<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

21

Opinion of the Court

over  the  forest  territory,  including  federal  regulation  of
  Brief  for  Respondent  56–60.  But  as  ex-
those  lands.
plained, the treaty’s text and the historical record suggest
that the phrase “unoccupied lands” had a specific meaning
to the Crow Tribe: lack of settlement.  The proclamation of
a  forest  reserve  withdrawing  land  from  settlement  would
not  categorically  transform  the  territory  into  an  area
resided  on  or  settled  by  non-Indians;  quite  the  opposite.
Nor  would  the  restrictions  on  hunting  in  national  forests
that  Wyoming  cites.  See  Appropriations  Act  of  1899,  ch.
424,  30  Stat.  1095;  36  CFR  §§241.2,  241.3  (Supp.  1941);
§261.10(d)(1) (2018).

Wyoming  also  claims  that  exploitative  mining  and
logging of the forest lands prior to 1897 would have caused
the  Crow  Tribe  to  view  the  Bighorn  Mountains  as  occu-
pied.  But  the  presence  of  mining  and  logging  operations
did  not  amount  to  settlement  of  the  sort  that  the  Tribe
would have understood as rendering the forest occupied.  In
fact,  the  historical  source  on  which  Wyoming  primarily
relies  indicates  that  there  was  “very  little”  settlement  of
Bighorn  National  Forest  around  the  time  the  forest  was
created.  Dept.  of  Interior,  Nineteenth  Ann.  Rep.  of  the
U. S. Geological Survey 167 (1898).

Considering the terms of the 1868 Treaty as they would
have been understood by the Crow Tribe, we conclude that
the creation of Bighorn National Forest did not remove the
forest lands, in their entirety, from the scope of the treaty.

IV
Finally, we note two ways in which our decision is lim-
ited.  First,  we  hold  that  Bighorn  National  Forest  is  not
categorically occupied, not that all areas within the forest
are unoccupied.  On remand, the State may argue that the
specific site where Herrera hunted elk was used in such a
way that it was “occupied” within the meaning of the 1868
Treaty.  See State v. Cutler, 109 Idaho 448, 451, 708 P. 2d
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a treaty and its implications for land use. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific historical events and documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

563

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

use of evidence in a way that systematically disadvantages
one side. Consider, for example, a rule providing that evi-
dence of a rape victim’s sexual relations with persons other
than the accused is admissible to prove consent, or a rule
providing that evidence of a sexual assault defendant’s prior
sexual offenses is inadmissible to show a propensity to com-
mit that type of crime. A statute repealing either of the
above rules would “always run in the prosecution’s favor . . .
[by] mak[ing] it easier to convict the accused.” Ante, at
546.7 Yet no one (until today) has suggested that such a
statute would be ex post facto as applied to offenses com-
mitted before its enactment.

The Court resists the conclusion that Article 38.07 func-
tions as a rule of witness competency by asserting that
“[b]oth before and after the amendment, the victim’s testi-
mony was competent evidence.” Ante, at 544.
In all but
the most technical sense that blanket statement is dubious.
If the victim was 14 years old or older at the time of the
offense (18 or older under the amended statute) and her tes-
timony is unbolstered by corroboration or outcry, the jury
may not credit that testimony in determining whether the
State has met its burden of proof. Such a victim is of course
not literally forbidden from testifying, but that cannot make
the difference for Ex Post Facto Clause purposes between a
sufﬁciency of the evidence rule and a witness competency
rule. Evidence to which the jury is not permitted to assign
weight is, in reality, incompetent evidence.

7 Cf. Fed. Rules Evid. 412(a)(1) (restricting admissibility of “[e]vidence
offered to prove that any alleged victim [of sexual misconduct] engaged in
other sexual behavior”); 412(b)(1)(B) (providing that “evidence of speciﬁc
instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the
person accused” is admissible to prove consent); 413(a) (providing that
“evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of
sexual assault is admissible” in sexual assault cases notwithstanding Rule
404(b)’s general prohibition on the introduction of prior bad acts evidence
“to show action in conformity therewith”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It discusses the use of evidence in a legal case, referencing a statute (Article 38.07) and its potential impact on the fairness of trials.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

ALITO, J., dissenting

of the Federal Government.”  Id., at 72.  Even when we have
sustained  legislation,  we  have  cautioned  against  congres-
sional overreach.  See Lara, 541 U. S., at 203–205.  We have
suggested that a law may exceed Congress’s power to regu-
late  Indian  affairs  if  it  has  “an  unusual  legislative  objec-
tive,” brings about “radical changes in tribal status,” or “in-
terfere[s] with the power or authority of any State.”  Ibid.

We  have  rarely  had  occasion  to  enforce  these  limits,  in
part  because  the  enactments  before  us  have  often  fallen
comfortably within the historical bounds of Congress’s enu-
merated powers.  See ante, at 33–38 (THOMAS, J., dissent-
ing).  But that does not mean that we should shy away from
enforcement  when  presented  with  a  statute  that  exceeds
what the Constitution allows.

II
Congress’s power in the area of Indian affairs cannot ex-
ceed the limits imposed by the “system of dual sovereignty
between  the  States  and  the  Federal  Government”  estab-
lished by the Constitution.  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S.
452, 457 (1991).  “The powers delegated . . . to the federal
government are few and defined,” while “[t]hose which . . .
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefi-
nite.”  The Federalist No. 45, p. 292 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
(J. Madison).  The powers retained by the States constitute
“ ‘a  residuary  and  inviolable  sovereignty,’ ”  secure  against
federal  intrusion.  Printz  v.  United  States,  521  U. S.  898,
919 (1997) (quoting The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (J. Madi-
son)).  This  structural  principle,  reinforced  in  the  Tenth
Amendment, “confirms that the power of the Federal Gov-
ernment is subject to limits that may, in a given instance,
reserve power to the States.”  New York, 505 U. S., at 157.
The corollary is also true: in some circumstances, the pow-
ers  reserved  to  the  States  inform  the  scope  of  Congress’s
power.  Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584
U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 15).  This includes in the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Haaland v. Brackeen.  It delves into the constitutional limits of Congress's power regarding Indian affairs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH v. HETRONIC INT’L, INC.

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

Court’s precedents command, the majority now requires a
third step: an assessment of whether the “conduct relevant
to the focus” occurred domestically, even when the focus of
the statute is not conduct.  Ante, at 9.  Making matters even
more confusing, the majority skips over the middle step of
this  new  framework,  concluding  that  it  is  unnecessary  to
discern the focus of the Lanham Act because “the conduct
relevant to any potential focus” that “the parties have prof-
fered”  must  be  “use  in  commerce,”  since  that  is  conduct
mentioned in the statute.  Ibid.3  In other words, under the
Court’s  unprecedented  three-step  framework,  no  statute
can reach relevant conduct abroad, no matter the true ob-
ject of the statute’s solicitude.

The Court’s novel approach transforms the traditional in-
quiry at step two into a conduct-only test, in direct conflict
with this Court’s jurisprudence.  The Court has expressly
recognized  that  a  statute’s  “focus”  can  be  “conduct,”  “par-
ties,” or “interests” that Congress sought to protect or regu-
late.  WesternGeco LLC, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (in-
ternal  quotation  marks  omitted);  see  also  Morrison,  561
U. S., at 266 (“the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the
place where the deception originated”).  After all, not every
federal statute subject to an extraterritoriality analysis “di-
rectly regulate[s] conduct.”  Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 116.

Because precedent does not support the Court’s recitation
of the extraterritoriality framework, the majority retreats
to  a  distorted  reading  of  the  Court’s  past  decisions.    The
majority relies on RJR Nabisco, see ante, at 9, but that case
does not support the majority’s course.  The Court in RJR
Nabisco noted that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act’s civil suit provision requires an “injury

——————

3 Even more confusing still, “use in commerce” is all that matters under
the  majority’s  conduct-only  analysis  even  though  other  conduct  is  also
listed as actionable in at least one of the provisions at issue.  15 U. S. C.
§1114(1)(a) (“the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
goods or services”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH v. HETRONIC INT’L, INC.  It delves into the legal interpretation of the Lanham Act and its extraterritorial reach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Snake,”  a  song  about  a  woman  who  nurses  a  sick  snake
back  to  health  but  then  is  attacked  by  the  snake,  as  a
warning about Syrian refugees entering the country.  Id.,
at  132,  163.    And  in  June  2017,  the  President  stated  on
Twitter  that  the  Justice  Department  had  submitted  a
“watered down, politically correct version” of the “original
Id.,  at  132.  The
Travel  Ban”  “to  S[upreme] C[ourt].”1
President  went  on  to  tweet:  “People,  the  lawyers  and  the
courts  can  call  it  whatever  they  want,  but  I  am  calling  it
what  we  need  and  what  it  is,  a  TRAVEL  BAN!”    Id.,  at
132–133.  He  added:  “That’s  right,  we  need  a  TRAVEL
BAN for certain DANGEROUS countries, not some politi
cally  correct  term  that  won’t  help  us  protect  our  people!”
Id.,  at  133.  Then,  on  August  17,  2017,  President  Trump
issued yet another tweet about Islam, once more referenc
ing  the  story  about  General  Pershing’s  massacre  of  Mus
lims in the Philippines: “Study what General Pershing . . .
did to terrorists when caught.  There was no more Radical
Islamic  Terror  for  35  years!”    IRAP  v.  Trump,  883  F. 3d
233,  267  (CA4  2018)  (IRAP  II)  (en  banc)  (alterations  in
original).

