<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

53

THOMAS, J., concurring

first  in  his  family  to  attend  UNC.    Post,  at  3.  JUSTICE
JACKSON  argues  that  race-conscious  admission  programs
are necessary to adequately compare the two applicants.  As
an initial matter, it is not clear why James’s race is the only
factor that could encourage UNC to admit him; his status
as a first-generation college applicant seems to contextual-
ize his application.  But, setting that aside, why is it that
John  should  be  judged  based  on  the  actions  of  his  great-
great-great-grandparents?
  And  what  would  JUSTICE
JACKSON say to John when deeming him not as worthy of
admission:  Some  statistically  significant  number  of  white
people had advantages in college admissions seven genera-
tions ago, and you have inherited their incurable sin?

Nor  should  we  accept  that  John  or  James  represent  all
members of their respective races.  All racial groups are het-
erogeneous,  and  blacks  are  no  exception—encompassing
northerners and southerners, rich and poor, and recent im-
migrants  and  descendants  of  slaves.    See,  e.g.,  T.  Sowell,
Ethnic America 220 (1981) (noting that the great success of
West Indian immigrants to the United States—dispropor-
tionate among blacks more broadly—“seriously undermines
the proposition that color is a fatal handicap in the Ameri-
can economy”).  Eschewing the complexity that comes with
individuality  may  make  for  an  uncomplicated  narrative,
but lumping people together and judging them based on as-
sumed  inherited  or  ancestral  traits  is  nothing  but  stereo-
typing.11

To further illustrate, let’s expand the applicant pool be-
yond John and James.  Consider Jack, a black applicant and
the  son  of  a  multimillionaire  industrialist.    In  a  world  of
race-based  preferences,  James’  seat  could  very  well  go  to

——————

11 Again,  universities  may  offer  admissions  preferences  to  students
from disadvantaged backgrounds, and they need not withhold those pref-
erences from students who happen to be members of racial minorities.
Universities may not, however, assume that all members of certain racial
minorities are disadvantaged.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It delves into the arguments surrounding race-conscious admissions programs in higher education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

39

Opinion of the Court

United States §780, pp. 250–251 (1833)).  And none of them
indicate whether he may be prosecuted for his official con-
duct.  See, e.g., post, at 6, 7, n. 2 (citing The Federalist No.
69; 4 Debates on the Constitution, at 109).  The principal
dissent’s most compelling piece of evidence consists of ex-
cerpted statements of Charles Pinckney from an 1800 Sen-
ate debate.  See post, at 7.  But those statements reflect only
the  now-discredited  argument  that  any  immunity  not  ex-
pressly mentioned in the Constitution must not exist.  See
3 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 384–385
(M. Farrand ed. 1911).  And Pinckney is not exactly a relia-
ble  authority  on  the  separation  of  powers:  He  went  on  to
state on the same day that “it was wrong to give the nomi-
nation of Judges to the President”—an opinion expressly re-
jected by the Framers.  Id., at 385.  Given the Framers’ de-
sire for an energetic and vigorous President, the principal
dissent’s  view  that  the  Constitution  they  designed  allows
all his actions to be subject to prosecution—even the exer-
cise of powers it grants exclusively to him—defies credulity.
Unable  to  muster  any  meaningful  textual  or  historical
support, the principal dissent suggests that there is an “es-
tablished  understanding”  that  “former  Presidents  are  an-
swerable to the criminal law for their official acts.”  Post, at
9.  Conspicuously absent is mention of the fact that since
the  founding,  no  President  has  ever  faced  criminal
charges—let alone for his conduct in office.  And accordingly
no court has ever been faced with the question of a Presi-
dent’s  immunity  from  prosecution.  All  that  our  Nation’s
practice establishes on the subject is silence.

Coming  up  short  on  reasoning,  the  dissents  repeatedly
level  variations  of  the  accusation  that  the  Court  has  ren-
dered the President “above the law.”  See, e.g., post, at 1, 3,
11, 12, 21, 30 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); post, at 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 19 (opinion of JACKSON, J.).  As before, that “rhetor-
ically chilling” contention is “wholly unjustified.”  Fitzger-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the majority opinion in a Supreme Court case. It argues against the proposition that a former President can be criminally prosecuted for actions taken while in office.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

172

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Breyer, J., dissenting

sweet.’ ” Kluger, Ashes to Ashes, at 77–78. The advertise-
ments of R J Reynolds (RJR) emphasized mood stability by
depicting a pilot remarking that “ ‘It Takes Steady Nerves
to Fly the Mail at Night . . . . That’s why I smoke Camels.
Id., at 86. RJR also advertised the
And I smoke plenty!’ ”
stimulating quality of cigarettes, stating in one instance that
“ ‘You get a Lift with a Camel,’ ” and, in another, that Camels
are “ ‘A Harmless Restoration of the Flow of Natural Body
Id., at 87. And claims of medical proof of mild-
Energy.’ ”
ness (and of other beneﬁcial effects) once were commonplace.
See, e. g., id., at 93 (Brown & Williamson advertised Kool-
brand mentholated cigarettes as “a tonic to hot, tired
throats”); id., at 101, 131 (Philip Morris contended that
“ ‘[r]ecognized laboratory tests have conclusively proven the
advantage of Phillip [sic] Morris’ ”); id., at 88 (RJR pro-
claimed “ ‘For Digestion’s sake, smoke Camels! . . . Camels
make mealtime more pleasant—digestion is stimulated—al-
kalinity increased’ ”). Although in recent decades cigarette
manufacturers have stopped making express health claims in
their advertising, consumers have come to understand what
the companies no longer need to express—that through
chemical action cigarettes stabilize mood, sedate, stimulate,
and help suppress appetite.

Second, even though the companies refused to acknowl-
edge publicly (until only very recently) that the nicotine in
cigarettes has chemically induced, and habit-forming, effects,
see, e. g., Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 1): Hearings
before the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environ-
ment, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 628 (1994) (hereinafter 1994
Hearings) (heads of seven major tobacco companies testiﬁed
under oath that they believed “nicotine is not addictive” (em-
phasis added)), the FDA recently has gained access to solid,
documentary evidence proving that cigarette manufacturers
have long known tobacco produces these effects within the
body through the metabolizing of chemicals, and that they
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history of cigarette advertising and the tobacco industry's knowledge of nicotine's addictive properties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C.

Opinion of the Court

368–369.
  The situation here is starkly different.  As discussed, the
attorney  general’s  motion  was  timely,  and  intervention
would not have produced anything like the disruption that
the  Court  cited  in  NAACP  v.  New  York.    Thus,  the  panel
was mistaken in finding that the attorney general’s motion
was untimely.

C
  The  panel’s  finding  on  prejudice  was  similarly  flawed.
The  panel  argued  that  intervention  would  prejudice  re-
spondents  because  the  attorney  general’s  rehearing  peti-
tion  pressed  an  issue  (third-party  standing)  that  had  not
been raised in the secretary’s briefs.  831 Fed. Appx., at 751,
752.  But the lack of third-party standing was not the only
argument  advanced  in  the  rehearing  petition,  App.  221–
227, and in any event, allowing the attorney general to in-
tervene  would  not  have  necessitated  that  the  third-party
standing issue be entertained.  If the secretary for Health
and Family Services had not retired from the field, he could
have raised that same argument in a petition for rehearing
or  in  a petition for certiorari.    In  that  event,  the  relevant
court  (the  Sixth  Circuit  in  deciding  whether  to  grant  en
banc  review  and  this  Court  in  deciding  whether  to  grant
certiorari)  could  have  considered  whether  the  third-party
standing argument should be considered despite the secre-
tary’s  failure  to  raise  the  issue  at  an  earlier  point  in  the
litigation.  That the issue was raised in the attorney gen-
eral’s rehearing petition, as opposed to one filed by the sec-
retary, was immaterial.
  Our  decision  in  McDonald  illustrates  the  panel’s  error.
In that case, we held that the defendant was not “unfairly
prejudiced simply because an appeal on behalf of putative
class members was brought by [an unnamed class member]
rather than by one of the original” parties, 432 U. S., at 394.
The situation here is similar.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the case of Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center. It delves into legal arguments regarding intervention and prejudice in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Opinion of the Court

have  his  right  to  the  free  exercise  of  religion  limited  by
generally  applicable  laws.    Still,  the  delicate  question  of
when  the  free  exercise  of  his  religion  must  yield  to  an
otherwise  valid  exercise  of  state  power  needed  to  be  de-
termined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on
the  part  of  the  State  itself  would  not  be  a  factor  in  the
balance  the  State  sought  to  reach.    That  requirement,
however,  was  not  met  here.  When  the  Colorado  Civil
Rights  Commission  considered  this  case,  it  did  not  do
so  with  the  religious  neutrality  that  the  Constitution
requires.

