<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of the Court

ERISA  plans  because  it  applies  to  PBMs  whether  or  not
they manage an ERISA plan. Indeed, the Act does not di-
rectly regulate health benefit plans at all, ERISA or other-
wise.  It affects plans only insofar as PBMs may pass along
higher pharmacy rates to plans with which they contract.
  ERISA plans are likewise not essential to Act 900’s oper-
ation.  Act 900 defines a PBM as any “entity that adminis-
ters or manages a pharmacy benefits plan or program,” and
it defines a “pharmacy benefits plan or program,” in turn,
as any “plan or program that pays for, reimburses, covers
the cost of, or otherwise provides for pharmacist services to
individuals who reside in or are employed in [Arkansas].”
Ark. Code Ann. §§17–92–507(a)(7), (9).  Under those provi-
sions,  Act  900  regulates  PBMs  whether  or  not  the  plans
they service fall within ERISA’s coverage.1  Act 900 is there-
fore analogous to the law in Travelers, which did not refer
to ERISA plans because it imposed surcharges “regardless
of  whether  the  commercial  coverage  [was]  ultimately  se-
cured by an ERISA plan, private purchase, or otherwise.”
514  U. S.,  at  656;  see  also  Dillingham,  519  U. S.,  at  328
(concluding that the relevant California law did not refer to
ERISA plans because the apprenticeship programs it regu-
lated did not need to be ERISA programs).

III
  PCMA disagrees that Act 900 amounts to nothing more
than cost regulation.  It contends that Act 900 has an im-
permissible connection with an ERISA plan because its en-
forcement mechanisms both directly affect central matters
of  plan  administration  and  interfere  with  nationally  uni-
form  plan  administration.    The  mechanisms  that  PCMA
identifies,  however,  do  not  require  plan  administrators  to
structure their benefit plans in any particular manner, nor

——————

1 PBMs contract with a variety of healthcare plans and programs that
are not covered by ERISA, including Medicaid, Medicare, military, and
market place plans.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the relationship between a state law (Act 900) and ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act). It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Court denied based on the circumstances surrounding Ken-
nedy’s  prayers.    The  court  concluded  that  Kennedy  had
“chose[n]  a  time  and  event,”  the  October  16  homecoming
game,  that  was  “a  big  deal”  for  students,  and  then  “used
that opportunity to convey his religious views” in a manner
a  reasonable  observer  would  have  seen  as  a  “public  em-
ployee . . . leading an orchestrated session of faith.”  App. to
Pet.  for  Cert.  303.    The  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed,  again
emphasizing the specific context of Kennedy’s prayers.  The
court rejected Kennedy’s contention that he had been “pray-
ing on the fifty-yard line ‘silently and alone.’ ”  Kennedy v.
Bremerton School Dist., 869 F. 3d 813, 825 (CA9 2017).  The
court noted that he had in fact refused “an accommodation
permitting him to pray . . . after the stadium had emptied,”
“indicat[ing] that it is essential that his speech be delivered
in  the  presence  of  students  and  spectators.”  Ibid.  This
Court denied certiorari.

Following discovery, the District Court granted summary
judgment  to  the  District.  The  court  concluded  that  Ken-
nedy’s 50-yard-line prayers were not entitled to protection
under the Free Speech Clause because his speech was made
in his capacity as a public employee, not as a private citizen.
443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1237 (WD Wash. 2020).  In addition,
the court held that Kennedy’s prayer practice violated the
Establishment Clause, reasoning that “speech from the cen-
ter of the football field immediately after each game . . . con-
veys  official  sanction.”  Id.,  at  1238.    That  was  especially
true  where  Kennedy,  a  school  employee,  initiated  the
prayer; Kennedy was “joined by students or adults to create
a group of worshippers in a place the school controls access
to”;  and  Kennedy  had  a  long  “history  of  engaging  in  reli-
gious activity with players” that would have led a familiar
observer to believe that Kennedy was “continuing this tra-
dition” with prayer at the 50-yard line.  Id., at 1238–1239.
The District Court further found that players had reported
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. It delves into the court's reasoning and the lower court's decisions regarding the legality of a coach's on-field prayers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007)

9

Opinion of the Court

jurisdiction  over  an  “industry  constituting  a  significant
portion of the American economy,” ibid.

EPA reasoned that climate change had its own “political
history”:  Congress  designed  the  original  Clean  Air  Act  to
address  local  air  pollutants  rather  than  a  substance  that
“is  fairly  consistent  in  its  concentration  throughout  the
world’s  atmosphere,”  68  Fed.  Reg.  52927  (emphasis
added); declined in 1990 to enact proposed amendments to
force  EPA  to  set  carbon  dioxide  emission  standards  for
motor  vehicles,  ibid.  (citing  H. R.  5966,  101st  Cong.,  2d
Sess.  (1990));  and  addressed  global  climate  change  in
other  legislation,  68  Fed.  Reg.  52927.    Because  of  this
political  history,  and  because  imposing  emission  limita-
tions  on  greenhouse  gases  would  have  even  greater  eco-
nomic and political repercussions than regulating tobacco,
EPA was persuaded that it lacked the power to do so.  Id.,
at 52928.  In essence, EPA concluded that climate change
was  so  important  that  unless  Congress  spoke  with  exact-
ing  specificity,  it  could  not  have  meant  the  agency  to
address it.

Having  reached  that  conclusion,  EPA  believed  it  fol-
lowed  that  greenhouse  gases  cannot  be  “air  pollutants”
within the meaning of the Act.  See ibid. (“It follows from
this  conclusion,  that  [greenhouse  gases],  as  such,  are  not
air  pollutants  under  the  [Clean  Air  Act’s]  regulatory  pro-
visions  . . .”).    The  agency  bolstered  this  conclusion  by
explaining that if carbon dioxide were an air pollutant, the
only feasible method of reducing tailpipe emissions would
be  to  improve  fuel  economy.  But  because  Congress  has
already  created  detailed  mandatory  fuel  economy  stan-
dards  subject  to  Department  of  Transportation  (DOT)
administration, the agency concluded that EPA regulation
would either conflict with those standards or be superflu-
ous.  Id., at 52929.

Even  assuming  that  it  had  authority  over  greenhouse
gases, EPA explained in detail why it would refuse to exer-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing a case and quoting from a regulatory document (68 Fed. Reg. 52927). It delves into the EPA's reasoning for not regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

517

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

As of June 30, 1987, the 1950 and 1974 Beneﬁt Plans reported
surplus assets, totaling over $33 million. House Report 9.

B

Following enactment of the Coal Act, the Commissioner
assigned to Eastern the obligation for Combined Fund pre-
miums respecting over 1,000 retired miners who had worked
for the company before 1966, based on Eastern’s status
as the pre-1978 signatory operator for whom the miners
had worked for the longest period of time. See 26 U. S. C.
§ 9706(a). Eastern’s premium for a 12-month period ex-
ceeded $5 million. See Brief for Petitioner 16.

Eastern responded by suing the Commissioner, as well as
the Combined Fund and its trustees, in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Eastern
asserted that the Coal Act, either on its face or as applied,
violates substantive due process and constitutes a taking of
its property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Eastern
also challenged the Commissioner’s interpretation of the
Coal Act. The District Court granted summary judgment
for respondents on all claims, upholding both the Commis-
sioner’s interpretation of the Coal Act and the Act’s constitu-
tionality. Eastern Enterprises v. Shalala, 942 F. Supp. 684
(Mass. 1996).

