<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

THOMAS, J., dissenting

E
  The  majority  opinion does  not  acknowledge  the District
Court’s  express  proportionality-based  reasoning.    That
omission  is  of  a  piece  with  its  earlier  noted  failures  to
acknowledge the well-known indeterminacy of the Gingles
framework, that black Alabamians are about two-sevenths
of  the  State’s  population,  and  that  the  plaintiffs  here  are
thus seeking statewide proportionality.  Through this pat-
tern of omissions, the majority obscures the burning ques-
tion in these cases.  The District Court’s vote-dilution find-
ing can be justified only by a racially loaded benchmark—
specifically, a benchmark of proportional control based on
race.  Is that the benchmark the statute demands?  The ma-
jority fails to confront this question head on, and it studi-
ously avoids mentioning anything that would require it to
do so.
  The same nonresponsiveness infects the majority’s anal-
ysis, which is largely devoted to rebutting an argument no-
body  makes.    Contrary  to  the  majority’s  telling,  Alabama
does not equate the “race-neutral benchmark” with “the me-
dian or average number of majority-minority districts” in a
large  computer-generated  set  of  race-blind  districting
plans.  Ante, at 15.  The State’s argument for a race-neutral
benchmark  is  rooted  in  the  text  of  §2,  the  logic  of  vote-
dilution  claims,  and  the  constitutional  problems  with  any
nonneutral benchmark.  See Brief for Appellants 32–46.  It
then relies on the computer evidence in these cases, among
other facts, to argue that the plaintiffs have not shown di-
lution relative to any race-neutral benchmark.  See id., at
54–56.  But the idea that “race-neutral benchmark” means
the  composite  average of  many  computer-generated plans
is the majority’s alone.
  After  thus  straw-manning  Alabama’s  arguments  at  the
outset,  the  majority  muddles  its  own  response.    In  a  per-
functory footnote, it disclaims any holding that “algorithmic
map  making”  evidence  “is  categorically  irrelevant”  in  §2
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Allen v. Milligan. It presents legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529BV$REG1

09-20-01 14:04:38

PGT (cid:127) USRULES

1204

SUPREME COURT BUILDING REGULATIONS

REGULATION FOUR
November 12, 1999
This Regulation is issued under authority of 40 U. S. C.
§ 13l for the protection of the Supreme Court building and
grounds and persons and property therein, and for the main-
tenance of suitable order and decorum of the Court, and en-
forces the provisions of 40 U. S. C. §§ 13g and 13i. Any per-
son who fails to comply with this Regulation may be subject
to a ﬁne and/or imprisonment pursuant to 40 U. S. C. § 13m.
No person who owns or has custody of a dog (hereinafter
“Owner”) shall permit the dog to be on Supreme Court
grounds unless the dog is secured by a leash that does not
exceed four feet in length.

Owners shall control their dogs and prevent their dogs
from harassing or injuring any person on Supreme Court
grounds or injuring any statue, seat, wall, fountain or any
erection or architectural feature, or tree, shrub, plant or turf
on Supreme Court grounds.

Any owner who permits his or her dog to defecate on
immediately remove the

Supreme Court grounds shall
excrement.

No owner shall permit his or her dog to enter the Supreme
Court building, unless the owner is disabled and the dog is
trained to assist the owner or the owner is a law enforcement
ofﬁcer and the dog is trained and authorized to assist the law
enforcement ofﬁcer.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal regulation regarding dogs on Supreme Court grounds. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Regulation</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

Act may be used to issue patents on claims directed to or
encompassing a human organism”).

Further  undercutting  the  PTO’s  practice,  the  United
States argued in the Federal Circuit and in this Court that
isolated DNA was not patent eligible under §101, Brief for
United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  20–33,  and  that  the
PTO’s  practice  was  not  “a  sufficient  reason  to  hold  that
isolated  DNA  is  patent-eligible.”  Id.,  at  26.   See  also  id.,
at  28–29.  These  concessions  weigh  against  deferring  to
the PTO’s determination.7

C
cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentabil-
ity  as  naturally  occurring,  isolated  DNA  segments.    As
already  explained,  creation  of  a  cDNA  sequence  from
mRNA results in an exons-only molecule that is not natu-
rally  occurring.8   Petitioners  concede  that  cDNA  differs
from  natural  DNA  in  that  “the  non-coding  regions  have

——————

7 Myriad  also  argues  that  we  should  uphold  its  patents  so  as  not  to
disturb  the  reliance  interests  of  patent  holders  like  itself.    Brief  for
Respondents  38–39.    Concerns  about  reliance  interests  arising  from
PTO determinations, insofar as they are relevant, are better directed to
Congress.  See Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc., 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 22–24).

8 Some  viruses  rely  on  an  enzyme  called  reverse  transcriptase  to  re-
produce by copying RNA into cDNA.  In rare instances, a side effect of
a viral infection of a cell can be the random incorporation of fragments
of the resulting cDNA, known as a pseudogene, into the genome.  Such
pseudogenes  serve  no  purpose;  they  are  not  expressed  in  protein
creation  because  they  lack  genetic  sequences  to  direct  protein  expres-
sion.  See J. Watson et al., Molecular Biology of the Gene 142, 144, fig.
7–5  (6th  ed.  2008).    Perhaps  not  surprisingly,  given  pseudogenes’
apparently random origins, petitioners “have failed to demonstrate that
the  pseudogene  consists  of  the  same  sequence  as  the  BRCA1  cDNA.”
Association  for  Molecular  Pathology  v.  United  States  Patent  and
Trademark  Office,  689  F. 3d  1303,  1356,  n. 5  (CA  Fed.  2012).    The
possibility  that  an  unusual  and  rare  phenomenon  might  randomly
create  a  molecule  similar  to  one  created  synthetically  through  human
ingenuity does not render a composition of matter nonpatentable.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion discussing the patentability of isolated DNA. It contains legal arguments, citations, and specific details about the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES v. BETHUNE-HILL

Opinion of the Court

State  Bd.  of  Elections,  326  F. Supp.  3d  128,  180  (2018).
The  court  therefore  enjoined  Virginia  “from  conducting
any elections . . . for the office of Delegate . . . in the Chal-
lenged Districts until a new redistricting plan is adopted.”
Id., at 227.  Recognizing the General Assembly’s “primary
jurisdiction” over redistricting, the District Court gave the
General Assembly approximately four months to “adop[t] a
new redistricting plan that eliminate[d] the constitutional
infirmity.”  Ibid.
  A  few  weeks  after  the  three-judge  District  Court’s  rul-
ing, Virginia’s Attorney General announced, both publicly
and  in  a  filing  with  the  District  Court,  that  the  State
would not pursue an appeal to this Court.  Continuing the
litigation,  the  Attorney  General  concluded,  “would  not  be
in  the  best  interest of the  Commonwealth or  its  citizens.”
Defendants’  Opposition  to  Intervenor-Defendants’  Motion
to  Stay  Injunction  Pending  Appeal  Under  28  U. S. C.
§1253  in  No.  3:14–cv–852  (ED  Va.),  Doc.  246,  p. 1.    The
House,  however,  filed  an  appeal  to  this  Court,  App.  to
Juris.  Statement  357–358,  which  the  State  Defendants
moved  to  dismiss  for  want  of  standing.    We  postponed
probable jurisdiction, 586 U. S. ___ (2018), and now grant
the State Defendants’ motion.  The House, we hold, lacks
authority to displace Virginia’s Attorney General as repre-
sentative of the State.  We further hold that the House, as
a single chamber of a bicameral legislature, has no stand-
ing  to  appeal  the  invalidation  of  the  redistricting  plan
separately from the State of which it is a part.1