Given  all  these  considerations,  it  is  proper  to  hold  that
whatever  the  outcome  of  some  future  controversy  involv-
ing  facts  similar  to  these,  the  Commission’s  actions  here
violated  the  Free  Exercise  Clause;  and  its  order  must  be
set aside.

I

A

Masterpiece  Cakeshop,  Ltd.,  is  a  bakery  in  Lakewood,
Colorado, a suburb of Denver.  The shop offers a variety of
baked goods, ranging from everyday cookies and brownies
to  elaborate  custom-designed  cakes  for  birthday  parties,
weddings, and other events.

Jack  Phillips  is  an  expert  baker  who  has  owned  and
operated the shop for 24 years.  Phillips is a devout Chris-
tian.  He has explained that his “main goal in life is to be
obedient  to”  Jesus  Christ  and  Christ’s  “teachings  in  all
aspects of his life.”  App. 148.  And he seeks to “honor God
through his work at Masterpiece Cakeshop.”  Ibid.  One of
Phillips’  religious  beliefs  is  that  “God’s  intention  for  mar-
riage from the beginning of history is that it is and should
be the union of one man and one woman.”  Id., at 149.  To
Phillips,  creating  a  wedding  cake  for  a  same-sex  wedding
would  be  equivalent  to  participating  in  a  celebration  that
is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in a case. It discusses religious freedom and the application of state laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
860

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10893.  Martin  v.  Virginia.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari

denied.

No.  08–10894.  Johnson  v.  Wisconsin.  Ct.  App.  Wis.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Wis.  2d  356,  763  N.  W.
2d  248.

No.  08–10895.  Mayer  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  948.

No. 08–10896.  Kelly v.  United States.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  313  Fed.  Appx.  899.

No.  08–10897.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  227.

No. 08–10898.  Penk v.  United States.  C. A. 10th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  733.

No.  08–10900.  Rey-Gonzalez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  95.

No.  08–10901.  Munoz-Mendez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  273.

No.  08–10903.  Martin  v.  Grayer,  Warden,  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.

Ga.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10904.  Lewis v.  United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10905.  Blackwell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  373.

No. 08–10906.  Berry v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  229.

No.  08–10907.  Leinenbach  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  53.

No.  08–10908.  Finney  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  752.

No.  08–10909.  Hernandez  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  4  So.  3d  642.

No.  08–10911.  Flores  v.  Adams,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  514.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

lvii

Page
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
President of U. S.; Atraqchi v.
1059
President of U. S.; Chenoweth v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012
President of U. S.; Government Employees v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1018
President of U. S.; Hyland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1088
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Price; Merritt v.
1009
Pride v. Missouri
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004
Pride v. Moses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1064
Prihoda v. Sondalle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118
Prime, Inc. v. Owner Operators Independent Drivers Assn., Inc.
1066
Prince v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1086,1121
. . . . . . .
Prince George’s County; First Mount Vernon, I. L. A. v.
1087
Process Control Corp.; Hydreclaim Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037
Prodigy Services Co.; Lunney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1098
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Professional Security Bureau, Ltd.; Watkins v.
1108
Professor Vladimir Popov MV.; Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc. v.
1130
Provanzano; Gorod v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1019
Pruitt v. Irvin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prunty; Oden v.
1101
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prupis; Beck v.
494
Pryor v. Summit Medical Associates, P. C.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012
Prystash v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1102
Public Citizen v. Carlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003
Public Lands Council v. Babbitt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
728
Public Service Electric and Gas; Barth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004
Pulido v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077
Punchard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003
Purdy; Zapata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1045
Purviance; Ashiegbu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1001
Pytel, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1107
Qualls v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1005
Qualls v. Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1087
Quilici; Burkhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054
Quinones v. Greiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114
Quintanilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029
Rainey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028
Rainy Lake One Stop, Inc. v. Marigold Foods, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . .
1038
Rajkovic v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . .
1075
Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1051
Ramey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1111
Ramirez-Palmer; Chae Ho Lee v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056
1043
Ramon-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ramos v. District Director, Exec. Ofﬁce for Immigration Review 1108
1075
Ramos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Randolph; Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

726

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

Scalia, J., dissenting

or terms of more than one year, a prisoner shall be eligible
for release on parole after serving one-third of such
term . . .”). The question whether further supervised re-
lease may be required after revocation of supervised release
is so entirely different from the question whether further
parole may be accorded after revocation of parole, that the
Court’s appeal to the parole practice demonstrates nothing
except the dire scarcity of arguments available to support
its conclusion.7

7 The Court also appeals to pre-Guidelines practice regarding probation
and special parole. Ante, at 711–712, n. 11. The pre-Guidelines proba-
tion practice is altogether inapt, since the governing statute explicitly pro-
vided for resentencing after violation, and speciﬁcally allowed the court
to “impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed.” 18
U. S. C. § 3653 (1982 ed.) (repealed). This makes it quite impossible for
probation practice to support the Court’s “broader point that a court’s
powers at the original sentencing are the baseline from which powers at
resentencing are determined,” ante, at 711, n. 11; all it proves is that they
are the baseline where the statute says so.
Indeed, the fact that the stat-
ute found it necessary to say so tends to contradict the Court’s position.
Special parole, while more akin to supervised release than either parole
or probation, hardly provides clear support for the Court’s reading of
§ 3583(e)(3).
In fact, the majority of Courts of Appeals have read the
relevant statute regarding special parole, 21 U. S. C. § 841(c) (1982 ed.) (re-
pealed), as not allowing reimposition of special parole in circumstances
analogous to those at issue here. See Manso v. Federal Detention Center,
182 F. 3d 814, 817 (CA11 1999) (citing cases). The Court’s reliance on the
Parole Commission’s 1977 interpretation of the special parole statute, see
28 CFR § 2.57(c) (1999), is misplaced. The principle that Congress is pre-
sumed to legislate in light of existing administrative interpretations does
not stretch to cover an administrative interpretation of a statute dealing
with a different subject, of recent vintage, and unsupported by judi-
cial opinion. Cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 645 (1998) (repetition
of existing statutory language assumed to incorporate “uniform body of
administrative and judicial precedent” that had “settled the meaning” of
existing provision); Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 297 (1981) (assuming
congressional awareness of “longstanding administrative construction”).
Further, some courts have found it unclear whether the Parole Commis-
sion’s regulation itself envisions reimposition of special parole. See, e. g.,
Fowler v. United States Parole Commission, 94 F. 3d 835, 841 (CA3 1996).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2010

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION ET UX.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 09–893.  Argued November 9, 2010—Decided April 27, 2011

The cellular telephone contract between respondents (Concepcions) and
petitioner (AT&T) provided for arbitration of all disputes, but did not
permit  classwide  arbitration.    After  the  Concepcions  were  charged
sales tax on the retail value of phones provided free under their ser-
vice contract, they sued AT&T in a California Federal District Court.
Their  suit  was  consolidated  with  a  class  action  alleging,  inter  alia,
that  AT&T  had  engaged  in  false  advertising  and  fraud  by  charging
sales tax on “free” phones.  The District Court denied AT&T’s motion
to  compel  arbitration  under  the  Concepcions’  contract.  Relying  on
the  California  Supreme  Court’s  Discover Bank  decision,  it  found  the
arbitration  provision  unconscionable  because  it  disallowed  classwide
proceedings.  The Ninth Circuit agreed that the provision was uncon-
scionable under California law and held that the Federal Arbitration
Act  (FAA),  which  makes  arbitration  agreements  “valid,  irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract,” 9 U. S. C. §2, did not preempt its
ruling.

