<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Id.,  at  97.  The  District  Court  concluded  that  the  State
“ha[d]  affirmatively  shown  that  sodium  thiopental  and
pentobarbital, the only alternatives to which the [petition
ers]  have  even  alluded,  are  not  available  to  the  [State].”
Id., at 98.

The  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Tenth  Circuit  affirmed.
Warner v. Gross, 776 F. 3d 721 (2015).  It, like the District
Court, held that petitioners were unlikely to prevail on the
merits  because  they  had  failed  to  prove  the  existence  of
“ ‘known and available alternatives.’ ”  Id., at 732.  “In any
event,” the court continued, it was unable to conclude that
the  District  Court’s  factual  findings  had  been  clearly
erroneous,  and  thus  petitioners  had  also  “failed  to  estab
lish  that  the  use  of  midazolam  in  their  executions  . . .
creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain.”  Ibid.

Petitioners  and  Charles  Warner  filed  a  petition  for
certiorari and an application to stay their executions.  The
Court  denied  the  stay  application,  and  Charles  Warner
was executed on January 15, 2015.  See Warner v.  Gross,
574  U. S.  ___  (2015)  (SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  dissenting  from
denial  of  certiorari).  The  Court  subsequently  granted
certiorari and, at the request of the State, stayed petition
ers’ pending executions.

II
I begin with the second of the Court’s two holdings: that
the  District  Court  properly  found  that  petitioners  did  not
demonstrate  a  likelihood  of  showing  that  Oklahoma’s
execution  protocol  poses  an  unconstitutional  risk  of  pain.
In  reaching  this  conclusion,  the  Court  sweeps  aside  sub
stantial  evidence  showing  that,  while  midazolam  may  be
able  to  induce  unconsciousness,  it  cannot  be  utilized  to
maintain unconsciousness in the face of agonizing stimuli.
Instead, like the District Court, the Court finds comfort in
Dr. Evans’ wholly unsupported claims that 500 milligrams
of  midazolam  will  “paralyz[e]  the  brain.”    In  so  holding,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 20–1199 and 21–707
_________________

20–1199

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF
HARVARD COLLEGE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.

21–707

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 29, 2023]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full.  I  add  this  concurring
opinion to further explain why the Court’s decision today is
consistent  with  and  follows  from  the  Court’s  equal
protection precedents, including the Court’s precedents on
race-based affirmative action in higher education.

Ratified in 1868 in the wake of the Civil War, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”  U. S. Const., Amdt. 14,
§1.  In accord with the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and
history, this Court considers all racial classifications to be
constitutionally suspect.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S.
306, 326 (2003); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

Congress was on well-established ground when it allowed
pension participants and beneficiaries to sue on their retire-
ment plan’s behalf.

2
The Court’s conflicting conclusion starts with inapposite
cases.  It invokes Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 708
(2013), reasoning that “to claim ‘the interests of others, the
litigants  themselves  still  must  have  suffered  an  injury  in
fact.’ ”    Ante,  at  4.  Perry,  a  case  about  a  California  ballot
initiative, is a far cry from this one.  Perry found that “pri-
vate parties” with no stake in the litigation “distinguishable
from the general interest of every citizen” were not proper
representatives of the State.  570 U. S., at 707, 710.  If an-
ything,  Perry  supports  petitioners  here:  This  Court  found
“readily  distinguishable”  other  representational-standing
cases  by  underscoring  their  sound  traditions.  Id.,  at  711
(distinguishing assignee and next-friend standing).8  A tra-
ditional beneficiary-versus-trustee claim like petitioners’ is
exactly such a suit.

Next,  the  Court  maintains  that  petitioners  “have  not
been  legally  or  contractually  assigned”  or  “appointed”  to

——————
287 (2008) (noting in the Article III standing context that “federal courts
routinely entertain suits which will result in relief for parties that are
not  themselves  directly  bringing  suit,”  such  as  when  “[t]rustees  bring
suits  to  benefit  their  trusts”);  see  also  id.,  at  304–305,  n. 2  (ROBERTS,
C. J., dissenting) (“Trustees, guardians ad litem, executors, and the like
make up a settled, continuous practice ‘of the sort traditionally amenable
to, and resolved by, the judicial process’ ”).

8 The  Court  cites  two  more  cases:  Gollust  v.  Mendell,  501  U. S.  115
(1991), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976).  But both endorsed ex-
pansive views of standing.  See Gollust, 501 U. S., at 125–127 (allowing
indirect  owners  of  a  corporation  to  sue  under  federal  securities  laws);
Craig,  429  U. S.,  at  194–195  (holding  that  a  plaintiff  had  representa-
tional standing to assert an equal protection claim on a business patron’s
behalf ).  To the extent the Court suggests that a financial loss is neces-
sary (or that a breach of fiduciary duty is insufficient) for standing, that
is incorrect.  See Part II–B, supra.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedent and argues against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

11

Per Curiam

ground  that  the  exclusion  violated  their  own  First
Amendment rights).

But the injunctions reach much further than that: They
also  bar  enforcement  of  §2(c)  against  foreign  nationals
abroad who have no connection to the United States at all.
The  equities  relied  on  by  the  lower  courts  do  not  balance
the  same  way  in  that  context.    Denying  entry  to  such  a
foreign  national  does  not  burden  any  American  party  by
reason of that party’s relationship with the foreign national.
And  the  courts  below  did  not  conclude  that  exclusion
in  such  circumstances  would  impose  any  legally  relevant
hardship  on  the  foreign  national  himself.    See  id.,  at  762
(“[A]n  unadmitted  and  nonresident  alien  . . .  ha[s]  no
constitutional right of entry to this country”).  So whatever
burdens  may  result  from  enforcement  of  §2(c)  against  a
foreign national who lacks any connection to this country,
they are, at a minimum, a good deal less concrete than the
hardships identified by the courts below.

At  the  same  time,  the  Government’s  interest  in  enforc-
ing  §2(c),  and  the  Executive’s  authority  to  do  so,  are  un-
doubtedly  at  their  peak  when  there  is  no  tie  between  the
foreign  national  and  the  United  States.    Indeed,  EO–2
itself  distinguishes  between  foreign  nationals  who  have
some connection to this country, and foreign nationals who
do  not,  by  establishing  a  case-by-case  waiver  system  pri-
marily  for  the  benefit  of  individuals  in  the  former  cate-
gory.  See,  e.g.,  §§3(c)(i)–(vi).  The  interest  in  preserving
national  security  is  “an  urgent  objective  of  the  highest
order.”  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1,
28 (2010).  To prevent the Government from pursuing that
objective  by  enforcing  §2(c)  against  foreign  nationals
unconnected to the United States would appreciably injure
its  interests,  without  alleviating  obvious  hardship  to
anyone else.

We  accordingly  grant  the  Government’s  stay  applica-
tions in part and narrow the scope of the injunctions as to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the application of a law (likely related to immigration or national security) and the balance of interests involved.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal opinion excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
872

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–11113.  Hernandez-Castillo  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.
Appx.  891.

No.  08–11114.  Handy  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  283.

No.  08–11115.  Hernandez,  aka  Moreno  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.
Appx.  719.

No.  08–11116.  Hughes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  714.

No.  08–11117.  Figuereo-Sanchez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–11119.  Hernandez-Zuniga v.  United States.  C.  A.
8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  64.
No.  08–11120.  Hernandez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  120.

No.  08–11121.  Hanna  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  520.

No. 08–11122.  Gant v.  United States.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No. 08–11124.  Winns v.  United States District Court for
the  Western  District  of  Washington.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer
tiorari  denied.

No.  08–11125.  Tech  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  173.

No.  08–11126.  Tucker  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  307.

No.  08–11127.  Cheeseman  v.  City  of  Reedsport,  Oregon,

et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Ore.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11128.  Caughman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  243.

