<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010)

5

ALITO, J., dissenting

videos and depictions of deadly animal fights.  See ante, at
10, 19.  Instead, the Court tacitly assumes for the sake of
argument that §48 is valid as applied to these depictions,
but  the  Court  concludes  that  §48  reaches  too  much  pro-
tected  speech  to  survive.    The  Court  relies  primarily  on
depictions of hunters killing or wounding game and depic-
tions of animals being slaughtered for food.  I address the
Court’s examples below.

A

I turn first to depictions of hunting.  As the Court notes,
photographs  and  videos  of  hunters  shooting  game  are
common.  See  ante,  at  13–14.  But  hunting  is  legal  in  all
50  States,  and  §48  applies  only  to  a  depiction  of  conduct
that is illegal in the jurisdiction in which the depiction is
created,  sold,  or  possessed.    §§48(a),  (c).    Therefore,  in  all
50  States,  the  creation,  sale,  or  possession  for  sale  of  the
vast  majority  of  hunting  depictions  indisputably  falls
outside §48’s reach.

Straining  to  find  overbreadth,  the  Court  suggests  that
§48  prohibits  the  sale  or  possession  in  the  District  of  Co-
lumbia  of  any  depiction  of  hunting  because  the  District—
undoubtedly  because  of  its  urban  character—does  not
permit  hunting  within  its  boundaries.    Ante,  at  13.    The
Court  also  suggests  that,  because  some  States  prohibit  a
particular  type  of  hunting  (e.g.,  hunting  with  a  crossbow
or “canned” hunting) or the hunting of a particular animal
(e.g.,  the  “sharp-tailed  grouse”),  §48  makes  it  illegal  for
persons  in  such  States  to  sell  or  possess  for  sale  a  depic-
tion  of  hunting  that  was  perfectly  legal  in  the  State  in
which the hunting took place.  See ante, at 12–14.

The Court’s interpretation is seriously flawed.  “When a
federal  court  is  dealing  with  a  federal  statute  challenged
as  overbroad,  it  should,  of  course,  construe  the  statute  to
avoid  constitutional  problems,  if  the  statute  is  subject  to
such  a  limiting  construction.”    Ferber,  458  U. S.,  at  769,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of a specific law (likely related to depictions of animal cruelty) and provides legal arguments against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

1

BARRETT, J., concurring in part

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–939
_________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[July 1, 2024]

 JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring in part.
For reasons I explain below, I do not join Part III–C of the
Court’s opinion.  The remainder of the opinion is consistent
with my view that the Constitution prohibits Congress from
criminalizing a President’s exercise of core Article II powers
and closely related conduct.  That said, I would have framed
the underlying legal issues differently.  The Court describes
the President’s constitutional protection from certain pros-
ecutions as an “immunity.”  As I see it, that term is short-
hand for two propositions: The President can challenge the
constitutionality of a criminal statute as applied to official
acts alleged in the indictment, and he can obtain interlocu-
tory review of the trial court’s ruling.

There  appears  to  be  substantial  agreement  on  the  first
point.  Like the Court, the dissenting Justices and the Spe-
cial  Counsel  all  accept  that  some  prosecutions  of  a  Presi-
dent’s official conduct may be unconstitutional.  See post, at
16 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); Brief for United States 24–
30.  As  for  interlocutory  review,  our  precedent  recognizes
that resolving certain legal issues before trial is necessary
to safeguard important constitutional interests—here, Ex-
ecutive Branch independence on matters that Article II as-
signs to the President’s discretion.

Properly conceived, the President’s constitutional protec-
tion from prosecution is narrow.  The Court leaves open the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes citations, case names, and the name of the Justice writing the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing as it represents the legal reasoning and analysis of a significant case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

728

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL et al. v. BABBITT,
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit

No. 98–1991. Argued March 1, 2000—Decided May 15, 2000

The Taylor Grazing Act, inter alia, grants the Secretary of the Interior
authority to divide the public rangelands into grazing districts, to spec-
ify the amount of grazing permitted in each district, and to issue grazing
leases or permits to “settlers, residents, and other stock owners,” 43
U. S. C. §§ 315, 315a, 315b; gives preference with respect to permits to
“landowners engaged in the livestock business, bona ﬁde occupants or
settlers, or owners of water or water rights,” § 315b; and speciﬁes that
grazing privileges “shall be adequately safeguarded,” but that the cre-
ation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit does not create
“any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands,” ibid. Since 1938,
conditions placed on grazing permits have reﬂected the grazing privi-
leges’ leasehold nature, and the grazing regulations in effect have pre-
served the Secretary’s authority to (1) cancel a permit under certain
circumstances, (2) reclassify and withdraw land from grazing to devote
it to a more valuable or suitable use, and (3) suspend animal unit months
(AUMs) of grazing privileges in the event of range depletion. Petition-
ers, ranching-related organizations, challenged several 1995 amend-
ments to the regulations. The District Court found four of the new
regulations unlawful. The Tenth Circuit reversed as to three of them,
upholding regulations that (1) changed the deﬁnition of “grazing prefer-
ence,” 43 CFR § 4100.0–5; (2) permitted those who are not “engaged in
the livestock business” to qualify for grazing permits, § 4110.1(a); and
(3) granted the United States title to all future “permanent” range im-
provements, § 4120.3–2.

Held: The regulatory changes do not exceed the Secretary’s Taylor Graz-

ing Act authority. Pp. 739–750.

(a) Section 4100.0–5’s new deﬁnition of “grazing preference” does not
violate 43 U. S. C. § 315b’s requirement that “grazing privileges” “be
adequately safeguarded.” Before its amendment, § 4100.0–5 deﬁned
“grazing preference” as “the total number of [AUMs] of livestock graz-
ing on public lands apportioned and attached to base property owned or
controlled by a permittee or lessee,” but the 1995 version refers only to
a priority, not to a speciﬁc number of AUMs, and it adds a new term,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case Public Lands Council v. Babbitt.  It outlines the background of the case, the legal issues involved, and the court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

475

Opinion of Stevens, J.

nomics  to  the  realm  of  corporate  electioneering,  there  may
be  no  “reason  to  think  the  market  ordering  is  intrinsically
good at all,” Strauss 1386.

The Court’s blinkered and aphoristic approach to the First
Amendment  may  well  promote  corporate  power  at  the  cost
of  the  individual  and  collective  self-expression  the  Amend
ment  was  meant  to  serve.  It  will  undoubtedly  cripple  the
ability of ordinary citizens, Congress, and the States to adopt
even  limited  measures  to  protect  against  corporate  domina
tion of the electoral process.  Americans may be forgiven if
they  do  not  feel  the  Court  has  advanced  the  cause  of  self-
government today.

2.  Shareholder Protection

There  is  yet  another  way  in  which  laws  such  as  § 203  can
serve  First  Amendment  values.  Interwoven  with  Austin’s
concern  to  protect the  integrity  of  the  electoral process  is  a
concern  to  protect  the  rights  of  shareholders  from  a  kind
of  coerced  speech:  electioneering  expenditures  that  do  not
“reﬂec[t] [their] support.”  494 U. S., at 660–661.  When cor
porations  use  general  treasury  funds  to  praise  or  attack  a
particular  candidate  for  ofﬁce,  it  is  the  shareholders,  as  the
residual  claimants,  who  are  effectively  footing  the  bill.
Those shareholders who disagree with the corporation’s elec
toral  message  may  ﬁnd  their  ﬁnancial  investments  being
used to undermine their political convictions.

The PAC mechanism, by contrast, helps ensure that those
who  pay  for  an  electioneering  communication  actually  sup
port its content and that managers do not use general treas
uries  to  advance  personal  agendas.  Ibid.  It  “ ‘allows  cor
porate  political  participation  without  the  temptation  to  use
corporate funds for political inﬂuence, quite possibly at odds
with  the  sentiments  of  some  shareholders  or  members.’ ”
McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at  204  (quoting  Beaumont,  539  U. S.,
at  163).  A  rule  that  privileges  the  use  of  PACs  thus  does
more than facilitate the political speech of like-minded share
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the First Amendment implications of corporate electioneering and shareholder rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1152

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 19, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–7460.  Hooks  v.  Bruton  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  241.

No.  09–7466.  Cordova  et  al.  v.  Aragon  et  al.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  1183.

No. 09–7471.  Chavez v.  Swarthout, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  341.

No.  09–7476.  Murray  v.  Milwaukee  County,  Wisconsin,
et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  341
Fed.  Appx.  213.

