<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

435

Opinion of the Court

tiff is harmed by the defendant, and that the harm will likely
be redressed by a favorable decision, that plaintiff has
standing—regardless of whether there are others who would

gated public schools. We held that the chain of causation between the
challenged action and the alleged injury was too attenuated to confer
standing:
“It is, ﬁrst, uncertain how many racially discriminatory private schools
are in fact receiving tax exemptions. Moreover, it is entirely speculative
. . . whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school
would lead the school to change its policies. . . . It is just as speculative
whether any given parent of a child attending such a private school would
decide to transfer the child to public school as a result of any changes
in educational or ﬁnancial policy made by the private school once it was
It is also pure speculation
threatened with loss of tax-exempt status.
whether, in a particular community, a large enough number of the numer-
ous relevant school ofﬁcials and parents would reach decisions that collec-
tively would have a signiﬁcant impact on the racial composition of the
public schools.”

Id., at 758 (footnote omitted).

Similarly, in Simon, the respondents challenged an IRS Revenue Rul-
ing that granted favorable tax treatment to nonproﬁt hospitals that of-
fered only emergency-room services to the poor. The respondents argued
that the Revenue Ruling “ ‘encouraged’ hospitals to deny services to indi-
426 U. S., at 42. As in Allen, we held that the chain of causation
gents.”
was too attenuated:
“It is purely speculative whether the denials of service . . . fairly can be
traced to [the IRS’s] ‘encouragement’ or instead result from decisions made
by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications.

“It is equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the court’s
remedial powers in this suit would result in the availability to respondents
of such services. So far as the complaint sheds light, it is just as plausi-
ble that the hospitals to which respondents may apply for service would
elect to forgo favorable tax treatment to avoid the undetermined ﬁnancial
drain of an increase in the level of uncompensated services.”
426 U. S.,
at 42–43.
See also id., at 45 (“Speculative inferences are necessary to connect
[respondents’] injury to the challenged actions of petitioners”).

The injury in the present case is comparable to the repeal of a law
granting a subsidy to sellers of processing plants if, and only if, they sell
to farmers’ cooperatives. Every farmers’ cooperative seeking to buy a
processing plant is harmed by that repeal.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically citing previous cases (Allen and Simon). It contains legal jargon and discusses standing in court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xlviii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Michigan; Stevens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan National Corp.; Haddad v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Michigan National Corp.; McMaster v.
Michigan State Univ.; Abe v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Middleton v. Kemna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Midgett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mikalajunas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miles v. Dunnigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians; Davis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miller, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miller v. Davis-Morrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miller v. French . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miller; Scott v.
Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miller; Wilson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Milloway v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mills v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mine Workers; Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miramax Film Corp.; Orson, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miramax Film Corp.; Roxy Screening Rooms v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miranda v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd. of Cal. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mirza; McCleary v.
Mississippi; McGilberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Missouri; Armentrout v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Missouri; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Missouri; Pride v.
Missouri; Worthington v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mistick PBT v. Housing Authority of Pittsburgh . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mitchell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mitchell v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mitchell v. Mantello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mitchell v. Roach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mitchell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mitchem; Harrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mitchem; Poole v.
Mitchum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd.; Van Ness Associates, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . .
Mitsubishi Electric Corp. v. Ampex Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mizani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mobile; Sammy’s of Mobile, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moenning v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moghadam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mojica v. Goord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1062
1020,1125
1078
1131
1006
1097
1028
1010
1100
1099
1015
1076
1051
1100
1044,1069,1131
1021
1121
1083
1017
1012
1012
1117
1110
1006
1120
1040
1004
1116
1018
1051
1083
1040
1071
1145
1074
1113
1104
1022
1054
1088
1052
1087
1036
1039
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely a section from a legal document. It lists cases with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 156 (1998)

169

Opinion of the Court

Finally, petitioners argue that the interest income trans-
ferred to the TEAJF is not “private property” because the
client funds held in IOLTA accounts “cannot reasonably be
expected to generate interest income on their own.” Brief
for Petitioners 18. As an initial matter, petitioners’ asser-
tion that client funds held in IOLTA accounts cannot be ex-
pected to generate interest income is plainly incorrect under
the express terms of the Texas IOLTA rules. Texas IOLTA
Rule 6 requires that client funds held by an attorney be de-
posited in an IOLTA account “if the interest which might be
earned” is insufﬁcient to offset the “cost of establishing and
maintaining the account, service charges, accounting costs
and tax reporting costs which would be incurred in attempt-
ing to obtain the interest on such funds for the client.”
In
other words, it is not that the client funds to be placed in
IOLTA accounts cannot generate interest, but that they can-
not generate net interest.

Whether client funds held in IOLTA accounts could gener-
ate net interest is a matter of some dispute. As written,
the Texas IOLTA program requires the calculation as to net
interest to be made “without regard to funds of other clients
which may be held by the attorney.” Texas IOLTA Rule 6.
This provision would deny to an attorney the traditional
practice of pooling funds of several clients in one account, a
practice which might produce net interest when opening an
account for each client would not. But in the District Court,
petitioners agreed that this portion of the rule was not to
be enforced, and that an attorney could make the necessary
calculation on the basis of pooled accounts. Petitioners
made a similar concession during oral argument here. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 13–16. We accept this concession but ﬁnd that it
does not avail petitioners.

We have never held that a physical item is not “property”
simply because it lacks a positive economic or market value.
For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" portion of a case. It discusses the legal definition of "private property" in the context of interest income generated from IOLTA accounts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting

Random  House  Dictionary  1307  (“coitus,”  “sexual  inter-
course” (defs. 5–6)); American Heritage Dictionary, at 1187
(“sexual intercourse” (def. 5)).19

Aside from these, what is there?  One definition, “to neck
passionately,” Random House Dictionary 1307 (def. 8), re-
fers to sexual conduct that is not necessarily heterosexual.
But can it be seriously argued that one of the aims of Title
VII  is  to  outlaw  employment  discrimination  against  em-
ployees, whether heterosexual or homosexual, who engage
in necking?  And even if Title VII had that effect, that is not
what is at issue in cases like those before us.

That  brings  us  to  the  two  remaining  subsidiary  defini-
tions, both of which refer to sexual urges or instincts and
their manifestations.  See the fourth definition in the Amer-
ican Heritage Dictionary, at 1187  (“the sexual urge or in-
stinct as it manifests itself in behavior”), and the fourth def-
inition in both Webster’s Second and Third (“[p]henomena
of  sexual  instincts  and  their  manifestations,”  Webster’s
New  International  Dictionary,  at  2296  (2d  ed.);  Webster’s
Third  New  International  Dictionary  2081  (1966)).    Since
both of these come after three prior definitions that refer to
men and women, they are most naturally read to have the
same association, and in any event, is it plausible that Title
VII  prohibits  discrimination  based  on  any  sexual  urge  or
instinct and its manifestations?  The urge to rape?

Viewing all these definitions, the overwhelming impact is
that discrimination because of “sex” was understood during
the  era  when  Title  VII  was  enacted  to  refer  to  men  and
women.  (The same is true of current definitions, which are
reproduced in Appendix B, infra.)  This no doubt explains
why  neither  this  Court  nor  any  of  the  lower  courts  have
tried to make much of the dictionary definitions of sex just
——————

19 See American Heritage Dictionary 1188 (1969) (defining “sexual in-
tercourse”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2082 (1966)
(same); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1308 (1966)
(same).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of the term "sex" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

tels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U. S. 1, 10 (2023) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring  in  judgment)  (“To  have  standing,  a  plaintiff  must
assert a violation of his [own] rights”).  In fact, under our
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a plaintiff need not
be injured at all; he can challenge a statute that lawfully
applies to him so long as it would be unlawful to enforce it
against others.  See United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762,
769 (2023).

Facial challenges also distort standing doctrine’s redress-
ability requirement.  The Court has held that a plaintiff has
standing to sue only when his “requested relief will redress
the alleged injury.”  Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 103.  With a fa-
cial challenge, however, a plaintiff seeks to enjoin every ap-
plication of a statute—including ones that have nothing to
do with his injury.  A plaintiff can ask, “Do [I] just want [the
court] to say that this statute cannot constitutionally be ap-
plied to [me] in this case, or do [I] want to go for broke and
try  to  get  the  statute  pronounced  void  in  all  its  applica-
tions?”  Morales, 527 U. S., at 77 (opinion of Scalia, J.).  In
this sense, the remedy sought by a facial challenge is akin
to  a  universal  injunction—a  practice  that  is  itself  “incon-
sistent with longstanding limits on equitable relief and the
power  of  Article  III  courts.”  Trump  v.  Hawaii,  585  U. S.
667, 713 (2018) (THOMAS, J., concurring); see Department
of Homeland Security v. New York, 589 U. S. ___, ___–___
(2020) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op.,
at 2–3); FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U. S.
367, 402 (2024) (THOMAS, J., concurring).

