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529US2

Unit: $U51

[09-26-01 10:31:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

502

BECK v. PRUPIS

Opinion of the Court

stitute an independent tort”); Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A. 2d
106, 110 (Me. 1972) (“ ‘[C]onspiracy’ fails as the basis for the
imposition of civil liability absent the actual commission of
some independently recognized tort; and when such separate
tort has been committed, it is that tort, and not the fact of
combination, which is the foundation of the civil liability”);
Earp v. Detroit, 16 Mich. App. 271, 275, 167 N. W. 2d 841,
845 (1969) (“Recovery may be had from parties on the theory
of concerted action as long as the elements of the separate
and actionable tort are properly proved”); Mills v. Hansell,
378 F. 2d 53 (CA5 1967) (per curiam) (afﬁrming dismissal of
conspiracy to defraud claim because no defendant committed
an actionable tort); J. & C. Ornamental Iron Co. v. Watkins,
114 Ga. App. 688, 691, 152 S. E. 2d 613, 615 (1966) (“[The
plaintiff] must allege all the elements of a cause of action
for the tort the same as would be required if there were no
allegation of a conspiracy”); Lesperance v. North American
Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 336, 345, 31 Cal. Rptr. 873,
878 (1963) (“[C]onspiracy cannot be made the subject of a
civil action unless something is done which without the con-
spiracy would give a right of action” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Middlesex Concrete Products & Excavat-
ing Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Assn., 37 N. J. 507, 516, 181 A. 2d
774, 779 (1962) (“[A] conspiracy cannot be made the subject
of a civil action unless something has been done which, ab-
sent the conspiracy, would give a right of action”); Chapman
v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 769, 772 (WD Mo. 1957) (holding that
a plaintiff who charged the defendants with “conspiring to
perpetrate an unlawful purpose” could not recover because
the defendants committed no unlawful act); Olmsted, Inc. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 218 Iowa 997, 998, 253 N. W. 804
(1934) (“[A] conspiracy cannot be the subject of a civil action
unless something is done pursuant to it which, without the
conspiracy, would give a right of action”); Adler v. Fenton,
24 How. 407, 410 (1861) (“[T]he act must be tortious, and
there must be consequent damage”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing case law. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.
v. HAWAII ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 17–965.  Argued April 25, 2018—Decided June 26, 2018

In September 2017, the President issued Proclamation No. 9645, seek-
ing  to  improve  vetting  procedures  for  foreign  nationals  traveling  to
the  United  States  by  identifying  ongoing  deficiencies  in  the  infor-
mation  needed  to  assess  whether  nationals  of  particular  countries
present a security threat.  The Proclamation placed entry restrictions
on the nationals of eight foreign states whose systems  for managing
and sharing information about their nationals the President deemed
inadequate.  Foreign states were selected for inclusion based on a re-
view undertaken pursuant to one of the President’s earlier Executive
Orders.  As part of that review, the Department of Homeland Securi-
ty (DHS), in consultation with the State Department and intelligence
agencies,  developed  an  information  and  risk  assessment  “baseline.”
DHS  then  collected  and  evaluated  data  for  all  foreign  governments,
identifying  those  having  deficient  information-sharing  practices  and
presenting  national  security  concerns,  as  well  as  other  countries  “at
risk”  of  failing  to  meet  the  baseline.    After  a  50-day  period  during
which  the  State  Department  made  diplomatic  efforts  to  encourage
foreign governments to improve their practices, the Acting Secretary
of  Homeland  Security  concluded  that  eight  countries—Chad,  Iran,
Iraq,  Libya,  North  Korea,  Syria,  Venezuela,  and  Yemen—remained
deficient.    She  recommended  entry  restrictions  for  certain  nationals
from all of those countries but Iraq, which had a close cooperative re-
lationship with the U. S.   She also recommended including Somalia,
which met the information-sharing component of the baseline stand-
ards but had other special risk factors, such as a significant terrorist
presence.  After consulting with multiple Cabinet members, the Pres-
ident  adopted  the  recommendations  and  issued  the  Proclamation.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

9

ALITO, J., dissenting

the  costs  of  complying  with  the  ACA’s  provisions.    So  too
would a more modest judgment limited to only those ACA
provisions that directly burden the States.

The standing dispute in this suit thus turns on traceabil-
ity.  See  ante,  at  14–16.    But  once  this  requirement  is
properly understood, it is apparent that it too is met.

Our cases explain that traceability requires “a causal con-
nection between the injury and the conduct complained of.”
Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560 (emphasis added).  In other words,
the injury has to be “ ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged
action of the defendant.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting Simon v. Eastern
Ky.  Welfare  Rights  Organization,  426  U. S.  26,  41  (1976);
emphasis added).  We have repeatedly and consistently de-
scribed the traceability inquiry this way.  See Spokeo, 578
U. S., at 338 (“The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury
in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct
of the defendant”); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Founda-
tion, Inc., 551 U. S. 587, 598 (2007) (plurality opinion) (“A
plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S.
332,  342  (2006)  (“A  plaintiff  must  allege  personal  injury
fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful con-
duct” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bennett v. Spear,
520 U. S. 154, 162 (1997) (requiring “that the injury is fairly
traceable to the actions of the defendant” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560 (requiring an
injury “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the de-
fendant”  (internal  quotation  marks  and  alterations  omit-
ted)); Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 757 (1984) (requiring
an  injury  “fairly  traceable  to  the  Government  conduct  re-
spondents challenge as unlawful”).5  Tracing injuries to par-
ticular  conduct  ensures  that  the  properly  adverse  parties

——————

5 There are dozens upon dozens of examples.  Some recent cases include
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It delves into legal arguments regarding traceability in the context of standing disputes related to the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

5

Opinion of the Court

willing to license.  §262(l)(3)(A)(ii).

Next,  within  60  days  of  receiving  the  sponsor’s  list,  the
applicant may provide to the sponsor a list of patents that
the  applicant  believes  are  relevant  but  that  the  sponsor
omitted  from  its  own  list,  §262(l)(3)(B)(i),  and  “shall  pro-
vide” to the sponsor reasons why it could not be held liable
for  infringing  the  relevant  patents,  §262(l)(3)(B)(ii).    The
applicant may argue that the relevant patents are invalid,
unenforceable,  or  not  infringed,  or  the  applicant  may
agree  not  to  market  the  biosimilar  until  a  particular  pat-
ent  has  expired.  Ibid.    The  applicant  must  also  respond
to  the  sponsor’s  offers  to  license  particular  patents.
§262(l)(3)(B)(iii).  Then,  within  60  days  of  receiving  the
applicant’s  responses,  the  sponsor  “shall  provide”  to  the
applicant  its  own  arguments  concerning  infringement,
enforceability,  and  validity  as  to  each  relevant  patent.
§262(l)(3)(C).

Following  this  exchange,  the  BPCIA  channels  the  par-
ties into two phases of patent litigation.  In the first phase,
the parties collaborate to identify patents that they would
like to litigate immediately.  The second phase is triggered
by  the  applicant’s  notice  of  commercial  marketing  and
involves  any  patents  that  were  included  on  the  parties’
§262(l)(3) lists but not litigated in the first phase.

At  the  outset  of  the  first  phase,  the  applicant  and  the
sponsor  must  negotiate  to  determine  which  patents  in-
cluded on the §262(l)(3) lists will be litigated immediately.
See  §§262(l)(4)(A),  (l)(6).    If  they  cannot  agree,  then  they
must engage in another list exchange.  §262(l)(4)(B).  The
applicant  “shall  notify”  the  sponsor  of  the  number  of  pat-
ents  it  intends  to  list  for  litigation,  §262(l)(5)(A),  and,
within  five  days,  the  parties  “shall  simultaneously  ex-
change”  lists  of  the  patents  they  would  like  to  litigate
immediately.
§262(l)(5)(B)(i).    This  process  gives  the
applicant  substantial  control  over  the  scope  of  the  first
phase of litigation: The number of patents on the sponsor’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text excerpt, likely from a court opinion. It discusses the Biosimilar Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) and its patent litigation provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–1712
_________________

JAMES J. THOLE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
U. S. BANK N. A., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 1, 2020]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
To  establish  standing  under  Article  III  of  the  Constitu-
tion, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he or she suffered
an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual
or imminent, (2) that the injury was caused by the defend-
ant, and (3) that the injury would likely be redressed by the
requested judicial relief.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992).

