<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

7

Opinion of the Court

Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U. S. 79,
90 (2000) (“It may well be that the existence of large arbi-
tration  costs  could  preclude  a  litigant  . . .  from  effectively
vindicating  her  federal  statutory  rights”).    But  the  fact
that  it  is  not  worth  the  expense  involved  in  proving  a
statutory  remedy  does  not  constitute  the  elimination  of
the  right  to  pursue  that  remedy.  See  681  F. 3d,  at  147
(Jacobs,  C.  J.,  dissenting  from  denial  of  rehearing  en
banc).3   The  class-action  waiver  merely  limits  arbitration
to the two contracting parties.  It no more eliminates those
parties’  right  to  pursue  their  statutory  remedy  than  did
federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal
relief  in  1938,  see  Fed.  Rule  Civ.  Proc. 23,  28  U. S. C.,
p. 864  (1938  ed.,  Supp  V);  7A  C.  Wright,  A.  Miller,  &  M.
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1752, p. 18 (3d ed.
2005).  Or,  to  put  it  differently,  the  individual  suit  that
was  considered  adequate  to  assure  “effective  vindication”
of  a  federal  right  before  adoption  of  class-action  proce-
dures  did  not  suddenly  become  “ineffective  vindication”
upon their adoption.4

——————

3 The dissent contends that a class-action waiver may deny a party’s
right  to  pursue  statutory  remedies  in  the  same  way  as  a  clause  that
bars  a  party  from  presenting  economic  testimony.    See  post,  at  3,  9.
That is a false comparison for several reasons: To begin with, it is not a
given that such a clause would constitute an impermissible waiver; we
have never considered the point.  But more importantly, such a clause,
assuming it makes vindication of the claim impossible, makes it impos-
sible not just as a class action but even as an individual claim.

4 Who  can  disagree  with  the  dissent’s  assertion  that  “the  effective-
vindication  rule  asks  about  the  world  today,  not  the world  as  it  might
have looked when Congress passed a given statute”?  Post, at 12.  But
time  does  not  change  the  meaning  of  effectiveness,  making  ineffective
vindication  today  what  was  effective  vindication  in  the  past.    The
dissent also says that the agreement bars other forms of cost sharing—
existing  before  the  Sherman  Act—that  could  provide  effective  vindica-
tion.  See post, at 11–12, and n. 5.  Petitioners denied that, and that is
not what the Court of Appeals decision under review here held.  It held
that, because other forms of cost sharing were not economically feasible
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the legal implications of class-action waivers in arbitration agreements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
396  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of Stevens, J.

I concur in the Court’s decision to sustain BCRA’s disclosure
provisions  and  join  Part  IV  of  its  opinion,  I  emphatically
dissent from its principal holding.

I

The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of
elected  institutions  across  the  Nation.  The  path  it  has
taken  to  reach  its  outcome  will,  I  fear,  do  damage  to  this
institution.  Before turning to the question whether to over
rule Austin and part of McConnell, it is important to explain
why the Court should not be deciding that question.

Scope of the Case

The  ﬁrst  reason  is  that  the  question  was  not  properly
brought  before  us.  In  declaring  § 203  of  BCRA  facially  un
constitutional  on  the  ground  that  corporations’  electoral  ex
penditures  may  not  be  regulated  any  more  stringently  than
those of individuals, the majority decides this case on a basis
relinquished  below,  not  included  in  the  questions  presented
to  us  by  the  litigants,  and  argued  here  only  in  response  to
the  Court’s  invitation.  This  procedure is  unusual  and  inad
visable for a court.2  Our colleagues’ suggestion that “we are
asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, McConnell,” ante,
at 319, would be more accurate if rephrased to state that “we
have asked ourselves” to reconsider those cases.

In the District Court, Citizens United initially raised a fa
cial  challenge  to  the  constitutionality  of  § 203.  App.  23a–

2 See  Yee  v.  Escondido,  503  U. S.  519,  535  (1992)  (“[U]nder  this  Court’s
Rule 14.1(a), only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included
therein,  will  be  considered  by  the  Court”  (internal  quotation  marks  and
alteration omitted)); Wood v. Allen, ante, at 304 (“[T]he fact that petitioner
discussed [an] issue in the text of his petition for certiorari does not bring
it  before  us.  Rule  14.1(a)  requires  that  a  subsidiary  question  be  fairly
included  in  the  question  presented  for  our  review”  (internal  quotation
marks  and brackets  omitted)); Cooper  Industries, Inc.  v.  Aviall  Services,
Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 168–169 (2004) (“We ordinarily do not decide in the ﬁrst
instance issues not decided below” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case. It discusses the Court's decision and provides reasoning against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1036

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 27, 2000

529 U. S.

law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.

No. D–2152.

In re Disbarment of Haley. Timothy S.
Haley, of Caldwell, N. J., is suspended from the practice of law in
this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, re-
quiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.

No. 99M75. Castillo v. Alabama. Motion to direct the Clerk

to ﬁle petition for writ of certiorari denied.

No. 99–1396. Chandler et al. v. Harris, Secretary of
State of Florida, et al. Appeal from D. C. S. D. Fla. Motion
of appellants to expedite consideration of jurisdictional statement
prior to May 8, 2000, denied.

No. 99–7817.

In re Falcon. Petition for writ of habeas cor-

pus denied.

No. 99–8249.

In re Hewlett. Petition for writ of manda-

mus denied.

No. 99–7932.

In re Webb. Petition for writ of mandamus

and/or prohibition denied.

Certiorari Denied

No. 99–879. Moghadam v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 175 F. 3d 1269.

No. 99–887. Richardson v. Reno, Attorney General, et
al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 180 F.
3d 1311.

No. 99–898. City of Chicago et al. v. Shalala, Secretary
of Health and Human Services, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-
tiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 598.

No. 99–949. Dahlstrom v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 180 F. 3d 677.

No. 99–993. Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Cen-
tral Arkansas et al. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 338 Ark. 322, 994 S. W. 2d 453.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal journal or database. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't seem to be a complete section of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1075

558 U. S.

December 7, 2009

to  dispense  with  printing  the  joint  appendix  granted.  Justice
Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this
petition.

No.  09–5327.  Holland  v.  Florida.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

[Certio
rari  granted,  ante,  p.  945.]  Motion  of  petitioner  for  appointment
of  counsel  granted.  Todd  G.  Scher,  Esq.,  of  Miami  Beach,  Fla.,  is
appointed  to  serve  as  counsel  for  petitioner  in  this  case.

No.  09–5768.  In  re  Miller.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  recon
sideration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[ante,  p.  813]  denied.

No.  09–6525.  Genevier  v.  Superior  Court  of  California,
Los Angeles County, et al.  Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  967]  denied.

No.  09–6684.  Howard  v.  United  States  District  Court
for  the  Southern  District  of  Ohio  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  985]  denied.

No.  09–6732.  Rogers  v.  KBR  Technical  Services,  Inc.

C.  A.  5th  Cir.;  and

No.  09–6765.  McGore  v.  Birkett,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.
Motions  of  petitioners  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
denied.  Petitioners  are  allowed  until  December  28,  2009,  within
which  to  pay  the  docketing  fees  required  by  Rule  38(a)  and  to
submit  petitions  in  compliance  with  Rule  33.1  of  the  Rules  of
this  Court.

No.  09–7290.  In  re  Al-Ghizzawi;
No.  09–7454.  In  re  Miller;  and
No.  09–7511.  In  re  Bromell.  Petitions  for  writs  of  habeas

corpus  denied.

No.  09–7470.  In  re  Armstrong.  Motion  of  petitioner  for
leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  petition  for  writ
of habeas corpus dismissed.  See this Court’s Rule 39.8.  Justice
Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this
petition.

No.  09–6857.  In  re  Bivens.  Petition  for  writ  of  mandamus

denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, not the main body of a document. It contains case numbers, dates, and summaries of decisions, which are not typical content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

622

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Opinion of the Court

Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 628 (1996) (“[I]t was settled early that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress a general
power to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations”);
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 936 (1982)
(“Careful adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement pre-
serves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach
of federal law and federal judicial power”); Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U. S. 991, 1002 (1982); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U. S. 163, 172 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S.
144, 147, n. 2 (1970); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S.
542, 554 (1876) (“The fourteenth amendment prohibits a state
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights
of one citizen as against another.
It simply furnishes an ad-
ditional guaranty against any encroachment by the States
upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen
as a member of society”).