In September 2017, President Trump tweeted that “[t]he
travel  ban  into  the  United  States  should  be  far  larger,
tougher and more specific—but stupidly, that would not be
politically correct!”  App. 133.  Later that month, on Sep
tember  24,  2017,  President  Trump  issued  Presidential
Proclamation  No.  9645,  82  Fed.  Reg.  45161  (2017)  (Proc
lamation),  which  restricts  entry  of  certain  nationals  from
six  Muslim-majority  countries.    On  November  29,  2017,
President  Trump  “retweeted”  three  anti-Muslim  videos,
entitled  “Muslim  Destroys  a  Statue  of  Virgin  Mary!”,
“Islamist mob pushes teenage boy off roof and beats him to
death!”,  and  “Muslim  migrant  beats  up  Dutch  boy  on

——————

1 According  to  the  White  House,  President  Trump’s  statements  on

Twitter are “official statements.”  App. 133.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedents and discusses the President's statements and actions related to a travel ban.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS,

FOURTEENTH DISTRICT

No. 16–254.  Argued March 22, 2017—Decided May 22, 2017

Petitioner Water Splash sued respondent Menon, a former employee, in
a Texas  state  court, alleging that  she had  begun working for a com-
petitor while still employed by Water Splash.  Because Menon resid-
ed in Canada, Water Splash obtained permission to effect service by
mail.  After Menon declined to answer or otherwise enter an appear-
ance,  the  trial  court  issued  a  default  judgment  for  Water  Splash.
That  court  subsequently  denied  Menon’s  motion  to  set  aside  the
judgment on the ground that she had not  been properly served.  On
appeal, Menon argued that service by mail does not comport with the
requirements of the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial  Documents  in  Civil  and  Commercial  Matters  (Hague
Service  Convention),  which  seeks  to  simplify,  standardize,  and  gen-
erally  improve  the  process  of  serving  documents  abroad,  specifying
certain  approved  methods  of  service  and  preempting  “inconsistent
methods  of  service”  wherever  it  applies,  Volkswagenwerk  Aktieng-
esellschaft  v.  Schlunk,  486  U. S.  694,  699.    The  Texas  Court  of  Ap-
peals  agreed  with  Menon,  holding  that  the  Convention  prohibited
service of process by mail.  Article 10, the provision at issue, consists
of  Articles  10(b)  and  10(c),  which  plainly  address  permissible  meth-
ods  of  “service,”  and  Article  10(a),  which  provides  that  the  Conven-
tion will not interfere with “the freedom  to send judicial documents,
by postal channels, directly to persons abroad,” but does not express-
ly refer to “service.”

Held: The  Hague  Service  Convention  does  not  prohibit  service  of  pro-

cess by mail.  Pp. 4–12.

(a) This Court begins its analysis by looking to the treaty’s text and
the  context  in  which  its  words  are  used.  See  Schlunk, 486  U. S.,  at
699.  The  key  word  in  Article  10(a)—“send”—is  a  broad  term,  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text. They are often used for informational purposes and are not meant to be indexed as part of the full legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

Opinion of the Court

(1969)  (per  curiam),  and  speech  integral  to  criminal  con-
duct, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490,
498 (1949)—are “well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of  speech,  the  prevention  and  punishment  of  which  have
never  been  thought  to  raise  any  Constitutional  problem.”
Chaplinsky  v.  New  Hampshire,  315  U. S.  568,  571–572
(1942).

The  Government  argues  that  “depictions  of  animal
cruelty”  should  be  added  to  the  list.    It  contends  that
depictions  of  “illegal  acts  of  animal  cruelty”  that  are
“made, sold, or possessed for commercial gain” necessarily
“lack expressive value,” and may accordingly “be regulated
as  unprotected  speech.”  Brief  for  United  States  10  (em-
phasis  added).  The  claim  is  not  just  that  Congress  may
regulate  depictions  of  animal  cruelty  subject  to  the  First
Amendment,  but  that  these  depictions  are  outside  the
reach of that Amendment altogether—that they fall into a
“ ‘First  Amendment  Free  Zone.’ ”
Board  of  Airport
Comm’rs  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Jews  for  Jesus,  Inc.,  482  U. S.
569, 574 (1987).

As  the  Government  notes,  the  prohibition  of  animal
cruelty itself has a long history in American law, starting
with the early settlement of the Colonies.  Reply Brief 12,
n. 8; see, e.g., The Body of Liberties §92 (Mass. Bay Colony
1641), reprinted in American Historical Documents 1000–
1904,  43  Harvard  Classics  66,  79  (C.  Eliot  ed.  1910)  (“No
man  shall  exercise  any  Tirranny  or  Crueltie  towards  any
bruite  Creature  which  are  usuallie  kept  for  man’s  use”).
But  we  are  unaware  of  any  similar  tradition  excluding
depictions  of  animal  cruelty  from  “the  freedom  of  speech”
codified  in  the  First  Amendment,  and  the  Government
points us to none.

The  Government  contends  that  “historical  evidence”
about  the  reach  of  the  First  Amendment  is  not  “a  neces-
sary  prerequisite  for  regulation  today,”  Reply  Brief  12,
n. 8, and that categories of speech may be exempted from
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the First Amendment's protection of speech, specifically focusing on depictions of animal cruelty. It presents legal arguments and cites previous cases, indicating it's part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

grappled with the divisive issue of abortion.  I greatly re-
spect all of the Justices, past and present, who have done
so.  Amidst extraordinary controversy and challenges, all of
them have addressed the abortion issue in good faith after
careful deliberation, and based on their sincere understand-
ings of the Constitution and of precedent.  I have endeav-
ored to do the same.

In my judgment, on the issue of abortion, the Constitu-
tion is neither pro-life nor pro-choice.  The Constitution is
neutral, and this Court likewise must be scrupulously neu-
tral.  The  Court  today  properly  heeds  the  constitutional
principle of judicial neutrality and returns the issue of abor-
tion to the people and their elected representatives in the
democratic process.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case. It discusses the Court's neutrality on the issue of abortion and its decision to return the issue to the democratic process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC.

SCALIA, J., dissenting

conditions, not wholesale prices.  Id., at 90–91.  The back-
ground  conditions  in  question,  pipelines’  purchases  from
gas wells, affected both the federal field of wholesale sales
and the state field of gas production.  Id., at  92–93.  And
the  regulations  took  aim  at  the  purchases’  effects  on  pro-
duction;  they  sought  to  promote  conservation  of  natural
resources  by  limiting  how  much  gas  pipelines  could  take
from  each  well.    Id.,  at  93.  No  matter;  the  Court  still
concluded  that  the  regulations  “invade[d]  the  federal
agency’s  exclusive  domain.”  Id.,  at  92.    The  factors  that
made  no  difference  in  Northern  Natural  should  make  no
difference today.

Contrast  Northern  Natural  with  Northwest  Central
Pipeline  Corp.  v.  State  Corporation  Comm’n  of  Kan.,  489
U. S.  493  (1989),  which  involved  state  regulations  that
restricted  the  times  when  producers  could  take  gas  from
wells.  On  this  occasion  the  Court  upheld  the  regula-
tions—not  because  the  law  aimed  at  the  objective  of  gas
conservation,  but  because  the  State  pursued  this  end  by
regulating  “ ‘the  physical  ac[t]  of  drawing  gas  from  the
earth.’ ”    Id.,  at  510.  Our  precedents  demand,  in  other
words, that the Court focus in the present case upon what
the  State  seeks  to  regulate  (a  pipeline  practice  that  is
subject  to  regulation  by  the  Commission),  not  why  the
State seeks to regulate it (to curb the practice’s effects on
retail rates).

Trying  to  turn  liabilities  into  assets,  the  Court  bran-
dishes  statements  from  Northern  Natural  and  Northwest
Central  that  (in  its  view)  discuss  where  state  law  was
“aimed”  or  “directed.”  Ante,  at  11.  But  read  in  context,
these  statements  refer  to  the  entity  or  activity  that  the
state  law  regulates,  not  to  which  of  the  activity’s  effects
the law seeks to control by regulating it.  See, e.g., North-
ern  Natural,  supra,  at  94  (“[O]ur  cases  have  consistently
recognized  a  significant  distinction  . . .  between  conserva-
tion measures aimed directly at interstate purchasers and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–271
_________________

ONEOK, INC., ET AL. PETITIONERS v.

