<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

Opinion of the Court

content-moderation  provisions,  restricting  covered  plat-
forms’  choices  about  whether  and  how  to  display  user-
generated  content  to  the  public.  And  both  include
individualized-explanation provisions, requiring platforms
to give reasons for particular content-moderation choices.
Florida’s  law  regulates  “social  media  platforms,”  as  de-
fined expansively, that have annual gross revenue of over
$100 million or more than 100 million monthly active users.
Fla. Stat. §501.2041(1)(g) (2023).1  The statute restricts var-
ied  ways  of  “censor[ing]”  or  otherwise  disfavoring  posts—
including  deleting,  altering,  labeling,  or  deprioritizing
them—based  on  their  content  or  source.  §501.2041(1)(b).
For example, the law prohibits a platform from taking those
actions against “a journalistic enterprise based on the con-
tent of its publication or broadcast.”  §501.2041(2)(j).  Simi-
larly, the law prevents deprioritizing posts by or about po-
litical  candidates.  See  §501.2041(2)(h).    And  the  law
requires platforms to apply their content-moderation prac-
tices to users “in a consistent manner.”  §501.2041(2)(b).

In  addition,  the  Florida  law  mandates  that  a  platform
provide an explanation to a user any time it removes or al-
ters any of her posts.  See §501.2041(2)(d)(1).  The requisite
notice  must  be  delivered  within  seven  days,  and  contain
both a “thorough rationale” for the action and an account of
how  the  platform  became  aware  of  the  targeted  material.
§501.2041(3).

The Texas law regulates any social-media platform, hav-
ing over 50 million monthly active users, that allows its us-
ers “to communicate with other users for the primary pur-
pose  of  posting  information,  comments,  messages,  or
images.”  Tex.  Bus.  &  Com.  Code  Ann.  §§120.001(1),

——————

1 The  definition  of  “social-media  platforms”  covers  “any  information
service, system, Internet search engine, or access software provider” that
“[p]rovides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including an Internet platform or a social media site.”  Fla. Stat.
§501.2041(1)(g)(1).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion discussing content moderation provisions in Florida and Texas laws. It outlines key aspects of these laws, including definitions, restrictions on content moderation practices, and requirements for providing explanations to users.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–297
_________________

TRANSUNION LLC, PETITIONER v. SERGIO L.
RAMIREZ

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 25, 2021]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
To have Article III standing to sue in federal court, plain-
tiffs must demonstrate, among other things, that they suf-
fered  a  concrete  harm.    No  concrete  harm,  no  standing.
Central to assessing concreteness is whether the asserted
harm has a “close relationship” to a harm traditionally rec-
ognized  as  providing  a  basis  for  a  lawsuit  in  American
courts—such as physical harm, monetary harm, or various
intangible harms including (as relevant here) reputational
harm.  Spokeo,  Inc.  v.  Robins,  578  U. S.  330,  340–341
(2016).

In this case, a class of 8,185 individuals sued TransUn-
ion,  a  credit  reporting  agency,  in  federal  court  under  the
Fair  Credit  Reporting  Act.  The  plaintiffs  claimed  that
TransUnion failed to use reasonable procedures to ensure
the accuracy of their credit files, as maintained internally
by TransUnion.  For 1,853 of the class members, TransUn-
ion provided misleading credit reports to third-party busi-
nesses.  We conclude that those 1,853 class members have
demonstrated  concrete  reputational  harm  and  thus  have
Article  III  standing  to  sue  on  the  reasonable-procedures
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.  While it is important legal text, it is not the kind of content typically indexed for general reading purposes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:05] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1107

529 U. S.

May 15, 2000

ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
Justice Stevens dissents. See
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
id., at 4, and cases cited therein. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 438.

Miscellaneous Orders

No. 99M85. Sanwick v. Carver, Warden. Motion to direct
the Clerk to ﬁle petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 99–1489. Raquel v. Education Management Corp.
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to ﬁle a
brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.

No. 99–8025. Bierley v. Connelly, Judge, Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Pennsylvania, Erie County, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying
leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ante, p. 1050] denied.
In re Lillibridge; and
In re Farley. Petitions for writs of habeas

No. 99–8457.
No. 99–9035.
corpus denied.

No. 99–1673.

In re Hirschfeld. Motion of petitioner to
defer consideration of petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.
Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.

No. 99–1652.
No. 99–8498.
No. 99–8512.
No. 99–8545.
No. 99–9026.

In re Ruiz Rivera;
In re Meloncon;
In re Tasby;
In re Pytel; and
In re Jarvis. Petitions for writs of manda-

mus denied.

Certiorari Denied

No. 99–592. Collins et al. v. Spokane Valley Fire Pro-

tection District No. 1; and

No. 99–788. Spokane Valley Fire Protection District
No. 1 v. Collins et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 188 F. 3d 1124.

No. 99–1084. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v.
Norris et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 191 F. 3d 283.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, including case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken. It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the main body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 139 (2010)

151

Opinion of the Court

Spisak  and  his  supporting  amici  say  that  this  argument
was constitutionally inadequate because: (1) It overly empha
sized  the  gruesome  nature  of  the  killings;  (2)  it  overly  em
phasized Spisak’s threats to continue his crimes; (3) it under
stated  the  facts  upon  which  the  experts  based  their  mental
illness conclusions; (4) it said little or nothing about any other
possible  mitigating circumstance;  and (5)  it made  no explicit
request that the jury return a verdict against death.

We  assume  for  present  purposes  that  Spisak  is  correct
that the closing argument was inadequate.  We nevertheless
ﬁnd  no  “reasonable  probability”  that  a  better  closing  argu
ment  without  these  defects  would  have  made  a  signiﬁcant
difference.

Any  different,  more  adequate  closing  argument  would
have  taken  place  in  the  following  context:  Spisak  admitted
that  he  had  committed  three  murders  and  two  other  shoot
ings.  Spisak’s  defense  at  the  guilt  phase  of  the  trial  con
sisted  of  an  effort  by  counsel  to  show  that  Spisak  was  not
guilty  by  reason  of  insanity.  And  counsel,  apparently  hop
ing  to  demonstrate  Spisak’s  mentally  defective  condition,
called him to the stand.

Spisak testiﬁed that he had shot and killed Horace Ricker
son,  Timothy  Sheehan,  and  Brian  Warford.  He  also  ad
mitted that he had shot and tried to kill John Hardaway, and
shot at Coletta Dartt.  He committed these crimes, he said,
because  he  was  a  follower  of  Adolf  Hitler,  who  was  Spisak’s
“spiritual  leader”  in  a  “war”  for  “survival”  of  “the  Aryan
people.”  4  id.,  at  1343–1344,  1396  (July  5,  1983).  He  said
that  he  had  purchased  guns  and  stockpiled  ammunition  to
further  this  war.  Id.,  at  1406–1408.  And  he  had  hoped  to
“create terror” at Cleveland State University, because it was
“one  of  the  prime  targets”  where  the  “Jews  and  the
system . . . are brainwashing the youth.”  Id., at 1426–1428.
Spisak then said that in February 1982 he had shot Ricker
son,  who  was  black,  because  Rickerson  had  made  a  sexual
advance on  Spisak in  a university  bathroom.  He expressed
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the closing argument in a capital case. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

