<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

restriction  is  to  shield  the  sensibilities  of  listeners,  the
general rule is that the right of expression prevails”).  “[A]
speech  burden  based  on  audience  reactions  is  simply
government  hostility  . . .  in  a  different  guise.”    Matal  v.
Tam, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 4).

Consider  what  Phillips  actually  said  to  the  individual
respondents in this case.  After sitting down with them for
a  consultation,  Phillips  told  the  couple,  “ ‘I’ll  make  your
birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell you cookies and brown
ies, I just don’t make cakes for same sex weddings.’ ”  App.
168.  It is hard to see how this statement stigmatizes gays
and lesbians more than blocking them from marching in a
city  parade,  dismissing  them  from  the  Boy  Scouts,  or
subjecting them to signs that say “God Hates Fags”—all of
which  this  Court  has  deemed  protected  by  the  First
Amendment.  See  Hurley,  supra,  at  574–575;  Dale,  530
U. S., at 644; Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. 443, 448 (2011).
Moreover, it is also hard to see how Phillips’ statement is
worse  than  the  racist,  demeaning,  and  even  threatening
speech  toward  blacks  that  this  Court  has  tolerated  in
previous decisions.  Concerns about “dignity” and “stigma”
did not carry the day when this Court affirmed the right of
white  supremacists  to  burn  a  25-foot  cross,  Virginia  v.
Black,  538  U. S.  343  (2003);  conduct  a  rally  on  Martin
Luther  King  Jr.’s  birthday,  Forsyth  County  v.  Nationalist
Movement, 505 U. S. 123 (1992); or circulate a film featur
ing hooded Klan members who were brandishing weapons
and  threatening  to  “ ‘Bury  the  niggers,’ ”  Brandenburg  v.
Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 446, n. 1 (1969) (per curiam).

Nor does the fact that this Court has now decided Ober-
gefell  v.  Hodges,  576  U. S.  ___  (2015),  somehow  diminish
Phillips’  right  to  free  speech.  “It  is  one  thing  . . .  to  con
clude  that  the  Constitution  protects  a  right  to  same-sex
marriage;  it  is  something  else  to  portray  everyone  who
does  not  share  [that  view]  as  bigoted”  and  unentitled  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It discusses the First Amendment right to free speech and how it applies to the baker's refusal to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

Opinion of the Court

II

Federal  antitrust  law  is  a  central  safeguard  for  the
Nation’s  free  market  structures.    In  this  regard  it  is  “as
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our
free-enterprise  system  as  the  Bill  of  Rights  is  to  the  pro
tection  of  our  fundamental  personal  freedoms.”  United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972).
The  antitrust  laws  declare  a  considered  and  decisive  pro
hibition by the Federal Government of cartels, price fixing,
and  other  combinations  or  practices  that  undermine  the
free market.

The Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C.
§1  et seq.,  serves  to  promote  robust  competition,  which  in
turn empowers the States and provides their citizens with
opportunities to pursue their own and the public’s welfare.
See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U. S. 621, 632 (1992).
The  States,  however,  when  acting  in  their  respective
realm, need not adhere in all contexts to a model of unfet
tered  competition.  While  “the  States  regulate  their  econ
omies  in  many  ways  not  inconsistent  with  the  antitrust
laws,”  id.,  at  635–636,  in  some  spheres  they  impose  re
strictions on occupations, confer exclusive or shared rights
to  dominate  a  market,  or  otherwise  limit  competition  to
achieve public objectives.  If every duly enacted state law
or policy were required to conform to the mandates of the
Sherman  Act,  thus  promoting  competition  at  the  expense
of  other  values  a  State  may  deem  fundamental,  federal
antitrust  law  would  impose  an  impermissible  burden  on
the  States’  power  to  regulate.    See  Exxon  Corp.  v.  Gover-
nor  of  Maryland,  437  U. S.  117,  133  (1978);  see  also
Easterbrook,  Antitrust  and  the  Economics  of  Federalism,
26 J. Law & Econ. 23, 24 (1983).

For  these  reasons,  the  Court  in  Parker  v.  Brown  inter
preted  the  antitrust  laws  to  confer  immunity  on  anticom
petitive conduct by the States when acting in their sover
eign  capacity.    See  317  U. S.,  at  350–351.    That  ruling
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the relationship between federal antitrust law and state action.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

Prisons have backlogs of up to 700 prisoners waiting to see
a  doctor.  Doc.  3231–13,  at 18.    A  review  of  referrals  for
urgent specialty care at one prison revealed that only 105
of  316  pending  referrals  had  a  scheduled  appointment,
and only 2 had an appointment scheduled to occur within
14  days.  Id.,  at  22–23.    Urgent  specialty  referrals  at  one
prison  had  been  pending  for  six  months  to  a  year.    Id.,
at 27.

Crowding  also  creates  unsafe  and  unsanitary  living
conditions  that  hamper  effective  delivery  of  medical  and
mental  health  care.    A  medical  expert  described  living
quarters  in  converted  gymnasiums  or  dayrooms,  where
large  numbers  of  prisoners  may  share  just  a  few  toilets
and  showers,  as  “ ‘breeding  grounds  for  disease.’ ”7   Juris.
App.  102a.  Cramped  conditions  promote  unrest  and  vio-
lence, making it difficult for prison officials to monitor and
control the prison population.  On any given day, prisoners
in  the  general  prison  population  may  become  ill,  thus
entering the plaintiff class; and overcrowding may prevent
immediate medical attention necessary to avoid suffering,
death,  or  spread  of  disease.    After  one  prisoner  was  as-
saulted in a crowded gymnasium, prison staff did not even
learn  of  the  injury  until  the  prisoner  had  been  dead  for
several  hours.    Tr.  382.  Living  in  crowded,  unsafe,  and
unsanitary  conditions  can  cause  prisoners  with  latent
mental  illnesses  to  worsen  and  develop  overt  symptoms.
Crowding  may  also  impede  efforts  to  improve  delivery  of

——————

7 Correctional officials at trial described several outbreaks of disease.
One  officer  testified  that  antibiotic-resistant  staph  infections  spread
widely among the prison population and described prisoners “bleeding,
oozing  with  pus  that  is  soaking  through  their  clothes  when  they  come
in  to  get  the wound covered  and  treated.”    Tr.  601,  604–605.    Another
witness  testified  that  inmates  with  influenza  were  sent  back  from  the
infirmary  due  to  a  lack  of  beds  and  that  the  disease  quickly  spread  to
“more than half ” the 340 prisoners in the housing unit, with the result
that the unit was placed on lockdown for a week.  Id., at 720–721.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically the opinion of the court in the case of Brown v. Plata. It discusses the negative impacts of prison overcrowding on healthcare and living conditions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of the Court

due  process  holding,  but  not  the  Commerce  Clause  hold
ing; and it thus reaffirmed the physical presence rule.  504
U. S., at 307–308, 317–318.
  The  Court  in  Quill  recognized  that  intervening  prece
dents,  specifically  Complete  Auto,  “might  not  dictate  the
same  result  were  the  issue  to  arise  for  the  first  time  to
day.”  504  U. S.,  at  311.    But,  nevertheless,  the  Quill
majority  concluded  that  the  physical  presence  rule  was
necessary  to  prevent  undue  burdens  on  interstate  com
merce.  Id.,  at  313,  and  n. 6.    It  grounded  the  physical
presence  rule  in  Complete  Auto’s  requirement  that  a  tax
have a “ ‘substantial nexus’ ” with the activity being taxed.
504 U. S., at 311.

Three Justices based their decision to uphold the physi
cal presence rule on stare decisis alone.  Id., at 320 (Scalia,
J.,  joined  by  KENNEDY  and  THOMAS,  JJ.,  concurring  in
part and concurring in judgment).  Dissenting in relevant
part,  Justice  White  argued  that  “there  is  no  relationship
between  the  physical-presence/nexus  rule  the  Court  re
tains  and  Commerce  Clause  considerations  that  allegedly
justify  it.”  Id.,  at  327  (opinion  concurring  in  part  and
dissenting in part).

