<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

963

558 U. S.

October 13, 2009

No.  09–6452.  Love  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–6455.  Pomales-Pizarro v.  United States.  C. A. 1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  578  F.  3d  78.

No.  09–6456.  Moore  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–6460.  Setser v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  482.

No.  09– 6466.  Zetino-Morales,  aka  Cety-Morales  v.
United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  835.

No.  09–6476.  Colson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  895.

No.  09–6478.  Collins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  825.

No.  09–6482.  Bell  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  976  A.  2d  224.

No.  09–6484.  Brewster  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  8.

No.  09–6485.  Barajas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  940.

No.  09–6487.  Jones  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6489.  Johns  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  737.

No.  09–6490.  Noble  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  125.

No.  09–6496.  Bunchan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  580  F.  3d  66.

No.  09–6498.  Brown  v.  United States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6499.  Bender  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  644.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

9

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

pages:  Users  can  upload  a  picture  and  some  basic  infor-
mation  about  themselves,  and  other  users  can  see  their
aggregated comments and “likes.”14  WebMD also provides
message  boards,  which  are  specifically  mentioned  in  the
statute  as  a  “mechanis[m]  to  communicate  with  other
users.”  N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §14–202.5(b)(4).

As  these  examples  illustrate,  the  North  Carolina  law
has  a  very  broad  reach  and  covers  websites  that  are  ill
suited for use in stalking or abusing children.  The focus of
the  discussion  on  these  sites—shopping,  news,  health—
does not provide a convenient jumping off point for conver-
sations  that  may  lead  to  abuse.  In  addition,  the  social
exchanges facilitated by these websites occur in the open,
and  this  reduces  the  possibility  of  a  child  being  secretly
lured into an abusive situation.  These websites also give
sex  offenders  little  opportunity  to  gather  personal  details
about a child; the information that can be listed in a pro-
file  is  limited,  and  the  profiles  are  brief.    What  is  more,
none of these websites make it easy to determine a child’s
precise location at a given moment.  For example, they do
not permit photo streams (at most, a child could upload a
single  profile  photograph),  and  they  do  not  include  up-to-
the minute location services.  Such websites would provide
essentially no aid to a would-be child abuser.

Placing this set of websites categorically off limits from
registered  sex  offenders  prohibits  them  from  receiving  or
engaging  in  speech  that  the  First  Amendment  protects
and  does  not  appreciably  advance  the  State’s  goal  of  pro-
tecting children from recidivist sex offenders.  I am there-
fore  compelled  to  conclude  that,  while  the  law  before  us
addresses  a  critical  problem,  it  sweeps  far  too  broadly  to
satisfy the demands of the Free Speech Clause.15

——————

14 See  WebMD,  Change  Your  Profile  Settings  (Feb.  19,  2014),  http://

www.webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/profile.

15 I express no view on whether a law that does not reach the sort of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in a case concerning internet access for registered sex offenders. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the North Carolina law in question and its potential impact on free speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

17

STEVENS, J., dissenting

from  settled  law  to  come  forward  with  persuasive  new
arguments  or  evidence.    The  textual  analysis  offered  by
respondent  and  embraced  by  the  Court  falls  far  short  of
sustaining that heavy burden.14  And the Court’s emphatic
reliance  on  the  claim  “that  the  Second  Amendment  . . .
codified  a  pre-existing  right,”  ante,  at  19,  is  of  course  be
side the point because the right to keep and bear arms for
service in a state militia was also a pre-existing right.

Indeed,  not  a  word  in  the  constitutional  text  even  ar
guably  supports  the  Court’s  overwrought  and  novel  de
scription  of  the  Second  Amendment  as  “elevat[ing]  above
all  other  interests”  “the  right  of  law-abiding,  responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”  Ante,
at 63.

II

The  proper  allocation  of  military  power  in  the  new
Nation  was  an  issue  of  central  concern  for  the  Framers.
The  compromises  they  ultimately  reached,  reflected  in
Article  I’s  Militia  Clauses  and  the  Second  Amendment,
represent  quintessential  examples  of  the  Framers’  “split
ting the atom of sovereignty.” 15

——————

14 The  Court’s  atomistic,  word-by-word  approach  to  construing  the
Amendment  calls  to  mind  the  parable  of  the  six  blind  men  and  the
elephant,  famously  set  in  verse  by  John  Godfrey  Saxe.    The  Poems  of
John  Godfrey  Saxe  135–136  (1873).    In  the  parable,  each  blind  man
approaches a single elephant; touching a different part of the elephant’s
body  in  isolation,  each  concludes  that  he  has  learned  its  true  nature.
One touches the animal’s leg, and concludes that the elephant is like a
tree; another touches the trunk and decides that the elephant is like a
snake; and so on.  Each of them, of course, has fundamentally failed to
grasp the nature of the creature.

15 By “ ‘split[ting] the atom of sovereignty,’ ” the Framers created “ ‘two
political  capacities,  one  state  and  one  federal,  each  protected  from
incursion  by  the  other.    The  resulting  Constitution  created  a  legal
system  unprecedented  in  form  and  design,  establishing  two  orders  of
government,  each  with  its  own  direct  relationship,  its  own  privity,  its
own  set  of  mutual  rights  and  obligations  to  the  people  who  sustain  it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Opinion of the Court

based because it prohibited trademarks based only on one
viewpoint, immoral or scandalous matter, while permitting
trademarks based on other viewpoints.  Id., at 393–394.

The names clause does not facially discriminate against
any viewpoint.  No matter the message a registrant wants
to convey, the names clause prohibits marks  that use an-
other  person’s  name  without  consent.    It  does  not  matter
“whether the use of [the] name is flattering, critical or neu-
tral.”  2 McCarthy §13:37.50.  The Government is thus not
singling out a trademark “based on the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.”  Reed,
576  U. S.,  at  168  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted);  ac-
cord, Brunetti, 588 U. S., at 394 (explaining that a viewpoint-
based trademark law “distinguishes between two opposed
sets of ideas”).

Elster  suggests  that  the  names  clause  verges  on  view-
point discrimination in practice.  According to Elster, it is
easier to obtain consent for a trademark that flatters a per-
son rather than mocks him.  This Court has found that a
law can discriminate based on viewpoint in its practical op-
eration.  See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 565
(2011); R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 391 (1992).  But,
here, there are many reasons why a person may be unable
to secure another’s consent to register a trademark bearing
his name.  Even when the trademark’s message is neutral
or complimentary, a person may withhold consent to avoid
any association with the goods, or to prevent his name from
being exploited for another’s gain.2

Although the names clause is not viewpoint based, it is

——————

2 It is also hard to see the viewpoint discrimination that Elster alleges
in  practice.    The  PTO  has  refused  registration  of  trademarks  such  as
“Welcome  President  Biden,”  “I  Stump  for  Trump,”  and  “Obama  Pa-
jama”—all because they contained another’s name without his consent,
not because of the viewpoint conveyed.  See PTO, Office Action of Dec. 8,
2020,  Serial  No.  90226753;  PTO,  Office  Action  of  Oct.  15,  2015,  Serial
No. 86728410; In re Hoefflin, 97 USPQ 2d 1174, 1177–1178 (TTAB 2010).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the constitutionality of the Lanham Act's "names clause." It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxxxvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

Smith v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  878,1086

855,

Smith v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887, 922, 923, 940, 946, 956, 957, 977, 1034, 1051, 1058, 1061, 1097,

1114,1116,1127,1128,1130,1131,1133

1148
Smith; United States v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024
Smith v. U. S. Court of Appeals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153
Smith; Villarreal v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Washington Mut. Bank FA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Smith v. Weber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1141

902

Smith; Wilson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Workman  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
895

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  807,1046

Smith v. Wrigley
908

Smithback v. Crain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1023

Smith, Inc.; CHF Industries, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116

Snellenberger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Snider v. Grayless
923

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sniezek; Rinaldi v.
999

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Snow v. Kansas
991

Snyder; Bazargani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Snyder; Powers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Social Security Admin.; Van De Berg v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1159

Social Security Admin.; Woods v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  887,1086

1106

Social Security Admin.; Zani v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Social  Security  Admin.,  Insp.  General;  Nat.  Taxpayers  Union  v.
809

Sodexho Marriott Services; Benitez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
976

Sohn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
884

Solan v. Ranck  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Solano-Moreta v. Rios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

1050

Solis; Brookens v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1082

Solis-Martinez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Solomon v. Philadelphia Newspapers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1109

. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Solomon v. Pioneer Adult Rehabilitation Center
877

Sommers v. Sommers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Sonachansingh v. New York  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
895

Sonczalla v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Song v. Turner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Sontchi v. Thaler
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Sonuga v. Napolitano  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936

Sony BMG Music Entertainment; Jorgensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Sony BMG Music Entertainment; Tenenbaum v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sosa-Garcia v. United States
987

Sossamon v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Sotero Menzor v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943

Soto v. Birkett  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and provides page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Syllabus

invokes such protections, “[t]he high respect that is owed to the office
of the Chief Executive . . . should inform the conduct of the entire pro-
ceeding,  including  the  timing  and  scope  of  discovery.”    Clinton,  520
U. S., at 707.  In addition, a President can raise subpoena-specific con-
stitutional  challenges  in  either  a  state  or  a  federal  forum.    As noted
above, he can challenge the subpoena as an attempt to influence the
performance of his official duties, in violation of the Supremacy Clause.
And he can argue that compliance with a particular subpoena would
impede his constitutional duties.  Pp. 17–21.

