<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

has applied strict scrutiny to content-based laws regulating the non-
commercial  speech  of  lawyers,  see  Reed,  supra,  at  ___,  professional
fundraisers,  see  Riley,  supra,  at  798,  and  organizations  providing
specialized advice on international law, see Holder v. Humanitarian
Law  Project,  561  U. S.  1,  27–28.    And  it  has  stressed  the  danger  of
content-based  regulations  “in  the  fields  of  medicine  and  public
health, where information can save lives.”  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
564  U. S.  552,  566.    Such  dangers  are  also  present  in  the  context  of
professional  speech,  where  content-based  regulation  poses  the  same
“risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regula-
tory  goal,  but  to  suppress  unpopular  ideas  or  information,”  Turner
Broadcasting  Systems,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  512  U. S.  622,  641.    When  the
government  polices  the  content  of  professional  speech,  it  can  fail  to
“ ‘preserve  an  uninhibited  marketplace  of  ideas  in  which  truth  will
ultimately  prevail.’ ”    McCullen  v.  Coakley,  573  U. S.  ___,  ___–___.
Professional  speech  is  also  a  difficult  category  to  define  with  preci-
sion.  See  Brown  v.  Entertainment  Merchants  Assn.,  564  U. S.  786,
791.  If States could choose the protection that speech receives simply
by requiring a license, they would have a powerful tool to impose “in-
vidious  discrimination  of  disfavored  subjects.”    Cincinnati  v.  Discov-
ery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 423, n. 19.  Pp. 11–14.

(c) Although  neither  California  nor  the  Ninth  Circuit  have  ad-
vanced  a  persuasive  reason  to  apply  different  rules  to  professional
speech,  the  Court  need  not  foreclose  the  possibility  that  some  such
reason  exists  because  the  licensed  notice  cannot  survive  even  inter-
mediate  scrutiny.    Assuming  that  California’s  interest  in  providing
low-income women with information about state-sponsored service is
substantial,  the  licensed  notice  is  not  sufficiently  drawn  to  promote
it.  The  notice  is  “wildly  underinclusive,”  Entertainment  Merchants
Assn.,  supra,  at  802,  because  it  applies  only  to  clinics  that  have  a
“primary purpose” of “providing family planning or pregnancy-related
services” while excluding several other types of clinics that also serve
low-income  women  and  could  educate  them  about  the  State’s  ser-
vices.  California  could  also  inform  the  women  about  its  services
“without  burdening  a  speaker  with  unwanted  speech,”  Riley,  supra,
at 800, most obviously through a public-information campaign.  Peti-
tioners  are  thus  likely  to  succeed  on  the  merits  of  their  challenge.
Pp. 14–17.

2. The  unlicensed  notice  unduly  burdens  protected  speech.    It  is
unnecessary to decide whether Zauderer’s standard applies here, for
even under Zauderer, a disclosure requirement cannot be “unjustified
or unduly burdensome.”  471 U. S., at 651.  Disclosures must remedy
a  harm  that  is  “potentially  real  not  purely  hypothetical,”  Ibanez  v.
Florida  Dept.  of  Business  and  Professional  Regulation,  Bd.  of  Ac-
  </content>
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This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the legal arguments and reasoning behind the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

BALDWIN v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

The “application of th[is] mandamus standard was a conse-
quence solely of the form of relief requested,” not a require-
ment that courts defer to the Executive’s reasonable inter-
pretation of a statute.  Bamzai, 126 Yale L. J., at 958.  The
Court  even  acknowledged  in  mandamus  cases  that  “[i]f  a
suit should come before this Court, which involved the con-
struction of any of these laws, the Court certainly would not
be bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a
department.”  Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 515 (1840);
see also United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40,
48–49 (1888).

The rule in Chevron thus differs from historical practice
in at least four ways.  First, it requires deference regardless
of whether the interpretation began around the time of the
statute’s  enactment  (and  thus  might  reflect  the  statute’s
original meaning).  Second, it requires deference regardless
of  whether  an  agency  has  changed  its  position.    Third,  it
requires deference regardless of whether the agency’s inter-
pretation has the sanction of long practice.  And fourth, it
applies  in  actions  in  which  courts  historically  have  inter-
preted statutes independently.

II
  Even if Chevron deference were sound, I have become in-
creasingly  convinced  that  Brand  X  was  still  wrongly  de-
cided because it is even more inconsistent with the Consti-
tution and traditional tools of statutory interpretation than
Chevron.

A
By  requiring  courts  to  overrule  their  own  precedent
simply because an agency later adopts a different interpre-
tation of a statute, Brand X likely conflicts with Article III
of  the  Constitution.  The  Constitution  imposes  a  duty  on
judges to exercise the judicial power.  See supra, at 2.  That
power is to be exercised “for the purpose of giving effect to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into legal arguments regarding the Chevron deference doctrine and its application in the case of Brand X.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

I
Halkbank is a bank whose shares are majority-owned by
the  Turkish  Wealth  Fund,  which  in  turn  is  part  of  and
owned  by  the  Republic  of  Turkey.  In  2019,  the  United
States  indicted  Halkbank  for  a  multi-year  conspiracy  to
evade economic sanctions imposed by the United States on
Iran.  The  indictment  alleged  that  Halkbank,  with  the
assistance  of  high-ranking  Turkish  government  officials,
laundered billions of dollars of Iranian oil and gas proceeds
through  the  global  financial  system,  including  the  U. S.
financial  system,  in  violation  of  U. S.  sanctions  and
numerous federal statutes.  The indictment further claimed
that Halkbank made false statements to the U. S. Treasury
Department  in  an  effort  to  conceal  the  scheme.    Two
individual  defendants,  including  a  former  Halkbank
executive, have already been convicted in federal court for
their roles in the alleged conspiracy.  According to the U. S.
Government,  several  other  indicted  defendants,  including
Halkbank’s former general manager and its former head of
foreign operations, remain at large.

Halkbank moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that an instrumentality of a foreign state such as Halkbank
is  immune  from  criminal  prosecution  under  the  Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U. S. C. §§1330, 1602
et seq.  The U. S. District Court for the Southern District of
New  York  denied  the  motion,  reasoning  in  relevant  part
that  the  FSIA  “does  not  appear  to  grant  immunity  in
criminal proceedings.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a, 34a.

Halkbank  filed  an  interlocutory  appeal,  and  the  U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.  16 F. 4th
336 (2021).  The Court of Appeals first determined that the
District  Court  has  subject  matter  jurisdiction  over  this
criminal  prosecution  under  18  U. S. C.  §3231.    As  to  the
FSIA, the Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that
the  FSIA  confers  immunity  in  criminal  proceedings  to
foreign states and their instrumentalities, but held that in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S. v. UNITED STATES. It lays out the background of the case, including the charges against Halkbank and its arguments for dismissal.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
58

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

result would be a (barely) sufficient hybrid claim.  Such a
scheme is obviously unworkable and has never been recog-
nized outside of Smith.

And then there is the problem that the hybrid-rights ex-
ception would largely swallow up Smith’s general rule.  A
great  many  claims  for  religious  exemptions  can  easily  be
understood  as  hybrid  free-exercise/free-speech  claims.
Take the claim in Smith itself.  To members of the Native
American Church, the ingestion of peyote during a religious
ceremony is a sacrament.  When Smith and Black partici-
pated in this sacrament, weren’t they engaging in a form of
expressive  conduct?  Their  ingestion  of  peyote  “communi-
cate[d], in a rather dramatic way, [their] faith in the tenets
of the Native American Church,” and the State’s prohibition
of that practice “interfered with their ability to communi-
cate this message” in violation of the Free Speech Clause.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism 1122.  And, “if a hy-
brid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain
an exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable
law  under  another  constitutional  provision,  then  there
would have been no reason for the Court in [the so-called]
hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at
all.”  Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 566–567 (opinion of Souter, J.);
see  also  Laycock,  8  J.  L.  &  Religion,  at  106  (noting  that
Smith “reduces the free exercise clause to a cautious redun-
dancy, relevant only to ‘hybrid’ cases”).  It is telling that this
Court has never once accepted a “hybrid rights” claim in the
more than three decades since Smith.

In addition to all these maneuvers—creating special cat-
egories  for  unemployment  compensation  cases,  cases  in-
volving
individualized  exemptions,  and  hybrid-rights
cases—Smith  ignored  the  multiple  occasions  when  the
Court  had  directly  repudiated  the  very  rule  that  Smith
adopted.  See supra, at 13–14.

