<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

for American Justice Association et al. as Amici Curiae 16–
20.  Under  the  provisions  of  the  Act  at  issue  here,  States
may sue tortfeasors directly, but as Florida itself explains,
it is “more cost-effective” for beneficiaries to sue.  Tr. of Oral
Arg. 65.  By diminishing beneficiaries’ interests in doing so,
the  Court’s  expansion  of  States’  assignment  rights  could
perversely cause States to recover fewer overall expenses,
all while unsettling expectations in the States that have re-
lied on a contrary reading of federal law.6

In the end, the Court’s atomizing interpretation has little
to commend it, particularly when contrasted with the con-
sistent,  administrable  scheme  Congress  crafted.  The
Court’s  reading  also  undercuts  Congress’  choice  to  allow
Medicaid beneficiaries to place their excess recovery funds
in Special Needs Trusts, protecting their ability to pay for
important expenses Medicaid will not cover.  See n. 1, su-
pra.  Congress may wish to intercede to address any disrup-
tion that ensues from today’s decision, but under a proper
reading of the Act, such intervention would have been un-
necessary.

*

*

*

“[T]he meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any
single section, but in all the parts together and in their re-
lation  to  the  end  in  view.”  Panama  Refining  Co.  v.  Ryan,
293 U. S. 388, 439 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).  Because
the Court disserves this cardinal rule today, I respectfully
dissent.

——————

6 The vast majority of lower courts (including Florida’s Supreme Court)
read these provisions much as I do.  See, e.g., Latham v. Office of Recovery
Servs., 2019 UT 51, 448 P. 3d 1241; Giraldo v. Agency for Health Care
Admin.,  248  So. 3d  53  (Fla.  2018);  In re  E.  B.,  229  W. Va.  435,  729
S. E. 2d 270 (2012); Doe v. Vermont Office of Health Access, 2012 VT 15A,
191  Vt.  517,  54  A. 3d  474;  Pet.  for  Cert.  18–19  (collecting  additional
cases).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U60

[09-26-01 12:39:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 803 (2000)

821

Opinion of the Court

709. The ﬁnding is not clearly erroneous; indeed it is all
but required.

Once § 505 went into effect, of course, a signiﬁcant percent-
age of cable operators felt it necessary to time channel their
sexually explicit programmers.
Id., at 711, and n. 14. This
is an indication that scrambling technology is not yet per-
fected. That is not to say, however, that scrambling is
completely ineffective. Different cable systems use differ-
ent scrambling systems, which vary in their dependability.
“The severity of the problem varies from time to time and
place to place, depending on the weather, the quality of the
equipment, its installation, and maintenance.”
Id., at 708.
At even the good end of the spectrum a system might bleed
to an extent sufﬁcient to trigger the time-channeling require-
ment for a cautious cable operator.
(The statute requires
the signal to be “fully block[ed].”
47 U. S. C. § 561(a) (1994
ed., Supp. III) (emphasis added).) A rational cable operator,
faced with the possibility of sanctions for intermittent bleed-
ing, could well choose to time channel even if the bleeding is
too momentary to pose any concern to most households. To
afﬁrm that the Government failed to prove the existence of
a problem, while at the same time observing that the statute
imposes a severe burden on speech, is consistent with the
analysis our cases require. Here, there is no probative evi-
dence in the record which differentiates among the extent of
bleed at individual households and no evidence which other-
wise quantiﬁes the signal bleed problem.

In addition, market-based solutions such as programmable
televisions, VCR’s, and mapping systems (which display a
blue screen when tuned to a scrambled signal) may eliminate
signal bleed at the consumer end of the cable. 30 F. Supp.
2d, at 708. Playboy made the point at trial that the Govern-
ment’s estimate failed to account for these factors.
Id., at
708–709. Without some sort of ﬁeld survey, it is impossible
to know how widespread the problem in fact is, and the only
indicator in the record is a handful of complaints. Cf.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the issue of signal bleed in cable television and its implications under the Communications Decency Act.  It delves into legal arguments, cites case law (529 U.S. 803), and discusses technical aspects of cable transmission.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SANCHEZ v. MAYORKAS

Syllabus

And his TPS does not eliminate the effect of that unlawful entry.  Sec-
tion 1254a(f)(4) provides that a TPS recipient who applies for perma-
nent  residency  will  be  treated  as  having  nonimmigrant  status—the
status  traditionally  and  generally  needed to  invoke  the LPR  process
under  §1255.    But  that  provision  does  not  aid  the  TPS  recipient  in
meeting §1255’s separate admission requirement.  Lawful status and
admission are distinct concepts in immigration law, and establishing
the former does not establish the latter.  Sanchez resists this conclu-
sion, arguing that the statute’s directive that a TPS recipient “shall be
considered  .  .  .  as  a  nonimmigrant”  for  purposes  of  §1255  means  he
must also be considered as admitted.    But the immigration laws no-
where state that admission is a prerequisite of nonimmigrant status.
So  there  is  no  reason  to  interpret  the  TPS  provision’s  conferral  of
nonimmigrant  status  as  including  a  conferral  of  admission.    In  fact,
contrary  to  Sanchez’s  position,  there  are  immigration  categories  in
which individuals have nonimmigrant status without admission.  See,
e.g., §§1101(a)(10), 1101(a)(15)(U), 1182(d)(14).  Thus, when Congress
confers nonimmigrant status for purposes of §1255, but says nothing
about admission, the Court has no basis for ruling an unlawful entrant
eligible to become an LPR.  Pp. 4–9.

967 F. 3d 242, affirmed.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section of a Supreme Court case.  It summarizes the legal arguments and the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

remedy trust losses) would deprive beneficiaries of their eq-
uitable interests in their trusts.  See ibid.  But the Court
cites nothing supporting that proposition.  To the contrary,
it is well settled that beneficiaries retain equitable interests
in  trust  assets  even  when  those  assets  are  insured  or  re-
plenished.  See  Bogert  &  Bogert  §599.  Some  States  and
trusts require that the “property of a trust . . . be insured”
or similarly protected; indeed, some jurisdictions impose on
trustees a fiduciary “duty to insure.”   Ibid. (collecting au-
thorities).  None of those authorities suggests that benefi-
ciaries lose their equitable interests as a result, and none
suggests  that  the  law  excuses  a  fiduciary’s  malfeasance
simply because other sources may help provide relief.  The
Court’s  opposing  view—that  employer  liability  and  insur-
ance  pardon  a  trustee’s  wrongdoing  from  a  beneficiary’s
suit—has no support in law.

Third, the Court draws a line between a trust and a con-
tract, ante, at 4, but this too is insignificant here.  The Court
declares that petitioners’ pension plan “is more in the na-
ture  of  a  contract,”  ibid.¸  but  then  overlooks  that  the  so-
called  contract  creates  a  trust.  The  Plan  Document  ex-
pressly requires that petitioners’ pension funds be held in a
“trust” exclusively for petitioners’ benefit.  App. 60–61.  The
Court’s  statement  that  “the  employer,  not  plan  partici-
pants, receives any surplus left over after all of the benefits
are paid,” cf. ante, at 4, actually proves that a trust exists.
The reason the employer does not receive any residual until
“after all of the benefits are paid,” ibid., is because the Plan
Document provides petitioners an enforceable residual in-
terest, Record in No. 13–cv–2687, Doc. 107–1, at 75.  It is
telling that the Court does not cite, let alone analyze, the
“contract” governing petitioners’ trust fund.

Last, the Court cites inapposite case law.  It asserts that
“this Court has stated” that “plan participants possess no
equitable or property interest in the plan.”  Ante, at 4 (citing
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U. S. 432 (1999), and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *THOLE v. U.S. BANK N.A.*. It argues against the majority opinion's stance on beneficiaries' rights in a trust. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

340

UNITED STATES v. BAJAKAJIAN

Opinion of the Court

gravity of his offense.15
It is larger than the $5,000 ﬁne im-
posed by the District Court by many orders of magnitude,
and it bears no articulable correlation to any injury suffered
by the Government.