——————

1 After the General Assembly failed to enact a new redistricting plan
within  the  four  months  allowed  by  the  District  Court,  that  court  en-
tered a remedial order delineating districts for the 2019 election.  The
House has noticed an appeal to this Court from that order as well, and
the  State  Defendants  have  moved  to  dismiss  the  follow-on  appeal  for
lack  of  standing.    See  Virginia  House  of  Delegates  v.  Bethune-Hill,
No. 18–1134.  In the appeal from the remedial order, the House and the
State  Defendants  largely  repeat  the  arguments  on  standing  earlier
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the part discussing the standing of the Virginia House of Delegates to appeal a redistricting case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxix

Page

1017

Quiah v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Quinn; Bowens v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Quinn v. Roach  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quinn v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,827,1077

974

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quinn; Williams v.
821

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quinones v. New York
835

Quintanais; Armann v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quintanilla v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1090,1134

835

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quintero v. Tennessee
1090

Quon; Ontario v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Quon; USA Mobility Wireless, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

R. v. Alameda County Social Services Agency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
R. v. Mental Health Bd. of Fourth Judicial Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

1082

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rabner; White v.
Raby v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  883,1038

827

Radwanski v. Ruiz  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

Ragin v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Raheim v. New York City Bd. of Ed.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  941,1087

Raihala v. Whitbeck  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  842,1086

Railsback v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  817,1064

1052

Raines v. Oklahoma
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rainey v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

922

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rainwater v. United States
836

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ramey v. Texas
Ramirez, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  944,1140

Ramirez v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
868

Ramirez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  916,930

928

Ramirez-Medina v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ramirez-Ponce v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  924,1066

1006

Ramirez Reyna v. United States
887

Ramirez-Rosales v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  883,918

Ramos v. United States
1092

Ramos Armando v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Ramsay v. Broward County Sheriff ’s Ofﬁce  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
884

Ranck; Solan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Randall County Sheriff ’s Ofﬁce; Higgins v.
1132

Randle v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Randle v. Woods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  857,1101

1009

Randolph v. Cole
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

Randolph; Pole v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
866

Rangel v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rangel v. Texas
843

Rapelje; Fleming v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

RAR  Development  Assocs.  v.  New  Jersey  Schools  Construction

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases alphabetically with corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

23

Opinion of the Court

First, the interests they view as compelling cannot be sub-
jected to meaningful judicial review.  Harvard identifies the
following educational benefits that it is pursuing: (1) “train-
ing future leaders in the public and private sectors”; (2) pre-
paring graduates to “adapt to an increasingly pluralistic so-
ciety”; (3) “better educating its students through diversity”;
and (4) “producing new knowledge stemming from diverse
outlooks.”  980  F. 3d,  at  173–174.    UNC  points  to  similar
benefits,  namely,  “(1) promoting  the  robust  exchange  of
ideas;  (2)  broadening  and  refining  understanding;  (3) fos-
tering  innovation  and  problem-solving;  (4) preparing  en-
gaged  and  productive  citizens  and  leaders;  [and]  (5) en-
hancing  appreciation,  respect,  and  empathy,  cross-racial
567
understanding,  and  breaking  down  stereotypes.”
F. Supp. 3d, at 656.

Although these are commendable goals, they are not suf-
ficiently coherent for purposes of strict scrutiny.  At the out-
set, it is unclear how courts are supposed to measure any of
these goals.  How is a court to know whether leaders have
been adequately “train[ed]”; whether the exchange of ideas
is “robust”; or whether “new knowledge” is being developed?
Ibid.; 980 F. 3d, at 173–174.  Even if these goals could some-
how be measured, moreover, how is a court to know when
they have been reached, and when the perilous remedy of
racial preferences may cease?  There is no particular point
at  which  there  exists  sufficient  “innovation  and  problem-
solving,”  or  students  who  are  appropriately  “engaged  and
productive.”  567 F. Supp. 3d, at 656.  Finally, the question
in this context is not one of no diversity or of some: it is a
question  of  degree.  How  many  fewer  leaders  Harvard
would  create  without  racial  preferences,  or  how  much
poorer the education at Harvard would be, are inquiries no
court could resolve.

Comparing  respondents’  asserted  goals  to  interests  we
have recognized as compelling further illustrates their elu-
sive nature.  In the context of racial violence in a prison, for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the use of racial preferences in university admissions. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the constitutionality of such practices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$82K 02-22-99 22:42:40 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 524 U. S. 184 (1998)

201

Scalia, J., dissenting

ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor
of the defendant.’ ” Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,
434 U. S. 275, 284–285 (1978), quoting United States v. Bass,
404 U. S. 336, 348 (1971).

Title 18 U. S. C. § 922(a)(1)(A) makes it unlawful for any
person to engage in the business of dealing in ﬁrearms with-
out a federal license. That provision is enforced criminally
through § 924(a)(1)(D), which imposes criminal penalties on
whoever “willfully violates any other provision of this chap-
ter.” The word “willfully” has a wide range of meanings,
and “ ‘its construction [is] often . . . inﬂuenced by its con-
text.’ ” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 141 (1994),
In
quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 497 (1943).
some contexts it connotes nothing more than “an act which
is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished
from accidental.” United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389,
inasmuch
394 (1933).
as the preceding three subparagraphs of § 924 specify a
mens rea of “knowingly” for other ﬁrearms offenses, see
§§ 924(a)(1)(A)–(C), a “willful” violation under § 924(a)(1)(D)
must require some mental state more culpable than mere
intent to perform the forbidden act. The United States con-
cedes (and the Court apparently agrees) that the violation is
not “willful” unless the defendant knows in a general way
that his conduct is unlawful. Brief for United States 7–9;
ante, at 193 (“The jury must ﬁnd that the defendant acted
with an evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful”).

In the present context, however,

That concession takes this case beyond any useful appli-
cation of the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Everyone agrees that § 924(a)(1)(D) requires some knowledge
of the law; the only real question is which law? The Court’s
answer is that knowledge of any law is enough—or, put an-
other way, that the defendant must be ignorant of every law
violated by his course of conduct to be innocent of willfully
violating the licensing requirement. The Court points to no
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia. It discusses the interpretation of a criminal statute and the concept of "willful" violation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

the sorts of problems that invariably arise in even simple
§1028A(a)(1) cases involving bogus restaurant bills.  Other
contexts  can  present  still  greater  complications  and  still
deeper uncertainties.  The problem we face, then, is not that
§1028A(a)(1)  presents  some  hard  cases  at  its  edges;  the
problem is this statute has no easy cases.  Really, you could
spend a whole day cooking up scenarios—ranging from the
mundane  to  the  fanciful—that  collapse  even  your  most
basic intuitions about what §1028A(a)(1) does and does not
criminalize.  Try making up some of your own and running
them by a friend or family member.  You may be surprised
at how sharply instincts diverge.

For  the  less  adventurous,  consider  just  the  facts  of  the
case now before us.  On one framing, it seems outrageous to
convict  Mr.  Dubin  of  aggravated  identity  theft.    After  all,
the patient did (at one point) receive psychological testing.
So  you  might  say,  as  the  Court  does,  that  Mr.  Dubin  lied
only about the qualifications of the individual who provided
those  services  and  the  date  on  which  they  occurred.    See
ante, at 2, 20.  But on another framing, the patient’s iden-
tity was “a key mover,” perhaps even “at the crux,” of the
fraud.  Mr. Dubin could not have successfully billed the in-
surance provider without accurately offering up some spe-
cific  patient’s  name  and  information.  Nor,  as  the  United
States notes, could Mr. Dubin have simply drawn a random
name from a hat.  Rather, his fraud depended on purloining
the specific identity of a “Texas Medicaid enrollee who had
at least three hours of psychological-testing reimbursement
left in his or her account.”  Brief for United States 13.  Along
the way, Mr. Dubin’s fraud directly harmed the patient by
depriving  him  of  his  annual  eligibility  for  otherwise-
compensable  psychological  services.    From  the  patient’s
perspective, Mr. Dubin’s use of his “means of identification”
could hardly feel “ancillary.”  Ante, at 1–2.

