<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

35

Opinion of the Court

that the act of “go[ing] armed to terrify the King’s subjects”
was “a great offence at the common law” and that the Stat-
ute of Northampton “is but an affirmance of that law.”  3
Mod.,  at  118,  87  Eng.  Rep.,  at  76  (first  emphasis  added).
Thus, one’s conduct “will come within the Act,”—i.e., would
terrify the King’s subjects—only “where the crime shall ap-
pear  to  be  malo  animo,”  1  Comb.,  at  39,  90  Eng.  Rep.,  at
330, with evil intent or malice.  Knight was ultimately ac-
quitted by the jury.11
——————
281, 87 Eng. Rep. 186 (K. B. 1690); King v. Lewellin, 1 Shower, K. B. 48,
89 Eng. Rep. 440 (K. B. 1689); cf. King and Queen v. Alsop, 4 Mod. 49,
50–51, 87 Eng. Rep. 256, 256–257 (K. B. 1691).  By the late 1700s, it was
widely recognized that the 1541 statute was “obsolete.”  2 R. Burn, The
Justice of the Peace, and Parish Officer 243, n. (11th ed. 1769); see also,
e.g.,  The  Farmer’s  Lawyer  143  (1774)  (“entirely  obsolete”);  1  G.  Jacob,
Game-Laws  II,  Law-Dictionary  (T.  Tomlins  ed.  1797);  2  R.  Burn,  The
Justice of the Peace, and Parish Officer 409 (18th ed. 1797) (calling the
1541 statute “a matter more of curiosity than use”).

In any event, lest one be tempted to put much evidentiary weight on
the 1541 statute, it impeded not only public carry, but further made it
unlawful  for  those  without  sufficient  means  to  “kepe  in  his  or  their
houses” any “handgun.”  33 Hen. 8 c. 6, §1.  Of course, this kind of limi-
tation is inconsistent with Heller’s historical analysis regarding the Sec-
ond Amendment’s meaning at the founding and thereafter.  So, even if a
severe restriction on keeping firearms in the home may have seemed ap-
propriate  in  the  mid-1500s,  it  was  not  incorporated  into  the  Second
Amendment’s scope.  We see little reason why the parts of the 1541 stat-
ute that address public carry should not be understood similarly.

We note also that even this otherwise restrictive 1541 statute, which
generally prohibited shooting firearms in any city, exempted discharges
“for the defence of [one’s] p[er]son or house.”  §4.  Apparently, the para-
mount need for self-defense trumped the Crown’s interest in firearm sup-
pression even during the 16th century.

11 The dissent discounts Sir John Knight’s Case, 3 Mod. 117, 87 Eng.
Rep. 75, because it only “arguably” supports the view that an evil-intent
requirement attached to the Statute of Northampton by the late 1600s
and early 1700s.  See post, at 37.  But again, because the Second Amend-
ment’s  bare  text  covers  petitioners’  public  carry,  the  respondents  here
shoulder the burden of demonstrating that New York’s proper-cause re-
quirement is consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and histori-
cal scope.  See supra, at 15.  To the extent there are multiple plausible
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing historical context related to gun laws. It cites legal precedents and historical documents, making it relevant content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
22

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

BREYER, J., dissenting

Armed Resistance to Crime, 86 J. Crim. L. & C. 150, 164
(1995);  see  also  ILEETA  Brief  App.  1–6  (summarizing
studies regarding defensive uses of guns).  Another study
estimated  that  for  a  period  of  12  months  ending  in  1994,
there  were  503,481  incidents  in  which  a  burglar  found
himself  confronted  by  an  armed  homeowner,  and  that  in
497,646  (98.8%)  of  them,  the  intruder  was  successfully
scared away.   See Ikida, Dahlberg, Sacks, Mercy, &  Pow-
ell,  Estimating  Intruder-Related  Firearms  Retrievals  in
U. S.  Households,  12  Violence  &  Victims  363  (1997).    A
third study suggests that gun-armed victims are substan-
tially less likely than non-gun-armed victims to be injured
in  resisting  robbery  or  assault.    Barnett  &  Kates,  Under
Fire, 45 Emory L. J. 1139, 1243–1244, n. 478 (1996).  And
additional evidence suggests that criminals are likely to be
deterred from burglary and other crimes if they know the
victim  is  likely  to  have  a  gun.    See  Kleck,  Crime  Control
Through the Private Use of Armed Force, 35 Social Prob-
lems  1,  15  (1988)  (reporting  a  substantial  drop  in  the
burglary rate in an Atlanta suburb that required heads of
households  to  own  guns);  see  also  ILEETA  Brief  17–18
(describing  decrease  in  sexual  assaults  in  Orlando  when
women were trained in the use of guns).
  Fourth,  respondent’s  amici  argue  that  laws  criminaliz-
ing gun possession are self-defeating, as evidence suggests
that  they  will  have  the  effect  only  of  restricting  law-
abiding  citizens,  but  not  criminals,  from  acquiring  guns.
See,  e.g.,  Brief  for  President  Pro  Tempore  of  Senate  of
Pennsylvania  as  Amicus  Curiae  35,  36,  and  n. 15.    That
effect,  they  argue,  will  be  especially  pronounced  in  the
District,  whose  proximity  to  Virginia  and  Maryland  will
provide criminals with a steady supply of guns.  See Brief
for Heartland Institute as Amicus Curiae 20.

In  the  view  of  respondent’s  amici,  this  evidence  shows
that other remedies—such as less restriction on gun own-
ership,  or  liberal  authorization  of  law-abiding  citizens  to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion. It cites studies and legal arguments related to gun ownership and crime.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
xxvi

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

987

Burnes v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Burnett v. General Motors Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Burnette; Pannell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1004

Burney v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Burns; Carter v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burroughs v. Broadspire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1031,1159

842

Burruel v. Spurgeon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923

Burt v. Yarborough
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1092

Burton v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1108

Burtt; Clark v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1079

Burtt; Lewis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
883

Burtt; Van Lilly v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burwell v. Las Vegas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844

924

Busby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

Busch v. Marple Newton School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bush, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  813,945

1015

Bush; Hefﬁngton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1059

Bush v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bushkin, Gaimes, Gains, Jonas & Stream; Purpura v.  . . . . . . . .  840,1020

825

Business Planning Systems, Inc. v. Personnel Decisions, Inc.  . . . .
1119

Bussey v. Marshall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
806

Butcher v. Guthrie  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
813

Butler, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Butler v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

Butler v. Greif, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

Butler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  903,1063

892

Byers v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1027

Bynes v. Oklahoma  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Bynum v. Levenhagen
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Byrd v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Byrd v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

Byrnes; Perry v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

C.; R. T.v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819

Cahoon v. Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1090

Cain, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Cain; Barnes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

Cain; Berry v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Cain; Daley v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cain v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  995,1140

1119

Cain; Lemons v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Cain; Robinson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1121

Cain; Stephens v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

Cain; Stogner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1033

Cain v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection. It lists the cases alphabetically with their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

ALITO, J., dissenting

health  or  safety.  See  Casey,  505  U. S.,  at  884–885  (joint
opinion).  Many  state  and  local  laws  that  are  justified  as
safety measures rest on debatable empirical grounds.  But
when  a  party  saddled  with  such  restrictions  challenges
them as a violation of due process, our cases call for the re-
strictions  to  be  sustained  if  “it  might  be  thought  that  the
particular legislative measure was a rational way” to serve
a  valid  interest.  See  Williamson  v.  Lee  Optical  of  Okla.,
Inc.,  348  U. S.  483,  488  (1955).    The  test  that  petitioners
advocate would give abortion providers an unjustifiable ad-
vantage over all other regulated parties, and for that rea-
son, it was rejected in Casey.  See 505 U. S., at 851 (majority
opinion).

Casey also rules out the balancing test adopted in Whole
Woman’s Health. Whole Woman’s Health simply misinter-
preted  Casey,  and  I  agree  that  Whole  Woman’s  Health
should  be  overruled  insofar  as  it  changed  the  Casey  test.
Unless Casey is reexamined—and Louisiana has not asked
us to do that—the test it adopted should remain the govern-
ing standard.

II

Because  the  plurality  adheres  to  the  balancing  test
adopted in Whole Woman’s Health, it considers whether the
Louisiana law helps to protect the health of women seeking
abortions, and it concludes that “nothing in the record indi-
cates that the background vetting for admitting privileges
adds  significantly  to  the  vetting  that  the  State  Board  of
Medical  Examiners  already  provides.”    Ante,  at  37.  THE
CHIEF JUSTICE seems to agree, ante, at 14–15 (opinion con-
curring in judgment), although it is unclear why this issue
matters under the test he favors.