ANIMAL SCIENCE PRODUCTS, INC. v.
HEBEI WELCOME PHARMACEUTICAL CO.
Opinion of the Court

including, for example, China’s statement to the WTO that
China  had  “g[i]ve[n]  up  export  administration . . .  of  vita-
min C” at the end of 2001.  810 F. Supp. 2d, at 532 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).5
  The  Court  of  Appeals  also  misperceived  this  Court’s
decision  in  United  States  v.  Pink,  315  U. S.  203  (1942).
See  837  F. 3d,  at  186–187,  189.    Pink,  properly  compre-
hended,  is  not  compelling  authority  for  the  attribution  of
controlling  weight  to  the  Ministry’s  brief.    We  note,  first,
that  Pink  was  a  pre-Rule  44.1  decision.    Second,  Pink
arose  in  unusual  circumstances.    Pink  was  an  action
brought by the United States to recover assets of the U. S.
branch  of  a  Russian  insurance  company  that  had  been
nationalized  in  1918,  after  the  Russian  revolution.    315
U. S.,  at  210–211.    In  1933,  the  Soviet  Government  as-
signed  the  nationalized  assets  located  in  this  country  to
the United States.  Id., at 211–212.  The disposition of the
case  turned  on  the  extraterritorial  effect  of  the  nationali-
zation  decree—specifically,  whether  the  decree  reached
assets  of  the  Russian  insurance  company  located  in  the
United  States,  or was  instead  limited  to  property  in  Rus-
sia.  Id., at 213–215, 217.  To support the position that the
decree  reached  all  of  the  company’s  assets,  the  United
States obtained an “official declaration of the Commissar-
iat  for  Justice”  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet
Republic.    Id.,  at  218.    The  declaration  certified  that  the
nationalization decree reached “the funds and property of
former  insurance  companies  . . .  irrespective  of  whether
[they  were]  situated  within  the  territorial  limits  of  [Rus-

——————

5 The  Court  of  Appeals  additionally  mischaracterized  the  Ministry’s
brief as a “sworn evidentiary proffer.”  837 F. 3d, at 189.  In so describ-
ing  the  Ministry’s  submission,  the  Court  of  Appeals  overlooked  that  a
court’s resolution of an issue of foreign law “must be treated as a ruling
on a question of law.”  Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 44.1.  The Ministry’s brief,
while  a  probative  source  for  resolving  the  legal  question  at  hand,  was
not an attestation to facts.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion discussing the case  ANIMAL SCIENCE PRODUCTS, INC. v. HEBEI WELCOME PHARMACEUTICAL CO. It cites legal precedents and delves into the interpretation of legal rules.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO

KAGAN, J., dissenting

practice, which that text was supposed to reflect.  So today’s
decision  has  no  basis  in  the  only  law  the  majority  deems
relevant.  It is grounded on air.

III
And  still  there  is  worse,  because  abandoning  Chevron
subverts every known principle of stare decisis.  Of course,
respecting  precedent  is  not  an  “inexorable  command.”
Payne  v.  Tennessee,  501  U. S.  808,  828  (1991).    But  over-
throwing it requires far more than the majority has offered
up here.  Chevron is entitled to stare decisis’s strongest form
of  protection.  The  majority  thus  needs  an  exceptionally
strong  reason  to  overturn  the  decision,  above  and  beyond
thinking it wrong.  And it has nothing approaching such a
justification,  proposing  only  a  bewildering  theory  about
Chevron’s “unworkability.”  Ante, at 32.  Just five years ago,
this Court in Kisor rejected a plea to overrule Auer v. Rob-
bins, 519 U. S. 452 (1997), which requires judicial deference
to  agencies’  interpretations  of  their  own  regulations.    See
588  U. S.,  at  586–589  (opinion  of  the  Court).    The  case
against overruling Chevron is at least as strong.  In partic-
ular,  the  majority’s  decision  today  will  cause  a  massive
shock to the legal system, “cast[ing] doubt on many settled
constructions” of statutes and threatening the interests of
many parties who have relied on them for years.  588 U. S.,
at 587 (opinion of the Court).

Adherence to precedent is “a foundation stone of the rule
of  law.”  Michigan  v.  Bay  Mills  Indian  Community,  572
U. S.  782,  798  (2014).  Stare  decisis  “promotes  the  even-
handed,  predictable,  and  consistent  development  of  legal
principles.”  Payne, 501 U. S., at 827.  It enables people to
order  their  lives  in  reliance  on  judicial  decisions.    And  it
“contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the ju-
dicial process,” by ensuring that those decisions are founded
in the law, and not in the “personal preferences” of judges.
Id.,  at  828;  Dobbs,  597  U. S.,  at  388  (dissenting  opinion).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal dissenting opinion. It discusses the legal principles of stare decisis and Chevron deference, arguing against the majority's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

VEGA v. TEKOH

Opinion of the Court

staff  reported  the  accusation  to  the  Los  Angeles  County
Sheriff ’s Department, and Deputy Vega responded.  Vega
questioned Tekoh at length in the hospital, and Tekoh even-
tually  provided  a  written  statement  apologizing  for  inap-
propriately touching the patient’s genitals.  The parties dis-
pute whether Vega used coercive investigatory techniques
to extract the statement, but it is undisputed that he never
informed Tekoh of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436 (1966), which held that during a custodial inter-
rogation police officers must inform a suspect that “he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an at-
torney one will be appointed for him prior to any question-
ing.”  Id., at 479.

Tekoh was arrested and charged in California state court
with unlawful sexual penetration.  At Tekoh’s first trial, the
judge  held  that  Miranda  had  not  been  violated  because
Tekoh was not in custody when he provided the statement,
but  the  trial  resulted  in  a  mistrial.    When  Tekoh  was  re-
tried, a second judge again denied his request to exclude the
confession.  This trial resulted in acquittal, and Tekoh then
brought  this  action  under  42  U. S. C.  §1983  against  Vega
and several other defendants seeking damages for alleged
violations  of  his  constitutional  rights,  including  his  Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.

When this §1983 case was first tried, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Vega, but the judge concluded that he had
given an improper jury instruction and thus granted a new
trial.  Before the second trial, Tekoh asked the court to in-
struct the jury that it was required to find that Vega vio-
lated  the  Fifth  Amendment  right  against  compelled  self-
incrimination  if  it  determined  that  he  took  a  statement
from Tekoh in violation of Miranda and that the statement
was  then  improperly  used  against  Tekoh  at  his  criminal
trial.  The District Court declined, reasoning that Miranda
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section from a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Vega v. Tekoh. It outlines the facts of the case, the legal issues involved (Miranda rights), and the procedural history.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS

ALITO, J., dissenting

the Court wrote in Allen.  What Allen actually requires is a
“personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly
unlawful conduct,” id., at 751 (emphasis added).  And what
this statement means is that the plaintiff ’s “injury” must
be  traceable  to  the  defendant’s  conduct,  and  that  conduct
must be “allegedly unlawful.”7  “Allegedly unlawful” means
that the plaintiff must allege that the conduct is unlawful.
(The States allege that the challenged enforcement actions
are unlawful using a traditional legal argument, see infra,
at 15–20.)  But a plaintiff ’s standing (and thus the court’s
Article  III  jurisdiction)  does  not  require  a  demonstration
that the defendant’s conduct is in fact unlawful.  That is a
merits issue.

If Article III standing required a showing that the plain-
tiff ’s alleged injury is traceable to (i.e., in some way caused
by) an unconstitutional provision, then whenever a claim of
unconstitutionality  was  ultimately  held  to  lack  legal
merit—even  after  a  full  trial—the  consequence  would  be
that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the
first place.  That would be absurd, and this Court has long
resisted efforts to transform ordinary merits questions into
threshold  jurisdictional  questions  by  jamming  them  into
the standing inquiry.  See, e.g., Arizona State Legislature v.
Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U. S. 787,
800  (2015);  Whitmore  v.  Arkansas,  495  U. S.  149,  155
(1990); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 624 (1989).
“[S]tanding does not depend on the merits of a claim.”  Da-
vis v. United States, 564 U. S. 229, 249, n. 10 (2011) (inter-
nal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  And “ ‘juris-
diction is not defeated by the possibility that the averments
[in  a  complaint]  might  fail  to  state  a  cause  of  action  on
which  petitioners  could  actually  recover.’ ”  Steel  Co.,  523
——————

7 Allen repeated that point seven more times, see 768 U. S., at 752, 753,
n. 19, 757–759, and that is precisely what countless other cases require,
see supra, at 9–10, and n. 5.  But the majority’s rejection of the relevant
theory of standing depends on this erroneous description of the law.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding standing in court, citing previous cases and legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GARZA v. IDAHO

THOMAS, J., dissenting

collateral  counsel,  admitted  that  the  appeal  waiver  “was
by the book,” that he “received exactly what he bargained
for in exchange for his plea,” and that there was “no ambi-
guity”  as  to  the  appropriate  sentence.  Id.,  at  161–162,
276–277.  Garza also conceded that, if forced to identify an
issue he would raise on appeal, “[t]he only issue that could
be identified is sentencing review.”  Id., at 176, 371.