The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these
decisions stems not only from the length of time they have
been on the books, but also from the insight attributable to
the Members of the Court at that time. Every Member had
been appointed by President Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garﬁeld,
or Arthur—and each of their judicial appointees obviously
had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events sur-
rounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Petitioners contend that two more recent decisions have
in effect overruled this longstanding limitation on Congress’
§ 5 authority. They rely on United States v. Guest, 383 U. S.
745 (1966), for the proposition that the rule laid down in the
Civil Rights Cases is no longer good law.
In Guest, the
Court reversed the construction of an indictment under 18
U. S. C. § 241, saying in the course of its opinion that “we
deal here with issues of statutory construction, not with
issues of constitutional power.”
383 U. S., at 749. Three
Members of the Court,
in a separate opinion by Justice
Brennan, expressed the view that the Civil Rights Cases
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, citing previous cases and discussing the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Congress's § 5 authority.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

GORSUCH, J., concurring

seize such children as were proper and take them away to
school, willing or unwilling.”  ARCIA 1886, at 199.  When
parents “hurried their children off to the mountains or hid
them away in camp,” agents “chase[d] and capture[d] them
like so many wild rabbits.”  Ibid.  Fathers were described
as “sullen,” mothers “loud in their lamentations,” and the
children “almost out of their wits with fright.”  Ibid.

Upon the children’s arrival, the boarding schools would
often seek to strip them of nearly every aspect of their iden-
tity.  The schools would take away their Indian names and
give them English ones.  See BIA Report 53.  The schools
would cut their hair—a point of shame in many native com-
munities, see J. Reyhner & J. Eder, American Indian Edu-
cation 178 (2004)—and confiscate their traditional clothes.
ARCIA 1886, at 199.  Administrators delighted in the pro-
cess,  describing  the  “metamorphosis  [a]s  wonderful,”  and
professing that, in the main, “the little savage seems quite
proud of his appearance.”  Ibid.  After intake, the schools
frequently  prohibited  children  from  speaking  their  native
language  or  engaging  in  customary  cultural  or  religious
practices.  BIA Report 53.  Nor could children freely associ-
ate with members of their own Tribe.  Schools would organ-
ize dorms by the “[s]ize of cadets, and not their tribal rela-
tions,”  so  as  to  further  “br[eak]  up  tribal  associations.”
ARCIA 1886, at 6.

Resistance could invite punishments that included “with-
holding food” and “whipping.”  BIA Report 54 (internal quo-
tation  marks  omitted).  Older  boys  faced  “court-martial,”
with  other  Indian  children  serving  as  prosecutors  and
judges.  Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs to the Secretary of Interior 188 (1881).  Even compli-
ant  students  faced  “[r]ampant  physical,  sexual,  and  emo-
tional abuse; disease; malnourishment; overcrowding; and
lack of health care.”  BIA Report 56.  Given these conditions,
it  is  unsurprising  that  many  children  tried  (often  unsuc-
cessfully) to flee.  Id., at 55, n. 176 (recounting incidents).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses historical practices of boarding schools for Native American children, citing specific reports and instances of abuse.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

of bingo, because whether a player wins turns on “historical
bingo draws.”  Ibid.1

In  addition  to  these  electronic  gaming  machines,  the
Tribe also offered live-called bingo 24 hours a day.  But the
conditions under which these actual bingo games were con-
ducted  violated  Texas  law  in  many  ways.  See  Tex.  Occ.
Code Ann. §2001.419 (West Supp. 2021) (setting forth cer-
tain bingo restrictions).

Texas filed suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief
against  the  Tribe  and  tribal  officials.    The  District  Court
granted an injunction, holding that “the Tribe’s bingo oper-
ations  fail  to  comply  with  Texas  law.”    2019  WL  639971,
*11.  The  Fifth  Circuit  affirmed,  concluding  that  in  ex-
change for federal trust status, “the Pueblo agreed that its
gaming activities would comply with Texas law,” including
all of the State’s gaming regulations.  955 F. 3d, at 410.  We
granted certiorari.  595 U. S. ___ (2021).

II
At  this  point  in  the  litigation,  the  Tribe  does  not  argue
that  all  of  its  gaming  activities  are  consistent  with  Texas
law.  Rather, it insists that Texas’s gaming laws simply do
not apply to it, unless Texas categorically bans the playing
of a particular type of game altogether.  The Tribe does not
make this argument based primarily on the text or struc-
ture  of  the statute.    It instead  relies  on Cabazon  Band  of
Mission  Indians,  480  U. S.  202,  which  interpreted  Public
Law 280.  The Tribe asks us to treat §107 of the Restoration
Act  as  implicitly  adopting  Cabazon  Band’s  framework,
which distinguishes between laws that are “ ‘criminal/pro-
hibitory’ ” and laws that are “ ‘civil/regulatory.’ ”  Id., at 209.
Under  this  framework,  state  laws  that  totally  prohibit  a

——————

1 A photograph from the record of this version of “bingo” is appended to
this opinion.  It confirms that the electronic bingo played at the Speaking
Rock Entertainment Center is about as close to real bingo as Bingo the
famous dog.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of a specific law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

delayed in taking any step to rein in the chaos he had un-
leashed.  Instead,  in  a  last  desperate  ploy  to  hold  onto
power, he allegedly “attempted to exploit the violence and
chaos at the Capitol” by pressuring lawmakers to delay the
certification of the election and ultimately declare him the
winner.  Id.,  at  233,  ¶119.  That  is  the  backdrop  against
which this case comes to the Court.

II
The Court now confronts a question it has never had to
answer in the Nation’s history: Whether a former President
enjoys  immunity  from  federal  criminal  prosecution.    The
majority  thinks  he  should,  and  so  it  invents  an  atextual,
ahistorical, and unjustifiable immunity that puts the Pres-
ident above the law.

The  majority  makes  three  moves  that,  in  effect,  com-
pletely  insulate  Presidents  from  criminal  liability.    First,
the majority creates absolute immunity for the President’s
exercise  of  “core  constitutional  powers.”    Ante,  at  6.  This
holding is unnecessary on the facts of the indictment, and
the majority’s attempt to apply it to the facts expands the
concept of core powers beyond any recognizable bounds.  In
any event, it is quickly eclipsed by the second move, which
is  to  create  expansive  immunity  for  all  “official  act[s].”
Ante, at 14.  Whether described as presumptive or absolute,
under the majority’s rule, a President’s use of any official
power for any purpose, even the most corrupt, is immune
from prosecution.  That is just as bad as it sounds, and it is
baseless.  Finally, the majority declares that evidence con-
cerning acts for which the President is immune can play no
role in any criminal prosecution against him.  See ante, at
30–32.  That holding, which will prevent the Government
from using a President’s official acts to prove knowledge or
intent in prosecuting private offenses, is nonsensical.

Argument by argument, the majority invents immunity
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision, claiming it creates an unjustified immunity for former presidents from criminal prosecution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
Syllabus

clusion in Palmore, a case decided after Congress had altered the na-
ture of the District of Columbia local courts so that its judges adjudi-
cated primarily local issues.  Pp. 17–21.

3. Given  the  conclusion  reached  here,  there  is  no  need  to  consider
whether  to  overrule  the  “Insular  Cases”  and  their  progeny,  see,  e.g.,
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 287, to consider the application of
the de facto officer doctrine, see Ryder v. United States, 515 U. S. 177,
or to decide questions about the application of the Federal Relations
Act and Public Law 600.  Pp. 21–22.

915 F. 3d 838, reversed and remanded.

 BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and  GINSBURG, ALITO, KAGAN, GORSUCH,  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.
THOMAS,  J.,  and  SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  filed  opinions  concurring  in  the  judg-
ment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal case syllabus, containing excerpts from the court's opinion and information about the justices involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 21–376, 21–377, 21–378 and 21–380
_________________

DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CHAD EVERET BRACKEEN, ET AL.

21–376

21–377

CHEROKEE NATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CHAD EVERET BRACKEEN, ET AL.

21–378

TEXAS, PETITIONER
v.
DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR, ET AL.

21–380

CHAD EVERET BRACKEEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
DEB HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 15, 2023]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full.  I  write  separately  to
emphasize that the Court today does not address or decide
the equal protection issue that can arise when the Indian
Child  Welfare  Act  is  applied  in  individual  foster  care  or
adoption  proceedings.  See  ante,  at  29,  32,  n. 10.    As  the
Court  explains,  the  plaintiffs  in  this  federal-court  suit
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and the introduction to a Supreme Court opinion. It is not the main body of the text and likely provides context and background information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA

INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

tion contains seventeen provisions referring to the “Legis-
lature” of a State, many of which cannot possibly be read
to mean “the people.”  See Appendix, infra.  Indeed, several
provisions  expressly  distinguish  “the  Legislature”  from
“the  People.”    See  Art. I,  §2;  Amdt.  17.    This  Court  has
accordingly  defined  “the  Legislature”  in  the  Elections
Clause as “the representative body which ma[kes] the laws
of the people.”  Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 365 (1932)
(quoting  Hawke  v.  Smith  (No.  1),  253  U. S.  221,  227
(1920); emphasis added).

