<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

952

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 26, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–1567. American Medical Assn. v. Practice Man-
agement Information Corp. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 121 F. 3d 516 and 133 F. 3d 1140.

No. 97–1578. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. United States.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 128 F. 3d 216.

No. 97–1610. Bunker Group, Inc., et al. v. United States
et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132
F. 3d 818.

No. 97–1618. Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United
States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 128
F. 3d 1294.

No. 97–1635. Government of Honduras et al. v. Hondu-
ras Aircraft Registry, Ltd., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 543.

No. 97–1646. National Environmental Waste Corp. v.

City of Riverside; and

No. 97–1810. City of Riverside v. National Environmen-
tal Waste Corp. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 129 F. 3d 1052.

No. 97–1686. Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 484.

No. 97–1693. Hadix et al. v. McGinnis et al. C. A. 6th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 940.

No. 97–1735. Rendish v. City of Tacoma et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 123 F. 3d 1216.

No. 97–1742. Dorsey v. Dorsey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–1743. Couch v. Sprint Corp. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 764.

No. 97–1745. Barandiaran et al. v. TCW Special Credits
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129
F. 3d 1330.

No. 97–1747. North Lawrence Community School Corp. v.
Mary M., Parent and Next Friend for Diane M., a Minor.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and relevant court information. This type of content is not typically considered suitable for general indexing as it is highly specialized and not meant for casual reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
896

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5277.  Martin  v.  Merrill,  Warden.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09– 5278.  Martin  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.

C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5279.  Jointer  v.  Garcia,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5280.  Allen v.  Hall, Superintendent, Two Rivers
Correctional  Institution.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
No.  09–5282.  Best  v.  GEICO  Casualty  Co.  Dist.  Ct.  App.

Fla.,  4th  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5284.  McFarland  v.  Deppisch,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  113.

No.  09–5286.  Pickens  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  268.

No.  09–5287.  Mullins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5288.  Mingo,  aka  Mine  v.  Lawler,  Superintend
ent, State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5291.  Montufar  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  896.

No.  09–5292.  Luke  v.  Alabama.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Ala.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  51  So.  3d  411.

No.  09–5293.  Letizia  v.  New  York.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.

N. Y.,  4th  Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5295.  McFadden  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  913.

No.  09–5296.  Rossaty,  aka  Mendez  v.  Holder,  Attorney

General.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5297.  Robinson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  264.

No. 09–5298.  Santos v.  United States.  C. A. 1st Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

SHELBY COUNTY v. HOLDER

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

constructed  to  prevent  minority  voters  from  fully  partici
pating in the electoral process” continued to exist, as well
as  racially  polarized  voting  in  the  covered  jurisdictions,
which  increased  the  political  vulnerability  of  racial  and
language  minorities  in  those  jurisdictions.    §§2(b)(2)–(3),
120 Stat. 577.  Extensive “[e]vidence of continued discrim
ination,”  Congress  concluded,  “clearly  show[ed]  the  con
tinued need for Federal oversight” in covered jurisdictions.
§§2(b)(4)–(5),  id.,  at  577–578.    The  overall  record  demon
strated  to  the  federal  lawmakers  that,  “without  the  con
tinuation  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act  of  1965  protections,
racial  and  language  minority  citizens  will  be  deprived  of
the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will have
their  votes  diluted,  undermining  the  significant  gains
made  by  minorities  in  the  last  40  years.”    §2(b)(9),  id.,  at
578.

Based  on  these  findings,  Congress  reauthorized  pre
clearance  for  another  25  years,  while  also  undertaking  to
reconsider the extension after 15 years to ensure that the
provision  was  still  necessary  and  effective.    42  U. S. C.
§1973b(a)(7), (8) (2006 ed., Supp. V).  The question before
the  Court  is  whether  Congress  had  the  authority  under
the Constitution to act as it did.

II
In answering this question, the Court does not write on
a  clean  slate.  It  is  well  established  that  Congress’  judg
ment  regarding  exercise  of  its  power  to  enforce  the  Four
teenth  and  Fifteenth  Amendments  warrants  substantial
deference.  The  VRA  addresses  the  combination  of  race
discrimination  and  the  right  to  vote,  which  is  “preserva
tive of all rights.”  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370
(1886).  When confronting the most constitutionally invid
ious  form  of  discrimination,  and  the  most  fundamental
right  in  our  democratic  system,  Congress’  power  to  act  is
at its height.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case of Shelby County v. Holder. It discusses the historical context and rationale behind the Voting Rights Act and Congress's authority to reauthorize it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1083

558 U. S.

December 7, 2009

No.  09–7389.  Gamble  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  472.

No.  09–7393.  Osequera-Morales  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7396.  Diallo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d  252.

No.  09–7401.  Ortkiese  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7403.  Baldwin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  518.

No.  09–7404.  Robertson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  568  F.  3d  1203.

No.  09–7406.  Saldana  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7407.  Savage  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7409.  Hartstein  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  589.

No.  09–7411.  Payan-Carrill,  aka  Mata-Carillo  v.  United
States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 331
Fed.  Appx.  292.

No.  09–7416.  Sanders  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  975  A.  2d  165.

No.  09–7417.  Rivera-Castaneda  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 331 Fed. Appx. 337.
No.  09–7420.  Wilson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  562.

No.  09–7421.  Culverhouse  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7422.  Gatherum  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  271.

No.  09–7427.  Grider  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  820.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

143

Opinion of the Court

ard, the FDA has concluded that, although tobacco products
might be effective in delivering certain pharmacological ef-
fects, they are “unsafe” and “dangerous” when used for these
purposes. Consequently, if tobacco products were within
the FDA’s jurisdiction, the Act would require the FDA to
remove them from the market entirely. But a ban would
contradict Congress’ clear intent as expressed in its more
recent, tobacco-speciﬁc legislation. The inescapable conclu-
sion is that there is no room for tobacco products within the
FDCA’s regulatory scheme.
If they cannot be used safely
for any therapeutic purpose, and yet they cannot be banned,
they simply do not ﬁt.

B

In determining whether Congress has spoken directly to
the FDA’s authority to regulate tobacco, we must also con-
sider in greater detail the tobacco-speciﬁc legislation that
Congress has enacted over the past 35 years. At the time a
statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible meanings.
Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus
those meanings. The “classic judicial task of reconciling
many laws enacted over time, and getting them to ‘make
sense’ in combination, necessarily assumes that the implica-
tions of a statute may be altered by the implications of a
later statute.” United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S., at 453.
This is particularly so where the scope of the earlier statute
is broad but the subsequent statutes more speciﬁcally ad-
dress the topic at hand. As we recognized recently in
United States v. Estate of Romani, “a speciﬁc policy embod-
ied in a later federal statute should control our construction
of the [earlier] statute, even though it ha[s] not been ex-
523 U. S., at 530–531.
pressly amended.”
Congress has enacted six separate pieces of legislation
since 1965 addressing the problem of tobacco use and human
health. See supra, at 137–138. Those statutes, among
other things, require that health warnings appear on all
packaging and in all print and outdoor advertisements, see
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the text of the Supreme Court's decision. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other legislation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

SHURTLEFF v. BOSTON

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

been exposed as an anomaly and a mistake.