Plaintiffs James Thole and Sherry Smith are two retired
participants  in  U. S.  Bank’s  retirement  plan.  Of  decisive
importance to this case, the plaintiffs’ retirement plan is a
defined-benefit plan, not a defined-contribution plan.  In a
defined-benefit plan, retirees receive a fixed payment each
month, and the payments do not fluctuate with the value of
the plan or because of the plan fiduciaries’ good or bad in-
vestment decisions.  By contrast, in a defined-contribution
plan, such as a 401(k) plan, the retirees’ benefits are typi-
cally tied to the value of their accounts, and the benefits can
turn  on  the  plan  fiduciaries’  particular  investment  deci-
sions.   See  Beck  v.  PACE  Int’l  Union,  551  U. S.  96,  98
(2007); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U. S. 432, 439–
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case citations, the name of the court, the parties involved, and the date of the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

7

Opinion of the Court

cases  that  are  not  moot  because  the  underlying  dispute
is  “capable  of  repetition,  yet  evading  review.”  See,  e.g.,
Nebraska  Press  Assn.  v.  Stuart,  427  U. S.  539,  546–547
(1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover,  the  underlying  facts  make  this  case  unlike
DeFunis  v.  Odegaard,  416  U. S.  312  (1974)  (per  curiam),
and  St.  Pierre  v.  United  States,  319  U. S.  41  (1943)  (per
curiam),  two  cases  that  respondents  believe  require  us  to
find  this  case  moot  regardless.    DeFunis  was  moot,  but
that is because the plaintiff himself was unlikely to again
suffer  the  conduct  of  which  he  complained  (and  others
likely  to  suffer  from  that  conduct  could  bring  their  own
lawsuits).  Here petitioner himself is likely to suffer future
imprisonment.

St.  Pierre  was  moot  because  the  petitioner  (a  witness
held in contempt and sentenced to five months’ imprison-
ment) had failed to “apply to  this Court for a stay” of the
federal-court  order  imposing  imprisonment.  319  U. S.,  at
42–43.  And, like the witness in St. Pierre, Turner did not
seek  a  stay  of  the  contempt  order  requiring  his  imprison-
ment.  But  this  case,  unlike  St.  Pierre,  arises  out  of  a
state-court proceeding.  And respondents give us no reason
to  believe  that  we  would  have  (or  that  we  could  have)
granted  a  timely  request  for  a  stay  had  one  been  made.
Cf.  28  U. S. C.  §1257  (granting  this  Court  jurisdiction  to
review  final  state-court  judgments).
In  Sibron,  we  re-
jected a similar “mootness” argument for just that reason.
392  U. S.,  at  53,  n. 13.    And  we  find  this  case  similar  in
this respect to Sibron, not to St. Pierre.

III

A

We must decide whether the Due Process Clause grants
an  indigent  defendant,  such  as  Turner,  a  right  to  state-
appointed  counsel  at  a  civil  contempt  proceeding,  which
may  lead  to  his  incarceration.    This  Court’s  precedents
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the mootness of a case and the right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings. It contains legal citations and arguments, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ROTKISKE v. KLEMM

Syllabus

shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or provision.
See, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §3416.  Pp. 4–6.

(b) Rotkiske  cannot  rely  on  the  application  of  an  equitable,  fraud-
specific  discovery  rule  to  excuse  his  otherwise  untimely  filing.  This
Court has noted the existence of decisions applying a discovery rule in
fraud cases, see, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 644, and
has  characterized  these  decisions  as  applying  an  equity-based  doc-
trine, see, e.g., California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ
Securities,  Inc.,  582  U. S.  ___,  ___.    Rotkiske,  however,  neither  pre-
served this issue before the Third Circuit nor raised it in his petition
for certiorari.  Pp. 6–7.

890 F. 3d 422, affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ.,
joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.  GINSBURG, J., filed an
opinion dissenting in part and dissenting from the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a condensed overview rather than the full text meant for reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

trict Court sentenced him to the statutory minimum of 15
years’  imprisonment  under  ACCA,  based  on  his  prior
felony  convictions  for  robbery,  attempted  robbery,  and
illegal possession of a sawed-off shotgun.

B
ACCA  provides  a  mandatory  minimum  sentence  for

certain  violations  of  §922(g),  which  prohibits  the  ship
ment,  transportation,  or  possession  of  firearms  or  ammu
nition by convicted felons, persons previously committed to
a  mental  institution,  and  certain  others.    Federal  law
normally  provides  a  maximum  sentence  of  10  years’  im
prisonment for such crimes.  See §924(a)(2).  Under ACCA,
however, if a defendant convicted under §922(g) has three
prior  convictions  “for  a  violent  felony  or  a  serious  drug
offense,” the sentencing court must impose a sentence of at
least 15 years’ imprisonment.  §924(e)(1).

ACCA’s  definition  of  a  “violent  felony”  has  three  parts.
First,  a  felony  qualifies  if  it  “has  as  an  element  the  use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the  person  of  another.”  §924(e)(2)(B)(i).    Second,  the  Act
specifically  names  four  categories  of  qualifying  felonies:
burglary,  arson,  extortion,  and  offenses  involving  the  use
of  explosives.  See  §924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Third,  the  Act  con
tains  what  we  have  called  a  “residual  clause,”  which
reaches  any  felony  that  “otherwise  involves  conduct  that
presents  a  serious  potential  risk  of  physical  injury  to
another.”  Ibid.

The present case concerns the residual clause.  The sole
question  raised  in  Johnson’s  certiorari  petition  was
whether  possession  of  a  sawed-off  shotgun  under  Minne-
sota  law  qualifies  as  a  violent  felony  under  that  clause.
Although  Johnson  argued  in  the  lower  courts  that  the
residual  clause  is  unconstitutionally  vague,  he  did  not
renew  that  argument  here.    Nevertheless,  after  oral  ar
gument, the Court raised the question of vagueness on its
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Johnson v. United States*. It discusses the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and its "residual clause" which defines a violent felony.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxiii

Page

849

Hageman v. Nooth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hagins v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Hailey v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  893,1102

897

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Haines; Jarrell v.
Hairston v. Haynes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Hakim v. Thomas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  885,1102

1149

Hale v. Bexar County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

Hale v. California  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
809

Hale v. Riggins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

Hale v. Tennis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
896

Hall; Allen v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

Hall; Corona-Cuevas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
837

Hall; D’Saachs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Hall; Gary v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hall v. Goddard
943

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  882,982

Hall; McClain v.
844

Hall; McGuigan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hall v. McNeil
Hall v. New Jersey  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Hall; O’Kelley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  840,1064

875

Hall; Pannell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
839

Hall; Rekow v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Hall; Sager v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hall; Staley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1073

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  929,1062

Hall v. United States
Hall; Wellons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
220

Hallford v. California
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  885,1139

Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge 7  . . . . . . . .
1049

Halliwell v. Superior Court of Cal., Sonoma County  . . . . . .  947,970,1086

914

Hallman v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Halter v. United States
1018

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hamani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1005,1141

1156

Hamdy v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hamer v. United States
833

Hamilton v. California
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hamilton v. Florida
989

Hamilton v. Lanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hamilton v. Massachusetts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
801

Hamlet, Ltd.; Hawkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  835,1064

1125

Hammond v. Keller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
892

Hammond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Hampton v. Belleque
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

Hamrick; Nowlin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

Hand v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases alphabetically with corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

17

JACKSON, J., dissenting

that ensure accountability for criminal conduct.7  For that
same  reason,  some  commentators  also  maintain  that  de-
creasing the certainty of accountability for wrongful acts at
least arguably reduces incentives to follow the law.8

Under the individual accountability model, because eve-
ryone is subject to the law, the potential of criminal liability
operates as a constraint on the actions and decisions of eve-
ryone, including the President.  After today, that reality is
no  more.  Consequently,  our  Nation  has  lost  a  substantial
check on Presidents who would use their official powers to
commit crimes with impunity while in office.

So,  one  might  ask,  what  remains  of  accountability  for
Presidents  under  law?    With  today’s  paradigm  shift,  the
majority  leaves  in  place  only  the  chance  that  this  Court
might  someday  determine  that  the  criminal  conduct  in
question  was  an  “unofficial”  act,  or  that  the  Government
will somehow rebut the presumption of immunity that ap-
plies to a President’s official acts, such that criminal conse-
quences might attach.  But with the parameters of official
and unofficial conduct unknown, I think it highly unlikely
that a sitting President would feel constrained by these re-
mote possibilities.

