<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

956

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 26, 1998

524 U. S.

No. 97–8120. Dougan v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 1424.

No. 97–8127. Richard v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8291. Griffin v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 178 Ill. 2d 65, 687 N. E. 2d 820.

No. 97–8361. Dixon v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 97–8382. Tennard v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 960 S. W. 2d 57.

No. 97–8427. Love v. Tippy, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 1066.

No. 97–8470. Mann v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 959 S. W. 2d 503.

No. 97–8528. Woodruff v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 1238.

No. 97–8536. Salas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 139 F. 3d 322.

No. 97–8539. O(cid:146)Riley v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8580. Nelson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8778. Munoz v. City of Martinez et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 F. 3d 378.

No. 97–8794.

Jo-Ann G. v. Cranston School Committee
et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 130
F. 3d 481.

No. 97–8803. Hamilton v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 703 So. 2d 1038.

No. 97–8809. Madrid v. Marshall, Warden, et al. C. A.

9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 147.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions from a legal document. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a section of a legal publication.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

518 U. S. 137, 145 (1996) (per curiam).

Unfortunately,  the  Court  does  not  even  attempt  to
demonstrate  that  the  six-judge  en  banc  majority  was
“clearly wrong” in its interpretation of Colorado’s domestic
restraining  order  statute;  nor  could  such  a  showing  be
made.  For  it  is  certainly  plausible  to  construe  “shall  use
every  reasonable  means  to  enforce  a  restraining  order”
and “shall  arrest,” Colo. Rev. Stat. §§18–6–803.5(3)(a)–(b)
(Lexis  1999)  (emphases  added),  as  conveying  mandatory
directives  to  the  police,  particularly  when  the  same  stat-
ute,  at  other  times,  tellingly  employs  different  language
that  suggests  police  discretion,  see  §18–6–803.5(6)(a)  (“A
peace  officer  is  authorized  to  use  every  reasonable  means
to  protect  . . .”;  “Such  peace  officer  may  transport  . . .”
(emphases added)).1  Moreover, unlike today’s decision, the
Court of Appeals was attentive to the legislative history of
the statute, focusing on a statement by the statute’s spon-
sor  in  the  Colorado  House,  ante,  at  10,  n. 6  (quoting
statement),  which  it  took  to  “emphasiz[e]  the  importance
of  the  police’s  mandatory  enforcement  of  domestic  re-
straining  orders.”    366  F. 3d  1093,  1107  (CA10  2004)  (en
banc).  Far  from  overlooking  the  traditional  presumption
of  police  discretion,  then,  the  Court  of  Appeals’  diligent
analysis of the statute’s text, purpose, and history led it to
conclude that the Colorado Legislature intended precisely
to  abrogate  that  presumption  in  the  specific  context  of
domestic restraining orders.  That conclusion is eminently
reasonable and, I believe, worthy of our deference.2

——————

1 The Court of Appeals also looked to other provisions of the statute to
inform  its  analysis.    In  particular,  it  reasoned  that  a  provision  that
gave  police  officers  qualified  immunity  in  connection  with  their  en-
forcement  of  restraining  orders,  see  Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §18–6–803.5(5)
(Lexis  1999),  supported  the  inference  that  the  Colorado  Legislature
intended  mandatory  enforcement.    See  366  F. 3d  1093,  1108  (CA10
2004) (en banc).

2 The Court declines to show deference for the odd reason that, in its
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens in the case of Castle Rock v. Gonzales. It delves into the interpretation of a Colorado domestic restraining order statute and argues against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

11

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

quented  by  children,  this  conduct  may  be  observed  by
parents, teachers, or others.  Third, the internet offers an
unprecedented  degree  of  anonymity  and  easily  permits  a
would-be molester to assume a false identity.

The Court is correct that we should be cautious in apply-
ing our free speech precedents to the internet.  Ante, at 6.
Cyberspace is different from the physical world, and if it is
true,  as  the  Court  believes,  that  “we  cannot  appreciate
yet” the “full dimensions and vast potential” of “the Cyber
Age,”  ibid.,  we  should  proceed  circumspectly,  taking  one
step  at  a  time.  It  is  regrettable  that  the  Court  has  not
heeded its own admonition of caution.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito. It discusses the application of free speech precedents to the internet and the unique challenges posed by cyberspace.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

I

In urging the ratification of the Constitution, Alexander
Hamilton famously wrote that “the judiciary, from the na-
ture of its functions, will always be the least dangerous” of
“the  different  departments  of  power.”  The  Federalist
No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).  This was so, Hamilton
explained, because the Judiciary “will be least in a capacity
to annoy or injure” “the political rights of the Constitution.”
Ibid.  Whereas “[t]he executive not only dispenses the hon-
ors but holds the sword of the community,” and “[t]he legis-
lature  not  only  commands  the  purse  but  prescribes  the
rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to
be regulated,” the Judiciary “may truly be said to have nei-
ther FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.”  Ibid.

But that power of judgment can nonetheless bind the Ex-
ecutive and Legislature—and the States.  It is modest only
if confined to its proper sphere.  As John Marshall empha-
sized during his one term in the House of Representatives,
“[i]f the judicial power extended to every question under the
constitution” or “to every question under the laws and trea-
ties  of  the  United  States,”  then  “[t]he  division  of  power
[among the branches of Government] could exist no longer,
and the other departments would be swallowed up by the
judiciary.”  4  Papers  of  John  Marshall  95  (C. Cullen  ed.
1984) (quoted in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S.
332, 341 (2006)).  To maintain adequate separation between
the Judiciary, on the one hand, and the political branches
and the States, on the other, Article III of the Constitution
authorizes  federal  courts  to  decide  only  “Cases”  and
“Controversies”—that  is,  “cases  of  a  Judiciary  nature.”
2  Records  of  the  Federal  Convention  of  1787,  p. 430
(M. Farrand ed. 1966) (J. Madison).

The case-or-controversy requirement imposes fundamen-
tal restrictions on who can invoke federal jurisdiction and
what types of disputes federal courts can resolve.  As perti-
nent  here, “when  it  is impossible for  a  court to  grant  any
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a case. It contains legal arguments, citations to historical documents and legal precedents, and discusses the interpretation of the Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE BREYER, building on his solo opinion in Trinity Lu-
theran, would adopt a “flexible, context-specific approach”
that “may well vary” from case to case.  Post, at 14, 16; see
Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (BREYER, J., concurring
in judgment).  As best we can tell, courts applying this ap-
proach  would  contemplate  the  particular  benefit  and  re-
striction at issue and discern their relationship to religion
and society, taking into account “context and consequences
measured in light of [the] purposes” of the Religion Clauses.
Post, at 16–17, 19 (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S.
677,  700  (2005)  (BREYER,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment)).
What  is  clear  is  that  JUSTICE BREYER  would  afford  much
freer rein to judges than our current regime, arguing that
“there is ‘no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal
judgment.’ ”  Post, at 19 (quoting Van Orden, 545 U. S., at
700 (opinion of BREYER, J.)).

The simplest response is that these dissents follow from
prior  separate  writings,  not  from  the  Court’s  decision  in
Trinity  Lutheran  or  the  decades  of  precedent  on  which  it
relied.  These precedents have “repeatedly confirmed” the
straightforward rule that we apply today:  When otherwise
eligible  recipients  are  disqualified  from  a  public  benefit
“solely because of their religious character,” we must apply
strict scrutiny.  Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___–___ (slip
op., at 6–10).  This rule against express religious discrimi-
nation is no “doctrinal innovation.”  Post, at 13 (opinion of
BREYER, J.).  Far from it.  As Trinity Lutheran explained,
the  rule  is  “unremarkable  in  light  of  our  prior  decisions.”
582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10).

For  innovation,  one  must  look  to  the  dissents.    Their
“room[y]” or “flexible” approaches to discrimination against
religious organizations and observers would mark a signif-
icant departure from our free exercise precedents.  The pro-
tections  of  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  do  not  depend  on  a
“judgment-by-judgment  analysis”  regarding  whether  dis-
crimination  against  religious  adherents  would  somehow
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It argues against the majority opinion in a case, citing previous precedents and outlining a different approach to religious discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MATAL v. TAM

Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

I

Those few categories of speech that the government can
regulate  or  punish—for  instance,  fraud,  defamation,  or
incitement—are well established within our constitutional
tradition.  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468
(2010).  Aside  from  these  and  a  few  other  narrow  excep-
tions,  it  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  First  Amend-
ment  that  the  government  may  not  punish  or  suppress
speech  based  on  disapproval  of  the  ideas  or  perspectives
the  speech  conveys.  See  Rosenberger  v.  Rector  and  Visi-
tors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 828–829 (1995).

