<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

international  community  specifically  and  universally
practices or endorses.

B
1

The plurality nonetheless allies itself with the view that
international law supplies the rule of decision in this case
based on its reading of footnote 20 in Sosa.  That footnote
sets  out  “[a]  related  consideration”  to  “the  determination
whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause
of action.”  542 U. S., at 732, and n. 20.  In full, it states:

“A related consideration is whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is
a  private  actor  such  as  a  corporation  or  individual.
Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d
774,  791–795  (CADC  1984)  (Edwards,  J.,  concurring)
(insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by private
actors  violates  international  law),  with  Kadic  v.
Karadžić,  70  F. 3d  232,  239–241  (CA2  1995)  (suffi
cient  consensus  in  1995  that  genocide  by  private  ac
tors  violates  international  law).”  542  U. S.,  at  732,
n. 20.

In the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, 621 F. 3d 111 (2010), the majority opinion read
footnote 20 to “requir[e] that [courts] look to international
law  to  determine  [their]  jurisdiction  over  ATS  claims
against  a  particular  class  of  defendant,  such  as  corpora
tions.”  Id.,  at  127  (emphasis  in  original).  The  plurality
today  accords  “considerable  force  and  weight  to  [that]
position,”  ante,  at  13,  and  so  proceeds  to  assess  whether
there  exists  a  specific,  universal,  and  obligatory  norm  of
liability for corporations in international law, ante, at 13–
17.  But  the  Court  of  Appeals  mistook  the  meaning  of
footnote 20, which simply draws attention to the fact that,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of a footnote in a previous Supreme Court case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
50

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

and  that  he  had  confessed  “not  to  the  church”  but  “to  his
friends and neighbours.”  Id., at 162.  Because the court pro-
vided no explanation of its decision, this case sheds no light
on the understanding of the free-exercise right.

All told, this mixed bag of antebellum decisions does little
to support Smith, and extending the search past the Civil
War does not advance Smith’s cause.  One of the objectives
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it has been argued, was to
protect  the  religious  liberty  of  African-Americans  in  the
South, where a combination of laws that did not facially tar-
get  religious  practice  had  been  used  to  suppress  religious
exercise by slaves.  See generally Lash, The Second Adop-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Un-
der  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  88  Nw.  U.  L.  Rev.  1106
(1994).

4

Some have claimed that the drafting history of the Bill of
Rights  supports  Smith.  See  Brief  for  First  Amendment
Scholars as Amici Curiae 10–11; Muñoz, Original Meaning
1085.  But as Professor Philip Hamburger, one of Smith’s
most  prominent  academic  defenders,  has  concluded,
“[w]hat any of this [history] implies about the meaning of
the Free Exercise Clause is speculative.”  Religious Exemp-
tion 928.

Here is the relevant history.  The House debated a provi-
sion,  originally  proposed  by  Madison,  that  protected  the
right to bear arms but included language stating that “no
person,  religiously  scrupulous,  shall  be  compelled  to  bear
arms.”  1 Annals of Cong. 749, 766 (1789); see also Muñoz,
Original Meaning 1112.  Some Members spoke in favor of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

 JUSTICE ALITO shows why that analysis is wrong under
our  precedents.  See  post,  at  13–17  (dissenting  opinion).
But  I  have  some  concerns  about  our  modern  vagueness
doctrine itself.  Whether that doctrine is defensible under
the  original  meaning  of  “due  process  of  law”  is  a  difficult
question  I  leave  for  the  another  day,  but  the  doctrine’s
history should prompt us at least to examine its constitu-
tional  underpinnings  more  closely  before  we  use  it  to
nullify yet another duly enacted law.

A

We  have  become  accustomed  to  using  the  Due  Process
Clauses  to  invalidate  laws  on  the  ground  of  “vagueness.”
The  doctrine  we  have  developed  is  quite  sweeping:  “A
statute can be impermissibly vague . . . if it fails to provide
people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
understand  what  conduct  it  prohibits”  or  “if  it  authorizes
or  even  encourages  arbitrary  and  discriminatory  enforce-
ment.”  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U. S. 703, 732 (2000).  Using
this  framework,  we  have  nullified  a  wide  range  of  enact-
ments.  We  have  struck  down  laws  ranging  from  city
ordinances,  Papachristou  v.  Jacksonville,  405  U. S.  156,
165–171  (1972),  to  Acts  of  Congress,  United  States  v.  L.
Cohen  Grocery  Co.,  255  U. S.  81,  89–93  (1921).    We  have
struck down laws whether they are penal, Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 452, 458 (1939), or not, Keyishian v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589,
597–604  (1967).1    We  have  struck  down  laws  addressing
——————

1 By “penal,” I mean laws “authoriz[ing] criminal punishment” as well
as those “authorizing fines or forfeitures . . . [that] are enforced through
civil rather than criminal process.”  Cf. C. Nelson, Statutory Interpreta-
tion  108  (2011)  (discussing  definition  of  “penal”  for  purposes  of  rule  of
lenity).  A  law  requiring  termination  of  employment  from  public  insti-
tutions,  for  instance,  is  not  penal.    See  Keyishian,  385  U. S.,  at  597–
604.  Nor  is  a  law  creating  an  “obligation  to  pay  taxes.”    Milwaukee
County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 271 (1935).  Conversely, a law
imposing a monetary exaction as a punishment for noncompliance with
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Johnson v. United States. It discusses the vagueness doctrine in due process law and its application.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524us1$82I

02-22-99 22:42:40 PAGES OPINPGT

198

BRYAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

cases support the notion that disregard of a known legal obli-
gation is sufﬁcient to establish a willful violation, they in no
way stand for the proposition that it is required.31

Finally, petitioner argues that § 922(b)(3), which is gov-
erned by § 924(a)(1)(D)’s willfulness standard, indicates that
Congress intended “willfully” to include knowledge of the
law. Section 922(b)(3) prohibits licensees from selling ﬁre-
arms to any person who the licensee knows or has reasonable
cause to believe does not reside in the licensee’s State, except
where, inter alia, the transaction fully complies with the
laws of both the seller’s and buyer’s State. The subsection
further states that the licensee “shall be presumed, . . . in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have had actual
knowledge of the State laws and published ordinances of
both States.” 32 Although petitioner argues that the pre-
sumption in § 922(b)(3) indicates that Congress intended will-
fulness to require knowledge of the law for all offenses cov-
ered by § 924(a)(1)(D), petitioner is mistaken. As noted
above, while disregard of a known legal obligation is cer-

the owner of the pawnshop, as well as his employees, had knowledge of
the law).

31 In Mayesh, for example, the court stated:
“The uncontroverted evidence shows clearly that plaintiff was aware of
the above holding period requirements. Mr. Mayesh had been previously
advised on the requirements under Illinois law, and he clearly acknowl-
edged that he was aware of them. . . . Since the material facts are undis-
puted, as a matter of law the plaintiff clearly and knowingly violated the
Illinois holding provisions . . . , and hence, 18 U. S. C. § 922(b)(2). This
court can only consider such action to have been ‘wilful’ as a matter of
law. There is no basis for trial of any disputed facts in this connection.
This is sufﬁcient to justify refusal of license renewal.”
58 F. R. D., at 540.
See also, e. g., Perri, 637 F. 2d, at 1336 (stating that when a dealer under-
stands the requirements of the law, but knowingly fails to follow them or
is indifferent to them, willfulness “is established,” i. e., is satisﬁed); Stein’s,
649 F. 2d, at 468 (“Evidence of repeated violations with knowledge of the
law’s requirements has been held sufﬁcient to establish willfulness” (em-
phasis added)); McLemore, 317 F. Supp., at 1078–1079.

