<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

of New York issues public-carry licenses only when an ap-
plicant demonstrates a special need for self-defense, we con-
clude that the State’s licensing regime violates the Consti-
tution.

I
A
New York State has regulated the public carry of hand-
guns at least since the early 20th century.  In 1905, New
York made it a misdemeanor for anyone over the age of 16
to “have or carry concealed upon his person in any city or
village of [New York], any pistol, revolver or other firearm
without a written license . . . issued to him by a police mag-
istrate.”  1905 N. Y. Laws ch. 92, §2, pp. 129–130; see also
1908 N. Y. Laws ch. 93, §1, pp. 242–243 (allowing justices
of the peace to issue licenses).  In 1911, New York’s “Sulli-
van Law” expanded the State’s criminal prohibition to the
possession of all handguns—concealed or otherwise—with-
out a government-issued license.  See 1911 N. Y. Laws ch.
195, §1, p. 443.  New York later amended the Sullivan Law
to clarify the licensing standard: Magistrates could “issue
to [a] person a license to have and carry concealed a pistol
or revolver without regard to employment or place of pos-
sessing  such  weapon”  only  if  that  person  proved  “good
moral character” and “proper cause.”  1913 N. Y. Laws ch.
608, §1, p. 1629.

Today’s licensing scheme largely tracks that of the early
1900s.  It is a crime in New York to possess “any firearm”
without a license, whether inside or outside the home, pun-
ishable by up to four years in prison or a $5,000 fine for a
felony offense, and one year in prison or a $1,000 fine for a
misdemeanor.  See N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §§265.01–b (West
2017),  261.01(1)  (West  Cum.  Supp.  2022),  70.00(2)(e)  and
(3)(b),  80.00(1)(a)  (West  2021),  70.15(1),  80.05(1).    Mean-
while,  possessing  a  loaded  firearm  outside  one’s  home  or
place of business without a license is a felony punishable by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in the case of *2 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN*.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain factual information and legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
868

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No. 08–11046.  Kessler v.  McNeil, Secretary, Florida De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–11047.  Jimenez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  284  Fed.  Appx.  668.

No.  08–11048.  Schulze  v.  Schultz,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  626.

No. 08–11049.  Lucas v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  326.

No.  08–11051.  Moytez-Pineda  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  859.

No.  08–11052.  Perez-Cruz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  50.

No. 08–11053.  Crain v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  329.

No.  08–11054.  DeWeaver  v.  Runnels,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  995.

No. 08–11055.  Crandell v.  Louisiana.  Ct. App. La., 2d Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  987  So.  2d  375.

No.  08–11056.  Roberson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  290.

No.  08–11057.  Ramirez  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  6th

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11059.  Franklin  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  372  Ill.  App.  3d  1095,  940
N.  E.  2d  305.

No.  08–11061.  Freeman  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  386  Ill.  App.  3d  1118,  970
N.  E.  2d  623.

No.  08–11062.  Island  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  804.

No.  08–11063.  Goodman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It is not sequential narrative text and is likely a table of contents or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U77

[09-06-00 18:33:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 103 (1998)

115

Opinion of the Court

this, because in 1995 it successfully applied to the Secretary
of the Interior under § 465 to restore federal trust status to
seven of the eight parcels at issue here. See Complaint ¶ 18
and Afﬁdavit of Joseph F. Halloran in support of Plaintiff ’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, in Civ. No. 5–95–99, ¶ V (DC
Minn.); Tr. of Oral Arg. 9.5

*

*

*

When Congress makes Indian reservation land freely
alienable, it manifests an unmistakably clear intent to render
such land subject to state and local taxation. The re-
purchase of such land by an Indian tribe does not cause the
land to reassume tax-exempt status. The eight parcels at
issue here were therefore taxable unless and until they were
restored to federal trust protection under § 465. The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals with respect to those lands
is reversed.

It is so ordered.

5 The Leech Lake Band and the United States, as amicus, also argue
that the parcels at issue here are not alienable—and therefore not tax-
able—under the terms of the Indian Nonintercourse Act, which provides:
“No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands . . . from any
Indian nation or tribe . . . shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless
the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution.”

25 U. S. C. § 177.

This Court has never determined whether the Indian Nonintercourse
Act, which was enacted in 1834, applies to land that has been rendered
alienable by Congress and later reacquired by an Indian tribe. Because
the parcels at issue here are not alienable—and therefore not taxable—
under the terms of the Indian Nonintercourse Act, which provides: “No
taxation if it remains freely alienable”, and because it was not addressed
by the Court of Appeals, we decline to consider it for the ﬁrst time in this
Court. See, e. g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367,
379, n. 5 (1996) (declining to address issue both because it was “outside
the scope of the question presented in this Court” and because “we gener-
ally do not address arguments that were not the basis for the decision
below”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations, and the Court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA,
FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–5924.  Argued October 7, 2019—Decided April 20, 2020

In 48 States and federal court, a single juror’s vote to acquit is enough to
prevent a conviction.  But two States, Louisiana and Oregon, have long
punished  people  based  on  10-to-2  verdicts.    In  this  case,  petitioner
Evangelisto  Ramos  was  convicted  of  a  serious  crime  in  a  Louisiana
court by a 10-to-2 jury verdict.  Instead of the mistrial he would have
received almost anywhere else, Ramos was sentenced to life without
parole.  He contests his conviction by a nonunanimous jury as an un-
constitutional denial of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

Held: The judgment is reversed.

2016–1199 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/2/17), 231 So. 3d 44, reversed.

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II–A, III, and IV–B–1, concluding that the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial—as incorporated against the States by way of the
Fourteenth  Amendment—requires  a  unanimous  verdict  to  convict  a
defendant of a serious offense.  Pp. 3–9, 11–15, 20–23.

(a) The  Constitution’s  text  and  structure  clearly  indicate  that  the
Sixth Amendment term “trial by an impartial jury” carries with it some
meaning about the content and requirements of a jury trial.  One such
requirement is that a jury must reach a unanimous verdict in order to
convict.  Juror unanimity emerged as a vital common law right in 14th-
century England, appeared in the early American state constitutions,
and provided the backdrop against which the Sixth Amendment was
drafted and ratified.  Postadoption treatises and 19th-century Ameri-
can legal treatises confirm this understanding.  This Court has com-
mented  on  the  Sixth  Amendment’s  unanimity  requirement  no  fewer
than 13 times over more than 120 years, see, e.g., Thompson v. Utah,
170 U. S. 343, 351; Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 288, and has
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

District  Courts.    When  exercising  jurisdiction  under  28
U. S. C.  §1253,  however,  this  Court  “has  not  hesitated  to
exercise  jurisdiction  ‘to  determine  the  authority  of  the
court below,’ ” including whether the three-judge court was
properly  constituted.  Gonzalez  v.  Automatic  Employees
Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90, 95, n. 12 (1974) (quoting Bailey
v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 34 (1962) (per curiam)); see also
Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U. S. 16, 18 (1934)
(per curiam) (“The case is analogous to those in which this
Court,  finding  that  the  court  below  has  acted  without
jurisdiction,  exercises  its  appellate  jurisdiction  to  correct
the  improper  action”).  The  merits  of  the  decision  to  con-
vene  the  three-judge  court,  therefore,  are  properly  before
this Court.

2
Before a three-judge court may be convened to consider
whether  to  enter  a  population  limit,  the  PLRA  requires
that  the  court  have  “previously  entered  an  order  for  less
intrusive  relief  that  has  failed  to  remedy  the  deprivation
of  the  Federal  right  sought  to  be  remedied.”    18  U.  S.  C.
§3626(a)(3)(A)(i).  This  provision  refers  to  “an  order.”  It
is satisfied if the court has entered one order, and this sin-
gle  order  has  “failed  to  remedy”  the  constitutional  viola-
tion.  The  defendant  must  also  have  had  “a  reasonable
amount of time to comply with the previous court orders.”
§3626(a)(3)(A)(ii).  This  provision  refers  to  the  court’s
“orders.”  It requires that the defendant have been given a
reasonable  time  to  comply  with  all  of  the  court’s  orders.
Together, these requirements ensure that the “ ‘last resort
remedy’ ”  of  a  population  limit  is  not  imposed  “ ‘as  a  first
step.’ ”    Inmates  of  Occoquan  v.  Barry,  844  F. 2d  828,  843
(CADC 1988).