No. 08–11131.  Grant v. United States.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  39.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, court names, and citations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case List</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN

JACKSON, J., dissenting

appears to criminally punish someone who merely encour-
ages or induces a civil violation.6
  That feature of the provision does not sit easily with its
categorization  as  a  solicitation  or  facilitation  statute,  be-
cause, ordinarily, a person may only be held criminally lia-
ble for aiding and abetting or solicitation when the under-
lying offense is itself a crime.  Aiding-and-abetting liability
is “a centuries-old view of culpability: that a person may be
responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out if
he helps another to complete its commission.”  Rosemond v.
United States, 572 U. S. 65, 70 (2014) (citing J. Hawley &
M. McGregor, Criminal Law 81 (1899)); see also 18 U. S. C.
§2(a)  (the  general  federal  aiding-and-abetting  statute,
providing  that  someone  who  “aids,  abets,  counsels,  com-
mands,  induces  or  procures”  the  commission  of  a  federal
crime “is punishable as a principal”).  As for solicitation, at
common  law,  the  solicited  offense  had  to  be  a  felony  or  a
serious misdemeanor; otherwise, “the solicitor [was] guilty
of  no  offense.”    1  J.  Ohlin,  Wharton’s  Criminal  Law  §9:2
(16th ed. 2021) (Wharton’s).  Today, “in some jurisdictions,
the offense solicited may be a felony or a misdemeanor; but
in others, it can only be a felony”—either way, though, the
underlying offense must be criminal.  Ibid. (footnotes omit-
ted); see also 18 U. S. C. §373 (the general federal solicita-
tion  statute,  which  is  limited  to  the  solicitation  of  violent
felonies).
  Here,  by  contrast,  the  encouragement  provision  on  its
face appears to permit a person to be punished as a felon
for merely encouraging a civil violation.  Thus, the statute

——————

6 Hansen takes issue with this feature of the statute, arguing that the
“ ‘speech  integral  to  criminal  conduct’  exception”  to  the  First  Amend-
ment’s  protection of  free  speech  “does  not  permit  the  criminal  punish-
ment of speech encouraging only a civil law violation.”  Brief for Respond-
ent  39.    The  majority  declines  to  address  this  argument,  leaving  it
available in future as-applied challenges to this and other statutes.  Ante,
at 19, n. 5, 20.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a statute and its potential implications for free speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

ALITO, J., dissenting

maps.  See ante, at 22–25.  Their conclusion, however, rests
on a faulty view of what non-predominance means.
  The  plurality’s  position  seems  to  be  that  race  does  not
predominate in the creation of a districting map so long as
the map does not violate other traditional districting crite-
ria such as compactness, contiguity, equally populated dis-
tricts, minimizing county splits, etc.  Ibid.  But this conclu-
sion is irreconcilable with our cases.  In Miller, for instance,
we acknowledged that the particular district at issue was
not “shape[d] . . . bizarre[ly] on its face,” but we nonetheless
held  that  race  predominated  because  of  the  legislature’s
“overriding  desire  to  assign  black  populations”  in  a  way
that  would  create  an  additional  “majority-black  district.”
515 U. S., at 917.
  Later  cases  drove  home  the  point  that  conformity  with
traditional districting principles does not necessarily mean
that a district was created without giving race a predomi-
nant role.  In Cooper, we held that once it was shown that
race was “ ‘the overriding reason’ ” for the selection of a par-
ticular  map,  “a  further  showing  of  ‘inconsistency  between
the enacted plan and traditional redistricting criteria’ is un-
necessary to a finding of racial predominance.”  581 U. S.,
at 301, n. 3 (quoting Bethune-Hill, 580 U. S., at 190).  We
noted that the contrary argument was “foreclosed almost as
soon as it was raised in this Court.”  Cooper, 581 U. S., at
301, n. 3; see also Vera, 517 U. S., at 966 (plurality opinion)
(race may still predominate even if “traditional districting
principle[s]  do  correlate  to  some  extent  with  the  district’s
layout”).    “Traditional  redistricting  principles  . . .  are  nu-
merous  and  malleable.  . . .  By  deploying  those  factors  in
various  combinations  and  permutations,  a  [mapmaker]
could construct a plethora of potential maps that look con-
sistent with traditional, race-neutral principles.”  Bethune-
Hill, 580 U. S., at 190.  Here, a plurality allows plaintiffs to
do precisely what we warned against in Bethune-Hill.
  The plurality’s analysis of predominance contravenes our
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito. It cites previous legal cases and delves into the legal concept of "racial predominance" in the context of districting maps.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 20–512 and 20–520
_________________

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
PETITIONER
v.
SHAWNE ALSTON, ET AL.

20–512

AMERICAN ATHLETIC CONFERENCE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
SHAWNE ALSTON, ET AL.

20–520

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2021]

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the Sherman Act, Congress tasked courts with enforc-
ing a policy of competition on the belief that market forces
“yield  the  best  allocation”  of  the  Nation’s  resources.    Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ.
of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 104, n. 27 (1984).  The plaintiffs be-
fore us brought this lawsuit alleging that the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and certain of its mem-
ber institutions violated this policy by agreeing to restrict
the  compensation  colleges  and  universities  may  offer  the
student-athletes who play for their teams.  After amassing
a vast record and conducting an  exhaustive trial, the dis-
trict court issued a 50-page opinion that cut both ways.  The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR

OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
BREYER, J., dissenting

even  if  each  side  happens  to  have  been  incorporated  as  a
separate legal entity.  See AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 219.

A contrary approach would have led to a rather surpris-
ing result in AOSI I.  Assume for a moment that the Policy
Requirement simply commanded respondents’ clearly iden-
tified  affiliates  to  speak—the  kind  of  “direct  regulation  of
speech”  that  we  said  “would  plainly  violate  the  First
Amendment,” id., at 213.  Treating corporate lines as iron-
clad would mean that respondents could not object to that
direct distortion of their own message.  Under all the cases
just discussed, however, that cannot be right.  And as dis-
cussed below, it is equally wrong under our cases involving
speech misattribution.

B
The  First  Amendment  protects  speakers  from  govern-
ment compulsion that is likely to cause an audience to mis-
take  someone  else’s  message  for  the  speaker’s  own  views.
See, e.g., Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572–573; Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1, 15–16 (1986).
Corporate  separation  makes  no  meaningful  difference  in
this speech-misattribution context, either.

Consider our unanimous decision in Hurley.  In that case,
a  group  called  the  South  Boston  Allied  War  Veterans
Council organized a parade.  515 U. S., at 560.  The Irish-
American  Gay,  Lesbian  and  Bisexual  Group  of  Boston—a
separate  group  who  called  themselves  “GLIB”  for  short—
wanted  to  participate.  Id.,  at  561.  After  the  Veterans
Council said no, GLIB obtained a court order directing the
Veterans Council to let GLIB march in the parade.  Id., at
561–562.  Recognizing that “every participating unit affects
the message conveyed by the parade organizers,” we held in
Hurley that the order distorted the Veterans Council’s pro-
tected speech.  Id., at 572–573.  Because GLIB wanted to
“carr[y] its own banner” with its own message, and because
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into First Amendment arguments related to corporate speech and misattribution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

LUCIA ET AL. v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 17–130.  Argued April 23, 2018—Decided June 21, 2018

The  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (SEC  or  Commission)  has
statutory authority to enforce the nation’s securities laws.  One way
it can do so is by instituting an administrative proceeding against an
alleged  wrongdoer.  Typically,  the  Commission  delegates  the  task  of
presiding  over  such  a  proceeding  to  an  administrative  law  judge
(ALJ).  The  SEC  currently  has  five  ALJs.    Other  staff  members,  ra-
ther  than  the  Commission  proper,  selected  them  all.    An  ALJ  as-
signed to hear an SEC enforcement action has the “authority to do all
things necessary and appropriate”  to ensure a “fair  and orderly” ad-
versarial proceeding.  17 CFR §§201.111, 200.14(a).  After a hearing
ends, the ALJ issues an initial decision.  The Commission can review
that decision, but if it opts against review, it issues an order that the
initial  decision  has  become  final.    See  §201.360(d).  The  initial  deci-
sion  is  then  “deemed  the  action  of  the  Commission.”    15  U. S. C.
§78d–1(c).

