<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC., DBA CALPORTLAND v.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
LOCAL UNION NO. 174

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

No. 21–1449.  Argued January 10, 2023—Decided June 1, 2023

Glacier  Northwest  delivers concrete to customers  in  Washington  State
using ready-mix trucks with rotating drums that prevent the concrete
from  hardening  during  transit.    Concrete  is  highly  perishable,  and
even concrete in a rotating drum will eventually harden, causing sig-
nificant damage to the vehicle.  Glacier’s truck drivers are members of
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 174.  Af-
ter a collective-bargaining agreement between Glacier and the Union
expired, the Union called for a work stoppage on a morning it knew the
company was in the midst of mixing substantial amounts of concrete,
loading  batches  into  ready-mix  trucks,  and  making  deliveries.    The
Union directed drivers to ignore Glacier’s instructions to finish deliv-
eries in progress.  At least 16 drivers who had already set out for de-
liveries  returned  with  fully  loaded  trucks.    By  initiating  emergency
maneuvers to offload the concrete, Glacier prevented significant dam-
age  to  its  trucks,  but  all  the  concrete  mixed  that  day  hardened  and
became useless.

Glacier sued the Union for damages in state court, claiming that the
Union  intentionally  destroyed  the  company’s  concrete  and  that  this
conduct amounted to common-law conversion and trespass to chattels.
The Union moved to dismiss Glacier’s tort claims on the ground that
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempted them.  While a
federal  law  generally  preempts  state  law  when  the  two  conflict,  the
NLRA preempts state law even when the two only arguably conflict.
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 245.  In
the Union’s view, the NLRA—which protects employees’ rights “to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, . . . and to en-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN

620

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS v. FINLEY

Souter, J., dissenting

seeking to create art that celebrates a minority, tribal, rural,
or inner-city culture. But even so, this is certainly a case in
which the challenged statute “reaches a substantial number
of impermissible applications,” not one in which the statute’s
“legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applica-
Id., at 771, 773. On the contrary, nothing in the
tions.”
record suggests that the grant scheme administered under
the broad authorization of the NEA’s governing statute, see
§§ 951, 954(c), devotes an overwhelming proportion of its re-
sources to schools and ethnic commemoration. Since the de-
cency and respect criteria may not be employed in the very
many instances in which the art seeking a subsidy is neither
aimed at children nor meant to celebrate a particular culture,
the statute is facially overbroad. Cf. City of Lakewood,
supra, at 766 (“[I]n a host of . . . First Amendment cases we
have . . . considered on the merits facial challenges to stat-
utes or policies that embodied discrimination based on the
content or viewpoint of expression, or vested ofﬁcials with
open-ended discretion that threatened the same, even where
it was assumed that a properly drawn law could have greatly
restricted or prohibited the manner of expression or circula-
tion at issue”). Accordingly, the Court’s observation that
there are a handful of permissible applications of the decency
and respect proviso, even if true, is irrelevant.15

15 The Court seemingly concedes that these isolated constitutional appli-
cations are in fact of little matter. For after speaking of speciﬁc applica-
tions that may be valid, the Court goes on to admit that these “would
not alone be sufﬁcient to sustain the statute.” Ante, at 585. The Court
nonetheless upholds the statute because it is not “persuaded that, in other
applications, the language of § 954(d)(1) itself will give rise to the suppres-
sion of protected expression.”
Ibid. This conclusion appears to rest on
some combination of (a) the Court’s competition rationale as distinguishing
Rosenberger and justifying the discrimination, (b) the Court’s reading of
the decency and respect proviso as something other than viewpoint based,
and (c) the Court’s treatment of “taking into consideration” as establishing
no ﬁrm mandate subject to constitutional scrutiny. As already explained,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter in the case of National Endowment for Arts v. Finley.  It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of the Court

may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the man-
ner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of
the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.”
Id., at 2520–2521.

Only one article of the Convention addresses arbitration
agreements—Article  II.    That  article  contains  only  three
provisions,  each  one  sentence  long.    Article  II(1)  requires
“[e]ach  Contracting  State  [to]  recognize  an  agreement  in
writing under which the parties undertake to submit to ar-
bitration all or any differences which have arisen or which
may arise between them in respect of a defined legal rela-
tionship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject
matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”  Id., at 2519.
Article II(2) provides that “[t]he term ‘agreement in writing’
shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitra-
tion agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an ex-
change of letters or telegrams.”  Ibid.  Finally, Article II(3)
states that “[t]he court of a Contracting State, when seized
of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have
made  an  agreement  within  the  meaning  of  this  article,
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties
to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null
and  void,  inoperative  or  incapable  of  being  performed.”
Ibid.

C
In 1970, the United States acceded to the New York Con-
vention, and Congress enacted implementing legislation in
Chapter 2 of the FAA.  See 84 Stat. 692, 9 U. S. C. §§201–
208.  Chapter 2 grants federal courts jurisdiction over ac-
tions governed by the Convention, §203; establishes venue
for such actions, §204; authorizes removal from state court,
§205;  and  empowers  courts  to  compel  arbitration,  §206.
Chapter 2 also states that “Chapter 1 applies to actions and
proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act. It discusses the legal framework surrounding arbitration agreements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

26

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Appendix to opinion of the Court

“(A) has determined that the provider fails to comply
substantially with the provisions of the agreement, with
the provisions of this subchapter and regulations there-
under, or with a corrective action required under section
1395ww(f)(2)(B) of this title.”

42 U. S. C. § 405(b) provides, in relevant part:

“(b) Administrative determination of entitlement
to
beneﬁts; ﬁndings of fact; hearings; investigations; evi-
dentiary hearings in reconsiderations of disability bene-
ﬁt terminations; subsequent applications

“(1) The Commissioner of Social Security is directed
to make ﬁndings of fact, and decisions as to the rights
of any individual applying for a payment under this
subchapter. Any such decision by the Commissioner of
Social Security which involves a determination of dis-
ability and which is in whole or in part unfavorable to
such individual shall contain a statement of the case,
in understandable language, setting forth a discussion
of the evidence, and stating the Commissioner’s de-
termination and the reason or reasons upon which it
is based. Upon request by any such individual or
upon request by a wife, divorced wife, widow, surviv-
ing divorced wife, surviving divorced mother, surviving
divorced father, husband, divorced husband, widower,
surviving divorced husband, child, or parent who makes
a showing in writing that his or her rights may be preju-
diced by any decision the Commissioner of Social Se-
curity has rendered, the Commissioner shall give such
applicant and such other individual reasonable notice
and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such
decision, and, if a hearing is held, shall, on the basis
of evidence adduced at the hearing, afﬁrm, modify, or
reverse the Commissioner’s ﬁndings of fact and such
decision. Any such request with respect to such a de-
cision must be ﬁled within sixty days after notice of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an excerpt from a court case. It includes legal citations, statutes, and a discussion of legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON

Syllabus

(1) The parties dispute how to define the relevant “class of work-
ers.”  Saxon argues that because the air transportation industry en-
gages in interstate commerce, airline employees, as a whole, constitute
a “class of workers” covered by §1.  By contrast, Southwest maintains
that the relevant class includes only those airline employees actually
engaged day-to-day in interstate commerce.  This Court rejects Saxon’s
industrywide  approach.    By  referring  to  “workers”  rather  than  “em-
ployees,” the FAA directs attention to “the performance of work.”  New
Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. ___, ___.  And the word “engaged” sim-
ilarly emphasizes the actual work that class members typically carry
out.  Saxon is therefore a member of a “class of workers” based on what
she frequently does at Southwest—that is, physically loading and un-
loading cargo on and off airplanes—and not on what Southwest does
generally.  Pp. 3–4.

(2) The  parties  also  dispute  whether  the  class  of  airplane  cargo
loaders  is  “engaged  in  foreign  or  interstate  commerce.”   It  is.  To  be
“engaged” in “commerce” means to be directly involved in transporting
goods across state or international borders.  Thus, any class of workers
so  engaged  falls  within  §1’s  exemption.    Airplane  cargo  loaders  are
such a class.