From  the  birth  of  modern  Establishment  Clause  litiga-
tion in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, this Court looked
primarily to historical practices and analogues to guide its
analysis.  330 U. S. 1, 9–15 (1947).  So, for example, while
the dissent in Everson disagreed with some of the majority’s
conclusions about what qualifies as an establishment of re-
ligion, it readily agreed that “[n]o provision of the Constitu-
tion is more closely tied to or given content by its generating
history than the religious clause of the First Amendment.”
Id., at 33–49 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  This approach fit,
too, with this Court’s usual course in other areas.  Often, we
have looked to early and long-continued historical practices
as evidence of the Constitution’s meaning at the time of its
adoption.5  And, in the years following Everson, the Court
followed  this  same  path  when  interpreting  the  Establish-
ment  Clause.  Agree  or  disagree  with  the  conclusions  in
these  cases,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  Court  ap-
proached them in large part using history as its guide.6
——————

5 See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 767–770 (2010); Giles
v. California, 554 U. S. 353, 358 (2008); see also The Pocket Veto Case,
279 U. S. 655, 689 (1929).

6 See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 680
(1970)  (upholding  tax  exemptions  for churches  because  they  were  sup-
ported by “more than a century of our history and uninterrupted prac-
tice”); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 294
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he line we must draw between the
permissible and the impermissible is one which accords with history and
faithfully  reflects  the  understanding  of  the  Founding  Fathers”);
McGowan  v.  Maryland,  366  U. S.  420,  437–440  (1961)  (assessing  “the
place of Sunday Closing Laws in the First Amendment’s history”); Tor-
caso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 490 (1961) (concluding that religious-test
oaths were one of the elements of “the formal or practical” religious es-
tablishments that “many of the early colonists left Europe and came here
hoping to” avoid).  JUSTICE THOMAS has raised important questions about
this  Court’s  incorporation  of  the  Establishment  Clause  against  the
States in these cases.  But “[e]ven assuming” incorporation, the Clause
“would only protect against an ‘establishment’ of religion as understood
at the founding.”  Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the historical context and interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
Opinion of the Court

FNHRA is largely composed of a litany of statutory require-
ments  that  Congress  laid  out  for  Medicaid-participant
States and “nursing facilities.”  §1396a(a)(28).11  Those in-
clude  “[r]equirements  relating  to  residents’  rights,”
§1396r(c)  (boldface  deleted),  two  of  which  Talevski’s  com-
plaint invoked.

The first requires nursing facilities to “protect and  pro-
mote” residents’ “right to be free from . . . any physical or
chemical  restraints  imposed  for  purposes  of  discipline  or
convenience and not required to treat the resident’s medical
symptoms.”  §1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii)  (referred  to  herein  as  “the
unnecessary-restraint provision”).  The second appears in a
subparagraph concerning “[t]ransfer and discharge rights,”
§1396r(c)(2)(A)  (boldface  deleted),  and  tells  nursing  facili-
ties that they “must not transfer or discharge [a] resident”
unless  certain  enumerated  preconditions,  including  ad-
vance notice of such a transfer or discharge, are met.  E.g.,
§§1396r(c)(2)(A)–(B)  (referred  to  herein  as  “the  predis-
charge-notice provision”).

As  for  enforcement,  like  other  aspects  of  Medicaid,  the
FNHRA  anticipates  “cooperative  federalism”—i.e.,  federal
and  state  actors  working  together—to  carry  out  the  stat-
ute’s aims.  Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family Servs. v.
Blumer, 534 U. S. 473, 495 (2002).  Thus, qualifying State
Medicaid plans, which are approved by the Secretary of the
U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS Sec-
retary),  §1396a(b),  must  include  provisions  that  relate  to
——————
to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, i.e., Medicaid.  See 101 Stat. 1330–
182.  The FNHRA added a materially identical section to the Medicare-
focused portion of the Social Security Act, 101 Stat. 1330–160, 42 U. S. C.
§1395i–3 et seq.  Because Talevski’s complaint relies only on the Medi-
caid-related FNHRA provisions, App. to Pet. for Cert. 76a, we hereafter
follow the parties and the Court of Appeals in referring only to the perti-
nent Medicaid provisions, as codified in the U. S. Code (§§1396a(a)(28),
1396r).

11 “Nursing  facility”  is  the  FNHRA’s  term  for  a  nursing  home.

§1396r(a).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA) and its requirements related to resident rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Case Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U47

[10-04-01 09:34:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 420 (2000)

437

Opinion of the Court

rights secured by the Constitution in state criminal proceed-
ings. Diligence will require in the usual case that the pris-
oner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state
court in the manner prescribed by state law.
“Comity . . .
dictates that when a prisoner alleges that his continued con-
ﬁnement for a state court conviction violates federal law, the
state courts should have the ﬁrst opportunity to review this
claim and provide any necessary relief.” O’Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838, 844 (1999). For state courts to have
their rightful opportunity to adjudicate federal rights, the
prisoner must be diligent in developing the record and pre-
senting, if possible, all claims of constitutional error.
If the
prisoner fails to do so, himself or herself contributing to the
absence of a full and fair adjudication in state court,
§ 2254(e)(2) prohibits an evidentiary hearing to develop the
relevant claims in federal court, unless the statute’s other
stringent requirements are met. Federal courts sitting in
habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and is-
sues which a prisoner made insufﬁcient effort to pursue in
state proceedings. Yet comity is not served by saying a
prisoner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim”
where he was unable to develop his claim in state court de-
spite diligent effort.
In that circumstance, an evidentiary
hearing is not barred by § 2254(e)(2).

III

Now we apply the statutory test.

If there has been no
lack of diligence at the relevant stages in the state proceed-
ings, the prisoner has not “failed to develop” the facts under
§ 2254(e)(2)’s opening clause, and he will be excused from
showing compliance with the balance of the subsection’s re-
quirements. We ﬁnd lack of diligence as to one of the three
claims but not as to the other two.

A
Petitioner did not exercise the diligence required to pre-
serve the claim that nondisclosure of Cruse’s psychiatric re-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the requirements for a prisoner to raise federal claims in state court and the consequences of failing to do so.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

27

Opinion of the Court

Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 13 (“The recog-
nized  relationship  is  a  political  relationship  between  the
United States and the tribe”); see also, e.g., note following
25 U. S. C. §5130, p. 678 (“ ‘[T]he United State has a trust
responsibility  to  recognized  Indian  tribes,  maintains  a
government-to-government relationships with those tribes,
and recognizes the sovereignty of those tribes’ ”).  In addi-
tion, the CARES Act’s use of the term “recognized govern-
ing body” is borrowed from ISDA itself, which lists the “rec-
ognized  governing  body”  of  an  Indian  tribe  as  one  type  of
“tribal organization” empowered to contract  with the gov-
ernment on the tribe’s behalf.  §5304(l).  In the ISDA con-
text,  this  term  has  long  been  understood  to  apply  to  an
ANC’s  board  of  directors,  the  ANC’s  governing  body  as  a
matter of corporate law.  See, e.g., App. 45 (An ANC’s “board
of directors . . . is its ‘governing body’ ”); see also Black’s Law
Dictionary,  at  219  (defining  “Board  of  Directors”  as  “[t]he
governing body of a private corporation”).  Indeed, respond-
ents do not dispute that the plain meaning of “recognized
governing body” covers an ANC’s board of directors.11

Looking  to  the  plain  meaning  of  “recognized  governing
body” makes even more sense because nothing in either the
CARES  Act  or  ISDA  suggests  that  the  term  “recognized
governing body” places additional limits on the kinds of In-
dian tribes eligible to benefit under the statutes.  In both
laws, the term instead pinpoints the particular entity that
will  receive  funding  on  behalf  of  an  Indian  tribe.  See  42
U. S. C. §801(g)(5); 25 U. S. C. §5304(l).  Because ANCs are
Indian  tribes  within  the  meaning  of  the  CARES  Act,  an
ANC’s board of directors is a “recognized governing body”
eligible to receive funding under Title V of the Act.

