<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

party administrator nationwide?  And, putting that aside,
why wouldn’t Wheaton’s claim be exactly the same under
the Court’s newly-fashioned system?  Either way, the end
result will be that a third-party administrator will provide
contraceptive  coverage.    Surely  the  Court  and  Wheaton
are  not  just  objecting  to  the  use  of  one  stamp  instead  of
two in order to avail itself of the accommodation.

The Court’s actions in this case create unnecessary costs
and layers of bureaucracy, and they ignore a simple truth:
The  Government  must  be  allowed  to  handle  the  basic
tasks of public administration in a manner that comports
with common sense.  It is not the business of this Court to
ensnare itself in the Government’s ministerial handling of
its affairs in the manner it does here.

*

*

*
I have deep respect for religious faith, for the important
and  selfless  work  performed  by  religious  organizations,
and for the values of pluralism protected by RFRA and the
Free Exercise Clause.  But the Court’s grant of an injunc-
tion in this case allows Wheaton’s beliefs about the effects
of its actions to trump the democratic interest in allowing
the Government to enforce the law.  In granting an injunc-
tion  concerning  this  religious  nonprofit  accommodation,
the  availability  of  which  served  as  the  premise  for  the
Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, the Court cannot possibly
be  applying  our  longstanding  requirement  that  a  party’s
entitlement to relief be indisputably clear.

Our  jurisprudence  has  over  the  years  drawn  a  careful
boundary  between  majoritarian  democracy  and  the  right
of  every  American  to  practice  his  or  her  religion  freely.
We should not use the extraordinary vehicle of an injunc-
tion  under  the  All  Writs  Act  to  work  so  fundamental  a
shift  in  that  boundary.   Because  Wheaton  cannot  justify
the  relief  it  seeks,  I  would  deny  its  application  for  an
injunction,  and  I  respectfully  dissent  from  the  Court’s
refusal to do so.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

party’s  pollutants  involuntarily,  it  would  invite  weighty
takings  arguments  under  the  Fifth  Amendment.  See
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S.
419, 421 (1982).  And if the statute really did grant the fed-
eral government the power to regulate virtually each shov-
elful of dirt homeowners may dig on their own properties, it
would sorely test the reaches of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause.  See National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. 519, 551–553 (2012).

Atlantic  Richfield’s  replies  do  nothing  to  address  these
problems.  Instead of making some helpful textual or con-
textual  rejoinder  about  §122,  the  company  asks  us  look
somewhere else entirely.  Now, Atlantic Richfield says, we
should  direct  our  attention  to  §107,  a  provision  that  lists
four classes of “[c]overed persons” the federal government
is authorized to sue under CERCLA.  One of these classes
encompasses any person who owns a “facility” where haz-
ardous waste has “come to be located.”  §§9607, 9601(9).  Be-
cause  the  landowners’  properties  qualify  as  “facilit[ies]”
where  Atlantic  Richfield’s  waste  has  come  to  be  located,
everyone admits the landowners themselves are “[c]overed
persons.”  And, according to Atlantic Richfield, this neces-
sarily  means  they  are  also  “potentially  responsible
part[ies]” subject to §122(e)(6)’s requirement that they seek
federal permission before proceeding with any cleanup.

But notice the linguistic contortion and logical leap.  Lin-
guistically, §107 identifies the “[c]overed persons” the gov-
ernment is authorized to sue.  Section 122 requires a “po-
tentially  responsible  party”  seeking  settlement  with  and
discharge of liability from the federal government to obtain
its permission before engaging in a cleanup.  The terms use
different  language,  appear  in  different  statutory  sections,
and address different matters.  Nor are these two sections
the only ones like them.  CERCLA differentiates between
covered  persons  and  potentially  responsible  parties  in
many places:  Some sections apply to all persons covered by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of sections within the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). It delves into legal arguments regarding the definition of "covered persons" and "potentially responsible parties" and their implications for cleanup procedures.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

29

Opinion of the Court

*4 (CD Cal., May 15, 2020).  By imbuing the availability of
shelter with constitutional significance in this way,  many
cities tell us, Martin and its progeny have “paralyzed” com-
munities and prevented them from implementing even pol-
icies designed to help the homeless while remaining sensi-
tive to the limits of their resources and the needs of other
citizens.  Cities  Cert.  Brief  4  (boldface  and  capitalization
deleted).

There  are  more  problems  still.    The  Ninth  Circuit  held
that  “involuntarily”  homeless  individuals  cannot  be  pun-
ished  for  camping  with  materials  “necessary  to  protect
themselves from the elements.”  72 F. 4th, at 896.  It sug-
gested,  too,  that  cities  cannot  proscribe  “life-sustaining
act[s]” that flow necessarily from homelessness.  72 F. 4th,
at 921 (joint statement of Silver and Gould, JJ., regarding
denial of rehearing).  But how far does that go?  The plain-
tiffs  before  us  suggest  a  blanket  is  all  that  is  required  in
Grants Pass.  Brief for Respondents 14.  But might a colder
climate trigger a right to permanent tent encampments and
fires for warmth?  Because the contours of this judicial right
are so “uncertai[n],” cities across the West have been left to
guess whether Martin forbids their officers from removing
everything  from  tents  to  “portable  heaters”  on  city  side-
walks.  Brief for City of Phoenix et al. on Pet. for Cert. 19,
29 (Phoenix Cert. Brief ).  There is uncertainty, as well, over
whether Martin requires cities to tolerate other acts no less
“attendant  [to]  survival”  than  sleeping,  such  as  starting
fires  to  cook  food  and  “public  urination  [and]  defecation.”
Phoenix Cert. Brief 29–30; see also Mahoney v. Sacramento,
2020  WL  616302,  *3  (ED  Cal.,  Feb.  10,  2020)  (indicating
that “the [c]ity may not prosecute or otherwise penalize the
[homeless] for eliminating in public if there is no alterna-
tive to doing so”).  By extending Robinson beyond the nar-
row class of status crimes, the Ninth Circuit has created a
right  that  has  proven  “impossible”  for  judges  to  delineate
except “by fiat.”  Powell, 392 U. S., at 534.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Martin v. Boise case. It delves into the legal arguments and implications surrounding homelessness and the rights of individuals experiencing it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. HIGGS

BREYER, J., dissenting

an execution, takes time.  That time means delay.  The re-
cent federal executions are again illustrative.  The Federal
Government  executed  Lee  21  years  after  his  conviction;
Brandon Bernard 20 years after his conviction; Alfred Bour-
geois 16 years after his conviction; Wesley Purkey 16 years
after  his  conviction;  and  Lisa  Montgomery  12  years  after
her conviction.  Today, the Government executes Higgs 20
years after his conviction.  The longer the delay, the weaker
the  basic penological justifications for imposing the death
penalty in the first place become, and the greater the psy-
chological suffering inflicted on the death row inmate.  I re-
main  convinced  that  this  dilemma  arises  out  of  efforts  to
impose  the  death  penalty.   Together  with  other  problems
that I have previously described, it calls into question the
constitutionality  of  the  death  penalty  itself.  See  Glossip,
supra, at 945–946 (BREYER, J., dissenting).

But  this  case  involves  a  procedural  issue.   The  Fourth
Circuit  issued  a  stay  of  the  execution  and  has  not  yet  re-
solved the Government’s appeal.  It is rare for us to consider
a question before the Circuit has decided it.  And I would
not  depart  from  ordinary  practice  here.   Consequently,  I
dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from Justice Breyer. It discusses the time delay between conviction and execution, arguing that it weakens the justifications for the death penalty and causes psychological suffering.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS

ALITO, J., dissenting

that he or she “has been physically present in the United
States  for  a  continuous  period  of  not  less  than  10  years.”
§1229b(b)(1)(A).
“For  purposes  of ”  that  rule,  however,
“any  period  of  . . .  continuous  physical  presence  in  the
United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is
served  a  notice  to  appear  under  section  1229(a)  of  this
title.”  §1229b(d)(1).    That  language  acts  as  a  stop-time
rule,  preventing  the  continuous-presence  clock  from  con-
tinuing  to  run  once  an  alien  is  served  with  a  notice  to
appear.

The question presented by this case is whether the stop-
time rule is triggered by service of a notice to appear that
is  incomplete  in  some  way.    A  provision  of  the  amended
Immigration  and  Nationality  Act  requires  that  the  Gov-
ernment  serve  an  alien  who  it  seeks  to  remove  with  a
notice  to  appear  “specifying”  a  list  of  things,  including
“[t]he  nature  of  the  proceedings  against  the  alien,”  “[t]he
legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted,”
“[t]he  acts  or  conduct  alleged  to  be  in  violation  of  law,”
“[t]he  charges  against  the  alien  and  the  statutory  provi-
sions alleged to have been violated,” and (what is relevant
here)  “[t]he  time  and  place  at  which  the  proceedings  will
be held.”  §§1229(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (G)(i).

