<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

CARSON v. MAKIN

Opinion of the Court

opportunity  to  receive  the  benefits  of  a  free  public  educa-
tion,” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, §2(1) (2008), and that
the required schools be operated by “the legislative and gov-
erning  bodies  of  local  school  administrative  units,”  §2(2).
But  Maine  is  the  most  rural  State  in  the  Union,  and  for
many school districts the realities of remote geography and
low  population  density  make  those  commands  difficult  to
heed.  Indeed,  of  Maine’s  260  school  administrative  units
(SAUs), fewer than half operate a public secondary school
of their own.  App. 4, 70, 73.

Maine  has  sought  to  deal  with  this  problem  in  part  by
creating  a  program  of  tuition  assistance  for  families  that
reside in such areas.  Under that program, if an SAU nei-
ther operates its own public secondary school nor contracts
with a particular public or private school for the education
of its school-age children, the SAU must “pay the tuition . . .
at  the  public  school  or  the  approved  private  school  of  the
parent’s choice at which the student is accepted.”  Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, §5204(4) (Cum. Supp. 2021).  Parents
who wish to take advantage of this benefit first select the
school they wish their child to attend.  Ibid.  If they select a
private school that has been “approved” by the Maine De-
partment of Education, the parents’ SAU “shall pay the tu-
ition” at the chosen school up to a specified maximum rate.
See §§2902, 2951, 5204(4).

To  be  “approved”  to  receive  these  payments,  a  private
school must meet certain basic requirements under Maine’s
compulsory education law.  §2951(1).  The school must ei-
ther be “[c]urrently accredited by a New England associa-
tion  of  schools  and  colleges”  or  separately  “approv[ed]  for
attendance purposes” by the Department.  §§2901(2), 2902.
Schools seeking approval from the Department must meet
specified curricular requirements, such as using English as
the language of instruction, offering a course in “Maine his-
tory, including the Constitution of Maine . . . and Maine’s
cultural and ethnic heritage,” and maintaining a student-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section of a case called Carson v. Makin. It delves into the details of a tuition assistance program in Maine and its application to private schools.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Syllabus

execute a task.  As part of an interface, the copied lines are inherently
bound together with uncopyrightable ideas (the overall organization of
the  API)  and the  creation  of  new  creative  expression  (the  code  inde-
pendently written by Google).  Unlike many other computer programs,
the value of the copied lines is in significant part derived from the in-
vestment of users (here computer programmers) who have learned the
API’s system.  Given these differences, application of fair use here is
unlikely to undermine the general copyright protection that Congress
provided for computer programs.  Pp. 21–24.

(2) The  inquiry  into  the  “the  purpose  and  character”  of  the  use
turns  in  large  measure  on  whether  the  copying  at  issue  was  “trans-
formative,” i.e., whether it “adds something new, with a further pur-
pose  or  different  character.”  Campbell,  510  U.  S.,  at  579.  Google’s
limited copying of the API is a transformative use.  Google copied only
what was needed to allow programmers to work in a different compu-
ting environment without discarding a portion of a familiar program-
ming language.  Google’s purpose was to create a different task-related
system  for  a  different  computing  environment  (smartphones)  and  to
create a platform—the Android platform—that would help achieve and
popularize that objective.  The record demonstrates numerous ways in
which  reimplementing  an  interface  can  further  the  development  of
computer programs.  Google’s purpose was therefore consistent with
that creative progress that is the basic constitutional objective of cop-
yright itself.  Pp. 24–28.

(3) Google  copied  approximately  11,500  lines  of  declaring  code
from the API, which amounts to virtually all the declaring code needed
to  call  up  hundreds  of  different  tasks.    Those  11,500  lines,  however,
are only 0.4 percent of the entire API at issue, which consists of 2.86
million total lines.  In considering “the amount and substantiality of
the portion used” in this case, the 11,500 lines of code should be viewed
as one small part of the considerably greater whole.  As part of an in-
terface, the copied lines of code are inextricably bound to other lines of
code that are accessed by programmers.  Google copied these lines not
because of their creativity or beauty but because they would allow pro-
grammers to bring their skills to a new smartphone computing envi-
ronment.  The “substantiality” factor will generally weigh in favor of
fair use where, as here, the amount of copying was tethered to a valid,
and transformative, purpose.  Pp. 28–30.

(4) The fourth statutory factor focuses upon the “effect” of the cop-
ying  in  the  “market  for  or  value  of  the  copyrighted  work.”    §107(4).
Here the record showed that Google’s new smartphone platform is not
a market substitute for Java SE.  The record also showed that Java
SE’s copyright holder would benefit from the reimplementation of its
interface into a different market.  Finally, enforcing the copyright on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a syllabus outlining the reasoning behind a court decision. It discusses copyright law and fair use, analyzing Google's reimplementation of Java's API.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–463
_________________

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
AUSTIN REEVE JACKSON, JUDGE, DISTRICT
COURT OF TEXAS, 114TH DISTRICT, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[December 10, 2021]

  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  and
JUSTICE  KAGAN  join,  concurring  in  the  judgment  in  part
and dissenting in part.
  For nearly three months, the Texas Legislature has sub-
stantially  suspended  a  constitutional  guarantee:  a  preg-
nant  woman’s  right  to  control  her  own  body.    See  Roe  v.
Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992).  In open defiance
of this Court’s precedents, Texas enacted Senate Bill 8 (S.
B. 8), which bans abortion starting approximately six weeks
after a woman’s last menstrual period, well before the point
of fetal viability.  Since S. B. 8 went into effect on September
1,  2021,  the  law  has  threatened  abortion  care  providers
with  the  prospect  of  essentially  unlimited  suits  for  dam-
ages, brought anywhere in Texas by private bounty hunt-
ers,  for  taking  any  action  to  assist  women  in  exercising
their constitutional right to choose.  The chilling effect has
been near total, depriving pregnant women in Texas of vir-
tually  all  opportunity  to  seek  abortion  care  within  their
home  State  after  their  sixth  week  of  pregnancy.    Some
women  have  vindicated  their  rights  by  traveling  out  of
State.  For the many women who are unable to do so, their
only  alternatives  are  to  carry  unwanted  pregnancies  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the names of justices. This is suitable for indexing as it is part of the actual legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

ALITO, J., dissenting

whether  the  hospital  would  have  made  the  same  request
had Doe 2 applied for courtesy privileges.  Id., at 1435.11

Doe 2 said he made an informal inquiry about admitting
privileges at University Hospital, where he has consulting
privileges, but that the head of the OB/GYN Department,
Dr. Groome, “essentially said” that the hospital would not
upgrade his credentials.  Id., at 384.  Doe 2 attributed this
to “the political nature of what I do and the controversy of
what I do.”  Ibid.  But Doe 2 did not introduce evidence (or
seek  to  elicit  testimony  from  Dr.  Groome)  substantiating
his account of this informal inquiry.

Doe 2’s account raises obvious questions.  Since he was
already a member of the University Hospital staff, it is not
apparent why the hospital would reject his request for up-
graded  privileges  because  of  “the  political  nature”  of  his
practice.  Id., at 440–441.  And University Hospital has long
been  on  notice  of  Doe  2’s  abortion  practice.    He  has  been
affiliated with that hospital since 1979, Record 9757, and
has performed abortions since 1980, id., at 9759.