C

Finally, we must reject the contention that the proportion-
ality of full forfeiture is demonstrated by the fact that the
First Congress enacted statutes requiring full forfeiture of
goods involved in customs offenses or the payment of mone-
tary penalties proportioned to the goods’ value.
It is argued
that the enactment of these statutes at roughly the same
time that the Eighth Amendment was ratiﬁed suggests that
full forfeiture, in the customs context at least, is a propor-
tional punishment. The early customs statutes, however, do
not support such a conclusion because, unlike § 982(a)(1), the
type of forfeiture that they imposed was not considered pun-
ishment for a criminal offense.

Certain of the early customs statutes required the forfeit-
ure of goods imported in violation of the customs laws, and,
in some instances, the vessels carrying them as well. See,
e. g., Act of Aug. 4, 1790, § 27, 1 Stat. 163 (goods unladen
without a permit from the collector). These forfeitures,
however, were civil in rem forfeitures, in which the Govern-
ment proceeded against the property itself on the theory
that it was guilty, not against a criminal defendant. See,
e. g., Harford v. United States, 8 Cranch 109 (1814) (goods
unladen without a permit); Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch
339, 340 (1813) (same). Such forfeitures sought to vindicate
the Government’s underlying property right in customs du-
ties, and like other traditional in rem forfeitures, they were
not considered at the founding to be punishment for an
offense. See supra, at 330–331. They therefore indicate

15 Respondent does not argue that his wealth or income are relevant to
the proportionality determination or that full forfeiture would deprive him
of his livelihood, see supra, at 335–336, and the District Court made no
factual ﬁndings in this respect.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion discussing the proportionality of forfeiture in a criminal case.  It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

Although the States set the actual rules governing exist-
ing power plants, EPA itself still retains the primary regu-
latory role in Section 111(d).  The Agency, not the States,
decides  the  amount  of  pollution  reduction  that  must  ulti-
mately  be  achieved.    It  does  so  by  again  determining,  as
when setting the new source rules, “the best system of emis-
sion reduction . . . that has been adequately demonstrated
for [existing covered] facilities.”  40 CFR §60.22(b)(5) (2021);
see also 80 Fed. Reg. 64664, and n. 1.  The States then sub-
mit  plans  containing  the  emissions  restrictions  that  they
intend to adopt and enforce in order not to exceed the per-
missible level of pollution established by EPA.  See §§60.23,
60.24; 42 U. S. C. §7411(d)(1).

Reflecting the ancillary nature of Section 111(d), EPA has
used it only a handful of times since the enactment of the
statute in 1970.  See 80 Fed. Reg. 64703, and n. 275 (past
regulations  pertained  to  “four  pollutants  from  five  source
categories”).  For  instance,  the  Agency  has  established
emissions limits on acid mist from sulfuric acid production,
41 Fed. Reg. 48706 (1976) (identifying “fiber mist elimina-
tor”  technology  as  BSER);  sulfide  gases  released  by  kraft
pulp mills, 44 Fed. Reg. 29829 (1979) (determining BSER
to  be  a  combination  of  scrubbers,  incineration,  filtration
systems, and temperature control); and emissions of vari-
ous  harmful  gases  from  municipal  landfills,  61  Fed.  Reg.
9907 (1996) (setting BSER as use of a flare to combust the
gases).  It was thus only a slight overstatement for one of
the architects of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act
to refer to Section 111(d) as an “obscure, never-used section
of the law.”  Hearings on S. 300 et al. before the Subcom-
mittee on Environmental Protection of the Senate Commit-
tee  on  Environment  and  Public  Works,  100th  Cong.,  1st
Sess., 13 (1987) (remarks of Sen. Durenberger).

B
Things changed in October 2015, when EPA promulgated
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in the case of West Virginia v. EPA. It discusses the role of the EPA in regulating existing power plants under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

assessment  will  be  able  to  get  their  money  back.    The
union is not entitled to dictate unilaterally the manner in
which it advertises the availability of the refund.

For  this  reason,  we  conclude  that  a  live  controversy

remains, and we proceed to the merits.

III

A

Our cases have often noted the close connection between
our  Nation’s  commitment  to  self-government  and  the
rights protected by the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Brown
v.  Hartlage,  456  U. S.  45,  52  (1982)  (“At  the  core  of  the
First  Amendment  are  certain  basic  conceptions  about  the
manner  in  which  political  discussion  in  a  representative
democracy should proceed”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1,
93,  n. 127  (1976)  (per curiam)  (“[T]he  central  purpose  of
the  Speech  and  Press  Clauses  was  to  assure  a  society  in
which  ‘uninhibited,  robust,  and  wide-open’  public  debate
concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only
in  such  a  society  can  a  healthy  representative  democracy
flourish”);  Cox  v.  Louisiana,  379  U. S.  536,  552  (1965)
(“Maintenance  of  the  opportunity  for  free  political  discus-
sion  is  a  basic  tenet  of  our  constitutional  democracy”);
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J.,  concurring);  Patterson  v.  Colorado  ex rel.  Attorney
General  of  Colo.,  205  U. S.  454,  465  (1907)  (Harlan,  J.,
dissenting).

The First Amendment creates “an open marketplace” in
which  differing  ideas  about  political,  economic,  and  social
issues  can  compete  freely  for  public  acceptance  without
improper government interference.  New York State Bd. of
Elections  v.  Lopez  Torres,  552  U. S.  196,  208  (2008).    See
also  Hustler  Magazine,  Inc.  v.  Falwell,  485  U. S.  46,  51
(1988);  Mills  v.  Alabama,  384  U. S.  214,  218–219  (1966).
The  government  may  not  prohibit  the  dissemination  of
ideas  that  it  disfavors,  nor  compel  the  endorsement  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Knox v. Service Employees. It contains legal arguments and citations to previous cases, indicating it is part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U50

[09-26-01 10:29:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 473 (2000)

483

Opinion of the Court

III

As AEDPA applied, the Court of Appeals should have
treated the notice of appeal as an application for a COA.
Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22(b); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(f); see
also Hohn, supra, at 240. To evaluate whether the Court of
Appeals should have granted a COA, we must determine
what the habeas applicant must show to satisfy the require-
ments of § 2253(c).

Citing § 2253(c)’s requirement that a COA may issue only
upon the “substantial showing of the denial of a constitu-
tional right,” the State contends that no appeal can be taken
if the District Court relies on procedural grounds to dismiss
the petition. According to the State, only constitutional rul-
ings may be appealed. Under this view, a state prisoner
who can demonstrate he was convicted in violation of the
Constitution and who can demonstrate that the district court
was wrong to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds
would be denied relief. We reject this interpretation. The
writ of habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting consti-
tutional rights.
In setting forth the preconditions for issu-
ance of a COA under § 2253(c), Congress expressed no inten-
tion to allow trial court procedural error to bar vindication
of substantial constitutional rights on appeal.

Our conclusion follows from AEDPA’s present provisions,
which incorporate earlier habeas corpus principles. Under
AEDPA, a COA may not issue unless “the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
28 U. S. C. § 2253(c) (1994 ed., Supp. III). Except
right.”
for substituting the word “constitutional” for the word “fed-
eral,” § 2253 is a codiﬁcation of the CPC standard announced
in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S., at 894. Congress had before
it the meaning Barefoot had given to the words it selected;
and we give the language found in § 2253(c) the meaning
ascribed it in Barefoot, with due note for the substitution
of the word “constitutional.” See Williams v. Taylor, ante,
at 434. To obtain a COA under § 2253(c), a habeas prisoner
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the requirements for obtaining a certificate of appealability (COA) in a habeas corpus case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1111

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.
3d  477.

No.  09–306.  Allen  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–346.  Martinez-Madera  v.  Holder,  Attorney  Gen
eral.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559
F.  3d  937.

No.  09–355.  Treesh,  Commissioner,  Kentucky  Depart
ment  of  Revenue,  et  al.  v.  DirecTV,  Inc.,  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.
Ky.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  290  S. W.  3d  638.

No.  09–356.  Paulsen  et  al.  v.  CNF,  Inc.,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  1061.

No.  09–358.  Ming  Wei  Liu  v.  Board  of  Trustees  of  the
University  of  Alabama  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  775.

No.  09–364.  Edwards  v.  Blue  Cross  Blue  Shield  of
Texas,  a  Division  of  Health  Care  Service  Corp.  Ct.  App.
Tex.,  5th  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  273  S.  W.
3d  461.

