<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

13

KAGAN, J., dissenting

experience;  and  to  involve  policy  choices,  including  cost-
benefit assessments and trade-offs between conflicting val-
ues.  So  a  court  without  relevant  expertise  or  experience,
and  without  warrant  to  make  policy  calls,  appropriately
steps back.  The court still has a role to play: It polices the
agency to ensure that it acts within the zone of reasonable
options.  But the court does not insert itself into an agency’s
expertise-driven,  policy-laden  functions.  That  is  the  ar-
rangement best suited to keep every actor in its proper lane.
And it is the one best suited to ensure that Congress’s stat-
utes work in the way Congress intended.

The majority makes two points in reply, neither convinc-
ing.  First, it insists that “agencies have no special compe-
tence” in filling gaps or resolving ambiguities in regulatory
statutes;  rather,  “[c]ourts  do.”   Ante,  at  23.  Score  one  for
self-confidence;  maybe  not  so  high  for  self-reflection  or
-knowledge.   Of  course  courts  often  construe  legal  texts,
hopefully  well.  And  Chevron’s  first  step  takes  full  ad-
vantage of that talent: There, a court tries to divine what
Congress meant, even in the most complicated or abstruse
statutory schemes.  The deference comes in only if the court
cannot do so—if the court must admit that standard legal
tools will not avail to fill a statutory silence or give content
to  an  ambiguous  term.    That  is  when  the  issues  look  like
the ones I started off with: When does an alpha amino acid
polymer  qualify  as  a  “protein”?    How  distinct  is  “distinct”
for squirrel populations?  What size “geographic area” will
ensure  appropriate  hospital  reimbursement?    As  between
two equally feasible understandings of “stationary source,”
should one choose the one more protective of the environ-
ment or the one more favorable to economic growth?  The
idea that courts have “special competence” in deciding such
questions whereas agencies have “no[ne]” is, if I may say,
malarkey.    Answering  those  questions  right  does  not
mainly demand the interpretive skills courts possess.  In-
stead, it demands one or more of: subject-matter expertise,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion. It delves into the complexities of judicial deference to agency expertise, particularly in interpreting ambiguous statutory language. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of judicial writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

LUCIA v. SEC

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

§557(b).  The  Commission  can  review  any  initial  decision
upon  petition  or  on  its  own  initiative.    15  U. S. C.  §78d–
1(b).  The Commission’s review of an ALJ’s initial decision
is  de novo.    5  U. S. C.  §557(c).    It  can  “make  any  findings
or conclusions that in its judgment are proper and on the
basis  of  the  record.”    17  CFR  §201.411(a)  (2017).    The
Commission  is  also  in  no  way  confined  by  the  record  ini-
tially  developed  by  an  ALJ.  The  Commission  can  accept
evidence  itself  or  refer  a  matter  to  an  ALJ  to  take  addi-
tional  evidence  that  the  Commission  deems  relevant  or
necessary.  See ibid.; §201.452.  In recent years, the Com-
mission has accepted review in every case in which it was
sought.  See  R.  Jackson,  Fact  and  Fiction:  The  SEC’s
Oversight  of  Administrative  Law  Judges  (Mar.  9,  2018),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/03/09/fact-and-fiction-
the-secs-oversight-of-administrative-law-judges/
last
visited June 19, 2018).  Even where the Commission does
not  review  an  ALJ’s  initial  decision,  as  in  cases  in  which
no party petitions for review and the Commission does not
act sua sponte, the initial decision still only becomes final
when  the  Commission  enters  a  finality  order.    17  CFR.
§201.360(d)(2).  And  by  operation  of  law,  every  action
taken by an ALJ “shall, for all purposes, . . . be deemed the
action of the Commission.”  15 U. S. C. §78d–1(c) (empha-
In  other  words,  Commission  ALJs  do  not
sis  added).
exercise  significant  authority  because  they  do  not,  and
cannot, enter final, binding decisions against the  Govern-
ment or third parties.

(as

The  majority  concludes  that  this  case  is  controlled  by
Freytag  v.  Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991).  See ante,
at 6.  In Freytag, the Court suggested that the Tax Court’s
special  trial  judges  (STJs)  acted  as  constitutional  officers
even  in  cases  where  they  could  not  enter  final,  binding
decisions.  In  such  cases,  the  Court  noted,  the  STJs  pre-
sided over adversarial proceedings in which they exercised
“significant  discretion”  with  respect  to  “important  func-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the role of administrative law judges (ALJs) within the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and their relationship to the Commission's review process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of the Court

A majority of the Federal Circuit declined to revisit the
court’s decision en banc, 908 F. 3d 738 (2018) (per curiam);
see  also  id.,  at  740  (Newman,  J.,  dissenting);  id.,  at  741
(Wallach,  J.,  dissenting),  and  we  granted  certiorari,  588
U. S. ___ (2019).

These cases present three questions: First, did §1342 of
the  Affordable  Care  Act  obligate  the  Government  to  pay
participating  insurers  the  full  amount  calculated  by  that
statute?  Second,  did  the  obligation  survive  Congress’  ap-
propriations  riders?  And  third,  may  petitioners  sue  the
Government under the Tucker Act to recover on that obli-
gation?  Because our answer to each is yes, we reverse.

II
The Risk Corridors statute created a Government obliga-
tion  to  pay  insurers  the  full  amount  set  out  in  §1342’s
formula.

A
An “obligation” is a “definite commitment that creates a
legal liability of the government for the payment of goods
and  services  ordered  or  received,  or  a  legal  duty  . . .  that
could mature into a legal liability by virtue of actions on the
part  of  the  other  party  beyond  the  control  of  the  United
States.”  GAO,  A  Glossary  of  Terms  Used  in  the  Federal
Budget  Process  70  (GAO–05–734SP,  2005).  The  Govern-
ment may incur an obligation by contract or by statute.  See
ibid.

Incurring an obligation, of course, is different from pay-
ing one.  After all, the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause
provides that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but  in  Consequence  of  Appropriations  made  by  Law.”
Art. I, §9, cl. 7; see also GAO, Principles of Federal Appro-
priations  Law  2–3  (4th  ed.  2016)  (hereinafter  GAO
Redbook) (“[T]he authority to incur obligations by itself is
not  sufficient  to  authorize  payments  from  the  Treasury”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010)

17

Opinion of the Court

adequate  reading  of  the  exceptions  clause  that  results  in
the statute’s banning only the depictions the Government
would like to ban.

The  Government  explains  that  the  language  of  §48(b)
was largely drawn from our opinion in Miller v. California,
413  U. S.  15  (1973),  which  excepted  from  its  definition  of
obscenity  any  material  with  “serious  literary,  artistic,
political, or scientific value,” id., at 24.  See Reply Brief 8,
9, and n. 5.  According to the Government, this incorpora-
tion  of  the  Miller  standard  into  §48  is  therefore  surely
enough to answer any First Amendment objection.  Reply
Brief 8–9.

In Miller we held that “serious” value shields depictions
of  sex  from  regulation  as  obscenity.  413  U. S.,  at  24–25.
Limiting Miller’s exception to “serious” value ensured that
“ ‘[a]  quotation  from  Voltaire  in  the  flyleaf  of  a  book
[would]  not  constitutionally  redeem  an  otherwise  obscene
publication.’ ”  Id.,  at  25,  n. 7  (quoting  Kois  v.  Wisconsin,
408 U. S. 229, 231 (1972) (per curiam)).  We did not, how-
ever,  determine  that  serious  value  could  be  used  as  a
general precondition to protecting other types of speech in
the first place.  Most of what we say to one another lacks
“religious,  political,  scientific,  educational,  journalistic,
historical, or artistic value” (let alone serious value), but it
is  still  sheltered  from  government  regulation.    Even
“ ‘[w]holly  neutral  futilities  . . .  come  under  the  protection
of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s ser-
mons.’ ”  Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 25 (1971) (quot-
ing Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting); alteration in original).

Thus,  the  protection  of  the  First  Amendment  presump-
tively extends to many forms of speech that do not qualify
for  the  serious-value  exception  of  §48(b),  but  nonetheless
fall within the broad reach of §48(c).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the First Amendment and the interpretation of a specific statute (likely related to obscenity).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

GALLARDO v. MARSTILLER

Opinion of the Court

for Petitioner 32.  Not so.  Section 1396k(a)(1)(A) only as-
signs “any rights . . . of the individual” (emphasis added),
which is most naturally read as covering those rights “the
individual”  possesses  while  on  Medicaid.  We  must  also
read §1396k(a)(1)(A)’s text in light of background legal prin-
ciples, and it is blackletter law that assignments typically
cover “only [those] rights possessed by the assignors at the
time  of  the  assignments,”  United  States  v.  Central  Gulf
Lines,  Inc.,  974  F. 2d  621,  629  (CA5  1992);  see  also  6A
C. J. S., Assignments §88 (2022), or those rights “expected
to  arise  out  of  an  existing  . . .  relationship,”  see  Restate-
ment  (Second)  of  Contracts  §321(1)  (1981);  see  also  9
A. Corbin, Contracts §50.1 (2022).  Given that legal back-
drop, §1396k(a)(1)(A) cannot cover the sort of “lifetime as-
signment” Gallardo invokes.5

*
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of

*

*

Appeals.