 LEARJET, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 21, 2015]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In  this  case,  a  group  of  manufacturers,  hospitals,  and

other institutions that buy natural gas directly from inter
state  pipelines  sued  the  pipelines,  claiming  that  they
engaged  in  behavior  that  violated  state  antitrust  laws.
The  pipelines’  behavior  affected  both  federally  regulated
wholesale  natural-gas  prices  and  nonfederally  regulated
retail  natural-gas  prices.  The  question  is  whether  the
federal  Natural  Gas  Act  pre-empts  these  lawsuits.    We
have said that, in passing the Act, “Congress occupied the
field of matters relating to wholesale sales and transporta
tion of natural gas in interstate commerce.”  Schneidewind
v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U. S. 293, 305 (1988).  Neverthe
less, for the reasons given below, we conclude that the Act
does  not  pre-empt  the  state-law  antitrust  suits  at  issue
here.

I

A

The  Supremacy  Clause  provides  that  “the  Laws  of  the
United  States”  (as  well  as  treaties  and  the  Constitution
itself )  “shall  be  the  supreme  Law  of  the  Land  . . .  any
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the court's name, the case name, and the beginning of the opinion itself. This is suitable content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

II
While  I  thus  agree  with  the  Court  that  the  particular
law  at  issue  in  this  case  violates  the  First  Amendment,  I
am  troubled  by  the  Court’s  loose  rhetoric.    After  noting
that  “a  street  or  a  park  is  a  quintessential  forum  for  the
exercise of First Amendment rights,” the Court states that
“cyberspace” and “social media in particular” are now “the
most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange
of  views.”  Ante,  at  4–5.    The  Court  declines  to  explain
what this  means with respect to  free speech law, and the
Court  holds  no  more  than  that  the  North  Carolina  law
fails  the  test  for  content-neutral  “time,  place,  and  man-
ner”  restrictions.    But  if  the  entirety  of  the  internet  or
even just “social media” sites16 are the 21st century equiv-
alent  of  public  streets  and  parks,  then  States  may  have
little  ability  to  restrict  the  sites  that  may  be  visited  by
even  the  most  dangerous  sex  offenders.  May  a  State
preclude  an  adult  previously  convicted  of  molesting  chil-
dren  from  visiting  a  dating  site  for  teenagers?    Or  a  site
where  minors  communicate  with  each  other  about  per-
sonal problems?  The Court should be more attentive to the
implications  of  its  rhetoric  for,  contrary  to  the  Court’s
suggestion,  there  are  important  differences  between  cy-
berspace and the physical world.

I will mention a few that are relevant to internet use by
sex offenders.  First, it is easier for parents to monitor the
physical  locations  that  their  children  visit  and  the  indi-
viduals  with  whom  they  speak  in  person  than  it  is  to
monitor  their  internet  use.  Second,  if  a  sex  offender  is
seen  approaching  children  or  loitering  in  a  place  fre-

——————

sites discussed above would satisfy the First Amendment.  Until such a
law is before us, it is premature to address that question.

16 As  the  law  at  issue  here  shows,  it  is  not  easy  to  provide  a  precise
definition of a “social media” site, and the Court makes no effort to do
so.  Thus, the scope of its dicta is obscure.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case Packingham v. North Carolina. It discusses the Court's stance on free speech in cyberspace and raises concerns about the implications of equating it with public spaces.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

KAGAN, J., concurring

with a revoked license will keep driving—that he has a his-
tory of disregarding driving rules—would no longer apply.
And without that, the case for assuming that an unlicensed
driver is at the wheel is hardly self-evident.  It would have
to  rest  on  an  idea  about  the  frequency  with  which  even
those who had previously complied with driving laws would
defy  a  State’s  penalty-backed  command  to  stay  off  the
roads.  But where would that idea come from?  As discussed
above, I doubt whether our collective common sense could
do the necessary work.  See supra, at 1.  Or otherwise said,
I  suspect  that  any  common  sense  invoked  in  this  altered
context would not much differ from a “mere ‘hunch’ ”—and
so  “not  create  reasonable  suspicion.”  Prado  Navarette  v.
California, 572 U. S. 393, 397 (2014) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1, 27 (1968)).

And even when, as under the revocation scheme here, a
starting presumption of reasonable suspicion makes sense,
the defendant may show that in his case additional infor-
mation dictates the opposite result.  The Court is clear on
this point, emphasizing that under the applicable totality-
of-the-circumstances test, “the presence of additional facts
might dispel reasonable suspicion” even though an officer
knows that a car on the road belongs to a person with a re-
voked license.  Ante, at 9; see ante, at 1 (stating that further
information  may  “negat[e]  an  inference  that  the  owner  is
the driver of the vehicle”).  Just as the Court once said of a
trained drug-detection dog’s “alert,” the license-revocation
signal is always subject to a defendant’s challenge, whether
through cross-examination of the officer or introduction of
his  own  fact  or  expert  witnesses.  Florida  v.  Harris,  568
U. S. 237, 247 (2013).

That challenge may take any number of forms.  The Court
offers a clear example of observational evidence dispelling
reasonable  suspicion:  if  the  officer  knows  the  registered
owner of a vehicle is an elderly man, but can see the driver
is a young woman.  See ante, at 9.  Similarly (if not as cut-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kagan. It delves into legal arguments and precedents related to reasonable suspicion in traffic stops, particularly concerning drivers with revoked licenses.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE

Opinion of the Court

As the Government recognizes, the Committee’s present
inability to repay the final $10,000 of Cruz’s loans consti-
tutes an injury in fact both to Cruz and to his Committee.
See Reply Brief 8.  Cruz, of course, suffers a $10,000 pock-
etbook  harm.    See  Czyzewski  v.  Jevic  Holding  Corp.,  580
U. S.  451,  464  (2017).  And  the  bar  on  repayment  injures
the Committee by preventing it from discharging its obliga-
tion to repay its debt, which may inhibit that form of financ-
ing  in  the  future.    The  Government  maintains,  however,
that these injuries are not traceable to the threatened en-
forcement of Section 304, for two reasons: first, because the
inability to repay Cruz’s loans was “self-inflicted,” and sec-
ond, because it is the threatened enforcement of an agency
regulation, not the statute itself, that causes the harm.  We
address each argument in turn.

A
First, the Government argues that appellees lack stand-
ing because their injuries were “self-inflicted.”  Brief for Ap-
pellant 20.  Because appellees knowingly triggered the ap-
plication of the loan-repayment limitation, the Government
says, any resulting injury is in essence traceable to them,
not  the  Government.    The  predicate  for  this  argument  is
appellees’  stipulation  in  the  District  Court  that  “the  sole
and exclusive motivation behind Senator Cruz’s actions in
making the 2018 loan[s] and the [C]ommittee’s actions in
waiting to repay them was to establish the factual basis for
this challenge.”  App. 325.  At bottom, the Government asks
us to recognize an exception to traceability for injuries that
a party purposely incurs.

We have never recognized a rule of this kind under Arti-
cle III.  To the contrary, we have made clear that an injury
resulting from the application or threatened application of
an unlawful enactment remains fairly traceable to such ap-
plication, even if the injury could be described in some sense
as  willingly  incurred.  See  Evers  v.  Dwyer,  358  U. S.  202,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically dealing with the case of Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate. It discusses the concept of standing in legal cases and whether the injuries suffered by Cruz and his committee are traceable to the challenged law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of the Court

college sports to take off.  “By the late 1880s the traditional
rivalry between Princeton and Yale was attracting 40,000
spectators and generating in excess of $25,000 . . . in gate
revenues.”  Zimbalist  7.    Schools  regularly  had  “graduate
students and paid ringers” on their teams.  Ibid.

Colleges offered all manner of compensation to talented
athletes.  Yale reportedly lured a tackle named James Ho-
gan with free meals and tuition, a trip to Cuba, the exclu-
sive right to sell scorecards from his games—and a job as a
cigarette agent for the American Tobacco Company.  Ibid.;
see  also  Needham,  The  College  Athlete,  McClure’s  Maga-
zine, June 1905, p. 124.  The absence of academic residency
requirements gave rise to “ ‘tramp athletes’ ” who “roamed
the country making cameo athletic appearances, moving on
whenever and wherever the money was better.”  F. Dealy,
Win at Any Cost 71 (1990).  One famous example was a law
student  at  West  Virginia  University—Fielding  H.  Yost—
“who, in 1896, transferred to Lafayette as a freshman just
in  time  to  lead  his  new  teammates  to  victory  against  its
arch-rival,  Penn.”  Ibid.    The  next  week,  he  “was  back  at
West  Virginia’s  law  school.”  Ibid.  College  sports  became
such a big business that Woodrow Wilson, then President
of  Princeton  University,  quipped  to  alumni  in  1890  that
“ ‘Princeton is noted in this wide world for three things: foot-
ball, baseball, and collegiate instruction.’ ”  Zimbalist 7.

