<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
858

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

N.  W.  2d  305);  and  O.  S.  v.  Mental  Health  Board  of  the
Fourth  Judicial  District  (277  Neb.  577,  763  N.  W.  2d  723).
Sup.  Ct.  Neb.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10858.  Smith  v.  ATM  Vancom  of  Las  Vegas  et  al.

C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10859.  Del  Rio  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10863.  Camacho  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  79.

No.  08–10864.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  656.

No. 08–10865.  Hernandez Torres v.  United States.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 318 Fed. Appx. 547.

No.  08–10866.  Turpin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  514.

No.  08–10867.  Walker  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10868.  Daniels  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.;  and  Daniels  v.  United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10869.  Christie  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  654.

No.  08–10870.  Chism  v.  Turner,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10871.  Caldwell  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10872.  Miller  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  351.

No.  08–10873.  McCulligan  v.  Pennsylvania.  Super.  Ct.

Pa.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  961  A.  2d  1279.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, and relevant court information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

BARRETT, J., concurring

B
Some have characterized the major questions doctrine as
a strong-form substantive canon designed to enforce Article
I’s Vesting Clause.  See, e.g., C. Sunstein, There Are Two
“Major Questions” Doctrines, 73 Admin. L. Rev. 475, 483–
484  (2021)  (asserting  that  recent  cases  apply  the  major
questions  doctrine  as  “a  nondelegation  canon”);  L.  Hein-
zerling, The Power Canons, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1933,
1946–1948 (2017) (describing the major questions doctrine
as a “normative” canon that “is both a presumption against
certain kinds of agency interpretations and an instruction
to Congress”).  On this view, the Court overprotects the non-
delegation principle by increasing the cost of delegating au-
thority  to  agencies—namely,  by  requiring  Congress  to
speak unequivocally in order to grant them significant rule-
making  power.  See  Barrett  172–176;  see  also  post,  at  27
(KAGAN, J., dissenting) (describing the major questions doc-
trine as a “heightened-specificity requirement”); Georgia v.
President of the United States, 46 F. 4th 1283, 1314 (CA11
2022)  (Anderson,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in
part) (“[T]he major questions doctrine is essentially a clear-
statement rule”).  This “clarity tax” might prevent Congress
from getting too close to the nondelegation line, especially
since the “intelligible principle” test largely leaves Congress
to self-police.  (So the doctrine would function like constitu-
tional  avoidance.)
In  addition  or  instead,  the  doctrine
might reflect the judgment that it is so important for Con-
gress to exercise “[a]ll legislative Powers,” Art. I, §1, that it
should be forced to think twice before delegating substan-
tial  discretion  to  agencies—even  if  the  delegation  is  well
within Congress’s power to make.  (So the doctrine would
function like the rule that Congress must speak clearly to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.)  No matter which ra-
tionale justifies it, this “clear statement” version of the ma-
jor  questions  doctrine  “loads  the  dice”  so  that  a  plausible
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Barrett in the case of Biden v. Nebraska. It delves into the legal doctrine of "major questions," analyzing its rationale and potential implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

29

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

statutory designation of a new and useful art”).36  Thus in
1952,  when  Congress  updated  the  patent  laws  as  part  of
its  ongoing  project  to  revise  the  United  States  Code,  it
changed  the  operative  language  in  §101,  replacing  the
term “art” with “process” and adding a definition of “proc-
ess” as a “process, art or method,” §100(b).

That change was made for clarity and did not alter the
scope  of  a  patentable  “process.”  See  Diehr,  450  U. S.,  at
184.  The  new  terminology  was  added  only  in  recognition
of  the  fact  that  courts  had  been  interpreting  the  category
“art”  by  using  the  terms  “process  or  method”;  Congress
thus wanted to avoid “the necessity of explanation that the
word ‘art’ as used in this place means ‘process or method.’ ”
S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952) (hereinafter
S. Rep.  1979);  accord,  H. R.  Rep.  No.  1923,  82d  Cong.,  2d
Sess.,  6  (1952)  (hereinafter  H. R.  Rep.  1923);  see  also  id.,
at  17  (explaining  that  “the  word  ‘art’ ”  in  §101  “has  been
interpreted by the courts as being practically synonymous
with  process  or  method,”  and  that  the  switch  to  the  word
“[p]rocess” was intended only for clarity).37

It appears that when Congress changed the language in
§101  to  incorporate  the  prevailing  judicial  terminology,  it
merely  codified  the  prevailing  judicial  interpretation  of
that  category  of  subject  matter.    See  Diehr,  450  U. S.,  at
184; see also Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U. S. 637, 641 (1954)
(“While it is true that statutory language should be inter-
preted  whenever  possible  according  to  common  usage,
some  terms  acquire  a  special  technical  meaning  by  a
process  of  judicial  construction”).   Both  the  Senate  and
House  Committee  Reports  explained  that  the  word  “proc-

——————

36 For examples of such usage, see The Telephone Cases, 126 U. S., at

533, and Burden, 15 How., at 267.

37 See  also  98  Cong.  Rec.  A415  (1952)  (remarks  of  Rep.  Bryson)  (de-
scribing, after the fact, the 1952 Patent Act, and explaining that “[t]he
word ‘art’ was changed to ‘process’ in order to clarify its meaning.  No
change in substance was intended”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 561 U.S. ____ (2010). It delves into the interpretation of patent law, particularly the definition of "process" under 35 U.S. Code §101.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

MOORE v. HARPER

Opinion of the Court

closely  parallel.  And  around  the  time  the  Articles  were
adopted  by  the  Second  Continental  Congress,  multiple
States regulated the “manner” of “appoint[ing] delegates,”
ibid., suggesting that the Framers did not understand that
language to insulate state legislative action from state con-
stitutional provisions.  See Del. Const., Art. XI (1776); Md.
Const., Art. XXVII (1776); Va. Const., cls. 3–4 (1776); Pa.
Const.,  §11  (1776);  N.  C.  Const.,  Art.  XXXVII  (1776);  Ga.
Const., Art. XVI (1777); N. Y. Const., Art. XXX (1777); S. C.
Const., Art. XXII (1778); Mass. Const., pt. 2, ch. IV (1780);
N. H. Const., pt. II (1784).

The defendants stress an 1820 convention held in Massa-
chusetts to amend the Commonwealth’s Constitution.  Af-
ter a Boston delegate proposed a provision regulating the
manner of federal elections, Joseph Story—then a Justice
of this Court—nixed the effort.  In Story’s view, such a pro-
vision  would  run  afoul  of  the  Elections  Clause  by  “as-
sum[ing] a control over the Legislature, which the constitu-
tion of the United States does not justify.”  Journal of the
Debates  and  Proceedings  in  the  Convention  of  Delegates
110 (1853).  But Story’s comment elicited little discussion,
and reflects the views of a jurist who, although “a brilliant
and accomplished man, . . . was not a member of the Found-
ing generation.”  U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U. S. 779, 856 (1995) (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

V
A
Although we conclude that the Elections Clause does not
exempt state legislatures from the ordinary constraints im-
posed by state law, state courts do not have free rein.  “State
courts are the appropriate tribunals . . . for the decision of
questions arising under their local law, whether statutory
or  otherwise.”  Murdock  v.  Memphis,  20  Wall.  590,  626
(1875).  At the  same  time,  the  Elections  Clause  expressly
vests power to carry out its provisions in “the Legislature”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Moore v. Harper. It contains legal arguments, citations to other cases and constitutional provisions, and the language of a judicial opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:49] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1104

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 1, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8887. Murchinson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 438.

No. 99–8890. Aiello v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 255.

No. 99–8891. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 260.

No. 99–8900. Lozano v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1338.

No. 99–8901. Lopez-Ayala, aka Prado-Perales v. United

States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8902. King v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1353.

No. 99–8903. Moore v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1338.

No. 99–8907. Vinson v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 200 F. 3d 820.

No. 99–8908. Mitchum v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 208 F. 3d 216.

No. 99–8917. McMillian v. Endicott, Warden. C. A. 7th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–899. Galaza, Warden, et al. v. Nino. C. A. 9th
Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 183 F. 3d
1003.

No. 99–1159. McDaniel, Warden, et al. v. Wills. C. A.
9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F.
3d 517.

No. 99–1184. Mack, Warden v. Paris. C. A. 6th Cir. Mo-
tion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 637.