The  first  of  these  conditions,  the  previous  order  re-
quirement  of  §3626(a)(3)(A)(i),  was  satisfied  in  Coleman
by appointment  of  a  Special  Master  in  1995,  and  it  was
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the case BROWN v. PLATA. It delves into the legal requirements for convening a three-judge court to consider population limits in prisons.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

no  limits,  as  “ ‘[r]eally,  universally,  relations  stop  no-
where.’ ”  New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 655 (1995)
(quoting  H.  James,  Roderick  Hudson  xli  (New  York  ed.,
World’s Classics 1980)).  This language thus cannot be “con-
sidered in isolation,” Maracich v. Spears, 570 U. S. 48, 59
(2013), and the Court must “go beyond the unhelpful text
and  the  frustrating  difficulty  of  defining  [this]  key  term”
and look to statutory context.  Travelers, 514 U. S., at 656.
That the  phrase refers to a relationship or nexus of some
kind is clear.  See Smith, 508 U. S., at 238 (“ ‘[I]n relation
to’ ” requires “some purpose or effect” between two things).
Yet  the  kind  of  relationship  required,  its  nature  and
strength, will be informed by context.

The  presence  of  two  such  context-dependent  terms  ren-
ders §1028A(a)(1) doubly attuned to its surroundings.  The
parties’  competing  readings  both  fall  within  the  range  of
meanings of “uses” and “in relation to,” taken alone.  Resort
to context is thus especially necessary here.4

——————

4 The Government tries to head off any contextual analysis at the pass,
urging that “uses” and “during and in relation to” in §1028A(a)(1) must
be read identically to Smith and other of this Court’s cases interpreting
18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A).  That provision applies to “any person who, dur-
ing and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . .
uses or carries a firearm.”  One need look no further than this Court’s
§924(c) case law to see why this argument fails.  The teaching of those
cases is that because “use” “draws meaning from its context, . . . we will
look not only to the word itself, but also to the statute and the [broader]
scheme.”  Bailey  v.  United  States,  516  U. S.  137,  143  (1995).    Section
1028A(a)(1) differs greatly from §924(c), from the thing that is “used,” to
the title, to the nature of the predicate offenses to which the enhance-
ment relates.  Words can wound, but names and numbers are not guns.
If anything, the ubiquity of names and their vast range of “uses” makes
the verb especially indeterminate in this context.  For that same reason,
the Court’s decision today does not alter its §924(c) case law.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute, §1028A(a)(1), and its related legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

27

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

order  was  rooted  in  dangerous  stereotypes  about,  inter
alia,  a  particular  group’s  supposed  inability  to  assimilate
and desire to harm the United States.  See Korematsu, 323
U. S.,  at  236–240  (Murphy,  J.,  dissenting).    As  here,  the
Government  was  unwilling  to  reveal  its  own  intelligence
agencies’ views of the alleged security concerns to the very
citizens  it  purported  to  protect.  Compare  Korematsu  v.
United  States,  584  F. Supp.  1406,  1418–1419  (ND  Cal.
1984)  (discussing  information  the  Government  knowingly
omitted from report presented to the courts justifying the
executive  order);  Brief  for  Japanese  American  Citizens
League as Amicus Curiae 17–19, with IRAP II, 883 F. 3d,
at  268;  Brief  for  Karen  Korematsu  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae
35–36, and n. 5 (noting that the Government “has gone to
great lengths to shield [the Secretary of Homeland Securi
ty’s]  report  from  view”).    And  as  here,  there  was  strong
evidence  that  impermissible  hostility  and  animus  moti-
vated the Government’s policy.

Although  a  majority  of  the  Court  in  Korematsu  was
willing  to  uphold  the  Government’s  actions  based  on  a
barren invocation of national security, dissenting Justices
warned of that decision’s harm to our constitutional fabric.
Justice  Murphy  recognized  that  there  is  a  need  for  great
deference  to  the  Executive  Branch  in  the  context  of  na
tional  security,  but  cautioned  that  “it  is  essential  that
there  be  definite  limits  to  [the  government’s]  discretion,”
as  “[i]ndividuals  must  not  be  left  impoverished  of  their
constitutional  rights  on  a  plea  of  military  necessity  that
has  neither  substance  nor  support.”    323  U. S.,  at  234
(Murphy,  J.,  dissenting).    Justice  Jackson  lamented  that
the  Court’s  decision  upholding  the  Government’s  policy
would  prove  to  be  “a  far  more  subtle  blow  to  liberty  than
the  promulgation  of  the  order  itself,”  for  although  the
executive  order  was  not  likely  to  be  long  lasting,  the
Court’s  willingness  to  tolerate  it  would  endure.    Id.,  at
245–246.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, citing  Korematsu v. United States. It argues against the government's actions based on national security, highlighting the use of stereotypes and lack of transparency.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN

618

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS v. FINLEY

Souter, J., dissenting

must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno,
481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987). But quite apart from any question
that might be raised about that statement as a general rule,11
it is beyond question, as the Court freely concedes, that it
can have no application here, it being well settled that the
general rule does not limit challenges brought under the
First Amendment’s speech clause.

There is an “exception to th[e] [capable-of-constitutional-
application] rule recognized in our jurisprudence [for] fa-
cial challenge[s] based upon First Amendment free-speech
grounds. We have applied to statutes restricting speech a
so-called ‘overbreadth’ doctrine, rendering such a statute in-
valid in all its applications (i. e., facially invalid) if it is invalid
in any of them.” Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 506 U. S. 1011, 1012 (1992) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); 12 see, e. g., Reno v. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844 (1997) (striking
down decency provision of Communications Decency Act as
facially overbroad); id., at 893–894 (O(cid:146)Connor, J., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (declining to
apply the rule of Salerno because the plaintiffs’ claim arose
under the First Amendment); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452
U. S., at 66 (“Because appellants’ claims are rooted in the
First Amendment, they are entitled to . . . raise an over-
breadth challenge”)
(internal quotation marks omitted);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 521–522 (1972).13 Thus,

11 Cf., e. g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S.
833, 895 (1992) (statute restricting abortion will be struck down if, “in a
large fraction of the cases in which [the statute] is relevant, it will operate
as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion”).

12 We have, however, recognized that “the overbreadth doctrine does
not apply to commercial speech.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 497 (1982).

13 Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (“The fact that
the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceiv-
able set of circumstances is insufﬁcient to render it wholly invalid, since
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting

added).

In short, the concept of discrimination “because of,” “on
account of,” or “on the basis of ” sex was well understood.  It
was part of the campaign for equality that had been waged
by women’s rights advocates for more than a century, and
what it meant was equal treatment for men and women.22

2

Discrimination  “because  of  sex”  was  not  understood  as
having anything to do with discrimination because of sex-
ual  orientation  or  transgender  status.    Any  such  notion
would have clashed in spectacular fashion with the societal
norms of the day.

For most 21st-century Americans, it is painful to be re-
minded of the way our society once treated gays and lesbi-
ans, but any honest effort to understand what the terms of
Title VII were understood to mean when enacted must take
into account the societal norms of that time.  And the plain
truth  is  that  in  1964  homosexuality  was  thought  to  be  a
mental disorder, and homosexual conduct was regarded as
morally culpable and worthy of punishment.

——————

22 Analysis of the way Title VII’s key language was used in books and
articles  during  the  relevant  time  period  supports  this  conclusion.    A
study searched a vast database of documents from that time to determine
how  the  phrase  “discriminate  against  . . .  because  of  [some  trait]”  was
used.  Phillips, The Overlooked Evidence in the Title VII Cases: The Lin-
guistic (and Therefore Textualist) Principle of Compositionality (manu-
script,  at  3)  (May  11,  2020)  (brackets  in  original),  https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3585940.  The study found that the phrase was used to denote
discrimination  against  “someone  . . .  motivated  by  prejudice,  or  biased
ideas  or  attitudes  . . .  directed  at  people  with  that  trait  in  particular.”
Id., at 7 (emphasis deleted).  In other words, “discriminate against” was
“associated  with  negative  treatment  directed  at  members  of  a  discrete
group.”  Id., at 5.  Thus, as used in 1964, “discrimination because of sex”
would have been understood to mean discrimination against a woman or
a man based on “unfair beliefs or attitudes” about members of that par-
ticular sex.  Id., at 7.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Bostock v. Clayton County. It delves into the historical understanding of "discrimination because of sex" in the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–637
_________________

DARRELL HEMPHILL, PETITIONER v. NEW YORK

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF NEW YORK

[January 20, 2022]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In  2006,  a  stray  9-millimeter  bullet  killed  a  2-year-old
child in the Bronx.  The State charged Nicholas Morris with
the murder, but after trial commenced, it offered him a plea
deal  for  a  lesser  charge.    The  State  specifically  required
Morris to admit to a new charge of possession of a .357-mag-
num  revolver,  not  the  9-millimeter  handgun  originally
charged in the indictment and used in the killing.

