<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Opinion of the Court

senger seat.  C. M. took advantage of the opportunity to es-
cape.  Rahimi  fired  as  she  fled,  although  it  is  unclear
whether  he  was  aiming  at  C. M.  or  the  witness.  Rahimi
later called C. M. and warned that he would shoot her if she
reported the incident.  Ibid.

Undeterred by this threat, C. M. went to court to seek a
restraining order.  In the affidavit accompanying her appli-
cation, C. M. recounted the parking lot incident as well as
other assaults.  She also detailed how Rahimi’s conduct had
endangered A. R.  Although Rahimi had an opportunity to
contest C. M.’s testimony, he did not do so.  On February 5,
2020, a state court in Tarrant County, Texas, issued a re-
straining order against him.  The order, entered with the
consent of both parties, included a finding that Rahimi had
committed “family violence.”  App. 2.  It also found that this
violence was “likely to occur again” and that Rahimi posed
“a credible threat” to the “physical safety” of C. M. or A. R.
Id., at 2–3.  Based on these findings, the order prohibited
Rahimi from threatening C. M. or her family for two years
or  contacting  C. M.  during  that  period  except  to  discuss
A. R.  Id., at 3–7.  It also suspended Rahimi’s gun license
for  two  years.    Id.,  at  5–6.    If  Rahimi  was  imprisoned  or
confined when the order was set to expire, the order would
instead terminate either one or two years after his release
date, depending on the length of his imprisonment.  Id., at
6–7.

In May, however, Rahimi violated the order by approach-
ing  C. M.’s  home  at  night.    He  also  began  contacting  her
through several social media accounts.

In November, Rahimi threatened a different woman with
a gun, resulting in a charge for aggravated assault with a
deadly  weapon.    And  while  Rahimi  was  under  arrest  for
that assault, the Texas police identified him as the suspect
in a spate of at least five additional shootings.

The first, which occurred in December 2020, arose from
Rahimi’s dealing in illegal drugs.  After one of his customers
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an opinion of the court regarding a case involving the defendant Rahimi. It details the events leading up to the restraining order against him and subsequent violations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
334  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

in order to avoid any chilling effect caused by some improper
interpretation.  See  Part  II–C,  supra.  It  is  well  known
that the public begins to concentrate on elections only in the
weeks  immediately  before  they  are  held.  There  are  short
timeframes  in  which  speech  can  have  inﬂuence.  The  need
or relevance of the speech will often ﬁrst be apparent at this
stage in the campaign.  The decision to speak is made in the
heat of political campaigns, when speakers react to messages
conveyed by others.  A speaker’s ability to engage in politi
cal  speech  that  could  have  a  chance  of  persuading  voters  is
stiﬂed  if the  speaker must  ﬁrst commence  a protracted  law
suit.  By the time the lawsuit concludes, the election will be
over  and  the  litigants  in  most  cases  will  have  neither  the
incentive nor, perhaps, the resources to carry on, even if they
could establish that the case is not moot because the issue is
“capable  of  repetition,  yet  evading  review.”  WRTL,  supra,
at  462  (opinion  of  Roberts,  C.  J.)  (citing  Los  Angeles  v.
Lyons,  461  U. S.  95,  109  (1983);  Southern  Paciﬁc  Terminal
Co.  v.  ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911)).  Here, Citizens United
decided  to  litigate  its  case  to  the  end.  Today,  Citizens
United  ﬁnally  learns,  two  years  after  the  fact,  whether  it
could  have  spoken  during  the  2008  Presidential  primary—
long  after  the  opportunity  to  persuade  primary  voters  has
passed.

Third  is  the  primary  importance  of  speech  itself  to  the
integrity  of  the  election  process.  As  additional  rules  are
created  for  regulating  political  speech,  any  speech  arguably
within  their  reach  is  chilled.  See  Part  II–A,  supra.  Cam
paign  ﬁnance  regulations  now  impose  “unique  and  complex
rules”  on  “71  distinct  entities.”  Brief  for  Seven  Former
Chairmen of FEC et al. as Amici Curiae 11–12.  These enti
ties  are  subject  to  separate  rules  for  33  different  types  of
political speech.  Id., at 14–15, n. 10.  The FEC has adopted
568 pages of regulations, 1,278 pages of explanations and jus
tiﬁcations  for those  regulations,  and 1,771  advisory  opinions
since  1975.  See  id.,  at  6,  n.  7.  In  fact,  after  this  Court  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically the opinion of the court in the case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.  It discusses the importance of free speech in elections and the potential chilling effect of campaign finance regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

1

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 11–345
_________________

ABIGAIL NOEL FISHER, PETITIONER v. UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2013]

JUSTICE GINSBURG, dissenting.
The University of Texas at Austin (University) is candid
about  what  it  is  endeavoring  to  do:  It  seeks  to  achieve
student-body  diversity  through  an  admissions  policy  pat-
terned after the Harvard plan referenced as exemplary in
Justice  Powell’s  opinion  in  Regents  of  Univ.  of  Cal.  v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 316–317 (1978).  The University has
steered clear of a quota system like the one struck down in
Bakke,  which  excluded  all  nonminority  candidates  from
competition  for  a  fixed  number  of  seats.  See  id.,  at  272–
275, 315, 319–320 (opinion of Powell, J.).  See also Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 293 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“Justice  Powell’s  opinion  in  [Bakke]  rules  out  a  racial
quota or set-aside, in which race is the sole fact of eligibil-
ity for certain places in a class.”).  And, like so many edu-
cational  institutions  across  the  Nation,1  the  University
has taken care to follow the model approved by the Court
in  Grutter  v.  Bollinger,  539  U. S.  306  (2003).    See  645

——————

1 See Brief for Amherst College et al. as Amici Curiae 33–35; Brief for
Association  of  American  Law  Schools  as  Amicus  Curiae  6;  Brief  for
Association of American Medical Colleges et al. as Amici Curiae 30–32;
Brief  for  Brown  University  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  2–3,  13;  Brief  for
Robert Post et al. as Amici Curiae 24–27; Brief for Fordham University
et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  5–6;  Brief  for  University  of  Delaware  et al.  as
Amici Curiae 16–21.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It includes citation information, the name of the court, the case name, and the date.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

43

Opinion of the Court

consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the closing section of a legal opinion, specifically the "It is so ordered" line, which signals the end of the court's decision.  It is not sequential narrative text and is likely not meant to be read as part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DUPREE v. YOUNGER

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–210.  Argued April 24, 2023—Decided May 25, 2023

Respondent Kevin Younger claims that during his pretrial detention in
a  Maryland  state  prison,  petitioner  Neil  Dupree,  then a  correctional
officer lieutenant, ordered three prison guards to attack him.  Younger
sued Dupree for damages under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging excessive
use of force.  Prior to trial, Dupree moved for summary judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), arguing that Younger had failed
to  exhaust  administrative  remedies  as  required  by  law.    Rule  56  re-
quires a district court to enter judgment on a claim or defense if there
is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.”  The District Court denied the
motion, finding no dispute that the Maryland prison system had inter-
nally investigated Younger’s assault, and concluding that this inquiry
satisfied Younger’s exhaustion obligation.  At trial, Dupree did not pre-
sent  evidence  relating  to  his  exhaustion  defense.    The  jury  found
Dupree and four codefendants liable and awarded Younger $700,000
in damages.  Dupree did not file a post-trial motion under Rule 50(b),
which allows a disappointed party to file a renewed motion for judg-
ment  as  a  matter  of  law.  He  appealed  a  single  issue  to  the  Fourth
Circuit: the District Court’s rejection of his exhaustion defense.  The
Fourth Circuit—bound by its precedent which holds that any claim or
defense rejected at summary judgment is not preserved for appellate
review unless it was renewed in a post-trial motion—dismissed the ap-
peal.

