<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

I
A
Some  suggest  that  homelessness  may  be  the  “defining
public  health  and  safety  crisis  in  the  western  United
States”  today.  72  F. 4th  868,  934  (CA9  2023)  (Smith,  J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  According to
the federal government, homelessness in this country has
reached its highest levels since the government began re-
porting data on the subject in 2007.  Dept. of Housing and
Urban Development, Office of Community Planning & De-
velopment, T. de Sousa et al., The 2023 Annual Homeless
Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress 2–3 (2023).  Cali-
fornia alone is home to around half of those in this Nation
living without shelter on a given night.  Id., at 30.  And each
of  the  five  States  with  the  highest  rates  of  unsheltered
homelessness in the country—California, Oregon, Hawaii,
Arizona,  and  Nevada—lies  in  the American  West.    Id., at
17.

Those  experiencing  homelessness  may  be  as  diverse  as
the Nation itself—they are young and old and belong to all
races and creeds.  People become homeless for a variety of
reasons, too, many beyond their control.  Some have been
affected  by  economic  conditions,  rising  housing  costs,  or
natural disasters.  Id., at 37; see Brief for United States as
Amicus  Curiae  2–3.  Some  have  been  forced  from  their
homes  to  escape  domestic  violence  and  other  forms  of  ex-
ploitation.  Ibid.  And still others struggle with drug addic-
tion and mental illness.  By one estimate, perhaps 78 per-
cent  of  the  unsheltered  suffer  from  mental-health  issues,
while  75  percent  struggle  with  substance  abuse.    See  J.
Rountree,  N.  Hess,  &  A.  Lyke,  Health  Conditions  Among
Unsheltered  Adults  in  the  U. S.,  Calif.  Policy  Lab,  Policy
Brief 5 (2019).

Those  living  without  shelter  often  live  together.    L.
Dunton  et al.,  Dept.  of  Housing  and  Urban  Development,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of an opinion from a court case. It discusses the issue of homelessness and provides some statistics.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

13

Opinion of the Court

present in patent law, between stimulating innovation by
protecting  inventors  and  impeding  progress  by  granting
patents when not justified by the statutory design.

III
Even though petitioners’ application is not categorically
outside  of  §101  under  the  two  broad  and  atextual  ap-
proaches the Court rejects today, that does not mean it is
a  “process”  under  §101.  Petitioners  seek  to  patent  both
the  concept  of  hedging  risk  and  the  application  of  that
concept  to  energy  markets.  App.  19–20.    Rather  than
adopting  categorical  rules  that  might  have  wide-ranging
and  unforeseen  impacts,  the  Court  resolves  this  case
narrowly  on  the  basis  of  this  Court’s  decisions  in  Benson,
Flook, and Diehr, which show that petitioners’ claims are
not  patentable  processes  because  they  are  attempts  to
patent  abstract  ideas.    Indeed,  all  members  of  the  Court
agree  that  the  patent  application  at  issue  here  falls  out-
side of §101 because it claims an abstract idea.

In Benson, the Court considered whether a patent appli-
cation  for  an  algorithm  to  convert  binary-coded  decimal
numerals  into  pure  binary  code  was  a  “process”  under
§101.  409 U. S., at 64–67.  The Court first explained that
“ ‘[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an
original  cause;  a  motive;  these  cannot  be  patented,  as  no
one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.’ ”  Id., at
67 (quoting Le Roy, 14 How., at 175).  The Court then held
the application at issue was not a “process,” but an unpat-
entable  abstract  idea.  “It  is  conceded  that  one  may  not
patent  an  idea.  But  in  practical  effect  that  would  be  the
result if the formula for converting  .  . . numerals to pure
binary numerals were patented in this case.”  409 U. S., at
71.  A  contrary  holding  “would  wholly  pre-empt  the
mathematical  formula  and  in  practical  effect  would  be  a
patent on the algorithm itself.”  Id., at 72.

In Flook, the Court considered the next logical step after
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses patent law and the patentability of abstract ideas.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Opinion of the Court

“(A)  to  store  or  produce  telephone  numbers  to  be
called,  using  a  random  or  sequential  number  genera-
tor; and

“(B) to dial such numbers.”

Facebook argues the clause “using a random or sequential
number  generator”  modifies  both  verbs  that  precede  it
(“store” and “produce”), while Duguid contends it modifies
only  the  closest  one  (“produce”).  We  conclude  that  the
clause  modifies  both,  specifying  how  the  equipment  must
either  “store”  or  “produce”  telephone  numbers.    Because
Facebook’s notification system neither stores nor produces
numbers “using a random or sequential number generator,”
it is not an autodialer.

A
We begin with the text.  Congress defined an autodialer
in  terms  of  what  it  must  do  (“store  or  produce  telephone
numbers to be called”) and how it must do it (“using a ran-
dom or sequential number generator”).  The definition uses
a familiar structure: a list of verbs followed by a modifying
clause.  Under  conventional  rules  of  grammar,  “[w]hen
there  is  a  straightforward,  parallel  construction  that  in-
volves all nouns or verbs in a series,” a modifier at the end
of the list “normally applies to the entire series.”  A. Scalia
&  B.  Garner,  Reading  Law:  The  Interpretation  of  Legal
Texts  147  (2012)  (Scalia  &  Garner)  (quotation  modified).
The Court often applies this interpretative rule, usually re-
ferred  to  as  the  “series-qualifier  canon.”  See  Paroline  v.
United States, 572 U. S. 434, 447 (2014) (citing Porto Rico
Railway,  Light  &  Power  Co.  v.  Mor,  253  U. S.  345,  348
(1920)); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 339–
340 (1971).  This canon generally reflects the most natural
reading of a sentence.  Imagine if a teacher announced that
“students must not complete or check any homework to be
turned  in  for  a  grade,  using  online  homework-help  web-
sites.”  It would be strange to read that rule as prohibiting
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the definition of an autodialer under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010)

11

Opinion of the Court

We  agree  with  petitioners  that  there  is  no  reason  to
think that scope certification by the Attorney General is a
prerequisite to immunity under §233(a).  To be sure, that
immunity  is  contingent  upon  the  alleged  misconduct
having  occurred  in  the  course  of  the  PHS  defendant’s
duties, but a defendant may make that proof pursuant to
the ordinary rules of evidence and procedure.  As petition-
ers  observe,  proof  of  scope  is  in  most  §233(a) cases  estab-
lished by a declaration affirming that the defendant was a
PHS  official  during  the  relevant  time  period.    See  Reply
Brief  for  Petitioner  Hui  6–7,  and  n. 1.    Thus,  while  scope
certification  may  provide  a  convenient  mechanism  for
establishing  that  the  alleged  misconduct  occurred  within
the  scope  of  the  employee’s  duties,  the  procedure  author-
ized  by  §2679(d)  is  not  necessary  to  effect  substitution  of
the United States.  Finally, that the FTCA’s scope certifi-
cation  procedure  was  enacted  almost  two  decades  after
§233(a)  confirms  that  Congress  did  not  intend  to  make
that  procedure  the  exclusive  means  for  PHS  personnel  to
invoke the official immunity provided by §233(a).

Respondents’  argument  based  on  §233(f)  is  similarly
unavailing.  That  subsection  authorizes  the  Secretary  of
Health  and  Human  Services  to  “hold  harmless  or  provide
liability  insurance”  for  a  PHS  officer  or  employee  for  per-
sonal  injuries  caused  by  conduct  occurring  “within  the
scope  of  his  office  or  employment  . . .  if  such  employee  is
assigned to a foreign country . . . and if the circumstances
are  such  as  are  likely  to  preclude  the  remedies  of  third
persons  against  the  United  States  described  in  section
2679(b).”  Noting  that  the  FTCA  precludes  recovery
against  the  United  States  for  “[a]ny  claim  arising  in  a
foreign country,” §2680(k), respondents urge that §233(f)’s
authorization  of  insurance  or  indemnification  in  those
circumstances anticipates that an injured party without a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal arguments related to immunity under a specific statute (likely §233(a)).  The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MELLOULI v. LYNCH

Opinion of the Court

U. S. C.  §1227(a)(2)(B)(i)  based  on  his  Kansas  misde-
meanor conviction.  Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) authorizes the
removal of an alien “convicted of a violation of . . . any law
or  regulation  of  a  State,  the  United  States,  or  a  foreign
country  relating  to  a  controlled  substance  (as  defined  in
section  802  of  Title  21).”    We  hold  that  Mellouli’s  Kansas
conviction  for  concealing  unnamed  pills  in  his  sock  did
not  trigger  removal  under  §1227(a)(2)(B)(i).    The  drug-
paraphernalia possession law under which he was convicted,
Kan.  Stat.  Ann.  §21–5709(b),  by  definition,  related  to  a
controlled  substance:  The  Kansas  statute  made  it  unlaw-
ful  “to  use  or  possess  with  intent  to  use  any  drug  para-
phernalia  to  . . .  store  [or]  conceal  . . .  a  controlled  sub-
stance.”  But  it  was  immaterial  under  that  law  whether
the  substance  was  defined  in  21  U. S. C.  §802.  Nor  did
the State charge, or seek to prove, that Mellouli possessed
law
a  substance  on  the  §802  schedules.
(§1227(a)(2)(B)(i)),  therefore,  did  not  authorize  Mellouli’s
removal.