As an abstract exercise, debating fact patterns like these
may  seem  good  fun.  But  there  is  nothing  entertaining
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice GorSUCH. It delves into the complexities of a specific statute (§1028A(a)(1)) and its application in a case involving aggravated identity theft.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

II

Before turning to the merits, we must assure ourselves of
our  jurisdiction.  See  Summers  v.  Earth  Island  Institute,
555  U. S.  488,  499  (2009).    UNC  argues  that  SFFA  lacks
standing  to  bring  its  claims  because  it  is  not  a  “genuine”
membership  organization.    Brief  for  University  Respond-
ents in No. 21–707, pp. 23–26.  Every court to have consid-
ered this argument has rejected it, and so do we.  See Stu-
dents  for  Fair  Admissions,  Inc.  v.  University  of  Tex.  at
Austin, 37 F. 4th 1078, 1084–1086, and n. 8 (CA5 2022) (col-
lecting cases).

Article III of the Constitution limits “[t]he judicial power
of the United States” to “cases” or “controversies,” ensuring
that federal courts act only “as a necessity in the determi-
nation  of  real,  earnest  and  vital”  disputes.  Muskrat  v.
United States, 219 U. S. 346, 351, 359 (1911) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  “To state a case or controversy un-
der Article III, a plaintiff must establish standing.”  Arizona
Christian  School  Tuition  Organization  v.  Winn,  563  U. S.
125,  133  (2011).    That,  in  turn,  requires  a  plaintiff  to
demonstrate  that  it  has  “(1)  suffered  an  injury  in  fact,
(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favor-
able  judicial  decision.”  Spokeo,  Inc.  v.  Robins,  578  U. S.
330, 338 (2016).

In cases like these, where the plaintiff is an organization,
the standing requirements of Article III can be satisfied in
two ways.  Either the organization can claim that it suffered
an  injury  in  its  own  right  or,  alternatively,  it  can  assert
“standing  solely  as  the  representative  of  its  members.”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 511 (1975).  The latter ap-
proach  is  known  as  representational  or  organizational
standing.  Ibid.; Summers, 555 U. S., at 497–498.  To invoke
it, an organization must demonstrate that “(a) its members
would  otherwise  have  standing  to  sue  in  their  own  right;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the issue of standing in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

THOMAS, J., dissenting

if ramming a vehicle into a police officer is a crime of vio-
lence”);  Davis,  875  F. 3d,  at  604  (holding  that  a  man
charged with first-degree rape who pleaded to first-degree
sexual abuse by forcible compulsion had not committed an
ACCA “violent felony” because the force required was insuf-
ficiently violent).  Moreover, courts attempting to apply the
categorical  approach  waste  time  thinking  up  improbable
hypotheticals,  making  the  approach  “very  difficult  to  ad-
minister.”  Burris,  912  F. 3d,  at  407  (Thapar,  J.,  concur-
ring); see also, e.g., Cradler v. United States, 891 F. 3d 659,
672 (CA6 2018) (Kethledge, J., concurring) (“Whatever the
merits of this approach, accuracy and judicial efficiency are
not among them”).  Finally, Congress, through legislation,
created crimes like §924(c) and enhancements like ACCA to
reduce gun crime rates by imposing long sentences on vio-
lent criminals who use firearms.  See Davis, 588 U. S., at
___–___ (KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1–2).  Yet,
as  a  growing  chorus  of  Court  of  Appeals  judges  has  ex-
plained, the categorical approach stymies that effort.  See,
e.g.,  United  States  v.  Ovalles,  905  F. 3d  1231,  1253–1257
(CA11 2018) (W. Pryor, J., concurring).  No rational legisla-
ture  would  have  implicitly  imposed  this  byzantine  and
resource-depleting legal doctrine that so encumbers federal
courts and threatens public safety.

Worse still, this Court has imposed these costs on the fed-
eral courts and the public even though the text of these pro-
visions does not demand them.  I have already pointed out
the “absurdity of applying the categorical approach to the
enumerated-offenses clause” of ACCA and have suggested
that a conduct-based approach better fits the text.  Quarles
v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (THOMAS, J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 1–2).  And although the categorical
approach might be a “linguistically possible” interpretation
of the residual clauses, “the underlying-conduct approach is
the better one.”  Dimaya, 584 U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., dis-
senting) (slip op., at 25).  And finally, while I have suggested
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments regarding the interpretation of certain criminal statutes, specifically the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

VIDAL v. ELSTER

Opinion of the Court

And,  this  Court  has  long  associated  names  with  the  good
will they may bear.  See McLean, 96 U. S., at 252; L. E. Wa-
terman Co., 235 U. S., at 96 (“He purported to transfer to
the partnership the good will attaching to his name”).  The
names  clause  thus  protects  “the  reputation  of  the  named
individual”  by  preventing  another  person  from  using  his
name.  Post, at 9 (opinion of BARRETT, J.).

Applying  these  principles,  we  have  recognized  that  a
party  has  no  First  Amendment  right  to  piggyback  off  the
goodwill another entity has built in its name.  In San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., the Court upheld a provision of
the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 that prohibited “ ‘any per-
son’ ” from using the word “ ‘Olympic’ ” for certain purposes
“ ‘[w]ithout  the  consent’ ”  of  the  U. S.  Olympic  Committee
(USOC),  and  subjected  violations  to  “ ‘the  remedies  pro-
vided in the Lanham Act.’ ”  483 U. S., at 528 (quoting 36
U. S. C. §380(a); alteration omitted).  The Court rejected the
argument that the consent requirement violated the First
Amendment because “Congress reasonably could conclude”
that the value of the word “ ‘Olympic’ was the product of the
USOC’s ‘own talents and energy.’ ”  483 U. S., at 532–533
(quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U. S.  562,  575  (1977)).  Although  the  petitioner  certainly
had a First Amendment right to speak on political matters,
it lacked the right to “exploit the commercial magnetism” of
the word “Olympic” and the USOC’s hard-won efforts in giv-
ing that word value.  483 U. S., at 539 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  The names clause guards a similar inter-
est.  By  protecting  a  person’s  use of  his  name,  the  names
clause “secur[es] to the producer the benefits of [his] good
reputation.”  Park  ’N  Fly,  Inc.  v.  Dollar  Park  &  Fly,  Inc.,
469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985); see also Pattishall, Two Hundred
Years,  at  121  (explaining  how  trademark  law  protects  a
person’s “commercial identity, thereby [allowing him] to en-
joy the fruits of his own labor”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the "names clause" and its relation to trademarks and goodwill. It's part of a coherent narrative and likely contains relevant information for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO

BARRETT, J., dissenting

Id., at 365, 367.  Thus, the presumption was unconstitution-
ally overbroad.

The Black plurality’s reasoning can be boiled down to the
following  insight:  When  context  is  ignored,  true  threats
cannot  be  reliably  distinguished  from  protected  speech.
The  reverse  also  holds:  When  context  is  properly  consid-
ered,  constitutional  concerns  abate.  See,  e.g.,  Watts  v.
United States, 394 U. S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (con-
cluding that a statement was “political hyperbole” instead
of  a  true  threat  based  on  “context,”  “the  expressly  condi-
tional nature of the statement,” and the “reaction of the lis-
teners”).