III
The physical presence rule has “been the target of criti
cism  over  many  years  from  many  quarters.”    Direct  Mar-
keting  Assn.  v.  Brohl,  814  F. 3d  1129,  1148,  1150–1151
(CA10  2016)  (Gorsuch, J.,  concurring).    Quill,  it  has  been
said,  was  “premised  on  assumptions  that  are  unfounded”
and  “riddled  with  internal  inconsistencies.”    Rothfeld,
Quill: Confusing the Commerce Clause, 56 Tax Notes 487,
488  (1992).  Quill  created  an  inefficient  “online  sales  tax
loophole” that gives out-of-state businesses an advantage.
A.  Laffer  &  D.  Arduin,  Pro-Growth  Tax  Reform  and  E-
Fairness  1,  4  (July  2013).    And  “while  nexus  rules  are
clearly  necessary,”  the  Court  “should  focus  on  rules  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Quill Corporation case and its impact on sales tax regulations. It cites legal precedents and arguments made by different justices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

TRUMP v. HAWAII

Opinion of the Court

lack  of  competence  on  the  part  of  the  courts  is  marked.”
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S., at 34.

The  upshot  of  our  cases  in  this  context  is  clear:  “Any
rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility”
of  the  President  “to  respond  to  changing  world  conditions
should be adopted only with the greatest caution,” and our
inquiry  into  matters  of  entry  and  national  security  is
highly  constrained.    Mathews,  426  U. S.,  at  81–82.    We
need not define the precise contours of that inquiry in this
case.  A  conventional  application  of  Mandel,  asking  only
whether  the  policy  is  facially  legitimate  and  bona  fide,
would put an end to our review.  But the Government has
suggested that it may be appropriate here for the inquiry
to extend beyond the facial neutrality of the order.  See Tr.
of  Oral  Arg.  16–17,  25–27  (describing  Mandel  as  “the
starting  point”  of  the  analysis).    For  our  purposes  today,
we assume that we may look behind the face of the Proc-
lamation  to  the  extent  of  applying  rational  basis  review.
That  standard  of  review  considers  whether  the  entry
policy  is  plausibly  related  to  the  Government’s  stated
objective  to  protect  the  country  and  improve  vetting  pro-
cesses.  See  Railroad  Retirement  Bd.  v.  Fritz,  449  U. S.
166,  179  (1980).    As  a  result,  we  may  consider  plaintiffs’
extrinsic evidence, but will uphold the policy so long as it
can reasonably be understood to result from a justification
independent of unconstitutional grounds.5
——————

5 The  dissent  finds  “perplexing”  the  application  of  rational  basis  re-
view in this context.  Post, at 15.  But what is far more problematic is
the  dissent’s  assumption  that  courts  should  review  immigration  poli-
cies,  diplomatic  sanctions,  and  military  actions  under  the de novo
“reasonable  observer”  inquiry  applicable  to  cases  involving  holiday
displays and graduation ceremonies.  The dissent criticizes application
of a more constrained standard of review as “throw[ing] the Establish-
ment Clause out the window.”  Post, at 16, n. 6.  But as the numerous
precedents  cited  in  this  section  make  clear,  such  a  circumscribed
inquiry  applies  to  any  constitutional  claim  concerning  the  entry  of
foreign  nationals.    See  Part  IV–C,  supra.  The  dissent  can  cite  no
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case *Trump v. Hawaii*.  It discusses the standard of review for immigration policies and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

69

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  15  U. S. C.  §1691(a)(1)  (Equal  Credit  Oppor-

tunity Act)

  15  U. S. C.  §1691d(a)  (Equal  Credit  Oppor-

tunity Act)

  15 U. S. C. §3151(a) (Full Employment and Bal-

anced Growth; Nondiscrimination)

  18 U. S. C. §246 (Deprivation of Relief Benefits)

  18 U. S. C. §3593(f ) (Special Hearing To Deter-
mine Whether a Sentence of Death Is Justified)

  20  U. S. C.  §1011(a)  (Higher  Education  Re-
sources  and  Student  Assistance;  Antidiscrimi-
nation)

  20  U. S. C.  §1011f(h)(5)(D)  (Disclosures  of  For-

eign Gifts)

  20 U. S. C. §1066c(d) (Historically Black College
and  University  Capital  Financing;  Limitations
on  Federal  Insurance  Bonds  Issued  by  Desig-
nated Bonding Authority)

  20 U. S. C. §1071(a)(2) (Federal Family Educa-

tion Loan Program)

  20 U. S. C. §1078(c)(2)(F) (Federal Payments To

Reduce Student Interest Costs)

  20  U. S. C.  §1087–1(e) (Federal Family Educa-

tion Loan Program; Special Allowances)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely from a legal document.  It is not sequential text and does not appear to be part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  601 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

Per Curiam

Limits,  Inc.  v.  Thornton,  514  U. S.  779,  803–804  (1995)
(quoting  1  J.  Story,  Commentaries  on  the  Constitution  of
the United States §627, p. 435 (3d ed. 1858)).  But nothing
in the Constitution delegates to the States any power to en-
force Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates.
As  an  initial  matter,  not  even  the  respondents  contend
that the Constitution authorizes States to somehow remove
sitting federal officeholders who may be violating Section 3.
Such a power would flout the principle that “the Constitu-
tion  guarantees  ‘the  entire  independence  of  the  General
Government  from  any  control  by  the  respective  States.’ ”
Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800 (2020) (quoting Farmers
and Mechanics Sav. Bank of Minneapolis v. Minnesota, 232
U. S. 516, 521 (1914)).  Indeed, consistent with that princi-
ple,  States  lack  even  the  lesser  powers  to  issue  writs  of
mandamus against federal officials or to grant habeas cor-
pus  relief  to  persons  in  federal  custody.  See  McClung  v.
Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598, 603–605 (1821); Tarble’s Case, 13
Wall. 397, 405–410 (1872).

The respondents nonetheless maintain that  States may
enforce Section 3 against candidates for federal office.  But
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, on its face, does not
affirmatively  delegate  such  a  power  to  the  States.    The
terms of the Amendment speak only to enforcement by Con-
gress,  which  enjoys  power  to  enforce  the  Amendment
through legislation pursuant to Section 5.

This can hardly come as a surprise, given that the sub-
stantive provisions of the Amendment “embody significant
limitations  on  state  authority.”    Fitzpatrick  v.  Bitzer,  427
U. S. 445, 456 (1976).  Under the Amendment, States can-
not  abridge  privileges  or  immunities,  deprive  persons  of
life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  process,  deny  equal
protection, or deny male inhabitants the right to vote (with-
out thereby suffering reduced representation in the House).
See Amdt. 14, §§1, 2.  On the other hand, the Fourteenth
Amendment grants new power to Congress to enforce the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, likely an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the Fourteenth Amendment and its implications for state power to enforce Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
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  <thinking>
This content appears to be a file comparison report, not the actual text content of a document. It focuses on metadata and changes made between two files.
  </thinking>
  <category>File comparison report</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

True,  approximately  three  percent  of  the  substances
appearing  on  Kansas’  lists  of  “controlled  substances”  at
the  time  of  Mellouli’s  conviction  did  not  fall  within  the
federal  definition,  ante,  at  3,  meaning  that  an  individual
convicted  of  possessing  paraphernalia  may  never  have
used  his  paraphernalia  with  a  federally  controlled  sub-
stance.  But  that  fact  does  not  destroy  the  relationship
between  the  law  and  federally  controlled  substances.
Mellouli was convicted for violating a state law “relating to
a  controlled  substance  (as  defined  in  section  802  of  title
21),”  so  he  was  properly  removed  under  8  U. S. C.
§1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

II

A

The majority rejects this straightforward interpretation
because  it  “reach[es]  state-court  convictions  . . .  in  which
‘[no] controlled substance (as defined in [§802])’ figures as
an element of the offense.”  Ante, at 13.  This assumes the
answer  to  the  question  at  the  heart  of  this  case:  whether
the  removal  statute  does  in  fact  reach  such  convictions.
To  answer  that  question  by  assuming  the  answer  is
circular.

The majority hints that some more limited definition of
“relating  to”  is  suggested  by  context.    See  ibid.    I  whole-
heartedly  agree  that  we  must  look  to  context  to  under-
stand indeterminate terms like “relating to,” which is why
I  look  to  surrounding  provisions  of  the  removal  statute.
These  “reveal  that  when  Congress  wanted  to  define  with
greater  specificity  the  conduct  that  subjects  an  alien  to
removal, it did so by omitting the expansive phrase ‘relat-
ing  to.’ ”    Supra,  at  3.    For  its  part,  the  majority  looks  to
the  context  of  other  provisions  referring  to  “controlled
substances”  without  a  definitional  parenthetical,  ante,  at
13, n. 11, and rejoins that the most natural reading of the
statute  “shrinks  to  the  vanishing  point  the  words  ‘as
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Mellouli v.  The text includes citations, legal terminology, and arguments about the interpretation of a statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

13

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

would require her to take time off from work.  911 F. 3d, at
606;  App.  266–269,  309.    The  school  responded  that  she
would not be welcomed back.  911 F. 3d, at 606; App. 270–
273.  At no point has St. James School suggested a religious
reason for terminating Biel’s employment.

