<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
Opinion of the Court

maintain assumpsit on a promise not under seal, made to
another for his benefit, . . . is now the prevailing rule in this
country”).7  “[S]omething more than ‘ambiguous historical
evidence’ is required before we will ‘flatly overrule a num-
ber  of  major  decisions  of  this  Court,’ ”  Gamble  v.  United
States,  587  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  11),  as  HHC
essentially asks us to do here.

Second, because “[t]here is no doubt that the cause of ac-
tion created by §1983 is, and was always regarded as, a tort
claim,” Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526
U. S. 687, 727 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment), HHC’s particular focus on 1870s law
governing third-party-beneficiary suits in contract is, at the
very least, perplexing.  If there is a reason that the princi-
ples  governing  those  suits  should  be  read  to  displace  the
plain  scope  of  §1983’s  “ ‘species  of  tort  liability,’ ”  Heck  v.
Humphrey,  512  U. S.  477,  483  (1994),  HHC  has  utterly
failed to identify it.

We have no doubt that HHC wishes §1983 said something
else.  But that is “an appeal better directed to Congress.”
Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (GORSUCH, J.,
concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part)  (slip  op.,  at  2).
Hewing to §1983’s text and history (not to mention our prec-
edent and constitutional role), we reject HHC’s request, and
reaffirm  that  “laws”  in  §1983  means  what  it  says.    Thi-
boutot, 448 U. S., at 4.8

——————

7 Black’s  Law  Dictionary  154  (11th  ed.  2019)  (defining  assumpsit,  as

relevant, as a “common-law action for . . . breach of a contract”).

8 HHC’s reply brief retreats from its initial ask, by appearing to con-
cede that Spending Clause legislation can secure individual rights under
§1983, but (it says) only if the statutory language “giv[es] funding recip-
ients clear notice.”  Reply Brief 1.  This newly minted argument contra-
dicts the opening brief ’s categorical claims about the scope of §1983.  In
any  event,  the  well-established  requirement  that  Congress  must  have
“unambiguously  conferred”  a  §1983-enforceable  right  in  a  Spending
Clause statute ensures the clear notice that HHC’s reply brief requests.
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 279–280, 283 (2002); Part III, infra.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion discussing the interpretation of a law (likely §1983). It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. v. CHRISTIAN ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA

No. 17–1498.  Argued December 3, 2019—Decided April 20, 2020

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act, 42 U. S. C. §9601 et seq., also known as the Superfund stat-
ute,  promotes  “the  timely  cleanup  of  hazardous  waste  sites  and  [en-
sures]  that  the  costs  of  such  cleanup  efforts  [are]  borne  by  those
responsible  for  the  contamination,”  CTS  Corp.  v.  Waldburger,  573
U. S. 1, 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Act directs the En-
vironmental Protection Agency to compile and annually revise a prior-
itized list of contaminated sites for cleanup, known as Superfund sites,
and makes responsible parties liable for the cost of the cleanup.  Before
a  cleanup  plan  is  selected,  a  remedial  investigation  and  feasibility
study is conducted to assess the contamination and evaluate cleanup
options.    Once  that  study  begins,  §122(e)(6)  of  the  Act  provides,  “no
potentially responsible party may undertake any remedial action” at
the site without EPA approval.  To insulate cleanup plans from collat-
eral  attack,  §113(b)  provides  federal  district  courts  with  “exclusive
original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under” the Act, and
§113(h)  then  strips  those  courts  of  jurisdiction  “to  review  any  chal-
lenges  to  removal  or  remedial  action,”  except  in  five  limited  circum-
stances.

For nearly a century, the Anaconda Copper Smelter in Butte, Mon-
tana contaminated an area of over 300 square miles with arsenic and
lead.  Over the past 35 years, EPA has worked with the current owner
of the now-closed smelter, Atlantic Richfield Company, to implement
a cleanup plan for a remediation expected to continue through 2025.
A  group  of  98  landowners  sued  Atlantic  Richfield  in  Montana  state
court for common law nuisance, trespass, and strict liability, seeking
restoration damages, which Montana law requires to be spent on prop-
erty  rehabilitation.    The  landowners’  proposed  plan  exceeds  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1116

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–645.  Ellis  et  al.  v.  Mississippi  Department  of
Health  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  43.

No. 09–648.  Mincoff v. United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  574  F.  3d  1186.

No.  09–5024.  Stewart  v.  New  York.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.
N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 57 App.
Div.  3d  1312,  870  N. Y.  S.  2d  157.

No.  09–5123.  Latchin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  554  F.  3d  709.

No.  09–5195.  Jacquemain  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  566.

No.  09–5371.  McCarthy  v.  Vilsack,  Secretary  of  Agri
culture,  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  456.

No.  09–5426.  Snellenberger,  aka  Cutter,  aka  Davidson,
aka  Frehly  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  548  F.  3d  699.

No.  09–5556.  Wion  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567
F.  3d  146.

No. 09–5659.  Mills v.  Connors et al.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  747.

No.  09–5994.  Lyons  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  415.

No. 09–6043.  Smith v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  876.

No.  09–6083.  Pryor  v.  Wolfe et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6085.  Thompson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  431.

No.  09–6213.  Kirkland  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  316.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, the court that heard the case, and a note about whether certiorari was granted or denied.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

9

Opinion of the Court

“the  attainment  of  a  diverse  student  body  . . .  is  a  consti-
tutionally  permissible  goal  for  an  institution  of  higher
education.”  438  U. S.,  at  311–312  (separate  opinion).
Thus,  under  Grutter,  strict  scrutiny  must  be  applied
to  any  admissions  program  using  racial  categories  or
classifications.
  According  to  Grutter,  a  university’s  “educational  judg-
ment  that  such  diversity  is  essential  to  its  educational
mission  is  one  to  which  we  defer.”    539  U. S.,  at  328.
Grutter  concluded  that  the  decision  to  pursue  “the  educa-
tional benefits that flow from student body diversity,” id.,
at  330,  that  the  University  deems  integral  to  its  mission
is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which
some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper under
Grutter.  A  court, of course, should ensure that there is a
reasoned,  principled  explanation  for  the  academic  deci-
sion.  On  this  point,  the  District  Court  and  Court  of
Appeals  were  correct  in  finding  that  Grutter  calls  for  de-
ference  to  the  University’s  conclusion,  “ ‘based  on  its
experience and expertise,’ ” 631 F. 3d, at 230 (quoting 645
F. Supp. 2d 587, 603 (WD Tex. 2009)), that a diverse stu-
dent  body  would  serve  its  educational  goals.    There  is
disagreement  about  whether  Grutter  was  consistent  with
the principles of equal protection in approving this compel-
ling  interest  in  diversity.  See  post,  at  1  (SCALIA,  J.,  con-
curring); post, at 4–5 (THOMAS, J., concurring); post, at 1–2
(GINSBURG,  J.,  dissenting).    But  the  parties  here  do  not
ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter’s holding.

A  university  is  not  permitted  to  define  diversity  as
“some  specified  percentage  of  a  particular  group  merely
because  of  its  race  or  ethnic  origin.”    Bakke,  supra,  at
307  (opinion  of  Powell,  J.).    “That  would  amount  to  out-
right racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional.”
Grutter,  supra,  at  330.
“Racial  balancing  is  not  trans-
formed  from  ‘patently  unconstitutional’  to  a  compelling
state  interest  simply  by  relabeling  it  ‘racial  diversity.’ ”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Grutter v. Bollinger and its implications for university admissions policies. It cites previous legal precedents and analyzes the concept of diversity in higher education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1053

558 U. S.

November 30, 2009

No.  09–6594.  Skinner  v.  Oklahoma.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Okla.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  210  P.  3d  840.

No.  09–6602.  White  v.  School  District  of  Philadelphia.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.
Appx.  102.