——————

11 The Utes rely also on Seldovia Native Assn., Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F. 2d
1335 (CA9 1990).  Seldovia never discussed the term “recognized govern-
ing body” and concerned whether ANCs are Indian tribes for purposes of
Circuit precedent construing the Eleventh Amendment.  Id., at 1350.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of the term "recognized governing body" in the context of the CARES Act and its relation to American Indian tribes and their ANC's.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xvii

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1133

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Chandler v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chandler v. Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chaney v. New Orleans Public Facility Management, Inc.
. . . . . .
Chappell v. Deeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chappell v. Meese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Charlotte Observer v. Presbyterian Health Services Corp.
. . . . .
Chattanooga; Diamonds and Lace Showbar v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chattanooga; D. L. S., Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chenard v. Nevada Dept. of Human Resources, Welfare Division . .
Chenoweth v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cherna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cherokee Corp. of Linden, Va., Inc. v. Capital Skiing Corp. . . . . .
Chesapeake Directory Sales Co.; Allen-Sesker v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chester v. Lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chicago; Federation of Advertising Industry Representatives v.
Chicago; Mann v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chicago v. Shalala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Ariz.; Peabody v.
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Fla.; Bitterman v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia v. Cunningham . . . . . . . . . . . .
Choe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chong Leung v. U. S. District Court
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Christensen v. Harris County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Christensen; Hyche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Christian v. Henderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Christian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Christmann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cigna Financial Advisors Inc.; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cintron v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County; Gulley v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Circuit Court of Va., Richmond; Bolling v.
Cisek; Bayon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Citibank, Inc.; Pedraglio Loli v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cittadino v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
City. See name of city.
Clabourne v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clanton v. Redford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clark v. Angelone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clark; Security Finance Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clark County; Buckwalter v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clay, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clay v. Sanders

1028
1004,1095
1092
1054
1044,1077,1119
1019
1064
1132
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a table of contents for a legal case report. It lists case names and corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

37

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J.

butions in fact distort the legislative process.  They affect
what  gets  done  and  how  it  gets  done.    They  affect  whom
Senators and House members see, whom they spend their
time with, what input they get . . . .’ ”  251 F. Supp. 2d, at
496 (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶¶7, 9).

Senator  Paul  Simon:  “ ‘While  I  realize  some  argue  donors
don’t buy favors, they buy access.  That access is the abuse
and it affects all of us. . . . You feel a sense of gratitude for
their  support.  .  .  .  Because  few  people  can  afford  to  give
over $20,000 or $25,000 to a party committee, those people
who can will receive substantially better access to elected
federal  leaders  than  people  who  can  only  afford  smaller
contributions or can not afford to make any contributions.
When you increase the amount that people are allowed to
give,  or  let  people  give  without  limit  to  the  parties,  you
increase the danger of unfair access.’ ”  251 F. Supp. 2d, at
496 (quoting Simon Decl. ¶16).

Senator  John  McCain:  “ ‘At  a  minimum,  large  soft  money
donations purchase an opportunity for the donors to make
their case to elected officials . . . in a way average citizens
cannot.’ ”    251  F. Supp.  2d,  at  496  (quoting  McCain
Decl. ¶6).

Senator  Warren  Rudman:  “ ‘I  understand  that  those  who
opposed  passage  of  the  Bipartisan  Campaign  Reform
Act,  and  those  who  now  challenge  its  constitutionality  in
Court,  dare  elected  officials  to  point  to  specific  [instances
of  vote  buying].  I  think  this  misses  the  point  altogether.
[The access and influence accorded large donors] is inher
ently,  endemically,  and  hopelessly  corrupting.    You  can’t
swim in the ocean without getting wet; you can’t be part of
this  system  without  getting  dirty.’ ”  251  F. Supp.  2d,  at
481 (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶10).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically dissenting opinions, citing quotes from various senators. It is part of the legal argument and thus suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

23

ALITO, J., dissenting

The per curiam’s main argument appears to go as follows:
Petitioners’  original  claim  was  a  challenge  to  New  York’s
old  rule;  this  claim  is  now  moot  due  to  the  repeal  of  that
rule; and what the petitioners are now asserting is a new
claim, namely, that New York’s current rule is also uncon-
stitutional.

This argument also misrepresents the nature of the claim
asserted  in  petitioners’  complaint.    What  petitioners
claimed in their complaint and still claim is that they are
entitled  to  “unrestricted  access”  to  out-of-city  ranges  and
competitions.  App. 36.  The City’s replacement of one law
denying unrestricted access with another that also denies
that access did not change the nature of petitioners’ claim
or render it moot.

Consider where acceptance of the argument adopted by
the per curiam leads.  Suppose that a city council, seeking
to  suppress  a  local  paper’s  opposition  to  some  of  its  pro-
grams, adopts an ordinance prohibiting the publication of
any editorial without the approval of a city official.  Suppose
that  a  newspaper  challenges  the  constitutionality  of  this
rule, arguing that the First Amendment confers the unre-
stricted right to editorialize without prior approval.  If the
council then repeals its ordinance and replaces it with a
new  one  requiring  approval  only  if  the  editorial  concerns
one particular city program, would that render the pending
lawsuit moot and require the paper to commence a new one?
Or take this example.  A State enacts a law providing that
any woman wishing to obtain an abortion must submit cer-
tification from five doctors that the procedure is medically
necessary.  After a woman sues, claiming that any require-
ment  of  physician  certification  is  unconstitutional,  the

——————
“reasonably necessary” under the new rule.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 64–65.  But
what that means is far from clear, and, at any rate, coffee breaks and the
like  are  just  illustrative  examples  of  potential  ways  in  which  the  new
rule affords something less than unfettered access to gun ranges, compe-
titions, and second homes outside the City.  See supra, at 13.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's assessment of the mootness of the petitioners' claim.  The text provides legal reasoning and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

INDEX

1313

NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES

ACT OF 1965. See Constitutional Law, V.

NEW MEXICO. See Constitutional Law, IV.

NONCAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS. See Constitutional

Law, I.

OHIO. See Constitutional Law, IV.

PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS. See Constitutional Law, VIII.

PIERCING CORPORATE VEIL. See Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.

POLITICAL COMMITTEES. See Standing to Sue, 2.

POLLUTION. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-

pensation, and Liability Act of 1980.

PRE-DEATH PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES. See Maritime

Law.

PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW. See Communications Act of 1934.

PRESENTMENT CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, VI.

PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY TO CANCEL PORTIONS OF LAWS. See

Constitutional Law, VI; Standing to Sue, 1.

PRIOR CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS. See Constitutional Law, I.

PRISONERS’ RIGHTS. See Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990, 1.

PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. See Constitutional

Law, VII.

PROPERTY RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, IX, 2; Jurisdiction, 1.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ LIABILITY FOR TEACHER-STUDENT SEXUAL

HARASSMENT. See Education Amendments of 1972.

QUIET TITLE ACT. See Jurisdiction, 1.

REASONABLENESS STANDARD OF CONDUCT. See Civil Rights

Act of 1964.

REMAND ORDERS. See Social Security Act.

REMOVAL JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction, 2.

RESERVATION LAND. See Taxes.

RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS. See Criminal Law, 2.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, not the actual content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

25

THOMAS, J., dissenting

might be too easy to subvert.  A tricky Congress could allow
the Executive to sneak a powerful, Cabinet-level-like officer
past the Senate by merely giving him a low rank.  Maybe.
But  this  seems  like  an  odd  case  to  address  that  concern.
And, even if this suit did raise the issue, the Court should
be hesitant to enforce its view of the Constitution’s spirit at
the cost of its text.

