<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

51

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

would exclude a talented young biologist who struggled to
maintain above-average grades in humanities classes.  And
it  would  exclude  a  student  whose  freshman-year  grades
were poor because of a family crisis but who got herself back
on track in her last three years of school, only to find herself
just  outside  of  the  top  decile  of  her  class.”  Fisher  II,  579
U. S., at 386.  A myopic focus on academic ratings “does not
lead to a diverse student body.”  Ibid.35

2
As noted above, this Court suggests that the use of race
in  college  admissions  is  unworkable  because  respondents’
objectives are not sufficiently “measurable,” “focused,” “con-
crete,” and “coherent.”  Ante, at 23, 26, 39.  How much more
precision  is  required  or  how  universities  are  supposed  to
meet  the  Court’s  measurability  requirement,  the  Court’s
opinion does not say.  That is exactly the point.  The Court
is not interested in crafting a workable framework that pro-
motes racial diversity on college campuses.  Instead, it an-
nounces a requirement designed to ensure all race-conscious
plans fail.  Any increased level of precision runs the risk of
violating the Court’s admonition that colleges and univer-
sities operate their race-conscious admissions policies with
no  “ ‘specified  percentage[s]’ ”  and  no  “specific  number[s]
firmly in mind.”  Grutter, 539 U. S., at 324, 335.  Thus, the
majority’s holding puts schools in an untenable position.  It
creates a legal framework where race-conscious plans must
be measured with precision but also must not be measured
with precision.  That holding is not meant to infuse clarity
into the strict scrutiny framework; it is designed to render
strict scrutiny “ ‘fatal in fact.’ ”  Id., at 326 (quoting Adarand
——————

35 Today’s decision is likely to generate a plethora of litigation by dis-
appointed  college  applicants  who  think  their  credentials  and  personal
qualities should have secured them admission.  By inviting those chal-
lenges, the Court’s opinion promotes chaos and incentivizes universities
to convert their admissions programs into inflexible systems focused on
mechanical factors, which will harm all students.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It argues against the majority opinion on the use of race in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ANIMAL SCIENCE PRODUCTS, INC., ET AL. v. HEBEI
WELCOME PHARMACEUTICAL CO. LTD. ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 16–1220.  Argued April 24, 2018—Decided June 14, 2018

Petitioners,  U. S.-based  purchasers  of  vitamin  C  (U. S.  purchasers),
filed a class-action suit, alleging that four Chinese corporations that
manufacture and export the nutrient (Chinese sellers), including the
two respondents here, had agreed to fix the price and quantity of vit-
amin C exported to the United States, in violation of §1 of the Sher-
man Act.  The Chinese sellers moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that Chinese law required them to fix the price and quantity
of  vitamin  C  exports,  thus  shielding  them  from  liability  under  U. S.
antitrust law.  The Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of
China  (Ministry)  filed  an  amicus  brief  in  support  of  the  motion,  ex-
plaining that it is the administrative authority authorized to regulate
foreign trade, and stating that the alleged conspiracy in restraint of
trade  was  actually  a  pricing  regime  mandated  by  the  Chinese  Gov-
ernment.    The  U. S.  purchasers  countered  that  the  Ministry  had
identified  no  law  or  regulation  ordering  the  Chinese  sellers’  price
agreement,  highlighted  a  publication  announcing  that  the  Chinese
sellers had agreed to control the quantity and rate of exports without
government  intervention,  and  presented  supporting  expert  testimo-
ny.
  The  District  Court  denied  the  Chinese  sellers’  motion  in  relevant
part,  concluding  that  it  did  not  regard  the  Ministry’s  statements  as
“conclusive,”  particularly  in  light  of  the  U. S.  purchasers’  evidence.
When  the  Chinese  sellers  subsequently  moved  for  summary  judg-
ment,  the  Ministry  submitted  another  statement,  reiterating  its
stance, and the U. S. purchasers pointed to China’s statement to the
World Trade Organization that it ended its export administration of
vitamin  C  in 2002.    The  court  denied  this  motion  as  well.    The  case
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. BOOKING.COM B. V.

Syllabus

Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 598.  Good-
year, the PTO maintains, established that adding a generic corporate
designation  like  “Company”  to  a  generic  term  does  not  confer  trade-
mark  eligibility.    According  to  the  PTO,  adding  “.com”  to  a  generic
term—like  adding  “Company”—can  convey  no  source-identifying
meaning.  That premise is faulty, for only one entity can occupy a par-
ticular Internet domain name at a time, so a “generic.com” term could
convey to consumers an association with a particular website.  More-
over, an unyielding legal rule that entirely disregards consumer per-
ception  is  incompatible  with  a  bedrock  principle  of  the  Lanham  Act:
The generic (or nongeneric) character of a particular term depends on
its meaning to consumers, i.e., do consumers in fact perceive the term
as the name of a class or, instead, as a term capable of distinguishing
among members of the class.  Pp. 8–11.

(2) The  PTO’s  policy  concerns  do  not  support  a  categorical  rule
against  registration  of  “generic.com”  terms.  The  PTO  asserts  that
trademark  protection  for  “Booking.com”  would  give  the  mark  owner
undue control over similar language that others should remain free to
use.    That  concern  attends  any  descriptive  mark.    Guarding  against
the anticompetitive effects the PTO identifies, several doctrines ensure
that registration of “Booking.com” would not yield its holder a monop-
oly on the term “booking.”  The PTO also doubts that owners of “ge-
neric.com”  brands  need  trademark  protection  in  addition  to  existing
competitive advantages.  Such advantages, however, do not inevitably
disqualify  a  mark  from  federal  registration.    Finally,  the  PTO  urges
that  Booking.com  could  seek  remedies  outside  trademark  law,  but
there is no basis to deny Booking.com the same benefits Congress ac-
corded other marks qualifying as nongeneric.  Pp. 11–14.

915 F. 3d 171, affirmed.

GINSBURG,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,

in  which
ROBERTS, C. J.,  and THOMAS, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH,  and
KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.  SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  filed  a  concurring  opinion.
BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

Opinion of the Court

in  Their  Civil  Rights,”  which  guaranteed  “full  and  equal
enjoyment”  of  certain  public  facilities  to  “all  citizens,”
“regardless  of  race,  color  or  previous  condition  of  servi-
tude.”  1885 Colo. Sess. Laws pp. 132–133.  A decade later,
the General Assembly expanded the requirement to apply
to  “all  other  places  of  public  accommodation.”    1895  Colo.
Sess. Laws ch. 61, p. 139.

Today,  the  Colorado  Anti-Discrimination  Act  (CADA)
carries forward the state’s tradition of prohibiting discrim-
ination  in  places  of  public  accommodation.  Amended  in
2007  and  2008  to  prohibit  discrimination  on  the  basis  of
sexual  orientation  as  well  as  other  protected  characteris-
tics, CADA in relevant part provides as follows:

“It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a per-
son, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or
deny to an individual or a group, because of disability,
race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital sta-
tus, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal en-
joyment  of  the  goods,  services,  facilities,  privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of a place of public ac-
commodation.”  Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §24–34–601(2)(a)
(2017).

The Act defines “public accommodation” broadly to include
any  “place  of  business  engaged  in  any  sales  to  the  public
and  any  place  offering  services  . . .  to  the  public,”  but
excludes “a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that
is principally used for religious purposes.”  §24–34–601(1).
CADA  establishes  an  administrative  system  for  the
resolution  of  discrimination  claims.    Complaints  of  dis-
crimination in violation of CADA are addressed in the first
instance by the Colorado Civil Rights Division.  The Divi-
sion investigates each claim; and if it finds probable cause
that  CADA  has  been  violated,  it  will  refer  the  matter  to
the  Colorado  Civil  Rights  Commission.  The  Commission,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the history and provisions of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Statement of ALITO, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
REPUBLICAN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA v.
KATHY BOOCKVAR, SECRETARY OF
PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.

