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  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–297.  Argued March 30, 2021—Decided June 25, 2021

The Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates the consumer reporting agencies
that compile and disseminate personal information about consumers.
15 U. S. C. §1681 et seq.  The Act also creates a cause of action for con-
sumers to sue and recover damages for certain violations.  §1681n(a).
TransUnion  is  a  credit  reporting  agency  that  compiles  personal  and
financial information about individual consumers to create consumer
reports  and  then  sells  those  reports  for  use  by  entities  that  request
information about the creditworthiness of individual consumers.  Be-
ginning  in  2002,  TransUnion  introduced  an  add-on  product  called
OFAC  Name  Screen  Alert.    When  a  business  opted  into  the  Name
Screen service, TransUnion would conduct its ordinary credit check of
the consumer, and it would also use third-party software to compare
the consumer’s name against a list maintained by the U. S. Treasury
Department’s  Office  of  Foreign  Assets  Control  (OFAC)  of  terrorists,
drug traffickers, and other serious criminals.  If the consumer’s first
and  last  name  matched  the  first  and  last  name  of  an  individual  on
OFAC’s list, then TransUnion would place an alert on the credit report
indicating that the consumer’s name was a “potential match” to a name
on the OFAC list.  At that time, TransUnion did not compare any data
other than first and last names.

A  class  of  8,185  individuals  with  OFAC  alerts  in  their  credit  files
sued TransUnion under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for failing to use
reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of their credit files.  The
plaintiffs also complained about formatting defects in certain mailings
sent to them by TransUnion.  The parties stipulated prior to trial that
only  1,853  class  members  (including  the  named  plaintiff  Sergio
Ramirez) had their misleading credit reports containing OFAC alerts
provided  to  third  parties  during  the  7-month  period  specified  in  the
  </content>
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This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
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18

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

those  applicable  to  other  sorts  of  works,  ibid.  (accepting
that copying as part of “reverse engineer[ing] a system to
ensure compatibility” could be a valid purpose).  And we are
told that our fair use analysis must prioritize certain factors
over  others,  post,  at  9,  n.  5,  even  though  our  case  law  in-
structs that fair use depends on the context, see Campbell,
510 U. S., at 577–578.

We  do  not  understand  Congress,  however,  to  have
shielded computer programs from the ordinary application
of  copyright’s  limiting  doctrines  in  this  way.  By  defining
computer  programs  in  §101,  Congress  chose  to  place  this
subject matter within the copyright regime.  Like other pro-
tected works, that means that the owners of computer pro-
grams enjoy the exclusive rights set forth in the Act, includ-
ing  the  right  to  “reproduce  [a]  copyrighted  work”  or  to
“prepare derivative works.”  17 U. S. C. §106.  But that also
means that exclusive rights in computer programs are lim-
ited  like  any  other  works.  Just  as  fair  use  distinguishes
among books and films, which are indisputably subjects of
copyright, so too must it draw lines among computer pro-
grams.  And just as fair use takes account of the market in
which  scripts  and  paintings  are  bought  and  sold,  so  too
must it consider the realities of how technological works are
created  and  disseminated.    We  do not  believe that  an  ap-
proach close to “all or nothing” would be faithful to the Cop-
yright Act’s overall design.

V
At the outset, Google argues that “fair use” is a question
for a jury to decide; here the jury  decided the question in
Google’s favor; and we should limit our review to determin-
ing whether “substantial evidence” justified the jury’s deci-
sion.  The  Federal  Circuit  disagreed.    It  thought  that  the
“fair  use”  question  was  a  mixed  question  of  fact  and  law;
that  reviewing  courts  should  appropriately  defer  to  the
jury’s  findings  of  underlying  facts;  but  that  the  ultimate
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court is discussing the application of fair use doctrine to computer programs.
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529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

521

Opinion of the Court

tioner’s pro se petition for certiorari, 527 U. S. 1002 (1999),
and appointed counsel, id., at 1051.

II

To prohibit legislative Acts “contrary to the ﬁrst princi-
ples of the social compact and to every principle of sound
legislation,” 6 the Framers included provisions they con-
sidered to be “perhaps greater securities to liberty and re-
publicanism than any [the Constitution] contains.” 7 The
provisions declare:

“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts . . . .” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10.8

The proscription against ex post facto laws “necessarily
requires some explanation; for, naked and without expla-
nation, it is unintelligible, and means nothing.” Calder v.
Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798) (Chase, J.).
In Calder v. Bull,
Justice Chase stated that the necessary explanation is de-
rived from English common law well known to the Fram-
ers: “The expressions ‘ex post facto laws,’ are technical, they
had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired
an appropriate meaning, by Legislators, Lawyers, and Au-
Id., at 391; see also id., at 389 (“The prohibition . . .
thors.”
very probably arose from the knowledge, that the Parlia-
ment of Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass
such laws . . .”); id., at 396 (Paterson, J.). Speciﬁcally, the

facto violation); Murphy v. Sowders, 801 F. 2d 205 (CA6 1986) (same);
Murphy v. Kentucky, 652 S. W. 2d 69 (Ky. 1983) (same). See also Idaho
v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P. 2d 788 (1981) ( judicial change in witness
corroboration rule may not be applied retroactively); Bowyer v. United
States, 422 A. 2d 973 (DC 1980) (same).

6 The Federalist No. 44, p. 282 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
7 Id., No. 84, at 511 (A. Hamilton).
8 Article I, § 9, cl. 3, has a similar prohibition applicable to Congress:

“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 513 (2000). It contains legal citations, discusses legal principles, and presents an argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

678

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Opinion of the Court

In 1927 (prior to our decision in Murdock), in a case involving
a request for habeas relief from a deportation order, we
declined to resolve whether “the Fifth Amendment guaran-
tees immunity from self-incrimination under state statutes.”
United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigra-
tion, 273 U. S. 103, 113 (1927). Although we found that the
witness had waived his claim to the privilege, our decision
might be read to suggest that there was some tension be-
tween the reasoning of two of the cases discussed above,
Hale v. Henkel and Brown v. Walker, and the analyses con-
tained in two others, United States v. Saline Bank of Va., 1
Pet. 100 (1828), and Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 186 (1906).
273 U. S., at 113. These last two cases have in fact been
cited here for the claim that prior to due process incorpora-
tion, the privilege could be asserted in a federal proceeding
based on fear of prosecution by a State.6 Saline Bank and
Ballmann are not, however, inconsistent with Murdock.

In Saline Bank, we permitted the defendants to refuse
discovery sought by the United States in federal court,
where the defendants claimed that their responses would re-
“The rule
sult in incrimination under the laws of Virginia.
clearly is, that a party is not bound to make any discovery
which would expose him to penalties, and this case falls
within it.”
1 Pet., at 104. But, for all the sweep of this
statement, the opinion makes no mention of the Fifth
Amendment, and in Hale v. Henkel, we explained that “the
prosecution [in Saline Bank] was under a state law which
imposed the penalty, and . . . the Federal court was simply

6 The language in Vajtauer that has been cited in support of this sugges-
tion says only that our conclusion that the witness waived his claim of
privilege “makes it unnecessary for us to consider the extent to which
the Fifth Amendment guarantees immunity from self-incrimination under
state statutes or whether this case is to be controlled by Hale v. Henkel,
201 U. S. 43; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 608; compare United States
v. Saline Bank, 1 Pet. 100; Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 186, 195.”
273
U. S., at 113.
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This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the United States Supreme Court case *United States v. Balsys*. It contains legal analysis and cites previous cases.
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  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
2

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

Opinion of the Court

their origins are clear.  Louisiana first endorsed nonunani-
mous verdicts for serious crimes at a constitutional conven-
tion  in  1898.  According  to  one  committee  chairman,  the
avowed purpose of that convention was to “establish the su-
premacy of the white race,” and the resulting document in-
cluded  many  of  the  trappings  of  the  Jim  Crow  era:  a  poll
tax, a combined literacy and property ownership test, and a
grandfather  clause  that  in  practice  exempted  white  resi-
dents from the most onerous of these requirements.1

Nor was it only the prospect of African-Americans voting
that concerned the delegates.  Just a week before the con-
vention, the U. S. Senate passed a resolution calling for an
investigation into whether Louisiana was systemically ex-
cluding African-Americans from juries.2  Seeking to avoid
unwanted  national  attention,  and  aware  that  this  Court
would  strike  down  any  policy  of  overt  discrimination
against African-American jurors as a violation of the Four-
teenth  Amendment,3  the  delegates  sought  to  undermine
African-American  participation  on  juries  in  another  way.
With a careful eye on racial demographics, the convention
delegates sculpted a “facially race-neutral” rule permitting
10-to-2 verdicts in order “to ensure that African-American
juror service would be meaningless.”4

Adopted in the 1930s, Oregon’s rule permitting nonunan-
imous verdicts can be similarly traced to the rise of the Ku
Klux Klan and efforts to dilute “the influence of racial, eth-
nic, and religious minorities on Oregon juries.”5  In fact, no
——————

1 Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
of the State of Louisiana 374 (H. Hearsey ed. 1898); Eaton, The Suffrage
Clause in the New Constitution of Louisiana, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 279, 286–
287 (1899); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145, 151–153 (1965).