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit afﬁrmed.
Eastern Enterprises v. Chater, 110 F. 3d 150 (1997). The
court rejected Eastern’s challenge to the Commissioner’s in-
terpretation of the Coal Act. Addressing Eastern’s substan-
tive due process claim, the court described the Coal Act as
“entitled to the most deferential level of judicial scrutiny,”
explaining that, “[w]here, as here, a piece of legislation is
purely economic and does not abridge fundamental rights, a
challenger must show that the legislature acted in an arbi-
trary and irrational way.”
Id., at 155–156 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
In the court’s view, the retroactive lia-
bility imposed by the Act was permissible “[a]s long as the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the beginning of an opinion by Justice O'Connor. It contains legal citations, references to statutes, and a description of the case's background. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

Opinion of the Court

State to which EPA could not apply its FIP.  See §7410(c)(1).
Ultimately, EPA recognized that it could not apply its FIP
to 12 of the 23 original States.7  Together, these 12 States
accounted  for  over  70  percent  of  the  emissions  EPA  had
planned  to  address  through  its  FIP.    See  Application  for
Ohio et al. in No. 23A349, p. 1 (States’ Application); see also
88 Fed. Reg. 36738–36739.8
  A  number  of  the remaining  States  and  industry  groups
challenged  the  remnants  of  the  FIP  in  the  D. C.  Circuit.
They pointed to the Act’s provisions authorizing a court to
“reverse any . . . action” taken in connection with a FIP that
is “arbitrary” or “capricious.”  §7607(d)(9)(A).  And they ar-
gued that EPA’s decision to apply the FIP to them even af-
ter so many other States had dropped out met that stand-
ard.  As part of their challenge, they asked that court to stay
any effort to enforce the FIP against them while their ap-
peal unfolded.  After that court denied relief, the applicants
renewed  their  request  here.    The  Court  has  received  and
reviewed over 400 pages of briefing and a voluminous rec-
ord,  held over an hour of oral argument on the applications,
and  engaged  in  months  of  postargument  deliberations  as
we often do for the cases we hear.

II
A
  Stay applications are nothing new.  They seek a form of
interim relief perhaps “as old as the judicial system of the
nation.”  Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4,
17  (1942).   Like  any  other federal  court faced with  a  stay
——————

7 See 88 Fed. Reg. 49295 (2023) (Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, and Texas); 88 Fed. Reg. 67102 (2023) (Alabama, Min-
nesota,  Nevada,  Oklahoma, Utah,  and  West  Virginia).   EPA  has  since
proposed settling the litigation over the Nevada SIP disapproval.  89 Fed.
Reg. 35091 (2024).

8 Of course, this could change again as litigation over the SIP denials
progresses past preliminary stay litigation and toward final decisions on
the merits.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, discusses specific regulations (FIP), and outlines arguments made in a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

ALITO, J., dissenting

privileges  at  Touro  Hospital,  where  Doe  5,  who  also  per-
forms abortions at Women’s Clinic, has privileges.

The  plurality  provides  an  explanation  that  is  found  no-
where in the record, i.e., that Doe 6 could not get privileges
at Touro because, unlike Doe 5, who performs both surgical
and medication abortions, Doe 6 performs only medication
abortions.  Ante, at 30.  Not only is this pure speculation,
but it is not evident why this difference might matter.  The
plurality  notes  that  Doe  6’s  medication  abortion  patients
have  never  been  admitted  to  a  hospital,  but  the  plurality
also argues that very few surgical abortion patients are ad-
mitted.  Ante, at 30, 37.  If Doe 6 had testified or been de-
posed, he could have been asked about his decision not to
apply at Touro, but that did not occur.

Aside from Touro, there are eight other hospitals in the
New Orleans area, but Doe 6 apparently made no attempt
to  get  privileges  at  six  of  these,  and  nothing  in  the  scant
record explains why.  He stated that he formally applied at
East  Jefferson  Hospital  and  made  an  informal  inquiry  at
Tulane Hospital, but much about these efforts is unknown.
No  representative  from  Tulane  or  East  Jefferson  testified
or was deposed, and no documents relating to either appli-
cation were offered.

With  respect  to  Doe  6’s  informal  inquiry  at  Tulane,  all
that the District Court had before it was a single paragraph
in Doe 6’s declaration in which he stated that he spoke to
an unnamed individual and was told he should not bother
to  apply  because  he  did  not  have  the  requisite  number  of
admissions per year.  App. 1310.  Nothing in the record re-
veals the type of privileges about which Doe 6 inquired.

Doe  6  furnished  even  less  information  about his  formal
application to East Jefferson hospital—a hospital which of-
fers courtesy privileges, and does not impose an admissions
requirement for those privileges.  Record 10679.  In his dec-
laration, which he signed in September 2014, Doe 6 wrote
that he had applied but had not received a response.  App.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses a case involving medical privileges and abortion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MOODY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA, ET AL. v.
NETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–277.  Argued February 26, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024*

In 2021, Florida and Texas enacted statutes regulating large social-me-
dia companies and other internet platforms.  The States’ laws differ in
the entities they cover and the activities they limit.  But both curtail
the platforms’ capacity to engage in content moderation—to filter, pri-
oritize,  and  label  the  varied  third-party  messages,  videos,  and  other
content their users wish to post.  Both laws also include individualized-
explanation provisions, requiring a platform to give reasons to a user
if it removes or alters her posts.

NetChoice LLC and the Computer & Communications Industry As-
sociation (collectively, NetChoice)—trade associations whose members
include  Facebook  and  YouTube—brought  facial  First  Amendment
challenges against the two laws.  District courts in both States entered
preliminary injunctions.

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the injunction of Florida’s law, as to all
provisions relevant here.  The court held that the State’s restrictions
on content moderation trigger First Amendment scrutiny under this
Court’s cases protecting “editorial discretion.”  34 F. 4th 1196, 1209,
1216.    The  court  then  concluded  that  the  content-moderation  provi-
sions are unlikely to survive heightened scrutiny.  Id., at 1227–1228.
Similarly,  the  Eleventh  Circuit  thought  the  statute’s  individualized-
explanation requirements likely to fall.  Relying on Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626, the

——————

*Together with No. 22–555, NetChoice, LLC, dba NetChoice, et al. v.
Paxton,  Attorney  General  of  Texas,  on  certiorari  to  the  United  States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

3

Syllabus

ly related to compelled speech and compelled association is compelled
funding  of  the  speech  of  private  speakers  or  groups.  Compulsory
subsidies  for  private  speech  are  thus  subject  to  exacting  First
Amendment scrutiny and cannot be sustained unless, first, there is a
comprehensive regulatory scheme involving a “mandated association”
among  those  who  are  required  to  pay  the  subsidy,  United  States  v.
United  Foods,  Inc.,  533  U. S.  405,  and,  second,  compulsory  fees  are
levied  only  insofar  as  they  are  a  “necessary  incident”  of  the  “larger
regulatory  purpose  which  justified  the  required  association,”  ibid.
Pp. 8−10.

(b) When  a  State  establishes  an  “agency  shop”  that  exacts  com-
pulsory  union  fees  as  a  condition  of  public  employment,  “[t]he  dis-
senting employee is forced to support financially an organization with
whose  principles  and  demands  he  may  disagree.”    Ellis  v.  Railway
Clerks, 466 U. S. 435, 455.  This form of compelled speech and associ-
ation  imposes  a  “significant  impingement  on  First  Amendment
rights.”  Ibid.  The  justification  for  permitting  a  union  to  collect  fees
from  nonmembers—to  prevent  them  from  free-riding  on  the  union’s
efforts—is  an  anomaly.    Similarly,  requiring  objecting  nonmembers
to opt out of paying the nonchargeable portion of union dues―rather
than  exempting  them  unless  they  opt  in―represents  a  remarkable
boon for unions, creating a risk that the fees nonmembers pay will be
used to further political and ideological ends with which they do not
agree.  Thus, Hudson, far from calling for a balancing of rights or in-
terests,  made  it  clear  that  any  procedure  for  exacting  fees  from  un-
willing  contributors  must  be  “carefully  tailored  to  minimize  the  in-
fringement”  of  free  speech  rights,  475  U. S.  302−303,  and  it  cited
cases  holding  that  measures  burdening  the  freedom  of  speech  or  as-
sociation  must  serve  a  compelling  interest  and  must  not  be  signifi-
cantly broader than necessary to serve that interest.  Pp. 10−13.