Held: A post-trial motion under Rule 50 is not required to preserve for
appellate review a purely legal issue resolved at summary judgment.
In  Ortiz  v.  Jordan,  the  Court  held  that  an  order  denying  summary
judgment on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds is not appealable af-
ter trial.  562 U. S. 180, 184.  Because the factual record developed at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a brief overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

37

GORSUCH, J., concurring

Kagama, 118 U. S., at 381–382).  In enacting ICWA, Con-
It  recognized  that
gress  affirmed  this  understanding.
“there is no resource that is more vital to the continued ex-
istence and integrity of Indian [T]ribes than their children.”
25 U. S. C. §1901(3).  Yet it also recognized that the mass-
removal  of  Indian  children  by  States  and  other  outsiders
threatened the “continued existence and integrity of Indian
[T]ribes.” Ibid.; see also §1901(4).  By setting out to elimi-
nate  that  practice,  Congress  sought  to  preserve  the
Indian-law bargain written into the Constitution’s text by
securing the continued viability of the “third sovereign.”  S.
O’Connor, Remark, Lessons From the Third Sovereign:  In-
dian Tribal Courts, 33 Tulsa L. J. 1 (1997).

No doubt, ICWA sharply limits the ability of States to im-
pose their own family-law policies on tribal members.  But
as we have seen, state intrusions on tribal authority have
been a recurring theme throughout American history.  See
Ablavsky 2014, at 1009–1037.  Long ago, those intrusions
led the framers to abandon the loophole-ridden Indian af-
fairs provision in the Articles of Confederation and adopt in
the Constitution a different arrangement that commits the
management of tribal relations solely to the federal govern-
ment.  Id., at 1038–1051; see also Clinton 1995, at 1098–
1165.  Recognizing as much, this Court has consistently re-
affirmed  the  Tribes’  “immunity  from  state  and  local  con-
trol.”  Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U. S.
545, 571 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).  If that
immunity means anything, it must mean that States and
others cannot use their own laws to displace federal Indian
policy.

Nor is there any serious question that Congress has the
power under the Indian Commerce Clause to enact protec-
tions against the removal of Indian children.  Thankfully,
Indian children are not (these days) units of commerce.  Cf.
Fletcher & Singel 897–898 (describing an early practice of
enslaving Indian children).  But at its core, ICWA restricts
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in a case before the Supreme Court. It discusses the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and its purpose.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxxxvii

Page
964
Soto-Cosme v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
977
Soto-Maciel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soto-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913
South Carolina; Bagley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  811,946

836

South Carolina; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905

South Carolina; Koon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

South Carolina; Mercer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
256

South Carolina v. North Carolina  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852

South Carolina; Scott v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

South Carolina Dept. of Probation, Parole, and Pardon; Miller v.
South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety; Robinson v.
912

. . . . . . . . . . .
South Coast Plumbing Systems, Inc.; Potter v.  . . . . . . . . .  812,1026,1139

Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority (SEPTA); Campbell v.
954

1098

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Southern v. United States
Southern Star Concrete; Harper v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  842,1139

906

Southland Bank; Anderson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
869

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Southwest Airlines; Wright v.
817

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Southwestern Bell Telephone, L. P.; Coffey v.
876

Sovereign Bank; Meyers v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

Soy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878

Spahn; Badura v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Spann v. Cobb County Superior Court Judges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

Spano v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1059

Spaulding v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

Spear v. Howerton  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930

Spearman v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spears v. McNeil
Spechler v. Tobin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Speedway Superamerica, L. L. C.; Gates v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

1113

Speer; Weiss v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

Spence v. Holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
883

Spencer v. Hofbauer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

Spencer v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Spencer; Wilson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Spielvogel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spigelman v. United States
898

Spikes v. Connecticut  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Spillman v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939

Spinelli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
139

Spisak; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Spivey v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Spoons, Inc. v. Guzman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957

Spriggs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852

Springer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal document, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.  It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 19–1257 and 19–1258
_________________

MARK BRNOVICH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
ARIZONA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL.

19–1257

ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL.

19–1258

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2021]

  JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In these cases, we are called upon for the first time to ap-
ply §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to regulations that
govern how ballots are collected and counted.  Arizona law
generally makes it very easy to vote.  All voters may vote by
mail or in person for nearly a month before election day, but
Arizona imposes two restrictions that are claimed to be un-
lawful.  First, in some counties, voters who choose to cast a
ballot in person on election day must vote in their own pre-
cincts or else their ballots will not be counted.  Second, mail-
in ballots cannot be collected by anyone other than an elec-
tion  official,  a  mail  carrier,  or  a  voter’s  family  member,
household  member,  or  caregiver.    After  a  trial,  a  District
Court  upheld  these  rules,  as  did  a  panel  of  the  United
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U39

[09-26-01 13:21:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 217 (2000)

237

Souter, J., concurring in judgment

The ﬁrst comprises First Amendment and related cases
grouped under the umbrella of academic freedom.3 Such
law might be implicated by the University’s proffered ration-
ale, that the grant scheme funded by the student activity
fee is an integral element in the discharge of its educational
mission. App. 253 (excerpt from Dean of Students Ofﬁce
Student Organization Handbook noting that the activities
of student groups constitute a “ ‘second curriculum’ ”); id.,
at 41, 42–44 (statement of Associate Dean of Students of
the UW-Madison noting academic importance of funding
scheme); see also ante, at 233. Our understanding of aca-
demic freedom has included not merely liberty from re-
straints on thought, expression, and association in the acad-
emy, but also the idea that universities and schools should
have the freedom to make decisions about how and what to
teach.
In Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214
(1985), we recognized these related conceptions: “Academic
freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited
exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and
somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by
Id., at 226, n. 12 (citations omitted).
the academy itself.”
Some of the opinions in our books emphasize broad concep-
tions of academic freedom that if accepted by the Court
might seem to clothe the University with an immunity to any
challenge to regulations made or obligations imposed in the
discharge of its educational mission. So, in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 (1957), Justice Frankfurter, concur-
ring in the result and joined by Justice Harlan, explained the

15.
If viewpoint neutrality is a sufﬁcient condition, the majority could
uphold the scheme here on that limited ground without deciding whether
it is a necessary one.

3 We have long recognized the constitutional importance of academic
freedom. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957)
(plurality opinion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960); Keyishian
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Souter in the case 529 U.S. 217 (2000).  It discusses academic freedom and the University's rationale for funding student activities.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

27

Opinion of the Court

tional beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—
it does not assure the existence of a “citizens’ militia” as a
safeguard against tyranny.  For Congress retains plenary
authority  to  organize  the  militia,  which  must  include  the
authority  to  say  who  will  belong  to  the  organized  force.17
That  is  why  the  first  Militia  Act’s  requirement  that  only
whites enroll caused States to amend their militia laws to
exclude free blacks.  See Siegel, The Federal Government’s
Power  to  Enact  Color-Conscious  Laws,  92  Nw.  U.  L.  Rev.
477,  521–525  (1998).  Thus,  if  petitioners  are  correct,  the
Second Amendment protects citizens’ right to use a gun in
an organization from which Congress has plenary author
ity  to  exclude  them.  It  guarantees  a  select  militia  of  the
sort  the  Stuart  kings  found  useful,  but  not  the  people’s
militia that was the concern of the founding generation.

