<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

ALITO, J., dissenting

all other portions of the ACA.

Ruling  on  what  it  construed  as  a  plaintiffs’  motion  for
partial summary judgment, the District Court declared the
entire ACA unlawful.  Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp.
3d  579,  619  (ND  Tex.  2018).    It  held  that  the  individual
plaintiffs had standing, that the individual mandate could
no  longer  be  sustained  as  a  lawful  exercise  of  Congress’s
taxing power, and that the mandate was inseverable from
the remainder of the ACA, including the provisions that im-
pose financial burdens on the state plaintiffs.  Id., at 592–
619.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated
in part.  Texas v. United States, 945 F. 3d 355 (CA5 2019).
It  found  that  both  the  state  plaintiffs  and  the  individual
plaintiffs  had  standing,  and  it  agreed  with  the  District
Court that the individual mandate could no longer be sus-
tained under the taxing power.  But the Court of Appeals
remanded the case and directed the District Court to reas-
sess the broad relief it had ordered.

The  state  intervenors  then  filed  a  petition  for  a  writ  of
certiorari seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ interlocu-
tory decision.  The plaintiffs opposed interlocutory review,
but filed a conditional cross-petition asking us to review the
Court  of  Appeals’  remand  decision  in  the  event  that  the
Court  granted  the  state  intervenors’  petition.    This  Court
granted both petitions.  589 U. S. ___ (2020).

II
We  may  consider  the  merits  of  this  appeal  if  even  one
plaintiff has standing, Little Sisters of the Poor, 591 U. S.,
at ___, n. 6; Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institu-
tional Rights, Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (2006), but the ma-
jority  concludes  that  no  plaintiff—neither  the  States  that
originally  brought  suit  nor  the  individual  plaintiffs  who
later  joined  them—has  standing  under  Article  III  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Texas v. United States. It discusses the legal standing of the plaintiffs and the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO

GORSUCH, J., concurring

At the same time, the Governor has chosen to impose no
capacity restrictions on certain businesses he considers “es-
sential.”  And it turns out the businesses the Governor con-
siders  essential  include  hardware  stores,  acupuncturists,
and  liquor  stores.  Bicycle  repair  shops,  certain  signage
companies, accountants, lawyers, and insurance agents are
all essential too.  So, at least according to the Governor, it
may be unsafe to go to church, but it is always fine to pick
up another bottle of wine, shop for a new bike, or spend the
afternoon exploring your distal points and meridians.  Who
knew  public  health  would  so  perfectly  align  with  secular
convenience?

As almost everyone on the Court today recognizes, squar-
ing the Governor’s edicts with our traditional First Amend-
ment rules is no easy task.  People may gather inside for
extended periods in bus stations and airports, in laundro-
mats and banks, in hardware stores and liquor shops.  No
apparent reason exists why people may not gather, subject
to  identical  restrictions,  in  churches  or  synagogues,  espe-
cially when religious institutions have made plain that they
stand ready, able, and willing to follow all the safety pre-
cautions  required  of  “essential”  businesses  and  perhaps
more besides.  The only explanation for treating religious
places  differently  seems  to  be  a  judgment  that  what  hap-
pens there just isn’t as “essential” as what happens in sec-
ular  spaces.  Indeed,  the  Governor  is  remarkably  frank
about this:  In his judgment laundry and liquor, travel and
tools, are all “essential” while traditional religious exercises
are not.  That is exactly the kind of discrimination the First
Amendment forbids.

Nor  is  the  problem  an  isolated  one.    In  recent  months,
certain other Governors have issued similar edicts.  At the
flick of a pen, they have asserted the right to privilege res-
taurants,  marijuana  dispensaries,  and  casinos  over
churches, mosques, and temples.  See Calvary Chapel Day-
ton Valley v. Sisolak, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (GORSUCH,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the Governor's restrictions on religious gatherings, comparing them to allowances for other businesses deemed "essential."  It's a relevant part of the legal argument and likely part of the document's main body.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Court Document</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

ALITO, J., concurring
ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–659
_________________

LARRY THOMPSON, PETITIONER v.
PAGIEL CLARK, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[April 4, 2022]

 JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  and

JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting.

Homer described the mythical chimera as a “grim mon-
ster”  made  of  “all  lion  in  front,  all  snake  behind,  all  goat
between.” The Iliad p. 201 (R. Fagles trans. 1990).  Today,
the  Court  creates  a  chimera  of  a  constitutional  tort  by
stitching together elements taken from two very different
claims:  a  Fourth  Amendment  unreasonable  seizure  claim
and a common-law malicious-prosecution claim.

The Court justifies this creation on the ground that mali-
cious prosecution is the common-law tort that is most anal-
ogous  to  an  unreasonable  seizure  claim.    And  because  a
common-law  malicious-prosecution  claim  demanded  proof
of a favorable termination, the Court holds that its new cre-
ation includes that element.  But this Court has never held
that  the  Fourth  Amendment  houses  a  malicious-prosecu-
tion claim, and the Court defends its analogy with just two
sentences of independent analysis and a reference to a body
of lower court cases.

I cannot agree with that approach.  The Court’s independ-
ent  analysis  of  this  important  question  is  far  too  cursory,
and its reliance on lower court cases is particularly ill-ad-
vised  here  because  that  body  of  case  law  appears  to  have
been heavily influenced by a mistaken reading of the plu-
rality opinion in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U. S. 266 (1994).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites legal precedents, uses legal terminology, and presents an argument against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON

Syllabus

“struck the right balance in crafting a remedy that both prevents anti-
competitive  harm  to  Student-Athletes  while  serving  the  procompeti-
tive purpose of preserving the popularity of college sports.”  958 F. 3d
1239, 1263.  Unsatisfied with that result, the NCAA asks the Court to
find that all of its existing restraints on athlete compensation survive
antitrust  scrutiny.    The  student-athletes  have  not  renewed  their
across-the-board challenge and the Court thus does not consider the
rules  that  remain  in  place.    The  Court  considers  only  the  subset  of
NCAA  rules  restricting  education-related  benefits  that  the  district
court enjoined.  The Court does so based on the uncontested premise
that  the  NCAA  enjoys  monopsony  control  in  the  relevant  market—
such that it is capable of depressing wages below competitive levels for
student-athletes and thereby restricting the quantity of student-ath-
lete labor.

Held: The district court’s injunction is consistent with established anti-

trust principles.  Pp. 15–36.

(a) The  courts  below  properly  subjected  the  NCAA’s  compensation
restrictions to antitrust scrutiny under a “rule of reason” analysis.  In
the Sherman Act, Congress tasked courts with enforcing an antitrust
policy of competition on the theory that market forces “yield the best
allocation”  of  the  Nation’s  resources.    National  Collegiate  Athletic
Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 104, n. 27.
The Sherman Act’s prohibition on restraints of trade has long been un-
derstood to prohibit only restraints that are “undue.”  Ohio v. American
Express Co., 585 U. S. ___, ___.  Whether a particular restraint is un-
due “presumptively” turns on an application of a “rule of reason anal-
ysis.”  Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5.  That manner of analysis
generally  requires  a  court  to  “conduct  a  fact-specific  assessment  of
market power and market structure” to assess a challenged restraint’s
“actual  effect  on  competition.”    American  Express,  585  U.  S.,  at  ___.
Pp. 15–24.

(1) The NCAA maintains the courts below should have analyzed
its compensation restrictions under an extremely deferential standard
because it is a joint venture among members who must collaborate to
offer consumers the unique product of intercollegiate athletic competi-
tion.  Even assuming the NCAA is a joint venture, though, it is a joint
venture with monopoly power in the relevant market.  Its restraints
are appropriately subject to the ordinary rule of reason’s fact-specific
assessment  of  their  effect  on  competition.    American  Express,  585
U. S., at ___.  Circumstances sometimes allow a court to determine the
anticompetitive effects of a challenged restraint (or lack thereof) under
an abbreviated or “quick look.”  See Dagher, 547 U. S., at 7, n. 3; Board
of Regents, 468 U. S., at 109, n. 39.  But not here.  Pp. 15–19.