One more point: Many States have long had statutes like
Colorado’s on the books.  See Brief for Illinois et al. as Amici
Curiae 16–17.  Before we took this case, the vast majority
of Courts of Appeals and state high courts had upheld these
statutes as constitutional.  So objective tests are effectively
the  status  quo  today,  yet  Counterman  still  struggles  to
identify past prosecutions that came close to infringing on
protected  speech.    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  28–30.  The  silence  is
telling.

C

So is the silence in the historical record.  Since 1791, true
threats have been excluded from the “speech” protected by
the First Amendment.  R. A.V., 505 U. S., at 382–383, 388.
If  Counterman  could  show  that  a  subjective  requirement
has been inherent in the definition of “true threat” since the
founding, he would have a compelling case.  But Counter-
man cannot make that showing.

For starters, he produces no evidence directly addressing
the meaning of the First Amendment—nothing from state
ratifying conventions, political commentary, or even early
debates about efforts to regulate threats in ways that might

——————
true threat.”  Id., at 360 (emphasis added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal definition of "true threats" and the constitutionality of a Colorado statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cv

Page

870

Nesselrode v. Measure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

Neufer v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Nevada; Christensen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nevada; Cortinas v.
1056

Nevada; Jardine v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

Nevada; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922

Nevada; Lobato v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Nevada; Nika v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Nevada; Rowell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nevada; Smith v.
Nevada; Stevens v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  850,1086

993

Nevada Dept. of Corrections; Johnson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922

Neven; Corrales v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

Neven; Olivas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

New Albany; Woodard v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852

New Bern; Davis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

New Direction Praise & Worship Ctr.; Arkansas A. M. E. Church v.
851

Newell v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

New Hampshire; Hynes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

New Hampshire; Veale v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

New Hampshire State Prison; Hearns v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

New Jersey; Balogh v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Jersey; Hall v.
893

New Jersey; Hoffman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

New Jersey; J. M. B. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967

New Jersey; Muhammad v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831

New Jersey; Nyhammer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

New Jersey; Stamos v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967

New Jersey; Winstead v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

New Jersey Schools Construction; RAR Development Assocs. v.
Newman, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Newman v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

1158

Newman; Metrish v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Mexico; Judd v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  996,1029,1140

806

New Mexico; Muniz v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

New Mexico; Texas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Mexico Military Institute; Ellenberg v.
998

Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.; Artis v.  . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .  989,1108

New Process Steel, L. P. v. National Labor Relations Bd.
928

Newton v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New York; Asante v.
836

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New York; Batista v.
1055

New York; Culbero v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New York; Dudley v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

833

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10144.  Luna  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  268  S. W.  3d  594.

No.  08–10148.  McMullen  v.  Tennis,  Superintendent,
State  Correctional  Institution  at  Rockview,  et  al.  C.  A.
3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  231.

No.  08–10153.  Massie  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  8  So.  3d  1134.

No.  08–10175.  Jenkins  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–10176.  Kaiser  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  5th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10189.  Morales  v.  Marques.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10190.  Pandolfi  v.  Wall,  Director,  Rhode  Island
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–10192.  Alix  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309
Fed.  Appx.  875.

No.  08–10193.  Porter  v.  Adams,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10194.  Hamilton  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  45  Cal.  4th  963,  200  P.  3d  898.
No.  08–10195.  Farias-Gonzalez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  1181.

No. 08–10201.  Ledbetter v.  Texas.  Ct.  App. Tex., 5th Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10205.  Jones  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia  De
partment  of  Corrections.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari  denied.
No.  08–10209.  Berry  v.  Cain,  Warden.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

No. 13–1314.  Argued March 2, 2015—Decided June 29, 2015

Under Arizona’s Constitution, the electorate shares lawmaking author-
ity  on  equal  footing  with  the  Arizona  Legislature.    The  voters  may
adopt  laws  and  constitutional  amendments  by  ballot  initiative,  and
they may approve or disapprove, by referendum, measures passed by
the Legislature.  Ariz. Const., Art. IV, pt. 1, §1.  “Any law which may
be enacted by the Legislature . . . may be enacted by the people under
the Initiative.”  Art. XXII, §14.

In  2000,  Arizona  voters  adopted  Proposition  106,  an  initiative
aimed  at  the  problem  of  gerrymandering.    Proposition  106  amended
Arizona’s Constitution, removing redistricting authority from the Ar-
izona  Legislature  and  vesting  it  in  an  independent  commission,  the
Arizona  Independent  Redistricting  Commission  (AIRC).    After  the
2010 census, as after the 2000 census, the AIRC adopted redistricting
maps for congressional as well as state legislative districts.  The Ari-
zona  Legislature  challenged  the  map  the  Commission  adopted  in
2012  for  congressional  districts,  arguing  that  the  AIRC  and  its  map
violated  the  “Elections  Clause”  of  the  U. S.  Constitution,  which  pro-
vides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Sena-
tors  and  Representatives  shall  be  prescribed  in  each  State  by  the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations.”  Because “Legislature” means the State’s
representative  assembly,  the  Arizona  Legislature  contended,  the
Clause precludes resort to an independent commission, created by in-
itiative,  to  accomplish  redistricting.    A  three-judge  District  Court
held  that  the  Arizona  Legislature  had  standing  to  sue,  but  rejected
its complaint on the merits.

Held:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

IV
A
If Louisiana’s path to an affirmance is a difficult one, the
dissent’s is trickier still.  The dissent doesn’t dispute that
the  Sixth  Amendment  protects  the  right  to  a  unanimous
jury  verdict,  or  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  extends
this right to state-court trials.  But, it insists, we must af-
firm Mr. Ramos’s conviction anyway.  Why?  Because the
doctrine of stare decisis supposedly commands it.  There are
two independent reasons why that answer falls short.

In the first place and as we’ve seen, not even Louisiana
tries  to  suggest  that  Apodaca  supplies  a  governing  prece-
dent.  Remember,  Justice  Powell  agreed  that  the  Sixth
Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict, so he
would have no objection to that aspect of our holding today.
Justice Powell reached a different result only by relying on
a dual-track theory of incorporation that a majority of the
Court had already rejected (and continues to reject).  And
to accept that reasoning as precedential, we would have to
embrace a new and dubious proposition:  that a single Jus-
tice writing only for himself has the authority to bind this
Court to propositions it has already rejected.

This  is  not  the  rule,  and  for  good  reason—it  would  do
more to destabilize than honor precedent.  To see how, con-
sider  a  hypothetical.    Suppose  we  face  a  question  of  first
impression under the Fourth Amendment:  whether a State
must  obtain  a  warrant  before  reading  a  citizen’s  email  in
the hands of an Internet provider and using that email as
evidence  in  a  criminal  trial.  Imagine  this  question  splits
the  Court,  with  four  Justices  finding  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment requires a warrant and four Justices finding no such
——————

Relatedly,  the  dissent  suggests  that,  before  doing  anything  here,  we
should survey all changes in jury practices since 1791.  See post, at 16,
n. 26.  It sounds like an interesting study—but not one that could alter
the  plain  meaning  of  the  Constitution  or  obliviate  its  undisputed  una-
nimity requirement.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in the case of Ramos v. Louisiana. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Sixth Amendment's right to a unanimous jury verdict.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  MANHATTAN COMMUNITY ACCESS CORP. v. HALLECK

