<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

JACKSON, J., concurring

attack, assault, or harm any player,’ ” should not be inter-
preted as being directed at hurt feelings, because the listed
“prohibited actions all concern dangerous physical conduct
that might inflict bodily harm; trash talk is simply not of
that kind.”  Ante, at 6.  I agree.  I would add that it is like-
wise clear from the listed prohibited acts that such a rule is
also not addressing far more serious and unexpected con-
duct than the kinds of acts that the preceding examples de-
scribe, which can result in serious and foreseeable physical
injuries during a rough-and-tumble football game.  By con-
trast, if a player were to shoot or poison another player, the
rule’s  drafters  would  expect  the  police  to  be  called,  not  a
referee.  Thus, we conclude that the rule is best understood
to be inapposite with respect to conduct at both extremes of
the universe of harmful acts in which a player might con-
ceivably engage.

We recognize this intuitive fact—that there is a certain
category  of  conduct  the  rule  is  designed  to  prohibit—be-
cause  we  recognize,  albeit  implicitly,  that  the  drafters  of
this rule have included these particular examples for a rea-
son.  We understand that, given the preceding list of exam-
ples, this rule was adopted with a clear intent concerning
its scope.  So, though a broad conception of “harm” is “liter-
ally covered by the language” of the rule, ibid., we appreci-
ate that the rule’s drafters did not intend for that term to
take on its most expansive meaning.  Instead, the examples
help illuminate what the drafters actually intended the rule
to cover.  From the preceding list, we can confidently dis-
cern that the drafters meant to proscribe only conduct that
risks  injuries  with  severity  akin  to  facemask  pulling,  not
trash talk or murder.1

——————

1 The majority invokes the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem gen-
eris to support this inference.  See ante, at 5.  Those canons are useful
interpretive tools, but in my view, they are ultimately only devices used
in furtherance of achieving our goal of determining “the intent of Con-
gress.”  United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Jackson. It delves into the interpretation of a rule regarding prohibited conduct in a sport, likely football.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of judicial opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

lxxiii

Page
1088
Wichita Falls; Garrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Widener Univ. School of Law; DeAngelis v.
1012
Wightman; Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096
Wilkerson v. Nielsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034
Wilkins v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056
Williams v. Atlanta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042
Williams v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1099
Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026
Williams v. Corrections Corp. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1022
Williams v. Henderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1059
Williams v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . .
1113
Williams v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133
Williams v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076
Williams v. Luebbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1020,1125
Williams v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1040,1091
Williams v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026
Williams v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1071
Williams v. Pitcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Williams v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362,420
Williams v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096
Williams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045,1078,1094,1103,1117,1131
1050
Williams v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120
Willis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1021
Willman v. Straub . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1104
Wills; McDaniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120
Wilson v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1098
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wilson v. Burlington N. S. F. R. Co.
1082
Wilson; Cook Group, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124
Wilson; Florida v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114
Wilson v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1021
Wilson v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1090
Wilson v. Ratelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076,1120
Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1090
Wingate v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1100
Winkle v. Oakland Jockey Club . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1084
Winsett v. West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1033
Winslow v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031,1125
Wisconsin; Bostedt v.
1078
Wisconsin; Goodwin v.
1050
Wisconsin; Williams v.
1009,1105
Wise v. Caddell Construction Co.
1070
Wisniewski v. Conti
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1069
Wohlleber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1017
Wojciechowski, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists the cases included in the report and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
16

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC

Opinion of the Court

firm remained enmeshed in a Board investigation).  But the
Government’s argument still conflicts with Free Enterprise
Fund’s reasoning.  In addressing why the firm’s claim was
collateral, the Court focused solely on what it was about—
again, that the firm challenged “the Board’s existence,” not
“its auditing standards.”  561 U. S., at 490.  And anyway,
the  Government’s  theory  ill  fits  the  point  of  the  Thunder
Basin inquiry—to decide when a particular claim is “of the
type” to fall outside a statutory review scheme.  510 U. S.,
at 212.  That inquiry, just as Free Enterprise Fund recog-
nized, requires considering the nature of the claim, not the
status  (pending  or  not)  of  an  agency  proceeding.  Or  said
another  way,  the  inquiry  contemplates  (as  our  collateral-
order  doctrine  also  does)  that  even  when  a  proceeding  is
pending, an occasional claim may get immediate review—
in part because it involves something discrete.  Cf. Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949)
(allowing  an  interlocutory  appeal  from  a  district  court’s
“collateral” ruling, “independent of the cause itself ”).  The
Government’s  redefinition  of  what  counts  as  collateral
would effectively foreclose that possibility.

Third and finally, Cochran’s and Axon’s claims are “out-
side  the  [Commissions’]  expertise.”  Thunder  Basin,  510
U. S.,  at  212.   On  that  issue,  Free  Enterprise  Fund  could
hardly  be  clearer.   Claims  that  tenure  protections  violate
Article  II,  the  Court  there  determined,  raise  “standard
questions  of  administrative”  and  constitutional  law,  de-
tached from “considerations of agency policy.”  561 U. S., at
491 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see
supra, at 10.  That statement covers Axon’s and Cochran’s
claims that ALJs are too far insulated from the President’s
supervision.    And  Axon’s  constitutional  challenge  to  the
combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions is
of  a  piece—similarly  distant  from  the  FTC’s  “competence
and expertise.”  561 U. S., at 491.  The Commission knows
a  good  deal  about  competition  policy,  but  nothing  special
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the arguments and precedents related to a case. It contains legal reasoning, citations to previous cases, and analysis of constitutional and administrative law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

KAGAN, J., dissenting

emergency.”  §1098bb(a)(1).  But the statute’s greater cov-
erage  came  with  no  sacrifice  of  potency.    When  the  law’s
emergency conditions are satisfied, the Secretary again has
the power to “waive or modify any statutory or regulatory
provision” relating to federal student-loan programs.  Ibid.
Before turning to the scope of that power, note the strin-
gency of the triggering conditions.  Putting aside military
applications, the Secretary can act only when the President
has declared a national emergency.  See §1098ee(4).  Fur-
ther,  the  Secretary  may  provide  benefits  only  to  “affected
individuals”—defined  as  anyone  who  “resides  or  is  em-
ployed in an area that is declared a disaster area . . . in con-
nection with a national emergency” or who has “suffered di-
rect economic hardship as a direct result of a . . . national
emergency.”  §§1098ee(2)(C)–(D).  And the Secretary can do
only  what  he  determines  to  be  “necessary”  to  ensure  that
those individuals “are not placed in a worse position finan-
cially in relation to” their loans “because of ” the emergency.
§1098bb(a)(2).  That  last  condition,  said  more  simply,  re-
quires the Secretary to show that the relief he awards does
not go beyond alleviating the economic effects of an emer-
gency on affected borrowers’ ability to repay their loans.

But if those conditions are met, the Secretary’s delegated
authority is capacious.  As in the prior statutes, the Secre-
tary has the linked power to “waive or modify any statutory
or  regulatory  provision”  applying  to  the  student-loan  pro-
grams.  §1098bb(a)(1).  To start with the phrase after the
verbs, “the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning.”  United
States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997).  “Any” of the refer-
enced provisions means, well, any of those provisions.  And
those  provisions  include  several  relating  to  student-loan
in
cancellation—more  precisely,  specifying  conditions
which  the  Secretary  can  discharge  loan  principal.  See
§§1087, 1087dd(g); 34 CFR §§682.402, 685.212 (2022).  Now
go  back  to  the  twin  verbs:  “waive  or  modify.”    To  “waive”
means  to  “abandon,  renounce,  or  surrender”—so  here,  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the scope of the Secretary of Education's authority to modify student loan programs under a national emergency. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22  MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

them  work  in  the  same  way:  Congress  enacts  a  law  that
imposes  restrictions  or  confers  rights  on  private  actors;  a
state  law  confers  rights  or  imposes  restrictions  that  con
flict  with  the  federal  law;  and  therefore  the  federal  law
takes precedence and the state law is preempted.

This  mechanism  is  shown  most  clearly  in  cases  involv
ing  “conflict  preemption.”    A  recent  example  is  Mutual
Pharmaceutical  Co.  v.  Bartlett,  570  U. S.  472  (2013).    In
that  case,  a  federal  law  enacted  under  the  Commerce
Clause  regulated  manufacturers  of  generic  drugs,  prohib
iting them from altering either the composition or labeling
approved by the Food and Drug Administration.  A State’s
tort  law,  however,  effectively  required  a  manufacturer  to
supplement  the  warnings  included  in  the  FDA-approved
label.  Id.,  at  480–486.    We  held  that  the  state  law  was
preempted  because  it  imposed  a  duty  that  was  incon
sistent—i.e., in conflict—with federal law.  Id., at 493.

