<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

JACKSON, J., dissenting

Our Fansteel decision stands for the principle that “em-
ployees ha[ve] the right to strike but they ha[ve] no license
to commit acts of violence or to seize their employer’s plant.”
Id., at 253.  The facts of that case involved 95 striking em-
ployees who effected a “sit-down strike by taking over and
holding two of [their employer’s] key buildings.”  Id., at 248
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The employees subse-
quently  engaged  in  “a  pitched  battle”  in  which  they  “re-
sisted the attempt by the sheriff to evict and arrest them.”
Id., at 249.  We held that the NLRA did not condone this
conduct,  which  would  “put  a  premium  on  resort  to  force”
and would “subvert the principles of law and order which
lie at the foundations of society.”  Id., at 253.

Congress’s incorporation of Fansteel’s limitation into the
NLRA establishes that, while employees have the right to
withhold their labor peaceably, subsequent affirmative acts
of  violence,  or  seizure  of  an  employer’s  premises,  are  not
protected labor practices.

2

As  a  general  matter,  the  dispute  in  this  case  is  over
whether  employees  can  withhold  their  labor  if  doing  so
risks  damage  to  their  employer’s  property.    As  explained
above,  by  carefully  restricting  limitations  on  the  right  to
strike in the NLRA itself, Congress has indicated that the
act of peacefully walking off the job is protected strike con-
duct  even  if  economic  harm  incidentally  results.  What  is
not protected is any subsequent affirmative step to destroy
or seize the employer’s property.  This is the statutory back-
drop against which the Board has developed the narrow re-
quirement  that  striking  employees  must  take  reasonable
precautions before or when they strike in order to forestall
or address foreseeable, imminent, and aggravated injury to

——————
other exceptions concern strikes for illegal objectives, strikes in breach
of contract, and strikes in breach of other federal law.  See S. Rep. No.
105, at 28.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 598 U.S. ____ (2023). It cites previous case law and discusses the legal framework surrounding labor strikes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:26:35
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CR

Pagination Table: RULES1

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Ordered:

APRIL 17, 2000

1. That the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts be, and they hereby are,
amended by including therein amendments to Criminal
Rules 7, 31, 32, and 38, and new Rule 32.2.

[See infra, pp. 1183–1187.]
2. That the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure shall take effect on December 1, 2000,
and shall govern in all proceedings in criminal cases there-
after commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all pro-
ceedings then pending.

3. That The Chief Justice be, and hereby is, authorized
to transmit to the Congress the foregoing amendments to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in accordance with
the provisions of Section 2072 of Title 28, United States
Code.

1181
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an order from the Supreme Court of the United States amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  It is sequential text and contains legal information that would likely be relevant for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Court Order</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

KAGAN, J., dissenting

Congress has left an ambiguity or gap, then a choice must
be made.  Who should give content to a statute when Con-
gress’s instructions have run out?  Should it be a court?  Or
should it be the agency Congress has charged with admin-
istering the statute?  The answer Chevron gives is that it
should usually be the agency, within the bounds of reason-
ableness.  That rule has formed the backdrop against which
Congress, courts, and agencies—as well as regulated par-
ties and the public—all have operated for decades.  It has
been applied in thousands of judicial decisions.  It has be-
come part of the warp and woof of modern government, sup-
porting regulatory efforts of all kinds—to name a few, keep-
ing air and water clean, food and drugs safe, and financial
markets honest.

And  the  rule  is  right.    This  Court  has  long  understood
Chevron  deference  to  reflect  what  Congress  would  want,
and so to be rooted in a presumption of legislative intent.
Congress knows that it does not—in fact cannot—write per-
fectly  complete  regulatory  statutes.    It  knows  that  those
statutes will inevitably contain ambiguities that some other
actor will have to resolve, and gaps that some other actor
will have to fill.  And it would usually prefer that actor to
be the responsible agency, not a court.  Some interpretive
issues arising in the regulatory context involve scientific or
technical subject matter.  Agencies have expertise in those
areas; courts do not.  Some demand a detailed understand-
ing  of  complex  and  interdependent  regulatory  programs.
Agencies know those programs inside-out; again, courts do
not.  And some present policy choices, including trade-offs
between competing goods.  Agencies report to a President,
who in turn answers to the public for his policy calls; courts
have no such accountability and no proper basis for making
policy.  And  of  course  Congress  has  conferred  on  that  ex-
pert,  experienced,  and  politically  accountable  agency  the
authority  to  administer—to  make  rules  about  and  other-
wise implement—the statute giving rise to the ambiguity or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO. It delves into the legal principle of Chevron deference, arguing for its continued validity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–916
_________________

THRYV, INC., FKA DEX MEDIA, INC., PETITIONER v.
CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[April 20, 2020]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.*
Inter partes review is an administrative process in which
a  patent  challenger  may  ask  the  U. S.  Patent  and  Trade-
mark  Office  (PTO)  to  reconsider  the  validity  of  earlier
granted patent claims.  This case concerns a statutorily pre-
scribed limitation of the issues a party may raise on appeal
from an inter partes review proceeding.

When  presented  with  a  request  for  inter  partes  review,
the  agency  must  decide  whether  to  institute  review.  35
U. S. C. §314.  Among other conditions set by statute, if the
request comes more than a year after suit against the re-
questing  party  for  patent  infringement,  “[a]n  inter  partes
review may not be instituted.”  §315(b).  “The determination
by the [PTO] Director whether to institute an inter partes
review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.”
§314(d).†

In this case, the agency instituted inter partes review in

——————

*JUSTICE  THOMAS  and  JUSTICE  ALITO join  all  but  Part  III–C  of  this

opinion.

† Key statutory provisions are reproduced in an appendix to this opin-

ion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

46

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Thomas, J., dissenting

(INS) procedures for administering an amnesty program
for illegal aliens. Despite the availability of judicial review
of these procedures in the context of statutorily authorized
review of orders of exclusion or deportation, and notwith-
standing the statute’s express prohibition of judicial re-
view of an INS “determination respecting an application
for adjustment of status [under the amnesty program],” 8
U. S. C. § 1160(e)(1), we held that these factors did not suf-
ﬁce to trump the “strong presumption in favor of judicial
review of administrative action.” Haitian Refugee Center,
498 U. S., at 498.

The majority declines to employ the presumption in
favor of preenforcement review to resolve the ambiguity
in § 1395ii; instead, it concocts a presumption against pre-
enforcement review, stating that its holding is “consisten[t]
with the distinction that this Court has often drawn between
a total preclusion of review and postponement of review.”
Ante, at 19 (citing Salﬁ, 422 U. S., at 762; Thunder Basin
Coal, supra, at 207, n. 8; Haitian Refugee Center, supra, at
496–499). But Thunder Basin Coal, as noted, supra, at 45,
teaches only that the presumption is not as strong when the
problem is one of delayed judicial review rather than com-
plete denial of judicial review—it does not establish that the
presumption lacks any force in the former context. And
Haitian Refugee Center directly supports the applicability
of the presumption in favor of preenforcement review; we
there invoked the presumption even though the plaintiffs had
a postenforcement review option—voluntarily surrendering
themselves for deportation and availing themselves of the
statutorily authorized judicial review of an order of exclu-
sion or deportation.
498 U. S., at 496. Only Salﬁ provides
the majority with modest support insofar as it acknowledged
(and distinguished) just the presumption against the com-
plete denial of judicial review, 422 U. S., at 762, omitting men-
tion of the presumption against delayed judicial review. But
this omission is readily explained: Presentment of a Social
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  It contains legal arguments and citations to other cases, which are all suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS

JACKSON, J., dissenting

by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the par-
ties.”  Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485, 490 (1953).  Ra-
ther, Congress “went on to confide primary interpretation
and application of its rules to a specific and specially con-
stituted  tribunal”:  the  National  Labor  Relations  Board.
Ibid.; see generally §§153–156.

