<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

Opinion of the Court

II
A
The  question  in  this  case  is  whether  18  U. S. C.
§666(a)(1)(B)  makes  it  a  federal  crime  for  state  and  local
officials to accept gratuities for their past official acts.  The
answer  is  no.  Six  reasons,  taken  together,  lead  us  to
conclude that §666 is a bribery statute and not a gratuities
statute—text,  statutory  history,  statutory  structure,
statutory punishments, federalism, and fair notice.

First is the text of §666.  Section 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a
crime  for  state  and  local  officials  to  “corruptly”  accept  a
payment  “intending  to  be  influenced  or  rewarded”  for  an
official act.1  Congress modeled the text of §666(a)(1)(B) for
state and local officials on §201(b), the bribery provision for
federal officials.  Section 201(b) similarly makes it a crime
for  federal  officials  to  “corruptly”  accept  a  payment  “in
return  for”  “being  influenced”  in  an  official  act.2    By
contrast,  §666  bears  little  resemblance  to  §201(c),  the
——————
1 Section 666(a)(1)(B) provides:

“Whoever . . . being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or
Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof [that receives more than
$10,000 in federal funds annually] corruptly solicits or demands for the
benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value
from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection
with  any  business,  transaction,  or  series  of  transactions  of  such
organization,  government,  or  agency  involving  any  thing  of  value  of
$5,000 or more; . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both.”
2 Section 201(b)(2)(A) provides:

“Whoever . . . being a public official or person selected to be a public
official,  directly  or  indirectly,  corruptly  demands,  seeks,  receives,
accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for
any  other  person  or  entity,  in  return  for:  being  influenced  in  the
performance of any official act; . . . shall be fined under this title or not
more  than  three  times  the  monetary  equivalent  of  the  thing  of  value,
whichever is greater, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or
both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of a specific law (18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)(B)) and provides legal reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxxxv

Page

1128

Smalls v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

SMC Corp. v. Norgren, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,813

87

Smith; Alvarez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
804

Smith; Asemani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

Smith v. ATM Vancom of Las Vegas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Smith v. Bank of America Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Smith v. Bridgestone Firestone Tire Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
855

Smith v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1107

Smith v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . . .
852

Smith v. Cameron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  803,1090

Smith v. Charleston County School Dist.
1149

Smith; Cimini v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

Smith v. Commissioner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Cuomo
966

Smith; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Denny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  886,1039

1074

Smith v. Donahue  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Smith v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Smith v. Ford Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

Smith; Frazier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  840,1138

Smith; Gonzalez v.
998

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith; Hardy v.
829

Smith v. Hawaii  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Huckins
943

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

Smith v. Kentucky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1021

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Knight
Smith v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

1007

Smith v. Mason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

Smith v. McBride  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1042

Smith v. McKune
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Mitchell
819

Smith; Morley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

Smith v. Nevada  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Smith v. Ozmint  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1143

Smith; Patrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

Smith v. Pepsi Bottling Group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

Smith v. Richards  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

Smith; Robbins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Spisak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
139

1124

Smith v. Strength  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Tallman
1138

Smith v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smith v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  870,1118
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010)

7

Opinion of the Court

the First Amendment’s protection without any long-settled
tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation.  Instead,
the  Government  points  to  Congress’s  “ ‘legislative  judg-
ment  that  . . .  depictions  of  animals  being  intentionally
tortured and killed [are] of such minimal redeeming value
as to render [them] unworthy of First Amendment protec-
tion,’ ” Brief for United States 23 (quoting 533 F. 3d, at 243
(Cowen, J., dissenting)), and asks the Court to uphold the
ban  on  the  same  basis.  The  Government  thus  proposes
that a  claim of categorical exclusion should be considered
under a simple balancing test: “Whether a given category
of  speech  enjoys  First  Amendment  protection  depends
upon  a  categorical  balancing  of  the  value  of  the  speech
against  its  societal  costs.”    Brief  for  United  States  8;  see
also id., at 12.

As  a  free-floating  test  for  First  Amendment  coverage,
that  sentence  is  startling  and  dangerous.  The  First
Amendment’s  guarantee  of  free  speech  does  not  extend
only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balanc-
ing  of  relative  social  costs  and  benefits.  The  First
Amendment  itself  reflects  a  judgment  by  the  American
people  that  the  benefits  of  its  restrictions  on  the  Govern-
ment outweigh the costs.  Our Constitution forecloses any
attempt  to  revise  that  judgment  simply  on  the  basis  that
some  speech  is  not  worth  it.  The  Constitution  is  not  a
document  “prescribing  limits,  and  declaring  that  those
limits may be passed at pleasure.”  Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 178 (1803).

To  be  fair  to  the  Government,  its  view  did  not  emerge
from  a  vacuum.    As  the  Government  correctly  notes,  this
Court has often described historically unprotected catego-
ries  of  speech  as  being  “ ‘of  such  slight  social  value  as  a
step  to  truth  that  any  benefit  that  may  be  derived  from
them  is  clearly  outweighed  by  the  social  interest  in  order
and  morality.’ ”    R. A. V.,  supra,  at  383  (quoting  Chap-
linsky,  supra,  at  572).  In  New  York  v.  Ferber,  458  U. S.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the First Amendment and the potential for categorizing certain types of speech as unprotected.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–459
_________________

WESCLEY FONSECA PEREIRA, PETITIONER v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2018]

JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting.
Although  this  case  presents  a  narrow  and  technical
issue  of  immigration  law,  the  Court’s  decision  implicates
the  status  of  an  important,  frequently  invoked,  once  cele-
brated, and now increasingly maligned precedent, namely,
Chevron  U. S. A.  Inc.  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense  Coun-
cil,  Inc.,  467  U. S.  837  (1984).    Under  that  decision,  if  a
federal  statute  is  ambiguous  and  the  agency  that  is  au-
thorized  to  implement  it  offers  a  reasonable  interpreta-
tion,  then  a  court  is  supposed  to  accept  that  interpreta-
tion.  Here,  a  straightforward  application  of  Chevron
requires us to accept the Government’s construction of the
provision at issue.  But the Court rejects the Government’s
interpretation  in  favor  of  one  that  it  regards  as  the  best
reading of the statute.  I can only conclude that the Court,
for whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron.

I
As  amended,  the  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act
generally  requires  the  Government  to  remove  nonperma-
nent  resident  aliens  who  overstay  the  terms  of  their  ad-
mission into this country.  See 8 U. S. C. §§1227(a)(1)(B)–
(C).  But  under  certain  circumstances,  the  Government
may  decide  to  cancel  their  removal  instead.    See  §1229b.
To  be  eligible  for  such  relief,  an  alien  must  demonstrate
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

19

GORSUCH, J., concurring

In the end, our disagreement really seems to center on a
difference  of  opinion  about  whether  the  statute  at  issue
here clearly authorizes the agency to adopt the CPP.  The
dissent even complains that I have failed to conduct an ex-
haustive analysis of the relevant statutory language.  See
post, at 28, n. 8.  But in this concurrence, I have sought to
provide some observations about the underlying doctrine on
which today’s decision rests.  On the merits of the case be-
fore us, I join the Court’s opinion, which comprehensively
sets forth why Congress did not clearly authorize the EPA
to engage in a “generation shifting approach” to the produc-
tion of energy in this country.  Ante, at 28.  In reaching its
judgment,  the  Court  hardly  professes  to  “appoin[t]  itself”
“the  decision-maker  on  climate  policy.”  Post,  at  33.  The
Court acknowledges only that, under our Constitution, the
people’s  elected  representatives  in  Congress  are  the  deci-
sionmakers  here—and  they  have  not  clearly  granted  the
agency the authority it claims for itself.  Ante, at 31.

*
When Congress seems slow to solve problems, it may be
only natural that those in the Executive Branch might seek
to take matters into their own hands.  But the Constitution
does  not  authorize  agencies  to  use  pen-and-phone  regula-
tions as substitutes for laws passed by the people’s repre-
sentatives.  In our Republic, “[i]t is the peculiar province of
the  legislature  to  prescribe  general  rules  for  the  govern-
ment of society.”  Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136 (1810).
Because today’s decision helps safeguard that foundational
constitutional promise, I am pleased to concur.

