<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC.

Syllabus

1, 126.  Pp. 18–19.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE,  joined by  JUSTICE ALITO,  JUSTICE KAVANAUGH,
and JUSTICE BARRETT, concluded in Part III that §6(c) cannot constitu-
tionally  be  enforced  to  the  extent  that  its  requirements  prevent  the
Director from reviewing final decisions rendered by APJs.  The Direc-
tor  accordingly  may  review  final  PTAB  decisions  and,  upon  review,
may issue decisions himself on behalf of the Board.  Section 6(c) other-
wise remains operative as to the other members of the PTAB.  When
reviewing such a decision by the Director, a court must decide the case
“conformably  to  the  constitution,  disregarding  the  law”  placing  re-
strictions on his review authority in violation of Article II.  Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178.

The appropriate remedy is a remand to the Acting Director to decide
whether  to  rehear  the  petition  filed  by  Smith  &  Nephew.    A  limited
remand provides an adequate opportunity for review by a principal of-
ficer.  Because the source of the constitutional violation is the restraint
on the review authority of the Director, rather than the appointment
of APJs by the Secretary, Arthrex is not entitled to a hearing before a
new panel of APJs.  Pp. 19–23.

 ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts
I  and  II,  in  which  ALITO,  GORSUCH,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,
joined,  and  an  opinion  with  respect  to  Part  III,  in  which  ALITO,  KA-
VANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in part and dissenting in part.  BREYER, J., filed an opinion con-
curring  in  the  judgment  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part,  in  which
SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opin-
ion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to Parts I
and II.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case.  It summarizes the main points of the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

IANCU v. BRUNETTI

Syllabus

society’s  sense  of  decency  or  propriety.    The  statute,  on  its  face,  dis-
tinguishes between two opposed sets of ideas: those aligned with con-
ventional moral standards and those hostile to them; those inducing
societal nods of approval and those provoking offense and condemna-
tion.  This  facial  viewpoint  bias  in  the  law  results  in  viewpoint-
discriminatory  application.    The  PTO  has  refused  to  register  marks
communicating “immoral” or “scandalous” views about (among other
things)  drug  use,  religion,  and  terrorism.    But  all  the  while,  it  has
approved  registration  of  marks  expressing  more  accepted  views  on
the same topics.

The  Government  says  the  statute  is  susceptible  of  a  limiting  con-
struction  that  would  remove  its  viewpoint  bias.    The  Government’s
idea  is  to  narrow  the  statutory  bar  to  “marks  that  are  offensive  [or]
shocking[ ]  because  of  their  mode  of  expression,  independent  of  any
views  that  they  may  express,”  which  would  mostly  restrict  the  PTO
to  refusing  marks  that  are  lewd,  sexually  explicit,  or  profane.    But
this  Court  cannot  accept  the  Government’s  proposal,  because  the
statute  says  something  markedly  different.    The  “immoral  or  scan-
dalous”  bar does not draw the line at lewd, sexually explicit, or pro-
fane marks.  Nor does it refer only to marks whose “mode of expres-
sion,” independent of viewpoint, is particularly offensive.  To cut the
statute  off  where  the  Government  urges  is  not  to  interpret  the  stat-
ute  Congress  enacted,  but  to  fashion  a  new  one.    And  once  the  “im-
moral or scandalous” bar is interpreted fairly, it must be invalidated.
Pp. 4–11.

 877 F. 3d 1330, affirmed.

KAGAN,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  THOMAS,
GINSBURG,  ALITO,  GORSUCH  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.  ALITO,  J.,
filed  a  concurring  opinion.  ROBERTS,  C. J.,  and  BREYER,  J.,  filed  opin-
ions concurring in part and dissenting in part.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER, J.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a summary of it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
c

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
Minneman, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1023,1159
Minnesota; Hatton v.
890
Minnesota; Jackson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  911,1105
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029
Minnesota; Larson v.
874
Minnesota; Muraski v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092
Minnesota; Roy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054
Minnesota; Runge v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998
Minnesota; Taylor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015
Minnesota; Townsend v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811
Minnfee, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1051
Miranda v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
876
Mirror Image Internet, Inc.; Lygren v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852
Mississippi; Barrett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1150
Mississippi; Booker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  851,1101

Mississippi; Bradley v.
855

Mississippi; Dismuke v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
806

Mississippi; Edmond v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

Mississippi; Garrett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

Mississippi; McGriggs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

Mississippi; Nunley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
846

Mississippi; Pierce v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mississippi; Roach v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  842,1038

Mississippi; Swift v.
1116

Mississippi Dept. of Health; Ellis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Missouri; Baumruk v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Missouri; Gaw v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Missouri; Graham v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  998,1102

913

Missouri; Jensen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Missouri; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Missouri; M. L. S. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  911,1066

Missouri; Phillips v.
1121

Missouri; Woods v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811

Missouri Gas Energy v. Schmidt
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

Mitchell; Davie v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133

Mitchell; Evans v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
850

Mitchell; Garner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  871,1101

Mitchell v. KDJM–FM
1150

Mitchell v. O’Brien  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mitchell; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Mitchell; Tompkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  900,1066

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  930,966,1061

Mitchell v. United States
876

Mitrano v. Kelly  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Mize; Jeffers v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
867

Mize; Kirkey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC.

STEVENS, J., dissenting

analysis  in  BPT  gave  the  EPA  the  ability  to  cushion  the
new  technology  requirement.  For  a  limited  time,  a  tech-
nology  with  costs  that  exceeded  its  benefits  would  not  be
considered “best.”

of

all

the

discharge

The  second  tier  of  technology  standards  required  exist-
ing  powerplants  to  adopt  the  “best  available  technology
economically  achievable”  to  advance  “the  national  goal  of
eliminating
pollutants.”
§1311(b)(2)(A).  In setting this “best available technology,”
or  “BAT,”8  standard,  Congress  gave  the  EPA  a  notably
different  command  for  deciding  what  technology  would
qualify  as  “best”:  The  EPA  was  to  consider,  among  other
factors, “the cost of achieving such effluent reduction,” but
Congress  did  not  grant  it  authority  to  balance  costs  with
the benefits of stricter regulation.  §1314(b)(2)(B).  Indeed,
in Crushed Stone this Court explained that the difference
between  BPT  and  BAT  was  the  existence  of  cost-benefit
authority in the first and the absence of that authority in
the  second.  See  449  U. S.,  at  71  (“Similar  directions  are
given  the  Administrator  for  determining  effluent  reduc-
tions  attainable  from  the  BAT  except  that  in  assessing
BAT total cost is no longer to be considered in comparison
to effluent reduction benefits”).

The BAT standard’s legislative history strongly supports
the view that Congress purposefully withheld cost-benefit
authority for this tier of regulation.  See ibid., n. 10.  The
House  of  Representatives  and  the  Senate  split  over  the
role cost-benefit analysis would play in the BAT provision.
The House favored the tool, see H. R. Rep. No. 92–911, p.
107  (1972),  1  Leg.  Hist.  794,  while  the  Senate  rejected  it,

——————

category  of  sources.”    1  Legislative  History  of  the  Water  Pollution
Control  Act  Amendments  of  1972  (Committee  Print  compiled  for  the
Senate  Committee  on  Public  Works  by  the  Library  of  Congress),  Ser.
No. 93–1, p. 170 (1973) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.)

8 Although  the  majority  calls  this  “BATEA,”  the  parties  refer  to  the

provision as “BAT,” and for simplicity, so will I.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the Clean Water Act and the different technology standards for pollution control.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgement</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U84

[09-06-00 20:39:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 214 (1998)

223

Opinion of the Court

While the ﬁled rate doctrine may seem harsh in some
circumstances, see, e. g., Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v.
Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 130–131 (1990), its strict
application is necessary to “prevent carriers from inten-
tionally ‘misquoting’ rates to shippers as a means of offer-
ing them rebates or discounts,” the very evil the ﬁling re-
quirement seeks to prevent.
Id., at 127. Regardless of the
carrier’s motive—whether it seeks to beneﬁt or harm a par-
ticular customer—the policy of nondiscriminatory rates is vi-
olated when similarly situated customers pay different rates
for the same services.
It is that antidiscriminatory policy
which lies at “the heart of the common-carrier section of the
Communications Act.” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, at 229.