The First Amendment guards against laws “targeted at
specific  subject  matter,”  a  form  of  speech  suppression
known  as  content  based  discrimination.    Reed  v.  Town  of
Gilbert,  576  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2015)  (slip  op.,  at  12).    This
category includes a subtype of laws that go further, aimed
at  the  suppression  of  “particular  views  . . .  on  a  subject.”
Rosenberger,  515  U. S.,  at  829.    A  law  found  to  discrimi-
nate  based  on  viewpoint  is  an  “egregious  form  of  content
discrimination,” which is “presumptively unconstitutional.”
Id., at 829–830.

At its most basic, the test for viewpoint discrimination is
whether—within  the  relevant  subject  category—the  gov-
ernment has singled out a subset of messages for disfavor
based  on  the  views  expressed.  See  Cornelius  v.  NAACP
Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806 (1985)
(“[T]he government violates the First Amendment when it
denies  access  to  a  speaker  solely  to  suppress  the  point  of
view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject”).  In
the  instant  case,  the  disparagement  clause  the  Govern-
ment  now  seeks  to  implement  and  enforce  identifies  the
relevant  subject  as  “persons,  living  or  dead,  institutions,
beliefs, or national symbols.”  15 U. S. C. §1052(a).  Within
that  category,  an  applicant  may  register  a  positive  or
benign  mark  but  not  a  derogatory  one.    The  law  thus
reflects  the  Government’s  disapproval  of  a  subset  of  mes-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Matal v. Tam. It delves into the First Amendment's protection of speech and the concept of viewpoint discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U90

[09-15-00 14:33:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

368

PENNSYLVANIA BD. OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE v. SCOTT
Opinion of the Court

search knows that the subject of his search is a parolee. We
decline to adopt such an approach. We have never sug-
gested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every cir-
cumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence.
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 350; Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 174 (1969). Furthermore, such
a piecemeal approach to the exclusionary rule would add an
additional layer of collateral litigation regarding the ofﬁcer’s
knowledge of the parolee’s status.

In any event, any additional deterrence from the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court’s rule would be minimal. Where the
person conducting the search is a police ofﬁcer, the ofﬁcer’s
focus is not upon ensuring compliance with parole conditions
or obtaining evidence for introduction at administrative pro-
ceedings, but upon obtaining convictions of those who com-
mit crimes. The noncriminal parole proceeding “falls out-
side the offending ofﬁcer’s zone of primary interest.” Janis,
supra, at 458. Thus, even when the ofﬁcer knows that the
subject of his search is a parolee, the ofﬁcer will be deterred
from violating Fourth Amendment rights by the application
of the exclusionary rule to criminal trials.

Even when the ofﬁcer performing the search is a parole
ofﬁcer, the deterrence beneﬁts of the exclusionary rule re-
main limited. Parole agents, in contrast to police ofﬁcers,
are not “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime,” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 914;
instead, their primary concern is whether their parolees
should remain free on parole. Thus, their relationship with
parolees is more supervisory than adversarial. Grifﬁn v.
Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 879 (1987).
It is thus “unfair to
assume that the parole ofﬁcer bears hostility against the pa-
rolee that destroys his neutrality; realistically the failure of
the parolee is in a sense a failure for his supervising ofﬁcer.”
Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 485–486. Although this rela-
tionship does not prevent parole ofﬁcers from ever violating
the Fourth Amendment rights of their parolees, it does mean
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt. It contains legal arguments and citations, suggesting it's part of the main body of the document and not a preliminary section.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

BREYER, J., dissenting

officials whose actions are necessary to implement the stat-
ute’s  enforcement  powers.  There  may  be  other  not-very-
new procedural bottles that can also adequately hold what
is, in essence, very old and very important legal wine: The
ability to ask the Judiciary to protect an individual from the
invasion of a constitutional right—an invasion that threat-
ens immediate and serious injury.
  As THE CHIEF JUSTICE writes, this Court should not per-
mit the law to take effect without assuring the applicants
(and  the  respondents)  an  opportunity  first  and  fully  to
make (or to refute) these and other arguments supporting
the request for an injunction.

For  these  reasons,  and  for  the  reasons  stated  by  THE
CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN,
I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529BV$REG1

09-20-01 14:04:38

PGT (cid:127) USRULES

BUILDING REGULATIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

REGULATION 100–1
September 29, 1994

Subject: Public hours of the United States Supreme Court.

1. PURPOSE:

To prescribe hours that the Supreme Court building is

open to the public.

2. AUTHORITY:

Subject to the approval of the Chief Justice, the Marshal
may promulgate regulations as provided for under 63 Stat.
617, as amended, 40 U. S. C. § 13l.

3. POLICY:

The Supreme Court building at 1 First Street, N. E.,
Washington, D. C. 20543 is open to the public Monday
through Friday, from 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., except on federal
holidays. The building is closed at all other times, although
persons having legitimate business may be admitted at other
times when so authorized by responsible ofﬁcials.

1201
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a set of building regulations for the Supreme Court. It includes a title, regulation number, date, subject, and the first few sections outlining purpose, authority, and policy.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal document, regulation</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–954
_________________

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. TEXAS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 30, 2022]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
I agree with the Court that the District Court had juris-
diction over Texas’s suit.  I also agree with the Court that
the Government prevails on the merits of the two specific
legal  questions  presented  here.  I  note,  moreover,  that  six
Members of the Court agree with the Court’s merits conclu-
sion.  See post, at 1 (BARRETT, J., dissenting).

I write separately to briefly elaborate on my understand-
ing of the relevant statutory provisions and to point out one
legal issue that remains open for resolution on remand.

When the Department of Homeland Security lacks suffi-
cient capacity to detain noncitizens at the southern border
pending their immigration proceedings (often asylum pro-
ceedings),  the  immigration  laws  afford  DHS  two  primary
options.

Option one:  DHS may grant noncitizens parole into the
United States if parole provides a “significant public bene-
fit.”  8 U. S. C. §1182(d)(5)(A).  Parole entails releasing in-
dividuals  on  a  case-by-case  basis  into  the  United  States
subject to “reasonable assurances” that they “will appear at
all  hearings.”    8  CFR  §212.5(d)  (2020);  see  8  U. S. C.
§1182(d)(5)(A).  Notably, every Administration beginning in
the late 1990s has relied heavily on the parole option, in-
cluding  the  administrations  of  Presidents  Clinton,  Bush,
Obama, Trump, and Biden.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 49–54.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
GORSUCH, J., concurring

malevolent  motive  does  not  convert  a  facially  discrimina-
tory  policy  into  a  neutral  policy  with  a  discriminatory  ef-
fect” or “alter [its] intentionally discriminatory character”).
Nor does it matter if the recipient discriminates against an
individual member of a protected class with the idea that
doing  so  might  “favor”  the  interests  of  that  “class”  as  a
whole or otherwise “promot[e] equality at the group level.”
Bostock, 590 U. S., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 13, 15).  Title VI
prohibits  a  recipient  of  federal  funds  from  intentionally
treating  any  individual  worse  even  in  part  because  of  his
race,  color,  or  national  origin  and  without  regard  to  any
other reason or motive the recipient might assert.  Without
question, Congress in 1964 could have taken the law in var-
ious  directions.  But  to  safeguard  the  civil  rights  of  all
Americans,  Congress  chose  a  simple  and  profound  rule.
One holding that a recipient of federal funds may never dis-
criminate based on race, color, or national origin—period.
If  this  exposition  of  Title  VI  sounds  familiar,  it  should.
Just next door, in Title VII, Congress made it “unlawful . . .
for  an  employer  . . .  to  discriminate  against  any  individ-
ual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or  national  origin.”
§2000e–2(a)(1).    Appreciating  the
breadth  of  this  provision,  just  three  years  ago  this  Court
read its essentially identical terms the same way.  See Bos-
tock, 590 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 4–9).  This Court has
long  recognized,  too,  that  when  Congress  uses  the  same
terms in the same statute, we should presume they “have
the same meaning.”  IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34
(2005).  And that presumption surely makes sense here, for
as  Justice  Stevens  recognized  years  ago,  “[b]oth  Title  VI
and Title VII” codify a categorical rule of “individual equal-
ity,  without  regard  to  race.”  Regents  of  Univ.  of  Cal.  v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 416, n. 19 (1978) (opinion concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis de-
leted).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its relation to discrimination based on race.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v.
MORRISSEY-BERRU
Opinion of the Court

that the Religion Clauses foreclose certain employment dis-
crimination claims brought against religious organizations.
565  U. S.,  at  188.    The  constitutional  foundation  for  our
holding  was  the  general  principle  of  church  autonomy  to
which we have already referred: independence in matters
of faith and doctrine and in closely linked matters of inter-
nal government.  The three prior decisions on which we pri-
marily  relied  drew  on  this  broad  principle,  and  none  was
exclusively  concerned  with  the  selection  or  supervision  of
clergy.  Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (1872), involved a dis-
pute about the control of church property, and both Kedroff,
344  U. S.  94,  and  Serbian  Eastern  Orthodox  Diocese  for
United  States  and  Canada  v.  Milivojevich,  426  U. S.  696
(1976), also concerned the control of property, as well as the
appointment and authority of bishops.