2 See 31 Cong. Rec. 1019 (1898).
3 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 310 (1880).
4 State v. Maxie, No. 13–CR–72522 (La. 11th Jud. Dist., Oct. 11, 2018),
App.  56–57;  see  also  Frampton,  The  Jim  Crow  Jury,  71  Vand.  L. Rev.
1593 (2018).

5 State v. Williams, No. 15–CR–58698 (C. C. Ore., Dec. 15, 2016), App.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the history and context of non-unanimous jury verdicts, particularly in relation to racial discrimination. It provides historical context and cites legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
30

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

Opinion of the Court

even more demanding than the intent test Congress jetti-
soned.  Demonstrating discriminatory intent, we have long
held,  “does  not  require  a  plaintiff  to  prove  that  the  chal-
lenged  action rested solely  on  racially  discriminatory  pur-
pose[ ].”  Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977) (emphasis added);
see  also  Reno,  520  U. S.,  at  488.    Alabama’s  proposed  ap-
proach stands in sharp contrast to all this, injecting into the
effects test of §2 an evidentiary standard that even our pur-
poseful discrimination cases eschew.

C
  Alabama  finally  asserts  that  the  Court  should  outright
stop applying §2 in cases like these because the text of §2
does not apply to single-member redistricting and because
§2 is unconstitutional as the District Court applied it here.
We disagree on both counts.
  Alabama  first  argues  that  §2  does  not  apply  to  single-
member redistricting.  Echoing JUSTICE THOMAS’s concur-
rence  in  Holder  v.  Hall,  Alabama  reads  §2’s  reference  to
“standard, practice, or procedure” to mean only the “meth-
ods for conducting a part of the voting process that might
. . .  be  used  to  interfere  with  a  citizen’s  ability  to  cast  his
vote.”    512  U. S.,  at  917–918  (opinion  concurring  in  judg-
ment).  Examples of covered activities would include “regis-
tration requirements, . . . the locations of polling places, the
times polls are open, the use of paper ballots as opposed to
voting  machines,  and  other  similar  aspects  of  the  voting
process.”  Id., at 922.  But not “a single-member districting
system  or  the  selection  of  one  set  of  districting  lines  over
another.”  Id., at 923.
  This  understanding  of §2  cannot  be  reconciled  with  our
precedent.    As  recounted  above,  we  have  applied  §2  to
States’  districting  maps  in  an  unbroken  line  of  decisions
stretching four decades.  See supra, at 11; see also Brnovich,
594 U. S., at ___, n. 5 (slip op., at 7, n. 5) (collecting cases).
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case *Allen v. Milligan*. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

5

Opinion of the Court

II
The  Ninth  Circuit’s  interpretation  is  incompatible  with
the text of §1326(d).  That section provides that defendants
charged  with  unlawful  reentry  “may  not”  challenge  their
underlying  removal  orders  “unless”  they  “demonstrat[e]”
that three conditions are met: (1) they have “exhausted any
administrative remedies,” (2) they were “deprived . . . of the
opportunity  for  judicial  review,”  and  (3)  “the  entry  of  the
order was fundamentally unfair.”  8 U. S. C. §1326(d).  The
requirements  are  connected  by  the  conjunctive  “and,”
meaning defendants must meet all three.  When Congress
uses  “mandatory  language”  in  an  administrative  exhaus-
tion provision, “a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust.”
Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 632, 639 (2016).  Yet that is what
the Ninth Circuit’s rule does.

Without the benefit of the Ninth Circuit’s extrastatutory
exception, §1326(d)’s first two procedural requirements are
not satisfied just because a noncitizen was removed for an
offense that did not in fact render him removable.  Indeed,
the  substantive  validity  of  the  removal  order  is  quite  dis-
tinct from whether the noncitizen exhausted his adminis-
trative remedies (by appealing the immigration judge’s de-
cision  to  the  BIA)  or  was  deprived  of  the  opportunity  for
judicial review (by filing a petition for review of a BIA deci-
sion with a Federal Court of Appeals).

III
Palomar-Santiago raises two counterarguments based on
the text of §1326(d).2  Neither is persuasive.  First, he con-
tends that further administrative review of a removal order

——————

2 Palomar-Santiago  separately  argues  that  the  offense  defined  by
§1326(a) includes as an element the defendant’s previous lawful removal
such that unlawful removals cannot support a conviction.  United States
v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U. S. 828, 834–835 (1987), rejected a similar ar-
gument  with respect  to  the  pre-AEDPA  version  of  §1326(a).    Palomar-
Santiago  now  presses  various  distinctions  between  that  case  and  this,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites a specific section of the U.S. Code and discusses legal precedent.  The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is not a table of contents, introductory paragraph, or other non-sequential text.
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2

BILSKI v. KAPPOS

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

patentable.  In  the  late  1990’s,  the  Federal  Circuit  and
others  called  this  proposition  into  question.    Congress
quickly  responded  to  a  Federal  Circuit  decision  with  a
stopgap measure designed to limit a potentially significant
new  problem  for  the  business  community.    It  passed  the
First  Inventors  Defense  Act  of  1999  (1999  Act),  113  Stat.
1501A–555 (codified at 35 U. S. C. §273), which provides a
limited  defense  to  claims  of  patent  infringement,  see
§273(b),  for  “method[s]  of  doing  or  conducting  business,”
§273(a)(3).  Following several more years of confusion, the
Federal  Circuit  changed  course,  overruling  recent  deci-
sions  and  holding  that  a  series  of  steps  may  constitute  a
patentable process only if it is tied to a machine or trans-
forms an article into a different state or thing.  This “ma-
chine-or-transformation test” excluded general methods of
doing  business  as  well  as,  potentially,  a  variety  of  other
subjects that could be called processes.

The  Court  correctly  holds  that  the  machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test for what constitutes
a patentable process; rather, it is a critical clue.1  But the
Court  is  quite  wrong,  in  my  view,  to  suggest  that  any
series of steps that is not itself an abstract idea or law of
nature  may  constitute  a  “process”  within  the  meaning  of
§101.  The  language  in  the  Court’s  opinion  to  this  effect
can  only  cause  mischief.    The  wiser  course  would  have
been  to  hold  that  petitioners’  method  is  not  a  “process”
because it describes only a general method of engaging in
business  transactions—and  business  methods  are  not
patentable.  More  precisely,  although  a  process  is  not
patent-ineligible simply because it is useful for conducting
business, a claim that merely describes a method of doing
——————

1 Even if the machine-or-transformation test may not define the scope
of  a  patentable  process,  it  would  be  a  grave  mistake  to  assume  that
anything  with  a  “ ‘useful,  concrete  and  tangible  result,’ ”  State  Street
Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368, 1373
(CA Fed. 1998), may be patented.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Stevens in the case of Bilski v. Kappos. Legal opinions are generally not suitable for indexing as they are not the primary content of a document and often contain specialized legal language.
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Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007)

9

SCALIA, J., dissenting

nation  of  such  agents.”  The  Court  simply  pretends  this
half of the definition does not exist.

The  Court’s  analysis  faithfully  follows  the  argument
advanced  by  petitioners,  which  focuses  on  the  word  “in-
cluding” in the statutory definition of “air pollutant.”  See
Brief  for  Petitioners  13–14.    As  that  argument  goes,  any-
thing  that  follows  the  word  “including”  must  necessarily
be  a  subset  of  whatever  precedes  it.    Thus,  if  greenhouse
gases qualify under the phrase following the word “includ-
ing,”  they  must  qualify  under  the  phrase  preceding  it.
Since greenhouse gases come within the capacious phrase
“any  physical,  chemical,  . . .  substance  or  matter  which  is
emitted  into  or  otherwise  enters  the  ambient  air,”  they
must  also  be  “air  pollution  agent[s]  or  combination[s]  of
such  agents,”  and  therefore  meet  the  definition  of  “air
pollutant[s].”

