<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

mercial social networking website.  The website (1) derives
revenue  from  ads  and  (2)  facilitates  social  introductions
for  the  purpose  of  information  exchanges.  Users  of  the
site  can  comment  on  articles,  reply  to  other  users’  com-
ments,  and  recommend  another  user’s  comment.10    Users
can also (3) create personal profiles that include a name or
nickname  and  a  photograph.    The  photograph  and  name
will then appear next to every comment the user leaves on
an article.  Finally (4), the back-and-forth comment section
is  a  mechanism  for  users  to  communicate  among  them-
selves.  The site thus falls within §14–202.5 and is accord-
ingly  off  limits  for  registered  sex  offenders  in  North
Carolina.

Or  consider  WebMD—a  website  that  contains  health-
related resources, from tools that help users find a doctor
to  information  on  preventative  care  and  the  symptoms
associated  with  particular  medical  problems.    WebMD,
too, allows children on the site.11  And it exhibits the four
hallmarks of a “commercial social networking” website.  It
  It  facilitates
obtains  revenue  from  advertisements.12
information  exchanges—via  message  boards  that  allow
users  to  engage  in  public  discussion  of  an  assortment  of
health  issues.13   It  allows  users  to  create  basic  profile

——————

washingtonpost.com/terms-of-service/2011/11/18/gIQAldiYiN_story.html?
utm_term=.9be5851f95.

10 See  Washington  Post,  Ad  choices  (Nov.  21,  2011),  https://www.
washingtonpost.com/how-can-i-opt-out-of-online-advertising-cookies/2011/
11/18/gIQABECbiN_story.html?utm_term=3da1f56d67e7;  Washington
Post,  Privacy  Policy  (May  2,  2017),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/
privacy-policy / 2011 / 11 / 18 / gIQASIiaiN _ story.html ? utm_term =
.8252a76f8df2.

11 See WebMD, Terms and Conditions of Use (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.

webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-terms-and-conditions-of-use.

12 WebMD, Advertising Policy (June 9, 2016), http://www.webmd.com/

about-webmd-policies/about-advertising-policy.

13 WebMD,  Message  Board  Overview  (Sept.  22,  2016),  http://www.

webmd.com/about-webmd-policies/about-community-overview.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito. It discusses the definition of "commercial social networking website" and provides examples like the Washington Post and WebMD.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

Figure 2. A purple silkscreen portrait of Prince created in 1984
by Andy Warhol to illustrate an article in Vanity Fair.

pencil drawings.  The works are collectively referred to as
the “Prince Series.”  See Appendix, infra.  Goldsmith did not
know about the Prince Series until 2016, when she saw the
image  of  an  orange  silkscreen  portrait  of  Prince  (“Orange
Prince”)  on  the  cover  of  a  magazine  published  by  Vanity
Fair’s parent company, Condé Nast.  See fig. 3, infra.

By that time, Warhol had died, and the Prince Series had
passed to the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts,
Inc.  AWF no longer possesses the works,2 but it asserts copy-
right in them.  It has licensed images of the works for com-
mercial and editorial uses.  In particular, after Prince died
in 2016, Condé Nast contacted AWF about the possibility of
reusing  the  1984  Vanity  Fair  image  for  a  special  edition
magazine that would commemorate Prince.  Once AWF in-
formed Condé Nast about the other Prince Series images,
however, Condé Nast obtained a license to publish Orange
——————

2 AWF  sold  12  of  the  works  to  collectors  and  galleries,  and  it  trans-
ferred custody of the remaining four works to the Andy Warhol Museum
in Pittsburgh.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal opinion, specifically citing a case and referencing artwork. It's likely part of the legal analysis and not the main body of the text meant for reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Snippet</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

COINBASE, INC.  v. BIELSKI

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–105.  Argued March 21, 2023—Decided June 23, 2023

Abraham Bielski filed a putative class action on behalf of Coinbase users
alleging that Coinbase, an online currency platform, failed to replace
funds fraudulently taken from the users’ accounts.  Because Coinbase’s
User Agreement provides for dispute resolution through binding arbi-
tration,  Coinbase  filed  a  motion  to  compel  arbitration.    The  District
Court denied the motion.  Coinbase then filed an interlocutory appeal
to  the  Ninth  Circuit  under  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act,  9  U. S. C.
§16(a), which authorizes an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a
motion to compel arbitration.  Coinbase also moved the District Court
to stay its proceedings pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal.
The District Court denied Coinbase’s stay motion, and the Ninth Cir-
cuit likewise declined to stay the District Court’s proceedings pending
appeal.

Held: A  district  court  must  stay  its  proceedings  while  an  interlocutory

appeal on the question of arbitrability is ongoing.  Pp. 2–10.

(a) Section  16(a)  does  not  say  whether  district  court  proceedings
must  be  stayed  pending  resolution  of  an  interlocutory  appeal.    But
Congress enacted the provision against a clear background principle
prescribed by this Court’s precedents:  An appeal, including an inter-
locutory appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those as-
pects of the case involved in the appeal.”  Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 58.  The Griggs principle resolves this case.
Because the question on appeal is whether the case belongs in arbitra-
tion or instead in the district court, the entire case is essentially “in-
volved in the appeal,” id., at 58, and Griggs dictates that the district
court stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrabil-
ity is ongoing.  Most courts of appeals to address this question, as well
as leading treatises, agree with that conclusion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the Court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

against  other  possible  defendants.  See,  e.g.,  Wayte,  470
U. S., at 604; Armstrong, 517 U. S., at 459, 463.

Second, as the Solicitor General points out, the standing
analysis  might  differ  when  Congress  elevates  de facto
injuries  to  the  status  of  legally  cognizable  injuries
redressable by a federal court.  See Brief for Petitioners 20,
n. 3; cf. TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at
10–11); Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 20
(1998); Raines, 521 U. S., at 820, n. 3; Lujan, 504 U. S., at
578;  Linda  R. S.,  410  U. S.,  at  617,  n. 3.    For  example,
Congress might (i) specifically authorize suits against the
Executive  Branch  by  a  defined  set  of  plaintiffs  who  have
suffered concrete harms from executive under-enforcement
and  (ii)  specifically  authorize  the  Judiciary  to  enter
appropriate  orders  requiring  additional  arrests  or
prosecutions by the Executive Branch.

Here, however, the relevant statutes do not supply such
specific authorization.  The statutes, even under the States’
own reading, simply say that the Department “shall” arrest
certain noncitizens.  Given the “deep-rooted nature of law-
enforcement  discretion,”  a  purported  statutory  arrest
mandate,  without  more,  does  not  entitle  any  particular
plaintiff  to  enforce  that  mandate  in  federal  court.    Castle
Rock, 545 U. S., at 761, 764–765, 767, n. 13; cf. Heckler, 470
U. S., at 835.  For an arrest mandate to be enforceable in
federal court, we would need at least a “stronger indication”
judicial  review  of  enforcement
from  Congress  that
discretion
specific
authorization for particular plaintiffs to sue and for federal
courts  to  order  more  arrests  or  prosecutions  by  the
Executive.  Castle Rock, 545 U. S., at 761.  We do not take
a  position  on  whether  such  a  statute  would  suffice  for
Article III purposes; our only point is that no such statute
is present in this case.4

appropriate—for

example,

is

——————

4 As the Solicitor General noted, those kinds of statutes, by infringing
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the standing of plaintiffs in a case. It delves into legal precedents and statutory interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 156 (1998)

163

Opinion of the Court

Texas who maintains an IOLTA account into which he
Id., at 82. Summers is a
regularly deposits client funds.
Texas citizen and businessman whose work requires him
to make regular use of the services of an attorney.
In Jan-
uary 1994, Summers learned that a retainer he had depos-
ited with his attorney was being held in an IOLTA account.
Id., at 85.
In February 1994, respondents ﬁled this suit
against petitioners—TEAJF, W. Frank Newton, in his ofﬁ-
cial capacity as chairman of TEAJF, and the nine Justices
of the Supreme Court of Texas. Respondents alleged, inter
alia, that the Texas IOLTA program violated their rights
under the Fifth Amendment, by taking their property with-
out just compensation.

The District Court granted summary judgment to peti-
tioners, reasoning that respondents had no property inter-
est in the interest proceeds generated by the funds held in
IOLTA accounts. Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas
Equal Access to Justice Foundation, 873 F. Supp. 1 (WD
Tex. 1995). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed, concluding that “any interest that accrues belongs
to the owner of the principal.” Washington Legal Foun-
dation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, 94 F.
3d 996, 1004 (1996). Because of a split over whether the
interest income generated by funds held in IOLTA ac-
counts is private property for purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause,3 we granted certiorari.
521 U. S.
1117 (1997).

II

The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.