The Ninth Circuit thought the ﬁled rate doctrine inap-
plicable “[b]ecause this case does not involve rates or rate-
setting, but rather involves the provisioning of services and
billing.”
108 F. 3d, at 990. Rates, however, do not exist
in isolation. They have meaning only when one knows the
services to which they are attached. Any claim for exces-
sive rates can be couched as a claim for inadequate services
and vice versa.
“If ‘discrimination in charges’ does not in-
clude non-price features, then the carrier could defeat the
broad purpose of the statute by the simple expedient of pro-
viding an additional beneﬁt at no additional charge. . . . An
unreasonable ‘discrimination in charges,’ that is, can come in
the form of a lower price for an equivalent service or in the
form of an enhanced service for an equivalent price.” Com-
petitive Telecommunications Assn. v. FCC, 998 F. 2d 1058,
1062 (CADC 1993). The Communications Act recognizes
this when it requires the ﬁled tariff to show not only
“charges,” but also “the classiﬁcations, practices, and regu-
lations affecting such charges,” 47 U. S. C. § 203(a); and
when it makes it unlawful to “extend to any person any privi-
leges or facilities in such communication, or employ or en-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 214 (1998). It discusses the "filed rate doctrine" and its application in the context of telecommunications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI

BREYER, J., dissenting

and  weeks,  then  stretching  into  months.”    Ante,  at  1.  At
some  point,  the  plaintiffs  allege,  all  the  defendants  knew
that they had nothing to do with the September 11 attacks
but continued to detain them anyway in harsh conditions.
Official  Government  policy,  both  before  and  after  the
defendants  became  aware  of  the  plaintiffs’  innocence,  led
to the plaintiffs being held in “tiny cells for over 23 hours a
day”  with  lights  continuously  left  on,  “shackled”  when
moved,  often  “strip  searched,”  and  “denied  access  to  most
forms of communication with the outside world.”  Ante, at
4  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    The  defendants
detained  the  plaintiffs  in  these  conditions  on  the  basis  of
their race or religion and without justification.

Moreover, the prison wardens were aware of, but delib-
erately indifferent to, certain unofficial activities of prison
guards involving a pattern of “physical and verbal abuse,”
such  as  “slam[ming]  detainees  into  walls;  twist[ing]  their
arms,  wrists,  and  fingers;  [breaking]  their  bones;”  and
subjecting them to verbal taunts.  Ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted).

The  plaintiffs’  complaint  alleges  that  all  the  defend-
ants—high-level Department of Justice officials and prison
wardens  alike—were  directly  responsible  for  the  official
confinement  policy,  which,  in  some  or  all  of  the  aspects
mentioned,  violated  the  due  process  and  equal  protection
components of the Fifth Amendment.  The complaint adds
that,  insofar  as  the  prison  wardens  were  deliberately
indifferent  to  the  unofficial  conduct  of  the  guards,  they
violated the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments.

I would hold that the complaint properly alleges consti-

tutional torts, i.e., Bivens actions for damages.

A
The Court’s holdings in Bivens, Carlson, and Davis rest
upon  four  basic  legal  considerations.    First,  the  Bivens
Court  referred  to  longstanding  Supreme  Court  precedent
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses constitutional torts and cites previous Supreme Court precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1178

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

tory  except  in  a  capital  case,  see  Rule  14.1(a),  or  when  or
dered by the Court.

2.  A  brief  in  opposition  should  be  stated  brieﬂy  and  in
plain terms and may not exceed the word or page limitations
speciﬁed  in  Rule  33.  In  addition  to  presenting  other  argu
ments for denying the petition, the brief in opposition should
address  any  perceived  misstatement  of  fact  or  law  in  the
petition that bears  on what issues properly  would be before
the  Court  if  certiorari  were  granted.  Counsel  are  admon
ished  that  they  have  an  obligation to  the  Court  to  point  out
in  the  brief  in  opposition,  and  not  later,  any  perceived  mis
statement made in the petition.  Any objection to consider
ation of a question presented based on what occurred in the
proceedings  below,  if  the  objection  does  not  go  to  jurisdic
tion,  may be  deemed waived  unless  called to  the Court’s  at
tention in the brief in opposition.

3.  Any  brief  in  opposition  shall  be  ﬁled  within  30  days
after the case is placed on the docket, unless the time is ex
tended by the Court or a Justice, or by the Clerk under Rule
30.4.  Forty  copies  shall  be  ﬁled,  except  that  a  respondent
proceeding  in  forma  pauperis  under  Rule  39,  including  an
inmate  of  an  institution,  shall  ﬁle  the  number  of  copies  re
quired  for  a  petition  by  such  a  person  under  Rule  12.2,  to
gether with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
a  copy  of  which  shall  precede  and  be  attached  to  each  copy
of  the  brief  in  opposition.  If  the  petitioner  is  proceeding
in forma pauperis,  the respondent shall prepare  its brief in
opposition,  if  any, as  required  by  Rule  33.2, and  shall  ﬁle  an
original  and  10  copies  of  that  brief.  Whether  prepared
under  Rule  33.1  or  Rule  33.2,  the  brief  in  opposition  shall
comply  with  the  requirements  of  Rule  24  governing  a  re
spondent’s brief, except that no summary of the argument is
required.  A brief in opposition may not be joined with any
other  pleading,  except  that  any  motion  for  leave  to  proceed
in  forma  pauperis  shall  be  attached.  The  brief  in  opposi
tion shall be served as required by Rule 29.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It outlines procedures for filing briefs in opposition to petitions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules/Procedure</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

‘fact’  side.”  Lilly  v.  Virginia,  527  U. S.  116,  148  (1999)
(Rehnquist,  C. J.,  concurring  in  judgment).  Because  the
“district court is ‘better positioned’ . . . to decide the issue,”
our review of the three-judge court’s primary cause deter-
mination  is  deferential.    Salve  Regina  College  v.  Russell,
499 U. S. 225, 233 (1991).

The  record  documents  the  severe  impact  of  burgeoning
demand  on  the  provision  of  care.  At  the  time  of  trial,
vacancy  rates  for  medical  and  mental  health  staff  ranged
as  high  as  20%  for  surgeons,  25%  for  physicians,  39%  for
nurse  practitioners,  and  54.1%  for  psychiatrists.    Juris.
App.  105a,  108a.    These  percentages  are  based  on  the
number  of  positions  budgeted  by  the  State.    Dr.  Ronald
Shansky,  former  medical  director  of  the  Illinois  prison
system,  concluded  that  these  numbers  understate  the  se-
verity  of  the  crisis  because  the  State  has  not  budgeted
sufficient  staff  to  meet  demand.5    According  to  Dr.
Shansky,  “even  if  the  prisons  were  able  to  fill  all  of  their
vacant  health  care  positions,  which  they  have  not  been
able to do to date, . . . the prisons would still be unable to
handle  the  level  of  need  given  the  current  overcrowding.”
Record  in  No.  2:90–CV–00520–LKK–JFM  (ED  Cal.),  Doc.
3231–13,  p. 16  (hereinafter  Doc.  3231–13).    Dr.  Craig
Haney,  a  professor  of  psychology,  reported  that  mental
health  staff  are  “managing  far  larger  caseloads  than  is
appropriate or effective.”  App. 596.  A prison psychiatrist
told Dr. Haney that “ ‘we are doing about 50% of what we
should be doing.’ ”  Ibid.  In the context of physical care Dr.
Shansky agreed that “demand for care, particularly for the
high  priority  cases,  continues  to overwhelm  the  resources

——————

5 Dr. Craig Haney likewise testified that the State had “significantly
underestimated the staffing needed to implement critical portions of the
Coleman  Program  Guide  requirements,”  that  “key  tasks  were  omitted
when  determining  staffing  workloads,”  and  that  estimates  were  based
on  “key  assumptions”  that  caused  the  State  to  underestimate  demand
for mental health care.  App. 596–597.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an excerpt from a court opinion. It discusses the impact of overcrowding on healthcare provision in prisons.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

BIDEN v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

to put the Termination Decision back on the chopping block
and  rethink  things,”  and  for  ultimately  “just  further  de-
fend[ing] what it had previously decided.”  Id., at 955.  And
the Court of Appeals drew a dichotomy between taking new
agency action and appealing an adverse decision, asserting
that “DHS chose not to take a new agency action” but “in-
stead chose to notice an appeal and defend its Termination
Decision in our court.”  Id., at 941.

We granted certiorari, 595 U. S. ___ (2022), and expedited

consideration of this appeal at the Government’s request.

II
We  begin  with  jurisdiction.    The  Government  contends
that the injunction the District Court entered was barred
by 8 U. S. C. §1252(f )(1).  That provision reads as follows:

“Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the
identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no
court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have juris-
diction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation
of [8 U. S. C. §§1221–1232], other than with respect to
the application of such provisions to an individual alien
against  whom  proceedings  under  [those  provisions]
have been initiated.”

