<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

31

Opinion of the Court

claims.”  Id., at 46, 48.  That proposal threatens to eviscer-
ate  the  immunity  we  have  recognized.    It  would  permit  a
prosecutor to do indirectly what he cannot do directly—in-
vite the jury to examine acts for which a President is im-
mune from prosecution to nonetheless prove his liability on
any charge.  But “[t]he Constitution deals with substance,
not  shadows.”  Cummings  v.  Missouri,  4  Wall.  277,  325
(1867).  And the Government’s position is untenable in light
of the separation of powers principles we have outlined.

If official conduct for which the President is immune may
be scrutinized to help secure his conviction, even on charges
that purport to be based only on his unofficial conduct, the
“intended effect” of immunity would be defeated.  Fitzger-
ald,  457  U. S.,  at  756.    The  President’s  immune  conduct
would be subject to examination by a jury on the basis of
generally applicable criminal laws.  Use of evidence about
such conduct, even when an indictment alleges only unoffi-
cial conduct, would thereby heighten the prospect that the
President’s  official  decisionmaking  will  be  distorted.    See
Clinton, 520 U. S., at 694, n. 19.

The Government asserts that these weighty concerns can
be managed by the District Court through the use of “evi-
dentiary rulings” and “jury instructions.”  Brief for United
States 46.  But such tools are unlikely to protect adequately
the  President’s  constitutional  prerogatives.  Presidential
acts frequently deal with “matters likely to ‘arouse the most
intense  feelings.’ ”  Fitzgerald,  457  U. S.,  at  752  (quoting
Pierson, 386 U. S., at 554).  Allowing prosecutors to ask or
suggest that the jury probe official acts for which the Pres-
ident  is  immune  would  thus  raise  a  unique  risk  that  the
jurors’ deliberations will be prejudiced by their views of the
President’s  policies  and  performance  while  in  office.    The
prosaic tools on which the Government would have courts
rely are an inadequate safeguard against the peculiar con-
stitutional concerns implicated in the prosecution of a for-
mer President.  Cf. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 706.  Although such
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the immunity of a President from prosecution and the potential impact of evidence related to official conduct on a trial.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1136

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 22, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–9137. Griffin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 208 F. 3d 1006.

No. 99–9138. Harris v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 483.

No. 99–9142. Forrest v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 F. 3d 870.

No. 99–9145. Green v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 55 Conn. App. 706, 740 A. 2d 450.

No. 99–9147. Hakopian v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 386.

No. 99–9148. George v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 370.

No. 99–9149. Giovannangeli v. United States. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9150. Gedman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 208 F. 3d 1006.

No. 99–9152. Graham v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9153. Damerville v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 197 F. 3d 287.

No. 99–9155. Holmes v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 200.

No. 99–9156. Enigwe v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 449.

No. 99–9157. Fairly v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–9159. Dyson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–9161. Rashid v. Reno, Attorney General, et al.

C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9163. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 262.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1023

529 U. S.

March 20, 2000

ent, Green Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 899 (ﬁrst judg-
ment); 189 F. 3d 460 (second judgment).

No. 99–7101. Holloway v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 156 F. 3d 1240.

No. 99–7127. Farhad v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 1097.

No. 99–7129. Fratta v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–7178. Tsu et ux. v. Tracy Federal Bank et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 172 F. 3d 59.

No. 99–7183. Woods et al. v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 Cal. 4th 668, 981 P. 2d
1019.

No. 99–7349. Loy v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 360.

No. 99–7409. Lane v. National Data Corp. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 180 F. 3d 272.

No. 99–7475. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 1256.

No. 99–7505. Lucky v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 755 So. 2d 845.

No. 99–7554. Morgan v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 187 Ill. 2d 500, 719 N. E. 2d 681.

No. 99–7720. Rettig v. Kent City School District et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 637.

No. 99–7728. Ortiz v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7738. Rodriguez v. Litscher, Secretary, Wiscon-
sin Department of Corrections. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks the narrative flow and contextual information typical of the main body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases or Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

33

Opinion of the Court

D

Given  the  standard  of  review,  it  should  come  as  no
surprise  that  the  Court  hardly  ever  strikes  down  a  policy
as  illegitimate  under  rational  basis  scrutiny.    On  the  few
occasions  where  we  have  done  so,  a  common  thread  has
been that the laws at issue lack any purpose other than a
“bare  . . .  desire  to  harm  a  politically  unpopular  group.”
Department  of  Agriculture  v.  Moreno,  413  U. S.  528,  534
(1973).  In  one  case,  we  invalidated  a  local  zoning  ordi-
nance  that  required  a  special  permit  for  group  homes  for
the intellectually disabled, but not for other facilities such
as fraternity houses or hospitals.  We did so on the ground
that the city’s stated concerns about (among other things)
“legal  responsibility”  and  “crowded  conditions”  rested  on
“an  irrational  prejudice”  against  the  intellectually  dis-
abled.  Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S.
432,  448–450  (1985)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
And in another case, this Court overturned a state consti-
tutional amendment that denied gays and lesbians access
to  the  protection  of  antidiscrimination  laws.  The  amend-
ment,  we  held,  was  “divorced  from  any  factual  context
from  which  we  could  discern  a  relationship  to  legitimate
state interests,” and “its sheer breadth [was] so discontin-
uous  with  the  reasons  offered  for  it”  that  the  initiative
seemed  “inexplicable  by  anything  but  animus.”    Romer  v.
Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 632, 635 (1996).

The Proclamation does not fit this pattern.  It cannot be
said  that  it  is  impossible  to  “discern  a  relationship  to
legitimate state interests” or that  the policy is “inexplica-
ble by anything but animus.”  Indeed, the dissent can only
attempt to argue otherwise by refusing to apply anything
resembling  rational  basis  review.    But  because  there  is

——————

authority  for  its  proposition  that  the  more  free-ranging  inquiry  it

proposes  is  appropriate  in  the  national  security  and  foreign  affairs

context.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the standard of review for policies under rational basis scrutiny. It cites previous cases where the Court has struck down policies deemed to be based on irrational prejudice or animus.  The author argues that the Proclamation in question does not fit this pattern and is therefore suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

In  my  view,  a  defendant  who  has  executed  an  appeal
waiver  cannot  show  prejudice  arising  from  his  counsel’s
decision  not  to  appeal  unless  he  (1)  identifies  claims  he
would have pursued that were outside the appeal waiver;
(2) shows that the plea was involuntary or unknowing; or
(3)  establishes  that  the  government  breached  the  plea
agreement.  Garza has not made any such showing, so he
cannot establish prejudice.  Furthermore, because Garza’s
counsel  acted  reasonably,  Garza  also  cannot  establish
deficient performance.  I would therefore affirm.

A

The  majority  relies  on  Flores-Ortega  to  create  its  new
rule, but if anything, that decision undermines the majori-
ty’s  per se  approach.
In  Flores-Ortega,  the  defendant
pleaded  guilty  to  second-degree  murder  without  waiving
any  of  his  appellate  rights.  528  U. S.,  at  473–474.    On
federal  collateral  review,  the  defendant  alleged  that  his
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal
after  she  promised  to  do  so.  Id.,  at  474.    The  record  con-
tained  conflicting  evidence  as  to  whether  the  defendant
had  communicated  his  desire  to  appeal,  and  the  District
Court concluded that he failed to carry his burden.  Id., at
475.  The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that “a habeas
petitioner need only show that his counsel’s failure to file
a  notice  of  appeal  was  without  the  petitioner’s  consent.”
Id., at 475–476.

