<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1133

558 U. S.

January 11, 2010

No. 09–7827.  Brown v.  United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  579  F.  3d  672.

No.  09–7828.  Brantley  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  342  Fed.  Appx.  762.

No.  09–7831.  Caron  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7832.  Evans  v.  Mitchell,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  344  Fed.  Appx.  234.

No.  09–7841.  Welch  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  195.

No.  09–7847.  Saldana,  aka  Rivera  v.  United  States.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  343  Fed.
Appx.  486.

No.  09–7848.  Rodriguez-Laguna  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 344 Fed. Appx. 381.

No.  09–7849.  Sandoval  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  572  F.  3d  1254.

No.  09–7850.  Sanchez  Salcido,  aka  Salcido  v.  United
States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 342
Fed.  Appx.  976.

No.  09–7851.  Smith  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  438.

No. 09–7852.  Rene E., a Juvenile v.  United States.  C.  A.

1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  583  F.  3d  8.

No.  09–7854.  Thielemann  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  575  F.  3d  265.

No. 09–7857.  Pliego  v.  United States.  C. A.  8th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  578  F.  3d  938.

No.  09–7859.  Cullison  v.  United  States.  Ct.  App.  D.  C.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  969  A.  2d  895.

No.  09–7861.  Robinson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  340.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the orders issued.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Court Orders)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xi

Page
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925
California; Federal Communications Comm’n v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
California; Huffman v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
California; Kimble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
908
California; MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
949
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Monge v.
721
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Robinson v.
929
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Salguero v.
938
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Swinney v.
944
California; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
California; Wood v.
941
California Bd. of Equalization; Lyon Metal Products, Inc. v.
. . . .
916
California Dental Assn. v. Federal Trade Comm’n . . . . . . . . . . . .
980
California Public Employee’s Retirement System v. Felzen . . . . .
980
Call v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Camacho v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974
Camacho v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974
Caminero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
Camp v. Riley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915
Campbell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970
Campbell v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Canaan v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Cannon v. Savage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Cantu Martinez, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Capaldi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910
Caranchini, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940
Cardenas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
922
Cargill, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923
Cargill v. Turpin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923
Carlon; NationsMart Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
Carlson v. Nebraska State Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carlton; Williams v.
923
Carlyle v. Saint-Evens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Carmichael; Kumho Tire Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
Carnegie Center Associates; Rhett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Caron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
308
Carr; Graves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
906
Carr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
Carrillo v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Carter v. Curran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
975
Carter; Minnesota v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945,971
930
Caruso; Pierce v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
Cash v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case report.  It lists the cases included in the report and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

KAGAN, J., dissenting

not my conclusion?  The majority’s argument is that “a vio-
lation of Miranda does not necessarily constitute a violation
of the Constitution,” because Miranda’s rules are “prophy-
lactic.”  Ante, at 13.  The idea is that the Fifth Amendment
prohibits  the  use  only  of  statements  obtained  by  compul-
sion, whereas Miranda excludes non-compelled statements
too.  See ante, at 4–5.  That is why, the majority says, the
Court has been able to recognize exceptions permitting cer-
tain  uses  of  un-Mirandized  statements  at  trial  (when  it
could not do so for compelled statements).  See ante, at 7–9.
But none of that helps the majority’s case.  Let’s assume,
as the majority says, that Miranda extends beyond—in or-
der to safeguard—the Fifth Amendment’s core guarantee.
Still, Miranda is enforceable through §1983.  It remains a
constitutional  rule,  as  Dickerson  held  (and  the  majority
agrees).  And it grants the defendant a legally enforceable
entitlement—in a word, a right—to have his confession ex-
cluded.  So, to refer back to the language of §1983, Miranda
grants a “right[ ]” “secured by the Constitution.”  Whether
that  right  to  have  evidence  excluded  safeguards  a  yet
deeper  constitutional  commitment  makes  no  difference  to
§1983.  The majority has no response to that point—except
to repeat what our argument assumes already.  See ante, at
14, n. 6 (describing Miranda as prophylactic).