3 Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F. 2d 1002 (CA11), cert. denied, 484 U. S.
917 (1987); In re Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts, 672 P. 2d 406 (Utah
1983); Petition of New Hampshire Bar Assn., 122 N. H., at 975–976, 453
A. 2d, at 1260–1261; In re Minnesota State Bar Assn., 332 N. W. 2d 151,
158 (Minn. 1982); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 395–396
(Fla. 1981).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

Opinion of the Court

from  a  State,  the  second  question  here—the  question  re-
garding  the  State’s  jurisdiction  to  prosecute  Castro-
Huerta—is also straightforward.  Under the Constitution,
States  have  jurisdiction  to  prosecute  crimes  within  their
territory  except  when  preempted  (in  a  manner  consistent
with  the  Constitution)  by  federal  law  or  by  principles  of
tribal  self-government.  As  we  have  explained,  no  federal
law preempts the State’s exercise of jurisdiction over crimes
committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian coun-
try.  And principles of tribal self-government likewise do not
preempt state jurisdiction here.

As a corollary to its argument that Indian country is in-
herently  separate  from  States,  the  dissent  contends  that
Congress  must  affirmatively  authorize  States  to  exercise
jurisdiction  in  Indian  country,  even  jurisdiction  to  prose-
cute crimes committed by non-Indians.  But under the Con-
stitution  and  this  Court’s  precedents,  the  default  is  that
States may exercise criminal jurisdiction within their terri-
tory.  See Amdt. 10.  States do not need a permission slip
from  Congress  to  exercise  their  sovereign  authority.    In
other words, the default is that States have criminal juris-
diction  in  Indian  country  unless  that  jurisdiction  is
preempted.  In the dissent’s view, by contrast, the default is
that States do not have criminal jurisdiction in Indian coun-
try unless Congress specifically provides it.  The dissent’s
view is inconsistent with the Constitution’s structure, the
States’ inherent sovereignty, and the Court’s precedents.

Straying  further  afield,  the  dissent  seizes  on  treaties
from  the  1800s.    Post,  at  18−20,  and  n. 4  (opinion  of
GORSUCH, J.).8  But those treaties do not preclude state ju-
risdiction  here.  The  dissent  relies  heavily  on  the  1835
Treaty  of  New  Echota,  which  stated  that  Indian  country
——————

8 Congress  “abolished  treatymaking  with  the  Indian  nations  in  1871
and has itself subjected the tribes to substantial bodies of state and fed-
eral law.”  County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Ya-
kima Nation, 502 U. S. 251, 257 (1992) (citation omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court case Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. It discusses the state's jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–968
_________________

CHIKE UZUEGBUNAM, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
STANLEY C. PRECZEWSKI, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[March 8, 2021]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
At all stages of litigation, a plaintiff must maintain a per-
sonal interest in the dispute.  The doctrine of standing gen-
erally  assesses  whether  that  interest  exists  at  the  outset,
while the doctrine of mootness considers whether it exists
throughout the proceedings.  To demonstrate standing, the
plaintiff  must  not  only  establish  an  injury  that  is  fairly
traceable  to  the  challenged  conduct  but  must  also  seek  a
remedy that redresses that injury.  And if in the course of
litigation a court finds that it can no longer provide a plain-
tiff  with  any  effectual  relief,  the  case  generally  is  moot.
This  case  asks  whether  an  award  of  nominal  damages  by
itself can redress a past injury.  We hold that it can.

I

According  to  the  complaint,  Chike  Uzuegbunam  is  an
evangelical Christian who believes that an important part
of  exercising  his  religion  includes  sharing  his  faith.    In
2016,  Uzuegbunam  decided  to  share  his  faith  at  Georgia
Gwinnett College, a public college where he was enrolled as
a student.  At an outdoor plaza on campus near the library
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case citations, the names of the parties involved, and the introductory portion of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26  MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

[Congress] would not have enacted those provisions which
are within its power, independently of [those] which [are]
not.”  Alaska  Airlines,  Inc.  v.  Brock, 480  U. S.  678,  684
(1987)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  In  conducting
that inquiry, we ask whether the law remains “fully opera
tive” without the invalid provisions, Free Enterprise Fund
v.  Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Bd.,  561  U. S.
477,  509  (2010)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  but
“we cannot rewrite a statute and give it an effect altogether
different  from  that  sought  by  the  measure  viewed  as  a
whole,” Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S.
330, 362 (1935).  We will consider each of the provisions at
issue separately.

1

Under  28  U. S. C.  §3702(1),  States  are  prohibited  from

“operat[ing],”  “sponsor[ing],”  or  “promot[ing]”  sports  gam
bling schemes.  If the provisions prohibiting state authori
zation  and  licensing  are  stricken  but  the  prohibition  on
state  “operat[ion]”  is  left  standing,  the  result  would  be  a
scheme sharply different from what Congress contemplated
when  PASPA  was  enacted.    At  that  time,  Congress
knew that New Jersey was considering the legalization of
sports  gambling  in  the  privately  owned  Atlantic  City
casinos  and  that  other  States  were  thinking  about  the
institution of state-run sports lotteries.  PASPA addressed
both of these potential developments.  It gave New Jersey
one  year  to  legalize  sports  gambling  in  Atlantic  City  but
otherwise banned the authorization of sports gambling in
casinos, and it likewise prohibited the spread of state-run
lotteries.  If Congress had known that States would be free
to  authorize  sports  gambling  in  privately  owned  casinos,
would it have nevertheless wanted to prevent States from
running sports lotteries?

That  seems  most  unlikely.  State-run  lotteries,  which
sold tickets costing only a few dollars, were thought more
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the constitutionality of a law (PASPA) regarding sports gambling. It delves into legal precedents and Congress's intent, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

15

Opinion of the Court

accord, id., at 783–784 (Brennan, J., concurring).  Or said
otherwise,  we  gave  the  defendant  a  chance  to  establish
that  she  was  qualified  for  citizenship,  and  held  that  she
could not be denaturalized if she did so—even though she
concealed  or  misrepresented  facts  that  suggested  the
opposite.  And  indeed,  all  our  denaturalization  decisions
share this crucial feature: We have never read a statute to
strip  citizenship  from  someone  who  met  the  legal  criteria
for acquiring it.  See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449
U. S.  490,  505–507  (1981);  Costello  v.  United  States,  365
U. S. 265, 269–272 (1961); Schneiderman v. United States,
320  U. S.  118,  122–123  (1943).    We  will  not  start  now.
Whatever  the  Government  shows  with  respect  to  a
thwarted  investigation,  qualification  for  citizenship  is  a
complete defense to a prosecution brought under §1425(a).

III
Measured against all we have said, the jury instructions
in  this  case  were  in  error.    As  earlier  noted,  the  District
Court told the jury that it could convict based on any false
statement in the naturalization process (i.e., any violation
of  §1015(a)),  no  matter  how  inconsequential  to  the  ulti-
mate decision.  See App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a; supra, at 3.
But as we have shown, the jury needed to find more than
an  unlawful  false  statement.  Recall  that  Maslenjak’s  lie
in  the  naturalization  process  concerned  her  prior  state-
ments  to  immigration  officials:  She  swore  that  she  had
been honest when applying for admission as a refugee, but
in  fact  she  had  not.  See  supra,  at  2–3.  The  jury  could
have convicted if that earlier dishonesty (i.e., the thing she
misrepresented  when  seeking  citizenship)  were  itself  a
reason to deny naturalization—say, because it counted as
“false testimony for the purpose of obtaining [immigration]
benefits” and thus demonstrated bad moral character.  See
supra, at 11–12.  Or else, the jury could have convicted if
(1)  knowledge  of  that  prior  dishonesty  would  have  led  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal criteria for citizenship and the elements of a crime under §1425(a).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Syllabus

547 U. S. 332, 342.  They allege two forms of injury: one indirect, one
direct.

(1) The  state  plaintiffs  allege  indirect  injury  in  the  form  of  in-
creased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs.  They
say the minimum essential coverage provision has caused more state
residents  to  enroll  in  the  programs.    The  States,  like  the  individual
plaintiffs,  have  failed  to  show  how  that  alleged  harm  is  traceable  to
the Government’s actual or possible action in enforcing §5000A(a), so
they lack Article III standing as a matter of law.  But the States have
also not shown that the challenged minimum essential coverage provi-
sion, without any prospect of penalty, will injure them by leading more
individuals to enroll in these programs.  Where a standing theory rests
on speculation about the decision of an independent third party (here
an  individual’s  decision  to  enroll  in  a  program  like  Medicaid),  the
plaintiff must show at the least “that third parties will likely react in
predictable  ways.”  Department  of  Commerce  v. New York,  588  U. S.
___,  ___.    Neither  logic  nor  evidence  suggests  that  an  unenforceable
mandate will cause state residents to enroll in valuable benefits pro-
grams that they would otherwise forgo.  It would require far stronger
evidence than the States have offered here to support their counterin-
tuitive theory of standing, which rests on a “highly attenuated chain
of possibilities.”  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 410–411.
Pp. 11–14.

