<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GLOSSIP ET AL. v. GROSS ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 14–7955.  Argued April 29, 2015—Decided June 29, 2015

Because capital punishment is constitutional, there must be a constitu-
tional means of carrying it out.  After Oklahoma adopted lethal injec-
tion as its method of execution, it settled on a three-drug protocol of
(1) sodium  thiopental  (a  barbiturate)  to  induce  a  state  of  uncon-
sciousness,  (2) a  paralytic  agent  to  inhibit  all  muscular-skeletal
movements,  and  (3) potassium  chloride  to  induce  cardiac  arrest.    In
Baze v. Rees, 553 U. S. 35, the Court held that this protocol does not
violate  the  Eighth  Amendment’s  prohibition  against  cruel  and  unu-
sual  punishments.    Anti-death-penalty  advocates  then  pressured
pharmaceutical  companies  to  prevent  sodium  thiopental  (and,  later,
another  barbiturate  called  pentobarbital)  from  being  used  in  execu-
tions.  Unable  to  obtain  either  sodium  thiopental  or  pentobarbital,
Oklahoma decided to use a 500-milligram dose of midazolam, a seda-
tive, as the first drug in its three-drug protocol.

Oklahoma  death-row  inmates  filed  a  42  U. S. C.  §1983  action
claiming that the use of midazolam violates the Eighth Amendment.
Four of those inmates filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and
argued that a 500-milligram dose of midazolam will not render them
unable to feel pain associated with administration of the second and
third drugs.  After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the District Court
denied  the  motion.  It  held  that  the  prisoners  failed  to  identify  a
known and available alternative method of execution that presented
a substantially less severe risk of pain.  It also held that the prison-
ers failed to establish a likelihood of showing that the use of midazo-
lam  created  a  demonstrated  risk  of  severe  pain.    The  Tenth  Circuit
affirmed.

Held: Petitioners have failed to establish a likelihood of success on the
merits  of  their  claim  that  the  use  of  midazolam  violates  the  Eighth
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
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  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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  <content>
2

VIDAL v. ELSTER

Opinion of the Court

Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 92 (1879); see also §1127.  As we have
explained, “[t]he principle underlying trademark protection
is that distinctive marks—words, names, symbols, and the
like—can help distinguish a particular artisan’s goods from
those of others.”  B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries,
Inc., 575 U. S. 138, 142 (2015).  So “[o]ne who first uses a
distinct  mark  in  commerce  thus  acquires  rights  to  that
mark,”  which  “include  preventing  others  from  using  the
mark.”  Ibid.

Trademark rights are primarily a matter of state law, but
an owner can obtain important rights through federal reg-
istration.  The  Lanham  Act  creates  a  federal  trademark-
registration  system  administered  by  the  PTO.    Federal
“[r]egistration  of  a  mark  is  not  mandatory,”  and  “[t]he
owner of an unregistered mark may still use it in commerce
and  enforce  it  against  infringers.”    Iancu  v.  Brunetti,  588
U. S. 388, 391 (2019).  Federal registration, however, “con-
fers important legal rights and benefits.”  B&B Hardware,
575 U. S., at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted).  For
example, a registrant may rely on registration in litigation
as  prima  facie  evidence  of  his  exclusive  right  to  use  the
mark.  §1115(a).  And,  registration  provides  nationwide
constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership of
the mark.  §1072.

Only marks that meet certain criteria are federally regis-
terable.  Among  other  criteria,  the  Lanham  Act  contains
what we will call the “names clause”—a prohibition on the
registration  of  a  mark  that  “[c]onsists  of  or  comprises  a
name  . . .  identifying  a  particular  living  individual  except
by  his  written  consent.”  §1052(c).  The  names  clause  ex-
cludes from registration “not only full names but also sur-
names,  shortened  names,  and  nicknames,  so  long  as  the
name does in fact identify a particular living individual.”  2
J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition §13:37,
p. 31 (5th ed. 2024) (McCarthy).

Steve Elster sought to register the trademark “Trump too
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt discussing trademark law, specifically focusing on the "names clause" of the Lanham Act. It provides legal analysis and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH v. HETRONIC INT’L, INC.

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

The Court’s transformative approach thwarts Congress’
ability  to  regulate  important  “interests”  or  “parties”  that
Congress has the power to regulate.  WesternGeco LLC, 585
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).  Some statutes may have a stat-
utory focus that is not strictly conduct and that implicates
some conduct abroad.  Cf., e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd
v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 165 (2004) (recognizing
the long-established view that U. S. antitrust laws “reflect
a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that
foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused” (emphasis de-
leted)).  Under the Court’s new categorical rule, those stat-
utes may not cover relevant conduct occurring abroad, even
if  that  conduct  impacts  domestic  interests  that  Congress
sought to protect.  At bottom, by reframing the inquiry at
step two as a conduct-only test, the Court’s new rule frus-
trates a key function of the presumption against extraterri-
toriality: to discern congressional meaning and “preserv[e]
a stable background against which Congress can legislate
with predictable effects” to protect domestic interests, Mor-
rison, 561 U. S., at 261, including those of U. S. trademark
owners and consumers.

The Court’s analysis is also inconsistent with Steele.  Ac-

——————
(2016),  the  majority  argues  that  the  Court  has  already  “acknowledged
that courts do not need to determine [a] statute’s ‘focus’ when all conduct
regarding the violations took place outside the United States. ”  Ante, at
11 (some internal quotation marks omitted).  The portion of RJR Nabisco
that the majority relies upon merely described the Court’s holding in Ki-
obel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108 (2013), a case that did
not involve step two.  In Kiobel, the Court held that the statute did not
rebut  the  presumption  against  extraterritoriality  at  step  one  and  de-
clined to address step two of the analysis (including determining the stat-
ute’s focus) because the claims at issue did not “touch and concern the
territory of the United States” other than through “mere corporate pres-
ence.”  Id., at 124–125.  Kiobel does not offer any guidance on what con-
stitutes a domestic application of a statute at step two.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH v. HETRONIC INT’L, INC. It delves into the Court's interpretation of extraterritoriality in legal statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 598 (2000)

651

Souter, J., dissenting

framers of the Constitution, were they present in this House
to-day, would inevitably regard this resolution as a most
direct blow at the doctrine of State’s rights and at the integ-
rity of the State sovereignties; for if you once deprive a State
as a collective organism of all share in the General Govern-
ment, you annihilate its federative importance.” 26 Cong.
Rec. 7774 (1894). Massachusetts Senator George Hoar like-
wise defended indirect election of the Senate as “a great se-
curity for the rights of the States.” S. Doc. No. 232, 59th
Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1906). And Elihu Root warned that
if the selection of senators should be taken from state leg-
islatures, “the tide that now sets toward the Federal Gov-
46 Cong. Rec.
ernment will swell in volume and power.”
2243 (1911).
“The time will come,” he continued, “when
the Government of the United States will be driven to
the exercise of more arbitrary and unconsidered power, will
be driven to greater concentration, will be driven to extend
its functions into the internal affairs of the States.”
Ibid.
See generally Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democ-
racy: Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth
Amendment, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 671, 712–714 (1999) (not-
ing federalism-based objections to the Seventeenth Amend-
ment). These warnings did not kill the proposal; the
Amendment was ratiﬁed, and today it is only the ratiﬁcation,
not the predictions, which this Court can legitimately heed.19

19 The majority tries to deﬂect the objection that it blocks an intended
political process by explaining that the Framers intended politics to set
the federal balance only within the sphere of permissible commerce leg-
islation, whereas we are looking to politics to deﬁne that sphere (in der-
ogation even of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)), ante, at 616.
But we all accept the view that politics is the arbiter of state interests
only within the realm of legitimate congressional action under the com-
merce power. Neither Madison nor Wilson nor Marshall, nor the Jones &
Laughlin, Darby, Wickard, or Garcia Courts, suggested that politics de-
ﬁnes the commerce power. Nor do we, even though we recognize that
the conditions of the contemporary world result in a vastly greater sphere
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses historical arguments against the Seventeenth Amendment and the role of politics in defining the scope of federal power.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

45

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

was not, and could not ever be, consistent with the Recon-
struction  Amendments,  ratified  to  give  the  former  slaves
full  citizenship.  Whatever  might  have  been  thought  in
Plessy’s time, the Brown Court explained, both experience
and “modern authority” showed the “detrimental effect[s]”
of  state-sanctioned  segregation:  It  “affect[ed]  [children’s]
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”  347
U. S., at 494.  By that point, too, the law had begun to re-
flect that understanding.  In a series of decisions, the Court
had  held  unconstitutional  public  graduate  schools’  exclu-
sion of black students.  See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S.
629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332
U. S.  631  (1948)  (per curiam);  Missouri  ex  rel.  Gaines  v.
Canada,  305  U. S.  337  (1938).  The  logic  of  those  cases,
Brown held, “appl[ied] with added force to children in grade
and  high  schools.”    347  U. S.,  at  494.    Changed  facts  and
changed law required Plessy’s end.