Held: Because it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution  of  the  full  purposes  and  objectives  of  Congress,”  Hines  v.
Davidowitz,  312  U. S.  52,  67,  California’s  Discover  Bank rule  is  pre-
empted by the FAA.  Pp. 4–18.

(a) Section  2  reflects  a  “liberal  federal  policy  favoring  arbitration,”
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S.
1, 24, and the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of
contract,”  Rent-A-Center,  West,  Inc.  v.  Jackson,  561  U. S.  ____,  ____.
Thus,  courts  must  place  arbitration  agreements  on  an  equal  footing
with  other  contracts,  Buckeye  Check  Cashing,  Inc.  v.  Cardegna,  546
U. S.  440,  443,  and  enforce  them  according  to  their  terms,  Volt  In-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a brief overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

5

Opinion of the Court

ment that officials “reject” the application of a prospective
voter who submits a completed Federal Form unaccompa-
nied by documentary evidence of citizenship.

A
The  Elections  Clause  has  two  functions.    Upon  the
States  it  imposes  the  duty  (“shall  be  prescribed”)  to  pre-
scribe the time, place, and manner of electing Representa-
tives and Senators; upon Congress it confers the power to
alter  those  regulations  or  supplant  them  altogether.    See
U. S.  Term  Limits,  Inc.  v.  Thornton,  514  U. S.  779,  804–
805  (1995);  id.,  at  862  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting).  This
grant  of  congressional  power  was  the  Framers’  insurance
against the possibility that a State would refuse to provide
for the election of representatives to the Federal Congress.
“[E]very  government  ought  to  contain  in  itself  the  means
of its own preservation,” and “an exclusive power of regu-
lating elections for the national government, in the hands
of  the  State  legislatures,  would  leave  the  existence  of  the
Union entirely at their mercy.  They could at any moment
annihilate  it  by  neglecting  to  provide  for  the  choice  of
persons to  administer its affairs.”  The  Federalist No. 59,
pp. 362–363  (C.  Rossiter  ed.  1961)  (A. Hamilton)  (empha-
sis  deleted).    That  prospect  seems  fanciful  today,  but  the
widespread,  vociferous  opposition  to  the  proposed  Consti-
tution made it a very real concern in the founding era.

The Clause’s substantive scope is broad.  “Times, Places,
and  Manner,”  we  have  written,  are  “comprehensive
words,”  which  “embrace  authority  to  provide  a  complete
code  for  congressional  elections,”  including,  as  relevant
here  and  as  petitioners  do  not  contest,  regulations  relat-
ing  to  “registration.”    Smiley  v.  Holm,  285  U. S.  355,  366
(1932); see also Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U. S. 15, 24–25
(1972)  (recounts);  United  States  v.  Classic,  313  U. S.  299,
320  (1941)  (primaries).  In  practice,  the  Clause  functions
as “a default provision; it invests the States with responsi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a formal tone.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

7

Opinion of GINSBURG, J.

provisions  enacted  at  the  same  time,  in  particular  §1520
and §1512(c)(1), see infra, at 10, 12–13.  Section 1519, he
maintains, targets not all manner of evidence, but records,
documents,  and  tangible  objects  used  to  preserve  them,
e.g.,  computers,  servers,  and  other  media  on  which  infor-
mation is stored.

We agree with Yates and reject the Government’s unre-
strained reading.  “Tangible object” in §1519, we conclude,
is better read to cover only objects one can use to record or
preserve information, not all objects in the physical world.

A
The  ordinary  meaning  of  an  “object”  that  is  “tangible,”
as stated in dictionary definitions, is “a discrete . . . thing,”
Webster’s  Third  New  International  Dictionary  1555
(2002),  that  “possess[es]  physical  form,”  Black’s  Law  Dic-
tionary  1683  (10th  ed.  2014).    From  this  premise,  the
Government concludes that “tangible object,” as that term
appears  in  §1519,  covers  the  waterfront,  including  fish
from the sea.

Whether  a  statutory  term  is  unambiguous,  however,
does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its compo-
nent  words.  Rather,  “[t]he  plainness  or  ambiguity  of
statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to
the language itself, [but as well by] the specific context in
which  that  language  is  used,  and  the  broader  context  of
the  statute  as  a  whole.”  Robinson  v.  Shell  Oil  Co.,  519
U. S. 337, 341 (1997).  See also Deal v. United States, 508
U. S.  129,  132  (1993)  (it  is  a  “fundamental  principle  of
statutory  construction  (and,  indeed,  of  language  itself)
that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isola-
tion,  but  must  be  drawn  from  the  context  in  which  it  is
used”).  Ordinarily,  a  word’s  usage  accords  with  its  dic-
tionary  definition.  In  law  as  in  life,  however,  the  same
words,  placed  in  different  contexts,  sometimes  mean  dif-
ferent things.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 574 U.S. ____ (2015). It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute, §1519, focusing on the meaning of "tangible object."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U55

[09-26-01 13:01:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 667 (2000)

687

Thomas, J., dissenting

of such a result. Thus, although the Court purports to
reject the Government’s argument that “beneﬁts” means
“funds that originate in a federal assistance program,” the
Court, in practice, adopts it.

A

First, the Court describes Medicare’s elaborate funding
structure and notes that Medicare’s reasonable cost recovery
system allows recovery of certain capital costs and the costs
of education and training. Ante, at 673–674. These provi-
sions of Medicare do not establish that hospitals receive
“beneﬁts.” To the contrary, the capital costs recoverable
under those provisions of Medicare are the costs tied to the
treatment of Medicare patients. See supra, at 684–685.
In
this sense, the cost provisions of Medicare expressly defeat
any suggestion that they are meant to provide a “beneﬁt” to
the hospital. These provisions are not designed to provide
ﬁnancial assistance to the hospital; they are designed to en-
sure that Medicare beneﬁciaries receive quality medical care.
And again, the Medicare program picks up only the portion
of the costs attributable to the care of Medicare beneﬁciaries.
42 CFR §§ 413.50, 413.85 (1999).
In fact, the Court does not
grapple with the evidence that Medicare systematically
under-compensates health care providers, evidence that
would further undermine the notion that hospitals are re-
ceiving some form of ﬁnancial assistance from the program.
See Utz, Federalism in Health Care: Costs and Beneﬁts, 28
Conn. L. Rev. 127, 138–139 (1995).