B
Our  interpretation  is  confirmed  by  analogous  arms-
bearing  rights  in  state  constitutions  that  preceded  and
immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment.
Four  States  adopted  analogues  to  the  Federal  Second
Amendment  in  the  period  between  independence  and  the

——————

17 Article I, §8, cl. 16 of the Constitution gives Congress the power

“[t]o  provide  for  organizing,  arming,  and disciplining,  the  Militia,
and  for  governing  such  Part  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the
Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively,
the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”

It  could  not  be  clearer  that  Congress’s  “organizing”  power,  unlike  its
“governing” power, can be invoked even for that part of the militia not
“employed  in  the  Service  of  the  United  States.”    JUSTICE  STEVENS
provides  no  support  whatever  for  his  contrary  view,  see  post,  at  19  n.
20.  Both the  Federalists  and Anti-Federalists read  the  provision as it
was written, to permit the creation of a “select” militia.  See The Feder
alist  No.  29,  pp.  226,  227  (B.  Wright  ed.  1961);  Centinel,  Revived,  No.
XXIX,  Philadelphia  Independent  Gazetteer,  Sept.  9,  1789,  in  Young
711, 712.
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *District of Columbia v. Heller*.  It discusses the interpretation of the Second Amendment and its relation to the concept of a "militia".
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

11.  In that case, the Court held that laws requiring the dis-
closure  of  factual  information  in  commercial  advertising
may  satisfy  the  First  Amendment  if  the  disclosures  are
“reasonably  related”  to  the  Government’s  interest  in  pre-
venting consumer deception.  471 U. S., at 651.  Because the
trade associations did not contest  Zauderer’s  applicability
before the Eleventh Circuit and both lower courts applied
its framework, I agree with the Court’s decision to rely upon
Zauderer at this stage.  However, I think we should recon-
sider Zauderer and its progeny.  “I am skeptical of the prem-
ise  on  which  Zauderer  rests—that,  in  the  commercial-
speech context, the First Amendment interests implicated
by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than
those at stake when speech is actually suppressed.”  Mila-
vetz,  Gallop  &  Milavetz,  P. A.  v.  United  States,  559  U. S.
229, 255 (2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, the common-carrier doctrine should continue to
guide  the  lower  courts’  examination  of  the  trade  associa-
tions’ claims on remand.  See post, at 18, and n. 17, 30 (opin-
ion of ALITO, J.).  “[O]ur legal system and its British prede-
cessor  have  long  subjected  certain  businesses,  known  as
common carriers, to special regulations, including a general
requirement  to  serve  all  comers.”    Biden  v.  Knight  First
Amendment Institute at Columbia Univ., 593 U. S. ___, ___
(2021) (THOMAS, J., concurring in grant of certiorari) (slip
op., at 3).  Moreover, “there is clear historical precedent for
regulating transportation and communications networks in
a  similar  manner  as  traditional  common  carriers”  given
their many similarities.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5).  Though
they  reached  different  conclusions,  both  the  Fifth  Circuit
and the Eleventh Circuit appropriately strove to apply the
common-carrier doctrine in assessing the constitutionality
of H. B. 20 and S. B. 7072 respectively.  See 49 F. 4th 439,
469–480  (CA5  2022);  NetChoice  v.  Attorney  Gen.,  Fla.,  34
F. 4th 1196, 1219–1222 (CA11 2022).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It contains legal citations, analysis of previous cases, and arguments related to the constitutionality of certain laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

540

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

Cummings v. Missouri addressed an ex post facto chal-
lenge to certain amendments to the Missouri State Con-
stitution made in 1865. When read together, those amend-
ments listed a series of acts deemed criminal (all dealing
with the giving of aid or comfort to anyone engaged in armed
hostility against the United States), and then declared that
unless a person engaged in certain professions (e. g., lawyers
and clergymen) swore an oath of loyalty, he “shall, on con-
viction [for failing to swear the oath], be punished” by a ﬁne,
imprisonment, or both.
Id., at 279–281. We held that these
provisions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Writing for the Court, Justice Field ﬁrst observed that
“[b]y an ex post facto law is meant one which imposes a pun-
ishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it
was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that
then prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which
less or different testimony is sufﬁcient to convict than was
then required.”
Id., at 325–326. The Court then held
the amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause in all
these respects: some of the offenses deemed criminal by
the amendments were not criminal acts before then, id., at
327–328; other acts were previously criminal, but now they
carried a greater criminal sanction, id., at 328; and, most
importantly for present purposes, the amendments per-
mitted conviction on less testimony than was previously
sufﬁcient, because they “subvert the presumptions of in-
nocence, and alter the rules of evidence, which heretofore,
under the universally recognized principles of the common
law, have been supposed to be fundamental and unchange-
able,” ibid. The Court continued: “They assume that the
parties are guilty; they call upon the parties to establish
their innocence; and they declare that such innocence can be
shown only in one way—by an inquisition, in the form of an
Ibid.
expurgatory oath, into the consciences of the parties.”
It is correct that Cummings held Missouri’s constitutional
amendments invalid under the fourth category because
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the case of Cummings v. Missouri and its implications for the Ex Post Facto Clause. It contains legal analysis and cites previous court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


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  <content>
4

FDA v. ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE

Syllabus

organizations  must  satisfy  the  usual  standards  for  injury  in  fact,
causation, and redressability that apply to individuals, id., at 378–379.
According  to  the  medical  associations,  FDA  has  “impaired”  their
“ability to provide services and achieve their organizational missions.”
Brief  for  Respondents  43.    That  argument  does  not  work  to
demonstrate  standing.   Like  an  individual,  an  organization  may  not
establish  standing  simply  based  on  the  “intensity  of  the  litigant’s
interest” or because of strong opposition to the government’s conduct,
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 486.  The plaintiff associations
therefore  cannot  establish  standing  simply  because  they  object  to
FDA’s actions.  The medical associations claim to have standing based
on their incurring costs to oppose FDA’s actions.  They say that FDA
has  “caused”  the  associations  to  conduct  their  own  studies  on
mifepristone so that the associations can better inform their members
and the public about mifepristone’s risks.  Brief for Respondents 43.
They  contend  that  FDA  has  “forced”  the  associations  to  “expend
considerable time, energy, and resources” drafting citizen petitions to
FDA, as well as engaging in public advocacy and public education, all
to  the  detriment  of  other  spending  priorities.    Id.,  at  44.  But  an
organization  that  has  not  suffered  a  concrete  injury  caused  by  a
defendant’s  action  cannot  spend  its  way  into  standing  simply  by
expending  money  to  gather  information  and  advocate  against  the
defendant’s  action.    Contrary  to  what  the  medical  associations
contend, the Court’s decision in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman does
not  stand  for  the  expansive  theory  that  standing  exists  when  an
organization diverts its resources in response to a defendant’s actions.
Havens was an unusual case, and this Court has been careful not to
extend the Havens holding beyond its context.  So too here.

Finally, it was suggested that plaintiffs must have standing because
otherwise  it  may  be  that  no  one  would  have  standing  to  challenge
FDA’s 2016 and 2021 actions.  That suggestion fails because the Court
has long rejected that kind of argument as a basis for standing.  The
“assumption”  that  if  these  plaintiffs  lack  “standing  to  sue,  no  one
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”  Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 227.  Rather, some
issues may be left to the political and democratic processes.  Pp. 21–
24.

78 F. 4th 210, reversed and remanded.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  THOMAS,

J., filed a concurring opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing the arguments and reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It is not the actual content of the case being discussed, but rather an analysis of the legal issues involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
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Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

19

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

“marked  extension”  of  Bivens  that  was  unnecessary  to
advance  its  purpose  of  holding  individual  officers  respon-
sible  for  “engaging
in  unconstitutional  wrongdoing.”
Malesko,  534  U. S.,  at  74.    Whether  corporate  defendants
should be subject to suit was “a question for Congress, not
us, to decide.”  Id., at 72.

Neither  the  language  of  the  ATS  nor  the  precedents
interpreting it support an exception to these general prin-
ciples  in  this  context.  In  fact,  the  separation-of-powers
concerns  that  counsel  against  courts  creating  private
rights  of  action  apply  with  particular  force  in  the  context
of  the  ATS.  See  infra,  at  25–26.    The  political  branches,
not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional
capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.  See Kiobel, 569
U. S.,  at  116–117.  That  the  ATS  implicates  foreign  rela-
tions “is itself a reason for a high bar to new private causes
of  action  for  violating  international  law.”  Sosa,  supra,
at 727.