Context confirms this reading.  In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U. S. 105, the Court applied two well-settled canons of statutory
interpretation to hold that §1 exempted only “transportation workers,”
rather  than  all  employees.  The  Court  indicated  that  any  such  ex-
empted worker must at least play a direct and “necessary role in the
free flow of goods” across borders.  Id., at 121.  Cargo loaders exhibit
this central feature of a transportation worker.

A final piece of statutory context further confirms that cargo loading
is part of cross-border “commerce.”  Section 1 of the FAA defines ex-
empted  “maritime  transactions”  to  include  “agreements  relating  to
wharfage . . . or any other matters in foreign commerce.”  Thus, if an
“agreemen[t] relating to wharfage”—i.e., money paid to access a cargo-
loading facility—is a “matte[r] in foreign commerce,” it stands to rea-
son that an individual who actually loads cargo on vehicles traveling
across borders is himself engaged in such commerce.  Pp. 4–7.

(b) Both  parties  proffer  arguments  disagreeing  with  this  analysis,

but none is convincing.  Pp. 7–11.

(1) Saxon thinks the relevant “class of workers” should include all
airline employees, not just cargo loaders.  For support, she argues that
“railroad employees” and “seamen”—two classes of workers listed im-
mediately before §1’s catchall provision—refer generally to employees
in  those  industries.    Saxon’s  premise  is  flawed.    “Seamen”  is  not  an
industrywide category but instead a subset of workers engaged in the
maritime shipping industry.  For example, “seamen” did not include
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, specifically outlining the reasoning behind a court's decision in the case of Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon. It breaks down the legal arguments and the court's interpretation of relevant statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 274 (1998)

275

Syllabus

should lie. Petitioners, relying on standards developed in the context
of Title VII, contend that damages are available in an implied action
under Title IX based on principles of respondeat superior and construc-
tive notice, i. e., without actual notice to ofﬁcials of discrimination in
school programs. Whether an educational institution can be said to vio-
late Title IX based on principles of respondeat superior and construc-
In this case,
tive notice has not been resolved by the Court’s decisions.
moreover, petitioners seek damages based on theories of respondeat
superior and constructive notice. Unlike Title IX, Title VII contains
an express cause of action for a damages remedy. Title IX’s private
action is judicially implied, however, and so contains no legislative ex-
pression of the scope of available remedies. Pp. 280–284.

(b) Because the private right of action is judicially implied, this Court
must infer how Congress would have addressed the issue of monetary
damages had the action been expressly included in Title IX.
It does
not appear that Congress contemplated unlimited damages against a
funding recipient that is unaware of discrimination in its programs.
When Title IX was enacted, the principal civil rights statutes containing
an express right of action did not allow monetary damages, and when
Title VII was amended to allow such damages, Congress limited the
amount recoverable in any individual case. Title IX was modeled after
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits race discrim-
ination in programs receiving federal funds. Both statutes condition
federal funding on a recipient’s promise not to discriminate, in what
amounts essentially to a contract between the Government and the
recipient.
In contrast, Title VII is framed as an outright prohibition.
Title IX’s contractual nature has implications for the construction of
the scope of available remedies. When Congress conditions the award
of federal funds under its spending power, the Court closely examines
the propriety of private actions holding recipients liable in damages
for violating the condition.
It is sensible to assume that Congress did
not envision a recipient’s liability in damages where the recipient was
unaware of the discrimination.

Title IX contains important clues that this was Congress’

intent.
Title IX’s express means of enforcement requires actual notice to ofﬁ-
cials of the funding recipient and an opportunity for voluntary com-
pliance before administrative enforcement proceedings can commence.
The presumable purpose is to avoid diverting education funding from
beneﬁcial uses where a recipient who is unaware of discrimination in
its programs is willing to institute prompt corrective measures. Allow-
ing recovery of damages based on principles of respondeat superior
or constructive notice in cases of teacher-student sexual harassment
would be at odds with that basic objective, as liability would attach
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BOECHLER v. COMMISSIONER

Syllabus

Section  6330(d)(1)  provides  that  a  “person  may,  within  30  days  of  a
determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of
such  determination  (and  the  Tax  Court  shall  have  jurisdiction  with
respect to such matter).”  Whether this provision limits the Tax Court’s
jurisdiction to petitions filed within the 30-day timeframe depends on
the meaning of “such matter,” the phrase marking the bounds of the
Tax Court’s jurisdiction.  Boechler contends that it refers only to the
immediately preceding phrase: a “petition [to] the Tax Court for review
of such determination,” making the filing deadline independent of the
jurisdictional grant.  The Commissioner, by contrast, argues that “such
matter” refers to the entire first clause of the sentence, sweeping in the
deadline and granting jurisdiction only over petitions filed within that
time, making the deadline jurisdictional.

The text does not clearly mandate the jurisdictional reading.  It is
hard to see how it could, given that “such matter” lacks a clear ante-
cedent.  Moreover,  Boechler’s  interpretation  has  a  small  edge  under
the last-antecedent rule, which instructs that the correct antecedent is
usually the closest reasonable one.  There are also other plausible ways
to read “such matter.”  For example, “such matter” might refer to “such
determination”  or  the  preceding  subsection’s  list  of  “[m]atters”  that
may  be  considered  during  the  collection  due  process  hearing,  see
§6330(c), but neither possibility ties the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to the
filing deadline.  And it is difficult to make the case that the jurisdic-
tional reading is clear where multiple plausible, nonjurisdictional in-
terpretations  exist.    Nothing  else  in  the  provision’s  text  or  structure
advances the case for jurisdictional clarity.  Finally, other tax provi-
sions enacted around the same time as §6330(d)(1) much more clearly
link their jurisdictional grants to a filing deadline—see §§6404(g)(1),
6015(e)(1)(A)—accentuating  the
in
§6330(d)(1).  Pp. 2–6.

lack  of  comparable  clarity

(b) The  Commissioner’s  counterarguments  fall  short.    In  this  con-
text, it is not enough that his interpretation of the statute is plausible,
or that some might even think it better than Boechler’s.  To satisfy the
clear-statement rule, the Commissioner’s interpretation must be clear,
and  it  is  not.  A  requirement  “does  not  become  jurisdictional  simply
because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains jurisdic-
tional provisions.”  Auburn, 568 U. S., at 155.  Rather than proximity,
what  is  needed  is  a  clear  tie  between  the  deadline  and  the  jurisdic-
tional grant.  The Commissioner also contends that a neighboring pro-
vision, §6330(e)(1), clarifies the jurisdictional effect of §6330(d)(1)’s fil-
ing  deadline.    Section  6330(e)(1)  plainly  conditions  the  Tax  Court’s
jurisdiction to grant an injunction to enforce the suspension of levy ac-
tions during collection due process hearings on a timely filing under
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus section. It lays out the legal issue, the arguments of both sides, and the court's reasoning.  While it is important legal information, it is not the primary content of the book itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A.

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

to “[r]espon[d] to deficiencies in prior law regulating [retire-
ment] plan fiduciaries” and to provide even greater protec-
tions  for  defined-benefit-plan  beneficiaries,  Harris  Trust,
530 U. S., at 241–242; see also Spokeo, 578 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 9) (historical and congressionally recognized injuries
often support standing).

Given all that history and ERISA’s text, this Court itself
has noted, in the defined-benefit-plan context, “that when a
trustee” breaches “his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries,”
the “beneficiaries may then maintain an action for restitu-
tion . . . or disgorgement.”  Harris Trust, 530 U. S., at 250.
Harris Trust confirms that ERISA incorporated “[t]he com-
mon law of trusts” to allow defined-benefit-plan beneficiar-
ies to seek relief from fiduciary breaches.  Ibid.; see also id.,
at 241–242 (noting that certain ERISA provisions “supple-
men[t] the fiduciary’s general duty of loyalty to the plan’s
beneficiaries”).5

2
The Court offers no reply to all the historical and statu-
tory evidence showing petitioners’ concrete interest in pru-
dent and loyal fiduciaries.

