<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

Opinion of the Court

would  reasonably  expect  that  organization  to react  differ-
ently if the letter came from, say, the U. S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York than if it came from an out-
of-state school board.

As DFS superintendent, Vullo had direct regulatory and
enforcement authority over all insurance companies and fi-
nancial  service  institutions  doing  business  in  New  York.
See N. Y. Fin. Servs.  Law Ann. §§202, 301.   Just like the
commission in Bantam Books, Vullo could initiate investi-
gations and refer cases for prosecution.  Indeed, she could
do much more than that.  Vullo also had the power to notice
civil charges and, as this case shows, enter into consent de-
crees that impose significant monetary penalties.

Against this backdrop, consider Vullo’s communications
with the DFS-regulated entities, particularly with Lloyd’s.
According to the NRA, Vullo brought a variety of insurance-
law violations to the Lloyd’s executives’ attention during a
private meeting in February 2018.  The violations included
technical infractions that allegedly plagued the affinity in-
surance  market  in  New  York  and  that  were  unrelated  to
any  NRA  business.    App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  199–200,  Com-
plaint  ¶21;  accord,  id.,  at  207–208,  ¶¶36–37;  id.,  at  223,
¶69.  Vullo allegedly said she would be “less interested in
pursuing  the[se]  infractions  . . .  so  long  as  Lloyd’s  ceased
providing  insurance  to  gun  groups,  especially  the  NRA.”
Id., at 199–200, ¶21.  Vullo therefore wanted Lloyd’s to dis-
associate from all gun groups, although there was no indi-
cation  that  such  groups  had  unlawful  insurance  policies
similar to the NRA’s.  Vullo also told the Lloyd’s executives
she  would  “focus”  her  enforcement  actions  “solely”  on  the
syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ignore other syndi-
cates writing similar policies.”  Id., at 223, ¶69.  The mes-
sage was therefore loud and clear: Lloyd’s “could avoid lia-
bility  for  [unrelated]  infractions”  if  it  “aided  DFS’s
campaign against gun groups” by terminating its business
relationships with them.  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the actions of a superintendent and their communications with a regulated entity. It provides context and analysis of the situation, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

67

Syllabus

UNION  PACIFIC  RAILROAD  CO.  v.  BROTHERHOOD

OF  LOCOMOTIVE  ENGINEERS  AND  TRAINMEN

GENERAL  COMMITTEE  OF  ADJUSTMENT,

CENTRAL  REGION

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit

No. 08–604.  Argued October 7, 2009—Decided December 8, 2009

The  Railway  Labor  Act  (RLA  or  Act)  was  enacted  to  promote  peaceful
and  efﬁcient  resolution  of  labor  disputes.  As  amended,  the  Act  man
dates  arbitration  of  “minor  disputes”  before  panels  composed  of  two
representatives  of  labor  and  two  of  industry,  with  a  neutral  referee  as
tiebreaker.  Union  Paciﬁc  R.  Co.  v.  Price,  360  U. S.  601,  610–613.  To
supply  arbitrators,  Congress  established  the  National  Railroad  Adjust
ment Board (NRAB or Board), a board of 34 private persons represent
ing  labor  and  industry  in  equal  numbers.  45  U. S. C.  § 153  First  (a).
Before  resorting  to  arbitration,  employees  and  carriers  must  exhaust
the  grievance  procedures  in  their  collective-bargaining  agreement
(hereinafter  CBA),  see  § 153  First  (i),  a  stage  known  as  “on-property”
proceedings.  As  a  ﬁnal  prearbitration  step,  the  parties  must  attempt
settlement  “in  conference”  between  representatives  of  the  carrier  and
the  grievant-employee.  § 152  Second,  Sixth.  The  RLA  contains  in
structions  concerning  the  place  and  time  of  conferences,  but  does  not
“supersede  the  provisions  of  any  agreement  (as  to  conferences)  .  .  .  be
tween the parties,” § 152 Sixth; in common practice the conference may
be as informal as a telephone conversation.  If the parties fail to achieve
resolution,  either  may  refer  the  matter  to  the  NRAB.  § 153  First  (i).
Submissions to the Board must include “a full statement of the facts and
all  supporting  data  bearing  upon  the  disputes.”  Ibid.  Parties  may
seek  court  review  of  an  NRAB  panel  order  on  one  or  more  stated
grounds: “failure . . . to comply with the requirements of [the RLA], . . .
failure  of  the  order  to  conform,  or  conﬁne  itself,  to  matters  within  the
scope of the division’s jurisdiction, or . . . fraud or corruption by a mem
ber  of  the  division  making  the  order.”  § 153  First  (q).  Courts  of  Ap
peals  have  divided  on  whether,  in  addition  to  the  statutory  grounds
for  judicial  review  stated  in  § 153  First  (q),  courts  may  review  NRAB
proceedings for due process violations.

After  petitioner  Union  Paciﬁc  Railroad  Co.  (hereinafter  Carrier)
charged  ﬁve  of  its  employees  with  disciplinary  violations,  their  union
(hereinafter  Union)  initiated  grievance  proceedings  pursuant  to  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary. It includes information about the case name, court, citation, and a brief overview of the Railway Labor Act and its arbitration process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

Opinion of the Court

IV

These are facial challenges, and that matters.  To succeed
on its First Amendment claim, NetChoice must show that
the law at issue (whether from Texas or from Florida) “pro-
hibits a substantial amount of protected speech relative to
its  plainly  legitimate  sweep.”  Hansen,  599  U. S.,  at  770.
None of the parties below focused on that issue; nor did the
Fifth or Eleventh Circuits.  But that choice, unanimous as
it has been, cannot now control.  Even in the First Amend-
ment context, facial challenges are disfavored, and neither
parties nor courts can disregard the requisite inquiry into
how a law works in all of its applications.  So on remand,
each court must evaluate the full scope of the law’s cover-
age.  It must then decide which of the law’s applications are
constitutionally permissible and which are not, and finally
weigh the one against the other.  The need for NetChoice to
carry its burden on those issues is the price of its decision
to challenge the laws as a whole.

But  there  has  been  enough  litigation  already  to  know
that  the  Fifth  Circuit,  if  it  stayed  the  course,  would  get
wrong at least one significant input into the facial analysis.
The parties treated Facebook’s News Feed and YouTube’s
homepage as the heartland applications of the Texas law.
At least on the current record, the editorial judgments in-
fluencing  the  content  of  those  feeds  are,  contrary  to  the
Fifth  Circuit’s  view,  protected  expressive  activity.    And
Texas  may  not  interfere  with  those  judgments  simply  be-
cause it would prefer a different mix of messages.  How that
matters for the requisite facial analysis is for the Fifth Cir-
cuit to decide.  But it should conduct that analysis in keep-
ing with two First Amendment precepts.  First, presenting
a curated and “edited compilation of [third party] speech” is
itself protected speech.  Hurley, 515 U. S., at 570.  And sec-
ond, a State “cannot advance some points of view by bur-
dening the expression of others.”  PG&E, 475 U. S., at 20.
To give government that power is to enable it to control the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the First Amendment implications of certain laws. It delves into legal precedents and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

47

Thomas, J., dissenting

Security beneﬁts claim for purposes of 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) is
accomplished by the near-costless act of ﬁling an application
for beneﬁts, to be contrasted with the extremely burden-
some presentment requirement facing the aliens in Haitian
Refugee Center or the named plaintiff in Ringer. The only
signiﬁcant hardship facing the claimants in Salﬁ arose from
the possibility that a lengthy administrative review proc-
ess would postpone a judicial decision ordering the Secre-
tary to pay the disputed beneﬁts; but the Court took care
of that problem by leniently construing § 405(g)’s require-
ment of a “ﬁnal” agency decision and by allowing the Sec-
retary to waive entirely § 405(g)’s requirement that decision
be made “after a hearing.” At bottom, then, the major-
ity cannot demonstrate why the presumption in favor of
preenforcement review, which dates at least from Abbott
Laboratories, should not be invoked to resolve the debate
between our conﬂicting readings of § 1395ii.

There is a practical reason why we employ the pre-
sumption not only to questions of whether judicial review
is available, but also to questions of when judicial re-
view is available. Delayed review—that is, a requirement
that a regulated entity disobey the regulation, suffer an
enforcement proceeding by the agency, and only then seek
judicial review—may mean no review at all. For when
the costs of “presenting” a claim via the delayed review
route exceed the costs of simply complying with the regu-
lation, the regulated entity will buckle under and comply,
even when the regulation is plainly invalid. See Seidenfeld,
Playing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review, 58 Ohio
St. L. J. 85, 104 (1997). And we can expect that this con-
sequence will often ﬂow from an interpretation of an am-
In Haitian
biguous statute to bar preenforcement review.
Refugee Center, for example, the aliens’ “postenforcement”
review option for asserting their challenge to the agency’s
procedures required the aliens to voluntarily surrender
themselves for deportation, suffer an order of deporta-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case 529 U.S. 1 (2000).  It discusses the availability of pre-enforcement judicial review and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of the Court

across the Nation cast faithless votes—the most in a cen-
tury, but well short of the goal.  Candidate Trump became
President Trump.  And, more to the point here, the State
fined the Electors $1,000 apiece for breaking their pledges
to support the same candidate its voters had.