Federal

I

A

This case involves the interplay between several federal
and state statutes.  Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), a provision of
the  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act,  66  Stat.  163,  as
amended, authorizes the removal of an alien “convicted of
a  violation  of  . . .  any  law  or  regulation  of  a  State,  the
United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled
substance  (as  defined  in  section  802  of  Title  21),  other
than  a  single  offense  involving  possession  for  one’s  own
use  of  30  grams  or
Section
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) incorporates 21 U. S. C. §802, which limits
the  term  “controlled  substance”  to  a  “drug  or  other  sub-
stance” included in one of five federal schedules.  §802(6).

less  of  marijuana.”

The  statute  defining  the  offense  to  which  Mellouli
pleaded  guilty,  Kan.  Stat.  Ann.  §21–5709(b),  proscribes
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the case of Mellouli v. Lynch. It delves into the interpretation of immigration law and its relation to a specific drug paraphernalia possession conviction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

Opinion of the Court

This theory is mistaken.  Proof of prejudice under Brecht
does not equate to a successful showing under AEDPA.  In-
stead,  the  inquiries  are  “entirely  different  in  kind.”
J. Greabe, The Riddle of Harmless Error Revisited, 54 Hou-
ston L. Rev. 59, 113, n. 297 (2016) (emphasis deleted).  They
pose courts with different questions to resolve and require
courts  to  answer  those  questions  based  on  different  legal
materials.

Take the questions the two tests pose.  When a state court
has applied Chapman, § 2254(d)(1) requires a habeas peti-
tioner to prove that the state court’s decision was unreason-
able.  Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, 181 (2011); Fry,
551  U. S.,  at  119.    To  accomplish  that,  a  petitioner  must
persuade a federal court that no “fairminded juris[t]” could
reach the state court’s conclusion under this Court’s prece-
dents.  Ayala, 576 U. S., at 269 (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Similarly, if a petitioner alleges the state court’s
decision  “was  based  on  an  unreasonable  determination  of
the facts” under § 2254(d)(2), it is not enough to show that
“reasonable  minds  reviewing  the  record  might  disagree
about the finding in question.”  Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U. S.
305,  314  (2015)  (internal  quotation  marks  and  alteration
omitted).  By contrast, under Brecht a petitioner may pre-
vail by persuading a federal court that it alone should har-
bor “grave doubt”—not absolute certainty—about whether
the  trial  error  affected  the  verdict’s  outcome.    O’Neal  v.
McAninch,  513  U. S.  432,  435  (1995).    In  sum,  where
AEDPA asks whether every fairminded jurist would agree
that an error was prejudicial, Brecht asks only whether a
federal  habeas  court  itself  harbors  grave  doubt  about  the
petitioner’s verdict.

Next,  consider  the  legal  materials  a  court  may  consult
when applying the two tests.  Section 2254(d)(1) limits ha-
beas relief to cases where a state-court decision contravenes
or unreasonably applies “clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  It
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the difference between two legal tests, Brecht and AEDPA, used to determine the prejudicial effect of trial errors. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

BREYER, J., dissenting

The majority claims that giving weight to these consider-
ations  would  be  a  departure  from  our  precedent  and  give
courts  too  much  discretion  to  interpret  the  Religion
Clauses.  See ante, at 16–18.  But we have long understood
that the “application” of the First Amendment’s mandate of
neutrality  “requires  interpretation  of  a  delicate  sort.”
Schempp, 374 U. S., at 226.  “Each value judgment under
the  Religion  Clauses,”  we  have  explained,  must  “turn  on
whether particular acts in question are intended to estab-
lish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have
the effect of doing so.”  Walz, 397 U. S., at 669.

Nor does the majority’s approach avoid judicial entangle-
ment in difficult and sensitive questions.  To the contrary,
as  I  have  just  explained,  it  burdens  courts  with  the  still
more complex task of untangling disputes between religious
organizations and state governments, instead of giving def-
erence to state legislators’ choices to avoid such issues alto-
gether.  At the same time, it puts States in a legislative di-
lemma, caught between the demands of the Free Exercise
and  Establishment  Clauses,  without  “breathing  room”  to
help ameliorate the problem.

I agree with the majority that it is preferable in some ar-
eas  of  the  law  to  develop  generally  applicable  tests.    The
problem, as our precedents show, is that the interaction of
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses makes it par-
ticularly  difficult  to  design  a  test  that  vindicates  the
Clauses’  competing  interests  in  all—or  even  most—cases.
That is why, far from embracing mechanical formulas, our
precedents  repeatedly  and  frankly  acknowledge  the  need
for precisely the kind of “ ‘judgment-by-judgment analysis’ ”
the majority rejects.  Ante, at 17; see, e.g., Walz, 397 U. S.,
at 669.  “The standards” of our prior decisions, we have said,
“should rather be viewed as guidelines with which to iden-
tify  instances  in  which  the  objectives  of  the  Religion
Clauses have been impaired.”  Tilton, 403 U. S., at 678 (plu-
rality opinion); accord, Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 773, n. 31.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BRNOVICH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA,
ET AL. v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–1257.  Argued March 2, 2021—Decided July 1, 2021*

Arizona law generally makes it very easy to vote.  Voters may cast their
ballots on election day in person at a traditional precinct or a “voting
center”  in  their  county  of  residence.    Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  §16–411(B)(4).
Arizonans also may cast an “early ballot” by mail up to 27 days before
an election, §§16–541, 16–542(C), and they also may vote in person at
an early voting location in each county, §§16–542(A), (E).  These cases
involve challenges under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) to
aspects  of  the  State’s  regulations  governing  precinct-based  election-
day voting and early mail-in voting.  First, Arizonans who vote in per-
son on election day in a county that uses the precinct system must vote
in the precinct to which they are assigned based on their address.  See
§16–122; see also §16–135.  If a voter votes in the wrong precinct, the
vote is not counted.  Second, for Arizonans who vote early by mail, Ar-
izona House Bill 2023 (HB 2023) makes it a crime for any person other
than a postal worker, an elections official, or a voter’s caregiver, family
member, or household member to knowingly collect an early ballot—
either before or after it has been completed. §§16–1005(H)–(I).
  The Democratic National Committee and certain affiliates filed suit,
alleging that both the State’s refusal to count ballots cast in the wrong
precinct and its ballot-collection restriction had an adverse and dispar-
ate effect on the State’s American Indian, Hispanic, and African-Amer-
ican citizens in violation of §2 of the VRA.  Additionally, they alleged
that the ballot-collection restriction was “enacted with discriminatory

——————

* Together with No. 19–1258, Arizona Republican Party et al. v. Dem-

ocratic National Committee et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1101

529 U. S.

May 1, 2000

No. 99–8433. Blitchington v. Moore, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 749 So. 2d 502.

No. 99–8435. Atraqchi v. Murphy et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8437. Valdez Ortiz v. Johnson, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d
1115.

No. 99–8438. Selman v. Sanders, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8440. Stell v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8445. Trinidad v. California. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8450. Wagoner v. Stubblefield, Superintendent,
Missouri Eastern Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8451. Wronke v. Steigmann, Justice, Appellate
Court of Illinois, Fourth District. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certio-
rari denied.

No. 99–8456. McGovern v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th

App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8461. Curry v. Walker et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 435.

No. 99–8466. Chandler v. Kennedy et al. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8471. Larch v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8479. Oden v. Prunty, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks a narrative flow and is structured like a legal document, not typical reading content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

19

Opinion of the Court

application of the second and third drugs.”  App. 77.  This
conclusion  was  not  clearly  erroneous.    Respondents’  ex-
pert, Dr. Evans, testified that the proper administration of
a  500-milligram  dose  of  midazolam  would  make  it  “a
virtual certainty” that any individual would be “at a suffi-
cient level of unconsciousness to resist the noxious stimuli
which  could  occur  from  application  of  the  2nd  and  3rd
drugs” used in the Oklahoma protocol.  Id., at 302; see also
id.,  at  322.  And  petitioners’  experts  acknowledged  that
they had no contrary scientific proof.  See id., at 243–244
(Dr. Sasich stating that the ability of midazolam to render
a person insensate to the second and third drugs “has not
been  subjected  to  scientific  testing”);  id.,  at  176  (Dr.
Lubarksy  stating  that  “there  is  no  scientific  literature
addressing the use of midazolam as a manner to adminis-
ter lethal injections in humans”).