“Express  preemption”  operates  in  essentially  the  same
way,  but  this  is  often  obscured  by  the  language  used  by
Congress in framing preemption provisions.  The provision
at issue in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S.
374 (1992), is illustrative.  The Airline Deregulation Act of
1978  lifted  prior  federal  regulations  of  airlines,  and  “[t]o
ensure  that  the  States  would  not  undo  federal  deregula
tion  with  regulation  of  their  own,”  id.,  at  378,  the  Act
provided that “no State or political subdivision thereof . . .
shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard,
or other provision having the force and effect of law relat
ing  to  rates,  routes,  or  services  of  any  [covered]  air  car
rier.”  49 U. S. C. App. §1305(a)(1) (1988 ed.).

This  language  might  appear  to  operate  directly  on  the
States,  but  it  is  a  mistake  to  be  confused  by  the  way  in
which a preemption provision is phrased.  As we recently
explained, “we do not require Congress to employ a partic
ular  linguistic  formulation  when  preempting  state  law.”
Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U. S. ___,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of preemption in federal law. It cites relevant case law and provides legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

59

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

scrutiny.”  Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 594 U. S. ___,
___ (2021) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1).  And
five  Justices  acceded  to  that  cynical  maneuver.    They  let
Texas  defy  this  Court’s  constitutional  rulings,  nullifying
Roe  and  Casey  ahead  of  schedule  in  the  Nation’s  second
largest State.

And now the other shoe drops, courtesy of that same five-
person  majority.  (We  believe  that  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE’s
opinion is wrong too, but no one should think that there is
not a large difference between upholding a 15-week ban on
the grounds he does and allowing States to prohibit abor-
tion from the time of conception.)  Now a new and bare ma-
jority of this Court—acting at practically the first moment
possible—overrules Roe and Casey.  It converts a series of
dissenting  opinions  expressing  antipathy  toward  Roe  and
Casey  into  a  decision  greenlighting  even  total  abortion
bans.  See ante, at 57, 59, 63, and nn. 61–64 (relying on for-
mer  dissents).    It  eliminates  a  50-year-old  constitutional
right that safeguards women’s freedom and equal station.
It breaches a core rule-of-law principle, designed to promote
constancy in the law.  In doing all of that, it places in jeop-
ardy other rights, from contraception to same-sex intimacy
and marriage.  And finally, it undermines the Court’s legit-
imacy.

Casey  itself  made  the  last  point  in  explaining  why  it
would not overrule Roe—though some members of its ma-
jority might not have joined Roe in the first instance.  Just
as we did here, Casey explained the importance of stare de-
cisis; the inappositeness of West Coast Hotel and Brown; the
absence  of  any  “changed  circumstances”  (or  other  reason)
justifying the reversal of precedent.  505 U. S., at 864; see
supra,  at  30–33,  37–47.    “[T]he  Court,”  Casey  explained,
“could not pretend” that overruling Roe had any “justifica-
tion beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out dif-
ferently from the Court of 1973.”  505 U. S., at 864.  And to
overrule for that reason?  Quoting Justice Stewart, Casey
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

BREYER, J., dissenting

would have had to get the gunpowder and load it into the
gun, an operation that would have taken a fair amount of
time to perform.  See Hicks, United States Military Shoul-
der Arms, 1795–1935, 1 Am. Military Hist. Foundation 23,
30  (1937)  (experienced  soldier  could,  with  specially  pre-
pared  cartridges  as  opposed  to  plain  gunpowder  and  ball,
load and fire musket 3-to-4 times per minute); id., at 26–
30 (describing the loading process); see also Grancsay, The
Craft  of  the  Early  American  Gunsmith,  6  Metropolitan
Museum  of  Art  Bulletin  54,  60  (1947)  (noting  that  rifles
were slower to load and fire than muskets).

Moreover,  the  law  would,  as  a  practical  matter,  have
prohibited the carrying of loaded firearms anywhere in the
city, unless the carrier had no plans to enter any building
or  was  willing  to  unload  or  discard  his  weapons  before
going  inside.  And  Massachusetts  residents  must  have
believed this kind of law compatible with the provision in
the  Massachusetts  Constitution  that  granted  “the  people
. . .  a  right  to  keep  and  to  bear  arms  for  the  common  de-
fence”—a provision that the majority says was interpreted
as  “secur[ing]  an  individual  right  to  bear  arms  for  defen-
sive  purposes.”  Art.  XVII  (1780),  in  3  The  Federal  and
State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic
Laws  1888,  1892  (F.  Thorpe  ed.  1909)  (hereinafter
Thorpe); ante, at 28–29 (opinion of the Court).

The New York City law, which required that gunpowder
in  the  home  be  stored  in  certain  sorts  of  containers,  and
laws  in  certain  Pennsylvania  towns,  which  required  that
gunpowder  be  stored  on  the  highest  story  of  the  home,
could well have presented similar obstacles to in-home use
of  firearms.  See  Act  of  April  13,  1784,  ch.  28,  1784  N. Y.
Laws p. 627; An Act for Erecting the Town of Carlisle, in
the  County  of  Cumberland,  into  a  Borough,  ch.  XIV,
§XLII, 1782 Pa. Laws p. 49; An Act for Erecting the Town
of  Reading,  in  the  County  of  Berks,  into  a  Borough,  ch.
LXXVI,  §XLII,  1783  Pa.  Laws  p.  211.    Although  it  is  un-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It discusses the practical implications of gun control laws and cites historical examples.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Syllabus

signatories  would  “not  be  permitted  to  decline  enforcement  of  such
agreements on the basis of parochial views of their desirability or in a
manner that would diminish the mutually binding nature of the agree-
ments.”  Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U. S. 506, 520, n. 15.

The postratification understanding of other contracting states—as
evidenced by the “[d]ecisions of the courts of other Convention signa-
tories,” El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U. S. 155,
175,  and  the  “postratification  conduct”  of  contracting  state  govern-
ments, Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U. S. 217, 227—may
also  serve  as  an  aid  to  this  Court’s  interpretation.    Here,  numerous
sources indicate that the New York Convention does not prohibit the
application of domestic law addressing the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.  These  sources,  however,  are  from  decades  after  the  fi-
nalization of the New York Convention’s text in 1958.  This diminishes
their  value  as  evidence  of  the  original  understanding  of  the  treaty’s
meaning.

Finally, because the Court’s textual analysis and the Executive’s in-
terpretation  of  the  Convention  align  here,  there  is  no  need  to  deter-
mine whether the Executive’s understanding is entitled to “weight” or
“deference.”  Cf. Edelman  v.  Lynchburg  College,  535  U. S.  106,  114–
115, n. 8.  Pp. 7–11.

(c) The Court of Appeals may address on remand whether GE En-
ergy can enforce the arbitration clauses under equitable estoppel prin-
ciples and which body of law governs that determination.  Pp. 11–12.

902 F. 3d 1316, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  SOTOMAYOR,

J., filed a concurring opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case. It includes citations, case names, and a brief overview of the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

ALITO, J., dissenting

right to counsel, both the bar ethics committee and the De-
partment  of  Labor,  which  had  intervened  in  state  court,
successfully  petitioned  for  review  in  this  Court.    We  then
held  that  the  attorney  could  defend  the  decision  below
based on the rights of his client.

Triplett is inapposite here for at least two reasons.  First,
the lawyer in that case did not initiate the litigation.  Sec-
ond, because the case arose in state court, his right to in-
voke his client’s rights in that forum was a question of state
law.  Had we prevented him from asserting those rights in
this  Court,  he  would  have  been  unable  to  defend  himself
against the petitioners’ arguments.  And on top of all this,
Triplett, as we noted in Kowalski, “involved the representa-
tion of known claimants,” and that “existing attorney-client
relationship [was] quite different from the hypothetical . . .
relationship” between the abortion providers and clients in
That  Craig  and
the present case.  543 U. S., at 131.
Triplett  are  the  best  authorities  the  plurality  can  find  is
telling proof of the weakness of its position.

F
  As THE CHIEF JUSTICE points out, stare decisis generally
counsels adherence to precedent, and in deciding whether
to overrule a prior decision, we consider factors beyond the
strength  of  the  precedent’s  reasoning.    Ante,  at  3–4.  But
here, such factors weigh in favor of overruling.