No.  09–370.  Lovely  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  570  F.  3d  778.

No. 09–384.  Office of Alaska Governor v. Equal Employ
ment  Opportunity  Commission  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  1062.

No.  09–386.  Ambraco,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  M/V  Clipper  Faith
et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  570
F.  3d  233.

No.  09–388.  S  &  D  Trading  Academy,  LLC,  et  al.  v.
AAFIS,  Inc.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  443.

No.  09–409.  Palmer,  By  and  Through  His  Parents  and
Legal  Guardians,  Palmer  et  ux.  v.  Waxahachie  Independ
ent  School  District.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  579  F.  3d  502.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is formatted in a way typical of legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
888

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5113.  Branigan  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5116.  Garrett  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  294.

No.  09–5117.  Herrera-Miranda,  aka  Herrera  v.  United
States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 318
Fed.  Appx.  302.

No.  09–5118.  Gemmill  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  569.

No.  09–5119.  Emerson  v.  Couvillion  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  507.

No.  09–5121.  Scoville  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  1174.

No.  09–5125.  Maitre  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5126.  Macia v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  925.

No.  09–5127.  Nixon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  395.

No.  09–5129.  Beal  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  688.

No.  09–5130.  Avalos-Rios  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  234.

No.  09–5132.  Corjasso  v.  Brown,  Attorney  General  of
California,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  567.

No.  09–5133.  Waggoner  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  687.

No.  09–5134.  Woodard  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5136.  Propst v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  483.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the type of content meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

13

Opinion of the Court

be  contradictory  “to  recognize  a  right  of  privacy  with  re-
spect to other matters of family life and not with respect to
the  decision  to  enter  the  relationship  that  is  the  founda-
tion of the family in our society.”  Zablocki, supra, at 386.
Choices  about  marriage  shape  an  individual’s  destiny.
As  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massachusetts  has
explained,  because  “it  fulfils  yearnings  for  security,  safe
haven,  and  connection  that  express  our  common  human-
ity,  civil  marriage  is  an  esteemed  institution,  and  the
decision  whether  and  whom  to  marry  is  among  life’s  mo-
mentous acts of self-definition.”  Goodridge, 440 Mass., at
322, 798 N. E. 2d, at 955.

The  nature  of  marriage  is  that,  through  its  enduring
bond,  two  persons  together  can  find  other  freedoms,  such
as expression, intimacy, and spirituality.  This is true for
all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.  See Wind-
sor,  570  U. S.,  at  ___–  ___  (slip  op.,  at  22–23).    There  is
dignity  in  the  bond  between  two  men  or  two  women  who
seek  to  marry  and  in  their  autonomy  to  make  such  pro-
found choices.  Cf. Loving, supra, at 12 (“[T]he freedom to
marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State”).

A  second  principle  in  this  Court’s  jurisprudence  is  that
the  right  to  marry  is  fundamental  because  it  supports  a
two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the
committed individuals.  This point was central to Griswold
v.  Connecticut,  which  held  the  Constitution  protects  the
right of married couples to use contraception.  381 U. S., at
485.  Suggesting  that  marriage  is  a  right  “older  than  the
Bill of Rights,” Griswold described marriage this way:

“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully  enduring,  and  intimate  to  the  degree  of  be-
ing sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of
life,  not  causes;  a  harmony  in  living,  not  political
faiths;  a  bilateral  loyalty,  not  commercial  or  social
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the fundamental right to marry and its importance in supporting a committed two-person union.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

933

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No. 08–1425.  Welch, Warden v. Moore.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Mo
tion  of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  531  F.  3d  393.

No.  08–1436.  Smith,  Litigation  Trustee,  Farmland  Dair
ies  LLC  Litigation  Trust,  et  al.  v.  Bank  of  America  Corp.
et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.  Re
ported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  536.

No.  08–1439.  Roe  et  al.  v.  City  of  Waterbury,  Con
necticut,  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice
Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this
petition.  Reported  below:  542  F.  3d  31.

No.  08–1459.  Michigan  v.  Dorsey.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Motion
of  respondent  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  granted.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1479.  Pfizer  Inc.  v.  Dotson;  and
No.  09–29.  Dotson  v.  Pfizer  Inc.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  The  Chief  Justice  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or  decision  of  these  petitions.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  284.

No.  08–1506.  Tenenbaum  v.  Sony  BMG  Music  Entertain
ment  et  al.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  The  Chief
Justice  and  Justice  Breyer  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  1.

No.  08–1528.  Sikorski  v.  Okemo  Mountain,  Inc.,  et  al.
C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no
part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported
below:  303  Fed.  Appx.  938.

No. 08–1539.  Smith, aka Shinnecock Smoke Shop v.  Cuomo,
Attorney  General  of  New  York.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration
or decision  of this petition.  Reported  below: 306 Fed.  Appx. 645.
No.  08–1543.  Sonuga  v.  Napolitano,  Secretary  of  Home
land  Security.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  So
tomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this
petition.  Reported  below:  303  Fed.  Appx.  901.

No.  08–1551.  Falso  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consider
ation  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  544  F.  3d  110.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, court names, dates, and information about petitions for certiorari.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

27

Opinion of the Court

that in Heller we reiterated that evidence of “how the Sec-
ond Amendment was interpreted from immediately after its
ratification  through  the  end  of  the  19th  century”  repre-
sented a “critical tool of constitutional interpretation.”  554
U. S., at 605.  We therefore examined “a variety of legal and
other sources to determine the public understanding of [the
Second Amendment] after its . . . ratification.”  Ibid.  And,
in other contexts, we have explained that “ ‘a regular course
of practice’ can ‘liquidate & settle the meaning of ’ disputed
or  indeterminate  ‘terms  &  phrases’ ”  in  the  Constitution.
Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op.,
at 13) (quoting Letter from J. Madison to S. Roane (Sept. 2,
1819),  in  8  Writings  of  James  Madison  450  (G.  Hunt  ed.
1908)); see also, e.g., Houston Community College System v.
Wilson, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 5) (same); The
Federalist No. 37, p. 229 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison);
see  generally  C.  Nelson,  Stare  Decisis  and  Demonstrably
Erroneous  Precedents,  87  Va.  L. Rev.  1,  10–21  (2001);  W.
Baude,  Constitutional  Liquidation,  71  Stan.  L. Rev.  1
(2019).  In other words, we recognize that “where a govern-
mental  practice  has  been  open,  widespread,  and  unchal-
lenged  since  the  early  days  of  the  Republic,  the  practice
should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitu-
tional  provision.”  NLRB  v.  Noel  Canning,  573  U. S.  513,
572 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see also My-
ers  v.  United  States,  272  U. S.  52,  174  (1926);  Printz  v.
United States, 521 U. S. 898, 905 (1997).

But to the extent later history contradicts what the text
says, the text controls.  “ ‘[L]iquidating’ indeterminacies in
written  laws  is  far  removed  from  expanding  or  altering
them.”  Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019)
(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  13);  see  also  Letter
from  J.  Madison  to  N.  Trist  (Dec.  1831),  in  9  Writings  of
James  Madison  477  (G.  Hunt  ed.  1910).    Thus,  “post-
ratification adoption or acceptance of laws that are incon-
sistent with the original meaning of the constitutional text
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing previous cases and legal arguments. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document, not a preface or other non-content section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

Boston City Hall the Way It Is? Boston.com (July 25, 2018),
https://www.boston.com/news/history/2018/07/ 25/boston-
city-hall-brutalism.

On the plaza, near City Hall’s entrance, stand three 83-
foot flagpoles.  Boston flies the American flag from the first
pole  (along  with  a  banner  honoring  prisoners  of  war  and
soldiers missing in action).  From the second, it flies the flag
of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts.  And  from  the
third,  it  usually  (but  not  always)  flies  Boston’s  flag—a
sketch of the “City on a Hill” encircled by a ring against a
blue backdrop.

Boston makes City Hall Plaza available to the public for
events.  Boston acknowledges that this means the plaza is
a “public forum.”  Brief for Respondents 27.  The city’s policy
is, “[w]here possible,” “to accommodate all applicants seek-
ing to take advantage of the City of Boston’s public forums,”
including the plaza and the area at the flagpoles’ base.  App.
to Pet. for Cert. 133a, 137a.