32 18 U. S. C. § 922(b)(3).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text from a court opinion. It contains legal jargon and references to specific statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U49

[10-24-00 10:29:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 460 (2000)

461

Syllabus

pleader’s favor. Because the propriety of allowing a pleading altera-
tion depends not only on the state of affairs prior to amendment but
also on what happens afterwards, Rule 15 both conveys the circum-
stances under which leave to amend shall be granted and directs how
the litigation will move forward following an amendment. When a
court grants leave to amend to add an adverse party after the time for
responding to the original pleading has lapsed, Rule 15(a) gives the
party so added “10 days after service of the amended pleading” to plead
in response. This opportunity to respond, fundamental to due process,
is the echo of the opportunity to respond to original pleadings secured
under Rule 12(a)(1). Thus, Rule 15 assumes an amended pleading will
be ﬁled and anticipates service of that pleading on the adverse party.
Nelson was never served with an amended pleading.
Indeed, no such
pleading was ever actually composed and ﬁled in court. Nor, after
the amendment joining Nelson, was he accorded time to state his de-
Instead, judgment
fenses against personal liability for costs and fees.
was entered against him the moment permission to amend the plead-
ing was granted. Appeal after judgment, in the circumstances this
case presents, did not provide an adequate opportunity to defend against
the imposition of liability. Cf. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287
U. S. 156. Nothing in the record indicates that Nelson afﬁrmatively
relinquished his right to respond on the merits of the case belatedly
stated against him in his individual capacity. That Nelson knew as
soon as Adams moved to amend the pleading and alter the judgment
that he might ultimately be subjected to personal liability does not mean
that he in fact had a fair chance, before alteration of the judgment, to
respond and be heard. Rule 15 and the due process for which it pro-
vides demand a more reliable and orderly course. First, as Rule 15(a)
indicates, pleading in response to an amended complaint is a prerogative
of parties, and Nelson was not a party prior to the District Court’s
ruling on Adams’ motion to amend. Second, as Rule 15 further pre-
scribes, the clock on an added party’s time to respond does not start
running until the new pleading naming that party is served, just as the
clock on an original party’s time to respond does not start running
until the original pleading is served, see Rule 12(a)(1)(A). This is not to
say that Rule 15 is itself a constitutional requirement. Beyond doubt,
however, a prospective party cannot fairly be required to answer an
amended pleading not yet permitted, framed, and served. Pp. 465–468.
(b) Adams’ arguments that Nelson waived his objections to the swift
process of the District Court are rejected. First, the assertion that
Nelson waived personal jurisdiction and absence-of-service arguments
is beside the point because Nelson’s winning argument is based neither
on personal jurisdiction nor on service of process. Second, the sub-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a portion of the syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the procedural rules surrounding amendments to pleadings and due process considerations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

ALITO, J., concurring
Opinion of ALITO, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 19–251 and 19–255
_________________

AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION,
PETITIONER
19–251
v.
ROB BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER, PETITIONER
19–255
v.
ROB BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2021]

 JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, con-
curring in Parts I, II–A, II–B–2, and III, and concurring in
the judgment.

I am pleased to join most of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion.
In particular, I agree  that the exacting scrutiny standard
drawn from our election-law jurisprudence has real teeth.
It requires both narrow tailoring and consideration of alter-
native  means  of  obtaining  the  sought-after  information.
See ante, at 9–11, 14–15 (opinion of the Court).  For the rea-
sons THE CHIEF JUSTICE explains, California’s blunderbuss
approach  to  charitable  disclosures  fails  exacting  scrutiny
and is facially unconstitutional.  See ante, at 12–19 (opinion
of the Court).  The question is not even close.  And for the
same reasons, California’s approach necessarily fails strict
scrutiny.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE would hold that the particular exact-
ing scrutiny standard in our election-law jurisprudence ap-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the name of the Justice writing the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

fully  guarded  from  examination and  inspection,  except  as
to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained
by  the  parties  forwarding  them  in  their  own  domiciles.”
Id.,  at  733.  The  reason,  drawn  from  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment’s text, was that “[t]he constitutional guaranty of the
right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  papers  against
unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  extends  to  their  pa-
pers,  thus  closed  against  inspection,  wherever  they  may
be.”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  It did not matter that letters
were  bailed  to  a  third  party  (the  government,  no  less).
The  sender  enjoyed  the  same  Fourth  Amendment  protec-
tion  as  he  does  “when  papers  are  subjected  to  search  in
one’s own household.”  Ibid.

These  ancient  principles  may  help  us  address  modern
data  cases  too.  Just  because  you  entrust  your  data—in
some  cases,  your  modern-day  papers  and  effects—to  a
third  party  may  not  mean  you  lose  any  Fourth  Amend-
ment  interest  in  its  contents.  Whatever  may  be  left  of
Smith and Miller, few doubt that e-mail should be treated
much like the traditional mail it has largely supplanted—
as a bailment in which the owner retains a vital and pro-
tected  legal  interest.  See  ante,  at  13  (KENNEDY,  J.,  dis-
senting) (noting that enhanced Fourth Amendment protec-
tion  may  apply  when  the  “modern-day  equivalents  of  an
individual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects’ . . . are held by a third
party”  through  “bailment”);  ante,  at  23,  n. 6  (ALITO,  J.,
dissenting)
(reserving  the  question  whether  Fourth
Amendment  protection  may  apply  in  the  case  of  “bail-
ment”  or  when  “someone  has  entrusted  papers  he  or  she
owns . . . to the safekeeping of another”); United States v.
Warshak,  631  F. 3d  266,  285–286  (CA6  2010)  (relying  on
an  analogy  to  Jackson  to  extend  Fourth  Amendment
protection to e-mail held by a third party service provider).
Second,  I  doubt  that  complete  ownership  or  exclusive
control  of  property  is  always  a  necessary  condition  to  the
assertion  of  a  Fourth  Amendment  right.    Where  houses
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, applying it to modern data cases through the lens of historical precedent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1012

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 6, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8124. Padilla-Mena v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 445.

No. 99–8125. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 433.

No. 99–866. Orson, Inc., t/a Roxy Screening Rooms v. Mir-
Justice
amax Film Corp. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 377.

No. 99–944. Chenoweth, Member of Congress, et al. v.
Clinton, President of the United States, et al. C. A.
D. C. Cir. Motion of Landmark Legal Foundation for leave to ﬁle
a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 181 F. 3d 112.

No. 99–950. Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Wightman,
Administratrix of the Estate of Wightman, Deceased,
et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Motions of Alliance of American Insurers
et al. and Association of American Railroads for leave to ﬁle briefs
as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 86
Ohio St. 3d 431, 715 N. E. 2d 546.

No. 99–981. Pennsylvania v. Halye. Super. Ct. Pa. Motion
of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 A. 2d 763.

No. 99–1041. Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama, et
al. v. Summit Medical Associates, P. C., et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Motion of James Clancy for leave to ﬁle a brief as amicus
curiae denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 180 F. 3d
1326.

Rehearing Denied

No. 98–9749. McFall v. Department of Agriculture, 528

U. S. 1003;

No. 99–5960. Rodriguez v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-

partment of Corrections, et al., 528 U. S. 971;

No. 99–6507. Pravda v. Saratoga County, New York,

et al., 528 U. S. 1063;

In re Dorrough, 528 U. S. 1017; and

No. 99–6915.
No. 99–7105. Eaton v. Dakota County Housing Redevel-
opment Authorities et al., 528 U. S. 1131. Petitions for re-
hearing denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket or summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

19

Opinion of the Court

I  basketball  and  FBS  football  can  proceed  (and  have  pro-
ceeded)  without  the  education-related  compensation  re-
strictions the district court enjoined; the games go on.  In-
stead, the parties dispute whether and to what extent those
restrictions in the NCAA’s labor market yield benefits in its
consumer market that can be attained using substantially
less  restrictive  means.  That  dispute  presents  complex
questions requiring more than a blink to answer.

B

Even if background antitrust principles counsel in favor
of  the  rule  of  reason,  the  NCAA  replies  that  a  particular
precedent ties our hands.  The NCAA directs our attention
to  Board  of  Regents,  where  this  Court  considered  the
league’s rules restricting the ability of its member schools
to televise football games.  468 U. S., at 94.  On the NCAA’s
reading, that decision expressly approved its limits on stu-
dent-athlete  compensation—and  this  approval  forecloses
any meaningful review of those limits today.

We  see  things  differently.  Board  of  Regents  explained
that the league’s television rules amounted to “[h]orizontal
price  fixing  and  output  limitation[s]”  of  the  sort  that  are
“ordinarily condemned” as “ ‘illegal per se.’ ”  Id., at 100.  The
Court declined to declare the NCAA’s restraints per se un-
lawful  only  because  they  arose  in  “an  industry”  in  which
some “horizontal restraints on competition are essential if
the product is to be available at all.”  Id., at 101–102.  Our
analysis today is fully consistent with all of this.  Indeed, if
any daylight exists it is only in the NCAA’s favor.  While
Board of Regents did not condemn the NCAA’s broadcasting
restraints as per se unlawful, it invoked abbreviated anti-
trust review as a path to condemnation, not salvation.  Id.,
at 109, n. 39.  If a quick look was thought sufficient before
rejecting  the  NCAA’s  procompetitive  rationales  in  that
case, it is hard to see how the NCAA might object to a court
providing a more cautious form of review before reaching a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into legal arguments and precedents related to antitrust law and the NCAA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:49] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1103

529 U. S.

May 1, 2000

No. 99–8849. Webb v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 449.