In any event, contrary to the view taken by the plurality
and (seemingly) by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, there is ample evi-
dence in the record showing that admitting privileges help
to protect the health of women by ensuring that physicians
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo.  It delves into legal arguments and precedents related to abortion regulations.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008)

41

BREYER, J., dissenting

plained,  this  is  an  approach  that  the  Court  has  taken  in
other  areas  of  constitutional  law.    See  supra,  at  10–11.
Application of such an approach, of course, requires judg-
ment,  but  the  very  nature  of  the  approach—requiring
careful identification of the relevant interests and evaluat-
ing the law’s effect upon them—limits the judge’s choices;
and  the  method’s  necessary  transparency  lays  bare  the
judge’s reasoning for all to see and to criticize.

The majority’s methodology is, in my view, substantially
less  transparent  than  mine.    At  a  minimum,  I  find  it
difficult to understand the reasoning that seems to under-
lie certain conclusions that it reaches.

The  majority  spends  the  first  54  pages  of  its  opinion
attempting  to  rebut  JUSTICE  STEVENS’  evidence  that  the
Amendment  was  enacted  with  a  purely  militia-related
purpose.
In  the  majority’s  view,  the  Amendment  also
protects  an  interest  in  armed  personal  self-defense,  at
least  to  some  degree.  But  the  majority  does  not  tell  us
precisely what that interest is.  “Putting all of [the Second
Amendment’s]  textual  elements  together,”  the  majority
says, “we find that they guarantee the individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”  Ante,
at 19.  Then, three pages later, it says that “we do not read
the  Second  Amendment  to  permit  citizens  to  carry  arms
for  any sort of confrontation.”  Ante, at 22.  Yet, with one
critical exception, it does not explain which confrontations
count.  It simply leaves that question unanswered.

The majority does, however, point to one type of confron-
tation  that  counts,  for  it  describes  the  Amendment  as
“elevat[ing]  above  all  other  interests  the  right  of  law-
abiding,  responsible  citizens  to  use  arms  in  defense  of
hearth  and  home.”  Ante,  at  63.      What  is  its  basis  for
finding  that  to  be  the  core  of  the  Second  Amendment
right?  The only historical sources identified by the major-
ity  that  even  appear  to  touch  upon  that  specific  matter
consist  of  an  1866  newspaper  editorial  discussing  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It critiques the majority opinion's reasoning and methodology regarding the interpretation of the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017)

3

Syllabus

(c) Three extratextual sources are especially helpful in ascertaining
Article  10(a)’s  meaning.    First,  the  Convention’s  drafting  history
strongly suggests that the drafters understood that service by postal
channels was permissible.  Second, in the half-century since the Con-
vention  was  adopted,  the  Executive  Branch  has  consistently  main-
tained  that  the  Hague  Service  Convention  allows  service  by  mail.
Finally, other signatories to the Convention have consistently adopt-
ed Water Splash’s view.  Pp. 8–12.

(d) The fact that Article 10(a) encompasses service by mail does not
mean  that  it  affirmatively  authorizes  such  service.   Rather,  service
by mail is permissible if the receiving state has not objected to service
by mail and if such service is authorized under otherwise-applicable
law.  Because  the  Court  of  Appeals  concluded  that  the  Convention
prohibited service by mail, it did not consider whether Texas law au-
thorizes the methods of service used by Water Splash.  That and any
other remaining issues are left to be considered on remand to the ex-
tent they are properly preserved.  P. 12.

472 S. W. 3d 28, vacated and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It summarizes the court's reasoning and decision, and includes citations to legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

Opinion of BREYER, J.

this standard requires courts independently to review the
legislative findings upon which an abortion-related statute
rests and to weigh the law’s “asserted benefits against the
burdens”  it  imposes  on  abortion  access.  579  U. S.,  at  ___
(slip op., at 21) (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124,
165 (2007)).

The Texas statute at issue in Whole Woman’s Health re-
quired abortion providers to hold “ ‘active admitting privi-
leges at a hospital’ ” within 30 miles of the place where they
perform abortions.  579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1) (quoting
Tex. Health & Safety Ann. Code §171.0031(a) (West Cum.
Supp. 2015)).  Reviewing the record for ourselves, we found
ample evidence to support the District Court’s finding that
the statute did not further the State’s asserted interest in
protecting  women’s  health.    The  evidence  showed,  moreo-
ver, that conditions on admitting privileges that served no
“relevant credentialing function,” 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at  25),  “help[ed]  to  explain”  the  closure  of  half  of  Texas’
abortion clinics, id., at ___ (slip op., at 24).  Those closures
placed a substantial obstacle in the path of Texas women
seeking an abortion.  Ibid.  And that obstacle, “when viewed
in  light  of  the  virtual  absence  of  any  health  benefit,”  im-
posed an “undue burden” on abortion access in violation of
the  Federal  Constitution.  Id.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  26);  see
Casey, 505 U. S., at 878 (plurality opinion).

In this case, we consider the constitutionality of a Louisi-
ana statute, Act 620, that is almost word-for-word identical
to Texas’ admitting-privileges law.  See La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§40:1061.10(A)(2)(a)  (West  2020).    As  in  Whole  Woman’s
Health, the District Court found that the statute offers no
significant health benefit.  It found that conditions on ad-
mitting  privileges  common  to  hospitals  throughout  the
State have made and will continue to make it impossible for
abortion providers to obtain conforming privileges for rea-
sons that have nothing to do with the State’s asserted in-
terests  in  promoting  women’s  health  and  safety.    And  it
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the constitutionality of a Louisiana abortion law. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, indicating it's part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 15 (2009)

17

Per Curiam

standard  of  reasonableness.”  Id.,  at  688.  In  light  of  “the
variety  of  circumstances  faced  by  defense  counsel  [and]  the
range  of  legitimate  decisions  regarding  how  best  to  repre
sent  a  criminal  defendant,”  the  performance  inquiry  neces
sarily turns on “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances.”  Id., at 688–689.  At all
points, “[j]udicial  scrutiny of counsel’s  performance must be
highly deferential.”  Id., at 689.

The challenge confronting Belmontes’ lawyer, John Schick,
was  very  speciﬁc.  Substantial  evidence  indicated  that  Bel
montes  had  committed  a  prior  murder,  and  the  prosecution
was  eager  to  introduce  that  evidence  during  the  penalty
phase  of  the  McConnell  trial.  The  evidence  of  the  prior
murder  was  extensive,  including  eyewitness  testimony,  Bel
montes’  own  admissions,  and  Belmontes’  possession  of  the
murder  weapon  and  the  same  type  of  ammunition  used  to
kill the victim.  Record 2239–2250, 2261; Deposition of John
Schick, Exhs. 62, 63, 64 (Sept. 26, 1995).

The  evidence,  furthermore,  was  potentially  devastating.
It  would  have  shown  that  two  years  before  Steacy  McCon
nell’s  death,  police  found  Jerry  Howard’s  body  in  a  secluded
area.  Howard had been killed execution style, with a bullet
to  the  back  of  the  head.  The  authorities  suspected  Bel
montes, but on the eve of trial the State’s witnesses refused
to cooperate  (Belmontes’ mother  had begged  one not  to tes
tify).  The prosecution therefore believed it could not prove
Belmontes  guilty  of  murder  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.
What the prosecution could prove, even without the recalci
trant witnesses, was that Belmontes possessed the gun used
to murder Howard.  So the State offered, and Belmontes ac
cepted, a no-contest plea to accessory after the fact to volun
tary  manslaughter.  Record  2239–2243;  Deposition  of  John
Schick, Exhs. 62, 63, 64.

But Belmontes had not been shy about discussing the mur
der,  boasting  to  several  people  that  he  had  killed  Howard.
Steven  Cartwright  informed  the  district  attorney  that  Bel
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses the standard of reasonableness for evaluating defense counsel's performance and then delves into a specific case involving Belmontes and a prior murder charge.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v.
WALL-STREET.COM, LLC
Opinion of the Court

registration  risks  dismissal  unless  the  copyright  owner
applies  for  registration  promptly  after  the  preregistered
work’s  publication  or  infringement.
§408(f)(3)–(4).  A
copyright  owner  may  also  sue  for  infringement  of  a  live
broadcast  before  “registration  . . .  has  been  made,”  but
faces dismissal of her suit if she fails to “make registration
for the work” within three months of its first transmission.
§411(c).  Even  in  these  exceptional  scenarios,  then,  the
copyright  owner  must  eventually  pursue  registration  in
order to maintain a suit for infringement.

