<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

Opinion of the Court

unambiguously secure.

As explained in Part III–A, supra, the FNHRA details ad-
ministrative  processes  concerning  inspection  of  covered
nursing facilities and accountability for noncompliant facil-
ities.  But the statute lacks any indicia of congressional in-
tent to preclude §1983 enforcement, such as an express pri-
vate  judicial  right  of  action  or  any  other  provision  that
might signify that intent.  See, e.g., id., at 121 (“[T]he exist-
ence of a more restrictive private remedy [in the statute it-
self] for statutory violations has been the dividing line be-
tween  those  cases  in  which  we  have  held  that  an  action
would lie under §1983 and those in which we have held that
it would not”).  Nor has HHC otherwise demonstrated that
enforcement  via  §1983  would  thwart  the  operation  of  the
administrative remedial scheme in any respect.

is

that

incompatible  with

HHC’s argument that we need look no further than the
detail of the FNHRA’s enforcement mechanisms to find con-
clusive evidence of implicit preclusion is unpersuasive.  Im-
plicit  preclusion  is  shown  by  a  “ ‘comprehensive  enforce-
ment  scheme
individual
enforcement  under  §1983.’ ”    Fitzgerald,  555  U. S.,  at  252
(emphasis added).  HHC’s single-minded focus on compre-
hensiveness mistakes the shadow for the substance, and it
disregards  the  import  of  these  FNHRA  provisions’  unam-
biguous conferral of rights.  The attendant presumption is
that §1983 can play its textually prescribed role as a vehicle
for enforcing those rights, even alongside a detailed enforce-
ment  regime  that  also  protects  those  interests,  so  long  as
§1983 enforcement is not “ ‘incompatible’ ” with Congress’s
handiwork.  Rancho  Palos  Verdes,  544  U. S.,  at  120,  122;
Blessing  v.  Freestone,  520  U. S.  329,  347–348  (1997)  (col-
lecting cases).

To be clear, a defendant can discharge its burden of show-
ing that the presumption is rebutted by pointing to a com-
prehensive scheme.  Middlesex County Sewerage Authority
v.  National  Sea  Clammers  Assn.,  453  U. S.  1,  20  (1981)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, likely from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the applicability of Section 1983 of the U.S. Code in the context of the FNHRA (presumably the Nursing Home Reform Act).  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH

Syllabus

actionable wrong—here, an act of international terrorism.  However,
that  does  not  require  a  strict  nexus  between  the  assistance  and  the
wrongful act; defendants are liable for other torts that are the foresee-
able risk of an intended tort, and an aider and abettor can assist some-
one without knowing all the details of his plan.  Plus, in appropriate
circumstances, a defendant’s role in an illicit enterprise can be so sys-
temic and intentional that the defendant aids and abets each act of the
enterprise—as in Halberstam itself.

To summarize the requirements of §2333(d)(2), the phrase “aids and
abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance” points to the el-
ements  and  factors  articulated  by  Halberstam.  Those  elements  and
factors  should  not  be  taken  as  inflexible  codes  but  should  be  under-
stood in light of the common law and applied as a framework designed
to hold defendants liable when they consciously and culpably “partici-
pate[d] in” a tortious act in such a way as to help “make it succeed.”
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613, 619.  Pp. 17–21.

(c)  Plaintiffs have satisfied Halberstam’s first two elements by al-
leging  both  that  ISIS  committed  a  wrong and  that  defendants  knew
they were playing some sort of role in ISIS’ enterprise.  But plaintiffs’
allegations do not show that defendants gave such knowing and sub-
stantial assistance to ISIS that they culpably participated in the Reina
attack.  Pp. 21–30.

(1) Plaintiffs allege that defendants aided and abetted ISIS in the
following ways: First, they provided social-media platforms, which are
generally available to the internet-using public; ISIS was able to up-
load content to those platforms and connect with third parties on them.
Second,  defendants’  recommendation  algorithms  matched  ISIS-re-
lated content to users most likely to be interested in that content.  And,
third, defendants knew that ISIS was uploading this content but took
insufficient steps to ensure that its content was removed.  Plaintiffs do
not allege that ISIS or Masharipov used defendants’ platforms to plan
or coordinate the Reina attack.  Nor do plaintiffs allege that defend-
ants gave ISIS any special treatment or words of encouragement.  Nor
is there reason to think that defendants carefully screened any content
before allowing users to upload it onto their platforms.

None of plaintiffs’ allegations suggest that defendants culpably “as-
sociate[d  themselves]  with”  the  Reina  attack,  “participate[d]  in  it  as
something  that  [they]  wishe[d]  to  bring  about,”  or  sought  “by  [their]
action to make it succeed.”  Nye & Nissen, 336 U. S., at 619 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  Defendants’ mere creation of their media
platforms is no more culpable than the creation of email, cell phones,
or  the  internet  generally.  And  defendants’  recommendation  algo-
rithms are merely part of the infrastructure through which all the con-
tent on their platforms is filtered.  Moreover, the algorithms have been
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a court syllabus. It discusses the legal elements of aiding and abetting a tortious act, using the case of TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH as an example.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.

MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

manded the case in light of Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus  Laboratories,  Inc.,  566  U. S.  ___  (2012).
See  Association  for  Molecular  Pathology  v.  Myriad  Genet-
ics, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012).

On  remand,  the  Federal  Circuit  affirmed  the  District
Court  in  part  and  reversed  in  part,  with  each  member  of
the  panel  writing  separately.    All  three  judges  agreed
that  only  petitioner  Ostrer  had  standing.    They  reasoned
that  Myriad’s  actions  against  him  and  his  stated  ability
and willingness to begin BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing if Myr-
iad’s patents were invalidated were sufficient for Article III
standing.  689  F. 3d,  at  1323;  id.,  at  1337  (opinion  of
Moore, J.); id., at 1348 (opinion of Bryson, J.).

With  respect  to  the  merits,  the  court  held  that  both
isolated DNA and cDNA were patent eligible under §101.
The  central  dispute  among  the  panel  members  was
whether  the  act  of  isolating  DNA—separating  a  specific
gene  or  sequence  of  nucleotides  from  the  rest  of  the
chromosome—is an inventive act that entitles the individ-
ual who first isolates it to a patent.  Each of the judges on
the  panel  had  a  different  view  on  that  question.    Judges
Lourie and Moore agreed that Myriad’s claims were patent
eligible under §101 but disagreed on the rationale.  Judge
Lourie  relied  on  the  fact  that  the  entire  DNA  molecule  is
held  together  by  chemical  bonds  and  that  the  covalent
bonds  at  both  ends  of  the  segment  must  be  severed  in
order to isolate segments of DNA.  This process technically
creates new molecules with unique chemical compositions.
See  id.,  at  1328  (“Isolated  DNA  . . .  is  a  free-standing
portion of a larger, natural DNA molecule.  Isolated DNA
has been cleaved (i.e., had covalent bonds in its backbone
chemically  severed)  or  synthesized  to  consist  of  just  a
fraction  of  a  naturally  occurring  DNA  molecule”).    Judge
Lourie  found  this  chemical  alteration  to  be  dispositive,
because  isolating  a  particular  strand  of  DNA  creates
a  nonnaturally  occurring  molecule,  even  though  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics. It delves into legal arguments and court decisions, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the core content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

889

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No. 09–5137.  Van Lilly v.  Knox et al.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  579.

No. 09–5140.  Palega v. United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  709.

No.  09–5141.  Moore  v.  Lawler,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional  Institution  at  Huntingdon,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5143.  Rosa v.  McNeil, Secretary, Florida Depart
ment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5145.  Brown  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  1108.

No.  09–5147.  Beltran  v.  Dexter,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5148.  Aguado-Guel  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5149.  Robinson  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–5150.  Ruelas  v.  Arizona.  Super.  Ct.  Ariz.,  County

of  Maricopa.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5151.  Thomas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  960.

