<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

485

Opinion of Thomas, J.

I cannot endorse a view of the First Amendment that sub
jects citizens of this Nation to death threats, ruined careers,
damaged  or  defaced  property,  or  pre-emptive  and  threaten
ing warning letters as the price for engaging in “core politi
cal  speech,  the  ‘primary  object  of  First  Amendment  protec
tion.’ ”  McConnell, 540 U. S., at 264 (Thomas, J., concurring
in  part,  concurring  in  judgment  in  part,  and  dissenting  in
part)  (quoting  Nixon  v.  Shrink  Missouri  Government  PAC,
528  U. S. 377,  410–411  (2000) (Thomas,  J.,  dissenting)).  Ac
cordingly,  I  respectfully  dissent  from  the  Court’s  judgment
upholding BCRA §§ 201 and 311.

speech,’ ”  and  which  “sometimes”  involved  “strong  and  abusive  language
in face-to-face encounters”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain substantial textual content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U99

[09-15-00 14:41:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

758

BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ELLERTH

Opinion of the Court

B

Scope of employment does not deﬁne the only basis for
employer liability under agency principles.
In limited cir-
cumstances, agency principles impose liability on employers
even where employees commit torts outside the scope of em-
ployment. The principles are set forth in the much-cited
§ 219(2) of the Restatement:

“(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of
his servants acting outside the scope of their employ-
ment, unless:

“(a) the master intended the conduct or the conse-

quences, or

“(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
“(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the

master, or

“(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf
of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent
authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relation.”

See also § 219, Comment e (Section 219(2) “enumerates the
situations in which a master may be liable for torts of serv-
ants acting solely for their own purposes and hence not in
the scope of employment”).

Subsection (a) addresses direct liability, where the em-
ployer acts with tortious intent, and indirect liability, where
the agent’s high rank in the company makes him or her the
employer’s alter ego. None of the parties contend Slowik’s
rank imputes liability under this principle. There is no con-
tention, furthermore, that a nondelegable duty is involved.
See § 219(2)(c). So, for our purposes here, subsections (a)
and (c) can be put aside.

Subsections (b) and (d) are possible grounds for imposing
employer liability on account of a supervisor’s acts and must
be considered. Under subsection (b), an employer is liable
when the tort is attributable to the employer’s own negli-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the scope of employer liability under agency principles. It cites legal precedents and analyzes specific subsections of the Restatement.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID

Opinion of the Court

students  from  completing  homework  altogether,  with  or
without online support.

Here,  the  series-qualifier  canon  recommends  qualifying
both  antecedent  verbs,  “store”  and  “produce,”  with  the
phrase “using a random or sequential number generator.”
That recommendation produces the most natural construc-
tion, as confirmed by other aspects of §227(a)(1)(A)’s text.

To begin, the modifier at issue immediately follows a con-
cise,  integrated  clause:  “store  or  produce  telephone  num-
bers to be called.”  See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employ-
ees Retirement Fund, 583 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op.,
at 21–22).  The clause “hangs together as a unified whole,”
id., at ___ (slip op., at  21), using the word  “or” to connect
two  verbs  that  share  a  common  direct  object,  “telephone
numbers to be called.”  It would be odd to apply the modifier
(“using a random or sequential number generator”) to only
a portion of this cohesive preceding clause.

This interpretation of §227(a)(1)(A) also “heed[s] the com-
mands of its punctuation.”  United States Nat. Bank of Ore.
v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S. 439,
454 (1993).  Recall that the phrase “using a random or se-
quential  number  generator”  follows  a  comma  placed  after
the  phrase  “store  or  produce  telephone  numbers  to  be
called.”  As several leading treatises explain, “ ‘[a] qualify-
ing phrase separated from antecedents by a comma is evi-
dence that the qualifier is supposed to apply to all the ante-
cedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one.’ ”
W. Eskridge, Interpreting Law: A Primer on How To Read
Statutes and the Constitution 67–68 (2016); see also 2A N.
Singer  &  S.  Singer,  Sutherland  Statutes  and  Statutory
Construction §47:33, pp. 499–500 (rev. 7th ed. 2014); Scalia
& Garner 161–162.  The comma in §227(a)(1)(A) thus fur-
ther suggests that Congress intended the phrase “using a
random or sequential number generator” to apply equally
to both preceding elements.

Contrary  to  Duguid’s  view,  this  interpretation  does  not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the interpretation of a specific statute (likely §227(a)(1)(A)). The text analyzes the grammatical structure and punctuation to determine the scope of a particular phrase.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

SANDOZ INC. v. AMGEN INC.

Opinion of the Court

injunction  pending  appeal  to  bar  Sandoz  from  marketing
Zarxio until 180 days after the date it provided its second
notice.  Id., at 1360–1361.

We  granted  Sandoz’s  petition  for  certiorari,  No.  15–
1039, and Amgen’s conditional cross-petition for certiorari,
No. 15–1195,  and  consolidated  the  cases.    580  U. S.  ___
(2017).

III

first  question  we  must  answer

is  whether
  The
§262(l)(2)(A)’s  requirement  that  an  applicant  provide  the
sponsor  with  its  application  and  manufacturing  infor-
mation is enforceable by an injunction under either federal
or state law.

A
We  agree  with  the  Federal  Circuit  that  an  injunction
under federal law is not available to enforce §262(l)(2)(A),
though  for  slightly  different  reasons  than  those  provided
by  the  court  below.    The  Federal  Circuit  held  that  “42
U. S. C.  §262(l)(9)(C)  and  35  U. S. C.  §271(e)  expressly
provide the only remedies” for a violation of §262(l)(2)(A),
794 F. 3d, at 1357, and neither of those provisions author-
izes  a  court  to  compel  compliance  with  §262(l)(2)(A).  In
concluding  that  the  remedies  specified  in  the  BPCIA  are
exclusive,  the  Federal  Circuit  relied  primarily  on
§271(e)(4),  which  states  that  it  provides  “ ‘the  only  reme-
dies which may be granted by a court for an act of [artifi-
cial] infringement.’ ”  Id., at 1356 (emphasis deleted).

The  flaw  in  the  Federal  Circuit’s  reasoning  is  that
Sandoz’s  failure  to  disclose  its  application  and  manufac-
turing  information  was  not  an  act  of  artificial  infringe-
ment,  and  thus  was  not  remediable  under  §271(e)(4).
Submitting  an  application  constitutes  an  act  of  artificial
infringement.  See §§271(e)(2)(C)(i), (ii) (“It shall be an act
of  infringement  to  submit  . . .  an  application  seeking  ap-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. It contains legal jargon and discusses specific sections of the law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–404.  Argued April 18, 2022—Decided June 21, 2022

In 2018, Washington enacted a workers’ compensation law that applied
only to certain workers at a federal facility in the State who were “en-
gaged in the performance of work, either directly or indirectly, for the
United States.”  Wash. Rev. Code §51.32.187(1)(b).  The facility, known
as the Hanford site, was once used by the Federal Government to de-
velop and produce nuclear weapons, and is now undergoing a complex
decontamination process.  Most workers involved in this cleanup pro-
cess are federal contract workers—people employed by private compa-
nies under contract with the Federal Government.  A smaller number
of  workers  involved  in  the  cleanup  include  State  employees,  private
employees,  and  federal  employees  who  work  directly  for  the  Federal
Government.  As compared to Washington’s general workers’ compen-
sation scheme, the law makes it easier for federal contract workers at
Hanford to establish their entitlement to workers’ compensation, thus
increasing workers’ compensation costs for the Federal Government.

The  United  States  brought  suit  against  Washington,  arguing  that
Washington’s  law  violates  the  Supremacy  Clause  by  discriminating
against the Federal Government.  The District Court concluded that
the law was constitutional because it fell within the scope of a federal
waiver of immunity contained in 40 U. S. C. §3172.  The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.

Held: Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Gov-
ernment and its contractors.  Because §3172 does not clearly and un-
ambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity from discrim-
inatory  state  laws,  Washington’s  law  is  unconstitutional  under  the
Supremacy Clause.  Pp. 3–11.

(a) This case is not moot.  After the Court granted certiorari, Wash-
ington enacted a new statute which changed the scope of the original
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U74

[09-06-00 17:54:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 51 (1998)

71

Opinion of the Court

sion over the subsidiary, especially one that assumes that
dual ofﬁcers always act on behalf of the parent, cannot be
used to identify operation of a facility resulting in direct pa-
rental liability. Nonetheless, a return to the ordinary mean-
ing of the word “operate” in the organizational sense will
indicate why we think that the Sixth Circuit stopped short
when it conﬁned its examples of direct parental operation to
exclusive or joint ventures, and declined to ﬁnd at least the
possibility of direct operation by CPC in this case.