*

*

*
The Court today draws a new line dividing inferior offic-
ers from principal ones.  The fact that this line places ad-
ministrative patent judges on the side of Ambassadors, Su-
preme Court Justices, and department heads suggests that
something is not quite right.  At some point, we should take
stock of our precedent to see if it aligns with the Appoint-
ments  Clause’s  original  meaning.  But,  for  now,  we  must
apply the test we have.  And, under that test, administra-
tive patent judges are both formally and functionally infe-
rior to the Director and to the Secretary.  I respectfully dis-
sent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MOORE v. HARPER

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

election.  See, e.g., Republican National Committee v. Dem-
ocratic National Committee, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (per
curiam)  (slip  op.,  at  2);  Purcell  v.  Gonzalez,  549  U. S.  1
(2006) (per curiam).  In light of the Purcell principle and the
particular circumstances and timing of the impending pri-
mary elections in North Carolina, it is too late for the fed-
eral courts to order that the district lines be changed for the
2022 primary and general elections, just as it was too late
for the federal courts to do so in the Alabama redistricting
case  last  month.    See  Merrill  v.  Milligan,  595  U. S.  ___
(2022) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring).

For  that  reason,  I  concur  in  the  Court’s  denial  of  the

emergency application for stay.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in the case Moore v. Harper. It discusses legal precedent and the timing of the case, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

477

Opinion of Stevens, J.

how  this  addresses  the  concerns  of  dissenting  union  mem
bers, who will also be affected by today’s ruling, and I fail to
understand  why  the  Court  is  so  conﬁdent  in  these  mecha
nisms.  By  “corporate  democracy,”  presumably  the  Court
means the rights of shareholders to vote and to bring deriva
tive suits for breach of ﬁduciary duty.  In practice, however,
many  corporate  lawyers  will  tell  you  that  “these  rights  are
so  limited  as  to  be  almost  nonexistent,”  given  the  internal
authority wielded by boards and managers and the expansive
protections afforded by the business judgment rule.  Blair &
Stout  320;  see  also  id.,  at  298–315;  Winkler,  32  Loyola  (LA)
L.  Rev.,  at  165–166,  199–200.  Modern  technology  may  help
make it easier to track corporate activity, including electoral
advocacy, but it is utopian to believe that it solves the prob
lem.  Most  American  households  that  own  stock  do  so
through  intermediaries  such  as  mutual  funds  and  pension
plans, see Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor? 95 Va.
L.  Rev.  1105  (2009),  which  makes  it  more  difﬁcult  both  to
monitor and to alter particular holdings.  Studies show that
a majority of individual investors make no trades at all dur
ing a given year.  Id., at 1117.  Moreover, if the corporation
in  question  operates  a  PAC,  an  investor  who  sees  the  com
pany’s  ads  may  not  know  whether  they  are  being  funded
through the PAC or through the general treasury.

If and when shareholders learn that a corporation has been
spending  general  treasury  money  on  objectionable  election
eering,  they  can  divest.  Even  assuming  that  they  reliably
learn  as  much,  however,  this  solution  is  only  partial.  The
injury to the shareholders’ expressive rights has already oc
curred; they might have preferred to keep that corporation’s
stock  in  their  portfolio  for  any  number  of  economic  reasons;
and they may incur a capital gains tax or other penalty from
selling their shares, changing their pension plan, or the like.
The  shareholder  protection  rationale  has  been  criticized  as
underinclusive, in that corporations also spend money on lob
bying and charitable contributions in ways that any particu
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. It discusses the implications of the Court's ruling on corporate political spending and the limitations of shareholder rights as a remedy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC. v. ARKANSAS TEACHER

RETIREMENT SYSTEM
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

served,  and  nothing  in  the  Second  Circuit’s  opinion  mis-
states  the  law.  Because  affirmance  is  appropriate  under
these circumstances, I respectfully dissent from Part II–A–
2 of the Court’s opinion and from the judgment of the Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

diverse.’ ”  Parents Involved, 551 U. S., at 724 (quoting Grut-
ter, 539 U. S., at 329).  And given the mismatch between the
means respondents employ and the goals they seek, it is es-
pecially  hard  to  understand  how  courts  are  supposed  to
scrutinize the admissions programs that respondents use.
The universities’ main response to these criticisms is, es-
sentially,  “trust  us.”  None  of  the  questions  recited  above
need  answering,  they  say,  because  universities  are  “owed
deference” when using race to benefit some applicants but
not others.  Brief for University Respondents in No. 21–707,
at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is true that our
cases have recognized a “tradition of giving a degree of def-
erence to a university’s academic decisions.”  Grutter, 539
U. S.,  at  328.    But  we  have  been unmistakably  clear  that
any  deference  must  exist  “within  constitutionally  pre-
scribed  limits,”  ibid.,  and  that  “deference  does  not  imply
abandonment or abdication of judicial review,” Miller–El v.
Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 340 (2003).  Universities may define
their  missions  as  they  see  fit.  The  Constitution  defines
ours.  Courts  may  not  license  separating  students  on  the
basis of race without an exceedingly persuasive justification
that is measurable and concrete enough to permit judicial
review.  As this Court has repeatedly reaffirmed, “[r]acial
classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but
the most exact connection between justification and classi-
fication.”  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 270 (2003) (in-
ternal  quotation  marks  omitted).  The  programs  at  issue
here do not satisfy that standard.5

——————

5 For that reason, one dissent candidly advocates abandoning the de-
mands of strict scrutiny.  See post, at 24, 26–28 (opinion of JACKSON, J.)
(arguing the Court must “get out of the way,” “leav[e] well enough alone,”
and defer to universities and “experts” in determining who should be dis-
criminated  against).    An  opinion  professing  fidelity  to  history  (to  say
nothing of the law) should surely see the folly in that approach.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the use of race in university admissions. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxxii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1095

Ridley-Turner; Israel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Riggins; Hale v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Riggins v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Riley; Frazier v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Riley v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Riley v. Pennsylvania Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  857,1099

Riley v. United States
923

Rinaldi v. Sniezek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1005

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rinick v. United States
995

Rios v. Cate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057

Rios; Rivera v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

Rios; Solano-Moreta v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Ripley v. Wyoming Medical Center
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rippy v. Burkett
987

Riser v. Department of Treasury  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
993

Risley v. Thaler
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Ritchie v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Ritchie v. Vast Resources, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

Ritter; Doyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955

Rittner v. Williams  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
989

Rivas, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rivas v. Ohio  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

807

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rivera; Brown v.
Rivera v. Department of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  878,1101

960

Rivera v. Nolan
Rivera v. Rios
1057

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  842,867,958,1133

Rivera v. United States
1132

Rivera Calderon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1083

Rivera-Castaneda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908

Rivera-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132

Rivera Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
859

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rivers v. United States
835,1038

Riverside County Dept. of Public Social Services; Colleen F. v.
939

Rizzo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Roach v. Mississippi  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roach; Quinn v.
823

Roach v. Roach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  968,1078

Roach v. Rockingham County Bd. of Ed.
Roach v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  949,1156

1109

Roanoke; Asbury v.
1127

Robbins v. Smith
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  994,1119

Robenson v. McNeil
938

Roberdeau, Inc.; Briarpatch Ltd., LP v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924

Roberge v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

clv

Page
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  840,1064

Ware v. Laney
1126
Warﬁeld v. Grams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1006
Warﬁeld v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
Warlick v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  955,1140

Warman v. Marberry
Warman v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131

Warren, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  968,1141

1100

Warren v. Fischer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
863

Warren; McClain v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Warren; Tate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1018

Warren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1058

Warrick v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Washington, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074

Washington; Addleman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington; Bing Yu v.
1123