(2) The NCAA next contends that the Court’s decision in Board of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. It outlines the background of the case, the issues before the court, and the court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

forcement so compelling that the warrantless search is ob-
jectively  reasonable  under  the  Fourth  Amendment.”
Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 403 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also ante, at 3.  As relevant here, one such rec-
ognized  “exigency”  is  the  “need  to  assist  persons  who  are
seriously injured or threatened with such injury.”  Brigham
City, 547 U. S., at 403; see also ante, at 1 (ROBERTS, C. J.,
concurring).  The Fourth Amendment allows officers to en-
ter a home if they have “an objectively reasonable basis for
believing” that such help is needed, and if the officers’ ac-
tions  inside  the  home  are  reasonable  under  the  circum-
stances.  Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 406; see also Michigan
v. Fisher, 558 U. S., at 47–48.

This case does not require us to explore all the contours
of  the  exigent  circumstances  doctrine  as  applied  to  emer-
gency-aid situations because the officers here disclaimed re-
liance on that doctrine.  But to avoid any confusion going
forward, I think it important to briefly describe how the doc-
trine applies to some heartland emergency-aid situations.
As  Chief  Judge  Livingston  has  cogently  explained,  alt-
hough  this  doctrinal  area  does  not  draw  much  attention
from courts or scholars, “municipal police spend a good deal
of  time  responding  to  calls  about  missing  persons,  sick
neighbors, and premises left open at night.”  Livingston, Po-
lice, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment,
1998 U. Chi. Leg. Forum 261, 263 (1998).  And as she aptly
noted,  “the  responsibility  of  police  officers  to  search  for
missing persons, to mediate disputes, and to aid the ill or
injured  has  never  been  the  subject  of  serious  debate;  nor
has”  the  “responsibility  of  police  to  provide  services  in  an
emergency.”  Id., at 302.

Consistent with that reality, the Court’s exigency prece-
dents, as I read them, permit warrantless entries when po-
lice officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe
that there is a current, ongoing crisis for which it is reason-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the Fourth Amendment and the exigent circumstances doctrine, particularly in the context of emergency aid situations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Opinion of the Court

register accords more modest benefits; notably, a listing on
that register announces one’s use of the designation to oth-
ers considering a similar mark.  See 3 J. McCarthy, Trade-
marks and Unfair Competition §19:37 (5th ed. 2019) (here-
inafter  McCarthy).    Even  without  federal  registration,  a
mark  may  be  eligible  for  protection  against  infringement
under both the Lanham Act and other sources of law.  See
Matal, 582 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 4–5).

Prime  among  the  conditions  for  registration,  the  mark
must  be  one  “by  which  the  goods of  the  applicant  may  be
distinguished from the goods of others.”  §1052; see §1091(a)
(supplemental  register  contains  “marks  capable  of  distin-
guishing . . . goods or services”).  Distinctiveness is often ex-
pressed on an increasing scale: Word marks “may be (1) ge-
neric;  (2)  descriptive;  (3)  suggestive;  (4)  arbitrary;  or  (5)
fanciful.”  Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U. S.
763, 768 (1992).

The more distinctive the mark, the more readily it quali-
fies for the principal register.  The most distinctive marks—
those  that  are  “ ‘arbitrary’  (‘Camel’  cigarettes),  ‘fanciful’
(‘Kodak’ film), or ‘suggestive’ (‘Tide’ laundry detergent)”—
may  be  placed  on  the  principal  register  because  they  are
“inherently distinctive.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Brothers, Inc., 529 U. S. 205, 210–211 (2000).  “Descriptive”
terms, in contrast, are not eligible for the principal register
based on their inherent qualities alone.  E.g., Park ’N Fly,
Inc.  v.  Dollar  Park  &  Fly,  Inc.,  718  F. 2d  327,  331  (CA9
1983) (“Park ’N Fly” airport parking is descriptive), rev’d on
other grounds, 469 U. S. 189 (1985).  The Lanham Act, “lib-
eraliz[ing]  the  common  law,”  “extended  protection  to  de-
scriptive  marks.”    Qualitex  Co.  v.  Jacobson  Products  Co.,
514 U. S. 159, 171 (1995).  But to be placed on the principal
register, descriptive terms must achieve significance “in the
minds of the public” as identifying the applicant’s goods or
services—a quality called “acquired distinctiveness” or “sec-
ondary  meaning.”  Wal-Mart  Stores,  529  U. S.,  at  211
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing trademark law and the Lanham Act. It delves into concepts like distinctiveness of marks, registration requirements, and acquired distinctiveness.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

33

BREYER, J., dissenting

that simple fact, demonstrated convincingly over the past
40 years, strongly supports the  claim that  the death pen
alty  violates  the  Eighth  Amendment.    A  death  penalty
system  that  is  unreliable  or  procedurally  unfair  would
violate  the  Eighth  Amendment.  Woodson,  428  U. S.,  at
305 (plurality opinion); Hall, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
22); Roper, 543 U. S., at 568.  And so would a system that,
if reliable and fair in its application of the death penalty,
would  serve  no  legitimate  penological  purpose.  Furman,
408 U. S., at 312 (White, J., concurring); Gregg, supra, at
183  (joint  opinion  of  Stewart,  Powell,  and  Stevens,  JJ.);
Atkins, supra, at 319.

IV
“Unusual”—Decline in Use of the Death Penalty
The  Eighth  Amendment  forbids  punishments  that  are
cruel and unusual.  Last year, in  2014, only seven States
carried  out  an  execution.    Perhaps  more  importantly,  in
the  last  two  decades,  the  imposition  and  implementation
of the death penalty have increasingly become unusual.  I
can  illustrate  the  significant  decline  in  the  use  of  the
death penalty in several ways.

An appropriate starting point concerns the trajectory of
the  number  of  annual  death  sentences  nationwide,  from
the  1970’s  to  present  day.  In  1977—just  after  the  Su
preme  Court  made  clear  that,  by  modifying  their  legisla
tion, States could reinstate the death penalty—137 people
were sentenced to death.  BJS 2013 Stats, at 19 (Table 16).
Many  States  having  revised  their  death  penalty  laws  to
meet  Furman’s  requirements,  the  number  of  death  sen
tences  then  increased.  Between  1986  and  1999,  286  per
sons on average were sentenced to death each year.   BJS
2013  Stats,  at  14,  19  (Tables  11  and  16).    But,  approxi
mately  15  years  ago,  the  numbers  began  to  decline,  and
they  have  declined  rapidly  ever  since.  See  Appendix  A,
infra  (showing  sentences  from  1977–2014).  In  1999,  279
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the Eighth Amendment and the declining use of the death penalty.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

Court’s judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation, likely part of a court opinion. Legal citations are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the main body of text meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

Connecticut

Delaware

Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of ALITO, J.

the state, said wildlife statutes shall control”),
§18–9–202(3) (“Nothing in this part 2 shall be
construed to amend or in any manner change
the authority of the wildlife commission, as
established in title 33, [Colo. Rev. Stat.], or to
prohibit any conduct therein authorized or
permitted”)
Conn. Gen. Stat. §53–247(b) (2009) (“Any person
who maliciously and intentionally maims,
mutilates, tortures, wounds or kills an animal
shall be fined not more than five thousand
dollars or imprisoned not more than five years
or both.  The provisions of this subsection shall
not apply to . . . any person . . . while lawfully
engaged in the taking of wildlife”)
Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §1325(f) (2007) (“This
section shall not apply to the lawful hunting or
trapping of animals as provided by law”)
Fla. Stat. §828.122(9)(b) (2007) (“This section
shall not apply to . . . [a]ny person using animals
to pursue or take wildlife or to participate in any
hunting regulated or subject to being regulated
by the rules and regulations of the Fish and
Wildlife Conservation Commission”)
Ga. Code Ann. §16–12–4(e) (2007) (“The provi-
sions of this Code section shall not be construed
as prohibiting conduct which is otherwise per-
mitted under the laws of this state or of the
United States, including, but not limited to . . .
hunting, trapping, fishing, [or] wildlife man-
agement”)
Haw. Rev. Stat. §711–1108.5(1) (2008 Cum.
Supp.) (“A person commits the offense of cruelty
to animals in the first degree if the person
intentionally or knowingly tortures, mutilates,
or poisons or causes the torture, mutilation, or
poisoning of any pet animal or equine animal
resulting in serious bodily injury or death of the
pet animal or equine animal”)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, specifically excerpts from various state wildlife statutes. It's likely part of a legal argument or analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Statutory Excerpts</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

only in passing and relegated its complete analysis of the
issue  to  a  footnote.    There,  the  court  stated  that  “[t]his
case  is  distinguishable  from  the  Colorado  Civil  Rights
Division’s  recent  findings  that  [the  other  bakeries]  in
Denver did not discriminate against a Christian patron on
the  basis  of  his  creed”  when  they  refused  to  create  the
requested  cakes.  370  P. 3d,  at  282,  n. 8.    In  those  cases,
the court continued, there was no impermissible discrimi-
nation  because  “the  Division  found  that  the  bakeries  . . .
refuse[d] the patron’s request . . . because of the offensive
nature of the requested message.”  Ibid.