(2) The  state  plaintiffs  also  claim  a  direct  injury  resulting  from  a
variety of increased administrative and related expenses allegedly re-
quired  by  §5000A(a)’s  minimum  essential  coverage  provision.    But
other provisions of the Act, not the minimum essential coverage provi-
sion, impose these requirements.  These provisions are enforced with-
out reference to §5000A(a).  See 26 U. S. C. §§6055, 6056.  A conclusion
that the minimum essential coverage requirement is unconstitutional
would not show that enforcement of these other provisions violates the
Constitution.  The other asserted pocketbook injuries related to the Act
are  similarly  the  result  of  enforcement  of  provisions  of  the  Act  that
operate independently of §5000A(a).  No one claims these other provi-
sions violate the Constitution.  The Government’s conduct in question
is therefore not “fairly traceable” to enforcement of the “allegedly un-
lawful” provision of which the plaintiffs complain—§5000A(a).  Allen,
468 U. S., at 751.  Pp. 14–16.

945 F. 3d. 355, reversed and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion.  ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opin-
ion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section. It outlines the legal arguments and the court's decision in a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U84

[09-06-00 20:39:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

216

AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.
v. CENTRAL OFFICE TELEPHONE, INC.
Opinion of the Court

David W. Carpenter argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Carter G. Phillips, Thomas W.
Merrill, Peter D. Keisler, and Marc E. Manly.

Bruce M. Hall argued the cause and ﬁled a brief for

respondent.*

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Central Ofﬁce Telephone, Inc. (COT), a re-
seller of long-distance communications services, sued peti-
tioner AT&T, a provider of long-distance communications
services, under state law for breach of contract and tortious
interference with contract. Petitioner is regulated as a
common carrier under the Communications Act of 1934, 48
Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. The issue
before us is whether the federal ﬁled-tariff requirements
of the Communications Act pre-empt respondent’s state-law
claims.

I

Respondent purchases “bulk” long-distance services—
volume-discounted services designed for large customers—
from long-distance providers, and resells them to smaller
customers. Like many other resellers in the telecommuni-
cations industry, respondent does not own or operate facili-
ties of its own; it is known as a “switchless reseller,” which
is the industry nomenclature for arbitrageur. Of course re-
spondent passes along only a portion of the bulk-purchase
discount to its aggregated customers, and retains the re-
maining discount as proﬁt.

Petitioner provides long-distance services and, as a com-
mon carrier under the Communications Act, § 153(h), must

*Gary M. Epstein, Maureen E. Mahoney, Teresa D. Baer, Walter H.
Alford, William B. Barﬁeld, M. Robert Sutherland, and Michael J.
Zpevak ﬁled a brief for the United States Telephone Association et al. as
amici curiae urging reversal.

Henry D. Levine, Ellen G. Block, and James S. Blaszak ﬁled a brief for
the Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee et al. as amici curiae.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes case names, parties involved, and the introduction to the Court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
4

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L.L.C. v. RUSSO

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

clinics have failed to maintain supplies of emergency medi-
cations and medical equipment for treating surgical compli-
cations.  One clinic used single-use hoses and tubes on mul-
tiple  patients,  and  the  solution  needed  to  sterilize
instruments was changed so infrequently that it often had
pieces  of  tissue  floating  in  it.    Hospital  credentialing  pro-
cesses, witnesses suggested, could help prevent such viola-
tions.  In the course of the credentialing process, physicians’
prior safety lapses, including criminal violations and medi-
cal malpractice suits, would be revealed and investigated,
and incompetent doctors might be weeded out.

The  legislature  heard,  too,  from  affected  women  and
emergency  room  physicians  about  clinic  doctors’  record  of
abandoning their patients.  One woman testified that, while
she  was  hemorrhaging,  her  abortion  provider  told  her,
“ ‘You’re  on  your  own.    Get  out.’ ”    Eventually,  the  woman
went to a hospital where an emergency room physician re-
moved fetal body parts that the abortion provider had left
in her body.  Another patient who complained of severe pain
following her abortion was told simply to go home and lie
down.  When she decided for herself to go to the emergency
room, physicians discovered a tear in her uterus and a large
hematoma containing a fetal head.  The woman required an
emergency  hysterectomy.    In  another  case,  a  clinic  physi-
cian allowed a patient to bleed for three hours, yet a clinic
employee testified that the physician would not let her call
911 because of possible media involvement.  In the end, the
employee  called  anyway  and  emergency  room  personnel
discovered that the woman had a perforated uterus and a
needed  a  hysterectomy.    A  different  physician  explained
that  she  routinely  treats  abortion  complications  in  the
emergency  room  when  the  physician  who  performed  the
abortion lacks admitting privileges.  In her experience, that
situation “puts a woman’s health at an unnecessary, unac-
ceptable risk that results from a delay of care . . . and a lack
of continuity of care.”  Admitting privileges would mitigate
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses concerns about the safety practices of certain clinics and the potential benefits of hospital credentialing processes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

13

Opinion of the Court

fault the political agenda of a state-favored union.

In  later  cases  such  as  Abood  and  Hudson,  we  assumed
without  any  focused  analysis  that  the  dicta  from  Street
had authorized the opt-out requirement as a constitutional
matter.  Thus  in  Hudson  we  did  not  take  issue  with  the
union’s practice of giving employees annual notice and an
opportunity  to  object  to  expected  political  expenditures.
At  the  same  time,  however,  we  made  it  clear  that  the
procedures  used  by  a  union  to  collect  money  from  non-
members must satisfy a high standard.

Contrary  to  the  view  of  the  Ninth  Circuit  panel  major-
ity,  we  did  not  call  for  a  balancing  of  the  “right”  of  the
union  to  collect  an  agency  fee  against  the  First  Amend-
ment  rights  of  nonmembers.    628  F. 3d,  at  1119–1120.
As we noted in Davenport, “unions have no constitutional
entitlement  to  the  fees  of  nonmember-employees.”    551
U. S.,  at  185.    A  union’s  “collection  of  fees  from  nonmem-
bers is authorized by an act of legislative grace,” 628 F. 3d,
at  1126  (Wallace,  J.,  dissenting)—one  that  we  have
termed “unusual” and “extraordinary,”  Davenport, supra,
at  184,  187.  Far  from  calling  for  a  balancing  of  rights  or
interests,  Hudson  made  it  clear  that  any  procedure  for
exacting  fees  from  unwilling  contributors  must  be  “care-
fully tailored to minimize the infringement” of free speech
rights.  475 U. S., at 303.  And to underscore the meaning
of this careful tailoring, we followed that statement with a
citation  to  cases  holding  that  measures  burdening  the
freedom of speech or association must serve a “compelling
interest”  and  must  not  be  significantly  broader  than  nec-
essary to serve that interest.3

——————

3 The specific citation was as follows:
“See  Roberts  v.  United  States  Jaycees,  [468  U. S.  609,  623  (1984)]
(Infringements  on  freedom  of  association  ‘may  be  justified  by  regu-
lations  adopted  to  serve  compelling  state  interests,  unrelated  to  the
suppression  of  ideas,  that  cannot  be  achieved  through  means  signifi-
cantly  less  restrictive  of  associational  freedoms’);  Elrod  v.  Burns,  427
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the constitutionality of agency fees collected from non-member employees by labor unions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of ALITO, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 18–587, 18–588, and 18–589
_________________

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.

18–587

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
18–588
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF COLORED PEOPLE, ET AL.; AND

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

CHAD WOLF, ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MARTIN JONATHAN BATALLA VIDAL, ET AL.

18–589

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

 [June 18, 2020]

 JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment in part and

dissenting in part.

Anyone interested in the role that the Federal Judiciary
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, case names, and the name of the Justice writing the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment

Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 315 (1988).  Or oth-
erwise said, granting intervention would enable the party
to  circumvent  those  limits,  by  awarding  him  the  “equiva-
lent” of more “time for filing a notice of appeal.”  Ibid.; see
Hutchinson  v.  Pfeil,  211  F. 3d  515,  519  (CA10  2000)
(“[I]ntervention is not a means to escape the consequences
of  noncompliance”  with  the  jurisdictional  timely-appeal
rule).  That is the essence of EMW’s objection.  EMW con-
tends that the attorney general, though a non-party, could
have  appealed  the  District  Court’s  judgment  because  it
bound his office.  But the attorney general chose at the time
not to appeal.  He should not now be allowed, EMW says, to
sidestep the jurisdictional deadline he missed by means of
intervening.  See Brief for Respondents 10, 15–16, 19–21.
  But  the  anti-circumvention  rationale  for  denying  inter-
vention does not sensibly apply here because of the change
in circumstances between the time to appeal and the time
of the motion to intervene.  Recall that the attorney general,
by agreeing early on to the dismissal of the claims against
him, effectively handed off defense of the challenged law to
the  health  secretary.    See  ante,  at  2.    After  the  District
Court ruled, the secretary continued to perform that func-
tion, appealing the court’s decision to strike down the law.
Assume  here,  as  EMW  argues,  that  the  attorney  general
also could have appealed.*  Even if so, the attorney general
had no reason to take that step: The secretary was handling
the appeal, just as he had handled the trial court proceed-
ings.  It was only once the Sixth Circuit ruled and the sec-
retary  ceased  defending  the  law—choosing  not  to  seek  en

——————

* That assumption is perfectly reasonable.  The agreement of dismissal
made the District Court’s judgment binding on the attorney general’s of-
fice (subject to any later revision or reversal).  See App. 29–30.  And a
non-party bound by a judgment often has the same appeal rights as a
party.    See  Devlin  v.  Scardelletti,  536  U. S.  1,  7–8  (2002)  (discussing
cases); C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, 15A Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure §3902.1, pp. 186–189, n. 35 (2d ed. Supp. 2021) (same).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kagan. It cites legal precedents and discusses the arguments surrounding a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

KAGAN, J., dissenting

democracy.”  Nixon  v.  Shrink  Missouri  Government  PAC,
528  U. S.  377,  388–389  (2000)  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  And  the  appearance  of  that  corruption  (though
scarcely mentioned in the majority opinion) is “[o]f almost
equal  concern.”  Id.,  at  388.    Avoiding  that  appearance  is
“critical” if public “confidence in the system of representa-
tive Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.”
Id., at 389.