The Electors challenged their fines in state court, arguing
that the Constitution gives members of the Electoral Col-
lege the right to vote however they please.  The Washington
Superior Court rejected the Electors’ claim in an oral deci-
sion,  and  the  State’s  Supreme  Court  affirmed  that  judg-
ment.  See In re Guerra, 193 Wash. 2d 380, 441 P. 3d 807
(2019).  The court relied heavily on our decision in Ray v.
Blair upholding a pledge requirement—though one without
a penalty to back it up.  See 193 Wash. 2d, at 393–399, 441
P. 3d, at 813–816.  In the state court’s view, Washington’s
penalty provision made no difference.  Article II of the Con-
stitution,  the  court  noted,  grants  broad  authority  to  the
States to appoint electors, and  so to impose conditions on
their appointments.  See id., at 393, 395, 441 P. 3d, at 813,
814.  And nothing in the document “suggests that electors
have discretion to cast their votes without limitation or re-
striction by the state legislature.”  Id., at 396, 441 P. 3d, at
814.

A few months later, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in a
case involving another faithless elector.  See Baca v. Colo-
rado Dept. of State, 935 F. 3d 887 (2019).  The Circuit Court
held  that  Colorado  could  not  remove  the  elector,  as  its
pledge  law  directs,  because  the  Constitution  “provide[s]
presidential electors the right to cast a vote” for President
“with discretion.”  Id., at 955.

We granted certiorari to resolve the split.  589 U. S. ___
(2020).  We  now  affirm  the  Washington  Supreme  Court’s
judgment that a State may enforce its pledge law against
an elector.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the case of faithless electors and the constitutionality of state laws requiring electors to vote for the candidate they pledged to support.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

U. S., at 742–743.  Justice Scalia reasoned that the Clean
Water Act does not merely “forbid the ‘addition of any pol-
lutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’
but  rather the ‘addition  of  any  pollutant  to  navigable  wa-
ters.’  Thus, from the time of the CWA’s enactment, lower
courts have held that the discharge into intermittent chan-
nels  of  any  pollutant  that  naturally  washes  downstream
likely  violates  §1311(a),  even  if  the  pollutants  discharged
from a point source do not emit ‘directly into’ covered wa-
ters, but pass ‘through conveyances’ in between.”  Id., at 743
(citations omitted).
  In  other  words,  under  Justice  Scalia’s  interpretation  in
Rapanos,  the  fact  that  the  pollutants  from  Maui’s
wastewater  facility  reach  the  ocean  via  an  indirect  route
does not itself exempt Maui’s facility from the Clean Water
Act’s permitting requirement for point sources.  The Court
today  adheres  to  Justice  Scalia’s  analysis  in  Rapanos  on
that issue.
  Second,  as  Justice  Scalia’s  opinion  in  Rapanos  pointed
out and as the Court’s opinion today explains, the statute
does not establish a bright-line test regarding when a pol-
lutant  may  be  considered  to  have  come  “from”  a  point
source.  The source of the vagueness is Congress’ statutory
text, not the Court’s opinion.  The Court’s opinion seeks to
translate  the  vague  statutory  text  into  more  concrete
guidance.
  Third,  JUSTICE  THOMAS’  dissent  states  that  “the  Court
does not commit” to “which factors are the most important”
in determining whether pollutants that enter navigable wa-
ters come “from” a point source.  Post, at 5.  That critique is
not accurate, as I read the Court’s opinion.  The Court iden-
tifies  relevant  factors  to  consider  and  emphasizes  that
“[t]ime and distance are obviously important.”  Ante, at 15.
And the Court expressly adds that “[t]ime and distance will
be the most important factors in most cases, but not neces-
sarily every case.”  Ante, at 16.  Although the statutory text
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh in the case of COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND. It delves into the interpretation of the Clean Water Act and its application to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

317

Counsel

pellee  on  the  original  argument.  With  them  on  the  briefs
were  then-Acting  Solicitor  General  Kneedler,  William  M.
Jay,  Thomasenia  P.  Duncan,  David  Kolker,  Kevin  Deeley,
and Adav Noti.

Seth  P.  Waxman  argued  the  cause  for  Senator  John  Mc
Cain et al. as amici curiae urging afﬁrmance.  With him on
the  briefs  were  Randolph  D.  Moss,  Roger  M.  Witten,  Scott
L.  Nelson,  Alan  B.  Morrison,  Brian  Wolfman,  Trevor
Potter,  J.  Gerald  Hebert,  Paul  S.  Ryan,  Tara  Malloy,  Fred
Wertheimer, and Donald J. Simon.*

*Briefs  of  amici  curiae  urging  reversal  were  ﬁled  for  the  Alliance  De
fense Fund by Benjamin W. Bull, Erik W. Stanley, and Robert J. McCully;
for  the  American  Civil  Rights  Union  by  Peter  Ferrara;  for  the  American
Federation  of  Labor  and  Congress  of  Industrial  Organizations  by  Jona
than  P.  Hiatt and  Laurence  E.  Gold;  for  the  Cato  Institute  by  Benjamin
D.  Wood,  Glenn  M.  Willard,  William  J.  McGinley,  and  Ilya  Shapiro;  for
the  Center  for  Competitive  Politics  by  Stephen  M.  Hoersting  and  Reid
Alan Cox; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
by  Jan  Witold  Baran,  Thomas  W.  Kirby,  Caleb  P.  Burns,  Robin  S.  Con
rad,  Amar  D.  Sarwal,  Steven  J.  Law,  and  Judith  K.  Richmond;  for  the
Committee for Truth in Politics, Inc., by James Bopp, Jr., and Richard E.
Coleson;  for  the  Foundation  for  Free  Expression  by  Deborah  J.  Dewart
and  James  L.  Hirsen;  for  the  National  Riﬂe  Association  by  Charles  J.
Cooper, David H. Thompson, and David Lehn; for the Reporters Commit
tee  for  Freedom  of  the  Press  by  Lucy  A.  Dalglish  and  Gregg  P.  Leslie;
and for the Wyoming Liberty Group et al. by Benjamin Barr.

Briefs  of  amici  curiae  urging  afﬁrmance  were  ﬁled  for  the  American
Independent  Business  Alliance  by  Brenda  Wright,  Lisa  J.  Danetz,  and
Daniel J. H. Greenwood; for the Campaign Legal Center et al. by Messrs.
Potter  and  Hebert,  Ms.  Malloy,  and  Messrs.  Ryan,  Simon,  and  Werth
eimer;  for  the  Center  for  Political  Accountability  et  al.  by  Karl  J.  Sand
strom;  for  the  League  of  Women  Voters  of  the  United  States  et  al.  by
Douglas  T.  Kendall,  Elizabeth  B.  Wydra,  David  H.  Gans,  and  Lloyd  J.
Leonard; for the Program on Corporations, Law and Democracy et al. by
Jeffrey  D.  Clements;  for  the  Sunlight  Foundation  et  al.  by  Gary  S.  Stein;
and for Norman Ornstein et al. by H. Christopher Bartolomucci.

Briefs of amici curiae were ﬁled for the State of Montana et al. by Steve
Bullock, Attorney General of Montana, and Anthony Johnstone, Solicitor,
by Terry Goddard, Attorney General of Arizona, Mary R. O’Grady, Solici
tor  General,  and  Orville  B.  Fitch  II,  Acting  Attorney  General  of  New
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal case citations and amicus curiae briefs. It's not the main body of text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Information</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

371

Opinion of the Court

261.  The  First  Amendment  protects  political  speech;  and
disclosure  permits  citizens  and  shareholders  to  react  to  the
speech of corporate entities in a proper way.  This transpar
ency  enables  the  electorate  to  make  informed  decisions  and
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.

C

For the same  reasons we uphold the  application of BCRA
§§ 201 and 311 to the ads, we afﬁrm their application to Hil
lary.  We  ﬁnd  no  constitutional  impediment  to  the  applica
tion  of  BCRA’s  disclaimer  and  disclosure  requirements  to  a
movie  broadcast  via  video-on-demand.  And  there  has  been
no  showing that,  as  applied in  this  case, these  requirements
would impose a chill on speech or expression.