A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of
these  two  instances  cannot  be  based  on  the  government’s
own assessment of offensiveness.  Just as “no official, high
or  petty,  can  prescribe  what  shall  be  orthodox  in  politics,
nationalism,  religion,  or  other  matters  of  opinion,”  West
Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943),
it is not, as the Court has repeatedly held, the role of the
State  or  its  officials  to  prescribe  what  shall  be  offensive.
See Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (opinion of
ALITO,  J.)  (slip  op.,  at  22–23).  The  Colorado  court’s  at-
tempt  to  account  for  the  difference  in  treatment  elevates
one view of what is offensive over another and itself sends
a signal of official disapproval of Phillips’ religious beliefs.
The  court’s  footnote  does  not,  therefore,  answer  the
baker’s  concern  that  the  State’s  practice  was  to  disfavor
the religious basis of his objection.

C
For  the  reasons  just  described,  the  Commission’s  treat-
ment  of  Phillips’  case  violated  the  State’s  duty  under  the
First  Amendment  not  to  base  laws  or  regulations  on  hos-
tility to a religion or religious viewpoint.

In  Church  of  Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  supra,  the  Court
made  clear  that  the  government,  if  it  is  to  respect  the
Constitution’s  guarantee  of  free  exercise,  cannot  impose
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It delves into the First Amendment implications of the case, specifically focusing on the government's role in determining what constitutes "offensive" content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 21–1086 and 21–1087
_________________

WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ET AL., APPELLANTS
v.
EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL.

21–1086

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MARCUS CASTER, ET AL.

21–1087

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 8, 2023]

  CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the
Court, except as to Part III–B–1.*
  In January 2022, a three-judge District Court sitting in
Alabama  preliminarily  enjoined  the  State  from  using  the
districting  plan  it  had  recently  adopted  for  the  2022  con-
gressional  elections,  finding  that  the  plan  likely  violated
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U. S. C. §10301.  This
Court stayed the District Court’s order pending further re-
view.  595 U. S. ___ (2022).  After conducting that review,
we now affirm.

——————

*JUSTICE KAVANAUGH joins all but Part III–B–1 of this opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the names of the parties involved, and the date of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

civilian classification of dual-status technicians for “bookkeeping” pur-
poses controls when it comes to pay and benefits.  Pp. 4–7.

959 F. 3d 210, affirmed.

BARRETT, J., delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH,
JJ., joined.  GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the front matter of a legal case, specifically the syllabus. It provides a summary of the case and the justices' opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

and n. 5.  Then, shifting focus from the internal mechanism
of  the  gun  to  the  perspective  of  the  shooter,  the  majority
holds that continuous forward pressure is too much human
input  for  bump-stock-enabled  continuous  fire  to  be  “auto-
matic.”  See ante, at 14–17.
  The  majority’s  reading  flies  in  the  face  of  this  Court’s
standard tools of statutory interpretation.  By casting aside
the statute’s ordinary meaning both at the time of its enact-
ment and today, the majority eviscerates Congress’s regu-
lation of machineguns and enables gun users and manufac-
turers to circumvent federal law.

A
  Start with the phrase “single function of the trigger.”  All
the  tools  of  statutory  interpretation,  including  dictionary
definitions,  evidence  of  contemporaneous  usage,  and  this
Court’s prior interpretation, point to that phrase meaning
the initiation of the firing sequence by an act of the shooter,
whether via a pull, push, or switch of the firing mechanism.
The majority nevertheless interprets “function of the trig-
ger” as “the mode of action by which the trigger activates
the  firing  mechanism.”    Ante,  at  7.    Because  in  a  bump-
stock-equipped  semiautomatic  rifle,  the  trigger’s  internal
mechanism must reset each time a weapon fires, the major-
ity reads each reset as a new “function.”  That reading fix-
ates  on a  firearm’s  internal  mechanics  while  ignoring  the
human act on the trigger referenced by the statute.
  Consider  the  relevant  dictionary  definitions.    In  1934,
when  Congress  passed  the  National  Firearms  Act,  “func-
tion” meant “the mode of action by which [something] fulfils
its  purpose.”    4  Oxford  English  Dictionary  602  (1933).    A
“trigger” meant the “movable catch or lever” that “sets some
force or mechanism in action.”  11 id., at 357.  The majority
agrees with those definitions.  Ante, at 7.  It errs, however,
by maintaining a myopic focus on a trigger’s mechanics ra-
ther  than  on  how  a  shooter  uses  a  trigger  to  initiate  fire.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It delves into the interpretation of a statute related to firearms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

THRYV, INC. v. CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

Microsoft  Corp.  v.  i4i L.  P.,  564 U. S.  91  (2011).    Perhaps
most  appealing,  proceedings  take  place  before  the  Patent
Trial and Appeal Board, rather than in an Article III court,
so there is no jury trial before a tenure-protected judge, only
a hearing before a panel of agency employees.

Some  say  the  new  regime  represents  a  particularly
efficient new way to “kill” patents.  Certainly, the numbers
tell an inviting story for petitioners like Thryv.  In approx-
imately  80%  of  cases  reaching  a  final  decision,  the
Board  cancels  some  or  all  of  the  challenged  claims.
Patent  Trial  and  Appeal  Board,  Trial  Statistics  10  (Feb.
2020),  https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Trial_Statistics_2020_02_29.pdf.  The Board has been busy,
too,  instituting  more  than  800  of  these  new  proceedings
every year.  See id., at 6.

Still, Thryv faced a hurdle.  Inter partes review “may not
be  instituted”  based  on  an  administrative  petition  filed
more than a year after “the petitioner, real party in inter-
est, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint al-
leging  infringement  of  the  patent”  in  federal  court.    35
U. S. C. §315(b).  So, while Congress sought to move many
cases out of court and into its new administrative process,
it  thought  patent  owners  who  have  already  endured  long
challenges in court shouldn’t have to face another layer of
administrative review.  After all, some repose is due inven-
tors.  Patents typically last 20 years; what happens to the
incentive to invent if litigation over them lasts even longer
(as  it  has  for  Mr.  DuVal)?    By  anyone’s  estimation,  too,
§315(b)’s  time  bar  was  sure  to  pose  a  special  problem  for
Thryv.    Yes,  Thryv  had  petitioned  for  inter  partes  review
one  year  after  being  served  with  CTC’s  complaint.    But
nearly 12 years had passed since Thryv’s predecessor and
privy first found itself on the business end of a lawsuit al-
leging that it had infringed Mr. DuVal’s patent.

Despite  this  apparently  fatal  defect,  the  Board  plowed
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and its process for reviewing patents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
994

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–5674.  Futch  v.  Dewey  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  102.

No.  09–5714.  O’Dwyer  v.  Nelson  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  741.

No.  09–5886.  Owens  v.  Virginia  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5981.  Reed  v.  Hofbauer,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6009.  Cook  v.  Adams,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6036.  Robenson  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–6050.  Roper  v.  Farwell,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6055.  Justice v.  King.  Ct. App. N. Y.  Certiorari de

nied.  Reported  below:  12  N. Y.  3d  908,  912  N.  E.  2d  1066.

No.  09–6068.  Cutaia  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  5th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  17  So.  3d  1239.

No.  09–6071.  Maisano  v.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–6072.  Langosh  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th

App.  Dist.,  Div.  1.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6081.  Niceley  v.  Kentucky.  Ct.  App.  Ky.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–6084.  Williams v.  McNeil, Secretary, Florida De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6086.  Williams v.  McBride, Warden.  C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  235.