No.  09–5152.  Zabala  v.  New  York.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.
N.  Y.,  1st  Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  58
App.  Div.  3d  554,  872  N. Y.  S.  2d  104.

No. 09–5153.  Vidal v.  United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  1113.

No.  09–5154.  Bell  v.  Bass-Jones  Lesure,  Judge,  District
Court  for  Oklahoma  County.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5155.  Bernal-Jimenez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, court names, dates, and disposition information. This type of information is not typically considered suitable for indexing as it is not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders/Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–980
_________________

JON HUSTED, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE,
PETITIONER v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH
INSTITUTE, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 11, 2018]

  THOMAS, J., concurring.
  I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full.    I  write  separately  to
add  that  respondents’  proposed  interpretation  of  the  Na-
tional  Voter  Registration  Act  (NVRA)  should  also  be  re-
jected  because  it  would  raise  significant  constitutional
concerns.
  Respondents  would  interpret  the  NVRA  to  prevent
States  from  using  failure  to  vote  as  evidence  when  decid-
ing whether their voting qualifications have been satisfied.
Brief for Respondents 25–30.  The Court’s opinion explains
why  that  reading  is  inconsistent  with  the  text  of  the
NVRA.    See  ante,  at  7–18.    But  even  if  the  NVRA  were
“susceptible”  to  respondents’  reading,  it  could  not  prevail
because  it  “raises  serious  constitutional  doubts”  that  the
Court’s interpretation avoids.  Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 2).
  As  I  have  previously  explained,  constitutional  text  and
history  both  “confirm  that  States  have  the  exclusive  au-
thority to set voter qualifications and to determine whether
those  qualifications  are  satisfied.”    Arizona  v.  Inter
Tribal  Council  of  Ariz.,  Inc.,  570  U. S.  1,  29  (2013)
(THOMAS, J., dissenting).  The Voter-Qualifications Clause
provides  that,  in  elections  for  the  House  of  Representa-
tives, “the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifica-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U99

[09-15-00 14:41:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

768

BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ELLERTH

Thomas, J., dissenting

claim of so-called “disparate treatment.” A disparate treat-
ment claim required a plaintiff to prove an adverse employ-
ment consequence and discriminatory intent by his employer.
See 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimi-
nation Law 10–11 (3d ed. 1996). A hostile environment
claim required the plaintiff to show that his work environ-
ment was so pervaded by racial harassment as to alter the
terms and conditions of his employment. See, e. g., Snell v.
Suffolk Cty., 782 F. 2d 1094, 1103 (CA2 1986) (“To establish
a hostile atmosphere, . . . plaintiffs must prove more than a
few isolated incidents of racial enmity”); Johnson v. Bunny
Bread Co., 646 F. 2d 1250, 1257 (CA8 1981) (no violation of
Title VII from infrequent use of racial slurs). This is the
same standard now used when determining whether sexual
harassment renders a work environment hostile. See Har-
ris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993) (ac-
tionable sexual harassment occurs when the workplace is
“permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted)).

In race discrimination cases, employer liability has turned
on whether the plaintiff has alleged an adverse employment
consequence, such as ﬁring or demotion, or a hostile work
environment.
If a supervisor takes an adverse employment
action because of race, causing the employee a tangible job
detriment, the employer is vicariously liable for resulting
damages. See ante, at 760–761. This is because such ac-
tions are company acts that can be performed only by the
exercise of speciﬁc authority granted by the employer, and
thus the supervisor acts as the employer.
If, on the other
hand, the employee alleges a racially hostile work environ-
ment, the employer is liable only for negligence: that is, only
if the employer knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have known, about the harassment and failed to take
remedial action. See, e. g., Dennis v. Cty. of Fairfax, 55 F.
3d 151, 153 (CA4 1995); Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION

Opinion of the Court

simply  “a  refinement  of  the  unconscionability  analysis
applicable to contracts generally in California.”  584 F. 3d,
at  857.  In  response  to  AT&T’s  argument  that  the  Con-
cepcions’  interpretation  of  California  law  discriminated
against arbitration, the Ninth Circuit rejected the conten-
tion that “ ‘class proceedings will reduce the efficiency and
expeditiousness  of  arbitration’ ”  and  noted  that  “ ‘Discover
Bank  placed  arbitration  agreements  with  class  action
waivers  on  the  exact  same  footing  as  contracts  that  bar
class  action  litigation  outside  the  context  of  arbitration.’ ”
Id.,  at  858  (quoting  Shroyer  v.  New  Cingular  Wireless
Services, Inc., 498 F. 3d 976, 990 (CA9 2007)).
We granted certiorari, 560 U. S. ___ (2010).

II

The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread
judicial  hostility  to  arbitration  agreements.    See  Hall
Street  Associates,  L.  L.  C.  v.  Mattel,  Inc.,  552  U. S.  576,
581 (2008).  Section 2, the “primary substantive provision
of  the  Act,”  Moses  H.  Cone  Memorial  Hospital  v.  Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24 (1983), provides, in relevant
part, as follows:

“A written provision in any maritime transaction or
a  contract  evidencing  a  transaction  involving  com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be
valid,  irrevocable,  and  enforceable,  save  upon  such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.”  9 U. S. C. §2.

We  have  described  this  provision  as  reflecting  both  a
“liberal  federal  policy  favoring  arbitration,”  Moses  H.
Cone,  supra,  at  24,  and  the  “fundamental  principle  that
arbitration  is  a  matter  of  contract,”  Rent-A-Center,  West,
Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S. ____ , ____ (2010) (slip op., at 3).
In line with these principles, courts must place arbitration
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Federal Arbitration Act and its application to a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
clx

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1128

Witherspoon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

WMC Mortgage Corp.; Melﬁ v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1023

Woerth, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Wolf v. Wisconsin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wolfe; Pryor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  988,1116

Wolfenbarger; Hunt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  894,1066

905

Wolfenbarger; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wollstein v. Mary Washington Hospital  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
846

Wong v. Belmontes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15,1138

1079

Wong; Dumas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
290

Wood v. Allen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Wood; Gunnett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

Wood v. Scutt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

Woodard v. New Albany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
888

Woodard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035

Woodberry v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woodmen of World Life Ins. Society; J. R. Y. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

Wood Mizer Products Inc.; Long v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  971,1140

1073

Woods, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935

Woods; Forney v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941

Woods; Grant v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1073

Woods v. Livingston  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Woods v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woods; Randle v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  857,1101

Woods v. Social Security Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  887,1086

Woods v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1073

972

Wordlow v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Worker’s Compensation; Tiffer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
895

Workman; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1106

Workman; White v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
869

Works v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128

Works v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Worley; Jenkins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

Worthington City School Dist.; Stancourt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909

Worthy; Marr v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Wrenn v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision  . . . .
839

Wright; Bright v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wright v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  914,1066

Wright; Hanks v.
1056

Wright v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
869

Wright v. Southwest Airlines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wright v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

Wright v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . .  861,906,907,916,948,975,1060,1101

975

Wright v. Volland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of the Court

They feel called by their faith to care for their elderly resi-
dents  regardless  of  “faith,  finances,  or  frailty.”  Brief  for
Residents and Families of Residents at Homes of the Little
Sisters of the Poor as Amici Curiae 14.  The Little Sisters
endeavor  to  treat  all  residents
“as  if  they  were  Jesus
[Christ] himself, cared for as family, and treated with dig-
nity until God calls them to his home.”  Complaint ¶14 in
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v.
Sebelius, No. 1:13–cv–02611 (D Colo.), p. 5 (Complaint).