——————
Case, American Enterprise Institute, J. on Govt. & Soc., July–Aug. 1980,
pp. 27–28.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a concurring opinion from a legal case. It delves into the legal arguments and reasoning behind the court's decision, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

held in trust, it imposes on the trustees and other plan man-
agers “ ‘strict standards’ ” of conduct “ ‘derived from the com-
mon law of trusts.’ ”  Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer,
573 U. S. 409, 416 (2014) (quoting Central States, Southeast
& Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc.,
472 U. S. 559, 570 (1985)).  These “fiduciary duties” obligate
the  trustees  and  managers  to  act  prudently  and  loyally,
looking out solely for the best interest of the plan’s partici-
pants and beneficiaries—typically, the employees who sac-
rifice  wages  today  to  secure  their  retirements  tomorrow.
§§1104, 1106.  Not surprisingly, ERISA fiduciaries owe du-
ties not only to the plan they manage, but also “to the ben-
eficiaries” and participants for whom they manage it.  Har-
ris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530
U. S. 238, 241–242, 250 (2000).

If  a  fiduciary  flouts  these  stringent  standards,  ERISA
provides a cause of action and makes the fiduciary person-
ally liable.  §§1109, 1132.  The United States Secretary of
Labor, a plan participant or beneficiary, or another fiduci-
ary  may  sue  for  “appropriate  relief  under  section  1109.”
§1132(a)(2);  see  also  §1132(a)(3)  (permitting  participants,
beneficiaries, or fiduciaries to bring suit “to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter
or the terms of the plan”).  Section 1109’s remedies include
restoration of lost assets, disgorgement of ill-gained profits,
and removal of the offending fiduciaries.  §1109(a).

B

Petitioners allege that, as of 2007, respondents breached
their fiduciary duty of loyalty by investing pension-plan as-
sets in respondents’ own mutual funds and by paying them-
selves  excessive  management  fees.    (Petitioners  further
contend that this self-dealing persists today.)  According to
the complaint, the fiduciaries also made imprudent invest-
ments  that  allowed  them  to  manipulate  accounting  rules,
boost their reported incomes, inflate their stock prices, and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case THOLE v. U.S. BANK N.A. It discusses fiduciary duties under ERISA and the potential for legal action against fiduciaries who breach those duties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1190

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

3.  A motion to the Court shall be ﬁled with the Clerk and
shall be accompanied by proof of service as required by Rule
29.  No motion may be presented in open Court, other than
a motion for admission to the Bar, except when the proceed
ing  to  which  it  refers  is being  argued.  Oral  argument  on  a
motion will not be permitted unless the Court so directs.

4.  Any  response  to  a  motion  shall  be  ﬁled  as  promptly  as
possible  considering  the  nature  of  the  relief  sought  and  any
asserted  need  for  emergency  action,  and,  in  any  event,
within  10  days  of  receipt,  unless  the  Court  or  a  Justice,  or
the Clerk under Rule 30.4, orders otherwise.  A response to
a  motion  prepared  as  required  by  Rule  33.1,  except  a  re
sponse  to  a  motion  for  leave  to  ﬁle  an  amicus  curiae  brief
(see Rule 37.5), shall be prepared in the same manner if time
permits.  In  an  appropriate  case,  the  Court  may  act  on  a
motion without waiting for a response.

Rule 22.  Applications to Individual Justices

1.  An  application  addressed  to  an  individual  Justice  shall
be ﬁled with the Clerk, who will transmit it promptly to the
Justice  concerned  if  an  individual  Justice  has  authority  to
grant the sought relief.

2.  The  original  and  two  copies  of  any  application  ad
dressed to an individual Justice shall be prepared as required
by  Rule  33.2,  and  shall  be  accompanied  by  proof  of  service
as required by Rule 29.

3.  An application shall be addressed to the Justice allotted
to  the  Circuit  from  which  the  case  arises.  An  application
arising  from  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the
Armed  Forces  shall  be  addressed  to  the  Chief  Justice.
When  the  Circuit  Justice  is  unavailable  for  any  reason,  the
application  addressed  to  that  Justice  will  be  distributed  to
the  Justice  then  available  who  is  next  junior  to  the  Circuit
Justice; the turn of the Chief Justice follows that of the most
junior Justice.

4.  A  Justice  denying  an  application  will  note  the  denial
thereon.  Thereafter,  unless  action  thereon  is  restricted  by
law  to  the  Circuit  Justice  or  is  untimely  under  Rule  30.2,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It outlines procedures for motions and applications to individual justices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U60

[09-26-01 12:39:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

846

UNITED STATES v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting

ally explicit” material—is “compelling.” The record shows
no similarly effective, less restrictive alternative. Conse-
quently § 505’s restriction, viewed in light of the proposed
alternative, is proportionate to need. That is to say, it re-
stricts speech no more than necessary to further that com-
pelling need. Taken together, these considerations lead to
the conclusion that § 505 is lawful.

I repeat that my disagreement with the majority lies in
the fact that, in my view, the Government has satisﬁed its
burden of proof.
In particular, it has proved both the exist-
ence of a serious problem and the comparative ineffective-
ness of § 504 in resolving that problem. This disagreement
is not about allocation of First Amendment burdens of proof,
basic First Amendment principle, nor the importance of that
Amendment to our scheme of Government. See ante, at
826–827. First Amendment standards are rigorous. They
safeguard speech. But they also permit Congress to enact
a law that increases the costs associated with certain speech,
where doing so serves a compelling interest that cannot be
served through the adoption of a less restrictive, similarly
effective alternative. Those standards at their strictest
make it difﬁcult for the Government to prevail. But they
do not make it impossible for the Government to prevail.

The majority here, however, has applied those standards
without making a realistic assessment of the alternatives.
It thereby threatens to leave Congress without power to
help the millions of parents who do not want to expose their
children to commercial pornography—but will remain ill
served by the Court’s chosen remedy. Worse still, the logic
of the majority’s “505/504” comparison (but not its holding
that the problem has not been established) would seem to
apply whether “bleeding” or totally unscrambled transmis-
sion is at issue.
If so, the public would have to depend solely
upon the voluntary conduct of cable channel operators to
avert considerably greater harm.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO

Syllabus

speech in a few limited areas.  Among these historic and traditional
categories of unprotected expression is true threats.  True threats are
“serious expression[s]” conveying that a speaker means to “commit an
act of unlawful violence.”  Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. 343, 359.  The
existence of a threat depends not on “the mental state of the author,”
but  on  “what  the  statement  conveys”  to  the  person  on  the  receiving
end.  Elonis v. United States, 575 U. S. 723, 733.  Yet the First Amend-
ment may still demand a subjective mental-state requirement shield-
ing some true threats from liability.  That is because bans on speech
have the potential to chill, or deter, speech outside their boundaries.
An important tool to prevent that outcome is to condition liability on
the State’s showing of a culpable mental state.  Speiser v. Randall, 357
U. S.  513,  526.    That  kind  of  “strategic  protection”  features  in  this
Court’s precedent concerning the most prominent categories of unpro-
tected speech.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 342.  With
regard to defamation, a public figure cannot recover for the injury such
a statement causes unless the speaker acted with “knowledge that it
was  false  or  with  reckless  disregard  of  whether  it  was  false  or  not.”
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 280.  The same idea
arises in the law respecting obscenity and incitement to unlawful con-
duct.  See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U. S. 105, 109; Hamling v. United
States, 418 U. S. 87, 122–123.  And that same reasoning counsels in
favor  of  requiring  a  subjective  element  in  a  true-threats  case.    A
speaker’s fear of mistaking whether a statement is a threat, fear of the
legal system getting that judgment wrong, and fear of incurring legal
costs all may lead a speaker to swallow words that are in fact not true
threats.    Insistence  on  a  subjective  element  in  unprotected-speech
cases, no doubt, has a cost: Even as it lessens chill of protected speech,
it makes prosecution of otherwise proscribable, and often dangerous,
communications harder.  But a subjective standard is still required for
true threats, lest prosecutions chill too much protected, non-threaten-
ing expression.  Pp. 5–10.