Compare the majority’s holding today to a prior decision,
in  which  the  Court  “rejected  [an]  attempt[ ]  to  limit  the
types of constitutional rights that are encompassed within ”
§1983.  Dennis,  498  U. S.,  at  445.    There,  the  Court  held
that a plaintiff could sue under §1983 for a violation of the
so-called dormant Commerce Clause, which safeguards in-
terstate commerce.  To the Court, it did not matter that the
Commerce Clause might be viewed as “merely allocat[ing]
power  between  the  Federal  and  State  Governments”  over
interstate commerce, rather than as “confer[ring] ‘rights.’ ”
Id., at 447.  Nor did it matter that the dormant Commerce
Clause’s  protection  is  only  “implied”  by  the  constitutional
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments and cites previous cases, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Opinion of the Court

UNC’s admissions program operates similarly.  The Uni-
versity frames the challenge it faces as “the admission and
enrollment of underrepresented minorities,” Brief for Uni-
versity Respondents in No. 21–707, at 7, a metric that turns
solely on whether a group’s “percentage enrollment within
the  undergraduate  student  body  is  lower  than  their  per-
centage within the general population in North Carolina,”
567  F. Supp. 3d,  at  591,  n. 7;  see  also  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  in
No.  21–707,  at  79.    The  University  “has  not  yet  fully
achieved  its  diversity-related  educational  goals,”  it  ex-
plains, in part due to its failure to obtain closer to propor-
tional representation.  Brief for University Respondents in
No. 21–707, at 7; see also 567 F. Supp. 3d, at 594.

The  problem  with  these  approaches  is  well  established.
“[O]utright racial balancing” is “patently unconstitutional.”
Fisher I, 570 U. S., at 311 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  That is so, we have repeatedly explained, because “[a]t
the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection
lies the simple command that the Government must treat
citizens  as individuals,  not  as  simply  components  of a  ra-
cial, religious, sexual or national class.”  Miller, 515 U. S.,
at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted).  By promising to
terminate their use of race only when some rough percent-
age of various racial groups is admitted, respondents turn
that principle on its head.  Their admissions programs “ef-
fectively assure[ ] that race will always be relevant . . . and
that  the  ultimate  goal  of  eliminating”  race  as  a  criterion
“will never be achieved.”  Croson, 488 U. S., at 495 (internal
——————
Asian students at Harvard varied significantly from 1980 to 1994—a 14-
year period that ended nearly three decades ago.  4 App. in No. 20–1199,
at 1770.  But the relevance of that observation—handpicked and trun-
cated as it is—is lost on us.  And the dissent does not and cannot dispute
that the share of black and Hispanic students at Harvard—“the primary
beneficiaries”  of  its  race-based  admissions  policy—has  remained  con-
sistent for decades.  397 F. Supp. 3d, at 178; 4 App. in No. 20–1199, at
1770.    For  all  the  talk  of  holistic  and  contextual  judgments,  the  racial
preferences at issue here in fact operate like clockwork.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the admissions policies of UNC and Harvard. It delves into the constitutionality of race-based admissions and cites previous Supreme Court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
914

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5634.  Means  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  889.

No.  09–5635.  Dobshinsky  v.  California.  Sup.  Ct.  Cal.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5638.  Graves  v.  Rozum,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional  Institution at  Somerset,  et  al.  C. A.  3d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5640.  Hudson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  332  Fed.  Appx.  45.

No.  09–5643.  Hanks  v.  Wright,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  261.

No.  09–5644.  Hallman  v.  Pennsylvania.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  963  A.  2d  566.

No.  09–5646.  Freeman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5647.  Hughes  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  626.

No. 09–5648.  Fields v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  290.

No. 09–5649.  Pate v. United States.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  684.

No.  09–5650.  Steele  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  386  Ill.  App.  3d  1119,  970
N.  E.  2d  624.

No.  09–5652.  Padilla-Rodriguez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.
724.

No.  09–5653.  Devore  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  640.

No. 09–5654.  Weatherton v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  567  F.  3d  149.