As  we  recently  held  in  Garland  v.  Aleman  Gonzalez,  596
U. S.  ___  (2022),  section  1252(f )(1)  “generally  prohibits
lower courts from entering injunctions that order federal of-
ficials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce,
implement,  or  otherwise  carry  out  the  specified  statutory
provisions.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5).  The District Court’s
injunction in this case violated that provision.  But that fact
simply  presents  us  with  the  following  question:  whether
section  1252(f )(1)  deprives  this  Court  of  jurisdiction  to
reach  the  merits  of  an  appeal,  where  the  lower  court  en-
tered a form of relief barred by that provision.  See Steel Co.
v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 95 (1998)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in a case titled "BIDEN v. TEXAS". It contains legal arguments, citations to statutes and previous cases, and discusses the jurisdiction of the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

THOMAS, J., dissenting

with  “equal  opportunity”  serving  an  ancillary  function.6
594  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  15).    Relying  significantly
on §2(b)’s disclaimer of a right to proportional representa-
tion,  we  also  held  that  §2  does  not  enact  a  “freewheeling
disparate-impact regime.”  Id., at ___, and n. 14 (slip op., at
22,  and  n.  14).    Brnovich  further  stressed  the  value  of
“benchmarks  with  which  . . .  challenged  [electoral]  rule[s]
can  be compared,”  id., at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  17), and  that  “a
meaningful comparison is essential” in judging the signifi-
cance of any challenged scheme’s racially disparate impact.
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 18).  To the extent §2 applies to dis-
tricting plans, then, it requires that they be “equally open
to participation” by voters of all races, but it is not a pure
disparate-impact  statute  and  does  not  guarantee  propor-
tional representation.
  In its main argument here, Alabama simply carries these
principles  to  their  logical  conclusion:  Any  vote-dilution
benchmark must be race neutral.  See Brief for Appellants
32–46.  Whatever “equal openness” means in the context of
single-member  districting,  no  “meaningful  comparison”  is
possible using a benchmark that builds in a presumption in
favor  of  minority-controlled  districts.    Indeed,  any  bench-
mark other than a race-neutral one would render the vote-
dilution inquiry fundamentally circular, allowing courts to
conclude that a districting plan “dilutes” a minority’s voting
strength  “on  account  of  race”  merely  because  it  does  not
measure  up  to  an  ideal  already  defined  in  racial  terms.
Such  a  question-begging  standard  would  not  answer  our
precedents’  demand  for  an  “objective,”  “reasonable  bench-
mark.”    Holder,  512  U. S.,  at  881  (plurality  opinion)  (em-
phasis  added).    Nor  could  any  nonneutral  benchmark  be
reconciled  with  Brnovich’s  rejection  of  a  disparate-impact

——————

6 While Brnovich involved a time-place-and-manner voting rule, not a
vote-dilution challenge to a districting plan, its analysis logically must
apply to vote-dilution cases if the text of §2 covers such claims at all.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 599 U.S. ____ (2023). It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it part of the core legal content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

Urquidez,  494  U. S.,  at  275;  cf.  10  U. S. C.  §§2734(a),
2734a(a); 18 U. S. C. §2340A; 21 U. S. C. §904; 22 U. S. C.
§§2669,  2669–1;  42  U. S. C.  §2000dd;  but  see  28  U. S. C.
§2680(k)  (Federal  Tort  Claims  Act’s  exception  for  torts
“arising in a foreign country”).  Plaintiffs did not raise any
such statutory claim in this case.

Second, it is long settled as a matter of American corpo-
rate  law  that  separately  incorporated  organizations  are
separate  legal  units  with  distinct  legal  rights  and  obliga-
tions.  See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468, 474–
475  (2003);  Cedric  Kushner  Promotions,  Ltd.  v.  King,  533
U. S.  158,  163  (2001);  P.  Blumberg,  K.  Strasser,  N.  Geor-
gakopoulos,  &  E.  Gouvin,  Corporate  Groups  §§6.01,  6.02,
6.05 (2020 Supp.).

Plaintiffs’  foreign  affiliates  were  incorporated  in  other
countries and are legally separate from plaintiffs’ American
organizations.  Even though the foreign organizations have
affiliated with the American organizations, the foreign or-
ganizations remain legally distinct from the American or-
ganizations.  Plaintiffs do not ask this Court to pierce the
corporate veil, nor do they invoke any other relevant excep-
tion  to  that  fundamental  corporate  law  principle.  Tr.  of
Oral Arg. 54.

Those two bedrock principles of American constitutional
law and American corporate law together lead to a simple
conclusion:  As  foreign  organizations  operating  abroad,
plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates possess no rights under the First
Amendment.

That conclusion corresponds to historical practice regard-
ing American foreign aid.  The United States supplies more
foreign aid than any other nation in the world.  Cong. Re-
search Serv., Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U. S.
Programs  and  Policy  (2020)  (Summary).  Acting  with  the
President  in  the  legislative  process,  Congress  sometimes
imposes conditions on foreign aid.  See 22 U. S. C. §§2271,
2272, 2371, 7110(g)(2).  Congress may condition funding on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the First Amendment rights of foreign organizations. It cites legal precedents and statutes, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting

holistic admissions programs like the one that the Univer-
sity of North Carolina (UNC) has operated, consistent with
Grutter  v.  Bollinger,  539  U. S.  306  (2003),  are  a  problem
with respect to achievement of that aspiration, rather than
a viable solution (as has long been evident to historians, so-
ciologists, and policymakers alike).

JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  has  persuasively  established  that
nothing  in  the  Constitution  or  Title  VI  prohibits  institu-
tions from taking race into account to ensure the racial di-
versity  of  admits  in  higher  education.    I  join  her  opinion
without qualification.  I write separately to expound upon
the universal benefits of considering race in this context, in
response to a suggestion that has permeated this legal ac-
tion from the start.  Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA)
has maintained, both subtly and overtly, that it is unfair for
a college’s admissions process to consider race as one factor
in a holistic review of its applicants.  See, e.g., Tr. of Oral
Arg. 19.

This  contention  blinks  both  history  and  reality  in  ways
too  numerous  to  count.    But  the  response  is  simple:  Our
country has never been colorblind.  Given the lengthy his-
tory of state-sponsored race-based preferences in America,
to say that anyone is now victimized if a college considers
whether  that  legacy  of  discrimination  has  unequally  ad-
vantaged  its  applicants  fails  to  acknowledge  the  well-
documented “intergenerational transmission of inequality”
that still plagues our citizenry.1
  It  is  that  inequality  that  admissions  programs  such  as
UNC’s help to address, to the benefit of us all.  Because the
majority’s judgment stunts that progress without any basis
in law, history, logic, or justice, I dissent.

——————

1 M. Oliver & T. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspec-
tive  on  Racial  Inequality  128  (1997)  (Oliver  &  Shapiro)  (emphasis  de-
leted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It delves into the arguments surrounding holistic admissions programs and the consideration of race in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

and  attitudes  have  swung  back  and  forth.    By  the  end  of
the  19th  century,  gambling  was  largely  banned  through
out  the  country,1  but  beginning  in  the  1920s  and  1930s,
laws prohibiting gambling were gradually loosened.

New  Jersey’s  experience  is  illustrative.  In  1897,  New
Jersey  adopted  a  constitutional  amendment  that  barred
all gambling in the State.2  But during the Depression, the
State  permitted  parimutuel  betting  on  horse  races  as  a
way  of  increasing  state  revenue,3  and  in  1953,  churches
and  other  nonprofit  organizations  were  allowed  to  host
bingo  games.4    In  1970,  New  Jersey  became  the  third
State  to  run  a  state  lottery,5  and  within  five  years,  10
other States followed suit.6

By the 1960s, Atlantic City,  “once the most fashionable
resort  of  the  Atlantic  Coast,”  had  fallen  on  hard  times,7
and casino gambling came to be seen as a way to revitalize
the city.8  In 1974, a referendum on statewide legalization
failed,9  but  two  years  later,  voters  approved  a  narrower
measure allowing casino gambling in Atlantic City alone.10
At that time, Nevada  was the only other State with legal

——————

1 See  Nat.  Gambling  Impact  Study  Comm’n,  Final  Report,  p. 2–1
(1999)  (Final  Report);  S.  Durham  &  K.  Hashimoto,  The  History  of
Gambling in America 34–35 (2010).

2 See  Atlantic  City  Racing  Assn.  v.  Attorney  General,  98  N. J.  535,

539–541, 489 A. 2d 165, 167–168 (1985).

3 See  Note,  The  Casino  Act:  Gambling’s  Past  and  the  Casino  Act’s

Future, 10 Rutgers-Camden L. J. 279, 287 (1979) (The Casino Act).

4 Id.,  at  288;  see  also  N. J.  Const.,  Art.  4,  §7,  ¶2(A);  Bingo  Licensing

Law, N. J. Stat. Ann. §5:8–24 et seq. ( West 2012).

5 See  State  Lottery  Law,  N. J.  Stat.  Ann.  §5:9–1  et seq.;  The  Casino

Act, at 288; N. J. Const., Art. 4, §7, ¶2(C); Final Report, at 2–1.