In sum, Doe 2 all but admitted in his e-mails that his ef-
forts  to  obtain  privileges  were  perfunctory;  he  declined  to
apply at a hospital where he previously had privileges; at
the  only  hospital  where  he  made  a  formal  application,  he
sought a position he knew he could not get for lack of a suf-
ficient  number  of  admissions;  and  at  one  other  hospital
(where he already had consulting privileges) he did no more
than make an informal inquiry.  The District Court should
have  considered  whether  Doe  2’s  efforts  were  consistent
——————

11 Each year, a physician with courtesy staff privileges at WKBC may
have as many as 49 “patient contacts,” which are defined as “any admis-
sion and management, consultation, procedure, response to emergency
call,  and  newborns.”    Record  9628,  9642  (capitalization  omitted).    And
contrary to the plurality’s suggestion, the fact that WKBC imposes the
same “[f]actors for [e]valuation” for courtesy and active staff-applicants
says little, since those factors do not set out any quantum of patient rec-
ords, and require only “relevant . . . experience” for the position sought.
Id., at 9669.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the actions of a physician (Doe 2) seeking admitting privileges at various hospitals and the court's reasoning regarding those actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part

II
In contrast  to the criminal-procedure context,  “[c]onsid-
erations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases
involving property and contract rights.”  Payne, 501 U. S.,
at 828.  Despite that fact, the Court has recently overruled
precedent where the Court’s shift threatened vast regula-
tory and economic consequences.  Janus  v. State, County,
and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. ___ (2018); id., at ___
(KAGAN,  J.,  dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  23)  (noting  that  the
Court’s opinion called into question “thousands of . . . con-
tracts covering millions of workers”); see South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 21) (not-
ing the “legitimate” burdens that the Court’s overruling of
precedent  would  place  on  vendors  who  had  started  busi-
nesses in reliance on a previous decision).

This  case,  by  contrast,  threatens  no  broad  upheaval  of
private economic rights.  Particularly when compared to the
interests  of  private  parties  who  have  structured  their  af-
fairs in reliance on our decisions, the States’ interests here
in  avoiding  a  modest  number  of  retrials—emphasized  at
such length by the dissent—are much less weighty.  They
are  certainly  not  new:  Opinions  that  force  changes  in  a
State’s criminal procedure typically impose such costs.  And
were this Court to take the dissent’s approach—defending
criminal-procedure opinions as wrong as Apodaca simply to
avoid  burdening  criminal  justice  systems—it  would  never
correct its criminal jurisprudence at all.

To pick up on the majority’s point, ante, at 23, in that al-
ternate universe, a trial judge alone could still decide the
critical  facts  necessary  to  sentence  a  defendant  to  death.
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002).  An officer would still be
able to search a car upon the arrest of any one of its recent
occupants.  New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), hold-
ing limited by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332 (2009).  And
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into legal arguments regarding stare decisis and the overruling of precedent in property and contract cases versus criminal procedure cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1459
_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JUSTIN
EUGENE TAYLOR

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2022]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
Justin Eugene Taylor and an accomplice pulled a gun on
a fellow drug dealer as they tried to rob him.  During the
attempted robbery, the victim was shot and killed.  Taylor
pleaded  guilty  to  using  a  firearm  during  an  attempted
Hobbs Act robbery, which he conceded was a “crime of vio-
lence” under 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3).  Taylor made that con-
cession because threatening to shoot someone during a rob-
bery is undoubtedly a violent act.  Yet, the Court holds that
Taylor did not actually commit a “crime of violence” because
a  hypothetical  defendant—the  Court  calls  him  “Adam”—
could have been convicted of attempting to commit Hobbs
Act robbery without using, attempting to use, or threaten-
ing to use physical force.  Ante, at 5; see §924(c)(3)(A).

This holding exemplifies just how this Court’s “categori-
cal approach” has led the Federal Judiciary on a “journey
Through the Looking Glass,” during which we have found
many “strange things.”  L. Carroll, Alice in Wonderland and
Through the Looking Glass 227 (J. Messner ed. 1982).  Ra-
ther than continue this 30-year excursion into the absurd,
I  would  hold  Taylor  accountable  for  what  he  actually  did
and uphold his conviction.  Accordingly, I respectfully dis-
sent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *United States v. Justin Eugene Taylor*.  It is sequential text and provides legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 22–277 and 22–555
_________________

ASHLEY MOODY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
FLORIDA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
NETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL.

22–277

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

22–555

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2024]

 JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment.

These cases present a complex clash between two novel
state laws and the alleged First Amendment rights of sev-
eral of the largest social media platforms.  Some things are
already clear.  Not every potential action taken by a social
media company will qualify as expression protected under
the First Amendment.  But not every hypothesized regula-
tion of such a company’s operations will necessarily be able
to withstand the force of the First Amendment’s protections
either.  Beyond those broadest of statements, it is difficult
to  say  much  more  at  this  time.  With  these  records  and
lower court decisions, we are not able to adequately evalu-
ate whether the challenged state laws are facially valid.

That is in no small part because, as all Members of the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes citation information, case names, and introductory remarks.  This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the core legal reasoning and decision-making process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

11

GORSUCH, J., concurring

Third, this Court has said that the major questions doc-
trine may apply when an agency seeks to “intrud[e] into an
area that is the particular domain of state law.”  Ibid.  Of
course,  another  longstanding  clear-statement  rule—the
federalism canon—also applies in these situations.  To pre-
serve the “proper balance between the States and the Fed-
eral  Government”  and  enforce  limits  on  Congress’s  Com-
merce Clause power, courts must “ ‘be certain of Congress’s
intent’ ”  before  finding  that  it  “legislate[d]  in  areas  tradi-
tionally regulated by the States.”  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U. S. 452, 459–460 (1991).  But unsurprisingly, the major
questions doctrine and the federalism canon often travel to-
gether.  When an agency claims the power to regulate vast
swaths of American life, it not only risks intruding on Con-
gress’s power, it also risks intruding on powers reserved to
the States.  See SWANC, 531 U. S., at 162, 174.

While  this  list  of  triggers  may  not  be  exclusive,  each  of
the signs the Court has found significant in the past is pre-
sent  here,  making  this  a  relatively  easy  case  for  the  doc-
trine’s application.  The EPA claims the power to force coal
and gas-fired power plants “to cease [operating] altogether.”
Ante, at 24.  Whether these plants should be allowed to op-
erate is a question on which people today may disagree, but
it is a question everyone can agree is vitally important.  See
ante,  at  24–25.    Congress  has  debated  the  matter  fre-
quently.  Ibid.; see generally Climate Change, The History
of a Consensus and the Causes of Inaction, Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Environment of the House Committee
on  Oversight  and  Reform,  116th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  pt.  I
(2019).  And so far it has “conspicuously and repeatedly de-
clined” to adopt legislation similar to the Clean Power Plan
(CPP).  Ante, at 20; see American Lung Assn. v. EPA, 985
F. 3d 914, 998, n. 19 (CADC 2021) (Walker, J., concurring
in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) (cataloguing failed legislative proposals); cf. Brown &
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into legal arguments regarding the "major questions doctrine" and its application to environmental regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.

as it sees fit with respect to farming, manufacturing, and
production practices in that State.  Through Proposition 12,
however, California has tried something quite different and
unusual.
It  has  attempted,  in  essence,  to  unilaterally
impose its moral and policy preferences for pig farming and
pork production on the rest of the Nation.  It has sought to
deny  market  access  to  out-of-state  pork  producers  unless
their farming and production practices in those other States
comply  with  California’s  dictates.
The  State  has
aggressively  propounded  a  “California  knows  best”
economic  philosophy—where  California  in  effect  seeks  to
regulate  pig  farming  and  pork  production  in  all  of  the
United  States.
California’s  approach  undermines
federalism and the authority of individual States by forcing
individuals  and  businesses  in  one  State  to  conduct  their
farming,  manufacturing,  and  production  practices  in  a
manner required by the laws of a different State.

Notably,  future  state  laws  of  this  kind  might  not  be
confined  to  the  pork  industry.  As  the  amici  brief  of  26
States points out, what if a state law prohibits the sale of
fruit  picked  by  noncitizens  who  are  unlawfully  in  the
country?  Brief for Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae 33.  What
if  a  state  law  prohibits  the  sale  of  goods  produced  by
workers  paid less than $20 per hour?   Or as  those States
suggest,  what  if  a  state  law  prohibits  “the  retail  sale  of
goods from producers that do not pay for employees’ birth
control  or  abortions”  (or  alternatively,  that  do  pay  for
employees’ birth control or abortions)?  Ibid.
constitutional

challenges,
California’s novel and far-reaching regulation could provide
a  blueprint  for  other  States.  California’s  law  thus  may
foreshadow a new era where States shutter their markets
to goods produced in a way that offends their moral or policy
preferences—and in doing so, effectively force other States
to  regulate  in  accordance  with  those  idiosyncratic  state
demands.  That  is  not  the  Constitution  the  Framers

If  upheld  against  all
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring and dissenting opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It discusses the constitutionality of California's Proposition 12, which sets standards for pig farming and pork production.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21A145
_________________

DR. A, ET AL., APPLICANTS v. KATHY HOCHUL,
GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

[December 13, 2021]

The application for injunctive relief presented to JUSTICE

SOTOMAYOR and by her referred to the Court is denied.