The SEC charged petitioner Raymond Lucia with violating certain
securities  laws  and  assigned  ALJ  Cameron  Elliot  to  adjudicate  the
case.  Following a hearing, Judge Elliot issued an initial decision con-
cluding that Lucia had violated the law and imposing sanctions.  On
appeal  to the SEC, Lucia argued that the administrative proceeding
was  invalid  because  Judge  Elliot  had  not  been  constitutionally  ap-
pointed.    According  to  Lucia,  SEC  ALJs  are  “Officers  of  the  United
States”  and  thus  subject  to  the  Appointments  Clause.   Under  that
Clause,  only  the  President,  “Courts  of  Law,”  or  “Heads  of  Depart-
ments”  can  appoint  such  “Officers.”    But  none  of  those  actors  had
made Judge Elliot an ALJ.  The SEC and the Court of Appeals for the
D. C.  Circuit  rejected  Lucia’s  argument,  holding  that  SEC  ALJs  are
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the opinion. They are typically used for informational purposes and do not contain the actual legal arguments or holdings of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SACKETT v. EPA

THOMAS, J., concurring

Court leaves off.

I

The CWA’s jurisdictional terms have a long pedigree and
are bound up with Congress’ traditional authority over the
channels  of  interstate  commerce.  Solid  Waste  Agency  of
Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S.
159, 168, and n. 3, 172, 173–174 (2001) (SWANCC).  That
traditional  authority  was  limited  in  two  ways.  First,  the
water had to be capable of being used as a highway for in-
terstate or foreign commerce.  Second, Congress could reg-
ulate such waters only for purposes of their navigability—
by, for example, regulating obstructions hindering naviga-
ble capacity.  By the time of the CWA’s enactment, the New
Deal era arguably had relaxed the second limitation; Con-
gress could regulate navigable waters for a wider range of
purposes.  But,  critically,  the  statutory  terms  “navigable
waters,” “navigable waters of the United States,” and “wa-
ters of the United States” were still understood as invoking
only  Congress’  authority  over  waters  that  are,  were,  or
could  be  used  as  highways  of  interstate  or  foreign  com-
merce.  The  CWA  was  enacted,  and  must  be  understood,
against that key backdrop.

A
As the Court correctly states, “land and water use lies at
the core of traditional state authority.”  Ante, at 23; see also
ante, at 2.  Prior to Independence, the Crown possessed sov-
ereignty over navigable waters in the Colonies, sometimes
held in trust by colonial authorities.  See R. Adler, The An-
cient  Mariner  of  Constitutional  Law:  The  Historical,  Yet
Declining  Role  of  Navigability,  90  Wash.  U. L. Rev.  1643,
1656–1659 (2013); R. Walston, The Federal Commerce and
Navigation  Powers:  Solid  Waste  Agency  of  Northern  Cook
County’s  Undecided  Constitutional  Issue,  42  Santa  Clara
L. Rev. 699, 721 (2002) (Walston).  Upon Independence, this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Sackett v. EPA. It delves into the history and interpretation of the Clean Water Act and its jurisdictional reach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

THOMAS, J., concurring

The same year as Gibson, Justice Harlan also penned his
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), in which
the Court upheld a Louisiana law requiring racial segrega-
tion on train cars.  In asserting that the law was unconsti-
tutional,  Harlan  did  not  rely  on  the  Equal  Protection
Clause.  Instead, he maintained that Louisiana’s law was
“inconsistent . . . with the equality of rights which pertains
to citizenship, National and State.”  Id., at 555.  And Har-
lan’s  famous  declaration  underscores  the  connection  be-
tween citizenship and equality: “Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens.  In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before
the  law.”  Id.,  at  559  (emphasis  added).  Given  that  the
Equal Protection Clause speaks of “person[s],” rather than
citizens, Harlan’s reasoning in Plessy suggests that citizen-
ship itself carried with it a right to equal treatment inde-
pendent of the “equal protection of the laws” guaranteed to
all “person[s].”4
——————
governmental entity, whether state or federal, consistent with the Four-
teenth Amendment.”  R. Barnett & E. Bernick, The Original Meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment 202 (2021).  “All that was constitutionally
disputed  among  Republicans  involved  the  status  of  national  privileges
and immunities in the states.”  Id., at 203.  Thus, the Privileges or Im-
munities  Clause  may  have confirmed  that  States  specifically  could not
abridge the rights of national citizenship, including whatever civil equal-
ity is guaranteed to “citizens” under the Citizenship Clause.

4 Justice Harlan’s decision not to rely on the Equal Protection Clause
also makes some sense in light of that provision’s object—the “Protection
of  the  Laws.”   It  is  possible  that the  Equal  Protection  Clause  does  not
prohibit discriminatory legislative classifications, but, consistent with its
focus on “protection,” instead only “imposes a duty on each state to pro-
tect all persons and property within its jurisdiction from violence and to
enforce their rights through the court system.”  C. Green, The Original
Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 Geo.
Mason U. Civ. Rights L. J. 1, 3 (2008); see also C. Green, The Original
Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and
Application, 19 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rights L. J. 219 (2009); J. Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L. J. 1385,
1433–1451 (1992).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It cites legal precedents and analyzes constitutional arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS

JACKSON, J., dissenting

cessation of work risks foreseeable, imminent, and aggra-
vated  harm  to  persons,  premises,  or  equipment.    Beyond
this narrow reasonable-precautions requirement, however,
employees  have  no  obligation  to  protect  their  employer’s
economic interests when they exercise the right to withhold
their labor.

B
Glacier does not allege that the cement truckdrivers com-
mitted acts of violence or seized its plant or property as part
of the strike the Union orchestrated.  Instead, the thrust of
its complaint is that the Union was aware of “the perishable
nature  of  batched  concrete,”  App.  9,  and  that  the  drivers’
walkout was intentionally timed so as to risk harm to that
product.  See id., at 10 (alleging “sabotage, ruination and
destruction of Glacier’s batched concrete”).

I  agree  with  the  majority  that  the  risk  of  losing  the
batched concrete alone would not be sufficient to divest the
striking  drivers  of  statutory  protection.    As  Glacier
acknowledges, wet concrete is a perishable good.  Ibid.  And
the Board has repeatedly reaffirmed that the loss of such
perishable goods due to a mere work stoppage does not ren-
der a strike unprotected.

There  is  also  no  duty  to  take  reasonable  precautions  to
prevent  this  kind  of  economic  loss,  which—standing
alone—posed no risk to persons, premises, or equipment, let
alone a risk of aggravated harm.  While it seems that the
drivers were in a position to save the batched concrete that
was inside their trucks when the strike was called (by, for
instance,  continuing  to  deliver  it  to  the  intended  custom-
ers), that is beside the point. Employees have a protected
right to withhold their labor.  And it would undercut that
right if they could be held liable for the incidental loss of the
perishable goods (which includes concrete no less than raw
poultry, cheese, or milk) that they tend to as part of their
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a court case. It discusses the legal rights of striking workers and the potential liability for economic losses incurred during a strike.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

80

PORTUONDO v. AGARD

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

In addition to its incapacity to serve the individualized
truth-ﬁnding function of trials, a generic tailoring argument
launched on summation entails the simple unfairness of pre-
venting a defendant from answering the charge. This prob-
lem was especially pronounced in the instant case. Under
New York law, defendants generally may not bolster their
own credibility by introducing their prior consistent state-
ments but may introduce such statements to rebut claims of
recent fabrication. See People v. McDaniel, 81 N. Y. 2d 10,
16, 611 N. E. 2d 265, 268 (1993); 117 F. 3d, at 715 (Winter,
C. J., concurring). Had the prosecution made its tailoring
accusations on cross-examination, Agard might have been
able to prove that his story at trial was the same as it had
been before he heard the testimony of other witnesses. A
prosecutor who can withhold a tailoring accusation until
summation can avert such a rebuttal.