That  is  certainly  one  possible  interpretation  of  the
statutory  definition.  The  word  “including”  can  indeed
indicate  that  what  follows  will  be  an  “illustrative”  sam-
pling  of  the  general  category  that  precedes  the  word.
Federal  Land  Bank  of  St.  Paul  v.  Bismarck  Lumber  Co.,
314  U. S.  95,  100  (1941).    Often,  however,  the  examples
standing alone are broader than the general category, and
must  be  viewed  as  limited  in  light  of  that  category.  The
Government  provides  a  helpful  (and  unanswered)  exam-
ple: “The phrase ‘any American automobile, including any
truck  or  minivan,’  would  not  naturally  be  construed  to
encompass  a  foreign-manufactured  [truck  or]  minivan.”
Brief  for  Federal  Respondent  34.    The  general  principle
enunciated—that  the  speaker  is  talking  about  American
automobiles—carries  forward  to  the  illustrative  examples
(trucks  and  minivans),  and  limits  them  accordingly,  even
though in isolation they are broader.  Congress often uses
the  word  “including”  in  this  manner.    In  28  U. S. C.
§1782(a),  for  example,  it  refers  to  “a  proceeding  in  a  for-
eign  or  international  tribunal,  including  criminal  investi-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 549 U.S. ____ (2007). It delves into the interpretation of the statutory definition of "air pollutant."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

23

ALITO, J., dissenting

(BARRETT,  J.,  concurring).    But  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the
Government could reach that conclusion.  At oral argument,
the  Solicitor  General  conceded  that  the  term  “health”  in
EMTALA  includes  mental  health,  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  77–78,
and if that is so, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in
which  the  Government’s  interpretation  of  EMTALA  could
require an abortion.

jeopardize

Suppose, for example, that a woman in the 10th week of
gestation  experiences  serious  depression  due  to  her  preg-
nancy.  If  she  asks  emergency  medical  professionals  for
treatment, her medical care providers might conclude that
her continued pregnancy could “reasonably be expected” to
seriously
the  woman’s  mental  health.
§1395dd(e)(1)(A).  Under  the  Government’s  reading  of
EMTALA, the woman would then have the right to “make
an  informed  decision”  about  the  treatment  she  received.
Brief for United States 41.  If the woman preferred to abort
rather  than  manage  her  depression  alongside  her  preg-
nancy, it is not apparent why the Government’s reading of
EMTALA would not require that abortion.

We have seen where a rule permitting abortions to pro-
tect the psychological health of pregnant women may lead.
In Roe, the Court held that a woman had the right to obtain
a post-viability abortion that was deemed “necessary, in ap-
propriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life
or health of the mother.”  Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 165
(1973).  In the companion case Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179
(1973),  the Court  wrote  that  a  doctor,  in  judging  whether
an  abortion  was  needed  to  preserve  a  pregnant  woman’s
health,  could  consider  “all  factors—physical,  emotional,
psychological,  familial,  and  the  woman’s  age—relevant  to
the  well-being  of  the  patient.”    Id.,  at  192.  That  decision
was  viewed  by  many  as  essentially  preventing  States
from  restricting  post-viability  abortions.25    As  Harvard

——————

25 See,  e.g.,  J.  Ely,  The  Wages  of  Crying  Wolf:  A  Comment  on Roe  v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically focusing on the interpretation of EMTALA (Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act) in relation to abortion. It presents a hypothetical scenario to argue against the government's interpretation of the law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES v. PROMETHEUS

LABORATORIES, INC.
Opinion of the Court

equation into the process as a whole.  Those steps included
“installing  rubber  in  a  press,  closing  the  mold,  constantly
determining  the  temperature  of  the  mold,  constantly  re-
calculating  the  appropriate  cure  time  through  the  use  of
the  formula  and  a  digital  computer,  and  automatically
opening  the  press  at  the  proper  time.”    Id.,  at  187.  It
nowhere  suggested  that  all  these  steps,  or  at  least  the
combination  of  those  steps,  were  in  context  obvious,  al
ready in use, or purely conventional.  And so the patentees
did  not  “seek  to  pre-empt  the  use  of  [the]  equation,”  but
sought “only to foreclose from others the use of that equa
tion  in  conjunction  with  all  of  the  other  steps  in  their
claimed  process.”
  These  other  steps  apparently
added  to  the  formula  something  that  in  terms  of  patent
law’s  objectives  had  significance—they  transformed  the
process into an inventive application of the formula.

Ibid.

The  process  in  Flook  (held  not  patentable)  provided  a

method  for  adjusting  “alarm  limits”  in  the  catalytic  con
version  of  hydrocarbons.    Certain  operating  conditions
(such as temperature, pressure, and flow rates), which are
continuously  monitored  during  the  conversion  process,
signal  inefficiency  or  danger  when  they  exceed  certain
“alarm  limits.”  The  claimed  process  amounted  to  an  im
proved system for updating those alarm limits through the
steps  of:  (1)  measuring  the  current  level  of  the  variable,
e.g., the temperature; (2) using an apparently novel math
ematical  algorithm  to  calculate  the  current  alarm  limits;
and (3) adjusting the system to reflect the new alarm-limit
values.  437 U. S., at 585–587.

The Court, as in Diehr, pointed out that the basic math
ematical  equation,  like  a  law  of  nature,  was  not  patenta
ble.  But  it  characterized  the  claimed  process  as  doing
nothing other than “provid[ing] a[n unpatentable] formula
for  computing  an  updated  alarm  limit.”    Flook,  supra,  at
586.  Unlike the process in Diehr, it did not “explain how
the variables used in the formula were to be selected, nor
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing patent law, specifically focusing on the patentability of processes involving mathematical formulas. It delves into case law examples like *Diehr* and *Flook* to illustrate the principles at play.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Case Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA

Opinion of the Court

both forms of knowledge in a provision limiting ERISA ac-
tions, it has done so explicitly.  We cannot assume that it
meant to do so by implication in §1113(2).  Instead we “gen-
erally presum[e] that Congress acts intentionally and pur-
posely when it includes particular language in one section
of  a  statute  but  omits  it  in  another.”    BFP  v.  Resolution
Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 537 (1994) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).

Petitioners dispute the characterization of anything less
than actual knowledge as constructive knowledge, arguing
that  the  latter  term  usually  refers  to  information  that  a
plaintiff must seek out rather than information that is sent
to him.  But if a plaintiff is not aware of a fact, he does not
have “actual knowledge” of that fact however close at hand
the fact might be.  §1113(2).  And Congress has never added
to §1113(2) the language it has used in other ERISA limita-
tions provisions to encompass both what a plaintiff actually
knows and what he reasonably could know.

As  presently  written,  therefore,  §1113(2)  requires  more
than evidence of disclosure alone.  That all relevant infor-
mation was disclosed to the plaintiff is no doubt relevant in
judging whether he gained knowledge of that information.
See Part III, infra.  To meet §1113(2)’s “actual knowledge”
requirement,  however,  the  plaintiff  must  in  fact  have  be-
come aware of that information.

B
Petitioners  offer  arguments  for  a  broader  reading  of
§1113(2) based on text, context, purpose, and statutory his-
tory.  All founder on Congress’s choice of the word “actual.”
As for text, petitioners do not dispute the normal defini-
tions of “actual,” “knowledge,” or “actual knowledge.”  They
focus  instead  on  the  least  conspicuous  part  of  the  phrase
“had actual knowledge”: the word “had.”  §1113(2).  Once a
plaintiff  receives  a  disclosure,  they  argue,  he  “ha[s]”  the
knowledge  that  §1113(2)  requires  because  he  effectively
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the interpretation of a specific section (§1113(2)) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The language is formal and discusses legal concepts like "actual knowledge" and "constructive knowledge" in the context of ERISA actions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16  AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR

OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
BREYER, J., dissenting

some  other  means,  CNN  should  have  constitutional  re-
course.  Some critical foreign policy interests might compli-
cate  the  First  Amendment  calculus—say,  a  wartime  need
to keep future battle plans secret.  But nothing like that is
present here.  And it is difficult to accept the notion that the
First  Amendment  permits  the  Government  to  suppress,
compel, or otherwise distort any and all American speech
transmitted abroad through a clearly identified foreign af-
filiate.

III

The upshot is: (1) The messages at issue here belong to
American  speakers;  (2)  clearly  identified  foreign  affiliates
are a critical means of conveying those messages overseas;
and (3) enforcing the Policy Requirement against those af-
filiates  distorts  respondents’  own  protected  speech—and
thus violates respondents’ own First Amendment rights.

The  majority  justifies  its  contrary  result  on  three  main
grounds,  two  of  which  it  says  are  “bedrock  principles”  of
American law.  See ante, at 3–6, 8.  I do not find these ar-
guments persuasive.

A
The first “bedrock principle” on which the majority relies
is the supposedly long-settled, across-the-board rule “that
foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not possess rights
under the U. S. Constitution.”  Ante, at 3.  That sweeping
assertion is neither relevant to this case nor correct on the
law.

It is not relevant because, as I have said, this case does
not  concern  the  constitutional  rights  of  foreign  organiza-
tions.  This case concerns the constitutional rights of Amer-
ican organizations.  Every respondent here is—and has al-
ways been—American.  AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 210; see also
Brief for Petitioners 7, 19 (acknowledging as much).  No for-
eign entities are party to this case, and respondents have
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Agency for Int'l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int'l, Inc.*  It discusses First Amendment rights and the government's ability to regulate speech transmitted abroad.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–476
_________________

303 CREATIVE LLC, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
AUBREY ELENIS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[June 30, 2023]

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Like  many  States,  Colorado  has  a  law  forbidding  busi-
nesses  from  engaging  in  discrimination  when  they  sell
goods  and  services  to  the  public.    Laws  along  these  lines
have done much to secure the civil rights of all Americans.
But  in  this  particular  case  Colorado  does  not  just  seek  to
ensure the sale of goods or services on equal terms.  It seeks
to use its law to compel an individual to create speech she
does  not  believe.  The  question  we  face  is  whether  that
course violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment.