For years, since at least 2005, the city has allowed groups
to hold flag-raising ceremonies on the plaza.  Participants
may hoist a flag of their choosing on the third flagpole (in
place  of  the  city’s  flag)  and  fly  it  for  the  duration  of  the
event,  typically  a  couple  of  hours.    Most  ceremonies  have
involved the flags of other countries—from Albania to Ven-
ezuela—marking the national holidays of Bostonians’ many
countries of origin.  But several flag raisings have been as-
sociated with other kinds of groups or causes, such as Pride
Week,  emergency  medical  service workers,  and  a  commu-
nity  bank.  All  told,  between  2005  and  2017,  Boston  ap-
proved  about  50  unique  flags,  raised  at  284  ceremonies.
Boston has no record of refusing a request before the events
that gave rise to this case.  We turn now to those events.

B
In July 2017, Harold Shurtleff, the director of an organi-
zation  called  Camp  Constitution,  asked  to  hold  a  flag-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It includes citations, case names, and a detailed description of events leading up to a legal dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

1. Absent  reasonable  suspicion,  police  extension  of  a  traffic  stop
in  order  to  conduct  a  dog  sniff  violates  the  Constitution’s  shield
against unreasonable seizures.

A routine traffic stop is more like a brief stop under Terry v. Ohio,
392  U. S.  1,  than  an  arrest,  see,  e.g.,  Arizona  v.  Johnson,  555  U. S.
323, 330.  Its tolerable duration is determined by the seizure’s “mis-
sion,”  which  is  to  address  the  traffic  violation  that  warranted  the
stop,  Illinois  v.  Caballes,  543  U. S.  405,  407  and  attend  to  related
safety  concerns.    Authority  for  the  seizure  ends  when  tasks  tied  to
the  traffic
infraction  are—or  reasonably  should  have  been—
completed.    The  Fourth  Amendment  may  tolerate  certain  unrelated
investigations that do not lengthen the roadside detention, Johnson,
555  U. S.,  at  327–328  (questioning);  Caballes,  543  U. S.,  at  406,  408
(dog sniff), but a traffic stop “become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged be-
yond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of issu-
ing a warning ticket, id., at 407.

Beyond  determining  whether  to  issue  a  traffic  ticket,  an  officer’s
mission  during  a  traffic  stop  typically  includes  checking  the  driver’s
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against
the  driver,  and  inspecting  the  automobile’s  registration  and  proof  of
insurance.  These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of
the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safe-
ly and responsibly.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 658–659.
Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary
inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s
traffic mission.

In concluding that the de minimis intrusion here could be offset by
the  Government’s  interest  in  stopping  the  flow  of  illegal  drugs,  the
Eighth Circuit relied on Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106.  The
Court  reasoned  in  Mimms  that  the  government’s  “legitimate  and
weighty” interest in officer safety outweighed the “de minimis” addi-
tional intrusion of requiring a driver, lawfully stopped, to exit a vehi-
cle, id., at 110–111.  The officer-safety interest recognized in Mimms,
however, stemmed from the danger to the officer associated with the
traffic  stop  itself.    On-scene  investigation  into  other  crimes,  in  con-
trast,  detours  from  the  officer’s  traffic-control  mission  and  therefore
gains no support from Mimms.

The Government’s argument that an officer who completes all traf-
fic-related  tasks  expeditiously  should  earn  extra  time  to  pursue  an
unrelated  criminal  investigation  is  unpersuasive,  for  a  traffic  stop
“prolonged beyond” the time in fact needed for the officer to complete
his  traffic-based  inquiries  is  “unlawful,”  Caballes,  543  U. S.,  at  407.
The critical question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or af-
ter  the  officer  issues  a  ticket,  but  whether  conducting  the  sniff  adds
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, outlining the reasoning behind a Supreme Court decision. It is not the actual content of a book and is likely not meant to be read sequentially.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

106

UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

Opinion of the Court

509; duties of senior licensed ofﬁcers to relieve the master,
id., at 511; manning standards for foreign vessels, id., at 513;
reporting of marine casualties, ibid.; minimum standards for
plating thickness, id., at 515; tank vessel manning require-
ments, id., at 517; and tank vessel construction standards,
If Con-
id., at 517–518, among other extensive regulations.
gress had intended to disrupt national uniformity in all of
these matters, it would not have done so by placement of the
saving clauses in Title I.

The saving clauses are further limited in effect to “this
Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 . . . , or section 9509 of [the
Internal Revenue Code].”
§§ 2718(a) and (c). These ex-
plicit qualiﬁers are inconsistent with interpreting the saving
clauses to alter the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA or regu-
lations promulgated thereunder. The text of the statute in-
dicates no intent to allow States to impose wide-ranging reg-
ulation of the at-sea operation of tankers. The clauses may
preserve a State’s ability to enact laws of a scope similar to
Title I, but do not extend to subjects addressed in the other
titles of the Act or other acts.

Limiting the saving clauses as we have determined re-
spects the established federal-state balance in matters of
maritime commerce between the subjects as to which the
States retain concurrent powers and those over which the
federal authority displaces state control. We have upheld
state laws imposing liability for pollution caused by oil spills.
See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411
U. S., at 325. Our view of OPA’s saving clauses preserves
this important role for the States, which is unchallenged
here. We think it quite unlikely that Congress would use a
means so indirect as the saving clauses in Title I of OPA to
upset the settled division of authority by allowing States to
impose additional unique substantive regulation on the at-
sea conduct of vessels. We decline to give broad effect to
saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful regu-
latory scheme established by federal law. See, e. g., Morales
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the case *United States v. Locke*. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific sections of law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA

BREYER, J., dissenting

given  to  the  majority’s  view,  are  no  longer  good  law.    In
Planned  Parenthood  of  Southeastern  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505
U. S.  833  (1992),  the  Court  again  considered  a  state  law
that  required  doctors  to  provide  information  to  a  woman
deciding  whether  to  proceed  with  an  abortion.  That  law
required the doctor to tell the woman about the nature of
the abortion procedure, the health risks of abortion and of
childbirth,  the  “ ‘probable  gestational  age  of  the  unborn
child,’ ” and the availability of printed materials describing
the fetus, medical assistance for childbirth, potential child
support,  and  the  agencies  that  would  provide  adoption
services  (or  other  alternatives  to  abortion).  Id.,  at  881
(joint  opinion  of  O’Connor,  KENNEDY,  and  Souter,  JJ.)
(quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3205 (1990)).

This time a joint opinion of the Court, in judging whether
the  State  could  impose  these informational  requirements,
asked whether doing so imposed an “undue burden” upon
women seeking an abortion.  Casey, 505 U. S., at 882–883.
It held that it did not.  Ibid.  Hence the statute was consti-
tutional.  Id.,  at  874.  The  joint  opinion  stated  that  the
statutory  requirements  amounted  to  “reasonable  meas-
ure[s]  to  ensure  an  informed  choice,  one  which  might
cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”  Id.,
at  883.  And,  it  “overruled”  portions  of  the  two  cases,
Akron  and  Thornburgh,  that  might  indicate  the  contrary.
Id., at 882.

In respect to overruling the earlier cases, it wrote:

“To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a consti-
tutional violation when the government requires, as it
does  here,  the  giving  of  truthful,  nonmisleading  in-
formation  about  the  nature  of  the  procedure,  the  at-
tendant  health  risks  and  those  of  childbirth,  and  the
‘probable  gestational  age’  of  the  fetus,  those  cases  go
too far, are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgment of
an  important  interest  in  potential  life,  and  are  over-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra*. It discusses the Court's previous rulings on abortion regulations, particularly *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey*.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Opinion of the Court

204 (1958) (per curiam) (that the plaintiff subjected himself
to discrimination “for the purpose of instituting th[e] litiga-
tion”  did  not  defeat  his  standing);  Havens  Realty  Corp.  v.
Coleman, 455 U. S. 363, 374 (1982) (a “tester” plaintiff pos-
ing as a renter for purposes of housing-discrimination liti-
gation still suffered an injury under Article III).