Instead,  the  Court  insists  again  that  “participants  in  a
defined-benefit plan are not similarly situated to the bene-
ficiaries of a private trust,” ante,  at 4, and that the “com-
plaint did not plausibly and clearly claim that the alleged
mismanagement  of  the  plan  substantially  increased  the

——————

5 Curiously,  today’s  Court  suggests  that  ERISA’s  efforts  to  bolster
trust-law fiduciary duties actually degraded them instead.  See ante, at
4 (justifying a narrow construction of ERISA protections because “trust
law informs but does not control interpretation of ERISA”).  Yet the case
the Court cites, Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U. S. 489 (1996), relied on trust
law to establish the minimum obligations ERISA imposes on plan fidu-
ciaries.  See id., at 506 (confirming that the “ERISA fiduciary duty in-
cludes [the] common law duty of loyalty”).  Today’s Court mistakes the
floor for the ceiling.  See ibid.; see also Harris Trust, 530 U. S., at 241–
242.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) and fiduciary duties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

GORSUCH, J., concurring

Williamson, 529 U. S., at 144.  It seems that fact has frus-
trated the Executive Branch and led it to attempt its own
regulatory solution in the CPP.  See 985 F. 3d, at 998, n. 20
(President  stating  that  “ ‘if  Congress  won’t  act  soon  .  .  .  I
will’ ”);  cf.  United  States  Telecom  Assn.  v.  FCC,  855  F. 3d
381, 423–424 (CADC 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (noting a “President’s interven-
tion [may] underscor[e] the enormous significance” of a reg-
ulation).

Other  suggestive  factors  are  present  too.    “The  electric
power  sector  is  among  the  largest  in  the  U. S.  economy,
with links to every other sector.”  N. Richardson, Keeping
Big  Cases  From  Making  Bad  Law:  The  Resurgent  “Major
Questions” Doctrine, 49 Conn. L. Rev. 355, 388 (2016).  The
Executive Branch has acknowledged that its proposed rule
would force an “aggressive transformation” of the electricity
sector through “transition to zero-carbon renewable energy
sources.”  White House Fact Sheet, App. in American Lung
Assn.  v.  EPA,  No.  19–1140  (CADC),  pp.  2076–2077.    The
Executive  Branch  has  also  predicted  its  rule  would  force
dozens of power plants to close and eliminate thousands of
jobs by 2025.  See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the
Clean Power Plan Final Rule 3–27, 3–30, 3–33, 6–25 (Oct.
23, 2015).  And industry analysts have estimated the CPP
would cause consumers’ electricity costs to rise by over $200
billion.   See  National  Mining  Assn.,  EPA’s  Clean  Power
Plan: An Economic Impact Analysis 2, 4 (2015).  Finally, the
CPP unquestionably has an impact on federalism, as “the
regulation  of  utilities  is  one  of  the  most  important  of  the
functions traditionally associated with the police power of
the States.”  Arkansas Elec. Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U. S. 375, 377 (1983).  None of this
is to say the policy the agency seeks to pursue is unwise or
should  not  be  pursued.  It  is  only  to  say  that  the  agency
seeks to resolve for itself the sort of question normally re-
served for Congress.  As a result, we look for clear evidence
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of West Virginia v. EPA. It delves into the arguments surrounding the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power plants.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–481
_________________

FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE, PETITIONER v.
ARGUS LEADER MEDIA, DBA ARGUS LEADER

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2019]

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress  has

instructed  that  the  disclosure  re-
quirements  of  the  Freedom  of  Information  Act  do  “not
apply”  to  “confidential”  private-sector  “commercial  or
financial  information”  in  the  government’s  possession.
But  when  does  information  provided  to  a  federal  agency
qualify  as  “confidential”?  The  Food  Marketing  Institute
says it’s enough if the owner keeps the information private
rather  than  releasing  it  publicly.
  The  government
suggests  that  an  agency’s  promise  to  keep  information
from  disclosure  may  also  suffice  to  render  it  confidential.
But the courts below imposed a different requirement yet,
holding that information can never be deemed confidential
unless  disclosing  it  is  likely  to  result  in  “substantial
competitive  harm”  to  the  business  that  provided  it.
Finding  at  least  this  “competitive  harm”  requirement
inconsistent with the terms of the statute, we reverse.

I
This  case  began  when  Argus  Leader,  a  South  Dakota
newspaper, filed a FOIA request for data collected by the
United  States  Department  of  Agriculture.  The  USDA
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and the introductory portion of the opinion itself. This type of content is highly suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

acquisition costs.  See §1395l(t)(14)(D).  Finally, HHS’s argument that
Congress  could  not  have  intended  for  the  agency  to  “overpay”  340B
hospitals for prescription drugs ignores the fact that Congress, when
enacting the statute, was well aware that 340B hospitals paid less for
covered  prescription  drugs.  It  may  be  that  the  reimbursement  pay-
ments  were  intended  to  offset  the  considerable  costs  of  providing
healthcare to the uninsured and underinsured in low-income and rural
communities.  Regardless, this Court is not the forum to resolve that
policy debate.  Pp. 9–14.

967 F. 3d 818, reversed and remanded.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus.  It summarizes the case and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1240

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

SERVICE—Continued

Rule

—Federal agency, ofﬁcer, or employee .............  29.4(a)
—Governor  and  State  Attorney  General  in

original actions ..............................................  17.3
—Mail  .....................................................................  29.3
—Personal service.................................................  29.3
—Solicitor  General  where  constitutionality  of

congressional act in issue ............................  29.4(b)

—Solicitor  General  where  United  States  or
federal  agency,  ofﬁcer,  or  employee  is
party ................................................................  29.4(a)

—State Attorney General where constitution

ality of state statute in issue ......................  29.4(c)

Proof of service, form  .................................................  29.5

When required

—Amicus curiae briefs and motions ................  37.5

—Appeals ...........................................................  18.1–18.5, 18.8, 18.10

—Applications to individual Justices  ...............  22.2, 22.4

—Briefs on merits  ...............................................  25.8

—Certiorari, petitions for writ of......................  12.3, 12.5, 12.6

—Dismissal of cases  ............................................  46.2(a)

—Extension of time, applications for  ...............  30.3, 30.4

—Extraordinary writs..........................................  20.2, 20.3(b)

—In forma pauperis proceedings  ....................  39.4

—Joint appendix ...................................................  26.1–26.4

—Motions, in general  ..........................................  21.3

—Original actions .................................................  17.3, 17.5–17.7

—Pro hac vice, motions to argue ......................  6.3

—Rehearing ...........................................................  44.1, 44.2

—Reply briefs .......................................................  15.6

—Supplemental briefs..........................................  15.8

SESSIONS OF COURT

Hours of open sessions .................................................  4.1

Opening of Term ...........................................................  4.1

Recesses ..........................................................................  4.3

SOLICITOR GENERAL

Amicus curiae brief for United States  ...................  37.4

Documents, cover color ................................................  33.1(e)

Service on

—When  constitutionality  of  congressional  act

in issue.............................................................  29.4(b)

—When  United  States  or  federal  ofﬁce,

agency, ofﬁcer, or employee is party .........  29.4(a)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a list of rules and their corresponding references, likely from a legal document. It is not sequential text meant to be read as a narrative.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:45] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

615

Souter, J., dissenting

dicate[s] that scarcity would give the State the right to exer-
cise viewpoint discrimination that is otherwise impermissi-
ble.”
Ibid.; see also Arkansas Ed. Television Comm’n v.
Forbes, 523 U. S. 666, 676 (1998) (scarcity of air time does not
justify viewpoint-based exclusion of candidates from a de-
bate on public television; neutral selection criteria must be
employed).
If the student activities fund at issue in Rosen-
berger had awarded competitive, merit-based grants to only
50%, or even 5%, of the applicants, on the basis of “journalis-
tic merit taking into consideration the message of the news-
paper,” it is obvious beyond peradventure that the Court
would not have come out differently, leaving the University
free to refuse funding after considering a publication’s Chris-
tian perspective.10

A word should be said, ﬁnally, about a proposed alterna-
tive to this failed analogy. As the Solicitor General put it

NEA, ante, at 585, is therefore misdirected.
It is not to the point that
the Government necessarily makes choices among competing applications,
or even that its judgments about artistic quality may be branded as sub-
jective to some greater or lesser degree; the question here is whether
the Government may apply patently viewpoint-based criteria in making
those choices.