2
In 1998, after a 20-year career in newspaper advertising
and  copywriting,  respondent  Agnes  Deirdre  Morrissey-
Berru began working as a substitute teacher at Our Lady
of Guadalupe School, another Catholic school in Southern
California.  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–267, p. 80a; App.
74.  More  recently,  she  taught  fifth  and  sixth  grade  full
time.  App. 73–75.
  Each year, Morrissey-Berru signed an employment con-
tract  with  the  school.    Like  Biel’s  contracts,  these  agree-
ments  referred  to  Morrissey-Berru  as  “Teacher”  and  di-
rected  her  to  the  benefits  guide  for  “Lay  Employees.”
App. 91–100, 127–164; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–267,
at 32a–42a.  Notably, the faculty handbook promised not to
discriminate on the basis of any protected characteristic, in-
cluding “race,” “sex,” “disability,” or “age.”  Record Excerpts
in No. 17–56624, p. 648.

“At no time” during her employment did Morrissey-Berru
“feel God was leading [her] to serve in the ministry,” nor did
she “believe [she] was accepting a formal . . . call to religious
service by working at Our Lady of Guadalupe as a fifth and
sixth grade teacher.”  App. to Brief in Opposition in No. 19–
267,  p.  2a.    Morrissey-Berru,  in  fact,  is  not  a  practicing
Catholic.  Ibid.   Although  Our  Lady  of  Guadalupe  School
“preferred” its teachers to be Catholic, there is a factual dis-
pute whether the school insisted on that prerequisite with-
out exception (and thus, for summary-judgment purposes,
the  Court  must  assume  there  was  no  absolute  require-
ment).  App. 110–111; Scott, 550 U. S., at 378.  Nor did the
school require teachers to have any background or training
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru*. It contains legal citations, arguments, and references to specific facts and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

941

524 U. S.

June 22, 1998

No. 97–8364. Hall v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 958 S. W. 2d 679.

No. 97–8447. Young v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 1437.

No. 97–8694. Sinn v. Ratelle, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 127.

No. 97–8695. Sikora v. Higley, Associate Warden. Sup.

Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8712. Moore v. Griesa et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 97–8715. Nocon v. Landress, Superintendent, Avon
Park Correctional Institution, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 45.

No. 97–8721. Parks v. Rivers, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8724. Allen v. Stewart, Director, Arizona De-
partment of Correction, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 97–8729. Wood et al. v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th

App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8733. Seaton v. Michigan (two judgments). Record-

er’s Court, City of Detroit, Mich. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8738. Hilliard v. Kaiser et al. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 151.

No. 97–8741. Wesley v. Wesley. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 97–8754. Percival v. Stine, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8757. Brown v. City of San Diego Police Depart-

ment. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8758. Brown v. Superior Court of California, San
Diego County. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks sequential narrative and is more akin to a legal docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

13

Opinion of the Court

Government  must  make  a  two-part  showing  to  meet  its
burden.  As  an  initial  matter,  the  Government  has  to
prove  that  the  misrepresented  fact  was  sufficiently  rele-
vant  to  one  or  another  naturalization  criterion  that  it
would  have  prompted  reasonable  officials,  “seeking  only
evidence  concerning  citizenship  qualifications,”  to  under-
take further investigation.  Id., at 774, n. 9.  If that much
is  true,  the  inquiry  turns  to  the  prospect  that  such  an
investigation  would  have  borne  disqualifying  fruit.    As  to
that second link in the causal chain, the Government need
not  show  definitively  that  its  investigation  would  have
unearthed a disqualifying fact (though, of course, it may).
Rather,  the  Government  need  only  establish  that  the
investigation  “would  predictably  have  disclosed”  some
legal disqualification.  Id., at 774; see id., at 783 (Brennan,
J., concurring).  If that is so, the defendant’s misrepresen-
tation contributed to the citizenship award in the way we
think §1425(a) requires.

That standard reflects two real-world attributes of cases
premised on what an unhindered investigation would have
found.  First is the difficulty of proving that a hypothetical
inquiry  would  have  led  to  some  disqualifying  discovery,
often  several  years  after  the  defendant  told  her  lies.    As
witnesses and other evidence disappear, the Government’s
effort  to  reconstruct  the  course  of  a  “could  have  been”
investigation  confronts  ever-mounting  obstacles.    See  id.,
at  779  (opinion  of  Scalia,  J.).    Second,  and  critical  to  our
analysis,  is  that  the  defendant—not  the  Government—
bears  the  blame  for  that  evidentiary  predicament.    After
all,  the  inquiry  cannot  get  this  far  unless  the  defendant
made  an  unlawful  false  statement  and,  by  so  doing,  ob-
structed the normal course of an investigation.  See id., at
783  (Brennan,  J.,  concurring)  (emphasizing  that  “the
citizen’s  misrepresentation  [in  a  naturalization  proceed-
ing] necessarily frustrated the Government’s investigative
efforts”); see also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the burden of proof in a case involving misrepresentation during the naturalization process.  It delves into legal precedent and specific requirements for the government to prove its case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

BREYER, J., dissenting

persons  were  sentenced  to  death.    BJS  2013  Stats,  at  19
(Table  16).  Last  year,  just  73  persons  were  sentenced  to
death.  DPIC,  The  Death  Penalty  in  2014:  Year  End  Re
port 1 (2015).

That  trend,  a  significant  decline  in  the  last  15  years,
also  holds  true  with  respect  to  the  number  of  annual
executions.  See  Appendix  B,  infra  (showing  executions
from 1977–2014).  In 1999, 98 people were executed.  BJS,
Data  Collection:  National  Prisoner  Statistics  Program
(BJS  Prisoner  Statistics)  (available  in  Clerk  of  Court’s
case file).  Last year, that number was only 35.  DPIC, The
Death Penalty in 2014, supra, at 1.

Next,  one  can  consider  state-level  data.    Often  when
deciding whether a punishment practice is, constitutionally
speaking,  “unusual,”  this  Court  has  looked  to  the  num-
ber of States engaging in that practice.  Atkins, 536 U. S.,
at 313–316; Roper, supra, at 564–566.  In this respect, the
number of active death penalty States has fallen dramati
cally.  In 1972, when the Court decided Furman, the death
penalty  was  lawful  in  41  States.    Nine  States  had  abol
ished  it.  E.  Mandery,  A  Wild  Justice:  The  Death  and
Resurrection  of  Capital  Punishment  in  America  145
(2013).  As  of  today,  19  States  have  abolished  the  death
penalty  (along  with  the  District  of  Columbia),  although
some  did  so  prospectively  only.    See  DPIC,  States  With
and  Without  the  Death  Penalty,  online  at  http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty.    In
11  other  States  that  maintain  the  death  penalty  on  the
books,  no  execution  has  taken  place  for  more  than  eight
years:  Arkansas  (last  execution  2005);  California  (2006);
Colorado  (1997);  Kansas  (no  executions  since  the  death
penalty was reinstated in 1976); Montana (2006); Nevada
(2006);  New  Hampshire  (no  executions  since  the  death
penalty  was  reinstated  in  1976);  North  Carolina  (2006);
Oregon (1997); Pennsylvania (1999); and Wyoming (1992).
DPIC, Executions by State and Year, online at http://www.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites statistics and legal precedents to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