New  York  recently

JUSTICE THOMAS would grant the application.
JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, dis-
senting from the denial of application for injunctive relief.
issued  a  regulation  requiring
healthcare workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine.  Those
who cite medical reasons are exempt.  But no comparable
exemption exists for individuals whose sincere religious be-
liefs prevent them from taking one of the currently availa-
ble vaccines.  It seems New York is one of just three States
to  have  a  scheme  like  this.  And  it  seems  originally  even
New York was headed in a different direction.  When it an-
nounced the mandate, the then-Governor promised a reli-
gious  exemption.  Weeks  later,  the  State  backtracked.    It
offered no scientific evidence, or even a written explanation,
for the decision.  But a new Governor who assumed office
around the same time spoke about it.  The new Governor
announced  that  the  decision  to  eliminate  the  exemption
was “intentiona[l]” and justified because no “organized reli-
gion” sought it and individuals who did were not “listening
to God and what God wants.”  Now, thousands of New York
healthcare workers face the loss of their jobs and eligibility
for unemployment benefits.  Twenty of them have filed suit
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It includes citations, case names, and the names of justices. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the legal reasoning and arguments within a case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Syllabus

is not the only legitimate interest served by restrictions on ballot col-
lection.  Third-party ballot collection can lead to pressure and intimi-
dation.    Further,  a  State  may  take  action  to  prevent  election  fraud
without waiting for it to occur within its own borders.  Pp. 30–34.

(d) HB 2023 was not enacted with a discriminatory purpose, as the
District Court found.  Appellate review of that conclusion is for clear
error.  Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 287–288.  The Dis-
trict Court’s finding on the question of discriminatory intent had am-
ple  support  in  the  record.    The  court  considered  the  historical  back-
ground  and  the  highly  politicized  sequence  of  events  leading  to  HB
2023’s enactment; it looked for any departures from the normal legis-
lative process; it considered relevant legislative history; and it weighed
the law’s impact on different racial groups.  See Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266–268.  The
court found HB 2023 to be the product of sincere legislative debate over
the wisdom of early mail-in voting and the potential for fraud.  And it
took care to distinguish between racial motives and partisan motives.
The District Court’s interpretation of the evidence was plausible based
on the record, so its permissible view is not clearly erroneous.  See An-
derson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 573–574.   The Court of Appeals
concluded that the District Court committed clear error by failing to
apply  a  “cat’s  paw”  theory—which  analyzes  whether  an  actor  was  a
“dupe” who was “used by another to accomplish his purposes.”  That
theory has its origin in employment discrimination cases and has no
application to legislative bodies.  Pp. 34–37.

948 F. 3d 989, reversed and remanded.

  ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  THOMAS,  GORSUCH,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined.    GOR-
SUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.  KAGAN,
J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  BREYER  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case.  It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a summary of the legal issues.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v.
MORRISSEY-BERRU
Opinion of the Court

an oath and license for any “ ‘vagrant Preacher, Moravian,
or disguised Papist’ ” to “ ‘Preach or Teach, Either in Public
or  Private.’ ”  S.  Cobb,  The  Rise  of  Religious  Liberty  in
America 358 (1902).

C

In  Hosanna-Tabor,  Cheryl  Perich,  a  kindergarten  and
fourth  grade  teacher  at  an  Evangelical  Lutheran  school,
filed suit in federal court, claiming that she had been dis-
charged  because  of  a  disability,  in violation  of  the  Ameri-
cans  with  Disabilities  Act  of  1990  (ADA),  42  U. S. C.
§12112(a).  The  school  responded  that  the  real  reason  for
her  dismissal  was  her  violation  of  the  Lutheran  doctrine
that disputes should be resolved internally and not by going
to outside authorities.  We held that her suit was barred by
the  “ministerial  exception”  and  noted  that  it  “concern[ed]
government interference with an internal church decision
that affects the faith and mission of the church.”  565 U. S.,
at 190.  We declined “to adopt a rigid formula for deciding
when an employee qualifies as a minister,” and we added
that it was “enough for us to conclude, in this our first case
involving the ministerial exception, that the exception co-
vers  Perich,  given  all  the  circumstances  of  her  employ-
ment.”  Id., at 190–191.  We identified four relevant circum-
stances but did not highlight any as essential.

First, we noted that her church had given Perich the title
of  “minister,  with  a  role  distinct  from  that  of  most  of  its
members.”  Id., at 191.  Although she was not a minister in
the usual sense of the term—she was not a pastor or deacon,
did not lead a congregation, and did not regularly conduct
religious services—she was classified as a “called” teacher,
as  opposed  to  a  lay  teacher,  and  after  completing  certain
academic requirements, was given the formal title “ ‘Minis-
ter of Religion, Commissioned.’ ”  Id., at 177–178, 191.

Second, Perich’s position “reflected a significant degree of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the "ministerial exception" in the context of employment law. It cites a previous case (Hosanna-Tabor) and delves into the details of that case, including the circumstances surrounding the employee's role and classification.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

27

KAGAN, J., dissenting

come out ahead on factor 1.

And if you think that’s just Shakespeare, here are a cou-
ple  more.
(Once  you  start  looking,  examples  are  every-
where.)  Lolita,  though  hard  to  read  today,  is  usually
thought one of the greatest novels of the 20th century.  But
the plotline—an adult man takes a room as a lodger; em-
barks on an obsessive sexual relationship with the preteen
daughter of the house; and eventually survives her death,
remaining marked forever—appears in a story by Heinz von
Lichberg written a few decades earlier.  Oh, and the girl’s
name is Lolita in both versions.  See generally M. Maar, The
Two Lolitas (2005).  All that said, the two works have little
in  common  artistically;  nothing  literary  critics  admire  in
the second Lolita is found in the first.  But to the majority?
Just two stories of revoltingly lecherous men, published for
profit.  So even factor 1 of the fair-use inquiry would not aid
Nabokov.  Or take one of the most famed adventure stories
ever  told.  Here  is  the  provenance  of  Treasure  Island,  as
Robert Louis Stevenson himself described it:

“No  doubt  the  parrot  once  belonged  to  Robinson  Cru-
soe.  No doubt the skeleton is conveyed from [Edgar Al-
lan] Poe.  I think little of these, they are trifles and de-
tails;  and  no  man  can  hope  to  have  a  monopoly  of
skeletons or make a corner in talking birds. . . . It is my
debt  to  Washington  Irving  that  exercises  my  con-
science,  and  justly  so,  for  I  believe  plagiarism  was
rarely  carried  farther.  . . .  Billy  Bones,  his  chest,  the
company  in  the  parlor,  the  whole  inner  spirit  and  a
good deal of the material detail of my first chapters—
all were there, all were the property of Washington Ir-
ving.”  My First Book—Treasure Island, in 21 Syracuse
University  Library  Associates  Courier  No.  2,  p.  84
(1986).

Odd that a book about pirates should have practiced piracy?
Not really, because tons of books do—and not many in order
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the concept of fair use in copyright law, using examples like "Lolita" and "Treasure Island" to illustrate its points.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

BROWN v. DAVENPORT

Opinion of the Court

with discretion when it comes to supplying habeas relief—
providing that they “may” (not must) grant writs of habeas
corpus, and that they should do so only as “law and justice
require.”  28 U. S. C.  §§ 2241,  2243.    This  language,  the
Court  recognized,  serves  as  “authorization  to  adjust  the
scope of the writ in accordance with equitable and pruden-
tial considerations.”  Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264,
278 (2008); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 716
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Foremost among those considerations is the States’ “power-
ful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty.”  Calde-
ron v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 556 (1998) (internal quota-
tion  marks  omitted).  Granting  habeas  relief  to  a  state
prisoner “intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched
by few exercises of federal judicial authority.”  Harrington
v.  Richter,  562  U. S.  86,  103  (2011)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).