By  statutory  mandate,  the  Board  is  composed  of  five
members who are appointed by the President with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate.  §153(a).  Congress also pro-
vided for an independent General Counsel, who is likewise
presidentially  appointed  and  Senate  confirmed.    §153(d);
see NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U. S. 112,
117–118 (1987).  The General Counsel conducts investiga-
tions into unfair labor practices and brings complaints be-
fore the Board through a “particular procedure” that Con-
gress  has  prescribed  “for  investigation,  complaint  and
notice,  and  hearing  and  decision,  including  judicial  relief
pending a final administrative order” from the Board.  Gar-
ner, 346 U. S., at 490; see §§153, 160.

The  Board  has  fleshed  out  this  process  via  rulemaking
authority that Congress has delegated.  §156.  If a person
believes that an employer or union has committed an unfair
labor practice, the person may file a charge with a regional
director, who acts on behalf of the General Counsel.  29 CFR
§101.2  (2022).  The  regional  director  investigates  the
charge.  §101.4.  If “the charge appears to have merit and
efforts  to  dispose  of  it  by  informal  adjustment  are  unsuc-
cessful,” the regional director issues a complaint on behalf
of the General Counsel.  §101.8.  When a General Counsel’s
complaint issues, an administrative law judge (ALJ) holds
a hearing and issues a decision, which the Board reviews if
any party files an exception.  §§101.8–101.12.  If the Board
finds that a party has engaged in an unfair labor practice,
it  must  order  the  party  to  “cease  and  desist”  and  to  take
“such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies”
of the NLRA.  29 U. S. C. §160(c).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a court case. It discusses the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and its role in labor disputes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

241 (1989), two aspects of the text of the ATS make clear
that  the  statute  allows  corporate  liability.    First,  the  text
confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear “civil
action[s]” for “tort[s].”  28 U. S. C. §1350.  Where Congress
uses  a  term  of  art  like  tort,  “it  presumably  knows  and
adopts  the  cluster  of  ideas  that  were  attached  to  [the]
borrowed  word  in  the  body  of  learning  from  which  it  was
taken  and  the  meaning  its  use  will  convey  to  the  judicial
mind  unless  otherwise  instructed.”    Morissette  v.  United
States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952).

Corporations  have  long  been  held  liable  in  tort  under
the  federal  common  law.  See  Philadelphia,  W.,  &  B. R.
Co.  v.  Quigley,  21  How.  202,  210  (1859)  (“At  a  very  early
period,  it  was  decided  in  Great  Britain,  as  well  as  in  the
United  States,  that  actions  might  be  maintained  against
corporations for torts; and instances may be found, in the
judicial  annals  of  both  countries,  of  suits  for  torts  arising
from  the  acts  of  their  agents,  of  nearly  every  variety”);
Chestnut  Hill  &  Spring  House  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Rutter,  4
Serg. & Rawle 6, 17 (Pa. 1818) (“[F]rom the earliest times
to  the  present,  corporations  have  been  held  liable  for
torts”).  This  Court  “has  assumed  that,  when  Congress
creates  a  tort  action,  it  legislates  against  a  legal  back
ground of ordinary tort-related . . . rules and consequently
intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.”  Meyer v.
Holley, 537 U. S. 280, 285 (2003).  The presumption, then,
is  that,  in  providing  for  “tort”  liability,  the  ATS  provides
for corporate liability.

Second,  whereas  the  ATS  expressly  limits  the  class  of
permissible  plaintiffs  to  “alien[s],”  §1350,  it  “does  not
distinguish  among  classes  of  defendants,”  Argentine  Re-
public v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 438
(1989).  That silence as to defendants cannot be presumed
to be inadvertent.  That is because in the same section of
the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789  as  what  is  now  the  ATS,  Con
gress provided the federal district courts with jurisdiction
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 584 U.S. ____ (2018). It cites legal precedents and analyzes the text of the Alien Tort Statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. PALOMAR-SANTIAGO

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–437.  Argued April 27, 2021—Decided May 24, 2021

Respondent Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national living in the United
States, was convicted in California state court of felony DUI in 1988.
At the time, lower courts understood that conviction to be an “aggra-
vated  felony”  subjecting  a  noncitizen  to  removal  from  the  United
States.  8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Palomar-Santiago was removed
following a hearing before an immigration judge and a waiver of his
right to appeal.  In 2017, Palomar-Santiago was found in the United
States  and  indicted  on  one  count  of  unlawful  reentry  after  removal.
See  §1326(a).    The  statute  criminalizing  unlawful  reentry  provides
that  a  collateral  challenge  to  the  underlying  deportation  order  may
proceed only if the noncitizen first demonstrates that (1) “any admin-
istrative remedies that may have been available” were exhausted, (2)
“the opportunity for judicial review” was lacking, and (3) “the entry of
the  order  was  fundamentally  unfair.”    §1326(d).    Palomar-Santiago
moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his prior removal
order was invalid in light of the 2004 holding in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543
U. S. 1, that felony DUI is not an aggravated felony.  Following Ninth
Circuit precedent, the District Court and Court of Appeals held that
Palomar-Santiago  was  excused  from  proving  the  first  two  require-
ments of §1326(d) because his felony DUI conviction had not made him
removable.  The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held: Each  of  the  statutory  requirements  of  §1326(d)  is  mandatory.

Pp. 5–8.

(a) The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is incompatible with the text
of  §1326(d),  which  provides  that  defendants  charged  with  unlawful
reentry “may not” challenge their underlying removal orders “unless”
they “demonstrat[e]” each of three conditions.  Section 1326(d)’s first
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FULTON ET AL. v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA,
PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 19–123.  Argued November 4, 2020—Decided June 17, 2021

Philadelphia’s foster care system relies on cooperation between the City
and private foster care agencies.  The City enters standard annual con-
tracts with the agencies to place children with foster families.  One of
the responsibilities of the agencies is certifying prospective foster fam-
ilies under state statutory criteria.  Petitioner Catholic Social Services
has contracted with the City to provide foster care services for over 50
years, continuing the centuries-old mission of the Catholic Church to
serve  Philadelphia’s  needy  children.    CSS  holds  the  religious  belief
that marriage is a sacred bond between a man and a woman.  Because
CSS believes that certification of prospective foster families is an en-
dorsement  of  their  relationships,  it  will  not  certify  unmarried  cou-
ples—regardless of their sexual orientation—or same-sex married cou-
ples.  But  other  private  foster  agencies  in  Philadelphia  will  certify
same-sex  couples,  and  no  same-sex  couple  has  sought  certification
from CSS.  Against this backdrop, a 2018 newspaper story recounted
the Archdiocese of Philadelphia’s position that CSS could not consider
prospective foster parents in same-sex marriages.  Calls for investiga-
tion  followed,  and  the  City  ultimately  informed  CSS  that  unless  it
agreed to certify same-sex couples the City would no longer refer chil-
dren  to  the  agency  or  enter  a  full  foster  care  contract  with  it  in  the
future.  The City explained that the refusal of CSS to certify same-sex
married  couples  violated  both  a  non-discrimination  provision  in  the
agency’s contract with the City as well as the non-discrimination re-
quirements of the citywide Fair Practices Ordinance.

CSS and three affiliated foster parents filed suit seeking to enjoin
the City’s referral freeze on the grounds that the City’s actions violated
the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

837

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10346.  Hines  v.  Tennessee.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tenn.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10347.  Johnson  v.  Gibson,  Warden.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  245.

No.  08–10350.  Garcia  v.  Yarborough,  Warden,  et  al.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.
Appx.  988.

No.  08–10351.  Smith  v.  Louisiana.  Sup.  Ct.  La.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  999  So.  2d  1140.

No.  08–10352.  Riley  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10355.  M.  L.  S.  v.  Missouri.  Ct.  App.  Mo.,  Western

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  275  S. W.  3d  293.

