<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
12

AMERICAN LEGION  v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting

can soldiers killed in the war sought to locate the bodies of
their loved ones, and then to decide what to do with their
remains.    Once  a  soldier’s  body  was identified, families
could choose to have the remains repatriated to the United
States or buried overseas in one of several American mili-
tary  cemeteries,  yet  to  be  established.    Eventually,  the
remains of 46,000 soldiers were repatriated, and those of
30,000  soldiers  were  laid  to  rest  in  Europe.    American
Battle  Monuments  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  the
President  of  the  United  States  Fiscal  Year  1925,  p.  5
(1926) (ABMC Report).
  While overseas cemeteries were under development, the
graves of American soldiers in Europe were identified by
one  of  two  temporary  wooden  markers  painted  white.
Christian  soldiers  were  buried  beneath  the  cross;  the
graves  of  Jewish  soldiers  were  marked  by  the  Star  of
David.  See L. Budreau, Bodies of War: World War I and
the Politics of Commemoration in America, 1919–1933, p.
120  (2010).    The  remains  of  soldiers  who  were  neither
Christian nor Jewish could be repatriated to the United
States for burial under an appropriate headstone.11
  When the War Department began preparing designs for
permanent headstones in 1919, “no topic managed to stir
more  controversy  than  the  use  of  religious  symbolism.”
Id.,  at  121–122.  Everyone involved in the dispute, how-
ever, saw the Latin cross as a Christian symbol, not as a
universal or secular one.  To achieve uniformity, the War
Department initially recommended replacing the tempo-

——————

11 For  unidentified  soldiers  buried  overseas,  the  American  Battle
Monuments Commission (ABMC) used the cross and the Star of David
markers  “in ‘proportion of known Jewish dead to know[n] Christians.’ ”
App. 164.  The ABMC later decided that “all unidentified graves would
be marked with a [c]ross.”  Id., at 164, n. 21.  This change was prompted
by  “fear  [that]  a  Star  of  David  would  be  placed  over  an  [u]nknown
Christian,”  not  by  the  belief  that  the  cross  had  become  a  universal
symbol.  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It discusses the history of marking graves of American soldiers in Europe after World War I, focusing on the use of religious symbols.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

YATES v. UNITED STATES

KAGAN, J., dissenting

more  conventional  result:  A  “tangible  object”  is  an  object
that’s  tangible.    I  would  apply  the  statute  that  Congress
enacted and affirm the judgment below.

I
While  the  plurality  starts  its  analysis  with  §1519’s
heading, see ante, at 10 (“We note first §1519’s caption”), I
would  begin  with  §1519’s  text.  When  Congress  has  not
supplied  a  definition,  we  generally  give  a  statutory  term
its  ordinary  meaning.  See,  e.g.,  Schindler  Elevator  Corp.
v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip
op.,  at  5).  As  the  plurality  must  acknowledge,  the  ordi-
nary meaning of “tangible object” is “a discrete thing that
possesses  physical  form.”    Ante,  at  7  (punctuation  and
citation omitted).  A fish is, of course, a discrete thing that
possesses  physical  form.    See  generally  Dr.  Seuss,  One
Fish Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish (1960).  So the ordinary
meaning  of  the  term  “tangible  object”  in  §1519,  as  no
one  here  disputes,  covers  fish  (including  too-small  red
grouper).

That  interpretation  accords  with  endless  uses  of  the
term  in  statute  and  rule  books  as  construed  by  courts.
Dozens  of  federal  laws  and  rules  of  procedure  (and  hun-
dreds  of  state  enactments)  include  the  term  “tangible
object” or its first cousin “tangible thing”—some in associ-
ation  with  documents,  others  not.    See,  e.g.,  7  U.  S.  C.
§8302(2) (referring to “any material or tangible object that
could  harbor  a  pest  or  disease”);  15  U. S. C.  §57b–1(c)
investigative  demands  for  “documentary
(authorizing
material  or  tangible  things”);  18  U. S. C.  §668(a)(1)(D)
(defining  “museum”  as  entity  that  owns  “tangible  objects
that  are  exhibited  to  the  public”);  28  U. S. C.  §2507(b)
(allowing  discovery  of  “relevant  facts,  books,  papers,  doc-
uments  or  tangible  things”).1    To  my  knowledge,  no  court

——————

1 From  Alabama  and  Alaska  through  Wisconsin  and  Wyoming  (and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Yates v. United States. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Opinion of ALITO, J.

  According to Sosa, when the First Congress enacted the
ATS  in  1789,  it  assumed  that  the  statute  would  “have
practical  effect  the  moment  it  became  law”  because  the
general  common  law  “would  provide  a  cause  of  action  for
[a] modest number of international law violations.”  Id., at
724.  That assumption,  however,  depended  on  the  contin-
ued existence of the general common law.  And in 1938—a
century  and  a  half  after  Congress  enacted  the  ATS—this
Court  rejected  the  “fallacy”  underlying  the  general  com-
mon  law,  declaring  definitively  that  “[t]here  is  no  federal
general common law.”  Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64, 78, 79 (1938).  That left the ATS in an awkward spot:
Congress  had  not  created  any  causes  of  action  for  the
statute  on  the  assumption  that  litigants  would  use  those
provided by the general common law, but now the general
common law was no more.

In Sosa, this Court did its best to resolve that problem.
“[I]t  would  be  unreasonable  to  assume,”  the  Court  ex-
plained,  “that  the  First  Congress  would  have  expected
federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable
international norms simply because the [general] common
law  might  lose  some  metaphysical  cachet  on  the  road  to
modern realism.”  542 U. S., at 730.  Although the general
common law was gone, the Court concluded, federal courts
could still exercise their authority to create so-called “fed-
eral common law” for those “ ‘few and restricted’ ” areas “in
which Congress has given the courts the power to develop
substantive law.”  Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Mate-
rials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 640 (1981).  Sosa interpreted the
ATS as conferring such authorization.
  As  a  result,  Sosa  held  that  federal  courts,  subject  to
certain conditions, may “recognize private causes of action
[under the ATS] for certain torts in violation of the law of
nations.”  542  U. S.,  at  724.    But  before  doing  so,  Sosa
stressed,  courts  should  follow  a  two-step  process.    First,
they  should  ensure  that  the  contemplated  cause  of  action
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and its interpretation in the case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it's part of the actual legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
Opinion of the Court

a  foreign  organization’s  ideological  commitments—for  ex-
ample, pro-democracy, pro-women’s rights, anti-terrorism,
pro-religious freedom, anti-sex trafficking, or the like.  Do-
ing so helps ensure that U. S. foreign aid serves U. S. inter-
ests.  By contrast, plaintiffs’ approach would throw a con-
In
stitutional  wrench  into  American  foreign  policy.
particular,  plaintiffs’ approach would put Congress in the
untenable position of either cutting off certain funding pro-
grams altogether, or instead funding foreign organizations
that may not align with U. S. values.  We see no constitu-
tional justification for the Federal Judiciary to interfere in
that fashion with American foreign policy and American aid
to foreign organizations.

In short, plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates are foreign organiza-
tions, and foreign organizations operating abroad have no
First Amendment rights.

To overcome that conclusion, plaintiffs advance two main

arguments.  But neither persuades us.

First,  plaintiffs  theorize  that  the  foreign  affiliates’  re-
quired statement of policy against prostitution and sex traf-
ficking  may  be  incorrectly  attributed  to  the  American  or-
ganizations.  Therefore,  the  theory  goes,  the  American
organizations themselves possess a First Amendment right
against imposition of the Policy Requirement on their for-
eign affiliates.