6 Id., at 2–1.
7 T. White, The Making of the President 1964, p. 275 (1965).
8 See D. Clary, Gangsters to Governors 152–153 (2017) (Clary).
9 See The Casino Act, at 289.
10 See ibid.; N. J. Const., Art. 4, §7, ¶2(D).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section of a case. It discusses the history of gambling laws in New Jersey and the lead-up to the legalization of casino gambling in Atlantic City.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  580 U. S. ____ (2017)

7

Opinion of the Court

Id., at 1336.  He was afflicted by severe fears of common-
place  things  like  flies,  spills,  and  public  restrooms.    As
Endrew’s  parents  saw  it,  his  academic  and  functional
progress  had  essentially  stalled:  Endrew’s  IEPs  largely
carried over the same basic goals and objectives from one
year  to  the  next,  indicating  that  he  was  failing  to  make
meaningful  progress  toward  his  aims.  His  parents  be-
lieved that only a thorough overhaul of the school district’s
approach  to  Endrew’s  behavioral  problems  could  reverse
the trend.  But in April 2010, the school district presented
Endrew’s  parents  with  a  proposed  fifth  grade  IEP  that
was, in their view, pretty much the same as his past ones.
So  his  parents  removed  Endrew  from  public  school  and
enrolled  him  at  Firefly  Autism  House,  a  private  school
that specializes in educating children with autism.

Endrew  did  much  better  at  Firefly.    The  school  devel-
oped  a  “behavioral  intervention  plan”  that  identified  En-
drew’s  most  problematic  behaviors  and  set  out  particular
strategies  for  addressing  them.  See  Supp.  App.  198a–
201a.  Firefly also added heft to Endrew’s academic goals.
Within months, Endrew’s behavior improved significantly,
permitting  him  to  make  a  degree  of  academic  progress
that had eluded him in public school.

In November 2010, some six months after Endrew started
classes at Firefly, his parents again met with representa-
tives  of  the  Douglas  County  School  District.    The  district
presented  a  new  IEP.  Endrew’s  parents  considered  the
IEP no more adequate than the one proposed in April, and
rejected  it.  They  were  particularly  concerned  that  the
stated  plan  for  addressing  Endrew’s  behavior  did  not
differ meaningfully from the plan in his fourth grade IEP,
despite  the  fact  that  his  experience  at  Firefly  suggested
that he would benefit from a different approach.

In  February  2012,  Endrew’s  parents  filed  a  complaint
with the Colorado Department of Education seeking reim-
bursement  for  Endrew’s  tuition  at  Firefly.    To  qualify  for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in a case involving special education. It provides background information about the case and the parties involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

155

Opinion of the Court

Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act even though smoking, I think,
has been widely recognized as being harmful to human
health.” Rural Development, Agriculture, and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1989: Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., 409 (1988). At the same hearing, the FDA’s
General Counsel testiﬁed that “what is fairly important in
FDA law is whether a product has a therapeutic purpose,”
and “[c]igarettes themselves are not used for a therapeutic
purpose as that concept is ordinarily understood.”
Id., at
410. Between 1987 and 1989, Congress considered three
more bills that would have amended the FDCA to grant the
FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. See H. R.
3294, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H. R. 1494, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989); S. 769, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). As
before, Congress rejected the proposals.
In 1992, Congress
instead adopted the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health
Administration Reorganization Act, Pub. L. 102–321, § 202,
106 Stat. 394 (codiﬁed at 42 U. S. C. § 300x et seq.), which
creates incentives for States to regulate the retail sale of
tobacco products by making States’ receipt of certain block
grants contingent on their prohibiting the sale of tobacco
products to minors.

Taken together, these actions by Congress over the past
35 years preclude an interpretation of the FDCA that grants
the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. We do
not rely on Congress’ failure to act—its consideration and
rejection of bills that would have given the FDA this author-
ity—in reaching this conclusion.
Indeed, this is not a case
of simple inaction by Congress that purportedly represents
its acquiescence in an agency’s position. To the contrary,
Congress has enacted several statutes addressing the partic-
ular subject of tobacco and health, creating a distinct regula-
tory scheme for cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.
In doing
so, Congress has been aware of tobacco’s health hazards and
It has also enacted this legisla-
its pharmacological effects.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 120 (2000). It discusses Congress's actions regarding tobacco regulation and its implications for the FDA's jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

17

BREYER, J., dissenting

Bivens by substituting the U. S. Government as a defend-
ant  in  suits  against  federal  officers  that  raised  constitu-
tional  claims.  See  Pfander,  Constitutional  Torts,  at  102.
Later,  Congress  expressly  immunized  federal  employees
acting in the course of their official duties from tort claims
except  those  premised  on  violations  of  the  Constitution.
See  Federal  Employees  Liability  Reform  and  Tort  Com-
pensation  Act  of  1988,  commonly  known  as  the  Westfall
Act, 28 U. S. C. §2679(b)(2)(A).  We stated that it is conse-
quently  “crystal  clear  that  Congress  views  [the  Federal
Tort  Claims  Act]  and  Bivens  as  [providing]  parallel,  com-
plementary  causes  of  action.”    Carlson,  446  U. S.,  at  20;
see Malesko, 534 U. S., at 68 (similar).  Congress has even
assumed the existence of a Bivens remedy in suits brought
by  noncitizen  detainees  suspected  of  terrorism.  See  42
U. S. C.  §2000dd–1  (granting  qualified  immunity—but
not  absolute  immunity—to  military  and  civilian  federal
officials  who  are  sued  by  alien  detainees  suspected  of
terrorism).

B

The  majority  opinion also  sets  forth  a  more  specific  list
of  factors  that  it  says  bear  on  “whether  a  case  presents  a
new  Bivens  context.”  Ante,  at  16.  In  the  Court’s  view,  a
“case  might  differ”  from  Bivens  “in  a  meaningful  way
because  of  [1]  the  rank  of  the  officers  involved;  [2]  the
constitutional  right  at  issue;  [3]  the  generality  or  specifi-
city of the individual action; [4] the extent of judicial guid-
ance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or
emergency to be confronted; [5] the statutory or other legal
mandate  under  which  the  officer  was  operating;  [6]  the
risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the func-
tioning  of  other  branches;  [7]  or  the  presence  of  potential
special  factors  that  previous  Bivens  cases  did  not  con-
sider.”  Ante, at 16.  In my view, these factors do not make a
“meaningful  difference”  at  Step  One  of  the  Bivens  frame-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the legal framework surrounding Bivens actions and the Westfall Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

769

Opinion of the Court

FCA imposes civil liability upon “[a]ny person” who, inter
alia, “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an
ofﬁcer or employee of the United States Government . . . a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”
31
U. S. C. § 3729(a). The defendant is liable for up to treble
Ibid.
damages and a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per claim.
An FCA action may be commenced in one of two ways.
First, the Government itself may bring a civil action against
the alleged false claimant. § 3730(a). Second, as is relevant
here, a private person (the relator) may bring a qui tam civil
action “for the person and for the United States Gov-
ernment” against the alleged false claimant, “in the name of
the Government.” § 3730(b)(1).

If it does so,

If a relator initiates the FCA action, he must deliver a
copy of the complaint, and any supporting evidence, to the
Government, § 3730(b)(2), which then has 60 days to in-
it
tervene in the action, §§ 3730(b)(2), (4).
assumes primary responsibility for prosecuting the action,
§ 3730(c)(1), though the relator may continue to participate
in the litigation and is entitled to a hearing before voluntary
dismissal and to a court determination of reasonableness
before settlement, § 3730(c)(2).
If the Government declines
to intervene within the 60-day period, the relator has the
exclusive right to conduct the action, § 3730(b)(4), and the
Government may subsequently intervene only on a showing
of “good cause,” § 3730(c)(3). The relator receives a share
of any proceeds from the action—generally ranging from 15

share of recovery against a person contracting with Indians in an unlawful
manner); § 201 (providing cause of action and share of recovery against a
person violating Indian protection laws); 35 U. S. C. § 292(b) (providing
cause of action and share of recovery against a person falsely marking
patented articles); cf. 18 U. S. C. § 962 (providing for forfeiture to informer
of share of vessels privately armed against friendly nations, but not ex-
pressly authorizing suit by informer); 46 U. S. C. § 723 (providing for for-
feiture to informer of share of vessels removing undersea treasure from
the Florida coast to foreign nations, but not expressly authorizing suit
by informer).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses the False Claims Act (FCA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BROWN v. DAVENPORT

KAGAN, J., dissenting

I

Because  the  majority  begins  with  some  law-chambers
history,  see  ante,  at  7–11,  I  do  too—though  fair  warning:
My discussion is no more relevant than the majority’s to the
issue before us.  Not surprisingly, neither of the parties to
this small and legally mundane case thought it a suitable
occasion  for  a  from-Blackstone-onward  theory  of  habeas
practice.  Yet the majority, unprompted, embarks on that
project, perhaps hoping that the seeds it sows now will yield
more  succulent  fruit  in  cases  to  come.  In  the  majority’s
story, post-conviction habeas relief was all but unavailable
until the mid-20th century—when in an instant the Court
in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953), upended the rules.
That account repeats the views expressed in a recent con-
currence,  authored  by  the  same  Justice  as  today  delivers
the  majority  opinion.  See  Edwards  v.  Vannoy,  593  U. S.
___, ___–___ (2021) (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (slip op., at
2–8); id., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (Habeas historically “provided
no recourse for a prisoner confined pursuant to a final judg-
ment of conviction”).  But the theory, in its fundamentals,
is wrong.  Federal courts long before Brown  extended ha-
beas  relief  to  prisoners  held  in  violation  of  the  Constitu-
tion—even after a final conviction.