No.  08–10358.  Swift  v.  Stanford.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  08–10361.  Monacelli  v.  UPS  Store  et  al.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10362.  Cruz-Meza  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  634.

No.  08–10363.  D’Saachs  v.  Hall,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  695.

No.  08–10365.  Gill  v.  Rock,  Superintendent,  Great
Meadow  Correctional  Facility.  Ct.  App.  N.  Y.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  12  N. Y.  3d  1,  903  N.  E.  2d  1146.

No.  08–10371.  Garcia  v.  Ryan,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10372.  Gardner v.  Norris, Director, Arkansas De
partment  of  Correction.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10373.  Heath  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10374.  Hughes  v.  Estate  of  Hughes,  Deceased.

Ct.  App.  Minn.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
976

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 20, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6524.  White  v.  Gates,  Secretary  of  Defense.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.
Appx.  134.

No.  09–6530.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  457.

No.  09–6534.  Matthews  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6539.  Williams et al. v.  United States.  C. A. 11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6541.  Delapaz  Vasquez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  461.

No.  09–6547.  Boyd  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6548.  Bluntson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  960.

No. 09–6551.  Joseph v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  519.

No.  09–6555.  Lopez-Castas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  419.

No.  09–6561.  DeVeaux,  aka  Dover  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.
Appx.  595.

No.  09–6566.  Sohn  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  392.

No.  09–6567.  Robinson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6568.  Rodriguez-Orozco  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 332 Fed. Appx. 968.

No.  09–6578.  Duronio  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6582.  Powell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  433.
  </content>
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  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

15

Opinion of the Court

jurisdiction  to  determine  just  and  reasonable  wholesale
rates.”  487 U. S., at 374.  By contrast, respondents’ state
antitrust  lawsuits  do  not  seek  to  challenge  the  reason-
ableness of any rates expressly approved by FERC.  Rather,
they seek to challenge the background marketplace condi
tions  that  affected  both  jurisdictional  and  nonjurisdic-
tional rates.

Petitioners additionally point to FPC v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 406 U. S. 621 (1972).  In that case, the Court
held  that  federal  law  gave  FPC  the  authority  to  allocate
natural  gas  during  shortages  by  ordering  interstate  pipe
lines  to  curtail  gas  deliveries  to  all  customers,  including
retail  customers.
  This  latter  fact,  the  pipelines  argue,
shows that FERC has authority to regulate index manipu
lation  insofar  as  that  manipulation  affects  retail  (as  well
as wholesale) sales.  Brief for Petitioners 26.  Accordingly,
they contend that state laws that aim at this same subject
are pre-empted.

This  argument,  however,  makes  too  much  of  too  little.
The  Court’s  finding  of  pre-emption  in  Louisiana  Power
rested  on  its  belief  that  the  state  laws  in  question  con-
flicted  with  federal  law.    The  Court  concluded  that  “FPC
has authority to effect orderly curtailment plans involving
both  direct  sales  and  sales  for  resale,”  406  U. S.,  at  631,
because  otherwise  there  would  be  “unavoidable  conflict
between” state regulation of direct sales and the “uniform
federal regulation” that the Natural Gas Act foresees, id.,
at  633–635.  Conflict  pre-emption  may,  of  course,  invali
date  a  state  law  even  though  field  pre-emption  does  not.
Because petitioners have not argued this case as a conflict
pre-emption  case,  Louisiana  Power  does  not  offer  them
significant help.

C
To the extent any conflicts arise between state antitrust
law  proceedings  and  the  federal  rate-setting  process,  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the conflict between state antitrust laws and federal rate-setting processes. It delves into legal precedents and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2  GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC. v. ARKANSAS TEACHER

RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Syllabus

finding that the District Court’s price impact determination was not
an abuse of discretion.  Goldman now argues that the Second Circuit
erred twice: first, by holding that the generic nature of Goldman’s al-
leged misrepresentations is irrelevant to the price impact inquiry; and
second, by assigning Goldman the burden of persuasion to prove a lack
of price impact.

Held:

1. The generic nature of a misrepresentation often is important evi-
dence of price impact that courts should consider at class certification,
including in inflation-maintenance cases.  That is true even though the
same evidence may be relevant to materiality, an inquiry reserved for
the merits phase of a securities-fraud class action.  See Amgen Inc. v.
Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U. S. 455.  A court
has an obligation before certifying a class to determine that Rule 23 is
satisfied, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U. S. 27, 35, and a court can-
not make that finding in a securities-fraud class action without consid-
ering all evidence relevant to price impact.  See Halliburton Co. v. Er-
ica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 284 (Halliburton II).   The parties
now accept this legal framework but dispute whether the Second Cir-
cuit properly considered the generic nature of Goldman’s alleged mis-
representations.  Because  the  Court  concludes  that  the  Second  Cir-
cuit’s  opinions  leave  sufficient  doubt  on  this  question,  the  Court
remands for the Second Circuit to consider all record evidence relevant
to price impact, regardless whether that evidence overlaps with mate-
riality or any other merits issue.  Pp. 6–9.

2. Defendants bear the burden of persuasion to prove a lack of price
impact by a preponderance of the evidence at class certification.  The
Court has held that nothing in Federal Rule of Evidence 301 constrains
the Court’s authority to change customary burdens of persuasion un-
der a federal statute, see NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,
462 U. S. 393, 404, n. 7, and the Court has exercised this authority to
reassign the burden of persuasion to the defendant in other contexts.
Goldman does not challenge the Court’s relevant precedents, but ques-
tions  whether  the  Court  exercised  this  authority  in  establishing  the
Basic framework pursuant to the securities laws.  The Court concludes
that Basic and Halliburton II did allocate to defendants the burden of
persuasion  to  prove  a  lack  of  price  impact.    As  relevant  here,  Basic
explains that defendants may rebut the presumption of reliance if they
“show that the misrepresentation in fact did not lead to a distortion of
price” by making “[a]ny showing that severs the link between the al-
leged  misrepresentation  and  .  .  .  the  price  received  (or  paid)  by  the
plaintiff.”  485 U. S., at 248 (emphasis added).  Similarly, Halliburton
II held that defendants may rebut the Basic presumption at class cer-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the court's reasoning and holdings in a specific case. It is not the actual content of a book and is more focused on legal analysis than narrative or informational text.
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2

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

Syllabus

1. The  Arizona  Legislature  has  standing  to  bring  this  suit.    In
claiming that Proposition 106 stripped it of its alleged constitutional
prerogative  to  engage  in  redistricting  and  that  its  injury  would  be
remedied  by  a  court  order  enjoining  the  proposition’s  enforcement,
the Legislature has shown injury that is ‘concrete and particularized’
and ‘actual or imminent,’ ” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
520  U. S.  43,  64,  “fairly  traceable  to  the  challenged  action,”  and  “re-
dressable  by  a  favorable  ruling,”  Clapper  v.  Amnesty  Int’l  USA,  568
U. S. ___, ___.  Specifically, Proposition 106, together with the Arizo-
na Constitution’s ban on efforts by the Arizona Legislature to under-
mine  the  purposes  of  an  initiative,  would  “completely  nullif[y]”  any
vote by the Legislature, now or “in the future,” purporting to adopt a
redistricting plan.  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 823–824.  Pp. 9–15.

2. The  Elections  Clause  and  2  U. S. C.  §2a(c)  permit  Arizona’s  use

of a commission to adopt congressional districts.  Pp. 15–35.

(a) Redistricting  is  a  legislative  function  to  be  performed  in  ac-
cordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may in-
clude the referendum, Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565,
567,  and  the  Governor’s  veto,  Smiley  v.  Holm,  285  U. S.  355,  369.
While exercise of the initiative was not at issue in this Court’s prior
decisions, there is no constitutional barrier to a State’s empowerment
of its people by embracing that form of lawmaking.  Pp. 15–19.