The majority says that in recognizing those changes, we
are  implicitly  supporting  the  half-century  interlude  be-
tween Plessy and Brown.  See ante, at 70.  That is not so.
First, if the Brown Court had used the majority’s method of
constitutional  construction,  it  might  not  ever  have  over-
ruled  Plessy,  whether  5  or  50  or  500  years  later.    Brown
thought that whether the ratification-era history supported
desegregation was “[a]t best . . . inconclusive.”  347 U. S., at
489.  But even setting that aside, we are not saying that a
decision  can  never  be  overruled  just  because  it  is  terribly
wrong.  Take West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S.
624, which the majority also relies on.  See ante, at 40–41,
70.  That  overruling  took  place  just  three  years  after  the
initial  decision,  before  any  notable  reliance  interests  had
developed.  It happened as well because individual Justices
changed their minds, not because a new majority wanted to
undo the decisions of their predecessors.  Both Barnette and
Brown, moreover, share another feature setting them apart
from  the  Court’s  ruling  today.  They  protected  individual
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites previous cases and discusses legal precedent.  The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE

Opinion of the Court

nonvoting as part of a test for removal.
  Another  provision  of  HAVA  makes  this  point  more
directly.    After  directing  that  “registrants  who  have  not
responded to a notice and . . . have not voted in 2 consecu-
tive general elections for Federal office shall be removed,”
it  adds  that  “no  registrant  may  be removed  solely  by  rea-
son of a failure to vote.”  §21083(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).

B
  Since  1994,  Ohio  has  used  two  procedures  to  identify
and  remove  voters  who  have
lost  their  residency
qualification.
  First, the State utilizes the Postal Service option set out
in  the  NVRA.    The  State  sends  notices  to  registrants
whom  the  Postal  Service’s  “national  change  of  address
service” identifies as having moved.  Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§3503.21(B)(1).    This  procedure  is  undisputedly  lawful.
See 52 U. S. C. §20507(c)(1).
  But  because  according  to  the  Postal  Service  “[a]s  many
as 40 percent of people who move do not inform the Postal
Service,”3 Ohio does not rely on this information alone.  In
its  so-called  Supplemental  Process,  Ohio  “identif[ies]
electors  whose  lack  of  voter  activity  indicates  they  may
have moved.”  Record 401 (emphasis deleted).  Under this
process,  Ohio  sends  notices  to  registrants  who  have  “not
engage[d] in any voter activity for a period of two consecu-
tive years.”  Id., at 1509.  “Voter activity” includes “casting
a  ballot”  in  any  election—whether  general,  primary,  or
special  and  whether  federal,  state,  or  local.    See  id.,  at
1507.    (And  Ohio  regularly  holds  elections  on  both  even
and  odd  years.)    Moreover,  the  term  “voter  activity”  is

——————

3 U. S.  Postal  Service,  Office  of  Inspector  Gen.,  MS–MA–15–006,
Strategies for Reducing Undeliverable as Addressed Mail 15 (2015); see
also Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae 10.  Respondents and
one of their amici dispute this statistic.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 46; Brief
for Asian Americans Advancing Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 27–28.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing voter registration procedures and the use of non-voting as a factor in removal. It contains legal citations and arguments, indicating it's part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

THRYV, INC. v. CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

enough:  “An elective despotism was not the government we
fought for.”  The Federalist No. 48, p. 311 (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) (emphasis deleted).  In a government “founded on free
principles,”  no  one  person,  group,  or  branch  may  hold  all
the keys of power over a private person’s liberty or property.
Ibid.    Instead,  power  must  be  set  against  power,  “divided
and  balanced  among  several  bodies  . . .  checked  and  re-
strained  by  the  others.”    Ibid.   As  Chief  Justice  Marshall
put it:  “It would excite some surprise if, in a government of
laws and of principle . . . a department whose appropriate
duty it is to decide questions of right, not only between in-
dividuals, but between the government and individuals,” a
statute might leave that individual “with no remedy, no ap-
peal to the laws of his country, if he should believe the claim
to  be  unjust.”  United  States  v.  Nourse,  9  Pet.  8,  28–29
(1835).

It  should  come  as  an  equal  surprise  to  think  Congress
might  have  imposed  an  express  limit  on  an  executive  bu-
reaucracy’s  authority  to  decide  the  rights  of  individuals,
and then entrusted that agency with the sole power to en-
force the limits of its own authority.  Yet on Thryv’s account,
§315(b)’s command that “inter partes review may not be in-
stituted” would be left entrusted to the good faith of the very
executive  officials  it  is  meant  to  constrain.    (Emphasis
added.)  We do not normally rush to a conclusion that Con-
gress has issued such “ ‘blank checks drawn to the credit of
some administrative officer.’ ”  Bowen v. Michigan Academy
of  Family  Physicians,  476  U. S.  667,  671  (1986)  (quoting
S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)).

That  usually  may  be  the  case,  Thryv  counters,  but  this
statute’s  unusually  modest  purpose  makes  it  plausible  to
think Congress meant to shield its application from judicial
review.  After all, the company submits, §315(b) is not really
a  firm  limit  on  the  agency’s  authority,  only  a  claim  pro-
cessing  rule.  For  proof,  the  company  reminds  us  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the balance of power and the limits of agency authority.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1021

558 U. S.

November  16,  2009

Certiorari  Granted—Reversed and  Remanded.

(See No.  08–1263,

ante,  p.  15.)

Certiorari  Dismissed

No.  09–6447.  Cohen  v.  Syme  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Ariz.  Motion
of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and
certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No. 09–6459.  Spurlock v.  Bank of America, N. A.  Cir. Ct.
Wayne  County,  W. Va.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed
in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this
Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As  petitioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this
Court’s  process,  the  Clerk  is  directed  not  to  accept  any  further
petitions  in  noncriminal  matters  from  petitioner  unless  the  dock
eting  fee  required  by  Rule  38(a)  is  paid  and  the  petition  is  sub
mitted  in  compliance  with  Rule  33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of
Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506  U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).
Justice Stevens dissents.  See id., at 4, and cases cited therein.

No.  09–6554.  Plummer  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As  peti
tioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk  is
directed  not  to  accept  any  further  petitions  in  noncriminal  mat
ters  from  petitioner  unless  the  docketing  fee  required  by  Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506
U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See
id.,  at  4,  and  cases  cited  therein.

No.  09–6586.  Smith  v.  Knight,  Superintendent,  Pendle
ton  Correctional  Facility.  Ct.  App.  Ind.  Motion  of  peti
tioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certio
rari dismissed.  See this Court’s Rule 39.8.  Reported below: 908
N.  E.  2d  1277.

Miscellaneous  Orders

No.  09M46.  Daniel  v.  Trans  Union  Consumer  Reporting.
Motion  to  direct  the  Clerk  to  ﬁle  petition  for  writ  of  certiorari
out  of  time  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal orders from a court, including case numbers, dates, and dispositions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely not meant to be read as a continuous story.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SEC v. JARKESY

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Government in its sovereign capacity, also known as a pub-
lic  right.  According  to  the  majority,  the  Constitution  re-
quires  the  Government  to  seek  civil  penalties  for  federal-
securities fraud before a jury in federal court.  The nature
of  the  remedy  is,  in  the  majority’s  view,  virtually  disposi-
tive.  That is plainly wrong.  This Court has held, without
exception, that Congress has broad latitude to create statu-
tory obligations that entitle the Government to civil penal-
ties, and then to assign their enforcement outside the regu-
lar courts of law where there are no juries.

