<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

GARLAND v. CARGILL

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

forward in the bump stock, which presses the trigger into
his  trigger  finger,  Cargill  v.  Barr,  502  F. Supp.  3d  1163,
1175 (WD Tex. 2020).  As long as the shooter keeps his trig-
ger  finger  on  the  finger  rest  and  maintains  constant  for-
ward pressure on the rifle’s barrel or front grip, the weapon
will  fire  continuously.    See  83  Fed.  Reg.  66516.    A  rifle
equipped with a bump stock can fire at a rate between 400
and 800 rounds per minute.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.

II
  A machinegun does not fire itself.  The important ques-
tion under the statute is how a person can fire it.  A weapon
is a “machinegun” when a shooter can (1) “by a single func-
tion of the trigger,” (2) shoot “automatically more than one
shot,  without  manually  reloading.”    26  U. S. C.  §5845(b).
The plain language of that definition refers most obviously
to a rifle like an M16, where a single pull of the trigger pro-
vides continuous fire as long as the shooter maintains back-
ward  pressure  on  the  trigger.    The  definition  of  “ma-
chinegun”  also  includes  “any  part  designed  and  intended
. . .  for  use  in  converting  a  weapon  into  a  machinegun.”
Ibid.    That  language  naturally  covers  devices  like  bump
stocks, which “conver[t]” semiautomatic rifles so that a sin-
gle pull of the trigger provides continuous fire as long as the
shooter maintains forward pressure on the gun.
  This is not a hard case.  All of the textual evidence points
to the same interpretation.  A bump-stock-equipped semi-
automatic  rifle is  a  machinegun  because (1) with  a single
pull  of  the  trigger,  a shooter  can (2)  fire continuous shots
without  any  human  input  beyond  maintaining  forward
pressure.    The  majority  looks  to  the  internal  mechanism
that  initiates  fire,  rather  than  the  human  act  of  the
shooter’s initial pull, to hold that a “single function of the
trigger” means a reset of the trigger mechanism.  Its inter-
pretation requires six diagrams and an animation to deci-
pher the meaning of the statutory text.  See ante, at 8–11,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Garland v. Cargill. It delves into the legal definition of a "machinegun" and argues that bump stocks should be classified as such.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
938

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–36.  Republic  of  Argentina  v.  Capital  Ventures
International.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Justice So
tomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this
petition.  Reported  below:  552  F.  3d  289.

No.  09–63.  McDaniel,  Warden  v.  Sechrest.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Motion  of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  549  F.  3d  789.

No. 09–71.  Slater v.  United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.
Appx.  78.

No.  09–76.  Nordella  v.  Blue  Cross  and  Blue  Shield  of
California  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  The
Chief  Justice  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of
this  petition.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  828.

No.  09–78.  Briarpatch  Ltd.,  LP,  et  al.  v.  Geisler  Rober
deau,  Inc.,  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice
Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this
petition.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  433.

No.  09–80.  Schoedinger  et  al.  v.  United  Healthcare  of
the  Midwest,  Inc.  C. A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice
Thomas  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  peti
tion.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  872.

No.  09–84.  Murphy,  Commissioner,  Connecticut  Depart
ment  of  Correction  v.  Bryant.  Sup.  Ct.  Conn.  Motion  of
respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  290  Conn.  502,  964  A.  2d  1186.
No.  09–214.  Pignard  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  303  Fed.
Appx.  923.

No.  09–5041.  Daigneault  v.  Eaton  Corp.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–5077.  Johnson  v.  Girdich,  Superintendent,  Up
state  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  de
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 87 (2009)

91

Opinion of the Court

they asked the court (1) to certify the case as a class action,
(2) to  declare that they  had a due  process right to  a prompt
postseizure  probable-cause  hearing,  (3)  to  declare  that  the
hearing  must  take  place  within  10  days  of  any  seizure,  and
(4)  to  enjoin  the  defendants’  current  practice  of  keeping
the  property  in  custody  for  a  longer  time  without  a  judi
cial  determination  of  probable  cause.  See  Complaint  ¶ 36,
App. 36a.

The  defendants  moved  to  dismiss  the  complaint  on  the
ground that Seventh Circuit precedent made clear that “the
Constitution does not require any procedure prior to the ac
tual  forfeiture  proceeding.”  Jones  v.  Takaki,  38  F.  3d  321,
324 (1994) (citing Von Neumann, supra, at 249).  On Febru
ary  22,  2007,  the  District  Court  granted  the  motion  to  dis
miss.  It also denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certiﬁca
tion.  The plaintiffs appealed.

On May 2, 2008, the Seventh Circuit decided the appeal in
the  plaintiffs’  favor.  Smith  v.  Chicago,  524  F.  3d  834.  It
reconsidered  and  departed  from  its  earlier  precedent.  Id.,
at 836–839.  It held that “the procedures set out in” the Illi
nois  statute  “show  insufﬁcient  concern  for  the  due  process
right  of  the  plaintiffs.”  Id.,  at  838.  And  it  added  that,
“given  the  length  of  time  which  can  result  between  the  sei
zure of property and the opportunity for an owner to contest
the  seizure  under”  Illinois  law,  “some  sort  of  mechanism  to
test the validity of the retention of the property is required.”
Ibid.  The  Court  of  Appeals  reversed  the  judgment  of  the
District  Court  and  remanded  the  case  for  further  proceed
ings.  Id.,  at  839.  Its  mandate  issued  about  seven  weeks
thereafter.

On February 23, 2009, we granted certiorari to review the
Seventh  Circuit’s  “due  process”  determination.  The  Court
of  Appeals  had  already  recalled  its  mandate.  The  parties
ﬁled briefs in this Court.  We then recognized that the case
might be moot, and we asked the parties to address the ques
tion of mootness at the forthcoming oral argument.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the Opinion of the Court section. It discusses the procedural history of a case, including appeals and the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

965

558 U. S.

October 13, 2009

late  courts  denied  petitioner  leave  to  appeal  the  trial  court’s  ac
tion.  Second,  petitioner  has  ﬁled  for  bankruptcy,  and  an  auto
matic  bankruptcy  stay  has  issued  pursuant  to  11  U. S. C.  § 362.
Respondent  contends  that  the  present  action  comes  within  the
scope  of  the  automatic  stay.  If  we  were  to  grant  the  petition  we
would  be  required  to  construe  New  Jersey  law  without  the  aid  of
a  reasoned  state  appellate  court  decision  and  to  confront  a  proce
dural  obstacle  unrelated  to  the  question  presented.  Under  these
circumstances, it is best to deny the petition.  It seems advisable,
however,  to  note  that  the  petition  for  certiorari  does  implicate
issues  of  constitutional  signiﬁcance.

No.  08–10604.  Baker  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d
Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  554
F.  3d  230.

No.  08–10885.  McCargo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–45.  Norris,  Director,  Arkansas  Department  of
Correction v. Sasser.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Motion of respondent for
leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  granted.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  553  F.  3d  1121.

No.  09–186.  Colon,  aka  Lopez  v.  Holder,  Attorney  Gen
eral.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.  Re
ported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  684.

No.  09–5194.  Josephberg  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  562  F.
3d  478.

No. 09–5761.  Luo v. Town of Hempstead, New York, et al.
C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no
part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported
below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  77.

No.  09–5816.  Uzamere  v.  Allen  E.  Kaye,  P.  C.,  et  al.
C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no
part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a list of court orders, including case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken. It is not sequential narrative text and lacks the characteristics of typical book content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of the Court

be administered in accordance with Article X, section 6, of
the Montana Constitution, which contains a “no-aid” provi-
sion  barring  government  aid  to  sectarian  schools.    See
Mont.  Code  Ann.  §15–30–3101.    In  full,  that  provision
states:

“Aid prohibited to sectarian schools. . . . The leg-
islature,  counties,  cities,  towns,  school  districts,  and
public corporations shall not make any direct or indi-
rect appropriation or payment from any public fund or
monies, or any grant of lands or other property for any
sectarian  purpose  or  to  aid  any  church,  school,  acad-
emy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or
scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by
any  church,  sect,  or  denomination.”  Mont.  Const.,
Art. X, §6(1).