In Sosa, the Court emphasized that federal courts must
exercise  “great  caution”  before  recognizing  new  forms  of
liability under the ATS.  542 U. S., at 728.  In light of the
foreign-policy  and  separation-of-powers  concerns  inherent
in  ATS  litigation,  there  is  an  argument  that  a  proper
application of Sosa would preclude courts from ever recog-
nizing  any  new  causes  of  action  under  the  ATS.    But  the
Court  need  not  resolve  that  question  in  this  case.  Either
way,  absent  further  action  from  Congress  it  would  be
inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign
corporations.

2
Even  in  areas  less  fraught  with  foreign-policy  conse-
quences,  the  Court  looks  to  analogous  statutes  for  guid-
ance  on  the  appropriate  boundaries  of  judge-made  causes
of action.  See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S.
19,  24  (1990);  Blue  Chip  Stamps  v.  Manor  Drug  Stores,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and its application to foreign corporations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

29

ALITO, J., dissenting

out  students  with  disfavored  beliefs.    Asked  at  oral  argu-
ment whether CLS could require applicants to pass a test
on  the  Bible,  Hastings’  attorney  responded:  “If  it  were
truly an objective knowledge test, it would be okay.”  Tr. of
Oral  Arg.  52.  The  long  history  of  disputes  about  the
meaning  of  Bible  passages  belies  any  suggestion  that  it
would be an easy task to determine whether the grading of
such a test was “objective.”

Third,  the  Court  argues  that  the  accept-all-comers
policy,  by  bringing  together  students  with  diverse  views,
encourages  tolerance,  cooperation,  learning,  and  the  de-
velopment of conflict-resolution skills.  Ante, at 23.  These
are  obviously  commendable  goals,  but  they  are  not  un-
dermined by permitting a religious group to restrict mem-
bership  to  persons  who  share  the  group’s  faith.    Many
religious  groups  impose  such  restrictions.  See,  e.g.,  Brief
for  Agudath  Israel  of  America  as  Amicus  Curiae  3
(“[B]ased  upon  millennia-old  Jewish  laws  and  traditions,
Orthodox  Jewish  institutions  . . .  regularly  differentiate
between  Jews  and  non-Jews”).  Such  practices  are  not
manifestations  of  “contempt”  for  members  of  other  faiths.
Cf.  ante,  at  6  (opinion  of  STEVENS,  J.)  (invoking  groups
that  have  “contempt  for  Jews,  blacks,  and  women”).    Nor
do they thwart the objectives that Hastings endorses.  Our
country  as  a  whole,  no  less  than  the  Hastings  College  of
Law,  values  tolerance,  cooperation,  learning,  and  the
amicable  resolution  of  conflicts.    But  we  seek  to  achieve
those goals through “[a] confident pluralism that conduces
to  civil  peace  and  advances  democratic  consensus-
building,” not by abridging First Amendment rights.  Brief
for  Gays  and  Lesbians  for  Individual  Liberty  as  Amicus
Curiae 35.

Fourth, the Court observes that Hastings’ policy “incor-
porates—in  fact,  subsumes—state-law  proscriptions  on
discrimination.”  Ante,  at  23.    Because  the  First  Amend-
ment  obviously  takes  precedence  over  any  state  law,  this
  </content>
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This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's stance on a religious institution's right to restrict membership.
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  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
12

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

tenced to a year of imprisonment, suspended for a term of
25  years  on  the  condition  that  they  not  reenter  the  Com-
monwealth  together  during  that  time.    Id.,  at  3.6    In  a
similar  vein,  Zablocki  v.  Redhail,  434  U. S.  374  (1978),
involved  a  man  who  was  prohibited,  on  pain  of  criminal
penalty,  from  “marry[ing]  in  Wisconsin  or  elsewhere”
because  of  his  outstanding  child-support  obligations,  id.,
at  387;  see  id.,  at  377–378.    And  Turner  v.  Safley,  482
U. S.  78  (1987),  involved  state  inmates  who  were  prohib-
ited from entering marriages without the permission of the
superintendent of the prison, permission that could not be
granted  absent  compelling  reasons,  id.,  at  82.  In  none  of
those  cases  were  individuals  denied  solely  governmental
——————

slavery in the colony.  Id., at 19–20.  Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws
likewise were passed in a 1691 resolution entitled “An act for suppress-
ing  outlying  Slaves.”    Act  of  Apr.  1691,  Ch.  XVI,  3  Va.  Stat.  86  (W.
Hening ed. 1823) (reprint 1969) (italics deleted).  “It was not until the
Civil  War  threw  the  future  of  slavery  into  doubt  that  lawyers,  legisla-
tors,  and  judges  began  to  develop  the  elaborate  justifications  that
signified the emergence of miscegenation law and made restrictions on
interracial  marriage  the  foundation  of  post-Civil  War  white  suprem-
acy.”  Pascoe, supra, at 27–28.

Laws defining marriage as between one man and one woman do not
share  this  sordid  history.    The  traditional  definition  of  marriage  has
prevailed  in  every  society  that  has  recognized  marriage  throughout
history.  Brief for Scholars of History and Related Disciplines as Amici
Curiae 1.  It arose not out of a desire to shore up an invidious institu-
tion  like  slavery,  but  out  of  a  desire  “to  increase  the  likelihood  that
children will be born and raised in stable and enduring family units by
both  the  mothers  and  the  fathers  who  brought  them  into  this  world.”
Id.,  at  8.  And  it  has  existed  in  civilizations  containing  all  manner  of
views  on  homosexuality.    See  Brief  for  Ryan  T.  Anderson  as  Amicus
Curiae  11–12  (explaining  that  several  famous  ancient  Greeks  wrote
approvingly  of  the  traditional  definition  of  marriage,  though  same-sex
sexual relations were common in Greece at the time).

6 The  prohibition  extended  so  far  as  to  forbid  even  religious  ceremo-
nies, thus raising a serious question under the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise  Clause,  as  at  least  one  amicus  brief  at  the  time  pointed  out.
Brief  for  John  J.  Russell  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  in  Loving  v.  Virginia,
O.T. 1966, No. 395, pp. 12–16.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses precedents and legal arguments related to marriage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
cxxviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

1025

Sampson v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

Sampson; Taylor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1063

Sam’s Club; Park Mini Storage Center Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1063

Sam’s East, Inc.; Park Mini Storage Center Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
Samuel v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  857,1086

942

Samuels; Grifﬁn v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
San Antonio; Martin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Sanches Montes v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1033,1159

1030

Sanchez v. McNeil
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  855,867,920,1057,1060,1117

Sanchez v. United States
895

Sanchez-Alvarez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

Sanchez-Oxio v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1005

Sanchez-Ramirez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928

Sanchez-Rosado v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanchez Salcido v. United States
863

Sanders v. Department of Housing and Urban Development
. . . .
809

Sanders v. Environmental Protection Agency
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanders v. Florida
1104

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanders v. McMaster
809

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanders v. North Carolina
Sanders v. United States
1083

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
San Diego; Yeager v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1013,1140

San Diego; Zahn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  886,1065

San Diego Cty. Health and Human Services Agcy.; Powell v.  . .  902,1066

San Diego Uniﬁed Port Dist.; Pierce v.
877

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907

Sandor; Jaquez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Sandor; Rust v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Sandoval v. Chicago  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

Sandoval v.  Los  Angeles County Dept. of Public Social Services
853

Sandoval v. Ulibarri  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133

Sandoval v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
870

Sandoval Mendoza v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Sand River Properties, LLC; Scohy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Sands v. Department of Homeland Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811

San Francisco; Golden Gate Restaurant Assn. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

San Francisco; Rodis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Sang v. Scribner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Sanoﬁ-Synthelabo; Apotex, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

Santa v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Santana v. Trani  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

Santiago v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  855,912,926

839

Santifer v. Evans
1080

Santos v. DiGuglielmo
896

Santos v. United States

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.  It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
4

SHURTLEFF v. BOSTON

Syllabus

98, 112.  Boston concedes that it denied petitioners’ request out of Es-
tablishment  Clause  concerns,  solely  because  the  proposed  flag  “pro-
mot[ed] a specific religion.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 155a.  In light of the
Court’s government-speech holding, Boston’s refusal to allow petition-
ers  to  raise  their  flag  because  of  its  religious  viewpoint  violated  the
Free Speech Clause.  Pp. 12–13.