Beyond the majority’s legal errors, its ruling reveals a far
more  fundamental  problem:  This  Court’s  repeated  failure
to appreciate that its decisions can threaten the separation
of powers.  Here, that threat comes from the Court’s mis-
taken  conclusion  that  Congress  cannot  assign  a  certain
public-rights  matter  for  initial  adjudication  to  the  Execu-
tive because it must come only to the Judiciary.

The  majority  today  upends  longstanding  precedent  and
the established practice of its coequal partners in our tri-
partite system of Government.  Because the Court fails to
act as a neutral umpire when it rewrites established rules
in the manner it does today, I respectfully dissent.

I

The story of this case is straightforward.  The Securities
and  Exchange  Commission  (SEC  or  Commission)  investi-
gated  respondents  George  Jarkesy  and  his  advisory  firm
Patriot28,  LLC,  for  alleged  violations  of  federal-securities
laws in connection with the launch of two hedge funds.

In deciding how and where to enforce these laws, the SEC
could have filed suit in federal court or adjudicated the mat-
ter in an administrative enforcement action subject to judi-
cial review.  See 15 U. S. C. §§77h–1, 77t, 78u, 78u–2, 78u–
3, 80b–3, 80b–9.  The SEC opted for the latter.  In 2013, the
SEC
initiated  an  administrative  enforcement  action
against  respondents,  alleging  violations  of  the  Securities
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case SEC v. Jarkesy. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

285

Opinion of the Court

itself, is not entitled to First Amendment protection because
Id., at 354, 719 A. 2d, at 276. Nude
it conveys no message.
dancing, however, is expressive conduct that is entitled to
some quantum of protection under the First Amendment, a
view that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted was
endorsed by eight Members of this Court in Barnes. 553
Pa., at 354, 719 A. 2d, at 276.

The Pennsylvania court next inquired whether the govern-
ment interest in enacting the ordinance was content neutral,
explaining that regulations that are unrelated to the sup-
pression of expression are not subject to strict scrutiny but
to the less stringent standard of United States v. O’Brien,
supra, at 377. To answer the question whether the ordi-
nance is content based, the court turned to our decision in
Barnes.
553 Pa., at 355–356, 719 A. 2d, at 277. Although
the Pennsylvania court noted that the Indiana statute at
issue in Barnes “is strikingly similar to the Ordinance we
are examining,” it concluded that “[u]nfortunately for our
purposes, the Barnes Court splintered and produced four
separate, non-harmonious opinions.”
553 Pa., at 356, 719
A. 2d, at 277. After canvassing these separate opinions, the
Pennsylvania court concluded that, although it is permissible
to ﬁnd precedential effect in a fragmented decision, to do so
a majority of the Court must have been in agreement on the
concept that is deemed to be the holding. See Marks v.
United States, 430 U. S. 188 (1977). The Pennsylvania court
noted that “aside from the agreement by a majority of the
Barnes Court that nude dancing is entitled to some First
Amendment protection, we can ﬁnd no point on which a ma-
jority of the Barnes Court agreed.” 553 Pa., at 358, 719
A. 2d, at 278. Accordingly, the court concluded that “no
clear precedent arises out of Barnes on the issue of whether
the [Erie] ordinance .
. passes muster under the First
Amendment.”

Ibid.

.

Having determined that there was no United States
Supreme Court precedent on point, the Pennsylvania court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the First Amendment implications of a nude dancing ordinance. It cites legal precedents and analyzes their application to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U48

[09-26-01 10:25:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

446

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

EDWARDS, WARDEN v. CARPENTER

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit

No. 98–2060. Argued February 28, 2000—Decided April 25, 2000

Respondent pleaded guilty while maintaining his innocence to Ohio mur-
der and robbery charges in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement
that the plea could be withdrawn if the death penalty was imposed.
The Ohio Court of Appeals afﬁrmed his conviction and sentence of im-
prisonment, and he did not appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. After
pursuing state postconviction relief pro se, respondent, represented by
new counsel, petitioned the Ohio Court of Appeals to reopen his direct
appeal, claiming that his original appellate counsel was constitutionally
ineffective in failing to challenge the sufﬁciency of the evidence sup-
porting his conviction and sentence. The court dismissed the applica-
tion as untimely under Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B), and the
Ohio Supreme Court afﬁrmed. Respondent then ﬁled a federal habeas
petition, raising, inter alia, the sufﬁciency-of-the-evidence claim, and
alleging that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in
not raising that claim on direct appeal. The District Court found that
his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was cause excusing the proce-
dural default of his sufﬁciency-of-the-evidence claim because Rule 26(B)
was not an adequate procedural ground to bar federal review of the
ineffective-assistance claim; concluded that respondent’s appellate coun-
sel was constitutionally ineffective; and granted the writ conditioned on
the state appellate court’s reopening of respondent’s direct appeal of the
sufﬁciency-of-the-evidence claim. On cross-appeals, the Sixth Circuit
held that the ineffective-assistance claim served as cause to excuse the
default of the sufﬁciency-of-the-evidence claim, whether or not the for-
mer claim had been procedurally defaulted, because respondent had
exhausted the ineffective-assistance claim by presenting it to the state
courts in his application to reopen the direct appeal. Finding preju-
dice from counsel’s failure to raise the sufﬁciency-of-the-evidence claim
on direct appeal, it directed the District Court to issue the writ con-
ditioned upon the state court’s according respondent a new culpability
hearing.

Held: A procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance claim can serve as
cause to excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim only if
the habeas petitioner can satisfy the “cause and prejudice” standard
with respect to the ineffective-assistance claim itself. The procedural
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a legal case, summarizing the facts and legal issues presented.  It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a summary of a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

Opinion of the Court

plies to all “governmental entities.”  It is implausible, the
United States submits, to think that Congress “commanded
every  county,  district,  and  municipality  in  the  Nation  to
prohibit  sports  betting.”  Ibid.    But  in  making  this  argu
ment, the United States again ignores the legal landscape
at  the  time  of  PASPA’s  enactment.  At  that  time,  sports
gambling  was  generally  prohibited  by  state  law,  and
therefore a State’s political subdivisions were powerless to
legalize  the  activity.  But  what  if  a  State  enacted  a  law
enabling, but not requiring, one or more of its subdivisions
to  decide  whether  to  authorize  sports  gambling?    Such
a  state  law  would  not  itself  authorize  sports  gambling.
The  ban  on  legalization  at  the  local  level  addresses  this
problem.

The  interpretation  adopted  by  the  Third  Circuit  and
advocated  by  respondents  and  the  United  States  not  only
ignores the situation that Congress faced when it enacted
PASPA  but  also  leads  to  results  that  Congress  is  most
unlikely  to  have  wanted.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  im
plausible conclusions that all of those favoring alternative
interpretations have been forced to reach about the extent
to which the provision permits the repeal of laws banning
sports gambling.

The  Third  Circuit  could  not  say  which,  if  any,  partial
repeals are allowed.  832 F. 3d, at 402.  Respondents and
the  United  States  tell  us  that  the  PASPA  ban  on  state
authorization  allows  complete  repeals,  but  beyond  that
they identify no clear line.  It is improbable that Congress
meant to enact such a nebulous regime.

C

The  respondents  and  United  States  argue  that  even  if

there  is  some  doubt  about  the  correctness  of  their  inter
pretation  of  the  anti-authorization  provision,  that  inter
pretation  should  be  adopted  in  order  to  avoid  any  anti-
commandeering  problem  that  would  arise  if  the  provision
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case dealing with the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).  It discusses the interpretation of the law and its implications for state and local governments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
42

BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971)).

Nevertheless,  the  PLRA  requires  a  court  to  adopt  a
remedy  that  is  “narrowly  tailored”  to  the  constitutional
violation  and  that  gives  “substantial  weight”  to  public
safety.  18 U. S. C. §3626(a).  When a court is imposing a
population  limit,  this  means  the  court  must  set  the  limit
at  the  highest  population  consistent  with  an  efficacious
remedy.  The court must also order the population reduc-
tion  achieved  in  the  shortest  period  of  time  reasonably
consistent with public safety.