II

All  parties  agree  that,  outside  of  statutory  exceptions
not  applicable  here,  §411(a)  bars  a  copyright  owner  from
suing  for  infringement  until  “registration  . . .  has  been
made.”  Fourth  Estate  and  Wall-Street  dispute,  however,
whether  “registration  . . .  has  been  made”  under  §411(a)
when  a  copyright  owner  submits  the  application,  materi-
als,  and  fee  required  for  registration,  or  only  when  the
Copyright  Office  grants  registration.    Fourth  Estate  ad-
vances  the  former  view—the  “application  approach”—
while  Wall-Street  urges  the  latter  reading—the  “registra-
tion  approach.”  The  registration  approach,  we  conclude,
reflects the only satisfactory reading of §411(a)’s text.  We
therefore reject Fourth Estate’s application approach.

A
Under  §411(a),  “registration  . . .  has  been  made,”  and  a
copyright  owner  may  sue  for  infringement,  when  the
Copyright  Office  registers  a  copyright.4   Section  411(a)’s
——————

4 Section  411(a)  provides,  in  principal  part:  “[N]o  civil  action  for  in-
fringement  of  the  copyright  in  any  United  States  work  shall  be  insti-
tuted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been
made  in  accordance  with  this  title.    In  any  case,  however,  where  the
deposit,  application,  and  fee  required  for  registration  have  been  deliv-
ered  to  the  Copyright  Office  in  proper  form  and  registration  has  been
refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringe-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing copyright law and the requirements for suing for infringement. It delves into the interpretation of specific sections of the Copyright Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

11

BARRETT, J., dissenting

cost-effectiveness thresholds and chosen emissions-control
measures.4  That is not how EPA understood it.  EPA char-
acterized  this  comment  as  arguing  that  “by  taking  action
before considering comments on the proposed disapprovals,
the EPA is presupposing the outcome of its proposed rule-
makings on the SIPs.”  Response to Comments 147 (noting
this comment’s ID number, 0518).  And EPA explained that
it “disagree[d]” with the argument that the “sequence” of its
actions  was “improper, unreasonable, or  bad  policy”;  EPA
had a statutory obligation to promulgate a FIP by the Au-
gust  2024  NAAQS  attainment  deadline.    Id., at  150.    If  a
commenter  had  said  with  reasonable  specificity  what  the
Court  says  today—that  “a  different  set  of  States  might
mean that the ‘knee in the curve’ might shift,” ante, at 7—
EPA  could  have  responded  with  more  explanation  of  why
its  methodology  did  not  depend  on  the  number  of covered
States—as  it  has  recently  explained.    But  EPA  cannot  be
penalized if it did not have reasonable notice of this objec-
tion.5

——————

4 So too with Portland Cement’s comment.  See ante, at 7.  That com-
ment simply echoes the quoted sentence from the Air Stewardship Coa-
lition almost word for word, also in the context of objecting to EPA’s de-
cision to propose a FIP before finalizing its SIP disapprovals.  Comments
of Portland Cement Association 7 (June 21, 2022).

5 The  Court  concludes  to  the  contrary  only  by  building  out  the  com-
ment’s bare reference to a “new assessment and modeling” with its own
inferences about the possible effect of different numbers of States on “the
math.”    Ante,  at  16,  n. 12  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    But  as
explained above, the comment itself said nothing about States dropping
out of the final plan or the possible impact of different numbers of States
on the FIP’s cost thresholds or emissions limits.  It is hard to believe that
a single sentence with no elaboration or explanation of the potential is-
sue—in a sea of thousands of pages of comments—gave EPA reasonable
notice that it should have included in its final rule a detailed explanation
of why the FIP’s emissions limits did not depend on the number of States.
Cf.  Public  Citizen,  Inc.  v.  FAA,  988  F. 2d  186,  197  (CADC  1993)  (An
“agency need not respond at all to comments that are ‘purely speculative
and do not disclose the factual or policy basis on which they rest’ ”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the reasoning behind a specific legal decision, referencing comments made during the rulemaking process and critiquing the EPA's approach.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

Per Curiam

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–807
_________________

BRADLEY LEDURE, PETITIONER v. UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[April 28, 2022]

PER CURIAM.
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.

 JUSTICE BARRETT took no part in the consideration or de-

cision of this case.
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This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court opinion.  It includes the case name, citation information, and the court's decision.
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  <category>Legal Document (Supreme Court Opinion)</category>
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  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

ordinary person’s—or judge’s—judgment, that matters.1

Finally, a stop must be individualized—that is, based on
“a  suspicion  that  the  particular  [subject]  being  stopped  is
engaged in wrongdoing.”  Cortez, 449 U. S., at 418; Prado
Navarette  v.  California,  572  U. S.  393,  396–397  (2014).
This does not mean that the officer must know the driver’s
identity.  But a seizure must rest on more than the “likeli-
hood that [a] given person” or particular vehicle is engaged
in wrongdoing.  Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 886–887.  The
inquiry  ordinarily  involves  some  observation  or  report
about the target’s behavior—not merely the class to which
he belongs.  See, e.g., Navarette, 572 U. S., at 398, 402 (up-
holding  vehicle  stop  based  on  an  anonymous  tip  about
driver conduct, interpreted in light of the “accumulated ex-
perience of thousands of officers”); Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 10
(evaluating the collective facts giving rise to suspicion that
an individual was transporting narcotics instead of relying
on law enforcement’s simplified drug courier “ ‘profile’ ”).

B

Faithful adherence to these precepts would yield a signif-
icantly different analysis and outcome than that offered by
the majority.

For  starters,  the  majority  flips  the  burden  of  proof.    It
permits Kansas police officers to effectuate roadside stops
whenever  they  lack  “information  negating  an  inference”
that a vehicle’s unlicensed owner is its driver.  Ante, at 1.

——————

1 Cortez explained why this is so.  Law enforcement officers, behaving
akin  to  “jurors  as  factfinders,”  have  “formulated  certain  commonsense
conclusions about human behavior” as it relates to “the field of law en-
forcement.”  449 U. S., at 418.  A trained officer thus “draws inferences
and makes deductions—inferences and deductions that might well elude
an untrained person.”  Ibid.; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S.
266, 276 (2002) (crediting officer assessment of driver behavior that was
based on “his specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the
area’s inhabitants”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It contains legal citations, analysis of legal precedent, and arguments about the application of law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ET AL. v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY
INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 19–177.  Argued May 5, 2020—Decided June 29, 2020

In the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria Act of 2003, as relevant here, Congress limited the funding of
American and foreign nongovernmental organizations to those with “a
policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”  22 U. S. C.
§7631(f).  In 2013, that Policy Requirement, as it is known, was held
to  be  an  unconstitutional  restraint  on  free  speech  when  applied  to
American organizations.  Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for
Open Society Int’l, Inc., 570 U. S. 205.  Those American organizations
now  challenge  the  requirement’s  constitutionality  when  applied  to
their legally distinct foreign affiliates.  The District Court held that the
Government  was  prohibited  from  enforcing  the  requirement  against
the foreign affiliates, and the Second Circuit affirmed.

Held: Because plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates possess no First Amendment
rights,  applying  the  Policy  Requirement  to  them  is  not  unconstitu-
tional.  Two bedrock legal principles lead to this conclusion.  As a mat-
ter of American constitutional law, foreign citizens outside U. S. terri-
tory  do  not  possess  rights  under  the  U. S.  Constitution.  See,  e.g.,
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 770–771.  And as a matter of Amer-
ican corporate law, separately incorporated organizations are separate
legal  units  with  distinct  legal  rights  and  obligations.    See,  e.g.,  Dole
Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468, 474–475.  That conclusion cor-
responds  to  Congress’s  historical  practice  of  conditioning  funding  to
foreign organizations, which helps ensure that U. S. foreign aid serves
U. S. interests.

Plaintiffs’  counterarguments  are  unpersuasive.  First,  they  claim
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a Supreme Court syllabus, which provides a summary of the court's opinion. It is not the actual content of the legal case and is meant to be a brief overview for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents/Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

31

Opinion of the Court

of  defense  for  all  failing  statutory  interpretation  argu-
ments:  naked policy appeals.  If we were to apply the stat-
ute’s plain language, they complain, any number of unde-
sirable policy consequences would follow.  Cf. post, at 44–54
(ALITO, J., dissenting).  Gone here is any pretense of statu-
tory interpretation; all that’s left is a suggestion we should
proceed without the law’s guidance to do as we think best.
But that’s an invitation no court should ever take up.  The
place to make new legislation, or address unwanted conse-
quences of old legislation, lies in Congress.  When it comes
to statutory interpretation, our role is limited to applying
the law’s demands as faithfully as we can in the cases that
come before us.  As judges we possess no special expertise
or authority to declare for ourselves what a self-governing
people should consider just or wise.  And the same judicial
humility that requires us to refrain from adding to statutes
requires us to refrain from diminishing them.