Years  later,  the  State  prosecuted  petitioner  Darrell
Hemphill  for  the  same  murder.  At  his  trial,  Hemphill
blamed Morris, and he elicited undisputed testimony from
a prosecution witness that police had recovered 9-millime-
ter ammunition from Morris’ nightstand.  Morris was out-
side the United States and not available to testify.  The trial
court allowed the State to introduce parts of the transcript
of  Morris’  plea  allocution  as  evidence  to  rebut  Hemphill’s
theory that Morris committed the murder.  The court rea-
soned  that  Hemphill’s  arguments  and  evidence  had
“open[ed] the door” to the introduction of these testimonial
out-of-court  statements,  not  subjected  to  cross-examina-
tion,  because  they  were  “ ‘reasonably  necessary’ ”  to  “ ‘cor-
rect’ ” the “ ‘misleading impression’ ” Hemphill had created.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case citation information, the title of the case, the date of the opinion, and the introductory portion of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

11

Opinion of the Court

have been reasonably modified and disposed: that it must
either have been lodged wholly in the national legislature,
or  wholly  in  the  State  legislatures,  or  primarily  in  the
latter,  and  ultimately  in  the  former.”    The  Federalist  No.
59, p. 362 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).  At no point was there a
suggestion that the federal courts had a role to play.  Nor
was there any indication that the Framers had ever heard
of courts doing such a thing.

C

Courts  have  nevertheless  been  called  upon  to  resolve  a
variety  of  questions  surrounding  districting.    Early  on,
doubts  were  raised  about  the  competence  of  the  federal
courts to resolve those questions.  See Wood v. Broom, 287
U. S. 1 (1932); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946).

In the leading case of Baker v. Carr, voters in Tennessee
complained  that  the  State’s  districting  plan  for  state
representatives  “debase[d]”  their  votes,  because  the  plan
was  predicated  on  a  60-year-old  census  that  no  longer
reflected  the  distribution  of  population  in  the  State.    The
plaintiffs  argued  that  votes  of  people  in  overpopulated
districts  held  less  value  than  those  of  people  in  less-
populated  districts,  and  that  this  inequality  violated  the
Equal  Protection  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.
The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that
the claim was not justiciable, relying on this Court’s prec-
edents,  including  Colegrove.    Baker  v.  Carr,  179  F. Supp.
824,  825,  826  (MD  Tenn.  1959).  This  Court  reversed.  It
identified  various  considerations  relevant  to  determining
whether  a  claim  is  a  nonjusticiable  political  question,
including  whether  there  is  “a  lack  of  judicially  discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving it.”  369 U. S.,
at  217.  The  Court  concluded  that  the  claim  of  population
inequality  among  districts  did  not  fall  into  that  category,
because  such  a  claim  could  be  decided  under  basic  equal
protection principles.  Id., at 226.  In Wesberry v. Sanders,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the history of court involvement in redistricting cases. It contains legal citations and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
830

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No. 08–9607.  Garcia v. Illinois.  App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  382  Ill.  App.  3d  1215,  967  N.  E.
2d  499.

No.  08–9610.  Jones  v.  Nevada.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  124  Nev.  1483,  238  P.  3d  827.

No. 08–9676.  Carter v. Texas.  Ct. Crim. App. Tex.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  08–9684.  Blaylock  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  535  F.  3d  922.

No.  08–9737.  Boynes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–9814.  Ragin  v.  United  States;  and
No.  08–9977.  Howard  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  760.

No.  08–9834.  Henderson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  536  F.  3d  776.

No.  08–9882.  Spence  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.

C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–9884.  Cooper v. United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  291  Fed.  Appx.  98.

No.  08–9887.  Sampath  v.  Concurrent  Technologies  Corp.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  299  Fed.
Appx.  143.

No.  08–9944.  Zuniga  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  553  F.  3d  1330.

No.  08–9948.  Prevatte  v.  French,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.
11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  547  F.  3d  1300.

No.  08–9992.  Mullen  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  621.

No.  08–9994.  Barnett  v.  Roper,  Superintendent,  Potosi
Correctional Center.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Re
ported  below:  541  F.  3d  804.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and reporting information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

162

PHILLIPS v. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

Opinion of the Court

§ 5(A); Rules 4, 7 of the Texas Rules Governing the Opera-
tion of the Texas Equal Access to Justice Program. Client
funds are considered “nominal in amount” or “held for a
short period of time” if the attorney holding the funds deter-
mines that

“such funds, considered without regard to funds of other
clients which may be held by the attorney, law ﬁrm or
professional corporation, could not reasonably be ex-
pected to earn interest for the client or if the interest
which might be earned on such funds is not likely to be
sufﬁcient to offset the cost of establishing and maintain-
ing the account, service charges, accounting costs and
tax reporting costs which would be incurred in attempt-
ing to obtain the interest on such funds for the client.”
Texas IOLTA Rule 6.

Interest earned by the funds deposited in an IOLTA ac-
count is to be paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foun-
dation (TEAJF), a nonproﬁt corporation established by the
Supreme Court of Texas. Tex. State Bar Rule, Art. XI,
§§ 3, 4; Texas IOLTA Rule 9(a). TEAJF distributes the
funds to nonproﬁt organizations that “have as a primary pur-
pose the delivery of legal services to low income persons.”
Texas IOLTA Rule 10. The Internal Revenue Service does
not attribute the interest generated by an IOLTA account to
the individual clients for federal income tax purposes so long
as the client has no control over the decision whether to place
the funds in the IOLTA account and does not designate who
will receive the interest generated by the account. See Rev.
Rul. 81–209, 1981–2 Cum. Bull. 16; Rev. Rul. 87–2, 1987–1
Cum. Bull. 18.

Respondents are the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF),
Michael Mazzone, and William Summers. WLF is a public-
interest law and policy center with members in the State
of Texas who are opposed to the Texas IOLTA program.
App. 26. Mazzone is an attorney admitted to practice in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Texas IOLTA program. It contains legal citations and definitions, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v.
PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 20–1199.  Argued October 31, 2022—Decided June 29, 2023*

Harvard College and the University of North Carolina (UNC) are two of
the oldest institutions of higher learning in the United States.  Every
year, tens of thousands of students apply to each school; many fewer
are admitted.  Both Harvard and UNC employ a highly selective ad-
missions process to make their decisions.  Admission to each school can
depend on a student’s grades, recommendation letters, or extracurric-
ular involvement.  It can also depend on their race.  The question pre-
sented  is  whether  the  admissions  systems  used  by  Harvard  College
and UNC are lawful under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.

At Harvard, each application for admission is initially screened by a
“first reader,” who assigns a numerical score in each of six categories:
academic, extracurricular, athletic, school support, personal, and over-
all.  For the “overall” category—a composite of the five other ratings—
a  first  reader can  and  does consider  the  applicant’s  race.    Harvard’s
admissions subcommittees then review all applications from a partic-
ular geographic area.  These regional subcommittees make recommen-
dations to the full admissions committee, and they take an applicant’s
race  into  account.    When  the  40-member  full  admissions  committee
begins its deliberations, it discusses the relative breakdown of appli-
cants by race.  The goal of the process, according to Harvard’s director
of admissions, is ensuring there is no “dramatic drop-off” in minority
admissions from the prior class.  An applicant receiving a majority of

——————

* Together with No. 21–707, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Uni-
versity  of  North  Carolina  et al.,  on  certiorari  before  judgment  to  the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

BARRETT, J., concurring in part

rule existed, the majority opinion does not identify it.  In-
stead, the Court draws from sources suggesting that a per-
son could not enforce a trademark with another individual’s
name  against  that  individual.  See  ante,  at  14–15.  Nor
could  she  fraudulently  attempt  to  pass  off  her  goods  as
those of another person, using that person’s name.  Ante, at
14.  So far, so good.  Yet the names clause prevents other
uses of someone else’s name that the common law may have
allowed.  And on that score, the Court does not fully grapple
with countervailing evidence.