The cases the Government cites do not alter our conclu-
sion.  In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398 (2013),
for example, the plaintiffs attempted to manufacture stand-
ing by voluntarily taking costly and burdensome measures
that they said were necessary to protect the confidentiality
of their communications in light of the Government surveil-
lance  policy  they  sought  to  challenge.    Id.,  at  402.  Their
problem, however, was that they could not show that they
had been or were likely to be subjected to that policy in any
event.  Id., at 416.  Likewise, in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey,
426 U. S. 660 (1976) (per curiam), we held that the unilat-
eral decisions by a group of States to reimburse their resi-
dents for taxes levied by other States was not a basis to at-
tack the legality of those taxes.  Nothing in the challenged
taxes required the plaintiff States to offer reimbursements;
accordingly, the financial injury those States suffered was
due  to  their  own  independent  response  to  taxes  levied  on
others.  Id., at 664.  Here, by contrast, the appellees’ inju-
ries are directly inflicted by the FEC’s threatened enforce-
ment of the provisions they now challenge.  That appellees
chose  to  subject  themselves  to  those  provisions  does  not
change the fact that they are subject to them, and will face
genuine  legal  penalties  if  they  do  not  comply.    See  52
U. S. C. §30109(a)(5); 11 CFR §111.24.

One  final  point  bears  mentioning.    The  Government
maintains that it should not be blamed for appellees’ inju-
ries because it provided the Committee with a legally avail-
able “alternative” that would have avoided any liability—
repaying Cruz’s loans in full with pre-election funds, within
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the standing of the appellees in a case challenging FEC provisions. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to injury and causation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U51

[09-26-01 10:31:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

504

BECK v. PRUPIS

Opinion of the Court

The principle that a civil conspiracy plaintiff must claim
injury from an act of a tortious character was so widely ac-
cepted at the time of RICO’s adoption as to be incorporated
in the common understanding of “civil conspiracy.” See Bal-
lentine’s Law Dictionary 252 (3d ed. 1969) (“It is the civil
wrong resulting in damage, and not the conspiracy which
constitutes the cause of action”); Black’s Law Dictionary 383
(4th ed. 1968) (“[W]here, in carrying out the design of the
conspirators, overt acts are done causing legal damage, the
person injured has a right of action” (emphasis added)). We
presume, therefore, that when Congress established in RICO
a civil cause of action for a person “injured . . . by reason
of ” a “conspir[acy],” it meant to adopt these well-established
common-law civil conspiracy principles.

Justice Stevens does not challenge our view that Con-
gress meant to incorporate common-law principles when it
adopted RICO. Nor does he attempt to make an afﬁrmative
case from the common law for his reading of the statute by
pointing to a case in which there was (a) an illegal agree-
ment; (b) injury proximately caused to the plaintiff by a
nontortious overt act in furtherance of the agreement; and
(c) recovery by the plaintiff. See post, at 508.
Instead, he
argues only that courts, authoritative commentators, and
even dictionaries repeatedly articulated a rule with no mean-
ing or application.8 We ﬁnd this argument to be implausible

472, 479 (CADC 1983) (stating that civil conspiracy requires “an overt
tortious act in furtherance of the agreement that causes injury. . . . Since
liability for civil conspiracy depends on performance of some underlying
tortious act, the conspiracy is not independently actionable; rather, it is a
means for establishing vicarious liability for the underlying tort”).

8 We disagree, moreover, with Justice Stevens’ interpretation of the
grounds for decision in some of the cases we have cited. For example,
Justice Stevens reads Mills v. Hansell, 378 F. 2d 53 (CA5 1967) (per
curiam), and Chapman v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 769, 772 (WD Mo. 1957),
to deny recovery for conspiracy because the defendants had not entered
into an unlawful agreement. See post, at 508–509. We think the opin-
ions, and the language cited from these opinions by Justice Stevens,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt. It contains legal jargon and discusses legal precedents.  While it is part of a legal document, it is the actual content meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

Opinion of the Court

referring children to CSS without requiring the agency to
certify same-sex couples.

The  District  Court  denied  preliminary  relief.   It  con-
cluded  that  the  contractual  non-discrimination  require-
ment  and  the  Fair  Practices  Ordinance  were  neutral  and
generally  applicable  under  Employment  Division,  Depart-
ment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872
(1990), and that the free exercise claim was therefore un-
likely  to  succeed.    320  F. Supp. 3d  661,  680–690  (ED  Pa.
2018).  The  court  also  determined  that  the  free  speech
claims were unlikely to succeed because CSS performed cer-
tifications  as  part  of  a  government  program.    Id.,  at
695–700.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.  Be-
cause  the  contract  between  the  parties  had  expired,  the
court focused on whether the City could insist on the inclu-
sion of new language forbidding discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation as a condition of contract renewal.  922
F. 3d  140,  153  (2019).    The  court  concluded  that  the  pro-
posed contractual terms were a neutral and generally ap-
plicable  policy  under  Smith.  922  F. 3d,  at  152–159.    The
court rejected the agency’s free speech claims on the same
grounds as the District Court.  Id., at 160–162.

CSS  and  the  foster  parents  sought  review.    They  chal-
lenged the Third Circuit’s determination that the City’s ac-
tions  were  permissible  under  Smith  and  also  asked  this
Court to reconsider that precedent.

We granted certiorari.  589 U. S. ___ (2020).

II
A
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, appli-
cable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, pro-
vides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the
free  exercise”  of  religion.  As  an  initial  matter,  it  is  plain
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the case Fulton v. Philadelphia. It sets the context for the case and outlines the legal arguments involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

Opinion of the Court

Id., at 978.  As of 2015, Android sales produced more than
$42 billion in revenue.  886 F. 3d, at 1187.

In 2010 Oracle Corporation bought Sun.  Soon thereafter
Oracle  brought  this  lawsuit  in  the  United  States  District
Court for the Northern District of California.

II
The case has a complex and lengthy history.  At the out-
set  Oracle  complained  that  Google’s  use  of  the  Sun  Java
API violated both copyright and patent laws.  For its copy-
right claim, Oracle alleged that Google infringed its copy-
right by copying, for 37 packages, both the literal declaring
code and the nonliteral organizational structure (or SSO) of
the API, i.e., the grouping of certain methods into classes
and  certain  classes  into  packages.    For  trial  purposes  the
District Court organized three proceedings.  The first would
cover the copyright issues, the second would cover the pa-
tent  issues,  and  the  third  would,  if  necessary,  calculate
damages.  Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 2d, at 975.  The court also
determined  that  a  judge  should  decide  whether  copyright
law  could  protect  an  API  and  that  the  jury  should  decide
whether Google’s use of Oracle’s API infringed its copyright
and, if so, whether a fair use defense nonetheless applied.
Ibid.

After six weeks of hearing evidence, the jury rejected Or-
acle’s  patent  claims  (which  have  since  dropped  out  of  the
case).  It  also  found  a  limited  copyright  infringement.    It
deadlocked as to whether Google could successfully assert
a fair use defense.  Id., at 976.  The judge then decided that,
regardless, the API’s declaring code was not the kind of cre-
ation to which copyright law extended its protection.  The
court noted that Google had written its own implementing
code,  which  constituted  the  vast  majority  of  its  API.  It
wrote that “anyone is free under the Copyright Act to write
his or her own code to carry out exactly the same” tasks that
the Sun Java API picks out or specifies.  Ibid.  Google copied
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U38

[09-26-01 08:44:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 205 (2000)

207

Opinion of the Court

Stuart M. Riback argued the cause for respondent. With

him on the brief was Mark I. Levy.*

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we decide under what circumstances a prod-
uct’s design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, in an
action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under
§ 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat.
441, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a).

I

Respondent Samara Brothers, Inc., designs and manufac-
Its primary product is a line of
tures children’s clothing.
spring/summer one-piece seersucker outﬁts decorated with
applique´ s of hearts, ﬂowers, fruits, and the like. A number
of chain stores, including JCPenney, sell this line of clothing
under contract with Samara.

