<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Enterprise support establishments are included. Because of this, comparability to 1997 Economic Census data may be limited.
Table 2 of the United States Geographic Area Series report presents data on enterprise support establishments that are included in the 2002 data. See introductory text for an explanation of the
treatment of enterprise support establishments in the 2002 Economic Census compared to the 1997 Economic Census]

NAICS
code

Geographic area, tax status, and kind of business

Estab(cid:1)
lishments
(number)

Receipts/
revenue
($1,000)

Expenses
($1,000)

Annual
payroll
($1,000)

First(cid:1)quarter
payroll
($1,000)

Paid
employees for
pay period
including
March 12
(number)

Percent of receipts/
revenue(cid:0)

From
admini(cid:1)
strative
records1

Estimated2

IDAHO FALLS(cid:1)BLACKFOOT, ID
COMBINED STATISTICAL AREA(cid:0)Con.
 ESTABLISHMENTS SUBJECT TO
FEDERAL INCOME TAX(cid:0)Con.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a table header and introductory text for a statistical table. It is not the main body of the document and likely provides context for the data that follows.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table header and introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v.
WALL-STREET.COM, LLC
Syllabus

(b) In  limited  circumstances,  copyright  owners  may  file  an  in-
fringement suit before undertaking registration.  For example, a copy-
right owner who is preparing to distribute a work of a type vulnera-
ble  to  predistribution  infringement—e.g.,  a  movie  or  musical
composition—may  apply  to  the  Copyright  Office  for  preregistration.
§408(f)(2).  A copyright owner may also sue for infringement of a live
broadcast before “registration . . . has been made.”  §411(c).  Outside
of  statutory  exceptions  not  applicable  here,  however,  §411(a)  bars  a
copyright  owner  from  suing  for  infringement  until  “registration  . . .
has been made.”  Fourth Estate advances the “application approach”
to  this  provision,  arguing  that  registration  occurs  when  a  copyright
owner submits a proper application for registration.  Wall-Street ad-
vocates  the  “registration  approach,”  urging  that  registration  occurs
only  when  the  Copyright  Office  grants  registration  of  a  copyright.
The  registration  approach  reflects  the  only  satisfactory  reading  of
§411(a)’s text.  Pp. 3–12.

(1) Read together, §411(a)’s first two sentences focus on action by
the Copyright Office—namely, its registration or refusal to register a
copyright claim.  If application alone sufficed to “ma[ke]” registration,
§411(a)’s second sentence—which permits a copyright claimant to file
suit when the Register has refused her application—would be super-
fluous.  Similarly,  §411(a)’s  third  sentence—which  allows  the  Regis-
ter to “become a party to the action with respect to the issue of regis-
trability  of
if  an
infringement suit could be filed and resolved before the Register act-
ed on an application.  The registration approach reading of §411(a) is
supported  by  other  provisions  of  the  Copyright  Act.    In  particular,
§410  confirms  that  application  is  discrete  from,  and  precedes,  regis-
tration, while §408(f)’s preregistration option would have little utility
if a completed application sufficed to make registration.  Pp. 4–7.

the  copyright  claim”—would  be  negated

(2) Fourth Estate primarily contends that the Copyright Act uses
the phrases “make registration” and “registration has been made” to
describe  submissions  by  the  copyright  owner.  Fourth  Estate  there-
fore insists that §411(a)’s requirement that “registration . . . has been
made  in  accordance  with  this  title”  most  likely  refers  to  a  copyright
owner’s  compliance  with  statutory  requirements  for  registration  ap-
plications.  Fourth  Estate  points  to  other  Copyright  Act  provisions
that appear to use the phrase “make registration” or one of its vari-
ants  to  describe  what  a  copyright  claimant  does.  Fourth  Estate
acknowledges, however, that determining how the Copyright Act uses
the  word  “registration”  in  a  particular  provision  requires  examining
the  “specific  context”  in  which  the  term  is  used.    The  “specific  con-
text” of §411(a) permits only one sensible reading: The phrase “regis-
tration . . . has been made” refers to the Copyright Office’s act grant-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a court syllabus outlining the arguments and reasoning behind a case regarding copyright law. It discusses the interpretation of specific sections of the Copyright Act and the legal implications of copyright registration.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

power.  The majority (again) overlooks that Apple and Mi-
crosoft created mobile operating systems without using Or-
acle’s declaring code.  Second, Oracle always made its de-
claring code freely available to programmers.  There is little
reason to suspect Oracle might harm programmers by stop-
ping now.  And third, the majority simply assumes that the
jury, in a future suit over current Android versions, would
give  Oracle  control  of  Android  instead  of  just  awarding
damages or perpetual royalties.

If  the  majority  is  going  to  speculate  about  what  Oracle
might do, it at least should consider what Google has done.
The majority expresses concern that Oracle might abuse its
copyright  protection  (on  outdated  Android  versions)  and
“ ‘attempt to monopolize the market.’ ”  Ante, at 34–35.  But
it is Google that recently was fined a record $5 billion for
abusing Android to violate antitrust laws.  Case AT.40099,
Google Android, July 18, 2018 (Eur. Comm’n-Competition);
European  Comm’n  Press  Release,  Commission  Fines
Google €4.34 Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android
Mobile  Devices  to  Strengthen  Dominance  of  Google’s
Search  Engine,  July  18,  2018.    Google  controls  the  most
widely used mobile operating system in the world.  And if
companies may now freely copy libraries of declaring code
whenever it is more convenient than writing their own, oth-
ers will likely hesitate to spend the resources Oracle did to
create  intuitive,  well-organized  libraries  that  attract  pro-
grammers and could compete with Android.  If the majority
is  worried  about  monopolization,  it  ought  to  consider
whether Google is the greater threat.

By  copying  Oracle’s  work,  Google  decimated  Oracle’s
market and created a mobile operating system now in over
2.5 billion actively used devices, earning tens of billions of
dollars  every  year.    If  these  effects  on  Oracle’s  potential
market favor Google, something is very wrong with our fair-
use analysis.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the case GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC. It delves into arguments regarding copyright, fair use, and potential market harm.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Statement</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

CARSON v. MAKIN

Opinion of the Court

that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment . . .
will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”  508 U. S., at
546.

This is not one of them.  As noted, a neutral benefit pro-
gram in which public funds flow to religious organizations
through  the  independent  choices  of  private  benefit  recipi-
ents  does  not  offend  the  Establishment  Clause.  See  Zel-
man, 536 U. S., at 652–653.  Maine’s decision to continue
excluding religious schools from its tuition assistance pro-
gram  after  Zelman  thus  promotes  stricter  separation  of
church  and  state  than  the  Federal  Constitution  requires.
See  also  post,  at  4  (BREYER,  J.,  dissenting)  (States  may
choose “not to fund certain religious activity . . . even when
the Establishment Clause does not itself prohibit the State
from funding that activity”); post, at 1 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dis-
senting) (same point).

But as we explained in both Trinity Lutheran and Espi-
noza, such an “interest in separating church and state ‘more
fiercely’  than  the  Federal  Constitution  . . .  ‘cannot  qualify
as compelling’ in the face of the infringement of free exer-
cise.”  Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (quoting
Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14)); see also
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 276 (1981) (“[T]he state
interest . . . in achieving greater separation of church and
State  than  is  already  ensured  under  the  Establishment
Clause  . . .  is  limited  by  the  Free  Exercise  Clause.”).
JUSTICE  BREYER  stresses  the  importance  of  “government
neutrality” when it comes to religious matters, post, at 13,
but there is nothing neutral about Maine’s program.  The
State pays tuition for certain students at private schools—
so long as the schools are not religious.  That is discrimina-
tion against religion.  A State’s antiestablishment interest
does not justify enactments that exclude some members of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in the case Carson v. Makin. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U99

[09-15-00 14:41:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 742 (1998)

759

Opinion of the Court

gence.
§ 219(2)(b). Thus, although a supervisor’s sexual
harassment is outside the scope of employment because the
conduct was for personal motives, an employer can be liable,
nonetheless, where its own negligence is a cause of the har-
assment. An employer is negligent with respect to sexual
harassment if it knew or should have known about the con-
duct and failed to stop it. Negligence sets a minimum
standard for employer liability under Title VII; but Ellerth
seeks to invoke the more stringent standard of vicarious
liability.

Section 219(2)(d) concerns vicarious liability for intentional
torts committed by an employee when the employee uses
apparent authority (the apparent authority standard), or
when the employee “was aided in accomplishing the tort
by the existence of the agency relation” (the aided in the
agency relation standard).
Ibid. As other federal deci-
sions have done in discussing vicarious liability for supervi-
sor harassment, e. g., Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 909
(CA11 1982), we begin with § 219(2)(d).