In  1860,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Rhode  Island  concluded
that the phrase “ ‘Roger Williams Long Cloth’ ” was “capable
of distinguishing” the manufacturer’s goods and thus qual-
ified as a trademark.  Barrows v. Knight, 6 R. I. 434, 438.
“ ‘Roger  Williams,’  though  the  name  of  a  famous  person,”
the Court explained, was, “as applied to cotton cloth, a fancy
name,” as would be the case with “any other her[o], living
or  dead.”  Ibid.  (emphasis  added).  Likewise,  a  New  York
court upheld the plaintiffs’ exclusive right to use the name
“Bismarck”  to  designate  their  paper  collars,  as  they  were
the first to “appropriate” the name for that purpose.  Mes-
serole v. Tynberg, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 410, 414 (Ct. Com. Pl.
1868).  The  court  thus  rejected  the  defendant’s  argument
that  the  plaintiffs  could  not  adopt  “the  name  of  a  distin-
guished German citizen” as a trademark.  Id., at 412.  Sum-
marizing, the Second Circuit explained that “[t]he law per-
mits the adoption as a trade-mark of the name of a person
who has achieved fame and distinction, provided the name
is not descriptive of the quality or the character of the arti-
cle  or  a  geographical  name.”  Stephano  Bros.,  Inc.  v.  Sta-
matopoulos,  238  F.  89,  93  (1916).  See  also  Medlar  &

——————
corporate  names,  not  written  or  printed  in  a  distinctive  manner,  or  of
designations  descriptive  of  the  character  or  quality  of  the  goods  with
which they are used, or of geographical names or terms.”  233 U. S., at
467.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Barrett. It delves into the legal history and interpretation of trademark law, particularly concerning the use of names.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

560

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

the accused could be convicted, like any other defendant, on
the basis of a guilty plea or a voluntary confession. Article
38.07, in other words, does not deﬁne “sexual assault proven
by corroborated victim testimony” as a distinct offense from
“sexual assault.” Rather, the measure operates only to re-
strict the State’s method of proving its case.5

And it does so without affecting in any way the burden of
persuasion that the prosecution must satisfy to support a
conviction. Under both the old and new versions of the stat-
ute, the applicable standard is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. The amendment in 1993 that repealed the corrobora-
tion requirement for victims between the ages of 14 and 18
did nothing to change that standard.

The Court recognizes that Article 38.07 does not affect the
applicable burden of persuasion, see ante, at 539, but several
times it asserts that the amended version of the statute
“changed the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a
conviction,” ante, at 530 (emphasis added). See also ante, at
531 (amended law “permitted petitioner to be convicted with
less than the previously required quantum of evidence”);
ante, at 532–533 (amended law “[r]educ[es] the quantum of
evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof ” (emphases
added)).
If by the word “quantum” the Court means to
refer to the burden of persuasion, these statements are
simply incorrect and contradict the Court’s own acknowledg-
ment. And if, as appears more likely, “quantum” refers to
some required quantity or amount of proof, the Court is also
wrong. The partial repeal of Article 38.07’s corroboration
requirement did not change the quantity of proof necessary
to convict in every case, for the simple reason that Texas has
never required the prosecution to introduce any particular

5 By the same reasoning, the repeal of the corroboration requirement
for victims between the ages of 14 and 18 plainly did not deprive sexual
assault defendants of any defense they previously enjoyed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the legal implications of a specific Texas statute regarding sexual assault.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR

OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.

Opinion of the Court

ever  purpose  the  Policy  Requirement  serves  in  selecting
funding  recipients,  its  effects  go  beyond  selection.    The
Policy  Requirement  is  an  ongoing  condition  on  recipients’
speech  and  activities,  a  ground  for  terminating  a  grant
after  selection  is  complete.  See  AAPD  12–04,  at  12.    In
any  event,  as  the  Government  acknowledges,  it  is  not
simply  seeking  organizations  that  oppose  prostitution.
Reply  Brief  5.  Rather,  it  explains,  “Congress  has  ex-
pressed  its  purpose  ‘to  eradicate’  prostitution  and  sex
trafficking,  22  U. S. C.  §7601(23),  and  it  wants  recipients
to  adopt  a  similar  stance.”    Brief  for  Petitioners  32  (em-
phasis  added).  This  case  is  not  about  the  Government’s
ability  to  enlist  the  assistance  of  those  with  whom  it  al-
ready  agrees.    It  is  about  compelling  a  grant  recipient  to
adopt a particular belief as a condition of funding.

By  demanding  that  funding  recipients  adopt—as  their
own—the  Government’s  view  on  an  issue  of  public  con-
cern,  the  condition  by  its  very  nature  affects  “protected
conduct  outside  the  scope  of  the  federally  funded  pro-
gram.”  Rust,  500  U. S.,  at  197.  A  recipient  cannot  avow
the belief dictated by the Policy Requirement when spend-
ing  Leadership  Act  funds,  and  then  turn  around  and
assert a contrary belief, or claim neutrality, when partici-
pating in activities on its own time and dime.  By requir-
ing  recipients  to  profess  a  specific  belief,  the  Policy
Requirement goes beyond defining the limits of the federally
funded  program  to  defining  the  recipient.    See  ibid.  (“our
‘unconstitutional  conditions’  cases  involve  situations  in
which  the  Government  has  placed  a  condition  on  the
recipient  of  the  subsidy  rather  than  on  a  particular  pro-
gram  or  service,  thus  effectively  prohibiting  the  recipient
from  engaging  in  the  protected  conduct  outside  the  scope
of the federally funded program”).

The  Government  contends  that  the  affiliate  guidelines,
established  while  this  litigation  was  pending,  save  the
program.  Under  those  guidelines,  funding  recipients  are
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the constitutionality of a policy requirement for grant recipients. It delves into the First Amendment implications of compelling recipients to adopt a specific stance on an issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

Opinion of the Court

Origin of the Second Amendment 275, 276 (D. Young ed.,
2d ed. 2001) (hereinafter Young); White, To the Citizens of
Virginia,  Feb.  22,  1788,  in  id.,  at  280,  281;  A  Citizen  of
America, (Oct. 10, 1787) in id., at 38, 40; Remarks on the
Amendments to the federal Constitution, Nov. 7, 1788, in
id.,  at  556.    It  was  understood  across  the  political  spec
trum that the right helped to secure the ideal of a citizen
militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive
military force if the constitutional order broke down.

It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amend
ment’s  prefatory  clause  announces  the  purpose  for  which
the  right  was  codified:  to  prevent  elimination  of  the  mili
tia.  The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving
the  militia  was  the  only  reason  Americans  valued  the
ancient  right;  most  undoubtedly  thought  it  even  more
important  for  self-defense  and  hunting.  But  the  threat
that  the  new  Federal  Government  would  destroy  the
citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason
that  right—unlike  some  other  English  rights—was  codi
fied  in  a  written  Constitution.  JUSTICE  BREYER’s  asser
tion  that  individual  self-defense  is  merely  a  “subsidiary
interest”  of  the  right  to  keep  and  bear  arms,  see  post,  at
36, is profoundly mistaken.  He bases that assertion solely
upon  the  prologue—but  that  can  only  show  that  self-
defense had little to do with the right’s codification; it was
the central component of the right itself.

Besides  ignoring  the  historical  reality  that  the  Second
Amendment  was  not  intended  to  lay  down  a  “novel  prin
cipl[e]”  but  rather  codified  a  right  “inherited  from  our
English  ancestors,”  Robertson  v.  Baldwin,  165  U. S.  275,
281  (1897),  petitioners’  interpretation  does  not  even
achieve  the  narrower  purpose  that  prompted  codification
of  the  right.  If,  as  they  believe,  the  Second  Amendment
right is no more than the right to keep and use weapons as
a member of an organized militia, see Brief for Petitition
ers 8—if, that is, the organized  militia is the sole institu
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text discussing the origin and purpose of the Second Amendment. It is sequential text and provides relevant information about the topic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

10

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Opinion of the Court

506 U. S. 1049 (1993). We granted certiorari to resolve
those differences.

II

Section 405(h) purports to make exclusive the judicial
Its second sentence
review method set forth in § 405(g).
says that “[n]o ﬁndings of fact or decision of the [Secretary]
shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental
agency except as herein provided.” § 405(h).
Its third sen-
tence, directly at issue here, says that “[n]o action against
the United States, the [Secretary], or any ofﬁcer or employee
thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title
28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.”
(Emphasis added.)