No.  09–6617.  Nitschke  v.  Coastal  Tank  Cleaning  et  al.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.
Appx.  183.

No.  09–6621.  Johnston  v.  Allen.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  231.

No.  09–6623.  Larson  v.  Gonzalez,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6631.  Edwards  v.  Rozum,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional  Institution at  Somerset,  et  al.  C. A.  3d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  236.

No. 09–6641.  LaMarca v.  McNeil, Secretary, Florida De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  929.

No.  09–6651.  McCreary  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6654.  Coleman v. Ott, Warden.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6662.  Cutts  v.  Hetzel,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6665.  Cardenas  v.  Figueroa,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6666.  Corona-Cuevas  v.  Hall,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6669.  Moore  v.  Arizona.  Sup.  Ct.  Ariz.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  222  Ariz.  1,  213  P.  3d  150.

No.  09–6672.  Veale  v.  New  Hampshire.  Sup.  Ct.  N.  H.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  158  N.  H.  632,  972  A.  2d
1009.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

Opinion of the Court

“ ‘an opinion or estimate so formed.’ ”  Id., at 16–17 (quoting
Webster’s  Third  New  International  Dictionary,  at  1223).
The  Government’s  argument  is  subtle,  to  say  the  least,
given  that  none  of  the  definitions  it  cites  expressly  refer-
ences discretion.  Evidently, the nature of the decisionmak-
ing process does the work: If the process occurs as the defi-
nitions describe, then the decision it yields is discretionary
and counts as a judgment.  And the Government says that
the factual findings in this case do not fit that description.
We  do  not  see  how  the  Government’s  cited  definitions
narrow  the  field  in  the  way  that  the  Government  claims.
Rather than delineating a special category of discretionary
determinations,  they  simply  describe  the  decisionmaking
process.  That process might involve a matter that the Gov-
ernment treats as “subjective” or one that it deems “objec-
tive.”  Either counts as a judgment, even under the defini-
tions that the Government offers.

Take the credibility determination at issue in this case.
It is easily described as an “opinion or evaluation” formed
“by discerning and comparing” the evidence presented.  The
Immigration  Judge  weighed  Patel’s  testimony,  reviewed
documents, and considered Patel’s history to conclude that
he was an evasive and untrustworthy witness.  Using the
word “judgment” to describe that kind of credibility deter-
mination is perfectly natural—in fact, we have used it this
way ourselves.  See, e.g., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U. S. 318, 327 (2015) (discussing “ ‘cred-
ibility judgments’ ” about a witness).  It is just as natural in
other factfinding contexts, like the Immigration Judge’s de-
termination that Patel lied on his driver’s license applica-
tion.  Finding that fact involved the same exercise of evalu-
ating conflicting evidence to make a judgment about what
happened.

So to succeed, the Government must do more than point
to the word “judgment.”  It must show that in context, the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court is analyzing the Government's argument regarding the nature of the decision-making process. It delves into the definition of "judgment" and uses examples to illustrate how credibility determinations and fact-finding inherently involve judgment calls.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1091

558 U. S.

December 14, 2009

in  the  name  and  pursuant  to  the  power  of  the  United  States.”
Reported  below:  940  A.  2d  1050.

No. 09–60.  Carachuri-Rosendo v.  Holder, Attorney Gen
eral.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Reported  below:
570  F.  3d  263.

Certiorari  Denied

No.  08–1472.  USA  Mobility  Wireless,  Inc.  v.  Quon  et  al.
C. A. 9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 529 F. 3d 892.
No.  08–10252.  Honken  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  541  F.  3d  1146.

No.  09–157.  Jinghai  Li  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.
Appx.  387.

No.  09–227.  Rasul  et  al.  v.  Myers  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  527.

No.  09–244.  United  States  v.  Bowden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–259.  Metro Lights, L. L. C. v. City of Los Angeles,
California.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  551  F.  3d  898.

No. 09–274.  Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Cor
rections  v.  Scott.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  567  F.  3d  573.

No.  09–301.  Common  Cause  of  Pennsylvania  et  al.  v.
Pennsylvania  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  558  F.  3d  249.

No.  09–309.  Time  Warner  Telecom  of  Oregon,  LLC  v.
City  of  Portland,  Oregon,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  496.

No.  09–353.  Merritt  v.  United  Parcel  Service,  Inc.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.
Appx.  410.

No.  09–429.  Ellenberg  v.  New  Mexico  Military  Insti
tute  et  al.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  572  F.  3d  815.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and information about the disposition of each case.
  </thinking>
  <category>List of court orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

SHOOP v. CASSANO

THOMAS, J., dissenting

reversed the Sixth Circuit almost two dozen times for fail-
ing  to  apply  AEDPA  properly.  See  10  F. 4th,  at  696–697
(listing  cases).  Many  of  those  reversals  have  been  sum-
mary.  See ibid.  The Court should add this case to the list.
Instead, the Court chooses to leave in place a clearly er-
roneous  decision  that  relieves  Cassano  of  his  death  sen-
tence.  In doing so, the Court inflicts a harm on “the State
and its citizens.”  Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U. S. ___,
___ (2022) (slip op., at 22).  By saddling the State with the
risk and expense of retrying a repeat murderer’s quarter-
century-old capital case, the Court permits the Court of Ap-
peals  to  “intrud[e]  on  [Ohio’s]  sovereignty  to  a  degree
matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority.”  Id.,
at ___ (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted).  At
worst, the State has lost its sovereign right to “enforce soci-
etal norms through criminal law.”  Ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted).  At best, if the retrial results in the same
verdict  and  sentence,  the  Court  will  have  consigned  the
State to several decades’ worth of additional death penalty
appeals.  See  Ramirez  v.  Collier,  595  U. S.  ___,  ___–___
(2022) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 6–7).  Ohio and
its citizens deserve better.

*

*

*

The  Court  of  Appeals  should  have  faithfully  applied
AEDPA deference and denied the writ.  Its failure to do so
“illustrate[d] a lack of deference to the state court’s deter-
mination  and  an  improper  intervention  in  state  criminal
processes, contrary to the purpose and mandate of AEDPA
and to the now well-settled meaning of and function of ha-
beas corpus in the federal system.”  Harrington, 562 U. S.,
at 104.  Because I would grant the State of Ohio’s petition
and summarily reverse, I respectfully dissent from denial
of certiorari.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It argues against the Court's decision to not overturn a lower court ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xxxvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

Compania  Naviera  Joanna;  Koninklijke  Boskalis  Westminster  v.
1112

Comptroller of Treasury of Md.; Bert v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  948,1086

1044

Comstock; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conarte v. United States
Concepcion v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903

Concurrent Technologies Corp.; Sampath v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  830,1064

876

Congemi; Arshad v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Congress Plaza Hotel & Convention Center; Shannon v. . . . . . . . .
1089

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conkright v. Frommert
Conn v. Klopotoski  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

Connecticut; Albright-Lazzari v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1043,1094

882

Connecticut; Alvaro F. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
895

Connecticut; Marquez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

Connecticut; Small v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Connecticut; Spikes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Connecticut; Triumph v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Connecticut Dept. of Public Utility Control v. FERC . . . . . . . . . .
940

Connecticut Judicial Branch; Daigneault v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Connection Distributing Co. v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Conner v. American Arbitration Assn.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Conner v. Lions Gate Entertainment Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116

Connors; Mills v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

Consalvo v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Constant v. California Dept. of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058

Contrera-Aguilar v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927

Contreras-Bracamonte v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936

Conway; Hayes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Conway; Victoria v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cook v. Adams  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

1126

Cook v. Beard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
832

Cook v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

Cook v. Galaza  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
892

Cook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Cook County; Bodenstab v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Cook County; Crazy Horse Too v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Cook County; Poo-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cook County Public Guardian; Struck v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1009,1109

1155

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cook Inc.; Johnson v.
901

Cooks v. Thaler
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Cooley v. Eng  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1145

. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cooley v. St. Bernard Parish Bureau of Prisions
906

Cooley Law School; Gueye v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Cooper v. Ayers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Cooper v. Carey  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
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Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Syllabus

neither altered Harper I’s analysis of the federal issue nor negated the
effect of the Harper I judgment striking down the 2021 plans, that is-
sue both has survived and requires decision by this Court.  Pp. 6–11.

