  Delaware  Constitution  imposes  on
its courts: the “major party” requirement and the “bare ma-
jority” requirement.  Bare majority requirements preclude
any single political party from having more than a bare ma-
jority of the seats in a public body.  Such requirements have
existed in various forums for roughly 150 years, currently
feature in a large number of public bodies, and have been
shown to help achieve ideological diversity.  Major party re-
quirements  like  Delaware’s,  by  contrast,  preclude  anyone
who is not a member of the two major political parties from
serving in a public body.  They are far rarer than their bare
majority cousins, and they arguably impose a greater bur-
den on First Amendment associational rights.  These differ-
ences may require distinct constitutional analyses.

Second,  that  possibility,  in  turn,  raises  the  question
whether Delaware’s major party and bare majority require-
ments  are  severable  from  one  another,  such  that  one  re-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It sets the stage for her analysis of the case and raises important constitutional questions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>