As support, plaintiffs point to First Amendment cases in-
volving  speech  misattribution  between  formally  distinct
speakers.  See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 574–575
(1995);  Pacific  Gas  &  Elec.  Co.  v.  Public  Util.  Comm’n  of
Cal.,  475  U. S.  1,  15  (1986)  (plurality  opinion);  cf.  Prune-
Yard  Shopping  Center  v.  Robins,  447  U. S.  74,  87  (1980).
But  the  constitutional  issue  in  those  cases  arose  because
the  State  forced  one  speaker  to  host  another  speaker’s
speech.  See Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572–573; Pacific Gas, 475
U. S., at 15; cf. PruneYard, 447 U. S., at 85, 87.  Here, by
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the First Amendment rights of foreign organizations. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lx

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

Goodno; Serna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Goodson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  913,1098

Google Inc.; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  843,1101

812

Gordon, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
975

Gordon v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gordon v. Supreme Court of Tex.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  890,1159

916

Gordon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gorman v. National Transportation Safety Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  892,1066

1026

Gosselin v. Colorado  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074

Gossett v. Administration of George W. Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1008

Gottlieb v. Securities and Exchange Comm’n  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1061

Government of Virgin Islands; Donovan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909

Governor of Ariz.; Abdullah v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Governor of Ariz.; Yoder v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1000,1140

1143

Governor of Cal. v. Plata
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

Governor of Colo.; Doyle v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Governor of Fla.; Frinfrock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Governor of Ill.; Bowens v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1085,1087

Governor of Ohio; Biros v.
1030

Governor of Ohio; Broom v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1142

Governor of Ohio; Hartman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Governor of P. R.; Correa-Ruiz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Governor of Tenn.; Jelovsek v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1067

Governor of Tenn.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Gowan v. Ward County Comm’n  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Graber v. Fuqua  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

950

Graham v. Addison  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Graham; Dunlap v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037

811

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Graham v. Florida
Graham v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  998,1102

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  891,901,929

Graham v. United States
838

Graham v. Washington  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991

Graham Co.; USI MidAtlantic, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1010

Graham Cty. Soil  & Water Conserv. Dist. v.  U. S.  ex  rel.  Wilson
820

Grain v. Trinity Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

Grams; Owens v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

Grams; Warﬁeld v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
849

Granado-Mena v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Grand Trunk Western R. Inc.; Nickels v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910

Granger v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1010

Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Grant v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1064

Grant; Dixon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Grant v. Oklahoma  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
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</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

JACKSON, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–857
_________________

MARCUS DEANGELO JONES, PETITIONER v.
DEWAYNE HENDRIX, WARDEN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 22, 2023]

JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.
Today,  the  Court  holds  that  an  incarcerated  individual
who has already filed one postconviction petition cannot file
another one to assert a previously unavailable claim of stat-
utory  innocence.1    The  majority  says  that  result  follows
from a “straightforward” reading of 28 U. S. C. §2255.  Ante,
at 10, 12.  But the majority reaches this preclusion decision
by “negative inference.”  Ante, at 10.  And it is far from ob-
vious that §2255(h)’s bar on filing second or successive post-
conviction  petitions  (with  certain  notable  exceptions)  pre-
vents a prisoner who has previously sought postconviction
relief from bringing a newly available legal innocence claim
in court.  See Part II, infra.

In  any  event,  putting  aside  its  questionable  interpreta-
tion  of  §2255(h),  the  majority  is  also  wrong  to  interpret
§2255(e)—known as the saving clause—as if Congress de-
signed  that  provision  to  filter  potential  habeas  claims
through the narrowest of apertures, saving essentially only
those that a court literally would be unable to consider due
to something akin to a natural calamity.  See Part I, infra.
This stingy characterization does not reflect a primary aim

——————

1 I  use  the  terms  “statutory  innocence”  and  “legal  innocence”  in  this
opinion interchangeably.  Both refer to a situation where an individual
was convicted under a statute that, properly interpreted, did not reach
his conduct.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It cites legal precedent and discusses the interpretation of specific statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1101

558 U. S.

December 14, 2009

No. 09–7527.  Wright v.  United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.
Appx.  709.

No.  09–7603.  Betts  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consider
ation  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–7621.  Hoffenberg  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  333
Fed.  Appx.  625.

Rehearing  Denied

No.  08–10439.  Ijadimini  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division,  ante,  p.  840;

No.  08–10552.  Jones  v.  Google  Inc.  et  al.,  ante,  p.  843;
No.  08–10588.  Kor  v.  Felker,  Warden,  ante,  p.  845;
No.  08–10629.  Brown  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion,  ante,  p.  846;

No.  08–10739.  Bradley  v.  Mississippi,  ante,  p.  851;
No.  08–10752.  Salazar  Lopez,  aka  Salazar  v.  United

States,  ante,  p.  852;

No.  08–10759.  In  re  Manship,  ante,  p.  813;
No.  08–10780.  Dittrich  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida

Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  853;
No.  08–10839.  Randle  v.  Woods,  ante,  p.  857;
No.  08–10922.  Lynch  v.  Hertzig  et  al.,  ante,  p.  861;
No.  08–11033.  Johnson  v.  Florida,  ante,  p.  867;
No.  08–11070.  In  re  Augustin,  ante,  p.  814;
No.  08–11112.  Mitchell  v.  KDJM–FM  et  al.,  ante,  p.  871;
No.  08–11141.  Thomas  v.  St.  Louis  Board  of  Police  Com

missioners  et  al.,  ante,  p.  873;

No.  09–112.  Ruiz  Rivera  et  al.  v.  Department  of  Educa

tion  et  al.,  ante,  p.  878;

No.  09–121.  Hoy  v.  Mentor  Township,  Michigan,  ante,

p.  878;

No.  09–318.  Morris  et  al.  v.  Lanpher  et  al.,  ante,  p.  970;
No.  09–5039.  Dillard  v.  Bazzle,  Warden,  ante,  p.  884;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA

THOMAS, J., dissenting

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that
petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred under state law
because it was “not raised previously on direct appeal” and
thus was “waived for further review.”  2018 OK CR 1057 ¶2,
___ P. 3d ___, ___ (citing Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, §1086 (2011)).
The  court  found  no  grounds  for  excusing  this  default,  ex-
plaining that “[p]etitioner [had] not established any suffi-
cient reason why his current grounds for relief were not pre-
viously raised.”  ___ P. 3d, at ___.  This state procedural bar
was applied independent of any federal law, and it is ade-
quate to support the decision below.  We therefore lack ju-
risdiction to disturb the state court’s judgment.

There are two possible arguments in favor of jurisdiction,
neither of which hold water.  First, one might claim that the
state procedural bar is not an “adequate” ground for deci-
sion in this case.  In Murphy, the Tenth Circuit suggested
that Oklahoma law permits jurisdictional challenges to be
raised for the first time on collateral review.  875 F. 3d, at
907, n. 5 (citing Wallace v. State, 1997 OK CR 18, 935 P. 2d
366).  But the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not
even hint at such grounds for excusing petitioner’s default
here.  More  importantly,  however,  we  may  not  go  beyond
“the four corners of the opinion” and delve into background
principles  of  Oklahoma  law  to  determine  the  adequacy  of
the  independent  state  ground.    Long,  463  U. S.,  at  1040.
This Court put an end to that approach in Long, noting that
“[t]he process of examining state law is unsatisfactory be-
cause it requires us to interpret state laws with which we
are generally unfamiliar, and which often, as in this case,
have not been discussed at length by the parties.”  Id., at
1039.  Moreover, such second-guessing disrespects “the in-
dependence of state courts,” id., at 1040, and the State it-
self, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 738–739 (1991).
Second, one might argue, as the Court does, that we have
jurisdiction because the decision below rests on federal, not
state, grounds.  See ante, at 38,  n. 15.  It is true that the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

THOMAS, J., dissenting

premise of judicial review itself.  “[A]n unconstitutional pro-
vision is never really part of the body of governing law,” for
“the Constitution automatically displaces [it] from the mo-
ment of [its] enactment.”  Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. ___,
___ (2021) (slip op., at 35) (emphasis added).  Thus, when a
court  holds  a  statute  unconstitutional,  it  is  emphatically
not  depriving  it  of  any  legal  force  that  it  previously  pos-
sessed as an Act.  The court is only deciding “a particular
case” “conformably to the constitution, disregarding” a stat-
ute  that  cannot  “govern  the  case”  because  it  is  already
“void.”  Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 178; accord, Bayard v. Sin-
gleton, 1 N. C. 5, 7 (1787) (holding that the unconstitutional
“act on which [a party’s] motion was grounded . . . must of
course,  in  that  instance,  stand  as  abrogated  and  without
any effect”).  “That is the classic explanation for the basis of
judicial review” set forth in Marbury and Bayard, and it re-
mains “from that day to this the sole continuing rationale
for  the  exercise  of  this judicial  power.”    Mackey  v.  United
States, 401 U. S. 667, 678 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).

The majority’s theory thus fails twice over, both as a de-
scription of Harper I ’s “judgment” and as an explanation of
how  any  justiciable  controversy  could  exist  in  this  Court.
The only power that the North Carolina courts exercised at
any stage of this case was that of “determin[ing] the respec-
tive rights and liabilities or duties of litigants in [the] con-
troversy”  before  them.  Nicholson,  275  N. C.,  at  447,  168
S. E.  2d,  at  406.    Harper  I ’s  judgment  line  did  not  read:
“Stricken down,” referring to the 2021 Act, but instead: “Re-
versed  and  remanded,”  referring  to  the  lower  court  judg-
ment and the case between these parties.  380 N. C., at 404,
868 S. E. 2d, at 560 (some capitalization deleted).  The ju-
dicial power operates upon parties and cases, not statutes,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the legal principles of judicial review and the nature of unconstitutional statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TYLER v. HENNEPIN COUNTY

Opinion of the Court

if at the end of three years the bill has not been paid, abso-
lute  title  vests  in  the  State,  and  the  tax  debt  is  extin-
guished.  §§281.18, 282.07.  The State may keep the prop-
erty  for  public  use  or  sell  it  to  a  private  party.    §282.01
subds. 1a, 3.  If the property is sold, any proceeds in excess
of  the  tax  debt  and  the  costs  of  the  sale  remain  with  the
County, to be split between it, the town, and the school dis-
trict.  §282.08.  The former owner has no opportunity to re-
cover this surplus.

