<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U50

[09-26-01 10:29:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 473 (2000)

477

Opinion of the Court

Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General
Robinson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Vicki
S. Marani.

David F. Sarnowski, Chief Deputy Attorney General of
Nevada, argued and reargued the cause for respondents.
With him on the briefs were Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attor-
ney General, and Julie A. Slabaugh, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral. With him on the brief on the original argument was
Ms. Del Papa.*

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are called upon to resolve a series of issues regarding
the law of habeas corpus, including questions of the proper
application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA). We hold as follows:

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the National Asso-
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Edward M. Chikofsky, Bar-
bara E. Bergman, and David M. Porter; and for the Rutherford Institute
by John W. Whitehead.

Briefs of amici curiae urging afﬁrmance were ﬁled for the State of
California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, David P.
Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Se-
nior Assistant Attorney General, and Donald E. De Nicola and A. Scott
Hayward, Deputy Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for
their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce M. Bo-
telho of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Mark Pryor of Arkansas,
M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Thomas J.
Miller of Iowa, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Rich-
ard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay)
Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of
Nebraska, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Michael F. Easley of
North Carolina, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael Fisher
of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett
of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Mark L. Earley of
Virginia, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington; and for the Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, the names of justices and attorneys involved, and the introduction to the Court's opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

Amendment.  Citing this Court’s precedent in Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S.
872 (1990), the ALJ determined that CADA is a “valid and
neutral  law  of  general  applicability”  and  therefore  that
applying it to Phillips in this case did not violate the Free
Exercise  Clause.    Id.,  at  879;  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  82a–
83a.  The  ALJ  thus  ruled  against  Phillips  and  the
cakeshop and in favor of Craig and Mullins on both consti-
tutional claims.

The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision in full.  Id.,
at  57a.  The  Commission  ordered  Phillips  to  “cease  and
desist from discriminating against . . . same-sex couples by
refusing to sell them wedding cakes or any product [they]
would sell to heterosexual couples.”  Ibid.  It also ordered
additional  remedial  measures,  including  “comprehensive
staff  training  on  the  Public  Accommodations  section”  of
CADA  “and  changes  to  any  and  all  company  policies  to
comply with . . . this Order.”  Id., at 58a.  The Commission
additionally  required  Phillips  to  prepare  “quarterly  com-
pliance reports” for a period of two years documenting “the
number of patrons denied service” and why, along with “a
statement describing the remedial actions taken.”  Ibid.

Phillips  appealed  to  the  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals,
which affirmed the Commission’s legal determinations and
remedial order.  The court rejected the argument that the
“Commission’s  order  unconstitutionally  compels”  Phillips
and the shop “to convey a celebratory message about same
sex  marriage.”  Craig  v.  Masterpiece  Cakeshop,  Inc.,  370
P. 3d  272,  283  (2015).  The  court  also  rejected  the  argu-
ment that the Commission’s order violated the Free Exer-
cise  Clause.    Relying  on  this  Court’s  precedent  in  Smith,
supra,  at  879,  the  court  stated  that  the  Free  Exercise
Clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicabil-
ity”  on  the  ground  that  following  the  law  would  interfere
with  religious  practice  or  belief.    370  P. 3d,  at  289.    The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

JACKSON, J., dissenting

Ibid.  Last, and perhaps most important, the statute specif-
ically  requires  that  the  official  who  solicits,  accepts,  or
agrees  to  accept  the  payment  do  so  “corruptly”  (the  mens
rea).  §666(a)(1)(B).  This series of carefully delineated cir-
cumstances—all  of  which  appear  in  the  text  of  §666—
means that payments or gifts to officials will not always be
captured by §666 under any and all circumstances, but only
if the violator acts in the ways described and with the re-
quired intent.

Notably, the majority takes the last statutory check I de-
scribe—the “corruptly” mens rea requirement—and trans-
forms  it  into  a  reason  to  read  the  statute  to  cover  only
bribes.  See ante, at 7–8, 15.  The majority maintains that
“corruptly”  signals  that  §666  is  a  bribery  statute  because
§201(b), the federal-official bribery statute, uses that term.
Ibid.  But, as I have already explained, the bribery statute
for federal officials is not the blueprint the majority makes
it out to be.  See Part II–B, supra.  And while the majority
suggests that “corruptly” just means quid pro quo, see ante,
at 8, it can give no reason why that must be so in this stat-
ute.

Instead, the majority gives a practical justification for its
preferred  interpretation.    It  suggests  that  if  §666  is  read
generally to apply to gratuities, and “corruptly” is read as a
narrowing  mens  rea  element,  then  the  statute  still  might
sweep  in  all  sorts  of  innocuous  gifts.  See  ante,  at  12–13.
Maybe.  Maybe not.  Again, the precise meaning of the term
“corruptly” is not the question before us today.  Nor does it
really  matter  here  because,  whatever  “corruptly”  means,
Snyder’s  behavior  clearly  fits  the  bill,  making  this  case  a
poor one to explore the contours of that term.  See Part III–
A, supra.

In any event, any uncertainty we might have about “cor-
ruptly” seems unwarranted considering the Court’s previ-
ous  definitions  of  that  word.    In  Arthur  Andersen  LLP  v.
United States, 544 U. S. 696 (2005), we wrote that the term
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Jackson. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute (§666) and its application to the case at hand.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of judicial opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

682

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Opinion of the Court

feature unique to the guarantee against self-incrimination
In the ab-
among the several Fifth Amendment privileges.
sence of waiver, the other such guarantees are purely and
simply binding on the government. But under the Self-
Incrimination Clause, the government has an option to ex-
change the stated privilege for an immunity to prosecutorial
use of any compelled inculpatory testimony. Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U. S., at 448–449. The only condition on
the government when it decides to offer immunity in place
of the privilege to stay silent is the requirement to provide
an immunity as broad as the privilege itself.
Id., at 449.
After Malloy had held the privilege binding on the state
jurisdictions as well as the National Government, it would
therefore have been intolerable to allow a prosecutor in one
or the other jurisdiction to eliminate the privilege by offer-
ing immunity less complete than the privilege’s dual jurisdic-
tional reach. Murphy accordingly held that a federal court
could not receive testimony compelled by a State in the ab-
sence of a statute effectively providing for federal immunity,
and it did this by imposing an exclusionary rule prohibiting
the National Government “from making any such use of com-
pelled testimony and its fruits,” 378 U. S., at 79 (footnote
omitted).

This view of Murphy as necessitated by Malloy was
adopted in the subsequent case of Kastigar v. United States,
supra, at 456, n. 42 (“Reconsideration of the rule that the
Fifth Amendment privilege does not protect a witness in one
jurisdiction against being compelled to give testimony that
could be used to convict him in another jurisdiction was
made necessary by the decision in Malloy v. Hogan”). Read
this way, Murphy rests upon the same understanding of the
Self-Incrimination Clause that Murdock recognized and to
which the earlier cases had pointed. Although the Clause
serves a variety of interests in one degree or another, see

the States were not deemed fully bound by the privilege against self-
incrimination.”

378 U. S., at 57, n. 6.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. It contains legal arguments, case citations, and a formal tone, all indicative of suitable content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1052

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 30, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–5739.  Del  Gallo  v.  Parent  et  al.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  58.

No.  09–5747.  Flick  v.  Kentucky.  Sup.  Ct.  Ky.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–5780.  Hojan  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  3  So.  3d  1204.

No.  09–6133.  Carruth  v.  Alabama.  Sup.  Ct.  Ala.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  21  So.  3d  770.

No.  09–6302.  Smith  v.  Mitchell,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  246.

No.  09–6379.  Gary  v.  Hall,  Warden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  1229.

No.  09–6392.  Rouse  v.  Department  of  State  et  al.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  408.