In our enquiry into the meaning Congress presumably had
in mind when it used the verb “to operate,” we recognized
that the statute obviously meant something more than mere
mechanical activation of pumps and valves, and must be read
to contemplate “operation” as including the exercise of direc-
tion over the facility’s activities. See supra, at 66–67. The
Court of Appeals recognized this by indicating that a parent
can be held directly liable when the parent operates the facil-
ity in the stead of its subsidiary or alongside the subsidiary
in some sort of a joint venture. See 113 F. 3d, at 579. We
anticipated a further possibility above, however, when we
observed that a dual ofﬁcer or director might depart so far
from the norms of parental inﬂuence exercised through dual
ofﬁceholding as to serve the parent, even when ostensibly
acting on behalf of the subsidiary in operating the facility.
See n. 13, supra. Yet another possibility, suggested by the
facts of this case, is that an agent of the parent with no hat
to wear but the parent’s hat might manage or direct activi-
ties at the facility.

Identifying such an occurrence calls for line-drawing yet
again, since the acts of direct operation that give rise to pa-
rental liability must necessarily be distinguished from the
interference that stems from the normal relationship be-
tween parent and subsidiary. Again norms of corporate be-
havior (undisturbed by any CERCLA provision) are crucial
reference points.
Just as we may look to such norms in
identifying the limits of the presumption that a dual ofﬁce-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of the term "operate" in the context of environmental liability under CERCLA.  It delves into legal precedents and corporate structures, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  MARIETTA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEE HEALTH

BENEFIT PLAN v. DAVITA INC.
Opinion of the Court

Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (ND Ga. 2009).  Moreover, sev-
eral weeks after the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit  agreed  with  Judge  Murphy’s  dissent  and  largely  re-
jected the Sixth Circuit’s analysis.  See DaVita Inc. v. Amy’s
Kitchen, Inc., 981 F. 3d 664 (2020).

This Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement

between the Courts of Appeals.  595 U. S. ___ (2021).

II
A
We first consider DaVita’s differentiation argument.  To
reiterate,  the  relevant  statutory  provision  states:    A  plan
“may  not  differentiate  in  the  benefits  it  provides  between
individuals having end stage renal disease and other indi-
viduals covered by such plan on the basis of the existence of
end  stage  renal  disease,  the  need  for  renal  dialysis,  or  in
any other manner.”  42 U. S. C. §1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii).

That statutory language prohibits a plan from differenti-
ating in benefits between individuals with and without end-
stage renal disease.  For example, a group health plan may
not  single  out  plan  participants  with  end-stage  renal  dis-
ease by imposing higher deductibles on them, or by covering
fewer services for them.  See 42 CFR §§411.161(b)(2)(i)–(iv).
If a plan does not differentiate in the benefits provided to
individuals with and without end-stage renal disease, then
a plan has not violated that statutory provision, and the dif-
ferentiation inquiry ends there.1

——————

1 If and only if a plan differentiates in benefits between those with and
those  without  end-stage  renal  disease,  the  next  question  would  be
whether the plan differentiates “on the basis of ” (i) the existence of the
disease, (ii) the need for renal dialysis, or (iii) in any other manner.  42
U. S. C. §1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii).    Those  three  circumstances,  especially  the
somewhat ungrammatically phrased catchall “in any other manner,” ap-
pear to cover the waterfront of possible bases on which a plan might dif-
ferentiate in the benefits provided to those with end-stage renal disease.
In other words, if there is differentiation, the differentiation is likely on
an impermissible basis.  Therefore, the only meaningful question under
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the interpretation of a statute related to health insurance benefits for individuals with end-stage renal disease. It delves into the specific language of the statute and provides legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

curring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment)).    States
cannot  put  individuals  to  the  choice  of  “be[ing]  compelled
to affirm someone else’s belief ” or “be[ing] forced to speak
when [they] would prefer to remain silent.”  Id., at 99.

III
Because Phillips’ conduct (as  described by  the Colorado
Court  of  Appeals)  was  expressive,  Colorado’s  public-
accommodations  law  cannot  penalize  it  unless  the  law
withstands  strict  scrutiny.    Although  this  Court  some
times reviews regulations of expressive conduct under the
more lenient test articulated in O’Brien,4 that test does not
apply  unless  the  government  would  have  punished  the
conduct regardless of its expressive component.  See, e.g.,
Barnes, 501 U. S., at 566–572 (applying O’Brien to evalu
ate  the  application  of a  general  nudity  ban  to  nude  danc
ing); Clark, 468 U. S., at 293 (applying O’Brien to evaluate
the application of a general camping ban to a demonstra
tion  in  the  park).  Here,  however,  Colorado  would  not  be
punishing  Phillips  if  he  refused  to  create  any  custom
wedding  cakes;  it  is  punishing  him  because  he  refuses  to
create  custom  wedding  cakes  that  express  approval  of
same-sex marriage.  In cases like this one, our precedents
demand  “ ‘the  most  exacting  scrutiny.’ ”    Johnson,  491
U. S., at 412; accord, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U. S. 1, 28 (2010).

The  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  address  whether  Colo
rado’s law survives strict scrutiny, and I will not do so in
the first instance.  There is an obvious flaw, however, with

——————

4 “[A]  government  regulation  [of  expressive  conduct]  is  sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers  an  important  or  substantial  governmental  interest;  if  the
governmental  interest  is  unrelated  to  the  suppression  of  free  expres
sion;  and  if  the  incidental  restriction  on  alleged  First  Amendment
freedoms  is  no  greater  than  is  essential  to  the  furtherance  of  that
interest.”  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it unsuitable for indexing as it is not general readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER
Opinion of the Court

II

The First Amendment provides, in part, that “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  The parties agree
that  the  Establishment  Clause  of  that  Amendment  does
not  prevent  Missouri  from  including  Trinity  Lutheran  in
the Scrap Tire Program.  That does not, however, answer
the  question  under  the  Free  Exercise  Clause,  because  we
have recognized that there is “play in the joints” between
what  the  Establishment  Clause  permits  and  the  Free
Exercise  Clause  compels.  Locke,  540  U. S.,  at  718  (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).

The Free Exercise Clause “protect[s] religious observers
against  unequal  treatment”  and  subjects  to  the  strictest
scrutiny laws that target the religious for “special disabili-
ties” based on their “religious status.”  Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 533, 542 (1993)
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Applying  that  basic
principle,  this  Court  has  repeatedly  confirmed  that  deny-
ing  a  generally  available  benefit  solely  on  account  of  reli-
gious  identity  imposes  a  penalty  on  the  free  exercise  of
religion  that  can  be  justified  only  by  a  state  interest  “of
the  highest  order.”  McDaniel  v.  Paty,  435  U. S.  618,  628
(1978) (plurality opinion) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S. 205, 215 (1972)).

In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1
(1947),  for  example,  we  upheld  against  an  Establishment
Clause challenge a New Jersey law enabling a local school
district to reimburse parents for the public transportation
costs  of  sending  their  children  to  public  and  private
schools,  including  parochial  schools.    In  the  course  of
ruling that the Establishment Clause allowed New Jersey
to extend that public benefit to all its citizens regardless of
their  religious  belief,  we  explained  that  a  State  “cannot
hamper  its  citizens  in  the  free  exercise  of  their  own  reli-
gion.  Consequently,  it  cannot  exclude  individual  Catho-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically dealing with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. It discusses relevant case law and legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529BV$

Unit: UIII

[08-22-01 08:54:19] PGT: FRT

J UST ICES

of the

SU PRE M E C OU R T
during the time of these reports

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Chief Justice.
JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice.
SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, Associate Justice.
ANTONIN SCALIA, Associate Justice.
ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice.
DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice.
CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice.
RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice.
STEPHEN BREYER, Associate Justice.

BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice.

retired

officers of the court
JANET RENO, Attorney General.
SETH P. WAXMAN, Solicitor General.
WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk.
FRANK D. WAGNER, Reporter of Decisions.
DALE E. BOSLEY, Marshal.
SHELLEY L. DOWLING, Librarian.

iii
  </content>
  <thinking>
The content appears to be a section of a legal document, likely the beginning of a Supreme Court report. It includes the names of justices, retired officers, and a page number.
  </thinking>
  <category>Introductory section of a legal document</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

KAGAN, J., dissenting

State’s  Native  American  citizens  need  to  travel  long  dis-
tances to use the mail.  Both policies violate Section 2, on a
straightforward application of its text.  Considering the “to-
tality of circumstances,” both “result in” members of some
races having “less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
a representative of their choice.”  §10301(b).  The majority
reaches the opposite conclusion because it closes its eyes to
the facts on the ground.10

A
  Arizona’s  out-of-precinct  policy  requires  discarding  any
Election  Day  ballot  cast  elsewhere  than  in  a  voter’s  as-
signed precinct.  Under the policy, officials throw out every
choice in every race—including national or statewide races
(e.g., for President or Governor) that appear identically on
every precinct’s ballot.  The question is whether that policy
unequally  affects  minority  citizens’  opportunity  to  cast  a
vote.
  Although the majority portrays Arizona’s use of the rule
as  “unremarkable,”  ante,  at  26,  the  State  is  in  fact  a  na-
tional  aberration  when  it  comes  to  discarding  out-of-
precinct  ballots.    In  2012,  about  35,000  ballots  across  the
country  were  thrown  out  because  they  were  cast  at  the
wrong precinct.  See U. S. Election Assistance Commission,
2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey 53 (2013).
Nearly one in three of those discarded votes—10,979—was
cast  in  Arizona.   Id., at  52.   As  the  Court of  Appeals con-
cluded, and the chart below indicates, Arizona threw away
ballots in that year at 11 times the rate of the second-place
discarder (Washington State).  Democratic Nat. Committee
v.  Hobbs,  948  F. 3d  989,  1001  (CA9  2020);  see  App.  72.
Somehow the majority labels that difference “marginal[ ],”
——————

10 Because I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that the effects
of these policies violate Section 2, I need not pass on that court’s alterna-
tive holding that the laws were enacted with discriminatory intent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee. It discusses the impact of Arizona's voting policies on minority citizens and argues that they violate the Voting Rights Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

tain some continuing financial stake in the litigation” in or-
der to have Article III standing to bring an insider trading
suit on behalf of the corporation); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S.
190, 194–195 (1976) (vendor who “independently” suffered
an Article III injury in fact could then assert the rights of
her  customers).  The  plaintiffs  themselves  do  not  have  a
concrete stake in this suit.

The plaintiffs point to the Court’s decisions upholding the
Article III standing of  assignees—that is, where a party’s
right  to  sue  has  been  legally  or  contractually  assigned  to
another party.  But here, the plan’s claims have not been
legally  or  contractually  assigned  to  Thole  or  Smith.    Cf.
Sprint  Communications  Co.  v.  APCC  Services,  Inc.,  554
U. S. 269, 290 (2008); Vermont Agency of Natural Resources
v.  United  States  ex  rel.  Stevens,  529  U. S.  765,  771–774
(2000) (qui tam statute makes a relator a partial assignee
and “gives the relator himself an interest in the lawsuit”)
(emphasis  deleted).    The  plaintiffs’  invocation  of  cases  in-
volving  guardians,  receivers,  and  executors  falls  short  for
basically the same reason.  The plaintiffs have not been le-
gally or contractually appointed to represent the plan.

Third,  in  arguing  for  standing,  Thole  and  Smith  stress
that ERISA affords the Secretary of Labor, fiduciaries, ben-
eficiaries, and participants—including participants in a de-
fined-benefit plan—a general cause of action to sue for res-
toration  of  plan  losses  and  other  equitable  relief.
  See
ERISA  §§502(a)(2),  (3),  29  U. S. C.  §§1132(a)(2),  (3).  But
the cause of action does not affect the Article III standing
analysis.  This  Court  has  rejected  the  argument  that  “a
plaintiff  automatically  satisfies  the  injury-in-fact  require-
ment whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right
and  purports  to  authorize  that  person  to  sue  to  vindicate
that right.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016)
(slip op., at 9); see Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 820, n. 3
(1997).  The Court has emphasized that “Article III stand-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the issue of standing in a lawsuit. It cites legal precedents and delves into the specific requirements for Article III standing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

31

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

already has.

Bracker involved a relatively minor civil dispute.  Arizona
sought to tax vehicles used by the White Mountain Apache
Tribe  in  logging  operations  on  tribal  lands.  See  Bracker,
448  U. S.,  at  138–140.  The  Tribe  opposed  the  effort,
pointing to a federal law that regulated tribal logging but
did not say anything about preempting the State’s vehicle
tax.  See id., at 141, 145.  The Court began by recognizing
that  the  usual  rules  of  preemption  are  not  “properly
applied” to Tribes.  Id., at 143.  Instead, the Court started
with the traditional “ ‘backdrop’ ”  presumption that States
lack  jurisdiction  in  Indian  country.    Ibid.  And  the  Court
explained that any ambiguities about the scope of federal
law must be “construed generously” in favor of the Tribes
as sovereigns.  Id., at 143–144.  With these rules in mind,
the Court proceeded to turn back the State’s tax based on a
“particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal,
and tribal interests at stake.”  Id., at 145.  The Court judged
that “traditional notions of [tribal] sovereignty,” the federal
government’s  “policy  of  promoting  tribal  self-sufficiency,”
and the rule requiring it to resolve “[a]mbiguities” in favor
of the Tribe trumped any competing state interest.  Id., at
143–144, 151.

Nothing  in  any  of  this  gets  the  Court  close  to  where  it
If  Arizona  had  to  proceed  against  the
wishes  to  go.
traditional  “backdrop”  rule  excluding  state  jurisdiction,
Oklahoma  must.  And  if  Arizona could  not  overcome  that
backdrop  rule  because  it  could  not  point  to  clear  federal
statutory  language  authorizing  its  comparatively  minor
civil tax, it is unfathomable how Oklahoma might overcome
that rule here.  The State has pointed—and can point—to
nothing  in  Congress’s  work  granting  it  the  power  to  try
crimes against tribal members on a tribal reservation.  In
Bracker, the Court found it instructive that Congress had
“comprehensive[ly]”  regulated  “the  harvesting  of  Indian
timber,” even if it had not spoken directly to the question of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It discusses a previous case, Bracker, and uses it to argue against the majority opinion in the current case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

77

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

*

*

*
For all these reasons, I would overrule Smith and reverse
the  decision  below.  Philadelphia’s  exclusion  of  CSS  from
foster care work violates the Free Exercise Clause, and CSS
is therefore entitled to an injunction barring Philadelphia
from taking such action.

After receiving more than 2,500 pages of briefing and af-
ter more than a half-year of post-argument cogitation, the
Court has emitted a wisp of a decision that leaves religious
liberty in a confused and vulnerable state.  Those who count
on  this  Court  to  stand  up  for  the  First  Amendment  have
every right to be disappointed—as am I.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito.  It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 23–726 and 23–727
_________________

MIKE MOYLE, SPEAKER OF THE IDAHO HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES

23–726

23–727

IDAHO, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 27, 2024]

JUSTICE JACKSON,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in

part.

In 1986, Congress passed the Emergency Medical Treat-
ment  and  Labor  Act  (EMTALA),  which  requires  hospitals
to provide stabilizing treatment when patients present with
emergency  medical  conditions.    See  42  U. S. C.  §1395dd.
Sometimes,  an  abortion  is  the  only  way  to  stabilize  a  pa-
tient and, therefore, comply with EMTALA.  But Idaho law
prohibits  abortions  unless  the  treating  physician  believes
that  the  abortion  is  “necessary  to  prevent  the  [patient’s]
death.” Idaho Code Ann. §18–622(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2023).

Recognizing  the  clear  conflict  between  EMTALA  and
Idaho  law,  a  Federal  District  Judge  issued  an  injunction
that had the effect of ensuring that Idaho physicians would
be  able  to  provide  the  abortion  care  EMTALA  requires.
Five months ago, this Court stayed that injunction.  As a
legal matter, this Court’s stay meant that unless a doctor
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xviii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
Florida; Hamilton v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
Florida; Howell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Meyers v.
958
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Monlyn v.
957
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Payne v.
943
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Powell v.
916
Florida; Rivera v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Florida Dept. of Corrections; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida Dept. of Corrections; Marquez v.
917
Floyd; Markland v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
Fludd v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919
Flynn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970
Flynn; Connor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
942
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Flynn; Sanders v.
Foley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967,972
933
Follett v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Fonoimoana; Valdez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Ford Motor Co.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Forney v. Apfel
266
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936,976
Forsyth; Humana Inc. v.
961
Fortes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
Francisco v. Ofﬁce of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Franklin v. Mazurkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
Fraser v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
Frejomil v. Goord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
French; Hill v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Frey; Fulcomer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
Frohwirth v. Cooke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Fulcomer v. Frey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Fuller v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962
Funches v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
G. v. Cranston School Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Gaerttner v. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
Gagliardi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915
Galen of Va., Inc.; Roberts v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
Gallant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
Gallego v. McDaniel
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
Gallego; McDaniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970
Gangopadhyay v. Gangopadhyay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920
943
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garcia; Flores v.
Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931,961
923
Garcia-Rosell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Garner v. Head . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

7

Opinion of the Court

would  permit  a  resumption  of  the  challenged  conduct  as
soon  as  the  case  is  dismissed.  See  City  of  Mesquite  v.
Aladdin’s  Castle,  Inc.,  455  U. S.  283,  289  (1982).    And
here,  since  the  union  continues  to  defend  the  legality  of
the  Political  Fight-Back  fee,  it  is  not  clear  why  the  union
would  necessarily  refrain  from  collecting  similar  fees  in
the future.