This  Court  started  reviewing  post-conviction  constitu-
tional claims under Congress’s first grant of habeas author-
ity, included in the Judiciary Act of 1789.  That provision,
applying only to federal prisoners, did not specifically pro-
vide for collateral review of constitutional claims.  See Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, §14, 1 Stat. 81–82 (enabling federal courts
to grant habeas writs to “inquir[e] into the cause of [a fed-
eral  prisoner’s]  commitment”).    But  even  without  explicit
permission, the Court in the mid-19th century invoked the
habeas  law  to  adjudicate  those  claims—including  some
from petitioners already convicted and sentenced.  See 1 R.
Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure §2.4[d][i], p. 51 (7th ed. 2020).  In Ex parte Wells,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Brown v. Davenport. It delves into the history and interpretation of habeas corpus law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

Much federal law proceeds on this same understanding.
Under  certain  circumstances,  a  court  “may  . . .  extend”  a
party’s  “time  for  appeal”  even  “after  the  expiration  of  the
time  otherwise  set  for  bringing  appeal.”
28  U. S. C.
§2107(c).  In other words, the timer can start, run, finish,
and then restart—because a court has the power to “extend”
the time allotted even after a lapse.  Likewise, the Federal
Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  prescribe  all  sorts  of  rules  about
“[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time”
in trial court proceedings.  Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b)(1).  And
for almost all rules prescribing a deadline, a district court
may  “extend  the  time”  even  “after  the  time  has  expired.”
Ibid.; cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b)(2).  More than a few law-
yers  and  clients  have  taken  advantage  of  “extensions”  of
just these sorts.

Still other examples exist.  Maybe most notably, just last
year Congress twice passed laws providing for the “exten-
sion” of public benefits that had lapsed or been interrupted.
See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116–
260, §203, 134 Stat. 1182 (providing an “extension” of un-
employment compensation starting on December 26, 2020,
after lapsing on July 31, 2020); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act, Pub. L. 116–136, §2114, 134 Stat.
281  (providing  an  “extension”  of  unemployment  benefits
starting in 2020, after lapsing in 2013).  The dissent gives
these particular examples short shrift because they appear
in statutes “passed in an emergency context” a decade after
the statute at issue here.  Post, at 7.  We do not doubt that
meaning  may  change  with  time,  but  unless  the  dissent
thinks the ordinary meaning of “extension” changed in just
10  years,  it’s  hard  to  understand  why  these  enactments
don’t shed at least some light on today’s question.  If any-
thing,  the  emergency  context  in  which  these  laws  were
passed—forcing legislators to use a term on short notice—
would seem to provide useful evidence of ordinary meaning.
Beyond that, the dissent counters by attempting to recast
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in a Supreme Court case. It discusses the common usage of the word "extension" in legal contexts, citing examples from federal law and recent legislation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  556 U. S. ____ (2009)

11

STEVENS, J., dissenting

weakens the provision’s mandate.11

Accordingly,  I  would  hold  that  the  EPA  is  without  au-
thority  to  perform  cost-benefit  analysis  in  setting  BTA
standards.    To  the  extent  the  EPA  relied  on  cost-benefit
analysis in establishing its BTA regulations,12 that action
was contrary to law, for Congress directly foreclosed such
reliance in the statute itself.13  Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843.

——————

11 The Court attempts to cabin its holding by suggesting that a “rigor-
ous  form  of  cost-benefit  analysis,”  such  as  the  form  “prescribed  under
the  statute’s  former  BPT  standard,”  may  not  be  permitted  for  setting
BTA  regulations.    Ante,  at  13.    Thus  the  Court  has  effectively  in-
structed the Agency that it can perform a cost-benefit analysis so long
as  it  does  not  resemble  the  kind  of  cost-benefit  analysis  Congress
elsewhere  authorized  in  the  CWA.    The  majority’s  suggested  limit  on
the  Agency’s  discretion  can  only  be  read  as  a  concession  that  cost-
benefit  analysis,  as  typically  performed,  may  be  inconsistent  with  the
BTA mandate.

12 The  “national  performance  standards”  the  EPA  adopted  were
shaped  by  economic  efficiency  concerns  at  the  expense  of  finding  the
technology  that  best  minimizes  adverse  environmental  impact.    In  its
final  rulemaking,  the  Agency  declined  to  require  industrial  plants  to
adopt  closed-cycle  cooling  technology,  which  by  recirculating  cooling
water  requires  less  water  to  be  withdrawn  and  thus  fewer  aquatic
organisms  to  be  killed.  Riverkeeper,  Inc.  v.  EPA,  358  F. 3d  174,  182,
n. 5  (CA2  2004);  69  Fed.  Reg.  41601,  and  n. 44.  This  the  Agency  de-
cided  despite  its  acknowledgment  that  “closed-cycle,  recirculating
cooling systems . . . can reduce mortality from impingement by up to 98
percent and entrainment by up to 98 percent.”  Id., at 41601.  The EPA
instead  permitted  individual  plants  to  resort  to  a  “suite”  of  options  so
long as the method used reduced impingement and entrainment by the
more  modest  amount  of  80  and  60  percent,  respectively.    See  40  CFR
§125.94(b).    The  Agency  also  permitted  individual  plants  to  obtain  a
site-specific  variance  from  the  national  performance  standards  if  they
could  prove  (1)  that  compliance  costs  would  be  “significantly  greater
than” those the Agency considered when establishing the standards, or
(2)  that  compliance  costs  “would  be  significantly  greater  than  the
benefits  of  complying  with  the  applicable  performance  standards,”
§125.94(a)(5).

13 Thus,  the  Agency’s  past  reliance  on  a  “wholly  disproportionate”
standard,  a  mild  variant  of  cost-benefit  analysis,  is  irrelevant.    See
ante,  at  14.  Because  “Congress  has  directly  spoken  to  the  precise
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's interpretation of the law and specifically criticizes the EPA's use of cost-benefit analysis in setting BTA standards.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:47] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

932

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 15, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–9060. Hall, aka Valeriano v. United States.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d
1261.

No. 97–9061. Francisco v. Office of Personnel Manage-
ment. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 152
F. 3d 939.

No. 97–9070. Zuckerman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9076. Gunn, aka Wells v. United States. C. A. 1st

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1150.

No. 97–9077. Delancy v. Crabtree, Warden, et al. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 780.

No. 97–9080. Federowicz v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 767.

No. 97–9085. Sheppard v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 595.

No. 97–9087. Grant v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–9091. Keller v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 430.

No. 97–9108. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9110. Queen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 136 F. 3d 1330.

No. 97–9111. Avery v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 917.

No. 97–9115. Tovar-Valencia v. United States. C. A. 5th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 137 F. 3d 1351.

No. 97–9116. Terry v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–9117. Toledo v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 913.

No. 97–9136. Nohara v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 909.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be the main body of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Syllabus

for interested women to obtain seamless access to contraception with-
out cost-sharing cannot justify supplanting the text’s plain meaning.
Even if such concerns are legitimate, they are more properly directed
at the regulatory mechanism that Congress put in place.  Pp. 14–18.

(b) Because  the  ACA  provided  a  basis  for  both  exemptions,  the
Court need not decide whether RFRA independently compelled the De-
partments’  solution.    However,  the  argument  that  the  Departments
could not consider RFRA at all is without merit.  It is clear from the
face of the statute that the contraceptive mandate is capable of violat-
ing RFRA.  The ACA does not explicitly exempt RFRA, and the regu-
lations  implementing  the  contraceptive  mandate  qualify  as  “Federal
law” or “the implementation of [Federal] law” under RFRA.  §2000bb–
3(a).  Additionally, this Court stated in Hobby Lobby that the mandate
violated RFRA as applied to entities with complicity-based objections.
And both Hobby Lobby and Zubik instructed the Departments to con-
sider  RFRA  going  forward.    Moreover,  in  light  of  the  basic  require-
ments of the rulemaking process, the Departments’ failure to discuss
RFRA  at  all  when  formulating  their  solution  would  make  them  sus-
ceptible to claims that the rules were arbitrary and capricious for fail-
ing to consider an important aspect of the problem.  Pp. 19–22.

2. The rules promulgating the exemptions are free from procedural

defects.  Pp. 22–26.

(a) Respondents claim that because the final rules were preceded
by  a  document  entitled  “Interim  Final  Rules  with  Request  for  Com-
ments” instead of “General Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” they are
procedurally invalid under the APA.  The IFRs’ request for comments
readily  satisfied  the  APA  notice  requirements.    And  even  assuming
that the APA requires an agency to publish a document entitled “notice
of  proposed  rulemaking,”  there  was  no  “prejudicial  error”  here,  5
U. S. C. §706.  Pp. 22–24.