In addition to these precedents, we looked to the “back-
ground”  against  which  “the  First  Amendment  was
adopted.”  Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U. S., at 183.  We noted that
16th-century  British  statutes  had  given  the  Crown  the
power to fill high “religious offices” and to control the exer-
cise  of  religion  in  other  ways,  and  we  explained  that  the
founding generation sought to prevent a repetition of these
practices in our country.  Ibid.  Because Cheryl Perich, the
teacher  in  Hosanna-Tabor,  had  a  title  that  included  the
word  “minister,”  we  naturally  concentrated  on  historical
events involving clerical offices, but the abuses we identi-
fied were not limited to the control of appointments.

We pointed to the various Acts of Uniformity, id., at 182,
which  dictated  what  ministers  could  preach  and  imposed
penalties for non-compliance.  Under the 1549 Act, a minis-
ter who “preach[ed,] declare[d,] or [spoke] any thing” in der-
ogation of any part of the Book of Common Prayer could be
sentenced  to  six  months  in  jail  for  a  first  offense  and  life
imprisonment for a third violation.  Act of Uniformity, 2 &
3 Edw. 6, ch. 1.  In addition, all other English subjects were
forbidden  to  say  anything  against  the  Book  of  Common
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v. MORRISSEY-BERRU. It delves into the legal principles surrounding employment discrimination claims against religious organizations, referencing previous court decisions and historical context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION

Syllabus

formation Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jun-
ior  Univ.,  489  U. S.  468,  478.    Section  2’s  saving  clause  permits
agreements  to  be  invalidated  by  “generally  applicable  contract  de-
fenses,”  but  not  by  defenses  that  apply  only  to  arbitration  or  derive
their  meaning  from  the  fact  that  an  agreement  to  arbitrate  is  at  is-
sue.  Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U. S. 681, 687.  Pp. 4–
5.

(b) In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court held that class
waivers  in  consumer  arbitration  agreements  are  unconscionable  if
the agreement is in an adhesion contract, disputes between the par-
ties  are  likely  to  involve  small  amounts  of  damages,  and  the  party
with  inferior  bargaining  power  alleges  a  deliberate  scheme  to  de-
fraud.  Pp. 5–6.

(c) The Concepcions claim that the Discover Bank rule is a ground
that  “exist[s]  at  law  or  in  equity  for  the  revocation  of  any  contract”
under FAA §2.  When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a
particular type of claim, the FAA displaces the conflicting rule.  But
the  inquiry  is  more  complex  when  a  generally  applicable  doctrine  is
alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors or interferes
with  arbitration.    Although  §2’s  saving  clause  preserves  generally
applicable contract defenses, it does not suggest an intent to preserve
state-law  rules  that  stand  as  an  obstacle  to  the  accomplishment  of
the  FAA’s  objectives.  Cf.  Geier  v.  American  Honda  Motor  Co.,  529
U. S.  861,  872.    The  FAA’s  overarching  purpose  is  to  ensure  the  en-
forcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to
facilitate  informal,  streamlined  proceedings.    Parties  may  agree  to
limit  the  issues  subject  to  arbitration,  Mitsubishi  Motors  Corp.  v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 628, to arbitrate accord-
ing to specific rules, Volt, supra, at 479, and to limit with whom they
will arbitrate, Stolt-Nielsen, supra, at ___.  Pp. 6–12.

(d) Class  arbitration,  to  the  extent  it  is  manufactured  by  Discover
Bank rather than consensual, interferes with fundamental attributes
of  arbitration.    The  switch  from  bilateral  to  class  arbitration  sacri-
fices  arbitration’s  informality  and  makes  the  process  slower,  more
costly,  and  more  likely  to  generate  procedural  morass  than  final
judgment.    And  class  arbitration  greatly  increases  risks  to  defen-
dants.  The absence of multilayered review makes it more likely that
errors will go uncorrected.  That risk of error may become unaccept-
able when damages allegedly owed to thousands of claimants are ag-
gregated  and  decided  at  once.    Arbitration  is  poorly  suited  to  these
higher  stakes.    In  litigation,  a  defendant  may  appeal  a  certification
decision  and  a  final  judgment,  but  9  U. S. C.  §10  limits  the  grounds
on which courts can vacate arbitral awards.  Pp. 12–18.

584 F. 3d 849, reversed and remanded.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing a court case. It is not the actual content of the book and is more of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Opinion of the Court

were  construed  to  require  States  to  maintain  their  laws
prohibiting  sports  gambling.  Brief  for  Respondents  38;
Brief  for  United  States  19.    They  invoke  the  canon  of
interpretation  that  a  statute  should  not  be  held  to  be
unconstitutional  if  there  is  any  reasonable  interpretation
that can save it.  See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___,
___ (2018) (slip op., at 12).  The plausibility of the alterna
tive interpretations is debatable, but even if the law could
be  interpreted  as  respondents  and  the  United  States
suggest,  it  would  still  violate  the  anticommandeering
principle, as we now explain.

III

A

The anticommandeering doctrine may sound arcane, but
it  is  simply  the  expression  of  a  fundamental  structural
decision  incorporated  into  the  Constitution,  i.e.,  the  deci
sion  to  withhold  from  Congress  the  power  to  issue  orders
directly  to  the  States.  When  the  original  States  declared
their  independence,  they  claimed  the  powers  inherent  in
sovereignty—in the words of the Declaration of Independ
ence,  the  authority  “to  do  all  . . .  Acts  and  Things  which
Independent States may of right do.”  ¶32.  The Constitu
tion limited but did not abolish the sovereign powers of the
States,  which  retained  “a  residuary  and  inviolable  sover
eignty.”  The  Federalist  No.  39,  p. 245  (C.  Rossiter  ed.
1961).  Thus, both the Federal Government and the States
wield  sovereign  powers,  and  that  is  why  our  system  of
government is said to be one of “dual sovereignty.”  Greg-
ory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 457 (1991).

The  Constitution  limits  state  sovereignty  in  several
ways.  It directly prohibits the States from exercising some
attributes  of  sovereignty.    See,  e.g.,  Art.  I,  §10.    Some
grants of power to the Federal Government have been held
to  impose  implicit  restrictions  on  the  States.    See,  e.g.,
Department  of  Revenue  of  Ky.  v.  Davis,  553  U. S.  328
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court case Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association. It discusses the anticommandeering doctrine and its application to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U72

[09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 11 (1998)

17

Opinion of the Court

to communications by a membership organization with its
members, App. 164–166, which the Act exempts from its
deﬁnition of “expenditures,” § 431(9)(B)(iii).
In AIPAC’s
view, these communications therefore did not violate § 441b’s
corporate expenditure prohibition.
2 Record, Doc. No. 19,
if AIPAC was right, those expenditures
pp. 2–6.
would not count toward the $1,000 ceiling on “expenditures”
that might transform an ordinary issue-related group into a
“political committee.”

§ 431(4).)

(And,

The FEC’s General Counsel concluded that, between 1983
and 1988, AIPAC had indeed funded communications of the
sort described. The General Counsel said that those ex-
penditures were campaign related, in that they amounted to
advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates.
App. 106–108. He added that these expenditures were
“likely to have crossed the $1,000 threshold.”
Id., at 146.
At the same time, the FEC closed the door to AIPAC’s invo-
cation of the “communications” exception. The FEC said
that, although it was a “close question,” these expenditures
were not membership communications, because that excep-
tion applies to a membership organization’s communications
with its members, and most of the persons who belonged to
AIPAC did not qualify as “members” for purposes of the Act.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 97a–98a; see also App. 170–173. Still,
given the closeness of the issue, the FEC exercised its dis-
cretion and decided not to proceed further with respect to
the claimed “corporate contribution” violation. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 98a.