(b) Title 2 U. S. C. §2a(c)—which provides that, “[u]ntil a State is
redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any ap-
portionment,”  it  must  follow  federally  prescribed  redistricting  proce-
dures—permits  redistricting  in  accord  with  Arizona’s  initiative.
From 1862 through 1901, apportionment Acts required a State to fol-
low  federal  procedures  unless  “the  [state]  legislature”  drew  district
lines.  In 1911, Congress, recognizing that States had  supplemented
the representative legislature mode of lawmaking with a direct law-
making role for the people, replaced the reference to redistricting by
the state “legislature” with a reference to redistricting of a State “in
the manner provided by the laws thereof.”  §4, 37 Stat. 14.  The Act’s
legislative  history  “leaves  no  . . .  doubt,”  Hildebrant,  241  U. S.,  at
568,  that  the  change  was  made  to  safeguard  to  “each  state  full  au-
thority  to  employ  in  the  creation  of  congressional  districts  its  own
laws and regulations.”  47 Cong. Rec. 3437.  “If they include the initi-
ative, it is included.”  Id., at 3508.  Congress used virtually identical
language in enacting §2a(c) in 1941.  This provision also accords full
respect to the redistricting procedures adopted by the States.  Thus,
so long as a State has “redistricted in the manner provided by the law
thereof”—as  Arizona  did  by  utilizing  the  independent  commission
procedure  in  its  Constitution—the  resulting  redistricting  plan  be-
comes the presumptively governing map.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n. Syllabi summarize the legal arguments and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
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  <content>
78  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

307, 313 (1993); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303
(1976) (per curiam); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348  U. S.  483,  491  (1955).    These  legitimate  interests  in-
clude  respect  for  and  preservation  of  prenatal  life  at  all
stages of development, Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 157–158; the
protection of maternal health and safety; the elimination of
particularly gruesome or barbaric medical procedures; the
preservation of the integrity of the medical profession; the
mitigation of fetal pain; and the prevention of discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, or disability.  See id., at 156–
157; Roe, 410 U. S., at 150; cf. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 728–
731 (identifying similar interests).

B
These  legitimate  interests  justify  Mississippi’s  Gesta-
tional Age Act.  Except “in a medical emergency or in the
case  of  a  severe  fetal  abnormality,”  the  statute  prohibits
abortion “if the probable gestational age of the unborn hu-
man being has been determined to be greater than fifteen
(15) weeks.”  Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191(4)(b).  The Mis-
sissippi Legislature’s findings recount the stages of “human
prenatal  development”  and  assert  the  State’s  interest  in
“protecting the life of the unborn.”  §2(b)(i).  The legislature
also  found  that  abortions  performed  after  15  weeks  typi-
cally  use  the  dilation  and  evacuation  procedure,  and  the
legislature  found  the  use  of  this  procedure  “for  nonthera-
peutic or elective reasons [to be] a barbaric practice, dan-
gerous for the maternal patient, and demeaning to the med-
ical profession.”  §2(b)(i)(8); see also Gonzales, 550 U. S., at
135–143 (describing such procedures).  These legitimate in-
terests provide a rational basis for the Gestational Age Act,
and  it  follows  that  respondents’  constitutional  challenge
must fail.

We end this opinion where we began.  Abortion presents

VII
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the rationale behind a gestational age act restricting abortion. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis, all characteristic of the body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

related to their rights under Title IX, of updates to the pro-
cesses schools must follow in investigating their complaints
of sex discrimination, of protections from retaliation should
they  file  a complaint,  and  of  much  more.    On  the  present
record, more tailored relief focused on the three challenged
provisions would have redressed respondents’ alleged inju-
ries without depriving the public of the Rule’s other provi-
sions.  Because  the  majority  of  this  Court  nonetheless
leaves the overly broad injunctions in place, I respectfully
dissent in part.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lvii

Page

989

Garraud, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

Garrett v. Mississippi  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

Garrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928

Garrison v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Gary v. Hall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
849

Garza v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
977

Garza Gallego v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Gaskin v. Kelly  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952

Gaskins v. Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

Gaston v. U. S. Postal Service
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1022

Gates; Ahmed v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

Gates; Al Libbi v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Gates; Al-Nashiri v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

Gates; Al Uzayti v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1007

Gates; Basardh v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Gates v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

Gates v. Michigan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1051

Gates; Paracha v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Gates; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gates v. Speedway Superamerica, L. L. C.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Gates; Trotter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1001,1141

Gates; White v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  976,1102

869

Gatewood v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gatewood v. Outlaw  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  993,1139

1083

Gatherum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gatling v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1129

Gaw v. Missouri  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

842

Gaylor v. Gerry
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925

Gaynor v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1150

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gearing v. California
Geertson Seed Farms; Monsanto Co. v.
1142

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GEICO Casualty Co.; Best v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  896,1066

947

GEICO General Ins. Co.; Walker v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938

Geisler Roberdeau, Inc.; Briarpatch Ltd., LP v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Geithner; Arensdorf v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Geithner; Wiley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  948,1086

1057

Geithner; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

Gemmill v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

General Motors Corp.; Burnett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General Nutrition Centers, Inc.; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

1114

General Services Administration; Lock v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Genevier v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County  . . . . .  967,1075

George; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

George v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  876,910
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

545

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

ples of fairness”). The imprecision of our regulatory tak-
ings doctrine does open the door to normative considerations
about the wisdom of government decisions. See, e. g., Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S., at 260 (zoning constitutes a
taking if it does not “substantially advance legitimate state
interests”). This sort of analysis is in uneasy tension with
our basic understanding of the Takings Clause, which has not
been understood to be a substantive or absolute limit on the
government’s power to act. The Clause operates as a con-
ditional limitation, permitting the government to do what
it wants so long as it pays the charge. The Clause pre-
supposes what the government intends to do is otherwise
constitutional:

“As its language indicates, and as the Court has fre-
quently noted, [the Takings Clause] does not prohibit the
taking of private property, but instead places a condition
on the exercise of that power. This basic understand-
ing of the Amendment makes clear that it is designed
not to limit the governmental interference with prop-
erty rights per se, but rather to secure compensation
in the event of otherwise proper interference amount-
ing to a taking.” First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S.
304, 314–315 (1987) (emphasis and citations omitted).

Given that the constitutionality of the Coal Act appears to
turn on the legitimacy of Congress’ judgment rather than on
the availability of compensation, see ante, at 521 (“[I]n a case
such as this one,
it cannot be said that monetary relief
against the Government is an available remedy”), the more
appropriate constitutional analysis arises under general due
process principles rather than under the Takings Clause.

It should be acknowledged that there are passages in some
of our cases on the imposition of retroactive liability for an
employer’s withdrawal from a pension plan which might give
some support to the plurality’s discussion of the Takings
Clause. See Connolly v. Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corpo-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the Takings Clause and due process principles in the context of a case involving the Coal Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS

JACKSON, J., dissenting

fore  the  addition  of  Corner  Post,  the  arbitrary-and-capri-
cious  claim  said  that  the  Board  failed  to  consider  certain
congressional instructions, relied on factors that Congress
did not intend for it to consider, and ran counter to evidence
before the Board.  See ECF Doc. 1, at 34–36.  Those claims,
too, were unchanged after the addition of Corner Post.  See
App. to Pet. for Cert. 82–84.

From the pleadings filed in this case, three observations
stand out.  First, these APA claims, like all APA claims, are
about what the agency itself did, so the logical point to start
the  clock  is  the  moment  the  agency  acted.    Second,  the
claims that Corner Post brings are not specific to it—they
are  identical  to  the  untimely  claims  the  coplaintiff  trade
groups brought before.  And, finally, although the majority
puts  procedural  challenges  to  the  side—asserting  that  its
holding does not extend to those, see ante, at 21, n. 8—the
claims  in  this  case  are  procedural,  so  the  majority’s  line-
drawing exercise is meaningless.