A

The  three-judge  court  concluded  that  the  population  of
California’s  prisons  should  be  capped  at  137.5%  of  design
capacity.  This  conclusion  is  supported  by  the  record.
Indeed, some evidence supported a limit as low as 100% of
design  capacity.    The  chief  deputy  secretary  of  Correc-
tional  Healthcare  Services  for  the  California  prisons  tes-
tified  that  California’s  prisons  “ ‘were  not  designed  and
made no provision for any expansion of medical care space
beyond  the  initial  100%  of  capacity.’ ”    Juris.  App.  176a.
Other  evidence  supported  a  limit  as  low  as  130%.    The
head  of  the  State’s  Facilities  Strike  Team  recommended
reducing  the  population  to  130%  of  design  capacity  as  a
long-term goal.  Id., at 179a–180a.  A former head of cor-
rectional systems in Washington State, Maine, and Penn-
sylvania  testified  that  a  130%  limit  would  “ ‘give  prison
officials  and  staff  the  ability  to  provide  the  necessary
programs and services for California’s prisoners.’ ”  Id., at
180a.  A  former  executive  director  of  the  Texas  prisons
testified  that  a  limit  of  130%  was  “ ‘realistic  and  appro-
priate’ ” and would “ ‘ensure that [California’s] prisons are
safe  and  provide  legally  required  services.’ ”    Ibid.  And  a
former  acting  secretary  of  the  California  prisons  agreed
with a 130% limit with the caveat that a 130% limit might
prove inadequate in some older facilities.  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing prison population limits and the legal reasoning behind them. It's sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Case Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

25

KAGAN, J., dissenting

ideal  of  proportional  representation  commanded  another
Republican  seat.  It  invalidated  that  district  because  the
quest  for  partisan  gain  made  the  State  override  its  own
political  geography  and  districting  criteria.  So  much,
then, for the impossibility of neutrality.

The  majority’s  sole  response  misses  the  point.    Accord-
ing  to  the  majority,  “it  does  not  make  sense  to  use”  a
State’s own (non-partisan) districting criteria as the base-
line  from  which  to  measure  partisan  gerrymandering
because  those  criteria  “will  vary  from  State  to  State  and
year  to  year.”    Ante,  at  27.  But  that  is  a  virtue,  not  a
vice—a  feature,  not  a  bug.  Using  the  criteria  the  State
itself has chosen at the relevant time prevents any judicial
predilections from affecting the analysis—exactly what the
majority  claims  it  wants.    At  the  same  time,  using  those
criteria enables a court to measure just what it should: the
extent  to  which  the  pursuit  of  partisan  advantage—by
these legislators at this moment—has distorted the State’s
districting decisions.  Sure, different non-partisan criteria
could  result,  as  the  majority  notes,  in  different  partisan
distributions  to  serve  as  the  baseline.  Ante,  at  28.  But
that  in  itself  raises  no  issue:  Everyone  agrees  that  state
officials using non-partisan criteria (e.g., must counties be
kept  together?  should  districts  be  compact?)  have  wide
latitude  in  districting.    The  problem  arises  only  when
legislators  or  mapmakers  substantially  deviate  from  the
baseline  distribution  by  manipulating  district  lines  for
partisan  gain.  So  once  again,  the  majority’s  analysis
falters  because  it  equates  the  demand  to  eliminate  parti-
san  gerrymandering  with  a  demand  for  a  single  partisan
distribution—the  one  reflecting  proportional  representa-
tion.  See  ante,  at  16–17.    But  those  two  demands  are
different, and only the former is at issue here.

The majority’s “how much is too much” critique fares no
better  than  its  neutrality  argument.    How  about  the  fol-
lowing for a first-cut answer: This much is too much.  By
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding partisan gerrymandering.  The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1149

558 U. S.

January 19, 2010

No.  09–577.  Hale  et  al.  v.  Bexar  County,  Texas.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 342 Fed. Appx. 921.
No.  09–585.  Harvest  Institute  Freedman  Federation
et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  923.

No.  09–586.  O’Callaghan  et  al.  v.  Temporary  Guardian
ship  of  Moulton.  Ct.  App.  Ind.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  903  N.  E.  2d  1070.

No. 09–588.  Golden v. Housman, Trustee, et al.  Sup. Jud.

Ct.  Me.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–595.  Ciptanagara  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.
Appx.  840.

No. 09–598.  MacDermid, Individually and as Administra
tor  of  the  Estate  of  MacDermid  v.  Discover  Financial
Services,  dba  Discover  Charge  Card.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  138.

No.  09–603.  County  of  Delaware,  Pennsylvania,  et  al.

v.  Federal  Aviation  Administration  et  al.;  and

No.  09–607.  County  of  Rockland,  New  York,  et  al.  v.
Federal  Aviation  Administration  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  52.

No.  09–618.  Jiminez  v.  Vaughan,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  890.

No.  09–633.  Cimini  v.  Smith  et  al.  App.  Ct.  Mass.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  74  Mass.  App.  1122,  909  N.  E.
2d  60.

No.  09–635.  Shinnecock  Smoke  Shop  v.  Kappos,  Director,
Patent  and  Trademark  Office.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  571  F.  3d  1171.

No.  09–646.  Carnival  Corp.,  dba  Carnival  Cruise  Lines,
Inc.  v.  Thomas.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  573  F.  3d  1113.

No.  09–649.  Konop  v.  Hawaiian  Airlines,  Inc.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  705.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is formatted in a way typical of legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

BARRETT, J., concurring

strict scrutiny regime, particularly when this Court’s reso-
lution  of  conflicts  between  generally  applicable  laws  and
other  First  Amendment  rights—like  speech  and  assem-
bly—has been much more nuanced.  There would be a num-
ber of issues to work through if Smith were overruled.  To
name a few: Should entities like Catholic Social Services—
which is an arm of the Catholic Church—be treated differ-
ently than individuals?  Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171 (2012).
Should  there  be  a  distinction  between  indirect  and  direct
burdens on religious exercise?  Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U. S. 599, 606–607 (1961) (plurality opinion).  What forms
of scrutiny should apply?  Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U. S. 398, 403 (1963) (assessing whether government’s in-
terest is “ ‘compelling’ ”), with Gillette v. United States, 401
U. S. 437, 462 (1971) (assessing whether government’s in-
terest is “substantial”).  And if the answer is strict scrutiny,
would pre-Smith cases rejecting free exercise challenges to
garden-variety  laws  come  out  the  same  way?    See  Smith,
494 U. S., at 888–889.

We  need  not  wrestle  with  these  questions  in  this  case,
though,  because  the  same  standard  applies  regardless
whether Smith stays or goes.  A longstanding tenet of our
free  exercise  jurisprudence—one  that  both  pre-dates  and
survives Smith—is that a law burdening religious exercise
must satisfy strict scrutiny if it gives government officials
discretion to grant individualized exemptions.  See  id., at
884 (law not generally applicable “where the State has in
place a system of individual exemptions” (citing Sherbert,
374  U. S.,  at  401,  n. 4));  see  also  Cantwell  v.  Connecticut,
310 U. S. 296, 303–307 (1940) (subjecting statute to height-
ened scrutiny because exemptions lay in discretion of gov-
ernment official).  As the Court’s opinion today explains, the
government contract at issue provides for individualized ex-
emptions  from  its  nondiscrimination  rule,  thus  triggering
strict  scrutiny.    And  all  nine  Justices  agree  that  the  City
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the case Fulton v. Philadelphia. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding religious freedom and the application of the "strict scrutiny" standard.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529IND

Unit: $UBV [10-03-01 07:01:03] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

I N D E X

ABUSE OF WRIT. See Habeas Corpus, 3.

ACTIVITY FEES AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES. See Constitutional

Law, VI, 1.

ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law, 3.

AIRBAGS. See Pre-emption of State Law, 3.

ANONYMOUS TIPS. See Constitutional Law, X, 2.

ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF

1996. See Habeas Corpus, 2.

ARBITRATION. See Venue.

ARSON. See Criminal Law, 1.