Shortly  after  the  scholarship  program  was  created,  the
Montana  Department  of  Revenue  promulgated  “Rule  1,”
over the objection of the Montana Attorney General.  That
administrative rule prohibited families from using scholar-
  Mont.  Admin.  Rule
ships  at  religious  schools.
§42.4.802(1)(a) (2015).  It did so by changing the definition
of  “qualified  education  provider”  to  exclude  any  school
“owned or controlled in whole or in part by any church, re-
ligious sect, or denomination.”  Ibid.  The Department ex-
plained that the Rule was needed to reconcile the scholar-
ship  program  with  the  no-aid  provision  of  the  Montana
Constitution.

The Montana Attorney General disagreed.  In a letter to
the Department, he advised that the Montana Constitution
did  not  require  excluding  religious  schools  from  the  pro-
gram, and if it did, it would “very likely” violate the United
States  Constitution  by  discriminating  against  the  schools
and  their  students.    See  Complaint  in  No.  DV–15–1152A
(Dist. Ct. Flathead Cty.), Exh. 3, pp. 2, 5–6.  The Attorney
General is not representing the Department in this case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing legal precedents and constitutional provisions. It's likely part of a larger legal document and contains important factual and legal information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
284

SOUTH  CAROLINA  v.  NORTH  CAROLINA

Opinion of Roberts, C. J.

III

Charlotte,  Duke  Energy,  and  CRWSP  claim  a  variety  of
speciﬁc needs for water to justify their intervention.  But all
those particular needs derive from an interest in the water of
the  Catawba  River.  That  interest  is  not  exclusive,  but  is
instead  shared  “with  all  other  citizens  and  creatures  of  the
state.”  New  Jersey  v.  New  York,  345  U. S.,  at  373.  The
State’s  “citizens  and  creatures”  certainly  put  the  Catawba’s
water  and  ﬂow  to  different  uses—many  for  drinking  water,
some for farming or recreation, others for generating power.
That  does  not,  however,  make  their  interest  in  the  water
itself unique.  And it is the respective interests of the States
in  the  water  itself  that  are  being  litigated  in  this  original
action—not  the  claims  of  particular  citizens  that  they  be  al
lowed to put the water to speciﬁed uses.  The latter subject
is  “an  intramural  dispute  over  the  distribution  of  water
within the [State],” ibid., and is not the subject of this origi
nal proceeding.

The  majority  recognizes  as  much  with  respect  to  Char
lotte,  ante,  at  274–276,  but  departs  from  these  principles  in
granting  intervention  to  Duke  Energy  and  CRWSP.  The
majority’s reasons for doing so do not withstand scrutiny.

The  majority  initially  contends  that  Duke  Energy  should
be allowed to intervene because it possesses “relevant infor
mation” that we are “likely to consider.”  Ante, at 272, 273.
Nonparties  often  do,  but  that  is  not  a  “compelling  interest”
justifying  intervention.  I  have  little  doubt  that  Philadel
phia  possessed  pertinent  information  in  New  Jersey  v.  New
York, but we did not permit Philadelphia to intervene on that
ground.  Parties to litigation have ready means of access to
relevant  information  held  by  nonparties,  and  those  nonpar
ties  can  certainly  furnish  such  information  on  their  own  if
they consider it in their best interests (through, for example,
participation as amici curiae).

The majority also states that Duke Energy has compelling
interests in its hydroelectric operations  along the river, and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the intervention of certain parties in a water rights dispute. It delves into legal precedents and arguments regarding the nature of the dispute and the justification for intervention.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY ET AL.
v. MYRIAD GENETICS, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 12–398.  Argued April 15, 2013—Decided June 13, 2013

Each  human  gene  is  encoded  as  deoxyribonucleic  acid  (DNA),  which
takes  the  shape  of  a  “double  helix.”    Each  “cross-bar”  in  that  helix
consists of two chemically joined nucleotides.  Sequences of DNA nu-
cleotides contain the information necessary to create strings of amino
acids  used  to  build  proteins  in  the  body.    The  nucleotides  that  code
for amino acids are “exons,” and those that do not are “introns.”  Sci-
entists  can  extract  DNA  from  cells  to  isolate  specific  segments  for
study.    They  can  also  synthetically  create  exons-only  strands  of  nu-
cleotides known as complementary DNA (cDNA).  cDNA contains only the
exons that occur in DNA, omitting the intervening introns.

Respondent  Myriad  Genetics,  Inc.  (Myriad),  obtained  several    pa-
tents  after  discovering  the  precise  location  and  sequence  of  the
BRCA1  and  BRCA2  genes,  mutations  of  which  can  dramatically  in-
crease the risk of breast and ovarian cancer.  This knowledge allowed
Myriad to determine the genes’ typical nucleotide sequence, which, in
turn,  enabled  it  to  develop  medical  tests  useful  for  detecting  muta-
tions  in  these  genes  in  a  particular  patient  to  assess  the  patient’s
cancer  risk.    If  valid,  Myriad’s  patents  would  give  it  the  exclusive
right to isolate an individual’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, and would
give Myriad the exclusive right to synthetically create  BRCA cDNA.
Petitioners filed suit, seeking a declaration that Myriad’s patents are
invalid under 35 U. S. C. §101.  As relevant here, the District Court
granted  summary  judgment  to  petitioners,  concluding  that  Myriad’s
claims  were  invalid  because  they  covered  products  of  nature.    The
Federal  Circuit  initially  reversed,  but  on  remand  in  light  of  Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___,
the Circuit found both isolated DNA and cDNA patent eligible.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of the Court

freely  alienable,  white  settlers  would  have  more  space  of
their own.  See id., at 14–15; cf. General Allotment Act of
1887, §5, 24 Stat. 389–390.

The Creek were hardly exempt from the pressures of the
allotment era.  In 1893, Congress charged the Dawes Com-
mission with negotiating changes to the Creek Reservation.
Congress identified two goals:  Either persuade the Creek
to cede territory to the United States, as it had before, or
agree  to  allot  its  lands  to  Tribe  members.  Act  of  Mar.  3,
1893, ch. 209, §16, 27 Stat. 645–646.  A year later, the Com-
mission reported back that the Tribe “would not, under any
circumstances, agree to cede any portion of their lands.”  S.
Misc.  Doc.  No.  24,  53d  Cong.,  3d  Sess.,  7  (1894).    At  that
time,  before  this  Court’s  decision  in  Lone  Wolf,  Congress
may not have been entirely sure of its power to terminate
an  established  reservation  unilaterally.    Perhaps  for  that
reason, perhaps for others, the Commission and Congress
took this report seriously and turned their attention to al-
lotment rather than cession.2

The  Commission’s  work  culminated  in  an  allotment
agreement with the Tribe in 1901.  Creek Allotment Agree-
ment, ch. 676, 31 Stat. 861.  With exceptions for certain pre-
existing  town  sites  and  other  special  matters,  the  Agree-
ment established procedures for allotting 160-acre parcels
to individual Tribe members who could not sell, transfer, or
otherwise encumber their allotments for a number of years.
§§3, 7, id., at 862–864 (5 years for any portion, 21 years for
the designated “homestead” portion).  Tribe members were
given deeds for their parcels that “convey[ed] to [them] all
right, title, and interest of the Creek Nation.”  §23, id., at

——————

2 The  dissent  stresses,  repeatedly,  that  the  Dawes  Commission  was
charged with seeking to extinguish the reservation.  Post, at 18, 24.  Yet,
the dissent fails to mention the Commission’s various reports acknowl-
edging that those efforts were unsuccessful precisely because the Creek
refused to cede their lands.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the history of the Creek Nation's land allotment and the legal context surrounding it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

865

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10987.  Erickson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  1150.

No. 08–10990.  Segura Moreno v.  United States.  C. A. 5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  739.

No.  08–10991.  Parr  v.  Middle  Tennessee  State  Univer

sity  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10992.  Bataz  Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.
848.

No. 08–10995.  Jarrard et al. v.  United States.  C. A. 11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  301  Fed.  Appx.  839.

No.  08–10998.  Udoinyion  v.  REMAX  of  Atlanta  et  al.

C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10999.  Walker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  307.

No.  08–11000.  Taylor  v.  Kentucky.  Sup.  Ct.  Ky.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  276  S. W.  3d  800.