Consistent  with  their  Catholic  faith,  the  Little  Sisters
hold the religious conviction “that deliberately avoiding re-
production through medical means is immoral.”  Little Sis-
ters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Burwell,
794 F. 3d 1151, 1167 (CA10 2015).  They challenged the self-
certification  accommodation,  claiming  that  completing  the
certification form would force them to violate their religious
beliefs by “tak[ing] actions that directly cause others to pro-
vide contraception or appear to participate in the Depart-
ments’ delivery scheme.”  Id., at 1168.  As a result, they al-
leged  that  the  self-certification  accommodation  violated
RFRA.  Under RFRA, a law that substantially burdens the
exercise of religion must serve “a compelling governmental
interest” and be “the least restrictive means of furthering
that  compelling governmental interest.”  §§2000bb–1(a)–(b).
The Court of Appeals disagreed that the self-certification
accommodation  substantially  burdened  the  Little  Sisters’
free  exercise  rights  and  thus  rejected  their  RFRA  claim.
Little Sisters, 794 F. 3d, at 1160.

The  Little  Sisters  were  far  from  alone  in  raising  RFRA
challenges  to  the  self-certification  accommodation.    Reli-
gious nonprofit organizations and educational institutions
across  the  country  filed  a  spate  of  similar  lawsuits,  most
resulting in rulings that the accommodation did not violate
RFRA.  See, e.g., East Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793
F. 3d  449  (CA5  2015);  Geneva  College  v.  Secretary,  U. S.
Dept.  of  Health  and  Human  Servs.,  778  F. 3d  422  (CA3
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from the Supreme Court case concerning the Little Sisters of the Poor and the contraceptive mandate. It discusses religious freedom claims and the relevant legal framework (RFRA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U41

[09-26-01 09:10:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 266 (2000)

267

Syllabus

the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. The
facts of this case do not require the Court to speculate about the circum-
stances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be
so great—e. g., a report of a person carrying a bomb—as to justify a
search even without a showing of reliability. Pp. 269–274.

727 So. 2d 204, afﬁrmed.

Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kennedy,
J., ﬁled a concurring opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, post,
p. 274.

Michael J. Neimand, Assistant Attorney General of Flor-
ida, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs
was Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General.

Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney
General Robinson, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.
Harvey J. Sepler argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Bennett H. Brummer and Andrew
Stanton.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for Americans for
Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Wayne W. Schmidt, James P.
Manak, Richard Weintraub, and Bernard J. Farber; for the Justice Coali-
tion by Scott D. Makar; for the National Association of Police Organiza-
tions by Stephen R. McSpadden; and for the State of Illinois et al. by
James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor
General, William Browers and Michael M. Glick, Assistant Attorneys
General, and Dan Schweitzer, joined by the Attorneys General for their
respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Janet Napoli-
tano of Arizona, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, Ken
Salazar of Colorado, John M. Bailey of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of
Delaware, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Jeffrey A. Modisett of Indiana, Thomas
J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisi-
ana, J. Joseph Curran of Maryland, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan,
Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph
P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T. Mc-
Laughlin of New Hampshire, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Michael
F. Easley of North Carolina, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew
Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes the case citation, syllabus, and information about the attorneys involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1218

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

eran  status.  A  copy  of  the  motion  shall  precede  and  be
attached  to  each  copy  of  the petition  for  a  writ  of  certiorari
or other substantive document ﬁled by the veteran.

2.  A  seaman  suing  under  28  U.  S.  C.  § 1916  may  proceed
without  prepayment  of  fees  or  costs  or  furnishing  security
therefor and may ﬁle a motion for leave to proceed on papers
prepared  as  required  by  Rule  33.2.  The  motion  shall  ask
leave to proceed as a seaman and be accompanied by an afﬁ
davit  or  declaration  setting  out  the  moving  party’s  seaman
status.  A copy of the motion shall precede and be attached
to  each  copy  of  the  petition  for  a  writ  of  certiorari  or  other
substantive document ﬁled by the seaman.

3.  An accused person petitioning for a writ of certiorari to
review  a  decision  of  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for
the Armed Forces under 28 U. S. C. § 1259 may proceed with
out prepayment of fees or costs or furnishing security there
for  and  without  ﬁling  an  afﬁdavit  of  indigency,  but  is  not
entitled  to  proceed  on  papers  prepared  as  required  by  Rule
33.2,  except  as  authorized  by  the  Court  on  separate  motion
under Rule 39.

PART  VIII.  DISPOSITION OF  CASES

Rule 41.  Opinions of the Court

Opinions of the Court will be released by the Clerk imme
diately  upon  their  announcement  from  the  bench,  or  as  the
Court  otherwise  directs.  Thereafter,  the  Clerk  will  cause
the  opinions  to  be  issued  in  slip  form,  and  the  Reporter  of
Decisions  will  prepare  them  for  publication  in  the  prelimi
nary prints and bound volumes of the United States Reports.

Rule 42.  Interest and Damages

1.  If a judgment for money in a civil case is afﬁrmed, any
interest  allowed  by  law  is  payable  from  the  date  the  judg
ment  under review  was  entered.  If a  judgment is  modiﬁed
or  reversed  with  a  direction  that  a  judgment  for  money  be
entered  below,  the  courts  below  may  award  interest  to  the
extent permitted by law.  Interest in cases arising in a state
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically from the Supreme Court. It's sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

In particular, the Court holds that the prohibition on state
“operat[ion]”  of  sports-gambling  schemes  cannot  survive,
because  it  does  not  believe  Congress  would  have  “wanted
to  prevent  States  from  running  sports  lotteries”  “had  [it]
known that States would be free to authorize sports gam-
bling in privately owned casinos.”  Ante, at 26.  In so rea-
soning,  the  Court  shutters  §3702(2),  under  which  private
parties  are  prohibited  from  operating  sports-gambling
schemes  precisely  when  state  law  authorizes  them  to  do
so.4

 This  plain  error  pervasively  infects  the  Court’s  severa-
bility  analysis.    The  Court  strikes  Congress’  ban  on  state
“sponsor[ship]”  and  “promot[ion]”  of  sports-gambling
schemes  because  it  has  (mistakenly)  struck  Congress’
prohibition  on  state  “operat[ion]”  of  such  schemes.    See
ante,  at  27.    It  strikes  Congress’  prohibitions  on  private
“sponsor[ship],”  “operat[ion],”  and  “promot[ion]”  of  sports-
gambling  schemes  because  it  has  (mistakenly)  struck
those same prohibitions on the States.  See ante, at 27–28.
And  it  strikes  Congress’  prohibition  on  “advertis[ing]”
sports-gambling schemes because it has struck everything
else.  See ante, at 29–30.

*

  *

  *

  In  PASPA,  shorn  of  the  prohibition  on  modifying  or
repealing  state  law,  Congress  permissibly  exercised  its
authority to regulate commerce by instructing States and
private  parties  to  refrain  from  operating  sports-gambling
schemes.  On no rational ground can it be concluded that
Congress would have preferred no statute at all if it could

——————

4

 As  earlier  indicated,  see  supra,  at  2,  direct  federal  regulation  of
sports-gambling schemes nationwide, including private-party schemes,
falls within Congress’ power to regulate activities having a substantial
effect  on  interstate  commerce.    See  Gonzales  v.  Raich,  545  U. S.  1,  17
(2005).    Indeed,  according  to  the  Court,  direct  regulation  is  precisely
what the anticommandeering doctrine requires.  Ante, at 14–18.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) and its interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

PATEL v. GARLAND

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

agency  decisions  to  ensure  they  are  at  least  supported  by
“substantial evidence.”  5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(E).  A similar, if
surely more deferential, principle finds voice in the INA.  As
relevant here, that statute endows federal courts of appeals
with the power to review “all questions of law and fact . . .
arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to re-
move  an  alien  from  the  United  States.”
8 U. S. C.
§ 1252(b)(9).  And the law further provides that a court may
reject the agency’s factual findings underlying an order of
removal  if  it  concludes  that  no  “reasonable  adjudicator”
could adopt them.  § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Garland v. Ming
Dai, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 7).