No.  09–6518.  Walter  v.  Pennsylvania.  Sup.  Ct.  Pa.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  600  Pa.  392,  966  A.  2d  560.

No.  09–6579.  Endencia  v.  ADT  Security  Services,  Inc.
C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.
Appx.  457.

No.  09–6580.  Ensey  v.  Oklahoma.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Okla.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6583.  Ware  v.  Garnett  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6585.  Kilpatrick  v.  Hernandez  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  353  Fed.  Appx.  84.

No. 09–6590.  Smith v.  Florida.  Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  9  So.  3d  633.

No.  09–6591.  Raines  v.  Oklahoma.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Okla.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6592.  Torres  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

15

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

Marshall) (“If [the Government of the United States] make
a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it
would  be  considered  by  the  judges  as  an  infringement  of
the Constitution which they are to guard. . . . They would
declare it void”); see also Vile 174.  The Framers “contem-
plated  [the  Constitution],  as  a  rule  for  the  government  of
courts, as well as of the legislature.”  Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137, 179–180 (1803).  Thus, if a case involved a
conflict between a law and the Constitution, judges would
have  a  duty  “to  adhere  to  the  latter  and  disregard  the
former.”  The Federalist No. 78, at 468 (A. Hamilton); see
also  Marbury,  1  Cranch,  at  178.  Similarly,  if  a  case  in-
volved  an  executive  effort  to  extend  a  law  beyond  its
meaning,  judges  would  have  a  duty  to  adhere  to  the  law
that  had  been  properly  promulgated  under  the  Constitu-
tion.  Cf.  id.,  at  157–158  (considering  the  scope  of  the
President’s constitutional power of appointment).  As this
Court  said  long  ago,  “[T]he  particular  phraseology  of  the
constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens
the  principle,  supposed  to  be  essential  to  all  written  con-
stitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void;
and  that  courts,  as  well  as  other  departments,  are  bound
by that instrument.”  Id., at 180.

Article  III  judges  cannot  opt  out  of  exercising  their
check.  As we have long recognized, “[t]he Judiciary has a
responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those
it  ‘would  gladly  avoid.’ ”  Zivotofsky  v.  Clinton,  566  U. S.
___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 5) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia,
6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821)).  This responsibility applies not
only  to  constitutional  challenges  to  particular  statutes,
see, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013)
(slip op., at 2), including those based on the separation of
powers,  Free  Enterprise  Fund,  561  U. S.,  at  501–502,  but
also  to  more  routine  questions  about  the  best  interpreta-
tion  of  statutes,  see,  e.g.,  Whitfield  v.  United  States,  574
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) (slip op., at 2–3), or the compati-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 575 U.S. ____ (2015). It discusses the role of the judiciary in interpreting the Constitution and upholding the rule of law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

UNITED STATES v. VAELLO MADERO

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

vanc[e]  a  reasonable  and  identifiable  governmental  objec-
tive.”  Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 235 (1981).  When
the relationship between a statutory classification and its
goal is “so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary
or  irrational,”  that  distinction  violates  equal  protection.
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U. S. 1, 11 (1992).

Congress’  decision  to  exclude  millions  of  U. S.  citizens
who reside in Puerto Rico from the SSI program fails even
this deferential test.4

A
The United States contends, and the Court accepts, that
Puerto Rico’s “tax status” provides a rational basis for ex-
cluding citizens who reside in Puerto Rico from the SSI pro-
gram.  See  ante,  at  5  (emphasis  deleted).  As  the  United
States  argues,  “Congress  could  rationally  conclude  that  a
jurisdiction that makes a reduced contribution to the fed-
eral treasury should receive a reduced share of the benefits
funded by that treasury.”  Brief for United States 17–18.

The  Court  holds  that  our  prior  decisions  in  Califano  v.
Torres, 435 U. S. 1 (1978) (per curiam), and Harris v. Ro-
sario, 446 U. S. 651 (1980) (per curiam), require acceptance
of this rationale.  Ante, at 4–5.  It is true that both Califano
and Harris relied on Puerto Rico’s tax status to justify the
unequal treatment of its residents.  See Califano, 435 U. S.,
——————

4 Because I would hold that this classification does not survive rational
basis, I do not consider whether the differential treatment of citizens who
reside in Puerto Rico requires a heightened standard of review, as the
District  Court  held.    See  356  F. Supp.  3d  208,  214–215  (PR  2019).    In
addition, because the Government disclaims any reliance on the Insular
Cases, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8–9, I do not address those cases in my analysis.
I do agree, however, with JUSTICE GORSUCH’s view that it “is past time to
acknowledge  the  gravity”  of the  error  of  the  Insular  Cases.  Ante,  at  1
(concurring opinion).  Those cases were premised on beliefs both odious
and wrong, and I share the concurrence’s “hope [that] the Court will soon
recognize that the Constitution’s application should never depend on the
government’s  concession  or  the  misguided  framework  of  the  Insular
Cases.”  Ante, at 9.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *United States v. Vaello Madero*. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the exclusion of Puerto Rican citizens from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

25

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

of [governmental] action.”  Laird, 408 U. S., at 15.  There is
no question that petitioners have shown that their donors
reasonably fear reprisals if their identities are publicly ex-
posed.  The Court and I, however, disagree about the likeli-
hood of that happening and the role Schedule Bs play in the
investigation of charitable malfeasance.  If the Court had
simply granted as-applied relief to petitioners based on its
reading of the facts, I would be sympathetic, although my
own views diverge.  But the Court’s decision is not nearly
so  narrow  or  modest.  Instead,  the  Court  jettisons  com-
pletely the longstanding requirement that plaintiffs demon-
strate an actual First Amendment burden before the Court
will subject government action to close scrutiny.  It then in-
validates  a  regulation  in  its  entirety,  even  though  it  can
point to no record evidence demonstrating that the regula-
tion  is  likely  to  chill  a  substantial  proportion  of  donors.
These moves are wholly inconsistent with the Court’s prec-
edents  and  our  Court’s  long-held  view  that  disclosure  re-
quirements  only  indirectly  burden  First  Amendment
rights.  With respect, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

SHURTLEFF v. BOSTON

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

omitted).  If that is the case, this factor supports the exclu-
sion of private parties from using the flagpoles even though
the government allows private parties to use the flagpoles
to  express  private  messages,  presumably  because  those
messages may be erroneously attributed to the government.
But there is no obvious reason why a government should be
entitled to suppress private views that might be attributed
to it by engaging in viewpoint discrimination.  The govern-
ment can always disavow any messages that might be mis-
takenly attributed to it.

The factors relied upon by the Court are thus an uncer-
tain  guide  to  speaker  identity.  But  beyond  that,  treating
these factors as a freestanding test for the existence of gov-
ernment speech artificially separates the question whether
the government is speaking from whether the government
is  facilitating  or  regulating  private  speech.    Under  the
Court’s  factorized  approach,  government  speech  occurs
when the government exercises a “sufficient” degree of con-
trol over speech that occurs in a setting connected with gov-
ernment speech in the eyes of history and the contemporary
public,  regardless  of  whether  the  government  is  actually
merely  facilitating  private  speech.    This  approach  allows
governments to exploit public expectations to mask censor-
ship.