B
On the matter of congressional intent, the consistent ac-
crual rule in the administrative-law context (the limitations
period starts running at the time of the final agency action)
is  patently  superior  to  the  majority’s  reading  of  §2401(a).
Congress enacts statutes of limitations to achieve basic pol-
icy goals: “repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty
about  a  plaintiff ’s  opportunity  for  recovery  and  a  defend-
ant’s  potential  liabilities.”  Rotella  v.  Wood,  528  U. S.  549,
555  (2000);  see  also  Gabelli,  568  U. S.,  at  448.    For  APA
claims, where rulemakings apply to the public writ large,
repose  and  certainty  would  never  exist  if  any  and  every
newly formed entity can challenge every agency regulation
in  existence.  Stated  simply,  the  majority  has  adopted  an
implausible  reading  of  §2401(a),  because,  as  I  explain  be-
low,  a  plaintiff-specific  accrual  rule  operating  in  this  con-
text undermines each of the central goals of all limitations
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

29

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

and orders barring violators from holding certain positions
and  performing  certain  activities  in  the  industry.    See  15
U. S. C. §§77h–1(f ), and (g), 78u–2, 78u–3(f ).

For these reasons, “[a]n action brought by an Executive
Branch agency to enforce federal securities laws is not the
same  as  an  action  brought  by  one  individual  against  an-
other for monetary or injunctive relief of the sort that law
courts (with juries) in England or the States have tradition-
ally heard.”  Brief for Professor John Golden et al. as Amici
Curiae  3.  Congress  did  not  unlawfully  “siphon”  a  tradi-
tional legal action “away from an Article III court” when it
enacted  the  federal-securities  laws  and  provided  for  their
enforcement within the SEC.  Ante, at 21.

The majority asserts that “Granfinanciera effectively de-
cides this case.”  Ante, at 20.  That can only be true, though,
if one ignores what Granfinanciera actually says: Its public-
rights analysis of whether an action is closely intertwined
with a federal regulatory program only applies “in cases not
involving the Federal Government.”  492 U. S., at 54.  The
analysis from Atlas Roofing controls where, as here, “ ‘the
Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an
otherwise  valid  statute.’ ”  492  U. S.,  at  51  (quoting  Atlas
Roofing, 430 U. S., at 458).

C
Both cases relied on by the majority, Tull and Granfinan-
ciera, reaffirm that Atlas Roofing controls precisely in cir-
cumstances like the ones at issue in this case.  That is why
the majority’s late-stage attempt to distinguish Atlas Roof-
ing fails.  The majority’s principal argument that the OSHA
scheme in Atlas Roofing “did not borrow its cause of action
from the common law” and was instead a “self-consciously
novel”  scheme  that  “resembled  a  detailed  building  code,”
ante, at 23–24, is flawed on multiple fronts.

First, OSHA’s cause of action should be largely irrelevant
under the majority’s view that the remedy of civil penalties
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and discusses the legal arguments at play.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

THOMAS, J., dissenting

potentially disenfranchising a subset of voters and enforc-
ing the election provisions—such as receipt deadlines—that
the legislature believes are necessary for election integrity.
That  occurred  last  year.    After  a  court  wrongly  altered
South Carolina’s witness requirement for absentee ballots,
this Court largely reinstated the original rule, but declined
to  apply  it  to  ballots  already  cast.    Andino  v.  Middleton,
ante, p. ___.  Settling rules well in advance of an election
rather than relying on postelection litigation ensures that
courts are not put in that untenable position.

In short, the postelection system of judicial review is at
most suitable for garden-variety disputes.  It generally can-
not restore the state of affairs before an election.  And it is
often incapable of testing allegations of systemic maladmin-
istration, voter suppression, or fraud that go to the heart of
public confidence in election results.  That is obviously prob-
lematic for allegations backed by substantial evidence.  But
the same is true where allegations are incorrect.  After all,
“[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral process is es-
sential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.”
Purcell,  supra,  at  4;  cf.  McCutcheon  v.  Federal  Election
Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 191, 206–207 (2014) (plurality opin-
ion)  (identifying  a  compelling  interest  in  rooting  out  the
mere  “appearance  of  corruption”  in  the  political  process).
An incorrect allegation, left to fester without a robust mech-
anism to test and disprove it, “drives honest citizens out of
the democratic process and breeds distrust of our govern-
ment.”  Purcell, supra, at 4.

III
Because the judicial system is not well suited to address
these kinds of questions in the short time period available
immediately  after  an  election,  we  ought  to  use  available
cases  outside  that  truncated  context  to  address  these  ad-
mittedly  important  questions.    Here,  we  have  the  oppor-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the complexities of postelection judicial review and its limitations in addressing election integrity concerns.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC. v. BUSK

Opinion of the Court

Integrity  Staffing  required  its  employees  to  undergo  a
security screening before leaving the warehouse at the end
of  each  day.  During  this  screening,  employees  removed
items  such  as  wallets,  keys,  and  belts  from  their  persons
and passed through metal detectors.

In  2010,  Busk  and  Castro  filed  a  putative  class  action
against  Integrity  Staffing  on  behalf  of  similarly  situated
employees in the Nevada warehouses for alleged violations
of the FLSA and Nevada labor laws.  As relevant here, the
employees alleged that they were entitled to compensation
under the FLSA for the time spent waiting to undergo and
actually undergoing the security screenings.  They alleged
that such time amounted to roughly 25 minutes each day
and  that  it  could  have  been  reduced  to  a  de  minimis
amount  by  adding  more  security  screeners  or  by  stagger-
ing the termination of shifts so that employees could flow
through  the  checkpoint  more  quickly.    They  also  alleged
that  the  screenings  were  conducted  “to  prevent  employee
theft” and thus occurred “solely for the benefit of the em-
ployers and their customers.”  App. 19, 21.

The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim, holding that the time spent waiting for and
undergoing  the  security  screenings  was  not  compensable
under the FLSA.  It explained that, because the screenings
occurred after the regular work shift, the employees could
state a claim for compensation only if the screenings were
an integral and indispensable part of the principal activi-
ties  they  were  employed  to  perform.  The  District  Court
held that these screenings were not integral and indispen-
sable  but  instead  fell  into  a  noncompensable  category  of
postliminary activities.

The  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Ninth  Cir-
cuit reversed in relevant part.  713 F. 3d 525 (2013).  The
Court  of  Appeals  asserted  that  postshift  activities  that
would ordinarily be classified as noncompensable postlim-
inary  activities  are  nevertheless  compensable  as  integral
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary. It provides context about the case, the parties involved, and the legal issues at stake.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  577 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ARIE S. FRIEDMAN, ET AL. v. CITY OF

HIGHLAND PARK, ILLINOIS

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 15–133.  Decided December 7, 2015

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SCALIA  joins,

dissenting from the denial of certiorari.

“[O]ur central holding in” District of Columbia v. Heller,
554  U. S.  570  (2008),  was  “that  the  Second  Amendment
protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful
purposes,  most  notably  for  self-defense  within  the  home.”
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality
opinion).  And  in  McDonald,  we  recognized  that  the  Sec-
ond Amendment applies fully against the States as well as
the Federal Government.  Id., at 750; id., at 805 (THOMAS,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

Despite  these  holdings,  several  Courts  of  Appeals—
including  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Seventh  Circuit  in
the  decision  below—have  upheld  categorical  bans  on
firearms  that  millions  of  Americans  commonly  own  for
lawful  purposes.  See  784  F. 3d  406,  410–412  (2015).
Because  noncompliance  with  our  Second  Amendment
precedents warrants this Court’s attention as much as any
of our precedents, I would grant certiorari in this case.