Reexamination of a precedent may be appropriate when
it is an “outlier” and its reasoning cannot be reconciled with
other established precedents, see Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.
v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 17); Janus v.
State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. ___, ___
(2018) (slip op., at 43); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S.
506, 521 (1995); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989), and that is true of
the rule allowing abortion providers to assert their patients’
rights.  The parties have not brought to our attention any
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It contains legal arguments and references to previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

9

THOMAS, J., dissenting

entire  election  process.  Natelson,  The  Original  Scope  of
the  Congressional  Power  to  Regulate  Elections,  13  U. Pa.
J. Constitutional L. 1, 10–18 (2010) (citing examples).  But
there  are  good  reasons  for  concluding  that  Article  I,  §4’s
use  of  “Manner”  is  considerably  more  limited.    Id.,  at  20.
The  Constitution  does  not  use  the  word  “Manner”  in  iso-
lation;  rather,  “after  providing  for  qualifications,  times,
and places, the Constitution described the residuum as ‘the
Manner  of  holding  Elections.’    This  precise  phrase  seems
to have been newly coined to denote a subset of traditional
‘manner’  regulation.”    Ibid.    (emphasis  deleted;  footnote
omitted).  Consistent  with  this  view,  during  the  state
ratification debates, the “Manner of holding Elections” was
construed  to  mean  the  circumstances  under  which  elec-
tions  were  held  and  the  mechanics  of  the  actual  election.
See  4  Debates  in  the  Several  State  Conventions  on  the
Adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution  71  (J.  Elliot  2d
ed. 1863) (hereafter Elliot’s Debates) (“The power over the
manner  of  elections  does  not  include  that  of  saying  who
shall  vote  . . .  the  power  over  the  manner  only  enables
them to determine how those electors shall elect—whether
by ballot, or by vote, or by any other way” (John Steele at
the North Carolina ratification debates)); A Pennsylvanian
to the New York Convention, Pennsylvania Gazette, June
11,  1788,  in  20  Documentary  History  1145  (J.  Kaminski,
G.  Saladino,  R.  Leffler,  &  C.  Schoenleber  eds.  2004)
(same);  Brief  for  Center  for  Constitutional  Jurisprudence
as  Amicus  Curiae  6–7  (same,  citing  state  ratification  de-
bates).  The text of the Times, Places and Manner Clause,
therefore, cannot be read to authorize Congress to dictate
voter eligibility to the States.

2
Article  I,  §4,  also  cannot  be  read  to  limit  a  State’s  au-
thority to set voter qualifications because the more specific
language of Article I, §2, expressly gives that authority to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a section from a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites legal precedents and delves into the interpretation of the US Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

17

BREYER, J., dissenting

Thus  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause  is  left with  no  independ-
ent  weight  since  complying  with  subsection  (d)  shields  a
State  from  violating  subsection  (b).    To  repeat  the  point,
under  the  majority’s  view,  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause  is
superfluous  in  respect  to  change-of-address  programs:
subsection (d) already accomplishes everything the major-
ity says is required of a State’s removal program—namely,
the sending of a notice.
  Finally, even if we were to accept the majority’s premise
that  the  question  here  is  whether  Ohio’s  system  removes
registered  voters  from  the  registration  list  “solely  by  rea-
son  of  a failure  to  vote,”  that  would  not  change  anything.
As I have argued, Part II, supra, the failure to respond to
a  forwardable  notice  is  an  irrelevant  factor  in  terms  of
what  it  shows  about  whether  that  registrant  changed  his
or her residence.  To add an irrelevant factor to a failure to
vote, say,  a factor  like having  gone  on  vacation  or  having
eaten  too  large  a  meal,  cannot  change  Ohio’s  sole  use  of
“failure to vote” into something it is not.

IV
  JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring, suggests that my reading
of  the  statute  “ ‘raises  serious  constitutional  doubts.’ ”
Ante,  at  1  (quoting  Jennings  v.  Rodriguez,  583  U. S.  ___,
___  (2018)  (slip  op.,  at  2)).    He  believes  that  it  “would
seriously interfere with the States’ constitutional authority
to set and enforce voter qualifications.”  Ante, at 2.  At the
same  time,  the  majority  “assume[s]”  that  “Congress  has
the  constitutional  authority  to  limit  voting  eligibility
requirements  in  the  way  respondents  suggest.”    Ante,  at
16, n. 5.  But it suggests possible agreement with JUSTICE
THOMAS, for it makes this assumption only “for the sake of
argument.”  Ibid.
  Our  cases  indicate,  however,  that  §8  neither  exceeds
Congress’ authority under the Elections Clause, Art. I, §4,
nor  interferes  with  the  State’s  authority  under  the  Voter
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the interpretation of a specific section of law (likely related to voter registration) and argues against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

v. Newsom, 590 U. S. ___ (2020).  There, the Court consid-
ered a California limitation on crowd size at religious ser-
vices.    California  treated  religious  organizations  better
than  some  secular  organizations,  like  movie  theaters,  but
worse  than  other  secular  organizations,  such  as  restau-
rants, supermarkets, retail stores, pharmacies, hair salons,
offices, factories, and the like.  In my view, the State of Cal-
ifornia’s  explanation,  at  least  on  that  record,  did  not  per-
suasively distinguish religious services from several of the
favored secular organizations, particularly restaurants and
supermarkets.    But  the  Court  ultimately  denied  the
church’s request for an emergency injunction.  In his con-
currence,  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE  appropriately  emphasized
both the high standard for obtaining injunctive relief in this
Court and the ongoing and rapidly changing public health
emergency.  THE CHIEF JUSTICE also noted that the favored
secular activities did not involve people who “congregate in
large groups” or “remain in close proximity for extended pe-
riods.”  Id., at ___ (opinion concurring in denial of applica-
tion for injunctive relief) (slip op., at 2).
  I  continue  to  think  that  the  restaurants  and supermar-
kets at issue in South Bay (and especially the restaurants)
pose similar health risks to socially distanced religious ser-
vices in terms of proximity to others and duration of visit.
I suspect that many who have frequented all three kinds of
establishments  in  recent  weeks  and  months  would  agree.
So I continue to respectfully disagree with South Bay.
  But accepting South Bay as a precedent, this case is much
different because it involves bars, casinos, and gyms.  Ne-
vada’s COVID–19-based health distinction between (i) bars,
casinos,  and  gyms  on  the  one  hand,  and (ii)  religious ser-
vices on the other hand, defies common sense.  As I see it,
the State cannot plausibly maintain that those large secu-
lar  businesses  are  categorically  safer  than  religious  ser-
vices, or that only religious services—and not bars, casinos,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and discusses legal arguments related to religious services and COVID-19 restrictions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
926
Cassan Enterprises, Inc. v. Dollar Systems, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
103
Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians . . . . . . . .
931
Castapheny v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Castaphney v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
979
Castillo v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920
Castro-Nino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,969
Cayetano; Tataii v.
Ceminchuk v. Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972
Central Ofﬁce Telephone; American Telephone & Telegraph v. . . 214,972
922
Champion v. Sack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974
Chandler v. Greene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965
Chanin; Parnar v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
Chao Hui Lin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
Chargualaf v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Chase v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
Chase Manhattan Bank v. San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
Chavez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
Chavez-Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 915,974
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living; Seif v.
975
Chicago v. Morales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Fla.; Schwarz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Utah; Peterson v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
927
Childress v. Richmond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953
Chiles; Coastal Petroleum Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
966
Chittim, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Christiani; Lu v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912
Christy v. Alexander & Alexander of N. Y., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Chun; Nakamura v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Cimino v. Zuk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Citibank, N. A.; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. C&L Enterprises, Inc. . . . . . . . . . .
901
City. See name of city.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clark; California v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clark; Grifﬁn v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clark; McClain v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clark v. Roy Anderson Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clayton; Bryan v.
C&L Enterprises, Inc.; Citizen Potawatomi Nation v.
. . . . . . . . .
Cleveland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clinton v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clinton; Turkowski v.
Clinton; United States v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clipper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cloutier v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

937
923
917
905
933
901
125
417
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,969
912
962
906
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

TRUMP v. HAWAII

Opinion of the Court

No.  8693,  3  CFR  86–87  (2011)  (President  Obama)  (sus-
pending  the  entry  of  individuals  subject  to  a  travel  re-
striction  under  United  Nations  Security  Council  resolu-
tions “until such time as the Secretary of State determines
that [the suspension] is no longer necessary”).  In fact, not
one of the 43 suspension orders issued prior to this litiga-
tion has specified a precise end date.