(b)  In this context, a recklessness standard—i.e., a showing that a
person “consciously disregard[ed] a substantial [and unjustifiable] risk
that  [his]  conduct  will  cause  harm  to  another,”  Voisine  v.  United
States,  579  U. S.  686,  691—is  the  appropriate  mens  rea.  Requiring
purpose or knowledge would make it harder for States to counter true
threats—with  diminished  returns  for  protected  expression.    Using  a
recklessness standard also fits with this Court’s defamation decisions,
which adopted a recklessness rule more than a half-century ago.  The
Court sees no reason to offer greater insulation to threats than to def-
amation.  While this Court’s incitement decisions demand more, the
reason for that demand—the need to protect from legal sanction the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, specifically discussing the legal definition of "true threats" and the required mental state for liability.  It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

the  Court’s  interpretation  render  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause  super-
fluous;  the  clause  retains  meaning  because  it  prohibits  States  from
using nonvoting both as the ground for removal and as the sole evi-
dence for another ground for removal (e.g., as the sole evidence that
someone has died).  Pp. 12–15.

(4) Respondents’  additional  argument—that  so  many  registered
voters discard return cards upon receipt that the failure to send cards
back is worthless as evidence that an addressee has moved—is based
on a dubious empirical conclusion that conflicts with the congression-
al  judgment  found  in  subsection  (d).    Congress  clearly  did  not  think
that the failure to send back a return card was of no evidentiary val-
ue, having made that conduct one of the two requirements for remov-
al under subsection (d).  Pp. 15–16.

(b) Nor has Ohio violated other NVRA provisions.  Pp. 16–21.

(1) Ohio  removes  the  registrants  at  issue  on  a  permissible
ground:  change  of  residence.    The  failure  to  return  a  notice  and  the
failure to vote simply serve as evidence that a registrant has moved,
not as the ground itself for removal.  Pp. 16–17.

(2) The  NVRA  contains  no  “reliable  indicator”  prerequisite  to
sending  notices,  requiring  States  to  have  good  information  that
someone  has  moved  before  sending  them  a  return  card.    So  long  as
the  trigger  for  sending  such  notices  is  “uniform,  nondiscriminatory,
and  in  compliance  with  the  Voting  Rights  Act,”  §20507(b)(1),  States
may  use  whatever  trigger  they  think  best,  including  the  failure  to
vote.  Pp. 17–19.

(3)   Ohio  has  not  violated  the  NVRA’s  “reasonable  effort”  provi-
sion, §20507(a)(4).  Even assuming that this provision authorizes fed-
eral courts to go beyond the restrictions set out in subsections (b), (c),
and (d) and strike down a state law that does not meet some stand-
ard  of  “reasonableness,”  Ohio’s  process  cannot  be  unreasonable  be-
cause  it  uses  the  change-of-residence  evidence  that  Congress  said  it
could:  the  failure  to  send  back  a  notice  coupled  with  the  failure  to
vote  for  the  requisite  period.    Ohio’s  process  is  accordingly  lawful.
Pp. 19–21.

838 F. 3d 699, reversed.

  ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  KENNEDY,  THOMAS,  and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,  joined.    THOMAS,  J.,  filed  a
concurring  opinion.    BREYER,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which
GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the court's reasoning and holdings in a case, and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
100  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court
Appendix A to opinion of the Court

woman whom he has reason to believe pregnant, at any
time during the period of gestation, any drug, medicine
or  substance,  whatsoever,  with  the  intent  thereby  to
procure the miscarriage of such woman, or with like in-
tent, to use any instrument or means whatsoever, un-
less such miscarriage is necessary to preserve her life;
and any person so offending, shall be punished by a fine
of not less than five hundred nor more than one thou-
sand dollars, and imprisoned in the State prison for not
less than one nor more than ten years.”

Sec. 2.  “If by reason of any of the acts described in
Section 1 hereof, the miscarriage of such woman is pro-
cured, and she does miscarry, causing the death of the
unborn child, whether before or after quickening time,
the person so offending shall be guilty of a felony, and
confined in the penitentiary for not less than two, nor
more than twenty-one years.”

Sec. 3.  “If, by reason of the commission of any of the
acts described in Section 1 hereof, the woman to whom
such drug or substance has been administered, or upon
whom  such  instrument  has  been  used,  shall  die,  the
person offending shall be punished as now prescribed
by law, for the offense of murder or manslaughter, as
the facts may justify.”

Sec.  4.  “The  consent  of  the  woman  to  the  perfor-
mance  of  the  operation  or  administering  of  the  medi-
cines  or  substances,  referred  to,  shall  be  no  defense,
and she shall be a competent witness in any prosecu-
tion under this act, and for that purpose she shall not
be considered an accomplice.”105

37.  Mississippi (1952):

Sec. 1.  “Whoever, by means of any instrument, med-
icine, drug, or other means whatever shall willfully and

——————

105 1910 Ky. Acts pp. 189–190 (emphasis added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text, specifically sections of a law regarding abortion.  It is sequential and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1210

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

(f)  the  name  of  the  attorney  who  is  counsel  of  record  for
the  party  concerned  (who  must  be  a  member  of  the  Bar  of
this  Court  except  as  provided  in  Rule  9.1),  and  on  whom
service  is  to  be  made,  with  a  notation  directly  thereunder
identifying the attorney as counsel of record and setting out
counsel’s  ofﬁce  address  and  telephone  number.  Only  one
counsel  of  record  may  be  noted  on  a  single  document.  The
names  of  other  members  of  the  Bar  of  this  Court  or  of  the
bar  of  the  highest  court  of  a  State  acting  as  counsel,  and,  if
desired, their addresses, may be added, but counsel of record
shall be clearly identiﬁed.  Names of persons other than at
torneys admitted to a state bar may not be listed, unless the
party  is  appearing  pro  se,  in  which  case  the  party’s  name,
address, and telephone number shall appear.  The foregoing
shall be displayed in an appropriate typographic manner and,
except  for  the  identiﬁcation  of  counsel,  may  not  be  set  in
type smaller than standard 11-point,  if the document is pre
pared as required by Rule 33.1.

2.  Every document exceeding ﬁve pages (other than a joint
appendix),  whether  prepared  under  Rule  33.1  or  Rule  33.2,
shall contain a table of contents and a table of cited authori
ties (i. e., cases alphabetically arranged, constitutional provi
sions,  statutes,  treatises,  and  other  materials)  with  refer
ences  to  the  pages  in  the  document  where  such  authorities
are cited.

3.  The  body  of  every  document  shall  bear  at  its  close  the
name  of  counsel  of  record  and  such  other  counsel,  identiﬁed
on  the  cover  of  the  document  in  conformity  with  subpara
graph 1(f) of this Rule, as may be desired.

4.  Every  appendix  to  a  document  must  be  preceded  by  a
table  of  contents  that  provides  a  description  of  each  docu
ment in the appendix.

5.  All  references  to  a  provision  of  federal  statutory  law
should  ordinarily  be  cited  to  the  United  States  Code,  if  the
provision  has  been  codiﬁed  therein.  In  the  event  the  pro
vision  has  not  been  classiﬁed  to  the  United  States  Code,
citation  should  be  to  the  Statutes  at  Large.  Additional  or
alternative  citations  should  be  provided  only  if  there  is  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a set of rules, likely from a legal document.  It outlines formatting and citation requirements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Rules and Formatting Guidelines</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

628

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Souter, J., dissenting

Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice

Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

The Court says both that it leaves Commerce Clause
precedent undisturbed and that the Civil Rights Remedy
of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U. S. C.
§ 13981, exceeds Congress’s power under that Clause.
I ﬁnd
the claims irreconcilable and respectfully dissent.1

I

Our cases, which remain at least nominally undisturbed,
stand for the following propositions. Congress has the
power to legislate with regard to activity that, in the aggre-
gate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 124–128 (1942); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452
U. S. 264, 277 (1981). The fact of such a substantial effect is
not an issue for the courts in the ﬁrst instance, ibid., but
for the Congress, whose institutional capacity for gathering
evidence and taking testimony far exceeds ours. By pass-
ing legislation, Congress indicates its conclusion, whether
explicitly or not, that facts support its exercise of the com-
merce power. The business of the courts is to review the
congressional assessment, not for soundness but simply for
the rationality of concluding that a jurisdictional basis
exists in fact. See ibid. Any explicit ﬁndings that Con-
gress chooses to make, though not dispositive of the ques-
tion of rationality, may advance judicial review by identi-
fying factual authority on which Congress relied. Applying
those propositions in these cases can lead to only one
conclusion.