Opinion of the Court

  In short, merely hosting speech by others is not a tradi-
tional, exclusive public function and does not alone trans-
form  private  entities  into  state  actors  subject  to  First
Amendment constraints.
  If  the  rule  were  otherwise,  all  private  property  owners
and  private  lessees  who  open  their  property  for  speech
would  be  subject  to  First  Amendment  constraints  and
would  lose  the  ability  to  exercise  what  they  deem  to  be
appropriate  editorial  discretion  within  that  open  forum.
Private  property  owners  and  private  lessees  would  face
the  unappetizing  choice  of  allowing  all  comers  or  closing
the  platform  altogether.    “The  Constitution  by  no  means
requires  such  an  attenuated  doctrine  of  dedication  of
private property to public use.”  Hudgens, 424 U. S., at 519
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Benjamin  Franklin
did  not  have  to  operate  his  newspaper  as  “a  stagecoach,
with  seats  for  everyone.”    F.  Mott,  American  Journalism
55  (3d  ed.  1962).    That  principle  still  holds  true.    As  the
Court said in Hudgens, to hold that private property own-
ers  providing  a  forum  for  speech  are  constrained  by  the
First  Amendment  would  be  “to  create  a  court-made  law
wholly  disregarding  the  constitutional  basis  on  which
private  ownership  of  property  rests  in  this  country.”    424
U. S.,  at  517  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    The
Constitution does not disable private property owners and
private  lessees  from  exercising  editorial  discretion  over
speech and speakers on their property.2
  The  producers  here  are  seeking  in  effect  to  circumvent
this Court’s case law, including Hudgens.  But Hudgens is
sound, and we therefore reaffirm our holding in that case.3

——————

2 A distinct question not raised here is the degree to which the First
Amendment  protects  private  entities  such  as  Time  Warner  or  MNN
from  government  legislation  or  regulation  requiring  those  private
entities to open their property for speech by others.  Cf. Turner Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 636–637 (1994).

3 In  Cornelius  v.  NAACP  Legal  Defense  &  Educational  Fund,  Inc.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's decision. It presents legal arguments and cites previous case law, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
840

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10435.  Henderson  v.  Liggin  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.  Appx.  214.

No.  08–10438.  Gonzalez  v.  Smith  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  298.

No.  08–10439.  Ijadimini  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10444.  Ware  v.  Laney  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10445.  Timothy  v.  Skolnik,  Director,  Nevada  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  63.

No. 08–10450.  Purpura v.  Bushkin, Gaimes, Gains, Jonas &
Stream  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  263.

No.  08–10451.  O’Kelley  v.  Hall,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.
Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 284 Ga. 758, 670 S. E. 2d 388.

No.  08–10458.  Cook  v.  Galaza,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10461.  Coleman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10466.  Daughtery v.  California.  Ct. App.  Cal., 4th

App.  Dist.,  Div.  1.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10469.  Piazza  v.  Curry,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10471.  Bates v.  United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  881.

No.  08–10472.  Johnson  v.  Roper,  Superintendent,  Potosi
Correctional  Center,  et  al.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  08–10473.  Lagaite  v.  Livingston,  Executive  Direc
tor,  Texas  Department  of  Criminal  Justice,  et  al.  Ct.
App.  Tex.,  3d  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and the court's decision (certiorari denied).
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

648

BRAGDON v. ABBOTT

Opinion of the Court

III

The petition for certiorari presented three other questions

for review. The questions stated:

“3. When deciding under title III of the ADA whether
a private health care provider must perform invasive
procedures on an infectious patient in his ofﬁce, should
courts defer to the health care provider’s professional
judgment, as long as it is reasonable in light of then-
current medical knowledge?

“4. What is the proper standard of judicial review
under title III of the ADA of a private health care pro-
vider’s judgment that the performance of certain inva-
sive procedures in his ofﬁce would pose a direct threat
to the health or safety of others?

“5. Did petitioner, Randon Bragdon, D. M. D., raise a
genuine issue of fact for trial as to whether he was war-
ranted in his judgment that the performance of certain
invasive procedures on a patient in his ofﬁce would have
posed a direct threat to the health or safety of others?”
Pet. for Cert. i.

Of these, we granted certiorari only on question three. The
question is phrased in an awkward way, for it conﬂates two
In asking whether it is appropriate to
separate inquiries.
defer to petitioner’s judgment, it assumes that petitioner’s
assessment of the objective facts was reasonable. The cen-
tral premise of the question and the assumption on which it
is based merit separate consideration.

Again, we begin with the statute. Notwithstanding the
protection given respondent by the ADA’s deﬁnition of dis-
ability, petitioner could have refused to treat her if her infec-
tious condition “pose[d] a direct threat to the health or safety
of others.”
42 U. S. C. § 12182(b)(3). The ADA deﬁnes a di-
rect threat to be “a signiﬁcant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by a modiﬁcation of policies,
practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the questions presented for review and the court's decision to grant certiorari on only one of them.  It delves into the legal interpretation of the ADA and its implications for healthcare providers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

claims.

II
A
A special statutory review scheme, this Court has recog-
nized, may preclude district courts from exercising jurisdic-
tion  over  challenges  to  federal  agency  action.    See,  e.g.,
Thunder Basin, 510 U. S., at 207.  District courts may ordi-
narily hear those challenges by way of 28 U. S. C. §1331’s
grant of jurisdiction for claims “arising under” federal law.
Congress, though, may substitute for that district court au-
thority an alternative scheme of review.  Congress of course
may do so explicitly, providing in so many words that dis-
trict court jurisdiction will yield.  But Congress also may do
so  implicitly,  by  specifying  a  different  method  to  resolve
claims about agency action.  The method Congress typically
chooses is the one used in both the Exchange Act and the
FTC Act: review in a court of appeals following the agency’s
own review process.  We have several times held that the
creation of such a review scheme for agency action divests
district courts of their ordinary jurisdiction over the covered
cases.  See Thunder Basin, 510 U. S., at 207–212; Elgin v.
Department of Treasury, 567 U. S. 1, 10–15 (2012); see also
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 489 (2010) (noting that statutory
schemes  for  agency  review  “[g]enerally”  are  “exclusive”).
The agency effectively fills in for the district court, with the
court of appeals providing judicial review.

But a statutory review scheme of that kind does not nec-
essarily  extend  to  every  claim  concerning  agency  action.
Our decision in Thunder Basin made that point clear.  After
finding that Congress’s creation of a “comprehensive review
process” like the ones here ousted district courts of jurisdic-
tion, the Court asked another question: whether the partic-
ular claims brought were “of the type Congress intended to
be reviewed within this statutory structure.”  510 U. S., at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the concept of statutory review schemes for federal agency actions and how they impact district court jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524ORD

Take: NOT1

Date/Time: 07-17-00 18:46:33

Reporter(cid:146)s Note

The next page is purposely numbered 901. The numbers between 811
and 901 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the ofﬁcial cita-
tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a reporter's note explaining the intentional omission of page numbers in a legal document. It provides context for the numbering system and is not part of the main legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Reporter's Note</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

CARSON v. MAKIN

Opinion of the Court

We  deemed  it  “unremarkable  in  light  of  our  prior  deci-
sions” to conclude that the Free Exercise Clause did not per-
mit Missouri to “expressly discriminate[ ] against otherwise
eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public ben-
efit solely because of their religious character.”  Id., at ___–
___ (slip op., at 9–10).  While it was true that Trinity Lu-
theran remained “free to continue operating as a church,” it
could enjoy that freedom only “at the cost of automatic and
absolute exclusion from the benefits of a public program for
which  the  Center  [was]  otherwise  fully  qualified.”    Id.,  at
___ (slip op., at 10) (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618,
626  (1978)  (plurality  opinion)).  Such  discrimination,  we
said, was “odious to our Constitution” and could not stand.
582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15).