The trial court granted summary judgment to Idaho.  It
explained  that  Garza  needed  to  identify  “non-frivolous
grounds for contending on appeal either that (i) the appeal
waiver  is  invalid  or  unenforceable,  or  (ii)  the  issues  he
wants to pursue on appeal are outside the waiver’s scope.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a.  The Idaho Court of Appeals and
the  Idaho  Supreme  Court  affirmed.    Notably,  the  Idaho
Supreme  Court  declined  to  presume  negligent  perfor-
mance because state law imposes a duty on counsel not to
file  frivolous  litigation  and  to  avoid  taking  actions  that
will jeopardize the benefit his client gained from the plea
bargain.  The  Idaho  Supreme  Court  also  found  Flores-
Ortega  inapplicable,  reasoning  that  once  a  defendant
waives his appellate rights, he no longer has a right to an
appellate proceeding at all.

II

As  with  most  ineffective-assistance  claims,  a  defendant
seeking  to show  that  counsel was constitutionally  ineffec-
tive  for  failing  to  file  an  appeal  must  show  deficient  per-
formance  and  prejudice.    Strickland  v.  Washington,  466
U. S.  668,  687  (1984).   Relying  on  Flores-Ortega,  the  ma-
jority  finds  that  Garza  has  satisfied  both  prongs.  In  so
holding,  it  adopts  a  rule  whereby  a  criminal  defendant’s
invocation  of  the  words  “I  want  to  appeal”  can  undo  all
sworn  attestations  to  the  contrary  and  resurrect  waived
statutory rights.

This  rule  is  neither  compelled  by  precedent  nor  con-
sistent with the use of appeal waivers in plea bargaining.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses legal precedent, the facts of the case, and the arguments made by the majority.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

KAGAN, J., dissenting

at a startling rate.  Maricopa County (recall, Arizona’s larg-
est by far) changed 40% or more of polling places before both
the  2008  and the  2012 elections.    See  329  F. Supp.  3d,  at
858 (noting also that changes “continued to occur in 2016”).
In 2012 (the election with the best data), voters affected by
those changes had an out-of-precinct voting rate that was
40% higher than other voters did.  See ibid.  And, critically,
Maricopa’s relocations hit minority voters harder than oth-
ers.  In 2012, the county moved polling stations in African
American  and  Hispanic  neighborhoods  30%  more  often
than in white ones.  See App. 110–111.  The odds of those
changes leading to mistakes increased yet further because
the affected areas are home to citizens with relatively low
education and income levels.  See id., at 170–171.  And even
putting  relocations  aside,  the  siting  of  polling  stations  in
minority  areas  caused  significant  out-of-precinct  voting.
Hispanic and Native American voters had to travel further
than white voters did to their assigned polling places.  See
id., at 109.  And all minority voters were disproportionately
likely to be assigned to polling places other than the ones
closest to where they lived.  See id., at 109, and n. 30, 175–
176.  Small wonder, given such siting decisions, that minor-
ity voters found it harder to identify and get to their correct
precincts.    But  the  majority  does  not  address  these  mat-
ters.11

——————

11 The majority’s excuse for failing to consider the plaintiffs’ evidence
on Arizona’s siting of polling places is that the plaintiffs did not bring a
separate  claim  against  those  practices.    See  ante,  at  30, n. 18.   If  that
sounds  odd,  it  is.    The  majority  does  not  contest  that  the  evidence  on
polling-place siting is relevant to the plaintiffs’ challenge to the out-of-
precinct policy.  Nor could the majority do so.  The siting practices are
one of the background conditions against which the out-of-precinct policy
operates—exactly the kind of thing that a totality-of-circumstances anal-
ysis demands a court take into account.  To refuse to think about those
practices because the plaintiffs might have brought a freestanding claim
against them is to impose an out-of-thin-air pleading requirement that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically focusing on the issue of polling place relocations and their disproportionate impact on minority voters.  It provides specific examples and data to support the argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Argument</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

KAGAN, J., dissenting

Executive Branches.”  Ibid.  A court may address the legal-
ity of a government action only if the person challenging it
has  standing—which  requires  that  the  person  have  suf-
fered a “concrete and particularized injury.”  Ibid.  It is not
enough for the plaintiff to assert a “generalized grievance[ ]”
about  government  policy.  Gill  v.  Whitford,  585  U. S.  ___,
___ (2018) (slip op., at 13).  And critically here, the plaintiff
cannot rest its claim on a third party’s rights and interests.
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975).  The plaintiff
needs its own stake—a “personal stake”—in the outcome of
the litigation.  TransUnion, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7).
If the plaintiff has no such stake, a court must stop in its
tracks.    To  decide  the  case  is  to  exceed  the  permissible
boundaries of the judicial role.

That  is  what  the  Court  does  today.    The  plaintiffs  here
are  six  States:  Arkansas,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Missouri,  Ne-
braska, and South Carolina.  They oppose the Secretary’s
loan cancellation plan on varied policy and legal grounds.
But  as  everyone  agrees,  those  objections  are  just  general
grievances;  they  do  not  show  the  particularized  injury
needed to bring suit.  And the States have no straightfor-
ward way of making that showing—of explaining how they
are  harmed  by  a  plan  that  reduces  individual  borrowers’
federal  student-loan  debt.  So  the  States  have  thrown  no
fewer than four different theories of injury against the wall,
hoping that a court anxious to get to the merits will say that
one of them sticks.  The most that can be said of the theory
the majority selects, proffered solely by Missouri, is that it
is less risible than the others.  It still contravenes a bedrock
principle  of  standing  law—that  a  plaintiff  cannot  ride  on
someone else’s injury.  Missouri is doing just that in relying
on injuries to the Missouri Higher Education Loan Author-
ity (MOHELA), a legally and financially independent public
corporation.  And  that  means  the  Court,  by  deciding  this
case,  exercises  authority  it  does  not  have.  It  violates  the
Constitution.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan in the case of Biden v. Nebraska. It discusses the concept of standing in legal cases and argues that the plaintiffs in this case do not have sufficient standing to challenge the Secretary's loan cancellation plan.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21A24
_________________

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH ET AL. v. AUSTIN REEVE
JACKSON, JUDGE, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

[September 1, 2021]

 JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  and

JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.

The  procedural  posture  of  this  case  leads  a  majority  of
this  Court  to  deny  the  applicants’  request  for  provisional
relief.  In my view, however, we should grant that request.
I  agree  with  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE,  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,
and JUSTICE KAGAN.  Texas’s law delegates to private indi-
viduals  the  power  to  prevent  a  woman  from  obtaining  an
abortion during the first stage of pregnancy.  But a woman
has a federal constitutional right to obtain an abortion dur-
ing  that  first  stage.  Planned  Parenthood  of  Southeastern
Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U. S.  833,  846  (1992);  Roe  v.  Wade,  410
U. S. 113, 164 (1973).  And a “State cannot delegate . . . a
veto power [over the right to obtain an abortion] which the
state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercis-
ing  during  the  first  trimester  of  pregnancy.”  Planned
Parenthood  of  Central  Mo.  v.  Danforth,  428  U. S.  52,  69
(1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, we have
made  clear  that  “since  the  State  cannot  regulate  or  pro-
scribe abortion during the first stage . . . the State cannot
delegate authority to any particular person . . . to prevent
abortion  during  that  same  period.”  Ibid.  The  applicants
persuasively argue that Texas’s law does precisely that.

The  very  bringing  into  effect  of  Texas’s  law  may  well
threaten the applicants with imminent and serious harm.
One of the clinic applicants has stated on its website that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual content of a legal decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U72

[09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 11 (1998)

29

Scalia, J., dissenting

basic issue that Question Two presents without considering
the special communicative nature of the “expenditures” here
at issue, cf. United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 121 (1948)
(describing relation between membership communications
and constitutionally protected rights of association). And, a
considered determination of the scope of the statutory ex-
emption that Congress enacted to address membership com-
munications would helpfully inform our consideration of the
“major purpose” test.