The Court’s only support for its choice to ignore the
distinction between summation and cross-examination is
Reagan v. United States, 157 U. S. 301 (1895), a decision
which, by its very terms, does not bear on today’s constitu-
It is true, as the Court says, that
tional controversy.
Reagan upheld a trial judge’s instruction that questioned the
credibility of a testifying defendant in a generic manner, and
it is also true that a defendant is no more able to respond
to an instruction than to a prosecutor’s summation. But
Reagan has no force as precedent for this case because, in
the 1895 Court’s view, the instruction there at issue did not
burden any constitutional right of the defendant.

The trial court in Reagan instructed the jury that when it
evaluated the credibility of the defendant’s testimony,
it
could consider that defendants have a powerful interest in
being acquitted, powerful enough that it might induce some
people to lie. See id., at 304–305. This instruction bur-
dened the defendant’s right to testify at his own trial. But
the Court that decided Reagan conceived of that right as one
dependent on a statute, not on any constitutional prescrip-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It discusses the implications of a prosecutor's argument regarding witness credibility and its impact on the defendant's right to testify.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

409

Opinion of Stevens, J.

over and  above the belief  that a  prior case was  wrongly de
cided.”  Planned Parenthood  of Southeastern Pa.  v.  Casey,
505 U. S. 833, 864 (1992).  No such justiﬁcation exists in this
case, and to the contrary there are powerful prudential rea
sons to keep faith with our precedents.17

The  Court’s  central  argument  for  why  stare  decisis  ought
to  be  trumped  is  that  it  does  not  like  Austin.  The  opin
ion  “was  not  well  reasoned,”  our  colleagues  assert,  and  it
conﬂicts  with  First  Amendment  principles.  Ante,  at  363.
This,  of  course,  is  the  Court’s  merits  argument,  the  many
defects in which we will soon consider.  I am perfectly will
ing to concede that if one of our precedents were dead wrong
in  its  reasoning  or  irreconcilable  with  the  rest  of  our  doc
trine,  there  would  be  a  compelling  basis  for  revisiting  it.
But neither is true of Austin, as I explain at length in Parts
III  and  IV,  infra,  at  414–478,  and  restating  a  merits  argu
ment  with  additional  vigor  does  not  give  it  extra  weight  in
the stare decisis calculus.

Perhaps  in  recognition  of  this  point,  the  Court  supple
ments  its merits  case  with  a smattering  of  assertions.  The
Court  proclaims  that  “Austin  is  undermined  by  experience
since  its  announcement.”  Ante,  at  364.  This  is  a  curious
claim  to make  in a  case  that lacks  a developed  record.  The
majority has  no empirical evidence with  which to substanti
ate the claim; we just have its ipse dixit that the real world
has not been kind to Austin.  Nor does the majority bother
to specify in what sense Austin has been “undermined.”  In
stead  it  treats  the  reader  to  a  string  of  non  sequiturs:  “Our
Nation’s speech dynamic is changing,” ante, at 364; “[s]peak
ers  have  become  adept  at  presenting  citizens  with  sound
bites, talking points, and scripted messages,” ibid.; “[c]orpo
rations . . . do not  have  monolithic  views,”  ibid.  How  any

17 I will have  more  to  say  shortly  about  the  merits—about  why  Austin
and McConnell are not doctrinal outliers, as the Court contends, and why
their  logic  is  not  only  defensible  but  also  compelling.  For  present  pur
poses, I limit the discussion to stare-decisis-speciﬁc considerations.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal principle of stare decisis (precedent) and argues against overturning a previous decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1054

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 30, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–6674.  Millen  v.  Florida.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  19  So.  3d  311.

No.  09–6676.  Mosley  v.  Upton,  Warden.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6683.  Falso  v.  Ablest  Staffing  Services  et  al.
C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.
Appx.  54.

No. 09–6689.  Johnson v.  Missouri.  Sup. Ct. Mo.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  284  S. W.  3d  561.

No.  09–6690.  Holguin  v.  Arizona.  Ct.  App.  Ariz.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–6693.  Starks  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6696.  Bundrant  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  De
partment  of  Criminal  Justice,  Correctional  Institutions
Division.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6698.  Rippy  v.  Burkett.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  898.

No.  09–6699.  Spivey  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6701.  Runge  v.  Minnesota.  Ct.  App.  Minn.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–6703.  Berry v.  Porterfield.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  245.

No.  09–6707.  Thomas  v.  Telegraph  Publishing  Co.  et  al.

Sup.  Ct.  N.  H.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6709.  Brown  v.  Hathaway,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6711.  Streater  v.  Gregory  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  327  Fed.  Appx.  520.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

at 6, 10); see Solem, 465 U. S., at 471.  Each of the indicia
from  our  precedents—subsequent  treatment  by  Congress,
the State’s unquestioned exercise of jurisdiction, and demo-
graphic evidence—confirms that the Creek reservation did
not survive statehood.

First,  “Congress’  own  treatment  of  the  affected  areas”
strongly  supports  disestablishment.    Id.,  at  471.  After
statehood, Congress enacted several statutes progressively
eliminating  restrictions  on  the  alienation  and  taxation  of
Creek  allotments,  and  Congress  subjected  even  restricted
lands to state jurisdiction.  Since Congress had already de-
stroyed nearly all tribal authority, these statutes rendered
Creek parcels little different from other plots of land in the
State.  See Act of May 27, 1908, 35 Stat. 312; Act of June
14, 1918, 40 Stat. 606; Act of Apr. 10, 1926, 44 Stat. 239.
This is not a scenario where Congress merely opened land
for “purchase . . . by non-Indians” while allowing the Tribe
to “continue to exercise governmental functions over [the]
land,”  ante,  at  11,  and  n. 3;  rather,  Congress  eliminated
both restrictions on the lands here and the Creek Nation’s
authority over them.  Such developments would be surpris-
ing if Congress intended for all of the former Indian Terri-
tory to be reservation land insulated from state jurisdiction
in significant ways.  The simpler and more likely explana-
tion is that they reflect Congress’s understanding through
the years that “all Indian reservations as such have ceased
to  exist”  in  Oklahoma,  S.  Rep.  No.  1232,  74th  Cong.,  1st
Sess., 6 (1935), and that “Indian reservations [in the Indian
Territory]  were  destroyed”  when  “Oklahoma  entered  the
union,” S. Rep. No. 101–216, p. 47 (1989).

That understanding is now woven throughout the U. S.
Code, which applies numerous statutes to the land here by
extending  them  to  the  “former  reservation[s]”  “in  Okla-
homa”—underscoring that no reservation exists today.  25
U. S. C. §2719(a)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added) (Indian Gaming
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 61 (2000)

85

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

requests, is instructed not to draw it. Carter v. Kentucky,
450 U. S. 288, 301–303 (1981) (An uninstructed jury is likely
to draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s failure to tes-
tify, so defendants are entitled to have trial courts instruct
juries that no such inference may be drawn.).

The inference involved in Grifﬁn is at least as “natural”
or “irresistible” as the inference the prosecutor in Agard’s
case invited the jury to draw. There are, to be sure, reasons
why an innocent defendant might not want to testify. Per-
haps he fears that his convictions for prior crimes will gener-
ate prejudice against him if placed before the jury; perhaps
he has an unappealing countenance that could produce the
same effect; perhaps he worries that cross-examination will
drag into public view prior conduct that, though not unlaw-
ful, is deeply embarrassing. For similar reasons, an inno-
cent person might choose to remain silent after arrest. But
in either the Grifﬁn scenario of silence at trial or the Doyle
scenario of silence after arrest, something beyond the simple
innocence of the defendant must be hypothesized in order to
explain the defendant’s behavior.

Not so in the present case.