Because deciding the constitutionality of a statute as ap-
plied to nonparties is not necessary to resolve a case or con-
troversy, it is beyond a federal court’s constitutional author-
ity.  Federal  courts  have  “no  power  per  se  to  review  and
annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are uncon-
stitutional.  That question may be considered only when the
justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened,
presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Moody v. NetChoice, LLC. It discusses the legal concept of facial challenges to statutes and argues against their use.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

omitted).  As a practical matter, the provision ensures that
women  have  access  to  contraception  at  no  cost  beyond
their insurance premiums.  Employers that do not comply
with the mandate are subject to civil penalties.

Recognizing  that  some  religions  disapprove  of  contra-
ceptives,  the  Government  has  sought  to  implement  the
mandate  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  freedom  of
conscience.
It  has  categorically  exempted  any  group
health  plan  of  a  “religious employer,” as defined by  refer-
ence  to  the  Tax  Code  provision  governing  churches.    See
45  CFR  §147.131(a);  http://hrsa.gov/womensguidelines  (as
visited July 2, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case
file).  And  it  has  extended  a  further  accommodation  to
religious  nonprofits  that  do  not  satisfy  the  categorical
exemption.  All agree that Wheaton qualifies as a religious
nonprofit.

To  invoke  the  accommodation  and  avoid  civil  penalties,
a religious nonprofit need only file a self-certification form
stating (1) that it “opposes providing coverage for some or
all  of  any  contraceptive  services  required  to  be  covered
under  [the  regulation]  on  account  of  religious  objections,”
(2) that  it  “is  organized  and  operates  as  a  nonprofit  en-
tity,” and (3) that it “holds itself out as a religious organiza-
tion.”  §147.131(b).  The form is reprinted in an appendix
to this opinion.  Any organization that completes the form
and  provides  a  copy  to  its  insurance  issuer  or  third-party
administrator1  need  not  “contract,  arrange,  pay,  or  refer
for  contraceptive  coverage”  to  which  it  objects.    78  Fed.
Reg. 39874 (2013); see 29 CFR §2590.715–2713A(b)(1) and
(c)(1).  Instead, the insurance issuer or third-party admin-

——————

1 Typically, an employer contracts to pay  a health insurer to provide
coverage;  the  insurer  both  covers  the  cost  of  medical  claims  and  man-
ages  the  process  for  administering  those  claims.    Employers  who
maintain  self-insured  plans  cover  the  cost  of  claims  for  medical  treat-
ment directly.  Such employers often contract with third-party adminis-
trators to administer the claims process.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. It discusses the contraceptive mandate and religious exemptions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

29

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

about  who  should  be  liable  under  the  TVPA  for  torture
and  extrajudicial  killing  should  restrict  who  can  be  held
liable  under  the  ATS  for  other  law-of-nations  violations,
particularly  where  Congress  made  a  different  judgment
about the scope of liability under the ATA for terrorism.

C
Finally,  the  plurality  offers  a  set  of  “[o]ther  considera
tions relevant to the exercise of judicial discretion” that it
concludes  “counsel  against  allowing  liability  under  the
ATS  for  foreign  corporations.”  Ante,  at  23.  None  is
persuasive.

First, the plurality asserts that “[i]t has not been shown
that corporate liability under the ATS is essential to serve
the goals of the statute” because “the ATS  will seldom be
the only way for plaintiffs to hold the perpetrators liable,”
and  because  “plaintiffs  still  can  sue  the  individual  corpo
rate employees responsible for a violation of international
law under the ATS.”  Ibid.  This Court has never previously
required that, to maintain an ATS action, a plaintiff must
show that the ATS is the exclusive means by which to hold
the alleged perpetrator liable and that no relief can be had
from other parties.  Such requirements extend far beyond
the inquiry Sosa contemplated and are without any basis
in the statutory text.

Moreover,  even  if  there  are  other  grounds  on  which  a
suit  alleging  conduct  constituting  a  law-of-nations  viola
tion  can  be  brought,  such  as  a  state-law  tort  claim,  the
First Congress created the ATS because it wanted foreign
plaintiffs  to  be  able  to  bring  their  claims  in  federal  court
and sue for law-of-nations violations.  A suit for state-law
battery, even if based on the same alleged conduct, is not
the equivalent of a federal suit for torture; the latter con
tributes  to  the  uptake  of  international  human  rights
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 584 U.S. ____ (2018).  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and its applicability to corporations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

19

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

strive to do, and what this Court has actually done across
the constitutional landscape for the last two centuries.

The  balancing  tests  (heightened  scrutiny  and  the  like)
are a relatively modern judicial innovation in constitutional
decisionmaking.  The “tiers of scrutiny have no basis in the
text or original meaning of the Constitution.”  J. Alicea & J.
Ohlendorf,  Against  the  Tiers  of  Constitutional  Scrutiny,
National Affairs 72, 73 (2019).  And before the late 1950s,
“what  we  would  now  call  strict  judicial  scrutiny  did  not
exist.”  R. Fallon, The Nature of Constitutional Rights: The
Invention and Logic of Strict Judicial Scrutiny 30 (2019).
The Court “appears to have adopted” heightened-scrutiny
tests  “by  accident”  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  in  a  series  of
Communist  speech  cases,  “rather  than  as  the  result  of  a
considered judgment.”  Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 125 (1991)
(Kennedy,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).    The  Court  has
employed balancing only in discrete areas of constitutional
law—and even in those cases, history still tends to play a
far larger role than overt judicial policymaking.7

To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Court overrule
cases  where  the  Court  has  applied  those  heightened-
scrutiny tests.  But I am challenging the notion that those

——————

7 The Court has articulated a heightened-scrutiny test in some pockets
of  free-speech  jurisprudence.    But  even  when  invoking  heightened
scrutiny in that context, the Court still often relies directly on history.
See, e.g., City of Austin v. Reagan Nat. Advertising of Austin, LLC, 596
U. S.  61,  75  (2022)  (a  city’s  regulation  of  solely  off-premises  billboards
was  within  “the  Nation’s  history  of  regulating  off-premises  signs”  as
“federal, state, and local jurisdictions have repeatedly relied upon on-/off-
premises  distinctions”  “for  the  last  50-plus  years”);  Perry  Ed.  Assn.  v.
Perry  Local  Educators’  Assn.,  460  U. S.  37,  45–46  (1983)  (“In  places
which by long tradition” “have been devoted to assembly and debate, the
rights  of  the  State  to
limit  expressive  activity  are  sharply
circumscribed”).  The Court has also used heightened scrutiny in certain
equal protection cases.  As discussed above, the Equal Protection Clause
rejected the history of racially discriminatory laws and practices.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history and application of heightened scrutiny tests in constitutional law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

825

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–1534.  Zdun  et  al.  v.  Henderson  et  al.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  215.

No.  08–1535.  Kavali  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1536.  Palazzo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  400.

No.  08–1537.  Khanna  v.  State  Bar  of  California  et  al.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.
Appx.  176.

No.  08–1538.  Feigenbaum  v.  Merrill  Lynch  &  Co.  et  al.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.
Appx.  585.

No. 08–1540.  Dixon  v.  Miami-Dade County,  Florida.  C.  A.
11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.
270.

No. 08–1541.  Covarrubias Ruezga v.  California.  Ct. App.

Cal.,  1st  App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1542.  Spielvogel  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1544.  Jallali  v.  Nova  Southeastern  University,
Inc.  Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.  Certiorari denied.  Reported
below:  992  So.  2d  338.

No.  08–1545.  Eghbal  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  548  F.  3d  1281.

No.  08–1546.  Keener  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  Fed.

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  551  F.  3d  1358.

No.  08–1548.  Business  Planning  Systems,  Inc.  v.  Person
nel  Decisions,  Inc.  Sup.  Ct.  Del.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  970  A.  2d  256.