The scope of the italicized language “to recover on any
claim arising under” the Social Security (or, as incorporated
through § 1395ii, the Medicare) Act is, if read alone, uncer-
tain. Those words clearly apply in a typical Social Security
or Medicare beneﬁts case, where an individual seeks a mone-
tary beneﬁt from the agency (say, a disability payment, or
payment for some medical procedure), the agency denies the
beneﬁt, and the individual challenges the lawfulness of that
denial. The statute plainly bars § 1331 review in such a
case, irrespective of whether the individual challenges the
agency’s denial on evidentiary, rule-related, statutory, consti-
tutional, or other legal grounds. But does the statute’s bar
apply when one who might later seek money or some other
beneﬁt from (or contest the imposition of a penalty by) the
agency challenges in advance (in a § 1331 action) the lawful-
ness of a policy, regulation, or statute that might later bar
recovery of that beneﬁt (or authorize the imposition of the
penalty)? Suppose, as here, a group of such individuals,
needing advance knowledge for planning purposes, together
bring a § 1331 action challenging such a rule or regulation
on general legal grounds.
Is such an action one “to recover
on any claim arising under” the Social Security or Medicare
Acts? That, in effect, is the question before us.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the scope of Section 405(h) of the Social Security Act. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxxxix

Page
Stevens v. Vons Cos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  874,1065

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125
Stevenson; Diggs v.
997
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stevenson; Grayson v.
1122
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart v. California
1116
Stewart v. New York  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart v. Rozum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  853,959

Stewart v. United States
831

Stitt v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stogner v. Cain
862

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stone v. McKee
Stone v. Texas
1013

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stone v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  903,926,1135

813

Stonier, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .  810,968

Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Dept. of Env. Prot.
959

Story v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Stover; Saterstad v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913

Stover v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Stoyanov v. Mabus  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036

Strahan v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Straw v. Klopotoski
1054

Streater v. Gregory
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Streich v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920

1124

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Strength; Smith v.
Strickland; Biros v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1085,1087

Strickland; Broom v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

Strickland; Hartman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1142

1060

Stricklin v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

Stringer v. Iowa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Strong v. Dragovich  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

Strong v. Illinois Dept. of Human Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  804,1045

Strong v. Pennsylvania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Struck v. Cook County Public Guardian  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1009,1109

Strunk v. Evans  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
855

Stubl v. Place  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  832,845

809

Sturdivant v. U. S. District Court
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962

Styer v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932

Styers; Ryan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Styles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1034,1058

Suarez v. United States
1125

Suggs v. Lindamood  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Suh Kim v. Synod of So. Cal. and Haw.
1003

Suitt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

Sullivan; Gonzalez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905

Sullivan; Martin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

9

Opinion of the Court

organizations seeking tax-exempt status under 26 U. S. C.
§501(c)(3)  not  engage  in  substantial  efforts  to  influence
legislation.    The  tax-exempt  status,  we  explained,  “ha[d]
much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization.”
461  U. S.,  at  544.    And  by  limiting  §501(c)(3)  status  to
organizations that did not attempt to influence legislation,
Congress had merely “chose[n] not to subsidize lobbying.”
Ibid.  In rejecting the nonprofit’s First Amendment claim,
the  Court  highlighted—in  the  text  of  its  opinion,  but  see
post, at 5—the fact that the condition did not prohibit that
organization  from  lobbying  Congress  altogether.    By  re-
turning  to  a  “dual  structure”  it  had  used  in  the  past—
separately  incorporating  as  a  §501(c)(3)  organization  and
§501(c)(4)  organization—the  nonprofit  could  continue  to
claim §501(c)(3) status for its nonlobbying activities, while
attempting  to influence legislation in its §501(c)(4) capac-
ity with separate funds.  Ibid.  Maintaining such a struc-
ture, the Court noted, was not “unduly burdensome.”  Id.,
at 545, n. 6.  The condition thus did not deny the organiza-
tion  a  government  benefit  “on  account  of  its  intention  to
lobby.”  Id., at 545.

In  FCC  v.  League  of  Women  Voters  of  California,  by
contrast,  the  Court  struck  down  a  condition  on  federal
financial assistance to noncommercial broadcast television
and  radio  stations  that  prohibited  all  editorializing,  in-
cluding with private funds.  468 U. S. 364, 399–401 (1984).
Even  a  station  receiving  only  one  percent  of  its  overall
budget  from  the  Federal  Government,  the  Court  ex-
plained,  was  “barred  absolutely  from  all  editorializing.”
Id., at 400.  Unlike the situation in Regan, the law provid-
ed no way for a station to limit its use of federal funds to
noneditorializing  activities,  while  using  private  funds  “to
make  known  its  views  on  matters  of  public  importance.”
468  U. S.,  at  400.    The  prohibition  thus  went  beyond  en-
suring  that  federal  funds  not  be  used  to  subsidize  “public
broadcasting station editorials,” and instead leveraged the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing previous cases (Regan and FCC v. League of Women Voters of California). It delves into the nuances of tax-exempt status and First Amendment rights related to lobbying.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. VAELLO MADERO

GORSUCH, J., concurring

ensuing peace treaty signed in 1898, the United States took
possession  of  Puerto  Rico,  Guam,  and  the  Philippines.
Treaty  of  Paris,  Arts.  1–3,  Dec.  10,  1898,  30  Stat.  1755–
1756.

But these acquisitions, hard on the heels of the annexa-
tion of Hawaii, soon ignited a fierce debate.  Some argued
that our republican traditions prevented the United States
from governing distant possessions as subservient colonies
without regard to the Constitution.  Others sought to devise
new theories by which Congress could permanently rule the
country’s new acquisitions as a European power might, un-
restrained by domestic law.  See Cabranes 395.

Leading members of the legal academy provided influen-
tial support for those in the second camp.  Their work cul-
minated in a series of articles in the Harvard Law Review
in  1899.  Christopher  Langdell  argued  that  the  Bill  of
Rights  was  “so  peculiarly  . . .  English  that  an  immediate
and compulsory application of [those rights] to ancient and
thickly settled Spanish colonies would furnish . . . proof of
our  unfitness  to  govern  dependencies,  or  deal  with  alien
races.”  The Status of Our New Territories, 12 Harv. L. Rev.
365,  386  (1899).    James  Bradley  Thayer  contended  that
“there is no lack of power in our nation . . . to govern these
islands as colonies, substantially as England might govern
them.”  Our  New  Possessions,  12  Harv.  L.  Rev.  464,  467
(1899).  Abbott  Lawrence  Lowell  submitted  that,  “apart
from treaty or legislation, possessions acquired by conquest
or cession do not become a part of the United States,” and
“constitutional limitations . . . do not apply.”  The Status of
Our New Possessions:  A Third View, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 155,
176  (1899).  Such  rules,  he  said,  “are  inapplicable  except
among  a  people  whose  social  and  political  evolution  has
been consonant with our own.”  Ibid.

The debate over American colonialism made its first ap-
pearance  in  this  Court  in  the  form  of  a  tax  dispute  in
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901).  Pursuant to the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in a case titled "United States v. Vaello Madero". It delves into the historical debate surrounding American colonialism and its implications for constitutional rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

Opinion of the Court

ternal quotation marks omitted).  Presented with two stat-
utes, the Court will “regard each as effective”—unless Con-
gress’ intention to repeal is “ ‘ “clear and manifest,” ’ ” or the
two  laws  are  “irreconcilable.”  Morton,  417  U. S.,  at  550–
551 (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198
(1939));  see  also  FCC  v.  NextWave  Personal  Communica-
tions Inc., 537 U. S. 293, 304 (2003) (“[W]hen two statutes
are  capable  of  co-existence,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  courts,
absent  a  clearly  expressed  congressional  intention  to  the
contrary,  to  regard  each  as  effective”  (internal  quotation
marks omitted)).

This  Court’s  aversion  to  implied  repeals  is  “especially”
strong “in the appropriations context.”  Robertson v. Seattle
Audubon Soc., 503 U. S. 429, 440 (1992); see also New York
Airways,  Inc.  v.  United  States,  177  Ct.  Cl.  800,  810,  369
F. 2d  743,  748  (1966).    The  Government  must  point  to
“something more than the mere omission to appropriate a
sufficient sum.”  United States v. Vulte, 233 U. S. 509, 515
(1914);  accord,  GAO  Redbook  2–63  (“The  mere  failure
to appropriate sufficient funds is not enough”).  The ques-
tion, then, is whether the appropriations riders manifestly
repealed  or  discharged  the  Government’s  uncapped
obligation.