V

When  word  concerning  the  plot  of  the  movie  Mr.  Smith
Goes to Washington reached the circles of Government, some
ofﬁcials sought, by persuasion, to discourage its distribution.
See  Smoodin,  “Compulsory”  Viewing  for  Every  Citizen:
Mr. Smith and the Rhetoric of Reception, 35 Cinema Journal
3,  19,  and  n.  52  (Winter  1996)  (citing  Mr.  Smith  Riles  Wash
ington,  Time,  Oct.  30,  1939,  p.  49);  Nugent,  Capra’s  Capitol
Offense,  N.  Y.  Times,  Oct.  29,  1939,  p.  X5.  Under  Austin,
though,  ofﬁcials  could  have  done  more  than  discourage  its
distribution—they could have banned the ﬁlm.  After all, it,
like  Hillary,  was  speech  funded  by  a  corporation  that  was
critical of  Members of Congress.  Mr.  Smith Goes  to Wash
ington  may  be  ﬁction  and  caricature;  but  ﬁction  and  carica
ture can be a powerful force.

Modern  day  movies,  television  comedies,  or  skits  on  You-
Tube.com  might  portray  public  ofﬁcials  or  public  policies  in
unﬂattering ways.  Yet if a covered transmission during the
blackout  period  creates  the  background  for  candidate  en
dorsement or opposition, a felony occurs solely because a cor
poration, other than an exempt media corporation, has made
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of campaign finance laws to a movie. It contains legal arguments and references to case law, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH v. HETRONIC INT’L, INC.

Opinion of the Court

U. S., at 269.  The use of a mark—even confined to one coun-
try—will often have effects that radiate to any number of
countries.  And when determining exactly what form of ab-
stract consumer confusion is sufficient in a given case, the
Judiciary  would  be  thrust  into  the  unappetizing  task  of
“navigating foreign policy disputes belong[ing] to the polit-
ical  branches.”  Jesner  v.  Arab  Bank,  PLC,  584  U. S.  ___,
___ (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (slip op., at 1).  If enough countries took this
approach, the trademark system would collapse.

This tension has not been lost on other sovereign nations.
The  European  Commission  gravely  warns  this  Court
against applying the Lanham Act “to acts of infringement
occurring  . . .  in  the  European  Union”  and  outside  of  the
United States.  Brief for European Commission on Behalf
of  the  European  Union  as  Amicus  Curiae  4  (emphasis
added).  To “police allegations of infringement occurring in
Germany,”  it  continues,  would  be  an  “unseemly”  act  of
“meddling in extraterritorial  affairs,” given  “international
treaty obligations that equally bind the United States.”  Id.,
at 28.  As the Commission and other foreign  amici recog-
nize, the “system only works if all participating states re-
spect their obligations, including the limits on their power.”
Id., at 29; see also, e.g., Brief for German Law Professors as
Amici Curiae 12; Brief for Guido Westkamp as Amicus Cu-
riae 2–3.  It thus bears repeating our longstanding admon-
ition that “United States law governs domestically but does
not rule the world.”  Microsoft Corp., 550 U. S., at 454.

IV

In sum, we hold that §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1) are not
extraterritorial and that the infringing “use in commerce”
of a trademark provides the dividing line between foreign
and  domestic  applications  of  these  provisions.    Under  the
Act, the “term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of
a  mark  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade,”  where  the  mark
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the extraterritorial reach of trademark law. It's part of a larger legal argument and contains legal citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cx

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

Oliver v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  910,1051

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  851,1038

Olivier v. California
884

Ollison; Hearod v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Ollison; Hernandez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

Oloba-Aisony v. Scribner
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948

Olofson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
883

Olvis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Om v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

810

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Omega, S. A.; Costco Wholesale Corp. v.
One Beacon Ins. Co.; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  822,1064

1100

Oneida Ltd. v. Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088

Onondaga County Sheriff ’s Dept.; Humphrey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1090

Ontario v. Quon
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operating Engineers; Ward v.
990

Orange County Social Services Agency; N. I. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Oregon; Bowen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  832,1141

Oregon; Curtis v.
873

Oregon; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Oregon; E. L. G. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Oregon; Ibarra Perez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Oregon; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
829

Oregon; Zweigart v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

Oregon Parole and Post-Prison Supervision; Shamsud-Din v.  . . . .
847

Oregon Parole and Post-Prison Supervision; Wrenn v.  . . . . . . . . .
822

Orion Reserves Ltd. Partnership v. Salazar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132

Orr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Orsello v. Gaffney  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Ortega v. Napa County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

1157

Ortega v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

Ortiz, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ortiz; Grifﬁn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  954,1086

983

Ortiz v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ortiz v. United States
1062

Ortiz-Ruiz v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

Ortkiese v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1085

Oruche v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

O. S. v. Mental Health Bd. of Fourth Judicial Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . .
1018

Osaki v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

Osborne v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Osequera-Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

851

Osiname v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128

Osley v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036

Osuna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oswald v. Thurmer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  851,1086
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  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U55

[09-26-01 13:01:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 667 (2000)

679

Opinion of the Court

tion. We need not go so far. Even assuming the examples
of subsection (c) bear upon the deﬁnition of beneﬁts, statu-
tory examples of nonapplicability do not necessarily give rise
to the inference that absent the enumeration the statute
would otherwise apply. To deﬁne all subsection (c) pay-
ments as exempted beneﬁts would go well beyond the ordi-
nary meaning of the word. On the other hand, the statute
is not written to say: “The term ‘beneﬁts’ does not include
bona ﬁde salary, wages, fees, or other compensation paid, or
expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of busi-
ness.” We must construe the term “beneﬁts,” then, in a
manner consistent with Congress’ intent not to reach the
enumerated class of transactions. See S. Rep. No. 98–225,
p. 370 (1984) (“[N]ot every Federal contract or disbursement
of funds would be covered [under § 666]. For example, if a
government agency lawfully purchases more than $10,000 in
equipment from a supplier, it is not the intent of this section
to make a theft of $5,000 or more from the supplier a Fed-
eral crime”).

We do not accept the view that the Medicare payments
here in question are for the limited purposes of compensating
providers or reimbursing them for ordinary course expendi-
tures. The payments are made for signiﬁcant and substan-
tial reasons in addition to compensation or reimbursement,
so that neither these terms nor the usual course of business
conditions set forth in subsection (c) are met here. The pay-
ments in question have attributes and purposes well beyond
those described in subsection (c). These attributes and pur-
poses are consistent with the deﬁnition of “beneﬁt.” While
the payments might have similarities to payments an insurer
would remit to a hospital quite without regard to the Medi-
care program, the Government does not make the payment
unless the hospital complies with its intricate regulatory
scheme. The payments are made not simply to reimburse
for treatment of qualifying patients but to assist the hospital
in making available and maintaining a certain level and qual-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the definition of "benefits" in a specific statute and applies it to Medicare payments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

over “all suits against consuls or vice-consuls.”  §9, 1 Stat.
76–77.  Where  Congress  wanted  to  limit  the  range  of
permissible defendants, then, it clearly knew how to do so.
Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here
Congress  includes  particular  language  in  one  section  of  a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it
is  generally  presumed  that  Congress  acts  intentionally
and  purposely  in  the  disparate  inclusion  or  exclusion”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Nothing  about  the  historical  background  against  which
the  ATS  was  enacted  rebuts  the  presumption  that  the
statute  incorporated  the  accepted  principle  of  corporate
liability  for  tortious  conduct.  Under  the  Articles  of  Con
federation,  the  Continental  Congress  was  unable  to  pro
vide redress to foreign citizens for violations of treaties or
the  law  of  nations,  which  threatened  to  undermine  the
United  States’  relationships  with  other  nations.    See
Kiobel,  569  U. S.,  at  123.    The  First  Congress  responded
with, inter alia, the ATS.  Although the two incidents that
highlighted  the  need  to  provide  foreign  citizens  with  a
federal forum in which to pursue their grievances involved
conflicts between natural persons, see ante, at 7 (majority
opinion) (describing the assault by a French adventurer on
the Secretary of the French Legation and the arrest of one
of  the  Dutch  Ambassador’s  servants  by  a  New  York  con
stable),  there  is  “no  reason  to  conclude  that  the  First
Congress  was  supremely  concerned  with  the  risk  that
natural  persons  would  cause  the  United  States  to  be
drawn  into  foreign  entanglements,  but  was  content  to
allow formal legal associations of individuals, i.e., corpora
tions, to do so,” Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F. 3d 11, 47
(CADC 2011), vacated on other grounds, 527 Fed. Appx. 7
(CADC  2013);  see  also  Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus
Curiae 6 (“The ATS was enacted to ensure a private dam
ages  remedy  for  incidents  with  the  potential  for  serious
diplomatic  consequences,  and  Congress  had  no  good  rea
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites legal precedents and discusses the historical context of the Alien Tort Statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

B
Six States moved for a preliminary injunction, claiming
that the plan exceeded the Secretary’s statutory authority.
The District Court held that none of the States had stand-
ing  to  challenge  the  plan  and  dismissed  the  suit.    ___
F. Supp. 3d ___ (ED Mo. 2022).  The States appealed, and
the Eighth Circuit issued a nationwide preliminary injunc-
tion pending resolution of the appeal.  The court concluded
that  Missouri  likely  had  standing  through  the  Missouri
Higher Education Loan Authority (MOHELA or Authority),
a public corporation that holds and services student loans.
52 F. 4th 1044 (2022).  It further concluded that the State’s
challenge raised “substantial” questions on the merits and
that the equities favored maintaining the status quo pend-
ing further review.  Id., at 1048 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

With the plan on pause, the Secretary asked this Court
to vacate the injunction or to grant certiorari before judg-
ment, “to avoid prolonging this uncertainty for the millions
of affected borrowers.”  Application 4.  We granted the peti-
tion and set the case for expedited argument.  598 U. S. ___
(2022).