10 Justice Scalia suggests that Rosenberger turned not on the distinc-
tion between government-as-speaker and government-as-facilitator-of-
private-speech, but rather on the fact that “the government had estab-
lished a limited public forum.” Ante, at 599. Leaving aside the proper
application of forum analysis to the NEA and its projects, I cannot agree
that the holding of Rosenberger turned on characterizing its metaphorical
forum as public in some degree. Like this case, Rosenberger involved
viewpoint discrimination, and we have made it clear that such discrimina-
tion is impermissible in all forums, even nonpublic ones, Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806 (1985), where,
by deﬁnition, the government has not made public property generally
available to facilitate private speech, Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Edu-
cators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 46 (1983) (deﬁning a nonpublic forum as “[p]ub-
lic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication”). Accordingly, Rosenberger’s brief allusion to forum
analysis was in no way determinative of the Court’s holding.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Souter. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1074

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 17, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8254. Harris v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8255. Pimentel Feliz v. Elo, Warden. C. A. 6th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8257. Gulledge v. Dees, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th

Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8260. Grosso v. Artuz, Superintendent, Green
Haven Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.

No. 99–8261. Duer v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 744 So. 2d 992.

No. 99–8262. Hudson v. Lamartiniere. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 184 F. 3d 819.

No. 99–8263. Harrell v. Mitchem, Warden, et al. C. A.

11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8265. Diehl v. Nelson et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 244.

No. 99–8268. Ellison v. Cycmanick, Judge, Florida Cir-
cuit Court, 9th Judicial Circuit, et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8270. Chambers v. Cook, Director, Oregon De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 201 F. 3d 443.

No. 99–8276. Blue v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Depart-
ment of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 741 So. 2d 1134.

No. 99–8283. Fausto v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8286. DeNictolis et al. v. Maloney, Commissioner,
Massachusetts Department of Correction. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8289. Peabody v. Zlaket, Chief Justice, Supreme
Court of Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1317.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
36  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

BREYER, J., dissenting

these early edicts and the subsequent Statute of Northamp-
ton, are irrelevant.  Ante, at 32.  But why should that be?
Pregun regulations prohibiting “going armed” in public il-
lustrate  an  entrenched  tradition  of  restricting  public  car-
riage of weapons.  That tradition seems as likely to apply to
firearms as to any other lethal weapons—particularly if we
follow the Court’s instruction to use analogical reasoning.
See ante, at 19–20.  And indeed, as we shall shortly see, the
most significant prefirearm regulation of public carriage—
the  Statute  of  Northampton—was  in  fact  applied  to  guns
once  they  appeared  in  England.    See  Sir  John  Knight’s
Case, 3 Mod. 117, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (K. B. 1686)

The Statute of Northampton was enacted in 1328.  2 Edw.
3,  258,  c.  3.  By  its  terms,  the  statute  made  it  a  criminal
offense to carry arms without the King’s authorization.  It
provided  that,  without  such  authorization,  “no  Man  great
nor  small,  of  what  Condition  soever  he  be,”  could  “go  nor
ride armed by night nor by day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in
the  presence  of  the  Justices  or  other  Ministers,  nor  in  no
part  elsewhere,  upon  pain  to  forfeit  their  Armour  to  the
King,  and  their  Bodies  to  Prison  at  the  King’s  pleasure.”
Ibid.  For more than a century following its enactment, Eng-
land’s  sheriffs  were  routinely  reminded  to  strictly  enforce
the  Statute  of  Northampton  against  those  going  armed
without the King’s permission.  See Calendar of the Close
Rolls, Edward III, 1330–1333, at 131 (Apr. 3, 1330) (1898);
1 Calendar of the Close Rolls, Richard II, 1377–1381, at 34
(Dec.  1,  1377)  (1914);  2  id.,  Richard  II,  1381–1385,  at  3
(Aug. 7, 1381) (1920); 3 id., Richard II, 1385–1389, at 128
(Feb. 6, 1386) (1921); id., at 399–400 (May 16, 1388); 4 id.,
Henry VI, 1441–1447, at 224 (May 12, 1444) (1937); see also
11  Tudor  Royal  Proclamations,  The  Later  Tudors:  1553–
1587, pp. 442–445 (Proclamation 641, 21 Elizabeth I, July
26, 1579) (P. Hughes & J. Larkin eds. 1969).

The Court thinks that the Statute of Northampton “has
little bearing on the Second Amendment,” in part because
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*. It delves into historical legal precedents and arguments related to gun control.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgement</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

thority,  but  Businesses  Are  Likely  to  Experience  Compli-
ance  Costs  5  (GAO–18–114,  Nov.  2017)  (Sales  Taxes  Re-
port)).  But  evidence  in  the  same  GAO  report  indicates
that  the  pendulum  is  swinging  in  the  opposite  direction,
and has been for some time.  States and local governments
are already able to collect approximately 80 percent of the
tax revenue that would be available if there were no phys-
ical-presence rule.  See Sales Taxes Report 8.  Among the
top  100  Internet  retailers  that  rate  is  between  87  and  96
percent.  See  id.,  at  41.  Some  companies,  including  the
online  behemoth  Amazon,*  now  voluntarily  collect  and
remit  sales  tax  in  every  State  that  assesses  one—even
those in which they have no physical presence.  See id., at
10.  To  the  extent  the  physical-presence  rule  is  harming
States, the harm is apparently receding with time.

The  Court  rests  its  decision  to  overrule  Bellas  Hess  on
the “present realities of the interstate marketplace.”  Ante,
at  18.  As  the  Court  puts  it,  allowing  remote  sellers  to
escape remitting a lawful tax is “unfair and unjust.”  Ante,
at  16.  “[U]nfair  and  unjust  to  . . .  competitors  . . .  who
must remit the tax; to the consumers who pay the tax; and
to the States that seek fair enforcement of the sales tax.”
Ante,  at  16.  But  “the  present  realities  of  the  interstate
marketplace” include the possibility that the  marketplace
itself  could  be  affected  by  abandoning  the  physical-
presence rule.  The Court’s focus on unfairness and injus-
tice  does  not  appear  to  embrace  consideration  of  that
current public policy concern.

The  Court,  for  example,  breezily  disregards  the  costs
that its decision will impose on retailers.  Correctly calcu-
lating  and  remitting  sales  taxes  on  all  e-commerce  sales

——————

* C.  Isidore,  Amazon  To  Start  Collecting  State  Sales  Taxes  Every-
where  (Mar.  29,  2017),  CNN  Tech,  http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/29/
technology/amazon-sales-tax/index.html  (all  Internet  materials  as  last
visited June 19, 2018).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It discusses the overruling of Bellas Hess and the implications of the physical-presence rule for sales tax collection.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

KAGAN, J., dissenting

See  Reply  Brief  for  29  States  and  State  Agencies  in  No.
15A773,  p. 33  (conceding  the  point).    The  effect  of  the
Court’s  order,  followed  by  the  Trump  administration’s  re-
peal of the rule, was that the Clean Power Plan never went
into  effect.  The  ensuing  years,  though,  proved  the  Plan’s
moderation.  Market forces alone caused the power industry
to  meet  the  Plan’s  nationwide  emissions  target—through
exactly  the  kinds  of  generation  shifting  the  Plan  contem-
plated.  See  84  Fed.  Reg.  32561–32562  (2019);  Brief  for
United States 47.  So by the time yet another President took
office, the Plan had become, as a practical matter, obsolete.
For that reason, the Biden administration announced that,
instead of putting the Plan into effect, it would commence a
new rulemaking.  Yet this Court determined to pronounce
on the legality of the old rule anyway.  The Court may be
right  that  doing  so  does  not  violate  Article  III  mootness
rules (which are notoriously strict).  See ante, at 14–16.  But
the Court’s docket is discretionary, and because no one is
now subject to the Clean Power Plan’s terms, there was no
reason  to  reach  out  to  decide  this  case.    The  Court  today
issues  what  is  really  an  advisory  opinion  on  the  proper
scope  of  the  new  rule  EPA  is  considering.  That  new  rule
will be subject anyway to immediate, pre-enforcement judi-
cial  review.    But  this  Court  could  not  wait—even  to  see
what the new rule says—to constrain EPA’s efforts to ad-
dress climate change.