C

As a general rule, apparent authority is relevant where
the agent purports to exercise a power which he or she does
not have, as distinct from where the agent threatens to
misuse actual power. Compare Restatement § 6 (deﬁning
“power”) with § 8 (deﬁning “apparent authority”).
In the
usual case, a supervisor’s harassment involves misuse of ac-
tual power, not the false impression of its existence. Appar-
ent authority analysis therefore is inappropriate in this con-
text.
If, in the unusual case, it is alleged there is a false
impression that the actor was a supervisor, when he in fact
was not, the victim’s mistaken conclusion must be a reason-
able one. Restatement § 8, Comment c (“Apparent author-
ity exists only to the extent it is reasonable for the third
person dealing with the agent to believe that the agent is
authorized”). When a party seeks to impose vicarious liabil-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 742 (1998).  It discusses the legal standard for employer liability in cases of sexual harassment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

5

Syllabus

dize  conduct  disapproved  by  the  State.    So  long  as  a  public  school
does not contravene constitutional limits, its choice to advance state-
law goals stands on firm footing.  Pp. 21–24.

(3) Hastings’ policy is all the more creditworthy in light of the
“substantial alternative channels that remain open for [CLS-student]
communication to take place.”  Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educa-
tors’  Assn.,  460  U. S.  37,  53.    Hastings  offered  CLS  access  to  school
facilities to conduct meetings and the use of chalkboards and certain
bulletin boards to advertise events.  Although CLS could not take ad-
vantage  of  RSO-specific  methods  of  communication,  the  advent  of
electronic  media  and  social-networking  sites  lessens  the  importance
of those channels.  Private groups, such as fraternities and sororities,
commonly maintain a presence at universities without official school
affiliation.  CLS was similarly situated: It hosted a variety of activi-
ties the year after Hastings denied it recognition, and the number of
students attending those meetings and events doubled.  “The variety
and type of alternative modes of access present here,” in short, “com-
pare favorably with those in other [limited public] forum cases where
[the Court has] upheld restrictions.”  Id., at 53–54.  Pp. 24–25.

(4) CLS’s  arguments  that  the  all-comers  policy  is  not  reason-
able are unavailing.  CLS contends that there can be no diversity of
viewpoints in a forum when groups are not permitted to form around
viewpoints,  but  this  argument  confuses  CLS’s  preferred  policy  with
constitutional  limitation—the  advisability  of  Hastings’  policy  does
not control its permissibility.  A State’s restriction on access to a lim-
ited public forum, moreover, “need not be the most reasonable or the
only reasonable limitation.”  Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 808.  CLS’s con-
tention that Hastings’ policy will facilitate hostile takeovers of RSOs
by  student  saboteurs  bent  on  subverting  a  group’s  mission  is  more
hypothetical  than  real;  there  is  no  history  or  prospect  of  RSO-
hijackings  at  Hastings.    Cf.  National  Endowment  for  Arts  v.  Finley,
524 U. S. 569, 584.  Finally, CLS’s assertion that Hastings lacks any
legitimate  interest  in  urging  religious  groups  not  to  favor  co-
religionists erroneously focuses on the benefits the group must forgo,
while ignoring the interests of those it seeks to fence out.  Hastings,
caught  in  the  crossfire  between  a  group’s  desire  to  exclude  and  stu-
dents’  demand  for  equal  access,  may  reasonably  draw  a  line  in  the
sand  permitting  all  organizations  to  express  what  they  wish  but  no
group to discriminate in membership.  Pp. 25–28.

(d) Hastings’ all-comers policy is viewpoint neutral.  Pp. 28–31.

(1) The  policy  draws  no  distinction  between  groups  based  on
their message or perspective; its requirement that all student groups
accept all comers is textbook viewpoint neutral.  Pp. 28–29.

(2) Conceding that the policy is nominally neutral, CLS asserts
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It summarizes the Court's reasoning and holding on a particular issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxx

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
958
Moore; Abdullah v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
Moore v. Cummings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
Moore v. Griesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Moore v. Keep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Moore; Martinez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Plath v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
964
Moore; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,979
907
Moore; Slezak v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moore; Williams v.
74
Moore Medical Corp.; Geissal v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
975
Morales; Chicago v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
Morgan; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moriarty; Tunnicliff v.
960
Morris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
Morris, Inc.; Blumenthal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Moss v. Garrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Mosseri v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Mountain Village; May v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
Movies, Inc. v. Kahn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
Mullens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
Munoz v. Martinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Murillo v. Terhune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
125
Muscarello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903
Mystic Lake Casino; Cohen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Mystic Lake Casino; Gavle v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Nakamura v. Chun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Narron v. Vance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947
Narvaiz v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Nary v. Hennessey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
National Assn. of Home Builders of U. S. v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . .
982
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
569
National Endowment for Arts v. Finley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952
National Environmental Waste Corp. v. Riverside . . . . . . . . . . . .
952
National Environmental Waste Corp.; Riverside v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
926
National Labor Relations Bd.; Machinists v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
National Labor Relations Bd.; McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. . . .
972
National Labor Relations Bd.; Yen v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK); Lebron v.
927
NationsMart Corp. v. Carlon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nazario; Cunningham v.
905
Nebraska State Bank; Carlson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Neill, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Nelson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920,956
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

BROWN v. DAVENPORT

Opinion of the Court

is  not  enough  that  the  state-court  decision  offends  lower
federal court precedents.  See, e.g., Glebe v. Frost, 574 U. S.
21, 24 (2014) (per curiam).  This Court’s dicta cannot supply
a  ground  for  relief.   See,  e.g.,  White  v.  Woodall,  572  U. S.
415, 419 (2014).  Nor can holdings that speak only at a high
level of generality.  See, e.g., Lopez v. Smith, 574 U. S. 1, 6
(2014) (per curiam); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652,
664 (2004).  Under AEDPA too, “[s]tate-court decisions are
measured against this Court’s precedents as of ‘the time the
state court renders its decision’ ” and cannot be held unrea-
sonable only in light of later decided cases.  Pinholster, 563
U. S., at 182 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 71–
72 (2003)).  None of these restrictions applies under Brecht.
There, a federal habeas court may consult and draw on the
whole body of law.  So, for example, a petitioner might be
able to prevail under Brecht thanks to favorable circuit case
law  but  still  lose  under  AEDPA  because  no  comparable
holding exists in this Court’s precedents.

Today’s  case  illustrates  how  these  differences  matter.
The Sixth Circuit granted relief to Mr. Davenport after con-
cluding that it harbored grave doubts about the jury’s ver-
dict.  It  did  not  claim  that  every  reasonable  jurist  would
share its doubts.  Nor did it purport to hold that the Michi-
gan state courts had acted contrary to or unreasonably ap-
plied  a  decision  of  this  Court.    Instead,  the  Sixth  Circuit
said  only  that  the  state-court  decisions  in  this  case  could
not be reconciled with a roughly analogous precedent from
the Ninth Circuit.  964 F. 3d, at 467.  Even assuming the
Sixth Circuit’s analysis was enough to permit relief under
Brecht, none of its reasoning was enough to warrant relief
under AEDPA.  Nor can any of this come as a surprise.  As
we have seen, if AEDPA makes winning habeas relief more
difficult, it is because Congress adopted the law to do just
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the differences between the Brecht and AEDPA standards for granting habeas relief.  It cites relevant case law and provides legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v.
CITY OF NEW YORK
ALITO, J., dissenting

and therefore I proceed on that assumption.)  And if that is
the reason for what the Court has done, the Court is wrong.
This case is not moot.

Article III, §2 of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction
of the federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies,” and as
a result, we may not “ ‘decide questions that cannot affect
the rights of litigants in the case before [us].’ ”  Chafin, 568
U. S., at 172.  Nor may we advise “ ‘what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.’ ”  Ibid.  This means that
the dispute between the parties in a case must remain alive
until its ultimate disposition.  If a live controversy ceases to
exist—i.e., if a case becomes moot—then we have no juris-
diction to proceed.  But in order for this to happen, a case
must really be dead, and as noted, that occurs only “ ‘when
it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief what-
ever to the prevailing party.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting Knox v. Service
Employees,  567  U. S.  298,  307  (2012)).    “ ‘[A]s  long  as  the
parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the out-
come of the litigation, the case is not moot.’ ”  Chafin, 568
U. S., at 172 (quoting Knox, 567 U. S., at 307–308).  Thus,
to  establish  mootness,  a  “demanding  standard”  must  be
met.  Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,
587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 6).