I
The  City  of  Highland  Park,  Illinois,  bans  manufactur-
ing, selling, giving, lending, acquiring, or possessing many
of  the  most  commonly  owned  semiautomatic  firearms,
which the City branded “Assault Weapons.”  See Highland
Park, Ill., City Code §§136.001(C), 136.005 (2015), App. to
Pet. for Cert. 65a, 71a.  For instance, the ordinance crimi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court dissenting opinion. It cites relevant case law and sets up the argument for why the case should be heard.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1091

529 U. S.

April 24, 2000

No. 99–8381. Flood v. Frank, Superintendent, State Cor-
rectional Institution at Huntingdon, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 816.

No. 99–8382. Farrell v. Pataki, Governor of New York,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205
F. 3d 1322.

No. 99–8385. Graham v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8387. Harris v. Florida Department of Correc-
tions et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 202 F. 3d 287.

No. 99–8389. Van Tran v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 6 S. W. 3d 257.

No. 99–8394. McCray v. Hine et al. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8400. Leininger v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8401. Kubica v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8409. Williams v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 743 So. 2d 16.

No. 99–8411. Larson v. Trippett, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 508.

No. 99–8413. Atwood v. Iowa. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 602 N. W. 2d 775.

No. 99–8436. Casellas v. McGinnis, Superintendent,
Southport Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1321.

No. 99–8444. Redeagle-Belgarde v. Lambert, Superin-
tendent, Washington State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1333.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and certiorari decisions. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's not the primary narrative content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

[petitioners’] claims regarding the inherent characteristics
of midazolam.”  Warner, 776 F. 3d, at 733.

C
The  Court  not  only  disregards  this  record  evidence  of
midazolam’s  inadequacy,  but  also  fails  to  fully  appreciate
the procedural posture in which this case arises.  Petition
ers have not been accorded a full hearing on the merits of
their  claim.  They  were  granted  only  an  abbreviated  evi
dentiary  proceeding  that  began  less  than  three  months
after the State issued its amended execution protocol; they
did  not  even  have  the  opportunity  to  present  rebuttal
evidence after Dr. Evans testified.  They sought a prelimi
nary injunction, and thus were not required to prove their
claim, but only to show that they were likely to succeed on
the  merits.  See  Winter  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense
Council,  Inc.,  555  U. S.  7,  20  (2008);  Hill  v.  McDonough,
547 U. S. 573, 584 (2006).

Perhaps  the  State  could  prevail  after  a  full  hearing,
though  this  would  require  more  than  Dr.  Evans’  unsup
ported  testimony.  At  the  preliminary  injunction  stage,
however,  petitioners  presented  compelling  evidence  sug
gesting that midazolam will not work as the State intends.
The  State,  by  contrast,  offered  absolutely  no  contrary
evidence worth crediting.  Petitioners are thus at the very
least  likely  to  prove  that,  due  to  midazolam’s  inherent
deficiencies,  there  is  a  constitutionally  intolerable  risk
that they will be awake, yet unable to move, while chemi
cals  known  to  cause  “excruciating  pain”  course  through
their veins.  Baze, 553 U. S., at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment).

III

The  Court’s  determination  that  the  use  of  midazolam

poses  no  objectively  intolerable  risk  of  severe  pain  is  fac
tually  wrong.    The  Court’s  conclusion  that  petitioners’
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It presents legal arguments and cites previous cases. The content is sequential and relevant to the case's subject matter.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

957

558 U. S.

October 13, 2009

No. 09–6219.  Spriggs v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  163.

No.  09–6230.  Pollino  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  478.

No.  09–6232.  Clay  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  403.

No.  09–6235.  Brown  v.  Kerestes,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional  Institution  at  Mahanoy,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6240.  Hussain  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  227.

No.  09–6242.  Isom  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  665.

No.  09–6246.  Tyler  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6247.  Alexeev  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  259.

No.  09–6251.  Birdsong  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  573.

No.  09–6252.  Mendoza-Zaragoza  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  431.

No. 09–6253.  Paredes v.  Marshall, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  639.

No.  09–6254.  Moore  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  736.

No.  09–6259.  Pine  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  84.

No.  09–6262.  Hoey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  165.

No.  09–6263.  Robinson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  237.

No. 09–6264.  Pitts, aka Smith v.  United States.  C. A. 4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  533.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the orders issued.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

FDA v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

sufficient basis for the decision”); id., at ___ (ALITO, J., dis-
senting) (slip op., at 3) (“Under our precedent, the critical
question . . . is whether [a] challenged . . . law places a ‘sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abor-
tion of a nonviable fetus’ ” (quoting Casey, 505 U. S., at 877
(plurality opinion))).  The Government has moreover failed
to  demonstrate  irreparable  harm.    For  these  reasons,  I
would deny the Government’s request.

II
A
  Due  to  particularly  severe  health  risks,  vastly  limited
clinic options, and the 10-week window for obtaining a med-
ication abortion, the FDA’s requirement that women obtain
mifepristone  in  person  during  the  COVID–19  pandemic
places an unnecessary and undue burden on their right to
abortion.  Pregnancy itself puts a woman at increased risk
for severe consequences from COVID–19.  In addition, more
than half of women who have abortions are women of color,
and  COVID–19’s  mortality  rate  is  three  times  higher  for
Black  and  Hispanic  individuals  than  non-Hispanic  White
individuals.  On top of that, three-quarters of abortion pa-
tients have low incomes, making them more likely to rely
on  public  transportation  to  get to  a  clinic to  pick  up  their
medication.  Such patients must bear further risk of expo-
sure  while  they  travel,  sometimes  for  several  hours  each
way, to clinics often located far from their homes.8  Finally,

——————

8 For instance, according to the most recently available data, Arkansas
has just three abortion clinics, and 77% of women of childbearing age live
in a county without any clinic.  Mississippi has just one abortion clinic,
and 91% of women of childbearing age live in a county without any clinic.
Missouri has just three abortion clinics, and 78% of women of childbear-
ing age live in a county without a clinic.  North Dakota has just one abor-
tion clinic, and 72% of women of childbearing age live in a county without
any clinic.  See Guttmacher Institute, R. Jones, E. Witwer, & J. Jerman,
Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2017,
pp. 17–18 (2019).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case FDA v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding the FDA's requirement for in-person dispensing of mifepristone during the COVID-19 pandemic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

of reasonableness here.7

Next, the State and the United States contend that the

privacy  interest  implicated  by  blood  draws  of  drunk
driving  suspects  is  relatively  minimal.    That  is  so,  they
claim, both because motorists have a diminished expecta
tion  of  privacy  and  because  our  cases  have  repeatedly
indicated that blood testing is commonplace in society and
typically  involves  “virtually  no  risk,  trauma,  or  pain.”
Schmerber, 384 U. S., at 771.  See also post, at 3, and n. 1
(opinion of THOMAS, J.).