986 F. 3d 78, reversed and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  SOTOMAYOR,  KAGAN,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined.  KA-
VANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion.  ALITO, J., filed an opinion con-
curring  in  the  judgment,  in  which  THOMAS  and  GORSUCH, JJ.,  joined.
GORSUCH,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment,  in  which
THOMAS, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision and the justices' opinions.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

19

Opinion of the Court

matter] to DHS for further consideration.”  554 F. Supp. 3d,
at 857.

As we explained two Terms ago in Department of Home-
land  Security  v.  Regents  of  Univ.  of  Cal.,  591  U. S.  ___
(2020), upon finding that the grounds for agency action are
inadequate, “a court may remand for the agency to do one
of two things.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13).  “First, the agency
can offer ‘a fuller explanation of the agency’s reasoning at
the time of the agency action.’ ”  Ibid. (emphasis deleted).  If
it chooses this route, “the agency may elaborate” on its ini-
tial reasons for taking the action, “but may not provide new
ones.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).  Alternatively, “the agency
can ‘deal with the problem afresh’ by taking new agency ac-
tion.”  Ibid. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194,
201  (1947)  (Chenery  II)).  “An  agency  taking  this  route  is
not limited to its prior reasons.”  Regents, 591 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 14).

Here, perhaps in light of this Court’s previous determina-
tion that the Government had “failed to show a likelihood
of success on the claim that the [June 1 Memorandum] was
not arbitrary and capricious,” 594 U. S. ___, the Secretary
selected  the  second  option  from  Regents:  He  accepted  the
District Court’s vacatur and dealt with the problem afresh.
The  October  29  Memoranda  made  that  clear  “by  its  own
terms,” Regents, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14), in which
the Secretary stated: “I am hereby terminating MPP.  Ef-
fective  immediately,  I  hereby  supersede  and  rescind  the
June  1  memorandum.”  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  263a–264a.
And consistent with that approach, the October 29 Memo-
randa offered several “new reasons absent from” the June 1
Memorandum,  Regents,  591  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  14),
including  an  examination  of  the  “considerations  that  the
District Court determined were insufficiently addressed in
the June 1 memo,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 259a.

The October 29 Memoranda were therefore final agency
action for the same reasons that the June 1 Memorandum
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the reasoning behind a decision regarding the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP). It contains legal citations, references to previous court cases, and detailed analysis of agency actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

it  also  gives  those  now  free  to  conduct  a  sports  betting
operation  the  “right  or  authority  to  act”;  it  “empowers”
them (respondents’ and the United States’s definition).

The  concept  of  state  “authorization”  makes  sense  only
against a backdrop of prohibition or regulation.  A State is
not  regarded  as  authorizing  everything  that  it  does  not
prohibit  or  regulate.    No  one  would  use  the  term  in  that
way.  For example, no one would say that a State “author
izes” its residents to brush their teeth or eat apples or sing
in  the  shower.    We  commonly  speak  of  state  authoriza-
tion  only  if  the  activity  in  question  would  otherwise  be
restricted.28

The  United  States  counters  that,  even  if  the  term  “au
thorize,”  standing  alone,  is  interpreted  as  petitioners
claim, PASPA contains additional language that precludes
that  reading.    The  provision  at  issue  refers  to  “author
iz[ation]  by  law,”  §3702(1)  (emphasis  added),  and  the
parallel  provision  governing  private  conduct,  §3702(2),
applies to conduct done “pursuant to the law . . . of a gov
ernmental entity.”  The United States maintains that one
“would  not  naturally  describe  a  person  conducting  a
sports-gambling operation that  is merely left unregulated
as acting ‘pursuant to’ state law.”  Brief for United States
18.  But  one  might  well  say  exactly  that  if  the  person
previously  was  prohibited  from  engaging  in  the  activity.
(“Now  that  the  State  has  legalized  the  sale  of  marijuana,
Joe is able to sell the drug pursuant to state law.”)

The  United  States  also  claims  to  find  support  for  its
interpretation  in  the  fact  that  the  authorization  ban  ap-

——————

28 See, e.g., A. McCullum, Vermont’s legal recreational marijuana law:
What you should know, USA Today Network (Jan. 23, 2018), online at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/ 2018/ 01 /23 / vermont
legal-marijuana-law-what-know/1056869001/  (“Vermont  . . .  bec[ame]
the  first  [State]  in  the  country  to  authorize  the  recreational  use  of
[marijuana] by an act of a state legislature.” (emphasis added)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a law related to sports betting. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific sections of a law (PASPA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

51

Appendix to opinion of THOMAS, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a citation and part of a legal document's appendix.  It is not the main body text and likely not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation and Appendix</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

2168 (2000).

RFRA and RLUIPA have restored part of the protection
that Smith withdrew, but they are both limited in scope and
can be weakened or repealed by Congress at any time.  They
are no substitute for a proper interpretation of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.

III
A

That project must begin with the constitutional text.  In
Martin  v.  Hunter’s  Lessee,  1  Wheat.  304,  338–339  (1816),
Justice Story laid down the guiding principle: “If the text be
clear and distinct, no restriction upon its plain and obvious
import ought to be admitted, unless the inference be irre-
sistible.”    And  even  though  we  now  have  a  thick  body  of
precedent regarding the meaning of most provisions of the
Constitution, our opinions continue to respect the primacy
of the Constitution’s text.  See, e.g., Chiafalo v. Washington,
591  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2020)  (slip  op.,  at  9–13)  (starting
with  the  text  of  Art.  II,  §1,  before  considering  historical
practice);  Knick  v.  Township  of  Scott,  588  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2019)  (slip  op.,  at  6)  (beginning  analysis  with  the  text  of
the  Takings  Clause);  Gamble  v.  United  States,  587  U. S.
___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 3–4) (starting with the text
of the Fifth Amendment before turning to history and prec-
edent); City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 519 (“In assessing the
breadth of §5’s enforcement power, we begin with its text”).
Smith,  however,  paid  shockingly  little  attention  to  the
text  of  the  Free  Exercise  Clause.    Instead  of  examining
what  readers  would  have  understood  its  words  to  mean
when  adopted,  the  opinion  merely  asked  whether  it  was
“permissible” to read the text to have the meaning that the
majority favored.  494 U. S., at 878.  This strange treatment
of the constitutional text cannot be justified—and is espe-
cially surprising since it clashes so sharply with the way in
which Smith’s author, Justice Scalia, generally treated the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Fulton v. Philadelphia. It focuses on the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

stances exists under which the Act would be valid.”  United
States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987).

“[U]nder  our  constitutional  system[,]  courts  are  not
roving  commissions  assigned  to  pass  judgment  on  the
validity of the Nation’s laws.”  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U. S. 601, 610–611 (1973).  Instead, the “judicial Power” is
limited to deciding particular “Cases” and “Controversies.”
U. S.  Const.,  Art. III,  §2.    “Embedded  in  the  traditional
rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle
that  a  person  to  whom  a  statute  may  constitutionally  be
applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the
ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitution
ally  to  others,  in  other  situations  not  before  the  Court.”
Broadrick,  413  U. S.,  at  610.    Yet  the  Court’s  opinion  in
this  case  contains  not  a  word  explaining  why  Congress
lacks  the  power  to  subject  to  preclearance  the  particular
plaintiff  that  initiated  this  lawsuit—Shelby  County,  Ala
bama.  The reason for the Court’s silence is apparent, for
as  applied  to  Shelby  County,  the  VRA’s  preclearance
requirement is hardly contestable.