It is so ordered.

——————

5 Florida  also  suggested  at  argument  that  §1396k(a)(1)(A)  includes  a
germaneness requirement such that the assignment extends only to pay-
ments for medical care germane—i.e., related—to an injury or illness for
which Medicaid covered treatment.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 69.  However,
we have no adversary briefing on this issue and no cause to resolve it.  It
is undisputed that the settlement from which Florida seeks recovery is
germane  to  the  injury  for  which  Florida  paid  out  Medicaid  funds,  and
Florida law requires as much.  See Fla. Stat. §409.910(6)(c).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the part where the court explains its reasoning for affirming a judgment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

LUCIA v. SEC

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J.

respect  is  often  highly  relevant.    Congress’  leeway  is  not,
of  course,  absolute—it  may  not,  for  example,  say  that
positions the Constitution itself describes as “Officers” are
not “Officers.”  But given the constitutional language, the
Court, when deciding whether other positions are “Officers
of  the  United  States”  under  the  Appointments  Clause,
should give substantial weight to Congress’ decision.

How  is  the  Court  to  decide  whether  Congress  intended
that the holder of a particular Government position count
as an “Office[r] of the United States”?  Congress might, of
course, write explicitly into the statute that the employee
“is an officer of the United States under the Appointments
Clause,”  but  an  explicit  phrase  of  this  kind  is  unlikely  to
appear.  If it does not, then I would approach the question
like  any  other  difficult  question  of  statutory  interpreta-
tion.  Several  considerations,  among  others,  are  likely  to
be  relevant.  First,  as  the  Court  said  in  Freytag  v.  Com-
missioner,  501  U. S.  868,  881  (1991),  and  repeats  today,
ante,  at  6,  where  Congress  grants  an  appointee  “ ‘signifi-
cant authority pursuant to the laws to the United States,’ ”
that supports the view that (but should not determinatively
decide that) Congress made that appointee an “Office[r] of
the United States.”  Freytag, supra, at 881 (quoting Buck-
ley, 424 U. S., at 126); see also United States v. Germaine,
99  U. S.  508,  511  (1879)  (holding  that  the  term  “officer”
“embraces  the  ideas  of  tenure,  duration,  emolument,  and
duties”).  The means of appointment that Congress chooses
is  also  instructive.    Where  Congress  provides  a  method
of  appointment  that  mimics  a  method  the  Appointments
Clause  allows  for  “Officers,”  that  fact  too  supports  the
view that (but does not determinatively decide that) Con-
gress viewed the position as one to be held by an “Officer,”
and  vice  versa.  See  id.,  at  509–511.  And  the  Court’s
decision  in  Free  Enterprise  Fund  suggests  a  third  indica-
tion of “Officer” status—did Congress provide the position
with removal protections that would be unconstitutional if
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring/dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the interpretation of the Appointments Clause of the US Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

discovered  through  the  exercise  of  due  diligence.”
§2254(e)(2)(A).    And  even  if  a  prisoner  can  satisfy  one  of
those  two  exceptions,  he  must  also  show  that  the  desired
evidence would demonstrate, “by clear and convincing evi-
dence,”  that  “no  reasonable  factfinder”  would  have  con-
victed him of the charged crime.  §2254(e)(2)(B).  Thus, alt-
hough  state  prisoners  may  occasionally  submit  new
evidence in federal court, “AEDPA’s statutory scheme is de-
signed to strongly discourage them from doing so.”  Pinhol-
ster, 563 U. S., at 186; see also Michael Williams, 529 U. S.,
at 437 (“Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alterna-
tive forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made
insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.”).

We  have  explained  that  a  federal  court,  in  deciding
whether to grant an evidentiary hearing or “otherwise con-
sider new evidence” under §2254(e)(2), must first take into
account these restrictions.  Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596
U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 21); see also Schriro, 550
U. S., at 474.  The reasons for this are familiar.  A federal
court “may never needlessly prolong a habeas case, particu-
larly  given  the  essential  need  to  promote  the  finality  of
state  convictions,”  so  a  court  must,  before  facilitating  the
development of new evidence, determine that it could be le-
gally considered in the prisoner’s case.  Shinn, 596 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 21) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted);  see  also  Bracy  v.  Gramley,  520  U. S.  899,  904
(1997) (“A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant
in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of
ordinary course.”).  If §2254(e)(2) applies and the prisoner
cannot  satisfy  its  “stringent  requirements,”  Michael  Wil-
liams, 529 U. S., at 433, holding an evidentiary hearing or
otherwise expanding the state-court record would “prolong
federal  habeas  proceedings  with  no  purpose,”  Shinn,  596
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  And that would in turn disturb the “State’s significant
interest in repose for concluded litigation.”  Harrington, 562
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, discusses legal precedent, and analyzes a specific legal issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

BREYER, J., dissenting

quo corruption to mean no more than “a direct exchange of
an official act for money”—an act akin to bribery.   Ante, at
2–3.  It  adds  specifically  that  corruption  does  not  include
efforts  to  “garner  ‘influence  over  or  access  to’  elected  offi
cials  or  political  parties.”  Ante,  at  19  (quoting  Citizens
United,  supra,  at  359).   Moreover,  the  Government’s  ef
forts to prevent the “appearance of corruption” are “equally
confined  to  the  appearance  of  quid  pro  quo  corruption,”
as narrowly defined.  Ante, at 19.  In the plurality’s view, a
federal statute could not prevent an individual from writ
ing a million dollar check to a political party (by donating
to  its  various  committees),  because  the  rationale  for  any
limit  would  “dangerously  broade[n]  the  circumscribed
definition  of  quid  pro  quo  corruption  articulated  in  our
prior cases.”  Ante, at 37.

This  critically  important  definition  of  “corruption”  is
inconsistent  with  the  Court’s  prior  case  law  (with  the
possible  exception  of  Citizens  United,  as  I  will  explain
below).  It  is  virtually  impossible  to  reconcile  with  this
Court’s  decision  in  McConnell,  upholding  the  Bipartisan
Campaign  Reform  Act  of  2002  (BCRA).    And  it  misun-
derstands  the  constitutional  importance  of  the  interests
at  stake.
interests—indeed,
fact,  constitutional
First Amendment interests—lie on both sides of the legal
equation.

In

A

In  reality,  as  the  history  of  campaign  finance  reform

shows and as our earlier cases on the subject have recog
nized,  the  anticorruption  interest  that  drives  Congress  to
regulate  campaign  contributions  is  a  far  broader,  more
important interest than the plurality acknowledges.  It is
an  interest  in  maintaining  the  integrity  of  our  public
governmental institutions.  And it is an interest rooted in
the Constitution and in the First Amendment itself.

Consider at least one reason why the First Amendment
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the definition of "corruption" in the context of campaign finance law and argues against the plurality opinion's narrow interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 14–7955
_________________

RICHARD E. GLOSSIP, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

KEVIN J. GROSS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[June 29, 2015]

 JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG  joins,

dissenting.

For the reasons stated in JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s opinion,
I dissent from the Court’s holding. But rather than try to
patch up the death penalty’s legal wounds one at a time, I
would  ask  for  full  briefing  on  a  more  basic  question:
whether the death penalty violates the Constitution.

The relevant legal standard is the standard set forth in
the  Eighth  Amendment.    The  Constitution  there  forbids
the  “inflict[ion]”  of  “cruel  and  unusual  punishments.”
Amdt.  8.  The  Court  has  recognized  that  a  “claim  that
punishment  is  excessive  is  judged  not  by  the  standards
that  prevailed  in  1685  when  Lord  Jeffreys  presided  over
the ‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of Rights was adopted,
but  rather  by  those  that  currently  prevail.”    Atkins  v.
Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 311 (2002).  Indeed, the Constitu
tion  prohibits  various  gruesome  punishments  that  were
common  in  Blackstone’s  day.    See  4  W.  Blackstone,  Com
mentaries on the Laws of England 369–370 (1769) (listing
mutilation and dismembering, among other punishments).
Nearly  40  years  ago,  this  Court  upheld  the  death  pen
alty  under  statutes  that,  in  the  Court’s  view,  contained
safeguards  sufficient  to  ensure  that  the  penalty  would  be
applied reliably and not arbitrarily.  See Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U. S. 153, 187 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the name of the justice, the case name, and the date. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

15

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

individuals Congress has deemed deportable or removable.”
Texas  v.  United  States,  86  F. Supp. 3d  591,  654  (SD  Tex.
2015).  The immigration statutes contain a level of granular
specificity that is exceedingly rare in the modern adminis-
trative state.  It defies all logic and common sense to con-
clude  that  a  statutory  scheme  detailed  enough  to  provide
conditional lawful presence to groups as narrowly defined
as  “alien  entrepreneurs,”  §1186b,  is  simultaneously  capa-
cious  enough  for  DHS  to  grant  lawful  presence  to  almost
two million illegal aliens with the stroke of a Cabinet secre-
tary’s pen.