That is exactly  the sort of argument Mr.  Patel seeks to
pursue.  He hopes to persuade a court of law that the BIA’s
factual errors in his case are so obvious no reasonable fact-
finder could adopt them.  It is a claim expressly permitted
by statute.  Tellingly, in the proceedings before us the gov-
ernment has continued to maintain that, however his case
is finally resolved, Mr. Patel is entitled to his day in court.
Nor  is  this  some  new  position.    For  at  least  20  years  the
government has taken the view that the law permits judi-
cial review in cases like these.  Yet even in the face of all
this, the majority balks.  It holds that no court may enter-
tain Mr. Patel’s challenge.  And its reasoning promises that
countless future immigrants will be left with no avenue to
correct even more egregious agency errors.

A

How does the majority manage to reach such an unlikely
conclusion?  It depends on a Court-appointed amicus who
offers arguments for the government that even the govern-
ment refuses to advance on its own behalf.  It turns out, too,
that all of those arguments hinge on a narrow exception to
the  usual  rule  of  judicial  review—one  found  in  8  U. S. C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  As relevant here, that exception reads:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a case, citing relevant statutes and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

97

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered the main body text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20A66
_________________

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ET AL. v.
WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY

[October 26, 2020]

  The  application  to  vacate  stay  presented  to  JUSTICE
KAVANAUGH and by him referred to the Court is denied.
  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, concurring in denial of applica-
tion to vacate stay.
  In  this  case,  as  in  several  this  Court  has  recently  ad-
dressed, a District Court intervened in the thick of election
season to enjoin enforcement of a State’s laws.  Because I
believe this intervention was improper, I agree with the de-
cision of the Seventh Circuit to stay the injunction pending
appeal.  I write separately to note that this case presents
different  issues  than  the  applications  this  Court  recently
denied in Scarnati v. Boockvar, ante, at ___, and Republican
Party of Pennsylvania v. Boockvar, ante, at ___.  While the
Pennsylvania applications implicated the authority of state
courts  to  apply  their  own  constitutions to  election regula-
tions, this case involves federal intrusion on state lawmak-
ing processes.  Different bodies of law and different prece-
dents  govern  these  two  situations  and  require,  in  these
particular circumstances, that we allow the modification of
election rules in Pennsylvania but not Wisconsin.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
52  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

Opinion of the Court

4
Evidence  from  around  the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment also fails to support respondents’ position.  For
the  most  part,  respondents  and  the  United  States  ignore
the “outpouring of discussion of the [right to keep and bear
arms]  in  Congress  and  in  public  discourse,  as  people  de-
bated whether and how to secure constitutional rights for
newly free slaves” after the Civil War.  Heller, 554 U. S., at
614.  Of course, we are not obliged to sift the historical ma-
terials for evidence to sustain New York’s statute.  That is
respondents’ burden.  Nevertheless, we think a short review
of the public discourse surrounding Reconstruction is useful
in  demonstrating  how  public  carry  for  self-defense  re-
mained a central component of the protection that the Four-
teenth Amendment secured for all citizens.

A short prologue is in order.  Even before the Civil War
commenced in 1861, this Court indirectly affirmed the im-
portance of the right to keep and bear arms in public.  Writ-
ing  for  the  Court  in  Dred  Scott  v.  Sandford,  19  How.  393
(1857), Chief Justice Taney offered what he thought was a
parade of horribles that would result from recognizing that
free  blacks  were  citizens  of  the  United  States.    If  blacks
were citizens, Taney fretted, they would be entitled to the
privileges  and  immunities  of  citizens,  including  the  right
“to  keep  and  carry  arms  wherever  they  went.”  Id.,  at  417
(emphasis added).  Thus, even Chief Justice Taney recog-
nized (albeit unenthusiastically in the case of blacks) that
public carry was a component of the right to keep and bear
arms—a right free blacks were often denied in antebellum
America.

After the Civil War, of course, the exercise of this funda-
mental right by freed slaves was systematically thwarted.
This  Court  has  already  recounted  some  of  the  Southern
abuses violating blacks’ right to keep and bear arms.  See
McDonald, 561 U. S., at 771 (noting the “systematic efforts”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the historical context of the Second Amendment and its relation to public carry. It is sequential text and relevant to the overall legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GILL v. WHITFORD

Syllabus

They  measure  instead  the  effect  that  a  gerrymander  has  on  the  for-
tunes of political parties.  That shortcoming confirms the fundamen-
tal problem with the plaintiffs’ case as presented on this record.  It is
a  case  about  group  political  interests,  not  individual  legal  rights.
Pp. 17–21.

(d) Where a plaintiff has failed to demonstrate standing, this Court
usually  directs  dismissal.    See,  e.g.,  DaimlerChrysler  Corp.  v.  Cuno,
547  U. S.  332,  354.    Here,  however,  where  the  case  concerns  an  un-
settled  kind  of  claim  that  the  Court  has  not  agreed  upon,  the  con-
tours and justiciability of which are unresolved, the case is remanded
to  the  District  Court  to  give  the  plaintiffs  an  opportunity  to  prove
concrete  and  particularized  injuries  using  evidence  that  would  tend
to demonstrate a burden on their individual votes.  Cf. Alabama Leg-
islative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U. S. ___, ___.  Pp. 21–22.

 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, vacated and remanded.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
GINSBURG,  BREYER,  ALITO,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined,  and  in
which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined except as to Part III.  KAGAN,
J.,  filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in  which  GINSBURG,  BREYER,  and  SO-
TOMAYOR,  JJ.,  joined.  THOMAS,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  part
and concurring in the judgment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's opinion.  It is not the main body of the legal text and likely provides a high-level overview.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SANDOZ INC. v. AMGEN INC. ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 15–1039.  Argued April 26, 2017—Decided June 12, 2017*

The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA or
Act)  provides  an  abbreviated  pathway  for  obtaining  Food  and  Drug
Administration (FDA) approval of a drug that is biosimilar to an al-
ready  licensed  biological  product  (reference  product).    42  U. S. C.
§262(k).  It also provides procedures for resolving patent disputes be-
tween  biosimilar  manufacturers  (applicants)  and  manufacturers  of
reference products (sponsors).  §262(l).  The Act treats the mere sub-
mission  of  a  biosimilar  application  as  an  “artificial”  act  of  infringe-
ment,  enabling  parties  to  bring  patent  infringement  actions  at  cer-
tain  points  in  the  application  process  even  if  the  applicant  has  not
committed  a  traditional  act  of  patent  infringement.    See  35  U. S. C.
§§271(e)(2)(C)(i), (ii).
  Under  §262(l)(2)(A),  an  applicant  seeking  FDA  approval  of  a  bio-
similar  must  provide  its  application  and  manufacturing  information
to the sponsor within 20 days of the date the FDA notifies the appli-
cant that it has accepted the application for review.  This triggers an
exchange of information between the applicant and sponsor designed
to create lists  of relevant patents and flesh out potential legal  argu-
ments.  §262(l)(3).  The  BPCIA  then  channels  the  parties  into  two
phases  of  patent  litigation.    In  the  first,  the  parties  collaborate  to
identify  patents  on  the  lists  for  immediate  litigation.    The  second
phase—triggered when the applicant, pursuant to §262(l)(8)(A), gives
the  sponsor  notice  at  least  180  days  before  commercially  marketing
the  biosimilar—involves  any  listed  patents  not  litigated  in  the  first
phase.    The  applicant  has  substantial  control  over  the  timing  and

——————

* Together with No. 15–1195, Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sandoz Inc., also on

certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are informational in nature and not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the core content of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

22307;  88  Fed.  Reg.  3095,  3118.  Similarly,  artificial
barriers such as dikes and levees typically do not block all
water  flow,  85  Fed.  Reg.  22312;  88  Fed.  Reg.  3076,  and
those  artificial  structures  were  often  built  to  control  the
surface  water  connection  between  the  wetland  and  the
water.  85  Fed.  Reg.  22315;  88  Fed.  Reg.  3118.  The
scientific  evidence  overwhelmingly  demonstrates  that
wetlands separated from covered waters by those kinds of
berms or barriers, for example, still play an important role
in  protecting  neighboring  and  downstream  waters,
including  by  filtering  pollutants,  storing  water,  and
providing  flood  control.    See  88  Fed.  Reg.  3118;  33  CFR
§320.4(b)(2)  (2022);  see  also  United  States  v.  Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121, 134 (1985).  In short,
those  adjacent  wetlands  may  affect  downstream  water
quality  and  flood  control  in  many  of  the  same  ways  that
adjoining wetlands can.