No.  08–11001.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  888.

No.  08–11002.  Rials  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  384  Ill.  App.  3d  1089,  973
N.  E.  2d  1088.

No.  08–11004.  Starling  v.  Arkansas.  Sup.  Ct.  Ark.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  2009  Ark.  156.

No.  08–11005.  Bentley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  803.

No.  08–11006.  Bodden  v.  North  Carolina.  Ct.  App.  N.  C.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  190  N.  C.  App.  505,  661
S.  E.  2d  23.

No.  08–11008.  McCorkle  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  804.

No.  08–11009.  Morgan  v.  Ford  et  al.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  532.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, including case numbers, citations, and disposition. It is not sequential narrative text and is likely not meant to be read as a continuous story.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

31

Opinion of the Court

Congress  can  regulate  sports  gambling  directly,  but  if  it
elects not to do so, each State is free to act on its own.  Our
job is to interpret the law Congress has enacted and decide
whether it is consistent with the Constitution.  PASPA  is
not.  PASPA “regulate[s] state governments’ regulation” of
their citizens, New York, 505 U. S., at 166.  The Constitu
tion gives Congress no such power.

The judgment of the Third Circuit is reversed.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the concluding portion of one. It is not sequential narrative text and likely not meant to be the primary content indexed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Fisher; or, alternatively, (2) whether UNC’s admissions pro-
gram  is  narrowly  tailored,  and  (3)  whether  Harvard’s  ad-
missions program is narrowly tailored.  See Brief for Peti-
tioner in No. 20–1199, p. i; Brief for Respondent in No. 20–
1199, p. i; Brief for University Respondents in No. 21–707,
p. i.  Answering the last two questions, which call for appli-
cation of settled law to the facts of these cases, is simple:
Deferring  to  the  lower  courts’  careful  findings  of  fact  and
credibility  determinations,  Harvard’s  and  UNC’s  policies
are narrowly tailored.

B
1

As to narrow tailoring, the only issue SFFA raises in the
UNC case is that the university cannot use race in its ad-
missions  process  because  race-neutral  alternatives  would
promote UNC’s diversity objectives.  That issue is so easily
resolved  in  favor  of  UNC  that  SFFA  devoted  only  three
pages  to  it  at  the  end  of  its  87-page  brief.    Brief  for  Peti-
tioner 83–86.

The  use  of  race  is  narrowly  tailored  unless  “workable”
and  “available”  race-neutral  approaches  exist,  meaning
race-neutral  alternatives  promote  the  institution’s  diver-
sity goals and do so at “ ‘tolerable administrative expense.’ ”
Fisher I, 570 U. S., at 312 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 280, n. 6 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
Narrow  tailoring  does  not  mean  perfect  tailoring.    The
Court’s precedents make clear that “[n]arrow tailoring does
not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral
alternative.”  Grutter, 539 U. S., at 339.  “Nor does it require
a university to choose between maintaining a reputation for
excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational
opportunities to members of all racial groups.”  Ibid.

As  the  District  Court  found  after  considering  extensive
expert  testimony,  SFFA’s  proposed  race-neutral  alterna-
tives do not meet those criteria.  UNC, 567 F. Supp. 3d,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. The text discusses the legal standard for "narrow tailoring" in affirmative action admissions programs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

13

THOMAS, J., concurring

the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to use race as a factor in affording educational opportuni-
ties  among  its  citizens.”    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  in  Brown  v.
Board of Education, O. T. 1952, No. 8, p. 7; see also Juris.
Statement  in  Davis  v.  School  Bd.  of  Prince  Edward  Cty.,
O. T. 1952, No. 191, p. 8 (“[W]e take the unqualified posi-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment has totally stripped
the  state  of  power  to  make  race  and  color  the  basis  for
governmental  action”);  Brief  for  Appellants  in  Brown  v.
Board  of  Education,  O. T.  1952,  No.  8,  p. 5  (“The  Four-
teenth  Amendment  precludes  a  state  from  imposing  dis-
tinctions  or  classifications  based  upon  race  and  color
alone”);  Brief  for  Appellants  in  Nos.  1,  2,  and  4,  and  for
Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument in Brown v. Board
of  Education,  O. T.  1953,  p.  65  (“That  the  Constitution  is
color blind is our dedicated belief ”).  The Constitution does
not pander to faddish theories about whether race mixing
is  in  the  public  interest.    The  Equal  Protection  Clause
strips  States  of  all  authority  to  use  race  as  a  factor  in
providing education.  All applicants must be treated equally
under the law, and no benefit in the eye of the beholder can
justify racial discrimination.

This principle is neither new nor difficult to understand.
In  1868,  decades  before  Plessy,  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court
held that schools may not discriminate against applicants
based on their skin color.  In Clark v. Board  of Directors,
24 Iowa 266 (1868), a school denied admission to a student
because  she  was  black,  and  “public  sentiment  [was]  op-
posed to the intermingling of white and colored children in
the same schools.”  Id., at 269.  The Iowa Supreme Court
rejected  that  flimsy  justification,  holding  that  “all  the
youths are equal before the law, and there is no discretion
vested  in  the  board  . . .  or  elsewhere,  to  interfere  with  or
disturb  that  equality.”    Id.,  at  277.    “For  the  courts  to
sustain  a  board  of  school  directors  . . .  in  limiting  the
rights  and  privileges  of  persons  by  reason  of  their  [race],
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments related to racial discrimination in education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL.,
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ
ALITO, J., dissenting

organizations  focused  on  a  subject  but  did  not  claim  to
promote a particular viewpoint on that subject (for exam-
ple,  the  Association  of  Communications,  Sports  &  Enter-
tainment Law); others were defined, not by subject, but by
viewpoint.  The forum did not have a single Party Politics
Club;  rather,  it  featured  both  the  Hastings  Democratic
Caucus  and  the  Hastings  Republicans.  There  was  no
Reproductive  Issues  Club;  the  forum  included  separate
pro-choice and pro-life organizations.  Students did not see
fit to create a Monotheistic Religions Club, but they have
formed  the  Hastings  Jewish  Law  Students  Association
and the Hastings Association of Muslim Law Students.  In
short,  the  RSO  forum,  true  to  its  design,  has  allowed
Hastings students to replicate on campus a broad array of
private, independent, noncommercial organizations that is
very similar to those that nonstudents have formed in the
outside world.

The accept-all-comers policy is antithetical to the design
of the RSO forum for the same reason that a state-imposed
accept-all-comers  policy  would  violate  the  First  Amend-
ment  rights  of  private  groups  if  applied  off  campus.  As
explained  above,  a  group’s  First  Amendment  right  of
expressive  association  is  burdened  by  the  “forced  inclu-
sion”  of  members  whose  presence  would  “affec[t]  in  a
significant  way  the  group’s  ability  to  advocate  public  or
private  viewpoints.”  Dale,  530  U. S.,  at  648.    The  Court
has therefore held that the government may not compel a
group  that  engages  in  “expressive  association”  to  admit
such  a  member  unless  the  government  has  a  compelling
interest,  “ ‘unrelated  to  the  suppression  of  ideas,  that
cannot  be  achieved  through  means  significantly  less  re-
strictive  of  associational  freedoms.’ ”  Ibid.  (quoting  Rob-
erts, 468 U. S., at 623).

There  can  be  no  dispute  that  this  standard  would  not
permit a generally applicable law mandating that private
religious  groups  admit  members  who  do  not  share  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the First Amendment rights of expressive association and the implications of a "compel inclusion" policy for private groups.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1215

the United States allowed by law to appear before this Court
when submitted by the agency’s authorized legal representa
tive; on behalf of a State, Commonwealth, Territory, or Pos
session when submitted by its Attorney General; or on behalf
of  a  city,  county,  town,  or  similar  entity  when  submitted  by
its authorized law ofﬁcer.

5.  A  brief or  motion ﬁled  under this  Rule shall  be accom
panied  by proof  of  service  as required  by  Rule  29, and  shall
comply  with  the  applicable  provisions  of  Rules  21,  24,  and
33.1 (except that it sufﬁces to set out in the brief the interest
of the amicus curiae, the summary of the argument, the ar
gument, and the conclusion).  A motion for leave to ﬁle may
not  exceed  1,500  words.  A  party  served  with  the  motion
may  ﬁle  an  objection  thereto,  stating  concisely  the  reasons
for  withholding  consent;  the  objection  shall  be  prepared  as
required by Rule 33.2.