ON MOTION TO EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF
THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

No. 20–542.  Decided [October 28, 2020]

  The motion to expedite consideration of the petition for a
writ of certiorari is denied.  JUSTICE BARRETT took no part
in the consideration or decision of this motion.
  Additional opinions may follow.
  Statement  of  JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE
THOMAS and JUSTICE GORSUCH join.
  The Court’s handling of the important constitutional is-
sue raised by this matter has needlessly created conditions
that could lead to serious post-election problems.  The Su-
preme  Court  of  Pennsylvania  has  issued  a  decree  that
squarely alters an important statutory provision enacted by
the Pennsylvania Legislature pursuant to its authority un-
der the Constitution of the United States to make rules gov-
erning the conduct of elections for federal office.  See Art. I,
§4, cl. 1; Art. II, §1, cl. 2; Bush v. Palm Beach County Can-
vassing Bd., 531 U. S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam).  In a law
called  Act  77,  the  legislature  permitted  all  voters  to  cast
their ballots by mail but unambiguously required that all
mailed ballots be received by 8 p.m. on election day.  2019
Pa. Leg. Serv. Act 2019–77; see 25 Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25,
§§3146.6(c), 3150.16(c) (Purdon 2020).  It also specified that
if  this  provision  was  declared  invalid,  much  of  the  rest  of
Act 77, including its liberalization of mail-in voting, would
be void.  Act 77, §11.  The legislature subsequently made it
clear that, in its judgment, the COVID–19 pandemic did not
call for any change in the election-day deadline.  In a law
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a statement by Justice Alito.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual content of a legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
348  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

To  bypass  Buckley  and  Bellotti,  the  Austin  Court  identi
ﬁed a new governmental interest in limiting political speech:
an  antidistortion  interest.  Austin  found  a  compelling  gov
ernmental interest in preventing “the corrosive and distort
ing effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accu
mulated  with  the  help  of  the  corporate  form  and  that  have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corpora
tion’s political ideas.”  494 U. S., at 660; see id., at 659 (citing
MCFL, 479 U. S., at 257; NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 500–501).

B

The Court is thus confronted with conﬂicting lines of prec
edent: a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political
speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-
Austin  line  that  permits  them.  No  case  before  Austin  had
held that Congress could  prohibit independent expenditures
for political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.
Before Austin, Congress had enacted legislation for this pur
pose, and the Government urged the same proposition before
this  Court.  See  MCFL,  supra,  at  257  (FEC  posited  that
Congress  intended  to  “curb  the  political  inﬂuence  of  ‘those
who  exercise  control  over  large  aggregations  of  capital’ ”
(quoting Automobile Workers, 352 U. S., at 585)); California
Medical  Assn.  v.  Federal  Election  Comm’n,  453  U. S.  182,
201  (1981)  (Congress  believed that  “differing  structures  and
purposes” of corporations and unions “may require different
forms  of  regulation  in  order  to  protect  the  integrity  of  the
electoral process”).  In  neither of these cases  did the Court
adopt the proposition.

In  its  defense  of  the  corporate-speech  restrictions  in
§ 441b, the Government notes the antidistortion rationale on
which Austin and its progeny rest in part, yet it all but aban
dons reliance upon it.  It argues instead that two other com
pelling interests support Austin’s holding that corporate ex
penditure  restrictions  are  constitutional:  an  anticorruption
interest,  see 494  U. S., at  678 (Stevens,  J., concurring),  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case. It delves into legal precedents and arguments surrounding corporate political spending.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., concurring

to investigate the Teapot Dome Scandal and pursue prose-
cutions.  See ch. 16, 43 Stat. 6.  And, a statute provided for
“the  appointment  of  an  independent  counsel”  that  we  ad-
dressed in Morrison v. Olson.  See 28 U. S. C. §592.  That
statute lapsed, and Congress has not since reauthorized the
appointment of an independent counsel.  See §599.2

We  cannot  ignore  the  importance  that  the  Constitution
places on who creates a federal office.  To guard against tyr-
anny, the Founders required that a federal office be “estab-
lished by Law.”  As James Madison cautioned, “[i]f there is
any point in which the separation of the Legislative and Ex-
ecutive  powers  ought  to  be  maintained  with  greater  cau-
tion, it is that which relates to officers and offices.”  1 An-
nals of Cong. 581.  If Congress has not reached a consensus
that a particular office should exist, the Executive lacks the
power to create and fill an office of his own accord.

II
It is difficult to see how the Special Counsel has an office
“established  by  Law,”  as  required  by  the  Constitution.
When the Attorney General appointed the Special Counsel,
he did not identify any statute that clearly creates such an
office.  See Dept. of Justice Order No. 5559–2022 (Nov. 18,
2022).  Nor did he rely on a statute granting him the au-
thority to appoint officers as he deems fit, as the heads of
some other agencies have.3  See supra, at 5.  Instead, the
Attorney General relied upon several statutes of a general
nature.  See Order No. 5559–2022 (citing 28 U. S. C. §§509,
510, 515, 533).
——————

2 To  be  sure,  a  few  Presidents  have  appointed  “special  prosecutors”
without pointing to any express statutory authorization.  See generally
T. Eastland, Ethics, Politics and the Independent Counsel 8–9 (1989) (de-
scribing past uses of special prosecutors).  But, this Court had no occa-
sion to review the constitutionality of those prosecutors’ authority.

3 In fact, Congress gave the Attorney General the power to appoint “ad-
ditional officers . . . as he deems necessary”—but, only for the Bureau of
Prisons.  18 U. S. C. §4041.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Trump v. United States. It discusses the constitutionality of the appointment of a Special Counsel.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

AMERICAN LEGION v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

Lemon  against  these  criticisms—and  they  don’t  because
they  can’t.    As  Justice  Kennedy  explained,  Lemon  is
“flawed  in  its  fundamentals,”  has  proved  “unworkable  in
practice,”  and  is  “inconsistent  with  our  history  and  our
precedents.”    County  of  Allegheny,  492  U. S.,  at  655,  669
(opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
  In  place  of  Lemon,  Part  II–D  of  the  plurality  opinion
relies  on  a  more  modest,  historically  sensitive  approach,
recognizing  that  “the  Establishment  Clause  must  be  in-
terpreted  by  reference  to  historical  practices  and  under-
standings.”  Ante, at 25 (quoting Town of Greece v. Gallo-
way,  572  U. S.  565,  576  (2014)  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted);  see  also  ante,  at  1–4  (KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concur-
ring).  So, by way of example, the plurality explains that a
state legislature may permissibly begin each session with
a  prayer  by  an  official  chaplain  because  “Congress  for
more than 200 years had opened its sessions with a prayer
and  . . .  many state  legislatures  had followed suit.”   Ante,
at  25  (discussing  Marsh  v.  Chambers,  463  U. S.  783
(1983), and Town of Greece, 572 U. S. 565).  The constitu-
tionality  of  a  practice  doesn’t  depend  on  some  artificial
and  indeterminate  three-part  test;  what  matters,  the
plurality  reminds  us,  is  whether  the  challenged  practice
fits  “ ‘within  the  tradition’ ”  of  this  country.    Ante,  at  27
(citing Town of Greece, 572 U. S., at 577).
  I agree with all this and don’t doubt that the monument
before  us  is  constitutional  in  light  of  the  nation’s  tradi-
tions.  But then the plurality continues on to suggest that
“longstanding  monuments,  symbols,  and  practices”  are
“presumpt[ively]”  constitutional.    Ante,  at  16.    And  about
that, it’s hard not to wonder: How old must a monument,
symbol, or practice be to qualify for this new presumption?
It  seems  94  years  is  enough,  but  what  about  the  Star  of
David  monument  erected  in  South  Carolina  in  2001  to
commemorate  victims  of  the  Holocaust,  or  the  cross  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of American Legion v. American Humanist Association. It discusses the Lemon test and the plurality opinion's preference for a more historically sensitive approach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

will impact associational rights, this Court requires plain-
tiffs to demonstrate that a requirement is likely to expose
their supporters to concrete repercussions in order to estab-
lish an actual burden.  It then applies a level of means-end
tailoring proportional to that burden.  The Court abandons
that approach here, instead holding that narrow tailoring
applies to disclosure requirements across the board, even if
there is no evidence that they burden anyone at all.

A
Before today, to demonstrate that a reporting or disclo-
sure  requirement  would  chill  association,  litigants  had  to
show  “a  reasonable  probability  that  the  compelled  disclo-
sure of . . . contributors’ names will subject them to threats,
harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials
or private parties.”  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 74 (1976)
(per curiam).  Proof could include “specific evidence of past
or  present  harassment  of  members  due  to  their  associa-
tional ties, or of harassment directed against the organiza-
tion itself,” ibid., as well as evidence that “fear of commu-
nity  hostility  and  economic  reprisals  that  would  follow
public  disclosure  . . .  had  discouraged  new  members  from
joining”  an  organization  or  caused  “former  members  to
withdraw,”  Bates,  361  U. S.,  at  524.    Although  the  Court
has  never  imposed  an  “unduly  strict  requiremen[t]  of
proof,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 74, it has consistently required
at least some record evidence demonstrating a risk of such
objective harms.  See Bates, 361 U. S., at 523–524; Patter-
son, 357 U. S., at 462–463.