If a defendant appears at trial
and gives testimony that ﬁts the rest of the evidence, sheer
innocence could explain his behavior completely. The infer-
ence from silence to guilt in Grifﬁn or from silence to un-
trustworthiness in Doyle is thus more direct than the infer-
ence from presence to tailoring.6 Unless one has prejudged

6 The Court describes the inference now at issue as one not from pres-
ence to tailoring but merely from presence to opportunity to tailor.
Ante, at 71, n. 2. The proposition that Agard simply had the opportunity
to tailor, we note, is not what the prosecutor urged upon the jury. She
encouraged the jury to draw, from the fact of Agard’s opportunity, the
inference that he had actually tailored his testimony. See App. 49 (De-
fendant was able “to sit here and listen to the testimony of all the other
witnesses before he testiﬁe[d]. . . . [He got] to sit here and think what am
I going to say and how am I going to say it? How am I going to ﬁt
it into the evidence? . . . He’s a smart man. . . . He used everything to
his advantage.”)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg. It discusses legal precedent and arguments related to a defendant's right to remain silent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 18–587, 18–588, and 18–589
_________________

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.

18–587

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
18–588
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF COLORED PEOPLE, ET AL.; AND

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

CHAD WOLF, ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MARTIN JONATHAN BATALLA VIDAL, ET AL.

18–589

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

 [June 18, 2020]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  and
JUSTICE GORSUCH join, concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, case names, and the name of the authoring Justice.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

goods or services.  The second is the right of all persons to
exercise  fundamental  freedoms  under  the  First  Amend-
ment,  as  applied  to  the  States  through  the  Fourteenth
Amendment.

The  freedoms  asserted  here  are  both  the  freedom  of
speech  and  the  free  exercise  of  religion.    The  free  speech
aspect  of  this  case  is  difficult,  for  few  persons  who  have
seen  a  beautiful  wedding  cake  might  have  thought  of  its
creation  as  an  exercise  of  protected  speech.  This  is  an
instructive  example,  however,  of  the  proposition  that  the
application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can
deepen our understanding of their meaning.

One  of  the  difficulties  in  this  case  is  that  the  parties
disagree  as  to  the  extent  of  the  baker’s  refusal  to  provide
service.  If  a  baker  refused  to  design  a  special  cake  with
words or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, a
cake  showing  words  with  religious  meaning—that  might
be different from a refusal to sell any cake at all.  In defin-
ing  whether  a  baker’s  creation  can  be  protected,  these
details might make a difference.

The  same  difficulties  arise  in  determining  whether  a
baker has a valid free exercise claim.  A baker’s refusal to
attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut the right
way, or a refusal to put certain religious words or decora-
tions on the cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has
been  baked  for  the  public  generally  but  includes  certain
religious words or symbols on it are just three examples of
possibilities that seem all but endless.

Whatever  the  confluence  of  speech  and  free  exercise
principles  might  be  in  some  cases,  the  Colorado  Civil
Rights Commission’s consideration of this case was incon-
sistent  with  the  State’s  obligation  of  religious  neutrality.
The reason and motive for the baker’s refusal were based
on  his  sincere  religious  beliefs  and  convictions.    The
Court’s precedents make clear that the baker, in his capac-
ity  as  the  owner  of  a  business  serving  the  public,  might
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It delves into the intersection of free speech and free exercise of religion in the context of a baker's refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

cli

Page

965

Uzamere v. Allen E. Kaye, P. C.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  988,1117

Vadde v. Georgia
1014

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vadlamudi; Atkins v.
973

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vail; Carver v.
854

Vail; Mowatt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Valdes v. United States
1100

Valdez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
941

Valencia-Lopez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Valenzuela v. California
1098

Valenzuela-Ruiz v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950

Valladares v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1002

Valle Mercado v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

ValuePest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v. Bayer Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Valverde v. Arizona  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  819,1064

Van Auken v. Catron, Catron & Pottow, P. A.
1023

Van Broughton, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

Vance v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Van Dang v. Evans  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Van De Berg v. Social Security Administration
1159

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vanderville; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  954,1086

809

Vang v. McDonald
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

Vanguard Car Rental USA Inc.; Anderson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Van Hook; Bobby v.
1151

Van Hoosen v. Kramer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Van Lilly v. Burtt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
883

889

Van Lilly v. Knox  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VanLoveren; Fisher v.
Van Myers v. Ennis Independent School Dist.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  912,1140

Vann, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  814,945

918

Vann v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vann v. United Airlines, Inc.
809

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Van Swait v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  908,1155

Varga v. Thaler
1078

Vargas v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  859,917,941

Vasquez v. Kirkland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1126

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  862,976,1085

Vasquez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  802,1045

Vasquez; Wells v.
915

Vasquez-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vasquez-Ochoa v. Holder
877

Vast Resources, Inc.; Ritchie v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Vathis v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1035

Vaughan; Gibson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

Vaughan; Jiminez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
871

Vaughn v. Runnels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxxxv

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

1007

Lazarenko v. United States
1134

Le v. United States
1135

Lea v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  944,1047

Leaf, In re
894

Leal v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1009

Leaphart v. Detroit
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1129

Leasure v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Leatch v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1120

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LeBlanc; Redd v.
951

LeBlanc; Robinson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

Lechoga-Sanchez v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

Lechuga-Montalvo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

Lechuga-Sanchez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Ledbetter v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

Ledingham v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1013

Lee v. Arkansas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  883,1061

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1030,1141

Lee County Ed. Assn.; Monacelli v.
974

Leftwich v. West Virginia
Legeno v. Douglas Elliman, LLC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  937,1087

948

Leibowitz v. Systems Division, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leight v. United States
1159

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
860

Leinenbach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lemery; French v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947

Lemmon; Lyles v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  953,1140

1117

Lemons v. Atlantic City Police Dept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Lemons v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1087

Lempke; Michalski v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852

Lemus-Gonzalez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
990

Lenham v. Disabled American Veterans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leonard v. Iowa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

890

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leonor v. Houston
993

Lerma-Velez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lester, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  988,1159

Letizia v. New York  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  896,1139

Lett; Renico v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1047,1145

1014

Levenhagen; Bynum v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1

Levenhagen; Corcoran v.
989

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc.
Levin; Wagenknecht v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  823,1064

1120

Levine; Beal v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1037

Levine v. McCabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901

Levy v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

Lewis v. Alabama  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

BILSKI v. KAPPOS

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment

moreover, that “[t]here is no suggestion in any of this early
consideration of process patents that processes for organiz-
ing  human  activity  were  or  ever  had  been  patentable.”
Id., at 972.

Three judges wrote dissenting opinions, although two of
those  judges  agreed  that  petitioners’  claim  is  not  patent
eligible.    Judge  Mayer  would  have  held  that  petitioners’
claim  “is  not  eligible  for  patent  protection  because  it  is
directed to a method of conducting business.”  Id., at 998.
He  submitted  that  “[t]he  patent  system  is  intended  to
protect  and  promote  advances  in  science  and  technology,
not  ideas  about  how  to  structure  commercial  transac-
tions.”
  “Affording  patent  protection  to  business
methods lacks constitutional and statutory support, serves
to  hinder  rather  than  promote  innovation[,]  and  usurps
that which rightfully belongs in the public domain.”  Ibid.

Ibid.

Judge  Rader  would  have  rejected  petitioners’  claim  on
the ground that it seeks to patent merely an abstract idea.
Id., at 1011.

Only  Judge  Newman  disagreed  with  the  court’s  conclu-
sion  that  petitioners’  claim  seeks  a  patent  on  ineligible
subject  matter.  Judge  Newman  urged  that  the  en  banc
court’s  machine-or-transformation  test  ignores  the  text
and history of §101, id., at 977–978, 985–990, is in tension
with  several  of  decisions  by  this  Court,  id.,  at  978–985,
and  the  Federal  Circuit,  id.,  at  990–992,  and  will  invali-
date thousands of patents that were issued in reliance on
those decisions, id., at 992–994.