The Court’s erroneous test not only will create real-world
consequences for the waters of the United States, but also
is  sufficiently  novel  and  vague  (at  least  as  a  single
standalone test) that it may create regulatory uncertainty
for  the  Federal  Government,  the  States,  and  regulated
parties.  As  the  Federal  Government  suggests,  the
continuous surface connection test raises “a host of thorny
questions” and will lead to “potentially arbitrary results.”
Brief for Respondents 29.  For example, how difficult does
it have to be to discern the boundary between a water and
a wetland for the wetland to be covered by the Clean Water
Act?  How  does  that  test  apply  to  the  many  kinds  of
wetlands  that  typically  do  not  have  a  surface  water
connection  to  a  covered  water  year-round—for  example,
wetlands  and  waters  that  are  connected  for  much  of  the
year  but  not  in  the  summer  when  they  dry  up  to  some
extent?  How  “temporary”  do  “interruptions  in  surface
connection”  have  to  be  for  wetlands  to  still  be  covered?
Ante,  at  21.  How  does  the  test  operate  in  areas  where
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the legal interpretation of the Clean Water Act and the implications of a particular test for determining wetland coverage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

19

KAGAN, J., dissenting

particular agency’s exercise of authority.  In each case, the
Court thought, the agency had strayed out of its lane, to an
area where it had neither expertise nor experience.  The At-
torney General making healthcare policy, the regulator of
pharmaceutical concerns deciding the fate of the tobacco in-
dustry,  and  so  on.  And  in  each  case,  the  proof  that  the
agency  had  roamed  too  far  afield  lay  in  the  statutory
scheme itself.  The agency action collided with other statu-
tory provisions; if the former were allowed, the latter could
not  mean  what  they  said  or  could  not  work  as  intended.
FDA having to declare tobacco “safe” to avoid shutting down
an industry; or EPA having literally to change hard num-
bers contained in the Clean Air Act.  There, according to the
Court, the statutory framework was “not designed to grant”
the authority claimed.  Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324.  The
agency’s  “singular”  assertion  of  power  “would  render  the
statute unrecognizable to the Congress” that wrote it.  Ibid.
(internal quotation marks omitted).

B

The  Court  today  faces  no  such  singular  assertion  of
agency power.  As I have already explained, nothing in the
Clean Air Act (or, for that matter, any other statute) con-
flicts with EPA’s reading of Section 111.  Notably, the ma-
jority does not dispute that point.  Of course, it views Sec-
tion 111 (if for unexplained reasons) as less clear than I do.
Compare ante, at 28, with supra, at 7–9.  But nowhere does
the majority provide evidence from within the statute itself
that  the  Clean  Power  Plan  conflicts  with  or  undermines
Congress’s design.  That fact alone makes this case differ-
ent from all the cases described above.  As to the other crit-
ical matter in those cases—is the agency operating outside
its sphere of expertise?—the majority at least tries to say
something.  It claims EPA has no “comparative expertise”
in “balancing the many vital considerations of national pol-
icy”  implicated  in  regulating  electricity  sources.    Ante,  at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case West Virginia v. EPA. It delves into the Court's past decisions regarding agency overreach and contrasts them with the current case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1061

558 U. S.

November 30, 2009

No. 09–7271.  Parra-Gonzalez v. United States.  C. A. 11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  887.

No. 09–7273.  Lee v. United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  541.

No.  09–7274.  Kattaria  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  553  F.  3d  1171.

No.  09–7285.  Lnu  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d  298.

No.  09–7288.  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d  308.

No.  09–7289.  Mitchell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  613.

No. 09–7295.  Ereme  v.  United States.  C. A.  4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  340.

No.  09–7296.  Donovan  v.  Government  of  the  Virgin  Is
lands.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335
Fed.  Appx.  206.

No. 09–7298.  Peraza-Carrillo v.  United States.  C. A. 9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  357.

No.  09–7299.  Coffman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7300.  Childress  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  954.

No.  09–7301.  Daniels  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7303.  Beltran-Garcia v. United States.  C. A. 10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  765.

No. 09–7304.  Lopez v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  552.

No. 09–7310.  Jackson v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7312.  Gonzalez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.  400.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

“legislation for a particular class of the blacks to the exclu-
sion  of  all  whites”),  App.  to  Cong.  Globe,  39th  Cong.,  1st
Sess.,  69–70  (statement  of  Rep.  Rousseau)  (“You  raise  a
spirit of antagonism between the black race and the white
race in our country, and the law-abiding will be powerless
to control it”).  President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill on
the basis that it provided benefits “to a particular class of
citizens,”  6  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents  1789–
1897, p. 425 (J. Richardson ed. 1897) (Messages & Papers)
(A. Johnson to House of Rep. July 16, 1866), but Congress
overrode his veto.  Cong. Globe 3849–3850.  Thus, rejecting
those opponents’ objections, the same Reconstruction Con-
gress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment eschewed the
concept of colorblindness as sufficient to remedy inequality
in education.

Congress also debated and passed the Civil Rights Act of
1866 contemporaneously with the Fourteenth Amendment.
The goal of that Act was to eradicate the Black Codes en-
acted by Southern States following ratification of the Thir-
teenth  Amendment.  See  id.,  at  474.  Because  the  Black
Codes focused on race, not just slavery-related status, the
Civil Rights Act explicitly recognized that white citizens en-
joyed certain rights that non-white citizens did not.  Section
1  of  the  Act  provided  that  all  persons  “of  every  race  and
color . . . shall have the same right[s]” as those “enjoyed by
white citizens.”  Act of Apr. 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27.  Similarly,
Section 2 established criminal penalties for subjecting ra-
cial minorities to “different punishment . . . by reason of . . .
color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white
persons.”  Ibid.  In other words, the Act was not colorblind.
By using white citizens as a benchmark, the law classified
by race and took account of the privileges enjoyed only by
white people.  As he did with the Freedmen’s Bureau Act,
President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act in part be-
cause he viewed it as providing Black citizens with special
treatment.  See Messages and Papers 408, 413 (the Act is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses historical context related to civil rights legislation and the concept of colorblindness.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Statement</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:26:35
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CR

Pagination Table: RULES1

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1187

(B) if a third party ﬁles a petition claiming an
interest in the property, conduct an ancillary pro-
ceeding under Rule 32.2(c).

(3) There is no right to trial by jury under Rule

32.2(e).

Rule 38. Stay of execution.

.

.

.

.

.

(e) Notice to victims and restitution.—A sanction im-
posed as part of the sentence pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §§ 3555
or 3556 may, if an appeal of the conviction or sentence is
taken, be stayed by the district court or by the court of ap-
peals upon such terms as the court ﬁnds appropriate. The
court may issue such orders as may be reasonably necessary
to ensure compliance with the sanction upon disposition of
the appeal, including the entering of a restraining order or
an injunction or requiring a deposit in whole or in part of
the monetary amount involved into the registry of the dis-
trict court or execution of a performance bond.