No. 99–8850. Evey v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 213 F. 3d 644.

No. 99–8851. Abouhalima v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 432.

No. 99–8852. Faiz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8853. Evans v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 191 F. 3d 451.

No. 99–8855. Hernandez-Corona v. United States. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1353.

No. 99–8858. Fowler v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 357.

No. 99–8860. Draper v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 F. 3d 870.

No. 99–8863. Tang Xue Dan v. United States. C. A. 2d

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1325.

No. 99–8867. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8873. Hopper v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 475.

No. 99–8874. Green v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8875. Greenwood v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 479.

No. 99–8876. Grist v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 259.

No. 99–8877. Custodio-Rossi v. United States. C. A. 1st

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 429.

No. 99–8879. Passaro v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 207 F. 3d 661.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

where employees fail to take reasonable precautions to pro-
tect the employer’s plant, equipment, or products from fore-
seeable imminent danger due to sudden cessation of work”);
see also Brief for Petitioner 14, 30–31; Brief for Respondent
28–29; Reply Brief 6–7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 68, 86.  Given this
undisputed limitation on the right to strike, we proceed to
consider  whether  the  Union  has  demonstrated  that  the
statute arguably protects the drivers’ conduct.  Davis, 476
U. S., at 395.  We conclude that it has not.2

The drivers engaged in a sudden cessation of work that
put Glacier’s property in foreseeable and imminent danger.
The Union knew that concrete is highly perishable and that
it can last for only a limited time in a delivery truck’s rotat-
ing  drum.  It  also  knew  that  concrete  left  to  harden  in  a
truck’s drum causes significant damage to the truck.  The
Union nevertheless coordinated with truck drivers to initi-
ate  the  strike  when  Glacier  was  in  the  midst  of  batching
large quantities of concrete and delivering it to customers.
Predictably, the company’s concrete was destroyed as a re-
sult.  And though Glacier’s swift action saved its trucks in
the end, the risk of harm to its equipment was both foresee-
able and serious.  See NLRB v. Special Touch Home Care
Services, Inc., 708 F. 3d 447, 460 (CA2 2013) (“The appro-
priate inquiry is focused on the risk of harm, not its reali-
zation”).

The Union failed to “take reasonable precautions to pro-
tect” against this foreseeable and imminent danger.  Beth-
any Medical Center, 328 N. L. R. B., at 1094.  It could have
——————

2 The  Union  moved  to  dismiss  Glacier’s  claims  for  failure  to  state  a
claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Like the Washington
Supreme  Court,  we  treat  both  motions  together  and  accept  the  allega-
tions in the complaint as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage.  198 Wash.
2d 768, 782–783, 500 P. 3d 119, 127 (2021); see also Kinney v. Cook, 159
Wash. 2d 837, 842, 154 P. 3d 206, 209 (2007).  Pursuant to Washington
law, we also may consider additional factual allegations made by Glacier
that support its complaint.  See Bravo v. Dolsen Companies, 125 Wash.
2d 745, 750, 888 P. 2d 147, 150 (1995).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case involving a labor dispute and the legality of a strike.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 18–1334, 18–1475, 18–1496, 18–1514 and 18–1521
_________________

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT
BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, PETITIONER
v.
AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL.

18–1334

AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
18–1475

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, ET AL.

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS
OF ALL TITLE III DEBTORS OTHER
THAN COFINA, PETITIONER
v.
AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL.

18–1496

18–1514

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL.

18–1521

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA
ELÉCTRICA Y RIEGO, INC., PETITIONER
v.
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT
BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

[June 1, 2020]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and the introduction to a Supreme Court opinion. It is not the main body of the text and likely provides context and background information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

Amendment  does  not  permit  the  government  to  compel  a
person  to  pay  for  another  party’s  speech  just  because  the
government  thinks  that  the  speech  furthers  the  interests
of the person who does not want to pay.4

Those supporting agency fees contend that the situation
here is different because unions are statutorily required to
“represen[t]  the  interests  of  all  public  employees  in  the
unit,” whether or not they are union members.  §315/6(d);
see, e.g., Brief for State Respondents 40–41, 45; post, at 7
(KAGAN, J., dissenting).  Why might this matter?

We  can  think  of  two  possible  arguments.  It  might  be
argued that a State has a compelling interest in requiring
the  payment  of  agency  fees  because  (1)  unions  would
otherwise  be  unwilling  to  represent  nonmembers  or  (2)  it
would  be  fundamentally  unfair  to  require  unions  to  pro
vide  fair  representation  for  nonmembers  if  nonmembers
were  not  required  to  pay.  Neither  of  these  arguments  is
sound.

First,  it  is  simply  not  true  that  unions  will  refuse  to
serve  as  the  exclusive  representative  of  all  employees  in
the  unit  if  they  are  not  given  agency  fees.    As  noted,  un
ions represent millions of public employees in jurisdictions
that  do  not  permit  agency  fees.    No  union  is  ever  com
pelled to seek that designation.
 On the contrary, designa
tion as exclusive representative is avidly sought.5  Why is

——————

4 The  collective-action  problem  cited  by  the  dissent,  post,  at  6,  is  not

specific to the agency-fee context.  And contrary to the dissent’s sugges
tion,  it  is  often  not  practical  for  an  entity  that  lobbies  or  advocates  on
behalf of  the  members of a  group to tailor its  message  so that only its
members benefit from its efforts.  Consider how effective it would be for
a  group  that  advocates  on  behalf  of,  say,  seniors,  to  argue  that  a  new
measure should apply only to its dues-paying members.

5 In order to obtain that status, a union must petition to be recognized
and  campaign  to  win  majority  approval.    Ill.  Comp.  Stat.,  ch.  5,
§315/9(a) (2016); see, e.g., County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations
Bd.,  231  Ill.  2d  593,  597–600,  900  N. E. 2d  1095,  1098–1099  (2008).
And unions eagerly seek this support.  See, e.g., Brief for Employees of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees case. It delves into the arguments surrounding agency fees and their constitutionality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

OHIO v. EPA

BARRETT, J., dissenting

the  errors  were  so  serious  and  related  to  matters  of  such
central relevance to the rule that there is a substantial like-
lihood that the rule would have been significantly changed
if such errors had not been made.”  §7607(d)(8) (emphasis
added).  This provision appears “tailor-made to undo” any
“rigid  presumption  of  vacatur”  that  might  apply  in  other
contexts.  N. Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative
Law, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 253, 291 (2017).
  The alleged error here plausibly is subject to §7607(d)(8)’s
harmless-error rule.  As explained above, the Court does not
suggest  that  it  is  substantively  “[un]reasonable”  to  apply
the FIP to fewer States, only that EPA did not “reasonably
explai[n]”  the  FIP’s  severability  in  response to  comments.
Prometheus, 592 U. S., at 423.  That is arguably an “alleged
procedural  error”  within  the  meaning  of  §7607(d)(8).    In
fact, the Act contemplates that at least some “arbitrary or
capricious” challenges allege failures to “observ[e] . . . pro-
cedure required by law,” and such challenges may only suc-
ceed if §7607(d)(8)’s “condition is . . . met.”  §7607(d)(9)(D).
  If  the  Act’s  harmless-error  rule  applies,  applicants  are
unlikely to prevail.  Given the apparent lack of connection
between the number of States covered and the FIP’s meth-
odology for determining cost thresholds and emissions lim-
its, it is difficult to imagine a “substantial” likelihood that
the rule would have been “significantly” different had EPA
just responded more thoroughly.  In fact, applicants seem
to have conceded as much.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6 (“[W]ith
full  candor  to  the  Court,  [the  cost  threshold]  could  be  the
same or even be more expensive”); id., at 9 (“I can’t tell you
what  that  looks  like,  whether  there  is  a  difference  in  the
obligations or not”).  And EPA, the Court says, had “notice”
of the alleged concern that the cost thresholds might change
with different States.  Ante, at 15.  Yet EPA still chose to
make the FIP severable because of its statutory obligation
to reduce downwind pollution—an obligation it repeatedly
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of a specific statute (likely related to environmental regulations). The language is formal and uses legal terminology, indicating its suitability for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

JACKSON, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 20–1199 and 21–707
_________________

20–1199

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF
HARVARD COLLEGE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.