The limits the majority now puts on EPA’s authority fly
in the face of the statute Congress wrote.  The majority says
it is simply “not plausible” that Congress enabled EPA to
regulate power plants’ emissions through generation shift-
ing.  Ante, at 31.  But that is just what Congress did when
it broadly authorized EPA in Section 111 to select the “best
system  of  emission
for  power  plants.
reduction”
§7411(a)(1).  The  “best  system”  full  stop—no  ifs,  ands,  or
buts of any kind relevant here.  The parties do not dispute
that  generation  shifting  is  indeed  the  “best  system”—the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of West Virginia v. EPA. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Clean Power Plan and the EPA's authority to regulate power plant emissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

THOMAS, J., dissenting

only “law-abiding, responsible citizens” is specious at best.7
See ante, at 17.

At argument, the Government invented yet another posi-
tion.  It explained that when it used the term “responsible”
in its briefs, it really meant “not dangerous.”  See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 10–11.  Thus, it posited that the Second Amendment
protects only law-abiding and non-dangerous citizens.  No
matter  how  many  adjectives  the  Government  swaps  out,
the fact remains that the Court has never adopted anything
akin to the Government’s test.  In reality, the “law-abiding,
dangerous citizen” test is the Government’s own creation,
designed to justify every one of its existing regulations.  It
has no doctrinal or constitutional mooring.

The Government finally tries to cram its dangerousness
test into our precedents.  It argues that §922(g)(8) and its
proffered historical laws have a shared justification of dis-
arming  dangerous  citizens.  The  Government,  however,
does not draw that conclusion by examining the historical
justification  for  each  law  cited.    Instead,  the  Government
simply looks—from a modern vantage point—at the mix of
laws and manufactures a possible connection between them
all.  Yet,  our  task  is  to  “assess  whether  modern  firearms
regulations  are  consistent  with  the  Second  Amendment’s
text and historical understanding.”  Bruen, 597 U. S., at 26
(emphasis added).  To do so, we must look at the historical
law’s  justification  as  articulated  during  the  relevant  time
period—not at modern post-hoc speculations.  See, e.g., id.,
at 41–42, 48–49; Heller, 554 U. S., at 631–632.  As I have
explained, a historically based study of the evidence reveals
that the Government’s position is untenable.  Supra, at 7–

——————

7 The only conceivably relevant language in our precedents is the pass-
ing reference in Heller to laws banning felons and others from possessing
firearms.  See 554 U. S., at 626–627, and n. 26.  That discussion is dicta.
As for Bruen, the Court used the phrase “ordinary, law-abiding citizens”
merely to describe those who were unable to publicly carry a firearm in
New York.  See, e.g., 597 U. S., at 9, 15, 31–32, 71.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

17

Opinion of the Court

on  the  truth  of  Rast’s  factual  statements.    Longoni  could
opine that the tested substances were marijuana, metham-
phetamine,  and  cannabis  only  because  he  accepted  the
truth of what Rast had reported about her work in the lab—
that  she  had  performed  certain  tests  according  to  certain
protocols and gotten certain results.  And likewise, the jury
could credit Longoni’s opinions identifying the substances
only because it too accepted the truth of what Rast reported
about her lab work (as conveyed by Longoni).  If Rast had
lied about all those matters, Longoni’s expert opinion would
have counted for nothing, and the jury would have been in
no position to convict.  So the State’s basis evidence—more
precisely,  the  truth  of  the  statements  on  which  its  expert
relied—propped up its whole case.  But the maker of those
statements was not in the courtroom, and Smith could not
ask her any questions.

Approving  that  practice  would  make  our  decisions  in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming a dead letter, and allow for
easy  evasion  of  the  Confrontation  Clause.    As  earlier  de-
scribed, those two decisions applied Crawford in “straight-
forward” fashion to forensic evidence.  Melendez-Diaz, 557
U. S., at 312; see Bullcoming, 564 U. S., at 659–661; supra,
at 3–5.  The first prevented the introduction of a lab ana-
lyst’s testimonial report sans lab analyst.  The second re-
fused to accede to the idea that any old analyst—i.e., a sub-
stitute who had not taken part in the lab work—would do.
Arizona offers only a slight variation.  On its view, a surro-
gate analyst can testify to all the same substance—that is,
someone  else’s  substance—as  long  as  he  bases  an  “inde-
pendent opinion” on that material.  And that is true even if,
as here, the proffered opinion merely replicates, rather than
somehow  builds  on,  the  testing  analyst’s  conclusions.    So
every  testimonial  lab  report  could  come  into  evidence
through  any  trained  surrogate,  however  remote  from  the
case.  And no defendant would have a right to cross-examine
the testing analyst about what she did and how she did it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Confrontation Clause and the admissibility of forensic evidence. It delves into the implications of allowing surrogate analysts to testify based on the work of others, arguing against this practice.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. 663, 688, n. 1 (2014)).
The difficulty of defining this supposedly traditional rem-
edy is the first sign that it is not a historically recognized
equitable remedy.  In contrast, an accounting for profits, or
accounting—a  distinct  form  of  relief  that  the  majority
groups with disgorgement—has a well-accepted definition:
It compels a defendant to account for, and repay to a plain-
tiff, those profits that belong to the plaintiff in equity.  Bray,
Fiduciary Remedies, in The Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary
Law 449 (E. Criddle, P. Miller, & R. Sitkoff eds. 2019).  The
definition of disgorgement, after today’s decision, is a rem-
edy  that  compels  each  defendant  to  pay  his  profits  (and
sometimes, though it is not clear when, all of his codefend-
ants’  profits)  to  a  third-party  Government  agency  (which
sometimes, though it is not clear when, passes the money
on to victims).  This remedy has no basis in historical prac-
tice.

No  published  case  appears  to  have  used  the  term  “dis-
gorgement”  to  refer  to  equitable  relief  until  the  20th  cen-
tury.  Even then, the earliest cases use the word in a “non-
technical” sense, Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae
22,  to  describe  the  action  a  defendant  must  take  when  a
party is awarded a traditional equitable remedy such as an
accounting for profits or an equitable lien.1  For example, in
Byrd v. Mullinix, 159 Ark. 310, 251 S. W. 871 (1923), the
Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the imposition of an
equitable lien to prevent a debtor from “put[ting] the money
in property which was itself beyond the reach of creditors,
and to compel its disgorgement,” id., at 316–317, 251 S. W.,
at 872.  Likewise, in Armstrong v. Richards, 128 Fla. 561,
175 So. 340 (1937), the Supreme Court of Florida referred
to “the right of the taxpayer to require an accounting from

——————

1 An  equitable  lien  is  imposed  on  a defendant’s  property  “as  security
for a claim on the ground that otherwise the former would be unjustly
enriched.”  Restatement of Restitution §161, p. 650 (1936).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis. While it is part of a legal document, it is the actual content of the opinion and not a preface, table of contents, or other non-sequential text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

KAGAN, J., dissenting

not  matter  how  different  the  Warhol  is  from  the  original
photo—how much “new expression, meaning, or message”
he  added.  It  does  not  matter  that  the  silkscreen  and  the
photo do not have the same aesthetic characteristics and do
not convey the same meaning.  It does not matter that be-
cause  of  those  dissimilarities,  the magazine  publisher  did
not view the one as a substitute for the other.  All that mat-
ters is that Warhol and the publisher entered into a licens-
ing transaction, similar to one Goldsmith might have done.
Because the artist had such a commercial purpose, all the
creativity in the world could not save him.

That  doctrinal  shift  ill  serves  copyright’s  core  purpose.
The law does not grant artists (and authors and composers
and so on) exclusive rights—that is, monopolies—for their
own sake.  It does so to foster creativity—“[t]o promote the
[p]rogress” of both arts and science.  U. S. Const., Art. I, §8,
cl. 8.  And for that same reason, the law also protects the
fair  use  of  copyrighted  material.  Both  Congress  and  the
courts have long recognized that an overly stringent copy-
right regime actually “stifle[s]” creativity by preventing art-
ists from building on the work of others.  Stewart v. Abend,
495 U. S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see Campbell, 510 U. S., at 578–579.  For, let’s be hon-
est,  artists  don’t  create  all  on  their  own;  they  cannot  do
what they do without borrowing from or otherwise making
use  of  the  work  of  others.    That  is  the  way  artistry  of  all
kinds—visual, musical, literary—happens (as it is the way
knowledge and invention generally develop).  The fair-use
test’s first factor responds to that truth: As understood in
our  precedent,  it  provides  “breathing  space”  for  artists  to
use existing materials to make fundamentally new works,
for the public’s enjoyment and benefit.  Id., at 579.  In now
remaking  that  factor,  and  thus  constricting  fair  use’s
boundaries,  the  majority  hampers  creative  progress  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments about copyright law and fair use, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Opinion of the Court

granted certiorari to resolve the split in authority regarding
the scope of liability under the CFAA’s “exceeds authorized
access” clause.  590 U. S. ___ (2020).