Serious dangers of actual and apparent quid pro quo cor-
ruption  attend  the  transactions  Section  304  regulates—
again, the use of post-election contributions to repay a can-
didate’s  personal  loans.    Consider  a  simple  comparison.
When a campaign uses a donation to fund routine electoral
activities (including speech), the money marginally aids the
candidate’s  electoral  odds,  but  in  no  way  adds  to  his  per-
sonal wealth.  By contrast, when a campaign uses a dona-
tion to repay the candidate’s loan, every dollar given goes
straight into the candidate’s pocket.  With each such contri-
bution, his assets increase; he can now buy a car or make
tuition payments or join a country club—all with his donors’
dollars.  So contributions going to loan repayment have ex-
ceptional  value  to  the  candidate—which  his  donors  of
course realize.  And when the contributions occur after the
election,  their  corrupting  potential  further  increases.    At
that  time,  a  campaign  can  use  donations  only  to  repay
loans,  of  which  some  97%  come  from  candidates.  See  11
CFR 110.1(b)(3)(i) (2017); A. Ovtchinnikov & P. Valta, Self-
Funding of Political Campaigns, Management Science, Ar-
ticles in Advance 5 (Apr. 7, 2022) (Ovtchinnikov, Self-Fund-
ing).  So post-election donors can be confident their money
will enrich a candidate personally.  And those donors have
of  course  learned  which  candidate  won.  When  they  give
money  to  repay  the  victor’s  loan,  they  know—not  merely
hope—he will be in a position to perform official favors.  The
recipe for quid pro quo corruption is thus in place: a dona-
tion to enhance the candidate’s own wealth (the quid), made
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into the potential for corruption related to post-election campaign contributions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

25

KAGAN, J., dissenting

The point is a simple one: If generation shifting can go big,
so  too  can  technological  controls  (assuming,  once  again,
that the statute’s text is ignored).  The problem (if any ex-
ists) is not with the channel, but with the volume.7

The majority’s claim about the Clean Power Plan’s nov-
elty—the most fleshed-out part of today’s opinion, see ante,
at 20–24—is also exaggerated.  As EPA explained when it
issued the Clean Power Plan, an earlier Section 111(d) reg-
ulation had determined that a cap-and-trade program was
the  “best  system  of  emission  reduction”  for  mercury.  70
Fed. Reg. 28616–28621 (2005); see 80 Fed. Reg. 64772.  In
the majority’s view, that rule was different because the “ac-
tual  emission  cap”  for  the  contemplated  cap-and-trade
scheme  was  based  on  the  use  of  a  plant-specific  technol-
ogy—namely,  wet  scrubbers.    Ante,  at  21  (internal  quota-
tion marks omitted).  But the approval of cap and trade al-
lowed  EPA  to  make  the  emissions  limits  more  stringent
than  it  otherwise  could  have,  because  EPA  knew  that
plants unable to cost-effectively install scrubbers could in-
stead meet the limits through generation shifting.  See 70
Fed. Reg. 28619.  EPA could have designed the Clean Power
Plan  in  the  same  way—say,  by  setting  emissions  limits
based  on  carbon-capture  technology,  with  the  expectation
that  many  plants  would  avail  themselves  of  an  approved
cap-and-trade program instead.  The majority gives no rea-
son to think Section 111(d) allows that approach but disal-
lows the Clean Power Plan.  In both, generation shifting is
——————

7 The majority dismisses these hypotheticals as fantastical, protesting
that  “EPA  has  never  ordered  anything  remotely  like  [them],  and  we
doubt it could.”  Ante, at 24, n. 3.  But that’s just the point.  EPA hasn’t
forced  the  elimination  of  coal  plants—whether  through  technological
controls  or  generation  shifting—because  the  statutory  constraints  pre-
vent it from doing so.  The majority offers no reason to think that those
constraints suffice for the measures it approves (fuel switching and car-
bon capture) but not for the measure it rejects (generation shifting).  Ei-
ther  the  constraints  are  enough  or  they  are  not.    The  majority  cannot
have it both ways.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Clean Power Plan and the interpretation of Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

THOMAS, J., dissenting

nent domain power was “complete in itself ” and, by its na-
ture, “inextricably intertwined” with judicial condemnation
proceedings,  States  surrendered  any  sovereign  immunity
that would otherwise render the eminent domain power in-
complete.  PennEast, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17).  By
saddling “completeness” with more analytical weight than
it  can  bear,  the  Court  has  devised  a  method  that  has  the
certainty  and  objectivity  of  a  Rorschach  test.    Beyond  its
inconsistency with PennEast, this contrivance also threat-
ens to rework or erase the Court’s prevailing sovereign im-
munity jurisprudence.

A
The  sentence  in  PennEast  upon  which  the  Court  fabri-
cates its test for plan-of-the-Convention waiver reads as fol-
lows: “[T]he federal eminent domain power is ‘complete in
itself,’  and  the  States  consented  to  the  exercise  of  that
power—in its entirety—in the plan of the Convention.”  594
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22) (quoting Kohl v. United States,
91 U. S. 367, 374 (1876); citation omitted).  The Court today
claims that this sentence in PennEast reduced our decades-
old State sovereign immunity jurisprudence to merely ask-
ing  whether  a  federal  power  is  “complete  in  itself.”    That
cannot be correct.

The Court in PennEast borrowed the “complete in itself ”
idea  from  Kohl,  which  had  approved  the  Federal  Govern-
ment’s condemnation of private land to build a post office in
Cincinnati, Ohio.  91 U. S., at 373–374.  Although the Fed-
eral  Government  had  relied  on  Ohio’s  eminent  domain
power, rather than its own, Kohl made clear that the Fed-
eral  Government’s  authority  to  condemn  land  did  not  de-
pend upon state law.  In doing so, Kohl stated that “[i]f the
United States have the [eminent domain] power, it must be
complete in itself.”  Id., at 374.  “It can neither be enlarged
nor diminished by a State.  Nor can any State prescribe the
manner  in  which  it  must  be  exercised.    The  consent  of  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases, indicating it is part of the main body of the legal document and not a preliminary or supplementary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

Syllabus

first step might be tentative does not by itself negate federal-court ju-
risdiction.    And  reducing  domestic  automobile  emissions  is  hardly
tentative.  Leaving aside the other greenhouse gases, the record indi-
cates that the U. S. transportation sector emits an enormous quantity
of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.  Pp. 20–21.

(d) While  regulating  motor-vehicle  emissions  may  not  by  itself
reverse global warming, it does not follow that the Court lacks juris-
diction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or re-
duce it.  See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 243, n. 15.  Because of
the enormous potential consequences, the fact that a remedy’s effec-
tiveness  might  be  delayed  during  the  (relatively  short)  time  it  takes
for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an older one is essentially ir-
relevant.  Nor is it dispositive that developing countries are poised to
substantially  increase  greenhouse  gas  emissions:  A  reduction  in  do-
mestic  emissions  would  slow  the  pace  of  global  emissions  increases,
no matter what happens elsewhere.  The Court attaches considerable
significance to EPA’s espoused belief that global climate change must
be addressed.  Pp. 21–23.

2. The scope of the Court’s review of the merits of the statutory is-
sues is narrow.  Although an agency’s refusal to initiate enforcement
proceedings  is  not  ordinarily  subject  to  judicial  review,  Heckler  v.
Chaney,  470  U. S.  821,  there  are  key  differences  between  nonen-
forcement and denials of rulemaking petitions that are, as in the pre-
sent  circumstances,  expressly  authorized.    EPA  concluded  alterna-
tively in its petition denial that it lacked authority under §7521(a)(1)
to  regulate  new  vehicle  emissions  because  carbon  dioxide  is  not  an
“air pollutant” under §7602, and that, even if it possessed authority,
it would decline to exercise it because regulation would conflict with
other  administration  priorities.    Because  the  Act  expressly  permits
review of such an action, §7607(b)(1), this Court “may reverse [it if it
finds  it  to  be]  arbitrary,  capricious,  an  abuse  of  discretion,  or  other-
wise not in accordance with law,” §7607(d)(9).  Pp. 24–25.