Like its predecessors, the Proclamation makes clear that
its  “conditional  restrictions”  will  remain  in  force  only  so
long as necessary to “address” the identified “inadequacies
and  risks”  within  the  covered  nations.    Proclamation
Preamble, and §1(h); see ibid.  (explaining that the aim  is
to  “relax[ ]  or  remove[ ]”  the  entry  restrictions  “as  soon  as
possible”).  To  that  end,  the  Proclamation  establishes  an
ongoing  process  to  engage  covered  nations  and  assess
every  180  days  whether  the  entry  restrictions  should  be
Indeed,  after  the
modified  or  terminated.  §§4(a),  (b).
initial review period, the President determined that Chad
had  made  sufficient
identity-
management protocols, and he accordingly lifted the entry
suspension  on  its  nationals.    See  Proclamation  No.  9723,
83 Fed. Reg. 15937.

improvements  to

its

Finally,  the  Proclamation  properly  identifies  a  “class  of
aliens”—nationals  of  select  countries—whose  entry  is
suspended.  Plaintiffs  argue  that  “class”  must  refer  to  a
well-defined  group  of  individuals  who  share  a  common
“characteristic” apart from nationality.  Brief for Respond-
ents  42.  But  the  text  of  §1182(f ),  of  course,  does  not  say
that,  and  the  word  “class”  comfortably  encompasses  a
group of people linked by nationality.  Plaintiffs also con-
tend  that  the  class  cannot  be  “overbroad.”    Brief  for  Re-
spondents  42.    But  that  simply  amounts  to  an  unspoken
tailoring  requirement  found  nowhere  in  Congress’s  grant
of  authority  to  suspend  entry  of  not  only  “any  class  of
aliens” but “all aliens.”

In short, the language of §1182(f) is clear, and the Proc-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the constitutionality of a travel restriction proclamation. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis of relevant statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

Opinion of the Court

III
The Fourth Circuit was wrong to hold that purely legal
issues resolved at summary judgment must be renewed in
a post-trial motion.  We need not decide whether the issue
Dupree raised on appeal is purely legal—the Court of Ap-
peals may evaluate that and any other properly preserved
arguments  in  the  first  instance.    We  therefore  vacate  the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it is not a suitable candidate for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

religious practice.  The majority’s decision imposing same-
sex marriage cannot, of course, create any such accommo-
dations.  The  majority  graciously  suggests  that  religious
believers  may  continue  to  “advocate”  and  “teach”  their
views  of  marriage.  Ante,  at  27.    The  First  Amendment
guarantees,  however,  the  freedom  to  “exercise”  religion.
Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses.

Hard  questions  arise  when  people  of  faith  exercise
religion in ways that may be seen to conflict with the new
right  to  same-sex  marriage—when,  for  example,  a  reli-
gious  college  provides  married  student  housing  only  to
opposite-sex  married  couples,  or  a  religious  adoption
agency  declines  to  place  children  with  same-sex  married
couples.  Indeed,  the  Solicitor  General  candidly  acknowl-
edged  that  the  tax  exemptions  of  some  religious  institu-
tions would be in question if they opposed same-sex mar-
riage.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 36–38.  There
is little doubt that these and similar questions will soon be
before this Court.  Unfortunately, people of faith can take
no comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority
today.

Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of today’s decision
is the extent to which the majority feels compelled to sully
those on the other side of the debate.  The majority offers a
cursory  assurance  that  it  does  not  intend  to  disparage
people who, as a matter of conscience, cannot accept same-
sex  marriage.    Ante,  at  19.    That  disclaimer  is  hard  to
square with the very next sentence, in which the majority
explains  that  “the  necessary  consequence”  of  laws  codify-
ing  the  traditional  definition  of  marriage  is  to  “demea[n]
or stigmatiz[e]” same-sex couples.  Ante, at 19.  The major-
ity reiterates such characterizations over and over.  By the
majority’s account, Americans who did nothing more than
follow the understanding of marriage that has existed for
our  entire  history—in  particular,  the  tens  of  millions  of
people who voted to reaffirm their States’ enduring defini-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically Obergefell v. Hodges. It discusses the implications of the majority decision on religious freedom and provides arguments against the legalization of same-sex marriage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GOLAN v. HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

expiration  of  a  full  copyright  term—either  in  the  United
States or the country of origin—receive no further protec-
tion  under  §514.  Ibid.12    Copyrights  “restored”13  under
URAA  §514  “subsist  for  the  remainder  of  the  term  of
copyright that the work would have otherwise been grant-
ed  . . .  if  the  work  never  entered  the  public  domain.”
§104A(a)(1)(B).  Prospectively,  restoration  places  foreign
works  on  an  equal  footing  with  their  U. S.  counterparts;
assuming  a  foreign  and  domestic  author  died  the  same
day,  their  works  will  enter  the  public  domain  simultane-
ously.  See  §302(a)  (copyrights  generally  expire  70  years
after  the  author’s  death).  Restored  works,  however,  re-
ceive  no  compensatory  time  for  the  period  of  exclusivity
they  would  have  enjoyed  before  §514’s  enactment,  had
they  been  protected  at  the  outset  in  the  United States.
Their total term, therefore, falls short of that available to
similarly situated U. S. works.

The  URAA’s  disturbance  of  the  public  domain  hardly
escaped  Congress’  attention.  Section  514  imposed  no
liability  for  any  use  of  foreign  works  occurring  before
restoration.  In addition, anyone remained free to copy and
use  restored  works  for  one  year  following  §514’s  enact-
ment.  See  17  U. S. C.  §104A(h)(2)(A).    Concerns  about
§514’s  compatibility  with  the  Fifth  Amendment’s  Takings

——————

12 Title 17 U. S. C. §104A(h)(6)(B) defines a “restored work” to exclude
“an  original  work  of  authorship”  that  is  “in  the  public  domain  in  its
source  country  through  expiration  of  [its]  term  of  protection.”    This
provision  tracks  Berne’s  denial  of  protection  for  any  work  that  has
“fallen  into  the  public  domain  in  the  country  of  origin  through  the
expiry of the term of protection.”  Art. 18(1), 828 U. N. T. S., at 251.

13 Restoration  is  a  misnomer  insofar  as  it  implies  that  all  works
protected  under  §104A  previously  enjoyed  protection.    Each  work  in
the  public  domain  because  of  lack  of  national  eligibility  or  subject-
matter  protection,  and  many  that  failed  to  comply  with  formalities,
never  enjoyed  U. S.  copyright  protection.    See,  e.g.,  3  Nimmer
§9A.04[A][1][b][iii], at 9A–26, and n. 29.4.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Copyright Restoration Act (URAA) and its implications for foreign works. It contains legal terminology and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–1121
_________________

DIANNE KNOX, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. SERVICE EM-
PLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 1000

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2012]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
In  this  case,  we  decide  whether  the  First  Amendment
allows a public-sector union to require objecting nonmem-
bers  to  pay  a  special  fee  for  the  purpose  of  financing  the
union’s political and ideological activities.

I

A

Under  California  law,  public-sector  employees  in  a
bargaining  unit  may  decide  by  majority  vote  to  create  an
“agency shop” arrangement under which all the employees
are represented by a union selected by the majority.  Cal.
Govt. Code Ann. §3502.5(a) (West 2010).  While employees
in  the  unit  are  not  required  to  join  the  union,  they  must
nevertheless pay the union an annual fee to cover the cost
of union services related to collective bargaining (so-called
chargeable expenses).  See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn.,
500  U. S.  507,  524  (1991);  Machinists  v.  Street,  367  U. S.
740, 760 (1961).

Our prior cases have recognized that such arrangements
represent  an  “impingement”  on  the  First  Amendment
rights of nonmembers.  Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U. S. 292,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

19

THOMAS, J., dissenting

single rhetorical question: Who could possibly think that a
person is harmed when he requests and is sent an incom-
plete credit report, or is sent a suspicious notice informing
him that he may be a designated drug trafficker or terrorist,
or is not sent anything informing him of how to remove this
inaccurate red flag?  The answer is, of course, legion: Con-
gress, the President, the jury, the District Court, the Ninth
Circuit, and four Members of this Court.

I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, which are generally suitable for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of the Court

proceeding as an element of a criminal offense must be per-
mitted where the deportation proceeding effectively elimi-
nates the right of the [noncitizen] to obtain judicial review.”
Id., at 839.

Congress responded by enacting §1326(d).  See Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
§441, 110 Stat. 1279.  Entitled “Limitation on collateral at-
tack on underlying deportation order,” §1326(d) establishes
three  prerequisites  that  defendants  facing  unlawful-
reentry charges must satisfy before they can challenge their
original removal orders.  The statute provides:

“In a criminal proceeding under this section, an alien
may not challenge the validity of the deportation order
. . . unless the alien demonstrates that—

“(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies
that may have been available to seek relief against the
order;

“(2) the deportation proceedings at which the order
was issued improperly deprived the alien of the oppor-
tunity for judicial review; and

“(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.”

8 U. S. C. §1326(d).

B
Palomar-Santiago  is  a  Mexican  national  who  obtained
permanent resident status in 1990.  The following year, he
was convicted in California state court of a felony DUI.  In
1998, Palomar-Santiago received a Notice to Appear from
the Immigration and Naturalization Service stating that he
was subject to removal because his DUI offense was an ag-
gravated felony.  Following a hearing, an immigration judge
ordered Palomar-Santiago’s removal on that ground.  Palo-
mar-Santiago waived his right to appeal and was removed
to Mexico the next day.