The  union  argues  that  concerns  about  voluntary  cessa-
tion  are  inapplicable  in  this  case  because  petitioners  do
not seek any prospective relief.  See Motion to Dismiss as
Moot  11–12.  But  even  if  that  is  so,  the  union’s  mootness
argument  fails  because  there  is  still  a  live  controversy  as
to  the  adequacy  of  the  SEIU’s  refund  notice.    A  case  be-
comes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant
“ ‘ “any effectual relief whatever” to the prevailing party.’ ”
Erie  v.  Pap’s  A.  M.,  529  U. S.  277,  287  (2000)  (quoting
Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9,
12  (1992),  in  turn  quoting  Mills  v.  Green,  159  U. S.  651,
653  (1895)).
“[A]s  long  as  the  parties  have  a  concrete
interest,  however  small,  in  the  outcome  of  the  litigation,
the  case  is  not  moot.”    Ellis  v.  Railway  Clerks,  466  U. S.
435, 442 (1984).

The  District  Court  ordered  the  SEIU  to  send  out  a
“proper” notice giving employees an adequate opportunity
to receive a full refund.  2008 WL 850128, *12.  Petitioners
argue  that  the  notice  that  the  SEIU  sent  was  improper
because  it  includes  a  host  of  “conditions,  caveats,  and
confusions  as  unnecessary  complications  aimed  at  reduc-
ing  the  number  of  class  members  who  claim  a  refund.”
Brief  for  Petitioners  in  Opposition  to  Motion  to  Dismiss
19.  In  particular,  petitioners  allege  that  the  union  has
refused to accept refund requests by fax or e-mail and has
made refunds conditional upon the provision of an original
signature and a Social Security number.  Id., at 18–19.  As
this dispute illustrates, the nature of the notice may affect
how  many  employees  who  object  to  the  union’s  special
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the adequacy of a refund notice sent by a union. It contains legal arguments, citations, and discusses specific details of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

919

524 U. S.

June 8, 1998

No. 97–8707. Brincat v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8709. Blackmon v. Poindexter, Warden, et al.

C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8718. Luman v. Dorsey, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 932.

No. 97–8801. Eisenhauer v. Massachusetts Bar Counsel.
Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 426
Mass. 448, 689 N. E. 2d 783.

No. 97–8818. Blair v. Thompson, Superintendent, Oregon
State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 129 F. 3d 124.

No. 97–8822. Valenzuela Rodriguez v. Marshall, War-
den. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 125
F. 3d 739.

No. 97–8846. Pizzo v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 715 So. 2d 1202.

No. 97–8856. Tyler v. Bowersox, Superintendent, Potosi

Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8869. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 894.

No. 97–8881. Mitchell v. Norris, Director, Arkansas De-
partment of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8891. Dismuke v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 46.

No. 97–8894. Fludd v. Miller, Superintendent, Eastern
New York Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 97–8899. Blais v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 141 F. 3d 1152.

No. 97–8907. DeLoach v. General Dynamics Corp. C. A.

5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 1456.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). This type of information is generally not considered the primary content of a legal document and is more like a summary or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

TURNER v. ROGERS

Opinion of the Court

with  significant  information.  Cf.  id.,  at  41a–43a  (Rogers
describes  where  Turner  lived  and  worked).    And  the  pro-
ceeding is ultimately for her benefit.

A  requirement  that  the  State  provide  counsel  to  the
noncustodial  parent  in  these  cases  could  create  an  asym-
metry of representation that would “alter significantly the
nature of the proceeding.”  Gagnon, supra, at 787.  Doing
so  could  mean  a  degree  of  formality  or  delay  that  would
unduly slow payment to those immediately in need.  And,
perhaps  more  important  for  present  purposes,  doing  so
could make the proceedings less fair overall, increasing the
risk of a decision that would erroneously deprive a family
of the support it is entitled to receive.  The needs of such
families  play  an  important  role  in  our  analysis.    Cf.  post,
at 10–12 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).

Third, as the Solicitor General points out, there is avail-
able a set of “substitute procedural safeguards,” Mathews,
424 U. S., at 335, which, if employed together, can signifi-
cantly  reduce  the  risk  of  an  erroneous  deprivation  of  lib-
erty.  They can do so, moreover, without incurring some of
the drawbacks inherent in recognizing an automatic right
to counsel.  Those safeguards include (1) notice to the de-
fendant  that  his  “ability  to  pay”  is  a  critical  issue  in  the
contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equiva-
lent) to elicit relevant financial information; (3) an oppor-
tunity  at  the  hearing  for  the  defendant  to  respond  to
statements and questions about his financial status, (e.g.,
those  triggered  by  his  responses  on  the  form);  and  (4)  an
express  finding  by  the  court  that  the  defendant  has  the
ability to pay.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26–27; Brief for United
States  as  Amicus  Curiae  23–25.  In  presenting  these  al-
ternatives,  the  Government  draws  upon  considerable
experience  in  helping  to  manage  statutorily  mandated
federal-state  efforts  to  enforce  child  support  orders.    See
supra,  at  10.  It  does  not  claim  that  they  are  the  only
possible  alternatives,  and  this  Court’s  cases  suggest,  for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the part discussing the reasons why counsel should not be required for non-custodial parents in child support cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,

HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ

ALITO, J., dissenting

Id.,  at  79.

against religious groups because it prohibits those groups
“from  selecting  officers  and  members  dedicated  to  a  par-
ticular set of religious ideals or beliefs” but “permits politi-
cal,  social  and  cultural  student  organizations  to  select
officers  and  members  dedicated  to  their  organization’s
In  response,  Hastings
ideals  and  beliefs.”
admitted that its Nondiscrimination Policy “permits politi-
cal,  social,  and  cultural  student  organizations  to  select
officers and members who are dedicated to a particular set
of  ideals  or  beliefs.”    Id.,  at  93.  The  Court  states  that
“Hastings  interprets  the  Nondiscrimination  Policy,  as  it
relates to the RSO program, to mandate acceptance of all
comers.”  Ante,  at  4.    But  this  admission  in  Hastings’
answer  shows  that  Hastings  had  not  adopted  this  inter-
pretation when its answer was filed.

Within  a  few  months,  however,  Hastings’  position
changed.  In July 2005, Mary Kay Kane, then the dean of
the law school, was deposed, and she stated: “It is my view
that  in  order  to  be  a  registered  student  organization  you
have  to  allow  all  of  our  students  to  be  members  and  full
participants if they want to.”  App. 343.  In a declaration
filed  in  October  2005,  Ms.  Chapman  provided  a  more
developed  explanation,  stating:  “Hastings  interprets  the
Nondiscrimination  Policy  as  requiring  that  student  or-
ganizations  wishing  to  register  with  Hastings  allow  any
Hastings student to become a member and/or seek a lead-
ership position in the organization.”  Id., at 349.

Hastings  claims  that  this  accept-all-comers  policy  has
existed since 1990 but points to no evidence that the policy
was  ever  put  in  writing  or  brought  to  the  attention  of
members  of  the  law  school  community  prior  to  the  dean’s
deposition.    Indeed,  Hastings  has  adduced  no  evidence  of
the  policy’s  existence  before  that  date.  And  while  Dean
Kane  and  Ms.  Chapman  stated,  well  after  this  litigation
had  begun,  that  Hastings  had  such  a  policy,  neither  they
nor any other Hastings official has ever stated in a deposi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific events and individuals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

43

Opinion of the Court

an editorial in The Loyal Georgian (Augusta) on February
3, 1866, assured blacks that “[a]ll men, without distinction
of  color,  have  the  right  to  keep  and  bear  arms  to  defend
their homes, families or themselves.”  Halbrook 19.

Congress  enacted  the  Freedmen’s  Bureau  Act  on  July

16, 1866.  Section 14 stated:

“[T]he  right  . . .  to  have  full  and  equal  benefit  of  all
laws  and  proceedings  concerning  personal  liberty,
personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and
disposition of  estate,  real  and  personal,  including  the
constitutional  right  to  bear  arms,  shall  be  secured  to
and  enjoyed  by  all  the  citizens  . . .  without  respect  to
race or color, or previous condition of slavery. . . . ”  14
Stat. 176–177.

The  understanding  that  the  Second  Amendment  gave
freed blacks the right to keep and bear arms was reflected
in congressional discussion of the bill, with even an oppo
nent  of  it  saying  that  the  founding  generation  “were  for
every man bearing his arms about him and keeping them
in his house, his castle, for his own defense.”  Cong. Globe,
39th Cong., 1st Sess., 362, 371 (1866) (Sen. Davis).