No.  09–7478.  Johnson  v.  Kelly,  Superintendent,  Missis
sippi  State  Penitentiary.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7479.  Ketchum  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7481.  Wilson v. Haws, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7496.  Loggins  v.  Cline,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  832.

No.  09–7497.  Kares  v.  Eniex  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7501.  Rutledge  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
344  Fed.  Appx.  924.

No. 09–7503.  Straw v.  Klopotoski, Superintendent, State
Correctional  Institution  at  Dallas,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7506.  Brown  v.  Kelley  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7510.  Jenner  et  al.  v.  Zavares,  Executive  Direc
tor,  Colorado  Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.
10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  339  Fed.  Appx.
879.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, circuit courts, and disposition information. This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is more suitable for indexing as metadata.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Summaries/Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

27

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

A
Answering  the  question  whether  Harvard’s  and  UNC’s
policies survive strict scrutiny under settled law is straight-
forward,  both  because  of  the  procedural  posture  of  these
cases  and  because  of  the  narrow  scope  of  the  issues  pre-
sented  by  petitioner  Students  for  Fair  Admissions,  Inc.
(SFFA).22

These cases arrived at this Court after two lengthy trials.
Harvard and UNC introduced dozens of fact witnesses, ex-
pert  testimony,  and  documentary  evidence  in  support  of
their  admissions  programs.  Brief  for  Petitioner  20,  40.
SFFA, by contrast, did not introduce a single fact witness
and relied on the testimony of two experts.  Ibid.

After making detailed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the District Courts entered judgment in favor of Har-
vard and UNC.  See 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 133–206 (Mass.
2019)  (Harvard  I );  567  F. Supp. 3d  580,  588–667  (MDNC
2021)  (UNC).  The  First  Circuit  affirmed  in  the  Harvard
case,  finding  “no  error”  in  the  District  Court’s  thorough
opinion.  980 F. 3d 157, 204 (2020) (Harvard II ).  SFFA then
filed petitions for a writ of certiorari in both cases, which
the Court granted.  595 U. S. ___ (2022).23

The  Court  granted  certiorari  on  three  questions:  (1)
whether  the  Court  should  overrule  Bakke,  Grutter,  and

——————
strategic litigation choice, and in our adversarial system, it is not up to
this Court to come up with “wrongs to right” on behalf of litigants.  Id., at
244 (internal quotation marks omitted).

22 SFFA is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization founded after this Court’s
decision in Fisher I, 570 U. S. 297 (2013).  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
20–1199, p. 10.  Its original board of directors had three self-appointed
members:  Edward  Blum,  Abigail  Fisher  (the  plaintiff  in  Fisher),  and
Richard Fisher.  See ibid.

23 Bypassing  the  Fourth  Circuit’s  opportunity  to  review  the  District
Court’s  opinion  in  the  UNC  case,  SFFA  sought  certiorari  before  judg-
ment, urging that, “[p]aired with Harvard,” the UNC case would “allow
the Court to resolve the ongoing validity of race-based admissions under
both Title VI and the Constitution.”  Pet. for Cert. in No. 21–707, p. 27.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in a case regarding affirmative action at Harvard and UNC.  It provides context about the procedural history of the case and the specific questions before the Court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

GORSUCH, J., concurring

and history.  597 U. S., at 19.  Perhaps judges’ jobs would
be easier if they could simply strike the policy balance they
prefer.  And a principle that the government always wins
surely would be simple for judges to implement.  But either
approach would let judges stray far from the Constitution’s
promise.  See Heller, 554 U. S., at 634.

One  more  point:    Our  resolution  of  Mr.  Rahimi’s  facial
challenge to §922(g)(8) necessarily leaves open the question
whether the statute might be unconstitutional as applied in
“particular circumstances.”  Salerno, 481 U. S., at 751.  So,
for  example,  we  do  not  decide  today  whether  the  govern-
ment may disarm a person without a judicial finding that
he  poses  a  “credible  threat”  to  another’s  physical  safety.
§922(g)(8)(C)(i); see ante, at 8.  We do not resolve whether
the  government  may  disarm  an  individual  permanently.
See ante, at 14 (stressing that, “like surety bonds of limited
duration,  Section  922(g)(8)’s  restriction  was  temporary  as
applied  to  [Mr.]  Rahimi”).  We  do  not  determine  whether
§922(g)(8) may be constitutionally enforced against a per-
son who uses a firearm in self-defense.  Notably, the surety
laws that inform today’s decision allowed even an individ-
ual found to pose a threat to another to “obtain an exception
if he needed his arms for self-defense.”  Ante, at 12; see also
post, at 23 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).  Nor do we purport to
approve in advance other laws denying firearms on a cate-
gorical basis to any group of persons a legislature happens
to  deem,  as  the  government  puts  it,  “not  ‘responsible.’”
Ante,  at  17  (quoting  Brief  for  United  States  6);  see  Tr.  of
Oral Arg. 31–32; see also post, at 27 (opinion of THOMAS, J.)
(“Not  a  single  Member  of  the  Court  adopts  the  Govern-
ment’s theory”).

We  do  not  resolve  any  of  those  questions  (and  perhaps
others like them) because we cannot.  Article III of the Con-
stitution  vests  in  this  Court  the  power  to  decide  only  the
“ ‘actual  cas[e]’ ”  before  us,  “ ‘not  abstractions.’ ”    Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 89 (1947).  And the case
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of United States v. Rahimi. It delves into the constitutional implications of a specific firearm statute and outlines the limitations of the Court's decision in this particular case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

839

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10408.  Christopher  v.  Bethune.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  950  A.  2d  75.

No.  08–10411.  Davidson  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10413.  Hodge  et  ux.  v.  Calvert  County  Public
Schools  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  297  Fed.  Appx.  224.

No. 08–10414.  Simpson v.  Florida.  Sup. Ct. Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  3  So.  3d  1135.

No.  08–10415.  Santifer  v.  Evans,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  857.

No.  08–10416.  Rekow  v.  Hall,  Superintendent,  Two  Riv
ers  Correctional  Institution.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  999.

No. 08–10421.  Rogers v.  Thaler, Director, Texas Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  555
F.  3d  483.

No.  08–10422.  Portillo  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10424.  Osborne  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  544  F.  3d  943.

No.  08–10427.  Babinski  v.  Voss.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  617.

No.  08–10428.  Bright  v.  Wright,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.  Appx.  813.

No.  08–10431.  Davis  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10432.  Coats  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  3d  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10434.  Harris  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.  App.  3d  1129,  970
N.  E.  2d  128.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, courts, and dates. This type of information is not typically considered the main body text of a document and is more like a legal index or docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

405

Opinion of the Court

established Federal
Court of the United States.”

law, as determined by the Supreme
(Emphases added.)

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit properly ac-
corded both the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application”
clauses independent meaning. The Fourth Circuit’s inter-
pretation of § 2254(d)(1) in Williams’ case relied, in turn, on
that court’s previous decision in Green v. French, 143 F. 3d
865 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 1090 (1999). See 163 F. 3d
860, 866 (CA4 1998) (“[T]he standard of review enunciated in
Green v. French continues to be the binding law of this Cir-
cuit”). With respect to the ﬁrst of the two statutory clauses,
the Fourth Circuit held in Green that a state-court decision
can be “contrary to” this Court’s clearly established prece-
dent in two ways. First, a state-court decision is contrary
to this Court’s precedent if the state court arrives at a con-
clusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question
of law. Second, a state-court decision is also contrary to this
Court’s precedent if the state court confronts facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court
precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours. See 143
F. 3d, at 869–870.