No.  08–1550.  Franke  v.  Poly-America  Medical  and  Den
tal  Benefits  Plan.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  555  F.  3d  656.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, parties involved, courts, and disposition information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

INTEL CORPORATION INVESTMENT POLICY
COMMITTEE ET AL. v. SULYMA

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–1116.  Argued December 4, 2019—Decided February 26, 2020

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires
plaintiffs with “actual knowledge” of an alleged fiduciary breach to file
suit within three years of gaining that knowledge, 29 U. S. C. §1113(2),
rather than within the 6-year period that would otherwise apply.  Re-
spondent Sulyma worked at Intel Corporation from 2010 to 2012 and
participated in two Intel retirement plans.  In October 2015, he sued
petitioners—administrators  of  those  plans—alleging  that  they  had
managed the plans imprudently.  Petitioners countered that the suit
was untimely under §1113(2) because Sulyma filed it more than three
years after they had disclosed their investment decisions to him.  Al-
though Sulyma had visited the website that hosted many of these dis-
closures many times, he testified that he did not remember reviewing
the relevant disclosures and that he had been unaware of the allegedly
imprudent  investments  while  working  at  Intel.    The  District  Court
granted summary judgment to petitioners under §1113(2).  The Ninth
Circuit  reversed.    That  court  agreed  with  petitioners  that  Sulyma
could have known about the investments from the disclosures, but held
that  his  testimony  created  a  dispute  as  to  when  he  gained  “actual
knowledge” for purposes of §1113(2).

Held: A  plaintiff  does  not  necessarily  have  “actual  knowledge”  under
§1113(2) of the information contained in disclosures that he receives
but does not read or cannot recall reading.  To meet §1113(2)’s “actual
knowledge” requirement, the plaintiff must in fact have become aware
of that information.  Pp. 5–12.

(a) ERISA’s  “plain  and  unambiguous  statutory  language”  must  be
enforced “according to its terms.”  Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251.  Although ERISA does not define the phrase
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered the main body of the opinion. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case and the court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

901

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5378.  Banks  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  435.

No.  09–5379.  Powell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  204.

No.  09–5380.  Acuna  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  283.

No. 09–5381.  Prince v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  742.

No.  09–5382.  Birtha  v.  Louisiana.  Sup.  Ct.  La.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5384.  Gonzales  v.  Salazar,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5385.  Felix  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  1036.

No.  09–5387.  Graham  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5390.  Ford  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5392.  Campbell  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  1  So.  3d  176.

No.  09–5393.  Carrasquillo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  34.

No.  09–5394.  Jemison  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  866.

No.  09–5395.  Cooks  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5397.  Shamsud-Din  v.  Oregon  Board  of  Parole
and  Post-Prison  Supervision.  Ct.  App.  Ore.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5399.  Levy  v.  Ohio  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

sonable observer would think he is merely complying with
Colorado’s  public-accommodations  law.  This  argument
would  justify  any  law  that  compelled  protected  speech.
And,  this  Court  has  never  accepted  it.  From  the  begin
ning,  this  Court’s  compelled-speech  precedents  have  re
jected arguments that “would resolve every issue of power
in favor of those in authority.”  Barnette, 319 U. S., at 636.
Hurley,  for  example,  held  that  the  application  of  Massa
chusetts’  public-accommodations
[the
organizers]  to  alter  the  expressive  content  of  their  pa
rade.”  515 U. S., at 572–573.  It did not hold that reason
able  observers  would  view  the  organizers  as  merely  com
plying with Massachusetts’ public-accommodations law.

law  “requir[ed]

The  decisions  that  the  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  cited
for this proposition are far afield.  It cited three decisions
where  groups  objected  to  being  forced  to  provide  a  forum
for  a  third  party’s  speech.    See  FAIR,  supra,  at  51  (law
school  refused  to  allow  military  recruiters  on  campus);
Rosenberger,  supra,  at  822–823  (public  university  refused
to provide funds to a religious student paper); PruneYard,
supra, at 77 (shopping center refused to allow individuals
to  collect  signatures  on  its  property).    In  those  decisions,
this  Court  rejected  the  argument  that  requiring  the
groups  to  provide  a  forum  for  third-party  speech  also
required them to endorse that speech.  See FAIR, supra, at
63–65; Rosenberger, supra, at 841–842; PruneYard, supra,
at  85–88.  But  these  decisions  do  not  suggest  that  the
government can force speakers to alter their own message.
See Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U. S., at 12 (“Notably absent
from  PruneYard  was  any  concern  that  access  . . .  might
affect  the  shopping  center  owner’s  exercise  of  his  own
right to speak”); Hurley, supra, at 580 (similar).

The  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  also  noted  that  Master
piece is a “for-profit bakery” that “charges its customers.”
370 P. 3d, at 287.  But this Court has repeatedly rejected
the  notion  that  a  speaker’s  profit  motive  gives  the  gov
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding compelled speech and the application of public accommodations laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

patents  at  the  federal  level  to  courts  alone.    The  only
apparent  exception  to  this  rule  cited  to  us  was  a  4  year
period  when  foreign  patentees  had  to  “work”  or  commer-
cialize  their  patents  or  risk  having  them  revoked.
Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent
Law,  58  Ariz.  L.  Rev.  263,  283–284  (2016).    And  the  fact
that for almost 200 years “earlier Congresses avoided use
of  [a]  highly  attractive”—and  surely  more  efficient—
means  for  extinguishing  patents  should  serve  as  good
“reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist”
at  the  time  of  the  founding.    Printz  v.  United  States,  521
U. S. 898, 905 (1997).
  One more episode still underscores the point.  When the
Executive  sought  to  claim  the  right  to  cancel  a  patent  in
the 1800s, this Court firmly rebuffed the effort.  The Court
explained:

“It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court
that  when  a  patent  has  [been  issued  by]  the  Patent
Office,  it  has  passed  beyond  the  control  and  jurisdic-
tion of that office, and is not subject to be revoked or
cancelled by the President, or any other officer of the
Government.    It  has  become  the  property  of  the  pa-
tentee,  and  as  such  is  entitled  to  the  same  legal  pro-
tection  as  other  property.”    McCormick  Harvesting
Machine  Co.  v.  Aultman,  169  U. S.  606,  608–609
(1898) (citations omitted).

As  a  result,  the  Court  held,  “[t]he  only  authority  compe-
tent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for
any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of the United
States,  and  not  in  the  department  which  issued  the  pat-
ent.”  Id., at 609.
  The Court today replies that McCormick sought only to
interpret  certain  statutes  then  in  force,  not  the  Constitu-
tion.  Ante, at 11, and n. 3.  But this much is hard to see.
Allowing the Executive to withdraw a patent, McCormick
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of the Constitution regarding patent rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

HERRERA v. WYOMING

Opinion of the Court

right,  even  if  still  valid  after  Wyoming’s  statehood,  does
not  protect  hunting  in  Bighorn  National  Forest  because
the  forest  lands  are  “occupied.”  We  agree  with  Herrera
and  the  United  States  that  Bighorn  National  Forest  did
not become categorically “occupied” within the meaning of
the 1868 Treaty when the national forest was created.5

——————

5 Wyoming  argues  that  the  judgment  below  should  be  affirmed  be-
cause  the  Tenth  Circuit  held  in  Repsis  that  the  creation  of  the  forest
rendered the land “occupied,” see 73 F. 3d, at 994, and thus Herrera is
precluded  from  raising  this  issue.    We  did  not  grant  certiorari  on  the
question  of  how  preclusion  principles  would  apply  to  the  alternative
judgment in Repsis, and—although our dissenting colleagues disagree,
see post, at 13, and n. 6—the decision below did not address that issue.
The  Wyoming  appellate  court  agreed  with  the  State  that  “the  pri-
mary  issue  in  [Herrera’s]  case  is  identical  to  the  primary  issue  in  the
Repsis  case.”   No.  2016–242  (4th  Jud.  Dist.,  Sheridan  Cty.,  Wyo.,  Apr.
25,  2017),  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  13  (emphasis  added).    That  “primary
issue”  was  the  Race  Horse  ground  of  decision,  not  the  “occupation”
ground,  which  Repsis  referred  to  as  “an  alternative  basis  for  affir-
mance,”  Repsis,  73  F. 3d,  at  993,  and  which  the  Wyoming  court  itself
described  as  an  “alternativ[e]”  holding,  No.  2016–242,  App.  to  Pet.  for
Cert. 33.  Reading the state court’s decision to give preclusive effect to
the  occupation  ground  as  well  would  not  fit  with  the  Wyoming  court’s
preclusion analysis, which, among other things, relied on a decision of
the Federal District Court in Repsis that did not address the occupation
issue.   See No. 2016–242, App. to Pet. for Cert. 14, 18; see also Repsis,
73  F. 3d,  at  993  (explaining  that  “the  district  court  did  not  reach  [the
occupation] issue”).  Context thus makes clear that the state court gave
issue-preclusive effect only to Repsis’ holding that the 1868 Treaty was
no  longer  valid,  not  to  Repsis’  independent,  narrower  holding  that
Bighorn  National  Forest  in  particular  was  “occupied”  land.    The  court
may not have addressed the issue-preclusive effect of the latter holding
because  of  ambiguity  in  the  State’s  briefing.  See  Appellee’s  Supple-
mental Brief in No. 2016–242, pp. 4, 11–12.