Similar  discussion  attended  the  passage  of  the  Civil
Rights  Act  of  1871  and  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.    For
example,  Representative  Butler  said  of  the  Act:  “Section
eight is intended to enforce the well-known constitutional
provision guaranteeing the right of the citizen to ‘keep and
bear arms,’ and provides that whoever shall take away, by
force or violence, or by threats and intimidation, the arms
and weapons which any person may have for his defense,
shall be deemed guilty of larceny of the same.”  H. R. Rep.
No. 37, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 7–8 (1871).  With respect
to  the  proposed  Amendment,  Senator  Pomeroy  described
as  one  of  the  three  “indispensable”  “safeguards  of  liberty
. . . under the Constitution” a man’s “right to bear arms for
the  defense  of  himself  and  family  and  his  homestead.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion citing historical context and legislation related to the Second Amendment. It includes quotes from historical documents and congressional debates, suggesting it's part of the legal argument rather than standalone text meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

447

Opinion of Stevens, J.

IV

Having  explained  why  this  is  not  an  appropriate  case  in
which to  revisit Austin  and McConnell  and why  these deci
sions  sit  perfectly  well  with  “First  Amendment  principles,”
ante,  at  319,  363,  I  come  at  last  to  the  interests  that  are  at
stake.  The majority recognizes that Austin and McConnell
may  be  defended  on  anticorruption,  antidistortion,  and
shareholder  protection  rationales.  Ante,  at  348–362.  It
badly  errs  both  in  explaining the  nature  of  these  rationales,
which  overlap  and  complement  each  other,  and  in  applying
them to the case at hand.

The Anticorruption Interest

Undergirding the majority’s approach to the merits is the
claim  that  the  only “sufﬁciently  important  governmental  in
terest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corrup
tion”  is  one  that  is  “limited  to  quid  pro  quo  corruption.”
Ante, at 359.  This is the same “crabbed view of corruption”
that  was  espoused  by  Justice  Kennedy  in McConnell  and
squarely  rejected  by  the  Court  in  that  case.  540  U. S.,  at
152.  While it is true that we have not always spoken about
corruption in a clear or consistent voice, the approach taken
by the  majority cannot  be right,  in my  judgment.  It disre
gards  our  constitutional  history  and  the  fundamental  de
mands of a democratic society.

On  numerous  occasions  we  have  recognized  Congress’  le
gitimate  interest  in  preventing  the  money  that  is  spent  on
elections  from  exerting  an  “ ‘undue  inﬂuence  on  an  ofﬁce
holder’s  judgment’ ”  and  from  creating  “ ‘the  appearance  of
such inﬂuence,’ ” beyond the sphere of quid pro quo relation
ships.  Id.,  at  150;  see  also,  e. g.,  id.,  at  143–144,  152–154;
Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 441; Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at
389.  Corruption can take many forms.  Bribery may be the
paradigm  case.  But  the  difference  between  selling  a  vote
and selling access is a matter of degree, not kind.  And sell
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 775 (1998)

783

Opinion of the Court

lifeguards had similarly informal talks with Gordon, but be-
cause Gordon did not feel that it was his place to do so, he
did not report these complaints to Terry, his own supervisor,
or to any other city ofﬁcial.
Id., at 1559–1560. Gordon re-
sponded to the complaints of one lifeguard by saying that
“the City just [doesn’t] care.”

Id., at 1561.

In April 1990, however, two months before Faragher’s res-
ignation, Nancy Ewanchew, a former lifeguard, wrote to
Richard Bender, the City’s Personnel Director, complaining
that Terry and Silverman had harassed her and other female
lifeguards.
Id., at 1559. Following investigation of this
complaint, the City found that Terry and Silverman had be-
haved improperly, reprimanded them, and required them to
choose between a suspension without pay or the forfeiture
of annual leave.

Ibid.

On the basis of these ﬁndings, the District Court concluded
that the conduct of Terry and Silverman was discriminatory
harassment sufﬁciently serious to alter the conditions of
Faragher’s employment and constitute an abusive working
environment.
Id., at 1562–1563. The District Court then
ruled that there were three justiﬁcations for holding the City
liable for the harassment of
its supervisory employees.
First, the court noted that the harassment was pervasive
enough to support an inference that the City had “knowl-
Id., at 1563. Next,
edge, or constructive knowledge,” of it.
it ruled that the City was liable under traditional agency
principles because Terry and Silverman were acting as
Id.,
its agents when they committed the harassing acts.
at 1563–1564. Finally, the court observed that Gordon’s
knowledge of the harassment, combined with his inaction,
“provides a further basis for imputing liability on [sic] the
Id., at 1564. The District Court then awarded Far-
City.”
agher $1 in nominal damages on her Title VII claim.
Id.,
at 1564–1565.

A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
76 F. 3d 1155

reversed the judgment against the City.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the case of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. It contains legal citations, case details, and a summary of court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

person  who  alone  composes  a  branch  of  government,”
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U. S. 848, 868 (2020).  The
Framers “sought to encourage energetic, vigorous, decisive,
and speedy execution of the laws by placing in the hands of
a single, constitutionally indispensable, individual the ulti-
mate authority that, in respect to the other branches, the
Constitution divides among many.”  Clinton v. Jones, 520
U. S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
They “deemed an energetic executive essential to ‘the pro-
tection  of  the  community  against  foreign  attacks,’  ‘the
steady administration of the laws,’ ‘the protection of prop-
erty,’ and ‘the security of liberty.’ ”  Seila Law, 591 U. S., at
223–224  (quoting  The  Federalist  No.  70,  p. 471  (J.  Cooke
ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)).  The purpose of a “vigorous” and
“energetic”  Executive,  they  thought,  was  to  ensure  “good
government,” for a “feeble executive implies a feeble execu-
tion of the government.”  Id., at 471–472.

The Framers accordingly vested the President with “su-
pervisory  and  policy  responsibilities  of  utmost  discretion
and  sensitivity.”  Fitzgerald,  457  U. S.,  at  750.    He  must
make  “the  most  sensitive  and  far-reaching  decisions  en-
trusted to any official under our constitutional system.”  Id.,
at 752.  There accordingly “exists the greatest public inter-
est” in providing the President with “ ‘the maximum ability
to deal fearlessly and impartially with’ the duties of his of-
fice.”  Ibid. (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203
(1979)).  Appreciating  the  “unique  risks  to  the  effective
functioning of government” that arise when the President’s
energies are diverted by proceedings that might render him
“unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties,” we
have  recognized  Presidential  immunities  and  privileges
“rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of
powers  and  supported  by  our  history.”    Fitzgerald,  457
U. S., at 749, 751, 752, n. 32.

In  Nixon v.  Fitzgerald, for instance, we recognized that
as “a functionally mandated incident of [his] unique office,”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Trump v. United States. It discusses the concept of Presidential immunity and the importance of an energetic executive.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
50  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

recruit  and  admit  students  from  different  backgrounds
based on all the other factors the Court’s opinion does not,
and cannot, touch.  Colleges and universities can continue
to consider socioeconomic diversity and to recruit and enroll
students who are first-generation college applicants or who
speak multiple languages, for example.  Those factors are
not “interchangeable” with race.  UNC, 567 F. Supp. 3d, at
643; see, e.g., 2 App. in No. 21–707, at 975–976 (Laura Or-
nelas, a UNC alumna, testifying that her Latina identity,
socioeconomic  status,  and  first-generation  college  status
are all important but different “parts to getting a full pic-
ture”  of  who  she  is  and  how  she  “see[s]  the  world”).    At
SFFA’s  own  urging,  those  efforts  remain  constitutionally
permissible.  See  Brief  for  Petitioner  81–86  (emphasizing
“race-neutral” alternatives that Harvard and UNC should
implement, such as those that focus on socioeconomic and
geographic diversity, percentage plans, plans that increase
community college transfers, and plans that develop part-
nerships with disadvantaged high schools); see also ante, at
51,  53,  55–56  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (arguing  universi-
ties  can  consider  “[r]ace-neutral  policies”  similar  to  those
adopted  in  States  such  as  California  and  Michigan,  and
that universities can consider “status as a first-generation
college applicant,” “financial means,” and “generational in-
heritance or otherwise”); ante, at 8 (KAVANAUGH, J., concur-
ring) (citing SFFA’s briefs and concluding that universities
can use “race-neutral” means); ante, at 14, n. 4 (GORSUCH,
J., concurring) (“recount[ing] what SFFA has argued every
step of the way” as to “race-neutral tools”).

The Court today also does not adopt SFFA’s suggestion
that  college  admissions  should  be  a  function  of  academic
metrics alone.  Using class rank or standardized test scores
as the only admissions criteria would severely undermine
multidimensional  diversity  in  higher  education.    Such  a
system “would exclude the star athlete or musician whose
grades suffered because of daily practices and training.  It
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. The text discusses the Court's decision and Justice Sotomayor's disagreement with it, focusing on the consideration of race in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

7–8) (noting the inaccuracies risked when courts “play am-
ateur historian”).