No.  09–5655.  Marshall  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  739.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xix

Page
Garrison; Haddle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,977
954
Garrity v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Garrity; Moss v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
955
Gavin v. Branstad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Gavle v. Little Six, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Gavle v. Mystic Lake Casino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Gay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
274
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951
Gecas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
74
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,972
General Dynamics Corp.; DeLoach v.
951
General Media Communications, Inc. v. Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
General Motors Corp.; Greb v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
923
General Motors Corp.; Sprague v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972
Georgia; DeYoung v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Georgia; Raulerson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
940
Giaimo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
931
Gianetta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gibbons v. Larkins
959
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gibson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,973
918
Gilday v. DuBois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
943
Gillis; Byrd v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gilluhugh; Kendrick v.
910
Gilmartin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Gleason v. Noyes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Godfrey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Godiva Chocolatier; Lambing v.
953
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Goetsch; Ma v.
927
Goetz v. Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility of Wis.
.
Goldﬂam, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
901
Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,961
910
Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
957
Goodnow; Zankich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Goodrich Co.; Zollo Drum Co. v.
933
Goodson; Inoco Ltd. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Goodson; Rowland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Goodwin; Hesterlee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Goord; Frejomil v.
901
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gottlieb, In re
952
Government of Honduras v. Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd.
. . .
936
Governor of Ala., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
Governor of Cal. v. Armstrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
Governor of Cal. v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians . . . . . . . . . .
953
Governor of Fla.; Coastal Petroleum Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document, not the main body of text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO

THOMAS, J., dissenting

430 U. S. 188, 193 (1977).4

To  the  extent  Justice  Stevens’  opinion  could  be  read  as
concluding  that  abortionists  have  standing  to  vicariously
assert their clients’ rights so long as the abortionists estab-
lish  standing  on  their  own  legal  claims,  his  position  has
been abrogated by this Court’s more recent decisions, which
have “confirm[ed] that a plaintiff must demonstrate stand-
ing  for  each  claim  he  seeks  to  press.”    DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 547 U. S., at 352.  But more importantly, Justice Ste-
vens’  opinion  does  not  support  the  abortionists  in  these
cases, because his opinion rested on case-specific facts not
implicated  here—namely,  the  fact  that  the  abortionists
would directly receive Medicaid payments from the defend-
ant agency if they prevailed and that they asserted viola-
tions  of  their  own  constitutional  rights.    In  these  cases,
there is no dispute that the abortionists’ sole claim before
this  Court  is  that  Louisiana’s  law  violates  the  purported
substantive due process rights of their clients.

2
Under  a  proper  understanding  of  Article  III,  plaintiffs
lack standing.  As explained above, in suits seeking to vin-
dicate private rights, the owners of those rights can estab-
lish a sufficient injury simply by asserting that their rights
have been violated.  Constitutional rights are generally con-
sidered “private rights” to the extent they “ ‘ belon[g] to in-
dividuals, considered as individuals.’ ”  Spokeo, 578 U. S., at
___  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  3)  (quoting  3
Blackstone,  Commentaries  *2);  see  also  United  States  v.

——————

4 Three Justices of this Court have recently taken the position that this
rule from Marks, 430 U. S. 188, does not necessarily apply in all 4–1–4
cases,  and  that  such  decisions  can  sometimes  produce  “no  controlling
opinion at all.”  Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (principal
opinion) (slip op., at 18).  But even under their view, Justice Blackmun’s
plurality in Singleton would not be considered binding precedent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
RESERVATION
GORSUCH, J., dissenting

  In defense of its implausibility argument, the Court sub-
mits any other reading would yield a redundancy.  Unless
ANCs  are  exempt  from  the  recognition  clause,  the  Court
suggests, Congress had no reason to mention them in the
statute’s opening clause because they already “fit into one
of the pre-existing ISDA categories,” like “ ‘tribe[s], band[s],
nation[s],  or  other  organized  group[s]  or  communit[ies],’ ”
ante, at 20–21 (quoting 25 U. S. C §5304(e)).
  But this much is hard to see too.  Admittedly, illustrative
examples of more general terms are in some sense always
redundant.    See  Chickasaw  Nation  v.  United  States,  534
U. S. 84, 89 (2001) (“[That] is meant simply to be illustra-
tive, hence redundant”).  But Congress often uses illustra-
tive examples in its statutory work, and the practice is not
entirely pointless.  As this Court has explained, illustrative
examples can help orient affected parties and courts to Con-
gress’s thinking, and often they serve to “remove any doubt”
about whether a particular listed entity is captured within
broader definitional terms.  Ali v. Federal Bureau of Pris-
ons, 552 U. S. 214, 226 (2008); see also Federal Land Bank
of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95, 99–100
(1941); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 176–177 (2012).
That much is certainly true here.  If Congress had failed to
list ANCs in ISDA’s first clause, a dispute could have arisen
over whether these corporate entities even qualify as “In-
dian . . . organized group[s] or communit[ies].”  See Brief for
Petitioners  in  No.  20–544,  p.  5;  supra,  at  9  (citing  43
U. S. C. §1601(b)).