What  are  these  consequences  anyway?    The  employers
worry that our decision will sweep beyond Title VII to other
federal or state laws that prohibit sex discrimination.  And,
under Title VII itself, they say sex-segregated bathrooms,
locker rooms, and dress codes will prove unsustainable af-
ter  our  decision  today.    But  none  of  these  other  laws  are
before us; we have not had the benefit of adversarial testing
about the meaning of their terms, and we do not prejudge
any such question today.  Under  Title VII, too, we do not
purport  to  address  bathrooms,  locker  rooms,  or  anything
else of the kind.  The only question before us is whether an
employer  who  fires  someone  simply  for  being  homosexual
or transgender has discharged or otherwise discriminated
against that individual “because of such individual’s sex.”
As used in Title VII, the term “ ‘discriminate against’ ” refers
to “distinctions or differences in treatment that injure pro-
tected individuals.”  Burlington N. & S. F. R., 548 U. S., at
59.  Firing  employees  because  of  a  statutorily  protected
trait  surely  counts.  Whether  other  policies  and  practices
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding a case and the Court's interpretation of the law.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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2

WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

road in 1991 and 2004.  Back in 1962, petitioners’ predeces-
sors in interest had granted the United States an easement
for the road.  The Government contends that the easement
includes public access, which petitioners dispute.  On peti-
tioners’ telling, the easement does not allow access to the
general  public  and  requires  the  Government  to  maintain
and patrol the road.

In  2018,  petitioners  brought  suit  under  the  Quiet  Title
Act.  The Government moved to dismiss the action on the
ground that the Act’s 12-year time limit had expired.  Un-
der  the  Act,  “[a]ny  civil  action  . . .  ,  except  for  an  action
brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced
within  twelve  years  of  the  date  upon  which  it  accrued.”
§2409a(g).  Accrual occurs “on the date the plaintiff or his
predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the
claim of the United States.”  Ibid.  The parties disagreed as
to  whether  the  Act’s  time  limit  is  jurisdictional,  which  is
relevant to the procedures for litigating whether §2409a(g)
bars petitioners’ claim.1

The District Court agreed with the Government and dis-
missed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
13 F. 4th 791 (2021).  Applying Circuit precedent, the Court
of  Appeals  held  that  this  Court  had  already  interpreted
§2409a(g) as jurisdictional in Block v. North Dakota ex rel.
Board  of  Univ.  and  School  Lands,  461  U. S.  273  (1983).
This further entrenched a divide among the Courts of Ap-
peals.2    This  Court  granted  certiorari  to  resolve  the  split,
——————

1 The  parties  dispute  the  precise  implications  on  remand  of  a  ruling
that §2409a(g) is nonjurisdictional.  This Court takes no position on that
dispute.

2 Compare  Wisconsin  Valley  Improvement  Co.  v.  United  States,  569
F. 3d  331,  333–335  (CA7  2009),  with,  e.g.,  Bank  One  Texas  v.  United
States, 157 F. 3d 397, 402–403 (CA5 1998); Spirit Lake Tribe v. North
Dakota,  262  F.  3d  732,  737–738  (CA8  2001);  Kane  County  v.  United
States,  772  F. 3d  1205,  1214–1215  (CA10  2014);  and  F.E.B.  Corp.  v.
United States, 818 F. 3d 681, 685–686 (CA11 2016).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case opinion. It includes case names, citations, and a summary of the legal dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
2

MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN.

Syllabus

PASPA.    New  Jersey  countered  that  PASPA  violates  the  Constitu-
tion’s  “anticommandeering”  principle  by  preventing  the  State  from
modifying  or  repealing  its  laws  prohibiting  sports  gambling.    The
District Court found no anticommandeering violation, the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed, and this Court denied review.

In  2014,  the  New  Jersey  Legislature  enacted  the  law  at  issue  in
these  cases.    Instead  of  affirmatively  authorizing  sports  gambling
schemes,  this  law  repeals  state-law  provisions  that  prohibited  such
schemes,  insofar  as  they  concerned  wagering  on  sporting  events  by
persons 21 years of age or older; at a horseracing track or a casino or
gambling  house  in  Atlantic  City;  and  only  as  to  wagers  on  sporting
events not involving a New Jersey college team or a collegiate event
taking  place  in  the  State.  Plaintiffs  in  the  earlier  suit,  respondents
here,  filed  a  new  action  in  federal  court.    They  won  in  the  District
Court, and the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the 2014 law, no
less than the 2012 one, violates PASPA.  The court further held that
the prohibition does not “commandeer” the States in violation of the
Constitution.

Held:

1. When  a  State  completely  or  partially  repeals  old  laws  banning
sports  gambling  schemes,  it  “authorize[s]”  those  schemes  under
PASPA.  Pp. 9–14.

(a) Pointing  out  that  one  accepted  meaning  of  “authorize”  is
“permit,” petitioners contend that any state law that has the effect of
permitting  sports  gambling,  including  a  law  totally  or  partially  re-
pealing  a  prior  prohibition,  amounts  to  authorization.    Respondents
maintain  that  “authorize”  requires  affirmative  action,  and  that  the
2014 law affirmatively acts by empowering a defined group of entities
and  endowing  them  with  the  authority  to  conduct  sports  gambling
operations.  They do not take the position that PASPA bans all modi-
fications  of  laws  prohibiting  sports  gambling  schemes,  but  just  how
far  they  think  a  modification  could  go  is  not  clear.    Similarly,  the
United  States,  as  amicus,  claims  that  the  State’s  2014  law  qualifies
as  an  authorization.    PASPA,  it  contends,  neither  prohibits  a  State
from enacting a complete repeal nor outlaws all partial repeals.  But
the United States also does not set out any clear rule for distinguish-
ing  between  partial  repeals  that  constitute  the  “authorization”  of
sports gambling and those that are permissible.  Pp. 10–11.

(b) Taking into account the fact that all forms of sports gambling
were  illegal  in  the  great  majority  of  States  at  the  time  of  PASPA’s
enactment,  the  repeal  of  a  state  law  banning  sports  gambling  not
only “permits” sports gambling but also gives those now free to conduct
a sports betting operation the “right or authority to act.”  The inter-
pretation adopted by the Third Circuit and advocated by respondents
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. It outlines the background of the case, the legal issues at hand, and the court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Case Syllabus</category>
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  <content>
6

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

inal cases, courts and prosecutors were also using the writ
to compel the production of necessary documents.  In Rex
v. Dixon, 3 Burr. 1687, 97 Eng. Rep. 1047 (K. B. 1765), for
example,  the  King’s  Bench  considered  the  propriety  of  a
subpoena duces tecum served on an attorney named Sam-
uel Dixon.  Dixon had been called “to give evidence before
the grand jury of the county of Northampton” and specifi-
cally  “to  produce  three  vouchers  . . .  in  order  to  found  a
prosecution  by  way  of  indictment  against  [his  client]
Peach . . . for forgery.”  Id., at 1687, 97 Eng. Rep., at 1047–
1048.  Although the court ultimately held that Dixon had
not needed to produce the vouchers on account of attorney-
client privilege, none of the justices expressed the slightest
doubt  about  the  general  propriety  of  subpoenas  duces
tecum  in  the  criminal  context.    See  id.,  at  1688,  97  Eng.
Rep.,  at  1048.  As  Lord  Chief  Justice  Ellenborough  later
explained,  “[i]n  that  case  no  objection  was  taken  to  the
writ,  but  to  the  special  circumstances  under  which  the
party  possessed  the  papers;  so  that  the  Court  may  be
considered  as  recognizing  the  general  obligation  to  obey
writs of  that description in other cases.”   Amey, supra, at
485, 103 Eng. Rep., at 658; see also 4 J. Chitty, Practical
Treatise  on  the  Criminal  Law  185  (1816)  (template  for
criminal subpoena duces tecum).

As Dixon shows, subpoenas duces tecum were routine in
part  because  of  their  close  association  with  grand  juries.
Early American colonists imported the grand jury, like so
many  other  common-law  traditions,  and  they  quickly
flourished.  See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338,
342–343  (1974).    Grand  juries  were  empaneled  by  the
federal  courts  almost  as  soon  as  the  latter  were  estab-
lished, and both they and their state counterparts actively
exercised  their  wide-ranging  common-law  authority.  See
R. Younger, The People’s Panel 47–55 (1963).  Indeed, “the
Founders thought the grand jury so essential . . . that they
provided in the Fifth Amendment that federal prosecution
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the historical use of subpoenas duces tecum in criminal cases, referencing English common law and early American legal practices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

Watch Company’s trade reputation” in the United States.
Ibid.  By  contrast,  the  fact  that  Steele  “affixed  the  mark
‘Bulova’  in  Mexico  City  rather  than  here”  was  not  “mate-
rial.”  Id., at 287.