The FEC’s determination that many of the persons who
belonged to AIPAC were not “members” effectively fore-
closed any claim that AIPAC’s communications did not count
as “expenditures” for purposes of determining whether
it was a “political committee.” Since AIPAC’s activities
fell outside the “membership communications” exception,
AIPAC could not invoke that exception as a way of escaping
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 11 (1998). It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific sections of the law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

THOMAS, J., dissenting

modern judgment would override “[f]ounding-[e]ra applica-
tions”).  At base, whether a person could keep, bear, or even
possess  firearms  would  be  Congress’s  policy  choice  under
the Government’s test.

That would be the direct inverse of the Founders’ and rat-
ifying public’s intent.  Instead of a substantive right guar-
anteed to every individual against Congress, we would have
a right controlled by Congress.  “A constitutional guarantee
subject to future judges’ [or Congresses’] assessments of its
usefulness  is  no  constitutional  guarantee  at  all.”    Heller,
554  U. S.,  at  634.  The  Second  Amendment  is  “the  very
product of an interest balancing by the people.”  Id., at 635.
It is this policy judgment—not that of modern and future
Congresses—“that  demands  our  unqualified  deference.”
Bruen, 597 U. S., at 26.

The Government’s own evidence exemplifies the dangers
of approaches based on generalized principles.  Before the
Court of Appeals, the Government pointed to colonial stat-
utes “disarming classes of people deemed to be threats, in-
cluding . . . slaves, and native Americans.”  Supp. Brief for
United States in No. 21–11001 (CA5), p. 33.  It argued that
since  early  legislatures  disarmed  groups  considered  to  be
“threats,” a modern Congress has the same authority.  Ibid.
The problem with such a view should be obvious.  Far from
an exemplar of Congress’s authority, the discriminatory re-
gimes  the  Government  relied  upon  are  cautionary  tales.
They warn that when majoritarian interests alone dictate
who is “dangerous,” and thus can be disarmed, disfavored
groups become easy prey.  One of many such examples was
the  treatment  of  freed  blacks  following  the  Civil  War.
“[M]any of the over 180,000 African-Americans who served
in the Union Army returned to the States of the old Confed-
eracy, where systematic efforts were made to disarm them
and other blacks.”  McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 771
formally  prohibited  African-
(2010).
  And,
Americans  from  possessing  firearms.”

Some  “States

  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *United States v. Rahimi*.  It discusses the Second Amendment and the intent of the Founders regarding gun ownership.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Syllabus

a §2255 motion.  That argument would nullify AEDPA’s limits on col-
lateral relief.

Jones suggests that denying him the chance to raise his Rehaif claim
in a §2241 petition would violate the Suspension Clause, U. S. Const.,
Art. I, §9, cl. 2.  This argument fails because it would extend the writ
of  habeas  corpus  far  beyond  its  scope  when  the  Constitution  was
drafted and ratified.  Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissi-
giam, 591 U. S. ___, ___.  When the Suspension Clause was adopted,
Jones’ Rehaif claim would not have been cognizable in habeas at all.
At the founding, a sentence after conviction “by a court of competent
jurisdiction” was “ ‘in itself sufficient cause’ ” for a prisoner’s continued
detention.  Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. ___, ___ (quoting Ex parte
Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202).  Of particular relevance here, a habeas court
had no power to “look beyond the judgment” to “re-examine the charges
on which it was rendered” for substantive errors of law—even “if . . .
the  [sentencing]  court  ha[d]  misconstrued  the  law,  and  ha[d]  pro-
nounced an offence to be punishable criminally, which [was] not so.”
Id., at 202, 209.  While Jones argues that pre-founding practice was
otherwise, he fails to identify a single clear case of habeas being used
to relitigate a conviction after trial by a court of general criminal juris-
diction.

The principles of Ex parte Watkins guided this Court’s understand-
ing of the habeas writ throughout the 19th century and well into the
20th.  See Brown, 596 U. S., at ___, n. 1 (collecting cases).  It was not
until 1974, in Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, that the Court held
for the first time that a substantive error of statutory law could be a
cognizable ground for a collateral attack on a federal court’s criminal
judgment.  See id., at 342–347.  The Suspension Clause neither consti-
tutionalizes that innovation nor requires its extension to a second or
successive collateral attack.

Jones’ remaining constitutional arguments are no more persuasive.
He argues that denying him a new opportunity for collateral review of
his Rehaif claim threatens Congress’s exclusive power to define crimes,
but a court does not usurp legislative power simply by misinterpreting
the law in a given case.  Next, Jones points to Fiore v. White, 531 U. S.
225 (per curiam), which applied the rule that due process requires that
the  prosecution  prove  every  element  of  a  crime  beyond a  reasonable
doubt.  But due process does not guarantee a direct appeal, McKane v.
Durston,  153  U. S.  684,  687,  let  alone  the  opportunity  to  have  legal
issues  redetermined  in  successive  collateral  attacks.    Finally,  the
Eighth Amendment’s constraint on the kinds of punishments govern-
ments  may  inflict  creates  no  independent  entitlement  to  a  second
round of postconviction review.  Pp. 12–20.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus section. It summarizes the arguments and holdings of the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1206

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

printed in typographic (as opposed to typewriter) characters.
The process used must produce a clear, black image on white
paper.  The  text  must  be  reproduced  with  a  clarity  that
equals or exceeds the output of a laser printer.

(b)  The  text  of  every  booklet-format  document,  including
any  appendix  thereto,  shall  be  typeset  in  a  Century  family
(e. g., Century Expanded, New  Century Schoolbook, or Cen
tury Schoolbook) 12-point type with 2-point or more leading
between  lines.  Quotations  in  excess  of  50  words  shall  be
indented.  The  typeface  of  footnotes  shall  be  10-point  type
with 2-point or more leading between lines.  The text of the
document must appear on both sides of the page.

(c)  Every  booklet-format  document  shall  be  produced  on
paper  that  is  opaque,  unglazed,  and  not  less  than  60  pounds
in weight, and shall have margins of at least three-fourths of
an inch on all sides.  The text ﬁeld, including footnotes, may
not exceed 41/8  by 71/8  inches.  The document shall be bound
ﬁrmly  in  at  least  two  places  along  the  left  margin  (saddle
stitch  or  perfect  binding  preferred)  so  as  to  permit  easy
opening,  and  no  part  of  the  text  should  be  obscured  by  the
binding.  Spiral,  plastic,  metal,  or  string  bindings  may  not
be used.  Copies of patent documents, except opinions, may
be  duplicated  in  such  size  as  is  necessary  in  a  separate
appendix.

(d)  Every booklet-format document, shall comply with the
word limits shown  on the chart in subparagraph  1(g) of this
Rule.  The  word  limits  do  not  include  the  questions  pre
sented, the list of parties and the corporate disclosure state
ment, the table of contents, the table of cited authorities, the
listing  of  counsel  at  the  end  of  the  document,  or  any  appen
dix.  The  word  limits  include  footnotes.  Verbatim  quota
tions  required  under  Rule  14.1(f),  if  set  out  in  the  text  of  a
brief  rather  than  in  the  appendix,  are  also  excluded.  For
good  cause,  the  Court  or  a  Justice  may  grant  leave  to  ﬁle  a
document  in  excess  of  the  word  limits,  but  application  for
such  leave  is  not  favored.  An  application  to  exceed  word
limits shall comply with Rule 22 and must be received by the
Clerk at least 15 days before the ﬁling date of the document
in question, except in the most extraordinary circumstances.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a set of rules or guidelines for formatting documents submitted to the Supreme Court. It outlines specific requirements for typography, paper quality, binding, and word limits.
  </thinking>
  <category>Rules and Formatting Guidelines</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM

Statement of GORSUCH, J.