In an effort to explain this dearth of evidence, Dr. Sasich
testified that “[i]t’s not my responsibility or the [Food and
Drug  Administration’s]  responsibility  to  prove  that  the
drug  doesn’t  work  or  is  not  safe.”    Tr.  of  Preliminary  In-
junction  Hearing  357  (Tr.).  Instead,  he  stated,  “it’s  the
responsibility  of  the  proponent  to  show  that  the  drug  is
safe  and  effective.”  Ibid.  Dr.  Sasich  confused  the  stand-
ard imposed on a drug manufacturer seeking approval of a
therapeutic drug with the standard that must be borne by
a  party  challenging  a  State’s  lethal  injection  protocol.
When a method of execution is authorized under state law,
a  party  contending  that  this  method  violates  the  Eighth
Amendment bears the burden of showing that the method
creates  an  unacceptable  risk  of  pain.    Here,  petitioners’
own experts effectively conceded that they lacked evidence
to prove their case beyond dispute.

Petitioners attempt to avoid this deficiency by criticizing
respondents’  expert.  They  argue  that  the  District  Court
should not have credited Dr. Evans’ testimony because he
admitted  that  his  findings  were  based  on  “ ‘extrapo-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the use of midazolam in lethal injections and the burden of proof regarding its effectiveness and safety. It delves into expert testimonies and legal precedents, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–1161
_________________

BEVERLY R. GILL, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.

WILLIAM WHITFORD, ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

[June 18, 2018]

JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I  join  Parts  I  and  II  of  the  Court’s  opinion  because  I
agree  that  the  plaintiffs  have  failed  to  prove  Article  III
standing.  I do not join Part III, which gives the plaintiffs
another chance to prove their standing on remand.  When
a  plaintiff  lacks  standing,  our  ordinary  practice  is  to  re-
mand  the  case  with  instructions  to  dismiss  for  lack  of
jurisdiction.  E.g.,  Lance  v.  Coffman,  549  U. S.  437,  442
(2007)  (per  curiam);  DaimlerChrysler  Corp.  v.  Cuno,  547
U. S. 332, 354 (2006); United States v. Hays, 515 U. S. 737,
747  (1995).    The  Court  departs  from  our  usual  practice
because  this  is  supposedly  “not  the  usual  case.”    Ante,  at
21.  But  there  is  nothing  unusual  about  it.    As  the  Court
explains, the plaintiffs’ lack of standing follows from long-
established principles of law.  See ante, at 13–17.  After a
year  and  a  half  of  litigation  in  the  District  Court,  includ-
ing  a  4-day  trial,  the  plaintiffs  had  a  more-than-ample
opportunity to prove their standing under these principles.
They failed to do so.  Accordingly, I would have remanded
this case with instructions to dismiss.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes case citations, the names of the justices, and the legal arguments being made. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

ment.  Ibid.  Coleman,  as  we  later  explained  in  Raines,
stood  “for  the  proposition  that  legislators  whose  votes
would  have  been  sufficient  to  defeat  (or  enact)  a  specific
legislative  Act  have  standing  to  sue  if  that  legislative
action  goes  into  effect  (or  does  not  go  into  effect),  on  the
ground  that  their  votes  have  been  completely  nullified.”
521 U. S., at 823.12  Our conclusion that the Arizona Legis
lature  has  standing  fits  that  bill.  Proposition  106,  to-
gether with the Arizona Constitution’s ban on efforts to un
dermine  the  purposes  of  an  initiative,  see  supra,  at  11,
would  “completely  nullif[y]”  any  vote  by  the  Legislature,
now or “in the future,” purporting to adopt a redistricting
plan.  Raines, 521 U. S., at 823–824.13

This dispute, in short, “will be resolved . . . in a concrete
factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences  of  judicial  action.”  Valley  Forge  Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State,  Inc.,  454  U. S.  464,  472  (1982).14   Accordingly,  we
——————

12 The case before us does not touch or concern the question whether
Congress has  standing to  bring a suit  against the President.  There is
no  federal  analogue  to  Arizona’s  initiative  power,  and  a  suit  between
Congress and the President would raise separation-of-powers concerns
absent  here.    The  Court’s  standing  analysis,  we  have  noted,  has  been
“especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force
[the  Court]  to  decide  whether  an  action  taken  by  one  of  the  other  two
branches  of  the  Federal  Government  was unconstitutional.”   Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 819–820 (1997).

13 In an endeavor to wish away  Coleman, JUSTICE SCALIA, in dissent,
suggests  the  case  may  have  been  “a  4-to-4  standoff.”  Post,  at  5.    He
overlooks  that  Chief  Justice  Hughes’  opinion,  announced  by  Justice
Stone, was styled “Opinion of the Court.”  307 U. S., at 435.  Describing
Coleman,  the  Court  wrote  in  Raines:    “By  a  vote  of  5–4,  we  held  that
[the  20  Kansas  Senators  who  voted  against  ratification  of  a  proposed
federal  constitutional  amendment]  had  standing.”    521  U. S.,  at    822.
For opinions recognizing the precedential weight of Coleman, see Baker
v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 208 (1962); United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S.
___, ___ (2013) (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 4–5).

14 Curiously,  JUSTICE  SCALIA,  dissenting  on  standing,  berates  the
Court  for  “treading  upon  the  powers  of  state  legislatures.”    Post,  at  6.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the standing of the Arizona Legislature in a case. It cites previous legal cases and delves into the legal arguments surrounding the issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010)

13

ALITO, J., dissenting

that the only way of preventing these crimes was to target
the sale of the videos.  Under  these circumstances, I can-
not  believe  that  the  First  Amendment  commands  Con-
gress  to  step  aside  and  allow  the  underlying  crimes  to
continue.

The  most  relevant  of  our  prior  decisions  is  Ferber,  458
U. S. 747, which concerned child pornography.  The Court
there held that child pornography is not protected speech,
and  I  believe  that  Ferber’s  reasoning  dictates  a  similar
conclusion here.

In  Ferber,  an  important  factor—I  would  say  the  most
important factor—was that child pornography involves the
commission of a crime that inflicts severe personal injury
to the “children who are made to engage in sexual conduct
for commercial purposes.’ ”  Id., at 753 (internal quotation
marks  omitted).    The  Ferber  Court  repeatedly  described
the  production  of  child  pornography  as  child  “abuse,”
“molestation,”  or  “exploitation.”  See,  e.g.,  id.,  at  749  (“In
recent  years,  the  exploitive  use  of  children  in  the  produc-
tion  of  pornography  has  become  a  serious  national  prob-
lem”);  id.,  at  758,  n. 9  (“Sexual  molestation  by  adults  is
often  involved  in  the  production  of  child  sexual  perform-
ances”).  As  later  noted  in  Ashcroft  v.  Free  Speech  Coali-
tion, 535 U. S. 234, 249 (2002), in Ferber “[t]he production
of the work, not its content, was the target of the statute.”
See  also  535  U.S.,  at  250  (Ferber  involved  “speech  that
itself is the record of sexual abuse”).

Second,  Ferber  emphasized  the  fact  that  these  underly-
ing  crimes  could  not  be  effectively  combated  without  tar-
geting the distribution of child pornography.  As the Court
put  it,  “the  distribution  network  for  child  pornography
must be closed if the production of material which requires
the  sexual  exploitation  of  children  is  to  be  effectively
controlled.”  458 U. S., at 759.  The Court added:

“[T]here  is  no  serious  contention  that  the  legislature
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It cites legal precedent and argues a particular point of view.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

KAGAN, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–111
_________________

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

COLORADO

[June 4, 2018]

 JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  joins,

concurring.

“[I]t  is  a  general  rule  that  [religious  and  philosophical]
objections  do  not  allow  business  owners  and  other  actors
in  the  economy  and  in  society  to  deny  protected  persons
equal  access  to  goods  and  services  under  a  neutral  and
generally applicable public accommodations law.”  Ante, at
9.  But  in  upholding  that  principle,  state  actors  cannot
show  hostility  to  religious  views;  rather,  they  must  give
those  views  “neutral  and  respectful  consideration.”    Ante,
at  12.    I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full  because  I  believe
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not satisfy that
obligation.    I  write  separately  to  elaborate  on  one  of  the
bases for the Court’s holding.