(b) Pointing to the fact that the final rules made only minor alter-
ations to the IFRs, respondents also contend that the final rules are
procedurally invalid because nothing in the record suggests that the
Departments maintained an open mind during the post-promulgation
process.  The “open-mindedness” test has no basis in the APA.  Each of
the APA’s procedural requirements was satisfied: The IFRs provided
sufficient notice, §553(b); the Departments “g[a]ve interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission
of written data, views or arguments,” §553(c); the final rules contained
“a  concise  general  statement  of  their  basis  and  purpose,”  ibid.;  and
they were published more than 30 days before they became effective,
§553(d).  Pp. 24–26.

930 F. 3d 543, reversed and remanded.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the arguments and holdings of the Court, but it is not the actual content of the case itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

Opinion of the Court

filed within a week after the Sixth Circuit issued its deci-
sion and within the 14-day time limit for petitioning for re-
hearing en banc.  Although the litigation by that time had
proceeded for years, that factor is not dispositive.  The at-
torney general’s need to seek intervention did not arise un-
til  the  secretary  ceased  defending  the  state  law,  and  the
timeliness  of  his  motion  should  be  assessed  in  relation  to
that point in time.
  Respondents argue that the attorney general should have
realized  as  soon  as  Governor  Beshear  took  office  that  his
secretary  for  Health  and  Family  Services  might  abandon
the  defense  of  HB  454.    Respondents  state  that  Governor
Beshear ran “on a pro-choice platform and . . . had repeat-
edly  withdrawn  from  the  defense  of  abortion  restrictions
when serving as Attorney General.”  Brief for Respondents
28.  But the new secretary whom he appointed after taking
office as Governor had continued to defend the law on ap-
peal, and respondents do not explain why the attorney gen-
eral  should  have  known  that  the  secretary  would  change
course after the panel’s decision was handed down.
  In arguing to the contrary, respondents point to our deci-
sion in NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345, but they mis-
read that decision.  In that case, several parties unsuccess-
fully sought to intervene in a Voting Rights Act case after
the United States, which had brought the action, consented
to the entry of judgment in favor of the defendant.  The Dis-
trict  Court  found  that  this  request  was  untimely,  and  we
affirmed, noting that the United States’ answer to the com-
plaint,  which  had  been  filed  almost  a  month  earlier,  had
revealed  that  the  Government  “was  without  information
with  which  it  could oppose the motion  for summary  judg-
ment.”    Id.,  at  367.    That  response,  we  concluded,  should
have  alerted  the  would-be  intervenors  about  the  United
States’  likely  course  of  action.    Ibid.    We  also  observed,
among other things, that intervention had “the potential for
seriously  disrupting”  the  approaching  elections.    Id.,  at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

Opinion of BREYER, J.

further  than  thirty  miles  from  the  location  at  which  the
abortion is performed or induced and that provides obstet-
rical or gynecological health care services.”  La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §40:1061.10(A)(2)(a).

The statute defines “active admitting privileges” to mean
that the doctor must be “a member in good standing” of the
hospital’s “medical staff . . . with the ability to admit a pa-
tient and to provide diagnostic and surgical services to such
patient.”  Ibid.; La. Admin. Code, tit. 48, pt. I, §4401.  Fail-
ure to comply may lead to fines of up to $4,000 per violation,
license  revocation,  and  civil  liability.    See  ibid.;  La.  Rev.
Stat. Ann. §40:1061.29.

B
A few weeks before Act 620 was to take effect in Septem-
ber 2014, three abortion clinics and two abortion providers
filed a lawsuit in Federal District Court.  They alleged that
Act 620 was unconstitutional because (among other things)
it imposed an undue burden on the right of their patients to
obtain an abortion.  App. 24.  The court later consolidated
their lawsuit with a similar, separate action brought by two
other  clinics  and  two  other  abortion  providers.    (Like  the
courts below, we shall refer to the two doctors in the first
case as Doe 1 and Doe 2; we shall refer to the two doctors in
the second case as Doe 5 and Doe 6; and we shall refer to
two other doctors then practicing in Louisiana as Doe 3 and
Doe 4.)

The plaintiffs immediately asked the District Court to is-
sue a temporary restraining order (TRO), followed by a pre-
liminary injunction that would prevent the law from taking
effect.  June Medical Services LLC v. Caldwell, No. 14–cv–
00525 (MD La., Aug. 22, 2014), Doc. No. 5.

The State of Louisiana, appearing for the defendant Sec-
retary of the Department of Health and Hospitals, filed a
response that opposed the plaintiffs’ TRO request.  App. 32–
39.  But the State went on to say that, if the court granted
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case June Medical Services LLC v. Russo. It contains legal citations, case names, and arguments related to a specific law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SACKETT ET UX. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–454.  Argued October 3, 2022—Decided May 25, 2023

Petitioners  Michael  and  Chantell  Sackett  purchased  property  near
Priest Lake, Idaho, and began backfilling the lot with dirt to prepare
for building a home.  The Environmental Protection Agency informed
the  Sacketts  that  their  property  contained  wetlands  and  that  their
backfilling violated the Clean Water Act, which prohibits discharging
pollutants into “the waters of the United States.”  33 U. S. C. §1362(7).
The EPA ordered the Sacketts to restore the site, threatening penalties
of over $40,000 per day.  The EPA classified the wetlands on the Sack-
etts’ lot as “waters of the United States” because they were near a ditch
that fed into a creek, which fed into Priest Lake, a navigable, intrastate
lake.  The Sacketts sued, alleging that their property was not “waters
of the United States.”  The District Court entered summary judgment
for the EPA.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the CWA covers
wetlands with an ecologically significant nexus to traditional naviga-
ble waters and that the Sacketts’ wetlands satisfy that standard.

Held: The  CWA’s  use  of  “waters”  in  §1362(7)  refers  only  to  “geo-
graphic[al]  features  that  are  described  in  ordinary  parlance  as
‘streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes’ ” and to adjacent wetlands that are
“indistinguishable” from those bodies of water due to a continuous sur-
face connection.  Rapanos v. United States, 547 U. S. 715, 755, 742, 739
(plurality opinion).  To assert jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland un-
der the CWA, a party must establish “first, that the adjacent [body of
water constitutes] . . . ‘water[s] of the United States’ (i.e., a relatively
permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable
waters);  and  second,  that  the  wetland  has  a  continuous  surface  con-
nection  with  that  water,  making  it  difficult  to  determine  where  the
‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”  Ibid.  Pp. 6–28.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

BARRETT, J., concurring
BARRETT, J., concurring in part

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–468
_________________

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. KAREN ROSS, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE CALI-
FORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD &
AGRICULTURE, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[May 11, 2023]

JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring in part.
A state law that burdens interstate commerce in clear ex-
cess  of  its  putative  local  benefits  flunks  Pike  balancing.
Pike  v.  Bruce  Church,  Inc.,  397  U. S.  137,  142  (1970).    In
most  cases,  Pike’s  “general  rule”  reflects  a  commonsense
principle: Where there’s smoke, there’s fire.  Ibid.  Under
our  dormant  Commerce  Clause  jurisprudence,  one  State
may  not  discriminate  against  another’s  producers  or  con-
sumers.  A law whose burdens fall incommensurately and
inexplicably  on  out-of-state  interests  may  be  doing  just
that.

But  to  weigh  benefits  and  burdens,  it  is  axiomatic  that
both must be judicially cognizable and comparable.  See De-
partment of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U. S. 328, 354–355
(2008).  I  agree  with  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  that  the  benefits
and burdens of Proposition 12 are incommensurable.  Cali-
fornia’s  interest  in  eliminating  allegedly  inhumane  prod-
ucts from its markets cannot be weighed on a scale opposite
dollars and cents—at least not without second-guessing the
moral judgments of California voters or making the kind of
policy decisions reserved for politicians.  Ante, at 18–21; Da-
vis, 553 U. S., at 360 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).  None
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Barrett.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

BREYER, J., dissenting

the 25-year period from 1991 to 2015 and found that “shall
issue” laws were associated with 6.5% higher total homicide
rates,  8.6%  higher  firearm  homicide  rates,  and  10.6%
higher  handgun  homicide  rates.  Siegel,  107  Am.  J.  Pub.
Health, at 1924–1925, 1927.  Another study longitudinally
followed 33 States that had adopted “shall-issue” laws be-
tween 1981 and 2007 and found that the adoption of those
laws  was  associated  with  a  13%–15%  increase  in  rates  of
violent crime after 10 years.  Donohue, 16 J. Empirical Le-
gal Studies, at 200, 240.  Numerous other studies show sim-
ilar  results.   See,  e.g.,  Siegel,  36  J.  Rural  Health,  at  261
(finding  that  “may  issue”  laws  are  associated  with  17%
lower firearm homicide rates in large cities); C. Crifasi et
al.,  Association  Between  Firearm  Laws  and  Homicide  in
Urban Counties, 95 J. Urb. Health 383, 387 (2018) (finding
that “shall issue” laws are associated with a 4% increase in
firearm homicide rates in urban counties); M. Doucette, C.
Crifasi, & S. Frattaroli, Right-to-Carry Laws and Firearm
Workplace  Homicides:  A  Longitudinal  Analysis  (1992–
2017), 109 Am. J. Pub. Health 1747, 1751 (Dec. 2019) (find-
ing  that  States  with  “shall  issue”  laws  between  1992  and
2017 experienced 29% higher rates of firearm-related work-
place homicides); Brief for Social Scientists et al. as Amici
Curiae 15–16, and nn. 17–20 (citing “thirteen . . . empirical
papers  from  just  the  last  few  years  linking  [“shall  issue”]
laws to higher violent crime”).