Amendment  unless  the  State  can  show  they  are  the  least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling government in-
terest.  ___ F. 3d, at ___, 2021 WL 222814, *9.
  In cases implicating this form of “strict scrutiny,” courts
nearly  always  face  an  individual’s  claim  of  constitutional
right  pitted  against  the  government’s  claim  of  special  ex-
pertise  in  a  matter  of  high  importance  involving  public
health or safety.  It has never been enough for the State to
insist  on  deference  or  demand  that  individual  rights  give
way to collective interests.  Of course we are not scientists,
but neither may we abandon the field when government of-
ficials with experts in tow seek to infringe a constitutionally
protected  liberty.    The  whole  point  of  strict  scrutiny  is  to
test the government’s assertions, and our precedents make
plain that it has always been a demanding and rarely sat-
isfied  standard.    See  Lukumi,  508  U. S.,  at  546.    Even  in
times  of  crisis—perhaps  especially  in  times  of  crisis—we
have a duty to hold governments to the Constitution.
  Still, California says it can thread the needle.  It insists
that religious worship is so different that it demands espe-
cially onerous regulation.  The State offers essentially four
reasons  why:  It  says  that  religious  exercises  involve  (1)
large numbers of people mixing from different households;
(2) in close physical proximity; (3) for extended periods; (4)
with singing.
  No one before us disputes that factors like these may in-
crease the risk of transmitting COVID–19.  And no one need
doubt that the State has a compelling interest in reducing
that risk.  This Court certainly is not downplaying the suf-
fering many have experienced in this pandemic.  But Cali-
fornia errs to the extent it suggests its four factors are al-
ways present in worship, or always absent from the other
secular activities its regulations allow.  Nor has California
sought to explain why it cannot address its legitimate con-
cerns  with  rules  short  of  a  total  ban.    Each  of  the  State’s
shortcomings are telltale signs this Court has long used to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the legal standard of "strict scrutiny" and applies it to California's restrictions on religious gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS v. FTC

ALITO, J., dissenting

specifying  the  qualifications  to  practice  medicine  was
clearly  a  proper  exercise  of  the  police  power.    Thus,  the
North  Carolina  statutes  establishing  and  specifying  the
powers of the State Board of Dental Examiners represent
precisely  the  kind  of  state  regulation  that  the  Parker
exemption was meant to immunize.

II

As noted above, the only question in this case is whether
the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners is really a
state  agency,  and  the  answer  to  that  question  is  clearly
yes.

  The  North  Carolina  Legislature  determined  that  the
practice of dentistry “affect[s] the public health, safety
and  welfare”  of  North  Carolina’s  citizens  and  that
therefore  the  profession  should  be  “subject  to  regula-
tion and control in the public interest” in order to en-
sure  “that  only  qualified  persons  be  permitted  to
practice dentistry in the State.”  N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§90–22(a) (2013).

  To further that end, the legislature created the North
Carolina  State  Board  of  Dental  Examiners  “as  the
agency  of  the  State  for  the  regulation  of  the  practice
of dentistry in th[e] State.”  §90–22(b).

  The  legislature  specified  the  membership  of  the
Board.  §90–22(c).  It  defined  the  “practice  of  dentis-
try,” §90–29(b), and it set out standards for licensing
practitioners,  §90–30.  The  legislature  also  set  out
standards  under  which  the  Board  can  initiate  disci-
plinary  proceedings  against  licensees  who  engage  in
certain improper acts.  §90–41(a).

  The legislature empowered the Board to “maintain an
action  in  the  name  of  the  State  of  North  Carolina  to
perpetually  enjoin  any  person  from  . . .  unlawfully
practicing dentistry.”  §90–40.1(a).  It authorized the
Board  to  conduct  investigations  and  to  hire  legal
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

142

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Opinion of the Court

Consequently, the analogy made by the FDA and the dis-
sent to highly toxic drugs used in the treatment of various
cancers is unpersuasive. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44413 (1996);
post, at 177 (opinion of Breyer, J.). Although “dangerous”
in some sense, these drugs are safe within the meaning of
the Act because, for certain patients, the therapeutic beneﬁts
outweigh the risk of harm. Accordingly, such drugs cannot
properly be described as “dangerous to health” under 21
U. S. C. § 352( j). The same is not true for tobacco products.
As the FDA has documented in great detail, cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco are an unsafe means to obtaining any
pharmacological effect.

The dissent contends that our conclusion means that “the
FDCA requires the FDA to ban outright ‘dangerous’ drugs
or devices,” post, at 174, and that this is a “perverse” reading
of the statute, post, at 174, 180. This misunderstands our
holding. The FDA, consistent with the FDCA, may clearly
regulate many “dangerous” products without banning them.
Indeed, virtually every drug or device poses dangers under
certain conditions. What the FDA may not do is conclude
that a drug or device cannot be used safely for any therapeu-
tic purpose and yet, at the same time, allow that product to
remain on the market. Such regulation is incompatible with
the FDCA’s core objective of ensuring that every drug or
device is safe and effective.

Considering the FDCA as a whole, it is clear that Con-
gress intended to exclude tobacco products from the FDA’s
jurisdiction. A fundamental precept of the FDCA is that
any product regulated by the FDA—but not banned—must
be safe for its intended use. Various provisions of the Act
make clear that this refers to the safety of using the product
to obtain its intended effects, not the public health ramiﬁca-
tions of alternative administrative actions by the FDA.
That is, the FDA must determine that there is a reasonable
assurance that the product’s therapeutic beneﬁts outweigh
the risk of harm to the consumer. According to this stand-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

863

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10950.  Barber  v.  Florida.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  Fla.,  5th

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  4  So.  3d  9.

No. 08–10951.  Bates v.  United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  552  F.  3d  472.

No.  08–10952.  Bavishi  v.  UBS  Financial  Services,  Inc.,

et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10953.  Broomfield v.  United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  441.

No.  08–10955.  Bennett  v.  Hulick,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10956.  Blackshear  v.  Dowling  et  al.  C.  A.  11th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10957.  Sanders  v.  Department  of  Housing  and
Urban Development et al.  C. A. 7th Cir.  Certiorari denied.

No.  08–10958.  Handley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10960.  Johnson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  583.

No.  08–10961.  King  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  810.

No.  08–10962.  Rojas-Barrera  v.  Wengler,  Warden.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10963.  Redd et al. v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10964.  McClain  v.  Warren,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10965.  Lowe  v.  Ohio.  Sup.  Ct.  Ohio.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  120  Ohio  St.  3d  1451,  898  N.  E.  2d  966.

No.  08–10966.  Doolin  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  45  Cal.  4th  390,  198  P.  3d  11.

No.  08–10967.  Medina-Beltran  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  542  F.  3d  729.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It's not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary rather than the actual content of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

The  notion that  such  laws  may  be  void  under  the  Consti-
tution’s  Due  Process  Clauses,  however,  is  a  more  recent
development.

Before  the  end  of  the  19th  century,  courts  addressed
vagueness  through  a  rule  of  strict  construction  of  penal
statutes,  not  a  rule  of  constitutional  law.    This  rule  of
construction—better  known  today  as  the  rule  of  lenity—
first  emerged  in  16th-century  England  in  reaction  to
Parliament’s  practice  of  making  large  swaths  of  crimes
capital  offenses,  though  it  did  not  gain  broad  acceptance
until  the  following  century.    See  Hall,  Strict  or  Liberal
Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 749–
751 (1935); see also 1 L. Radzinowicz, A History of English
Criminal Law and Its Administration From 1750, pp. 10–
11  (1948)  (noting  that  some  of  the  following  crimes  trig-
gered  the  death  penalty:  “marking  the  edges  of  any
current coin of the kingdom,” “maliciously cutting any hop-
binds  growing  on  poles  in  any  plantation  of  hops,”  and
“being  in  the  company  of  gypsies”).    Courts  relied  on  this
rule  of  construction  in  refusing  to  apply  vague  capital-
offense statutes to prosecutions before them.  As an exam-
ple  of  this  rule,  William  Blackstone  described  a  notable
instance  in  which  an  English  statute  imposing  the  death
penalty  on  anyone  convicted  of  “stealing  sheep,  or  other
cattle”  was “held to extend to nothing but mere sheep” as
“th[e]  general  words,  ‘or  other  cattle,’  [were]  looked  upon
as much too loose to create a capital offence.”  1 Commen-
taries on the Laws of England 88 (1765).2

——————

2 At the time, the ordinary meaning of the word “cattle” was not lim-
ited to cows, but instead encompassed all “[b]easts of pasture; not wild
nor  domestick.”    1  S.  Johnson,  A  Dictionary  of  the  English  Language
(4th  ed.  1773).    Parliament  responded  to  the  judicial  refusal  to  apply
the  provision  to  “cattle”  by  passing  “another  statute,  15  Geo.  II.  c.  34,
extending the [law] to bulls, cows, oxen, steers, bullocks, heifers, calves,
and  lambs,  by  name.”    1  Blackstone,  Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of
England, at 88.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Johnson v. United States. It discusses the historical development of the rule of lenity in interpreting vague penal statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J.

down  the  list.  I  am  certain  they  did  this  because  they
found  it  more  effective  to  have  Members  make  calls.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting Simon Decl. ¶7).

Senator John McCain: “ ‘[T]he parties encourage Members
of Congress to raise large amounts of soft money to benefit
their  own  and  others’  re-election.  At  one  recent  caucus
meeting,  a  Member  of  Congress  was  praised  for  raising
$1.3  million  dollars  for  the  party.    James  Greenwood,  a
Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, recently told
the  New  York  Times  that  House  leaders  consider  soft
money  fundraising  prowess  in  assigning  chairmanships
and  other  sought-after  jobs.  .  .  .  I  share  Mr.  Greenwood’s
concerns.’ ”  Id., at 476 (quoting McCain Decl. ¶7).