Indeed, the Court has expressly held that parties do not
have  standing  to  bring  claims  where  they  assert  nothing
more than that government action will cause a “subjective
‘chill.’ ”  Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 13–14 (1972).  It does
not matter if an individual perceives a government regula-
tion “as inappropriate,” or believes “it is inherently danger-
ous for the [government] to be concerned with” a particular
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and a formal tone.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

BROWN v. DAVENPORT

KAGAN, J., dissenting

is no.  And that is not just what our precedents say.  It is
also what the real world shows.  Several Circuits formerly
followed  the  rule  the  majority  announces  today:  Habeas
courts there could not grant relief before separately apply-
ing Brecht and AEDPA/Chapman.  Yet neither the majority
nor the State has come up with a single case (nor have I) in
which a court held that a petitioner satisfied Brecht but not
AEDPA/Chapman.  Which  for  all  the  reasons  Fry,  Ayala,
and I have given is no wonder.  Apply Brecht alone or apply
both Brecht and AEDPA: The same people will, and will not,
receive habeas relief.6

All today’s holding does going forward is compel habeas
courts,  and  the  parties  before  them,  to  spin  their  wheels.
All it does is what Fry observed “certainly makes no sense”:
require “formal application of [two] tests” when only one—
Brecht—matters.  551 U. S., at 120.  Of course, it is not the
worst thing in the world to have to do unnecessary work of
this kind; parties and courts alike will find ways to limit the
inefficiencies  involved.  But  really,  why  should  they  have
to?  Our  prior  decisions  got  the  question  here  right.  The
courts that have followed their instructions did everything
needed.  Better, by far, to have left it at that.

——————

6 The  decision  here  does  not  show  otherwise,  contra  the  majority’s
claim  that  it  “illustrates”  how  today’s  apply-both-tests  directive  “mat-
ter[s].”  Ante, at 16. The only way that claim could be true is if the ma-
jority  believed  Davenport’s  claim  passes  the  Brecht  test  (and  yet  fails
AEDPA/Chapman, as it holds).  But the majority believes nothing of the
sort.    The  majority  merely  indulges  the  “assum[ption]”  that  the  Sixth
Circuit could have found Brecht satisfied.  Ante, at 16, 25.  And the ma-
jority’s  analysis  shows  how  far-fetched  it  thinks  that  assumption  is.
Though  under  the  banner  of  AEDPA,  the  majority  disagrees  at  every
turn with the Sixth Circuit’s reasons for granting relief under Brecht—
both the Sixth Circuit’s assessment of the record and its reading of this
Court’s precedent.  See ante, at 21–25.  No one could read today’s opinion
and  think  the  majority  harbors  “grave  doubt”  that  the  trial  error  here
affected the verdict.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

THOMAS, J., dissenting

federal power must be “complete in itself,” the States sur-
rendered their sovereign immunity with respect to any fed-
eral  power that  is  “inextricably  intertwined”  with  judicial
proceedings, like eminent domain; otherwise, sovereign im-
munity would excuse the States from the judicial proceed-
ing and the federal power would be incomplete. PennEast,
594 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 16–17) (linking complete-
ness  of  eminent  domain  power  to  condemnation  proceed-
ings).  Yet, now, the Court abandons the only limiting prin-
ciple in PennEast’s test.10

That  is  mistaken.    To  begin  with,  disaggregating  the
“complete in itself ” standard from PennEast’s “inextricably
intertwined”  justification  renders  meaningless  the  idea  of
“completeness” in the context of state sovereign immunity.
Consider the Court’s opinion here, which says that any fed-
eral power “complete in itself ” must be accompanied with a
surrender of state sovereign immunity.  The Court does not
define what it means for a federal power to be “complete in
itself,” except that “ ‘the States consented to the exercise of
that  power—in  its  entirety—in  the  plan  of  the  Conven-
tion.’ ”  Ante, at 6 (quoting PennEast, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip
op.,  at  22)).    But  that  self-referential  definition  begs  the
question.  If the Court tied the “completeness” of a federal
power to an inherent connection with judicial proceedings,
it  could  give  the  term  independent  meaning  and  make
sense of PennEast’s actual analysis.

Worse  still,  today’s  decision  removes  the  one  important
guardrail on the “completeness” inquiry that PennEast de-
scribed.  Absent that limit, the Court’s indefinite test will
provide future courts cover to further erode the States’ sov-
ereign immunity.

——————

10 My “quarrel” therefore does not “li[e] with PennEast,” ante, at 13, but
with the Court’s decision today to convert PennEast’s “complete in itself ”
language  into  an  all-encompassing  sovereign-immunity  test  that  is  di-
vorced from PennEast’s “inextricably intertwined” principle.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is part of a legal dissenting opinion, containing legal arguments and analysis. It is sequential text and relevant to the overall content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

YATES v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

Cortez, Florida, Officer Jones measured the fish contained
in  the  wooden  crates.    This  time,  however,  the  measured
fish,  although  still  less  than  20  inches,  slightly  exceeded
the  lengths  recorded  on  board.  Jones  surmised  that  the
fish  brought  to  port  were  not  the  same  as  those  he  had
detected during his initial inspection.  Under questioning,
one  of  the  crew  members  admitted  that,  at  Yates’s  direc-
tion,  he  had  thrown  overboard  the  fish  Officer  Jones  had
measured at sea, and that he and Yates had replaced the
tossed grouper with fish from the rest of the catch.

For  reasons  not  disclosed  in  the  record  before  us,  more
than  32  months  passed  before  criminal  charges  were
lodged against Yates.  On May 5, 2010, he was indicted for
destroying  property  to  prevent  a  federal  seizure,  in  viola-
tion of §2232(a), and for destroying, concealing, and cover-
ing up undersized fish to impede a federal investigation, in
violation  of  §1519.1    By  the  time  of  the  indictment,  the
minimum  legal  length  for  Gulf  red  grouper  had  been
lowered  from  20  inches  to  18  inches.  See  50  CFR
§622.37(d)(2)(iv)  (effective  May  18,  2009).  No  measured
fish in Yates’s catch fell below that limit.  The record does
not reveal what civil penalty, if any, Yates received for his
possession  of  fish  undersized  under  the  2007  regulation.
See 16 U. S. C. §1858(a).

Yates was tried on the criminal charges in August 2011.
At the end of the Government’s case in chief, he moved for
a judgment of acquittal on the §1519 charge.  Pointing to
§1519’s title and its origin as a provision of the Sarbanes-
Oxley  Act,  Yates  argued  that  the  section  sets  forth  “a
documents  offense”  and  that  its  reference  to  “tangible
object[s]” subsumes “computer hard drives, logbooks, [and]
  App.  91–92.  Yates
things  of  that  nature,”  not  fish.

——————

1 Yates was also charged with making a false statement to federal law
enforcement  officers,  in  violation  of  18  U. S. C.  §1001(a)(2).    That
charge, on which Yates was acquitted, is not relevant to our analysis.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, specifically the opinion of Justice Ginsburg in the case of Yates v. United States. It provides context about the case, the charges against Yates, and his arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

from  its  tuition  assistance  program  after  Zelman  thus  promotes
stricter separation of church and state than the Federal Constitution
requires.  But a State’s antiestablishment interest does not justify en-
actments that exclude some members of the community from an oth-
erwise generally available public benefit because of their religious ex-
ercise.  Pp. 9–11.

(c) The  First  Circuit’s  attempts  to  recharacterize  the  nature  of
Maine’s tuition assistance program do not suffice to distinguish this
case from Trinity Lutheran or Espinoza.  Pp. 11–18.

(1) The First Circuit held that the “nonsectarian” requirement was
constitutional because the benefit was properly viewed not as tuition
payments to be used at approved private schools but instead as fund-
ing for the “rough equivalent of the public school education that Maine
may permissibly require to be secular.”  979 F. 3d 21, 44.  But the stat-
ute does not say anything like that.  The benefit provided by statute is
tuition  at  a  public  or  private  school,  selected  by  the  parent,  with  no
suggestion that the “private school” must somehow provide a “public”
education.  Moreover, the differences between private schools eligible
to receive tuition assistance under Maine’s program and a Maine pub-
lic school are numerous and important.  To start with, private schools
do not have to accept all students, while public schools generally do.
In addition, the free public education that Maine insists it is providing
through the tuition assistance program is often not free, as some par-
ticipating private schools charge several times the maximum benefit
that Maine is willing to provide.  And the curriculum taught at partic-
ipating  private  schools  need  not  even  resemble  that  taught  in  the
Maine public schools.