This Court reversed.  We first concluded that the Ninth
Circuit’s rule “effectively impose[d] an obligation on coun-
sel in all cases either (1) to file a notice of appeal, or (2) to
discuss  the  possibility  of  an  appeal  with  the  defendant,
ascertain his wishes, and act accordingly.”  Id., at 478.  We
rejected “this per se rule as inconsistent with Strickland’s
holding  that  ‘the  performance  inquiry  must  be  whether
counsel’s  assistance  was  reasonable  considering  all  the
circumstances.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting 466 U. S., at 688).  We also
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to appeal waivers and ineffective assistance of counsel.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

“forced  entry”  into  the  building,  “breaking  windows,”  and
“assaulting members of the U. S. Capitol Police.”  App. 189.
This breach of the Capitol caused Members of Congress to
evacuate  the  Chambers  and  delayed  the  certification  pro-
cess.  The complaint alleges that Fischer was one of those
who invaded the building.

According  to  the  complaint,  about  an  hour  after  the
Houses  recessed,  Fischer  trespassed  into  the  Capitol  and
was involved in a physical confrontation with law enforce-
ment.  Fischer claimed in Facebook posts that he “pushed
police back about 25 feet,” and that he “was inside the [Cap-
itol] talking to police.”  Id., at 193–194.  Body camera foot-
age shows Fischer near a scrum between the crowd and po-
lice who were trying to eject trespassers from the building.
Id., at 195–196.

A grand jury returned a seven-count superseding indict-
ment  against  Fischer.  Six  of  those  counts  allege  that
Fischer forcibly assaulted a federal officer, entered and re-
mained in a restricted building, and engaged in disorderly
and disruptive conduct in the Capitol, among other crimes.
See  id.,  at  181–185;  18  U. S. C.  §§111(a),  231(a)(3),
1752(a)(1), (a)(2); 40 U. S. C. §§5104(e)(2)(D), (G).  Those six
counts carry maximum penalties ranging from six months’
to eight years’ imprisonment.

In Count Three, the only count now before us, the Gov-
ernment  charged  Fischer  with  violating  18  U. S. C.
§1512(c)(2).  Fischer moved to dismiss that count, arguing
that the provision criminalizes only attempts to impair the
availability  or  integrity  of  evidence.    The  District  Court
granted his motion in relevant part.  It concluded that the
scope  of  Section  1512(c)(2)  is  limited  by  subsection  (c)(1)
and therefore requires the defendant to “ ‘have taken some
action with respect to a document, record, or other object.’ ”
2022 WL 782413, *4 (DC, Mar. 15, 2022) (quoting United
States v. Miller, 589 F. Supp. 3d 60, 78 (DC 2022)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an excerpt from a court opinion discussing a case. It contains legal terminology, citations, and a summary of the case's events and arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

EGBERT v. BOULE

Opinion of the Court

interest, actually “requires [the defendant’s] conduct.”  Ibid.
Instead,  we  “ask  whether  the  Judiciary  should  alter  the
framework  established  by  the  political  branches  for  ad-
dressing” any such conduct that allegedly violates the Con-
stitution.  Ibid.  With respect to that question, the foregoing
discussion shows that the Judiciary is ill equipped to alter
that framework generally, and especially so when it comes
to First Amendment claims.

Boule  responds  that  any  hesitation  is  unwarranted  be-
cause  this  Court  in  Passman  already  identified  a  Bivens
cause  of  action  under  allegedly  similar  circumstances.
There, the Court permitted a congressional staffer to sue a
congressman for sex discrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment.  See 442 U. S., at 231.  In Boule’s view, Passman, like
this  case,  permitted  a  damages  action  to  proceed  even
though it required the factfinder to probe a federal official’s
motives for taking an adverse action against the plaintiff.

(Congress  can

Even assuming the factual parallels are as close as Boule
claims,  Passman  carries  little  weight  because  it  predates
our  current  approach  to  implied  causes  of  action  and  di-
verges  from  the  prevailing  framework  in  three  important
ways.  First,  the  Passman  Court  concluded  that  a  Bivens
action must be available if there is “no effective means other
than the judiciary to vindicate” the purported Fifth Amend-
ment right.  442 U. S., at 243; see also Carlson, 446 U. S.,
at  18–19
foreclose  Bivens  relief  by
“provid[ing]  an  alternative  remedy  which  it  explicitly  de-
clared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Con-
stitution and viewed as equally effective”).  Since then, how-
ever, we have explained that the absence of relief “does not
by any means necessarily imply that courts should award
money  damages.”  Schweiker,  487  U. S.,  at  421.    Second,
Passman indicated that a damages remedy is appropriate
unless Congress “explicit[ly]” declares that a claimant “may
not recover money damages.”  442 U. S., at 246–247 (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted;  emphasis  deleted).    Now,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court is analyzing a precedent case (Passman). It is sequential text and provides legal argument, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

The  District  Court  adopted  the  Magistrate  Judge’s
factual  findings  and  legal  conclusions  and  denied  Rodri
guez’s  motion  to  suppress.  The  court  noted  that,  in  the
Eighth  Circuit,  “dog  sniffs  that  occur  within  a  short  time
following the completion of a traffic stop are not constitu
tionally  prohibited  if  they  constitute  only  de  minimis
intrusions.”  App. 114 (quoting United States v. Alexander,
448 F. 3d 1014, 1016 (CA8 2006)).  The court thus agreed
with  the  Magistrate  Judge  that  the  “7  to  10  minutes”
added  to  the  stop  by  the  dog  sniff  “was  not  of  constitu
tional significance.”  App. 114.  Impelled by that decision,
Rodriguez  entered  a  conditional  guilty  plea  and  was  sen
tenced to five years in prison.

The  Eighth  Circuit  affirmed.    The  “seven-  or  eight-
minute  delay”  in  this  case,  the  opinion  noted,  resembled
delays  that  the  court  had  previously  ranked  as  permissi
ble.  741 F. 3d 905, 907 (2014).  The Court of Appeals thus
ruled  that  the  delay  here  constituted  an  acceptable  “de
minimis intrusion on Rodriguez’s personal liberty.”  Id., at
908.  Given  that  ruling,  the  court  declined  to  reach  the
question  whether  Struble  had  reasonable  suspicion  to
continue  Rodriguez’s  detention  after  issuing  the  written
warning.

We granted certiorari to resolve a division among lower

courts  on  the  question  whether  police  routinely  may  ex
tend  an  otherwise-completed  traffic  stop,  absent  reason
able suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff.  573 U. S. ___
(2014).  Compare, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 270 F. 3d
625,  632  (CA8  2001)  (postcompletion  delay  of  “well  under
ten minutes” permissible), with, e.g., State v.  Baker, 2010
UT  18,  ¶13,  229  P. 3d  650,  658  (2010)  (“[W]ithout  addi
tional  reasonable  suspicion,  the  officer  must  allow  the
seized  person  to  depart  once  the  purpose  of  the  stop  has
concluded.”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses a case (Rodriguez v. United States) and the legal arguments surrounding a dog sniff during a traffic stop.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Syllabus

message.”  510 U. S., at 579.  But Campbell cannot be read to mean
that  §107(1)  weighs  in  favor  of  any  use  that  adds  new  expression,
meaning, or message.  Otherwise, “transformative use” would swallow
the copyright owner’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works, as
many derivative works that “recast, transfor[m] or adap[t]” the origi-
nal, §101, add new expression of some kind.  The meaning of a second-
ary work, as reasonably can be perceived, should be considered to the
extent necessary to determine whether the purpose of the use is dis-
tinct from the original.  For example, the Court in Campbell considered
the messages of 2 Live Crew’s song to determine whether the song had
a parodic purpose.  But fair use is an objective inquiry into what a user
does with an original work, not an inquiry into the subjective intent of
the user, or into the meaning or impression that an art critic or judge
draws from a work.

Even  granting  the  District  Court’s  conclusion  that  Orange  Prince
reasonably can be perceived to portray Prince as iconic, whereas Gold-
smith’s portrayal is photorealistic, that difference must be evaluated
in the context of the specific use at issue.  The purpose of AWF’s recent
commercial  licensing  of  Orange  Prince  was  to  illustrate  a  magazine
about Prince with a portrait of Prince.  Although the purpose could be
more  specifically  described  as  illustrating  a  magazine  about  Prince
with  a  portrait  of  Prince,  one  that  portrays  Prince  somewhat  differ-
ently from Goldsmith’s photograph (yet has no critical bearing on her
photograph), that degree of difference is not enough for the first factor
to favor AWF, given the specific context and commercial nature of the
use.  To hold otherwise might authorize a range of commercial copying
of photographs to be used for purposes that are substantially the same
as those of the originals.

