<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–1164
_________________

LARRY STEVEN WILKINS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[March 28, 2023]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Larry Steven Wilkins and Jane Stanton wanted quiet ti-
tles and a quiet road.  Wilkins and Stanton, the petitioners
here, both live alongside Robbins Gulch Road in rural Mon-
tana.  The  United  States  has  permission,  called  an  ease-
ment, for use of the road, which the Government interprets
to include making the road available for public use.  Peti-
tioners allege that the road’s public use has intruded upon
their  private  lives,  with  strangers  trespassing,  stealing,
and even shooting Wilkins’ cat.

Petitioners sued over the scope of the easement under the
Quiet  Title  Act,  which  allows  challenges  to  the  United
States’ rights in real property.  Invoking the Act’s 12-year
time  limit,  28  U. S. C.  §2409a(g),  the  Government  main-
tains  that  the  suit  is  jurisdictionally  barred.    Petitioners
counter, and the Court holds, that §2409a(g) is a nonjuris-
dictional claims-processing rule.

Robbins Gulch Road runs through about a mile of private
property.  Petitioners  acquired  their  properties  along  the

I
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes the case citation, the title of the opinion, the date, and the introductory paragraph of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

SCALIA, J., dissenting

it

See,  e.g.,  Northern  Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  State  Corporation
Comm’n of Kan., 372 U. S. 84, 89 (1963) (state regulation
of  pipelines’  gas  purchases  preempted  because  it  “in-
vade[s]  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  which  the  Natural  Gas
Act has conferred upon the [Commission]”); Exxon Corp. v.
Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 185 (1983) (state law prohibiting
producers  from  passing  on  production  taxes  preempted
because
“trespasse[s]  upon  FERC’s  authority”);
Schneidewind  v.  ANR  Pipeline  Co.,  485  U. S.  293,  309
(1988) (state securities regulation directly affecting whole-
sale  rates  and  gas  transportation  facilities  preempted
because  it  regulates  “matters  that  Congress  intended
FERC  to  regulate”).    The  test  for  preemption  in  this  set-
ting, the Court has confirmed, “ ‘is whether the matter on
which  the  State  asserts  the  right  to  act  is  in  any  way
regulated by the Federal Act.’ ”  Id., at 310, n. 13.
  Straightforward  application  of  these  precedents  would
make  short  work  of  the  case  at  hand.  The  Natural  Gas
Act empowers the Commission to regulate “practice[s] . . .
affecting  [wholesale]  rate[s].”  §717d.  Nothing  in  the  Act
suggests  that  the  States  share  power  to  regulate  these
practices.  The  Commission  has  reasonably  determined
that this power allows it to regulate the behavior involved
in this case, pipelines’ use of sham trades and false reports
to  manipulate  gas  price  indices.    Because  the  Commis-
sion’s  exclusive  authority  extends  to  the  conduct  chal-
lenged  here,  state  antitrust  regulation  of  that  conduct  is
preempted.

II
The  Court  agrees  that  the  Commission  may  regulate
index manipulation, but upholds state antitrust regulation
of this practice anyway on account of “other considerations
that  weigh  against  a  finding  of  pre-emption  in  this  con-
text.”  Ante,  at  16.  That  is  an  unprecedented  decision.
The  Court  does  not  identify  a  single  case—not  one—in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia. It cites legal precedents and argues against the majority opinion's stance on preemption.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012)

21

Opinion of the Court

held that the Copyright Clause does not demand that each
copyright provision, examined discretely, operate to induce
new  works.    Rather,  we  explained,  the  Clause  “empowers
Congress  to  determine  the  intellectual  property  regimes
that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends
of  the  Clause.”  Id.,  at  222.  And  those  permissible  ends,
we held, extended beyond the creation of new works.  See
id., at 205–206 (rejecting the notion that “ ‘the only way to
promote  the  progress  of  science  [is]  to  provide  incentives
to create new works’ ” (quoting Perlmutter, Participation in
the  International  Copyright  System  as  a  Means  to  Pro-
mote  the  Progress  of  Science  and  Useful  Arts,  36  Loyola
(LA) L. Rev. 323, 332 (2002))).26

Even  were  we  writing  on  a  clean  slate,  petitioners’
argument would be unavailing.  Nothing in the text of the
Copyright Clause confines the “Progress of Science” exclu-
sively to “incentives for creation.”  Id., at 324, n. 5 (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Evidence  from  the  found-
ing,  moreover,  suggests  that  inducing  dissemination—as
opposed to creation—was viewed as an appropriate means
to  promote  science.  See  Nachbar,  Constructing  Copy-
right’s  Mythology,  6  Green  Bag  2d  37,  44  (2002)  (“The
scope  of  copyright  protection  existing  at  the  time  of  the
framing,”  trained  as  it  was  on  “publication,  not  creation,”
“is  inconsistent  with  claims  that  copyright  must  promote
creative  activity  in  order  to  be  valid.”  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted)).  Until  1976,  in  fact,  Congress  made
“federal  copyright  contingent  on  publication[,]  [thereby]

——————

26 The  dissent  also  suggests,  more  tentatively,  that  at  least  where
copyright  legislation  extends  protection  to  works  previously  in  the
public domain, Congress must counterbalance that restriction with new
incentives to create.  Post, at 8.  Even assuming the public domain were
a  category  of  constitutional  significance,  contra  supra,  at  13–19,  we
would not understand “the Progress of Science” to have this contingent
meaning.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses copyright law and the interpretation of the Copyright Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

13

Opinion of the Court

ways  of  obtaining  information  unlawfully.  First,  an  indi-
vidual violates the provision when he “accesses a computer
without authorization.”  §1030(a)(2).  Second, an individual
violates the provision when he “exceeds authorized access”
by accessing a computer “with authorization” and then ob-
taining  information  he  is  “not  entitled  so  to  obtain.”
§§1030(a)(2), (e)(6).  Van Buren’s reading places the provi-
sion’s  parts  “into  an  harmonious  whole.”    Roberts  v.  Sea-
Land Services, Inc., 566 U. S. 93, 100 (2012) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  The Government’s does not.

Start  with  Van  Buren’s  view.    The  “without  authoriza-
tion” clause, Van Buren contends, protects computers them-
selves  by  targeting  so-called  outside  hackers—those  who
“acces[s] a computer without any permission at all.”  LVRC
Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F. 3d 1127, 1133 (CA9 2009);
see also Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union of North
Am., 648 F. 3d 295, 304 (CA6 2011).  Van Buren reads the
“exceeds  authorized  access”  clause  to  provide  complemen-
tary protection for certain information within computers.  It
does  so,  Van  Buren  asserts,  by  targeting  so-called  inside
hackers—those who access a computer with permission, but
then  “ ‘exceed’  the  parameters  of  authorized  access  by  en-
tering an area of the computer to which [that] authorization
does not extend.”  United States v. Valle, 807 F. 3d 508, 524
(CA2 2015).

Van Buren’s account of subsection (a)(2) makes sense of
the  statutory  structure  because  it  treats  the  “without  au-
thorization”  and  “exceeds  authorized  access”  clauses  con-
sistently.  Under Van Buren’s reading, liability under both
clauses stems from a gates-up-or-down inquiry—one either
can or cannot access a computer system, and one either can
or  cannot  access  certain  areas  within  the  system.8    And
——————

8 For present purposes, we need not address whether this inquiry turns
only on technological (or “code-based”) limitations on access, or instead
also looks to limits contained in contracts or policies.  Cf. Brief for Orin
Kerr as Amicus Curiae 7 (urging adoption of code-based approach).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a section of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MELLOULI v. LYNCH

Opinion of the Court

portation “on convictions, not conduct,” the approach looks
to the statutory definition of the offense of conviction, not
to the particulars of an alien’s behavior.  Das, The Immi-
gration  Penalties  of  Criminal  Convictions:  Resurrecting
Categorical  Analysis  in  Immigration  Law,  86  N.  Y.  U.  L.
Rev.  1669,  1701,  1746  (2011).    The  state  conviction  trig-
gers  removal  only  if,  by  definition,  the  underlying  crime
falls  within  a  category  of  removable  offenses  defined  by
federal law.  Ibid.  An alien’s actual conduct is irrelevant
to the inquiry, as the adjudicator must “presume that the
conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of the
acts  criminalized”  under  the  state  statute.  Moncrieffe  v.
Holder,  569  U.  S.  ___,  ___  (2013)  (slip  op.,  at  5)  (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted).4

The  categorical  approach  “has  a  long  pedigree  in  our
Nation’s immigration law.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6).  As
early  as  1913,  courts  examining  the  federal  immigration
——————

major  fraud  or  deceit  statute  with  any  relevant  monetary  threshold,”
id.,  at  40.    As  categorically  interpreted,  (M)(ii),  the  tax  evasion  provi-
sion,  would  have  no  application,  and  (M)(i),  the  fraud  or  deceit  provi-
sion,  would  apply  only  in  an  extraordinarily  limited  and  haphazard
manner.    Ibid.   We  therefore  concluded  that  Congress  intended  the
monetary  thresholds  in  subparagraphs  (M)(i)  and  (M)(ii)  to  apply  “to
the  specific  circumstances  surrounding  an  offender’s  commission  of
In  the  main,
[the  defined]  crime  on  a  specific  occasion.”
§1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the provision at issue here, has no such circumstance-
specific thrust; its language refers to crimes generically defined.