No. 99–1070. People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v.
Department of State et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

officials by April 13.  Now, under this Court’s order, tens of
thousands of absentee voters, unlikely to receive their bal-
lots in time to cast them, will be left quite literally without
a vote.

This Court’s intervention is thus ill advised, especially so
at this late hour.  See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 4–5
(2006) (per curiam).  Election officials have spent the past
few  days  establishing  procedures  and  informing  voters  in
accordance  with  the  District  Court’s  deadline.    For  this
Court to upend the process—a day before the April 7 post-
mark  deadline—is  sure  to  confound  election  officials  and
voters.

B

What concerns could justify consequences so grave?  The
Court’s order first suggests a problem of forfeiture, noting
that the plaintiffs’ written preliminary-injunction motions
did  not  ask  that  ballots  postmarked  after  April  7  be
counted.  But unheeded by the Court, although initially si-
lent, the plaintiffs specifically requested that remedy at the
preliminary-injunction hearing in view of the ever-increas-
ing demand for absentee ballots.  See Tr. 102–103 (Apr. 1,
2020).

Second, the Court’s order cites Purcell, apparently skep-
tical  of the District  Court’s intervention shortly before  an
election.  Nevermind that the District Court was reacting
to a grave, rapidly developing public health crisis.  If prox-
imity to the election counseled hesitation when the District
Court acted several days ago, this Court’s intervention to-
day—even  closer  to  the  election—is  all  the  more  inappro-
priate.

Third, the Court notes that the District Court’s order al-
lowed absentee voters to cast ballots after election day.  If a
voter already in line by the poll’s closing time can still vote,
why should Wisconsin’s absentee voters, already in line to
receive ballots, be denied the franchise?  According to the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the Court's decision to change the deadline for absentee ballots in Wisconsin.  The text is sequential and provides legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

right  before  strict  scrutiny  applies.    See,  e.g.,  Kennedy  v.
Bremerton School Dist., 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (ALITO, J.,
statement respecting denial of certiorari); McConnell, Free
Exercise  Revisionism  and  the  Smith  Decision,  57  U.  Chi.
L. Rev. 1109, 1121–1122 (1990).
  Rather  than  vacate  and  remand  in  light  of  these  prob-
lems, today’s majority denies relief.  On the merits, the ma-
jority suggests the applicants may not have “squarely” ad-
vanced  the  second  argument  about  “hybrid”  rights.    But
however that may be, no one doubts the applicants have al-
ways pressed the first argument—that the Governor’s two
EOs together discriminate against religion.  The Sixth Cir-
cuit’s  failure  to  engage  that  argument  is  alone  sufficient
grounds for vacatur.  The majority disputes none of this but
instead turns to an assessment of the equities.  Whatever
the  problems  with  the  Sixth  Circuit’s  order,  it  says,  we
should let this one go because this case is old news; winter
break is coming soon, and the Governor’s decrees will expire
in a few weeks, on January 4.
  I would assess the equities differently.  The EOs remain
in force, the dispute over them remains live, and the deci-
sion allowing them to stand is flawed.  Nothing prevents us
from saying so; no one attempts to suggest this case is moot;
and the applicants are entitled to a fair assessment of their
rights under accurate legal rules.  The plaintiffs proceeded
expeditiously in challenging the EOs; they have hardly sat
on their rights.  Nor should a Governor be able to evade ju-
dicial review by issuing short-term edicts and then urging
us  to  overlook  their  problems  only  because  one  edict  is
about to expire while the next has yet to arrive.  Come Jan-
uary 4, a new school semester will be about to start, and the
Governor has expressly told us that he reserves the right to
issue more decrees like these if and when religious schools
try to resume holding classes.  Rather than telling the par-
ties to renew their fight in a month, asking the Sixth Circuit
to resolve the case now, under accurate legal rules, would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of legal issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

Syllabus

the  appearance  of  corruption.    See  Davis,  supra,  at  741.  Moreover,
the only type of corruption that Congress may target is quid pro quo
corruption.    Spending  large  sums  of  money  in  connection  with  elec-
tions, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corrup-
tion.  Nor  does  the  possibility  that  an  individual  who  spends  large
sums may garner “influence over or access to” elected officials or po-
litical parties.  Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S.
310, 359.  The line between quid pro quo corruption and general in-
fluence  must  be  respected  in  order  to  safeguard  basic  First  Amend-
ment rights, and the Court must “err on the side of protecting politi-
cal  speech  rather  than  suppressing  it.”  Federal  Election  Comm’n  v.
Wisconsin  Right  to  Life,  551  U. S.  449,  457  (opinion  of  ROBERTS,
C. J.).  Pp. 18–21.

(2) The Government argues that the aggregate limits further the
permissible objective of preventing quid pro quo corruption.  The dif-
ficulty is that once the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contribu-
tions of any amount, even though Congress’s selection of a base limit
indicates  its  belief  that  contributions  beneath  that  amount  do  not
create  a  cognizable  risk  of  corruption.    The  Government  must  thus
defend  the  aggregate  limits  by  demonstrating  that  they  prevent  cir-
cumvention  of  the  base  limits,  a  function  they  do  not  serve  in  any
meaningful way.  Given the statutes and regulations currently in ef-
fect,  Buckley’s  fear  that  an  individual  might  “contribute  massive
amounts  of  money  to  a  particular  candidate  through  . . .  unear-
marked contributions” to entities likely to support the candidate, 424
U. S., at 38, is far too speculative.  Even accepting Buckley’s circum-
vention theory, it is hard to see how a candidate today could receive
“massive amounts of money” that could be traced back to a particular
donor uninhibited by the aggregate limits.  The Government’s scenar-
ios offered in  support of that possibility  are either illegal under cur-
rent campaign finance laws or implausible.  Pp. 21–30.

(3) The  aggregate  limits  also  violate  the  First  Amendment  be-
cause they are not “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms.”  Buckley, supra, at 25.  The Government ar-
gues  that  the  aggregate  limits  prevent  an  individual  from  giving  to
too  many  initial  recipients  who  might  then  recontribute  a  donation,
but  experience  suggests  that  the  vast  majority  of  contributions  are
retained and spent by their recipients.  And the Government has pro-
vided no reason to believe that candidates or party committees would
dramatically  shift  their  priorities  if  the  aggregate  limits  were  lifted.
The indiscriminate ban on all contributions above the aggregate lim-
its is thus disproportionate  to the Government’s interest in prevent-
ing circumvention.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, focusing on the arguments and reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision.  It is not the actual content of a book and is likely not meant to be read sequentially.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  MANHATTAN COMMUNITY ACCESS CORP. v. HALLECK

Opinion of the Court

that  MNN,  as  a  private  actor,  is  not  subject  to  First
Amendment  constraints  on  how  it  exercises  editorial
discretion  over  the  speech  and  speakers  on  its  public
access channels.

III
  Perhaps  recognizing  the  problem  with  their  argument
that  MNN  is  a  state  actor  under  ordinary  state-action
principles  applicable  to  private  entities  and  private  prop-
erty,  the  producers  alternatively  contend  that  the  public
access  channels  are  actually  the  property  of  New  York
City,  not  the  property  of  Time  Warner  or  MNN.    On  this
theory,  the  producers  say  (and  the  dissent  agrees)  that
MNN is in essence simply managing government property
on behalf of New York City.
  The  short  answer  to  that  argument  is  that  the  public
access  channels  are  not  the  property  of  New  York  City.
Nothing  in  the  record  here  suggests  that  a  government
(federal,  state,  or  city)  owns  or  leases  either  the  cable
system  or  the  public  access  channels  at  issue  here.    Both
Time Warner and MNN are private entities.  Time Warner
is the cable operator, and it owns its cable network, which
contains the public access channels.  MNN operates those
public  access  channels  with  its  own  facilities  and  equip-
ment.    The  City  does  not  own  or  lease  the  public  access
channels, and the City does not possess a formal easement
or  other  property  interest  in  those  channels.    The  fran-
chise  agreements  between  the  City  and  Time  Warner  do
not  say  that  the  City  has  any  property  interest  in  the
public  access  channels.    On  the  contrary,  the  franchise
agreements  expressly  place  the  public  access  channels
“under the jurisdiction” of MNN.  App. 22.  Moreover, the
producers  did  not  allege  in  their  complaint  that  the  City
has  a  property  interest  in  the  channels.   And the  produc-
ers have not cited any basis in state law for such a conclu-
sion.    Put  simply,  the  City  does  not  have  “any  formal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck. It delves into the legal arguments regarding whether MNN, a private entity, is subject to First Amendment constraints when managing public access channels.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