By 1905, though, a crisis emerged.  While college football
was hugely popular, it was extremely violent.  Plays like the
flying wedge and the players’ light protective gear led to 7
football fatalities in 1893, 12 deaths the next year, and 18
in 1905.  Id., at 8.  President Theodore Roosevelt responded
by convening a meeting between Harvard, Princeton, and
Yale to review the rules of the game, a gathering that ulti-
mately  led  to  the  creation  of  what  we  now  know  as  the
NCAA.    Ibid.  Organized  primarily  as  a  standard-setting
body, the association also expressed a view at its founding
about  compensating  college  athletes—admonishing  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically discussing the history of college sports and the formation of the NCAA. It contains factual information and analysis relevant to the legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

Opinion of the Court

its  expertise,  and  does  so  in  a  manner  akin  to  a  criminal
prosecutor.  Building on that premise, the Government ar-
gues  that  the  rescission  of  a  non-enforcement  policy  is no
different—for purposes of reviewability—from the adoption
of that policy.  While the rescission may lead to increased
enforcement,  it  does  not,  by  itself,  constitute  a  particular
enforcement  action.  Applying  this  logic  to  the  facts  here,
the Government submits that DACA is a non-enforcement
policy and that its rescission is therefore unreviewable.

But  we  need  not  test  this  chain  of  reasoning  because
DACA is not simply a non-enforcement policy.  For starters,
the DACA Memorandum did not merely “refus[e] to insti-
tute proceedings” against a particular entity or even a par-
ticular class.  Ibid.  Instead, it directed USCIS to “establish
a clear and efficient process” for identifying individuals who
met the enumerated criteria.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a.
Based on this directive, USCIS solicited applications from
eligible  aliens,  instituted  a  standardized  review  process,
and sent formal notices indicating whether the alien would
receive the two-year forbearance.  These proceedings are ef-
fectively “adjudicat[ions].”  Id., at 117a.  And the result of
these adjudications—DHS’s decision to “grant deferred ac-
tion,” Brief for Petitioners 45—is an “affirmative act of ap-
proval,” the very opposite of a “refus[al] to act,” Chaney, 470
U. S., at 831–832.  In short, the DACA Memorandum does
not announce a passive non-enforcement policy; it created
a  program  for  conferring  affirmative  immigration  relief.
The creation of that program—and its rescission—is an “ac-
tion [that] provides a focus for judicial review.”  Id., at 832.
The  benefits  attendant  to  deferred  action  provide
further  confirmation  that  DACA  is  more  than  simply  a
non-enforcement  policy.  As  described  above,  by  virtue  of
receiving deferred action, the 700,000 DACA recipients may
request work authorization and are eligible for Social Secu-
rity and Medicare.  See supra, at 3.  Unlike an agency’s re-
fusal to take requested enforcement action, access to these
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, focusing on its reviewability. The language is formal and uses legal terminology, indicating its suitability for indexing within a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014)

3

Opinion of the Court

the false statement law, the Commission “shall” refer the
matter to the relevant county prosecutor.  Ohio Rev. Code
Ann.  §§3517.155(D)(1)–(2)  (Lexis  Supp.  2014).    Alterna-
tively,  the  Commission’s  regulations  state  that  it  may
simply issue a reprimand.  See Ohio Admin. Code §3517–
1–14(D).  Violation of the false statement statute is a first-
degree  misdemeanor  punishable  by  up  to  six  months  of
imprisonment,  a  fine  up  to  $5,000,  or  both.    Ohio  Rev.
Code  Ann.  §§3599.40  (Lexis  2013),  3517.992(V)  (Lexis
Supp.  2014).  A  second  conviction  under  the  false  state-
ment statute is a fourth-degree felony that carries a man-
datory penalty of disfranchisement.  §3599.39.

II

Petitioner  Susan  B.  Anthony  List  (SBA)  is  a  “pro-life
advocacy  organization.”  525  Fed.  Appx.  415,  416  (CA6
2013).  During the 2010 election cycle, SBA publicly criti-
cized  various  Members  of  Congress  who  voted  for  the
Patient  Protection  and  Affordable  Care  Act  (ACA).
In
particular, it issued a press release announcing its plan to
“educat[e]  voters  that  their  representative  voted  for  a
health  care  bill  that  includes  taxpayer-funded  abortion.”
App.  49–50.    The  press  release  listed  then-Congressman
Steve  Driehaus,  a  respondent  here,  who  voted  for  the
ACA.  SBA also sought to display a billboard in Driehaus’
district  condemning  that  vote.  The  planned  billboard
would  have  read:  “Shame  on  Steve  Driehaus!    Driehaus
voted  FOR  taxpayer-funded  abortion.”  Id.,  at  37.  The
advertising  company  that  owned  the  billboard  space  re-
fused  to  display  that  message,  however,  after  Driehaus’
counsel threatened legal action.

On October 4, 2010, Driehaus filed a complaint with the
Ohio Elections Commission alleging, as relevant here, that
SBA  had  violated  §§3517.21(B)(9)  and  (10)  by  falsely
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal citations, references to statutes and regulations, and discusses a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Circuit has joined three other Courts of Appeals refusing to
apply strict scrutiny.2  This split is widespread, entrenched,
and worth addressing.

This case is an obvious vehicle for resolving that conflict.
The New York mandate includes a medical exemption but
no religious exemption, even though “allowing a healthcare
worker to remain unvaccinated undermines the State’s as-
serted public health goals equally whether that worker hap-
pens to remain unvaccinated for religious reasons or medi-
cal ones.”  Dr. A., 595 U. S., at ___ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.)
(slip op., at 8).  The Court could give much-needed guidance
by simply deciding whether that single secular exemption
renders the state law not neutral and generally applicable.
Moreover, I would not miss the chance to answer this re-
curring question in the normal course on our merits docket.
Over the last few years, the Federal Government and the
States  have  enacted  a  host  of  emergency  measures  to  ad-
dress the COVID–19 pandemic.  Many were not neutral to-
ward  religious  exercise  or  generally  applicable.  See,  e.g.,
Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (per curiam)
(slip op., at 4) (listing four other cases from the Ninth Cir-
cuit alone); Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,
592 U. S. ___ (2020).  Circumstances forced us to confront
challenges  to  those  measures  in  an  emergency  posture,  a
practice  that  Members  of  this  Court  have  criticized.    See,
e.g., Merrill v. Milligan, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (KAGAN,
J., dissenting from grant of application for stay) (slip op., at
11) (lamenting use of the so-called “shadow docket to signal
——————
F. 3d 1214, 1234–1235 (CA11 2004); Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark,
170  F. 3d  359,  365–366  (CA3  1999);  Mitchell  Cty.  v.  Zimmerman,  810
N. W. 2d 1, 15–16 (Iowa 2012).

2 See We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F. 4th 266, 284–290 (CA2
2021) (per curiam); Doe v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 19 F. 4th 1173,
1177–1178 (CA9 2021); Doe 1–6 v. Mills, 16 F. 4th 20, 29–31 (CA1 2021);
303  Creative  LLC  v.  Elenis,  6  F. 4th  1160,  1186  (CA10  2021),  cert.
granted, 595 U. S. ___ (2022) (granting certiorari to review a Free Speech
Clause claim).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal arguments and reasoning behind the dissent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

v. Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Bd.,  537  F. 3d
667,  698  (CADC  2008)  (Kavanaugh,  J.,  dissenting)  (“We
should  resolve  questions  about  the  scope  of  those
precedents  in  light  of  and  in  the  direction  of  the
constitutional text and constitutional history”).

is

But  the

first  stop

in  this  Court’s  constitutional
decisionmaking
precedents—the
the
accumulated wisdom of jurists from Marshall and Story to
Harlan  and  Taft;  from  Hughes  and  Black  to  Jackson  and
White;  from  Rehnquist  and  O’Connor  to  Kennedy  and
Scalia; and so on.

Court’s

III
Some  say  that  courts  should  determine  exceptions  to
broadly  worded  individual  rights,  including  the  Second
Amendment,  by  looking  to  policy.    Uphold  a  law  if  it  is  a
good idea; strike it down if it is not.  True, the proponents
of  a  policy-based  approach  to  interpretation  of  broadly
worded  or  vague  constitutional  text  usually  do  not  say  so
explicitly  (although  some  do).  Rather,  they  support  a
balancing  approach  variously  known  as  means-end
scrutiny,  heightened  scrutiny,  tiers  of  scrutiny,  rational
basis  with  bite,  or  strict  or  intermediate  or  intermediate-
plus or rigorous or skeptical scrutiny.  Whatever the label
of  the  day,  that  balancing  approach  is  policy  by  another
name.  It requires judges to weigh the benefits against the
burdens of a law and to uphold the law as constitutional if,
in  the  judge’s  view,  the  law  is  sufficiently  reasonable  or
important.    See  M.  Barnes  &  E.  Chemerinsky,  The  Once
and  Future  Equal  Protection  Doctrine?,  43  Conn.  L. Rev.
1059,  1080  (2011)  (“The  levels  of  scrutiny  are  essentially
balancing tests”).