Ibid.

4 A  version  of  this  approach,  known  as  the  “modified  categorical  ap-
proach,” applies to “state statutes that contain several different crimes,
each  described  separately.”    Moncrieffe  v.  Holder,  569  U.  S.  ___,  ___
(2013)  (slip  op.,  at  5).    In  such  cases,  “a  court  may  determine  which
particular  offense  the  noncitizen  was  convicted  of  by  examining  the
charging document and jury instructions, or in the case of a guilty plea,
the plea agreement, plea colloquy, or some comparable judicial record of
the  factual  basis  for  the  plea.”    Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks  omit-
ted).  Off  limits  to  the  adjudicator,  however,  is  any  inquiry  into  the
particular  facts  of  the  case.    Because  the  Government  has  not  argued
that  this  case  falls  within  the  compass  of  the  modified-categorical
approach, we need not reach the issue.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the "categorical approach" in immigration law. It delves into case law and legal precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

JACKSON, J., dissenting

or any other reprehensible and outlawed criminal act will
turn on whether he committed that act in his official capac-
ity, such that the answer to the immunity question will al-
ways and inevitably be: It depends.

Under  the  individual  accountability  paradigm,  the  ac-
countability analysis is markedly less convoluted, and leads
to a more certain outcome.  None of the same complications
or consequences arise, because, as I have explained, there
are no exemptions from the criminal law for any person, but
every defendant can assert whatever legal arguments and
defenses might be applicable under governing law.   Since
no one is above the law, everyone can focus on what the law
demands and permits, and on what the defendant did or did
not do; no one has to worry about characterizing any crimi-
nal  conduct  as  official  or  unofficial  in  order  to  assess  the
applicability of an immunity at the outset.

The majority’s new Presidential accountability model is
also distinct insofar as it accepts as a basic starting premise
that generally applicable criminal laws do not apply to eve-
ryone in our society.  In the majority’s view, while all other
citizens  of  the  United  States  must  do  their  jobs  and  live
their lives within the confines of criminal prohibitions, the
President cannot be made to do so; he must sometimes be
exempt from the law’s dictates depending on the character
of his conduct.  Indeed, the majority holds that the Presi-
dent,  unlike  anyone  else  in  our  country,  is  comparatively
free to engage in criminal acts in furtherance of his official
duties.

That  point  bears  emphasizing.    Immunity  can  issue  for
Presidents under the majority’s model even for unquestion-
ably  and  intentionally  egregious  criminal  behavior.  Re-
gardless of the nature or the impact of the President’s crim-
inal conduct, so long as he is committing crimes “pursuant
to the powers invested exclusively in him by the Constitu-
tion,” ante, at 7, or as needed “to carry out his constitutional
duties without undue caution,” ante, at 14, he is likely to be
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It presents legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2018)

7

Opinion of the Court

United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 40 F. Supp. 3d 744
(ED La. 2014).  The court determined that Unit 1 satisfied
the  statutory  definition  of  unoccupied  critical  habitat,
which requires only that the Service deem the land “essen-
tial for the conservation [of] the species.”  Id., at 760.

Weyerhaeuser also challenged the Service’s decision not
to  exclude  Unit  1  from  the  dusky  gopher  frog’s  critical
habitat, arguing that the Service had failed to adequately
weigh  the  benefits  of  designating  Unit  1  against  the  eco-
nomic impact.  In addition, Weyerhaeuser argued that the
Service  had  used  an  unreasonable  methodology  for  esti-
mating  economic  impact  and,  regardless  of  methodology,
had  failed  to  consider  several  categories  of  costs.    Id.,
at  759.  The  court  approved  the  Service’s  methodology
and  declined  to  consider  Weyerhaeuser’s  challenge  to
the decision not to exclude.  See id., at 763–767, and n. 29.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed.  827 F. 3d 452.  The Court of
Appeals  rejected  the  suggestion  that  the  definition  of
critical  habitat  contains  any  “habitability  requirement.”
Id.,  at  468.  The  court  also  concluded  that  the  Service’s
decision  not  to  exclude  Unit  1  was  committed  to  agency
discretion by law and was therefore unreviewable.  Id., at
473–475.  Judge  Owen  dissented.  She  wrote  that  Unit  1
could not be “essential for the conservation of the species”
because  it  lacked  the  open-canopy  forest  that  the  Service
itself  had  determined  was  “essential  to  the  conservation”
of the frog.  Id., at 480–481.

The  Fifth  Circuit  denied  rehearing  en  banc.    Markle
Interests,  LLC  v.  United  States  Fish  and  Wildlife  Serv.,
848  F.  3d  635  (2017).  Judge  Jones  dissented,  joined  by
Judges  Jolly,  Smith,  Clement,  Owen,  and  Elrod.    They
reasoned  that  critical  habitat  must  first  be  habitat,  and
Unit  1  in  its  present  state  could  not  be  habitat  for  the
dusky gopher frog.  Id., at 641.  The dissenting judges also
concluded that the Service’s decision not to exclude Unit 1
was  reviewable  for  abuse  of  discretion.  Id.,  at  654,  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. It cites court cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U48

[09-26-01 10:25:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

456

EDWARDS v. CARPENTER

Breyer, J., concurring in judgment

If I could stop here, the rules would be complicated, but
still comprehensible. The federal habeas judge would look
to state law and state practice to determine the facts and
circumstances surrounding a state procedural rule that the
State claims is an “adequate and independent state ground.”
However, the federal judge would determine the adequacy
of that “state ground” as a matter of federal law.

Unfortunately, the rules have become even more com-
In Carrier, the Court considered a prisoner’s conten-
plex.
tion that he had “cause” for failing to follow a state proce-
dural rule—a rule that would have barred his federal claim.
The “cause,” in the prisoner’s view, was that his lawyer (who
had failed to follow the state procedural rule) had performed
inadequately. This Court determined, as a matter of federal
law, that only a performance so inadequate that it violated
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assist-
ance of counsel could amount to “cause” sufﬁcient to over-
come a “procedural default.”
Id., at 488–489. That being
so, the Court reasoned, the prisoner should have to exhaust
the ineffectiveness claim in state court. The Court wrote:

“[I]f a petitioner could raise his ineffective assistance
claim for the ﬁrst time on federal habeas in order to
show cause for a procedural default, the federal habeas
court would ﬁnd itself in the anomalous position of adju-
dicating an unexhausted constitutional claim for which
Id., at 489.
state court review might still be available.”

And today the Court holds not only that the prisoner must
exhaust this claim by presenting it to the state courts, but
also that his failure to do so properly, i. e., a failure to comply
with the State’s rules for doing so, bars that prisoner from
ever asserting that claim as a “cause” for not having com-
plied with state procedural rules.

The opinion in Carrier raises a special kind of “exhaus-
tion” problem. The Court considered a type of “cause” (“in-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Breyer. It discusses the complexities of federal habeas corpus and the "adequate and independent state ground" doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
36

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Post-Civil War Legislative History

The  Court  suggests  that  by  the  post-Civil  War  period,
the  Second  Amendment  was  understood  to  secure  a  right
to  firearm  use  and  ownership  for purely  private  purposes
like personal self-defense.  While it is true that some of the
legislative history on which the Court relies supports that
contention, see ante, at 41–44, such sources are entitled to
limited,  if  any,  weight.    All  of  the  statements  the  Court
cites were made long after the framing of the Amendment
and  cannot  possibly  supply  any  insight  into  the  intent  of
the  Framers;  and  all  were  made  during  pitched  political
debates, so that they are better characterized as advocacy
than good-faith attempts at constitutional interpretation.