II
Before addressing the legality of the Secretary’s program,
we must first ensure that the States have standing to chal-
lenge it.  Under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff
needs a “personal stake” in the case.  TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 7).  That is,
the  plaintiff  must  have  suffered  an  injury  in  fact—a  con-
crete  and  imminent  harm  to  a  legally  protected  interest,
like property or money—that is fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged  conduct  and  likely  to  be  redressed  by  the  lawsuit.
Lujan  v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504  U. S.  555,  560–561
(1992).  If at least one plaintiff has standing, the suit may
proceed.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the beginning of the opinion of the court. It sets the stage for the case by outlining the procedural history and the legal standard for standing.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

134

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Opinion of the Court

the FDA’s “[m]ission” to include “protect[ing] the public
health by ensuring that . . . drugs are safe and effective”
and that “there is reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of devices intended for human use.” The
FDCA requires premarket approval of any new drug, with
some limited exceptions, and states that the FDA “shall
issue an order refusing to approve the application” of a new
drug if it is not safe and effective for its intended purpose.
If the FDA discovers after approval
§§ 355(d)(1)–(2), (4)–(5).
that a drug is unsafe or ineffective, it “shall, after due notice
and opportunity for hearing to the applicant, withdraw ap-
proval” of the drug. 21 U. S. C. §§ 355(e)(1)–(3). The Act
also requires the FDA to classify all devices into one of three
categories.
§ 360c(b)(1). Regardless of which category the
FDA chooses, there must be a “reasonable assurance of
the safety and effectiveness of the device.” 21 U. S. C.
§§ 360c(a)(1)(A)(i), (B), (C) (1994 ed. and Supp. III); 61 Fed.
Reg. 44412 (1996). Even the “restricted device” provision
pursuant to which the FDA promulgated the regulations at
issue here authorizes the agency to place conditions on the
sale or distribution of a device speciﬁcally when “there can-
not otherwise be reasonable assurance of its safety and effec-
tiveness.”
21 U. S. C. § 360j(e). Thus, the Act generally re-
quires the FDA to prevent the marketing of any drug or
device where the “potential for inﬂicting death or physical
injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic beneﬁt.”
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544, 556 (1979).

In its rulemaking proceeding, the FDA quite exhaustively
documented that “tobacco products are unsafe,” “danger-
ous,” and “cause great pain and suffering from illness.” 61
Fed. Reg. 44412 (1996).
It found that the consumption of
tobacco products presents “extraordinary health risks,” and
that “tobacco use is the single leading cause of preventable
death in the United States.”
It stated that
“[m]ore than 400,000 people die each year from tobacco-
related illnesses, such as cancer, respiratory illnesses, and

Id., at 44398.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco products. It cites relevant sections of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and provides context about the FDA's findings on the dangers of tobacco.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 290 (2010)

299

Opinion of the Court

1322–1325.  The  dissent  therefore  concluded  that  the  state
court’s application of Strickland to the facts of this case was
unreasonable.  542 F. 3d, at 1326.

We  granted  certiorari  to  resolve  two  related  questions
raised  by  Wood’s  petition.  First,  we  granted  review  of  a
question that has divided the Courts of Appeals: whether, in
order to satisfy § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must establish only
that the state-court factual determination on which the deci
sion  was  based  was  “unreasonable,”  or  whether  § 2254(e)(1)
additionally  requires  a  petitioner  to  rebut  a  presumption
that the determination was correct with clear and convincing
evidence.1  We also granted review of the question whether
the  state  court  reasonably  determined  that  Wood’s  counsel
made a “strategic decision” not to pursue or present evidence
of his mental deﬁciencies.  556 U. S. 1234 (2009).  Wood’s pe

1 See,  e. g.,  542  F.  3d  1281,  1285,  1304,  n.  23  (CA11  2008)  (case  below);
Taylor  v.  Maddox,  366  F.  3d  992,  999–1000  (CA9)  (where  a  habeas  peti
tioner  challenges  state-court  factual  ﬁndings “based  entirely  on  the  state
record,”  the  federal  court  reviews  those  ﬁndings  for  reasonableness  only
under  § 2254(d)(2),  but  where  a  petitioner  challenges  such  ﬁndings  based
in part on  evidence that is extrinsic to the  state-court record, § 2254(e)(1)
applies),  cert.  denied,  543  U. S.  1038  (2004);  Lambert  v.  Blackwell,  387
F.  3d  210,  235  (CA3  2004)  (“[Section]  2254(d)(2)’s  reasonableness  determi
nation  turns  on  a  consideration  of  the  totality  of  the  ‘evidence  presented
in the state-court proceeding,’ while § 2254(e)(1) contemplates a challenge
to the state court’s individual factual determinations, including a challenge
based wholly or in part on evidence outside the state trial record”); Trus
sell v.  Bowersox, 447 F. 3d 588, 591 (CA8) (federal habeas relief is available
only “if the state court made ‘an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light  of the  evidence  presented in  the State  court  proceeding,’ 28  U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(2),  which  requires  clear  and  convincing  evidence  that  the  state
court’s  presumptively  correct  factual  ﬁnding  lacks  evidentiary  support”),
cert. denied, 549 U. S. 1034 (2006); Ben-Yisrayl v.  Buss, 540 F. 3d 542, 549
(CA7  2008)  (§ 2254(d)(2)  can  be  satisﬁed  by  showing,  under  § 2254(e)(1),
that  a  state-court  decision  “rests  upon  a  determination  of  fact  that  lies
against  the  clear  weight  of  the  evidence”  because  such  a  decision  “is,
by  deﬁnition,  a  decision  so  inadequately  supported  by  the  record  as  to
be  arbitrary  and  therefore  objectively  unreasonable”  (internal  quotation
marks omitted)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites case law and legal statutes, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

25

Opinion of the Court

In these circumstances, Hines cannot rely on “the predict-
able  effect of  Government  action  on  the  decisions  of  third
parties”;  rather,  she  can  only  “speculat[e]  about  the  deci-
sions of third parties.”  Department of Commerce, 588 U. S.,
at 768.  It is “no more than conjecture” to assume that Hines
will be subject to White House-induced content moderation.
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 108 (1983).  Hines (along
with the other plaintiffs) has therefore failed to establish a
likelihood of future injury traceable to the White House or
the Surgeon General’s Office.  Likewise, the risk of future
harm traceable to the CDC is minimal.  The CDC stopped
meeting with the platforms in March 2022.  Thereafter, the
platforms sporadically asked the CDC to verify or debunk
several claims about vaccines.  But the agency has not re-
ceived any such message since the summer of 2022.10

The plaintiffs’ counterarguments do not persuade.  First,
they argue that they suffer “continuing, present adverse ef-
fects”  from  their  past  restrictions,  as  they  must  now  self-
censor on social media.  O’Shea, 414 U. S., at 496.  But the
plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing merely by inflict-
ing harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical
future harm that is not certainly impending.”  Clapper, 568
U. S., at 416.  And as we explained, the plaintiffs have not
shown that they are likely to face a risk of future censorship
traceable to the defendants.  Indeed, even before the defend-
ants entered the scene, the plaintiffs “had a similar incen-
tive to engage in” self-censorship, given the platforms’ inde-
pendent content moderation.  Id., at 417.  So it is “difficult
——————

10 The dissent claims that the future injury prong is satisfied because
Facebook  continued  to  censor  Hines  at  the  time  of  her  complaint  and
thereafter.  Post, at 17.  But the dissent gives short shrift to the key point:
By  the  time  Hines  filed  suit  in  August  2022,  the  White  House  was  no
longer  engaged  in  any  sort  of  “pressure  campaign”  toward  Facebook.
(Note that the dissent, in its 10-page recounting of the record, devotes
only one paragraph to the events of 2022.  Post, at 14.)  Thus, when Hines
sued, it was unlikely that Facebook’s actions were fairly traceable to the
White House at the time—or would be going forward.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

Opinion of the Court

crime,” in violation of then-existing 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1),
more narrowly than many Circuits’ previous case law.  See
516 U. S., at 142 (describing the Circuits’ approaches).  Un-
der this Court’s §2255 precedent, Bailey’s narrowing inter-
pretation  was  grounds  for  a  collateral  attack  by  federal
prisoners who had been convicted under the Courts of Ap-
peals’  broader  interpretations.    See  Davis,  417  U. S.,  at
342–347 (holding a claim of legal error based on an inter-
vening change in statutory interpretation cognizable under
§2255).  Many prisoners with Bailey claims, however, had
already  exhausted  their  first  §2255  motion,  and  Bailey’s
statutory holding plainly did not satisfy either of §2255(h)’s
conditions for a second or successive motion.