941 F. 3d 631, affirmed and remanded.

  ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG,
BREYER,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined.    KAVANAUGH,  J.,  filed  an
opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment,  in  which  GORSUCH,  J.,  joined.
THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section from a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus. It summarizes the case and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxvi

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
274
Lago Vista Independent School Dist.; Gebser v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Lambing v. Godiva Chocolatier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
Landress; Nocon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
Lane; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Langley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
Lara v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Larkins; Gibbons v.
936
Larsen v. American Medical Security, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
Law v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965
Law Ofﬁces of John A. Chanin; Parnar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Le v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
LeBlanc; Jackson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK)
920
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lee v. United States
Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians; Cass County v. . . . . . . . .
103
Leeds; Barker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,970
937
Lefcourt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962
Leuro-Rosas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
Levesque v. Yamaguchi
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Lewis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lewis; Wegner v.
904
Lexington; Yeo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950
Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v. Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
Library of Congress; Depree v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Lin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903
Little Six, Inc.; Cohen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Little Six, Inc.; Gavle v.
924
Livingstone; Donahey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lloyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Local. For labor union, see name of trade.
924
Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co. v. Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Lonardo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915
Long v. Alachua County School Bd.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Longariello v. School Bd. of Dade County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Long Island Univ.; Maher v.
933
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lopez v. Monterey County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,977
920
Lopez-Murcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Los Angeles County Superior Court; Hadji-Elias v. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Louisiana; Ortiz v.
943
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,972
Louisiana; Pizzo v.
934
Louisiana; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety; Berry v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Love; Gaerttner v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
Love v. Tippy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Syllabus

570 U. S., at 311.  Respondents’ second proffered end point—when stu-
dents receive the educational benefits of diversity—fares no better.  As
explained, it is unclear how a court is supposed to determine if or when
such goals would be adequately met.  Third, respondents suggest the
25-year  expectation  in  Grutter  means  that  race-based  preferences
must be allowed to continue until at least 2028.  The Court’s statement
in Grutter, however, reflected only that Court’s expectation that race-
based preferences would, by 2028, be unnecessary in the context of ra-
cial diversity on college campuses.  Finally, respondents argue that the
frequent reviews they conduct to determine whether racial preferences
are  still  necessary  obviates  the  need  for  an  end  point.  But  Grutter
never suggested that periodic review can make unconstitutional con-
duct constitutional.  Pp. 29–34.

(f) Because  Harvard’s  and  UNC’s  admissions  programs  lack  suffi-
ciently focused and measurable objectives warranting the use of race,
unavoidably employ race in a negative manner, involve racial stereo-
typing,  and  lack  meaningful  end  points,  those  admissions  programs
cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  guarantees  of  the  Equal  Protection
Clause.  At the same time, nothing prohibits universities from consid-
ering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected the applicant’s life,
so long as that discussion is concretely tied to a quality of character or
unique ability that the particular applicant can contribute to the uni-
versity.  Many universities have for too long wrongly concluded that
the  touchstone  of  an  individual’s  identity  is  not  challenges  bested,
skills built, or lessons learned, but the color of their skin.  This Nation’s
constitutional history does not tolerate that choice.  Pp. 39–40.

No. 20–1199, 980 F. 3d 157; No. 21–707, 567 F. Supp. 3d 580, reversed.

 ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
ALITO,  GORSUCH,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined.  THOMAS,  J.,
filed  a  concurring  opinion.  GORSUCH,  J.,  filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in
which  THOMAS,  J.,  joined.  KAVANAUGH,  J.,  filed  a  concurring  opinion.
SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined, and
in  which  JACKSON,  J.,  joined  as  it  applies  to  No.  21–707.  JACKSON,  J.,
filed a dissenting opinion in No. 21–707, in which SOTOMAYOR and KA-
GAN, JJ., joined.  JACKSON, J., took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of the case in No. 20–1199.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the court's reasoning and decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

Opinion of the Court

“wildly  underinclusive.”  Entertainment  Merchants  Assn.,
supra, at 802.  The notice applies only to clinics that have
a  “primary  purpose”  of  “providing  family  planning  or
pregnancy-related  services”  and  that  provide  two  of  six
categories  of  specific  services.  §123471(a).  Other  clinics
that  have  another  primary  purpose,  or  that  provide  only
one  category  of  those  services,  also  serve  low-income
women and could educate them about the State’s services.
According  to  the  legislative  record,  California  has  “nearly
1,000 community clinics”—including “federally designated
community  health  centers,  migrant  health  centers,  rural
health centers, and frontier health centers”—that “serv[e]
more  than  5.6  million  patients  . . .  annually  through  over
17  million  patient  encounters.”    App.  58.  But  most  of
those  clinics  are  excluded  from  the  licensed  notice  re-
quirement  without  explanation.  Such  “[u]nderinclusive-
ness raises serious doubts about whether the government
is  in  fact  pursuing  the  interest  it  invokes,  rather  than
disfavoring  a  particular  speaker  or  viewpoint.”    Enter-
tainment Merchants Assn., 564 U. S., at 802.

The  FACT  Act  also  excludes,  without  explanation,  fed-
eral clinics and Family PACT providers from the licensed-
notice requirement.  California notes that those clinics can
enroll  women  in  California’s  programs  themselves,  but
California’s stated interest is informing women that these
services  exist  in  the  first  place.  California  has  identified
no  evidence  that  the  exempted  clinics  are  more  likely  to
provide this information than the covered clinics.  In fact,
the exempted clinics have long been able to enroll women
in California’s programs, but the FACT Act was premised
on  the  notion  that  “thousands  of  women  remain  unaware
of [them].”  Cal. Legis. Serv., §1(b).  If the goal is to max-
imize women’s awareness of these programs, then it would
seem that California would ensure that the places that can
immediately  enroll  women  also  provide  this  information.
The  FACT  Act’s  exemption  for  these  clinics,  which  serve
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the  "FACT Act" and its application. It delves into the Act's requirements for licensed clinics and its exemptions for certain providers, analyzing the rationale behind these provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

n. 119.4  These sparse results were presumably good news.
They  likely  showed  that  the  VRA  and  other  efforts  had
achieved a large measure of success in combating the pre-
viously  widespread  practice  of  using  such  rules  to  hinder
minority groups from voting.
  This Court first construed the amended §2 in Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986)—another vote-dilution case.
Justice  Brennan’s  opinion  for  the  Court  set  out  three
threshold requirements for proving a §2 vote-dilution claim,
and, taking its cue from the Senate Report, provided a non-
exhaustive  list  of  factors  to  be  considered  in  determining
whether  §2  had  been  violated.    Id.,  at  44–45,  48–51,  80.
“The essence of a §2 claim,” the Court said, “is that a certain
electoral  law,  practice,  or  structure  interacts  with  social
and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the op-
portunities”  of  minority  and  non-minority  voters  to  elect
their preferred representatives.  Id., at 47.
  In the years since Gingles, we have heard a steady stream
of §2 vote-dilution cases,5 but until today, we have not con-
sidered how §2 applies to generally applicable time, place,
or  manner  voting  rules.    In  recent  years,  however,  such
claims have proliferated in the lower courts.6

——————

4 See Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60, 63 (WD La. 1968) (parish clerks
discriminated with respect to absentee voting); United States v. Post, 297
F. Supp. 46, 51 (WD La. 1969) (election official induced blacks to vote in
accordance with outdated procedures and made votes ineffective); Toney
v. White, 488 F. 2d 310, 312 (CA5 1973) (registrar discriminated in purg-
ing voting rolls).