——————
them in ceviche.”  See Cordle, No-Cook Dishes, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
July 17, 2013, p. L4.  Maybe the restaurant meant to speak of ceviche as
“cooked” in the sense of “fish . . . ‘cooked’ by marinating it in an acidic
dressing”  like  lime  juice.    See  Bittman,  Ceviche  Without  Fear,  N. Y.
Times, Aug. 14, 2002, p. F3.  Or maybe the restaurant simply listed every
dish it makes, understanding some dishes would be excluded by the con-
cluding “cooked” proviso.  Even in the Court’s own hypothetical it is not
“implausible” to apply the modifier across the board.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, likely from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the interpretation of a statute and provides legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  566 U. S. ____ (2012)

13

Opinion of the Court

did the [claim] contain any disclosure relating to chemical
processes at work or the means of setting off an alarm or
adjusting the alarm limit.”  Diehr, supra, at 192, n. 14; see
also Flook, 437 U. S., at 586.  And so the other steps in the
process did not limit the claim to a particular application.
Moreover,  “[t]he  chemical  processes  involved  in  catalytic
conversion  of  hydrocarbons[,]  . . .  the  practice  of  monitor
ing the chemical process variables, the use of alarm limits
to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must
be  recomputed  and  readjusted,  and  the  use  of  comput-
ers  for  ‘automatic  monitoring-alarming’ ”  were  all  “well
known,”  to  the  point  where,  putting  the  formula  to  the
side,  there  was  no  “inventive  concept”  in  the  claimed
application  of  the  formula.  Id.,  at  594.  “[P]ost-solution
activity”  that  is  purely  “conventional  or  obvious,”  the
Court  wrote,  “can[not]  transform  an  unpatentable  princi
ple into a patentable process.”  Id., at 589, 590.

The  claim  before  us  presents  a  case  for  patentability
that  is  weaker  than  the  (patent-eligible)  claim  in  Diehr
and  no  stronger  than  the  (unpatentable)  claim  in  Flook.
Beyond  picking  out  the  relevant  audience,  namely  those
who  administer  doses  of  thiopurine  drugs,  the  claim  sim-
ply tells doctors to: (1) measure (somehow) the current level
of  the  relevant  metabolite,  (2)  use  particular  (unpatenta
ble) laws of nature (which the claim sets forth) to calculate
the current toxicity/inefficacy limits, and (3) reconsider the
drug  dosage  in  light  of  the  law.  These  instructions  add
nothing  specific  to  the  laws  of  nature  other  than  what  is
well-understood, routine, conventional activity, previously
engaged in by those in the field.  And since they are steps
that must be taken in order to apply the laws in question,
the  effect  is  simply  to  tell  doctors  to  apply  the  law  some
how  when  treating  their  patients.    The  process  in  Diehr
was not so characterized; that in Flook was characterized
in roughly this way.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the patentability of a process. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to patent law, making it unsuitable for indexing as general content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

GONZALES v. O CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE
UNIAO DO VEGETAL
Opinion of the Court

hoasca  (pronounced  “wass-ca”),  a  sacramental  tea  made
from two plants unique to the Amazon region.  One of the
plants,  psychotria  viridis,  contains  dimethyltryptamine
(DMT),  a  hallucinogen  whose  effects  are  enhanced  by
alkaloids from the other plant, banisteriopsis caapi.  DMT,
as  well  as  “any  material,  compound,  mixture,  or  prepara-
tion,  which  contains  any  quantity  of  [DMT],”  is  listed  in
Schedule  I  of  the  Controlled  Substances  Act.  §812(c),
Schedule I(c).

In 1999, United States Customs inspectors intercepted a
shipment to the American UDV containing three drums of
hoasca.  A  subsequent  investigation  revealed  that  the
UDV  had  received  14  prior  shipments  of  hoasca.  The
inspectors seized the intercepted shipment and threatened
the UDV with prosecution.