Petitioner  Wescley  Pereira  is  a  Brazilian  citizen  who
entered  the  United  States  lawfully  in  2000  but  then  ille-
gally  overstayed  his  nonimmigrant  visa.    In  2006,  the
Government  caused  him  to  be  served  in  person  with  a
document styled as a notice to appear for removal proceed-
ings.  Pereira concedes that he overstayed his visa and is
thus  removable,  but  he  argues  that  he  is  nonetheless
eligible  for  cancellation  of  removal  because  he  has  now
been  in  the  country  continuously  for  more  than  10  years.
He contends that the notice served on him in 2006 did not
qualify as a notice to appear because it lacked one piece of
information  that  such  a  notice  is  supposed  to  contain,
namely, the time at which his removal proceedings were to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal arguments related to immigration law and the interpretation of a specific statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

of  fees  levied  to  cover  nonchargeable  expenses,  our  prior
decisions  approach,  if  they  do  not  cross,  the  limit  of  what
the First Amendment can tolerate.”  Ante, at 14 (emphasis
added);  see  also  ante,  at  21–22  (“[B]y  allowing  unions  to
collect  any  fees  from  nonmembers  and  by  permitting
unions  to  use  opt-out  rather  than  opt-in  schemes  when
annual  dues  are  billed,  our  cases  have  substantially  im-
pinged  upon  the  First  Amendment  rights  of  nonmem-
bers”);  ante,  at  11–12  (“Once  it  is  recognized  . . .  that  a
nonmember cannot be forced to fund a union’s political or
ideological  activities,  what  is  the  justification  for  putting
the burden on the nonmember to opt out of making such a
payment?  Shouldn’t  the  default  rule  comport  with  the
probable preferences of most nonmembers?”).

To  cast  serious  doubt  on  longstanding  precedent  is  a
step  we  historically  take  only  with  the  greatest  caution
and reticence.  To do so, as the majority does, on our own
invitation  and  without  adversarial  presentation  is  both
unfair  and  unwise.  It  deprives  the  parties  and  potential
amici  of  the  opportunity  to  brief  and  argue  the  question.
It deprives us of the benefit of argument that the parties,
with  concrete  interests  in  the  question,  are  surely  better
positioned  than  we  to  set  forth.    See  NASA,  562  U. S.,  at
___,  n. 10  (opinion  for  the  Court  by  ALITO,  J.)  (slip  op.,
at  11,  n. 10)  (“It  is  undesirable  for  us  to  decide  a  matter
of  this  importance  in  a  case  in  which  we  do  not  have  the
benefit  of  briefing  by  the  parties  and  in  which  potential
amici had little notice that the matter might be decided”).
Not  content  with  our  task,  prescribed  by  Article  III,  of
answering  constitutional  questions,  the  majority  today
decides to ask them as well.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case Knox v. Service Employees. It delves into the First Amendment implications of union fees and criticizes the majority's approach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

KEMP v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

law.  Because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cogniza-
ble under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limita-
tions period.  Pp. 3–10.

(a) As  a  matter  of  text,  structure,  and  history,  a  “mistake”  under
Rule  60(b)(1)  includes  a  judge’s  errors  of  law.    When  the  Rule  was
adopted in 1938 and revised in 1946, the word “mistake” applied to any
“misconception,”  “misunderstanding,”  or  “fault  in  opinion  or  judg-
ment.”  Webster’s New International Dictionary 1383.  Likewise, in its
legal  usage,  “mistake”  included  errors  “of  law  or  fact.”   Black’s  Law
Dictionary 1195.  Thus, regardless whether “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1)
carries  its  ordinary  meaning  or  legal  meaning,  it  includes  a  judge’s
mistakes of law.  Rule 60(b)(1)’s drafters could have used language to
connote a narrower understanding of “mistake,” yet they chose not to
qualify that term.  Similarly, the Rule’s drafters could have excluded
mistakes  by  judges  from  the  Rule’s  reach.    In  fact,  the  Rule  used  to
read that way.  When adopted in 1938, Rule 60(b) initially referred to
“his”—i.e.,  a  party’s—“mistake,”  so  judicial  errors  were  not  covered.
The 1946 revision to the Rule deleted the word “his,” thereby removing
any limitation on whose mistakes could qualify.  Pp. 4–6.

(b) Neither the Government nor Kemp offers a reason to depart from

this reading of Rule 60(b)(1).  Pp. 6–10.

(1) The  Government  contends  that  the  term  “mistake”  encom-
passes only so-called “obvious” legal errors.  This contention—also held
by several Courts of Appeals—is unconvincing.  None of the dictionar-
ies from the time the Rule was adopted and revised suggests this “ob-
viousness” gloss.  Nor does the text or history of Rule 60(b)(1) limit its
reach only to flagrant cases that would have historically been corrected
by courts sitting in equity.  Finally, requiring courts to decide not only
whether there was a mistake but also whether that mistake was suffi-
ciently “obvious” raises questions of administrability.  P. 6.

(2) Kemp’s  arguments  for  limiting  Rule  60(b)(1)  to  non-judicial,
non-legal errors are also unconvincing.  He claims that Rule 60(b)(1)’s
other  grounds  for  relief—“inadvertence,”  “surprise,”  and  “excusable
neglect”—involve exclusively non-legal, non-judicial errors, and thus
“mistake” should be similarly limited.  But courts have found that ex-
cusable neglect may involve legal error, see, e.g., Lenaghan v. Pepsico,
Inc.,  961  F. 2d  1250,  1254–1255,  and  they  have  a  similar  history  of
granting  relief  based  on  “judicial  inadvertence,”  Larson  v.  Heritage
Square  Assocs.,  952  F. 2d  1533,  1536.    Kemp  argues  that  Rule  60’s
structure favors interpreting the term “mistake” narrowly to include
only  non-legal  errors,  and  the  Court’s  contrary  interpretation  would
create confusing overlap between Rule 60(b)(1) and relief available un-
der other parts of Rule 60 not subject to Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations
period.  But the overlap Kemp suggests would exist even if “mistake”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, specifically discussing the interpretation of Rule 60(b)(1) in the context of a legal error.  It is sequential text and provides legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

KAGAN, J., dissenting in part

relationship between end stage renal disease and dialysis—
and the text it wrote reflects that knowledge.  The statute
proscribes not just differentiation “on the basis of the exist-
ence of end stage renal disease,” but also “on the basis of . . .
the  need  for  renal  dialysis,  or  in  any  other  manner.”
§1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii).  The back half of that provision prevents
exactly  the  circumvention  the  majority  today  allows.    It
bars  plans  from  differentiating  between  people  with  and
without end stage renal disease even when that differenti-
ation is accomplished indirectly—by targeting their treat-
ment, or by relying on some other proxy for the condition.
So contra the majority, the statutory text does indeed pro-
hibit differentiation as to services—and not only as to indi-
viduals.  See ante, at 6, n. 2.

That reading also fits with the statute’s purpose.  As the
majority  recognizes,  the  MSPA’s  renal  disease  provisions
were designed to prevent plans from foisting the cost of di-
alysis  onto  Medicare.    See  ante,  at  2.  Yet  the  Court  now
tells plans they can do just that, so long as they target dial-
ysis, rather than the patients who rely on it, for disfavored
coverage.  Congress would not—and did not—craft a statute
permitting such a maneuver.  Now Congress will have to fix
a statute this Court has broken.  I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

APA,  the  longstanding  and  settled  precedent  adhering  to
that  text  and  history,  and  the  radical  consequences  for
administrative law and individual liberty that would ensue
if vacatur were suddenly no longer available.

The text and history of the APA authorize vacatur.  The
text directs courts to “set aside” unlawful agency actions.  5
U. S. C.  §706(2)(A).    When  Congress  enacted  the  APA  in
1946,  the  phrase  “set  aside”  meant  “cancel,  annul,  or
revoke.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1612 (3d ed. 1933); see also
Black’s  Law  Dictionary  1537  (4th  ed.  1951)  (same);
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 1103 (W. Baldwin ed. 1926) (“To
annul; to make void; as, to set aside an award”).   At  that
time,  it  was  common  for  an  appellate  court  that  reversed
the decision of a lower court to direct that the lower court’s
“judgment” be “set aside,” meaning vacated.  E.g., Shawkee
Mfg. Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U. S. 271, 274 (1944).
Likewise,  Congress  used  the  phrase  “set  aside”  in  many
pre-APA statutes that plainly contemplated the vacatur of
agency actions.2

The

APA

incorporated

and
contemporaneous meaning of “set aside.”  When a federal
court sets aside an agency action, the federal court vacates
that order—in much the same way that an appellate court
vacates the judgment of a trial court.

common

that

The APA prescribes the same “set aside” remedy for all
categories of “agency action,” including agency adjudicative
orders and agency rules.  §§551(13), 706(2).  When a federal
court  concludes  that  an  agency  adjudicative  order  is

——————

2 See, e.g., Hepburn Act of 1906, ch. 3591, §5, 34 Stat. 584, 592 (courts
could “enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order or requirement of ”
the Interstate Commerce Commission); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
ch. 404, §25(a), 48 Stat. 881, 902 (authorizing courts “to affirm, modify,
and enforce or set aside [an] order” of the SEC); Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic  Act  of  1938,  ch.  675,  §701(f )(3),  52  Stat.  1040,  1055–1056
(authorizing a court to “affirm the order” of the FDA, “or to set it aside
in whole or in part, temporarily or permanently”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It delves into the legal precedent and interpretation surrounding the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the concept of vacatur (setting aside agency actions).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO

GORSUCH, J., concurring

fine, or establish that they qualified for an exemption.  Id.,
at 25 (asking whether the State’s scheme was “reasonable”);
id., at 27 (same); id., at 28 (same).  Rational basis review is
the test this Court normally applies to Fourteenth Amend-
ment challenges, so long as they do not involve suspect clas-
sifications based on race or some other ground, or a claim of
fundamental right.  Put differently, Jacobson didn’t seek to
depart from normal legal rules during a pandemic, and it
supplies no precedent for doing so.  Instead, Jacobson ap-
plied what would become the traditional legal test associ-
ated with the right at issue—exactly what the Court does
today.  Here, that means strict scrutiny:  The First Amend-
ment traditionally requires a State to treat religious exer-
cises at least as well as comparable secular activities unless
it can meet the demands of strict scrutiny—showing it has
employed  the  most  narrowly  tailored  means  available  to
satisfy a compelling state interest.  Church of Lukumi, 508
U. S., at 546.