(c) There  is  no  justification  for  the  SEIU’s  failure  to  provide  a
fresh Hudson notice.  Hudson rests on the principle that nonmembers
should not be required to fund a union’s political and ideological pro-
jects  unless  they  choose  to  do  so  after  having  “a  fair  opportunity”  to
assess  the  impact  of  paying  for  nonchargeable  union  activities.    475
U. S.,  at  303.  The  SEIU’s  procedure  cannot  be  considered  to  have
met Hudson’s requirement that fee-collection procedures be carefully
tailored  to  minimize  impingement  on  First  Amendment  rights.    The
SEIU  argues  that  nonmembers  who  objected  to  the  special  assess-
ment but were not given the opportunity to opt out would have been
given  the  chance  to  recover  the  funds  by  opting  out  when  the  next
annual notice was sent, and that the amount of dues payable the fol-
lowing  year  by  objecting  nonmembers  would  decrease  if  the  special
assessment  were  found  to  be  for  nonchargeable  purposes.    But  this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion or a portion of a court case. It discusses compelled speech and association in the context of union fees. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Court Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–130
_________________

RAYMOND J. LUCIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2018]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The  Appointments  Clause  of  the  Constitution  lays  out
the  permissible  methods  of  appointing  “Officers  of  the
United  States,”  a  class  of  government  officials  distinct
from mere employees.  Art. II, §2, cl. 2.  This case requires
us  to  decide  whether  administrative  law  judges  (ALJs)  of
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (SEC  or  Com-
mission) qualify as such “Officers.”  In keeping with Frey-
tag  v.  Commissioner,  501  U. S.  868  (1991),  we  hold  that
they do.

I

The SEC has statutory authority to enforce the nation’s
securities laws.  One way it can do so is by instituting an
administrative  proceeding  against  an  alleged  wrongdoer.
By  law,  the  Commission  may  itself  preside  over  such  a
proceeding.  See  17  CFR  §201.110  (2017).  But  the  Com-
mission also may, and typically does, delegate that task to
an  ALJ.  See  ibid.;  15  U. S. C.  §78d–1(a).    The  SEC  cur-
rently  has  five  ALJs.    Other  staff  members,  rather  than
the  Commission  proper,  selected  them  all.    See  App.  to
Pet. for Cert. 295a–297a.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes the citation, the title of the case, the date, and the introductory portion of the opinion delivered by Justice Kagan.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

23

Opinion of the Court

care.  Two  prisoners  committed  suicide  by  hanging  after
being placed in cells that had been identified as requiring
a  simple  fix  to  remove  attachment  points  that  could  sup-
port  a  noose.    The  repair  was  not  made  because  doing  so
would involve removing prisoners from the cells, and there
was  no  place  to  put  them.  Id.,  at  769–777.  More  gen-
erally,  Jeanne  Woodford,  the  former  acting  secretary  of
California’s  prisons,  testified  that  there  “ ‘are  simply  too
many  issues  that  arise  from  such  a  large  number  of  pris-
oners,’ ” and that, as a result, “ ‘management spends virtu-
ally  all  of  its  time  fighting  fires  instead  of  engaging  in
thoughtful  decision-making  and  planning’ ”  of  the  sort
needed  to  fashion  an  effective  remedy  for  these  constitu-
tional violations.  Juris. App. 82a.

Increased  violence  also  requires  increased  reliance  on
lockdowns  to  keep  order,  and  lockdowns  further  impede
In  2006,  prison  officials
the  effective  delivery  of  care.
instituted 449 lockdowns.  Id., at 116a.  The average lock-
down  lasted  12  days,  and  20  lockdowns  lasted  60  days  or
longer.  Ibid.    During  lockdowns,  staff  must  either  escort
prisoners to medical facilities or bring medical staff to the
prisoners.  Either  procedure  puts  additional  strain  on
already  overburdened  medical  and  custodial  staff.    Some
programming  for  the  mentally  ill  even  may  be  canceled
altogether  during  lockdowns,  and  staff  may  be  unable  to
supervise the delivery of psychotropic medications.

The  effects  of  overcrowding  are  particularly  acute  in
the  prisons’  reception  centers,  intake  areas  that  process
140,000  new  or  returning  prisoners  every  year.  Id.,  at
85a.  Crowding  in  these  areas  runs  as  high  as  300%  of
design  capacity.
Id.,  at  86a.  Living  conditions  are
“ ‘toxic,’ ”  and  a  lack  of treatment  space  impedes  efforts  to
identify  inmate  medical  or  mental  health  needs  and  pro-
vide  even  rudimentary  care.    Id.,  at  92a.    The  former
warden  of  San  Quentin  reported  that  doctors  in  that
prison’s  reception  center  “ ‘were  unable  to  keep  up  with
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the negative impacts of overcrowding in California prisons. It provides factual details and cites evidence, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

BROWN v. PLATA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

any  adverse  impact  on  public  safety  or  the  operation  of  a
criminal  justice  system  caused  by  the  relief”  and  author-
izes  them  to  appoint  Special  Masters,  §3626  (a)(1)(A),  (f),
provisions  that  seem  to  presuppose  the  possibility  of  a
structural remedy.  It also sets forth criteria under which
courts may issue orders that have “the purpose or effect of
reducing or limiting the prisoner population,” §3626(g)(4).
I do not believe that objection carries the day.  In addi-
tion  to  imposing  numerous  limitations  on  the  ability  of
district  courts  to  order  injunctive  relief  with  respect  to
prison conditions, the PLRA states that “[n]othing in this
section  shall  be  construed  to  . . .  repeal  or  detract  from
otherwise applicable limitations on the remedial powers of
the  courts.”  §3626(a)(1)(C).    The  PLRA  is  therefore  best
understood  as  an  attempt  to  constrain  the  discretion  of
courts  issuing  structural  injunctions—not  as  a  mandate
for  their  use.  For  the  reasons  I  have  outlined,  structural
injunctions, especially prisoner-release orders, raise grave
separation-of-powers  concerns  and  veer  significantly  from
the historical role and institutional capability of courts.  It
is  appropriate  to  construe  the  PLRA  so  as  to  constrain
courts  from  entering  injunctive  relief  that  would  exceed
that role and capability.

*

*

*

The District Court’s order that California release 46,000
prisoners  extends  “further  than  necessary  to  correct  the
violation  of  the  Federal  right  of  a  particular  plaintiff  or
plaintiffs” who have been denied needed medical care.  18
U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(A).  It is accordingly forbidden by the
PLRA—besides defying all sound conception of the proper
role of judges.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia in the case of Brown v. Plata. It discusses the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and its implications for court-ordered prisoner releases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP.

Opinion of the Court

select among trifles, de minimis non curat lex is not Latin
for close enough for government work.

That  said,  we  nonetheless  agree  with  the  basic  percep-
tion  of  the  Courts  of  Appeals  that  it  is  most  unlikely
Congress  meant  §203(o)  to  convert  federal  judges  into
time-study professionals.  That is especially so since the conse-
quence of dispensing with the intricate exercise of separat-
ing the minutes spent clothes-changing and washing from
the  minutes  devoted  to  other  activities  is  not  to  prevent
compensation  for  the  uncovered  segments,  but  merely  to
leave the issue of compensation to the process of collective
bargaining.  We  think  it  is  possible  to  give  the  text  of
§203(o)  a  meaning  that  avoids  such  relatively  inconse-
quential judicial involvement in “a morass of difficult, fact-
specific determinations,” Sepulveda, 591 F. 3d, at 218.

The  forerunner  of  §203(o)—the  Portal-to-Portal  Act
provision  whose  interpretation  by  the  Labor  Department
prompted  its  enactment—focused  narrowly  on  the  activi-
ties  involved:  “activities  which  are  preliminary  to  or
postliminary to [the employee’s] principal activity or activ-
ities.”  §254(a)(2).  Section 203(o), by contrast, is addressed
not  to  certain  “activities,”  but  to  “time  spent”  on  certain
activities, viz., “changing clothes or washing.”  Just as one
can  speak  of  “spending  the  day  skiing”  even  when  less-
than-negligible portions of the day are spent having lunch
or  drinking  hot  toddies,  so  also  one  can  speak  of  “time
spent  changing  clothes  and  washing”  when  the  vast  pre-
ponderance  of  the  period  in  question  is  devoted  to  those
activities.  To  be  sure,  such  an  imprecise  and  colloquial
usage will not ordinarily be attributed to a statutory text,
but  for  the  reasons  we  have  discussed  we  think  that  ap-
propriate  here.    The  question  for  courts  is  whether  the
period at issue can, on the whole, be fairly characterized as
“time  spent  in  changing  clothes  or  washing.”  If  an  em-
ployee devotes the vast majority of the time in question to
putting  on  and  off  equipment  or  other  non-clothes  items
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the interpretation of a specific law (likely related to employee compensation). It contains legal jargon and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 728 (2000)