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  984,1108

Washington; Cluck v.
819

Washington; Daniels v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1050

Washington v.  Department of Defense, Defense Logistics Agency
1094

Washington; Entler v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

Washington v. Experian  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
838

Washington; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952

Washington; Hawkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942

Washington; Hendrickson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  817,1064

Washington; Railsback v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  900,1060

Washington v. United States
Washington; Wells v.
1030

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Washington Group Int’l; Joint Comm. of Plumbing & Pipeﬁtting v.
846

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washington Hospital; Wollstein v.
942

Washington Mut. Bank FA; Smith v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Waterbury; Roe v.
921

Waterman v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1135

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Watford v. United States
1121

Watkins v. Georgia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

Watkins v. Massachusetts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

Watkins v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
862

Watley v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
851

Watson v. Akron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

Watson; Babb v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

Watson v. Milyard
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Watson v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
828

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Watson v. Pennsylvania
809

Watson v. Preslesnik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1090

Watson; Robertson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
885

Watson v. Rozum  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

444

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of the Court

U. S. C. § 691(a)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II), those determinations
did not qualify his discretion to cancel or not to cancel. Fi-
nally, whenever the President suspended an exemption
under the Tariff Act, he was executing the policy that Con-
gress had embodied in the statute.
In contrast, whenever
the President cancels an item of new direct spending or a
limited tax beneﬁt he is rejecting the policy judgment made
by Congress and relying on his own policy judgment.35
Thus, the conclusion in Field v. Clark that the suspensions
mandated by the Tariff Act were not exercises of legislative
power does not undermine our opinion that cancellations
pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act are the functional equiv-
alent of partial repeals of Acts of Congress that fail to satisfy
Article I, § 7.

The Government’s reliance upon other tariff and import
statutes, discussed in Field, that contain provisions similar
to the one challenged in Field is unavailing for the same
reasons.36 Some of those statutes authorized the President
to “suspen[d] and discontinu[e]” statutory duties upon his de-
termination that discriminatory duties imposed by other na-
tions had been abolished. See 143 U. S., at 686–687 (discuss-
ing Act of Jan. 7, 1824, ch. 4, § 4, 4 Stat. 3, and Act of May
24, 1828, ch. 111, 4 Stat. 308).37 A slightly different statute,

35 For example, one reason that the President gave for canceling § 968 of
the Taxpayer Relief Act was his conclusion that “this provision failed to
target its beneﬁts to small-and-medium size cooperatives.” App. to Juris.
Statement 71a (Cancellation No. 97–2); see n. 8, supra. Because the Line
Item Veto Act requires the President to act within ﬁve days, every exer-
cise of the cancellation power will necessarily be based on the same facts
and circumstances that Congress considered, and therefore constitute a
rejection of the policy choice made by Congress.

36 The Court did not, of course, expressly consider in Field whether
those statutes comported with the requirements of the Presentment
Clause.

37 Cf. 143 U. S., at 688 (discussing Act of Mar. 6, 1866, ch. 12, § 2, 14 Stat.
4, which permitted the President to “declare the provisions of this act to
be inoperative” and lift import restrictions on foreign cattle and hides
upon a showing that such importation would not endanger U. S. cattle).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Clinton v. City of New York. It contains legal arguments and citations to other legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

PATEL v. GARLAND

Opinion of the Court

eligibility stage.  And in the Government’s view, the Immi-
gration  Judge’s  factual  findings  were  “nondiscretionary”
determinations to which the bar did not apply.

A  majority  of  the  full  Eleventh  Circuit  agreed  with  the
panel  decision  and  held  that  all  factual  determinations
made as part of considering a request for discretionary re-
lief fall within §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s prohibition on judicial re-
view.  Patel  v.  United  States  Atty.  Gen.,  971  F. 3d  1258,
1272–1273  (2020).  In  reaching  this  conclusion,  the  Elev-
enth Circuit deepened a split among the courts of appeals
as to the scope of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).1

We  granted  certiorari  to  resolve  the  conflict.  594  U. S.
___ (2021).  Because the Government has continued to take
the position that §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not prohibit review
of the fact determinations at issue, we invited Taylor A. R.
Meehan to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in
support of the judgment below.  594 U. S. ___ (2021).  She
has ably discharged her responsibilities.

II
Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of jurisdiction to re-
view “any judgment regarding the granting of relief ” under
§1255.  The outcome of this case largely turns on the scope
of the word “judgment,” an issue on which the parties and

——————

1 The Fourth and Seventh Circuits appear to interpret §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
the way that the Eleventh Circuit does.  See Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F. 3d
475, 480 (CA4 2006); Cevilla v. Gonzales, 446 F. 3d 658, 660–661 (CA7
2006).  Other Courts of Appeals distinguish between discretionary and
nondiscretionary judgments but do so in a way that seems to preclude all
review of fact questions.  See Castro v. Holder, 727 F. 3d 125, 128–129
(CA1 2013); Rosario v. Holder, 627 F. 3d 58, 61 (CA2 2010); Arambula-
Medina  v.  Holder,  572  F. 3d  824,  828  (CA10  2009).    The  remainder  to
weigh in on the question take the Government’s position.  See Mendez-
Moranchel  v.  Ashcroft,  338  F. 3d  176,  178–179  (CA3  2003);  Garcia-
Melendez v. Ashcroft, 351 F. 3d 657, 661 (CA5 2003); Santana-Albarran
v. Ashcroft, 393 F. 3d 699, 703 (CA6 2005); Ortiz-Cornejo v. Gonzales, 400
F. 3d 610, 612 (CA8 2005); Mamigonian v. Biggs, 710 F. 3d 936, 943–946
(CA9 2013).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the scope of a legal statute and cites other court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
THOMAS, J., dissenting

State’s legislature.  Id., at 505  Significantly, the only con-
sequence for a State’s breach of the use condition was con-
tractual  in  nature—“the  grant  to  such  State  shall  cease;
and said State shall be bound to pay the United States the
amount received of any lands previously sold.”  Id., at 504–
505.  The Second Morrill Act, enacted in 1890, followed the
same framework, donating money for the endowment of ag-
ricultural and mechanical arts colleges, subject to the con-
dition that black students not be excluded.  Ch. 841, 26 Stat.
417.  Like  the  First  Morrill  Act,  the  only  consequence  for
noncompliance  was  that  future  appropriations  under  the
Act would cease until the State brought itself into compli-
ance.  Id., at 419.

In the early 20th century, the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment and the national income tax vastly expanded
the revenue available to the Federal Government.  But the
increasingly  ambitious  spending  programs  that  followed
did  not  break  the  contractual  pattern  established  by  the
Morrill  Acts.  Thus,  early-20th-century  highway  grants
took the form of an offer to enter a contract, with the conse-
quence of noncompliance being the cutoff of federal funds.
See Corwin, 36 Harv. L. Rev., at 574, n. 72 (describing Fed-
eral Highway Act of 1916); see also id., at 573–575 (collect-
ing other examples).

Even  in  the  New  Deal  era,  advocates  of  far-reaching
spending programs continued to understand the spending
power as a mere power of appropriation.  Professor Corwin,
for example, recognized that the States must be depended
upon to exercise the legislative power needed to implement
such  programs.    Thus,  “federal  highway  construction  re-
lie[d] on the state power of eminent domain, as well as on
state power to police and protect highways during and after
their  construction.”    National-State  Cooperation—Its  Pre-
sent Possibilities, 46 Yale L. J. 599, 617 (1937).  Similarly,
national protection of forests depended on “the power of the
states to regulate the conduct of persons entering forests,”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

43

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

hard  to  see  how  the  public  would  be  benefited  by  disclo-
sure”  of  certain  business  tools,  since  the  nondisclosure  of
these  tools  “encourages  businesses  to  initiate  new  and
individualized plans of operation,” which “in turn, leads to
a greater variety of business methods.”  Bicron, 416 U. S.,
at 483.