B
Following Steele, the Courts of Appeals developed various
tests, modeled after  Steele’s facts,  to address the Lanham
Act’s extraterritorial reach.2  This Court also subsequently
adopted a two-step framework for determining when a stat-
ute  can  apply  extraterritorially  to  foreign  conduct.    That
framework  implements “a canon of statutory  construction
known  as  the  presumption  against  extraterritoriality.”
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. 325,
335  (2016).  The  presumption  reflects  the  “longstanding
principle of American law that legislation of Congress, un-
less a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”  Morrison
v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010)
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    That  is,  courts  pre-
sume that, “in general, ‘United States law governs domes-
tically  but  does  not  rule  the  world.’ ”    RJR  Nabisco,  579
U. S., at 335 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550
U. S. 437, 454 (2007)).

Under this framework, the Court first asks “whether the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted”
by “a clear, affirmative indication that [the statute] applies
extraterritorially.”  RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337.  If the
presumption  is  not  rebutted  at  that  first  step,  the  Court
——————

2 See, e.g., Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F. 3d 960, 969 (CA9 2016);
McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F. 3d 107, 111 (CA1 2005); International Cafe,
S.  A.  L.  v.  Hard  Rock  Cafe  Int’l  (U. S. A.),  Inc.,  252  F. 3d  1274,  1278
(CA11 2001); Aerogroup Int’l, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 152 F. 3d
948 (CA Fed. 1998); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F. 3d 246,
250 (CA4 1994); American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coopera-
tive Assn., 701 F. 2d 408, 414, n. 8 (CA5 1983); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v.
T. Eaton Co., 234 F. 2d 633, 642–643 (CA2 1956).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act and cites previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

BREYER, J., dissenting

memorandum  reasons, “[e]xcluding  . . .  illegal aliens  from
the apportionment base is more consonant with the princi-
ples of representative democracy underpinning our system
of Government.”  85 Fed. Reg. 44680.  Whatever the merits
of that policy, it is not the approach to representative de-
mocracy that is set forth in the statute.  Congress chose in-
stead a view of democracy wherein the Representatives are
apportioned based on “the whole number of persons in each
state,” not the whole number of voters, citizens, or lawful
residents.

The  Government  is  surely  correct  that  the  statute  pro-
vides the President and the Secretary some degree of dis-
cretion in carrying out their statutory responsibilities.  The
concept of “usual residence” is an indeterminate one, which
“has continued to hold broad connotations.”  Franklin, 505
U. S., at 805.  The exercise of that discretion may involve a
number of judgment calls.  How long must a person reside
in a State before it can be presumed that she intends to re-
main?  Should prisoners be counted in the State of their in-
carceration,  or  the  State  where  they  resided prior  to,  and
where they intend to return following, their confinement?
In resolving such issues, the Executive’s judgment has con-
sistently been directed toward the meaning of “usual resi-
dence.”  A policy that draws lines based on immigration sta-
tus does no such thing.  Most aliens without lawful status
have lived exclusively in the United States for many years.
See Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn, Pew Research Center, Five
Facts  About  Illegal  Immigration  in  the  U. S.  (2019).    The
Government does not suggest otherwise.  Its own Residency
Rule, which treated ICE detainees’ residency  in the same
manner  as  other  federal  prisoners,  recognizes  the  lack  of
any  logical  relationship  between  immigration  status  and
residence.  Put simply, discretion to interpret and apply a
statutory command is not a blank check to depart from it.
That, I fear, is what the Government has tried to do here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the interpretation of a statute related to apportionment and the government's policy regarding undocumented immigrants.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.”  U. S. Const., Amdt. 11.

This text “means what it says.  It eliminates federal judicial
power  over  one  set  of  cases:    suits  filed  against  states,  in
law or equity, by diverse plaintiffs.”  Baude & Sachs, The
Misunderstood  Eleventh  Amendment,  169  U.  Pa.  L. Rev.
609, 612 (2021).

The  Eleventh  Amendment  sometimes  does  less  than
structural immunity:  It applies only in federal court (“the
Judicial power of the United States”).  And it applies only to
diversity suits (“by Citizens of another State”).  But some-
times the Amendment does more:  It imposes an Article III
subject-matter jurisdiction barrier (“The judicial Power . . .
shall not be construed  to extend”), not a mere privilege of
personal jurisdiction.  And it admits of no waivers, abroga-
tions, or exceptions (“to any suit in law or equity”).

This  case  appears  to  present  “the  rare  scenario”  that
comes within the Eleventh Amendment’s text.  Brief for Re-
spondent State of New Jersey 12.  Because PennEast sued
New Jersey in federal court, this suit implicates “the Judi-
cial power of the United States.”  See 28 U. S. C. §§132, 451.
This condemnation suit, by any stretch, is “a[ ] suit in law
or  equity.”  See  Kohl  v.  United  States,  91  U. S.  367,  376
(1876)  (“a  proceeding  to  take  land”  and  “determin[e]  the
compensation to be made” is “a suit at common law”); Boom
Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 406–407 (1879) (same).  Pen-
nEast  “commenced”  this  suit  “against”  New  Jersey.
It
named the State in its complaint as a defendant as required
by the Civil Rules.  Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 71.1(c)(1).  And it
asked the court for an injunction permitting it to take “im-
mediate possession” of New Jersey’s soil.  Hagood v. South-
ern, 117 U. S. 52, 67–68 (1886) (“The State is not only the
real  party  to  the  controversy,  but  the  real  party  against
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

5

Opinion of the Court

sought  to  have  his  backpay  counted  as  taxable  wages  for
the purpose of obtaining credits under the Social Security
system.  The  Court  stated  that  the  term  “service,”  used
with  respect  to  Social  Security,  “means  not  only  work
actually  done  but  the  entire  employer-employee  relation-
ship for which compensation is paid to the employee by the
employer.”  Id., at 365–366.

As  confirmation  of  that  principle,  severance  payments
often vary, as they did here, according to the function and
seniority  of  the  particular  employee  who  is  terminated.
For  example,  under  both  termination  plans,  Quality
Stores employees were given severance payments based on
job  grade  and  management  level.    And  under  the  second
termination plan, nonofficer employees who had served at
least  two  years  with  their  company  received  more  in  sev-
erance  pay  than  nonofficer  employees  who  had  not—a
standard  example  of  a  company  policy  to  reward  employ-
ees for a greater length of good service and loyalty.

In this respect severance payments are like many other
benefits  employers  offer  to  employees  above  and  beyond
salary  payments.    Like  health  and  retirement  benefits,
stock  options,  or  merit-based  bonuses,  a  competitive  sev-
erance  payment  package  can  help  attract  talented  em-
ployees.  Here,  the  terminations  leading  to  the  severance
payments  were  triggered  by  the  employer’s  involuntary
bankruptcy  proceeding,  a  prospect  against  which  employ-
ees may wish to protect themselves in an economy that is
always subject to changing conditions.

Severance  payments,  moreover,  can  be  desirable  from
the  perspective  of  the  employer  as  an  alternative  or  sup-
plemental  form  of  remuneration.  In  situations  in  which
Chapter  11  bankruptcy  reorganization  is  necessary,  an
employer may seek to retain goodwill by paying its termi-
nated employees well, thus reinforcing its reputation as a
worthy employer.  Employers who downsize in a period of
slow  business  may  wish  to  retain  the  ability  to  rehire
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the nature of severance payments and their classification for tax purposes. It presents a legal argument with citations and examples.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
822

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–1467.  Carranza  v.  Chavez  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  559  F.  3d  486.

No.  08–1468.  Donovan  v.  Arkansas  Supreme  Court  Com
mittee  on  Professional  Conduct.  Sup.  Ct.  Ark.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  375  Ark.  350,  290  S. W.  3d  599.

No.  08–1469.  Orion  Reserves  Limited  Partnership  v.  Sa
lazar,  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  553  F.  3d  697.

No.  08–1471.  Shropshire,  Individually  and  as  Next
Friend  of  Shropshire  v.  Laidlaw  Transit,  Inc.  C.  A.  6th
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  550  F.  3d  570.

No. 08–1474.  Jordan et al. v. Mosley.  C. A. 11th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  298  Fed.  Appx.  803.

No. 08–1475.  Hung Lin Wu v.  Holder, Attorney General.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  288  Fed.
Appx.  428.

No.  08–1477.  Baden  Sports,  Inc.  v.  Molten  USA,  Inc.,
et al.  C. A. Fed. Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 556
F.  3d  1300.