3. Because  greenhouse  gases  fit  well  within  the  Act’s  capacious
definition of “air pollutant,” EPA has statutory authority to regulate
emission  of  such  gases  from  new  motor  vehicles.    That  definition—
which  includes  “any  air  pollution  agent  . . .  ,  including any  physical,
chemical,  . . .  substance  . . .  emitted  into  . . .  the  ambient  air  . . . ,”
§7602(g)  (emphasis  added)—embraces  all  airborne  compounds  of
whatever  stripe.    Moreover,  carbon  dioxide  and  other  greenhouse
gases  are  undoubtedly  “physical  [and]  chemical  . . .  substance[s].”
Ibid.  EPA’s reliance on postenactment congressional actions and de-
liberations  it  views  as  tantamount  to  a  command  to  refrain  from
regulating  greenhouse  gas  emissions  is  unavailing.  Even  if  pos-
tenactment legislative history could shed light on the meaning of an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the court's reasoning and holdings, and this excerpt discusses the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

JONES v. HENDRIX

JACKSON, J., dissenting

by a mudslide.  The majority’s parsimonious perspective on
the  meaning  of  “inadequate  or  ineffective”  is  flawed  in
many respects.

First and foremost, it is entirely atextual.  The majority
cites exactly zero dictionary definitions of the terms “inad-
equate” or “ineffective.”  And while it does reference an ear-
lier  draft  of  the  legislation  that  became  §2255,  ante,  at  7
(quoting Hayman, 342 U. S., at 215, n. 23), it fails to men-
tion  that  Congress  specifically  rejected  language  that  em-
braced the majority’s “impracticable only” proposition.  See
Hayman, 342 U. S., at 215, n. 23; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.
3d 245, 250 (CA3 1997).

Furthermore,  while  the  majority  opinion  accurately  re-
cites the history and purpose of §2255, see ante, at 5–6, it
ignores  the  import  of  that  history.  As  explained  above,
when Congress enacted §2255 in 1948, it intended to ensure
equivalence between traditional habeas and the new §2255
mechanism for postconviction review.  Supra, at 5.  Accord-
ingly,  Congress  inserted  the  saving  clause  to  ensure  that
certain  pre-existing  postconviction  claims  (say,  a  claim  of
statutory innocence) could still be heard even if the statu-
tory language Congress was adopting inadvertently barred
them.  Supra, at 3–7.  And Congress preserved the language
of  §2255(e)—the  language  that  performs  the  equalizing
function—in  1996,  even  as  it  made  other  significant
changes to §2255.  Supra, at 7–8.

Ignoring  all  this,  the  majority  grounds  its  analysis  of
§2255(e) in a scattershot of lower court cases that the ma-
jority  claims  “[t]raditionally”  viewed  the  saving  clause  as
solving only for practical filing problems.  Ante, at 6–7.  To
be sure, a handful of lower courts applied the saving clause
where the sentencing court was dissolved.  Ibid.  But lower
courts have also “[t]raditionally,” ante, at 6, treated the sav-
ing  clause  as  permitting  individuals  with  previously  una-
vailable statutory innocence claims to file habeas petitions
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a judge named Jackson. It delves into the interpretation of a legal statute (likely §2255) and its saving clause.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. v. CHRISTIAN

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

that even the Court today does not invoke as limits on re-
covery  here.  §9659(h).   Three  times  Congress  made  its
point as plainly as anyone might.

So  how  does  Atlantic  Richfield  seek  to  transform
CERCLA from a tool to aid cleanups into a ban on them?
The company has to point to something in the statutory text
that trumps these many provisions and preempts the land-
owners’ right to use state law to restore their lands.  After
all, merely “[i]nvoking some brooding federal interest or ap-
pealing  to  a  judicial  policy  preference  should  never  be
enough to win preemption of a state law”; instead, a party
like  Atlantic  Richfield  seeking  to  displace  state  law  must
identify “ ‘a constitutional text or a federal statute’ that does
the  displacing.”  Virginia  Uranium,  Inc.  v.  Warren,  587
U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 3)
(quoting Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Pe-
troleum Corp., 485 U. S. 495, 503 (1988)).

In  answer,  Atlantic  Richfield  directs  our  attention  to
§122(e)(6).  It’s  a  provision  buried  in  a  section  captioned
“Settlements.”  The section outlines the process private par-
ties  must  follow  to  negotiate  a  settlement  and  release  of
CERCLA liability with the federal government.  Subsection
(e)(6)  bears  the  title  “Inconsistent  response  action”  and
states  that,  “[w]hen  either  the  President,  or  a  potentially
responsible  party  pursuant  to  an  administrative  order  or
consent decree under this chapter, has initiated a remedial
investigation and feasibility study for a particular facility
under  this  chapter,  no  potentially  responsible  party  may
undertake  any  remedial  action  at  the  facility  unless  such
remedial action has been authorized by the President.”  42
U. S. C. §9622(e)(6).  So even read for all its worth, this pro-
vision only bars those “potentially responsible” to the fed-
eral  government  from  initiating  cleanup  efforts  without
prior approval.  To get where it needs to go, Atlantic Rich-
field must find some way to label the innocent landowners
here  “potentially  responsible  part[ies]”  on  the  hook  for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a section of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). It delves into legal arguments regarding preemption of state law and the rights of landowners.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Syllabus

equate “exceed[ing] authorized access” with the act of entering a part
of the system to which a computer user lacks access privileges.  Pp. 11–
12.

(b) The  statute’s  structure  further  cuts  against  the  Government’s
position.  Subsection (a)(2) specifies two distinct ways of obtaining in-
formation unlawfully—first, when an individual “accesses a computer
without  authorization,”  §1030(a)(2),  and  second,  when  an  individual
“exceeds authorized access” by accessing a computer “with authoriza-
tion” and then obtaining information he is “not entitled so to obtain,”
§§1030(a)(2), (e)(6).  Van Buren contends that the “without authoriza-
tion”  clause  protects  computers  themselves  from  outside  hackers,
while the “exceeds authorized access” clause provides complementary
protection  for  certain  information  within  computers  by  targeting  so-
called inside hackers.  Under Van Buren’s reading, liability under both
clauses stems from a gates-up-or-down inquiry—one either can or can-
not access a computer system, and one either can or cannot access cer-
tain areas within the system.  This treats the clauses consistently and
aligns with the computer-context understanding of access as entry.  By
contrast, the Government proposes to read the first phrase “without
authorization”  as  a  gates-up-or-down  inquiry  and  the  second  phrase
“exceeds  authorized  access”  as  dependent  on  the  circumstances—a
reading inconsistent with subsection (a)(2)’s design and structure.  The
Government’s reading leaves unanswered why the statute would pro-
hibit accessing computer information, but not the computer itself, for
an improper purpose.

Another  structural  problem  for  the  Government:  §1030(a)(2)  also
gives rise to civil liability, §1030(g), with the statute defining “damage”
and  “loss”  to  specify  what  a  plaintiff  in  a  civil  suit  can  recover.
§§1030(e)(8),  (11).    Both  terms  focus  on  technological  harms  to  com-
puter data or systems.  Such provisions make sense in a scheme aimed
at avoiding the ordinary consequences of hacking but are ill fitted to
remediating “misuse” of sensitive information that employees permis-
sibly access using their computers.  Pp. 12–16.

(c) The  Government’s  claims  that  precedent  and  statutory  history
support its interpretation are easily dispatched.  This Court’s decision
in Musacchio v. United States, 577 U. S. 237, did not address the issue
here, and the Court is not bound to follow any dicta in the case.  As for
statutory history, the Government claims that the original 1984 Act’s
precursor to the “exceeds authorized access” language—which covered
any person who, “having accessed a computer with authorization, uses
the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such au-
thorization does not extend”—supports its reading.  But that Congress
removed any reference to “purpose” in the CFAA cuts against reading
the statute to cover purpose-based limitations.  Pp. 16–17.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal brief or court document, specifically a section outlining the reasoning behind an argument. It discusses the interpretation of a specific statute (CFAA) and uses legal terminology and structure.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 15–1358.  Argued January 18, 2017—Decided June 19, 2017*

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the
Federal  Government  ordered  hundreds  of  illegal  aliens  to  be  taken
into custody and held pending a determination whether a particular
detainee had connections to terrorism.  Respondents, six men of Arab
or  South  Asian  descent,  were  detained  for  periods  of  three  to  six
months  in  a  federal  facility  in  Brooklyn.    After  their  release,  they
were removed from the United States.  They then filed this putative
class  action  against  petitioners,  two  groups  of  federal  officials.    The
first  group  consisted  of  former  Attorney  General  John  Ashcroft,  for-
mer  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  Director  Robert  Mueller,  and
former Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner James
Ziglar (Executive Officials).  The second group consisted of the facili-
ty’s warden and assistant warden Dennis Hasty and James Sherman
(Wardens).    Respondents  sought  damages  for  constitutional  viola-
tions  under  the  implied  cause  of  action  theory  adopted  in  Bivens  v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, alleging that peti-
tioners detained them in harsh pretrial conditions for a punitive pur-
pose, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; that petitioners did so be-
cause of their actual or apparent race, religion, or national origin, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment; that the Wardens subjected them
to  punitive  strip  searches,  in  violation  of  the  Fourth  and  Fifth
Amendments; and that the Wardens knowingly allowed the guards to
abuse them, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  Respondents also
brought  a  claim  under  42  U. S. C.  §1985(3),  which  forbids  certain

——————

*Together  with  No.  15–1359,  Ashcroft,  Former  Attorney  General,
et al. v. Abbasi et al., and No. 15–1363, Hasty et al. v. Abbasi et al., also
on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

178

PHILLIPS v. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

Souter, J., dissenting

of funds from the pocket of a failing business owner with
IOLTA’s disposition of funds the client never had or could
have received. Neither the equation, nor its relevance to
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of just compensation, is
immune to question.