We have been particularly wary of attempts by parties to
manufacture mootness in order to evade review.  See Knox,
567 U. S., at 307; accord, Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Asso-
ciated  Gen.  Contractors  of  America  v.  Jacksonville,  508
U. S.  656,  661  (1993).    And  it  is  black-letter  law  that  we
have a “virtually unflagging” obligation to exercise our ju-
risdiction.  Colorado  River  Water  Conservation  Dist.  v.
United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976).

In  this  case,  the  amended  City  ordinance  and  the  new
State law gave petitioners most of what they sought in their
complaint, but the new laws did not give them complete re-
lief.  It is entirely possible for them to obtain more relief,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It discusses the concept of mootness in legal cases and argues that the case at hand is not moot.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 21–86 and 21–1239
_________________

21–86

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC., PETITIONER
v.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
MICHELLE COCHRAN

21–1239

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[April 14, 2023]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In each of these two cases, the respondent in an adminis-
trative enforcement action challenges the constitutional au-
thority of the  agency to  proceed.  Both respondents claim
that the agencies’ administrative law judges (ALJs) are in-
sufficiently  accountable  to  the  President,  in  violation  of
separation-of-powers  principles.  And  one  respondent  at-
tacks as well the combination of prosecutorial and adjudi-
catory functions in a single agency.  The challenges are fun-
damental, even existential.  They maintain in essence that
the agencies, as currently structured, are unconstitutional
in much of their work.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citations, case names, and the introduction of the Court's reasoning. This type of content is highly suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
102

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and part of a court document.  It is likely not the main body text of a book and should not be indexed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

Opinion of the Court

States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763 (1878); see also Jacobs v.
Prichard, 223 U. S. 200, 214 (1912).

“Respect,” though, was just that.  The views of the Exec-
utive  Branch  could  inform  the  judgment  of  the  Judiciary,
but  did  not  supersede  it.  Whatever  respect  an  Executive
Branch interpretation was due, a judge “certainly would not
be bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a
department.”    Decatur,  14  Pet.,  at  515;  see  also  Burnet  v.
Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. 1, 16 (1932).  Otherwise, ju-
dicial judgment would not be independent at all.  As Justice
Story put it, “in cases where [a court’s] own judgment . . .
differ[ed] from that of other high functionaries,” the court
was “not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.”  Dickson,
15 Pet., at 162.

B
The New Deal ushered in a “rapid expansion of the ad-
ministrative process.”  United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U. S. 632, 644 (1950).  But as new agencies with new powers
proliferated,  the  Court  continued  to  adhere  to  the  tradi-
tional understanding that questions of law were for courts
to decide, exercising independent judgment.

During this period, the Court often treated agency deter-
minations  of  fact  as  binding  on  the  courts,  provided  that
there  was  “evidence  to  support  the  findings.”  St.  Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 51 (1936).
“When  the  legislature  itself  acts  within  the  broad  field  of
legislative discretion,” the Court reasoned, “its determina-
tions are conclusive.”  Ibid.  Congress could therefore “ap-
point[ ] an agent to act within that sphere of legislative au-
thority” and “endow the agent with power to make findings
of fact which are conclusive, provided the requirements of
due  process  which  are  specially  applicable  to  such  an
agency are met, as in according a fair hearing and acting
upon evidence and not arbitrarily.”  Ibid. (emphasis added).
But the Court did not extend similar deference to agency
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the historical relationship between the Executive and Judicial branches regarding the interpretation of law, and the deference courts have given to agency fact-finding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

I
A
Federal and state law distinguish between two kinds of
payments  to  public  officials—bribes  and  gratuities.    As  a
general  matter,  bribes  are  payments  made  or  agreed  to
before an official act in order to influence the official with
respect to that future official act.  American law generally
treats bribes as inherently corrupt and unlawful.

But  the  law’s  treatment  of  gratuities  is  more  nuanced.
Gratuities are typically payments made to an official after
an official act as a token of appreciation.  Some gratuities
can be problematic.  Others are commonplace and might be
innocuous.  A family gives a holiday tip to the mail carrier.
Parents  send  an  end-of-year  gift  basket  to  their  child’s
public  school  teacher.  A  college  dean  gives  a  college
sweatshirt to a city council member who comes to speak at
an event.  A state legislator’s neighbor drops off a bottle of
wine to congratulate her for her work on a new law.

As those examples suggest, gratuities after the official act
are not the same as bribes before the official act.  After all,
unlike  gratuities,  bribes  can  corrupt  the  official  act—
meaning that the official takes the act for private gain, not
for  the  public  good.    That  said,  gratuities  can  sometimes
also  raise  ethical  and  appearance  concerns.  For  that
reason, Congress, States, and local governments have long
regulated gratuities to public officials.

Not  surprisingly,  different  governments  draw  lines  in
different  places.  For  example,  some  States  allow  public
officials  to  accept  gifts  below  certain  threshold  amounts.
E.g.,  Colo.  Const.,  Art.  XXIX,  §3(6)  (allowing  gifts  under
$75);  Kan.  Stat.  Ann.  §46–237(a)(1)  (2021)  (allowing  gifts
under $40 per year); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 268A, §§3(b), (f),
23(b),  (f)  (2020)  (allowing  gifts  under  $50);  W.  Va.  Code
Ann. §61–5A–6(b) (Lexis 2020) (allowing “trivial” gifts that
pose “no substantial risk of affecting official impartiality”).
Some States bar accepting any gifts for specific activities,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the difference between bribes and gratuities. It provides context and legal definitions, which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

Syllabus

By forcing courts to instead pretend that ambiguities are necessarily
delegations, Chevron prevents judges from judging.  Pp. 23–26.

(4) Because  Chevron’s  justifying  presumption  is,  as  Members  of
the Court have often recognized, a fiction, the Court has spent the bet-
ter part of four decades imposing one limitation on Chevron after an-
other.  Confronted with the byzantine set of preconditions and excep-
tions that has resulted, some courts have simply bypassed Chevron or
failed to heed its various steps and nuances.  The Court, for its part,
has  not  deferred  to  an  agency  interpretation  under  Chevron  since
2016.  But because Chevron remains on the books, litigants must con-
tinue to wrestle with it, and lower courts—bound by even the Court’s
crumbling precedents—understandably continue to apply it.  At best,
Chevron has been a distraction from the question that matters: Does
the statute authorize the challenged agency action?  And at worst, it
has  required  courts  to  violate  the  APA  by  yielding  to  an  agency  the
express  responsibility,  vested  in  “the  reviewing  court,”  to  “decide  all
relevant  questions  of  law”  and  “interpret  . . .  statutory  provisions.”
§706 (emphasis added).  Pp. 26–29.

(d) Stare decisis, the doctrine governing judicial adherence to prece-
dent, does not require the Court to persist in the Chevron project.  The
stare  decisis  considerations  most  relevant  here—“the  quality  of  [the
precedent’s] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, . . .
and  reliance  on  the  decision,”  Knick  v.  Township  of  Scott,  588  U. S.
180, 203 (quoting Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees,
585 U. S. 878, 917)—all weigh in favor of letting Chevron go.

Chevron has proved to be fundamentally misguided.  It reshaped ju-
dicial  review  of  agency  action  without  grappling  with  the  APA,  the
statute that lays out how such review works.  And its flaws were ap-
parent from the start, prompting the Court to revise its foundations
and continually limit its application.

Experience has also shown that Chevron is unworkable.  The defin-
ing feature of its framework is the identification of statutory ambigu-
ity, but the concept of ambiguity has always evaded meaningful defi-
nition.  Such an impressionistic and malleable concept “cannot stand
as  an  every-day  test  for  allocating”  interpretive  authority  between
courts and agencies.  Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 125.  The
Court has also been forced to clarify the doctrine again and again, only
adding  to  Chevron’s  unworkability,  and  the  doctrine  continues  to
spawn difficult threshold questions that promise to further complicate
the inquiry should Chevron be retained.  And its continuing import is
far from clear, as courts have often declined to engage with the doc-
trine, saying it makes no difference.

Nor  has  Chevron  fostered meaningful  reliance.    Given  the  Court’s
constant  tinkering  with  and  eventual  turn  away  from  Chevron,  it  is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus or a summary of a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case  603 U. S. ____ (2024). It outlines the arguments and reasoning behind a decision regarding the Chevron doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS

Opinion of the Court

1948—not to mention in the Little Tucker Act—the dissent
cannot “displace” this “standard rule” with scattered cita-
tions to different, inapposite statutes.  Green, 578 U. S., at
554.