We  have  set  forth  the  relevant  Fourth  Amendment
standard  for  subpoenaing  business  records  many  times
over.  Out  of  those  dozens  of  cases,  the  majority  cannot
find even one that so much as suggests an exception to the
Oklahoma  Press  standard  for  sufficiently  personal  infor-
mation.  Instead, we have always “described the constitu-
tional  requirements”  for  compulsory  process  as  being
“ ‘settled’ ” and as applying categorically to all “ ‘subpoenas
[of]  corporate  books  or  records.’ ”    Lone  Steer,  Inc.,  464
U. S.,  at  415  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    That
standard,  we  have  held,  is  “the  most”  protection  the
Fourth  Amendment  gives  “to  the  production  of  corporate
records  and  papers.”    Oklahoma  Press,  327  U. S.,  at  208
(emphasis added).2

Although  the  majority  announces  its  holding  in  the
context  of  the  Stored  Communications  Act,  nothing  stops
its  logic  from  sweeping  much  further.    The  Court  has
offered  no  meaningful  limiting  principle,  and  none  is
apparent.  Cf.  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  31  (Carpenter’s  counsel
admitting  that  “a  grand  jury  subpoena  . . .  would  be  held
to the same standard as any other subpoena or subpoena-
like request for [cell-site] records”).

Holding  that  subpoenas  must  meet  the  same  standard
as  conventional  searches  will  seriously  damage,  if  not
destroy, their utility.  Even more so than at the founding,
today  the  Government  regularly  uses  subpoenas  duces
tecum and other forms of compulsory process to carry out
its  essential  functions.    See,  e.g.,  Dionisio,  410  U. S.,  at
11–12  (grand  jury  subpoenas);  McPhaul,  364  U. S.,  at
382–383  (legislative  subpoenas);  Oklahoma  Press,  supra,
at 208–209 (administrative subpoenas).  Grand juries, for
——————

2 All that the Court can say in response is that we have “been careful
not  to  uncritically  extend  existing  precedents”  when  confronting  new
technologies.  Ante, at 20.  But applying a categorical rule categorically
does not “extend” precedent, so the Court’s statement ends up sounding
a lot like a tacit admission that it is overruling our precedents.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Carpenter v. United States. It discusses the Fourth Amendment and its application to subpoenas for business records.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

47

Opinion of the Court

factor supporting Abood.27

*

*

*
We  recognize  that  the  loss  of  payments  from  nonmem
bers may cause unions to experience unpleasant transition
costs  in  the  short  term,  and  may  require  unions  to  make
adjustments in order to attract and retain members.  But
we must  weigh these disadvantages against the consider
able  windfall  that  unions  have  received  under  Abood  for
the  past  41  years.    It  is  hard  to  estimate  how  many  bil
lions  of  dollars  have  been  taken  from  nonmembers  and
transferred to public-sector unions in violation of the First
Amendment.  Those  unconstitutional  exactions  cannot  be
allowed to continue indefinitely.

All  these  reasons—that  Abood’s  proponents  have  aban
doned  its  reasoning,  that  the  precedent  has  proved  un
workable,  that  it  conflicts  with  other  First  Amendment
decisions, and that subsequent developments have eroded
its  underpinnings—provide  the  “ ‘special  justification[s]’ ”
for  overruling  Abood.  Post,  at  19  (KAGAN, J.,  dissenting)
(quoting  Kimble  v.  Marvel  Entertainment,  LLC,  576  U. S.

___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 8)).28

——————

27 The  dissent  emphasizes  another  type  of  reliance,  namely,  that
“[o]ver 20 States have by now enacted statutes authorizing [agency-fee]
provisions.”  Post, at 23.  But as we explained in Citizens United, “[t]his
is not a compelling interest for stare decisis.  If it were, legislative acts
could prevent us from overruling our own precedents, thereby interfer
ing with our duty ‘to say what the law is.’ ”  558 U. S., at 365 (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).  Nor does our decision
“ ‘require  an  extensive  legislative  response.’ ”    Post,  at  23.  States  can
keep  their  labor-relations  systems  exactly  as  they  are—only  they
cannot  force  nonmembers  to  subsidize  public-sector  unions.   In  this
way,  these  States  can  follow  the  model  of  the  federal  government  and
28 other States.

28 Unfortunately,  the  dissent  sees  the  need  to  resort  to  accusations
that  we  are  acting  like  “black-robed  rulers”  who  have  shut  down  an
“energetic  policy  debate.”  Post,  at  27–28.    We  certainly  agree  that
judges  should  not  “overrid[e]  citizens’  choices”  or  “pick  the  winning
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the overruling of a precedent case (Abood).  It delves into the legal reasoning behind the decision, citing costs,  constitutional conflicts, and the evolution of legal interpretations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

13

Opinion of the Court

predecessor says that the “first sale” doctrine protects “the
transfer  of  any  copy  the  possession  of  which  has  been
lawfully  obtained.”  The  present  version  says  that  “the
owner  of  a  particular  copy  or  phonorecord  lawfully  made
under  this  title  is  entitled  to  sell  or  otherwise  dispose  of
the  possession  of  that  copy  or  phonorecord.”    What  does
this change in language accomplish?

The  language  of  the  former  version  referred  to  those
who  are  not  owners  of  a  copy,  but  mere  possessors  who
“lawfully  obtained”  a  copy.  The  present  version  covers
only  those  who  are  owners  of  a  “lawfully  made”  copy.
Whom  does  the  change  leave  out?    Who  might  have  law-
fully obtained a copy of a copyrighted work but not owned
that  copy?  One  answer  is  owners  of  movie  theaters,  who
during  the  1970’s  (and  before)  often  leased  films  from
movie  distributors  or  filmmakers.    See  S.  Donahue,
American  Film  Distribution  134,  177  (1987)  (describing
producer-distributer and distributer-exhibitor agreements);
Note, The Relationship Between  Motion Picture Distribu
tion  and  Exhibition:  An  Analysis  of  the  Effects  of  Anti-
Blind  Bidding  Legislation,  9  Comm/Ent.  L. J.  131,  135
(1986).  Because  the  theater  owners  had  “lawfully  ob
tained”  their  copies,  the  earlier  version  could  be  read  as
allowing  them  to  sell  that  copy,  i.e.,  it  might  have  given
them  “first  sale”  protection.    Because  the  theater  owners
were  lessees,  not  owners,  of  their  copies,  the  change  in
language  makes  clear  that  they  (like  bailees  and  other
lessees) cannot take advantage of the “first sale” doctrine.
(Those  who  find  legislative  history  useful  will  find  confir
mation  in, e.g.,  House  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  Copy
right Law Revision, Supplementary Report of the Register
of  Copyrights  on  the  General  Revision  of  the  U. S.  Copy
right  Law:  1965  Revision  Bill,  89th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  pt.
6,  p.  30  (Comm.  Print  1965)  (hereinafter  Copyright  Law
Revision)  (“[W]here  a  person  has  rented  a  print  of  a  mo
tion  picture  from  the  copyright  owner,  he  would  have  no
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the "first sale" doctrine in copyright law. It analyzes the changes in language between older and newer versions of the law and their implications for different types of possessors of copyrighted works.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

33

JACKSON, J., dissenting

now  squarely  rejected  it.21    However  grounded  in  history
and tradition the Court’s own view of the scope of habeas
might be, it is obviously not shared by the Legislature that
enacted the statute we are now interpreting.

Second, here again, the majority evaluates the historical
pedigree of legal innocence claims based on faulty history.
It  maintains  that,  historically,  a  court  could  review  a  ha-
beas petition filed by a convicted individual only for “juris-
dictional”  errors  (which  the  majority  defines  narrowly).
Ante, at 15–18, 24–25; cf. Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. ___,
___–___ (2021) (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–8).
But those who have researched this contention have called
it “narrative and myth but not history.”  L. Kovarsky, Ha-
beas Myths, Past and Present, 101 Texas L. Rev. Online 57,
79  (2022)  (Kovarsky);  see  also  J.  Siegel,  Habeas,  History,
and  Hermeneutics,  64  Ariz.  L.  Rev.  505,  524–532  (2022)
(Siegel); Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022)
(KAGAN, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2–8).22

——————

21 Section 2255 explicitly authorizes a convicted prisoner to “move the
court which imposed the sentence” for the prescribed relief, and it allows
petitions to be filed after “the date on which the judgment of conviction
becomes final.”  §§2255(a), (f )(1).  Also, the major procedural change ac-
complished by Congress’s adoption of §2255 in 1948 was to transfer the
filing of postconviction petitions from the district of confinement to the
sentencing court, see United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 215–216
(1952)—a shift that only makes sense if Congress contemplated postcon-
viction challenges.