Langston confirms that the appropriations riders did nei-
ther.  Recall that in Langston, Congress had established a
statutory obligation to pay a salary of $7,500, yet later ap-
propriated  a  lesser  amount.    118  U. S.,  at  393–394.    This
Court held that Congress did not “abrogat[e] or suspen[d]”
the salary-fixing statute by “subsequent enactments [that]
merely appropriated a less amount” than necessary to pay,
because  the  appropriations  bill  lacked  “words  that  ex-
pressly or by clear implication modified or repealed the pre-
vious law.”  Id., at 394.
  Vulte reaffirmed that a mere failure to appropriate does
not repeal or discharge an obligation to pay.  At issue there
was  whether  certain  appropriations  Acts  had  repealed  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of statutes and appropriations. It cites previous cases and legal principles, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM

KAGAN, J., dissenting

treated in law as though they were the same.”  Plyler v. Doe,
457 U. S. 202, 216 (1982).  So “States must treat like cases
alike  but  may  treat  unlike  cases  accordingly.”    Vacco  v.
Quill,  521  U. S.  793,  799  (1997);  see  Lukumi,  508  U. S.,
at 542.1
  California’s  response  to  the  COVID  pandemic  satisfies
that  neutrality  rule  by  regulating  worship  services  the
same as other activities “where large groups of people [come
together] in close proximity for extended periods of time.”
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S.
___, ___ (2020) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in denial of ap-
plication for injunctive relief ) (slip op., at 2).  The restricted
activities  include  attending  a  worship  service  or  political
meeting; going to a lecture, movie, play, or concert; and fre-
quenting a restaurant, winery, or bar.  So the activities are
both religious and secular—and many of the secular gath-
erings, too, are constitutionally protected.  In all those com-
munal activities, California requires mask wearing and so-
cial  distancing,  and  bars  indoor  singing  and  chanting,  to
reduce  the  risk  of  COVID  transmission.    In  addition,  the
State has put limits on how many people can assemble in
one  indoor  space—whether  a  church,  theater,  or  lecture
hall.  Depending on COVID case and test-positivity rates,
public gatherings may occur only at specified occupancy lev-
els—for example, at 50% or 25% of a facility’s capacity.  And
when  COVID  rates  are  highest,  all  those  capacity  limits
give way to a rule that the gathering—again, whether reli-
gious or secular—take place outdoors (with no limits on at-
tendance).    Given  California’s  mild  climate,  that  re-
striction—the  one  the  Court  today  lifts  for  houses  of
worship  alone—does  not  amount to  a  ban  on  the  activity.
Worship services, along with other gatherings, have taken

——————

1 Only if a government fails this neutrality test must its policy “be jus-
tified by a compelling government interest and . . . be narrowly tailored
to advance that interest.”  Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 531–532.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding California's COVID-19 restrictions on religious gatherings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
ALITO, J., dissenting

Ms.  Chapman  requesting  permission  to  set  up  an  “advice
table”  on  a  campus  patio  on  August  23  and  24  so  that
members  of  CLS  could  speak  with  students  at  the  begin-
ning  of  the  fall  semester.    Id.,  at  298.  This  request—
merely  to  set  up  a  table  on  a  patio—could  hardly  have
interfered with any other use of the law school’s premises
or  cost  the  school  any  money.    But  although  the  request
was  labeled  “time  sensitive,”  ibid.,  Ms.  Chapman  did  not
respond  until  the  dates  in  question  had  passed,  and  she
then advised the student that all further inquiries should
be made through CLS’s attorney.  Id., at 297–298.

In September 2005, CLS tried again.  Through counsel,
CLS  sought  to  reserve  a  room  on  campus  for  a  guest
speaker who was scheduled to appear on a specified date.
Id., at 302–303.  Noting Ms. Chapman’s tardy response on
the  prior  occasion,  the  attorney  asked  to  receive  a  re-
sponse  before  the  scheduled  date,  but  once  again  no  an-
swer  was  given  until  after  the  date  had  passed.    Id.,  at
300.

Other statements in the majority opinion make it seem
as if the denial of registration did not hurt CLS at all.  The
Court  notes  that  CLS  was  able  to  hold  Bible-study  meet-
ings  and  other  events.  Ante,  at  6.    And  “[a]lthough  CLS
could not take advantage of RSO-specific methods of com-
munication,”  the  Court  states,  “the  advent  of  electronic
media and social-networking sites reduces the importance
of those channels.”  Ante, at 24.

At  the  beginning  of  the  2005  school  year,  the  Hastings
CLS group had seven members, App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a,
so  there  can  be  no  suggestion  that  the  group  flourished.
And  since  one  of  CLS’s  principal  claims  is  that  it  was
subjected  to  discrimination  based  on  its  viewpoint,  the
majority’s  emphasis  on  CLS’s  ability  to  endure  that  dis-
crimination—by  using  private  facilities  and  means  of
communication—is quite amazing.

This  Court  does  not  customarily  brush  aside  a  claim  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case. It argues against the majority opinion's stance and provides specific examples to support its claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

again  held  that  race-based  affirmative  action  in  higher
education  did  not  violate  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  or
Title VI.  Grutter, 539 U. S., at 343.  This time, however, the
Court also specifically indicated—despite the reservations
of  Justice  Ginsburg  and  Justice  Breyer—that  race-based
affirmative  action  in  higher  education  would  not  be
constitutionally  justified  after  another  25  years,  at  least
absent  something  not  “expect[ed].”    Ibid.    And  various
Members  of  the  Court  wrote  separate  opinions  explicitly
referencing the Court’s 25-year limit.

  Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court stated:  “We
expect  that  25  years  from  now,  the  use  of  racial
preferences  will  no  longer  be  necessary  to  further
the interest approved today.”  Ibid.

  JUSTICE THOMAS expressly concurred in “the Court’s
holding  that  racial  discrimination
in  higher
education admissions will be illegal in 25 years.”  Id.,
at 351 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

  JUSTICE  THOMAS,  joined  here  by  Justice  Scalia,
reiterated  “the  Court’s  holding”  that  race-based
affirmative  action  in  higher  education  “will  be
unconstitutional in 25 years” and “that in 25 years
the practices of the Law School will be illegal,” while
also  stating  that  “they  are,  for  the  reasons  I  have
given, illegal now.”  Id., at 375–376.

  Justice  Kennedy

“the  Court’s
referred
pronouncement  that  race-conscious  admissions
programs  will  be  unnecessary  25  years  from  now.”
Id., at 394 (dissenting opinion).

to

joined  by  Justice  Breyer,
  Justice  Ginsburg,
limit  but
acknowledged
questioned  it,  writing  that  “one  may  hope,  but  not
firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s span,
progress  toward  nondiscrimination  and  genuinely

the  Court’s  25-year
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the discussion surrounding the 25-year limit on race-based affirmative action in higher education as mentioned in the Grutter v. Bollinger case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

Not  only  does  the  Court  adopt  an  unnatural  construc
tion of the §109(a) phrase “lawfully made under this title.”
Concomitantly,  the  Court  reduces  §602(a)(1)  to  insignifi
cance.  As the Court appears to acknowledge, see ante, at
26,  the  only  independent  effect  §602(a)(1)  has  under  to
day’s  decision  is  to  prohibit  unauthorized  importations
carried out by persons who merely have possession of, but
do  not  own,  the  imported  copies.  See  17  U. S. C.  §109(a)
(§109(a)  applies  to  any  “owner  of  a  particular  copy  or
phonorecord  lawfully  made  under  this  title”  (emphasis
added)).6    If  this  is  enough  to  avoid  rendering  §602(a)(1)
entirely “superfluous,” ante, at 26, it hardly suffices to give
the owner’s importation right the scope Congress intended
it to have.  Congress used broad language in §602(a)(1); it
did so to achieve a broad objective.  Had Congress intended
simply  to  provide  a  copyright  remedy  against  larcenous
lessees,  licensees,  consignees,  and  bailees  of  films  and
other  copyright-protected  goods,  see  ante,  at  13–14,  26,  it
likely  would  have  used  language  tailored  to  that  narrow
purpose.  See 2 Nimmer §8.12[B][6][c], at 8–184.31, n. 432
(“It  may  be  wondered  whether  .  .  .  potential  causes  of
action [against licensees and the like] are more than theo
retical.”).  See also ante, at 2 (KAGAN, J., concurring) (the
Court’s decision limits §602(a)(1) “to a fairly esoteric set of

——————

tion of the minimum-wage laws.

6 When  §602(a)(1)  was  originally  enacted  in  1976,  it  played  an  addi
tional  role—providing  a  private  cause  of  action  against  importers  of
piratical goods.  See Quality King, 523 U. S., at 146.  In 2008, however,
Congress  amended  §602  to  provide  for  such  a  cause  of  action  in
§602(a)(2),  which  prohibits  the  unauthorized  “[i]mportation  into  the
United States . . . of copies or phonorecords, the making of which either
constituted  an  infringement  of  copyright,  or  which  would  have  consti
tuted  an  infringement  of  copyright  if  [Title  17]  had  been  applicable.”
See PROIPA, §105(b)(3), 122 Stat. 4259–4260.  Thus, under the Court’s
interpretation,  the  only  conduct  reached  by  §602(a)(1)  but  not
§602(a)(2)  is  a  nonowner’s  unauthorized  importation  of  a  nonpiratical
copy.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.*.  It is sequential and contains legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–1314
_________________

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE, APPELLANT v.

ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING

COMMISSION ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

[June 29, 2015]

CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SCALIA,

JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.