Smith’s rough treatment of prior decisions diminishes its

own status as a precedent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Fulton v. Philadelphia. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding religious exemptions and the precedent set by the Smith case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

21

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

Int’l, Inc., 721 F.  3d 1330, 1340–1344 (CA Fed. 2013).  It’s
no  wonder,  then,  that  district  courts  sometimes  throw  up
their  hands  and  let  the  Board  take  over  whenever  inter
partes review and patent litigation begin to overlap.  Why
bother with a trial if “the finality of any judgment rendered
by  [a]  Court  will  be  dubious”?  Order  Granting  Stay  in
Click-to-call  Technologies  LP  v.  Ingenio,  Inc.,  No.  12–cv–
00465 (WD Tex.), Doc. No. 147, p. 4.

It’s understandable, too, why the agency might think so
much  is  up  for  grabs.  Not  only  did  this  Court  give  away
much of its Article III authority in Oil States on a mistaken
assessment that patents were historically treated as public
franchises  rather  than  private  rights.    Some  would  have
had the Court go even further.  Rather than looking to his-
tory to determine how patents were treated, as both the ma-
jority and dissent sought to do, these Members of the Court
suggested  that  agencies  should  be  allowed  to  withdraw
even  private  rights  if  “a  number  of  factors”—taken  to-
gether, of course—suggest it’s a good idea.  Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833, 851 (1986);
see  also  Oil  States,  584  U. S.,  at  ___  (BREYER, J.,  concur-
ring) (slip op., at 1).  These “factors” turn out to include such
definitive and easily balanced considerations as the “nature
of  the  claim,”  the  “nature  of  the  non-Article  III  tribunal,”
and the “nature and importance of the legislative purpose
served by the grant of adjudicatory authority to a tribunal
with judges who lack Article III’s tenure and compensation
protections.”  Stern  v.  Marshall,  564  U. S.  462,  513  (2011)
(BREYER, J., dissenting).  In other words, Article III prom-
ises that a person’s private rights may be taken only in pro-
ceedings  before  an  independent  judge,  unless  the  govern-
ment’s goals would be better served by a judge who isn’t so
independent.

Thryv seeks to assure us that affected parties can still file
writs of mandamus in courts if the Patent Office gets really
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP*.  It discusses the implications of the *Oil States* case and the role of the Patent Office in patent litigation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

JACKSON, J., dissenting

readily  susceptible  to  the  majority’s  narrowing  construc-
tion.

III
  The majority nevertheless revises the statute, leaning on
the canon of constitutional avoidance.  Ante, at 16–17.7  But
that canon “comes into play only when, after the application
of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be sus-
ceptible of more than one construction.”  Jennings v. Rodri-
guez, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 12) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  It does not give the Court license “to
rewrite a statute as it pleases.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).
And, here, for the reasons explained above, it is clear that
the majority has mounted “a serious invasion of the legisla-
tive domain.”  Stevens, 559 U. S., at 481 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  The majority’s rescue mission is especially
problematic  because  it  is  taking  place  in  the  context  of  a
First  Amendment  challenge  to  a  statute  on  overbreadth
grounds, as explained below.

A
  Overbreadth  challenges  are  an  “exception  to  the  usual
rules  governing  standing,”  a  variation  the  Court  has  long
permitted in recognition of the “danger of tolerating, in the
area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal
statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.”
Dombrowski,  380  U. S.,  at  486–487  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted).    Absent  overbreadth  doctrine,  “the  con-
tours  of  regulation[s]”  that  impinge  on  the  freedom  of
speech “would have to be hammered out case by case—and

——————

7 The majority implies that constitutional avoidance is a backup argu-
ment.  Ante, at 16 (suggesting that its reading of the statute is the “best
one”).  But, in my view, the text and history of the encouragement provi-
sion make it hard to get even close to the majority’s narrow reading with-
out substantial reliance on the constitutional-avoidance principle.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

JONES v. HENDRIX

Syllabus

(2) The Government asks the Court to adopt a novel interpreta-
tion of §2255(e)’s saving clause based on an elaborate argument.  Start-
ing from the premise that the words “inadequate or ineffective” imply
reference to a “benchmark” of adequacy and effectiveness, the Govern-
ment equates that benchmark with the types of claims cognizable in
federal habeas petitions by state prisoners under the general habeas
statutes.  The Government ultimately concludes that §2255(h) renders
§2255 “inadequate or ineffective to test” a federal prisoner’s statutory
claim in cases where the prisoner has already filed one §2255 motion
and the claim otherwise satisfies pre-AEDPA habeas principles, which
generally  will  require  “a  ‘colorable  showing  of  factual  innocence.’ ”
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 495 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson,
477 U. S. 436, 454 (plurality opinion)).

The Court sees no indication that the saving clause adopts the Gov-
ernment’s  state-prisoner-habeas  benchmark.    In  any  event,  that
benchmark has uncertain relevance to the question presented here be-
cause  federal  habeas  relief  does  not  lie  for  errors  of  state  law.    The
Government’s  theory  ultimately  rests  instead  on  its  assertion  that
§2255(h) is simply not clear enough to support the inference that Con-
gress entirely closed the door on pure statutory claims not brought in
a federal prisoner’s initial §2255 motion.  That assertion is unpersua-
sive.

The Government asserts that the Court must require “the clearest
command” before construing AEDPA to “close [the] courthouse doors”
on “a strong equitable claim” for relief.  Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S.
631,  646,  649  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    But  AEDPA’s  re-
strictions embody Congress’s policy judgment regarding the appropri-
ate balance between finality and error correction.  The Court declines
to adopt a presumption against finality.  Further, the Court typically
has found clear-statement rules appropriate when a statute implicates
historically or constitutionally grounded norms that the Court would
not  expect  Congress  to  unsettle  lightly.    See,  e.g.,  Alabama  Assn.  of
Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. ___, ___
(per curiam).  As  far  as  history  and  the  Constitution  are  concerned,
“there is nothing incongruous about a system in which this kind of er-
ror—the application of a since-rejected statutory interpretation—can-
not be remedied after final judgment,” George v. McDonough, 596 U. S.
___, ___, and thus nothing fundamentally surprising about Congress
declining to make such errors remediable in a second or successive col-
lateral attack.  Pp. 20–25.

8 F. 4th 683, affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  SOTOMAYOR
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the book, but rather a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

that  it  lacks  legal  authority  to  try  cases  of  this  sort;  and
ignore  fundamental  principles  of  tribal  sovereignty,  a
treaty, the Oklahoma Enabling Act, its own state constitu-
tion, and Public Law 280.  Oklahoma must pursue a propo-
sition  so  novel  and  so  unlikely  that  in  over  two  centuries
not  a  single  State  has  successfully  attempted  it  in  this
Court.
Incredibly,  too,  the  defense  of  tribal  interests
against the State’s gambit falls to a non-Indian criminal de-
fendant.  The real party in interest here isn’t Mr. Castro-
Huerta but the Cherokee, a Tribe of 400,000 members with
its own government.  Yet the Cherokee have no voice as par-
ties  in  these  proceedings;  they  and  other  Tribes  are  rele-
gated to the filing of amicus briefs.

II
A
Today  the  Court  rules  for  Oklahoma.  In  doing  so,  the
Court announces that, when it comes to crimes by non-In-
dians  against  tribal  members  within  tribal  reservations,
Oklahoma may “exercise jurisdiction.”  Ante, at 4.  But this
declaration comes as if by oracle, without any sense of the
history recounted above and unattached to any colorable le-
gal  authority.  Truly,  a  more  ahistorical  and  mistaken
statement of Indian law would be hard to fathom.

The source of the Court’s error is foundational.  Through
most of its opinion, the Court proceeds on the premise that
Oklahoma  possesses  “inherent”  sovereign  power  to  prose-
cute  crimes  on  tribal  reservations  until  and  unless  Con-
gress “preempt[s]” that authority.  Ante, at 5–18.  The Court
emphasizes that States normally wield broad police powers
within  their  borders  absent  some  preemptive  federal  law.
See ante, at 4–6; see also Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren,
587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (lead opinion) (slip op., at 12).