I
A
Through her business, 303 Creative LLC, Lorie Smith of-
fers website and graphic design, marketing advice, and so-
cial media management services.  Recently, she decided to
expand her offerings to include services for couples seeking
websites for their weddings.  As she envisions it, her web-
sites will provide couples with text, graphic arts, and videos
to “celebrate” and “conve[y ]” the “details” of their “unique
love  story.”  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  182a,  187a,  198a.    The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the introduction to the opinion itself. This type of content is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it is legal text and not the primary content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U79

[09-08-00 13:44:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 125 (1998)

147

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

§§ 925(a)(2)(B) and 926A use “transport,” not “carry,” to
“impl[y] personal agency and some degree of possession.”
Ibid.10

Reading “carries” in § 924(c)(1) to mean “on or about [one’s]
person” is fully compatible with these and other “Firearms”
statutes.11 For example, under § 925(a)(2)(B), one could
carry his gun to a car, transport it to the shooting competi-
tion, and use it to shoot targets. Under the conditions of
§ 926A, one could transport her gun in a car, but under no
circumstances could the gun be readily accessible while she
travels in the car.
“[C]ourts normally try to read language
in different, but related, statutes, so as best to reconcile

10 The Court asserts that “ ‘transport’ is a broader category that includes
‘carry’ but also encompasses other activity.” Ante, at 135.
“Carry,” how-
ever, is not merely a subset of “transport.” A person seated at a desk
with a gun in hand or pocket is carrying the gun, but is not transporting
it. Yes, the words “carry” and “transport” often can be employed inter-
changeably, as can the words “carry” and “use.” But in Bailey, this Court
settled on constructions that gave “carry” and “use” independent mean-
ings. See 516 U. S., at 145–146. Without doubt, Congress is alert to the
discrete meanings of “transport” and “carry” in the context of vehicles,
as the Legislature’s placement of each word in § 926A illustrates. The
narrower reading of “carry” preserves discrete meanings for the two
words, while in the context of vehicles the Court’s interpretation of
“carry” is altogether synonymous with “transport.” Tellingly, when re-
ferring to ﬁrearms traveling in vehicles, the “Firearms” statutes routinely
use a form of “transport”; they never use a form of “carry.”

11 See infra, at 149, nn. 13, 14. The Government points to numerous
federal statutes that authorize law enforcement ofﬁcers to “carry ﬁre-
arms” and notes that, in those authorizing provisions, “carry” of course
means “both on the person and in a vehicle.” Brief for United States
31–32, and n. 18. Quite right. But as viewers of “Sesame Street” will
quickly recognize, “one of these things [a statute authorizing conduct] is
not like the other [a statute criminalizing conduct].” The authorizing
statutes in question are properly accorded a construction compatible with
the clear purpose of the legislation to aid federal law enforcers in the
performance of their ofﬁcial duties.
It is fundamental, however, that a
penal statute is not to be construed generously in the Government’s favor.
See, e. g., United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 348 (1971).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It contains legal citations, analysis of statutes, and arguments against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

5

BREYER, J., dissenting

B

This  case  focuses  upon  a  practice  called  “steering.”
American  Express  has  historically  charged  higher  mer
chant  fees  than  its  competitors.    App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.
173a–176a.  Hence,  fewer  merchants  accept  American
Express’  cards  than  its  competitors’.    Id.,  at  184a–187a.
But,  perhaps  because  American  Express  cardholders  are,
on  average,  wealthier,  higher-spending,  or  more  loyal  to
American  Express  than  other  cardholders,  vast  numbers
of merchants still accept American Express cards.  See id.,
at  156a,  176a–177a,  184a–187a.    Those  who  do,  however,
would (in order to avoid the higher American Express fee)
often  prefer  that  their  customers  use  a  different  card  to
charge  a  purchase.  Thus,  the  merchant  has  a  monetary
incentive  to  “steer”  the  customer  towards  the  use  of  a
different  card.  A  merchant  might  tell  the  customer,  for
example, “American Express costs us more,” or “please use
Visa if you can,” or “free shipping if you use Discover.”  See
id., at 100a–102a.

Steering  makes  a  difference,  because  without  it,  the
shopper does not care whether the merchant pays more to
American  Express  than  it  would  pay  to  a  different  card
company—the  shopper  pays  the  same  price  either  way.
But  if  steering  works,  then  American  Express  will  find  it
more  difficult  to  charge  more  than  its  competitors  for
merchant-related  services,  because  merchants  will  re
spond  by  steering  their  customers,  encouraging  them  to
use  other  cards.    Thus,  American  Express  dislikes  steer
ing;  the  merchants  like  it;  and  the  shoppers  may  benefit
from it, whether because merchants will offer them incen
tives  to  use  less  expensive  cards  or  in  the  form  of  lower
retail prices overall.  See id., at 92a, 97a–104a.

In  response  to  its  competitors’  efforts  to  convince  mer
chants  to  steer  shoppers  to  use  less  expensive  cards,
American Express tried to stop, or at least to limit, steer
ing  by  placing  antisteering  provisions  in  most  of  its  con
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the practice of "steering" by merchants and its implications for American Express's pricing strategy. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

effective date.  §3704(a)(3).27

New  Jersey  did  not  take  advantage  of  this  special  op
tion,  but  by  2011,  with  Atlantic  City  facing  stiff  competi
tion, the State had a change of heart.  New Jersey voters
approved an amendment to the State Constitution making
it  lawful  for  the  legislature  to  authorize  sports  gambling,
Art. IV, §7, ¶2(D), (F), and in 2012 the legislature enacted
a law doing just that, 2011 N. J. Laws p. 1723 (2012 Act).

The  2012  Act  quickly  came  under  attack.  The  major
professional  sports  leagues  and  the  NCAA  brought  an
action  in  federal  court  against  the  New  Jersey  Governor
and other state officials (hereinafter New Jersey), seeking
to  enjoin  the  new  law  on  the  ground  that  it  violated
In  response,  the  State  argued,  among  other
PASPA.
things,  that  PASPA  unconstitutionally  infringed  the
State’s sovereign authority to end its sports gambling ban.
See  National  Collegiate  Athletic  Assn.  v.  Christie,  926
F. Supp. 2d 551, 561 (NJ 2013).

In making this argument, the State relied primarily on
two  cases,  New  York  v.  United  States,  505  U. S.  144
(1992),  and  Printz  v.  United  States,  521  U. S.  898  (1997),
in  which  we  struck  down  federal  laws  based on  what  has
been  dubbed  the  “anticommandeering”  principle.  In  New
York,  we  held  that  a  federal  law  unconstitutionally  or
dered  the  State  to  regulate  in  accordance  with  federal
standards,  and  in  Printz,  we  found  that  another  federal
statute  unconstitutionally  compelled  state  officers  to
enforce federal law.

Relying on these cases, New Jersey argued that PASPA
is  similarly  flawed  because  it  regulates  a  State’s  exercise

——————

27 Although this provision did not specifically mention New Jersey or
Atlantic  City,  its  requirements—permitting  legalization  only  “in  a
municipality”  with  an  uninterrupted  10-year  history  of  legal  casino
gaming—did not fit anyplace else.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the constitutionality of PASPA (Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act) in relation to New Jersey's legalization of sports gambling. It delves into legal precedents and arguments made by both sides.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
COUNTY ET AL. v. TALEVSKI, AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF TALEVSKI

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–806.  Argued November 8, 2022—Decided June 8, 2023

After Gorgi Talevski’s move to a nursing home in 2016 proved problem-
atic, Talevski (through his wife Ivanka) brought an action under 42 U.
S. C. §1983 against a county-owned nursing home and its agents (col-
lectively,  HHC),  claiming  that  HHC’s  treatment  of  Talevski  violated
rights guaranteed him under the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act
(FNHRA).  The  District  Court  granted  HHC’s  subsequent  motion  to
dismiss  Talevski’s  complaint,  reasoning  that  no  plaintiff  can  enforce
provisions  of  the  FNHRA  via  §1983.    The  Seventh  Circuit  reversed,
concluding  that  the  rights  referred  to  in  two  FNHRA  provisions  in-
voked by Talevski—the right to be free from unnecessary chemical re-
straints, see §1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii), and rights to be discharged or trans-
ferred  only  when  certain  preconditions  are  met,  see  §1396r(c)—
“unambiguously  confer  individually  enforceable  rights  on  nursing-
home  residents,”  making  those  rights  presumptively  enforceable  via
§1983.  6 F. 4th 713, 720.  The Seventh Circuit further found nothing
in the FNHRA to indicate congressional intent to foreclose §1983 en-
forcement.