The  Court  partly  relies  on  the  “disparate  consideration
of  Phillips’  case  compared  to  the  cases  of  [three]  other
bakers”  who  “objected  to  a  requested  cake  on  the  basis  of
conscience.”  Ante, at 14, 18.  In the latter cases, a customer
named  William  Jack  sought  “cakes  with  images  that
conveyed  disapproval  of  same-sex  marriage,  along  with
religious text”; the bakers whom he approached refused to
make  them.  Ante,  at  15;  see  post,  at  3  (GINSBURG,  J.,
dissenting)  (further  describing  the  requested  cakes).
Those  bakers  prevailed  before  the  Colorado  Civil  Rights
Division and Commission, while Phillips—who objected for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kagan.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 139 (2010)

157

Opinion of Stevens, J.

able  life  sentences—is  appropriate.  Consistent  with  Ohio
law  at  the  time  of  Spisak’s  trial,1  the  jury  was  told  that  it
must  reach  its  decision  unanimously.  The  jury  was  not  in
structed  on  the  consequence  of  its  failure  to  agree  unani
mously  that  Spisak  should  be  sentenced  to  death.  Spisak
and  the  Court  of  Appeals  both  described  these  instructions
as “acquittal ﬁrst” because they would have led a reasonable
jury  to  believe  that  it  ﬁrst  had  to  “acquit”  the  defendant  of
death—unanimously—before  it  could  give  effect  to  a  lesser
penalty.

Following its prior decision in Davis v.  Mitchell, 318 F. 3d
682 (CA6 2003), in which it struck down “virtually identical”
jury instructions, Spisak v.  Mitchell, 465 F. 3d 684, 710 (CA6
2006),  the  Court  of  Appeals  concluded  that  the  instructions
given during Spisak’s penalty phase were impermissible be
cause they “require[d] the jury to unanimously reject a death
sentence  before  considering  other  sentencing  alternatives,”
id.,  at  709.  In  Davis,  the  court  had  explained  that  an  in
struction  that  requires  a  capital  jury  to  “ﬁrst  unanimously
reject  the  death  penalty  before  it  can  consider  a  life
sentence . . .  precludes the individual jury from giving effect
to mitigating evidence . . . .”  318 F. 3d, at 689.  The source

1 Ohio  no longer  uses the  type of  jury instructions  at  issue in  this case.
In  1996  the  Ohio  Supreme  Court  instructed  that  “[i]n  Ohio,  a  solitary
juror  may  prevent  a  death  penalty  recommendation  by  ﬁnding  that  the
aggravating circumstances in the case do not outweigh the mitigating fac
tors.  Jurors  from  this  point  forward  should  be  so  instructed.”  State  v.
Brooks,  75  Ohio  St.  3d  148,  162,  661  N.  E.  2d  1030,  1042.  Although  the
Brooks  decision  signaled  a  change  in  Ohio’s  capital  jury  instructions,  it
was not a change in state law: One juror had the power to prevent a death
penalty  recommendation  before  Brooks.  See  State  v.  Springer,  63  Ohio
St. 3d 167, 172, 586 N. E. 2d 96, 100 (1992) (holding that an offender must
be sentenced to life if the penalty-phase jury deadlocks).  Thus, consistent
with  our  view  that  “accurate  sentencing  information  is  an  indispensable
prerequisite  to  a  [jury’s]  determination  of  whether  a  defendant  shall  live
or die,” Gregg v.  Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 190 (1976) ( joint opinion of Stew
art,  Powell,  and  Stevens,  JJ.),  the  Ohio  high  court  laudably  improved
upon the accuracy of Ohio capital jury instructions in Brooks.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice Stevens in the case of Spisak v. Ohio. It discusses the jury instructions given during the penalty phase of Spisak's trial and their constitutionality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

though  those  practices  had  by  then  “fallen  into  disuse.”
Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. 119, 130 (2019) (citing 4 W.
Blackstone,  Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  England  370
(1769) (Blackstone)).  The Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause was adopted to ensure that the new Nation would
never  resort  to  any  of  those  punishments  or  others  like
them.  Punishments  like  those  were  “cruel”  because  they
were  calculated  to  “ ‘superad[d]’ ”  “ ‘terror,  pain,  or  dis-
grace.’ ”  587 U. S., at 130  (quoting 4 Blackstone 370).  And
they  were  “unusual”  because,  by  the  time  of  the  Amend-
ment’s adoption, they had “long fallen out of use.”  587 U. S.,
at 130.  Perhaps some of those who framed our Constitution
thought,  as  Justice  Story  did,  that  a  guarantee  against
those kinds of “atrocious” punishments would prove “unnec-
essary”  because  no  “free  government”  would  ever  employ
anything like them.  3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Con-
stitution of the United States §1896, p. 750 (1833).  But in
adopting  the  Eighth  Amendment,  the  framers  took  no
chances.

All  that  would  seem  to  make  the  Eighth  Amendment  a
poor  foundation  on  which  to  rest  the  kind  of  decree  the
plaintiffs  seek  in  this  case  and  the  Ninth  Circuit  has  en-
dorsed since Martin.  The Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause  focuses  on  the  question  what  “method  or  kind  of
punishment”  a  government  may  impose  after  a  criminal
conviction, not on the question whether a government may
criminalize particular behavior in the first place or how it
may go about securing a conviction for that offense.  Powell,
392  U. S.,  at  531–532.  To  the  extent  the  Constitution
speaks to those other matters, it does so, as we have seen,
in other provisions.

Nor,  focusing  on  the  criminal  punishments  Grant  Pass
imposes, can we say they qualify as cruel and unusual.  Re-
call that, under the city’s ordinances, an initial offense may
trigger  a  civil  fine.    Repeat  offenses  may  trigger  an  order
temporarily barring an individual from camping in a public
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. It delves into the historical context and interpretation of the clause, applying it to a specific case involving the City of Grants Pass.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
Opinion of the Court

§701(a)(1),  or  that  the  “agency  action  is  committed  to
agency discretion by law,” §701(a)(2).  The latter exception
is at issue here.

To “honor the presumption of review, we have read the
exception in §701(a)(2) quite narrowly,”  Weyerhaeuser  Co.
v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___
(2018) (slip op., at 12), confining it to those rare “adminis-
trative  decision[s]  traditionally  left  to  agency  discretion,”
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 191 (1993).  This limited cat-
egory of unreviewable actions includes an agency’s decision
not  to  institute  enforcement  proceedings,  Heckler  v.
Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 831–832 (1985), and it is on that ex-
ception that the Government primarily relies.

In  Chaney,  several  death-row  inmates  petitioned  the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take enforcement
action  against  two  States  to  prevent  their  use  of  certain
drugs for lethal injection.  The Court held that the FDA’s
denial of that petition was presumptively unreviewable in
light  of  the  well-established  “tradition”  that  “an  agency’s
decision not to prosecute or enforce” is “generally commit-
ted  to  an  agency’s  absolute  discretion.”    Id.,  at  831.  We
identified a constellation of reasons that underpin this tra-
dition.  To start, a non-enforcement decision “often involves
a  complicated  balancing  of  a  number  of  factors  which
are  peculiarly  within  [the  agency’s]  expertise,”  such  as
“whether the particular enforcement action requested best
fits the agency’s overall policies.”  Ibid.  The decision also
mirrors, “to some extent,” a prosecutor’s decision not to in-
dict, which has “long been regarded as the special province
of the Executive Branch.”  Id., at 832.  And, as a practical
matter, “when an agency refuses to act” there is no action
to “provide[ ] a focus for judicial review.”  Ibid.

The Government contends that a general non-enforcement
policy  is  equivalent  to  the  individual  non-enforcement
decision at issue in Chaney.  In each case, the Government
argues, the agency must balance factors peculiarly within
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the precedent set by the case *Heckler v. Chaney*.  It delves into the legal reasoning behind the unreviewability of certain agency non-enforcement decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

315

Opinion of Souter, J.

to current fact, the city council’s closest approach to an evi-
dentiary record on secondary effects and their causes was
the statement of one councilor, during the debate over the
ordinance, who spoke of increases in sex crimes in a way that
might be construed as a reference to secondary effects. See
App. 44. But that reference came at the end of a litany of
concerns (“free condoms in schools, drive-by shootings, abor-
tions, suicide machines,” and declining student achievement
test scores) that do not seem to be secondary effects of nude
dancing.
Ibid. Nor does the invocation of Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560 (1991), in one paragraph of the
preamble to Erie’s ordinance sufﬁce. App. to Pet. for Cert.
42a. The plurality opinion in Barnes made no mention
of evidentiary showings at all, and though my separate opin-
ion did make a pass at the issue, I did not demand reliance
on germane evidentiary demonstrations, whether speciﬁc to
the statute in question or developed elsewhere. To invoke
Barnes, therefore, does not indicate that the issue of evi-
dence has been addressed.