13

THOMAS, J., dissenting

tions.  See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Inter Tribal Council
of Arizona, Inc. (ITCA) et al. 30–31, 48–50 (hereafter Brief
for  ITCA  Respondents;  Brief  for  Gonzalez  Respondents
44–50;  Brief  for  United  States  24–27,  31–33.    But  this
Court  does  not  have  the  power  to  alter  the  terms  of
the  Constitution.    Moreover,  this  Court’s  decisions  do  not
support  the  respondents’  and  the  Government’s  position.
Respondents and the United States point out that Smi-
ley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (1932), mentioned “registration”
in  a  list  of  voting-related  subjects  it  believed  Congress
could  regulate  under  Article  I,  §4.    Id.,  at  366  (listing
“notices,  registration,  supervision  of  voting,  protection  of
voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting
of  votes,  duties  of inspectors  and  canvassers,  and  making
and  publication  of  election  returns”  (emphasis  added)).
See  Brief  for  ITCA  Respondents  49;  Brief  for  Gonzalez
Respondents  48;  Brief  for  United  States  21.    But  that
statement  was  dicta  because  Smiley  involved  congres-
sional  redistricting,  not  voter  registration.    285  U. S.,  at
361–362.  Cases since Smiley have similarly not addressed
the  issue  of  voter  qualifications  but  merely  repeated  the
word “registration” without further analysis.  See Cook v.
Gralike,  531  U. S.  510,  523  (2001);  Roudebush  v.  Hartke,
405 U. S. 15, 24 (1972).
  Moreover,  in  Oregon  v.  Mitchell,  400  U. S.  112  (1970),
a majority of this Court, “took the position that [Article I,
§4,]  did  not  confer  upon  Congress  the  power  to  regulate
voter  qualifications  in  federal  elections,”  as  the  majority
recognizes.  Ante,  at  14,  n.  8.    See  Mitchell,  400  U. S.,  at
288  (Stewart,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in
part);  id.,  at  210–212  (Harlan,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and
dissenting  in  part);  id.,  at  143  (opinion  of  Douglas,  J.).
And  even  the  majority’s  decision  in  U. S.  Term  Limits,
from  which  I  dissented,  recognized  that  Madison’s  Feder-
alist No. 52 “explicitly contrasted the state control over the
qualifications  of  electors”  with  what  it  believed  was  “the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites other cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing as part of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1063

558 U. S.

November 30, 2009

No.  09–7341.  Banks  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7342.  Angulo-Hernandez  et  al.  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  2.
No.  09–7343.  Benton  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  969.

No.  09–7344.  Berkefelt  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  566.

No. 09–7345.  Booker v. United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  576  F.  3d  506.

No.  09–7346.  Bryant  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.  Appx.  259.

No.  09–7348.  Beverly  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  44.

No.  09–7349.  Butler  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09– 348.  Tradin  Organics  USA,  Inc.  v.  Maryland
Casualty  Co.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice
Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this
petition.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  10.

No.  09–376.  Pitkins,  Superintendent,  State  Correc
tional Institution at Laurel Highlands, et al. v.  Hummel.
C. A. 3d Cir.  Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis  granted.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.
3d  290.

No.  09–383.  Park  Mini  Storage  Center  Co.  v.  Sam’s  East,
Inc.,  dba  Sam’s  Club.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  2d  Dist.  Certiorari
denied.  Justice  Breyer  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or
decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  11  So.  3d  951.

No.  09–5217.  Scott  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.
Appx.  71.

No.  09–5553.  Brisco  v.  Ercole,  Superintendent,  Green
Haven  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  de
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Opinion of the Court

number of other violations as predicates for liability.  This
mechanism  radically  expands  the  scope  of  PAGA  actions.
The  default  penalties  set  by  PAGA  are  $100  for  each  ag-
grieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and
$200 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each
subsequent violation.  Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2699(f )(2).  In-
dividually,  these  penalties  are  modest;  but  given  PAGA’s
additive dimension, low-value claims may easily be welded
together into high-value suits.

B
Petitioner Viking River Cruises, Inc. (Viking), is a com-
pany that offers ocean and river cruises around the world.
When respondent Angie Moriana was hired by Viking as a
sales  representative,  she  executed  an  agreement  to  arbi-
trate  any  dispute  arising  out  of  her  employment.  The
agreement  contained  a  “Class  Action  Waiver”  providing
that in any arbitral proceeding, the parties could not bring
any dispute as a class, collective, or representative PAGA
action.  It  also  contained  a  severability  clause  specifying
that if the waiver was found invalid, any class, collective,
representative, or PAGA action would presumptively be lit-
igated  in  court.  But  under  that  severability  clause, if  any
“portion”  of  the  waiver  remained  valid,  it  would  be  “en-
forced in arbitration.”

After  leaving  her  position  with  Viking,  Moriana  filed  a
PAGA action against Viking in California court.  Her com-
plaint contained a claim that Viking had failed to provide
her  with  her  final  wages  within  72  hours,  as  required  by
§§101–102 of the California Labor Code.  But the complaint
also asserted a wide array of other code violations allegedly
sustained by other Viking employees, including violations
of  provisions  concerning  the  minimum  wage,  overtime,
meal  periods,  rest  periods,  timing  of  pay,  and  pay  state-
ments.  Viking  moved  to  compel  arbitration  of  Moriana’s
“individual”  PAGA  claim—here  meaning  the  claim  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case involving the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) and arbitration agreements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

Opinion of the Court

the national interest); whose entry to suspend (“all aliens
or any class of aliens”); for how long (“for such period as he
shall  deem  necessary”);  and  on  what  conditions  (“any
restrictions he may deem to be appropriate”).  It is there-
fore  unsurprising  that  we  have  previously  observed  that
§1182(f ) vests the President with “ample power” to impose
entry  restrictions  in  addition  to  those  elsewhere  enumer-
ated  in  the  INA.  Sale,  509  U. S.,  at  187  (finding  it  “per-
fectly  clear”  that  the  President  could  “establish  a  naval
blockade”  to  prevent  illegal  migrants  from  entering  the
United  States);  see  also  Abourezk  v.  Reagan,  785  F. 2d
1043,  1049,  n.  2  (CADC  1986)  (describing  the  “sweeping
proclamation power” in §1182(f ) as enabling the President
to  supplement  the  other  grounds  of  inadmissibility  in  the
INA).

The  Proclamation  falls  well  within  this  comprehensive
delegation.    The  sole  prerequisite  set  forth  in  §1182(f )  is
that  the  President  “find[ ]”  that  the  entry  of  the  covered
aliens “would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States.”  The  President  has  undoubtedly  fulfilled  that
requirement here.  He first ordered DHS and other agen-
cies to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of every single
country’s  compliance  with  the  information  and  risk  as-
sessment baseline.  The President then issued a Proclama-
tion  setting  forth  extensive  findings  describing  how  defi-
ciencies  in  the  practices  of  select  foreign  governments—
several  of  which  are  state  sponsors  of  terrorism—deprive
the  Government  of  “sufficient  information  to  assess  the
risks  [those  countries’  nationals]  pose  to  the  United
States.”  Proclamation §1(h)(i).  Based on that review, the
President  found  that  it  was  in  the  national  interest  to
restrict  entry  of  aliens  who  could  not  be  vetted  with
adequate  information—both  to  protect  national  security
and  public  safety,  and  to  induce  improvement  by  their
home countries.  The Proclamation therefore “craft[ed] . . .
country-specific  restrictions  that  would  be  most  likely  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from the Supreme Court. It discusses the President's power to restrict entry of aliens based on national security concerns, citing relevant legal precedents and the text of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

The  Elections  Clause  both  imposes  a  duty  on  States  and
assigns  that  duty  to  a  particular  state  actor:  In  the  ab-
sence  of  a  valid  congressional  directive  to  the  contrary,
States must draw district lines for their federal represent-
atives.  And that duty “shall” be carried out “in each State
by the Legislature thereof.”

In  Arizona,  however,  redistricting  is  not  carried  out  by
the legislature.  Instead, as the result of a ballot initiative,
an  unelected  body  called  the  Independent  Redistricting
Commission  draws  the  lines.    See  ante,  at  6–7.    The  key
question  in  the  case  is  whether  the  Commission  can  con-
duct congressional districting consistent with the directive
that such authority be exercised “by the Legislature.”

The majority concedes that the unelected Commission is
not  “the  Legislature”  of  Arizona.  The  Court  contends
instead  that  the  people  of  Arizona  as  a  whole  constitute
“the Legislature” for purposes of the Elections Clause, and
that  they  may  delegate  the  congressional  districting  au-
thority conferred by that Clause to the Commission.  Ante,
at 25.  The majority provides no support for the delegation
part  of  its  theory,  and  I  am  not  sure  whether  the  major-
ity’s analysis is correct on that issue.  But even giving the
Court the benefit of the doubt in that regard, the Commis-
sion  is  still  unconstitutional.  Both  the  Constitution  and
our  cases  make  clear  that  “the  Legislature”  in  the  Elec-
tions  Clause  is  the  representative  body  which  makes  the
laws of the people.

A
The  majority  devotes  much  of  its  analysis  to  establish-
ing  that  the  people  of  Arizona  may  exercise  lawmaking
power  under  their  State  Constitution.    See  ante,  at  5–6,
25,  27–28.  Nobody  doubts  that.  This  case  is  governed,
however, by the Federal Constitution.  The States do not,
in  the  majority’s  words,  “retain  autonomy  to  establish
their  own  governmental  processes,”  ante,  at  27,  if  those
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Elections Clause and the constitutionality of an independent redistricting commission in Arizona.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

THOMAS, J., concurring

(recognizing that a private space can become a public forum
when leased to the government).  Common-carrier regula-
tions,  although  they  directly  restrain  private  companies,
thus may have an indirect effect of subjecting government
officials to suits that would not otherwise be cognizable un-
der our public-forum jurisprudence.