22 The majority relies heavily on Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 (1830),
to support its purported “jurisdictional” line.  Ante, at 15–18.  But Wat-
kins does not stand for the broad proposition that the majority derives.
Watkins  “itself  relies  on  contested  habeas  history,”  and  is  (as  scholars
have explained) distinguishable.  Kovarsky 70–71.  That Watkins cannot
mean what the majority says is confirmed by the numerous “19th and
early 20th century cases . . . that undeniably decided the merits of con-
stitutional  claims  that  were  not  premised  on  the  detaining  authority’s
lack of jurisdiction or application of an unconstitutional statute or sen-
tence.”  Hertz & Liebman §2.4[c], at 44.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and cites other legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

ALITO, J., dissenting

competency.”  App. 818.  That process, he explained, “thor-
oughly  vet[s]  the  qualifications  of  [applicants]  to  ensure
that [they] are competent to provide the services that are in
question.”  Ibid.

June  Medical’s  expert,  Dr.  Eva  Pressman,  agreed  that
“admitting privileges can serve the function of providing an
evaluation  mechanism  for  physician  competency.”    Id.,  at
1042,  1091;  Record  10864.    Doe  3,  one  of  the  doctors  who
currently  performs  abortions  in  Louisiana,  also  acknowl-
edged the credentialing value of admitting privileges, App.
247–248, as did Doe 4, another Louisiana abortion doctor,
Record 14155.

Although  the  plurality  contends  that  the  review  con-
ducted by hospitals adds little to the vetting undertaken by
the State Board of Medical Examiners (Board), that is not
true.  Hospitals  look  beyond  the  mere  possession  of  a  li-
cense, and they do that for very obvious reasons.  If nothing
else, their review process serves the hospitals’ interests by
diminishing the risk of awards for malpractice committed
by doctors practicing on their premises.  In Louisiana, hos-
pitals that perform negligent credentialing cannot benefit
from the State’s medical malpractice cap.  See Billeaudeau
v. Opelousas General Hospital Auth., 2016–0846, p. 21 (La.
10/19/16),  218  So.  3d  513,  527.    In  addition,  a  hospital’s
“Medicare participation and other certifications depend on
completing the credentialing process.”2

The review conducted by hospitals goes beyond that of the
Board  in  another  way:  it  is  continuous.  Under  the  Joint
Commission Standards, hospitals must monitor physicians

——————

2 Ryan, Negligent Credentialing: A Cause of Action for Hospital Peer
Review Decisions, 59 How. L. J. 413, 419 (2016); see also Eskine, Square
Pegs and Round Holes: Antitrust Law and the Privileging Decision, 44
U. Kan. L. Rev. 399, 401 (1996) (“[H]ospitals have strong incentives to
award  staff  privileges  only  to  those  physicians  who  have  proven  to  be
capable and knowledgeable physicians”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the topic of admitting privileges for physicians and their relevance to competency evaluations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

The proposal passed the House by a vote of 128 to 37.  Id.,
at 2545.

Senator Jacob Howard introduced the proposed Amend-
ment in the Senate, powerfully asking, “Ought not the time
to be now passed when one measure of justice is to be meted
out to a member of one caste while another and a different
measure is meted out to the member of another caste, both
castes being alike citizens of the United States, both bound
to obey the same laws, to sustain the burdens of the same
Government, and both equally responsible to justice and to
God for the deeds done in the body?”  Id., at 2766.  In keep-
ing with this view, he  proposed an introductory sentence,
declaring that “ ‘all persons born in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the States wherein they reside.’ ”  Id., at 2869.
This text, the Citizenship Clause, was the final missing el-
ement  of  what  would  ultimately  become  §1  of  the  Four-
teenth Amendment.  Howard’s draft for the proposed citi-
zenship text was modeled on the Civil Rights Act of 1866’s
text,  and  he  suggested  the  alternative  language  to  “re-
mov[e] all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens
of  the  United  States,”  a  question  which  had  “long  been  a
great  desideratum  in  the  jurisprudence  and  legislation  of
this  country.”  Id.,  at 2890.    He  further  characterized  the
addition as “simply declaratory of what I regard as the law
of the land already.”  Ibid.

The proposal was approved in the Senate by a vote of 33
to 11.  Id., at 3042.  The House then reconciled differences
between the two measures, approving the Senate’s changes
by a vote of 120 to 32.  See id., at 3149.  And, in June 1866,
the amendment was submitted to the States for their con-
sideration and ratification.  Two years later, it was ratified
by  the  requisite  number  of  States  and  became  the  Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See
15  Stat.  706–707;  id.,  at  709–711.  Its  opening  words  in-
stilled in our Nation’s Constitution a new birth of freedom:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
70  UNION  PACIFIC  R.  CO.  v.  LOCOMOTIVE  ENGINEERS

Syllabus

process.  Rooted in § 152, the RLA’s “[g]eneral duties” section, and not
moored to the NRAB’s “[e]stablishment[,] . . . powers[,] and duties” set
out  in  § 153  First,  conferencing  is  often  informal  in  practice,  and  is  no
more “jurisdictional” than is the presuit resort to the EEOC held nonju
risdictional and forfeitable in Zipes.  And if the conference requirement
is not “jurisdictional,” then failure initially to submit proof of conferenc
ing  cannot  be  of  that  genre.  And  although  the  Carrier  alleges  that
NRAB  decisions  support  characterizing  conferencing  as  jurisdictional,
if  the  NRAB  lacks  authority  to  deﬁne  its  panels’  jurisdiction,  surely
the panels themselves lack that authority.  Furthermore, NRAB panels
have variously addressed the matter.  Pp. 81–85.

(b)  Neither  the  RLA  nor  Circular  One  could  plausibly  be  read  to
require, as a prerequisite to the NRAB’s exercise of jurisdiction, submis
sion  of  proof  of  conferencing.  Instructions  on  party  submissions  are
claim-processing,  not  jurisdictional,  rules.  The  Board  itself  has  recog
nized  that  conferencing  may  not  be  a  “question  in  dispute,”  and  when
that  is  so,  proof  thereof  need  not  accompany  party  submissions.  It
makes  sense  to  exclude  at  the  arbitration  stage  newly  presented
“data”  supporting  the  employee’s  grievance,  29  CFR  § 301.5(d)—evi
dence  the  carrier  had  no  opportunity  to  consider  prearbitration.  But
conferencing  is not  a  fact  bearing on  the  merits  of a  grievance.  More
over,  the  RLA  respects  the  parties’  right  to  order  for  themselves  the
conference  procedures  they  will  follow.  See  45  U. S. C.  § 152  Sixth.
Pp. 85–86.

522 F. 3d 746, afﬁrmed.

Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

J.  Scott  Ballenger  argued  the  cause  for  petitioner.  With
him  on  the  briefs  were  Maureen  E.  Mahoney,  Melissa  B.
Arbus,  James  C.  Knapp,  Jr.,  J.  Michael  Hemmer,  Patricia
O. Kiscoan, and Donald J. Munro.

Thomas  H.  Geoghegan  argued  the  cause  and  ﬁled  a  brief

for respondent.*

*Peter Buscemi, Harry A. Rissetto, Jonathan C. Fritts, and Joanna L.
Moorhead  ﬁled  a  brief  for  the  National  Railway  Labor  Conference  et  al.
as amici curiae urging reversal.

Briefs  of  amici  curiae  urging  afﬁrmance  were  ﬁled  for  the  American
Federation  of  Labor  and  Congress  of  Industrial  Organizations  by  Jona
than  P.  Hiatt,  James  B.  Coppess,  and  Laurence  Gold;  and  for  the  Broth
erhood  of  Locomotive  Engineers  and  Trainmen,  National  Division,  by
Harold A. Ross.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and decision in a case. It is not the actual content of a book and is more of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

KELLY v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

program fraud statute bars “obtain[ing] by fraud” the “property” (in-
cluding money) of a federally funded program or entity.  §666(a)(1)(A).
These  statutes  are  “limited  in  scope  to  the  protection  of  property
rights,” and do not authorize federal prosecutors to “set[ ] standards of
disclosure and good government for local and state officials.”  McNally
v.  United  States,  483  U. S.  350,  360.    So  under  either  provision,  the
Government had to show not only that Baroni and Kelly engaged in
deception,  but  that  an  object  of  their  fraud  was  money  or  property.
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U. S. 12, 26.