But the fact that people are “accorded less privacy in . . .
automobiles  because  of  th[e]  compelling  governmental
need  for  regulation,”  California  v.  Carney,  471  U. S.  386,
392 (1985), does not diminish a motorist’s privacy interest
in  preventing  an  agent  of  the  government  from  piercing
his  skin.  As  to  the  nature  of  a  blood  test  conducted  in  a
medical setting by trained personnel, it is concededly less
intrusive  than  other  bodily  invasions  we  have  found  un
reasonable.   See  Winston,  470  U. S.,  at  759–766  (surgery
to  remove  a  bullet);  Rochin  v.  California,  342  U. S.  165,
172–174  (1952)  (induced  vomiting  to  extract  narcotics
capsules  ingested  by  a  suspect  violated  the  Due  Process
Clause).  For  that  reason,  we  have  held  that  medically
drawn  blood  tests  are  reasonable  in  appropriate  circum
stances.  See  Skinner,  489  U. S.,  at  618–633  (upholding

——————

7 The dissent contends that officers in the field will be unable to apply
the traditional totality of the circumstances test in this context because
they  will  not  know  all  of  the  relevant  facts  at  the  time  of  an  arrest.
See post, at 6.  But  because “[t]he police  are presumably familiar with
the mechanics and time involved in the warrant process in their partic
ular jurisdiction,” post, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.), we expect that
officers  can  make  reasonable  judgments  about  whether  the  warrant
process  would  produce  unacceptable  delay  under  the  circumstances.
Reviewing  courts  in  turn  should  assess  those  judgments  “ ‘from  the
perspective  of  a  reasonable  officer  on  the  scene,  rather  than  with  the
20/20  vision  of  hindsight.’ ”    Ryburn  v.  Huff,  565  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2012)
(per curiam) (slip op., at 8).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the reasonableness of blood draws from drunk driving suspects. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of relevant legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE

BREYER, J., dissenting

likely  to  move  or  has  already  moved.    And,  as  the  Regis-
tration  Act  says,  “if  it  appears  from  change-of-address
provided by the Postal Service that . . . the registrant has
moved to a different residence not in the same registrar’s
jurisdiction,” the State has a reasonable (hence acceptable)
basis  for  “us[ing]  the  notice  procedure  described  in  sub-
section
(d)(2)  to  confirm  the  change  of  address.”
§20507(c)(1)(B).
  The  second  illustration  of  how  the  Confirmation  Proce-
dure  is  supposed  to  function  appears  in  a  portion  of  the
statute  I  have  not  yet  discussed—namely,  §6  of  the  Na-
tional Voter Registration Act, which sets out the rules for
voter  registration  by  mail.    See  §6,  107  Stat.  80,  52
U. S. C.  §20505.    In  particular,  §6(d),  entitled  “Undeliv-
ered Notices,” says that, “[i]f a notice of the disposition of a
mail  voter  registration  application  . . .  is  sent  by  nonfor-
wardable mail and is returned undelivered,” at that point
the  State  “may  proceed  in  accordance  with  section  8(d),”
namely,  the  Confirmation  Procedure,  and  send  the  same
“last chance” notice that I have just discussed.  §20505(d)
(emphasis added).
  Note that §6(d) specifies a nonforwardable mailing—and
not a forwardable mailing, like one specified in §8(d).  This
distinction matters.  Why?  If a person moves, a forward-
able  mailing  will  be  sent  along  (i.e.,  “forwarded”)  to  that
person’s new address; in contrast, a nonforwardable mail-
ing will not be forwarded to the person’s new address but
instead will be returned to the sender and marked “unde-
liverable.”    And  so  a  nonforwardable  mailing  that  is  re-
turned  to  the  sender  marked  “undeliverable”  indicates
that the intended recipient may have moved.  After all, the
Postal  Service,  as  the  majority  points  out,  returns  mail
marked  “undeliverable”  if  the  intended  recipient  has
moved—not  if  the  person  still  lives  at  his  old  address.
Ante, at 6, and n. 3.
  Under  §6(d),  the  Registration  Act  expressly  endorses
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the National Voter Registration Act and its procedures for confirming voter addresses.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
874

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No. 09–7.  Stevens v.  Vons Cos., Inc.  Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–11.  Raybestos  Products  Co.  v.  Indiana  Depart
ment  of  Environmental  Management.  Sup.  Ct.  Ind.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  897  N.  E.  2d  469.

No.  09–12.  Sandoval  et  al.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  Illinois.
C. A. 7th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 560 F. 3d 703.

No.  09–13.  Redstone  Resources,  Inc.  v.  Holme,  Rob
erts  &  Owen,  LLP,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Colo.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–14.  Shannon,  Director,  Illinois  Department  of
Labor,  et  al.  v.  520  South  Michigan  Avenue  Associates,
Ltd.,  dba  Congress  Plaza  Hotel  &  Convention  Center.
C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  549  F.  3d
1119.

No.  09–15.  Adamo,  Executor  of  the  Estate  of  Rose,
et  al.  v.  Brown  &  Williamson  Tobacco  Corp.,  Successor  in
Interest  to  American  Tobacco  Co.,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  N.  Y.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  11  N.  Y.  3d  545,  900  N.  E.
2d  966.

No.  09–16.  Muraski  v.  Minnesota.  Sup.  Ct.  Minn.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–17.  Silverman  et  al. v.  State  Farm  Mutual  Auto
mobile  Insurance  Co.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  440.

No.  09–18.  Gang  Song  v.  Turner  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–19.  Hill  v.  United  States  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  296  Fed.  Appx.  921.

No.  09–20.  Green  et  al.  v.  Jefferson  County  Commission
et al.  C.  A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported  below: 563
F.  3d  1243.

No.  09–22.  Jelovsek  v.  Bredesen,  Governor  of  Tennes
see,  et al.  C.  A. 6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported below:
545  F.  3d  431.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and certiorari decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

PETER v. NANTKWEST, INC.

Opinion of the Court

particularly important because §145 permits an unsuccess-
ful government agency to recover its expenses from a pre-
vailing party.  Reading §145 to award attorney’s fees in that
circumstance “would be a radical departure from longstand-
ing fee-shifting principles adhered to in a wide range of con-
texts.”  Ruckelshaus, 463 U. S., at 683.

The American Rule thus provides the starting point for
assessing  whether  §145  authorizes  payment  of  the  PTO’s
legal fees.

III
To determine whether Congress intended to depart from
the American Rule presumption, the Court first “look[s] to
the language of the section” at issue.  Hardt, 560 U. S., at
254  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  While  “[t]he  ab-
sence of [a] specific reference to attorney’s fees is not dis-
positive,” Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809,
815  (1994),  Congress  must  provide  a  sufficiently  “specific
and explicit” indication of its intent to overcome the Amer-
ican Rule’s presumption against fee shifting.  Alyeska Pipe-
line, 421 U. S., at 260.

A
The reference to “expenses” in §145 does not invoke attor-
ney’s fees with the kind of “clarity we have required to de-
viate from the American Rule.”  Baker Botts, 576 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 4).

Definitions  of  “expenses”  provide  scant  guidance.    The
term, standing alone, encompasses wide-ranging “expendi-
ture[s] of money, time, labor, or resources to accomplish a
result,”  Black’s  Law  Dictionary  698  (10th  ed.  2014),
“charges or costs met with in . . . doing one’s work,” Web-
ster’s New World College Dictionary 511 (5th ed. 2014), and
“outlay[s]” for labor, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law
180 (1996); see also N. Webster, An American Dictionary of
the English Language 319 (3d ed. 1830) (defining the term
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's decision. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court

islatures with authority to set rules governing federal elec-
tions free from restrictions imposed under state law.

I
The  Elections  Clause  provides:  “The  Times,  Places  and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.”  Ibid.  The Clause “imposes” on state legislatures
the  “duty”  to  prescribe  rules  governing  federal  elections.
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U. S. 1, 8
(2013).  It also guards “against the possibility that a State
would refuse to provide for the election of representatives”
by authorizing Congress to prescribe its own rules.  Ibid.

A

The 2020 decennial census showed that North Carolina’s
population had increased by nearly one million people, en-
titling the State to an additional seat in its federal congres-
sional delegation.  U. S. Census Bureau, 2020 Census Ap-
portionment  Results  (2021)  (Table  A).  Following  those
results,  North  Carolina’s  General  Assembly  set  out  to  re-
draw  the  State’s  congressional  districts.    North  Carolina
League of Conservation Voters, Inc. v. Representative Destin
Hall, 21 CVS 015426 etc. (Super. Ct. Wake Cty., N. C., Dec.
3,  2021),  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  260a–261a,  rev’d  and  re-
manded  on  other  grounds,  Harper  v.  Hall,  380  N. C.  317,
868 S. E. 2d 499 (2022) (Harper I ).  The General Assembly
also drafted new maps for the State’s legislative districts,
including  the  State  House  and  the  State  Senate.    Id.,  at
328–329, 868 S. E. 2d, at 513.  In November 2021, the As-
sembly  enacted  three  new  maps,  each  passed  along  party
lines.  Id., at 329, 868 S. E. 2d, at 513; see N. C. Gen. Stat.
Ann. §120–1 (2021) (State Senate); §120–2 (State House);
§163–201 (U. S. House of Representatives).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in a case called Moore v. Harper. It sets the context for the case and cites relevant legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:05] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1106

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 11, 15, 2000

529 U. S.

Certiorari Denied

May 11, 2000

No. 99–9483 (99A929). McBride v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App.
Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre-
sented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied.