2
The standard accrual rule that §2401(a)’s limitations pe-
riod  exemplifies  is  plaintiff  specific—even  if  repose  provi-
sions  like  the  Hobbs  Act  eschew  a  “challenger-by-
challenger” approach.  Brief for Respondent 9.  The Board’s
rule  would  start  the  limitations  period  applicable  to  the
plaintiff not when she had a complete and present cause of
action but when the agency action was final and, theoreti-
cally, some other plaintiff was injured and could have sued.
But §2401(a)’s text focuses on a specific plaintiff: “the com-
plaint is filed within six years after the right of action first
accrues.”  (Emphasis added.)

The  dissent  disputes  §2401(a)’s  plaintiff  specificity  by
pointing out that it does not say “the plaintiff ’s right of ac-
tion first accrues.”  Post, at 9.  True, but it does use the def-
inite article “the” to link “the complaint” with “the right of
action.”  So the most natural interpretation is that its limi-
tations  period  begins  when  the  cause  of  action  associated
with the complaint—the plaintiff ’s cause of action—is com-
plete.  And while the dissent cites dictionary definitions of
“accrue” that mention “ ‘a right to sue,’ ” ibid., the statute’s
use of the definite article “the” takes precedence.  The Board
and the dissent read §2401(a) as if it says “the complaint is
filed  within  six  years  after  a  right  of  action  [i.e.,  anyone’s
right of action] first accrues”—which, of course, it does not.
In  fact,  we  have  explained  that  the  traditional  accrual
rule  looks  to  when  “the  plaintiff ”—this  particular  plain-
tiff—“has a complete and present cause of action.”  Green,
578  U. S.,  at  554  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted;  em-
phasis added).  No precedent suggests that the traditional
rule  contemplates  the  Board’s  hypothetical  “when  could
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically part of a court's decision. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and uses legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

Syllabus

message of “pride.”  Id., at 561.  It held that ordering the group’s ad-
mittance would “alter the expressive content of the[ ] parade,” and that
the decision to exclude the group’s message was the organizers’ alone.
Id., at 572–574.

From  that  slew  of  individual  cases,  three  general  points  emerge.
First, the First Amendment offers protection when an entity engaged
in compiling and curating others’ speech into an expressive product of
its  own  is  directed  to  accommodate  messages  it  would  prefer  to  ex-
clude.  Second, none of that changes just because a compiler includes
most items and excludes just a few.  It “is enough” for the compiler to
exclude  the  handful  of  messages  it  most  “disfavor[s].”  Hurley,  515
U. S., at 574.  Third, the government cannot get its way just by assert-
ing an interest in better balancing the marketplace of ideas.  In case
after case, the Court has barred the government from forcing a private
speaker  to  present  views  it  wished  to  spurn  in  order  to  rejigger  the
expressive realm.  Pp. 13–19.

(2) “[W]hatever  the  challenges  of  applying  the  Constitution  to
ever-advancing technology, the basic principles” of the First Amend-
ment  “do  not  vary.”  Brown  v.  Entertainment  Merchants  Assn.,  564
U. S. 786, 790.  And the principles elaborated in the above-summarized
decisions establish that Texas is not likely to succeed in enforcing its
law against the platforms’ application of their content-moderation pol-
icies to their main feeds.

Facebook’s News Feed and YouTube’s homepage present users with
a continually updating, personalized stream of other users’ posts.  The
key to the scheme is prioritization of content, achieved through algo-
rithms.  The selection and ranking is most often based on a user’s ex-
pressed interests and past activities, but it may also be based on other
factors, including the platform’s preferences.  Facebook’s Community
Standards and YouTube’s Community Guidelines detail the messages
and  videos  that  the  platforms  disfavor.    The  platforms  write  algo-
rithms to implement those standards—for example, to prefer content
deemed particularly trustworthy or to suppress content viewed as de-
ceptive.    Beyond  ranking  content,  platforms  may  add  labels,  to  give
users additional context.  And they also remove posts entirely that con-
tain  prohibited  subjects  or  messages,  such  as  pornography,  hate
speech, and misinformation on certain topics.  The platforms thus un-
abashedly control the content that will appear to users.

Texas’s law, though, limits their power to do so.  Its central provision
prohibits  covered  platforms  from  “censor[ing]”  a  “user’s  expression”
based on the “viewpoint” it contains.  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§143A.002(a)(2).  The platforms thus cannot do any of the things they
typically do (on their main feeds) to posts they disapprove—cannot de-
mote,  label,  or  remove  them—whenever  the  action  is  based  on  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a section of a Supreme Court syllabus. It discusses the First Amendment and its application to content moderation on social media platforms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

KAGAN, J., concurring

religious reasons to baking a wedding cake for a same-sex
couple—did not.  The Court finds that the legal reasoning
of  the  state  agencies  differed  in  significant  ways  as  be-
tween  the  Jack  cases  and  the  Phillips  case.   See  ante,  at
15.  And  the  Court  takes  especial  note  of  the  suggestion
made  by  the  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals,  in  comparing
those  cases,  that  the  state  agencies  found  the  message
Jack requested “offensive [in] nature.”  Ante, at 16 (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).    As  the  Court  states,  a
“principled  rationale  for  the  difference  in  treatment”  can-
not  be  “based  on  the  government’s  own  assessment  of
offensiveness.”  Ibid.

What  makes  the  state  agencies’  consideration  yet  more
disquieting  is  that  a  proper  basis  for  distinguishing  the
cases  was  available—in  fact,  was  obvious.  The  Colorado
Anti-Discrimination  Act  (CADA)  makes  it  unlawful  for  a
place of public accommodation to deny “the full and equal
enjoyment”  of  goods  and  services  to  individuals  based  on
certain  characteristics,  including  sexual  orientation  and
creed.  Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(2)(a) (2017).  The three
bakers  in  the  Jack  cases  did  not  violate  that  law.    Jack
requested them to make a cake (one denigrating gay peo-
ple  and  same-sex  marriage)  that  they  would  not  have
made  for  any  customer.
In  refusing  that  request,  the
bakers did not single out Jack because of his religion, but
instead  treated  him  in  the  same  way  they  would  have
treated anyone else—just as CADA requires.  By contrast,
the same-sex couple in this case requested a wedding cake
that Phillips would have made for an opposite-sex couple.
In  refusing  that  request,  Phillips  contravened  CADA’s
demand  that  customers  receive  “the  full  and  equal  enjoy-
ment”  of  public  accommodations  irrespective  of  their
sexual  orientation.  Ibid.   The  different  outcomes  in  the
Jack  cases  and  the  Phillips  case  could  thus  have  been
justified  by  a  plain  reading  and  neutral  application  of
Colorado  law—untainted  by  any  bias  against  a  religious
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It discusses the legal reasoning behind the Court's decision and highlights the differences in treatment between the Jack cases and the Phillips case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
GORSUCH, J., dissenting

contends that ANCs are recognized by the federal govern-
ment in this sense.
  Admittedly,  not  every  statutory  use  of  the  word  “recog-
nized” must carry the same meaning.  See ante, at 14.  But
not only does ISDA arise in the field of Indian law where
the term “recognition” has long carried a particular mean-
ing.  The statute proceeds to refer to groups that are “rec-
ognized  as  eligible  for  the  special  programs  and  services
provided by the United States to Indians because of their
status  as  Indians.”    This  full  phrase  is  a  mouthful,  but  it
was a familiar one to Congress by the time it passed ISDA
in 1975.  In preceding decades, Congress used similar lan-
guage in statute after statute granting and terminating for-
mal  federal  recognition  of  certain  tribes.1    All  of  which
strongly  suggests  that  ISDA’s  recognition  clause  likewise
refers  to  the  sort  of  formal  government-to-government
recognition that triggers eligibility for the full “panoply of
benefits  and  services”  the  federal  government  provides  to
——————

1

 E.g.,  Act  of  Sept.  21,  1959,  §5,  73  Stat.  593  (upon  termination,  the
former Tribe and its members “shall not be entitled to any of the special
services performed by the United States for Indians because of their sta-
tus as Indians”); Act of Aug. 23, 1954, §2, 68 Stat. 769 (same); Act of Aug.
18, 1958, §10(b), 72 Stat. 621 (same); Act of Sept. 5, 1962, §10, 76 Stat.
431 (same); Act of Apr. 12, 1968, Pub. L. 90–287, §2, 82 Stat. 93 (“Nothing
in this Act shall make such tribe or its members eligible for any services
performed  by  the  United  States  for  Indians  because  of  their  status  as
Indians”); Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. 93–197, 87 Stat. 770 (An
Act “to reinstitute the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin as a feder-
ally recognized sovereign Indian tribe; and to restore to the Menominee
Tribe of Wisconsin those Federal services furnished to American Indians
because of their status as American Indians”).  This sort of language also
appeared  in  recognition  statutes  in  the  years  immediately  following
ISDA.  E.g., Indian Tribal Restoration Act, §4, 92 Stat. 247 (Tribes and
their members “shall be entitled to participate in the programs and ser-
vices provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as
Indians”); Siletz Indian Tribe Restoration Act, §3(a), 91 Stat. 1415 (rein-
stating eligibility for “all Federal services and benefits furnished to fed-
erally recognized Indian tribes”); Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Restora-
tion Act, §3a, 94 Stat. 317 (same).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the meaning of "recognized" in the context of Indian law and cites previous legislation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

REPUBLICAN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA
20–542
v.
VERONICA DEGRAFFENREID, ACTING SECRETARY
OF PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.