5 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S. 380 (1991) (multi-member district);
Houston Lawyers’ Assn. v. Attorney General of Tex., 501 U. S. 419 (1991)
(at-large elections); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146 (1993) (district-
ing); Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25 (1993) (same); Holder v. Hall, 512
U. S.  874  (1994)  (single-member  commission);  Johnson  v.  De  Grandy,
512 U. S. 997 (1994) (districting); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U. S. 74 (1997)
(same); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399
(2006) (same); Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. ___ (2018) (same).

6 See Brief for Sen. Ted Cruz et al. as Amici Curiae 22–24 (describing
§2 challenges to laws regulating absentee voting, precinct voting, early
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and its application to voting rules.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

1860–1880, p. 638 (1935); see J. Anderson, The Education
of Blacks in the South 1860–1935, p. 7 (1988).  Black Amer-
icans  thus  insisted,  in  the  words  of  Frederick  Douglass,
“that in a country governed by the people, like ours, educa-
tion of the youth of all classes is vital to its welfare, pros-
perity, and to its existence.”  Address to the People of the
United States (1883), in 4 P. Foner, The Life and Writings
of Frederick Douglass 386 (1955).  Black people’s yearning
for freedom of thought, and for a more perfect Union with
educational opportunity for all, played a crucial role during
the Reconstruction era.

Yet emancipation marked the beginning, not the end, of
that era.  Abolition alone could not repair centuries of racial
subjugation.  Following the Thirteenth Amendment’s rati-
fication, the Southern States replaced slavery with “a sys-
tem  of  ‘laws  which  imposed  upon  [Black  people]  onerous
disabilities and  burdens,  and  curtailed  their rights  in  the
pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that
their freedom was of little value.’ ”  Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 390 (1978) (opinion of Marshall, J.)
(quoting  Slaughter-House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  70  (1873)).
Those so-called “Black Codes” discriminated against Black
people on the basis of race, regardless of whether they had
been previously enslaved.  See, e.g., 1866 N. C. Sess. Laws
pp. 99, 102.

Moreover,  the  criminal  punishment  exception  in  the
Thirteenth  Amendment  facilitated  the  creation  of  a  new
system  of  forced  labor  in  the  South.    Southern  States  ex-
panded their criminal laws, which in turn “permitted invol-
untary servitude as a punishment” for convicted Black per-
sons.  D.  Blackmon,  Slavery  by  Another  Name:  The  Re-
Enslavement  of  Black  Americans  From  the  Civil  War  to
World War II, pp. 7, 53 (2009) (Slavery by Another Name).
States required, for example, that Black people “sign a la-
bor contract to work for a white employer or face prosecu-
tion  for  vagrancy.”  The  Second  Founding  48.    State  laws
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the history of racial discrimination in education and the legacy of slavery.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

25

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

defendants in ATS actions.

2
The  plurality  instead  purports  to  defer  to  Congress  by
relying  heavily  on  the  Torture  Victim  Protection  Act  of
1991  (TVPA),  106  Stat.  73,  note  following  28  U. S. C.
§1350, to support its categorical bar.  See ante, at 20.  The
TVPA  makes  available  to  all  individuals,  not  just  foreign
citizens, a civil cause of action for torture and extrajudicial
killing that may be brought against natural persons.  See
Mohamad  v.  Palestinian  Authority,  566  U. S.  449,  451–
452, 454 (2012).  The plurality extrapolates from Congress’
decision regarding the scope of liability under the TVPA a
rule  that  it  contends  should  govern  all  ATS  suits.  See
ante, at 20.  But there is no reason to think that because
Congress  saw  fit  to  permit  suits  only  against  natural
persons for two specific law-of-nations violations, Congress
meant to foreclose corporate liability for all law-of-nations
violations.  The plurality’s contrary conclusion ignores the
critical textual differences between the ATS and TVPA, as
well  as  the  TVPA’s  legislative  history,  which  emphasizes
Congress’ intent to leave the ATS undisturbed.

On its face, the TVPA is different from the ATS in sev
eral  significant  ways:  It  is  focused  on  only  two  law-of
nations  violations,  torture  and  extrajudicial  killing;  it
makes  a  cause  of  action  available  to  all  individuals,  not
just  foreign  citizens;  and  it  uses  the  word  “individual”  to
delineate  who  may  be  liable.    See  28  U. S. C.  §1350  note.
The ATS, by contrast, is concerned with all law-of-nations
violations  generally,  makes  a  cause  of  action  available
only  to  foreign  citizens,  and  is  silent  as  to  who  may  be
liable.  Because of the textual differences between the two
statutes,  the  Court  unanimously  concluded  in  Mohamad
that the ATS “offers no comparative value” in ascertaining
the  scope  of  liability  under  the  TVPA.  566  U. S.,  at  458.
It makes little sense, then, to conclude that the TVPA has
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D.  C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 20–1199 and 21–707
_________________

20–1199

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF
HARVARD COLLEGE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.

21–707

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 29, 2023]

 CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the

Court.

In these cases we consider whether the admissions sys-
tems used by Harvard College and the University of North
Carolina, two of the oldest institutions of higher learning in
the  United  States,  are  lawful  under  the  Equal  Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I
A

Founded  in  1636,  Harvard  College  has  one  of  the  most
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion.  It includes the citation information, notice about potential revisions, and the introduction to the case. This type of text is generally suitable for indexing as it is the core legal content of the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC.

Opinion of the Court

II

Petitioners, supported  by the United States, argue that
their  customers’  state  antitrust  lawsuits  are  within  the
field  that  the  Natural  Gas  Act  pre-empts.    See  Brief  for
Petitioners  18  (citing  Schneidewind,  485  U. S.,  at  305);
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13 (same).  They
point  out  that  respondents’  antitrust  claims  target  anti
competitive  activities  that  affected  wholesale  (as  well  as
retail)  rates.  See  Brief  for  Petitioners  2.    They  add  that
the  Natural  Gas  Act  expressly  grants  FERC  authority  to
keep wholesale rates at reasonable levels.  See ibid. (citing
15 U. S. C. §§717(b), 717d(a)).  In exercising this authority,
FERC  has  prohibited  the  very  kind  of  anticompetitive
conduct  that  the  state  actions  attack.    See  Part  I–B–3,
supra.    And,  petitioners  contend,  letting  these  actions
proceed will permit state antitrust courts to reach conclu
sions about that conduct that differ from those that FERC
might  reach  or  has  already  reached.    Accordingly,  peti
tioners  argue,  respondents’  state-law  antitrust  suits  fall
within the pre-empted field.

A
Petitioners’  arguments  are  forceful,  but  we  cannot  ac
cept their conclusion.  As we have repeatedly stressed, the
Natural  Gas  Act  “was  drawn  with  meticulous  regard  for
the  continued  exercise  of  state  power,  not  to  handicap  or
dilute it in any way.”  Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v.
Public  Serv.  Comm’n  of  Ind.,  332  U. S.  507,  517–518
(1947);  see  also  Northwest  Central,  489  U. S.,  at  511  (the
“legislative  history  of  the  [Act]  is  replete  with  assurances
that  the  Act  ‘takes  nothing  from  the  State  [regulatory]
commissions’ ”  (quoting  81  Cong.  Rec.  6721  (1937))).    Ac
cordingly,  where  (as  here)  a  state  law  can  be  applied  to
nonjurisdictional  as  well  as  jurisdictional  sales,  we  must
proceed  cautiously,  finding  pre-emption  only  where  de
tailed examination convinces us that a matter falls within
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it's part of the actual case content and suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GOLAN v. SAADA

Opinion of the Court

measures that could mitigate that risk.  That said, the ques-
tion whether ameliorative measures would be appropriate
or effective will often overlap considerably with the inquiry
into whether a grave risk exists.  See Simcox v. Simcox, 511
F. 3d 594, 607–608 (CA6 2007) (explaining that the appro-
priateness  and  utility  of  ameliorative  measures  correlate
with the gravity of the risk to the child).  In many instances,
a court may find it appropriate to consider both questions
at once.  For example, a finding of grave risk as to a part of
a  country  where  an  epidemic  rages  may  naturally  lead  a
court simultaneously to consider whether return to another
part of the country is feasible.  The fact that a court may
consider ameliorative measures concurrent with the grave-
risk determination, however, does not mean that the Con-
vention imposes a categorical requirement on a court to con-
sider  any  or  all  ameliorative  measures  before  denying  re-
turn once it finds that a grave risk exists.7

Under the Convention and ICARA, district courts’ discre-
tion to determine whether to return a child where doing so
would pose a grave risk to the child includes the discretion