2. The Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent au-
thority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections.
Marbury  v.  Madison,  1  Cranch  137,  famously  proclaimed  this
Court’s authority to invalidate laws that violate the Federal Constitu-
tion.  But Marbury did not invent the concept of judicial review.  State
courts  had  already  begun  to  impose  restraints  on  state  legislatures,
even before the Constitutional Convention, and the practice continued
to mature during the founding era.  James Madison extolled judicial
review  as  one  of  the  key  virtues  of  a  constitutional  system,  and  the
concept of judicial review was so entrenched by the time the Court de-
cided Marbury that Chief Justice Marshall referred to it as one of so-
ciety’s “fundamental principles.”  Id., at 177..

The Elections Clause does not carve out an exception to that fun-
damental principle.  When state legislatures prescribe the rules con-
cerning federal elections, they remain subject to the ordinary exercise
of state judicial review.  Pp. 11–26.

(a) In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565, this Court
examined the Elections Clause’s application to a provision of the Ohio
Constitution  permitting  the State’s  voters to  reject,  by  popular  vote,
any law enacted by the State’s General Assembly.  This Court upheld
the  Ohio  Supreme  Court’s  determination  that  the  Federal  Elections
Clause did not preclude subjecting legislative acts under the Clause to
a popular referendum, rejecting the contention that “to include the ref-
erendum within state legislative power for the purpose of apportion-
ment is repugnant to §4 of Article I [the Elections Clause].”  Id., at 569.
And in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, this Court considered the effect
of a Governor’s veto, pursuant to his authority under the State’s Con-
stitution, of a congressional redistricting plan.  This Court held that
the  Governor’s  veto  did  not  violate  the  Elections  Clause,  reasoning
that a state legislature’s “exercise of . . . authority” under the Elections
Clause “must be in accordance with the method which the State has
prescribed for legislative enactments.”  Id., at 367.  The Court high-
lighted that the Federal Constitution contained no “provision of an at-
tempt to endow the legislature of the State with power to enact laws
in any manner other than that in which the constitution of the State
has provided that laws shall be enacted.”  Id., at 368.

This Court recently reinforced the teachings of Hildebrant and Smi-
ley in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Comm’n, 576 U. S. 787, a case concerning the constitutionality of an
Arizona ballot initiative to amend the State Constitution and to vest
redistricting  authority  in  an  independent  commission.  Significantly
  </content>
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  <content>
12

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

549 U. S. 183 (2007).  There, this Court sought to apply pro-
visions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Id., at 185.
Under the INA, an individual with a prior state-court con-
viction that meets certain “generic” offense definitions un-
der  federal  law  may  face  deportation.    Id.,  at  186,  189;
see  also  8 U. S. C.  §§ 1101(a)(43)(G),  1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).    In
Duenas-Alvarez, there was no doubt that the relevant state
offense overlapped significantly with the federal definition
of  generic  “theft.”    549  U. S.,  at  190.    But,  Mr.  Duenas-
Alvarez  argued,  state  courts  had  interpreted  the  offense
broadly to reach aiding and abetting conduct that fell “be-
yond generic theft.”  Id., at 190–191.  To test this assertion,
the Court looked to state decisional law and asked whether
a “realistic probability” existed that the State “would apply
its statute to conduct that falls outside” the federal generic
definition.  Id., at 193.

None  of  this  begins  to  help  the  government  for  at  least
two  reasons.  First,  the  immigration  statute  at  issue  in
Duenas-Alvarez  required  a  federal  court  to  make  a  judg-
ment  about  the  meaning  of  a  state  statute.    Appreciating
the respect due state courts as the final arbiters of state law
in  our  federal  system,  this  Court  reasoned  that  it  made
sense to consult how a state court would interpret its own
State’s  laws.    Cf.  Estate  of  Thornton  v.  Caldor,  Inc.,  472
U. S. 703, 709, n. 8 (1985).  Meanwhile, no such federalism
concern  is  in  play  here.    The  statute  before  us  asks  only
whether  the  elements  of  one  federal  law  align  with  those
prescribed
in  Duenas-
Alvarez  the  elements  of  the  relevant  state  and  federal  of-
fenses clearly overlapped and the only question the Court
faced was whether state courts also “appl[ied] the statute
in  [a]  special  (nongeneric)  manner.”  549  U. S.,  at  193.
Here,  we  do  not  reach  that  question  because  there  is  no
overlap to begin with.  Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does
not  require  proof  of  any  of  the  elements  § 924(c)(3)(A)  de-
mands.  That  ends  the  inquiry,  and  nothing  in  Duenas-

another.

Second,

in
  </content>
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This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Duenas-Alvarez and its relevance to the current case. It delves into legal interpretations and statutory analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
xl

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

814

Daley, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Daley v. Cain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
807

Dallas County; Ruston v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dalton v. Texas
1055

Daly v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Daly v. Ryan
1027

D’Angelo v. Ryan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1028,1140

Daniel v. Scott
1119

Daniel v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
886

Daniel v. Trancoso
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1021

Daniel v. Trans Union Consumer Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Daniels v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

Daniels v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Daniels v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1033,1061

858

Daniels v. U. S. District Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

Daniels v. Washington
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Dann v. Arizona  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

. . . . . .
Danner v. Board of Prof. Responsibility of Sup. Ct. Tenn.
1113

Danner v. Commission on Continuing Legal Ed. of Tenn. . . . . . . .
808

Danser v. Lawrence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Dantzler, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Daphne; Bethel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Darby v. Moore
1076

D’Aria v. Glass  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Darian v. Accent Builders, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

Darian v. Pasternak  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

962

Dartez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Darty v. Superior Drive Source  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
899

1074

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dasisa v. Expert Care Nursing Service, Inc.
Dasisa v. University of Mass. Bd. of Trustees . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  803,1045

1001

Daubon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Daughtery v. California
839

Davidson v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Davidson; Torricellas v.
1116

Davidson v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Davie v. Mitchell
813

Davies, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1043

Davis v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

Davis v. Branker
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Davis v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Davis v. California Western School of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Davis v. Commissioner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Davis v. Correctional Medical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

Davis v. Curry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
28

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

BREYER, J., dissenting

In  sum,  the  explanation  of  why  aggregate  limits  are
needed  is  complicated,  as  is  the  explanation  of  why  other
methods  will  not  work.    But  the  conclusion  is  simple:
There  is  no  “substantial  mismatch”  between  Congress’
legitimate objective and the “means selected to achieve it.”
Ante,  at  10.  The  Court,  as  in  Buckley,  should  hold  that
aggregate contribution limits are constitutional.

V
The  District  Court  in  this  case,  holding  that  Buckley
foreclosed  McCutcheon’s  constitutional  challenge  to  the
aggregate  limits,  granted  the  Government’s  motion  to
dismiss  the  complaint  prior  to  a  full  evidentiary  hearing.
See  893  F.  Supp.  2d  133,  140–141  (DC  2012).    If  the  plu
rality  now  believes  the  District  Court  was  wrong,  then
why does it not return the case for the further evidentiary
development which has not yet taken place?