What  is  more,  much  of  the  evidence  the  Court  offers  is
decidedly less clear than its discussion allows.  The Court
notes  that  “[b]lacks  were  routinely  disarmed  by  Southern
States  after  the  Civil  War.  Those  who  opposed  these
injustices  frequently  stated  that  they  infringed  blacks’
constitutional  right  to  keep  and  bear  arms.”    Ante,  at  42.
The  Court  hastily  concludes  that  “[n]eedless  to  say,  the
claim  was  not  that  blacks  were  being  prohibited  from
carrying  arms  in  an  organized  state  militia,”  ibid.  But
some  of  the  claims  of  the  sort  the  Court  cites  may  have
been just that.  In some Southern States, Reconstruction-
era  Republican  governments  created  state  militias  in
which  both  blacks  and  whites  were  permitted  to  serve.
Because  “[t]he  decision  to  allow  blacks  to  serve  alongside
whites  meant  that  most  southerners  refused  to  join  the
new militia,” the bodies were dubbed “Negro militia[s].”  S.
Cornell,  A  Well-Regulated  Militia  176–177  (2006).    The
“arming  of  the  Negro  militias  met  with  especially  fierce
resistance  in  South  Carolina. . . .  The  sight  of  organized,
armed  freedmen  incensed  opponents  of  Reconstruction
and led to an intensified campaign of Klan terror.  Leading
members of the Negro militia were beaten or lynched and
their weapons stolen.”  Id., at 177.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a portion of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It delves into the historical context of the Second Amendment, specifically focusing on post-Civil War legislation.  The text is sequential and provides legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
36  ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.

v. GOLDSMITH
KAGAN, J., dissenting

and it did.  In failing to give Warhol credit for that trans-
formation, the majority distorts ultimate resolution of the
fair-use question.

Still more troubling are the consequences of today’s rul-
ing for other artists.  If Warhol does not get credit for trans-
formative copying, who will?  And when artists less famous
than  Warhol  cannot  benefit  from  fair  use,  it  will  matter
even more.  Goldsmith would probably have granted War-
hol a license with few conditions, and for a price well within
his  budget.  But  as  our  precedents  show,  licensors  some-
times place stringent limits on follow-on uses, especially to
prevent kinds of expression they disapprove.  And licensors
may  charge  fees  that  prevent  many  or  most  artists  from
gaining access to original works.  Of course, that is all well
and good if an artist wants merely to copy the original and
market it as his own.  Preventing those uses—and thus in-
centivizing  the  creation  of  original  works—is  what  copy-
rights are for.  But when the artist wants to make a trans-
formative use, a different issue is presented.  By now, the
reason  why  should  be  obvious.  “Inhibit[ing]  subsequent
writers” and artists from “improv[ing] upon prior works”—
as  the  majority  does  today—will  “frustrate  the  very  ends
sought to be attained” by copyright law.  Harper & Row, 471
U. S., at 549.  It will stifle creativity of every sort.  It will
impede new art and music and literature.  It will thwart the
expression  of  new  ideas  and  the  attainment  of  new
knowledge.  It will make our world poorer.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case, specifically regarding Andy Warhol's use of copyrighted material. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding fair use and transformative copying.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

832

Bacon v. Laswell
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878

Badura v. Spahn  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
883

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baez v. Pennsylvania
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  811,946

Bagley v. South Carolina
1145

Bailey v. Wakeﬁeld  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

Baines v. Folino  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baker v. Georgia
951

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Baker v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  869,903,965,1130

1147

Bakery Machinery & Fabrications, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc.
924

Balderas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

Baldwin v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

Balentine v. Texas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

Balentine v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  974,1102

Balko v. McNeil
1000

Ball v. Houston  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Ballard; Clutter v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Ballard; Mower v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1150

Ballard; Pendleton v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Ballard v. Simien  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Ballenger v. Mauney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931

Balleza-Cortez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

Balogh v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034

Banales v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Banda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1129

Bank of America Corp.; Smith v.
933

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1021

Bank of America, N. A.; Spurlock v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969

Bank of N. Y.; Roberts v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Banks v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
883

Banks v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  901,1063

831

Bannister v. Illinois
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Bannister v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034

Banuelos v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963

Barajas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barbee v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Barber v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  863,952

832

Barber; Peoples v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Barber v. Thomas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

Barber v. Walker
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barbosa-Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1018

Barbour v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  917,1140

1005

Barian v. United States
1080

Barker v. Texas
1027

Barkus v. Runnels

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the book.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

AMERICAN LEGION v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of ALITO, J.

Proclamation),  and  it  reenacted  the  Northwest  Territory
Ordinance,  which  provided  that  “[r]eligion,  morality,  and
knowledge,  being  necessary  to  good  government  and  the
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education
shall forever be encouraged,” 1 Stat. 52, n. (a).  President
Washington  echoed  this  sentiment  in  his  Farewell  Ad-
dress,  calling  religion  and  morality  “indispensable  sup-
ports”  to  “political  prosperity.”    Farewell  Address  (1796),
in 35 The Writings of George Washington 229 (J. Fitzpat-
rick  ed.  1940).    See  also  P.  Hamburger,  Separation  of
Church and State 66 (2002).  The First Congress looked to
these “supports” when it chose to begin its sessions with a
prayer.  This practice was designed to solemnize congres-
sional  meetings,  unifying  those  in  attendance  as  they
pursued a common goal of good governance.
  To achieve that purpose, legislative prayer needed to be
inclusive  rather  than  divisive,  and  that  required  a  deter-
mined  effort  even  in  a  society  that  was  much  more  reli-
giously  homogeneous  than  ours  today.    Although  the
United  States  at  the  time  was  overwhelmingly  Christian
and  Protestant,28  there  was  considerable  friction  between
Protestant  denominations.    See  M.  Noll,  America’s  God:
From  Jonathan  Edwards  to  Abraham  Lincoln  228  (2002).
Thus,  when  an  Episcopal  clergyman  was  nominated  as
chaplain,  some  Congregationalist  Members  of  Congress
objected  due  to  the  “ ‘diversity  of  religious  sentiments
represented  in  Congress.’ ”    D.  Davis,  Religion  and  the
Continental  Congress  74  (2000).    Nevertheless,  Samuel
Adams, a staunch Congregationalist, spoke in favor of the
motion:  “ ‘I  am  no  bigot.    I  can  hear  a  prayer  from  a  man
of  piety  and  virtue,  who  is  at  the  same  time  a  friend  of
his  country.’ ”    Ibid.    Others  agreed  and  the  chaplain  was
appointed.
  Over  time,  the  members  of  the  clergy  invited  to  offer

——————

28 W. Hutchison, Religious Pluralism in America 20–21 (2003).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the history and context of legislative prayer in the United States.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

21

Opinion of the Court

based  on  a  user’s  expressed  interests  and  past  activities.
But  it  may  also  be  based  on  more  general  features  of  the
communication  or  its  creator.  Facebook’s  Community
Standards and YouTube’s Community Guidelines detail the
messages and videos that the platforms disfavor.  The plat-
forms write algorithms to implement those standards—for
example, to prefer content deemed particularly trustworthy
or to suppress content viewed as deceptive (like videos pro-
moting “conspiracy theor[ies]”).  Id., at 113a.

Beyond  rankings  lie  labels.    The  platforms  may  attach
“warning[s], disclaimers, or general commentary”—for ex-
ample, informing users that certain content has “not been
verified by official sources.”  Id., at 75a.  Likewise, they may
use “information panels” to give users “context on content
relating to topics and news prone to misinformation, as well
as context about who submitted the content.”  Id., at 114a.
So,  for  example,  YouTube  identifies  content  submitted  by
state-supported media channels, including those funded by
the Russian Government.  See id., at 76a.

for

exceptions

But sometimes, the platforms decide, providing more in-
formation  is  not  enough;  instead,  removing  a  post  is  the
right  course.    The  platforms’  content-moderation  policies
also say when that is so.  Facebook’s Standards, for exam-
ple,  proscribe  posts—with
“news-
worth[iness]” and other “public interest value”—in catego-
ries  and  subcategories  including:  Violence  and  Criminal
Behavior (e.g., violence and incitement, coordinating harm
and publicizing crime, fraud and deception); Safety (e.g., su-
icide and self-injury, sexual exploitation, bullying and har-
assment); Objectionable Content (e.g., hate speech, violent
and graphic content); Integrity and Authenticity (e.g., false
news, manipulated media).  Id., at 412a–415a, 441a–442a.
YouTube’s Guidelines similarly target videos falling within
categories  like:  hate  speech,  violent  or  graphic  content,
child safety, and misinformation (including about elections
and vaccines).  See id., at 430a–432a.  The platforms thus
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses how social media platforms like Facebook and YouTube moderate content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

Opinion of the Court

which the Court of Appeals believed would “create a celeb-
rity-plagiarist  privilege.”  Id.,  at  43;  see  also  ibid.  (“[T]he
fact that Martin Scorsese’s recent film The Irishman is rec-
ognizably ‘a Scorsese’ does not absolve him of the obligation
to license the original book” (some internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted)).

On  the  other  three  factors,  the  Court  of  Appeals  found
that  the  creative  and  unpublished  nature  of  Goldsmith’s
photograph favored her, id., at 45; that the amount and sub-
stantiality of the portion taken (here, “the ‘essence’ ” of the
photograph) was not reasonable in relation to the purpose
of the use, id., at 45–47; and that AWF’s commercial licens-
ing encroached on Goldsmith’s protected market to license
her photograph “to publications for editorial purposes and
to other artists to create derivative works,” id., at 48–51.3
The  court  noted  that  there  was  “no  material  dispute  that
both  Goldsmith  and  AWF  have  sought  to  license  (and  in-
deed have successfully licensed) their respective depictions
of Prince to popular print magazines to accompany articles
about him.”  Id., at 49 (footnote omitted).

