<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

one  of  the  asserted  justifications  for  Colorado’s  law.    Ac
cording  to  the  individual  respondents,  Colorado  can  com
pel Phillips’ speech to prevent him from “ ‘denigrat[ing] the
dignity’ ” of same-sex couples, “ ‘assert[ing] [their] inferior-
ity,’ ” and subjecting them to “ ‘humiliation, frustration, and
embarrassment.’ ”    Brief  for  Respondents  Craig  et al.  39
(quoting  J.  E.  B.  v.  Alabama  ex  rel.  T.  B.,  511  U. S.  127,
142  (1994);  Heart  of  Atlanta  Motel,  Inc.  v.  United  States,
379  U. S.  241,  292  (1964)  (Goldberg,  J.,  concurring)).
These  justifications  are  completely  foreign  to  our  free-
speech jurisprudence.

States  cannot  punish  protected  speech  because  some
group  finds  it  offensive,  hurtful,  stigmatic,  unreasonable,
or undignified.  “If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the  First  Amendment,  it  is  that  the  government  may  not
prohibit  the  expression  of  an  idea  simply  because  society
finds  the  idea  itself  offensive  or  disagreeable.”    Johnson,
supra,  at  414.    A  contrary  rule  would  allow  the  govern
ment to stamp out virtually any speech at will.  See Morse
v.  Frederick,  551  U. S.  393,  409  (2007)  (“After  all,  much
political and religious speech might be perceived as offen
sive to some”).  As the Court reiterates today, “it is not . . .
the role of the State or its officials to prescribe what shall
be  offensive.”  Ante,  at  16.    “ ‘Indeed,  if  it  is  the  speaker’s
opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for
according it constitutional protection.’ ”  Hustler Magazine,
Inc.  v.  Falwell,  485  U. S.  46,  55  (1988);  accord,  Johnson,
supra,  at  408–409.
If  the  only  reason  a  public-
accommodations  law  regulates  speech  is  “to  produce  a
society  free  of  . . .  biases”  against  the  protected  groups,
that purpose is “decidedly fatal” to the law’s constitution
ality,  “for  it  amounts  to  nothing  less  than  a  proposal  to
limit  speech  in  the  service  of  orthodox  expression.”    Hur-
ley,  515  U. S.,  at  578–579;  see  also  United  States  v.  Play-
boy  Entertainment  Group,  Inc.,  529  U. S.  803,  813  (2000)
(“Where  the  designed  benefit  of  a  content-based  speech
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on free speech arguments. It delves into the constitutionality of Colorado's law and cites relevant Supreme Court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

humanitarian  reasons  or  [a]  significant  public  benefit,”  8
U. S. C.  §1182(d)(5)(A);  provide  for  temporary  protected
status when the Attorney General finds that removal to a
country with an ongoing armed conflict “would pose a seri-
ous threat to [an alien’s] personal safety,” §1254a(b)(1)(A);
and allow the Secretary of Homeland Security (in consulta-
tion with the Secretary of State) to waive visa requirements
for certain aliens for up to 90 days, §§1187(a)–(d).

The immigration laws are equally complex and detailed
when  it  comes  to  obtaining  lawful  permanent  residence.
Congress  has  expressly  specified  numerous  avenues  for
obtaining  an  immigrant  visa,  which  aliens  may  then  use
to  become  lawful  permanent  residents.    §§1201,  1255(a).
Among  other  categories,  immigrant  visas  are  available  to
specified family-sponsored aliens, aliens with advanced de-
grees  or  exceptional  abilities,  certain  types  of  skilled  and
unskilled  workers,  “special  immigrants,”  and  those  enter-
ing  the  country  to  “engag[e]  in  a  new  commercial  enter-
prise.”  §§1153(a)–(b),  1154;  see  also  Congressional  Re-
search  Service,  Nonimmigrant  and  Immigrant  Visa
Categories, at 6–7 (Table 2).  Refugees and asylees also may
receive  lawful  permanent  residence  under  certain  condi-
tions,  §1159;  8  CFR  §§209.1,  209.2.4    As  with  temporary
lawful  presence,  each  avenue  to  lawful  permanent  resi-
dence status has its own set of rules and exceptions.5

As the Fifth Circuit held in the DAPA litigation, a conclu-
sion  with  which  then-Attorney  General  Sessions  agreed,
“specific and detailed provisions[ of] the INA expressly and

——————

4 The immigration statutes also provide for conditional lawful perma-
nent residence status.  See §1186a(b)(1)(A)(i) (two years for spouses to
demonstrate that the marriage “was [not] entered into for the purpose of
procuring  an  alien’s  admission  as  an  immigrant”);  §1186b  (qualifying
business entrepreneurs).

5 For instance, Congress has carved out rules for aliens who served in
the Armed Forces, §§1438–1440, and alien spouses who have been sub-
ject to domestic abuse, §§1186a(c)(4)(C)–(D).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt discussing the complexities of US immigration law, specifically focusing on pathways to lawful permanent residence. It contains legal citations and references to specific sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

and  ushering  in  the  Jim  Crow  era,  the  Court  finally  cor-
rected course in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483
(1954), announcing that primary schools must either deseg-
regate  with  all  deliberate  speed  or  else  close  their  doors.
See also Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955)
(Brown II ).  It then pulled back in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U. S.  306  (2003),  permitting  universities  to  discriminate
based on race in their admissions process (though only tem-
porarily) in order to achieve alleged “educational benefits of
diversity.”  Id., at 319.  Yet, the Constitution continues to
embody a simple truth: Two discriminatory wrongs cannot
make a right.

I wrote separately in Grutter, explaining that the use of
race in higher education admissions decisions—regardless
of whether intended to help or to hurt—violates the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Id., at 351 (opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part).  In the decades since, I have repeat-
edly stated that Grutter was wrongly decided and should be
overruled.  Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 570 U. S.
297, 315, 328 (2013) (concurring opinion) (Fisher I ); Fisher
v.  University  of  Tex.  at  Austin,  579  U. S.  365,  389  (2016)
(dissenting opinion).  Today, and despite a lengthy interreg-
num, the Constitution prevails.

Because the Court today applies genuine strict scrutiny
to the race-conscious admissions policies employed at Har-
vard and the University of North Carolina (UNC) and finds
that  they  fail  that  searching  review,  I  join  the  majority
opinion in full.  I write separately to offer an originalist de-
fense of the colorblind Constitution; to explain further the
flaws of the Court’s Grutter jurisprudence; to clarify that all
forms of discrimination based on race—including so-called
affirmative action—are prohibited under the Constitution;
and to emphasize the pernicious effects of all such discrim-
ination.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It delves into the history of race-based admissions policies in higher education and argues against their constitutionality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

PAVAN v. SMITH

Per Curiam

at 23).  Indeed, in listing those terms and conditions—the
“rights,  benefits,  and  responsibilities”  to  which  same-sex
couples,  no  less  than  opposite-sex  couples,  must  have
access—we  expressly  identified  “birth  and  death  certifi-
cates.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17).  That was no accident:
Several of the plaintiffs in Obergefell challenged a State’s
refusal  to  recognize  their  same-sex  spouses  on  their  chil-
dren’s birth certificates.  See  DeBoer v.  Snyder, 772 F. 3d
388, 398–399 (CA6 2014).  In considering those challenges,
we  held  the  relevant  state  laws  unconstitutional  to  the
extent  they  treated  same-sex  couples  differently  from
opposite-sex couples.  See 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 23).
That holding applies with equal force to §20–18–401.

Echoing  the  court  below,  the  State  defends  its  birth-
certificate law on the ground that being named on a child’s
birth  certificate  is  not  a  benefit  that  attends  marriage.
Instead,  the  State  insists,  a  birth  certificate  is  simply  a
device  for  recording  biological  parentage—regardless  of
whether  the  child’s  parents  are  married.    But  Arkansas
law makes birth certificates about more than just genetics.
As  already  discussed,  when  an  opposite-sex  couple  con-
ceives a child by way of anonymous sperm donation—just
as  the  petitioners  did  here—state  law  requires  the  place-
ment  of  the  birth  mother’s  husband  on  the  child’s  birth
certificate.  See supra, at 2.  And that is so even though (as
the  State  concedes)  the  husband  “is  definitively  not  the
biological father” in those circumstances.  Brief in Opposi-
tion 4.*  Arkansas has thus chosen to make its birth certif-

——————

* As  the  petitioners  point  out,  other  factual  scenarios  (beyond  those
present  in  this  case)  similarly  show  that  the  State’s  birth  certificates
are about more than genetic parentage.  For example, when an Arkan-
sas  child  is  adopted,  the  State  places  the  child’s  original  birth  certifi-
cate under seal and issues a new birth certificate—unidentifiable as an
amended  version—listing  the  child’s  (nonbiological)  adoptive  parents.
See  Ark.  Code  §§20–18–406(a)(1),  (b)  (2014);  Ark.  Admin.  Code
007.12.1–5.5(a) (Apr. 2016).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically focusing on the argument regarding birth certificates and same-sex marriage. It's part of a larger legal discussion and contains legal citations and terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:26:35
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CR

Pagination Table: RULES1

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1185

conditions reasonably necessary to preserve the prop-
erty’s value pending any appeal.