Several Courts of Appeals found a workaround for those
prisoners in the saving clause.  With minor differences in
reasoning  and  wording,  they  held  that  §2255  was  “inade-
quate  and  ineffective”  under  the  saving  clause—and  that
§2241 was therefore available—when AEDPA’s second-or-
successive restrictions barred a prisoner from seeking relief
based  on  a  newly  adopted  narrowing  interpretation  of  a
criminal statute that circuit precedent had foreclosed at the
time of the prisoner’s trial, appeal, and first §2255 motion.
This  application  of  the  saving  clause  took  shape  in  In re
Dorsainvil,  119  F. 3d  245,  251  (CA3  1997);  Triestman  v.
United States, 124 F. 3d 361, 378–380 (CA2 1997); and In re
Davenport, 147 F. 3d 605, 609–611 (CA7 1998), and it was
later adopted by most of the other Circuits.  See Ivy v. Pon-
tesso, 328 F. 3d 1057, 1059–1060 (CA9 2003); Martin v. Pe-
rez, 319 F. 3d 799, 804–805 (CA6 2003); Reyes–Requena v.
United States, 243 F. 3d 893, 904 (CA5 2001); In re Jones,
226  F. 3d  328,  333–334  (CA4  2000);  Wofford  v.  Scott,  177
F. 3d  1236,  1242–1245  (CA11  1999),  overruled  by  McCar-
than v. Director of Goodwill Industries–Suncoast, Inc., 851
F. 3d 1076 (CA11 2017) (en banc); but see Prost v. Anderson,
636 F. 3d 578, 584–595 (CA10 2011) (Gorsuch, J.) (holding
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the case of Bailey and the application of the saving clause in §2241.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES

BREYER, J., dissenting

objections.  In a word, a new opportunity to object means
time, effort, and funds set aside to deal with a new layer of
administrative procedure.

I  recognize  that  allowing  objections  only  once  a  year  is
only one possible way to administer a fee-charging system.
In  principle,  one  might  allow  nonmembers  to  pose  new
objections to their dues payments biannually, or quarterly,
or  even  once  a  month,  as  actual  expenses  do,  or  do  not,
correspond  to  initial  union  predictions.    But  for  constitu-
tional purposes the critical fact is that annual objection is
at least one reasonably practical way to permit the princi-
pled  objector  to  avoid  paying  for  politics  with  which  he
disagrees.  See Hudson, 475 U. S., at 307, n. 18.  And that
is so whether ordinary or special assessments are at stake.
Further,  the  nonmember  who  did  not  object  initially  is
not  likely  to  be  a  nonmember  who  strongly  opposes  the
union’s  politics.  That  many  unions  take  political  posi-
tions and that they spend money seeking to advance those
positions  is  not  exactly  a  secret.    All  those  whom  this
union represents know from history that it spends money
each year for nonchargeable purposes.  And any nonmem-
ber who has significant negative views about such matters
is  likely  to  have  objected  in  advance.    Those  who  did  not
object initially (but do so later) likely include many whose
objection  rests,  not  upon  constitutionally  protected  politi-
cal grounds, but simply upon a desire not to pay a higher
fee.   And  those  who  withhold  fees  for  that  reason  are  not
entitled to constitutional protection in doing so.  Here, the
nonobjector cannot even claim that an increase in the total
fee (by the amount of the special assessment) took him by
surprise,  for  in  its  initial  Hudson  notice  the  union  said
that “[d]ues are subject to change without further notice to
fee payers.”  App. 98.

Finally, if the union will not let a nonmember object to a
special assessment, that nonmember has an easy remedy.
He  or  she  can  simply  object  the  first  time  around.  After
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Knox v. Service Employees. It delves into the arguments surrounding the constitutionality of allowing unions to charge non-members for political activities.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

JACKSON, J., dissenting

of thousands of applicants has the capacity to take full ad-
vantage of the opportunity to attend, and contribute to, this
prestigious institution, and thus merits admission.92  And
UNC has concluded that ferreting this out requires under-
standing the full person, which means taking seriously not
just SAT scores or whether the applicant plays the trumpet,
but also any way in which the applicant’s race-linked expe-
rience bears on his capacity and merit.  In this way, UNC
is able to value what it means for James, whose ancestors
received  no  race-based  advantages,  to  make  himself  com-
petitive  for  admission  to  a  flagship  school  nevertheless.
Moreover, recognizing this aspect of James’s story does not
preclude UNC from valuing John’s legacy or any obstacles
that his story reflects.

So,  to  repeat:  UNC’s  program  permits,  but  does  not  re-
quire, admissions officers to value both John’s and James’s
love for their State, their high schools’ rigor, and whether
either  has  overcome  obstacles  that  are  indicative  of  their
“persistence of commitment.”93  It permits, but does not re-
quire,  them  to  value  John’s  identity  as  a  child  of  UNC
alumni (or, perhaps, if things had turned out differently, as
a  first-generation  White  student  from  Appalachia  whose
family struggled to make ends meet during the Great Re-
cession).  And it permits, but does not require, them to value
James’s race—not in the abstract, but as an element of who
he  is,  no  less  than  his  love  for  his  State,  his  high  school
courses, and the obstacles he has overcome.

Understood properly, then, what SFFA caricatures as an
unfair  race-based  preference  cashes  out,  in  a  holistic  sys-
tem,  to  a  personalized  assessment  of  the  advantages  and
disadvantages that every applicant might have received by
accident of birth plus all that has happened to them since.
It ensures a full accounting of everything that bears on the

——————

92 See 3 App. 1409, 1414, 1416.
93 Id., at 1414–1415.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the admissions process at UNC and the consideration of race as a factor. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

right that may not even have majority support on the cur-
rent  Supreme  Court.”    Reply  Brief  for  Intervenors  in  No.
21–50949 (CA5), pp. 3, 4; see also id., at 4 (“The Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the Constitution are not the Con-
stitution itself—they are, after all, called opinions”).
  There  is  no  dispute  that  under  this  Court’s  precedents,
women  have  a  constitutional  right  to  seek  abortion  care
prior to viability.  As noted, S. B. 8 was created to frustrate
that right by raising seemingly novel procedural issues, and
it has had precisely the intended effect.  Under such unique
circumstances, the equities plainly favor administrative re-
lief while this Court sorts out these issues.  Every day that
S. B. 8 remains in effect is a day in which such tactics are
rewarded.    And  every  day  the  scheme  succeeds  increases
the likelihood that it will be adapted to attack other federal
constitutional rights.

*

  *

  *
  There  are  women  in  Texas  who  became  pregnant  on  or
around  the  day  that  S.  B.  8  took  effect.    As  I  write  these
words, some of those women do not know they are pregnant.
When they find out, should they wish to exercise their con-
stitutional right to seek abortion care, they will be unable
to do so  anywhere  in their  home  State.   Those with  suffi-
cient resources may spend thousands of dollars and multi-
ple days anxiously seeking care from out-of-state providers
so overwhelmed with Texas patients that they cannot ade-
quately  serve  their  own  communities.    Those  without  the
ability to make this journey, whether due to lack of money
or childcare or employment flexibility or the myriad other
constraints  that  shape  people’s  day-to-day  lives,  may  be
forced to carry to term against their wishes or resort to dan-
gerous methods of self-help.  None of this is seriously in dis-
pute.
  These  circumstances  are  exceptional.    Women  seeking
abortion care in Texas are entitled to relief from this Court
now.  Because of the Court’s failure to act today, that relief,
if it comes, will be too late for many.  Once again, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion and discusses the impact of the law in question on women's access to abortion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

Syllabus

duct—that  “have  never  been  thought  to  raise  any  Constitutional
problem,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572.  Depic-
tions  of  animal  cruelty  should  not  be  added  to  that  list.    While  the
prohibition  of  animal  cruelty  has  a  long  history  in  American  law,
there  is  no  evidence  of  a  similar  tradition  prohibiting  depictions  of
such cruelty.  The Government’s proposed test would broadly balance
the  value  of  the  speech  against  its  societal  costs  to  determine
whether  the  First  Amendment  even  applies.    But  the  First  Amend-
ment’s  free  speech  guarantee  does  not  extend  only  to  categories  of
speech  that  survive  an  ad hoc  balancing  of  relative  social  costs  and
benefits.  The Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American
people  that  the  benefits  of  its  restrictions  on  the  Government  out-
weigh  the  costs.  New  York  v.  Ferber,  458  U. S.  747,  distinguished.
Pp. 5–9.

(b) Stevens’s  facial  challenge  succeeds  under  existing  doctrine.

Pp. 9–20.