——————

7 See,  e.g.,  Plato,  Laws  274  (B.  Jowett  transl.  2000)  (“Not  that  he  is
punished because he did wrong, for that which is done can never be un-
done, but in order that in future times, he, and those who see him cor-
rected, may utterly hate injustice, or at any rate abate much of their evil-
doing”);  see  also  J.  Bentham,  The  Rationale  of  Punishment  20  (1830)
(“General prevention ought to be the chief end of punishment, as it is its
real justification”); A. von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punish-
ments 44 (1976) (“The threat and imposition of punishment is called for
in order to secure compliance—not full compliance, but more compliance
than there might be were there no legal penalties at all”).

8 See, e.g., M. Ryan, Taking Another Look at Second-Look Sentencing,
81 Brooklyn L. Rev. 149, 156, and n. 37 (2015) (“[U]ndermining the . . .
certainty  of  punishment  . . .  could  undermine  the  deterrence  value  of
punishment”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the concept of presidential accountability and the implications of the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cvii

Noble v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nochez-Rivera v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Noe v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nolan; Rivera v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Noland; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nooth; Hageman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nooth; King v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norcott; Book v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Nordberg v. Ocean Meadows Condominium Assn.
Nordella v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norﬂeet v. Illinois
Norfolk Southern Corp.; Freeman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norgren, Inc.; SMC Corp. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Noriega-Valenzuela v. United States
Norman v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norris; Gardner v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norris; McCullough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norris; Norton v.
Norris; Rucker v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norris v. Sasser  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norris v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norris; Williams v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North American Stainless, LP; Thompson v.
North Carolina; Alabama v.
North Carolina; Bodden v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina; Bunche v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina; Byrd v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina; Garcell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina; Hazelwood v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina; Narron v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina; Perkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina; Pinkston v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina; Sanders v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina; South Carolina v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Carolina; Taylor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Dakota; Blurton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Dakota; Holbach v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Northwest Administrators, Inc.; Cutter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Northwest Health System; Pichoff v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Northwest La. Fish & Game Preserve Comm’n v.  United States
Northwest Medical Center of Wash. County; Pichoff v.
. . . . . . . .
Norton v. Fannie Mae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norton v. Norris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

963

842

1100

960

900

849

855

940

1115

938

1015

873

1148

849

1015

837

921

983

950

965

958

951

1090

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  944,1010

865

1124

1014

846

999

1013

818

866

854

809

256

851

1036

893

1115

828

1113

828

1145

983
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

EBAY INC. v. MERCEXCHANGE, L. L. C.

Opinion of the Court

parties  failed  to  reach  an  agreement.  MercExchange
subsequently  filed  a  patent  infringement  suit  against
eBay and Half.com in the United States District Court for
the  Eastern  District  of  Virginia.  A  jury  found  that  Mer-
cExchange’s patent was valid, that eBay and Half.com had
infringed that patent, and that an award of damages was
appropriate.1

Following  the  jury  verdict,  the  District  Court  denied
MercExchange’s  motion  for  permanent  injunctive  relief.
275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (2003).  The Court of Appeals for the
Federal  Circuit  reversed,  applying  its  “general  rule  that
courts  will  issue  permanent  injunctions  against  patent
infringement  absent  exceptional  circumstances.”
401
F. 3d  1323,  1339  (2005).    We  granted  certiorari  to  deter-
mine  the  appropriateness  of  this  general  rule.    546  U. S
___ (2005).

II
According  to  well-established  principles  of  equity,  a
plaintiff  seeking  a  permanent  injunction  must  satisfy  a
four-factor  test  before  a  court  may  grant  such  relief.    A
plaintiff  must  demonstrate:  (1)  that  it  has  suffered  an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
as  monetary  damages,  are  inadequate  to  compensate  for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted;  and  (4)  that  the  public  interest  would  not  be
disserved by a permanent injunction.  See, e.g., Weinberger
v.  Romero-Barcelo,  456  U. S.  305,  311–313  (1982);  Amoco
Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 542 (1987).  The
decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an
act of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable
on  appeal  for  abuse  of  discretion.    See,  e.g.,  Romero-
——————

1 EBay  and  Half.com  continue  to  challenge  the  validity  of  MercEx-
change’s patent in proceedings pending before the United States Patent
and Trademark Office.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of EBAY INC. v. MERCEXCHANGE, L. L. C. It sets the context of the case and outlines the legal principles at play.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1120

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

May 15, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8938. de la Luz Saldana et al. v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 265.
No. 99–8940. Scarborough v. California. Ct. App. Cal.,

1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8944. Wheels v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8946. Armentrout v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 8 S. W. 3d 99.

No. 99–8949.

Iredia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 828.

No. 99–8952. Stradwick v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1329.

No. 99–8959. Bryant v. Irvin, Superintendent, Wende

Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8964. Wai Chong Leung v. United States District
Court for the Central District of California. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8966. Willis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8967. Wilson v. Angelone, Director, Virginia De-
partment of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 201 F. 3d 439.

No. 99–8969. Clyburn v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 260.

No. 99–8970. Colliers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 823.

Jemison v. United States; and
No. 99–8971.
No. 99–9024. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 823.

No. 99–8972. Womack v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 283.

No. 99–8979.

Jackson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1279.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, relevant courts, and whether certiorari was granted or denied.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting

middle-class America” (by giving $95 billion to veterans and
their families between 1944 and 1971) was “deliberately de-
signed to accommodate Jim Crow.”41  So, too, will I bypass
how  Black  people  were  prevented  from  partaking  in  the
consumer credit market—a market that helped White peo-
ple who could access it build and protect wealth.42  Nor will
time  and  space  permit  my  elaborating  how  local  officials’
racial hostility meant  that even those benefits that  Black
people  could  formally  obtain  were  unequally  distributed
along racial lines.43  And I could not possibly discuss every
way in which, in light of this history, facially race-blind pol-
icies still work race-based harms today (e.g., racially dispar-
ate tax-system treatment; the disproportionate location of
toxic-waste facilities in Black communities; or the deliber-
ate  action  of  governments  at  all  levels  in  designing  inter-
state highways to bisect and segregate Black urban commu-
nities).44

The point is this: Given our history, the origin of persis-
tent race-linked gaps should be no mystery.  It has never
been a deficiency of Black Americans’ desire or ability to, in
Frederick  Douglass’s  words,  “stand  on  [their]  own  legs.”45
Rather,  it  was  always  simply  what  Justice  Harlan  recog-
nized 140 years ago—the persistent and pernicious denial
of “what had already been done in every State of the Union
for the white race.”  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., at 61 (dis-
senting opinion).

——————

41 Katznelson 113–114; see id., at 113–141; see also, e.g., id., at 139–
140 (Black veterans, North and South, were routinely denied loans that
White veterans received); Rothstein 167.

42 Baradaran 112–113.
43 Katznelson 22–23; Rothstein 167.
44 Id., at 54–56, 65, 127–131, 217; Stanford Institute for Economic Pol-
icy Research, Measuring and Mitigating Disparities in Tax Audits 1–7
(2023); Dickerson 1096–1097.

45 What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston, Mas-
sachusetts, on 26 January 1865, in 4 The Frederick Douglass Papers 68
(J. Blassingame & J. McKivigan eds. 1991).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case, specifically focusing on the historical context of racial inequality in America. It cites various sources and arguments to support its claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–511
_________________

TIM SHOOP, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.
RAYMOND A. TWYFORD, III

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2022]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, dissenting.
The Court granted review to decide whether and under
what  circumstances  a  federal  district  court  may  order  a
State to transport a prisoner to a hospital for testing.  Later,
however,  it  became  clear  a  potential  jurisdictional  defect
threatened to preclude the Court from reaching that ques-
tion.  The District Court’s transportation ruling was an in-
terlocutory order, not a final judgment.  To address its mer-
its, the Court would first have to extend the collateral order
doctrine  to  a  new  class  of  cases.  See  Cohen  v.  Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 545–547 (1949).  In a
terse footnote today, the Court does just that.  Ante, at 5,
n. 1.