Second, the Court relies on the numerous obligations im-
posed on health care providers participating in Medicare.
Ante, at 672–675. The Court notes that health care provid-
ers must satisfy licensing standards, provide a laundry list
of particular health care services, and ensure an effective
quality-assurance program.
I assume, however, that the
same could be said of most Government contractors. The
defense contractor who agrees to build the military’s equip-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the Court's interpretation of the term "benefits" in the context of Medicare.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

III
  My disagreement with the Court runs far deeper than a
quibble  over  how  many  defendants  these  petitioners  may
sue.  The dispute is over whether States may nullify federal
constitutional rights by employing schemes like the one at
hand.   The  Court  indicates  that  they  can, so  long  as  they
write  their  laws  to  more  thoroughly  disclaim  all  enforce-
ment  by  state  officials,  including  licensing  officials.    This
choice to shrink from Texas’ challenge to federal supremacy
will have far-reaching repercussions.  I doubt the Court, let
alone the country, is prepared for them.
  The  State’s  concessions  at  oral  argument  laid  bare  the
sweeping consequences of its position.  In response to ques-
tioning,  counsel  for  the  State  conceded  that  pre-enforce-
ment review would be unavailable even if a statute imposed
a bounty of $1,000,000 or higher.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 50–53.
Counsel further admitted that no individual constitutional
right was safe from attack under a similar scheme.  Tr. of
Oral Arg. in United States v. Texas, No. 21–588, pp. 59–61,
64–65.  Counsel even asserted that a State could further rig
procedures by abrogating a state supreme court’s power to
bind  its  own  lower  courts.    Id.,  at  78–79.    Counsel  main-
tained that even if a State neutered appellate courts’ power
in such an extreme manner, aggrieved parties’ only path to
a  federal  forum  would  be  to  violate  the  unconstitutional
law, accede to infringement of their substantive and proce-
dural rights all the way through the state supreme court,
and then, at last, ask this Court to grant discretionary cer-
tiorari review.  Ibid.  All of these burdens would layer atop

——————
flout its terms, even if it nominally binds other state officials, and it errs
by implying as much now.  The Court responds by downplaying how ex-
ceptional Texas’ scheme is, but it identifies no true analogs in precedent.
See ante, at 11 (identifying only “somewhat” analogous statutes).  S. B. 8
is no tort or private attorneys general statute: It deputizes anyone to sue
without establishing any pre-existing personal stake (i.e., standing) and
then skews procedural rules to favor these plaintiffs.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson.  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the case and the potential implications of the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

9

Opinion of the Court

is  possible  to  violate  (c)(2)  by  creating  false  evidence—ra-
ther than altering incriminating evidence.  See, e.g., United
States  v.  Reich,  479  F.  3d  179,  185–187  (CA2  2007)  (So-
tomayor, J.) (prosecution under subsection (c)(2) for trans-
mitting a forged court order).  Subsection (c)(2) also ensures
that liability is still imposed for impairing the availability
or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding be-
yond  the  “record[s],  document[s],  or  other  object[s]”  enu-
merated in (c)(1), such as witness testimony or intangible
information.  See, e.g., United States v. Mintmire, 507 F. 3d
1273,  1290  (CA11  2007)  (prosecution  under  subsection
(c)(2)  based  in  part  on  the  defendant’s  attempt  to  orches-
trate a witness’s grand jury testimony).

The dissent supposes that because the word “otherwise”
in  (c)(2)  can  mean  “in  a  different  manner,”  “by  other
means,” or “in other respects,” (c)(1) and (c)(2) are “distinct
and independent prohibitions.”  Post, at 2, 5 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  But the word “otherwise” is not by
itself  “sufficient  to  demonstrate  that  the  examples  do  not
limit the scope of the clause.”  Begay, 553 U. S., at 144 (em-
phasis deleted).  “Otherwise” can link a set of examples to
a general phrase and give it more definite meaning—even
in statutory sentences that rival the complexity of Section
1512(c).  See  Finnegan  v.  Leu,  456  U. S.  431,  437–438
(1982); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, 493 U. S. 67, 91–
92 (1989).

2

It  makes  sense  to  read  subsection  (c)(2)  as  limited  by

(c)(1) in light of the history of the provision.

Prior  to  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act,  Section  1512  imposed
criminal liability on anyone who “knowingly uses intimida-
tion or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades an-
other person” to, among other things, shred documents. 18
U. S. C. §1512(b)(2)(B) (2000 ed.).  But the Enron account-
ing scandal revealed a loophole: Although Enron’s “outside
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the interpretation of a specific section of the law (Section 1512(c)) and its application in a particular case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
46

MICHIGAN  v.  FISHER

Per Curiam

broken house windows, the glass still on the ground outside.
The  ofﬁcers  also  noticed  blood  on  the  hood  of  the  pickup
and  on  clothes  inside  of  it,  as  well  as  on  one  of  the  doors
to  the  house.
(It  is  disputed  whether  they  noticed  this  im
mediately upon reaching the house, but undisputed that they
noticed it before the allegedly unconstitutional entry.)
Through a window, the ofﬁcers could see respondent, Jeremy
Fisher,  inside  the  house,  screaming  and  throwing  things.
The  back  door  was  locked,  and  a  couch  had  been  placed  to
block the front door.

The ofﬁcers knocked, but Fisher refused to answer.  They
saw  that  Fisher  had  a  cut  on  his  hand,  and  they  asked  him
whether he needed medical attention.  Fisher ignored these
questions  and  demanded,  with  accompanying  profanity,  that
the ofﬁcers go to get a search warrant.  Ofﬁcer Goolsby then
pushed  the  front  door  partway  open  and  ventured  into  the
house.  Through the window of the open door he saw Fisher
pointing a long gun at him.  Ofﬁcer Goolsby withdrew.

Fisher was charged under Michigan law with assault with
a  dangerous  weapon  and  possession  of  a  ﬁrearm  during  the
commission of a felony.  The trial court concluded that Ofﬁ
cer  Goolsby  violated  the  Fourth  Amendment  when  he  en
tered  Fisher’s  house,  and  granted  Fisher’s  motion  to  sup
press  the  evidence  obtained  as  a  result—that  is,  Ofﬁcer
Goolsby’s statement that Fisher pointed a riﬂe at him.  The
Michigan Court of Appeals initially remanded for an eviden
tiary hearing, see Docket No. 256027, 2005 WL 3481454 (Dec.
20, 2005) (per curiam), after which the trial court reinstated
its  order.  The  Court  of  Appeals  then  afﬁrmed  over  a  dis
sent  by  Judge  Talbot.  See  2008  WL  786515,  at  *2;  id.,  at
*2–*5.  The  Michigan  Supreme  Court  granted  leave  to  ap
peal,  but,  after  hearing  oral  argument,  it  vacated  its  prior
order  and  denied  leave  instead;  three  justices,  however,
would  have  taken  the  case  and  reversed  on  the  ground  that
the  Court  of  Appeals  misapplied  the  Fourth  Amendment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a court opinion. It describes the events leading up to a police entry into a residence and the subsequent charges against the resident.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

child’s  tribe;  or  (3)  other  Indian  families.”    §1915(a).  For
foster care, a preference is given to (1) “the Indian child’s
extended family”; (2) “a foster home licensed, approved, or
specified by the Indian child’s tribe”; (3) “an Indian foster
home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian li-
censing  authority”;  and  then  (4)  another  institution  “ap-
proved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organi-
zation  which  has  a  program  suitable  to  meet  the  Indian
child’s  needs.”  §1915(b).    For  purposes  of  the  placement
preferences, an “Indian” is “any person who is a member of
an Indian tribe,” and an “Indian organization” is “any group
. . .  owned  or  controlled  by  Indians.”    §§1903(3),  (7).  To-
gether, these definitions mean that Indians from any tribe
(not just the tribe to which the child has a tie) outrank un-
related non-Indians for both adoption and foster care.  And
for  foster  care,  institutions  run  or  approved  by  any  tribe
outrank  placements  with  unrelated  non-Indian  families.
Courts  must  adhere  to  the  placement  preferences  absent
“good cause” to depart from them.  §§1915(a), (b).

The child’s tribe may pass a resolution altering the prior-
itization  order.  §1915(c).  If  it  does,  “the  agency  or  court
effecting  the  placement  shall  follow  such  order  so  long  as
the placement is the least restrictive setting appropriate to
the particular needs of the child.”  Ibid.  So long as the “least
restrictive setting” condition is met, the preferences of the
Indian child or her parent cannot trump those set by stat-
ute or tribal resolution.  But, “[w]here appropriate, the pref-
erence of the Indian child or parent shall be considered” in
making a placement.  Ibid.