The  majority  largely  ignores  this  evidence,  relying
instead  on  disconnected  observations  about  direct  democ-
racy,  a  contorted  interpretation  of  an  irrelevant  statute,
and  naked  appeals  to  public  policy.  Nowhere  does  the
majority explain how a constitutional provision that vests
redistricting authority in “the Legislature” permits a State
to  wholly  exclude  “the  Legislature”  from  redistricting.
Arizona’s  Commission  might  be  a  noble  endeavor—
although  it  does  not  seem  so  “independent”  in  practice—
but  the  “fact  that  a  given  law  or  procedure  is  efficient,
convenient, and useful . . . will not save it if it is contrary
to  the  Constitution.”    INS  v.  Chadha,  462  U. S.  919,  944
(1983).  No matter how concerned we may be about parti-
sanship  in  redistricting,  this  Court  has  no  power  to  ger-
rymander the Constitution.  I respectfully dissent.

I

The majority begins by discussing policy.  I  begin with

the Constitution.  The Elections Clause provides:

“The  Times,  Places  and  Manner  of  holding  Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Con-
gress  may  at  any  time  by  Law  make  or  alter  such
Regulations,  except  as  to  the  Places  of  chusing  Sena-
tors.”  Art. I, §4, cl. 1.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n. It cites legal precedents and analyzes the Constitutionality of a redistricting process.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

Opinion of the Court

of challenge, and other accustomed requisites. . . .”39  Loui-
siana  notes  that  the  House  of  Representatives  approved
this text with minor modifications.  Yet, the State stresses,
the Senate replaced “impartial jury of freeholders of the vic-
inage” with “impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed” and also removed the
explicit references to unanimity, the right of challenge, and
“other accustomed requisites.”  In light of these revisions,
Louisiana  would  have  us  infer  an  intent  to  abandon  the
common law’s traditional unanimity requirement.

But  this  snippet  of  drafting  history  could  just  as  easily
support the opposite inference.  Maybe the Senate deleted
the language about unanimity, the right of challenge, and
“other  accustomed  prerequisites”  because  all  this  was  so
plainly included in the promise of a “trial by an impartial
jury”  that  Senators  considered  the  language  surplusage.
The truth is that we have little contemporaneous evidence
shedding  light  on  why  the  Senate  acted  as  it  did.40    So
rather than dwelling on text left on the cutting room floor, we
are much better served by interpreting the language Con-
gress retained and the States ratified.  And, as we’ve seen,
at the time of the Amendment’s adoption, the right to a jury
trial meant a trial in which the jury renders a unanimous
verdict.

Further  undermining  Louisiana’s  inference  about  the
drafting history is the fact it proves too much.  If the Sen-
ate’s deletion of the word “unanimity” changed the meaning
of  the  text  that  remains,  then  the  same  would  seemingly
have to follow for the other deleted words as well.  So it’s
not  just  unanimity  that  died  in  the  Senate,  but  all  the

——————

39 1 Annals of Cong. 435 (1789).
40 In private writings, Madison did explain some of the Senate’s objec-
tions with his original phrasing of the vicinage requirement.  See 5 Writ-
ings of James Madison 420–424 (G. Hunt ed. 1904) (letters to E. Pend-
leton,  Sept.  14  and  23,  1789).    But  this  is  little  help  in  explaining  the
other changes made in the Senate.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a snippet of legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the history and interpretation of the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial, specifically focusing on the requirement of a unanimous verdict.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BROWN v. DAVENPORT

Syllabus

habeas relief and ordered Michigan either to retry or release Mr. Dav-
enport.  This Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit conflict about
the proper interaction between the tests found in Brecht and AEDPA.

Held: When  a  state  court  has  ruled  on  the  merits  of  a  state  prisoner’s
claim, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief without applying both
the test this Court outlined in Brecht and the one Congress prescribed
in  AEDPA;  the  Sixth  Circuit  erred  in  granting  habeas  relief  to  Mr.
Davenport  based  solely  on  its  assessment  that  he  could  satisfy  the
Brecht standard.  Pp. 6–25.

(a) When Congress supplies a constitutionally valid rule of decision,
federal courts must follow it.  In AEDPA, Congress instructed that a
federal court “shall not . . . gran[t]” relief with respect to a claim that
has been adjudicated on the merits in state court “unless” certain con-
ditions are met.  §2254(d).  To be sure, the court below in this case was
required to ensure that petitioner carried his burden under the terms
of Brecht.  But satisfying Brecht is only a necessary condition to habeas
relief here; AEDPA must also be satisfied.  The Sixth Circuit erred in
holding otherwise.  Pp. 6–7.

(b) Since the founding, Congress has authorized federal courts to is-
sue habeas writs to federal custodians, and since the Civil War, Con-
gress has extended that authority to include issuance of writs to state
custodians.  All along, Congress’s statutes used permissive rather than
mandatory language; federal courts enjoy the “power to” grant writs of
habeas corpus in certain circumstances.  That structure persists today;
federal courts “may” grant habeas relief “as law and justice require.”
28 U. S. C. §§2241, 2243.

Under  the  traditional  understanding  of  habeas  corpus,  a  prisoner
could not usually use the writ to challenge a final judgment of convic-
tion  issued  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction.    But  by  1953,  this
Court had begun to depart from that understanding.  In Brown v. Al-
len, 344 U. S. 443, 458, it held that a state-court judgment “is not res
judicata” in federal habeas proceedings with respect to a petitioner’s
federal  constitutional  claims.    After  Brown,  federal  courts  struggled
with an exploding caseload of habeas petitions from state prisoners.

Eventually,  this  Court  responded  by  devising  new  rules  aimed  at
separating the meritorious needles from the growing haystack of ha-
beas petitions.  The Court’s decision in Brecht—which reasoned that
Chapman’s  harmless-error  rule  for  direct  appeals  was  inappropriate
for  use  in  federal  habeas  review  of  final  state-court  judgments,  507
U. S.,  at  633–634—was  part  of  that  effort.    Brecht,  like  this  Court’s
other  equitable  doctrines  restricting  habeas  relief,  stems  ultimately
from the discretion preserved by Congress’s habeas statutes.

Congress  later  introduced  its  own  reforms  in  AEDPA,  instructing
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered the main body of the text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

part.”  §1395dd(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added).2

When a hospital determines that an “emergency medical
condition” exists, it has two options.  It may provide “treat-
ment”  within  the  capability  of  its  “staff  and  facilities.”
§1395dd(b)(1)(A). Or it may “transfer . . . the individual” to
another  hospital  that  “has  available  space  and  qualified
personnel for the treatment” as long as the transfer would
effect  a  net  benefit  for  the  patient.    §§1395dd(b)(1)(B),
(c)(2)(B)(i).

At no point in its elaboration of the screening, stabiliza-
tion,  and  transfer  requirements  does  EMTALA  mention
abortion.  Just the opposite is true: EMTALA requires the
hospital  at  every  stage  to  protect  an  “unborn  child”  from
harm.

Begin with the screening provision, which requires a hos-
pital  “to  determine  whether  or  not  an  emergency  medical
condition (within the meaning of subsection (e)(1)) exists.”
§1395dd(a).  “[W]ith respect to a pregnant woman,” subsec-
tion  (e)(1)  defines  an  emergency  medical  condition  as  one
that is sufficiently serious to “plac[e] . . . the health of the
woman  or  her  unborn  child  . . .  in  serious  jeopardy.”
§1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).  Thus, if the hospital
identifies an emergency medical condition threatening the
child, it must “stabilize” that condition to ensure that the
child’s  health  does  not
“jeopardy.”
§§1395dd(b)(1)(A), (e)(1)(A)(i).  It goes without saying that
aborting an “unborn child” does not protect it from jeopardy.
Similarly,  if  a  hospital  wants  to  transfer  a  pregnant
woman to another facility, it may not do so unless, among
other things, a physician certifies directly or through an in-
termediary that the medical benefits of transfer outweigh

remain

in

——————

2 At  oral  argument,  the  Solicitor  General stated  that,  in  the  Govern-
ment’s view, an “impairment” or “dysfunction” under §1395dd (e)(1)(A)(i)
and (ii) may be temporary.  Tr. of Oral Arg.  80.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal statutes and discusses their interpretation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

Like the relevant federal statutes, the 1998 Clinton Ex-
ecutive Order expressly added sexual orientation as a new,
separately  prohibited  form  of  discrimination.  As  Judge
Lynch cogently spelled out, “the Clinton Administration did
not argue that the prohibition of sex discrimination in” the
prior 1969 Executive Order “already banned, or henceforth
would  be  deemed  to  ban,  sexual  orientation  discrimina-
tion.”  883 F. 3d, at 152, n. 22 (dissenting opinion).  In short,
President Clinton’s 1998 Executive Order indicates that the
Executive Branch, like Congress, has long understood sex-
ual orientation discrimination to be distinct from, and not
a form of, sex discrimination.