AWF asserts another related purpose of Orange Prince, which is to
comment on the “dehumanizing nature” and “effects” of celebrity.  No
doubt, many of Warhol’s works, and particularly his uses of repeated
images, can be perceived as depicting celebrities as commodities.  But
even if such commentary is perceptible on the cover of Condé Nast’s
tribute to “Prince Rogers Nelson, 1958–2016,” on the occasion of the
man’s death, the asserted commentary is at Campbell’s lowest ebb: It
“has no critical bearing on” Goldsmith’s photograph, thus the commen-
tary’s “claim to fairness in borrowing from” her work “diminishes ac-
cordingly  (if  it  does  not  vanish).”  Campbell,  510  U. S.,  at  580.    The
commercial nature of the use, on the other hand, “loom[s] larger.”  Ibid.
Like satire that does not target an original work, AWF’s asserted com-
mentary “can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for
the very act of borrowing.”  Id., at 581.  Moreover, because AWF’s copy-
ing of Goldsmith’s photograph was for a commercial use so similar to
the photograph’s typical use, a particularly compelling justification is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion or a portion of a court ruling. It discusses copyright law and the concept of "fair use" in the context of Andy Warhol's artwork. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Court Ruling Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1148

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 19, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–412.  SMC  Corp.  et  al.  v.  Norgren,  Inc.,  et  al.
C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.
Appx.  991.

No.  09–439.  QSI  Holdings,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  Alford  et  al.
C. A. 6th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 571 F. 3d 545.
No.  09–447.  Hecker  et  al.  v.  Deere  &  Co.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  575.

No. 09–518.  Bullock v.  Klein et al.  C. A.  3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  812.

No.  09–549.  United  States  et  al.  v.  Smith.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  1090.

No.  09–550.  Fessler  et  ux.  v.  Kirk  Sauer  Community
Development of  Wilkes-Barre et al.  C. A.  3d Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  174.

No.  09–555.  Ashabranner  v.  Goodman,  Individually  and
as  Administratrix  of  the  Estate  of  Goodman,  Deceased;
and

No.  09–574.  Goodman,  Individually  and  as  Administra
trix  of  the  Estate  of  Goodman,  Deceased  v.  Harris
County,  Texas,  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  571  F.  3d  388.

No.  09–556.  Schreiner  v.  Ewing  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Wash.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  147  Wash.  App.  1026.

No.  09–558.  Ratcliff  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  9th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09– 561.  Parkhurst  et  ux.,  Individually  and  as
Guardians and  Next Friends of H.  P. v.  Tabor et  al.  C.  A.
8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  861.

No. 09–565.  Bason v.  Yukins, Warden.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  323.

No. 09–568.  Maremont Corp. v.  St. John, Individually and
as  Administratrix  ad  Prosequendum  of  the  Estate  of
St.  John.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–575.  English-Speaking  Union  v.  Johnson  et  al.
C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.
Appx.  4.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, the court that heard the case, and the outcome (certiorari denied).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

phonorecord.”  (Emphasis added.)

Thus, even though §106(3) forbids distribution of a copy of,
say,  the  copyrighted  novel  Herzog  without  the  copyright
owner’s permission, §109(a) adds that, once a copy of Her-
zog  has  been  lawfully  sold  (or  its  ownership  otherwise
lawfully  transferred),  the  buyer  of  that  copy  and  subse
quent  owners  are  free  to  dispose  of  it  as  they  wish.    In
copyright  jargon,  the  “first  sale”  has  “exhausted”  the
copyright owner’s §106(3) exclusive distribution right.

What, however, if the copy of Herzog was printed abroad

and then initially sold with the copyright owner’s permis
sion?  Does  the  “first  sale”  doctrine  still  apply?  Is  the
buyer, like the buyer of a domestically manufactured copy,
free to bring the copy into the United States and dispose of
it as he or she wishes?

To  put  the  matter  technically,  an  “importation”  provi

sion, §602(a)(1), says that

“[i]mportation into the United States, without the au
thority  of  the  owner  of  copyright  under  this  title,  of
copies  . . .  of  a  work  that  have  been  acquired  outside
the  United  States  is  an  infringement  of  the exclusive
right  to  distribute  copies  . . .  under  section  106  . . . .”
17  U. S. C.  §602(a)(1)  (2006  ed.,  Supp.  V)  (emphasis
added).

Thus  §602(a)(1)  makes  clear  that  importing  a  copy
without  permission  violates  the  owner’s  exclusive  distri-
bution right.  But in doing so, §602(a)(1) refers explicitly to
the  §106(3)  exclusive  distribution  right.  As  we  have  just
said,  §106  is  by  its  terms  “[s]ubject  to”  the  various  doc
trines  and  principles  contained  in  §§107  through  122,  in-
cluding  §109(a)’s  “first  sale”  limitation.    Do  those  same
modifications  apply—in  particular,  does  the  “first  sale”
modification  apply—when  considering  whether  §602(a)(1)
prohibits importing a copy?

In  Quality  King  Distributors,  Inc.  v.  L’anza  Research
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically discussing copyright law and the "first sale" doctrine in relation to imported copies. It's part of a legal argument and provides context and analysis of relevant statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

957

524 U. S.

June 26, 1998

No. 97–8816. Shown v. Oklahoma et al. Ct. Crim. App.

Okla. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8817. Smith v. Jarvis et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 136.

No. 97–8819. Zankich v. Goodnow. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 97–8820. Allmond v. Fauver et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 1254.

No. 97–8821. Boatwright v. Singletary, Secretary, Flor-
ida Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 705 So. 2d 569.

No. 97–8823. Monlyn v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 705 So. 2d 1.

No. 97–8834. Ferguson v. Johnson et al. C. A. 1st Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8840. Roberts v. Battelle Memorial Institute.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 372.

No. 97–8843. Rayborn v. Hatcher, Warden, et al. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8851. Brooks v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 960 S. W. 2d 479.

No. 97–8855. Washington v. Service Employees(cid:146) Interna-
tional Union, Local 50, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 825.

No. 97–8857. White v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8866. Franklin v. Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Rockview. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8876. Nary v. Hennessey, Sheriff, San Francisco

County, California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE

KAGAN, J., dissenting

And might be reintroduced until the end of time.  Because
what  all  these  bills  have  in  common  is  that  they  are  not
laws.  The  politicians  who  benefit  from  partisan  gerry-
mandering  are  unlikely  to  change  partisan  gerrymander-
ing.  And because those politicians maintain themselves in
office  through  partisan  gerrymandering,  the  chances  for
legislative reform are slight.

No worries, the majority says; it has another idea.  The
majority  notes  that  voters  themselves  have  recently  ap-
proved  ballot  initiatives  to  put  power  over  districting  in
the  hands  of  independent  commissions  or  other  non-
partisan  actors.    See  ante,  at  32.  Some  Members  of  the
majority, of course, once thought such initiatives unconsti-
tutional.  See  Arizona  State  Legislature,  576  U. S.,  at  ___
(ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  1).    But  put  that
aside.  Fewer  than  half  the  States  offer  voters  an  oppor-
tunity  to  put  initiatives  to  direct  vote;  in  all  the  rest  (in-
cluding North Carolina and Maryland), voters are depend-
ent on legislators to make electoral changes (which for all
the  reasons  already  given,  they  are  unlikely  to  do).    And
even when voters have a mechanism they can work them-
selves,  legislators  often  fight  their  efforts  tooth  and  nail.
Look  at  Missouri.    There,  the  majority  touts  a  voter-
approved  proposal  to  turn  districting  over  to  a  state  de-
mographer.  See ante, at 32.  But before the demographer
had drawn a single line, Members of the state legislature
had introduced a bill to start undoing the change.  See Mo.
H. J. Res. 48, 100th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (2019).
I’d  put  better  odds  on  that  bill’s  passage  than  on  all  the
congressional proposals the majority cites.