——————

7 Saada argues that the approach of other signatory countries, includ-
ing the United Kingdom, supports the position that consideration of ame-
liorative measures is required.  See, e.g., In re E, [2011] UKSC 27 ¶52
(stating that the focus of the return inquiry should be on the sufficiency
of protective measures where there are disputed allegations of domestic
violence).  The Hague Conference on Private International Law’s Guide
to Good Practice, which the Hague Conference issued to encourage con-
sistent application of the grave-risk exception internationally, also offers
some support for this position, explaining that courts generally should
consider  “the  circumstances  as  a  whole,  including  whether  adequate
measures of protection are available.”  1980 Child Abduction Convention:
Guide to Good Practice, Pt. VI, Art. 13(1)(b), p. 31, ¶41 (2020).  The Con-
vention itself, however, leaves contracting states free to require or not
require  consideration  of  ameliorative  measures,  and  consistent  with
most signatory countries outside the European Union, see, e.g., Arthur
& Secretary, Dept. of Family & Community Servs. and Anor, [2017] Fam-
CAFC 111 ¶69 (Austl.), Congress has not chosen to require such consid-
eration.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. It delves into the interpretation of "grave risk" and the role of ameliorative measures in child return decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
GINSBURG, J., dissenting

based disparities in access to preventive care.  See supra, at
3.  Overlooked  by  the  Court,  see  ante,  at  14–18,  and  the
opinion concurring in the judgment, see ante, at 2–3 (opin-
ion  of  KAGAN,  J.),  HRSA’s  expertise  does  not  include  any
proficiency in delineating religious and moral exemptions.
One  would  not,  therefore,  expect  Congress  to  delegate  to
HRSA  the  task  of  crafting  such  exemptions.  See  King  v.
Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 486 (2015) (“It is especially unlikely
that  Congress  would  have  delegated  this  decision  to  [an
agency] which has no expertise in . . . policy of this sort.”).14
In  fact,  HRSA  did  not  craft  the  blanket  exemption.    As
earlier observed, see supra, at 7, that task was undertaken
by  the  IRS,  EBSA,  and  CMS.
  See  also  45  CFR
§147.132(a)(1), 147.133(a)(1) (direction by the IRS, EBSA,
and  CMS  that  HRSA’s  guidelines  “must  not  provide  for”
contraceptive  coverage  in  the  circumstances  described  in
the blanket exemption (emphasis added)).  Nowhere in 42
U. S. C. §300gg–13(a)(4) are those agencies named, as ear-
lier  observed,  see  supra,  at  8–9,  an  absence  the  Govern-
ment,  the  Court,  and  the  opinion  concurring  in  the  judg-
ment do not deign to acknowledge.  See Brief for HHS et al.
15–20;  ante,  at  14–18  (opinion  of  the  Court);  ante,  at  2–3
(opinion of KAGAN, J.).

C
If the ACA does not authorize the blanket exemption, the
Government urges, then the exemption granted to houses
of worship in 2011 must also be invalid.  Brief for HHS et al.
19–20.  As the Court of Appeals explained, however, see 930
——————

14 A  more  logical  choice  would  have  been  HHS’s  Office  for  Civil
Rights  (OCR),  which  “enforces  . . .  conscience  and  religious  freedom
laws”  with  respect  to  HHS  programs.    HHS,  OCR,  About  Us,
www.hhs.gov/ocr/about-us/index.html.    Indeed,  when  the  Senate  intro-
duced an amendment to the ACA similar in character to the blanket ex-
emption, a measure that failed to pass, the Senate instructed that OCR
administer the exemption. 158 Cong. Rec. 1415 (2012) (proposed amend-
ment); id., at 2634 (vote tabling amendment).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding religious exemptions and the Affordable Care Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

Opinion of the Court

Atomic tend to support, not undermine, our conclusion to-
day.

*

*

*
Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Fed-
eral Government and its contractors.  Because §3172 does
not clearly and unambiguously waive the Government’s im-
munity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.  The Ninth
Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary is reversed, and the case
is  remanded  for  further  proceedings  consistent  with  this
opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the concluding portion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a statement of the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

19

Opinion of the Court

ences” were “of no legal significance”).

A  fortiori,  if  the  TTAB  considers  a  different  mark  alto-
gether, issue preclusion would not apply.  Needless to say,
moreover,  if  the  TTAB  has  not  decided  the  same  issue as
that  before  the  district  court,  there  is  no  reason  why  any
deference would be warranted.

For a similar reason, the Eighth Circuit erred in holding
that  issue  preclusion  could  not  apply  here  because  the
TTAB relied too heavily on “appearance and sound.”  App.
to  Pet.  for  Cert.  10a.  Undoubtedly  there  are  cases  in
which  the  TTAB  places  more  weight  on  certain  factors
than  it  should.  When  that  happens,  an  aggrieved  party
should seek judicial review.  The fact that the TTAB may
have  erred,  however,  does  not  prevent  preclusion.    As
Judge  Colloton  observed  in  dissent,  “ ‘issue  preclusion
prevent[s]  relitigation  of  wrong  decisions  just  as  much  as
right  ones.’ ”    716  F. 3d,  at  1029  (quoting  Clark  v.  Clark,
984  F. 2d  272,  273  (CA8  1993));  see  also  Restatement
(Second) of Judgments §28, Comment j, at 284 (explaining
that  “refusal  to  give  the  first  judgment  preclusive  effect
should  not  . . .  be  based  simply  on  a  conclusion  that  [it]
was patently erroneous”).

B
Hargis  also  argues  that  registration  is  categorically
incompatible with issue preclusion because the TTAB uses
procedures  that  differ  from  those  used  by  district  courts.
Granted, “[r]edetermination of issues is warranted if there
is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of
procedures  followed  in  prior  litigation.”    Montana,  440
U. S.,  at  164,  n. 11;  see  also  Parklane  Hosiery,  439  U. S.,
at  331,  and  n. 15  (similar).    But  again,  this  only  suggests
that  sometimes  issue  preclusion  might  be  inappropriate,
not that it always is.

No  one  disputes  that  the  TTAB  and  district  courts  use
different procedures.  Most notably, district courts feature
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of issue preclusion in trademark cases. It cites legal precedents and delves into the specific procedures of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) and district courts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

Opinion of the Court

1

Long  regarded  as  a  leading  case  on  civil  aiding-and-
abetting  and  conspiracy  liability,  see  130  Stat.  852,  Hal-
berstam  arose  from  a  distinctive  fact  pattern.    Bernard
Welch  was  a  serial  burglar  who  had  killed  Michael  Hal-
berstam during a break-in.  705 F. 2d, at 474.  Halberstam’s
estate then sued Welch’s live-in partner, Linda Hamilton,
for aiding and abetting and conspiring with Welch.  Id., at
474, 476.7  Hamilton was not present for Halberstam’s mur-
der, or even allegedly aware of the murder.  See id., at 474–
476.  But the facts made clear that “[s]he was a willing part-
ner  in  [Welch’s]  criminal  activities.”    Id.,  at  474  (internal
quotation marks omitted).  Hamilton had lived with Welch
for five years, during which time the couple had risen from
modest  circumstances  to  possess  a  substantial  fortune.
Ibid.  This rapid ascent was remarkable because Welch had
no  outside  employment.    Id.,  at  475.    Rather,  he  left  the
house most evenings and returned with antiques, jewelry,
and precious metals—some of which he melted down into
gold and silver ingots by using a smelting furnace that he
had  installed  in  their  garage.  Meanwhile,  Hamilton  did
bookkeeping  work  for  Welch’s  “business,”  facilitating  the
sale of those stolen goods.  Ibid.  She had Welch’s customers
make  checks  payable  to  her,  falsified  her  tax  returns  at
Welch’s direction, and kept records of incoming payments
from Welch’s customers—with no records of outgoing funds
to his “suppliers.”  Ibid.  Their arrangement continued until
Welch was arrested after he killed Halberstam while bur-
glarizing Halberstam’s home.  Ibid.