Petitioner Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., is one of the Nation’s
best known retailers, selling among other things children’s
clothing.
In 1995, Wal-Mart contracted with one of its sup-
pliers, Judy-Philippine, Inc., to manufacture a line of chil-
dren’s outﬁts for sale in the 1996 spring/summer season.
Wal-Mart sent Judy-Philippine photographs of a number of
garments from Samara’s line, on which Judy-Philippine’s gar-
ments were to be based; Judy-Philippine duly copied, with

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the International
Mass Retail Association by Jeffrey S. Sutton and Robert J. Verdisco; for
the Private Label Manufacturers Association by Arthur M. Handler; and
for Scott P. Zimmerman by Charles W. Calkins.

H. Bartow Farr III, Richard G. Taranto, and Stephen M. Trattner ﬁled
a brief for Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urg-
ing afﬁrmance.

Briefs of amici curiae were ﬁled for the American Intellectual Property
Law Association by Sheldon H. Klein, Michael A. Grow, and Louis T.
Pirkey; for the International Trademark Association by Theodore H.
Davis, Jr., Morton D. Goldberg, and Marie V. Driscoll; and for Payless
Shoesource, Inc., by William A. Rudy and Robert Kent Sellers.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the beginning of the Court's analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–402
_________________

TIMOTHY IVORY CARPENTER, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 2018]

CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the

Court.

This  case  presents  the  question  whether  the  Govern-
ment  conducts  a  search  under  the  Fourth  Amendment
when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide
a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.

I

A

There are 396 million cell phone service accounts in the
United  States—for  a  Nation  of  326  million  people.    Cell
phones  perform  their  wide  and  growing  variety  of  func-
tions  by  connecting  to  a  set  of  radio  antennas  called  “cell
sites.”  Although cell sites are usually mounted on a tower,
they  can  also  be  found  on  light  posts,  flagpoles,  church
steeples, or the sides of buildings.  Cell sites typically have
several  directional  antennas  that  divide  the  covered  area
into sectors.

Cell  phones  continuously  scan  their  environment  look-
ing  for  the  best  signal,  which  generally  comes  from  the
closest  cell  site.  Most  modern  devices,  such  as
smartphones, tap into  the wireless network several times
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

BARRETT, J., concurring

Congress to legislate on “important subjects” while delegat-
ing  away  only  “the  details.”    Wayman  v.  Southard,  10
Wheat. 1, 43 (1825).  That is different from a normative rule
that discourages Congress from empowering agencies.  To
see what I mean, return to the ambitious babysitter.  Our
expectation  of  clearer  authorization  for  the  amusement-
park trip is not about discouraging the parent from giving
significant leeway to the babysitter or forcing the parent to
think hard before doing so.  Instead, it reflects the intuition
that  the  parent  is  in  charge  and  sets  the  terms  for  the
babysitter—so  if  a  judgment  is  significant,  we  expect  the
parent to make it.  If, by contrast, one parent left the chil-
dren with the other parent for the weekend, we would view
the same trip differently because the parents share author-
ity  over  the  children.  In  short,  the  balance  of  power  be-
tween those in a relationship inevitably frames our under-
standing  of  their  communications.    And  when  it  comes  to
the  Nation’s  policy,  the  Constitution  gives  Congress  the
reins—a  point  of  context  that  no  reasonable  interpreter
could ignore.

Given these baseline assumptions, an interpreter should
“typically  greet”  an  agency’s  claim  to  “extravagant  statu-
tory  power”  with  at  least  some  “measure  of  skepticism.”
Utility  Air,  573  U. S.,  at  324.    That  skepticism  is  neither
“made-up” nor “new.”  Post, at 24, 29 (KAGAN, J., dissent-
ing).  On the contrary, it appears in a line of decisions span-
ning at least 40 years.  E.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473,
485–486 (2015); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 267–268
(2006); Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159–160; Indus-
trial  Union  Dept.,  AFL–CIO  v.  American  Petroleum  Insti-
tute, 448 U. S. 607, 645 (1980) (plurality opinion).3

Still, this skepticism does not mean that courts have an

——————

3 Indeed, the doctrine may have even deeper roots.  See ICC v. Cincin-
nati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 494–495 (1897) (explaining that
for agency assertions of “vast and comprehensive” power, “no just rule of
construction would tolerate a grant of such power by mere implication”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Barrett in the case of Biden v. Nebraska. It delves into the interpretation of Congressional delegation of authority to agencies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC.

Opinion of the Court

regulation  was  aimed  directly  at  interstate  pipelines.    It
wrote  that  the  state  law  was  designed  to  keep  “a  natural
gas company from raising its equity levels above a certain
point” in order to keep the company’s revenue requirement
low, thereby ensuring lower wholesale rates.  Id., at 307–
308.  Indeed,  the  Court  expressly  said  that  the  state  law
was pre-empted because it was “directed at . . . the control
of rates and facilities of natural gas companies,” “precisely
the  things  over  which  FERC  has  comprehensive  author-
ity.”  Id., at 308 (emphasis added).

The  dissent  rejects  the  notion  that  the  proper  test  for
purposes  of  pre-emption  in  the  natural  gas  context  is
whether  the  challenged  measures  are  “aimed  directly  at
interstate  purchasers  and  wholesales  for  resale”  or  not.
Northern  Natural,  supra,  at  94.  It  argues  that  this  ap
proach  is  “unprecedented,”  and  that  the  Court’s  focus
should  be  on  “what  the  State  seeks  to  regulate  . . .  ,  not
why the State seeks to regulate it.”  Post, at 6 (opinion of
SCALIA, J.).  But the “target” to which our cases refer must
mean  more  than  just  the  physical  activity  that  a  State
regulates.  After  all,  a  single  physical  action,  such  as
reporting  a  price  to  a  specialized  journal,  could  be  the
subject of many different laws—including tax laws, disclo
sure laws, and others.  To repeat the point we made above,
no one could claim that FERC’s regulation of this physical
activity  for  purposes  of  wholesale  rates  forecloses  every
other form of state regulation that affects those rates.

Indeed,  although  the  dissent  argues  that  Schneidwind
created a definitive test for pre-emption in the natural gas
context  that  turns  on  whether  “the  matter  on  which  the
State  asserts  the  right  to  act  is  in  any  way  regulated  by
the  Federal  Act,”  post,  at  3  (quoting  485  U. S.,  at  310,
n. 13), Schneidewind could not mean this statement as an
absolute  test.    It  goes on  to  explain  that  the  Natural  Gas
Act  does  not  pre-empt  “traditional”  state  regulation,  such
as state blue sky laws (which, of course, raise wholesale—
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–877
_________________

FREDERICK L. ALLEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ROY
A. COOPER, III, GOVERNOR OF NORTH
CAROLINA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[March 23, 2020]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in

the judgment.

I  agree  with  the  Court’s  conclusion  that  the  Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act of 1990, 17 U. S. C. §501 et seq.,
does not validly abrogate States’ sovereign immunity.  But
I cannot join the Court’s opinion in its entirety.  I write sep-
arately to note two disagreements and one question that re-
mains open for resolution in a future case.

First, although I agree that Florida Prepaid Postsecond-
ary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627
(1999), is binding precedent, I cannot join the Court’s dis-
cussion of stare decisis.  The Court claims we need “ ‘special
justification[s]’ ” to overrule precedent because error alone
“cannot  overcome  stare  decisis.”  Ante,  at  9–10.    That  ap-
proach “does not comport with our judicial duty under Arti-
cle III.”  Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019)
(THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2).  If our decision in
Florida  Prepaid  were  demonstrably  erroneous,  the  Court
would  be  obligated  to  “correct  the  error,  regardless  of
whether  other  factors  support  overruling  the  precedent.”
587 U. S., at ___–___ (same) (slip op., at 8–9).

Here,  adherence  to  our  precedent  is  warranted  because
petitioners have not demonstrated that our decision in Flor-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

AMERICAN LEGION  v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting

  Every  Court  of  Appeals  to  confront  the  question  has
held that “[m]aking a . . . Latin cross a war memorial does
not make the cross secular,” it “makes the war memorial
sectarian.”    Id., at  747.10  See also Separation of Church
——————

ing”); Lemay, Politics in the Art of War: The American War Cemeteries,
38 Int’l J. Mil. History & Historiography 223, 225 (2018) (“[T]he [cross]
grave markers assert the absolute valour and Christ-like heroism of the
American dead . . . .”).