There is one point, however, on which an evidentiary rec-
ord is not quite so hard to ﬁnd, but it hurts, not helps, the
city. The ﬁnal O’Brien requirement is that the incidental
speech restriction be shown to be no greater than essential
to achieve the government’s legitimate purpose. 391 U. S.,
at 377. To deal with this issue, we have to ask what basis
there is to think that the city would be unsuccessful in coun-
tering any secondary effects by the signiﬁcantly lesser re-
striction of zoning to control the location of nude dancing,
thus allowing for efﬁcient law enforcement, restricting ef-
fects on property values, and limiting exposure of the public.

position to look to the facts of their own community’s experience as well
as to experiences elsewhere. Their failure to do so is made all the clearer
by one of the amicus briefs, largely devoted to the argument that scien-
tiﬁcally sound studies show no such correlation. See Brief for First
Amendment Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae 16–23; id., at App.
1–29.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice Souter in the case 529 US 277. It discusses the evidentiary requirements for restricting nude dancing and cites relevant case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part

As the Court’s opinion here explains, Pike’s balancing and
tailoring principles are most frequently deployed to detect
the  presence  or  absence  of  latent  economic  protectionism.
See ante, at 15–18.  That is no surprise.  Warding off state
discrimination against interstate commerce is at the heart
of our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  See ante,
at 7, 9–11, 15–16.

As  the  Court’s  opinion  also  acknowledges,  however,  the
Court  has  “generally  le[ft]  the  courtroom  door  open”  to
claims premised on “even nondiscriminatory burdens.”  De-
partment  of  Revenue  of  Ky.  v.  Davis,  553  U. S.  328,  353
(2008);  see  ante,  at  17.    Indeed,  “a  small  number”  of  this
Court’s cases in the Pike line “have invalidated state laws
. . . that appear to have been genuinely nondiscriminatory”
in  nature.  General  Motors  Corp.  v.  Tracy,  519  U. S.  278,
298, n. 12 (1997); see ante, at 17.  Often, such cases have
addressed state laws that impose burdens on the arteries of
commerce, on “trucks, trains, and the like.”  Ibid., n. 2.  Yet,
there is at least one exception to that tradition.  See Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S. 624, 643–646 (1982) (invalidating
a nondiscriminatory state law that regulated tender offers
to shareholders).
  Pike claims that do not allege discrimination or a burden
on an artery of commerce are further from Pike’s core.  As
THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE  recognizes,  however,  the  Court  today
does not shut the door on all such Pike claims.  See ante, at
17–18, and n. 2; post, at 2–3.  Thus, petitioners’ failure to
allege discrimination or an impact on the instrumentalities
of commerce does not doom their Pike claim.

Nor does a  majority of  the Court endorse the view that
judges are not up to the task that Pike prescribes.  JUSTICE
GORSUCH,  for  a  plurality,  concludes  that  petitioners’  Pike
claim  fails  because  courts  are  incapable  of  balancing  eco-
nomic burdens against noneconomic benefits.  See ante, at
18–21.  I  do  not  join  that  portion  of  JUSTICE  GORSUCH’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS. It delves into the legal principles of the dormant Commerce Clause and the Pike balancing test.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
98

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case citation and part of a court document.  It is likely not the main body text of a book and should not be indexed.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xx

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
1006
1006
1006
1122
1134
1118

1026
1111
193
1010
1008

Corey v. Pamper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corey v. Retchin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corey v. Sidransky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coronado v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coropuna v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner.
Corrections Corp. of America; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Correia v. Meachum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co.
. . . . . .
Cortinas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cotner; McLaughlin v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
County. See name of county.
Court of Appeals. See U. S. Court of Appeals.
Coutee v. Dormire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd.; Gal-Oliver v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Covington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Covington; Whelchel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cowan; Britz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cowan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cowans v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cowhig v. Caldera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cox v. Hooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cox v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cranford v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crawford v. Hill
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crawford v. Yukins
Crayon v. Roe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crews v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Criscione v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cromartie; Hunt v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cromartie; Smallwood v.
Crook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crosby v. Lambert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crosby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cruz; American Airlines, Inc. v.
CSX Transportation, Inc.; Phillips v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cullen; Olin Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Northeast Dairy Compact Comm’n . .
Cunningham; Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia v.
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cuomo; Ferrell v.
Cuozzo v. Waynick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Curry v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Curtis v. Kemna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1134
1097
1121
1067
1006
1061
1102
1005,1095
1116
1010,1137
1022
1073
1025
1041
1105
1032
1014,1035
1014
1070
1009,1125
1080
1144
1004
1020
1098
1021
1066
1033
1101
1071
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, not the main body text of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting

in core constitutional concepts of individual freedom, and of
the equal rights of citizens to decide on the shape of their
lives.  Those legal concepts, one might even say, have gone
far toward defining what it means to be an American.  For
in this Nation, we do not believe that a government control-
ling all private choices is compatible with a free people.  So
we do not (as the majority insists today) place everything
within “the reach of majorities and [government] officials.”
West  Virginia  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Barnette,  319  U. S.  624,  638
(1943).  We believe in a Constitution that puts some issues
off limits to majority rule.  Even in the face of public oppo-
sition,  we  uphold  the  right  of  individuals—yes,  including
women—to make their own choices and chart their own fu-
tures.  Or at least, we did once.

A
Some half-century ago, Roe struck down a state law mak-
ing it a crime to perform an abortion unless its purpose was
to save a woman’s life.  The Roe Court knew it was treading
on difficult and disputed ground.  It understood that differ-
ent people’s “experiences,” “values,” and “religious training”
and  beliefs  led  to  “opposing  views”  about  abortion.    410
U. S., at 116.  But by a 7-to-2 vote, the Court held that in
the earlier stages of pregnancy, that contested and contest-
able choice must belong to a woman, in consultation with
her family and doctor.  The Court explained that a long line
of  precedents,  “founded  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s
concept  of  personal  liberty,”  protected  individual  deci-
sionmaking  related  to  “marriage,  procreation,  contracep-
tion, family relationships, and child rearing and education.”
Id., at 152–153 (citations omitted).  For the same reasons,
the Court held, the Constitution must protect “a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”  Id.,
at 153.  The Court recognized the myriad ways bearing a
child can alter the “life and future” of a woman and other
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses the legal and constitutional arguments surrounding abortion rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

31

Opinion of the Court

at 821–822.

The results of the Harvard admissions process reflect this
numerical commitment.  For the admitted classes of 2009
to 2018, black students represented a tight band of 10.0%–
11.7% of the admitted pool.  The same theme held true for
other minority groups:

Brief  for  Petitioner  in  No.  20–1199  etc.,  p.  23.    Harvard’s
focus on numbers is obvious.7
——————

7 The  principal  dissent  claims  that  “[t]he  fact  that  Harvard’s  racial
shares of admitted applicants varies relatively little . . . is unsurprising
and reflects the fact that the racial makeup of Harvard’s applicant pool
also  varies  very  little  over  this  period.”    Post,  at  35  (opinion  of
SOTOMAYOR, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But that is exactly
the point: Harvard must use precise racial preferences year in and year
out to maintain the unyielding demographic composition of its class.  The
dissent is thus left to attack the numbers themselves, arguing they were
“handpicked”  “from  a  truncated  period.”    Ibid.,  n.  29  (opinion  of
SOTOMAYOR, J.).  As supposed proof, the dissent notes that the share of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing a case and referencing arguments made within it. It contains legal jargon and references to specific court documents, making it unsuitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.

ALITO, J., concurring

school’s exercise of a degree of authority that is commensu-
rate with the task that the parents ask the school to per-
form.  Because public school students attend school for only
part of the day and continue to live at home, the degree of
authority conferred is obviously less than that delegated to
the head of a late-18th century boarding school, but because
public school students are taught outside the home, the au-
thority conferred may be greater in at least some respects
than that enjoyed by a tutor of Blackstone’s time.

So how much authority to regulate speech do parents im-
plicitly delegate when they enroll a child at a public school?
The answer must be that parents are treated as having re-
linquished the measure of authority that the schools must
be  able  to  exercise  in  order  to  carry  out  their  state-
mandated educational mission, as well as the authority to
perform any other functions to which parents expressly or
implicitly  agree—for  example,  by  giving  permission  for  a
child to participate in an extracurricular activity or to go on
a school trip.

III
I  have  already  explained  what  this  delegated  authority
means  with  respect  to  student  speech  during  standard
classroom  instruction.  And  it  is  reasonable  to  infer  that
this  authority  extends  to  periods  when  students  are  in
school but are not in class, for example, when they are walk-
ing in a hall, eating lunch, congregating outside before the
school day starts, or waiting for a bus after school.  During
the entire school day, a school must have the authority to
protect  everyone  on  its  premises,  and  therefore  schools
must be able to prohibit threatening and harassing speech.
An  effective  instructional  atmosphere  could  not  be  main-
tained in a school, and good teachers would be hard to re-
cruit and retain, if students were free to abuse or disrespect
them.  And the school has a duty to protect students while
in school because their parents are unable to do that during
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Alito in the case of Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B.L. It discusses the degree of authority parents delegate to schools regarding student speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

KAGAN, J., dissenting in part

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1641
_________________

MARIETTA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEE
HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v. DAVITA INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2022]

JUSTICE KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR  joins,

dissenting in part.