This analysis may help explain the Second Circuit’s intu-
ition that part of Mr. Trump’s Twitter account was a public
forum.  But that intuition has problems.  First, if market
power is a predicate for common carriers (as some scholars
suggest), nothing in the record evaluates Twitter’s market
power.  Second, and more problematic, neither the Second
Circuit nor respondents have identified any regulation that
restricts Twitter from removing an account that would oth-
erwise be a “government-controlled space.”

2
Even if digital platforms are not close enough to common
carriers, legislatures might still be able to treat digital plat-
forms like places of public accommodation.  Although defi-
nitions between jurisdictions vary, a company ordinarily is
a place of public accommodation if it provides “lodging, food,
entertainment,  or  other  services  to  the  public  . . .  in  gen-
eral.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 20 (11th ed. 2019) (defining
“public  accommodation”);  accord,  42  U. S. C.  §2000a(b)(3)
(covering places of “entertainment”).  Twitter and other dig-
ital  platforms  bear  resemblance  to  that  definition.    This,
too, may explain the Second Circuit’s intuition.  Courts are
split, however, about whether federal accommodations laws
apply  to  anything  other  than  “physical”  locations.    Com-
pare, e.g., Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F. 3d 557,
559 (CA7 1999) (Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act  (ADA)  covers  websites),  with  Parker  v.  Metropolitan
Life  Ins.  Co.,  121  F. 3d  1006,  1010–1011  (CA6  1997)  (en
banc) (Title III of the ADA covers only physical places); see
also  42  U. S. C.  §§2000a(b)–(c)  (discussing  “physica[l]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 593 U.S. ____ (2021). It delves into legal arguments and precedents related to the First Amendment and the treatment of digital platforms like Twitter.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–915
_________________

UNICOLORS, INC., PETITIONER v.
H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[February 24, 2022]

  JUSTICE THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE ALITO  joins,  and
with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins  as  to  all  but  Part  II,
dissenting.
  A  copyright  registration  is  invalid  if  the  registrant  in-
cluded materially inaccurate information in its application
“with knowledge that [the information] was inaccurate.”  17
U. S. C. §411(b)(1)(A).  In its petition for certiorari, Unicol-
ors  asked  us  to  decide  a  question  on  which  the  Courts  of
Appeals were split: whether §411(b)(1)(A)’s “knowledge” el-
ement requires “indicia of fraud.”  Pet. for Cert. i.  Specifi-
cally, Unicolors argued that “knowledge” requires “inten[t]
to defraud the Copyright Office.”  Id., at 7.
  Yet  now,  after  having  “persuaded  us  to  grant certiorari
on this issue,” Unicolors has “chosen to rely on a different
argument in [its] merits briefing.”  Visa Inc. v. Osborn, 580
U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (internal punctuation altered).  It no
longer argues that §411(b)(1)(A) requires fraudulent intent
and instead proposes a novel “actual knowledge” standard.
Because I would not reward Unicolors for its legerdemain,
and  because  no  other  court  had,  before  today,  ever  ad-
dressed whether §411(b)(1)(A) requires “actual knowledge,”
I  would  dismiss  the  writ  of  certiorari  as  improvidently
granted.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P.* It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

JACKSON, J., dissenting

The statute at issue here—28 U. S. C. §2401(a)—supple-
ments those specific provisions.  In doing so, §2401(a) serves
a special purpose: to act as a catchall that imposes an outer
time  limit  on  claims  brought  against  the  United  States
when  no  other  statute  of  limitations  applies.    Under
§2401(a), “every civil action commenced against the United
States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within
six  years  after  the  right  of  action  first  accrues.”    This
catchall limitations statute has been applied in a range of
contexts,  including  APA  claims  (like  this  one),  contract
claims, see Crown Coat, 386 U. S., at 510–511, and more,
see,  e.g.,  Natural  Resources  Defense  Council  v.  Haaland,
102 F. 4th 1045, 1074 (CA9 2024) (claims under the Endan-
gered Species Act).

Consistent with the broad scope of its potential applica-
tion,  §2401(a)  uses  broad  language.  It  starts  the  6-year
clock when “the right of action first accrues.”  §2401(a).  No
more elaboration or specificity is given.  So, what does the
sparse text of §2401(a) tell us?

To start, the statute tells us to look at when “the right of
action first accrues.”  (Emphasis added.)  The word “first”
directs us to start the clock at the earliest possible oppor-
tunity once the claim accrues.  From the text alone, then,
we  know  that  this  moment  in  time  should happen  sooner
rather than later.  But when that moment occurs depends
on the meaning of both “the right of action” and “accrues.”
Next, the provision uses the unadorned phrase “the right
of  action.”  Because  this  statute  is  applicable  to  a  broad
range of causes of action against the Government, the un-
derlying  statute  (here  the  APA)  provides  “the  right  of  ac-
tion,”  not  §2401(a)  itself.  Put  another  way,  the  §2401(a)
catchall  applies  to  different  causes  of  action,  and  those
causes of action establish different legal claims. Though the
right of action is not the same for an APA claim as it is for
an Endangered Species Act claim, §2401(a)’s broad “right of
action” language applies to both of these claims, and more.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the statute of limitations for civil actions against the United States, focusing on 28 U.S.C. §2401(a).  The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

JOHNSON v. ARTEAGA-MARTINEZ

Opinion of the Court

statutory provisio[n] is clear” and that it did not support a
periodic bond hearing requirement.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at
23).

The Jennings Court also rejected the lower court’s appli-
cation of the canon of constitutional avoidance.  Earlier in
its opinion, the Court explained that “[t]he canon of consti-
tutional avoidance ‘comes into play only when, after the ap-
plication of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found
to be susceptible of more than one construction.’ ”  Id., at ___
(slip op., at 12) (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371,
385 (2005)).  “In the absence of more than one plausible con-
struction, the canon simply has no application. ”  Jennings,
583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Applying  this  reasoning  to  §1226(a),  the  Court
concluded that the canon was inapposite because “[n]othing
in §1226(a)’s text . . . even remotely supports the imposition
of either of th[e] requirements” the Ninth Circuit had im-
posed.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 23).

B
The  question  presented  is  whether  §1231(a)(6)  requires
bond hearings before immigration judges after six months
of detention in which the Government bears the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.  Section
1231(a)(6) provides that certain noncitizens who have been
ordered removed “may be detained beyond the removal pe-
riod and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of
supervision.”  This  text,  which  does  not  address  or  “even
hin[t]” at the requirements imposed below, directs that we
answer this question in the negative.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at
14).

The Jennings Court emphasized that the canon of consti-
tutional  avoidance  is  only  applicable  where  a  statute  has
“more than one plausible construction.”  Id., at ___ (slip op.,
at 12).  Here, there is no plausible construction of the text
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the application of statutory interpretation principles and case law. It delves into the meaning of specific sections of a law and how courts have interpreted them.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.

MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

of  the  structural  differences  between  isolated  DNA  and
naturally  occurring  DNA,  especially  where  the  structural
differences are merely ancillary to the breaking of covalent
bonds, a process that is itself not inventive.”  Ibid.  More-
over,  Judge  Bryson  gave  no  weight  to  the  PTO’s  position
on  patentability  because  of  the  Federal  Circuit’s  position
that  “the  PTO  lacks  substantive  rulemaking  authority  as
to issues such as patentability.”  Id., at 1357.

Although  the  judges  expressed  different  views  concern-
ing the patentability of isolated DNA, all three agreed that
patent  claims  relating  to  cDNA  met  the  patent  eligibility
requirements  of  §101.  Id.,  at  1326,  and  n. 9  (recognizing
that  some  patent  claims  are  limited  to  cDNA  and  that
such  claims  are  patent  eligible  under  §101);  id.,  at  1337
(Moore,  J.,  concurring  in  part);  id.,  at  1356  (Bryson,  J.,
concurring  in  part  and  dissenting in  part)  (“cDNA  cannot
be isolated from nature, but instead must be created in the
laboratory  . . .  because  the  introns  that  are  found  in  the
native  gene  are  removed  from  the  cDNA  segment”).3    We
granted certiorari.  568 U. S. ___ (2012).