The  majority’s  most  perplexing  “solution”  is  to  look  to
state courts.  Ante, at 30.  “[O]ur conclusion,” the majority
states,  does  not  “condemn  complaints  about  districting  to
echo  into  a  void”:  Just  a  few  years  back,  “the  Supreme
Court  of  Florida  struck  down  that  State’s  congressional
districting  plan  as  a  violation”  of  the  State  Constitution.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically Justice Kagan's dissent in *Rucho v. Common Cause*. It argues against the majority's stance on partisan gerrymandering.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

has  effectively  amended  the  regulation  itself,”  something
that  under  the  APA  requires  use  of  notice-and-comment
procedures.  Brief for Respondent 20–21.

The  act  of  “amending,”  however,  in  both  ordinary  par-
lance  and  legal  usage,  has  its  own  meaning  separate  and
apart from the act of “interpreting.”  Compare Black’s Law
Dictionary  98  (10th  ed.  2014)  (defining  “amend”  as  “[t]o
change  the  wording  of ”  or  “formally  alter  . . .  by  striking
out,  inserting,  or  substituting  words”),  with  id.,  at  943
(defining  “interpret”  as  “[t]o  ascertain  the  meaning  and
significance of thoughts expressed in words”).  One would
not normally say that a court “amends” a statute when it
interprets  its  text.    So  too  can  an  agency  “interpret”  a
regulation without “effectively amend[ing]” the underlying
source  of  law.    MBA  does  not  explain  how,  precisely,  an
interpretive rule changes the regulation it interprets, and
its assertion is impossible to reconcile with the longstand-
ing  recognition  that  interpretive  rules  do  not  have  the
force  and  effect  of  law.   See  Chrysler  Corp.,  441  U. S.,  at
302,  n.  31  (citing  Attorney  General’s  Manual  on  the  Ad-
ministrative  Procedure  Act  30,  n. 3  (1947));  Skidmore  v.
Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).

MBA’s “interpretation-as-amendment” theory is particu-
larly odd in light of the limitations of the Paralyzed Veter-
ans  doctrine.    Recall  that  the  rule  of  Paralyzed  Veterans
applies  only  when  an  agency  has  previously  adopted  an
interpretation  of  its  regulation.    Yet  in  that  initial  inter-
pretation  as  much  as  all  that  come  after,  the  agency  is
giving a definite meaning to an ambiguous text—the very
act  MBA  insists  requires  notice  and  comment.    MBA  is
unable  to  say  why  its  arguments  regarding  revised  inter-
pretations  should  not  also  extend  to  the  agency’s  first
interpretation.4

——————

4 MBA alternatively suggests that interpretive rules have the force of
law  because  an  agency’s  interpretation  of  its  own  regulations  may  be
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the legal implications of an agency's interpretation of a regulation. It delves into the distinction between interpretation and amendment, citing legal precedents and definitions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
Opinion of the Court

satisfy the Appointments Clause, other times it has speci-
fied  methods  that  would  not  satisfy  the  Appointments
Clause,  including  elections  and  appointment  by  local  offi-
cials.  Officials with primarily local duties have often fallen
into the latter categories.  We know of no case endorsing an
Appointments  Clause  based  challenge  to  such  selection
methods.  Indeed, to read Appointments Clause constraints
as binding Puerto Rican officials with primarily local duties
would  work  havoc  with  Puerto  Rico’s  (federally  ratified)
democratic methods for selecting many of its officials.

We  thus  conclude  that  while  the  Appointments  Clause
does  restrict  the  appointment  of  “Officers  of  the  United
States” with duties in or related to the District of Columbia
or an Article IV entity, it does not restrict the appointment
of local officers that Congress vests with primarily local du-
ties under Article IV, §3, or Article I, §8, cl. 17.

B
The question remains whether the Board members have
primarily local powers and duties.  We note that the Clause
qualifies the phrase “Officers of the United States” with the
words  “whose  Appointments  . . .  shall  be  established  by
Law.”  And  we  also  note  that  PROMESA  says  that  the
Board is “an entity within the territorial government” and
“shall  not  be  considered  a  department,  agency,  establish-
ment,  or  instrumentality  of  the  Federal  Government.”
§101(c), 130 Stat. 553.  But the most these words show is
that Congress did not intend to make the Board members
“Officers of the United States.”  It does not prove that, inso-
far as the Constitution is concerned, they succeeded.

But we think they have.  Congress did not simply state
that the Board is part of the local Puerto Rican government.
Rather, Congress also gave the Board a structure, a set of
duties, and related powers all of which are consistent with
this statement.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Appointments Clause of the US Constitution and its application to a board in Puerto Rico.  It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U79

[09-08-00 13:44:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

138

MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

At the same time, the narrow interpretation creates its
own anomalies. The statute, for example, deﬁnes “ﬁrearm”
to include a “bomb,” “grenade,” “rocket having a propellant
charge of more than four ounces,” or “missile having an
explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter
ounce,” where such device is “explosive,” “incendiary,” or de-
livers “poison gas.”
18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(4)(A). On petition-
ers’ reading, the “carry” provision would not apply to in-
stances where drug lords, engaged in a major transaction,
took with them “ﬁrearms” such as these, which most likely
could not be carried on the person.

Fourth, petitioners argue that we should construe the
word “carry” to mean “immediately accessible.” And, as we
have said, they point out that several Courts of Appeals have
limited the statute’s scope in this way. See, e. g., Foster,
supra, at 708; Giraldo, supra, at 676. That interpretation,
however, is difﬁcult to square with the statute’s language,
for one “carries” a gun in the glove compartment whether or
not that glove compartment is locked. Nothing in the stat-
ute’s history suggests that Congress intended that limita-
tion. And, for reasons pointed out above, see supra, at 137,
we believe that the words “during” and “in relation to” will
limit the statute’s application to the harms that Congress
foresaw.

Finally, petitioners and the dissent invoke the “rule of len-
ity.” The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity,
however, is not sufﬁcient to warrant application of that rule,
for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree. Cf. Smith,
508 U. S., at 239 (“The mere possibility of articulating a nar-
rower construction . . . does not by itself make the rule of
lenity applicable”).
“ ‘The rule of lenity applies only if,
“after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,” . . .
we can make “no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended.” ’ ” United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 499
(1997) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 65 (1995), in turn
quoting Smith, supra, at 239, and Ladner v. United States,
358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958)). To invoke the rule, we must con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Muscarello v. United States*.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

35

BREYER, J., dissenting

N. Y., City Code §180–1(F) (2000); Chicago, Ill., Municipal
Code §8–24–025(a), 8–20–030(h); Cincinnati, Ohio, Admin.
Code §708–37(a) (Supp. 2008); Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance
§628.03(a)  (2008);  Columbus,  Ohio,  City  Code  §2323.31
(2007);  Denver,  Colo.,  Municipal  Code  §38–130(e)  (2008);
Morton  Grove,  Ill.,  Village  Code  §6–2–3(B);  N. Y. C.
Admin.  Code  §10–303.1  (2007);  Oak  Park,  Ill.,  Village
Code  §27–2-1;  Rochester,  N. Y.,  Code  §47–5(f)  (2008);
South  Bend,  Ind.,  Ordinance  §§13–97(b),  13–98  (2008);
Toledo, Ohio, Municipal Code §549.23(a).  These bans, too,
suggest  that  there  may  be  no  substitute  to  an  outright
prohibition  in  cases  where  a  governmental  body  has
deemed a particular type of weapon especially dangerous.