The  State  must  record  each  placement,  including  a  de-
scription of the efforts made to comply with ICWA’s order
of preferences.  §1915(e).  Both the Secretary of the Interior
and the child’s tribe have the right to request the record at
any time.  Ibid.  State courts must also transmit all final
adoption decrees and specified information about adoption
proceedings to the Secretary.  §1951(a).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and its placement preferences for Native American children in foster care and adoption.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  601 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Third,  S.  B.  4  hampers  active  federal  immigration  en-
forcement efforts and places federal immigration officers in
danger.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may
“lose the ability to pursue expedited removals, which must
be used to remove noncitizens within 14 days of their arri-
val  into  the  country.”  Id.,  at  *39.  As  the  District  Court
noted, “[b]y changing immigration patterns to more danger-
ous terrain, SB 4 will also risk placing DHS officers in more
danger as they mount emergency responses to individuals
in life-threatening situations.”  Ibid.  That same “[t]errain
along  these  borders”  may  “resul[t]  in  more  immigrant
deaths.”  Ibid.

Fourth, S. B. 4 can harm “federal agencies’ ability to de-
tect security risks . . . as Texas police disrupt DHS’s ability
to centrally and timely monitor illicit drug trades, human
trafficking, and imminent threats.”  Id., at *43.  For exam-
ple, “[e]ven if Texas does share all data related to noncitizen
arrests with DHS, the agency will have a diminished ability
to detect time-sensitive threats,” which may hinder “coun-
terterrorism efforts.”  Id., at *39.

Fifth, S. B. 4 may force El Paso County, one of the appli-
cants, to “have to pay to expand its jail, provide counsel for
indigent  defendants,  and  hire  more  Sheriff  deputies  and
court personnel.  El Paso County may lose the ability to fo-
cus on high risk or violent criminals, harming its jail cost
containment efforts.”  Id., at *40 (citation omitted).

Sixth, S. B. 4 “would immediately impose criminal liabil-
ity  on  thousands  of  noncitizens  who  re-entered  the  state.
The removal of noncitizens cannot be undone, even if a stay
on  [the  District  Court’s]  injunction  is  ultimately  lifted.
Thousands of individuals should not be arrested, incarcer-
ated, or removed prior to resolution of SB 4’s constitution-
ality.”  Id.,  at  *43.  Even  if  a  state  officer  only  “escorts  a
noncitizen to the border” and “departs after the noncitizen
enters the other country,” S. B. 4 still forces a noncitizen to
“either depart into Mexico or . . . face 20 years in prison if
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It presents arguments against a specific law (S.B. 4) and cites legal precedents and reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
182

NRG  POWER  MARKETING,  LLC  v.  MAINE  PUB.
UTIL.  COMM’N
Stevens, J., dissenting

Otherwise, it would hardly serve to protect contract stability
better  than  the  plain  vanilla  just-and-reasonable  standard
and the Court’s decision in Morgan Stanley would have little
effect.  Furthermore,  the  Court  today  reiterates  that  the
doctrine poses a high bar.  See ante, at 173–174.

It  was  sensible  to  require  a  contracting  party  to  show
something  more  than  its  own  desire  to  get  out  of  what
proved to be a bad bargain before FERC could abrogate the
parties’  bargain.  It  is  not  sensible,  nor  authorized  by  the
statute, for the Court to change the de facto standard of re
view whenever a rate is set by private contract, based solely
on  the  Court’s  view  that  contract  stability  should  be  pre
served  unless  there  is  extraordinary  harm  to  the  public
interest.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

which did not negotiate the rate but must nonetheless purchase electricity
at  that  price  in  the  forward capacity  market  unless  it  self-supplies  its  ca
pacity—to  assert  their  private  interest  in  making  a  rate  challenge.  The
Court suggests that FERC could set aside a rate under the public interest
standard  if  the  contract  established  favorable  rates  between  allied  busi
nesses  to  the  detriment  of  other  wholesale  customers,  ante,  at  175,  but
has  not  spelled  out  whether  a  challenger  would  still  have  to  show  that
circumstance  harmed  the  public  interest.  It  remains  unclear  whether  a
noncontracting party that must purchase or sell electricity at a rate it did
not  negotiate  could  argue  that  a  rate  fails  the  “public  interest  standard”
because the rate is detrimental to that entity’s private interest.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

the law long afforded patent holders more protection than
that  against  the  threat  of  governmental  intrusion  and
dispossession.    The law requires us to honor those histori-
cal rights, not diminish them.
  Still,  the  Court  asks  us  to  look  away  in  yet  another
direction.  At the founding, the Court notes, the Executive
could  sometimes  both  dispense  and  revoke  public  fran-
chises.    And  because,  it  says,  invention  patents  are  a
species  of  public  franchises,  the  Court  argues  the  Execu-
tive  should  be  allowed  to  dispense  and  revoke  them  too.
Ante, at 9–10.   But  labels  aside,  by  the  time  of  the  found-
ing the law treated patents protected by the Patent Clause
quite  differently  from  ordinary  public  franchises.    Many
public  franchises  amounted  to  little  more  than  favors
resembling  the  original  royal  patents  the  framers  expressly
refused to protect in the Patent Clause.  The Court points
to  a  good  example:  the  state-granted  exclusive  right  to
operate a toll bridge.  Ante, at 9.  By the founding, courts
in this country (as in England) had come to view anticom-
petitive  monopolies  like  that  with  disfavor,  narrowly
construing  the  rights  they  conferred.    See  Proprietors  of
Charles  River  Bridge  v.  Proprietors  of  Warren  Bridge,  11
Pet. 420, 544 (1837).  By contrast, courts routinely applied
to  invention  patents  protected  by  the  Patent  Clause  the
“liberal  common  sense  construction”  that  applies  to  other
instruments  creating  private  property  rights,  like  land
deeds.  Davis v. Palmer, 7 F. Cas. 154, 158 (No. 3,645) (CC
Va. 1827) (Marshall, C. J.); see also Mossoff, Reevaluating
the  Patent  Privilege  990  (listing  more  differences  in
treatment).  As Justice Story explained, invention patents
protected by the Patent Clause were “not to be treated as
mere monopolies odious in the eyes of the law, and there-
fore  not  to  be  favored.”    Ames  v.  Howard,  1  F.  Cas.  755,
756  (No.  326)  (CC  Mass.  1833).    For  precisely  these  rea-
sons  and  as  we’ve seen,  the  law traditionally  treated  pat-
ents issued under the Patent Clause very differently than
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the historical context and legal precedents surrounding patent rights and the Executive's power.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

In  an  October  28  letter,  the  District  notified  Kennedy
that it was placing him on paid administrative leave for vi-
olating its directives at the October 16, October 23, and Oc-
tober 26 games by kneeling on the field and praying imme-
diately following the games before rejoining the players for
postgame talks.  The District recounted that it had offered
accommodations to, and offered to engage in further discus-
sions  with,  Kennedy  to  permit  his  religious  exercise,  and
that Kennedy had failed to respond to these offers.  The Dis-
trict  stressed  that  it  remained  willing  to  discuss  possible
accommodations if Kennedy was willing.

After  the  issues  with  Kennedy  arose,  several  parents
reached out to the District saying  that their children had
participated in Kennedy’s prayers solely to avoid separat-
ing themselves from the rest of the team.  No BHS students
appeared to pray on the field after Kennedy’s suspension.