Geraldine  Tyler  is  94  years  old.  In  1999,  she  bought  a
one-bedroom condominium in Minneapolis and lived alone
there for more than a decade.  But as Tyler aged, she and
her family decided that she would be safer in a senior com-
munity, so they moved her to one in 2010.  Nobody paid the
property taxes on the condo in Tyler’s absence and, by 2015,
it  had  accumulated  about  $2300  in  unpaid  taxes  and
$13,000  in  interest  and  penalties.  Acting  under  Minne-
sota’s  forfeiture  procedures,  Hennepin  County  seized  the
condo  and  sold  it  for  $40,000,  extinguishing  the  $15,000
debt.  App. 5.  The County kept the remaining $25,000 for
its own use.

Tyler  filed  a  putative  class  action  against  Hennepin
County and its officials, asserting that the County had un-
constitutionally  retained  the  excess  value  of  her  home
above her tax debt.  As relevant, she brought claims under
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Exces-
sive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.

The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state
a claim.  505 F. Supp. 3d 879, 883 (Minn. 2020).  The Eighth
Circuit  affirmed.  26  F. 4th  789,  790  (2022).    It  held  that
“[w]here  state  law  recognizes  no  property  interest  in  sur-
plus  proceeds  from  a  tax-foreclosure  sale  conducted  after
adequate notice to the owner, there is no unconstitutional
taking.”  Id., at 793.  The court also rejected Tyler’s claim
under  the  Excessive  Fines  Clause,  adopting  the  District
Court’s reasoning that the forfeiture was not a fine because
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, likely from a court opinion. It outlines the facts of the case, the legal arguments made, and the decisions of the lower courts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cxli

Page

Swisher v. Wakeﬁeld
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Swisher International, Inc. v. Vilsack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932

Syme; Cohen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1021

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Synod of So. Cal. and Haw.; Kyung Suh Kim v.
823

Systems Division, Inc.; Leibowitz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948

Szanto v. Szanto  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
836

T. v. N. G. S. C.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

Tabor; Parkhurst v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Tai Wang Mak v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852

Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd.; Alphapharm Pty., Ltd. v.
. . . .
821

Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd.; Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v.  . . .
821

Talley; Maxwell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Tallman; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

879

Tandiono v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tandy; Telfair v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1028,1102

850

Tan Huynh v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Tanner; Virginia Beach v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

Tanoh; Dow Chemical Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925

Tapia-Cortez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
813

Tapia-Fierro, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958

Tardelli v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1024

Target Corp.; Rothman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144

Target National Bank; Ghee v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

Target Stores; Monacelli v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Tarkington v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County
. . . . .
1024

Tarrant County; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tate v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

Tate v. Warren  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Tatum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  909,1066

1038

Tavares v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
989

Tax Comm’r of Ohio v. Commerce Energy, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

Taylor v. Kentucky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

Taylor v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

Taylor v. Minnesota  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

Taylor v. Murphy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

Taylor v. National City Bank  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
851

Taylor v. North Carolina
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000

Taylor v. Purkett  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor v. Roper
1118

Taylor v. Sampson
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

Taylor; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor; Taylor Acquisitions, LLC v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
880

Taylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  930,959,1136

880

Taylor Acquisitions, LLC v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases alphabetically with corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

missed.  If the Court did not do so, they intimated, the pub-
lic would realize that the Court is “motivated mainly by pol-
itics, rather than by adherence to the law,” and the Court
would face the possibility of legislative reprisal.  Brief for
Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse et al. as Amici Curiae 2–3, 18 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).

Regrettably, the Court now dismisses the case as moot.
If the Court were right on the law, I would of course approve
that disposition.  Under the Constitution, our authority is
limited to deciding actual cases or controversies, and if this
were  no  longer  a  live  controversy—that  is,  if  it  were  now
moot—we would be compelled to dismiss.  But if a case is
on our docket and we have jurisdiction, we have an obliga-
tion to decide it.  As Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the
Court in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821), “[w]e
have  no  more  right  to  decline  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”

Thus,  in  this  case,  we  must  apply  the  well-established
standards for determining whether a case is moot, and un-
der those standards, we still have a live case before us.  It
is certainly true that the new City ordinance and the new
State  law  give  petitioners  most  of  what  they  sought,  but
that is not the test for mootness.  Instead, “a case ‘becomes
moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any ef-
fectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’ ”  Chafin v.
Chafin, 568 U. S. 165, 172 (2013) (emphasis added).  “ ‘As
long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small,
in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.’ ”  Ibid.
(emphasis added).

Respondents  have  failed  to  meet  this  “heavy  burden.”
Adarand  Constructors,  Inc.  v.  Slater,  528  U. S.  216,  222
(2000)  (per curiam)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
This is so for two reasons.  First, the changes in City and
State law do not provide petitioners with all the injunctive
relief they sought.  Second, if we reversed on the merits, the
District Court on remand could award damages to remedy
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding the case and the Court's decision to dismiss it as moot.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Opinion of the Court

among other things, their “class rank, GPA, and test scores;
the  ratings  assigned  to  them  by  their  initial readers;  and
their status as residents, legacies, or special recruits.”  Ibid.
(footnote omitted).  The review committee either approves
or rejects each admission recommendation made by the first
reader, after which the admissions decisions are finalized.
Ibid.  In making those decisions, the review committee may
also  consider  the  applicant’s  race.    Id.,  at  607;  2  App.  in
No. 21–707, p. 407.1

C
Petitioner,  Students  for  Fair  Admissions  (SFFA),  is  a

——————

1 JUSTICE  JACKSON  attempts  to  minimize  the  role  that  race  plays  in
UNC’s  admissions  process  by  noting  that,  from  2016–2021,  the  school
accepted a lower “percentage of the most academically excellent in-state
Black candidates”—that is, 65 out of 67 such applicants (97.01%)—than
it did similarly situated Asian applicants—that is, 1118 out of 1139 such
applicants (98.16%).  Post, at 20 (dissenting opinion); see also 3 App. in
No. 21–707, pp. 1078–1080.  It is not clear how the rejection of just two
black applicants over five years could be “indicative of a genuinely holis-
tic [admissions] process,” as JUSTICE JACKSON contends.  Post, at 20–21.
And indeed it cannot be, as the overall acceptance rates of academically
excellent  applicants  to  UNC  illustrates  full  well.    According  to  SFFA’s
expert, over 80% of all black applicants in the top academic decile were
admitted to UNC, while under 70% of white and Asian applicants in that
decile were admitted.  3 App. in No. 21–707, at 1078–1083.  In the second
highest academic decile, the disparity is even starker: 83% of black ap-
plicants were admitted, while 58% of white applicants and 47% of Asian
applicants were admitted.  Ibid.  And in the third highest decile, 77% of
black  applicants  were  admitted,  compared  to  48%  of  white  applicants
and  34%  of  Asian  applicants.    Ibid.  The  dissent  does  not  dispute  the
accuracy of these figures.  See post, at 20, n. 94 (opinion of JACKSON, J.).
And  its  contention  that  white  and  Asian  students  “receive  a  diversity
plus” in UNC’s race-based admissions system blinks reality.  Post, at 18.
The same is true at Harvard.  See Brief for Petitioner 24 (“[A]n African
American [student] in [the fourth lowest academic] decile has a higher
chance  of  admission  (12.8%)  than  an  Asian  American  in  the top  decile
(12.7%).”  (emphasis  added));  see  also  4  App.  in  No.  20–1199,  p.  1793
(black applicants in the top four academic deciles are between four and
ten times more likely to be admitted to Harvard than Asian applicants
in those deciles).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions v. President & Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the admissions process at UNC and Harvard, focusing on the role of race in those processes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring

right to shape its own faith and mission,” id., at 188 (major-
ity opinion), courts should defer to a religious organization’s
sincere determination that a position is “ministerial.”  Id.,
at 197 (THOMAS, J., concurring).