The Government argues that the scheme had the object of obtaining
the Port Authority’s money or property in two ways.  First, the Gov-
ernment claims that Baroni and Kelly sought to commandeer part of
the  Bridge  itself  by  taking  control of  its  physical  lanes.  Second,  the
Government asserts that the defendants aimed to deprive the Port Au-
thority of the costs of compensating the traffic engineers and back-up
toll collectors.  For different reasons, neither of these theories can sus-
tain the verdicts.

Baroni’s and Kelly’s realignment of the access lanes was an exercise
of  regulatory  power—a  reallocation  of  the  lanes  between  different
groups of drivers.  This Court has already held that a scheme to alter
such a regulatory choice is not one to take the government’s property.
Id., at 23.  And while a government’s right to its employees’ time and
labor is a property interest, the prosecution must also show that it is
an “object of the fraud.”  Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S. 349,
355.  Here, the time and labor of the Port Authority employees were
just the implementation costs of the defendants’ scheme to reallocate
the Bridge’s lanes—an incidental (even if foreseen) byproduct of their
regulatory object.  Neither defendant sought to obtain the services that
the employees provided.  Pp. 6–13.

909 F. 3d 550, reversed and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal case syllabus, outlining the arguments and reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It is not the actual content of the book and is more of a summary and analysis of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

No. 11–1425.  Argued January 9, 2013—Decided April 17, 2013

Respondent McNeely was stopped by a Missouri police officer for speed-
ing and crossing the centerline.  After declining to take a breath test
to  measure  his  blood  alcohol  concentration  (BAC),  he  was  arrested
and taken to a nearby hospital for blood testing.  The officer never at-
tempted  to  secure  a  search  warrant.    McNeely  refused  to  consent  to
the blood test, but the officer directed a lab technician to take a sam-
ple.  McNeely’s  BAC  tested  well  above  the  legal  limit,  and  he  was
charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI).  He moved to suppress
the blood test result, arguing that taking his blood without a warrant
violated  his  Fourth  Amendment  rights.    The  trial  court  agreed,  con-
cluding  that  the  exigency  exception  to  the  warrant  requirement  did
not  apply  because,  apart  from  the  fact  that  McNeely’s  blood  alcohol
was dissipating, no circumstances suggested that the officer faced an
emergency.
The  State  Supreme  Court  affirmed,  relying  on
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, in which this Court upheld a
DWI  suspect’s  warrantless  blood  test  where  the  officer  “might  rea-
sonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in
which  the  delay  necessary  to  obtain  a  warrant,  under  the  circum-
stances,  threatened  ‘the  destruction  of  evidence,’ ”  id.,  at  770.    This
case,  the  state  court  found,  involved  a  routine  DWI  investigation
where  no  factors  other  than  the  natural  dissipation  of  blood  alcohol
suggested that there was an emergency, and, thus, the nonconsensu-
al  warrantless  test  violated  McNeely’s  right  to  be  free  from  unrea-
sonable searches of his person.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

358 S. W. 3d 65, affirmed.

JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I, II–A, II–B, and IV, concluding that in drunk-driving inves-
tigations,  the  natural  dissipation  of  alcohol  in  the  bloodstream  does
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case, providing a summary of the case and the Court's decision. Syllabi are not considered part of the main body of the opinion and are meant for informational purposes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Syllabus

be accepted as immutable components” but should be “adapted as new
cases  test  their  usefulness  in  evaluating  vicarious  liability.”    Id.,  at
489.  Pp. 9–11.

(ii) Because  the  allegations  here—involving  international  ter-
rorist networks and world-spanning internet platforms—are a far cry
from the facts of Halberstam, the Court must ascertain the basic thrust
of Halberstam’s elements to determine how to adapt them to the facts
of this case.  To do so, the Court turns to the common law of aiding and
abetting upon which Halberstam rested, and to which JASTA’s com-
mon-law terminology points.  At common law, the basic “view of culpa-
bility” animating aiding and abetting liability is that “a person may be
responsible  for  a  crime  he  has  not  personally  carried  out  if  he  helps
another to complete its commission.”  Rosemond v. United States, 572
U. S. 65, 70.  However, the concept of “helping” in the commission of a
crime or a tort has never been boundless and ordinarily requires some
level of blameworthy conduct; those limits ensure that aiding and abet-
ting does not sweep in mere passive bystanders or those who, for ex-
ample, simply deliver mail that happens to aid criminals.  In tort law,
many  cases  have  thus  required  a  voluntary, conscious, and  culpable
participation in the wrongful conduct to establish aiding and abetting.
In doing so, they further articulated Halberstam’s framework to cap-
ture those limits.  As above, that framework requires that the defend-
ant give knowing and substantial assistance to the primary tortfeasor;
notably,  courts  often  viewed  those  twin  requirements  as  working  in
tandem, with a lesser showing of one demanding a greater showing of
the  other  to  establish  a  conscious,  culpable  participation  in  the  tort.
Pp. 11–16.

(iii) Halberstam differentiated types of aid along the same cul-
pability axis that grounded the common law.  And its six factors for
“substantial  assistance”  call  for  the  same  balancing  that  courts  had
undertaken previously between the nature and amount of assistance
and the defendant’s scienter.  Pp. 16–17.

(2) The parties then vigorously dispute what precisely a defendant
must aid and abet under §2333(d)(2).  Plaintiffs assert that it is “the
person,” while defendants insist that it is the “act of international ter-
rorism.”  That syntactic dispute makes little difference here, because
aiding and abetting is inherently a rule of secondary liability for spe-
cific wrongful acts.  In the tort context, liability is imposed only when
someone commits (not merely agrees to commit) an actual tort.  And
in this case, the ATA limits that liability to injuries caused by an “act
of international terrorism,” §2333(a).  It thus is not enough for a de-
fendant to have given substantial assistance to a transcendent enter-
prise.  A defendant must have aided and abetted (by knowingly provid-
ing  substantial  assistance)  another  person  in  the  commission  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the syllabus outlining the Court's reasoning. It discusses legal precedents, common law principles, and the specific language of a statute (likely the Anti-Terrorism Act).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

late  18th  and  early  19th  century  did  not  criminalize  pre-
quickening  abortions  does  not  mean  that  anyone  thought
the States lacked the authority to do so.  When legislatures
began to exercise that authority as the century wore on, no
one, as far as we are aware, argued that the laws they en-
acted violated a fundamental right.  That is not surprising
since  common-law  authorities  had  repeatedly  condemned
abortion and described it as an “unlawful” act without re-
gard to whether it occurred before or after quickening.  See
supra, at 16–21.

Another  amicus  brief  relied  upon  by  respondents  (see
Brief for Respondents 21) tries to dismiss the significance
of the state criminal statutes that were in effect when the
Fourteenth  Amendment  was  adopted  by  suggesting  that
they  were  enacted  for  illegitimate  reasons.  According  to
this account, which is based almost entirely on statements
made  by  one  prominent  proponent  of  the  statutes,  im-
portant motives for the laws were the fear that Catholic im-
migrants  were  having  more  babies  than  Protestants  and
that  the  availability  of  abortion  was  leading  White
Protestant women to “shir[k their] maternal duties.”  Brief
for American Historical Association et al. as Amici Curiae
20.

Resort to this argument is a testament to the lack of any
real historical support for the right that Roe and Casey rec-
ognized.  This Court has long disfavored arguments based
on alleged legislative motives.  See, e.g., Erie v. Pap’s A. M.,
529 U. S. 277, 292 (2000) (plurality opinion); Turner Broad-
casting  System,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  512  U. S.  622,  652  (1994);
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 (1968); Arizona
v.  California,  283  U. S.  423,  455  (1931)  (collecting  cases).
The Court has recognized that inquiries into legislative mo-
tives “are a hazardous matter.”  O’Brien, 391 U. S., at 383.
Even when an argument about legislative motive is backed
by statements made by legislators who voted for a law, we
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. It discusses historical context and legal precedent related to abortion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
270

SOUTH  CAROLINA  v.  NORTH  CAROLINA

Opinion of the Court

On  these  facts,  we  think  it  is  clear  that  the  CRWSP  has
carried  its  burden  of  showing  a  compelling  interest  in  the
outcome  of  this  litigation  that  distinguishes  the  CRWSP
from all other citizens of the party States.  See New Jersey
v.  New York, 345 U. S., at  373.  Apart from its interest as a
user of the Catawba River’s water, the CRWSP has made a
$30  million  investment  in  its  plant  and  infrastructure,  with
each  participating  county  incurring  approximately  half  of
this cost as debt.  Each county is responsible for one-half of
the CRWSP’s cost of operations, and the venture is designed
to  break  even  from  year  to  year.  Any  disruption  to  the
CRWSP’s  operations  would  increase—not  lessen—the  difﬁ
culty  of  our  task  in  achieving  a  “just  and  equitable”  alloca
tion  in  this  dispute.  See  Nebraska  v.  Wyoming,  325  U. S.
589,  618  (1945).  We  believe  that  the  CRWSP  has  shown  a
compelling  interest  in  protecting  the  viability  of  its  opera
tions, which are premised on a ﬁne balance between the joint
venture’s two participating counties.