Alabama is home to Selma, site of the “Bloody Sunday”
beatings  of  civil-rights  demonstrators  that  served  as  the
catalyst for the VRA’s enactment.  Following those events,
Martin Luther King, Jr., led a march from Selma to Mont
gomery, Alabama’s capital, where he called for passage of
the VRA.  If the Act passed, he foresaw, progress could be
made  even  in  Alabama,  but  there  had  to  be  a  steadfast
national  commitment  to  see  the  task  through  to  comple
tion.  In  King’s  words,  “the  arc  of  the  moral  universe  is
long,  but  it  bends  toward  justice.”    G.  May,  Bending  To
ward  Justice:  The  Voting  Rights  Act  and  the  Transfor
mation of American Democracy 144 (2013).

History has proved King right.  Although circumstances
in  Alabama  have  changed,  serious  concerns  remain.
Between  1982  and  2005,  Alabama  had  one  of  the  highest
rates of successful §2 suits, second only to its VRA-covered
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and its application to Shelby County, Alabama.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

3

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

prevention  of  sexual  exploitation  and  abuse  of  children
constitutes  a  government  objective  of  surpassing  im-
portance.”  Ferber,  supra,  at  757.    “Sex  offenders  are  a
serious  threat,”  and  “the  victims  of  sexual  assault  are
most  often  juveniles.”    McKune  v.  Lile,  536  U. S.  24,  32
(2002)  (plurality  opinion);  see  Connecticut  Dept.  of  Public
Safety v. Doe, 538 U. S. 1, 4 (2003).  “[T]he . . . interest [of ]
safeguarding  the  physical  and  psychological  well-being  of
a minor . . . is a compelling one,”  Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior  Court,  County  of  Norfolk,  457  U. S.  596,  607
(1982),  and  “we  have  sustained  legislation  aimed  at  pro-
tecting  the  physical  and  emotional  well-being  of  youth
even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of
constitutionally protected rights,” Ferber, supra, at 757.

Repeat  sex  offenders  pose  an  especially  grave  risk  to
children.  “When  convicted  sex  offenders  reenter  society,
they are much more likely than any other type of offender
to  be  rearrested  for  a  new  rape  or  sexual  assault.”
McKune, supra, at 33 (plurality opinion); see United States
v.  Kebodeaux,  570  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2013)  (slip  op.,
at 8–9).

The  State’s  interest  in  protecting  children  from  recidi-
vist sex offenders plainly applies to internet use.  Several
factors make the internet a powerful tool for the would-be
child  abuser.  First,  children  often  use  the  internet  in  a
way  that  gives  offenders  easy  access  to  their  personal
information—by,
communicating  with
strangers  and  allowing  sites  to  disclose  their  location.1
Second, the internet provides previously unavailable ways

for  example,

——————

1 See  Pew  Research  Center,  Teens,  Social  Media,  and  Privacy  5
(May  21,  2013),  http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/05/PIP_
TeensSocialMediaandPrivacy_PDF.pdf  (all  internet  materials  as  last
visited  June  16,  2017);  J.  Wolak,  K.  Mitchell,  &  D.  Finkelhor,  National
Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Online Victimization of Youth:
Five  Years  Later  7  (2006)  (prepared  by  Univ.  of  N.  H.,  Crimes  Against
Children Research Center), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV138.pdf.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the government's interest in preventing child sexual exploitation and abuse, particularly in the context of internet use by sex offenders.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1135

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No. 09–7911.  Christensen v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  582  F.  3d  860.

No.  09–7913.  Watford  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7919.  Baca-Quiroz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  362.

No. 09–7926.  Isom v.  United  States.  C. A. 1st Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  580  F.  3d  43.

No.  09–7930.  Olander  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  764.

No.  09–7936.  Lea  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  350  Fed.  Appx.  754.

No.  09–7942.  Boyce  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  911.

No.  09–7943.  Berro  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  348  Fed.  Appx.  98.

No.  09–7944.  Augustine-Neri  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  920.

No.  09–7954.  Meza  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  351  Fed.  Appx.  396.

No.  09–7957.  Matthews  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  106.

No.  09–7958.  Gonzalez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  701.

No.  09–7962.  Wheeler  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  632.

No.  09–7965.  Johnson  v.  United  States  et  al.  (Reported
below: 580 F. 3d 666); and Ward et al. v.  United States.  C.  A.
7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7971.  Shaw  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  936.

No.  09–7972.  Stone  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d  83.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is formatted in a way typical of legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

405

Opinion of Stevens, J.

types  of  corporations,  or  unions.  It  certainly  would  not  in
validate  the  statute  as  applied  to  a  large  for-proﬁt  corpora
tion.  See  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  8,  4  (Mar.  24,  2009)  (counsel  for
Citizens  United  emphasizing  that  appellant is  “a  small,  non
proﬁt organization, which is very much like [an MCFL corpo
ration],”  and  afﬁrming  that  its  argument  “deﬁnitely  would
not be the same” if Hillary were distributed by General Mo
tors).12  There is no legitimate basis for resurrecting a facial
challenge that dropped out of this case 20 months ago.
Narrower Grounds

It is all the more distressing that our colleagues have man
ufactured  a  facial  challenge,  because  the  parties  have  ad
vanced numerous ways to resolve the case that would facili
tate  electioneering  by  nonproﬁt  advocacy  corporations  such
as Citizens United, without toppling statutes and precedents.
Which  is  to  say,  the  majority  has  transgressed  yet  another
“cardinal” principle of the judicial process: “[I]f it is not nec
essary  to  decide  more,  it  is  necessary  not  to  decide  more,”
PDK Labs. Inc. v.  Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F. 3d 786,

12 The  Chief  Justice  is  therefore  much  too  quick  when  he  suggests
that,  “[e]ven  if  considered  in  as-applied  terms,  a  holding  in  this  case  that
the  Act  may  not  be  applied  to  Citizens  United—because  corporations  as
well  as  individuals  enjoy  the  pertinent  First  Amendment  rights—would
mean  that  any  other  corporation  raising  the  same  challenge  would  also
win.”  Ante, at 376 (concurring opinion).  That conclusion would only fol
low if the Court were to ignore Citizens United’s plausible as-applied argu
ments and instead take the implausible position that all corporations and
all  types  of  expenditures  enjoy  the  same  First  Amendment  protections,
which  always  trump  the  interests  in  regulation.  At  times,  the  majority
appears  to  endorse  this  extreme  view.  At  other  times,  however,  it  ap
pears  to  suggest  that  nonproﬁt  corporations  have  a  better  claim  to  First
Amendment  protection  than  for-proﬁt  corporations,  see  ante,  at  337,  355,
“advocacy”  organizations  have  a  better  claim  than  other  nonproﬁts,  ante,
at  337,  domestic  corporations  have  a  better  claim  than  foreign  corpora
tions, ante, at 362, small corporations have a better claim than large corpo
rations,  ante,  at  354–356,  and  printed  matter  has  a  better  claim  than
broadcast communications, ante, at 349.  The majority never uses a multi
national business corporation in its hypotheticals.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on arguments regarding the application of campaign finance laws to corporations. It's part of a larger legal discussion and not standalone, readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xxviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page
808
California; Gimbel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Gonzalez v.
975
California; Gordon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873
California; Grant v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Gurnsey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  955,1140

990

California; Gutierrez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917

California; Hadley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Hale v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

California; Hallford v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  885,1139

833

California; Hamilton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

California; Harris v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Harrod v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
885