To  begin,  as  I  have  explained,  that  kind  of  balancing
approach  to  constitutional  interpretation  departs  from
what Framers such as Madison stated, what jurists such as
Marshall  and  Scalia  did,  what  judges  as  umpires  should
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the approach to constitutional interpretation, arguing against a policy-based approach and advocating for a text-based approach grounded in the Constitution's original meaning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CASSIRER v. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION
FOUNDATION
Syllabus

could go forward.  To determine what property law governed the dis-
pute, the courts below had to apply a choice-of-law rule.  The Cassirer
plaintiffs urged the use of California’s choice-of-law rule; the Founda-
tion advocated a rule based in federal common law.  The courts below
picked the federal option.  That option, they then held, commanded use
of  the  property  law  of  Spain,  not  California.    Applying  Spanish  law,
the  courts  determined  that  the  Foundation  was  the  rightful  owner.
This Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of
Appeals as to what choice-of-law rule a court should apply in an FSIA
case raising non-federal claims.

Held: In an FSIA suit raising non-federal claims against a foreign state
or instrumentality, a court should determine the substantive law by
using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against
a private party.  Here, that means applying the forum State’s choice-
of-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law.

The FSIA provides a baseline principle of foreign sovereign immun-
ity  from  civil  actions  unless  a  statutory  exception  applies  (including
the  expropriation  exception  found  to  apply  here).    See  §§1604–1607.
Yet the FSIA was never “intended to affect the substantive law deter-
mining the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality” deemed ame-
nable to suit.  First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior
de Cuba, 462 U. S. 611, 620.  To the contrary, Section 1606 of the stat-
ute provides: “As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign
state is not entitled to immunity under [the FSIA], the foreign state
shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances.”  When a foreign state is not im-
mune from suit, it is  subject to the same  rules of liability (the same
substantive law) as a private party.  See First Nat. City Bank, at 622,
n. 11.

Section  1606  dictates  the  selection  of  a  choice-of-law  rule:  It  must
mirror the rule that would apply in a similar suit between private par-
ties.  Only the same choice-of-law rule can guarantee use of the same
substantive law—and thus guarantee the same liability.  Consider two
suits seeking recovery of a painting: one suit against a foreign-state-
controlled museum (as here), the other against a private museum.  If
the choice-of-law rules in the two suits differed, so might the substan-
tive law chosen.  And if the substantive law differed, so might the suits’
outcomes.  Contrary to Section 1606, the two museums would not be
“liable to the same manner and to the same extent.”

In this case, Section 1606 requires the use of California’s choice-of-
law  rule—because  that  is  the  rule  a  court  would  use  in  comparable
private litigation.  Consider the just-hypothesized suit against a pri-
vate  museum,  brought  as  this  case  was  in  California  and  asserting
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the legal issues, the lower courts' decisions, and the Supreme Court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CONCEPCION v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

235 months.  The Government conceded Concepcion’s eligibility for re-
lief  but  opposed  the  motion,  emphasizing  that  Concepcion’s  original
sentence of 228 months fell within the new Guidelines range of 188 to
235 months, and citing factors in Concepcion’s prison record that the
Government believed counseled against a sentence reduction.  In his
reply brief, represented by counsel, Concepcion made two primary ar-
guments in support of a reduced sentence.  First, he argued that he
would  no  longer  be  considered  a  career  offender  because  one  of  his
prior  convictions  had  been  vacated  and  his  remaining  convictions
would not constitute crimes of violence that trigger the enhancement.
Without  the  enhancement,  Concepcion  contended  that  his  revised
Guidelines  range  should  be  57  to  71  months.    Second,  Concepcion
pointed to postsentencing evidence of rehabilitation.

The District Court denied Concepcion’s motion.  It declined to con-
sider  that  Concepcion  would  no  longer  qualify  as  a  career  offender
based on its judgment that the First Step Act did not authorize such
relief.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a.  The District Court did not address
Concepcion’s evidence of rehabilitation or the Government’s counter-
vailing evidence of Concepcion’s disciplinary record.  The Court of Ap-
peals  affirmed  in  a  divided  opinion,  and  added  to  the  disagreement
among the Circuits as to whether a district court deciding a First Step
Act motion must, may, or may not consider intervening changes of law
or fact.

Held: The  First  Step  Act  allows  district  courts  to  consider  intervening
changes  of  law  or  fact  in  exercising  their  discretion  to reduce  a  sen-
tence.  Pp. 6–18.

(a) Federal courts historically have exercised broad discretion to
consider all relevant information at an initial sentencing hearing, con-
sistent  with  their  responsibility  to  sentence  the  whole person  before
them.  That discretion also carries forward to later proceedings that
may modify an original sentence.  District courts’ discretion is bounded
only  when  Congress  or  the  Constitution  expressly  limits  the  type  of
information  a  district  court  may  consider  in  modifying  a  sentence.
Pp. 6–11.

(1) There  is  a  “long”  and  “durable”  tradition  that  sentencing
judges “enjo[y] discretion in the sort of information they may consider”
at an initial sentencing proceeding.  Dean v. United States, 581 U. S.
62, 66.  That unbroken tradition also characterizes federal sentencing
history.  Indeed, “[i]t has been uniform and constant in the federal ju-
dicial  tradition  for  the  sentencing  judge  to  consider  every  convicted
person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human
failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and
the punishment to ensue.”  Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 113.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case *Concepcion v. United States*. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

47

THOMAS, J., concurring

come to believe—accurately or not—that their race was re-
sponsible for their failure to attain a life-long dream.  These
individuals, and others who wished for their success, may
resent members of what they perceive to be favored races,
believing  that  the  successes  of  those  individuals  are  un-
earned.

What,  then,  would  be  the  endpoint  of  these  affirmative
action policies?  Not racial harmony, integration, or equal-
ity under the law.  Rather, these policies appear to be lead-
ing  to  a  world  in  which  everyone  is  defined  by  their  skin
color, demanding ever-increasing entitlements and prefer-
ences on that basis.  Not only is that exactly the kind of fac-
tionalism  that  the  Constitution  was  meant  to  safeguard
against, see The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison), but it is a
factionalism based on ever-shifting sands.

That is because race is a social construct;  we may each
identify as members of particular races for any number of
reasons, having to do with our skin color, our heritage, or
our cultural identity.  And, over time, these ephemeral, so-
cially constructed categories have often shifted.  For exam-
ple, whereas universities today would group all white ap-
plicants together, white elites previously sought to exclude
Jews and other white immigrant groups from higher edu-
cation.  In fact, it is impossible to look at an individual and
know definitively his or her race; some who would consider
themselves black, for example, may be quite fair skinned.
Yet, university admissions policies ask individuals to iden-
tify themselves as belonging to one of only a few reduction-
ist racial groups.  With boxes for only “black,” “white,” “His-
panic,” “Asian,” or the ambiguous “other,” how is a Middle
Eastern person to choose?  Someone from the Philippines?
See  post,  at  5–7  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring).   Whichever
choice he makes (in the event he chooses to report a race at
all), the form silos him into an artificial category.  Worse, it
sends a clear signal that the category matters.

But,  under  our  Constitution,  race  is  irrelevant,  as  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the societal implications of affirmative action policies, arguing against them based on the fluidity of racial categories and the potential for increased factionalism.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

JONES v. HENDRIX, WARDEN

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE  EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–857.  Argued November 1, 2022—Decided June 22, 2023

In 2000, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri sentenced
petitioner  Marcus  DeAngelo  Jones  after  he  was  convicted  on  two
counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18
U. S. C.  §922(g)(1),  and  one  count  of  making  false  statements  to  ac-
quire a firearm.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed Jones’ convictions and
sentence.    Jones  then  filed  a  motion  pursuant  to  28  U. S. C.  §2255,
which  resulted  in  the  vacatur  of  one  of  his  concurrent  §922(g)  sen-
tences.  Many years later, this Court held in Rehaif v. United States,
588 U. S. ___, that a defendant’s knowledge of the status that disqual-
ifies him from owning a firearm is an element of a §922(g) conviction.
Rehaif ’s holding abrogated contrary Eighth Circuit precedent applied
by the courts in Jones’ trial and direct appeal.  Seeking to collaterally
attack  his  remaining  §922(g)  conviction  based  on  Rehaif ’s  statutory
holding,  Jones  filed  a  petition  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  under  28
U. S. C. §2241 in the district of his imprisonment, the Eastern District
of Arkansas.  The District Court dismissed Jones’ habeas petition for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Held: Section 2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening
change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Anti-
terrorism  and  Effective  Death  Penalty  Act  of  1996’s  (AEDPA)  re-
strictions on second or successive §2255 motions by filing a §2241 ha-
beas petition.  Pp. 3–25.