Next, consider the right asserted.  Mr. Jacobson claimed
that  he  possessed  an  implied  “substantive  due  process”
right  to  “bodily  integrity”  that  emanated  from  the  Four-
teenth Amendment and allowed him to avoid not only the
vaccine but also the $5 fine (about $140 today) and the need
to show he qualified for an exemption.  197 U. S., at 13–14.
This Court disagreed.  But what does that have to do with
our circumstances?  Even if judges may impose emergency
restrictions on rights that some of them have found hiding
in the Constitution’s penumbras, it does not follow that the
same fate should befall the textually explicit right to reli-
gious exercise.

Finally,  consider  the  different  nature  of  the  restriction.
In Jacobson, individuals could accept the vaccine, pay the
fine, or identify a basis for exemption.  Id., at 12, 14.  The
imposition on Mr. Jacobson’s claimed right to bodily integ-
rity,  thus,  was  avoidable  and  relatively  modest.    It  easily
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to religious exercise and government restrictions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2014)

3

Opinion of the Court

and  indispensable  to  an  employee’s  principal  activities  if
those  postshift  activities  are  necessary  to  the  principal
work performed and done for the benefit of the employer.
Id., at 530.  Accepting as true the allegation that Integrity
Staffing  required  the  security  screenings  to  prevent  em-
ployee  theft,  the  Court  of  Appeals  concluded  that  the
screenings  were  “necessary”  to  the  employees’  primary
work  as  warehouse  employees  and  done  for  Integrity
Staffing’s benefit.  Id., at 531.

We  granted  certiorari,  571  U. S.  ___  (2014),  and  now

reverse.

II

A

Enacted  in  1938,  the  FLSA  established  a  minimum
wage and overtime compensation for each hour worked in
excess of 40 hours in each workweek.  §§6(a)(1), 7(a)(3), 52
Stat.  1062–1063.    An  employer  who  violated  these  provi-
sions  could  be  held  civilly  liable  for  backpay,  liquidated
damages, and attorney’s fees.  §16, id., at 1069.

But the FLSA did not define “work” or “workweek,” and
this  Court  interpreted  those  terms  broadly.    It  defined
“work”  as  “physical  or  mental  exertion  (whether  burden-
some  or  not)  controlled  or  required  by  the  employer  and
pursued  necessarily  and  primarily  for  the  benefit  of  the
employer and his business.”  Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co.
v.  Muscoda  Local  No.  123,  321  U. S.  590,  598  (1944).
Similarly, it defined “the statutory workweek” to “includ[e]
all time during which an employee is necessarily required
to  be  on  the  employer’s  premises,  on  duty  or  at  a  pre-
scribed workplace.”  Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,
328 U. S. 680, 690–691 (1946).   Applying these expansive
definitions,  the  Court  found  compensable  the  time  spent
traveling  between  mine  portals  and  underground  work
areas,  Tennessee  Coal,  supra,  at  598,  and  the  time  spent
walking  from  timeclocks  to  work  benches,  Anderson,  su-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, case names, and discusses legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
54  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

decision as a matter of policy, were unsparing in their crit-
icism.  John Hart Ely famously wrote that Roe was “not con-
stitutional law and g[ave] almost no sense of an obligation
to try to be.”  Ely 947 (emphasis deleted).  Archibald Cox,
who served as Solicitor General under President Kennedy,
commented that Roe “read[s] like a set of hospital rules and
regulations”  that  “[n]either  historian,  layman,  nor  lawyer
will be persuaded . . . are part of . . . the Constitution.”  The
Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 113–
114 (1976).  Laurence Tribe wrote that “even if there is a
need to divide pregnancy into several segments with lines
that  clearly  identify  the  limits  of  governmental  power,
‘interest-balancing’  of  the  form  the  Court  pursues  fails  to
justify any of the lines actually drawn.”  Tribe 4–5.  Mark
Tushnet termed Roe a “totally unreasoned judicial opinion.”
Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional
Law 54 (1988).  See also P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate 157
(1982);  A.  Amar,  Foreword:  The  Document  and  the  Doc-
trine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 110 (2000).

Despite  Roe’s  weaknesses,  its  reach  was  steadily  ex-
tended in the years that followed.  The Court struck down
laws  requiring  that  second-trimester  abortions  be  per-
formed only in hospitals, Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 433–439 (1983); that mi-
nors  obtain  parental  consent,  Planned  Parenthood  of
Central  Mo.  v.  Danforth,  428  U. S.  52,  74  (1976);  that
women give written consent after being informed of the sta-
tus of the developing prenatal life and the risks of abortion,
Akron, 462 U. S., at 442–445; that women wait 24 hours for
an abortion, id., at 449–451; that a physician determine vi-
ability in a particular manner, Colautti, 439 U. S., at 390–
397;  that  a  physician  performing  a  post-viability  abortion
use the technique most likely to preserve the life of the fe-
tus, id., at 397–401; and that fetal remains be treated in a
humane  and  sanitary  manner,  Akron,  462  U. S.,  at  451–
452.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization and the history of Roe v. Wade. It cites legal precedents and provides analysis of the legal arguments surrounding abortion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
108

MOHAWK  INDUSTRIES,  INC.  v.  CARPENTER

Opinion of the Court

two  conditions  of  the  collateral  order  doctrine—conclusive
ness  and  separateness—but  not  the  third—effective  unre
viewability.  Because  we  agree  with  the  Court  of  Appeals
that  collateral  order  appeals  are  not  necessary  to  ensure
effective  review  of  orders  adverse  to  the  attorney-client
privilege,  we  do  not  decide  whether  the  other  Cohen  re
quirements are met.

Mohawk  does  not  dispute  that  “we  have  generally  denied
review  of  pretrial  discovery  orders.”  Firestone,  449  U. S.,
at 377; see also 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Fed
eral  Practice  and  Procedure  § 3914.23,  p.  123  (2d  ed.  1992)
(hereinafter  Wright  &  Miller)  (“[T]he  rule  remains  settled
that  most  discovery  rulings  are  not  ﬁnal”).  Mohawk  con
tends,  however,  that  rulings  implicating  the  attorney-client
privilege differ in kind from run-of-the-mill discovery orders
because  of  the  important  institutional  interests  at  stake.
According  to  Mohawk,  the  right  to  maintain  attorney-client
conﬁdences—the  sine  qua  non  of  a  meaningful  attorney-
client  relationship—is  “irreparably  destroyed  absent  im
mediate  appeal”  of  adverse  privilege  rulings.  Brief  for
Petitioner 23.

We  readily  acknowledge  the  importance  of  the  attorney-
client privilege, which “is one of the oldest recognized privi
leges for conﬁdential communications.”  Swidler & Berlin v.
United  States,  524  U. S.  399,  403  (1998).  By  assuring  con
ﬁdentiality, the privilege encourages clients to make “full and
frank”  disclosures  to  their  attorneys,  who  are  then  better
able  to  provide  candid  advice  and  effective  representation.
Upjohn Co. v.  United States, 449 U. S. 383, 389 (1981).  This,
in  turn,  serves  “broader  public  interests  in  the  observance
of law and administration of justice.”  Ibid.