The word “contrary” is commonly understood to mean “di-
ametrically different,” “opposite in character or nature,” or
“mutually opposed.” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 495 (1976). The text of § 2254(d)(1) therefore
suggests that the state court’s decision must be substantially
different from the relevant precedent of this Court. The
Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the “contrary to” clause
accurately reﬂects this textual meaning. A state-court deci-
sion will certainly be contrary to our clearly established
precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts
the governing law set forth in our cases. Take, for example,
our decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668
(1984).
If a state court were to reject a prisoner’s claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  It discusses the interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) and the "contrary to" clause within that section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 598 (2000)

655

Breyer, J., dissenting

a return to the conceptual straitjackets of Schechter and
Carter Coal and Usery than to something like the unsteady
state of obscenity law between Redrup v. New York, 386
U. S. 767 (1967) (per curiam), and Miller v. California,
413 U. S. 15 (1973), a period in which the failure to provide
a workable deﬁnition left this Court to review each case
ad hoc. See id., at 22, n. 3; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas,
390 U. S. 676, 706–708 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As our
predecessors learned then, the practice of such ad hoc re-
view cannot preserve the distinction between the judicial
and the legislative, and this Court, in any event, lacks the
institutional capacity to maintain such a regime for very
long. This one will end when the majority realizes that the
conception of the commerce power for which it entertains
hopes would inevitably fail the test expressed in Justice
Holmes’s statement that “[t]he ﬁrst call of a theory of law is
that it should ﬁt the facts.” O. Holmes, The Common Law
167 (Howe ed. 1963). The facts that cannot be ignored today
are the facts of integrated national commerce and a politi-
cal relationship between States and Nation much affected
by their respective treasuries and constitutional modiﬁca-
tions adopted by the people. The federalism of some earlier
time is no more adequate to account for those facts today
than the theory of laissez-faire was able to govern the na-
tional economy 70 years ago.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens joins,
and with whom Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg
join as to Part I–A, dissenting.

No one denies the importance of the Constitution’s fed-
Its state/federal division of authority
eralist principles.
protects liberty—both by restricting the burdens that gov-
ernment can impose from a distance and by facilitating
citizen participation in government that is closer to home.
The question is how the judiciary can best implement that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

17

BREYER, J., dissenting

fact  robbery)  receive  the  death  penalty,  while  another
defendant  does  not,  despite  having  stabbed  his  wife  60
times  and  killed  his  6-year-old  daughter  and  3-year-old
son  while  they  slept?    See  Donohue,  Capital  Punishment
in  Connecticut,  1973–2007:  A  Comprehensive  Evaluation
from 4686 Murders to One Execution, pp. 128–134 (2013),
online  at  http://works.bepress.com/john_donohue/87.    In
each  instance,  the  sentences  compared  were  imposed  in
the same State at about the same time.

The  question  raised  by  these  examples  (and  the  many
more I could give but do not), as well as by the research to
which I have referred, is the same question Justice Stew
art,  Justice  Powell,  and  others  raised  over  the  course  of
several decades: The imposition and implementation of the
death  penalty  seems  capricious,  random,  indeed,  arbi
trary.  From  a  defendant’s  perspective,  to  receive  that
sentence,  and  certainly  to  find  it  implemented,  is  the
equivalent of being struck by lightning.  How then can we
reconcile the death penalty with the demands of a Consti
tution that first and foremost insists upon a rule of law?

III
“Cruel”—Excessive Delays
The problems of reliability and unfairness almost inevi
tably  lead  to  a  third  independent  constitutional  problem:
excessively  long  periods  of  time  that  individuals  typically
spend  on  death  row,  alive  but  under  sentence  of  death.
That is to say, delay is in part a problem that the Consti
tution’s  own  demands  create.  Given  the  special  need  for
reliability and fairness in death penalty cases, the Eighth
Amendment  does,  and  must,  apply  to  the  death  penalty
“with special force.”  Roper, 543 U. S., at 568.  Those who
face  “that  most  severe  sanction  must  have  a  fair  oppor
tunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their execu
tion.”  Hall v. Florida, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at
22).  At the same time, the Constitution insists that “every
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the arbitrariness of the death penalty and the issue of excessive delays on death row.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Opinion of the Court

robberies.

Based  on  that  information,  the  prosecutors  applied  for
court  orders  under  the  Stored  Communications  Act  to
obtain cell phone records for petitioner Timothy Carpenter
and  several  other  suspects.  That  statute,  as  amended  in
1994, permits the Government to compel the disclosure of
certain telecommunications records when it “offers specific
and  articulable  facts  showing  that  there  are  reasonable
grounds  to  believe”  that  the  records  sought  “are  relevant
and  material  to  an  ongoing  criminal  investigation.”    18
U. S. C.  §2703(d).    Federal  Magistrate  Judges  issued  two
orders  directing  Carpenter’s  wireless  carriers—MetroPCS
and  Sprint—to  disclose  “cell/site  sector  [information]  for
[Carpenter’s]  telephone[ ]  at  call  origination  and  at  call
termination  for  incoming  and  outgoing  calls”  during  the
four-month  period  when  the  string  of  robberies  occurred.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a, 72a.  The first order sought 152
days  of  cell-site  records  from  MetroPCS,  which  produced
records  spanning  127  days.    The  second  order  requested
seven days of CSLI from Sprint, which produced two days
of records covering the period when Carpenter’s phone was
“roaming”  in  northeastern  Ohio.    Altogether  the  Govern-
ment  obtained  12,898  location  points  cataloging  Carpen-
ter’s movements—an average of 101 data points per day.

Carpenter  was  charged  with  six  counts  of  robbery  and
an  additional  six  counts  of  carrying  a  firearm  during  a
federal crime of violence.  See 18 U. S. C. §§924(c), 1951(a).
Prior  to  trial,  Carpenter  moved  to  suppress  the  cell-site
data provided by the wireless carriers.  He argued that the
Government’s  seizure  of  the  records  violated  the  Fourth
Amendment  because  they  had  been  obtained  without  a
warrant supported by probable cause.  The District Court
denied the motion.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a–39a.

At  trial,  seven  of  Carpenter’s  confederates  pegged  him
as  the  leader  of  the  operation.  In  addition,  FBI  agent
Christopher  Hess  offered  expert  testimony  about  the  cell-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically an excerpt from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the case of Timothy Carpenter and the use of cell phone location data in a criminal investigation. The content is sequential and provides context for a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxx

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page
Rashad v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
Rashid v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  831,975
899
Rasmussen v. Frakes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Raspanti v. Ofﬁce of Disciplinary Counsel
1091
Rasul v. Myers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148
Ratcliff v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
987
Ratliff; Astrue v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
831
Ray v. Allen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151
Ray v. Federal Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
835
Ray; McKinney v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874
Raybestos Products Co. v. Indiana Dept. of Environmental Mgmt.
846
Raymond v. Weber  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028
Raytheon Co.; Mohiuddin v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
864
Razvi v. FIA Card Services, N. A.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081
Rector v. Georgia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827
Rector of St. James Parish v. Protestant Episcopal Church in L. A.
Redd v. LeBlanc  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  863,917

Redd v. United States
942

Redding; Hawk v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Reddy v. Matthews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
805

Redford v. Redford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Redman v. Potomac Place Associates, LLC
1121

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

Redstone Resources, Inc. v. Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP  . . . . .
Reed v. Cirtin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  971,1102

Reed; Doe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  967,1142

Reed v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

994

Reed v. Hofbauer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reed v. Swilley
857

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  861,1097,1156

Reed v. West Virginia
913

Reedsport; Cheeseman v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  872,1038

1094

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reese; Kennedy v.
1153

Reese v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reese v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  992,1139

Reeves v. DSI Security Services
1031

Reeves v. Louisiana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969

Regal-Beloit Corp.; Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v.  . . . . . . . . . . .
Regal-Beloit Corp.; Union Paciﬁc R. Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969

Regents of Univ. of Cal.; Secarea v.
Reger v. Walker  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Register v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reilly; Flipping v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reilly; Schwab v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
Reinhard; Virginia Ofﬁce of Protection and Advocacy v.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,1065

806

1157

1020

810

1145
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

21

Opinion of the Court

an  opinion  is  not  always  to  be  parsed  as  though  we  were
dealing with [the] language of a statute.”  Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 341 (1979).  Yet that is exactly what
Mr. Davenport and the dissent ask of us.  They would have
us override a lawful congressional command—that no fed-
eral habeas relief should issue “unless” AEDPA’s applicable
conditions are satisfied.  § 2254(d).  And they would have us
do so on the basis of a handful of sentences extracted from
decisions that had no reason to pass on the argument Mr.
Davenport presents today.  We neither expect nor hope that
our  successors  will  comb  these  pages  for  stray  comments
and stretch them beyond their context—all to justify an out-
come  inconsistent  with  this  Court’s  reasoning  and  judg-
ments and with Congress’s instructions.  Such an exalted
view of this Court’s every passing remark would turn stare
decisis  from  a  tool  of judicial  humility  into  one  of  judicial
hubris.

IV

Having concluded that the Sixth Circuit erred by failing
to apply AEDPA before granting habeas relief, one question
remains:  Assuming  Mr.  Davenport  can  satisfy  Brecht  as
the Sixth Circuit held, can he satisfy AEDPA?  The answer
helps illustrate how the two inquiries are distinct and why
a  federal  court  must  answer  both  before  overturning  a
state-court conviction.