(a) Congress created §2255  as a remedial  vehicle by which federal
prisoners  could  collaterally  attack  their  sentences  by  motion  in  the
sentencing court, rather than by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under §2241 in the district of confinement.  The “sole purpose” of §2255
was to address the “serious administrative problems” created by dis-
trict  courts  collaterally  reviewing  one  another’s  proceedings  without
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the Court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1070

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 17, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1509. Gardner v. United States et al. C. A. D. C.

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1532. Hartsel v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 812.

No. 99–1535. Scharringhausen v. United States. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 256.

No. 99–1540. White v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1353.

No. 99–7188. Polk et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 919.

No. 99–7316. Mendez v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 986 P. 2d 275.

No. 99–7472. Ladd v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 3 S. W. 3d 547.

No. 99–7511. Stephney v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 440.

No. 99–7780. Scott v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–7781. Wisniewski v. Conti et al. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 651.

No. 99–7839. Crook v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 238.

No. 99–8064. Chaidez v. Scribner et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st

App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8076.

Johnson v. Essex County Hospital Center.

Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8088. Bocelli v. Vaughn, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 253.

No. 99–8092. Riley v. Lock, Superintendent, Central
Missouri Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

Opinion of the Court

courts from hearing a category of cases in §113(b) by strip-
ping  federal  courts  of  jurisdiction  over  those  cases  in
§113(h).  And if that were Congress’s goal, it would be hard
to imagine a more oblique way of  achieving it.  Often the
simplest  explanation  is  the  best:  Section  113(b)  deprives
state  courts  of  jurisdiction  over  cases  “arising  under”  the
Act—just as it says—while §113(h) deprives federal courts
of jurisdiction over certain “challenges” to Superfund reme-
dial actions—just as it says.

Second, the company’s argument does not account for the
exception in §113(h) for federal courts sitting in diversity.
Section 113(h) permits federal courts in diversity cases to
entertain state law claims regardless of whether they are
challenges  to  cleanup  plans.    See  DePue  v.  Exxon  Mobil
Corp., 537 F. 3d 775, 784 (CA7 2008).  But Atlantic Rich-
field does not even try to explain why the Act would permit
such state law claims to proceed in federal court, but not in
state court.  The Act permits federal courts and state courts
alike to entertain state law claims, including challenges to
cleanups.

That leads us to the third difficulty with Atlantic Rich-
field’s argument.  We have recognized a “deeply rooted pre-
sumption  in  favor  of  concurrent  state  court  jurisdiction”
over federal claims.  Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U. S. 455, 458–
459 (1990).  Only an “explicit statutory directive,” an “un-
mistakable implication from legislative history,” or “a clear
incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal
interests” can displace this presumption.  Id., at 460.  Ex-
plicit, unmistakable, and clear are not words that describe
Atlantic  Richfield’s  knotty  interpretation  of  §§113(b)
and (h).

It would be one thing for Atlantic Richfield to try to sur-
mount the clear statement rule that applies to the uncom-
mon, but not unprecedented, step of stripping state courts
of jurisdiction over federal claims.  But Atlantic Richfield’s
position requires a more ambitious step: Congress stripping
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the interpretation of specific sections of a law (likely the Superfund Act) and argues against a particular interpretation put forth by Atlantic Richfield.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MURTHY v. MISSOURI

ALITO, J., dissenting

record plainly shows.  For months in 2021 and 2022, a cote-
rie of officials at the highest levels of the Federal Govern-
ment continuously harried and implicitly threatened Face-
book  with  potentially  crippling  consequences  if  it  did  not
comply with their wishes about the suppression of certain
COVID–19-related speech.  Not surprisingly, Facebook re-
peatedly  yielded.    As  a  result  Hines  was  indisputably  in-
jured, and due to the officials’ continuing efforts, she was
threatened with more of the same when she brought suit.
These past and threatened future injuries were caused by
and traceable to censorship that the officials coerced, and
the injunctive relief she sought was an available and suita-
ble remedy.  This evidence was more than sufficient to es-
tablish Hines’s standing to sue, see Lujan v.  Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561–562 (1992), and consequently,
we are obligated to tackle the free speech issue that the case
presents.  The Court, however, shirks that  duty and thus
permits the successful campaign of coercion in this case to
stand as an attractive model for future officials who want
to control what the people say, hear, and think.

That  is  regrettable.  What  the  officials  did  in  this  case
was more subtle than the ham-handed censorship found to
be  unconstitutional  in  Vullo,  but  it  was  no  less  coercive.
And because of the perpetrators’ high positions, it was even
more dangerous. It was blatantly unconstitutional, and the
country  may  come  to  regret  the  Court’s  failure  to  say  so.
Officials who read today’s decision together with Vullo will
get the message.  If a coercive campaign is carried out with
enough sophistication, it may get by.  That is not a message
this Court should send.

In the next section of this opinion, I will recount in some
detail what was done by the officials in this case, but in con-
sidering the coercive impact of their conduct, two prominent
facts must be kept in mind.

First, social media have become a leading source of news
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Murthy v. Missouri. It discusses the issue of government censorship on social media platforms and argues that the majority opinion fails to address the unconstitutionality of the government's actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

INDEX

1307

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
I. Double Jeopardy.

Noncapital sentencing proceedings—Retrial on prior conviction alle-
gation.—Double Jeopardy Clause, which precludes retrial on a prior con-
viction allegation in capital sentencing proceedings, does not apply in non-
capital sentencing proceedings. Monge v. California, p. 721.

II. Due Process.

1. Coal Industry Retiree Health Beneﬁt Act of 1992—Health care bene-
ﬁts funding.—Court of Appeals’ decision, that Act’s allocation of liability
for funding health care beneﬁts for coal industry retirees and their de-
pendents does not violate Due Process Clause as applied to a company
is reversed. Eastern Enterprises v.
that left coal
Apfel, p. 498.

industry in 1965,

2. Jury instructions—Lesser included offense.—Beck v. Alabama, 447
U. S. 625—which invalidated a state law prohibiting lesser included of-
fense instructions in capital cases, when such offenses to charged crime
existed under state law—does not require state courts to instruct juries
on offenses that are not lesser included offenses of charged crime under
state law. Hopkins v. Reeves, p. 88.

III. Excessive Fines.

Failure to report currency transport—Full forfeiture of funds.—Where
respondent’s sole offense was his failure to report to Government, as re-
quired by federal law, that he was leaving United States with more than
$10,000 in currency, forfeiture of entire $357,144 he failed to declare would
violate Excessive Fines Clause because it would be grossly disproportional
to gravity of his offense. United States v. Bajakajian, p. 321.

IV. Extradition Clause.

Habeas relief—State court’s authority.—New Mexico Supreme Court
exceeded its authority under Extradition Clause and Extradition Act when
it afﬁrmed a habeas grant releasing respondent from custody even though
New Mexico Governor had previously ordered him extradited to Ohio.
New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, p. 151.

V. Freedom of Expression.

National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965—
Selection criteria for National Endowment for the Arts grants.—Title 20
U. S. C. § 954(d)(1)—which requires NEA to consider “general standards
of decency and respect for . . . diverse beliefs and values” in awarding
grants—is facially valid, as it neither inherently interferes with First
Amendment rights nor violates constitutional vagueness principles. Na-
tional Endowment for Arts v. Finley, p. 569.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an index from a legal document, specifically a section on Constitutional Law. It lists topics and corresponding case names.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

SEC v. JARKESY

GORSUCH, J., concurring

Crown,”  and  demanded  the  right  to  the  “common  law  of
England” and the “great and inestimable privilege” of a jury
trial.  Declaration  and  Resolves  of  the  First  Continental
Congress,  Oct.  14,  1774,  in  1  Journals  of  the  Continental
Congress,  1774–1789, pp. 68–69  (W.  Ford  1904  ed.).  Two
years later, the drafters of the Declaration of Independence
repeated  these  concerns,  admonishing  the  King  for
“ma[king]  Judges  dependent  on  his  Will  alone,”  ¶11,  and
“[f]or depriving [the colonists] in many cases, of the benefits
of Trial by Jury,” ¶20.  By that point, however, the “musket
fire at Lexington and Concord . . . signaled the end not only
of the vice-admiralty courts, but of all British rule in Amer-
ica.”  Ubbelohde 190.