Today the Court crafts for the Medicare Secondary Payer
Act (MSPA) a massive and inexplicable workaround.  The
MSPA instructs that a group health plan “may not differ-
entiate in the benefits it provides between individuals hav-
ing end stage renal disease and other individuals covered
by such plan on the basis of the existence of end stage renal
disease,  the  need  for  renal  dialysis,  or  in  any  other  man-
ner.”  42  U. S. C.  §1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii).    The  majority  holds
that  the  plan  here  does  not  so  “differentiate”  because  it
draws  distinctions  only  between  dialysis  and  other  treat-
ments—not between individuals with end stage renal dis-
ease and individuals without it.  See ante, at 6, n. 2.  That
conclusion flies in the face of both common sense and the
statutory text.*

One fact is key to understanding this case: Outpatient di-
alysis is an almost perfect proxy for end stage renal disease.
Virtually  everyone  with  end  stage  renal  disease—and

——————

*Like the majority, I am unpersuaded by DaVita’s arguments concern-
ing  disparate-impact  liability  and  the  MSPA’s  separate  take-into-ac-
count clause.  See ante, at 5, 7.  But I part ways with the majority as to
DaVita’s “proxy” theory (which the majority relegates to a footnote).  See
ante, at 6, n. 2.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS

ALITO, J., dissenting

C provides that a party is not obligated to comply with pro-
vision A if provision B is held to be unconstitutional.  Based
on the plain text of this law, a party subject to provision A
should be able to obtain relief from the enforcement of pro-
vision A if it can show that provision B is unconstitutional.
To hold otherwise would be directly contrary to the statu-
tory  text.  But  the  Court’s  reasoning  would  make  such  a
claim impossible.  The plaintiff would be thrown out of court
at the outset of the case for lack of standing.

That cannot be right.  And if the Court really means to
foreclose all such claims from now on, that is a big change
because  we  have  repeatedly  heard  such  arguments  and
evaluated them on the merits.  See Lea, Situational Sever-
ability,  103  Va.  L. Rev.  735,  769  (2017)  (explaining  that
similar “claims are a longstanding feature of American ju-
risprudence”).

In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau, 591 U. S. ___ (2020), a law firm resisted the CFPB’s
efforts to enforce a civil investigative demand.  The firm ar-
gued that (A) it was harmed by actions taken under statu-
tory provisions authorizing the Bureau to issue civil inves-
tigative demands; (B) the Bureau’s Director, under whose
authority the demands had been issued, was protected by
an  unlawful  removal  restriction;  and  (C)  the  removal  re-
striction was inseverable from the investigative provisions.
The Court did not decide the severability issue at the stand-
ing stage.  Instead, it properly treated severability as a mer-
its  issue,  held  that  the  removal  restriction  was  unlawful,
and considered whether relief could be granted because the
investigative provisions were inseverable from the removal
restriction.  Id., at ___–___ (opinion of the Court) (slip op.,
at 11–30); id., at ___–___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 30–
36).
  Indeed, the Seila Law Court had little trouble dismissing
the same misguided approach to traceability that the ma-
jority adopts today.  The court-appointed amicus suggested
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of California v. Texas. It discusses the concept of severability in law and uses the case of Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as an example.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. WISCONSIN

STATE LEGISLATURE
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

consin’s legislature has not done so, unlike the South Caro-
lina legislature in Andino, for example.  But the Wisconsin
State Legislature’s decision not to modify its election rules
in light of the pandemic is itself a policy judgment worthy
of the same judicial deference that this Court afforded the
South Carolina legislature in Andino, ante, p. ___.  In short,
state  legislatures,  not  federal  courts,  primarily  decide
whether and how to adjust election rules in light of the pan-
demic.
  Third, the District Court did not sufficiently appreciate
the significance of election deadlines.  This Court has long
recognized that a State’s reasonable deadlines for register-
ing to vote, requesting absentee ballots, submitting absen-
tee ballots, and voting in person generally raise no federal
constitutional  issues  under  the  traditional  Anderson-Bur-
dick balancing test.  See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S.
780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428 (1992).
  To state the obvious, a State cannot conduct an election
without deadlines.   It  follows  that  the  right to  vote  is  not
substantially burdened by a requirement that voters “act in
a timely fashion if they wish to express their views in the
voting  booth.”    Burdick,  504  U. S.,  at  438.    For  the  same
reason, the right to vote is not substantially burdened by a
requirement that voters act in a timely fashion if they wish
to cast an absentee ballot.  Either way, voters need to vote
on time.  A deadline is not unconstitutional merely because
of voters’ “own failure to take timely steps” to ensure their
franchise.  Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 758 (1973).
Voters who, for example, show up to vote at midnight after
the polls close on election night do not have a right to de-
mand that the State nonetheless count their votes.  Voters
who submit their absentee ballots after the State’s deadline
similarly do not have a right to demand that the State count
their votes.
  For important reasons, most States, including Wisconsin,
require absentee ballots to be received by election day, not
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in the case of Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin. It discusses the court's deference to state legislatures in setting election rules, particularly during a pandemic, and the importance of election deadlines.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U78

[09-06-00 18:35:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

116

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

DOOLEY, personal representative of the ESTATE
OF CHUAPOCO, et al. v. KOREAN AIR
LINES CO., LTD.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit

No. 97–704. Argued April 27, 1998—Decided June 8, 1998

The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA or Act) allows certain relatives
of a decedent to sue for their own pecuniary losses, but does not author-
ize recovery for the decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering. Petition-
ers, personal representatives of three passengers killed when Korean
Air Lines Flight KE007 was shot down over the Sea of Japan, sued
respondent airline (KAL) for, inter alia, damages for their decedents’
pre-death pain and suffering. While their suit was pending, this Court
decided in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U. S. 217—which
arose out of the same disaster—that the Warsaw Convention permits
compensation only for legally cognizable harm, but leaves the speciﬁca-
tion of what constitutes such harm to applicable domestic law, id., at
231; that DOHSA supplies the applicable United States law where an
airplane crashes on the high seas, ibid.; and that where DOHSA applies,
neither state nor general maritime law can permit recovery of loss-of-
society damages, id., at 230. Subsequently, the District Court in this
case granted KAL’s motion to dismiss petitioners’ nonpecuniary dam-
ages claims on the ground that DOHSA does not permit recovery for
such damages, including damages for a decedent’s pre-death pain and
suffering.
In afﬁrming, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ ar-
gument that general maritime law provides a survival action for pain
and suffering damages, holding that Congress has decided who may sue
and for what in cases of death on the high seas.

Held: Because Congress has chosen not to authorize a survival action for
a decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering in a case of death on the high
seas, there can be no general maritime survival action for such damages.
Before Congress enacted DOHSA, admiralty law did not permit an ac-
tion to recover damages for a person’s death.
In DOHSA, Congress
authorized such a cause of action for certain surviving relatives in cases
of death on the high seas, 46 U. S. C. App. § 761, but limited recovery to
the survivors’ own pecuniary losses, § 762. DOHSA’s limited survival
provision also restricts recovery to the survivors’ pecuniary losses.
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, this Court
§ 765.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

13

Opinion of the Court

by State or Federal law.”  15 U. S. C. §57b(e).  Here, how-
ever, the question is not one of preserving pre-existing rem-
edies given by other statutory provisions.  The question is
whether those other provisions (namely, §13(b)) gave that
remedy in the first place.

Fourth, the Commission points out that the courts of ap-
peals  have,  until  recently,  consistently  accepted  its  inter-
pretation, and that Congress has in effect twice ratified that
interpretation in subsequent amendments to the Act.  See,
e.g., Brief for Respondent 8, and n. 3 (citing the similar con-
clusions of eight Circuits).  But see FTC v. Credit Bureau
Center, LLC, 937 F. 3d 764 (CA7 2019); FTC v. AbbVie Inc.,
976 F. 3d 327 (CA3 2020).  We have held that Congress’ ac-
quiescence to a settled judicial interpretation can suggest
adoption of that interpretation.  See, e.g., Monessen South-
western  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan,  486  U. S.  330,  338  (1988).    We
have also said, however, that when “Congress has not com-
prehensively revised a statutory scheme but has made only
isolated  amendments  . . . [i]t  is  impossible  to  assert  with
any  degree  of  assurance  that  congressional  failure  to  act
represents affirmative congressional approval of [a court’s]
statutory interpretation.”  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S.
275,  292  (2001)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  We
find this latter statement the more relevant here.