751

O’Connor, J., concurring

First, in Part II–A, the Court holds that the Secretary did
not exceed his authority under the Taylor Grazing Act by
promulgating the new “grazing preference” and “permitted
use” rules.
I agree with that holding but would place spe-
cial emphasis on the Court’s third reason for rejecting peti-
tioners’ facial challenge to the regulations. Petitioners have
not shown how the new regulations themselves—rather than
speciﬁc actions the Secretary might take pursuant to those
regulations—violate the Taylor Grazing Act’s requirement
that “grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged . . . be
adequately safeguarded.” 43 U. S. C. § 315b.
It is of partic-
ular importance, as the Court notes, ante, at 743, that the
Secretary has assured us that the new regulations do not in
actual practice “alter the active use/suspended use formula
in grazing permits” and that “ ‘present suspended use would
continue to be recognized and have a priority for additional
grazing use within the allotment.’ ” Brief for Respondents
22 (quoting Bureau of Land Management, Rangeland Reform
’94: Final Environmental Impact Statement 144 (1994)).
For these reasons, petitioners’ facial challenge to the regula-
tions must fail. Should a permit holder ﬁnd, however, that
the Secretary’s speciﬁc application of the new regulations
deviates from the above assurances and in the process de-
prives the permit holder of grazing privileges to such an ex-
tent that the Secretary’s conduct can be termed a failure to
adequately safeguard such privileges, the permit holder may
bring an as-applied challenge to the Secretary’s action at
that time. The Court’s holding today in no way forecloses
such a challenge. See ante, at 744 (“[T]he affected permit
holder remains free to challenge such an individual [denial
of] grazing privileges, and the courts remain free to deter-
mine its lawfulness in context”).

Second, it is important to note that the Court’s decision
today only rejects petitioners’ claim that the 1995 regula-
tions exceed the Secretary’s authority under the Taylor
Grazing Act. We are not presented in this case with a claim
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding grazing regulations and the Taylor Grazing Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1006

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6820.  Warfield  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6824.  Humbert  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  132.

No.  09–6827.  Dharni  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  554.

No.  09–6831.  Lacen-Berrios  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6837.  Sealed  Petitioner  v.  United  States;  and

No.  09–6838.  Sealed  Petitioners  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.
669.

No.  09–6840.  Carney  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6841.  Roberson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6844.  Brooks v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  195.

No.  09–6847.  Ramirez  Reyna  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  353.

No.  09–6856.  Blanks  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6859.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  1093.

No.  09–6860.  Alejandre-Alcaraz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 329 Fed. Appx. 122.

No. 09–6869.  Morris v.  United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–6872.  Vigil  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  775.

No.  09–6873.  Montoya-Carmona  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
4th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 326 Fed. Appx. 255.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not the actual content of a book and is likely a legal docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

27

Opinion of the Court

dissent also adopts a construction of §106(3) that “signifi
cantly  curtails”  §109(a)’s  effect,  post,  at  26,  and  so  limits
the  scope  of  that  provision  to  a  similar,  or  even  greater,
degree.

In Quality King we rejected the “superfluous” argument
for  similar  reasons.    But,  when  rejecting  it,  we  said  that,
where  an  author  gives  exclusive  American  distribution
rights  to  an  American  publisher  and  exclusive  British
distribution  rights  to  a  British  publisher,  “presumably
only  those  [copies]  made  by  the  publisher  of  the  United
States  edition  would  be  ‘lawfully  made  under  this  title’
within the meaning of §109(a).”  523 U. S., at 148 (empha
sis  added).    Wiley  now  argues  that  this  phrase  in  the
Quality  King  opinion  means  that  books  published  abroad
(under license) must fall outside the words “lawfully made
under  this  title”  and  that  we  have  consequently  already
given  those  words  the  geographical  interpretation  that  it
favors.

We  cannot,  however,  give  the  Quality  King  statement
the  legal  weight  for  which  Wiley  argues.    The  language
“lawfully made under this title” was not at issue in Qual
ity King; the point before us now was not then fully argued;
we  did  not  canvas  the  considerations  we  have  here  set
forth;  we  there  said  nothing  to  suggest  that  the  example
assumes  a  “first  sale”;  and  we  there  hedged  our  state-
ment with the word “presumably.”  Most importantly, the
statement  is  pure  dictum.  It  is  dictum  contained  in  a
rebuttal  to  a  counterargument.  And  it  is  unnecessary
dictum  even  in  that  respect.    Is  the  Court  having  once
written  dicta  calling  a  tomato  a  vegetable  bound  to  deny
that it is a fruit forever after?

To the contrary, we have written that we are not neces
sarily  bound  by  dicta  should  more  complete  argument
demonstrate  that  the  dicta  is  not  correct.  Central  Va.
Community  College  v.  Katz,  546  U. S.  356,  363  (2006)
(“[W]e are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites previous case law and argues against a particular interpretation of a statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TRUMP v. HAWAII

BREYER, J., dissenting

ond  possibility,  i.e.,  that  the  Government  is  not  applying
the  Proclamation  as  written.  The  Proclamation  provides
that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland
Security  “shall coordinate to adopt guidance” for consular
officers to follow when deciding whether to grant a waiver.
§3(c)(ii).  Yet,  to  my  knowledge,  no  guidance  has  issued.
The  only  potentially  relevant  document  I  have  found
consists  of  a  set  of  State  Department  answers  to  certain
Frequently  Asked  Questions,  but  this  document  simply
restates the Proclamation in plain language for visa appli-
cants.  It does not provide guidance for consular officers as
to  how  they  are  to  exercise  their  discretion.    See  Dept.  of
State,  FAQs  on  the  Presidential  Proclamation,  https://
travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-
resources/presidential-proclamation-archive/2017-12-04-
Presidential-Proclamation.html  (all  Internet  materials  as
last visited June 25, 2018).

An  examination  of  publicly  available  statistics  also
provides cause for concern.  The State Department reported
that  during  the  Proclamation’s  first  month,  two  waivers
were  approved  out  of  6,555  eligible  applicants.    Letter
from M. Waters, Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs, to
Sen.  Van  Hollen  (Feb.  22,  2018).    In  its  reply  brief,  the
Government  claims  that  number  increased  from  2  to  430
during  the  first  four  months  of  implementation.    Reply
Brief  17.  That  number,  430,  however,  when  compared
with the number of pre-Proclamation visitors, accounts for
a miniscule percentage of those likely eligible for visas, in
such  categories  as  persons  requiring  medical  treatment,
academic  visitors,  students,  family  members,  and  others
belonging  to  groups  that,  when  considered  as  a  group
(rather than case by case), would not seem to pose security
threats.

Amici  have  suggested  that  there  are  numerous  appli-
cants  who  could  meet  the  waiver  criteria.    For  instance,
the  Proclamation  anticipates  waivers  for  those  with  “sig-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the implementation of a Presidential Proclamation and raises concerns about its application.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Loving, 388 U. S., at 6–7.

The  majority  observes  that  these  developments  “were
not  mere  superficial  changes”  in  marriage,  but  rather
“worked  deep  transformations  in  its  structure.”    Ante,  at
6–7.  They  did  not,  however,  work  any  transformation  in
the core structure of marriage as the union between a man
and a woman.  If you had asked a person on the street how
marriage was defined, no one would ever have said, “Mar-
riage is the union of a man and a woman, where the woman
is  subject  to  coverture.”    The  majority  may  be  right  that
the  “history  of  marriage  is  one  of  both  continuity  and
change,”  but  the  core  meaning  of  marriage  has  endured.
Ante, at 6.

B
Shortly  after  this  Court  struck  down  racial  restrictions
on marriage in Loving, a gay couple in Minnesota sought a
marriage  license.  They  argued  that  the  Constitution
required  States  to  allow  marriage  between  people  of  the
same  sex  for  the  same  reasons  that  it  requires  States  to
allow  marriage  between  people  of  different  races.    The
Minnesota  Supreme  Court  rejected  their  analogy  to  Lov-
ing,  and  this  Court  summarily  dismissed  an  appeal.
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972).