Respectfully, I would have dismissed this case as improv-
idently  granted  when  the  jurisdictional  complication  be-
came apparent.  We did not take this case to extend Cohen.
And this Court has repeatedly “admoni[shed]” other courts
to keep “the class of collaterally appealable orders . . . ‘nar-
row and selective.’ ”  Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter,
558 U. S. 100, 113 (2009).  If anything, this call for caution
“has acquired special force in recent years with the enact-
ment of legislation designating rulemaking . . . as the pre-
ferred means for determining whether and when prejudg-
ment orders should be immediately appealable.”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It discusses jurisdictional issues and the Court's decision to extend the collateral order doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

Phillips met Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins when they
entered his shop in the summer of 2012.  Craig and Mul-
lins  were  planning  to  marry.    At  that  time,  Colorado  did
not  recognize  same-sex  marriages,  so  the  couple  planned
to  wed  legally  in  Massachusetts  and  afterwards  to  host  a
reception  for  their  family  and  friends  in  Denver.    To  pre-
pare  for  their  celebration,  Craig  and  Mullins  visited  the
shop and told Phillips that they were interested in order-
ing  a  cake  for  “our  wedding.”    Id.,  at  152  (emphasis  de-
leted).  They  did  not  mention  the  design  of  the  cake  they
envisioned.

Phillips  informed  the  couple  that  he  does  not  “create”
wedding  cakes  for  same-sex  weddings.    Ibid.    He  ex-
plained, “I’ll make your birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell
you cookies and brownies, I just don’t make cakes for same
sex  weddings.”    Ibid.  The  couple  left  the  shop  without
further discussion.

The  following  day,  Craig’s  mother,  who  had  accompa-
nied the couple to the cakeshop and been present for their
interaction  with  Phillips,  telephoned  to  ask  Phillips  why
he  had  declined  to  serve  her  son.    Phillips  explained  that
he  does  not  create  wedding  cakes  for  same-sex  weddings
because  of  his  religious  opposition  to  same-sex  marriage,
and also because Colorado (at that time) did not recognize
same-sex  marriages.    Id.,  at  153.  He  later  explained  his
belief  that  “to  create  a  wedding  cake  for  an  event  that
celebrates something that directly goes against the teach-
ings of the Bible, would have been a personal endorsement
and  participation  in  the  ceremony  and  relationship  that
they were entering into.”  Ibid. (emphasis deleted).

B
For most of its history, Colorado has prohibited discrim-
ination  in  places  of  public  accommodation.    In  1885,  less
than  a  decade  after  Colorado  achieved  statehood,  the
General  Assembly  passed  “An  Act  to  Protect  All  Citizens
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary. It sets the scene, introduces the parties involved, and outlines the initial interaction that led to the dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summary/Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:26:35
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CR

Pagination Table: RULES1

1186

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

belongs, in whole or in part, to a codefendant or third
party, nor may a third party object to the ﬁnal order
on the ground that the third party had an interest in
the property.

(3) If multiple third-party petitions are ﬁled in the
same case, an order dismissing or granting one petition
is not appealable until rulings are made on all petitions,
unless the court determines that there is no just reason
for delay.

(4) An ancillary proceeding is not part of sentencing.

(d) Stay pending appeal.—If a defendant appeals from a
conviction or order of forfeiture, the court may stay the
order of forfeiture on terms appropriate to ensure that the
property remains available pending appellate review. A
stay does not delay the ancillary proceeding or the determi-
nation of a third party’s rights or interests.
If the court
rules in favor of any third party while an appeal is pending,
the court may amend the order of forfeiture but shall not
transfer any property interest to a third party until the deci-
sion on appeal becomes ﬁnal, unless the defendant consents
in writing or on the record.

(e) Subsequently located property; substitute property.

(1) On the government’s motion, the court may at any
time enter an order of forfeiture or amend an existing
order of forfeiture to include property that:

(A) is subject to forfeiture under an existing
order of forfeiture but was located and identiﬁed
after that order was entered; or

(B) is substitute property that qualiﬁes for for-

feiture under an applicable statute.

(2) If the government shows that the property is sub-
ject to forfeiture under Rule 32.2(e)(1), the court shall:
(A) enter an order forfeiting that property, or
amend an existing preliminary or ﬁnal order to in-
clude it; and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically rules of criminal procedure regarding forfeiture. It is sequential and coherent, likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL
CONSULTANTS, INC.
Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.

III
Having concluded that the 2015 government-debt excep-
tion created an unconstitutional exception to the 1991 ro-
bocall restriction, we must decide whether to invalidate the
entire 1991 robocall restriction, or instead to invalidate and
sever the 2015 government-debt exception.  Before we apply
ordinary severability principles, we must address plaintiffs’
broader initial argument for why the entire 1991 robocall
restriction is unconstitutional.

A
Plaintiffs  correctly  point  out  that  the  Government’s  as-
serted interest for the 1991 robocall restriction is consumer
privacy.  But according to plaintiffs, Congress’s willingness
to enact the government-debt exception in 2015 betrays a
newfound  lack  of  genuine  congressional  concern  for  con-
sumer privacy.  As plaintiffs phrase it, the 2015 exception
“undermines  the  credibility”  of  the  Government’s  interest
in consumer privacy.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 38.  Plaintiffs further
contend that if Congress no longer has a genuine interest
in consumer privacy, then the underlying 1991 robocall re-
striction is no longer justified (presumably under any level
of  heightened  scrutiny)  and  is  therefore  now  unconstitu-
tional.

Plaintiffs’  argument  is  not  without  force,  but  we  ulti-
mately disagree with it.  It is true that the Court has recog-
nized that exceptions to a speech restriction “may diminish
the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting
speech in the first place.”  City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S.
43, 52 (1994).  But here, Congress’s addition of the govern-
ment-debt exception in 2015 does not cause us to doubt the
credibility  of  Congress’s  continuing  interest  in  protecting
consumer privacy.

After all, the government-debt exception is only a slice of
the overall robocall landscape.  This is not a case where a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the reasoning behind a court's decision. It discusses the constitutionality of a robocall restriction and the impact of a specific exception.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

tution authority as opposed to  some other inter partes re-
view  institution  authority.  In  fact,  you  can  strike  “under
this  section”  from  §314(d)  and  Thryv’s  interpretation  re-
mains unchanged.  That’s a pretty good clue something has
gone wrong.

Faced with this problem of surplusage, Thryv alludes to
the possibility that Congress included redundant language
to be “double sure.”  But double sure of what?  Thryv does
not identify any confusion that the phrase “under this sec-
tion” might help avoid.  Given the lack of any other provi-
sion, anywhere in the U. S. Code, authorizing anyone to in-
stitute  inter  partes  review,  even  the  most  obtuse  reader
would never have any use for the clarification supposedly
provided by “under this section” on Thryv’s account.

Maybe  so,  Thryv  replies,  but  we  shouldn’t  worry  about
the  surplusage  here  because  the  AIA  contains  surplusage
elsewhere.  The  other  putative  examples  of  surplusage
Thryv identifies, however, have no bearing on the provision
now before us.  And even a passing glance reveals no sur-
plusage in them either.  Consider §315(c).  It says that “the
Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that
inter partes review any person who properly files a petition
under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a pre-
liminary response under section 313 . . . , determines war-
rants the institution of an inter partes review under section
314.” (Emphasis added.)  Thryv argues that all these cross-
references  are  unnecessary.  But  look  closely:    Each  of
§315(c)’s cross-references does important work to establish
the rules for joinder.  Strike the first and the requirements
of a joinder petition become undefined.  Strike the second
and it’s a mystery what kind of response the patent owner
is entitled to file.  Strike the third and the Director’s deter-
mination  whether  to  grant  joinder  becomes  standardless.
All  of  this  language  has  a  point  to  it—just  as  “under  this
section” does under a faithful interpretation of §314(d).

That leaves Thryv only one more tenuous textual lifeline
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the interpretation of a specific section of the AIA (America Invents Act), arguing against a particular interpretation put forth by Thryv. The language is dense and legalistic, characteristic of judicial opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

States  v.  Carpenter,  462  F.  3d  981,  986–987  (CA8  2006)
(finding  reasonable  suspicion  for  a  dog  sniff  based  on
implausible  travel  plans  and  nervous  conduct);  United
States v. Ludwig, 641 F. 3d 1243, 1248–1250 (CA10 2011)
(finding reasonable suspicion for a dog sniff where, among
other  things,  the  officer  smelled  “strong  masking  odors,”
the  defendant’s  “account  of  his  travel  was  suspect,”  and
the  defendant  “was  exceptionally  nervous  throughout  his
encounter”).