Held: The FNHRA provisions at issue unambiguously create §1983-en-
forceable  rights,  and  the  Court  discerns  no  incompatibility  between
private enforcement under §1983 and the remedial scheme that Con-
gress devised.  Pp. 5–23.

(a) Section 1983 has, since the 1870s, provided an express cause of
action to any person deprived (by someone acting under color of state
law)  of  “any  rights  . . .  secured  by  the  Constitution  and  laws.”    The
Court has long refused to read §1983’s unmodified term “laws” to mean
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

NASA v. NELSON

Opinion of the Court

in part.”  Id., at 596–597.

That analysis applies with even greater force where the
Government  acts,  not  as  a  regulator,  but  as  the  manager
of  its  internal  affairs.  See  Engquist,  supra,  at  598–599.
SF–85’s  “treatment  or  counseling”  question  reasonably
seeks to identify a subset of acknowledged drug users who
are  attempting  to  overcome  their  problems.  The  Govern-
ment’s considered position is that phrasing the question in
more  permissive  terms  would  result  in  a  lower  response
rate, and the question’s effectiveness in identifying illegal-
drug  users  who  are  suitable  for  employment  would  be
“materially reduced.”  Reply Brief for Petitioners 19.  That
is  a  reasonable  position,  falling  within  the  “ ‘wide  lati-
tude’ ”  granted  the  Government  in  its  dealings  with  em-
ployees.  See Engquist, supra, at 600.

3
The  Court  of  Appeals  also  held  that  the  broad,  “open-
ended  questions”  on  Form  42  likely  violate  respondents’
informational-privacy  rights.    Form  42  asks  applicants’
designated  references  and  landlords  for  “information”
bearing  on  “suitability  for  government  employment  or  a
security clearance.”  App. 97.  In a series of questions, the
Government  asks  if  the  reference  has  any  “adverse  infor-
mation”  about  the  applicant’s  “honesty  or  trustworthi-
ness,”  “violations  of  the  law,”  “financial  integrity,”  “abuse
of  alcohol  and/or  drugs,”  “mental  or  emotional  stability,”
“general behavior or conduct,” or “other matters.”  Ibid.

These  open-ended  inquiries,  like  the  drug-treatment
question  on  SF–85,  are  reasonably  aimed  at  identifying
capable  employees  who  will  faithfully  conduct  the  Gov-
ernment’s  business.  See  Engquist,  supra,  at  598–599.
Asking  an  applicant’s  designated  references  broad,  open-
ended questions about job suitability is an appropriate tool
for separating strong candidates from weak ones.  It would
be  a  truly  daunting  task  to  catalog  all  the  reasons  why  a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case NASA v. Nelson. It discusses the government's right to ask certain questions on employment forms to assess suitability for government jobs.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

506

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

beneﬁts to miners and their families. The 1947 NBCWA did
not specify the beneﬁts to which miners and their depend-
ents were entitled.
Instead, three trustees appointed by
the parties were given authority to determine “coverage and
eligibility, priorities among classes of beneﬁts, amounts of
beneﬁts, methods of providing or arranging for provisions
for beneﬁts, investment of trust funds, and all other related
1947 NBCWA 146, App. (CA1) 619.
matters.”

Disagreement over beneﬁts continued, however, leading
to the execution of another NBCWA in 1950, which created
a new multiemployer trust, the United Mine Workers of
America Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950 (1950 W&R
Fund). The 1950 W&R Fund established a 30-cents-per-ton
royalty on coal produced, payable by signatory operators on
a “several and not joint” basis for the duration of the 1950
Agreement.
1950 NBCWA 63, App. (CA1) 640. As with
the 1947 W&R Fund, the 1950 W&R Fund was governed by
three trustees chosen by the parties and vested with respon-
sibility to determine the level of beneﬁts.
Id., at 59–61,
App. (CA1) 638–639. Between 1950 and 1974, the 1950
NBCWA was amended on occasion, and new NBCWA’s were
adopted in 1968 and 1971. Except for increases in the
amount of royalty payments, however, the terms and struc-
ture of the 1950 W&R Fund remained essentially unchanged.
A 1951 amendment recognized the creation of the Bitumi-
nous Coal Operators’ Association (BCOA), a multiemployer
bargaining association, which became the primary repre-
sentative of coal operators in negotiations with the Union.
See App. (CA1) 647–648.

Under the 1950 W&R Fund, miners and their dependents
were not promised speciﬁc beneﬁts. As the 1950 W&R
Fund’s Annual Report for the ﬁscal year ending June 30,
1955, explained:

“Under the legal and ﬁnancial obligations . . . imposed
[by the Trust Agreement], the Fund is operated on
a pay-as-you-go basis, maintaining a sound relation-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an opinion from the Supreme Court case Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel. It contains legal jargon and cites previous agreements and court documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BILSKI v. KAPPOS

545 F. 3d 943, affirmed.

Syllabus

JUSTICE  KENNEDY  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  except  as  to
Parts II–B–2 and II–C–2, concluding that petitioners’ claimed inven-
tion is not patent eligible.  Pp. 4–8, 10–11, 12–16.

(a) Section  101  specifies  four  independent  categories  of  inventions
or  discoveries  that  are  patent  eligible:  “process[es],”  “machin[es],”
“manufactur[es],”  and  “composition[s]  of  matter.”    “In  choosing  such
expansive  terms,  . . .  Congress  plainly  contemplated  that  the  patent
laws would be given wide scope,” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S.
303, 308, in order to ensure that “ ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement,’ ”  id.,  at  308–309.    This  Court’s  precedents  provide
three  specific  exceptions  to  §101’s  broad  principles:  “laws  of  nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”  Id., at 309.  While not re-
quired by the statutory text, these exceptions are consistent with the
notion that a  patentable process must  be “new and useful.”  And, in
any case, the exceptions have defined the statute’s reach as a matter
of  statutory  stare  decisis  going  back  150  years.    See  Le  Roy  v.
Tatham,  14  How.  156,  174.    The  §101  eligibility  inquiry  is  only  a
threshold  test.    Even  if  a  claimed  invention  qualifies  in  one  of  the
four categories, it must also satisfy “the conditions and requirements
of this title,” §101(a), including novelty, see §102, nonobviousness, see
§103, and a full and particular description, see §112.  The invention
at issue is claimed to be a “process,” which §100(b) defines as a “proc-
ess,  art  or  method,  and  includes a  new  use  of  a  known  process,  ma-
chine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”  Pp. 4–5.

(b) The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for pat-
ent eligibility  under §101.   The Court’s precedents establish  that  al-
though that test may be a useful and important clue or investigative
tool, it is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a pat-
ent-eligible  “process”  under  §101.    In  holding  to  the  contrary,  the
Federal  Circuit  violated  two  principles  of  statutory  interpretation:
Courts “ ‘should not read into the patent laws limitations and condi-
tions  which  the  legislature  has  not  expressed,’ ”  Diamond  v.  Diehr,
450 U. S. 175, 182, and, “[u]nless otherwise defined, ‘words will be in-
terpreted  as  taking  their  ordinary,  contemporary,  common  mean-
ing,’ ”  ibid.  The  Court  is  unaware  of  any  ordinary,  contemporary,
common  meaning  of  “process”  that  would  require  it  to  be  tied  to  a
machine or the transformation of an article.  Respondent Patent Di-
rector  urges  the  Court  to  read  §101’s  other  three  patentable  catego-
ries as confining “process” to a machine or transformation.  However,
the  doctrine  of  noscitur  a  sociis  is  inapplicable  here,  for  §100(b)  al-
ready  explicitly  defines  “process,”  see  Burgess  v.  United  States,  553
U. S.  124,  130,  and  nothing  about  the  section’s  inclusion  of  those
other categories suggests that a “process” must be tied to one of them.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case *Bilski v. Kappos*. Syllabi are summaries of legal cases and are not typically considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

such  as  the  federal  Civil  Rights  Act,  list  establishments
that qualify, but these establishments are ones open to the
public  generally.  See,  e.g.,  42  U. S. C.  §2000a(b)  (hotels,
restaurants,  gas  stations,  movie  theaters,  concert  halls,
sports  arenas,  stadiums).    A  public  accommodations  law
does not force anyone to start a business, or to hold out the
business’s goods or services to the public at large.  The law
also  does  not  compel  any  business  to  sell  any  particular
good or service.  But if a business chooses to profit from the
public market, which is established and maintained by the
state, the state may require the business to abide by a legal
norm of nondiscrimination.  In particular, the state may en-
sure that groups historically marked for second-class status
are not denied goods or services on equal terms.

The concept of a public accommodation thus embodies a
simple,  but  powerful,  social  contract:  A  business  that
chooses  to  sell  to  the  public  assumes  a  duty  to  serve  the
public without unjust discrimination.  J. Singer, No Right
To Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property,
90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1283, 1298 (1996) (Singer).