But, however these issues of taking and compensation
may someday be adjudicated, two things are clear now: the
issues are serious and they might be resolved against re-
If that should happen, today’s holding would
spondents.
stand as an abstract proposition without signiﬁcance for the
application of the Fifth Amendment.

If abstraction were guaranteed to be harmless, of course,
an abstract ruling now and again would not matter much,
beyond the time spent reaching it. But our law has been
wary of abstract legal propositions not only because the
common-law tradition is a practical one, but because abstrac-
tions pose their own peculiar risks. As The Chief Justice
noted in a different but related context, there is a danger in
“cutting loose the notion of ‘just compensation’ from the
notion of ‘private property.’ ” Almota Farmers Elevator &
Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U. S. 470, 486 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id., at 482–483 (“While
the inquiry as to what property interest is taken by the con-
demnor and the inquiry as to how that property interest
shall be valued are not identical ones, they cannot be di-
vorced without seriously undermining a number of rules
dealing with the law of eminent domain”).

One may wonder here not only whether the theoretical
property analysis may skew the resolution of the taking and
compensation issues that will follow, but also how far today’s
holding may unsettle accepted governmental practice else-
where. By recognizing an abstract property right to inter-
est “actually ‘earned’ ” by a party’s principal, ante, at 168,
does the Court not raise the possibility of takings challenges
whenever the government holds and makes use of the prin-
cipal of private parties, as it frequently does? When, for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter in the case of Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation.  It delves into legal arguments regarding property rights and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of just compensation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

21

Opinion of the Court

IV

The  dissent  emphasizes  the  history  of  mistreatment  of
American  Indians.  But  that  history  does  not  resolve  the
legal questions presented in this case.  Those questions are:
(i) whether  Indian  country  is  part  of  a  State or  instead  is
separate  and  independent  from  a  State;  and  (ii) if  Indian
country is part of a State, whether the State has concurrent
jurisdiction  with  the  Federal  Government  to  prosecute
crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian
country.

The answers to those questions are straightforward.  On
the  first  question,  as  explained  above,  this  Court  has  re-
peatedly  ruled  that  Indian  country  is  part  of  a  State,  not
separate from a State.  By contrast, the dissent lifts up the
1832 decision in Worcester v. Georgia as a proper exposition
of  Indian  law.  But  this  Court  long  ago  made  clear  that
Worcester rested on a mistaken understanding of the rela-
tionship between Indian country and the States.  The Court
has stated that the “general notion drawn from Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s opinion in Worcester v. Georgia” “has yielded
to  closer  analysis”:  “By  1880  the  Court  no  longer  viewed
reservations  as  distinct  nations.  On  the  contrary,  it  was
said that a reservation was in many cases a part of the sur-
rounding State or Territory, and subject to its jurisdiction
except as forbidden by federal law.”  Organized Village of
Kake, 369 U. S., at 72.

Because  Indian  country  is  part  of  a  State,  not  separate

——————
the Civil War, 9 Am. Indian Q. 4, 385, 388 (1985); 1 F. Cohen, Handbook
of  Federal  Indian  Law  §4.07(1)(a),  p.  289  (2012);  see  McGirt  v.  Okla-
homa, 591 U. S. ___, ___−___ (2020) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (slip op.,
at 3−4); Cherokee Nation v. Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86, 89−90 (DC 2017).
In  any  event,  it  is  not  evident  why  the  pre-Civil  War  history  of  tribal
discord with States—unconnected from any statutory text—should disa-
ble States from exercising jurisdiction in 2022 to ensure that crime vic-
tims in state territory are protected under the State’s laws.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the legal status of Indian country and jurisdiction over crimes committed there. It presents legal arguments and cites previous court decisions, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 120 (2010)

121

Per Curiam

no warrant for entirely excluding the DNA evidence or Romero’s testi
mony  from  that  court’s  consideration.  The  report  did  not  contest  that
the  DNA  evidence  matched  respondent,  and  a  rational  jury  could  con
sider that evidence to be powerful evidence of guilt.  Furthermore, the
Ninth  Circuit’s  discussion  of  the  non-DNA  evidence  departed  from  the
deferential  review  demanded  by  Jackson  and  28  U. S. C.  § 2254(d)(1),
which permits a federal habeas court to set aside a state-court decision
only if it is “an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Fed
eral  law.”  While  the  Ninth  Circuit  acknowledged  that  it  must  review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, its recitation
of inconsistencies in the testimony shows it failed to do that.  Although
the  court’s  Jackson  analysis  relied  substantially  upon  the  State’s  post-
conviction concession that there was insufﬁcient evidence to convict re
spondent absent the DNA ﬁndings, the concession posited a situation in
which  there  was  no  DNA  evidence  at  all,  not  one  in  which  some  testi
mony  regarding  such  evidence  was  called  into  question.  Pp.  130–134.
2.  Respondent’s claim that the admission of Romero’s inaccurate DNA
testimony denied him a fair trial under Manson v.  Brathwaite, 432 U. S.
98, 114, is forfeited because he makes it for the ﬁrst time in his brief on
the merits in this Court.  Pp. 134–136.

525 F. 3d 787, reversed and remanded.

Per Curiam.

In  Jackson  v.  Virginia,  443  U. S.  307  (1979),  we  held  that
a state prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if a federal
judge  ﬁnds  that  “upon  the  record  evidence  adduced  at  the
trial  no  rational  trier  of  fact  could  have  found  proof  of  guilt
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.”  Id.,  at  324.  A  Nevada  jury
convicted  respondent  of  rape;  the  evidence  presented  in
cluded  DNA  evidence  matching  respondent’s  DNA  proﬁle.
Nevertheless, relying upon a report prepared by a DNA ex
pert over 11 years after the trial, the Federal District Court
applied  the  Jackson  standard  and  granted  the  writ.  A  di
vided  Court  of  Appeals  afﬁrmed.  Brown  v.  Farwell,  525
F.  3d  787  (CA9  2008).  We  granted  certiorari  to  consider
whether those courts misapplied Jackson.  Because the trial
record includes both the DNA evidence and other convincing
evidence of guilt, we conclude that they clearly did.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites case law, discusses legal standards, and summarizes the facts of a particular case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

598

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit

No. 99–5. Argued January 11, 2000—Decided May 15, 2000*

Petitioner Brzonkala ﬁled suit, alleging, inter alia, that she was raped
by respondents while the three were students at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, and that this attack violated 42 U. S. C. § 13981, which pro-
vides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated
violence. Respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds that the com-
plaint failed to state a claim and that § 13981’s civil remedy is unconsti-
tutional. Petitioner United States intervened to defend the section’s
In dismissing the complaint, the District Court held
constitutionality.
that it stated a claim against respondents, but that Congress lacked
authority to enact § 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identiﬁed
as the sources of federal authority for § 13981. The en banc Fourth
Circuit afﬁrmed.

Held: Section 13981 cannot be sustained under the Commerce Clause or

§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 607–627.