The Court’s decision today is a step in the right direction.
The  Court  properly  declines  to  consider  whether  an  em-
ployee shares the religious organization’s beliefs when de-
termining whether that employee’s position falls within the
“ministerial  exception,”  explaining  that  to  “determin[e]
whether a person is a ‘co-religionist’ . . . would risk judicial
entanglement  in  religious  issues.”    Ante,  at  26.    But  the
same can be said about the broader inquiry whether an em-
ployee’s position is “ministerial.”  This Court usually goes
to  great  lengths  to  avoid  governmental  “entanglement”
with  religion,  particularly  in  its  Establishment  Clause
cases.  See,  e.g.,  Lemon  v.  Kurtzman,  403  U. S.  602,  613
(1971).2   For  example,  the  Court  has  held  that  a  public
school became impermissibly “entangle[d]” with religion by
simply permitting students to say a prayer before football
games and overseeing a class election for whom would de-
liver the prayer.  Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe,
530 U. S. 290, 305–307 (2000).  And, in Locke v. Davey, 540
U. S. 712 (2004), the Court concluded that it would violate
States’ “antiestablishment interests” if tax dollars even in-
directly  supported  the  education  of  ministers,  id.,  at  722.
But, when it comes to the autonomy of religious organiza-
tions in our ministerial-exception cases, these concerns of
entanglement have not prevented the Court from weighing
——————

2 As  I  have  previously  explained,  this  Court’s  Establishment  Clause
jurisprudence  “is  unmoored  from  the  original  meaning  of  the  First
Amendment.”  Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, ante, at 2 (concur-
ring opinion).  Properly understood, the Establishment Clause proscribes
governmental “ ‘coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support
by  force  of  law  and  threat  of  penalty.’ ”  American  Legion  v. American
Humanist  Assn.,  588  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in
judgment)  (slip  op.,  at  3)  (quoting  Lee  v.  Weisman,  505  U. S.  577,  640
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the "ministerial exception" and the Court's role in interpreting religious organizations' autonomy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

93

Opinion of the Court
Appendix A to opinion of the Court

cause the death of such person, and being thereof duly
convicted, shall be punished by confinement in the pen-
itentiary for a term not less than one year and not more
than seven years.  And every person who shall admin-
ister  or  cause  to  be  administered  or  taken,  any  such
poison, substance or liquid, with the intention to pro-
cure  the  miscarriage  of  any  woman  then  being  with
child, and shall thereof be duly convicted, shall be im-
prisoned  for  a  term  not  exceeding  three  years  in  the
penitentiary,  and  fined  in  a  sum  not  exceeding  one
thousand dollars.”95

27.  Maryland (1868):

Sec. 2.  “And be it enacted, That any person who shall
knowingly advertise, print, publish, distribute or circu-
late, or knowingly cause to be advertised, printed, pub-
lished, distributed or circulated, any pamphlet, printed
paper, book, newspaper notice, advertisement or refer-
ence containing words or language, giving or conveying
any  notice,  hint  or  reference  to  any  person,  or  to  the
name of any person real or fictitious, from whom; or to
any place, house, shop or office, when any poison, drug,
mixture, preparation, medicine or noxious thing, or any
instrument or means whatever; for the purpose of pro-
ducing abortion, or who shall knowingly sell, or cause
to be sold any such poison, drug, mixture, preparation,
medicine  or  noxious  thing  or  instrument  of  any  kind
whatever; or where any advice, direction, information
or knowledge may be obtained for the purpose of caus-
ing the miscarriage or abortion of any woman pregnant
with  child,  at  any  period  of  her  pregnancy,  or  shall
knowingly sell or cause to be sold any medicine, or who
shall  knowingly  use  or  cause  to  be  used  any  means

——————

95 Neb. Rev. Stat., Tit. 4, ch. 4, §42 (1866) (emphasis added); see also
Neb. Gen. Stat., ch. 58, §§6, 39 (1873) (expanding criminal liability for
abortions by other means, including instruments).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, likely from a court opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses specific laws related to abortion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

KAGAN, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–506
_________________

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
NEBRASKA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 30, 2023]

JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  and

JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.

In every respect, the Court today exceeds its proper, lim-

ited role in our Nation’s governance.

Some 20 years ago, Congress enacted legislation, called
the HEROES Act, authorizing the Secretary of Education
to provide relief to student-loan borrowers when a national
emergency struck.  The Secretary’s authority was bounded:
He  could  do  only  what  was  “necessary”  to  alleviate  the
emergency’s impact on affected borrowers’ ability to repay
their student loans.  20 U. S. C. §1098bb(a)(2).  But within
that bounded area, Congress gave discretion to the Secre-
tary.  He could “waive or modify any statutory or regulatory
provision”  applying  to  federal  student-loan  programs,  in-
cluding  provisions  relating  to  loan  repayment  and  for-
giveness.  And in so doing, he could replace the old provi-
sions  with  new  “terms  and  conditions.”  §§1098bb(a)(1),
(b)(2).  The Secretary, that is, could give the relief that was
needed, in the form he deemed most appropriate, to coun-
teract the effects of a national emergency on borrowers’ ca-
pacity to repay.  That may have been a good idea, or it may
have  been a  bad  idea.    Either  way,  it  was  what  Congress
said.

When COVID hit, two Secretaries serving two different
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan.  It includes citations, case names, and the formal structure typical of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Opinion of the Court

  That requirement also would have the potential to inval-
idate just about any voting rule a State adopts.  Take the
example  of  a  State’s  interest  in  preventing  voting  fraud.
Even  if  a  State  could  point  to  a  history  of  serious  voting
fraud within its own borders, the dissent would apparently
strike  down  a  rule  designed  to  prevent  fraud  unless  the
State could demonstrate an inability to combat voting fraud
in any other way, such as by hiring more investigators and
prosecutors,  prioritizing  voting  fraud  investigations,  and
heightening criminal penalties.  Nothing about equal open-
ness  and  equal  opportunity  dictates  such  a  high  bar  for
States to pursue their legitimate interests.
  With  all  other  circumstances  swept  away,  all  that  re-
mains in the dissent’s approach is the size of any disparity
in a rule’s impact on members of protected groups.  As we

——————
the Court hypothesized a case involving an “uncouth” district shaped like
the one in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 340 (1960), for which an
inquiry under §2 “would at least arguably be required.”  501 U. S., at 427.
The Court then wrote the language upon which the dissent seizes:  “Plac-
ing elections for single-member offices entirely beyond the scope of cov-
erage of §2 would preclude such an inquiry, even if the State’s interest
in maintaining the ‘uncouth’ electoral system was trivial or illusory and
even if any resulting impairment of a minority group’s voting strength
could be remedied without significantly impairing the State’s interest in
electing judges on a district-wide basis.”  Id., at 427–428.
  That  reductio  ad  absurdum,  used  to  demonstrate  only  why  an  auto-
matic exemption from §2 scrutiny was inappropriate, did not announce
an “inquiry” at all—much less the least-burdensome-means requirement
the dissent would have us smuggle in from materially different statutory
regimes.  Post, at 18, n. 5, 26.  Perhaps that is why no one—not the par-
ties, not the United States, not the 36 other amici, not the courts below,
and certainly not this Court in subsequent decisions—has advanced the
dissent’s surprising reading of a single phrase in Houston Lawyers Assn.
The  dissent  apparently  thinks  that  in  1991  we  silently  abrogated  the
principle that the nature of a State’s interest is but one of many factors
to  consider, see  Thornburg  v.  Gingles,  478  U. S.  30,  44–45  (1986), and
that our subsequent cases have erred by failing simply to ask whether a
less burdensome measure would suffice.  Who knew?
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and a discussion of voting rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

ALITO, J., concurring
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

these  or  any  other  questions  naturally  raised  by  its  ipse
dixit that the exception in §841(a) is “sufficiently like” an
element  to  require  that  it  be  treated  as  such  in  some  re-
spects but not others.

C
The Court also errs in holding that, if a §841(a)(1) defend-
ant “meets the burden of producing evidence that his or her
conduct was ‘authorized,’ ” the Government has the burden
to  “prove  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant
knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized man-
ner,” ante, at 5.  As noted, the common-law rule was that
the defendant had the burden of production and persuasion
on  any  affirmative  defense.  And  the  Court  has  held  that
when Congress does not address the burden of proof in the
text  of  a  statute,  “we  presume  that  Congress  intended  to
preserve  the  common-law  rule.”    Smith  v.  United  States,
568 U. S. 106, 112 (2013); see also Dixon, 548 U. S., at 13–
14.

The Court identifies one and only one reason for deviat-
ing  from  this  background  rule—the  fact  that  §885(a)(1)
states that “the burden of going forward with the evidence
with respect to any . . . exemption or exception shall be upon
the  person  claiming  its  benefit.”  Because  this  provision
does not say expressly that a defendant also has the burden
of persuasion, the Court infers that Congress meant to al-
locate that burden to the prosecution.  That inference is un-
warranted.  Section 885(a)(1) explicitly relieves the Govern-
ment  of  the  burden  of  “negativ[ing]”  exceptions  “in  any
trial.”  And it is hard to see how the Government does not
have the burden to “negative” exceptions if it must affirma-
tively disprove a prima facie case of authorization any time
a defendant satisfies the initial burden of production.

But even if one credits the majority’s assumption that the
CSA partly deviates from the common-law rule by shifting
the burden of persuasion to the Government, the majority’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of statutes, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

by  the  rule  in  the  first  place.  Instead,  the  unregulated
plaintiff  can  obtain  meaningful  relief  only  if  the  APA
authorizes  vacatur  of  the  agency  rule,  thereby  remedying
the  adverse  downstream  effects  of  the  rule  on  the
unregulated plaintiff.