Finally, although the District Court had not reached the
issue, the Court of Appeals rejected AWF’s argument that
the  Prince  Series  works  were  not  substantially  similar  to
Goldsmith’s photograph.  See id., at 52–54.

Judge  Jacobs  concurred.    He  stressed  that  the  Court  of
Appeals’  holding  “d[id]  not  consider,  let  alone  decide,
whether  the  infringement  here  encumbers  the  original
Prince Series works.”  Id., at 54.  Instead, “the only use at

——————

3 The  Court  of  Appeals  considered  not  only  the  possibility  of  market
harm caused by the actions of AWF but also “whether ‘unrestricted and
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by [AWF] would result in a
substantially  adverse  impact  on  the  potential  market’ ”  for  the  photo-
graph, including the market for derivative works.  11 F. 4th 26, 49–50
(CA2 2021) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U. S. 569,
590  (1994));  see  also  Harper  &  Row,  Publishers,  Inc.  v.  Nation  Enter-
prises, 471 U. S. 539, 568 (1985).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court. It contains legal citations, analysis of legal arguments, and references to previous court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

21

Opinion of the Court

propriations  bill  decreased  the  salaries  for  federal  inter-
preters  (from  $400  to  $300)  and  changed  how  the  agency
would  distribute  any  “ ‘additional  pay’ ”  (from  “ ‘all  emolu-
ments  and  allowances  whatsoever’ ”  to  payments  at  the
agency head’s discretion).  109 U. S., at 147, 149.  And in
Fisher, Congress altered an obligation to pay judges $3,000
per year by providing that a lesser appropriation would be
“ ‘in  full  compensation’ ”  for  services  rendered  in  the  next
fiscal year.  109 U. S., at 144.9

The appropriations bills here created no such conflict as
in Mitchell and Fisher.  The riders did not reference §1342’s
payment formula at all, let alone “irreconcilabl[y]” change
it.  Mitchell, 109 U. S., at 150.  Nor did they provide that
Risk  Corridors  payments  from  profitable  plans  would  be
“ ‘in  full  compensation’ ”  of  the  Government’s  obligation  to
unprofitable plans.  Fisher, 109 U. S., at 146.  Instead, the
riders here must be taken at face value: as a “mere omission
to appropriate a sufficient sum.”  Vulte, 233 U. S., at 515.
Congress  could  have  used  the  kind  of  language  we  have
held  to  effect  a  repeal  or  suspension—indeed,  it  did  so  in
other provisions of the relevant appropriations bills.  See,
e.g., §716, 128 Stat. 2163 (“None of the funds appropriated
or otherwise made available by this or any other Act shall
be used . . . ”); §714, 129 Stat. 2275 (same); §714, 131 Stat.
168 (same).  But for the Risk Corridors program, it did not.

——————

9 The Federal Circuit has also recognized that Congress may override
a  statutory  payment  formula  through  an  appropriation  that  expressly
earmarks a lesser amount for that payment obligation in the upcoming
fiscal year.  See Highland Falls-Fort Montgomery Central School Dist. v.
United States, 48 F. 3d 1166, 1169–1171 (1995); see also GAO Redbook
2–62  (discussing  Highland  Falls  and  noting  that  earmarking  a  lesser
amount can create an “irreconcilable conflict” with a statutory payment
formula).  Perhaps because these cases do not involve an earmark to sat-
isfy an incompatible payment formula, the Federal Circuit did not rely
on Highland Falls below.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing previous cases (Mitchell and Fisher) and discussing the interpretation of appropriations bills related to the Risk Corridors program.  The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. VAELLO MADERO

Syllabus

Due  Process  Clause.    The  District  Court  and  the  Court  of  Appeals
agreed.

Held: The Constitution does not require Congress to extend SSI benefits
to  residents  of  Puerto  Rico.  In  Califano  v.  Torres,  435  U. S.  1,  and
Harris v. Rosario, 446 U. S. 651, the Court applied the deferential ra-
tional-basis  test  to  uphold  Congress’s  decision  not  to  extend  certain
federal benefits to Puerto Rico, noting that because Congress chose to
treat residents of Puerto Rico differently from residents of the States
for purposes of tax laws, it could do the same for benefits programs.
Those two precedents dictate the result here.  Congress’s decision to
exempt Puerto Rico’s residents from most federal income, gift, estate,
and excise taxes supplies a rational basis for likewise distinguishing
residents  of  Puerto  Rico  from  residents  of  the  States  for  purposes  of
the  SSI  benefits  program.  Vaello  Madero’s  contrary  position  would
usher in potentially far-reaching consequences, with serious implica-
tions for the Puerto Rican people and the Puerto Rican economy.  The
Constitution does not require that extreme outcome.  Pp. 4–6.

956 F. 3d 12, reversed.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ.,
joined.  THOMAS,  J.,  and  GORSUCH,  J.,  filed  concurring  opinions.    SO-
TOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS

Syllabus

gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection,” 29 U. S. C. §157—at least argu-
ably protected the drivers’ conduct, so the State lacked  the power to
hold the Union accountable for any of the strike’s consequences.  The
Washington  Supreme  Court  agreed  with  the  Union,  reasoning  that
“the NLRA preempts Glacier’s tort claims related to the loss of its con-
crete product because that loss was incidental to a strike arguably pro-
tected by federal law.”

Held: The NLRA did not preempt Glacier’s tort claims alleging that the
Union intentionally destroyed the company’s property during a labor
dispute.  Pp. 6–12.

(a) The parties agree that the NLRA protects the right to strike but
that this right is not absolute.  The National Labor Relations Board
has long taken the position—which the parties accept—that the NLRA
does  not  shield  strikers  who  fail  to  take  “reasonable  precautions”  to
protect  their  employer’s  property  from  foreseeable,  aggravated,  and
imminent danger due to the sudden cessation of work.  Bethany Medi-
cal Center, 328 N. L. R. B. 1094.  Given this undisputed limitation on
the right to strike, the Court concludes that the Union has not met its
burden  as  the  party  asserting  preemption  to  demonstrate  that  the
NLRA arguably protects the drivers’ conduct.  Longshoremen v. Davis,
476 U. S. 380, 395.  Accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the
Union did not take reasonable precautions to protect Glacier’s property
from imminent danger resulting from the drivers’ sudden cessation of
work.  The Union knew that concrete is highly perishable, that it can
last  for  only  a  limited  time  in  a  delivery  truck’s  rotating  drum,  and
that concrete left to harden in a truck’s drum causes significant dam-
age to the truck.  The Union nevertheless coordinated with truck driv-
ers  to  initiate  the  strike  when  Glacier  was  in  the  midst  of  batching
large quantities of concrete and delivering it to customers.  The result-
ing risk of harm to Glacier’s equipment and destruction of its concrete
were both foreseeable and serious.  The Union thus failed to “take rea-
sonable precautions to protect” against this foreseeable and imminent
danger.  Bethany Medical Center, 328 N. L. R. B., at 1094.  Indeed, far
from taking reasonable precautions, the Union executed the strike in
a manner designed to achieve those results.  Because such conduct is
not arguably protected by the NLRA, the state court erred in dismiss-
ing Glacier’s tort claims as preempted. Pp. 6–8.

(b) The Union’s efforts to resist the conclusion that the NLRA does
not arguably protect its conduct are unavailing.  First, the Union em-
phasizes  that  the  NLRA’s  protection  of  the  right  to  strike  should  be
interpreted generously.  But the protected right to strike is not abso-
lute, thus the Court must analyze whether the strike exceeded the lim-
its of conduct protected by the statute.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. It outlines the legal issues at hand and the court's holding.  While it is important legal information, it is not the primary content of a book and is more of a summary or overview.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ONEOK, INC., ET AL.  v. LEARJET, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–271.  Argued January 12, 2015—Decided April 21, 2015

Respondents,  a  group  of  manufacturers,  hospitals,  and  other  institu-
tions that buy natural gas directly from interstate pipelines, sued pe-
titioner interstate pipelines, claiming that the pipelines had engaged
in  behavior  that  violated  state  antitrust  laws.    In  particular,  re-
spondents  alleged  that  petitioners  reported  false  information  to  the
natural-gas indices on which respondents’ natural-gas contracts were
based.  The indices affected not only retail natural-gas prices, but al-
so wholesale natural-gas prices.

After  removing  the  cases  to  federal  court,  the  petitioner  pipelines
sought  summary  judgment  on  the  ground  that  the  Natural  Gas  Act
pre-empted respondents’ state-law claims.  That Act gives the Feder-
al Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) the authority to determine
whether  rates  charged  by  natural-gas  companies  or  practices  affect-
ing  such  rates  are  unreasonable.    15  U. S. C.  §717d(a).    But  it  also
limits FERC’s jurisdiction to the transportation of natural gas in in-
terstate commerce, the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for
resale, and natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or
sale.  §717(b).  The Act leaves regulation of other portions of the in-
dustry—such as retail sales—to the States.  Ibid.