Not  only  does  the  Court  reach  out  to  decide  a  question
not  really  presented  by  the  facts  in  this  case,  but  the
Court’s  answer  to  that  question  is  arbitrary.   The  Court
refuses  to  address  the  real  Fourth  Amendment  question:
whether  the  stop  was  unreasonably  prolonged.    Instead,
the  Court  latches  onto  the  fact  that  Officer  Struble  deliv-
ered the warning prior to the dog sniff and proclaims that
the authority to detain based on a traffic stop ends when a
citation  or  warning  is  handed  over  to  the  driver.    The
Court  thus  holds  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  was  vio-
lated, not because of the length of the stop, but simply be-
cause  of  the  sequence  in  which  Officer  Struble  chose  to
perform his tasks.

This  holding  is  not  only  arbitrary;  it  is  perverse  since
Officer  Struble  chose  that  sequence  for  the  purpose  of
protecting his own safety and possibly the safety of others.
See  App.  71–72.    Without  prolonging  the  stop,  Officer
Struble could have conducted the dog sniff while one of the
tasks that the Court regards as properly part of the traffic
stop  was  still  in  progress,  but  that  sequence  would  have
entailed  unnecessary  risk.    At  approximately  12:19  a.m.,
after  collecting  Pollman’s  driver’s  license,  Officer  Struble
did two things.  He called in the information needed to do
a  records  check  on  Pollman  (a  step  that  the  Court  recog-
nizes  was  properly  part  of  the  traffic  stop),  and  he  re-
quested  that  another  officer  report  to  the  scene.    Officer
Struble  had  decided  to  perform  a  dog  sniff  but  did  not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It cites other legal cases and argues against the majority opinion's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

19

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

(and baseless) civil suits would hamper the Executive may
have been justified in Fitzgerald, but a well-founded federal
criminal  prosecution  poses  no  comparable  danger  to  the
functioning of the Executive Branch.

2
At the same time, the public interest in a federal criminal
prosecution of a former President is vastly greater than the
public interest in a private individual’s civil suit.  All nine
Justices in Fitzgerald explicitly recognized that distinction.
The  five-Justice  majority  noted  that  there  was  a  greater
public interest “in criminal prosecutions” than in “actions
for civil damages.”  457 U. S., at 754, n. 37.  Chief Justice
Burger’s concurrence accordingly emphasized that the ma-
jority’s immunity was “limited to civil damages claims,” ra-
ther than “criminal prosecution.”  Id., at 759–760.  The four
dissenting Justices agreed that a “contention that the Pres-
ident is immune from criminal prosecution in the courts,” if
ever made, would not “be credible.”  Id., at 780 (White, J.,
dissenting).  At the very least, the Fitzgerald Court did not
expect that its balancing test would lead to the same out-
come in the criminal context.

The public’s interest in prosecution is transparent: a fed-
eral prosecutor herself acts on behalf of the United States.
Even the majority acknowledges that the “[f]ederal crimi-
nal laws seek to redress ‘a wrong to the public’ as a whole,
not  just  ‘a  wrong  to  the  individual,’ ”  ante,  at  13  (quoting
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 668 (1892)), such that
there is “a compelling ‘public interest in fair and effective
law enforcement,’ ” ante, at 13 (quoting Vance, 591 U. S., at
808).  Indeed, “our historic commitment to the rule of law”
is “nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that
. . . ‘guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.’ ” Nixon, 418
U. S., at 708–709 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U. S.
78, 88 (1935)).

The public interest in criminal prosecution is particularly
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It discusses the public interest in criminal prosecution of a former President, referencing the case of Fitzgerald.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

its camping laws against the plaintiffs.  Ibid.

No other circuit has followed Martin’s lead with respect
to  public-camping  laws.  Nor  did  the  decision  go  unre-
marked within the Ninth Circuit.  When the full court de-
nied rehearing en banc, several judges wrote separately to
note their dissent.  In one statement, Judge Bennett argued
that Martin was inconsistent with the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.  That provision, Judge Bennett con-
tended, prohibits certain methods of punishment a govern-
ment may impose after a criminal conviction, but it does not
“impose  [any]  substantive  limits  on  what  conduct  a  state
may criminalize.”  920 F. 3d, at 599–602.  In another state-
ment, Judge Smith lamented that Martin had “shackle[d]
the hands of public officials trying to redress the serious so-
cietal concern of homelessness.”  Id., at 590.  He predicted
the  decision  would  “wrea[k]  havoc  on  local  governments,
residents, and businesses” across the American West.  Ibid.
  After Martin, similar suits proliferated against Western
cities within the Ninth Circuit.  As Judge Smith put it, “[i]f
one picks up a map of the western United States and points
to a city that appears on it, there is a good chance that city
has already faced” a judicial injunction based on Martin or
the threat  of one “in the few short years since [the Ninth
Circuit] initiated its Martin experiment.”  72 F. 4th, at 940;
see, e.g., Boyd v. San Rafael, 2023 WL 7283885, *1–*2 (ND
Cal., Nov. 2, 2023); Fund for Empowerment v. Phoenix, 646
F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1132 (Ariz. 2022); Warren v. Chico, 2021
WL 2894648, *3 (ED Cal., July 8, 2021).

Consider  San  Francisco,  where  each  night  thousands
sleep “in tents and other makeshift structures.”  Brief for
City and County of San Francisco et al. as Amici Curiae 8
(San Francisco Brief ).  Applying Martin, a district court en-
tered  an  injunction  barring  the  city  from  enforcing  “laws
and ordinances to prohibit involuntarily homeless individ-
uals from sitting, lying, or sleeping on public property.”  Co-
alition on Homelessness v. San Francisco, 647 F. Supp. 3d
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion discussing the case City of Grants Pass v. Johnson and its impact on public camping laws. It cites other cases and legal arguments, indicating it's part of the main body of the text and not a separate element like a table of contents or introductory paragraph.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

B
In  the  days  when  this  Court  followed  an  exclusively
property-based  approach  to  the  Fourth  Amendment,  the
distinction  between  an  individual’s  Fourth  Amendment
rights  and  those  of  a  third  party  was  clear  cut.    We  first
asked  whether  the  object  of  the  search—say,  a  house,
papers,  or  effects—belonged  to  the  defendant,  and,  if  it
did, whether the Government had committed a “trespass”
in  acquiring  the  evidence  at  issue.  Jones,  565  U. S.,  at
411, n. 8.

When  the  Court  held  in  Katz  that  “property  rights  are
not  the  sole  measure  of  Fourth  Amendment  violations,”
Soldal v.  Cook County, 506 U. S.  56, 64 (1992), the sharp
boundary  between  personal  and  third-party  rights  was
tested.  Under  Katz,  a  party  may  invoke  the  Fourth
Amendment whenever law enforcement officers violate the
party’s “justifiable” or “reasonable” expectation of privacy.
See  389  U. S.,  at  353;  see  also  id.,  at  361  (Harlan,  J.,
concurring)  (applying  the  Fourth  Amendment  where  “a
person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy”  and  where  that  “expectation  [is]  one  that  society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’ ”).  Thus freed from
the limitations imposed by property law, parties began to
argue that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
items  owned  by  others.  After  all,  if  a  trusted  third  party
took  care  not  to  disclose  information  about  the  person  in
question, that person might well have a reasonable expec-
tation that the information would not be revealed.

Efforts  to  claim  Fourth  Amendment  protection  against
searches of the papers and effects of others came to a head
in  Miller,  425  U. S.  435,  where  the  defendant  sought  the
suppression  of  two  banks’  microfilm  copies  of  his  checks,
deposit  slips,  and  other  records.  The  defendant  did  not
claim that he owned these documents, but he nonetheless
argued  that  “analysis  of  ownership,  property  rights  and
possessory  interests  in  the  determination  of  Fourth
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the concept of reasonable expectation of privacy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

Opinion of the Court
Appendix B to opinion of the Court

B

State Legislation and Judicial Decisions

Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage

Legislation

Del. Code Ann., Tit. 13, §129 (Cum. Supp. 2014)
D. C. Act No. 18–248, 57 D. C. Reg. 27 (2010)
Haw. Rev. Stat. §572 –1 (2006) and 2013 Cum. Supp.)
Ill. Pub. Act No. 98–597
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19, §650–A (Cum. Supp. 2014)
2012 Md. Laws p. 9
2013 Minn Laws p. 404
2009 N. H. Laws p. 60
2011 N. Y Laws p. 749
2013 R. I. Laws p. 7
2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves p. 33
2012 Wash. Sess. Laws p. 199

Judicial Decisions

Goodridge  v.  Department  of  Public  Health,  440  Mass.

309, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (2003)

Kerrigan  v.  Commissioner  of  Public  Health,  289  Conn.

135, 957 A. 2d 407 (2008)

Varnum v. Brien, 763 N. W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009)
Griego  v.  Oliver,  2014–NMSC–003,  ___  N. M.  ___,  316

P. 3d 865 (2013)

Garden  State  Equality  v.  Dow,  216  N. J.  314,  79  A. 3d

1036 (2013)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal references (legislation and judicial decisions) related to same-sex marriage. This type of information is generally not considered core content for indexing in a typical document pipeline.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal References</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

U. S. C.  §1464  (prohibiting  “obscene,  indecent,  or  profane
language”  in  radio  communications);  FCC  v.  Pacifica
Foundation,  438  U. S.  726,  746,  and  n. 22  (1978)  (opinion
of  Stevens,  J.)  (regulator’s  objection  to  a  monologue  con-
taining various “four-letter words” was not to its “point of
view, but to the way in which it [wa]s expressed”); 46 CFR
§67.117(b)(3)  (2018)  (Coast  Guard  regulation  prohibiting
vessel  names  that  “contain”  or  are  “phonetically  identical
to  obscene,  indecent,  or  profane  language,  or  to  racial  or
ethnic epithets”); see also Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities
Forum,  95  Nw.  U.  L.  Rev.  1357,  1416–1417,  and  n. 432
(2001) (noting that “swear words” are “perhaps more than
any  other  categor[y]  capable  of  specific  articulation”  and
citing  one  state  agency’s  list).  Of  course,  “scandalous”
offers  its  own  limiting  principle:  if  a  word,  though  not
exactly  polite,  cannot  be  said  to  be  “scandalous”—e.g.,
“shocking”  or  “extremely  offensive,”  8  Century  Dictionary
5374—it  is  clearly  not  the  kind  of  vulgarity  or  profanity
that Congress intended to target.  Everyone can think of a
small number of words (including the apparent homonym
of Brunetti’s mark) that would, however, plainly qualify.5

——————

appear to confirm, that “scandalous” in §1052(a) has often been applied
to  cover  this  kind  of  content,  see  Brief  for  United  States  27;  In  re
Boulevard  Entertainment,  Inc.,  334  F. 3d  1336,  1340  (CA  Fed.  2003);
Snow, Denying Trademark for Scandalous Speech, 51 U. C. D. L. Rev.
2331, 2339 (2018) (Snow), the majority notes that the  PTO has hardly
amassed a perfect track record of consistency, see ante, at 6–8.  Be that
as  it  may,  the  Government  undeniably  receives  a  large  volume  of
trademark  applications  that  easily  would  fit  under  this  rubric  (exam-
ples  of  which  I  will  spare  the  reader).    See  In  re  Brunetti,  877  F. 3d
1330,  1355  (CA  Fed.  2017)  (noting  an  appendix  containing  marks
denied  registration  “whose  offensiveness  cannot  be  reasonably  ques-
tioned”).  As  a  result  of  today’s  ruling,  all  of  those  marks  will  now
presumably have to be registered.

5 There is at least one particularly egregious racial epithet that would
fit this description as well.  While Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. ___ (2017),
removed a statutory basis to deny the registration of racial epithets in
general,  the  Government  represented  at  oral  argument  that  it  is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Iancu v. Brunetti*. It contains legal citations, analysis of relevant statutes and case law, and arguments regarding trademark law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

JACKSON, J., dissenting

special  privilege  that  Government  officials  sometimes  in-
voke when carrying out their official duties.1

All of this is to say that our Government has long func-
tioned under an accountability paradigm in which no one is
above the law; an accused person is innocent until proven
guilty; and criminal defendants may raise defenses, both le-
gal and factual, tailored to their particular circumstances,
whether they be Government officials or ordinary citizens.
For over two centuries, our Nation has survived with these
principles intact.

B
With that understanding of how our system of accounta-
bility  for  criminal  acts  ordinarily  functions,  it  becomes
much  easier  to  see  that  the  majority’s  ruling  in  this  case
breaks new and dangerous ground.  Departing from the tra-
ditional  model  of  individual  accountability,  the  majority
has  concocted  something  entirely  different:  a  Presidential
accountability model that creates immunity—an exemption
from criminal law—applicable only to the most powerful of-
ficial in our Government.

1
So, how does this new Presidential accountability model
work?  An  initial  problem  is  the  lack  of  clarity  regarding
what this new model entails.  The majority announces only
its most basic contours.  See ante, at 6 (asserting that “the

——————

1 See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 1093 (3d ed. 1982) (“Deeds
which otherwise would be criminal, such as taking or destroying prop-
erty, taking hold of a person by force and against his will, placing him in
confinement, or even taking his life, are not crimes if done with proper
public authority”); see also 2 Robinson §141(a) (describing the public-au-
thority defense, under which a defendant may escape liability if he “has
been specifically authorized to engage in the conduct constituting the of-
fense in order to protect or further a public interest”); Brief for United
States 29–30, n. 11; ante, at 16, n. 3 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (citing
Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 384 (1937)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case.  It is sequential text and provides legal argument, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH

Opinion of the Court

In 2014, George asked the Board to revise that final deci-
sion  on  grounds  of  “clear  and  unmistakable  error.”  38
U. S. C.  §7111.    In  particular,  he  claimed  that  the  Board
erred by applying a later invalidated regulation to deny his
claim for benefits without holding the VA to its full burden
of proof to rebut the statutory presumption of sound condi-
tion.  For  more  than  40  years,  including  George’s  time  in
service, a VA regulation provided that the agency could re-
but  the  presumption  simply  by  showing,  according  to  a
heightened burden of proof, that a disability predated ser-
vice.  See 26 Fed. Reg. 1580 (1961); 38 CFR §3.304(b) (1976).
In  2003,  however,  the  VA  concluded  that  this  regulation
conflicted with the statute, which it now understood to re-
quire an additional showing (by the same burden of proof ):
that  the  veteran’s  condition  was  not  later  aggravated  by
service.  VA Op. Gen. Counsel Precedent (VA Op.) 3–2003
(July 16, 2003).  The VA recognized that it seemed “illogi-
cal” to require an additional showing with “no obvious bear-
ing upon the presumed fact of whether the veteran was in
sound condition when he or she entered service.”  Id., at 8.
But it explained that the statutory text nonetheless “com-
pel[led]” this reading.  Ibid.  Based on this about-face, the
VA confessed error in a pending case applying the regula-
tion, and the Federal Circuit agreed that this “difficult to
parse” and “somewhat self-contradictory” statute rendered
the  regulation  “incorrect.”    Wagner  v.  Principi,  370  F. 3d
1089, 1093, 1097 (2004).  The VA ultimately amended the
regulation to resolve the issue going forward.  70 Fed. Reg.
23027 (2005).

The Board denied George’s claim for collateral relief, and
the Veterans Court affirmed.  The Federal Circuit also af-
firmed,  concluding  that  the  application  of  a  later  invali-
dated  regulation  does not  fall  into  the  narrow  category  of
“clear and unmistakable error” permitting revision of a fi-
nal decision under 38 U. S. C. §§5109A and 7111.  991 F. 3d
1227 (2021).  We granted certiorari.  595 U. S. ___ (2022).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing a case regarding veterans' benefits. It contains legal terminology, citations, and a summary of the case's history.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ROTKISKE v. KLEMM ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 18–328.  Argued October 16, 2019—Decided December 10, 2019

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) authorizes private civil
actions against debt collectors who engage in certain prohibited prac-
tices.  An FDCPA action must be brought “within one year from the
date on which the violation occurs.”  15 U. S. C. §1692k(d).  Respondent
Klemm  &  Associates  (Klemm)  sued  petitioner  Rotkiske  to  collect  an
unpaid debt and attempted service at an address where Rotkiske no
longer lived.  An individual other than Rotkiske accepted service.  Rot-
kiske failed to respond to the summons, and Klemm obtained a default
judgment in 2009.  Rotkiske claims that he first learned of this judg-
ment in 2014 when his mortgage application was denied.  He then filed
suit against Klemm, alleging that Klemm violated the FDCPA by con-
tacting him without lawful ability to collect.  Klemm moved to dismiss
the action as barred by the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations.
As relevant here, Rotkiske argued for the application of a “discovery
rule” to delay the beginning of the limitations period until the date that
he knew or should have known of the alleged FDCPA violation.  Rely-
ing  on  the  statute’s  plain  language,  the  District  Court  rejected  Rot-
kiske’s approach and dismissed the action.  The Third Circuit affirmed.