The APA empowers federal courts to “hold unlawful and
set aside agency action” that, as relevant here, is arbitrary
and capricious or is contrary to law.  5 U. S. C. §706(2).  The
Federal  Government  and  the  federal  courts  have  long
understood §706(2) to authorize vacatur of unlawful agency
rules, including in suits by unregulated plaintiffs who are
adversely affected by an agency’s regulation of others.

Recently,  the  Government  has  advanced  a  far-reaching
argument that the APA does not allow vacatur.  See Brief
for Respondent 42; Brief for United States in United States
v. Texas, O. T. 2022, No. 22–58, pp. 40–44.  Invoking a few
law  review  articles,  the  Government  contends  that  the
APA’s  authorization  to  “set  aside”  agency  action  does  not
allow vacatur, but instead permits a court only to enjoin an
agency from enforcing a rule against the plaintiff.

If the Government were correct on that point, Corner Post
could not obtain any relief in this suit because, to reiterate,
Corner Post is not regulated by the rule to begin with.  And
the  APA  would  supply  no  remedy  for  most  other
unregulated  but  adversely  affected  parties  who
traditionally have brought, and regularly still bring, APA
suits challenging agency rules.

The  Government’s  position  would  revolutionize  long-
settled  administrative  law—shutting  the  door  on  entire
classes  of  everyday  administrative  law  cases.
The
Government’s  newly  minted  position  is  both  novel  and
wrong.  It “disregards a lot of history and a lot of law.”  M.
Sohoni,  The  Past  and  Future  of  Universal  Vacatur,  133
Yale L. J. 2305, 2311 (2024).

The  APA  authorizes  vacatur  of  agency  rules;  therefore,

Corner Post can obtain relief in this case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It delves into the interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and its implications for vacating agency rules.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

prayer while presenting locker-room speeches to students.
That tradition predated Mr. Kennedy at the school.  App.
170.  And he willingly ended it, as the District has acknowl-
edged.  Id., at 77, 170.  He also willingly ended his practice
of  postgame  religious  talks  with  his  team.    Id.,  at  70,  77,
170–172.  The only prayer Mr. Kennedy sought to continue
was the kind he had “started out doing” at the beginning of
his tenure—the prayer he gave alone.  Id., at 293–294.  He
made clear that he could pray “while the kids were doing
the  fight  song”  and  “take  a  knee  by  [him]self  and  give
thanks and continue on.”  Id., at 294.  Mr. Kennedy even
considered it “acceptable” to say his “prayer while the play-
ers  were  walking  to  the  locker  room”  or  “bus,”  and  then
catch up with his team.  Id., at 280, 282; see also id., at 59
(proposing the team leave the field for the prayer).  In short,
Mr. Kennedy did not seek to direct any prayers to students
or require anyone else to participate.  His plan was to wait
to  pray  until  athletes  were  occupied,  and  he  “told  every-
body” that’s what he wished “to do.”  Id., at 292.  It was for
three  prayers  of  this  sort  alone  in  October  2015  that  the
District suspended him.  See Parts I–B and I–C, supra.

Naturally,  Mr.  Kennedy’s  proposal  to  pray  quietly  by
himself on the field would have meant some people would
have seen his religious exercise.  Those close at hand might
have heard him too.  But learning how to tolerate speech or
prayer of all kinds is “part of learning how to live in a plu-
ralistic society,” a trait of character essential to “a tolerant
citizenry.”  Lee, 505 U. S., at 590.  This Court has long rec-
ognized as well that “secondary school students are mature
enough . . . to understand that a school does not endorse,”
let  alone  coerce  them  to  participate  in,  “speech  that  it
merely  permits  on  a  nondiscriminatory  basis.”    Mergens,
496 U. S., at 250 (plurality opinion).  Of course, some will
take offense to certain forms of speech or prayer they are
sure to encounter in a society where those activities enjoy
such  robust  constitutional  protection.    But  “[o]ffense . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. It discusses the facts of the case and legal precedents related to religious expression in public schools.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

BARRETT, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 22–138
_________________

BILLY RAYMOND COUNTERMAN, PETITIONER v.
COLORADO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
COLORADO

[June 27, 2023]

JUSTICE  BARRETT,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  joins,

dissenting.

Billy  Counterman  was  convicted  under  a  Colorado  law
that prohibits true threats.  As everyone agrees, the statute
requires  that  the  speaker  understand  the  meaning  of  his
words.  Ante, at 4, n. 1.  The question is what more the First
Amendment requires.  Colorado maintains that an objective
standard  is  enough—that  is,  the  government  must  show
that a reasonable person would regard the statement as a
threat of violence.  Counterman, however, argues that the
First  Amendment  requires  a  subjective  test—that  is,  the
speaker himself must intend or know the threatening na-
ture of the statement.

It should be easy to choose between these positions.  True
threats  do  not  enjoy  First  Amendment  protection,  and
nearly every other category of unprotected speech may be
restricted  using  an  objective  standard.    Nonetheless,  the
Court  adopts  a  subjective  standard,  though  not  quite  the
one advanced by Counterman.  The Court holds that speak-
ers  must  recklessly  disregard  the  threatening  nature  of
their speech to lose constitutional protection.  Because this
unjustifiably grants true threats preferential treatment, I
respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual legal reasoning and arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Statement of GORSUCH, J.

identify laws that fail strict scrutiny.  See, e.g., First Nat.
Bank  of  Boston  v.  Bellotti,  435 U. S.  765,  793 (1978)  (The
State’s proffered “purpose is belied, however, by the provi-
sions  of  the  statute,  which  are  both  underinclusive  and
overinclusive.”).
  Consider California’s arguments in turn.  The State pre-
sumes that worship inherently involves a large number of
people.  Never mind that scores might pack into train sta-
tions  or  wait  in  long  checkout  lines  in  the  businesses  the
State allows to remain open.   Never mind, too, that some
worshippers may seek only to pray in solitude, go to confes-
sion, or study in small groups.  See Harvest Rock Church,
Inc. v. Newsom, App. to Emergency Application for Writ of
Injunction,  No.  20A137,  Exh.  A,  No.  20–56357,  p. 4,  n. 1
(CA9, Jan. 25, 2021) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
Nor does California explain why the less restrictive option
of  limiting  the  number  of  people  who  may  gather  at  one
time is insufficient for houses of worship, even though it has
found  that  answer  adequate  for  so  many  stores  and  busi-
nesses.
  Next, the State tells us that worshippers are sure to seek
close  physical  interactions.    It  touts  its  mild  climate,  too,
suggesting  that  worshippers  might  enjoy  more  space  out-
doors.    Yet,  California  is  not  as  concerned  with  the  close
physical  proximity  of  hairstylists  or  manicurists  to  their
customers, whom they touch and remain near for extended
periods.  The State does not force them or retailers to do all
their  business  in  parking  lots  and  parks.    And  California
allows  people  to  sit  in  relatively  close  proximity  inside
buses too.  Nor, again, does California explain why the nar-
rower options it thinks adequate in many secular settings—
such  as  social  distancing  requirements,  masks,  cleaning,
plexiglass barriers, and the like—cannot suffice here.  Es-
pecially when those measures are in routine use in religious
services across the country today.
  California  worries  that  worship  brings  people  together
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a portion of one, specifically Justice Gorsuch's statement. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis of a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Per Curiam

had improved since the stay was entered, while the harm to
landlords  had  continued  to  increase.  Ibid.,  n. 3.    But  the
court concluded that its hands were tied by the law of the
case,  in  light  of  the  D. C.  Circuit’s  earlier  decision  not  to
vacate the stay.  Ibid.  That denial was followed by one more
stop at the D. C. Circuit, where that court again declined to
lift the stay.  2021 WL 3721431 (Aug. 20, 2021).

Having passed through the lower courts twice, the plain-
tiffs  return  as  applicants  to  this  Court  to  again  ask  us  to
vacate the District Court’s stay.

II
The  District  Court  concluded  that  its  stay  is  no  longer
justified under the governing four-factor test.  See Nken v.
Holder, supra, at 434.  We agree.