D
The  upshot  is  that  the  District’s  objectives  are  compel-
ling;  its  predictive  judgments  as  to  its  law’s  tendency  to
achieve those objectives are adequately supported; the law
does  impose  a  burden  upon  any  self-defense  interest  that
the Amendment seeks to secure; and there is no clear less
restrictive  alternative.    I  turn  now  to  the  final  portion  of
the  “permissible  regulation”  question:  Does  the  District’s
law  disproportionately  burden  Amendment-protected
interests?  Several  considerations,  taken  together,  con-
vince me that it does not.

First, the District law is tailored to the life-threatening
problems  it  attempts  to  address.    The  law  concerns  one
class  of  weapons,  handguns,  leaving  residents  free  to
possess shotguns and rifles, along with ammunition.  The
area that falls within its scope is totally urban.  Cf. Loril-
lard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 563 (2001) (var-
ied  effect  of  statewide  speech  restriction  in  “rural,  urban,
or suburban” locales “demonstrates a lack of narrow tailor-
ing”).  That  urban  area  suffers  from  a  serious  handgun-
fatality  problem.    The  District’s  law  directly  aims  at  that
compelling  problem.  And  there  is  no  less  restrictive  way
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal codes and discusses legal arguments.  The content is sequential and relevant to the case's discussion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

127

Opinion of the Court

missions, more than “at any other time in its history on any
61 Fed. Reg. 44418 (1996).
other subject.”

On August 28, 1996, the FDA issued a ﬁnal rule entitled
“Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Ciga-
rettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Ado-
Id., at 44396. The FDA determined that nico-
lescents.”
tine is a “drug” and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
are “drug delivery devices,” and therefore it had jurisdiction
under the FDCA to regulate tobacco products as customarily
marketed—that is, without manufacturer claims of therapeu-
tic beneﬁt.
Id., at 44397, 44402. First, the FDA found that
tobacco products “ ‘affect the structure or any function of
the body’ ” because nicotine “has signiﬁcant pharmacological
effects.”
Id., at 44631. Speciﬁcally, nicotine “exerts psy-
choactive, or mood-altering, effects on the brain” that cause
and sustain addiction, have both tranquilizing and stimulat-
Id., at 44631–44632. Sec-
ing effects, and control weight.
ond, the FDA determined that these effects were “intended”
under the FDCA because they “are so widely known and
foreseeable that [they] may be deemed to have been intended
by the manufacturers,” id., at 44687; consumers use tobacco
products “predominantly or nearly exclusively” to obtain
these effects, id., at 44807; and the statements, research, and
actions of manufacturers revealed that they “have ‘designed’
cigarettes to provide pharmacologically active doses of nico-
tine to consumers,” id., at 44849. Finally, the agency con-
cluded that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are “combina-
tion products” because, in addition to containing nicotine,
they include device components that deliver a controlled
amount of nicotine to the body, id., at 45208–45216.

Having resolved the jurisdictional question, the FDA next
explained the policy justiﬁcations for its regulations, detail-
ing the deleterious health effects associated with tobacco
use.
It found that tobacco consumption was “the single
leading cause of preventable death in the United States.”
Id., at 44398. According to the FDA, “[m]ore than 400,000
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal citations, case names, and discusses legal arguments and precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xcviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Meyers v. Sovereign Bank  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meza v. United States
Meza Segundo v. Texas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miami-Dade County; Dixon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miami-Dade School Bd.; American Civil Liberties Union of Fla. v.
Michael v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michalski, In re
Michalski v. Lempke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michel v. United States
Michigan; Charles v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan v. Davis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan v. Fisher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Gates v.
Michigan; Hollady v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Ivanova v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Ivanova-Warner v.
Michigan; Jakaj v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Kilbourne v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Kitchen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Lambert v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; McQuirter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Owens v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Robertson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Rone v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Salerno v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan v. Shaﬁer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Thomas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Wells v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan v. Williams
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Johns v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Petersen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Spencer v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan Dept. of Corrections; White v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan Dept. of Human Services; Filbrandt v.
Michigan State Treasurer; Richardson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan State Univ.; Sternberg v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Middlebrooks v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Middle Tenn. State Univ.; Parr v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Middleton v. Schult . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Middleton v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Midi v. Holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miggins v. United States

Page

876

1135

828

825

1023

1085

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  814,1022

1087

1037

1155

878

933

45

1078

1112

1145

1153

1153

866

910

1028

1081

1094

1032

992

995

1118

992

1151

1123

931

1123

1027

845

905

1108

1124

1128

882

865

1100

1080

1080

958
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxxi

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Grassini v. DuPage Township . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Graves v. Boone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Graves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grayson v. Royer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greater N. Y. Metropolitan Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani . . . . . . .
Green v. Connecticut
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Green v. Stelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Green v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Green v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greene v. Douglas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greene; Palaganas-Suarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greene v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greenwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greiner; Carpenter v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greiner; Quinones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grifﬁn v. United States
Grifﬁth v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollution Control and Ecology . . . . .
Grindle, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grinnell v. Russell
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grist v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grosso v. Artuz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grover v. Boyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guam Economic Development Authority v. United States . . . . . .
Guesman v. District Court of Nev., Clark County . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guesman v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
Guiliani; Greater N. Y. Metropolitan Food Council, Inc. v.
Gulf Shores; Lassan v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gulledge v. Dees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gulley v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gulley v. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . .
Gulley v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gutenkauf v. Maricopa County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gutierrez-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guzman v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Habelman v. Garvey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haddad v. Lieberman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haddad v. Michigan National Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hahn v. Star Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hairston v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hakim v. Jacob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hakopian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1109
1087
1043,1093
1067
1066
1136
1098
1059
1044,1064,1079,1103
1038,1144
1041
1090
1052
1103
1115
1114
1044,1136
1018
1014
1079
1103
1074
1026
1017
1069
1069
1066
1133
1074
1049
1033
1105
1069
1122
1031
1100
1115
1099
1078
1020
1134
1025
1136
1036
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

BARRETT, J., dissenting

“pros and cons of whether a statute should sweep broadly
or narrowly.”  United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 484
(1984).  Once Congress has set the outer bounds of liability,
the Executive Branch has the discretion to select particular
cases to prosecute within those boundaries.  By atextually
narrowing  §1512(c)(2), the Court has failed to respect the
prerogatives of the political branches.  Cf. ante, at 15.  I re-
spectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a clear argumentative structure.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

7

Opinion of the Court

Blatantly  discriminatory  evasions  of  federal  decrees  are
rare.  And  minority  candidates  hold  office  at  unprece-
dented levels.”  Id., at 202.  Finally, we questioned whether
the problems that §5 meant to address were still “concen-
trated  in  the  jurisdictions  singled  out  for  preclearance.”
Id., at 203.

Eight  Members  of  the  Court  subscribed  to  these  views,
and  the  remaining  Member  would  have  held  the  Act  un-
constitutional.  Ultimately, however, the Court’s construc-
tion  of  the  bailout  provision  left  the  constitutional  issues
for another day.

B
Shelby County is located in Alabama, a covered jurisdic-
tion.  It  has  not  sought  bailout,  as  the  Attorney  General
has  recently  objected  to  voting  changes  proposed  from
within  the  county.  See  App.  87a–92a.  Instead,  in  2010,
the  county  sued  the  Attorney  General  in  Federal  District
Court  in  Washington,  D. C.,  seeking  a  declaratory  judg-
ment that sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are
facially  unconstitutional,  as  well  as  a  permanent  injunc-
tion  against  their  enforcement.    The  District  Court  ruled
against  the  county  and  upheld  the  Act.    811  F. Supp.  2d
424, 508 (2011).  The court found that the evidence before
Congress in 2006 was sufficient to justify reauthorizing §5
and continuing the §4(b) coverage formula.