Six years later, this Court held in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites case law (Leocal v. Ashcroft) and legal statutes (8 U.S.C. §1326(d)). The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–1466
_________________

MARK JANUS, PETITIONER v. AMERICAN FEDER
ATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL

EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 27, 2018]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under Illinois law, public employees are forced to subsi
dize  a  union,  even  if  they  choose  not  to  join  and  strongly
object  to  the  positions  the  union  takes  in  collective  bar
gaining  and  related  activities.  We  conclude  that  this
arrangement  violates  the  free  speech  rights  of  nonmem
bers  by  compelling  them  to  subsidize  private  speech  on
matters of substantial public concern.

We upheld a similar law in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed.,
431  U. S.  209  (1977),  and  we  recognize  the  importance  of
following precedent unless there are strong reasons for not
doing  so.  But  there  are  very  strong  reasons  in  this  case.
Fundamental  free  speech  rights  are  at  stake.  Abood  was
poorly  reasoned.
It  has  led  to  practical  problems  and
abuse.
It  is  inconsistent  with  other  First  Amendment
cases and has been undermined by more recent decisions.
Developments  since  Abood  was  handed  down  have  shed
new  light  on  the  issue  of  agency  fees,  and  no  reliance
interests on the part of public-sector unions are sufficient
to  justify  the  perpetuation  of  the  free  speech  violations
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes the case citation, the title of the case, the date, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

Syllabus

ban  on  such  speech  would  satisfy  the  proper  level  of  scrutiny.    But
the  Government  nowhere  extends  these  arguments  to  other  depic-
tions, such as hunting magazines and videos, that are presumptively
protected  by  the  First  Amendment  but  that  remain  subject  to  §48.
Nor does the Government seriously contest that these presumptively
impermissible  applications  of  §48  far  outnumber  any  permissible
ones.  The Court therefore does not decide whether a statute limited
to  crush  videos  or  other  depictions  of  extreme  animal  cruelty  would
be constitutional.  Section 48 is not so limited but is instead substan-
tially  overbroad,  and  therefore  invalid  under  the  First  Amendment.
Pp. 19–20.

533 F. 3d 218, affirmed.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,
SCALIA,  KENNEDY,  THOMAS,  GINSBURG,  BREYER,  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,
joined.  ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section of a Supreme Court case.  It summarizes the Court's decision and reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16  ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC.

v. GOLDSMITH
KAGAN, J., dissenting

at 36) that a follow-on creator should just pay a licensing
fee for its use of an original work.  But sometimes copyright
holders charge an out-of-range price for licenses.  And other
times they just say no.  In Campbell, for example, Orbison’s
successor-in-interest turned down 2 Live Crew’s request for
a  license,  hoping  to  block  the  rap  take-off  of  the  original
song.  See 510 U. S., at 572–573.  And in Google, the parties
could not agree on licensing terms, as Sun insisted on con-
ditions that Google thought would have subverted its busi-
ness model.  See 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3).  So without
fair use, 2 Live Crew’s and Google’s works—however new
and important—might never have been made or, if made,
never have reached the public.  The prospect of that loss to
“creative progress” is what lay behind the Court’s inquiry
into transformativeness—into the expressive novelty of the
follow-on  work  (regardless  whether  the  original  creator
granted permission).  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 25); see Camp-
bell, 510 U. S., at 579.

Now recall all the ways Warhol, in making a Prince por-
trait  from  the  Goldsmith  photo,  “add[ed]  something  new,
with a further purpose or different character”—all the ways
he  “alter[ed]  the  [original  work’s]  expression,  meaning,
[and] message.”  Ibid.  The differences in form and appear-
ance,  relating  to  “composition,  presentation, color  palette,
and media.”  1 App. 227; see supra, at 7–10.  The differences
in  meaning  that  arose  from  replacing  a  realistic—and  in-
deed  humanistic—depiction  of  the  performer  with  an  un-
natural, disembodied, masklike one.  See ibid.  The convey-
ance  of  new  messages  about  celebrity  culture  and  its
personal and societal impacts.  See ibid.  The presence of,
in a word, “transformation”—the kind of creative building
that copyright exists to encourage.  Warhol’s use, to be sure,
had a commercial aspect.  Like most artists, Warhol did not
want to hide his works in a garret; he wanted to sell them.
But as Campbell and Google both demonstrate (and as fur-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses copyright law, fair use, and the case of Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529IND

Unit: $UBV [10-03-01 07:01:03] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

1212

INDEX

FOURTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, X.

FRAUD. See Criminal Law, 2.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. See Constitutional Law, V.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH. See Constitutional Law, VI.

GENDER-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE. See Constitutional Law, I; III.

GEORGIA. See Constitutional Law, IV, 1.

GRAZING. See Taylor Grazing Act.

HABEAS CORPUS.

1. Cause for procedural default.—A procedurally defaulted ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim can serve as cause for procedural default of
another habeas claim only if habeas petitioner can satisfy “cause and
prejudice” standard with respect to ineffective-assistance claim itself.
Edwards v. Carpenter, p. 446.

2. Development of claims in state court.—Under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(2),
as amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a
“fail[ure] to develop the factual basis of [a] claim in State court” is not
established unless there is a lack of diligence, or some greater fault, at-
tributable to federal habeas petitioner or his counsel. Williams v. Tay-
lor, p. 420.

3. Successive petition—Dismissal on procedural grounds.—A federal
habeas corpus petition ﬁled after an initial petition was dismissed on pro-
cedural grounds without reaching prisoner’s underlying constitutional
claim is not a “second or successive” petition subject to dismissal for abuse
of writ. Slack v. McDaniel, p. 473.

IMPRISONMENT. See Criminal Law, 5.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. See Constitutional

Law, IX; Habeas Corpus, 1.

INFRINGEMENT OF TRADE DRESS. See Trademark Act of 1946.

IN LIMINE MOTION. See Criminal Law, 3.

JURISDICTION.

Federal-question jurisdiction—Challenge to Medicare enforcement reg-
ulations.—Title 42 U. S. C. § 405(h), incorporated into Medicare Act by 42
U. S. C. § 1331ii, sets out a special administrative and judicial review sys-
tem for Medicare claim denials that bars respondent nursing home associa-
tion from invoking federal-question jurisdiction to challenge Medicare en-
forcement regulations’ validity. Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term
Care, Inc., p. 1.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document. Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and provide a guide to the document's contents rather than the actual content itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

25

Opinion of the Court

115 (CLS maintained a Yahoo! message group to dissemi
nate  information  to  students.);  Christian  Legal  Society  v.
Walker, 453 F. 3d 853, 874 (CA7 2006) (Wood, J., dissent
ing)  (“Most  universities  and  colleges,  and  most  college
aged students, communicate through email, websites, and
hosts like MySpace . . . .  If CLS had its own website, any
student at the school with access to Google—that is, all of
them—could  easily  have  found  it.”).    See  also  Brief  for
Associated Students of the University of California, Hast
ings  College  of  Law  as  Amicus  Curiae  14–18  (describing
host  of  ways  CLS  could  communicate  with  Hastings’  stu
dents outside official channels).

Private groups, from fraternities and sororities to social
clubs  and  secret  societies,  commonly  maintain  a  presence
at  universities  without  official  school  affiliation.21    Based
on  the  record  before  us,  CLS  was  similarly  situated:  It
hosted  a  variety  of  activities  the  year  after  Hastings  de
nied it recognition, and the number of students attending
those  meetings  and  events  doubled.  App.  224,  229–230.
“The  variety  and  type  of  alternative  modes  of  access  pre
sent  here,”  in  short,  “compare  favorably  with  those  in
other  [limited  public]  forum  cases  where  we  have  upheld
restrictions on access.”  Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U. S., at 53–
54.  It  is  beyond  dissenter’s  license,  we  note  again,  see
supra,  at  21,  n. 17,  constantly  to  maintain  that  nonrecog
nition  of  a  student  organization  is  equivalent  to  prohibit
ing its members from speaking.

——————

21 See, e.g., Baker, Despite Lack of University Recognition, Pi Kappa
Theta Continues to Grow, The New Hampshire, Sept. 28, 2009, pp. 1, 5
(unrecognized  fraternity  able  to  grow  despite  severed  ties  with  the
University of New Hampshire); Battey, Final Clubs Provide Controver
sial  Social  Outlet,  Yale  Daily  News,  Apr.  5,  2006,  pp. 1,  4  (Harvard
social clubs, known as “final clubs,” “play a large role in the experience
of  . . .  students”  even  though  “they  became  completely  disassociated
from the university in 1984”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing previous cases and arguments. It's part of a larger legal document and contains legal jargon.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC

Opinion of the Court

ploy an alternative design that the FDA has approved for
distribution  (an  approval  it  takes  years  to  obtain56)?  Or
does it suffice that a vaccine design has been approved in
other  countries?    Or  could  there  be  liability  for  failure  to
use a design that exists only in a lab?  Neither the Act nor
the  FDA  regulations  provide  an  answer,  leaving  the  uni-
verse  of  alternative  designs  to  be  limited  only  by  an  ex-
pert’s imagination.