While  the  dissent  questions  whether  forfeiture  could  have  played  a
part in the state court’s analysis given that the court invited the parties
to  submit  supplemental  briefs  on  preclusion,  post,  at  13,  n. 6,  the
parties suggest that Wyoming failed adequately to raise the claim even
in its supplemental brief.  See Brief for Petitioner 49 (“the state made
no  such  argument  before”  the  state  court);  Brief  for  United  States  as
Amicus Curiae 31 (noting ambiguity in the State’s supplemental brief).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the "occupation" status of land in relation to a treaty. It's sequential text and presents a legal argument, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

industry has already converted to some form of group hous-
ing for pregnant pigs.  Id., at 186a.  But, petitioners cau-
tioned, even some farmers who already raise group-housed
pigs will have to modify their practices if they wish to com-
ply with Proposition 12.  Id., at 208a–209a.  Much of pork
production today is vertically integrated, too, with farmers
selling  pigs  to  large  processing  firms  that  turn  them  into
different  “cuts  of  meat”  and  distribute  the  “different
parts  . . . all over to completely different end users.”  Id., at
334a–335a.  Revising  this  system  to  segregate  and  trace
Proposition 12-compliant pork, petitioners alleged, will re-
quire certain processing firms to make substantial new cap-
ital investments.  Id., at 205a–206a.  Ultimately, petition-
ers  estimated  that  “compliance  with  Proposition  12  will
increase production costs” by “9.2% . . . at the farm level.”
Id., at 214a.  These compliance costs will fall on California
and out-of-state producers alike.  Ibid.  But because Cali-
fornia imports almost all the pork it consumes, petitioners
emphasized, “the majority” of Proposition 12’s compliance
costs will be initially borne by out-of-state firms.  Ibid.

After  considerable  motions  practice,  the  district  court
held that petitioners’ complaint failed to state a claim as a
matter of law and dismissed the case.  456 F. Supp. 3d 1201
(SD Cal. 2020).  With Judge Ikuta writing for a unanimous
panel,  the  Ninth  Circuit  affirmed.    6  F. 4th  1021  (2021).
Following that ruling, petitioners sought certiorari and we
agreed to consider the complaint’s legal sufficiency for our-
selves.  596 U. S. ___ (2022).

II
The Constitution vests Congress with the power to “reg-
ulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”  Art. I, §8,
cl. 3.  Everyone agrees that Congress may seek to exercise
this power to regulate the interstate trade of pork, much as
it has done with various other products.  Everyone agrees,
too, that congressional enactments may preempt conflicting
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of a challenge to Proposition 12. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the constitutionality of the law and its impact on interstate commerce.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

ute’s  mandatory  directive  formed  the  basis  for  the  suit
because it was “a specific duty imposed by statute for the
benefit  of  individuals  previously  identified  by  judicial
order.”  Id.,  at  707,  670  P. 2d,  at  140.11  In  Matthews  v.
Pickett  County,  996  S. W.  2d  162  (Tenn.  1999)  (on  certifi-
cation  to  the  Sixth  Circuit),  the  court  confirmed  that  the
statute  mandated  arrest  for  violations  of  domestic  re-
straining orders, and it held that the “public duty” defense
to  a  negligence  action  was  unavailable  to  the  defendant
police officers because the restraining order had created a
“special duty” to protect the plaintiff.  Id., at 165.  See also
Campbell  v.  Campbell,  294  N. J.  Super.  18,  24,  682  A. 2d
272, 274 (1996) (domestic restraining order statute “allows
no  discretion”  with  regard  to  arrest;  “[t]he  duty  imposed
on the police officer is ministerial”); Donaldson v. Seattle,
65  Wash.  App.  661,  670,  831  P. 2d  1098,  1103  (1992)
(“Generally, where an officer has legal grounds to make an
arrest he has considerable discretion to do so.  In regard to
domestic violence, the rule is the reverse.  If the officer has
the legal grounds to arrest pursuant to the statute, he has
a  mandatory  duty  to  make  the  arrest”).    To  what  extent
the  Colorado  Supreme  Court  would  agree  with  the  views
of these courts is, of course, an open question, but it does
seem  rather  brazen  for  the  majority  to  assume  that  the
Colorado  Supreme  Court  would  repudiate  this  consistent
line of persuasive authority from other States.

Indeed,  the  Court  fails  to  come  to  terms  with  the  wave
of  domestic  violence  statutes  that  provides  the  crucial
context  for  understanding  Colorado’s  law.  The  Court
concedes that, “in the specific context of domestic violence,

——————

11 The  Oregon  Supreme  Court  noted  that  the  “widespread  refusal  or
failure  of  police  officers  to  remove  persons  involved  in  episodes  of
domestic  violence  was  presented  to  the  legislature  as  the  main  reason
for tightening the law so as to require enforcement of restraining orders
by  mandatory  arrest  and  custody.”  Nearing,  295  Ore.,  at  709,  670
P. 2d, at 142.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to mandatory arrest for domestic violence violations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

and spent only by their recipients.  Such a solution would
address  the  same  circumvention  possibilities  as  the  cur-
rent aggregate limits, while not completely barring contri-
butions beyond the aggregate levels.  In addition (or as an
alternative),  if  Congress  believes  that  circumvention  is
especially likely to occur through  creation of a joint fund-
raising  committee,  it  could  require  that  funds  received
through those committees be spent by their recipients (or
perhaps  it  could  simply  limit  the  size  of  joint  fundraising
committees).  Such  alternatives  to  the  aggregate  limits
properly  refocus  the  inquiry  on  the  delinquent  actor:  the
recipient of a contribution within the base limits, who then
routes  the  money  in  a  manner  that  undermines  those
limits.  See  Citizens  United,  supra,  at  360–361;  cf.  Bart-
nicki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 514, 529–530 (2001).

Indeed, Congress has adopted transfer restrictions, and
the  Court  has  upheld  them,  in  the  context  of  state  party
spending.  See 2 U. S. C. §441i(b).  So-called “Levin funds”
are  donations  permissible  under  state  law  that  may  be
spent  on  certain  federal  election  activity—namely,  voter
registration  and  identification,  get-out-the-vote  efforts,  or
generic campaign activities.  Levin funds are raised directly
by  the  state  or  local  party  committee  that  ultimately
spends  them.  §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv).    That  means  that  other
party  committees  may  not  transfer  Levin  funds,  solicit
Levin funds on behalf of the particular state or local com-
mittee, or engage in joint fundraising of Levin funds.  See
McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at  171–173.    McConnell  upheld
those  transfer  restrictions  as  “justifiable  anticircumven-
tion  measures,”  though  it  acknowledged  that  they  posed
some  associational  burdens.  Id.,  at  171.  Here,  a  narrow
transfer  restriction  on  contributions  that  could  otherwise
be recontributed in excess of the base limits could rely on a
similar justification.

Other alternatives might focus on earmarking.  Many of
the  scenarios  that  the  Government  and  the  dissent  hy-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing campaign finance regulations and potential alternatives to aggregate contribution limits.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
40  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

To the extent the Court suggests national security interests
are  “distinct,”  those  interests  cannot  explain  the  Court’s
narrow  exemption,  as  national  security  interests  are  also
implicated at civilian universities.  See infra, at 64–65.  The
Court also attempts to justify its carveout based on the fact
that “[n]o military academy is a party to these cases.”  Ante,
at 22, n. 4.  Yet the same can be said of many other institu-
tions that are not parties here, including the religious uni-
versities supporting respondents, which the Court does not
similarly exempt from its sweeping opinion.  See Brief for
Georgetown  University  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  18–29
(Georgetown Brief ) (Catholic colleges and universities not-
ing that they rely on the use of race in their holistic admis-
sions to further not just their academic goals, but also their
religious missions); see also Harvard II, 980 F. 3d, at 187,
n. 24 (“[S]chools that consider race are diverse on numerous
dimensions, including in terms of religious affiliation, loca-
tion, size, and courses of study offered”).  The Court’s carve-
out only highlights the arbitrariness of its decision and fur-
ther  proves  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  does  not
categorically prohibit the use of race in college admissions.
The concurring opinions also agree that the Constitution
tolerates  some  racial  classifications.    JUSTICE  GORSUCH
agrees with the majority’s conclusion that racial classifica-
tions are constitutionally permissible if they advance a com-
pelling  interest  in  a  narrowly  tailored  way.    Ante,  at  23.
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, too, agrees that the Constitution per-
mits the use of race if it survives strict scrutiny.  Ante, at
2.32  JUSTICE THOMAS offers an “originalist defense of the

——————

32 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH agrees that the effects from the legacy of slav-
ery  and  Jim  Crow  continue  today,  citing  Justice  Marshall’s  opinion  in
Bakke.  Ante,  at  7  (citing  438  U. S.,  at  395–402).    As  explained  above,
Justice  Marshall’s  view  was  that  Bakke  covered  only  a  portion  of  the
Fourteenth Amendment’s sweeping reach, such that the Court’s higher
education precedents must be expanded, not constricted.  See 438 U. S.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College.  It is sequential text and contains relevant legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

LORA v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

We express no position on the Government’s view of dou-
ble jeopardy, because even assuming it, arguendo, the Gov-
ernment’s view does not refute our holding on the question
presented.  The Government says someone cannot receive
both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences for the same
conduct.  But that aligns with our conclusion here: If a de-
fendant receives a sentence under subsection (j), he does not
receive a sentence “imposed . . . under [subsection (c)]” that
would
consecutive-sentence  mandate.
§924(c)(1)(D)(ii).  Accordingly,  the  Government’s  view  of
double  jeopardy  can  easily  be  squared  with  our  view  that
subsection (j) neither incorporates subsection (c)’s penalties
nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate.

trigger

the

B
The  Government  protests  that  it  is  “implausible”  that
Congress imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate
under  subsection  (c)  but  not  subsection  (j),  which  covers
more serious offense conduct.  Brief for United States 9, 28–
35.  Yet that result is consistent with other design features
of the statute.