20–574

JAKE CORMAN, ET AL.
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, MIDDLE DISTRICT

Nos. 20–542 and 20–574.  Decided February 22, 2021

  JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
  I  agree  with  JUSTICE THOMAS  that  we  should  grant  re-
view in these cases.  They present an important and recur-
ring constitutional question: whether the Elections or Elec-
tors Clauses of the United States  Constitution, Art. I, §4,
cl. 1; Art. II, §1, cl. 2, are violated when a state court holds
that a state constitutional provision overrides a state stat-
ute governing the manner in which a federal election is to
be conducted.  That question has divided the lower courts,*
and our review at this time would be greatly beneficial.
  In the cases now before us, a statute enacted by the Penn-
sylvania  Legislature  unequivocally  requires  that  mailed
ballots be received by 8 p.m. on election day.  Pa. Stat. Ann.,
Tit.  25,  §§3146.6(c),  3150.16(c)  (Purdon  2020).    Neverthe-
less, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing a provision of
the  State  Constitution  mandating  that  elections  “be  free
and  equal,”  Art.  I,  §5,  altered  that  deadline  and  ordered

——————

*See Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar, ___ Pa. ___, ___–___,
238 A. 3d 345, 369–372 (2020); Carson v. Simon, 978 F. 3d 1051, 1059–
1060 (CA8 2020).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the names of justices. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BROWN v. PLATA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

tively  suffered  an  Eighth  Amendment  violation.  That
theory is contrary to the bedrock rule that the sole purpose
of  classwide  adjudication  is  to  aggregate  claims  that  are
individually  viable.  “A  class  action,  no  less  than  tradi-
tional  joinder  (of  which  it  is  a  species),  merely  enables  a
federal  court  to  adjudicate  claims  of  multiple  parties  at
once,  instead  of  in  separate  suits.    And  like  traditional
joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact
and  the  rules  of  decision  unchanged.”  Shady  Grove  Or-
thopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U. S. ___,
___ (2010) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 14).

The second possibility is that every member of the plain-
tiff  class  has  suffered  an  Eighth  Amendment  violation
merely by virtue of being a patient in a poorly-run prison
system, and the purpose of the class is merely to aggregate
all  those  individually  viable  claims.    This  theory  has  the
virtue  of  being  consistent  with  procedural  principles,  but
at the cost of a gross substantive departure from our case
law.  Under  this  theory,  each  and  every  prisoner  who
happens  to  be  a  patient  in  a  system  that  has  systemic
weaknesses—such  as  “hir[ing]  any  doctor  who  had  a  li-
cense,  a  pulse  and  a  pair  of  shoes,”  ante,  at  10  (internal
quotation  marks  omitted)—has  suffered  cruel  or  unusual
punishment, even if that person cannot make an individu-
alized  showing  of  mistreatment.    Such  a  theory  of  the
Eighth Amendment is preposterous.  And we have said as
much  in  the  past:  “If  . . .  a  healthy  inmate  who  had  suf-
fered  no  deprivation  of  needed  medical  treatment  were
able  to  claim  violation  of  his  constitutional  right  to  medi-
cal care . . . simply on the ground that the prison medical
facilities  were  inadequate,  the  essential  distinction  be-
tween  judge  and  executive  would  have  disappeared:  it
would  have  become  the  function  of  the  courts  to  assure
adequate  medical  care  in  prisons.”    Lewis  v.  Casey,  518
U. S. 343, 350 (1996).

Whether  procedurally  wrong  or  substantively  wrong,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Brown v. Plata. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding Eighth Amendment violations in the context of prison healthcare.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

15

Opinion of the Court

required to perform abortions or to provide other treatment
that  violates  their  consciences.  See  42  U. S. C.  §300a–
7(c)(1); see also H. R. 4366, 118th Cong., 2d Sess., Div. C,
Title  II,  §203  (2024).  The  Church  Amendments,  for
instance,  speak  clearly.    They  allow  doctors  and  other
healthcare  personnel  to  “refus[e]  to  perform  or  assist”  an
abortion without punishment or discrimination from their
employers.    42  U. S. C.  §300a–7(c)(1).    And  the  Church
Amendments more broadly provide that doctors shall not be
required  to  provide  treatment  or  assistance  that  would
violate  the  doctors’  religious  beliefs  or  moral  convictions.
§300a–7(d).  Most if not all States have conscience laws to
the  same  effect.  See  N.  Sawicki,  Protections  From  Civil
Liability  in  State  Abortion  Conscience  Laws,  322  JAMA
1918 (2019); see, e.g., Tex. Occ. Code Ann. §103.001 (West
2022).

Moreover,  as  the  Government  notes,  federal  conscience
protections  encompass  “the  doctor’s  beliefs  rather  than
particular  procedures,”  meaning  that  doctors  cannot  be
required  to  treat  mifepristone  complications  in  any  way
that would violate the doctors’ consciences.  Tr. of Oral Arg.
37; see §300a–7(c)(1).  As the Government points out, that
strong protection for conscience remains true even in a so-
called  healthcare  desert,  where  other  doctors  are  not
readily available.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 18.

Not only as a matter of law but also as a matter of fact,
the federal conscience laws have protected pro-life doctors
ever  since  FDA  approved  mifepristone  in  2000.  The
plaintiffs have not identified any instances where a doctor
was  required,  notwithstanding  conscience  objections,  to
perform  an  abortion  or  to  provide  other  abortion-related
treatment  that  violated  the  doctor’s  conscience.  Nor  is
there any evidence in the record here of hospitals overriding
or failing to accommodate doctors’ conscience objections.

In  other  words,  none  of  the  doctors’  declarations  says
anything  like  the  following:    “Here  is  the  treatment  I
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of conscience protections to doctors regarding abortion-related treatment. It cites legal precedents and regulations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

ix

Page

Alabama v. North Carolina  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  944,1010

809

Alabama; Selensky v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Alabama Dept. of Human Resources; Simpson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
966

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alabi v. United States
1126

Alameda County Social Services Agency; H. R. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Alameda County Transit Parking Enforcement; Del Castello v.  . .
834

Alameida; Atienza Wagan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137

Alameida v. Phelps  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alander v. United States
992

Alaska; Curry v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Alaska; Reust v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940

Albany County Probation Dept.; Maltsev v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Albany Police Dept. v. Lewis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1050

946

Alberico v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Albright-Lazzari v. Connecticut  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1043,1094

1131

Alcala v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1129

Aldridge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1006

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alejandre-Alcaraz v. United States
1124

Alexander v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919

Alexander v. Ryan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960

Alexander v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
900

Alexandre v. Maine
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957

Alexeev v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Alford; QSI Holdings, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfredo-Cardenas v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  987,1075

Al-Ghizzawi, In re
Alicea-Cardoza v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
850

833

Alix v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1059

Allan-Selvin v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Allen v. Barnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Allen v. Belcher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Allen v. Hall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allen; Johnston v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  900,1046

Allen; Melson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Allen v. Montana
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Allen; Parker v.
831

Allen; Ray v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allen v. Tennessee  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  913,925,1033,1136

Allen v. United States
1111

Allen v. Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allen; Whisenhant v.
290

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Allen; Wood v.
965

Allen E. Kaye, P. C.; Uzamere v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Al Libbi v. Gates
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

III
I therefore turn to the question whether NetChoice estab-
lished  facial  unconstitutionality,  and  I  begin  with  the
States’  content-moderation  requirements.    To  show  that
these  provisions  are  facially  invalid,  NetChoice  had  to
demonstrate that they lack a plainly legitimate sweep un-
der  the  First  Amendment.  Our  precedents  interpreting
that Amendment provide the numerator (the number of un-
constitutional  applications)  and  denominator  (the  total
number  of  possible  applications)  that  NetChoice  was  re-
quired to identify in order to make that showing.  Estimat-
ing the numerator requires an understanding of the First
Amendment  principles  that  must  be  applied  here,  and  I
therefore provide a brief review of those principles.