A

The applicants not only have a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits—it is difficult to imagine them losing.
The Government contends that the first sentence of §361(a)
gives the CDC broad authority to take whatever measures
it deems necessary to control the spread of COVID–19, in-
cluding issuing the moratorium.  But the second sentence
informs the grant of authority by illustrating the kinds of
measures that could be necessary: inspection, fumigation,
disinfection,  sanitation,  pest  extermination,  and  destruc-
tion of contaminated animals and articles.  These measures
directly relate to preventing the interstate spread of disease
by identifying, isolating, and destroying the disease itself.
The CDC’s moratorium, on the other hand, relates to inter-
state infection far more indirectly: If evictions occur, some
subset  of  tenants  might  move  from  one  State  to  another,
and some subset of that group might do so while infected
with  COVID–19.    See  86  Fed.  Reg.  43248–43249.  This
downstream connection between eviction and the interstate
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court decision. It includes citations, legal terminology, and a discussion of legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

PAVAN v. SMITH

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

many  analogues  across  the  country  and  throughout  his-
tory,  offends  the  Constitution.    To  the  contrary,  to  the
extent they speak to the question at all, this Court’s prec-
edents  suggest  just  the  opposite  conclusion.    See,  e.g.,
Michael  H.  v.  Gerald  D.,  491  U. S.  110,  124–125  (1989);
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 73 (2001).  Neither
does  anything  in  today’s  opinion  purport  to  identify  any
constitutional problem with a biology based birth registra-
tion regime.  So whatever else we might do with this case,
summary  reversal  would  not  exactly  seem  the  obvious
course.

What,  then,  is  at  work  here?  If  there  isn’t  a  problem
with  a  biology  based  birth  registration  regime,  perhaps
the concern lies in this particular regime’s exceptions.  For
it  turns  out  that  Arkansas’s  general  rule  of  registration
based on biology does admit of certain more specific excep-
tions.  Most  importantly  for  our  purposes,  the  State
acknowledges  that  §9–10–201  of  the  Arkansas  Code  con-
trols how birth certificates are completed in cases of artifi-
cial  insemination  like  the  one  before  us.
  The  State
acknowledges,  too,  that  this  provision,  written  some  time
ago,  indicates  that  the  mother’s  husband  generally  shall
be treated as the father—and in this way seemingly antic-
ipates only opposite-sex marital unions.

But if the artificial insemination statute is the concern,
it’s  still  hard  to  see  how  summary  reversal  should  follow
for at least a few reasons.  First, petitioners didn’t actually
challenge §9–10–201 in their lawsuit.  Instead, petitioners
sought  and  the  trial  court  granted  relief  eliminating  the
State’s  authority  under  §20–18–401  to  enforce  a  birth
registration regime generally based on biology.  On appeal,
the  state  supreme  court  simply  held  that  this  overbroad
remedy  wasn’t  commanded  by  Obergefell  or  the  Constitu-
tion.  And, again, nothing in today’s opinion for the Court
identifies anything wrong, let alone clearly wrong, in that
conclusion.  Second,  though  petitioners’  lawsuit  didn’t
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to a case involving birth registration.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 274 (1998)

301

Stevens, J., dissenting

can claim immunity from damages liability.11
Indeed, the
rule that the Court adopts would preclude a damages rem-
edy even if every teacher at the school knew about the har-
assment but did not have “authority to institute corrective
measures on the district’s behalf.” Ante, at 277.
It is not
my function to determine whether this newly fashioned rule
is wiser than the established common-law rule.
It is proper,
however, to suggest that the Court bears the burden of justi-
fying its rather dramatic departure from settled law, and to
explain why its opinion fails to shoulder that burden.

III

The Court advances several reasons why it would “frus-
trate the purposes” of Title IX to allow recovery against a
school district that does not have actual notice of a teacher’s
sexual harassment of a student. Ante, at 285 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). As the Court acknowledges, how-
ever, the two principal purposes that motivated the enact-
ment of Title IX were: (1) “ ‘to avoid the use of federal
resources to support discriminatory practices’ ”; and (2) “ ‘to
provide individual citizens effective protection against those
practices.’ ” Ante, at 286 (quoting Cannon, 441 U. S., at
704).
It seems quite obvious that both of those purposes
would be served—not frustrated—by providing a damages
remedy in a case of this kind. To the extent that the Court’s
reasons for its policy choice have any merit, they suggest
that no damages should ever be awarded in a Title IX case—
in other words, that our unanimous holding in Franklin
should be repudiated.

11 The Court concludes that its holding “does not affect any right of re-
covery that an individual may have against a school district as a matter
of state law or against the teacher in his individual capacity under state
In this case, of course,
law or under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.” Ante, at 292.
the District Court denied petitioners’ § 1983 claim on summary judgment,
and it is undisputed that the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 101.051 (1997), immunizes school districts from tort lia-
bility in cases like this one.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

BARRETT, J., dissenting

subjective ones.  So an objective test “complements the ex-
planation  for  excluding  threats  of  violence  from  First
Amendment protection in the first place.”  United States v.
Jeffries, 692 F. 3d 473, 480 (CA6 2012).

II
The Court agrees that “[t]he existence of a threat depends
not  on  ‘the  mental  state  of  the  author,’  but  on  ‘what  the
statement conveys’ to the person on the other end.”  Ante,
at  6.  And  it  acknowledges  that  “[w]hen  the  statement  is
understood as a true threat, all the harms that have long
made  threats  unprotected  naturally  follow.”  Ibid.  None-
theless,  the  Court  holds  Colorado’s  statute  unconstitu-
tional.  Why?    Because  the  Court  installs  a  prophylactic
buffer zone to avoid chilling protected speech—a buffer zone
that protects true threats unless the speaker “consciously
disregarded  a  substantial  risk  that  his  communications
would be viewed as threatening violence.”  Ante, at 1, 4–5.
That reasoning is flawed.

A
The Court’s first error is awarding true threats “pride of
place among unprotected speech.”  Elonis v. United States,
575 U. S. 723, 767 (2015) (THOMAS, J., dissenting).  We have
held that nearly every category of unprotected speech may
be regulated using an objective test.  In concluding other-
wise, the Court neglects certain cases and misreads others.
Start  with  fighting  words—a  category  of  unprotected
speech that the Court skips past.  Fighting words are “per-
sonally abusive epithets” that are “inherently likely to pro-
voke violent reaction.”  Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 20
(1971).  Under  our  precedent,  legislatures  may  regulate
fighting  words  even  when  the  speaker  does  not  intend  to
provoke the listener (or does not recklessly disregard that
possibility).  Chaplinsky,  315  U. S.,  at  572–573  (rejecting
First  Amendment  challenge  to  a  state  law  punishing
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

375

Roberts, C. J., concurring

but because, in the absence of any valid narrower ground of
decision,  there  is  no  way  to  avoid  Citizens  United’s  broader
constitutional argument.

The  dissent  advocates  an  approach  to  addressing  Citizens
United’s claims  that I  ﬁnd quite  perplexing.  It presumably
agrees  with  the  majority  that  Citizens  United’s  narrower
statutory  and  constitutional  arguments  lack  merit—other
wise its conclusion that the group should lose this case would
make no sense.  Despite agreeing that these narrower argu
ments  fail,  however,  the  dissent  argues  that  the  majority
should nonetheless latch on to one of them in order to avoid
reaching the broader constitutional question of whether Aus
tin remains good law.  It even suggests that the Court’s fail
ure to adopt one of these concededly meritless arguments is
a  sign  that  the  majority  is  not  “serious  about  judicial  re
straint.”  Post, at 408.

This approach is based on a false premise: that our practice
of  avoiding  unnecessary  (and  unnecessarily  broad)  constitu
tional  holdings  somehow  trumps  our  obligation  faithfully  to
interpret  the  law.  It  should  go  without  saying,  however,
that  we  cannot embrace  a  narrow  ground of  decision  simply
because it is narrow; it must also be right.  Thus while it is
true that “[i]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is neces
sary  not  to  decide  more,”  post,  at  405  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted),  sometimes  it  is  necessary  to  decide  more.
There  is  a  difference  between  judicial  restraint  and  judicial
abdication.  When  constitutional  questions  are  “indispen
sably  necessary”  to  resolving  the  case  at  hand,  “the  court
must  meet  and  decide  them.”  Ex  parte  Randolph,  20
F.  Cas.  242,  254  (No.  11,558)  (CC  Va.  1833)  (Marshall,  C.  J.).
Because it is necessary to reach Citizens United’s broader
argument  that  Austin  should  be  overruled,  the  debate  over
whether to consider this claim on an as-applied or facial basis
strikes  me  as  largely  beside  the  point.  Citizens  United
has  standing—it  is  being  injured  by  the  Government’s  en
forcement  of  the  Act.  Citizens  United  has  a  constitutional
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.  It delves into the legal arguments and reasoning behind the decision, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

ALITO, J., dissenting

i.e., held within bounds, see Webster’s Third 476; Random
House  308,  if  the  topography  of  the  land  in  question  im-
poses some boundaries on its flow.

If  the  term  “point  source”  is  read  in  this  way,  it  would
have a broad reach and would cover many of the cases that
trouble the Court.  Moreover—and I find this point partic-
ularly  important—even  if  this  interpretation  fails  to  cap-
ture every case that seems to call out for regulation, that
would not mean that these cases would necessarily remain
unchecked.  The States have the authority to regulate the
discharge  of  pollutants  by  non-point  sources.  See  33
U. S. C. §§1285(j), 1314(f ), 1329(i), 1329(b)(1), (h).  They are
entrusted with a vital role under the Clean Water Act, and
there is no reason to believe that they would tolerate cases
of abuse.