Exercising its equitable discretion, and informed by these
concerns,  the  Court  began  to  develop  doctrines  “aimed  at
returning the Great Writ closer to its historic office.”  Ed-
wards, 593 U. S., at ___ (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (slip op.,
at 8).  The Court established procedural-default standards
to prevent petitioners from evading independent and ade-
quate  state-law  grounds  sustaining  their  convictions.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 86–87 (1977).  The Court
held that some claims are not cognizable in federal habeas
if  state  courts  provide  a  mechanism  for  review.  Stone  v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 494–495 (1976).  The Court also ap-
plied  new  rules  to  prevent  cycles  of  repetitive  filings.
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 486–493 (1991).

Brecht  was  part of this effort.  In Chapman,  this Court
held that, when a defendant demonstrates on direct appeal
that a constitutional error occurred at his trial, his convic-
tion cannot stand unless the government proves the error’s
harmlessness  “beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.”    386  U. S.,  at
24.  In Brecht, the Court resolved that this same standard
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Brecht and its relation to the Chapman case. It delves into the standards of harmless error in constitutional cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

legislation”).  In other words, from the moment the ATS be-
came law, Congress expected federal courts to identify ac-
tionable  torts  under  international  law  and  to  provide  in-
jured plaintiffs with a forum to seek redress.

That historical fact must guide jurists when determining
“whether  allowing  [a]  case  to  proceed  under  the  ATS  is  a
proper exercise of judicial discretion.”  Id., at ___ (plurality
opinion)  (slip  op.,  at  12).  JUSTICE  THOMAS  suggests  that
courts may recognize a cause of action under the ATS only
“in very limited circumstances,” if at all.  Ante,  at 5.  But
the ATS calls for much more.  The First Congress made the
legislative determination that a remedy should be available
under the ATS to foreign citizens who suffer “tort[s] . . . in
violation of the law of nations.”  28 U. S. C. §1350.  Barring
some  extraordinary  collateral  consequence  that  could  not
have been foreseen by Congress, federal courts should not,
under the guise of judicial discretion, second-guess that leg-
islative decision.

JUSTICE THOMAS therefore  errs  in asserting that  courts
“plac[e] great stress on the separation of powers” when they
recognize causes of action under the ATS.  Ante, at 7.  That
would be news to the First Congress, which from the begin-
ning counted on federal courts to “recognize enforceable in-
ternational  norms”  in order  to  give  the  ATS  “practical  ef-
fect.”    Sosa,  542  U. S.,  at  719,  730.  To  now  suggest  that
identifying  actionable  torts  “risks  ‘upset[ting]  the  careful
balance of interests struck by the lawmakers’ ” is ahistorical
at best.  Ante, at 8 (quoting Hernández v. Mesa, 589 U. S.
___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 5); brackets in original).

Indeed, one need look no further than the text of the ATS
to understand the task that the First Congress assigned to
the Federal Judiciary.  As originally enacted, the ATS gave
federal courts “cognizance . . . of all causes where an alien
sues for  a tort  only in violation  of  the  law  of nations  or  a
treaty of the United States.”  §9, 1 Stat. 77.  Congress did
not need to legislate those “causes” into existence because
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe.  It delves into the interpretation and application of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

7

Opinion of the Court

Rather,  they  worked  deep  transformations  in  its  structure,
affecting aspects of marriage long viewed by many as essen-
tial.    See  generally  N.  Cott,  Public  Vows;  S.  Coontz,  Mar-
riage; H. Hartog, Man & Wife in America: A History (2000).

These  new  insights  have  strengthened,  not  weakened,
the institution of marriage.  Indeed, changed understand-
ings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new
dimensions  of  freedom  become  apparent  to  new  genera-
tions,  often  through  perspectives  that  begin  in  pleas  or
protests  and  then  are  considered  in  the  political  sphere
and the judicial process.

This  dynamic  can  be  seen  in  the  Nation’s  experiences
with  the  rights  of  gays  and  lesbians.    Until  the  mid-20th
century,  same-sex  intimacy  long  had  been  condemned  as
immoral  by  the  state  itself  in  most  Western  nations,  a
belief often embodied in the criminal law.  For this reason,
among others, many persons did not deem homosexuals to
have  dignity  in  their  own  distinct  identity.    A  truthful
declaration  by  same-sex  couples  of  what  was  in  their
hearts  had  to  remain  unspoken.    Even  when  a  greater
awareness  of  the  humanity  and  integrity  of  homosexual
persons  came  in  the  period  after  World  War  II,  the  argu-
ment  that  gays  and  lesbians  had  a  just  claim  to  dignity
was  in  conflict  with  both  law  and  widespread  social  con-
ventions.  Same-sex  intimacy  remained  a  crime  in  many
States.  Gays  and  lesbians  were  prohibited  from  most
government  employment,  barred  from  military  service,
excluded under immigration laws, targeted by police, and
burdened in their rights to associate.  See Brief for Organ-
ization of American Historians as Amicus Curiae 5–28.

For much of the 20th century, moreover, homosexuality
was treated as an illness.  When the American Psychiatric
Association  published  the  first  Diagnostic  and  Statistical
Manual  of  Mental  Disorders  in  1952,  homosexuality  was
classified as a mental disorder, a position adhered to until
1973.  See Position Statement on Homosexuality and Civil
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges. It discusses the historical evolution of societal views on same-sex relationships and how those views have changed over time.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury in this case.2  The
evidence that I have recounted is enough to establish that
our  previous  interpretations  of  the  Sixth  Amendment  are
not demonstrably erroneous.  What is necessary, however,
is a clear understanding of the means by which the Sixth
Amendment  right  applies  against  the  States.    We  should
rely  on  the  Privileges  or  Immunities  Clause,  not  the  Due
Process  Clause  or  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  in  some
vague sense.  Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment.

——————

2 Similarly, I express no view on how fundamental the right to unanim-
ity is, what other attributes of a criminal jury are protected by the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause, what rights are protected in misdemeanor
cases, or what rights are protected in civil trials.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment and its application against the states.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
808

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5790.  Sibley  v.  Grievance  Committee  of  the  Sev
enth  Judicial  District.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.  N.  Y.,  4th  Jud.
Dept.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pau
peris  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.  Reported  below:  61  App.  Div.  3d  85,  874  N. Y.  S. 2d  338.

No.  09–5800.  Danser  v.  Lawrence,  Judge,  United  States
District  Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  Indiana.
C. A. 7th Cir.  Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.

No.  09–5856.  Wagner  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Re
ported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  626.

No.  09–5878.  Childs  v.  Weinshienk,  Senior  Judge,  United
States District Court for the District of Colorado.  C. A.
10th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma
pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule
39.8.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  860.

No.  09–6054.  Voinche  v.  United  States  District  Court
for  the  Middle  District  of  Louisiana  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Re
ported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  525.

Miscellaneous  Orders

No.  08A1098  (08–1204).  Gimbel  v.  California  et al.,  556
U.  S.  1269.  Application  for  leave  to  ﬁle  petition  for  rehearing  in
excess  of  the  word  limit,  addressed  to  Justice  Ginsburg  and
referred  to  the  Court,  denied.

No.  09A140  (09–246).  Bridgeport  Roman  Catholic  Dioce
san  Corp.  v.  New  York  Times  Co.  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Conn.  Ap
plication  for  stay,  addressed  to  Justice  Scalia  and  referred  to
the  Court,  denied.

No.  08M92.  Torres  v.  Amerada  Hess  Corp.;

No. 09M12.  Roberson v.  LFI Fort Pierce, Inc.,  et al.; and

No.  09M17.  Abercrombie  v.  Department  of  Agriculture.