10 See  874  F. 3d  195,  207  (CA4 2017) (case below) (“Even in the me-
morial  context,  a  Latin  cross  serves  not  . . .  as  a  generic  symbol  of
death,  but  rather  a  Christian  symbol  of  the  death  of  Jesus  Christ.”);
American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F. 3d 1095, 1122 (CA10 2010)
(“[A]  memorial  cross  is  not a generic symbol of death; it is a Christian
symbol  of  death  that  signifies  or  memorializes  the  death  of  a  Chris-
tian.”);  Trunk  v.  San  Diego,  629 F. 3d 1099, 1102 (CA9 2011) (“Resur-
rection  of  this  Cross  as  a  war  memorial  does  not  transform  it  into  a
secular  monument.”);  Separation  of  Church  and  State  Comm.  v.  Eu-
gene, 93 F. 3d 617, 619 (CA9 1996) (per curiam) (“[T]he City urges that
the  cross  is  no  longer  a  religious  symbol  but  a  war  memorial.    This
argument  . . .  fails  to  withstand  Establishment  Clause  analysis.”);
Gonzales  v.  North  Twp.  of  Lake  Cty.,  4  F. 3d  1412,  1418  (CA7  1993)
(“[W]e are masters of the obvious, and we know that . . . the Latin cross
. . .  is  ‘[the]  unmistakable  symbol  of  Christianity  as  practiced  in  this
country  today.’ ”  (quoting  Harris  v.  Zion,  927  F. 2d  1401,  1403  (CA7
1991)).    See  also  Jewish  War  Veterans  of  the  United  States  v.  United
States, 695 F. Supp. 3, 11 (DC 1988) (“[D]efendants are unable to cite a
single  federal  case  where  a  cross  such  as  the  one  at  issue  here  has
survived Establishment Clause scrutiny.”).
  The Courts of Appeals have similarly concluded that the Latin cross
remains  a  Christian  symbol  when  used  for  other  purposes.    See,  e.g.,
Robinson v. Edmond, 68 F. 3d 1226, 1232 (CA10 1995) (city seal depict-
ing  the  cross)  (“The  religious  significance  and meaning of the Latin or
Christian  cross  are  unmistakable.”);  Carpenter  v.  City  and  County  of
San  Francisco,  93  F. 3d  627,  630  (CA9  1996) (103-foot cross in public
park)  (“The  Latin  cross  . . .  [‘]represents  with  relative  clarity  and
simplicity  the  Christian  message  of the crucifixion and resurrection of
Jesus Christ, a doctrine at the heart of Christianity.’ ”); American Civil
Liberties Union of Ill. v. St. Charles, 794 F. 2d 265, 272–273 (CA7 1986)
(35-foot cross displayed atop a fire house during the Christmas season)
(“The  cross  . . .  is  ‘the  principal  symbol  of  the  Christian  religion,  re-
calling the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and the redeeming benefits of his
passion  and death.’ ”); Friedman v. Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Bernalillo
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case American Legion v. American Humanist Association. It cites other legal cases and arguments related to the constitutionality of a Latin cross war memorial.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

807

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.  As  petitioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,
the  Clerk  is  directed  not  to  accept  any  further  petitions  in  non
criminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required
by  Rule  38(a)  is  paid  and  the  petition  is  submitted  in  compliance
with  Rule  33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of
Appeals,  506  U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dis
sents.  See  id.,  at  4,  and  cases  cited  therein.

No. 09–5436.  Crutcher v.  Williams, Warden, et al.  C.  A.
9th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pau
peris  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.

No.  09–5451.  Ruston  v.  Dallas  County,  Texas,  et  al.
C. A. 5th Cir.  Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  262.

No.  09–5488.  Wallace  v.  Moberg  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–5512.  Brown  v.  Rivera,  Warden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–5576.  Smith  v.  Wrigley,  Superintendent,  New
Castle Correctional Facility.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Motion of peti
tioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certio
rari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As  petitioner  has
repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk  is  directed  not
to  accept  any  further  petitions  in  noncriminal  matters  from  peti
tioner  unless  the docketing  fee  required  by  Rule  38(a) is  paid  and
the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1.  See Mar
tin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506  U. S.  1  (1992)
(per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See  id.,  at  4,  and
cases  cited  therein.

No. 09–5630.  Oduok v. Ferro et al.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Motion
of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Reported
below:  303  Fed.  Appx.  790.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, each detailing a denial of pauperis status and dismissal of a certiorari petition.  It lacks sequential narrative and is more akin to a legal docket than readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
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  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxxv

Page
Roberts v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949,979
915
Roberts v. University of Louisville Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
Robinson, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Robinson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rodrick; Mississippi v.
919
Rodriguez v. Marshall
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915
Rodriguez-Moreno; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
982
Roe; Anderson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
979
Roe; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947
Rogers Processors, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
Rojas v. Fitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920
Roper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
966
Rose, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rosen; Swinick v.
927
Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971
Rothman v. University of Mass. Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948
Rotter, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
Rousan v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,970
Rouse; Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
933
Rowland v. Goodson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Roy Anderson Corp.; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Rubin; Brown v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1301
Rubin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rubin; United States v.
964
Ruck v. Transportation Union, Executive Bd.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950
Rudd, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
Rudd v. Hanley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974
Ruiz Camacho v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974
Ruiz Camacho v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Runyon; Said v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925
Russell v. VBR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sack; Champion v.
901
Sadler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Safeway, Inc.; McQuown v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Said v. Runyon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
Saile v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Saint-Evens; Carlyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
Salas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Salazar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Salguero v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Salisbury; Mizuno v.
966
Sanborn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sanchez v. Sprunk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 955,971
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U53

[09-26-01 10:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

594

CHRISTENSEN v. HARRIS COUNTY

Stevens, J., dissenting

ability and the use of comp time must be contained within
an agreement. The “thing to be done” under the Act is for
the parties to come to terms.
It is because they have not
done so with respect to the use of comp time here that the
county may not unilaterally force its expenditure.

The Court is thus likewise mistaken in its insistence that
under petitioners’ reading, the comp time exception “would
become a nullity” because employees could “forc[e] employ-
ers to pay cash compensation instead of providing compensa-
tory time” for overtime work. Ante, at 585. Quite the con-
trary, employers can only be “forced” either to abide by the
arrangements to which they have agreed, or to comply with
the basic statutory requirement that overtime compensation
is payable in cash.

Moreover, as the Court points out, ante, at 580, 584, even
absent an agreement on the way in which comp time may be
used, employers may at any time require employees to “cash
out” of accumulated comp time, thereby readily avoiding
any forced payment of comp time employees may accrue.
§ 207(o)(3)(B); 29 CFR § 553.26(a) (1999). Neither can it be
said that Congress somehow assumed that the right to force
employees to use accumulated comp time was to be an im-
plied term in all comp time agreements. Congress speciﬁ-
cally contemplated that employees might well reach the stat-
in
utory maximum of accrued comp time, by requiring,
§ 207(o)(3)(A), that once the statutory maximum is reached,
employers must compensate employees in the preferred
form—cash—for every hour over the limit.

Finally, it is not without signiﬁcance in the present case
that the Government department responsible for the stat-
ute’s enforcement shares my understanding of its meaning.
Indeed, the Department of Labor made its position clear to
the county itself in response to a direct question posed by
the county before it decided—agency advice notwithstand-
ing—to implement its forced-use policy nonetheless. The
Department of Labor explained:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice.  It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxxxviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1113

Springﬁeld Holding Co. Ltd. LLC; Children’s Fund v.  . . . . . . . . .
1092

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sprinkle; Grund v.
842

Spurgeon; Burruel v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1021

Spurlock v. Bank of America, N. A.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

Stacey v. Tierney  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Stafford v. Astrue
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1073

Staley v. Hall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stallard v. United States
974

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stamos v. New Jersey
1051

Stamper; McNeill v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
812

Stamps, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
869

Stamps v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

Stancourt v. Worthington City School Dist.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

Standard Ins. Co.; Harris v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stanford; Swift v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  837,1064

1032

Stanko v. Davis
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
849

Staples v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Stark v. Maine  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Starks v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

Starling v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Starling v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930

State.  See also name of State.