And  like  any  factorized  analysis,  this  approach  cannot
provide  a  principled  way  of  deciding  cases.  The  Court’s
analysis here proves the point.  The Court concludes that
two of the three factors—history and public perception—fa-
vor the City.  But it nonetheless holds that the flag displays
did  not  constitute  government  speech.    Why  these  factors
drop out of the analysis—or even do not justify a contrary
conclusion—is left unsaid.  This cannot be the right way to
determine  when  governmental  action  is  exempt  from  the
First Amendment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Shurtleff v. Boston. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding government speech and the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

THOMAS, J., dissenting

B
A brief historical examination of Article III’s case-or-con-
troversy  requirement  confirms  what  our  recent  decisions
suggest: The rule against third-party standing is constitu-
tional,  not  prudential.  The  judicial  power  is  limited  to
“ ‘ “cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amena-
ble to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” ’ ”  Id., at ___
(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  1)  (quoting  Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529  U. S.  765,  774  (2000));  see  also  Muskrat  v.  United
States, 219 U. S. 346, 356–357 (1911).  Thus, to ascertain
the  scope  of  Article  III’s  case-or-controversy  requirement,
“we must ‘refer directly to the traditional, fundamental lim-
itations upon the powers of common-law courts.’ ”  Spokeo,
supra, at ___ (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2) (quot-
ing Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305, 340 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting)).  “One focus” of these traditional limitations was
“on the particular parties before the court, and whether the
rights that they [were] invoking [were] really theirs to con-
trol.”  Woolhandler & Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine? 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 732 (2004).  An examina-
tion  of  these  limitations  reveals  that  a  plaintiff  could  not
establish  a  case  or  controversy  by  asserting  the  constitu-
tional rights of others.

The limitations imposed on suits at common law varied
based on the type of right the plaintiff sought to vindicate.
Spokeo, 578 U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op.,
at 2).  The rights adjudicated by common-law courts gener-
ally fell into one of two categories: public or private.  Public
rights  are  those  “owed ‘to  the  whole  community  . . .  in  its
social aggregate capacity.’ ”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (quot-
ing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *5).  Private rights, on
the other hand, are those “ ‘belonging to individuals, consid-
ered  as  individuals.’ ”  Spokeo,  supra,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 2) (quoting 3 Blackstone, Commen-
taries *2).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the historical context and constitutional basis for the "third-party standing" rule in legal cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND LIFE

ADVOCATES, DBA NIFLA, ET AL. v. BECERRA,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 16–1140.  Argued March 20, 2018—Decided June 26, 2018

The  California  Reproductive  Freedom,  Accountability,  Comprehensive
Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act) was enacted to regulate cri-
sis  pregnancy  centers—pro-life  centers  that  offer  pregnancy-related
services.    The  FACT  Act  requires  clinics  that  primarily  serve  preg-
nant  women  to  provide  certain  notices.    Clinics  that  are  licensed
must notify women that California provides free or low-cost services,
including abortions, and give them a phone number to call.  Its stated
purpose  is  to  make  sure  that  state  residents  know  their  rights  and
what  health  care  services  are  available  to  them.    Unlicensed  clinics
must notify women that California has not licensed the clinics to pro-
vide medical services.  Its stated purpose is to ensure that pregnant
women know when they are receiving health care from licensed pro-
fessionals.    Petitioners—two  crisis  pregnancy  centers,  one  licensed
and one unlicensed, and an organization of crisis pregnancy centers—
filed suit.  They alleged that both the licensed and the unlicensed no-
tices  abridge  the  freedom  of  speech  protected  by  the  First  Amend-
ment.  The  District  Court  denied  their  motion  for  a  preliminary  in-
junction,  and  the  Ninth  Circuit  affirmed.    Holding  that  petitioners
could  not  show  a  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits,  the  court  con-
cluded that the licensed notice survived a lower level of scrutiny ap-
plicable  to  regulations  of  “professional  speech,”  and  that  the  unli-
censed notice satisfied any level of scrutiny.

Held:

1. The licensed notice likely violates the First Amendment.  Pp. 6–

17.

(a) Content-based  laws  “target  speech  based  on  its  communica-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text. They are informational in nature and not meant to be indexed as part of the case's content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
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  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

1

STEVENS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 08–1371
_________________

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY CHAPTER OF THE UNI-

VERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF

THE LAW, AKA HASTINGS CHRISTIAN FELLOW-

SHIP, PETITIONER v. LEO P. MARTINEZ ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 28, 2010]

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
The Court correctly confines its discussion to the narrow
issue  presented  by  the  record,  see  ante,  at  8–12,  and  cor-
rectly  upholds  the  all-comers  policy.    I  join  its  opinion
without reservation.  Because the dissent has volunteered
an  argument  that  the  school’s  general  Nondiscrimination
Policy would be “plainly” unconstitutional if applied to this
case,  post,  at  18  (opinion  of  ALITO,  J.),  a  brief  response
is  appropriate.
In  my  view,  both  policies  are  plainly
legitimate.

The  Hastings  College  of  Law’s  (Hastings)  Nondiscrimi-
nation  Policy  contains  boilerplate  language  used  by  insti-
tutions  and  workplaces  across  the  country:  It  prohibits
“unlawfu[l]”  discrimination  “on  the  basis  of  race,  color,
religion,  national  origin,  ancestry,  disability,  age,  sex  or
sexual  orientation.”  App.  220.  Petitioner,  the  Hastings
chapter  of  the  Christian  Legal  Society  (CLS),  refused  to
comply.  As  the  Court  explains,  ante,  at  5–6,  CLS  was
unwilling  to  admit  members  unless  they  affirmed  their
belief  in  certain  Christian  doctrines  and  refrained  from
“participation  in  or  advocacy  of  a  sexually  immoral  life-
style,”  App.  146.    CLS,  in  short,  wanted  to  receive  the
school’s  formal  recognition—and  the  benefits  that  attend
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Stevens. It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

13

Opinion of the Court

permissibly  decisive  manner.”  Id.,  at  334,  335.  We  also
noted  then  and  have  emphasized  since  that  this  extra-
ordinary  legislation  was  intended  to  be  temporary,  set  to
expire  after  five  years.
Id.,  at  333;  Northwest  Austin,
supra, at 199.

At the time, the coverage formula—the means of linking
the  exercise  of  the  unprecedented  authority  with  the
problem  that  warranted  it—made  sense.  We  found  that
“Congress  chose  to  limit  its  attention  to  the  geographic
areas  where  immediate  action  seemed  necessary.”    Kat-
zenbach,  383  U. S.,  at  328.  The  areas  where  Congress
found  “evidence  of  actual  voting  discrimination”  shared
two characteristics: “the use of tests and devices for voter
registration,  and  a  voting  rate  in  the  1964  presidential
election  at  least  12  points  below  the  national  average.”
Id.,  at  330.  We  explained  that  “[t]ests  and  devices  are
relevant  to  voting  discrimination  because  of  their  long
history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate
is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread disen-
franchisement must inevitably affect the number of actual
voters.”  Ibid.    We  therefore  concluded  that  “the  coverage
formula [was] rational in both practice and theory.”  Ibid.
It accurately reflected those jurisdictions uniquely charac-
terized  by  voting  discrimination  “on  a  pervasive  scale,”
linking coverage to the devices used to effectuate discrimi-
nation  and  to  the  resulting  disenfranchisement.    Id.,  at
308.  The  formula  ensured  that  the  “stringent  remedies
[were]  aimed  at  areas  where  voting  discrimination  ha[d]
been most flagrant.”  Id., at 315.

C
Nearly  50  years  later,  things  have  changed  dramati-
cally.  Shelby  County  contends  that  the  preclearance  re-
quirement, even without regard to its disparate coverage,
is  now  unconstitutional.  Its  arguments  have  a  good  deal
of force.  In the covered jurisdictions, “[v]oter turnout and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Shelby County v. Holder. It contains legal citations, analysis of previous rulings, and arguments about the constitutionality of a law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xlviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

809

Environmental Protection Agency; Sanders v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1150

Epis v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Epps; Bownes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

1056

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Epps; Slaughter v.
Epps v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  958,1017

1122

Epps v. Wagner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
829

Epps; Walker v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011

Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n; Federal Express Corp. v.  . . . .
1111

Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n; Ofﬁce of Alaska Governor v.  . .
997

Erath; Meredith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
993

Erazo-Villatoro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1063

Ercole; Brisco v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935

Ercole; Duran v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ercole; McCoy v.
936

Ercole; Palmer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
982

Ercole; Rodriguez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1061

Ereme v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Erickson v. Massachusetts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

Erickson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907

Ervin v. Horel
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Escobar v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
851

977

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Espinosa v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  967,987

Espinosa; United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
907

Espinosa-Martinez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035

Esquivel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Essell v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1018

Estate.  See name of estate.