Motions  to  direct  the  Clerk  to  ﬁle  petitions  for  writs  of  certiorari
out  of  time  under  this  Court’s  Rule  14.5  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and focuses on legal proceedings rather than a story or informative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. HIGGS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

imperative  public  importance  as  to  justify  deviation  from
normal appellate practice and to require immediate deter-
mination in this Court.”  This Court’s Rule 11.  The Govern-
ment  falls  far  short  of  meeting  this  strict  standard.
Whether  district  courts  can  amend  final  orders  and  judg-
ments  in  this  situation  is  an  open  and  novel  question  on
which none of the courts of appeals have spoken.  After fail-
ing to act since Higgs’ sentence was imposed in 2001, the
Government  gives  no  compelling  reason  why  it  suddenly
cannot wait a few weeks while courts give his claim the con-
sideration  it  deserves.  Certainly,  there  is  no  “imperative
public  importance”  behind  the  Government’s  request.    I
would deny the Government’s petition.

II
Sadly, it is not surprising that the Court grants this ex-
traordinary request.  Over the past six months, this Court
has repeatedly sidestepped its usual deliberative processes,
often at the Government’s request, allowing it to push for-
ward with an unprecedented, breakneck timetable of exe-
cutions.  With due judicial consideration, some of the Gov-
ernment’s arguments may have prevailed and some or even
many of these executions may have ultimately been allowed
to  proceed.    Others  may  not  have  been.    Either  way,  the
Court should not have sanctioned these executions without
resolving these critical issues.  The stakes were simply too
high.

A
Even  after  thirteen  federal  executions  in  six  months,
basic,  recurring  questions  about  the  FDPA  and  the  2019
Protocol  remain  unanswered.    For  example,  what  does  it
mean  to  “implement[ ]”  a  federal  death  sentence  “in  the
manner  prescribed  by  the  law  of  the  State”?    18  U. S. C.
§3596(a).  Answers run the gamut.  Some judges believe the
FDPA merely requires following the State’s “top-line choice
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

that Abood has countenanced for the past 41 years.  Abood
is therefore overruled.

I

A

Under  the  Illinois  Public  Labor  Relations  Act  (IPLRA),
employees  of  the  State  and  its  political  subdivisions  are
permitted  to  unionize.
See  Ill.  Comp.  Stat.,  ch.  5,
§315/6(a) (West 2016).  If a majority of the employees in a
bargaining  unit  vote  to  be  represented  by  a  union,  that
union  is  designated  as  the  exclusive  representative  of  all
the  employees.  §§315/3(s)(1),  315/6(c),  315/9.    Employees
in the unit are not obligated to join the union selected by
their co-workers, but whether they join or not, that union
is  deemed  to  be  their  sole  permitted  representative.    See
§§315/6(a), (c).

Once  a  union  is  so  designated,  it  is  vested  with  broad
authority.  Only the union may negotiate with the employer
on  matters  relating  to  “pay,  wages,  hours[,]  and  other
conditions  of  employment.”  §315/6(c).  And  this  authority
extends to the negotiation of what the IPLRA calls “policy
matters,”  such  as  merit  pay,  the  size  of  the  work  force,
layoffs,  privatization,  promotion  methods,  and  non
discrimination  policies.   §315/4;  see  §315/6(c);  see  gener-
ally,  e.g.,  Illinois  Dept.  of  Central  Management  Servs.  v.
AFSCME, Council 31, No. S–CB–16–17 etc., 33 PERI ¶67
(ILRB Dec. 13, 2016) (Board Decision).

Designating  a  union  as  the  employees’  exclusive  repre
sentative  substantially  restricts  the  rights  of  individual
employees.    Among  other  things,  this  designation  means
that individual employees may not be represented by any
agent other than the designated union; nor may individual
their  employer.
employees  negotiate  directly  with
§§315/6(c)–(d),  315/10(a)(4);  see  Matthews  v.  Chicago
Transit  Authority,  2016  IL  117638,  51  N. E. 3d  753,  782;
accord, Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 678,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA) and its implications for unionization and employee rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A.

Syllabus

injuries to the plan where they themselves have not “suffered an injury
in fact,” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 708, or been legally or
contractually  appointed  to  represent  the  plan.    Third,  the  fact  that
ERISA affords all participants—including defined-benefit plan partic-
ipants—a cause of action to sue does not satisfy the injury-in-fact re-
quirement here.  “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even
in  the  context  of  a  statutory  violation.”    Spokeo,  Inc.  v.  Robins,  578
U. S. ___, ___.  Fourth, the plaintiffs contend that meaningful regula-
tion of plan fiduciaries is possible only if they may sue to target per-
ceived fiduciary misconduct.  But this Court has long rejected that ar-
gument for Article III standing, see Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S.
464,  489,  and  defined-benefit  plans  are  regulated  and  monitored  in
multiple ways.
  The  plaintiffs’  amici  assert  that  defined-benefit  plan  participants
have  standing  to  sue  if  the plan’s  mismanagement  was  so  egregious
that it substantially increased the risk that the plan and the employer
would fail and be unable to pay the participants’ future benefits.  The
plaintiffs do not assert that theory of standing here, nor did their com-
plaint allege that level of mismanagement.  Pp. 2–8.

 873 F. 3d 617, affirmed.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a condensed overview rather than the full text meant for reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxxxvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1050

Lewis; Albany Police Dept. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Lewis v. Burger King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Lewis v. Burtt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Lewis v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lewis; Garibay v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

1013

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lewis; Lopez v.
Lewis v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . .  860,867,928,931,960,999,1003,1062

1048

Lewis Palmer School Dist. No. 38; Corder v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
808

LFI Fort Pierce, Inc.; Roberson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1091

Li v. Holder
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1146

Liberty Bank & Trust Co.; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948

Liberty Counsel v. Florida Bar Bd. of Governors . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044

Liberty International Underwriters, Inc.; Gargano v. . . . . . . . . . .
946

Liberty Mut. Assurance Co.; Everson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.; Gunderson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1060

Libman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

Liggin; Henderson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

Liles, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

Lin v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  827,1064

Linam v. Linam
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  891,1139

Lincoln General Ins.; Hoffman v.
1125

Lindamood; Suggs v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Linder v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

Lindsay; Fiore v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lindsey v. Georgia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1127

Lindsey v. United States
867

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Link v. Rhodes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
864

Linniman v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Linton v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  955,1140

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  930,1144

Linton v. United States
822

Lin Wu v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lionetti v. United States
942

Lions Gate Entertainment Corp.; Conner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960

Lirette v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

Little v. Ryan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
854

Little v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959

Littlejohn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Littles v. United States
1111

Liu v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1019

Liu v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Livingston; Lagaite v.
1073

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Livingston; Woods v.
1099

Livingstone v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

L. M. v. Capistrano Uniﬁed School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP

Opinion of the Court

substantial the evidence of Congress’s legislative purpose,
the better.  See Watkins, 354 U. S., at 201, 205 (preferring
such evidence over “vague” and “loosely worded” evidence
of Congress’s purpose).  That is particularly true when Con-
gress contemplates legislation that raises sensitive consti-
tutional  issues,  such  as  legislation  concerning  the  Presi-
dency.  In such cases, it is “impossible” to conclude that a
subpoena is designed to advance a valid legislative purpose
unless Congress adequately identifies its aims and explains
why the President’s information will advance its considera-
tion of the possible legislation.  Id., at 205–206, 214–215.

Fourth, courts should be careful to assess the burdens im-
posed on the President by a subpoena.  We have held that
burdens  on  the  President’s  time  and  attention  stemming
from judicial process and litigation, without more, generally
do not cross constitutional lines.  See Vance, ante, at 12–14;
Clinton, 520 U. S., at 704–705.  But burdens imposed by a
congressional subpoena should be carefully scrutinized, for
they stem from a rival political branch that has an ongoing
relationship with the President and incentives to use sub-
poenas for institutional advantage.