II

A

Section 101 of the Patent Act provides:

“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful . . .
composition  of  matter,  or  any  new  and  useful  im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, sub-
ject  to  the  conditions  and  requirements  of  this  title.”

——————

3 Myriad  continues  to  challenge  Dr.  Ostrer’s  Declaratory  Judgment
Act standing in this Court.  Brief for Respondents 17–22.  But we find
that, under the Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
Dr. Ostrer has alleged sufficient facts “under all the circumstances, [to]
show  that  there  is  a  substantial  controversy,  between  parties  having
adverse  legal  interests,  of  sufficient  immediacy  and  reality  to  warrant
the  issuance  of  a  declaratory  judgment.”    549  U. S.  118,  127  (2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the patentability of isolated DNA. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Opinion of the Court

“started  talking  trash,”  Rahimi  drove  to  the  man’s  home
and shot into it.  Brief for United States 3.  While driving
the next day, Rahimi collided with another car, exited his
vehicle, and proceeded to shoot at the other car.  Three days
later,  he  fired  his  gun  in  the  air  while  driving  through  a
residential neighborhood.  A few weeks after that, Rahimi
was speeding on a highway near Arlington, Texas, when a
truck flashed its lights at him.  Rahimi hit the brakes and
cut across traffic to chase the truck.  Once off the highway,
he  fired  several  times  toward  the  truck  and  a  nearby  car
before fleeing.  Two weeks after that, Rahimi and a friend
were dining at a roadside burger restaurant.  When the res-
taurant  declined  his  friend’s  credit  card,  Rahimi  pulled  a
gun and shot into the air.

The  police  obtained  a  warrant  to  search  Rahimi’s  resi-
dence.  There they discovered a pistol, a rifle, ammunition—
and a copy of the restraining order.

B
Rahimi was indicted on one count of possessing a firearm
while subject to a domestic violence restraining order, in vi-
olation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8).  At the time, such a viola-
tion was punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment (since
amended  to  15  years).  §924(a)(2);  see  Bipartisan  Safer
Communities Act, Pub. L. 117–159, §12004(c)(2), 136 Stat.
1329, 18 U. S. C. §924(a)(8).  A prosecution under Section
922(g)(8) may proceed only if three criteria are met.  First,
the defendant must have received actual notice and an op-
portunity  to  be  heard  before  the  order  was  entered.
§922(g)(8)(A).  Second, the order must prohibit the defend-
ant  from  either  “harassing,  stalking,  or  threatening”  his
“intimate partner” or his or his partner’s child, or “engaging
in other conduct that would place [the] partner in reasona-
ble  fear  of  bodily  injury”  to  the  partner  or  child.
§922(g)(8)(B).  A defendant’s “intimate partner[s]” include
his spouse or any former spouse, the parent of his child, and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the part outlining the facts of the case. It is sequential text and provides relevant information about the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summary/Facts</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BOECHLER, P.C. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–1472.  Argued January 12, 2022—Decided April 21, 2022

In 2015, the Internal Revenue Service notified Boechler, P.C., a North
Dakota law firm, of a discrepancy in its tax filings.  When Boechler did
not respond, the IRS assessed an “intentional disregard” penalty and
notified Boechler of its intent to levy Boechler’s property to satisfy the
penalty.  See 26 U. S. C. §§6330(a), 6721(a)(2), (e)(2)(A).  Boechler re-
quested  and  received  a  “collection  due  process  hearing”  before  the
IRS’s Independent Office of Appeals pursuant to §6330(b), but the Of-
fice sustained the proposed levy.  Under §6330(d)(1), Boechler had 30
days to petition the Tax Court for review.  Boechler filed its petition
one day late.  The Tax Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdic-
tion and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that §6330(d)(1)’s 30-
day filing deadline is jurisdictional and thus cannot be equitably tolled.

Held: Section 6330(d)(1)’s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review
of a collection due process determination is a nonjurisdictional dead-
line subject to equitable tolling.  Pp. 2–11.

(a) Not all procedural requirements are jurisdictional.  Many simply
instruct “parties [to] take certain procedural steps at certain specified
times” without conditioning a court’s authority to hear the case on com-
pliance with those steps.  Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435.
The  distinction  matters,  as  jurisdictional  requirements  cannot  be
waived  or  forfeited,  must  be  raised  by  courts  sue  sponte,  and  do  not
allow for equitable exceptions.  Id., at 434–435; Sebelius v. Auburn Re-
gional Medical Center, 568 U. S 145, 154.  As such, a procedural re-
quirement is jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” that it is.
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515.  This case therefore turns
on whether Congress has clearly stated that §6330(d)(1)’s deadline is
jurisdictional.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

THOMAS, J., dissenting

When the APA was enacted, the meaning of a statute was
considered a question of law.  The Court recognized as much
in Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365 (1945),
writing that questions about “the meaning of the words of
[the statute]” were “questions of law,” id., at 371.  See also
Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev.
899,  901  (1943);  J.  Thayer,  Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evi-
dence  at  the  Common  Law  193  (1898).    Moreover,  §706
“places  the  court’s  duty  to  interpret  statutes  on  an  equal
footing  with  its  duty  to  interpret  the  Constitution,  and
courts never defer to agencies in reading the Constitution.”
Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77
Texas  L. Rev.  113,  194  (1998).    Finally,  the  deferential
standards of review elsewhere in the APA—which require
courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-
ings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion . . . [or] unsupported by substantial
evidence,”  §706(2)—do  not  mention  statutory  interpreta-
tion.  See id., at 194.  Even if Chevron raised no constitu-
tional concerns, these statutory arguments give rise to se-
rious doubts about Chevron’s legitimacy.

C
In the past, I have left open the possibility that “there is
some unique historical justification for deferring to federal
agencies.”  Michigan,  supra,  at  ___  (concurring  opinion)
(slip op., at 4).  It now appears to me that there is no such
special justification and that Chevron is inconsistent with
accepted  principles  of  statutory  interpretation  from  the
first century of the Republic.

For  most  of  the  19th  century,  there  was  no  general
federal-question jurisdiction.  Instead, review was available
in  a  common-law  action,  under  certain  limited  grants  of
federal-question jurisdiction, or by extraordinary writ (such
as a writ of mandamus).  Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial
Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L. J. 908,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Chevron doctrine, a principle of administrative law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION v.
ALSTON ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–512.  Argued March 31, 2021—Decided June 21, 2021*

Colleges  and  universities  across  the  country  have  leveraged  sports  to
bring in revenue, attract attention, boost enrollment, and raise money
from alumni.  That profitable enterprise relies on “amateur” student-
athletes who compete under horizontal restraints that restrict how the
schools may compensate them for their play.  The National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) issues and enforces these rules, which re-
strict compensation for student-athletes in various ways.  These rules
depress compensation for at least some student-athletes below what a
competitive market would yield.
   Against this backdrop, current and former student-athletes brought
this antitrust lawsuit challenging the NCAA’s restrictions on compen-
sation.  Specifically, they alleged that the NCAA’s rules violate §1 of
the Sherman Act, which prohibits “contract[s], combination[s], or con-
spirac[ies] in restraint of trade or commerce.”  15 U. S. C. §1.  Key facts
were undisputed: The NCAA and its members have agreed to compen-
sation limits for student-athletes; the NCAA enforces these limits on
its  member-schools;  and  these  compensation  limits  affect  interstate
commerce.  Following a bench trial, the district court issued a 50-page
opinion that refused to disturb the NCAA’s rules limiting undergrad-
uate athletic scholarships and other compensation related to athletic
performance.    At  the  same  time,  the  court  found  unlawful  and  thus
enjoined  certain  NCAA  rules  limiting  the  education-related  benefits
schools may make available to student-athletes.  Both sides appealed.
The  Ninth  Circuit  affirmed  in  full,  holding  that  the  district  court

——————

* Together with No. 20–520, American Athletic Conference et al. v. Al-

ston et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xlii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
960
906
946