The  crucial  question,  however,  is  not  whether  an  interest
is  important  in  the  abstract;  it  is  whether  deferring  review
until ﬁnal judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the
cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of rele
vant  orders.  We  routinely  require  litigants  to  wait  until
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the attorney-client privilege and the rules around appealing discovery orders. It's sequential text and relevant to the overall content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

582

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS v. FINLEY

Opinion of the Court

lence’), rather than isolated and treated as exogenous consid-
In keeping with that
erations.” Report to Congress 89.
recommendation, the criteria in § 954(d)(1) inform the assess-
ment of artistic merit, but Congress declined to disallow any
particular viewpoints. As the sponsors of § 954(d)(1) noted
in urging rejection of the Rohrabacher Amendment: “[I]f we
start down that road of prohibiting categories of expression,
categories which are indeed constitutionally protected
speech, where do we end? Where one Member’s aversions
end, others with different sensibilities and with different val-
ues begin.”
136 Cong. Rec. 28624 (statement of Rep. Cole-
man); see also id., at 28663 (statement of Rep. Williams) (ar-
guing that the Rohrabacher Amendment would prevent the
funding of Jasper Johns’ ﬂag series, The Merchant of Venice,
Chorus Line, Birth of a Nation, and the Grapes of Wrath).
In contrast, before the vote on § 954(d)(1), one of its sponsors
stated: “If we have done one important thing in this amend-
ment, it is this. We have maintained the integrity of free-
Id., at 28674.
dom of expression in the United States.”
That § 954(d)(1) admonishes the NEA merely to take “de-
cency and respect” into consideration and that the legislation
was aimed at reforming procedures rather than precluding
speech undercut respondents’ argument that the provision
inevitably will be utilized as a tool for invidious viewpoint
In cases where we have struck down legis-
discrimination.
lation as facially unconstitutional, the dangers were both
more evident and more substantial.
In R. A. V. v. St. Paul,
505 U. S. 377 (1992), for example, we invalidated on its face
a municipal ordinance that deﬁned as a criminal offense the
placement of a symbol on public or private property “ ‘which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender.’ ” See id., at 380. That provision
set forth a clear penalty, proscribed views on particular “dis-
favored subjects,” id., at 391, and suppressed “distinctive
idea[s], conveyed by a distinctive message,” id., at 393.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the constitutionality of a law regarding funding for the arts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CARSON v. MAKIN

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

religious  institutions.   Moreover,  the  Court  for  many  dec-
ades understood the Establishment Clause to prohibit gov-
ernment from funding religious exercise.*

Over  time,  the  Court  eroded  these  principles  in  certain
respects.  See,  e.g.,  Zelman  v.  Simmons-Harris,  536  U. S.
639, 662 (2002) (allowing government funds to flow to reli-
gious schools if private individuals selected the benefiting
schools;  the  government  program  was  “entirely  neutral
with  respect  to  religion”;  and  families  enjoyed  a  “genuine
choice among options public and private, secular and reli-
gious”).  Nevertheless, the space between the Clauses con-
tinued to afford governments “some room to recognize the
unique status of religious entities and to single them out on
that basis for exclusion from otherwise generally applicable
laws.”  Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (SOTOMAYOR, J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 9).

Trinity Lutheran veered sharply away from that under-
standing.  After assuming away an Establishment Clause
violation,  the  Court  revolutionized  Free  Exercise  doctrine
by equating a State’s decision not to fund a religious organ-
ization with presumptively unconstitutional discrimination
on the basis of religious status.  See id., at ___–___ (slip op.,
at 10–11).  A plurality, however, limited the Court’s deci-
sion to “express discrimination based on religious identity”
(i.e., status), not “religious uses of funding.”  Id., at ___, n. 3
(slip op., at 14, n. 3).   In other words, a  State was barred

——————

* See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 16 (1947) (“No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions . . . ”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 222–223
(1997)  (observing  that  government  aid  that  impermissibly  “advanc[ed]
. . .  religion”  was  constitutionally  barred); Mitchell  v. Helms,  530  U. S.
793, 840 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“[O]ur decisions
provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious ac-
tivities” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 875–876 (1995) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (chronicling cases).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Carson v. Makin. It discusses the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and how the Court's interpretation of these clauses has evolved over time.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

Coleman  Special  Master  and  Plata  Receiver  were  unable
to  provide  assurance  that  further,  substantially  similar
efforts would yield success absent a population reduction.
Instead,  the  Coleman  Special  Master  explained  that
“many of the clinical advances . . .  painfully accomplished
over  the  past  decade  are  slip-sliding  away”  as  a  result  of
overcrowding.    App.  481–482.    And  the  Plata  Receiver
indicated  that,  absent  a  reduction  in  overcrowding,  a
successful  remedial  effort  could  “all  but  bankrupt”  the
State of California.  App. 1053.

Having engaged in remedial efforts for 5 years in Plata
and 12 in Coleman, the District Courts were not required
to  wait  to  see  whether  their  more  recent  efforts  would
yield  equal  disappointment.  When  a  court  attempts  to
remedy  an  entrenched  constitutional  violation  through
reform  of  a  complex  institution,  such  as  this  statewide
prison system, it may be necessary in the ordinary course
to  issue  multiple  orders  directing  and  adjusting  ongoing
remedial efforts.  Each new order must be given a reason-
able time to succeed, but reasonableness must be assessed
in light of the entire history of the court’s remedial efforts.
A  contrary  reading  of  the  reasonable  time  requirement
would in effect require district courts to impose a morato-
rium  on  new  remedial  orders  before  issuing  a  population
limit.  This unnecessary period of inaction would delay an
eventual  remedy  and  would  prolong  the  courts’  involve-
ment,  serving  neither  the  State  nor  the  prisoners.    Con-
gress  did  not  require  this  unreasonable  result  when  it
used the term “reasonable.”

The Coleman and Plata courts had a solid basis to doubt
that additional efforts to build new facilities and hire new
staff  would  achieve  a  remedy.    Indeed,  although  5  years
have  now  passed  since  the  appointment  of  the  Plata
Receiver  and  approval  of  the  revised  plan  of  action  in
Coleman,  there  is  no  indication  that  the  constitutional
violations have been cured.  A report filed by the Coleman
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text discussing the reasoning behind a court's decision. It is sequential text and provides contextually relevant information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

19

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

a  blood  sample  despite  a  suspect’s  refusal  (often  limiting
testing to cases involving an accident resulting in death or
serious  bodily  injury)  or  prohibit  nonconsensual  blood
tests  altogether.9    Among  these  States,  several  lift  re
strictions  on  nonconsensual  blood  testing  if  law  enforce
ment officers first obtain a search warrant or similar court
order.10  Cf. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U. S. ___, ___

——————

9 See  Ala.  Code  §32–5–192(c)  (2010);  Alaska  Stat.  §§28.35.032(a),
28.35.035(a)  (2012);  Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §28–1321(D)(1)  (West  2012);
Ark.  Code  Ann.  §§5–65–205(a)(1),  5–65–208(a)(1)
(Supp.  2011);
Conn.  Gen.  Stat.  §§14–227b(b),  14–227c(b)  (2011);  Fla.  Stat.  Ann.
§316.1933(1)(a)  (West  2006);  Ga.  Code  Ann.  §§40–5–67.1(d),  (d.1)
(2011);  Haw.  Rev.  Stat.  §291E–15  (2009  Cum.  Supp.),  §§291E–21(a),
291E–33  (2007),  §291E–65  (2009  Cum.  Supp.);  Iowa  Code  §§321J.9(1),
321J.10(1), 321J.10A(1) (2009); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§8–1001(b), (d) (2001);
Ky.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §189A.105(2)  (Lexis  Supp.  2012);  La.  Rev.  Stat.
Ann. §§32:666.A(1)(a)(i), (2) (Supp. 2013); Md. Transp. Code Ann. §§16–
205.1(b)(i)(1),  (c)(1)  (Lexis  2012);  Mass.  Gen.  Laws  Ann.,  ch.  90,
§§24(1)(e),  (f)(1)  (West  2012);  Mich.  Comp.  Laws  Ann.  §257.625d(1)
(West 2006); Miss. Code Ann. §63–11–21 (1973–2004); Mont. Code Ann.
§§61–8–402(4),  (5)  (2011);  Neb.  Rev.  Stat.  §60–498.01(2)  (2012
Cum.  Supp.),  §60–6,210  (2010);  N. H.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §§265–A:14(I),
265–A:16  (West  2012  Cum.  Supp.);  N. M.  Stat.  Ann.  §66–8–111(A)
(LexisNexis 2009); N. Y. Veh. & Traf. Law Ann. §§1194(2)(b)(1), 1194(3)
(West 2011); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §39–20–01.1(1) (Lexis Supp. 2011),
§39–20–04(1) (Lexis 2008); Okla. Stat., Tit. 47, §753 (West Supp. 2013);
Ore.  Rev.  Stat.  §813.100(2)  (2011);  75  Pa.  Cons.  Stat.  §1547(b)(1)
(2004); R. I. Gen. Laws §§31–27–2.1(b), 31–27–2.9(a) (Lexis 2010); S. C.
Code  Ann.  §56–5–2950(B)  (Supp.  2011);  Tenn.  Code  Ann.  §§55–10–
406(a)(4),  (f)  (2012);  Tex.  Transp.  Code  Ann.  §§724.012(b),  724.013
(West  2011);  Vt.  Stat.  Ann.,  Tit.  23,  §§1202(b),  (f)  (2007);  Wash.  Rev.
Code §§46.20.308 (2)–(3), (5) (2012); W. Va. Code Ann. §17C–5–7 (Lexis
Supp. 2012); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §31–6–102(d) (Lexis 2011).