II
A
1
Both Van Buren and the Government raise a host of pol-
icy  arguments  to  support  their  respective  interpretations.
But we start where we always do: with the text of the stat-
ute.  Here, the most relevant text is the phrase “exceeds au-
thorized access,” which means “to access a computer with
authorization  and  to  use  such  access  to  obtain  . . .  infor-
mation in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so
to obtain.”  §1030(e)(6).

The parties agree that Van Buren “access[ed] a computer
with authorization” when he used his patrol-car computer
and valid credentials to log into the law enforcement data-
base.  They also agree that Van Buren “obtain[ed] . . . infor-
mation in the computer” when he acquired the license-plate
record for Albo.  The dispute is whether Van Buren was “en-
titled so to obtain” the record.

“Entitle”  means  “to  give  . . .  a  title,  right,  or  claim  to
something.”  Random House Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage 649 (2d ed. 1987).  See also Black’s Law Dictionary
477 (5th ed. 1979) (“to give a right or legal title to”).  The
parties agree that Van Buren had been given the right to
acquire license-plate information—that is, he was “entitled
to obtain” it—from the law enforcement computer database.
But was Van Buren “entitled so to obtain” the license-plate
information, as the statute requires?

Van Buren says yes.  He notes that “so,” as used in this
statute, serves as a term of reference that recalls “the same
manner  as  has  been  stated”  or  “the  way  or  manner  de-
scribed.”  Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1246; 15 Oxford Eng-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites case law and legal definitions, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

EGBERT v. BOULE

Syllabus

Amendment violation for unlawful retaliation.  Invoking Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, Boule asked the Dis-
trict  Court  to  recognize  a  damages  action  for  each  alleged  constitu-
tional violation.  The District Court declined to extend Bivens as re-
quested, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

Held: Bivens does not extend to create causes of action for Boule’s Fourth
Amendment  excessive-force  claim  and  First  Amendment  retaliation
claim.  Pp. 5–17.

(a) In Bivens, the Court held that it had authority to create a dam-
ages action against federal agents for violating the plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment  rights.  Over  the  next  decade,  the  Court  also  fashioned
new causes of action under the Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Pass-
man, 442 U. S. 228, and the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green,
446 U. S. 14.  Since then, however, the Court has come “to appreciate
more fully the tension between” judicially created causes of action and
“the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power,” Her-
nández v. Mesa, 589 U. S. ___, ___, and has declined 11 times to imply
a similar cause of action for other alleged constitutional violations, see,
e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367.
Rather than dispense with Bivens, the Court now emphasizes that rec-
ognizing  a  Bivens  cause  of  action  is  “a  disfavored  judicial  activity.”
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. ___, ___.

The  analysis  of  a  proposed  Bivens  claim  proceeds  in  two  steps:  A
court asks first whether the case presents “a new Bivens context”—i.e.,
is it “meaningfully different from the three cases in which the Court
has implied a damages action,” Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___, and, second,
even  if  so,  do  “special  factors”  indicate  that  the  Judiciary  is  at  least
arguably less equipped than Congress to “weigh the costs and benefits
of allowing a damages action to proceed.”  Id., at ___.  This two-step
inquiry often resolves to a single question: whether there is any reason
to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages
remedy.  Further, under the Court’s precedents, a court may not fash-
ion a Bivens remedy if Congress already has provided, or has author-
ized  the  Executive  to  provide,  “an  alternative  remedial  structure.”
Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___.  Pp. 5–8.

(b) The Court of Appeals conceded that Boule’s Fourth Amendment
claim  presented  a  new  Bivens  context,  but  its  conclusion  that  there
was no reason to hesitate before recognizing a cause of action against
Agent Egbert was incorrect for two independent reasons.  Pp. 9–13.

(1) First, the “risk of undermining border security provides reason
to  hesitate  before  extending  Bivens  into  this  field.”  Hernández,  589
U. S., at ___.  In Hernández, the Court declined to create a damages
remedy for an excessive-force claim against a Border Patrol agent be-
cause “regulating the conduct of agents at the border unquestionably
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the legal issues, the court's holding, and the reasoning behind the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC. v. BUSK

ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–433.  Argued October 8, 2014—Decided December 9, 2014

Petitioner  Integrity  Staffing  Solutions,  Inc.,  required  its  hourly  ware-
house  workers,  who  retrieved  products  from  warehouse  shelves  and
packaged  them  for  delivery  to  Amazon.com  customers,  to  undergo  a
security screening before leaving the warehouse each day.  Respond-
ents, former employees, sued the company alleging, as relevant here,
that they were entitled to compensation under the Fair Labor Stand-
ards  Act  of  1938  (FLSA)  for  the  roughly  25  minutes  each  day  that
they  spent  waiting  to  undergo  and  undergoing  those  screenings.
They also alleged that the company could have reduced that time to a
de minimis amount by adding screeners or staggering shift termina-
tions  and  that  the  screenings  were  conducted  to  prevent  employee
theft  and,  thus,  for  the  sole  benefit  of  the  employers  and  their  cus-
tomers.

The  District  Court  dismissed  the  complaint  for  failure  to  state  a
claim, holding that the screenings were not integral and indispensa-
ble  to  the  employees’  principal  activities  but  were  instead  postlimi-
nary and noncompensable.  The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit  reversed  in  relevant  part,  asserting  that  postshift  activities
that  would  ordinarily  be  classified  as  noncompensable  postliminary
activities  are  compensable  as  integral  and  indispensable  to  an  em-
ployee’s principal activities if the postshift activities are necessary to
the principal work and performed for the employer’s benefit.

Held: The time that respondents spent waiting to undergo and undergo-
ing security screenings is not compensable under the FLSA.  Pp. 3–9.
(a) Congress  passed  the  Portal-to-Portal  Act  to  respond  to  an  eco-
nomic emergency created by the broad judicial interpretation given to
the FLSA’s undefined terms “work” and “workweek.”  See 29 U. S. C.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning or content of the case. They are informational in nature and not meant to be indexed as part of the document's body.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

13

ALITO, J., dissenting

to  cover  adult  children  would  expose  many  state  health
plans  to  penalties  under  42  U. S. C.  §300gg–22(b)(2),  and
those penalties can amount to $100 per day for each person
offered noncompliant coverage.  Ibid.  Thus, the States are
presented  with  the  choice  of  spending  millions  to  cover
adult children or risking untold sums for failing to do so.

In  this  way,  the  States’  financial  injuries  from  offering
health coverage to adult children are traceable to the loom-
ing threat of enforcement actions.  And those financial in-
juries can be prospectively redressed by a declaratory judg-
ment making clear that the States are not, in fact, obligated
to offer health coverage to children up to age 26.

While I have outlined two examples of concrete, tracea-
ble,  and  redressable  injuries  demonstrated  by  the  state
plaintiffs, these examples are not exhaustive.  The ACA is
an enormously complex statute, and the States have offered
evidence of ongoing financial injuries relating to compliance
with  many  other  different  (and  enforceable)  ACA  provi-
sions.  See, e.g., App. 81–86 (Texas’s compliance costs); id.,
at 139 (Kansas); id., at 158–162, 165–170 (Missouri); id., at
182–184 (South Carolina); id., at 186–190 (South Dakota);
id., at 345–350 (Georgia).

B
The Court largely ignores the theory of standing outlined
above.  It devotes most of its attention to two other theories,
see ante, at 4–14, and when it does address the relevant in-
juries, its arguments are deeply flawed.