(4) Upon a party’s request in a case in which a jury
returns a verdict of guilty, the jury shall determine
whether the government has established the requisite
nexus between the property and the offense committed
by the defendant.

(c) Ancillary proceeding; ﬁnal order of forfeiture.

(1) If, as prescribed by statute, a third party ﬁles a
petition asserting an interest in the property to be for-
feited, the court shall conduct an ancillary proceeding
but no ancillary proceeding is required to the extent that
the forfeiture consists of a money judgment.

(A) In the ancillary proceeding, the court may, on
motion, dismiss the petition for lack of standing, for
failure to state a claim, or for any other lawful rea-
son. For purposes of the motion, the facts set forth
in the petition are assumed to be true.

(B) After disposing of any motion ﬁled under
Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A) and before conducting a hearing
on the petition, the court may permit the parties to
conduct discovery in accordance with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure if the court determines
that discovery is necessary or desirable to resolve
factual issues. When discovery ends, a party may
move for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(2) When the ancillary proceeding ends, the court
shall enter a ﬁnal order of forfeiture by amending the
preliminary order as necessary to account for any third-
party rights.
If no third party ﬁles a timely claim, the
preliminary order becomes the ﬁnal order of forfeiture,
if the court ﬁnds that the defendant (or any combination
of defendants convicted in the case) had an interest in
the property that is forfeitable under the applicable stat-
ute. The defendant may not object to the entry of the
ﬁnal order of forfeiture on the ground that the property
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically the Rules of Criminal Procedure. It outlines procedures related to forfeiture of property.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Rule</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON

Opinion of the Court

who  physically  load  and  unload  baggage,  airmail,  and
freight.  It also employs “ramp supervisors,” who train and
supervise teams of ramp agents.  Frequently, ramp super-
visors  step  in  to  load  and  unload  cargo  alongside  ramp
agents.  See 993 F. 3d 492, 494 (CA7 2021).

Saxon  is  a  ramp  supervisor  for  Southwest  at  Chicago
Midway International Airport.  As part of her employment
contract,  she  agreed  to  arbitrate  wage  disputes  individu-
ally.  Nevertheless, when Saxon came to believe that South-
west was failing to pay proper overtime wages to her and
other ramp supervisors, she brought a putative class action
against Southwest under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq.

Southwest  sought  to  enforce  its  arbitration  agreement
with  Saxon  under  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act  (FAA),  9
U. S. C. §1 et seq., and moved to dismiss the lawsuit.  In re-
sponse, Saxon invoked §1 of the FAA, which exempts from
the  statute’s  ambit  “contracts  of  employment  of  seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in  foreign  or  interstate  commerce.”  Saxon  argued  that
ramp  supervisors,  like  seamen  and  railroad  employees,
were an exempt “class of workers engaged in foreign or in-
terstate commerce.”  Ibid.

The District Court disagreed, holding that only those in-
volved in “actual transportation,” and not the “mer[e] han-
dling  [of]  goods,”  fell  within  the  exemption.
  2019  WL
4958247, *7 (ND Ill., Oct. 8, 2019).  The Court of Appeals
reversed.  It held that “[t]he act of loading cargo onto a ve-
hicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, as that
term was understood at the time of the [FAA’s] enactment
in 1925.”  993 F. 3d, at 494.  Citing Saxon’s “uncontroverted
declaration” that ramp supervisors at Midway “frequently”
load  and  unload  cargo,  the  Court  of  Appeals  reserved  the
question  “whether  supervision  of  cargo  loading  alone”
would also fall within the FAA’s §1 exemption.  Id., at 494,
497.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It presents a legal argument and analysis related to the Federal Arbitration Act and its application to ramp supervisors.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ARIZONA ET AL. v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF

ARIZONA, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 12–71.  Argued March 18, 2013—Decided June 17, 2013

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) requires States to
“accept and use” a uniform federal form to register voters for federal
elections.  42  U. S. C.  §1973gg–4(a)(1).    That  “Federal  Form,”  devel-
oped by the federal Election Assistance Commission (EAC), requires
only that an applicant aver, under penalty of perjury, that he is a cit-
izen.  Arizona  law,  however,  requires  voter-registration  officials  to
“reject”  any  application  for  registration,  including  a  Federal  Form,
that is not accompanied by documentary evidence of citizenship.  Re-
spondents,  a  group  of  individual  Arizona  residents  and  a  group  of
nonprofit organizations, sought to enjoin that Arizona law.  Ultimate-
ly,  the  District  Court  granted  Arizona  summary  judgment  on  re-
spondents’  claim  that  the  NVRA  pre-empts  Arizona’s  requirement.
The  Ninth  Circuit  affirmed  in  part  but  reversed  as  relevant  here,
holding  that  the  state  law’s  documentary-proof-of-citizenship  re-
quirement is pre-empted by the NVRA.

Held: Arizona’s  evidence-of-citizenship  requirement,  as  applied  to  Fed-
eral  Form  applicants,  is  pre-empted  by  the  NVRA’s  mandate  that
States “accept and use” the Federal Form.  Pp. 4–18.

(a) The  Elections  Clause  imposes  on  States  the  duty  to  prescribe
the  time,  place,  and  manner  of  electing  Representatives  and  Sena-
tors,  but  it  confers  on  Congress  the  power  to  alter  those  regulations
or  supplant  them  altogether.  See  U. S.  Term  Limits,  Inc.  v.
Thornton,  514  U. S.  779,  804–805.    This  Court  has  said  that  the
terms  “Times,  Places,  and  Manner”  “embrace  authority  to  provide  a
complete  code  for  congressional  elections,”  including  regulations  re-
lating to “registration.”  Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 366.  Pp. 4–6.

(b) Because  “accept  and  use”  are  words  “that  can  have  more  than
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a brief overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

GOLAN v. HOLDER

BREYER, J., dissenting

phan  books  in  the  European  Union  (13%  of  the  total
number of books in-copyright there), 225,000 orphan films in
European  film  archives,  and  17  million  orphan  photo
graphs  in  United  Kingdom  museums.    A.  Vuopala,  As
sessment of the Orphan works issue and Costs for Rights
Clearance  19,  25  (2010),  online  at  http://ec.europa.eu/
information_society/activities/digital_libraries/doc/reports_
orphan/anna_report.pdf  (all  Internet  materials  as  visited
Jan. 13, 2012, and available in Clerk of  Court’s case file).
How  is  a  university,  a  film  collector,  a  musician,  a  data
base  compiler,  or  a  scholar  now  to  obtain  permission  to
use  any  such  lesser  known  foreign  work  previously  in
the American public domain?  Consider the questions that
any  such  individual,  group,  or  institution  usually  must
answer:  Is  the  work  eligible  for  restoration  under  the
statute?  If so, who now holds the copyright—the author?
an  heir?  a  publisher?  an  association?  a  long-lost  cousin?
Whom  must  we  contact?  What  is  the  address?  Suppose
no one answers?  How do we conduct a negotiation?

To  find  answers  to  these,  and  similar  questions,  costs
money.  The  cost  to  the  University  of  Michigan  and  the
Institute of Museum and Library Services, for example, to
determine  the  copyright  status  of  books  contained  in  the
HathiTrust  Digital  Library  that  were  published  in  the
United  States  from  1923  to  1963  will  exceed  $1  million.
Brief for American Library Assn. et al. as Amici Curiae 15.
It  is  consequently  not  surprising  to  learn  that  the  Los
Angeles Public Library has been unable to make its collec
tion  of  Mexican  folk  music  publicly  available  because  of
problems locating copyright owners, that a Jewish cultural
organization has abandoned similar efforts to make avail
able  Jewish  cultural  music  and  other  materials,  or  that
film preservers, museums, universities, scholars, database
compilers, and others report that the administrative costs
associated  with  trying  to  locate  foreign  copyright  owners
have  forced  them  to  curtail  their  cultural,  scholarly,  or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically focusing on the challenges of copyright clearance for lesser-known foreign works. It delves into the difficulties faced by institutions and individuals in identifying copyright holders and the associated costs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 775 (1998)