10 See  Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §28–1321(D)(1)  (West  2012);  Ga.  Code
Ann.  §§40–5–67.1(d),  (d.1)  (2011);  Ky.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §189A.105(2)(b)
(Lexis Supp. 2012); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §257.625d(1) (West 2006);
Mont.  Code  Ann.  §61–8–402(5)  (2011);  N. M.  Stat.  Ann.  §66–8–111(A)
(LexisNexis 2009); N. Y. Veh. & Traf. Law Ann. §§1194(2)(b)(1), 1194(3)
(West 2011); Ore. Rev. Stat. 813.320(2)(b) (2011); R. I. Gen. Laws §31–
27–2.9(a)  (Lexis  2010);  Tenn.  Code  Ann.  §55–10–406(a)(4)  (2012);  Vt.
Stat.  Ann.,  Tit.  23,  §1202(f)  (2007);  Wash.  Rev.  Code  §46.20.308(1)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically citing case law and legal statutes. It's likely part of a larger legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

also Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 120; Sosa, 542 U. S., at 716–717,
and  n. 11.  Congress’  “principal  objective”  in  establishing
federal jurisdiction over such torts, therefore, “was to avoid
foreign entanglements by ensuring the availability of a fed-
eral forum where the failure to provide one might cause an-
other  nation  to  hold  the  United  States  responsible  for  an
injury  to  a  foreign  citizen.”  Jesner,  584  U. S.,  at  ___–___
(slip op., at 8–9).

As  this  Court  explained  in  Sosa,  “[t]he  anxieties  of  the
preconstitutional period cannot be ignored easily enough to
think that the [ATS] was not meant to have a practical ef-
fect.’ ”  542 U. S., at 719.  It was Congress’ assessment that
diplomatic strife is best avoided by providing a federal fo-
rum to redress those law-of-nations torts that, if not reme-
died, could bring international opprobrium upon the United
States.  Because the First Congress did not pass “the ATS
only to leave it lying fallow indefinitely,” the statute “is best
read as having been enacted on the understanding that the
common law would provide a cause of action” for widely rec-
ognized torts in violation of the law of nations.  Id., at 719,
724; see also Jesner, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (“[T]he
[ATS]  was  not  enacted  to  sit  on  a  shelf  awaiting  further

——————
The first occurred in 1784 when a French adventurer assaulted the Sec-
retary  of  the  French  Legation  in  Philadelphia,  prompting  the  French
Minister to complain to Congress “that a violation of the laws of Nations
. . . hath been committed.”  27 Journals of the Continental Congress 478
(G. Hunt ed. 1928).  Three years later, a New York City constable created
another diplomatic imbroglio by entering the home of the Dutch Ambas-
sador and arresting one of his servants.  The Ambassador wrote to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, calling the incident “a most notorious and
direct violation of the rights of nations” and demanding the Secretary’s
“official [interposition] . . . to obtain the satisfaction due . . . by virtue of
the laws of nations.”  Letter from P. Van Berckel to J. Jay (Dec. 18, 1787),
in 3 Dept. of State, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States
of America 443 (1837) (hereinafter Diplomatic Correspondence) (brack-
ets in original).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, indicating it's part of a legal document and not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 19–1434, 19–1452 and 19–1458
_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
ARTHREX, INC., ET AL.

19–1434

19–1452

SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
ARTHREX, INC., ET AL.

19–1458

ARTHREX, INC., PETITIONER
v.
SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2021]

 CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the

Court with respect to Parts I and II.

The validity of a patent previously issued by the Patent
and Trademark Office can be challenged before the Patent
Trial  and  Appeal  Board,  an  executive  tribunal  within  the
PTO.  The Board, composed largely of Administrative Pa-
tent Judges appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, has
the final word within the Executive Branch on the validity
of  a  challenged  patent.  Billions  of  dollars  can  turn  on  a
Board decision.

Under the Constitution, “[t]he executive Power” is vested
in the President, who has the responsibility to “take Care
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case citations, the names of the parties involved, and the date of the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the actual legal reasoning and decision-making of the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

the  U. S.  District  Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of  Michi-
gan, seeking information from ZF and two of its senior of-
ficers.  (Section 1782 allows a party to obtain discovery even
in advance of a proceeding.  See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Mi-
cro Devices, Inc., 542 U. S. 241, 259 (2004).)  The District
Court granted the request, and Luxshare served subpoenas
on ZF and the officers.

ZF moved to quash the subpoenas, arguing (among other
things)  that  the  DIS  panel  was  not  a  “foreign  or  interna-
tional  tribunal”  under  §1782.    As  ZF  acknowledged,  how-
ever, Circuit precedent foreclosed that argument.  See Ab-
dul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp., 939 F. 3d 710
(CA6 2019).  The District Court ordered ZF to produce doc-
uments and an officer to sit for a deposition, and the Sixth
Circuit denied ZF’s request for a stay.

We granted a stay and certiorari before judgment to re-
solve a split among the Courts of Appeals over whether the
phrase “foreign or international tribunal” in §1782 includes
private arbitral panels.  Compare Servotronics, Inc. v. Boe-
ing Co., 954 F. 3d 209 (CA4 2020); Abdul Latif, 939 F. 3d
710, with National Broadcasting Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
165  F. 3d  184  (CA2  1999);  Republic  of  Kazakhstan  v.
Biedermann Int’l, 168 F. 3d 880 (CA5 1999); Servotronics,
Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F. 3d 689 (CA7 2020).

B
The second case began with a dispute between Lithuania
and  a  disappointed  Russian  investor  in  AB  bankas
SNORAS (Snoras), a failed Lithuanian bank.  After finding
Snoras unable to meet its obligations, Lithuania’s central
bank  nationalized  it  and  appointed  Simon  Freakley,  cur-
rently the CEO of a New York-based consulting firm called
AlixPartners,  LLP,  as  a  temporary  administrator.    After
Freakley issued a report on Snoras’ financial status, Lithu-
anian authorities commenced bankruptcy proceedings and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

21

Opinion of the Court

The indictment’s allegations that the requested investi-
gations were “sham[s]” or proposed for an improper purpose
do not divest the President of exclusive authority over the
investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Justice De-
partment  and  its  officials.    App.  186–187,  Indictment
¶10(c).  And the President cannot be prosecuted for conduct
within  his  exclusive  constitutional  authority.  Trump  is
therefore  absolutely  immune  from  prosecution  for  the  al-
leged  conduct  involving  his  discussions  with  Justice  De-
partment officials.

2
The  indictment  next  alleges  that  Trump  and  his  co-
conspirators “attempted to enlist the Vice President to use
his ceremonial role at the January 6 certification proceed-
ing to fraudulently alter the election results.”  Id., at 187,
¶10(d).  In  particular,  the  indictment  alleges  several  con-
versations in which Trump pressured the Vice President to
reject States’ legitimate electoral votes or send them back
to state legislatures for review.  See, e.g., id., at 222–224,
226, ¶¶90, 92–93, 97.

The  Government  explained  at  oral  argument  that  alt-
hough  it  “has  not  yet  had  to  come  to  grips  with  how  [it]
would  analyze”  Trump’s  interactions  with  the  Vice  Presi-
dent, there is “support” to characterize that conduct as offi-
cial.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 128.  Indeed, our constitutional system
anticipates that the President and Vice President will re-
main in close contact regarding their official duties over the
course of the President’s term in office.  These two officials
are the only ones “elected by the entire Nation.”  Seila Law,
591 U. S., at 224; see Art. II, §1.  The Constitution provides
that “the Vice President shall become President” in the case
of “the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation.”  Amdt. 25, §1.  It also “empowers the Vice
President, together with a majority of the ‘principal officers
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the indictment against Donald Trump and arguments related to presidential immunity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 598 (2000)

631

Souter, J., dissenting

in the eight separate Reports issued by Congress and its
committees over the long course leading to enactment.8 Cf.
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 278–279 (noting “extended hearings,”
“vast amounts of testimony and documentary evidence,” and
“years of the most thorough legislative consideration”).

With respect to domestic violence, Congress received

evidence for the following ﬁndings:

“Three out of four American women will be victims
of violent crimes sometime during their life.” H. R.
Rep. No. 103–395, p. 25 (1993) (citing U. S. Dept. of
Justice, Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice
29 (2d ed. 1988)).

“Violence is the leading cause of injuries to women
ages 15 to 44 . . . .” S. Rep. No. 103–138, p. 38 (1993)
(citing Surgeon General Antonia Novello, From the
Surgeon General, U. S. Public Health Services, 267
JAMA 3132 (1992)).

“[A]s many as 50 percent of homeless women and chil-
dren are ﬂeeing domestic violence.” S. Rep. No. 101–
545, p. 37 (1990) (citing E. Schneider, Legal Reform
Efforts for Battered Women: Past, Present, and Future
(July 1990)).

“Since 1974, the assault rate against women has out-
stripped the rate for men by at least twice for some
age groups and far more for others.” S. Rep. No. 101–

in the Courts, Final Report (1989); Wisconsin Equal Justice Task Force,
Final Report (Jan. 1991).