The key manner in which participating private schools are required
to resemble Maine public schools, however, is that they must be secu-
lar.    Maine  may  provide  a  strictly  secular  education  in  its  public
schools.  But BCS and Temple Academy—like numerous other recipi-
ents  of  Maine  tuition  assistance  payments—are  not  public  schools.
Maine has chosen to offer tuition assistance that parents may direct to
the public or private schools of their choice.  Maine’s administration of
that  benefit  is  subject  to  the  free  exercise  principles  governing  any
public benefit program—including the prohibition on denying the ben-
efit based on a recipient’s religious exercise.  Pp. 11–15.

(2) The Court of Appeals also attempted to distinguish this case from
Trinity  Lutheran  and  Espinoza  on  the  ground  that  the  funding  re-
strictions in those cases were “solely status-based religious discrimi-
nation,” while the challenged provision here “imposes a use-based re-
striction.”    979  F. 3d,  at  35,  37–38.    Trinity  Lutheran  and  Espinoza
held that the Free Exercise Clause forbids discrimination on the basis
of religious status.  But those decisions never suggested that use-based
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus or a summary of a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case Carson v. Makin. It outlines the arguments and reasoning behind the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

SNYDER v. PHELPS

Opinion of the Court

principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibi-
ted, robust, and wide-open.”  New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,  376  U. S.  254,  270  (1964).    That  is  because  “speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the  essence  of  self-government.”    Garrison  v.  Louisiana,
379 U. S. 64, 74–75 (1964).  Accordingly, “speech on public
issues  occupies  the  highest  rung  of  the  hierarchy  of  First
Amendment  values,  and  is  entitled  to  special  protection.”
Connick  v.  Myers,  461  U. S.  138,  145  (1983)  (internal
quotation marks omitted).
  “ ‘[N]ot  all  speech  is  of  equal  First  Amendment  impor-
tance,’ ”  however,  and  where  matters  of  purely  private
significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are
often less rigorous.  Hustler, supra, at 56 (quoting Dun &
Bradstreet, supra, at 758); see Connick, supra, at 145–147.
That  is  because  restricting  speech  on  purely  private  mat-
ters  does  not  implicate  the  same  constitutional  concerns
as limiting speech on matters of public interest: “[T]here is
no  threat  to  the  free  and  robust  debate  of  public  issues;
there  is  no  potential  interference  with  a  meaningful  dia-
logue  of  ideas”;  and  the  “threat  of  liability”  does  not  pose
the  risk  of  “a  reaction  of  self-censorship”  on  matters  of
public  import.  Dun  &  Bradstreet,  supra,  at  760  (internal
quotation marks omitted).

We  noted  a  short  time  ago,  in  considering  whether
public  employee  speech  addressed  a  matter  of  public  con-
cern,  that  “the  boundaries  of  the  public  concern  test  are
not  well  defined.”  San  Diego  v.  Roe,  543  U. S.  77,  83
(2004) (per curiam).  Although that remains true today, we
have  articulated  some  guiding  principles,  principles  that
accord  broad  protection  to  speech  to  ensure  that  courts
themselves do not become inadvertent censors.

Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can
“be  fairly  considered  as  relating  to  any  matter  of  politi-
cal,  social,  or  other  concern  to  the  community,”  Connick,
supra,  at  146,  or  when  it  “is  a  subject  of  legitimate  news
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically discussing the First Amendment and public concern. It delves into legal precedents and principles, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxlvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1117

1007

1151

934

899

951

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1101

Thomas v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas; McNeil v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. Michigan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. New York City
Thomas v. Parker  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas; Richardson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Comm’rs
952

Thomas v. St. Paul  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1050

Thomas v. Shinseki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Thomas v. Telegraph Publishing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  950,1117

917

Thomas v. Thomas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thomas v. United States . . . . .  851,866,889,890,913,927,961,962,1050,1097

Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hospital; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  878,1086

1077

Thomas Kinkade Co., LLC v. Hazlewood  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906

Thomas M. Cooley Law School; Gueye v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Thompson v. Adams  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1090

Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039

Thompson v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thompson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  870,913,923,1116

1150

Thompson v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923

Thongsophaporn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

Thorne v. Larkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

Thorward v. Knowles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913

891

Thurman v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1130

Thurmer; Bowie v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
806

Thurmer; Glover v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
885

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thurmer; Hooker v.
1057

Thurmer; Lopez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  851,1086

Thurmer; Oswald v.
1014

Thurmer; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
983

Tibbs v. McWhorter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
984

Tibbs v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

TIC-The Industrial Co.; Friedland v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tierney; Stacey v.
1121

Tiffer v. Worker’s Compensation
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962

Tilghman v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128

Tillery v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Tilley; Haygood v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Tillman v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

Tilton v. Cate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Tilton; Guadarrama v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
992

Tilzer; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP

THOMAS, J., dissenting

against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures,”  a  subpoena
for  private,  nonofficial  documents  raises  those  questions.
Thus, the power to subpoena private documents, which the
Committee  did  not  exercise,  is  a  far  greater  power  and
much less likely to be implied in Congress’ legislative pow-
ers.

In 1832, the House investigated Representative Samuel
Houston for assaulting Representative William Stanberry.
Stanberry had accused Houston of collusion with Secretary
of War John Eaton in connection with a bid for a Govern-
ment  contract,  and  the  House  initiated  an  investigation
into  the  truthfulness  of  Stanberry’s  accusation.    8  Cong.
Deb. 2550, 3022–3023 (1832).  The House subpoenaed wit-
nesses  to  testify,  and  one  of  them  brought  official  corre-
spondence between the Secretary of War and the President.
H. R. Rep. No. 502, 22d Cong., 1st Sess. 64, 66–67 (1832).
But official documents are obviously different from nonoffi-
cial documents.  Moreover, the subpoenas were issued pur-
suant to the House’s enumerated privilege of punishing its
own Members, Art. I, §5, not as part of its legislative pow-
ers.  Because these subpoenas were not issued pursuant to
a legislative power, they do not aid the Committees’ case.

2
As late as 1827, a majority of the House declined to au-
thorize the Committee on Manufactures to subpoena docu-
ments, amid concerns that it was unprecedented.  During
the debate over the resolution, one opponent remarked that
“[t]here is no instance under this Government, within my
recollection, where this power has been given for the mere
purpose of enabling a committee of this House to adjust the
details  of  an  ordinary  bill.”  4  Cong.  Deb.  865–866  (Rep.
Strong); see also id., at 862 (referring to “authority to bring
any  citizens  of  the  United  States  . . .  whom  they  might
choose  to  send  for,  and  compel  them  to  give  answers  to
every inquiry which should be addressed to them” as “very
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses historical precedents and legal arguments related to subpoenas and congressional power.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

KENNEDY, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–9972
_________________

DENNYS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER v.

 UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[April 21, 2015]

JUSTICE KENNEDY, dissenting.
My join in JUSTICE THOMAS’ dissenting opinion does not
extend  to  Part  III.  Although  the  issue  discussed  in  that
Part  was  argued  here,  the  Court  of  Appeals  has  not  ad-
dressed that aspect of the case in any detail.  In my view
the  better  course  would  be  to  allow  that  court  to  do  so  in
the first instance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Dennys Rodriguez v. United States*.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

847

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10659.  Cassell  v.  Adam  Toler  Memorial  Funeral
Home, Inc.  Cir. Ct. Wyoming County, W. Va.  Certiorari denied.

No.  08–10661.  Dale  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  553
F.  3d  876.

No.  08–10662.  Watson  v.  New  York.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.
N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 55 App.
Div.  3d  934,  865  N. Y.  S.  2d  573.

No. 08–10664.  Torricellas v. Davidson, Warden.  C. A. 9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  279  Fed.  Appx.  504.

No.  08–10665.  Willenbring  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  225.

No.  08–10667.  Wrenn  v.  Oregon  Board  of  Parole  and
Post-Prison  Supervision  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  609.

No.  08–10668.  Jiles  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10670.  Jenkins  v.  Cate,  Secretary,  California  De
partment  of  Corrections  and  Rehabilitation.  C.  A.  9th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10671.  Link v.  Rhodes et al.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  624.

No. 08–10672.  Triumph v.  Connecticut.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  550.

No.  08–10676.  Snider  v.  Grayless  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Okla.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10678.  Johnson v.  Arkansas.  Sup. Ct. Ark.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  375  Ark.  462,  291  S. W.  3d  581.

No.  08–10680.  Wilson  v.  Guthria  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10681.  Wilson  v.  Caldwell  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, parties involved, courts, and certiorari decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Syllabus

crimes  receive  different  punishments  that  “reflect  their  relative
seriousness.”  Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S., at 405.  For example, accepting
a bribe as a federal official is punishable by up to 15 years in prison,
while accepting an illegal gratuity as a federal official is punishable by
up  to  only  2  years.  If  the  Government  were  correct  that  §666  also
covered  gratuities,  Congress  would  have  inexplicably  authorized
punishing gratuities to state and local officials five times more severely
than gratuities to federal officials—10 years for state and local officials
compared  to  2  years  for  federal  officials.    The  Government  cannot
explain why Congress would have created such substantial sentencing
disparities.  Pp. 9–10.