Congress  plainly  chose  a  different  approach  to  punish-
ment in subsection (j) than in subsection (c).  Subsection (c),
first enacted in 1968, is full of mandatory penalties.  It con-
tains  mandatory  minimum  years  of  imprisonment  and
mandatory consecutive sentences.  In fact, when subsection
(j)  was  enacted  in  1994,  subsection  (c)  specified  not  just
mandatory  minimums,  but  exact  mandatory  terms  of  im-
prisonment.  18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1) (1994 ed.) (e.g., exactly
five  years  of  imprisonment  for  the  base  subsection  (c)  of-
fense).

Subsection (j), by contrast, generally eschews mandatory
penalties in favor of sentencing flexibility.  Unlike subsec-
tion  (c),  subsection  (j)  contains  no  mandatory  minimums.
Even  for  murder,  subsection  (j)  expressly  permits  a  sen-
tence of “any term of years.”  §924(j)(1) (emphasis added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute (likely 18 U.S. Code §924). It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR,
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
v. ELSTER

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 22–704.  Argued November 1, 2023—Decided June 13, 2024

Drawing on a 2016 Presidential primary debate exchange between then-
candidate Donald Trump and Senator Marco Rubio, respondent Steve
Elster sought to federally register the trademark “Trump too small” to
use on shirts and hats.  An examiner from the Patent and Trademark
Office refused registration based on the “names clause,” a Lanham Act
prohibition  on  the  registration  of  a  mark  that  “[c]onsists  of  or  com-
prises a name . . . identifying a particular living individual except by
his written consent,” 15 U. S. C. §1052(c).  The Trademark Trial and
Appeal  Board  affirmed,  rejecting  Elster’s  argument  that  the  names
clause violates his First Amendment right to free speech.  The Federal
Circuit reversed.

Held: The Lanham Act’s names clause does not violate the First Amend-

ment.  Pp. 3–22.

(a) When  enforcing  the  First  Amendment’s  prohibition  against
abridging freedom of speech, this Court “distinguish[es] between con-
tent-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.”  National Insti-
tute  of  Family  and  Life  Advocates  v.  Becerra,  585  U. S.  755,  766.    A
content-based regulation “target[s] speech based on its communicative
content,” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 163, and is “ ‘presump-
tively unconstitutional,’ ” National Institute of Family and Life Advo-
cates,  585  U. S.,  at  766.    Viewpoint  discrimination  is  a  particularly
“egregious  form  of  content discrimination”  that  targets  not  merely  a
subject matter “but particular views taken by speakers on the subject.”
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are informational in nature and not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the core content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS

Opinion of the Court

political  speech,  it  is  certainly  “affected  with  a  constitu-
tional  interest.”  Babbitt,  supra,  at  298;  see  also  Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971) (“[T]he consti-
tutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent applica-
tion  precisely  to  the  conduct  of  campaigns  for  political
office”).

B
Next,  petitioners’  intended  future  conduct  is  “argua-
bly. . . proscribed by [the] statute” they wish to challenge.
Babbitt,  supra,  at  298.    The  Ohio  false  statement  law
sweeps  broadly,  see  supra,  at  1–2,  and  n. 1.,  and  covers
the  subject  matter  of  petitioners’  intended  speech.    Both
SBA  and  COAST  have  alleged  an  intent  to  “[m]ake”
statements “concerning the voting record of a candidate or
public  official,”  §3517.21(B)(9),  and  to  “disseminate”
statements  “concerning  a  candidate  . . .  to  promote  the
the  candidate,”
election,  nomination,  or  defeat  of
§3517.21(B)(10).  And,  a  Commission  panel  here  already
found  probable  cause  to  believe  that  SBA  violated  the
statute  when  it  stated  that  Driehaus  had  supported
“taxpayer-funded  abortion”—the  same  sort  of  statement
petitioners plan to disseminate in the future.  Under these
circumstances, we have no difficulty concluding that peti-
tioners’  intended  speech  is  “arguably  proscribed”  by  the
law.

Respondents incorrectly rely on Golden v. Zwickler, 394
U. S. 103 (1969).  In that case, the plaintiff had previously
distributed  anonymous  leaflets  criticizing  a  particular
Congressman  who  had  since  left  office.    Id.,  at  104–106,
and n. 2.  The Court dismissed the plaintiff ’s challenge to
the  electoral  leafletting  ban  as  nonjusticiable  because  his
“sole  concern  was  literature  relating  to  the  Congressman
and  his  record,”  and  “it  was  most  unlikely  that  the  Con-
gressman  would  again  be  a  candidate.”  Id.,  at  109  (em-
phasis  added).  Under  those  circumstances,  any  threat  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding political speech and a specific Ohio law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U99

[09-15-00 14:41:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 742 (1998)

753

Opinion of the Court

ment occurred.
If the plaintiff established a quid pro quo
claim, the Courts of Appeals held, the employer was subject
to vicarious liability. See Davis v. Sioux City, 115 F. 3d
1365, 1367 (CA8 1997); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F. 3d 503, 513–
514 (CA9 1994); Bouton v. BMW of North America, Inc., 29
F. 3d 103, 106–107 (CA3 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County,
1 F. 3d 1122, 1127 (CA10 1993); Kauffman v. Allied Signal,
Inc., 970 F. 2d 178, 185–186 (CA6), cert. denied, 506 U. S.
1041 (1992); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F. 2d
1311, 1316 (CA11 1989). The rule encouraged Title VII
plaintiffs to state their claims as quid pro quo claims, which
in turn put expansive pressure on the deﬁnition. The equiv-
alence of the quid pro quo label and vicarious liability is illus-
trated by this case. The question presented on certiorari is
whether Ellerth can state a claim of quid pro quo harass-
ment, but the issue of real concern to the parties is whether
Burlington has vicarious liability for Slowik’s alleged mis-
conduct, rather than liability limited to its own negligence.
The question presented for certiorari asks:

“Whether a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment
may be stated under Title VII . . . where the plaintiff
employee has neither submitted to the sexual advances
of the alleged harasser nor suffered any tangible effects
on the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment as a consequence of a refusal to submit to
those advances?” Pet. for Cert. i.

We do not suggest the terms quid pro quo and hostile
work environment are irrelevant to Title VII litigation. To
the extent they illustrate the distinction between cases in-
volving a threat which is carried out and offensive conduct
in general, the terms are relevant when there is a threshold
question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination in vio-
lation of Title VII. When a plaintiff proves that a tangible
employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a
supervisor’s sexual demands, he or she establishes that the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 742 (1998). It contains legal jargon and discusses the legal framework surrounding sexual harassment claims under Title VII.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
50  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

With the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the peo-
ple of our Nation proclaimed that the law may not sort citi-
zens based on race.  It is this principle that the Framers of
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  adopted  in  the  wake  of  the
Civil War to fulfill the promise of equality under the law.
And  it  is  this  principle  that  has  guaranteed  a  Nation  of
equal  citizens  the  privileges  or  immunities  of  citizenship
and the equal protection of the laws.  To now dismiss it as
“two-dimensional  flatness,”  post,  at  25  (JACKSON,  J.,  dis-
senting),  is  to  abdicate  a  sacred  trust  to  ensure  that  our
“honored dead . . . shall not have died in vain.”  A. Lincoln,
Gettysburg Address (1863).
  Yet, JUSTICE JACKSON  would replace the second Found-
ers’ vision with an organizing principle based on race.  In
fact, on her view, almost all of life’s outcomes may be un-
hesitatingly ascribed to race.  Post, at 24–26.  This is so, she
writes, because of statistical disparities among different ra-
cial groups. See post, at 11–14.  Even if some whites have a
lower household net worth than some blacks, what matters
to  JUSTICE  JACKSON  is  that  the  average  white  household
has more wealth than the average black household.  Post,
at 11.