.

.

.

.

.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically the Rules of Criminal Procedure. It contains numbered rules, sub-sections, and legal language.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN.

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

bility of agency actions with enabling statutes, Utility Air
Regulatory  Group  v.  EPA,  573  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2014)  (slip
op.,  at  10).  In  each  case,  the  Judiciary  is  called  upon  to
exercise its independent judgment and apply the law.

But  we  have  not  consistently  exercised  the  judicial
check  with  respect  to  administrative  agencies.    Even
though  regulated  parties  have  repeatedly  challenged
agency interpretations as inconsistent with existing regu-
lations,  we  have  just  as  repeatedly  declined  to  exercise
independent  judgment  as  to  those  claims.    Instead,  we
have  deferred  to  the  executive  agency  that  both  promul-
gated  the  regulations  and  enforced  them.    Although  an
agency’s  interpretation  of  a  regulation  might  be  the  best
interpretation, it also might not.  When courts refuse even
to  decide  what  the  best  interpretation  is  under  the  law,
they  abandon  the  judicial  check.  That  abandonment
permits  precisely  the  accumulation  of  governmental  pow-
ers that the Framers warned against.  See The Federalist
No. 47, at 302 (J. Madison).

C
This accumulation of governmental powers allows agen-
cies  to  change  the  meaning  of  regulations  at  their  discre-
tion  and  without  any  advance  notice  to  the  parties.  It  is
precisely  this  problem  that  the  United  States  Court  of
Appeals  for  the  D. C.  Circuit  attempted  to  address  by
requiring  agencies  to  undertake  notice  and  comment
procedures  before  substantially  revising  definitive  inter-
pretations  of  regulations.  Paralyzed  Veterans,  supra.
Though legally erroneous, the Court of Appeals’ reasoning
was  practically  sound.  When  courts  give  “controlling
weight”  to  an  administrative  interpretation  of  a  regula-
tion—instead  of  to  the  best  interpretation  of  it—they
effectively  give  the  interpretation—and  not  the  regula-
tion—the force and effect of law.  To regulated parties, the
new interpretation might as well be a new regulation.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case *PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN.* It delves into the judicial review of administrative agency actions and the importance of courts applying their independent judgment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20– 5904
_________________

TARAHRICK TERRY, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 14, 2021]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1986, Congress established mandatory-minimum pen-
alties  for  cocaine  offenses.    If  the  quantity  of  cocaine  in-
volved in an offense exceeded a minimum threshold, then
courts were required to impose a heightened sentence.  Con-
gress  set  the  quantity  thresholds  far  lower  for  crack  of-
fenses than for powder offenses.  But it has since narrowed
the gap by increasing the thresholds for crack offenses more
than fivefold.  The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115–391,
132 Stat. 5194, makes those changes retroactive and gives
certain crack offenders an opportunity to receive a reduced
sentence.  The question here is whether crack offenders who
did not trigger a mandatory minimum qualify.  They do not.

I

In  the  mid-1980s,  the  United  States  witnessed  a  steep
surge in the use of crack cocaine, and news of high-profile,
cocaine-related deaths permeated the media.  Witnesses be-
fore  Congress,  and  Members  of  Congress  themselves,  be-
lieved  that  a  “crack  epidemic”  was  also  fueling  a  crime
wave.  Crack, they said, was far more addictive and danger-
ous than powder cocaine; it was cheaper and thus easier to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the title of the case, the date, and the beginning of the opinion itself. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

homeless whenever possible.  Id., at 153, ¶428.3.1

Still,  shortly  after  the  panel  decision  in  Martin,  two
homeless individuals, Gloria Johnson and John Logan, filed
suit  challenging  the  city’s  public-camping  laws.    App.  37,
Third  Amended  Complaint  ¶¶6–7.    They  claimed,  among
other things, that the city’s ordinances violated the Eighth
Amendment’s  Cruel  and  Unusual  Punishments  Clause.
Id., at 51, ¶66.  And they sought to pursue their claim on
behalf of a class encompassing “all involuntarily homeless
people living in Grants Pass.”  Id., at 48, ¶52.2

The district court certified the class action and enjoined
the city from enforcing its public-camping laws against the
homeless.    While  Ms.  Johnson  and  Mr.  Logan  generally
sleep in their vehicles, the court held, they could adequately
represent the class, for sleeping in a vehicle can sometimes
count  as  unlawful  “ ‘camping’ ”  under  the  relevant  ordi-
nances.  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  219a  (quoting  Grants  Pass
Municipal Code §5.61.010).  And, the court found, everyone
——————

1 The dissent cites minutes from a community roundtable meeting to
suggest  that  officials  in  Grants  Pass  harbored  only  punitive  motives
when adopting their camping ban.  Post, at 13–14 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR,
J.).  But the dissent tells at best half the story about that meeting.  In
his opening remarks, the Mayor stressed that the city’s goal was to “find
a balance between providing the help [homeless] people need and not en-
abling . . . aggressive negative behavior” some community members had
experienced.  App. 112.  And, by all accounts, the “purpose” of the meet-
ing was to “develo[p ] strategies to . . . connect [homeless] people to ser-
vices.”  Ibid.  The city manager and others explained that the city was
dealing with problems of “harassment” and “defecation in public places”
by  those  who  seemingly  “do  not  want  to  receive  services.”    Id.,  at  113,
118–120.    At  the  same  time,  they  celebrated  “the  strong  commitment”
from “faith-based entities” and a “huge number of people” in the city, who
have “come together for projects” to support the homeless, including by
securing “funding for a sobering center.”  Id., at 115, 123.

2 Another named plaintiff, Debra Blake, passed away while this case
was pending in the Ninth Circuit, and her claims are not before us.  72
F. 4th 868, 880, n. 12 (2023).  Before us, the city does not dispute that
the remaining named plaintiffs face a credible threat of sanctions under
its ordinances.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing a case about public camping laws and homelessness. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a summary of the case's background.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

21

BREYER, J., dissenting

NRA  Brief).  Indeed,  a  comparison  with  49  other  major
cities  reveals  that  the  District’s  homicide  rate  is  actually
substantially  higher  relative  to  these  other  cities  than  it
was  before  the  handgun  restriction  went  into  effect.    See
Brief  for  Academics  as  Amici  Curiae  7–10  (hereinafter
Academics’  Brief);  see  also  Criminologists’  Brief  6–9,  3a–
4a, 7a.  Respondent’s amici report similar results in com-
paring  the  District’s  homicide  rates  during  that  period  to
that  of  the  neighboring  States  of  Maryland  and  Virginia
(neither  of which  restricts  handguns  to  the  same  degree),
and  to  the  homicide  rate  of  the  Nation  as  a  whole.    See
Academics’ Brief 11–17; Criminologists’ Brief 6a, 8a.
  Second, respondent’s amici point to a statistical analysis
that  regresses  murder  rates  against  the  presence  or  ab-
sence  of  strict  gun  laws  in  20  European  nations.    See
Criminologists’  Brief  23  (citing  Kates  &  Mauser,  Would
Banning  Firearms  Reduce  Murder  and  Suicide?  30  Harv.
J. L.  &  Pub.  Pol’y  649,  651–694  (2007)).    That  analysis
concludes  that  strict  gun  laws  are  correlated  with  more
murders, not fewer.  See Criminologists’ Brief 23; see also
id.,  at  25–28.  They  also  cite  domestic  studies,  based  on
data  from  various  cities,  States,  and  the  Nation  as  a
whole, suggesting that a reduction in the number of guns
does not lead to a reduction in the amount of violent crime.
See id., at 17–20.  They further argue that handgun bans
do not reduce suicide rates, see id., at 28–31, 9a, or rates
of  accidents,  even  those  involving  children,  see  Brief  for
International  Law  Enforcement  Educators  and  Trainers
Assn.  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  App.  7–15  (hereinafter
ILEETA Brief).