6.  Except for briefs presented on behalf of amicus curiae
listed in Rule 37.4, a brief ﬁled under this Rule shall indicate
whether counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in
part  and  whether  such  counsel  or  a  party  made  a  monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission
of  the  brief,  and  shall  identify  every  person  other  than  the
amicus  curiae,  its  members,  or  its  counsel,  who  made  such
a  monetary  contribution.  The  disclosure  shall  be  made  in
the ﬁrst footnote on the ﬁrst page of text.

Rule 38.  Fees

Under 28 U. S. C. § 1911, the fees charged by the Clerk are:
(a)  for  docketing  a  case  on  a  petition  for  a  writ  of  certio
rari  or  on  appeal  or  for  docketing  any  other  proceeding,  ex
cept  a  certiﬁed  question  or  a  motion  to  docket  and  dismiss
an appeal under Rule 18.5, $300;

(b)  for ﬁling a petition for rehearing or a motion for leave

to ﬁle a petition for rehearing, $200;

(c)  for reproducing  and certifying any record  or paper, $1
per  page;  and  for  comparing  with  the  original  thereof  any
photographic reproduction of any record or paper, when fur
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a set of rules from the Supreme Court of the United States. It is likely part of a legal document and not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

29

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

newlywed  gay  or  lesbian  couple,  even  if  she  believes  the
couple is not, in fact, just married because in her view their
marriage is “false.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 36, 40–41.

3
Because any burden on petitioners’ speech is incidental
to  CADA’s  neutral  regulation  of  commercial  conduct,  the
regulation  is  subject  to  the  standard  set  forth  in  O’Brien.
That standard is easily satisfied here because the law’s ap-
plication “promotes a substantial government interest that
would  be  achieved  less  effectively  absent  the  regulation.”
FAIR, 547 U. S., at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, this Court has already held that the State’s goal of
“eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal
access  to  publicly  available  goods  and  services”  is  “unre-
lated to the suppression of expression” and “plainly serves
compelling  state  interests  of  the  highest  order.”    Roberts,
468 U. S., at 624.  The Court has also held that by prohibit-
ing only “acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution
of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages,”
the  law  “responds  precisely  to  the  substantive  problem
which legitimately concerns the State and abridges no more
speech . . . than is necessary to accomplish that purpose.”
Id., at 628–629 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted); see supra, at 4–7.

C

The Court reaches the wrong answer in this case because
it asks the wrong questions.  The question is not whether
the  company’s  products  include  “elements  of  speech.”
FAIR, 547 U. S., at 61.  (They do.)  The question is not even
whether  CADA  would  require  the  company  to  create  and
sell speech, notwithstanding the owner’s sincere objection
to doing so, if the company chooses to offer “such speech” to
the public.  Id., at 62.  (It would.)  These questions do not
resolve the First Amendment inquiry any more than they
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

37144; see 45 Fed. Reg. 85345.

  In  1986,  under  President  Reagan,  the  Army  Corps
adopted a new regulatory provision defining “waters of
the  United  States”  and  reaffirmed  that  “adjacent”
wetlands  include  wetlands  “separated  from  other
waters  of  the  United  States  by  man-made  dikes  or
barriers,  natural  river  berms,  beach  dunes  and  the
like.”  51 Fed. Reg. 41210, 41251.

  From  1986  until  2015,  under  Presidents  Reagan,
George  H. W.  Bush,  Clinton,  George  W.  Bush,  and
Obama,  the  regulations  continued  to  cover  wetlands
“separated  from other  waters of the United States by
man-made  dikes  or  barriers,  natural  river  berms,
beach  dunes  and  the  like.”  See  33  CFR  §328.3(c)
(1991);  40  CFR  §230.3(b)  (1991);  33  CFR  §328.3(c)
(1998);  40  CFR  §230.3(b)  (1998);  33  CFR  §328.3(c)
(2005);  40  CFR  §230.3(b)  (2005);  33  CFR  §328.3(c)
(2010); 40 CFR §230.3(b) (2010).

  In 2015, under President Obama, the Army Corps and
EPA  promulgated  a  new  rule,  which  again  specified
that  “adjacent”  wetlands  include  wetlands  “separated
by constructed dikes or barriers, natural river berms,
beach dunes, and the like.”  80 Fed. Reg. 37105, 37116.
  In 2019 and 2020, under President Trump,  the Army
Corps  and  EPA  repealed  the  2015  rule  and  issued  a
new rule.  But even following the repeal and new rule,
adjacent  wetlands
that  are
“physically  separated”  from  certain  covered  waters
“only by a natural berm, bank, dune, or similar natural
feature” or “only by an artificial dike, barrier, or similar
artificial structure so long as that structure allows for
a direct hydrologic surface connection . . . in a typical
year,  such  as  through  a  culvert,  flood  or  tide  gate,
pump, or similar artificial feature.”  85 Fed. Reg. 22338,
22340 (2020).

included  wetlands
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the definition of "waters of the United States" and how it has been interpreted and applied by different administrations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

27

THOMAS, J., dissenting

of this nature, entered into freely by both parties, is an
exercise of sovereign regulation and control over one of
the parties or over the subject matter with which the
contract deals. . . . The rights of the United States un-
der  the  contracts  are  no  greater  than  would  be  the
rights of a private citizen under similar contracts, and
enforcement  must  be  by  ordinary  judicial  process  ac-
cording to the law of the forum.  The contracts are not
derogatory of any sovereign rights of the States; they
are carried out pursuant to and under the protection of
the laws of the States. . . . The purpose and effect of the
contracts so entered into are simply to accomplish the
spending  of  the  money  on  the  conditions  imposed  by
Congress,  and  in  authorizing  execution  of  such  con-
tracts Congress was not exerting a power outside of the
field of appropriation.”  Id., at 266–267.

The Government also disclaimed that the Act would have
pre-emptive effect: Because it went “no further than offer-
ing benefits to those who comply with certain conditions,”
States “remain[ed] as free after the passage of this Act as
before to pass laws rendering it impossible for any of their
inhabitants  to  comply  with  such  conditions.”  Id.,  at  268.
Thus, to avoid a Tenth Amendment problem, the Govern-
ment relied on the traditional distinction between the Fed-
eral  Government’s  power  to  spend  and  its  power  to  regu-
late:

“The distinction between an application of the Fed-
eral lawmaking power to enforce compliance with the
desire of Congress and the use of the spending power
to  offer  benefits  which  might  persuade  people  to  that
end [was] recognized in this manner by th[e] first Con-
gresses.
.

 .

 .

 .

 .

“When  the  United  States  goes  no  further  than  ex-
tending benefits to citizens who arrange their affairs in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and quotes from previous rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

403

Opinion of the Court

lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States.”

Accordingly, for Williams to obtain federal habeas relief, he
must ﬁrst demonstrate that his case satisﬁes the condition
set by § 2254(d)(1). That provision modiﬁes the role of
federal habeas courts in reviewing petitions ﬁled by state
prisoners.

Justice Stevens’ opinion in Part II essentially contends
that § 2254(d)(1) does not alter the previously settled rule
of independent review.
Indeed, the opinion concludes its
statutory inquiry with the somewhat empty ﬁnding that
§ 2254(d)(1) does no more than express a “ ‘mood’ that the
Federal Judiciary must respect.” Ante, at 386. For Jus-
tice Stevens, the congressionally enacted “mood” has two
important qualities. First, “federal courts [must] attend to
every state-court judgment with utmost care” by “carefully
weighing all the reasons for accepting a state court’s judg-
ment.” Ante, at 389. Second, if a federal court undertakes
that careful review and yet remains convinced that a prison-
er’s custody violates the Constitution, “that independent
Ibid.
judgment should prevail.”
One need look no further than our decision in Miller to
see that Justice Stevens’
interpretation of § 2254(d)(1)
gives the 1996 amendment no effect whatsoever. The com-
mand that federal courts should now use the “utmost care”
by “carefully weighing” the reasons supporting a state
court’s judgment echoes our pre-AEDPA statement in
Miller that federal habeas courts “should, of course, give
great weight to the considered conclusions of a coequal state
judiciary.”
474 U. S., at 112. Similarly, the requirement
that the independent judgment of a federal court must in the
end prevail essentially repeats the conclusion we reached in
the very next sentence in Miller with respect to the speciﬁc
issue presented there: “But, as we now reafﬁrm, the ultimate
question whether, under the totality of the circumstances,
the challenged confession was obtained in a manner compat-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of a specific law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

958

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 26, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–8877. Kendrick v. Gilluhugh et al. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 915.