Just  over  a  century  ago,  Arizona  became  the  second
State in the Union to ratify the Seventeenth Amendment.
That  Amendment  transferred  power  to  choose  United
States  Senators  from  “the  Legislature”  of  each  State,
Art. I,  §3,  to  “the  people  thereof.”    The  Amendment  re-
sulted  from  an  arduous,  decades-long  campaign  in  which
reformers  across  the  country  worked  hard  to  garner  ap-
proval from Congress and three-quarters of the States.

What  chumps!    Didn’t  they  realize  that  all  they  had  to
do was interpret the constitutional term “the Legislature”
to mean “the people”?  The Court today performs just such
a magic trick with the Elections Clause.  Art. I, §4.  That
Clause  vests  congressional  redistricting  authority  in  “the
Legislature”  of  each  State.  An  Arizona  ballot  initiative
transferred  that  authority  from  “the  Legislature”  to  an
“Independent  Redistricting  Commission.”    The  majority
approves  this  deliberate  constitutional  evasion  by  doing
what  the  proponents  of  the  Seventeenth  Amendment
dared not: revising “the Legislature” to mean “the people.”
The Court’s position has no basis in the text, structure,
or  history  of  the  Constitution,  and  it  contradicts  prece-
dents  from  both  Congress  and  this  Court.  The  Constitu-
  </content>
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This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the name of the court, the case name, and the name of the dissenting justice.
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Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment

any  medical  procedure,”  enact  “regulations  to  further  the
health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion.”  Id., at
878.  To  serve  the  latter  interest,  the  State  may,  among
other things, “enact rules and regulations designed to en-
courage her to know that there are philosophic and social
arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in
favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term.”  Id., at 872.
The State’s freedom to enact such rules is “consistent with
Roe’s  central  premises,  and  indeed  the  inevitable  conse-
quence of our holding that the State has an interest in pro-
tecting the life of the unborn.”  Id., at 873.

Under Casey, the State may not impose an undue burden
on the woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.  “A finding of
an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a
state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abor-
tion  of  a  nonviable  fetus.”  Id.,  at  877.  Laws  that  do  not
pose a substantial obstacle to abortion access are permissi-
ble, so long as they are “reasonably related” to a legitimate
state interest.  Id., at 878.

After faithfully reciting this standard, the Court in Whole
Woman’s Health added the following observation: “The rule
announced  in  Casey  . . .  requires  that  courts  consider  the
burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws confer.”  579 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op.,
at 19–20).  The plurality repeats today that the undue bur-
den standard requires courts “to weigh the law’s asserted
benefits against the burdens it imposes on abortion access.”
Ante, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Read in isolation from Casey, such an inquiry could invite
a grand “balancing test in which unweighted factors myste-
riously  are  weighed.”  Marrs  v.  Motorola,  Inc.,  577  F. 3d
783, 788 (CA7 2009).  Under such tests, “equality of treat-
ment  is  . . .  impossible  to  achieve;  predictability  is  de-
stroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facilitated; judicial courage
is impaired.”  Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal precedent set by Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, focusing on the undue burden standard for abortion regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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  <content>
40

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

BREYER, J., dissenting

be whether a modern restriction on a right to self-defense
duplicates  a  past  one,  but  whether  that  restriction,  when
compared  with  restrictions  originally  thought  possible,
enjoys a similarly strong justification.  At a minimum that
similarly strong justification is what the District’s modern
law, compared with Boston’s colonial law, reveals.

Fourth, a contrary view, as embodied in today’s decision,
will  have  unfortunate  consequences.    The  decision  will
encourage  legal  challenges  to  gun  regulation  throughout
the  Nation.  Because  it  says  little  about  the  standards
used  to  evaluate  regulatory  decisions,  it  will  leave  the
Nation  without  clear  standards  for  resolving  those  chal-
lenges.  See ante, at 54, and n. 26.  And litigation over the
course  of  many  years,  or  the  mere  specter  of  such  litiga-
tion,  threatens  to  leave  cities  without  effective  protection
against gun violence and accidents during that time.

As important, the majority’s decision threatens severely
to limit the ability of more knowledgeable, democratically
elected  officials  to  deal  with  gun-related  problems.    The
majority says that it leaves the District “a variety of tools
for combating” such problems.  Ante, at 64.  It fails to list
even  one  seemingly  adequate  replacement  for  the  law  it
strikes down.  I can understand how reasonable individu-
als can disagree about the merits of strict gun control as a
crime-control  measure,  even  in  a  totally  urbanized  area.
But  I  cannot  understand  how  one  can  take  from  the
elected  branches  of  government  the  right  to  decide
whether to insist upon a handgun-free urban populace in a
city now facing a serious crime problem and which, in the
future, could well face environmental or other emergencies
that threaten the breakdown of law and order.

V

The  majority  derides  my  approach  as

“judge-
empowering.”  Ante, at 62.  I take this criticism seriously,
but  I  do  not  think  it  accurate.  As  I  have  previously  ex-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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8

AMERICAN LEGION  v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting

anity around the world should not loom over public thor-
oughfares, suggesting official recognition of that religion’s
paramountcy.

B
  The Commission urges in defense of its monument that
the Latin cross “is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian
beliefs”; rather, “when used in the context of a war memo-
rial,” the cross becomes “a universal symbol of the sacrifices
of  those  who  fought  and  died.”    Brief  for  Petitioner
Maryland-National  Capital  Park  and Planning Commis-
sion  34–35  (Brief  for  Planning  Commission)  (internal
quotation marks omitted).  See also Brief for United States
as  Amicus  Curiae  25  (The  Latin  cross  is  “a  Christian
symbol  . . .  [b]ut  it  is  also  ‘a  symbol often used to honor
and  respect [soldiers’] heroic acts.’ ” (quoting Buono, 559
U. S., at 721 (plurality opinion); some internal quotation
marks omitted)).
  The  Commission’s  “[a]ttempts  to  secularize  what  is
unquestionably  a  sacred  [symbol]  defy  credibility  and
disserve  people  of  faith.”   Van  Orden,  545  U. S.,  at  717
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  See, e.g., Brief for Amici Chris-
tian  and  Jewish  Organizations  7  (“For  Christians  who
think  seriously  about  the  events  and  message  that  the
cross  represents,  [the  Commission’s]  claims  are  deeply
offensive.”).  The asserted commemorative meaning of the
cross  rests  on—and  is  inseparable  from—its  Christian
meaning: “the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and the redeem-
ing  benefits  of  his  passion  and  death,” specifically, “the
salvation  of  man.”    American  Civil  Liberties  Union  of
Illinois  v.  St.  Charles,  794  F. 2d  265,  273  (CA7  1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
  Because of its sacred meaning, the Latin cross has been
used  to  mark  Christian  deaths  since at least the fourth
century.    See  Jensen,  supra,  at  68–69.    The  cross  on  a
grave  “says  that  a  Christian  is  buried  here,”  Brief  for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the religious symbolism of the Latin cross and its appropriateness in a public monument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GOLAN v. SAADA

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 20–1034.  Argued March 22, 2022—Decided June 15, 2022

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Ab-
duction requires the judicial or administrative authority of a Contract-
ing State to order a child returned to the child’s country of habitual
residence if the authority finds that the child has been wrongfully re-
moved to or retained in the Contracting State.  The authority “is not
bound to order the return of the child,” however, if the authority finds
that return would expose the child to a “grave risk” of “physical or psy-
chological  harm  or  otherwise  place  the  child  in  an  intolerable  situa-
tion.”  The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) im-
plements  the  Convention  in  the  United  States,  granting  federal  and
state courts jurisdiction over Convention actions and directing those
courts to decide cases in accordance with the Convention.

Petitioner Narkis Golan, a United States citizen, married respond-
ent  Isacco  Saada,  an  Italian  citizen,  in  Italy,  where  they  had  a  son,
B. A. S., in 2016.  In 2018, Golan flew with B. A. S. to the United States
to attend a wedding and, instead of returning to Italy, moved into a
domestic violence shelter with B. A. S.  Saada thereafter timely filed a
petition with the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York,  seeking  an  order  returning  B. A. S.  to  Italy  pursuant  to  the
Hague Convention.  The District Court concluded that B. A. S. would
face a grave risk of harm if returned to Italy, given evidence that Saada
had abused Golan and that being exposed to this abuse harmfully af-
fected B. A. S.  The court, however, ordered B. A. S.’ return to Italy, ap-
plying  Second  Circuit  precedent  obligating  it  to  “examine  the  full
range of options that might make possible the safe return of a child”
and  concluding  that  ameliorative  measures  could  reduce  the  risk  to
B. A. S. sufficiently to require his return.  The Second Circuit vacated
the  return  order,  finding  the  District  Court’s  ameliorative  measures
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

950

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 26, 1998

524 U. S.

C. A. 10th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 522 U. S. 1107.] Motions of
Initiative & Referendum Institute and National Voter Outreach,
Inc., for leave to ﬁle briefs as amici curiae granted.