In any event, even if patents on business methods were
useful for encouraging innovation and disclosure, it would
still  be  questionable  whether  they  would,  on  balance,
facilitate  or  impede  the  progress  of  American  business.
For  even  when  patents  encourage  innovation  and  disclo-
sure, “too much patent protection can impede rather than
‘promote  the  Progress  of  . . .  useful  Arts.’ ”  Laboratory
Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,
548  U. S.  124,  126–127  (2006)  (BREYER,  J.,  dissenting
from  dismissal  of  certiorari).  Patents  “can  discourage
research  by  impeding  the  free  exchange  of  information,”
for  example,  by  forcing  people  to  “avoid  the  use  of  poten-
tially  patented  ideas,  by  leading  them  to  conduct  costly
and  time-consuming  searches  of  existing  or  pending  pat-
ents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by
raising  the  costs  of  using  the  patented”  methods.    Id.,  at
127.  Although “[e]very patent is the grant of a privilege of
exacting  tolls  from  the  public,”  Great  Atlantic,  340  U. S.,
at  154  (Douglas,  J.,  concurring),  the  tolls  of  patents  on
business methods may be especially high.

The  primary  concern  is  that  patents  on  business  meth-
ods  may  prohibit  a  wide  swath  of  legitimate  competition
and  innovation.  As  one  scholar  explains,  “it  is  useful  to
conceptualize  knowledge  as  a  pyramid:  the  big  ideas  are
on  top;  specific  applications  are  at  the  bottom.”  Dreyfuss
275.  The  higher  up  a  patent  is  on  the  pyramid,  the
greater  the  social  cost  and  the  greater  the  hindrance  to
further  innovation.53   Thus,  this  Court  stated  in  Benson

——————

53 See Dreyfuss 276; Merges & Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Stevens. It delves into the arguments surrounding patents on business methods, discussing their potential benefits and drawbacks.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

790

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Stevens, J., dissenting

liability for violating federal laws.
It is through the lens of
those post-1986 cases that the Court has chosen to construe
the statute at issue in this case. To explain my disagree-
ment with the Court, I shall comment on pre-1986 cases, the
legislative history of the 1986 amendments, and the statutory
text of the FCA—all of which support the view that Con-
gress understood States to be included within the meaning
of the word “person” in § 3729.
I shall then brieﬂy explain
why the State’s constitutional defenses fail, even under the
Court’s post-1986 construction of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.

I

Cases decided before 1986 uniformly support the proposi-
tion that the broad language used in the FCA means what it
says. Although general statutory references to “persons”
are not normally construed to apply to the enacting sover-
eign, United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 275
(1947), when Congress uses that word in federal statutes en-
forceable by the Federal Government or by a federal agency,
it applies to States and state agencies as well as to private
individuals and corporations. Thus, for example, the word
“person” in the Sherman Act does not include the sovereign
that enacted the statute (the Federal Government), United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600 (1941), but it does in-
clude the States, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159 (1942).
Similarly, States are subject to regulation as a “person”
within the meaning of the Shipping Act of 1916, California
v. United States, 320 U. S. 577 (1944), and as a “common car-
rier” within the meaning of the Safety Appliance Act, United
States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936).
In the latter case,
the State of California “invoke[d] the canon of construction
that a sovereign is presumptively not intended to be bound”
by a statute unless the Act expressly declares that to be
the case.
Id., at 186. We rejected the applicability of that
canon, stating:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. The language, citations, and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xx

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
Governor of N. C. v. Cromartie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
980
Grant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,932
906
Graves v. Carr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
924
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gray; Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co. v.
953
Grayson; Hayden v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greb v. General Motors Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
Green, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,924,946,972
974
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greene; Chandler v.
968
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greene v. Citibank, N. A.
976
Greene; DuBois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greene; King v.
978
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greene; Strickler v.
904
Greenwell; Raytheon Aerospace, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948
Greer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
920
Greer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940
Gregory v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
979
Grenada v. Hubbard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912
Gretzler v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912
Gretzler v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
Griesa; Moore v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953
Grievance Comm., 9th Judicial Dist. of N. Y.; Klein v. . . . . . . . . . .
917
Grievance Comm., 2d & 11th Judicial Dists. of N. Y.; Ashton v.
. .
933
Grifﬁn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923
Grifﬁn v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
Grifﬁn v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Grifﬁn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grigas; Harvey v.
949
GTE Midwest Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n . . . . . . . .
962
Guam; Palomo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
Guanipa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gundy; Bowen v.
907
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
Gunn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gurney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,970
Haddle v. Garrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,977
952
Hadix v. McGinnis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Hadji-Elias v. Los Angeles County Superior Court . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Hadji-Elias v. Shahbaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
981
Haggar Apparel Co.; United States v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
Haley v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948
Hall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941
Hall v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
Hall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
Hamilton v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
979
Hamilton v. Roe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely a section heading or table of contents from a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

KAGAN, J., dissenting

at  321  (quoting  Rodriguez  de  Quijas  v.  Shearson/
American  Express,  Inc.,  490  U. S.  477,  484  (1989);
some alterations omitted).  That instruction, Justice Scalia
explained,  was  “incompatible”  with  an  expectation  that
“private parties anticipate our overrulings.”  406 U. S., at
320.  He  concluded:  “[R]eliance  upon  a  square,  unaban-
doned  holding  of  the  Supreme  Court  is  always  justifiable
reliance.”  Ibid.  Abood’s holding was square.  It was una-
bandoned before today.  It was, in other words, the law—
however  much  some  were  working  overtime  to  make  it
not.  Parties,  both  unions  and  governments,  were  thus
justified  in  relying  on  it.    And  they  did  rely,  to  an  extent
rare among our decisions.  To dismiss the overthrowing of
their settled expectations as entailing no more than some
“adjustments”  and  “unpleasant  transition  costs,”  ante,  at
47, is to trivialize stare decisis.

IV
There is no sugarcoating today’s  opinion.  The majority
overthrows  a  decision  entrenched  in  this  Nation’s  law—
and in its economic life—for over 40 years.  As a result, it
prevents  the  American  people,  acting  through  their  state
and  local  officials,  from  making  important  choices  about
workplace governance.  And it does so by weaponizing the
First  Amendment,  in  a  way  that  unleashes  judges,  now
and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory
policy.
  Departures from stare decisis are supposed to be “excep-
tional  action[s]”  demanding  “special  justification,”  Rum-
sey, 467 U. S., at 212—but the majority offers nothing like
that here.  In contrast to the vigor of its attack on Abood,
the  majority’s  discussion  of  stare  decisis  barely  limps  to
the finish line.  And no wonder: The standard factors this
Court  considers  when  deciding  to  overrule  a  decision  all
cut one way.  Abood’s legal underpinnings have not eroded
over time: Abood is now, as it was when issued, consistent
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees. It discusses the legal reasoning behind the majority opinion and argues against it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

21

Opinion of the Court

must do . . . and the end that they find to be morally wrong
. . . is simply too attenuated.”  Hobby Lobby, 573 U. S., at
723–724.  Likewise, though we did not decide whether the
self-certification accommodation ran afoul of RFRA in Zu-
bik, we directed the parties on remand to “accommodat[e]”
the free exercise rights of those with complicity-based ob-
jections to the self-certification accommodation.  578 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 4).  It is hard to see how the Departments
could  promulgate  rules  consistent  with  these  decisions  if
they  did  not  overtly  consider  these  entities’  rights  under
RFRA.