The upshot, in our view, is that we should permit the FEC
to address, in the ﬁrst instance, the issue presented by Ques-
tion Two. We can thereby take advantage of the relevant
agency’s expertise, by allowing it to develop a more precise
rule that may dispose of this case, or at a minimum, will aid
the Court in reaching a more informed conclusion.
In our
view, the FEC should proceed to determine whether or not
AIPAC’s expenditures qualify as “membership communica-
tions,” and thereby fall outside the scope of “expenditures”
that could qualify it as a “political committee.”
If the FEC
decides that despite its new rules, the communications here
do not qualify for this exception, then the lower courts, in
reconsidering respondents’ arguments, can still evaluate the
signiﬁcance of the communicative context in which the case
arises.
If, on the other hand, the FEC decides that AIPAC’s
activities fall within the “membership communications” ex-
ception, the matter will become moot.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O(cid:146)Connor and

Justice Thomas join, dissenting.

The provision of law at issue in this case is an extraordi-
nary one, conferring upon a private person the ability to
bring an Executive agency into court to compel its enforce-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

27

Opinion of the Court

not demonstrate, for example, that the alleged information
deficit  hindered  their  ability  to  correct  erroneous  infor-
mation  before  it  was  later  sent  to  third  parties.    An  “as-
serted informational injury that causes no adverse effects
cannot satisfy Article III.”  Ibid.

*

*

*

No concrete harm, no standing.  The 1,853 class members
whose  credit  reports  were  provided  to  third-party  busi-
nesses suffered a concrete harm and thus have standing as
to the reasonable-procedures claim.  The 6,332 class mem-
bers whose credit reports were not provided to third-party
businesses did not suffer a concrete harm and thus do not
have  standing  as  to  the  reasonable-procedures  claim.    As
for  the  claims  pertaining  to  the  format  of  TransUnion’s
mailings, none of the 8,185 class members other than the
named plaintiff Ramirez suffered a concrete harm.

We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.  In light of our conclusion
about  Article  III  standing,  we  need  not  decide  whether
Ramirez’s claims were typical of the claims of the class un-
der Rule 23.  On remand, the Ninth Circuit may consider in
the first instance whether class certification is appropriate
in light of our conclusion about standing.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically discussing standing in a case against TransUnion. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

gay persons or gay marriages.  See Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd.,
Charge No. P20140071X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Le Bak-
ery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X (Mar. 24, 2015);
Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Mar. 24,
2015).

There  were,  to  be  sure,  responses  to  these  arguments
that the State could make when it contended for a differ-
ent  result  in  seeking  the  enforcement  of  its  generally
applicable  state  regulations  of  businesses  that  serve  the
public.  And any decision in favor of the baker would have
to  be  sufficiently  constrained,  lest  all  purveyors  of  goods
and  services  who  object  to  gay  marriages  for  moral  and
religious reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs say-
ing  “no  goods  or  services  will  be  sold  if  they  will  be  used
for gay marriages,” something that would impose a serious
stigma  on  gay  persons.    But,  nonetheless,  Phillips  was
entitled  to  the  neutral  and  respectful  consideration  of  his
claims in all the circumstances of the case.

B
The neutral and respectful consideration to which Phil-
lips  was  entitled  was  compromised  here,  however.    The
Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of his case has some
elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the
sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection.

That  hostility  surfaced  at  the  Commission’s  formal,
public  hearings,  as  shown  by  the  record.    On  May  30,
2014, the seven-member Commission convened publicly to
consider Phillips’ case.  At several points during its meet-
ing, commissioners endorsed the view that religious beliefs
cannot  legitimately  be  carried  into  the  public  sphere  or
commercial  domain,  implying  that  religious  beliefs  and
persons are less than fully welcome in Colorado’s business
community.  One  commissioner  suggested  that  Phillips
can  believe  “what  he  wants  to  believe,”  but  cannot  act  on
his  religious  beliefs  “if  he  decides  to  do  business  in  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the opinion of the court. It contains legal arguments and references to specific cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–1392
_________________

THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2022]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court because it correctly holds
that there is no constitutional right to abortion.  Respond-
ents  invoke  one  source  for  that  right:  the  Fourteenth
Amendment’s  guarantee  that  no  State  shall  “deprive  any
person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  process  of
law.”  The Court well explains why, under our substantive
due process precedents, the purported right to abortion is
not a form of “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause.
Such a right is neither “deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-
tory and tradition” nor “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.”  Washington  v.  Glucksberg,  521  U. S.  702,  721
(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[T]he idea that
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood the
Due Process Clause to protect a right to abortion is farcical.”
June Medical Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___, ___
(2020) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 17).

I  write  separately  to  emphasize  a  second,  more  funda-
mental reason why there is no abortion guarantee lurking
in  the  Due  Process  Clause.  Considerable  historical  evi-
dence indicates that “due process of law” merely required
executive and judicial actors to comply with legislative en-
actments and the common law when depriving a person of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in the Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case.  It is sequential text and provides legal argument, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CANIGLIA v. STROM ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 20–157.  Argued March 24, 2021—Decided May 17, 2021

During an argument with his wife, petitioner Edward Caniglia placed a
handgun on the dining room table and asked his wife to “shoot [him]
and  get  it  over  with.”  His  wife  instead  left  the  home  and  spent  the
night at a hotel.  The next morning, she was unable to reach her hus-
band by phone, so she called the police to request a welfare check.  The
responding  officers  accompanied  Caniglia’s  wife  to  the  home,  where
they encountered Caniglia on the porch.  The officers called an ambu-
lance based on the belief that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others.
Caniglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation on the
  But  once
condition  that  the  officers  not  confiscate  his  firearms.
Caniglia  left,  the  officers  located  and  seized  his  weapons.    Caniglia
sued, claiming that the officers had entered his home and seized him
and his firearms without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.  The District Court granted summary judgment to the officers.
The First Circuit affirmed, extrapolating from the Court’s decision in
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, a theory that the officers’ removal
of Caniglia and his firearms from his home was justified by a “commu-
nity caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement.

Held: Neither  the  holding  nor  logic  of  Cady  justifies  such  warrantless
searches  and  seizures  in  the  home.  Cady  held  that  a  warrantless
search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not vio-
late  the  Fourth  Amendment.    In reaching this  conclusion,  the  Court
noted  that  the  officers  who  patrol  the  “public  highways”  are  often
called  to  discharge  noncriminal  “community  caretaking  functions,”
such as responding to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents.  413
U. S., at 441.  But searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally
different, as the Cady opinion repeatedly stressed.  Id., at 439, 440–
442.  The very core of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee is the right
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

ZF AUTOMOTIVE US, INC. v. LUXSHARE, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

nation.  See  id.,  at  14–15  (a  governmental  adjudicator  is
“one whose role in deciding the dispute rests on” a “nation’s
sovereign authority”).

This  reading  of  “foreign  tribunal”  is  reinforced  by  the
statutory defaults for discovery  procedure.  In addition to
authorizing district courts to order testimony or the produc-
tion of evidence, §1782 permits them to “prescribe the prac-
tice and procedure, which may be in whole or part the prac-
tice and procedure of the foreign country or the international
tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or produc-
ing  the  document  or  other  thing.”  §1782(a)  (emphasis
added).  The reference to the procedure of “the foreign coun-
try  or  the  international  tribunal”  parallels  the  authoriza-
tion for district courts to grant discovery for use in a “for-
eign  or  international  tribunal”  mentioned  just  before  in
§1782.  The statute thus presumes that a “foreign tribunal”
follows “the practice and procedure of the foreign country.”
It is unremarkable for the statute to presume that a foreign
court, quasi-judicial body, or any other governmental adju-
dicatory  body  follows  the  practice  and  procedures  pre-
scribed by the government that conferred authority on it.3
But that would be an odd assumption to make about a pri-
vate adjudicatory body, which is typically the creature of an
agreement between private parties who prescribe their own
rules.  See  Stolt-Nielsen  S. A.  v.  AnimalFeeds  Int’l  Corp.,
559 U. S. 662, 683 (2010).  That the default discovery pro-
cedures for a “foreign tribunal” are governmental suggests
that the body is governmental too.

Now  for  “international  tribunal.”