This lore is not and has never been true.  Even in the seg-
regated  South  where  I  grew  up,  individuals  were  not  the
sum of their skin color.  Then as now, not all disparities are
based on race; not all people are racist; and not all differ-
ences  between  individuals  are  ascribable  to  race.    Put
simply, “the fate of abstract categories of wealth statistics
is not the same as the fate of a given set of flesh-and-blood
human beings.”  T. Sowell, Wealth, Poverty and Politics 333
(2016).  Worse still, JUSTICE JACKSON uses her broad obser-
vations about statistical relationships between race and se-
lect measures of health, wealth, and well-being to label all
blacks as victims.  Her desire to do so is unfathomable to
me.  I  cannot  deny  the  great  accomplishments  of  black
Americans,  including  those  who  succeeded  despite  long
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It delves into the Fourteenth Amendment, racial equality, and critiques Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

897

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5299.  Washington  v.  Experian  et  al.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5300.  Wilson v. United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  911.

No.  09–5302.  Yearby  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  790.

No.  09–5303.  Waldron-Ramsey v.  Pacholke, Superintend
ent,  Stafford  Creek  Corrections  Center.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  1008.

No.  09–5304.  Evans  v.  Louisiana.  Sup.  Ct.  La.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  993  So.  2d  1218.

No.  09–5306.  Lachira  v.  Sutton.  App.  Ct.  Conn.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5307.  Joyner  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  619.

No.  09–5309.  Jarrell  v.  Haines,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  376.

No.  09–5310.  Maisano  v.  Ruiz.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–5311.  Sanchez-Oxio  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5312.  Monacelli  v.  Heartland  Educational  Con

sortium  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5313.  Perry  v.  Byrnes  (two  judgments).  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5314.  Amelo-Rodriguez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 324 Fed. Appx. 390.

No.  09–5315.  Balogh  v.  New  Jersey.  Super.  Ct.  N.  J.,  App.

Div.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5316.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  553  F.  3d  768.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks sequential narrative and is more akin to a legal docket than readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES

Opinion of the Court

sought must perforce affect the entire class at once, as in a
(b)(2)  class.  For  that  reason  these  are  also  mandatory
classes:  The  Rule  provides  no  opportunity  for  (b)(1)  or
(b)(2)  class  members  to  opt  out,  and  does  not  even  oblige
the District Court to afford them notice of the action.  Rule
23(b)(3), by contrast, is an “adventuresome innovation”  of
the  1966  amendments,  Amchem,  521  U. S.,  at  614  (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted),  framed  for  situations  “in
which ‘class-action treatment is not as clearly called for’,”
id.,  at  615  (quoting  Advisory  Committee’s  Notes,  28
U. S. C.  App.,  p.  697  (1994  ed.)).    It  allows  class  certifica-
tion in a much wider set of circumstances but with greater
procedural protections.  Its only prerequisites are that “the
questions  of  law  or  fact  common  to  class  members  pre-
dominate  over  any  questions  affecting  only  individual
members,  and  that  a  class  action  is  superior  to  other
available  methods  for  fairly  and  efficiently  adjudicating
the  controversy.”  Rule  23(b)(3).    And  unlike  (b)(1)  and
(b)(2)  classes,  the  (b)(3)  class  is  not  mandatory;  class
members  are  entitled  to  receive  “the  best  notice  that  is
practicable  under  the  circumstances”  and  to  withdraw
from the class at their option.  See Rule 23(c)(2)(B).

Given  that  structure,  we  think  it  clear  that  individ-
ualized  monetary  claims  belong  in  Rule  23(b)(3).    The
(b)(3)  class—
procedural  protections  attending
predominance,  superiority,  mandatory  notice,  and  the
right  to  opt  out—are  missing  from  (b)(2)  not  because  the
Rule considers them unnecessary, but because it considers
them unnecessary to a (b)(2) class.  When a class seeks an
indivisible  injunction  benefitting  all  its  members  at  once,
there is no reason to undertake a case-specific inquiry into

the

——————

individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests,” Rule 23(b)(1)(B), such as in “ ‘limited
fund’ cases, . . . in which numerous persons make claims against a fund
insufficient to satisfy all claims,” Amchem, supra, at 614.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal framework for class-action lawsuits under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically focusing on the differences between Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. VAELLO MADERO

Opinion of the Court

Vaello  Madero  invoked  the  U. S.  Constitution.    Vaello
Madero  argued  that  Congress’s  exclusion  of  residents  of
Puerto  Rico  from  the  Supplemental  Security  Income  pro-
gram violated the equal-protection component of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

Vaello Madero’s constitutional argument prevailed in the
District Court and the Court of Appeals, 956 F. 3d 12 (CA1
2020), and we granted certiorari, 592 U. S. ___ (2021).  We
respectfully disagree with those Courts.  In our view, this
Court’s  precedents,  in  addition  to  the  constitutional  text
and historical practice discussed above, establish that Con-
gress may distinguish the Territories from the States in tax
and benefits programs such as Supplemental Security In-
come, so long as Congress has a rational basis for doing so.
In Califano v. Torres, the Court addressed whether Con-
gress’s  decision  not  to  extend  Supplemental  Security  In-
come to Puerto Rico violated the constitutional right to in-
terstate travel.  435 U. S. 1 (1978) (per curiam).  Applying
the  deferential  rational-basis  test,  the  Court  upheld  Con-
gress’s  decision.    The  Court  explained  that  Congress  had
exempted residents of Puerto Rico from federal taxes.  And
the Court concluded that Congress could likewise treat res-
idents of Puerto Rico differently from residents of the States
in  the  Supplemental  Security  Income  benefits  program.
Id., at 3–5, and n. 7.

A few years later, in Harris v. Rosario, the Court again
ruled that Congress’s differential treatment of Puerto Rico
in a federal benefits program did not violate the Constitu-
tion—this time, the equal-protection component of the Fifth
Amendment’s  Due  Process  Clause.  446  U. S.  651  (1980)
(per curiam).  The  Court  stated  that  the  Territory  Clause
permits  Congress  to  “treat  Puerto  Rico  differently  from
States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions.”
Id.,  at  651−652.  Citing  the  prior  decision  in  Torres,  the
Court  noted  that  Congress’s  tax  laws  treated  residents  of
Puerto  Rico  differently  from  residents  of  the States.    And
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of *United States v. Vaello Madero*. It delves into constitutional arguments related to the Supplemental Security Income program and cites relevant precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

EGBERT v. BOULE

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

B
Ziglar  and  Hernández  control  here.  Applying  the  two-
step  framework  set  forth  in  those  cases,  the  Court  of  Ap-
peals’ determination that Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim
is cognizable under Bivens should be affirmed for two inde-
pendent  reasons.  First,  Boule’s  claim  does  not  present  a
new context.  Second, even if it did, no special factors would
counsel hesitation.

1

Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim does not arise in a new
context.  Bivens  itself  involved  a  U. S.  citizen  bringing  a
Fourth Amendment claim against individual, rank-and-file
federal law enforcement officers who allegedly violated his
constitutional rights within the United States by entering
his property without a warrant and using excessive force.
Those are precisely the facts of Boule’s complaint.

The only arguably salient difference in “context” between
this case and Bivens is that the defendants in Bivens were
employed at the time by the (now-defunct) Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, while Agent Egbert was employed by CBP.  As
discussed,  however,  this  Court’s  precedent  instructs  that
some differences are too “trivial . . . to create a new Bivens
context.”  Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26).2  That it
was a CBP agent rather than a Federal Bureau of Narcotics
agent  who  unlawfully  entered  Boule’s  property  and  used
constitutionally  excessive  force  against  him  plainly  is  not
the sort of “meaningful” distinction that our new-context in-
quiry is designed to weed out.  Ibid.