The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit affirmed.  In
assessing  §5,  the  D. C.  Circuit  considered  six  primary
categories  of  evidence:  Attorney  General  objections  to
voting  changes,  Attorney  General  requests  for  more  in-
formation regarding voting changes, successful §2 suits in
covered  jurisdictions,  the  dispatching  of  federal  observers
to  monitor  elections  in  covered  jurisdictions,  §5  preclear-
ance  suits  involving  covered  jurisdictions,  and  the  deter-
rent effect of §5.  See 679 F. 3d 848, 862–863 (2012).  After
extensive  analysis  of  the  record,  the  court  accepted  Con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and a case brought by Shelby County. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2007

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ET AL. v. HELLER

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 07–290.  Argued March 18, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008

District of Columbia law bans handgun possession by making it a crime
to  carry  an  unregistered  firearm  and  prohibiting  the  registration  of
handguns;  provides  separately  that  no  person  may  carry  an  unli-
censed  handgun,  but  authorizes  the  police  chief  to  issue  1-year  li-
censes;  and  requires  residents  to  keep  lawfully  owned  firearms
unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar de-
vice.  Respondent Heller, a D. C. special policeman, applied to regis-
ter  a  handgun  he  wished  to  keep  at  home,  but  the  District  refused.
He filed  this  suit seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin
the city from enforcing the bar on handgun registration, the licensing
requirement insofar as it prohibits carrying an unlicensed firearm in
the home, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the
use of functional firearms in the home.  The District Court dismissed
the  suit,  but  the  D. C.  Circuit  reversed,  holding  that  the  Second
Amendment  protects  an  individual’s  right  to  possess  firearms  and
that the city’s total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that
firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for
self-defense, violated that right.

Held:

1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a
firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for
traditionally  lawful  purposes,  such  as  self-defense  within  the  home.
Pp. 2–53.

(a) The Amendment’s prefatory clause announces a purpose, but
does  not  limit  or  expand  the  scope  of  the  second  part,  the  operative
clause.  The  operative  clause’s  text  and  history  demonstrate  that  it
connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms.  Pp. 2–22.

(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court’s interpretation
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1086

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 24, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–658. Castillo et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th
[Certiorari granted, 528 U. S. 1109.] Motion for appoint-
Cir.
ment of counsel granted, and it is ordered that Stanley Rentz,
Esq., of Waco, Tex., be appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner
Graeme Leonard Craddock in this case. Request for expenses
and attorney’s fees denied without prejudice.

No. 99–830. Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska,
et al. v. Carhart. C. A. 8th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 528 U. S.
1110.] Motion of Rutherford Institute for leave to ﬁle a brief as
amicus curiae granted.

No. 99–8861.
No. 99–8869.
No. 99–8918.

In re DeVore;
In re Dumornay; and
In re Jones. Petitions for writs of habeas cor-

pus denied.

Certiorari Granted

No. 99–7504. Lopez v. Davis, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 186 F. 3d 1092.

Certiorari Denied

No. 98–9563. Ashford v. Gilmore, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 167 F. 3d 1130.

No. 98–9840. Bui v. DiPaolo, Superintendent, Massachu-
setts Correctional Institution, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 170 F. 3d 232.

No. 99–538. Bock, Administrator of the Estate of Bock,
Deceased v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181 F. 3d 920.

No. 99–863. Prince v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 632.

No. 99–1040. Port of Portland v. Ronne et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 933.

No. 99–1179. Power Engineering Co. et al. v. United
States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
191 F. 3d 1224.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (granted, denied, etc.). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

Opinion of the Court

That this rule developed at common law is unsurprising
in the light of the noneconomic rights that individuals had
at that time.  A contrary rule would have meant, in many
cases, that there was no remedy at all for those rights, such
as due process or voting rights, that were not readily reduc-
ible to monetary valuation.  See D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies
§3.3(2) (3d ed. 2018) (nominal damages are often awarded
for a right “not economic in character and for which no sub-
stantial non-pecuniary award is available”); see also Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266–267 (1978) (awarding nominal
damages for a violation of procedural due process).  By per-
mitting  plaintiffs  to  pursue  nominal  damages  whenever
they  suffered  a  personal  legal  injury,  the  common  law
avoided  the  oddity  of  privileging  small-dollar  economic
rights over important, but not easily quantifiable, nonpecu-
niary rights.

B
Respondents and the dissent attempt to discount this his-
torical  line  of  cases  by  contending  that  something  other
than nominal damages provided redressability.  They argue
instead  that  courts  could  award  nominal  damages  only
when a plaintiff pleaded compensatory damages but failed
to  prove  a  specific  amount.    In  those  circumstances,  they
say,  the  plea  for  compensatory  damages  is  what  satisfied
the redressability requirement, and courts awarded nomi-
nal damages merely as a technical matter.  We do not agree.
To begin with, the cases themselves did not require a plea
for compensatory damages as a condition for receiving nom-
inal  damages.  Lord  Holt  spoke  in  categorical  terms:
“[E]very injury imports a damage,” so a plaintiff who proved
a legal violation could always obtain some form of damages
because  he  “must  of  necessity  have  a  means  to  vindicate
and maintain [the right].”  Ashby, 2 Raym. Ld., at 953–955,
92 Eng. Rep., at 136–137.  Justice Story’s language was no
less definitive: “The law tolerates no farther inquiry than
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It delves into legal precedent and arguments regarding nominal damages.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

89

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered the main body text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

27

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

as  a  statutory  bulwark  against  courts  deviating  from
Bobbs-Merrill  in  a  way  that  increases  copyright  owners’
control  over  downstream  distribution,  and  legislative
history  indicates  that  is  precisely  the  role  Congress  in
tended  §109(a)  to  play.    Congress  first  codified  the  first
sale doctrine in §41 of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat.
1084.21    It  did  so,  the  House  Committee  Report  on  the
1909  Act  explains,  “in  order  to  make  . . .  clear  that  [Con
gress  had]  no  intention  [of]  enlarg[ing]  in  any  way  the
construction  to  be  given  to  the  word  ‘vend.’ ”    H. R.  Rep.
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1909).  According to the
Committee Report, §41 was “not intended to change [exist
ing law] in any way.”  Ibid.  The position I have stated and
explained  accords  with  this  expression  of  congressional
intent.  In  enacting  §41  and  its  successors,  I  would  hold,
Congress did not “change . . . existing law,” ibid., by strip
ping the word “vend” (and thus its substitute “distribute”)
of the limiting construction imposed in Bobbs-Merrill.

In any event, the reading of the Copyright Act to which
I  subscribe  honors  Congress’  aim  in  enacting  §109(a)
while  the  Court’s  reading  of  the  Act  severely  diminishes
§602(a)(1)’s role.  See  supra, at 10–12.  My  position in no
way  tugs  against  the  principle  underlying  §109(a)—i.e.,
that  certain  conduct  by  the  copyright  owner  exhausts  the

——————

States with the copyright owner’s permission, not when it is distributed
abroad.  But under §109(a), as interpreted in Quality King, any author
ized distribution of a U. S.-made copy, even a distribution occurring in
a  foreign  country,  exhausts  the  copyright  owner’s  distribution  right
under  §106(3).    See  523  U. S.,  at  145,  n. 14.    Section  109(a)  therefore
provides for exhaustion in a circumstance not reached by Bobbs-Merrill.
21 Section 41 of the 1909 Act provided: “[N]othing in this Act shall be
deemed  to  forbid,  prevent,  or  restrict  the  transfer  of  any  copy  of  a
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained.”
35 Stat. 1084.  This language was repeated without material change in
§27  of  the  Copyright  Act  of  1947,  61  Stat.  660.    As  noted  above,  see
supra,  at  2,  17  U. S. C.  §109(a)  sets  out  the  current  codification  of  the
first sale doctrine.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

Hickman; Scott v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  900,1139

Hickox v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Hicks v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  849,884,1034

1120

Higgins v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Higgins; McGee v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Higgins v. Randall County Sheriff ’s Ofﬁce  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1084

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Higgins v. United States
814

Hill, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hill v. District of Columbia Dept. of Employment Services  . . .  955,1086