“International”  can
mean either (1) involving or of two or more “nations,” or (2)
involving or of two or more “nationalities.”  American Her-
itage Dictionary, at 685 (“[o]f, relating to, or involving two

——————

3 The provision makes the similarly unremarkable assumption that an
“international tribunal” defaults to the rules on which the relevant na-
tions agreed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of the term "foreign tribunal" in the context of US law.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 17–1712
_________________

JAMES J. THOLE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
U. S. BANK N. A., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 1, 2020]

 JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG,

JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.

The Court holds that the Constitution prevents millions
of  pensioners  from  enforcing  their  rights  to  prudent  and
loyal management of their retirement trusts.  Indeed, the
Court determines that pensioners may not bring a federal
lawsuit  to  stop  or  cure  retirement-plan  mismanagement
until their pensions are on the verge of default.  This con-
clusion conflicts with common sense and longstanding prec-
edent.

I
A
ERISA1  protects  “the  interests  of  participants  in  em-
ployee  benefit  plans  and  their  beneficiaries.”    29  U. S. C.
§1001(b).  Chief among these safeguards is that “all assets
of an employee benefit plan” must “be held in trust by one
or  more  trustees”  for  “the  exclusive  purposes of  providing
benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries.”
§§1103(a), (c)(1).  A retirement plan’s assets “shall never in-
ure to the benefit of any employer.”  §1103(c)(1).

Because ERISA requires that retirement-plan assets be

——————

1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,  88 Stat. 829, as

amended, 29 U. S. C. §1001 et seq.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citations, case names, and the signature of the Justice.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

19

Opinion of the Court

the  Government  to  specify  the  time  and  place  of  removal
proceedings,  while  allowing  the  Government  to  change
that  information,  might  encourage  DHS  to  provide  “arbi-
trary  dates  and  times  that  are  likely  to  confuse  and  con-
found  all  who  receive  them.”    Post,  at  8.  The  dissent’s
argument  wrongly  assumes  that  the  Government  is  ut-
terly incapable of specifying an accurate date and time on a
notice  to  appear  and  will  instead  engage  in  “arbitrary”
behavior.  See  ibid.    The  Court  does  not  embrace  those
unsupported  assumptions.  As  the  Government  concedes,
“a  scheduling  system  previously  enabled  DHS  and  the
immigration court to coordinate in setting hearing dates in
some  cases.”    Brief  for  Respondent  50,  n. 15;  Brief  for
National Immigrant Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 30–
31.  Given  today’s  advanced  software  capabilities,  it  is
hard  to  imagine  why  DHS  and  immigration  courts  could
not again work together to schedule hearings before send-
ing notices to appear.

Finally, the dissent’s related contention that including a
changeable  date  would  “mislead”  and  “prejudice”  nonciti-
zens is unfounded.  Post, at 8.  As already explained, if the
Government changes the date of the removal proceedings,
it  must  provide  written  notice  to  the  noncitizen,
§1229(a)(2).  This notice requirement mitigates any poten-
tial  confusion  that  may  arise  from  altering  the  hearing
date.  In  reality,  it  is  the  dissent’s  interpretation  of  the
statute  that  would  “confuse  and  confound”  noncitizens,
post, at 8, by authorizing the Government to serve notices
that lack any information about the time and place of the
removal proceedings.

E
In  a  last  ditch  effort  to  salvage  its  atextual  interpreta-
tion,  the  Government  invokes  the  alleged  purpose  and
legislative  history  of  the  stop-time  rule.    Brief  for  Re-
spondent  37–40.  Even  for  those  who  consider  statutory
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the interpretation of a statute and the arguments made by both sides.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

Syllabus

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J.,
and THOMAS, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT and JACKSON, JJ.,
joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. GORSUCH, J., filed an opin-
ion concurring in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and the introductory section of a Supreme Court opinion. It is not the main body of the text meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

SEC v. JARKESY

Opinion of the Court

From the beginning we have emphasized one point: “To
avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it
proper  to  state  that  we  do  not  consider  congress  can  . . .
withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from
its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in
equity, or admiralty.”  Murray’s Lessee, 18 How., at 284.  We
have never embraced the proposition that “practical” con-
siderations alone can justify extending the scope of the pub-
lic  rights  exception  to  such  matters.  Stern,  564  U. S.,  at
501.  “[E]ven  with  respect  to  matters  that  arguably  fall
within the scope of the ‘public rights’ doctrine, the presump-
tion is in favor of Article III courts.”  Northern Pipeline Con-
str.  Co.,  458  U. S.,  at  69,  n. 23  (plurality  opinion)  (citing
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 548–549, and n. 21
(1962) (plurality opinion)).  And for good reason: “Article III
could neither serve its purpose in the system of checks and
balances nor preserve the integrity of judicial decisionmak-
ing if the other branches of the Federal Government could
confer the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities outside

——————
no foothold), nor in the ratification history (where again it would find no
support), nor in a careful, category-by-category analysis of underlying le-
gal principles of the sort performed by Murray’s Lessee (which it does not
attempt),  nor  even  in  a  case-specific  functional  analysis  (also  not  at-
tempted).  Instead, the dissent extrapolates from the outcomes in cases
concerning unrelated applications of the public rights exception and from
one opinion, Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm’n, 430 U. S. 442 (1977).  The result is to blur the distinctions our
cases have drawn in favor of the legally unsound principle that just be-
cause the Government may extract civil penalties in administrative tri-
bunals in some contexts, it must always be able to do so in all contexts.
The dissent also appeals to practice, ignoring that the statute Jarkesy
and Patriot28 have been prosecuted under is barely over a decade old.  It
is also unclear how practice could transmute a private right into a public
one,  or  how  the  absence  of legal  challenges  brought  by  one  generation
could waive the individual rights of the next.  Practice may be probative
when it reflects the settled institutional understandings of the branches.
That  case  is  far  weaker  when  the  rights  of  individuals  are  directly  at
stake.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion in the case SEC v. Jarkesy. It delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion (Dissenting)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting

The flagship educational institution of a former Confeder-
ate State has embraced its constitutional obligation to af-
ford genuine equal protection to applicants, and, by exten-
sion, to the broader polity that its students will serve after
graduation.   Surely  that  is  progress  for  a  university  that
once  engaged  in  the  kind  of  patently  offensive  race-
dominated admissions process that the majority decries.

With its holistic review process, UNC now treats race as
merely one aspect of an applicant’s life, when race played a
totalizing, all-encompassing, and singularly determinative
role for applicants like James for most of this country’s his-
tory: No matter what else was true about him, being Black
meant he had no shot at getting in (the ultimate race-linked
uneven playing field).  Holistic programs like UNC’s reflect
the reality that Black students have only relatively recently
been permitted to get into the admissions game at all.  Such
programs  also  reflect  universities’  clear-eyed  optimism
that, one day, race will no longer matter.

So much upside.  Universal benefits ensue from holistic
admissions programs that allow consideration of all factors
material to merit (including race), and that thereby facili-
tate diverse student populations.  Once trained, those UNC
students who have thrived in the university’s diverse learn-
ing environment are well equipped to make lasting contri-
butions  in  a  variety  of  realms  and  with  a  variety  of  col-
leagues, which, in turn, will steadily decrease the salience
of race for future generations.  Fortunately, UNC and other
institutions of higher learning are already on this beneficial
path.  In fact, all that they have needed to continue moving
this  country  forward  (toward  full  achievement  of  our  Na-
tion’s founding promises) is for this Court to get out of the
way and let them do their jobs.  To our great detriment, the
majority cannot bring itself to do so.

B
The overarching reason the majority gives for becoming
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues in favor of holistic admissions processes that consider race as one factor among many.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
244

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER

Opinion of the Court

.

instructs: “The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen
. is within the  discretion  of  the  Board,  subject  to  the
.
restrictions  of  this  section.  The  Board  has  discretion  to
deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made
out a prima facie case for relief.”  8 CFR § 1003.2(a).  Nev
ertheless, in defense of the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, ami
cus  urges  that  regulations  sufﬁce  to  trigger  8  U. S. C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s proscription of judicial review.