In  the  past,  when  evaluating  the  constitutionality  of
campaign  finance  restrictions,  we  have  typically  relied
upon  an  evidentiary  record  amassed  below  to  determine
whether the law served a  compelling governmental objec
tive.  And, typically, that record contained testimony from
Members of Congress (or state legislators) explaining why
Congress  (or  the  legislature)  acted  as  it  did.  See,  e.g.,
McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at  147–154  (upholding  federal  re
strictions  on  soft  money  by  drawing  on  an  extensive  Dis
trict Court record that contained declarations from current
and former Members of Congress); Colorado II, 533 U. S.,
at  457–465  (upholding  federal  limits  on  coordinated  ex
penditures between parties and candidates on the basis of
a  summary  judgment  record  that  contained  declarations
from  party  operatives,  fundraisers,  and  Members  of  Con
gress);  Shrink  Missouri,  528  U. S.,  at  393  (upholding
Missouri’s  contribution  limits  on  the  basis  of  the  lower
court record, which contained similar declarations).  If we
are to overturn an act of Congress here, we should do so on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses campaign finance regulations and the legal reasoning behind them.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
922

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5893.  Rainwater  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  431.

No.  09–5895.  Hewitt  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  756.

No.  09–5897.  Gregory  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  425.

No. 09–5898.  Serrano-Rangel v.  United States.  C. A. 7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  14.

No.  09–5900.  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5905.  Walker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  183.

No.  09–5908.  Davis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  655.

No.  09–5909.  Lobato  v.  Nevada.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  125  Nev.  1057,  281  P.  3d  1196.

No.  09–5910.  Doe  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  850.

No. 09–5911.  Brito v. United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  225.

No.  09–5914.  Corrales  v.  Neven,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  32.

No. 09–5915.  Rodriguez v.  Pennsylvania Board of Proba

tion  and  Parole.  Commw.  Ct.  Pa.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5917.  Ingram  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  382.

No.  09–5918.  Hughley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  171.

No. 09–5919.  Gibson v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  391.

No. 09–5922.  Curtis v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
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This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

Opinion of the Court

the  proceedings—a  powerful  disincentive  to  resist  a  court
order.  See §201.180(a)(1)(i); supra, at 9.  Similarly, if the
offender  is  an  attorney,  the  ALJ  can  “[s]ummarily  sus-
pend”  him  from  representing  his  client—not  something
the typical lawyer wants to invite.  §201.180(a)(1)(ii).  And
finally,  a  judge  who  will,  in  the  end,  issue  an  opinion
complete  with  factual  findings,  legal  conclusions,  and
sanctions  has  substantial  informal  power  to  ensure  the
parties  stay  in  line.  Contrary  to  the  amicus’s  view,  all
that  is  enough  to  satisfy  Freytag’s  fourth  item  (even  sup-
posing, which we do not decide, that each of those items is
necessary for someone conducting adversarial hearings to
count as an officer).
  And  the  amicus’s  standard-of-review  distinction  fares
just as badly.  The Freytag Court never suggested that the
deference  given  to  STJs’  factual  findings  mattered  to  its
Appointments  Clause  analysis.  Indeed,  the  relevant  part
of  Freytag  did  not  so  much  as  mention  the  subject  (even
though  it  came  up  at  oral  argument,  see  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.
33–41).  And  anyway,  the  Commission  often  accords  a
similar  deference  to  its  ALJs,  even  if  not  by  regulation.
The  Commission  has  repeatedly  stated,  as  it  did  below,
that its ALJs are in the “best position to make findings of
fact”  and  “resolve  any  conflicts  in  the  evidence.”    App.  to
Pet.  for  Cert.  241a  (quoting  In re  Nasdaq  Stock  Market,
LLC, SEC Release No. 57741 (Apr. 30, 2008)).  (That was
why  the  SEC  insisted  that  Judge  Elliot  make  factual
findings  on  all  four  allegations  of  Lucia’s  deception.    See
supra, at 3.)  And when factfinding derives from credibility
judgments,  as  it  frequently  does,  acceptance  is  near-
automatic.  Recognizing  ALJs’  “personal  experience  with
the  witnesses,”  the  Commission  adopts  their  “credibility
finding[s] absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary.”
App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  241a;  In re  Clawson,  SEC  Release
No. 48143 (July 9, 2003).  That practice erases the consti-
tutional line the amicus proposes to draw.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Protection  Clause  supplies  independent  weight  for  its
position, nor does it attempt to justify its gratuitous viola-
tion of the canon against unnecessarily resolving constitu-
tional  questions.    See  Northwest  Austin  Municipal  Util.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 197 (2009).  In any
event,  the  marriage  laws  at  issue  here  do  not  violate  the
Equal  Protection  Clause,  because  distinguishing  between
opposite-sex  and  same-sex  couples  is  rationally  related  to
the  States’  “legitimate  state  interest”  in  “preserving  the
traditional  institution  of  marriage.”    Lawrence,  539  U. S.,
at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

It  is  important  to  note  with  precision  which  laws  peti-
tioners  have  challenged.  Although  they  discuss  some  of
the ancillary legal benefits that accompany marriage, such
as  hospital  visitation  rights  and  recognition  of  spousal
status  on  official  documents,  petitioners’  lawsuits  target
the  laws  defining  marriage  generally  rather  than  those
allocating  benefits  specifically.  The  equal  protection
analysis  might  be  different,  in  my  view,  if  we  were  con-
fronted  with  a  more  focused  challenge  to  the  denial  of
certain  tangible  benefits.    Of  course,  those  more  selective
claims  will  not  arise  now  that  the  Court  has  taken  the
drastic  step  of  requiring  every  State  to  license  and  recog-
nize marriages between same-sex couples.

IV
The  legitimacy  of  this  Court  ultimately  rests  “upon  the
respect  accorded  to  its  judgments.”    Republican  Party  of
Minn.  v.  White,  536  U. S.  765,  793  (2002)  (KENNEDY,  J.,
concurring).  That respect flows from the perception—and
reality—that  we  exercise  humility  and  restraint  in  decid-
ing cases according to the Constitution and law.  The role
of the Court envisioned by the majority today, however, is
anything  but  humble  or  restrained.    Over  and  over,  the
majority exalts the role of the judiciary in delivering social
change.  In  the  majority’s  telling,  it  is  the  courts,  not  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges.  It contains legal arguments and citations, which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

Opinion of the Court

that, names or other means of identification are used rou-
tinely  for  billing  and  payment,  whether  payment  apps,
credit and debit cards, a bill sent by mail, or an invoice sent
electronically.  So long as the criteria for the broad predi-
cate offenses are met, the Government’s reading creates an
automatic 2-year sentence for generic overbilling that hap-
pens to use ubiquitous payment methods.

A far more sensible conclusion from the statutory struc-
ture is that §1028A(a)(1)’s enhancement is not indiscrimi-
nate, but targets situations where the means of identifica-
tion  itself  plays  a  key  role—one  that  warrants  a  2-year
mandatory minimum.  This points once more to a targeted
reading, where the means of identification is at the crux of
the underlying criminality, not an ancillary feature of bill-
ing.

E
If more were needed, a final clue comes from the stagger-
ing breadth of the Government’s reading.  This Court has
“ ‘traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of
a  federal  criminal  statute.’ ”    Marinello,  584  U. S.,  at  ___
(slip op., at 9) (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S.
593, 600 (1995)); see also Arthur Andersen LLP v.  United
States,  544  U. S.  696,  703–704  (2005);  McBoyle  v.  United
States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931).  This restraint arises “both
out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress and out of
concern that a fair warning should be given to the world in
language that the common world will understan[d] of what
the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.”  Marinello,
584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  After all, “[c]rimes are supposed to be defined by
the legislature, not by clever prosecutors riffing on equivo-
cal language.”  Spears, 729 F. 3d, at 758.

——————
another element of the statute show that the Government itself under-
stands the problems that arise from its sweeping reading of “uses” and
“in relation to.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute (likely §1028A(a)(1)) and argues against a broad reading of its language. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

THRYV, INC. v. CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

these same sources.  All the rest is generously filled in by
the company’s own account about how inter partes review
ought to work.