But the effort to wedge Tribes into that paradigm is a cat-
egory  error.  Tribes  are  not  private  organizations  within
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta.  It discusses the court's decision and argues against it, citing legal precedents and principles of tribal sovereignty.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY

Opinion of the Court

ternal quotation marks omitted).  Congress may also abro-
gate  state  sovereign  immunity  under  the  Fourteenth
Amendment,  Fitzpatrick  v.  Bitzer,  427  U. S.  445,  456
(1976), again assuming it does so with the requisite clarity,
Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721,
726 (2003).  And a State may be sued if it has agreed to suit
in the “plan of the Convention,” which is shorthand for “the
structure  of  the  original  Constitution  itself.”  Alden,  527
U. S.,  at  728;  see  The  Federalist  No. 81,  pp. 548–549  (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (A.  Hamilton).  The “plan of  the Conven-
tion”  includes  certain  waivers  of  sovereign  immunity  to
which all States implicitly consented at the founding.  See
Alden,  527  U. S.,  at  755–756.    We  have  recognized  such
waivers in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, Central
Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356, 379 (2006);
see Allen v. Cooper, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 8),
suits by other States, South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192
U. S. 286, 318 (1904), and suits by the Federal Government,
United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 646 (1892).

B
The respondents and the dissent argue that private par-
ties cannot condemn state-owned property under §717f(h)
because  there  is  no  applicable  exception  to  sovereign  im-
munity.  In the dissent’s view, PennEast’s suit is barred be-
cause §717f(h) is just another “exercise of Congress’ power
to regulate interstate commerce,” and “Congress cannot au-
thorize private suits against a nonconsenting State pursu-
ant to its Commerce Clause power.”  Post, at 4 (opinion of
BARRETT,  J.);  see  also  Brief  for  Respondent  NJCF  22–24.
The dissent also contends that States did not implicitly con-
sent to private condemnation suits when they ratified the
Constitution.  See post, at 4–7; see also Brief for Respondent
NJCF 38–44; Brief for Respondent New Jersey et al. 13–22.
Beginning with the argument that Congress cannot sub-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing sovereign immunity and the ability of private parties to condemn state-owned property. It is part of a larger legal argument and contains legal citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

90

UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

Syllabus

validity of other Washington regulations may be assessed in light of the
considerable federal interest at stake. Pp. 99–117.

(a) The State has enacted legislation in an area where the federal
interest has been manifest since the beginning of the Republic and is
now well established. Congress has, beginning with the Tank Vessel
Act of 1936, enacted a series of statutes pertaining to maritime tanker
transports. These include the PWSA, Title I of which authorizes, but
does not require, the Coast Guard to enact measures for controlling
vessel trafﬁc or for protecting navigation and the marine environment,
33 U. S. C. § 1223(a), and Title II of which, as amended, requires the
Coast Guard to issue regulations addressing the design, construction,
alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualiﬁ-
cation, and manning of covered vessels, 46 U. S. C. § 3703(a). Congress
later enacted OPA, Title I of which, among other things, imposes liabil-
ity for both removal costs and damages on parties responsible for an oil
spill, 33 U. S. C. § 2702, and includes two saving clauses preserving the
States’ authority to impose additional liability, requirements, and penal-
ties, §§ 2718(a) and (c). Congress has also ratiﬁed international agree-
ments in this area, including the International Convention of Standards
of Training Certiﬁcation and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).
Pp. 99–103.

(b) In Ray, the Court held that the PWSA and Coast Guard regula-
tions promulgated under that Act pre-empted Washington’s pilotage re-
quirement, limitation on tanker size, and tanker design and construction
rules. The Ray Court’s interpretation of the PWSA is correct and con-
trolling here.
Its basic analytic structure explains why federal pre-
emption analysis applies to the challenged regulations and allows scope
and due recognition for the traditional authority of the States and locali-
ties to regulate some matters of local concern.
In narrowing the pre-
emptive effect given the PWSA in Ray, the Ninth Circuit placed more
weight on OPA’s saving clauses than they can bear. Like Title I of
OPA, in which they are found, the saving clauses are limited to regula-
tions governing liability and compensation for oil pollution, and do not
extend to rules regulating vessel operation, design, or manning. Thus,
the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA and its regulations is not affected
by OPA, and Ray’s holding survives OPA’s enactment undiminished.
The Ray Court’s prefatory observation that an “assumption” that the
States’ historic police powers were not to be superseded by federal law
unless that was the clear and manifest congressional purpose does not
mean that a presumption against pre-emption aids the Court’s analysis
here. An assumption of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the
State regulates in an area where there has been a history of signiﬁcant
federal presence. The Ray Court held, among other things, that Con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, specifically the section outlining the reasoning behind the court's decision. It is sequential text and provides legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

The  Ninth  Circuit  misapplied  our  existing  Pike  jurispru-
dence  in  evaluating  petitioners’  allegations.  I  would  find
that petitioners’ have plausibly alleged a substantial bur-
den against interstate commerce, and would therefore va-
cate the judgment and remand the case for the court below
to  decide  whether  petitioners  have  stated  a  claim  under
Pike.

I
The Ninth Circuit stated that “[w]hile the dormant Com-
merce Clause is not yet a dead letter, it is moving in that
direction.”  6  F. 4th  1021,  1033  (2021).    Today’s  majority
does not pull the plug.  For good reason: Although Pike is
susceptible  to  misapplication  as  a  freewheeling  judicial
weighing of benefits and burdens, it also reflects the basic
concern of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence that there
be “free private trade in the national marketplace.”  General
Motors  Corp.  v.  Tracy,  519  U. S.  278,  287  (1997)  (quoting
Reeves,  Inc.  v.  Stake,  447  U. S.  429,  437  (1980));  see  also
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432
U. S.  333,  350  (1977)  (Pike  protects  “a  national  ‘common
market’ ”).  “Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause,
is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encour-
aged to produce by the certainty that he will have free ac-
cess to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes
will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by cus-
toms  duties  or  regulations  exclude  them.”  H.  P.  Hood  &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 539 (1949).

The majority’s discussion of our Pike jurisprudence high-
lights  two  types  of  cases:  those  involving  discriminatory
state laws and those implicating the “instrumentalities of
interstate transportation.”  Ante, at 17, n. 2.  But Pike has
not been so narrowly typecast.  As a majority of the Court
acknowledges, “we generally leave the courtroom door open
to plaintiffs invoking the rule in Pike, that even nondiscrim-
inatory  burdens  on  commerce  may  be  struck  down  on  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of the Chief Justice of the United States in the case of National Pork Producers Council v. Ross. It delves into the application of the Pike test in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment

demeaning  to  the  medical  profession.”  Miss.  Code  Ann.
§41–41–191(2)(b)(i)(8).    That  procedure  accounts  for  most
abortions  performed  after  the  first  trimester—two  weeks
before the period at issue in this case—and “involve[s] the
use  of  surgical  instruments  to  crush  and  tear  the  unborn
child  apart.”    Ibid.;  see  also  Gonzales,  550  U. S.,  at  135.
Again, it would make little sense to focus on viability when
evaluating a law based on these permissible goals.

In short, the viability rule was created outside the ordi-
nary course of litigation, is and always has been completely
unreasoned,  and  fails  to  take  account  of  state  interests
since  recognized  as  legitimate.  It  is  indeed  “telling  that
other  countries  almost  uniformly  eschew”  a  viability  line.
Ante, at 53 (opinion of the Court).  Only a handful of coun-
tries, among them China and North Korea, permit elective
abortions  after  twenty  weeks;  the  rest  have  coalesced
around  a  12–week  line.    See  The  World’s  Abortion  Laws,
Center  for  Reproductive  Rights  (Feb.  23,  2021)  (online
source  archived  at  www.supremecourt.gov)
(Canada,
China, Iceland, Guinea-Bissau, the Netherlands, North Ko-
rea, Singapore, and Vietnam permit elective abortions after
twenty weeks).  The Court rightly rejects the arbitrary via-
bility rule today.

II
None of this, however, requires that we also take the dra-
matic step of altogether eliminating the abortion right first
recognized in Roe.  Mississippi itself previously argued as
much to this Court in this litigation.

When  the  State  petitioned  for  our  review,  its  basic  re-
quest was straightforward: “clarify whether abortion prohi-
bitions before viability are always unconstitutional.”  Pet.
for Cert. 14.  The State made a number of strong arguments
that  the  answer  is  no,  id.,  at  15–26—arguments  that,  as
discussed, I find persuasive.  And it went out of its way to
make  clear  that  it  was  not  asking  the  Court  to  repudiate
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It discusses the viability rule in abortion law and argues against it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–309.  Argued March 28, 2022—Decided June 6, 2022

Respondent  Latrice  Saxon,  a  ramp  supervisor  for  Southwest  Airlines,
trains and supervises teams of ramp agents who physically load and
unload cargo on and off airplanes that travel across the country.  Like
many ramp supervisors, Saxon also frequently loads and unloads cargo
alongside the ramp agents.  Saxon came to believe that Southwest was
failing  to  pay  proper  overtime  wages  to  ramp  supervisors,  and  she
brought a putative class action against Southwest under the Fair La-
bor Standards Act of 1938.  Because Saxon’s employment contract re-
quired her to arbitrate wage disputes individually, Southwest sought
to  enforce  its  arbitration  agreement  and  moved  to  dismiss.    In  re-
sponse, Saxon claimed that ramp supervisors were a “class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and therefore exempt from
the  Federal  Arbitration  Act’s  coverage.    9  U. S. C.  §1.    The  District
Court disagreed, holding that only those involved in “actual transpor-
tation,” and not those who merely handle goods, fell within §1’s exemp-
tion.  The Court of Appeals reversed.  It held that “[t]he act of loading
cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, as
that  term  was  understood  at  the  time  of  the  [FAA’s]  enactment  in
1925.”  993 F. 3d 492, 494.