To  determine  Hamilton’s  liability,  the  D. C.  Circuit  un-
dertook an extensive survey of the common law, examining

——————

7 Halberstam’s estate also sued Welch himself; a default judgment was
entered against Welch, who did not appeal.  See Halberstam, 705 F. 2d,
at 474.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites a previous case (Halberstam) and lays out the facts of that case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

21

Opinion of the Court

reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act.  The court below and
the  parties  have  debated  what  that  record  shows—they
have  gone  back  and  forth  about  whether  to  compare  cov-
ered  to  noncovered  jurisdictions  as  blocks,  how  to  dis-
aggregate  the  data  State  by  State,  how  to  weigh  §2  cases
as  evidence  of  ongoing  discrimination,  and  whether  to
consider  evidence  not  before  Congress,  among  other  is-
sues.  Compare,  e.g.,  679  F. 3d,  at  873–883  (case  below),
with id., at 889–902 (Williams, J., dissenting).  Regardless
of how to look at the record, however, no one can fairly say
that  it  shows  anything  approaching  the  “pervasive,”  “fla-
grant,”  “widespread,”  and  “rampant”  discrimination  that
faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the
covered  jurisdictions  from  the  rest  of  the  Nation  at  that
time.  Katzenbach,  supra,  at  308,  315,  331;  Northwest
Austin, 557 U. S., at 201.

But a more fundamental problem remains: Congress did
not use the record it compiled to shape a coverage formula
grounded  in  current  conditions.  It  instead  reenacted  a
formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical rela-
tion  to  the  present  day.    The  dissent  relies  on  “second-
generation  barriers,”  which  are  not  impediments  to  the
casting  of  ballots,  but  rather  electoral  arrangements  that
affect the weight of minority votes.  That does not cure the
problem.  Viewing  the  preclearance  requirements  as  tar-
geting  such  efforts  simply  highlights  the  irrationality  of
continued  reliance  on  the  §4  coverage  formula,  which  is
based  on  voting  tests  and  access  to  the  ballot,  not  vote
dilution.  We  cannot  pretend  that  we  are  reviewing  an
updated  statute,  or  try  our  hand  at  updating  the  statute
ourselves, based on the new record compiled by Congress.
Contrary to the dissent’s contention, see post, at 23, we are
not ignoring the record; we are simply recognizing that  it
played no role in shaping the statutory formula before us
today.

The  dissent  also  turns  to  the  record  to  argue  that,  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and the evidence presented to Congress during its reauthorization.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

JACKSON, J., concurring

Ante, at 8–9.

This understanding of §1512(c)’s text and purpose is en-
tirely consistent with the statute’s enactment history.  Con-
gress enacted §1512(c) as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which “was prompted  by the exposure of Enron’s massive
accounting  fraud  and  revelations  that  the  company’s  out-
side auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, had systematically de-
stroyed  potentially  incriminating  documents.”    Yates  v.
United  States,  574  U. S.  528,  535–536  (2015)  (plurality
opinion).  When introducing what later became §1512(c) on
the Senate floor, Senator Lott emphasized that its principal
purpose was to target document destruction, which was, at
the time, prohibited “only if . . . a subpoena ha[d] been is-
sued for the evidence that ha[d] been destroyed or altered.”
148 Cong. Rec. S6545 (July 10, 2002).  “[T]his section,” he
explained, “would allow the Government to charge obstruc-
tion against individuals who acted alone, even if the tam-
pering took place prior to the issuance of a grand jury sub-
poena.”  Ibid.  Similarly, the Senate Report accompanying
the proposed statute noted that “current federal obstruction
of justice statutes relating to document destruction [were]
riddled  with  loopholes  and  burdensome  proof  require-
ments.”  S. Rep. No. 107–146, p. 6 (2002).  According to the
Senate  Report,  §1512(c)  was  drafted  to  fill  these  gaps:
“When  a  person  destroys  evidence  with  the  intent  of  ob-
structing any type of investigation and the matter is within
the  jurisdiction  of  a  federal  agency,  overly  technical  legal
distinctions should neither hinder nor prevent prosecution
and punishment.”  Id., at 7.

Conversely, there is no indication whatsoever that Con-
gress intended to create a sweeping, all-purpose obstruction
statute.  As  the  majority  notes,  “[f]ederal  obstruction  law
consists of numerous provisions that target specific crimi-
nal acts and settings.”  Ante, at 10.  Outside of the Govern-
ment’s  proposed  interpretation  of  §1512(c),  Congress  has
never enacted “a one-size-fits-all solution to obstruction of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a section of a legal document. It cites legal precedents, discusses statutory interpretation, and uses legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

JONES v. HENDRIX

JACKSON, J., dissenting

inference  that  Congress  silently  repealed  the  traditional
[postconviction]  remedy  for  federal  prisoners  who  have
been  imprisoned  for  conduct  that  Congress  did  not  crimi-
nalize.”  Brief for Respondent 28.  I proceed here to add that
nothing outside of AEDPA—not the background legal prin-
ciples that existed at the time Congress enacted the statute,
nor the practical consequences of reading §2255(h) in this
manner—supports that inference either.

Take  equity,  for  instance.    When  Congress  crafted
§2255(h), it legislated against an important background eq-
uitable principle pertaining to postconviction relief: Courts
should not interpret statutory provisions governing habeas
review to even “ ‘run the risk’ ” of causing prisoners to “ ‘for-
ever los[e] their opportunity for any federal review of their
. . .  claims.’ ”    Panetti  v.  Quarterman,  551  U. S.  930,  945–
946  (2007)  (quoting  Rhines  v.  Weber,  544  U. S.  269,  275
(2005));  see  also  Stewart  v.  Martinez-Villareal,  523  U. S.
637, 645 (1998).  This means that Congress was well aware
that  courts  consistently  “rel[y]  on  equitable  doctrines  to
carve out . . . ways petitioners can bypass [otherwise appli-
cable] procedural obstacles” when a prisoner has “not had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate their federal claims.”  E.
Primus,  Equitable  Gateways:  Toward  Expanded  Federal
Habeas  Corpus  Review  of  State-Court  Criminal  Convic-
tions,  61  Ariz.  L. Rev.  291,  305  (2019).11    Knowing  that
courts are equitable tribunals that tend to operate in this
fashion  should  have  prompted  Congress  to  express  its  in-

——————

11 Many of the Courts of Appeals that had read §2255(e) as saving legal
innocence claims invoked this equitable principle.  See, e.g., In re Daven-
port, 147 F. 3d, at 609; Triestman, 124 F. 3d, at 378; In re Dorsainvil, 119
F. 3d, at 251.  As lower courts also recognized, the impetus to provide a
meaningful  opportunity  for  review  of  a  postconviction  claim  was  espe-
cially strong when failure to hear the claim might result in a “miscar-
riage of justice.”  See Reyes-Requena, 243 F. 3d, at 904; In re Dorsainvil,
119 F. 3d, at 251.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

17

Opinion of the Court

The  “eminent  common-law  authorities  (Blackstone,
Coke, Hale, and the like),” Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U. S. ___,
___ (2020) (slip op., at 7), all describe abortion after quick-
ening as criminal.  Henry de Bracton’s 13th-century trea-
tise  explained  that  if  a  person  has  “struck  a  pregnant
woman,  or  has  given  her  poison,  whereby  he  has  caused
abortion, if the foetus be already formed and animated, and
particularly if it be animated, he commits homicide.”  2 De
Legibus  et  Consuetudinibus  Angliae  279  (T.  Twiss  ed.
1879); see also 1 Fleta, c. 23, reprinted in 72 Selden Soc. 60–
61  (H.  Richardson  &  G.  Sayles  eds.  1955)  (13th-century
treatise).25

Sir  Edward  Coke’s  17th-century  treatise  likewise  as-
serted  that  abortion  of  a  quick  child  was  “murder”  if  the
“childe be born alive” and a “great misprision” if the “childe
dieth in her body.”  3 Institutes of the Laws of England 50–
51 (1644).  (“Misprision” referred to “some heynous offence
under the degree of felony.”  Id., at 139.)  Two treatises by
Sir  Matthew  Hale  likewise  described  abortion  of  a  quick
child who died in the womb as a “great crime” and a “great
misprision.”   Pleas  of  the  Crown  53  (P.  Glazebrook  ed.
1972); 1 History of the Pleas of the Crown 433 (1736) (Hale).
And writing near the time of the adoption of our Constitu-
tion,  William  Blackstone  explained  that  abortion  of  a
“quick”  child  was  “by  the  ancient  law  homicide  or  man-
slaughter”  (citing  Bracton),  and  at  least  a  very  “heinous
misdemeanor” (citing Coke).  1 Commentaries on the Laws
of England 129–130 (7th ed. 1775) (Blackstone).

English cases dating all the way back to the 13th century
corroborate  the  treatises’  statements  that  abortion  was  a
crime.  See generally J. Dellapenna, Dispelling the Myths

——————
25.