JUSTICE  ALITO  points  to  competing  empirical  evidence
that arrives at a different conclusion.  Ante, at 3, n. 1 (con-
curring opinion).  But these types of disagreements are ex-
actly the sort that are better addressed by legislatures than
courts.  The Court today restricts the ability of legislatures
to  fulfill  that  role.  It  does  so  without  knowing  how  New
York’s law is administered in practice, how much discretion
licensing  officers  in  New  York  possess,  or  whether  the
proper cause standard differs across counties.  And it does
so without giving the State an opportunity to develop the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites studies and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U60

[09-26-01 12:39:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

820

UNITED STATES v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, INC.
Opinion of the Court

“The Government presented evidence of two city
councillors, eighteen individuals, one United States Sen-
ator, and the ofﬁcials of one city who complained either
to their [cable operator], to their local Congressman, or
to the FCC about viewing signal bleed on television.
In
each instance, the local [cable operator] offered to, or did
in fact, rectify the situation for free (with the exception
of 1 individual), with varying degrees of rapidity.
In-
cluded in the complaints was the additional concern that
other parents might not be aware that their children are
exposed to this problem.
In addition, the Government
presented evidence of a child exposed to signal bleed at
a friend’s house. Cindy Omlin set the lockout feature
on her remote control to prevent her child from tuning
to adult channels, but her eleven year old son was never-
theless exposed to signal bleed when he attended a
slumber party at a friend’s house.

“The Government has presented evidence of only a
handful of isolated incidents over the 16 years since 1982
when Playboy started broadcasting. The Government
has not presented any survey-type evidence on the mag-
nitude of the ‘problem.’ ”
Id., at 709 (footnote and rec-
ord citations omitted).

Spurred by the District Court’s express request for more
speciﬁc evidence of the problem, see 945 F. Supp., at 779,
n. 16, the Government also presented an expert’s spread-
sheet estimate that 39 million homes with 29.5 million chil-
dren had the potential to be exposed to signal bleed, 30
F. Supp. 2d, at 708–709. The Government made no attempt
to conﬁrm the accuracy of its estimate through surveys or
other ﬁeld tests, however. Accordingly, the District Court
discounted the ﬁgures and made this ﬁnding: “[T]he Govern-
ment presented no evidence on the number of households
actually exposed to signal bleed and thus has not quantiﬁed
Id., at
the actual extent of the problem of signal bleed.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on a case involving signal bleed from adult channels. It contains legal arguments, citations, and factual details relevant to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ANDINO v. MIDDLETON

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

and the health of the people to the politically accountable
officials  of  the  States.”    South  Bay  United  Pentecostal
Church  v.  Newsom,  590  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2020)  (ROBERTS,
C. J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive re-
lief) (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted).  “When those officials ‘undertake[ ] to act in areas
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,’ their lat-
itude ‘must be especially broad.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting Marshall
v.  United  States,  414  U. S.  417,  427  (1974);  alteration  in
original).  It follows that a State legislature’s decision either
to  keep  or  to  make  changes  to  election  rules  to  address
COVID–19  ordinarily  “should  not  be  subject  to  second-
guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which lacks the
background,  competence,  and  expertise  to  assess  public
health  and  is  not  accountable  to  the  people.”    South  Bay,
590 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2) (citing Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 545 (1985)).
The District Court’s injunction contravened that principle.
  Second,  for  many  years,  this  Court  has  repeatedly  em-
phasized  that  federal  courts  ordinarily  should  not  alter
state election rules in the period close to an election.  See
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).  By en-
joining  South  Carolina’s  witness  requirement  shortly  be-
fore  the  election,  the  District  Court  defied  that  principle
and  this  Court’s  precedents.    See  ___  F. 3d  ___,  ___–___
(CA4  2020)  (Wilkinson and  Agee,  JJ.,  dissenting  from de-
nial of stay).
  For  those  two  alternative  and  independent  reasons,  I
agree  with  this  Court’s  order  staying  in  part  the  District
Court’s injunction.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in the case of ANDINO v. MIDDLETON.  It discusses legal precedent and principles related to state election rules and federal court intervention.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:25:22
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CV

Pagination Table: RULES1

1174

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

warrant and any supplemental process must be de-
livered to a person or organization authorized to en-
force it, who may be: (A) a marshal; (B) someone
under contract with the United States; (C) someone
specially appointed by the court for that purpose;
or, (D) in an action brought by the United States,
any ofﬁcer or employee of the United States.

(c) Deposit in court.—If the property that is the sub-
ject of the action consists in whole or in part of freight,
the proceeds of property sold, or other intangible prop-
erty, the clerk must issue—in addition to the warrant—
a summons directing any person controlling the prop-
erty to show cause why it should not be deposited in
court to abide the judgment.

(d) Supplemental process.—The clerk may upon ap-
plication issue supplemental process to enforce the
court’s order without further court order.

(4) Notice.—No notice other than execution of process is
required when the property that is the subject of the action
has been released under Rule E(5).
If the property is not
released within 10 days after execution, the plaintiff must
promptly—or within the time that the court allows—give
public notice of the action and arrest in a newspaper desig-
nated by court order and having general circulation in the
district, but publication may be terminated if the property
is released before publication is completed. The notice must
specify the time under Rule C(6) to ﬁle a statement of inter-
est in or right against the seized property and to answer.
This rule does not affect the notice requirements in an action
to foreclose a preferred ship mortgage under 46 U. S. C.
§ 31301 et seq., as amended.

.

.

.

.

.

(6) Responsive pleading; interrogatories.

(a) Civil forfeiture.—In an in rem forfeiture action

for violation of a federal statute:

(i) a person who asserts an interest in or right
against the property that is the subject of the action
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically the Rules of Civil Procedure. It outlines procedures related to warrants, property seizure, and notice requirements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules/Procedure</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

Syllabus

must satisfy at least “strict scrutiny,” showing that its restrictions on
the plaintiff’s protected rights serve a compelling interest and are nar-
rowly tailored to that end.  See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533.  A similar
standard generally obtains under the Free Speech Clause.  See Reed
v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 171.  The District asks the Court to
apply to Mr. Kennedy’s claims the more lenient second-step Pickering–
Garcetti test, or alternatively, intermediate scrutiny.  The Court con-
cludes, however, that the District cannot sustain its burden under any
standard.  Pp. 19–30.

i. The  District,  like  the  Ninth  Circuit  below,  insists  Mr.  Ken-
nedy’s  rights  to  religious  exercise  and  free  speech  must  yield  to  the
District’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation under
Lemon and its progeny.  The Lemon approach called for an examina-
tion of a law’s purposes, effects, and potential for entanglement with
religion.  Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612–613.  In time, that approach also
came  to  involve  estimations  about  whether  a  “reasonable  observer”
would consider the government’s challenged action an “endorsement”
of religion.  See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 593.  But—given the
apparent  “shortcomings”  associated  with  Lemon’s  “ambitiou[s],”  ab-
stract,  and  ahistorical  approach  to  the  Establishment  Clause—this
Court long ago abandoned  Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot.
American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588 U. S. ___, ___ (plu-
rality opinion).
   In  place  of  Lemon  and  the  endorsement  test,  this  Court  has  in-
structed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by “‘ref-
erence to historical practices and understandings.’ ”  Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U. S. 565, 576.  A natural reading of the First Amend-
ment suggests that the Clauses have “complementary” purposes, not
warring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the oth-
ers.  Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 13, 15.  An analysis
focused on original meaning and history, this Court has stressed, has
long  represented  the  rule  rather  than  some  “ ‘exception’ ”  within  the
“Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”  Town of Greece, at 575.
The District and the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to heed this guid-
ance.  Pp. 19–30.

ii. The  District  next  attempts  to  justify  its  suppression  of  Mr.
Kennedy’s religious activity by arguing that doing otherwise would co-
erce students to pray.  The Ninth Circuit did not adopt this theory in
proceedings  below  and  evidence  of  coercion  in  this  record  is  absent.
The District suggests that any visible religious conduct by a teacher or
coach should be deemed—without more and as a matter of law—im-
permissibly coercive on students.  A rule that the only acceptable gov-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus section of a Supreme Court case. It outlines the legal arguments and the court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY

Syllabus

agreed compensation—to “acquire the same by the exercise of the right
of  eminent  domain.”    §717f(h).    This  delegation  is  categorical;  by  its
terms, §717f(h) delegates to certificate holders the power to condemn
any necessary rights-of-way, including land in which a State holds an
interest.  Pp. 11–12.