Held: Saxon belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or inter-

state commerce” to which §1’s exemption applies.  Pp. 3–11.

(a) This  Court  interprets  §1’s  language  according  to  its  “ordinary,
contemporary,  common  meaning.”  Sandifer  v.  United  States  Steel
Corp.,  571  U. S.  220,  227.    To  discern  that  ordinary  meaning,  those
words  “ ‘must  be  read’ ”  and  interpreted  “ ‘in  their  context.’ ”  Parker
Drilling  Management  Services,  Ltd.  v.  Newton,  587  U. S.  ___,  ___.
Pp. 3–7.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

25

KAGAN, J., dissenting

act as continued barriers to registration and voting”).8  Sec-
tion 2 was meant to disrupt the status quo, not to preserve
it—to eradicate then-current discriminatory practices, not
to set them in amber.  See Bossier, 528 U. S., at 334 (under
Section 2, “[i]f the status quo” abridges the right to vote “rel-
ative to what the right to vote ought to be, the status quo
itself must be changed”).9  And as to election rules common
now,  the  majority  oversimplifies.    Even  if  those  rules  are
unlikely to violate Section 2 everywhere, they may easily do
so somewhere.  That is because the demographics and po-
litical geography of States vary widely and Section 2’s ap-
plication depends on place-specific facts.  As we have recog-
nized,  the  statute  calls  for  “an  intensely  local  appraisal,”
not  a  count-up-the-States  exercise.    Gingles,  478  U. S.,  at
79; see supra, at 17.  This case, as I’ll later discuss, offers a
perfect illustration of how the difference between those two
approaches can matter.  See infra, at 29–40.

——————

8 The House Report listed some of those offensive, even though facially
neutral and then-prevalent, practices: “inconvenient location and hours
of registration, dual registration for county and city elections,” “frequent
and  unnecessary  purgings  and  burdensome  registration  requirements,
and failure to provide . . . assistance to illiterates.”  H. R. Rep., at 14.  So
too the Senate Report complained of “inconvenient voting and registra-
tion  hours”  and  “reregistration  requirements  and  purging  of  voters.”
S. Rep., at 10, n. 22; see supra, at 16.

9 Even setting aside Section 2’s status-quo-disrupting lean, this Court
has  long  rejected—including  just  last  Term—the  majority’s  claim  that
the  state  of  the  world  at  the  time  of  a  statute’s  enactment  provides  a
useful “benchmark[ ]” when applying a broadly written law.  Ante, at 17.
Such  a  law  will  typically  come  to  encompass  applications—even  “im-
portant” ones—that were not “foreseen at the time of enactment.”  Bos-
tock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 26).  To pre-
vent  that  from  happening—as  the  majority  does  today,  on  the  ground
that Congress simply must have “intended” it—is “to displace the plain
meaning of the law in favor of something lying behind it.”  Ibid.; see id.,
at ___ (slip op., at 30) (When a law is “written in starkly broad terms,” it
is “virtually guaranteed that unexpected applications [will] emerge over
time”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND

Syllabus

statutory objectives can also provide guidance, and EPA can provide
administrative  guidance.    Although  this  interpretation  does  not  pre-
sent as clear a line as the other interpretations proffered, the EPA has
applied the permitting provision to some discharges through ground-
water for over 30 years, with no evidence of inadministrability or an
unmanageable expansion in the statute’s scope.  Pp. 15–18.

886 F. 3d 737, vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.  KAV-
ANAUGH,  J.,  filed  a  concurring  opinion.  THOMAS,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting
opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.  ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opin-
ion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet from a legal case syllabus, containing citations, case names, and information about the justices involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 19–251 and 19–255
_________________

AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION,
PETITIONER
19–251
v.
ROB BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER, PETITIONER
19–255
v.
ROB BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2021]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  concurring  in  Parts  I,  II–A,  II–B–2,

and III–A, and concurring in the judgment.

The Court correctly holds that California’s disclosure re-
quirement violates the First Amendment.  It also correctly
concludes that the District Court properly enjoined Califor-
nia’s  attorney  general  from  collecting  the  forms  at  issue,
which  contain  sensitive  donor  information.    But,  while  I
agree with much of the Court’s opinion, I would approach
three issues differently.

First, the bulk of “our precedents . . . require application
of strict scrutiny to laws that compel disclosure of protected
First Amendment association.”  Doe v. Reed, 561 U. S. 186,
232  (2010)  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting).    California’s  law  fits
that  description.    Although  the  Court  rightly  holds  that
even  the  less  demanding  “exacting  scrutiny”  standard  re-
quires  narrow  tailoring  for  laws  that  compel  disclosure,
ante, at 9–11, invoking exacting scrutiny is at odds with our
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal reasoning of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA

INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

adopting  new  congressional  districts,  and  the  Governor
exercised his veto power under the State Constitution.  As
noted above, the Minnesota secretary of state defended the
veto on the ground that “the Legislature” in the Elections
Clause  referred  not  just  to  “the  two  houses of  the  legisla-
ture”  but  to  “the  entire  legislative  power  of  the  state  . . .
however  exercised.”    This  Court  rejected  that  argument,
reiterating  that  the  term  “Legislature”  meant  “the  repre-
sentative  body  which  made  the  laws  of  the  people.”    285
U. S.,  at  365  (quoting  Hawke,  253  U. S.,  at  227).    The
Court  nevertheless  went  on  to  hold  that  the  Elections
Clause  did  not  prevent  a  State  from  applying  the  usual
rules  of  its  legislative  process—including  a  gubernatorial
veto—to election regulations prescribed by the legislature.
285  U. S.,  at  373.    As  in  Hildebrant,  the  legislature  was
not displaced, nor was it redefined; it just had to start on a
new redistricting plan.

The  majority  initially  describes  Hildebrant  and  Smiley
as holding that “redistricting is a legislative function, to be
performed in accordance with the State’s prescriptions for
lawmaking,  which  may  include  the  referendum  and  the
Governor’s veto.”  Ante, at 19.  That description is true, so
far as it goes.  But it hardly supports the result the major-
ity  reaches  here.  There  is  a  critical  difference  between
allowing a State to supplement the legislature’s role in the
legislative  process  and  permitting  the  State  to  supplant
the legislature altogether.  See Salazar, 541 U. S., at 1095
(Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“to
be  consistent  with  Article  I,  §4,  there  must  be  some  limit
on the State’s ability to define lawmaking by excluding the
legislature itself”).  Nothing in Hildebrant, Smiley, or any
other  precedent  supports  the  majority’s  conclusion  that
imposing  some  constraints  on  the  legislature  justifies
deposing it entirely.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n. It delves into the interpretation of the Elections Clause and its implications for redistricting processes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP

Opinion of the Court

During the waning years of the Weimar Republic, a con-
sortium  of  three  art  firms  owned  by  Jewish  residents  of
Frankfurt  purchased  the  Welfenschatz  from  the  Duke  of
Brunswick.  By 1931, the consortium had sold about half of
the  collection’s  pieces  to  museums  and  individuals  in  Eu-
rope and the United States, including many to the Cleve-
land Museum of Art, where they reside today.

Conditions  facing  the  consortium  changed  dramatically
after the collapse of the German economy and the rise of the
Nazi government.  After ascending to power, Hermann Goe-
ring—Adolf Hitler’s deputy and the Prime Minister of Prus-
sia—became  interested  in  the  remainder  of  the  Welfen-
schatz.
The  complaint  alleges  that  he  employed  a
combination of political persecution and physical threats to
coerce the consortium into selling the remaining pieces to
Prussia in 1935 for approximately one-third of their value.
Two of the consortium members fled the country following
the sale, and the third died in Germany shortly thereafter.
The United States took possession of the Welfenschatz in
the course of the occupation of Nazi Germany at the end of
the  war,  eventually  turning  the  collection  over  to  the
Federal  Republic  of  Germany.    For  nearly  60  years,  the
treasure  has  been  maintained  by  Stiftung  Preussischer
Kulturbesitz (SPK)—the Prussian Cultural Heritage Foun-
dation—and  it  is  now  displayed  at  a  museum  in  Berlin.
SPK is an instrumentality of the Federal Republic.