No. 97–8938. Abdullah v. Moore, Director, South Caro-
lina Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 122 F. 3d 1060.

No. 97–8953. Toles v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 P. 2d 180.

No. 97–8962. Ayala et al. v. Speckard, Superintendent,
Groveland Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 62.

No. 97–8980. Meyers v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 704 So. 2d 1368.

No. 97–8987. Phenix v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 114 Nev. 116, 954 P. 2d 739.

No. 97–9000. Abdeslem v. United States Embassy, Ma-

nila, Philippines. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9002. Crafton v. Crafton. Ct. App. Ore. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 97–9011. Carrillo et ux. v. Arizona et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 376.

No. 97–9020. Booker v. Apfel, Commissioner of Social
Security. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
136 F. 3d 136.

No. 97–9042. Howell v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 707 So. 2d 674.

No. 97–9063. Barcena v. Illinois Department of Public
Health et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 291 Ill. App. 3d 1104, 716 N. E. 2d 871.

No. 97–9082. Devery v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–9093. Scott v. New Mexico. Ct. App. N. M. Certio-

rari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks sequential narrative and is more akin to a legal docket or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

572 U. S., at 577 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Town-
ship  v.  Schempp,  374  U. S.  203,  294  (1963)  (Brennan,  J.,
concurring)).  An analysis focused on original meaning and
history, this Court has stressed, has long represented the
rule rather than some “ ‘exception’ ” within the “Court’s Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence.”  572 U. S., at 575; see
American Legion, 588 U. S., at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip
op.,  at  25);  Torcaso  v.  Watkins,  367  U. S.  488,  490  (1961)
(analyzing certain historical elements of religious establish-
ments);  McGowan  v.  Maryland,  366  U. S.  420,  437–440
(1961)  (analyzing  Sunday  closing  laws  by  looking  to  their
“place . . . in the First Amendment’s history”); Walz v. Tax
Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 680 (1970) (an-
alyzing the “history and uninterrupted practice” of church
tax exemptions).  The District and the Ninth Circuit erred
by failing to heed this guidance.

B
Perhaps sensing that the primary theory it pursued be-
low  rests  on  a  mistaken  understanding  of  the  Establish-
ment Clause, the District offers a backup argument in this
Court.  It still contends that its Establishment Clause con-
cerns  trump  Mr.  Kennedy’s  free  exercise  and  free  speech
rights.  But the District now seeks to supply different rea-
soning for that result.  Now, it says, it was justified in sup-
pressing Mr. Kennedy’s religious activity because otherwise
it would have been guilty of coercing students to pray.  See
Brief for Respondent 34–37.  And, the District says, coerc-
ing worship amounts to an Establishment Clause violation
on anyone’s account of the Clause’s original meaning.

As it turns out, however, there is a pretty obvious reason
why the Ninth Circuit did not adopt this theory in proceed-
ings below:  The evidence cannot sustain it.  To be sure, this
Court  has  long  held  that  government  may  not,  consistent
with  a  historically  sensitive  understanding  of  the  Estab-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of a Supreme Court case. It delves into the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and its interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

appellate review concluded.  See id., at 30 (judgment bind-
ing on attorney general’s office “subject to any modification,
reversal or vacation of the judgment on appeal”).
  For  these  reasons,  we  refuse  to  adopt  a  categorical
claims-processing rule that bars consideration of the attor-
ney general’s motion.  In doing so, we do not attempt to set
out a general rule governing the right of non-parties to ap-
peal or to move for appellate intervention.

III
  Having  concluded  that  neither  a  jurisdictional  require-
ment  nor  a  mandatory  claims-processing  rule  barred  con-
sideration of the attorney general’s motion, we turn to the
question whether the Court of Appeals properly denied that
motion.  No statute or rule provides a general standard to
apply in deciding whether intervention on appeal should be
allowed.   The  Federal Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure  make
only one passing reference to intervention, and that refer-
ence concerns the review of agency action.  See Rule 15(d);
Amalgamated  Transit  Union  Int’l,  AFL–CIO  v.  Donovan,
771 F. 2d 1551, 1553, n. 3 (CADC 1985).  Without any rule
that  governs  appellate  intervention,  we  have  looked  else-
where for guidance.  Thus we have considered the “policies
underlying intervention” in the district courts, Automobile
Workers v. Scofield, 382 U. S. 205, 217, n. 10 (1965), includ-
ing  the  legal  “interest”  that  a  party  seeks  to  “protect”
through  intervention  on  appeal.    Fed.  Rule  Civ.  Proc.
24(a)(2).

A
  In defending the Kentucky law, the attorney general as-
serts a substantial legal interest that sounds in deeper, con-
stitutional considerations.  As we have observed, our Con-
stitution “ ‘spli[t] the atom of sovereignty.’ ”  Alden v. Maine,
527 U. S. 706, 751 (1999) (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U. S.
489, 504, n. 17 (1999)).  “The Constitution limited but did
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal standing of the attorney general to appeal a decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ET AL. v.
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–587.  Argued November 12, 2019—Decided June 18, 2020*

In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a memo-
randum announcing an immigration relief program known as Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which allows certain unauthor-
ized aliens who arrived in the United States as children to apply for a
two-year  forbearance  of  removal.  Those  granted  such  relief  become
eligible  for  work  authorization  and  various  federal  benefits.    Some
700,000 aliens have availed themselves of this opportunity.

Two years later, DHS expanded DACA eligibility and created a re-
lated program known as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA).  If implemented, that program
would have made 4.3 million parents of U. S. citizens or lawful perma-
nent  residents  eligible  for  the  same  forbearance  from  removal,  work
eligibility, and other benefits as DACA recipients.  Texas, joined by 25
other States, secured a nationwide preliminary injunction barring im-
plementation of both the DACA expansion and DAPA.  The Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld the injunction, concluding that the program violated the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which carefully defines eligi-
bility for benefits.  This Court affirmed by an equally divided vote, and

——————

* Together with No. 18–588, Trump, President of the United States, et
al. v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al.,
on certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, and No. 18–589, Wolf, Acting Secretary
of Homeland Security, et al. v. Batalla Vidal et al., on certiorari before
judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are informational in nature and not meant to be indexed as part of the case's content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

CHIAVERINI v. CITY OF NAPOLEON

Opinion of the Court

proceeding  would  insulate  officers  from  a  Fourth  Amend-
ment  malicious-prosecution  claim  relating  to  any  other
charges, no matter how baseless.

In taking that position, the Sixth Circuit stepped out on
its own.  Three other Courts of Appeals have held that the
presence of probable cause for one charge does not automat-
ically  defeat  a  Fourth  Amendment  malicious-prosecution
claim  alleging  the  absence  of  probable  cause  for  another
charge.  See Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F. 3d 1147, 1159–1162
(CA11 2020); Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F. 3d 75, 83–85 (CA3
2007); Posr v. Doherty, 944 F. 2d 91, 100 (CA2 1991).

We  granted  certiorari  to  resolve  that  circuit  split,  601

U. S. ___ (2023), and we now vacate the decision below.

II
Section  1983  enables  an  individual  to  recover  damages
from a state or local official for the deprivation of a consti-
tutional right.  Such a suit is of course premised on a con-
stitutional violation.  But its elements and rules may also
be  shaped  by  common-law  tort  principles,  against  whose
backdrop  §1983  was  enacted.  See  Manuel  v.  Joliet,  580
U. S. 357, 370 (2017).  To determine the precise contours of
a constitutional claim under §1983, we have held, a court
should  identify  the  “most  analogous”  common-law  tort  to
the constitutional harm alleged.  Ibid.  And the court should
incorporate  that  tort’s  requirements  to  the  extent  con-
sistent with “the values and purposes of the constitutional
right at issue.”  Ibid.; Thompson, 596 U. S., at 43.