Other considerations may be pertinent as well; one case
every two centuries does not afford enough experience for
an exhaustive list.

When Congress seeks information “needed for intelligent
legislative action,” it “unquestionably” remains “the duty of
all citizens to cooperate.”  Watkins, 354 U. S., at 187 (em-
phasis  added).  Congressional  subpoenas  for  information
from the President, however, implicate special concerns re-
garding the separation of powers.  The courts below did not
take adequate account of those concerns.  The judgments of
the Courts of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit and the Second
Circuit are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court in the case of Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP. It delves into the constitutional considerations surrounding congressional subpoenas for information from the President.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1226

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

APPEALS—Continued

Rule

—Fee........................................................................  18.3, 38(a)

—Multiple judgments...........................................  18.2

—Page limits  ........................................................  33.2(b)

—Service.................................................................  18.3, 29.3–29.5

—Supplemental briefs..........................................  18.10, 33.1(g)(iv)

—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  18.3, 30.2, 30.3

—Word limits  ........................................................  33.1(g)(i)

Jurisdiction noted or postponed .................................  18.12

Notice of appeal

—Clerk of district court, ﬁled with...................  18.1

—Contents..............................................................  18.1

—Response .............................................................  18.6

—Service.................................................................  18.1

—Time to ﬁle .........................................................  18.1

Parties to proceeding ...................................................  18.2

Record .............................................................................  18.11, 18.12

Summary disposition ....................................................  18.12

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

Certiﬁed cases  ..............................................................  19.3
Notice of appearance, when required........................  9

APPENDIX—See also Joint Appendix

Briefs on merits.............................................................  24.3
Cover color .....................................................................  33.1(e)
Documents,  format  and  general  preparation  re

quirements ..................................................................  33, 34

Jurisdictional statements.............................................  18.3
Petitions for writ of certiorari....................................  14.1(i)

APPLICATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES—See

Justices
ARGUMENT

Absence of quorum, effect of ......................................  4.2

Additional time, request for........................................  28.3

Amicus curiae ...............................................................  28.7

Calendar, call of.............................................................  27

Certiﬁed cases................................................................  19.4

Combined cases .............................................................  27.3

Content............................................................................  28.1, 28.5

Counsel, notiﬁcation of argument date .....................  27.2

Cross-appeals .................................................................  28.2

Cross-writs of certiorari ..............................................  28.2

Divided argument  ........................................................  28.4

Hearing lists...................................................................  27.2
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a list of rules and sub-rules, likely from a legal document. It is not sequential text meant to be read as a narrative.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Rules/Regulations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

9

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

sonable observer would think he is merely complying with
Colorado’s  public-accommodations  law.  This  argument
would  justify  any  law  that  compelled  protected  speech.
And,  this  Court  has  never  accepted  it.  From  the  begin
ning,  this  Court’s  compelled-speech  precedents  have  re
jected arguments that “would resolve every issue of power
in favor of those in authority.”  Barnette, 319 U. S., at 636.
Hurley,  for  example,  held  that  the  application  of  Massa
chusetts’  public-accommodations
[the
organizers]  to  alter  the  expressive  content  of  their  pa
rade.”  515 U. S., at 572–573.  It did not hold that reason
able  observers  would  view  the  organizers  as  merely  com
plying with Massachusetts’ public-accommodations law.

law  “requir[ed]

The  decisions  that  the  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  cited
for this proposition are far afield.  It cited three decisions
where  groups  objected  to  being  forced  to  provide  a  forum
for  a  third  party’s  speech.    See  FAIR,  supra,  at  51  (law
school  refused  to  allow  military  recruiters  on  campus);
Rosenberger,  supra,  at  822–823  (public  university  refused
to provide funds to a religious student paper); PruneYard,
supra, at 77 (shopping center refused to allow individuals
to  collect  signatures  on  its  property).    In  those  decisions,
this  Court  rejected  the  argument  that  requiring  the
groups  to  provide  a  forum  for  third-party  speech  also
required them to endorse that speech.  See FAIR, supra, at
63–65; Rosenberger, supra, at 841–842; PruneYard, supra,
at  85–88.  But  these  decisions  do  not  suggest  that  the
government can force speakers to alter their own message.
See Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U. S., at 12 (“Notably absent
from  PruneYard  was  any  concern  that  access  . . .  might
affect  the  shopping  center  owner’s  exercise  of  his  own
right to speak”); Hurley, supra, at 580 (similar).

The  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  also  noted  that  Master
piece is a “for-profit bakery” that “charges its customers.”
370 P. 3d, at 287.  But this Court has repeatedly rejected
the  notion  that  a  speaker’s  profit  motive  gives  the  gov
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding compelled speech and the application of public accommodations laws.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

JACKSON, J., dissenting

Government action to file a facial challenge.

The District Court rejected Corner Post’s argument, fol-
lowing the lead of every court of appeals that had ever ad-
dressed accrual of an APA facial challenge.2  It held that the
addition of Corner Post as a plaintiff did not make a differ-
ence to the timeliness of the business groups’ claims.  The
Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that “when plaintiffs bring
a facial challenge to a final agency action, the right of action
accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, upon pub-
lication  of  the  regulation.”    North  Dakota  Retail  Assn.  v.
Board of Governors of FRS, 55 F. 4th 634, 641 (2022).

II
But here we are.  Three-quarters of a century after Con-
gress enacted the APA, a majority of this Court rejects the
consensus view that, for facial challenges to agency rules,
the statutory 6-year limitations period runs from the publi-
cation of the rule.  Instead, it holds that an APA claim ac-
crues “when the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.”
Ante, at 1.  The majority maintains that the text of §2401(a)
demands this result.  But if that answer is so obvious, one
wonders  why  no  court  proclaimed  it  until  more  than  75
years after all the statutory pieces were in place.

To explain how the majority got this ruling wrong, I find
it necessary to provide the right answer.  Here, the relevant
——————

2 The majority’s opinion says we took this case to resolve a circuit split,
suggesting that the Sixth Circuit had reached the contrary conclusion.
See ante, at 3–4.  It had not.  In Herr v. United States Forest Serv., 803
F. 3d 809 (2015), the Sixth Circuit addressed accrual in the context of an
as-applied challenge after the Government had threatened enforcement.
There, the Circuit pegged accrual to the moment of the injury allegedly
caused by application of the rule to the plaintiff, see id., at 820, and did
not discuss whether that same accrual rule would apply to facial chal-
lenges.  Since Herr, neither the Sixth Circuit nor any district court within
it has extended Herr’s rule to facial challenges to final agency actions,
and at least one District Court has expressly rejected such an extension.
See Linney’s Pizza, LLC v. Board of Governors of FRS, 2023 WL 6050569,
*2–*4 (ED Ky., Sept. 15, 2023).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal arguments related to the accrual of a facial challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting

Long before Title VII was adopted, many pioneering state
and federal laws had used language substantively indistin-
guishable  from  Title  VII’s  critical  phrase,  “discrimination
because of sex.”  For example, the California Constitution
of 1879 stipulated that no one, “on account of sex, [could] be
disqualified  from  entering  upon  or  pursuing  any  lawful
business, vocation, or profession.”  Art. XX, §18 (emphasis
added).  It  also  prohibited  a  student’s  exclusion  from  any
state  university  department  “on  account  of  sex.”    Art.  IX,
§9; accord, Mont. Const., Art. XI, §9 (1889).

Wyoming’s  first  Constitution  proclaimed  broadly  that
“[b]oth male and female citizens of this state shall equally
enjoy all civil, political and religious rights and privileges,”
Art. VI, §1 (1890), and then provided specifically that “[i]n
none of the public schools . . . shall distinction or discrimi-
nation be made on account of sex,” Art. VII, §10 (emphasis
added); see also §16 (the “university shall be equally open
to students of both sexes”).  Washington’s Constitution like-
wise required “ample provision for the education of all chil-
dren . . . without distinction or preference on account of . . .
sex.”  Art. IX, §1 (1889) (emphasis added).