Respondents are two United States citizens and a citizen
of the United Kingdom who trace their lineages back to the
three  members  of  the  consortium.  The  heirs  first  ap-
proached SPK claiming that the sale of the Welfenschatz to
the Prussian Government was unlawful.  SPK conducted its
own  investigation  of  the  sale  and  determined  that  the
transaction  occurred  at  a  fair  market  price  without  coer-
cion.

In  2014,  the  parties  agreed  to  submit  the  claim  to  the
German  Advisory  Commission  for  the  Return  of  Cultural
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It provides background information about the Welfenschatz, the parties involved, and the nature of the dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

States.  Id., at 277.  It was only in the opinion’s conclusion
that,  in  remanding,  the  Court  remarked  that  if  the  time
limit  applied,  “the  courts  below  had  no  jurisdiction  to  in-
quire into the merits.”  Id., at 292.  The opinion contains no
discussion of whether the provision was “ ‘technically juris-
dictional’ ” or what in the case would have “turn[ed] on that
characterization.”  Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512 (quoting Steel
Co., 523 U. S., at 91).  There is nothing more than an “un-
refined  dispositio[n]”  stating  that  a  “threshold  fact”  must
“b[e] established” for there to be “jurisdiction.”  546 U. S.,
at 511 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This is a text-
book  “drive-by  jurisdictional  rulin[g]”  that  Arbaugh  held
“should be accorded no precedential effect” as to whether a
limit is jurisdictional.  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).

In  an  effort  to  endow  a  fleeting  statement  with  lasting
significance, the Government and the dissent invoke histor-
ical context.  Block described the Act’s time limit as “a con-
dition on the waiver of sovereign immunity.”  461 U. S., at
287.  Block never stated, however, that the Act’s time limit
was  therefore  truly  a  limit  on  subject-matter  jurisdiction.
Yet according to the Government and the dissent, this went
without saying because the case law at the time was “un-
mistakably” clear that  conditions on waivers  of immunity
were subject-matter jurisdictional.  Post, at 9.

This reading is undermined by the very history on which
it draws.  In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498
U. S.  89  (1990),  the  Court  surveyed  the  case  law  about
whether “time limits in suits against the Government” are
subject to “equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel.”  Id., at
94.  If associating time limits with waivers of sovereign im-
munity  clearly  made  those  limits  jurisdictional,  equitable
exceptions would be just as clearly foreclosed.  Instead, Ir-
win described the Court’s approach to this question as “ad
hoc” and “unpredictab[le],” “leaving open” whether equita-
ble exceptions were available in any given case.  Id., at 94–
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion discussing jurisdictional issues related to a time limit in a statute. It contains legal citations, references to prior case law, and a detailed analysis of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES

JACKSON, J., dissenting

without  those  lines,  “19  million  state  and  local  officials”
could be imprisoned “for accepting even commonplace gra-
tuities.”  Ante, at 1.

The majority’s fretting falls flat, especially in the context
of this case.  There is no question that state, local, and tribal
officials deserve “clear lines,” but we were not asked to pro-
vide all of them at this moment.4  And, perhaps even more
important,  nothing  about  the  facts  of  this  case  even  re-
motely implicates a reasonable concern about the criminal-
ization of innocuous conduct on the part of an unwary offi-
cial.  Furthermore,  most  of  the  clear  lines  the  majority
seeks already exist—they come from the text of the statute.
Limits within the text of §666 provide “fair notice” that com-
monplace  gratuities  are  typically  not  within  the  statute’s
reach, contra, ante, at 11, and they suffice to prevent pros-
ecution of the gift cards, burrito bowls, and steak dinners
that derail today’s decision.5

A
If  one  simply  accepts  what  the  statute  says  it  covers—
local officials who corruptly solicit, accept, or agree to accept
rewards  in  connection  with  official  business  worth  over  a
certain  amount—Snyder’s  case  is  an  easy  one.    Perhaps
that is why the majority spends so little time describing it.
Snyder took office as mayor of the city of Portage, Indi-
ana, in January 2012.  As mayor, Snyder and his appointees

——————

4 Given  the  question  presented,  the  majority’s  demand  for  a  compre-
hensive interpretation of §666, for all purposes, is both striking and in-
consistent  with  our  usual  incremental  approach.    See  St.  Amant  v.
Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 730–731 (1968) (observing that the “outer lim-
its” of “many legal standards”—whether they be “provided by the Consti-
tution, statutes, or case law”—are “marked out through case-by-case ad-
judication”).

5 Notably, I am not the only Justice who has viewed §666 in this way.
See Sorich v. United States, 555 U. S. 1204, 1207 (2009) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) (describing §666(a) as providing a “clear
rul[e]” prohibiting “bribes and gratuities to public officials”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Jackson. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

23

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

opinion.  With  broad  official-acts  immunity  covering  the
field, this ostensibly narrower immunity serves little pur-
pose.  In any event, this case simply does not turn on con-
duct  within  the  President’s  “exclusive  sphere  of  constitu-
tional authority,” and the majority’s attempt to apply a core
immunity of its own making expands the concept of “core
constitutional powers,” ante, at 6, beyond any recognizable
bounds.

The idea of a narrow core immunity might have some in-
tuitive appeal, in a case that actually presented the issue.
If the President’s power is “conclusive and preclusive” on a
given  subject,  then  Congress  should  not  be  able  to  “ac[t ]
upon the subject.”  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U. S. 579, 638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  In his
Youngstown  concurrence,  Justice  Robert  Jackson  posited
that  the  President’s  “power  of  removal  in  executive  agen-
cies” seemed to fall within this narrow category.  Ibid., n. 4.
Other  decisions  of  this  Court  indicate  that  the  pardon
power also falls in this category, see United States v. Klein,
13  Wall.  128,  147  (1872)  (“To  the  executive  alone  is  in-
trusted  the  power  of  pardon;  and  it  is  granted  without
limit”), as does the power to recognize foreign countries, see
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U. S. 1, 32 (2015) (holding that the
President has “exclusive power . . . to control recognition de-
terminations”).

In  this  case,  however,  the  question  whether  a  former
President enjoys a narrow immunity for the “exercise of his
core  constitutional  powers,”  ante,  at  6,  has  never  been  at
issue,  and  for  good  reason:  Trump  was  not  criminally  in-
dicted for taking actions that the Constitution places in the
unassailable core of Executive power.  He was not charged,
for example, with illegally wielding the Presidency’s pardon
power or veto power or appointment power or even removal
power.  Instead, Trump was charged with a conspiracy to
commit fraud to subvert the Presidential election.  It is true
that the detailed indictment in this case alleges that Trump
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding presidential immunity, referencing previous court cases and the specific charges against former President Trump.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

alters the normal operation of our adversarial system.”  Id.,
at 434.  “For purposes of efficiency and fairness, our legal
system is replete with rules” like forfeiture, which require
parties to raise arguments themselves and to do so at cer-
tain  times.  Ibid.  Jurisdictional  bars,  however,  “may  be
raised at any time” and courts have a duty to consider them
sua sponte.  Ibid.  When such eleventh-hour jurisdictional
objections prevail post-trial or on appeal, “many months of
work  on  the  part  of  the  attorneys  and  the  court  may  be
wasted.”  Id., at 435.  Similarly, doctrines like waiver and
estoppel ensure efficiency and fairness by precluding par-
ties from raising arguments they had previously disavowed.
Because these doctrines do not apply to jurisdictional objec-
tions, parties can disclaim such an objection, only to resur-
rect it when things go poorly for them on the merits.  Ibid.
Given this risk of disruption and waste that accompanies
the  jurisdictional  label,  courts  will  not  lightly  apply  it  to
procedures  Congress  enacted  to  keep  things  running
smoothly and efficiently.  Courts will also not assume that
in  creating  a  mundane  claims-processing  rule,  Congress
made it “unique in our adversarial system” by allowing par-
ties to raise it at any time and requiring courts to consider
it sua sponte.  Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center,
568 U. S. 145, 153 (2013).  Instead, “traditional tools of stat-
utory construction must plainly show that Congress imbued
a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.”  United
States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410 (2015).

