<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

HUI v. CASTANEDA

Syllabus

plainly  precludes  a  Bivens  action  against  petitioners  by  limiting  re-
covery for harms arising from the conduct at issue to an FTCA action
against the United States.  The breadth of §233(a)’s words “exclusive”
and “any” supports this reading, as does the provision’s inclusive ref-
erence  to  all  civil  proceedings  arising  out  of  “the  same  subject-
matter.”  Because  the  phrase  “exclusive  of  any  other  civil  action”  is
easily  broad  enough  to  accommodate  both  known  and  unknown
causes  of  action,  the  Court’s  reading  is  not  undermined  by  the  fact
that §233(a) preceded Bivens.  The later enacted Westfall Act further
supports  this  understanding  of  §233(a).    In  amending  the  FTCA  to
make its remedy against the United States exclusive for most claims
against Government employees for their official conduct, the Westfall
Act  essentially  duplicated  §233(a)’s  exclusivity  language,  28  U. S. C.
§ 2679(b)(1), but provided an explicit exception for constitutional vio-
lations,  §2679(b)(2).    This  shows  that  Congress  did  not  understand
the  exclusivity  provided  by  §2679(b)(1)—or  the  substantially  similar
§233(a)—to imply such an exception.  Pp. 5–7.

(b) Respondents’  arguments  to  the  contrary  do  not  undermine  the

Court’s conclusion.  Pp. 7–12.

(1) Respondents’  heavy  reliance  on  Carlson  v.  Green,  446  U. S.
14,  is  misplaced.    Carlson  is  inapposite  to  the  issue  in  this  case—
whether petitioners are immune from suit for the alleged violations—
because  the  Carlson  petitioners  invoked  no  official  immunity.    In-
stead,  the  case  considered  the  separate  question  whether  a  remedy
was available under the Eighth Amendment for alleged violations of
the  Cruel  and  Unusual  Punishments  Clause  notwithstanding  that  a
federal remedy was also available under the FTCA.  Pp. 7–8.

(2) Contrary to respondents’ contention, §233(a) does not incorpo-
rate  a  Bivens  exception  through  its  cross-reference  to  §1346(b)  and
that  section’s  cross-reference  to  the  FTCA,  which  includes  the
Westfall  Act  exception  for  constitutional  claims,  §2679(b)(2)(A).    Be-
cause  §233(a)  refers  only  to  “[t]he  remedy  . . .  provided  by  sections
1346(b) and 2672” (emphasis added), only those portions of the FTCA
that  establish  its  remedy  are  incorporated  by  §233(a)’s  reference  to
§1346.  Section 2679(b) is not such a provision.  Pp. 8–10.

(3) Respondents’  claim  that  the  Westfall  Act’s  Bivens  exception,
§2679(b)(2)(A),  directly  preserves  a  Bivens  action  against  PHS  offi-
cers  and  employees  is  belied  by  the  fact  that  the  provision  by  its
terms applies only to the specific immunity set forth in “[p]aragraph
(1).”  Moreover, if §233(a) forecloses a Bivens action against PHS per-
sonnel, respondents’ reading of §2679(b)(2)(A) would effect an implied
repeal  of  the  more  specific  §233(a).    Repeals  by  implication  are  not
favored and will not be presumed absent a clear and manifest legisla-
tive intent to repeal.  Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U. S.
  </content>
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This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the reasoning behind a court's decision in the case of HUI v. CASTANEDA. It summarizes legal arguments and precedents, making it unsuitable for indexing as it's not the primary content meant for reading.
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  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
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Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

11

Opinion of the Court

The  reviewing  court  must  ultimately  be  satisfied  that  no
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the edu-
cational  benefits  of  diversity.  If  “ ‘a  nonracial  approach
. . .  could  promote  the  substantial  interest  about  as  well
and  at  tolerable  administrative  expense,’ ”  Wygant  v.
Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 280, n. 6 (1986) (quoting
Greenawalt,  Judicial  Scrutiny  of  “Benign”  Racial  Prefer-
ence  in  Law  School  Admissions,  75  Colum.  L. Rev.  559,
578–579  (1975)),  then  the  university  may  not  consider
race.  A plaintiff, of course, bears the burden of placing the
validity of a university’s adoption of an affirmative action
plan  in  issue.  But  strict  scrutiny  imposes  on  the  univer-
sity the ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turning to
racial classifications, that available, workable race-neutral
alternatives do not suffice.

Rather  than  perform  this  searching  examination,  how-
ever, the Court of Appeals held petitioner could challenge
only  “whether  [the  University’s]  decision  to  reintroduce
race  as  a  factor  in  admissions  was  made  in  good  faith.”
631  F. 3d,  at  236.    And  in  considering  such  a  challenge,
the  court  would  “presume  the  University  acted  in  good
faith” and place on petitioner the burden of rebutting that
presumption.
Id.,  at  231–232.  The  Court  of  Appeals
held  that  to  “second-guess  the  merits”  of  this  aspect  of
the University’s decision was a task it was “ill-equipped to
perform”  and  that  it  would  attempt  only  to  “ensure  that
[the  University’s]  decision  to  adopt  a  race-conscious  ad-
missions  policy  followed  from  [a  process  of]  good  faith
consideration.”  Id.,  at  231.  The  Court  of  Appeals  thus
concluded  that  “the  narrow-tailoring  inquiry—like  the
compelling-interest  inquiry—is  undertaken  with  a  degree
of deference to the Universit[y].”  Id., at 232.  Because “the
efforts of the University have been studied, serious, and of
high  purpose,”  the  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  the  use  of
race in the admissions program fell within “a constitution-
ally protected zone of discretion.”  Id., at 231.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal standard for reviewing affirmative action policies in university admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

Opinion of the Court

cannot adopt the Plan under the HEROES Act regardless
of  the  procedures  it  follows.  Reply  in  No.  4:22–cv–908
(ND Tex.,  Oct. 20, 2022), ECF Doc. 26, pp. 3–4.  But they
observed that the Department has claimed it also has au-
thority to forgive loans under a different statute, the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (HEA), which authorizes the Secre-
tary  to  “compromise,  waive,  or  release  any  right,  title,
claim, lien, or demand.”  20 U. S. C. §1082(a)(6).  Thus, re-
spondents argued, there is a chance that vacating the Plan
would prompt the Department to pursue loan relief under
the HEA instead.  In this Court, Brown and Taylor discuss
the HEA at length for the first time in this litigation.  See
Brief for Respondents 28–32.

Having  recounted  this  history,  we  now  understand  re-
spondents’ claim and theory of standing as follows.  First,
because the HEROES Act does not substantively authorize
the Plan, the Department was obligated to follow the typi-
cal  negotiated-rulemaking  and  notice-and-comment  re-
quirements.  Second, if the Department had observed those
procedures, respondents might have used those opportuni-
ties to convince the Department (1) that proceeding under
the HEROES Act is unlawful or otherwise undesirable, and
(2) that it should adopt a different loan-forgiveness plan un-
der  the  HEA  instead,  one  that  is  more  generous  to  them
than  the  HEROES  Act  plan  that  they  allege  is  unlawful.
They  assert  there  is  at  least  a  chance  that  this  series  of
events will come to pass now if we vacate the Plan.  Id., at
19.

C
Describing respondents’ claim illustrates how unusual it
is.  They  claim  they  are  injured  because  the  Government
has  not  adopted  a  lawful  benefits  program  under  which
they would qualify for assistance.  But the same could be
said of anyone who might benefit from a benefits program
that the Government has not chosen to adopt.  It is difficult
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the standing of the respondents in a case. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the HEROES Act and the Higher Education Act of 1965, analyzing the Department of Education's authority to implement loan forgiveness programs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1110

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 15, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1514.

Jones v. Waremart Foods, Inc. Ct. App. Cal.,

1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1516. Fry’s Food Stores of Arizona, Inc. v. Sny-
der. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201
F. 3d 445.