The Constitution of Utah, adopted in 1895, provided that
the right to vote and hold public office “shall not be denied
or abridged on account of sex.”  Art. IV, §1 (emphasis added).
And in the next sentence it made clear what “on account of
sex”  meant,  stating  that  “[b]oth  male  and  female  citizens
. . . shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights
and privileges.”  Ibid.

The  most  prominent  example  of  a  provision  using  this
language was the Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920,
which bans the denial or abridgment of the right to vote “on
account of sex.”  U. S. Const., Amdt. 19.  Similar language
appeared in the proposal of the National Woman’s Party for
an Equal Rights Amendment.  As framed in 1921, this pro-
posal forbade all “political, civil or legal disabilities or ine-
qualities  on  account  of  sex,  [o]r  on  account  of  marriage.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites historical legal precedents and constitutional amendments to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE v. ARGUS LEADER MEDIA

Syllabus

to the judgment ordering disclosure; and a favorable ruling from this
Court would redress the retailers’ injury by reversing that judgment.
Pp. 4–5.

2. Where  commercial  or  financial  information  is  both  customarily
and actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the gov-
ernment under an assurance of privacy, the information is “confiden-
tial” within Exemption 4’s meaning.  Pp. 5–12.

(a) At  the  time  of  FOIA’s  enactment,  the  term  “confidential”
meant  “private”  or  “secret.”    Contemporary  dictionaries  suggest  two
conditions  that  might  be  required  for  information  communicated  to
another  to  be  considered  confidential:  when  the  information  is  cus-
tomarily kept private, or at least closely held, by the person impart-
ing  it;  and  when  the  party  receiving  the  information  provides  some
assurance that it will remain secret.  At least the first of these condi-
tions must be met; it is hard to see how information could be deemed
confidential if its owner shares it freely.  But the Court need not re-
solve whether both conditions are necessary because both conditions
are clearly met here.  Uncontested testimony established that the In-
stitute’s  retailers  customarily  do  not  disclose  store-level  SNAP  data
or  make  it  publicly  available.    And  to  induce  retailers  to  participate
in  SNAP  and  provide  store-level  information,  the  government  has
long  promised  retailers  that  it  will  keep  their  information  private.
Early courts of appeals confronting Exemption 4 interpreted its terms
in ways consistent with these understandings.  Pp. 5–7.

(b) Argus  Leader  pins  its  hopes  on  the  “substantial  competitive
harm”  requirement  from  the  D. C.  Circuit’s  decision  in  National
Parks  &  Conservation  Assn.  v.  Morton,  498  F. 2d  765.    There,  the
court inappropriately resorted to legislative history before consulting
the  statute’s  text  and  structure  and  relied  heavily  on  statements
from witnesses in congressional hearings years earlier on a different
bill that was never enacted into law.  Unsurprisingly, National Parks
has  drawn  considerable  criticism  over  the  years,  and  even  the  D. C.
Circuit has distanced itself from the decision.  Pp. 7–10.

(c) Argus  Leader’s  attempt  to  salvage  National  Parks  is  unper-
suasive.    First,  it  rearranges  the  text  of  Exemption  4  to  create  a
phrase that does not appear in the statute: “confidential commercial
information.”  It suggests that this synthetic term mirrors a preexist-
ing  common  law  term  of  art  that  covers  only  information  whose  re-
lease  would  lead  to  substantial  competitive  harm,  but  points  to  no
treatise or case decided before Exemption 4’s adoption that assigned
any  such  meaning  to  the  terms  actually  before  the  Court.    Nor  will
this  Court  ordinarily  imbue  statutory  terms  with  a  specialized  com-
mon law meaning when Congress has not itself invoked the common
law terms of art associated with that meaning.  See, e.g., Bruesewitz
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, outlining the reasoning behind a court's judgment. It is not the actual content of a book and is likely not meant to be read for entertainment or informational purposes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

27

Opinion of the Court

benign than other forms of gambling, and that is why they
had  been  adopted  in  many  States.    Casino  gambling,  on
the  other  hand,  was  generally  regarded  as  far  more  dan
gerous.  A  gambler  at  a  casino  can  easily  incur  heavy
losses, and the legalization of privately owned casinos was
known  to  create  the  threat  of  infiltration  by  organized
crime,  as  Nevada’s  early  experience  had  notoriously
shown.31  To the Congress that adopted PASPA, legalizing
sports gambling in privately owned casinos while prohibit
ing  state-run  sports  lotteries  would  have  seemed  exactly
backwards.

Prohibiting  the  States  from  engaging  in  commercial
activities that are permitted for private parties would also
have  been  unusual,  and  it  is  unclear  what  might  justify
such  disparate  treatment.    Respondents  suggest  that
Congress wanted to prevent States from taking steps that
the  public  might  interpret  as  the  endorsement  of  sports
gambling,  Brief  for  Respondents  39,  but  we  have  never
held  that  the  Constitution  permits  the  Federal  Govern
ment  to  prevent  a  state  legislature  from  expressing  its
views on subjects of public importance.  For these reasons,
we do not think that the provision barring state operation
of sports gambling can be severed.

We reach the same conclusion with respect to the provi
sions  prohibiting  state  “sponsor[ship]”  and  “promot[ion].”
The  line  between  authorization,  licensing,  and  operation,
on  the  one  hand,  and  sponsorship  or  promotion,  on  the
other, is too uncertain.  It is unlikely that Congress would
have  wanted  to  prohibit  such  an  ill-defined  category  of
state conduct.

2
Nor  do  we  think  that  Congress  would  have  wanted  to

——————

31 See Clary 84–102.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the reasoning behind a particular legal ruling related to sports gambling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF
AND ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED TEXAS
MUNICIPALITIES v. HOTELS.COM, L. P., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–334.  Argued April 21, 2021—Decided May 27, 2021

The City of San Antonio—acting on behalf of a class of 173 Texas munic-
ipalities—was  awarded  a  multi-million  dollar  judgment  in  Federal
District  Court  against  a  number  of  popular  online  travel  companies
(OTCs) over the calculation of hotel occupancy taxes.  To prevent exe-
cution  on  that  judgment  pending  appeal,  the  OTCs  obtained  super-
sedeas bonds securing the judgment.  See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 62.  On
appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that the OTCs had not un-
derpaid on their taxes.  In accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure  39(d),  the  OTCs  filed  with  the  circuit  clerk  a  bill  of  costs
seeking appellate docketing fees and printing costs, which were taxed
without objection.  The OTCs then filed a bill of costs in the District
Court  seeking  more  than  $2.3  million  in  costs—primarily  for  premi-
ums  paid  on  the  supersedeas  bonds  that  are  listed  in  Rule  39(e)  as
“taxable  in  the  district  court  for  the  benefit  of  the  party  entitled  to
costs.”  San Antonio objected and urged the District Court to exercise
its discretion to decline to tax all or most of those costs.  The District
Court held that it had no discretion to deny or reduce those costs under
Circuit precedent.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the
District  Court  lacked  discretion  to  deny  or  reduce  appellate  cost
awards.

Held: Rule 39 does not permit a district court to alter a court of appeals’
allocation of the costs listed in subdivision (e) of that Rule.  Pp. 5–14.
(a)  Rule 39 creates a cohesive scheme for taxing appellate costs that
gives discretion over the allocation of appellate costs to the courts of
appeals.  Rule 39(a) sets out default rules for cost allocation based on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text. They are typically used for informational purposes and do not contain the actual legal arguments or holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.