The Court’s primary argument rests on a patent distor-
tion  of  the  traceability  prong  of  our  established  test  for
standing.  Partially quoting a line in Allen,  the Court  de-
mands a showing that the “Government’s conduct in ques-
tion is . . . ‘fairly traceable’ to enforcement of the ‘allegedly
unlawful’  provision  of  which  the  plaintiffs  complain—
§5000A(a).”  Ante, at 15 (quoting 468 U. S., at 751; emphasis
added).  This is a flat-out misstatement of the law and what
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the standing of the state plaintiffs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

19

Opinion of the Court

along with posts including data from the Vaccine Adverse
Event Reporting System (VAERS).  And in March 2021, the
CDC  flagged  several  misinformation  trends  for  Facebook,
including  claims  related  to  pregnancy  and  VAERS  data.
Because  Hines  does  not  provide  dates  for  the  fact  checks,
we cannot know whether the CDC could be responsible.

In May 2022, Facebook restricted Hines’ account for post-
ing an article discussing increased rates of myocarditis in
teenagers following vaccination.  A little over a year earlier,
the CDC warned Facebook against claims of “unsubstanti-
ated  links  to  new  [vaccine]  side  effects,”  including  “ ‘irri-
tab[ility],’ ” “ ‘auto-immune issues, infertility,’ ” and “ ‘neuro-
logical damage including lowered IQ.’ ”  54 Record 17,042–
17,043  (emphasis  deleted).    There  is  no  evidence  that  the
CDC ever listed myocarditis as an unsubstantiated side ef-
fect—but because it is an alleged side effect, it at least falls
under  the  same  umbrella  as  the  CDC’s  communication.
Health Freedom’s February 2023 violation, by contrast, was
for posting that vaccine manufacturers would not compen-
sate those with vaccine-related injuries—a topic that bears
little resemblance to the content that the CDC flagged.

In April 2023, Hines received violations for posts about
children  and  the  vaccine.  In  November  2021,  Facebook
worked with the CDC to update its policies to remove addi-
tional  false  claims  including  that  “ ‘the  COVID  vaccine  is
not  safe  for  kids.’ ”    37  id.,  at  11,457.    It  is  not  clear  that
either  of  Hines’  posts  violated  the  CDC-influenced  policy
against  false  claims  related  to  children  and  the  vaccine.
One  simply  referred  to  the  World  Health  Organization’s
COVID–19 vaccine recommendations for children, and the
other discussed the role of children within the “predatory”
pharmaceutical industry.  App. 789–790.  Given the loose
match between the policy and the posts, it is hard to call it
“likely” that Facebook was enforcing the CDC’s preferences
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the relationship between Facebook, the CDC, and content moderation related to COVID-19 vaccines. It provides specific examples and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT v. B. L., A MINOR,
BY AND THROUGH HER FATHER, LEVY, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 20–255.  Argued April 28, 2021—Decided June 23, 2021

Mahanoy Area High School student B. L. failed to make the school’s var-
sity cheerleading squad.  While visiting a local convenience store over
the weekend, B. L. posted two images on Snapchat, a social media ap-
plication for smartphones that allows users to share temporary images
with  selected  friends.    B. L.’s  posts  expressed  frustration  with  the
school and the school’s cheerleading squad, and one contained vulgar
language and gestures.  When school officials learned of the posts, they
suspended B. L. from the junior varsity cheerleading squad for the up-
coming year.  After unsuccessfully seeking to reverse that punishment,
B. L. and her parents sought relief in federal court, arguing inter alia
that punishing B. L. for her speech violated the First Amendment.  The
District Court granted an injunction ordering the school to reinstate
B. L. to the cheerleading team.  Relying on Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, to grant B. L.’s subse-
quent  motion  for  summary  judgment,  the  District  Court  found  that
B. L.’s punishment violated the First Amendment because her Snap-
chat  posts  had  not  caused  substantial  disruption  at  the  school.   The
Third Circuit affirmed the judgment, but the panel majority reasoned
that Tinker did not apply because schools had no special license to reg-
ulate student speech occurring off campus.

Held: While  public  schools  may  have  a  special  interest  in  regulating
some  off-campus  student  speech,  the  special  interests  offered  by  the
school are not sufficient to overcome B. L.’s interest in free expression
in this case.  Pp. 4–11.

(a) In  Tinker,  we  indicated  that  schools  have  a  special  interest  in
regulating on-campus student speech that “materially disrupts class-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV.

Opinion of the Court

adopt today is one that can be readily applied.  In a great
many  cases,  it  will  be  known  even  before  litigation  is
commenced  whether  an  alleged  harasser  was  a  supervi
sor,  and  in  others,  the  alleged  harasser’s  status  will  be
come clear to both sides after discovery.  And once this is
known,  the  parties  will  be  in  a  position  to  assess  the
strength of  a case and to explore the possibility of resolv
ing  the  dispute.    Where  this  does  not  occur,  supervisor
status will generally be capable of resolution at summary
judgment.  By contrast, under the approach advocated by
petitioner  and  the  EEOC,  supervisor  status  would  very
often be murky—as this case well illustrates.12

According to petitioner, the record shows that Davis, her
alleged harasser, wielded enough authority to qualify as a
supervisor.  Petitioner  points  in  particular  to  Davis’  job
description,  which  gave  her  leadership  responsibilities,
and to evidence that Davis at times led or directed Vance
and  other  employees  in  the  kitchen.    See  Brief  for  Peti
tioner  42–43  (citing  record);  Reply  Brief  22–23  (same).
The United States, on the other hand, while applying the
same  open-ended  test  for  supervisory  status,  reaches  the
opposite  conclusion.  At  least  on  the  present  record,  the
United States tells us, Davis fails to qualify as a supervi
sor.  Her job description, in the Government’s view, is not
dispositive, and the Government adds that it would not be
enough for petitioner to show that Davis “occasionally took
the lead in the kitchen.”  Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 31 (U. S. Brief).
This  disagreement

is  hardly  surprising  since  the

——————

12 The  dissent  attempts  to  find  ambiguities  in  our  holding,  see  post,
at  15–16,  and  n. 5,  but  it  is  indisputable  that  our  holding  is  orders  of
magnitude  clearer  than  the  nebulous  standard  it  would  adopt.   Em
ployment  discrimination  cases  present  an  almost  unlimited  number
of  factual  variations,  and  marginal  cases  are  inevitable  under  any
standard.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the definition of "supervisor" in the context of workplace harassment. It delves into the arguments presented by both parties involved in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

Syllabus

misplaced because those maps do not accurately represent the district-
ing process in Alabama.  Regardless, the map-comparison test that Al-
abama proposes is flawed in its fundamentals.  Neither the text of §2
nor the fraught debate that produced it suggests that “equal access” to
the fundamental right of voting turns on technically complicated com-
puter  simulations.    Further,  while  Alabama  has  repeatedly  empha-
sized that HB1 cannot have violated §2 because none of plaintiffs’ two
million odd maps contained more than one majority-minority district,
that (albeit very big) number is close to irrelevant in practice, where
experts  estimate  the  possible  number  of  Alabama  districting  maps
numbers is at least in the trillion trillions.
  Alabama would also require plaintiffs to demonstrate that any devi-
ations between the State’s enacted plan and race-neutral alternatives
“can be explained only by racial discrimination.”  Brief for Alabama 44
(emphasis added).  But the Court’s precedents and the legislative com-
promise struck in the 1982 amendments clearly rejected treating dis-
criminatory intent as a requirement for liability under §2.  Pp. 22, 25–
30.