Under the statute’s terms, we assess the reasonableness
of  the  “last  state-court  adjudication  on  the  merits  of ”  the
petitioner’s claim.  Greene v. Fisher, 565 U. S. 34, 40 (2011).
In this case, that is the decision of the Michigan Court of
Appeals.  To  be  sure,  after  that  intermediate  court  ruled
against  Mr.  Davenport  he  sought  discretionary  review  in
the  Michigan  Supreme  Court,  which  denied  his  request.
See 494 Mich., at 875, 832 N. W. 2d, at 390.  But a discre-
tionary denial of leave to appeal does not typically entail an
“adjudication”  of  the  underlying  claim’s  “merits”  under
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in a habeas corpus case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

BARRETT, J., concurring

view, it became evident in each case that the agency’s as-
sertion of “highly consequential power” went “beyond what
Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted.”
West Virginia, 597 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20).

III
As for today’s case: The Court surely could have “hi[t] the
send button,” post, at 23 (KAGAN, J., dissenting), after the
routine statutory analysis set out in Part III–A.  But it is
nothing new for a court to punctuate its conclusion with an
additional point, and the major questions doctrine is a good
one  here.  Ante,  at  25,  n. 9.    It  is  obviously  true  that  the
Secretary’s  loan cancellation program has “vast ‘economic
and  political  significance.’ ”    Utility  Air,  573  U. S.,  at  324.
That matters not because agencies are incapable of making
highly consequential decisions, but rather because an initi-
ative of this scope, cost, and political salience is not the type
that Congress lightly delegates to an agency.  And for the
reasons given by the Court, the HEROES Act provides no
indication that Congress empowered the Secretary to do an-
ything of the sort.  Ante, at 12–18, 25.

Granted,  some  context  clues  from  past  major  questions
cases are absent here—for example, this is not a case where
the agency is operating entirely outside its usual domain.
But  the  doctrine  is  not  an  on-off  switch  that  flips  when  a
critical mass of factors is present—again, it simply reflects
“common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely
to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political
magnitude.”  Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 133.  Com-
mon sense tells us that as more indicators from our previ-
ous major questions cases are present, the less likely it is
that  Congress  would  have  delegated  the  power  to  the
agency without saying so more clearly.

Here,  enough  of  those  indicators  are  present  to  demon-
strate that the Secretary has gone far “beyond what Con-
gress  could  reasonably  be  understood  to  have  granted”  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Barrett in a case concerning student loan forgiveness. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations of the HEROES Act, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

Constitution  to  preserve  that  understanding  of  liberty.
Yet the majority invokes our Constitution in the name of a
“liberty”  that  the  Framers  would  not  have  recognized,  to
the detriment of the liberty they sought to protect.  Along
the way, it rejects the idea—captured in our Declaration of
Independence—that human dignity is innate and suggests
instead  that  it  comes  from  the  Government.    This  distor-
tion of our Constitution not only ignores the text, it inverts
the  relationship  between  the  individual  and  the  state  in
our Republic.  I cannot agree with it.

I
The majority’s decision today will require States to issue
marriage  licenses  to  same-sex  couples  and  to  recognize
same-sex marriages entered in other States largely based
on  a  constitutional  provision  guaranteeing  “due  process”
before  a  person  is  deprived  of  his  “life,  liberty,  or  prop-
erty.”  I have elsewhere explained the dangerous fiction of
treating  the  Due  Process  Clause  as  a  font  of  substantive
rights.  McDonald  v.  Chicago,  561  U. S.  742,  811–812
(2010)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in
judgment).  It distorts the constitutional text, which guar-
antees only whatever “process” is “due” before a person is
deprived of life, liberty, and property.  U. S. Const., Amdt.
14,  §1.  Worse,  it  invites  judges  to  do  exactly  what  the
majority has done here—“ ‘roa[m] at large in the constitu-
tional field’ guided only by their personal views” as to the
“ ‘fundamental  rights’ ”  protected  by  that  document.
Planned  Parenthood  of  Southeastern  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505
U. S. 833, 953, 965 (1992) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in
judgment  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part)  (quoting  Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 502 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in judgment)).

By  straying  from  the  text  of  the  Constitution,  substan-
tive due process exalts judges at the expense of the People
from whom they derive their authority.  Petitioners argue
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the Obergefell v. Hodges case. It argues against the majority's decision to legalize same-sex marriage, citing concerns about judicial overreach and the distortion of constitutional principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

158

PHILLIPS v. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

Syllabus

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O(cid:146)Con-
nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Souter, J., ﬁled a dis-
senting opinion, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined,
post, p. 172. Breyer, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 179.

Darrell E. Jordan argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Brittan L. Buchanan, David J.
Schenck, and Nancy Trease.

Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With
him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger,
Assistant Attorneys General Hunger and Schiffer, Patricia
A. Millett, Robert Klarquist, and Timothy Dowling.

Richard A. Samp argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Daniel J. Popeo, Donald B. Ayer,
Thomas M. Fisher, and Michael J. Mazzone.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ﬁled for the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts et al. by Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of
Massachusetts, and Deborah Steenland, Assistant Attorney General, and
by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Grant
Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Richard Blumenthal
of Connecticut, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of
Georgia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James
E. Ryan of Illinois, Jeffrey A. Modisett of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of
Iowa, Albert B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana,
Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J.
Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Jeremiah W.
(Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del
Papa of Nevada, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Dennis C.
Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp
of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson
of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania,
Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, John Knox Walkup of Tennessee, Jan
Graham of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Christine O. Gregoire
of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and William U.
Hill of Wyoming; for the American Association of Retired Persons et al.
by John H. Pickering, Bruce Vignery, Michael R. Schuster, and J. Allen
May; for the American Bar Association by Jerome J. Shestack, Jerold
S. Solovy, Barry Levenstam, Paul M. Smith, and Nory Miller; for the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes information about the case name, the justices involved, and the attorneys representing each side.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

AMERICAN LEGION  v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN.

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting

for  Graves  of  American  Soldiers  in  Europe,  Hearings
before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of
Representatives, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1924) (empha-
sis added).  The Executive Director of the Jewish Welfare
Board stated that “if any religious symbol is erected over
the graves, then Judaism should have its symbol over the
graves  of its dead.”  Id., at 19.  Others expressing views
described  the  Latin  cross  as  the  appropriate  symbol  to
“mar[k] the graves of the Christian heroes of the American
forces.”    Id.,  at  24  (emphasis  added).    As  stated  by  the
National Catholic War Council, “the sentiment and desires
of  all  Americans,  Christians  and  Jews  alike,  are  one”:
“They  who  served  us  in  life  should  be  honored, as they
would have wished, in death.”  Ibid.13
  Far  more  crosses  than  Stars  of  David,  as  one  would
expect, line the grounds of American cemeteries overseas,
for Jews composed only 3% of the United States popula-
tion  in  1917.    J.  Fredman  &  L.  Falk,  Jews  in  American
Wars 100 (5th ed. 1954).  Jews accounted for nearly 6% of
U. S.  forces  in  World  War  I  (in  numbers,  250,000),  and
3,500  Jewish  soldiers  died  in  that  war.    Ibid.    Even  in
Flanders Field, with its “ ‘crosses, row on row,’ ” ante, at 5
(quoting J. McCrae, In Flanders Fields, In Flanders Fields
and Other Poems 3 (G. P. Putnam’s Sons ed. 1919)), “Stars
of David mark the graves of [eight American soldiers] of
Jewish faith,” American Battle Monuments Commission,
Flanders Field American Cemetery and Memorial Visitor
Booklet 11.14

——————

13 As  noted,  supra,  at  12,  the  bodies  of  soldiers  who  were  neither
Christian  nor  Jewish  could  be  repatriated  to  the  United  States  and
buried  in  a  national  cemetery (with a slab headstone), Quartermaster
Report,  or  in  a  private  cemetery  (with  a  headstone  of  the  family’s
choosing).

14 Available  at  https://www.abmc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
FlandersField_Booklet.pdf  (all  Internet  materials as last visited June
18,  2019).    For  the  respective  numbers  of  cross  and  Star  of  David
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg in the case of American Legion v. American Humanist Association. The text includes citations, legal arguments, and historical context related to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

907

Stevens, J., dissenting

preferring instead to put the burden on petitioners to show
that their tort claim would not frustrate the Secretary’s pur-
poses. Ante, at 882 (noting that petitioners’ arguments
“cannot, by themselves, change the legal result”).
In view
of the important principles upon which the presumption is
founded, however, rejecting it in this manner is profoundly
unwise.