No. 99–1519. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Bailey
et al. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 206 W. Va. 654, 527 S. E. 2d 516.

No. 99–1521. Estates of Red Wolf and Bull Tail et al.
v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 1059.

No. 99–1522. White v. Regents of the University of Cal-
ifornia et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 188 F. 3d 516.

No. 99–1523. United States ex rel. A–1 Ambulance Serv-
ice, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 381.

No. 99–1524. Louisiana Department of Transportation
and Development v. Long, on Behalf of His Minor Son,
Long, et al. Ct. App. La., 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 743 So. 2d 743.

No. 99–1527. Woodward, Individually and as Bernalillo
County Clerk, et al. v. Perry. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1126.

No. 99–1528. Moore v. Molina et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 922.

No. 99–1536. D. H. L. Associates, Inc. v. O’Gorman et al.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 50.

No. 99–1539. McCleary et al. v. Mirza, District Mining
Manager, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 205 F. 3d 1329.

No. 99–1542. Lynas v. Lynas. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist.

Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names, court origins, and disposition (certiorari denied). This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a legal document and is more like a table of contents or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

Opinion of the Court

construction that renders state gaming regulations simul-
taneously both (permissible) prohibitions and (impermissi-
ble)  regulations.    Rather  than  supply  coherent  guidance,
Texas’s  reading  of  the  law  renders  it  an  indeterminate
mess.

The State’s interpretation of subsection (a) presents an-
other related problem.  Suppose we could somehow overlook
the  indeterminacy  its  interpretation  yields  and  adopt  the
State’s  view  that  it  may  “prohibit”  bingo  under  subsec-
tion (a) not merely by outlawing bingo altogether but also
by  dictating  the  time,  place,  and  manner  in  which  it  is
played.  On that account, subsection (b) would be left with
no work to perform, its terms dead letters all.  Yes, subsec-
tion  (b)  says  that  it  does  not  federalize  Texas’s  civil  and
criminal gaming regulations on tribal land.  But, the State
effectively suggests, we should turn a blind eye to all that.
It’s a result that defies yet another of our longstanding can-
ons  of  statutory  construction—this  one,  the  rule  that  we
must  normally  seek  to  construe  Congress’s  work  “so  that
effect is given to all provisions, so that no part will be inop-
erative  or  superfluous,  void  or  insignificant.”  Corley  v.
United States, 556 U. S. 303, 314 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

Seeking a way around these problems, Texas only stum-
bles on another.  The State submits that subsection (b) per-
forms real work even on its reading by denying its courts
and gaming commission “jurisdiction” to punish violations
of subsection (a) and sending disputes over “regulatory” vi-
olations to federal court instead.  The dissent also embraces
this approach.  See post, at 14–15.  But this understanding
of subsection (b) only serves to render still another portion
of the statute—subsection (c)—a nullity.  Titled “Jurisdic-
tion  Over  Enforcement  Against  Members,”  subsection  (c)
grants the federal courts “exclusive” jurisdiction over viola-
tions of subsection (a), and it also permits Texas to “brin[g]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific sections of a law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
xlvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page
1118
Dragovich; Strong v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Drake v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119
Drew; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  853,956
845
Drug Enforcement Administration; Babb v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092
Drug Enforcement Administration; Novelty, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . .
918
Dryden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D’Saachs v. Hall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837
DSI Security Services; Reeves v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  992,1139

964

DTD Enterprises, Inc. v. Wells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931

Duarte v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911

Dudley v. New York  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

Dufrene Boats, Inc. v. Nga Trinh  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Dumas v. Wong
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
832

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dumont v. United States
1001

Duncan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1108

Dunckle; Polk v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037

Dunlap v. Graham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

Dunn v. Indiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1154

Dupont v. Gerry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Duquesne v. Harrison  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Duran v. Ercole
976

Duronio v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

Dutra v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Duvall v. Lombardi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Dyer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Dyke v. Clarke  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dykes v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

926

Dyson v. Corbett
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133

E. v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
964

Eames v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923

Eason v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

East End Property Co. #1, LLC v. Town Bd. of Brookhaven  . . . .
1007

Easterday v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Eastom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
892

Eaton Corp.; Daigneault v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  938,1019

822

Eaton Corp.; HK Systems, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1157

Eberhardt v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

Ede v. Pennsylvania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Edison Electric Institute v. Piedmont Environmental Council  . . .
1120

Edison State College; Monacelli v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

Edmond v. Caskey  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
806

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Edmond v. Mississippi
1111

Edwards v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tex.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937

Edwards v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
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This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting

An additional argument made in passing also fights the
text of Title VII and the policy it reflects.  The Court pro-
claims that “[a]n individual’s homosexuality or transgender
status is not relevant to employment decisions.”  Ante, at 9.
That is the policy view of many people in 2020, and perhaps
Congress would have amended Title VII to implement it if
this Court  had not intervened.  But that is not the policy
embodied in Title VII in its current form.  Title VII prohib-
its discrimination based on five specified grounds, and nei-
ther sexual orientation nor gender identity is on the list.  As
long as an employer does not discriminate based on one of
the listed grounds, the employer is free to decide for itself
which characteristics are “relevant to [its] employment de-
cisions.”  Ibid.  By proclaiming that sexual orientation and
gender identity are “not relevant to employment decisions,”
the  Court  updates  Title  VII  to  reflect  what  it  regards  as
2020 values.

The Court’s remaining argument is based on a hypothet-
ical that the Court finds instructive.  In this hypothetical,
an employer has two employees who are “attracted to men,”
and “to the employer’s mind” the two employees are “mate-
rially identical” except that one is a man and the other is a
woman.  Ante, at 9 (emphasis added).  The Court reasons
that if the employer fires the man but not the woman, the
employer  is  necessarily  motivated  by  the  man’s  biological
sex.  Ante, at 9–10.  After all, if two employees are identical
in every respect but sex, and the employer fires only one,
what other reason could there be?

The problem with this argument is that the Court loads
the dice.  That is so because in the mind of an employer who
does  not  want  to  employ  individuals  who  are  attracted  to

——————
namely,  “pregnancy,  childbirth,  [and]  related  medical  conditions.”    42
U. S. C.  §2000e(k).    This  definition  should  inform  the  meaning  of  “be-
cause of sex” in Title VII more generally.  Unlike pregnancy, neither sex-
ual  orientation  nor  gender  identity  is  biologically  linked  to  women  or
men.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Bostock v. Clayton County. It argues against the majority opinion's interpretation of Title VII.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

ALITO, J., dissenting

(ATS), a provision like the Tucker Act that grants federal
jurisdiction  but  does  not  itself  create  any  right  of  action.
Sosa  v.  Alvarez-Machain,  542  U. S.  692,  713  (2004).    Our
cases have assumed that the ATS was enacted on the as-
sumption  that  it  would  provide  a  jurisdictional  basis  for
plaintiffs to assert common-law claims, see id., at 724, but
our recent cases have held that even there, we should exer-
cise “great caution” before recognizing any new claims not
created by statute, id., at 728.  See also Jesner, 584 U. S.,
at ___–___ (slip op., at 18–19); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum  Co.,  569  U. S.  108,  116–117  (2013).    There  is  every
reason to believe that a similar caution should guide cases
under  the  Tucker  Act—especially  when  billions  of  dollars
of  federal  funds  are  at  stake.    The  money-mandating  test
that  the  Court  applies  here  is  in  stark  tension  with  this
precedent.

Despite its importance, the legitimacy of inferring a right
of  action  under  §1342  has  not  received  much  attention  in
these cases.  The Federal Circuit addressed the question in
passing in a footnote, 892 F. 3d 1311, 1320, n. 2 (2018), and
in this Court, the briefing and argument focused primarily
on other issues.  No attempt was made to reconcile our ap-
proach to inferring rights of action in Tucker Act cases with
our broader jurisprudence.