21–707

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 29, 2023]

JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and

JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.*

Gulf-sized  race-based  gaps  exist  with  respect  to  the
health, wealth, and well-being of American citizens.  They
were  created  in  the  distant  past,  but  have  indisputably
been passed down to the present day through the genera-
tions.  Every  moment  these  gaps  persist  is  a  moment  in
which this great country falls short of actualizing one of its
foundational principles—the “self-evident” truth that all of
us are created equal.  Yet, today, the Court determines that

——————

*JUSTICE JACKSON did not participate in the consideration or decision
of the case in No. 20–1199, and issues this opinion with respect to the
case in No. 21–707.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Jackson.  It includes citation information, case names, and the introduction to the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

348

UNITED STATES v. BAJAKAJIAN

Kennedy, J., dissenting

and incidental objects, when the Court invokes the distinc-
tion it gets the results backwards.

II

Turning to the question of excessiveness, the majority
states the test: A defendant must prove a gross dispropor-
tion before a court will strike down a ﬁne as excessive. See
ante, at 334. This test would be a proper way to apply the
Clause, if only the majority were faithful in applying it. The
Court does not, however, explain why in this case forfeiture
of all of the cash would have suffered from a gross dispropor-
tion. The offense is a serious one, and respondent’s smug-
gling and failing to report were willful. The cash was lawful
to own, but this fact shows only that the forfeiture was a
ﬁne; it cannot also prove that the ﬁne was excessive.

The majority illuminates its test with a principle of defer-
ence. Courts “ ‘should grant substantial deference to the
broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess’ ” in
setting punishments. Ante, at 336 (quoting Solem v. Helm,
463 U. S. 277, 290 (1983)). Again, the principle is sound
but the implementation is not. The majority’s assessment
of the crime accords no deference,
let alone substantial
deference, to the judgment of Congress. Congress deems
the crime serious, but the Court does not. Under the con-
gressional statute, the crime is punishable by a prison sen-
tence, a heavy ﬁne, and the forfeiture here at issue. As the
statute makes clear, the Government needs the information
to investigate other serious crimes, and it needs the penalties
to ensure compliance.

A

By afﬁrming, the majority in effect approves a meager
$15,000 forfeiture. The majority’s holding purports to be
narrower, saying only that forfeiture of the entire $357,144
would be excessive. Ante, at 337, and n. 11. This narrow
holding is artiﬁcial in constricting the question presented
for this Court’s review. The statute mandates forfeiture of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

Opinion of the Court

charge  is  valid.    That  rule  receives  support  from  neither
half of the claim’s name—neither from the Fourth Amend-
ment  nor  from  the  malicious-prosecution  tort  we  have  in-
voked  as  an  analogy.  And  the  question  is  not  close,  as
shown by the parties’ decision not to contest it in this Court.
The parties, almost needless to say, have found a substi-
tute ground of disagreement, involving the element of cau-
sation.  As noted earlier, a Fourth Amendment malicious-
prosecution  suit  depends  not  just  on  an  unsupported
charge, but on that charge’s causing a seizure—like the ar-
rest and three-day detention here.  See supra, at 4–5.  The
parties and amicus curiae offer three different views of how
that causation element is met when a valid charge is also
in the picture.  Chiaverini’s test is the easiest to satisfy.  On
his view, when both valid and invalid charges are brought
before a judge for a probable cause determination, the war-
rant the judge issues is irretrievably tainted; so any deten-
tion depending on that warrant is the result of the invalid
charge.  See Reply Brief 10–11 (citing Williams, 965 F. 3d,
at  1165);  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  5–6,  26–28.  The  United  States
disagrees, arguing for the use of a but-for test to discover
whether  the  invalid  charge,  apart  from  the  valid  ones,
caused a detention.  See id., at 41–43.  The question then
would  be  whether  the judge  “in  fact  [would]  have  author-
ized” the detention had the invalid charge not been present.
Id., at 43.  And finally, the officers urge a still stricter test.
In their view, the question is whether the judge, absent the
invalid  charge,  could  have  legally  authorized  the  deten-
tion—regardless  of  what  he  really  would  have  done.  See
Brief for Officers 20–21.

But that new dispute is not now fit for our resolution.  The
test  for  finding  causation  is  no  part  of  the  question  we
agreed to review.  For that reason, it was not fully briefed.
And  most  important,  the  court  below  did  not  address  the
matter, nor have many others.  “[W]e are a court of review,
not of first view.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the issue of causation in a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution case. While it's legal text, it's part of the core argument and decision-making process, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

21

Opinion of the Court

over the others.  See Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330
U. S. 1, 13, 15 (1947).

The  District  arrived  at  a  different  understanding  this
way.  It  began  with  the  premise  that  the  Establishment
Clause is offended whenever a “reasonable observer” could
conclude  that  the  government  has  “endorse[d]”  religion.
App. 81.  The District then took the view that a “reasonable
observer” could think it “endorsed Kennedy’s religious ac-
tivity by not stopping the practice.”  991 F. 3d, at 1018; see
also  App.  80–81;  Parts  I  and  II,  supra.  On  the  District’s
account, it did not matter whether the Free Exercise Clause
protected Mr. Kennedy’s prayer.  It did not matter if his ex-
pression was private speech protected by the Free Speech
Clause.  It did not matter that the District never actually
endorsed Mr. Kennedy’s prayer, no one complained that it
had,  and  a  strong  public  reaction  only  followed  after  the
District  sought  to  ban  Mr.  Kennedy’s  prayer.   Because  a
reasonable observer could (mistakenly) infer that by allow-
ing  the  prayer  the  District  endorsed  Mr.  Kennedy’s  mes-
sage, the District felt it had to act, even if that meant sup-
pressing  otherwise  protected  First  Amendment  activities.
In this way, the District effectively created its own “vise be-
tween the Establishment Clause on one side and the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses on the other,” placed it-
self in the middle, and then chose its preferred way out of
its self-imposed trap.  See Pinette, 515 U. S., at 768 (plural-
ity  opinion);  Shurtleff  v.  Boston,  596  U. S.  ___,  ___–___
(2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at
4–5).

To defend its approach, the District relied on Lemon and
its  progeny.    See  App.  43–45.    In  upholding  the  District’s
actions,  the  Ninth  Circuit  followed  the  same  course.    See
Part II–C, supra.  And, to be sure, in Lemon this Court at-
tempted  a  “grand  unified  theory”  for  assessing  Establish-
ment Clause claims.  American Legion v. American Human-
ist Assn., 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (plurality opinion) (slip
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and its application to a particular case involving prayer at a government meeting.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA

Syllabus

countancy, 512 U. S. 136, 146, and can extend “no broader than rea-
sonably necessary,” In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191, 203.  California has
not  demonstrated  any  justification  for  the  unlicensed  notice  that  is
more  than  “purely  hypothetical.”    The  only  justification  put  forward
by  the  state  legislature  was  ensuring  that  pregnant  women  know
when they are receiving medical care from licensed professionals, but
California  denied  that  the  justification  for  the  law  was  that  women
did not know what kind of facility they are entering when they go to a
crisis pregnancy center.  Even if the State had presented a nonhypo-
thetical justification, the FACT Act unduly burdens protected speech.
It  imposes  a  government-scripted,  speaker-based  disclosure  require-
ment  that  is  wholly  disconnected  from  the  State’s  informational  in-
terest.  It requires covered facilities to post California’s precise notice,
no  matter  what  the  facilities  say  on  site  or  in  their  advertisements.
And  it  covers  a  curiously  narrow  subset  of  speakers:  those  that  pri-
marily  provide  pregnancy-related  services,  but  not  those  that  pro-
vide,  e.g.,  nonprescription  birth  control.  Such  speaker-based  laws
run  the  risk  that  “the  State  has  left  unburdened  those  speakers
whose messages are in accord with its own views.”  Sorrell, supra, at
580.  For  these  reasons,  the  unlicensed  notice  does  not  satisfy  Zau-
derer, assuming that standard applies.  Pp. 17–20.