ATTORNEY’S FEES. See Constitutional Law, II, 1.

AUTOMOBILE SAFETY. See Pre-emption of State Law, 3.

BAGGAGE SEARCHES. See Constitutional Law, X, 1.

BRIBERY. See Criminal Law, 2.

BUILDING REGULATIONS FOR SUPREME COURT.

Text of Regulations, p. 1199.

BUS PASSENGERS. See Constitutional Law, X, 1.

CABLE TELEVISION. See Constitutional Law, VI, 2.

CAUSE AND PREJUDICE STANDARD. See Habeas Corpus, 1.

COMMERCE CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, I.

COMMON-LAW TORT ACTIONS. See Pre-emption of State Law, 3.

COMPENSATORY TIME. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION. See Constitutional Law,

VII.

CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES. See Constitutional Law, VIII.

CONSPIRACY. See Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Organiza-

tions Act.

1207
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

at 670–674.  For similar reasons, this Court has recognized
on  multiple  other  occasions  that  Puerto  Rico  is  akin  to  a
State in key respects.  See, e.g., Flores de Otero, 426 U. S.,
at 597 (Congress granted Puerto Rico “a measure of auton-
omy  comparable  to  that  possessed  by  the  States”);  Rodri-
guez, 457 U. S., at 8 (“Puerto Rico, like a state, is an auton-
omous political entity”); see also Sánchez Valle, 579 U. S.,
at ___ (BREYER, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3) (“[T]he paral-
lels  between  admission  of  new  States  and  the  creation  of
the Commonwealth [of Puerto Rico] are significant”).

The compact also had international ramifications, as the
Federal  Government  repeatedly  represented  at  the  time.
Shortly  after  the  ratification  and  approval  of  the  Puerto
Rico  Constitution,  federal  officials  certified  to  the  United
Nations that, for Puerto Rico, the United States no longer
needed to comply with certain reporting obligations under
the  United  Nations  Charter  regarding  territories  “whose
peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-govern-
ment.”  Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1048, Art.
73, June 26, 1945, T. S. No. 993 (U. N. Charter).  According
to  federal  officials,  that  was  because  the  people  of  Puerto
Rico  now  had  “complete  autonomy  in  internal  economic
matters and in cultural and social affairs under a Constitu-
tion adopted by them and approved by the Congress.”  Mem-
orandum by the Government of the United States of Amer-
ica  Concerning
the  Cessation  of  Transmission  of
Information Under Article 73(e) of the Charter With Regard
to  the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico,  in  A.  Fernós-Isern,
Original Intent in the Constitution of Puerto Rico 153 (2d
ed.  2002).  To  the  extent  federal  law  had  previously  “di-
rected or authorized interference with matters of local gov-
ernment by the Federal Government,” federal officials elab-
orated,  “[t]hose  laws  . . .  ha[d]  been  repealed.”    Ibid.;  see
also  ibid.  (“Congress  has  agreed  that  Puerto  Rico  shall
have,  under  [the  Puerto  Rico]  Constitution,  freedom  from
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal status of Puerto Rico and its relationship to the United States.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011 )

3

BREYER, J., concurring

uphold the application of state law in these circumstances
would  punish  Westboro  for  seeking  to  communicate  its
views on matters of public concern without proportionately
advancing  the  State’s  interest  in  protecting  its  citizens
against  severe  emotional  harm.  Consequently,  the  First
Amendment  protects  Westboro.    As  I  read  the  Court’s
opinion, it holds no more.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the application of state law and the First Amendment, indicating it's part of a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

JACKSON, J., dissenting

dividual  circumstances  revealed  in  the  student’s  applica-
tion.”82  Stephen Farmer, the head of UNC’s Office of Un-
dergraduate  Admissions,  confirmed  at  trial  (under  oath)
that UNC’s admissions process operates in this fashion.83

Thus,  to  be  crystal  clear:  Every  student  who  chooses  to
disclose his or her race is eligible for such a race-linked plus,
just as any student who chooses to disclose his or her unu-
sual interests can be credited for what those interests might
add to UNC.  The record supports no intimation to the con-
trary.  Eligibility is just that; a plus is never automatically
awarded, never considered in numerical terms, and never
automatically results in an offer of admission.84  There are
no race-based quotas in UNC’s holistic review process.85  In
fact, during the admissions cycle, the school prevents any-
one who knows the overall racial makeup of the admitted-
student pool from reading any applications.86

More  than  that,  every  applicant  is  also  eligible  for  a
diversity-linked plus (beyond race) more generally.87  And,
notably, UNC understands diversity broadly, including “so-
cioeconomic status, first-generation college status . . . polit-
ical beliefs, religious beliefs . . . diversity of thoughts, expe-
riences, ideas, and talents.”88

——————

82 3 App. 1416 (emphasis added); see also 2 id., at 631–639.
83 567 F. Supp. 3d, at 591, 595; 2 App. 638 (Farmer, when asked how
race  could  “b[e]  a  potential  plus”  for  “students  other  than  underrepre-
sented  minority  students,”  pointing  to  a  North  Carolinian  applicant,
originally from Vietnam, who identified as “Asian and Montagnard”); id.,
at  639  (Farmer  stating  that  “the  whole  of  [that  student’s]  background
was  appealing  to  us  when  we  evaluated  her  applicatio[n],”  and  noting
how her “story reveals sometimes how hard it is to separate race out from
other things that we know about a student.  That was integral to that
student’s story.  It was part of our understanding of her, and it played a
role in our deciding to admit her”).
84 3 id., at 1416; Rosenberg ¶25.
85 2 App. 631.
86 Id., at 636–637, 713.
87 3 id., at 1416; 2 id., at 699–700.
88 Id., at 699; see also Rosenberg ¶24.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically focusing on the University of North Carolina's admissions process. It argues against the use of race as a factor in admissions, citing specific examples and testimony.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

676

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Opinion of the Court

case, we addressed the question whether a self-incrimination
privilege could be invoked in the one jurisdiction based on
fear of prosecution by the other, saying that “[w]e think the
legal immunity is in regard to a prosecution in the same ju-
risdiction, and when that is fully given it is enough.”
Id., at
382. A year later, in the course of considering whether a
federal witness, immunized from federal prosecution, could
invoke the privilege based on fear of state prosecution, we
adopted the general proposition that “the possibility that in-
formation given by the witness might be used” by the other
government is, as a matter of law, “a danger so unsubstantial
and remote” that it fails to trigger the right to invoke the
privilege. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 69 (1906).

“[I]f the argument were a sound one it might be carried
still further and held to apply not only to state prosecu-
tions within the same jurisdiction, but to prosecutions
under the criminal laws of other States to which the
witness might have subjected himself. The question
has been fully considered in England, and the conclusion
reached by the courts of that country [is] that the only
danger to be considered is one arising within the same
jurisdiction and under the same sovereignty. Queen v.
Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311[, 121 Eng. Rep. 730]; King of the
Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 State Trials (N. S.), 1049, 1068;
State v. March, 1 Jones (N. Car.), 526; State v. Thomas,
98 N. Car. 599.”

Ibid.

A holding to this effect came when United States v. Mur-
dock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931), “deﬁnitely settled” the question
whether in a federal proceeding the privilege applied on ac-
count of fear of state prosecution, concluding “that one under
examination in a federal tribunal could not refuse to answer
on account of probable incrimination under state law.”
United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 396 (1933).

“The English rule of evidence against compulsory self-
incrimination, on which historically that contained in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause and its application in federal vs. state proceedings.  It cites previous cases and legal precedents, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

property.