One obvious difference from United States v. Lopez, 514
U. S. 549 (1995), is the mountain of data assembled by Con-

1 Finding the law a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power, I have
no occasion to reach the question whether it might also be sustained as an
exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites previous cases and lays out the legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

Opinion of the Court

nate parental rights or remove an Indian child from an un-
safe  environment  must  first  “satisfy  the  court  that  active
efforts have been made to provide remedial services and re-
habilitative  programs  designed  to  prevent  the  breakup  of
the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuc-
cessful.”  §1912(d).  Even then, the court cannot order a fos-
ter care placement unless it finds “by clear and convincing
evidence, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses,
that the continued custody of the child by the parent or In-
dian  custodian  is  likely  to  result  in  serious  emotional  or
physical damage to the child.”  §1912(e).  To terminate pa-
rental  rights,  the  court  must  make  the  same  finding  “be-
yond a reasonable doubt.”  §1912(f ).

The Act applies to voluntary proceedings too.  Relinquish-
ing a child temporarily (to foster care) or permanently (to
adoption) is a grave act, and a state court must ensure that
a  consenting  parent  or  custodian  knows  and  understands
“the terms and consequences.”  §1913(a).  Notably, a biolog-
ical parent who voluntarily gives up an Indian child cannot
necessarily  choose  the  child’s  foster  or  adoptive  parents.
The child’s tribe has “a right to intervene at any point in [a]
proceeding” to place a child in foster care or terminate pa-
rental  rights,  as  well  as  a  right  to  collaterally  attack  the
state court’s decree.  §§1911(c), 1914.  As a result, the tribe
can  sometimes  enforce  ICWA’s  placement  preferences
against  the  wishes of one or  both  biological parents,  even
after the child is living with a new family.  See Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30, 49–52
(1989).

ICWA’s  placement  preferences,  which  apply  to  all  cus-
tody  proceedings  involving  Indian  children,  are  hierar-
chical: State courts may only place the child with someone
in a lower-ranked group when there is no available place-
ment in a higher-ranked group.  For adoption, “a preference
shall  be  given”  to  placements  with  “(1)  a  member  of  the
child’s  extended  family;  (2)  other  members  of  the  Indian
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion discussing the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). It delves into the Act's provisions regarding parental rights, foster care, and adoption of Indian children.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

statements’ threatening character.  The second issue here
concerns  what  precise  mens  rea  standard  suffices  for  the
First  Amendment  purpose  at  issue.   Again  guided  by  our
precedent, we hold that a recklessness standard is enough.
Given  that  a  subjective  standard  here  shields  speech  not
independently  entitled  to  protection—and  indeed  posing
real  dangers—we  do  not  require  that  the  State  prove  the
defendant had any more specific intent to threaten the vic-
tim.

A
“From  1791  to  the  present,”  the  First  Amendment  has
“permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few
limited areas.”  United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468
(2010).  These “historic and traditional categories” are “long
familiar  to  the  bar”  and  perhaps,  too,  the  general  public.
Ibid.  One is incitement—statements “directed [at] produc-
ing imminent lawless action,” and likely to do so.  Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).  An-
other  is  defamation—false  statements  of  fact  harming
another’s reputation.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U. S. 323, 340, 342 (1974).  Still a third is obscenity—value-
less material “appeal[ing] to the prurient interest” and de-
scribing “sexual conduct” in “a patently offensive way.”  Mil-
ler  v.  California,  413  U. S.  15,  24  (1973).    This  Court  has
“often described [those] historically unprotected categories
of  speech  as  being  of  such  slight  social  value  as  a  step  to
truth  that  any  benefit  that  may  be  derived  from  them  is
clearly outweighed by the social interest” in their proscrip-
tion.  Stevens, 559 U. S., at 470 (internal quotation marks
omitted; emphasis deleted).

“True  threats”  of  violence  is  another  historically  unpro-
tected category of communications.  Virginia v. Black, 538
U. S. 343, 359 (2003); see United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S.
709, 717–718 (2012) (plurality opinion).  The “true” in that
term distinguishes what is at issue from jests, “hyperbole,”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the legal definition of "true threats" and the First Amendment implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

811

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–1458.  Missouri  Gas  Energy  v.  Schmidt,  Woods

County,  Oklahoma,  Assessor.  Sup.  Ct.  Okla.;  and

No.  08–1515.  Golden  Gate  Restaurant  Assn.  v.  City  and
County  of  San  Francisco,  California,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
The  Solicitor  General  is  invited  to  ﬁle  briefs  in  these  cases  ex
pressing  the  views  of  the  United  States.

No.  08–1596.  Rhine  v.  Deaton  et  ux.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  2d
Dist.  The  Solicitor  General  of  Texas  is  invited  to  ﬁle  a  brief  in
this  case  expressing  the  views  of  the  State  of  Texas.

No.  08–7412.  Graham  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  1st
Dist.
[Certiorari  granted,  556  U. S.  1220.]  Motion  of  petitioner
for  appointment  of  counsel  granted.  Bryan  S.  Gowdy,  Esq.,  of
Jacksonville,  Fla.,  is  appointed  to  serve  as  counsel  for  petitioner
in  this  case.

No.  08–8224.  Burke  v.  Aniskovich  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [556  U. S.  1150]  denied.

No. 08–9547.  In re Minnfee.  Motion of petitioner for recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[556  U. S.  1268]  denied.

No.  08–9603.  In  re  Haddad.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[556  U. S.  1281]  denied.

No.  08–9685.  Veale  et  al.  v.  United  States  et  al.  C.  A.
1st Cir.  Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying
leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [556  U. S.  1256]  denied.

No.  08–9822.  Bagley  v.  South  Carolina.  Sup.  Ct.  S.  C.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [557  U. S.  902]  granted.  Order  en
tered  June  15,  2009,  vacated.

No.  08–10258.  Hayes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [557  U. S.  917]  denied.

No.  08–10306.  In  re  Farley.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[556  U. S.  1280]  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and related actions, likely from a legal journal or docket. It's not sequential narrative text and contains legal jargon.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

752

PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL v. BABBITT

O’Connor, J., concurring

§ 706(2)(A), that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in promulgating the new regulations. Under our de-
cision in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 42 (1983),
an agency that departs from its previous rules will be found
to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously if it fails “to supply
a reasoned analysis for the change . . . .” Although peti-
tioners pressed precisely such an “arbitrary and capricious”
challenge before the District Court, for whatever reason,
they chose not to raise it before this Court. Regardless of
whether the “arbitrary and capricious” claim remains open
to these permit holders, the Court’s decision does not fore-
close such an APA challenge generally by permit holders af-
fected by the 1995 regulations.

With these understandings, I join the Court’s opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor. It contains legal arguments and references to case law, indicating it's part of the actual content meant to be read and understood.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Opinion of the Court

II
A
This case turns on the meaning of the 1997 statute sub-
jecting  a  final  veterans’  benefits  decision  to  collateral  re-
view  on  grounds  of  “clear  and  unmistakable  error.”    111
Stat. 2271 (38 U. S. C. §§5109A, 7111).  Neither this statute
nor  any  other  defines  this  term—indeed,  it  appears  no-
where else in the entire United States Code.  The modifiers
“clear”  and  “unmistakable”  indicate  that  this  is  a  narrow
category excluding some forms of error cognizable in other
contexts.  The statutory structure similarly suggests a nar-
row category because this form of review functions as a lim-
ited exception to finality, in contrast to the broad provision
of one direct appeal for “[a]ll questions” in a case.  §7104(a).
But beyond those general contours, the statute itself does
not identify the specific ways in which this category is nar-
rower than garden-variety “error.”