839 F. 3d 823, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  KENNEDY, J., filed
a concurring opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO and GORSUCH,
JJ.,  joined.  BREYER,  J.,  filed  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  GINSBURG,
SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, which is not the primary content meant to be read and understood by the general public. It summarizes legal arguments and the court's decision, not the narrative or informational content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

BREYER, J., dissenting

sibility  that  [large]  merchants  would  respond  to  its  price
increases  by  attempting  to  shift  share  to  a  competitor’s
network”  because  the  nondiscrimination  provisions  pro
hibited  steering.
It  included  the  District
Court’s  ultimate  finding  of  fact,  not  overturned  by  the
Court  of  Appeals,  that  the  challenged  provisions  “were
integral  to”  American  Express’  “[price]  increases  and
thereby caused merchants to pay higher prices.”  Ibid.

Id.,  at  215.

As I explained above, this Court has stated that “[s]ince
the  purpose  of  the  inquiries  into  market  definition  and
market  power  is  to  determine  whether  an  arrangement
has  the  potential  for  genuine  adverse  effects  on  competi
tion, proof of actual detrimental effects . . . can obviate the
need for” those inquiries.  Indiana Federation of Dentists,
476 U. S., at 460–461 (internal quotation marks omitted).
That statement is fully applicable here.  Doubts about the
District  Court’s  market-definition  analysis  are  beside  the
point  in  the  face  of  the  District  Court’s  findings  of  actual
anticompetitive harm.

The  majority  disagrees  that  market  definition  is  irrele
vant.  See ante, at 11–12, and n. 7.  The majority explains
that  market  definition  is  necessary  because  the  nondis
crimination  provisions  are  “vertical  restraints”  and
“[v]ertical  restraints  often  pose  no  risk  to  competition
unless the entity imposing them has market power, which
cannot be evaluated unless the Court first determines the
relevant market.”  Ante, at 11, n. 7.  The majority thus, in
a  footnote,  seems  categorically  to  exempt  vertical  re
straints  from  the  ordinary  “rule  of  reason”  analysis  that
has applied to them since the Sherman Act’s enactment in
1890.  The majority’s only support for this novel exemption
is  Leegin  Creative  Leather  Products,  Inc.  v.  PSKS,  Inc.,
551  U. S.  877  (2007).  But  Leegin  held  that  the  “rule  of
reason”  applied  to  the  vertical  restraint  at  issue  in  that
case.  See id., at 898–899.  It said nothing to suggest that
vertical  restraints  are  not  subject  to  the  usual  “rule  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and analysis of market power.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

23

GORSUCH, J., concurring

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”  §2000d.  The Equal Protection Clause reads:
“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.”  Amdt. 14, §1.  That
such differently worded provisions should mean the same
thing is implausible on its face.

Consider just some of the obvious differences.  The Equal
Protection Clause operates on States.  It does not purport
to regulate the conduct of private parties.  By contrast, Title
VI applies to recipients of federal funds—covering not just
many state actors, but many private actors too.  In this way,
Title VI reaches entities and organizations that the Equal
Protection Clause does not.

In other respects, however, the relative scope of the two
provisions  is  inverted.  The  Equal  Protection  Clause  ad-
dresses all manner of distinctions between persons and this
Court has held that it implies different degrees of judicial
scrutiny for different kinds of classifications.  So, for exam-
ple, courts apply strict scrutiny for classifications based on
race,  color,  and  national  origin;  intermediate  scrutiny  for
classifications  based  on  sex;  and  rational-basis  review  for
classifications  based  on  more  prosaic  grounds.    See,  e.g.,
Fisher, 579 U. S., at 376; Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488
U. S. 469, 493–495 (1989) (plurality opinion); United States
v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 555–556 (1996); Board of Trus-
tees  of  Univ.  of  Ala.  v.  Garrett,  531  U. S.  356,  366–367
(2001).  By contrast, Title VI targets only certain classifica-
tions—those based on race, color, or national origin.  And
that  law  does  not  direct  courts  to  subject  these  classifica-
tions to one degree of scrutiny or another.  Instead, as we
have seen, its rule is as uncomplicated as it is momentous.
Under Title VI, it is always unlawful to discriminate among
persons  even  in  part  because  of  race,  color,  or  national
origin.

In truth, neither Justice Powell’s nor Justice Brennan’s
opinion in Bakke focused on the text of Title VI.  Instead,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its relationship to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

21

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

countries  are  eligible  for  the  Visa  Waiver  Program,  the
Government considers whether they can satisfy numerous
criteria—e.g.,  using  electronic,  fraud-resistant  passports,
§1187(a)(3)(B),  24-hour  reporting  of  lost  or  stolen  pass
ports,  §1187(c)(2)(D),  and  not  providing  a  safe  haven  for
terrorists, §1187(a)(12)(D)(iii).  The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, also
must determine that a country’s inclusion in the program
will  not  compromise  “the  law  enforcement  and  security
interests of the United States.”  §1187(c)(2)(C).  Eligibility
for  the  program  is  reassessed  on  an  annual  basis.  See
§1187(a)(12)(D)(iii), 1187(c)(12)(A).  As a result of a recent
review,  for  example,  the  Executive  decided  in  2016  to
remove  from  the  program  dual  nationals  of  Iraq,  Syria,
Iran, and Sudan.  See Brief for Former National Security
Officials as Amici Curiae 27.

Put  simply,  Congress  has  already  erected  a  statutory

scheme  that  fulfills  the  putative  national-security  inter
ests the Government now puts forth to justify the Procla
mation.  Tellingly, the Government remains wholly unable
to  articulate  any  credible  national-security  interest  that
would  go  unaddressed  by  the  current  statutory  scheme
absent  the  Proclamation.    The  Government  also  offers  no
evidence that this current vetting scheme, which involves
a highly searching consideration of individuals required to
obtain visas for entry into the United States and a highly
searching consideration of which countries are eligible for
inclusion  in  the  Visa  Waiver  Program,  is  inadequate  to
achieve  the  Proclamation’s  proclaimed  objectives  of  “pre
venting  entry  of  nationals  who  cannot  be  adequately
vetted  and  inducing  other  nations  to  improve  their  [vet
ting and information-sharing] practices.”  Ante, at 34.

For  many  of  these  reasons,  several  former  national-
security  officials  from  both  political  parties—including
former  Secretary  of  State  Madeleine  Albright,  former
State  Department  Legal  Adviser  John  Bellinger  III,  for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or dissenting judgment, specifically from Justice Sotomayor. It cites legal statutes and discusses the government's justification for a particular proclamation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Syllabus

ing registration,  not to  the  copyright claimant’s  request for registra-
tion.

Fourth Estate’s contrary reading stems in part from its misappre-
hension of the significance of certain 1976 revisions to the Copyright
Act.    But  in  enacting  §411(a),  Congress  both  reaffirmed  the  general
rule  that  registration  must  precede  an  infringement  suit  and  added
an exception in that provision’s second sentence to cover instances in
which registration is refused.  That exception would have no work to
do if Congress intended the 1976 revisions to clarify that a copyright
claimant may sue immediately upon applying for registration.  Note-
worthy,  too,  in  years  following the  1976  revisions,  Congress  resisted
efforts  to  eliminate  §411(a), which  contains  the  registration  require-
ment.

Fourth Estate also argues that, because “registration is not a con-
dition of copyright protection,” §408(a), §411(a) should not bar a copy-
right  claimant  from  enforcing  that  protection  in  court  once  she  has
applied for registration.  But the Copyright Act safeguards copyright
owners  by  vesting  them  with  exclusive  rights  upon  creation  of  their
works  and prohibiting infringement from  that point forward.  To re-
cover for such infringement, copyright owners must simply apply for
registration and await the Register’s decision.  Further, Congress has
authorized  preregistration  infringement  suits  with  respect  to  works
vulnerable to predistribution infringement, and Fourth Estate’s fear
that a copyright owner might lose the ability to enforce her rights en-
tirely  is  overstated.  True,  registration  processing  times  have  in-
creased  from  one  to  two  weeks  in  1956  to  many  months  today.    De-
lays,  in  large  part,  are  the  result  of  Copyright  Office  staffing  and
budgetary  shortages  that  Congress  can  alleviate,  but  courts  cannot
cure.    Unfortunate  as  the  current  administrative  lag  may  be,  that
factor  does  not  allow  this  Court  to  revise  §411(a)’s  congressionally
composed text.  Pp. 7–12.