803

Opinion of the Court

Co., 12 F. 3d 668, 675 (CA7 1993); Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N. J.
490, 505, 706 A. 2d 685, 692 (1998) (emphasizing that a super-
visor’s conduct may have a greater impact than that of col-
leagues at the same level); cf. Torres, 116 F. 3d, at 631. See
also White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1209–1210 (La.
1991) (a supervisor’s harassment of a subordinate is more apt
to rise to the level of intentional inﬂiction of emotional dis-
tress than comparable harassment by a coemployee); Con-
treras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 740, 565
P. 2d 1173, 1176 (1977) (same); Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering,
Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498–499, and n. 2, 468 P. 2d 216, 218–219,
and n. 2 (1970) (same). The agency relationship affords con-
tact with an employee subjected to a supervisor’s sexual har-
assment, and the victim may well be reluctant to accept the
risks of blowing the whistle on a superior. When a person
with supervisory authority discriminates in the terms and
conditions of subordinates’ employment, his actions necessar-
ily draw upon his superior position over the people who
report to him, or those under them, whereas an employee
generally cannot check a supervisor’s abusive conduct the
same way that she might deal with abuse from a co-worker.
When a fellow employee harasses, the victim can walk away
or tell the offender where to go, but it may be difﬁcult to
offer such responses to a supervisor, whose “power to super-
vise—[which may be] to hire and ﬁre, and to set work sched-
ules and pay rates—does not disappear . . . when he chooses
to harass through insults and offensive gestures rather than
directly with threats of ﬁring or promises of promotion.”
Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 854 (1991). Rec-
ognition of employer liability when discriminatory misuse of
supervisory authority alters the terms and conditions of a
victim’s employment is underscored by the fact that the em-
ployer has a greater opportunity to guard against miscon-
duct by supervisors than by common workers; employers
have greater opportunity and incentive to screen them, train
them, and monitor their performance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically focusing on the issue of employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors.  It cites legal precedents and discusses the power dynamics inherent in supervisor-subordinate relationships.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Opinion of the Court

C
  One other important feature of §2(b) stands out.  The pro-
vision  requires  consideration  of  “the  totality  of  circum-
stances.”  Thus, any circumstance that has a logical bearing
on whether voting is “equally open” and affords equal “op-
portunity” may be considered.  We will not attempt to com-
pile an exhaustive list, but several important circumstances
should be mentioned.

1
  1. First, the size of the burden imposed by a challenged
voting rule is highly relevant.  The concepts of “open[ness]”
and “opportunity” connote the absence of obstacles and bur-
dens that block or seriously hinder voting, and therefore the
size  of  the  burden  imposed  by  a  voting  rule  is  important.
After all, every voting rule imposes a burden of some sort.
Voting  takes  time  and,  for  almost  everyone,  some  travel,
even if only to a nearby mailbox.  Casting a vote, whether
by  following  the  directions  for  using  a  voting  machine  or
completing a paper ballot, requires compliance with certain
rules.  But because voting necessarily requires some effort
and compliance with some rules, the concept of a voting sys-
tem that is “equally open” and that furnishes an equal “op-
portunity” to cast a ballot must tolerate the “usual burdens
of  voting.”    Crawford  v.  Marion  County  Election  Bd.,  553
U. S. 181, 198 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.).  Mere incon-
venience  cannot  be  enough  to  demonstrate  a  violation  of
§2.11
——————

11 There is a difference between openness and opportunity, on the one
hand, and the absence of inconvenience, on the other.  For example, sup-
pose that an exhibit at a museum in a particular city is open to everyone
free of charge every day of the week for several months.  Some residents
of the city who have the opportunity to view the exhibit may find it in-
convenient to do so for many reasons—the problem of finding parking,
dislike  of  public  transportation,  anticipation  that  the  exhibit  will  be
crowded, a plethora of weekend chores and obligations, etc.  Or, to take
another example,  a  college  course  may  be  open  to  all  students  and  all
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a voting rights law. It is sequential text and provides relevant legal analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

BREYER, J., dissenting

searching historical surveys that the Court’s approach re-
quires.  Tellingly, even the Courts of Appeals that have ad-
dressed the question presented here (namely, the constitu-
tionality  of  public  carriage  restrictions  like  New  York’s)
“have, in large part, avoided extensive historical analysis.”
Young v. Hawaii, 992 F. 3d 765, 784–785 (CA9 2021) (col-
lecting  cases).  In  contrast,  lawyers  and  courts  are  well
equipped to administer means-end scrutiny, which is regu-
larly applied in a variety of constitutional contexts, see su-
pra, at 24–25.

Second, the Court’s opinion today compounds these prob-
lems, for it gives the lower courts precious little guidance
regarding  how  to  resolve  modern  constitutional  questions
based  almost  solely  on  history.  See,  e.g.,  ante,  at  1
(BARRETT, J., concurring) (“highlight[ing] two methodologi-
cal points that the Court does not resolve”).  The Court de-
clines to “provide an exhaustive survey of the features that
render  regulations  relevantly  similar  under  the  Second
Amendment.”  Ante, at 20.  Other than noting that its his-
tory-only analysis is “neither a . . . straightjacket nor a . . .
blank  check,”  the  Court  offers  little  explanation  of  how
stringently its test should be applied.  Ante, at 21.  Ironi-
cally, the only two “relevan[t]” metrics that the Court does
identify are “how and why” a gun control regulation “bur-
den[s  the]  right  to  armed  self-defense.”    Ante,  at  20.  In
other words, the Court believes that the most relevant met-
rics of comparison are a regulation’s means (how) and ends
(why)—even as it rejects the utility of means-end scrutiny.
What the Court offers instead is a laundry list of reasons
to  discount  seemingly  relevant  historical  evidence.  The
Court believes that some historical laws and decisions can-
not justify upholding modern regulations because, it says,
they were outliers.  It explains that just two court decisions
or  three  colonial  laws  are  not  enough  to  satisfy  its  test.
Ante, at 37, 57.  But the Court does not say how many cases
or  laws  would  suffice  “to  show  a  tradition  of  public-carry
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's reliance on historical analysis and advocates for a means-end scrutiny approach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

Opinion of the Court

Rev. Stat., ch. 134, §6 (1836).  If the individual did post a
bond and then broke the peace, the bond would be forfeit.  4
Blackstone 253.

Well  entrenched  in  the  common  law,  the  surety  laws
could be invoked to prevent all forms of violence, including
spousal  abuse.    As  Blackstone  explained,  “[w]ives  [could]
demand [sureties] against their husbands; or husbands, if
necessary,  against  their  wives.”  Id.,  at  254.  These  often
took the form of a surety of the peace, meaning that the de-
fendant pledged to “keep the peace.”  Id., at 252–253; see R.
Bloch,  The  American  Revolution,  Wife  Beating,  and  the
Emergent Value of Privacy, 5 Early American Studies 223,
232–233, 234–235 (2007) (Bloch) (discussing peace bonds).
Wives also demanded sureties for good behavior, whereby a
husband pledged to “demean and behave himself well.”  4
Blackstone 253; see Bloch 232–233, 234–235, and n. 34.

While  communities  sometimes  resorted  to  public  sham-
ing  or  vigilante  justice  to  chastise  abusers,  sureties  pro-
vided  the  public  with  a  more  measured  solution.  B.
McConville, The Rise of Rough Music, in Riot and Revelry
in Early America 90–100 (W. Pencak, M. Dennis, & S. New-
man eds. 2002).  In one widely reported incident, Susannah
Wyllys  Strong,  the  wife  of  a  Connecticut  judge,  appeared
before Tapping Reeve in 1790 to make a complaint against
her husband.  K. Ryan, “The Spirit of Contradiction”: Wife
Abuse  in  New  England,  1780–1820,  13  Early  American
Studies 586, 602 (2015).  Newspapers carried the story in
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York.  Ibid.  Reeve
ultimately ordered the man to post a bond of £1,000.  Id., at
603.

Importantly  for  this  case,  the  surety  laws  also  targeted
the  misuse  of  firearms.  In  1795,  for  example,  Massachu-
setts enacted a law authorizing justices of the peace to “ar-
rest” all who “go armed offensively [and] require of the of-
fender  to  find  sureties  for  his  keeping  the  peace.”    1795
Mass.  Acts  ch.  2,  in  Acts  and  Resolves  of  Massachusetts,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion citing historical legal precedents and examples. It discusses the common law history of surety laws and their application to spousal abuse and firearm misuse.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

rely on artificial intelligence (AI), a machine learning tool
that  arranges,  deletes,  and  modifies  content  and  learns
from its own choices.

candidates

In  addition  to  barring  censorship,  the  Florida  law  at-
tempts to prevent platforms from unfairly influencing elec-
tions or distorting public discourse.  To do this, it requires
platforms to host candidates for public office and journal-
istic enterprises.7  §§501.2041(2)(h), (j).  For the same rea-
sons, the law also prohibits platforms from censoring posts
for  public  office.
made  by  or  about
§501.2041(2)(h).
  Disclosure  provisions.    S. B.  7072  requires  platforms  to
make  both  general  and  individual  disclosures  about  how
and  when  they  censor  the  speech  of  Floridians.  The  law
requires  platforms  to  publish  their  content-moderation
standards  and
inform  users  of  any  changes.
§§501.2041(2)(a), (c).   And whenever a platform censors  a
user, S. B. 7072 requires it to: (1) notify the user of the cen-
sorship decision in writing within seven days; (2) provide “a
thorough” explanation of the action and how the platform
became aware of the affected content; and (3) allow the user
“to  access  or  retrieve  all  of  the  user’s  information,
content,  material,  and  data  for  at  least  60  days.”
§§501.2041(2)(d), (i), (3).

to

To  ensure  compliance  with  these  provisions,  S. B.  7072
authorizes  the  Florida  attorney  general  to  bring  civil  and
administrative  actions  against  noncomplying  platforms.