(a) The Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with author-
ity to enact § 13981’s federal civil remedy. A congressional enactment
will be invalidated only upon a plain showing that Congress has ex-
ceeded its constitutional bounds. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S.
549, 568, 577–578. Petitioners assert that § 13981 can be sustained
under Congress’ commerce power as a regulation of activity that sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce. The proper framework for ana-
lyzing such a claim is provided by the principles the Court set out
in Lopez. First, in Lopez, the noneconomic, criminal nature of pos-
sessing a ﬁrearm in a school zone was central to the Court’s conclusion
that Congress lacks authority to regulate such possession. Similarly,
gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense, economic
activity. Second, like the statute at issue in Lopez, § 13981 contains no
jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in
pursuance of Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce. Although
Lopez makes clear that such a jurisdictional element would lend support
to the argument that § 13981 is sufﬁciently tied to interstate commerce

*Together with No. 99–29, Brzonkala v. Morrison et al., also on certio-

rari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court decision. It includes case information, a syllabus outlining the case's background and issues, and the Court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

Opinion of the Court

e.g.,  Supp.  App.  164–173.    But  this  Court  has  never  held
that  a  State’s  adherence  to  a  previously  used  districting
plan can defeat a §2 claim.  If that were the rule, a State
could immunize from challenge a new racially discrimina-
tory redistricting plan simply by claiming that it resembled
an old racially discriminatory plan.  That is not the law: §2
does not permit a State to provide some voters “less oppor-
tunity  . . .  to  participate  in  the  political  process”  just  be-
cause the State has done it before.  52 U. S. C. §10301(b).
  As to the second and third Gingles preconditions, the Dis-
trict Court determined that there was “no serious dispute
that Black voters are politically cohesive, nor that the chal-
lenged districts’ white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc
to  usually  defeat  Black  voters’  preferred  candidate.”    582
F. Supp.  3d,  at  1016  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
The Court noted that, “on average, Black voters supported
their  candidates  of  choice  with  92.3%  of  the  vote”  while
“white  voters  supported  Black-preferred  candidates  with
15.4% of the vote.”  Id., at 1017 (internal quotation marks
omitted).    Plaintiffs’  experts  described  the  evidence  of  ra-
cially  polarized  voting  in  Alabama  as  “intens[e],”  “very
strong,” and “very clear.”  Ibid.  Even Alabama’s expert con-
ceded “that the candidates preferred by white voters in the
areas that he looked at regularly defeat the candidates pre-
ferred by Black voters.”  Id., at 1018.
  Finally, the District Court concluded that plaintiffs had
carried their burden at the totality of circumstances stage.
The Court observed that elections in Alabama were racially
polarized; that “Black Alabamians enjoy virtually zero suc-
cess in statewide elections”; that political campaigns in Al-
abama had been “characterized by overt or subtle racial ap-
peals”; and that “Alabama’s extensive history of repugnant
racial and voting-related discrimination is undeniable and
well documented.”  Id., at 1018–1024.
  We see no reason to disturb the District Court’s careful
factual findings, which are subject to clear error review and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Allen v. Milligan. It contains legal arguments, citations, and factual findings relevant to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

part of a longstanding practice of the employee ministering
religion to students as the public watched.  A school district
is not required to permit such conduct; in fact, the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits it from doing so.

A
The  Establishment  Clause  prohibits  States  from  adopt-
ing laws “respecting an establishment of religion.”  Amdt.
1; see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 49 (1985) (recogniz-
ing  the  Clause’s  incorporation  against  the  States).    The
First Amendment’s next Clause prohibits the government
from making any law “prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
Taken  together,  these  two  Clauses  (the  Religion  Clauses)
express the view, foundational to our constitutional system,
“that religious beliefs and religious expression are too pre-
cious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the State.”  Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 589 (1992).  Instead, “preserva-
tion and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a
responsibility  and  a  choice  committed  to  the  private
sphere,”  which  has  the  “freedom  to  pursue  that  mission.”
Ibid.

The Establishment Clause protects this freedom by “com-
mand[ing] a separation of church and state.”  Cutter v. Wil-
kinson, 544 U. S. 709, 719 (2005).  At its core, this means
forbidding  “sponsorship,  financial  support,  and  active  in-
volvement  of  the  sovereign  in  religious  activity.”    Walz  v.
Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 668 (1970).
In the context of public schools, it means that a State cannot
use “its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths
or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals.”
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No.
71, Champaign Cty., 333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948).

Indeed,  “[t]he  Court  has  been  particularly  vigilant  in
monitoring  compliance  with  the  Establishment  Clause  in
elementary and secondary schools.”  Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U. S. 578, 583–584 (1987).  The reasons motivating this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist.  It discusses the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and its application to public schools.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MILLER v. ALABAMA

ALITO, J., dissenting

It  is  true  that,  at  least  for  now,  the  Court  apparently
permits  a  trial  judge  to  make  an  individualized  decision
that  a  particular  minor  convicted  of  murder  should  be
sentenced  to  life  without  parole,  but  do  not  expect  this
possibility  to  last  very  long.    The  majority  goes  out  of  its
way to express the view that the imposition of a sentence
of  life  without  parole  on  a  “child”  (i.e.,  a  murderer  under
the age of 18) should be uncommon.  Having held in Gra-
ham  that  a  trial  judge  with  discretionary  sentencing
authority may not impose a sentence of life without parole
on a minor who has committed a nonhomicide offense, the
Justices  in  the  majority  may  soon  extend  that  holding  to
minors who commit murder.  We will see.

What today’s decision shows is that our Eighth Amend
ment  cases  are  no  longer  tied  to  any  objective  indicia  of
society’s  standards.    Our  Eighth  Amendment  case  law  is
now  entirely  inward  looking.  After  entirely  disregarding
objective indicia of our society’s standards in Graham, the
Court now  extrapolates from  Graham.  Future cases may
extrapolate  from  today’s  holding,  and  this  process  may
continue  until  the  majority  brings  sentencing  practices
into  line  with  whatever  the  majority  views  as  truly
evolved standards of decency.

The  Eighth  Amendment  imposes  certain  limits  on  the

——————

rejected  what  it  called  the  “outmoded  rehabilitation  model”  for  federal
criminal  sentencing.    S. Rep.  No.  98–225,  p.  38  (1983).    According  to
the Report, “almost everyone involved in the criminal justice system now
doubts  that  rehabilitation  can  be  induced  reliably  in  a  prison  setting,
and  it  is  now  quite  certain  that  no  one  can  really  detect  whether  or
when a prisoner is rehabilitated.” Ibid.  The Report also “observed that
the indeterminate-sentencing system had two ‘unjustifi[ed] and ‘shame
ful’  consequences.  The  first  was  the  great  variation  among  sentences
imposed  by  different  judges  upon  similarly  situated  offenders.  The
second  was  uncertainty  as  to  the  time  the  offender  would  spend  in
prison.  Each was a serious impediment to an evenhanded and effective
operation  of  the  criminal  justice  system.”  Mistretta,  supra,  at  366
(quoting S. Rep. No. 98–225, at 38, 65 (citation omitted)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Eighth Amendment and sentencing practices for minors convicted of murder.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

29

Opinion of the Court
Appendix A to opinion of the Court

APPENDICES

A

State and Federal Judicial Decisions

Addressing Same-Sex Marriage

United States Courts of Appeals Decisions

Adams v. Howerton, 673 F. 2d 1036 (CA9 1982)
Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F. 3d 673 (CA9 2006)
Citizens  for  Equal  Protection  v.  Bruning,  455  F. 3d  859

(CA8 2006)

Windsor v. United States, 699 F. 3d 169 (CA2 2012)
Massachusetts  v.  Department  of  Health  and  Human

Services, 682 F. 3d 1 (CA1 2012)

Perry v. Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052 (CA9 2012)
Latta v. Otter, 771 F. 3d 456 (CA9 2014)
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F. 3d 648 (CA7 2014)
Bishop v. Smith, 760 F. 3d 1070 (CA10 2014)
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F. 3d 352 (CA4 2014)
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F. 3d 1193 (CA10 2014)
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F. 3d 388 (CA6 2014)
Latta  v.  Otter,  779  F. 3d  902  (CA9  2015)  (O’Scannlain,

J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)

United States District Court Decisions

Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (CD Cal. 1980)
Citizens  for  Equal  Protection,  Inc.  v.  Bruning,  290

F. Supp. 2d 1004 (Neb. 2003)

Citizens  for  Equal  Protection  v.  Bruning,  368  F. Supp.

2d 980 (Neb. 2005)

Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (MD Fla. 2005)
Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (CD Cal.

2005)

Bishop v. Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 447 F. Supp. 2d

1239 (ND Okla. 2006)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a list of legal cases related to same-sex marriage, likely an appendix or bibliography section of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Appendix, Bibliography</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

A
1
Respondent  Kristen  Biel  was  a  teacher  at  St.  James
School, a Catholic school in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles.6
Biel initially served as a substitute teacher, teaching first
grade two days a week.  App. 248–249.  At the end of the
2013 school year, the school hired Biel as a full-time fifth-
grade teacher.  911 F. 3d, at 605; App. 250.

Biel’s employment contract identified her position as just
that: “Grade 5 Teacher.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–
348, p. 103a; App. 328–329.  The contract referred to Biel
throughout  as  “teacher,”  and  directed  her  to  the  benefits
guide for “Lay Employees.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–
348,  at  105a;  App.  320,  325,  327–329.    The  contract  also
stated that Biel would work ‘‘within [St. James’s] overrid-
ing  commitment’’  to  church  ‘‘doctrines,  laws,  and  norms’’
and would ‘‘model, teach, and promote behavior in conform-
ity  to  the  teaching  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.’’  911
F. 3d, at 605 (internal quotation marks omitted).  According
to the faculty handbook, all faculty (religion teachers or not)
‘‘participate in the Church’s mission’’ of providing ‘‘quality
Catholic education to . . . students, educating them in aca-
demic areas and in . . . Catholic faith and values.”  Id., at
605–606  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    The  faculty
handbook  further  instructs  teachers  to  follow  California’s
public-school curricular requirements.  Id., at 606.