Our presumption against pre-emption is rooted in the
It recognizes that when Congress
concept of federalism.
legislates “in a ﬁeld which the States have traditionally
occupied . . . [,] we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S.,
at 230; see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525
(1977). The signal virtues of this presumption are its place-
ment of the power of pre-emption squarely in the hands of
Congress, which is far more suited than the Judiciary to
strike the appropriate state/federal balance (particularly in
areas of traditional state regulation), and its requirement
In
that Congress speak clearly when exercising that power.
this way, the structural safeguards inherent in the normal
operation of the legislative process operate to defend state
interests from undue infringement. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 552 (1985);
see United States v. Morrison, ante, at 660–663 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62,
93–94 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce Termi-
nix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 292–293 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460–464
(1991).
In addition, the presumption serves as a limiting
principle that prevents federal judges from running amok
with our potentially boundless (and perhaps inadequately
considered) doctrine of implied conﬂict pre-emption based on
frustration of purposes—i. e., that state law is pre-empted if
it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens.  It contains legal arguments and citations, which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U74

[09-06-00 17:54:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

66

UNITED STATES v. BESTFOODS

Opinion of the Court

cert. denied, 502 U. S. 1004 (1991); United States v. Kayser-
Roth Corp., 910 F. 2d 24, 26 (CA1 1990) (“[A] person who is
an operator of a facility is not protected from liability by the
legal structure of ownership”).12

This much is easy to say: the difﬁculty comes in deﬁning
actions sufﬁcient to constitute direct parental “operation.”
Here of course we may again rue the uselessness of
CERCLA’s deﬁnition of a facility’s “operator” as “any person
. . . operating” the facility, 42 U. S. C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii), which
leaves us to do the best we can to give the term its “ordinary
or natural meaning.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137,
145 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In a mechan-
ical sense, to “operate” ordinarily means “[t]o control the
functioning of; run: operate a sewing machine.” American
Heritage Dictionary 1268 (3d ed. 1992); see also Webster’s
New International Dictionary 1707 (2d ed. 1958) (“to work;
as, to operate a machine”). And in the organizational sense
more obviously intended by CERCLA, the word ordinarily
means “[t]o conduct the affairs of; manage: operate a busi-
ness.” American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 1268; see
also Webster’s New International Dictionary, supra, at 1707
(“to manage”). So, under CERCLA, an operator is simply
someone who directs the workings of, manages, or conducts
the affairs of a facility. To sharpen the deﬁnition for pur-
poses of CERCLA’s concern with environmental contamina-
tion, an operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations
speciﬁcally related to pollution, that is, operations having

12 See Oswald 257 (“There are . . . instances . . . in which the parent
has not sufﬁciently overstepped the bounds of corporate separateness to
warrant piercing, yet is involved enough in the facility’s activities that it
should be held liable as an operator.
Imagine, for example, a parent who
strictly observed corporate formalities, avoided intertwining ofﬁcers and
directors, and adequately capitalized its subsidiary, yet provided active,
daily supervision and control over hazardous waste disposal activities of
the subsidiary. Such a parent should not escape liability just because its
activities do not justify a piercing of the subsidiary’s veil”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the definition of "operator" in the context of environmental contamination laws (CERCLA). It contains legal citations and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

norms is not ours to make.  It is a decision that belongs to
those  answerable  to  the  people  and  assigned  by  the  Con-
stitution to defend this nation.  If they wish our help, they
are free to enlist it, but we should not ever be in the busi-
ness of elbowing our way in.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of a section written by Justice Gorsuch.  It discusses the role of the judiciary in matters of national security and foreign policy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

campaign—to  repay  Cruz’s  loans.  Ordinarily,  it  would  not  matter
whether  a  plaintiff  was  challenging  the  statute’s  enforcement  or  in-
stead the enforcement of a regulation.  Here, however, the parties as-
sume that the distinction makes a difference because the subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction of the three-judge District Court is limited to actions
challenging the enforcement of the statute.  See BRCA §304(a).  Even
under the Government’s account, the present inability of the Commit-
tee to repay and Cruz to recover the final $10,000 is traceable to the
operation of Section 304 itself.  An agency’s regulation cannot “operate
independently of” the statute that authorized it.  California v. Texas,
593 U. S. ___, ___.  Here, the FEC’s 20-day rule was expressly promul-
gated to implement Section 304.  Thus, if Section 304 is invalid and
unenforceable, the agency’s 20-day rule is as well, and the remedy ap-
pellees sought in the District Court would redress appellees’ harm by
preventing enforcement of the agency’s 20-day rule.  See Lujan, 504
U. S., at 561.  In challenging the FEC’s threatened enforcement of the
loan-repayment limitation, through its implementing regulation, ap-
pellees may raise constitutional claims against Section 304, the statu-
tory provision that, through the agency’s regulation, is being enforced.
Cf.  Collins  v.  Yellen,  594  U. S.  ___,  ___–___.    And  because  they  are
challenging “the constitutionality of [a] provision of [BCRA],” §403(a),
jurisdiction was proper in the three-judge District Court.  Pp. 6–10.

2. Section 304 of BCRA burdens core political speech without proper

justification.  Pp. 10–22.

(a) The  loan-repayment  limitation  abridges  First  Amendment
rights by burdening candidates who wish to make expenditures on be-
half  of  their  own  candidacy through  personal  loans.   Restricting  the
sources of funds that campaigns may use to repay candidate loans in-
creases  the  risk  that  such  loans  will  not  be  repaid  in  full,  which,  in
turn, deters candidates from loaning money to their campaigns.  This
burden is no small matter.  Debt is a ubiquitous tool for financing elec-
toral  campaigns,  especially  for  new  candidates  and  challengers.   By
inhibiting a candidate from using this critical source of campaign fund-
ing,  Section  304  raises  a  barrier  to  entry—thus  abridging  political
speech.  Pp. 10–13.

(b) The  Government  has  not  demonstrated  that  the  loan-repay-
ment  limitation  furthers  a  permissible  goal.    Any  law  that  burdens
First Amendment freedoms, even slightly, must be justified by a per-
missible interest.  Pp. 13–22.

(i) The only permissible ground for restricting political speech
recognized by this Court is the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption
or its appearance.  See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572
U. S. 185, 207.  Here, the Government argues that the contributions
at issue raise a heightened risk of corruption because they are used to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a legal case, outlining the arguments and issues presented. It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a summary of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
966

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

October 13, 20, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–5863.  Davis  v.  Smith,  Superintendent,  Shawan
gunk  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or
decision  of  this  petition.

No. 09–6280.  Luna v.  United States.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.
Appx.  721.

No.  09–6296.  Yalincak  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–6408.  Azzara  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  293  Fed.
Appx.  814.

No.  09–6430.  Alabi  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  334  Fed.
Appx.  379.

No.  09–6454.  Mitchell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  326
Fed.  Appx.  1.

October  20,  2009

Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded.

(See No. 08–10495,

ante, p. 1.)

Certiorari  Dismissed

No.  09–6035.  Millen  v.  Kansas  City  Star.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–6121.  Sibley  v.  United  States  Court  of  Appeals
for  the  Second  Circuit.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner
for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari
dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

end  of  every  lawsuit.    It  preserves  a  forum  for  plaintiffs
seeking relief for concrete and personal harms while filter-
ing out those with generalized grievances that belong to a
legislature to address.  Traditional remedial rules do simi-
lar work at the back end of a case.  They ensure successful
plaintiffs obtain meaningful relief.  But they also restrain
courts from altering rights and obligations more broadly in
ways that  would interfere with the power reserved to the
people’s elected representatives.  In this case, standing and
remedies intersect.  The States lack standing because fed-
eral courts do not have authority to redress their injuries.
Section 1252(f )(1) denies the States any coercive relief.  A
vacatur order under §706(2) supplies them no effectual re-
lief.  And such an order itself may not even be legally per-
missible.  The States urge us to look past these problems,
but  I  do  not  see  how  we  might.    The  Constitution  affords
federal courts considerable power, but it does not establish
“government by lawsuit.”  R. Jackson, The Struggle for Ju-
dicial Supremacy 286–287 (1941).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice GorSUCH. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

311

Held:

Syllabus

1.  Because  the  question  whether  § 441b  applies  to  Hillary cannot  be
resolved  on  other,  narrower  grounds  without  chilling  political  speech,
this Court must consider the continuing effect of the speech suppression
upheld in Austin.  Pp. 322–336.