——————

7 A “journalistic enterprise” is defined as any entity doing business in
Florida that: (1) has published more than 100,000 words online and has
at least 50,000 paid subscribers or 100,000 monthly users; (2) has pub-
lished at least 100 hours of audio or video online and has at least 100
million annual viewers; (3) operates a cable channel that produces more
than 40 hours of content per week to at least 100,000 subscribers; or (4)
operates  under  a  Federal  Communications  Commission  broadcast  li-
cense.  Fla. Stat. §501.2041(1)(d).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses a law related to online content moderation and includes legal citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

Opinion of the Court

Parents  Involved  in  Community  Schools  v.  Seattle  School
Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 732 (2007).

Once  the  University  has  established  that  its  goal  of  di-
versity  is  consistent  with  strict  scrutiny,  however,  there
must  still  be  a  further  judicial  determination  that  the
admissions process  meets  strict  scrutiny  in  its  implemen-
tation.  The University must prove that the means chosen
by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored
to  that  goal.    On  this  point,  the  University  receives  no
deference.  Grutter made clear that it is for the courts, not
for university administrators, to ensure that “[t]he means
chosen to accomplish the [government’s] asserted purpose
must  be  specifically  and  narrowly  framed  to  accomplish
that purpose.”  539 U. S., at 333 (internal quotation marks
omitted).  True, a court can take account of a university’s
experience  and  expertise  in  adopting  or  rejecting  certain
admissions processes.  But, as the Court said in Grutter, it
remains at all times the University’s obligation to demon-
strate,  and  the  Judiciary’s  obligation  to  determine,  that
admissions processes “ensure that each applicant is evalu-
ated  as  an  individual  and  not  in  a  way  that  makes  an
applicant’s  race  or  ethnicity  the  defining  feature  of  his  or
her application.”  Id., at 337.

Narrow  tailoring  also  requires  that  the  reviewing  court
verify  that  it  is  “necessary”  for  a  university  to  use  race
to  achieve  the  educational  benefits  of  diversity.    Bakke,
supra, at 305.  This involves a careful judicial inquiry into
whether  a  university  could  achieve  sufficient  diversity
without  using  racial  classifications.    Although  “[n]arrow
tailoring  does  not  require  exhaustion  of  every  conceivable
race-neutral  alternative,”  strict  scrutiny  does  require  a
court to examine with care, and not defer to, a university’s
“serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives.”  See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 339–340 (empha-
sis  added).    Consideration  by  the  university  is  of  course
necessary, but it is not sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the "strict scrutiny" standard applied to affirmative action in university admissions.  It delves into the legal requirements for universities to demonstrate the necessity and narrow tailoring of their race-conscious admissions policies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

freedom  of  speech.  We  have  held  time  and  again  that
freedom of speech “includes both the right to speak freely
and  the  right  to  refrain  from  speaking  at  all.”    Wooley  v.
Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714 (1977); see Riley v. National
Federation  of  Blind  of N.  C.,  Inc., 487  U. S.  781,  796–797
(1988);  Harper  &  Row,  Publishers,  Inc.  v.  Nation  Enter-
prises,  471  U. S.  539,  559  (1985);  Miami  Herald  Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 256–257 (1974); accord,
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475
U. S.  1,  9  (1986)  (plurality  opinion).  The  right  to  eschew
association  for  expressive  purposes  is  likewise  protected.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 623 (1984)
(“Freedom  of  association . . . plainly  presupposes  a  free
dom  not  to  associate”);  see  Pacific  Gas  &  Elec.,  supra,  at
12  (“[F]orced  associations  that  burden  protected  speech
are impermissible”).  As Justice Jackson memorably put it:
“If  there  is  any  fixed  star  in  our  constitutional  constella
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters  of  opinion  or  force  citizens  to  confess  by  word  or
act  their  faith  therein.”  West  Virginia  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Bar-
nette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943) (emphasis added).

Compelling individuals to mouth support for views they
find  objectionable  violates  that  cardinal  constitutional
command, and in most contexts, any such effort would be
universally  condemned.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  the
State of Illinois required all residents to sign a document
expressing  support  for  a  particular  set  of  positions  on
controversial public issues—say, the platform of one of the
major political parties.  No one, we trust, would seriously
argue that the First Amendment permits this.

Perhaps because such compulsion so plainly violates the
Constitution,  most  of  our  free  speech  cases  have  involved
restrictions on what can be said, rather than laws compel
ling speech.  But measures compelling speech are at least
as threatening.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically discussing the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and the prohibition against compelled speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court
Appendix A to opinion of the Court

Rosenbrahn  v.  Daugaard,  61  F. Supp.  3d  862  (S.  D.,

2015)

Caspar v. Snyder, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 224741

(ED Mich., Jan. 15, 2015)

Searcey  v.  Strange,  2015  U. S.  Dist.  LEXIS  7776  (SD

Ala., Jan. 23, 2015)

Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (SD Ala. 2015)
Waters v. Ricketts, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1271 (Neb. 2015)

State Highest Court Decisions

Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N. W. 2d 185 (1971)
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S. W. 2d 588 (Ky. 1973)
Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44 (1993)
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A. 2d 307 (D. C. 1995)
Baker v. State,  170 Vt. 194, 744 A. 2d 864 (1999)
Brause v. State, 21 P. 3d 357 (Alaska 2001) (ripeness)
Goodridge  v.  Department  of  Public  Health,  440  Mass.

309, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (2003)

In re  Opinions  of  the  Justices  to  the  Senate,  440  Mass.

1201, 802 N. E. 2d 565 (2004)

Li v. State, 338 Or. 376, 110 P. 3d 91 (2005)
Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public Health,446 Mass.

350, 844 N. E. 2d 623 (2006)

Lewis v. Harris, 188 N. J. 415, 908 A. 2d 196 (2006)
Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 138 P. 3d 963

(2006)

Hernandez  v.  Robles,  7  N. Y.  3d  338,  855  N. E. 2d  1

(2006)

Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 932 A. 2d 571 (2007)
In re  Marriage  Cases,  43  Cal.  4th  757,  183  P. 3d  384

(2008)

Kerrigan  v.  Commissioner  of  Public  Health,  289  Conn.

135, 957 A. 2d 407 (2008)

Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 207 P. 3d 48 (2009)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal cases cited in a document, likely an opinion or legal brief.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal citations</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

13

Opinion of the Court

haustion).
Indeed, in this very case, the Seventh Circuit
held that several of respondent’s claims were not ripe and
remanded for ripeness review of the remainder. 143 F. 3d,
at 1077–1078. Doctrines of “ripeness” and “exhaustion” con-
tain exceptions, however, which exceptions permit early re-
view when, for example, the legal question is “ﬁt” for resolu-
tion and delay means hardship, see Abbott Laboratories,
supra, at 148–149, or when exhaustion would prove “futile,”
see McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U. S. 140, 147–148 (1992);
McKart, supra, at 197–201.
(And sometimes Congress ex-
pressly authorizes preenforcement review, though not here.
See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 2618(a)(1)(A) (Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act).)

Insofar as § 405(h) prevents application of the “ripeness”
and “exhaustion” exceptions, i. e., insofar as it demands the
“channeling” of virtually all
legal attacks through the
agency, it assures the agency greater opportunity to apply,
interpret, or revise policies, regulations, or statutes with-
out possibly premature interference by different individual
courts applying “ripeness” and “exhaustion” exceptions case
by case. But this assurance comes at a price, namely, oc-
casional individual, delay-related hardship.
In the context
of a massive, complex health and safety program such as
Medicare, embodied in hundreds of pages of statutes and
thousands of pages of often interrelated regulations, any of
which may become the subject of a legal challenge in any
of several different courts, paying this price may seem justi-
In any event, such was the judgment of Congress as
ﬁed.
understood in Salﬁ and Ringer. See Ringer, supra, at 627;
Salﬁ, supra, at 762.

Despite the urging of the Council and supporting amici,
we cannot distinguish Salﬁ and Ringer from the case before
us. Those cases themselves foreclose distinctions based
upon the “potential future” versus the “actual present” na-
ture of the claim, the “general
legal” versus the “fact-
speciﬁc” nature of the challenge, the “collateral” versus
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 1 (2000). It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS

Opinion of the Court

focused  specific  review  provisions—flouting  Rotkiske’s  ad-
monition  to  heed  such  distinctions.    According  to  the  dis-
sent, we cannot expect “Congress to have explicitly stated
that accrual in §2401(a) starts at the point of final agency
action when §2401(a) is a residual provision” that applies
generally.  Post, at 15.  But §2401(a)’s text reflects a choice:
Congress took the Little Tucker Act’s plaintiff-focused lim-
itations  period—which  began  when  “the  right  accrued  for
which the claim is made,” 36 Stat. 1093—and made it gen-
erally applicable to “every” suit against the United States,
§2401(a); see Part III, supra.  Congress could have created
a separate residual provision for suits challenging agency
action and pegged its limitations period to the moment of
finality,  using  statutes  like  the  Emergency  Price  Control
Act as a model.  It chose a different path.