1093

Estep v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1134

Estes v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
870

Estrada-Guerra v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Eugene; Bowers v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Evans v. Cartledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evans v. Glass
1106

Evans; Hon Lau v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

Evans v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
802

Evans; McCright v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Evans v. Mercy Medical Center  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133

Evans v. Mitchell
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

Evans v. O’Brien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Evans; Rodriguez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

Evans; Santifer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
855

Evans; Strunk v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Evans; Trevino v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evans v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  870,1001
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1207

(e)  Every  booklet-format  document,  shall  have  a  suitable
cover  consisting  of  65-pound  weight  paper  in  the  color  indi
cated  on  the  chart  in  subparagraph  1(g)  of  this  Rule.  If  a
separate  appendix  to  any  document  is  ﬁled,  the  color  of  its
cover shall be the same as that of the cover of the document
it  supports.  The  Clerk  will  furnish  a  color  chart  upon  re
quest.  Counsel shall ensure that there is adequate contrast
between  the  printing  and  the  color  of  the  cover.  A  docu
ment  ﬁled  by  the  United  States,  or  by  any  other  federal
party represented by the Solicitor General, shall have a gray
cover.  A  joint  appendix,  answer  to  a  bill  of  complaint,  mo
tion for leave to intervene, and any other document not listed
in subparagraph 1(g) of this Rule shall have a tan cover.

(f)  Forty copies of a booklet-format document shall be ﬁled.
(g)  Word  limits  and  cover  colors  for  booklet-format  docu

ments are as follows:

Type of Document

(i)	  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (Rule 14); Mo
tion  for  Leave  to  File  a  Bill  of  Complaint  and
Brief  in  Support  (Rule  17.3);  Jurisdictional
Statement (Rule 18.3); Petition for an Extraor
dinary Writ (Rule 20.2)

(ii)	  Brief in Opposition (Rule  15.3); Brief in Oppo
sition  to  Motion  for  Leave  to  File  an  Original
Action (Rule 17.5); Motion to Dismiss or Afﬁrm
(Rule  18.6);  Brief  in  Opposition  to  Mandamus
or Prohibition (Rule 20.3(b)); Response to a Pe
tition for Habeas Corpus (Rule 20.4)

(iii)  Reply  to  Brief  in  Opposition  (Rules  15.6  and
17.5);  Brief  Opposing  a  Motion  to  Dismiss  or
Afﬁrm (Rule 18.8)

(iv)  Supplemental  Brief  (Rules  15.8,  17,  18.10,  and

25.5)

(v)	  Brief on the Merits for Petitioner or Appellant
(Rule 24); Exceptions by Plaintiff to Report of
Special Master (Rule 17)

(vi)	  Brief  on  the  Merits  for  Respondent  or  Appel
lee  (Rule  24.2);  Brief  on  the  Merits  for  Re
spondent or Appellee Supporting Petitioner or
Appellant  (Rule  12.6);  Exceptions  by  Party
Other Than Plaintiff to Report of Special Mas
ter (Rule 17)

Word

Limits

Color of

Cover

9,000

white

9,000

orange

3,000

tan

3,000

tan

15,000

light blue

15,000

light red
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a set of rules for document formatting, specifically for booklet-format documents filed with the Supreme Court. It outlines requirements for cover color, paper weight, and word limits based on the type of document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Rules and Regulations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 666 (1998)

717

Breyer, J., dissenting

dom,” ibid. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), and it is that conduct,
not a foreign proceeding, that is at issue here.

B

If the policies and purposes that this Court has said under-
lie the Fifth Amendment—respect for individual dignity and
privacy, prevention of governmental overreaching, preserva-
tion of an accusatorial system of criminal justice—would all
be well served by applying the privilege when a witness le-
gitimately fears foreign prosecution, then what reason could
there be for reinterpreting the privilege so as not to recog-
nize it here?

Two reasons have been suggested: First, one might see a
government’s compulsion of testimony followed by its own
use of that testimony in a criminal prosecution as somewhat
more unfair than compulsion by one government and use by
another. And one might also ﬁnd the States and the Federal
Government so closely interconnected that the unfairness is
further diminished where the prosecuting sovereign is a for-
eign country.

But this factor, in my view, cannot be determinative. For
one thing, this issue of fairness is a matter of degree, not
kind. For another, changes in transportation and communi-
cation have made relationships among nations ever closer, to
the point where cooperation among international prosecutors
and police forces may be as great today as among the States
(or between the States and the Federal Government) a half
century ago. See supra, at 714–715 (discussing rise in inter-
national cooperation). Finally, this Court’s cases suggest
that the remaining considerations—particularly the inherent
indignity and cruelty to the individual in compelling self-
incrimination—bulk larger in terms of the basic values that
the Fifth Amendment reﬂects than does this single, partial,
fairness consideration. See supra, at 712–713 (citing cases).
I cannot agree that this particular feature—the fact that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 89 (2000)

103

Opinion of the Court

I. L. M. 546, and the International Convention of Standards
of Training, Certiﬁcation and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,
With Annex, 1978 (STCW), S. Exec. Doc. EE, 96–1, C. T. I. A.
No. 7624.

The United States argues that these treaties, as the su-
preme law of the land, have pre-emptive force over the state
regulations in question here. We need not reach that issue
at this stage of the case because the state regulations we
address in detail below are pre-empted by federal statute
and regulations. The existence of the treaties and agree-
ments on standards of shipping is of relevance, of course, for
these agreements give force to the longstanding rule that
the enactment of a uniform federal scheme displaces state
law, and the treaties indicate Congress will have demanded
national uniformity regarding maritime commerce. See
Ray, 435 U. S., at 166 (recognizing Congress anticipated “ar-
riving at international standards for building tank vessels”
and understanding “the Nation was to speak with one voice”
on these matters).
In later proceedings, if it is deemed nec-
essary for full disposition of the case, it should be open to
the parties to argue whether the speciﬁc international agree-
ments and treaties are of binding, pre-emptive force. We do
not reach those questions, for it may be that pre-emption
principles applicable to the basic federal statutory structure
will sufﬁce, upon remand, for a complete determination.

III

In Ray v. Atlantic Richﬁeld, supra, the Court was asked
to review, in light of an established federal and international
regulatory scheme, comprehensive tanker regulations im-
posed by the State of Washington. The Court held that the
PWSA and Coast Guard regulations promulgated under that
Act pre-empted a state pilotage requirement, Washington’s
limitation on tanker size, and tanker design and construc-
tion rules.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing pre-emption principles in maritime law. It cites relevant case law (Ray v. Atlantic Richfield) and treaties. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

gases  because  of  some  residual  uncertainty—which,  con-
trary  to  JUSTICE  SCALIA’s  apparent  belief,  post,  at  5–8,  is
in fact all that it said, see 68 Fed. Reg. 52929 (“We do not
believe . . . that it would be either effective or appropriate
for EPA to establish [greenhouse gas] standards for motor
vehicles  at  this  time”  (emphasis  added))—is  irrelevant.
The  statutory  question  is  whether  sufficient  information
exists to make an endangerment finding.