When  the  smoke  settled,  the  American  people  went  to
great lengths to prevent a backslide toward anything like
the vice-admiralty courts.  Erlinger, 602 U. S., at ___–___
(slip op., at 5–6).  One product of these efforts was Article
III  of  the  Constitution.  There,  the  Constitution  provided
that  “[t]he  judicial  Power”—the  power  over  “Cases”  and
“Controversies”—would lie with life-tenured, salary-protected
judges.  §§1–2;  see  Oil  States  Energy  Services,  LLC  v.
Greene’s  Energy  Group,  LLC,  584  U. S.  325,  346  (2018)
(GORSUCH, J.,  dissenting).    As  the  Court  has  recognized,
this meant the Executive Branch could “exercise no part of
th[e] judicial power.”  Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 275 (1856), “no matter how
court-like [its] decisionmaking process might appear,” Ortiz
v. United States, 585 U. S. 427, 465 (2018) (ALITO, J., dis-
senting).  Nor could Congress “withdraw from judicial cog-
nizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of
a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty”—the
traditional scope of the “judicial Power.”  Murray’s Lessee,
18 How., at 284; see Art. III, §2.

Despite these guarantees, many at the founding thought
Article III didn’t go far enough.  Yes, it promised a defend-
ant  an  independent  judge  rather  than  one  dependent  on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history and intent behind Article III of the Constitution, which establishes the judicial branch.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
948

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 13, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–240.  Hafterson  et  vir,  Personal  Representa
tives  of  the  Estate  of  Hafterson,  Deceased  v.  United
States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–243.  Leibowitz,  Trustee  v.  Systems  Division,  Inc.
C. A. 7th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 563 F. 3d 639.
No.  09–249.  Martini  v.  AT&T  Inc.  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–255.  Velez  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  388  Ill.  App.  3d  493,  903  N.  E.
2d  43.

No. 09–256.  Olofson v. United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  652.

No.  09–268.  Morris  v.  Family Dollar  Stores  of  Ohio,  Inc.
C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.
Appx.  330.

No.  09–269.  Wright v.  United States.  C.  A.  4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  772.

No. 09–276.  Liberty Counsel et al. v. Florida Bar Board
of  Governors  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  12  So.  3d  183.

No.  09–281.  Demarest  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  570  F.  3d  1232.

No. 09–290.  Battle v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  283.

No.  09–295.  Bert  v.  Comptroller  of  the  Treasury  of
Maryland.  Ct.  Sp.  App.  Md.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  183  Md.  App.  760.

No. 09–316.  Davis v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–319.  Lacey  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  319.

No.  09–324.  Wiley  v.  Geithner,  Secretary  of  the  Treas
ury, et al.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
329  Fed.  Appx.  512.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and the court that heard the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

lxxi

Wai Chong Leung v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker v. Akers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker v. Conroy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker; Coronado v.
Walker; Curry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker v. Dinning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker; Olivo Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wallace v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walter; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walter; Vaile v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walton v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ward; Gaskin v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ward v. Trent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Warden v. California State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Warden. See also name of warden.
Ware v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ware v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Waremart Foods, Inc.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Warshawsky & Co.; Ironworkers v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington; Alvarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington; Anderegg v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington; Greene v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington; Leininger v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington; Murdock v.
Washington; Saiyed v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington; Shultz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington County; Ellis v.
. . .
Washington Dept. of Social and Health Services; Safouane v.
Washington Dept. of Social and Health Services; Swenson v.
. . . .
Waters, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Waters v. Hesson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Waterview Management Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. . . . . . .
Watkins v. Professional Security Bureau, Ltd.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Watson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Watts v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Watts v. Network Solutions, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wayne v. Jarvis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Waynick; Cuozzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1120
1132
1122
1134
1101
1025
1071
1117
1080,1135
1030,1125
205
1041
1034
1076
1007
1055,1145
1020

1071
1038
1110
1003
1115
1130
1071
1090
1091
1134
1058
1066
1024
1094
1087
1112
1108
1016
1114
1003
1108
1032
1145
1088
1115
1033
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BILSKI ET AL. v. KAPPOS, UNDER SECRETARY OF

COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND

DIRECTOR, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 08–964.  Argued November 9, 2009—Decided June 28, 2010

Petitioners’ patent application seeks protection for a claimed invention
that explains how commodities buyers and sellers in the energy mar-
ket can protect, or hedge, against the risk of price changes.  The key
claims are claim 1, which describes a series of steps instructing how
to  hedge  risk,  and  claim  4,  which  places  the  claim  1  concept  into  a
simple  mathematical  formula.    The  remaining  claims  explain  how
claims 1 and 4 can be applied to allow energy suppliers and consum-
ers  to  minimize  the  risks  resulting  from  fluctuations  in  market  de-
mand.  The patent examiner rejected the application on the grounds
that the invention is not implemented on a specific apparatus, merely
manipulates  an  abstract  idea,  and  solves  a  purely  mathematical
problem.  The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences agreed and
affirmed.  The Federal Circuit, in turn, affirmed.  The en banc court
rejected  its  prior  test  for  determining  whether  a  claimed  invention
was  a  patentable  “process”  under  Patent  Act,  35  U. S. C.  §101—i.e.,
whether the invention produced a “useful, concrete, and tangible re-
sult,”  see,  e.g.,  State  Street Bank  &  Trust  Co  v.  Signature  Financial
Group,  Inc.,  149  F. 3d  1368,  1373—holding  instead  that  a  claimed
process  is  patent  eligible  if:  (1)  it  is  tied  to  a  particular  machine  or
apparatus,  or  (2)  it  transforms  a  particular  article  into  a  different
state or thing.  Concluding that this “machine-or-transformation test”
is the sole test for determining patent eligibility of a “process” under
§101, the court applied the test and held that the application was not
patent eligible.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
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  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER
Syllabus

benefit on account of religion.  The District Court likened the case be-
fore  it  to  Locke  v.  Davey,  540  U. S.  712,  where  this  Court  upheld
against  a  free  exercise  challenge  a  State’s  decision  not  to  fund  de-
grees  in  devotional  theology  as  part  of  a  scholarship  program.    The
District Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the
State to make funds available under the Scrap Tire Program to Trini-
ty  Lutheran.    A  divided  panel  of  the  Eighth  Circuit  affirmed.    The
fact that the State could award a scrap tire grant to Trinity Lutheran
without  running  afoul  of  the  Establishment  Clause  of  the  Federal
Constitution,  the  court  ruled,  did  not  mean  that  the  Free  Exercise
Clause  compelled  the  State  to  disregard  the  broader  antiestablish-
ment principle reflected in its own Constitution.

Held: The  Department’s  policy  violated  the  rights  of  Trinity  Lutheran
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First  Amendment by denying
the Church an otherwise available public benefit on account of its re-
ligious status.  Pp. 6–15.

(a) This  Court  has  repeatedly  confirmed  that  denying  a  generally
available  benefit  solely  on  account  of  religious  identity  imposes  a
penalty  on  the  free  exercise  of  religion.    Thus,  in  McDaniel  v.  Paty,
435 U. S. 618, the Court struck down a Tennessee statute disqualify-
ing  ministers  from  serving  as  delegates  to  the  State’s  constitutional
convention.    A  plurality  recognized  that  such  a  law  discriminated
against McDaniel by denying him a benefit solely because of his “sta-
tus as a ‘minister.’ ”  Id., at 627.  In recent years, when rejecting free
exercise challenges to neutral laws of general applicability, the Court
has been careful to distinguish such laws  from those that  single out
the  religious  for  disfavored  treatment.    See,  e.g.,  Lyng  v.  Northwest
Indian  Cemetery  Protective  Assn.,  485  U. S.  439;  Employment  Div.,
Dept.  of  Human  Resources  of  Ore.  v.  Smith,  494  U. S.  872;  and
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520.  It has
remained  a  fundamental  principle  of  this  Court’s  free  exercise  juris-
prudence  that  laws  imposing  “special  disabilities  on  the  basis  of  .  .  .
religious status” trigger  the strictest scrutiny.  Id., at 533.  Pp. 6–9.

(b) The Department’s policy expressly discriminates against other-
wise  eligible  recipients  by  disqualifying  them  from  a  public  benefit
solely  because  of  their  religious  character.    Like  the  disqualification
statute  in  McDaniel,  the  Department’s  policy  puts  Trinity  Lutheran
to a choice: It may participate in an otherwise available benefit pro-
gram or remain a religious institution.  When the State conditions a
benefit in this way, McDaniel says plainly that the State has imposed
a  penalty  on  the  free  exercise  of  religion  that  must  withstand  the
most exacting scrutiny.  435 U. S., at 626, 628.

The Department contends that simply declining to allocate to Trin-
ity  Lutheran  a  subsidy  the  State  had  no  obligation  to  provide  does
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It summarizes the case, the arguments, and the court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

GOLAN v. HOLDER

BREYER, J., dissenting

U. S.,  at  222.    But  does  the  Clause  empower  Congress  to
enact  a  statute  that  withdraws  works  from  the  public
domain, brings about higher prices and costs, and in doing
so  seriously  restricts  dissemination,  particularly  to  those
who  need  it  for  scholarly,  educational,  or  cultural  pur-
poses—all  without  providing  any  additional  incentive  for
the  production  of  new  material?    That  is  the  question
before us.  And, as I have said, I believe the answer is no.
Congress in this statute has exceeded what are, under any
plausible reading of the Copyright Clause, its permissible
limits.