Under this clear statement rule, the analysis of §2409a(g)
is  straightforward.3   “[I]n  applying  th[e]  clear  statement

——————

3 The dissent maintains that this Court’s settled clear statement rule
does not apply here because §2409a(g) is a condition on a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity and “as such, this Court should interpret it as a juris-
dictional bar to suit.”  Post, at 2 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).  Over three dec-
ades ago, this Court in “Irwin . . . foreclose[d] th[e] argument” that “time
limits” are jurisdictional simply because they “function as conditions on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal principles related to jurisdiction and statutory interpretation. The text is sequential and coherent, indicating it's part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

Opinion of the Court

475 U. S. 574, 594 (1986) (“ ‘[W]e must be concerned lest a
rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular
type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discourag-
ing  legitimate  price  competition’ ”);  Leegin,  551  U. S.,  at
895 (noting that courts should avoid “increas[ing] the total
cost of the antitrust system by prohibiting procompetitive
conduct the antitrust laws should encourage”).  Accordingly,
we  will  analyze  the  two-sided  market  for  credit-card
transactions  as  a  whole  to  determine  whether  the  plain-
tiffs have shown that Amex’s antisteering provisions have
anticompetitive effects.

B
The  plaintiffs  have  not  carried  their  burden  to  prove
anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.  The plain-
tiffs stake their entire case on proving that Amex’s agree-
ments  increase  merchant  fees.    We  find  this  argument
unpersuasive.

As  an  initial  matter,  the  plaintiffs’  argument  about
merchant fees wrongly focuses on only one side of the two-
sided  credit-card  market.    As  explained,  the  credit-card
market  must  be  defined  to  include  both  merchants  and
cardholders.  Focusing on merchant fees alone misses the
mark  because  the  product  that  credit-card  companies  sell
is transactions, not services to merchants, and the compet-
itive effects of a restraint on transactions cannot be judged
by  looking  at  merchants  alone.    Evidence  of  a  price  in-
crease  on  one  side  of  a  two-sided  transaction  platform
cannot by itself demonstrate an anticompetitive exercise of
market power.  To demonstrate anticompetitive effects on
the two-sided credit-card market as a whole, the plaintiffs
must  prove  that  Amex’s  antisteering  provisions  increased
the  cost  of  credit-card  transactions  above  a  competitive
level,  reduced  the  number  of  credit-card  transactions,  or
otherwise  stifled  competition  in  the  credit-card  market.
See  1  Kalinowski  §12.02[2];  Craftsman  Limousine,  Inc.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the antitrust implications of American Express's antisteering provisions. It delves into legal precedents and economic analysis of the credit card market.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

35

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

mostly does not even grant certiorari on one-year-old, one-
to-one Circuit splits, because we know that a bit of disagree-
ment is an inevitable part of our legal system.  To borrow
an old saying that might apply here: Not one or even a cou-
ple of swallows can make the majority’s summer.

Anyone concerned about workability should consider the
majority’s  substitute  standard.    The  majority  says  a  law
regulating or banning abortion “must be sustained if there
is  a  rational  basis  on  which  the  legislature  could  have
thought  that  it  would  serve  legitimate  state  interests.”
Ante, at 77.  And the majority lists interests like “respect
for and preservation of prenatal life,” “protection of mater-
nal  health,”  elimination  of  certain  “medical  procedures,”
“mitigation  of  fetal  pain,”  and  others.    Ante,  at  78.  This
Court will surely face critical questions about how that test
applies.  Must a state law allow abortions when necessary
to  protect  a  woman’s  life  and  health?  And  if  so,  exactly
when?  How much risk to a woman’s life can a State force
——————
pressive.  The majority says that lower courts have split over how to ap-
ply the undue burden standard to parental notification laws.  See ante,
at 60, and n. 54.  But that is not so.  The state law upheld had an exemp-
tion  for  minors  demonstrating  adequate  maturity,  whereas  the  ones
struck  down  did  not.  Compare  Planned  Parenthood  of  Blue  Ridge  v.
Camblos, 155 F. 3d 352, 383–384 (CA4 1998), with Planned Parenthood
of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Adams, 937 F. 3d 973, 981 (CA7 2019), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 591 U. S. ___ (2020), and Planned Parenthood, Sioux
Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F. 3d 1452, 1460 (CA8 1995).  The majority says
there is a split about bans on certain types of abortion procedures.  See
ante, at 61, and n. 55.  But the one court to have separated itself on that
issue did so based on a set of factual findings significantly different from
those  in  other  cases.  Compare  Whole  Woman’s  Health  v.  Paxton,  10
F. 4th  430,  447–453  (CA5  2021),  with  EMW  Women’s  Surgical  Center,
P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 960 F. 3d 785, 798–806 (CA6 2020), and West Ala.
Women’s Center v. Williamson, 900 F. 3d 1310, 1322–1324 (CA11 2018).
Finally, the majority says there is a split about whether an increase in
travel time  to reach a clinic is an undue burden.  See ante, at 61, and
n. 56.    But  the  cases  to  which  the  majority  refers  predate  this  Court’s
decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582 (2016),
which clarified how to apply the undue burden standard to that context.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It argues against the majority's decision and provides legal reasoning and examples to support its stance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

“Stare  decisis  is  the  preferred  course  because  it  pro
motes  the  evenhanded,  predictable,  and  consistent  devel
opment  of  legal  principles,  fosters  reliance  on  judicial
decisions,  and  contributes  to  the  actual  and  perceived
integrity of the judicial process.”  Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U. S. 808, 827 (1991).  We will not overturn a past decision
unless  there  are  strong  grounds  for  doing  so.    United
States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S.
843,  855–856  (1996);  Citizens  United,  558  U. S.,  at  377
(ROBERTS, C. J., concurring).  But as we have often recog
nized,  stare  decisis  is  “ ‘not  an  inexorable  command.’ ”
Pearson  v.  Callahan,  555  U. S.  223,  233  (2009);  see  also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 577 (2003); State Oil Co.
v.  Khan,  522  U. S.  3,  20  (1997);  Agostini  v.  Felton,  521
U. S.  203,  235  (1997);  Seminole  Tribe  of  Fla.  v.  Florida,
517 U. S. 44, 63 (1996); Payne, supra, at 828.

The  doctrine  “is  at  its  weakest  when  we  interpret  the
Constitution  because  our  interpretation  can  be  altered
only  by  constitutional  amendment  or  by  overruling  our
prior decisions.”  Agostini, supra, at 235.  And stare decisis
applies  with  perhaps  least  force  of  all  to  decisions  that
wrongly  denied  First  Amendment  rights:  “This  Court  has
not  hesitated  to  overrule  decisions  offensive  to  the  First
Amendment  (a  fixed  star  in  our  constitutional  constella
tion, if there is one).”  Federal Election Comm’n v. Wiscon-
sin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 500 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment)  (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Citizens United, supra,
at  362–365  (overruling  Austin,  494  U. S.  652);  Barnette,
319  U. S.,  at  642  (overruling  Minersville  School  Dist.  v.
Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940)).

Our  cases  identify  factors  that  should  be  taken  into
account  in  deciding  whether  to  overrule  a  past  decision.
Five  of  these  are  most  important  here:  the  quality  of
Abood’s  reasoning,  the  workability  of  the  rule  it  estab
lished,  its  consistency  with  other  related  decisions,  devel
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the doctrine of stare decisis and its application to First Amendment cases. It cites previous Supreme Court decisions and analyzes their reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

are  concerned  with  the  imposition  of  a  term  of  imprison
ment  on  offenders  who  kill.    The  two  (carefully  selected)
cases  before  us  concern  very  young  defendants,  and  de
spite  the  brutality  and  evident  depravity  exhibited  by  at
least one of the petitioners, it is hard not to feel sympathy
for a 14-year-old sentenced to life without the possibility of
release.  But no one should be confused by the particulars
of the two cases before us.  The category of murderers that
the Court delicately calls “children” (murderers under the
age of 18) consists overwhelmingly of young men who are
fast  approaching  the  legal  age  of  adulthood.    Evan  Miller
and  Kuntrell  Jackson  are  anomalies;  much  more  typical
are murderers like Christopher Simmons, who committed
a  brutal  thrill-killing  just  seven  months  shy  of  his  18th
birthday.  Roper, 543 U. S., at 556.

Seventeen-year-olds  commit  a  significant  number  of

murders every year,1 and some of these crimes are incred
ibly brutal.  Many of these murderers are at least as ma
ture as the average 18-year-old.  See Thompson, 487 U. S.,
at 854 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that
maturity may “vary widely among different individuals of
the same age”).  Congress and the legislatures of 43 States
have  concluded  that  at  least  some  of  these  murderers
should  be  sentenced  to  prison  without  parole,  and  28
States and the Federal Government have decided that for
some of these offenders life without parole should be man
datory.  See Ante, at 20–21, and nn. 9–10.  The majority of
this Court now overrules these legislative judgments.2

——————

1 Between  2002  and  2010,  17-year-olds  committed  an  average  com
bined  total  of  424  murders  and  nonnegligent  homicides  per  year.  See
Dept.  of  Justice,  Bureau  of  Justice  Statistics,  §4,  Arrests,  Age  of  per
sons arrested (Table 4.7).