II

Before explaining in more detail how I would decide this
case,  I  will  comment  briefly  on  the  Court’s  opinion.    The
opinion is less than pellucid in more than one respect, and,
if misunderstood, could result in confusion or upset settled
areas of the law.  Three preliminary observations may be
clarifying.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Stevens in the case of Bilski v. Kappos. It delves into the arguments and reasoning surrounding patent eligibility for business methods.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

Torres received an honorable discharge.  But he returned
home  with  constrictive  bronchitis,  a  respiratory  condition
that  narrowed  his  airways  and  made  breathing  difficult.
These ailments, Torres alleges, changed his life and left him
unable  to  work  at  his  old  job  as  a  state  trooper.  Torres
asked his former employer, respondent Texas Department
of Public Safety (Texas), to accommodate his condition by
reemploying him in a different role.  Texas refused to do so.
Torres sued Texas in state court.  He argued that Texas
had violated USERRA’s mandate that state employers re-
hire returning servicemembers, use “reasonable efforts” to
accommodate  any  service-related  disability,  or  find  an
“equivalent” position (or its “nearest approximation”) where
such disability prevents the veteran from holding his prior
position.  38 U. S. C. §4313(a)(3).  Texas moved to dismiss
the  suit  by invoking  sovereign  immunity.    The  trial  court
denied the motion.  A divided intermediate appellate court
reversed,  stating  this  Court’s  precedents  established  that
Congress could not authorize private suits against noncon-
senting States pursuant to its Article I powers except under
the Bankruptcy Clause and citing Central Va. Community
College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356 (2006).  See 583 S. W. 3d 221,
225–230 (Tex. App. 2018).  The Supreme Court of Texas de-
nied discretionary review.

After  the  decision  below,  this  Court  decided  PennEast,
594  U. S.  ___.    There,  we  recognized  that  the  States  had
waived their sovereign immunity as to the exercise of the
federal  eminent  domain  power  under  the  structure  of  the
Constitution pursuant to the “plan of the Convention.”  See
id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).  We then granted Torres’ petition
for certiorari to decide whether, in light of that intervening
decision, USERRA’s damages remedy against state employ-
ers is constitutional.

Congress  enacted  USERRA  as  an  exercise  of  its  power

II
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It sets the stage for the case, outlining the background and the legal issues at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP

BRANDS LLC

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 16–341.  Argued March 27, 2017—Decided May 22, 2017

The  patent  venue  statute,  28  U. S. C.  §1400(b),  provides  that  “[a]ny
civil  action  for  patent  infringement  may  be  brought  in  the  judicial
district  where  the  defendant  resides,  or  where  the  defendant  has
committed  acts  of  infringement  and  has  a  regular  and  established
place  of  business.”    In  Fourco  Glass  Co.  v.  Transmirra  Products
Corp.,  353  U. S.  222,  226,  this  Court  concluded  that  for  purposes  of
§1400(b) a domestic corporation “resides” only in its State of incorpo-
ration, rejecting the argument that §1400(b) incorporates the broader
definition  of  corporate  “residence”  contained  in  the  general  venue
statute,  28  U. S. C.  §1391(c).    Congress  has  not  amended  §1400(b)
since  Fourco,  but  it  has  twice  amended  §1391,  which  now  provides
that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” and “[f]or all venue pur-
poses,”  a  corporation  “shall  be  deemed  to  reside,  if  a  defendant,  in
any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s
personal  jurisdiction  with  respect  to  the  civil  action  in  question.”
§§1391(a), (c).

Respondent  filed  a  patent  infringement  suit  in  the  District  Court
for  the  District  of  Delaware  against  petitioner,  a  competitor  that  is
organized under Indiana law and headquartered in Indiana but ships
the allegedly infringing products into Delaware.  Petitioner moved to
transfer  venue  to  a  District  Court  in  Indiana,  claiming  that  venue
was  improper  in  Delaware.    Citing  Fourco,  petitioner  argued  that  it
did  not  “resid[e]”  in  Delaware  and  had  no  “regular  and  established
place of business” in Delaware under §1400(b).  The District Court re-
jected  these  arguments.    The  Federal  Circuit  denied  a  petition  for  a
writ of mandamus, concluding that §1391(c) supplies the definition of
“resides” in §1400(b).  The Federal Circuit reasoned that because pe-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

TRUMP v. VANCE

ALITO, J., dissenting

The Presidency deserves greater protection.  Thus, in a
case like this one, a prosecutor should be required (1) to pro-
vide at least a general description of the possible offenses
that are under investigation, (2) to outline how the subpoe-
naed records relate to those offenses, and (3) to explain why
it is important that the records be produced and why it is
necessary for production to occur while the President is still
in office.

In  the  present  case,  the  district  attorney  made  a  brief
It
proffer,  but  important  questions  were  left  hanging.
would not be unduly burdensome to insist on answers be-
fore enforcing the subpoena.

One obvious question concerns the scope of the subpoena.
The subpoena issued by the grand jury is largely a copy of
the subpoenas issued by Committees of the House of Rep-
resentatives, and it would be quite a coincidence if the rec-
ords  relevant  to  an  investigation  of  possible  violations  of
New York criminal law just so happened to be almost iden-
tical to the records thought by congressional Committees to
be useful in considering federal legislation.  It is therefore
appropriate to ask the district attorney to explain the need
for the various items that the subpoena covers.

The  district  attorney  should  also  explain  why  it  is  im-
portant that the information in question be obtained from
the  President’s  records  rather  than  another  source.  See,
e.g., Nixon, 418 U. S., at 702; Sealed Case, 121 F. 3d, at 755.
And the district attorney should set out why he finds it nec-
essary that the records be produced now as opposed to when
the  President  leaves  office.    At  argument,  respondent’s
counsel told us that his office’s concern is the expiration of
the statute of limitations,11 but there are potential solutions
to that problem.  Even if New York law does not automati-
cally  suspend  the  statute  of  limitations  for  prosecuting  a

——————

11 Tr. of Oral Arg. 77, 102.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Trump v. Vance. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the subpoena of presidential records.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

25

Opinion of the Court

we  asked  whether  the  Act’s  “importation  provision,”  now
§602(a)(1)  (then  §602(a)),  barred  importation  (without
permission)  of  a  copyrighted  item  (labels  affixed  to  hair
care  products)  where  an  American  copyright  owner  au
thorized  the  first  sale  and  export  of  hair  care  products
with  copyrighted  labels  made  in  the  United  States,  and
where a buyer sought to import them back into the United
States  without  the  copyright  owner’s  permission.  523
U. S., at 138–139.

We held that the importation provision did not prohibit
sending the products back into the United States (without
the copyright owner’s permission).  That section says:

“Importation  into  the  United  States,  without  the  au
thority  of  the  owner  of  copyright  under  this  title,  of
copies  or  phonorecords  of  a  work  that  have  been
acquired outside the United States is an infringement
of  the  exclusive  right  to  distribute  copies  or  phono
records  under  section  106.”  17  U. S. C.  §602(a)(1)
(2006  ed.,  Supp.  V)  (emphasis  added).    See  also
§602(a) (1994 ed.).

We  pointed  out  that  this  section  makes  importation  an
infringement of the “exclusive right to distribute . . . under
106.”  We  noted  that  §109(a)’s  “first  sale”  doctrine  limits
the scope of the §106 exclusive distribution right.  We took
as  given  the  fact  that  the  products  at  issue  had  at  least
once  been  sold.    And  we  held  that  consequently,  importa
tion  of  the  copyrighted  labels  does  not  violate  §602(a)(1).
523 U. S., at 145.