The  District  Court  granted  petitioners’  motion  for  summary  judg-
ment, reasoning that because petitioners’ challenged practices direct-
ly affected wholesale as well as retail prices, they were pre-empted by
the Act.  The Ninth Circuit reversed.  While acknowledging that the
pipelines’  index  manipulation  increased  wholesale  prices  as  well  as
retail  prices,  it  held  that  the  state-law  claims  were  not  pre-empted
because  they  were  aimed  at  obtaining  damages  only  for  excessively
high retail prices.

Held: Respondents’ state-law antitrust claims are not within the field of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are typically used for informational purposes and are not meant to be indexed as part of the main content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

THOMAS, J., concurring

Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873), Justice Bradley’s dissent articu-
lated  the  equal-citizenship  principle:  “Citizenship  of  the
United States ought to be, and, according to the Constitu-
tion, is, a sure and undoubted title to equal rights in any
and every State in this Union.”  Id., at 113.  “If a man be
denied full equality before the law, he is denied one of the
essential  rights  of  citizenship  as  a  citizen  of  the  United
States.”  Ibid.; see also id., at 118 (“Equality before the law
is  undoubtedly  one  of  privileges  and  immunities  of  every
citizen”).  Justice  Field’s  dissent  similarly  explained  that
the  1866  Act  rested  “upon  the  theory  that  citizens  of  the
United States as such were entitled to the rights and privi-
leges  enumerated,  and  that  to  deny  to  any  such  citizen
equality in these rights and privileges with others, was, to
the extent of the denial, subjecting him to an involuntary
servitude,” i.e., rejecting his status as a citizen.  Id., at 91–
92.

Three  years  after  the  Slaughter-House  Cases,  Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1875, prohibiting discrimi-
nation in public accommodations.  During the congressional
debates over the 1875 Act, Republicans reiterated the rela-
tionship between the status of “citizen” and entitlement to
equal civil rights.  See Williams 565–570; see also C. Green,
Equal Citizenship, Civil Rights, and the Constitution 164–
202 (2015) (collecting examples).  In a virtually unanimous
opinion, this Court held the 1875 Act unconstitutional be-
cause  discrimination  by  public  accommodations  was  not
state action Congress could regulate under the Fourteenth
Amendment.  See  Civil  Rights  Cases,  109  U. S.  3,  25–26
(1883).  The lone dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan,
focused  primarily  on  citizenship  and  echoed  Republicans’
understanding  of  equal  citizenship:  “Citizenship  in  this
country necessarily imports at least equality of civil rights
among citizens of every race in the same State.  It is funda-
mental  in  American  citizenship  that,  in  respect  of  such
rights,  there  shall  be  no  discrimination  by  the  State . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legislation, demonstrating its relevance to legal analysis and interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

13

Opinion of the Court

plained  why  this  would  be  “unfair”  and  ill  advised.    See
ibid.; see also Rodriquez, 395 U. S., at 330.  Compounding
the  trouble,  defendants  would  be  asked  to  make  these
showings  in  the  face  of  the  heightened  standards  and
related  hurdles  that  attend  many  postconviction  proceed-
ings.  See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §§2254, 2255; see also Brief for
Idaho  Association  of  Criminal  Defense  Lawyers  et al.  as
Amici Curiae 22–25.

The Government’s proposal is also unworkable.  For one,
it would be difficult and time consuming for a postconvic-
tion court to determine—perhaps years later—what appel-
late  claims  a  defendant  was  contemplating  at  the  time  of
conviction.13    Moreover,  because  most  postconviction  peti-
tioners will be pro se, courts would regularly have to parse
both (1) what claims a pro se defendant seeks to raise and
(2) whether each plausibly invoked claim is subject to the
defendant’s  appeal  waiver  (which  can  be  complex,  see
supra,  at  4–6),  all  without  the  assistance  of  counseled
briefing.  We are not persuaded that this would be a more
efficient  or  trustworthy  process  than  the  one  we  reaffirm
today.

The  more  administrable  and  workable  rule,  rather,  is
the  one  compelled  by  our  precedent:  When  counsel’s  defi-
cient  performance  forfeits  an  appeal  that  a  defendant
otherwise  would  have  taken,  the  defendant  gets  a  new
opportunity to appeal.  That is the rule already in use in 8
of the 10 Federal Circuits to have considered the question,
see  supra,  at  3,  and  n. 3,  and  neither  Idaho  nor  its  amici
have  pointed  us  to  any  evidence  that  it  has  proved  un-
manageable there.14  That rule does no more than restore

——————

13 To the extent relief would turn on what precisely a defendant said
to counsel regarding specific claims, moreover, Garza rightly points out
the  serious  risk  of  “causing  indigent  defendants  to  forfeit  their  rights
simply because they did not know what words to use.”  Reply Brief 17.

14 It is, of course, inevitable that some defendants under this rule will
seek  to  raise  issues  that  are  within  the  scope  of  their  appeal  waivers.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of legal issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
826

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–1552.  Freeman,  Individually  and  in  His  Capacity
as  Representative  of  the  Estate  of  Freeman,  et  al.  v.
United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  556  F.  3d  326.

No. 08–1557.  Marti v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  294  Fed.  Appx.  439.

No.  08–1558.  Imperial  Merchant  Services,  Inc.,  dba
Check  Recovery  Systems,  Inc.  v.  Hunt,  Individually  and
on  Behalf  of  All  Others  Similarly  Situated.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  1137.

No.  08–1560.  Jolley  v.  Department  of  Housing  and
Urban Development.  C. A. Fed. Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Re
ported  below:  299  Fed.  Appx.  966.

No.  08–1561.  Tjong  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.  C.  A.
6th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 308 Fed. Appx. 957.

No.  08–1563.  Aster  v.  Aster.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  6th  App.  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1565.  Kriger  et  al.  v.  Bowen  Property  Manage
ment  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  300  Fed.  Appx.  526.

No. 08–1567.  TePoel v. United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  549.

No. 08–1568.  Turay v.  Richards et al.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–1570.  Curtis  v.  Napolitano,  Secretary  of  Home
land  Security.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  360.

No.  08–1572.  Hoffman  et  al.  v.  Jonesfilm;  and
No.  09–75.  Jonesfilm  v.  Hoffman  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  962.

No.  08–1573.  Fine  v.  State  Bar  of  California.  Sup.  Ct.

Cal.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1574.  Gaber  v.  Henderson  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  210.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and the court that heard the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

weighed  against  Phillips’  sincere  religious  objections  in  a
way consistent with the requisite religious neutrality that
must  be  strictly  observed.  The  official  expressions  of
hostility  to  religion  in  some  of  the  commissioners’  com-
ments—comments  that  were  not  disavowed  at  the  Com-
mission  or  by  the  State  at  any  point  in  the  proceedings
that led to affirmance of the order—were inconsistent with
what  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  requires.  The  Commis-
sion’s disparate consideration of Phillips’ case compared to
the cases of the other bakers suggests the same.  For these
reasons, the order must be set aside.

III
The  Commission’s  hostility  was  inconsistent  with  the
First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in
a  manner  that  is  neutral  toward  religion.    Phillips  was
entitled  to  a  neutral  decisionmaker  who  would  give  full
and  fair  consideration  to  his  religious  objection  as  he
sought to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this
case was presented, considered, and decided.  In this case
the  adjudication  concerned  a  context  that  may  well  be
different going forward in the respects noted above.  How-
ever  later  cases  raising  these  or  similar  concerns  are
resolved in the future, for these reasons the rulings of the
Commission  and  of  the  state  court  that  enforced  the
Commission’s order must be invalidated.

The  outcome  of  cases  like  this  in  other  circumstances
must  await  further  elaboration  in  the  courts,  all  in  the
context  of  recognizing  that  these  disputes  must  be  re-
solved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere
religious  beliefs,  and  without  subjecting  gay  persons  to
indignities when  they  seek  goods  and  services  in  an  open
market.

The  judgment  of  the  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  is  re-

versed.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the conclusion and closing of the case Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.  It is suitable for indexing as it is the core content of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

liv

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Olvera-Trejo v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O’Malley; Gaskins v.
Onan Corp.; Langlie v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Onaro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O’Neal v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O’Neal v. Sinnreich & Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O’Neill v. Cohn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Orbe v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Orcutt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oregon; McWeeney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oregon State Ofﬁce, Services to Children and Families; Lukens v.
Orr v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ortega v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ortega-Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ortiz v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ortiz-Miranda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Osborne; McLean v.
Oscar Mayer Foods Corp.; Marcum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O. S. C. & Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O’Toole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ott v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Owens v. Pitcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Owner Operators Independent Drivers Assn., Inc.; New Prime v.
Owner Operators Independent Drivers Assn., Inc.; Prime, Inc. v.
Owsley v. San Antonio Independent School Dist.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paciﬁc Eternity, S. A. v. Deiulemar Compagnia Di Navigazione . .
Packard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Padilla-Mena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pagano v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paglingayen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PaineWebber Group, Inc.; Zinsmeyer Trusts Partnership v. . . . . .
Painter; Sheppard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Painter; Taylor v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Palacio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Palaganas-Suarez v. Greene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Palmer v. Barram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Palmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Palomino v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pamper; Corey v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Panama Canal Comm’n; Nicolas v.
Panola County Jail; Callicutt v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pappa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pap’s A. M.; Erie v.