Federal  regulations  likewise  reflect  that  same  under-
standing.  The Office of Personnel Management is the fed-
eral agency that administers and enforces personnel rules
across the  Federal Government.   OPM has issued regula-
tions that “govern . . . the employment practices of the Fed-
eral Government generally, and of individual agencies.”  5
CFR §§300.101, 300.102 (2019).  Like the federal statutes
and the Presidential Executive Orders, those OPM regula-
tions separately prohibit sex discrimination and sexual ori-
entation discrimination.

The States have proceeded in the same fashion.  A major-
ity  of  States  prohibit  sexual  orientation  discrimination  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a section from a legal document. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of laws and executive orders related to discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Argument</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

809

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09M1.  Sturdivant  v.  United  States  District  Court

for  the  District  of  Columbia;

No.  09M2.  Jones  v.  General  Nutrition  Centers,  Inc.;
No.  09M4.  Scohy  v.  Sand  River  Properties,  LLC;
No.  09M5.  Frazier  v.  Riley  et  al.;
No.  09M7.  Mottram  v.  Davis,  Warden;
No.  09M8.  Cottingham  v.  Policy  Studies,  Inc.;
No.  09M9.  Vang  v.  McDonald,  Acting  Warden;
No.  09M10.  Eichwedel  v.  Illinois;
No.  09M13.  Benitez  v.  Sodexho  Marriott  Services;
No.  09M16.  Vann  v.  United  Airlines,  Inc.;
No.  09M18.  Selensky  v.  Alabama;
No.  09M19.  Sanders  v.  North  Carolina  et  al.;
No.  09M20.  Ndukwe  v.  Violette  et  al.;
No.  09M21.  Solomon  v.  Philadelphia  Newspapers  et  al.;
No.  09M22.  Hale  v.  Riggins  et  al.;
No.  09M23.  Riley  v.  Pennsylvania  Unemployment  Com

pensation  Board  of  Review;

No.  09M24.  Sanders  v.  Environmental  Protection

Agency  et  al.;

No.  09M25.  Watson  v.  Preslesnik,  Warden;  and
No.  09M26.  West  v.  United  States.  Motions  to  direct  the
Clerk  to  ﬁle  petitions  for  writs  of  certiorari  out  of  time  denied.
No.  09M3.  Moore  v.  Adventist  Health  System/Georgia

Inc.  et  al.;

No.  09M6.  Lacen-Berrios  v.  United  States;
No.  09M14.  Sealed  Petitioner  v.  United  States;  and
No.  09M15.  Sealed  Petitioners  v.  United  States.  Mo
tions  for  leave  to  ﬁle  petitions  for  writs  of  certiorari  under  seal
with  redacted  copies  for  the  public  record  granted.

No.  09M11.  Staub  v.  Proctor  Hospital.  Motion  for  leave

to  proceed  as  a  veteran  granted.

No.  65,  Orig.  Texas  v.  New  Mexico.  Motion  of  the  River
Master  for  fees  and  reimbursement  of  expenses  granted,  and  the
River Master is awarded a total of $6,910.61 for the period July 1,
2008,  through  June  30,  2009,  to  be  paid  equally  by  the  parties.
[For  earlier  order  herein,  see,  e. g.,  555  U. S.  806.]

No.  137,  Orig.  Montana  v.  Wyoming  et  al.  Motion  of  the
Special  Master  for  allowance  of  fees  and  reimbursement  of  ex
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, including case numbers, dates, and brief descriptions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Order Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 09–152
_________________

RUSSELL BRUESEWITZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

WYETH LLC, FKA WYETH, INC., FKA WYETH

LABORATORIES, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 [February 22, 2011]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a preemption provision enacted in
the  National  Childhood  Vaccine  Injury  Act  of  1986
(NCVIA)1  bars  state-law  design-defect  claims  against
vaccine manufacturers.

I

A

For the last 66 years, vaccines have been subject to the
same  federal  premarket  approval  process  as  prescription
drugs,  and  compensation  for  vaccine-related  injuries  has
been  left  largely  to  the  States.2    Under  that  regime,  the
elimination of communicable diseases through vaccination
became “one of the greatest achievements” of public health
in  the  20th  century.3   But  in  the  1970’s  and  1980’s  vac-

——————

1 42 U. S. C. §300aa–22(b)(1).
2 See  P.  Hutt,  R.  Merrill,  &  L.  Grossman,  Food  and  Drug  Law  912–

913, 1458 (3d ed. 2007).

3 Centers for Disease Control, Achievements in Public Health, 1900–
1999:  Impact  of  Vaccines  Universally  Recommended  for  Children,  48
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 243, 247 (Apr. 2, 1999).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MO., INC. v. NEVILS

Syllabus

reimbursement in this context, Coventry had unlawfully obtained re-
imbursement.    Coventry  countered  that  §8902(m)(1)  preempted  the
state law.  The trial court granted summary judgment in Coventry’s
favor, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Missouri Su-
preme  Court  reversed.    Finding  §8902(m)(1)  susceptible  to  diverse
plausible  readings,  the  court  invoked  a  “presumption  against
preemption”  to  conclude  that  the  federal  statute’s  preemptive  scope
excluded  subrogation  and  reimbursement.    On  remand  from  this
Court for further consideration in light of OPM’s 2015 rule, the Mis-
souri  Supreme  Court  adhered  to  its  earlier  decision.    A  majority  of
the  Missouri  Supreme  Court  also  held  that  §8902(m)(1)  violates  the
Supremacy Clause.

Held:

1. Because  contractual  subrogation  and  reimbursement  prescrip-
tions  plainly  “relate  to  . . .  payments  with  respect  to  benefits,”
§8902(m)(1),  they  override  state  laws  barring  subrogation  and  reim-
bursement.  Pp. 6–9.

(a) This  reading  best  comports  with  §8902(m)(1)’s  text,  context,
and purpose.  Contractual provisions for subrogation and reimburse-
ment “relate to . . . payments with respect to benefits” because subro-
gation and reimbursement rights yield just such payments.  When a
carrier exercises its right to either reimbursement or subrogation, it
receives  from  either  the  beneficiary  or  a  third  party  “payment”  re-
specting  the  benefits  the  carrier  had  previously  paid.    The  carrier’s
very  provision  of  benefits  triggers  the  right  to  payment.    Congress’
use  of  the  expansive  phrase  “relate  to,”  which  “express[es]  a  broad
pre-emptive  purpose,”  Morales  v.  Trans  World  Airlines,  Inc.,  504
U. S.  374,  383,  weighs  against  Nevils’  effort  to  narrow  the  term
“payments”  to  exclude  payments  that  occur  “long  after”  a  carrier’s
provision  of  benefits.    Nevils’  argument  that  Congress  intended  to
preempt only state coverage requirements, e.g., inclusion of acupunc-
ture and chiropractic services, also miscarries.

The  statutory  context  and  purpose  reinforce  this  conclusion.
FEHBA  concerns  “benefits  from  a  federal  health  insurance  plan  for
federal employees that arise from a federal law.”  Bell v. Blue Cross &
Blue  Shield  of  Okla.,  823  F. 3d  1198,  1202.    Strong  and  “distinctly
federal interests are involved,” Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.
v. McVeigh, 547 U. S. 677, 696, in uniform administration of the pro-
gram, free from state interference, particularly in regard to coverage,
benefits, and payments.  The Federal Government also has a signifi-
cant financial stake in subrogation and reimbursement.  Pp. 6–8.

(b)  McVeigh’s  suggestion  that  §8902(m)(1)  has  two  “plausible”
interpretations,  547  U. S.,  at  698,  Nevils  asserts,  supports  applica-
tion of the presumption against preemption here.  But the Court nev-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Held" section of a Supreme Court decision. It outlines the Court's reasoning and conclusion on a legal matter related to health insurance and subrogation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2013

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BOND v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 12–158.  Argued November 5, 2013—Decided June 2, 2014

To  implement  the  international  Convention  on  the  Prohibition  of  the
Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons
and  on  Their  Destruction,  Congress  enacted  the  Chemical  Weapons
Convention Implementation Act of 1998.  The statute forbids, among
other  things,  any  person  knowingly  to  “possess[ ]  or  use  . . .  any
chemical weapon,” 18 U. S. C. §229(a)(1).  A “chemical weapon” is “[a]
toxic  chemical  and  its  precursors,  except  where  intended  for  a  pur-
pose not prohibited under this chapter.”  §229F(1)(A).  A “toxic chem-
ical”  is  “any  chemical  which  through  its  chemical  action  on  life  pro-
cesses can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm
to humans or animals.  The term includes all such chemicals, regard-
less of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of
whether  they  are  produced  in  facilities,  in  munitions  or  elsewhere.”
§229F(8)(A).  “[P]urposes not prohibited by this chapter” is defined as
“[a]ny  peaceful  purpose  related  to  an  industrial,  agricultural,  re-
search,  medical,  or  pharmaceutical  activity  or  other  activity,”  and
other specific purposes.  §229F(7).