In the decades after Baker, greater numbers of gays and
lesbians began living openly, and many expressed a desire
to have their relationships recognized as marriages.  Over
time,  more  people  came  to  see  marriage  in  a  way  that
could  be  extended  to  such  couples.    Until  recently,  this
new view of marriage remained a minority position.  After
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2003 inter-
preted  its  State  Constitution  to  require  recognition  of
same-sex  marriage,  many  States—including  the  four  at
issue  here—enacted  constitutional  amendments  formally
adopting the longstanding definition of marriage.

Over the last few years, public opinion on marriage has
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges. It discusses the history of marriage and the arguments surrounding same-sex marriage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1032

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 20, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8307. Burgess v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 286.

No. 99–8308. Benally v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 649.

No. 99–8309. Watson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1307.

No. 99–8310. Brown v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 910.

No. 99–8313. Montoya v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 286.

No. 99–8316. MacDonald v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 1260.

No. 99–8325. Cabrera v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 262.

No. 99–8326. Belcher v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 437.

No. 99–8327. Bannerman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 503.

No. 99–8328. Criscione v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 445.

No. 99–8331. Carrillo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 279.

No. 99–8332. Allen v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 208 F. 3d 206.

No. 99–8333. Arroyo v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 54.

No. 99–8340. Palmer v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 833.

No. 99–8346. Vernon v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 884.

No. 99–8370. Ridenbaugh v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Licking

County. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's section on case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxviii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
938
May v. Mountain Village . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
May v. Shuttle, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Maynard; Home Savings of America v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
Mayor of Lansing; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901
Mays, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Mays v. Dayton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
Mays v. East St. Louis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Mazurkiewicz; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
McBryde; Judicial Council of Fifth Judicial Circuit v. . . . . . . . . . .
909
McCabe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
McCarthy; Jarvi v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
McClain v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960
McClain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
. . .
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd.
910
McClellan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921
McClinton v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915
McDaniel; CSX Transportation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
McDaniel v. Gallego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
McDaniel; Gallego v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
McDonald v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
McDonald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
McDufﬁe v. First Union National Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McGinnis; Bazzetta v.
952
McGinnis; Hadix v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
966
McGowen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
McGrew v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd.
. . . . . . . . . .
953
MCI Telecommunications Corp.; Matrix Communications Corp. v.
951
McLaughlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
McLeod v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McMillan; White v.
969
McQuown v. Safeway, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902
Meisler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
Melendez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
Menard, Inc.; Brand Management, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mendelson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,948
918
Merkobrad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
Messino; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.; Melendez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951
. . . . . . . . . .
Metropolitan School Dist. Perry Township; Smith v.
966
Meyer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Meyers v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mezzetta v. United States
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:26:35
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CR

Pagination Table: RULES1

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Supreme Court of the United States
washington, d. c.

April 17, 2000

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States of America in Congress Assembled:

By direction of the Supreme Court of the United States, I
have the honor to submit to the Congress the amendments
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that have been
adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant
to Section 2072 of Title 28, United States Code.

Accompanying these rules are excerpts from the report of
the Judicial Conference of the United States containing the
Committee Notes submitted to the Court for its consider-
ation pursuant to Section 331 of Title 28, United States Code.

Sincerely,

(Signed) William H. Rehnquist

Chief Justice of the United States

1180
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a letter of transmittal, which is not part of the main body of the document and typically provides context about the enclosed rules. It's not suitable for indexing as it doesn't contain the actual content meant for reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Letter of Transmittal</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
900

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09– 5358.  Mendez-Sanchez,  aka  Lopez  v.  United
States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
563  F.  3d  935.

No.  09–5359.  Tompkins  v.  Mitchell,  Correctional  Admin
istrator  IV,  Mountain  View  Correctional  Institution.
C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.
Appx.  283.

No.  09–5360.  Washington  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5361.  Alexandre  v.  Maine.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5362.  Brewer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5364.  Lynch  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  275.

No.  09–5365.  Colman  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5366.  King  v.  Noland  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  656.

No.  09–5368.  Scott  v.  Hickman,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5369.  Ford  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 09–5372.  De La O v.  Thaler, Director, Texas Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324
Fed.  Appx.  307.

No.  09–5373.  Melson  v.  Allen,  Commissioner,  Alabama
Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  548  F.  3d  993.

No.  09–5376.  Carr  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and the circuit court where the case was heard. This type of information is not typically considered suitable for indexing as it is not the main body of text meant for reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

15

Opinion of the Court

guidance of local officials.  The speech was indeed planned
to  coincide  with  Matthew  Snyder’s  funeral,  but  did  not
itself  disrupt  that  funeral,  and  Westboro’s  choice  to  con-
duct its picketing at that time and place did not alter the
nature of its speech.

Speech  is  powerful.  It  can  stir  people  to  action,  move
them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—
inflict great pain.  On the facts before us, we cannot react
to  that  pain  by  punishing  the  speaker.    As  a  Nation  we
have  chosen  a  different  course—to  protect  even  hurtful
speech  on  public  issues  to  ensure  that  we  do  not  stifle
public  debate.  That  choice  requires  that  we  shield  West-
boro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the concluding section. It discusses the power of speech, the court's decision to protect even hurtful speech, and affirms the judgment of a lower court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Court has doggedly adhered to [its core holding] again and
again, often to disastrous ends.”  Gamble v. United States,
587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op.,
at 16).  In doing so, the Court has repeatedly invoked stare
decisis.  See, e.g., Casey, 505 U. S., at 854–869.  And today,
a majority of the Court insists that this doctrine compels its
result.  See  ante,  at  40  (plurality  opinion);  ante,  at  2,  11
(opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.).

The  Court’s  current  “formulation  of  the  stare  decisis
standard does not comport with our judicial duty under Ar-
ticle III,” which requires us to faithfully interpret the Con-
stitution.  Gamble,  587  U. S.,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,  concur-
ring)  (slip  op.,  at  2).  Rather,  when  our  prior  decisions
clearly conflict with the text of the Constitution, we are re-
quired to “privilege [the] text over our own precedents.”  Id.,
at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  10).   Because  Roe  and  its  progeny  are
premised  on  a  “demonstrably  erroneous  interpretation  of
the  Constitution,”  we  should  not  apply  them  here.  587
U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 10).

Even under THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s approach to stare deci-
sis, continued adherence to these precedents cannot be jus-
tified.  Stare decisis is “not an inexorable command,” ante,
at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted), and this Court has
recently overruled a number of poorly reasoned precedents
that have proved themselves to be unworkable, see Knick v.
Township of Scott, 588 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (ROBERTS,
C. J., for the Court) (slip op., at 20–23); Franchise Tax Bd.
of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at
16–17); Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees,
585 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 33–47).  As I have
already demonstrated, supra, at 14–17, Roe’s reasoning is
utterly  deficient—in  fact,  not  a  single  Justice  today  at-
tempts to defend it.

Moreover, the fact that no five Justices can agree on the
proper interpretation of our precedents today evinces that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion, citing previous cases and constitutional interpretations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the or-
ganization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor
the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.”  Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 343 (1977).

Respondents do not contest that SFFA satisfies the three-
part  test  for  organizational  standing  articulated  in  Hunt,
and like the courts below, we find no basis in the record to
conclude  otherwise.  See  980  F. 3d,  at  182–184;  397
F. Supp. 3d, at 183–184; No. 1:14–cv–954 (MDNC, Sept. 29,
2018), App. D to Pet. for Cert. in No. 21–707, pp. 237–245
(2018 DC Opinion).  Respondents instead argue that SFFA
was  not  a  “genuine  ‘membership  organization’ ”  when  it
filed suit, and thus that it could not invoke the doctrine of
organizational standing in the first place.  Brief for Univer-
sity  Respondents  in  No.  21–707,  at  24.    According  to  re-
spondents,  our  decision  in  Hunt  established  that  groups
qualify as genuine membership organizations only if they
are controlled and funded by their members.  And because
SFFA’s members did neither at the time this litigation com-
menced, respondents’ argument goes, SFFA could not rep-
resent  its  members  for  purposes  of  Article  III  standing.
Brief for University Respondents in No. 21–707, at 24 (cit-
ing Hunt, 432 U. S., at 343).