I  am  unwilling  to  endorse  the  Court’s  holding  in  these
cases without understanding how the “money-mandating”
test on which the Court relies fits into our general approach
to the recognition of implied rights of action.5  Because the

——————

5 The Court claims that the logic of this opinion “suggests that a federal
statute could never provide a cause of action for damages absent magic
words  explicitly  inviting  suit.”  Ante,  at  25,  n. 12.  But  all  I  suggest  is
that the Court request briefing on the question of inferring causes of ac-
tion to recover damages under the Tucker Act.  The Court makes no effort
to explain how the test it applies here can be reconciled with our general
approach to inferring private rights of action but is apparently content
to allow that inconsistency to remain.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the interpretation of the Tucker Act and the implications for inferring rights of action. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

843

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10534.  Diggs  v.  Louisiana.  Sup.  Ct.  La.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  994  So.  2d  31.

No.  08–10535.  Ramsay  v.  Broward  County  Sheriff’s  Of
fice  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  303  Fed.  Appx.  761.

No.  08–10538.  Powell  v.  Arkansas.  Sup.  Ct.  Ark.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  2009  Ark.  117.

No.  08–10540.  Votta  v.  Massachusetts.  App.  Ct.  Mass.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  73  Mass.  App.  1117,  899
N.  E.  2d  919.

No.  08–10541.  Vasquez-Ochoa  v.  Holder,  Attorney  Gen

eral.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10542.  Khondaker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  712.

No.  08–10545.  Fleming  v.  Rapelje, Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  520.

No. 08–10546.  Wai Mui v.  McGrath, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  302  Fed.  Appx.  741.

No.  08–10547.  Berkley  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
310  Fed.  Appx.  665.

No.  08–10552.  Jones  v.  Google  Inc.  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10553.  Rodriguez  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10556.  Mercer  v.  South  Carolina.  Sup.  Ct.  S.  C.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  381  S.  C.  149,  672  S.  E.
2d  556.

No.  08–10558.  Tuten  v.  Tennis,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional Institution at Rockview, et al.  C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10559.  Mower v.  Ballard, Warden.  Cir. Ct. Mercer

County,  W. Va.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for indexing as part of a document's main content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNICOLORS, INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–915.  Argued November 8, 2021—Decided February 24, 2022

A valid copyright registration provides a copyright holder with important
legal  advantages,  including  the  right  to  bring  a  “civil  action  for  in-
fringement” of the copyrighted work.  17 U. S. C. §411(a).  Petitioner
Unicolors, the owner of copyrights in various fabric designs, filed a copy-
right infringement action against H&M Hennes & Mauritz (H&M).  A
jury found in favor of Unicolors.  H&M sought judgment as a matter of
law, arguing that Unicolors could not maintain an infringement suit
because  Unicolors  knowingly  included  inaccurate  information  on  its
registration  application,  rendering  its  copyright  registration  invalid.
The alleged inaccuracy stemmed from Unicolors having filed a single
application seeking registration for 31 separate works despite a Copy-
right  Office  regulation  that  provides  that  a  single  application  may
cover multiple works only if they were “included in the same unit of
publication.”  H&M argued that Unicolors did not meet this require-
ment  because  Unicolors  had  initially  made  some  of  the  31  designs
available for sale exclusively to certain customers, while offering the
rest to the general public.  The District Court determined that because
Unicolors did not know when it filed its application that it had failed
to satisfy the “single unit of publication” requirement, Unicolors’ copy-
right registration remained valid by operation of the safe harbor pro-
vision provided under §411(b)(1)(A).  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit de-
termined that it did not matter whether Unicolors was aware that it
had failed to satisfy the single unit of publication requirement, because
the safe harbor excuses only good-faith mistakes of fact, not law.  Uni-
colors  had  known  the  relevant  facts,  so  its  knowledge  of  the  law  (or
lack thereof ) was irrelevant.

Held: Section 411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and
a mistake of fact; lack of either factual or legal knowledge can excuse
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case.  Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page
1003
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arkansas; Burgie v.
847
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arkansas; Johnson v.
1047
Arkansas; Joyner v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013
Arkansas; Lee v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arkansas; Maxwell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  883,1139

1031

Arkansas; Polonczyk v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Arkansas; Powell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

Arkansas; Starling v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

Arkansas A. M. E. Church v. New Direction Praise & Worship Ctr.
1113

Arkansas Dairy Cooperative Assn. v.  Department of Agriculture
822

Arkansas Sup. Ct. Committee on Prof. Conduct; Donovan v.
. . . .
944

Arlington County Dept. of Human Services; Hey v.  . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Armando v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835

Armann v. Quintanais . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1128

Armbrister v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927

Armenta-Alcantar v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1075

Armstrong, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999

Armstrong v. Kerestes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Armstrong v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  829,1057

814

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arnold, In re
991

Arnold v. KPMG LLP
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Arnold v. Lamarque  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004

Aronja-Inda v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Aronov v. Napolitano  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Arrellano v. Texas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arriaga-Guerrero v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

Arshad v. Congemi  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
876

918

Arteaga-Giron v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1115

Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.; Babcock v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
998

Artis v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.  . . . . . . . . . .
998

Artus; Blie v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Artus; Martinez v.
931

Arzate v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1029

Asante v. New York  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1007

Asay; McNeil v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1000

Asbell v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1109

Asbury v. Roanoke  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
805

Asemani v. Ahmadinejad  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
804

Asemani v. Fisher
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
803

Asemani v. Islamic Republic of Iran  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
804

Asemani v. Maryland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
804

Asemani v. Smith  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
803

Asemani v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Ashabranner v. Goodman  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection.  It lists cases by jurisdiction and provides page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

1316

INDEX

WORDS AND PHRASES—Continued.

5. “Public entity.” Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U. S. C.

§ 12132. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, p. 206.

6. “Willfully.” Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, 18 U. S. C. § 924(a)

(1)(D). Bryan v. United States, p. 184.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index entry, not sequential text meant to be read.
  </thinking>
  <category>index entry</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
870

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–11081.  Nesselrode  v.  Measure  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  300  Fed.  Appx.  509.

No.  08–11082.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  846.

No.  08–11083.  Pace  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  556  F.  3d  1211.

No.  08–11084.  Williams  v.  William  Beaumont  Hospital.

C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11085.  Cooper  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  304  Fed.  Appx.  165.

No.  08–11086.  Cotton  v.  Kelley,  Trustee.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11087.  Estrada-Guerra  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–11088.  Evans v. United States.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–11089.  Smith  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11090.  Sigala-Trejo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11091.  Swanson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  868.

No.  08–11092.  Scotti  v.  Scotti.  Ct.  App.  Mich.  Certiorari

denied.

No. 08–11093.  Mendoza-Sandoval, aka Sandoval Mendoza
v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported
below:  308  Fed.  Appx.  58.

No. 08–11094.  Pena-Gomez v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  348.

No.  08–11095.  Thompson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  554  F.  3d  450.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, circuit courts, and sometimes the reported decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012)

3

Opinion of the Court

Berne Convention, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Stockholm
on  July  14,  1967,  Art.  1,  5(1),  828  U.  N.  T.  S.  221,  225,
231–233.  Nationals  of  a  member  country,  as  well  as  any
author who publishes in one of Berne’s 164 member states,
thus enjoy copyright protection in nations across the globe.
Art. 2(6), 3.  Each country, moreover, must afford at least
the  minimum  level  of  protection  specified  by  Berne.    The
copyright  term  must  span  the  author’s  lifetime,  plus  at
least  50  additional  years,  whether  or  not  the  author  has
complied  with  a  member  state’s  legal  formalities.    Art.
5(2), 7(1).  And, as relevant here, a work must be protected
abroad unless its copyright term has expired in either the
country  where  protection  is  claimed  or  the  country  of
origin.  Art. 18(1)–(2).1

A different system of transnational copyright protection
long  prevailed  in  this  country.    Until  1891,  foreign  works
were categorically excluded from Copyright Act protection.
Throughout  most  of  the  20th  century,  the  only  eligible
foreign authors were those whose countries granted recip-
rocal  rights  to  U. S.  authors  and  whose  works  were  print

——————

1 Article 18 of the Berne Convention provides:
“(1) This Convention shall apply to all works which, at the moment of
its coming into force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the
country of origin through the expiry of the term of protection.