No.  09–6099.  Jones  v.  Yates,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

THOMPSON v. CLARK ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 20–659.  Argued October 12, 2021—Decided April 4, 2022

In January 2014, petitioner Larry Thompson was living with his fiancée
(now wife) and their newborn baby in an apartment in Brooklyn, New
York.  Thompson’s sister-in-law, who apparently suffered from a men-
tal illness, called 911 to report that Thompson was sexually abusing
the baby.  When Emergency Medical Technicians arrived, Thompson
denied  that  anyone  had  called  911.    When  the  EMTs  returned  with
four police officers, Thompson told them that they could not enter with-
out a warrant.  The police nonetheless entered and handcuffed Thomp-
son.  EMTs took the baby to the hospital where medical professionals
examined her and found no signs of abuse.  Meanwhile, Thompson was
arrested  and  charged  with  obstructing  governmental  administration
and  resisting  arrest.    He  was  detained  for  two  days  before  being  re-
leased.  The  charges  against  Thompson  were  dismissed  before  trial
without any explanation by the prosecutor or judge.  After the dismis-
sal, Thompson filed suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging several con-
stitutional violations, including a Fourth Amendment claim for mali-
cious prosecution.  To maintain that Fourth Amendment claim under
§1983, a plaintiff such as Thompson must demonstrate, among other
things,  that  he  obtained  a  favorable  termination  of  the  underlying
criminal prosecution.  To meet that requirement, Second Circuit prec-
edent required Thompson to show that his criminal prosecution ended
not merely without a conviction, but also with some affirmative indi-
cation of his innocence.  See Lanning v. Glens Falls, 908 F. 3d 19, 22.
The District Court, bound by Lanning, held that Thompson’s criminal
case had not ended in a way that affirmatively indicated his innocence
because Thompson could not offer any substantial evidence to explain
why his case was dismissed.  The Second Circuit affirmed the dismis-
sal  of  Thompson’s  claim.    This  Court  granted  certiorari  to  resolve  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are informational in nature and not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the core content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

Opinion of the Court

about  the  separation  of  powers.  For  that  reason,  we  ob-
served two Terms ago, “agency adjudications are generally
ill suited to address structural constitutional challenges”—
like those maintained here.  Carr v. Saul, 593 U. S. ___, ___
(2021) (slip op., at 9).

On this last factor, even the Government mostly gives up
the ghost.  Its argument goes: “Even when an agency lacks
expertise in interpreting the Constitution, it can still ‘apply
its  expertise’  by  deciding  other  issues”—whether  “statu-
tory, regulatory, or factual”—“that ‘may obviate the need to
address  the  constitutional  challenge.’ ”  Brief  for  Federal
Parties  54 (quoting  Elgin,  567  U. S.,  at  22–23).  The first
clause of that sentence concedes the  expertise point—and
the rest cannot reclaim it.  True enough, we partly relied in
Elgin on the MSPB’s expertise on a raft of ordinary employ-
ment issues surrounding the employee’s contention that the
Equal  Protection  Clause  barred  his  discharge.   See  567
U. S., at 22–23; supra, at 9.  But the Government here does
not pretend that Axon’s and Cochran’s constitutional claims
are similarly intertwined with or embedded in matters on
which the Commissions are expert.  (It is precisely because
those  claims  are  not  so  entangled  that  the  Government
must try to redefine what it means for claims to be “collat-
eral” to an agency action.  See supra, at 15–16.)  And unlike
in  Elgin,  ruling  for  Axon  and  Cochran  on  expertise-laden
grounds would not “obviate the need” to address their con-
stitutional claims—which, again, allege injury not from this
or that ruling but from subjection to all agency authority.
Those claims of here-and-now harm would remain no mat-
ter  how much expertise could  be “brought to bear” on the
other issues these cases involve.  Thunder Basin, 510 U. S.,
at 215.

All three Thunder Basin factors thus point in the same
direction—toward  allowing district  court  review  of  Axon’s
and Cochran’s claims that the structure, or even existence,
of  an  agency  violates  the  Constitution.    For  the  reasons
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to the separation of powers and agency authority.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

state law specifically gives the Attorney General the discre-
tion to make these kinds of decisions”).

If any doubt remains, the results delivered by the attor-
ney general’s representation should eliminate it.  The attor-
ney general sought and secured on appeal a reversal of the
District  Court’s  preliminary  injunction.    He  also  won  the
Governor’s dismissal from the suit.  It is hardly persuasive
to flyspeck the attorney general’s litigation approach when
that very approach has vindicated the State’s interests.

Finally, the Court alludes to petitioners’ argument that
state  respondents’  representation  of  petitioners’  interests
was inadequate because the Governor (who vetoed S. B. 824
and personally opposed the law) exercised appointment au-
thority over state respondents.  Ante, at 16.  The Court is
right  not  to  fully  embrace  this  argument,  which  implies
that the attorney general and the career professionals in his
office are incapable of executing their statutory duty to rep-
resent North Carolina in litigation and defend its interests.
See  N. C.  Gen.  Stat.  Ann.  §114–2.  Petitioners’  “startling
accusation” flies in the face of the presumption that public
officials can be trusted to exercise their official duties and
overlooks the attorney general’s vigorous advocacy to date.
999 F. 3d,  at 937; see United States  v. Chemical Founda-
tion,  Inc.,  272  U. S.  1,  15  (1926)  (courts  should  “presume
that [public officials] have properly discharged their official
duties”).  As the Court of Appeals explained, that the Gov-
ernor  or  the  attorney  general  “may  have  expressed  policy
views at odds with S.B. 824 in the past is no ground for a
federal court to infer that [the attorney general] would ab-
dicate his official duty to the State by subterfuge, mounting
a sham defense of the statute.”  999 F. 3d, at 937.  To sug-
gest otherwise does a grave “disservice to the dignified work
of  government  lawyers  who  each  day  put  aside  their  own
policy and political preferences to advocate dutifully on be-
half of their governments and the general public.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

KAGAN, J., concurring

invitation to save §602(a)(1) from Quality King by destroy-
ing  the  first-sale  protection  that  §109(a)  gives  to  every
owner  of  a  copy  manufactured  abroad.    That  would  swap
one  (possible)  mistake  for  a  much  worse  one,  and  make
our  reading  of  the  statute  only  less  reflective  of  Congres-
sional  intent.  If  Congress  thinks  copyright  owners  need
greater  power  to  restrict  importation  and  thus  divide
markets,  a  ready  solution  is  at  hand—not  the  one  John
Wiley offers in this case, but the one the Court rejected in
Quality King.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kagan. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNICOLORS, INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P.

Syllabus

an  inaccuracy  in  a  copyright  registration  under  §411(b)(1)(A)’s  safe
harbor.  Pp. 4–9.

it  was

lacked  “knowledge  that

(a) The  Copyright  Act  provides  that  a  certificate  of  registration  is
valid, even though it contains inaccurate information, as long as the
copyright  holder
inaccurate.”
§411(b)(1)(A).  Case law and the dictionary instruct that “knowledge”
has historically “meant and still means the fact or condition of being
aware of something.”  Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma,
589  U.  S.  ___,  ___  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Nothing  in
§411(b)(1)(A) suggests that the safe harbor applies differently simply
because an applicant made a mistake of law as opposed to a mistake
of fact.  If Unicolors was not aware of the legal requirement that ren-
dered information in its application inaccurate, it could not have in-
cluded the inaccurate information “with knowledge that it was inaccu-
rate.”  §411(b)(1)(A).  Pp. 4–5.

(b) Nearby statutory provisions help confirm that here “knowledge”
refers to knowledge of the law as well as the facts.  Registration appli-
cations  call  for  information  that  requires  both  legal  and  factual
knowledge.  See, e.g., §409(4) (whether a work was made “for hire”);
§409(8) (when and where the work was “published”); §409(9) (whether
the  work  is  “a  compilation  or  derivative  work”).    Inaccurate  infor-
mation in a registration may arise from a mistake of law or a mistake
of  fact.    Nothing  in  the  statutory  language  suggests  that  Congress
wanted to forgive applicants—many of whom lack legal training—for
factual but not (often esoteric) legal mistakes.  Moreover, had Congress
intended a scienter requirement other than actual knowledge, it would
have said so explicitly, as it did in other parts of the Copyright Act.
Indeed, cases decided before Congress enacted §411(b) overwhelmingly
concluded  that  inadvertent  mistakes  on  registration  certificates—
many  of  which  involved  mistakes  of  law—neither  invalidated  copy-
right  registrations  nor  disallowed  infringement  actions.    The  Court
finds  no  indication  that  Congress  intended  to  alter  this  well-estab-
lished rule when it enacted §411(b).  Pp. 5–7.