In Kennedy’s annual review, the head coach of the varsity
team  recommended  Kennedy  not  be  rehired  because  he
“failed to follow district policy,” “demonstrated a lack of co-
operation with administration,” “contributed to negative re-
lations  between  parents,  students,  community  members,
coaches,  and  the  school  district,”  and  “failed  to  supervise
student-athletes  after  games  due  to  his  interactions  with
media  and  community”  members.  Id.,  at  114.    The  head
coach himself also resigned after 11 years in that position,
expressing fears that he or his staff would be shot from the
crowd or otherwise attacked because of the turmoil created
by Kennedy’s media appearances.  Three of five other assis-
tant coaches did not reapply.

C
Kennedy then filed suit.  He contended, as relevant, that
the District violated his rights under the Free Speech and
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.  Kennedy
moved  for  a  preliminary  injunction,  which  the  District
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It details the events leading up to a lawsuit filed by a coach who was placed on leave for praying on the field after games.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxv

Page

827

Harris v. Standard Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Harris v. Sweatt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952

Harris v. Terry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . .  849,910,915,929,1017,1018,1034,1062

978

Harris; Virginia v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
802

Harris v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
810

Harris Associates L. P.; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Harris County; Goodman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

Harris County; James v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Harrison; Duquesne v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harrison; Trotter v.
987

Harrison-Belk; Barnes v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
885

Harrod v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
846

Harry; McCree v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

Harry; Ware v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

Hart v. Safeway, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.; Doroshow v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hartley; Backus v.
834

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hartley; Toliver v.
852

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hartley; Zapata v.
1142

Hartman v. Strickland
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Hartman v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Hartmann v. Delaware  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

Hartstein v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

. . . . . .
Harvest Institute Freedman Federation v. United States
Harvey v. Lynch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
891

Harvey v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  852,921

850

Harwell v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

Hastings Christian Fellowship v. Martinez  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926

Hatchet v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

Hathaway; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916

Hathaway; Houston v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
890

Hatton v. Minnesota  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Hauck; Wilson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Hauman v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930

Havens v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
829

Hawaii; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.; Konop v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Hawk v. Redding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hawkins v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  842,1038

1013

Hawkins v. Coyle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hawkins v. Hamlet, Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  835,1064

836

Hawkins v. Pennsylvania
952

Hawkins v. Washington

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

23

Opinion of the Court

cial  authorization,  for  in  every  case  the  law  must  be  con
cerned that evidence is being destroyed.  But that inquiry
ought  not  to  be  pursued  here  where  the  question  is  not
properly  before  this  Court.    Having  rejected  the  sole  ar
gument presented to us challenging the Missouri Supreme
Court’s decision, we affirm its judgment.

*

*
We hold that in drunk-driving investigations, the natu
ral dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not con-
stitute  an  exigency  in  every  case  sufficient  to  justify
conducting a blood test without a warrant.

*

The  judgment  of  the  Missouri  Supreme  Court  is

affirmed.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the concluding section. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a formal tone characteristic of court decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ZF AUTOMOTIVE US, INC. v. LUXSHARE, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

would qualify as intergovernmental.  Ergo, the Fund says,
the ad hoc panel must be intergovernmental too.

This does not follow.  It is not dispositive whether an ad-
judicative  body  shares  some  features  of  other  bodies  that
look governmental.  Instead, the inquiry is whether those
features and other evidence establish the intent of the rele-
vant  nations  to  imbue  the  body  in  question  with  govern-
mental authority.  And though we need not decide the sta-
tus  of  the  I’m  Alone  and  Mixed  Claims  commissions,  it  is
worth noting some differences between the treaties provid-
ing  for  them  and  the  treaty  at  issue  here.    For  instance,
those  treaties  specified  that  each  sovereign  would  be  in-
volved in the formation of the bodies, and, with respect to
the treaty creating the Mixed Claims Commission in par-
ticular,  it  also  specified  where  the  commission  would  ini-
tially  meet,  the  method  of  funding,  and  that  the  commis-
sioners  could  appoint  other  officers  to  assist  in  the
proceedings.  See  Convention  Between  the  United  States
and Great Britain for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicat-
ing  Liquors,  Art. IV,  Jan.  23,  1924,  43  Stat.  1761–1762,
T. S.  No.  685;  Agreement  Between  the  United  States  and
Germany  for  a  Mixed  Commission  to  Determine  the
Amount  To  Be  Paid  by  Germany  in  Satisfaction  of  Ger-
many’s Financial Obligations Under the Treaty Concluded
Between the Two Governments on August 25, 1921, Arts.
II, III, IV, V, Aug. 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 2200, T. S. No. 665.  So
while there are some similarities between the ad hoc arbi-
tration panel and the I’m Alone and Mixed Claims commis-
sions,  there  are  distinctions  too.  Thus,  even  taking  the
Fund’s  argument  on  its  own  terms,  its  analogies  are  less
helpful than it hopes.

*
In sum, only a governmental or intergovernmental adju-
dicative body constitutes a “foreign or international tribu-

*

*
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the nature of an ad hoc arbitration panel. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–138
_________________

BILLY RAYMOND COUNTERMAN, PETITIONER v.
COLORADO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
COLORADO

[June 27, 2023]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins
as to Parts I, II, III–A, and III–B, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment.

When  the  government  seeks  to  punish  speech  based  on
its content, the First  Amendment typically imposes strin-
gent  requirements.  This  ensures  that  the  government,
even when pursuing compelling objectives, does not unduly
burden our Nation’s commitment to free expression.  “From
1791  to  the  present,  however,  the  First  Amendment  has
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few
limited areas.”  United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468
(2010)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    These  catego-
ries must be “well-defined and narrowly limited” in light of
the serious consequences that flow from carving out speech
from ordinary First Amendment protections.  Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571 (1942).

“True threats” are one such category, and there is a tra-
dition  of  criminalizing  threats  stretching  back  centuries.
This  includes  punishing  single  utterances  based  on  the
message  conveyed.  One  paradigmatic  example  of  this
would be writing and mailing a letter threatening to assas-
sinate  the  President.  Such  laws  are  plainly  important.
There is no longstanding tradition, however, of punishing
speech  merely  because  it  is  unintentionally  threatening.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It sets the stage for her argument by discussing the First Amendment and the limited categories of speech that can be restricted, focusing on "true threats."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxxviii

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Snelling v. Housing Authority of St. Louis County . . . . . . . . . . . .
Snyder, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sobin v. Fairfax County Dept. of Human Development
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Social Security Administration; Eggena v.
Solomon v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sonnier; Crawford & Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sorto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Southard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
South Carolina; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Southeastern Maritime Co. v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Southern Cal. Off-Track Wagering v. Cabazon Mission Indians . .
Southern New England Telephone Co. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Speckard; Ayala v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Speckard; Bryant v.
Sprague v. General Motors Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Springer v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sprint Corp.; Cahnmann v.
Sprint Corp.; Couch v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spruill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sprunk; Sanchez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stacy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
Stanford Univ. School of Medicine/Medical Center; Bayer v.
State. See also name of State.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
State Automobile Ins. Co.; Stinson v.
State Retirement and Pension System of Md.; Cale v.
. . . . . . . . .
Steele v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stein, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Steuer; Viray v.
Stewart; Allen v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart; DeWig v.
Stewart; Dixon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart v. Falcone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart; Gretzler v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart v. Monroe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stewart v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stine; Percival v.
Stinson v. State Automobile Ins. Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stinson; Vasquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Strachan v. Tillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Strickler v. Greene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sudwisher v. Hoffpauir’s Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sullivan; American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
960
950
906
908
930
950
921
913
943
981
951
926
949
958
907
923
920
952
952
940
929
927
968