Hunt  involved  the  Washington  State  Apple  Advertising
Commission, a state agency whose purpose was to protect
the  local  apple  industry.  The  Commission  brought  suit
challenging a North Carolina statute that imposed a label-
ing requirement on containers of apples sold in that State.
The Commission argued that it had standing to challenge
the requirement on behalf of Washington’s apple industry.
See id., at 336–341.  We recognized, however, that as a state
agency, “the Commission [wa]s not a traditional voluntary
membership organization . . . , for it ha[d] no members at
all.”  Id., at 342.  As a result, we could not easily apply the
three-part  test  for  organizational  standing,  which  asks
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically an excerpt from the Supreme Court case *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College*. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding organizational standing, citing precedent from *Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n*.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER AND
PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 19–431.  Argued May 6, 2020—Decided July 8, 2020*

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) requires
covered employers to provide women with “preventive care and screen-
ings” without “any cost sharing requirements,” and relies on Preven-
tive Care Guidelines (Guidelines) “supported by the Health Resources
and Services Administration” (HRSA) to determine what “preventive
care  and  screenings”  includes.    42  U.  S.  C.  §300gg–13(a)(4).    Those
Guidelines  mandate  that  health  plans  provide  coverage  for  all  Food
and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods.  When the
Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury
(Departments) incorporated the Guidelines, they also gave HRSA the
discretion  to  exempt  religious  employers,  such  as  churches,  from
providing contraceptive coverage. Later, the Departments also prom-
ulgated a  rule accommodating qualifying religious organizations that
allowed  them  to  opt  out  of  coverage  by  self-certifying  that  they  met
certain criteria to their health insurance issuer, which would then ex-
clude  contraceptive  coverage  from  the  employer’s  plan  and  provide
participants with separate payments for contraceptive services with-
out imposing any cost-sharing requirements.

Religious entities challenged the rules under the Religious Freedom
Restoration  Act  of  1993  (RFRA).    In  Burwell  v.  Hobby  Lobby  Stores,
Inc.,  573  U.  S.  682,  this  Court  held  that  the  contraceptive  mandate
substantially  burdened  the  free  exercise  of  closely  held  corporations
with  sincerely  held  religious  objections  to  providing  their  employees
with certain methods of contraception.  And in Zubik v. Burwell, 578

——————

* Together with 19–454, Trump, President of the United States, et al.

v. Pennsylvania et al., on certiorari to the same Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

THOMAS, J., dissenting

already effectively allowed for equitable tolling.”  Id., at 48
(citing  Irwin,  498  U. S.,  at  96).    “Given  this  fact,  and  the
unusually  generous  nature  of  the  [Act]’s  limitations  time
period,”  the  Court  concluded  that  “extension  of  the  statu-
tory period by additional equitable tolling would be unwar-
ranted.”  524 U. S., at 48–49.  Thus, while Beggerly might
be read to view the Act’s time bar as potentially susceptible
to  tolling  (and  thus,  by  inference,  nonjurisdictional),  the
Court did not hold that the bar actually could be tolled.  Ra-
ther, the Court held the opposite.  Beggerly is therefore, at
best, ambiguous with respect to the jurisdictional nature of
the time bar.  As such, it does not overcome the Court’s clear
prior view set out in both Block and Mottaz.

For  the  majority,  the  Court’s  statements  in  Block  and
Mottaz  are  not  “definitiv[e]”  enough  to  satisfy  John  R.
Sand.  Ante, at 11.  But, the import of the Court’s references
to “jurisdiction” in Block and Mottaz would have been clear
at the time.  A court in the 1980s discussing a provision of
a  statute  as  a  waiver  of  sovereign  immunity,  citing  Sher-
wood (and, later, Block), invoked a well-known set of ideas
that readers at the time unmistakably associated with the
concept  of  jurisdiction.    In  fact,  the  Court  in  Dalm  cited
Block and Mottaz—and no other cases—for the proposition
that  conditions  on  waivers  of  sovereign  immunity  “define
th[e] court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”  494 U. S., at
608  (emphasis  added;  internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
The Court’s precedents must be understood in that context.

*

*

*

The Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations functions as a
condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity, and is there-
fore jurisdictional.  This Court has repeatedly characterized
the Act’s time bar as jurisdictional, and that interpretation
remains authoritative under John R. Sand.  Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments regarding the interpretation of a statute of limitations and its jurisdictional implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

dividual practitioner acting in the usual course of his pro-
fessional practice.”  21 CFR §1306.04(a).  We assume, as did
the courts below and the parties here, that a prescription is
“authorized” and therefore lawful if it satisfies this stand-
ard.  At Ruan’s and Kahn’s trials, the Government argued
that  the  doctors’  prescriptions  failed  to  comply  with  this
standard.  The doctors argued that their prescriptions did
comply, and that, even if not, the doctors did not knowingly
deviate or intentionally deviate from the standard.

Ruan,  for  example,  asked  for  a  jury  instruction  that
would have required the Government to prove that he sub-
jectively knew that his prescriptions fell outside the scope of
his prescribing authority.  The District Court, however, re-
jected this request.  The court instead set forth a more ob-
jective standard, instructing the jury that a doctor acts law-
fully when he prescribes “in good faith as part of his medical
treatment of a patient in accordance with the standard of
medical practice generally recognized and accepted in the
United  States.”    App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  in  No.  20–410,  p.
139a.  The court further instructed the jury that a doctor
violates §841 when “the doctor’s actions were either not for
a  legitimate  medical  purpose  or  were  outside  the  usual
course of professional medical practice.”  Ibid.  The jury con-
victed Ruan, and the trial court sentenced him to over 20
years in prison and ordered him to pay millions of dollars
in restitution and forfeiture.

The  Eleventh  Circuit  affirmed  Ruan’s  convictions.    See
966 F. 3d 1101, 1120, 1166–1167 (2020).  The appeals court
held that a doctor’s “subjectiv[e] belie[f] that he is meeting
a patient’s  medical needs by prescribing a controlled sub-
stance”  is  not  a  “complete  defense”  to  a  §841 prosecution.
Id., at 1167.  Rather, the court said, “ ‘[w]hether a defendant
acts in the usual course of his professional practice must be
evaluated based on an objective standard, not a subjective
standard.’ ”  Id., at 1166 (quoting United States v. Joseph,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case involving drug prescriptions and the legal standard for determining whether they are lawful.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA

Syllabus

“actual knowledge,” its meaning is plain.  Dictionaries confirm that, to
have “actual knowledge” of a piece of information, one must in fact be
aware of it.  Legal dictionaries give “actual knowledge” the same mean-
ing.  The  law  will  sometimes  impute  knowledge—often  called  “con-
structive” knowledge—to a person who fails to learn something that a
reasonably diligent person would have learned.  The addition of “ac-
tual” in §1113(2) signals that the plaintiff’s knowledge must be more
than hypothetical.  Congress has repeatedly drawn the same “linguis-
tic distinction,” Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 647, elsewhere
in ERISA.  When Congress has included both actual and constructive
knowledge in ERISA limitations provisions, Congress has done so ex-
plicitly.  But Congress has never added to §1113(2) the language it has
used in those other provisions to encompass both forms of knowledge.
Pp. 5–8.

(b) Petitioners’  arguments  for  a  broader  reading  of  §1113(2)  based
on  text,  context,  purpose,  and  statutory  history  all  founder  on  Con-
gress’s choice of the word “actual.”  Petitioners may well be correct that
heeding  the  plain  meaning  of  §1113(2)  substantially  diminishes  the
protection that it provides for ERISA fiduciaries.  But if policy consid-
erations suggest that the current scheme should be altered, Congress
must be the one to do it.  Pp. 8–11.
(c) This opinion does not foreclose any of the “usual ways” to prove ac-
tual knowledge at any stage in the litigation.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U. S. 825, 842.  Plaintiffs who recall reading particular disclosures will
be bound by oath to say so in their depositions.  Actual knowledge can
also be proved through “inference from circumstantial evidence.”  Ibid.
And this opinion does not preclude defendants from contending that
evidence  of  “willful  blindness”  supports  a  finding  of  “actual
knowledge.”  Cf. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U. S.
754, 769.  Pp. 11–12.

909 F. 3d 1069, affirmed.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal syllabus, providing a summary of a Supreme Court case. It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather an overview of the legal issues and the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

GORSUCH, J., concurring

richer than what can be found in any single judge or panel
of judges.”  Precedent 9.