Walter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walton v. Bartlett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walton v. Princeton Baptist Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Warden. See name of warden.
Warkow, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,966
Warren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
Washington, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,963
955
Washington v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Washington v. Service Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940
Washington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
156
Washington Legal Foundation; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Wasko v. Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Watson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Wayne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
Wegner v. Lewis
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913
Weisser, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Weissman v. Cohn, Liﬂand, Perlman, Hermann & Knopf
. . . . . . .
901
Wellons, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wells v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
Wells Electronics, Inc.; Pfaff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,975
941
Wesley v. Wesley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
West; Cummings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
West; Epps v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976,977
West Covina v. Perkins
946
Western Weighing and Inspection Bureau; Hayes v.
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
West High School; Bauchman v.
953
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942,971
West Virginia; Jackson v.
Whatley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940,945
906
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Whitaker; McGrew v.
968
Whitaker v. Whitaker
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913
White, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
White; Barbir v.
931
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
White; Castapheny v.
931
White; Castaphney v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960
White v. Internal Revenue Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
White v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
White v. McMillan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
928
White v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
Whitehall Realty Co.; Whitehall Tenants Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
926
Whitehall Tenants Corp. v. Whitehall Realty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Whiteside, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Widnall; Belhomme v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Wilkerson v. Tutt
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
Williams v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely found at the beginning of a legal document.  It is not sequential text and is not the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxxxi

Page

876

Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp.; Department of Interior v.  . . . . . . .
868

Kessler v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Ketchum v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Keyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1008

Khahaifa; Savinon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
855

Khalafala v. U. S. District Court
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Khalil v. Holder
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Khan v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Khanna v. State Bar of Cal.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Khondaker v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036

Kiderlen v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910

Kilbourne v. Michigan
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Kilby; Haburn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

Kiley v.  American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
1146

Killian; Corines v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Kilpatrick v. Hernandez  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1023,1139

Kim v. Department of Labor
981

Kim v. Federal Way  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945

Kim v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  968,1078

Kim v. Progressive Express Ins. Co.
823

Kim v. Synod of So. Cal. and Haw.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

Kim v. Wernette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Kimbrough v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Kimco of Evansville, Inc. v. Indiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kincaid-Chauncey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

Kinchion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004

53

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kindler; Beard v.
1033

Kindsfather v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

Kinetic Concepts, Inc.; Medela AG v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

King; Justice v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

King; Manigault v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
900

King v. Noland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
855

King v. Nooth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887

King v. Ryan
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
King; Shelton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

King v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  863,1058

1077

Kinkade Co., LLC v. Hazlewood  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1104

Kinnell v. McKune  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
855

Kinney v. Bergh  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
866

Kinney v. Iowa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kinney v. McQuiggin
882

Kipple v. Georgia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
867

Kirkey v. Mize  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116

Kirkland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
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This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

Opinion of the Court

words of the Division, the requested cake included “word-
ing  and  images  [the  baker]  deemed  derogatory,”  Jack  v.
Gateaux,  Ltd.,  Charge  No.  P20140071X,  at  4;  featured
“language and images [the baker] deemed hateful,” Jack v.
Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X, at 4;  or
displayed a message the baker “deemed as discriminatory,
Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X, at 4.

The  treatment  of  the  conscience-based  objections  at
issue in these three cases contrasts with the Commission’s
treatment  of  Phillips’  objection.    The  Commission  ruled
against  Phillips  in  part  on  the  theory  that  any  message
the  requested  wedding  cake  would  carry  would  be  at-
tributed  to  the  customer,  not  to  the  baker.    Yet  the  Divi-
sion  did  not  address  this  point  in  any  of  the  other  cases
with  respect  to  the  cakes  depicting  anti-gay  marriage
symbolism.    Additionally,  the  Division  found  no  violation
of  CADA  in  the  other  cases  in  part  because  each  bakery
was  willing  to  sell  other  products,  including  those  depict-
ing  Christian  themes,  to  the  prospective  customers.    But
the  Commission  dismissed  Phillips’  willingness  to  sell
“birthday  cakes,  shower  cakes,  [and]  cookies  and  brown-
ies,” App. 152, to gay and lesbian customers as irrelevant.
The  treatment  of  the  other  cases  and  Phillips’  case  could
reasonably  be  interpreted  as  being  inconsistent  as  to  the
question  of  whether  speech  is  involved,  quite  apart  from
whether the cases should ultimately be distinguished.  In
short, the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ religious
objection  did  not  accord  with  its  treatment  of  these  other
objections.

Before the Colorado Court of Appeals, Phillips protested
that  this  disparity  in  treatment  reflected  hostility  on  the
part of the Commission toward his beliefs.  He argued that
the Commission had treated the other bakers’ conscience-
based  objections  as  legitimate,  but  treated  his  as  illegiti-
mate—thus  sitting  in  judgment  of  his  religious  beliefs
themselves.  The Court of Appeals addressed the disparity
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the treatment of religious objections in cases involving bakers refusing service to same-sex couples. It delves into inconsistencies in the Commission's approach to similar cases, highlighting potential bias against Phillips' religious beliefs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

453

Opinion of Scalia, J.

tution could not command statesmanship. They could sim-
ply provide structures from which it might emerge. The
fact that these mechanisms, plus the proper functioning of
the separation of powers itself, are not employed, or that
they prove insufﬁcient, cannot validate an otherwise uncon-
stitutional device. With these observations, I join the opin-
ion of the Court.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O(cid:146)Connor joins, and
with whom Justice Breyer joins as to Part III, concurring
in part and dissenting in part.

Today the Court acknowledges the “ ‘overriding and time-
honored concern about keeping the Judiciary’s power within
its proper constitutional sphere.’ ” Ante, at 421, quoting
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 820 (1997).
It proceeds, how-
ever, to ignore the prescribed statutory limits of our jurisdic-
tion by permitting the expedited-review provisions of the
Line Item Veto Act to be invoked by persons who are not
“individual[s],” 2 U. S. C. § 692 (1994 ed., Supp. II); and to
ignore the constitutional limits of our jurisdiction by permit-
ting one party to challenge the Government’s denial to an-
other party of favorable tax treatment from which the ﬁrst
party might, but just as likely might not, gain a concrete
beneﬁt.
In my view, the Snake River appellees lack stand-
ing to challenge the President’s cancellation of the “limited
tax beneﬁt,” and the constitutionality of that action should
not be addressed.
I think the New York appellees have
standing to challenge the President’s cancellation of an “item
of new direct spending”; I believe we have statutory author-
ity (other than the expedited-review provision) to address
that challenge; but unlike the Court I ﬁnd the President’s
cancellation of spending items to be entirely in accord with
the Constitution.

I

The Court’s unrestrained zeal to reach the merits of this
case is evident in its disregard of the statute’s expedited-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 417 (1998). It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1141

558  U. S.

January  11,  12,  2010

No.  09–6512.  Smith  v.  Weber,  Warden,  ante,  p.  1000;
No.  09–6542.  Monacelli  v.  Lee  County  Education  Assn.

et  al.,  ante,  p.  1030;

No.  09–6543.  Monacelli  v.  Heartland  Educational  Con

sortium  et  al.,  ante,  p.  1030;

No.  09–6562.  Elizares  v.  Thomas,  Warden,  et  al.,  ante,

p.  1000;

No.  09–6563.  Monacelli  v.  Heartland  Educational  Con

sortium  et  al.,  ante,  p.  1030;

No.  09–6572.  Wheeler  v.  Miller,  ante,  p.  1000;
No.  09–6584.  Bowman  v.  Colorado,  ante,  p.  1001;
No.  09–6601.  Trotter  v.  Gates,  Secretary  of  Defense,

ante,  p.  1001.

No.  09–6677.  In  re  Warren,  ante,  p.  968;
No.  09–6804.  Hamani  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  1005;
No.  09–7005.  Wise  v.  Floyd,  Judge,  United  States  Dis
trict  Court  for  the  District  of  South  Carolina,  et  al.,
ante,  p.  1033;

No.  09–7036.  Karim-Panahi  v.  United  States,  ante,

p.  1034;  and

No.  09–7137.  Nelson  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  1037.  Peti

tions  for  rehearing  denied.

No.  08–11058.  Samas  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  937;

No.  09–312.  Greene  v.  Hanover  Direct,  Inc.,  et  al.,  ante,

p.  1019;

No.  09–424.  Pannell  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  1019;  and
No. 09–5726.  Peace v.  Astrue, Commissioner of Social Se
curity,  ante,  p.  941.  Petitions  for  rehearing  denied.  Justice
Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of
these  petitions.

No.  08–10112.  Curtis  v.  Oregon,  ante,  p.  832;  and
No.  09–5922.  Curtis  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  922.  Mo

tions  for  leave  to  ﬁle  petitions  for  rehearing  denied.

January  12,  2010

Miscellaneous Order.

(For the Court’s order approving revisions

to  the  Rules  of  this  Court,  see  post,  p.  1162.)