We are further persuaded that neither State can properly
represent the interests of the CRWSP in this litigation.  See
New  Jersey  v.  New  York,  supra,  at  373.  The  complaint  at
tributes  a  portion  of  the  total  water  transfers  that  have
harmed  South  Carolina  to  the  CRWSP,  yet  North  Carolina
expressly states that it “cannot represent the interests of the
joint venture.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 54.  A moment’s reﬂection
reveals  why  this  is  so.  In  this  dispute,  as  in  all  disputes
over  limited  resources,  each  State  maximizes  its  equitable
share of the Catawba River’s water only by arguing that the
other  State’s  equitable  share  must  be  reduced.  See,  e. g.,
Colorado  v.  New  Mexico,  459  U. S.  176,  186–187  (1982).  It
is thus likely that North Carolina, in response to South Caro
lina’s  demand  for  a  greater  share  of  the  Catawba  River’s
water,  will  take  the  position  that  downstream  users—such
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from a court case, specifically discussing the interests of the Catawba River Water Supply Project (CRWSP) in a water rights dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–842
_________________

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,
PETITIONER v. MARIA T. VULLO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 30, 2024]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Six decades ago, this Court held that a government en-
tity’s “threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of
coercion” against a third party “to achieve the suppression”
of disfavored speech violates the First Amendment.  Ban-
tam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 67 (1963).  Today,
the Court reaffirms what it said then: Government officials
cannot attempt to coerce private parties in order to punish
or  suppress  views  that  the  government  disfavors.  Peti-
tioner  National  Rifle  Association  (NRA)  plausibly  alleges
that respondent Maria Vullo did just that.  As superinten-
dent  of  the  New  York  Department  of  Financial  Services,
Vullo allegedly pressured regulated entities to help her sti-
fle the NRA’s pro-gun advocacy by threatening enforcement
actions  against  those  entities  that  refused  to  disassociate
from  the  NRA  and  other  gun-promotion  advocacy  groups.
Those allegations, if true, state a First Amendment claim.

I
A

Because  this  case  comes  to  us  at  the  motion-to-dismiss
stage, the Court assumes the truth of “well-pleaded factual
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion.  It includes the citation, the title of the case, the date, and the beginning of the opinion itself.  This type of content is highly suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

den?  In my view, the answer is yes.  The necessary precon-
dition that permitted him to obtain that data was absent.
The Court does not dispute that the phrase “exceeds au-
thorized access” readily encompasses Van Buren’s conduct.
It notes, instead, that the statute includes a definition for
that phrase and that “we must follow that definition, even
if  it  varies  from  a  term’s  ordinary  meaning.”  Tanzin  v.
Tanvir,  592  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2020)  (slip  op.,  at  3)  (internal
quotation  marks  omitted).    The  problem  for  the  majority
view, however, is that the text, ordinary principles of prop-
erty  law,  and  statutory  history  establish  that  the  defini-
tional provision is quite consistent with the term it defines.

I
A

The Act defines “exceeds authorized access” as “to access
a computer with authorization and to use such access to ob-
tain or alter information in the computer that the accesser
is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”  §1030(e)(6).  For pur-
poses of this appeal, it is agreed that Van Buren was au-
thorized to log into a government database and that he used
his entry to obtain fake license-plate information from that
database.  I  thus  agree  with  the  majority  that  this  case
turns on whether Van Buren was “entitled so to obtain” the
fake license-plate information.  I also agree that “so” asks
whether Van Buren had a right to obtain that information
through  the  means  identified  earlier  in  the  definition:  (1)
accessing a computer with authorization and (2) using that
access  to  obtain  information  in  the  computer.    In  other
words, Van Buren’s conduct was legal only if he was enti-
tled to obtain that specific license-plate information by us-
ing his admittedly authorized access to the database.

He was not.  A person is entitled to do something only if
he has a “right” to do it.  Black’s Law Dictionary 477 (5th
ed. 1979); see also American Heritage Dictionary 437 (def.
3a) (1981) (to “allow” or to “qualify”).  Van Buren never had
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Van Buren v. United States. It delves into the legal interpretation of a specific statute and its application to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Syllabus

and KAGAN, JJ., filed a dissenting opinion.  JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting
opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and a list of justices who filed dissenting opinions. This is not the main body text of a legal document and is likely not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation and Dissenting Opinions</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

IN RE WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH

BREYER, J., dissenting

four months.  For these reasons, as elaborated by JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR, I would grant the writ petitioners seek.

I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It is sequential and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

29

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

tion of marriage—have acted to “lock . . . out,” “disparage,”
“disrespect  and  subordinate,”  and  inflict  “[d]ignitary
wounds”  upon  their  gay  and  lesbian  neighbors.    Ante,  at
17, 19, 22, 25.  These apparent assaults on the character of
fairminded  people  will  have  an  effect,  in  society  and  in
court.  See post, at 6–7 (ALITO, J., dissenting).  Moreover,
they are entirely gratuitous.  It is one thing for the major-
ity  to  conclude  that  the  Constitution  protects  a  right  to
same-sex  marriage;  it  is  something  else  to  portray  every-
one  who  does  not  share  the  majority’s  “better  informed
understanding” as bigoted.  Ante, at 19.

In  the  face  of  all  this,  a  much  different  view  of  the
Court’s  role  is  possible.    That  view  is  more  modest  and
restrained.  It  is  more  skeptical  that  the  legal  abilities  of
judges  also  reflect  insight  into  moral  and  philosophical
issues.  It  is  more  sensitive  to  the  fact  that  judges  are
unelected  and  unaccountable,  and  that  the  legitimacy  of
their power depends on confining it to the exercise of legal
judgment.  It is more attuned to the lessons of history, and
what  it  has  meant  for  the  country  and  Court  when  Jus-
tices  have  exceeded  their  proper  bounds.    And  it  is  less
pretentious than to suppose that while people around the
world  have  viewed  an  institution  in  a  particular  way  for
thousands  of  years,  the  present  generation  and  the  pre-
sent Court are the ones chosen to burst the bonds of that
history and tradition.

*

*

*
If  you  are  among  the  many  Americans—of  whatever
sexual  orientation—who  favor  expanding  same-sex  mar-
riage,  by  all  means  celebrate  today’s  decision.  Celebrate
the  achievement  of  a  desired  goal.    Celebrate  the  oppor-
tunity  for  a  new  expression  of  commitment  to  a  partner.
Celebrate  the  availability  of  new  benefits.  But  do  not
celebrate the Constitution.  It had nothing to do with it.

I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It expresses a legal and philosophical argument against the majority opinion on same-sex marriage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

CARSON v. MAKIN

BREYER, J., dissenting

resurfacing school playgrounds to make them safer for chil-
dren.  Any  Establishment  Clause  concerns  arising  from
providing money to religious schools for the creation of safer
play yards are readily distinguishable from those raised by
providing money to religious schools through the program
at issue here—a tuition program designed to ensure that all
children receive their constitutionally guaranteed right to
a free public education.  After all, cities and States normally
pay for police forces, fire protection, paved streets, munici-
pal  transport,  and  hosts  of  other  services  that  benefit
churches as well as secular organizations.  But paying the
salary of a religious teacher as part of a public school tuition
program is a different matter.