856 F. 3d 1338, affirmed.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section. It summarizes the case and the Court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1092

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 14, 2009

558 U. S.

No. 09–434.  Vathis v.  Florida.  Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  9  So.  3d  622.

No.  09–436.  Roy  v.  Minnesota.  Ct.  App.  Minn.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  761  N. W.  2d  883.

No.  09–441.  Ventimiglia  et  ux.  v.  St.  Louis,  Church  of
God,  Inc.,  dba  Twin  Rivers  Worship  Center,  et  al.  Ct.
App. Mo., Eastern Dist.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 284
S. W.  3d  681.

No.  09–465.  Bowers  v.  City  of  Eugene,  Oregon,  et  al.
Ct. App. Ore.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 227 Ore. App.
290,  205  P.  3d  890.

No.  09–492.  Lewis  et  al.  v.  Citgo  Petroleum  Corp.  C.  A.

7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  698.

No.  09–508.  Novelty,  Inc.  v.  Drug  Enforcement  Adminis
tration  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  571  F.  3d  1176.

No.  09–521.  Grund  v.  Sprinkle.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  09–557.  Royal  Oak  Entertainment,  L.  L.  C.,  et  al.  v.
City  of  Royal  Oak,  Michigan,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  482.

No.  09–582.  Betts  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  576  F.  3d  738.

No. 09–584.  Burton  v.  United States.  C. A.  4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  469.

No.  09–5124.  Marmolejo-Campos,  aka  Ramos  Armando  v.
Holder,  Attorney  General.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  903.

No.  09– 5171.  Hernandez-Carrera  et  al.  v.  United
States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
547  F.  3d  1237.

No.  09–5466.  Lopez-Garcia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  1306.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal database or journal. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 156 (1998)

157

Syllabus

Webb’s does not control because examples such as income-only trusts
and marital community property rules demonstrate that Texas does not,
in fact, adhere to the general rule is rejected. These examples miss the
point of Webb’s. Their exception by Texas from the “interest follows
principal” rule has a ﬁrm basis in traditional property law principles,
whereas petitioners point to no such principles allowing the owner of
funds temporarily deposited in an attorney trust account to be deprived
of the interest the funds generate. Petitioners’ further contention that
“interest follows principal” in Texas only if it is allowed by law does
not assist their cause. They do not argue that Texas law prohibits the
payment of interest on IOLTA funds, but, rather, that interest actually
“earned” by such funds is not the private property of the principal’s
owner. Regardless of whether that owner has a constitutionally cog-
nizable interest in the anticipated generation of interest by his funds,
any interest that does accrue attaches as a property right incident to
the ownership of the underlying principal. Petitioners’ ﬁnal argument
that the money transferred to the TEAJF is not “private property”
because IOLTA funds cannot reasonably be expected to generate in-
terest income on their own is plainly incorrect under Texas’ require-
ment that client funds be deposited in an IOLTA account “if the in-
terest which might be earned” is insufﬁcient to offset account costs and
service charges that would be incurred in obtaining it.
It is not that
the funds to be placed in IOLTA accounts cannot generate interest, but
that they cannot generate net interest. This Court has indicated that
a physical item does not lack “property” status simply because it does
not have a positive economic or market value. See, e. g., Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 435, 437, n. 15. While
IOLTA interest income may have no economically realizable value to
its owner, its possession, control, and disposition are nonetheless val-
uable rights. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704, 715. The United
States’ argument that “private property” is not implicated here because
IOLTA interest income is “government-created value” is factually erro-
neous: The State does nothing to create value; the value is created by
respondents’ funds. The Federal Government, through its banking and
taxation regulations, imposes costs on this value if private citizens at-
tempt to exercise control over it. Waiver of these costs if the property
is remitted to the State hardly constitutes “government-created value.”
In any event, this Court rejected a similar argument in Webb’s, supra,
at 162. Pp. 163–171.

2. This Court leaves for consideration on remand the question
whether IOLTA funds have been “taken” by the State, as well as the
amount of “just compensation,” if any, due respondents. P. 172.

94 F. 3d 996, afﬁrmed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the syllabus section. It presents legal arguments and reasoning related to the ownership of interest earned on funds held in attorney trust accounts (IOLTA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

the plan’s behalf.  Typically that is the fiduciary’s job.  See
§1102(a)(1) (fiduciaries have “authority to control and man-
age the operation and administration of the plan”).  But im-
agine  a  case  like  this  one,  where  the  fiduciaries  refuse  to
sue because they would be the defendants.  Does the Con-
stitution compel a pension plan to let a fox guard the hen-
house?

Of  course  not.  This  Court’s  representational  standing
doctrine  permits  petitioners  to  sue  on  their  plan’s  behalf.
See  Food  and  Commercial  Workers  v.  Brown  Group,  Inc.,
517 U. S. 544, 557 (1996).  This doctrine “rests on the prem-
ise that in certain circumstances, particular  relationships
(recognized either by common-law tradition or by statute)
are sufficient to rebut the background presumption . . . that
litigants may not assert the rights of absent third parties.”
Ibid.  (footnotes  omitted).    This  is  especially  so  where,  as
here, there is “some sort of impediment” to the other party’s
“effective assertion of their own rights.”  R. Fallon, J. Man-
ning, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler’s The Fed-
eral Courts and the Federal System 158 (6th ed. 2009); see
also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 410–411 (1991).

The common law has long regarded a beneficiary’s repre-
sentational suit as a proper “basis for a lawsuit in English
or American courts.”  Spokeo, 578 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
9).  When “the trustee cannot or will not” sue, a beneficiary
may  do  so  “as  a  temporary  representative  of  the  trust.”
Bogert  &  Bogert  §869.    The  common  law  also  allows  “the
terms of a trust” to “confer upon others the power to enforce
the  trust,”  giving  that  person  “standing”  to  “bring  suit
against  the  trustee.”  Restatement  (Third)  of  Trusts  §94,
Comment d(1), at 7.

ERISA embraces this tradition.  Sections 1132(a)(2) and
(a)(3) authorize participants and beneficiaries to sue “in a
representative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole,”
Russell, 473 U. S., at 142, n. 9, so that any “recovery” aris-
ing from the action “inures to the benefit of the plan as a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 590 U.S. ____ (2020). It delves into legal arguments regarding representational standing in the context of ERISA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  580 U. S. ____ (2017)

3

Statement of THOMAS, J.

forfeiture  has  in  recent  decades  become  widespread  and
highly  profitable.  See,  e.g.,  Institute  for  Justice,  D.  Car-
penter, L. Knepper, A. Erickson,  & J. McDonald, Policing
for  Profit:  The  Abuse  of  Civil  Asset  Forfeiture  10  (2d  ed.
Nov. 2015) (Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund
took  in  $4.5  billion  in  2014  alone),  https://ij.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2nd-edition.pdf
(as  last  visited  Feb.  27,  2017).    And  because  the  law  en-
forcement entity responsible for seizing the property often
keeps  it,  these  entities  have  strong  incentives  to  pursue
forfeiture.  Id., at 14 (noting that the Federal Government
and many States permit 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds
to  flow  directly  to  law  enforcement);  see  also  App.  to  Pet.
for  Cert.  B–2  (directing  that  the  money  in  this  case  be
divided  between  the  “Cleveland  Police  Department”  and
the “Liberty County District Attorney’s Office”).

This  system—where  police  can  seize  property  with
limited judicial oversight and retain it for their own use—
has  led  to  egregious  and  well-chronicled  abuses.  Accord-
ing to one nationally publicized report, for example, police
in  the  town  of  Tenaha,  Texas,  regularly  seized  the  prop-
erty of out-of-town drivers passing through and collaborated
with  the  district  attorney  to  coerce  them  into  signing
waivers  of  their  property  rights.  Stillman,  Taken,  The
New Yorker, Aug. 12 & 19, 2013, pp. 54–56.  In one case,
local  officials  threatened  to  file  unsubstantiated  felony
charges  against  a  Latino  driver  and  his  girlfriend  and  to
place  their  children  in  foster  care  unless  they  signed  a
waiver.  Id.,  at  49.  In  another,  they  seized  a  black  plant
worker’s  car  and  all  his  property  (including  cash  he
planned  to  use  for  dental  work),  jailed  him  for  a  night,
forced  him  to  sign  away  his  property,  and  then  released
him on the side of the road without a phone or money.  Id.,
at  51.  He  was  forced  to  walk  to  a  Wal-Mart,  where  he
borrowed a stranger’s phone to call his mother, who had to
rent a car to pick him up.  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or court document, specifically a statement from Justice Thomas. It contains legal citations, arguments, and examples of alleged abuses.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Court Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

27

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

tutional  violation.  The  case  is  pending  on  appeal  before
this Court, and I take no position on the merits question.
But  a  finding  that  the  partisanship  in  the  redistricting
plan  did  not  violate  the  Constitution  hardly  proves  that
the  Commission  is  operating  free  of  partisan  influence—
and  certainly  not  that  it  complies  with  the  Elections
Clause.