2 As the Court noted in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 366
(1989), Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to eliminate
discretionary  sentencing  and  parole  because  it  concluded  that  these
practices had led to gross abuses.  The Senate Report for the 1984 bill
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It discusses the topic of sentencing juveniles for murder and cites relevant legal precedents and statistics.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

GARLAND v. CARGILL

Opinion of the Court

against ineffectiveness.  That presumption weighs against
interpretations of a statute that would “rende[r] the law in
a great measure nugatory, and enable offenders to elude its
provisions in the most easy manner.”  The Emily, 9 Wheat.
381,  389  (1824).    It  is  a  modest  corollary  to  the  com-
monsense proposition “that Congress presumably does not
enact useless laws.”  United States v. Castleman, 572 U. S.
157, 178 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment).
  In  ATF’s  view,  Congress  “restricted  machineguns  be-
cause they eliminate the manual movements that a shooter
would otherwise need to make in order to fire continuously”
at a high rate of fire, as bump stocks do.  Brief for Petition-
ers 40.  So, ATF reasons, concluding that bump stocks are
lawful “simply because the [trigger] moves back and forth
. . . would exalt artifice above reality and enable evasion of
the federal machinegun ban.”  Id., at 41–42 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  The dissent endorses a similar view.
See post, at 14–17.
  The  presumption  against  ineffectiveness  cannot  do  the
work that ATF and the dissent ask of it.  A law is not useless
merely because it draws a line more narrowly than one of
its  conceivable  statutory  purposes  might  suggest.    Inter-
preting §5845(b) to exclude semiautomatic rifles equipped
with bump stocks comes nowhere close to making it useless.
Under  our  reading,  §5845(b)  still  regulates  all  traditional
machineguns.  The fact that it does not capture other weap-
ons capable of a high rate of fire plainly does not render the
law  useless.    Moreover,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how
ATF  can  plausibly  argue  otherwise,  given  that  its  con-
sistent position for almost a decade in numerous separate
decisions was that §5845(b) does not capture semiautomatic
rifles equipped with bump stocks.  See App. 16–68.  Curi-
ously, the dissent relegates ATF’s about-face to a footnote,
instead pointing  to  its classification  of  other  devices.   See
post, at 14–17, and n. 6.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It delves into the interpretation of a statute (likely related to firearms) and argues against a particular interpretation put forth by the ATF.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

15

Opinion of the Court

Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546–547.  The City offers no compel-
ling reason why it has a particular interest in denying an
exception to CSS while making them available to others.

*

*

*
As  Philadelphia  acknowledges,  CSS  has  “long  been  a
point of light in the City’s foster-care system.”  Brief for City
Respondents 1.  CSS seeks only an accommodation that will
allow it to continue serving the children of Philadelphia in
a  manner  consistent  with  its  religious  beliefs;  it  does  not
seek to impose those beliefs on anyone else.  The refusal of
Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision of foster
care services unless it agrees to certify same-sex couples as
foster  parents  cannot  survive  strict  scrutiny,  and  violates
the First Amendment.

In view of our conclusion that the actions of the City vio-
late  the  Free  Exercise  Clause,  we  need  not  consider
whether they also violate the Free Speech Clause.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the concluding portion of the opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations, and the court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

969

558 U. S.

October 20, 2009

Certiorari  Granted

No.  08–1234.  Kiyemba  et  al.  v.  Obama,  President  of  the
United  States,  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  granted.
Reported  below:  555  F.  3d  1022.

No.  08–1553.  Kawasaki  Kisen  Kaisha  Ltd.  et  al.  v.

Regal-Beloit  Corp.  et  al.;  and

No.  08–1554.  Union  Pacific  Railroad  Co.  v.  Regal-Beloit
Corp.  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  granted,  cases  consoli
dated,  and  a  total  of  one  hour  is  allotted  for  oral  argument.  Re
ported  below:  557  F.  3d  985.

Certiorari  Denied

No.  08–1427.  Brockman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  681.

No.  08–1428.  Burkey  v.  Marberry,  Warden.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  142.

No.  08–1453.  Rollins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  552  F.  3d  739.

No.  08–1465.  Rodriguez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  Armed

Forces.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  67  M.  J.  110.

No.  08–9991.  Mosley  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306
Fed.  Appx.  40.

No.  08–10521.  Parker  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  3d

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  991  So.  2d  411.

No.  08–10993.  Macias  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  50.

No.  09–183.  Roberts  v.  Bank  of  New  York.  Ct.  App.  Ore.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  223  Ore.  App.  259,  195  P.
3d  923.

No.  09–185.  Anderson  v.  Iowa  City  Development  Board
et al.  Ct. App. Iowa.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 767
N. W.  2d  420.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, including case numbers, citations, and decisions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

Opinion of the Court

meet the statute’s standards for admitting new merits evi-
dence, it serves no purpose to develop such evidence just to
assess  cause  and  prejudice.  See  Shinn,  596  U. S.,  at  ___
(slip op., at 20) (“when a federal habeas court . . . admits or
reviews new evidence for any purpose, it may not consider
that  evidence  on  the  merits  of  a  negligent  prisoner’s  de-
faulted claim unless the exceptions in §2254(e)(2) are satis-
fied”).  The District Court thus erred in ordering Twyford’s
transfer  to  gather  evidence  he  had  never  demonstrated
would be admissible.

*

*

*
A  transportation  order  that  allows  a  prisoner  to  search
for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of ”
a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action, 28
U. S. C. §1651(a), when the prisoner has not shown that the
desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a
particular claim for relief.  Because the District Court en-
tered such an order despite Twyford’s failure to make the
required showing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals af-
firming that order is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the admissibility of new evidence in a habeas corpus case and the requirements for a court to order a prisoner's transfer to gather evidence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA
Opinion of the Court

gress  provided  that  the  “[g]overnment  shall  not  substan-
tially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the bur-
den results from a rule of general applicability” unless “it
demonstrates  that  application  of  the  burden  . . .  is  in  fur-
therance of a compelling governmental interest; and . . . is
the  least  restrictive  means  of  furthering  that  compelling
governmental interest.”  §§2000bb–1(a)–(b).  Placing Con-
gress’ intent beyond dispute, RFRA specifies that it “applies
to  all  Federal  law,  and  the  implementation  of  that  law,
whether statutory or otherwise.”  §2000bb–3(a).  RFRA also
permits Congress to exclude statutes from RFRA’s protec-
tions.  §2000bb–3(b).

It is clear from the face of the statute that the contracep-
tive mandate is capable of violating RFRA.  The ACA does
not  explicitly  exempt  RFRA,  and  the  regulations  imple-
menting  the  contraceptive  mandate  qualify  as  “Federal
law”  or  “the  implementation  of  [Federal]  law.”    §2000bb–
3(a);  cf.  Chrysler  Corp.  v.  Brown,  441  U. S.  281,  297–298
(1979).  Additionally, we expressly stated in Hobby Lobby
that the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA as applied
to  entities with  complicity-based  objections.   573  U. S.,  at
736.  Thus, the potential for conflict between the contracep-
tive mandate and RFRA is well settled.  Against this back-
drop,  it  is  unsurprising  that  RFRA  would  feature  promi-
nently  in  the  Departments’  discussion  of  exemptions  that
would not pose similar legal problems.

Moreover,  our  decisions  all  but  instructed  the  Depart-
ments  to  consider  RFRA  going  forward.  For  instance,
though we held that the mandate violated RFRA in Hobby
Lobby, we left it to the Federal Government to develop and
implement a solution.  At the same time, we made it abun-
dantly clear that, under RFRA, the Departments must ac-
cept  the  sincerely  held  complicity-based  objections  of  reli-
gious  entities.    That  is,  they  could  not  “tell  the  plaintiffs
that their beliefs are flawed” because, in the Departments’
view,  “the  connection  between  what  the  objecting  parties
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and its application to the contraceptive mandate.  It cites previous cases and legal precedents, indicating it is part of a larger legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY v. PHILIPP

Opinion of the Court

not “property takings in violation of international law.”  Tr.
of  Oral  Arg.  70.  This  distinction  between  “takings”  and
“taken,”  they  say,  is  the  difference  between  incorporating
the specific international law governing takings of property
and incorporating international law writ large.  Ibid.