That’s far from enough.  The historic presumption of ju-
dicial review has never before folded before a couple stray
pieces of legislative history and naked policy appeals.  Be-
sides, Thryv’s submissions cannot withstand the mildest in-
spection even on their own terms.  No one doubts that Con-
gress  authorized  inter  partes  review  to  encourage  further
scrutiny of already issued patents.  But lost in Thryv’s tell-
ing about the purposes of the AIA is plenty of evidence that
Congress also included provisions to preserve the value of
patents and protect the rights of patent owners.  For exam-
ple, Congress sharply limited the legal grounds that might
be pursued in inter partes review, §311(b); afforded patent
owners an opportunity to respond to petitions prior to insti-
tution,  §313;  and,  most  relevant  today,  protected  patent
owners from the need to fight a two-front war before both
the Board and federal district court, §315.  Legislating in-
volves compromise and it would be naive to think that, as
the price for their zealous new procedures for canceling pat-
ents,  those  who  proposed  the  AIA  didn’t  have  to  accept
some protections like these for patent holders.  Yet, Thryv
glides past all these provisions without comment.  Worse,
taking  the  company’s  argument  to  its  logical  conclusion
could render these protections into “ ‘merely advisory’ ” fea-
tures  of  the  law.  Bowen,  476  U. S.,  at  671.    If  adopted,
Thryv’s  vision  of  an  administrative  regime  singularly  fo-
cused  on  the  efficient  canceling  of  patents  could  become
self-fulfilling.

A case decided just weeks ago supplies a telling point of
comparison.  In  Guerrero-Lasprilla  v.  Barr,  589  U. S.  ___
(2020),  Congress  sought  to  expedite  the  removal  of  aliens
convicted of certain aggravated felonies by foreclosing judi-
cial  review  of  their  cases  unless  they  raised  “questions  of
law.”  See 8 U. S. C. §§1252(a)(2)(C), (D).  But the statute
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations to statutes and case law, and a distinct writing style characteristic of legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 4 (2009)

13

Alito, J., concurring

that  Van  Hook  committed  the  murder  alone  in  the  course
of  an  aggravated  robbery.  See  Ohio  Rev.  Code  Ann.
§ 2929.04(A)(7)  (Lexis  2006).  Van  Hook’s  confession  made
clear,  and  he  never  subsequently  denied,  both  that  he  was
the  sole  perpetrator  of  the  crime  and  that  “[h]is  intention
from beginning to end was to rob [Self] at some point in their
evening’s activities.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 295a; see id., at
276a–278a,  294a.  Nor  did  he  arrive  at  that  intention  on  a
whim: Van Hook had previously pursued the same strategy—
of  luring  homosexual  men  into  secluded  settings  to  rob
them—many times since his teenage years, and he employed
it  again  even  after  Self ’s  murder  in  the  weeks  before  his
arrest.  See  id.,  at  279a,  295a,  374a.  Although  Van  Hook
apparently  deviated  from  his  original  plan  once  the  offense
was underway—going beyond stealing Self ’s goods to killing
him  and  disﬁguring  the  dead  body—that  hardly  helped  his
cause.  The  Sixth  Circuit,  which  focused  on  the  number  of
aggravating factors instead of their weight, see 560 F. 3d, at
530;  cf.  Ohio  Rev.  Code  Ann.  § 2929.04(B),  gave  all  this  evi
dence  short  shrift,  leading  it  to  overstate  further  the  effect
additional mitigating evidence might have had.

*

*

*

The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to pro
ceed  in  forma  pauperis  are  granted.  The  judgment  of  the
Court  of  Appeals  is  reversed,  and  the  case  is  remanded  for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito, concurring.
I  join  the  Court’s  per  curiam  opinion  but  emphasize  my
understanding  that  the  opinion  in  no  way  suggests  that  the
American  Bar  Association’s  Guidelines  for  the  Appointment
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
(rev. ed. 2003) (2003 Guidelines or ABA Guidelines) have spe
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito. It contains legal citations, arguments, and a conclusion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U39

[09-26-01 13:21:31] PAGES PGT: OPIN

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

217

Syllabus

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN SYSTEM v. SOUTHWORTH et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit

No. 98–1189. Argued November 9, 1999—Decided March 22, 2000

Petitioner, Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System (here-
inafter University), requires students at the University’s Madison cam-
pus to pay a segregated activity fee. The fee supports various campus
services and extracurricular student activities.
In the University’s
view, such fees enhance students’ educational experience by promoting
extracurricular activities, stimulating advocacy and debate on diverse
points of view, enabling participation in campus administrative activity,
and providing opportunities to develop social skills, all consistent with
the University’s broad educational mission. Registered student organi-
zations (RSO’s) engaging in a number of diverse expressive activities
are eligible to receive a portion of the fees, which are administered by
the student government subject to the University’s approval. The par-
ties have stipulated that the process for reviewing and approving RSO
applications for funding is administered in a viewpoint-neutral fashion.
RSO’s may also obtain funding through a student referendum. Re-
spondents, present and former Madison campus students, ﬁled suit
against the University, alleging, inter alia, that the fee violates their
First Amendment rights, and that the University must grant them the
choice not to fund RSO’s that engage in political and ideological expres-
sion offensive to their personal beliefs.
In granting respondents sum-
mary judgment, the Federal District Court declared the fee program
invalid under Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, and Keller v.
State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1, and enjoined the University from using
the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech.
Agreeing with the District Court that this Court’s compelled speech
precedents control, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the program was
not germane to the University’s mission, did not further a vital Univer-
sity policy, and imposed too great a burden on respondents’ free speech
rights.
It added that protecting those rights was of heightened concern
following Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S.
819, because if the University could not discriminate in distributing the
funds, students could not be compelled to fund organizations engaging
in political and ideological speech.
It extended the District Court’s
order and enjoined the University from requiring students to pay that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a summary of the case rather than the full text of the legal arguments and opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

then devise plans to implement that late-breaking injunc-
tion, and then determine as necessary how best to inform
voters, as well as state and local election officials and vol-
unteers,  about  those  last-minute changes.   It  is  one  thing
for state legislatures to alter their own election rules in the
late  innings  and  to  bear  the  responsibility  for  any  unin-
tended consequences.  It is quite another thing for a federal
district court to swoop in and alter carefully considered and
democratically  enacted  state  election  rules  when  an  elec-
tion is imminent.
  That  important  principle  of  judicial  restraint  not  only
prevents voter confusion but also prevents election admin-
istrator confusion—and thereby protects the State’s inter-
est  in  running  an  orderly,  efficient  election  and  in  giving
citizens (including the losing candidates and their support-
ers) confidence in the fairness of the election.  See Purcell,
549 U. S., at 4–5; Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd.,
553 U. S. 181, 197 (2008) (plurality opinion).  The principle
also discourages last-minute litigation and instead encour-
ages litigants to bring any substantial challenges to election
rules ahead of time, in the ordinary litigation process.  For
those reasons, among others, this Court has regularly cau-
tioned that a federal court’s last-minute interference with
state election laws is ordinarily inappropriate.
  In this case, however, just six weeks before the November
election and after absentee voting had already begun, the
District Court ordered several changes to Wisconsin’s elec-
tion laws, including a change to Wisconsin’s deadline for re-
ceipt of absentee ballots.  Although the District Court’s or-
der  was  well  intentioned  and  thorough,  it  nonetheless
contravened this Court’s longstanding precedents by usurp-
ing  the  proper  role  of  the  state  legislature  and  rewriting
state election laws in the period close to an election.
  Applicants retort that the Purcell principle precludes an
appellate  court—such  as  the  Seventh  Circuit  here—from
overturning a district court’s injunction of a state election
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in a case related to Wisconsin's election laws. It discusses the principle of judicial restraint in election law cases and argues that the District Court's order altering Wisconsin's election laws was inappropriate.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CANTERO v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A.