Page
1044
1114
1087
1029
1039
1112
1062
1113
1122
1090
1033
1099
1012
1030
1060
1023,1101
1055
1026
1041,1125
1097
1043
1099
1115
1066
1066
1020
1109
1068
1012
1062
1017
1020
1100
1075
1093
1041
1002
1032
1041
1006
1022
1078
1061
277
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, not the main body text of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 321 (1998)

337

Opinion of the Court

of the forfeiture to the gravity of the defendant’s offense.
If
the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the
gravity of the defendant’s offense, it is unconstitutional.

B

Under this standard, the forfeiture of respondent’s entire
$357,144 would violate the Excessive Fines Clause.11 Re-
spondent’s crime was solely a reporting offense.
It was per-
missible to transport the currency out of the country so long
as he reported it. Section 982(a)(1) orders currency to be
forfeited for a “willful” violation of the reporting require-
ment. Thus, the essence of respondent’s crime is a willful
failure to report the removal of currency from the United
States.12 Furthermore, as the District Court found, re-

siveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly erroneous.
See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 574–575 (1985). But the
question whether a ﬁne is constitutionally excessive calls for the applica-
tion of a constitutional standard to the facts of a particular case, and in
this context de novo review of that question is appropriate. See Ornelas
v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 697 (1996).

11 The only question before this Court is whether the full forfeiture of
respondent’s $357,144 as directed by § 982(a)(1) is constitutional under the
Excessive Fines Clause. We hold that it is not. The Government peti-
tioned for certiorari seeking full forfeiture, and we reject that request.
Our holding that full forfeiture would be excessive reﬂects no judgment
that “a forfeiture of even $15,001 would have suffered from a gross dispro-
portion,” nor does it “afﬁr[m] the reduced $15,000 forfeiture on de novo
review.” Post, at 349. Those issues are simply not before us. Nor, in-
deed, do we address in any respect the validity of the forfeiture ordered
by the District Court, including whether a court may disregard the terms
of a statute that commands full forfeiture: As noted, supra, at 327, re-
spondent did not cross-appeal the $15,000 forfeiture ordered by the Dis-
trict Court. The Court of Appeals thus declined to address the $15,000
forfeiture, and that question is not properly presented here either.

12 Contrary to the dissent’s contention, the nature of the nonreporting
offense in this case was not altered by respondent’s “lies” or by the “suspi-
cious circumstances” surrounding his transportation of his currency. See
post, at 352–353. A single willful failure to declare the currency consti-
tutes the crime, the gravity of which is not exacerbated or mitigated by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 321 (1998).  It contains legal jargon and discusses the constitutionality of a forfeiture.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–927 (20A134)
_________________

UNITED STATES v. DUSTIN JOHN HIGGS

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT AND APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY

[January 15, 2021]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting.
After seventeen years without a single federal execution,
the  Government  has  executed  twelve  people  since  July.
They  are  Daniel  Lee,  Wesley  Purkey,  Dustin  Honken,
Lezmond  Mitchell,  Keith  Nelson,  William  LeCroy  Jr.,
Christopher Vialva, Orlando Hall, Brandon Bernard, Alfred
Bourgeois,  Lisa  Montgomery,  and,  just  last  night,  Corey
Johnson.  Today, Dustin Higgs will become the thirteenth.
To put that in historical context, the Federal Government
will have executed more than three times as many people
in the last six months than it had in the previous six dec-
ades.

This  unprecedented  rush  of  federal  executions  has  pre-
dictably  given  rise  to  many  difficult  legal  disputes.    One
source of confusion has been the Federal Death Penalty Act
(FDPA), which Congress enacted in 1994 to guide the impo-
sition and implementation of federal death sentences.  Pub.
L. No. 103–322, Tit. VI, §60002(a), 108 Stat. 1959 (codified
as amended at 18 U. S. C. §3591 et seq.).  Prior to last July,
the  Federal  Government  had  executed  just  three  people
since the enactment of the FDPA, two in 2001 and one in
2003.  Many  questions  about  the  FDPA  remain  unan-
swered.

Another source of uncertainty has been the Department
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
58

BEARD  v.  KINDLER

Opinion of the Court

postverdict  motions  in  1984  had  not  abused  his  discretion.
In  October  1991—more  than  seven  years  after  the  jury’s
death recommendation—the court formally imposed the
death  sentence.  Commonwealth  v.  Kindler,  No.  2747  etc.
(Ct. Common Pleas, Feb. 28, 1992), App. 66–70.

Kindler appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in de
clining  to  address  the  merits  of  his  postverdict  motions.
The  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court  afﬁrmed.  Kindler,  536
Pa., at 232–234, 639 A. 2d, at 3.  That court recognized that
“trial courts, when faced with a defendant in fugitive status,
.  .  .  have  every  right  to  fashion  an  appropriate  response[,]
which  can  include  the  dismissal  of  pending  post-verdict  mo
tions.”  Id.,  at  233,  639  A.  2d,  at  3.  The  court  then  deter
mined  that  the  trial  court’s  decision  to  dismiss  Kindler’s
claims  fell  within  its  authority:  The  “dismiss[al]  [of]  the
post-verdict  motions  was  a  reasonable  response  to  Appel
lant’s  ‘ﬂouting’  of  the  authority  of  the  court.”  Id.,  at  233–
234,  639  A.  2d,  at  3.  Under  Pennsylvania’s  fugitive  forfeit
ure  law,  the  court  concluded,  Kindler’s  case  therefore  came
to  it  “without  any  allegations  of  error  (direct  or  collateral)
preserved.”  Id., at 234, 639 A. 2d, at 4.

The  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court  nonetheless  conducted
the  “limited  review”  mandated  for  death  sentences  under
Pennsylvania  law.  Under  that  review,  the  court  was  re
quired to conﬁrm that the evidence was sufﬁcient to support
the conviction of ﬁrst-degree murder and at least one aggra
vating  factor,  and  that  the  sentence  was  not  excessive,  dis
proportionate,  or  the  product  of  passion  or  prejudice.  Id.,
at  234–235,  639  A.  2d,  at  4.  Satisﬁed  that  Kindler’s  convic
tion  met  these  standards,  the  court  afﬁrmed  his  conviction
and  sentence.  We  denied  certiorari.  Kindler  v.  Pennsyl
vania, 513 U. S. 933 (1994).

On  state  habeas,  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  rejected
Kindler’s claims.  That court held that the Pennsylvania Su
preme  Court  had  already  ruled  that  Kindler’s  escape  for
feited all claims challenging his conviction and sentence that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the case of Beard v. Kindler. It delves into the legal proceedings, appeals, and the court's decisions regarding the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

road  back  country,  outdoor  activities  similar  to  hunting,”
such as “fishing, hiking & camping etc.”  App. 41.  But, at
the same time, the officer emphasized that the restrictions
were “intended to prohibit [Nash] from carrying concealed
in ANY LOCATION typically open to and frequented by the
general public.”  Ibid.

Between 2008 and 2017, Koch was in the same position
as  Nash:  He  faced  no special  dangers,  wanted  a  handgun
for  general  self-defense,  and  had  only  a  restricted  license
permitting  him  to  carry  a  handgun  outside  the  home  for
hunting and target shooting.  In late 2017, Koch applied to
a licensing officer to remove the restrictions on his license,
citing his extensive experience in safely handling firearms.
Like Nash’s application, Koch’s was denied, except that the
officer permitted Koch to “carry to and from work.”  Id., at
114.

C

Respondents  are  the  superintendent  of  the  New  York
State  Police,  who  oversees  the  enforcement  of  the  State’s
licensing laws, and a New York Supreme Court justice, who
oversees the processing of licensing applications in Rensse-
laer County.  Petitioners sued respondents for declaratory
and  injunctive  relief  under  Rev.  Stat.  1979,  42  U. S. C.
§1983, alleging that respondents violated their Second and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying their unrestricted-
license  applications  on  the  basis  that  they  had  failed  to
show  “proper  cause,”  i.e.,  had  failed  to  demonstrate  a
unique need for self-defense.