The  claim  Chiaverini  brought—a  Fourth  Amendment
malicious-prosecution  claim—emerged  from  that  method.
The constitutional violation alleged in such a suit is a type
of unreasonable seizure—an arrest and detention of a per-
son based on a criminal charge lacking probable cause.  In
Thompson  v.  Clark,  we  analogized  a  suit  alleging  that
Fourth Amendment wrong to the common-law tort of mali-
cious  prosecution.  See  id.,  at  43–44.    The  “gravamen”  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon. It delves into the legal arguments and precedents surrounding Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1151

558 U. S.

January 19, 2010

No.  09–6792.  Kern  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  296.

No.  09–6835.  Van  Hoosen  v.  Kramer,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  590.

No.  09–6846.  White  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  571  F.  3d  365.

No.  09–6983.  Owen  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  894.

No. 09–6985.  Rucker v.  Illinois Department of Children
and  Family  Services.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  397.

No.  09–7156.  Cornwell  v.  Bobby,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  398.

No.  09–7168.  Wadford  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  198.

No.  09–7326.  Isa  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7424.  Ray  v.  Federal  Insurance  Co.  et  al.  C.  A.
3d Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported below:  340 Fed.  Appx. 105.

No.  09–7435.  Haywood  v.  Bedatsky  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  621.

No.  09–7442.  Jackson  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  18  So.  3d  1016.

No. 09–7443.  Hale v.  Tennis, Superintendent, State Cor
rectional  Institution  at  Rockview,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7444.  Thomas  v.  Michigan.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7453.  Sairras  v.  Schleffer  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  698.

No.  09–7457.  Fuller  v.  Bergh,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

BREYER, J., dissenting

this country “has no constitutional rights regarding his ap-
plication”  (emphasis  added));  Kleindienst  v.  Mandel,  408
U. S. 753, 762 (1972) (similar).

There is wisdom in our past restraint.  Situations where
a foreign citizen outside U. S. Territory might fairly assert
constitutional rights are not difficult to imagine.  Long-term
permanent residents are “foreign citizens.”  Does the Con-
stitution therefore allow American officials to assault them
at will while “outside U. S. territory”?  Many international
students attend college in the United States.  Does the First
Amendment permit a public university to revoke their ad-
mission based on an unpopular political stance they took on
social media while home for the summer?  Foreign citizens
who have never set foot in the United States, for that mat-
ter,  often  protest  when  Presidents  travel  overseas.  Does
that  mean  Secret  Service  agents  can,  consistent  with  our
Constitution,  seriously  injure  peaceful  protestors  abroad
without any justification?

We have never purported to give a single “bedrock” an-
swer to these or myriad other extraterritoriality questions
that might arise in the future.  To purport to do so today, in
a case where the question is not presented and where the
matter is not briefed, is in my view a serious mistake.

And there is no need to set forth an absolute rule here.
Respondents have conceded that their foreign affiliates lack
First Amendment rights of their own while acting abroad.
See ante, at 3.  If in spite of everything else, the majority
considers this point material to its decision, all that need be
said is: “We accept respondents’ concession and proceed on
that  basis.”  To  say  so  much  more  “run[s]  contrary  to  the
fundamental principal of judicial restraint,” a principle that
applies  with  particular  force  to  constitutional  interpreta-
tion.  Washington State Grange v. Washington State Repub-
lican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 450 (2008); see also, e.g., Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the complexities of extraterritorial application of constitutional rights, raising hypothetical scenarios and arguing against a broad, absolute rule.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxiii

960

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
956
Illinois; Grifﬁn v.
955
Illinois; Hickey v.
916
Illinois; Irby v.
955
Illinois; Thomas v.
955
Illinois; Woolley v.
939
Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation; Krain v.
958
Illinois Dept. of Public Health; Barcena v.
965
Immigration and Naturalization Service; Eyoum v.
906
Indiana; Canaan v.
Indiana; Hoovler v.
905
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,970
937
Inner City Press/Community on Move v. Board of Governors, FRS
933
Inoco Ltd. v. Goodson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INOVA Health Care Services; Colbert v.
In re. See name of party.
Internal Revenue Service; White v.
International. For labor union, see name of trade.
918
Iowa; J. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970
Iowa; Knowles v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Iowa; Trobaugh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
Iowa Utilities Bd.; Association for Local Telecom. Services v.
. . .
949
Iowa Utilities Bd.; AT&T Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
Iowa Utilities Bd.; Federal Communications Comm’n v. . . . . . . . .
949
Iowa Utilities Bd.; MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . .
916
Irby v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948
Irons, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
J. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Jackson v. Florida Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Jackson v. LeBlanc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Jackson v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson v. Singletary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971
Jackson v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,971
908
Jacobs v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
J. A. J. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Jakoby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
James, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
James v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Jarvi v. McCarthy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Jarvis; Smith v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
J. C. v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jefferson County; Doyle v.
953
Jenson; Oglebay Norton Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Jeppsen v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
Jiles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1021

529 U. S.

March 20, 2000

No. 99–1214. Caterpillar Inc. et al. v. New Hampshire
Department of Revenue et al. Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 144 N. H. 253, 741 A. 2d 56.

No. 99–1215. Batts et al. v. Clinton et al. Ct. App. Cal.,

2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1221. Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, Guardian of
Ammerman, et al. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 705 N. E. 2d 539.

No. 99–1226. Wilson et al. v. Miller et al. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 537.

No. 99–1228. Howe v. Richardson et al. C. A. 1st Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193 F. 3d 60.

No. 99–1237. Zahran et ux. v. Cleary Building Corp.
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 182
F. 3d 923.

No. 99–1241. Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia et al.
v. Cunningham et al. Ct. Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County, Pa. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1251. Beachy v. Boise Cascade Corp. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 1010.

No. 99–1254. Thomas v. District of Columbia Court of
Appeals Board on Professional Responsibility. Ct. App.
D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 A. 2d 538.

No. 99–1260. Weldon et ux. v. Farm Credit Services of
Michigan’s Heartland, PCA. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 232 Mich. App. 662, 591 N. W. 2d 438.

No. 99–1269. Taylor v. Iowa. Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–1282. Willman v. Straub, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1290. Norwood v. Western Federal Credit Union

et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1299. Alhilawi v. Alaska. Super. Ct. Alaska, 1st

Jud. Dist. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases with their corresponding case numbers, citations, and the outcome of a certiorari petition. This type of information is generally considered suitable for indexing as it provides legal context and historical data.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

15

THOMAS, J., dissenting

their  “penumbras,”  which  were  “formed  by  emanations
from  those  guarantees  that  help  give  them  life  and  sub-
stance.”  Ibid.  This reasoning is as mystifying as it is base-
less.

As  Justice  Black  observed  in  his  dissent,  this  general
“right  of  privacy”  was  never  before  considered  a  constitu-
tional guarantee protecting citizens from governmental in-
trusion.  Id.,  at  508–510.    Rather,  the  concept  was  one  of
tort  law,  championed  by  Samuel  Warren  and  the  future
Justice Louis Brandeis in their 1890 Harvard Law Review
article entitled, “The Right to Privacy.”  4 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
Over 20 years after the Fourteenth Amendment was rati-
fied and a century after the Bill of Rights was adopted, War-
ren and Brandeis were among the first to advocate for this
privacy  right  in  the  context  of  tort  relief  for  those  whose
personal information and private affairs were exploited by
others.  Id.,  at  193,  195–196,  214–220.    By  “exalting  a
phrase . . . used in discussing grounds for tort relief, to the
level of a constitutional rule,” the Court arrogated to itself
the “power to invalidate any legislative act which [it] find[s]
irrational, unreasonable[,] or offensive” as an impermissi-
ble “interfere[nce] with ‘privacy.’ ”  Griswold, supra, at 510,
n. 1, 511 (Black, J., dissenting).