Representative  Christopher  Shays:  “ ‘Soft  money  is  raised
directly  by  federal  candidates,  officeholders,  and  national
political party leaders.  National party officials often raise
these funds by promising donors access to elected officials.
The national parties and national congressional campaign
committees  also  request  that  Members  of  Congress  make
the calls to soft money donors to solicit more funds.’ ”  Id.,
at 471 (quoting Shays Decl. ¶18).

Representative  Marty  Meehan:  “ ‘Members  of  Congress
raise money for the national party committees, and I have
been  involved  in  such  fund-raising  for  the  Democratic
Party.    At  the  request  of  the  Party  Members  of  Congress
go  to  the  [DCCC]  and  call  prospective  donors  from  lists
provided by the Party to ask them to participate in Party
events,  such  as  DCCC  dinners  or  Democratic  National
Committee (DNC) dinners.  These lists typically consist of
persons  who  have  contributed  to  the  Democratic  Party  in
the past.’ ”  251 F. Supp. 2d, at 471 (quoting Meehan Decl.
in  Republican  National  Committee  v.  FEC,  No.  98–CV–
1207 (DC), ¶6).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion. It includes quotations and citations, suggesting it is part of the main body of the text and not a separate element like a table of contents or introductory paragraph.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

1175

(b)  A  list  of  all  parties  to  the  proceeding  in  the  court
whose judgment is sought to be reviewed (unless the caption
of the case contains the names of all the parties), and a corpo
rate disclosure statement as required by Rule 29.6.

(c)  If  the  petition  exceeds  ﬁve  pages  or  1,500  words,  a
table of contents and a table of cited authorities.  The table
of contents shall include the items contained in the appendix.
(d)  Citations  of  the  ofﬁcial  and  unofﬁcial  reports  of  the
opinions and orders entered in the case by courts or adminis
trative agencies.

(e)  A concise statement of the basis for jurisdiction in this

Court, showing:

(i)  the  date  the  judgment  or  order  sought  to  be  re
viewed was entered (and, if applicable, a statement that
the petition is ﬁled under this Court’s Rule 11);

(ii)  the  date  of  any  order  respecting  rehearing,  and
the  date  and  terms  of  any  order  granting  an  extension
of time to ﬁle the petition for a writ of certiorari;

(iii)  express  reliance  on  Rule  12.5,  when  a  cross-
petition  for a  writ  of certiorari  is  ﬁled  under that  Rule,
and  the  date  of  docketing  of  the  petition  for  a  writ  of
certiorari in  connection with which  the cross-petition is
ﬁled;

(iv)  the statutory provision believed to confer on this
Court  jurisdiction  to  review  on  a  writ  of  certiorari  the
judgment or order in question; and

(v)  if applicable, a statement that the notiﬁcations re

quired by Rule 29.4(b) or (c) have been made.

(f)  The  constitutional  provisions,  treaties,  statutes,  ordi
nances,  and  regulations  involved  in  the  case,  set  out  verba
tim with appropriate citation.  If the provisions involved are
lengthy,  their  citation  alone  sufﬁces  at  this  point,  and  their
pertinent text shall be set out in the appendix referred to in
subparagraph 1(i).

(g)  A  concise  statement  of  the  case  setting  out  the  facts
material to consideration of the questions presented, and also
containing the following:
  </content>
  <thinking>
This content appears to be a set of rules or guidelines for filing a petition with the Supreme Court. It outlines specific requirements for the petition's structure and content, including information about parties, jurisdiction, cited authorities, and relevant legal provisions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Rules and Guidelines</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16

WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES

Opinion of the Court

without  some  common  direction.  Respondents  attempt  to
make  that  showing  by  means  of  statistical  and  anecdotal
evidence, but their evidence falls well short.

The statistical evidence consists primarily of regression
analyses  performed  by  Dr.  Richard  Drogin,  a  statistician,
and  Dr.  Marc  Bendick,  a  labor  economist.    Drogin  con-
ducted his  analysis region-by-region, comparing the num-
ber  of  women  promoted  into  management  positions  with
the  percentage  of  women  in  the  available  pool  of  hourly
workers.  After  considering  regional  and  national  data,
Drogin  concluded  that  “there  are  statistically  significant
disparities  between  men  and  women  at  Wal-Mart  .  . .
[and] these disparities . . . can be explained only by gender
discrimination.”  603  F. 3d,  at  604  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted).    Bendick  compared  work-force  data  from
Wal-Mart  and  competitive  retailers  and  concluded  that
Wal-Mart “promotes a lower percentage of women than its
competitors.”  Ibid.

Even  if  they  are  taken  at  face  value,  these  studies  are
insufficient  to  establish  that  respondents’  theory  can  be
proved on a classwide basis.  In Falcon, we held that one
named plaintiff ’s experience of discrimination was insuffi-
cient  to  infer  that  “discriminatory  treatment  is  typical  of
[the employer’s employment] practices.”  457 U. S., at 158.
A similar failure of inference arises here.  As Judge Ikuta
observed in her dissent, “[i]nformation about disparities at
the  regional  and  national  level  does  not  establish  the
existence of disparities at individual stores, let alone raise
the inference that a company-wide policy of discrimination
is implemented by discretionary decisions at the store and
district level.”  603 F. 3d, at 637.  A regional pay disparity,
for  example,  may  be  attributable  to  only  a  small  set  of
Wal-Mart  stores,  and  cannot  by  itself  establish  the  uni-
form,  store-by-store  disparity  upon  which  the  plaintiffs’
theory of commonality depends.

There  is  another,  more  fundamental,  respect  in  which
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing statistical evidence presented in a case against Wal-Mart. It delves into the legal arguments regarding the sufficiency of this evidence to establish a company-wide policy of gender discrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

274

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

GEBSER et al. v. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit

No. 96–1866. Argued March 25, 1998—Decided June 22, 1998

Petitioner Gebser, a high school student in respondent Lago Vista Inde-
pendent School District, had a sexual relationship with one of her teach-
ers. She did not report the relationship to school ofﬁcials. After the
couple was discovered having sex and the teacher was arrested, Lago
Vista terminated his employment. During this time, the district had
not distributed an ofﬁcial grievance procedure for lodging sexual harass-
ment complaints or a formal antiharassment policy, as required by fed-
eral regulations. Gebser and her mother, also a petitioner here, ﬁled
suit raising, among other things, a claim for damages against Lago Vista
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which provides
in pertinent part that a person cannot “be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal ﬁnancial
assistance,” 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). The Federal District Court granted
Lago Vista summary judgment.
In afﬁrming, the Fifth Circuit held
that school districts are not liable under Title IX for teacher-student
sexual harassment unless an employee with supervisory power over the
offending employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power to end
it, and failed to do so, and ruled that petitioners could not satisfy that
standard.

Held: Damages may not be recovered for teacher-student sexual harass-
ment in an implied private action under Title IX unless a school district
ofﬁcial who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures
on the district’s behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indiffer-
ent to, the teacher’s misconduct. Pp. 280–293.

(a) The express statutory means of enforcing Title IX is administra-
tive, as the statute directs federal agencies who distribute education
funding to establish requirements in furtherance of the nondiscrimina-
tion mandate and allows agencies to enforce those requirements, in-
cluding ultimately by suspending or terminating federal funding. The
Court held in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, that
Title IX is also enforceable through an implied private right of action.
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60, the Court
established that monetary damages are available in such an action,
but made no effort to delimit the circumstances in which that remedy
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of legal cases and are not typically considered the primary content meant for reading and understanding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

against any citizen because of his race.’ ”  Bolling v. Sharpe,
347  U. S.  497,  499  (1954)  (quoting  Gibson  v.  Mississippi,
162 U. S. 565, 591 (1896) (Harlan, J., for the Court)).  As we
recounted  in  striking  down  the  State  of  Virginia’s  ban  on
interracial marriage 13 years after Brown, the Fourteenth
Amendment “proscri[bes] . . . all invidious racial discrimi-
nations.”  Loving  v.  Virginia,  388  U. S.  1,  8  (1967).    Our
cases had thus “consistently denied the constitutionality of
measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of
race.”  Id., at 11–12; see also Yick Wo, 118 U. S., at 373–375
(commercial  property);  Shelley  v.  Kraemer,  334  U. S.  1
(1948) (housing covenants); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S.
475 (1954) (composition of juries); Dawson, 350 U. S., at 877
(beaches and bathhouses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879
(1955)  (per curiam)  (golf  courses);  Browder,  352  U. S.,  at
903 (busing); New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v.
Detiege, 358 U. S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (public parks); Bai-
ley v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 (1962) (per curiam) (transpor-
tation  facilities);  Swann  v.  Charlotte-Mecklenburg  Bd.  of
Ed., 402 U. S. 1 (1971) (education); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U. S. 79 (1986) (peremptory jury strikes).