We would not place so much weight on a gerund.  The text
of  the  expropriation  exception  as  a  whole  supports  Ger-
many’s  reading.    In  its  entirety  the  clause  provides  that
United  States  courts  may  exercise  jurisdiction  over  a  for-
eign sovereign in any case

“in which rights in property taken in violation of inter-
national law are in issue and that property or any prop-
erty  exchanged  for  such  property  is  present  in  the
United States in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
that property or any property exchanged for such prop-
erty is owned or operated by an agency or instrumen-
tality  of  the  foreign  state  and  that  agency  or  instru-
mentality  is  engaged  in  a  commercial  activity  in  the
United States.”  28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(3).

The exception places repeated emphasis on property and
property-related  rights,  while  injuries  and  acts  we  might
associate with genocide are notably lacking.  That would be
remarkable if the provision were intended to provide relief
for  atrocities  such  as  the  Holocaust.    A  statutory  phrase
concerning property rights most sensibly references the in-
ternational law governing property rights, rather than the
law of genocide.

What  is  more,  the  heirs’  interpretation  of  the  phrase
“taken in violation of international law” is not limited to vi-
olations of the law of  genocide but extends  to any human
rights  abuse.  Their  construction  would  arguably  force
courts themselves to violate international law, not only ig-
noring the domestic takings rule but also derogating inter-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the interpretation of a specific clause related to property rights and international law. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the scope of the clause and its potential application to cases involving genocide.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
992

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–279.  Robertson  v.  Michigan.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–282.  Davis  et  al.  v.  Tilzer  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Kan.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  288  Kan.  477,  204  P.  3d  617.

No.  09–283.  Reeves  v.  DSI  Security  Services  et  al.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.
Appx.  659.

No.  09–284.  Independence  News,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  City  of
Charlotte,  North  Carolina.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  148.

No.  09–298.  Blum  v.  Federal  Aviation  Administration
et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326
Fed.  Appx.  189.

No.  09–299.  Michigan  v.  Shafier.  Sup.  Ct.  Mich.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  483  Mich.  205,  768  N. W.  2d  305.

No.  09–320.  Chapman  et  al.  v.  Casner  et  al.  C.  A.  Fed.

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  294.

No.  09–334.  Heimermann  v.  McCaughtry  et  al.  Ct.  App.
Wis.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Wis.  2d  355,  763
N. W.  2d  247.

No. 09–336.  Rx.com, Inc. v.  Medco Health Solutions, Inc.,
et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322
Fed.  Appx.  394.

No.  09–354.  Villarreal  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  286  S. W.  3d  321.

No.  09–366.  Curry  v.  Alaska.  Sup.  Ct.  Alaska.  Certiorari

denied.

No. 09–378.  Akins v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  335.

No.  09–5016.  Barrett  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  347.

No.  09–5043.  Hovind  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  615.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not the actual content of a book and is likely a legal document or court docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

in  the  United  States  . . .  is  prohibited.”).    The  Copyright
Office  originally  recommended  against  such  an  extension
of  the  importation  ban,  reasoning  that  enforcement  of
territorial restrictions was best left to contract law.  Copy
right Law Revision 126.

Publishing-industry representatives argued strenuously

against  the  position  initially  taken  by  the  Copyright  Of
fice.  At a 1962 panel discussion on the Copyright Office’s
report, for example, Horace Manges of the American Book
Publishers Council stated:

“When  a  U. S.  book  publisher  enters  into  a  contract
with  a  British  publisher  to  acquire  exclusive  U. S.
rights  for  a  particular  book,  he  often  finds  that  the
English  edition  . . .  of  that  particular  book  finds  its
way into this country.  Now it’s all right to say, ‘Com
mence  a  lawsuit  for  breach  of  contract.’  But  this  is
expensive,  burdensome,  and,  for  the  most  part,  inef
fective.”  Copyright  Law  Revision  Part  2:  Discussion
and  Comments  on  Report  of  the  Register  of  Copy
rights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright
Law,  88th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  212  (H. R.  Judiciary
Comm. Print 1963).

Sidney  Diamond,  representing  London  Records,  elabo
rated on Manges’ statement.  “There are many situations,”
he  explained,  “in  which  it  is  not  necessarily  a  question of
the inadequacy of a contract remedy—in the sense that it
may be difficult or not quick enough to solve the particular
problem.”  Id., at 213.  “Very frequently,” Diamond stated,
publishers  “run  into  a  situation  where  . . .  copies  of  [a]
work . . . produced in a foreign country . . . may be shipped
[to the United States] without violating any contract of the
U. S.  copyright  proprietor.”    Ibid.   To  illustrate,  Diamond
noted, if a “British publisher [sells a copy] to an individual
who in turn ship[s] it over” to the United States, the indi
vidual’s conduct would not “violate [any] contract between
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses copyright law and the importation of books.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

21

ALITO, J., dissenting

of  racial  discrimination  in  this  country  not  to  understand
what is at stake in such cases . . . .  A prohibition on ‘race-
mixing’  was  . . .  grounded  in  bigotry  against  a  particular
race and was an integral part of preserving the rigid hier-
archical distinction that denominated members of the black
race as inferior to whites.”  883 F. 3d, at 158–159 (Lynch,
J., dissenting).

Discrimination because of sexual orientation is different.

It cannot be regarded as a form of sex discrimination on the
ground that applies in race cases since discrimination be-
cause of sexual orientation is not historically tied to a pro-
ject that aims to subjugate either men or women.  An em-
ployer  who  discriminates  on  this  ground  might  be  called
“homophobic” or “transphobic,” but not sexist.  See Wittmer
v.  Phillips  66  Co.,  915  F.  3d  328,  338  (CA5  2019)  (Ho,  J.,
concurring).

3
The  opinion  of  the  Court  intimates  that  the  term  “sex”
was not universally understood in 1964 to refer just to the
categories of male and female, see ante, at 5, and while the
Court  does  not  take  up  any  alternative  definition  as  a
ground for its decision, I will say a word on this subject.

As previously noted, the definitions of “sex” in the una-
bridged dictionaries in use in the 1960s are reproduced in
Appendix A, infra.  Anyone who examines those definitions
can see that the primary definition in every one of them re-
fers  to  the  division  of  living  things  into  two  groups,  male
and  female,  based  on  biology,  and  most  of  the  definitions
further down the list are the same or very similar.  In addi-
tion,  some  definitions  refer  to  heterosexual  sex  acts.    See

——————
tinctions  based  on  sex.   Title  42  U. S. C.  §2000e–2(e)(1)  allows  for  “in-
stances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [a] partic-
ular business or enterprise.”  Race is wholly absent from this list.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding discrimination based on sexual orientation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment

with  subsequent  factual  and  legal  developments,  and  the
reliance interests that the precedent has engendered.  See
Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S.
___, ____–____ (2018) (slip op., at 34–35).
  Stare decisis principles also determine how we handle a
decision that itself departed from the cases that came be-
fore it.  In those instances, “[r]emaining true to an ‘intrinsi-
cally  sounder’  doctrine  established  in  prior  cases  better
serves the values of stare decisis than would following” the
recent departure.  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515
U. S.  200,  231  (1995)  (plurality  opinion).  Stare  decisis  is
pragmatic and contextual, not “a mechanical formula of ad-
herence to the latest decision.”  Helvering v.  Hallock, 309
U. S. 106, 119 (1940).

II
A
Both Louisiana and the providers agree that the undue
burden  standard  announced  in  Casey  provides  the  appro-
priate framework to analyze Louisiana’s law.  Brief for Pe-
titioners in No. 18–1323, pp. 45–47; Brief for Respondent in
No. 18–1323, pp. 60–62.  Neither party has asked us to re-
assess the constitutional validity of that standard.

Casey  reaffirmed  “the  most  central  principle  of  Roe  v.
Wade,” “a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before
viability.”  Casey, 505 U. S., at 871 (plurality opinion).1  At
the same time, it recognized that the State has “important
and legitimate interests in . . . protecting the health of the
pregnant  woman and in protecting the potentiality of hu-
man  life.”  Id.,  at  875–876  (internal  quotation  marks  and
brackets omitted).

To  serve  the  former  interest,  the  State  may,  “[a]s  with

——————

1 Although parts of Casey’s joint opinion were a plurality not joined by
a majority of the Court, the joint opinion is nonetheless considered the
holding of the Court under Marks v.  United States, 430 U. S. 188, 193
(1977), as the narrowest position supporting the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO. It delves into legal principles like stare decisis and the undue burden standard in the context of abortion rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>