B
Then-Attorney General Sessions concluded that the ini-
tial  DACA  program  suffered  from  the  “same  legal  . . .  de-
fects”  as  DAPA  and  expanded  DACA,  finding  that,  like
those programs, DACA was implemented without statutory
authority.  App. 877–878.  Not only was this determination
correct, but it is also dispositive for purposes of our review.
“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power . . .
is limited to the authority granted by Congress.”  Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 208 (1988).  DHS
had no authority here to create DACA, and the unlawful-
ness of that program is a sufficient justification for its re-
scission.

The  majority  opts  for  a  different  path,  all  but  ignoring
DACA’s substantive legal defect.  See ante, at 18–19.  On
the majority’s understanding of APA review, DHS was re-
quired to provide additional policy justifications in order to
rescind an action that it had no authority to take.  This rule
“has  no  basis  in  our  jurisprudence,  and  support  for  [it]  is
conspicuously absent from the Court’s opinion.”  Massachu-
setts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497, 536 (2007) (ROBERTS, C. J., dis-
senting).

The lack of support for the majority’s position is hardly
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California*.  It discusses the legality of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and the reasoning behind its rescission.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA

Opinion of the Court

Ibid.    The

unrelated  to  achieving  its  purported  goal.”
North  Carolina  Supreme  Court  reversed,  concluding  that
the  law  is  “constitutional  in  all  respects.”    368  N. C.,  at
381,  777  S. E.  2d,  at  741.    Among  other  things,  the  court
explained that the law is “carefully tailored . . . to prohibit
registered  sex  offenders  from  accessing  only  those  Web
sites  that  allow  them  the  opportunity  to  gather  infor-
mation  about  minors.”  Id.,  at  389,  777  S. E.  2d,  at  747.
The  court  also  held  that  the  law  leaves  open  adequate
alternative  means  of  communication  because  it  permits
petitioner  to  gain  access  to  websites  that  the  court  be-
lieved  perform  the  “same  or  similar”  functions  as  social
media,  such  as  the  Paula  Deen  Network  and  the  website
for  the  local  NBC  affiliate.  Id.,  at  390,  777  S. E.  2d,  at
747.  Two  justices  dissented.  They  stated  that  the  law
impermissibly  “creates  a  criminal  prohibition  of  alarming
breadth and extends well beyond the evils the State seeks
to  combat.”  Id.,  at  401,  777  S. E.  2d,  at  754  (opinion  of
Hudson,  J.)  (alteration,  citation,  and  internal  quotation
marks omitted).

The  Court  granted  certiorari,  580  U. S.  ___  (2016),  and

now reverses.

II
A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that
all  persons  have  access  to  places  where  they  can  speak
and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once
more.  The Court has sought to protect the right to speak
in this spatial context.  A basic rule, for example, is that a
street or a park is a quintessential forum for the exercise
of  First  Amendment  rights.  See  Ward  v.  Rock  Against
Racism,  491  U. S.  781,  796  (1989).  Even  in  the  modern
era, these places are still essential venues for public gath-
erings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply
to learn and inquire.

While  in  the  past  there  may  have  been  difficulty  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses a case involving internet access for registered sex offenders and the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

529

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

that could not have anticipated the liability, and the extent
of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the par-
ties’ experience.

C

We believe that the Coal Act’s allocation scheme, as ap-
plied to Eastern, presents such a case. We reach that con-
clusion by applying the three factors that traditionally have
informed our regulatory takings analysis. Although Jus-
tice Kennedy and Justice Breyer would pursue a differ-
ent course in evaluating the constitutionality of the Coal Act,
they acknowledge that this Court’s opinions in Connolly and
Concrete Pipe indicate that the regulatory takings frame-
work is germane to legislation of this sort. See post, at 545–
546 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part); post, at 555–556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

As to the ﬁrst factor relevant in assessing whether a reg-
ulatory taking has occurred, economic impact, there is no
doubt that the Coal Act has forced a considerable ﬁnancial
burden upon Eastern. The parties estimate that Eastern’s
cumulative payments under the Act will be on the order of
$50 to $100 million. See Brief for Petitioner 2 ($100 million);
Brief for Respondents UMWA Combined Beneﬁt Fund et al.
46 ($51 million). Eastern’s liability is thus substantial, and
the company is clearly deprived of the amounts it must pay
the Combined Fund. See Connolly, 475 U. S., at 222. The
fact that the Federal Government has not speciﬁed the assets
that Eastern must use to satisfy its obligation does not ne-
It is clear that the Act requires Eastern
gate that impact.
to turn over a dollar amount established by the Commis-
sioner under a timetable set by the Act, with the threat of
severe penalty if Eastern fails to comply. See 26 U. S. C.
§§ 9704(a) and (b) (directing liable operators to pay annual
premiums as computed by the Commissioner); § 9707 (impos-
ing, with limited exceptions, a penalty of $100 per day per
eligible beneﬁciary if payment is not made in accordance
with § 9704).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the economic impact of a regulation on a company and applies a legal framework to determine if the regulation constitutes a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

boat—this  Court  had  no  occasion  to  address  the  matter.2
On that sole ground, and reaching no other issue, I dissent
from the Court’s judgment.

——————

2  The  Montana  Supreme  Court’s  decision  leaves  parents  where  they
would  be  had the  State  never  enacted  a  scholarship  program.    In  that
event, no one would argue that Montana was obliged to provide such a
program solely for parents who send their children to religious schools.
But  cf.  ante,  at  13  (ALITO,  J.,  concurring)  (inapt  reference  to  Anatole
France’s remark).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from Justice Ginsburg. It's part of a larger legal argument and not standalone text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Snippet</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  MARIETTA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEE HEALTH

BENEFIT PLAN v. DAVITA INC.
Syllabus

covered individuals.  Pp. 4–7.

(a) Section 1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii) prohibits a plan from differentiating in
benefits  between  individuals  with  and  without  end-stage  renal  dis-
ease.  Because the Marietta Plan’s terms apply uniformly to individu-
als with and without end-stage renal disease, the Plan does not “dif-
ferentiate  in  the  benefits  it  provides  between  individuals”  with  and
without end-stage renal disease.  DaVita argues that the statute au-
thorizes liability even when a plan limits benefits in a uniform way if
the limitation on benefits has a disparate impact on individuals with
end-stage renal disease.  But the text of the statute cannot be read to
encompass a disparate-impact theory.  The statutory provision simply
coordinates payments between group health plans and Medicare; the
statute  does  not  dictate  any  particular  level  of  dialysis  coverage.
Pp. 4–7.

(b) DaVita’s  contention  that  a  plan  that  provides  limited  coverage
for outpatient dialysis impermissibly “take[s] into account” the Medi-
care eligibility of plan participants with end-stage renal disease fails
for  the  same  reason.    Because  the  Marietta  Plan  provides  the  same
outpatient dialysis benefits to all Plan participants, whether or not a
participant is entitled to or eligible for Medicare, the Plan cannot be
said to “take into account” whether its participants are entitled to or
eligible for Medicare.  Pp. 7.

978 F. 3d 326, reversed and remanded.

  KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  THOMAS,  BREYER,  ALITO,  GORSUCH,  and  BARRETT  JJ.,  joined.
KAGAN, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which SOTOMAYOR, J.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal syllabus, summarizing a court case. It is not the actual content of the book and is not meant to be read and understood in the same way.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19A1070
_________________

CALVARY CHAPEL DAYTON VALLEY v. STEVE
SISOLAK, GOVERNOR OF NEVADA, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

[July 24, 2020]

  JUSTICE GORSUCH, dissenting from denial of application
for injunctive relief.
  This is a simple case.  Under the Governor’s edict, a 10-
screen “multiplex” may host 500 moviegoers at any time.  A
casino, too, may cater to hundreds at once, with perhaps six
people huddled at each craps table here and a similar num-
ber  gathered  around  every  roulette  wheel  there.    Large
numbers  and  close  quarters  are  fine  in  such  places.    But
churches,  synagogues,  and  mosques  are  banned  from  ad-
mitting  more  than  50  worshippers—no  matter  how  large
the building, how distant the individuals, how many wear
face masks, no matter the precautions at all.  In Nevada, it
seems,  it  is  better  to  be  in  entertainment  than  religion.
Maybe that is nothing new.  But the First Amendment pro-
hibits  such  obvious  discrimination  against  the  exercise  of
religion.  The world we inhabit today, with a pandemic upon
us,  poses  unusual  challenges.    But  there  is  no  world  in
which  the  Constitution  permits  Nevada  to  favor  Caesars
Palace over Calvary Chapel.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It discusses a case involving restrictions on religious gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN

BREYER, J., dissenting

carriage  outright,  26  States  had  “may  issue”  licensing  re-
gimes, 7 States had “shall issue” regimes, and 1 State (Ver-
mont) allowed concealed carriage  without a permit.  Con-
gressional Research Service, Gun Control: Concealed Carry
Legislation in the 115th Congress 1 (Jan. 30, 2018).  Thus,
it  has  only  been  in  the  last  few  decades  that  States  have
shifted  toward  “shall  issue”  licensing  laws.    Prior  to  that,
most States operated “may issue” licensing regimes without
legal or practical problem.