In addition, schools were excluded from the playground
resurfacing program at issue in Trinity Lutheran because
of the mere fact that they were “owned or controlled by a
church,  sect,  or  other  religious  entity.”    582  U. S.,  at  ___
(slip op., at 2).  Schools were thus disqualified from receiv-
ing playground funds “solely because of their religious char-
acter,” not because of the “religious uses of [the] funding”
they would receive.  Id., at ___, ___, n. 3 (slip op., at 10, 14,
n. 3).  Here, by contrast, a school’s “ ‘affiliation or associa-
tion with a church or religious institution . . . is not dispos-
itive’ ” of its ability to receive tuition funds.  979 F. 3d 21,
38 (CA1 2020) (quoting then-commissioner of Maine’s De-
partment of Education).  Instead, Maine chooses not to fund
only those schools that “ ‘promot[e] the faith or belief system
with which [the schools are] associated and/or presen[t] the
[academic]  material  taught  through  the  lens  of  this
faith’ ”—i.e., schools that will use public money for religious
purposes.  Ibid.  Maine thus excludes schools from its tui-
tion program not because of the schools’ religious character
but because the schools will use the funds to teach and pro-
mote religious ideals.

For  similar  reasons,  Espinoza  does  not  resolve  the  pre-
sent  case.  In  Espinoza,  Montana  created  “a  scholarship
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case Carson v. Makin. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the constitutionality of a tuition program that excludes religious schools.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA

INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

B
The  unambiguous  meaning  of  “the  Legislature”  in  the
Elections Clause as a representative body is confirmed by
other  provisions  of  the  Constitution  that  use  the  same
term in the same way.  When seeking to discern the mean-
ing  of  a  word  in  the  Constitution,  there  is  no  better  dic-
tionary than the rest of the Constitution itself.  Our prece-
dents  new  and  old  have  employed  this  structural  method
of interpretation to read the Constitution in the manner it
was  drafted  and  ratified—as  a  unified,  coherent  whole.
See,  e.g.,  NLRB  v.  Noel  Canning,  573  U. S.  ___,  ___–___
(2014)  (slip  op.,  at  19–20);  id.,  at  ___  (SCALIA,  J.,  concur-
ring in judgment) (slip op., at 32); McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 414–415 (1819); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1
Wheat.  304,  328–330  (1816);  Amar,  Intratextualism,  112
Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999).

The  Constitution  includes  seventeen  provisions  refer-
ring  to  a  State’s  “Legislature.”    See  Appendix,  infra.
Every one of those references is consistent with the under-
standing  of  a  legislature  as  a  representative  body.    More
importantly,  many  of  them  are  only  consistent  with  an
institutional legislature—and flatly incompatible with the
majority’s  reading  of  “the  Legislature”  to  refer  to  the
people as a whole.

Start with the Constitution’s first use of the term: “The
House  of  Representatives  shall  be  composed  of  Members
chosen  every  second  Year  by  the  People  of  the  several
States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qual-
ifications  requisite  for  Electors  of  the  most  numerous
Branch  of  the  State  Legislature.”  Art. I,  §2,  cl. 1.    This
reference  to  a  “Branch  of  the  State  Legislature”  can  only
be  referring  to  an  institutional  body,  and  the  explicit
juxtaposition of “the State Legislature” with “the People of
the  several  States”  forecloses  the  majority’s  proposed
reading.

The next Section of Article I describes how to fill vacan-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n. It discusses the interpretation of the term "the Legislature" in the Elections Clause of the Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

THOMAS, J., dissenting

The States accordingly enacted numerous laws to regu-
late Indians within their territorial boundaries, as well as
those  Indians’  interactions  with  the  States’  citizens.    See,
e.g.,  D.  Rosen,  American  Indians  and  State  Law  34,  52
(2007) (Rosen).  For example, New York passed laws forbid-
ding its citizens from suing to enforce contracts with Indi-
ans who lived on Indian lands, and Virginia regulated the
sale of land held by Indians.  See Laws of the Colonial and
State Governments, Relating to Indians and Indian Affairs,
From 1633 to 1831, pp. 65–67, 158–159 (1832).  Massachu-
setts authorized its Governor to appoint guardians to over-
see Indians and their property, while Ohio and Indiana for-
bade the sale of liquor to Indians.  Id., at 21–22, 232–234.

On  the  whole,  States  also  generally  applied  both  their
civil  and  criminal  laws  to  Indians,  with  many  extending
their criminal laws to all Indians anywhere in the State—
including,  sometimes,  on  Indian  reservations  within  the
State.  See  Rosen  53;  see  also,  e.g.,  Goodell  v.  Jackson  ex
dem.  Smith,  20  Johns.  693  (N. Y.  Ct.  Corr.  Errors  1823);
State v. Doxtater, 47 Wis. 278, 2 N. W. 439 (1879) (collecting
cases).  To be sure, some of these laws may have conflicted
with valid federal treaties or statutes on point, and courts
at the time often did not precisely demarcate the constitu-
tional  boundaries  between  state  and  federal  authority.
Rosen 55–56.4  But, when opponents of the Trade and In-
tercourse  Acts’  criminal  provisions  complained  that  state

——————

4 The Constitution expressly denied certain powers to States, including
the power to “enter into any Treaty,” but it is silent on States’ relation-
ship with Indians.  See Art. I, §10; see also Letter from T. Jefferson to H.
Knox (Aug. 10, 1791), in 22 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 27 (C. Cullen ed.
1986) (noting that States lack “a right to Treat with the Indians”).  To be
sure, in 1832, this Court held that Georgia could not extend its laws over
the territory held by the Cherokee Nation.  See Worcester v. Georgia, 6
Pet. 515.  However, that opinion “yielded to closer analysis,” and Indian
reservations have since been treated as part of the State they are within.
See Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 5)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It cites legal precedents and discusses the historical relationship between states and Native Americans.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

903

Georgia; Anuforo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Georgia; Baker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Georgia; Davis v.
1076

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Georgia; Henley v.
1076

Georgia; Hudson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
882

Georgia; Kipple v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

Georgia; Lindsey v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

Georgia; Patterson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
209

Georgia; Presley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Georgia; Rector v.
1081

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Georgia; Vadde v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  988,1117

1121

Georgia; Watkins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Georgia; Wright v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Gerard v. Board of Regents of Ga.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Geren; Appleby v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Geren; Laber v.
1154

Gerry; Dupont v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
842

Gerry; Gaylor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Gerry; Kuperman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gerry; Pelletier v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  909,1139

Gharb v. Unitronics (1989) (R’’G) Ltd.
Ghee v. Target National Bank
1144

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  935,1087

Gialto v. Obama
1113

Giampa v. Giampa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

Giannone v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gibbons v. Savage
932

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Giberson v. Ryan
1118

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Gibson; Johnson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922

Gibson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035

Gibson v. Vaughan
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

Giddens v. Johnson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
892

Giddings v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
849

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gil v. United States
818

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gilbert v. Post
1058

Gilden v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1150

Giles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Gil-Hernandez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gill v. Rock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Gill v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  910,942

Gillespie v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1017

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  823,1066

Gilley v. Monsanto Co.
958

Gilyard v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
808

Gimbel v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Giordano v. United States

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection.  It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

vant  state  law  is  established  by  a  decision  of  “the  State’s  highest
court,” that decision is “binding on the federal courts,” Wainwright v.
Goode,  464  U. S.  78,  84,  but  views  of  the  State’s  attorney  general,
while attracting “respectful consideration,” do not garner controlling
weight,  Arizonans  for  Official  English  v.  Arizona,  520  U. S.  43,  76–
77, n. 30.  Furthermore, because the Second Circuit riveted its atten-
tion on the Ministry’s submission, it did not address evidence submit-
ted  by  the  U. S.  purchasers.    The  court  also  misperceived  the  pre-
Rule 44.1 decision of United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203.  Under the
particular  circumstances  of  that  case,  this  Court  found  conclusive  a
declaration from the government of the Russian Socialist Federal So-
viet  Republic  on  the  extraterritorial  effect  of  a  decree  nationalizing
assets: The declaration was obtained by the United States through of-
ficial “diplomatic channels,” id., at 218; there was no indication that
the declaration was inconsistent with the Russian Government’s past
statements; and the declaration was consistent with expert evidence
in point.
  The  Second  Circuit  expressed  concern  about  reciprocity,  but  the
United  States  has  not  historically  argued  that  foreign  courts  are
bound  to  accept  its  characterizations  or  precluded  from  considering
other  relevant  sources.    International  practice  is  also  inconsistent
with the Second Circuit’s rigid rule.  Pp. 7–12.