B

The legal duty of a business open to the public to serve
the public without unjust discrimination is deeply rooted in
our history.  The true power of this principle, however, lies
in  its  capacity  to  evolve,  as  society  comes  to  understand
more forms of unjust discrimination and, hence, to include
more persons as full and equal members of “the public.”

1
“At  common  law,  innkeepers,  smiths,  and  others  who
‘made profession of a public employment,’ were prohibited
from  refusing,  without  good  reason,  to  serve  a  customer.”
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 571 (1995) (quoting Lane v.
Cotton,  12  Mod.  472,  485,  88  Eng.  Rep.  1458,  1465  (K. B.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into the legal concept of public accommodations and its historical context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2010

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINI-

STRATION ET AL. v. NELSON ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 09–530.  Argued October 5, 2010—Decided January 19, 2011

The  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration  (NASA)  has  a
workforce of both federal civil servants and Government contract em-
ployees.  Respondents are contract employees at NASA’s Jet Propul-
sion  Laboratory  (JPL),  which  is  operated  by  the  California  Institute
of  Technology  (Cal  Tech).    Respondents  were  not  subject  to  Govern-
ment  background  checks  at  the  time  they  were  hired,  but  that
changed when the President ordered the adoption of uniform identifi-
cation  standards  for  both  federal  civil  servants  and  contractor  em-
ployees.  The  Department of Commerce  mandated that contract em-
ployees with long-term access to federal facilities complete a standard
background check, typically the National Agency Check with Inquir-
ies  (NACI),  by  October  2007.    NASA  modified  its  contract  with  Cal
Tech  to  reflect  the  new  requirement,  and  JPL  announced  that  em-
ployees who did not complete the NACI process in time would be de-
nied access to JPL and face termination by Cal Tech.

The  NACI  process,  long used  for  prospective  civil  servants,  begins
with the employee filling out a standard form (here, Standard Form
85,  the  Questionnaire  for  Non-Sensitive  Positions  (SF–85)).    SF–85
asks  whether  an  employee  has  “used,  possessed,  supplied,  or  manu-
factured illegal drugs” in the last year.  If so, the employee must pro-
vide details, including information about “treatment or counseling re-
ceived.”  The  employee  must  also  sign  a  release  authorizing  the
Government to obtain personal information from schools, employers,
and  others  during  its  investigation.    Once  SF–85  is  completed,  the
Government  sends  the  employee’s  references  a  questionnaire  (Form
42)  that  asks  open-ended  questions  about  whether  they  have  “any
reason  to  question”  the  employee’s  “honesty  or  trustworthiness,”  or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U73

[09-06-00 17:32:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

38

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. BEGGERLY et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit

No. 97–731. Argued April 27, 1998—Decided June 8, 1998

In 1979, the United States sued respondents and others to quiet title to
land it sought for a federal park, contending that respondents did not
have clear title because the Government had never patented the dis-
puted land after acquiring it as part of the Louisiana Purchase. Gov-
ernment ofﬁcials searched public land records during discovery, but re-
ported to respondents that they found no proof of a grant to a private
landowner. A 1982 settlement agreement quieted title in the Govern-
In 1994, respond-
ment’s favor in return for a payment to respondents.
ents sued to set aside the settlement agreement and obtain damages,
claiming that they had evidence showing that the land had been granted
to a private owner before the Louisiana Purchase, but the District Court
concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. The Fifth Circuit
reversed, ﬁnding two jurisdictional bases: (1) the suit was an “independ-
ent action” to set aside the settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 60(b); and (2) the Quiet Title Act (QTA or Act).
In reaching the
second conclusion, the court found that the QTA’s 12-year statute of
limitations was subject to equitable tolling and therefore suit was not
barred by the fact that respondents had known about the Government’s
claim since 1979. The court then vacated the settlement agreement and
instructed the District Court to quiet title in respondents’ favor.

Held: The Fifth Circuit had no jurisdiction over respondents’ suit.

Pp. 42–49.

(a) Rule 60(b)’s history and language are inconsistent with the Gov-
ernment’s position that an “independent action” to set aside a judgment
requires an independent source of jurisdiction. The original Rule 60(b)
established a new system to govern requests to reopen judgments. Be-
cause it was unclear whether that Rule provided the exclusive means
for obtaining postjudgment relief, the Rule was amended in 1946 to
clarify that nearly all of the old forms of obtaining relief from a judg-
ment were abolished but that the “independent action” survived. How-
ever, this does not mean that the requirements for a meritorious inde-
pendent action have been met here. Such actions should be available
only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice. See Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U. S. 238, 244. Respondents’ allegation
that the United States failed to thoroughly search its records and make
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case.  It outlines the case name, background, and the court's holding.  This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1028

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 20, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8085. Barkley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8090. Smith v. Tally, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8107. Clabourne v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 194 Ariz. 379, 983 P. 2d 748.

No. 99–8117. Santos v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8120. Midgett v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 143.

No. 99–8126. Rainey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 203 F. 3d 824.

No. 99–8127. Sanders v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 637.

No. 99–8129. Cobbs v. United States Postal Service

et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8130. Cancassi v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J.,

App. Div. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8133. Smith v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 1034.

No. 99–8135. Turnley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 483.

No. 99–8138. Stevens v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 188 F. 3d 505.

No. 99–8142. Monaco et ux. v. United States. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 381 and 199
F. 3d 1324.

No. 99–8148. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 785.

No. 99–8152. Daly v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8154. Excinia v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1306.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's section on recent rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

696

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Opinion of the Court

any extension would depend ultimately on an analysis of the
likely costs and beneﬁts of extending the privilege as Balsys
requests.
If such analysis were dispositive for us, we would
conclude that Balsys has not shown that extension of the
protection would produce a beneﬁt justifying the rule he
seeks.

The Court of Appeals directed careful attention to an eval-
uation of what would be gained and lost on Balsys’s view.
It concluded, for example, that few domestic cases would be
adversely affected by recognizing the privilege based upon
fear of foreign prosecution, 119 F. 3d, at 135–137; 17 that
American contempt sanctions for refusal to testify are so le-
nient in comparison to the likely consequences of foreign
prosecution that a witness would probably refuse to testify
even if the privilege were unavailable to him, id., at 142
(Block, J., concurring); that by statute and treaty the United
States could limit the occasions on which a reasonable fear
of foreign prosecution could be shown, as by modifying ex-
tradition and deportation standards in cases involving the
privilege, id., at 138–139; and that because a witness’s refusal
to testify may be used as evidence in a civil proceeding, de-
portation of people in Balsys’s position would not necessarily
be thwarted by recognizing the privilege as he claims it, id.,
at 136.

The Court of Appeals accordingly thought the net burden
of the expanded privilege too negligible to justify denying
its expansion. We remain skeptical, however. While we
will not attempt to comment on every element of the Court
of Appeals’s calculation, two of the points just noted would
present difﬁculty. First, there is a question about the stand-
ard that should govern any decision to justify a truly discre-
tionary ruling by making the assumption that it will induce
the Government to adopt legislation with international im-
plications or to seek international agreements, in order to

17 The assessment was, of course, necessarily based on experience under

the same-sovereign view of the privilege.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the part where the court is analyzing the arguments for and against extending a legal privilege.  The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is part of the main body of the text and not a preliminary or supplementary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U45

[09-26-01 10:03:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 344 (2000)

361

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

spares the railroads from tort liability, even for the in-
adequacy of devices designed only to secure the “minimum”
protection Congress envisioned for all crossings. See 23
U. S. C. § 130(d). Counsel for petitioner Norfolk Southern
Railway correctly conceded at oral argument that the rele-
vant statutes do not compel releasing the railroads when the
devices installed, though meeting federal standards for “min-
imum” protection, see ante, at 350, fail to provide adequate
protection. The road is open for the Secretary of Transpor-
tation to enact regulations clarifying that point. See ante,
at 359–360 (Breyer, J., concurring).