826

State Bar of Cal.; Fine v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

State Bar of Cal.; Khanna v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
State Bar of Cal.; Sharpe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
867

844

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
State Bar of Mich.; Kendall v.
State, County & Municipal Employees; Patterson v.  . . . . . . . . .  878,1065

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.; Kodrin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.; Fultz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

1043

State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.; Hurst v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.; Silverman v.  . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

Staten v. Parker  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Staub v. Proctor Hospital  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  809,1010

867

Steel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Steele v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914

1126

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Steele; Mendoza v.
Steele; Owens v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  879,1065

1122

Stephens v. Branker  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Stephens v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  824,904

Stephens v. United States
1124

Steppe v. California Ins. Comm’r  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128

Sternberg v. Michigan State Univ.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  850,1086

Stevens v. Nevada
1134

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stevens v. United States
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

423

Opinion of the Court

On August 11, 1997, the President sent identical notices to
the Senate and to the House of Representatives canceling
“one item of new direct spending,” specifying § 4722(c) as
that item, and stating that he had determined that “this
cancellation will reduce the Federal budget deﬁcit.” He
explained that § 4722(c) would have permitted New York
“to continue relying upon impermissible provider taxes to
ﬁnance its Medicaid program” and that “[t]his preferential
treatment would have increased Medicaid costs, would have
treated New York differently from all other States, and
would have established a costly precedent for other States
to request comparable treatment.” 3

Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997

A person who realizes a proﬁt from the sale of securities
is generally subject to a capital gains tax. Under existing
law, however, an ordinary business corporation can acquire
a corporation, including a food processing or reﬁning com-
pany, in a merger or stock-for-stock transaction in which no
gain is recognized to the seller, see 26 U. S. C. §§ 354(a),
If,
368(a); the seller’s tax payment, therefore, is deferred.
however, the purchaser is a farmers’ cooperative, the parties
cannot structure such a transaction because the stock of the
cooperative may be held only by its members, see § 521(b)(2);
thus, a seller dealing with a farmers’ cooperative cannot ob-
tain the beneﬁts of tax deferral.

a waiver be applied for, in accordance with subparagraph (E) of such sec-
tion, and, (if so applied for) upon which action by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services (including any judicial review of any such proceeding)
has not been completed as of July 23, 1997, are deemed to be permissible
health care related taxes and in compliance with the requirements of
subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 1903(w)(3) of such Act.”
111 Stat.
515.

3 App. to Juris. Statement 63a–64a (Cancellation No. 97–3). The quoted
text is an excerpt from the statement of reasons for the cancellation, which
is required by the Line Item Veto Act. See 2 U. S. C. § 691a (1994 ed.,
Supp. II).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 417 (1998). It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses a specific section of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

Opinion of the Court

again  acknowledging  that  Miranda  adopted  prophylactic
rules,  the  Court  balanced  the  competing  interests  and
found that the costs of adopting the warden’s argument out-
weighed  any  benefits.  On  the  cost  side,  the  Court  noted
that  enforcing  Miranda  “safeguards  ‘a  fundamental  trial
right” and furthers “the correct ascertainment of guilt” at
trial.  507  U. S.,  at  691–692.    And  on  the  other  side,  the
Court  found  that  the adoption  of  a  Stone-like  rule  “would
not significantly benefit the federal courts in their exercise
of habeas jurisdiction, or advance the cause of federalism in
any substantial way.”  507 U. S., at 693.

Thus,  all  the  post-Miranda  cases  we  have  discussed
acknowledged the prophylactic nature of the Miranda rules
and engaged in cost-benefit analysis to define the scope of
these prophylactic rules.

E
Contrary  to  the  decision  below  and  Tekoh’s  argument
here, see Brief for Respondent 24, our decision in Dickerson,
530 U. S. 428, did not upset the firmly established prior un-
derstanding of Miranda as a prophylactic decision.  Dicker-
son involved a federal statute, 18 U. S. C. §3501, that effec-
tively overruled Miranda by making the admissibility of a
statement given during custodial interrogation turn solely
on whether it was made voluntarily.  530 U. S., at 431–432.
The Court held that Congress could not abrogate Miranda
by statute because Miranda was a “constitutional decision”
that adopted a “constitutional rule,” 530 U. S., at 438–439,
and the Court noted that these rules could not have been
made applicable to the States if it did not have that status,
see ibid.

At the same time, however, the Court made it clear that
it was not equating a violation of the Miranda rules with
an outright Fifth Amendment violation.  For one thing, it
reiterated  Miranda’s  observation  that  “the  Constitution
would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the precedent set by Miranda and subsequent cases, analyzing the prophylactic nature of Miranda rules and their application.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

RUTLEDGE v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE
MANAGEMENT ASSN.
THOMAS, J., concurring

  But it is not enough for this Court to reach the right con-
clusions.  We should do so in the way Congress instructed.
Indeed, although we have generally arrived at the conclu-
sions we would arrive at under a text-based approach, our
capacious,  nontextual  test  encourages  departure  from  the
text.  The decision below is testament to that problem.  We
unanimously reverse that decision today, but we can hardly
fault  judges  when  they  apply  the  amorphous test  that  we
gave them.  We can and should do better.

——————
(1997).  That makes sense because ERISA has nothing to say about those
activities.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the opinion, not a heading, footnote, or other non-sequential element.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

17

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

540 U. S., at 725.  The Court could “think of few areas in
which  a  State’s  antiestablishment  interests  come  more
into  play”  than  the  “procuring  [of]  taxpayer  funds  to  sup-
port church leaders.”  Id., at 722.

The  same  is  true  of  this  case,  about  directing  taxpayer
funds to houses of worship, see supra, at 2.  Like the use of
public dollars for ministers at issue in Locke, turning over
public funds to houses of worship implicates serious anti-
establishment and free exercise interests.  The history just
discussed  fully  supports  this  conclusion.  As  states  dises-
tablished, they repealed laws allowing taxation to support
religion  because  the  practice  threatened  other  forms  of
government  support  for,  involved  some  government  con-
trol  over,  and  weakened  supporters’  control  of  religion.
Common sense also supports this conclusion.  Recall that a
state  may  not  fund  religious  activities  without  violating
the Establishment Clause.  See Part II–A, supra.  A state
can  reasonably  use  status  as  a  “house  of  worship”  as  a
stand-in  for  “religious  activities.”    Inside  a  house  of  wor-
ship, dividing the religious from the secular would require
intrusive  line-drawing  by  government,  and  monitoring
those  lines  would  entangle  government  with  the  house  of
worship’s  activities.    And  so  while  not  every  activity  a
house of worship undertakes will be inseparably linked to
religious  activity,  “the  likelihood  that  many  are  makes  a
categorical  rule  a  suitable  means  to  avoid  chilling  the
exercise of religion.”  Amos, 483 U. S., at 345 (Brennan, J.,
concurring  in  judgment).    Finally,  and  of  course,  such
funding implicates the free exercise rights of taxpayers by
denying them the chance to decide for themselves whether
and how to fund religion.  If there is any “ ‘room for play in
the joints’ between” the Religion Clauses, it is here.  Locke,
540 U. S., at 718 (quoting Walz, 397 U. S., at 669).

As was true in Locke, a prophylactic rule against the use
of  public  funds  for  houses  of  worship  is  a  permissible
accommodation of these weighty interests.  The rule has a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1131

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No.  09–7745.  Flores-Sotelo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  404.

No.  09–7746.  Garcia-Aguilar  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  736.

No.  09–7747.  Garibay  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  91.

No.  09–7748.  Hill  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7750.  Murphy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7751.  Padilla  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  382.

No. 09–7752.  Lugo v.  United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–7755.  Smith v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  501.

No. 09–7756.  Mendoza Alcala v.  United States.  C. A. 5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  985.

No. 09–7762.  Martinez-Torres v. United States.  C. A. 1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7765.  James  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  968  A.  2d  523.

No.  09–7766.  Lauderdale  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  571  F.  3d  657.

No.  09–7771.  Upshaw  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  898.

No.  09–7772.  Warman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  578  F.  3d  320.

No.  09–7775.  Chatman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  351  Fed.  Appx.  658.

No. 09–7776.  Cirilo-Munoz v. United States.  C. A. 1st Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  582  F.  3d  54.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of decisions. This is not the kind of sequential, readable text that would typically be indexed for general content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>