(1) In the First Amendment context, a law may be invalidated as
overbroad  if  “a  ‘substantial  number’  of  its  applications  are  unconsti-
tutional,  ‘ “judged  in  relation  to  the  statute’s  plainly  legitimate
sweep.” ’ ”  Washington  State  Grange  v.  Washington  State  Republican
Party,  552  U. S.  442,  449,  n. 6.    Stevens  claims  that  common  depic-
tions of ordinary and lawful activities constitute the vast majority of
materials subject to §48.  The Government does not defend such ap-
plications,  but  contends  that  the  statute  is  narrowly  limited  to  spe-
cific  types  of  extreme  material.    Section  48’s  constitutionality  thus
turns on how broadly it is construed.  Pp. 9–10.

(2) Section 48 creates a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth.
The  statute’s  definition  of  a  “depiction  of  animal  cruelty”  does  not
even  require  that  the  depicted  conduct  be  cruel.    While  the  words
“maimed,  mutilated,  [and]  tortured”  convey  cruelty,  “wounded”  and
“killed” do not.  Those words have little ambiguity and should be read
according to their ordinary meaning.  Section 48 does require that the
depicted  conduct  be  “illegal,”  but  many  federal  and  state  laws  con-
cerning  the  proper  treatment  of  animals  are  not  designed  to  guard
against animal cruelty.  For example, endangered species protections
restrict even the humane wounding or killing of animals.  The statute
draws no distinction based on the reason the conduct is made illegal.
Moreover,  §48  applies  to  any  depiction  of  conduct  that  is  illegal
in the State in which the depiction is created, sold, or possessed, “re-
gardless of whether the . . . wounding . . . or killing took place” there,
§48(c)(1).  Depictions of entirely lawful conduct may run afoul of the
ban  if  those  depictions  later  find  their  way  into  States  where  the
same conduct is unlawful.  This greatly expands §48’s scope, because
views  about  animal  cruelty  and  regulations  having  no  connection  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal arguments and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v.
MORRISSEY-BERRU
Syllabus

required to comply with her school’s faculty handbook, which set out
similar  expectations.    Each  taught  religion  in  the  classroom,  wor-
shipped with her students, prayed with her students, and had her per-
formance measured on religious bases.

Both teachers sued their schools after their employment was termi-
nated.  Morrissey-Berru claimed that OLG had demoted her and had
failed  to  renew  her  contract  in  order  to  replace  her  with  a  younger
teacher in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967.  OLG invoked Hosanna-Tabor’s “ministerial exception” and suc-
cessfully  moved  for  summary  judgment,  but  the  Ninth  Circuit  re-
versed, holding that Morrissey-Berru did not fall within the exception
because she did not have the formal title of “minister,” had limited for-
mal religious training, and did not hold herself out publicly as a reli-
gious leader.  Biel alleged that St. James discharged her because she
had  requested  a  leave  of  absence  to  obtain  breast  cancer  treatment.
Like OLG, St. James obtained summary judgment under the “minis-
terial exception.”  But the Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Biel
lacked  Perich’s  credentials,  religious  training,  and  ministerial  back-
ground.

Held: The  First  Amendment’s  Religion  Clauses  foreclose  the  adjudica-
tion  of  Morrissey-Berru’s  and  Biel’s  employment-discrimination
claims.  Pp. 10–27.

(a) The  independence  of  religious  institutions  in  matters  of  “faith
and doctrine” is closely linked to independence in what the Court has
termed “ ‘matters of church government.’ ”  Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U. S.,
at 186.  For this reason, courts are bound to stay out of employment
disputes  involving  those  holding  certain  important  positions  with
churches and other religious institutions.  Pp. 10–11.

(b) When the “ministerial exception” reached this Court in Hosanna-
Tabor,  the  Court  looked  to  precedent  and  the  “background”  against
which  “the  First  Amendment  was  adopted,”  565  U. S.,  at  183,  and
unanimously  recognized  that  the  Religion  Clauses  foreclose  certain
employment-discrimination claims brought against religious organiza-
tions, id., at 188.  Pp. 11–14.

(c) In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court applied the “ministerial exception”
but declined “to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee
qualifies as a minister.”  565 U. S., at 190.  Instead, the Court identi-
fied four relevant circumstances of Perich’s employment at an Evan-
gelical Lutheran school.  First, Perich’s church had given her the title
of “minister, with a role distinct from that of most of its members.”  Id.,
at 191.  Second, her position “reflected a significant degree of religious
training followed by a formal process of commissioning.”  Ibid.  Third,
she “held herself out as a minister of the Church” and claimed certain
tax benefits.  Id., at 191–192.  Fourth, her “job duties reflected a role
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO., LLC v. NEW JERSEY ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 19–1039.  Argued April 28, 2021—Decided June 29, 2021

Congress passed the Natural Gas Act in 1938 to regulate the transpor-
tation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce.  To build an in-
terstate pipeline, a natural gas company must obtain from the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission a certificate reflecting that such con-
struction “is or will be required by the present or future public conven-
ience and necessity.”  15 U. S. C. §717f(e).  As originally enacted, the
NGA  did  not  provide  a  mechanism  for  certificate  holders  to  secure
property rights  necessary  to  build  pipelines,  often  leaving  certificate
holders with only an illusory right to build.  Congress remedied this
defect in 1947 by amending the NGA to authorize certificate holders to
exercise the federal eminent domain power, thereby ensuring that cer-
tificates of public convenience and necessity could be given effect.   See
§717f(h).

FERC granted petitioner PennEast Pipeline Co. a certificate of pub-
lic  convenience  and  necessity  authorizing  construction  of  a  116-mile
pipeline from Pennsylvania to New Jersey.  Several parties, including
respondent New Jersey, petitioned for review of FERC’s order in the
D. C. Circuit.  The D. C. Circuit has held those proceedings in abeyance
pending resolution of this case.  PennEast filed various complaints in
Federal District Court in New Jersey seeking to exercise the federal
eminent  domain  power  under  §717f(h)  to  obtain  rights-of-way  along
the  pipeline  route  approved  by  FERC.    As  relevant  here,  PennEast
sought to condemn parcels of land in which either New Jersey or the
New Jersey Conservation Foundation asserts a property interest.  New
Jersey moved to dismiss PennEast’s complaints on sovereign immun-
ity  grounds.    The  District  Court  denied  the  motion,  and  it  granted
PennEast’s requests for a condemnation order and preliminary injunc-
tive relief.  The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order insofar
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

17

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

The  Court  implies  that  the  1965  bill’s  “explici[t]  re
fer[ence] to §106” showed a marked departure from §44(a)
of  the  Copyright  Office’s  prior  draft.    Ante,  at  29.    The
Copyright Office, however, did not see it that way.  In its
summary of the 1965 bill’s provisions, the Copyright Office
observed  that  §602(a)  of  the  1965  bill,  like  §44(a)  of  the
Copyright Office’s prior draft, see supra, at 15–16, permit
ted copyright owners to bring infringement actions against
unauthorized  importers  in  cases  “where  the  copyright
owner had authorized the making of [the imported] copies
in a foreign country for distribution only in that country.”
Copyright Law Revision Part 6, at 149–150.  See also id.,
at XXVI (Under §602(a) of the 1965 bill, “[a]n unauthorized
importer  could  be  enjoined  and  sued  for  damages  both
where  the  copies  or  phonorecords  he  was  importing
were  ‘piratical’  (that  is,  where  their  making  would  have
constituted  an  infringement  if  the  U. S.  copyright  law
could  have  been  applied),  and  where  their  making  was
‘lawful.’ ”).

The  current  text  of  §602(a)(1)  was  finally  enacted  into
law in 1976.  See Copyright Act of 1976, §602(a), 90 Stat.
2589–2590.  The House and Senate Committee Reports on
the  1976  Act  demonstrate  that  Congress  understood,  as
did the Copyright Office, just what that text meant.  Both
Reports state:

“Section 602 [deals] with two separate situations: im
portation  of  ‘piratical’  articles  (that  is,  copies  or
phonorecords  made  without  any  authorization  of  the

——————

In the current version, the phrase “for the purpose of distribution to the
public” is omitted and the phrase “that have been acquired outside the
United States” appears in its stead.  There are no material differences
between the quoted language from the 1965 bill and the corresponding
language contained in the 1964 bill.  See Copyright Law Revision Part
6: Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., 292–293 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal citations, references to specific sections of copyright law, and a detailed argument about the interpretation of those laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

501 U. S., at 779.

But  not  entirely.  This  Court  has  permitted  a  federal
court to entertain a suit against a nonconsenting State on
two  conditions.  First,  Congress  must  have  enacted  “un-
equivocal  statutory  language”  abrogating  the  States’  im-
munity from the suit.  Seminole Tribe, 517 U. S., at 56 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); see Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U. S. 223, 228 (1989) (requiring Congress to “mak[e] its in-
tention unmistakably clear”).  And second, some constitu-
tional  provision  must  allow  Congress  to  have  thus  en-
croached  on  the  States’  sovereignty.  Not  even  the  most
crystalline  abrogation  can  take  effect  unless  it  is  “a  valid
exercise of constitutional authority.”  Kimel v. Florida Bd.
of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 78 (2000).