“(2)  If,  however,  through  the  expiry  of  the  term  of  protection  which
was previously granted, a work has fallen into the public domain of the
country  where  protection  is  claimed,  that  work  shall  not  be  protected
anew.

“(3) The application of this principle shall be subject to any provisions
contained in special conventions to that effect existing or to be conclud-
ed  between  countries  of  the  Union.  In  the  absence  of  such  provisions,
the  respective  countries  shall  determine,  each  in  so  far  as  it  is  con-
cerned, the conditions of application of this principle.

“(4)  The  preceding  provisions  shall  also  apply  in  the  case  of  new
accessions to the Union and to cases in which protection is extended by
the  application  of  Article  7  or  by  the  abandonment  of  reservations.”
828 U. N. T. S. 251.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It cites legal precedents and discusses copyright law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

116

UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

Opinion of the Court

prescribe regulations on the marine casualties to be reported
and the manner of reporting,” and the statute lists the kinds
of casualties that the regulations must cover. See also
§ 3717(a)(4) (requiring the Secretary of Transportation to
“establish a marine safety information system”). Congress
did not intend its reporting obligations to be cumulative to
those enacted by each political subdivision whose jurisdiction
a vessel enters. The State’s reporting requirement is a sig-
niﬁcant burden in terms of cost and the risk of innocent non-
compliance. The Roanoke, 189 U. S. 185, 195 (1903) (the
master of a vessel is in a position “such that it is almost
impossible for him to acquaint himself with the laws of each
individual State he may visit”). Furthermore, it affects a
vessel operator’s out-of-state obligations and conduct, where
a State’s jurisdiction and authority are most in doubt. The
state reporting requirement under WAC § 317–21–130 is
pre-empted.

V

As to conﬂict pre-emption under Title I, Washington ar-
gues that certain of its regulations, such as its watch require-
ment in times of restricted visibility, are of limited extrater-
ritorial effect and necessary to address the peculiarities of
Puget Sound. On remand, the Court of Appeals or District
Court should consider whether the remaining regulations
are pre-empted under Title I conﬂict pre-emption or Title II
ﬁeld pre-emption, or are otherwise pre-empted by these
titles or under any other federal law or international agree-
ment raised as possible sources of pre-emption.

We have determined that Washington’s regulations re-
garding general navigation watch procedures, English lan-
guage skills, training, and casualty reporting are pre-
empted. Petitioners make substantial arguments that the
remaining regulations are pre-empted as well.
It is prefera-
ble that the remaining claims be considered by the Court of
Appeals or by the District Court within the framework we
have discussed. The United States did not participate in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's decision. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE

KAGAN, J., dissenting

to  his  campaign.  The  theory  of  the  legislation  is  easy  to
grasp.  Political  contributions  that  will  line  a  candidate’s
own pockets, given after his election to office, pose a special
danger of corruption.  The candidate has a more-than-usual
interest in obtaining the money (to replenish his personal
finances), and is now in a position to give something in re-
turn.  The  donors  well  understand  his  situation,  and  are
eager  to  take  advantage  of  it.  In  short,  everyone’s  incen-
tives are stacked to enhance the risk of dirty dealing.  At
the very least—even if an illicit exchange does not occur—
the public will predictably perceive corruption in post-elec-
tion payments directly enriching an officeholder.  Congress
enacted Section 304 to protect against those harms.

In striking down the law today, the Court greenlights all
the  sordid  bargains  Congress  thought  right  to  stop.    The
theory  of  the  decision  (unlike  of  the  statute)  is  hard  to
fathom.  The  majority  says  that  Section  304  violates  the
candidate’s First Amendment rights by interfering with his
ability  to  “self-fund”  his  campaign.    Ante,  at  12.  But  the
candidate can in fact self-fund all he likes.  The law impedes
only  his  ability  to  use  other  people’s  money  to  finance  his
campaign—much  as  standard  (and  permissible)  contribu-
tion  limits  do.  And  even  that  third-party  restriction  is  a
modest one, applying only to post- (not pre-) election dona-
tions  to  repay  sizable  (not  small)  loans.    So  the  majority
overstates  the  First  Amendment  burdens  Section  304  im-
poses.  At the same time, the majority understates the anti-
corruption  values  Section  304  serves.    In  the  majority’s
view, there is “scant” danger here of quid pro quo corrup-
tion; loan repayments produce only the “sort of ‘corruption’ ”
in which contributors wield “greater influence” over candi-
dates than they otherwise would.  Ante, at 16–17, 21.  As-
sume away all objections to that distinction, which even the
majority concedes is “vague,” ante, at 16; for better or worse,
it underlies this Court’s recent campaign finance decisions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision to strike down a law restricting post-election campaign donations. The text provides legal reasoning and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

LUNA PEREZ v. STURGIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–887.  Argued January 18, 2023—Decided March 21, 2023

Petitioner  Miguel  Luna  Perez,  who  is  deaf,  attended  schools  in  Michi-
gan’s Sturgis Public School District (Sturgis) from ages 9 through 20.
When Sturgis announced that it would not permit Mr. Perez to gradu-
ate, he and his family filed an administrative complaint with the Mich-
igan Department of Education alleging (among other things) that Stur-
gis  failed  to  provide  him  a  free  and  appropriate  public  education  as
required  by  the  Individuals  with  Disabilities  Education  Act  (IDEA).
See 20 U. S. C. §1415.  They claimed that Sturgis supplied Mr. Perez
with unqualified interpreters and misrepresented his educational pro-
gress.  The parties reached a settlement in which Sturgis promised to
provide  the  forward-looking  relief  Mr.  Perez  sought,  including  addi-
tional schooling.  Mr. Perez then sued in federal district court under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) seeking compensatory dam-
ages.  Sturgis moved to dismiss.  It claimed that 20 U. S. C. §1415(l)
barred Mr. Perez from bringing his ADA claim because it requires a
plaintiff “seeking relief that is also available under” IDEA to first ex-
haust  IDEA’s  administrative  procedures.  The  district  court  agreed
and dismissed the suit, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Held: IDEA’s exhaustion requirement does not preclude Mr. Perez’s ADA
lawsuit because the relief he seeks (i.e., compensatory damages) is not
something IDEA can provide.  Pp. 3–8.

(a) Section §1415(l) contains two features.  The first clause focuses
on  “remedies”  and  sets  forth  this  general  rule:    “Nothing  [in  IDEA]
shall  be  construed  to  restrict”  the  ability  to  seek  “remedies”  under
“other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.”
The second clause carves out an exception:  Before filing a civil action
under other federal laws “seeking relief that is also available” under
IDEA,  “the  procedures  under  [§1415](f)  and  (g)  shall  be  exhausted.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion.  Syllabi are summaries of the Court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the legal issues and the Court's ruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Syllabus

abandonment to avoid the demands of the Takings Clause.  Pp. 12–14.