The  jurisdiction-stripping  provision,  amicus  reminds,  re
fers  to  “authority  .  .  .  speciﬁed  under  this  subchapter.”  As
she  reads  that  formulation,  the  word  “under”  is  key.  She
comprehends  “under”  to  mean  “pursuant  to,”  “subordinate
to,”  “below  or  lower  than,”  “inferior  . . . in  rank  or  impor
tance,”  “by  reason  of  the  authority  of.”  Brief  for  Court-
Appointed  Amicus  Curiae  in  Support  of  Judgment  Below
15, 17 (citing, inter alia, Florida Dept. of Revenue v.  Picca
dilly  Cafeterias,  Inc.,  554  U. S.  33,  39  (2008);  Ardestani  v.
INS,  502  U. S.  129,  135  (1991)).  Administrative  regulations
count  for  § 1252(a)(2)(B)  purposes,  she  urges,  because  they
are issued “pursuant to,” and are measures “subordinate to,”
the legislation they serve to implement.  The parties, on the
other  hand,  read  “speciﬁed  under  this  subchapter”  to  mean
“speciﬁed in,” or “speciﬁed by,” the subchapter.11

On  the  reading  amicus  advances,  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  would
bar judicial review of any decision that an executive regula
tion places within the BIA’s discretion, including the decision
to  deny  a  motion  to  reopen.  On  the  parties’  reading,  how
ever,  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  precludes  judicial  review  only  when
the  statute itself  speciﬁes the  discretionary character  of the
Attorney General’s authority.

11 Deﬁning “under,” as used in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), to mean “pursuant to,”
or “subordinate to,” and not “in” or “by,” the Attorney General observes,
would give rise to “a fatal anomaly”: “Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) would apply
only to regulations promulgated ‘under the authority of ’ the relevant sub-
chapter,  and  not  to  speciﬁcations  of  discretion  in  the  subchapter  itself.”
Reply Brief for Respondent 6.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the interpretation of a specific statute (8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)) and its implications for judicial review of immigration decisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U58

[09-26-01 12:26:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN

754

OHLER v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-
nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Souter, J., ﬁled a dis-
senting opinion, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined,
post, p. 760.

Benjamin L. Coleman, by appointment of the Court, 528
U. S. 984, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
briefs was Mario G. Conte.

Barbara McDowell argued the cause for the United
States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Wax-
man, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, Deputy Solici-
tor General Dreeben, and Jonathan L. Marcus.*

Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the

Court.

Petitioner, Maria Ohler, was arrested and charged with
importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana with
the intent to distribute. The District Court granted the
Government’s motion in limine seeking to admit evidence
of her prior felony conviction as impeachment evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1). Ohler testiﬁed
at trial and admitted on direct examination that she had
been convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 1993.
The jury convicted her of both counts, and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit afﬁrmed. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that Ohler may not challenge the in limine
ruling of the District Court on appeal.

Maria Ohler drove a van from Mexico to California in July
1997. As she passed through the San Ysidro Port of Entry,
a customs inspector noticed that someone had tampered
with one of the van’s interior panels.
Inspectors searched
the van and discovered approximately 81 pounds of mari-
juana. Ohler was arrested and charged with importation
of marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to

*Jody Manier Kris and Lisa Kemler ﬁled a brief for the National As-
sociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging
reversal.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It includes information about the case, the justices involved, and a summary of the facts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

MATAL v. TAM

Opinion of the Court

volume of applications have produced a haphazard record
(Even  today,  the  principal  register  is
of  enforcement.
replete  with  marks  that  many  would  regard  as  disparag-
ing  to  racial  and  ethnic  groups.6)  Registration  of  the
offensive marks that Tam cites is likely attributable not to
the  acceptance  of  his  interpretation  of  the  clause  but  to
other  factors—most  likely  the  regrettable  attitudes  and
sensibilities of the time in question.

III
Because the disparagement clause applies to marks that
disparage  the  members  of  a  racial  or  ethnic  group,  we
must  decide  whether  the  clause  violates  the  Free  Speech
Clause  of  the  First  Amendment.    And  at  the  outset,  we
must  consider  three  arguments  that  would  either  elimi-
nate  any  First  Amendment  protection  or  result  in  highly
permissive  rational-basis  review.    Specifically,  the  Gov-
ernment  contends  (1)  that  trademarks  are  government
speech, not private speech, (2) that trademarks are a form
of  government  subsidy,  and  (3)  that  the  constitutionality
of the disparagement clause should be tested under a new
“government-program” doctrine.  We address each of these
arguments below.

A

The  First  Amendment  prohibits  Congress  and  other
government  entities  and  actors  from  “abridging  the  free-
dom  of  speech”;  the  First  Amendment  does  not  say  that
Congress  and  other  government  entities  must  abridge
their own ability to speak freely.  And our cases recognize
that  “[t]he  Free  Speech  Clause  . . .  does  not  regulate  gov-
ernment  speech.”  Pleasant  Grove  City  v.  Summum,  555

——————

to postulate.” Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 USPQ 2d 1705, 1737 (TTAB
1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (DC 2003), rev’d and remanded in part,
415 F. 3d 44 (CADC 2005) (per curiam).

6 See, e.g., App. to Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., as Amicus Curiae.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the disparagement clause in trademark law and its potential conflict with the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cix

Page

1055

Oguagha v. Cravener  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Ogunde v. Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Ohio; Ashipa v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1050

Ohio; Baumgartner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
869

Ohio; Bruce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ohio; DeNoma v.
1096

Ohio; Elmore v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Ohio; Kelley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

Ohio; Levy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
863

Ohio; Lowe v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Ohio; Murphy v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1012

Ohio; Rivas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
815

Ohio; Robinson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
883

Ohio; Runyon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
876

Ohio; Skropits v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Ohio; Trimble v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1134

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ojeda-Estrada v. United States
974

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Okafor v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  840,1064

O’Kelley v. Hall
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Okemo Mountain, Inc.; Sikorski v.
1027

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oklahoma; Bynes v.
1052

Oklahoma; Ensey v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Oklahoma; Grant v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Oklahoma; Hanson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

Oklahoma; James v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
895

Oklahoma; Jones v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906

Oklahoma; Magnan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Oklahoma; Raines v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oklahoma; Rojem v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

Oklahoma; Skinner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1053

835

Oklahoma; Young v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
898

Okoro v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1138

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Okupe v. United States
1135

Olander v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

O’Laughlin; O’Brien v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oldbear v. United States
1016

Old Chief v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

Oliphant v. Mendoza-Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1150

Olis v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
841

Olivares v. Garcia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952

Olivarez v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Olivas v. Neven
1009

Oliver, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
876

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oliver; Samadi v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
48  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

VII

For  these  reasons,  States  and  public-sector  unions  may

no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employ
ees.  Under  Illinois  law,  if  a  public-sector  collective-
bargaining  agreement  includes  an  agency-fee  provision
and the union certifies to the employer the amount of the
fee,  that  amount  is  automatically  deducted  from  the  non
member’s wages.  §315/6(e).  No form of employee consent
is required.

This  procedure  violates  the  First  Amendment  and  can
not  continue.  Neither  an  agency  fee  nor  any  other  pay
ment  to  the  union  may  be  deducted  from  a  nonmember’s
wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such
a  payment,  unless  the  employee affirmatively  consents  to
pay.  By  agreeing  to  pay,  nonmembers  are  waiving  their
First  Amendment  rights,  and  such  a  waiver  cannot  be
presumed.  Johnson  v.  Zerbst,  304  U. S.  458,  464  (1938);
see also Knox, 567 U. S., at 312–313.  Rather, to be effec
tive, the waiver must be freely given and shown by “clear
and compelling” evidence.  Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388  U. S.  130,  145  (1967)  (plurality  opinion);  see  also
College  Savings  Bank  v.  Florida  Prepaid  Postsecondary
Ed.  Expense  Bd.,  527  U. S.  666,  680–682  (1999).    Unless
employees  clearly  and  affirmatively  consent  before  any
money is taken from them, this standard cannot be met.