Two Terms ago, in Espinoza, we reached the same con-
clusion as to a Montana program that provided tax credits
to donors who sponsored scholarships for private school tu-
ition.  The Montana Supreme Court held that the program,
to the extent it included religious schools, violated a provi-
sion of the Montana Constitution that barred government
aid to any school controlled in whole or in part by a church,
sect, or denomination.  As a result of that holding, the State
terminated  the  scholarship  program,  preventing  the  peti-
tioners  from  accessing  scholarship  funds  they  otherwise
would have used to fund their children’s educations at reli-
gious schools.

We again held that the Free Exercise Clause forbade the
State’s  action.    The  application  of  the  Montana  Constitu-
tion’s no-aid provision, we explained, required strict scru-
tiny because it “bar[red] religious schools from public bene-
fits solely because of the religious character of the schools.”
Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).  “A State need not
subsidize  private  education,”  we  concluded,  “[b]ut  once  a
State  decides  to  do  so,  it  cannot  disqualify  some  private
schools solely because they are religious.”  Id., at ___ (slip
op., at 20).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Carson v. Makin. It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

THOMAS, J., concurring

(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring).  The  Free  Exercise  Clause,  alt-
hough enshrined explicitly in the Constitution, rests on the
lowest rung of the Court’s ladder of rights, and precariously
so  at  that.  Returning  the  Establishment  Clause  to  its
proper scope will not completely rectify the Court’s dispar-
ate treatment of constitutional rights, but it will go a long
way toward allowing free exercise of religion to flourish as
the Framers intended.  I look forward to the day when the
Court takes up this task in earnest.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
J UST ICES
of  the

SU PRE M E  C OU R T
during  the  time  of  these  reports

JOHN  G.  ROBERTS,  Jr.,  Chief  Justice.

JOHN  PAUL  STEVENS,  Associate  Justice.

ANTONIN  SCALIA,  Associate  Justice.

ANTHONY  M.  KENNEDY,  Associate  Justice.

CLARENCE  THOMAS,  Associate  Justice.

RUTH  BADER  GINSBURG,  Associate  Justice.

STEPHEN  BREYER,  Associate  Justice.

SAMUEL  A.  ALITO,  Jr.,  Associate  Justice.

SONIA  SOTOMAYOR,  Associate  Justice.

retired
SANDRA  DAY  O’CONNOR,  Associate  Justice.
DAVID  H.  SOUTER,  Associate  Justice.

officers  of  the  court
ERIC  H.  HOLDER,  Jr.,  Attorney  General.
ELENA KAGAN, Solicitor General.
WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk.
FRANK D. WAGNER, Reporter of Decisions.
PAMELA TALKIN, Marshal.
JUDITH A. GASKELL,  Librarian.

iii
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a list of Justices of the Supreme Court and other officers of the court. This is likely a section from the beginning of a legal document or report and not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>List of Justices and Court Officers</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 89 (2000)

119

Appendix to opinion of the Court

“9. Personnel Policies—Illicit Drugs and Alcohol Use—
WAC 317–21–235. Requires drug and alcohol testing and
reporting.

“10. Personnel Policies—Personnel Evaluation—WAC
317–21–240. Requires operators to monitor the ﬁtness for
duty of crew members, and requires operators to at least
annually provide a job performance and safety evaluation for
all crew members on vessels covered by a prevention plan
who serve for more than six months in a year.

“11. Personnel Policies—Work Hours—WAC 317–21–245.
Sets limitations on the number of hours crew members may
work.

“12. Personnel Policies—Language—WAC 317–21–250.
Requires all licensed deck ofﬁcers and the vessel master to
be proﬁcient in English and to speak a language understood
by subordinate ofﬁcers and unlicensed crew. Also requires
all written instruction to be printed in a language under-
stood by the licensed ofﬁcers and unlicensed crew.

“13. Personnel Policies—Record Keeping—WAC 317–21–
255. Requires operators to maintain training records for
crew members assigned to vessels covered by a prevention
plan.

“14. Management—WAC 317–21–260. Requires opera-
tors to implement management practices that demonstrate
active monitoring of vessel operations and maintenance, per-
sonnel training, development, and ﬁtness, and technological
improvements in navigation.

“15. Technology—WAC 317–21–265. Requires tankers to
be equipped with global positioning system receivers, two
separate radar systems, and an emergency towing system.
“16. Advance Notice of Entry and Safety Reports—WAC
317–21–540. Requires at least twenty-four hours notice
prior to entry of a tanker into state waters, and requires
that the notice report any conditions that pose a hazard to
the vessel or the marine environment.” 148 F. 3d, at 1057–
1058 (footnote omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of regulations or policies extracted from a legal document. It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a non-essential part of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>List of Regulations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  571 U. S. ____ (2014)

3

Syllabus

entire  period  would  not  qualify  as  “time  spent  in  changing  clothes”
under  §203(o),  even  if  some  clothes  items  were  also  donned  and
doffed.  But  if  the  vast  majority  of  the  time  is  spent  in  donning  and
doffing “clothes” as defined here, the entire period qualifies, and the
time  spent  putting  on  and  off  other  items  need  not  be  subtracted.
Here, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court’s conclusion
that the time spent donning and doffing safety glasses and earplugs
was  minimal.    And  this  Court  is  disinclined  to  disturb  the  District
Court’s additional factual finding, not addressed by the Seventh Cir-
cuit,  that  the  respirators  were  donned  and  doffed  as  needed  during
the normal workday and thus fell beyond §203(o)’s scope.  Pp. 12–15.

678 F. 3d 590, affirmed.

SCALIA,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  KENNEDY,  THOMAS,  GINSBURG,  BREYER,  ALITO,  and  KAGAN,

JJ., joined, and in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined except as to footnote 7.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision. It is not the main body of the legal text and likely provides a condensed overview for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC.

Opinion of the Court

41606), and (2) significant reduction in the energy output
of  the  altered  facilities,  id.,  at  41605.    And  finally,  EPA’s
assessment  of  the  relatively  meager  financial  benefits  of
the  Phase  II  regulations  that  it  adopted—reduced  im-
pingement  and  entrainment  of  1.4  billion  aquatic  organ-
isms,  id.,  at  41661,  Exh.  XII–6,  with  annualized  use-
benefits of $83 million, id., at 41662, and non-use benefits
of  indeterminate  value,  id.,  at  41660–41661—when  com-
pared to annual costs of $389 million, demonstrates quite
clearly that the agency did not select the Phase II regula-
tory  requirements  because  their  benefits  equaled  their
costs.

While  not  conclusive,  it  surely  tends  to  show  that  the
EPA’s  current  practice  is  a  reasonable  and  hence  legiti-
mate  exercise  of  its  discretion  to  weigh  benefits  against
costs  that  the  agency  has  been  proceeding  in  essentially
this  fashion  for  over  30  years.    See  Alaska  Dept.  of  Envi-
ronmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461, 487 (2004);
Barnhart  v.  Walton,  535  U. S.  212,  219–220  (2002).    As
early as 1977, the agency determined that, while §1326(b)
does not require cost-benefit analysis, it is also not reason-
able  to  “interpret  Section  [1326(b)]  as  requiring  use  of
technology  whose  cost  is  wholly  disproportionate  to  the
environmental  benefit  to  be  gained.”  In re  Public  Service
Co.  of  New  Hampshire,  1  E. A. D.  332,  340  (1977).    See
also  In re  Central  Hudson  Gas  and  Electric  Corp.,  EPA
Decision of the General Counsel, NPDES Permits, No. 63,
pp.  371,  381  (July  29,  1977)  (“EPA  ultimately  must  dem-
onstrate  that  the  present  value  of  the  cumulative  annual
cost  of  modifications  to  cooling  water  intake  structures  is
not wholly  out of proportion  to the magnitude of the esti-
mated  environmental  gains”);  Seacoast  Anti-Pollution
League v. Costle, 597 F. 2d 306, 311 (CA1 1979) (rejecting
challenge  to  an  EPA  permit  decision  that  was  based  in
part  on  the  agency’s  determination  that  further  restric-
tions  would  be  “ ‘wholly  disproportionate  to  any  environ-
mental  benefit’ ”).  While  the  EPA’s  prior  “wholly  dispro-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the EPA's cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulations. It's part of a larger legal argument and contains legal citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012)