Although St. James School “recommended” that teachers
be Catholic, the school did not require it.  App. 289.  Nor did
the school require teachers to have experience, training, or

——————
the  position  that  any  material  fact  is  genuinely  in  dispute)  with,  e.g.,
Brief for Respondents 12–13, n. 4, 40–41 (taking the position that mate-
rial facts are genuinely in dispute).

6 Unlike the Court, I begin with Biel’s case because it was the first one
decided and the only one deemed precedential below.  Biel passed away
last year, losing her life to the same cancer that allegedly lost her a job
at St. James.  Biel’s husband now represents her estate.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 591 U.S. ____ (2020). It contains legal citations, case names, and arguments presented in a formal legal style.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–1271
_________________

TIMOTHY K. MOORE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SPEAKER OF THE NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. REBECCA HARPER, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
NORTH CAROLINA

[June 27, 2023]

JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,
and with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins as to Part I, dissenting.
This Court sits “to resolve not questions and issues but
‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’ ”  Arizona Christian School Tui-
tion  Organization  v.  Winn,  563  U. S.  125,  132  (2011);  see
U. S. Const., Art. III, §1.  As a corollary of that basic consti-
tutional  principle,  the  Court  “is  without  power  to  decide
moot  questions  or  to  give  advisory  opinions  which  cannot
affect the rights of the litigants in the case before it.”  St.
Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41, 42 (1943) (per curiam).
To do so would be to violate “the oldest and most consistent
thread in the federal law of justiciability.”  Flast v. Cohen,
392 U. S. 83, 96 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The  opinion  that  the  Court  releases  today  breaks  that
thread.  It “affirms” an interlocutory state-court judgment
that  has  since  been  overruled  and  supplanted  by  a  final
judgment resolving all claims in petitioners’ favor.  The is-
sue on which it opines—a federal defense to claims already
dismissed on other grounds—can no longer affect the judg-
ment in this litigation in any way.  As such, the question is
indisputably moot, and today’s majority opinion is plainly
advisory.  Because  the  writ  of  certiorari  should  be  dis-
missed, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis within a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

THOMAS, J., dissenting

II
To  explain  the  original  understanding  of  the  Constitu-
tion’s  enumerated  powers  with  regard  to  Indians,  I  start
with our Nation’s Founding-era dealings with Indian tribes.
Those early interactions underscore that the Constitution
conferred specific, enumerated powers on the Federal Gov-
ernment which aimed at specific problems that the Nation
faced under the Articles of Confederation.  The new Federal
Government’s actions with respect to Indian tribes are eas-
ily explained by those enumerated powers.  Meanwhile, the
States continued to enjoy substantial authority with regard
to tribes.  At each turn, history and constitutional text thus
point to a set of enumerated powers that can be applied to
Indian  tribes—not  some  sort  of  amorphous,  unlimited
power than can be applied to displace all state laws when it
comes to Indians.

A

Before  the  Revolution,  most  of  the  Thirteen  Colonies
adopted their own regulations governing Indian trade.  See
Adoptive Couple, 570 U. S., at 660 (THOMAS, J., concurring);
R.  Natelson,  The  Original  Understanding  of  the  Indian
Commerce  Clause,  85  Denver  U.  L. Rev.  201,  219,  and
n. 121  (2007)  (Natelson)  (collecting  laws).    These  regula-
tions were necessary because colonial traders abused their
Indian trading partners, often provoking violent Indian re-
taliation.  See Adoptive Couple, 570 U. S., at 660–661; 1 F.
Prucha, The Great Father 18–21 (1984) (Prucha).  Most co-
lonial governments thus imposed licensing systems of some
form both to protect Indians and to maintain trading rela-
tionships with them.  See id., at 19.  However, the colonial
laws were not uniform, leading to rivalries between the Col-
onies, corruption, fraud, and other abuses by traders.  Id.,
at 21.  Then, once the Nation had achieved independence,
it “faced innumerable difficulties,” id., at 46, from finding
ways to uphold its treaties with foreign nations to economic
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Haaland v. Brackeen. It delves into the original understanding of the Constitution's enumerated powers regarding Native American tribes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
422  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of Stevens, J.

ety,  Morse  v.  Frederick,  551  U. S.  393,  396–397,  404  (2007)
(quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.  Fraser, 478 U. S. 675,
682 (1986)).

The  free  speech  guarantee  thus  does  not  render  every
other  public  interest  an  illegitimate  basis  for  qualifying  a
speaker’s  autonomy;  society  could  scarcely  function  if  it
did.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  our  First  Amendment  doctrine
has  “frowned  on”  certain  identity-based  distinctions,  Los
Angeles Police Dept. v.  United Reporting Publishing Corp.,
528 U. S. 32, 47, n. 4 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting), particu
larly those that may reﬂect invidious discrimination or pref
erential  treatment  of  a  politically  powerful  group.  But  it
is  simply  incorrect  to  suggest  that  we  have  prohibited  all
legislative  distinctions  based  on  identity  or  content.  Not
even close.

The  election  context  is  distinctive  in  many  ways,  and  the
Court,  of  course,  is  right  that  the  First  Amendment  closely
guards political speech.  But in this context, too, the author
ity  of  legislatures  to  enact  viewpoint-neutral  regulations
based  on  content  and  identity  is  well  settled.  We  have,  for
example,  allowed  state-run  broadcasters  to  exclude  inde
pendent  candidates  from  televised  debates.  Arkansas  Ed.
Television  Comm’n  v.  Forbes,  523  U. S.  666  (1998).48  We
have upheld statutes that prohibit the distribution or display
of campaign materials near a polling place.  Burson v.  Free
man, 504 U. S. 191 (1992).49  Although we have not reviewed

48 I dissented in Forbes because the broadcaster’s decision to exclude the
respondent  from  its  debate  was  done  “on  the  basis  of  entirely  subjective,
ad hoc judgments,” 523 U. S., at 690, that suggested anticompetitive view
point discrimination, id., at 693–694, and lacked a compelling justiﬁcation.
Needless to say, my concerns do not apply to the instant case.

49 The  law  at  issue  in  Burson  was  far  from  unusual.  “[A]ll  50  States,”
the Court observed, “limit access to the areas in or around polling places.”
504  U. S.,  at  206  (plurality  opinion);  see  also  Note,  91  Ky.  L.  J.  715,  729,
n. 89, 747–769 (2003) (collecting statutes).  I dissented in Burson because
the evidence adduced to justify Tennessee’s law was “exceptionally thin,”
504 U. S., at 219, and “the reason for [the] restriction [had] disappear[ed]”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
52  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

a woman as an “equal citizen[ ],” with all the rights, privi-
leges,  and  obligations  that  status  entails.    Gonzales,  550
U. S., at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see supra, at 23–24.
It reflects that she is an autonomous person, and that soci-
ety and the law recognize her as such.  Like many constitu-
tional rights, the right to choose situates a woman in rela-
tionship to others and to the government.  It helps define a
sphere  of  freedom,  in  which  a  person  has  the  capacity  to
make choices free of government control.  As Casey recog-
nized, the right “order[s]” her “thinking” as well as her “liv-
ing.”  505 U. S., at 856.  Beyond any individual choice about
residence, or education, or career, her whole life reflects the
control and authority that the right grants.

Withdrawing a woman’s right to choose whether to con-
tinue  a  pregnancy  does  not  mean  that  no  choice  is  being
made.
It  means  that  a  majority  of  today’s  Court  has
wrenched this choice from women and given it to the States.
To allow a State to exert control over one of “the most inti-
mate and personal choices” a woman may make is not only
to affect the course of her life, monumental as those effects
might be.  Id., at 851.  It is to alter her “views of [herself]”
and her understanding of her “place[ ] in society” as some-
one  with  the  recognized  dignity  and  authority  to  make
these choices.  Id., at 856.  Women have relied on Roe and
Casey  in  this  way  for  50  years.    Many  have  never  known
anything else.  When Roe and Casey disappear, the loss of
power, control, and dignity will be immense.

The Court’s failure to perceive the whole swath of expec-
tations  Roe  and  Casey  created  reflects  an  impoverished
view of reliance.  According to the majority, a reliance in-
terest must be “very concrete,” like those involving “prop-
erty” or “contract.”  Ante, at 64.  While many of this Court’s
cases addressing reliance have been in the “commercial con-
text,”  Casey,  505  U. S.,  at  855,  none  holds  that  interests
must be analogous to commercial ones to warrant stare de-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It discusses the importance of the right to choose and the impact of overturning Roe v. Wade.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>