For now, it suffices to say that  the Court’s history-and-
tradition test offers essentially no guidance for school ad-
ministrators.  If even judges and Justices, with full adver-
sarial  briefing  and  argument  tailored  to  precise  legal  is-
sues, regularly disagree (and err) in their amateur efforts
at history, how are school administrators, faculty, and staff
supposed to adapt?  How will school administrators exercise
their  responsibilities  to  manage  school  curriculum  and
events  when  the  Court  appears  to  elevate  individuals’
rights to religious exercise above all else?  Today’s opinion
provides little in the way of answers; the Court simply sets
the stage for future legal changes that will inevitably follow
the Court’s choice today to upset longstanding rules.

D

Finally, the Court acknowledges that the Establishment
Clause  prohibits  the  government  from  coercing  people  to
engage in religion practice, ante, at 24–25, but its analysis
of  coercion  misconstrues  both  the  record  and  this  Court’s
precedents.

The Court claims that the District “never raised coercion
concerns” simply because the District conceded that there
was  “ ‘no  evidence  that  students  [were]  directly  coerced  to
pray with Kennedy.’ ”  Ante, at 25 (emphasis added).  The
Court’s suggestion that coercion must be “direc[t]” to be cog-
nizable under the Establishment Clause is contrary to long-
established  precedent.  The  Court  repeatedly  has  recog-
nized  that  indirect  coercion  may  raise  serious  establish-
ment  concerns,  and  that  “there  are  heightened  concerns
with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive
pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.”
Lee, 505 U. S., at 592 (opinion of the Court); see also supra,
at 15–16.  Tellingly, none of this Court’s major cases involv-
ing school prayer concerned school practices that required
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the Court's history-and-tradition test and its implications for school administrators. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN.

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

Legem  Naturalem  Libri  Duo  83–86  (1682)  (F.  Moore
transl. 1927); see also 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 59–61 (1765).

One of the key elements of the Federalists’ arguments in
support  of  the  allocation  of  power  to  make  binding  inter-
pretations  of  the  law  was  that  Article  III  judges  would
exercise  independent  judgment.    Although  “judicial  inde-
pendence”  is  often  discussed  in  terms  of  independence
from external threats, the Framers understood the concept
to also require independence from the “internal threat” of
“human will.”  P. Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 507,
508  (2008);  see  also  The  Federalist  No.  78,  at  465  (A.
Hamilton)  (“The  judiciary  .  .  .  may  truly  be  said  to  have
neither  FORCE  nor  WILL  but  merely  judgment  . . .  ”).
Independent  judgment  required  judges  to  decide  cases  in
accordance  with  the  law  of  the  land,  not  in  accordance
with  pressures  placed  upon  them  through  either  internal
or  external  sources.    Internal  sources  might  include  per-
sonal  biases,  while  external  sources  might  include  pres-
sure  from  the  political  branches,  the  public,  or  other
interested parties.  See Hamburger, supra, at 508–521.

The Framers made several key decisions at the Conven-
tion  with  these  pressures  in  mind.    For  example,  they
rejected  proposals  to  include  a  federal  council  of  revision
after  several  participants  at  the  Convention  expressed
concern that judicial involvement in such a council would
foster internal biases.  Rufus King of Maryland, for exam-
ple, asserted that “the Judges ought to be able to expound
the law as it should come before them, free from the bias
of having participated  in its formation.”  1 Records of the
Federal  Convention  of  1787,  at  98.  Alexander  Hamilton
repeated  these  concerns  in  The  Federalist,  arguing    that
“the  judges,  who  are  to  be  interpreters  of  the  law,  might
receive  an  improper  bias  from  having  given  a  previous
opinion  in  their  revisionary  capacities”  or  “be  induced  to
embark  too  far  in  the  political  views  of  [the  Executive]”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedents and discusses the concept of judicial independence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

23

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

McBratney and Draper held that federal statutes admitting
certain States to the Union effectively meant those States
could now prosecute crimes on tribal lands involving only
non-Indians.    Yet,  as  aggressive  as  these  decisions  were,
they took care to safeguard the rule that a State’s admission
to the Union does not convey with it the power to punish
“crimes committed by or against Indians.”  McBratney, 104
U. S., at 624; Draper, 164 U. S., at 247.  Indeed, soon after
Oklahoma  became  a  State,  this  Court  explained  that  the
“grant of statehood” may have endowed Oklahoma with au-
thority to try crimes “not committed by or against Indians,”
but  with  statehood  did  not  come  any  authority  to  try
“crimes by or against Indians” on tribal lands.  Ramsey, 271
U. S., at 469; see also n. 5, supra; Donnelly v. United States,
228 U. S. 243, 271 (1913); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 220;
Cohen  506–509.    The  decision  whether  and  when  this  ar-
rangement  should  “cease”  “rest[ed]  with  Congress  alone.”
Ramsey, 271 U. S., at 469.

The truth is, Congress has authorized the application of
state criminal law on tribal lands for offenses committed by
or  against  Native  Americans  only  in  very  limited  circum-
stances.  The most notable examples can be found in Public
Law 280 and related statutes.  In 1940, Kansas successfully
lobbied  Congress  for  criminal  jurisdiction  in  Indian  coun-
try.  Nearly identical laws for North Dakota, Iowa, and New
York  followed  close  behind.  Then  in  1953,  Congress
adopted Public Law 280 in which it authorized five States
to exercise criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands and estab-
lished  procedures  for  additional  States  to  assume  similar
authority.  In  1968,  Congress  amended  Public  Law  280.
Now,  before  a  State  like  Oklahoma  may  try  crimes  by  or
against Native Americans arising on tribal lands, it must
take action to amend any state law disclaiming that author-
ity; then, the State must seek and obtain tribal consent to
any  extension  of  state  jurisdiction.  See  Part  I–B,  supra;
Clinton 958–962.  Unless a State takes these steps, it does
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites previous cases and legal statutes, indicating it is part of a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 775 (1998)

807

Opinion of the Court

failed to avail herself of the employer’s preventive or reme-
dial apparatus, she should not recover damages that could
have been avoided if she had done so.
If the victim could
have avoided harm, no liability should be found against the
employer who had taken reasonable care, and if damages
could reasonably have been mitigated no award against a
liable employer should reward a plaintiff for what her own
efforts could have avoided.

In order to accommodate the principle of vicarious liability
for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well
as Title VII’s equally basic policies of encouraging fore-
thought by employers and saving action by objecting em-
ployees, we adopt the following holding in this case and in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, ante, p. 742, also de-
cided today. An employer is subject to vicarious liability to
a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment
created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible em-
ployment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an
afﬁrmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof
by a preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
8(c). The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b)
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take ad-
vantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities pro-
vided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While
proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment
policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every
instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suit-
able to the employment circumstances may appropriately be
addressed in any case when litigating the ﬁrst element of the
defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulﬁll
the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid
harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to
use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a case.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, which is suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY ET AL.
v. MYRIAD GENETICS, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 12–398.  Argued April 15, 2013—Decided June 13, 2013

Each  human  gene  is  encoded  as  deoxyribonucleic  acid  (DNA),  which
takes  the  shape  of  a  “double  helix.”    Each  “cross-bar”  in  that  helix
consists of two chemically joined nucleotides.  Sequences of DNA nu-
cleotides contain the information necessary to create strings of amino
acids  used  to  build  proteins  in  the  body.    The  nucleotides  that  code
for amino acids are “exons,” and those that do not are “introns.”  Sci-
entists  can  extract  DNA  from  cells  to  isolate  specific  segments  for
study.    They  can  also  synthetically  create  exons-only  strands  of  nu-
cleotides known as complementary DNA (cDNA).  cDNA contains only the
exons that occur in DNA, omitting the intervening introns.

Respondent  Myriad  Genetics,  Inc.  (Myriad),  obtained  several    pa-
tents  after  discovering  the  precise  location  and  sequence  of  the
BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes,  mutations  of  which  can  dramatically  in-
crease the risk of breast and ovarian cancer.  This knowledge allowed
Myriad to determine the genes’ typical nucleotide sequence, which, in
turn,  enabled  it  to  develop  medical  tests  useful  for  detecting  muta-
tions  in  these  genes  in  a  particular  patient  to  assess  the  patient’s
cancer  risk.    If  valid,  Myriad’s  patents  would  give  it  the  exclusive
right to isolate an individual’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, and would
give Myriad the exclusive right to synthetically create  BRCA cDNA.
Petitioners filed suit, seeking a declaration that Myriad’s patents are
invalid under 35 U. S. C. §101.  As relevant here, the District Court
granted  summary  judgment  to  petitioners,  concluding  that  Myriad’s
claims  were  invalid  because  they  covered  products  of  nature.    The
Federal  Circuit  initially  reversed,  but  on  remand  in  light  of  Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___,
the Circuit found both isolated DNA and cDNA patent eligible.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U79

[09-08-00 13:44:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 125 (1998)

127

Opinion of the Court

who knowingly possesses and conveys ﬁrearms in a vehicle,
including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car,
which the person accompanies.