——————

side,”  ibid.—unless  the  Constitution  commands  that  they  do  so.    But
when  a  federal  or  state  law  violates  the  Constitution,  the  American
doctrine  of  judicial  review  requires  us  to  enforce  the  Constitution.
Here,  States  with  agency-fee  laws  have  abridged  fundamental  free
speech  rights.    In  holding  that  these  laws  violate  the  Constitution,  we
are  simply  enforcing  the  First  Amendment  as  properly  understood,
“[t]he  very  purpose  of  [which]  was  to  withdraw  certain  subjects  from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts.”  West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S.
624, 638 (1943).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the constitutionality of agency fees in public-sector unions. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis, all of which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

SEC v. JARKESY

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

id., at 43–49.  That did not resolve the case, however.  Un-
like in Tull, the proceeding at issue in Granfinanciera was
in a non-Article III forum (i.e., a bankruptcy court).  So, to
answer whether Congress could assign the fraudulent-con-
veyance claim to a bankruptcy judge for decision, Congress
needed  to  decide  whether  the  “legal  cause  of  action  in-
volve[d] ‘public rights.’ ”  492 U. S., at 53.

Granfinanciera explains that there are two ways to iden-
tify a “public right.”  First, there are the matters in which
Congress enacts a statutory cause of action that “inheres in,
or lies against, the Federal Government in its sovereign ca-
pacity.”  Id., at 53 (citing Atlas Roofing, 430 U. S., at 458).
These  matters  necessarily  arise  between  the  Government
and the people in connection with the Government’s exer-
cise of its constitutional authority.  See supra, at 7–8.  In
these cases, the Court said, Atlas Roofing controls the pub-
lic-rights analysis.  See Granfinanciera, 492 U. S., at 51, 53.
The  Court  explained  that  “Congress  may  effectively  sup-
plant a common law cause of action carrying with it a right
to  a  jury  trial  with  a  statutory  cause  of  action  shorn  of  a
jury trial right if that statutory cause of action inheres in,
or lies against, the Federal Government in its sovereign ca-
pacity.”  Id., at 53 (citing Atlas Roofing, 430 U. S., at 458).
The second kind of public right that Granfinanciera rec-
ognized  involves  “disputes  to  which  the  Federal  Govern-
ment is not a party in its sovereign capacity,” 492 U. S., at
55, n. 10, that is, usually “[w]holly private” disputes, id., at
51.  The  public-rights  analysis  in  these  private-dispute
cases looks different: “The crucial question, in cases not in-
volving the Federal Government, is whether ‘Congress, act-
ing for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitu-
tional  powers  under  Article  I,  has  created  a  seemingly
“private” right that is so closely integrated into a public reg-
ulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency res-
olution  with  limited  involvement  by  the  Article  III  judici-
ary.’ ”  Id.,  at  54  (quoting  Thomas,  473  U. S.,  at  593–594;
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It delves into legal precedents and arguments regarding the assignment of fraudulent conveyance claims to bankruptcy judges.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–463
_________________

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
AUSTIN REEVE JACKSON, JUDGE, DISTRICT
COURT OF TEXAS, 114TH DISTRICT, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[December 10, 2021]

  JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court, ex-
cept as to Part II–C.
  The Court granted certiorari before judgment in this case
to determine whether, under our precedents, certain abor-
tion providers can pursue a pre-enforcement challenge to a
recently enacted Texas statute.  We conclude that such an
action is permissible against some of the named defendants
but not others.

I
  Earlier this year Texas passed the Texas Heartbeat Act,
87th Leg., Reg. Sess., also known as S. B. 8.  The Act pro-
hibits  physicians  from  “knowingly  perform[ing]  or  in-
duc[ing] an abortion on a pregnant woman if the physician
detected  a  fetal  heartbeat  for  the  unborn  child”  unless  a
medical  emergency  prevents  compliance.    Tex.  Health  &
Safety  Code  Ann.  §§171.204(a),  171.205(a)  (West  Cum.
Supp. 2021).  But the law generally does not allow state of-
ficials  to  bring  criminal  prosecutions  or  civil  enforcement
actions.  Instead, S. B. 8 directs enforcement “through . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the beginning of the opinion itself.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

7

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

This is a big game of whack-a-mole.’ ”  Id., at 24.  Consider
Jerry Lee, a Grants Pass resident who sleeps in a van.  Over
the  course  of  three  days,  he  was  woken  up  and  cited  six
times for “camping in the city limits” just because he was
sleeping in the van.  App. 99 (capitalization omitted).  Lee
left the van each time only to return later to sleep.  Police
reports eventually noted that he “continues to disregard the
city  ordinance  and  returns  to  the  van  to  sleep  as  soon  as
police leave the area.  Dayshift needs to check on the van
this morning and . . . follow up for tow.”  Ibid. (same).

Shelter beds that are available in theory may be practi-
cally unavailable because of “restrictions based on gender,
age, income, sexuality, religious practice, curfews that con-
flict  with  employment  obligations,  and  time  limits  on
stays.”  Social  Scientists  Brief  22.    Studies  have  shown,
however, that the “vast majority of those who are unshel-
tered would move inside if safe and affordable options were
available.”    Service  Providers  Brief  8  (collecting  studies).
Consider CarrieLynn Hill.  She cannot stay at Gospel Res-
cue Mission, the only entity in Grants Pass offering tempo-
rary beds, because “she would have to check her nebulizer
in  as  medical  equipment  and,  though  she  must  use  it  at
least once every four hours, would not be able to use it in
her  room.”  Disability  Rights  Brief  18.    Similarly,  Debra
Blake’s  “disabilities  prevent  her  from  working,  which
means she cannot comply with the Gospel Rescue Mission’s
requirement that its residents work 40-hour work weeks.”
Ibid.

Before I move on, consider one last example of a Nashville
man  who  experienced  homelessness  for  nearly  20  years.
When an outreach worker tried to help him secure housing,
the worker had difficulty finding him for his appointments
because he was frequently arrested for being homeless.  He
was arrested 198 times and had over 250 charged citations,
all for petty offenses.  The outreach worker made him a t-
shirt  that  read  “Please  do  not  arrest  me,  my  outreach
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It presents arguments and examples related to homelessness and the criminalization of homelessness.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1231

Rule

CLERK—Continued

Noncompliance with Rules, return of papers ..........  14.5, 18.13

Ofﬁce hours.....................................................................  1.3

Opinions of Court, disposition of................................  41

Orders of dismissal .......................................................  46.1, 46.2

Original records, when returned................................  1.2

Record, request for .......................................................  12.7, 18.11, 18.12

Records and documents, maintenance of..................  1.2

COMPUTATION OF TIME

Method.............................................................................  30.1

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL ACT
Procedure  where  United  States  or  federal  agency

or employee not a party...........................................  29.4(b)

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTE

Procedure  where  State  or  state  agency  or  em

ployee not a party .....................................................  29.4(c)

CORPORATIONS

Corporate disclosure statement ..............................  14.1(b), 24.1(b), 29.6

COSTS—See also Fees

Armed forces cases .......................................................  40.3

Certiﬁed cases................................................................  43.4

Dismissal of appeal before docketing........................  18.5

Double costs ...................................................................  43.7

Frivolous ﬁlings.............................................................  42.2

Joint appendix................................................................  26.3

Judgment afﬁrmed ........................................................  43.1

Judgment reversed or vacated ...................................  43.2

Mandate, itemization in................................................  43.6

Seamen cases..................................................................  40.2

Stays ................................................................................  23.4

Taxable items .................................................................  43.3

United States, allowed for or against .......................  43.5

Veterans cases ...............................................................  40.1

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Applications arising from ............................................  22.3
Documents, preparation requirements......................  40.3
Fees and costs on review.............................................  40.3

COURTS OF APPEALS

Certiﬁed questions........................................................  19
Certiorari before judgment.........................................  11
Considerations governing review on certiorari ......  10
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a table of contents or an index for a legal document, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It lists rule numbers and brief descriptions, not sequential narrative text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
Opinion of the Court

Brief for Respondents Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Res-
ervation et al. 54.  It merely confirms the powers Congress
expressly  afforded  ANCs  and  that  the  Executive  Branch
has long understood ANCs to possess.

III
Almost  everyone  agrees  that  if  ANCs  are  Indian  tribes
under ISDA, they are eligible for funding under Title V of
the CARES Act.  If Congress did not want to make ANCs
eligible for CARES Act funding, its decision to incorporate
ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition into the CARES Act would
be inexplicable.  Had Congress wished to limit CARES Act
funding to federally recognized tribes, it could simply have
cross-referenced the List Act instead, as it had in numerous
statutes  before.10    Instead,  Congress  invoked  a  definition
that expressly includes ANCs (and has been understood for
decades to include them).  Today’s ruling merely gives effect
to that decision.