Fortunately, a robust regulatory backdrop fills in the de-
tails.  Where Congress employs a term of art “ ‘ “obviously
transplanted from another legal source,” ’ it ‘ “brings the old
soil  with  it.” ’ ”  Taggart  v.  Lorenzen,  587  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2019) (slip op., at 5).  That principle applies here.  In 1997,
Congress used an unusual term that had a long regulatory
history in this very context.  It enacted no new “definition”
or other provision indicating any departure from the “same
meaning” that the VA had long applied.  Hall v. Hall, 584
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2018)  (slip  op.,  at  13).    We  therefore  agree
with  the  Federal  Circuit  that  Congress  “codif[ied]  and
adopt[ed] the [clear-and-unmistakable-error] doctrine as it
had developed under” prior agency practice.  Cook v. Prin-
cipi, 318 F. 3d 1334, 1344 (2002) (en banc).  That longstand-
ing VA practice reveals several respects in which the clear-
and-unmistakable category is a “very specific and rare kind
of  error”  narrower  than  error  simpliciter.
38  CFR
§20.1403(a).

Most important for present purposes, the history reveals
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of a specific statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.

Opinion of the Court

none  other  than  the  power  to  pre-empt,  the  reasonable
assumption is that the statutory text accurately communi-
cates  the  scope  of  Congress’s  pre-emptive  intent.    More-
over, the federalism concerns underlying the presumption
in  the  Supremacy  Clause  context  are  somewhat  weaker
here.  Unlike  the  States’  “historic  police  powers,”  Rice,
supra, at 230, the States’ role in regulating  congressional
elections—while  weighty  and  worthy  of  respect—has
always  existed  subject  to  the  express  qualification  that  it
“terminates  according  to  federal  law.”  Buckman  Co.  v.
Plaintiffs’  Legal  Comm.,  531  U. S.  341,  347  (2001).    In
sum,  there  is  no  compelling  reason  not  to  read  Elections
Clause legislation simply to mean what it says.

We  conclude  that  the  fairest  reading  of  the  statute  is
that  a  state-imposed  requirement  of  evidence  of  citizen-
ship  not  required  by  the  Federal  Form  is  “inconsistent
with”  the  NVRA’s  mandate  that  States  “accept  and  use”
the Federal Form.  Siebold, supra, at 397.  If this reading
prevails, the Elections Clause requires that Arizona’s rule
give way.

We  note,  however,  that  while  the  NVRA  forbids  States
to  demand  that  an  applicant  submit  additional  infor-
mation beyond that required by the Federal Form, it does
not  preclude  States  from  “deny[ing]  registration  based  on
information  in  their  possession  establishing  the  appli-
cant’s  ineligibility.”7   Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus
Curiae 24.  The NVRA clearly contemplates that not every
submitted  Federal  Form  will  result  in  registration.    See

——————

7 The  dissent  seems  to  think  this  position  of  ours  incompatible  with
our  reading  of  §1973gg–6(a)(1)(B),  which  requires  a  State  to  “ensure
that any eligible applicant is registered to vote in an election . . . if the
valid  voter  registration  form  of  the  applicant  is  postmarked”  by  a
certain date.  See post, at 9–10 (opinion of ALITO, J.).  What the dissent
overlooks is that §1973gg–6(a)(1)(B) only requires a State to register an
“eligible  applicant”  who  submits  a  timely  Federal  Form.    (Emphasis
added.)
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute related to voter registration. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, all characteristic of legal text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 09–893
_________________

AT&T MOBILITY LLC, PETITIONER v. VINCENT

CONCEPCION ET UX.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 27, 2011]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section  2  of  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act  (FAA)  makes
agreements  to  arbitrate  “valid,  irrevocable,  and  enforce-
able,  save upon  such  grounds  as  exist  at  law  or  in  equity
for  the  revocation  of  any  contract.”    9  U. S. C.  §2.    We
consider whether the FAA prohibits States from condition-
ing the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on
the availability of classwide arbitration procedures.

I

In February 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion entered
into  an  agreement  for  the  sale  and  servicing  of  cellular
telephones  with  AT&T  Mobility  LCC  (AT&T).1    The  con-
tract  provided  for  arbitration  of  all  disputes  between  the
parties, but required that claims be brought in the parties’
“individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member
in any purported class or representative proceeding.”  App.

——————

1 The  Concepcions’  original  contract  was  with  Cingular  Wireless.
AT&T  acquired  Cingular  in  2005  and  renamed  the  company  AT&T
Mobility  in  2007.    Laster  v.  AT&T  Mobility  LLC,  584  F. 3d  849,  852,
n. 1 (CA9 2009).
  </content>
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This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2010

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TURNER v. ROGERS ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

No. 10–10.  Argued March 23, 2011—Decided June 20, 2011

After  a  South  Carolina  family  court  ordered  petitioner  Turner  to  pay
$51.73  per  week  to  respondent  Rogers  to  help  support  their  child,
Turner repeatedly failed to pay the amount due and was held in con-
tempt five times.  For the first four, he was sentenced to 90 days’ im-
prisonment, but he ultimately paid what he owed (twice without be-
ing jailed, twice after spending a few days in custody).  The fifth time
he did not pay but completed a 6-month sentence.  After his release,
the  family  court  clerk  issued  a  new  “show  cause”  order  against
Turner  because  he  was  $5728.76  in  arrears.    Both  he  and  Rogers
were  unrepresented  by  counsel  at  his  brief  civil  contempt  hearing.
The judge found Turner in willful contempt and sentenced him to 12
months in prison without making any finding as to his ability to pay
or  indicating  on  the  contempt  order  form  whether  he  was  able  to
make  support  payments.    After  Turner  completed  his  sentence,  the
South  Carolina  Supreme  Court  rejected  his  claim  that  the  Federal
Constitution entitled him to counsel at his contempt hearing, declar-
ing  that  civil  contempt  does  not  require  all  the  constitutional  safe-
guards applicable in criminal contempt proceedings.

Held:

1. Even  though  Turner  has completed  his  12-month  sentence,  and
there  are  not  alleged  to  be  collateral  consequences  of  the  contempt
determination  that  might  keep  the  dispute  alive,  this  case  is  not
moot,  because  it  is  “capable  of  repetition”  while  “evading  review,”
Southern  Pac.  Terminal  Co.  v.  Interstate  Commerce  Comm’n,  219
U. S. 498, 515.  A case remains live if “(1) the challenged action [is] in
its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or ex-
piration,  and  (2)  there  [is]  a  reasonable  expectation  that  the  same
complaining  party  [will]  be  subjected  to  the  same  action  again.”
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149.  Here, the “challenged ac-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a brief overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U60

[09-26-01 12:39:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

803

Syllabus

UNITED STATES et al. v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAIN-
MENT GROUP, INC.

appeal from the united states district court for the
district of delaware

No. 98–1682. Argued November 30, 1999—Decided May 22, 2000

Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires cable televi-
sion operators providing channels “primarily dedicated to sexually-
oriented programming” either to “fully scramble or otherwise fully
block” those channels or to limit their transmission to hours when chil-
dren are unlikely to be viewing, set by administrative regulation as
between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Even before § 505’s enactment, cable opera-
tors used signal scrambling to limit access to certain programs to paying
customers. Scrambling could be imprecise, however; and either or both
audio and visual portions of the scrambled programs might be heard or
seen, a phenomenon known as “signal bleed.” The purpose of § 505 is
to shield children from hearing or seeing images resulting from signal
bleed. To comply with § 505, the majority of cable operators adopted
the “time channeling” approach, so that, for two-thirds of the day, no
viewers in their service areas could receive the programming in ques-
tion. Appellee Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., ﬁled this suit chal-
lenging § 505’s constitutionality. A three-judge District Court con-
cluded that § 505’s content-based restriction on speech violates the First
Amendment because the Government might further its interests in less
restrictive ways. One plausible, less restrictive alternative could be
found in § 504 of the Act, which requires a cable operator, “[u]pon re-
quest by a cable service subscriber . . . without charge, [to] fully scram-
ble or otherwise fully block” any channel the subscriber does not wish
to receive. As long as subscribers knew about this opportunity, the
court reasoned, § 504 would provide as much protection against un-
wanted programming as would § 505.