Jurors,  of  course,  often  decide  similar  questions  with
little  guidance,  and  we  do  not  suggest  that  the  absence
of  guidance  alone  suggests  preemption.  But  the  lack  of
guidance  for  design  defects  combined  with  the  exten-
sive  guidance  for  the  two  grounds  of  liability  specifically
mentioned in the Act strongly suggests that design defects
were  not  mentioned  because  they  are  not  a  basis  for
liability.

The  mandates  contained  in  the  Act  lead  to  the  same
conclusion.  Design-defect  torts,  broadly  speaking,  have
two  beneficial  effects:  (1)  prompting  the  development  of
improved  designs,  and  (2)  providing  compensation  for
inflicted  injuries.  The  NCVIA  provides  other  means  for
achieving  both  effects.   We  have  already  discussed  the
Act’s  generous  compensation  scheme.  And  the  Act  pro-
vides many means of improving vaccine design.  It directs
the  Secretary  of  Health  and  Human  Services  to  promote
“the  development  of  childhood  vaccines  that  result  in
fewer and less serious adverse reactions.”57  It establishes
a National Vaccine Program, whose Director is “to achieve
optimal prevention of human infectious diseases . . . and to
achieve  optimal  prevention  against  adverse  reactions.”58
The  Program  is  to  set  priorities  for  federal  vaccine  re-
search,  and  to  coordinate  federal  vaccine  safety  and  effi-

——————

56 See Sing & William, Supplying Vaccines, at 66–67.
57 42 U. S. C. §300aa–27(a)(1).
58 §300aa–1.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding design defects in vaccines and their potential liability.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U98

[09-06-00 19:40:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 721 (1998)

733

Opinion of the Court

a capital sentencing proceeding.” Caspari, 510 U. S., at 392;
see also Goldhammer, 474 U. S., at 30 (“[T]he decisions of
this Court ‘clearly establish that a sentenc[ing in a noncapi-
tal case] does not have the qualities of constitutional ﬁnality
that attend an acquittal’ ”) (quoting DiFrancesco, 449 U. S.,
at 134).
In addition, we have cited Bullington as an exam-
ple of the heightened procedural protections accorded capital
defendants. See Strickland, supra, at 686–687 (“A capital
sentencing proceeding . . . is sufﬁciently like a trial in its
adversarial format and in the existence of standards for deci-
sion, see [Bullington], that counsel’s role in the proceeding
is comparable to counsel’s role at trial”).

In an attempt to minimize the relevance of the death pen-
alty context, petitioner argues that the application of double
jeopardy principles turns on the nature rather than the con-
sequences of the proceeding. For example, petitioner notes
that Bullington did not overrule the Court’s decision in
Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919)—which found
the double jeopardy bar inapplicable to a particular capital
sentencing proceeding—but rather distinguished it on the
ground that the proceeding at issue did not bear the hall-
marks of a trial on guilt or innocence. Stroud predates our
decisions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972) (per
curiam), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976) ( joint
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); it was decided
at a time when “no signiﬁcant constitutional difference be-
tween the death penalty and lesser punishments for crime
had been expressly recognized by this Court.” See Gard-
ner, supra, at 357 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Consequently,
the capital sentencing procedures at issue in Stroud did not
resemble a trial, and the Court confronted a different ques-
tion in that case. The holding of Bullington turns on both
the trial-like proceedings at issue and the severity of the
penalty at stake. That the Court focused on the absence of
procedural safeguards in distinguishing an earlier capital
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a case. It contains legal citations, discusses precedents, and analyzes legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

one  of  the  asserted  justifications  for  Colorado’s  law.    Ac
cording  to  the  individual  respondents,  Colorado  can  com
pel Phillips’ speech to prevent him from “ ‘denigrat[ing] the
dignity’ ” of same-sex couples, “ ‘assert[ing] [their] inferior-
ity,’ ” and subjecting them to “ ‘humiliation, frustration, and
embarrassment.’ ”    Brief  for  Respondents  Craig  et al.  39
(quoting  J.  E.  B.  v.  Alabama  ex  rel.  T.  B.,  511  U. S.  127,
142  (1994);  Heart  of  Atlanta  Motel,  Inc.  v.  United  States,
379  U. S.  241,  292  (1964)  (Goldberg,  J.,  concurring)).
These  justifications  are  completely  foreign  to  our  free-
speech jurisprudence.

States  cannot  punish  protected  speech  because  some
group  finds  it  offensive,  hurtful,  stigmatic,  unreasonable,
or undignified.  “If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the  First  Amendment,  it  is  that  the  government  may  not
prohibit  the  expression  of  an  idea  simply  because  society
finds  the  idea  itself  offensive  or  disagreeable.”    Johnson,
supra,  at  414.    A  contrary  rule  would  allow  the  govern
ment to stamp out virtually any speech at will.  See Morse
v.  Frederick,  551  U. S.  393,  409  (2007)  (“After  all,  much
political and religious speech might be perceived as offen
sive to some”).  As the Court reiterates today, “it is not . . .
the role of the State or its officials to prescribe what shall
be  offensive.”  Ante,  at  16.    “ ‘Indeed,  if  it  is  the  speaker’s
opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for
according it constitutional protection.’ ”  Hustler Magazine,
Inc.  v.  Falwell,  485  U. S.  46,  55  (1988);  accord,  Johnson,
supra,  at  408–409.
If  the  only  reason  a  public-
accommodations  law  regulates  speech  is  “to  produce  a
society  free  of  . . .  biases”  against  the  protected  groups,
that purpose is “decidedly fatal” to the law’s constitution
ality,  “for  it  amounts  to  nothing  less  than  a  proposal  to
limit  speech  in  the  service  of  orthodox  expression.”    Hur-
ley,  515  U. S.,  at  578–579;  see  also  United  States  v.  Play-
boy  Entertainment  Group,  Inc.,  529  U. S.  803,  813  (2000)
(“Where  the  designed  benefit  of  a  content-based  speech
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on free speech arguments. It delves into the constitutionality of Colorado's law and cites relevant Supreme Court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

455

Opinion of Stevens, J.

or harm a particular candidate, these nominally independent
expenditures began to corrupt the political process in a very
direct  sense.  The  sponsors  of  these  ads  were  routinely
granted  special  access  after  the  campaign  was  over;  “candi
dates and ofﬁcials knew who their friends were,” McConnell,
540  U. S.,  at  129.  Many  corporate  independent  expendi
tures,  it  seemed,  had  become  essentially  interchangeable
with  direct  contributions  in  their  capacity  to  generate  quid
pro quo arrangements.  In an age in which money and tele
vision  ads  are  the  coin  of  the  campaign  realm,  it  is  hardly
surprising  that  corporations  deployed  these  ads  to  curry
favor with, and to gain inﬂuence over, public ofﬁcials.

The  majority  appears  to  think  it  decisive  that  the  BCRA
record  does  not  contain  “direct  examples  of  votes  being  ex
changed for . . .  expenditures.”  Ante, at 360 (internal quota
tion  marks  omitted).  It  would  have  been  quite  remarkable
if Congress  had created a  record detailing such  behavior by
its  own  Members.  Proving  that  a  speciﬁc  vote  was  ex
changed  for  a  speciﬁc  expenditure  has  always  been  next  to
impossible: Elected ofﬁcials have diverse motivations, and no
one will acknowledge that he sold a vote.  Yet, even if “[i]n
gratiation  and  access  .  .  .  are  not  corruption”  themselves,
ibid.,  they  are  necessary  prerequisites to  it;  they  can  create
both  the  opportunity  for,  and  the  appearance  of,  quid  pro
quo arrangements.  The inﬂux of unlimited corporate money
into  the  electoral  realm  also  creates  new  opportunities  for
the mirror image of quid pro quo deals: threats, both explicit
and  implicit.  Starting  today,  corporations  with  large  war
chests  to  deploy  on  electioneering  may  ﬁnd  democratically
elected  bodies  becoming  much  more  attuned  to  their  inter
ests.  The  majority  both  misreads  the  facts  and  draws  the
wrong  conclusions  when  it  suggests  that  the  BCRA  record
provides “only scant evidence that independent expenditures
. . . ingratiate,” and that, “in any event,” none of it matters.
Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It argues against the majority opinion's stance on campaign finance regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

3

Syllabus

SCALIA,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a
concurring  opinion.    BREYER,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which
GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and a list of justices involved in the case. This is not the main body of the text and is likely part of the case's metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Participation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

BRCA2  genes.  The  location  and  order  of  the  nucleotides
existed in nature before Myriad found them.  Nor did Myr-
iad  create  or  alter  the  genetic  structure  of  DNA.    In-
stead, Myriad’s principal contribution was uncovering the
precise  location  and  genetic  sequence  of  the  BRCA1
and  BRCA2  genes  within  chromosomes  17  and  13.  The
question is whether this renders the genes patentable.