Moreover, even considering, as the Court does, only the
present state of play, its tally provides an incomplete pic-
ture because it accounts for only the number of States with
“may issue” regimes, not the number of people governed by
those regimes.  By the Court’s count, the seven “may issue”
jurisdictions are New York, California, Hawaii, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia.
Ante, at 5–6.  Together, these seven jurisdictions comprise
about 84.4 million people and account for over a quarter of
the country’s population.  U. S. Census Bureau, 2020 Pop-
ulation  and  Housing  State  Data  (Aug.  12,  2021)  (2020
Population), https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/
interactive/2020-population-and-housing-state-data.html.
Thus, “may issue” laws can hardly be described as a mar-
ginal or outdated regime.

And there are good reasons why these seven jurisdictions
may have chosen not to follow other States in shifting to-
ward “shall issue” regimes.  The seven remaining “may is-
sue” jurisdictions are among the most densely populated in
the United States: the District of Columbia (with an aver-
age  of  11,280.0  people/square  mile  in  2020),  New  Jersey
(1,263.0),  Massachusetts  (901.2),  Maryland  (636.1),  New
York (428.7), California (253.7), and Hawaii (226.6).  U. S.
Census Bureau, Historical Population Density (1910–2020)
(Apr.  26,  2001),  https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-
series/dec/density-data-text.html.  In comparison, the aver-
age population density of the United States as a whole is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the history and prevalence of "may issue" and "shall issue" gun licensing regimes in the United States.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
918

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5764.  Dryden  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  563  F.  3d  1168.

No.  09–5766.  Moore  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  688.

No.  09–5769.  Arteaga-Giron  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  428.

No.  09–5771.  Venson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  543.

No.  09–5772.  Vann  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–5773.  Batavichus  v.  Holder,  Attorney  General.

C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5775.  Rosado  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  198.

No.  09–5779.  Hunter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  558  F.  3d  495.

No.  09–5781.  Shelton,  aka  Henderson  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.
Appx.  530.

No.  09–5782.  Simba  v.  Branch  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  841.

No.  09–5783.  Ramos  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5784.  Jerdine  v.  West  Virginia.  Cir.  Ct.  Kanawha

County,  W. Va.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5785.  Creed  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  330  Fed.  Appx.  771.

No. 09–5786.  James v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5787.  Ford  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading comprehension.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA

Opinion of the Court

rizes how we should approach the question of disestablish-
ment into three “steps.”  It reads Solem as requiring us to
examine the laws passed by Congress at the first step, con-
temporary events at the second, and even later events and
demographics at the third.  On the State’s account, we have
so far finished only the first step; two more await.

This is mistaken.  When interpreting Congress’s work in
this arena, no less than any other, our charge is usually to
ascertain and follow the original meaning of the law before
us.  New  Prime  Inc.  v.  Oliveira,  586  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)
(slip op., at 6).  That is the only “step” proper for a court of
law.  To be sure, if during the course of our work an ambig-
uous statutory term or phrase emerges, we will sometimes
consult contemporaneous usages, customs, and practices to
the extent they shed light on the meaning of the language
in question at the time of enactment.  Ibid.  But Oklahoma
does not point to any ambiguous language in any of the rel-
evant statutes that could plausibly be read as an Act of dis-
establishment.  Nor may a court favor contemporaneous or
later practices instead of the laws Congress passed.  As So-
lem explained, “[o]nce a block of land is set aside for an In-
dian reservation and no matter what happens to the title of
individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its
reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates other-
wise.”  465 U. S., at 470 (citing United States v. Celestine,
215 U. S. 278, 285 (1909)).

Still, Oklahoma reminds us that other language in Solem
isn’t  so  constrained.  In  particular,  the  State  highlights  a
passage  suggesting  that  “[w]here  non-Indian  settlers
flooded  into  the  opened  portion  of  a  reservation  and  the
area  has  long  since  lost  its  Indian  character,  we  have
acknowledged  that  de  facto,  if  not  de  jure,  diminishment
may have occurred.”  465 U. S., at 471.  While acknowledg-
ing that resort to subsequent demographics was “an unor-
thodox  and  potentially  unreliable  method  of  statutory  in-
terpretation,”  the  Court  seemed  nonetheless  taken  by  its
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA. It delves into legal interpretation and cites previous rulings, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

87

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered the main body text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:26] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1049

529 U. S.

March 27, 2000

addition to anti-development attitudes and vesting problems,
property owners and developers are confronting decisions of state
courts which either ignore or do not follow the ‘essential nexus’
standard set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n to
validate development exactions” (footnote omitted)); M. Berger,
Recent Developments in the Law of Inverse Condemnation, Q203
ALI–ABA Video Law Review Study 1, 4 (1991) (“Last year, we
noted that the California appellate courts had reacted to the Su-
preme Court’s decisions in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, (1987) 482 U. S. 304 and Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm’n (1987) 483 U. S. 825 by seeking
ways to evade their evident mandate, either procedurally or sub-
stantively”). Were they the only arguable bases for the decision
I would favor summary reversal, and remand for conduct of the
Nollan-Dolan analysis. The third basis, however, is at least a
plausible one, and raises a question that will doubtless be pre-
sented in many cases. Though I am unaware of a conﬂict of
authority on the precise point, the other grounds upon which the
court relied entitle this case to our attention, and should overcome
our usual preference for cases that present actual conﬂicts.
I
would therefore grant certiorari and schedule the case for
argument.

No. 99–1081. Town of Muldrow et al. v. Sequoyah County
Rural Water District No. 7. C. A. 10th Cir. Motions of Ala-
bama Water and Wastewater Institute et al., Water Works and
Sewer Board of Birmingham, Texas Municipal League et al., City
of Broken Arrow et al., and Greenville Utilities Commission for
leave to ﬁle briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 191 F. 3d 1192.

Jay v. AT&T Corp. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-
No. 99–1324.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consider-
tiorari denied.
ation or decision of this petition. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 641.

Rehearing Denied

No. 98–9959. Gulley v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee

County, 528 U. S. 862;

No. 99–7028. Fisher v. Varner, Superintendent, State

Correctional Institution at Retreat, 528 U. S. 1092;

No. 99–7375. Champion v. United States, 528 U. S. 1128; and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a section of a court opinion or a legal journal. It contains citations, legal terminology, and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

Justice Byron White aptly put it in his dissent, the decision
represented the “exercise of raw judicial power,” 410 U. S.,
at 222, and it sparked a national controversy that has em-
bittered our political culture for a half century.4
  Eventually, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992), the Court revisited Roe, but the
Members of the Court  split three ways.  Two Justices ex-
pressed no desire to change Roe in any way.5  Four others
wanted  to  overrule  the  decision  in  its  entirety.6    And  the
three remaining Justices, who jointly signed the controlling
opinion,  took  a  third  position.7    Their  opinion  did  not  en-
dorse Roe’s reasoning, and it even hinted that one or more
of its authors might have “reservations” about whether the
Constitution protects a right to abortion.8  But the opinion
concluded that stare decisis, which calls for prior decisions
to  be  followed  in  most  instances,  required  adherence  to
what it called Roe’s “central holding”—that a State may not
constitutionally protect fetal life before “viability”—even if
that  holding  was  wrong.9   Anything  less,  the  opinion
claimed,  would  undermine  respect  for  this  Court  and  the
rule of law.

Paradoxically, the judgment in Casey did a fair amount
of  overruling.  Several  important  abortion  decisions  were

——————

4 See  R.  Ginsburg,  Speaking  in  a  Judicial  Voice,  67  N. Y.  U.  L. Rev.
1185, 1208 (1992) (“Roe . . . halted a political process that was moving in
a  reform  direction  and  thereby,  I  believed,  prolonged  divisiveness  and
deferred stable settlement of the issue”).

5 See 505 U. S., at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id., at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-
ment in part, and dissenting in part).

6 See id., at 944 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part); id., at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).

7 See id., at 843 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
8 Id., at 853.
9 Id., at 860.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the landmark case Roe v. Wade and its subsequent interpretation in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

believe that a given group is the target of discrimination,
and  they  do  not,  as  a  general  matter,  violate  the  First  or
Fourteenth Amendments”).