8 See S. Rep. No. 101–545 (1990); Majority Staff of Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Violence Against Women: The Increase of Rape in America,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1991); S. Rep. No. 102–197 (1991); Ma-
jority Staff of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Violence Against
Women: A Week in the Life of America, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print
1992); S. Rep. No. 103–138 (1993); Majority Staff of Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, The Response to Rape: Detours on the Road to Equal
Justice, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1993); H. R. Rep. No. 103–395
(1993); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103–711 (1994).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 598 (2000). It cites legislative history and reports on domestic violence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

up  to  15  years  in  prison.
70.00(2)(c) and (3)(b), 80.00(1)(a).

§§265.03(3)  (West  2017),

A  license  applicant  who  wants  to  possess  a  firearm  at
home (or in his place of business) must convince a “licensing
officer”—usually a judge or law enforcement officer—that,
among other things, he is of good moral character, has no
history of crime or mental illness, and that “no good cause
exists  for  the  denial  of  the  license.”    §§400.00(1)(a)–(n)
(West  Cum.  Supp.  2022).    If  he  wants  to  carry  a  firearm
outside  his  home  or  place  of  business  for  self-defense,  the
applicant must obtain an unrestricted license to “have and
carry”  a  concealed  “pistol  or  revolver.”    §400.00(2)(f ).    To
secure that license, the applicant must prove that “proper
cause exists” to issue it.  Ibid.  If an applicant cannot make
that showing, he can receive only a “restricted” license for
public carry, which allows him to carry a firearm for a lim-
ited purpose, such as hunting, target shooting, or employ-
ment.  See, e.g., In re O’Brien, 87 N. Y. 2d 436, 438–439, 663
N. E.  2d  316,  316–317 (1996);  Babernitz  v.  Police  Dept.  of
City of New York, 65 App. Div. 2d 320, 324, 411 N. Y. S. 2d
309, 311 (1978); In re O’Connor, 154 Misc. 2d 694, 696–698,
585 N. Y. S. 2d 1000, 1003 (Westchester Cty. 1992).

No  New  York  statute  defines  “proper  cause.”    But  New
York courts have held that an applicant shows proper cause
only if he can “demonstrate a special need for self-protection
distinguishable from that of the general community.”  E.g.,
In re Klenosky, 75 App. Div. 2d 793, 428 N. Y. S. 2d 256, 257
(1980).  This “special need” standard is demanding.  For ex-
ample, living or working in an area “ ‘noted for criminal ac-
tivity’ ”  does  not  suffice.  In re  Bernstein,  85  App.  Div.  2d
574,  445  N. Y. S.  2d  716,  717  (1981).    Rather,  New  York
courts generally require evidence “of particular threats, at-
tacks  or  other  extraordinary  danger  to  personal  safety.”
In re Martinek, 294 App. Div. 2d 221, 222, 743 N. Y. S. 2d
80, 81 (2002); see also In re Kaplan, 249 App. Div. 2d 199,
201, 673 N. Y. S. 2d 66, 68 (1998) (approving the New York
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses New York's laws regarding firearm licenses and the "proper cause" standard for obtaining a license to carry a concealed weapon.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U53

[09-26-01 10:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

592

CHRISTENSEN v. HARRIS COUNTY

Stevens, J., dissenting

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg and

Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

Because the disagreement between the parties concerns
the scope of an exception to a general rule, it is appropriate
to begin with a correct identiﬁcation of the relevant general
rule. That rule gives all employees protected by the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 a statutory right to compensa-
tion for overtime work payable in cash, whether they work
in the private sector of the economy or the public sector. 29
U. S. C. §§ 206, 207 (1994 ed. and Supp. III).
In 1985, Con-
gress enacted an exception to that general rule that permits
States and their political subdivisions to use compensatory
time instead of cash as compensation for overtime. The ex-
ception, however, is not applicable unless the public employer
ﬁrst arrives at an agreement with its employees to substi-
tute that type of compensation for cash. § 207(o); 29 CFR
§ 553.23 (1999). As I read the statute, the employer has no
right to impose compensatory overtime payment upon its
employees except in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment authorizing its use.

The Court stumbles because it treats § 207’s limited and
conditional exception as though it were the relevant general
rule. The Court begins its opinion by correctly asserting
that public employers may “compensate their employees for
overtime by granting them compensatory time or ‘comp
time,’ which entitles them to take time off work with full
pay.” Ante, at 578.
It is not until it reaches the bottom of
the second page, however, that the Court acknowledges that
what appeared to be the relevant general rule is really an
exception from the employees’ basic right to be paid in cash.
Ante, at 579.

In my judgment, the fact that no employer may lawfully
make any use of “comp time” without a prior agreement with
the affected employees is of critical importance in answering
the question whether a particular method of using that form
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the text of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens. It is sequential text and contains relevant legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,

HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ

Opinion of the Court

ual conduct.”  App. 226.  CLS also excludes students who
hold  religious  convictions  different  from  those  in  the
Statement of Faith.  Id., at 227.

On  September  17,  2004,  CLS  submitted  to  Hastings  an
application  for  RSO  status,  accompanied  by  all  required
documents, including the set of bylaws mandated by CLS-
National.  Id.,  at  227–228.    Several  days  later,  the  Law
School  rejected  the  application;  CLS’s  bylaws,  Hastings
explained,  did  not  comply  with  the  Nondiscrimination
Policy because CLS barred students based on religion and
sexual orientation.  Id., at 228.

CLS formally requested an exemption from the Nondis
crimination  Policy,  id.,  at  281,  but  Hastings  declined  to
grant  one.  “[T]o  be  one  of  our  student-recognized  organi
zations,”  Hastings  reiterated,  “CLS  must  open  its  mem
bership  to  all  students  irrespective  of  their  religious  be
liefs  or  sexual  orientation.”  Id.,  at  294.  If  CLS  instead
chose  to  operate  outside  the  RSO  program,  Hastings
stated,  the  school  “would  be  pleased  to  provide  [CLS]  the
use  of  Hastings  facilities  for  its  meetings  and  activities.”
Ibid.    CLS  would  also  have  access  to  chalkboards  and
generally available campus bulletin boards to announce its
events.  Id., at 219, 233.  In other words, Hastings would
do nothing to suppress CLS’s endeavors, but neither would
it lend RSO-level support for them.

Refusing  to  alter  its  bylaws,  CLS  did  not  obtain  RSO
status.  It did, however, operate independently during the
2004–2005  academic  year.  CLS  held  weekly  Bible-study
meetings  and  invited  Hastings  students  to  Good  Friday
and  Easter  Sunday  church  services.    Id.,  at  229.  It  also
hosted  a  beach  barbeque,  Thanksgiving  dinner,  campus
lecture  on  the  Christian  faith  and  the  legal  practice,  sev
eral fellowship dinners, an end-of-year banquet, and other
informal social activities.  Ibid.

On  October  22,  2004,  CLS  filed  suit  against  various
Hastings  officers  and  administrators  under  42  U. S. C.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a court opinion. It includes information about the parties involved, the nature of the dispute, and some background details.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v.
MORRISSEY-BERRU
Syllabus

THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.  SO-
TOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section header from a legal document, likely indicating the start of a syllabus or a list of opinions related to a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus/Case Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

criminal acts.  See ante, at 30–32.

Even though the majority’s immunity analysis purports
to  leave  unofficial  acts  open  to  prosecution,  its  draconian
approach  to  official-acts  evidence  deprives  these  prosecu-
tions of any teeth.  If the former President cannot be held
criminally liable for his official acts, those acts should still
be admissible to prove knowledge or intent in criminal pros-
ecutions of unofficial acts.  For instance, the majority strug-
gles with classifying whether a President’s speech is in his
capacity as President (official act) or as a candidate (unoffi-
cial act).  Imagine a President states in an official speech
that he intends to stop a political rival from passing legis-
lation that he opposes, no matter what it takes to do so (of-
ficial act).  He then hires a private hitman to murder that
political rival (unofficial act).  Under the majority’s rule, the
murder indictment could include no allegation of the Presi-
dent’s  public  admission  of  premeditated  intent  to  support
the mens rea of murder.  That is a strange result, to say the
least.5

The  majority’s  extraordinary  rule  has  no  basis  in  law.
Consider the First Amendment context.  Although the First
Amendment  prohibits  criminalizing  most  speech,  it  “does
not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech,” including its use
“to prove motive or intent.”  Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U. S.
476, 489 (1993).  Evidentiary rulings and limiting instruc-
tions  can  ensure  that  evidence  concerning  official  acts  is
“considered only for the proper purpose for which it was ad-
mitted.”  Huddleston v. United States, 485 U. S. 681, 691–
692 (1988).  The majority has no coherent explanation as to

——————

5 The majority suggests, in a footnote, that a “prosecutor may point to
the public record to show the fact that the President performed the offi-
cial act,” so long as the prosecutor does not “invite the jury to inspect”
the act in any way.  Ante, at 32, n. 3.  Whatever that suggestion is sup-
posed to accomplish, it does not salvage the majority’s nonsensical evi-
dentiary rule.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It argues against the majority's ruling on the admissibility of evidence related to official acts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