903

Hill v. Hillier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Hill v. Kemna  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  874,891,915,926,961,1065,1109,1131

817

Hill Dermaceuticals, Inc. v. Rx Solutions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1084

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hilliard v. United States
903

Hillier; Hill v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Himmelberger v. Ayers
837

Hines v. Tennessee  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hines v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  919,927

1150

Hirmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

Hirt v. Montana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

HK Systems, Inc. v. Eaton Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1157

Hobereck v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
802

Hobley v. District of Columbia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

Hodge v. Calvert County Public Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hoefert v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
884

957

Hoey v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hofbauer; Reed v.
954

Hofbauer; Ruiz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
883

Hofbauer; Spencer v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1010

Hoffart v. Herman
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hoffenberg v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1101

826

Hoffman v. Jonesﬁlm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Hoffman; Jonesﬁlm v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hoffman v. Lincoln General Ins.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  891,1139

893

Hoffman v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Hoffman v. United Airlines, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hoffman v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  929,1140

947

Hofmeister v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  884,1065

Hogues v. Thaler
1052

Hojan v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holbach v. North Dakota
801

Holder; Afanwi v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Holder; Arguelles-Olivares v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Holder; Barry v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, not the actual content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 19–715 and 19–760
_________________

19–715

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MAZARS USA, LLP, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

19–760

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[July 9, 2020]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
Three Committees of the U. S. House of Representatives
issued subpoenas to several accounting and financial firms
to obtain the personal financial records of the President, his
family, and several of his business entities.  The Commit-
tees do not argue that these subpoenas were issued pursu-
ant to the House’s impeachment power.  Instead, they argue
that the subpoenas are a valid exercise of their legislative
powers.

Petitioners challenge the validity of these subpoenas.  In
doing so, they call into question our precedents to the extent
that they allow Congress to issue legislative subpoenas for
the President’s private, nonofficial documents.  I would hold
that Congress has no power to issue a legislative subpoena
for private, nonofficial documents—whether they belong to
the President or not.  Congress may be able to obtain these
documents as part of an investigation of the President, but
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas. It includes citations, case names, and the formal language typical of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

Opinion of the Court

ibid.4  Ohio was one such State.  Its Constitution provided
that “[a]ny elector who fails to vote in at least one election
during any period of four consecutive years shall cease to
be an elector unless he again registers to vote.”  Art. V, §1
(1977).
  In addition, our reading prohibits States from using the
failure to vote as the sole cause for removal on any ground,
not  just  because  of  a  change  of  residence.    Recall  that
subsection (d)’s removal process applies only to change-of-
residence  removals  but  that  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause
applies  to  all  removals.    Without  the  Failure-to-Vote
Clause,  therefore,  States  could  use  the  failure  to  vote  as
conclusive  evidence  of  ineligibility  for  some  reason  other
than  change  of  residence,  such  as  death,  mental  incapac-
ity, or a criminal conviction resulting in prolonged impris-
onment.

D
  Respondents put forth one additional argument regard-
ing  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause.    In  essence,  it  boils  down
to this.  So many properly registered voters simply discard
return  cards  upon  receipt  that  the  failure  to  send  them
back  is  worthless  as  evidence  that  the  addressee  has
moved.    As  respondents’  counsel  put  it  at  argument,  “a
notice that doesn’t get returned” tells the State “absolutely
nothing about whether the person has moved.”  Tr. of Oral
Arg. 41, 58.  According to respondents, when Ohio removes
registrants for failing to respond to a notice and failing to
vote, it functionally “removes people solely for non-voting”
unless  the  State  has  additional  “reliable  evidence”  that  a
registrant has moved.  Id., at 49, 71.
  This  argument  is  based  on  a  dubious  empirical  conclu-
——————

4 See,  e.g.,  Haw.  Rev.  Stat.  §11–17(a)  (1993);  Idaho  Code  Ann.  §34–
435 (1981); Minn. Stat. §201.171 (1992); Mont. Code Ann. §13–2–401(1)
(1993); N. J. Stat. Ann. §19:31–5 (West Supp. 1989); Okla. Stat., Tit. 26,
§4–120.2 (1991); Utah Code §20–2–24(1)(b) (1991).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the "Failure-to-Vote Clause" and its implications for voter registration.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1078

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 7, 2009

558 U. S.

No. 09–6078.  GwanJun Kim v. Progressive Express Insur

ance  Co.  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6186.  Lewis  v.  Alabama.  Sup.  Ct.  Ala.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  24  So.  3d  540.

No.  09–6243.  Varga  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321
Fed.  Appx.  390.

No. 09–6453.  Roach v.  Rockingham County Board of Edu

cation  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6774.  Galache  v.  Kenan,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6775.  Gates  v.  Michigan.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6780.  Frost  v.  Toney.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  de

nied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  296.

No.  09–6782.  Bundrant  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6784.  Anderson  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6786.  Brown  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  Pennsylva
nia,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
331  Fed.  Appx.  898.

No.  09–6789.  Om  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  3d  App.  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6791.  Garland  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6796.  Hrusovsky  v.  Harlow,  Superintendent,
State  Regional  Correctional  Facility  at  Mercer,  et  al.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 256 (2010)

275

Opinion of the Court

zens  and  creatures  of  the  state,”  whose  interest  the  State
presumptively  represents  in  matters  of  sovereign  policy.
Id., at 373.  We conclude that Charlotte has not carried that
burden.  Thus,  respect  for  “sovereign  dignity”  requires  us
to  recognize  that  North  Carolina  properly  represents  Char
lotte  in  this  dispute  over  a  matter  of  uniquely  sovereign
interest.  See ibid.

North  Carolina’s  own  statements  only  reinforce  this  con
clusion.  North  Carolina  has  said  that  it  will  defend  Char
lotte’s  authorized  33  mgd  transfer.  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  52–53.
The  State  expressly  disagrees  with  Charlotte’s  assertion
that  the  city’s  interest  is not  adequately  represented  by  the
State.  Brief  for  State  of  North  Carolina  in  Opposition  to
Plaintiff ’s Exceptions 22.  Indeed, in response to Charlotte’s
motion to intervene, North Carolina wrote the following:

“[T]he  State  must  represent  the  interests  of  every  per
son  that  uses  water  from  the  North  Carolina  portion  of
the Catawba River basin.  In fact, the State has a par
ticular  concern  for  its  political  subdivisions,  such  as
Charlotte,  which  actually  operate  the  infrastructure  to
provide  water  to  the  State’s  citizens. . . .  The State has
every reason to defend the [transfers] that it has author
ized  for  the  beneﬁt  of  its  citizens.  The  State  cannot
agree with any implication that because it represents all
of the users of water in North Carolina it cannot, or will
not[,]  represent  the  interests  of  Charlotte  in  this  litiga
tion  initiated  by  South  Carolina.”  Brief  for  State  of
North  Carolina  in  Response  to  City  of  Charlotte’s  Mo
tion  for  Leave  To  Intervene  and  File  Answer  1–2,  ¶ 1.

These  statements  are  consistent  with  North  Carolina’s  role
as parens patriae, and we see no reason that North Carolina
cannot  represent  Charlotte’s  interest  in  this  sovereign  dis
pute.  See New Jersey v.  New York, 345 U. S., at 374 (noting
that Philadelphia’s interest “is invariably served by the Com
monwealth’s position”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the representation of Charlotte's interests in a water rights dispute. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

86

PORTUONDO v. AGARD

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

the defendant as guilty, or unless there are speciﬁc reasons
to believe that particular testimony has been altered, the
possibility that the defendant is telling the truth is surely
as good an explanation for the coherence of the defendant’s
testimony as any that involves wrongful tailoring.
I there-
fore disagree with the Court’s assertion, ante, at 68, that
the Court of Appeals’ decision in Agard’s case differs from
our decision in Grifﬁn by “requir[ing] the jury to do what
is practically impossible.” 7
It makes little sense to main-
tain that juries able to avoid drawing adverse inferences
from a defendant’s silence would be unable to avoid thinking
that only a defendant’s opportunity to spin a web of lies could
explain the seamlessness of his testimony.