No. 97–1130. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. C. A. Fed.
Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 523 U. S. 1003.] Motion of Federal Cir-
cuit Bar Association for leave to ﬁle a brief as amicus curiae
granted.

No. 97–1184. National Federation of Federal Employ-
ees, Local 1309 v. Department of the Interior et al.; and
No. 97–1243. Federal Labor Relations Authority v. De-
partment of the Interior et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
[Certiorari
granted, ante, p. 903.] Motion of petitioners to dispense with
printing the joint appendix granted.

No. 97–1396. Lopez et al. v. Monterey County et al.
D. C. N. D. Cal.
[Probable jurisdiction noted, 523 U. S. 1093.]
Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral
argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.

No. 97–1426. Crawford & Co. v. Sonnier, 523 U. S. 1107.
Motion of respondent for attorney’s fees and costs denied without
prejudice to reﬁling in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit.

No. 97–1481. Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Day,
523 U. S. 1119. Motion of respondent for attorney’s fees and
costs denied.

No. 97–1952.

In re Hayden. Petition for writ of habeas cor-

pus denied.

No. 97–8490.
No. 97–8802.
No. 97–8861.
No. 97–8928.
No. 97–9237.

In re Rudd;
In re Snyder et al.;
In re Baez;
In re Ayars; and
In re Ijemba. Petitions for writs of manda-

mus denied.

No. 97–1789.
No. 97–8864.

In re Eidson; and
In re Betka. Petitions for writs of prohibi-

tion denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal journal or database. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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8

BROWN v. PLATA

ALITO, J., dissenting

finds “by clear and convincing evidence that . . . crowding
is  the  primary  cause  of  the  violation  of  a  Federal  right”
and  that  “no  other  relief  will  remedy  the  violation  of  the
Federal right.”  §3626(a)(3)(E).

These  statutory  restrictions  largely  reflect  general
standards for injunctive relief aimed at remedying consti-
tutional  violations  by  state  and  local  governments.    “The
power of the federal courts to restructure the operation of
local  and  state  governmental  entities  is  not  plenary.  . . .
Once a constitutional violation is found, a federal court is
required to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit the nature
and extent of the constitutional violation.”  Dayton Bd. of
Ed.  v.  Brinkman,  433 U. S.  406,  419–420  (1977)  (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Here, the majority and the court below maintain that no
remedy  short  of  a  massive  release  of  prisoners  from  the
general prison population can remedy the State’s failure to
provide constitutionally adequate health care.  This argu-
ment is implausible on its face and is not supported by the
requisite clear and convincing evidence.

It is instructive to consider the list of deficiencies in the
California  prison  health  care  system  that  are  highlighted
in today’s opinion for this Court and in the opinion of the
court  below.  The  deficiencies  noted  by  the  majority  here
include  the  following:  “ ‘[e]xam  tables  and  counter  tops,
where  prisoners  with  . . .  communicable  diseases  are
treated, [are] not routinely disinfected,’ ” ante, at 10; medi-
cal facilities “ ‘are in an abysmal state of disrepair,’ ” ibid.;
medications  “ ‘are  too  often  not  available  when  needed,’ ”
ante,  at  10–11;  “ ‘[b]asic  medical  equipment  is  often  not
available  or  used,’ ”  ante,  at  10;  prisons  “would  ‘hire  any
doctor  who  had  “a  license,  a  pulse  and  a  pair  of  shoes,” ’ ”
ibid.;  and  medical  and  mental  health  staff  positions  have
high  vacancy  rates,  ante,  at  20.  The  three-judge  court
pointed  to  similar  problems.    See  Juris.  App.  93a–121a
(citing,  among  other  things,  staffing  vacancies,  too  few
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

Opinion of the Court

Court of Common Pleas for a writ of habeas corpus, and ob-
tained  discharge  in  an  opinion  by  Chief  Justice  Vaughn.
Jones  points  to  one  part  of  Vaughn’s  opinion,  which  criti-
cized the return of the writ for not specifying that the jurors
“kn[e]w and believe[d] th[e] evidence to be full and manifest
against the indicted persons,” without which the jurors’ ver-
dict was “no cause of fine or imprisonment.”  Id., at 142, 124
Eng. Rep., at 1009.  Jones asks us to read this passage as
reflecting  a  supposed  common-law  rule  that  habeas  relief
was  available  whenever  a  convicting  court  had  not  found
the necessary mens rea of a crime.  That reading, however,
entirely misses the actual basis of Vaughn’s opinion, which
was  the  judge’s  absolute  want  of  power  to  question  the
jury’s determination of the facts.  See id., at 149, 124 Eng.
Rep.,  at  1013  (“It  is  absurd  a  jury  should  be  fined  by  the
Judge for going against their evidence, when he who fineth
knows not what it is . . . .  [I]f it be demanded, what is the
fact?  the  Judge  cannot  answer  it”);  see  also  Stephen  375
(“[T]he judges who heard the argument . . . decided that the
discretion of the jury to believe the evidence or not could not
be questioned”).  Thus, Bushell’s Case no more undermines
Watkins than do the justice-of-the-peace cases.

The  principles  of  Watkins  guided  this  Court’s  under-
standing  of  the  habeas  writ  throughout  the  19th  century
and well into the 20th.  See Brown, 596 U. S., at ___, n. 1
(slip  op.,  at  9,  n. 1)  (collecting  cases);  see  also  Johnson  v.
Zerbst,  304  U. S.  458,  465–466  (1938).    Even  in  Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880), which held that the constitu-
tionality  of  a  prisoner’s  statute  of  conviction  could  be  re-
viewed  on  habeas  (as  going  to  jurisdiction),7  the  Court

——————

7 The Court seemingly abandoned that notion in Glasgow v. Moyer, 225
U. S. 420 (1912), which explained that “[t]he principle” that nonjurisdic-
tional errors of substantive law are not cognizable in habeas “is not the
less applicable because the law which was the foundation of the indict-
ment  and  trial  is  asserted  to  be  unconstitutional  . . . .  [I]f  a  court  has
jurisdiction of the case the writ of habeas corpus cannot be employed to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the case of *Bushell's Case* and its relation to *Watkins* and habeas corpus. It delves into legal precedent and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U39

[09-26-01 13:21:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN

218

BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIV. OF WIS. SYSTEM
v. SOUTHWORTH
Syllabus

portion of the fee used to fund RSO’s engaged in political or ideologi-
cal expression.

Held:

1. The First Amendment permits a public university to charge its
students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurric-
ular student speech, provided that the program is viewpoint neutral.
The University exacts the fee at issue for the sole purpose of facilitating
the free and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its students. Ob-
jecting students, however, may insist upon certain safeguards with re-
spect to the expressive activities they are required to support. The
Court’s public forum cases are instructive here by close analogy. Be-
cause the complaining students must pay fees to subsidize speech they
ﬁnd objectionable, even offensive, the rights acknowledged in Abood and
Keller are implicated.
In those cases, this Court held that a required
service fee paid by nonunion employees to a union, Abood, supra, at 213,
and fees paid by lawyers who were required to join a state bar associa-
tion, Keller, supra, at 13–14, could be used to fund speech germane to
those organizations’ purposes but not to fund the organizations’ own
political expression. While these precedents identify the protesting
students’ interests, their germane speech standard is unworkable in the
context of student speech at a university and gives insufﬁcient protec-
tion both to the objecting students and to the University program itself.
Even in the union context, this Court has encountered difﬁculties in
deciding what is germane and what is not. The standard becomes all
the more unmanageable in the public university setting, particularly
where, as here, the State undertakes to stimulate the whole universe of
speech and ideas. To insist upon asking what speech is germane would
be contrary to the very goal the University seeks to pursue. The vast
extent of permitted expression also underscores the high potential for
intrusion on the objecting students’ First Amendment rights, for it is
all but inevitable that the fees will subsidize speech that some students
ﬁnd objectionable or offensive. A university is free to protect those
rights by allowing an optional or refund system, but such a system is
If a university determines that its
not a constitutional requirement.
mission is well served if students have the means to engage in dynamic
discussion on a broad range of issues, it may impose a mandatory fee to
sustain such dialogue.
It must provide some protection to its students’
First Amendment interests, however. The proper measure, and the
principal standard of protection for objecting students, is the require-
ment of viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding support. This
obligation was given substance in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of Univ. of Va., supra, which concerned a student’s right to use an extra-
curricular speech program already in place. The instant case considers
the antecedent question whether a public university may require stu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the syllabus and the beginning of the opinion for the case *Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth*.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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