The  UDV  filed  suit  against  the  Attorney  General  and
other  federal  law  enforcement  officials,  seeking  declara-
tory  and  injunctive  relief.    The  complaint  alleged,  inter
alia,  that  applying  the  Controlled  Substances  Act  to  the
UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca violates RFRA.  Prior to
trial, the UDV moved for a preliminary injunction, so that
it  could  continue  to  practice  its  faith  pending  trial  on  the
merits.

At  a  hearing  on  the  preliminary  injunction,  the  Gov-
ernment  conceded  that  the  challenged  application  of  the
Controlled  Substances  Act  would  substantially  burden  a
sincere  exercise  of  religion  by  the  UDV.    See  O  Centro
Espirita  Beneficiente  Uniao  do  Vegetal  v.  Ashcroft,  282
F. Supp.  2d  1236,  1252  (NM  2002).    The  Government
argued,  however,  that  this  burden  did  not  violate  RFRA,
because  applying  the  Controlled  Substances  Act  in  this
case  was  the  least  restrictive  means  of  advancing  three
compelling  governmental  interests:  protecting  the  health
and  safety  of  UDV  members,  preventing  the  diversion  of
hoasca from the church to recreational users, and comply-
ing  with  the  1971  United  Nations  Convention  on  Psycho-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a court opinion. It discusses the legal context surrounding the use of hoasca in a religious context and the conflict with the Controlled Substances Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

49

Opinion of the Court

to shield information from disclosure and the right to make
and implement important personal decisions without gov-
ernmental interference.  See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589,
599–600 (1977).  Only the cases involving this second sense
of the term could have any possible relevance to the abor-
tion issue, and some of the cases in that category involved
personal decisions that were obviously very, very far afield.
See Pierce, 268 U. S. 510 (right to send children to religious
school); Meyer, 262 U. S. 390 (right to have children receive
German language instruction).

What remained was a handful of cases having something
to do with marriage, Loving, 388 U. S. 1 (right to marry a
person  of  a  different  race),  or  procreation,  Skinner,  316
U. S. 535 (right not to be sterilized); Griswold, 381 U. S. 479
(right of married persons to obtain contraceptives); Eisen-
stadt,  405  U. S.  438  (same,  for  unmarried  persons).    But
none  of  these  decisions  involved  what  is  distinctive  about
abortion: its effect on what Roe termed “potential life.”

When the Court summarized the basis for the scheme it
imposed on the country, it asserted that its rules were “con-
sistent with” the following: (1) “the relative weights of the
respective  interests  involved,”  (2)  “the  lessons  and  exam-
ples of medical and legal history,” (3) “the lenity of the com-
mon law,” and (4) “the demands of the profound problems
of the present day.”  Roe, 410 U. S., at 165.  Put aside the
second and third factors, which were based on the Court’s
flawed account of history, and what remains are precisely
the sort of considerations that legislative bodies often take
into account when they draw lines that accommodate com-
peting interests.  The scheme Roe produced looked like leg-
islation, and the Court provided the sort of explanation that
might be expected from a legislative body.

What Roe did not provide was any cogent justification for
the lines it drew.  Why, for example, does a State have no

c
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the landmark case Roe v. Wade. It delves into the Court's reasoning and the arguments surrounding abortion rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 15–1039 and 15–1195
_________________

15–1039

SANDOZ INC., PETITIONER
v.
AMGEN INC., ET AL.

15–1195

AMGEN INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
SANDOZ INC.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 12, 2017]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These  cases  involve  42  U. S. C.  §262(l),  which  was  en-
acted as part of the Biologics Price Competition and Inno-
vation  Act  of  2009  (BPCIA),  124  Stat.  808.    The  BPCIA
governs  a  type  of  drug  called  a  biosimilar,  which  is  a
biologic product that is highly similar to a biologic product
that  has  already  been  approved  by  the  Food  and  Drug
Administration  (FDA).    Under  §262(l),  an  applicant  that
seeks FDA approval of a biosimilar must provide its appli-
cation  materials  and  manufacturing  information  to  the
manufacturer of the corresponding biologic within 20 days
of  the  date  the  FDA  notifies  the  applicant  that  it  has
accepted  the  application  for  review.    The  applicant  then
must  give  notice  to  the  manufacturer  at  least  180  days
before marketing the biosimilar commercially.