The two examples of acquiescence to which the Commis-
sion refers do not convince us that Congress acquiesced in
the  lower  courts’  interpretation.    The  Commission  first
points  to  amendments  that  Congress  made  to  the  Act  in
1994.  See  §10,  108  Stat.  1695–1696.    Those  two  amend-
ments, however, simply revised §13(b)’s venue, joinder, and
service rules, not its remedial provisions.  They tell us noth-
ing about the words “permanent injunction” in §13(b).

The Commission also points to amendments made to the
Act in 2006.  Those amendments modified the scope of §5 so
that,  where  certain  conduct  in  foreign  commerce  is  in-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other legal cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of the Court

whether the rescission was arbitrary and capricious in vio-
lation of the APA, and (3) whether the plaintiffs have stated
an equal protection claim.

II
The  dispute  before  the  Court  is  not  whether  DHS  may
rescind DACA.  All parties agree that it may.  The dispute
is  instead  primarily  about  the  procedure  the  agency  fol-
lowed in doing so.

The  APA  “sets  forth  the  procedures  by  which  federal
agencies  are  accountable  to  the  public  and  their  actions
subject to review by the courts.”  Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U. S. 788, 796 (1992).  It requires agencies to engage in
“reasoned  decisionmaking,”  Michigan  v.  EPA,  576  U. S.
743, 750 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), and di-
rects  that  agency  actions  be  “set  aside”  if  they  are  “arbi-
trary”  or  “capricious,”  5  U. S. C.  §706(2)(A).    Under  this
“narrow standard of review, . . . a court is not to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency,” FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 513 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted), but instead to assess only whether the de-
cision was “based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment,” Cit-
izens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402,
416 (1971).

But before determining whether the rescission was arbi-
trary  and  capricious,  we  must  first  address  the  Govern-
ment’s  contentions  that  DHS’s  decision  is  unreviewable
under the APA and outside this Court’s jurisdiction.

A
The  APA  establishes  a  “basic  presumption  of  judicial
review [for] one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency ac-
tion.’ ”  Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140
(1967) (quoting §702).  That presumption can be rebutted
by a showing that the relevant statute “preclude[s]” review,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal framework surrounding the rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and the applicable standards of review.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

15

BREYER, J., dissenting

want to accept those cards that many customers have and
use.  Ibid.  From this, the majority concludes that “courts
must  include  both  sides  of  the  platform—merchants  and
cardholders—when  defining  the  credit-card  market.”
Ante, at 12; accord, 838 F. 3d, at 197.

1
Missing from the majority’s analysis is any explanation
as  to  why,  given  the  purposes  that  market  definition
serves in antitrust law, the fact that a credit-card firm can
be  said  to  operate  a  “two-sided  transaction  platform”
means  that  its  merchant-related  and  shopper-related
services  should  be  combined  into  a  single  market.    The
phrase  “two-sided  transaction  platform”  is  not  one  of
antitrust  art—I  can  find  no  case  from  this  Court  using
those words.  The majority defines the phrase as covering
a business that “offers different products or services to two
different  groups  who  both  depend  on  the  platform  to  in
termediate  between  them,”  where  the  business  “cannot
make a sale to one side of the platform without simultane
ously  making  a  sale  to  the  other”  side  of  the  platform.
Ante, at 2.  I take from that definition that there are four
relevant  features  of  such  businesses  on  the  majority’s
account: they (1) offer different products or services, (2) to
different  groups  of  customers,  (3)  whom  the  “platform”
connects, (4) in simultaneous transactions.  See ibid.

What  is  it  about  businesses  with  those  four  features
that  the  majority  thinks  justifies  a  special  market-
definition  approach  for  them?    It  cannot  be  the  first  two
features—that  the  company  sells  different  products  to
different groups of customers.  Companies that sell multi
ple  products  to  multiple  types  of  customers  are  common
place.  A  firm  might  mine  for  gold,  which  it  refines  and
sells  both  to  dentists  in  the  form  of  fillings  and  to  inves
tors in the form of ingots.  Or, a firm might drill for both
oil  and  natural  gas.    Or  a  firm  might  make  both  ignition
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 585 U.S. ____ (2018).  It delves into the legal arguments surrounding market definition in antitrust law, focusing on the concept of "two-sided transaction platforms."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

Appeals’  brief  discussion  of  this  disparity  of  treatment  does  not  an-
swer Phillips’ concern that the State’s practice was to disfavor the re-
ligious basis of his objection.  Pp. 12–16.

(c) For these reasons, the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ case
violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws
or  regulations  on  hostility  to  a  religion  or  religious  viewpoint.    The
government,  consistent  with  the  Constitution’s  guarantee  of  free  ex-
ercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious be-
liefs  of  affected  citizens  and  cannot  act  in  a  manner  that  passes
judgment  upon  or  presupposes  the  illegitimacy  of  religious  beliefs
and  practices.  Church  of  Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508
U. S.  520.  Factors  relevant  to  the  assessment  of  governmental  neu-
trality include “the historical background of the decision under chal-
lenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official
policy  in  question,  and  the  legislative  or  administrative  history,  in-
cluding  contemporaneous  statements  made  by  members  of  the  deci-
sionmaking  body.”  Id.,  at  540.  In  view  of  these  factors,  the  record
here  demonstrates  that  the  Commission’s  consideration  of  Phillips’
case was neither tolerant nor respectful of his religious beliefs.  The
Commission gave “every appearance,” id., at 545, of adjudicating his
religious  objection  based  on  a  negative  normative  “evaluation  of  the
particular justification” for his objection and the religious grounds for
it, id., at 537, but government has no role in expressing or even sug-
gesting  whether  the  religious  ground  for  Phillips’  conscience-based
objection is legitimate or illegitimate.  The inference here is thus that
Phillips’  religious  objection  was  not  considered  with  the  neutrality
required by the Free Exercise Clause.  The State’s interest could have
been  weighed  against  Phillips’  sincere  religious  objections  in  a  way
consistent with the requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly
observed.  But the official expressions of hostility to religion in some
of  the  commissioners’  comments  were  inconsistent  with  that  re-
quirement, and the Commission’s disparate consideration of Phillips’
case  compared  to  the  cases  of  the  other  bakers  suggests  the  same.
Pp. 16–18.

370 P. 3d 272, reversed.

KENNEDY, J., delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and BREYER, ALITO, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  KAGAN, J.,
filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in  which  BREYER,  J.,  joined.    GORSUCH,  J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
GORSUCH, J., joined.  GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus. It summarizes the court's decision and reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1065

558 U. S.

November 30, 2009

No.  08–10575.  Dinkins  v.  Sebelius,  Secretary  of  Health

and  Human  Services,  ante,  p.  844;

No.  08–10617.  Ayres  v.  Virginia,  ante,  p.  845;
No.  08–10636.  Wilson  v.  Simpson,  Warden,  ante,  p.  846;
No.  08–10824.  Jones  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  856;
No. 08–10829.  Murray v.  Locke, State Medical Examiner,

et  al.,  ante,  p.  856;

No.  08–10956.  Blackshear  v.  Dowling  et  al.,  ante,  p.  863;
No.  08–10978.  White  v.  Donley,  Secretary  of  the  Air

Force,  et  al.,  ante,  p.  864;

No.  08–11007.  In  re  Brown,  ante,  p.  814;
No.  08–11036.  Diaz  v.  Florida,  ante,  p.  867;
No.  08–11066.  Shiraishi  v.  United  States,  ante,  p.  869;
No.  08–11084.  Williams  v.  William  Beaumont  Hospital,

ante,  p.  870;

No.  09–7.  Stevens  v.  Vons  Cos.,  Inc.,  ante,  p.  874;
No.  09–19.  Hill  v.  United  States  et  al.,  ante,  p.  874;
No.  09–44.  Cano  v.  Industrial  Commission  of  Arizona

No.  09–46.  United  States  ex  rel.  Vuyyuru  v.  Jadhav

et  al.,  ante,  p.  875;

et  al.,  ante,  p.  875;

No.  09–72.  Brocail  v.  Detroit  Tigers,  Inc.,  ante,  p.  877;
No.  09–99.  Patterson  v.  American  Federation  of  State,
County  and  Municipal  Employees,  AFL–CIO,  #2456,  ante,
p.  878;

No.  09–116.  Secarea  v.  Regents  of  the  University  of

California  et  al.,  ante,  p.  878;

No.  09–130.  Owens  v.  Steele,  Warden,  ante,  p.  879;
No.  09–133.  Morters  v.  Barr  et  al.,  ante,  p.  946;
No.  09–5046.  Haywood  v.  Tribeca  Lending  Corp.  et  al.,

ante,  p.  884;

No.  09–5047.  Hogues  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion,  ante,  p.  884;