In  reaching  this  conclusion  we  endorsed  Bobbs-Merrill

and  its  statement  that  the  copyright  laws  were  not  “in
tended to create a right which would permit the holder of
the copyright to fasten, by notice in a book . . . a restriction
upon  the  subsequent  alienation  of  the  subject-matter  of
copyright after the owner had parted with the title to one
who  had  acquired  full  dominion  over  it.”    210  U. S.,  at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, citing previous cases and legal statutes. It discusses copyright law and the "first sale" doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012)

9

THOMAS, J., dissenting

decision  leaves  intact  the  discretionary  imposition  of  life-
without-parole  sentences  for  juvenile  homicide  offenders,
it  “think[s]  appropriate  occasions  for  sentencing  juveniles
to  [life  without  parole]  will  be  uncommon.”  Ante,  at  17.
That  statement  may  well  cause  trial  judges  to  shy  away
from imposing life without parole sentences and embolden
appellate judges to set them aside when they are imposed.
And,  when  a  future  petitioner  seeks  a  categorical  ban  on
sentences  of  life  without  parole  for  juvenile  homicide
offenders, this Court will most assuredly look to the “actual
sentencing  practices”  triggered  by  this  case.    The  Court
has, thus, gone from “merely” divining the societal consen-
sus of today to shaping the societal consensus of tomorrow.

*

*

*
  Today’s decision invalidates a constitutionally permissi-
ble  sentencing  system  based  on  nothing  more  than  the
Court’s belief that “its own sense of morality . . . pre-empts
that  of  the  people  and  their  representatives.”    Graham,
supra,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  29).
Because nothing in the Constitution grants the Court the
authority it exercises today, I respectfully dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and analysis of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

5

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

to remedy harms like those the States demonstrated in this
suit, they would seek an injunction.  The injunction would
direct federal officials to detain aliens consistent with what
the States say the immigration laws demand.  But even as-
suming an injunction like that would redress the States’ in-
juries, that form of relief is not available to them.

It  is  not  available  because  of  8  U. S. C.  §1252(f )(1).
There, Congress provided that “no court (other than the Su-
preme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin
or restrain the operation of ” certain immigration laws, in-
cluding the very laws  the States  seek to have enforced in
this case.  If there were any doubt about how to construe
this command, we resolved it in Garland v. Aleman Gonza-
lez,  596  U. S.  ___  (2022).    In  that  case,  we  held  that
§1252(f )(1) “prohibits lower courts from . . . order[ing] fed-
eral officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to en-
force, implement, or otherwise carry out the specified stat-
utory provisions.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5).  Put simply, the
remedy  that  would  ordinarily  have  the  best  chance  of  re-
dressing the States’ harms is a forbidden one in this case.

The  district  court  thought  it  could  sidestep  §1252(f )(1).

Instead of issuing an injunction, it purported to “vacate” the
Guidelines pursuant to §706(2) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure  Act  (APA),  5  U. S. C.  §706(2).    606  F. Supp.  3d,  at
498–501,  and  n. 71.    Vacatur,  as  the  district  court  under-
stood it, is a distinct form of relief that operates directly on
agency action, depriving it of legal force or effect.  See id.,
at 499–500.  And vacatur, the district court reasoned, does
not offend §1252(f )(1), because it does not entail an order
directing any federal official to do anything.  See id., at 501,
n. 71.  The States embrace this line of argument before us.
Brief for Respondents 43–47; Tr. of Oral Arg. 75–82.

It’s  a  clever  workaround,  but  it  doesn’t  succeed.    Start
with perhaps the simplest reason.  Assume for the moment
the district court was right that §1252(f )(1) does not bar va-
catur  orders  and  that  §706(2)  authorizes  courts  to  issue
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice GorSUCH. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the States' attempt to enforce certain immigration laws and the limitations imposed by 8 U.S.C. §1252(f)(1).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
viii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

821

Adams v. Federal Aviation Administration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
860

Adams; Flores v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1031

Adams v. Honda Engineering North America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . .
1144

Adams; Hon Lau v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916

Adams; Johnson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1095

Adams; Mejia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Adams; Porter v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
866

Adams; Rangel v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
953

Adams; Thompson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  902,1026,1034,1157

Adams v. United States
Adamson v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  869,1144

862

Adamson v. Poorter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Adam Toler Memorial Funeral Home, Inc.; Cassell v.  . . . . . . . . . .
932

Adcock v. Freightliner LLC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Addison; Graham v.
1074

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Addleman v. Washington
1007

Ad Hoc Comm. of Kenton Cty. Bondholders v. Delta Air Lines
. .
859

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adkins v. Six
1074

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Administration of George W. Bush; Gossett v.
1052

ADT Security Services, Inc.; Endencia v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adventist Health System/Ga. Inc.; Moore v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  809,1050

859

Advocate Health Care Network; Waivio v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
801

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Afanwi v. Holder
1138

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Agron v. Columbia Univ.
889

Aguado-Guel v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

Aguilar v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

Aguilar v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aguilera-Meza v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1150

805

Ahmadinejad; Asemani v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1022

Ahmed v. Gates
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907

Ailsworth v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147

Akal Security, Inc.; Allmond v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1157

Akel v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1036

Akers v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
992

Akins v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
851

Akron; Watson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Alabama; Carruth v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Alabama; Culver v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Alabama; Foster v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949

Alabama; Hyde v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Alabama; Jenkins v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1078

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alabama; Lewis v.
896

Alabama; Luke v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1030

Alabama; Marshall v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists cases by name and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT1

[08-17-00 11:06:46] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

926

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

June 15, 1998

524 U. S.

Certiorari Denied

No. 96–8874. Sasser v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 107 F. 3d 23.

No. 96–9142. Reeves v. Hopkins, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 102 F. 3d 977.

No. 97–241. Zollo Drum Co., Inc., et al. v. B. F. Goodrich
Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
99 F. 3d 505 and 112 F. 3d 88.

No. 97–1515. District Lodge 64, International Associa-
tion of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL(cid:150)CIO, et al.
v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 130 F. 3d 1083.

No. 97–1553. Vann et ux. v. United States et al. C. A.

3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 135 F. 3d 768.

No. 97–1565. Mississippi v. Roderick et al. Sup. Ct. Miss.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704 So. 2d 49.

No. 97–1608. Wilson, Governor of California, et al. v.

Cabazon Band of Mission Indians et al.; and

No. 97–1636. Southern California Off-Track Wagering,
Inc., et al. v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 124 F. 3d 1050.

No. 97–1649. Arneson v. Apfel, Commissioner of Social
Security. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
128 F. 3d 1243.

No. 97–1658. Yinger v. City of Dearborn et al. C. A. 6th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 132 F. 3d 35.

No. 97–1664. Bende v. Brogdon. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.

Dist. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–1669. Cassan Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Dollar
Systems, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 131 F. 3d 145.

No. 97–1671. Whitehall Tenants Corp. et al. v. White-
hall Realty Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 133 F. 3d 908.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks narrative flow and is structured like a legal docket.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

EBAY INC. v. MERCEXCHANGE, L. L. C.

Syllabus

C. J.,  filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in  which  SCALIA  and  GINSBURG,  JJ.,
joined.    KENNEDY,  J.,  filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in  which  STEVENS,
SOUTER, and BREYER, JJ., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section header (Syllabus) from a legal case, likely followed by the case summary.  This type of information is generally not considered the main body text of a legal document and is often excluded from indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

STEVENS, J., dissenting

Those state provisions highlight the importance members
of the founding generation attached to the maintenance of
state  militias;  they  also  underscore  the  profound  fear
shared by many in that era of the dangers posed by stand
ing armies.6  While the need for state militias has not been

——————

liberty;  and  that,  in  all  cases,  the  military  should  be  under  strict
subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.”  1 B. Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights 235 (1971) (hereinafter Schwartz).

Maryland’s Declaration of Rights, Arts. XXV–XXVII (1776), provided:
“That  a  well-regulated  militia  is  the  proper  and  natural  defence  of  a
free government”; “That standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and
ought not to be raised or kept up, without consent of the Legislature”;
“That in all cases, and at all times, the military ought to be under strict
subordination to and control of the civil power.”  1 Schwartz 282.