No.  08–1483.  Kuhn  v.  Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco,  Fire

arms  and  Explosives.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–1485.  Brown  et  al.  v.  One  Beacon  Insurance  Co.,
Inc.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317
Fed.  Appx.  915.

No.  08–1486.  Gagnon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  553  F.  3d  1021.

No.  08–1487.  Hart  v.  Safeway,  Inc.  Ct.  App.  Ore.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  219  Ore.  App.  428,  182  P.  3d  325.
No.  08–1488.  HK  Systems,  Inc.  v.  Eaton  Corp.  C.  A.  7th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  553  F.  3d  1086.

No.  08–1489.  Flynn  v.  Yara  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  N.  M.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  08–1490.  Hopkins  v.  D.  C.  Chapman  Ventures,  Inc.

Cir.  Ct.  W. Va.,  Nicholas  County.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It is not sequential narrative text and is not suitable for indexing as part of a book's content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

subsequent language Myriad explains that the location of
the  gene  was  unknown  until  Myriad  found  it  among  the
approximately  eight  million  nucleotide  pairs  contained  in
a subpart of chromosome 17.  See Ibid.5  The ’473 and ’492
patents contain similar language as well.  See id., at 854,
947.  Many  of  Myriad’s  patent  descriptions  simply  detail
the  “iterative  process”  of  discovery  by  which  Myriad  nar-
rowed the possible locations for the gene sequences that it
sought.6    See,  e.g.,  id.,  at  750.  Myriad  seeks  to  import
these  extensive  research  efforts  into  the  §101  patent-
eligibility  inquiry.    Brief  for  Respondents  8–10,  34.  But
extensive effort alone is insufficient to satisfy the demands
of §101.

Nor are Myriad’s claims saved by the fact that isolating
DNA from the human genome severs chemical bonds and
thereby  creates  a  nonnaturally  occurring  molecule.    Myr-
iad’s claims are simply not expressed in terms of chemical
composition,  nor  do  they  rely  in  any  way  on  the  chemi-
cal  changes  that  result  from  the  isolation  of  a  particular
section of DNA.  Instead, the claims understandably focus
on  the  genetic  information  encoded  in  the  BRCA1  and

——————

Notwithstanding  Myriad’s  repeated  use  of  the  phrase  “present
invention,”  it  is  clear  from  the  text  of  the  patent  that  the  various
discoveries are the “invention.”

5 “Starting from a region on the long arm of human chromosome 17 of
the human genome, 17q, which has a size estimated at about 8 million
base  pairs,  a  region  which  contains  a  genetic  locus,  BRCA1,  which
causes  susceptibility  to  cancer,  including  breast  and  ovarian  cancer,
has been identified.”  Ibid.

6 Myriad  first  identified  groups  of  relatives  with  a  history  of  breast
cancer  (some  of  whom  also  had  developed  ovarian  cancer);  because
these individuals were related, scientists knew that it was more likely
that their diseases were the result of genetic predisposition rather than
other factors.  Myriad compared sections of their chromosomes, looking
for shared genetic abnormalities not found in the general population.  It
was that process which eventually enabled Myriad to determine where
in the genetic sequence the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes reside.  See, e.g.,
id., at 749, 763–775.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing patent law related to gene sequences. It contains legal jargon and cites specific patent numbers and case information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1100

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

December 14, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  09–7614.  Noe  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  805.

No.  09–7615.  Phillips  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  583  F.  3d  1261.

No. 09–7618.  Sims v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  340  Fed.  Appx.  959.

No.  09–7620.  Valdez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  382.

No.  09–7623.  Barron  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  331  Fed.  Appx.  327.

No.  09–253.  Adames  et  al.  v.  Beretta  U.  S.  A.  Corp.  Sup.
Ct.  Ill.  Motions  of  Children’s  Defense  Fund  and  Legal  Commu
nity Against Violence et al. for leave to ﬁle briefs as amici curiae
granted.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 233 Ill. 2d 276, 909
N.  E.  2d  742.

No.  09–432.  Global  Network  Communications,  Inc.  v.
City  of  New  York,  New  York,  et  al.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consider
ation  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  145.

No.  09–442.  Oneida  Ltd.  v.  Pension  Benefit  Guaranty
Corporation.  C. A. 2d Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Justice Soto-
mayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  this  peti
tion.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  154.

No.  09–5221.  McCourty  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  562  F.
3d  458.

No. 09–5243.  Warren v. Fischer, Commissioner, New York
Department of Correctional Services, et al.  C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  con
sideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  09–5490.  Middleton  v.  Schult,  Warden.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  299
Fed.  Appx.  94.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal publication. It's not sequential narrative text and doesn't contain the kind of content meant for general reading.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

THRYV, INC. v. CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP

Opinion of the Court

filed in 2001, which ended in a voluntary dismissal without
prejudice.2  In  Click-to-Call’s  view,  that  2001  suit  started
§315(b)’s  one-year  clock,  making  the  2013  petition
untimely.

The Board disagreed.  Section 315(b) did not bar the in-
stitution  of  inter  partes  review,  the  Board  concluded,  be-
cause  a  complaint  dismissed  without  prejudice  does  not
trigger §315(b)’s one-year limit.  Finding no other barrier to
institution,  the  Board  decided  to  institute  review.  After
proceedings on the merits, the Board issued a final written
decision  reiterating  its  rejection  of  Click-to-Call’s  §315(b)
argument and canceling 13 of the patent’s claims as obvious
or lacking novelty.

Click-to-Call appealed, challenging only the Board’s de-
termination that §315(b) did not preclude inter partes re-
view.  The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, agreeing with Thryv and the Director (who in-
tervened on appeal) that §314(d)’s bar on appeal of the in-
stitution decision precludes judicial review of the agency’s
application  of  §315(b).  Citing  our  intervening  decision  in
Cuozzo, see infra, at 6–7, we granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment, and remanded.  Click-to-Call Technologies, LP v.
Oracle Corp., 579 U. S. ___ (2016).  On remand, the Court
of Appeals again dismissed the appeal on the same ground.
Thereafter, in another case, the en banc Federal Circuit
held  that  “time-bar  determinations  under  §315(b)  are  ap-
pealable”  notwithstanding  §314(d).  Wi-Fi  One,  LLC  v.
Broadcom Corp., 878 F. 3d 1364, 1367 (2018).  The majority
opinion construed §314(d)’s reference to the determination
whether to institute inter partes review “under this section”

——————

2 The 2001 suit was brought by Inforocket.Com, Inc.—then the exclu-
sive licensee of the ’836 patent—against Keen, Inc.  See Inforocket.Com,
Inc. v. Keen, Inc., No. 1:01–cv–05130 (SDNY).  While the suit was pend-
ing, Keen acquired Inforocket and the District Court dismissed the suit
without prejudice.  By the time of the inter partes review petition, Keen
had become Ingenio (now Thryv).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing a case involving patent law and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). It delves into the interpretation of specific sections of the law and the procedural history of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2014)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–433
_________________

INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC.,

PETITIONER v. JESSE BUSK ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[December 9, 2014]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The employer in this case required its employees, ware-
house  workers  who  retrieved  inventory  and  packaged  it
for  shipment,  to  undergo  an  antitheft  security  screen-
ing before leaving the warehouse each day.  The question
presented is whether the employees’ time spent waiting to
undergo  and  undergoing  those  security  screenings  is
compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA), 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq., as amended by the Portal-
to-Portal Act of 1947, §251 et seq.  We hold that the time is
not  compensable.  We  therefore  reverse  the  judgment  of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

I

Petitioner  Integrity  Staffing  Solutions,  Inc.,  provides
warehouse staffing to Amazon.com throughout the United
States.  Respondents  Jesse  Busk  and  Laurie  Castro
worked as hourly employees of Integrity Staffing at ware-
houses in Las Vegas and Fenley, Nevada, respectively.  As
warehouse  employees,  they  retrieved  products  from  the
shelves and packaged those products for delivery to Ama-
zon customers.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

13

Opinion of the Court

as well as retail—investment costs).  Id., at 308, n. 11.

Antitrust  laws,  like  blue  sky  laws,  are  not  aimed  at

natural-gas  companies  in  particular,  but  rather  all  busi
nesses in the marketplace.  See ibid.  They are far broader
in  their  application  than,  for  example,  the  regulations  at
issue  in  Northern  Natural,  which  applied  only  to  entities
buying gas from fields within the State.  See 372 U. S., at
85–86,  n. 1;  contra,  post,  at  5–6  (stating  that  Northern
Natural concerned “background market conditions”).  This
broad  applicability  of  state  antitrust  law  supports  a  find
ing of no pre-emption here.