Nevertheless,  the  Ute  Indian  Tribe  of  the  Uintah  and
Ouray  Reservation  argues  that  the  CARES  Act  excludes
ANCs  regardless of whether they  are Indian tribes under
ISDA.    Recall  that  the  CARES  Act  allocates  money  to
“Tribal governments.”  42 U. S. C. §801(a)(2)(B).  A “Tribal
government” is “the recognized governing body of an Indian
tribe.”  §801(g)(5).  According to the Utes, ANCs do not have
a “recognized governing body” because that term applies to
the governing body of a federally recognized tribe alone.

As  the  Utes  implicitly  acknowledge,  however,  federal
recognition  is  usually  discussed  in  relation  to  tribes,  not
their  governing  bodies.  Brief  for  Respondent  Ute  Indian

——————

10 See,  e.g.,  Indian  Arts  and  Crafts  Amendments  Act  of  2010,
§203(a)(2),  124  Stat.  2263  (“The  term  ‘Indian  tribe’  has  the  meaning
given the term in section 102 of the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe
List  Act  of  1994”);  Helping  Expedite  and  Advance  Responsible  Tribal
Home Ownership Act of 2012, §2, 126 Stat. 1150 (same); Deadbeat Par-
ents Punishment Act of 1998, §2, 112 Stat. 619 (same).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the section discussing the eligibility of Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) for funding under the CARES Act.  It cites legal precedents and arguments made by different parties involved in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. v. SAXON

Opinion of the Court

“class of workers” as all airline employees who carry out the
“customary work” of the airline, rather than cargo loaders
more specifically.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 56.  That larger class of
employees potentially includes everyone from cargo loaders
to shift schedulers to those who design Southwest’s website.
See id., at 51–52; but cf. ibid. (conceding that those who run
the Southwest credit-card points program likely would not
count).

To support this reading, Saxon invokes the ejusdem gen-
eris canon.  She argues, first, that “railroad employees” and
“seamen”  refer  generally  to  employees  in  those industries
providing  “dominant  mode[s]  of  transportation”  in  inter-
state and foreign commerce.  Brief for Respondent 17.  She
then reasons, second, that all “workers who do the work of
the  airlines  have  the  same  relationship  to  commerce  as
those who do the work of the railroad or ship.”  Ibid.

Saxon’s attempted invocation of ejusdem generis is una-
vailing  because  it  proceeds  from  the  flawed  premise  that
“seamen” and “railroad employees” are both industrywide
categories.  The statute’s use of “seamen” shows why that
premise is mistaken.  In 1925, seamen did not include all
those  employed  by  companies  engaged  in  maritime  ship-
ping.  Rather,  seamen were  only  those  “whose  occupation
[was] to assist in the management of ships at sea; a mari-
ner; a sailor; . . . any person (except masters, pilots, and ap-
prentices duly indentured and registered) employed or en-
gaged in any capacity on board any ship.”  Webster’s 1906;
see  also,  e.g.,  Black’s  1063  (seamen:  “[s]ailors;  mariners;
persons whose business is navigating ships”).

Because “seamen” includes only those who work on board
a vessel, they constitute a subset of workers engaged in the
maritime shipping industry.  Regardless of whether “rail-
road  employees”  include  all  rail-transportation  workers,
the narrow definition of “seamen” shows that the two terms
cannot share a “common attribute” of identifying transpor-
tation workers on an industrywide basis.  Ali, 552 U. S., at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute related to "seamen" and "railroad employees." The text delves into legal arguments and precedents, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part

(rejecting  retroactivity  for  Caldwell  v.  Mississippi,  472
U. S. 320 (1985)); see also Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255, 261
(1986)  (per  curiam)  (rejecting  retroactivity  for  Batson  v.
Kentucky,  476  U. S.  79  (1986));  DeStefano  v.  Woods,  392
U. S.  631,  635  (1968)  (per  curiam)  (rejecting  retroactivity
for Duncan, 391 U. S. 145).

So  assuming  that  the  Court  faithfully  applies  Teague,
today’s  decision  will  not  apply  retroactively  on  federal
habeas corpus review and will not disturb convictions that
are final.8

In addition, as to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims,
an attorney presumably would not have been deficient for
failing  to  raise  a  constitutional  jury-unanimity  argument
before  today’s  decision—or  at  the  very  least,  before  the
Court  granted  certiorari  in  this  case.    Before  today,  after
all,  this  Court’s  precedents  had  repeatedly  allowed  non-
unanimous juries in state criminal cases.  In that situation,
the Courts of Appeals have consistently held that an attor-
ney is not ineffective for failing to anticipate or advocate for
the overruling of a  constitutional precedent of this Court.
See, e.g., Walker v. United States, 810 F. 3d 568, 577 (CA8
2016);  United  States  v.  Smith,  241  F. 3d  546,  548  (CA7
2001); Honeycutt v. Mahoney, 698 F. 2d 213, 216–217 (CA4
1983);  see  also  Steiner  v.  United  States,  940  F. 3d  1282,
1293 (CA11 2019) (per curiam); Snider v. United States, 908
F. 3d  183,  192  (CA6  2018);  Green  v.  Johnson,  116  F. 3d
1115, 1125 (CA5 1997).

For those reasons, the reliance interests at stake in this
case  are  not  especially  substantial,  and  they  do  not  man-
date adherence to Apodaca.9

——————

8 In Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (1986) (per curiam), this Court con-
cluded—without briefing or oral argument—that Batson would not apply
retroactively.  Under the well-settled Teague principles, there should be
no  doubt  that  today’s  decision  likewise  will  not  apply  retroactively  on
collateral review.

9 JUSTICE ALITO’s characteristically incisive dissent rests largely on his
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh. It cites previous cases and legal precedents to support its arguments regarding the retroactivity of the Court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

IANCU v. BRUNETTI

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

not  pebbles  in  alien  juxtaposition;  they  have  only  a  com-
munal  existence;  and  not  only  does  the  meaning  of  each
interpenetrate  the  other,  but  all  in  their  aggregate  take
their  purport  from  the  setting  in  which  they  are  used.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F. 2d 954, 957
(CA2  1941)  (L.  Hand,  J.)).  Accordingly,  and  relatedly,
courts should, to the extent possible, read statutes so that
“ ‘no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.’ ”  TRW  Inc.  v.  Andrews,  534  U. S.  19,  31
(2001).1

Here, Congress used not only the word “scandalous,” but
also  the  words  “immoral”  and  “disparage,”  in  the  same
block  of  statutory  text—each  as  a  separate  feature  that
could  render  a  mark  unregistrable.  See  §1052(a).    Tam
already decided that “disparage” served to prohibit marks
that  were  offensive  because  they  derided  a  particular
person  or  group.    See  582  U. S.,  at  ___  (opinion  of  ALITO,
J.) (slip op., at 22) (“It denies registration to any mark that
is offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of
any group”); id., at ___ (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (slip op., at
2) (“[A]n applicant may register a positive or benign mark
but not a derogatory one”).  That defines one of the three
words.  Meanwhile,  as  the  majority  explains,  the  word
“immoral” prohibits marks that are offensive because they
transgress widely held moral beliefs.  See ante, at 5.  That
defines a second of the three words.

With marks that are offensive because they are dispar-
aging  and  marks  that  are  offensive  because  they  are  im-
moral already covered, what work did Congress intend for

——————

1 For  example,  McDonnell  v.  United  States,  579  U. S.  ___  (2016),  in-
volved  a  statute  that  defined  an  “ ‘official  act’ ”  as  “ ‘any  decision  or
action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.’ ”
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13).  The Court declined to read “ ‘question’ ” and
“ ‘matter’ ”  as  covering  “a  typical  meeting,  call,  or  event  arranged  by  a
public official” because doing so would deprive the words “ ‘cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy’ ” of meaning.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 16).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute related to trademark registration.  It cites previous cases and legal principles to support its argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>