Undeterred, the dissent insists that by the time §2401(a)
was enacted, Congress had “uniformly expressed [a] judg-
ment” that the limitations period for agency suits should be
defendant-centric  and  start  with  finality.  Post,  at  14.
Again, this argument disregards §2401(a)’s text in favor of
alleged  congressional  intent  divined  from  other  statutes
with very different language.  “As this Court has repeatedly
stated, the text of a law controls over purported legislative
intentions  unmoored  from  any  statutory  text”;  the  Court
“may not ‘replace the actual text with speculation as to Con-
gress’ intent.’ ”  Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U. S. 629,
642 (2022) (quoting Magwood  v. Patterson, 561 U. S. 320,
334 (2010)).

In  any  event,  the  dissent  misunderstands  the  history.
See post, at 14, and n. 6.  (Notably, the Board itself does not
make this argument.)  While the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942 preceded the APA (1946) and §2401(a) (1948),
most finality-focused limitations provisions, like the Hobbs
Act (1950), came later.  See post, at 12–13, and n. 5; e.g., 5
U. S. C. §7703(b)(1) (added by 92 Stat. 1143 (1978)).  To con-
jure its supposed backdrop, the dissent cites a hodgepodge
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion discussing the dissent's arguments regarding the statute of limitations.  It is sequential text and contains relevant legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

Per Curiam

as neutral because they single out houses of worship for es-
pecially harsh treatment.1

In a red zone, while a synagogue or church may not admit
more than 10 persons, businesses categorized as “essential”
may  admit  as  many  people  as  they  wish.    And  the  list  of
“essential” businesses includes things such as acupuncture
facilities,  camp  grounds,  garages,  as  well  as  many  whose
services are not limited to those that can be regarded as es-
sential, such as all plants manufacturing chemicals and mi-
croelectronics  and  all  transportation  facilities.    See  New
York  State,  Empire  State  Development,  Guidance  for  De-
termining  Whether  a  Business  Enterprise  is  Subject  to  a
Workforce  Reduction  Under  Recent  Executive  Orders,
https://esd.ny.gov/guidance-executive-order-2026.  The dis-
parate treatment is even more striking in an orange zone.
While attendance at houses of worship is limited to 25 per-
sons,  even  non-essential  businesses  may  decide  for  them-
selves how many persons to admit.

These  categorizations  lead  to  troubling  results.    At  the
hearing in the District Court, a health department official
testified about a large store in Brooklyn that could “literally
have hundreds of people shopping there on any given day.”
App.  to  Application  in  No.  20A87,  Exh.  D,  p.  83.  Yet  a
nearby  church  or  synagogue  would  be  prohibited  from  al-
lowing more than 10 or 25 people inside for a worship ser-
vice.  And  the  Governor  has  stated  that  factories  and
schools  have  contributed  to  the  spread  of  COVID–19,  id.,
Exh. H, at 3; App. to Application in No. 20A90, pp. 98, 100,
but  they  are  treated  less  harshly  than  the  Diocese’s
churches and Agudath Israel’s synagogues, which have ad-
mirable safety records.

Because the challenged restrictions are not “neutral” and

——————

1 Compare Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 29)

(directive “neutral on its face”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of COVID-19 restrictions that disproportionately impact houses of worship. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it's part of a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xl

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Kerrville; Gonzales v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kessler v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kidd; Fidelity Warranty Services, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kikuyama v. Maddock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Killino v. Riverside School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kimberlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kinchloe v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
King, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
King v. Bell
King v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
King v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
King v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
King v. Walter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kingston v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kipkirwa v. Santa Clara County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kirksey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Klisser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Klumpp v. Luebbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Knight v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Knight Publishing Co. v. Presbyterian Health Services Corp.
. . .
Kobayashi v. Spencer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Konteh; Kulczak v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Korones, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kowalski v. Oregon State Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
KPHN Radio; Tolbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kreps v. Pesina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Krilich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Krim v. Abboud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kubica v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kuhlman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kuhlmann; Dominguez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kuhn v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kukes v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kulczak v. Konteh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kulka v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kumar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kutschke v. Commissioner of Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
L.; Florida v.
Labora v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Labor Union. See name of trade.
Ladd v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lady J. Lingerie, Inc.; Jacksonville v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LaFargue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LaFevers; Gibson v.

Page
1130
1100
1069
1134
1068
1035
1133
1129
1041
1071
1027
1061,1104
1041
1042
1057,1145
1027
1112
1039,1145
1057
1033
1055
1112
1035
1014
1113
1072
1112
1067
1091
1015
1133
1022
1063
1112
1008
1129
1064
266
1123

1070
1053
1108
1013
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

518

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

retroactive application . . . is supported by a legitimate legis-
lative purpose furthered by rational means,” for “judgments
about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the ex-
clusive province of the legislative and executive branches.”
Id., at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
concluded that Congress’ purpose in enacting the Coal Act
was legitimate and that Eastern’s obligations under the Act
are rationally related to those objectives, because Eastern’s
execution of pre-1974 NBCWA’s contributed to miners’ ex-
pectations of lifetime health beneﬁts.
Id., at 157. The
court rejected Eastern’s argument that costs of retiree
health beneﬁts should be borne by post-1974 coal operators,
reasoning that Eastern’s proposal would require coal opera-
tors to fund health beneﬁts for miners whom the operators
had never employed.
Id., at 158, n. 5. The court also noted
the substantial dividends that Eastern had received from
EACC.

Id., at 158.

The court analyzed Eastern’s claim that the Coal Act ef-
fects an uncompensated taking under the three factors set
out in Connolly v. Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation,
475 U. S. 211, 225 (1986): “(1) the economic impact of the reg-
ulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regula-
tion interferes with the claimant’s reasonable investment-
backed expectations, and (3) the nature of the governmental
110 F. 3d, at 160. With respect to the Act’s eco-
action.”
nomic impact on Eastern, the court observed that the Act
“does not involve the total deprivation of an asset.”
Ibid.
The Act’s terms, the court found, “reﬂec[t] a sufﬁcient degree
of proportionality” because Eastern is assigned liability only
for miners “whom it employed for a relevant (and relatively
long) period of time,” and then only if no post-1977 NBCWA
Ibid. The
signatory (or related person) can be found.
court also rejected Eastern’s contention that the Act unrea-
sonably interferes with its investment-backed expectations,
explaining that the pattern of federal intervention in the coal
industry and Eastern’s role in fostering an expectation of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529BV$

Unit: $UIV

[08-22-01 08:54:01] PGT: FRT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Allotment of Justices

It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits,
pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such
allotment be entered of record, effective September 30, 1994, viz.:
For the District of Columbia Circuit, William H. Rehnquist,

Chief Justice.

For the First Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice.
For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate

Justice.

For the Third Circuit, David H. Souter, Associate Justice.
For the Fourth Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice.
For the Fifth Circuit, Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice.
For the Sixth Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice.
For the Seventh Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice.
For the Eighth Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice.
For the Ninth Circuit, Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate

Justice.

For the Tenth Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice.
For the Eleventh Circuit, Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate

Justice.

For the Federal Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice.

September 30, 1994.

(For next previous allotment, and modiﬁcations, see 502 U. S.,

p. vi, 509 U. S., p. v, and 512 U. S., p. v.)

iv
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an allotment of Supreme Court Justices to circuits. It is sequential text and contains meaningful content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION

Opinion of the Court

adhesion  in  a  setting  in  which  disputes  between  the
contracting parties predictably involve small amounts
of  damages,  and  when  it  is  alleged  that  the  party
with the superior bargaining power has carried out a
scheme  to  deliberately  cheat  large  numbers  of  con-
sumers out of individually small sums of money, then
. . .  the  waiver  becomes  in  practice  the  exemption  of
the  party  ‘from  responsibility  for  [its]  own  fraud,  or
willful  injury  to  the  person  or  property  of  another.’
Under  these  circumstances,  such  waivers  are  uncon-
scionable  under  California  law  and  should  not  be  en-
forced.”  Id.,  at  162,  113  P. 3d,  at  1110  (quoting  Cal.
Civ. Code Ann. §1668).

California courts have frequently applied this rule to find
arbitration agreements unconscionable.  See, e.g., Cohen v.
DirecTV, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1451–1453, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 813, 819–821 (2006); Klussman v. Cross Country
Bank, 134 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1297, 36 Cal Rptr. 3d 728,
738–739 (2005); Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 4th
544, 556–557, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 237–239 (2005).

III

A

The  Concepcions  argue  that  the  Discover  Bank  rule,
given its origins in California’s unconscionability doctrine
and  California’s  policy  against  exculpation,  is  a  ground
that “exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract” under FAA §2.  Moreover, they argue that even if
we  construe  the  Discover  Bank  rule  as  a  prohibition  on
collective-action waivers rather than simply an application
of  unconscionability,  the  rule  would  still  be  applicable  to
all  dispute-resolution  contracts,  since  California  prohibits
waivers  of  class  litigation  as  well.   See  America  Online,
Inc.  v.  Superior  Ct.,  90  Cal.  App.  4th  1,  17–18,  108  Cal.
Rptr. 2d 699, 711–713 (2001).