In  short,  EPA  has  offered  no  reasoned  explanation  for
its  refusal  to  decide  whether  greenhouse  gases  cause  or
contribute  to  climate  change.    Its  action  was  therefore
“arbitrary,  capricious,  . . .  or  otherwise  not  in  accordance
with law.” 42 U. S. C. §7607(d)(9)(A).  We need not and do
not  reach  the  question  whether  on  remand  EPA  must
make  an  endangerment  finding,  or  whether  policy  con-
cerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it makes
such  a  finding.  Cf.  Chevron  U. S. A.  Inc.  v.  Natural  Re-
sources  Defense  Council,  Inc.,  467  U. S.  837,  843–844
(1984).  We  hold  only  that  EPA  must  ground  its  reasons
for action or inaction in the statute.

VIII
The  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  is  reversed,  and
the  case  is  remanded  for  further  proceedings  consistent
with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the conclusion of the opinion in the case of Massachusetts v. EPA.  It is sequential text and provides legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Per Curiam

Court  allow  ballots  mailed  and  postmarked  after  election
day, April 7, to be counted.  That is a critical point in the
case.  Nonetheless, five days before the scheduled election,
the  District  Court  unilaterally  ordered  that  absentee  bal-
lots mailed and postmarked after election day, April 7, still
be counted so long as they are received by April 13.  Extend-
ing  the  date  by  which  ballots  may  be  cast  by  voters—not
just received by the municipal clerks but cast by voters—
for an additional six days after the scheduled election day
fundamentally alters the nature of the election.  And again,
the plaintiffs themselves did not even ask for that relief in
their preliminary injunction motions.  Our point is not that
the argument is necessarily forfeited, but is that the plain-
tiffs themselves did not see the need to ask for such relief.
By changing the election rules so close to the election date
and by affording relief that the plaintiffs themselves did not
ask for in their preliminary injunction motions, the District
Court contravened this Court’s precedents and erred by or-
dering such relief.  This Court has repeatedly emphasized
that  lower  federal  courts  should  ordinarily  not  alter  the
election rules on the eve of an election.  See Purcell v. Gon-
zalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam); Frank v. Walker, 574
U. S. 929 (2014); Veasey v. Perry, 574 U. S. __ (2014).

The unusual nature of the District Court’s order allowing
ballots  to  be  mailed  and  postmarked  after  election  day  is
perhaps  best  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  the  District
Court had to issue a subsequent order enjoining the public
release of any election results for six days after election day.
In  doing  so,  the  District  Court  in  essence  enjoined  non-
parties to this lawsuit.  It is highly questionable, moreover,
that this attempt to suppress disclosure of the election re-
sults for six days after election day would work.  And if any
information  were  released  during  that  time,  that  would
gravely affect the integrity of the election process.  The Dis-
trict Court’s order suppressing disclosure of election results
showcases the unusual nature of the District Court’s order
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a court opinion. It discusses a case regarding election rules and ballot counting. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it's not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

VEGA v. TEKOH

KAGAN, J., dissenting

§2254(a).  Miranda checks both boxes.  The Court has “con-
sistently applied Miranda’s rule to prosecutions arising in
state courts.”  Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 438.  And prisoners
may claim Miranda violations in federal-court habeas pro-
ceedings.  See 530 U. S., at 439, n. 3; Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U. S. 99, 107, n. 5 (1995).  So Dickerson is unequivocal:
Miranda is set in constitutional stone.

Miranda’s constitutional rule gives suspects a correlative
“right[ ].”  §1983.  Under Miranda, a suspect typically has a
right  to  be  tried  without  the  prosecutor  using  his  un-
Mirandized statement.  And we know how that right oper-
ates in the real world.  Suppose a defendant standing trial
was able to show the court that he gave an un-Mirandized
confession  during  a  custodial  interrogation.    The  court
would have no choice but to exclude it from the prosecutor’s
case.  As one judge below put it: “Miranda indisputably cre-
ates individual legal rights that are judicially enforceable.
(Any prosecutor who doubts this can try to introduce an un-
Mirandized  confession  and  then  watch  what  happens.)”
Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles, 997 F. 3d 1260, 1263 (CA9
2021) (Miller, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
The  majority  basically  agrees  with  everything  I’ve  just
explained.
It  concurs  that,  per  Dickerson,  Miranda
“adopted a ‘constitutional rule.’ ”  Ante, at 11 (quoting Dick-
erson, 530 U. S., at 439); see ante, at 12.  How could it not?
That  Miranda  is  a  constitutional  rule  is  what  Dickerson
said (and said and said).  The majority also agrees that Mi-
randa  “directed  that  statements  obtained  in  violation  of
[its] rules may not be used by the prosecution in its case-in-
chief ”—which  is  simply  another  way  of  saying  that  Mi-
randa  grants  suspects  a  right  to  the  exclusion  of  those
statements from the prosecutor’s case.  Ante, at 5.

So how does the majority hold that a violation of Miranda
is not a “deprivation of [a] right[ ]” “secured by the Consti-
tution”?  §1983.  How does it agree with my premises, but
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of VEGA v. TEKOH. It discusses the Miranda rule and its application in federal habeas proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CHIAVERINI v. CITY OF NAPOLEON

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

of the Fourth Amendment is objective reasonableness.  But
a  common-law  malicious-prosecution  claim  focuses  on  the
defendant’s  subjective  intent.  Ante,  at  2  (opinion  of
THOMAS, J.).   The  Fourth  Amendment  addresses  the  per-
missibility of a seizure.  But a common-law malicious-pros-
ecution claim can (and usually does) proceed without one.
Ante, at 2–3.  A seizure in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment can (and often does) take place without the initiation
of any judicial process.  But the whole point of a malicious-
prosecution claim is to contest the appropriateness of past
judicial proceedings.  Ante, at 2.  For all these reasons, it’s
“pretty  hard  to  see  how  you  might  squeeze  anything  that
looks quite like the common law tort of malicious prosecu-
tion into the Fourth Amendment.”  Cordova, 816 F. 3d, at
663 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.).

That is not to say no constitutional hook exists for a §1983
claim  addressing  the  malicious  use  of  process.    Rather,  it
seems to me only that such a claim would be more properly
housed in the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Albright, 510
U. S., at 283 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).  After all, unlike the
Fourth  Amendment,  that  provision  does  focus  on  judicial
proceedings,  guaranteeing  those  who  come  before  our
courts “due process” of law.  See ibid.; Thompson, 596 U. S.,
at  43,  n. 2;  Cordova,  816  F. 3d,  at  662  (opinion  of  Gor-
such, J.).  Inhering in due process is a promise that courts
will  respect,  at  the  least,  those  “customary  procedures  to
which  freemen  were  entitled  by  the  old  law  of  England.”
Sessions  v.  Dimaya,  584  U. S.  148,  176  (2018)  (GORSUCH,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal
quotation marks omitted).  And the common law has long
recognized a tort of malicious prosecution to protect against
the  abuse  of  judicial  proceedings.  Albright,  510  U. S.,  at
283 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).

Admittedly, a procedural due process claim for malicious
prosecution may come with its own set of limitations.  After
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a malicious prosecution claim and its potential connection to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxi

Page
1103
Custodio-Rossi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053
Cutshall v. Sundquist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce; Love v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004
C. Volante Corp. v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074
Cycmanick; Ellison v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036,1124
Dahlstrom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012
. .
Dakota County Housing Redevelopment Authorities; Eaton v.
1068
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust; Gold v.
1067
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dallas County; Foreman v.
1073
Dallas County; Gaines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028
Daly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136
Damerville v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1109
Damon; Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc. v. Damon . . . . . . . . .
1103
Dan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055
Daniele v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1073
Daniels v. Galaza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088
Daniels v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1065
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Darby v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.
1018
Dart v. Dart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037
Datalect Computer Services, Ltd. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . .
1125
Davage, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034
Davage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030
Davenport v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1073
Davidson v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093
Davidson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039
Davis v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130
Davis v. Hanover Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1086
Davis; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099
Davis v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1040
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Davis v. Missouri
1078
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Davis; Peacock v.
1090
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Davis v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
1111,1118,1129
Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076
Davis-Morrell; Miller v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121
Dawkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Day; Woodberry v.
1069
Daybrook Fisheries, Inc.; Holmes v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053,1124
DCR, Inc. v. Pierce County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1008
Deal v. Catoe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034
Dean; Ports v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034
DeAngelis v. Widener Univ. School of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1033
DeBauche v. Trani
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1010,1145
DeBrown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079
DeCaro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
876

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–48.  Lawrence v.  Welch et  al.  C. A.  6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  531  F.  3d  364.