Held: Absent the application of an equitable doctrine, §1692k(d)’s statute
of limitations begins to run when the alleged FDCPA violation occurs,
not when the violation is discovered.  Pp. 4–7.

(a) The plain text of §1692k(d) unambiguously sets the date of the
violation as the event that starts the FDCPA’s one-year limitations pe-
riod.  Rotkiske argues for the application of a general discovery rule as
a principle of statutory interpretation that, in effect, would read a dis-
covery provision into §1692k(d).  But adopting this approach would re-
quire improper atextual supplementation of the statute.  Such supple-
mentation is particularly inappropriate when, as here, Congress has
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion.  Syllabi are not considered part of the main body of the opinion and are meant to provide a summary for readers. They are not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal arguments and holdings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

21

BREYER, J., dissenting

Moreover,  we  must  consider  death  warrants  that  have
been  issued  and  revoked,  not  once,  but  repeatedly.    See,
e.g., Pet. for Cert. in Suárez Medina v. Texas, O. T. 2001,
No. 02–5752, pp. 35–36 (filed Aug. 13, 2002) (“On fourteen
separate  occasions  since  Mr.  Suárez  Medina’s  death  sen
tence was imposed, he has been informed of the time, date,
and  manner  of  his  death.  At  least  eleven  times,  he
has  been  asked  to  describe  the  disposal  of  his  bodily
remains”);  Lithwick,  Cruel  but  not  Unusual,  Slate,
Apr.  1,  2011,  online  at  http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/cruel_but_not_
unusual.html  (John  Thompson  had  seven  death  warrants
signed before he was exonerated); see also, e.g., WFMZ-TV
69  News,  Michael  John  Parrish’s  Execution  Warrant
Signed  by  Governor  Corbett  (Aug.  18,  2014),  online  at
http: / / www.wfmz.com /news/Regional-Poconos-Coal / Local/
michael-john-parrishs-execution-warrant-signed-by-governor-
corbett/27595356  (former  Pennsylvania  Governor  signed
36  death  warrants  in  his  first  3.5  years  in  office  even
though  Pennsylvania  has  not  carried  out  an  execution
since 1999).

Several  inmates  have  come  within  hours  or  days  of
execution  before  later  being  exonerated.  Willie  Manning
was  four  hours  from  his  scheduled  execution  before  the
Mississippi  Supreme  Court  stayed  the  execution.    See
Robertson,  With  Hours  to  Go,  Execution  is  Postponed,
N. Y. Times, Apr. 8, 2015, p. A17.  Two years later, Man
ning  was  exonerated  after  the  evidence  against  him,  in
cluding flawed testimony from an FBI hair examiner, was
severely  undermined.  Nave,  Why  Does  the  State  Still
Want to Kill Willie Jerome Manning? Jackson Free Press,
Apr. 29, 2015.  Nor is Manning an outlier case.  See, e.g.,
Martin,  Randall  Adams,  61,  Dies;  Freed  With  Help  of
Film,  N. Y.  Times,  June  26,  2011,  p. 24  (Randall  Adams:
stayed  by  this  Court  three  days  before  execution;  later
exonerated);  N.  Davies,  White  Lies  231,  292,  298,  399
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites other cases and news articles to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ENDREW F., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND

NEXT FRIENDS, JOSEPH F. ET AL. v. DOUGLAS COUNTY

SCHOOL DISTRICT RE–1

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 15–827.  Argued January 11, 2017—Decided March 22, 2017

The  Individuals  with  Disabilities  Education  Act  (IDEA)  offers  States
federal  funds  to  assist  in  educating  children  with  disabilities.  The
Act conditions that funding on compliance with certain statutory re-
quirements, including the requirement that States provide every eli-
gible child a “free appropriate public education,” or FAPE, by means
of a uniquely tailored “individualized education program,” or IEP.  20
U. S. C. §§1401(9)(D), 1412(a)(1).

This Court first addressed the FAPE requirement in Board of Ed.
of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley,
458 U. S. 176.  The Court held that the Act guarantees a substantive-
ly  adequate  program  of  education  to  all  eligible  children,  and  that
this requirement is satisfied if the child’s IEP sets out an educational
program that is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational  benefits.”    Id.,  at  207.    For  children  fully  integrated  in
the regular classroom, this would typically require an IEP “reasona-
bly  calculated  to  enable  the  child  to  achieve  passing  marks  and  ad-
vance from grade to grade.”  Id., at 204.  Because the IEP challenged
in Rowley plainly met this standard, the Court declined “to establish
any  one  test  for  determining  the  adequacy  of  educational  benefits
conferred  upon  all  children  covered  by  the  Act,”  instead  “confin[ing]
its analysis” to the facts of the case before it.  Id., at 202.

Petitioner Endrew F., a child with autism, received annual IEPs in
respondent  Douglas  County  School  District  from  preschool  through
fourth  grade.    By  fourth  grade,  Endrew’s  parents  believed  his  aca-
demic and functional progress had stalled.  When the school district
proposed a fifth grade IEP that resembled those from past years, En-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

Opinion of the Court

credit of up to $150 to any taxpayer who donates to a par-
ticipating “student scholarship organization.”  Mont. Code
Ann.  §§15–30–3103(1),  –3111(1)  (2019).    The  scholarship
organizations then use the donations to award scholarships
to  children  for  tuition  at  a  private  school.
§§15–30–
3102(7)(a), –3103(1)(c).1

So far only one scholarship organization, Big Sky Schol-
arships, has participated in the program.  Big Sky focuses
on  providing  scholarships  to  families  who  face  financial
hardship or have children with disabilities.  Scholarship or-
ganizations like Big Sky must, among other requirements,
maintain an application process for awarding the scholar-
ships;  use  at  least  90%  of  all  donations  on  scholarship
awards; and comply with state reporting and monitoring re-
quirements.  §§15–30–3103(1), –3105(1), –3113(1).

A family whose child is awarded a scholarship under the
program may use it at any “qualified education provider”—
that is, any private school that meets certain accreditation,
testing, and safety requirements.  See §15–30–3102(7).  Vir-
tually every private school in Montana qualifies.  Upon re-
ceiving  a  scholarship,  the  family  designates  its  school  of
choice, and the scholarship organization sends the scholar-
ship funds directly to the school.  §15–30–3104(1).  Neither
the  scholarship  organization  nor  its  donors  can  restrict
awards  to  particular  types  of  schools.    See  §§15–30–
3103(1)(b), –3111(1).

The Montana Legislature allotted $3 million annually to
fund the tax credits, beginning in 2016.  §15–30–3111(5)(a).
If  the  annual  allotment  is  exhausted,  it  increases  by  10%
the following year.  Ibid.  The program is slated to expire in
2023.  2015 Mont. Laws p. 2186, §33.

The Montana Legislature also directed that the program

——————

1 The Legislature provided the same tax credit to taxpayers who donate
to  public  schools  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  innovative  educational
programs or curing technology deficiencies at such schools.  See Mont.
Code Ann. §15–30–3110 (2019).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the details of a Montana tax credit program for private school scholarships. It outlines the program's structure, eligibility requirements, and funding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  566 U. S. ____ (2012)

17

Opinion of the Court

this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the pub
lic have the benefit of it without the permission of this
patentee.”  Id., at 113.

  Similarly,  in  Benson  the  Court  said  that  the  claims
before  it  were  “so  abstract  and  sweeping  as  to  cover  both
known and unknown uses of the [mathematical formula].”
409 U. S., at 67, 68.  In Bilski  the Court pointed out that
to  allow  “petitioners  to  patent  risk  hedging  would  pre
empt use of this approach in all fields.”  561 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 15).  And in Flook the Court expressed concern
that the claimed process was simply “a formula for compu
ting an updated alarm limit,” which might “cover a broad
range of potential uses.”  437 U. S., at 586.