When  state  law  prohibits  outright  the  arbitration  of  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the Discover Bank rule and its application to arbitration agreements. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to unconscionability and class action waivers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

YATES v. UNITED STATES

KAGAN, J., dissenting

with something as real as a fish)?  If not (and the answer
is  not),  then  that  term  cannot  function  as  a  failsafe  for
e-mails.

The  concurrence  acknowledges  that  no  one  of  its  argu-
ments can carry the day; rather, it takes the Latin canons
plus  §1519’s  verbs  plus  §1519’s  title  to  “tip  the  case”  for
Yates.  Ante,  at  1.  But  the  sum  total  of  three  mistaken
arguments is . . . three mistaken arguments.  They do not
get better in the combining.  And so the concurrence ends
up right where the plurality does, except that the concur-
rence,  eschewing  the  rule  of  lenity,  has  nothing  to  fall
back on.

III
If  none  of  the  traditional  tools  of  statutory  interpreta-
tion can produce today’s result, then what accounts for it?
The plurality offers a clue when it emphasizes the dispro-
portionate  penalties  §1519  imposes  if  the  law  is  read
broadly.  See  ante,  at  17–18.  Section  1519,  the  plurality
objects, would then “expose[ ] individuals to 20-year prison
sentences  for  tampering  with  any  physical  object  that
might  have evidentiary value in any federal investigation
into any offense.”  Ante, at 18.  That brings to the surface
the  real  issue:  overcriminalization  and  excessive  punish-
ment in the U. S. Code.

Now as to this statute, I think the plurality somewhat—
though  only  somewhat—exaggerates  the  matter.    The
plurality  omits  from  its  description  of  §1519  the  require-
ment that a person act “knowingly” and with “the intent to
impede,  obstruct,  or  influence”  federal  law  enforcement.
And in highlighting §1519’s maximum penalty, the plural-
ity  glosses  over  the  absence  of  any  prescribed  minimum.
(Let’s  not  forget  that  Yates’s  sentence  was  not  20  years,
but 30 days.)  Congress presumably enacts laws with high
maximums and no minimums when it thinks the prohibited
conduct  may  run  the  gamut  from  major  to  minor.    That
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

61

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.

APPENDIX
This Appendix analyzes in full each of the 28 cases the
majority  says  support  today’s  decision  to  overrule  Roe  v.
Wade,  410  U. S.  113  (1973),  and  Planned  Parenthood  of
Southeastern  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U. S.  833  (1992).    As  ex-
plained herein, the Court in each case relied on traditional
stare decisis factors in overruling.

A great many of the overrulings the majority cites involve
a prior precedent that had been rendered out of step with
or effectively abrogated by contemporary case law in light
of intervening developments  in the broader doctrine.  See
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at
22) (holding  the  Sixth  Amendment  requires  a  unanimous
jury verdict in state prosecutions for serious offenses, and
overruling  Apodaca  v.  Oregon,  406  U. S.  404  (1972),  be-
cause “in the years since Apodaca, this Court ha[d] spoken
inconsistently about its meaning” and had undercut its va-
lidity  “on  at  least  eight  occasions”);  Ring  v.  Arizona,  536
U. S. 584, 608–609 (2002) (recognizing a Sixth Amendment
right to have a jury find the aggravating factors necessary
to impose a death sentence and, in so doing, rejecting Wal-
ton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), as overtaken by and
irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466
(2000));  Agostini  v.  Felton,  521  U. S.  203,  235–236  (1997)
(considering the Establishment Clause’s constraint on gov-
ernment aid to religious instruction, and overruling Aguilar
v.  Felton,  473  U. S.  402  (1985),  in  light  of  several  related
doctrinal  developments  that  had  so  undermined  Aguilar
and  the  assumption  on  which  it  rested  as  to  render  it  no
longer good law); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 93–96
(1986) (recognizing that a defendant may make a prima fa-
cie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection
of  a  jury  venire  by  relying  solely  on  the  facts  in  his  case,
and, based on subsequent developments in equal protection
law,  rejecting  part  of  Swain  v.  Alabama,  380  U. S.  202
(1965), which had imposed a more demanding evidentiary
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It analyzes cases cited by the majority opinion and argues that they do not support the overruling of Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

THOMAS, J., concurring

the power “to review and annul acts of Congress” is “little
more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitu-
tional  enactment”  and  that  “the  court  enjoins  . . .  not  the
execution of the statute, but the acts of the official”).  And
courts  do  not  have  the  power  to  “excise”  or  “strike  down”
statutes.  See  39  Op.  Atty.  Gen.  22,  22–23  (1937)  (“The
decisions  are  practically  in  accord  in  holding  that  the
courts  have  no  power  to  repeal  or  abolish  a  statute”);
Harrison  82  (“[C]ourts  do  not  make  [nonseverable]  provi-
sions inoperative . . . .  Invalidation by courts is a figure of
speech”);  Mitchell,  The  Writ-of-Erasure  Fallacy,  104  Va.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript, at 4) (“The federal
courts have no authority to erase a duly enacted law from
the statute  books”), online at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3158038  (as  last  visited  May  11,
2018).

Because courts cannot take a blue pencil to statutes, the
severability  doctrine  must  be  an  exercise  in  statutory
interpretation.    In  other  words,  the  severability  doctrine
has  courts  decide  how  a  statute  operates  once  they  con-
clude  that  part  of  it  cannot  be  constitutionally  enforced.
See  Fallon,  As-Applied  and  Facial  Challenges  and  Third-
Party  Standing,  113  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1321,  1333–1334
(2000); Harrison 88.  But even under this view, the sever-
ability doctrine is still dubious for at least two reasons.

First,  the  severability  doctrine  does  not  follow  basic
principles of statutory interpretation.  Instead of requiring
courts to determine what a statute means, the severability
doctrine requires courts to make  “a nebulous inquiry into
hypothetical congressional intent.”  Booker, supra, at 320,
n. 7 (THOMAS, J., dissenting in part).  It requires judges to
determine  what  Congress  would  have  intended  had  it
known that part of its statute was unconstitutional.*  But

——————

* The first court to engage in this counterfactual exploration of legis-
lative intent was the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Warren
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association. It delves into the legal doctrine of severability, arguing against its application.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U74

[09-06-00 17:54:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

64

UNITED STATES v. BESTFOODS

Opinion of the Court

be charged with derivative CERCLA liability for its subsid-
iary’s actions.10

IV
A
If the Act rested liability entirely on ownership of a pollut-
ing facility, this opinion might end here; but CERCLA liabil-
ity may turn on operation as well as ownership, and nothing
in the statute’s terms bars a parent corporation from direct
liability for its own actions in operating a facility owned by
its subsidiary. As Justice (then-Professor) Douglas noted al-
most 70 years ago, derivative liability cases are to be distin-
guished from those in which “the alleged wrong can seem-
ingly be traced to the parent through the conduit of its own
personnel and management” and “the parent is directly a
participant in the wrong complained of.” Douglas 207, 208.11

(Mass. 1987) (noting that, since “federal common law draws upon state law
for guidance, . . . the choice between state and federal [veil-piercing law]
may in many cases present questions of academic interest, but little practi-
cal signiﬁcance”). But cf. Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The
Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 853
(1982) (arguing that federal common law need not mirror state law, be-
cause “federal common law should look to federal statutory policy rather
than to state corporate law when deciding whether to pierce the corporate
veil”). Since none of the parties challenges the Sixth Circuit’s holding
that CPC and Aerojet incurred no derivative liability, the question is not
presented in this case, and we do not address it further.

10 Some courts and commentators have suggested that this indirect,
veil-piercing approach can subject a parent corporation to liability only as
an owner, and not as an operator. See, e. g., Lansford-Coaldale Joint
Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., supra, at 1220; Oswald, Bifurcation of the
Owner and Operator Analysis under CERCLA, 72 Wash. U. L. Q. 223, 281–
282 (1994) (hereinafter Oswald). We think it is otherwise, however.
If
a subsidiary that operates, but does not own, a facility is so pervasively
controlled by its parent for a sufﬁciently improper purpose to warrant veil
piercing, the parent may be held derivatively liable for the subsidiary’s
acts as an operator.

11 While this article was written together with Professor Shanks, the
passages quoted in this opinion were written solely by Justice Douglas.
See Douglas 193, n. *.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the case United States v. Bestfoods. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U40

[10-04-01 09:23:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 244 (2000)

263

Souter, J., dissenting

the reviews that the old Rule would have guaranteed will in
fact serve longer sentences.3

Thus, I believe the Eleventh Circuit properly granted
summary judgment for respondent. Although Georgia ar-
gues that the board freely makes exceptions to the 8-year
Rule in appropriate cases, the State provided no evidence
that the board’s occasional willingness to reexamine cases
sufﬁciently mitigates the substantial probability of increased
punishment. While the majority accepts the argument that,
even without evidence of practice, the board’s discretion to
revisit its assignment of a reconsideration date may be sufﬁ-

3 The majority suggests, ante, at 252, that the Court required no particu-
lar procedural safeguards in California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales,
even though the Court mentioned those safeguards as an important factor
in its conclusion that there was no increase in the quantum of punishment
in that case, see 514 U. S., at 511–512. This is true, but it does not address
the problem with Georgia’s virtually unbounded scheme. Once the risk
of increased punishment exists, the board’s nearly nonexistent safeguards
provide no way of reducing that risk.