No.  09–50.  Lygren  v.  Mirror  Image  Internet,  Inc.,  et  al.

Sup.  Ct.  Del.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–51.  Singleton v. Florida Department of Juvenile
Justice.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
329  Fed.  Appx.  222.

No.  09–52.  Skropits  v.  Ohio.  Sup.  Ct.  Ohio.  Certiorari  de

nied.  Reported  below:  121  Ohio  St.  3d  103,  902  N.  E.  2d  464.

No.  09–54.  Department  of  the  Interior  et  al.  v.  Kerr-
McGee  Oil  &  Gas  Corp.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  554  F.  3d  1082.

No.  09–56.  Marshall  v.  Brandywine  Chesapeake  Hous

ing  Corp.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–57.  Mitrano  v.  Kelly.  Ct.  Sp.  App.  Md.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  183  Md.  App.  766.

No.  09–58.  Arshad,  Individually  and  on  Behalf  of  Ar-
shad,  Deceased,  et  al.  v.  Congemi,  Chief  of  Police,  City  of
Kenner,  Louisiana,  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
No. 09–59.  Douglas  v.  United States.  C. A.  5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  320.

No.  09–61.  Meyers  v.  Sovereign  Bank  et  al.  Super.  Ct.

Pa.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  959  A.  2d  475.

No.  09–62.  Peyton  v.  Fred’s  Stores  of  Arkansas,  Inc.
C. A. 8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 561 F. 3d 900.
No.  09–64.  George  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–65.  Samadi v.  Oliver.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.  Appx.  458.

No.  09–66.  Sessoms  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–67.  Whiteside  v.  Russellville  Newspapers,  Inc.,
et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Ark.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  2009
Ark.  135,  295  S. W.  3d  798.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't represent the typical content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

the  costs  and  benefits  of  firearms  restrictions”  under
means-end scrutiny).  We declined to engage in means-end
scrutiny because “[t]he very enumeration of the right takes
out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of
Government—the  power  to  decide  on  a  case-by-case  basis
whether  the  right  is  really  worth  insisting  upon.”    Heller,
554  U. S.,  at  634.    We  then  concluded:  “A  constitutional
guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its use-
fulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.”  Ibid.

Not only did Heller decline to engage in means-end scru-
tiny generally, but it also specifically ruled out the interme-
diate-scrutiny test that respondents and the United States
now  urge  us  to  adopt.  Dissenting  in  Heller,  JUSTICE
BREYER’s proposed standard—“ask[ing] whether [a] statute
burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is
out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other
important  governmental  interests,”  id.,  at  689–690  (dis-
senting opinion)—simply expressed a classic formulation of
intermediate scrutiny in a slightly different way, see Clark
v. Jeter, 486 U. S. 456, 461 (1988) (asking whether the chal-
lenged law is “substantially related to an important govern-
ment objective”).  In fact, JUSTICE BREYER all but admitted
that his Heller dissent advocated for intermediate scrutiny
by  repeatedly  invoking  a  quintessential  intermediate-
scrutiny precedent.  See Heller, 554 U. S., at 690, 696, 704–
705  (citing  Turner  Broadcasting  System,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  520
U. S. 180 (1997)).  Thus, when Heller expressly rejected that
dissent’s “interest-balancing inquiry,” 554 U. S., at 634 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted), it necessarily rejected in-
termediate scrutiny.5

——————

5 The dissent asserts that we misread Heller to eschew means-end scru-
tiny because Heller mentioned that the District of Columbia’s handgun
ban “would fail constitutional muster” “[u]nder any of the standards of
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.”  Hel-
ler, 554 U. S., at 628–629; see post, at 23 (opinion of BREYER, J.).  But
Heller’s passing observation that the District’s ban would fail under any
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen. It delves into the legal reasoning and precedents surrounding the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

GILL v. WHITFORD

Opinion of the Court

The  judgment  of  the  District  Court  is  vacated,  and  the
case  is  remanded  for  further  proceedings  consistent  with
this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the conclusion of a legal opinion, likely from a court case. It's sequential text and contains relevant legal information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–529
_________________

ALEX CANTERO, ET AL., INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PETITIONERS v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N. A.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 30, 2024]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal law extensively regulates national banks such as
Bank of America and expressly preempts some (but not all)
state laws that regulate national banks.  This case concerns
the standard for determining when state laws that regulate
national banks are preempted.  As relevant here, the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010 expressly incorporated the standard that
this Court articulated in  Barnett Bank of Marion County,
N. A.  v.  Nelson,  517  U. S.  25  (1996).
  12  U. S. C.
§25b(b)(1)(B).  That  standard  asks  whether  a  state  law
“prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the
national bank of its powers.”  Ibid.  Because the Court of
Appeals  in  this  case  did  not  apply  that  standard  in  a
manner consistent with Dodd-Frank and Barnett Bank, we
vacate and remand.

I
A
The United States maintains a dual system of banking,
made  up  of  parallel  federal  and  state  banking  systems.
That dual system allows privately owned banks to choose
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Syllabus

political advocacy a hair’s-breadth away from incitement—is not pre-
sent here.  For true threats, recklessness strikes the right balance, of-
fering “enough ‘breathing space’ for protected speech,” without sacri-
ficing too many of the benefits of enforcing laws against true threats.
Elonis, 575 U. S., at 748.  Pp. 10–14.

(c) The State prosecuted Counterman in accordance with an objec-
tive  standard  and  did  not  have  to  show  any  awareness  on  Counter-
man’s part of his statements’ threatening character.  That is a viola-
tion of the First Amendment.  P. 14.

497 P. 3d 1039, vacated and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
GORSUCH, J., joined as to Parts I, II, III–A, and III–B.  THOMAS, J., filed
a dissenting opinion.  BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
THOMAS, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus.  It summarizes the case and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

THRYV, INC., FKA DEX MEDIA, INC. v. CLICK-TO-
CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 18–916.  Argued December 9, 2019—Decided April 20, 2020

Inter partes review is an administrative process that permits a patent
challenger to ask the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office to reconsider
the validity of earlier granted patent claims.  For inter partes review
to proceed, the agency must agree to institute review.  See 35 U. S. C.
§314.  Among other conditions set by statute, if a request comes more
than a year after suit against the requesting party for patent infringe-
ment, “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted.”  §315(b).  The
agency’s “determination . . . whether to institute an inter partes review
under this section shall be final and nonappealable.”  §314(d).

Entities  associated  with  petitioner  Thryv, Inc.  sought  inter  partes
review  of  a  patent  owned  by  respondent  Click-to-Call  Technologies,
LP.  Click-to-Call  countered  that  the  petition  was  untimely  under
§315(b).    The  Patent  Trial  and  Appeal  Board  (Board)  disagreed  and
instituted review.  After proceedings on the merits, the Board issued a
final written decision reiterating its §315(b) decision and canceling 13
of the patent’s claims as obvious or lacking novelty.  Click-to-Call ap-
pealed the Board’s §315(b) determination.  Treating the Board’s appli-
cation  of  §315(b)  as  judicially  reviewable,  the  Court  of  Appeals  con-
cluded  that  the  petition  was  untimely,  vacated  the  Board’s  decision,
and remanded with instructions to dismiss.