(5) Interpreting  §666  as  a  gratuities  statute  would  significantly
infringe on bedrock federalism principles.  Generally, States have the
“prerogative to regulate the permissible scope of interactions between
state officials and their constituents.”  McDonnell v. United States, 579
U. S.  550,  576.    The  differing  approaches  by  the  state  and  local
governments  reflect  policy  judgments  about  when  gifts  expressing
appreciation  to  public  officials  for  their  past  acts  cross  the  line  from
the  innocuous  to  the  problematic.   Those  carefully  calibrated  policy
decisions would be gutted if the Court were to accept the Government’s
interpretation of §666.  Reading §666 to create a federal prohibition on
gratuities would suddenly subject 19 million state and local officials to
a new and different regulatory regime for gratuities.  The Court should
hesitate  before  concluding  that  Congress  prohibited  gratuities  that
state and local governments have allowed.  After all, Congress does not
lightly override state and local governments on such core matters of
state and local governance.  Pp. 10–11.

(6) The  Government’s  interpretation  of  the  statute  would  create
traps for unwary state and local officials.  Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S., at
411.  The  Government  says  that  the  statute  would  not  cover
“innocuous” or “obviously benign” gratuities, but the Government does
not identify any remotely clear lines separating such a gratuity from a
criminal gratuity.  The Government simply opines that state and local
officials  may  not  accept  wrongful  gratuities.    The  Government’s  so-
called guidance would leave state and local officials entirely at sea to
guess about what gifts they are allowed to accept under federal law,
with the threat of up to 10 years in federal prison if they happen to
guess  wrong.   That  is  not  how  federal  criminal  law  works.   And  the
Court has rejected the view that it should construe a criminal statute
on the assumption that the Government will use it responsibly.  See
McDonnell, 579 U. S., at 576.  Pp. 11–14.

(b) Faced with the phalanx of difficulties with its interpretation of
§666, the Government’s argument boils down to one main point—that
§666  uses  the  term  “rewarded”  as  well  as  “influenced.”    The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal brief or a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the interpretation of a specific statute (§666) and its implications for state and local officials. The language is formal and legalistic, with references to case law and legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

21

Opinion of the Court

EEOC’s  definition  of  a  supervisor,  which  both  petitioner
and the United States defend, is a study in ambiguity.  In
its  Enforcement  Guidance,  the  EEOC  takes  the  position
that an employee, in order to be classified as a supervisor,
must wield authority “ ‘of sufficient magnitude so as to as
sist  the  harasser  explicitly  or  implicitly  in  carrying  out
the harassment.’ ”  Id., at 27 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert.
89a (EEOC Guidance)).  But any  authority over the work
of another employee provides at least some assistance, see
Ellerth,  supra,  at  763,  and  that  is  not  what  the  United
States  interprets  the  Guidance  to  mean.    Rather,  it  in
forms  us,  the  authority  must  exceed  both  an  ill-defined
temporal  requirement  (it  must  be  more  than  “occa
siona[l]”)  and  an  ill-defined  substantive  requirement  (“an
employee  who  directs  ‘only  a  limited  number  of  tasks  or
assignments’  for  another  employee  . . .  would  not  have
sufficient authority to qualify as a supervisor.”  U. S. Brief
28 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 92a (EEOC Guidance));
U. S. Brief 31.

We read the EEOC Guidance as saying that the number
(and perhaps the importance) of the tasks in question is a
factor to be considered in determining whether an employ
ee qualifies as a supervisor.  And if this is a correct inter
pretation of the EEOC’s position, what we are left with is
a proposed standard of remarkable ambiguity.

The vagueness of this standard  was highlighted at oral
argument  when  the  attorney  representing  the  United
States was asked to apply that standard to the situation in
Faragher,  where  the  alleged  harasser  supposedly  threat
ened to assign the plaintiff to clean the toilets in the life
guard station for a year if she did not date him.  524 U. S.,
at 780.  Since cleaning the toilets is just one task, albeit an
unpleasant one, the authority to assign that job would not
seem  to  meet  the  more-than-a-limited-number-of-tasks
requirement  in  the  EEOC  Guidance.    Nevertheless,  the
Government attorney’s first response was that the author
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the EEOC's definition of a supervisor and its ambiguity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

When CLS applied for registration, Judy Hansen Chap-
man, the Director of  Hastings’  Office of Student Services,
sent  an  e-mail  to  an  officer  of  the  chapter  informing  him
that  “CLS’s  bylaws  did  not  appear  to  be  compliant”  with
the  Hastings  Nondiscrimination  Policy,  App.  228,  277,  a
written  policy  that  provides  in  pertinent  part  that  “[t]he
University of California, Hastings College of the Law shall
not  discriminate  unlawfully  on  the  basis  of  race,  color,
religion,  national  origin,  ancestry,  disability,  age,  sex  or
sexual  orientation,”  id.,  at  220.  As  far  as  the  record  re-
flects,  Ms.  Chapman  made  no  mention  of  an  accept-all-
applicants policy.

A few  days later, three officers of the chapter met  with
Ms. Chapman, and she reiterated that the CLS bylaws did
not comply with “the religion and sexual orientation provi-
sions of the Nondiscrimination Policy and that they would
need  to  be  amended  in  order  for  CLS  to  become  a  regis-
tered  student  organization.”    Id.,  at  228.    About  a  week
later, Hastings sent CLS a letter to the same effect.  Id., at
228–229, 293–295.  On both of these occasions, it appears
that  not  a  word  was  said  about  an  accept-all-comers
policy.

When  CLS  refused  to  change  its  membership  require-
ments,  Hastings  denied  its  request  for  registration—thus
making CLS the only student group whose application for
registration has ever been rejected.  Brief in Opposition 4.
In  October  2004,  CLS  brought  this  action  under  42
U. S. C.  §1983  against  the  law  school’s  dean  and  other
school officials, claiming, among other things, that the law
school,  by  enacting  and  enforcing  the  Nondiscrimination
Policy,  had  violated  CLS’s  First  Amendment  right  to
freedom of speech.  App. 78.

In  May  2005,  Hastings  filed  an  answer  to  CLS’s  first
amended complaint and made an admission that is signifi-
cant  for  present  purposes.    In  its  complaint,  CLS  had
alleged  that  the  Nondiscrimination  Policy  discriminates
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal citations, arguments, and references to specific policies and events.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

GORSUCH, J., concurring

guarantees.  I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  and  write  to  offer
some additional observations about the doctrine on which it
rests.

I
A

One  of  the  Judiciary’s  most  solemn  duties  is  to  ensure
that  acts  of  Congress  are  applied  in  accordance  with  the
Constitution in the cases that come before us.  To help fulfill
that duty, courts have developed certain “clear-statement”
rules.  These rules assume that, absent a clear statement
otherwise,  Congress  means  for  its  laws  to  operate  in  con-
gruence with the Constitution rather than test its bounds.
In this way, these clear-statement rules help courts “act as
faithful agents of the  Constitution.”  A.  Barrett, Substan-
tive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B. U. L. Rev. 109, 169
(2010) (Barrett).

Consider  some  examples.  The  Constitution  prohibits
Congress from passing laws imposing various types of ret-
roactive  liability.  See  Art.  I,  §  9;  Landgraf  v.  USI  Film
Products, 511 U. S. 244, 265–266 (1994).  Consistent with
this rule, Chief Justice Marshall long ago advised that “a
court . . . ought to struggle hard against a [statutory] con-
struction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the
rights  of  parties.”  United  States  v.  Schooner  Peggy,
1 Cranch  103,  110  (1801).    Justice  Paterson  likewise  in-
sisted that courts must interpret statutes to apply only pro-
spectively “unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative,
that  no  other  meaning  can  be  annexed  to  them.”    United
States v. Heth, 3 Cranch 399, 413 (1806).

The Constitution also incorporates the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity.  See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1,
12–17 (1890).  To enforce that doctrine, courts have consist-
ently  held  that  “nothing  but  express  words,  or  an  insur-
mountable  implication”  would  justify  the  conclusion  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of West Virginia v. EPA. It discusses the "clear-statement" rules used by courts to interpret legislation in light of the Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

41

BREYER, J., dissenting

Oklahoma,  487  U. S.  815,  833,  n.  40  (1988)  (plurality
opinion).

For the reasons I have set forth in this opinion, I believe
it highly likely that the death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment.  At  the  very  least,  the  Court  should  call  for
full briefing on the basic question.