(a)  Citizens  United’s  narrower  arguments—that  Hillary  is  not  an
“electioneering communication” covered by § 441b because it is not “pub
licly  distributed”  under  11  CFR  § 100.29(a)(2);  that  § 441b  may  not  be
applied to Hillary under Federal Election Comm’n v.  Wisconsin Right
to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (WRTL), which found § 441b unconstitutional
as  applied  to  speech  that  was  not  “express  advocacy  or  its  functional
equivalent,”  id.,  at  481  (opinion  of  Roberts,  C.  J.),  determining  that  a
communication “is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if
[it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal
to  vote  for  or  against  a  speciﬁc  candidate,”  id.,  at  469–470;  that  § 441b
should  be  invalidated  as  applied  to  movies  shown  through  video-on
demand because  this delivery  system has  a lower  risk of  distorting the
political  process  than  do  television  ads;  and  that  there  should  be  an
exception to § 441b’s ban for nonproﬁt corporate political speech funded
overwhelmingly by individuals—are not sustainable under a fair reading
of the statute.  Pp. 322–329.

(b)  Thus,  this  case  cannot  be  resolved  on  a  narrower  ground  with
out chilling political  speech,  speech  that  is  central  to  the  First  Amend
ment’s  meaning  and  purpose.  Citizens  United  did  not  waive  this  chal
lenge  to  Austin  when  it  stipulated  to  dismissing  the  facial  challenge
below, since (1) even if such a challenge could be waived, this Court may
reconsider  Austin  and  § 441b’s  facial  validity  here  because  the  District
Court “passed upon” the issue, Lebron v.  National Railroad Passenger
Corporation,  513  U. S.  374,  379;  (2)  throughout  the  litigation,  Citizens
United has asserted a claim that  the FEC has violated its right to free
speech; and (3) the parties cannot enter into a stipulation that prevents
the  Court  from  considering  remedies  necessary  to  resolve  a  claim  that
has  been  preserved.  Because  Citizens  United’s  narrower  arguments
are not sustainable, this Court must, in an exercise of its judicial respon
sibility,  consider  § 441b’s  facial  validity.  Any  other  course  would  pro
long the substantial, nationwide chilling effect caused by § 441b’s corpo
rate  expenditure  ban.  This  conclusion  is  further  supported  by  the
following: (1) the uncertainty caused by the Government’s litigating po
sition; (2) substantial time would be required to clarify § 441b’s applica
tion on the points raised by the Government’s position in order to avoid
any chilling effect caused by an improper interpretation; and (3) because
speech  itself  is  of  primary  importance  to  the  integrity  of  the  election
process, any speech arguably within the reach of rules created for regu
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the holding and syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It is not suitable for indexing as it is not the primary content meant to be read and understood by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Court Holding and Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS

Opinion of the Court

assumption.  See  post,  at  6,  9.)  The  Government  bases
this  argument  on  the  definiendum,  “depiction  of  animal
cruelty,” cf. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 11 (2004), and
on  “ ‘the  commonsense  canon  of  noscitur  a  sociis.’ ”    Reply
Brief  7  (quoting  Williams,  553  U. S.,  at  294).    As  that
canon recognizes, an ambiguous term may be “given more
precise content by the neighboring words with which it is
associated.”
Ibid.  Likewise,  an  unclear  definitional
phrase may take meaning from the term to be defined, see
Leocal,  supra,  at  11  (interpreting  a  “ ‘substantial  risk’ ”  of
the  “us[e]”  of  “physical  force”  as  part  of  the  definition  of
“ ‘crime of violence’ ”).

But  the  phrase  “wounded  . . .  or  killed”  at  issue  here
contains little ambiguity.  The Government’s opening brief
properly  applies  the  ordinary  meaning  of  these  words,
stating  for  example  that  to  “ ‘kill’  is  ‘to  deprive  of  life.’ ”
Brief  for  United  States  14  (quoting  Webster’s  Third  New
International  Dictionary  1242  (1993)).    We  agree  that
“wounded”  and  “killed”  should  be  read  according  to  their
ordinary meaning.  Cf. Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast
Air  Quality  Management  Dist.,  541  U. S.  246,  252  (2004).
Nothing about that meaning requires cruelty.

While  not  requiring  cruelty,  §48  does  require  that  the
depicted  conduct  be  “illegal.”    But  this  requirement  does
not  limit  §48  along  the  lines  the  Government  suggests.
There  are  myriad  federal  and  state  laws  concerning  the
proper  treatment  of  animals,  but  many  of  them  are  not
designed  to  guard  against  animal  cruelty.    Protections  of
endangered species, for example, restrict even the humane
“wound[ing]  or  kill[ing]”  of  “living  animal[s].”    §48(c)(1).
Livestock  regulations  are  often  designed  to  protect  the
health  of  human  beings,  and  hunting  and  fishing  rules
(seasons,  licensure,  bag  limits,  weight  requirements)  can
be designed to raise revenue, preserve animal populations,
or prevent accidents.  The text of §48(c) draws no distinc-
tion  based  on  the  reason  the  intentional  killing  of  an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a law regarding the depiction of animal cruelty. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis of the law's language.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

a “foreign tribunal” follows “the practice and procedure of the foreign
country.”  That the default discovery procedures for a “foreign tribu-
nal” are governmental suggests that the body is governmental too.

Similarly, an “international tribunal” is best understood as one that
involves or is of two or more nations, meaning that those nations have
imbued the tribunal with official power to adjudicate disputes.  So un-
derstood, a “foreign tribunal” is a tribunal imbued with governmental
authority by one nation, and an “international tribunal” is a tribunal
imbued with governmental authority by multiple nations.  Pp. 5–9.

(b) Section 1782’s focus on governmental and intergovernmental tri-
bunals is confirmed by both the statute’s history and a comparison to
the Federal Arbitration Act.  From 1855 until 1964, §1782 and its an-
tecedents covered assistance only to foreign “courts.”  Congress estab-
lished the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure,
see §§1–2, 72 Stat. 1743, and charged the Commission with improving
the process of judicial assistance, specifying that the “assistance and
cooperation” was “between the United States and foreign countries” and
that “the rendering of assistance to foreign courts and quasi-judicial
agencies” should be improved.  Ibid. (emphasis added).  In 1964, Con-
gress  adopted  the  Commission’s  proposed  legislation,  which  became
the modern version of §1782.  Interpreting §1782 to reach only bodies
exercising governmental authority is consistent with Congress’ charge
to the Commission.  The animating purpose of §1782 is comity: Per-
mitting federal courts to assist foreign and international governmental
bodies  promotes  respect  for  foreign  governments  and  encourages re-
ciprocal assistance.  It is difficult to see how enlisting district courts to
help private bodies adjudicating purely private disputes abroad would
serve that end.

Extending §1782 to include private bodies would also be in signifi-
cant  tension  with  the  FAA,  which  governs  domestic  arbitration,  be-
cause §1782 permits much broader discovery than the FAA allows.  In-
terpreting §1782 to reach private arbitration would therefore create a
notable  mismatch  between  foreign  and  domestic  arbitration.    Pp. 9–
11.

(c) The adjudicative bodies in these cases are not governmental or
intergovernmental tribunals that fall within §1782.  The dispute be-
tween Luxshare and ZF involves private parties that agreed in a pri-
vate  contract  that  DIS,  a  private  dispute-resolution  organization,
would  arbitrate  any  disputes  between  them.    No  government  is  in-
volved in creating the DIS panel or prescribing its procedures.  Con-
trary  to  Luxshare’s  suggestion,  a  commercial  arbitral  panel  like  the
DIS panel does not qualify as governmental simply because the law of
the  country  in  which  it  would  sit  (here,  Germany)  governs  some  as-
pects  of  arbitration  and  courts  play  a  role  in  enforcing  arbitration
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion or a portion of one. It cites a case (596 U.S. ____ (2022)) and discusses the interpretation of a legal statute (Section 1782).  The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it is not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

39

Opinion of the Court

That is a remarkable view of the judicial role—remarka-
bly  wrong.  Lost  in  the  false  pretense  of  judicial  humility
that the dissent espouses is a claim to power so radical, so
destructive,  that  it  required  a  Second  Founding  to  undo.
“Justice Harlan knew better,” one of the dissents decrees.
Post, at 5 (opinion of JACKSON, J.).  Indeed he did:

“[I]n  view  of  the  Constitution,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling
class of citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our Constitu-
tion is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates clas-
ses among citizens.”  Plessy, 163 U. S., at 559 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).