Georgia insists that its lack of procedural safeguards is irrelevant to this
case, because due process does not require much in the way of procedural
safeguards for parole. But that is beside the point. The challenge here
is to the retroactive increase in the quantum of punishment. Unlike the
California procedure for delaying parole reconsideration in Morales, the
Georgia procedure here includes no actual hearing for the prisoner whose
reconsideration is delayed ﬁve extra years, and the board is not required
to explain itself. Georgia’s procedural minimalism increases the likeli-
hood that prisoners will get rubberstamp treatment, and decreases the
likelihood that the exceptions to the policy on which the majority relies
will actually be applied in a way that diminishes the signiﬁcant probability
of increased punishment. Cf. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U. S. 75, 81–82, n. 4
(1988) (stating that a requirement to give written reasons provides an
inducement to make careful decisions in cases that might otherwise be
summarily ignored); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U. S. 259, 290–291 (2000) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (noting that the process of writing out reasons for
decision improves the quality of the decision and can reveal error). Pa-
role need not operate under rigidly deﬁned procedures, but if the board
decides to make changes retroactive, it must do something to prevent
those changes from increasing punishment in violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

1308

INDEX

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued.
VI. Presentment Clause.

Line Item Veto Act.—Act’s procedures for Presidential cancellation of
provisions of duly enacted laws violate Presentment Clause. Clinton v.
City of New York, p. 417.

VII. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.

Domestic proceeding—Fear of foreign prosecution.—A witness in a do-
mestic proceeding may not claim Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination based on fear of prosecution by a foreign nation. United
States v. Balsys, p. 666.

VIII. Searches and Seizures.

Admissibility of evidence—Parole revocation hearing.—Exclusionary
rule, which generally prohibits introduction at a criminal trial of evidence
obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, does not
apply in parole revocation hearings. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and
Parole v. Scott, p. 357.

IX. Taking of Property.

1. Coal Industry Retiree Health Beneﬁt Act of 1992—Health care bene-
ﬁts funding.—Court of Appeals’ decision, that Act’s allocation of liability
for funding health care beneﬁts for coal industry retirees and their de-
pendents does not violate Takings Clause as applied to a company that left
coal industry in 1965, is reversed. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, p. 498.
2. Interest on Lawyers Trust Account program—Use of client funds.—
Interest earned on client funds deposited by an attorney in an “IOLTA”
account is client’s “private property” for Takings Clause purposes. Phil-
lips v. Washington Legal Foundation, p. 156.

CONTRACT ACTIONS. See Communications Act of 1934.

CORPORATIONS. See Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.

CRIMINAL LAW. See also Attorney-Client Privilege; Constitutional

Law, I; II, 2; IV; VIII; Jurisdiction, 3.

1. Dealing in ﬁrearms without a license—“Willfully.”—Firearms Own-
ers’ Protection Act’s prohibition of “willfully” violating 18 U. S. C.
§ 922(a)(1)(A)—which forbids dealing in ﬁrearms without a federal
li-
cense—requires proof only that defendant knew that his conduct was un-
lawful, not that he also knew of licensing requirement. Bryan v. United
States, p. 184.

2. Federal ﬁrearms restrictions—Restoration of civil rights.—Where
State of conviction has restored a felon’s civil rights but restricts
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document. It lists topics and corresponding case names and page numbers.  Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and provide a guide to the document rather than the document's content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

624

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Opinion of the Court

To accept petitioners’ argument, moreover, one must add
to the three Justices joining Justice Brennan’s reasoned ex-
planation for his belief that the Civil Rights Cases were
wrongly decided, the three Justices joining Justice Clark’s
opinion who gave no explanation whatever for their similar
view. This is simply not the way that reasoned constitu-
tional adjudication proceeds. We accordingly have no hesi-
tation in saying that it would take more than the naked
dicta contained in Justice Clark’s opinion, when added to
Justice Brennan’s opinion, to cast any doubt upon the endur-
ing vitality of the Civil Rights Cases and Harris.

Petitioners also rely on District of Columbia v. Carter,
409 U. S. 418 (1973). Carter was a case addressing the ques-
tion whether the District of Columbia was a “State” within
the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983—a section
which by its terms requires state action before it may be
employed. A footnote in that opinion recites the same
litany respecting Guest that petitioners rely on. This litany
is of course entirely dicta, and in any event cannot rise above
its source. We believe that the description of the § 5 power
contained in the Civil Rights Cases is correct:

“But where a subject is not submitted to the general
legislative power of Congress, but is only submitted
thereto for the purpose of rendering effective some pro-
hibition against particular [s]tate legislation or [s]tate
action in reference to that subject, the power given is
limited by its object, and any legislation by Congress in
the matter must necessarily be corrective in its charac-
ter, adapted to counteract and redress the operation of
such prohibited state laws or proceedings of [s]tate ofﬁ-
cers.”

109 U. S., at 18.

Petitioners alternatively argue that, unlike the situation
in the Civil Rights Cases, here there has been gender-based
disparate treatment by state authorities, whereas in those
cases there was no indication of such state action. There is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of United States v. Morrison. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to the Civil Rights Cases and the interpretation of the 14th Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

Janus  then  sought  review  in  this  Court,  asking  us  to
overrule  Abood  and  hold  that  public-sector  agency-fee
arrangements are unconstitutional.  We granted certiorari
to consider this important question.  582 U. S. ___ (2017).

II

Before  reaching  this  question,  however,  we  must  con-
sider a threshold issue.  Respondents contend that the Dis-
trict  Court  lacked  jurisdiction  under  Article  III  of  the
Constitution  because  petitioner  “moved  to  intervene  in
[the Governor’s] jurisdictionally defective lawsuit.”  Union
Brief in Opposition 11; see also id., at 13–17; State Brief in
Opposition  6;  Brief  for  Union  Respondent  i,  16–17;  Brief
for  State  Respondents  14,  n.  1.  This  argument  is  clearly
wrong.

It rests on the faulty premise that petitioner intervened
in  the  action  brought  by  the  Governor,  but  that  is  not
what happened.  The District Court did not grant petition
er’s motion to intervene in that lawsuit.  Instead, the court
essentially  treated  petitioner’s  amended  complaint  as  the
operative complaint in a new lawsuit.  App. 110–112.  And
when the case is viewed in that way, any Article III issue
vanishes.  As  the  District  Court  recognized—and  as  re
spondents  concede—petitioner  was  injured  in  fact  by
Illinois’  agency-fee  scheme,  and  his  injuries  can  be  re
dressed  by  a  favorable  court  decision.    Ibid.;  see  Record
2312–2313,  2322–2323.  Therefore,  he  clearly  has  Article
III standing.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555,
560–561 (1992).  It is true that the District Court docketed
petitioner’s  complaint  under  the  number  originally  as
signed  to  the  Governor’s  complaint,  instead  of  giving  it  a
new  number  of  its  own.    But  Article  III  jurisdiction  does
not turn on such trivialities.

The  sole  decision  on  which  respondents  rely,  United
States  ex  rel.  Texas  Portland  Cement  Co.  v.  McCord,  233
U. S. 157 (1914), actually works against them.  That case
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the Opinion of the Court in the case of Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees. It discusses the court's jurisdiction and the petitioner's standing in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1147

558 U. S.

January 19, 2010

No.  09–7492.  In  re  Thomas.  Petition  for  writ  of  mandamus

and/or  prohibition  denied.

Certiorari  Denied

No.  08–11060.  Ferguson  v.  West  Virginia.  Cir.  Ct.  Ka

nawha  County,  W. Va.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–197.  Kimco  of  Evansville,  Inc.,  nka  KCH  Acquisi
tion,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  Indiana.  Sup.  Ct.  Ind.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  902  N.  E.  2d  206.

No.  09–224.  Nickels  v.  Grand  Trunk  Western  Railroad,
Inc.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560
F.  3d  426.

No.  09–294.  Unus  et  al.  v.  Kane  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  103.

No.  09–302.  Masarik  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  901.

No.  09–310.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  607.

No.  09–314.  City  of  Virginia  Beach,  Virginia  v.  Tanner
et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  277
Va.  432,  674  S.  E.  2d  848.

No.  09–325.  Aronov  v.  Napolitano,  Secretary  of  Home
land  Security,  et  al.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  562  F.  3d  84.

No. 09–343.  Edison Electric Institute et al. v.  Piedmont
Environmental Council et al.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certiorari de
nied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  304.

No.  09–379.  Allmond  v.  Akal  Security,  Inc.,  et  al.  C.  A.

11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  1312.

No.  09–385.  Bakery  Machinery  &  Fabrications,  Inc.  v.
Traditional  Baking,  Inc.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  570  F.  3d  845.