25 Even before Bracton’s time, English law imposed punishment for the
killing of a fetus.  See Leges Henrici Primi 222–223 (L. Downer ed. 1972)
(imposing penalty for any abortion and treating a woman who aborted a
“quick” child “as if she were a murderess”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion citing historical legal texts and cases. It discusses the historical legal status of abortion in English common law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 428 (2009) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  An order telling the Governor not to
do what he’s not doing fails to meet that stringent standard.
As  noted,  the  challenged  restrictions  raise  serious  con-
cerns  under  the  Constitution,  and  I  agree  with  JUSTICE
KAVANAUGH  that  they  are  distinguishable  from  those  we
considered in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. New-
som, 590 U. S. ___ (2020), and Calvary Chapel Dayton Val-
ley v. Sisolak, 591 U. S. ___ (2020).  See ante, at 1, 3–4 (con-
curring opinion).  I take a different approach than the other
dissenting Justices in this respect.

To be clear, I do not regard my dissenting colleagues as
“cutting the Constitution loose during a pandemic,” yielding
to  “a  particular  judicial  impulse  to  stay  out  of  the  way  in
times of crisis,” or “shelter[ing] in place when the Constitu-
tion is under attack.”  Ante, at 3, 5–6 (opinion of GORSUCH,
J.).  They simply view the matter differently after careful
study and analysis reflecting their best efforts to fulfill their
responsibility under the Constitution.

One solo concurrence today takes aim at my concurring
opinion  in  South  Bay.  See  ante,  at  3–6  (opinion  of
GORSUCH, J.).  Today’s concurrence views that opinion with
disfavor because “[t]o justify its result, [it] reached back 100
years  in  the  U. S.  Reports  to  grab  hold  of  our  decision  in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905).”  Ante, at 3.
Today’s concurrence notes that Jacobson “was the first case
South Bay cited on the substantive legal question before the
Court,”  and  “it  was  the  only  case  cited  involving  a  pan-
demic.”  Ante,  at  5.    And  it  suggests  that,  in  the  wake  of
South Bay, some have “mistaken this Court’s modest deci-
sion in Jacobson for a towering authority that overshadows
the Constitution during a pandemic.”  Ibid.  But while Ja-
cobson occupies three pages of today’s concurrence, it war-
ranted exactly one sentence in South Bay.  What did that
one sentence say?  Only that “[o]ur Constitution principally
entrusts  ‘[t]he  safety  and  the  health  of  the  people’  to  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

Opinion of the Court

scrutiny,  its  decision  affirming  the  District  Court’s  grant
of  summary  judgment  to  the  University  was  incorrect.
That  decision  is  vacated,  and  the  case  is  remanded  for
further proceedings.

I

A

Located in Austin, Texas, on the most renowned campus
of the Texas state university system, the University is one
of  the  leading  institutions  of  higher  education  in  the  Na-
tion.  Admission is prized and competitive.  In 2008, when
petitioner  sought  admission  to  the  University’s  entering
class,  she  was  1  of  29,501  applicants.    From  this  group
12,843  were  admitted,  and  6,715  accepted  and  enrolled.
Petitioner was denied admission.

In  recent  years  the  University  has  used  three  different
programs  to evaluate candidates  for admission.  The first
is  the  program  it  used  for  some  years  before  1997,  when
the  University  considered  two  factors:  a  numerical  score
reflecting an applicant’s test scores and academic perform-
ance  in  high  school  (Academic  Index  or  AI),  and  the
applicant’s  race.  In 1996, this system was held unconsti-
tutional  by  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the
Fifth  Circuit.    It  ruled  the  University’s  consideration  of
race  violated  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  because  it  did
not further any compelling government interest.  Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932, 955 (1996).

The  second  program  was  adopted  to  comply  with  the
Hopwood  decision.  The  University  stopped  considering
race in admissions and substituted instead a new holistic
metric  of  a  candidate’s  potential  contribution  to  the  Uni-
versity,  to  be  used  in  conjunction  with  the  Academic  In-
dex.  This “Personal Achievement Index” (PAI) measures a
student’s  leadership  and  work  experience,  awards,  extra-
curricular activities, community service, and other special
circumstances  that  give  insight  into  a  student’s  back-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in a case called *Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin*.  It sets the stage for the case, outlining the background and previous legal decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

Opinion of the Court

tration.  Preregistration, as noted supra, at 3–4, allows the
author  of  a  work  vulnerable  to  predistribution  infringe-
ment to enforce her exclusive rights in court before obtain-
ing registration or refusal thereof.  A copyright owner who
fears prepublication infringement would have no reason to
apply  for  preregistration,  however,  if  she  could  instead
simply complete an application for registration and imme-
diately  commence  an  infringement  suit.    Cf.  TRW  Inc.  v.
Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 29 (2001) (rejecting an interpreta-
tion  that  “would  in  practical  effect  render  [a  provision]
superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances”).

B
Challenging  the  Eleventh  Circuit’s  judgment,  Fourth
Estate  primarily  contends  that  the  Copyright  Act  uses
“the phrase ‘make registration’ and its passive-voice coun-
terpart  ‘registration  has  been  made’ ”  to  describe  submis-
sions by the copyright owner, rather than Copyright Office
responses  to  those  submissions.  Brief  for  Petitioner  21.
Section  411(a)’s  requirement  that  “registration  . . .  has
been  made  in  accordance  with  this  title,”  Fourth  Estate
insists,  most  likely  refers  to  a  copyright  owner’s  compli-
ance  with  the  statutory  specifications  for  registration
applications.  In  support,  Fourth  Estate  points  to  Copy-
right  Act  provisions  that  appear  to  use  the  phrase  “make
registration”  or  one  of  its  variants  to  describe  what  a
copyright  claimant  does.    See  id.,  at  22–26  (citing  17
U. S. C.  §§110,  205(c),  408(c)(3),  411(c),  412(2)).    Further-
more,  Fourth  Estate  urges  that  its  reading  reflects  the
reality  that,  eventually,  the  vast  majority  of  applications
are granted.  See Brief for Petitioner 41.

Fourth  Estate  acknowledges,  however,  that  the  Copy-
right Act sometimes uses “registration” to refer to activity
by  the  Copyright  Office,  not  activity  undertaken  by  a
copyright  claimant.    See  id.,  at  27–28  (citing  17  U. S. C.
§708(a)).  Fourth  Estate  thus  agrees  that,  to  determine
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal jargon and cites relevant sections of the Copyright Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Opinion of the Court

Court continued, “the Framers would not have allowed ad-
mission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examina-
tion.”  Id.,  at  53–54.4   Because  “[t]he  text  of  the  Sixth
Amendment  does  not  suggest  any  open-ended  exceptions
from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the
courts,” the requirement was “most naturally read” to ad-
mit  “only  those  exceptions  established  at  the  time  of  the
founding.”  Id., at 54; see also Giles v. California, 554 U. S.
353, 377 (2008) (“declin[ing] to approve an exception to the
Confrontation Clause unheard of at the time of the found-
ing or for 200 years thereafter”).

B

The State accepts all of the foregoing principles.  It does
not  dispute  that  Morris’  plea  allocution  was  testimonial,
meaning  that  it  implicated  Hemphill’s  rights  under  the
Confrontation  Clause.  Nor  does  the  State  argue  that  the
“opening the door” rule announced in People v. Reid and ap-
plied  in  Hemphill’s  case  was  an  exception  to  the  right  to
confrontation at common law.

The State’s primary contention is that the Reid rule “is
not an exception to the Confrontation Clause at all.”  Brief
for Respondent 36.  Instead, the State attempts to charac-
terize the Reid rule as a mere “procedural rule” that “treats
the misleading door-opening actions of counsel as the equiv-
alent  of  failing  to  object  to  the  confrontation  violation.”
Brief for Respondent 31.  So construed, the argument goes,

——————

4 The Crawford Court defined “testimony” as a “solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”
541 U. S., at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[A]t a minimum,”
the  Court  explained,  this  includes  “prior  testimony  at  a  preliminary
hearing,  before  a  grand  jury,  or  at  a  former  trial;  and  . . .  police
interrogations.”  Id., at 68.  Subsequent decisions have expounded on this
definition.  See, e.g., Ohio v. Clark, 576 U. S. 237, 244–245 (2015).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion discussing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. It cites legal precedents and delves into legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

9

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

because most large donors do not seek improper influence
over legislators’ actions.  Although the Court accepted that
premise,  it  nevertheless  rejected  the  overbreadth  chal-
lenge for two reasons: First, it was too “difficult to isolate
suspect  contributions”  based  on  a  contributor’s  subjective
Id.,  at  30.  Second,  “Congress  was  justified  in
intent.
concluding  that  the  interest  in  safeguarding  against  the
appearance  of  impropriety  requires  that  the  opportunity
for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary
contributions be eliminated.”  Ibid.