(c) Those who consider legislative history will find indications that
Congress  enacted  §411(b)  to  make  it  easier,  not  more  difficult,  for
nonlawyers to obtain valid copyright registrations.  It did so in part by
“eliminating loopholes” that allowed infringers to exploit mistakes in
the  application  process  to  prevent  enforcement  of  otherwise  validly
registered copyrights.  H. R. Rep. No. 110–617, p. 20. Given this his-
tory, it would make no sense if §411(b) left copyright registrations ex-
posed to invalidation based on applicants’ good-faith misunderstand-
ings of the details of copyright law.  P. 7.

(d) H&M’s remaining arguments are unavailing.  First, the Court’s
interpretation of the statute will not allow copyright holders to avoid
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It is not the actual content of a book and is likely meant for legal professionals.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS

ALITO, J., dissenting

567  U. S.  387,  401  (2012).    If  States  are  also  barred  from
bringing suit even when they satisfy our established test for
Article III standing, they are powerless to defend their vital
interests.  If a President fails or refuses to enforce the im-
migration  laws,  the  States  must  simply  bear  the  conse-
quences.  That interpretation of executive authority and Ar-
ticle  III’s  case  or  controversy  requirement  is  deeply  and
dangerously flawed.

I
The Court’s opinion omits much that is necessary to un-
derstand  the  significance  of  its  decision,  and  I  therefore
begin  by  summarizing  the  relevant  statutory  provisions,
the  challenged  Department  of  Homeland  Security  (DHS)
action,  and  the  District  Court’s  findings  of  fact  regarding
the injury faced by the State of Texas as the result of what
DHS has done.

A
The relevant statutory provisions have figured in several
prior decisions, and in those cases we have recounted how
they  came  to  be  enacted  and  have  clearly  described  what
they require.  These provisions were part of the Illegal Im-
migration  Reform  and  Immigration  Responsibility  Act  of
1996 (IIRIRA), which  was adopted “against a backdrop  of
wholesale failure by the [Immigration and Naturalization
Service] to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by
aliens.”  Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 518 (2003).2  Con-
gress concluded that a central cause of that failure was the
Attorney General’s “broad discretion to conduct individual-
ized bond hearings and to release criminal aliens from cus-
tody  during  their  removal  proceedings.”    Id.,  at  519.  To
remedy  this  problem, Congress  “subtract[ed]  some  of  that

——————

2 The Immigration and Naturalization Service was merged into DHS

in 2003.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *United States v. Texas*. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of statutory provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

51

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

would exclude a talented young biologist who struggled to
maintain above-average grades in humanities classes.  And
it  would  exclude  a  student  whose  freshman-year  grades
were poor because of a family crisis but who got herself back
on track in her last three years of school, only to find herself
just  outside  of  the  top  decile  of  her  class.”  Fisher  II,  579
U. S., at 386.  A myopic focus on academic ratings “does not
lead to a diverse student body.”  Ibid.35

2
As noted above, this Court suggests that the use of race
in  college  admissions  is  unworkable  because  respondents’
objectives are not sufficiently “measurable,” “focused,” “con-
crete,” and “coherent.”  Ante, at 23, 26, 39.  How much more
precision  is  required  or  how  universities  are  supposed  to
meet  the  Court’s  measurability  requirement,  the  Court’s
opinion does not say.  That is exactly the point.  The Court
is not interested in crafting a workable framework that pro-
motes racial diversity on college campuses.  Instead, it an-
nounces a requirement designed to ensure all race-conscious
plans fail.  Any increased level of precision runs the risk of
violating the Court’s admonition that colleges and univer-
sities operate their race-conscious admissions policies with
no  “ ‘specified  percentage[s]’ ”  and  no  “specific  number[s]
firmly in mind.”  Grutter, 539 U. S., at 324, 335.  Thus, the
majority’s holding puts schools in an untenable position.  It
creates a legal framework where race-conscious plans must
be measured with precision but also must not be measured
with precision.  That holding is not meant to infuse clarity
into the strict scrutiny framework; it is designed to render
strict scrutiny “ ‘fatal in fact.’ ”  Id., at 326 (quoting Adarand
——————

35 Today’s decision is likely to generate a plethora of litigation by dis-
appointed  college  applicants  who  think  their  credentials  and  personal
qualities should have secured them admission.  By inviting those chal-
lenges, the Court’s opinion promotes chaos and incentivizes universities
to convert their admissions programs into inflexible systems focused on
mechanical factors, which will harm all students.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It argues against the majority opinion on the use of race in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–5726
_________________

DEXTER EARL KEMP, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 13, 2022]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, dissenting.
The Court took this case to determine whether a district
court’s mistake of law is correctable under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6).

From the start, granting review was a questionable use
of judicial resources.  The answer matters only under rare
circumstances:  A losing party fails to appeal or secure relief
under Rule 59(e), opting instead to file a Rule 60(b) motion.
That motion comes more than a year after judgment but—
piling contingency on contingency—within what the court
would otherwise deem a “reasonable time.”  Rule 60(c)(1).
By petitioner’s own (uncontested) count, his is the first pe-
tition  ever  to  present  today’s  question  for  this  Court’s  re-
view.  See Pet. for Cert. 24; Brief in Opposition 26.  Beyond
even that, an alternative route exists to resolve the ques-
tion posed here.  Congress has adopted the Rules Enabling
Act.  See 28 U. S. C. §§ 2071–2077.  Under its terms, a com-
mittee  composed  of  judges  and  practitioners  may  recom-
mend to this Court any warranted clarifications to the Fed-
eral  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure.
Those
recommendations  generally  take  effect  upon  our  approval
and absent congressional objection.  § 2074.

§ 2073.

Undeterred, the Court takes up and resolves this case an-
yway.  It holds that Rule 60(b)(1), not Rule 60(b)(6), applies.
In an unexpected twist, the Court adopts a further position
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the name of the dissenting Justice. This type of text is generally suitable for indexing as it is part of the legal reasoning and decision-making process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

In 1906, Congress sought to deliver on its treaty promises
when  it  adopted  the  Oklahoma  Enabling  Act.    That  law
paved the way for the new State’s admission to the Union.
But in doing so, Congress took care to require Oklahoma to
“agree and declare” that it would “forever disclaim all right
and title in or to . . . all lands lying within [the State’s] lim-
its owned or held by any Indian, tribe, or nation.”  34 Stat.
270.  Instead of granting the State some new power to pros-
ecute  crimes  by  or  against  tribal  members,  Congress  in-
sisted that tribal lands “shall be and remain subject to the
jurisdiction,  disposal,  and  control  of  the  United  States.”
Ibid.  Oklahoma complied with Congress’s instructions by
adopting both of these commitments verbatim in its Consti-
tution.  Art. I, § 3.

Underscoring  the  nature  of  this  arrangement,  the  Ena-
bling  Act  further  provided  that  “nothing  contained  in  the

——————
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In truth, while some members of the
Tribe did side with the Confederacy, others fought for the Union.  See 1
Litton 222, 224, 239.  Regardless, after the Civil War the federal govern-
ment punished the entire Tribe by stripping some of its lands in the 1866
Treaty of Washington.  See id., at 245.  But that pact did not terminate
the  government’s  other  existing  treaty  promises.    To  the  contrary,  the
new treaty expressly confirmed that “[a]ll provisions of treaties, hereto-
fore ratified . . . and not inconsistent with the provisions of this treaty,
are hereby reaffirmed.”  Treaty with the Cherokee, Art. XXXI, 14 Stat.
806.  As for the 1871 statute the Court cites, it makes plain that “nothing
herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation
of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any . . . Indian
nation or tribe.”  16 Stat. 566.  Recognizing as much, this Court in 1896
expressly recognized that the Tribe’s “guarantee of self-government” in
the Treaty of New Echota remained in force.  Talton, 163 U. S., at 380.
In the years since, this Court and others have recognized the continuing
vitality of various aspects of the treaty too.  See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma,  397  U. S.  620,  628  (1970);  EEOC  v.  Cherokee  Nation,  871
F. 2d 937, 938 (CA10 1989).  And in this very case, the federal govern-
ment has confirmed that the Nation’s treaties continue to “protect” the
Tribe.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 121.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. It delves into the history of treaties and land rights concerning Native American tribes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring

exercising their independent judgment to resolve ambigui-
ties.  Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip
op., at 3); see also Michigan, 576 U. S., at 761 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.);  see  also  Perez,  575  U. S.,  at  123  (opinion  of
THOMAS, J.).  By tying a judge’s hands, Chevron prevents
the Judiciary from serving as a constitutional check on the
Executive.  It allows “the Executive . . . to dictate the out-
come  of  cases  through  erroneous  interpretations.”    Bald-
win, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 4);
Michigan,  576  U. S.,  at  763,  n.  1  (opinion  of  THOMAS, J.);
see also Perez, 575 U. S., at 124 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).  Be-
cause  the  judicial  power  requires  judges  to  exercise  their
independent  judgment,  the  deference  that  Chevron  re-
quires contravenes Article III’s mandate.