I

The question arises in two cases, which we have consoli-
dated for argument. Petitioner in the ﬁrst case, Frank J.
Muscarello, unlawfully sold marijuana, which he carried in
his truck to the place of sale. Police ofﬁcers found a hand-
gun locked in the truck’s glove compartment. During plea
proceedings, Muscarello admitted that he had “carried” the
gun “for protection in relation” to the drug offense, App.
in No. 96–1654, p. 12, though he later claimed to the con-
trary, and added that, in any event, his “carr[ying]” of the
gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope
of the statutory word “carries.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in
No. 96–1654, p. 10a.

Petitioners in the second case, Donald Cleveland and En-
rique Gray-Santana, placed several guns in a bag, put the
bag in the trunk of a car, and then traveled by car to a pro-
posed drug-sale point, where they intended to steal drugs
from the sellers. Federal agents at the scene stopped them,
searched the cars, found the guns and drugs, and arrested
them.

In both cases the Courts of Appeals found that petitioners
had “carrie[d]” the guns during and in relation to a drug
trafﬁcking offense.
106 F. 3d 636, 639 (CA5 1997); 106 F. 3d
1056, 1068 (CA1 1997). We granted certiorari to determine
whether the fact that the guns were found in the locked
glove compartment, or the trunk, of a car precludes applica-
tion of § 924(c)(1). We conclude that it does not.

II
A

We begin with the statute’s language. The parties vigor-
ously contest the ordinary English meaning of the phrase
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Muscarello v. United States*. It discusses the interpretation of a statute related to firearm possession during drug trafficking.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1047

558 U. S.

November 30, 2009

pay  the  docketing  fees  required  by  Rule  38(a)  and  to  submit  peti
tions  in  compliance  with  Rule  33.1  of  the  Rules  of  this  Court.

No.  09–6442.  In  re  Leaf;  and
No.  09–7258.  In  re  Newman.  Petitions  for  writs  of  habeas

corpus  denied.

No.  09–351.  In  re  Pesarik;  and
No.  09–7229.  In  re  Walshe.  Petitions  for  writs  of  manda

mus  denied.

No.  09–7050.  In  re  Dantzler.  Petition  for  writ  of  manda

mus  and/or  prohibition  denied.

Certiorari  Granted

No. 08–1191.  Morrison et al. v.  National Australia Bank
Ltd.  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.  Justice  Soto-
mayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  peti
tion.  Reported  below:  547  F.  3d  167.

No.  09–338.  Renico,  Warden  v.  Lett.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Mo
tion  of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  granted.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.
421.

No.  09–5201.  Barber  et  al.  v.  Thomas,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  granted.

Certiorari  Denied

No. 08–1392.  Massis v.  Holder, Attorney General, et al.
C. A. 4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 549 F. 3d 631.
No.  08–1494.  Arguelles-Olivares  v.  Holder,  Attorney
General.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
526  F.  3d  171.

No. 08–1575.  Linder v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  552  F.  3d  391.

No.  09–10.  Joyner  v.  Arkansas.  Sup.  Ct.  Ark.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  2009  Ark.  168,  303  S. W.  3d  54.

No.  09–26.  Hertz,  Individually  and  as  Personal  Repre
sentative  of  the  Estate  of  Hertz,  Deceased  v.  United
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal publication. It contains case numbers, court names, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/List of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

GORSUCH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–1195
_________________

KENDRA ESPINOZA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
MONTANA

[June 30, 2020]

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring.
The people of Montana, acting through their legislature,
adopted a school choice program.  It provided a modest tax
credit  to  individuals  and  businesses  who  donated  to  non-
profit scholarship organizations.  As the program began to
take root, Montana had just one scholarship organization.
It granted scholarships to families who were struggling fi-
nancially or had children with disabilities.  Recipients were
free  to  use the  scholarships  at  the  schools  of  their  choice.
Some families chose secular schools, others religious ones.
Kendra Espinoza, the lead petitioner in this case, is a sin-
gle mother who works three jobs.  She planned to use schol-
arships  to  help  keep  her  daughters  at  an  accredited  reli-
gious  school.  That  is,  until  the  Montana  Supreme  Court
struck down the tax credit program.  Those seeking a tax
credit were free to choose whether to direct their donations
to the independent scholarship organization; the organiza-
tion was then free to choose scholarship recipients; and, af-
ter  that,  parents  were  free  to  choose  where  to  use  those
scholarships.  But, the Montana Supreme Court held, this
arrangement  impermissibly  allowed  state  funds  to  find
their way to religious schools, in violation of a state consti-
tutional provision.  By way of remedy, the court ordered an
end to the tax credit program, effectively killing Montana’s
school  choice  experiment:  Without  tax  credits,  donations
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

maintain a tribal body to wrap up the distribution of Creek
lands.  Indeed, the Court does not cite any examples of the
Creek Nation exercising significant government authority
in the wake of the statutes discussed above.  Instead, the
Court  alludes  to  subsequent  changes  in  the  1920s  to  the
general “federal outlook towards Native Americans,” and it
observes that in the 1930s Congress authorized the Creek
Nation to reconstitute its tribal courts and adopt a consti-
tution and bylaws.  Ante, at 15.  That, however, simply high-
lights the drastic extent to which Congress erased the Na-
tion’s authority at the turn of the century.

Third, Congress destroyed the foundation of sovereignty
by stripping the Creek Nation of its territory.  The commu-
nal title held by the Creek Nation, which “did not recognize
private property in land,” “presented a serious obstacle to
the creation of [a] State.”  Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665,
667  (1912).    Well  aware  of  this  impediment,  Congress  es-
tablished the Dawes Commission and directed it to negoti-
ate with the Five Tribes for “the extinguishment of the na-
tional  or  tribal  title  to  any  lands”  within  the  Indian
Territory.  Act of Mar. 3, 1893, §16, 27 Stat. 645.  That ex-
tinguishment  could  be  accomplished  through  “cession”  of
the  tribal  lands  to  the  United  States,  “allotment”  of  the
lands among the Indians, or any other agreed upon method.
Ibid.  The  Commission  initially  sought  cession,  but  ulti-
mately  sought  to  extinguish  the  title  through  allotment.
See ante, at 9.

In the Original Creek Agreement of 1901, Congress did
just that.  The agreement provided that “[a]ll lands belong-
ing to the Creek tribe,” except town sites and lands reserved
for  schools  and  public  buildings,  “shall  be  allotted  among
the  citizens  of  the  tribe.”  §§2,  3,  31  Stat.  862  (emphasis
added).  Town sites, rather than being allotted, were made
available  for  purchase  by  the  non-Indians  residing  there.
§§11–16, id., at 866–867.  Unclaimed lots were to be sold at
public  auction,  with  the  proceeds  divvied  up  among  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion in a Supreme Court case. It discusses the historical context of the Creek Nation's sovereignty and the impact of federal legislation on their land rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Opinion of the Court

§1997e(a).  The District Court denied the motion.  It noted
factual disagreements between the parties about whether
Younger had adhered to Maryland’s Administrative Rem-
edy  Procedure  but  concluded  that  it  “need  not  resolve
[those]  disputes.”  Younger  v.  Green,  Civ.  No.  16–3269  (D
Md., Dec. 19, 2019), App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a.  Instead, the
court observed that there was “no dispute” that the Mary-
land  prison  system  had  internally  investigated  Younger’s
assault.
  And  it  held  that  this  inquiry  satisfied
Younger’s exhaustion obligation.

Ibid.

The case then proceeded to a jury trial.  Dupree did not
present any evidence relating to his exhaustion defense, nor
did  he  invoke  exhaustion  in  his  Rule  50(a)  motion,  which
the District Court denied.  The jury found Dupree and four
of his codefendants liable and awarded Younger $700,000
in damages.  Dupree did not file a post-trial motion under
Rule 50(b).

Dupree appealed a single issue to the Fourth Circuit: the
District Court’s rejection of his exhaustion defense at sum-
mary judgment.  Unfortunately for Dupree, the appeal was
over before it began.  Fourth Circuit precedent maintains
that  a  claim  or  defense  rejected  at  summary  judgment  is
not preserved for appellate review unless it was renewed in
a post-trial motion—even when the issue is a purely legal
one.  Varghese v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 424 F. 3d 411, 422–
423 (2005).  Bound by this precedent, the panel dismissed
the appeal.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision further cemented a conflict
among the Courts of Appeals over whether a  purely legal
challenge resolved at summary judgment must be renewed
in a post-trial motion in order to preserve that challenge for
appellate review.  We granted certiorari to resolve the dis-
agreement.2  598 U. S. ___ (2023).