Doubtless,  past  judicial  decisions  may,  as  they  always
have, command “greater or less authority as precedents, ac-
cording to circumstances.”  Lincoln Speech 401.  But, like
English judges before us, we have long turned to familiar
considerations to guide our assessment of the weight due a
past decision.  So, for example, as this Court has put it, the
weight  due  a  precedent  may  depend  on  the  quality  of  its
reasoning, its consistency with related decisions, its worka-
bility,  and  reliance  interests  that  have  formed  around  it.
See  Ramos,  590  U. S.,  at  106.    The  first  factor  recognizes
that the primary power of any precedent lies in its power to
persuade—and poorly reasoned decisions may not provide
reliable evidence of the law’s meaning.  The second factor
reflects the fact that a precedent is more likely to be correct
and worthy of respect when it reflects the time-tested wis-
dom of generations than when it sits “unmoored” from sur-
rounding law.  Ibid.  The remaining factors, like workability
and  reliance,  do  not  often  supply  reason  enough  on  their
own to abide a flawed decision, for almost any past decision
is likely to benefit some group eager to keep things as they
are and content with how things work.  See, e.g., id., at 108.
But these factors can sometimes serve functions similar to
the others, by pointing to clues that may suggest a past de-
cision is right in ways not immediately obvious to the indi-
vidual judge.

When  asking  whether  to  follow  or  depart  from  a  prece-
dent, some judges deploy adverbs.  They speak of whether
or  not  a  precedent  qualifies  as  “demonstrably  erroneous,”
Gamble  v.  United  States,  587  U. S.  678,  711  (2019)
(THOMAS, J.,  concurring),  or  “egregiously  wrong,”  Ramos,
590 U. S., at 121 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part).  But
the emphasis the adverb imparts is not meant for dramatic
effect.  It  seeks  to  serve  instead  as  a  reminder  of  a  more
substantive lesson.  The lesson that, in assessing the weight
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the weight given to precedent in legal decision-making.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

904

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 1, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–664. Settles et al. v. Penilla, Administrator of
the Estate of Penilla, Deceased. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 115 F. 3d 707.

No. 97–1388. Mays et al. v. City of East St. Louis et al.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 123 F. 3d 999.

No. 97–1402. University Health Services, Inc. v. Sha-
lala, Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 120 F. 3d 1145.

No. 97–1407. Falkenberry v. Taylor. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 47.

No. 97–1454. Anchorage Education Assn. et al. v. Pat-
terson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 131 F. 3d 807.

No. 97–1462. Yeo, Individually and on Behalf of His
Children v. Town of Lexington et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 241.

No. 97–1497. Mizuno et al. v. Salisbury, Chapter 11
Trustee. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
125 F. 3d 858.

No. 97–1560. Raytheon Aerospace, Inc., et al. v. Green-
well. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135
F. 3d 140.

No. 97–1594. DePrins v. Van Damme et al. Ct. App. Tex.,
12th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 953 S. W. 2d 7.

No. 97–1604. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan et al. v.
Mayor of Lansing et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 222 Mich. App. 637, 564 N. W. 2d 177.

No. 97–1626. Cunningham v. Nazario et al. C. A. 3d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 142 F. 3d 427.

No. 97–1627. Collins v. City of Hazlehurst. Sup. Ct.

Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 So. 2d 408.

No. 97–1645. Bush v. Zeeland Board of Education et al.

C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, and information about the court and the outcome (certiorari denied).
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV.

Opinion of the Court

supervisor  always  is  aided  by  the  agency  relation.”  El-
lerth,  supra,  at  763;  see  Faragher,  524  U. S.,  at  803–805.
But  it  would  go  too  far,  we  found,  to  make  employers
strictly liable whenever a  “supervisor” engages in harass
ment that does not result in a tangible employment action,
and we therefore held that in such cases the employer may
raise an affirmative defense.  Specifically, an employer can
mitigate or avoid liability by showing (1) that it exercised
reasonable care  to  prevent  and  promptly  correct  any  har
assing  behavior  and  (2)  that  the  plaintiff  unreasonably
failed  to  take  advantage  of  any  preventive  or  corrective
opportunities that were provided.  Faragher, supra, at 807;
Ellerth,  524  U. S.,  at  765.    This  compromise,  we  ex-
plained,  “accommodate[s]  the  agency  principles  of  vicari
ous  liability  for  harm  caused  by  misuse  of  supervisory
authority,  as  well  as  Title  VII’s  equally  basic  policies  of
encouraging  forethought  by  employers  and  saving  action
by objecting employees.”  Id., at 764.

The  dissenting  Members  of  the  Court  in  Ellerth  and
Faragher  would  not  have  created  a  special  rule  for  cases
Instead,  they
involving  harassment  by  “supervisors.”
would  have  held  that  an  employer  is  liable  for  any  em
ployee’s  creation  of  a  hostile  work  environment  “if,  and
only  if,  the  plaintiff  proves  that  the  employer  was  negli
gent  in  permitting  the  [offending]  conduct  to  occur.”
Ellerth,  supra,  at  767  (THOMAS, J.,  dissenting);  Faragher,
supra, at 810 (same).

C
Under  Ellerth  and  Faragher,  it  is  obviously  important
whether an alleged harasser is a “supervisor” or merely a
co-worker,  and the lower courts  have disagreed about the
meaning  of  the  concept  of  a  supervisor  in  this  context.
Some  courts,  including  the  Seventh  Circuit  below,  have
held that an employee is not a supervisor unless he or she
has  the  power  to  hire,  fire,  demote,  promote,  transfer,  or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the concept of "supervisor" in the context of workplace harassment. It cites previous cases (Ellerth and Faragher) and delves into the legal arguments surrounding employer liability.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxlii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1122

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Teagle v. DiGuglielmo
1010

Teamsters; Granite Rock Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
872

Tech v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931

Tejada v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Telegraph Publishing Co.; Thomas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Telemaque, In re
814

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Telfair, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  988,989,1102

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1028,1102

Telfair v. Tandy
1149

. . . . . . . . . .
Temporary Guardianship of Moulton; O’Callaghan v.
933

Tenenbaum v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Tennessee; Allen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

Tennessee; Argo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Tennessee; Bowman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tennessee; Davis v.
911

Tennessee; Dean v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
891

Tennessee; Grifﬁn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Tennessee; Hines v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
892

Tennessee; Kiser v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
802

Tennessee; McGowan v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

Tennessee; Quintero v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1048

Tennessee Valley Authority; Matheny v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tennis; Hale v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

Tennis; McMullen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  833,1038

843

Tennis; Tuten v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Tensley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

TePoel v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Terrazas Loya v. United States
Terry; Bishop v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

952

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Terry; Harris v.
951

Texas; Aguilar v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Texas; Arrellano v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

Texas; Balentine v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Texas; Barbee v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Texas; Barker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
983

Texas; Blanton v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

Texas; Carter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Texas; Castillo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Texas; Cole v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Texas; Dalton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

Texas; Del Rio v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Texas; Diaz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
849

Texas; Garza v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

Texas; Graves v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
881

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Helgerson v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

THOMAS, J., concurring

304.  This  Court  held  that  the  term  “navigable”  refers  to
waters that are “navigable in fact,” meaning that “they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary con-
dition,  as  highways  for  commerce,  over  which  trade  and
travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water.”  The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall., at
563.  The Court then explained that navigable waters are
“of the United States,” “in contradistinction from the navi-
gable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary
condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a
continued highway over which commerce is or may be car-
ried on with other States or foreign countries in the custom-
ary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.”
Ibid.; see also The Montello, 11 Wall. 411, 415 (1871) (“If . . .
the river is not of itself a highway for commerce with other
States or foreign countries, or does not form such highway
by its connection with other waters, and is only navigable
between different places within the State, then it is not a
navigable water of the United States, but only a navigable
water of the State”).  It is this “junction” between waters to
“for[m] a continued highway for commerce, both with other
States  and  with  foreign  countries,”  that  brings  the  water
“under the direct control of Congress in the exercise of its
commercial power.”  The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall., at 564.  The
definition of a “navigable water of the United States” was
thus linked directly to the limits on Congress’ commerce au-
thority:  A  navigable  water  of  the  United  States  was  one
that was ordinarily used for interstate or foreign commerce.
Wetlands  were  generally  excluded  from  this  definition.
In Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621 (1900), for example,
the  Court  employed  the  Daniel  Ball  test  to  hold  that  the
term “navigable waters of the United States,” as used in the
1890 River and Harbor Act, did not “prevent the exercise by
the State of Louisiana of its power to reclaim swamp and
overflowed lands by regulating and controlling the current
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It cites previous cases and legal precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC.