A

The First Amendment protects “the freedom of speech,”
and most of our cases interpreting this right have involved
government  efforts  to  forbid,  restrict,  or  compel  a  party’s
own  oral  or  written  expression.  Agency  for  Int’l  Develop-
ment v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc., 570 U. S. 205,
213 (2013); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714 (1977);
West  Virginia  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Barnette,  319  U. S.  624,  642
(1943).  Some cases, however, have involved another aspect
of the free speech right, namely, the right to “presen[t] . . .
an edited compilation of speech generated by other persons”
for  the  purpose  of  expressing  a  particular  message.    See
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 570 (1995).  As used in this
context, the term “compilation” means any effort to present
the expression of others in some sort of organized package.
See ibid.

An example such as the famous Oxford Book of English
Poetry illustrates why a compilation may constitute expres-
sion on the part of the compiler.  The editors’ selection of
the  poems  included  in  this  volume  expresses  their  view
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Moody v. NetChoice. It delves into First Amendment principles related to content moderation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

KAGAN, J., dissenting

549 U. S., at 548 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting).  After today,
no one will have to go back 50 years for the classic case of
the  Court  manipulating  standing  doctrine,  rather  than
obeying  the  edict  to  stay  in  its  lane.    The  majority  and  I
differ, as I’ll soon address, on whether the Executive Branch
exceeded its authority in issuing the loan cancellation plan.
But  assuming  the  Executive  Branch  did  so,  that  does  not
license this Court to exceed its own role.  Courts must still
“function as courts,” this one no less than others.  Ibid.  And
in our system, that means refusing to decide cases that are
not really cases because the plaintiffs have not suffered con-
crete injuries.  The Court ignores that principle in allowing
Missouri to piggy-back on the “legal rights and interests” of
If
an  independent  entity.    Warth,  422  U. S.,  at  499.
MOHELA wanted to, it could have brought this suit.  It de-
clined to do so.  Under the non-manipulable, serious version
of standing law, that would have been the end of the mat-
ter—regardless how much Missouri, or this Court, objects
to the Secretary’s plan.

II

The majority finds no firmer ground when it reaches the
merits.  The statute Congress enacted gives the Secretary
broad authority to respond to national emergencies.  That
authority kicks in only under exceptional conditions.  But
when  it  kicks  in,  the  Secretary  can  take  exceptional
measures.  He can “waive or modify any statutory or regu-
latory  provision”  applying  to  the  student-loan  program.
§1098bb(a)(1).  And as part of that power, he can “appl[y]”
new  “terms  and  conditions”  “in  lieu  of ”  the  former  ones.
§1098bb(b)(2).  That means when an emergency strikes, the
Secretary can alter, so as to cover more people, pre-existing
provisions enabling loan discharges.  Which is exactly what
the Secretary did in establishing his loan forgiveness plan.
The majority’s contrary conclusion rests first on stilted tex-
tual analysis.  The majority picks the statute apart piece by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1025

558 U. S.

November 16, 2009

No.  09–307.  Brown  et  ux.  v.  Falcone  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Del.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  976  A.  2d  170.

No.  09–308.  U-Haul  Company  of  California  v.  City  of
Berkeley,  California,  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st  App.  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–317.  City of Patterson, California v.  Building In
dustry  Association of  Central California  et  al.  Ct. App.
Cal.,  5th  App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  171
Cal.  App.  4th  886,  90  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  63.

No.  09–322.  Gregory  et  al.  v.  Dillard’s  Inc.  C.  A.  8th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  464.

No. 09–326.  Harjo et al. v.  Pro-Football, Inc.  C.  A.  D.  C.

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  880.

No.  09–327.  Sampson  v.  Sun  Life  Assurance  Company  of
Canada.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
556  F.  3d  6.

No.  09–368.  Jenkins  v.  Alabama.  Sup.  Ct.  Ala.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  26  So.  3d  464.

No.  09–372.  Forte  v.  Knight  Ridder  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  112.

No.  09–382.  Correa-Ruiz  et  al.  v.  Fortuno,  Governor  of
Puerto  Rico,  et  al.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  573  F.  3d  1.

No.  09–407.  Abreu-Velez  v.  Board  of  Regents  of  the
University  System  of  Georgia  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  611.

No.  09–421.  McClaren  v.  Wisconsin.  Sup.  Ct.  Wis.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Wis.  2d  739,  767  N.  W.
2d  550.

No.  09–433.  Wills  v.  Potter,  Postmaster  General.  C.  A.
11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.  Appx.
748.

No.  09–437.  Spechler  v.  Tobin.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  870.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

established meaning of an “element” is clear: It is a “ ‘con-
stituent par[t]’ of a crime’s legal definition—[a] thin[g] the
‘prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to sus-
tain a conviction.’ ” Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. 500,
504  (2016)  (quoting  Black’s  Law  Dictionary  634  (10th  ed.
2014)).  See also, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466,
477  (2000);  United  States  v.  Gaudin,  515  U. S.  506,  510
(1995).

It is also established that there are two different types of
elements.  Some are invariant; that is, they must be proved
in  every  case.    But  it  is  not  uncommon  for  statutes  to  in-
clude a set of alternative elements and to provide that one,
but not all, of these alternative elements must be proved to
secure  a  conviction.  As  the  Court  said  in  Descamps  v.
United States, 570 U. S. 254 (2013), a statute may “se[t] out
one or more elements of the offense in the alternative—for
example,  [by]  stating  that  burglary  involves  entry  into  a
building or an automobile.” Id., at 257 (emphasis in origi-
nal).

The Hobbs Act includes both types of elements.  It crimi-
nalizes a robbery that “obstructs, delays, or affects” inter-
state  commerce,  18  U. S. C.  §1951(a),  and  it  defines  “rob-
bery” to mean “the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal
property from the person . . . of another, against his will, by
means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of
injury, immediate or future,” §1951(b)(1).  Accordingly, the
elements of Hobbs Act robbery are (1) the unlawful taking
or obtaining (2) of personal property (3) from the person of
another (4) against his or her will (5) by means of actual or
(6) by means of threatened force, or (7) by means of violence,
or  (8)  by  means  of  fear  of  injury.    The  first  four  elements
must be proved in every case, while the last four are alter-
native  elements  any  one  of  which  is  sufficient  for  convic-
tion.2  A completed Hobbs Act robbery satisfies §924(c)(3)(A)

——————

2 There  is  no  plausible  argument  that  actual  force,  threatened  force,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses the legal definition of elements in a crime, using the Hobbs Act as an example.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

SEC v. JARKESY

GORSUCH, J., concurring

treatment as a public right, for example, the Court in Gran-
financieria read Atlas Roofing as having “left the term ‘pub-
lic rights’ undefined.”  492 U. S., at 51, n. 8.  And since then
this Court has, in one case after another, “adhere[d]” only
to  Atlas  Roofing’s  “general  teaching”  that  Congress  may
constitutionally  adopt  “new  statut[es] ”  assigning  matters
that indeed qualify as “public rights . . . to an administra-
tive  agency.”  492  U. S.,  at  51  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted); see, e.g., Stern, 564 U. S., at 489–490; Oil States,
584 U. S., at 345.

Yet, even after the Court moved away from Atlas Roofing,
our public rights jurisprudence remained muddled.  Since
then, the Court has suggested that public rights might in-
clude  those  “involving  statutory  rights  that  are  integral
parts of a public regulatory scheme.”  Granfinanciera, 492
U. S., at 55, n. 10.  We have changed course and tried our
hand at a five-factor balancing test.  See Stern, 564 U. S.,
at 491 (describing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor,  478  U. S.  833  (1986)).    We  have  replaced  that  test
with  one  that  considers  “at  least  seven  different”  factors.
564 U. S., at 504 (Scalia, J., concurring).  And at one time
or another, these factors have included the consideration of
“the  concerns  that  drove  Congress  to  depart  from  the  re-
quirements of Article III.”  Schor, 478 U. S., at 851.  So, for
example, we have asked whether insistence on “the institu-
tional integrity of the Judicial Branch” would “unduly con-
strict Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action
pursuant to its Article I powers.”  Ibid.