——————

2 Egbert argues in passing that the fact that he was operating under a
“ ‘statutory  . . .  mandate’  not  invoked  in  prior  cases,”  standing  alone,
“dooms  [Boule’s]  no-new-context  argument.”    Reply  Brief  19  (quoting
Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16)).  Not so.  Egbert fails to show
that any difference in statutory mandates as between CBP agents and
other law enforcement officers is “meaningful,” which our precedents re-
quire him to do.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 16).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of EGBERT v. BOULE. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a Fourth Amendment claim and the applicability of the Bivens action.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

McGIRT v. OKLAHOMA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF
OKLAHOMA

No. 18–9526.  Argued May 11, 2020—Decided July 9, 2020

The Major Crimes Act (MCA) provides that, within “the Indian country,”
“[a]ny Indian who commits” certain enumerated offenses “shall be sub-
ject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any
of  [those]  offenses,  within  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  United
States.”    18  U. S. C.  §1153(a).    “Indian  country”  includes  “all  land
within  the  limits  of  any  Indian  reservation  under  the  jurisdiction  of
the United States Government.”  §1151.  Petitioner Jimcy McGirt was
convicted by an Oklahoma state court of three serious sexual offenses.
He unsuccessfully argued in state postconviction proceedings that the
State  lacked  jurisdiction  to  prosecute  him  because  he  is  an  enrolled
member of the Seminole Nation and his crimes took place on the Creek
Reservation.  He seeks a new trial, which, he contends, must take place
in federal court.

Held: For MCA purposes, land reserved for the Creek Nation since the

19th century remains “Indian country.”  Pp. 3–42.

(a) Congress  established  a  reservation  for  the  Creek  Nation.    An
1833 Treaty fixed borders for a “permanent home to the whole Creek
Nation of Indians,” 7 Stat. 418, and promised that the United States
would “grant a patent, in fee simple, to the Creek nation of Indians for
the [assigned] land” to continue “so long as they shall exist as a nation,
and continue to occupy the country hereby assigned to them,” id., at
419.  The patent formally issued in 1852.

Though the early treaties did not refer to the Creek lands as a “res-
ervation,” similar language in treaties from the same era has been held
sufficient to create a reservation, see, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U. S. 404, 405, and later Acts of Congress—referring to the
“Creek reservation”—leave no room for doubt, see, e.g., 17 Stat. 626.
In addition, an 1856 Treaty promised that “no portion” of Creek lands
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1030

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 16, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6511.  Sanchez  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6522.  Ede  v.  Pennsylvania.  Sup.  Ct.  Pa.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  600  Pa.  506,  968  A.  2d  228.

No.  09–6526.  Ayyar  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6532.  Marshall  v.  Alabama.  Sup.  Ct.  Ala.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  20  So.  3d  830.

No.  09–6533.  LaForge  v.  Iowa.  Ct.  App.  Iowa.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  772  N. W.  2d  15.

No.  09–6542.  Monacelli  v.  Lee  County  Education  Assn.

et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6543.  Monacelli  v.  Heartland  Educational  Con

sortium  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6544.  Turner  v.  Runnels,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6545.  Nunley v.  Mississippi.  Sup. Ct. Miss.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6546.  Miller  v.  Friel,  Warden.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6550.  Wells  v.  Washington.  Ct.  App.  Wash.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  147  Wash.  App.  1018.

No.  09–6553.  Broom  v.  Strickland,  Governor  of  Ohio,
et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  579
F.  3d  553.

No.  09–6556.  Watkins  v.  Massachusetts.  Sup.  Jud.  Ct.

Mass.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6559.  Doorbal  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  1222.

No.  09–6563.  Monacelli  v.  Heartland  Educational  Con

sortium  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case summaries from a legal document, likely a Supreme Court docket.  It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

11

Opinion of the Court

USA,  Inc.,  586  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  7).    And
Congress  has  never  reenacted  Exemption  4.  So  whether
Congress’s  use  of similar  language  in other  statutes  after
National  Parks  might  (or  might  not)  tell  us  what  later
Congresses  understood  those  other  statutes  to  mean,  it
tells  us  nothing  about  Congress’s  understanding  of  the
language it enacted in Exemption 4 in 1966.

Finally, Argus urges us to adopt a “substantial competi-
tive  harm”  requirement  as  a  matter  of  policy  because  it
believes  FOIA  exemptions  should  be  narrowly  construed.
But  as  we  have  explained  in  connection  with  another
federal statute, we normally “have no license to give [stat-
utory]  exemption[s]  anything  but  a  fair  reading.”    Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip
op., at 9).  Nor do we discern a reason to depart from that
rule  here:  FOIA  expressly  recognizes  that  “important
interests [are] served by [its] exemptions,” FBI v. Abram-
son,  456  U. S.  615,  630–631  (1982),  and  “[t]hose  exemp-
tions  are  as  much  a  part  of  [FOIA’s]  purpose[s  and  poli-
cies]  as  the  [statute’s  disclosure]  requirement,”  Encino
Motorcars, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).  So, just as we
cannot  properly  expand  Exemption  4  beyond  what  its
terms  permit,  see,  e.g.,  Milner,  562  U. S.,  at  570–571,  we
cannot arbitrarily constrict it either by adding limitations
found nowhere in its terms.

Our  dissenting  colleagues  appear  to  endorse  something
like this final argument.  They seem to agree that the law
doesn’t  demand  proof  of  “substantial”  or  “competitive”
harm, but they think it would be a good idea to require a
showing  of  some  harm.    Neither  side,  however,  has  advo-
cated  for  such  an  understanding  of  the  statute’s  terms.
And  our  colleagues’  brief  brush  with  the  statutory  text
doesn’t help; they cite exclusively from specialized diction-
ary definitions lifted from the national security classifica-
tion context that have no bearing on Exemption 4.  Really,
our colleagues’ submission boils down to a policy argument
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the interpretation of Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and cites relevant case law. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

If, moreover, the Court were to hold that foreign corpo-
rations may be held liable under the ATS, that precedent-
setting  principle  “would  imply  that  other  nations,  also
applying  the  law  of  nations,  could  hale  our  [corporations]
into  their  courts  for  alleged  violations  of  the  law  of  na-
tions.”  Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 124.  This judicially mandated
doctrine,  in  turn,  could  subject  American  corporations  to
an  immediate,  constant  risk  of  claims  seeking  to  impose
massive liability for the alleged conduct of their employees
and  subsidiaries  around  the  world,  all  as  determined  in
foreign  courts,  thereby  “hinder[ing]  global  investment  in
developing economies, where it is most needed.”  Brief for
United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  in  American  Isuzu  Mo-
tors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, O. T. 2007, No. 07–919, p. 20 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).

In  other  words,  allowing  plaintiffs  to  sue  foreign  corpo-
rations  under  the  ATS  could  establish  a  precedent  that
discourages American corporations from investing abroad,
including in developing economies where the host govern-
ment might have a history of alleged human-rights  viola-
tions, or where judicial systems might lack the safeguards
of  United  States  courts.    And,  in  consequence,  that  often
might  deter  the  active  corporate  investment  that  contrib-
utes  to  the  economic  development  that  so  often  is  an  es-
sential foundation for human rights.

It is also true, of course, that natural persons can and do
use  corporations  for  sinister  purposes,  including  conduct
that  violates  international  law.  That  the  corporate  form
can be an instrument for inflicting grave harm and suffer-
ing  poses  serious  and  complex  questions  both  for  the  in-
ternational  community  and  for  Congress.    So  there  are
strong arguments for permitting the victims to seek relief
from  corporations  themselves.    Yet  the  urgency  and  com-
plexity of this problem make it all the more important that
Congress  determine  whether  victims  of  human-rights
abuses  may  sue  foreign  corporations  in  federal  courts  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice Kennedy in the case of Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC. It discusses the potential implications of holding foreign corporations liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
812

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No. 08–10333.  Moore v.  United States District Court for
the  Western  District  of  Washington.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [557  U. S.  901]  denied.

No.  08–10440.  Ford  v.  Christiana  Care  Health  Systems

et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.;

et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.;

No.  08–10625.  GwanJun  Kim  v.  Department  of  Labor

No.  08–10997.  Williams  v.  Church’s  Chicken  et  al.  Ct.

App.  Cal.,  2d  App.  Dist.;

No. 09–5205.  Nicoloudakis v.  Abraham, Philadelphia Dis

trict  Attorney,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.;

No.  09–5294.  Ortega  v.  Napa  County,  California.  Ct.

App.  Cal.,  1st  App.  Dist.;

No.  09–5305.  Corines  v.  Broward  County  Sheriff’s  De

partment  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.;

No.  09–5346.  Potter  v.  South  Coast  Plumbing  Systems,

Inc.,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.  Dist.,  Div.  2;

No.  09–5400.  Menke  v.  Gaddy  et  al.  Ct.  App.  N.  M.;
No.  09–5448.  Rodriguez  v.  Quality  Engineering  Prod

ucts  et  al.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  1st  Dist.;

No.  09–5496.  Abbey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.;
No.  09–5515.  Quinn  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.;  and
No.  09–5728.  Hollis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Mo
tions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.
Petitioners  are  allowed  until  October  26,  2009,  within  which  to
pay  the  docketing  fees  required  by  Rule  38(a)  and  to  submit  peti
tions  in  compliance  with  Rule  33.1  of  the  Rules  of  this  Court.