Myriad  recognizes  that  our  decision  in  Chakrabarty  is
central  to  this  inquiry.  Brief  for  Respondents  14,  23–27.
In Chakrabarty, scientists added four plasmids to a bacte-
rium, which enabled it to break down various components
of  crude  oil.  447  U. S.,  at  305,  and  n. 1.    The  Court  held
that the modified bacterium was patentable.  It explained
that  the  patent  claim  was  “not  to  a  hitherto  unknown
natural  phenomenon,  but  to  a  nonnaturally  occurring
manufacture  or  composition  of  matter—a  product  of  hu-
man ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and]
use.’ ”  Id.,  at  309–310  (quoting  Hartranft  v.  Wiegmann,
121  U.  S.  609,  615  (1887);  alteration  in  original).    The
Chakrabarty bacterium was new “with markedly different
characteristics  from  any  found  in  nature,”  447  U. S.,  at
310,  due  to  the  additional  plasmids  and  resultant  “capac-
ity  for  degrading  oil.”  Id.,  at  305,  n. 1.    In  this  case,  by
contrast,  Myriad  did  not  create  anything.    To  be  sure,  it
found  an  important  and  useful  gene,  but  separating  that
gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of
invention.
  Groundbreaking,  innovative,  or  even  brilliant  discovery
does not by itself satisfy the §101 inquiry.  In Funk Broth-
ers  Seed  Co.  v.  Kalo  Inoculant  Co.,  333  U. S.  127  (1948),
this Court considered a composition patent that claimed a
mixture  of  naturally  occurring  strains  of  bacteria  that
helped  leguminous  plants  take  nitrogen  from  the  air  and
fix it in the soil.  Id., at 128–129.  The ability of the bacte-
ria to fix nitrogen was well known, and farmers commonly
“inoculated” their crops with them to improve soil nitrogen
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion discussing the patentability of genes. It delves into the legal precedent set by Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., highlighting the distinction between discovering naturally occurring phenomena and creating something new.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ

Opinion of the Court

TransUnion  to  potential  creditors  during  the  period  from
January 1, 2011, to July 26, 2011.  The District Court ruled
that all 8,185 class members had Article III standing.  2016
WL 6070490, *5 (Oct. 17, 2016).

At  trial,  Ramirez  testified  about  his  experience  at  the
Nissan dealership.  But Ramirez did not present evidence
about the experiences of other members of the class.

After six days of trial, the jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiffs.  The jury awarded each class member $984.22 in
statutory damages and $6,353.08 in punitive damages for a
total award of more than $60 million.  The District Court
rejected all of TransUnion’s post-trial motions.

The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
in relevant part.  951 F. 3d 1008 (2020).  The court held that
all members of the class had Article III standing to recover
damages for all three claims.  The court also concluded that
Ramirez’s claims were typical of the class’s claims for pur-
poses  of  Rule  23  of  the  Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure.
Finally, the court reduced the punitive damages award to
$3,936.88 per class member, thus reducing the total award
to about $40 million.

Judge  McKeown  dissented  in  relevant  part.   As  to  the
reasonable-procedures  claim,  she  concluded  that  only  the
1,853 class members whose reports were actually dissemi-
nated by TransUnion to third parties had Article III stand-
ing to recover damages.  In her view, the remaining 6,332
class members did not suffer a concrete injury sufficient for
standing.  As  to  the  two  claims  related  to  the  mailings,
Judge  McKeown  would  have  held  that  none  of  the  8,185
class members other than the named plaintiff Ramirez had
standing as to those claims.

We granted certiorari.  592 U. S. ___ (2020).

II
The question in this case is whether the 8,185 class mem-
bers have Article III standing as to their three claims.  In Part
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the case TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. It sets the context for the case, outlining the claims, the lower court rulings, and the Supreme Court's involvement.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

7

Opinion of the Court

may impose lesser remedies, such as civil penalties, transfer
of residents, denial of some or all payment, state monitoring,
and the like. Where a nursing home, though deﬁcient in
some respects, is in “[s]ubstantial compliance,” i. e., where its
deﬁciencies do no more than create a “potential for [causing]
minimal harm,” the Secretary will impose no sanction or
remedy at all. See generally 42 U. S. C. § 1395i–3(h); 42
CFR § 488.301 (1998); § 488.400 et seq.; App. 54, 66 (Manual).
The statute and regulations also create various review pro-
cedures.
42 U. S. C. §§ 1395cc(b)(2)(A), (h); 42 CFR § 431.151
et seq. (1998); § 488.408(g); 42 CFR pt. 498 (1998).

The association’s complaint ﬁled in Federal District Court
In
attacked the regulations as unlawful in four basic ways.
its view: (1) certain terms, e. g., “substantial compliance”
and “minimal harm,” are unconstitutionally vague; (2) the
regulations and manual, particularly as implemented, vio-
late statutory requirements seeking enforcement consist-
ency, 42 U. S. C. § 1395i–3(g)(2)(D), and exceed the legislative
mandate of the Medicare Act; (3) the regulations create ad-
ministrative procedures inconsistent with the Federal Con-
stitution’s Due Process Clause; and (4) the manual and other
agency publications create legislative rules that were not
promulgated consistent with the Administrative Procedure
Act’s demands for “notice and comment” and a statement of
“basis and purpose,” 5 U. S. C. § 553. See App. 18–19, 27–38,
43–49 (Amended Complaint).

B

We next describe the two competing jurisdictional routes
through which the association arguably might seek to mount
its legal attack. The route it has followed, federal-question
jurisdiction, is set forth in 28 U. S. C. § 1331, which simply
states that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treat-
ies of the United States.” The route that it did not follow,
the special Medicare review route, is set forth in a complex
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the legal framework surrounding nursing home deficiencies and the association's complaint against the regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007)

1

SCALIA, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 05–1120
_________________

MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[April 2, 2007]

 JUSTICE  SCALIA,  with  whom  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE,

JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.

I  join  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE’s  opinion  in  full,  and  would
hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to decide this case
because  petitioners  lack  standing.    The  Court  having
decided  otherwise,  it  is  appropriate  for  me  to  note  my
dissent on the merits.

I

A

The  provision  of  law  at  the  heart  of  this  case  is
§202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), which provides that
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)  “shall  by  regulation  prescribe  . . .  standards  appli-
cable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or
classes  of  new  motor  vehicles  or  new  motor  vehicle  en-
gines,  which  in  his  judgment  cause,  or  contribute  to,  air
pollution  which  may  reasonably  be  anticipated  to  endan-
ger  public  health  or  welfare.”    42  U. S. C.  §7521(a)(1)
(emphasis  added).    As  the  Court  recognizes,  the  statute
“condition[s] the exercise of EPA’s authority on its forma-
tion of a ‘judgment.’ ”  Ante, at 30.  There is no dispute that
the  Administrator  has  made  no  such  judgment  in  this
case.  See ante, at 32 (“We need not and do not reach the
question  whether  on  remand  EPA  must  make  an  endan-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion.  It includes citations, case names, and the names of justices. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

971

524 U. S.

August 12, 1998

No. 97–5745. Sanchez v. United States, ante, p. 955;
No. 97–6791. Nghiem v. Toshiba America Electronic Com-

ponents, Inc., 522 U. S. 1080;

No. 97–7946. Viray v. Beneficial California, Inc., et al.,

523 U. S. 1123;

No. 97–7988. Haynes v. Kepka et al., 523 U. S. 1083;
No. 97– 8029. Mason-Neubarth v. Dameron Hospital

Assn., 523 U. S. 1083;

No. 97–8120. Dougan v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida

Department of Corrections, et al., ante, p. 956;
No. 97–8236. Dumas v. Illinois, 523 U. S. 1125;
No. 97–8246. Rothman v. University of Massachusetts

Medical Center, 523 U. S. 1125;

No. 97–8288. Billemeyer v. Missouri et al., 523 U. S. 1126;
No. 97–8310.
No. 97–8355.