The interpretation I have outlined is not only consistent
with the statutory language; it is strongly supported by the
Clean Water Act’s regulatory scheme for at least two rea-
sons.  First,  it  respects  Congress’  decision  to  treat  point-
source  pollution  differently  from  non-point-source  pollu-
tion, including pollution conveyed by groundwater.  See 84
Fed. Reg. 16832.7  The Court itself recognizes this:

“[T]he  structure  of  the  statute  indicates  that,  as  to
groundwater  pollution  and  non[-]point  source  pollu-
tion, Congress intended to leave substantial responsi-
bility and autonomy to the States.”  Ante, at 6.
“Over many decades, and with federal encouragement,

——————

7 The Act contains a number of references to groundwater (a non-point
source)  outside  the  NPDES  context.  The  Act  textually  distinguishes
groundwater  from  surface  water  and  navigable  waters,  §1252(a),  pro-
vides funding for state regulation of groundwater pollution, and suggests
that groundwater is a non-point source.  See §1329(h)(5)(D) (authorizing
EPA  to  prioritize  grants  to  States  that  have  implemented  or  proposed
“carry[ing] out groundwater quality protection activities which [EPA] de-
termines are part of a comprehensive non[-]point source pollution control
program”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

9

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

shifted rapidly.  In 2009, the legislatures of Vermont, New
Hampshire, and the District of Columbia became the first
in  the  Nation  to  enact  laws  that  revised  the  definition  of
marriage to include same-sex couples, while also providing
accommodations for religious believers.  In 2011, the New
York Legislature enacted a similar law.  In 2012, voters in
Maine did the same, reversing the result of a referendum
just  three  years  earlier  in  which  they  had  upheld  the
traditional definition of marriage.

In  all,  voters  and  legislators  in  eleven  States  and  the
District  of  Columbia  have  changed  their  definitions  of
marriage to include same-sex couples.  The highest courts
of  five  States  have  decreed  that  same  result  under  their
own Constitutions.  The remainder of the States retain the
traditional definition of marriage.

Petitioners  brought  lawsuits  contending  that  the  Due
Process  and  Equal  Protection  Clauses  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment  compel  their  States  to  license  and  recognize
marriages  between  same-sex  couples.  In  a  carefully  rea-
soned  decision,  the  Court  of  Appeals  acknowledged  the
democratic  “momentum”  in  favor  of  “expand[ing]  the
definition  of  marriage  to  include  gay  couples,”  but  con-
cluded that petitioners had not made “the case for consti-
tutionalizing  the  definition  of  marriage  and  for  removing
the issue from the place it has been since the founding: in
the  hands  of  state  voters.”  772  F. 3d,  at  396,  403.    That
decision  interpreted  the  Constitution  correctly,  and  I
would affirm.

II
Petitioners first contend that the marriage laws of their
States violate the Due Process Clause.  The Solicitor Gen-
eral of the United States, appearing in support of petition-
ers,  expressly  disowned  that  position  before  this  Court.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. on Question 1, at 38–39.  The majority
nevertheless  resolves  these  cases  for  petitioners  based
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges. It discusses the history of marriage equality legislation and the arguments made by the petitioners.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CHICAGO v. FULTON

Opinion of the Court

any property made available to the estate by  other provi-
sions  of  the  Bankruptcy  Code.”  United  States  v.  Whiting
Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198, 205 (1983).  One such provision,
§542, is important for present purposes.  Titled “Turnover
of property to the estate,” §542 provides, with just a few ex-
ceptions, that an entity (other than a custodian) in posses-
sion of property of the bankruptcy estate “shall deliver to
the trustee, and account for” that property.

A second automatic consequence of the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition is that, with certain exceptions, the petition
“operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” of efforts to
collect  from  the  debtor  outside  of  the  bankruptcy  forum.
§362(a).    The  automatic  stay  serves  the  debtor’s  interests
by protecting the estate from dismemberment, and it also
benefits creditors as a group by preventing individual cred-
itors from pursuing their own interests to the detriment of
the others.  Under the Code, an individual injured by any
willful violation of the stay “shall recover actual damages,
including costs and attorneys’ fees, and in appropriate cir-
cumstances, may recover punitive damages.”  §362(k)(1).

Among the many collection efforts prohibited by the stay
is “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or
of property from the estate or to exercise control over prop-
erty of the estate.”  §362(a)(3) (emphasis added).  The prohi-
bition against exercising control over estate property is the
subject of the present dispute.

In  the  case  before  us,  the  city  of  Chicago  (City)  im-
pounded each respondent’s vehicle for failure to pay fines
for  motor  vehicle  infractions.    Each  respondent  filed  a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and requested that the City
return his or her vehicle.  The City refused, and in each case
a bankruptcy court held that the City’s refusal violated the
automatic  stay.  The  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  all  of  the
judgments  in  a  consolidated  opinion.    In re  Fulton,  926
F. 3d 916 (CA7 2019).  The court concluded that “by retain-
ing  possession  of  the  debtors’  vehicles  after  they  declared
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Chicago v. Fulton*. It contains legal arguments, citations, and discusses the Bankruptcy Code. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–1195
_________________

KENDRA ESPINOZA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
MONTANA

[June 30, 2020]

JUSTICE ALITO, concurring.
I  join  the  opinion  of  the  Court  in  full.    The  basis  of  the
decision  below  was  a  Montana  constitutional  provision
that, according to the Montana Supreme Court, forbids par-
ents  from  participating  in  a  publicly  funded  scholarship
program  simply  because  they  send  their  children  to  reli-
gious schools.  Regardless of the motivation for this provi-
sion or its predecessor, its application here violates the Free
Exercise Clause.

Nevertheless, the provision’s origin is relevant under the
decision we issued earlier this Term in Ramos v. Louisiana,
590 U. S. ___ (2020).  The question in Ramos was whether
Louisiana  and  Oregon  laws  allowing  non-unanimous  jury
verdicts in  criminal trials violated the Sixth  Amendment.
The Court held that they did, emphasizing that the States
originally  adopted  those  laws  for  racially  discriminatory
reasons.  See  id.,  at  ___–___  (slip  op.,  at  1–3).    The  role
of the Ku Klux Klan was highlighted.  See ibid.; see also id.,
at ___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 4);
id.,  at  ___  (KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring  in  part)  (slip  op.,
at 12).

I argued in dissent that this original motivation, though
deplorable, had no bearing on the laws’ constitutionality be-
cause such laws can be adopted for non-discriminatory rea-
sons, and “both States readopted their rules under different
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Kendra Espinoza et al. v. Montana Department of Revenue et al. It delves into the legal arguments and reasoning behind the decision, referencing other cases and constitutional provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP

Opinion of the Court

III
The heirs offer several counterarguments, but none can
overcome the text, context, and history of the expropriation
exception.

First,  the  heirs  rely  on  the  2016  Foreign  Cultural  Ex-
change Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act.  The Act
amends the FSIA to explain that participation in specified
“art  exhibition  activities”  does  not  qualify  as  “commercial
activity” within the meaning of the expropriation exception.
28 U. S. C. §1605(h).  This clarification responded to deci-
sions  of  federal  courts  holding  to  the  contrary,  see,  e.g.,
Malewicz v. Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 313–315 (DC
2005),  and  enables  foreign  states  to  loan  art  to  American
museums  without  fear  that  the  work’s  presence  in  the
United States will subject them to litigation here.  The pro-
vision, however, does not apply to claims brought against
Germany  arising  out  of  the  period  from  January  1933
through  May  1945.    §§1605(h)(2),  (3).   According  to  the
heirs, this clarification of the expropriation exception shows
that Congress anticipated Nazi-era claims could be adjudi-
cated by way of that exception.