No.  09–5058.  Patterson  v.  City  of  Chesapeake,  Virginia,

et  al.,  ante,  p.  885;

No.  09–5072.  Zahn  v.  City  of  San  Diego,  California,  ante,

p.  886;

No.  09–5082.  Weeks  v.  White’s  Mill  Colony,  Inc.,  ante,

p.  886;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal case orders, including case numbers, citations, and dates. It is not sequential narrative text and is likely a table of contents or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

71

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  20  U. S. C.  §1756  (Remedies  With  Respect  to

School District Lines)

  20 U. S. C. §2396 (Career and Technical Educa-
tion; Federal Laws Guaranteeing Civil Rights)

  20 U. S. C. §3401(2) (Department of Education;

Congressional Findings)

  20 U. S. C. §7231d(b)(2)(C) (Magnet Schools As-
sistance; Applications and Requirements)

  20 U. S. C. §7914 (Strengthening and Improve-
ment  of  Elementary  and  Secondary  Schools;
Civil Rights)

  22 U. S. C. §262p–4n (Foreign Relations and In-
tercourse; Equal Employment Opportunities)

  22 U. S. C. §2304(a)(1) (Human Rights and Se-

curity Assistance)

  22 U. S. C. §2314(g) (Furnishing of Defense Ar-
ticles or Related Training or Other Defense Ser-
vice on Grant Basis)

  22  U. S. C.  §2426  (Discrimination  Against

United States Personnel)

  22 U. S. C. §2504(a) (Peace Corps Volunteers)

  22  U. S. C.  §2661a  (Foreign  Contracts  or  Ar-

rangements; Discrimination)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely from a legal document.  It is not sequential text and does not appear to be the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–965
_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. HAWAII, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 26, 2018]

THOMAS, J., concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, which highlights just a few of
the many  problems with the plaintiffs’ claims.  There are
several more.  Section 1182(f) does not set forth any judi-
cially enforceable limits that constrain the President.  See
Webster  v.  Doe,  486  U. S.  592,  600  (1988).    Nor  could  it,
since  the  President  has  inherent  authority  to  exclude
aliens  from  the  country.
See  United  States  ex  rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy,  338  U. S.  537,  542–543  (1950);
accord,  Sessions  v.  Dimaya,  584  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2018)
(THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 13–14).  Further, the
Establishment  Clause  does  not  create  an  individual  right
to be free from all laws that a “reasonable observer” views
as religious or antireligious.  See Town of Greece v. Gallo-
way,  572  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2014)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in
part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 6); Elk Grove
Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 52–53 (2004)
(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).    The  plaintiffs
cannot  raise  any  other  First  Amendment  claim,  since  the
alleged  religious  discrimination  in  this  case  was  directed
at aliens abroad.  See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U. S. 259, 265 (1990).  And, even on its own terms, the
plaintiffs’  proffered  evidence  of  anti-Muslim  discrimina-
tion is unpersuasive.

Merits  aside,  I  write  separately  to  address  the  remedy
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Trump v. Hawaii.  It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 11-02-00 08:45:59
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3EV

Pagination Table: RULES1

AMENDMENTS TO
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

The following amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence were pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 17, 2000,
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2072, and were reported to Congress by The
Chief Justice on the same date. For the letter of transmittal, see post,
p. 1190. The Judicial Conference report referred to in that letter is not
reproduced herein.

Note that under 28 U. S. C. § 2074, such amendments shall take effect
no earlier than December 1 of the year in which they are transmitted to
Congress unless otherwise provided by law.

For earlier reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence, see 409 U. S.
1132. For earlier publication of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
amendments thereto, see 441 U. S. 1005, 480 U. S. 1023, 485 U. S. 1049,
493 U. S. 1173, 500 U. S. 1001, 507 U. S. 1187, 511 U. S. 1187, 520 U. S. 1323,
and 523 U. S. 1235.

1189
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be an introductory section to a document containing amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence. It provides information about the amendments' origin, effective date, and references to previous versions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Introductory Information/Legal Notice</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA

Opinion of the Court

Cal  Population  by  County  for  Jan.  2015,  pp. 4–5  (Sept.
2016) (identifying the required languages for Los Angeles
County  as  English,  Spanish,  Armenian,  Mandarin,  Can-
tonese,  Korean,  Vietnamese,  Farsi,  Tagalog,  Russian,
Cambodian, Other Chinese, and Arabic).

The  stated  purpose  of  the  FACT  Act,  including  its  li-
censed  notice  requirement,  is  to  “ensure  that  California
residents  make  their  personal  reproductive  health  care
decisions knowing their rights and the health care services
available  to  them.”    2015  Cal.  Legis.  Serv.  Ch.  700,  §2
(A. B.  775)  (West)  (Cal.  Legis.  Serv.).    The  Legislature
posited that “thousands of women remain unaware of the
public programs available to provide them with contracep-
tion,  health  education  and  counseling,  family  planning,
prenatal  care,  abortion,  or  delivery.”  §1(b).  Citing  the
“time  sensitive”  nature  of  pregnancy-related  decisions,
§1(c),  the  Legislature  concluded  that  requiring  licensed
facilities  to  inform  patients  themselves  would  be  “[t]he
most effective” way to convey this information, §1(d).

2
The second notice requirement in the FACT Act applies
to  “unlicensed  covered  facilit[ies].”  §123471(b).    To  fall
under  the  definition  of  “unlicensed  covered  facility,”  a
facility  must  not  be  licensed  by  the  State,  not  have  a  li-
censed  medical  provider  on  staff  or  under  contract,  and
have  the  “primary  purpose”  of  “providing  pregnancy-
related  services.”
Ibid.   An  unlicensed  covered  facility
also  must  satisfy  at  least  two  of  the  following  four
requirements:

“(1) The facility offers obstetric ultrasounds, obstetric
sonograms, or prenatal care to pregnant women.

“(2) The facility offers pregnancy testing or pregnancy
diagnosis.

“(3) The facility advertises or solicits patrons with of-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be legal text, specifically an excerpt from a court opinion. It includes citations, legal terminology, and discusses a specific law (the FACT Act).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

1

Opinion of ALITO, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 16–499
_________________

JOSEPH JESNER, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

ARAB BANK, PLC

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[April 24, 2018]

JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment.

Creating  causes  of  action  under  the  Alien  Tort  Statute
against  foreign  corporate  defendants  would  precipitate
exactly  the  sort  of  diplomatic  strife  that  the  law  was  en-
acted to prevent.  As a result, I agree with the Court that
we  should  not  take  that  step,  and  I  join  Parts  I,  II–B–1,
and II–C of the opinion of the Court.  I write separately to
elaborate  on  why  that  outcome  is  compelled  not  only  by
“judicial  caution,”  ante,  at  27  (majority  opinion),  but  also
by the separation of powers.

I
The  ATS  is  a  jurisdictional  statute.  It  provides  that
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
28  U. S. C.  §1350.    By  its  terms,  the  ATS  does  not  create
any causes of action.

In  Sosa v.  Alvarez-Machain, 542  U. S. 692 (2004), how-
ever,  this  Court  nevertheless  held  that  federal  courts,
exercising  their  authority  in  limited  circumstances  to
make  federal  common  law,  may  create  causes  of  action
that aliens may assert under the ATS.  That holding takes
some explaining.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes case citations, the names of the parties involved, and the name of the Justice writing the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the actual legal reasoning and decision-making process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

BARRETT, J., concurring

rights as well as structural provisions?  See Baude, Consti-
tutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 49–51 (2019) (can-
vassing  arguments).  The  historical  inquiry  presented  in
this  case  does  not  require  us  to  answer  such  questions,
which might make a difference in another case.  See ante,
at 17–19.

Second and relatedly, the Court avoids another “ongoing
scholarly debate on whether courts should primarily rely on
the  prevailing  understanding  of  an  individual  right  when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868” or when
the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791.  Ante, at 29.  Here,
the  lack  of  support  for  New  York’s  law  in  either  period
makes it unnecessary to choose between them.  But if 1791
is the benchmark, then New York’s appeals to Reconstruc-
tion-era history would fail for the independent reason that
this evidence is simply too late (in addition to too little).  Cf.
Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___, ___–
___ (2020) (slip op., at 15–16) (a practice that “arose in the
second half of the 19th century . . . cannot by itself establish
an early American tradition” informing our understanding
of the First Amendment).  So today’s decision should not be
understood  to  endorse  freewheeling  reliance  on  historical
practice from the mid-to-late 19th century to establish the
original meaning of the Bill of Rights.  On the contrary, the
Court  is  careful  to  caution  “against  giving  postenactment
history more weight than it can rightly bear.”  Ante, at 26.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Barrett in the case of New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen.  It delves into the historical context and legal arguments surrounding the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>