Opinion of the Court

President”  with  respect  to  whether  a  major  disaster  war-
rants  an  exception  to  the  Endangered  Species  Act’s  re-
quirements); §4026(b)(2), 118 Stat. 3725, note following 22
U. S. C.  §2751,  p.  925  (FAA  Administrator  “shall  accept
the  certification  of  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security
that a missile defense system is effective and functional to
defend commercial aircraft against” man-portable surface-
to-air missiles); 25 U. S. C. §1300h–6(a) (“For the purpose
of  proceeding  with  the  per  capita  distribution”  of  certain
funds, “the Secretary of the Interior shall accept the tribe’s
certification  of  enrolled  membership”);  30  U. S. C.  §923(b)
(the  Secretary  of  Labor  “shall  accept  a  board  certified  or
board eligible radiologist’s interpretation” of a chest X ray
used to diagnose black lung disease); 42 U. S. C. §1395w–
21(e)(6)(A)  (“[A]  Medicare+Choice  organization  . . .  shall
accept  elections  or  changes  to  elections  during”  specified
periods).3

Arizona’s  reading  is  also  difficult  to  reconcile  with
neighboring  provisions  of  the  NVRA.  Section  1973gg–
6(a)(1)(B)  provides  that  a  State  shall  “ensure  that  any
eligible applicant is registered to vote in an election . . . if
the  valid  voter  registration  form  of  the  applicant  is  post-
marked”  not  later  than  a  specified  number  of  days  before
the  election.
(Emphasis  added.)  Yet  Arizona  reads  the
phrase  “accept  and  use”  in  §1973gg–4(a)(1)  as  permitting
it to reject a completed Federal Form if the applicant does
not  submit  additional  information  required  by  state  law.
That  reading  can  be  squared  with  Arizona’s  obligation

——————

3 The  dissent  accepts  that  a  State  may  not  impose  additional  re-
quirements that render the Federal Form entirely superfluous; it would
require  that  the  State  “us[e]  the  form  as  a  meaningful  part  of  the
registration process.”  Post, at 7 (opinion of ALITO, J.).  The dissent does
not  tell  us  precisely  how  large  a  role  for  the  Federal  Form  suffices  to
make it “meaningful”: One step out of two?  Three?  Ten?   There is no
easy  answer,  for  the  dissent’s  “meaningful  part”  standard  is  as  inde-
terminate as it is atextual.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the interpretation of a specific section of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). It delves into the meaning of "accept and use" in the context of voter registration forms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

45

ALITO, J., dissenting

some  of  them.  In  addition,  Congress  might  have  crafted
special rules for some of the relevant statutes.  But by in-
tervening  and  proclaiming  categorically  that  employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity is simply a form of discrimination because of sex, the
impeded—and  perhaps  effectively
Court  has  greatly
ended—any  chance  of  a  bargained  legislative  resolution.
Before  issuing  today’s  radical  decision,  the  Court  should
have given some thought to where its decision would lead.
As  the  briefing  in  these  cases  has  warned,  the  position
that the Court now adopts will threaten freedom of religion,
freedom of speech, and personal privacy and safety.  No one
should think that the Court’s decision represents an unal-
loyed victory for individual liberty.

I will briefly note some of the potential consequences of
the Court’s decision, but I do not claim to provide a compre-
hensive survey or to suggest how any of these issues should
necessarily play out under the Court’s reasoning.43
  “[B]athrooms,  locker  rooms,  [and  other  things]  of  [that]
kind.”  The Court may wish to avoid this subject, but it is a
matter  of  concern  to  many  people  who  are  reticent  about
disrobing or using toilet facilities in the presence of individ-
uals whom they regard as members of the opposite sex.  For
some, this may simply be a question of modesty, but for oth-
ers, there is more at stake.  For women who have been vic-
timized by sexual assault or abuse, the experience of seeing
an unclothed person with the anatomy of a male in a con-
fined  and  sensitive  location  such  as  a  bathroom  or  locker
room can cause serious psychological harm.44

Under  the  Court’s  decision,  however,  transgender  per-
sons  will  be  able  to  argue  that  they  are  entitled  to  use  a
bathroom or locker room that is reserved for persons of the
——————

43 Contrary  to  the  implication  in  the  Court’s  opinion,  I  do  not  label
these potential consequences “undesirable.”  Ante, at 31.  I mention them
only as possible implications of the Court’s reasoning.

44 Brief for Defend My Privacy et al. as Amici Curiae 7–10.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the potential consequences of the Court's decision and raises concerns about freedom of religion, speech, and privacy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–7120
_________________

SAMUEL JAMES JOHNSON, PETITIONER v. UNITED
STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2015]

JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment.
In my view, and for the reasons well stated by JUSTICE
ALITO in dissent, the residual clause of the Armed Career
Criminal  Act  is  not  unconstitutionally  vague  under  the
categorical  approach  or  a  record-based  approach.    On  the
assumption  that  the  categorical  approach  ought  to  still
control,  and  for  the  reasons  given  by  JUSTICE  THOMAS  in
Part I of his opinion concurring in the judgment, Johnson’s
conviction  for  possession  of  a  short-barreled  shotgun  does
not qualify as a violent felony.

For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy.  It includes citation information, the court name, case name, and the introduction to the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1116

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 15, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8602. Cox v. Hooks, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8604. Powell v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 5 S. W. 3d 369.

No. 99–8605. Scott v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8606. Reynolds v. Galaza, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 254.

No. 99–8610. Thompkins v. Hicks, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8611. Thompson v. Johnson, Director, Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8620. Moore v. Relin. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–8622. Love v. Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Of-
fice et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
87 Ohio St. 3d 158, 718 N. E. 2d 426.

No. 99–8626. Collins v. G/H Contracting Co. et al. C. A.

6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 440.

No. 99–8640. Hukill v. Auto Care, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 437.

No. 99– 8660. Whiting v. Scott, Executive Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8662. Worthington v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 8 S. W. 3d 83.

No. 99–8665. Biggs v. Borg, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1350.

No. 99–8674. Poe v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 11–345
_________________

ABIGAIL NOEL FISHER, PETITIONER v. UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2013]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion because I agree that the Court
of  Appeals  did  not  apply  strict  scrutiny  to  the  University
of  Texas  at  Austin’s  (University)  use  of  racial  discrimi-
nation  in  admissions  decisions.  Ante,  at  1.  I  write  sepa-
rately to explain that I would overrule Grutter v.  Bollinger,
539 U. S. 306 (2003), and hold that a State’s use of race in
higher  education  admissions  decisions  is  categorically
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.

I

A

The  Fourteenth  Amendment  provides  that  no  State
shall  “deny  to  any  person  . . .  the  equal  protection  of    the
laws.”  The  Equal  Protection  Clause  guarantees  every
person  the  right  to  be  treated  equally  by  the  State,  with-
out  regard  to  race.    “At  the  heart  of  this  [guarantee]  lies
the  principle  that  the  government  must  treat  citizens  as
individuals,  and  not  as  members  of  racial,  ethnic,  or  reli-
gious groups.”  Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U. S. 70, 120–121
(1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring).  “It is for this reason that
we must subject all racial classifications to the strictest of
scrutiny.”  Id., at 121.

Under  strict  scrutiny,  all  racial  classifications  are  cate-
gorically prohibited unless they are “ ‘necessary to further
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part

opinion.  I acknowledge that the inquiry is difficult and del-
icate, and federal courts are well advised to approach the
matter with caution.  See ante, at 28.  Yet, I agree with THE
CHIEF JUSTICE that courts generally are able to weigh dis-
parate  burdens  and  benefits  against  each  other,  and  that
they  are  called  on  to  do  so  in  other  areas  of  the  law  with
some frequency.  See post, at 3–4.  The means-ends tailoring
analysis that Pike incorporates is likewise familiar to courts
and does not raise the asserted incommensurability prob-
lems that trouble JUSTICE GORSUCH.

In my view, and as JUSTICE GORSUCH concludes for a sep-
arate plurality of the Court, petitioners’ Pike claim fails for
a much narrower reason.  Reading petitioners’ allegations
in light of the Court’s decision in Exxon Corp. v. Governor
of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117 (1978), the complaint fails to al-
lege  a  substantial  burden  on  interstate  commerce.    See
ante, at 21–25.  Alleging a substantial burden on interstate
commerce is a threshold requirement that plaintiffs must
satisfy before courts need even engage in Pike’s balancing
and tailoring analyses.  Because petitioners have not done
so, they fail to state a Pike claim.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>