Opinion of the Court

Instead, Dodd-Frank provided, as relevant here, that the
National Bank Act preempts a state law “only if” the state
law (i) discriminates against national banks as compared to
state banks; or (ii) “prevents or significantly interferes with
the  exercise  by  the  national  bank  of  its  powers,”  as
determined  “in  accordance  with  the  legal  standard  for
preemption  in  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the
United States in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N. A. v.
Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner, et al., 517 U.S. 25
(1996).”  §§25b(b)(1)(A), (B).
  New York’s interest-on-escrow law does not discriminate
against  national  banks.  The  question  of  whether  New
York’s interest-on-escrow law is preempted therefore must
be analyzed under Dodd-Frank’s “prevents or significantly
interferes”  preemption  standard.
judicial
application  of  that  preemption  standard,  Dodd-Frank
expressly  incorporates  this  Court’s  decision  in  Barnett
Bank.  The  preemption  question  here  therefore  must  be
decided “in accordance with” Barnett Bank, as Dodd-Frank
directs.  §25b(b)(1)(B).2

To  guide

A
In  Barnett  Bank,  a  Florida  law  prohibited  most  banks
from selling insurance.  Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A.
v. Nelson, 517 U. S. 25, 29 (1996).  A dispute arose because
federal law authorized national banks to sell insurance in
small towns, and a national bank wanted to sell insurance
in a small Florida town.  Id., at 28–29.

This  Court  held  that  the  Florida  law  was  preempted
because  the  law  significantly  interfered  with  the  national
——————

2 Cantero’s  mortgage  agreement  (unlike  Hymes  and  Harwayne-
Gidansky’s  mortgage  agreement)  was  signed  after  Dodd-Frank  was
enacted but before Dodd-Frank became effective.  Because we conclude
that Dodd-Frank adopted Barnett Bank, and because Barnett Bank was
also the governing preemption standard before Dodd-Frank, the timing
of Cantero’s mortgage agreement does not affect the preemption analysis
here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the preemption of state law by the National Bank Act. It cites relevant case law (Barnett Bank) and statutory provisions (Dodd-Frank). The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BIDEN v. TEXAS

BARRETT, J., dissenting

of  a  question  otherwise  within  its  competence.    See,  e.g.,
California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 7)
(redressability “consider[s] the relationship between ‘the ju-
dicial relief requested’ and the ‘injury’ suffered”); Los Ange-
les v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 105–107 (1983) (failure to allege
sufficient likelihood of future injury deprives a federal court
of  Article  III  “jurisdiction  to  entertain  [the  count]  of  the
complaint” seeking injunctive relief ).

So  it  seems  to  me  quite  possible  that  §1252(f )(1)  with-
draws  subject-matter  jurisdiction  over  cases  seeking  cer-
tain remedies.  Indeed, while the Government has a theory
for why the Court can reach the merits in this case, it char-
acterizes  §1252(f )(1)  as  imposing  “jurisdictional  limita-
tions” that “speak to ‘a court’s power’ ” and “ ‘can never be
forfeited  or  waived.’ ”    Supplemental  Brief  for  Petitioners
19–20; see also Miranda, 34 F. 4th, at 354 (concluding that
“§1252(f )(1) is a jurisdiction-stripping statute” that cannot
be  waived).  If  there  is  a  reason  to  treat  limitations  on
subject-matter jurisdiction and limitations on remedial au-
thority as mutually exclusive—either in general or in this
statutory scheme—the Court does not explain it.

The Court breezes past other questions too.  Most nota-
bly,  it  gives  surprisingly  little  attention  to  a  phrase  on
which  it  places  significant  weight:  §1252(f )(1)’s  parenthe-
tical exempting “the Supreme Court” from its general bar
on  “jurisdiction  or  authority.”  The  parties  hardly  discuss
this parenthetical, which does not appear to have an ana-
logue  elsewhere  in  the  United  States  Code.  The  Court,
however,  takes  the  phrase  as  conclusive  evidence  that
§1252(f )(1)  does  not  deprive  district  courts  of  subject-
matter jurisdiction over “non-individual claims under [the
covered provisions],” because if it did, “no such claims could
ever arrive at this Court, rendering the provision’s specific
carveout  for  Supreme  Court  injunctive  relief  nugatory.”
Ante, at 10.
  While  this  interpretation  has  some  surface  appeal,  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Barrett in the case of Biden v. Texas. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute, §1252(f )(1), and its implications for subject-matter jurisdiction in federal courts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
Opinion of ALITO, J.

now  plays  in  our  constitutional  system  should  consider
what has happened in these cases.  Early in the term of the
current  President,  his  administration  took  the  controver-
sial  step  of  attempting  to  rescind  the  Deferred  Action  for
Childhood  Arrivals  (DACA)  program.    Shortly  thereafter,
one of the nearly 700 federal district court judges blocked
this rescission, and since then, this issue has been mired in
litigation.  In  November  2018,  the  Solicitor  General  filed
petitions for certiorari, and today, the Court still does not
resolve the question of DACA’s rescission.  Instead, it tells
the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  to  go  back  and  try
again.  What this means is that the Federal Judiciary, with-
out holding that DACA cannot be rescinded, has prevented
that  from  occurring  during  an  entire  Presidential  term.
Our constitutional system is not supposed to work that way.
I join JUSTICE THOMAS’s opinion.  DACA presents a deli-
cate political issue, but that is not our business.  As JUSTICE
THOMAS explains, DACA was unlawful from the start, and
that alone is sufficient to justify its termination.  But even
if DACA were lawful, we would still have no basis for over-
turning  its  rescission.  First,  to  the  extent  DACA  repre-
sented a lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion, its re-
scission  represented  an  exercise  of  that  same  discretion,
and it would therefore be unreviewable under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.  5 U. S. C. §701(a)(2); see Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 831–832 (1985).  Second, to the ex-
tent we could review the rescission, it was not arbitrary and
capricious for essentially the reasons explained by JUSTICE
KAVANAUGH.  See  post,  at  4–6  (opinion  concurring  in  the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the opinion of Justice Alito in the case of Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

945

524 U. S.

June 22, 1998

No. 97–9152. Zaragoza, aka Valera v. United States.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 441.

No. 97–9153. Vallejo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 140 F. 3d 1038.

No. 97–9156.

James v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 138 F. 3d 951.

No. 97–9164. Whatley v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 601.

No. 97–9165. Bartley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 437.

No. 97–9173. Woodruff v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 438.

No. 97–9180. Carter v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F. 3d 218.

No. 97–9181. Bieri v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–9184. Hooker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1160.

No. 97–9187. Hobbs v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 137 F. 3d 384.

No. 97–9191. Bolling v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 770.

No. 97–1054. Chase Manhattan Bank, as Trustee of the
IBM Retirement Plan Trust Fund v. City and County of
San Francisco et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Jus-
tice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition. Reported below: 121 F. 3d 557.

No. 97–1511. Moore, Director, South Carolina Depart-
ment of Corrections v. Cummings. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion
of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 728.

No. 97–1706. American Life & Casualty Insurance Co.
Justice

v. Trostel et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, circuit courts, and whether certiorari was granted or denied.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE

Opinion of the Court

on other legislative aims.  For example, we have denied at-
tempts  to  reduce  the  amount  of  money  in  politics,  see
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 191, to level electoral opportuni-
ties  by  equalizing  candidate  resources,  see  Bennett,  564
U. S., at 749–750, and to limit the general influence a con-
tributor  may  have  over  an  elected  official,  see  Citizens
United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 359–360
(2010).  However well intentioned such proposals may be,
the  First  Amendment—as  this  Court  has  repeatedly  em-
phasized—prohibits  such  attempts  to  tamper  with  the
“right  of  citizens  to  choose  who  shall  govern  them.”
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 227; see also Davis, 554 U. S., at
742; Bennett, 564 U. S., at 750.