Third,  they  point  to  evidence  indicating  that  firearm
ownership  does  have  a  beneficial  self-defense  effect.
Based  on  a  1993  survey,  the  authors  of  one  study  esti-
mated that there were 2.2-to-2.5 million defensive uses of
guns  (mostly  brandishing,  about  a  quarter  involving  the
actual  firing  of  a  gun)  annually.  See  Kleck  &  Gertz,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically focusing on the arguments against a handgun restriction. It contains legal citations, statistical references, and arguments about the effectiveness of gun control.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxliii

Page

Texas; Houston v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1124

Texas; Hughes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  835,886

1141

Texas; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Texas; Kaiser v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Texas; Ledbetter v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950

Texas; Lopez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Texas; Luna v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931

Texas v. Martinez  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

Texas; McCreary v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Texas; McDaniel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

Texas; Meza Segundo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Texas; Middleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

Texas; Miller v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950

Texas; Moffett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Texas v. New Mexico  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

Texas; Payne v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Texas; Perez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

Texas; Ramey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952

Texas; Rangel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Texas; Ratcliff v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Texas; Reese v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Riggins v.
843

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Rodriguez v.
954

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Rohden v.
838

Texas; Simon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987

Texas; Sossamon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Texas; Stone v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Texas; Sutton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1039

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Thompson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Tillman v.
953

862

Texas; Urista v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
992

Texas; Villarreal v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Wanzer v.
1073

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Woods v.
1093

Texas; Young v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1015

Texas Dept. of Transportation; Eisenhauer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
T. G. v. Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services  . . . .  878,1139

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Thaler; Alix v.
995

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Amason v.
851

Thaler; Anderson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
993

Thaler; Avila v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thaler; Balentine v.
1154

Thaler; Barnes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Thaler; Batiste v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

It is easy to see why.  We do not normally suppose that
Congress blithely includes words in its laws that perform
no work.  See, e.g., Liu v. SEC, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip
op., at 16) (noting the “ ‘cardinal principle of interpretation
that courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute’ ”).  Yet that is exactly what the majority’s
interpretation requires of us.  If subparagraph (B)(i) oper-
ated as the majority imagines, Congress would have had no
need to deny courts jurisdiction over “any judgment regard-
ing the granting of relief under section 1255.”  Instead, Con-
gress  could  have  simply  omitted  the  italicized  words  and
denied jurisdiction over “any judgment under section 1255.”
Plainly, all those additional words must do something.  And
the work they perform is clear—the phrase directs us to the
Attorney  General’s  second-step  discretionary  judgment  to
grant relief.  That alone is a judgment “regarding the grant-
ing of relief.”  And under the statute’s terms, that judgment
alone is shielded from judicial review.

The majority’s attempt to resolve its surplusage problem
only underscores the gravity of its error.  First, the majority
tells us that, as used in subparagraph (B)(i), the words “any
judgment” mean “any authoritative decision.”  Ante, at 7, 8.
Then the majority tells us that the phrase “regarding the
granting  of  relief ”  expands  the  universe  of  covered  judg-
ments  further,  because  the  word  “regarding”  “ ‘generally
has a broadening effect.’ ”  Ante, at 8–9.  But how could that
be?  Under the majority’s reading of the word “judgment,”
the statute already precludes judicial review of any author-
itative decision “under section 1255.”  There is no further
corner of the universe left to explore.  Once more, the words
regarding the granting of relief are left without work to per-
form.  Rather than sort out its surplusage problem, the ma-
jority’s answer only highlights its bind.

What is more, the majority’s argument rests on a faulty
premise.  The  majority  insists  that  the  word  “regarding”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute and argues against the majority's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–637
_________________

DARRELL HEMPHILL, PETITIONER v. NEW YORK

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF NEW YORK

[January 20, 2022]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
This Court may review “[f]inal judgments or decrees ren-
dered by the highest court of a State” only where, as rele-
vant here, a federal right “is specially set up or claimed” in
the  state  court.  28  U. S. C.  §1257(a).    Because  Darrell
Hemphill did not raise his Sixth Amendment claim in the
New York Court of Appeals, we lack jurisdiction to review
that court’s decision.  I respectfully dissent.

I
Under New York case law, a trial court may generally ad-
mit otherwise inadmissible evidence if a party has “opened
the  door”  to  its  introduction  at  trial.    People  v.  Massie,  2
N. Y. 3d 179, 180, 809 N. E. 2d 1102 (2004) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  A party “opens the door” when he pre-
sents “evidence or argument” that is “incomplete and mis-
leading,”  and  responsive  evidence  is  necessary  to  “correct
the  misleading  impression.”    Id.,  at  184,  809  N. E. 2d,  at
1105.  In People v. Reid, 19 N. Y. 3d 382, 388, 971 N. E. 2d
353, 357 (2012), the New York Court of Appeals held that
this  door-opening  doctrine  permits  a  trial  court  to  admit
testimonial hearsay otherwise barred by the Sixth Amend-
ment’s Confrontation Clause.  In this case, invoking Reid,
the trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce Nich-
olas Morris’ plea allocution to rebut Hemphill’s defense that
Morris possessed the murder weapon.  See ante, at 3–5.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal reasoning of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ

Syllabus

mat.  Moreover,  an  asserted  informational  injury  that  causes  no  ad-
verse effects does not satisfy Article III.  Pp. 24–27.

951 F. 3d 1008, reversed and remanded.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a
dissenting  opinion,  in  which  BREYER,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,
joined.  KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and SO-
TOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal case syllabus, containing case name, citation, and information about the justices involved.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is likely not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxxvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1054

Runge v. Minnesota  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Runnels; Barkus v.
868

Runnels; DeWeaver v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Runnels; Hollis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123

Runnels; Preciado v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Runnels; Sharpe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

Runnels; Turner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
871

Runnels; Vaughn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Runnels; Watts v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  841,1086

883

Runyon v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

Rush v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

Rushing v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
978

Russ v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Russell v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
876

Russellville Newspapers, Inc.; Whiteside v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1016

Russo v. Hulick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Russo; Yeboah-Sefah v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Rust v. Sandor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
807

Ruston v. Dallas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Rutledge v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Ruvalcaba v. Brown  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

R. W. v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
992

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rx.com, Inc. v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc.
817

Rx Solutions; Hill Dermaceuticals, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919

Ryan; Alexander v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

Ryan; Allison v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ryan; Beaty v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
832

1028

Ryan; Daly v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

Ryan; D’Angelo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Ryan; Garcia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

Ryan; Giberson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887

Ryan; King v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Ryan; Kopy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ryan; Little v.
974

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ryan; Maisano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  971,994

1119

Ryan; Miller v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Ryan v. Scott  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1002

Ryan; Slinger v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932

Ryan v. Styers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1108

S. v. Franklin County Children Services
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

S. v. Mental Health Bd. of Fourth Judicial Dist.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

S. v. Missouri  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

S. v. Prince George’s County Child Protective Services  . . . . . . . .
1137

Sabbur v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

GORSUCH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–108
_________________

JAMES E. SNYDER, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2024]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring.
Call it what you will.  The Court today speaks of infer-
ences from the word “corruptly,” the statute’s history and
structure, and associated punishments.  See ante, at 7.  It
discusses concerns of fair notice and federalism.  Ibid.  But
the bottom line is that, for all those reasons, any fair reader
of this statute would be left with a reasonable doubt about
whether  it  covers  the  defendant’s  charged  conduct.    And
when that happens, judges are bound by the ancient rule of
lenity to decide the case as the Court does today, not for the
prosecutor but for the presumptively free individual.  See
United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 464–465 (2019).