*

*

*
The  people  of  Arizona  have  concerns  about  the  process
of congressional redistricting in their State.  For better or
worse,  the  Elections  Clause  of  the  Constitution  does  not
allow  them  to  address  those  concerns  by  displacing  their
legislature.    But  it  does  allow  them  to  seek  relief  from
Congress,  which  can  make  or  alter  the  regulations  pre-
scribed  by  the  legislature.    And  the  Constitution  gives
them another means of change.  They can follow the lead
of  the  reformers  who  won  passage  of  the  Seventeenth
Amendment.  Indeed,  several  constitutional  amendments
over  the  past  century  have  involved  modifications  of  the
electoral  process.  Amdts.  19,  22,  24,  26.  Unfortunately,
today’s  decision  will  only  discourage  this  democratic
method of change.  Why go through the hassle of writing a
new  provision  into  the  Constitution  when  it  is  so  much
easier to write an old one out?

I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AMERICAN LEGION v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

Association  suggests,  is  enough  to  allow  it  to  insist  on  a
federal  judicial  decree  ordering  the  memorial’s  removal.
Maybe,  the  Association  concedes,  others  who  are  less
offended lack standing to sue.  Maybe others still who are
equally  affected  but  who  come  into  contact  with  the  me-
morial  too  infrequently  lack  standing  as  well.    See  Tr.  of
Oral  Arg.  48–49.    But,  the  Association  assures  us,  its
members  are  offended  enough—and  with  sufficient  fre-
quency—that they may sue.
  This “offended observer” theory of standing has no basis
in  law.    Federal  courts  may  decide  only  those  cases  and
controversies  that  the  Constitution  and  Congress  have
authorized them to hear.  And to establish standing to sue
consistent  with  the  Constitution,  a  plaintiff  must  show:
(1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.  The
injury-in-fact test requires a plaintiff to prove “an invasion
of  a  legally  protected  interest  which  is  (a)  concrete  and
particularized  . . .  and  (b)  actual  or  imminent,  not  conjec-
tural or hypothetical.”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
  Unsurprisingly,  this  Court  has  already  rejected  the
notion  that  offense  alone  qualifies  as  a  “concrete  and
particularized”  injury  sufficient  to  confer  standing.    We
could  hardly  have  been  clearer:  “The  presence  of  a  dis-
agreement,  however  sharp  and  acrimonious  it  may  be,  is
insufficient  by  itself  to  meet  Art.  III’s  requirements.”
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62 (1986).  Imagine if a
bystander disturbed by a police stop tried to sue under the
Fourth  Amendment.    Suppose  an  advocacy  organization
whose  members  were  distressed  by  a  State’s  decision  to
deny  someone  else  a  civil  jury  trial  sought  to  complain
under  the  Seventh  Amendment.    Or  envision  a  religious
group  upset  about  the  application  of  the  death  penalty
trying  to  sue  to  stop  it.    Does  anyone  doubt  those  cases
would  be  rapidly  dispatched  for  lack  of  standing?    Cf.
Whitmore  v. Arkansas, 495  U. S.  149,  151  (1990)  (holding
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of American Legion v. American Humanist Association. It delves into the legal concept of standing in court, arguing against the "offended observer" theory.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xiv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

881

Attorney General; Jao v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Attorney General; Jinghai Li v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Attorney General; Joseph v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General; Khalil v.
1110

Attorney General; Khan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

Attorney General; Koloay v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Attorney General; Kristiadi v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  233,810

Attorney General; Kucana v.
945

Attorney General; Kurji v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General; Linton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  955,1140

965

Attorney General; Lopez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

Attorney General; Luna-Hernandez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Attorney General; Marmolejo-Campos v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Attorney General; Martin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111

Attorney General; Martinez-Madera v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Attorney General; Martinez-Rodriguez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Attorney General; Martini v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Attorney General; Massis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Attorney General; Mendez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Attorney General; Mensah v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Attorney General; Midi v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

Attorney General; Mongane v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General; Mosere v.
1031

Attorney General; Ndongo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General; Nichols v.
941

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  916,1067

Attorney General; Njoku v.
1048

Attorney General; Pedernera v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Attorney General; Ramos Armando v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Attorney General; Rossaty v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General; Santoso v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

1155

Attorney General; Saquic-Sacche v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General; Silva v.
830

Attorney General; Spence v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Attorney General; Sunarto v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945

Attorney General; Sungwook Kim v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Attorney General; Tandiono v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Attorney General; Tjong v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Attorney General; Vasquez-Ochoa v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943

Attorney General of Ariz.; Hall v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1050

Attorney General of Ark.; Anderson-Tully Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

Attorney General of Cal.; Corjasso v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144

Attorney General of Cal.; Hon Lau v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General of Cal.; Ruvalcaba v.
951

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General of Colo.; McDaniel v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

shelters in Grants Pass where [she could] stay.”  Ibid.

Another  homeless  individual  was  found  outside  a  non-
profit “in severe distress outside in the frigid air.”  Id., at
109.  “[H]e could not breathe and he was experiencing acute
pain,” and he “disclosed fear that he would be arrested and
trespassed again for being outside.”  Ibid.  Another, Carri-
eLynn  Hill,  whose  story  you  read  earlier,  see supra,  at  7,
was ticketed for “lying down on a friend’s mat” and “lying
down under a tarp to stay warm.”  App. 134.  She was “con-
stantly afraid” of being “cited and arrested for being outside
in  Grants  Pass.”  Ibid.  She  is  unable  to  stay  at  the  only
shelter in the City because she cannot keep her nebulizer,
which she needs throughout the night, in her room.  So she
does  “not  know  of  anywhere  in  the  city  of  Grants  Pass
where [she] can safely sleep or rest without being arrested,
trespassed, or moved along.”  Id., at 135.  As she put it: “The
only way I have figured out how to get by is try to stay out
of sight and out of mind.”  Ibid.  Stories like these fill the
record and confirm the City’s success in targeting the status
of being homeless.

The majority proclaims, with no citation, that “it makes
no difference whether the charged defendant is homeless, a
backpacker on vacation passing through town, or a student
who abandons his dorm room to camp out in protest.”  Ante,
at 20.  That describes a fantasy.  In reality, the deputy chief
of police operations acknowledged that he was not aware of
“any  non-homeless  person  ever  getting  a  ticket  for  illegal
camping in Grants Pass.”  Tr. of Jim Hamilton in Blake v.
Grants  Pass,  No.  1:18–cr–01823  (D  Ore.,  Oct.  16,  2019),
ECF Doc. 63–4, p. 16.  Officers testified that “laying on a
blanket  enjoying  the  park”  would  not  violate  the  ordi-
nances, ECF Doc. 63–7, at 2; and that bringing a sleeping
bag to “look at stars” would not be punished, ECF Doc. 63–
5, at 5.  Instead, someone violates the Ordinance only if he
or she does not “have another home to go to.”  Id., at 6.  That
is the definition of being homeless.  The majority does not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal dissenting opinion, focusing on the experiences of homeless individuals in Grants Pass and the city's enforcement of anti-camping ordinances. It provides specific examples and quotes from the case record to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Argument</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

Syllabus

possessing  guns  in  the  home,  Heller  never  established  a  categorical
rule  that  the  Constitution  prohibits  regulations  that  forbid  firearm
possession in the home.  Indeed, Heller stated that many such prohi-
bitions, like those on the possession of firearms by “felons and the men-
tally  ill,”  are  “presumptively  lawful.”  Heller,  554  U. S.,  at  626,  627,
n. 26.  And the Court’s conclusion in Bruen that regulations like the
surety laws are not a proper historical analogue for a broad gun licens-
ing regime does not mean that they cannot be an appropriate analogue
for a narrow one. Pp. 13–15.