When  it  comes  to  weddings,  it  can  be  assumed  that  a
member  of  the  clergy  who  objects  to  gay  marriage  on
moral  and  religious  grounds  could  not  be  compelled  to
perform the ceremony without denial of his or her right to
the  free  exercise  of  religion.    This  refusal  would  be  well
understood  in  our  constitutional  order  as  an  exercise  of
religion, an exercise that gay persons could recognize and
accept  without serious diminishment to their own dignity
and worth.  Yet if that exception were not confined, then a
long  list  of  persons  who  provide  goods  and  services  for
marriages  and  weddings  might  refuse  to  do  so  for  gay
persons,  thus  resulting  in  a  community-wide  stigma  in-
consistent  with  the  history  and  dynamics  of  civil  rights
laws  that  ensure  equal  access  to  goods,  services,  and
public accommodations.

It  is  unexceptional  that  Colorado  law  can  protect  gay
persons, just as it can protect other classes of individuals,
in  acquiring  whatever  products  and  services  they  choose
on  the  same  terms  and  conditions  as  are  offered  to  other
members of the public.  And there are no doubt innumera-
ble  goods  and  services  that  no  one  could  argue  implicate
the  First  Amendment.    Petitioners  conceded,  moreover,
that  if  a  baker  refused  to  sell  any  goods  or  any  cakes  for
gay  weddings,  that  would  be  a  different  matter  and  the
State  would  have  a  strong  case  under  this  Court’s  prece-
dents  that  this  would  be  a  denial  of  goods  and  services
that  went  beyond  any  protected  rights  of  a  baker  who
offers  goods  and  services  to  the  general  public  and  is
subject  to  a  neutrally  applied  and  generally  applicable
public accommodations law.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–7, 10.

Phillips  claims,  however,  that  a  narrower  issue  is  pre-
sented.  He argues that he had to use his artistic skills to
make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It delves into the intersection of religious freedom and anti-discrimination laws in the context of a baker refusing to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  556 U. S. ____ (2009)

11

Opinion of the Court

to  the  effluent  reduction  benefits  to  be  achieved.”
§1314(b)(1)(B).  In applying the BCT test it is instructed to
consider “the reasonableness of the relationship between the
costs  of  attaining  a  reduction  in  effluents  and  the  effluent
reduction  benefits  derived.”
  §1314(b)(4)(B)  (emphasis
added).    And  in  applying  the  BATEA  and  BADT  tests  the
EPA  is  instructed  to  consider  the  “cost  of  achieving  such
effluent  reduction.”    §§1314(b)(2)(B),  1316(b)(1)(B).  There
is no such elucidating language applicable to the BTA test
at issue here.  To facilitate comparison, the texts of these
five tests, the clarifying factors applicable to them, and the
entities to which they apply are set forth in the Appendix,
infra.

The  Second  Circuit,  in  rejecting  the  EPA’s  use  of  cost-
benefit analysis, relied in part on the propositions that (1)
cost-benefit  analysis  is  precluded  under  the  BATEA  and
BADT  tests;  and  (2)  that,  insofar  as  the  permissibility  of
cost-benefit analysis is concerned, the BTA test (the one at
issue here) is to be treated the same as those two.  See 475
F. 3d, at 98.  It is not obvious to us that the first of these
propositions is correct, but we need not pursue that point,
since  we  assuredly  do  not  agree  with  the  second.    It  is
certainly  reasonable  for  the  agency  to  conclude  that  the
BTA  test  need  not  be  interpreted  to  permit  only  what
those  other  two  tests  permit.    Its  text  is  not  identical  to
theirs.  It  has  the  relatively  modest  goal  of  “minimizing
adverse  environmental  impact”  as  compared  with  the
BATEA’s  goal  of  “eliminating  the  discharge  of  all  pollut-
ants.”  And  it  is  unencumbered  by  specified  statutory
factors of the sort provided for those other two tests, which
omission can reasonably be interpreted to suggest that the
EPA  is  accorded  greater  discretion  in  determining  its
precise content.

Respondents  and  the  dissent  argue  that  the  mere  fact
that  §1326(b)  does  not  expressly  authorize  cost-benefit
analysis for the BTA test, though it does so for two of the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the interpretation of a specific statute (likely related to environmental regulations) and the permissibility of cost-benefit analysis in its application.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

Opinion of the Court

Executive Branch.  As the head of that branch, the Presi-
dent  “occupies  a  unique  position  in  the  constitutional
scheme.”  Nixon  v.  Fitzgerald,  457  U. S.  731,  749  (1982).
His duties, which range from faithfully executing the laws
to commanding the Armed Forces, are of unrivaled gravity
and breadth.  Quite appropriately, those duties come with
protections  that  safeguard  the  President’s  ability  to  per-
form his vital functions.  See, e.g., ibid. (concluding that the
President enjoys “absolute immunity from damages liabil-
ity predicated on his official acts”); Nixon, 418 U. S., at 708
(recognizing  that  presidential  communications  are  pre-
sumptively privileged).

In addition, the Constitution guarantees “the entire inde-
pendence of the General Government from any control by
the respective States.”  Farmers and Mechanics Sav. Bank
of Minneapolis v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 521 (1914).  As
we have often repeated, “States have no power . . . to retard,
impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of
the constitutional laws enacted by Congress.”  McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (1819).  It follows that States
also lack the power to impede the President’s execution of
those laws.

Marshall’s  ruling  in  Burr,  entrenched  by  200  years  of
practice  and  our  decision  in  Nixon,  confirms  that  federal
criminal subpoenas do not “rise to the level of constitution-
ally forbidden impairment of the Executive’s ability to per-
form its constitutionally mandated functions.”  Clinton, 520
U. S., at 702–703.  But the President, joined in part by the
Solicitor  General,  argues  that  state  criminal  subpoenas
pose  a  unique  threat  of  impairment  and  thus  demand
greater protection.  To be clear, the President does not con-
tend here that this subpoena, in particular, is impermissi-
bly burdensome.  Instead he makes a categorical argument
about the burdens generally associated with state criminal
subpoenas,  focusing  on  three:  diversion,  stigma,  and  har-
assment.  We address each in turn.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It delves into the constitutional arguments surrounding the President's immunity from state criminal subpoenas.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page
845
Florida; Aguilar v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Atwater v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
846
Florida; Barber v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  863,952
955
Florida; Barnes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126
Florida; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Burkell v.
890
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Cannedy v.
996
Florida; Chavez v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841
Florida; Consalvo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
832
Florida; Cook v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080
Florida; Cooper v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1123
Florida; Crews v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Crum v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
836
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Cunniff v.
Florida; Cutaia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  994,1140

Florida; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  952,1093

Florida; De La Fe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

Florida; Diaz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  867,1065

869

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Dixon v.
1094

Florida; Finfrock v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

Florida; Fleitas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Florida; Garcon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952

Florida; Gocio v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1118

Florida; Good v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
811

Florida; Graham v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Florida; Hamilton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
884

Florida; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Harris v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  893,1066

860

Florida; Hernandez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Hickox v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Florida; Hojan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  945,1075

Florida; Holland v.
838

Florida; Humphrey v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Florida; Hunter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Jackson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

Florida; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  867,952,1101

Florida; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  913,1102

Florida; Kelley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  883,1159

Florida; Langon v.
Florida; Lugo v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
867

1028

Florida; McGee v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Meizlik v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  907,1102

845

Florida; Meshell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida; Millen v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 53 (2009)

59

Opinion of the Court

Kindler  may  once  have  been  entitled  to  bring.  Common
wealth  v.  Kindler,  No.  2747  etc.  (July  23,  1997),  App.  183,
187–188.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.
Kindler, 554 Pa., at 514, 722 A. 2d, at 143.