Held: Because the Government failed to prove § 505 is the least restrictive
means for addressing a real problem, the District Court did not err in
holding the statute violative of the First Amendment. Pp. 811–827.

(a) Two points should be understood: (1) Many adults would ﬁnd the
material at issue highly offensive, and considering that the material
comes unwanted into homes where children might see or hear it against
parental wishes or consent, there are legitimate reasons for regulating
it; and (2) Playboy’s programming has First Amendment protection.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case.  It summarizes the case and the court's decision, but it is not the actual content of the case itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO

THOMAS, J., dissenting

this Court in New York Times and its progeny broke sharply
from the common law of libel, and there are sound reasons
to question whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments
displaced this body of common law.”  McKee, 586 U. S., at
___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 6).  Thus, as I have
previously noted, “[w]e should reconsider our jurisprudence
in this area.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14); see also Berisha v.
Lawson, 594 U. S. ___ (2021) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).

I am far from alone.  Many Members of this Court have
questioned  the  soundness  of  New  York  Times  and  its  nu-
merous extensions.  See, e.g., Berisha, 594 U. S., at ___–___
(GORSUCH, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op.,
at  5–8);  Coughlin  v.  Westinghouse  Broadcasting  &  Cable,
Inc.,  476  U. S.  1187  (1986)  (Burger,  C. J.,  joined  by
Rehnquist,  J.,  dissenting  from  denial  of  certiorari);  Gertz,
418  U. S.,  at  370  (White,  J.,  dissenting);  Rosenbloom  v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29, 62 (1971) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting); id., at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring); see
also E. Kagan, A Libel Story: Sullivan Then and Now, 18 L.
& Soc. Inquiry 197, 207 (1993); J. Lewis & B. Ottley, New
York Times v. Sullivan at 50, 64 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 35–36
(2014) (collecting statements from Justice Scalia); cf. Tah v.
Global  Witness  Publishing,  Inc.,  991  F. 3d  231,  251–256
(CADC 2021) (Silberman, J., dissenting in part) (question-
ing the doctrine).  It is thus unfortunate that the majority
chooses  not  only  to  prominently  and  uncritically  invoke
New York Times, but also to extend its flawed, policy-driven
First Amendment analysis to true threats, a separate area
of this Court’s jurisprudence.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GARLAND v. CARGILL

Syllabus

are lawful “simply because the [trigger] moves back and forth . . . would
exalt  artifice  above  reality  and  enable  evasion  of  the  federal  ma-
chinegun ban.”  Id., at 41–42.  The presumption against ineffectiveness
cannot do the work that ATF asks of it.  Interpreting §5845(b) to ex-
clude semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks comes nowhere
close to making the statute useless.  Pp. 17–19.

57 F. 4th 447, affirmed.

  THOMAS, J. delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and  BARRETT, JJ., joined.   ALITO,  J.,
filed a concurring opinion.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal case syllabus, providing a summary of the court's decision and the justices' participation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN.

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

interpretive  rules,  we  have  allowed  agencies  to  make
rules  unhampered  by  notice-and-comment
binding
procedures.

The  problem  is  bad  enough,  and  perhaps  insoluble  if
Chevron is not to be uprooted, with respect to interpretive
rules  setting  forth  agency  interpretation  of  statutes.    But
an  agency’s  interpretation  of  its  own  regulations  is  an-
other matter.  By giving that category of interpretive rules
Auer deference, we do more than allow the agency to make
binding regulations without notice and comment.  Because
the  agency  (not  Congress)  drafts  the  substantive  rules
that  are  the  object  of  those  interpretations,  giving  them
deference  allows  the  agency  to  control  the  extent  of  its
notice-and-comment-free domain.  To expand this domain,
the  agency  need  only  write  substantive  rules  more
broadly and vaguely, leaving plenty of gaps to be filled in
later,  using  interpretive  rules  unchecked  by  notice  and
comment.  The  APA  does  not  remotely  contemplate  this
regime.

Still and all, what are we to do about the problem?  The
Paralyzed  Veterans  doctrine  is  a  courageous  (indeed,
brazen)  attempt  to  limit  the  mischief  by  requiring  an
interpretive  rule  to  go  through  notice  and  comment  if  it
revises an earlier definitive interpretation of a regulation.
That  solution  is  unlawful  for  the  reasons  set  forth  in  the
Court’s  opinion:  It  contradicts  the  APA’s  unqualified  ex-
emption  of  interpretive  rules  from  notice-and-comment
rulemaking.

But  I  think  there  is  another  solution—one  unavailable
to the D. C. Circuit since it involves the overruling of one
this Court’s decisions (that being even a greater fault than
merely ignoring the APA).  As I have described elsewhere,
the rule of Chevron, if it did not comport with the APA, at
least  was  in  conformity  with  the  long  history  of  judicial
review  of  executive  action,  where  “[s]tatutory  ambiguities
. . .  were  left  to  reasonable  resolution  by  the  Executive.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia. It delves into the legal interpretation of agency rules and the Chevron doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U78

[09-06-00 18:35:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 116 (1998)

117

Syllabus

held that, in a case of death on the high seas, a decedent’s survivors
could not recover damages under general maritime law for their loss of
society, reasoning that, since DOHSA announced Congress’ considered
judgment on, inter alia, beneﬁciaries, survival, and damages, id., at 625,
the Court had no authority to substitute its views for those expressed
by Congress, id., at 626. Because Higginbotham involved only the
scope of the remedies available in a wrongful-death action, it did not
address the availability of other causes of action. However, petitioners
err in contending that DOHSA is a wrongful-death statute with no bear-
ing on the availability of a survival action. By authorizing only certain
surviving relatives to recover damages, and by limiting damages to
those relatives’ pecuniary losses, Congress provided the exclusive recov-
ery for deaths on the high seas. Petitioners concede that their action
would expand the class of beneﬁciaries entitled to recovery and the re-
coverable damages; but Congress has already decided these issues and,
thus, has precluded the judiciary from expanding either category.
DOHSA’s survival provision conﬁrms the Act’s comprehensive scope by
expressing Congress’ considered judgment on the availability and con-
tours of a survival action in cases of death on the high seas. Congress
has simply chosen to adopt a more limited survival provision than that
urged by petitioners.
Indeed, Congress did so in the same year that it
incorporated a survival action similar to the one petitioners seek into
the Jones Act, permitting seamen to recover damages for their own
injuries.
In the exercise of its admiralty jurisdiction, the Court will
not upset the balance Congress struck by authorizing a cause of action
with which Congress was certainly familiar but nonetheless declined to
adopt. Pp. 121–124.

117 F. 3d 1477, afﬁrmed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Juanita M. Madole argued the cause and ﬁled briefs for

petitioners.

Andrew J. Harakas argued the cause for respondent.

With him on the brief was George N. Tompkins, Jr.

Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging afﬁrmance. On the brief were So-
licitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Hun-
ger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, David C. Frederick,
Barbara B. O’Malley, and Bruce G. Forrest.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case citations, legal reasoning, and mentions of the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Sen-
ate,  as  agents  of  the  State,  by  and  through  counsel  of  their  choice,”
“shall jointly have standing to intervene on behalf of the General As-
sembly as a party in any judicial proceeding challenging a North Car-
olina statute or provision of the North Carolina Constitution.”  N. C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. §1–72.2(b).  And the State has made plain that it con-
siders the leaders of the General Assembly “necessary parties” to suits
like this one.  §120–32.6(b).