Nor  does  the  Telecommunications  Act  give  Carpenter  a
property right in the cell-site records simply because they
are subject  to confidentiality restrictions.  See 47 U. S. C.
§222(c)(1) (without a customer’s  permission,  a cell service
provider  may  generally  “use,  disclose,  or  permit  access  to
individually  identifiable  [cell-site  records]”  only  with
respect  to  “its  provision”  of  telecommunications  services).
Many  federal  statutes  impose  similar  restrictions  on
private  entities’  use  or  dissemination  of  information  in
their  own  records  without  conferring  a  property  right  on
third parties.4

——————

4 See,  e.g.,  Family  Educational  Rights  and  Privacy  Act,  20  U. S. C.
§1232g(b)(1)  (“No  funds  shall  be  made  available  under  any  applicable
program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or
practice  of  permitting  the  release  of  education  records  (or  personally
identifiable  information  contained  therein  other  than  directory  infor-
mation . . . ) of students without the written consent of their parents to
any  individual,  agency,  or  organization  . . .”);  Video  Privacy  Protection
Act,  18  U. S. C.  §2710(b)(1)  (“A  video  tape  service  provider  who  know-
ingly  discloses,  to  any  person,  personally  identifiable  information
concerning  any  consumer  of  such  provider  shall  be  liable  to  the  ag-
grieved person for the relief provided in subsection (d)”); Driver Privacy
Protection  Act,  18  U. S. C.  §2721(a)(1)  (“A  State  department  of  motor
vehicles,  and  any  officer,  employee,  or  contractor  thereof,  shall  not
knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person or entity
. . .  personal  information  . . .”);  Fair  Credit  Reporting  Act,  15  U. S. C.
§1681b(a)  (“[A]ny  consumer  reporting  agency  may  furnish  a  consumer
report  under  the  following  circumstances  and  no  other  . . .”);  Right  to
Financial Privacy Act, 12 U. S. C. §3403(a) (“No financial institution, or
officer,  employees,  or  agent  of  a  financial  institution,  may  provide  to
any  Government  authority  access  to  or  copies  of,  or  the  information
contained in, the financial records of any customer except in accordance
with  the  provisions  of  this  chapter”);  Patient  Safety  and  Quality  Im-
provement  Act,  42  U. S. C.  §299b–22(b)  (“Notwithstanding  any  other
provision of Federal, State, or local law, and subject to subsection (c) of
this section, patient safety work product shall be confidential and shall
not be disclosed”); Cable Act, 47 U. S. C. §551(c)(1) (“[A] cable operator
shall  not  disclose  personally  identifiable  information  concerning  any
subscriber  without  the  prior  written  or  electronic  consent  of  the  sub-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Carpenter v. United States. It discusses the issue of property rights in cell-site location data.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

1

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–302
_________________

ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR,
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PETITIONER v. ERIK BRUNETTI

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2019]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, concurring in part and dissent-

ing in part.

The  Lanham  Act  directs  the  Patent  and  Trademark
Office  to  refuse  registration  to  marks  that  consist  of  or
comprise  “immoral,  deceptive,  or  scandalous  matter.”    15
U. S. C.  §1052(a).    Although  the  statute  lists  “immoral”
and “scandalous” separately, the PTO has long read those
terms together to constitute a unitary bar on “immoral or
scandalous” marks.

The  Government  concedes  that  the  provision  so  read  is
broad enough to reach not only marks that offend because
of their mode of expression (such as vulgarity and profanity)
but  also  marks  that  offend  because  of  the  ideas  they  con-
vey.  The  Government  urges,  however,  that  the  provision
can  be  given  a  narrowing  construction—it  can  be  under-
stood  to  cover  only  marks  that  offend  because  of  their
mode of expression.

The  Court  rejects  that  proposal  on  the  ground  that  it
would  in  effect  rewrite  the  statute.   I  agree  with  the  ma-
jority  that  the  “immoral”  portion  of  the  provision  is  not
susceptible  of  a  narrowing  construction  that  would  elimi-
nate its viewpoint bias.  As JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR explains,
however,  the  “scandalous”  portion  of  the  provision  is  sus-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes citation information, the names of the parties involved, and the text of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

GONZALES v. O CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE
UNIAO DO VEGETAL
Opinion of the Court

peyote  exception,  however,  has  been  in  place  since  the
outset  of  the  Controlled  Substances  Act,  and  there  is  no
evidence  that  it  has  “undercut”  the  Government’s  ability
to enforce the ban on peyote use by non-Indians.

The Government points to some pre-Smith cases relying
on  a  need  for  uniformity  in  rejecting  claims  for  religious
exemptions  under  the  Free  Exercise  Clause,  see  Brief  for
Petitioners 16, but those cases strike us as quite different
from  the  present  one.    Those  cases  did  not  embrace  the
notion  that  a  general  interest  in  uniformity  justified  a
substantial  burden  on  religious  exercise;  they  instead
scrutinized  the  asserted  need  and  explained  why  the
denied exemptions could not be accommodated.  In United
States  v.  Lee,  455  U. S.  252  (1982),  for  example,  the  Court
rejected a  claimed  exception  to  the  obligation  to  pay  Social
Security  taxes,  noting  that  “mandatory  participation  is
indispensable  to  the  fiscal  vitality  of  the  social  security
system”  and  that  the  “tax  system  could  not  function  if  de-
nominations  were  allowed  to  challenge  the  tax  system
because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates
their religious belief.”  Id., at  258, 260.  See also Hernandez
v.  Commissioner,  490  U. S.  680,  700  (1989)  (same).    In
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion),
the  Court  denied  a  claimed  exception  to  Sunday  closing
laws,  in  part  because  allowing  such  exceptions  “might  well
provide  [the  claimants]  with  an  economic  advantage  over
their competitors who must remain closed on that day.”  Id.,
at 608–609.  The whole point of a “uniform day of rest for all
workers”  would  have  been  defeated  by  exceptions.    See
Sherbert,  374  U. S.,  at  408  (discussing  Braunfeld).  These
cases show that the Government can demonstrate a compel-
ling interest in uniform application of a particular program
by  offering  evidence  that  granting  the  requested  religious
accommodations  would  seriously  compromise  its  ability  to
administer the program.

Here the Government’s argument for uniformity is differ-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Free Exercise Clause and the Controlled Substances Act. It delves into precedents and arguments regarding religious exemptions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

3

Syllabus

(c) cDNA is not a “product of nature,” so it is patent eligible under
§101.  cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentability as
naturally  occurring,  isolated  DNA  segments.    Its  creation  results  in
an exons-only molecule, which is not naturally occurring.  Its order of
the exons may be dictated by nature, but the lab technician unques-
tionably  creates  something  new  when  introns  are  removed  from  a
DNA sequence to make cDNA.  Pp. 16–17.

(d) This  case,  it  is  important  to  note,  does  not  involve  method
claims,  patents  on  new  applications  of  knowledge  about  the  BRCA1
and BRCA2 genes, or the patentability of DNA in which the order of
the naturally occurring nucleotides has been altered.  Pp. 17–18.

689 F. 3d 1303, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN,
JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined in part.  SCALIA, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus, which summarizes the court's holdings.  It is sequential text and provides legal reasoning, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

192

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Breyer, J., dissenting

nothing more than an intent not to change the jurisdictional
status quo.

The upshot is that the Court today holds that a regulatory
statute aimed at unsafe drugs and devices does not authorize
regulation of a drug (nicotine) and a device (a cigarette) that
the Court itself ﬁnds unsafe. Far more than most, this par-
ticular drug and device risks the life-threatening harms that
administrative regulation seeks to rectify. The majority’s
conclusion is counterintuitive. And, for the reasons set
forth, I believe that the law does not require it.

Consequently, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal jargon and references to a case (FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
THOMAS, J., concurring

to support the Government’s objectives with regard to those
programs.  Ibid.  After all, the Constitution itself “impos[es]
affirmative ideological commitments prerequisite to assist-
ing in the government’s work.”  Id., at 227.  It excludes view-
points  such  as  communism  and  anarchism,  stating  that
those engaged in government work must swear an oath to
support our Constitution’s republican form of government.
See Art. VI, cl. 3.

Moreover, the mere conditioning of funds on “ ‘the affir-
mation of a belief’ ” tied to the purpose of a government pro-
gram involves “no compulsion at all.”  AOSI I, 570 U. S., at
226 (Scalia, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissenting).  Such a
condition is “the reasonable price of admission to a limited
government-spending  program  that  each  organization  re-
mains free to accept or reject.”  Ibid.  Just as respondents
are not compelled to associate with their foreign affiliates,
see ante, at 6–8, they are not compelled to participate in the
Leadership Act program.