As persuasively explained by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 38 F. 3d 304
(1994) (Posner, C. J.), and reiterated by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit in the instant case, 173 F. 3d 386
(1999), our prior decision in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easter-
wood, 507 U. S. 658 (1993), does not necessitate the ouster of
state law the Court now commands. Easterwood, in which
the tort claimant prevailed, dispositively held only that fed-
eral funding was necessary to trigger preemption, not that
it was sufﬁcient by itself to do so. Because federal funds
did not in fact subsidize the crossing at issue in that case,
id., at 671–673, any statement as to the automatic pre-
emptive effect of federal funding should have remained open
for reconsideration in a later case where federal funds did
participate.
I do not read the admittedly unclear language
of 23 CFR §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) (1999) to dictate that Fed-
eral Highway Administration authorization of federal fund-
ing to install devices is tantamount to approval of each of
those devices as adequate to protect safety at every crossing
so funded. And I do not think a previous administration’s
argument to that effect as amicus curiae in Easterwood
I
estops the Government from taking a different view now.
agree with the sound reasoning in Shots and would afﬁrm
the Court of Appeals’ judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It discusses legal precedents and arguments related to railroad safety regulations and preemption of state law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
78

UNION PACIFIC R. CO. v. LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS

Opinion of the Court

Board’s  deliberations,”  the  Carrier  had  forfeited  the  issue.
Id., at 105a–106a.  The dissenters urged that the Union had
furnished  evidence  showing  “the  cases  had  all  been  con
ferenced,  even  though  the  relevant  Collective  Bargaining
Agreement  [did]  not  require  [conferencing].”  Id.,  at  105a.
Dismissal  of  the  claims,  the  dissenters  charged,  demon
strated “the kind of gamesmanship that breeds contempt for
the minor dispute process.”  Id., at 107a.

The Union ﬁled a petition for review in the United States
District  Court  for  the  Northern  District  of  Illinois,  asking
the court to set aside the Board’s orders on the ground that
the  panel  had  “unlawfully  held  [it  lacked]  authority  to  as
sume jurisdiction over [the] cases [absent] evidence of a ‘con
ference’ between the parties in the . . .  ‘on-property’ record.”
Pet. to Review ¶ 1.  Nothing in the Act or the NRAB’s pro
cedural rules, the Union maintained, mandated dismissal for
failure to allege and prove conferencing in the Union’s origi
nal  submission.  Id.,  ¶¶ 3,  4.  By  imposing,  without  war
rant,  “a  technical  pleading  or  evidentiary  requirement”  and
elevating  it  to  jurisdictional  status,  the  Union  charged,  the
panel  had  “egregiously  violate[d]  the  Act,”  id.,  ¶ 3,   or
“fail[ed]  to  conform  its  jurisdiction  to  that  required  by  .  .  .
law,”  id.,  ¶ 4.  Alternatively,  the  Union  asserted  that  the
panel  violated  procedural  due  process  by  entertaining  the
Carrier’s  untimely  objection,  even  though  “the  Carrier  had
failed to raise any objection as to lack of conferencing” in its
submissions.  Id., ¶ 5.

The District Court afﬁrmed the Board’s orders.  Address
ing  the  Union’s  argument  that  the  no-proof-of-conferencing
issue was untimely raised, the court accepted the panel’s de
scription of the issue as “jurisdictional,” and noted the famil
iar  proposition  that  jurisdictional  challenges  may  be  raised
at  any  stage  of  the  proceedings.  432  F.  Supp.  2d  768,  777,
and n. 7 (2006).

On  appeal, the  Seventh Circuit  recognized that  the Union
had presented its case “through both a statutory and consti
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the opinion of the court. It discusses a dispute between the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Locomotive Engineers union, focusing on a jurisdictional issue regarding the National Railroad Adjustment Board's (NRAB) handling of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 15–1358, 15–1359 and 15–1363
_________________

15–1358

JAMES W. ZIGLAR, PETITIONER
v.
AHMER IQBAL ABBASI, ET AL.

JOHN D. ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY
GENERAL, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
AHMER IQBAL ABBASI, ET AL.

15–1359

15–1363

DENNIS HASTY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
AHMER IQBAL ABBASI, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 19, 2017]

JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG  joins,

dissenting.

In  Bivens  v.  Six  Unknown  Fed.  Narcotics  Agents,  403
U. S. 388 (1971), this Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment  provides  a  damages  remedy  for  those  whom  federal
officials  have  injured  as  a  result  of  an  unconstitutional
search  or  seizure.  In  Davis  v.  Passman,  442  U. S.  228
(1979), the Court held that the Fifth Amendment provides
a  damages  remedy  to  an  individual  dismissed  by  her
employer (a Member of Congress) on the basis of her sex in
violation  of  the  equal  protection  component  of  that
Amendment’s  Due  Process  Clause.    And  in  Carlson  v.
Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment provides a damages remedy to a prisoner who
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer.  It includes case citations, the name of the court, and the parties involved. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2013

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SANDIFER ET AL. v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 12–417.  Argued November 4, 2013—Decided January 27, 2014

Petitioner  Sandifer  and  others  filed  a  putative  collective  action  under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, seeking backpay for time spent
donning  and  doffing  pieces  of  protective  gear  that  they  assert  re-
spondent  United States  Steel  Corporation  requires  workers  to  wear
because of hazards at its steel plants.  U. S. Steel contends that this
donning-and-doffing  time,  which  would  otherwise  be  compensable
under the Act, is noncompensable under a provision of its collective-
bargaining agreement with petitioners’ union.  That provision’s valid-
ity depends on 29 U. S. C. §203(o), which allows parties to collectively
bargain  over  whether  “time  spent  in  changing  clothes . . . at  the  be-
ginning or end of each workday” must be compensated.  The District
Court granted U. S. Steel summary judgment in pertinent part, hold-
ing  that  petitioners’  donning  and  doffing  constituted  “changing
clothes” under §203(o).  It also assumed that any time spent donning
and doffing items that were not “clothes” was “de minimis” and hence
noncompensable.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Held: The  time  petitioners  spend  donning  and  doffing  their  protective

gear is not compensable by operation of §203(o).  Pp. 3–15.

(a) This  Court  initially  construed  compensability  under  the  Fair
Labor Standards Act expansively.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co., 328 U. S. 680.  The Act was amended in 1949, however,
to provide that the compensability of time spent “changing clothes or
washing at the beginning or end of each workday” is a subject appro-
priately  committed  to  collective  bargaining,  §203(o).  Whether  peti-
tioners’  donning  and  doffing  qualifies  as  “changing  clothes”  depends
on the meaning of that statutory phrase.  Pp. 3–6.

(b) The term “clothes,” which is otherwise undefined, is “interpret-
ed as taking [its] ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”  Perrin
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court opinion. Syllabi are summaries of the court's decision and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the actual legal reasoning or arguments presented in the case.
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Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Statement of KAVANAUGH, J.

many would be unwilling to express except privately.”  Id.,
at 708.  By protecting the confidentiality of those internal
communications,  the  Presidential  communications  privi-
lege facilitates candid advice and deliberations, and it leads
to more informed and better Presidential decisionmaking.
The Nixon Court noted, by way of historical example, that
the Constitutional Convention was conducted “in complete
privacy” and that the records of the Convention remained
confidential for more than 30 years.  Id., at 705, n. 15.  As
was true at the Constitutional Convention, the Presidential
communications privilege cannot fulfill its critical constitu-
tional function unless Presidents and their advisers can be
confident in the present and future confidentiality of their
advice.  If Presidents  and  their  advisers  thought  that  the
privilege’s  protections  would  terminate  at  the  end  of  the
Presidency and that their privileged communications could
be disclosed when the President left office (or were subject
to the absolute control of a subsequent President who could
be  a  political  opponent  of  a  former  President),  the  conse-
quences for the Presidency would be severe.  Without suffi-
cient  assurances  of  continuing  confidentiality,  Presidents
and  their  advisers  would  be  chilled  from  engaging  in  the
full and frank deliberations upon which effective discharge
of the President’s duties depends.

To be clear, to say that a former President can invoke the
privilege  for  Presidential  communications  that  occurred
during his Presidency does not mean that the privilege is
absolute  or  cannot  be  overcome.   The  tests  set  forth  in
Nixon,  418  U. S.,  at  713,  and  Senate  Select  Committee  on
Presidential  Campaign  Activities  v.  Nixon,  498  F. 2d  725,
731 (CADC 1974) (en banc), may apply to a former Presi-
dent’s  privilege  claim  as  they  do  to  a  current  President’s
privilege  claim.    Moreover,  it  could  be  argued  that  the
strength of a privilege claim should diminish to some extent
as the years pass after a former President’s term in office.
In all events, the Nixon and Senate Select Committee tests
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or a section from a legal document. It contains legal citations, formal language, and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Date/Time: 08-17-01 13:25:22
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3CV

Pagination Table: RULES1

1172

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

(ii) If the property is other tangible or intangible
property, the summons, process, and any supple-
mental process must be delivered to a person or
organization authorized to serve it, who may be (A)
a marshal; (B) someone under contract with the
United States; (C) someone specially appointed by
the court for that purpose; or, (D) in an action
brought by the United States, any ofﬁcer or em-
ployee of the United States.

(e) The plaintiff may invoke state-law remedies under
Rule 64 for seizure of person or property for the purpose
of securing satisfaction of the judgment.

(2) Notice to defendant.—No default judgment may be en-
tered except upon proof—which may be by afﬁdavit—that:
(a) the complaint, summons, and process of attach-
ment or garnishment have been served on the defendant
in a manner authorized by Rule 4;

(b) the plaintiff or the garnishee has mailed to the de-
fendant the complaint, summons, and process of attach-
ment or garnishment, using any form of mail requiring
a return receipt; or

(c) the plaintiff or the garnishee has tried diligently
to give notice of the action to the defendant but could
not do so.
.