These  decisions  reflect  the  “core  purpose”  of  the  Equal
Protection  Clause:  “do[ing]  away  with  all  governmentally
imposed discrimination based on race.”  Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U. S. 429, 432 (1984) (footnote omitted).  We have rec-
ognized that repeatedly.  “The clear and central purpose of
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  to  eliminate  all  official
state  sources  of  invidious  racial  discrimination  in  the
States.”  Loving,  388  U. S.,  at  10;  see  also  Washington  v.
Davis,  426  U. S.  229,  239  (1976)  (“The  central  purpose  of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is  the  prevention  of  official  conduct  discriminating  on  the
basis of race.”); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 192
(1964) (“[T]he historical fact [is] that the central purpose of
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  to  eliminate  racial  dis-
crimination.”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the Fourteenth Amendment and its prohibition against racial discrimination. It cites numerous previous Supreme Court cases that support this principle.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

25

STEVENS, J., dissenting

With all of these sources upon which to draw, it is strik
ingly  significant  that  Madison’s  first  draft  omitted  any
mention  of  nonmilitary  use  or  possession  of  weapons.
Rather,  his  original  draft  repeated  the  essence  of  the  two
proposed  amendments  sent  by  Virginia,  combining  the
substance of the two provisions succinctly into one, which
read: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia
being  the  best  security  of  a  free  country;  but  no  person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled
to render military service in person.”  Cogan 169.

Madison’s decision to model the Second Amendment on

the  distinctly  military  Virginia  proposal  is  therefore  re
vealing,  since  it  is  clear  that  he  considered  and  rejected
formulations  that  would  have  unambiguously  protected
civilian uses of firearms.  When Madison prepared his first
draft, and when that draft was debated and modified, it is
reasonable to assume that all participants in the drafting
process  were  fully  aware  of  the  other  formulations  that
would have protected civilian use and possession of weap
ons and that their choice to craft the Amendment as they
did  represented  a  rejection  of  those  alternative  formula
tions.

Madison’s initial inclusion of an exemption for conscien
tious objectors sheds revelatory light on the purpose of the
Amendment.  It  confirms  an  intent  to  describe  a  duty  as
well as a right, and it unequivocally identifies the military
character  of  both.    The  objections  voiced  to  the  conscien
tious-objector  clause  only  confirm  the  central  meaning  of
the  text.  Although  records  of  the  debate  in  the  Senate,
which  is  where  the  conscientious-objector  clause  was
——————

the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a
free State; that Standing Armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as
dangerous to liberty; and that, in all cases, the military should be under
strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.”  1 Schwartz
234.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the historical context and interpretation of the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

539

Opinion of the Court

The better understanding of Collins’ discussion of the
Ex Post Facto Clause is that it eliminated a doctrinal hitch
that had developed in our cases, which purported to deﬁne
the scope of the Clause along an axis distinguishing be-
tween laws involving “substantial protections” and those
that are merely “procedural.” Both Kring v. Missouri, 107
U. S. 221 (1883), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343
(1898)—the two cases Collins overruled—relied on just
In overruling them, the Court correctly
that distinction.
pointed out, “the prohibition which may not be evaded is
the one deﬁned by the Calder categories.”
497 U. S., at 46.
Accordingly, Collins held that it was a mistake to stray be-
yond Calder’s four categories, not that the fourth category
was itself mistaken.28

VII

Texas next argues that even if the fourth category exists,
it is limited to laws that retrospectively alter the burden
of proof (which Article 38.07 does not do). See also post, at
572 (dissenting opinion).
It comes to this conclusion on the
basis of two pieces of evidence. The ﬁrst is our decision in
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867). The second con-
cerns Texas’ historical understanding of Fenwick’s case.

28 The dissent would have us dismiss our numerous and repeated invo-
cations of the fourth category, see supra, at 525, because they were merely
“mechanical . . . recitation[s]” in cases that did not depend on the fourth
category. Post, at 568.
Instead, the dissent would glean original mean-
ing from Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 (1925), and Collins v. Youngblood,
497 U. S. 37 (1990). Post, at 567–568. First of all, the dissent is factually
mistaken; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867), relied on the fourth
category in invalidating the laws at issue there. See infra this page and
540–541. And Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884) (discussed
infra, at 542–547), speciﬁcally distinguished category four. See post, at
570–571 (“Hopt .
. retain[ed] Calder’s fourth category”). Second, as
mentioned above, neither Beazell nor Collins relied on the fourth category,
so it is not apparent why the dissent would place so much emphasis on
those two cases that did not depend on category four.

.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 513 (2000). It discusses the Ex Post Facto Clause and the legal precedent surrounding it.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011)

7

Opinion of the Court

to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3), and that they could serve as ade-
quate class representatives, see Rule 23(a)(4).  Id., at 614–
615.  With respect to the Rule 23(b)(2) question, the Ninth
Circuit  held  that  respondents’  backpay  claims  could  be
certified  as  part  of  a  (b)(2)  class  because  they  did  not
“predominat[e]”  over  the  requests  for  declaratory  and
injunctive  relief,  meaning  they  were  not  “superior  in
strength,  influence,  or  authority”  to  the  nonmonetary
claims.  Id., at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted).4

Finally, the Court of Appeals determined that the action
could  be  manageably  tried  as  a  class  action  because  the
District Court could adopt the approach the Ninth Circuit
approved in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F. 3d 767, 782–
787  (1996).  There  compensatory  damages  for  some  9,541
class  members  were  calculated  by  selecting  137  claims  at
random,  referring  those  claims  to  a  special  master  for
valuation, and then extrapolating the validity and value of
the untested claims from the sample set.  See 603 F. 3d, at
625–626.  The  Court  of  Appeals  “s[aw]  no  reason  why  a
similar  procedure  to  that  used  in  Hilao  could  not  be  em-
ployed in this case.”  Id., at 627.  It would allow Wal-Mart
“to  present  individual  defenses  in  the  randomly  selected
‘sample cases,’ thus revealing the approximate percentage
of class members whose unequal pay or nonpromotion was
due  to  something  other  than  gender  discrimination.”
Ibid., n. 56 (emphasis deleted).
——————

4 To enable that result, the Court of Appeals trimmed the (b)(2) class
in  two  ways:  First,  it  remanded  that  part  of  the  certification  order
which included respondents’ punitive-damages claim in the (b)(2) class,
so that the District Court might consider whether that might cause the
monetary relief to predominate.  603 F. 3d, at 621.  Second, it accepted
in  part  Wal-Mart’s  argument  that  since  class  members  whom  it  no
longer  employed  had  no  standing  to  seek  injunctive  or  declaratory
relief, as to them monetary claims must predominate.  It excluded from
the  certified  class  “those  putative  class  members  who  were  no  longer
Wal-Mart employees at the time Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed,” id., at
623 (emphasis added).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing class action certification and the arguments made by both parties. It contains legal terminology and references to case law, indicating its suitability for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Second, a public accommodations law ensures equal dig-
nity in the common market.  Indeed, that is the law’s “fun-
damental object”: “to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to
public  establishments.’ ”  Heart  of  Atlanta  Motel,  Inc.  v.
United  States,  379  U. S.  241,  250  (1964)  (quoting  S. Rep.
No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 (1964)).  This purpose does
not  depend  on  whether  goods  or  services  are  otherwise
available.  “ ‘Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents,
hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration,
and embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he
is  told  that  he  is  unacceptable  as  a  member  of  the  public
because of his [social identity].  It is equally the inability to
explain to a child that regardless of education, civility, cour-
tesy, and morality he will be denied the right to enjoy equal
treatment.’ ”    379  U. S.,  at  292  (Goldberg,  J.,  concurring).
When a young Jewish girl and her parents come across a
business with a sign out front that says, “ ‘No dogs or Jews
allowed,’ ”3 the fact that another business might serve her
family does not redress that “stigmatizing injury,” Roberts,
468  U. S.,  at  625.  Or,  put  another  way,  “the  hardship
Jackie Robinson suffered when on the road” with his base-
ball team “was not an inability to find some hotel that would
have him; it was the indignity of not being allowed to stay
in the same hotel as his white teammates.”  J. Oleske, The
Evolution of Accommodation, 50 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib.
L. Rev. 99, 138 (2015).