26 F. 4th 789, reversed.

ROBERTS,  C.  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  for  a  unanimous  Court.    GOR-

SUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which JACKSON, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and syllabus.  It is not the main body of the text and likely provides introductory information about the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 15–1194.  Argued February 27, 2017—Decided June 19, 2017

North  Carolina  law  makes  it  a  felony  for  a  registered  sex  offender  “to
access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offend-
er knows that the site permits minor children to become members or
to  create  or  maintain  personal  Web  pages.”    N. C.  Gen.  Stat.  Ann.
§§14–202.5(a), (e).  According to sources cited to the Court, the State
has prosecuted over 1,000 people for violating this law, including pe-
titioner,  who  was  indicted  after  posting  a  statement  on  his  personal
Facebook profile about a positive experience in traffic court.  The trial
court  denied  petitioner’s  motion  to  dismiss  the  indictment  on  the
ground that the law violated the First Amendment.  He was convict-
ed  and  given  a  suspended  prison  sentence.    On  appeal,  the  State
Court  of  Appeals  struck  down  §14–202.5  on  First  Amendment
grounds, but the State Supreme Court reversed.

Held: The North Carolina statute impermissibly restricts lawful speech

in violation of the First Amendment.  Pp. 4–10.

(a)  A  fundamental  First  Amendment  principle  is  that  all  persons
have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, af-
ter  reflection,  speak  and  listen  once  more.    Today,  one  of  the  most
important places to exchange views is cyberspace, particularly social
media,  which  offers  “relatively  unlimited,  low-cost  capacity  for  com-
munication of all kinds,” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521
U. S.  844,  870,  to  users  engaged  in  a  wide  array  of  protected  First
Amendment activity on any number of diverse topics.  The Internet’s
forces and directions are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that
courts  must  be  conscious  that  what  they  say  today  may  be  obsolete
tomorrow.  Here, in one of the first cases the Court has taken to ad-
dress the relationship between the First Amendment and the modern
Internet, the Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting
that the First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 274 (1998)

307

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

allegations, but by the allowable defenses; (2) this Court’s
pathmarkers are needed to afford guidance to lower courts
and school ofﬁcials responsible for the implementation of
Title IX.

In line with the tort law doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences, see generally C. McCormick, Law of Damages 127–
159 (1935), I would recognize as an afﬁrmative defense to a
Title IX charge of sexual harassment, an effective policy for
reporting and redressing such misconduct. School districts
subject to Title IX’s governance have been instructed by the
Secretary of Education to install procedures for “prompt and
equitable resolution” of complaints, 34 CFR § 106.8(b) (1997),
and the Department of Education’s Ofﬁce of Civil Rights has
detailed elements of an effective grievance process, with
speciﬁc reference to sexual harassment, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034,
12044–12045 (1997).

The burden would be the school district’s to show that
its internal remedies were adequately publicized and likely
would have provided redress without exposing the com-
plainant to undue risk, effort, or expense. Under such a re-
gime, to the extent that a plaintiff unreasonably failed to
avail herself of the school district’s preventive and remedial
measures, and consequently suffered avoidable harm, she
would not qualify for Title IX relief.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case 524 U.S. 274. It discusses legal arguments and precedents related to Title IX and sexual harassment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

BARRETT, J., concurring

“unique  political  history”:  the  FDA’s  longstanding  disa-
vowal of authority to regulate it, Congress’s creation of “a
distinct  regulatory  scheme  for  tobacco  products,”  and  the
tobacco industry’s “significant” role in “the American econ-
omy.”  Id., at 159–160.  In light of those considerations, we
concluded that “Congress could not have intended to dele-
gate a decision of such economic and political significance
to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”  Id., at 160.

We  have  also  been  “[s]keptical  of  mismatches”  between
broad “invocations of power by agencies” and relatively nar-
row  “statutes  that  purport  to  delegate  that  power.”    In re
MCP  No.  165,  OSHA,  Interim  Final  Rule:  Covid–19  Vac-
cination and Testing, 20 F. 4th 264, 272 (CA6 2021) (Sutton,
C. J.,  dissenting  from  denial  of  initial  hearing  en  banc).
Just as an instruction to “pick up dessert” is not permission
to buy a four-tier wedding cake, Congress’s use of a “subtle
device” is not authorization for agency action of “enormous
importance.”  MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American
Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.,  512  U. S.  218,  231  (1994);  cf.
Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457,
468  (2001)  (Congress  does  not  “hide  elephants  in  mouse-
holes”).  This principle explains why the Centers for Disease
Control  and  Prevention’s  (CDC’s)  general  authority  to
“ ‘prevent the . . . spread of communicable diseases’ ” did not
authorize  a  nationwide  eviction  moratorium.  Alabama
Assn. of Realtors, 594 U. S., at ___–___, ___ (slip op., at 2–3,
6).  The statute, we observed, was a “wafer-thin reed” that
could not support the assertion of “such sweeping power.”
Id., at ___ (slip op., at  7).  Likewise, in West  Virginia, we
held  that  a  “little-used  backwater”  provision in  the  Clean
Air  Act  could  not  justify  an  Environmental  Protection
Agency  (EPA)  rule  that  would  “restructur[e]  the  Nation’s
overall mix of electricity generation.”  597 U. S., at ___, ___
(slip op., at 16, 26).

Another  telltale  sign  that  an  agency  may  have  trans-
gressed its statutory authority is when it regulates outside
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Barrett in the case of Biden v. Nebraska. It discusses the principle of agency deference and how courts should interpret the scope of agency authority.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

Syllabus

Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U. S. 359, 374).  By doing so, a court upholds
the traditional conception of the judicial function that the APA adopts.
Pp. 13–18.

(c) The deference that Chevron requires of courts reviewing agency

action cannot be squared with the APA.  Pp. 18–29.

(1) Chevron, decided in 1984 by a bare quorum of six Justices, trig-
gered a marked departure from the traditional judicial approach of in-
dependently  examining  each  statute  to  determine  its  meaning.   The
question in the case was whether an Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulation was consistent with the term “stationary source” as
used in the Clean Air Act.  467 U. S., at 840.  To answer that question,
the Court articulated and employed a now familiar two-step approach
broadly  applicable  to  review  of  agency  action.    The  first  step  was  to
discern “whether Congress ha[d] directly spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue.”  Id., at 842.  The Court explained that “[i]f the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter,” ibid., and courts were
therefore to “reject administrative constructions which are contrary to
clear congressional intent,” id., at 843, n. 9.  But in a case in which “the
statute [was] silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” at
hand, a reviewing court could not “simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administra-
tive interpretation.”  Id., at 843 (footnote omitted).  Instead, at Chev-
ron’s second step, a court had to defer to the agency if it had offered “a
permissible construction of the statute,” ibid., even if not “the reading
the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a
judicial proceeding,” ibid., n. 11.  Employing this new test, the Court
concluded that Congress had not addressed the question at issue with
the necessary “level of specificity” and that EPA’s interpretation was
“entitled to deference.”  Id., at 865.

Although the Court did not at first treat Chevron as the watershed
decision  it  was  fated  to  become,  the  Court  and  the courts  of  appeals
were soon routinely invoking its framework as the governing standard
in cases involving statutory questions of agency authority.  The Court
eventually decided that Chevron rested on “a presumption that Con-
gress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by
an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and
foremost,  by  the  agency,  and  desired  the  agency  (rather  than  the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 740–741.  Pp.
18–20.

(2) Neither Chevron nor any subsequent decision of the Court at-
tempted to reconcile its framework with the APA.  Chevron defies the
command of the APA that “the reviewing court”—not the agency whose
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, specifically discussing the Chevron deference doctrine.  It is not the main body of the legal argument and is more of a summary or outline.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

17

Opinion of the Court

regulations  that  are  hostile  to  the  religious  beliefs  of  af-
fected  citizens  and  cannot  act  in  a  manner  that  passes
judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious
beliefs and practices.  The Free Exercise Clause bars even
“subtle departures from neutrality” on matters of religion.
Id., at 534.  Here, that means the Commission was obliged
under  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  to  proceed  in  a  manner
neutral  toward  and  tolerant  of  Phillips’  religious  beliefs.
The  Constitution  “commits  government  itself  to  religious
tolerance,  and  upon  even  slight  suspicion  that  proposals
for  state  intervention  stem  from  animosity  to  religion  or
distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remem-
ber  their  own  high  duty  to  the  Constitution  and  to  the
rights it secures.”  Id., at 547.