The District Court dismissed petitioners’ complaint and
the Court of Appeals affirmed.  See 818 Fed. Appx. 99, 100
(CA2  2020).  Both  courts  relied  on  the  Court  of  Appeals’
prior  decision  in  Kachalsky,  701  F. 3d  81,  which  had  sus-
tained New York’s proper-cause standard, holding that the
requirement was “substantially related to the achievement
of an important governmental interest.”  Id., at 96.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

FDA v. ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE

Opinion of the Court

be caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury likely
would  be  redressed  by  the  requested  judicial  relief.  See
Summers  v.  Earth  Island  Institute,  555  U. S.  488,  493
(2009); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–
561
Those  specific  standing  requirements
constitute “an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III.”  Id., at 560.

(1992).

The second and third standing requirements—causation
and redressability—are often “flip sides of the same coin.”
Sprint  Communications  Co.  v.  APCC  Services,  Inc.,  554
U. S.  269,  288  (2008).    If  a  defendant’s  action  causes  an
injury,  enjoining  the  action  or  awarding  damages  for  the
action  will  typically  redress  that  injury.    So  the  two  key
questions in most standing disputes are injury in fact and
causation.1

First  is  injury  in  fact.  An  injury  in  fact  must  be
“concrete,” meaning that it must be real and not abstract.
See TransUnion, 594 U. S., at 424.  The injury also must be
particularized;  the  injury  must  affect  “the  plaintiff  in  a
personal  and  individual  way”  and  not  be  a  generalized
grievance.  Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560, n. 1.  An injury in fact
can  be  a  physical  injury,  a  monetary  injury,  an  injury  to
one’s property, or an injury to one’s constitutional rights, to
take  just  a  few  common  examples.  Moreover,  the  injury
must be actual or imminent, not speculative—meaning that
the injury must have already occurred or be likely to occur
soon.  Clapper, 568 U. S., at 409.  And when a plaintiff seeks
prospective relief such as an injunction, the plaintiff must
establish a sufficient likelihood of future injury.  Id., at 401.
By requiring the plaintiff to show an injury in fact, Article

——————

1 Redressability can still pose an independent bar in some cases.  For
example, a plaintiff who suffers injuries caused by the government still
may  not  be  able  to  sue  because  the  case  may  not  be  of  the  kind
“traditionally redressable in federal court.”  United States v. Texas, 599
U. S.  670,  676  (2023);  cf.  California  v.  Texas,  593  U. S.  659,  671–672
(2021).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the concept of standing in court. It delves into the requirements for a plaintiff to demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressability.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

15

Opinion of the Court

subject  on  which  legislation  could  be  had.”  Brief  for  Re-
spondent 46 (quoting Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S.
109, 127 (1959), and Eastland, 421 U. S., at 506).  That ap-
proach is appropriate, the House argues, because the cases
before  us  are  not  “momentous  separation-of-powers  dis-
putes.”  Brief for Respondent 1.

Largely  following  the  House’s  lead,  the  courts  below
treated  these  cases  much  like  any  other,  applying  prece-
dents that do not involve the President’s papers.  See 943
F. 3d, at 656–670; 940 F. 3d, at 724–742.  The Second Cir-
cuit concluded that “this case does not concern separation
of  powers”  because  the  House  seeks  personal  documents
and the President sued in his personal capacity.  943 F. 3d,
at 669.  The D. C. Circuit, for its part, recognized that “sep-
aration-of-powers  concerns  still  linger  in  the  air,”  and
therefore it did not afford deference to the House.  940 F. 3d,
at 725–726.  But, because the House sought only personal
documents, the court concluded that the case “present[ed]
no direct interbranch dispute.”  Ibid.

The  House’s  approach  fails  to  take  adequate  account  of
the  significant  separation  of  powers  issues  raised  by  con-
gressional subpoenas for the President’s information.  Con-
gress and the President have an ongoing institutional rela-
tionship  as  the  “opposite  and  rival”  political  branches
established by the Constitution.  The Federalist No. 51, at
349.  As a result, congressional subpoenas directed at the
President differ markedly from congressional subpoenas we
have  previously  reviewed,  e.g.,  Barenblatt,  360  U. S.,  at
127; Eastland, 421 U. S., at 506, and they bear little resem-
blance to criminal subpoenas issued to the President in the
course  of  a  specific  investigation,  see  Vance,  ante,  p.  ___;
Nixon,  418  U. S.  683.    Unlike  those  subpoenas,  congres-
sional subpoenas for the President’s information unavoida-
bly pit the political branches against one another.  Cf. In re
Sealed Case, 121 F. 3d 729, 753 (CADC 1997) (“The Presi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding congressional subpoenas for presidential information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–50
_________________

JASCHA CHIAVERINI, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. CITY OF NAPOLEON, OHIO, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 20, 2024]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, dissenting.
Section 1983 performs vital work by permitting individu-
als to vindicate their constitutional rights in federal court.
But it does not authorize this Court to expound new rights
of its own creation.  As this Court has put it, §1983 does not
turn the Constitution into a “ ‘ “font of tort law.” ’ ”  Albright
v. Oliver, 510 U. S. 266, 284 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 544
(1981)).

Despite that settled rule, the Court today doubles down
on a new tort of its own recent invention—what it calls a
“Fourth  Amendment  malicious-prosecution”  cause  of  ac-
tion.  Ante, at 1; see Thompson v. Clark, 596 U. S. 36, 43–
44 (2022).  Respectfully, it is hard to know where this tort
comes  from.    Stare  for  as  long  as  you  like  at  the  Fourth
Amendment  and  you  won’t  see  anything  about  prosecu-
tions, malicious or otherwise.  Instead, the Amendment pro-
vides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”
As  its  language  suggests,  the  Fourth  Amendment  sup-
plies nothing like a common-law claim for malicious prose-
cution.  Ante, at 2 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see Cordova v.
Albuquerque,  816  F. 3d  645,  662–663  (CA10  2016)  (Gor-
such, J., concurring in judgment).  Just consider some of the
differences.  This Court has long held that the touchstone
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice GorSUCH.  It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal argument within a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

divining the true position of the [State] on issues like the
meaning of state law, or even for purposes of doctrines like
judicial  estoppel.”  Kaul,  942  F. 3d,  at  801–802;  see  New
Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S. 369, 373 (1953) (per curiam)
(declining  to  be  drawn  into  “intramural  dispute”  within  a
State).

It is difficult to overstate the burden the Court’s holding
will foist on district courts.  Each intervenor will be entitled
to file its own brief concerning every motion and will be en-
titled to its own discovery.  Even when state agents’ posi-
tions align, this multitude of parties will clog federal courts
and  delay  the  administration  of  justice.3  When  state
agents’ positions diverge, courts will also be put in the un-
enviable position of determining “which of [a State’s] repre-
sentatives . . . better represents it.”  999 F. 3d, at 934.  Out
of respect for federalism, if nothing else, we should not in-
terpret state law to hijack federal courts’ ability to manage
litigation involving States.  See Virginia Office for Protec-
tion  and  Advocacy  v.  Stewart,  563  U. S.  247,  272  (2011)
(ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (noting the “indignity” suffered
by a State when “a federal judge . . . decide[s] an internal
state dispute”).

III
Aided by its new presumption of inadequacy, the Court
concludes that state respondents inadequately represented
petitioners’  stated  interests.    The  Court  states  that  in  so
holding, it “[c]ast[s] aspersions on no one.”  Ante, at 16.  In
the  Court’s  view,  however,  petitioners  (unlike  state  re-
spondents and their counsel, the attorney general) “are not
——————

3 This case is the perfect example.  The District Court scheduled trial
for January 2021, but postponed it to January 2022 pending resolution
of  petitioners’  appeal  of  their  second  motion  for  intervention.  See  999
F. 3d, at 923.  After certiorari was granted, the District Court stayed trial
pending this Court’s disposition of the case.  Now that the District Court
will be obligated to allow petitioners to intervene, trial inevitably will be
delayed much further.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis. While it's part of a legal document, it's not a table of contents, introductory paragraph, or list of questions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
ALITO, J., dissenting

dependent upon each issue.’ ”  Id., at 172–173.  They simi-
larly  refused  to  provide  a  definitive  answer  when  asked
whether they would be willing to “use any means possible”
to  achieve  their  aims.  Id.,  at  173.  The  president  of  the
college  refused  to  allow  the  group  to  be  recognized,  con-
cluding that the philosophy of the SDS was “antithetical to
the  school’s  policies”  and  that  it  was  doubtful  that  the
local  chapter  was  independent  of  the  national  organiza-
tion,  the  “ ‘published  aims  and  philosophy’ ”  of  which  in-
cluded  “ ‘disruption  and  violence.’ ”    Id.,  at  174–175,  and
n. 4.

The  effects  of  nonrecognition  in  Healy  were  largely  the
same as those present here.  The SDS was denied the use
of  campus  facilities,  as  well  as  access  to  the  customary
means used for communication among the members of the
college community.  Id., at 176, 181–182.