No.  09–395.  Ricci,  Associate  Administrator,  New  Jersey
State  Prison,  et  al.  v.  Kamienski.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  740.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and the court's decision (certiorari denied).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MERRILL v. PEOPLE FIRST OF ALABAMA

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

generally, not in-person voting specifically, and that absen-
tee  voting  ensures  access  to  that  benefit.    But  under  the
ADA, “[t]he benefit itself . . . cannot be defined in a way that
effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
uals the meaningful access to which they are entitled.”  Al-
exander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 301 (1985).  In-person vot-
ers receive assistance from poll workers; need no witnesses,
notaries,  or  copies of  their photo  IDs,  as  Alabama  law  re-
quires for absentee ballots; and know their ballot will not
arrive too late or be rejected for failure to comply with ab-
sentee ballots’ many requirements.  ___ F. Supp. 3d, at ___,
2020 WL 5814455, *59–*60.  Absentee and in-person voting
are different benefits, and voters with disabilities are enti-
tled to equal access to both.
  The District Court’s modest injunction is a reasonable ac-
commodation, given the short time before the election.  It
does  not  require  all  counties  to  adopt  curbside  voting;  it
simply  gives  prepared  counties  the  option  to  do  so.    This
remedy respects both the right of voters with disabilities to
vote safely and the State’s interest in orderly elections.  The
District Court’s compromise likewise does not risk creating
“voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away
from the polls.”  Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 4–5 (2006)
(per  curiam).    The  injunction  lifts  burdensome  require-
ments rather than imposing them, and permits county offi-
cials to help educate voters about whether curbside voting
is  available  in  their  county.    See  ___  F.  Supp.  3d,  at  ___,
2020  WL  5814455,  *44.    Moreover,  the  injunction  neither
invalidates state law nor prohibits the secretary from issu-
ing  guidance  consistent  with  the  District  Court’s  ruling.
Id., at *45, *61–*62.
  Plaintiff Howard Porter, Jr., a Black man in his seventies
with  asthma  and  Parkinson’s  Disease,  told  the  District
Court: “ ‘[S]o many of my [ancestors] even died to vote.  And
while I don’t mind dying to vote, I think we’re past that –
we’re past that time.’ ”  Id., at *11, *15.  Election officials in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Merrill v. People First of Alabama. It discusses the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the right of voters with disabilities to access the polls.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

lack of state control over the qualifications of the elected.”
514 U. S., at 806 (emphasis added).  Most of the remaining
cases  cited  by  respondents  and  the  Government  merely
confirm  that  Congress’  power  to  regulate  the  “Manner
of  holding  Elections”  is  limited  to  regulating  events  sur-
rounding  the  when,  where,  and  how  of  actually  casting
ballots.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Classic,  313  U. S.  299
(1941)  (upholding  federal  regulation  of  ballot  fraud  in
primary voting); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1884)
(upholding  federal  penalties  for  intimidating  voter  in
congressional  election);  see  also  Foster  v.  Love,  522  U. S.
67  (1997)  (overturning  Louisiana  primary  system  whose
winner  was  deemed  elected  if  he  received  a  majority  of
votes  in  light  of  federal  law  setting  the  date  of  federal
general  elections);  Roudebush,  supra  (upholding  Indiana
ballot recount procedures in close Senate election as within
state  power  under  Article  I,  §4).  It  is,  thus,  difficult  to
maintain that the Times, Places and Manner Clause gives
Congress  power  beyond  regulating  the  casting  of  ballots
and related activities, even as a matter of precedent.2

——————

2 Article I, §§2 and 4, and the Seventeenth Amendment concern con-
gressional elections.  The NVRA’s “accept and use” requirement applies
to  all  federal  elections,  even  presidential  elections.    See  §1973gg–
4(a)(1).  This  Court  has  recognized,  however,  that  “the  state  legisla-
ture’s power to select the manner for appointing [presidential] electors
is plenary; it may, if it chooses, select the electors itself.”  Bush v. Gore,
531  U. S.  98,  104  (2000)  (per  curiam)  (citing  U. S.  Const.,  Art. II,  §1,
and McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 35 (1892)).  As late as 1824, six
State Legislatures chose electoral college delegates, and South Carolina
continued  to  follow  this  model  through  the  1860  election.    1  Guide  to
U. S. Elections 821 (6th ed. 2010).  Legislatures in Florida in 1868 and
Colorado in 1876 chose delegates, id., at 822, and in recent memory, the
Florida Legislature in 2000 convened a special session to consider how
to  allocate  its  25  electoral  votes  if  the  winner  of  the  popular  vote  was
not  determined  in  time  for  delegates  to  participate  in  the  electoral
college,  see  James,  Election  2000:  Florida  Legislature  Faces  Own
Disputes  over  Electors,  Wall  Street  Journal,  Dec.  11,  2000,  p.  A16,
though  it  ultimately  took  no  action.    See  Florida’s  Senate  Adjourns
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the interpretation of the "Times, Places and Manner" Clause of the Constitution and its implications for election regulation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Tribe.  The  court  held  that  through  the  Restoration  Act,
“Congress—and  the  Tribe—intended  for  Texas’  gaming
laws and regulations to operate as surrogate federal law on
the Tribe’s reservation in Texas.”  Id., at 1334.  The Tribe
was thus required to follow all of Texas’s gaming rules un-
less  it  could  persuade  Congress  to  repeal  the  Restoration
Act.  We denied certiorari.  514 U. S. 1016 (1995).

For more than 25 years, this straightforward interpreta-
tion of the Restoration Act held.  Yet the Tribe continually
pushed  the  Act’s  limits,  resulting  in  numerous  successful
requests for injunctive relief from Texas to enforce its gam-
ing laws.  See, e.g., 955 F. 3d 408, 412 (CA5 2020).  In sev-
eral instances, federal courts had to hold tribal officials in
contempt for disregarding injunctions.  Ibid.

The present litigation traces back to 2016.  After a Dis-
trict  Court  enjoined  illegal  “ ‘sweepstakes’ ”  games  being
conducted by the Pueblo, the Tribe announced it would be
“ ‘transitioning  to  bingo.’ ”    Ibid.  As  noted,  Texas  outlaws
almost all gambling, though it does permit charitable bingo
activities in certain limited situations.

In 2017, Texas inspected the Pueblo’s Speaking Rock En-
tertainment Center to determine whether it was complying
with state law.  The answer appeared to be “no.”  Slot ma-
chines are outlawed in Texas, as are “gambling device ver-
sions  of bingo.”    Tex.  Penal  Code Ann.  §47.01(4)(A)  (West
2011); see also §47.02(a)(3) (West Supp. 2021).  Yet inside
the Tribe’s casino, officials found more than 2,000 machines
that looked exactly like “ ‘Las-Vegas-style slot machines.’ ”
955  F. 3d,  at  412.    Players  press  a  button,  graphics  spin,
noise  plays,  and  eventually  players  learn  whether  they
have won or lost.  The machines are accessible 24 hours a
day and, for added effect, are emblazoned with names like
“Big Texas Payday,” “Welcome to Fabulous Las Vegas,” and
“Lucky  Duck.”    2019  WL  639971,  *5  (WD  Tex.,  Feb.  14,
2019).  Although  the  machines  resemble  slot  machines  in
every relevant respect, the Tribe insisted they were a form
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses a legal dispute between a Native American tribe and the state of Texas regarding gambling regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

through  grossly  inadequate  provision  of  medical  and
mental health care.

This Court now holds that the PLRA does authorize the
relief  afforded  in  this  case  and  that  the  court-mandated
population  limit  is  necessary  to  remedy  the  violation  of
prisoners’  constitutional  rights.  The  order  of  the  three-
judge  court,  subject  to  the  right  of  the  State  to  seek
its  modification  in  appropriate  circumstances,  must  be
affirmed.

I

A

The  degree  of  overcrowding  in  California’s  prisons  is
exceptional.  California’s  prisons  are  designed  to  house  a
population just under 80,000, but at the time of the three-
judge  court’s  decision  the  population  was  almost  double
that.  The State’s prisons had operated at around 200% of
design  capacity  for  at  least  11  years.  Prisoners  are
crammed  into  spaces  neither  designed  nor  intended  to
house  inmates.    As  many  as  200  prisoners  may  live  in  a
gymnasium,  monitored  by  as  few  as  two  or  three  correc-
tional  officers.    App.  1337–1338,  1350;  see  Appendix  B,
infra.  As many as 54 prisoners may share a single toilet.
App. 1337.

The  Corrections  Independent  Review  Panel,  a  body
appointed  by  the  Governor  and  composed  of  correctional
consultants  and  representatives  from  state  agencies,
concluded  that  California’s  prisons  are  “ ‘severely  over-
crowded,  imperiling  the  safety  of  both  correctional  em-
ployees and inmates.’ ”1  Juris. Statement App., O. T. 2009,

——————

1 A similar conclusion was reached by the Little Hoover Commission,
a  bipartisan  and
independent  state  body,  which  stated  that
“[o]vercrowded conditions inside the prison walls are unsafe for inmates
and staff,” Solving California’s Corrections Crisis: Time is Running Out
17  (Jan.  2007),  and  that  “California’s  correctional  system  is  in  a  tail-
spin,” id., at i.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in the case of Brown v. Plata. It discusses the issue of overcrowding in California prisons and the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>