The Board submits that North Carolina law does not afford the leg-
islative leaders authority to represent state interests.  But that argu-
ment is difficult to square with the express statutory language.  Alter-
natively, the Board argues that the statutes authorizing the legislative
leaders to participate here violate the State Constitution by usurping
power vested in the executive branch alone.  That logic is hard to fol-
low, however, given the Board’s concession that the legislative leaders
may intervene permissively under Rule 24(b), and likely as a matter
of right under Rule 24(a)(2) if the attorney general ceases to defend the
law.

The NAACP offers a different reply, pointing out that Rule 24(a)(2)
permits intervention only by “new” parties.  And, it submits, the legis-
lative leaders are already effectively “existing” parties to this suit chal-
lenging the enforcement of state law.  That argument rests on a prem-
ise that is both formally and functionally mistaken.  First, the NAACP
has not sued the State but only certain state officers, and, so far, the
legislative leaders are not among them.  Functionally, however, this
suit implicates North Carolina’s sovereign interests regardless of the
named parties.  And, where a State chooses to divide its sovereign au-
thority among different officials and authorize their participation in a
suit challenging state law, a full consideration of the State’s practical
interests may require the involvement of different voices with different
perspectives.  Pp. 8–13.

(b) Concerning Rule 24(a)(2)’s third requirement, lower courts have
adopted a variety of tests for evaluating whether an existing defendant
already “adequately represent[s]” the same interests a proposed inter-
venor seeks to vindicate.  Here, both the District Court and the en banc
Court of Appeals improperly applied a “presumption” that the Board
adequately represented the legislative leaders’ interests and held that
the leaders could not overcome this presumption.  But Rule 24(a)(2)’s
test in this regard presents proposed intervenors with only a minimal
challenge: It promises intervention to those who bear an interest that
may be practically impaired or impeded “unless existing parties ade-
quately  represent  that  [same]  interest.”    See,  e.g.,  Trbovich  v.  Mine
Workers, 404 U. S. 528.  Some lower courts have suggested that a pre-
sumption  of  adequate  representation  remains  appropriate  in  certain
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal argument or excerpt from a court opinion. It discusses the standing of legislative leaders to intervene in a lawsuit challenging a North Carolina statute. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

415

Opinion of O’Connor, J.

however, see ante, at 393, Williams’ case did not implicate
the unusual circumstances present in cases like Lockhart or
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157 (1986). Accordingly, for the
very reasons I set forth in my Lockhart concurrence, the
emphasis on outcome was entirely appropriate in Williams’
case.

Third, I also agree with the Court that, to the extent the
Virginia Supreme Court did apply Strickland, its applica-
tion was unreasonable. See ante, at 395–398. As the Court
correctly recounts, Williams’ trial counsel failed to conduct
an investigation that would have uncovered substantial
amounts of mitigation evidence. See ante, at 395–396. For
example, speaking only of that evidence concerning Williams’
“nightmarish childhood,” ante, at 395, the mitigation evi-
dence that trial counsel failed to present to the jury showed
that “Williams’ parents had been imprisoned for the criminal
neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been
severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had
been committed to the custody of the social services bureau
for two years during his parents’ incarceration (including one
stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents
were released from prison, had been returned to his parents’
custody,” ibid. (footnote omitted). See also ante, at 395,
n. 19. The consequence of counsel’s failure to conduct the
requisite, diligent investigation into his client’s troubling
background and unique personal circumstances manifested
itself during his generic, unapologetic closing argument,
which provided the jury with no reasons to spare petitioner’s
life. More generally, the Virginia Circuit Court found that
Williams’ trial counsel failed to present evidence showing
that Williams “had a deprived and abused upbringing; that
he may have been a neglected and mistreated child; that he
came from an alcoholic family; . . . that he was borderline
mentally retarded;” and that “[his] conduct had been good
in certain structured settings in his life (such as when he
In addition, the Circuit
was incarcerated).” App. 422–423.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice O'Connor in the case of Williams v. Virginia. It discusses the application of the Strickland v. Washington standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

435

Opinion of Stevens, J.

cant in evaluating precedents.  Second, each case in this line
expressed support for the principle that corporate and union
political speech ﬁnanced with PAC funds, collected voluntar
ily from the organization’s stockholders or members, receives
greater  protection  than  speech  ﬁnanced  with  general  treas
ury funds.60

This principle was carried forward when Congress enacted
comprehensive campaign ﬁnance reform in the Federal Elec
tion  Campaign  Act  of  1971  (FECA),  86  Stat.  3,  which  re
tained  the  restriction  on  using  general  treasury  funds  for
contributions and  expenditures, 2  U. S. C. § 441b(a).  FECA

60 See  Pipeﬁtters  v.  United  States,  407  U. S.  385,  409,  414–415  (1972)
(reading the statutory bar on corporate and union campaign spending not
to apply to “the voluntary donations of employees,” when maintained in a
separate  account,  because  “[t]he  dominant  [legislative]  concern  in  requir
ing that contributions be voluntary was, after all, to protect the dissenting
stockholder  or  union  member”);  Automobile  Workers,  352  U. S.,  at  592
(advising the District Court to consider on remand whether the broadcast
in question was “paid for out of the general dues of the union membership
or  [whether]  the  funds  [could]  be  fairly  said  to  have  been  obtained  on  a
voluntary basis”); United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 123 (1948) (observing
that “funds voluntarily contributed [by union members or corporate stock
holders]  for  election  purposes”  might  not  be  covered  by  the  expenditure
bar).  Both  the  Pipeﬁtters  and  the  Automobile  Workers  Courts  approv
ingly  referenced  Congress’  goal  of  reducing  “the  effect  of  aggregated
wealth on federal elections,” understood as wealth drawn from a corporate
or union general treasury without the stockholders’ or members’ “free and
knowing choice.”  Pipeﬁtters, 407 U. S., at 416; see Automobile Workers,
352 U. S., at 582.

The  two  dissenters  in  Pipeﬁtters  would  not  have  read  the  statutory
provision in question, a successor to § 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, to allow
such robust use of corporate and union funds to ﬁnance otherwise prohib
ited electioneering.  “This opening of the door to extensive corporate and
union  inﬂuence  on  the  elective  and  legislative  processes,”  Justice  Powell
wrote, “must be viewed with genuine concern.  This seems to me to be a
regressive  step  as  contrasted  with  the  numerous  legislative  and  judicial
actions  in  recent  years  designed  to  assure  that  elections  are  indeed  free
and  representative.”  407  U. S.,  at  450  (opinion  of  Powell,  J.,  joined  by
Burger, C. J.).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing campaign finance law and precedents. It contains legal citations and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

TRUMP v. VANCE

Opinion of the Court

any  other  source”  and  is  needed  “now,  rather  than  at  the
end  of  the  President’s  term.”    Brief  for  United  States  as
Amicus Curiae 29, 32 (internal quotation marks and alter-
ation omitted).  JUSTICE ALITO, largely embracing those cri-
teria, agrees that a state criminal subpoena to a President
“should  not  be  allowed  unless  a  heightened  standard  is
met.”  Post,  at  16–18  (asking  whether  the  information  is
“critical” and “necessary . . . now”).

We disagree, for three reasons.  First, such a heightened
standard would extend protection designed for official doc-
uments to the President’s private papers.  As the Solicitor
General  and  JUSTICE  ALITO  acknowledge,  their  proposed
test  is  derived  from  executive  privilege  cases  that  trace
back to Burr.  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26–
28; post, at 17.  There, Marshall explained that if Jefferson
invoked  presidential  privilege  over  executive  communica-
tions, the court would not “proceed against the president as
against an ordinary individual” but would instead require
an affidavit from the defense that “would clearly show the
paper to be essential to the justice of the case.”  Burr, 25
F. Cas., at 192.  The Solicitor General and JUSTICE ALITO
would have us apply a similar standard to a President’s per-
sonal papers.  But this argument does not account for the
relevant passage from Burr: “If there be a paper in the pos-
session of the executive, which is not of an official nature,
he must stand, as respects that paper, in nearly the same
situation with any other individual.”  Id., at 191 (emphasis
added).  And  it  is  only  “nearly”—and  not  “entirely”—be-
cause the President retains the right to assert privilege over
documents  that,  while  ostensibly  private,  “partake  of  the
character of an official paper.”  Id., at 191–192.