The lower federal courts held that the First Amendment
rights of the SDS chapter had not been violated, and when
the case reached this Court, the college, much like today’s
majority, sought to minimize the effects of nonrecognition,
arguing that the SDS members “still may meet as a group
off campus, that they still may distribute written material
off  campus,  and  that  they  still  may  meet  together  infor-
mally on campus . . . as individuals.”  Id., at 182–183.

This  Court  took  a  different  view.   The  Court  held  that
the  denial  of  recognition  substantially  burdened  the  stu-
dents’ right to freedom of association.  After observing that
“[t]he primary impediment to free association flowing from
nonrecognition is the denial of use of campus facilities for
meetings and other appropriate purposes,” id., at 181, the
Court continued:

  “Petitioners’  associational  interests  also  were  cir-
cumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin
boards  and  the  school  newspaper.    If  an  organization
is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It discusses a case involving a student group's right to recognition and the impact of non-recognition on their First Amendment rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

MOYLE v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

Clause] provisions . . . is in no way mandatory”).  “[T]he ‘le-
gitimacy of Congress’ power’ ” to enforce conditions tied to
federal funds depends on whether the parties who accepted
federal  funds  also  “ ‘voluntarily  and  knowingly’ ”  accepted
the  conditions.  Cummings  v.  Premier  Rehab  Keller,  596
U. S. 212, 219 (2022) (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U. S.
181, 186 (2002)).

Because the enforcement of conditions attached to the re-
ceipt of federal money depends on a recipient’s knowing and
voluntary  consent,  “the conditions must be set  out  ‘unam-
biguously.’ ”  Arlington Central, 548 U. S., at 296 (quoting
Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17).  And recipients must be given
a  “legitimate  choice  whether  to  accept  the  federal  condi-
tions.”  National  Federation  of  Independent  Business  v.
Sebelius,  567  U. S.  519,  578  (2012)  (opinion  of  ROBERTS,
C. J.); accord, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548,
590  (1937).  The  Government’s  interpretation  founders  at
both points.

First, consider the requirement that EMTALA speak un-
ambiguously.  Even if it were possible to read EMTALA as
requiring  abortions  prohibited  by  Idaho  law,  it  is  beyond
dispute  that  such  a  requirement  is  not  unambiguously
clear.  The statute does not mention abortion, let alone ex-
pressly bind hospitals to perform abortions contrary to state
law.

The  need  for  clear  statutory  language  is  especially  im-
portant  in  this  suit  because  the  Government’s  interpreta-
tion would intrude on an area traditionally left to state con-
trol, namely, the practice of medicine.  We typically expect
Congress to “ ‘make its intention “clear and manifest” if it
intends  to  pre-empt  the  historic  powers  of  the  States.’ ”
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461 (1991) (quoting Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)); see
also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 274 (2006) (“[T]he
background principles of our federal system also belie the
notion  that  Congress  would  use  such  an  obscure  grant  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It discusses the legal interpretation of EMTALA and its implications for abortion access in light of Idaho law.  The text is sequential and coherent, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

izes the city and, when flying at halfstaff, conveys a community mes-
sage  of  sympathy  or  somber  remembrance.    The  question  remains
whether,  on  the  20  or  so  times  a  year  when  Boston  allowed  private
groups  to  raise  their  own  flags,  those  flags,  too,  expressed  the  city’s
message.  The circumstantial evidence of the public’s perception does
not resolve the issue.  The most salient feature of this case is that Bos-
ton neither actively controlled these flag raisings nor shaped the mes-
sages the flags sent.  To be sure, Boston maintained control over an
event’s date and time to avoid conflicts, and it maintained control over
the plaza’s physical premises, presumably to avoid chaos.  But the key
issue  is  whether  Boston  shaped  or  controlled  the  flags’  content  and
meaning; such evidence would tend to show that Boston intended to
convey the flags’ messages as its own.  And on that issue, Boston’s rec-
ord  is  thin.    Boston  says  that  all  (or  at  least  most)  of  the  50  unique
flags  it  approved  reflect  particular  city-endorsed  values  or  causes.
That may well be true of flying other nations’ flags, or the Pride Flag
raised annually to commemorate Boston Pride Week, but the connec-
tion to other flag-raising ceremonies, such as one held by a community
bank, is more difficult to discern.  Further, Boston told the public that
it sought “to accommodate all applicants” who wished to hold events
at Boston’s “public forums,” including on City Hall Plaza.  App. to Pet.
for Cert. 137a.  The city’s application form asked only for contact infor-
mation and a brief description of the event, with proposed dates and
times.  The city employee who handled applications testified that he
did not request to see flags before the events.  Indeed, the city’s prac-
tice was to approve flag raisings without exception—that is, until pe-
titioners’ request.  At the time, Boston had no written policies or clear
internal  guidance  about  what  flags  groups  could  fly  and  what  those
flags would communicate.  Boston’s control is therefore not comparable
to the degree of government involvement in the selection of park mon-
uments in Summum, see 555 U. S., at 472–473, or license plate designs
in Walker, see 576 U. S., at 213.  Boston’s come-one-come-all practice—
except, that is, for petitioners’ flag—is much closer to the Patent and
Trademark Office’s policy of registering all manner of trademarks in
Matal, see 582 U. S., at ___, ___.  All told, Boston’s lack of meaningful
involvement in the selection of flags or the crafting of their messages
leads the Court to classify the third-party flag raisings as private, not
government, speech.  Pp. 6–12.

2.  Because  the  flag-raising  program  did  not  express  government
speech,  Boston’s  refusal  to  let  petitioners  fly  their  flag  violated  the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  When the government
does not speak for itself, it may not exclude private speech based on
“religious  viewpoint”;  doing  so  “constitutes  impermissible  viewpoint
discrimination.”  Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding the display of a flag on public property and whether the government's refusal to allow it constitutes a violation of the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–979
_________________

PANKAJKUMAR S. PATEL, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[May 16, 2022]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE

SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.

It is no secret that when processing applications, licenses,
and  permits  the  government  sometimes  makes  mistakes.
Often, they are small ones—a misspelled name, a misplaced
application.  But  sometimes  a  bureaucratic  mistake  can
have life-changing consequences.  Our case is such a case.
An  immigrant  to  this  country  applied  for  legal  residency.
The  government  rejected  his  application.    Allegedly,  the
government did so based on a glaring factual error.  In cir-
cumstances like that, our law has long permitted individu-
als to petition a court to consider the question and correct
any mistake.

Not anymore.  Today, the Court holds that a federal bu-
reaucracy can make an obvious factual error, one that will
result  in  an  individual’s  removal  from  this  country,  and
nothing can be done about it.  No court may even hear the
case.  It  is  a  bold  claim  promising  dire  consequences  for
countless lawful immigrants.  And it is such an unlikely as-
sertion  of  raw  administrative  power  that  not  even  the
agency that allegedly erred, nor any other arm of the Exec-
utive Branch, endorses it.  Today’s majority acts on its own
to shield the government from the embarrassment of hav-
ing to correct even its most obvious errors.  Respectfully, I
dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court.  It is sequential text and likely part of the actual legal content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U51

[09-26-01 10:31:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

512

BECK v. PRUPIS

Stevens, J., dissenting

only qualifying “tortious act” must be “an act that is inde-
pendently wrongful under RICO.” Ante, at 505–506 (em-
phasis added).

And if one assumes further that the Court is correct to
say that the only qualifying “ ‘ac[t] of a tortious character’ ”
is “an act that is independently wrongful under RICO,” the
analogy does not actually support what the Court has held.
The majority holds that § 1964(c) liability could be imposed
if the overt acts injuring the plaintiff are among those rack-
eteering activities listed in § 1961(1)—such as murder, brib-
ery, arson, and extortion. Racketeering activities, however,
are not “independently wrongful under RICO.” They are,
of course, independently wrongful under other provisions of
state and federal criminal law, but RICO does not make rack-
eteering activity itself wrongful under the Act. The only
acts that are “independently wrongful under RICO” are vio-
lations of the provisions of § 1962. Thus, even accepting the
Court’s own analogy, if petitioner were harmed by predicate
acts deﬁned in § 1961(1), that still would not, by itself, give
rise to a cause of action under § 1964(c). Only if those rack-
eteering activities also constituted a violation of § 1962(a),
(b), or (c) would petitioner be harmed by “an act that is inde-
pendently wrongful under RICO.” And, of course, if peti-
tioner were already harmed by conduct covered by one of
those provisions, he would hardly need to use § 1962(d)’s con-
spiracy provision to establish a cause of action.

*

*

*

The plain language of RICO makes it clear that petition-
er’s civil cause of action under § 1964(c) for a violation of
§ 1962(d) does not require that he be injured in his business
or property by any particular kind of overt act in further-
ance of the conspiracy. The Court’s recitation of the com-
mon law of civil conspiracy does not prove otherwise, and,
indeed, contradicts its own holding.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens in the case of Beck v. Prudential.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>