Chevron deference also permits the Executive Branch to
exercise powers not given to it.  “When the Government is
called upon to perform a function that requires an exercise
of legislative, executive, or judicial power, only the vested
recipient  of  that  power  can  perform  it.”  Department  of
Transportation  v.  Association  of  American  Railroads,  575
U. S.  43,  68  (2015)  (THOMAS, J.,  concurring  in  judgment).
Because the Constitution gives the Executive Branch only
“[t]he  executive  Power,”  executive  agencies  may  constitu-
tionally  exercise  only  that  power.    Art. II,  §1,  cl. 1.    But,
Chevron  gives  agencies  license  to  exercise  judicial  power.
By allowing agencies to definitively interpret laws so long
as  they  are  ambiguous,  Chevron  “transfer[s]”  the  Judici-
ary’s  “interpretive  judgment  to  the  agency.”    Perez,  575
U. S., at 124 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Baldwin, 589
U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 4); Michi-
gan, 576 U. S., at 761–762 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); post, at
18 (GORSUCH, J., concurring).

Chevron deference “cannot be salvaged” by recasting it as
deference to an agency’s “formulation of policy.”  Baldwin,
589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (slip op., at 3).  If that were true, Chevron
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It delves into the legal arguments against the Chevron deference doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

94

UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

Opinion of the Court

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
The maritime oil transport industry presents ever-present,
all too real dangers of oil spills from tanker ships, spills
which could be catastrophes for the marine environment.
After the supertanker Torrey Canyon spilled its cargo of
120,000 tons of crude oil off the coast of Cornwall, England,
in 1967, both Congress and the State of Washington enacted
more stringent regulations for these tankers and provided
for more comprehensive remedies in the event of an oil spill.
The ensuing question of federal pre-emption of the State’s
laws was addressed by the Court in Ray v. Atlantic Rich-
ﬁeld Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978).

In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in
Prince William Sound, Alaska, and its cargo of more than 53
million gallons of crude oil caused the largest oil spill in
United States history. Again, both Congress and the State
of Washington responded. Congress enacted new statutory
provisions, and Washington adopted regulations governing
tanker operations and design. Today we must determine
whether these more recent state laws can stand despite the
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil
tankers. Relying on the same federal statute that con-
trolled the analysis in Ray, we hold that some of the State’s
regulations are pre-empted; as to the balance of the regula-
tions, we remand the case so their validity may be assessed
in light of the considerable federal interest at stake and in
conformity with the principles we now discuss.

E. Vedder; and for the Steamship Association of Southern California by
David E. R. Woolley and Thomas A. Russell.

Briefs of amici curiae were ﬁled for the Government of Canada by Mar-
garet K. Pfeiffer; for the Paciﬁc Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associa-
tions et al. by Bryan P. Coluccio; for the Paciﬁc Merchant Shipping Asso-
ciation by Sam D. Delich and James B. Nebel; for the Prince William
Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council by Avrum M. Gross and Susan
A. Burke; and for the Puget Sound Steamship Operators Association et al.
by Richard W. Buchanan and Robert W. Nolting.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes the case name, the justices involved, and the introductory paragraphs of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BOND v. UNITED STATES

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

constitutional.

I would hold that it was not, and for that reason would
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.

I.  The Statutory Question
A.  Unavoidable Meaning of the Text
The meaning of the Act is plain.  No person may know-
ingly “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly
or  indirectly,  receive,  stockpile,  retain,  own,  possess,  or
use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.”  18 U. S. C.
§229(a)(1).  A “chemical weapon” is “[a] toxic chemical and
its  precursors,  except  where  intended  for  a  purpose  not
prohibited  under  this  chapter  as  long  as  the  type  and
quantity is consistent with such a purpose.”  §229F(1)(A).
A  “toxic  chemical”  is  “any  chemical  which  through  its
chemical  action  on  life  processes  can  cause  death,  tempo-
rary  incapacitation  or  permanent  harm  to  humans  or
animals.  The term includes all such chemicals, regardless
of  their  origin  or  of  their  method  of  production,  and  re-
gardless  of  whether  they  are  produced  in  facilities,  in
munitions  or  elsewhere.”    §229F(8)(A).    A  “purpose  not
prohibited” is “[a]ny peaceful purpose related to an indus-
trial,  agricultural,  research,  medical,  or  pharmaceutical
activity or other activity.”  §229F(7)(A).

Applying  those  provisions  to  this  case  is hardly  compli-
cated.  Bond  possessed  and  used  “chemical[s]  which
through [their] chemical action on life processes can cause
death,  temporary  incapacitation  or  permanent  harm.”
Thus, she possessed “toxic chemicals.”  And, because they
were not possessed or used only for a “purpose not prohib-
ited,”  §229F(1)(A),  they  were  “chemical  weapons.”    Ergo,
Bond violated the Act.  End of statutory analysis, I would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Scalia in the case of Bond v. United States. It delves into the interpretation of the Chemical Weapons Convention Act and its application to the specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

462

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of Scalia, J.

Ibid.

withdrawing the land from agricultural production, whereas
sale—even at bargain-basement prices for the land—would
at least enable recoupment of the cost of improvements, such
as drainage systems.
In the present case, by con-
trast, we have no reason to believe that IPP is not operating
its processing plant at a proﬁt, and will not continue to do so
in the future; Snake River has proffered no evidence that
IPP or any other processor would surely have sold if only
the President had not canceled the tax deferral. The only
uncertainty in Bryant was whether any of the respondents
would wind up as buyers of any of the excess land; that
seemed probable enough, since “respondents are residents of
the Imperial Valley who desire to purchase the excess land
for purposes of farming.”
Ibid. We have no basis to say
that it is “likely” that Snake River would have purchased a
processing facility if § 968 had not been canceled.

More fundamentally, however, the reasoning of Bryant
should not govern the present case because it represents a
crabbed view of the standing doctrine that has been super-
seded. Bryant was decided at the tail-end of “an era in
which it was thought that the only function of the constitu-
tional requirement of standing was ‘to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues,’ ”
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 11 (1998), quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). Thus, the Bryant Court ulti-
mately afforded the respondents standing simply because
they “had a sufﬁcient stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy,” 447 U. S., at 368, not because they had demonstrated
injury in fact, causation, and redressability.
“That parsimo-
nious view of the function of Article III standing has since
yielded to the acknowledgment that the constitutional re-
quirement is a ‘means of “deﬁn[ing] the role assigned to the
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power,” ’ and ‘a part of
the basic charter . . . provid[ing] for the interaction between
[the federal] government and the governments of the several
States,’ ” Spencer, supra, at 11–12, quoting Valley Forge
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice Scalia in the case of Clinton v. City of New York.  It discusses the standing doctrine and its application to the case at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1017

529 U. S.

March 20, 2000

No. 99–8089.
No. 99–8294.

In re Paglingayen; and
In re Jarvis. Petitions for writs of manda-

mus denied.

No. 99–1316.
No. 99–1351.

In re Wojciechowski; and
In re Marcone. Petitions for writs of manda-

mus and/or prohibition denied.

Certiorari Granted

No. 99–859. Central Green Co. v. United States. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 177 F. 3d 834.

No. 99–804. Cleveland v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 as presented by the peti-
tion. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 296.

No. 99–1038. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United
Mine Workers of America, District 17, et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of Institute for a Drug-Free Workplace for leave to ﬁle a
brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Reported
below: 188 F. 3d 501.

No. 99–1185. Seling, Superintendent, Special Commit-
ment Center v. Young. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari
granted. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 870.

Certiorari Denied

No. 99–818. Guam Economic Development Authority v.
United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 179 F. 3d 630.

No. 99–837. Conley v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 186 F. 3d 7.

No. 99–882. Copper et al. v. City of Fargo et al. C. A.

8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 184 F. 3d 994.

No. 99–919. Balfour Beatty Bahamas Ltd. v. Bush. C. A.

11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 170 F. 3d 1048.