Petitioner  Bond  sought  revenge  against  Myrlinda  Haynes—with
whom her husband had carried on an affair—by spreading two toxic
chemicals  on  Haynes’s  car,  mailbox,  and  door  knob  in  hopes  that
Haynes  would  develop  an  uncomfortable  rash.    On  one  occasion
Haynes  suffered  a  minor  chemical  burn  that  she  treated  by  rinsing
with  water,  but  Bond’s  attempted  assaults  were  otherwise  entirely
unsuccessful.    Federal  prosecutors  charged  Bond  with  violating,
among other things, section 229(a).  Bond moved to dismiss the chem-
ical  weapons  charges  on  the  ground  that  the  Act  violates  the  Tenth
Amendment.  When the District Court denied her motion, she plead-
ed guilty but reserved the right to appeal.  The Third Circuit initially
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1137

529 U. S.

May 22, 2000

No. 99–9167. Cox v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 369.

No. 99–9169. Betemit v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9173. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1349.

No. 99–9184. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 824.

No. 99–9189. Buckley v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 708.

No. 99–9192. Upshaw v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1327.

No. 99–9197. Pena v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1326.

No. 99–9200. Turner v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1307.

No. 99–9203. Majors v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 1206.

No. 99–9204. Marino v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 200 F. 3d 6.

No. 99–9211. Stone v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 824.

No. 99–9215. Calderon-Espinoza v. United States. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 210 F. 3d 386.

No. 99–9219. Mansilla-Hernandez v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d
1337.

No. 99–9226. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–9239.

Jones v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 283.

No. 99–9240. Leslie v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 211 F. 3d 597.
  </content>
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This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal document, not typical readable content.
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  <category>Legal Docket</category>
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  <content>
46

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

Opinion of the Court

tions of government, as well as against enemies from
without,  that  government  is  forbidden  by  any  law  or
proceeding to invade or destroy the right to keep and
bear arms. . . .  The clause is analogous to the one se
curing  the  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press.    Free
dom, not license, is secured; the fair use, not the libel
lous abuse, is protected.”  J. Pomeroy, An Introduction
to  the  Constitutional  Law  of  the  United  States  152–
153 (1868) (hereinafter Pomeroy).

“As  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  the
constitutions of several of the states, in terms more or
less comprehensive, declare the right of the people to
keep and bear arms, it has been a subject of grave dis
cussion, in some of the state courts, whether a statute
prohibiting  persons,  when  not  on  a  journey,  or  as
travellers,  from  wearing  or  carrying  concealed  weap-
ons, be constitutional.  There has been a great differ
ence of opinion on the question.”  2 J. Kent, Commen
taries  on  American  Law  *340,  n. 2  (O.  Holmes  ed.,
12th ed. 1873) (hereinafter Kent).

“Some  general  knowledge  of  firearms  is  important  to
the public welfare; because it would be impossible, in
case of war, to organize promptly  an efficient force of
volunteers  unless  the  people  had  some  familiarity
with  weapons  of  war.    The  Constitution  secures  the
right of the people to keep and bear arms.  No doubt, a
citizen who keeps a gun or pistol under judicious pre
cautions, practices in safe places the use of it, and in
due time teaches his sons to do the same, exercises his
individual right.  No doubt, a person whose residence
or  duties  involve  peculiar  peril  may  keep  a  pistol  for
prudent  self-defence.”  B.  Abbott,  Judge  and  Jury:  A
Popular Explanation of the Leading Topics in the Law
of the Land 333 (1880) (hereinafter Abbott).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal opinions and commentary on the Second Amendment right to bear arms. It provides historical context and legal interpretations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Commentary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xiv

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bush; Balfour Beatty Bahamas Ltd. v.
Bush; Horsley v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Buss v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bustamante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Butler v. Pitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Butler; Sughrue v.
Butterworth; Malowney v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BVR Liquidating, Inc. v. Automobile Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bybee v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Byers v. Mahoney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Byrd v. Environmental Protection Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Byrd v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cabana v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cabla v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cabrera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Caddell Construction Co.; Wise v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cadena-Guerrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cadwell; Smith v.
Caggiano; Pennington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cain; Beckham v.
Cain; Cittadino v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cain; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cain; Harris v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cain; Isaacs v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cain; Jeffers v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cain; Kingston v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cain; Mayeux v.
Cain; Taylor v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cain; Tuesno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calbone; Hall v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Caldera; Cowhig v.
Calderon v. McDowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calderon-Espinoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Calhoun v. DeTella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Aguirre v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Arizona v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Castro v.
California; Earp v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Falsetta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Fausto v.
California; Flowers v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Ford v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Francis v.

Page
1017
1007
1089
1123
1133
1039
1055
1067
1117
1075
1018
1031
1010
1092
1032
1009,1105
1082
1084
1113
1095
1133
1072
1074
1093
1132
1042
1009
1088
1024
1122
1077
1005,1095
1082
1137
1009,1095
1040
1015
1057
1005
1089
1074
1009
1014
1042
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely found at the beginning of a legal document.  It is not the main body of the text and is more of a navigational tool.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 233 (2010)

243

Opinion of the Court

ify that prescription,9  and does not otherwise “specif[y]” that
reopening  decisions  are  “in  the  discretion  of  the  Attorney
General.” 10

III

A

1

The  Board’s  discretionary  authority  to  act  on  a  motion  to
reopen,  we  have  thus  far  explained,  is  “speciﬁed”  not  in  a
statute, but only in the Attorney General’s regulation, which

9 As earlier noted, see supra, at 240–241, n. 6, the Seventh Circuit stated
that  the  regulation  specifying  the  Board’s  discretion  over  motions  to  re
open,  8  CFR  § 1003.2(a),  “draw[s]  [its]  force  from  provisions  in  the  Act.”
533 F. 3d, at 536 (citing 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7)).  It is hard to see how the
regulation  could  draw  force  from  § 1229a(c)(7),  for  the  regulation  was  al
ready  in  force  when  that  statutory  provision  was  enacted.  The  regula
tion, 8  CFR § 1003.2(a), was published  April 29, 1996, 61  Fed. Reg. 18900,
18904;  8  U. S. C.  § 1229a(c)(7)  was  enacted  September  30,  1996,  § 304,  110
Stat. 3009–593.

10 The  only  statutory  reference  to  discretion  respecting  motions  to  re
open appears in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), which gives the Attorney General
“discretion”  to  waive  one  of  the  statute’s  time  limitations  in  extraordi
nary circumstances.

Amicus  urges  that  “the  statutory  language  governing  motions  to  re
open anticipates an exercise of Attorney General discretion when it states,
‘[t]he  motion  to  reopen  shall  state  the  new  facts  that  will  be  proven  at  a
hearing to be held if the motion is granted.’ ”  Brief for Court-Appointed
Amicus  Curiae  in  Support  of  Judgment  Below  19,  n.  8  (quoting
§ 1229a(c)(7)(B)).  One  can  demur  to  the  argument  that  Congress  antici
pated  that  decisions on  reopening  motions  would be  discretionary.  Even
so, the statutory proscription Congress enacted, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), speaks
of  authority  “speciﬁed”—not  merely  assumed  or  contemplated—to  be  in
the  Attorney  General’s  discretion.  “Speciﬁed”  is  not  synonymous  with
“implied”  or  “anticipated.”  See  Webster’s  New  Collegiate  Dictionary
1116  (1974)  (“specify”  means  “to  name  or  state  explicitly  or  in  detail”).
See  also  Soltane  v.  U. S.  Dept.  of  Justice,  381  F.  3d  143,  147  (CA3  2004)
(Alito,  J.)  (“[W]e  do  not  think  .  .  .  that  the  use  of  marginally  ambiguous
statutory language, without more, is adequate to ‘specif[y]’ that a particu
lar  action  is  within  the  Attorney  General’s  discretion  for  the  purposes
of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal citations, case names, and detailed legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Syllabus

action it reviews—is to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “in-
terpret . . . statutory provisions.”  §706 (emphasis added).  It requires
a  court  to  ignore,  not  follow,  “the  reading  the  court  would  have
reached” had it exercised its independent judgment as required by the
APA.  Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 11.  Chevron insists on more than
the “respect” historically given to Executive Branch interpretations; it
demands that courts mechanically afford binding deference to agency
interpretations, including those that have been inconsistent over time,
see id., at 863, and even when a pre-existing judicial precedent holds
that an ambiguous statute  means something else, National Cable &
Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967,
982.  That regime is the antithesis of the time honored approach the
APA prescribes.