Petitioners  and  the  dissent  argue  that  there  is,  or
should  be,  a  clear  division  between  areas  of  state  and
federal  authority  in  natural-gas  regulation.  See  Brief  for
Petitioners 18; post, at 7.  But that Platonic ideal does not
describe  the  natural  gas  regulatory  world.    Suppose
FERC, when setting wholesale rates in the former cost-of
service  rate-making  days,  had  denied  cost  recovery  for
pipelines’  failure  to  recycle.  Would  that  fact  deny  States
the power to enact and apply recycling laws?  These state
laws  might  well  raise pipelines’  operating  costs,  and  thus
the costs of wholesale natural gas transportation.  But in
Northwest Central we said that “[t]o find field pre-emption
of [state] regulation merely because purchasers’ costs and
hence  rates  might  be  affected  would  be  largely  to  nullify
. . . §1(b).”  489 U. S., at 514.

The  dissent  barely  mentions  the  limitations  on  FERC’s
powers in §1(b), but the enumeration of FERC’s powers in
§5(a)  is  circumscribed  by  a  reference  back  to  the  limita
tions  in  §1(b).    See  post,  at  1–3.  As  we  explained  above,
see Part I–B–1, supra, those limits are key to understand
ing  the  careful  balance  between  federal  and  state  regula
tion that Congress struck when it passed the Natural Gas
Act.  That Act “was drawn with meticulous regard for the
continued  exercise  of  state  power,  not  to  handicap  or
dilute  it  in  any  way.”    Panhandle  Eastern,  332  U. S.,  at
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the balance of power between federal and state regulation in the natural gas industry.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U78

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120

DOOLEY v. KOREAN AIR LINES CO.

Opinion of the Court

airplane crash occurs on the high seas, DOHSA supplies the
Id., at 231. Accordingly,
substantive United States law.”
the petitioners could not recover damages for loss of society:
“[W]here DOHSA applies, neither state law, see Offshore
Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207, 232–233 (1986), nor
general maritime law, see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,
436 U. S. 618, 625–626 (1978), can provide a basis for recovery
of loss-of-society damages.”
Id., at 230. We did not decide,
however, whether the petitioners in Zicherman could re-
cover for their decedents’ pre-death pain and suffering, as
KAL had not raised this issue in its petition for certiorari.
See id., at 230, n. 4.

After the Zicherman decision, KAL again moved to dis-
miss all of petitioners’ claims for nonpecuniary damages.
The District Court granted this motion, holding that United
States law (not South Korean law) governed these cases; that
DOHSA provides the applicable United States law; and that
DOHSA does not permit the recovery of nonpecuniary dam-
ages––including petitioners’ claims for their decedents’ pre-
death pain and suffering.
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster
of Sept. 1, 1983, 935 F. Supp. 10, 12–15 (1996).

On appeal, petitioners argued that, although DOHSA does
not itself permit recovery for a decedent’s pre-death pain and
suffering, general maritime law provides a survival action
that allows a decedent’s estate to recover for injuries (includ-
ing pre-death pain and suffering) suffered by the decedent.
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and afﬁrmed.
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 117 F. 3d
1477 (CADC 1997). Assuming, arguendo, that there is a
survival cause of action under general maritime law, the
court held that such an action is unavailable when the death
is on the high seas:

“For deaths on the high seas, Congress decided who may
sue and for what.
Judge-made general maritime law
may not override such congressional judgments, how-
ever ancient those judgments may happen to be. Con-
  </content>
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This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the applicability of DOHSA (Death on the High Seas Act) and maritime law in a case involving a plane crash. It contains legal citations and arguments, indicating it's part of the actual legal content.
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Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

31

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

No human being could possibly review even a tiny frac-
tion of this gigantic outpouring of speech, and it is therefore
hard  to  see  how  any  shared  message  could  be  discerned.
And even if someone could view all this data and find such
a  message,  how  likely  is  it  that  the  addition  of  a  small
amount of discordant speech would change the overall mes-
sage?

Now  consider  how  newspapers  and  social-media  plat-
forms edit content.  Newspaper editors are real human be-
ings, and when the Court decided Tornillo (the case that the
majority finds most instructive), editors assigned articles to
particular reporters, and copyeditors went over typescript
with a blue pencil.  The platforms, by contrast, play no role
in selecting the billions of texts and videos that users try to
convey to each other.  And the vast bulk of the “curation”
and  “content  moderation”  carried  out  by  platforms  is  not
done by human beings.  Instead, algorithms remove a small
fraction of nonconforming posts post hoc and prioritize con-
tent based on factors that the platforms have not revealed
and may not even know.  After all, many of the biggest plat-
forms are beginning to use AI algorithms to help them mod-
erate  content.  And  when  AI  algorithms  make  a  decision,
“even  the  researchers  and  programmers  creating  them
don’t  really  understand  why  the  models  they  have  built
make  the  decisions  they  make.”56   Are  such  decisions
equally  expressive  as  the  decisions  made  by  humans?
Should we at least think about this?

Other questions abound.  Maybe we should think about
the enormous power exercised by platforms like Facebook
and YouTube as a result of “network effects.”  Cf.  Ohio v.

——————
about 150,000 words.  A typical word consists of 10 to 20 bytes.  There-
fore, the average issue of the New York Times contains around 3 million
bytes.

56 T.  Xu,  AI  Makes  Decisions  We  Don’t  Understand—That’s  a  Pro-
blem,  (Jul.  19,  2021),  https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/ai-right-
explanation.
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  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito. It delves into the complexities of content moderation on platforms like social media, contrasting human editorial decisions with algorithmic approaches.
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  <content>
P R E L I M I N A R Y  P R I N T

Volume 598 U. S. Part 1
Pages 17–38

OFFICIAL  REPORTS

OF

THE  SUPREME  COURT

February 22, 2023

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions

NOTICE:  This  preliminary  print  is  subject  to  formal  revision  before
the bound volume is published.  Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of  Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D.C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

Page Proof Pending Publication
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This content appears to be a preliminary print notice with publication details and copyright information. It is not the main body text of a legal case and is likely to be revised before final publication.
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  <category>Preliminary Print Notice</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
4

BILSKI v. KAPPOS

BREYER, J., concurring in judgment

“method  of  training  janitors  to  dust  and  vacuum  using
video  displays,”  a  “system  for  toilet  reservations,”  and  a
“method of using color-coded bracelets to designate dating
status in order to limit ‘the embarrassment of rejection’ ”);
see  also  Brief  for  Respondent  40–41,  and  n. 20  (listing
dubious patents).  To the extent that the Federal Circuit’s
decision  in  this  case  rejected  that  approach,  nothing  in
today’s  decision  should  be  taken  as  disapproving  of  that
determination.  See ante, at 16; ante, at 2, n. 1 (STEVENS,
J., concurring in judgment).

In  sum,  it  is  my  view  that,  in  reemphasizing  that  the
“machine-or-transformation”  test  is  not  necessarily  the
sole test of patentability, the Court intends neither to de-
emphasize  the  test’s  usefulness  nor  to  suggest  that  many
patentable processes lie beyond its reach.

With  these  observations,  I  concur  in  the  Court’s

judgment.

III
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Bilski v. Kappos. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding patentability and the "machine-or-transformation" test.
  </thinking>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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2

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC

Opinion of the Court

These  years  have  brought  a  dizzying  transformation  in
how people communicate, and with it a raft of public policy
issues.  Social-media platforms, as well as other websites,
have gone from unheard-of to inescapable.  They structure
how  we  relate  to  family  and  friends,  as  well  as  to  busi-
nesses,  civic  organizations,  and  governments.  The  novel
services  they  offer  make  our  lives  better,  and  make  them
worse—create  unparalleled  opportunities  and  unprece-
dented dangers.  The questions of whether, when, and how
to regulate online entities, and in particular the social-media
giants, are understandably on the front-burner of many leg-
islatures and agencies.  And those government actors will
generally be better positioned than courts to respond to the
emerging challenges social-media entities pose.

But courts still have a necessary role in protecting those
entities’  rights  of  speech,  as  courts  have  historically  pro-
tected traditional media’s rights.  To the extent that social-
media  platforms  create  expressive  products,  they  receive
the  First  Amendment’s  protection.  And  although  these
cases are here in a preliminary posture, the current record
suggests  that  some  platforms,  in  at  least  some  functions,
are indeed engaged in expression.  In constructing certain
feeds, those platforms make choices about what third-party
speech to display and how to display it.  They include and
exclude, organize and prioritize—and in making millions of
those decisions each day, produce their own distinctive com-
pilations of expression.  And while much about social media
is new, the essence of that project is something this Court
has seen before.  Traditional publishers and editors also se-
lect and shape other parties’ expression into their own cu-
rated speech products.  And we have repeatedly held that
laws curtailing their editorial choices must meet the First
Amendment’s requirements.  The principle does not change
because the curated compilation has gone from the physical
to the virtual world.  In the latter, as in the former, govern-
ment  efforts  to  alter  an  edited  compilation  of  third-party
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  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introductory section. It sets the context for the case and discusses the relevant legal issues surrounding social media and free speech.
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Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

17

THOMAS, J., dissenting

not constitutional avoidance.