The  Government  argues  that  the  contributions  at  issue
raise a heightened risk of corruption because of the use to
which they are put: repaying a candidate’s personal loans.
It also maintains that post-election contributions are par-
ticularly troubling because the contributor will know—not
merely hope—that the recipient, having prevailed, will be
in a position to do him some good.

We greet the assertion of an anticorruption interest here
with a measure of skepticism, for the loan-repayment limi-
tation  is  yet  another  in  a  long  line  of  “prophylaxis-upon-
prophylaxis approach[es]” to regulating campaign finance.
McCutcheon,  572  U. S.,  at  221  (quoting  Federal  Election
Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 479
(2007)  (opinion  of  ROBERTS,  C. J.)).    Individual  contribu-
tions to candidates for federal office, including those made
after the candidate has won the election, are already regu-
lated in order to prevent corruption or its appearance.  Such
contributions are capped at $2,900 per election, see 86 Fed.
Reg.  7869,  and  nontrivial  contributions  must  be  publicly
disclosed, see 52 U. S. C. §§30104(b)(3)(A), (c)(1).  The dis-
sent’s dire predictions about the impact of today’s decision
elide the fact that the contributions at issue remain subject
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing campaign finance regulations. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to campaign contributions and potential corruption.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

332

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Stevens, J., dissenting

the ordinance’s total ban on the ground that its censorship of
protected speech might be justiﬁed by an overriding state
interest, it should conclude that the ordinance is patently in-
valid. For these reasons, as well as the reasons set forth in
Justice White’s dissent in Barnes, I respectfully dissent.

Erie’s Ordinance No. 75–1994 updates an older ordinance of similar import.
Unfortunately, that old regulation is not in the record. Consequently,
whether the new ordinance merely “replaces” the old one is a matter of
debate. From statements of one councilmember, it can reasonably be in-
ferred that the old ordinance was merely a residential zoning restriction,
not a total ban. See App. 43.
If that is so, it leads to the further question
why Erie felt it necessary to shift to a total ban in 1994.

But even if the plurality’s factual contention is correct, it does not under-
mine the points I have made in the text.
In Barnes, the point of noting
the ancient pedigree of the Indiana statute was to demonstrate that its
passage antedated the appearance of adult entertainment venues, and
therefore could not have been motivated by the presence of those estab-
lishments. The inference supposedly rebutted in Barnes stemmed from
the timing of the enactment. Here, however, the inferences I draw de-
pend on the text of the ordinance, its preamble, its scope and enforcement,
and the comments of the councilmembers. These do not depend on the
timing of the ordinance’s enactment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. The language, citations, and legal arguments strongly suggest this.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

9

Opinion of the Court

tions” for Members of Congress, while giving Congress the
power to “make or alter” any such regulations.  Whether to
give  that  supervisory  authority  to  the  National  Govern-
ment  was  debated  at  the  Constitutional  Convention.
When  those  opposed  to  such  congressional  oversight
moved  to  strike  the  relevant  language,  Madison  came  to
its defense:

“[T]he State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse
to consult the common interest at the expense of their
local  coveniency  or  prejudices. . . .  Whenever  the
State  Legislatures  had  a  favorite  measure  to  carry,
they would take care so to mould their regulations as
to  favor  the  candidates  they  wished  to  succeed.”    2
Records  of  the  Federal  Convention  of  1787,  at  240–
241.

During  the  subsequent  fight  for  ratification,  the  provi-
sion remained a subject of debate.  Antifederalists predicted
that  Congress’s  power  under  the  Elections  Clause  would
allow  Congress  to  make  itself  “omnipotent,”  setting  the
“time”  of  elections  as  never  or  the  “place”  in  difficult  to
reach  corners  of  the  State.    Federalists  responded  that,
among  other  justifications,  the  revisionary  power  was
necessary to counter state legislatures set on undermining
fair  representation,  including  through  malapportionment.
M. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United
States Constitution 340–342 (2016).  The Federalists were,
for  example,  concerned  that  newly  developing  population
centers would be deprived of their proper electoral weight,
as some cities had been in Great Britain.  See 6 The Doc-
umentary  History  of  the  Ratification  of  the  Constitution:
Massachusetts  1278–1279  (J.  Kaminski  &  G.  Saladino
eds. 2000).

Congress  has  regularly  exercised  its  Elections  Clause
power,  including  to  address  partisan  gerrymandering.
The  Apportionment  Act  of  1842,  which  required  single-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing legal precedent and historical context surrounding the Elections Clause of the US Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

NASA v. NELSON

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

First  Amendment  case  protecting  private  possession  of
obscenity;  the  deservedly  infamous  dictum  in  Griswold  v.
Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), concerning the “penum-
bra”  of  the  First  Amendment;  and  three  concurring  or
dissenting  opinions,  none  of  which  remotely  intimated
that  there  might  be  such  a  thing  as  a  substantive  due
process  right  to  informational  privacy.  429  U. S.,  at  599,
n. 25.  Nixon provided even less support.  After citing the
observation  in  Whalen  that  “[o]ne  element  of  privacy  has
been  characterized  as  the  individual  interest  in  avoiding
disclosure  of  personal  matters,”  Nixon,  supra,  at  457
(quoting  Whalen,  supra,  at  599;  internal  quotation  marks
omitted), it proceeded to conduct a straightforward Fourth
It  “assume[d]”  that  there  was  a
Amendment  analysis.
“legitimate  expectation  of  privacy”  in  the  materials,  and
rejected the appellant’s argument that the statute at issue
was  “precisely  the  kind  of  abuse  that  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment was intended to prevent.”  Nixon, supra, at 457–458,
460.  It  is  unfathomable  why  these  cases’  passing,  barely
explained  reference  to  a  right  separate  from  the  Fourth
Amendment—an unenumerated right that they held to be
not applicable—should be afforded stare decisis weight.

At this point the reader may be wondering: “What, after
all,  is  the  harm  in  being  ‘minimalist’  and  simply  refusing
to  say  that  violation  of  a  constitutional  right  of  informa-
tional privacy can never exist?  The outcome in this case is
the same, so long as the Court holds that any such hypo-
thetical right was not violated.”  Well, there is harm.  The
Court’s  never-say-never  disposition  does  damage  for  sev-
eral reasons.

1.  It  is  in  an  important  sense  not  actually  minimalist.
By  substituting  for  one  real  constitutional  question
(whether  there  exists  a  constitutional  right  to  informa-
tional privacy) a different constitutional question (whether
NASA’s  background  checks  would  contravene  a  right  to
informational  privacy  if  such  a  right  existed),  the  Court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Scalia in the case of NASA v. Nelson. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding informational privacy and the Court's stance on it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

THOLE ET AL. v. U. S. BANK N. A. ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–1712.  Argued January 13, 2020—Decided June 1, 2020

Plaintiffs James Thole and Sherry Smith are retired participants in U. S.
Bank’s defined-benefit retirement plan, which guarantees them a fixed
payment each month regardless of the plan’s value or its fiduciaries’
good  or  bad  investment  decisions.    Both  have  been  paid  all  of  their
monthly pension benefits so far and are legally and contractually enti-
tled to those payments for the rest of their lives.  Nevertheless, they
filed a putative class-action suit against U. S. Bank and others (collec-
tively,  U. S.  Bank)  under  the  Employee  Retirement  Income  Security
Act  of  1974  (ERISA),  alleging  that  the  defendants  violated  ERISA’s
duties  of  loyalty  and  prudence  by  poorly  investing  the  plan’s  assets.
They request the repayment of approximately $750 million to the plan
in losses suffered due to mismanagement; injunctive relief, including
replacement of the plan’s fiduciaries; and attorney’s fees.  The District
Court  dismissed  the  case,  and  the  Eighth  Circuit  affirmed  on  the
ground that the plaintiffs lack statutory standing.