Chevron cannot be reconciled with the APA by presuming that stat-
utory ambiguities are implicit delegations to agencies.  That presump-
tion does not approximate reality.  A statutory ambiguity does not nec-
essarily reflect a congressional intent that an agency, as opposed to a
court,  resolve  the  resulting  interpretive  question.    Many  or  perhaps
most  statutory  ambiguities  may  be unintentional.  And  when  courts
confront statutory ambiguities in cases that do not involve agency in-
terpretations  or  delegations  of  authority,  they  are  not  somehow  re-
lieved of their obligation to independently interpret the statutes.  In-
stead of declaring a particular party’s reading “permissible” in such a
case, courts use every tool at their disposal to determine the best read-
ing of the statute and resolve the ambiguity.  But in an agency case as
in  any  other,  there  is  a  best  reading  all  the  same—“the  reading  the
court would have reached” if no agency were involved.  Chevron, 467
U. S., at 843, n. 11.  It therefore makes no sense to speak of a “permis-
sible”  interpretation  that  is  not  the  one  the  court,  after  applying  all
relevant interpretive tools, concludes is best.

Perhaps most fundamentally, Chevron’s presumption is misguided
because  agencies  have  no  special  competence  in  resolving  statutory
ambiguities.  Courts do.  The Framers anticipated that courts would
often  confront  statutory  ambiguities  and  expected  that courts  would
resolve  them  by  exercising  independent  legal  judgment.    Chevron
gravely erred in concluding that the inquiry is fundamentally different
just  because  an  administrative  interpretation  is  in  play.    The  very
point of the traditional tools of statutory construction is to resolve stat-
utory ambiguities.  That is no less true when the ambiguity is about
the  scope  of  an  agency’s  own  power—perhaps  the  occasion  on  which
abdication in favor of the agency is least appropriate.  Pp. 21–23.

(3) The  Government  responds  that  Congress  must  generally  in-
tend  for  agencies  to  resolve  statutory  ambiguities  because  agencies
have subject matter expertise regarding the statutes they administer;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion or scholarly article discussing the Chevron doctrine. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the deference courts should give to agency interpretations of statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

DR. A v. HOCHUL

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

they are likely to suffer.  Roman Catholic Diocese of Brook-
lyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 2).  In
this case, no one seriously disputes that, absent relief, the
applicants will suffer an irreparable injury.  Not only does
New  York  threaten  to  have  them  fired  and  strip  them  of
unemployment  benefits.  This  Court  has  held  that  “[t]he
loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal peri-
ods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 373 (1976).  Accordingly, be-
fore us the parties’ fight focuses dominantly on whether the
applicants are likely to succeed on the merits of their First
Amendment claim.

The answer to that question is clear.  The Free Exercise
Clause  protects  not  only  the  right  to  hold  unpopular  reli-
gious beliefs inwardly and secretly.  It protects the right to
live out those beliefs publicly in “the performance of (or ab-
stention  from)  physical  acts.”  Employment  Div.,  Dept.  of
Human  Resources  of  Ore.  v.  Smith,  494  U. S.  872,  877
(1990).  Under this Court’s precedents, laws targeting acts
for  disfavor  only  when  they  are  religious  in  nature  or  be-
cause of their religious character are “doubtless . . . uncon-
stitutional.”  Id.,  at  877–878.    As  a  result,  where  “official
expressions of hostility to religion” accompany laws or poli-
cies  burdening  free  exercise,  we  have  simply  “set  aside”
inquiry.  Masterpiece
such  policies  without  further
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U. S.
___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 18).  But even where such overt
animus  is  lacking,  laws  that  impose  burdens  on  religious
exercises  must  still  be  both  neutral  toward  religion  and
generally  applicable  or  survive  strict  scrutiny.   Church  of
Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508  U. S.  520,  546
(1993).  To meet its burden under strict scrutiny, the gov-
ernment must demonstrate that its law is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest.  Id., at 531–532.  Ap-
plying  these  principles  to  this  case,  New  York’s  mandate
falters at each step.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments regarding the Free Exercise Clause and the constitutionality of New York's mandate.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

971

558 U. S.

October 20, 2009

No. 09–349.  Yaitsky v.  United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  322  Fed.  Appx.  347.

No.  09–5022.  Rothery  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  5th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  6  So.  3d  622.

No.  09–5128.  Balentine  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
324  Fed.  Appx.  304.

No.  09–5131.  Davis  v.  Branker,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  926.

No.  09–5389.  Fields  v.  Kentucky.  Sup.  Ct.  Ky.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  274  S. W.  3d  375.

No.  09–5391.  Evertson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  509.

No.  09–5896.  Cassell  v.  White,  Correctional  Adminis
trator,  Maury  Correctional  Institution.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  245.

No.  09–5923.  Maisano  v.  Ryan,  Director,  Arizona  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari
denied.

No.  09–5926.  Reed  v.  Cirtin.  Ct.  App.  Mo.,  Southern  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  280  S. W.  3d  143.

No.  09–5929.  Pruitt  v.  Schofield,  Warden.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5952.  Olivas  v.  Neven,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  70.

No.  09–5960.  Long  et  ux.  v.  Wood  Mizer  Products  Inc.
C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.
Appx.  755.

No. 09–5963.  Tung v.  Cuevas et al.  Ct. App. Cal., 5th App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5965.  Neufer  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the orders issued.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

need and no good reason to decide anything other than the
facial unconstitutionality question actually before us.  After
all, we do not know how the platforms “moderate” their us-
ers’ content, much less whether they do so in an inherently
expressive way under the First Amendment.  Nevertheless,
the majority is undeterred.  It inexplicably singles out a few
provisions and a couple of platforms for special treatment.
And it unreflectively assumes the truth of NetChoice’s un-
supported  assertion  that  social-media  platforms—which
use secret algorithms to review and moderate an almost un-
imaginable quantity of data today—are just as expressive
as the newspaper editors who marked up typescripts in blue
pencil 50 years ago.

These as-applied issues are important, and we may have
to decide them before too long.  But these cases do not pro-
vide the proper occasion to do so.  For these reasons, I am
therefore compelled to provide a more complete discussion
of those matters than is customary in an opinion that con-
curs only in the judgment.

I
As the Court has recognized, social-media platforms have
become the “modern public square.”  Packingham v. North
Carolina, 582 U. S. 98, 107 (2017).  In just a few years, they
have transformed the way in which millions of Americans
communicate with family and friends, perform daily chores,
conduct business, and learn about and comment on current
events.  The vast majority of Americans use social media,1
and the average person spends more than two hours a day
on various platforms.2  Young people now turn primarily to
——————

1 J.  Gottfried,  Pew  Research  Center,  Americans’  Social  Media  Use  3
(2024).  As platforms incorporate new features and technology, the num-
ber  of  Americans  who  use  social  media  is  expected  to  grow.    S.  Dixon,
Statista,  Social  Media  Users
in  the  United  States  2020–2029
(Jan.  30,  2024),  https://www.statista.com/statistics/278409/number-of-
social-network-users-in-the-united-states.

2 V.  Filak,  Exploring  Mass  Communication:  Connecting  With  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Moody v. NetChoice.  It delves into the First Amendment implications of social media content moderation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U47

[10-04-01 09:34:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 420 (2000)

439

Opinion of the Court

sion, ﬂash backs . . . .
[T]he psychological report states
he is overwhelmed by feelings of guilt and shame in his
actions. He is numb. He is trying to suppress his feel-
ings, but when he has feelings, there is only pain and
sadness.” App. 424.

The description accords with the contents of the psychiatric
report, which diagnosed Cruse as suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder:

“[Cruse] has recurrent nightmares and visualizes the
face of the woman that he killed. When attempting to
describe this nightmare, he breaks openly into tears and
his face reddens. . . . He continues to feel worthless as a
person . . . . He has no hope for his future and has
been thinking of suicide constantly. . . . He does describe
inability to sleep, often tossing and turning, waking up,
and feeling fatigued during the day. . . . He described
neurovegetative symptoms of major depression and
post-traumatic nightmares, recurrent in nature, of the
[murders].”

Id., at 495–499.