.

.

.

.

Rule C. In rem actions: special provisions.
.

.

.

.

.

(2) Complaint.—In an action in rem the complaint must:

(a) be veriﬁed;
(b) describe with reasonable particularity the prop-

erty that is the subject of the action;

(c) in an admiralty and maritime proceeding, state
that the property is within the district or will be within
the district while the action is pending;

(d) in a forfeiture proceeding for violation of a federal

statute, state:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically the Rules of Civil Procedure. It contains numbered sections, sub-sections, and legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J.

would protect certain basic principles.  A principle that pre-
vents  Congress  from  affording  inferior  level  adjudicators
some decisionmaking independence was not among them.

Finally,  the  Executive  Branch  and  Congress  are  more
likely than are judges to understand how to implement the
tasks that Congress has written into legislation.  That un-
derstanding  encompasses  the  nature  of  different  mecha-
nisms of bureaucratic control that may apply to the many
thousands of administrators who will carry out those tasks.
And it includes an awareness of the reasonable limits that
can be placed on supervisors to ensure that those working
under them enjoy a degree of freedom sufficient to carry out
their  responsibilities.    Considered  as  a  group,  unelected
judges have little, if any, experience related to this kind of
a problem.

This is not to say that the Constitution grants Congress
free rein.  But in this area of the law a functional approach,
when  compared  with  the  highly  detailed  judicial-rules-
based  approach  reflected  in  the  Court’s  decision,  is  more
likely to prevent inappropriate judicial interference.  It em-
bodies,  at  least  to  a  degree,  the  philosopher’s  advice:
“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”

II
For the reasons I have set forth above, I do not agree with
the  Court’s  basic  constitutional  determination.    For  pur-
poses of determining a remedy, however, I recognize that a
majority  of  the  Court  has  reached  a  contrary  conclusion.
On this score, I believe that any remedy should be tailored
to the constitutional violation.  Under the Court’s new test,
the current statutory scheme is defective only because the
APJ’s  decisions  are  not  reviewable  by  the  Director  alone.
The Court’s remedy addresses that specific problem, and for
that reason I agree with its remedial holding.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring and dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into constitutional arguments regarding the reviewability of administrative law judges' decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON

Opinion of the Court

Rawle  explained  how  the  Electoral  College  functioned:
“[T]he electors do not assemble in their several states for a
free exercise of their own judgments, but for the purpose of
electing”  the  nominee  of  “the  predominant  political  party
which has chosen those electors.”  A View of the Constitu-
tion of the United States of America 57 (2d ed. 1829).  Look-
ing back at the close of the century, this Court had no doubt
that Story’s and Rawle’s descriptions were right.  The elec-
tors, the Court noted, were chosen “simply to register the
will of the appointing power in respect of a particular can-
didate.”  McPherson, 146 U. S., at 36.

State election laws evolved to reinforce that development,
ensuring that a State’s electors would vote the same way as
its  citizens.  As  noted  earlier,  state  legislatures  early
dropped out of the picture; by the mid-1800s, ordinary vot-
ers  chose  electors.    See  supra,  at  4.  Except  that  increas-
ingly, they did not do so directly.  States listed only presi-
dential candidates on the ballot, on the understanding that
electors would do no more than vote for the winner.  Usu-
ally, the State could ensure that result by appointing elec-
tors chosen by the winner’s party.  But to remove any doubt,
States began in the early 1900s to enact statutes requiring
electors to pledge that they would squelch any urge to break
ranks with voters.  See supra, at 5.  Washington’s law, pe-
nalizing a pledge’s breach, is only another in the same vein.
It reflects a tradition more than two centuries old.  In that
practice, electors are not free agents; they are to vote for the
candidate whom the State’s voters have chosen.

The  history  going  the  opposite  way  is  one  of  anomalies
only.  The Electors stress that since the founding, electors
have cast some 180 faithless votes for either President or
Vice President.  See Brief for Petitioners 7.  But that is 180
out of over 23,000.  See Brief for Republican National Com-
mittee as Amicus Curiae 19.  And more than a third of the
faithless  votes  come  from  1872,  when  the  Democratic
Party’s  nominee  (Horace  Greeley)  died  just  after  Election
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the history and practice of the Electoral College. It provides historical context and legal precedent, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

MOORE v. HARPER

Syllabus

for present purposes, the Court embraced the core principle espoused
in Hildebrant and Smiley: Whatever authority was responsible for re-
districting, that entity remained subject to constraints set forth in the
State Constitution.  The Court dismissed the argument that the Elec-
tions Clause divests state constitutions of the power to enforce checks
against the exercise of legislative power.

The basic principle of these cases—reflected in Smiley’s unanimous
command  that  a  state  legislature  may  not  “create  congressional  dis-
tricts independently of” requirements imposed “by the state constitu-
tion  with respect  to  the  enactment  of  laws,”  285  U. S., at  373—com-
mands continued respect.  Pp. 15–18.

(b) The precedents of this Court have long rejected the view that
legislative action under the Elections Clause is purely federal in char-
acter, governed only by restraints found in the Federal Constitution.
The argument to the contrary does not account for the Framers’ un-
derstanding that when legislatures make laws, they are bound by the
provisions  of  the  very  documents  that  give  them  life.   Thus,  when  a
state  legislature  carries  out  its  federal  constitutional  power  to  pre-
scribe rules regulating federal elections, it acts both as a lawmaking
body created and bound by its state constitution, and as the entity as-
signed particular authority by the Federal Constitution.  Both consti-
tutions restrain the state legislature’s exercise of power.

This Court’s decision in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, in which
the  Court  analyzed  the  Constitution’s  similarly  worded  Electors
Clause, is inapposite.  That decision did not address any conflict be-
tween state constitutional provisions and state legislatures.  Nor does
Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130, which involved a contested vote by a
state legislature to ratify a federal constitutional amendment, help pe-
titioners.  That case concerned the power of state legislatures to ratify
amendments to the Federal Constitution.  But fashioning regulations
governing  federal  elections  “unquestionably  calls  for  the  exercise  of
lawmaking authority.”  Arizona State Legislature, 576 U. S., at 808, n.
17.  And the exercise of such authority in the context of the Elections
Clause is subject to the ordinary constraints on lawmaking in the state
constitution.  Pp. 18–22.

(c) Petitioners concede that at least some state constitutional pro-
visions  can  restrain  a  state  legislature’s  exercise  of  authority  under
the Elections Clause, but they read Smiley and Hildebrant to differen-
tiate  between  procedural  and  substantive  constraints.   But  neither
case drew such a distinction, and petitioners do not in any event offer
a defensible line between procedure and substance in this context.  Pp.
22–24.

(d)  Historical  practice  confirms  that  state  legislatures  remain
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, outlining the court's reasoning in the Moore v. Harper case. It is not the actual content of a book and is more of a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
1248

INDEX

SAME-SEX  MARRIAGE.  See  Stays.

SEARCHES  AND  SEIZURES.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  10.

SIXTH  AMENDMENT.  See  Constitutional  Law,  III;  Habeas  Corpus,

4,  5,  6,  7,  8.

SOUTH  CAROLINA.  See  Suits  Between  States.

STATE  GROUNDS  DOCTRINE.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  1.

STAYS.

Public  broadcast  of  federal  trials—Amending  Local  Rules.—Because
it  appears  that  courts  below  did  not  follow  appropriate  procedures  set
forth in federal law before amending their Rules to allow public broadcast
ing of federal trials, broadcast of instant case—a challenge to a California
proposition  that  overturned  a  State  Supreme  Court  ruling  permitting
same-sex  marriage—is  stayed  pending  ﬁling,  and  disposition,  of  a  certio
rari and/or mandamus petition.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, p. 183.

SUITS  BETWEEN  STATES.

Equitable distribution of river waters—Intervention.—In South Caro
lina’s original action seeking an equitable apportionment with North Caro
lina of Catawba River’s waters, Catawba River Water Supply Project and
Duke  Energy  Carolinas,  LLC,  have  satisﬁed  appropriate  standard  for  in
tervention as parties, see New Jersey v.  New York, 345 U. S. 369, 373, but
city of Charlotte, N. C., has not.  South Carolina v. North Carolina, p. 256.

SUPPRESSION  OF  EVIDENCE.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  10.

SUPREME  COURT.

Rules of the Supreme Court, p. 1161.

TRIAL  OFFICIALS’  MISCONDUCT.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  2.

VOIR  DIRE.  See  Constitutional  Law,  III.

WARRANTLESS  SEARCHES.  See  Habeas  Corpus,  10.

WHOLESALE-ENERGY  CONTRACTS.  See  Federal  Power  Act.
  </content>
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This is an index, not the actual content of a book. Indexes list topics and their corresponding page numbers.
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