No  one  here  disputes  that  Congress  used  clear  enough
language to abrogate the States’ immunity from copyright
infringement suits.  As described above, the CRCA provides
that States “shall not be immune” from those actions in fed-
eral court.  §511(a); see supra, at 2–3.  And the Act specifies
that  a  State  stands  in  the  identical  position  as  a  private
defendant—exposed to liability and remedies “in the same
manner and to the same extent.”  §501(a); see §511(b).  So
there is no doubt what Congress meant to accomplish.  In-
deed, this Court held in Florida Prepaid that the essentially
verbatim  provisions  of  the  Patent  Remedy  Act  “could  not
have  [made]  any  clearer”  Congress’s  intent  to  remove  the
States’ immunity.  527 U. S., at 635.

The contested question is whether Congress had author-
ity to take that step.  Allen maintains that it did, under ei-
ther of two constitutional provisions.  He first points to the
clause  in  Article  I  empowering  Congress  to  provide  copy-
right protection.  If that fails, he invokes Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress to “en-
force”  the  commands  of  the  Due  Process  Clause.  Neither
contention can succeed.  The slate on which we write today
is  anything  but  clean.  Florida  Prepaid,  along  with  other
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the issue of state immunity from copyright infringement suits and cites previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

op., at 9–10); alterations in original).  As I see it, the deci-
sion  below—which  maintained  neutrality  between  sec-
tarian and nonsectarian private schools—did no such thing.
Finding the “beginning” of the Montana Supreme Court’s
decision erroneous, this Court regards the state court’s ul-
timate  judgment  as  irrelevant.    Ante,  at  20–22.    In  the
Court’s recounting, the Montana court first held that reli-
gious  schools  must  be  excluded  from  the  scholarship  pro-
gram—necessarily  determining  that  the  Free  Exercise
Clause  permitted  that  result—and  only  subsequently
struck the entire program as a way of carrying out its hold-
ing.  See ante, at 21 (“When the [Montana Supreme] Court
was called upon to apply a state law no-aid provision to ex-
clude religious schools from the program, it was obligated
by the Federal Constitution to reject the invitation.”).  But
the initial step described by this Court is imaginary.  The
Montana court determined that the scholarship program vi-
olated the no-aid provision because it resulted in aid to re-
ligious schools.  Declining to rewrite the statute to exclude
those  schools,  the  state  court  struck  the  program  in  full.
393 Mont. 446, 463–468, 435 P. 3d 603, 612–614 (2018).  In
doing so, the court never made religious schools ineligible
for an otherwise available benefit, and it never decided that
the Free Exercise Clause would allow that outcome.1

Thus, contrary to this Court’s assertion, see ante, at 21,
the no-aid provision did not require the Montana Supreme

——————

1  In  its  opinion,  Montana’s  highest  court  stated  without  explanation
that this case is not one in which application of the no-aid provision vio-
lates  the  Free  Exercise  Clause.    393  Mont.,  at  468,  435  P. 3d,  at  614.
When the court made that statement, it had already invalidated the en-
tire scholarship program.  Ibid.  Accordingly, the court’s statement can-
not be understood to have approved of excluding religious schools from
an otherwise available scholarship.  Instead, the statement is most fairly
read to convey that the Free Exercise Clause allows a State to decline to
fund any private schools, an outcome that avoids state aid to religious
schools.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case of Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue.  It delves into the legal reasoning behind the court's decision and argues against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
40  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

To the extent the Court suggests national security interests
are  “distinct,”  those  interests  cannot  explain  the  Court’s
narrow  exemption,  as  national  security  interests  are  also
implicated at civilian universities.  See infra, at 64–65.  The
Court also attempts to justify its carveout based on the fact
that “[n]o military academy is a party to these cases.”  Ante,
at 22, n. 4.  Yet the same can be said of many other institu-
tions that are not parties here, including the religious uni-
versities supporting respondents, which the Court does not
similarly exempt from its sweeping opinion.  See Brief for
Georgetown  University  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  18–29
(Georgetown Brief ) (Catholic colleges and universities not-
ing that they rely on the use of race in their holistic admis-
sions to further not just their academic goals, but also their
religious missions); see also Harvard II, 980 F. 3d, at 187,
n. 24 (“[S]chools that consider race are diverse on numerous
dimensions, including in terms of religious affiliation, loca-
tion, size, and courses of study offered”).  The Court’s carve-
out only highlights the arbitrariness of its decision and fur-
ther  proves  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  does  not
categorically prohibit the use of race in college admissions.
The concurring opinions also agree that the Constitution
tolerates  some  racial  classifications.    JUSTICE  GORSUCH
agrees with the majority’s conclusion that racial classifica-
tions are constitutionally permissible if they advance a com-
pelling  interest  in  a  narrowly  tailored  way.    Ante,  at  23.
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, too, agrees that the Constitution per-
mits the use of race if it survives strict scrutiny.  Ante, at
2.32  JUSTICE THOMAS offers an “originalist defense of the

——————

32 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH agrees that the effects from the legacy of slav-
ery  and  Jim  Crow  continue  today,  citing  Justice  Marshall’s  opinion  in
Bakke.  Ante,  at  7  (citing  438  U. S.,  at  395–402).    As  explained  above,
Justice  Marshall’s  view  was  that  Bakke  covered  only  a  portion  of  the
Fourteenth Amendment’s sweeping reach, such that the Court’s higher
education precedents must be expanded, not constricted.  See 438 U. S.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College.  It is sequential text and contains relevant legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 17–459.  Argued April 23, 2018—Decided June 21, 2018

Under  the  Illegal  Immigration  Reform  and  Immigrant  Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), nonpermanent residents who are subject to re-
moval  proceedings  may  be  eligible  for  cancellation  of  removal  if,
among other things, they have “been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately
preceding  the  date  of  [an]  application”  for  cancellation.    8  U. S. C.
§1229(b)(1)(A).  Under the stop-time rule, however, the period of con-
tinuous presence is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a no-
tice  to  appear  under  section  1229(a).”    §1229(d)(1)(A).    Section
1229(a),  in  turn,  provides  that  the  Government  shall  serve  nonciti-
zens in removal proceedings with a written “ ‘notice to appear,’ ” spec-
ifying,  among  other  things,  “[t]he  time  and  place  at  which  the  [re-
moval]  proceedings  will  be  held.”    §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).  Per  a  1997
regulation  stating  that  a  “notice  to  appear”  served  on  a  noncitizen
need  only  provide  “the  time,  place  and  date  of  the  initial  removal
hearing,  where  practicable,”  62  Fed.  Reg.  10332,  the  Department  of
Homeland  Security  (DHS),  at  least  in  recent  years,  almost  always
serves noncitizens with notices that fail to specify the time, place, or
date  of  initial  removal  hearings  whenever  the  agency  deems  it  im-
practicable  to  include  such  information.  The  Board  of  Immigration
Appeals  (BIA)  has  held  that  such  notices  trigger  the  stop-time  rule
even if they do not specify the time and date of the removal proceed-
ings.

Petitioner Wescley Fonseca Pereira is a native and citizen of Brazil
who  came  to  the  United  States  in  2000  and  remained  after  his  visa
expired.  Following a 2006 arrest for operating a vehicle while under
the  influence  of  alcohol,  DHS  served  Pereira  with  a  document  titled
“notice to appear” that did not specify the date and time of his initial
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

ALITO, J., concurring

daily reading from the King James Bible, a curriculum that,
Mann said, let the book “speak for itself.”  4 Life and Works
of Horace Mann 312 (1891) (Mann’s 12th annual report on
the Massachusetts schools; emphasis deleted).  Yet it was
an affront to many Christians and especially Catholics, not
to mention non-Christians.11

Mann’s goal was to “Americanize” the incoming Catholic
immigrants.
In  fact,  he  and  other  proponents  of  the
common-school movement used language and made insinu-
ations that today would be considered far more inflamma-
tory.
In  his  10th  annual  report  on  the  Massachusetts
schools, Mann described the State as “parental,” assuming
the responsibility of weaning children “[f ]or the support of
the poor, nine-tenths of whose cost originate with foreigners
or come from one prolific vice,” meaning alcohol.  4 Life and
Works of Horace Mann, at 132, 134 (emphasis deleted).  In
other  writing,  he  described  the  common-school  movement
as “ ‘laboring to elevate mankind into the upper and purer
regions of civilization, Christianity, and the worship of the
true God; all those who are obstructing the progress of this
cause are impelling the race backwards into barbarism and
idolatry.’ ”    Glenn  171–172  (quoting  an  1846  article  by
Mann in the Common School Journal).