§22(b)(1)’s liability exemption.8

In  addition  to  the  1986  Report,  one  other  piece  of  the
Act’s  legislative  history  provides  further  confirmation  of
the  petitioners’  textual  reading  of  §22(b)(1).    When  Con-
gress  enacted  the  Vaccine  Act  in  1986,  it  did  not  initially
include a source of payment for the no-fault compensation
program  the  Act  established.  The  Act  thus  “made  the
compensation  program  and  accompanying  tort  reforms
contingent  on  the  enactment  of  a  tax  to  provide  funding
——————

8 Respondent  suggests  an  alternative  reading  of  the  1986  Report.
According to respondent, “the principle in Comment K” is simply that of
nonliability  for  “unavoidably  unsafe”  products,  and  thus  Congress’
stated intent in the 1986 Report to apply the “principle in Comment K”
to  “the  vaccines  covered  in  the  bill”  means  that  Congress  viewed  the
covered  vaccines  as  a  class  to  be  “ ‘unavoidably  unsafe.’ ”    1986  Report
25–26;  Brief  for  Respondent  42.    The  concurrence  makes  a  similar
argument.    Ante,  at  1–2  (opinion  of  BREYER,  J.).    This  interpretation
finds  some  support  in  the  1986  Report,  which  states  that  “if  [injured
individuals]  cannot  demonstrate  under  applicable  law  either  that  a
vaccine  was  improperly  prepared  or  that  it  was  accompanied  by  im-
proper  directions  or  inadequate  warnings  [they]  should  pursue  recom-
pense  in  the  compensation  system,  not  the  tort  system.”    1986  Report
26.  It  also  finds  some  support  in  the  pre-Vaccine  Act  case  law,  which
reflected  considerable  disagreement  in  the  courts  over  “whether  com-
ment k applies to pharmaceutical products across the board or only on
a  case-by-case  basis.”    Ausness,  Unavoidably  Unsafe  Products  and
Strict Products Liability: What Liability Rule Should be Applied to the
Sellers  of  Pharmaceutical  Products?  78  Ky.  L. J.  705,  708,  and  n. 11
(1989–1990) (collecting cases).  This interpretation, however, is under-
mined by the fact that Congress has never directed the Food and Drug
Administration  (FDA)  or  any  other  federal  agency  to  review  vaccines
for  optimal  vaccine  design,  see  infra,  at  20–22,  and  n. 19,  and  thus  it
seems  highly  unlikely  that  Congress  intended  to  eliminate  the  tradi-
tional mechanism for such review (i.e., design defect liability), particu-
larly given its express retention of state tort law in the Vaccine Act, see
42 U. S. C. §300aa–22(a).  In any event, to the extent there is ambiguity
as to how precisely Congress intended the “principle in Comment K” to
apply  to  the  covered  vaccines,  that  ambiguity  is  explicitly  resolved  in
petitioners’ favor by the 1987 House Energy and Commerce Committee
Report,  H.  R.  Rep.  No.  100–391,  pt.  1,  pp.  690–691  (hereinafter  1987
Report).  See infra this page and 11–12.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of a specific section of the Vaccine Act and cites legislative history and legal precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

remed[y],” based on its “inherent equity power” and a belief
that “the congressional purpose is effectuated by so doing.”
312 F. Supp., at 91.  But the sources it cited are dubious.
The court  relied on J. I. Case Co.  v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426
(1964), a case about implied causes of action that we have
since abrogated.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275,
287 (2001).  It also relied on a securities law treatise that
advocated for what it called “restitution” but admitted that
district courts had no express authority to grant the remedy
and that the SEC had never sought this remedy in the past.
3  L.  Loss,  Securities  Regulation  1827–1828  (1961).    It  is
functionally this same unauthorized remedy that the SEC
and courts now call “disgorgement.”  The details have var-
ied over time, but the lineage is clear: Disgorgement is “a
relic of the heady days” of courts inserting judicially created
relief into statutes.  Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,
534 U. S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).

Disgorgement as a remedy in its own right is also absent
from legal publications until the 20th century.  Leading le-
gal dictionaries did not define the term until the turn of the
20th  century.  See,  e.g.,  Merriam-Webster’s  Dictionary  of
Law 143 (1996); Black’s Law Dictionary 480 (7th ed. 1999).
Nor was disgorgement included in the first Restatement of
Restitution, adopted in 1936.  The remedy does not appear
until the Third Restatement, adopted in 2010, which states
that “[r]estitution remedies” that seek “to eliminate profit
from wrongdoing . . . are often called ‘disgorgement’ or ‘ac-
counting.’ ”  2 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Un-
just  Enrichment  §51(4),  p.  203.    But  “Restatement”  is  an
inapt title for this edition of the treatise.  Like many of the
modern  Restatements,  its  “authors  have  abandoned  the
mission of describing the law, and have chosen instead to
set  forth  their  aspirations  for  what  the  law  ought  to  be.”
Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U. S. 445, 475 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The inclusion of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and discusses legal concepts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–1702
_________________

MANHATTAN COMMUNITY ACCESS CORPORATION,
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. DEEDEE HALLECK, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 17, 2019]

  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG,
JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
  The Court tells a very reasonable story about a case that
is not before us.  I write to address the one that is.
  This  is  a  case  about  an  organization  appointed  by  the
government  to  administer  a  constitutional  public  forum.
(It is not, as the Court suggests, about a private property
owner that simply opened up its property to others.)  New
York City (the City) secured a property interest in public-
access  television  channels  when  it  granted  a  cable  fran-
chise to a cable company.  State regulations require those
public-access  channels  to  be  made  open  to  the  public  on
terms  that  render  them  a  public  forum.    The  City  con-
tracted  out  the  administration  of  that  forum  to  a  private
organization,  petitioner  Manhattan  Community  Access
Corporation  (MNN).    By  accepting  that  agency  relation-
ship, MNN stepped into the City’s shoes and thus qualifies
as a state actor, subject to the First Amendment like any
other.

I
A
  A  cable-television  franchise  is,  essentially,  a  license  to
create a system for distributing cable TV in a certain area.
It is a valuable right, usually conferred on a private com-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the names of justices. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the legal reasoning and arguments presented in a court case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
818

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No. 08–1351.  Frazier v.  Smith, Commissioner, Florida De
partment  of  Education,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  535  F.  3d  1279.

No.  08–1352.  Arkansas  Annual  Conference  of  the  Afri
can Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., et al. v.  New Direc
tion  Praise  and  Worship  Center,  Inc.  Sup.  Ct.  Ark.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  375  Ark.  428,  291  S. W.  3d  562.

No.  08–1353.  Borough  of  Carlstadt,  New  Jersey,  et  al.
v.  Tomu  Development  Co.,  Inc.  Super.  Ct.  N.  J.,  App.  Div.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1355.  Lucas  v.  University  of  Colorado,  Health

Sciences  Center.  Ct.  App.  Colo.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1359.  Fisher  v.  VanLoveren  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Ohio,

Hamilton  County.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1360.  Clayton  v.  Pennsylvania  Department  of
Welfare  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  104.

No.  08–1363.  Narron  v.  North  Carolina.  Ct.  App.  N.  C.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  193  N.  C.  App.  76,  666
S.  E.  2d  860.

No. 08–1366.  Rosch v.  Whatcom County, Washington.  Ct.
App.  Wash.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  145  Wash.
App.  1007.

No.  08–1368.  Gilbert  v.  Post.  Ct.  Civ.  App.  Okla.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  08–1370.  Johnson  v.  George  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  299  Fed.  Appx.  139.

No.  08–1373.  Stancourt  et  ux.,  Parents  of  Stancourt  v.
Worthington  City  School  District.  Ct.  App.  Ohio,  Morgan
County.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1374.  Robinson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  547  F.  3d  632.

No.  08–1376.  Cundiff  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  200.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, courts, and reporting information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION

BREYER, J., dissenting

“[a]rbitration  is  poorly  suited  to  . . .  higher  stakes”  lacks
empirical  support.  Ante,  at  16.    Indeed,  the  majority
provides  no  convincing  reason  to  believe  that  parties  are
unwilling  to  submit  high-stake  disputes  to  arbitration.
And there are numerous counterexamples.  Loftus, Rivals
Resolve Dispute Over Drug, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 16,
2011, p. B2 (discussing $500 million settlement in dispute
submitted  to  arbitration);  Ziobro,  Kraft  Seeks  Arbitration
In  Fight  With  Starbucks  Over  Distribution,  Wall  Street
Journal, Nov. 30, 2010, p. B10 (describing initiation of an
arbitration  in  which  the  payout  “could  be  higher”  than
$1.5  billion);  Markoff,  Software  Arbitration  Ruling  Gives
I.B.M.  $833  Million  From  Fujitsu,  N. Y.  Times,  Nov.  30,
1988,  p.  A1  (describing  both  companies  as  “pleased  with
the ruling” resolving a licensing dispute).