Factors  relevant  to  the  assessment  of  governmental
neutrality  include  “the  historical  background  of  the  deci-
sion  under  challenge,  the  specific  series  of  events  leading
to  the  enactment  or  official  policy  in  question,  and  the
legislative  or  administrative  history,  including  contempo-
raneous statements made by members of the decisionmak-
ing body.”  Id., at 540.  In view of these factors the record
here demonstrates that the Commission’s consideration of
Phillips’  case  was  neither  tolerant  nor  respectful  of  Phil-
lips’  religious  beliefs.    The  Commission  gave  “every  ap-
pearance,”  id.,  at  545,  of  adjudicating  Phillips’  religious
objection based on a negative normative “evaluation of the
particular justification” for his objection and the religious
grounds  for  it.  Id.,  at  537.    It  hardly  requires  restating
that  government  has  no  role  in  deciding  or  even  suggest-
ing  whether  the  religious  ground  for  Phillips’  conscience-
based  objection  is  legitimate  or  illegitimate.    On  these
facts,  the  Court  must  draw  the  inference  that  Phillips’
religious objection was not considered with the neutrality
that the Free Exercise Clause requires.

While the issues here are difficult to resolve, it must be
concluded  that  the  State’s  interest  could  have  been
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Free Exercise Clause and its application to a particular case involving religious objections.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

PATEL v. GARLAND

Syllabus

of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) clearly indicate that judicial review of fact determi-
nations is precluded in the discretionary-relief context, and the Court
has no reason to resort to the presumption of reviewability.  P. 17.

971 F. 3d 1258, affirmed.

BARRETT,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  THOMAS,  ALITO,  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.    GORSUCH,  J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus section.  It includes case name, citation, and information about the court's decision and the justices involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U45

[09-26-01 10:03:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

360

NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SHANKLIN

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

agency remains free to amend its regulations to achieve the
commonsense result that the Government itself now seeks.
With that understanding, I join the majority’s opinion.

Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens joins,

dissenting.

A fatal accident occurred on October 3, 1993, at a railroad
crossing in Gibson County, Tennessee. The crossing was
equipped not with automatic gates or ﬂashing lights, but
only with basic warning signs installed with federal funds
provided under the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings
Program. See 23 U. S. C. § 130. This federal program
. .
aimed to ensure that States would, “[a]t a minimum, .
provide signs for all railway-highway crossings.” § 130(d).
No authority, federal or state, has found that the signs in
place at the scene of the Gibson County accident were ade-
quate to protect safety, as distinguished from being a bare
minimum. Nevertheless, the Court today holds that whole-
sale federal
improvements at 196 crossings
throughout 11 west Tennessee counties preempts all state
regulation of safety devices at each individual crossing. As
a result, respondent Dedra Shanklin cannot recover under
state tort law for the railroad’s failure to install adequate
devices. And the State of Tennessee, because it used fed-
is
eral money to provide at least minimum protection,
stopped from requiring the installation of adequate devices
at any of the funded crossings.

funding of

The upshot of the Court’s decision is that state negligence
law is displaced with no substantive federal standard of
conduct to ﬁll the void. That outcome deﬁes common sense
and sound policy. Federal regulations already provide that
railroads shall not be required to pay any share of the cost
of federally ﬁnanced grade crossing improvements. 23 CFR
§ 646.210(b)(1) (1999). Today the railroads have achieved a
double windfall: the Federal Government foots the bill for
installing safety devices; and that same federal expenditure
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific events and regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

17

Opinion of the Court

harmony, not to manufacture conflict.3

IV
  Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches no further than the pur-
poseful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to
violate  federal  law.    So  understood,  the  statute  does  not
“prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech” rela-
tive to its “plainly legitimate sweep.”  Williams, 553 U. S.,
at 292.
  Start with clause (iv)’s valid reach.  Hansen does not dis-
pute that the provision encompasses a great deal of nonex-
pressive  conduct—which  does  not  implicate  the  First
Amendment at all.  Brief for Respondent 22–23.  Consider
just a few examples: smuggling noncitizens into the coun-
try,  see  United  States  v.  Okatan,  728  F. 3d  111,  113–114
(CA2 2013); United States v. Yoshida, 303 F. 3d 1145, 1148–
1151 (CA9 2002), providing counterfeit immigration docu-
ments, see United States v. Tracy, 456 Fed. Appx. 267, 269–
270  (CA4  2011)  (per curiam);  United  States  v.  Castillo-
Felix,  539  F. 2d  9,  11  (CA9  1976),  and  issuing  fraudulent
Social  Security  numbers  to  noncitizens,  see  Edwards  v.
Prime,  Inc.,  602  F. 3d  1276,  1295–1297  (CA11  2010).    A
brief survey of the Federal Reporter confirms that these are
heartland clause (iv) prosecutions.  See 40 F. 4th, at 1072
(opinion  of  Bumatay,  J.)  (listing  additional  examples,  in-
cluding  arranging  fraudulent  marriages  and  transporting
noncitizens on boats).  So the “plainly legitimate sweep” of
the provision is extensive.
  When we turn to the other side of the ledger, we find it
pretty much blank.  Hansen fails to identify a single prose-
cution  for  ostensibly  protected  expression  in  the  70  years

——————

3 The  canon  of  constitutional  avoidance  is  a  problem  for  the  dissent.
Attempting to overcome it, JUSTICE JACKSON suggests that the canon has
less force in the context of an overbreadth challenge.  Post, at 17.  Our
cases offer no support for that proposition.  In this context, as in others,
ordinary principles of interpretation apply.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the interpretation of a specific law (Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)) and its potential impact on free speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1134

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

No. 09–7864.  Pirtle  v.  United States.  C. A.  4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  236.

No.  09–7869.  Fountain,  aka  Matthews  v.  United  States.

C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7871.  Garcia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  1271.

No.  09–7872.  Huttinger  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  350  Fed.  Appx.  147.

No.  09–7875.  Flucker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  474.

No.  09–7876.  Holman  v.  Shinseki,  Secretary  of  Veterans

Affairs.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7881.  McRae v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  301.

No.  09–7886.  Wilson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  337  Fed.  Appx.  747.

No. 09–7888.  Le v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  821.

No.  09–7889.  Juvenile  Female  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  566  F.  3d  943.

No.  09–7898.  Stevens  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  580  F.  3d  718.

No.  09–7899.  Quintanilla  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7901.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7904.  Davis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7906.  Ojeda-Estrada  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  871.

No.  09–7907.  Estes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.  Appx.  97.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, circuit courts, and whether certiorari was granted or denied.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WEST VIRGINIA ET AL. v. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 20–1530.  Argued February 28, 2022—Decided June 30, 2022*

In 2015, the  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the
Clean  Power  Plan  rule,  which  addressed  carbon  dioxide  emissions
from existing coal- and natural-gas-fired power plants.  For authority,
the  Agency  cited  Section  111  of  the  Clean  Air  Act,  which,  although
known as the New Source Performance Standards program, also au-
thorizes  regulation  of  certain  pollutants  from  existing  sources  under
Section 111(d).  42 U. S. C. §7411(d).  Prior to the Clean Power Plan,
EPA had used Section 111(d) only a handful of times since its enact-
ment in 1970.  Under that provision, although the States set the actual
enforceable  rules  governing  existing  sources  (such  as  power  plants),
EPA determines the emissions limit with which they will have to com-
ply.  The Agency derives that limit by determining the “best system of
emission reduction . . . that has been adequately demonstrated,” or the
BSER, for the kind of existing source at issue.  §7411(a)(1).  The limit
then reflects the amount of pollution reduction “achievable through the
application of” that system.  Ibid.