The  Policy  Requirement  does  not  violate  the  First
Amendment, regardless of whether it is applied to respond-
ents, respondents’ legally distinct foreign affiliates, or any
other organization, foreign or domestic.  Because the Court
properly rejects respondents’ attempt to extend our errone-
ous precedent, I join its opinion in full.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.  It delves into the First Amendment implications of the Leadership Act and argues against the respondents' claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
36

SEC v. JARKESY

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

today, but those of us who cherish the rule of law have noth-
ing to celebrate.

*

*

*
Today’s  ruling  is  part  of  a  disconcerting  trend:  When it
comes  to  the  separation  of  powers,  this  Court  tells  the
American public and its coordinate branches that it knows
best.  See, e.g., Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. 220, 227 (2021)
(concluding  that  the  Federal  Housing  Finance  Agency’s
“structure  violates  the  separation  of  powers”  because  the
Agency was led by a single Director removable by the Pres-
ident only “ ‘for cause’ ”); United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 594
U. S. 1, 6, 23 (2021) (holding that “authority wielded by [Ad-
ministrative  Patent  Judges]  during  inter  partes  review is
incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an
inferior office”); Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 202–205 (holding
that “the structure of the [Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau] violates the separation of powers” because it was
led by a single Director removable by the President only “for
cause”); Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Account-
ing Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 483–484, 492 (2010) (hold-
ing  “that  the  dual  for-cause  limitations  on  the  removal  of
[Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight]  Board  members
contravene the Constitution’s separation of powers”).  The
Court tells Congress how best to structure agencies, vindi-
cate harms to the public at large, and even provide for the
enforcement of rights created for the Government.  It does
all  of  this  despite  the  fact  that,  compared  to  its  political
counterparts,  “the  Judiciary  possesses  an  inferior  under-
standing of the realities of administration” and how “politi-
cal power . . . operates.”  Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at
523 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

There are good reasons for Congress to set up a scheme
like the SEC’s.  It may yield important benefits over jury
trials in federal court, such as greater efficiency and exper-
tise, transparency and reasoned decisionmaking, as well as
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the separation of powers and the Court's role in reviewing agency structures.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. v. CHRISTIAN

Syllabus

responsible parties, and EPA does not have authority to alter that def-
inition.

The landowners also argue that §122(e)(6) cannot carry the weight
ascribed to it because it is located in the section on settlement negoti-
ations.  Settlements, however, are the heart of the Superfund statute.
Section  122(a)  of  the  Act  commands  EPA  to  proceed  by  settlement
“[w]henever practicable and in the public interest . . . in order to expe-
dite  effective  remedial  actions  and  minimize  litigation.”    And  EPA’s
efforts to negotiate settlement agreements and issue orders for clean-
ups account for approximately 69% of all cleanup work currently un-
derway.  Pp. 13–21.

390 Mont. 76, 408 P. 3d 515, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and re-

manded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I and II–A of
which were unanimous, Part II–B of which was joined by THOMAS, GINS-
BURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., and
Part III of which was joined by GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR,
KAGAN, and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.  ALITO,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in
part  and  dissenting  in  part.  GORSUCH,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring
part and dissenting in part, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal case syllabus, which typically summarizes the case and its legal reasoning. It's not the main body of the legal text and is not meant to be read and understood in isolation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1120

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–7141.  Redd  v.  LeBlanc,  Secretary,  Louisiana  De
partment  of  Public  Safety  and  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.
5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  348  Fed.  Appx.  10.

No.  09–7142.  Robinson  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  4th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  11  So.  3d  962.

No.  09–7144.  Sharrieff  v.  Ricci,  Associate  Administra
tor,  New  Jersey  State  Prison,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  574  F.  3d  225.

No. 09–7161.  Jones  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct. Ill.,  1st Dist.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  387  Ill.  App.  3d  1179,  981  N.  E.
2d  537.

No.  09–7165.  Rojem  v.  Oklahoma.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Okla.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  207  P.  3d  385.

No.  09–7167.  Walls  v.  Cannon,  Judge,  Circuit  Court  of

Illinois,  Cook  County.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7173.  Monacelli  v.  Target  Stores  et  al.  C.  A.

11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7174.  Monacelli  v.  Enterprise  Leasing  Co.  et  al.

C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7175.  Monacelli  v.  Edison  State  College  et  al.

C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7191.  Higgins  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.  App.  3d  1129,  970
N.  E.  2d  128.

No.  09–7197.  Mulvey  v.  Naito.  Int.  Ct.  App.  Haw.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  120  Haw.  383,  205  P.  3d  648.

No.  09–7199.  Beal  v.  Levine  et  al.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.

N. Y.,  3d  Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7203.  Miller  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7206.  Vizcarra  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxxvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

Jarriel; Harris v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
884

Jean-Charles v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1005

Jeanlouis v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jeffers v. Mize
1121

Jeffers v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1033

Jefferson County Comm’n; Green v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Jefferson Univ. Hospital; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1086

Jeffries v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
853

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jelovsek v. Bredesen
874

Jemison v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

Jenkins v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Jenkins v. Cate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Jenkins; Clark v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Jenkins; Huusko v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950

Jenkins; McCarthy v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  893,1086

Jenkins v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Jenkins; Roberts v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Jenkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924

Jenkins v. Worley  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Jenner v. Zavares  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Jennings v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

Jensen v. Missouri
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913

918

Jerdine v. West Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L. P. A. . .  810,1089

Jerry v. Pennsylvania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  805,1022

Jiles v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Jimenez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  868,1129

1004

Jimenez-Alvarado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

Jiminez v. Vaughan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Jinghai Li v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1019

Jin Xin Ye v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
J. L.; S. B.v.
815

J. L. Spoons, Inc. v. Guzman  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
J. M. B. v. New Jersey
1123

Johns v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963

Johns v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1139

916

Johnson v. Adams  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Johnson v. Arkansas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1067

Johnson v. Bredesen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Johnson; Brooks v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Brown v.
902

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Johnson; Cain v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  995,1140

953

Johnson v. California

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

792

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Stevens, J., dissenting

had decried the “fraud and peculation” by state ofﬁcials in
connection with the procurement of military supplies and
Government contracts—speciﬁcally mentioning the pur-
chases of supplies by the States of Illinois, Indiana, New
York, and Ohio. See H. R. Rep. No. 2, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. ii–a, pp. xxxviii–xxxix (1862). Although the FCA was
not enacted until the following year, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit correctly observed that “it is difﬁ-
cult to suppose that when Congress considered the bills
leading to the 1863 Act a year later it either meant to ex-
clude the States from the ‘persons’ who were to be liable for
presentation of false claims to the federal government or had
forgotten the results of this extensive investigation.” 162
F. 3d 195, 206 (1998). That observation is faithful to the
broad construction of the Act that this Court consistently
endorsed in cases decided before 1986 (and hardly requires
any “suspension of disbelief ” as the majority supposes, ante,
at 783, n. 12).

Thus, in United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U. S. 228,
232 (1968), after noting that the Act was passed as a result
of investigations of the fraudulent use of federal funds during
the Civil War, we inferred “that the Act was intended to
reach all types of fraud, without qualiﬁcation, that might re-
sult in ﬁnancial loss to the Government.” See also Rain-
water v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 592 (1958) (“It seems
quite clear that the objective of Congress [in the FCA] was
broadly to protect the funds and property of the Government
from fraudulent claims”); H. R. Rep. No. 99–660, p. 18 (1986)
(“[T]he False Claims Act is used as . . . the primary vehicle
by the Government for recouping losses suffered through
fraud”).
Indeed, the fact that Congress has authorized
qui tam actions by private individuals to supplement the
remedies available to the Federal Government provides addi-
tional evidence of its intent to reach all types of fraud that
cause ﬁnancial loss to the Federal Government. Finally, the
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. It discusses the history and intent of the False Claims Act and argues for its applicability to states.
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74

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

here because Philadelphia’s ouster of CSS from foster care
work simply does not further any interest that can properly
be  protected  in  this  case.  As  noted,  CSS’s  policy  has  not
hindered  any  same-sex  couples  from  becoming  foster  par-
ents, and there is no threat that it will do so in the future.
CSS’s policy has only one effect: It expresses the idea that
same-sex couples should not be foster parents because only
a man and a woman should marry.  Many people today find
this idea not only objectionable but hurtful.  Nevertheless,
protecting against this form of harm is not an interest that
can justify the abridgment of First Amendment rights.