This is especially true in light of the basic requirements
of  the  rulemaking  process.    Our  precedents  require  final
rules to “articulate a satisfactory explanation for [the] ac-
tion including a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United
States,  Inc.  v.  State  Farm  Mut.  Automobile  Ins.  Co.,  463
U. S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This
requirement allows courts to assess whether the agency has
promulgated an arbitrary and capricious rule by “entirely
fail[ing] to consider an important aspect of the problem [or]
offer[ing] an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to  the  evidence  before  [it].”  Ibid.;  see  also  Department  of
Commerce  v.  New  York,  588  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2019)
(BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (slip
op., at 3–4); Genuine Parts Co. v. EPA, 890 F. 3d 304, 307
(CADC  2018);  Pacific  Coast  Federation  of  Fishermen’s
Assns. v. United States Bur. of Reclamation, 426 F. 3d 1082,
1094 (CA9 2005).  Here, the Departments were aware that
Hobby Lobby held the mandate unlawful as applied to reli-
gious  entities  with  complicity-based  objections.    82  Fed.
Reg.  47799;  83  Fed.  Reg.  57544–57545.    They  were  also
aware  of  Zubik’s  instructions.  82  Fed.  Reg.  47799.    And,
aside from our own decisions, the Departments were mind-
ful of the RFRA concerns raised in “public comments and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to religious freedom and the Affordable Care Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U91

[09-06-00 17:16:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 381 (1998)

397

Kennedy, J., concurring

the absence of a general consent to suit in all similar
causes of action. Since the state legislature may waive
state immunity only by general law, it is not to be pre-
sumed in the absence of clear language to the contrary,
that they conferred on administrative or executive ofﬁ-
cers discretionary power to grant or withhold consent in
individual cases. . . . It would seem, therefore, that no
properly authorized executive or administrative ofﬁcer
of the state has waived the state’s immunity to suit in
the federal courts.”
323 U. S., at 467–469 (footnotes
omitted).

See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396, n. 2 (1975).

Notwithstanding the quoted language from Ford Motor
Co., the absence of speciﬁc authorization, it seems to me, is
not an insuperable obstacle to adopting a rule of waiver in
every case where the State, through its attorneys, consents
If the
to removal from the state court to the federal court.
States know or have reason to expect that removal will con-
stitute a waiver, then it is easy enough to presume that an
attorney authorized to represent the State can bind it to the
jurisdiction of the federal court (for Eleventh Amendment
purposes) by the consent to removal.

It is true as well that the Court’s recent cases have disfa-
vored constructive waivers of the Eleventh Amendment and
have required the State’s consent to suit be unequivocal.
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 246–247
(1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 673. The conduct
which may give rise to the waiver in the instance of removal
is far less equivocal than the conduct at issue in those cases,
however. Here the State’s consent amounted to a direct in-
vocation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, an act
considerably more speciﬁc than the general participation in
a federal program found insufﬁcient in Atascadero and
Edelman.

These questions should be explored.

If it were demon-
strated that a federal rule ﬁnding waiver of the Eleventh
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kennedy. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
88

ALVAREZ  v.  SMITH

Syllabus

issue contested throughout the litigation.  Here, the Court believes that
the presence of the federal case played no signiﬁcant role in the termina
tion  of  plaintiffs’  state-court  forfeiture  proceedings.  Plaintiffs’  forfeit
ure  cases  took  place  with  no  procedural  link  to  the  case  before  this
Court;  apparently  terminated  on  substantive  grounds  in  their  ordinary
course;  and,  to  the  Court’s  knowledge,  no  one  raised  the  procedural
question  at  issue  here  in  those  cases.  This  Court  therefore  concludes
that it should follow its ordinary practice and order vacatur.  Pp. 94–97.

524 F. 3d 834, vacated and remanded.

Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and  Scalia,  Kennedy,  Thomas,  Ginsburg,  Alito,  and  Sotomayor,  JJ.,
joined,  and  in  which  Stevens,  J.,  joined  as  to  Parts  I  and  II.  Stevens,
J.,  ﬁled  an  opinion  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part,  post, p. 97.

Paul  A.  Castiglione  argued  the  cause  for  petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Anita Alvarez, pro se, Patrick
T. Driscoll, Jr., and Alan J. Spellberg.

William M. Jay argued the cause for the United States as
amicus  curiae  in  support  of  petitioner.  With  him  on  the
brief  were  Solicitor  General  Kagan,  Assistant  Attorneys
General Breuer and West, Deputy Solicitor General Katyal,
Harry  Harbin,  Michael  S.  Raab,  David  A.  Martin,  and  Al
fonso Robles.

Thomas  Peters  argued  the  cause  for  respondents.  With
him  on  the  brief  were  Craig  B.  Futterman  and  Richard
Epstein.*

*Briefs  of  amici  curiae  urging  reversal  were  ﬁled  for  the  State  of  Illi
nois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Michael A. Sco
dro, Solicitor General, Jane Elinor Notz, Deputy Solicitor General, Eldad
Malamuth, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for
their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Terry Goddard
of  Arizona,  John  W.  Suthers  of  Colorado,  Thurbert  E.  Baker  of  Georgia,
Mark  J.  Bennett  of  Hawaii,  Lawrence  G.  Wasden  of  Idaho,  Gregory  F.
Zoeller  of  Indiana,  Thomas J. Miller of  Iowa,  Martha  Coakley  of  Massa
chusetts, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada,
Richard Cordray of Ohio, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Henry
McMaster  of  South  Carolina,  Greg  Abbott  of  Texas,  Mark  L.  Shurtleff  of
Utah, Robert M. McKenna of Washington, J.  B.  Van  Hollen  of Wisconsin,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, providing a summary of the case and the court's decision.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

terrorism.  Dec. 9, 1999, Art. 2, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106–49,
2178  U. N. T. S.  230.    It  then  requires  each  signatory
state, “in accordance with its domestic legal principles,” to
“take  the  necessary  measures  to  enable  a  legal  entity
located  in  its  territory  or  organized  under  its  laws  to  be
held liable when a person responsible for the management
or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity,” violated
the  Convention.  Id.,  Art.  5(1).    The  Convention  provides
that “[s]uch liability may be criminal, civil, or administra
tive,”  ibid.,  so  long  as  the  penalties,  which  can  include
monetary  sanctions,  are  “effective,  proportionate  and
dissuasive.”  Id., Art. 5(3).  The United States is a party to
the Convention, along with 131 other states.5

The plurality dismisses the relevance of this Convention

because it does not require states parties to hold corpora
tions liable in common-law tort actions, but rather permits
them  to  “fulfill  their  obligations  . . .  by  adopting  detailed
regulatory regimes governing financial institutions.”  Ante,
at 16.  That critique misses the point.  The significance of
the  Convention  is  that  the  international  community
agreed  that  financing  terrorism  is  unacceptable  conduct
and  that  such  conduct  violates  the  Convention  when  un
dertaken by corporations.  That the Convention leaves up
to each state party how to impose liability on corporations,
e.g.,  via  erecting  a  regulatory  regime,  providing  for  tort
actions, or imposing criminal sanctions, is unremarkable,6
and  simply  reflects  that  international  law  sets  out  stand
——————

5 See  International  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  the  Financing
of  Terrorism,  online  at  https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/
Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-11.en.pdf (all Internet materials
as last visited Apr. 16, 2018).