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  842,1038

California; Hawkins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887

California; Hawthorne v.
838

California; Hayes v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
802

California; Herships v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

California; Jackson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

California; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

California; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Langosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

California; Martin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  804,997

1120

California; Miller v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910

California; Monteverde v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

California; Neufer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Newman v.
996

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Olivier v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  851,1038

1078

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Om v.
905

California; Pine v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Pineda v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

California; Plummer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1021,1146

California; Portillo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

1136

California; Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

California; Qazza v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

California; Ramirez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Shabazz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
803

California; Simmons v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  805,1045

855

California; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

California; Stewart v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

California; Valenzuela v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

California; Vizcarra v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

California; Waldie v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

California; Walker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919

California; Yann v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1107

. . . .
California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation; Smith v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

Section 1028A(a)(1) would thus apply automatically any time a name
or other means of identification happens to be part of the payment or
billing  method  used  in  the  commission  of  a  long  list  of  predicate  of-
fenses.  Dubin’s more targeted reading requires that the use of a means
of identification have “a genuine nexus” to the predicate offense.  When
the  underlying  crime  involves  fraud  or  deceit,  as  many  of  §1028A’s
predicates do, this entails using a means of identification specifically
in a fraudulent or deceitful manner, not as a mere ancillary feature of
a payment or billing method.  A careful examination of §1028A(a)(1)’s
text and structure points to a narrower reading.  Pp. 4–5.

(b) The  terms  “uses”  and  “in  relation  to”  have  been  singled  out  by
this Court as being particularly sensitive to context.  The “various def-
initions  of  ‘use’  imply  action  and  implementation.”  Bailey  v.  United
States,  516  U. S.  137,  145.    Beyond  that  general  concept,  however,
“ ‘use’ takes on different meanings depending on context.”  Id., at 143.
This requires looking “not only to the word itself, but also to the statute
and the [surrounding] scheme, to determine the meaning Congress in-
tended.”  Ibid.  “In  relation  to”  is  similarly  context  sensitive.    If  ex-
tended to its furthest reach, “relate to” would be practically limitless.
The phrase clearly refers to a relationship or nexus of some kind, but
the nature and strength of this relationship or nexus will be informed
by context.  Because the presence of two such context-dependent terms
renders §1028A(a)(1) doubly attuned to its surroundings, resort to con-
text is especially necessary.  Pp. 5–7.

(c) Section 1028A(a)(1)’s title and terms both point toward reading
the provision to capture the ordinary understanding of identity theft,
where misuse of a means of identification is at the crux of the crimi-
nality.  Pp. 8–15.

(1) Section 1028A is a focused, standalone provision, and its title—
“Aggravated identity theft”—suggests that identity theft is at the core
of  §1028A(a)(1).    A  statute’s  title  has  long  been  considered  a  “ ‘too[l]
available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the meaning of a statute.”
Almendarez-Torres  v.  United  States,  523  U. S.  224,  234.    Section
1028A’s title is especially valuable here because it does not summarize
a list of “complicated and prolific” provisions, Trainmen v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528, and also “reinforces what the text’s
nouns and verbs independently suggest,”  Yates v. United States, 574
U. S. 528, 552 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). The Court has pre-
viously observed the contrast between §1028A’s targeted title and the
broad title of neighboring provision §1028: “ ‘Fraud and related activity
in connection with identification documents, authentication features,
and  information.’ ”  Flores-Figueroa  v.  United  States,  556  U. S.  646,
655.  That  “Congress  separated  the  [identity]  fraud  crime  from  the
[identity] theft crime in” §1028A suggests that §1028A is focused on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the legal arguments and reasoning behind the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR

OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
BREYER, J., dissenting

the state court had ordered a previously invited marcher (or
worse  still,  all  previously  invited  marchers)  to  display
GLIB’s banner, the Veterans Council would have prevailed
all the same.  By compelling speech from an existing affili-
ate (or all of them), that order would have required, even
more brazenly, that the Veterans Council “alter the expres-
sive  content  of  their  parade”  in  violation  of  the  Veterans
Council’s First Amendment rights.  515 U. S., at 572–573.
So  too  if  the  state  court  had  decreed  that  GLIB’s  banner
must  adorn  a  horse,  oxen,  or  for  that  matter  R2–D2,  a
robot—even  though  those  entities  lack  their  own  First
Amendment rights.  Whether the transmitter of a speaker’s
protected  message  does  (or  does  not)  have  its  own  First
Amendment  rights  is  beside  the  point.    Cf.  Wooley,  430
U. S.,  at  717  (prohibiting  New  Hampshire  from  requiring
that the state motto adorn a driver’s car, even though cars
do not have First Amendment rights).

There is a reason why, until today, we had not confronted
a case like the one just described.  Cf. ante, at 6.  Requiring
someone to host another person’s speech is often a perfectly
legitimate thing for the Government to do.  See, e.g., FAIR,
547 U. S., at 65 (holding that the Government may require
law schools to host speech from military recruiters); Prune-
Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 87–88 (1980)
(holding that the Government may require the owner of a
private  shopping  mall  to  host  speech  from  politically
minded  pamphleteers).  Even  the  court  order  at  issue  in
Hurley  was  an  understandable  (though  unconstitutional)
application of a “venerable” civil rights law.  See 515 U. S.,
at 571.  But because compelling people to profess a belief
they  do  not  hold  is  almost  always  unconstitutional,  see
AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 213, the Government rarely dares try.
The Government’s well-founded reticence in the past is no
reason to bless its boldness at present.

Bottom line: The critical question here, as in Hurley, is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding compelled speech and the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

BREYER, J., dissenting

not.

We  have  previously  found,  as  the  majority  points  out,
that “a neutral benefit program in which public funds flow
to religious organizations through the independent choices
of private benefit recipients does not offend the Establish-
ment Clause.”  Ante, at 10 (citing Zelman, 536 U. S., at 652–
653).  We have thus concluded that a State may, consistent
with the Establishment Clause, provide funding to religious
schools  through  a  general  public  funding  program  if  the
“government aid . . . reach[es] religious institutions only by
way of the deliberate choices of . . . individual [aid] recipi-
ents.”  Id., at 652.

But  the  key  word  is  “may.”    We  have  never  previously
held what the Court holds today, namely, that a State must
(not may) use state funds to pay for religious education as
part of a tuition program designed to ensure the provision
of free statewide public school education.

What  happens  once  “may”  becomes  “must”?    Does  that
transformation  mean  that  a  school  district  that  pays  for
public  schools  must  pay  equivalent  funds  to  parents  who
wish  to  send  their  children  to  religious  schools?    Does  it
mean  that  school  districts  that  give  vouchers  for  use  at
charter schools must pay equivalent funds to parents who
wish  to  give  their  children  a  religious  education?  What
other social benefits are there the State’s provision of which
means—under the majority’s interpretation of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause—that the State must pay parents for the re-
ligious equivalent of the secular benefit provided?  The con-
cept of “play in the joints” means that courts need not, and
should  not,  answer  with  “must”  these  questions  that  can
more appropriately be answered with “may.”

The majority also asserts that “[t]he ‘unremarkable’ prin-
ciples applied in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza suffice to
resolve  this  case.”  Ante,  at  9.  Not  so.  The  state-funded
program at issue in Trinity Lutheran provided payment for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38

CRUZ v. ARIZONA

Barrett, J., dissenting

And  we  have  cautioned  before  that  “[f]ederal  habeas  courts
must  not  lightly  `disregard  state  procedural  rules  that  are
substantially  similar  to  those  to  which  we  give  full  force  in
our  own courts.' ”  Johnson  v.  Lee, 578  U. S.  605, 609  (2016)
(per curiam) (quoting Kindler, 558 U. S., at 62).