These  “obstructers”  were  Catholic  and  other  religious
groups  and  families  who  objected  to  the  common  schools’
religious programming, which, as just seen, was not neutral
on matters of religion.  Objections met violent response.  In
Massachusetts  and  elsewhere,  Catholic  students  were
beaten  and  expelled  for  refusing  to  read  from  the  King
James Bible.12  In New York, a mob destroyed the residence
of Bishop John Hughes, who had argued that, if the State

——————

11 See Glenn 166; Lain, God, Civic Virtue, and the American Way: Re-

constructing Engel, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 479, 487–488 (2015).

12 See Jeffries & Ryan 300.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito. It discusses the history of the common school movement and its religious implications, citing historical figures and events.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

SCALIA, J., dissenting

going on to affirm the Kansas Supreme Court, was written
by Chief Justice Hughes and announced by Justice Stone.
Justice  Frankfurter,  joined  by  three  other  Justices,  held
there  was  no  standing,  and  would  have  dismissed  the
petition  (leaving  the  judgment  of  the  Kansas  Supreme
Court  in  place).    Justice  Butler,  joined  by  Justice  McRey-
nolds,  dissented  (neither  joining  Hughes’s  opinion  nor
separately  discussing  standing)  and  would  have  reversed
the Kansas Supreme Court.

That adds up to two votes to affirm on the merits, two to
reverse  on  the  merits  (without  discussing  standing)  and
four to dismiss for lack of standing.  Justice Stanley Reed,
who was on the Court  and apparently participated in  the
case,  is  not  mentioned  in  any  of  the  opinions  recorded  in
the United States Reports.  So, in order to find Coleman a
binding precedent on standing, rather than a 4-to-4 stand-
off,  one  must  assume  that  Justice  Reed  voted  with
Hughes.    There  is  some  reason  to  make  that  assumption:
The four Justices rejecting standing went on to discuss the
merits,  because  “the  ruling  of  the  Court  just  announced
removes from the case the question of petitioners’ standing
to sue.”  307 U. S., at 456 (Black, J., concurring).  But then
again, if nine Justices participated, how could it be that on
one  of  the  two  issues  in  the  case  the  Court  was  “equally
divided and therefore . . . expresse[d] no opinion”?  Id., at
447.

A pretty shaky foundation for a significant precedential
ruling.  Besides that, the two dissenters’ mere assumption
of  standing—neither  saying  anything  about  the  subject
nor  joining  Hughes’s  opinion  on  the  point—produces  (if
you  assume  Reed  joined  Hughes)  a  majority  for  standing
but no majority opinion explaining why.  And even under
the  most  generous  assumptions,  since  the  Court’s  judg-
ment  on  the  issue  it  resolved  rested  on  the  ground  that
that issue presented a political question—which is itself a
rejection  of  jurisdiction,  Zivotofsky  v.  Clinton,  566  U. S.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses a previous case (Coleman) and its relevance to the current case. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

Act may be used to issue patents on claims directed to or
encompassing a human organism”).

Further  undercutting  the  PTO’s  practice,  the  United
States argued in the Federal Circuit and in this Court that
isolated DNA was not patent eligible under §101, Brief for
United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  20–33,  and  that  the
PTO’s  practice  was  not  “a  sufficient  reason  to  hold  that
isolated  DNA  is  patent-eligible.”  Id.,  at  26.   See  also  id.,
at  28–29.  These  concessions  weigh  against  deferring  to
the PTO’s determination.7

C
cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentabil-
ity  as  naturally  occurring,  isolated  DNA  segments.    As
already  explained,  creation  of  a  cDNA  sequence  from
mRNA results in an exons-only molecule that is not natu-
rally  occurring.8   Petitioners  concede  that  cDNA  differs
from  natural  DNA  in  that  “the  non-coding  regions  have

——————

7 Myriad  also  argues  that  we  should  uphold  its  patents  so  as  not  to
disturb  the  reliance  interests  of  patent  holders  like  itself.    Brief  for
Respondents  38–39.    Concerns  about  reliance  interests  arising  from
PTO determinations, insofar as they are relevant, are better directed to
Congress.  See Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc., 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 22–24).

8 Some  viruses  rely  on  an  enzyme  called  reverse  transcriptase  to  re-
produce by copying RNA into cDNA.  In rare instances, a side effect of
a viral infection of a cell can be the random incorporation of fragments
of the resulting cDNA, known as a pseudogene, into the genome.  Such
pseudogenes  serve  no  purpose;  they  are  not  expressed  in  protein
creation  because  they  lack  genetic  sequences  to  direct  protein  expres-
sion.  See J. Watson et al., Molecular Biology of the Gene 142, 144, fig.
7–5  (6th  ed.  2008).    Perhaps  not  surprisingly,  given  pseudogenes’
apparently random origins, petitioners “have failed to demonstrate that
the  pseudogene  consists  of  the  same  sequence  as  the  BRCA1  cDNA.”
Association  for  Molecular  Pathology  v.  United  States  Patent  and
Trademark  Office,  689  F. 3d  1303,  1356,  n. 5  (CA  Fed.  2012).    The
possibility  that  an  unusual  and  rare  phenomenon  might  randomly
create  a  molecule  similar  to  one  created  synthetically  through  human
ingenuity does not render a composition of matter nonpatentable.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion discussing the patentability of isolated DNA. It contains legal arguments, citations, and specific details about the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

31

THOMAS, J., concurring

tims of past governmental discrimination from so-called be-
nign  race-conscious  measures,  such  as  affirmative  action.
Croson, 488 U. S., at 504–505; Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 226–227 (1995).  To enforce that dis-
tinction, our precedents explicitly require that any attempt
to compensate victims of past governmental discrimination
must  be  concrete  and  traceable  to  the  de  jure  segregated
system, which must have some discrete and continuing dis-
criminatory  effect  that  warrants  a  present  remedy.    See
United States v. Fordice, 505 U. S. 717, 731 (1992).  Today’s
opinion for the Court reaffirms the need for such a close re-
medial  fit,  hewing  to  the  same  line  we  have  consistently
drawn.  Ante, at 24–25.

Without  such  guardrails,  the  Fourteenth  Amendment
would become self-defeating, promising a Nation based on
the equality ideal but yielding a quota- and caste-ridden so-
ciety  steeped  in  race-based  discrimination.  Even  Grutter
itself  could  not  tolerate  this  outcome.  It  accordingly  im-
posed a time limit for its race-based regime, observing that
“ ‘a core  purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to  do
away  with  all  governmentally  imposed  discrimination
based on race.’ ”  539 U. S., at 341–342 (quoting Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429, 432 (1984); alterations omitted).

The Court today enforces those limits.  And rightly so.  As
noted above, both Harvard and UNC have a history of racial
discrimination.  But,  neither  have  even  attempted  to  ex-
plain  how  their  current  racially  discriminatory  programs
are  even  remotely  traceable  to  their  past  discriminatory
conduct.  Nor could they; the current race-conscious admis-
sions programs take no account of ancestry and, at least for
Harvard,  likely  have  the  effect  of  discriminating  against
some of the very same ethnic groups against which Harvard
previously discriminated (i.e., Jews and those who are not
part of the white elite).  All the while, Harvard and UNC
ask us to blind ourselves to the burdens imposed on the mil-
lions  of  innocent  applicants  denied  admission  because  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in a case regarding affirmative action. It cites legal precedents and argues against the current race-conscious admissions programs at Harvard and UNC.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

and  repeatedly  fails  to  answer  his  phone  throughout  the
day  and  night.  A  concerned  relative  calls  the  police  and
asks the officers to perform a wellness check.  Two officers
drive  to  the  man’s  home.    They  knock  but  receive  no  re-
sponse.  May the officers enter the home?  Of course.

Again, the officers have an “objectively reasonable basis”
for  believing  that  an  occupant  is  “seriously  injured  or
threatened with such injury.”  Brigham City, 547 U. S., at
400, 403.  Among other possibilities, the elderly man may
have fallen and hurt himself, a common cause of death or
serious  injury  for  older  individuals.    The  Fourth  Amend-
ment does not prevent the officers from entering the home
and checking on the man’s well-being.2

To be sure, courts, police departments, and police officers
alike must take care that officers’ actions in those kinds of
cases are reasonable under the circumstances.  But both of
those examples and others as well, such as cases involving
unattended  young  children  inside  a  home,  illustrate  the
kinds  of  warrantless  entries  that  are  perfectly  constitu-
tional  under  the  exigent  circumstances  doctrine,  in  my
view.

With those observations, I join the Court’s opinion in full.

——————

2 In 2018 in the United States, approximately 32,000 older adults died
from falls.  Falls are also the leading cause of injury for older adults.  B.
Moreland,  R.  Kakara,  &  A.  Henry,  Trends  in  Nonfatal  Falls  and  Fall-
Related Injuries Among Adults Aged ≥ 65 Years––United States, 2012–
2018, 69 MMWR 875 (2020).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the legal basis for warrantless entries into homes under the exigent circumstances doctrine, using examples like a wellness check on an elderly man.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>