Johnson v. Crist, Warden, 523 U. S. 1086;
Jackson v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida

Department of Corrections, 523 U. S. 1140;

No. 97–8519. Dixon v. Stewart, Director, Arizona De-

partment of Correction, et al., 523 U. S. 1128;

No. 97–8530. Laessig v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al., 523 U. S.
1129;

No. 97–8533. Nowik v. North Dakota et al., ante, p. 907;
No. 97–8570. Cookish v. New Hampshire, ante, p. 917;
No. 97–8572. Father v. Boeing Co. et al., ante, p. 918;
In re Bradin, ante, p. 914;
No. 97–8578.
No. 97–8587. Sancho v. United States, 523 U. S. 1112;
No. 97–8605. Adames v. Batista et al., ante, p. 918;
In re Sidles, ante, p. 914;
No. 97–8617.
No. 97–8690. King v. Adamson et al., ante, p. 930;
No. 97–8695. Sikora v. Higley, Associate Warden, ante,

p. 941;

No. 97–8704. Harms v. United States, 523 U. S. 1131;
In re Crooms, ante, p. 925;
No. 97–8710.
No. 97–8733. Seaton v. Michigan (two judgments), ante,

p. 941;

Jackson v. West Virginia et al., ante, p. 942;
No. 97–8806.
No. 97–8818. Blair v. Thompson, Superintendent, Oregon

State Penitentiary, ante, p. 919;

No. 97–8838. Carter v. United States, 523 U. S. 1144;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their corresponding citations. It is likely part of a legal document or database and not the main body of text meant for reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

BREYER, J., dissenting

compelling a clearly identified domestic affiliate to espouse
a government message distorts respondents’ own protected
speech, AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 219, so too does compelling a
clearly identified foreign affiliate to espouse the same gov-
ernment message.  Either way, federal funding conditioned
on that affirmative avowal of belief comes at an unconstitu-
tionally high “price of evident hypocrisy.”  Ibid.

Properly  understood,  our  speech-misattribution  cases—
in particular Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bi-
sexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557 (1995)—confirm
that common-sense conclusion.  Any other result would un-
dermine  First  Amendment  protections  for  the  countless
American speakers who address audiences overseas.

A

Respondents  should  prevail  here  for  the  same  reasons
they prevailed in AOSI I.  When respondents speak through
legally  separate  but  clearly  identified  affiliates,  we  held,
that speech is attributed to respondents for First Amend-
ment  purposes.  AOSI I,  570  U. S.,  at  219.    So  when  the
Government demands as a condition of federal funding that
their clearly identified affiliate “espouse a specific belief as
its own,” respondents may express a contrary view through
some  other  corporate  channel  only  on  pain  of  appearing
hypocritical.  Ibid.  Leveraging Congress’ Article I spending
power to distort respondents’ protected speech in this way
therefore  violates  respondents’  First  Amendment  rights—
whatever else might be said about the affiliate’s own First
Amendment rights (or asserted lack thereof ).  Ibid.

These principles apply with full force to the dispute now
before us.  Respondents and their affiliates receive federal
funding  to  fight  HIV/AIDS  overseas.  What  has  been  at
stake  in  this  case  from  the  beginning,  then,  is  protected
speech  often  aimed  at  audiences  abroad.    Our  decision  in
AOSI I  shielded  respondents’  global  message  from  govern-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 591 U.S. ____ (2020).  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain valuable textual information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

485

Breyer, J., dissenting

such law or . . . the best available information . . . .”
2 U. S. C. § 691(b) (1994 ed., Supp. II).

The second is purposive. The clear purpose behind the
Act, conﬁrmed by its legislative history,
is to promote
“greater ﬁscal accountability” and to “eliminate wasteful
federal spending and . . . special tax breaks.” H. R. Conf.
Rep. No. 104–491, p. 15 (1996).

The third is substantive. The President must determine
that, to “prevent” the item or amount “from having legal
force or effect” will “reduce the Federal budget deﬁcit; . . .
not impair any essential Government functions; and . . . not
harm the national interest.”
2 U. S. C. § 691(a)(A) (1994 ed.,
Supp. II).

The resulting standards are broad. But this Court has
upheld standards that are equally broad, or broader. See,
e. g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S.
190, 225–226 (1943) (upholding delegation to Federal Commu-
nications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing as
“public interest, convenience, or necessity” require) (internal
quotation marks omitted); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U. S. 591, 600–603 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal
Power Commission to determine “just and reasonable”
rates); United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307
U. S. 533, 577 (1939) (if milk prices were “unreasonable,” Sec-
retary of Agriculture could “ﬁ[x]” prices to a level that was
“in the public interest”). See also Lichter v. United States,
334 U. S. 742, 785–786 (1948) (delegation of authority to de-
termine “excessive” proﬁts); American Power & Light Co. v.
SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 104–105 (1946) (delegation of authority to
Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent “unfairly or
inequitably” distributing voting power among security hold-
ers); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 427 (1944) (up-
holding delegation to Price Administrator to ﬁx commodity
prices that would be “fair” and “equitable”).

Indeed, the Court has only twice in its history found that
a congressional delegation of power violated the “nondele-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It discusses the constitutionality of a congressional delegation of power and cites previous Supreme Court cases to support his argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ZF AUTOMOTIVE US, INC. v. LUXSHARE, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

Luxshare’s dispute with ZF is straightforward.  Private par-
ties agreed in a private contract that DIS, a private dispute-
resolution  organization,  would  arbitrate  any  disputes  be-
tween them.  See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 682 (“[A]n ar-
bitrator derives his or her powers from the parties’ agree-
ment to forgo the legal process and submit their disputes to
private dispute resolution”).  By default, DIS panels operate
under DIS rules, just like panels of any other private arbi-
tration  organization  operate  under  private  arbitral  rules.
The panels are formed by the parties—with each party se-
lecting one arbitrator and those two arbitrators choosing a
third.  No government is involved in creating the DIS panel
or prescribing its procedures.  This adjudicative body there-
fore does not qualify as a governmental body.

Luxshare  weakly  suggests  that  a  commercial  arbitral
panel like the DIS panel qualifies as governmental so long
as the law of the country in which it would sit (here, Ger-
many) governs some aspects of arbitration and courts play
a  role  in  enforcing  arbitration  agreements.    See  Brief  for
Respondent in No. 21–401, at 26–27; Boeing, 954 F. 3d, at
213–214.  But private entities do not become governmental
because  laws  govern  them  and  courts  enforce  their  con-
tracts—that  would  erase  any  distinction  between  private
and governmental adjudicative bodies.  Luxshare’s implau-
sibly broad definition of a governmental adjudicative body
is nothing but an attempted end run around §1782’s limit.

B
The ad hoc arbitration panel at issue in the Fund’s dis-
pute with Lithuania presents a harder question.  A sover-
eign is on one side of the dispute, and the option to arbitrate
is contained in an international treaty rather than a private
contract.  These factors, which the Fund emphasizes, offer
some support for the argument that the ad hoc panel is in-
tergovernmental.  Yet neither Lithuania’s presence nor the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the nature of arbitration and whether a particular panel qualifies as a governmental body.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS v. FTC

ALITO, J., dissenting

Building  Co.  v.  Trustees  of  Rex  Hospital,  425  U. S.  738,
743, n. 2 (1976) (“[D]ecisions by this Court have permitted
the  reach  of  the  Sherman  Act  to  expand  along  with  ex-
panding  notions  of  congressional  power”).  And  the  ex-
panded  reach  of  the  Sherman  Act  raised  an  important
question.  The  Sherman  Act  does  not  expressly  exempt
States from its scope.  Does that mean that the Act applies
to  the  States  and  that  it  potentially  outlaws  many  tradi-
tional  state  regulatory  measures?    The  Court  confronted
that question in Parker.
  In  Parker,  a  raisin  producer  challenged  the  California
Agricultural  Prorate  Act,  an  agricultural  price  support
program.  The California Act authorized the creation of an
Agricultural  Prorate  Advisory  Commission  (Commission)
to establish marketing plans for certain agricultural com-
modities within the State.  317 U. S., at 346–347.  Raisins
were  among  the  regulated  commodities,  and  so  the  Com-
mission  established  a  marketing  program  that  governed
many  aspects  of  raisin  sales,  including  the  quality  and
quantity of raisins sold, the timing of sales, and the price
at  which  raisins  were  sold.  Id.,  at  347–348.  The  Parker
Court assumed that this program would have violated “the
Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely
by  virtue  of  a  contract,  combination  or  conspiracy  of  pri-
vate  persons,”  and  the Court  also assumed  that  Congress
could have prohibited a State from creating a program like
California’s if it had chosen to do so.  Id., at 350.  Never-
theless,  the  Court  concluded  that  the  California  program
did  not  violate  the  Sherman  Act  because  the  Act  did  not
circumscribe state regulatory power.  Id., at 351.

The  Court’s  holding  in  Parker  was  not  based  on  either
the language of the Sherman Act or anything in the legis-
lative  history  affirmatively  showing  that  the  Act  was  not
meant to apply to the States.  Instead, the Court reasoned
that “[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution,  the  states  are  sovereign,  save  only  as  Con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It discusses the Sherman Act and its application to states, referencing the landmark case Parker v. Brown.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>