Lenity may sometimes, as it does today, go unnamed.  It
may be deployed under other guises, too.  “Fair notice” or
“fair warning” are especially familiar masks.  See, e.g., ante,
at 7, 11, 13; Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 6–7, 9–
10 (2018); McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576
(2016).  Cf.  Wooden  v.  United  States,  595  U. S.  360,  389
(2022)  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment)  (“Lenity
works  to  enforce  the  fair  notice  requirement”);  Yates  v.
United States, 574 U. S. 528, 548 (2015) (plurality opinion)
(same).  Other times, we clothe lenity in its corollary—that
courts cannot “rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow
the”  scope  of  an  “otherwise  wide-ranging”  criminal  law.
Marinello, 584 U. S., at 11; see, e.g., ante, at 13; Dubin v.
United States, 599 U. S. 110, 131 (2023).  And in still other
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice GorSUCH. It contains legal citations, analysis of a statute, and arguments about legal principles like lenity and fair notice.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

HERRERA v. WYOMING

Opinion of the Court

Herrera  because  he  is  a  member  of  the  Crow  Tribe,  and
the  Tribe  had  litigated  the  Repsis  suit  on  behalf  of  itself
and  its  members.  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  15–17,  31;  App.
258.  Herrera, in other words, was not allowed to relitigate
the validity of the treaty right in his own case.

The  court  also  held  that,  even  if  the  1868  Treaty  right
survived Wyoming’s entry into the Union, it did not permit
Herrera to hunt in Bighorn National Forest.  Again follow-
ing  Repsis,  the  court  concluded  that  the  treaty  right  ap-
plies  only  on  “unoccupied”  lands  and  that  the  national
forest became categorically “occupied” when it was created.
See App.  to Pet. for Cert. 33–34;  Repsis, 73  F. 3d, at 994.
The  state  appellate  court  affirmed  the  trial  court’s  judg-
ment and sentence.

The  Wyoming  Supreme  Court  denied  a  petition  for
review,  and  this  Court  granted  certiorari.  585  U. S.  ___
(2018).  For  the  reasons  that  follow,  we  now  vacate  and
remand.

II
We  first  consider  whether  the  Crow  Tribe’s  hunting
rights  under  the  1868  Treaty  remain  valid.  Relying  on
this Court’s decision in Mille Lacs, Herrera and the United
States  contend  that  those  rights  did  not  expire  when
Wyoming became a State in 1890.  We agree.

A
Wyoming  argues  that  this  Court’s  decision  in  Race
Horse establishes that the Crow Tribe’s 1868 Treaty right
expired at  statehood.  But this case is controlled by  Mille
Lacs, not Race Horse.

Race  Horse  concerned  a  hunting  right  guaranteed  in  a
treaty  with  the  Shoshone  and  Bannock  Tribes.  The
Shoshone-Bannock  Treaty  and  the  1868  Treaty  with  the
Crow  Tribe  were  signed  in  the  same  year  and  contain
identical  language  reserving  an  off-reservation  hunting
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in the case of Herrera v. Wyoming. It discusses the legal arguments and the Court's decision regarding hunting rights of the Crow Tribe.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

KELLY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

States  4,  32;  see  supra,  at  5.  Maybe,  as  the  Government
contends, all of this work was “needed” to realize the final
plan—“to accomplish what [Baroni and Kelly] were trying
to do with the [B]ridge.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 60.  Even if so, it
would make no difference.  Every regulatory decision (think
again  of  Cleveland,  see  supra,  at  11)  requires  the  use  of
some employee labor.  But that does not mean every scheme
to alter a regulation has that labor as its object.  Baroni’s
and Kelly’s plan aimed to impede access from Fort Lee to
the George Washington Bridge.  The cost of the employee
hours spent on implementing that plan was its incidental
byproduct.

To  rule  otherwise  would  undercut  this  Court’s  oft-
repeated  instruction:  Federal  prosecutors  may  not  use
property fraud statutes to “set[ ] standards of disclosure and
good government for local and state officials.”  McNally, 483
U. S., at 360; see supra, at 7.  Much of governance involves
(as it did here) regulatory choice.  If U. S. Attorneys could
prosecute as property fraud every lie a state or local official
tells  in  making  such  a  decision,  the  result  would  be—as
Cleveland  recognized—“a  sweeping  expansion  of  federal
criminal jurisdiction.”  531 U. S., at 24.  And if those prose-
cutors could end-run Cleveland just by pointing to the reg-
ulation’s  incidental  costs,  the  same  ballooning  of  federal
power  would  follow.    In  effect,  the  Federal  Government
could use the criminal law to enforce (its view of ) integrity
in broad swaths of state and local policymaking.  The prop-
erty fraud statutes do not countenance that outcome.  They
do not “proscribe[ ] schemes to defraud citizens of their in-
tangible  rights  to  honest  and  impartial  government.”
McNally, 483 U. S., at 355; see supra, at 7.  They bar only
schemes for obtaining property.

III
As Kelly’s own lawyer  acknowledged, this case involves
an  “abuse  of  power.”    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  19.    For  no  reason
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court is analyzing the arguments and making its ruling.  It is sequential text and discusses legal concepts, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE v. ARGUS LEADER MEDIA

Opinion of BREYER, J.

consider  Exemption  4  has  interpreted  it  [using]  National
Park[s] ”);  Critical Mass Energy Project v.  NRC, 975 F. 2d
871,  876  (CADC  1992)  (en  banc)  (collecting  cases).    One
way to satisfy that requirement is by showing that disclo-
sure is “likely” to “cause substantial harm to the competi-
tive position of the person from whom the information was
obtained.”  National  Parks,  498  F. 2d,  at  770,  and  n. 17.
The  Eighth  Circuit,  in  this  case,  applied  the  same  stand-
ard.  Argus  Leader  Media  v.  United  States  Dept.  of  Agri-
culture, 889 F. 3d 914, 915 (2018).  And, like the majority,
I  believe  that  National  Parks’  harm  requirement  goes
too far.

For one thing, National Parks held that the only form of
private  harm  that  can  warrant  nondisclosure  is  “competi-
tive”  harm.    498  F. 2d,  at  770–771  (emphasis  added).
Later courts took this  to mean that harm from “future or
potential  competition”  does  not  suffice,  Niagara  Mohawk
Power  Corp.  v.  Department  of  Energy,  169  F. 3d  16,  19
(CADC  1999),  and  even  that  harm  must  “flo[w]  from  the
affirmative use of proprietary information by competitors,”
Public  Citizen  Health  Research  Group  v.  FDA,  704  F. 2d
1280,  1291,  n. 30  (CADC  1983)  (some  emphasis  added).
But  disclosure  of  confidential  information  can  cause  a
business  serious  harm  in  ways  not  so  directly  linked  to
competition.  Disclosure,  for  example,  might  discourage
customers  from  using  a  firm’s  products,  but  without  sub-
stantial effect on its rivals.  It could mean increased poten-
tial  competition,  which  may,  or  may  not,  materialize.    It
could,  by  revealing  buying  habits,  undermine  a  regulated
firm  that  has  no  competitors.  The  list  goes  on.  I  can
discern  no  basis  in  the  statute  for  categorically  excluding
these other types of harm from the scope of Exemption 4.

Similarly,  the  need  to  prove  “substantial”  competitive
harm  can  sometimes  produce  complex  debates  about  the
nature  of  competition  and  the  degree  of  injury.    National
Parks,  498  F. 2d,  at  770.  And  those  debates  can  mean
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of Exemption 4. It delves into legal precedents and arguments regarding the scope of harm that can justify non-disclosure under this exemption.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>