With respect, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer. It contains legal citations and arguments, which are not typically considered suitable for indexing in a general document pipeline.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1080

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 7, 2009

558 U. S.

No. 09–6867.  Ibarra  Perez v.  Oregon.  Ct.  App. Ore.  Cer
tiorari denied.  Reported below: 218 Ore. App. 375, 180 P. 3d 185.
No.  09–6880.  Cooper  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  17  So.  3d  705.

No.  09–6893.  Barker  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–6894.  Arrellano v.  Texas.  Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6895.  Bell  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330
Fed.  Appx.  492.

No.  09–6896.  Walker  v.  Carter  County,  Kentucky,  et  al.

C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6897.  Young  v.  Bodison,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  205.

No.  09–6926.  Kirnon  v.  Klopotoski,  Superintendent,
State Correctional  Institution at  Dallas, et al.  C.  A. 3d
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6950.  Midi  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.  C.  A.

4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  566  F.  3d  132.

No.  09–6971.  Ignacio  v.  United  States  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  689.

No.  09–6992.  Ballenger  v.  Mauney,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  224.

No.  09–6994.  Middleton  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  14th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7021.  Marshner  v.  Maryland.  Ct.  Sp.  App.  Md.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  184  Md.  App.  751.

No.  09–7029.  Johnson  v.  Oregon.  Sup.  Ct.  Ore.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  346  Ore.  258,  210  P.  3d  906.

No.  09–7109.  Santos  v.  DiGuglielmo,  Superintendent,
State  Correctional  Institution  at  Graterford,  et  al.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC

Opinion of the Court

but  also  civil  and  criminal  litigation—require  parties  to
wait before appealing, even when doing so subjects them to
“significant  burdens.”   Brief  for  Federal  Parties  47–49.
That is true, and will remain so: Nothing we say today por-
tends newfound enthusiasm for interlocutory review.  Re-
turn, for example, to Thunder Basin and Elgin.  There, the
coal company and federal employee could both have argued
that  the  statutory  review  process  would  subject  them  to
greater litigation costs than their preferred suit in district
court.  But that would not have mattered.  We have made
clear, just as the Government says, that “the expense and
disruption”  of  “protracted  adjudicatory  proceedings”  on  a
claim  do  not  justify  immediate  review.  FTC  v.  Standard
Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U. S. 232, 244 (1980); see, e.g., Myers v.
Bethlehem  Shipbuilding  Corp.,  303  U. S.  41,  51  (1938).
What makes the difference here is the nature of the claims
and  accompanying  harms  that  the  parties  are  asserting.
Again, Axon and Cochran protest the “here-and-now” injury
of  subjection  to  an  unconstitutionally  structured  deci-
sionmaking process.  See supra, at 13.  And more, subjec-
tion to that process irrespective of its outcome, or of other
decisions made within it.  A nearer analogy  than  any  the
Government  offers  is  to  our  established  immunity  doc-
trines.   There,  we  have  identified  certain  rights  “not  to
stand trial” or face other legal processes.  Mitchell v. For-
syth,  472  U. S.  511,  526  (1985).    And  we  have  recognized
that those rights are “effectively lost” if review is deferred
until after trial.  Ibid.  So too here, Axon and Cochran will
lose  their  rights  not  to  undergo  the  complained-of  agency
proceedings if they cannot assert those rights until the pro-
ceedings are over.

The  collateralism  factor  favors  Axon  and  Cochran  for
much the same  reason—because  they are challenging  the
Commissions’ power to proceed at all, rather than actions
taken in the agency proceedings.  That distinction, as noted
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the merits of interlocutory review in a case involving Axon Enterprise, Inc. and the FTC. The text delves into legal precedents and arguments related to the nature of the claims and potential harms faced by the parties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC.

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Like the Court of Appeals, I am convinced that the EPA
has misinterpreted the plain text of §316(b).  Unless costs
are  so  high  that  the  best  technology  is  not  “available,”
Congress  has  decided  that  they  are  outweighed  by  the
benefits  of  minimizing  adverse  environmental  impact.
Section  316(b)  neither  expressly  nor  implicitly  authorizes
the EPA to use cost-benefit analysis when setting regula-
tory standards; fairly read, it prohibits such use.

I
As typically performed by the EPA, cost-benefit analysis
requires  the  Agency  to  first  monetize  the  costs  and  bene-
fits  of  a  regulation,  balance  the  results,  and  then  choose
the regulation with the greatest net benefits.  The process
is  particularly  controversial  in  the  environmental  context
in  which  a  regulation’s  financial  costs  are  often  more
obvious  and  easier  to  quantify  than  its  environmental
benefits.  And  cost-benefit  analysis  often,  if  not  always,
yields  a  result  that  does  not  maximize  environmental
protection.

For  instance,  although  the  EPA  estimated  that  water
intake  structures  kill  3.4  billion  fish  and  shellfish  each
year,1  see  69  Fed.  Reg.  41586,  the  Agency  struggled  to
calculate  the  value  of  the  aquatic  life  that  would  be  pro-

——————

1 To  produce  energy,  industrial  powerplants  withdraw  billions  of
gallons  of  water  daily  from  our  Nation’s  waterways.    Thermo-
electric  powerplants  alone  demand  39  percent  of  all  freshwater  with-
drawn  nationwide.  See  Dept.  of  Energy,  Addressing  the  Critical
Link  Between  Fossil  Energy  and  Water  2  (Oct.  2005),  http://
www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/coalpower/ewr/pubs/NETL_Water_Paper
_Final_Oct.2005.pdf  (all  Internet  materials  as  visited  Mar.  18,  2009,
and  available  in  Clerk  of  Court’s  case  file).    The  fish  and  shellfish  are
killed  by  “impingement”  or  “entrainment.”    Impingement  occurs  when
aquatic  organisms  are  trapped  against  the  screens  and  grills  of  water
intake  structures.    Entrainment  occurs  when  these  organisms  are
drawn  into  the  intake  structures.  See  Riverkeeper,  Inc.  v.  EPA,  475
F. 3d 83, 89 (CA2 2007); 69 Fed. Reg. 41586 (2004).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

19

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of GINSBURG,  J.

APPENDIX

The Bladensburg Peace Cross.  App. 887.

Map showing the location of the Peace Cross.  App. 1533.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a table of contents or a list of appendices, not the main body text of a legal opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

5

Opinion of the Court

of a “right to counsel” in civil contempt proceedings enforc-
ing  child  support  orders,  we  granted  the  writ.    Compare,
e.g., Pasqua v. Council, 186 N. J. 127, 141–146, 892 A. 2d
663,  671–674  (2006);  Black  v.  Division  of  Child  Support
Enforcement, 686 A. 2d 164, 167–168 (Del. 1996); Mead v.
Batchlor, 435 Mich. 480, 488–505, 460 N. W. 2d 493, 496–
504 (1990); Ridgway v.  Baker, 720 F. 2d 1409, 1413–1415
(CA5  1983)  (all  finding  a  federal  constitutional  right  to
counsel  for  indigents  facing  imprisonment  in  a  child  sup-
port  civil  contempt  proceeding),  with  Rodriguez  v.  Eighth
Judicial Dist. Ct., County of Clark, 120 Nev. 798, 808–813,
102  P. 3d  41,  48–51  (2004)  (no  right  to  counsel  in  civil
contempt  hearing  for  nonsupport,  except  in  “rarest  of
cases”); Andrews v. Walton, 428 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1983)
(“no  circumstances  in  which  a  parent  is  entitled  to  court-
appointed  counsel  in  a  civil  contempt  proceeding  for  fail-
ure to pay child support”).  Compare also In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 468 F. 2d 1368, 1369 (CA9 1972) (per curiam)
(general  right  to  counsel  in  civil  contempt  proceedings),
with Duval v. Duval, 114 N. H. 422, 425–427, 322 A. 2d 1,
3–4 (1974) (no general right, but counsel may be required
on case-by-case basis).