965
908
944
969
969
941
978
969
971
947
912
931
979
941
965
959
908
978
940
981
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely found at the beginning of a legal document.  It lists cases by name and provides a page number for their location within the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Syllabus

bound by state constitutional restraints when exercising authority un-
der the Elections Clause.  Two state constitutional provisions adopted
shortly  after  the  founding  expressly  constrained  state  legislative  ac-
tion under the Elections Clause.  See Del. Const., Art. VIII, §2 (1792);
Md. Const., Art. XIV (1810).  In addition, multiple state constitutions
at the time of the founding regulated the “manner” of federal elections
by requiring that “elections shall be by ballot.”  See, e.g., Ga. Const.,
Art. IV, §2.  Moreover, the Articles of Confederation—from which the
Framers  borrowed—provided  that  “delegates  shall  be  annually  ap-
pointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct.”
Art. V.    Around  the  time  the  Articles  were  adopted,  multiple  States
regulated the appointment of delegates, suggesting that the Framers
did not understand that language to insulate state legislative action
from  state  constitutional  provisions.    See,  e.g.,  Del.  Const.,  Art.  XI
(1776).  Pp. 24–26.
  3. Although the Elections Clause does not exempt state legislatures
from  the  ordinary  constraints  imposed  by  state  law,  federal  courts
must not abandon their duty to exercise judicial review.  This Court
has an obligation to ensure that state court interpretations of state law
do not evade federal law.  For example, States “may not sidestep the
Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests.”  Phillips
v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U. S. 156, 167.  While the Court
does not adopt a test by which state court interpretations of state law
can  be  measured  in  cases  implicating  the  Elections  Clause,  state
courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such
that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures
to regulate federal elections.
  The  Court  need  not  decide  whether  the  North  Carolina  Supreme
Court strayed beyond the limits derived from the Elections Clause, as
petitioners did not meaningfully present the issue in this Court.  Pp.
26–29.

380 N. C. 317, 868 S. E. 2d 499, affirmed.

  ROBERTS,  C. J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  SO-
TOMAYOR,  KAGAN,  KAVANAUGH,  BARRETT,  and  JACKSON,  JJ.,  joined.
KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion.  THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting
opinion in which GORSUCH, J., joined, and in which ALITO, J., joined as to
Part I.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Per Curiam

measure  “necessary.”  42  U. S. C.  §264(a);  42  CFR  §70.2.
Could the CDC, for example, mandate free grocery delivery
to the homes of the sick or vulnerable?  Require manufac-
turers to provide free computers to enable people to work
from home?  Order telecommunications companies to pro-
vide  free  high-speed  Internet  service  to  facilitate  remote
work?

This  claim  of  expansive  authority  under  §361(a)  is  un-
precedented.  Since that provision’s enactment in 1944, no
regulation premised on it has even begun to approach the
size or scope of the eviction moratorium.  And it is further
amplified by the CDC’s decision to impose criminal penal-
ties of up to a $250,000 fine and one year in jail on those
who  violate  the  moratorium.    See  86  Fed.  Reg.  43252;  42
CFR §70.18(a).  Section 361(a) is a wafer-thin reed on which
to rest such sweeping power.

B
The equities do not justify depriving the applicants of the
District Court’s judgment in their favor.  The moratorium
has  put  the  applicants,  along  with  millions  of  landlords
across the country, at risk of irreparable harm by depriving
them of rent payments with no guarantee of eventual recov-
ery.  Despite  the  CDC’s  determination  that  landlords
should  bear  a  significant  financial  cost  of  the  pandemic,
many landlords have modest means.  And preventing them
from evicting tenants who breach their leases intrudes on
one of the most fundamental elements of property owner-
ship—the  right  to  exclude.  See  Loretto  v.  Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 435 (1982).

As  harm  to  the  applicants  has  increased,  the  Govern-
ment’s interests have decreased.  Since the District Court
entered its stay, the Government has had three additional
months  to  distribute  rental-assistance  funds  to  help  ease
the transition away from the moratorium.  Whatever inter-
est the Government had in maintaining the moratorium’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal citations, arguments about the interpretation of laws, and discussions of legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

TRUMP v. NEW YORK

BREYER, J., dissenting

Census Bureau Data 18 (2009) (estimating that as of 2009
at  least  24  federal  programs  automatically  distributed  at
least $10 billion in annual funding to States keyed directly
to the decennial census’s State population figures).  Given
the connection between the decennial census and funding
allocation, a change of a few thousand people in a State’s
enumeration can affect its share of federal resources.

I  do  not  agree  with  the  Court  that  the  lingering  uncer-
tainty over the Government’s plans renders this litigation
unripe, nor that the apportionment process is at a “prelim-
inary  stage.”    Ante,  at  5.    For  one  thing,  the  Government
has spent over a year collecting the administrative records
that  will  be  used  to  fulfill  the  Presidential  memorandum.
See Exec. Order No. 13880, 84 Fed. Reg. 33823 (2019) (call-
ing for federal departments to share administrative records
so the Department of Commerce can “generate a more reli-
able count of the unauthorized alien population in the coun-
try . . . [and] an estimate of the aggregate number of aliens
unlawfully present in each State”).  For another, the Gov-
ernment has told us in related litigation that further delays
in  proceeding  with  apportionment  beyond  the  statutory
deadline would harm “the ability to meet contingent redis-
tricting  deadlines”  in  the  States,  because  “ ‘delays  would
mean deadlines that are established in state constitutions
or statutes will be impossible to meet.’ ”  See Reply Brief in
Support of Application for Stay Pending Appeal in Ross v.
National Urban League, O.T. 2020, No. 20A62, p. 11.  Act-
ing  on  that  concern,  we  granted  the  Government’s  stay
pending  appeal  so  as  to  hasten  the  Government’s  efforts
ahead  of  these  deadlines.  See  Ross  v.  National  Urban
League,  592  U. S.  ___  (2020).    Presumably,  waiting  to  re-
solve this issue until after the President submits his tabu-
lation will cause further hardship by delaying redistricting
further.  States will begin to consider the consequences of
reapportionment  soon.  See,  e.g.,  Del.  Code  Ann.,  Tit.  29,
§805 (2020) (“After the official reporting of the 2020 federal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses census data and its impact on federal funding allocation. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

or  “of  the  merits  of  the  legislation”  at  issue.  Davidson  v.
New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 (1878).

By  contrast,  and  as  today’s  concurrence  recognizes,  the
legal standard the plurality applies when it comes to admit-
ting  privileges  for  abortion  clinics  turns  out  to  be  exactly
the  sort  of all-things-considered  balancing  of benefits  and
burdens this Court has long rejected.  Really, it’s little more
than the judicial version of a hunter’s stew:  Throw in any-
thing  that  looks  interesting,  stir,  and  season  to  taste.    In
another context, this Court has described the sort of deci-
sionmaking on display today as “inherently, and therefore
permanently, unpredictable.”  Crawford v. Washington, 541
U. S.  36,  68,  n. 10  (2004).    Under  its  terms,  “[w]hether  a
[burden] is deemed [undue] depends heavily on which fac-
tors the judge considers and how much weight he accords
each of them.”  Id., at 63.

What  was  true  there  turns  out  to  be  no  less  true  here.
The plurality sides with the district court in concluding that
the time and cost some women might have to endure to ob-
tain an abortion outweighs the benefits of Act 620.  Perhaps
the plurality sees that answer as obvious, given its appar-
ent conclusion that the Act would offer the public no bene-
fits of any kind.  But for its test to provide any helpful guid-
ance,  it  must  be  capable  of  resolving  cases  the  plurality
can’t so easily dismiss.  Suppose, for example, a factfinder
credited the State’s evidence of medical benefit, finding that
a small number of women would obtain safer medical care
if the law went into effect.  But suppose the same factfinder
also credited a plaintiff ’s evidence of burden, finding that a
large number of women would have to endure longer wait
times and farther drives, and that a very small number of
women would be unable to obtain an abortion at all.  How
is  a  judge  supposed  to balance,  say,  a  few  women’s  emer-
gency hysterectomies against many women spending extra
hours  travelling  to  a  clinic?    The  plurality’s  test  offers  no
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

11

Opinion of the Court

the  Indian  tribes,  and  such  power  is  superior  and  para-
mount to the authority of any State within whose limits are
Indian tribes”).