——————

2 Compare Rothstein v. Carriere, 373 F. 3d 275, 284 (CA2 2004) (post-
trial motion not required to preserve claims of purely legal error); Frank
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case, legal precedents, and the procedural history of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MELLOULI v. LYNCH

Opinion of the Court

covered substances.  It made deportable, for example, any
alien  convicted  of  “import[ing],”  “buy[ing],”  or  “sell[ing]”
any  “narcotic  drug,”  defined  as  “opium,  coca  leaves,  co-
caine,  or  any  salt,  derivative,  or  preparation  of  opium  or
coca leaves, or cocaine.”  Ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596–597.  Over
time, Congress amended the statute to include additional
offenses  and  additional  narcotic  drugs.6   Ultimately,  the
Anti-Drug  Abuse  Act  of  1986  replaced  the  increasingly
long  list  of  controlled  substances  with  the  now  familiar
reference to “a controlled substance (as defined in [§802]).”
See  §1751,  100  Stat.  3207–47.    In  interpreting  successive
versions of the removal statute, the BIA inquired whether
the  state  statute  under  which  the  alien  was  convicted
covered federally controlled substances and not others.7

Matter of Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1965), is illustra-
tive.  At the time the BIA decided Paulus, the immigration
statute made deportable any alien who had been “convicted
of  a  violation  of  . . .  any  law  or  regulation  relating  to  the
illicit  possession  of  or  traffic  in  narcotic  drugs  or  mari-

——————

6 The  1956  version  of  the  statute,  for  example,  permitted  removal  of
any  alien  “who  at  any  time  has  been  convicted  of  a  violation  of,  or  a
conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation relating to the illicit posses-
sion  of  or  traffic  in  narcotic  drugs,  or  who  has  been  convicted  of  a
violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation governing
or  controlling  the  taxing,  manufacture,  production,  compounding,
transportation,  sale,  exchange,  dispensing,  giving  away,  importation,
exportation,  or  the  possession  for  the  purpose  of  the  manufacture,
production,  compounding,  transportation,  sale,  exchange,  dispensing,
giving away, importation, or exportation of opium, coca leaves, heroin,
marihuana,  any  salt  derivative  or  preparation  of  opium  or  coca  leaves
or  isonipecaine  or  any  addiction-forming  or  addiction-sustaining  opi-
ate.”  Narcotic Control Act of 1956, §301(b), 70 Stat. 575.

7 See,  e.g.,  Matter  of  Fong,  10  I.  &  N.  Dec.  616,  619  (BIA  1964)  (a
Pennsylvania  conviction  for  unlawful  use  of  a  drug  rendered  alien
removable  because  “every  drug  enumerated  in  the  Pennsylvania  law
[was]  found  to  be  a  narcotic  drug  or  marijuana  within  the  meaning  of
[the  federal  removal  statute]”),  overruled  in  part  on  other  grounds,
Matter of Sum, 13 I. & N. Dec. 569 (1970).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of immigration law related to drug offenses. It cites previous legal cases and statutes, indicating it's part of a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

GORSUCH, J., concurring

the greatest disabilities.  Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U. S. 793,
827–828 (2000) (plurality opinion).  A right meant to protect
minorities  instead  could  become  a  cudgel  to  ensure  con-
formity.

It doesn’t take a long or searching look through history or
around  the  world  to  see  how  this  can  go.    In  the  century
before our Nation’s founding, Oliver Cromwell promised to
Catholics in Ireland:  “ ‘As to freedom of conscience, I med-
dle with no man’s conscience; but if you mean by that, lib-
erty  to  celebrate  the  Mass,  I  would  have  you  understand
that in no place where the power of the Parliament of Eng-
land  prevails  shall  that  be  permitted.’ ”    McDaniel,  435
U. S., at 631, n. 2 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (quoting S. Hook,
Paradoxes of Freedom 23 (1962)); see also 1 T. Carlyle, Oli-
ver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches 395 (1845) (recording
Cromwell’s  October  19,  1649,  letter  to  the  Governor  of
Ross).  Even today, in fiefdoms small and large, people of
faith are made to choose between receiving the protection
of the State and living lives true to their religious convic-
tions.

Of course, in public benefits cases like the one before us
the stakes are not so dramatic.  Individuals are forced only
to choose between forgoing state aid or pursuing some as-
pect of their faith.  The government does not put a gun to
the head, only a thumb on the scale.  But, as so many of our
cases explain, the Free Exercise Clause doesn’t easily toler-
ate  either;  any  discrimination  against  religious  exercise
must meet the demands of strict scrutiny.  In this way, the
Clause seeks to ensure that religion remains “a matter of
voluntary  choice  by  individuals  and  their  associations,
[where]  each  sect  ‘ flourish[es]  according  to  the  zeal  of  its
adherents and the appeal of its dogma,’ ” influenced by nei-
ther  where  the  government  points  its  gun  nor  where  it
places its thumb.  McDaniel, 435 U. S., at 640 (opinion of
Brennan J.) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313
(1952)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and provides historical examples to support his argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

YATES v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

more limited than the Government’s.4

The contemporaneous passage of §1512(c)(1), which was
contained  in  a  section  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  discrete
from  the  section  embracing  §1519  and  §1520,  is  also  in-
structive.  Section 1512(c)(1) provides:
“(c) Whoever corruptly—
“(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record,
document,  or  other  object,  or  attempts  to  do  so,  with
the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availabil-
ity for use in an official proceeding

.

 .

 .
“shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.”

 .

 .

The legislative history reveals that §1512(c)(1) was drafted
and  proposed  after  §1519.    See  148  Cong.  Rec.  12518,
13088–13089  (2002).  The  Government  argues,  and  Yates
does  not  dispute,  that  §1512(c)(1)’s  reference  to  “other
object”  includes  any  and  every  physical  object.    But  if
§1519’s  reference  to  “tangible  object”  already  included  all
physical  objects,  as  the  Government  and  the  dissent  con-
tend,  then  Congress  had  no  reason  to  enact  §1512(c)(1):
Virtually  any  act  that  would  violate  §1512(c)(1)  no  doubt
would  violate  §1519  as  well,  for  §1519  applies  to  “the

——————

4 The dissent contends that nothing can be drawn from the placement
of  §1519  because,  before  and  after  Sarbanes-Oxley,  “all  of  Chapter  73
was  ordered  chronologically.”  Post,  at  9.  The  argument  might  have
some  force  if  the  factual  premise  were  correct.    In  Sarbanes-Oxley,
Congress  directed  insertion  of  §1514A  before  §1518,  then  the  last
section  in  Chapter  73.    If,  as  the  dissent  argues,  Congress  adopted
§1519 to fill out §1512, post, at 6–7, it would have made more sense for
Congress  to  codify  the  substance  of  §1519  within  §1512  or  in  a  new
§1512A,  rather  than  placing  §1519  among  specialized  provisions.
Notably,  in  Sarbanes-Oxley,  Congress  added  §1512(c)(1),  “a  broad  ban
on  evidence-spoliation,”  cf.  post,  at  9,  n.  2,  to  §1512,  even  though
§1512’s  preexisting  title  and  provisions  all  related  to  witness-
tampering.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the case Yates v. United States. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific sections of law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

analogical reasoning, determining whether a historical reg-
ulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm
regulation requires a determination of whether the two reg-
ulations are “relevantly similar.”  C. Sunstein, On Analogi-
cal Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 773 (1993).  And be-
cause “[e]verything is similar in infinite ways to everything
else,” id., at 774, one needs “some metric enabling the anal-
ogizer to assess which similarities are important and which
are  not,”  F.  Schauer  &  B.  Spellman,  Analogy,  Expertise,
and Experience, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 254 (2017).  For in-
stance, a green truck and a green hat are relevantly similar
if one’s metric is “things that are green.”  See ibid.  They
are not relevantly similar if the applicable metric is “things
you can wear.”

While we do not now provide an exhaustive survey of the
features  that  render  regulations  relevantly  similar  under
the  Second  Amendment,  we  do  think  that  Heller  and
McDonald point toward at least two metrics: how and why
the  regulations  burden  a  law-abiding  citizen’s  right  to
armed self-defense.  As we stated in Heller and repeated in
McDonald,  “individual  self-defense  is  ‘the  central  compo-
nent’  of  the  Second  Amendment  right.”  McDonald,  561
U. S., at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599); see also id.,
at 628 (“the inherent right of self-defense has been central
to the Second Amendment right”).  Therefore, whether mod-
ern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden
on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden
is comparably justified are “ ‘central’ ” considerations when
engaging in an analogical inquiry.  McDonald, 561 U. S., at
767 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599).7

——————

7 This does not mean that courts may engage in independent means-
end scrutiny under the guise of an analogical inquiry.  Again, the Second
Amendment is the “product of an interest balancing by the people,” not
the evolving product of federal judges.  Heller, 554 U. S., at 635 (empha-
sis altered).  Analogical reasoning requires judges to apply faithfully the
balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances, and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a section of a legal opinion discussing the application of analogical reasoning to Second Amendment jurisprudence. It delves into the concept of "relevantly similar" regulations and provides guidance on how to assess such similarities in the context of the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>