II
The Act before us says that it “restores” American copy
right  to  a  set  of  works,  which,  for  the  most  part,  did  not
previously  enjoy  American  copyright  protection.    These
works  had  fallen  into  America’s  public  domain,  but  as  of
the “restoration” date, they had not yet fallen into the pub
lic domain of the foreign country where they originated.

The  statute  covers  works  originating  almost  anywhere
outside  the  United  States.  See  17  U. S. C.  §104A(h)(3)
(setting  out  eligibility  criteria);  U. S.  Copyright  Office,
Circular No. 38A: International Copyright Relations of the
United  States  (2010).    The  relevant  set  of  works  consists
primarily of works originating abroad that did not obtain,
or  at  some  point  lost,  American  copyright  protection  be
cause  (1)  the  author  failed  to  comply  with  applicable
American  copyright  formalities  (such  as  notice  or  renew
al),  or  (2)  the  nation  in  which  they  were  first  published
then lacked copyright relations with the United States, or
(3)  they  are  sound  recordings  fixed  before  February  15,
1972.  §104A(h)(6)(C).  A  work  must  also  satisfy  other
technical  requirements:  It  must  have  had  a  rightholder
who  was  a  national  or  resident  of  an  eligible  country  on
the day it was created; and it cannot have been published
in the United States within 30 days of its first publication.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Golan v. Holder. It discusses the Copyright Clause and the implications of the Copyright Restoration Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

ALITO, J., concurring

was going to fund religious public education, it should also
support church schools.  The militia needed to be called to
protect St. Patrick’s Cathedral.13  Most notorious were the
Philadelphia Bible Riots.  In 1844, a rumor circulated in the
city’s nativist newspapers that a school director, who was
Catholic,  had  ordered  that  Bible  reading  be  stopped.14
Months of scaremongering broke out into riots that left two
of  the  city’s  Catholic  churches  burned  and  several  people
dead.  Only by calling out the militia and positioning a can-
non  in  front  of  a  Catholic  church—which  itself  had  been
taking cannon fire—were the riots ultimately quelled.15

Catholic and Jewish schools sprang up because the com-
mon schools were not neutral on matters of religion.  “Faced
with  public  schools  that  were  culturally  Protestant  and
with curriculum[s] and textbooks that were, consequently,
rife with material that Catholics and Jews found offensive,
many  Catholics  and  Orthodox  Jews  created  separate
schools,” and those “who could afford to do so sent their chil-
dren to” those schools.16

But  schools  require  significant  funding,  and  when  reli-
gious organizations requested state assistance, Mann and
others  labeled  them  “sectarian”—that  is,  people  who  had
separated from the prevailing orthodoxy.  See, e.g., Jeffries
& Ryan 298, 301.  The Blaine movement quickly followed.

——————

13 See  Viteritti,  Choosing  Equality:  School  Choice,  the  Constitution,

and Civil Society 151 (1999).

14 See Sekulow & Tedesco, The Story Behind Vidal v. Girard’s Execu-
tors: Joseph Story, the Philadelphia Bible Riots, and Religious Liberty,
32 Pepperdine L. Rev. 605, 630 (2005).

15 See id., at 633–638.
16 Brief  for  Union  of  Orthodox  Jewish  Congregations  of  America  as
Amicus Curiae in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,
O.  T.  2016,  No. 15–577,  p.  15  (internal  quotation  marks,  citation,  and
brackets omitted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Alito in a case related to religious freedom and public funding. It cites historical events and legal arguments to support the Justice's position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
76

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  36 U. S. C. §190305(c) (Retired Enlisted Associ-

ation, Incorporated; Governing Body)

  36 U. S. C. §220522(a)(8) and (9) (United States
Olympic Committee; Eligibility Requirements)

  36  U. S. C.  §230504(b)  (Vietnam  Veterans  of

America, Inc.; Membership)

  36  U. S. C.  §230505(c)  (Vietnam  Veterans  of

America, Inc.; Governing Body)

  40  U. S. C.  §122(a)  (Federal  Property  and  Ad-
ministrative  Services;  Prohibition  on  Sex  Dis-
crimination)

  40  U. S. C.  §14702  (Appalachian  Regional  De-

velopment; Nondiscrimination)

  42 U. S. C. §213(f ) (Military Benefits)

  42 U. S. C. §290cc–33(a) (Projects for Assistance

in Transition From Homelessness)

  42 U. S. C. §290ff–1(e)(2)(C) (Children With Se-
rious  Emotional  Disturbances;  Requirements
With  Respect  to  Carrying  Out  Purpose  of
Grants)

  42 U. S. C. §295m (Public Health Service; Pro-
hibition Against Discrimination on Basis of Sex)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely from a court opinion.  Legal citations are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2011

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES, DBA MAYO

MEDICAL LABORATORIES, ET AL. v. PROMETHEUS

LABORATORIES, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 10–1150.  Argued December 7, 2011—Decided March 20, 2012

Although “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are
not patentable subject matter under §101 of the Patent Act, Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 185, “an application of a law of nature . . . to
a known structure or process may [deserve] patent protection,” id., at
187.  But to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-
eligible application of such a law, a patent must do more than simply
state  the  law  of  nature while  adding  the words  “apply  it.”    See,  e.g.,
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 71–72.  It must limit its reach to a
particular, inventive application of the law.
  Respondent,  Prometheus  Laboratories,  Inc.  (Prometheus),  is  the
sole and exclusive licensee of the two patents at issue, which concern
the use of thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune diseases.  When in-
gested, the body metabolizes the drugs, producing metabolites in the
bloodstream.    Because  patients  metabolize  these  drugs  differently,
doctors have found it difficult to determine whether a particular pa-
tient’s dose is too high, risking harmful side effects, or too low, and so
likely ineffective.  The patent claims here set forth processes embody-
ing  researchers’  findings  that  identify  correlations  between  metabo-
lite  levels  and  likely  harm  or  ineffectiveness  with  precision.    Each
claim recites (1) an “administering” step—instructing a doctor to ad-
minister  the  drug  to  his  patient—(2)  a  “determining”  step—telling
the doctor to measure the resulting metabolite levels in the patient’s
blood—and  (3)  a  “wherein”  step—describing  the  metabolite  concen-
trations above which there is a likelihood of harmful side-effects and
below  which  it  is  likely  that  the  drug  dosage  is  ineffective,  and  in-
forming  the  doctor  that  metabolite  concentrations  above  or  below
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for the reader.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO

Opinion of the Court

the availability of firearms, including specifically by weak-
ening the NRA.”  Id., at 221, ¶67.  She also “discussed an
array of technical regulatory infractions plaguing the affinity-
insurance marketplace” in New York.  Id., at 199, ¶21.  Vullo
told the Lloyd’s executives “that DFS was less interested in
pursuing  the[se]  infractions”  unrelated  to  any  NRA  busi-
ness “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun
groups, especially the NRA.”  Id., at 199–200, ¶21; accord,
id., at 223, ¶69 (alleging that Vullo made it clear to Lloyd’s
that it “could avoid liability for infractions relating to other,
similarly  situated  insurance  policies,  so  long  as  it  aided
DFS’s campaign against gun groups”).1  Vullo and Lloyd’s
struck a deal: Lloyd’s “would instruct its syndicates to cease
underwriting firearm-related policies and would scale back
its NRA-related business,” and “in exchange, DFS would fo-
cus  its  forthcoming  affinity-insurance  enforcement  action
solely  on  those  syndicates  which  served  the  NRA,  and  ig-
nore other syndicates writing similar policies.”  Ibid., ¶69.
On  April  19,  2018,  Vullo  issued  two  virtually  identical
guidance letters on DFS letterhead entitled, “Guidance on
Risk  Management  Relating  to  the  NRA  and  Similar  Gun
Promotion Organizations.”  Id., at 246–251 (Guidance Let-
ters).  Vullo sent one of the letters to insurance companies
and the other to financial services institutions.  In the let-
ters, Vullo pointed to the “social backlash” against the NRA
and other groups “that promote guns that lead to senseless
violence”  following  “several  recent  horrific  shootings,  in-
cluding in Parkland, Florida.”  Id., at 246, 249.  Vullo then
cited recent instances of businesses severing their ties with
the NRA as examples of companies “fulfilling their corpo-
rate social responsibility.”  Id., at 247, 250.

——————

1 According to the complaint, other affinity organizations offered simi-
lar insurance policies, including the New York State Bar Association, the
New York City Bar, and the New York State Psychological Association,
among others.  See App. to Pet. for Cert. 207–208, Complaint ¶36.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically focusing on the case of National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo. It contains legal arguments, citations, and details about the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>