Kindler  then  sought  federal  habeas  relief.  The  District
Court  determined  that  the  fugitive  forfeiture  rule  did  not
provide an adequate basis to bar federal review of Kindler’s
habeas  claims.  291  F.  Supp.  2d,  at  340–343.  The  District
Court  then  proceeded  to  address  the  merits,  granting  Kin
dler’s  petition  on  the  grounds  that  he  was  sentenced  based
on  jury  instructions  that  were  unconstitutional  under  Mills
v.  Maryland,  486  U. S.  367  (1988),  and  that  the  prosecutor
improperly  introduced  an  aggravating  factor  at  sentencing.
291  F.  Supp.  2d,  at  346–351,  357–358.  The  court  rejected
Kindler’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Id., at 356.
The  Third  Circuit  afﬁrmed.  That  court  began  by  recog
nizing  that  “[a]  procedural  rule  that  is  consistently  applied
in  the  vast  majority  of  cases  is  adequate  to  bar  federal  ha
beas  review  even  if  state  courts  are  willing  to  occasionally
overlook it and review the merits of a claim for relief where
the rule would otherwise apply.”  Kindler v.  Horn, 542 F. 3d
70,  79  (2008).  The  Court  of  Appeals  then  considered  the
Pennsylvania  fugitive  forfeiture  rule  in  place  at  the  time  of
Kindler’s ﬁrst escape: “Pennsylvania courts had discretion to
hear  an  appeal  ﬁled  by  a  fugitive  who  had  been  returned
to  custody  before  an  appeal  was  initiated  or  dismissed. . . .
Accordingly,  the  fugitive  forfeiture  rule  was  not  ‘ﬁrmly  es
tablished’  and  therefore  was  not  an  independent  and  ade
quate  procedural  rule  sufﬁcient  to  bar  review  of  the  merits
of a habeas petitio[n] in  federal court.”  Ibid. (citing Doctor
v.  Walters,  96  F.  3d  675,  684–686  (CA3  1996)).  The  court
thus  determined  that  “the  state  trial  court  still  had  discre
tion  to  reinstate  his  post-verdict  motions.  Accordingly,  we
conclude  that,  under  Doctor,  Pennsylvania’s  fugitive  waiver
law  did  not  preclude  the  district  court  from  reviewing  the
merits  of  the  claims  raised  in  Kindler’s  habeas  petition.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Kindler v. Horn. It cites legal precedents and outlines the court's reasoning for its decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

3

Opinion of the Court

after  spending  two  or  three  days  in  custody).    The  fifth
time he did not pay but completed a 6-month sentence.

After  his  release  in  2006  Turner  remained  in  arrears.
On  March  27,  2006,  the  clerk  issued  a  new  “show  cause”
order.  And after an initial postponement due to Turner’s
failure  to  appear,  Turner’s  civil  contempt  hearing  took
place  on  January  3,  2008.    Turner  and  Rogers  were  pre-
sent, each without representation by counsel.

The hearing was brief.  The court clerk said that Turner
was  $5,728.76  behind  in  his  payments.  The  judge  asked
Turner  if  there  was  “anything  you  want  to  say.”    Turner
replied,

“Well, when I first got out, I got back on dope.  I done
meth,  smoked  pot  and  everything  else,  and  I  paid  a
little bit here and there.  And, when I finally did get to
working, I broke my back, back in September.  I filed
for disability and SSI.  And, I didn’t get straightened
out off the dope until I broke my back and laid up for
two  months.  And,  now  I’m  off  the  dope  and  every-
thing.  I just hope that you give me a chance.  I don’t
know what else to say.  I mean, I know I done wrong,
and  I  should  have  been  paying  and  helping  her,  and
I’m  sorry.  I  mean,  dope  had  a  hold  to  me.”  App.  to
Pet. for Cert. 17a.

The judge then said, “[o]kay,” and asked Rogers if she had
anything  to  say.    Ibid.   After  a  brief  discussion  of  federal
benefits, the judge stated,

“If  there’s  nothing  else,  this  will  be  the  Order  of
the  Court.  I  find  the  Defendant  in  willful  contempt.
I’m  [going  to]  sentence  him  to  twelve  months  in  the
Oconee County Detention Center.  He may purge him-
self of the contempt and avoid the sentence by having
a  zero  balance  on  or  before  his  release.    I’ve  also
placed  a  lien  on  any  SSI  or  other  benefits.”    Id.,  at
18a.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal transcript, specifically a portion of a court opinion detailing a civil contempt case. It includes dialogue between the judge and the defendant, as well as the judge's ruling and sentence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Transcript</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

KELLY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

fraudulent  schemes  “for  obtaining  money  or  property”);
§666(a)(1)(A)  (making  it  a  crime  to  “obtain[ ]  by  fraud  . . .
property”).  The  jury  convicted  the  defendants,  and  the
lower courts upheld the verdicts.

The question presented is whether the defendants com-
mitted  property  fraud.    The  evidence  the  jury  heard  no
doubt  shows  wrongdoing—deception,  corruption,  abuse  of
power.  But the federal fraud statutes at issue do not crim-
inalize all such conduct.  Under settled precedent, the offi-
cials could violate those laws only if an object of their dis-
honesty  was  to  obtain  the  Port  Authority’s  money  or
property.  The Government contends it was, because the of-
ficials  sought  both  to  “commandeer”  the  Bridge’s  access
lanes and to divert the wage labor of the Port Authority em-
ployees used in that effort.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 58.  We disa-
gree.  The realignment of the toll lanes was an exercise of
regulatory power—something this Court has already held
fails to meet the statutes’ property requirement.  And the
employees’ labor was just the incidental cost of that regula-
tion, rather than itself an object of the officials’ scheme.  We
therefore reverse the convictions.

I

The setting of this case is the George Washington Bridge.
Running between Fort Lee and Manhattan, it is the busiest
motor-vehicle bridge in the world.  Twelve lanes with toll-
booths feed onto the Bridge’s upper level from the Fort Lee
side.  Decades ago, the then-Governor of New Jersey com-
mitted  to  a  set  allocation  of  those  lanes  for  the  morning
commute.  And (save for the four days soon described) his
plan has lasted to this day.  Under the arrangement, nine
of  the  lanes  carry  traffic  coming  from  nearby  highways.
The three remaining lanes, designated by a long line of traf-
fic  cones  laid  down  each  morning,  serve  only  cars  coming
from Fort Lee.

The  case’s  cast  of  characters  are  public  officials  who
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" in a case called Kelly v. United States. It discusses the legal arguments and the court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U40

[10-04-01 09:23:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN

254

GARNER v. JONES

Opinion of the Court

Board’s consideration of numerous factors speciﬁc to an
inmate’s offense, rehabilitative efforts, and ability to live a
responsible, productive life). The essence of respondent’s
case, as we see it, is not that discretion has been changed in
its exercise but that, in the period between parole reviews,
it will not be exercised at all. The statutory structure, its
implementing regulations, and the Parole Board’s unrefuted
representations regarding its operations do not lead to this
conclusion.

The law changing the frequency of parole reviews is quali-
ﬁed in two important respects. First, the law vests the
Parole Board with discretion as to how often to set an in-
mate’s date for reconsideration, with eight years for the max-
imum. See Ga. Rules & Regs., Rule 475–3–.05(2) (1985)
(“Reconsideration . . . shall take place at least every eight
years”). Second, the Board’s policies permit “expedited pa-
role reviews in the event of a change in their circumstance
or where the Board receives new information that would
warrant a sooner review.” App. 56. These qualiﬁcations
permit a more careful and accurate exercise of the discretion
the Board has had from the outset. Rather than being re-
quired to review cases pro forma, the Board may set recon-
sideration dates according to the likelihood that a review will
result in meaningful considerations as to whether an inmate
is suitable for release. The Board’s stated policy is to pro-
vide for reconsideration at 8-year intervals “when, in the
Board’s determination, it is not reasonable to expect that pa-
Ibid.
role would be granted during the intervening years.”
The policy enables the Board to put its resources to better
use, to ensure that those prisoners who should receive parole
come to its attention. By concentrating its efforts on those
cases identiﬁed as having a good possibility of early release,
the Board’s Rules might result in the release of some prison-
ers earlier than would have been the case otherwise.

The particular case of respondent well illustrates that the
Board’s Rule changes are designed for the better exercise of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the text of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Garner v. Jones.  It discusses the Parole Board's discretion in setting parole review dates and argues that the changes to the law do not eliminate discretion but rather allow for a more efficient and effective exercise of it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. WISCONSIN
STATE LEGISLATURE
GORSUCH, J., concurring

mail but also by bringing them to a county clerk’s office, or
various “no touch” drop boxes staged locally, or certain poll-
ing places on election day.  Never mind that those unable to
vote on election day have still other options in Wisconsin,
like voting in-person during a 2-week voting period before
election day.  And never mind that the court itself found the
pandemic  posed  an  insufficient  threat  to  the  health  and
safety  of  voters  to  justify  revamping the State’s  in-person
election procedures.
  So it’s indisputable that Wisconsin has made considera-
ble  efforts  to  accommodate  early  voting  and  respond  to
COVID.  The district court’s only possible complaint is that
the State hasn’t done enough.  But how much is enough?  If
Wisconsin’s statutory absentee voting deadline can be dis-
carded  on  the  strength  of  the  State’s  status  as  a  COVID
“hotspot,”  what  about  the  identical  deadlines  in  30  other
States?  How much of a “hotspot” must a State (or maybe
some sliver of it) be before judges get to improvise?  Then
there’s  the  question  what  these  new  ad  hoc  deadlines
should  be.    The  judge  in  this  case  tacked  6  days  onto  the
State’s election deadline, but what about 3 or 7 or 10, and
what’s  to  stop  different  judges  choosing  (as  they  surely
would)  different  deadlines  in  different  jurisdictions?    A
widely shared state policy seeking to make election day real
would give way to a Babel of decrees.  And what’s to stop
courts from tinkering with in-person voting rules too?  This
judge declined to go that far, but the plaintiffs thought he
should have, and it’s not hard to imagine other judges ac-
cepting invitations to unfurl the precinct maps and decide
whether  States  should  add  polling  places,  revise  their
hours, rearrange the voting booths within them, or maybe
even supplement existing social distancing, hand washing,
and ventilation protocols.
  The  Constitution  dictates  a  different  approach  to  these
how-much-is-enough questions.  The Constitution provides
that state legislatures—not federal judges, not state judges,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State Legislature. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding voting procedures during the COVID-19 pandemic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI

BREYER, J., dissenting

gress,  though  likely  aware  of  the  “high-level  policies”
involved  in  this  suit,  did  not  “choose  to  extend  to  any
person  the  kind  of  remedies”  that  the  plaintiffs  here
“seek.”  Ante, at 20–21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
I doubt the strength of these two general considerations.