Today, the Court does much to return us to a more tradi-
tional understanding of public rights.  Adhering to Granfi-
nancieria,  the  Court  rejects  the  government’s  overbroad
reading  of  Atlas  Roofing  and  recognizes  that  the  kind  of
atextual and ahistorical (not to mention confusing) tests it
inspired do little more than ask policy questions the Con-
stitution settled long ago.  Yes, a limited category of public
rights  were  originally  and  even  long  before  understood  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the Court's evolving understanding of "public rights" in the context of administrative agency jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

19

THOMAS, J., concurring

of,  not  the  solution  to,  this  clustering.    There  is  some
evidence  that  students  admitted  as  a  result  of  racial  dis-
crimination  are  more  likely  to  abandon  their  initial  aspi-
rations  to  become  scientists  and  engineers  than  are
students with similar qualifications who attend less selective
schools.  See, e.g., Elliott, Strenta, Adair, Matier, & Scott,
The Role of Ethnicity in Choosing and Leaving Science in
Highly Selective Institutions, 37 Research in Higher Educ.
681,  699–701  (1996).5    These  students  may  well  drift
towards  less  competitive  majors  because  the  mismatch
caused  by  racial  discrimination  in  admissions  makes  it
difficult for them to compete in more rigorous majors.

Moreover,  the  University’s  discrimination  “stamp[s]
[blacks  and  Hispanics]  with  a  badge  of  inferiority.”
Adarand,  515  U. S.,  at  241  (opinion  of  THOMAS,  J.).  It
taints the accomplishments of all those who are admitted
as  a  result  of  racial  discrimination.    Cf.  J.  McWhorter,
Losing  the  Race:  Self-Sabotage  in  Black  America  248
(2000)  (“I  was  never  able  to  be  as  proud  of  getting  into
Stanford as my classmates could be. . . . [H]ow much of an
achievement  can  I  truly  say  it  was  to  have  been  a  good
enough  black  person  to  be  admitted,  while  my  colleagues
had been considered good enough people to be admitted”).
And, it taints the accomplishments of all those who are the

——————

5 The  success  of  historically  black  colleges  at  producing  graduates
who go on to earn graduate degrees in science and engineering is well
documented.  See,  e.g.,  National  Science  Foundation,  J.  Burrelli  &  A.
Rapoport,  InfoBrief,  Role  of  HBCUs  as  Baccalaureate-Origin  Institu-
tions  of  Black  S&E  Doctorate  Recipients  6  (2008)  (Table  2)  (showing
that, from 1997–2006, Howard University had more black students who
went  on  to  earn  science  and  engineering  doctorates  than  any  other
undergraduate  institution,  and  that  7  other  historically  black  colleges
ranked  in  the  top  10);  American  Association  of  Medical  Colleges,
Diversity  in  Medical  Education:  Facts  &  Figures  86  (2012)  (Table  19)
(showing that, in 2011, Xavier University had more black students who
went on to earn medical degrees than any other undergraduate institu-
tion and that Howard University was second).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It discusses the potential negative impacts of racial discrimination in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Syllabus

“strong presumption of validity.”  Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319.  It
must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature
could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests.  Id.,
at 320.

Mississippi’s  Gestational  Age  Act  is  supported  by  the  Mississippi
Legislature’s specific findings, which include the State’s asserted in-
terest in “protecting the life of the unborn.”  §2(b)(i).  These legitimate
interests provide a rational basis for the Gestational Age Act, and it
follows that respondents’ constitutional challenge must fail.  Pp. 76–
78.

(e) Abortion presents a profound moral question.  The Constitution
does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or prohib-
iting  abortion.  Roe  and  Casey  arrogated  that  authority.    The  Court
overrules those decisions and returns that authority to the people and
their elected representatives.  Pp. 78–79.

945 F. 3d 265, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, GOR-
SUCH,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined.  THOMAS,  J.,  and  KA-
VANAUGH, J., filed concurring opinions.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment.  BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., filed
a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the court's opinion and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

5

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

sentences  was  not  dispositive.    Here,  the  Court  excuses
the  high  number  of  actual  sentences  by  citing  the  high
number  of  statutes  imposing  it.  To  say  that  a  sentence
may  be  considered  unusual  because  so  many  legislatures
approve it stands precedent on its head.2

The Court also advances another reason for discounting
the  laws  enacted  by  Congress  and  most  state  legisla-
tures.  Some of the jurisdictions that impose mandatory life
without  parole  on  juvenile  murderers  do  so  as  a  result  of
two  statutes:  one  providing  that  juveniles  charged  with
serious crimes may be tried as adults, and another gener-
ally  mandating  that  those  convicted  of  murder  be  impris-
oned  for  life.  According  to  the  Court,  our  cases  suggest
that where the sentence results from the interaction of two
such  statutes,  the  legislature  can  be  considered  to  have
imposed  the  resulting  sentences  “inadvertent[ly].”  Ante,
at  22–25.  The  Court  relies  on  Graham  and  Thompson  v.
Oklahoma,  487  U. S.  815,  826,  n.  24  (1988)  (plurality
opinion), for the proposition that these laws are therefore
not valid evidence of society’s views on the punishment at
issue.

It  is  a  fair  question  whether  this  Court  should  ever
assume a legislature is so ignorant of its own laws that it
does  not  understand  that  two  of  them  interact  with  each

——————

2 The Court’s reference to discretionary sentencing practices is a dis-
traction.  See ante, at 21–22, n. 10.  The premise of the Court’s decision
is that mandatory sentences are categorically different from discretion-
ary  ones.  So  under  the  Court’s  own  logic,  whether  discretionary  sen-
tences  are  common  or  uncommon  has  nothing  to  do  with  whether
mandatory  sentences  are  unusual.    In  any  event,  if  analysis  of  discre-
tionary sentences were relevant, it would not provide objective support
for  today’s  decision.    The  Court  states  that  “about  15%  of  all  juvenile
life-without-parole  sentences”—meaning  nearly  400  sentences—were
imposed  at  the  discretion  of  a  judge  or  jury.    Ante,  at  22,  n. 10.    Thus
the  number  of  discretionary  life  without  parole  sentences  for  juvenile
murderers,  relative  to  the  number  of  juveniles  arrested  for  murder,  is
about 1,000 times higher than the corresponding number in Graham.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's reasoning regarding mandatory life sentences for juvenile murderers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
46

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

STEVENS, J., dissenting

knocked off the table.39

I do not know whether today’s decision will increase the
labor  of  federal  judges  to  the  “breaking  point”  envisioned
by  Justice  Cardozo,  but  it  will  surely  give  rise  to  a  far
more  active  judicial  role  in  making  vitally  important
national policy decisions than was envisioned at any time
in the 18th, 19th, or 20th centuries.

The Court properly disclaims any interest in evaluating
the wisdom of the specific policy choice challenged in this
case, but it fails to pay heed to a far more important policy
choice—the choice made by the Framers themselves.  The
Court  would  have  us  believe  that over  200  years  ago,  the
Framers  made  a  choice  to  limit  the  tools  available  to
elected  officials  wishing  to  regulate  civilian  uses  of  weap
ons,  and  to  authorize  this  Court  to  use  the  common-law
process  of  case-by-case  judicial  lawmaking  to  define  the
contours of acceptable gun control policy.  Absent compel
ling  evidence  that  is  nowhere  to  be  found  in  the  Court’s
opinion,  I  could  not  possibly  conclude  that  the  Framers
made such a choice.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

——————

39 It  was  just  a  few  years  after  the  decision  in  Miller  that  Justice
Frankfurter  (by  any  measure  a  true  judicial  conservative)  warned  of
the  perils  that  would  attend  this  Court’s  entry  into  the  “political
thicket” of legislative districting.  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 556
(1946)  (plurality  opinion).    The  equally  controversial  political  thicket
that the Court has decided to enter today is qualitatively different from
the  one  that  concerned  Justice  Frankfurter:  While  our  entry  into  that
thicket  was  justified  because  the  political  process  was  manifestly
unable to solve the problem of unequal districts, no one has suggested
that the political process is not working exactly as it should in mediat
ing  the  debate  between  the  advocates  and  opponents  of  gun  control.
What impact the Court’s unjustified entry into this thicket will have on
that  ongoing  debate—or  indeed  on  the  Court  itself—is  a  matter  that
future historians will no doubt discuss  at length.  It is, however, clear
to me that adherence to a policy of judicial restraint would be far wiser
than the bold decision announced today.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens in the District of Columbia v. Heller case. It argues against the majority opinion and provides a legal and policy analysis of the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–10
_________________

MICHAEL D. TURNER, PETITIONER v. REBECCA L.