Held: Because  Thole  and  Smith  have  no concrete  stake  in  the  lawsuit,
they lack Article III standing.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U. S. 555, 560–561.  Win or lose, they would still receive the exact same
monthly benefits they are already entitled to receive.

None  of  the  plaintiffs’  arguments  suffices  to  establish  Article  III
standing.  First, the plaintiffs rely on a trust analogy in arguing that
an ERISA participant has an equitable or property interest in the plan
and that injuries to the plan are therefore injuries to the participants.
But participants in a defined-benefit plan are not similarly situated to
the  beneficiaries  of  a  private  trust  or  to  participants  in  a  defined-
contribution plan, and they possess no equitable or property interest in
the plan, see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U. S. 432, 439–441.
Second, the plaintiffs cannot assert representative standing based on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

19

ALITO, J., dissenting

and  (C)  the  constitutional  provisions  were  arguably  inse-
verable from the unconstitutional provision.

In Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U. S. 678 (1987), a
group of airlines challenged provisions of the Airline Dereg-
ulation Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1705, that benefited airline em-
ployees.   The  airlines argued  that  (A)  enforcement  of  and
regulations  under  those  provisions  injured  them;  (B)  the
Airline Deregulation Act also contained an unlawful legis-
lative  veto;  and  (C)  the  employee-benefit  provisions  were
“ineffective” because they were inseverable from the legis-
lative veto provision, 480 U. S., at 680.  This Court consid-
ered  and  unanimously  rejected  the  airlines’  argument  on
the merits of the severability question, id., at 687–697, but
no one questioned the airlines’ standing to seek relief.

The  Court’s  treatment  of  these  arguments  in  the  cases
just  discussed  is  not  a  modern  innovation.    In  El  Paso  &
Northeastern R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87 (1909), for ex-
ample, a railway company challenged a portion of the Em-
ployers’ Liability Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 232, that preempted
territorial law more favorable to the railway.  The company
argued that (A) a portion of the Act governing U. S. Terri-
tories exposed it to liability in the suit; (B) other portions
affecting  intrastate  commerce  exceeded  Congress’s  Com-
merce Clause power; and (C) the first portion could not be
applied  because  it  was  inseverable  from  the  unconstitu-
tional portions.  The Court agreed that the interstate com-
merce aspects of the Act were unlawful, but held that they
were severable from the territorial provision.  215 U. S., at
93–98.

In Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892),
three  importers  challenged  the  collection  of  tariffs  under
the McKinley Tariff Act.  See Act of Oct. 1, 1890, 26 Stat.
567.  They argued that (A) several provisions of the Act im-
posed tariffs on goods they imported; (B) §3 of the Act un-
lawfully  delegated  legislative  powers  to  the  President  by
permitting  him  to  suspend  the  free  importation  of  other
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 4 (2009)

5

Per Curiam

tence  under  the correct  standard,  we  grant the  petition  and
reverse.

I

On February  18, 1985,  Van Hook went  to a  Cincinnati bar
that  catered  to  homosexual  men,  hoping  to  ﬁnd  someone  to
rob.  He approached David Self, and after the two spent sev
eral  hours  drinking  together  they  left  for  Self ’s  apartment.
There  Van  Hook  “lured  Self  into  a  vulnerable  position”  and
attacked  him,  ﬁrst  strangling  him  until  he  was  unconscious,
then killing him with a kitchen knife and mutilating his body.
State v.  Van Hook, 39 Ohio St. 3d 256, 256–257, 530 N. E. 2d
883, 884  (1988) (statement of  the case).  Before  ﬂeeing with
Self ’s  valuables,  Van  Hook  attempted  to  cover  his  tracks,
stufﬁng the knife and other items into the body and smearing
ﬁngerprints  he  had  left  behind.  Six  weeks  later,  police
found him in Florida, where he confessed.

Van  Hook  was  indicted  in  Ohio  for  aggravated  murder,
with  one  capital  speciﬁcation,  and  aggravated  robbery.  He
waived his right to a jury trial, and a three-judge panel found
him guilty of both charges and the capital speciﬁcation.  At
the  sentencing  hearing,  the  defense  called  eight  mitigation
witnesses,  and  Van  Hook  himself  gave  an  unsworn  state
ment.  After  weighing  the  aggravating  and  mitigating  cir
cumstances, the trial court imposed the death penalty.  The
Ohio  courts  afﬁrmed  on  direct  appeal,  id.,  at  265,  530  N.  E.
2d, at 892; State v.  Van Hook, No. C–85–0565, 1987 WL 11202
(Ohio  App.,  May  13,  1987)  (per curiam),  and  we  denied  cer
tiorari,  Van  Hook  v.  Ohio,  489  U. S.  1100  (1989).  Van  Hook
also sought state postconviction relief, which the Ohio courts
denied.  State  v.  Van  Hook,  No.  C–910505,  1992  WL  308350
(Ohio  App.,  Oct.  21,  1992)  (per  curiam),  appeal  denied,  66
Ohio  St.  3d  1440,  608  N.  E.  2d  1085,  rehearing  denied,  66
Ohio St. 3d 1470, 611 N. E. 2d 328 (1993); State v.  Van Hook,
70 Ohio St. 3d 1216, 639 N. E. 2d 1199 (1994).

Van  Hook  ﬁled  this  federal  habeas  petition  in  1995.  The
District  Court  denied  relief  on  all  17  of  his  claims.  Van
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court decision. It includes citations, case names, and a description of the events leading up to the trial.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
266

SOUTH  CAROLINA  v.  NORTH  CAROLINA

Opinion of the Court

ware  River’s  headwaters.  345  U. S.,  at  370.  The  Court
granted  the  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania  leave  to  inter
vene  and,  in  1931,  entered  a  decree  enjoining  certain  diver
sions of water by the State of New York and the city of New
York.  Id., at 371.  In 1952, the city of New York moved to
modify  the  decree,  and  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  ﬁled
oppositions.  After  the Court  referred  the matter  to a  Spe
cial Master, the city of Philadelphia sought leave to intervene
on  the  basis  of  its  use  of  the  Delaware  River’s  water.  Id.,
at 371–372.

This Court denied Philadelphia leave to intervene.  Penn
sylvania  had  intervened  pro  interesse  suo  “to  protect  the
rights and  interests of  Philadelphia and  Eastern Pennsylva
nia in the Delaware River.”  Id., at 374; see also New Jersey
v.  New  York,  283  U. S.  336,  342  (1931).  In  view  of  Pennsyl
vania’s  participation,  the  Court  wrote  that  when  a  State  is
“a  party  to  a  suit  involving  a  matter  of  sovereign  interest,”
it  is  parens  patriae  and  “ ‘must  be  deemed  to  represent  all
[of]  its  citizens.’ ”  345  U. S.,  at  372–373  (quoting  Kentucky
v.  Indiana,  281  U. S.  163,  173–174  (1930)).  This  principle
serves  the  twin  purposes  of  ensuring  that  due  respect  is
given  to  “sovereign  dignity”  and  providing  “a  working  rule
for  good  judicial  administration.”  345  U. S.,  at  373.  The
Court,  thus,  set  forth  the  following  standard  governing  in
tervention in an original action by a nonstate entity:

“An  intervenor  whose  state  is  already  a  party  should
have the burden of showing some compelling interest in
his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all
other citizens  and creatures of the  state, which interest
is not properly represented by the state.”  Ibid.

On  several  subsequent  occasions  the  Court  has  reafﬁrmed
this “general rule.”  See Nebraska v.  Wyoming, 515 U. S. 1,
21–22  (1995);  United  States  v.  Nevada,  412  U. S.  534,  538
(1973)  (per  curiam);  Illinois  v.  Milwaukee,  406  U. S.  91,  97
(1972).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the precedent set by the Supreme Court regarding intervention in original actions. It contains legal citations and analysis, indicating it's part of the main body of the document and not a separate section like a table of contents or introductory paragraph.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>