The transcript put petitioner’s state habeas counsel on notice
of the report’s existence and possible materiality. The sole
indication that counsel made some effort to investigate the
report is an October 30, 1995, letter to the prosecutor in
which counsel requested “[a]ll reports of physical and mental
examinations, scientiﬁc tests, or experiments conducted in
connection with the investigation of the offense, including
but not limited to: . . . [a]ll psychological test or polygraph
examinations performed upon any prosecution witness and
all documents referring or relating to such tests . . . .”
Id.,
at 346–347. After the prosecution declined the requests ab-
sent a court order, id., at 353, it appears counsel made no
further efforts to ﬁnd the speciﬁc report mentioned by
Cruse’s attorney. Given knowledge of the report’s existence
and potential importance, a diligent attorney would have
done more. Counsel’s failure to investigate these references
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the part discussing the psychological state of the defendant, Cruse. It includes quotes from a psychiatric report and details about the defense attorney's actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY

Syllabus

as it awarded PennEast relief with respect to New Jersey’s property
interests.  The Third Circuit concluded that because §717f(h) did not
clearly delegate to certificate holders the Federal Government’s ability
to sue nonconsenting States, PennEast was not authorized to condemn
New Jersey’s property.

Held: Section 717f(h) authorizes FERC certificate holders to condemn all
necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or States.
Pp. 6–23.

(a) The United States raises a threshold challenge to the Third Cir-
cuit’s jurisdiction below on the grounds that §717r(b) grants the court
of appeals reviewing FERC’s certificate order (here, the D. C. Circuit)
“exclusive” jurisdiction to “affirm, modify, or set aside such order.”  The
Court  rejects  this  challenge.    New  Jersey  does  not  seek  to  modify
FERC’s order; it asserts a defense against the condemnation proceed-
ings initiated by PennEast.  The Third Circuit’s decision that §717f(h)
does not grant natural gas companies the right to bring condemnation
suits against States did not “modify” or “set aside” FERC’s order, which
neither  purports  to  grant  PennEast  the  right  to  file  a condemnation
suit against States nor addresses whether §717f(h) grants that right.
Contrary to the argument of the United States, New Jersey’s appeal is
not a collateral attack on the FERC order.  Pp. 6–7.

(b) The Federal Government has exercised its eminent domain au-
thority since the founding, connecting our country through turnpikes,
bridges, and railroads—and more recently through pipelines, telecom-
munications  infrastructure,  and  electric  transmission  facilities.    The
Court  has  upheld  these  exercises  of  the  federal  eminent  domain
power—whether by the Government or a private corporation, whether
through the upfront taking of property or a condemnation action, and
whether against private property or state-owned land.  Section 717f(h)
falls within this established practice.  Pp. 7–12.

(1) Governments have long taken property for public use without
the owner’s consent.  The United States is no different.  While the Con-
stitution and Bill of Rights did not use the term “eminent domain,” the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (“nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation”) presupposed the
existence of such a power.  Initially, the Federal Government exercised
its eminent domain authority in areas subject to exclusive federal ju-
risdiction.  The Court later confirmed that federal eminent domain ex-
tended to property within a State.  Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367.
The Court’s decision in Kohl—which upheld the power of the United
States  to  condemn  land  in  Ohio  to  construct  a  federal  building—ob-
served that eminent domain was a “means well known when the Con-
stitution was adopted” and that “[t]he powers vested by the Constitu-
tion  in  the  general  government  demand  for  their  exercise  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1088

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 24, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1445. Speth v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 6 S. W. 3d 530.

No. 99–1447.

Jones v. Frank et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 254.

No. 99–1455. Atwell v. Atwell. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st

Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 So. 2d 858.

No. 99–1459. DePluzer v. Illinois et al. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 272.

No. 99–1460. Watts v. Network Solutions, Inc. C. A. 7th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 276.

No. 99–1492. Garrison v. City of Wichita Falls et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d
1114.

No. 99–1513.

In re Kavalaris. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari

denied.

No. 99–1525. Mizani, aka Slater v. United States. C. A.

4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 261.

No. 99–1531. Hyland v. Clinton, President of the United
States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 208
F. 3d 213.

No. 99–5793. Harrison v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 707 N. E. 2d 767.

No. 99–6035. Taylor v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 538.

No. 99–6199. Colvin-El v. Nuth, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 F. 3d 1332.

No. 99–6738. Vann v. Small, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 650.

No. 99–7299. White v. United States; and
No. 99–7523. White et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1307.

No. 99–7407. Daniels v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 187 Ill. 2d 301, 718 N. E. 2d 149.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U51

[09-26-01 10:31:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 494 (2000)

503

Opinion of the Court

Consistent with this principle, it was sometimes said that
a conspiracy claim was not an independent cause of action,
but was only the mechanism for subjecting co-conspirators
to liability when one of their member committed a tortious
act. Royster v. Baker, 365 S. W. 2d 496, 499, 500 (Mo. 1963)
(“[A]n alleged conspiracy by or agreement between the de-
fendants is not of itself actionable. Some wrongful act to
the plaintiff ’s damage must have been done by one or more
of the defendants, and the fact of a conspiracy merely bears
on the liability of the various defendants as joint tort-
feasors”). See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F. 2d 472, 479
(CADC 1983) (“Since liability for civil conspiracy depends on
performance of some underlying tortious act, the conspiracy
is not independently actionable; rather, it is a means for es-
tablishing vicarious liability for the underlying tort”).7

7 Justice Stevens quotes from some of the cases we have cited to
suggest that the common law allowed recovery from harm caused by
any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See post, at 510–511, n. 5
(dissenting opinion). However, his quotations omit pertinent language.
When read in context, it is clear that these passages refer to harm, not
from any overt act, but only from overt acts that are themselves tortious.
Compare ibid. with Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407, 410 (1861) (“[I]t must
be shown that the defendants have done some wrong, that is, have violated
some right of theirs . . . .
[I]n these cases the act must be tortious”);
Royster v. Baker, 365 S. W. 2d 496, 499 (Mo. 1963) (“Strictly speaking,
there has been no distinct form of writ or action of conspiracy; but the
action sounds in tort, and is of the nature of an action on the case upon
the wrong done under the conspiracy alleged. The gist of the action is
not the conspiracy, but the wrong done by acts in furtherance of the con-
spiracy” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Lesperance v.
North American Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 336, 345, 31 Cal. Rptr.
873, 878 (1963) (“ ‘It is well settled that a conspiracy cannot be made the
subject of a civil action unless something is done which without the con-
spiracy would give a right of action’ ”); Earp v. Detroit, 16 Mich. App. 271,
275, 167 N. W. 2d 841, 845 (1969) (“There is no civil action for conspiracy
alone.
It must be coupled with the commission of acts which damaged
the plaintiff. Recovery may be had from parties on the theory of con-
certed action as long as the elements of the separate and actionable tort
are properly proved” (citation omitted)); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F. 2d
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the common law concept of conspiracy and its relation to tortious acts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GARZA v. IDAHO

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO

No. 17–1026.  Argued October 30, 2018—Decided February 27, 2019

Petitioner Gilberto Garza, Jr., signed two plea agreements, each arising
from state criminal charges and each containing a clause stating that
Garza  waived  his  right  to  appeal.    Shortly  after  sentencing,  Garza
told his trial counsel that he wished to appeal.  Instead of filing a no-
tice of appeal, counsel informed Garza that an appeal would be “prob-
lematic” given Garza’s appeal waiver.  After the time period for Gar-
za to preserve an appeal lapsed, he sought state postconviction relief,
alleging that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by
failing  to  file  a  notice  of  appeal  despite  his  repeated  requests.  The
Idaho  trial  court  denied  relief,  and  the  Idaho  Court  of  Appeals  af-
firmed.  Also  affirming,  the  Idaho  Supreme  Court  held  that  Garza
could not show the requisite deficient performance by counsel and re-
sulting prejudice.  In doing so, the court concluded that the presump-
tion  of  prejudice  recognized  in  Roe  v.  Flores-Ortega,  528  U. S.  470,
when trial counsel fails to file an appeal as instructed does not apply
when the defendant has agreed to an appeal waiver.

Held: Flores-Ortega’s  presumption  of  prejudice  applies  regardless  of

whether a defendant has signed an appeal waiver.  Pp. 3–14.

(a) Under  Strickland  v.  Washington,  466  U. S.  668,  a  defendant
who  claims  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  must  prove  (1)  “that
counsel’s  representation  fell  below  an  objective  standard  of  reasona-
bleness,” id., at 687–688, and (2) that any such deficiency was “preju-
dicial to the defense,” id., at 692.  However, “prejudice is presumed”
in “certain Sixth Amendment contexts,” ibid., such as “when counsel’s
constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an ap-
peal  that  he  otherwise  would  have  taken,”  Flores-Ortega,  528  U. S.,
at 484.  Pp. 3–4.