Finally,  in  one  paragraph  of  its  139-page  opinion,  the
Court turned to the $25,000 aggregate limit under FECA.
As  a  preliminary  matter,  it  noted  that  the  constitution-
ality  of  the  aggregate  limit  “ha[d]  not  been  separately
addressed  at  length  by  the  parties.”    Id.,  at  38.  Then,  in
three  sentences,  the  Court  disposed  of  any  constitutional
objections  to  the  aggregate  limit  that  the  challengers
might have had:

“The  overall  $25,000  ceiling  does  impose  an  ultimate
restriction  upon  the  number  of  candidates  and  com-
mittees  with  which  an  individual  may  associate  him-
self  by  means  of  financial  support.    But  this  quite
modest  restraint  upon  protected  political  activity
serves  to  prevent  evasion  of  the  $1,000  contribution
limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute
massive  amounts  of  money  to  a  particular  candidate
through  the  use  of  unearmarked  contributions  to  po-
litical  committees  likely  to  contribute  to  that  candi-
date, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political
party.    The  limited,  additional  restriction  on  associa-
tional  freedom  imposed  by  the  overall  ceiling  is  thus
no  more  than  a  corollary  of  the  basic  individual  con-
tribution limitation that we have found to be constitu-
tionally valid.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing campaign finance regulations and the constitutionality of contribution limits. It presents legal arguments and cites previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Opinion of the Court

Id., at 127, n. 1.

The District Court denied the motion to intervene.  North
Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Cooper, 332 F. R. D.
161  (MDNC  2019).  In  doing  so,  the  court  applied  a  “pre-
sumption”  that  the  legislative  leaders’  interests  would  be
adequately  represented  by  the  Governor  and  Board  and
their  legal  representative,  the  attorney  general.  Id.,  at
168–170.  On the court’s view, the legislative leaders might
someday have an interest sufficient to warrant intervention
if the existing parties refused to offer any defense of S. B.
824.  Id., at 166.  But because nothing like that had yet hap-
pened,  the  District  Court  denied  the  motion  to  intervene
without prejudice to renewal later.  Id., at 172–173.

In  time,  the  legislative  leaders  took  up  the  District
Court’s  offer  to  renew  their  motion.    They  pointed  to  this
Court’s intervening decision in Bethune-Hill, which “clari-
fied” that legislative leaders sometimes may be legally en-
titled to intervene and represent “the interest of the State
in defending the constitutionality of ” a state law.  App. 159.
They also updated the District Court on the Board’s conduct
in state-court proceedings.  There, the Board had conceded
that its “ ‘primary objective’ ” wasn’t defending S. B. 824, but
obtaining  guidance  regarding  which  law  it  would  need  to
enforce  in  an  upcoming  election  (S. B.  824  or  preexisting
law).  Id., at 156.  Seizing on this concession, the state-court
plaintiffs argued that even the Board did not think it would
ultimately prevail on the merits.  Id., at 157.  In the end,
however, the District Court was unmoved by these develop-
ments.  It  denied  the  legislative  leaders’  renewed  motion
and addressed Bethune-Hill only in a footnote stating that
the decision did not “change the calculus.”  North Carolina
State  Conference  of  NAACP  v.  Cooper,  2019  WL  5840845,
*2, n. 3 (MDNC, Nov. 7, 2019).

As the federal litigation proceeded without the legislative
leaders, the NAACP sought a preliminary injunction to pre-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations to legal precedents and discusses the arguments and decisions made in a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  556 U. S. ____ (2009)

15

Opinion of the Court

portionate”  standard  may  be  somewhat  different  from  its
current  “significantly  greater  than”  standard,  there  is
nothing in the statute that would indicate that the former
is a permissible interpretation while the latter is not.

Indeed,  in  its  review  of  the  EPA’s  Phase  I  regulations,
the  Second  Circuit  seemed  to  recognize  that  §1326(b)
permits some form of cost-benefit analysis.  In considering
a  challenge  to  the  EPA’s  rejection  of  dry  cooling  systems7
as the “best technology available” for Phase I facilities the
Second  Circuit  noted  that  “while  it  certainly  sounds  sub-
stantial that dry cooling is 95 percent more effective than
closed-cycle  cooling,  it  is  undeniably  relevant  that  that
difference represents a relatively small improvement over
cost.”
closed-cycle
Riverkeeper, 358 F. 3d, at 194, n. 22.  And in the decision
below  rejecting  the  use  of  cost-benefit  analysis  in  the
Phase  II  regulations,  the  Second  Circuit  nonetheless
interpreted “best technology available” as mandating only
those  technologies  that  can  “be  reasonably  borne  by  the
industry.”  475 F. 3d, at 99.  But whether it is “reasonable”
to bear a particular cost may well depend on the resulting
benefits;  if  the  only  relevant  factor  was  the  feasibility  of
the costs, their reasonableness would be irrelevant.

cooling  at  a  very

significant

In the last analysis, even respondents ultimately recog-
nize that some form of cost-benefit analysis is permissible.
They  acknowledge  that  the  statute’s  language  is  “plainly
not  so  constricted  as  to  require  EPA  to  require  industry
petitioners  to  spend  billions  to  save  one  more  fish  or
plankton.”    Brief  for  Respondents  Riverkeeper,  Inc.  et al.
29.  This  concedes  the  principle—the  permissibility  of  at
least some cost-benefit analysis—and we see no statutory
basis  for  limiting  its  use  to  situations  where  the  benefits

——————

7 Dry  cooling  systems  use  air  drafts  to  remove  heat,  and  accordingly
remove little or no water from surrounding water sources.  See 66 Fed.
Reg. 65282 (2001).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute related to environmental regulations. It delves into the permissibility of cost-benefit analysis in determining the "best technology available."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

51

Opinion of the Court

fault.  The  defendants  made  no  appearance  in  the  case,
neither  filing  a  brief  nor  appearing  at  oral  argument;  the
Court  heard  from  no  one  but  the  Government  (reason
enough, one would think, not to make that case the begin
ning  and  the  end  of  this  Court’s  consideration  of  the  Sec
ond Amendment).  See Frye, The Peculiar Story of United
States  v.  Miller,  3  N. Y.  U.  J. L.  &  Liberty  48,  65–68
(2008).  The  Government’s  brief  spent  two  pages  discuss
ing  English  legal  sources,  concluding  “that  at  least  the
carrying of weapons without lawful occasion or excuse was
always  a  crime”  and  that  (because  of  the  class-based  re
strictions  and  the  prohibition  on  terrorizing  people  with
dangerous or unusual weapons) “the early English law did
not  guarantee  an  unrestricted  right  to  bear  arms.”    Brief
for  United  States,  O.  T.  1938,  No.  696,  at  9–11.    It  then
went on to rely primarily on the discussion of the English
right  to  bear  arms  in  Aymette  v.  State,  21  Tenn.  154,  for
the proposition that the only uses of arms protected by the
Second  Amendment  are  those  that  relate  to  the  militia,
not  self-defense.  See  Brief  for  United  States,  O.  T.  1938,
No. 696, at 12–18.  The final section of the brief recognized
that  “some  courts  have  said  that  the  right  to  bear  arms
includes  the  right  of  the  individual  to  have  them  for  the
protection  of  his  person  and  property,”  and  launched  an
alternative  argument  that  “weapons  which  are  commonly
used  by  criminals,”  such  as  sawed-off  shotguns,  are  not
protected.  See  id.,  at  18–21.  The  Government’s  Miller
brief  thus  provided  scant  discussion  of  the  history  of  the
Second  Amendment—and  the  Court  was  presented  with
no  counterdiscussion.  As  for  the  text  of  the Court’s  opin
ion itself, that discusses none of the history of the Second
It  assumes  from  the  prologue  that  the
Amendment.
Amendment  was  designed  to  preserve  the  militia,  307
U. S., at 178 (which we do not dispute), and then reviews
some  historical  materials  dealing  with  the  nature  of  the
militia, and in particular with the nature of the arms their
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the history and interpretation of the Second Amendment. It cites legal precedents and delves into historical context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

ALITO, J., concurring

outside  their  homes,  the  Second  Amendment  was  under-
stood at the time of adoption to apply under those circum-
stances.  The  Court’s  exhaustive  historical  survey  estab-
lishes that point very clearly, and today’s decision therefore
holds that a State may not enforce a law, like New York’s
Sullivan Law, that effectively prevents its law-abiding res-
idents from carrying a gun for this purpose.