Just  eight  years  later,  the  Court  utilized  its  newfound
power  in  Roe  v.  Wade,  410  U. S.  113  (1973).    There,  the
Court struck down a Texas law restricting abortion as a vi-
olation of a woman’s constitutional “right of privacy,” which
it grounded in the “concept of personal liberty” purportedly
protected  by  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment.  Id., at 153.  The Court began its legal analysis
by openly acknowledging that the Constitution’s text does
not “mention any right of privacy.”  Id., at 152.  The Court
nevertheless  concluded  that  it  need  not  bother  with  our
founding  document’s  text,  because  the  Court’s  prior  deci-
sions—chief  among  them  Griswold—had  already  divined
such a right from constitutional penumbras.  Roe, 410 U. S.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

19

Opinion of the Court

dissent, the State argues that attempts to distinguish be-
tween  prohibition  and  regulation  are  sure  to  prove  “un-
workable.”  Brief for Respondent 29 (citing 480 U. S., at 224
(opinion  of  Stevens,  J.)).    Indeed,  the  State  suggests  that
problems  are  likely  to  arise  in  this  very  case.    Under  our
reading, Texas highlights, courts on remand might be called
on to decide whether “electronic bingo” qualifies as “bingo”
and thus a gaming activity merely regulated by Texas, or
whether it constitutes an entirely different sort of gaming
activity absolutely banned by Texas and thus forbidden as
a  matter  of  federal  law.  And,  the  State  worries,  any  at-
tempt to answer that question may require evidence, expert
testimony, and further litigation.

We appreciate these concerns, but they do not persuade
us.  Most fundamentally, they are irrelevant.  It is not our
place to question whether Congress adopted the wisest or
most workable policy, only to discern and apply the policy
it  did  adopt.  If  Texas  thinks  good  governance  requires  a
different set of rules, its appeals are better directed to those
who make the laws than those charged with following them.
Even on its own terms, we are not sure what to make of
Texas’s policy argument.  We do not doubt that the Resto-
ration Act’s prohibitory/regulatory distinction can and will
generate borderline cases.  See F. Cohen, Handbook of Fed-
eral Indian Law 541–544 (N. Newton ed. 2012).  It may even
be that electronic bingo will prove such a case.  But if ap-
plying the Act’s terms poses challenges, that hardly makes
it unique among federal statutes.  Nor is the line the Resto-
ration Act asks us to enforce quite as unusual as Texas sug-
gests.  Courts have applied the same prohibitory/regulatory
framework elsewhere in this country under Public Law 280
for decades.  See id., at 541–547.  IGRA, too, draws a similar
line to assess the propriety of class II gaming on Indian res-
ervations nationwide.  See 25 U. S. C. § 2710(b)(1)(A); see
also  K.  Washburn,  Federal  Law,  State  Policy,  and  Indian
Gaming, 4  Nev. L. J. 285, 289–290 (2004).  In fact, Texas
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court addresses the State's arguments. It contains legal reasoning, citations, and analysis of relevant laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

9

Opinion of the Court

vided. No action against the United States, the [Sec-
retary], or any ofﬁcer or employee thereof shall be
brought under section 1331 or 1346 [federal defendant
jurisdiction] of title 28 to recover on any claim arising
under this subchapter.”

(Emphasis added.)

Section 1395ii makes § 405(h) applicable to the Medicare Act
“to the same extent as” it applies to the Social Security Act.

C

The case before us began when the Illinois Council on
Long Term Care, Inc. (Council), an association of about 200
Illinois nursing homes participating in the Medicare (or
Medicaid) program, ﬁled the complaint we have described,
supra, at 7, in Federal District Court.
(Medicaid is not at
issue in this Court.) The District Court, as we have said,
dismissed the complaint for lack of federal-question juris-
diction. No. 96 C 2953 (ND Ill., Mar. 31, 1997), App. to Pet.
for Cert. 13a, 15a.
In doing so, the court relied upon § 405(h)
as interpreted by this Court in Weinberger v. Salﬁ, 422 U. S.
749 (1975), and Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602 (1984). App.
to Pet. for Cert. 15a–19a.

The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. 143 F. 3d
1072 (CA7 1998).
In its view, a later case, Bowen v. Michi-
gan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667 (1986),
had signiﬁcantly modiﬁed this Court’s earlier case law.
Other Circuits have understood Michigan Academy differ-
ently. See Michigan Assn. of Homes and Servs. for the
Aging v. Shalala, 127 F. 3d 496, 500–501 (CA6 1997); Ameri-
can Academy of Dermatology v. HHS, 118 F. 3d 1495, 1499–
1501 (CA11 1997); St. Francis Medical Center v. Shalala,
32 F. 3d 805, 812–813 (CA3 1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S.
1016 (1995); Farkas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 24 F. 3d
853, 855–860 (CA6 1994); Abbey v. Sullivan, 978 F. 2d 37,
41–44 (CA2 1992); National Kidney Patients Assn. v. Sulli-
van, 958 F. 2d 1127, 1130–1134 (CADC 1992), cert. denied,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 1 (2000). It includes citations, legal terminology, and a discussion of relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  546 U. S. ____ (2006)

13

Opinion of the Court

tionship justifies overriding the same congressional findings
on  which  the  Government  relies  in  resisting  any  exception
for the UDV’s religious use of hoasca.  In other words, if any
Schedule  I  substance  is  in  fact  always  highly  dangerous  in
any  amount  no  matter  how  used,  what  about  the  unique
relationship  with  the  Tribes  justifies  allowing  their  use  of
peyote?    Nothing  about  the  unique  political  status  of  the
Tribes makes their members immune from the health risks
the Government asserts accompany any use of a Schedule I
substance, nor insulates the Schedule I substance the Tribes
use in religious exercise from the alleged risk of diversion.

The  Government  argues  that  the  existence  of  a  congres-
sional exemption for peyote does not indicate that the Con-
trolled  Substances  Act  is  amenable  to  judicially  crafted
exceptions.
  RFRA,  however,  plainly  contemplates  that
courts  would  recognize  exceptions—that  is  how  the  law
works.    See  42  U. S. C.  §2000bb–1(c)  (“A  person  whose
religious  exercise  has  been  burdened  in  violation  of  this
section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a
judicial  proceeding  and  obtain  appropriate  relief  against  a
government”).  Congress’ role in the peyote exemption—and
the Executive’s, see 21 CFR §1307.31 (2005)—confirms that
the  findings  in  the  Controlled  Substances  Act  do  not  pre-
clude exceptions altogether; RFRA makes clear that it is the
obligation  of  the  courts  to  consider  whether  exceptions  are
required under the test set forth by Congress.

C
The  well-established  peyote  exception  also  fatally  un-
dermines  the  Government’s  broader  contention  that  the
Controlled Substances Act establishes a closed regulatory
system  that  admits  of  no  exceptions  under  RFRA.    The
Government  argues  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  Con-
trolled Substances Act will be “necessarily . . . undercut” if
the  Act  is  not  uniformly  applied,  without  regard  to  bur-
dens  on  religious  exercise.    Brief  for  Petitioners  18.  The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and its application to the Controlled Substances Act.  The content is sequential and relevant to the legal argument being made.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

Because of the narrow focus on churches, this first exemp-
tion is known as the church exemption.

The Guidelines were scheduled to go into effect for plan
years  beginning  on  August  1,  2012.  77  Fed.  Reg.  8725–
8726.  But in February 2012, before the Guidelines took ef-
fect, the Departments promulgated a final rule that tempo-
rarily prevented the Guidelines from applying to certain re-
ligious  nonprofits.    Specifically,  the  Departments  stated
their  intent  to  promulgate  additional  rules  to  “accommo-
dat[e] non-exempted, non-profit organizations’ religious ob-
jections  to  covering  contraceptive  services.”  Id.,  at  8727.
Until that rulemaking occurred, the 2012 rule also provided
a  temporary  safe  harbor  to  protect  such  employers.  Ibid.
The safe harbor covered nonprofits “whose plans have con-
sistently not covered all or the same subset of contraceptive
services for religious reasons.”3  Thus, the nonprofits who
availed themselves of this safe harbor were not subject to
the  contraceptive  mandate  when  it  first  became  effective.
The Departments promulgated another final rule in 2013
that is relevant to these cases in two ways.  First, after re-
iterating  that  §300gg–13(a)(4)  authorizes  HRSA  “to  issue
guidelines in a manner that exempts group health plans es-
tablished  or  maintained  by  religious  employers,”  the  De-
partments “simplif[ied]” and “clarif[ied]” the definition of a
religious employer.  78 Fed. Reg. 39873.4  Second, pursuant

——————

3 Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Center for Consumer Information
and  Insurance  Oversight,  Centers  for  Medicare  &  Medicaid  Services,
Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor for Certain Em-
ployers, Group Health Plans and Group Health Insurance Issuers With
Respect  to  the  Requirement  To  Cover  Contraceptive  Services  Without
Cost Sharing Under Section 2713 of the Public Health Service Act, Sec-
tion 715(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and Sec-
tion 9815(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, p. 2 (2013).