837 F. 3d 175, vacated and remanded.

  GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section. It summarizes the case and the court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TYLER v. HENNEPIN COUNTY, MINNESOTA, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–166.  Argued April 26, 2023—Decided May 25, 2023

Geraldine Tyler owned a condominium in Hennepin County, Minnesota,
that accumulated about $15,000 in unpaid real estate taxes along with
interest  and  penalties.    The  County  seized  the  condo  and  sold  it  for
$40,000,  keeping  the  $25,000  excess  over  Tyler’s  tax  debt  for  itself.
Minn. Stat. §§281.18, 282.07, 282.08.  Tyler filed suit, alleging that the
County had unconstitutionally retained the excess value of her home
above  her  tax  debt  in  violation  of  the  Takings  Clause  of  the  Fifth
Amendment  and  the  Excessive  Fines  Clause  of  the  Eighth  Amend-
ment.  The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim,
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Held: Tyler plausibly alleges that Hennepin County’s retention of the ex-
cess value of her home above her tax debt violated the Takings Clause.
Pp. 3–14.

(a) Tyler’s claim that the County illegally appropriated the $25,000
surplus  constitutes  a  classic  pocketbook  injury  sufficient  to  give  her
standing.  TransUnion  LLC  v.  Ramirez,  594  U. S.  ___,  ___.    Even  if
there are debts on her home, as the County claims, Tyler still plausibly
alleges  a  financial  harm,  for  the  County  has  kept  $25,000  that  she
could have used to reduce her personal liability for those debts.  Pp. 3–
4.

(b) Tyler has stated a claim under the Takings Clause, which pro-
vides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”  Whether remaining value from a tax sale is prop-
erty protected under the Takings Clause depends on state law, “tradi-
tional  property  law  principles,”  historical  practice,  and  the  Court’s
precedents.  Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U. S. 156,
165–168.  Though state law is an important source of property rights,
it cannot be the only one because otherwise a State could “sidestep the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

BREYER, J., dissenting

course, at this early stage, a district court’s assessment of
that  issue  is  only  preliminary  because  it  cannot  know  for
certain what evidence will be revealed.  After the evidence
is developed, the court will need to make a final determina-
tion of whether it is in fact admissible.  Requiring appellate
courts to review both the district court’s preliminary assess-
ment of admissibility on interlocutory appeal and its ulti-
mate assessment of the same question after final judgment
is unnecessarily duplicative and inefficient.

All of these concerns suggest that transportation orders
like the one here do not satisfy the requirements for inter-
locutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine.

B
The  Court  points  out  in  response that  “[e]very  Court  of
Appeals to consider the question” has found a transporta-
tion order to be immediately appealable.   Ante, at 5, n. 1.
True.  But few Courts of Appeals have been asked to “con-
sider the question.”  The Court cites, over the last five dec-
ades, only four cases (besides this one) that have concluded
that  transportation  orders  are  immediately  appealable.
Ibid.  (citing  Jones  v.  Lilly,  37  F. 3d  964,  965–966  (CA3
1994);  Jackson  v.  Vasquez,  1  F. 3d  885,  887–888  (CA9
1993); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F. 2d 476, 479 (CA5 1977);
Barnes v. Black, 544 F. 3d 807, 810–811 (CA7 2008)).  An
average of one decision every decade can hardly be thought
to establish a lower court consensus.  A contrary determi-
nation here would not disturb settled practice.

The Court also asserts that, on one occasion, we have pre-
viously reviewed a transportation order.  See Pennsylvania
Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474
U. S. 34 (1985).  But the precedential value of that decision
is limited because the opinion did not discuss the Court of
Appeals’ jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from
the order.  See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 511
(2006).  It does not set forth a jurisdictional ruling at all.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding the appealability of a transportation order.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
928

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–6092.  Collamore  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  708.

No.  09–6093.  Newton  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  293  Fed.  Appx.  201.

No.  09–6094.  Ramirez-Medina  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  485.

No.  09–6095.  Sanchez-Rosado  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  277.

No.  09–6096.  Scott  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  605.

No.  09–6098.  Martin  v.  United  States;  and
No.  09–6123.  Garrison  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  862.

No.  09–6100.  Salazar-Galvan  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  396.

No.  09–6104.  Anderson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  8.

No.  09–6106.  Brown  v.  United  States  District  Court  for
the  District  of  South  Dakota.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–6107.  Azzara  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6110.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  439.

No.  09–6112.  McMullin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  1.

No.  09–6113.  Lacue  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6114.  Kuehne  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  647  F.  3d  667.

No.  09–6115.  Lewis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  858.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1059

558 U. S.

November 30, 2009

No. 09–7192.  Grant v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7193.  Frost  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  725.

No.  09–7195.  Galloway  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  829.

No.  09–7198.  Herrera  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  349  Fed.  Appx.  737.

No.  09–7200.  Avery  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  259.

No.  09–7204.  Barnett  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  574  F.  3d  600.

No.  09–7207.  Watson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  226.

No.  09–7208.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  869.

No.  09–7213.  Bush  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  826.

No.  09–7214.  Pita  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  537.

No.  09–7215.  McAffee  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  435.

No. 09–7216.  Powell v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–7217.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7221.  Allan-Selvin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  347  Fed.  Appx.  314.

No.  09–7222.  Spaulding  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  942.

No.  09–7226.  Pettiford  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  352.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

LUCIA v. SEC

Syllabus

not “Officers of the United States,” but are instead mere employees—
officials  with  lesser  responsibilities  who  are  not  subject  to  the  Ap-
pointments Clause.

Held: The Commission’s  ALJs  are “Officers of the  United States,” sub-

ject to the Appointments Clause.  Pp. 5–13.

(a) This  Court’s  decisions  in  United  States  v.  Germaine,  99  U. S.
508,  and  Buckley  v.  Valeo,  424  U. S.  1,  set  out  the  basic  framework
for  distinguishing  between officers and  employees.    To  qualify  as  an
officer,  rather  than  an  employee,  an  individual  must  occupy  a  “con-
tinuing” position established by law, Germaine, 99 U. S., at 511, and
must  “exercis[e]  significant  authority  pursuant  to  the  laws  of  the
United States,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 126.

In  Freytag  v. Commissioner,  501  U. S.  868,  the  Court  applied  this
framework  to  “special  trial  judges”  (STJs)  of  the  United  States  Tax
Court.  STJs could issue the final decision of the Tax Court in “com-
paratively  narrow  and  minor  matters.”    Id.,  at  873.  In  more  major
matters, they could preside over the hearing but could not issue a fi-
nal decision.  Instead, they were to “prepare proposed findings and an
opinion”  for  a  regular  Tax  Court  judge  to  consider.    Ibid.   The  pro-
ceeding  challenged  in  Freytag  was  a  major  one.  The  losing  parties
argued on appeal that the  STJ who presided over their hearing was
not constitutionally appointed.

This Court held that STJs are officers.  Citing Germaine, the Frey-
tag  Court  first  found  that  STJs  hold  a  continuing  office  established
by law.  See 501 U. S., at 881.  The Court then considered, as Buckley
demands, the “significance” of the “authority” STJs wield.  501 U. S.,
at 881.  The Government had argued that STJs are employees in all
cases  in  which  they  could  not  enter  a  final  decision.    But  the  Court
thought that the Government’s focus on finality “ignore[d] the signifi-
cance  of  the  duties  and  discretion  that  [STJs]  possess.”    Ibid.    De-
scribing  the  responsibilities  involved  in  presiding  over  adversarial
hearings,  the  Court  said:  STJs  “take  testimony,  conduct  trials,  rule
on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce com-
pliance  with  discovery  orders.”    Id.,  at  881–882.    And  the  Court  ob-
served  that  “[i]n  the  course  of  carrying  out  these  important  func-
tions,” STJs “exercise significant discretion.”  Id., at 882.

Freytag’s analysis decides  this case.  The Commission’s ALJs, like
the  Tax  Court’s  STJs,  hold  a  continuing  office  established  by  law.
SEC ALJs “receive[ ] a career appointment,” 5 CFR §930.204(a), to a
position  created  by  statute,  see  5  U. S. C.  §§556–557,  5372,  3105.
And they exercise the same “significant discretion” when carrying out
the  same  “important  functions”  as  STJs  do.    Freytag,  501  U. S.,  at
882.  Both sets of officials have all the authority needed to ensure fair
and orderly adversarial hearings—indeed, nearly all the tools of fed-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus section outlining the court's holding and reasoning. It's sequential text providing a legal argument and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>