(c) Respondents  contend  that  sovereign  immunity  bars  condemna-
tion actions against a nonconsenting State.  Alternatively, respondents
contend that §717f(h) does not speak with sufficient clarity to author-
ize such actions.  The Court rejects each argument, for reasons stated
below.  Pp. 13–22.

(1) “States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sov-
ereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Consti-
tution.”  Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 713.  A State may be sued only
in limited circumstances, including where the State expressly consents
or where Congress clearly abrogates the State’s immunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment.  A State may also be sued if it has implicitly
agreed to suit in the “plan of the Convention,” which is shorthand for
“the  structure  of  the  original  Constitution  itself.”  Id.,  at  728.    The
Court  has  looked  to  the  plan  of  the  Convention  to  permit  actions
against  nonconsenting  States  in  the  context  of  bankruptcy  proceed-
ings, suits by other States, and suits by the Federal Government.  Pp.
13–14.

(2) Respondents do not dispute that the NGA empowers certificate
holders to condemn private property, but they contend that the same
certificate holders have no power to condemn state-owned property un-
der  §717f(h).    It  is  argued  that  the  NGA  cannot  authorize  such  con-
demnation actions under the Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, which generally prohibits Congress from using
its  Article  I  powers  to  abrogate  state  sovereign  immunity.    But  con-
gressional abrogation is not the only means of subjecting States to suit.
The  States  implicitly  consented  to  private  condemnation  suits  when
they ratified the Constitution, and respondents’ arguments to the con-
trary cannot be squared with the Court’s precedents.

Respondents do not dispute that the Federal Government enjoys a
power  of  eminent  domain  superior  to  that  of  the  States,  or  that  the
Federal Government can delegate that power to private parties.  Re-
spondents instead point to the absence of founding-era evidence of pri-
vate  condemnation  suits  against  nonconsenting  States  to  maintain
that States did not consent to such suits when they entered the federal
system.  Respondents would divorce the federal eminent domain power
from the power to bring condemnation actions—and then argue that
the latter cannot be delegated to private parties with respect to state-
owned  lands.    But  the  eminent  domain  power  is  inextricably  inter-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the arguments and reasoning behind a Supreme Court case. It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a summary of the legal issues involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

373

Roberts, C. J., concurring

posters,  the  Internet,  and  virtually  any  other  medium  that
corporations and unions might ﬁnd useful in expressing their
views on matters of public concern.  Its theory, if accepted,
would  empower  the  Government  to  prohibit  newspapers
from  running  editorials  or  opinion  pieces  supporting  or  op
posing candidates for ofﬁce, so long as the newspapers were
owned by corporations—as the major ones are.  First
Amendment rights could be conﬁned to individuals, subvert
ing  the  vibrant  public  discourse  that  is  at  the  foundation  of
our democracy.

The Court properly rejects that theory, and I join its opin
ion  in  full.  The  First  Amendment  protects  more  than  just
the  individual  on  a  soapbox  and  the  lonely  pamphleteer.  I
write separately to address the important principles of judi
cial restraint and stare decisis implicated in this case.

I

Judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is “the
gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to
perform.”  Blodgett v.  Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 147–148 (1927)
(Holmes,  J.,  concurring).  Because  the  stakes  are  so  high,
our standard practice is to refrain from addressing constitu
tional questions except when necessary to rule on particular
claims  before  us.  See  Ashwander  v.  TVA,  297  U. S.  288,
346–348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  This policy under
lies  both  our  willingness  to  construe  ambiguous  statutes  to
avoid constitutional problems and our practice “ ‘never to for
mulate  a  rule  of  constitutional  law  broader  than  is  required
by  the  precise  facts  to  which  it  is  to  be  applied.’ ”  United
States  v.  Raines,  362  U. S.  17,  21  (1960)  (quoting  Liverpool,
New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v.  Commissioners of Em
igration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885)).

The  majority  and  dissent  are  united  in  expressing  alle
giance  to  these  principles.  Ante,  at  329;  post,  at  405–406
(Stevens,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  It delves into First Amendment rights and judicial restraint.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

YATES v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–7451.  Argued November 5, 2014—Decided February 25, 2015

While conducting an offshore inspection of a commercial fishing vessel
in the Gulf of Mexico, a federal agent found that the ship’s catch con-
tained  undersized  red  grouper,  in  violation  of  federal  conservation
regulations.  The  officer  instructed  the  ship’s  captain,  petitioner
Yates,  to  keep  the  undersized  fish  segregated  from  the  rest  of  the
catch  until  the  ship  returned  to  port.    After  the  officer  departed,
Yates instead told a crew member to throw the undersized fish over-
board.  For this offense, Yates was charged with destroying, conceal-
ing,  and  covering  up  undersized  fish  to  impede  a  federal  investiga-
tion,  in  violation  of  18  U. S. C.  §1519.    That  section  provides  that  a
person may be fined or imprisoned for up to 20 years if he “knowingly
alters,  destroys,  mutilates,  conceals,  covers  up,  falsifies,  or  makes  a
false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent
to  impede,  obstruct,  or  influence”  a  federal  investigation.    At  trial,
Yates moved for a judgment of acquittal on the §1519 charge.  Point-
ing to §1519’s origin as a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
a  law  designed  to  protect  investors  and  restore  trust  in  financial
markets  following  the  collapse  of  Enron  Corporation,  Yates  argued
that  §1519’s  reference  to  “tangible  object”  subsumes  objects  used  to
store  information,  such  as  computer  hard  drives,  not  fish.    The  Dis-
trict Court denied Yates’s motion, and a jury found him guilty of vio-
lating §1519.  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, conclud-
ing  that  §1519  applies  to  the  destruction  or  concealment  of  fish
because, as objects having physical form, fish fall within the diction-
ary definition of “tangible object.”

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

733 F. 3d 1059, reversed and remanded.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

Opinion of the Court

this Court has long consulted original and historical under-
standings of the Constitution’s structure and the principles
of  “sovereignty  and  comity”  it  embraces.    BMW  of  North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559, 572 (1996).  This Court
has invoked as well a number of the Constitution’s express
provisions—including “the Due Process Clause and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.”  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U. S. 797, 818 (1985).  The antidiscrimination principle
found in our dormant Commerce Clause cases may well rep-
resent one more effort to mediate competing claims of sov-
ereign authority under our horizontal separation of powers.
But  none  of  this  means,  as  petitioners  suppose,  that  any
question about the ability of a State to project its power ex-
traterritorially must yield to an “almost per se” rule under
the dormant Commerce Clause.  This Court has never be-
fore claimed so much “ground for judicial supremacy under
the  banner  of  the  dormant  Commerce  Clause.”    United
Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Man-
agement  Authority,  550  U. S.  330,  347  (2007).    We  see  no
reason to change course now.1

——————

1 Beyond Baldwin, Brown-Forman, and Healy, petitioners point to Ed-
gar v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S. 624 (1982), as authority for the “almost per
se” rule they propose.  Invoking the dormant Commerce Clause, a plural-
ity in that case declined to enforce an Illinois securities law that “directly
regulate[d] transactions which [took] place . . . wholly outside the State”
and  involved  individuals  “having  no  connection  with  Illinois.”  Id.,  at
641–643 (emphasis added).  Some have questioned whether the state law
at issue in Edgar posed a dormant Commerce Clause question as much
as one testing the territorial limits of state authority under the Consti-
tution’s  horizontal  separation  of  powers.    See,  e.g.,  D.  Regan,  Siamese
Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Com-
merce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 Mich.
L. Rev. 1865, 1875–1880, 1897–1902 (1987); cf. Shelby County v. Holder,
570  U. S.  529,  535  (2013)  (“[A]ll  States  enjoy  equal  sovereignty”).   But
either way, the Edgar plurality opinion does not support the rule peti-
tioners propose.  That decision spoke to a law that directly regulated out-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *National Pork Producers Council v. Ross*. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of constitutional principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1092

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 24, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8459. Nickerson v. Luebbers, Superintendent,
Potosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–8467. Clark v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8468. Christian v. Henderson, Postmaster Gen-
eral. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189
F. 3d 477.

No. 99–8496. Lampson v. West, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
217 F. 3d 858.

No. 99–8519. Woods v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8531.

Johnson, aka Campbell v. Pennsylvania.
Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 A. 2d
205.

No. 99–8546. Reynolds v. Rooney et ux. Ct. App. Tex.,

5th Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8549. Robinson v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De-
partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8556. Woodward v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 996 S. W. 2d 925.

No. 99–8584. Cabla v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 6 S. W. 3d 543.

No. 99–8590.

Jackson v. Luebbers, Superintendent, Po-
tosi Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8614. Armstrong v. Gammon, Superintendent,
Moberly Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 441.

No. 99–8619. Lockaby v. United States; and
No. 99–8791. McLeod v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1115.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and dates. This type of information is generally not considered the primary content of a legal document and is more like an index or table of contents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>