4 The Departments took this action to prevent an unduly narrow inter-
pretation of the church exemption, in which “an otherwise exempt plan
[was]  disqualified  because  the  employer’s  purposes  extend[ed]  beyond
the inculcation of religious values or because the employer . . . serve[d]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal citations, references to regulations, and discusses legal concepts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

not just domestic takings.  In the 1950s and 1960s, a grow-
ing  chorus  of  newly  independent  states,  particularly  in
Latin America, resisted any foreign restraint on their abil-
ity to nationalize property.  See Young, The Story of Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, in Federal Courts Stories
422–423  (V.  Jackson  &  J.  Resnik  eds.  2010).    Put  differ-
ently, states and scholars disagreed over whether interna-
tional law provided a remedy for a sovereign’s interference
with  anyone’s  property  rights,  not  whether  domestic  tak-
ings were outside the purview of international law.  That
principle was beyond debate.

We confronted this dispute over the existence of interna-
tional  law  constraints  on  sovereign  takings  in  Sabbatino,
where we were asked to decide claims arising out of Cuba’s
nationalization  of  American  sugar  interests  in  1960.    376
U. S., at 403.  This Court observed that there were “few if
any  issues  in  international  law  today  on  which  opinion
seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state’s power
to expropriate the property of aliens.”  Id., at 428 (emphasis
added).  Hesitant to delve into this controversy, we instead
invoked  the  act  of  state  doctrine,  which  prevents  United
States  courts  from  determining  the  validity  of  the  public
acts of a foreign sovereign.  Id., at 436.

Congress did not applaud the Court’s reticence.  Within
months  of  Sabbatino,  it  passed  the  Second  Hickenlooper
Amendment  to  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1964.    The
Amendment prohibits United States courts from applying
the act of state doctrine where a “right[ ] to property is as-
serted” based upon a “taking . . . by an act of that state in
violation of the principles of international law.”  22 U. S. C.
§2370(e)(2).
  Courts  and  commentators  understood  the
Amendment to permit adjudication of claims the Sabbatino
decision had avoided—claims against foreign nations for ex-
propriation  of  American-owned  property.    But  nothing  in
the Amendment purported to alter any rule of international
law, including the domestic takings rule.  See F. Palicio y
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the history of international law regarding sovereign takings of property, referencing the case of *Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino* and the Second Hickenlooper Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

1312

INDEX

JURISDICTION—Continued.

2. Federal courts—Removal jurisdiction.—Presence in an otherwise
removable case of a claim that may be barred by Eleventh Amendment
does not destroy federal courts’ removal jurisdiction to hear remaining
claims. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, p. 381.

3. Supreme Court—Habeas corpus—Denial of certiﬁcate of appealabil-
ity.—This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1) to review a
denial by a circuit judge or a court of appeals of an application for a cer-
tiﬁcate of appealability, which is required by § 2253(c)(1), as amended by
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, before an appeal
may be taken from an order denying habeas relief. Hohn v. United
States, p. 236.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.

KAL 007. See Maritime Law.

LAWYERS AND CLIENTS. See Attorney-Client Privilege; Constitu-

tional Law, IX, 2.

LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.

LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR FI REAR MS. See Crim inal

Law, 1.

LINE ITEM VETO ACT. See Constitutional Law, VI; Standing to

Sue, 1.

LOCAL TAXES. See Taxes.

LONG-DISTANCE SERVICE. See Communications Act of 1934.

MANDATORY PRISON TERMS. See Criminal Law, 3.

MARITIME LAW.

Airplane accident—Survival action—Pre-death pain and suffering.—
Because Death on the High Seas Act does not authorize a survival action
for a decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering, there can be no general
maritime survival action for such damages. Dooley v. Korean Air Lines
Co., p. 116.

MINERS’ HEALTH CARE BENEFITS. See Constitutional Law, II,

1; IX, 1.

MISSOURI. See Criminal Law, 4.

MONEY LAUNDERING. See Criminal Law, 4.

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS GRANTS. See Constitu-

tional Law, V.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document. It lists topics and corresponding page numbers. Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and provide a guide to the document's contents rather than the actual content itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 205 (2000)

213

Opinion of the Court

or a product ‘source,’ ” id., at 163. And where it is not rea-
sonable to assume consumer predisposition to take an afﬁxed
word or packaging as indication of source—where, for exam-
ple, the afﬁxed word is descriptive of the product (“Tasty”
bread) or of a geographic origin (“Georgia” peaches)—inher-
ent distinctiveness will not be found. That is why the stat-
ute generally excludes, from those word marks that can be
registered as inherently distinctive, words that are “merely
descriptive” of the goods, § 2(e)(1), 15 U. S. C. § 1052(e)(1), or
“primarily geographically descriptive of them,” see § 2(e)(2),
15 U. S. C. § 1052(e)(2).
In the case of product design, as in
the case of color, we think consumer predisposition to equate
the feature with the source does not exist. Consumers are
aware of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most
unusual of product designs—such as a cocktail shaker shaped
like a penguin—is intended not to identify the source, but
to render the product itself more useful or more appealing.
The fact that product design almost invariably serves pur-
poses other than source identiﬁcation not only renders inher-
ent distinctiveness problematic; it also renders application of
an inherent-distinctiveness principle more harmful to other
consumer interests. Consumers should not be deprived of
the beneﬁts of competition with regard to the utilitarian and
esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a
rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against
new entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness.
How easy it is to mount a plausible suit depends, of course,
upon the clarity of the test for inherent distinctiveness, and
where product design is concerned we have little conﬁdence
that a reasonably clear test can be devised. Respondent and
the United States as amicus curiae urge us to adopt for
product design relevant portions of the test formulated by
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals for product pack-
aging in Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568
F. 2d 1342 (1977). That opinion, in determining the inherent
distinctiveness of a product’s packaging, considered, among
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the concept of inherent distinctiveness in trademark law, specifically in the context of product design.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

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396 WISCONSIN DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS v. SCHACHT

Kennedy, J., concurring

pulsion to appear in federal court and, like any other defend-
ant, has the unilateral right to block removal of the case, any
appearance the State makes in federal court may well be
regarded as voluntary in the same manner as the appear-
ances which gave rise to the waivers in Clark and Gardner.
Some Courts of Appeals, following this reasoning, have
recognized that consent to removal may constitute a waiver.
Newﬁeld House, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Pub. Welfare,
651 F. 2d 32, 36, n. 3 (CA1), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1114 (1981);
see also Estate of Porter v. Illinois, 36 F. 3d 684, 691 (CA7
1994); Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F. 2d 1211, 1214 (CA11 1986);
Gwinn Area Community Schools v. Michigan, 741 F. 2d 840,
847 (CA6 1984). These cases have ﬁrst inquired, however,
whether state law authorized the attorneys representing the
State to waive the Eleventh Amendment on its behalf. Peti-
tioners cited this qualiﬁcation when we raised the issue at
oral argument in the instant case. This was also the Court’s
apparent concern in Ford Motor Co., in which it held:

“It is conceded by the respondents that if it is within
the power of the administrative and executive ofﬁcers of
Indiana to waive the state’s immunity, they have done
so in this proceeding. The issue thus becomes one of
their power under state law to do so. As this issue has
not been determined by state courts, this Court must
resort to the general policy of the state as expressed in
its Constitution, statutes and decisions. Article 4, § 24
of the Indiana Constitution provides:
“ ‘Provision may be made, by general law, for bringing
suit against the State, as to all liabilities originating
after the adoption of this Constitution; but no special act
authorizing such suit to be brought, or making compen-
sation to any person claiming damages against the State,
shall ever be passed.’
“We interpret this provision as indicating a policy pro-
hibiting state consent to suit in one particular case in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and citations to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>