Opinion of the Court

other  tests,  displays  an  intent  to  forbid  its  use.  This
surely proves too much.  For while it is true that two of the
other  tests  authorize  cost-benefit  analysis,  it  is  also  true
that  all  four  of  the  other  tests  expressly  authorize  some
consideration  of  costs.  Thus,  if  respondents’  and  the  dis-
sent’s conclusion regarding the import of §1326(b)’s silence
is correct, it is a fortiori true that the BTA test permits no
consideration  of  cost  whatsoever,  not  even  the  “cost-
effectiveness”  and  “feasibility”  analysis  that  the  Second
Circuit  approved,  see  supra,  at  6,  that  the  dissent  would
approve,  post,  at  1–2,  and  that  respondents  acknowledge.
The  inference  that  respondents  and  the  dissent  would
draw  from  the  silence  is,  in  any  event,  implausible,  as
§1326(b)  is  silent  not  only  with  respect  to  cost-benefit
analysis  but  with  respect  to  all  potentially  relevant  fac-
tors.  If  silence  here  implies  prohibition,  then  the  EPA
could not consider any factors in implementing §1326(b)—
an  obvious  logical  impossibility.    It  is  eminently  reason-
able to conclude that §1326(b)’s silence is meant to convey
nothing more than a refusal to tie the agency’s hands as to
whether  cost-benefit  analysis  should  be  used,  and  if  so  to
what degree.

Contrary  to  the  dissent’s  suggestion,  see  post,  at  3–4,
our  decisions  in  Whitman  v.  American  Trucking  Assns.,
Inc.,  531  U. S.  457  (2001),  and  American  Textile  Mfrs.
Institute,  Inc.  v.  Donovan,  452  U. S.  490  (1981),  do  not
undermine  this  conclusion.
In  American  Trucking,  we
held  that  the  text  of  §109  of  the  Clean  Air  Act,  “inter-
preted  in  its  statutory  and  historical  context  . . .  unambi-
guously  bars  cost  considerations”  in  setting  air  quality
standards  under  that  provision.    531  U. S.,  at  471.    The
relevant  “statutory  context”  included  other  provisions  in
the Clean Air Act that expressly authorized consideration
of costs, whereas §109 did not.  Id., at 467–468.  American
Trucking  thus  stands for  the  rather  unremarkable  propo-
sition  that  sometimes  statutory  silence,  when  viewed  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's decision. It contains legal arguments and references to other legal cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

(SDNY),  Doc.  14,  p. 3.    Thus,  in  his  view,  §109(a)’s  “first
sale” doctrine permitted him to resell or otherwise dispose
of the books without the copyright owner’s further permis
sion.  Id., at 2–3.

The District Court held that Kirtsaeng could not assert
the  “first  sale”  defense  because,  in  its  view,  that  doctrine
does  not  apply  to  “foreign-manufactured  goods”  (even  if
made abroad with the copyright owner’s permission).  App.
to Pet. for Cert. 72a.  The jury then found that Kirtsaeng
had  willfully  infringed  Wiley’s  American  copyrights  by
selling and importing without authorization copies of eight
of  Wiley’s  copyrighted  titles.    And  it  assessed  statutory
damages  of  $600,000  ($75,000  per  work).    654  F. 3d,  at
215.

On  appeal,  a  split  panel  of  the  Second  Circuit  agreed
with  the  District  Court.  Id.,  at  222.  It  pointed  out  that
§109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine applies only to “the owner of
a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this title.”  Id.,
at 218–219 (emphasis added).  And, in the majority’s view,
this language means that the “first sale” doctrine does not
apply  to  copies  of  American  copyrighted  works  manufac
tured abroad.  Id., at 221.  A dissenting judge thought that
the words “lawfully made under this title” do not refer “to
a  place  of  manufacture”  but  rather  “focu[s]  on  whether  a
particular  copy  was  manufactured  lawfully  under”  Amer-
ica’s  copyright  statute,  and  that  “the  lawfulness  of  the
manufacture of a particular copy should be judged by U. S.
copyright law.”  Id., at 226 (opinion of Murtha, J.).

We  granted  Kirtsaeng’s  petition  for  certiorari  to  con-
sider  this  question  in  light  of  different  views  among  the
Circuits.  Compare  id.,  at  221  (case  below)  (“first  sale”
doctrine does not apply to copies manufactured outside the
United  States),  with  Omega  S.  A.  v.  Costco  Wholesale
Corp., 541 F. 3d 982, 986 (CA9 2008) (“first sale” doctrine
applies  to  copies  manufactured  outside  the  United  States
only  if  an  authorized  first  sale  occurs  within  the  United
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the "first sale" doctrine in copyright law. It cites case names, legal documents, and specific sections of the law.  The content is sequential and relevant to the legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

315

Syllabus

(4)  Because  § 441b  is  not  limited  to  corporations  or  associations
created  in  foreign  countries  or funded  predominantly  by  foreign  share
holders,  it  would  be  overbroad  even  if  the  Court  were  to  recognize  a
compelling governmental interest in limiting  foreign inﬂuence over the
Nation’s political process.  P. 362.

(d)  The relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to stare deci
sis, beyond workability—the precedent’s antiquity, the reliance interests
at stake, and whether the decision was well reasoned—counsel in favor
of abandoning Austin, which itself contravened the precedents of Buck
ley and Bellotti.  As already explained, Austin was not well reasoned.
It  is  also  undermined  by  experience  since  its  announcement.  Political
speech  is so  ingrained in  this country’s  culture that  speakers  ﬁnd ways
around  campaign  ﬁnance  laws.  Rapid  changes  in  technology—and  the
creative  dynamic  inherent  in  the  concept  of  free  expression—counsel
against  upholding  a  law  that  restricts  political  speech  in  certain  media
or  by  certain  speakers.  In  addition,  no  serious  reliance  issues  are  at
stake.  Thus,  due  consideration  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  Austin
should be overruled.  The Court returns to the principle established in
Buckley  and  Bellotti  that  the  Government  may  not  suppress  political
speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.  No sufﬁcient govern
mental  interest  justiﬁes  limits  on  the  political  speech  of  nonproﬁt  or
for-proﬁt corporations.  Pp. 362–366.

3.  BCRA  §§ 201  and  311  are  valid  as  applied  to  the  ads  for  Hillary

and to the movie itself.  Pp. 366–372.

(a)  Disclaimer  and disclosure  requirements may  burden the  ability
to  speak,  but  they  “impose  no  ceiling  on  campaign-related  activities,”
Buckley, supra, at 64, or “ ‘ “prevent anyone from speaking,” ’ ” McCon
nell, 540 U. S., at 201.  The Buckley Court explained that disclosure can
be justiﬁed by a governmental interest in providing “the electorate with
information”  about  election-related  spending  sources.  424  U. S.,  at  66.
The McConnell Court applied this interest in rejecting facial challenges
to §§ 201 and 311.  540 U. S., at 196.  However, the Court acknowledged
that  as-applied  challenges  would  be  available  if  a  group  could  show  a
“ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that disclosing its contributors’ names would
“ ‘subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Govern
ment ofﬁcials or private parties.’ ”  Id., at 198.  Pp. 366–367.

(b)  The disclaimer and disclosure requirements are valid as applied
to Citizens United’s ads.  They fall within BCRA’s “electioneering com
munication”  deﬁnition:  They  referred  to  then-Senator  Clinton  by  name
shortly  before  a  primary  and  contained  pejorative  references  to  her
candidacy.  Section  311  disclaimers  provide  information  to  the  elector
ate,  McConnell,  supra,  at  196,  and  “insure  that  the  voters  are  fully
informed”  about  who  is  speaking,  Buckley,  supra,  at  76.  At  the  very
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It summarizes the court's reasoning and holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>