No. 99–920. Riley et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 888.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (granted or denied).  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

Opinion of the Court

injure  someone.    The  act  of  making  an  extortionate  de
mand  or  breaking  and  entering  into  someone’s  home
does  not,  in  and  of  itself,  normally  cause  physical  injury.
Rather, risk of injury arises because the extortionist might
engage in violence after making his demand or because the
burglar might confront a resident in the home after break
ing and entering.

We  are  convinced  that  the  indeterminacy  of  the  wide-
ranging  inquiry  required  by  the  residual  clause  both  de
nies  fair  notice  to  defendants  and  invites  arbitrary  en
forcement  by  judges.    Increasing  a  defendant’s  sentence
under the clause denies due process of law.

A
Two  features  of  the  residual  clause  conspire  to  make  it
unconstitutionally  vague.  In  the  first  place,  the  residual
clause leaves grave uncertainty about how to estimate the
risk  posed  by  a  crime.    It  ties  the  judicial  assessment  of
risk to a judicially imagined “ordinary case” of a crime, not
to real-world facts or statutory elements.  How does one go
about deciding what kind of conduct the “ordinary case” of
a  crime  involves?  “A  statistical  analysis  of  the  state  re
porter?    A  survey?    Expert  evidence?    Google?  Gut  in
stinct?”  United  States  v.  Mayer,  560  F. 3d  948,  952  (CA9
2009) (Kozinski, C. J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).  To take an example, does the ordinary instance
of  witness  tampering  involve  offering  a  witness  a  bribe?
Or threatening a witness with violence?  Critically, pictur
ing  the  criminal’s  behavior  is  not  enough;  as  we  have
already  discussed,  assessing  “potential  risk”  seemingly
requires  the  judge  to  imagine  how  the  idealized  ordinary
case  of  the  crime  subsequently  plays  out.  James  illus
trates  how  speculative  (and  how  detached  from  statutory
elements)  this  enterprise  can  become.  Explaining  why
attempted burglary poses a serious potential risk of physi
cal  injury,  the  Court  said:  “An  armed  would-be  burglar
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the constitutionality of a specific clause and its potential for vagueness and arbitrary enforcement.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. TAM

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 15–1293.  Argued January 18, 2017—Decided June 19, 2017

Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this mon-
iker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as
a derogatory term for Asian persons.  Tam sought federal registration
of  the  mark  “THE  SLANTS.”    The  Patent  and  Trademark  Office
(PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibit-
ing  the  registration  of  trademarks  that  may  “disparage  . . .  or  bring
. . .  into  contemp[t]  or  disrepute”  any  “persons,  living  or  dead.”    15
U. S. C.  §1052(a).    Tam  contested  the  denial  of  registration  through
the  administrative  appeals  process,  to  no  avail.    He  then  took  the
case  to  federal  court,  where  the  en  banc  Federal  Circuit  ultimately
found  the  disparagement  clause  facially  unconstitutional  under  the
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

808 F. 3d 1321, affirmed.

JUSTICE  ALITO  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court  with  respect  to

Parts I, II, and III–A, concluding:

1. The  disparagement  clause  applies  to  marks  that  disparage  the
members of a racial or ethnic group.  Tam’s view, that the clause ap-
plies only to natural or juristic persons, is refuted by the plain terms
of the clause, which uses the word “persons.”  A mark that disparages
a “substantial” percentage of the members of a racial or ethnic group
necessarily  disparages  many  “persons,”  namely,  members  of  that
group.  Tam’s  narrow  reading  also  clashes  with  the  breadth  of  the
disparagement  clause,  which  by  its  terms  applies  not  just  to  “per-
sons,”  but  also  to  “institutions”  and  “beliefs.”    §1052(a).    Had  Con-
gress wanted to confine the reach of the clause, it could have used the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1060

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 30, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–7227.  Wade  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  509.

No.  09–7230.  Wright  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7231.  Weatherspoon  v.  United  States.  C.  A. 3d

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  143.

No.  09–7234.  Sanchez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  641.

No.  09–7235.  Lugo  Luna  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  778.

No.  09–7237.  Martinez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  846.

No. 09–7238.  Libman v. United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  614.

No.  09–7240.  Mackey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  243.

No. 09–7248.  Washington v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  877.

No.  09–7249.  Timley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  782.

No.  09–7251.  Madrigal-Diaz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  657.

No. 09–7253.  Pirtle  v.  United States.  C. A.  7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  108.

No.  09–7254.  Anderson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  878.

No. 09–7256.  Wilson v. United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7261.  Stricklin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  599.

No.  09–7269.  Murphy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  578  F.  3d  719.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, circuit courts, and reporting information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

IANCU v. BRUNETTI

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

public  associates  the  contents  of  trademarks  with  the
Federal  Government,”  Tam,  582  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at
17),  registration  nevertheless  entails  Government  in-
volvement  in  promoting  a  particular  mark.    Registration
requires  the  Government  to  publish  the  mark,  as  well  as
to take steps to combat international infringement.  See 15
U. S. C. §§1062, 1124; see also Brief for United States 35.
The  Government  has  a  reasonable  interest  in  refraining
from  lending  its  ancillary  support  to  marks  that  are  ob-
scene,  vulgar,  or  profane.  Cf.  Hustler  Magazine,  Inc.  v.
Falwell,  485  U. S.  46,  56  (1988)  (“[S]peech  that  is  vulgar,
offensive, and shocking is not entitled to absolute constitu-
tional protection under all circumstances” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).

III
“The  cardinal  principle  of  statutory  construction  is  to
save  and  not  to  destroy.”  Jones  &  Laughlin  Steel  Corp.,
301  U. S.,  at  30;  see  also  Hooper  v.  California,  155  U. S.
648,  657  (1895)  (“The  elementary  rule  is  that  every  rea-
sonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save
a statute from unconstitutionality”).  In directing the PTO
to deny the ancillary benefit of registration to trademarks
featuring “scandalous” content, Congress used a word that
is susceptible of different meanings.  The majority’s read-
ing  would  render  the  provision  unconstitutional;  mine
would  save  it.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  Court
ought  to  adopt  the  narrower  construction,  rather  than
permit  a  rush  to  register  trademarks  for  even  the  most
viscerally  offensive  words  and  images  that  one  can
imagine.13

——————

13 As noted above, I agree with the majority that §1052(a)’s bar on the
registration of “immoral” marks is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimi-
nation.  See  supra,  at  2.    I  would  simply  sever  that  provision  and
uphold  the  bar  on  “scandalous”  marks.  See  Reno  v.  American  Civil
Liberties  Union,  521  U. S.  844,  882–883  (1997);  Brockett  v.  Spokane
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the case IANCU v. BRUNETTI. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

9

BREYER, J., dissenting

In  light  of  this  history,  how  likely  is  it  that  Congress,
seeking to “satisfy in full the requirements of . . . interna-
tional  organizations  conducting  activities  in  the  United
States,”  S.  Rep.  No.  861,  at  2–3  (emphasis  added),  would
have  understood  the  statute  to  take  from  many  interna-
tional  organizations  with  one  hand  the  immunity  it  had
given them with the other?  If Congress wished the Act to
carry out one of its core purposes—fulfilling the country’s
international  commitments—Congress  would  not  have
wanted the statute to change over time, taking on a mean-
ing that would fail to grant not only full, but even partial,
immunity to many of those organizations.

B
Congress also intended to facilitate international organ-
izations’  ability  to  pursue  their  missions  in  the  United
States.  To illustrate why that purpose is better served by
a static interpretation, consider in greater detail the work
of  the  organizations  to  which  Congress  wished  to  provide
broad  immunity.  Put  the  IMF  to  the  side,  for  Congress
enacted  a  separate  statute  providing  it  with  immunity
(absent  waiver)  in  all  cases.  See  22  U. S. C.  §286h.    But
UNRRA, the World Bank, the FAO, and the  UN itself all
originally  depended  upon  the  Immunities  Act  for  the
immunity they sought.