The  first  question  presented  by  these  cases  is  whether
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES

BREYER, J., dissenting

ployees who raised a general objection at the beginning of
the year.  The union has honored their objections by sub-
tracting from their special payments the same 44% that it
subtracts  from  each  of  their  ordinary  monthly  payments.
App. 309.  And we know that the special assessment here
did not even work temporary constitutional harm.  That is
because  audited  figures  showed  that  the  union’s  total
nonchargeable (e.g., political) expenses for that year ended
up  as  a  lower  percentage  of  total  expenses  than  the  pre-
vious  year.  Hence  the  objecting  nonmembers  ended  up
being  charged  too  little,  not  too  much,  even  with  the  spe-
cial assessment thrown into the mix.

Let  me  put  the  point  more  specifically.  The  union’s
June  2005  Hudson  notice  said  that  the  union  would
charge  objecting  nonmembers  roughly  56%  of  the  dues
paid  by  union  members.    See  App.  102.  That  56%  figure
represented the chargeable portion of expenditures accord-
ing  to  the  audited  figures  from  2004.  Thus,  if  the  fee
charged  to  a  union  member  pursuant  to  the  2005  notice
was $400, the fee charged to an objecting nonmember was
$224.  The  union  similarly  prorated  the  special  assess-
ment  charging  objecting  nonmembers  56%  of  the  assess-
ment  it  imposed  upon  members.  Thus,  if  the  special
assessment amounted to $50 for a member, it amounted to
$28  for  an  objecting  nonmember.    And  total  dues  in  this
example would have amounted to $450 for a member and
$252 for a nonmember.

In the event, the union’s chargeable expenses for 2005—
including the funds raised pursuant to the special assess-
ment—amounted  to  more  than  56%  of  its  total  expendi-
tures.  The  auditor’s  reports  show  that  the  union’s  total
Id.,
expenditures  in  2005  amounted  to  $40,045,409.
at  166.  Chargeable  expenses  amounted  to  $27,552,746,
which works out to 69% of the total budget.  Ibid.  Thus, a
substantially  larger  portion  of  the  union’s  2005  spending
was  chargeable  (69%)  than  it  had  been  in  2004  (56%).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the details of a union's financial practices and how they relate to the rights of non-members.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

Opinion of the Court

cockroaches.

When  questioned,  Castro-Huerta  admitted  that  he  had
severely undernourished his stepdaughter during the pre-
ceding month.  The State of Oklahoma criminally charged
both  Castro-Huerta  and  his  wife  for  child  neglect.    Both
were convicted.  Castro-Huerta was sentenced to 35 years
of imprisonment, with the possibility of parole.  This case
concerns the State’s prosecution of Castro-Huerta.

After Castro-Huerta was convicted and while his appeal
was  pending  in  state  court,  this  Court  decided  McGirt  v.
Oklahoma, 591 U. S. ___ (2020).  In McGirt, the Court held
that Congress had never properly disestablished the Creek
Nation’s reservation in eastern Oklahoma.  As a result, the
Court concluded that the Creek Reservation remained “In-
dian country.”  Id., at ___–___, ___, ___ (slip op., at 1–3, 17,
28).  The status of that part of Oklahoma as Indian country
meant that different jurisdictional rules might apply for the
prosecution  of  criminal  offenses  in  that  area.    See  18
U. S. C.  §§1151–1153.    Based  on  McGirt’s  reasoning,  the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals later recognized that
several  other  Indian  reservations  in  Oklahoma  had  like-
wise  never  been  properly  disestablished.  See,  e.g.,  State
ex rel. Matloff v.  Wallace, 2021  OK CR 21, ¶15, 497 P. 3d
686, 689 (reaffirming recognition of the Cherokee, Choctaw,
and  Chickasaw  Reservations);  Grayson  v.  State,  2021  OK
CR 8, ¶10, 485 P. 3d 250, 254 (Seminole Reservation).

In  light  of  McGirt  and  the  follow-on  cases,  the  eastern
part of Oklahoma, including Tulsa, is now recognized as In-
dian country.  About two million people live there, and the
vast majority are not Indians.

The classification of eastern Oklahoma as Indian country
has  raised  urgent  questions  about  which  government  or
governments have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes commit-
ted there.  This case is an example:  a crime committed in
what is now recognized as Indian country (Tulsa) by a non-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion discussing the case of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. It sets the context of the case, including the crime committed, the convictions, and the relevant legal precedent set by McGirt v. Oklahoma.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

185

Breyer, J., dissenting

provision does more. Does it forbid the FDA to regulate
at all?