(4) The Fifth Circuit erred in reading Bruen to require a “histori-
cal  twin”  rather  than  a  “historical  analogue.”   597  U. S.,  at  30.   The
panel  also  misapplied  the  Court’s  precedents  when  evaluating
Rahimi’s facial challenge.  Rather than consider the circumstances in
which Section 922(g)(8) was most likely to be constitutional, the panel
instead focused on hypothetical scenarios where the provision might
raise constitutional concerns.  P. 16.

(5) Finally,  the  Court  rejects  the  Government’s  contention  that
Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not “responsible.”  The
Court used this term in Heller and Bruen to describe the class of citi-
zens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right.  Those de-
cisions, however, did not define the term and said nothing about the
status of citizens who were not “responsible.”  P. 17.

61 F. 4th 443, reversed and remanded.

ROBERTS,  C. J.,  delivered  the  opinion  for  the  Court,  in  which  ALITO,
SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ.,
joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAGAN, J.,
joined. GORSUCH, J., KAVANAUGH, J., BARRETT, J., and JACKSON, J., filed
concurring opinions. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a Supreme Court case.  It is not the full text of the decision and focuses on legal arguments and precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U73

[09-06-00 17:32:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

44

UNITED STATES v. BEGGERLY

Opinion of the Court

the Federal Rules still survived. This problem, along with
several others, was addressed in the 1946 amendment to
Rule 60(b). The 1946 amendment revised the Rule to read
substantially as it reads now:

“(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
a party’s legal representative from a ﬁnal judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mis-
take, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisﬁed, released, or dis-
charged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective ap-
plication; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2),
and (3) not more than one year after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this subdivision (b) does not affect the ﬁnality of
a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independ-
ent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or
proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually
personally notiﬁed as provided in Title 28, U. S. C.,
§ 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita que-
rela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill
of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining
any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as pre-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's written decision. It includes legal citations and discusses the application of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

102

UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

Opinion of the Court

sponsible for an oil spill. § 2702. Other provisions provide
defenses to, and limitations on, this liability. 33 U. S. C.
§§ 2703, 2704. Of considerable importance to these cases are
OPA’s saving clauses, found in Title I of the Act, § 2718, and
to be discussed below.

Title IV of OPA is entitled “Prevention and Removal.”
For the most part, it amends existing statutory provisions
or instructs the Secretary of Transportation (whose depart-
ments include the Coast Guard) to take action under previ-
ous grants of rulemaking authority. For example, Title IV
instructs the Coast Guard to require reporting of marine cas-
ualties resulting in a “signiﬁcant harm to the environment.”
46 U. S. C. § 6101(a)(5) (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Title IV fur-
ther requires the Secretary to issue regulations to deﬁne
those areas, including Puget Sound, on which single hulled
tankers shall be escorted by other vessels. 104 Stat. 523.
By incremental dates speciﬁed in the Act, all covered tanker
vessels must have a double hull. 46 U. S. C. § 3703a.

4. Treaties and International Agreements.

The scheme of regulation includes a signiﬁcant and intri-
cate complex of international treaties and maritime agree-
ments bearing upon the licensing and operation of vessels.
We are advised by the United States that the international
regime depends upon the principle of reciprocity. That is to
say, the certiﬁcation of a vessel by the government of its
own ﬂag nation warrants that the ship has complied with
international standards, and vessels with those certiﬁcates
may enter ports of the signatory nations. Brief for United
States 3.

Illustrative of treaties and agreements to which the
United States is a party are the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 32 U. S. T. 47, T. I. A. S.
No. 9700, the International Convention for Prevention of Pol-
lution from Ships, 1973, S. Exec. Doc. C, 93–1, 12 I. L. M.
1319, as amended by 1978 Protocol, S. Exec. Doc. C, 96–1, 17
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) and its relation to international maritime agreements. It contains legal citations and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN

622

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS v. FINLEY

Souter, J., dissenting

States. Because the NEA provides much of its support
with conditions that require matching or co-funding
from private sources, the NEA’s funding involvement in
a project necessarily has a multiplier effect in the com-
petitive market for funding of artistic endeavors. . . .
[In addition,] most non-federal funding sources regard
the NEA award as an imprimatur that signiﬁes the
recipient’s artistic merit and value. NEA grants lend
prestige and legitimacy to projects and are therefore
critical to the ability of artists and companies to attract
non-federal funding sources. Grant applicants rely on
the NEA well beyond the dollar value of any particular
grant.” Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohn-
mayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 783 (CD Cal. 1991) (footnote
and internal quotation marks omitted).16

Since the decency and respect proviso of § 954(d)(1) is sub-
stantially overbroad and carries with it a signiﬁcant power
to chill artistic production and display, it should be struck
down on its face.17

16 See also, e. g., 131 Cong. Rec. 24808 (1985) (“[S]upport from the En-
dowmen[t] has always represented a ‘Good Housekeeping Seal’ of approval
which has helped grantees generate non-Federal dollars for projects and
productions”).

17 I agree with the Court that § 954(d) is not unconstitutionally vague.
Any chilling that results from imprecision in the drafting of standards
(such as “artistic excellence and artistic merit”) by which the Government
awards scarce grants and scholarships is an inevitable and permissible
consequence of distributing prizes on the basis of criteria dealing with
a subject that deﬁes exactness. The necessary imprecision of artistic-
merit-based criteria justiﬁes tolerating a degree of vagueness that might
be intolerable when applying the First Amendment to attempts to regu-
late political discussion. Cf. Arkansas Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes,
523 U. S. 666, 694–695 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting). My problem is
not with the chilling that may naturally result from necessarily open
standards;
it is with the unacceptable chilling of “dangerous ideas,”
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 519 (1958), that naturally results from
explicitly viewpoint-based standards.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV.

Opinion of the Court

is  particularly  high  where  the  jury  is  faced  with  instruc
tions  on  alternative  theories  of  liability  under  which  dif
ferent  parties  bear  the  burden  of  proof.14   By  simplifying
the  process  of  determining  who  is  a  supervisor  (and  by
extension,  which  liability  rules  apply  to  a  given  set  of
facts), the approach that we take will help to ensure that
juries  return  verdicts  that  reflect  the  application  of  the
correct legal rules to the facts.

Contrary to the dissent’s suggestions, see post, at 14, 17,
this  approach  will  not  leave  employees  unprotected
against harassment by co-workers who possess the author
ity  to  inflict  psychological  injury  by  assigning  unpleasant
tasks or by altering the work environment in objectionable
ways.  In  such  cases,  the  victims  will  be  able  to  prevail
simply  by  showing  that  the  employer  was  negligent  in
permitting  this  harassment  to  occur,  and  the  jury  should
be  instructed  that  the  nature  and  degree  of  authority
wielded  by  the  harasser  is  an  important  factor  to  be  con

——————

ual  Disparate  Treatment:  Thoroughness  or  Simplicity?  12  Lab.  Law.
399,  419  (1997)  (concluding  that  more  straightforward  instructions
“provid[e] the jury with clearer guidance of their mission”); Davis, The
Stumbling  Three-Step,  Burden-Shifting  Approach  in  Employment
Discrimination  Cases,  61  Brook.  L. Rev. 703,  742–743  (1995)  (discuss
ing  potential  for  juror  confusion  in  the  face  of  complex  instructions);
Note,  Toward  a  Motivating  Factor  Test  for  Individual  Disparate
Treatment  Claims,  100  Mich.  L. Rev.  234,  262–273  (2001)  (discussing
the  need  for  a  simpler  approach  to  jury  instructions  in  employment
discrimination cases).

14 Cf.  Struve,  Shifting  Burdens:  Discrimination  Law  Through  the
Lens  of  Jury  Instructions,  51  Boston  College  L. Rev.  279,  330–334
(2010)  (arguing  that  unnecessary  confusion  arises  when  a  jury  must
resolve different claims under different burden frameworks); Monahan,
Cabrera  v.  Jakabovitz—A  Common-Sense  Proposal  for  Formulating
Jury  Instructions  Regarding  Shifting  Burdens  of  Proof  in  Disparate
Treatment  Discrimination  Cases,  5  Geo.  Mason  U.  C.  R.  L.  J.  55,  76
(1994)  (“Any  jury  instruction  that  attempts  to  shift  the  burden  of  per
suasion on closely related issues is never likely to be successful”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the burden of proof in harassment cases. It's sequential text and provides legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>