(b) This case hinges on two procedural devices: appeal waivers and
notices of appeal.  No appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005)

7

STEVENS, J., dissenting

of  employing  a  procedure  that  will  provide  the  correct
answer to the central question of state law.  See Brockett,
472 U. S., at 510 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring) (“Speculation
by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in
the  absence  of  a  prior  state  court  adjudication  is  particu-
larly gratuitous when, as is the case here, the state courts
stand willing to address questions of state law on certifica-
tion from a federal court”).6

III

Three  flaws  in  the  Court’s  rather  superficial  analysis  of
the merits highlight the unwisdom of its decision to answer
the  state-law  question  de  novo.  First,  the  Court  places
undue  weight  on  the  various  statutes  throughout  the
country  that  seemingly  mandate  police  enforcement  but
are generally understood to preserve police discretion.  As
a result, the Court gives short shrift to the unique case of
“mandatory  arrest”  statutes  in  the  domestic  violence
context;  States  passed  a  wave  of  these  statutes  in  the
1980’s and 1990’s with the unmistakable goal of eliminat-
——————

6 The Court is correct that I would take an “anyone-but-us approach,”
ante, at 9, n. 5, to the question of who decides the issue of Colorado law
in  this  case.    Both  options  that  I  favor—deferring  to  the  Circuit’s
interpretation  or,  barring  that,  certifying  to  the  Colorado  Supreme
Court—recognize  the  comparative  expertise  of  another  tribunal  on
questions of state law.  And both options offer their own efficiencies.  By
contrast, the Court’s somewhat overconfident “only us” approach lacks
any cogent justification.  The fact that neither party requested certifica-
tion  certainly  cannot  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  dismissing  that  option.
As with  abstention, the considerations that weigh in favor of certifica-
tion—federal-state  comity,  constitutional  avoidance,  judicial  efficiency,
the  desire  to  settle  correctly  a  recurring  issue  of  state  law—transcend
the  interests  of  individual  litigants,  rendering  it  imprudent  to  cast
them as gatekeepers to the procedure.  See, e.g., Elkins v. Moreno, 435
U. S.  647,  662  (1978)  (certifying  state-law  issue  absent  a  request  from
the  parties);  Aldrich  v.  Aldrich,  375  U. S.  249  (1963)  (per  curiam)
(same); see also 17A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice
and  Procedure  §4248,  p.  176  (2d  ed.  1988)  (“Ordinarily  a  court  will
order certification on its own motion”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

KAGAN, J., dissenting

which  required  teachers  who  had  not  joined  the  union  to
pay it “a service charge equal to the regular dues required
of [u]nion members.”  Abood, 431 U. S., at 212.  A group of
non-union members sued over that clause, arguing that it
violated the First Amendment.

In considering their challenge, the Court canvassed the
purposes  of  the  “agency  shop”  clause.  It  was  rooted,  the
Court  understood,  in  the  “principle  of  exclusive  union
representation”—a  “central  element”  in  “industrial  rela-
tions”  since  the  New  Deal.  Id.,  at  220.    Significant  bene-
fits,  the  Court  explained,  could  derive  from  the  “designa-
tion  of  a  single  [union]  representative”  for  all  similarly
situated  employees  in  a  workplace.    Ibid.  In  particular,
such  arrangements:  “avoid[ ]  the  confusion  that  would
result from attempting to enforce two or more agreements
specifying  different terms and conditions of employment”;
“prevent[ ]  inter-union  rivalries  from  creating  dissension
within  the  work  force”;  “free[ ]  the  employer  from  the
possibility  of  facing  conflicting  demands  from  different
unions”; and “permit[ ] the employer and a single union to
reach  agreements  and settlements  that  are  not  subject  to
attack  from  rival  labor  organizations.”    Id.,  at  220–221.
As  proof,  the  Court  pointed  to  the  example  of  exclusive-
representation  arrangements  in  the  private-employment
sphere:  There,  Congress  had  long  thought  that  such
schemes  would  promote  “peaceful  labor  relations”  and
“labor stability.”  Id., at 219, 229.  A public employer like
Detroit,  the  Court  believed,  could  reasonably  make  the
same calculation.

But  for  an  exclusive-bargaining  arrangement  to  work,
such  an  employer  often  thought,  the  union  needed  ade-
quate  funding.  Because  the  “designation  of  a  union  as
exclusive representative carries with it great responsibili-
ties,”  the  Court  reasoned,  it  inevitably  also  entails  sub-
stantial costs.  Id., at  221.  “The  tasks of negotiating and
administering  a  collective-bargaining  agreement  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal precedent of *Abood v. Detroit Board of Education* and the rationale behind "agency shop" clauses in union contracts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

2

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Syllabus

did not rely on these provisions when it ﬁled suit against, inter alios,
petitioners (hereinafter Secretary), challenging the validity of Medi-
care regulations that impose sanctions or remedies on nursing homes
that violate certain substantive standards. Rather, it invoked federal-
question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
In dismissing for lack of juris-
diction, the Federal District Court found that 42 U. S. C. § 405(h), as
interpreted in Weinberger v. Salﬁ, 422 U. S. 749, and Heckler v. Ringer,
466 U. S. 602, barred a § 1331 suit. The Seventh Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S.
667, had signiﬁcantly modiﬁed such earlier case law.

Held: Section 405(h), as incorporated by § 1395ii, bars federal-question

jurisdiction here. Pp. 10–25.

(a) Section 405(h) purports to make exclusive § 405(g)’s judicial re-
view method. While its “to recover on any claim arising under” lan-
guage plainly bars § 1331 review where an individual challenges on
any legal ground the agency’s denial of a monetary beneﬁt under the
Social Security and Medicare Acts, the question here is whether an
anticipatory challenge to the lawfulness of a policy, regulation, or stat-
ute that might later bar recovery or authorize imposition of a penalty
is also an action “to recover on any claim arising under” those Acts.
P. 10.

(b) Were the Court not to take account of Michigan Academy, § 405(h),
as interpreted in Salﬁ and Ringer, would clearly bar this § 1331 lawsuit.
The Court found in the latter cases that § 405(h) applies where “both
the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation” of a claim
is the Social Security Act, Salﬁ, supra, at 760–761, or the Medicare Act,
Ringer, 466 U. S., at 615. All aspects of a present or future beneﬁts
claim must be channeled through the administrative process.
Id., at
621–622. As so interpreted, § 405(h)’s bar reaches beyond ordinary
administrative law principles of “ripeness” and “exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies”—doctrines that normally require channeling a legal
challenge through the agency—by preventing the application of excep-
tions to those doctrines. This nearly absolute channeling requirement
assures the agency greater opportunity to apply, interpret, or revise
policies, regulations, or statutes without possibly premature inter-
ference by individual courts applying “ripeness” and “exhaustion” ex-
ceptions case by case. The assurance comes at the price of occasional
individual, delay-related hardship, but paying such a price in the con-
text of a massive, complex health and safety program such as Medi-
care was justiﬁed in the judgment of Congress as understood in Salﬁ
and Ringer. Salﬁ and Ringer cannot be distinguished from the instant
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the legal issues, the lower court rulings, and the Supreme Court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

the Federal Register, justify the rule by reference to legal
authority, describe “the subjects and issues involved” in the
rule, and allow interested parties to submit comments.  5
U. S. C. §§553(b)–(c); see also Kisor, 588 U. S., at ___ (opin-
ion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 17).  As we have recognized
recently, use of the word “shall” indicates that these proce-
dures impose mandatory obligations on the agency before it
can adopt a valid binding regulation.  See Maine Commu-
nity  Health  Options  v.  United  States,  590  U. S.  ___,  ___
(2020) (slip op., at 12).  After undergoing notice and com-
ment, the agency then publishes the final rule, which must
“articulate  a  satisfactory  explanation  for  [the]  action  in-
cluding a rational connection between the facts found and
the  choice  made.”  Motor  Vehicle  Mfrs.  Assn.  of  United
States,  Inc.  v.  State  Farm  Mut.  Automobile  Ins.  Co.,  463
U. S.  29,  43  (1983)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
Only after completing this process is the legislative rule a
valid law.  See Kisor, 588 U. S., at ___ (opinion of GORSUCH,
J.) (slip op., at 17).10

Because DACA has the force and effect of law, DHS was
required to observe the procedures set out in the APA if it
wanted to promulgate a legislative rule.  It is undisputed,
however,  that  DHS  did  not  do  so.    It  provided  no  oppor-
tunity for interested parties to submit comments regarding
the effect that the program’s dramatic and very significant
change in immigration law would have on various aspects
of society.  It provided no discussion of economic considera-
tions or national security interests.  Nor did it provide any
substantial  policy  justifications  for  treating  young  people

——————

10 The APA also provides certain exceptions from notice and comment
rulemaking.  For example, an agency may promulgate a legally binding
rule without notice and comment if good cause exists to do so.  5 U. S. C.
§553(b)(B).  This text would become a nullity if the agency could achieve
the  same  effect  by  simply  dispensing  with  notice  and  comment  proce-
dures altogether.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and its requirements for rulemaking. It delves into the specifics of notice and comment procedures, mandatory obligations, and the need for justification in rule creation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>