II
Respondents  argue  that  this  case  is  moot.    See  Massa-
chusetts  v.  Mellon,  262  U. S.  447,  480  (1923)  (Article  III
judicial  power  extends  only  to  actual  “cases”  and  “contro-
versies”); Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U. S. __, __ (2009) (slip op.,
at 4) (“An actual controversy must be extant at all stages
of review” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  They point
out  that  Turner  completed  his  12-month  prison  sentence
in 2009.  And they add that there are no “collateral conse-
quences”  of  that  particular  contempt  determination  that
might  keep  the  dispute  alive.    Compare  Sibron  v.  New
York, 392 U. S. 40, 55–56 (1968) (release from prison does
not moot a criminal case because “collateral consequences”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings related to child support. It cites legal precedents and arguments, indicating its suitability for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

498

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY, et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the first circuit

No. 97–42. Argued March 4, 1998—Decided June 25, 1998

In 1946, a historic labor agreement between coal operators and the United
Mine Workers of America (UMWA) led to the creation of beneﬁt funds
that provided for the medical expenses of miners and their dependents,
with the precise beneﬁts determined by UMWA-appointed trustees.
Those trusts served as the model for the United Mine Workers of
America Welfare and Retirement Fund (1947 W&R Fund), which was
established by the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1947
(1947 NBCWA). The Fund used proceeds of a royalty on coal produc-
tion to provide beneﬁts to miners and their families, and trustees deter-
mined beneﬁt levels and other matters. The 1950 NBCWA created a
new fund (1950 W&R Fund), which used a ﬁxed amount of royalties for
beneﬁts, gave trustees the authority to establish and adjust beneﬁt lev-
els so as to remain within the budgetary restraints, and did not guaran-
tee lifetime health beneﬁts for retirees and their dependents. The 1950
W&R Fund continued to operate with beneﬁt levels subject to revision
until the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
introduced speciﬁc funding and vesting requirements for pension plans.
To comply with ERISA, the UMWA and the Bituminous Coal Operators’
Association entered into the 1974 NBCWA, which created four new
trusts.
It was the ﬁrst agreement to expressly reference health bene-
ﬁts for retirees, but it did not alter the employers’ obligation to contrib-
ute a ﬁxed amount of royalties. The new agreement did not extend the
employers’ liability beyond the term of the agreement. Miners who
retired before 1976 were covered by the 1950 Beneﬁt Plan and Trust
(1950 Beneﬁt Plan), and those retiring after 1975 were covered by the
1974 Beneﬁt Plan and Trust (1974 Beneﬁt Plan). The increase in bene-
ﬁts and other factors—the decline in coal production, the retirement of
a generation of miners, and rapid acceleration in health care costs—
quickly caused ﬁnancial problems for the 1950 and 1974 Beneﬁt Plans.
To ensure the Plans’ solvency, the 1978 NBCWA obligated signatories
to make sufﬁcient contributions to maintain beneﬁts as long as they
were in the coal business. As the Plans continued to suffer ﬁnancially,
employers began to withdraw, leaving the remaining signatories to ab-
sorb the increasing cost of covering retirees left behind.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a legal case, specifically the case of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a summary of the case rather than the full text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

21

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

arrangements for “transition[ing]” quickly to forms of “rep-
resentative government.”  J. Eblen, The First and Second
United States Empires: Governors and Territorial Govern-
ment 1784–1912, pp. 54, 59 (1968); see also Leibowitz, De-
fining Status, at 6–7.

Congress’ provision of limited or incremental home-rule
measures,  moreover,  seems  to  reveal  little  about  the  re-
strictions the Appointments Clause imposes on officers se-
lected by the Federal Government.  By definition, selection
by  home  rule  does  not  track  the  methods  outlined  in  the
Appointments Clause.  But perhaps that is because home-
rule measures give to the Territory the ability to select its
own  governing  officers,  which  by  necessity  are  territorial
rather than federal.  That the Territory selects its own gov-
erning officers, and that these officers are necessarily terri-
torial,  does  not  obviously  imply  that  Congress  may  disre-
gard  the  Appointments  Clause  when  it  later  provides  for
the Federal Government to select officers carrying out ter-
ritorial responsibilities.6

In  all,  then,  it  is  not  particularly  surprising  that  many
officers who acted for the Territories historically were ap-
pointed in a manner other than that set out in the Appoint-
ments  Clause.  Viewed  in  proper  historical  context,  those
officers’  appointments  may  reflect  nothing  more  than  the
necessary incidents of the transition to and establishment
of  full  territorial  self-government.  For  the  overwhelming
majority  of  Territories  in  this  Nation’s  history,  of  course,
that turning point coincided with Statehood.  See Leibowitz,
Defining Status, at 6–8 (describing the “transitory nature”
of the early Territories’ “evolutionary process culminat[ing]

——————

6 For that reason, no unavoidable tension seems to exist between re-
quiring compliance with the Appointments Clause for the Board mem-
bers and preserving complete home rule in Puerto Rico (or, for that mat-
ter, any of the other Territories).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 590 U.S. ____ (2020). It delves into the historical context of the Appointments Clause and its application to territorial officers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

1860–1880, p. 638 (1935); see J. Anderson, The Education
of Blacks in the South 1860–1935, p. 7 (1988).  Black Amer-
icans  thus  insisted,  in  the  words  of  Frederick  Douglass,
“that in a country governed by the people, like ours, educa-
tion of the youth of all classes is vital to its welfare, pros-
perity, and to its existence.”  Address to the People of the
United States (1883), in 4 P. Foner, The Life and Writings
of Frederick Douglass 386 (1955).  Black people’s yearning
for freedom of thought, and for a more perfect Union with
educational opportunity for all, played a crucial role during
the Reconstruction era.

Yet emancipation marked the beginning, not the end, of
that era.  Abolition alone could not repair centuries of racial
subjugation.  Following the Thirteenth Amendment’s rati-
fication, the Southern States replaced slavery with “a sys-
tem  of  ‘laws  which  imposed  upon  [Black  people]  onerous
disabilities and  burdens,  and  curtailed  their rights  in  the
pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that
their freedom was of little value.’ ”  Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 390 (1978) (opinion of Marshall, J.)
(quoting  Slaughter-House  Cases,  16  Wall.  36,  70  (1873)).
Those so-called “Black Codes” discriminated against Black
people on the basis of race, regardless of whether they had
been previously enslaved.  See, e.g., 1866 N. C. Sess. Laws
pp. 99, 102.

Moreover,  the  criminal  punishment  exception  in  the
Thirteenth  Amendment  facilitated  the  creation  of  a  new
system  of  forced  labor  in  the  South.    Southern  States  ex-
panded their criminal laws, which in turn “permitted invol-
untary servitude as a punishment” for convicted Black per-
sons.  D.  Blackmon,  Slavery  by  Another  Name:  The  Re-
Enslavement  of  Black  Americans  From  the  Civil  War  to
World War II, pp. 7, 53 (2009) (Slavery by Another Name).
States required, for example, that Black people “sign a la-
bor contract to work for a white employer or face prosecu-
tion  for  vagrancy.”  The  Second  Founding  48.    State  laws
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the history of racial discrimination in education and the legacy of slavery.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  601 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

BARRETT, J., concurring

make an intelligent decision on the motion for a stay pend-
ing appeal.  Once the court is equipped to rule, its obligation
to  apply  the  Nken  factors  is  triggered—a  point  that  some
judges have pressed their Circuits to consider.  See, e.g., Doe
#1, 944 F. 3d, at 1226 (Bress, J., dissenting); National Ur-
ban League, 977 F. 3d, at 705, n. 5 (Bumatay, J., dissent-
ing).  The United States suggests that, on several occasions,
the Fifth Circuit has allowed administrative stays to linger
for so long that they function like stays pending appeal.  Ap-
plication to Vacate Stay 15, n. 3.

The  time  may  come,  in  this  case  or  another,  when  this
Court is forced to conclude that an administrative stay has
effectively become a stay pending appeal and review it ac-
cordingly.  But at this juncture in this case, that conclusion
would be premature.  The applicants’ opposition to the ad-
ministrative stay included a request that any such stay it-
self be stayed for seven days pending an application to this
Court, and the Fifth Circuit granted that request in its or-
der.  It  is  surprising  that  both  the  parties  and  the  panel
contemplated from the start that this Court might review
an administrative stay.  Before this Court intervenes on the
emergency  docket,  the  Fifth  Circuit  should  be  the  first
mover: It should apply the Nken factors and decide the mo-
tion  for  a  stay  pending  appeal.    It  can  presumably  do  so
promptly.  Texas’s  motion  for  a  stay  pending  appeal  was
fully  briefed  in  the  Fifth  Circuit  by  March  5,  almost  two
weeks ago.  Merits briefing on Texas’s challenge to the Dis-
trict Court’s injunction of S. B. 4 is currently underway.  If
a decision does not issue soon, the applicants may return to
this Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Barrett. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a stay pending appeal and the application of the Nken factors.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

499

Syllabus

Ultimately, Congress passed the Coal Industry Retiree Health Beneﬁt
Act of 1992 (Coal Act) to stabilize funding and provide for beneﬁts to
retirees by merging the 1950 and 1974 Beneﬁt Plans into a new fund
(Combined Fund) that provides substantially the same beneﬁts as pro-
vided by the 1950 and 1974 Plans and is funded by premiums assessed
against coal operators that signed any NBCWA or other agreement re-
quiring contributions to the 1950 or 1974 Beneﬁt Plans. Respondent,
Commissioner of Social Security, assigns retirees to signatory coal oper-
ators according to the following allocation formula: First, to the most
recent signatory to the 1978 or a subsequent NBCWA to employ the
retiree in the coal industry for at least two years, 26 U. S. C. § 9706(a)(1);
second, to the most recent signatory to the 1978 or a subsequent
NBCWA to employ the retiree in the coal industry, § 9706(a)(2); and
third, to the signatory operator that employed the retiree in the coal
industry for the longest period of time prior to the effective date of the
1978 NBCWA, § 9706(a)(3).