ROGERS ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

SOUTH CAROLINA

[June 20, 2011]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, and
with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE ALITO join as
to Parts I–B and II, dissenting.

The  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment
does  not  provide  a  right  to  appointed  counsel  for  indi-
gent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt pro-
ceedings.  Therefore,  I  would  affirm.    Although  the  Court
agrees  that  appointed  counsel  was  not  required  in  this
case,  it  nevertheless  vacates  the  judgment  of  the  South
Carolina Supreme Court on a different ground, which the
parties  have  never  raised.    Solely  at  the  invitation  of
the  United  States  as  amicus  curiae,  the  majority  decides
that Turner’s contempt proceeding violated due process be-
cause  it  did  not  include  “alternative  procedural  safe-
guards.”  Ante,  at  15.  Consistent  with  this  Court’s  long-
standing practice, I would not reach that question.1

I
The  only  question  raised  in  this  case  is  whether  the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates a
right to appointed counsel for all indigent defendants facing
incarceration in civil contempt proceedings.  It does not.
——————

1 I  agree  with  the  Court  that  this  case  is  not  moot  because  the  chal-
lenged  action  is  likely  to  recur  yet  is  so  brief  that  it  otherwise  evades
our review.  Ante, at 5–7.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion.  It includes citations, case names, and the name of the justice writing the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

5

Opinion of the Court

No.  09–416,  p.  56a  (hereinafter  Juris.  App.).    In  2006,
then-Governor  Schwarzenegger  declared  a  state  of  emer-
gency in the prisons, as “ ‘immediate action is necessary to
prevent  death  and  harm  caused  by  California’s  severe
prison  overcrowding.’ ”  Id.,  at  61a.    The  consequences  of
overcrowding  identified  by  the  Governor  include  “ ‘in-
creased,  substantial  risk  for  transmission  of  infectious
illness’ ”  and  a  suicide  rate  “ ‘approaching  an  average  of
one per week.’ ”  Ibid.

Prisoners  in  California  with  serious  mental  illness  do
not receive minimal, adequate care.  Because of a shortage
of  treatment  beds,  suicidal  inmates  may  be  held  for  pro-
longed  periods  in  telephone-booth  sized  cages  without
toilets.  See  Appendix  C,  infra.  A  psychiatric  expert  re-
ported  observing  an  inmate  who  had  been  held  in  such  a
cage  for  nearly  24  hours,  standing  in  a  pool  of  his  own
urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic.  Prison officials
explained  they  had  “ ‘no  place  to  put  him.’ ”    App.  593.
——————

At trial, current and former California prison officials also testified to
the  degree  of  overcrowding.    Jeanne  Woodford,  who  recently  adminis-
tered  California’s  prison  system,  stated  that  “ ‘[o]vercrowding  in  the
[California  Department  of  Corrections  and  Rehabilitation  (CDCR)]  is
extreme,  its  effects  are  pervasive  and  it  is  preventing  the  Department
from providing adequate mental and medical health care to prisoners.’ ”
Juris.  App.  84a.    Matthew  Cate,  the  head  of  the  California  prison
system,  stated  that  “ ‘overpopulation  makes  everything  we  do  more
difficult.’ ”    Ibid.    And  Robin  Dezember,  chief  deputy  secretary  of  Cor-
rectional Healthcare Services, stated that “we are terribly overcrowded
in our prison system” and “overcrowding has negative effects on every-
body in the prison system.”  Tr. 853, 856.

Experts  from  outside  California  offered  similar  assessments.    Doyle
Wayne  Scott,  the  former  head  of  corrections  in  Texas,  described  con-
ditions  in  California’s  prisons  as  “appalling,”  “inhumane,”  and  “unac-
ceptable”  and  stated  that  “[i]n  more  than  35  years  of  prison  work
experience,  I  have  never  seen  anything  like  it.”    App.  1337.    Joseph
Lehman,  the  former  head  of  correctional  systems  in  Washington,
Maine,  and  Pennsylvania,  concluded  that  “[t]here  is  no  question  that
California’s  prisons  are  overcrowded”  and  that  “this  is  an  emergency
situation; it calls for drastic and immediate action.”  Id., at 1312.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the conditions of California prisons and the state of emergency declared due to overcrowding. It presents factual information, expert testimony, and legal citations, all characteristic of a legal document's body.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

For  the  reasons  stated,  I  would  vacate  the  judgment  of
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and remand the
case for further proceedings.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from Justice Ginsburg. Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the core legal reasoning and arguments of a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring

This Court also embraced that view when we reencoun-
tered the Act in 2015.  King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473.  Sav-
ing  the  Act  again  through  a  feat  of  linguistic  ingenuity—
this time by redefining “State” to mean “ ‘State or the Fed-
eral Government,’ ” id., at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting)—the
Court explained that “Congress [had] found that the guar-
anteed issue and community rating requirements would not
work without the [mandate],” id., at 482; see also post, at 5
(ALITO, J., dissenting).

But times have changed.  In this suit, the plaintiffs assert
that the mandate is unconstitutional because it no longer
imposes financial consequences and thus cannot be justified
as a tax.  And given that the mandate is unconstitutional,
other portions of the Act that actually harm the plaintiffs
must  fall  with  it.  In  response  to  this  theory,  the  current
administration contends that the mandate can be severed
from the rest of the Act.  Letter from E. Kneedler, Deputy
Solicitor  General,  to  S.  Harris,  Clerk  of  Court  (Feb.  10,
2021)  (notifying  the  Court  of  the  Federal  Government’s
change in position).  The Act’s other defenders agree.  Brief
for Petitioners 35–49.  In other words, those who would pre-
serve the Act must reverse course and argue that the man-
date has transformed from the cornerstone of the law into
a standalone provision.

II
On all of this JUSTICE ALITO and I agree.  Where we part
ways is on the relief to which the plaintiffs are entitled.  The
Constitution  gives  this  Court  only  the  power  to  resolve
“Cases”  or  “Controversies.”    Art. III,  §2.
  As  everyone
agrees,  we  have  interpreted  this  language  to  require  a
plaintiff to present an injury that is traceable to a particu-
lar “unlawful” action.  Ante, at 5, 11, 14–16; post, at 9–10
(ALITO, J., dissenting).  And in light of the specific theories
and arguments advanced in this suit, I do not believe that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of constitutional issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

The Court today treats these precedents as aging relics
in  need  of  “clarif[ication].”    Ante,  at  19.  But  these  prece-
dents  have  been  clear  enough  for  some  time.  Just  a  few
Terms ago, the same inquiry was described as “well settled”
by the unanimous Court in Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U. S.
481, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 5).  First, the Court explained,
“we start with the statutory text.”  Ibid.  “Under our prece-
dents,” the Court continued, “we also ‘examine all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the opening of a reservation.’ ”  Id.,
at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  6)  (quoting  Hagen,  510  U. S.,  at  412).
Thus,  second  and  third,  we  “look  to  any  unequivocal  evi-
dence of the contemporaneous and subsequent understand-
ing  of  the  status  of  the  reservation  by  members  and  non-
members, as well as the United States and the State.”  577
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  These inquiries include, respectively, the “history sur-
rounding the passage of the [relevant] Act” as well as the
subsequent  “demographic  history”  and  “treatment”  of  the
lands at issue.  Id., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 8, 10).

Today the Court does not even discuss the governing ap-
proach reiterated throughout these precedents.  The Court
briefly  recites  the  general  rule  that  disestablishment  re-
quires clear congressional “intent,” ante, at 8, but the Court
then declines to examine the categories of evidence that our
precedents demand we consider.  Instead, the Court argues
at length that allotment alone is not enough to disestablish
a reservation.  Ante, at 8–12.  Then the Court argues that
the “many” “serious blows” dealt by Congress to tribal gov-
ernance, and the creation of the new State of Oklahoma, are
each  insufficient  for  disestablishment.    Ante,  at  13–16.
Then the Court emphasizes that “historical practices or cur-
rent demographics” do not “by themselves” “suffice” to dis-
establish a reservation.  Ante, at 17–18.

This  is  a  school  of  red  herrings.    No  one  here  contends
that  any  individual  congressional  action  or  piece  of  evi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites previous cases and argues against the majority opinion's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>