15

BREYER, J., dissenting

domain, the statute, in literal terms, “abridges” a preexist
ing freedom to speak.  In practical terms, members of the
public  might  well  have  decided  what  to  say,  as  well  as
when and how to say it, in part by reviewing with a view
to  repeating,  expression  that  they  reasonably  believed
was,  or  would  be,  freely  available.    Given  these  speech
implications,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Congress  has  long
sought  to  protect  public  domain  material  when  revising
the  copyright  laws.    See  infra,  at  19  (listing  instances).
And this Court has assumed the particular importance of
public domain material in roughly analogous circumstanc
es.  See  Graham,  383  U. S.,  at  6  (“Congress  may  not  au
thorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain”); Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470, 484 (1974) (trade secret
protection  is  not  incompatible  with  “policy  that  matter
once  in  the  public  domain  must  remain  in  the  public  do
main”);  Cox  Broadcasting  Corp.  v.  Cohn,  420  U. S.  469,
496  (1975)  (First  Amendment  prohibits  sanctioning  press
for  publishing  material  disclosed  in  public  court  docu
ments);  see  also  Dastar  Corp.  v.  Twentieth  Century  Fox
Film Corp., 539 U. S. 23, 33 (2003) (“The right to copy . . .
once  a  copyright  has  expired  . . .  passes  to  the  public”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Moreover, whereas forward-looking copyright laws tend
to  benefit  those  whose  identities  are  not  yet  known  (the
writer  who  has  not  yet  written  a  book,  the  musician  who
has  not  yet  composed  a  song),  when  a  copyright  law  is
primarily  backward  looking  the  risk  is  greater  that  Con
gress is trying to help known beneficiaries at the expense
of  badly  organized  unknown  users  who  find  it  difficult  to
argue  and  present  their  case  to  Congress.    In  Eldred,  I
thought this problem was severe.  See generally 537 U. S.,
at  243–266  (dissenting  opinion).  And  in  light  of  the  fact
that Congress, with one minor exception, heard testimony
only  from  the  representatives  of  existing  copyright  hold
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments regarding copyright law and public domain.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

The  Grutter  Court  rejected  those  arguments  for  ending
race-based affirmative action in higher education in 2003.
But  in  doing  so,  the  Court  struck  a  careful  balance.    The
Court  ruled  that  narrowly  tailored  race-based  affirmative
action  in  higher  education  could  continue  for  another
generation.  But  the  Court  also  explicitly  rejected  any
“permanent
justification  for  racial  preferences,”  and
therefore ruled that race-based affirmative action in higher
education could continue only for another generation.  539
U. S., at 342–343.

Harvard and North Carolina would prefer that the Court
now ignore or discard Grutter’s 25-year limit on race-based
affirmative action in higher education, or treat it as a mere
aspiration.  But the 25-year limit constituted an important
part of Justice O’Connor’s nuanced opinion for the Court in
Grutter.  Indeed,  four  of  the  separate  opinions  in  Grutter
discussed the majority opinion’s 25-year limit, which belies
any  suggestion  that  the  Court’s  reference  to  it  was
insignificant or not carefully considered.

In  short,  the  Court  in  Grutter  expressly  recognized  the
serious issues raised by racial classifications—particularly
permanent  or  long-term  racial  classifications.    And  the
Court “assure[d] all citizens” throughout America that “the
deviation  from  the  norm  of  equal  treatment”  in  higher
education could continue for another generation, and only
for  another  generation.  Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).

A generation has now passed since Grutter, and about 50
years have gone by since the era of Bakke and DeFunis v.
Odegaard,  416  U. S.  312
(1974),  when  race-based
affirmative  action  programs  in  higher  education  largely
began.  In  light  of  the  Constitution’s  text,  history,  and
precedent,  the  Court’s  decision  today  appropriately
respects and abides by Grutter’s explicit temporal limit on
in  higher
the  use  of  race-based  affirmative  action
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the history and context of race-based affirmative action in higher education, referencing the Grutter v. Bollinger case and its 25-year limit.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

First, the Court points to 28 U. S. C. §1330.  That provi-
sion grants federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over
civil cases against foreign sovereigns when one of the excep-
tions provided in §§1605–1607 applies.  From this grant of
civil jurisdiction, the Court reasons, it is a “natural infer-
ence” that §1604’s immunity rule must apply only in civil
cases.  Ante, at 11.  More naturally, however, it seems to me
that any inference from §1330 runs the other way.  Section
1330 shows that when Congress wanted to limit its atten-
tion to civil suits, it knew how to do so.  Section 1604 con-
tains no similar language restricting its scope to civil dis-
putes.  Instead, it speaks far more broadly, holding that a
foreign state “shall be immune” unless a statutorily speci-
fied exception applies.  Normally, when Congress includes
limiting  language  in  one  section  of  a  law  but  excludes  it
from another, we understand the difference in language to
convey a difference in meaning (expressio unius est exclusio
alterius).  See, e.g., Bittner v. United States, 598 U. S. 85,
94  (2023);  Department  of  Homeland  Security  v.  MacLean,
574 U. S. 383, 391 (2015).  The Court’s interpretation of the
FSIA defies this traditional rule of statutory construction.
Today, the Court does to §1604 exactly what it recognizes
we  may  not  do  to  §3231—grafting  an  atextual  limitation
onto the law’s unambiguous terms (in this instance, adding
a “civil”-only restriction).

Second, the Court suggests we should read §1604 as af-
fording immunity only in civil cases because §1605’s excep-
tions apply only in civil cases.  Ante, at 11.  But here both
the  premise  and  the  conclusion  seem  to  me  mistaken.    If
some of §1605’s exceptions apply only in civil cases, others
speak more expansively.  Take the exception relevant here.
The  commercial-activities  exception  found  in  §1605(a)(2)
denies sovereign immunity “in any case . . . in which the ac-
tion is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state.” (Emphasis added).  No-
where  does  this  exception  distinguish  between  civil  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring and dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of a specific section of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxxiii

Hayes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haynes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haynes v. Federal Aviation Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haynes v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haynes v. Mattina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Health South Corp. of Ala.; Corey v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Heard; Dixon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Heard v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hearn v. Board of Public Ed. for Savannah and Chatham County
Hebert v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hedgepeth v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Helgoth, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Helman; Howell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hemmerle v. Bakst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hencke, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Henderson; Christian v.
Henderson; Tuckness v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Henderson v. Virginia Employment Comm’n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Henderson; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Henry; Garcia v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Henry; Samuels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Herman; McDougal-Saddler v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez-Corona v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez-Miranda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hernandez-Villanueva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hershﬁeld v. Board of Zoning Appeals, King George County . . . .
Hershﬁeld v. Colonial Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hesson; Bolden v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hesson; Waters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hewlett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hibbert v. Terhune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hicks; Thompkins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hiivala v. Lambert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hill v. Bell
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hill v. Brigano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hill; Crawford v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hill v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hill v. Kansas City Area Transportation Authority . . . . . . . . . . .
Hine; McCray v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hines v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hines v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hinton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hirschfeld, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1010
1016
1115
1043
1007
1006
1073
1004
1109
1072
1006
1016
1062
1034
1015
1092
1038
1071
1022
1135
1056
1066
1028,1043,1082
1103
1030
1082
1054
1004
1112
1114
1036
1007
1116
1009
1004
1134
1073
1060
1033
1091
1007
1005
1056
1107
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page
Norwood; Bell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973
Norwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  864,983
1008
Noster v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113
Novak v. Jablonski  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825
Nova Southeastern Univ., Inc.; Jallali v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991
Novastar Mortgage, Inc.; Saffran v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092
Novelty, Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Administration . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126
Nowlin v. Hamrick  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
165,810

NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. Maine Public Utilities Comm’n
831

Nunez v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Nunez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

Nunley v. Mississippi  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

nVIDIA Corp.; Carlyle Fortran Trust v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1084

Nweke v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nyhammer v. New Jersey
831

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Obama; Gialto v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  935,1087

Obama; Holt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Obama; Kiyemba v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  969,1145

838

Obama; Lutz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036

Obasohan v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

Obiajulu v. Professional Employees  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

O’Boyle v. Braverman
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

O’Brien; Evans v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1150

O’Brien; Mitchell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O’Brien v. O’Laughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

O’Brien; United States v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1022

819

O’Bryan v. Holy See  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

O’Callaghan v. Temporary Guardianship of Moulton . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Ocean Meadows Condominium Assn.; Nordberg v.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
977

O’Connor v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

O’Dea v. BNSF R. Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952

O’Diah v. New York  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

Odom v. Ozmint  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Odomes v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oduok v. Ferro  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
807

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  944,1090

O’Dwyer v. Becnel
1079

O’Dwyer v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

O’Dwyer v. Nelson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

Ofﬁce of Alaska Governor v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n  . .
991

Ofﬁce of Disciplinary Counsel; Raspanti v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Ofﬁce of Personnel Management; Cartledge v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
890

Ofﬁce of Personnel Management; Cowan v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
O’Flaherty; Bright v.
842

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ogedengbe v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1022,1098
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.  It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

79

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  42 U. S. C. §4701 (Intergovernmental Personnel
Program; Congressional Findings and Declara-
tion of Policy)

  42  U. S. C.  §5057(a)(1)  (Domestic  Volunteer

Services; Nondiscrimination Provisions)

  42 U. S. C. §5151(a) (Nondiscrimination in Dis-

aster Assistance)

  42 U. S. C. §5309(a) (Community Development;
Nondiscrimination in Programs and Activities)

  42  U. S. C.  §5891  (Development  of  Energy

Sources; Sex Discrimination Prohibited)

  42  U. S. C.  §6709  (Public  Works  Employment;
Sex Discrimination; Prohibition; Enforcement)

  42  U. S. C.  §6727(a)(1)  (Public  Works  Employ-

ment; Nondiscrimination)

  42 U. S. C. §6870(a) (Weatherization Assistance

for Low-Income Persons)

  42 U. S. C. §8625(a) (Low-Income Home Energy
Assistance; Nondiscrimination Provisions)

  42 U. S. C. §9821 (Community Economic Devel-

opment; Nondiscrimination Provisions)

  42  U. S. C.  §9849  (Head  Start  Programs;  Non-

discrimination Provisions)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a list of legal citations, specifically referencing sections of the United States Code (U.S.C.).  It is not sequential narrative text and likely serves as a reference for legal arguments within a larger document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

state’s interest in committing the emotionally disturbed un-
der a particular standard of proof.”).  Here too, a majority
of  the  Court  agrees  that  it  is  possible  to  balance  benefits
and burdens under the approach set forth in Pike.  See ante,
at 2–3 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); post, at 1–2 (opinion of
KAVANAUGH, J.).

II
This case comes before us on a Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and in my view the court
below erred in how it analyzed petitioners’ allegations un-
der Pike.  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[f]or dormant
Commerce Clause purposes, laws that increase compliance
costs, without more, do not constitute a significant burden
on interstate commerce.”  6 F. 4th, at 1032.  The panel then
dismissed petitioners’ claim under Pike by concluding that
the complaint alleged only an increase in compliance costs
due to Proposition 12.  6 F. 4th, at 1033.  But, as I read it,
the  complaint  alleges  more  than  simply  an  increase  in
“compliance costs,” unless such costs are defined to include
all the fallout from a challenged regulatory regime.  Peti-
tioners identify broader, market-wide consequences of com-
pliance—economic  harms  that  our  precedents  have  recog-
nized  can  amount  to  a  burden  on  interstate  commerce.  I
would therefore find that petitioners have stated a substan-
tial  burden  against  interstate  commerce,  vacate  the  judg-
ment below, and remand this case for the Ninth Circuit to
consider  whether  petitioners  have  plausibly  claimed  that
the burden alleged outweighs any “putative local interests”
under Pike.  397 U. S., at 142.

A
Our precedents have long distinguished the costs of com-
plying  with  a  given  state  regulation  from  other  economic
harms  to  the  interstate  market.  Bibb  v.  Navajo  Freight
Lines, Inc., 359 U. S. 520 (1959), illustrates the point.  In
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the analysis of a case concerning the dormant Commerce Clause. It delves into the court's interpretation of the Pike balancing test and the distinction between compliance costs and broader market impacts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

23

THOMAS, J., dissenting

State can never be a condition precedent to its enjoyment.”
Ibid.

Before  PennEast,  the  phrase  “complete  in  itself ”  never
appeared  in  our  modern  state  sovereign  immunity  prece-
dents.  PennEast itself invoked the concept for one purpose:
to reject the contention that one could “[s]eparat[e] the em-
inent  domain  power  from  the  power  to  condemn”—i.e.,  to
disaggregate  those  “inextricably  intertwined”  powers—
when determining whether the history of federal eminent
domain  supported  finding  a  waiver  of  state  sovereign  im-
munity.  594  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  17).    According  to
PennEast, to deprive the Federal Government of a power to
condemn  property  in  judicial  proceedings  brought  by  pri-
vate delegatees would be tantamount to depriving the Gov-
ernment  of  part  of  the  eminent  domain  power  itself,  con-
trary to Kohl’s characterization of that power as “complete
in itself.”  594 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 17–18).

The Court today errs by attributing to Kohl an outsized
role in PennEast’s sovereign immunity analysis.  The Court
in PennEast never stated that “completeness in itself ” rep-
resented  the  governing  test  for  plan-of-the-Convention
waiver.  Likewise, PennEast made no effort to explain how
the “complete in itself ” inquiry would work beyond the con-
text of eminent domain.  And because PennEast did not in-
voke Kohl to break new doctrinal ground, the Court made
no attempt to reconcile the “complete in itself ” inquiry with
this  Court’s  longstanding  sovereign  immunity  precedents
(e.g.,  Alden,  Seminole  Tribe,  Federal  Maritime  Comm’n,
Hans, etc.).  Again, if PennEast had made “completeness in
itself ” the applicable test, surely the Court would have dis-
cussed the concept more thoroughly.

The  Court  compounds  its  overreading  of  PennEast’s
“complete  in  itself ”  language  by  unjustifiably  dismissing
PennEast’s  “inextricably  intertwined”  rationale  as  a  mere
“technical aspect” of the decision.  Ante, at 15.  PennEast is
best  read  to  stand  for  the  proposition  that,  because  every
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites previous cases and analyzes legal arguments.  The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529ORD

Take: NOT1

Date/Time: 09-28-01 08:20:32

Reporter’s Note

The next page is purposely numbered 1001. The numbers between 913
and 1001 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the ofﬁcial cita-
tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a reporter's note explaining the intentional omission of page numbers in a legal document. It provides context for the numbering system and is not part of the main legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Reporter's Note</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>