No.  08–10564.  In  re  Smith;
No.  08–10988.  In  re  Corines;
No.  08–11038.  In  re  Simmons;
No.  08–11050.  In  re  Salazar;
No.  09–5139.  In  re  Ortiz;
No.  09–5156.  In  re  Morrison;
No.  09–5213.  In  re  Martinez;
No.  09–5308.  In  re  Johnson;
No.  09–5606.  In  re  Stamps;
No.  09–5696.  In  re  Usher;
No.  09–5719.  In  re  Bojonquez;
No.  09–5753.  In  re  Gordon;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their status, likely from a legal publication or docket. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be the main body of any legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

Syllabus

these facts risks causing creativity-related harms to the public.  When
taken together, these considerations demonstrate that the fourth fac-
tor—market effects—also weighs in favor of fair use.  Pp. 30–35.

(e) The fact that computer programs are primarily functional makes
it difficult to apply traditional copyright concepts in that technological
world.  Applying the principles of the Court’s precedents and Congress’
codification  of  the  fair  use  doctrine  to  the  distinct  copyrighted  work
here, the Court concludes that Google’s copying of the API to reimple-
ment a user interface, taking only what was needed to allow users to
put  their  accrued  talents  to  work  in  a  new  and  transformative  pro-
gram,  constituted  a  fair  use  of  that  material  as  a  matter  of  law.  In
reaching this result, the Court does not overturn or modify its earlier
cases involving fair use.  Pp. 35–36.

886 F. 3d 1179, reversed and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  SOTOMAYOR,  KAGAN,  GORSUCH,  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.  BAR-
RETT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision.  It is not the actual content of the book and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

Syllabus

as the State demands or face sanctions for expressing her own beliefs,
sanctions that may include compulsory participation in “remedial . . .
training,”  filing  periodic  compliance  reports,  and  paying  monetary
fines.  That is an impermissible abridgement of the First Amendment’s
right to speak freely.  Hurley, 515 U. S., at 574.

Under  Colorado’s  logic,  the  government  may  compel  anyone  who
speaks for pay on a given topic to accept all commissions on that same
topic—no matter the message—if the topic somehow implicates a cus-
tomer’s statutorily protected trait.  6 F. 4th, at 1199 (Tymkovich, C. J.,
dissenting).  Taken seriously, that principle would allow the govern-
ment to force all manner of artists, speechwriters, and others whose
services involve speech to speak what they do not believe on pain of
penalty.  The Court’s precedents recognize the First Amendment tol-
erates  none  of  that.    To  be  sure,  public  accommodations  laws  play  a
vital  role  in  realizing  the  civil  rights  of  all  Americans,  and  govern-
ments in this country have a “compelling interest” in eliminating dis-
crimination  in  places  of  public  accommodation.    Roberts  v.  United
States  Jaycees,  468  U. S.  609,  628.    This  Court  has  recognized  that
public accommodations laws “vindicate the deprivation of personal dig-
nity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public estab-
lishments.”  Heart  of  Atlanta  Motel,  Inc.  v.  United  States,  379  U. S.
241, 250 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Over time, governments
in this country have expanded public accommodations laws in notable
ways.  Statutes like Colorado’s grow from nondiscrimination rules the
common law sometimes imposed on common carriers and places of tra-
ditional public accommodation like hotels and restaurants.  Dale, 530
U. S., at 656–657.  Often, these enterprises exercised something like
monopoly power or hosted or transported others or their belongings.
See, e.g., Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129
U. S. 397, 437.  Importantly, States have also expanded their laws to
prohibit  more forms  of  discrimination.    Today,  for  example,  approxi-
mately  half  the  States  have  laws  like  Colorado’s  that  expressly  pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  The Court has
recognized this is “unexceptional.”  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Col-
orado  Civil  Rights  Comm’n,  584  U. S.  ___,  ___.    States  may  “protect
gay persons, just as [they] can protect other classes of individuals, in
acquiring  whatever  products  and  services  they  choose  on  the  same
terms  and  conditions  as  are  offered  to  other  members  of  the  public.
And  there  are  no  doubt  innumerable  goods  and  services  that  no  one
could argue implicate the First Amendment.”  Ibid.  At the same time,
this Court has also long recognized that no public accommodations law
is immune from the demands of the Constitution.  In particular, this
Court has held, public accommodations statutes can sweep too broadly
when deployed to compel speech.  See, e.g., Hurley, 515 U. S., at 571,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus.  It summarizes the legal arguments and holdings of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

KAGAN, J., dissenting

over—that  Brecht  makes  AEDPA  functionally  immaterial
on  matters  relating  to  harmlessness.    “In  Fry,”  the  Ayala
Court began, “we held that the Brecht standard ‘subsumes’
the requirements that [AEDPA] imposes when a federal ha-
beas petitioner contests a state court’s determination that
a constitutional error was harmless under Chapman.”  576
U. S.,  at  268.    Because  that  is  so,  Ayala  continued  (again
quoting  Fry),  “a  federal  habeas  court  need  not  ‘formal[ly]’
apply  both  Brecht  and  ‘AEDPA/Chapman.’ ”    576  U. S.,  at
268  (alteration  in  original).  And  if  that  were  not  clear
enough, the Court reprised: “In sum, a prisoner who seeks
federal habeas corpus relief must satisfy Brecht, and if the
state court adjudicated his claim on the merits, the Brecht
test subsumes the limitations imposed by AEDPA.”  Id., at
270.  But  still,  the  Court  was  not  done.    In  turning  to
whether  the  error  at  issue  had  caused  Ayala  harm,  the
Court noted that he “necessarily” would not satisfy Brecht
if he had failed to satisfy AEDPA/Chapman—which is the
flipside  of  saying  he  necessarily  would  satisfy  AEDPA/
Chapman if he had satisfied Brecht.  576 U. S., at 270.  Both
are  a  function,  once  again,  of  Brecht  “obviously  sub-
sum[ing]” AEDPA/Chapman.5

Today’s majority contorts Ayala, too, beyond recognition.
The majority insists that only a “carefully curated snippet”
of that decision—one sentence, in fact—cuts against today’s
holding.  Ante,  at  20.  But  see  all  the  quotations  above.
Ayala  repeats  the  key  point  favoring  Davenport—that  a
court applying Brecht need not separately apply AEDPA—
multiple times over a span of more than three pages (with
the rest of that section providing supportive analysis).  See
576 U. S., at 267–270.  Similarly, the majority asserts that

——————

5 Only  the  Ayala  Court’s  application  of  Brecht  provoked  a  dissenting
opinion.  The dissent explained that its disagreement did “not stem from
[the  Court’s] discussion  of  the  applicable  standard  of  review”—i.e.,  the
Brecht standard alone—“which simply restates the holding of Fry.”  576
U. S., at 291 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites previous cases and legal precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

3

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

(SCALIA, J., concurring).  Respondents make no claim that
the  State  has  deprived  them  of  liberty  without  the  requi-
site  procedures,  and  their  due  process  claim  therefore
must  fail.  Even  under  the  formula  we  have  adopted  for
identifying  liberties  entitled  to  protection  under  the  faux
“substantive” component of the Due Process Clause—that
“the  Due  Process  Clause  specially  protects  those  funda-
mental  rights  and  liberties  which  are,  objectively,  deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” Washington
v.  Glucksberg,  521  U. S.  702,  720–721  (1997)  (internal
quotation  marks  omitted)—respondents’  claim  would  fail.
Respondents do not even attempt  to argue  that the  claim
at issue in this case passes that test, perhaps recognizing
the  farcical  nature  of  a  contention  that  a  right  deeply
rooted  in  our  history  and  tradition  bars  the  Government
from  ensuring  that  the  Hubble  Telescope  is  not  used  by
recovering drug addicts.

The  absurdity  of  respondents’  position  in  this  case
should  not,  however,  obscure  the  broader  point:  Our  due
process  precedents,  even  our  “substantive  due  process”
precedents,  do  not  support  any  right  to  informational
privacy.  First, we have held that the government’s act of
defamation  does  not  deprive  a  person  “of  any  ‘liberty’
protected by the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”  Paul  v.  Davis,  424  U. S.  693,  709  (1976).
We  reasoned  that  stigma,  standing  alone,  does  not  “sig-
nificantly alte[r]” a person’s legal status so as to “justif[y]
the invocation of procedural safeguards.”  Id., at 708–709.
If outright defamation does not qualify, it is unimaginable
that the mere disclosure of private information does.

Second,  respondents  challenge  the  Government’s collec-
tion  of  their  private  information.    But  the  Government’s
collection of private information is regulated by the Fourth
Amendment,  and  “[w]here  a  particular  Amendment  pro-
vides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection
against  a  particular  sort  of  government  behavior,  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Scalia in a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding due process and informational privacy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>