Further, even though contract defenses, e.g., duress and

unconscionability,  slow  down  the  dispute  resolution  proc
ess,  federal  arbitration  law  normally  leaves  such  matters
to  the  States.    Rent-A-Center,  West,  Inc.  v.  Jackson,  561
U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 4) (arbitration agreements
“may  be  invalidated  by  ‘generally  applicable  contract
defenses’ ”  (quoting  Doctor’s  Associates,  Inc.  v.  Casarotto,
517  U. S.  681,  687  (1996))).    A  provision  in  a  contract  of
adhesion  (for  example,  requiring  a  consumer  to  decide
very  quickly  whether  to  pursue  a  claim)  might  increase
the  speed  and  efficiency  of  arbitrating  a  dispute,  but  the
State can forbid it.  See, e.g., Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 122
Ohio  St.  3d  63,  67,  2009–Ohio–2054,  ¶19,  908  N. E.  2d
408,  412  (“Unconscionability  is  a ground  for  revocation  of
an arbitration agreement”); In re Poly-America, L. P., 262
S. W.  3d  337,  348  (Tex.  2008)  (“Unconscionable  contracts,
however—whether  relating  to  arbitration  or  not—are
unenforceable under Texas law”).  The Discover Bank rule
amounts to a variation on this theme.  California is free to
define unconscionability as it sees fit, and its common law
is of no federal concern so long as the State does not adopt
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's stance on arbitration.  The content is sequential and relevant to the legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HENRY SCHEIN, INC., ET AL. v. ARCHER & WHITE
SALES, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–1272.  Argued October 29, 2018—Decided January 8, 2019

Respondent Archer & White Sales, Inc., sued petitioner Henry Schein,
Inc., alleging violations of federal and state antitrust law and seeking
both money damages and injunctive relief.  The relevant contract be-
tween  the  parties  provided  for  arbitration  of  any  dispute  arising
under or related to the agreement, except for, among other things, ac-
tions seeking injunctive relief.  Invoking the Federal Arbitration Act,
Schein asked the District Court to refer the matter to arbitration, but
Archer  &  White  argued  that  the  dispute  was  not  subject  to  arbitra-
tion  because  its  complaint  sought  injunctive  relief,  at  least  in  part.
Schein contended that because the rules governing the contract pro-
vide  that  arbitrators  have  the  power  to  resolve  arbitrability  ques-
tions,  an  arbitrator—not  the  court—should  decide  whether  the  arbi-
tration  agreement  applied.    Archer  &  White  countered that Schein’s
argument for arbitration was wholly groundless, so the District Court
could resolve the threshold arbitrability question.  The District Court
agreed  with  Archer  &  White  and  denied  Schein’s  motion  to  compel
arbitration.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Held: The “wholly groundless” exception to arbitrability is inconsistent
with the Federal Arbitration Act and this Court’s precedent.  Under
the  Act,  arbitration  is  a  matter  of  contract,  and  courts  must  enforce
arbitration  contracts  according  to  their  terms.  Rent-A-Center,  West,
Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S. 63, 67.  The parties to such a contract may
agree to have an arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular
dispute,  but  also  “ ‘gateway’  questions  of  ‘arbitrability.’ ”  Id.,  at  68–
69.  Therefore, when the parties’ contract delegates  the arbitrability
question to an arbitrator, a court may not override the contract, even
if  the  court  thinks  that  the  arbitrability  claim  is  wholly  groundless.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of court opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text. They are often used for informational purposes and are not meant to be indexed as part of the full legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  UNITED STATES EX REL. SCHUTTE v. SUPERVALU INC.

Opinion of the Court

conscious belief that his claims are false.
  Second, Safeco did not purport to set forth the purely ob-
jective  safe  harbor  that  respondents  invoke.    To  the  con-
trary,  Safeco  stated  that  a  person  is  reckless  if  he  acts
“knowing  or  having  reason  to  know  of  facts  which  would
lead a reasonable man to realize” that his actions were sub-
stantially risky.  551 U. S., at 69 (emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted).  Or, as Safeco alternatively put
it, the common law of recklessness contained an objective
standard because it encompassed actions involving “an un-
justifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so ob-
vious that it should be known.”  Id., at 68 (emphasis added;
internal  quotation  marks  omitted);  see  also  Restatement
(Second)  of  Torts  §500,  Comment  a  (1964)  (“Recklessness
may consist of either of two different types of conduct.  In
one the actor knows . . . of facts which create a high degree
of risk”).  Thus, as we have stated previously, “[n]othing in
Safeco suggests that we should look to facts that the defend-
ant  neither  knew  nor  had  reason  to  know  at  the  time  he
acted.”  Halo Electronics, 579 U. S., at 106.6  By a similar
token here, we do not look to legal interpretations that re-
spondents did not believe or have reason to believe at the
time they submitted their claims.

3
Respondents make one more argument, approaching the
issue from a somewhat different angle.  They contend that,
at  common  law,  their  claims  would  not  be  actionable  as
fraudulent even if their reported prices were not accurate
under the correct meaning of “usual and customary.”  Their
——————

6 Respondents read a footnote in Safeco to establish the sort of purely
objective safe harbor for which they argue.  See Safeco, 551 U. S., at 70,
n. 20.  But that footnote—even if it does deem subjective intent to be ir-
relevant in the FCRA context—certainly was not meant to establish the
general  rule  for  the  terms  “knowing”  or  “reckless”  in  all  contexts.  Cf.
Halo Electronics, 579 U. S., at 106, n. (distinguishing the footnote in the
patent-infringement context).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of recklessness in the context of fraud. It delves into legal precedents and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
civ

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1012

Murtagh v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Musick v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

M/V Clipper Faith; Ambraco, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Myers; Rasul v.
1044

Myers v. Silbermann
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd.  . . .
1127

Myrieckes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Nabried v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  815,1064

Nacchio v. United States
985

Naddi v. Hernandez  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057

Nailor v. Castillo
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

Naito; Mulvey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Nall v. McCall
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

Napa County; Ortega v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Napolitano; Aronov v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Napolitano; Bosse v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Napolitano; Curtis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1103

Napolitano; Robinson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Napolitano; Sonuga v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

Narron v. North Carolina  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nash; Panton v.
1004

Nash v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

National Australia Bank Ltd.; Morrison v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

National City Bank; Taylor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088

National Collegiate Athletic Assn.; Millen v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1089

National Football League; American Needle, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . .
National Labor Relations Bd.; Avery Heights v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945

945

National Labor Relations Bd.; Church Homes, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . .
990

National Labor Relations Bd.; Grenada Stamping & Assembly v.
National Labor Relations Bd.; New Process Steel, L. P. v.  . . . .  989,1108

816

National Taxpayers Union v.  S. S. A., Ofﬁce of Inspector General
National Transportation Safety Bd.; Gorman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . .  892,1066

881

Navar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Ndongo v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ndoromo, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  944,1102

809

Ndukwe v. Violette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Neal v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
813

Neal-El, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
846

Nebraska Dept. of Health and Human Services; Renneke v.  . . . . .
1055

Negrete v. Holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

Nelson; O’Dwyer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .  871,873,916,935,1035,1037,1129,1141

Nelson v. United States
974

Nesbitt v. Circuit Court of Ill., Cook County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
864

Nesgoda v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

bach,  383  U. S.,  at  308,  315,  337.    We  recognized  that  it
“may  have  been  an  uncommon  exercise  of  congressional
power,”  but  concluded  that  “legislative  measures  not  oth-
erwise appropriate” could be justified by “exceptional con-
ditions.”  Id.,  at  334.    We  have  since  noted  that  the  Act
“authorizes  federal  intrusion  into  sensitive  areas  of  state
and  local  policymaking,”  Lopez,  525  U. S.,  at  282,  and
represents  an  “extraordinary  departure  from  the  tradi-
tional  course  of  relations  between  the  States  and  the
Federal Government,” Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n,
502  U. S.  491,  500–501  (1992).    As  we  reiterated  in
Northwest  Austin,  the  Act  constitutes  “extraordinary
legislation  otherwise  unfamiliar  to  our  federal  system.”
557 U. S., at 211.

B
In  1966,  we  found  these  departures  from  the  basic  fea-
tures of our system of government justified.  The “blight of
racial discrimination in voting” had “infected the electoral
process  in  parts  of  our  country  for  nearly  a  century.”
Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308.  Several States had enacted
a  variety  of  requirements  and  tests  “specifically  designed
to  prevent”  African-Americans  from  voting.  Id.,  at  310.
Case-by-case  litigation  had  proved  inadequate  to  prevent
such  racial  discrimination  in  voting,  in  part  because
States  “merely  switched  to  discriminatory  devices  not
covered  by  the  federal  decrees,”  “enacted  difficult  new
tests,” or simply “defied and evaded court orders.”  Id., at
314.  Shortly  before  enactment  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act,
only 19.4 percent of African-Americans of voting age were
registered to vote in Alabama, only 31.8 percent in Louisi-
ana,  and  only  6.4  percent  in  Mississippi.
Id.,  at  313.
Those  figures  were  roughly  50  percentage  points  or  more
below the figures for whites.  Ibid.

In  short,  we  concluded  that  “[u]nder  the  compulsion  of
these  unique  circumstances,  Congress  responded  in  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Voting Rights Act. It cites previous cases and provides historical context for the Act's enactment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>