This Court has already answered that question expressly
and in the negative. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
505 U. S. 504 (1992). Cipollone held that the FCLAA’s pre-
emption provision does not bar state or federal regulation
outside the provision’s literal scope.
Id., at 518. And it de-
scribed the pre-emption provision as “merely prohibit[ing]
state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particu-
lar cautionary statements on cigarette labels . . . .”

Ibid.

This negative answer is fully consistent with Congress’ in-
tentions in regard to the pre-emption language. When Con-
gress enacted the FCLAA, it focused upon the regulatory
efforts of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), not the
FDA. See 1965 Hearings 1–2. And the Public Health Cig-
arette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91–222, § 7(c), 84 Stat. 89,
expressly amended the FCLAA to provide that “[n]othing in
this Act shall be construed to afﬁrm or deny the [FTC’s]
holding that it has the authority to issue trade regulation
rules” for tobacco. See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91–897,
p. 7 (1970) (statement of House Managers) (we have “no in-
tention to resolve the question as to whether” the FTC could
regulate tobacco in a different way); see also 116 Cong. Rec.
7921 (1970) (statement of Rep. Satterﬁeld) (same). Why
would one read the FCLAA’s pre-emption clause—a provi-
sion that Congress intended to limit even in respect to the
agency directly at issue—so broadly that it would bar a dif-
ferent agency from engaging in any other cigarette regula-
tion at all? The answer is that the Court need not, and
should not, do so. And, inasmuch as the Court already has
declined to view the FCLAA as pre-empting the entire ﬁeld
of tobacco regulation, I cannot accept that that same law
bars the FDA’s regulatory efforts here.

When the FCLAA’s narrow pre-emption provision is set
aside, the majority’s conclusion that Congress clearly in-
tended for its tobacco-related statutes to be the exclusive
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It discusses the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) and its preemption clause. The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS

ALITO, J., dissenting

see id., at 575 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.); see also id., at
574 (opinion of the Court), and the House and state inter-
venors now argue that the mandate can still be sustained
on this ground despite the fact that the “tax” it supposedly
imposes is now set at zero.  In NFIB, I did not see how the
mandate’s penalty could be understood as a tax, see id., at
661–669 (joint dissent), but assuming for the sake of argu-
ment that the majority’s understanding was correct at the
time, it is now indefensible.

The Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and
collect Taxes” “to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”  Art. I,
§8, cl. 1.  In NFIB, the Court made clear that “the essential
feature of any tax” is that it “produces at least some revenue
for  the  Government.”    567  U. S.,  at  564  (opinion  of  the
Court).  That limitation follows from the text of the provi-
sion.  A tax cannot assist in paying debts or providing for
the general welfare or defense if it raises no money.  More-
over, the concept of laying and collecting taxes plainly en-
tails the collection of revenue.  At the founding, to “lay” in
the relevant sense meant to “assess; to charge; to impose.”
2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage (1828) (Webster); see also S. Johnson, A Dictionary
of  the  English  Language  (10th  ed.  1792)  (Johnson)  (“To
charge as a payment”).  To “collect” meant to “gather money
or revenue from debtors; to demand and receive.”  1 Web-
ster; see also Johnson (“To gather together”).  And a “tax”
was a “rate or sum of money” assessed on certain persons
or  property.  2  Webster.  Read  together,  this  language
means that Congress is empowered to pass laws that raise
revenue.

In recognizing that raising revenue is an “essential fea-
ture” of any exercise of the taxing power, NFIB built on a
substantial line of precedent.  See Department of Revenue
of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. 767, 778 (1994); United
States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 28, and n. 4 (1953); United
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and citations, which are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE

ALITO, J., concurring

2010, 2027.  That amendment was rejected.