VI

For  the  reasons  provided  above,  the  Harvard  and  UNC
admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guaran-
tees  of  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.  Both  programs  lack
sufficiently focused and measurable objectives warranting
the use of race, unavoidably employ race in a negative man-
ner,  involve  racial  stereotyping,  and  lack  meaningful  end
points.  We have never permitted admissions programs to
work in that way, and we will not do so today.

At  the  same  time,  as  all  parties  agree,  nothing  in  this
opinion  should  be  construed  as  prohibiting  universities
from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race af-
fected his or her life, be it through discrimination, inspira-
tion, or otherwise.  See, e.g., 4 App. in No. 21–707, at 1725–
1726,  1741;  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  in  No.  20–1199,  at  10.    But,
despite the dissent’s assertion to the contrary, universities
may  not  simply  establish  through  application  essays  or
other means the regime we hold unlawful today.  (A dissent-
ing opinion is generally not the best source of legal advice
on how to comply with the majority opinion.)  “[W]hat can-
not be done directly cannot be done indirectly.  The Consti-
tution deals with substance, not shadows,” and the prohibi-
tion against racial discrimination is “levelled at the thing,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of affirmative action in university admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GE ENERGY POWER CONVERSION FRANCE SAS,
CORP., FKA CONVERTEAM SAS v. OUTOKUMPU
STAINLESS USA, LLC, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–1048.  Argued January 21, 2020—Decided June 1, 2020

ThyssenKrupp  Stainless  USA,  LLC,  entered  into  three  contracts  with
F. L.  Industries,  Inc.,  for  the  construction  of  cold  rolling  mills  at
ThyssenKrupp’s steel manufacturing plant in Alabama.  Each contract
contained a clause requiring arbitration of any contract dispute.  F. L.
Industries  then  entered  into  a  subcontractor  agreement  with  peti-
tioner (GE Energy) for the provision of nine motors to power the cold
rolling mills.  After the motors for the cold rolling mills allegedly failed,
Outokumpu  Stainless  USA,  LLC  (which  acquired  ownership  of  the
plant), and its insurers sued GE Energy in Alabama state court.  GE
Energy removed the case to federal court under 9 U. S. C. §205.  It then
moved  to  dismiss  and  compel  arbitration,  relying  on  the  arbitration
clauses in the F. L. Industries and ThyssenKrupp contracts.  The Dis-
trict Court granted the motion, concluding that both Outokumpu and
GE Energy were parties to the agreement.  The Eleventh Circuit re-
versed.  It concluded that the Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention or Con-
vention) allows enforcement of an arbitration agreement only by the
parties that actually signed the agreement and that GE Energy was a
nonsignatory.  It also held that allowing GE Energy to rely on state-
law equitable estoppel doctrines to enforce the arbitration agreement
would conflict with the Convention’s signatory requirement.

Held: The New York Convention does not conflict with domestic equita-
ble  estoppel  doctrines  that  permit  the  enforcement  of  arbitration
agreements by nonsignatories.  Pp. 3–12.

(a) Chapter  1 of  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act  (FAA)  does not  “alter
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are typically used for informational purposes and are not suitable for indexing as they do not contain the full text of the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TURNER v. ROGERS

Syllabus

about  his  financial  status;  and  (4)  an  express  finding  by  the  court
that the defendant has the ability to pay.

This  decision  does  not  address  civil  contempt  proceedings  where
the  underlying  support  payment  is  owed  to  the  State,  e.g.,  for  reim-
bursement of welfare funds paid to the custodial parent, or the ques-
tion what due process requires in an unusually complex case where a
defendant  “can  fairly  be  represented  only  by  a  trained  advocate,”
Gagnon, supra, at 788.  Pp. 10–16.

3. Under  the  circumstances,  Turner’s  incarceration  violated  due
process  because  he  received  neither  counsel  nor  the  benefit  of  alter-
native  procedures  like  those  the  Court  describes.  He  did  not  have
clear notice that his ability to pay would constitute the critical ques-
tion  in  his  civil  contempt  proceeding.    No  one  provided  him  with  a
form  (or  the  equivalent)  designed  to  elicit  information  about  his  fi-
nancial  circumstances.    And  the  trial  court  did  not  find  that  he  was
able  to  pay  his  arrearage,  but  nonetheless  found  him  in  civil  con-
tempt and ordered him incarcerated.  P. 16.

387 S. C. 142, 691 S. E. 2d 470, vacated and remanded.

BREYER,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  KENNEDY,
GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a dis-
senting  opinion,  in  which  SCALIA,  J.,  joined,  and  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and ALITO, JJ., joined as to Parts I–B and II.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case summary, specifically the syllabus section.  It outlines the case, the court's decision, and the justices involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DR. A v. HOCHUL

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

arguing that the State’s conduct violates the First Amend-
ment and asking us to enjoin the enforcement of the man-
date against them until this Court can decide their petition
for certiorari.

Respectfully, I believe they deserve that relief.

I
A
The doctors and nurses who filed this suit and a compan-
ion case have gone to great lengths to serve their patients
during the COVID–19 pandemic.  Consider two of their sto-
ries.

Dr. J. is an OB/GYN who works in a New York hospital.
She  is  also  a  devout  Catholic.  During  the  pandemic,  she
has consistently treated patients infected with COVID–19
in spite of the risks to herself.  Sometimes, in emergencies,
she has had to rush into a delivery room without knowing
whether  a  delivering  mother  is  infected  with  the  disease.
Dr. J. has done all this even while pregnant herself.

Dr. F. serves a rural town as an oral surgeon.  Like Dr.
J., he is Catholic and has never turned away a patient in-
fected with COVID–19.  Instead, he has faced open wounds
and mouths even when it involved risks to his own health.
Dr. F. says he has done so because, if he had refused, many
of his patients seeking care could not have obtained it else-
where.

These applicants are not “ ‘anti-vaxxers’ ” who object to all
vaccines.  Complaint in No. 21–CV–01009 (NDNY), ¶ 37(g).
Instead,  the  applicants  explain,  they  cannot  receive  a
COVID–19 vaccine because their religion teaches them to
oppose abortion in any form, and because each of the cur-
rently  available  vaccines  has  depended  upon  abortion-de-
rived fetal cell lines in its production or testing.  The appli-
cants acknowledge that many other religious believers feel
differently about these matters than they do.  But no one
questions the sincerity of their religious beliefs.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses a case involving religious objections to COVID-19 vaccination mandates.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v.
MORRISSEY-BERRU
THOMAS, J., concurring

in on the theological questions of which positions qualify as
“ministerial.”

As this Court has explained, the Religion Clauses do not
permit  governmental  “interfere[nce]  with  . . .  a  religious
group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its
appointments.”  Hosanna-Tabor,  supra,  at  188.  To  avoid
such  interference,  we  should  defer  to  these  groups’  good-
faith understandings of which individuals are charged with
carrying out the organizations’ religious missions.

Here,  the  record  confirms  the  sincerity  of  petitioners’
claims that, as lay teachers, Morrissey-Berru and Biel held
ministerial roles in these parish schools.  For example, the
Our Lady of Guadalupe Faculty Handbook states that lay
teachers serve “special pastoral administrative roles . . . in
the service of the people of God.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. in
No. 19–267, p. 52a (emphasis added).  Moreover, their “es-
sential job duties” include “[m]odeling, teaching of and com-
mitment to Catholic religious and moral values.” Id., at 55a
(boldface  deleted);  see  also  id.,  at  32a  (Morrissey-Berru’s
teaching  contract);  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  in  No.  19–348,
  And  both  Morrissey-
p. 96a  (Biel’s  teaching  contract).
Berru’s  and  Biel’s  teaching  contracts  required  that  their
“duties and responsibilities . . . be performed [with an] over-
riding commitment” to “develop[ing] . . . a Catholic School
Faith Community” in accordance with “the doctrines, laws
and norms of the Catholic Church.”  Ibid.; App. to Pet. for
Cert. in No. 19–267, at 32a.  Finally, amicus curiae United
States  Conference  of  Catholic  Bishops  confirms  that  peti-
tioners’ understanding is consistent with the Church’s view
that “Catholic teachers play a critical role” in the Church’s
ministry.  Brief  for  United  States  Conference  of  Catholic
Bishops 10–11; see also Catechism of the Catholic Church
8  (2d  ed.  2016)  (noting  that  the  goal  of  “education  in  the
faith of children [is] to initiat[e] the hearers into the full-
ness of Christian life” (emphasis deleted; internal quotation
marks omitted)).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v. MORRISSEY-BERRU. It delves into the theological definition of "ministerial" roles within a religious context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
456  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N

Opinion of Stevens, J.