We  have  covered  this  ground  repeatedly  in  free  speech
cases.  In an open, pluralistic, self-governing society, the ex-
pression  of  an  idea  cannot  be  suppressed  simply  because
some  find  it  offensive,  insulting,  or  even  wounding.    See
Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at 1–
2)  (“Speech  may  not  be  banned  on  the  ground  that  it  ex-
presses ideas that offend”); Hurley, 515 U. S., at 579 (“[T]he
law . . . is not free to interfere with speech for no better rea-
son than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored  one,  however  enlightened  either  purpose  may
strike  the  government”);  Johnson,  491  U. S.,  at  414  (“If
there  is  a  bedrock  principle  underlying  the  First  Amend-
ment,  it  is  that  the  government  may  not  prohibit  the  ex-
pression of an idea simply because society finds the idea it-
self offensive or disagreeable”); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U. S. 726, 745 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“[T]he fact
that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient rea-
son for suppressing it.  Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion
that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for accord-
ing  it  constitutional  protection”);  Street  v.  New  York,  394
U. S. 576, 592 (1969) (“[T]he public expression of ideas may
not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves
offensive to some of their hearers”); Cf. Coates v. Cincinnati,
402  U. S.  611,  615  (1971)  (“Our  decisions  establish  that
mere public intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for
  </content>
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This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Fulton v. Philadelphia. It discusses the First Amendment implications of a policy that excludes same-sex couples from being foster parents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

37

STEVENS, J., dissenting

One  particularly  chilling  account  of  Reconstruction-era

Klan  violence  directed  at  a  black  militia  member  is  re
counted in the memoir of Louis F. Post, A “Carpetbagger”
in South Carolina, 10 Journal of Negro History 10 (1925).
Post  describes  the  murder  by  local  Klan  members  of  Jim
Williams, the captain of a “Negro militia company,” id., at
59, this way:

“[A]  cavalcade  of  sixty  cowardly  white  men,  com
pletely  disguised  with  face  masks  and  body  gowns,
rode up one night in March, 1871, to the house of Cap
tain Williams . . . in the wood [they] hanged [and shot]
him  . . .  [and  on  his  body  they]  then  pinned  a  slip  of
paper  inscribed,  as  I  remember  it,  with  these  grim
words:  ‘Jim Williams gone to his last muster.’”  Id., at
61.

In light of this evidence, it is quite possible that at least
some of the statements on which the Court relies actually
did  mean  to  refer  to  the  disarmament  of  black  militia
members.

IV

The brilliance of the debates that resulted in the Second
Amendment faded into oblivion during the ensuing years,
for  the  concerns  about  Article  I’s  Militia  Clauses  that
generated  such  pitched  debate  during  the  ratification
process and led to the adoption of the Second Amendment
were short lived.

In  1792,  the  year  after  the  Amendment  was  ratified,
Congress passed a statute that purported to establish “an
Uniform  Militia  throughout  the  United  States.”    1  Stat.
271.  The  statute  commanded  every  able-bodied  white
male citizen between the ages of 18 and 45 to be enrolled
therein  and  to  “provide  himself  with  a  good  musket  or
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This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites historical evidence and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
2

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Syllabus

the full committee’s votes is tentatively accepted for admission.  At the
end  of  this  process,  the  racial  composition  of  the  tentative  applicant
pool is disclosed to the committee.  The last stage of Harvard’s admis-
sions process, called the “lop,” winnows the list of tentatively admitted
students to arrive at the final class.  Applicants that Harvard consid-
ers  cutting  at  this  stage  are  placed  on  the  “lop  list,”  which  contains
only four pieces of information: legacy status, recruited athlete status,
financial aid eligibility, and race.  In the Harvard admissions process,
“race is a determinative tip for” a significant percentage “of all admit-
ted African American and Hispanic applicants.”

UNC  has  a  similar  admissions  process.    Every  application  is  re-
viewed first by an admissions office reader, who assigns a numerical
rating to each of several categories.  Readers are required to consider
the applicant’s race as a factor in their review.  Readers then make a
written recommendation on each assigned application, and they may
provide an applicant a substantial “plus” depending on the applicant’s
race.  At this stage, most recommendations are provisionally final.  A
committee of experienced staff members then conducts a “school group
review” of every initial decision made by a reader and either approves
or rejects the recommendation.  In making those decisions, the com-
mittee may consider the applicant’s race.

Petitioner, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), is a nonprofit or-
ganization whose stated purpose is “to defend human and civil rights
secured by law, including the right of individuals to equal protection
under  the  law.”    SFFA  filed  separate  lawsuits  against  Harvard  and
UNC, arguing that their race-based admissions programs violate, re-
spectively, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  After separate bench
trials,  both  admissions  programs  were  found  permissible  under  the
Equal Protection Clause and this Court’s precedents.  In the Harvard
case, the First Circuit affirmed, and this Court granted certiorari.  In
the UNC case, this Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Held: Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs violate the Equal Pro-

tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pp. 6–40.

(a) Because SFFA complies with the standing requirements for or-
ganizational plaintiffs articulated by this Court in Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, SFFA’s obligations un-
der Article III are satisfied, and this Court has jurisdiction to consider
the merits of SFFA’s claims.

The  Court  rejects  UNC’s  argument  that  SFFA  lacks  standing  be-
cause  it  is  not  a  “genuine”  membership  organization.    An  organiza-
tional plaintiff can satisfy Article III jurisdiction in two ways, one of
which is to assert “standing solely as the representative of its mem-
  </content>
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This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case, outlining the background, arguments, and holding of the case.  It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a summary and overview.
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  <category>Syllabus</category>
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</suitable>
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  <content>
6

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

analysis is informed by historical understandings “of what
was  deemed  an  unreasonable  search  and  seizure  when
[the Fourth Amendment] was adopted.”  Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 (1925).  On this score, our cases
have  recognized  some  basic  guideposts.  First,  that  the
Amendment seeks to secure “the  privacies of life” against
“arbitrary  power.”  Boyd  v.  United  States,  116  U. S.  616,
630  (1886).   Second,  and  relatedly,  that  a  central  aim  of
the  Framers  was  “to  place  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  too
permeating  police  surveillance.”    United  States  v.  Di  Re,
332 U. S. 581, 595 (1948).

We  have  kept  this  attention  to  Founding-era  under-
standings in mind when applying the Fourth Amendment
to  innovations  in  surveillance  tools.  As  technology  has
enhanced  the  Government’s  capacity  to  encroach  upon
areas  normally  guarded  from  inquisitive  eyes,  this  Court
has  sought  to  “assure[  ]  preservation  of  that  degree  of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment  was  adopted.”  Kyllo  v.  United  States,  533
U. S. 27, 34 (2001).  For that reason, we rejected in Kyllo a
“mechanical interpretation” of the Fourth Amendment and
held that use of a thermal imager to detect heat radiating
from the side of the defendant’s home was a search.  Id., at
35.  Because  any  other  conclusion  would  leave  homeown-
ers “at the mercy of advancing technology,” we determined
that  the  Government—absent  a  warrant—could  not  capi-
talize  on  such  new  sense-enhancing  technology  to  explore
——————

exclusively  property-based  approach.  Post,  at  1–2,  17–21  (THOMAS  J.,
dissenting);  post,  at  6–9  (GORSUCH,  J.,  dissenting).    Katz  of  course
“discredited” the “premise that property interests control,” 389 U. S., at
353,  and we have repeatedly emphasized  that privacy interests do not
rise  or  fall  with  property  rights,  see,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Jones,  565
U. S.  400,  411  (2012)  (refusing  to  “make  trespass  the  exclusive  test”);
Kyllo  v.  United  States,  533  U. S.  27,  32  (2001)  (“We  have  since  decou-
pled violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory
violation  of  his  property.”).    Neither  party  has  asked  the  Court  to
reconsider Katz in this case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Carpenter v. United States. It discusses the Fourth Amendment and its application to modern surveillance technologies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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