The  first  consideration,  in  my  view,  is  not  relevant.    I
concede  that  the  majority  and  concurring  opinions  in
Bivens looked in part for support to the fact that the Court
had implied damages remedies from statutes silent on the
subject.  See 403 U. S., at 397; id., at 402–403 (Harlan, J.,
concurring  in  judgment).    But  that  was  not  the  main
argument  favoring  the  Court’s  conclusion.    Rather,  the
Court drew far stronger support from the need for such a
remedy when measured against a common-law and consti-
tutional  history  of  allowing  traditional  legal  remedies
where  necessary.  Id.,  at  392,  396–397.  The  Court  be-
lieved such a remedy was necessary to make effective the
Constitution’s protection of certain basic individual rights.
See  id.,  at  392;  id.,  at  407  (opinion  of  Harlan,  J.).  Simi-
larly,  as  the  Court  later  explained,  a  damages  remedy
against federal officials prevented the serious legal anom-
aly  I  previously  mentioned.    Its  existence  made  basic
constitutional protections of the individual against Federal
Government abuse (the Bill of Rights’ pre-Civil War objec-
tive)  as  effective  as  protections  against  abuse  by  state
officials  (the  post-Civil  War,  post  selective-incorporation
objective).  See supra, at 7.

Nor is the second circumstance—congressional silence—
relevant  in  the  manner  that  the  majority  opinion  de-
scribes.  The Court initially saw that silence as indicating
an  absence  of  congressional  hostility  to  the  Court’s  exer-
cise  of  its  traditional  remedy-inferring  powers.    See
Bivens, supra, at 397; Davis, 442 U. S., at 246–247.  Con-
gress’  subsequent  silence  contains  strong  signs  that  it
accepted Bivens actions as part of the law.  After all, Con-
gress  rejected  a  proposal  that  would  have  eliminated
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011)

9

ALITO, J., dissenting

beds  for  mentally  ill  prisoners,  and  an  outmoded  records
management system).

Is  it  plausible  that  none  of  these  deficiencies  can  be
remedied  without  releasing  46,000  prisoners?    Without
taking  that  radical  and  dangerous  step,  exam  tables  and
counter  tops  cannot  properly  be  disinfected?    None  of  the
system’s  dilapidated  facilities  can  be  repaired?    Needed
medications  and  equipment  cannot  be  purchased  and
used?  Staff  vacancies  cannot  be  filled?    The  qualifica-
tions  of  prison  physicians  cannot  be  improved?  A  better
records  management  system  cannot  be  developed  and
implemented?

I do not dispute that general overcrowding contributes to
many of the California system’s healthcare problems.  But
it  by  no  means  follows  that  reducing  overcrowding  is  the
only or the best or even a particularly good way to allevi-
ate  those  problems.  Indeed,  it  is  apparent  that  the  pris-
oner release ordered by the court below is poorly suited for
this purpose.  The release order is not limited to prisoners
needing  substantial  medical  care  but  instead  calls  for  a
reduction  in  the  system’s  overall  population.  Under  the
order  issued  by  the  court  below,  it  is  not  necessary  for
a  single  prisoner  in  the  plaintiff  classes  to  be  released.
Although  some  class  members  will  presumably  be  among
those  who  are  discharged,  the  decrease  in  the  number  of
prisoners needing mental health treatment or other forms
of  extensive  medical  care  will  be  much  smaller  than  the
total  number  of  prisoners  released,  and  thus  the  release
will  produce  at  best  only  a  modest  improvement  in  the
burden on the medical care system.

The  record  bears  this  out.    The  Special  Master  stated
dramatically  that  even  releasing  100,000  inmates  (two-
thirds  of  the  California  system’s  entire  inmate  popula-
tion!) would leave the problem of providing mental health
treatment “largely unmitigated.”  App. 487.  Similarly, the
Receiver proclaimed that “ ‘those . . . who think that popu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the court's order to release prisoners due to overcrowding, claiming it is not an effective solution to the healthcare problems within the California prison system.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BIDEN v. MISSOURI

Per Curiam

I
A
The Medicare program provides health insurance to indi-
viduals 65 and older, as well as those with specified disabil-
ities.  The Medicaid program does the same for those with
low  incomes.  Both  Medicare  and  Medicaid  are  adminis-
tered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who
has general statutory authority to promulgate regulations
“as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the
functions with which [he] is charged.”  42 U. S. C. §1302(a).
One such function—perhaps the most basic, given the De-
partment’s core mission—is to ensure that the healthcare
providers who care for Medicare and Medicaid patients pro-
tect  their  patients’  health  and  safety.    Such  providers  in-
clude  hospitals,  nursing  homes,  ambulatory  surgical  cen-
ters, hospices, rehabilitation facilities, and more.  To that
end, Congress authorized the Secretary to promulgate, as a
condition of a facility’s participation in the programs, such
“requirements as [he] finds necessary in the interest of the
health and safety of individuals who are furnished services
in the institution.”  42 U. S. C. §1395x(e)(9) (hospitals); see,
e.g.,  §§1395x(cc)(2)(J)  (outpatient  rehabilitation  facilities),
1395i–3(d)(4)(B)  (skilled  nursing  facilities),  1395k(a)(2)(F)
(i) (ambulatory surgical centers); see also §§1396r(d)(4)(B),
1396d(l)(1), 1396d(o) (corresponding provisions in Medicaid
Act).

Relying  on  these  authorities,  the  Secretary  has  estab-
lished long lists of detailed conditions with which facilities
must comply to be eligible to receive Medicare and Medicaid
funds.  See, e.g., 42 CFR pt. 482 (2020) (hospitals); 42 CFR
pt. 483 (long-term care facilities); 42 CFR §§416.25–416.54
(ambulatory  surgical  centers).  Such  conditions  have  long
included  a  requirement  that  certain  providers  maintain
and  enforce  an  “infection  prevention  and  control  program
designed . . . to help prevent the development and transmis-
sion  of  communicable  diseases  and  infections.”    §483.80
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the beginning of the opinion in the case of Biden v. Missouri. It provides background information on the Medicare and Medicaid programs and the Secretary of Health and Human Services' authority to establish regulations for healthcare providers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:25:22
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CV

Pagination Table: RULES1

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Ordered:

APRIL 17, 2000

1. That the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts be, and they hereby are,
amended by including therein amendments to Civil Rules 4,
5, 12, 14, 26, 30, and 37 and to Rules B, C, and E of the
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims.

[See infra, pp. 1159–1177.]
2. That the foregoing amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims shall take effect on Decem-
ber 1, 2000, and shall govern all proceedings in civil cases
thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable,
all proceedings in civil cases then pending.

3. That The Chief Justice be, and hereby is, authorized
to transmit to the Congress the foregoing amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with
the provisions of Section 2072 of Title 28, United States
Code.

1157
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an order from the Supreme Court of the United States amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  It is sequential text and contains the actual legal content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

23

BREYER, J., dissenting

analysis would be appropriate in other cases where the text
and history are not clear.
  But  the  Heller  Court  did  not  end  its  opinion  with  that
preliminary  question.  After  concluding  that  the  Second
Amendment protects an individual right to possess a fire-
arm for self-defense, the Heller Court added that that right
is  “not  unlimited.”    Id.,  at  626.    It  thus  had  to  determine
whether  the  District  of  Columbia’s  law,  which  banned
handgun possession in the home, was a permissible regula-
tion of the right.  Id., at 628–630.  In answering that second
question,  it  said:  “Under  any  of  the  standards  of  scrutiny
that  we  have  applied  to  enumerated  constitutional  rights,
banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the
nation  to  “keep”  and  use  for  protection  of one’s  home  and
family’ would fail constitutional muster.”   Id., at 628–629
(emphasis added; footnote and citation omitted).  That lan-
guage makes clear that the Heller Court understood some
form of means-end scrutiny to apply.  It did not need to spec-
ify whether that scrutiny should be intermediate or strict
because, in its view, the District’s handgun ban was so “se-
vere” that it would have failed either level of scrutiny.  Id.,
at  628–629;  see  also  id.,  at  628,  n. 27  (clarifying  that  ra-
tional-basis review was not the proper level of scrutiny).