Consider,  for  example,  the  mission  of  UNRRA.  The
United States and other nations created that organization
in  1943,  as  the  end  of World  War  II  seemed  in  sight.    Its
objective  was,  in  the  words  of  President  Roosevelt,  to
“ ‘assure  a  fair  distribution  of  available  supplies  among’ ”
those liberated in World War II, and “ ‘to ward off death by
starvation or exposure among these peoples.’ ”  1 G. Wood-
bridge, UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief
and  Rehabilitation  Administration  3  (1950).   By  the  time
Congress passed the Immunities Act in 1945, UNRRA had
obtained  and  shipped  billions  of  pounds  of  food,  clothing,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the interpretation of a statute and its historical context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

lxiii

Shayesteh v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shedler; Fink v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sheppard v. Painter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sherman v. American Cyanamid Co.
Short, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shultz v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sibley v. LeMaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sidransky; Corey v.
Siefert; Comfort Silkie Company Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Siegel, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sikes; Trice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sikora v. Bohn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Silas, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Siler v. Dillingham Ship Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Silo v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simmons v. Luebbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simmons v. United States
Simmons v. Wetherall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Simpson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sinclair; Corcoran v.
Sinnreich & Francisco; O’Neal v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sirbaugh v. Elo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sketoe v. Exxon Co., USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Skyers v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Skyers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slack v. McDaniel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slater v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sledge v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sletten; Campbell v.
Small; Vann v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smallwood v. Cromartie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smeeks; Young v.
Smiltneek; Murray v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Amoco Oil Co.
Smith v. Barrios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith; Brazzell v.
Smith v. Cadwell
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith; Carey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Garcia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Harris County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1135
1117
1100
1037
1129
1010
1066
1019
1006
1019
1083
1025,1084
1106
1052
1083
1095
1089
1119
1038
1030
1109
1112
1125
1057
1071
1061
473
1088
1135
1067
1088
1014
1117
1054
1016
1033
1024
1114
1084
1058
1025
1117
1038
1033
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
46

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

free-exercise  right.  Not  only  are  these  decisions  few  in
number, but they reached mixed results.  In addition, some
are unreasoned; some provide ambiguous explanations; and
many  of  the  cases  denying  exemptions  were  based  on
grounds that do not support Smith.

The  most  influential  early  case  granting  an  exemption
was People v. Philips, 1 W. L. J. 109, 112–113 (Gen. Sess.,
N. Y.  1813),  where  the  court  held  that  a  Catholic  priest
could  not  be  compelled  to  testify  about  a  confession.    The
priest’s  refusal,  the  court  reasoned,  was  protected  by  the
state constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and
did not fall within the exception for “acts of licentiousness”
and “practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of th[e]
State.”63  This, of course, is exactly the understanding of the
free-exercise  right  that  is  seen  in  the  founding  era  State
Constitutions.

Although  Philips  was  not officially reported,  knowledge
of the decision appears to have spread widely.  Four years
later,  another  New  York  court  implicitly  reaffirmed  the
principle Philips recognized but found the decision inappli-
cable because the Protestant minister who was called to tes-
tify did not feel a religious obligation to refuse.  See Smith’s
Case,  2  N. Y.  City-Hall  Recorder  77,  80,  and  n.  (1817);
McConnell, Origins 1505–1506; Walsh 40–41.

In 1827, a South Carolina court relied on Philips as sup-
port for its decision to grant an exemption from a state law
relied  on  to  bar  the  testimony  of  a  witness  who  denied  a
belief in punishment after death for testifying falsely, and
the State’s newly constituted high court approved that opin-
ion.  Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 Carolina L. J. 202, 213, 214
(1827).64
  In Commonwealth v. Cronin, 2 Va. Cir. 488, 498, 500, 505
——————

63 Privileged  Communications  to  Clergymen,  1  Cath.  Law.  199,  207–

209 (1955).

64 See also Walsh 41; Campbell, A New Approach 992, n. 99; Lombardi,

Free Exercise 408, and n. 152.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to the free exercise of religion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–603
_________________

LE ROY TORRES, PETITIONER v. TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
TEXAS, THIRTEENTH DISTRICT

[June 29, 2022]

 JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Constitution vests in Congress the power “[t]o raise
and  support  Armies”  and  “[t]o  provide  and  maintain  a
Navy.”  Art. I, §8, cls. 1, 12–13.  Pursuant to that authority,
Congress enacted a federal law that gives returning veter-
ans the right to reclaim their prior jobs with state employ-
ers and authorizes suit if those employers refuse to accom-
modate  them.  See  Uniformed  Services  Employment  and
Reemployment  Rights  Act  of  1994  (USERRA),  38  U. S. C.
§4301  et  seq.    This  case  asks  whether  States  may  invoke
sovereign immunity as a legal defense to block such suits.

In our view, they cannot.  Upon entering the Union, the
States implicitly agreed that their sovereignty would yield
to  federal  policy  to  build  and  keep  a  national  military.
States  thus  gave  up  their  immunity  from  congressionally
authorized suits pursuant to the “ ‘plan of the Convention,’ ”
as  part  of  “ ‘the  structure  of  the  original  Constitution  it-
self.’ ” PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594 U. S. ___,
___ (2021) (slip op., at 14) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S.
706, 728 (1999)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes the case citation, the title of the case, the date, and the name of the Justice delivering the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the legal reasoning and decision-making of the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

KAGAN, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20A66
_________________

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL. v.
WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY

[October 26, 2020]

  JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  and
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting.
  In April, residents of Wisconsin voted in presidential pri-
maries.    That  election  was  one  of  the  first  during  the
COVID–19  pandemic,  which  has  turned  in-person  voting
(with  its  often-long  lines,  touch  screens,  and  enclosed
booths)  into  a  health  risk,  especially  for  older  and  less
healthy  Americans.    Given  these  emergency  conditions,  a
district  judge  directed  the  State to  accept  mail  ballots re-
ceived in the six days after the polls closed.  That extension
of Wisconsin’s ballot-receipt deadline ensured that COVID-
related delays in the delivery and processing of mail ballots
would  not  disenfranchise  citizens  fearful  of  voting  in  per-
son.    Because  of  the  court’s  ruling,  state  officials  counted
80,000  ballots—about  five  percent  of  the  total  cast—that
were postmarked by Election Day but would have been dis-
carded for arriving a few days later.
  Today,  millions  of  Wisconsin  citizens  are  preparing  to
vote in the November election.  But COVID is not over.  In
Wisconsin,  the  pandemic  is  much  worse—more  than  20
times  worse,  by  one  measure—than  it  was  in  the  spring:
The State’s health department now reports a weekly aver-
age of 3,879 cases per day, compared to 175 per day when
the April election took place.  See Wisconsin Department of
Health  Services,  COVID–19:  Wisconsin  Cases  (Oct.  26,
2020), www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/covid-19/cases.htm.  Indeed,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan.  It sets the context for the case and outlines the issue at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.
v. GOLDSMITH
GORSUCH, J., concurring

Id.,  at  591.    Reading  §107  as  a  whole,  then,  it  supplies
courts with a sequential chain of questions about the par-
ticular challenged use—starting with its purpose and char-
acter (in the first factor) and ending with its effect (in the
fourth).  There is no double counting here.  Contra, post, at
22  (KAGAN, J.,  dissenting).  Instead,  the  statute  proceeds
from step to step, asking judges to assess whether the chal-
lenged use (as revealed by its purpose, character, amount
of source material used, and effect) serves as a complement
to or a substitute for a copyrighted work.

With all this in mind, the Court’s decision seems to me
exactly  right.  Does  Mr.  Warhol’s  image  seek  to  depict
Prince  as  a  “larger-than-life”  icon  while  Ms.  Goldsmith’s
photograph  attempts  to  cast  him  in  a  more  “vulnerable”
light?  See ante, at 28–35; post, at 9–10, 35 (KAGAN, J., dis-
senting).  Or are the artistic purposes latent in the two im-
ages  and  their  aesthetic  character  actually  more  similar
than that?  Happily, the law does not require judges to tan-
gle with questions so far beyond our competence.  Instead,
the  first  fair-use  factor  requires  courts  to  assess  only
whether the purpose and character of the challenged use is
the same as a protected use.  And here, the undisputed facts
reveal that the Foundation sought to use its image as a com-
mercial  substitute  for  Ms.  Goldsmith’s  photograph.    Of
course,  competitive  products  often  differ  in  material  re-
spects and a buyer may find these differences reason to pre-
fer one offering over another.  Cf. post, at 10, 18 (KAGAN, J.,
dissenting).  But under the first fair-use factor the salient
point is that the purpose and character of the Foundation’s
use involved competition with Ms. Goldsmith’s image.  To
know that much is to know the first fair-use factor favors
Ms. Goldsmith.

It  is  equally  important,  however,  to  acknowledge  what
this case does not involve and what the Court does not de-
cide.  Worried about the fate of artists seeking to portray
reclining nudes or papal authorities, or authors hoping to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Judge Gor-
such in the case of Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith. It analyzes the legal arguments related to fair use in copyright law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>