The Court states in the alternative that if proscribing ge-
neric accusations of tailoring at summation does not require
the jury to do the impossible, then it prohibits prosecutors
from “inviting the jury to do what the jury is perfectly enti-
tled to do.” Ante, at 68. The Court offers no prior au-
thority, however, for the proposition that a jury may con-
stitutionally draw the inference now at issue. The Second
Circuit thought the matter open, and understandably so
in light of Grifﬁn and Carter. But even if juries were per-
mitted to draw the inference in question, it would not follow
that prosecutors could urge juries to draw it. Doyle pro-
hibits prosecutors from urging juries to draw adverse in-
ferences from a defendant’s choice to remain silent after re-

7 In fact, the Court of Appeals’ decision in Agard’s case does not tell
juries to do anything; it merely prevents prosecutors from inviting them
to do something.
I presume that the Court means to say that the Court
of Appeals’ decision prohibits prosecutors from inviting juries to do some-
thing jurors will inevitably do even without invitation.
In either case,
however, the Court’s conﬁdence that all juries will naturally regard the
defendant’s presence at trial as a reason to be suspicious of his testimony
is perplexing in light of the Court’s equal conﬁdence that allowing com-
ment on the same subject is “essential” to the truth-ﬁnding function of the
trial. See ante, at 73.
If all juries think this anyway, the pursuit of truth
will not suffer if they are not told to think it.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. The text is sequential and coherent, indicating it is part of the main body of the document and not a separate element like a table of contents or list of questions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

THOMAS, J., concurring

The Army Corps of Engineers originally understood the
CWA  in  precisely  this  way.    In  its  1974  regulation  estab-
lishing the first CWA §404 permitting program,6 the Corps
interpreted  the  term  “the  waters  of  the  United  States”  to
establish jurisdiction over the traditional navigable waters
as determined by the expanded Daniel Ball test, noting also
that the term is limited by Congress’ navigation authority.
39 Fed. Reg. 12115.  The Corps anchored its jurisdiction in
the expanded Daniel Ball test, defining “navigable waters”
to include “those waters of the United States which are sub-
ject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or
have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible
for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.”  33
CFR §209.120(d)(1) (1974); see also §§209.260(d)(1)–(3) (re-
quiring “[p]ast, present, or potential presence of interstate
or  foreign  commerce,”  “[p]hysical  capabilities  for  use  by
commerce,”  and  “[d]efined  geographic  limits  of  the  water
body”).  The  regulations  also  made  clear  that  traditional
navigability factors were the baseline for CWA jurisdiction:
“It  is  the  water  body’s  capability  of  use  by  the  public  for
purposes of transportation or commerce which is the deter-
minative factor.”  §209.260(e)(1).
  Almost  immediately,  however,  a  few  courts  and  the  re-
cently created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) re-
jected  this  interpretation.    Instead,  they  interpreted  the
CWA  to  assert  the  full  extent  of  Congress’  New  Deal  era
authority to regulate anything that substantially affects in-
terstate commerce by itself or in the aggregate.  See United
States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F. 2d 1317, 1323–
1329  (CA6  1974);  P.  F.  Z.  Properties,  Inc.  v.  Train,  393
F. Supp. 1370, 1381 (DC 1975); National Resource Defense
Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (DC 1975);

——————

6 Section  404  authorizes  the  Corps  to  “issue  permits  . . .  for  the  dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified
disposal sites.”  33 U. S. C. §§1344(a), (d).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 598 U.S. ____ (2023). It delves into the interpretation of the Clean Water Act (CWA) and its jurisdictional reach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC.

Opinion of the Court

energy price index,” and “for reporting transaction data to
index  developers.”  Price  Discovery  in  Natural  Gas  and
Elec.  Markets,  104  FERC  ¶61,121,  pp.  61,407,  61,408
(2003).  Finally, FERC, after finding that certain jurisdic
tional  sellers  had  “engaged  in  wash  trading  . . .  that  re
sulted in the manipulation of [natural-gas] prices,” termi
nated those sellers’ blanket marketing certificates.  Enron
Power  Marketing,  Inc.,  103  FERC  ¶61,343,  p.  62,303
(2003).

Congress also took steps to address these problems.  In
particular,  it  passed  the  Energy  Policy  Act  of  2005,  119
Stat.  594,  which  gives  FERC  the  authority  to  issue  rules
and regulations to prevent “any manipulative or deceptive
device  or  contrivance”  by  “any  entity  . . .  in  connection
with the purchase or sale of natural gas or the purchase or
sale  of  transportation  services  subject  to  the  jurisdiction
of ” FERC, 15 U. S. C. §717c–1.

C
We now turn to the cases before us.  Respondents, as we
have  said,  bought  large  quantities  of  natural  gas  directly
from interstate pipelines for their own consumption.  They
believe that they overpaid in these transactions due to the
interstate  pipelines’  manipulation  of  the  natural-gas
indices.  Based on this belief, they filed state-law antitrust
suits  against  petitioners  in  state  and  federal  courts.    See
App.  244–246  (alleging  violations  of  Wis.  Stat.  §§133.03,
133.14, 133.18); see also App. 430–433 (same); id., at 519–
521  (same);  id.,  at  362–364  (alleging  violations  of  Kansas
Restraint  of  Trade  Act,  Kan.  Stat.  Ann.  §50–101  et  seq.);
App.  417–419  (alleging  violations  of  Missouri  Antitrust
Law,  Mo.  Rev.  Stat.  §§416.011–416.161).    The  pipelines
removed  all  the  state  cases  to  federal  court,  where  they
were consolidated and sent for pretrial proceedings to the
Federal District  Court  for the  District of Nevada.  See 28
U. S. C. §1407.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Supreme Court's decision in ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC. It discusses legal precedents and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in the context of natural gas price manipulation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$75M 02-18-99 19:35:21 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 524 U. S. 74 (1998)

79

Opinion of the Court

plan as of the date he elects COBRA continuation coverage
is ineligible for COBRA coverage under § 1162(2)(D)(i), and
that James Geissal presented insufﬁcient evidence of detri-
mental reliance on Moore’s representation that he was enti-
tled to beneﬁts under COBRA. The Magistrate also found
that there was no signiﬁcant difference between the terms
of coverage under Aetna’s plan and Moore’s; they differed
only in the amount of their respective deductibles, and there
was no evidence that Aetna’s plan excluded or limited cover-
age for James Geissal’s condition.

The Magistrate then granted Geissal’s unopposed motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for the entry of
ﬁnal judgment on Counts I and II, and so enabled Geissal
to seek immediate review of the Magistrate’s decision. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit afﬁrmed, 114 F. 3d
1458 (1997), and we granted certiorari, 522 U. S. 1086 (1998),
to resolve a conﬂict among the Circuits on whether an em-
ployer may deny COBRA continuation coverage under its
health plan to an otherwise eligible beneﬁciary covered
under another group health plan at the time he elects cover-
age under COBRA.4

II
A

The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1985, Pub. L. 99–272, 100 Stat. 82, 222–237, amended the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act, among other stat-

4 Compare Lutheran Hosp., Inc. v. Business Men’s Assurance Co., 51
F. 3d 1308 (CA7 1995) (an employer may not cease providing COBRA con-
tinuation coverage under its plan merely because its former employee has
pre-existing coverage under another group health plan), and Oakley v.
City of Longmont, 890 F. 2d 1128 (CA10 1989) (same), cert. denied, 494
U. S. 1082 (1990), with National Cos. Health Beneﬁt Plan v. St. Joseph’s
Hosp., Inc., 929 F. 2d 1558 (CA11 1991) (an employer may suspend the
COBRA continuation coverage of a former employee who had pre-existing
coverage under another group health plan), and Brock v. Primedica, Inc.,
904 F. 2d 295 (CA5 1990) (same).
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