In  her  analysis  of  the  record,  Judge  Kollar-Kotelly  docu
mented  the  pervasiveness  of  this  ingratiation  and  explained
its  signiﬁcance  under  the  majority’s  own  touchstone  for  de
ﬁning  the  scope  of  the  anticorruption  rationale,  Buckley.
See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 555–560, 622–625.  Wit
nesses  explained  how  political  parties  and  candidates  used
corporate  independent  expenditures  to  circumvent  FECA’s
“hard-money”  limitations.  See,  e. g.,  id.,  at  478–479.  One
former Senator candidly admitted to the District Court that
“ ‘[c]andidates  whose  campaigns  beneﬁt  from  [phony  “issue
ads”]  greatly  appreciate  the  help  of  these  groups.  In  fact,
Members will also be favorably disposed to those who ﬁnance
these groups when they later seek access to discuss pending
legislation.’ ”  Id.,  at  556  (quoting  declaration  of  Sen.  Dale
Bumpers).  One  prominent  lobbyist  went  so  far  as  to  state,
in  uncontroverted  testimony,  that  “ ‘unregulated  expendi
tures—whether soft money donations to the parties or issue
ad  campaigns—can  sometimes  generate  far  more  inﬂuence
than  direct  campaign  contributions.’ ”  Ibid.  (quoting  decla
ration of Wright Andrews; emphasis added).  In sum, Judge
Kollar-Kotelly  found,  “[t]he  record  powerfully  demonstrates
that electioneering communications paid for with the general
treasury  funds  of  labor  unions  and  corporations  endears
those entities  to elected ofﬁcials  in a  way that could  be per
ceived  by  the  public  as  corrupting.”  Id.,  at  622–623.  She
concluded  that  the  Government’s  interest  in  preventing  the
appearance  of  corruption,  as  that  concept  was  deﬁned  in
Buckley,  was  itself  sufﬁcient  to  uphold  BCRA  § 203.  251
F.  Supp.  2d,  at  622–625.  Judge  Leon  agreed.  See  id.,  at
804–805  (dissenting  only  with  respect  to  the  Wellstone
Amendment’s coverage of MCFL corporations).

When  the  McConnell  Court  afﬁrmed the  judgment  of  the
District  Court  regarding  § 203,  we  did  not  rest  our  holding
on a narrow notion of quid pro quo corruption.  Instead we
relied on the governmental interest in combating the unique
forms  of  corruption  threatened  by  corporations,  as  recog
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It delves into the arguments and reasoning surrounding campaign finance regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

THOMAS, J., concurring

a  compelling  governmental  interest’ ”  and  “narrowly  tai-
lored  to  that  end.”  Johnson  v.  California,  543  U. S.  499,
514  (2005)  (quoting  Grutter,  supra,  at  327).    This  most
exacting  standard  “has  proven  automatically  fatal”  in
almost  every  case.  Jenkins,  supra,  at  121  (THOMAS,  J.,
concurring).    And  rightly  so.    “Purchased  at  the  price  of
immeasurable  human  suffering,  the  equal  protection
principle  reflects  our  Nation’s  understanding  that  [racial]
classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the
individual and our society.”  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 240 (1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring in
part  and  concurring  in  judgment).    “The  Constitution
abhors  classifications  based  on  race”  because  “every  time
the  government  places  citizens  on  racial  registers  and
makes  race  relevant  to  the  provision  of  burdens  or  bene-
fits,  it  demeans  us  all.”    Grutter,  supra,  at  353  (THOMAS,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

B
1
The  Court  first  articulated  the  strict-scrutiny  standard
in  Korematsu  v.  United  States,  323  U. S.  214  (1944).
There, we held that “[p]ressing public necessity may some-
times justify the existence of [racial discrimination]; racial
antagonism never can.”  Id., at 216.1  Aside from Grutter,
the  Court  has  recognized  only  two  instances  in  which  a
“[p]ressing public necessity” may justify racial discrimina-
tion  by  the  government.    First,  in  Korematsu,  the  Court
recognized  that  protecting  national  security  may  satisfy
this exacting standard.  In that case, the Court upheld an
evacuation  order  directed  at  “all  persons  of  Japanese
ancestry” on the grounds that the Nation was at war with
Japan  and  that  the  order  had  “a  definite  and  close  rela-

——————

1 The standard of “pressing public necessity” is more frequently called
a “compelling governmental interest.”  I use the terms interchangeably.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. It discusses the strict scrutiny standard applied to racial classifications in government action.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON

Opinion of the Court

the  petitioners  asked  us  to  enjoin  any  enforcement  of
S. B. 8.  And given the statute’s approaching effective date,
they asked us to rule within two days.  The Court took up
the  application  and,  in  the  abbreviated  time  available  for
review, concluded that the petitioners’ submission failed to
identify a basis in existing law sufficient to justify disturb-
ing the Court of Appeals’ decision denying injunctive relief.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 594 U. S. ___ (2021).
  After  that  ruling,  the  petitioners  filed  a  second  emer-
gency  request.    This  time  they  asked  the  Court  to  grant
certiorari before judgment to resolve the defendants’ inter-
locutory appeals in the first instance, without awaiting the
views of the Fifth Circuit.  This Court granted the petition-
ers’  request  and  set  the  case  for  expedited  briefing  and
argument.  595 U. S. ___ (2021).

II
  Because  this  Court  granted  certiorari  before  judgment,
we  effectively  stand  in  the  shoes  of  the  Court  of  Appeals.
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 690–692 (1974);
S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, D. Himmel-
farb, Supreme Court Practice 2-11 (11th ed. 2019).  In this
case,  that means  we must  review  the  defendants’  appeals
challenging  the  District  Court’s  order  denying  their  mo-
tions to dismiss.  As with any interlocutory appeal, our re-
view  is  limited  to  the  particular  orders  under  review  and
any other ruling “inextricably intertwined with” or “neces-
sary to ensure meaningful review of ” them.  Swint v. Cham-
bers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 51 (1995).  In this pre-
liminary  posture,  the  ultimate  merits  question—whether
S. B. 8 is consistent with the Federal Constitution—is not
before the Court.  Nor is the wisdom of S. B. 8 as a matter
of public policy.

A
  Turning  to  the  matters  that  are  properly  put  to  us,  we
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in the case of WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON.  It discusses the procedural history of the case and the scope of the Court's review.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

11

BREYER, J., dissenting

they openly “offer[ed] greater access to federal office hold
ers  as  the  donations  gr[e]w  larger.”  Id.,  at  502.    I  have
placed  in  Appendix  A  more  examples  of  the  kind  of  evi
dence that filled the District Court record in McConnell.

This  Court  upheld  BCRA’s  limitations  on  soft  money
contributions by relying on just the kind of evidence I have
described.  We wrote:

“The evidence in the record shows that candidates and
donors  alike  have  in  fact  exploited  the  soft-money
loophole,  the  former  to  increase  their  prospects  of
election and the latter to create debt on the part of of
ficeholders . . . . Plaintiffs argue that without concrete
evidence of an instance in which a federal officeholder
has  actually  switched  a  vote  [in  exchange  for  soft
money] . . . , Congress has not shown that there exists
real or apparent corruption. . . . [P]laintiffs conceive of
corruption too narrowly.  Our cases have firmly estab
lished  that  Congress’  legitimate  interest  extends  be
yond  preventing  simple  cash-for-votes  corruption  to
curbing  ‘undue  influence  on  an  officeholder’s  judg
ment,  and  the  appearance  of  such  influence.’ ”  540
U. S., at 146, 149–150 (quoting Colorado II, 533 U. S.,
at  441;  emphasis  added;  paragraphs  and  paragraph
breaks omitted).

We  specifically  rejected  efforts  to  define  “corruption”  in
ways  similar  to  those  the  plurality  today  accepts.  We
added:

“Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as clas
sic  quid  pro  quo  corruption  is  the  danger  that  office
holders  will  decide  issues  not  on  the  merits  or  the
desires  of  their  constituencies,  but  according  to  the
wishes of those who have made large financial contri
butions valued by the officeholder.”  540 U. S., at 153.

Insofar  as  today’s  decision  sets  forth  a  significantly  nar
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>