Second, neither the Solicitor General nor JUSTICE ALITO
has  established  that  heightened  protection  against  state
subpoenas is necessary for the Executive to fulfill his Arti-
cle II functions.  Beyond the risk of harassment, which we
addressed  above,  the  only  justification  they  offer  for  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court's opinion in the case of Trump v. Vance. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a state criminal subpoena to a President.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xcix

Page

983

Migliaccio v. Castaneda
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Mikos v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miles v. United States
1132

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Millen, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,1011

1088

Millen v. Commercial Appeal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Millen v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Millen v. Kansas City Star  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  966,1046

1079

Millen v. Management Cleaning Controls  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088

Millen v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miller, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,1075,1146

829

Miller v. Beard  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

Miller v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miller; Francis v.
1026

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miller v. Friel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1030,1159

954

Miller v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

Miller v. Palmer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miller v. Pennsylvania
1124

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Miller v. Rock Hill City Police Dept.
1119

Miller v. Ryan
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

Miller v.  South  Carolina Dept. of Probation,  Parole, and Pardon
Miller v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

Miller v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  858,915,958,1026,1098

947

Miller v. Villegas
Miller; Wheeler v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1141

Miller-Stout; Kamps v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

1107

Millhouse v. Grondolsky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116

Mills v. Connors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mills; Nichols v.
1017

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Millspin v. United States
939

Miloro v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. BPI Communications, Inc.  . . .
1152

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Milwaukee County; Murray v.
1112

Milwaukee Deputy Sheriff ’s Assn. v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

Milyard; Watson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937

Minaya v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945

Mincey v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116

Mincoff v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Mine v. Lawler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905

Mines v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Mingo v. Lawler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

Ming Wei Liu v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala.  . . . . . . . . . . .
881

Ming Yen Hou v. New York City Dept. of Env. Prot.  . . . . . . . . . .
970

Minh Huynh v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1023

Minix, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U73

[09-06-00 17:32:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

50

UNITED STATES v. BEGGERLY

Stevens, J., concurring

apply in such an unlikely hypothetical situation. The Court
need not (and, therefore, properly does not) address that
quite different type of case. Accordingly, I join the Court’s
opinion without reservation.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, likely from a court opinion.  It includes case information, a judge's name, and part of a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 21–234.  Argued April 19, 2022—Decided June 15, 2022

When petitioner Kevin George joined the Marine Corps in 1975, he did
not disclose his history of schizophrenic episodes, and a medical exam-
ination noted no mental disorders.  After George suffered an episode
during training, the Marines medically discharged him.  George then
applied to the Department of Veterans Affairs under 38 U. S. C. §1110
for veterans’ disability benefits based on his schizophrenia.  A regional
office of the VA denied George’s claim, and the VA’s Board of Veterans’
Appeals denied his appeal in 1977.
  In 2014, George asked the Board to revise its final decision.  When
the VA denies a benefits claim, that decision generally becomes “final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed by any other official or by any
court”  after  the  veteran  exhausts  the  opportunity  for  direct  appeal.
§511(a);  see  §7104(a).    But  George  sought  collateral  review  under  a
statutory exception allowing a veteran to seek revision of a final bene-
fits decision at any time on grounds of “clear and unmistakable error.”
§§5109A, 7111; see 38 CFR §§3.105, 20.1400–20.1411.  In particular,
he claimed that the Board clearly and unmistakably erred by applying
a  later  invalidated  regulation  to  deny  his  claim  for  benefits  without
holding the VA to its burden of proof to rebut the statutory presump-
tion that he was in sound condition when he entered service.
  The Board denied George’s claim for collateral relief, and the Veter-
ans Court affirmed.  The Federal Circuit also affirmed, concluding that
the application of a later invalidated regulation does not fall into the
narrow category of “clear and unmistakable error” permitting revision
of a final decision under 38 U. S. C. §§5109A and 7111.

Held: The invalidation of a VA regulation after a veteran’s benefits deci-
sion becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief based on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xxxiii

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

1081

Chief Judge, U. S. District Court; Patten v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1082

Chief Justice, Supreme Court of N. J.; White v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113

Children’s Fund v. Springﬁeld Holding Co. Ltd. LLC
. . . . . . . . .
1012

Children’s Hospital v. Shinn  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

Childress v. Cameron  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  820,1061

Childress v. United States
808

Childs v. Weinshienk
Chipla College; Tucker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  904,1102

858

Chism v. Turner  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Cho-Ing Tseng v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
871

Choiniere v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Chrin v. Ibrix, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Christensen v. Nevada  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Christensen v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1135

1027

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Christian v. California
Christiana Care Health Systems; Ford v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1023

871

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Christian County; Witham v.
1076

Christian Legal Soc., UC Hastings College of Law v. Martinez  . .
858

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Christie v. United States
1077

Christie’s International PLC; Fastov v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

Christopher v. Bethune
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1087

Chrysler LLC; Indiana State Police Pension Trust v.  . . . . . . . . . .
952

Chumpia v. Memphis
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Chung v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco County . . . . . . . .
Chung v. United States
1005

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074

Chung Lau v. Giurbina  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1105

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chung Lau v. Shumsky
945

Church Homes, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd.  . . . . . . . . . .
Church’s Chicken; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1045

1149

Cimini v. Smith
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947

Cincinnati Ins. Co.; Hofmeister v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959

Ciocan v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905

Ciocchetti v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

Ciptanagara v. Holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

Circuit Court of Ill., Cook County; Nesbitt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cirilo-Munoz v. United States
Cirtin; Reed v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  971,1102

1092

Citgo Petroleum Corp.; Lewis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n
310

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
City.  See name of city.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clandestine Attackers/Assailants; Sikora v.
Clark v. Burtt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clark v. California

1042

1108

1106
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
44

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of BREYER, J.

C
Percentage of U.S. population in States that conducted an
execution within prior 3 years

Year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

Percentage
54%
60%
63%
63%
61%
70%
68%
67%
57%
53%
52%
52%
55%
57%
53%
39%
43%
42%
39%
34%
33%
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a table of data showing the percentage of the U.S. population living in states that conducted an execution within the past three years.
  </thinking>
  <category>Data Table</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–179.  Argued March 27, 2023—Decided June 23, 2023

Respondent Helaman Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path
to  U. S.  citizenship  through “adult  adoption.”   But  that was  a  scam.
Though there is no path to citizenship through “adult adoption,” Han-
sen  earned  nearly  $2  million  from  his  scheme.    The  United  States
charged Hansen with, inter alia, violating 8 U. S. C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv),
which forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter,
or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the
fact that such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.”  Hansen was
convicted and moved to dismiss the clause (iv) charges on First Amend-
ment overbreadth grounds.  The District Court rejected Hansen’s ar-
gument, but the Ninth Circuit concluded that clause (iv) was unconsti-
tutionally overbroad.

Held: Because §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation
and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law, the clause
is not unconstitutionally overbroad.  Pp. 4–20.

(a)  Hansen’s First Amendment overbreadth challenge rests on the
claim that clause (iv) punishes so much protected speech that it cannot
be applied to anyone, including him.  A court will hold a statute facially
invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if the law “prohibits a substan-
tial  amount  of  protected  speech”  relative  to  its  “plainly  legitimate
sweep.”  United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 292.  In such a cir-
cumstance, society’s interest in free expression outweighs its interest
in  the  statute’s  lawful  applications.    Otherwise,  courts  must  handle
unconstitutional applications as they usually do—case-by-case.  Pp. 4–
5.

(b) The  issue  here  is  whether  Congress  used  “encourage”  and  “in-
duce” in clause (iv) as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and
facilitation (thus capturing only a narrow band of speech) or instead
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>