That is all we decide.  Our holding decides nothing about
who  may  lawfully  possess  a  firearm  or  the  requirements
that must be met to buy a gun.  Nor does it decide anything
about the kinds of weapons that people may possess.  Nor
have  we  disturbed  anything  that  we  said  in  Heller  or
McDonald  v.  Chicago,  561  U. S.  742  (2010),  about  re-
strictions that may be imposed on the possession or carry-
ing of guns.

In light of what we have actually held, it is hard to see
what legitimate purpose can possibly be served by most of
the dissent’s lengthy introductory section.  See post, at 1–8
(opinion of BREYER, J.).  Why, for example, does the dissent
think it is relevant to recount the mass shootings that have
occurred  in  recent  years?    Post,  at  4–5.  Does  the  dissent
think that laws like New York’s prevent or deter such atroc-
ities?  Will a person bent on carrying out a mass shooting
be stopped if he knows that it is illegal to carry a handgun
outside the home?  And how does the dissent account for the
fact that one of the mass shootings near the top of its list
took place in Buffalo?  The New York law at issue in this
case obviously did not stop that perpetrator.

What is the relevance of statistics about the use of guns
to commit suicide?  See post, at 5–6.  Does the dissent think
that a lot of people who possess guns in their homes will be
stopped or deterred from shooting themselves if they cannot
lawfully take them outside?

The dissent cites statistics about the use of guns in do-
mestic disputes, see post, at 5, but it does not explain why
these  statistics  are  relevant  to  the  question  presented  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*. It delves into the legal arguments and interpretations surrounding the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

Opinion of the Court

fers  to  provide  prenatal  sonography,  pregnancy  tests,
or pregnancy options counseling.

“(4)  The  facility  has  staff  or  volunteers  who  collect
health information from clients.”  Ibid.

Clinics operated by the United States and licensed primary
care  clinics  enrolled  in  Medi-Cal  and  Family  PACT  are
excluded.  §123471(c).

Unlicensed  covered  facilities  must  provide  a  government-
drafted  notice  stating  that  “[t]his  facility  is  not  li-
censed as a medical facility by the State of California and
has no licensed medical provider  who provides or directly
supervises the provision of services.”  Cal. Health & Safety
Code Ann. §123472(b)(1).  This notice must be provided on
site  and  in  all  advertising  materials.    §§123472(b)(2),  (3).
Onsite,  the  notice  must  be  posted  “conspicuously”  at  the
entrance  of  the  facility  and  in  at  least  one  waiting  area.
§123472(b)(2).  It must be “at least 8.5 inches by 11 inches
and written in no less than 48-point type.”  Ibid.  In adver-
tisements,  the  notice  must  be  in  the  same  size  or  larger
font  than  the  surrounding  text,  or  otherwise  set  off  in  a
way  that  draws  attention  to  it.    §123472(b)(3).    Like  the
licensed  notice,  the  unlicensed  notice  must  be  in  English
and  any  additional  languages  specified  by  state  law.
§123471(b).  Its stated purpose is to ensure “that pregnant
women in California know when they are getting medical
care from licensed professionals.”  Cal. Legis. Serv., §1(e).

B

After  the  Governor  of  California  signed  the  FACT  Act,
petitioners—a  licensed  pregnancy  center,  an  unlicensed
pregnancy  center,  and  an  organization  composed  of  crisis
pregnancy  centers—filed  this  suit.    Petitioners  alleged
that  the  licensed  and  unlicensed notices  abridge  the  free-
dom  of  speech  protected  by  the  First  Amendment.    The
District  Court  denied  their  motion  for  a  preliminary
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal citations, references to statutes, and discusses legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

vii

Page
1021
Ammerman; Ford Motor Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1033
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Amoco Oil Co.; Smith v.
1124
Amoco Production Co. v. Lobo Exploration Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1038
Amon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054
Ampex Corp.; Mitsubishi Electric Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1135
Anciso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130
Anderegg v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1020
Anderson; Johnson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114
Anderson v. Linahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1041
Anderson v. McClellan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1010,1104
Anderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119
Andrews v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079
Andrus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1109
Angelo v. Gee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Angelone; Clark v.
1008
Angelone; Johnson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058
Angelone; Ogunde v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1060
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Angelone; Rau v.
1013
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Angelone; Weeks v.
1132
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Angelone; Welch v.
1120
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Angelone; Wilson v.
1033
Angelone; Winslow v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132
Angleton v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093
Anthony v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1008
Antonio Gonzalez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110
A–1 Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Los Angeles County . . . . . . . . . .
1037
A–1 Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Melton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099
A–1 Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Monterey County . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089
Apfel; Jones v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1002
Apprendi v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003
Archivist of U. S.; Public Citizen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083
Arctic Alaska Fisheries Corp. v. Hoddevik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arestigueta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078
Arizaga Ramos v. Dist. Director, Ofﬁce for Immigration Review 1108
1015
Arizona v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028
Arizona; Clabourne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037
Arizona v. Leyva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arizona; Poland v.
1005
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arizona; Qualls v.
1005
Arizona; White v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1001
Arkansas; Alsbrook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036
Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Central Ark. . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055
Arkansas; Fowler v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1068
Arkansas; Hayden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

Opinion of the Court

of legal errors, then it does not always require knowledge of
the misrepresentation in the registration application, and
therefore  does  not  require  the  typical  elements  of  fraud.
Thus,  the  “knowledge”  question  that  the  parties  have  ar-
gued,  and  which  we  decide,  was  a  “subsidiary  question
fairly  included”  in  the  petition’s  question  presented.    See
this Court’s Rule 14.1(a).
  As  to  the  decision  below,  the  Ninth  Circuit  wrote  that
“the knowledge inquiry is not whether Unicolors knew that
including  a  mixture  of  confined  and  non-confined  designs
would  run  afoul  of  the  single-unit  registration  require-
ments; the inquiry is merely whether Unicolors knew that
certain designs included in the registration were confined
and, therefore, were each published separately to exclusive
customers.”  959 F. 3d, at 1200.  In context, we understand
this  statement  to  hold  that  Unicolors’  “knowledge”  of  the
facts that produced the inaccuracy was sufficient to demon-
strate  its  knowledge  of  the  inaccuracy  itself  under
§411(b)(1)(A).  Unicolors’ knowledge of the relevant law was
irrelevant.  The Ninth Circuit therefore explicitly addressed
the question we here decide.

*

  *
  For these reasons,  the judgment  of  the  Ninth Circuit  is
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

  *

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to trademark law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

Opinion of the Court

that the NLRA’s protection of the right to strike should “ ‘be
given a generous interpretation.’ ”  Brief for Respondent 21
(quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 234–
235 (1963)).  A strike, it points out, consists of a “concerted
stoppage of work.”  §142(2).  So, the argument goes, by en-
gaging in a concerted stoppage of work to support their eco-
nomic  demands,  the  drivers  engaged  in  conduct  arguably
protected by §7 of the NLRA.

This  argument  oversimplifies  the  NLRA.  As  we  ex-
plained,  the  right  to  strike  is  limited  by  the  requirement
that  workers  “take  reasonable  precautions  to  protect  the
employer’s plant, equipment, or products from foreseeable
imminent danger due to sudden cessation of work.”  Beth-
any Medical Center, 328 N. L. R. B., at 1094.  So the mere
fact  that  the  drivers  engaged  in  a  concerted  stoppage  of
work to support their economic demands does not end the
analysis.  We must also ask whether the strike exceeded the
limits of the statute.

Second, the Union argues that “workers do not forfeit the
Act’s protections simply by commencing a work stoppage at
a time when the loss of perishable products is foreseeable.”
Brief for Respondent 22.  It points out that the Board has
found strikers’ conduct protected even when their decision
not to work created a risk that perishable goods would spoil.
See, e.g., Lumbee Farms Coop., 285 N. L. R. B. 497 (1987)
(raw poultry processing workers), enf ’d, 850 F. 2d 689 (CA4
1988);  Central  Oklahoma  Milk  Producers  Assoc.,  125
N. L. R. B. 419 (1959) (milk-truck drivers), enf ’d, 285 F. 2d
495  (CA10  1960);  Leprino  Cheese  Co.,  170  N. L. R. B.  601
(1968)  (cheese  factory  employees),  enf ’d,  424  F. 2d  184
(CA10 1970).  If the mere risk of spoilage is enough to ren-
der  a  strike  illegal,  the  Union  insists,  then  workers  who
deal with perishable goods will have no meaningful right to
strike.

The Union is swinging at a straw man.  It casts this case
as one involving nothing more than a foreseeable risk that
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