We  agree  with  the  heirs,  but  only  to  a  limited  extent.
Claims  concerning  Nazi-era  art  takings  could  be  brought
under the expropriation exception where the claims involve
the  taking  of  a  foreign  national’s  property.  See,  e.g.,  Alt-
mann,  541  U. S.,  at  680–682  (claim  concerning  Austrian
taking of Czechoslovakian national’s art brought under the
expropriation exception).  As for the heirs’ suggestion that
the Clarification Act demonstrates that Congress meant to
abrogate immunity for any Nazi-era claim, however, we do
not  interpret  Congress’s  effort  to  preserve  sovereign  im-
munity in a narrow, particularized context—art shows—as
supporting  the  broad  elimination  of  sovereign  immunity
across all areas of law.  The Clarification Act did not pur-
port to amend the critical phrase here—“taken in violation
of international law”—and we will not construe it to do so.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a section of a legal opinion discussing the expropriation exception and its application to Nazi-era art claims. It provides legal analysis and interpretation of relevant statutes and case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES ET AL. EX REL. SCHUTTE ET AL. v.
SUPERVALU INC. ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–1326.  Argued April 18, 2023—Decided June 1, 2023*

In these cases, petitioners have sued retail pharmacies under the False
Claims Act (FCA), 31 U. S. C. §3729 et seq.  The FCA permits private
parties  to  bring  lawsuits  in  the  name  of  the  United  States  against
those  who  they  believe  have  defrauded  the  Federal  Government,
§3730(b), and imposes liability on anyone who “knowingly” submits a
“false” claim to the Government, §3729(a).  Here, petitioners claim that
respondents—SuperValu  and  Safeway—defrauded  two  federal  bene-
fits programs, Medicaid and Medicare.  Both Medicaid and Medicare
offer prescription-drug coverage to their beneficiaries, and both often
cap any reimbursement for drugs at the pharmacy’s “usual and cus-
tomary” charge to the public.  But, according to petitioners, SuperValu
and Safeway for years offered various pharmacy discount programs to
their  customers—yet  reported  their higher  retail  prices,  rather  than
their discounted prices.  Petitioners also presented evidence that the
companies believed their discounted prices were their usual and cus-
tomary  prices  and  tried  to  prevent  regulators  and  contractors  from
finding  out  about  their  discounted  prices.    In  sum,  petitioners  claim
that the evidence shows that respondents thought their claims were
inaccurate yet submitted them anyway.

Two essential elements of an FCA violation are (1) the falsity of the
claim  and  (2)  the  defendant’s  knowledge  of  the  claim’s  falsity.    The
District Court ruled against SuperValu on the falsity element—finding
that  its  discounted  prices  were  its  usual  and  customary  prices  and

——————

* Together with No. 22–111, United States et al. ex rel. Proctor v. Safe-

way, Inc., also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
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</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON

Syllabus

law such that the workers’ compensation scheme no longer applied ex-
clusively to Hanford site workers who work for the United States.  But
a  case  is  not  moot  unless  it  is  impossible  for  the  Court  to  grant  any
effectual relief.  Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,
587 U. S. ___, ___.  The United States asserts that a ruling in its favor
will allow it to recoup or to avoid paying millions of dollars in workers’
compensation  claims.    Washington  disagrees,  arguing  that  the  new
statute  applies  retroactively  and  is  broad  enough  to  encompass  any
claim filed under the earlier law.  But it is not the Court’s practice to
interpret statutes in the first instance, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U. S.
189, 201, nor does the Court know how Washington’s state courts will
interpret the new law.  It is thus not impossible for the United States
to  recover  money  if  the  Court  rules  in  its  favor,  and  the  case  is  not
moot.  Pp. 3–4.

(b) Since McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, this Court has in-
terpreted the Supremacy Clause as prohibiting States from interfering
with  or  controlling  the  operations  of  the  Federal  Government.    This
constitutional doctrine—often called the intergovernmental immunity
doctrine—has evolved to bar state laws that either regulate the United
States directly or discriminate against the Federal Government or its
contractors.  A  state  law  discriminates  against  the  Federal  Govern-
ment  or  its  contractors  if  it  “single[s  them]  out”  for  less  favorable
“treatment,” Washington v. United States, 460 U. S. 536, 546, or if it
regulates them unfavorably on some basis related to their governmen-
tal “status,” North Dakota v. United States, 495 U. S. 423, 438 (plural-
ity opinion).

Washington’s law violates these principles by singling out the Fed-
eral Government for unfavorable treatment.  The law explicitly treats
federal workers differently than state or private workers, and imposes
costs upon the Federal Government that state and private entities do
not bear.  The law thus violates the Supremacy Clause unless Congress
has consented to such regulation through waiver.  Pp. 4–6.

(c) Congress waives the Federal Government’s immunity “only when
and to the extent there is a clear congressional mandate.”  Hancock v.
Train,  426  U. S.  167,  179.    Washington  argues  that  Congress  has
waived  federal  immunity  from  state  workers’  compensation  laws  on
federal lands and projects through §3172(a).  Section 3172(a) says that
“[t]he state authority charged with enforcing and requiring compliance
with the state workers’ compensation laws . . . may apply [those] laws
to all land and premises in the State which the Federal Government
owns,”  as  well  as  “to  all  projects,  buildings,  constructions,  improve-
ments, and property in the State and belonging to the Government, in
the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.”  Washington reads the statute’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case.  It summarizes the legal arguments and issues presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 209 (2010)

215

Per Curiam

ings conﬁdential.  Id., at 503–504.  The Court, nonetheless,
found it was error to close the courtroom.  Id., at 513.

Trial  courts  are  obligated  to  take  every  reasonable  meas
ure  to  accommodate  public  attendance  at  criminal  trials.
Nothing  in  the  record  shows  that  the  trial  court  could  not
have  accommodated  the  public  at  Presley’s  trial.  Without
knowing the precise circumstances, some possibilities include
reserving one or more rows for the public; dividing the jury
venire  panel  to  reduce  courtroom  congestion;  or  instructing
prospective  jurors  not  to  engage  or  interact  with  audience
members.

Petitioner  also  argues  that,  apart  from  failing to consider
alternatives  to  closure,  the  trial  court  erred  because  it  did
not  even  identify  any  overriding  interest  likely  to  be  preju
diced  absent  the  closure  of  voir  dire.  There  is  some  merit
to  this  complaint.  The  generic  risk  of  jurors  overhearing
prejudicial  remarks,  unsubstantiated  by  any  speciﬁc  threat
or incident, is inherent whenever members of the public are
present during the selection of jurors.  If broad concerns of
this  sort  were  sufﬁcient  to  override  a  defendant’s  constitu
tional right to a public trial, a court could exclude the public
from  jury  selection  almost  as  a  matter  of  course.  As  noted
in  the  dissent  below,  “the  majority’s  reasoning  permits  the
closure of voir dire in every criminal case conducted in this
courtroom  whenever  the  trial  judge  decides,  for  whatever
reason, that he or she would prefer to ﬁll the courtroom with
potential  jurors  rather  than  spectators.”  285  Ga.,  at  276,
674 S. E. 2d, at 913 (opinion of Sears, C. J.).

There  are  no  doubt  circumstances  where  a  judge  could
conclude  that  threats  of  improper  communications  with  ju
rors or safety concerns are concrete enough to warrant clos
ing  voir  dire.  But  in  those  cases,  the  particular  interest,
and  threat  to  that  interest,  must  “be  articulated  along  with
ﬁndings  speciﬁc  enough  that  a  reviewing  court  can  deter
mine  whether  the  closure  order  was  properly  entered.”
Press-Enterprise I, supra, at 510; see also Press-Enterprise
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the right to a public trial and the circumstances under which a courtroom can be closed during jury selection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Syllabus

death of the employee, not on the appointment of an estate adminis-
trator, even though the latter was the “only person authorized by the
statute to maintain the action.”  Koons, 271 U. S., at 60.  The Board
interprets Koons to hold that a claim accrued at a time when no plain-
tiff  could  sue,  just  as  it  says  Corner  Post’s  claim  “accrued”  before  it
could sue.  But in Koons, the beneficiaries on whose behalf any admin-
istrator would seek relief—the “real parties in interest”—had the right
to “procure the action” after the employee died.  Given this unique con-
text, Koons does not contradict the proposition that a claim generally
accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.
Next, the Board relies on dicta in Crown Coat to support its contention
that  the  word  “accrues”  can  take  on  different  meanings  in  different
contexts.  But the Board misreads Crown Coat, which did not suggest
that the words “right of action first accrues” in a single statute should
mean different things in different contexts.  Instead, the Court inter-
preted §2401(a)—the very statute at issue here—to embody the tradi-
tional  rule  that  a  claim  accrues  when  the  plaintiff  has  the  right  to
bring suit in court.  Pp. 16–20.

(4) Finally, the Board raises policy concerns.  It emphasizes that
agencies and regulated parties need the finality of a 6-year cutoff, and
that successful facial challenges filed after six years upset the reliance
interests of those that have long operated under existing rules.  But
“pleas  of  administrative  inconvenience  . . .  never  ‘justify  departing
from the statute’s clear text.’ ”  Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155,
169 (quoting Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U. S. 198, 217).  Congress could
have chosen different language in §2401(a) or created a general statute
of repose for agencies, but it did not.  In any event, the Board’s policy
concerns  are  overstated  because  regulated  parties  may  always  chal-
lenge a regulation as exceeding the agency’s statutory authority in en-
forcement proceedings against them.  Moreover, there are significant
interests  supporting  the  plaintiff-centric  accrual  rule,  including  the
APA’s “basic presumption” of judicial review, Abbott Labs., 387 U. S.,
at  140,  and  our  “deep-rooted  historic  tradition  that  everyone  should
have  his  own  day  in  court,”  Richards  v.  Jefferson  County,  517  U. S.
793, 798.  Pp. 20–23.

55 F. 4th 634, reversed and remanded.

BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which in which ROB-
ERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion.  JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., and KAGAN, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section. It summarizes the case and the court's reasoning.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>