These  statements  reflect  the  fact  that,  even  though
rewarding  with  patents  those  who  discover  new  laws  of
nature and the like might well encourage their discovery,
those  laws  and  principles,  considered  generally,  are  “the
basic  tools  of  scientific  and  technological  work.”    Benson,
supra,  at  67.    And  so  there  is  a  danger  that  the  grant  of
patents that tie up their use will inhibit future innovation
premised upon them, a danger that becomes acute when a
patented process amounts to no more than an instruction
to  “apply  the  natural  law,”  or  otherwise  forecloses  more
future  invention  than  the  underlying  discovery  could
reasonably  justify.  See  generally  Lemley,  Risch,  Sichel
man,  &  Wagner,  Life  After  Bilski,  63  Stan.  L. Rev.  1315
(2011)  (hereinafter  Lemley)  (arguing  that  §101  reflects
this  kind  of  concern);  see  also  C.  Bohannan  &  H.
Hovenkamp,  Creation  without  Restraint:  Promoting  Lib
erty  and  Rivalry  in  Innovation  112  (2012)  (“One  problem
with  [process]  patents  is  that  the  more  abstractly  their
claims  are  stated,  the  more  difficult  it  is  to  determine
precisely  what  they  cover.  They  risk  being  applied  to  a
wide  range  of  situations  that  were  not  anticipated  by  the
patentee”);  W.  Landes  &  R.  Posner,  The  Economic  Struc
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and discusses legal principles related to patents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U84

[09-06-00 20:39:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 214 (1998)

221

Opinion of the Court

from April to October 1990, and to obtain the termination
charges that respondent did not pay in 1992.

Throughout the proceedings in District Court, petitioner
argued that respondent’s state-law contract and tort claims
were pre-empted by the ﬁled-tariff requirements of § 203 of
the Act. The Magistrate Judge rejected this argument and
instructed the jury to consider not only the written subscrip-
tion agreements, but also any statements made or documents
furnished before the parties signed the agreements “ ‘if you
ﬁnd that the parties intended that those statements or writ-
ten materials form part of their agreements.’ ” Brief for
Petitioner 18. The Magistrate Judge also instructed the
jury that it could not ﬁnd for respondent on its contract
claims unless it found that petitioner engaged in willful mis-
conduct. He declined to instruct on punitive damages for
the tortious-interference claim. The jury found for respond-
ent on its state-law claims, rejected petitioner’s counter-
claim, and awarded respondent $13 million in lost proﬁts.
The Magistrate Judge reduced the judgment to $1.154 mil-
lion, which represented the lost proﬁts respondent claimed
during the period before it canceled SDN on September 30,
1992; he found that there was no competent evidence for lost
proﬁts after that date. The Court of Appeals, over a dissent
by Judge Brunetti, afﬁrmed the judgment but reversed the
Magistrate Judge’s failure to instruct on punitive damages
and remanded for a trial on that aspect of the case.
108
F. 3d 981 (CA9 1997). We granted certiorari to determine
whether the federal ﬁled-rate requirements of § 203 pre-empt
respondent’s claims.

522 U. S. 1024 (1997).

II

Section 203(a) of the Communications Act requires every
common carrier to ﬁle with the FCC “schedules,” i. e., tariffs,
“showing all charges” and “showing the classiﬁcations, prac-
tices, and regulations affecting such charges.”
47 U. S. C.
§ 203(a). Section 203(c) makes it unlawful for a carrier to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 214 (1998). It contains legal citations, case details, and a summary of the court proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Snippet</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Opinion of the Court

  Because the States bear “primary responsibility” for de-
veloping  compliance  plans,  §7401(a)(3),  EPA  has  “no  au-
thority to question the wisdom of a State’s choices of emis-
sion  limitations.”    Train  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense
Council, Inc., 421 U. S. 60, 79 (1975).  So long as a SIP sat-
isfies  the  “applicable  requirements”  of  the  Act,  including
the Good Neighbor Provision, EPA “shall approve” it within
18  months  of
  §7410(k)(3);  see
§§7410(k)(1)(B), (k)(2).  If, however, a SIP falls short, EPA
“shall” issue a Federal Implementation Plan, or FIP, for the
noncompliant State—that is, “unless” the State corrects the
deficiencies in its SIP first.  §7410(c)(1); EME Homer, 572
U. S., at 498.  EPA must also ensure States meet the new
air-quality standard by a statutory deadline.  See §7511.

its  submission.

B
  A layer of ozone in the atmosphere shields the world from
the sun’s radiation.  See National Resources Defense Coun-
cil v. EPA, 464 F. 3d 1, 3 (CADC 2006).  But closer to earth,
ozone can hurt more than it helps.  Forming when sunlight
interacts with a wide range of precursor pollutants, ground-
level ozone can trigger and exacerbate health problems and
damage  vegetation.    80  Fed.  Reg.  65299,  65302,  65370
(2015).
  To  mitigate  those  and  other  problems,  in  2015  EPA  re-
vised its air-quality standards for ozone from 75 to 70 parts
per billion.  Id., at 65293–65294.  That change triggered a
requirement for States to submit new SIPs.  Id., at 65437.
Along the way, EPA issued a guidance document advising
States that they had “flexibility” in choosing how to address
their Good Neighbor obligations.  See EPA, Memorandum,
Information  on  the  Interstate  Transport  State  Implemen-
tation Plan Submissions for the 2015 Ozone National Am-
bient Air Quality Standards 3 (Mar. 27, 2018).  With that
and other guidance in hand, many (though not all) States
submitted SIPs.  See 84 Fed. Reg. 66612 (2019).  And many
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the Clean Air Act, State Implementation Plans (SIPs), and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) role in regulating air quality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

Syllabus

vacated  the  ACE  rule  and  its  embedded  repeal  of  the  Clean  Power
Plan,  and  accordingly  purports  to  bring  the  Clean  Power  Plan  back
into legal effect.  There is little question that the petitioner States are
injured,  since  the  rule  requires  them  to  more  stringently  regulate
power plant emissions within their borders.  The Government counters
that EPA’s current posture has mooted the prior dispute.  The distinc-
tion  between  mootness  and  standing  matters,  however,  because  the
Government  bears  the  burden  to  establish  that  a  once-live  case  has
become moot.  The Government’s argument in this case boils down to
its representation that EPA does not intend to enforce the Clean Power
Plan prior to promulgating a new Section 111(d) rule.  But “voluntary
cessation does not moot a case” unless it is “absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
551 U. S. 701, 719.  Here, the Government “nowhere suggests that if
this  litigation is  resolved  in its  favor  it  will  not”  reimpose  emissions
limits predicated on generation shifting.  Ibid.  Pp. 14–16.

2. Congress did not grant EPA in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act
the authority to devise emissions caps based on the generation shifting
approach the Agency took in the Clean Power Plan.  Pp. 16–31.

(a) In  devising  emissions  limits  for  power  plants,  EPA  “deter-
mines” the BSER that—taking into account cost, health, and other fac-
tors—it finds “has been adequately demonstrated,” and then quanti-
fies “the degree of emission limitation achievable” if that best system
were  applied  to  the  covered  source.  §7411(a)(1).  The  issue  here  is
whether restructuring  the Nation’s overall  mix  of  electricity  genera-
tion,  to  transition  from  38%  to  27%  coal  by  2030,  can  be  the  BSER
within the meaning of Section 111.

Precedent teaches that there are “extraordinary cases” in which the
“history  and  the  breadth  of  the  authority  that  [the  agency]  has  as-
serted,” and the “economic and political significance” of that assertion,
provide a “reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress” meant
to confer such authority.  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U. S. 120, 159–160.  See, e.g., Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. ___, ___; Utility Air Reg-
ulatory  Group  v.  EPA,  573  U. S.  302,  324;  Gonzales  v.  Oregon,  546
U. S. 243, 267; National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA,
595 U. S. ___, ___.  Under this body of law, known as the major ques-
tions doctrine, given both separation of powers principles and a prac-
tical  understanding  of  legislative  intent,  the  agency  must  point  to
“clear congressional authorization” for the authority it claims.  Utility
Air, 573 U. S., at 324.  Pp. 16–20.

(b) This  is  a  major  questions  case.    EPA  claimed  to  discover  an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. It outlines the arguments and holdings of the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
96

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and part of a court document.  It is likely not the main body text of a book and should not be indexed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>