To illustrate, imagine a funeral home in rural Mississippi
agrees to transport and cremate the body of an elderly man
who has passed away, and to host a memorial lunch.  Upon
learning  that  the  man’s  surviving  spouse  is  also  a  man,
however, the funeral home refuses to deal with the family.

——————

3 Hearings on the Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg To Be Associate
Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  before  the  Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 (1993).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It cites legal precedents and uses legal language.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

1310

INDEX

EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972.

Title IX—Implied cause of action—Teacher-student sexual harass-
ment.—Monetary damages in a Title IX implied cause of action may not
be recovered for teacher-student sexual harassment unless a school dis-
trict ofﬁcial with authority to institute corrective measures on district’s
behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, teacher’s
misconduct. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., p. 274.

EIGHTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, III.

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT. See Jurisdiction, 2.

EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974.

Group health plan—Continuation of coverage.—Where Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 amended ERISA to permit a
beneﬁciary of an employer’s group health plan to elect continuing coverage
that he might otherwise lose because of a qualifying event, such as termi-
nation of employment, an employer may not deny such continuation cover-
age to a qualiﬁed beneﬁciary who is covered under another health plan at
time he elects COBRA coverage. Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp., p. 74.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Civil Rights Act of 1964; Con-
stitutional Law, II, 1; IX, 1; Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964.

ENHANCED SENTENCES. See Criminal Law, 2.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION. See Comprehensive Environmen-

tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.

EXCESSIVE FINES. See Constitutional Law, III.

EXCLUSIONARY RULE. See Constitutional Law, VIII.

EXTRADITION. See Constitutional Law, IV.

FEAR OF FOREIGN PROSECUTION. See Constitutional Law, VII.

FEDERAL COURTS. See Jurisdiction, 2.

FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971. See Standing to

Sue, 2.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. See Jurisdiction, 1.

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See Communications Act of 1934;

Criminal Law, 2; Jurisdiction, 2.

FIFTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, I; II, 1; V; VII; IX.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index of legal topics and corresponding case names. It is not sequential text meant to be read in order and does not contain the actual content of the book.
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

548

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

law, demonstrates that Texas perceived the issue of witness
trustworthiness as both an admissibility issue and as a sufﬁ-
ciency question; that it long ago abandoned its rule that vic-
tims of these types of crimes are incompetent as witnesses;
and that Article 38.07 codiﬁes Texas’ sufﬁciency of the evi-
dence solution to the trustworthiness issue.

Next, the dissent argues that under Texas’ law “the prose-
cution need not introduce the victim’s testimony at all, much
In-
less any corroboration of that testimony.” Post, at 559.
stead, “[u]nder both the old and new versions of the statute,
a conviction could be sustained on the testimony of a single
third-party witness, on purely circumstantial evidence, or
Ibid. Because other ave-
in any number of other ways.”
nues of prosecution—besides the victim’s testimony (with or
without corroboration or outcry)—remain available to the
State, Article 38.07 “did not change the quantity of proof
necessary to convict in every case.” Post, at 560 (emphasis
added in part and deleted in part); see also post, at 561 (“Ar-
ticle 38.07 has never dictated what it takes in all cases . . .
for evidence to be sufﬁcient to convict” (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, the dissent urges, more evidence (in the form
of corroboration) is not really required under Article 38.07.
See post, at 560–561, 574.
It is unclear whether the dissent’s
argument is that laws cannot be sufﬁciency of the evidence
rules unless they apply to every conviction for a particular
crime, or whether the dissent means that sufﬁciency rules
not applicable in every prosecution for a particular crime do
not fall within Calder’s fourth category, which refers to less
testimony “required . . . in order to convict the offender.”
3 Dall., at 390 (emphasis added in part and deleted in part).
Either way, the argument fails.

Fenwick’s case once again provides the guide. The dis-
sent agrees that “[t]he treason statute in effect at the time
like the Treason Clause of
of John Fenwick’s conspiracy,
our Constitution, embodied .
. a quantitative sufﬁciency
.
[of the evidence] rule.” Post, at 573. But, it argues, Fen-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's decision. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

refers to a “manner or circumstance,” the Government sim-
ultaneously ignores the definition’s further instruction that
such  manner  or  circumstance  already  will  “ ‘ha[ve]  been
stated,’ ”  “ ‘asserted,’ ”  or  “ ‘described.’ ”    Id.,  at  18  (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1246; 15 Oxford English Diction-
ary, at 887).  Under the Government’s approach, the rele-
vant  circumstance—the  one  rendering  a  person’s  conduct
illegal—is not identified earlier in the statute.  Instead, “so”
captures  any  circumstance-based  limit  appearing  any-
where—in the United States Code, a state statute, a private
agreement, or anywhere else.  And while the Government
tries to cabin its interpretation by suggesting that any such
limit must be “specifically and explicitly” stated, “express,”
and “inherent in the authorization itself,” the Government
does  not  identify  any  textual  basis  for  these  guardrails.
Brief for United States 19; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41.

Van Buren’s account of “so”—namely, that “so” references
the previously stated “manner or circumstance” in the text
of  §1030(e)(6)  itself—is  more  plausible  than  the  Govern-
ment’s.  “So” is not a free-floating term that provides a hook
for  any  limitation  stated  anywhere.    It  refers  to  a  stated,
identifiable  proposition  from  the  “preceding”  text;  indeed,
“so” typically “[r]epresent[s]” a “word or phrase already em-
ployed,” thereby avoiding the need for repetition.  15 Oxford
English Dictionary, at 887; see Webster’s Third New Inter-
national Dictionary 2160 (1986) (so “often used as a substi-
tute . . . to express the idea of a preceding phrase”).  Myriad
federal statutes illustrate this ordinary usage.3  We agree
——————

3 See, e.g., 7 U. S. C. §171(8) (authorizing Secretary of Agriculture “[t]o
sell  guayule  or  rubber  processed  from  guayule  and  to  use  funds  so  ob-
tained  in  replanting  and  maintaining  an  area”);  18  U. S. C.  §648  (any
person  responsible  for  “safe-keeping of  the  public  moneys”  who  “loans,
uses, or converts to his own use . . . any portion of the public moneys . . .
is guilty of embezzlement of the money so loaned, used, converted, de-
posited, or exchanged”); §1163 (“[W]hoever embezzles, steals, [or] know-
ingly  converts  to  his  use”  money  or  property  “belonging  to  any  Indian
tribal  organization,”  or  “[w]hoever,  knowing  any  such  moneys  . . .  or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, focusing on the interpretation of a specific statute. It contains legal jargon and references to case law, indicating its suitability for indexing in a legal document repository.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

25

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

people, who are responsible for making “new dimensions of
freedom  . . .  apparent  to  new  generations,”  for  providing
“formal discourse” on social issues, and for ensuring “neu-
tral discussions, without scornful or disparaging commen-
tary.”  Ante, at 7–9.

Nowhere  is  the  majority’s  extravagant  conception  of
judicial supremacy more evident than in its description—
and  dismissal—of  the  public  debate  regarding  same-sex
marriage.  Yes,  the  majority  concedes,  on  one  side  are
thousands  of  years  of  human  history  in  every  society
known  to  have  populated  the  planet.  But  on  the  other
side, there has been “extensive litigation,” “many thought-
ful  District  Court  decisions,”  “countless  studies,  papers,
books,  and  other  popular  and  scholarly  writings,”  and
“more than 100” amicus briefs in these cases alone.  Ante,
at  9,  10,  23.  What  would  be  the  point  of  allowing  the
democratic process to go on?  It is high time for the Court
to decide the meaning of marriage, based on five lawyers’
“better informed understanding” of “a liberty that remains
urgent in our own era.”  Ante, at 19.  The answer is surely
there in one of those amicus briefs or studies.

Those who founded our country would not recognize the
majority’s  conception  of  the  judicial  role.    They  after  all
risked  their  lives  and  fortunes  for  the  precious  right  to
govern  themselves.    They  would  never  have  imagined
yielding  that  right  on  a  question  of  social  policy  to  unac-
countable and unelected judges.  And they certainly would
not have been satisfied by a system empowering judges to
override  policy  judgments  so  long  as  they  do  so  after  “a
quite extensive discussion.”  Ante, at 8.  In our democracy,
debate  about  the  content  of  the  law  is  not  an  exhaustion
requirement  to  be  checked  off  before  courts  can  impose
their will.  “Surely the Constitution does not put either the
legislative  branch  or  the  executive  branch  in  the  position
of a television quiz show contestant so that when a given
period  of  time  has  elapsed  and  a  problem  remains  unre-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision and emphasizes the role of democratic processes in shaping social policy.
  </thinking>
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