Certiorari  Denied

No.  09–8394  (09A628).  Johnson  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.
Tex.  Application  for  stay  of  execution  of  sentence  of  death,  pre
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, including case numbers, dates, and actions taken. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

Opinion of the Court

the jurisdiction of state courts in adoption proceedings in-
volving  Indian  children.  Fisher  v.  District  Court  of  Six-
teenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U. S. 382, 390 (1976) (per
curiam).

Petitioners are trying to turn a general observation (that
Congress’s Article I powers rarely touch state family law)
into a constitutional carveout (that family law is wholly ex-
empt  from  federal  regulation).  That  argument  is  a  non-
starter.    As  James  Madison  said  to  Members  of  the  First
Congress, when the Constitution conferred a power on Con-
gress, “they might exercise it, although it should interfere
with  the  laws,  or  even  the  Constitution  of  the  States.”    2
Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791).  Family law is no exception.

C
Petitioners come at the problem from the opposite direc-
tion too: Even if there is no family law carveout to the In-
dian affairs power, they contend that Congress’s authority
does  not  stretch  far  enough  to  justify  ICWA.    Ticking
through  the  various  sources  of  power,  petitioners  assert
that the Constitution does not authorize Congress to regu-
late custody proceedings for Indian children.   Their argu-
ments fail to grapple with our precedent, and because they
bear the burden of establishing ICWA’s unconstitutionality,
we cannot sustain their challenge to the law.  See Lujan v.
G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U. S. 189, 198 (2001).

Take the Indian Commerce Clause, which is petitioners’
primary focus.  According to petitioners, the Clause author-
izes Congress to legislate only with respect to Indian tribes
as  government  entities,  not  Indians  as  individuals.    Brief
for Individual Petitioners 47–50.  But we held more than a
century ago that “commerce with the Indian tribes, means
commerce  with  the  individuals  composing  those  tribes.”
United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407, 416–417 (1866) (law
prohibiting the sale of alcohol to Indians in Indian country);
United States v. Nice, 241 U. S. 591, 600 (1916) (same).  So
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the constitutionality of its provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

21

Opinion of the Court

State  in  the  country,  meanwhile,  “has  attained  a  propor-
tional share” of districts in which Hispanic-preferred candi-
dates are likely to prevail.  Id., at 3–4.  That is because as
residential segregation decreases—as it has “sharply” done
since  the  1970s—satisfying  traditional  districting  criteria
such as the compactness requirement “becomes more diffi-
cult.”  T. Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting,
70 Duke L. J. 261, 279, and n. 105 (2020).
  Indeed, as amici supporting the appellees emphasize, §2
litigation in recent years has rarely been successful for just
that reason.  See Chen Brief 3–4.  Since 2010, plaintiffs na-
tionwide  have  apparently  succeeded  in  fewer  than  ten  §2
suits.  Id., at 7.  And “the only state legislative or congres-
sional  districts  that  were  redrawn  because  of  successful
Section 2 challenges were a handful of state house districts
near  Milwaukee  and  Houston.”    Id.,  at  7–8.    By  contrast,
“[n]umerous  lower  courts”  have  upheld  districting  maps
“where, due to minority populations’ geographic diffusion,
plaintiffs  couldn’t  design  an  additional  majority-minority
district” or satisfy the compactness requirement.  Id., at 15–
16 (collecting cases).  The same has been true of recent liti-
gation in this Court.  See Abbott, 585 U. S., at ___–___ (slip
op., at 33–34) (finding a Texas district did not violate §2 be-
cause “the geography and demographics of south and west
Texas do not permit the creation of any more than the seven
Latino . . . districts that exist under the current plan”).4

——————

4 Despite this all, the dissent argues that courts have apparently been
“methodically carving the country into racially designated electoral dis-
tricts”  for  decades.   Post,  at 48  (opinion  of  THOMAS,  J.).  And  that,  the
dissent inveighs, “should inspire us to repentance.”  Ibid.  But propor-
tional representation of minority voters is absent from nearly every cor-
ner of this country despite §2 being in effect for over 40 years.  And in
case after case, we have rejected districting plans that would bring States
closer to proportionality when those plans violate traditional districting
criteria.  See supra, at 19–21.  It seems it is the dissent that is “quixoti-
cally  joust[ing]  with  an  imaginary  adversary.”    Post,  at  47  (opinion  of
THOMAS, J.).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and the challenges of creating districts that proportionally represent minority voters.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

UNICOLORS, INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P.

Opinion of the Court

III
  H&M  argues  that  our  interpretation  of  the  statute  will
make it too easy for copyright holders, by claiming lack of
knowledge, to avoid the consequences of an inaccurate ap-
plication.  But courts need not automatically accept a copy-
right holder’s claim that it was unaware of the relevant le-
gal requirements of copyright law.  We have recognized in
civil cases that willful blindness may support a finding of
actual  knowledge.    Intel  Corp.,  589  U. S.,  at  ___–___  (slip
op., at 11–12).  Circumstantial evidence, including the sig-
nificance of the legal error, the complexity of the relevant
rule,  the  applicant’s  experience  with  copyright  law,  and
other  such  matters,  may  also  lead  a  court  to  find  that  an
applicant was actually aware of, or willfully blind to, legally
inaccurate information.  See id., at ___ (slip op., at 11).
  H&M also argues that our interpretation is foreclosed by
the  legal  maxim  that  “ignorance  of  the  law  is  no  excuse.”
See Brief for Respondent 41–43.  This maxim “normally ap-
plies where a defendant has the requisite mental state in
respect  to  the  elements  of [a]  crime  but  claims  to  be  una-
ware of the existence of a statute proscribing his conduct.”
Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op.,
at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It does not apply
in this civil case concerning the scope of a safe harbor that
arises from ignorance of collateral legal requirements.  See
ibid.
  Finally, H&M claims that neither Unicolors’ petition for
certiorari  nor  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  opinion  addressed  the
question we decide here.  The petition, however, asked us
to decide whether a registration may be invalidated under
§411(b) even though there are no “indicia of fraud . . . as to
the work at issue in the subject copyright registration.”  Pet.
for Cert. i.  Fraud typically requires “[a] knowing misrepre-
sentation  . . .  of  a  material  fact.”    Black’s  Law  Dictionary
802 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added).  If, as the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded, §411(b)(1)(A) does not require “knowledge”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of copyright law and the concept of "willful blindness."  It delves into legal precedents and arguments made by both parties involved in a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON

Opinion of the Court

that it lacks any plausible textual footing in Article 10.2

If the drafters wished to limit Article 10(a) to a particu
lar subset of documents, they presumably would have said
so—as they did, for example, in Article 15, which refers to
“a writ of summons or an equivalent document.”  Instead,
Article  10(a)  uses  the  term  “judicial  documents”—the
same  term  that  is  featured  in  10(b)  and  10(c).  Accord-
ingly, the notion that Article 10(a) governs a different set of
documents  than  10(b)  or  10(c)  is  hard  to  fathom.  And  it
certainly  derives  no  support  from  the  use  of  the  word
“send,”  whose  ordinary  meaning  is  broad  enough  to  cover
the  transmission  of  any  judicial  documents  (including
litigation-initiating  documents).    Nothing  about  the  word
“send”  suggests  that  Article  10(a)  is  narrower  than  10(b)
and  10(c),  let  alone  that  Article  10(a)  is  somehow  limited
to “post-answer” documents.

Ultimately,  Menon  wishes  to  read  the  phrase  “send
judicial  documents”  as  “serve  a  subset  of  judicial  docu
ments.”  That is an entirely atextual reading, and Menon
offers  no  sustained  argument  in  support  of  it.  Therefore,
the  only  way  to  escape  the  conclusion  that  Article  10(a)
includes  service  of  process  is  to  assert  that  it  does  not
cover  service  of  documents  at  all—and,  as  shown  above,
that reading is structurally implausible and renders Arti
cle 10(a) superfluous.

——————

2 The argument also assumes that the scope of the Convention is not

limited to service of process (otherwise, Article 10(a) would be superflu
ous even under Menon’s reading).  Schlunk can be read to suggest that
this  assumption  is  wrong.   486  U. S.,  at  700–701;  see  1  B.  Ristau,
International  Judicial  Assistance  §4–1–4(2),  p.  112  (1990  rev.  ed.)
(Ristau)  (stating  that  the  English  term  “service”  in  the  Convention
“means the formal delivery of a legal document to the addressee in such
a  manner  as  to  legally  charge  him  with  notice  of  the  institution  of  a
legal proceeding”).  For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume,
arguendo, that Menon’s assumption is correct.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a particular article (Article 10) within a legal convention.  It delves into textual analysis and legal reasoning, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>