In the Clean Power Plan, EPA determined that the BSER for exist-
ing  coal  and  natural  gas  plants  included  three  types  of  measures,
which the Agency called “building blocks.”  80 Fed. Reg. 64667.  The
first  building  block  was  “heat  rate  improvements”  at  coal-fired
plants—essentially practices such plants could undertake to burn coal

——————

* Together with No. 20–1531, North American Coal Corp. v. Environ-
mental  Protection  Agency  et al.,  No.  20–1778,  Westmoreland  Mining
Holdings  LLC  v.  Environmental  Protection  Agency  et al.,  and  No.  20–
1780,  North  Dakota  v.  Environmental  Protection  Agency  et al.,  also  on
certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are informational in nature and not meant to be indexed as part of the actual legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

7

ALITO, J., dissenting

tion, affidavit, or declaration when this policy took effect.

Hastings’  effort  to  portray  the  accept-all-comers  policy
as  merely  an  interpretation  of  the  Nondiscrimination
Policy runs into obvious difficulties.  First, the two policies
are  simply  not  the  same:  The  Nondiscrimination  Policy
proscribes discrimination on a limited number of specified
grounds,  while  the  accept-all-comers  policy  outlaws  all
selectivity.    Second,  the  Nondiscrimination  Policy  applies
to everything that Hastings does, and the law school does
not follow an accept-all-comers policy in activities such as
admitting students and hiring faculty.

In an effort to circumvent this problem, the Court writes
that “Hastings interprets the Nondiscrimination Policy, as
it relates to the RSO program, to mandate acceptance of all
comers.”  Ante, at 4 (emphasis added).  This puts Hastings
in  the  implausible  position  of  maintaining  that  the  Non-
discrimination  Policy  means  one  thing  as  applied  to  the
RSO program and something quite different as applied to
all  of  Hastings’  other  activities.  But  the  Nondiscrimina-
tion  Policy  by  its  terms  applies  fully  to  all  components  of
the  law  school,  “including  administration  [and]  faculty.”
App. 220.

Third,  the  record  is  replete  with  evidence  that,  at  least
until  Dean  Kane  unveiled  the  accept-all-comers  policy  in
July  2005,  Hastings  routinely  registered  student  groups
with bylaws limiting membership and leadership positions
to  those  who  agreed  with  the  groups’  viewpoints.    For
example,  the  bylaws  of  the  Hastings  Democratic  Caucus
provided  that  “any  full-time  student  at  Hastings  may
become a member of HDC so long as they do not exhibit a
consistent disregard and lack of respect for the objective of
the organization as stated in Article 3, Section 1.”  App. to
Pet. for Cert. 118a (emphasis added).  The constitution of
the  Association  of  Trial  Lawyers  of  America  at  Hastings
provided  that  every  member  must  “adhere  to  the  objec-
tives  of  the  Student  Chapter  as  well  as  the  mission  of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

Opinion of the Court

groups’ flags from City Hall’s third pole amounted to gov-
ernment speech.  See 2020 WL 555248, *5, ___ F. Supp. 3d
___, ___ (Mass., Feb. 4, 2020).  Hence, the city acted within
its constitutional authority in declining to raise Camp Con-
stitution’s flag.  Id., at *3, *5.  The District Court therefore
granted summary judgment for Boston.  The First Circuit
affirmed.  See 986 F. 3d 78 (2021).

Shurtleff  and  Camp  Constitution  next  petitioned  this
Court for certiorari.  We agreed to decide whether the flags
Boston allows groups to fly express government speech, and
whether  Boston  could,  consistent  with  the  Free  Speech
Clause, deny petitioners’ flag-raising request.

II
A
The first and basic question we must answer is whether
Boston’s  flag-raising  program  constitutes  government
speech.  If so, Boston may refuse flags based on viewpoint.
The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause does not pre-
vent the government from declining to express a view.  See
Pleasant  Grove  City  v.  Summum,  555  U. S.  460,  467–469
(2009).  When the government wishes to state an opinion,
to speak for the community, to formulate policies, or to im-
plement  programs,  it  naturally  chooses  what  to  say  and
what not to say.  See Walker, 576 U. S., at 207–208.  That
must be true for government to work.  Boston could not eas-
ily congratulate the Red Sox on a victory were the city pow-
erless  to  decline  to  simultaneously  transmit  the  views  of
disappointed Yankees fans.  The Constitution therefore re-
lies first and foremost on the ballot box, not on rules against
viewpoint discrimination, to check the government when it
speaks.    See  Board  of  Regents  of  Univ.  of  Wis.  System  v.
Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, 235 (2000).

The  boundary  between  government  speech  and  private
expression can blur when, as here, a government invites the
people  to  participate  in  a  program.  In  those  situations,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the concept of government speech and its implications for free speech rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxxviii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  913,1102

Jones v. Florida
1076

Jones v. Franklin
809

Jones v. General Nutrition Centers, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  843,1101

Jones v. Google Inc.
Jones v. Harris Associates L. P.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
810

Jones v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  993,1120

833
Jones v. Johnson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1146
Jones v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
886
Jones v. McDaniel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830
Jones v. Nevada  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
895
Jones v. Oklahoma
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
829
Jones v. Pennsylvania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jones v. Perlman
895
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jones v. Platteview Apartments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1033,1159

1064

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jones v. Scribner
1109

Jones v. Shaw Group
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Jones v. Trombley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845,

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jones v. United States
852, 856, 890, 892, 895, 899, 906, 909, 916, 929, 959, 963, 977, 1005,
1065,1140

1064

Jones; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

Jones v. Yates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Jonesﬁlm v. Hoffman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

Jonesﬁlm; Hoffman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961

Jordan v. Federal Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jordan v. Mosley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  920,924,1140

Jordan v. United States
936

Jorgensen v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952

Joseph v. Curry
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Joseph v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  905,976

Joseph v. United States
965

Josephberg v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Jowers; Moorman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Joyner v. Arkansas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

Joyner v. Johnson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
J. R. v. Mental Health Bd. of 4th Jud. Dist.
1024
J. R. Y. v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Juarez-Galvan v. United States
1058
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Judd v. New Mexico  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  996,1029,1140
1120
Judge, Circuit Court of Ill., Cook County; Walls v.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112
Judge, Criminal Court of Tenn., 13th Jud. Dist.; Carter v.  . . . . . .
889
Judge, District Court for Okla. County; Bell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
975
Judge, Superior Court of Alaska, 3d Dist.; Wright v.  . . . . . . . . . .
935
Judge, Supreme Court of N. Y., Kings County; Antoine v.  . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MELLOULI v. LYNCH

THOMAS, J., dissenting

relating  to  a  controlled  substance  (as  defined  in  section
802  of  title  21).”  Thus,  Mellouli  was  properly  subject  to
removal  if  the  Kansas  statute  of  conviction  “relat[es]  to
a  controlled  substance  (as  defined  in  section  802  of  title
21),”  regardless  of  whether  his  particular  conduct  would
also  have  subjected  him  to  prosecution  under  federal
controlled-substances laws.  See ante, at 6 (“An alien’s actual
conduct  is  irrelevant  to  the  inquiry”).    The  majority’s  12
references  to  the  sock  that  Mellouli  used  to  conceal  the
pills are thus entirely beside the point.1

The  critical  question,  which  the  majority  does  not  di-
rectly answer, is what it means for a law or regulation to
“relat[e]  to  a  controlled  substance  (as  defined  in  section
802 of title 21).”  At a minimum, we know that this phrase
does not require a complete overlap between the substances
controlled  under  the  state  law  and  those  controlled  un-
der  21  U. S. C.  §802.    To  “relate  to”  means  “ ‘to  stand  in
some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer;
to  bring  into  association  with  or  connection  with.’ ”  Mo-
rales  v.  Trans  World  Airlines,  Inc.,  504  U. S.  374,  383
(1992)  (quoting  Black’s  Law  Dictionary  1158  (5th  ed.
1979)).  In  ordinary  parlance,  one  thing  can  “relate  to”
another even if it also relates to other things.  As ordinar-
ily  understood,  therefore,  a  state  law  regulating  various
controlled  substances  may  “relat[e]  to  a  controlled  sub-
stance  (as  defined  in  section  802  of  title  21)”  even  if  the
statute  also  controls  a  few  substances  that  do  not  fall
within the federal definition.