6 The  Genocide  Convention  also  does  not  specifically  require  that
states parties recognize tort claims for genocide, but federal courts have
long  permitted  such  actions  under  the  ATS  as  a  matter  of  federal
common law.  See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F. 3d, at 236.  The same is true of the
Torture  Convention.  See,  e.g.,  Filartiga  v.  Pena-Irala,  630  F. 2d  876,
885 (CA2 1980).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and international conventions, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

JACKSON, J., dissenting

its  prosecutorial  discretion  several  times.”    Ibid.    But  we
were not moved: Such a prosecution was permitted by the
statute, we noted, and that was enough to make it a serious
threat.  “[T]he First Amendment protects against the Gov-
ernment;  it  does  not  leave  us  at  the  mercy  of  noblesse
oblige.”  Ibid.
  Second, just as in Stevens, “[t]his prosecution is itself ev-
idence of the danger in putting faith in Government repre-
sentations of prosecutorial restraint.”  Ibid.  At trial in this
very  case,  the  Government  objected  to  Hansen’s  proposed
jury instructions, which would have required, among other
things,  that  the  Government  prove  that  Hansen  intended
the noncitizen in question to reside in the United States il-
legally.    The  Government’s  objection  was  telling.    It  was
based  on  the  argument  that  the  proposed  instructions
added elements not found in the text of the statute itself.
And  the  District  Court  was  persuaded;  it  sided  with  the
Government in that regard.9  But now that the statute’s va-
lidity hangs in the balance, the Government has reversed
course entirely—it now implores us to read into the statute
the  very  element  that  it  earlier  opposed  as  atextual.    See
Brief for United States 23–28.
  This debacle exemplifies the real and ever-present risk of
continuing to have facially overbroad criminal statutes on
the books.  In its role as prosecutor, the Government often
stakes out a maximalist position, only later to concede lim-
its when  the  statute  upon which  it relies  might  be struck
down entirely and the Government finds itself on its back
foot.10  I am not suggesting bad faith on anyone’s part; these

——————

9 As the Government conceded during oral argument before this Court,
given that its elements argument prevailed below, the instructions that
the District Court gave to the jury in this case were legally erroneous.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11; see also id., at 39–40 (acknowledging that the
Court “should send the case back to the Ninth Circuit and let the Ninth
Circuit decide what’s appropriate in light of ” the flawed instructions).

10 The Court has seen similar moves in multiple cases just this Term.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1057

558 U. S.

November 30, 2009

No.  09–7071.  Parmelee  v.  McKenna,  Attorney  General

of  Washington.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7074.  Prendergast  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  843.

No.  09–7079.  Chavis  v.  Fischer,  Commissioner,  New  York
Department of Correctional Services, et al.  C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  333  Fed.  Appx.  641.

No.  09–7083.  Powell  v.  Kentucky.  Ct.  App.  Ky.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7094.  Lopez  v.  Thurmer,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  573  F.  3d  484.

No.  09–7099.  Williams  v.  Geithner,  Secretary  of  the
Treasury.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
327  Fed.  Appx.  175.

No.  09–7145.  Rivera  v.  Rios,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7148.  Nailor  v.  Castillo,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7154.  Doe  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7155.  Davis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7157.  Murphy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  563.

No.  09–7159.  Pablo-Gonzalez,  aka  Gonzales,  aka  Garcia-
Gonzalez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  246.

No.  09–7162.  Sanchez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  995.

No.  09–7163.  Amreya  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  825.

No.  09–7164.  Armstrong  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  889.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is more of a legal docket than readable content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

BREYER, J., dissenting

designed to “ ‘induce religious faith.’ ”  Locke, 540 U. S., at
716, 721.  That kind of program simply cannot be likened to
Missouri’s decision to exclude a church school from apply-
ing for a grant to resurface its playground.
  The  Court  in  Locke  recognized  that  the  study  of  devo-
tional theology can be “akin to a religious calling as well as
an  academic  pursuit.”  Id.,  at  721.    Indeed,  “the  shaping,
through primary education, of the next generation’s minds
and spirits” may be as critical as training for the ministry,
which itself, after all, is but one of the activities necessary
to  help  assure  a  religion’s  survival.    Zelman  v.  Simmons-
Harris, 536 U. S. 639, 725 (2002) (BREYER, J., dissenting).
That is why many faith leaders emphasize the central role
of  schools  in  their  religious  missions.    See,  e.g.,  Southern
Baptist  Convention,  Resolution  on  the  Importance  of
Christ-Centered Education (2014) (underscoring the power
of Christian schools to “win students to salvation through
evangelism,  make  disciples,  and  foster  spiritual  develop-
ment”); The Holy See, John Paul II, Catechesi Tradendae
¶69 (Oct. 16, 1979) (explaining that “the underlying reason
for” the Catholic school “is precisely the quality of the reli-
gious  instruction  integrated  into  the  education  of  the  pu-
pils”).  It is why at least some teachers at religious schools
see  their  work  as  a  form  of  ministry.  See, e.g.,  Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,
565  U. S.  171,  192  (2012).    And  petitioners  have  testified
that it is a “major reason” why they chose religious schools
for  their  children.  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  152  (the  school
teaches “the same Christian values that I teach at home”).
Nothing in the Constitution discourages this type of in-
struction.  To the contrary, the Free Exercise Clause draws
upon a history that places great value upon the freedom of
parents to teach their children the tenets of their faith.  Cf.
Wisconsin  v.  Yoder,  406  U. S.  205,  213–214  (1972).    The
leading figures of America’s Enlightenment followed in the
footsteps of those who, after the English civil wars, came to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue. Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain valuable legal and historical information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1050

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 30, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–391.  White  v.  Department  of  Defense  et  al.

C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–393.  Baumgartner  v.  Ohio.  Ct.  App.  Ohio,  Cuya
hoga  County.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  122  Ohio  St.
3d  1457,  908  N.  E.  2d  946.

No.  09–398.  Louisiana  v.  Abshire  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  574  F.  3d  267.

No.  09–399.  Moore  v.  Adventist  Health  System/Geor
gia  Inc.  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  209.

No.  09–411.  Thomas  v.  Shinseki,  Secretary  of  Veterans

Affairs,  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–415.  Anderson-Tully  Co.  v.  McDaniel,  Attorney
General of Arkansas.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Re
ported  below:  571  F.  3d  760.

No.  09–428.  Washington  v.  Department  of  Defense,  De
fense  Logistics  Agency.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  285.

No.  09–431.  City  of  Albany  Police  Department  et  al.  v.
Lewis.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332
Fed.  Appx.  641.

No.  09–449.  Patrick  v.  Shinseki,  Secretary  of  Veterans

Affairs.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–462.  Thomas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  397.

No.  09–463.  Brookens  v.  Solis,  Secretary  of  Labor.

C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–464.  Benson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  561  F.  3d  718.

No. 09–478.  Trivedi v.  United States et al.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  679.

No.  09–486.  Harley  et  ux.  v.  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below:
294  Fed.  Appx.  711.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, and information about the court and the outcome (certiorari denied).
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Statement of THOMAS, J.

the watertight nationwide prohibition that a closely divided
Court found necessary to justify the Government’s blanket
prohibition in Raich.  If the Government is now content to
allow States to act “as laboratories” “ ‘and try novel social
and economic experiments,’ ” Raich, 545 U. S., at 42 (O’Con-
nor, J., dissenting), then it might no longer have authority
to intrude on “[t]he States’ core police powers . . . to define
criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of their citizens.”  Ibid.  A prohibition on intrastate use or
cultivation  of  marijuana  may  no  longer  be  necessary  or
proper to support the Federal Government’s piecemeal ap-
proach.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or case citation, likely from a Supreme Court decision. It contains legal jargon and references to previous cases, suggesting it's not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>