Delaware’s  Declaration  of  Rights,  §§18–20  (1776),  provided:  “That  a
well regulated militia is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free
government”;  “That  standing  armies  are  dangerous  to  liberty,  and
ought  not  to  be  raised  or  kept  up  without  the  consent  of  the  Legisla
ture”; “That in all cases and at all times the military ought to be under
strict  subordination  to  and  governed  by  the  civil  power.”    1  Schwartz
278.

Finally,  New  Hampshire’s  Bill  of  Rights,  Arts.  XXIV–XXVI  (1783),
read: “A well regulated militia is the proper, natural, and sure defence
of a state”; “Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to
be  raised  or  kept  up  without  consent  of  the  legislature”;  “In  all  cases,
and at all times, the military ought to be under strict subordination to,
and  governed  by  the  civil  power.”    1  Schwartz  378.    It  elsewhere  pro
vided:  “No  person  who  is  conscientiously  scrupulous  about  the  lawful
ness  of  bearing  arms,  shall  be  compelled  thereto,  provided  he  will  pay
an equivalent.”  Id., at 377 (Art. XIII).

6 The  language  of  the  Amendment’s  preamble  also  closely  tracks  the
language of a number of contemporaneous state militia statutes, many
of which began with nearly identical statements.  Georgia’s 1778 militia
statute,  for  example,  began,  “[w]hereas  a  well  ordered  and  disciplined
Militia, is essentially necessary, to the Safety, peace and prosperity, of
this  State.”  Act  of  Nov.  15,  1778,  19  Colonial  Records  of  the  State  of
Georgia  103  (Candler  ed.  1911  (pt.  2)).    North  Carolina’s  1777  militia
statute started with this language: “Whereas a well regulated Militia is
absolutely  necessary  for  the  defending  and  securing  the  Liberties  of  a
free  State.”  N. C.  Sess.  Laws  ch.  1,  §I,  p. 1.    And  Connecticut’s  1782
“Acts  and  Laws  Regulating  the  Militia”  began,  “Whereas  the  Defence
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller. It cites historical documents and legal precedents to support the author's argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
36  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

III
The Court concludes that Harvard’s and UNC’s policies
are unconstitutional because they serve objectives that are
insufficiently measurable, employ racial categories that are
imprecise  and  overbroad,  rely  on  racial  stereotypes  and
disadvantage nonminority groups, and do not have an end
point.  Ante, at 21–34, 39.  In reaching this conclusion, the
Court claims those supposed issues with respondents’ pro-
grams  render  the  programs  insufficiently  “narrow”  under
the  strict  scrutiny  framework  that  the  Court’s  precedents
command.  Ante, at 22.  In reality, however, “the Court to-
day  cuts  through  the  kudzu”  and  overrules  its  “higher-
education  precedents”  following  Bakke.  Ante,  at  22
(GORSUCH, J., concurring).

There is no better evidence that the Court is overruling
the  Court’s  precedents  than  those  precedents  themselves.
“Every one of the arguments made by the majority can be
found in the dissenting opinions filed in [the] cases” the ma-
jority now overrules.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 846
(1991)  (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting);  see,  e.g.,  Grutter,  539
U. S., at 354 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“Unlike the majority, I seek to define with preci-
sion  the  interest  being  asserted”);  Fisher  II,  579  U. S.,  at
389  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting)  (race-conscious  admissions

——————
class,” ibid., misunderstands basic principles of statistics.  A number of
factors (most notably, the demographic composition of the applicant pool)
affect  the  demographic  composition  of  the  entering  class.    Assume,  for
example, that Harvard admitted students based solely on standardized
test scores.  If test scores followed a normal distribution (even with dif-
ferent averages by race) and were relatively constant over time, and if
the  racial  shares  of  total  applicants  were  also  relatively  constant  over
time, one would expect the same “unyielding demographic composition
of [the] class.”  Ibid.  That would be true even though, under that hypo-
thetical scenario, Harvard does not consider race in admissions at all.  In
other words, the Court’s inference that precise racial preferences must
be the cause of relatively constant racial shares of admitted students is
specious.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College.  It argues against the majority opinion's conclusion that Harvard's and UNC's admissions policies are unconstitutional.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Dissenting</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

135

Opinion of the Court

heart disease, often suffering long and painful deaths,” and
that “[t]obacco alone kills more people each year in the
United States than acquired immunodeﬁciency syndrome
(AIDS), car accidents, alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs, sui-
cides, and ﬁres, combined.”
Indeed, the FDA charac-
Ibid.
terized smoking as “a pediatric disease,” id., at 44421, be-
cause “one out of every three young people who become
regular smokers . . . will die prematurely as a result,” id.,
at 44399.

These ﬁndings logically imply that, if tobacco products
were “devices” under the FDCA, the FDA would be required
to remove them from the market. Consider, ﬁrst, the
FDCA’s provisions concerning the misbranding of drugs or
devices. The Act prohibits “[t]he introduction or delivery
for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug,
device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.” 21
In light of the FDA’s ﬁndings, two distinct
U. S. C. § 331(a).
FDCA provisions would render cigarettes and smokeless to-
bacco misbranded devices. First, § 352( j) deems a drug or
device misbranded “[i]f it is dangerous to health when used
in the dosage or manner, or with the frequency or duration
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling
thereof.” The FDA’s ﬁndings make clear that tobacco prod-
ucts are “dangerous to health” when used in the manner pre-
scribed. Second, a drug or device is misbranded under the
Act “[u]nless its labeling bears . . . adequate directions for
use .
in such manner and form, as are necessary for
the protection of users,” except where such directions are
“not necessary for the protection of the public health.”
§ 352(f)(1). Given the FDA’s conclusions concerning the
health consequences of tobacco use, there are no directions
that could adequately protect consumers. That is, there are
no directions that could make tobacco products safe for ob-
taining their intended effects. Thus, were tobacco products
within the FDA’s jurisdiction, the Act would deem them mis-
branded devices that could not be introduced into interstate

.

.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically an opinion from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 120 (2000). It discusses the FDA's findings on the dangers of tobacco and how those findings might apply to the regulation of tobacco products under the FDCA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
54  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

Jack rather than John—both are black, after all.  And what
about  members  of  the  numerous  other  racial  and  ethnic
groups in our Nation?  What about Anne, the child of Chi-
nese immigrants?  Jacob, the grandchild of Holocaust sur-
vivors who escaped to this Nation with nothing and faced
discrimination  upon  arrival?  Or  Thomas,  the  great-
grandchild of Irish immigrants escaping famine?  While ar-
ticulating  her  black  and  white  world  (literally),  JUSTICE
JACKSON  ignores  the  experiences  of  other  immigrant
groups (like Asians, see supra, at 43–44) and white commu-
nities that have faced historic barriers.
  Though JUSTICE JACKSON seems to think that her race-
based theory can somehow benefit everyone, it is an immu-
table  fact  that  “every  time  the  government  uses  racial
criteria to ‘bring the races together,’ someone gets excluded,
and the person excluded suffers an injury solely because of
his  or  her  race.”  Parents  Involved,  551  U. S.,  at  759
(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (citation  omitted).    Indeed,
JUSTICE JACKSON seems to have no response—no explana-
tion at all—for the people who will shoulder that burden.
How,  for  example,  would  JUSTICE  JACKSON  explain  the
need for race-based preferences to the Chinese student who
has  worked  hard  his  whole  life,  only  to  be  denied  college
admission in part because of his skin color?  If such a bur-
den would seem difficult to impose on a bright-eyed young
person, that’s because it should be. History has taught us
to abhor theories that call for elites to pick racial winners
and losers in the name of sociological experimentation.

Nor  is  it  clear  what  another  few  generations  of  race-
conscious  college  admissions  may  be  expected  to  accom-
plish.  Even today, affirmative action programs that offer
an  admissions  boost  to  black  and  Hispanic  students  dis-
criminate against those who identify themselves as mem-
bers  of  other  races  that  do  not  receive  such  preferential
treatment.  Must others in the future make sacrifices to re-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case, specifically focusing on the arguments against race-based college admissions. It delves into the potential harm and lack of clear benefit from such policies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Court Document</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>