Even  if  the  EAC  were  a  going  concern  instead  of  an
empty  shell,  I  disagree  with  the  majority’s  application  of
the  constitutional  avoidance  canon.  I  would  not  require
Arizona to seek approval for its registration requirements
from  the  Federal  Government,  for,  as  I  have  shown,  the
Federal  Government  does  not  have  the  constitutional
authority to withhold such approval.  Accordingly, it does
not  have  the  authority  to  command  States  to  seek  it.    As
a  result,  the  majority’s  proposed  solution  does  little  to
avoid  the  serious  constitutional  problems  created  by  its
interpretation.

*

*

*
Instead  of  adopting  respondents’  definition  of  “accept
and  use”  and  offering  Arizona  the  dubious  recourse  of
bringing  an  APA  challenge  within  the  NVRA  framework,
I  would  adopt  an  interpretation  of  §1973gg–4(a)(1)  that
avoids  the  constitutional  problems  with  respondents’  in-
terpretation.    The  States,  not  the  Federal  Government,
have  the  exclusive  right  to  define  the  “Qualifications
requisite for Electors,” U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 1, which
includes  the  corresponding  power  to  verify  that  those
qualifications have been met.  I would, therefore, hold that
Arizona may “reject any application for registration that is
not accompanied by satisfactory evidence of United States
citizenship,”  as  defined  by  Arizona  law.    Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.
Ann. §16–166(F).

I respectfully dissent.
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This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific laws and constitutional provisions.
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  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

23

Opinion of the Court

that  the  Act  was  “uncommon”  and  “not  otherwise  appro-
priate,”  but  was  justified  by  “exceptional”  and  “unique”
conditions.  383  U. S.,  at  334,  335.    Multiple  decisions
since  have  reaffirmed  the  Act’s  “extraordinary”  nature.
See, e.g., Northwest Austin, supra, at 211.  Yet the dissent
goes  so  far  as  to  suggest  instead  that  the  preclearance
requirement and disparate treatment of the States should
be upheld into the future “unless there [is] no or almost no
evidence of unconstitutional action by States.”  Post, at 33.
In  other  ways  as  well,  the  dissent  analyzes  the  ques-
tion presented as if our decision in Northwest Austin never
happened.  For  example,  the  dissent  refuses  to  con-
sider the principle of equal sovereignty, despite Northwest
Austin’s  emphasis  on  its  significance.    Northwest  Austin
also  emphasized  the  “dramatic”  progress  since  1965,  557
U. S.,  at  201,  but  the  dissent  describes  current  levels  of
discrimination  as  “flagrant,”  “widespread,”  and  “perva-
sive,”  post,  at  7,  17  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
Despite  the  fact  that  Northwest  Austin  requires  an  Act’s
“disparate geographic coverage” to be “sufficiently related”
to  its  targeted  problems,  557  U. S.,  at  203,  the  dissent
maintains  that  an  Act’s  limited  coverage  actually  eases
Congress’s  burdens,  and  suggests  that  a  fortuitous  rela-
tionship should suffice.  Although Northwest Austin stated
definitively  that  “current  burdens”  must  be  justified  by
“current needs,” ibid., the dissent argues that the coverage
formula can be justified by history, and that the required
showing can be weaker on reenactment than when the law
was first passed.

There  is  no  valid  reason  to  insulate  the  coverage  for-
mula from review merely because it was previously enacted
40  years  ago.  If  Congress  had  started  from  scratch  in
2006, it plainly could not have enacted the present cover-
age formula.  It would have been irrational for Congress to
distinguish  between  States  in  such  a  fundamental  way
based  on  40-year-old  data,  when  today’s  statistics  tell  an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from the Supreme Court. It discusses the Voting Rights Act and its coverage formula, referencing prior cases and arguments. The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

21

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

tion, coaching, and overseeing their work.”  Id., at 13.  And
another  employee  testified  to  believing  that  Davis  was  “a
supervisor.”
Id.,  at  386.  But  because  the  supervisor-
status  inquiry  should  focus  on  substance,  not  labels  or
paper  descriptions,  it  is  doubtful  that  this  slim  evidence
would  enable  Vance  to  survive  a  motion  for  summary
judgment.  Nevertheless,  I  would  leave  it  to  the  Seventh
Circuit  to  decide,  under  the  proper  standard  for  super-
visory  status,  what  impact,  if  any,  Davis’  job  description
and  the  co-worker’s  statement  should  have  on  the  deter-
mination of Davis’ status.9

V
Regrettably,  the  Court  has  seized  upon  Vance’s  thin
case  to  narrow  the  definition  of  supervisor,  and  thereby
manifestly  limit  Title  VII’s  protections  against  workplace
harassment.  Not even Ball State, the defendant-employer
in  this  case,  has  advanced  the  restrictive  definition  the
Court adopts.  See supra, at 5.  Yet the Court, insistent on
constructing  artificial  categories  where  context  should  be
key,  proceeds  on  an  immoderate  and  unrestrained  course
to corral Title VII.

Congress  has,  in  the  recent  past,  intervened  to  correct
this  Court’s  wayward  interpretations  of  Title  VII.    See
Lilly  Ledbetter  Fair  Pay  Act  of  2009,  123  Stat.  5,  super-
seding Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U. S.
618  (2007).  See  also  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1991,  105  Stat.
1071, superseding in part, Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,
Inc.,  490  U. S.  900  (1989);  Martin  v.  Wilks,  490  U. S.  755
(1989);  Wards  Cove  Packing  Co.  v.  Atonio,  490  U. S.  642

——————

9 The Court agrees that Davis “would probably not qualify” as Vance’s
supervisor  under  the  EEOC’s  definition.  Ante,  at  28–29.    Then  why,
one  might  ask,  does  the  Court  nevertheless  reach  out  to  announce  its
restrictive standard in this case, one in which all parties, including the
defendant-employer,  accept  the  fitness  for  Title  VII  of  the  EEOC’s
Guidance?  See supra, at 5.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
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16

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

regulated  by  a  robust  body  of  common-law  rules.  See
generally  W.  Cuddihy,  The  Fourth  Amendment:  Origins
and  Original  Meaning  602–1791  (2009);  e.g.,  Wilson  v.
Arkansas,  514  U. S.  927,  931–936  (1995)  (discussing  the
common-law  knock-and-announce  rule).    The  search-and
seizure  practices  that  the  Founders  feared  most—such  as
general warrants—were already illegal under the common
law, and jurists such as Lord Coke described violations of
the common law as “against reason.”  See Donahue 1270–
1271,  and  n. 513.    Locke,  Blackstone,  Adams,  and  other
influential  figures  shortened  the  phrase  “against  reason”
to  “unreasonable.”  See  id.,  at  1270–1275.    Thus,  by  pro
hibiting  “unreasonable”  searches  and  seizures  in  the
Fourth Amendment, the Founders ensured that the newly
created  Congress  could  not  use  legislation  to  abolish  the
established common-law rules of search and seizure.  See
T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations *303 (2d ed. 1871); 3
J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States §1895, p. 748 (1833).

Although the Court today maintains that its decision is
based  on  “Founding-era  understandings,”  ante,  at  6,  the
Founders  would  be  puzzled  by  the  Court’s  conclusion  as
well  as  its  reasoning.  The  Court  holds  that  the  Govern
ment  unreasonably  searched  Carpenter  by  subpoenaing
the  cell-site  records  of  Sprint  and  MetroPCS  without  a
warrant.    But  the  Founders  would  not  recognize  the
Court’s “warrant requirement.”  Ante, at 21.  The common
law  required  warrants  for  some  types  of  searches  and
seizures,  but  not  for  many  others.    The  relevant  rule  de
pended on context.  See Acevedo, supra, at 583–584 (opin
ion  of  Scalia,  J.);  Amar,  Fourth  Amendment  First  Princi
ples,  107  Harv.  L.  Rev.  757,  763–770  (1994); Davies  738–
739.  In  cases  like  this  one,  a  subpoena  for  third-party
documents was not a “search” to begin with, and the com
mon  law  did  not  limit  the  government’s  authority  to  sub
poena third parties.  See post, at 2–12 (ALITO, J., dissent
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Carpenter v. United States. It discusses the historical context of the Fourth Amendment and argues against the majority opinion's interpretation of the warrant requirement.
  </thinking>
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