Held: Section 314(d) precludes judicial review of the agency’s application

of §315(b)’s time prescription.  Pp. 6–14.

(a) A  party  generally  cannot  contend  on  appeal  that  the  agency
should  have  refused  “to  institute  an  inter  partes  review.”    §314(d).
That follows from §314(d)’s text and Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC
v.  Lee,  579  U. S.  ___.    In  Cuozzo,  this  Court  explained  that  §314(d)
“preclud[es]  review  of  the  Patent  Office’s  institution  decisions”—at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of the Court

Converteam SAS, 902 F. 3d 1316 (2018).  The court inter-
preted the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention or Con-
vention) to include a “requirement that the parties actually
sign  an  agreement  to  arbitrate  their  disputes  in  order  to
compel  arbitration.”  Id.,  at  1326  (emphasis  in  original).
The court concluded that this requirement was not satisfied
because  “GE  Energy  is  undeniably  not  a  signatory  to  the
Contracts.”  Ibid.    It  then  held  that  GE  Energy  could  not
rely on state-law equitable estoppel doctrines to enforce the
arbitration  agreement  as  a  nonsignatory  because,  in  the
court’s view, equitable estoppel conflicts with the Conven-
tion’s signatory requirement.  Id., at 1326–1327.

Given  a  conflict  between  the  Courts  of  Appeals  on  this

question,2 we granted certiorari.  588 U. S. ___ (2019).

II
A
Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) permits
courts  to  apply  state-law  doctrines  related  to  the  enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements.  Section 2 of that chapter
provides that an arbitration agreement in writing “shall be
. . . enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  9 U. S. C. §2.
As we have explained, this provision requires federal courts
to “place [arbitration] agreements ‘ “upon the same footing
as  other  contracts.” ’ ”  Volt  Information  Sciences,  Inc.  v.
Board  of  Trustees  of  Leland  Stanford  Junior  Univ.,  489
U. S. 468, 474 (1989) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417  U. S.  506,  511  (1974)).    But  it  does  not  “alter  back-
ground principles of state contract law regarding the scope
of  agreements  (including  the  question  of  who  is  bound  by

——————

2 Compare  902  F. 3d  1316,  1326  (CA11  2018),  and  Yang  v.  Majestic
Blue Fisheries, LLC, 876 F. 3d 996, 1001–1002 (CA9 2017), with Aggarao
v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F. 3d 355, 375 (CA4 2012), and Sourcing
Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 3d 38, 48 (CA1 2008).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and legal statutes, indicating it is part of a legal argument and decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

MATAL v. TAM

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of ALITO, J.

clause protects every person living or dead as well as every
Is  it  conceivable  that  commerce  would  be
institution.
disrupted by a trademark saying: “James Buchanan was a
disastrous president” or “Slavery is an evil institution”?

There is also a deeper problem with the argument that
commercial  speech  may  be  cleansed  of  any  expression
likely  to  cause  offense.    The  commercial  market  is  well
stocked  with  merchandise  that  disparages  prominent
figures and groups, and the line between commercial and
non-commercial  speech  is  not  always  clear,  as  this  case
illustrates.  If  affixing  the  commercial  label  permits  the
suppression  of  any  speech  that  may  lead  to  political  or
social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered.

*

*
For  these  reasons,  we  hold  that  the  disparagement
clause  violates  the  Free  Speech  Clause  of  the  First
Amendment.  The  judgment  of  the  Federal  Circuit  is
affirmed.

*

It is so ordered.
 JUSTICE  GORSUCH  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or

decision of this case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court rules on the constitutionality of a disparagement clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–468
_________________

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. KAREN ROSS, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE CALI-
FORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD &
AGRICULTURE, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[May 11, 2023]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring in part and dissenting

in part.

In  today’s  fractured  decision,  six  Justices  of  this  Court
affirmatively  retain  the  longstanding  Pike  balancing  test
for  analyzing  dormant  Commerce  Clause  challenges  to
state  economic  regulations.    Ante,  at  1  (SOTOMAYOR,  J.,
joined  by  KAGAN,  J.,  concurring  in  part);  ante,  at  2–3
(ROBERTS,  C. J.,  joined  by  ALITO,  KAVANAUGH,  and
JACKSON,  JJ.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part);
see  Pike  v.  Bruce  Church,  Inc.,  397  U. S.  137  (1970).
Although  Parts  IV–B  and  IV–D  of  JUSTICE  GORSUCH’s
opinion would essentially overrule the Pike balancing test,
those  subsections  are  not  controlling  precedent,  as  I
understand it.

But  Part  IV–C  of  JUSTICE  GORSUCH’s  opinion  is
controlling precedent for purposes of the Court’s judgment
as  to  the  plaintiffs’  Pike  claim.
  There,  a  four-Justice
plurality of the Court applies Pike and rejects the plaintiffs’
dormant  Commerce  Clause  challenge  under  Pike.  The
plurality  reasons  that  the  plaintiffs’  complaint  did  not
sufficiently  allege  that  the  California  law  at  issue  here
imposed  a  substantial  burden  on  interstate  commerce
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the names of justices. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the actual legal reasoning and decision-making process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

35

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

§41107(a)  (Federal  Maritime  Commission);  47  U. S. C.
§503(b)(3)  (Federal  Communications  Commission);  49
U. S. C.  §521  (Federal  Railroad  Administration);  §46301
(Department of Transportation).

Some  agencies,  like  the  Consumer  Financial  Protection
Bureau,  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency,  and  the
SEC, can pursue civil penalties in both administrative pro-
ceedings and federal court.  See, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §§5563(a),
5564(a),  5565(a)(1),  (2)(H),  and  (c)  (Consumer  Financial
Protection Bureau); 33 U. S. C. §§1319(a), (b), and (g) (En-
vironmental Protection Agency); supra, at 2 (SEC).  Others
do  not  have  that  choice.  As  the  above-cited  statutes  con-
firm, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Fed-
eral  Mine  Safety  and  Health  Review  Commission,  the
Department  of  Agriculture,  and  many  others,  can  pursue
civil penalties only in agency enforcement proceedings.  For
those and countless other agencies, all the majority can say
is tough luck; get a new statute from Congress.

Against this backdrop, our coequal branches will be sur-
prised to learn that the rule they thought long settled, and
which  remained  unchallenged  for  half  a  century,  is  one
that, according to the majority and the concurrence, my dis-
sent just announced today.  Unfortunately, that mistaken
view means that the constitutionality of hundreds of stat-
utes may now be in peril, and dozens of agencies could be
stripped of their power to enforce laws enacted by Congress.
Rather than acknowledge the earthshattering nature of its
holding, the majority has tried to disguise it.  The majority
claims  that  its  ruling  is  limited  to  “civil  penalty  suits  for
fraud” pursuant to a statute that is “barely over a decade
old,” ante, at 18, n. 2, 22, an assurance that is in significant
tension with other parts of its reasoning.  That incredible
assertion should fool no one.  Today’s decision is a massive
sea  change.  Litigants  seeking  further  dismantling  of  the
“administrative  state”  have  reason  to  rejoice  in  their  win
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal dissenting opinion. It cites legal statutes and discusses the implications of a court ruling.  While it is important legal content, it is not the primary narrative content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Statement</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2010

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 10–277.  Argued March 29, 2011—Decided June 20, 2011

Respondents,  current  or  former  employees  of  petitioner  Wal-Mart,
sought judgment against the company for injunctive and declaratory
relief, punitive damages, and backpay, on behalf of themselves and a
nationwide  class  of  some  1.5  million  female  employees,  because  of
Wal-Mart’s alleged discrimination against women in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  They claim that local managers
exercise  their  discretion  over  pay  and  promotions  disproportionately
in  favor  of  men,  which  has  an  unlawful  disparate  impact  on  female
employees;  and  that  Wal-Mart’s  refusal  to  cabin  its  managers’  au-
thority amounts to disparate treatment.  The District Court certified
the  class,  finding  that  respondents  satisfied  Federal  Rule  of  Civil
Procedure 23(a), and Rule 23(b)(2)’s requirement of showing that “the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that
apply  generally  to  the  class,  so  that  final  injunctive  relief  or  corre-
sponding  declaratory  relief  is  appropriate  respecting  the  class  as  a
whole.”  The  Ninth  Circuit  substantially  affirmed,  concluding,  inter
alia,  that  respondents  met  Rule  23(a)(2)’s  commonality  requirement
and  that  their  backpay  claims  could  be  certified  as  part  of  a  (b)(2)
class  because  those  claims  did  not  predominate  over  the  declaratory
and  injunctive  relief  requests.    It  also  ruled  that  the  class  action
could be manageably tried without depriving Wal-Mart of its right to
present its statutory defenses if the District Court selected a random
set  of  claims  for  valuation  and  then  extrapolated  the  validity  and
value of the untested claims from the sample set.