The  Court  makes  a  case  for  why  the  Arizona  Supreme
Court's  interpretation  of  its  own  precedent  is  wrong.  If  I
were  on  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court,  I  might  agree.  But
that call is not within our bailiwick.  Our job is to determine
whether the Arizona Supreme Court's decision is defensible,
and we owe the utmost deference to the state court in mak-
ing that judgment.  Cases of inadequacy are extremely rare,
and this is not one.  I respectfully dissent.

Page Proof Pending Publication
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Barrett in the case of Cruz v. Arizona. It discusses the Court's deference to state court interpretations of precedent and argues that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision is defensible.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

KAGAN, J., dissenting

relief  when  an  emergency  has  inflicted  greater  harm?
I
can’t  believe  the  majority  really  thinks  Congress  would
have  answered  “no.”  In  any  event,  the  statute  Congress
passed does not say “no.”  Delegations like the HEROES Act
are  designed  to  enable  agencies  to  “adapt  their  rules  and
policies to the demands of changing circumstances.”  FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 157
(2000).  Congress  allows,  and  indeed  expects,  agencies  to
take  more  serious  measures  in  response  to  more  serious
problems.

Similarly unavailing is the majority’s reliance on the con-
troversy surrounding the program.  Student-loan cancella-
tion, the majority says, “raises questions that are personal
and  emotionally  charged,”  precipitating  “profound  debate
across  the  country.”    Ante,  at  22.  I  have  no  quarrel  with
that description.  Student-loan forgiveness, and responses
to COVID generally, have joined the list of issues on which
this Nation is divided.  But that provides yet more reason
for the Court to adhere to its properly limited role.  There
are two paths here.  One is to respect the political branches’
judgments.  On that path, the Court recognizes the breadth
of  Congress’s  delegation  to  the  Secretary,  and  declines  to
interfere  with  his  use  of  that  granted  authority.    Maybe
Congress was wrong to give the Secretary so much discre-
tion;  or  maybe  he,  and  the  President  he  serves,  did  not
make good use of it.  But if so, there are political remedies—
accountability  for  all  the  actors,  up  to  the  President,  who
the public thinks have made mistakes.  So a political con-
troversy is resolved by political means, as our Constitution
requires.  That is one path.  Now here is the other, the one
the  Court  takes.  Wielding  its  judicially  manufactured
heightened-specificity  requirement,  the  Court  refuses  to
acknowledge  the  plain  words  of  the  HEROES  Act.    It  de-
clines  to  respect  Congress’s  decision  to  give  broad  emer-
gency powers to the Secretary.  It strikes down his lawful
use of that authority to provide student-loan assistance.  It
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Biden v. Nebraska. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the HEROES Act and its application to student loan forgiveness.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of the Court

contrast, the United States is not forcing plaintiffs to affili-
ate with foreign organizations.  Plaintiffs are free to choose
whether to affiliate with foreign organizations and are free
to disclaim agreement with the foreign affiliates’ required
statement of policy.  Any alleged misattribution in this case
and any effect on the American organizations’ message of
neutrality toward prostitution stems from their choice to af-
filiate  with  foreign  organizations,  not  from  U. S.  Govern-
ment  compulsion.
Because  the  First  Amendment
misattribution cases are premised on government compul-
sion to associate with another entity, those cases do not ap-
ply here.

In  support  of  their  misattribution  argument,  plaintiffs
also cite Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash.,
461  U. S.  540,  544–545,  and  n. 6  (1983).    But  as  relevant
here, that case simply explained that a speech restriction
on  a  corporate  entity  did  not  prevent  a  separate  affiliate
from speaking, a point that is not disputed in this case.

We  appreciate  that  plaintiffs  would  prefer  to  affiliate
with foreign organizations that do not oppose prostitution.
But Congress required foreign organizations to oppose pros-
titution in return for American funding.  And plaintiffs can-
not export their own First Amendment rights to shield for-
eign organizations from Congress’s funding conditions.

Stressing that their position is limited, plaintiffs empha-
size that the Court could narrowly decide to protect the free
speech  rights  of  only  those  foreign  organizations  that  are
closely identified  with  American organizations—for exam-
ple, those foreign affiliates that share similar names, logos,
and  brands  with  American  organizations.    According  to
plaintiffs,  those  “closely  identified”  scenarios  greatly  in-
crease  the  risk  of  misattribution.  But  again,  the  First
Amendment  cases  involving  speech  misattribution  arose
when the State forced one speaker to host another speaker’s
speech.  No compulsion is present here.  Moreover, plain-
tiffs’  proposed  line-drawing  among  foreign  organizations
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the section discussing the plaintiffs' misattribution argument. It delves into legal precedents and the application of the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Syllabus

does  not  decide  whether  Bradford  can  pursue  nominal  damages  and
leaves for the District Court to determine whether Bradford has estab-
lished a past, completed injury.  Pp. 11–12.

781 Fed. Appx. 824, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BREYER, ALITO,
SOTOMAYOR,  KAGAN,  GORSUCH,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined.
KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissent-
ing opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are typically summaries of the court's decision and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

limits  entail  only  a  “marginal”  speech  restriction  because
“[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support
for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate
the  underlying  basis  for  the  support.”    424  U. S.,  at  20,
21.  But this Court has never required a speaker to explain
the  reasons  for  his  position  in  order  to  obtain  full  First
Amendment  protection.
Instead,  we  have  consistently
held  that  speech  is  protected  even  “when  the  underlying
basis for a position is not given.”  Shrink Missouri, supra,
at  415,  n. 3  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting);  see,  e.g.,  City  of
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 46 (1994) (sign reading “For
Peace in the Gulf ”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 415–
416 (1989) (flag burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent  Community  School  Dist.,  393  U. S.  503,  510–511
(1969)  (black  armband  signifying  opposition  to  Vietnam
War);  see  also  Colorado  I,  supra,  at  640  (opinion  of
THOMAS, J.) (“Even a pure message of support, unadorned
with reasons, is valuable to the democratic process”)

Equally  unpersuasive  is  Buckley’s  suggestion  that  con-
tribution  limits  warrant  less  stringent  review  because
“[t]he  quantity  of  communication  by  the  contributor  does
not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution,”
and “[a]t most, the size of the contribution provides a very
rough  index  of  the  intensity  of  the  contributor’s  support
for the candidate.”  424 U. S., at 21.  Contributions do in-
crease  the  quantity  of  communication  by  “amplifying  the
voice  of  the  candidate”  and  “help[ing]  to  ensure  the  dis-
semination of the messages that the contributor wishes to
convey.”  Shrink  Missouri,  supra,  at  415  (THOMAS,  J.,
dissenting).  They  also  serve  as  a  quantifiable  metric  of
the  intensity  of  a  particular  contributor’s  support,  as
demonstrated  by  the  frequent  practice  of  giving  different
amounts to different candidates.  Buckley simply failed to
recognize  that  “we  have  accorded  full  First  Amendment
protection  to  expressions  of  intensity.”    Id.,  at  415,  n.  3;
see  also  Cohen  v.  California,  403  U. S.  15,  25–26  (1971)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it part of the core content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 20–543 and 20–544
_________________

20–543

JANET L. YELLEN, SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY, PETITIONER
v.
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS
RESERVATION, ET AL.

20–544

ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGE CORPORATION
ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS
RESERVATION, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[June 25, 2021]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*
In March 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Re-
lief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, 134 Stat. 281.  Ti-
tle  V  of  the  Act  allocates  $8  billion  of  monetary  relief  to
134  Stat.  502,  42  U. S. C.
“Tribal  governments.”
§801(a)(2)(B).  Under  the  CARES  Act,  a  “Tribal  govern-
ment” is the “recognized governing body of an Indian tribe”
as defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act (ISDA).  §§801(g)(5), (1).  ISDA, in turn, de-
fines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation,

——————

*JUSTICE ALITO joins Parts I, II–C, II–D, III, and IV of this opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the beginning of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>