Petitioner Eastern Enterprises (Eastern) was a signatory to every
NBCWA executed between 1947 and 1964.
It is “in business” within
the Coal Act’s meaning, although it left the coal industry in 1965, after
transferring its coal operations to a subsidiary (EACC) and ultimately
selling its interest in EACC to respondent Peabody Holding Company,
Inc. (Peabody). Under the Coal Act, the Commissioner assigned East-
ern the obligation for Combined Fund premiums respecting over 1,000
retired miners who had worked for the company before 1966. Eastern
sued the Commissioner and other respondents, claiming that the Coal
Act violates substantive due process and constitutes a taking in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court granted respondents
summary judgment, and the First Circuit afﬁrmed.

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

110 F. 3d 150, reversed and remanded.

Justice O(cid:146)Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia,

and Justice Thomas, concluded:

1. The declaratory judgment and injunction petitioner seeks are an
appropriate remedy for the taking alleged in this case, and it is within
the district courts’ power to award such equitable relief. The Tucker
Act may require that a just compensation claim under the Takings
Clause be ﬁled in the Court of Federal Claims, but petitioner does not
In situations analogous to
seek compensation from the Government.
the one here, this Court has assumed the lack of a compensatory remedy
and has granted equitable relief for Takings Clause violations without
discussing the Tucker Act’s applicability. See, e. g., Babbitt v. Youpee,
519 U. S. 234, 234–235. Pp. 519–522.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court decision. It includes citations, case names, and a brief overview of the legal issues involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

Opinion of the Court

occurred both because the defendant ran a red light and be-
cause the plaintiff failed to signal his turn at the intersec-
tion, we might call each a but-for cause of the collision.  Cf.
Burrage  v.  United  States,  571  U. S.  204,  211–212  (2014).
When it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional
but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid
liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to
its challenged employment decision.  So long as the plain-
tiff ’s  sex  was  one  but-for  cause  of  that  decision,  that  is
enough to trigger the law.  See ibid.; Nassar, 570 U. S., at
350.

No doubt, Congress could have taken a more parsimoni-
ous  approach.  As  it  has  in  other  statutes,  it  could  have
added  “solely”  to  indicate  that  actions  taken  “because  of ”
the confluence of multiple factors do not violate the law.  Cf.
11 U. S. C. §525; 16 U. S. C. §511.  Or it could have written
“primarily because of ” to indicate that the prohibited factor
had to be the main cause of the defendant’s challenged em-
ployment decision.  Cf. 22 U. S. C. §2688.  But none of this
is the law we have.  If anything, Congress has moved in the
opposite direction, supplementing Title VII in 1991 to allow
a  plaintiff  to  prevail  merely  by  showing  that  a  protected
trait  like  sex  was  a  “motivating  factor”  in  a  defendant’s
challenged employment practice.  Civil Rights Act of 1991,
§107, 105 Stat. 1075,  codified at 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(m).
Under this more forgiving standard, liability can sometimes
follow even if sex wasn’t a but-for cause of the employer’s
challenged decision.  Still, because nothing in our analysis
depends on the motivating factor test, we focus on the more
traditional but-for causation standard that continues to af-
ford a viable, if no longer exclusive, path to relief under Ti-
tle VII.  §2000e–2(a)(1).

As sweeping as even the but-for causation standard can
be,  Title  VII  does  not  concern  itself  with  everything  that
happens “because of ” sex.  The statute imposes liability on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the "but-for" causation standard in the context of Title VII employment discrimination. It delves into legal precedents and interpretations of the statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  601 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Per Curiam

States”  and  the  President  is  not  an  “officer  of  the  United
States” within the meaning of that provision.  See App. to
Pet. for Cert. 184a–284a.

In  December,  the  Colorado  Supreme  Court  reversed  in
part and affirmed in part by a 4 to 3 vote.  Reversing the
District  Court’s  operative  holding,  the  majority  concluded
that  for  purposes  of  Section  3,  the  Presidency  is  an  office
under the United States and the President is an officer of
the United States.  The court otherwise affirmed, holding
(1) that the Colorado Election Code permitted the respond-
ents’ challenge based on Section 3; (2) that Congress need
not pass implementing legislation for disqualifications un-
der Section 3 to attach; (3) that the political question doc-
trine  did  not  preclude  judicial  review  of  former  President
Trump’s eligibility; (4) that the District Court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting into evidence portions of a con-
gressional Report on the events of January 6; (5) that the
District  Court did not err in concluding that  those events
constituted  an  “insurrection”  and  that  former  President
Trump “engaged in” that insurrection; and (6) that former
President  Trump’s  speech  to  the  crowd  that  breached  the
Capitol on January 6 was not protected by the First Amend-
ment.  See id., at 1a–114a.

The Colorado Supreme Court accordingly ordered Secre-
tary  Griswold not to “list President Trump’s  name on the
2024  presidential  primary  ballot”  or  “count  any  write-in
votes cast for him.”  Id., at 114a.  Chief Justice Boatright
and Justices Samour and Berkenkotter each filed dissent-
ing opinions.  Id., at 115a–124a, 125a–161a, 162a–183a.

Under the terms of the opinion of the Colorado Supreme
Court,  its  ruling  was  automatically  stayed  pending  this
Court’s review.  See id., at 114a.  We granted former Presi-
dent Trump’s petition for certiorari, which raised a single
question: “Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering
President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential pri-
mary ballot?”  See 601 U. S. ___ (2024).  Concluding that it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a portion of one, specifically discussing the case of former President Trump's eligibility for the 2024 presidential ballot in Colorado. It cites legal precedents, court decisions, and specific sections of law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28  ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.

v. GOLDSMITH
KAGAN, J., dissenting

to “target” or otherwise comment on the originals.  “Thomas
Mann, himself a master of [the art,] called [it] ‘higher crib-
bing.’ ”    Lethem  59.  The  point  here  is  that  most  writers
worth their salt steal other writers’ moves—and put them
to  other,  often  better  uses.  But  the  majority  would  say,
again and yet again in the face of such transformative cop-
ying, “no factor 1 help and surely no fair use.”

Or how about music?  Positively rife with copying of all
kinds.  Suppose some early blues artist (W. C. Handy, per-
haps?)  had  copyrighted  the  12-bar,  three-chord  form—the
essential foundation (much as Goldsmith’s photo is to War-
hol’s silkscreen) of many blues songs.  Under the majority’s
view,  Handy  could  then  have  controlled—meaning,  cur-
tailed—the development of the genre.  And also of a fair bit
of rock and roll.  “Just another rendition of 12-bar blues for
sale  in  record  stores,”  the  majority  would  say  to  Chuck
Berry  (Johnny  B.  Goode),  Bill  Haley  (Rock  Around  the
Clock), Jimi Hendrix (Red House), or Eric Clapton (Cross-
roads).  Or to switch genres, imagine a pioneering classical
composer  (Haydn?)  had  copyrighted  the  three-section  so-
nata form.  “One more piece built on the same old structure,
for use in concert halls,” the majority might say to Mozart
and  Beethoven  and  countless  others:  “Sure,  some  new
notes, but the backbone of your compositions is identical.”

And  then,  there’s  the  appropriation  of  those  notes,  and
accompanying  words,  for  use  in  new  and  different  ways.
Stravinsky reportedly said that great composers do not im-
itate, but instead steal.  See P. Yates, Twentieth Century
Music 41 (1967).  At any rate, he would have known.  He
took  music  from  all  over—from  Russian  folk  melodies  to
Schoenberg—and made it inimitably his own.  And then—
as these things go—his music became a source for others.
Charlie Parker turned The Rite of Spring into something of
a jazz standard: You can still hear the Stravinsky lurking,
but jazz musicians make the composition a thing of a differ-
ent  kind.  And  popular  music?    I  won’t  point  fingers,  but
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically focusing on the concept of copyright and fair use in relation to artistic appropriation. It uses examples from literature, music, and art to argue against a restrictive interpretation of copyright law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>