(d) The  Court  disagrees  with  Alabama’s  assertions  that  the  Court
should stop applying §2 in cases like these because the text of §2 does
not apply to single-member redistricting and because §2 is unconstitu-
tional as the District Court applied it here.  Alabama’s understanding
of §2 would require abandoning four decades of the Court’s §2 prece-
dents.  The Court has unanimously held that §2 and the Gingles frame-
work  apply  to  claims  challenging  single-member  districts.    Growe  v.
Emison,  507  U. S.  25,  40.    As  Congress  is  undoubtedly  aware  of  the
Court’s construction of §2 to apply to districting challenges, statutory
stare  decisis  counsels  staying  the  course  until  and  unless  Congress
acts.  In any event, the statutory text supports the conclusion that §2
applies to single-member districts.  Indeed, the contentious debates in
Congress  about  proportionality  would  have  made  little  sense  if  §2’s
coverage was as limited as Alabama contends.
  The Court similarly rejects Alabama’s argument that §2 as applied
to  redistricting is  unconstitutional  under  the  Fifteenth  Amendment.
The Court held over 40 years ago “that, even if §1 of the [Fifteenth]
Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination,” City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U. S. 156, 173, the VRA’s “ban on electoral changes
that are discriminatory in effect is an appropriate method of promoting
the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment,” id., at 177.  Alabama’s con-
tention that the Fifteenth Amendment does not authorize race-based
redistricting as a remedy for §2 violations similarly fails.  The Court is
not persuaded by Alabama’s arguments that §2 as interpreted in Gin-
gles exceeds the remedial authority of Congress.
  The Court’s opinion does not diminish or disregard the concern that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section.  It summarizes the Court's reasoning and holdings on a particular case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1004

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 6, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1098. Barth v. Public Service Electric and Gas
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 193
F. 3d 514.

No. 99–1117. Heard v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari de-

nied. Reported below: 187 Ill. 2d 36, 718 N. E. 2d 58.

No. 99–1124. C. Volante Corp. v. Brown et al. C. A. 2d

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 351.

No. 99–1125. Kansas Public Employees Retirement Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc., et al. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 922.

No. 99–1129. Aziz v. Bluefield State College. C. A. 4th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1303.

No. 99–1130. Clanton v. Township of Redford. Ct. App.

Mich. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1131. Medical Society of New Jersey et al. v.
Robins, President, New Jersey State Board of Medical
Examiners, et al. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 321 N. J. Super. 586, 729 A. 2d 1056.

No. 99–1136. Phillips v. CSX Transportation, Inc. C. A.

4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 285.

No. 99–1158. Lal v. State System of Higher Education of
Pennsylvania (SSHE) et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 185 F. 3d 862.

No. 99–1200. Hershfield v. Town of Colonial Beach et

al. Ct. App. Va. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1229. Ratcliff v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 637.

No. 99–1234. Hill, Warden v. Bell. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 1089.

No. 99–1252. Pride v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 1 S. W. 3d 494.

No. 99–1253. Rodriguez v. West, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
189 F. 3d 1351.
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This appears to be a list of court cases, with each entry providing a case number, name, court, and relevant information about the case's status. This type of information is generally not considered the primary content of a document and is more suitable for a legal database or index.
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Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

1

Opinion of BREYER, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–302
_________________

ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR,
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PETITIONER v. ERIK BRUNETTI

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2019]

JUSTICE  BREYER,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in

part.

Our precedents warn us against interpreting statutes in
ways  that  would  likely  render  them  unconstitutional.
Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383,
397  (1988)  (noting  that  a  law  “will  be  upheld”  if  it  is
“ ‘readily  susceptible’  to  a  narrowing  construction  that
would make it constitutional”); United States v. 12 200-ft.
Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U. S. 123, 130, n. 7 (1973)
(noting  our  “duty”  to  adopt  a  “ ‘fairly  possible’ ”  construc-
tion  by  which  constitutional  doubts  “ ‘may  be  avoided’ ”
(quoting  United  States  v.  Thirty-seven  Photographs,  402
U. S.  363,  369  (1971))).  Following  these  precedents,  I
agree  with  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  that,  for  the  reasons  she
gives,  we  should  interpret  the  word  “scandalous”  in  the
present  statute  to  refer  only  to  certain  highly  “vulgar”  or
“obscene”  modes  of  expression.    See  post,  at  6–7  (opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The  question,  then,  is  whether  the  First  Amendment
permits  the  Government  to  rely  on  this  statute,  as  nar-
rowly construed, to deny the benefits of federal trademark
registration  to  marks  like  the  one  at  issue  here,  which
involves the use of the term “FUCT” in connection with a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
6

LIU v. SEC

Opinion of the Court

Montanile  v.  Board  of  Trustees  of  Nat.  Elevator  Industry
Health Benefit Plan, 577 U. S. 136, 142 (2016).  The “basic
contours of the term are well known” and can be discerned
by  consulting  works  on  equity  jurisprudence.  Great-West
Life  &  Annuity  Ins.  Co.  v.  Knudson,  534  U. S.  204,  217
(2002).

These  works  on  equity  jurisprudence  reveal  two  princi-
ples.  First, equity practice long authorized courts to strip
wrongdoers  of  their  ill-gotten  gains,  with  scholars  and
courts using various labels for the remedy.  Second, to avoid
transforming an equitable remedy into a punitive sanction,
courts restricted the remedy to an individual wrongdoer’s
net profits to be awarded for victims.

A

Equity  courts  have  routinely  deprived  wrongdoers  of
their  net  profits  from  unlawful  activity,  even  though  that
remedy may have gone by different names.  Compare, e.g.,
1  D.  Dobbs,  Law  of  Remedies  §4.3(5),  p.  611  (1993)  (“Ac-
counting  holds  the  defendant  liable  for  his  profits”),  with
id.,  §4.1(1),  at  555  (referring  to  “restitution”  as  the  relief
that  “measures  the  remedy  by  the  defendant’s  gain  and
seeks to force disgorgement of that gain”); see also Restate-
ment  (Third)  of  Restitution  and  Unjust  Enrichment  §51,
Comment a, p. 204 (2010) (Restatement (Third)) (“Restitu-
tion  measured  by  the  defendant’s  wrongful  gain  is  fre-
quently called ‘disgorgement.’  Other cases refer to an ‘ac-
counting’  or  an  ‘accounting  for  profits’ ”);  1  J.  Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence §101, p. 112 (4th ed. 1918) (describ-
ing an accounting as an equitable remedy for the violation
of strictly legal primary rights).

No matter the label, this “profit-based measure of unjust
enrichment,” Restatement (Third) §51, Comment a, at 204,
reflected a foundational principle: “[I]t would be inequitable
that  [a  wrongdoer]  should  make  a  profit  out  of  his  own
wrong,” Root v. Railway Co., 105 U. S. 189, 207 (1882).  At
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the concept of disgorgement of profits in equity jurisprudence. It cites legal precedents and legal scholarship, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
20

TRUMP v. VANCE

Opinion of the Court

permitted by state law, which usually include bad faith and
undue burden or breadth.  See, e.g., Virag, 54 N. Y. 2d, at
442–445, 430 N. E. 2d, at 1252–1253; In re Grand Jury Sub-
poenas, 72 N. Y. 2d 307, 315–316, 528 N. E. 2d 1195, 1200
(1988) (recognizing that grand jury subpoenas can be chal-
lenged  as  “overly  broad”  or  “unreasonably  burdensome”
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).  And,  as  in  federal
court,  “[t]he  high  respect  that  is  owed  to  the  office  of  the
Chief Executive . . . should inform the conduct of the entire
proceeding,  including  the  timing  and  scope  of  discovery.”
Clinton, 520 U. S., at 707.  See id., at 724 (BREYER, J., con-
curring in judgment) (stressing the need for courts presid-
ing over suits against the President to “schedule proceed-
ings  so  as  to  avoid  significant  interference  with  the
President’s  ongoing  discharge  of  his  official  responsibili-
ties”); Nixon, 418 U. S., at 702 (“[W]here a subpoena is di-
rected to a President . . . appellate review . . . should be par-
ticularly meticulous.”).

Furthermore, although the Constitution does not entitle
the Executive to absolute immunity or a heightened stand-
ard, he is not “relegate[d]” only to the challenges available
to  private  citizens.    Post,  at  17  (opinion  of  ALITO,  J.).  A
President  can  raise  subpoena-specific  constitutional  chal-
lenges,  in  either  a  state  or  federal  forum.    As  previously
noted, he can challenge the subpoena as an attempt to in-
fluence the performance of his official duties, in violation of
the Supremacy Clause.  See supra, at 17.  This avenue pro-
tects against local political machinations “interposed as an
obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional
power.”  United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 332 (1937).
In  addition,  the  Executive  can—as  the  district  attorney
concedes—argue  that  compliance  with  a  particular  sub-
poena would impede his constitutional duties.  Brief for Re-
spondent Vance 42.  Incidental to the functions confided in
Article II is “the power to perform them, without obstruc-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Trump v. Vance*.  It discusses the legal challenges a President can raise against subpoenas.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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