Despite  Heller’s  express  invocation  of  means-end  scru-
tiny, the Court today claims that the majority in Heller re-
jected means-end scrutiny because it rejected my dissent in
that case.  But that argument misreads both my dissent and
the majority opinion.  My dissent in Heller proposed directly
weighing  “the  interests  protected  by  the  Second  Amend-
ment on one side and the governmental public-safety con-
cerns  on  the  other.”  Id.,  at  689.    I  would  have  asked
“whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way
or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s sal-
utary  effects  upon  other  important  governmental  inter-
ests.”  Id., at 689–690.  The majority rejected my dissent,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It delves into the interpretation of the Second Amendment and the level of scrutiny applied to gun control laws, referencing the Heller case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

THOMAS, J., concurring

514  U. S.  549,  587–601  (1995)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)
(documenting  why  the  Commerce  Clause  does  not  permit
Congress  to  regulate  purely  local  activities  that  have  a
substantial  effect  on  interstate  commerce).    But  even
assuming  the  Commerce  Clause  allows  Congress  to  pro-
hibit  intrastate  sports  gambling  “directly,”  it  “does  not
authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regula-
tion  of  interstate  commerce.”    New  York  v.  United  States,
505  U. S.  144,  166  (1992).    The  Necessary  and  Proper
Clause does not give Congress this power either, as a law
is  not  “proper”  if  it  “subvert[s]  basic  principles  of  federal-
ism and dual sovereignty.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1,
65  (2005)  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting).  Commandeering  the
States,  as  PASPA  does,  subverts  those  principles.    See
Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 923–924 (1997).

Because  PASPA  is  at  least  partially  unconstitutional,
our precedents instruct us to determine “which portions of
the  . . .  statute  we  must  sever  and  excise.”    United  States
v.  Booker,  543  U. S.  220,  258  (2005)  (emphasis  deleted).
The  Court  must  make  this  severability  determination  by
asking  a  counterfactual  question:  “ ‘Would  Congress  still
have  passed’  the  valid  sections  ‘had  it  known’  about  the
constitutional  invalidity  of  the  other  portions  of  the  stat-
ute?”  Id., at 246 (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecommuni-
cations Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U. S. 727, 767 (1996)
(plurality  opinion)).    I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  because  it
gives the best answer it can to this question, and no party
has  asked  us  to  apply  a  different  test.    But  in  a  future
case,  we  should  take  another  look  at  our  severability
precedents.

Those precedents appear to be in tension with traditional
limits  on  judicial  authority.    Early  American  courts  did
not  have  a  severability  doctrine.    See  Walsh,  Partial  Un-
constitutionality,  85  N. Y. U.  L. Rev.  738,  769  (2010)
(Walsh).  They  recognized  that  the  judicial  power  is,  fun-
damentally,  the  power  to  render  judgments  in  individual
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association. It delves into legal arguments regarding the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, and discusses the concept of severability in constitutional law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

discrimination or law enforcement overreach,” which lends
itself to a Bivens action, from a challenge to “large-scale pol-
icy decisions,” which does not).  No special factors counsel
against allowing Boule’s Bivens action to proceed.

C
Boule also argues that his First Amendment retaliatory-
investigation claim is cognizable under Bivens.  I concur in
the Court’s judgment that it is not, but I arrive at that con-
clusion by following precedent rather than by applying the
Court’s  new,  single-step  inquiry.  Ante,  at  7;  see  infra,  at
15–17.

This Court has repeatedly assumed without deciding that
Bivens  extends  to  First  Amendment  claims,  see  Wood  v.
Moss, 572 U. S. 744, 757 (2014), but has never squarely held
as much, see Reichle v.  Howards, 566 U. S. 658, 663, n. 4
(2012).  Accordingly, Boule’s First Amendment retaliation
presents a new context for the purpose of the Bivens analy-
sis.  See Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 24) (noting that
a case can present a new context if it implicates a different
constitutional  right  than  those  already  recognized  as  cog-
nizable under Bivens).

Moving to the second step of the Bivens inquiry, unlike
Boule’s  Fourth  Amendment  claim,  there  is  “reason  to
pause” before extending Bivens to Boule’s First Amendment
claim.  Hernández, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7).  In par-
ticular, his First Amendment claim raises line-drawing con-
cerns  similar  to  those  this  Court  identified  in  Wilkie,  551
U. S. 537.  In Wilkie, a landowner sought to bring a Bivens
action  against  federal  officials  whom  the  landowner  ac-
cused of harassment and intimidation meant to extract an
easement across his property.  551 U. S., at 541.  The Court
observed that “defining a workable cause of action” for such
a  claim  was  “difficul[t].”    Id.,  at  555;  see  also  id.,  at  557.
Recognizing  a  Bivens  action  to  redress  retaliation  under
such  circumstances  would,  in  the  Court’s  view,  “invite
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

which  the  point  now  at  issue  was  not  fully  debated”);
Humphrey’s  Executor  v.  United  States,  295  U. S.  602,
627–628  (1935)  (rejecting,  under  stare  decisis,  dicta,  “which
may  be  followed  if  sufficiently  persuasive  but  which  are
not controlling”).  And, given the bit part that our Quality
King  statement  played  in  our  Quality  King  decision,  we
believe the view of stare decisis set forth in these opinions
applies to the matter now before us.

Second, Wiley and the dissent argue (to those who con
sider  legislative  history)  that  the  Act’s  legislative  history
supports their interpretation.  But the historical events to
which  it  points  took  place  more  than  a  decade  before  the
enactment of the Act and, at best, are inconclusive.

During  the  1960’s,  representatives  of  book,  record,  and
film industries, meeting with the Register of Copyrights to
discuss copyright revision, complained about the difficulty
of  dividing  international  markets.    Copyright  Law  Revi
sion  Discussion  and  Comments  on  Report  of  the  Register
of  Copyrights  on  the  General  Revision  of  the  U. S.  Copy
right  Law,  88th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  pt.  2,  p.  212  (Comm.
Print 1963) (English editions of “particular” books “fin[d]”
their  “way  into  this  country”);  id.,  at  213  (works  “pub
li[shed] in a country where there is no copyright protection
of any sort” are put into “the free stream of commerce” and
“shipped  to  the  United  States”);  ibid.  (similar  concern  in
respect to films).

The then-Register of Copyrights,  Abraham  Kaminstein,
found  these  examples  “very  troubl[ing].”  Ibid.    And  the
Copyright  Office  released  a  draft  provision  that  it  said
“deals  with  the  matter  of  the  importation  for  distribution
in  the  United  States  of  foreign  copies  that  were  made
under  proper  authority  but  that,  if  sold  in  the  United
States, would be sold in contravention of the rights of the
copyright  owner  who  holds  the  exclusive  right  to  sell
copies in the United States.”  Id., pt. 4, at 203.  That draft
version,  without  reference  to  §106,  simply  forbids  unau
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing copyright law and the importation of foreign copies. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN

694

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit

No. 99–5153. Argued February 22, 2000—Decided May 15, 2000

18 U. S. C. § 3583(e)(3).

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced most forms of parole with
supervised release overseen by the sentencing court.
If release con-
ditions are violated, that court may “revoke [the] release, and require
the person to serve in prison all or part of the [supervised release]
. without credit for time previously served on postrelease
term .
.
supervision . . . .”
In March 1994, the District
Court sentenced petitioner Johnson to imprisonment followed by a term
of supervised release. After beginning supervised release in 1995,
Johnson violated two conditions of his release. The District Court re-
voked his release and ordered him to serve an 18-month prison term to
be followed by an additional 12 months of supervised release. The
court cited no authority for ordering additional supervised release, but,
under Circuit law, it might have relied on 18 U. S. C. § 3583(h), a subsec-
tion added to the statute in 1994, which explicitly gave district courts
that power.
Johnson appealed, arguing that § 3583(e)(3) did not give
the district courts power to order a new supervised release term follow-
ing reimprisonment, and that applying § 3583(h) to him violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause. Although the Sixth Circuit had previously taken
the same position as Johnson with regard to § 3583(e)(3), it afﬁrmed his
sentence, reasoning that § 3583(h)’s application was not retroactive
because revocation of supervised release was punishment for John-
son’s violation of his release conditions, which occurred after the 1994
amendments.

Held:

1. Section 3583(h) does not apply retroactively, so no ex post facto
issue arises in this case. To prevail on his ex post facto claim, Johnson
must show, inter alia, that the law operates retroactively. Contrary to
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, postrevocation penalties are attributable
to the original conviction, not to defendants’ new offenses for violating
their supervised release conditions. Thus, to sentence Johnson under
§ 3583(h) would be to apply that section retroactively. However, absent
a clear statement of congressional intent, § 3583(h) applies only to cases
in which the initial offense occurred after the amendment’s effective
date, September 13, 1994. The Government offers nothing indicating a
contrary intent. The decision to alter § 3583(e)(3)’s supervised release
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they provide a summary of the case rather than the full legal argument and decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>