May 15, 2000

Dismissal Under Rule 46

No. 99–1025. BankBoston, N. A. v. Suarez et ux. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46. Reported
below: 198 F. 3d 234.

Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded

No. 99–437. Lehman, Secretary, Washington Depart-
ment of Corrections v. MacFarlane et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to the
Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.
Reported below: 179 F. 3d 1131.

Certiorari Dismissed

No. 99–8528. Sikora v. Bohn. Ct. App. Neb. Motion of peti-
tioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certio-
rari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. Reported below: 8
Neb. App. lvii.

No. 99–8548. Patterson v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule
39.8. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1118.

No. 99–8983. Sallee v. United States Parole Commission.
C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule
39.8. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 631.

No. 99–8898. Nagy v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Mo-
tion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8. As peti-
tioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a list of cases and their dispositions from the Supreme Court. It includes case numbers, parties involved, court of origin, and the outcome of the certiorari petition.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 666 (1998)

697

Opinion of the Court

mitigate the burdens that the ruling would otherwise im-
pose. Because foreign relations are speciﬁcally committed
by the Constitution to the political branches, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2,
we would not make a discretionary judgment premised on
inducing them to adopt policies in relation to other nations
without squarely confronting the propriety of grounding
judicial action on such a premise.

Second, the very assumption that a witness’s silence may
be used against him in a deportation or extradition proceed-
ing due to its civil nature, 119 F. 3d, at 136 (citing Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U. S., at 1038–1039), raises serious questions
about the likely gain from recognizing fear of foreign prose-
cution. For if a witness claiming the privilege ended up in
a foreign jurisdiction that, for whatever reason, recognized
no privilege under its criminal law, the recognition of the
privilege in the American courts would have gained nothing
for the witness. This possibility, of course, presents a sharp
contrast with the consequences of recognizing the privilege
based on fear of domestic prosecution.
If testimony is com-
pelled, Murphy itself illustrates that domestic courts are not
even wholly dependent on immunity statutes to see that no
use will be made against the witness; the exclusionary prin-
ciple will guarantee that. See Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79.
Whatever the cost to the Government may be, the beneﬁt to
the individual is not in doubt in a domestic proceeding.

Since the likely gain to the witness fearing foreign prose-
cution is thus uncertain, the countervailing uncertainty
about the loss of testimony to the United States cannot be
dismissed as comparatively unimportant. That some testi-
mony will be lost is highly probable, since the United States
will not be able to guarantee immunity if testimony is
compelled (absent some sort of cooperative international
arrangement that we cannot assume will occur). While the
Court of Appeals is doubtless correct that the expected con-
sequences of some foreign prosecutions may be so severe
that a witness will refuse to testify no matter what, not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the implications of recognizing a witness's fear of foreign prosecution as a basis for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

25

Opinion of the Court

by  Wal-Mart  lack  standing  to  seek  injunctive  or  declara-
tory relief against its employment practices.  The Court of
Appeals’  response  to  that  difficulty,  however,  was  not  to
eliminate  all  former  employees  from  the  certified  class,
but  to  eliminate  only  those  who  had  left  the  company’s
employ by the date the complaint was filed.  That solution
has  no  logical  connection  to  the  problem,  since  those  who
have left their Wal-Mart jobs since the complaint was filed
have  no  more  need  for  prospective  relief  than  those  who
left beforehand.  As a consequence, even though the valid-
ity  of  a  (b)(2)  class  depends  on  whether  “final  injunctive
relief  or  corresponding  declaratory  relief  is  appropriate
respecting  the  class  as  a  whole,”  Rule  23(b)(2)  (emphasis
added),  about  half  the  members  of  the  class  approved  by
the Ninth Circuit have no claim for injunctive or declara-
tory  relief  at  all.  Of  course,  the  alternative  (and  logical)
solution of excising plaintiffs from the class as they leave
their  employment  may  have  struck  the  Court  of  Appeals
as  wasteful  of  the  District  Court’s  time.    Which  indeed  it
is,  since  if  a  backpay  action  were  properly  certified  for
class treatment under (b)(3), the ability to litigate a plain-
tiff ’s backpay claim as part of the class would not turn on
the  irrelevant  question  whether  she  is  still  employed  at
Wal-Mart.    What  follows  from  this,  however,  is  not  that
some  arbitrary  limitation  on  class  membership  should  be
imposed  but  that  the  backpay  claims  should  not  be  certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(2) at all.

Finally,  respondents  argue  that  their  backpay  claims
are appropriate for a (b)(2) class action because a backpay
award is equitable in nature.  The latter may be true, but
it  is  irrelevant.  The  Rule  does  not  speak  of  “equitable”
remedies  generally  but  of  injunctions  and  declaratory
judgments.  As  Title  VII  itself  makes  pellucidly  clear,
backpay  is  neither.    See  42  U. S. C.  §2000e–5(g)(2)(B)(i)
and  (ii)  (distinguishing  between  declaratory  and  injunc-
tive  relief  and  the  payment  of  “backpay,”  see  §2000e–
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal standing of a class action lawsuit and the appropriateness of certifying certain claims under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

27

Opinion of the Court

Why isn’t that enough to demonstrate that today’s result
isn’t totally unexpected?  How many people have to foresee
the application for it to qualify as “expected”?  Do we look
only at the moment the statute was enacted, or do we allow
some time for the implications of a new statute to be worked
out?  Should we consider the expectations of those who had
no  reason  to  give  a  particular  application  any  thought  or
only those with reason to think about the question?  How
do we account for those who change their minds over time,
after learning new facts or hearing a new argument?  How
specifically or generally should we frame the “application”
at  issue?  None  of  these  questions  have  obvious  answers,
and the employers don’t propose any.

One could also reasonably fear that objections about un-
expected applications will not be deployed neutrally.  Often
lurking just behind such objections resides a cynicism that
Congress could not possibly have meant to protect a disfa-
vored group.  Take this Court’s encounter with the Ameri-
cans  with  Disabilities  Act’s  directive  that  no  “ ‘public  en-
tity’ ”  can  discriminate  against  any  “ ‘qualified  individual
with  a  disability.’ ”    Pennsylvania  Dept.  of  Corrections  v.
Yeskey,  524  U. S.  206,  208  (1998).    Congress,  of  course,
didn’t  list  every  public  entity  the  statute  would  apply  to.
And no one batted an eye at its application to, say, post of-
fices.  But  when  the  statute  was  applied  to  prisons,  curi-
ously, some demanded a closer look:  Pennsylvania argued
that  “Congress  did  not ‘envisio[n]  that  the  ADA  would  be
applied  to  state  prisoners.’ ”  Id.,  at  211–212.  This  Court
emphatically  rejected  that  view,  explaining  that,  “in  the
context of an unambiguous statutory text,” whether a spe-
cific  application  was  anticipated  by  Congress  “is  irrele-
vant.”  Id., at 212.  As Yeskey and today’s cases exemplify,
applying protective laws to groups that were politically un-
popular at the time of the law’s passage—whether prison-
ers in the 1990s or homosexual and transgender employees
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute and the concept of "unexpected applications." The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>