To be clear, however, “plenary” does not mean “free-float-
ing.”  A power unmoored from the Constitution would lack
both justification and limits.  So like the rest of its legisla-
tive powers, Congress’s authority to regulate Indians must
derive  from  the  Constitution,  not  the  atmosphere.    Our
precedent traces that power to multiple sources.

The Indian Commerce Clause authorizes Congress “[t]o
regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”  Art. I, §8,
cl. 3.  We have interpreted the Indian Commerce Clause to
reach not only trade, but certain “Indian affairs” too.  Cot-
ton  Petroleum  Corp.  v.  New  Mexico,  490  U. S.  163,  192
(1989).  Notably, we have declined to treat the Indian Com-
merce Clause as interchangeable with the Interstate Com-
merce Clause.  Ibid.  While under the Interstate Commerce
Clause, States retain “some authority” over trade, we have
explained  that  “virtually  all  authority  over  Indian  com-
merce and Indian tribes” lies with the Federal Government.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 62 (1996).

The  Treaty  Clause—which  provides  that  the  President
“shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties”—provides a second source of
power over Indian affairs.  Art. II, §2, cl. 2.  Until the late
19th  century,  relations  between  the  Federal  Government
and  the  Indian  tribes  were  governed  largely  by  treaties.
Lara, 541 U. S., at 201.  Of course, the treaty power “does
not literally authorize Congress to act legislatively,” since
it is housed in Article II rather than Article I.  Ibid.  Never-
theless, we have asserted that “treaties made pursuant to
that  power  can  authorize  Congress  to  deal  with  ‘matters’
with which otherwise ‘Congress could not deal.’ ”  Ibid.  And
even though the United States formally ended the practice
of entering into new treaties with the Indian tribes in 1871,
this decision did not limit Congress’s power “to legislate on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the constitutional basis for Congress's authority to regulate Indian tribes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

Duke, advising her to rescind DACA.  Sessions stated that,
in  his  legal  opinion,  DACA  took  effect  “through  executive
action, without proper statutory authority and with no es-
tablished  end-date,  after  Congress’  repeated  rejection  of
proposed legislation that would have accomplished a simi-
lar result.  Such an open-ended circumvention of immigra-
tion laws was an unconstitutional exercise of authority by
the Executive Branch.”  Id., at 877.  The letter also stated
that  DACA  was  infected  with  the  “same  legal  . . .  defects
that the courts recognized as to DAPA,” id., at 878, and thus
DACA would likely be enjoined as well.

Then-Acting  Secretary  Duke  rescinded  DACA  the  next
day, also through a memorandum.  Her memorandum be-
gan by noting that DACA “purported to use deferred action
. . . to confer certain benefits to illegal aliens that Congress
had not otherwise acted to provide by law.”  App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 18–587, at 112a.  It described the history of the
Fifth Circuit litigation, noting that the court had concluded
that  DAPA  “conflicted  with  the  discretion  authorized  by
Congress” because  “the  [INA]  flatly  does  not  permit  the
reclassification of millions of illegal aliens as lawfully pre-
sent.”  Id., at 114a (internal quotation marks omitted).  Fi-
nally,  the  memorandum  accepted  then-Attorney  General
Sessions’ legal determination that DACA was unlawful for
the same reasons as DAPA.  See §1103(a)(1).  In light of the
legal conclusions reached by the Fifth Circuit and the At-
torney  General,  then-Acting  Secretary  Duke  set  forth  the
procedures for winding down DACA.

These  three  cases  soon  followed.  In  each,  respondents
claimed,  among  other  things,  that  DACA’s  rescission  was
arbitrary  and  capricious  under  the  APA.  Two  District
Courts granted a preliminary nationwide injunction, while
the third vacated the rescission.

II
  “ ‘[A]n agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the rescission of DACA and related legal challenges. It contains legal arguments, case citations, and references to specific government actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

Opinion of the Court

bears the burden to “justify its regulation.”  Id., at 24.

Nevertheless, some courts have misunderstood the meth-
odology  of  our  recent  Second  Amendment  cases.  These
precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in am-
ber.  As  we explained in Heller, for example,  the reach of
the  Second  Amendment  is  not  limited  only  to  those  arms
that were in existence at the founding.  554 U. S., at 582.
Rather, it “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that con-
stitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in ex-
istence.”  Ibid.  By that same logic, the Second Amendment
permits more than just those regulations identical to ones
that could be found in 1791.  Holding otherwise would be as
mistaken  as  applying  the  protections  of  the  right  only  to
muskets and sabers.

As  we  explained  in  Bruen,  the  appropriate  analysis  in-
volves  considering  whether  the  challenged  regulation  is
consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory
tradition.  597  U. S.,  at  26–31.    A  court  must  ascertain
whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to laws that our
tradition is understood to permit, “apply[ing] faithfully the
balance  struck  by  the  founding  generation  to  modern  cir-
cumstances.”  Id., at 29, and n. 7.  Discerning and develop-
ing the law in this way is “a commonplace task for any law-
yer or judge.”  Id., at 28.

Why and how the regulation burdens the right are cen-
tral to this inquiry.  Id., at 29.  For example, if laws at the
founding regulated firearm use to address particular prob-
lems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws
imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within
a permissible category of regulations.  Even when a law reg-
ulates  arms-bearing  for  a  permissible  reason,  though,  it
may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an ex-
tent beyond what was done at the founding.  And when a
challenged regulation does not precisely match its histori-
cal  precursors,  “it  still  may  be  analogous  enough  to  pass
constitutional muster.”  Id., at 30.  The law must comport
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Second Amendment. It delves into legal precedents and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
40  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

T.  Sowell,  Affirmative  Action  Around  the  World  145–146
(2004).  In doing so, those policies sort at least some blacks
and Hispanics into environments where they are less likely
to succeed academically relative to their peers.  Ibid.  The
resulting mismatch places “many blacks and Hispanics who
likely would have excelled at less elite schools . . . in a posi-
tion where underperformance is all but inevitable because
they  are  less  academically  prepared  than  the  white  and
Asian students with whom they must compete.”  Fisher I,
570 U. S., at 332 (THOMAS, J., concurring).

It  is  self-evident  why  that  is  so.    As  anyone  who  has
labored over an algebra textbook  has undoubtedly discov-
ered,  academic  advancement  results  from  hard  work  and
practice, not mere declaration.  Simply treating students as
though their grades put them at the top of their high school
classes  does  nothing  to  enhance  the  performance  level  of
those  students  or  otherwise  prepare  them  for  competitive
college  environments.    In  fact,  studies  suggest  that  large
racial  preferences  for  black  and  Hispanic  applicants  have
led to a disproportionately large share of those students re-
ceiving mediocre or poor grades once they arrive in compet-
itive collegiate environments.  See, e.g., R. Sander, A Sys-
temic  Analysis  of  Affirmative  Action  in  American  Law
Schools, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 367, 371–372 (2004); see also R.
Sander  &  R.  Steinbuch,  Mismatch  and  Bar  Passage:  A
School-Specific  Analysis  (Oct.  6,  2017),  https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3054208.  Take science, technology, engineering,
and  mathematics  (STEM)  fields,  for  example.    Those  stu-
dents who receive a large admissions preference are more
likely  to  drop  out  of  STEM  fields  than  similarly  situated
students who did not receive such a preference.  F. Smith &
J.  McArdle,  Ethnic  and  Gender  Differences  in  Science
Graduation at Selective Colleges With Implications for Ad-
mission Policy and College Choice, 45 Research in Higher
Ed. 353 (2004).  “Even if most minority students are able to
meet the normal standards at the ‘average’ range of colleges
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the topic of affirmative action and its potential negative impacts on academic performance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>