Held:

1. The  certification  of  the  plaintiff  class  was  not  consistent  with

Rule 23(a).  Pp. 8–20.

(a) Rule  23(a)(2)  requires  a  party  seeking  class  certification  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a brief overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Statement of GORSUCH, J.

what it first appears.  It seems California’s powerful enter-
tainment industry has won an exemption.2  So, once more,
we appear to have a State playing favorites during a pan-
demic, expending considerable effort to protect lucrative in-
dustries  (casinos  in  Nevada;  movie  studios  in  California)
while denying similar largesse to its faithful.  See, e.g., Cal-
vary  Chapel  Dayton  Valley  v.  Sisolak,  591  U. S.  ___,  ___
2020)  (GORSUCH,  J.,  dissenting  from  denial  of  application
for injunction relief ).
  Once more, too, the State has not explained how a total
ban  on  religious  singing  is  narrowly  tailored  to  its  legiti-
mate  public  health  concerns.    Even  if  a  full  congregation
singing hymns is too risky, California does not explain why
even a single masked cantor cannot lead worship behind a
mask and a plexiglass shield.  Or why even a lone muezzin
may not sing the call to prayer from a remote location inside
a mosque as worshippers file in.  The Ninth Circuit sought
to defend California’s uneven regime by observing that the
——————

2 There is some confusion over what rules actually apply to Hollywood
but I would not allow the government officials who created California’s
complex regime to benefit from its confusing nature.  The district court
did not address the singing ban, and the Ninth Circuit applied rational-
basis  review  because  it  was not  convinced  that  anyone  is  permitted  to
sing indoors in California.  ___ F. 3d., ___, 2021 WL 222814, *18 (CA9,
Jan. 22, 2021).  But the record suggests that music, film, and television
studios are permitted to sing indoors.  See Record in No. 20–56358, Doc.
18–4, p. 124 (CA9) (decl. of Screen Actors Guild General Counsel) (“Sing-
ing  in  larger  groups  [inside  the  studio]  is  permitted  but  only  . . .  with
additional protections.”).  California’s most recent edict prohibits singing
at “private” “social situations” as well as “activities protected by the First
Amendment to the extent they are not already permitted by other guid-
ance.”  California Dept. of Public Health, Guidance for the Prevention of
COVID–19  Transmission  for  Gatherings  (updated  Nov.  13,  2020).    No
one seems to know exactly how far this language stretches, but it seems
unlikely to apply to the entertainment industry, which has its own gov-
erning guidance.  And California does not squarely deny as much here.
See  Brief  in  Opposition  51–52,  and  n. 52.    As  the  Court  recognizes,
though, nothing in today’s order precludes future relief on this claim ei-
ther.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses a case regarding California's restrictions on religious singing during the pandemic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

KAGAN, J., dissenting

Today,  the  majority  does  not  respect  that  judgment.    It
gives courts the power to make all manner of scientific and
technical judgments.  It gives courts the power to make all
manner of policy calls, including about how to weigh com-
peting goods and values.  (See Chevron itself.)  It puts courts
at the apex of the administrative process as to every con-
ceivable subject—because there are always gaps and ambi-
guities  in  regulatory  statutes,  and  often  of  great  import.
What  actions  can  be  taken  to  address  climate  change  or
other  environmental  challenges?  What  will  the  Nation’s
health-care system look like in the coming decades?  Or the
financial or transportation systems?  What rules are going
to  constrain  the  development  of  A.I.?    In  every  sphere  of
current or future federal regulation, expect courts from now
on to play a commanding role.  It is not a role Congress has
given to them, in the APA or any other statute.  It is a role
this Court  has now claimed for  itself, as well as for other
judges.

And  that  claim  requires  disrespecting,  too,  this  Court’s
precedent.  There are no special reasons, of the kind usually
invoked  for  overturning  precedent,  to  eliminate  Chevron
deference.  And given Chevron’s pervasiveness, the decision
to do so is likely to produce large-scale disruption.  All that
backs today’s decision is the majority’s belief that Chevron
was  wrong—that  it  gave  agencies  too  much  power  and
courts not enough.  But shifting views about the worth of
regulatory actors and their work do not justify overhauling
a cornerstone of administrative law.  In that sense too, to-
day’s majority has lost sight of its proper role.

And it is impossible to pretend that today’s decision is a
one-off, in either its treatment of agencies or its treatment
of precedent.  As to the first, this very Term presents yet
another example of the Court’s resolve to roll back agency
authority,  despite  congressional  direction  to  the  contrary.
See SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S. ___ (2024); see also supra, at
3.  As to the second, just my own defenses of stare decisis—
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are a crucial part of legal discourse and provide valuable insights into legal reasoning and interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.

the  Executive  Branch  possesses  the  legal  authority  to  re-
scind DACA  and  to resume pre-DACA  enforcement  of  the
immigration laws enacted by Congress.  Having previously
adopted a policy of prosecutorial discretion and nonenforce-
ment with respect to a particular class of offenses or indi-
viduals, the Executive Branch has the legal authority to re-
scind such a policy and resume enforcing the law enacted
by  Congress.    The  Executive  Branch’s  exercise  of  that  re-
scission  authority  is  subject  to  constitutional  constraints
and may also be subject to statutory constraints.  The nar-
row  legal  dispute  here  concerns  a  statutory  constraint—
namely, whether the Executive Branch’s action to rescind
DACA satisfied the general arbitrary-and-capricious stand-
ard of the Administrative Procedure Act, or APA.
  The  APA’s  arbitrary-and-capricious  standard  requires
that agency action be reasonable and reasonably explained.
As  the  Court  has  long  stated,  judicial  review  under  that
standard is deferential to the agency.  The Court may not
substitute its policy judgment for that of the agency.  The
Court  simply  ensures  that  the  agency  has  acted  within  a
broad zone of reasonableness and, in particular, has reason-
ably  considered  the  relevant  issues  and  reasonably  ex-
plained the decision.  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc.,  556  U. S.  502  (2009);  Motor  Vehicle  Mfrs.  Assn.  of
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,
463 U. S. 29 (1983).
  The  Executive  Branch  explained  its  decision  to  rescind
DACA in two sequential memorandums by successive Sec-
retaries  of  Homeland  Security:  the  2017  Duke  Memoran-
dum and the 2018 Nielsen Memorandum.  The Duke Mem-
orandum  focused  on  DACA’s  perceived  legal  flaws.    The
Court today finds the Duke Memorandum insufficient un-
der the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard.
  But regardless of whether the Court is correct about the
Duke Memorandum, the Nielsen Memorandum more fully
explained  the  Department’s  legal  reasons  for  rescinding
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the rescission of DACA and the legal arguments surrounding it. It cites legal precedents and delves into the specifics of the Administrative Procedure Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>