——————

1 It  is  likewise  beside  the  point  that  the  pills  were,  in  fact,  federally
controlled  substances,  that  Mellouli  concealed  them  in  his  sock  while
being booked into jail, that he was being booked into jail for his second
arrest  for  driving  under  the  influence  in  less  than  one  year,  that  he
pleaded to the paraphernalia offense after initially being charged with
trafficking  contraband  in  jail,  or  that  he  has  since  been  charged  with
resisting  arrest  and  failure  to  display  a  valid  driver’s  license  upon
demand.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the interpretation of a law relating to controlled substances and its application to a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

25

Opinion of the Court

that would serve to prevent this Court from becoming . . .
the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal responsi-
bility, in diverse areas of the criminal law, throughout the
country.”  Powell, 392 U. S., at 533.  After all, nothing in the
Amendment’s text or history exists to “confine” or guide our
review.  Id., at 534.  Unaided by those sources, we would be
left  “to  write  into  the  Constitution”  our  own  “formulas,”
many of which would likely prove unworkable in practice.
Id., at 537.  Along the way, we would interfere with “essen-
tial considerations of federalism” that reserve to the States
primary responsibility for drafting their own criminal laws.
Id., at 535.

In particular, Justice Marshall observed, extending Rob-
inson to cover involuntary acts  would effectively “impe[l]”
this Court “into defining” something akin to a new “insanity
test in constitutional terms.”  392 U. S., at 536.  It would
because an individual like the defendant in Powell does not
dispute  that  he  has  committed  an  otherwise  criminal  act
with the requisite mens rea, yet he seeks to be excused from
“moral accountability” because of his “ ‘condition.’ ”  Id., at
535–536.  And “[n]othing,” Justice Marshall said, “could be
less fruitful than for this Court” to try to resolve for the Na-
tion profound questions like that under a provision of the
Constitution that does not speak to them.  Id., at 536.  In-
stead, Justice Marshall reasoned, such matters are gener-
ally left to be resolved through “productive” democratic “di-
alogue”  and  “experimentation,”  not  by  “freez[ing]”  any
particular,  judicially preferred approach “into a rigid con-
stitutional mold.”  Id., at 537.

We  recently  reemphasized  that  last  point  in  Kahler  v.
Kansas  in  the  context  of  a  Due  Process  Clause  challenge.
Drawing  on  Justice  Marshall’s  opinion  in  Powell,  we
acknowledged  that  “a  state  rule  about  criminal  liability”
may violate due process if it departs from a rule “so rooted
in  the  traditions”  of  this  Nation  that  it  might  be  said  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1097

558 U. S.

December 14, 2009

No. 09–7386.  Haberman v. Century 21 Chamberlain & As
sociates  et  al.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  4th  App.  Dist.,  Div.  3.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  173  Cal.  App.  4th  1,  92  Cal.  Rptr.
3d  249.

No. 09–7425.  McGriggs v.  Mississippi.  Ct. App. Miss.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  14  So.  3d  746.

No. 09–7462.  Fiore v. Lindsay, Warden.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.  Appx.  168.

No.  09–7467.  Charles  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  576  F.  3d  1060.

No. 09–7480.  Reed v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  800.

No.  09–7494.  Hutchins  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  349  Fed.  Appx.  920.

No.  09–7500.  Solano-Moreta  v.  Rios,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7502.  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  905.

No.  09–7509.  Burgess  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  576  F.  3d  1078.

No.  09–7514.  McKnight  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7515.  Reliford  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7518.  Thomas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  328.

No.  09–7521.  Becerra-Fuentes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 341 Fed. Appx. 957.

No.  09–7522.  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  576  F.  3d  762.

No.  09–7529.  Jennings  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, each with a case number, citation information, and a note indicating whether certiorari was granted or denied.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

the  Constitution,  then  administrative  patent  judges  must
be inferior officers.  See Art. II, §2, cl. 2.  And if administra-
tive  patent  judges  are  inferior  officers  and  have  been
properly appointed as such, then the Appointments Clause
challenge  fails.  After  all,  the  Constitution  provides  that
“Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of . . . inferior
Officers . . . in the Heads of Departments.”  Ibid.

The  majority’s  new  Appointments  Clause  doctrine,
though,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  validity  of  an  officer’s
appointment. Instead, it polices the dispersion of executive
power among officers.  Echoing our doctrine that Congress
may not mix duties and powers from different branches into
one actor, the Court finds that the constitutional problem
here is that Congress has given a specific power—the au-
thority to finally adjudicate inter partes review disputes—
to one type of executive officer that the Constitution gives
to another.  See ante, at 21 (plurality opinion); see also, e.g.,
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 503 (2011) (assignment of
Article III power to Bankruptcy Judge); Bowsher v. Synar,
478  U. S.  714,  728–735  (1986)  (assignment  of  executive
power  to  a  legislative  officer).    That  analysis  is  doubly
flawed.

For one thing, our separation-of-powers analysis does not
fit.  The Constitution recognizes executive, legislative, and
judicial  power,  and  it  vests  those  powers  in  specific
branches.  Nowhere does the Constitution acknowledge any
such  thing  as  “inferior-officer  power”  or  “principal-officer
power.”  And it certainly does not distinguish between these
sorts of powers in the Appointments Clause.

And even if it did, early patent dispute schemes establish
that  the  power  exercised  by  the  administrative  patent
judges here does not belong exclusively to principal officers.
Nonprincipal  officers  could—and  did—render  final  deci-
sions in specific patent disputes, not subject to any appeal
to a superior executive officer.  In 1793, Congress provided
that resolution of disputes, where two applicants sought a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. The language, structure, and citations are all consistent with this type of content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

604

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Opinion of the Court

newspaper that Morrison would be returning to Virginia
Tech for the fall 1995 semester, she dropped out of the
university.

In December 1995, Brzonkala sued Morrison, Crawford,
and Virginia Tech in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia. Her complaint alleged that
Morrison’s and Crawford’s attack violated § 13981 and that
Virginia Tech’s handling of her complaint violated Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373–375,
20 U. S. C. §§ 1681–1688. Morrison and Crawford moved to
dismiss this complaint on the grounds that it failed to state
a claim and that § 13981’s civil remedy is unconstitutional.
The United States, petitioner in No. 99–5, intervened to de-
fend § 13981’s constitutionality.

The District Court dismissed Brzonkala’s Title IX claims
against Virginia Tech for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Poly-
technic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (WD Va. 1996).
It then held that Brzonkala’s complaint stated a claim against
Morrison and Crawford under § 13981, but dismissed the
complaint because it concluded that Congress lacked author-
ity to enact the section under either the Commerce Clause or
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (WD Va. 1996).
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the
District Court, reinstating Brzonkala’s § 13981 claim and
her Title IX hostile environment claim.1 Brzonkala v. Vir-
ginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 132 F. 3d 949 (CA4 1997).
The full Court of Appeals vacated the panel’s opinion and
reheard the case en banc. The en banc court then issued
an opinion afﬁrming the District Court’s conclusion that
Brzonkala stated a claim under § 13981 because her com-
plaint alleged a crime of violence and the allegations of
Morrison’s crude and derogatory statements regarding his

1 The panel afﬁrmed the dismissal of Brzonkala’s Title IX disparate

treatment claim. See 132 F. 3d, at 961–962.
  </content>
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This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the case summary. It provides context about the case, the parties involved, and the legal issues at play.
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  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
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