Thus, the no-aid provision’s terms keep it “[t]ethered” to
its original “bias,” and it is not clear at all that the State
“actually confront[ed]” the provision’s “tawdry past in reen-
acting it.”  Ramos, 590 U. S., at ___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., con-
curring in part) (slip op., at 4).  After all, whereas the no-
aid  provision  had  originally  been foisted  on Montana,  the
State  readopted  it  voluntarily—“sectarian”  references  in-
cluded.  Whether or not the State did so for any reason that
could be called legitimate, the convention delegates recog-
nized  that  the  provision  would  “continue  to  mean  and  do
whatever it does now,” Convention Tr. 2014 (statement of
Delegate  Loendorf ),  and  the  discrimination  in  this  case
shows that the provision continues to have its originally in-
tended effect.  And even if Montana had done more to ad-
dress  its  no-aid  provision’s  past,  that  would  of  course  do
nothing to resolve the bias inherent in the Blaine Amend-
ments  among  the  17  States,  by  respondents’  count,  that
have not readopted or amended them since around the turn
of the 20th century.20

Today’s public schools are quite different from those en-
visioned by Horace Mann, but many parents of many differ-
ent  faiths  still  believe  that  their  local  schools  inculcate  a
worldview that is antithetical to what they teach at home.
Many have turned to religious schools, at considerable ex-
pense,  or  have  undertaken  the  burden  of  homeschooling.
The  tax-credit  program  adopted  by  the  Montana  Legisla-

——————

20 Ala. Const., Art. XIV, §263 (1901); Ariz. Const., Art. II, §12, Art. IX,
§10  (1912);  Colo.  Const.,  Art. V,  §34,  Art. IX,  §7  (1876);  Del.  Const.,
Art. X, §3 (1897); Ind. Const., Art. I, §6 (1851); Ky. Const. §189 (1891);
Miss. Const., Art. 8, §208 (1890); Nev. Const., Art. XI, §10 (1880); N. H.
Const.,  Pt.  II,  Art.  83  (1877);  N. M.  Const.,  Art.  XII,  §3  (1911);  N. D.
Const.,  Art. VIII,  §152  (1889);  Ohio  Const.,  Art. VI,  §2  (1851);  Okla.
Const.,  Art. II,  §5  (1907);  Ore. Const.,  Art.  I,  §5  (1857);  S. D.  Const.,
Art. VIII,  §16  (1889);  Wis.  Const.,  Art.  I,  §18,  Art. X,  §3  (1848);  Wyo.
Const., Art. I, §19, Art. VII, §8 (1889).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of *Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue*. It delves into the history and implications of the Blaine Amendments, which prohibit public funding for religious institutions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GOLAN v. HOLDER

Syllabus

U. S. statutory formalities.  Works encompassed by §514 are granted
the protection they would have enjoyed had the United States main-
tained  copyright  relations  with  the  author’s  country  or  removed  for-
malities  incompatible  with  Berne.    As  a  consequence  of  the  barriers
to U. S. copyright protection prior to §514’s enactment, foreign works
“restored”  to  protection  by  the  measure  had  entered  the  public  do-
main  in  this  country.    To  cushion  the  impact  of  their  placement  in
protected  status,  §514  provides  ameliorating  accommodations  for
parties  who  had  exploited  affected  works  before  the  URAA  was
enacted.

Petitioners  are  orchestra  conductors,  musicians,  publishers,  and
others who formerly enjoyed free access to works §514 removed from
the  public  domain.  They  maintain  that  Congress,  in  passing  §514,
exceeded its authority under the Copyright Clause and transgressed
First Amendment limitations.  The District Court granted the Attor-
ney General’s motion for summary judgment.  Affirming in part, the
Tenth  Circuit  agreed  that  Congress  had  not  offended  the  Copyright
Clause,  but  concluded  that  §514  required  further  First  Amendment
inspection in light of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186.  On remand,
the  District  Court  granted  summary  judgment  to  petitioners  on  the
First Amendment claim, holding that §514’s constriction of the public
domain was not justified by any of the asserted federal interests.  The
Tenth Circuit reversed, ruling that §514 was narrowly tailored to fit
the  important  government aim  of  protecting  U. S.  copyright  holders’
interests abroad.

Held:

1. Section 514 does not exceed Congress’ authority under the Copy-

right Clause.  Pp. 13–23.

(a) The text of the Copyright Clause does not exclude application
of  copyright  protection  to  works  in  the  public  domain.    Eldred  is
largely dispositive of petitioners’ claim that the Clause’s confinement
of a copyright’s lifespan to a “limited Tim[e]” prevents the removal of
works from the public domain.  In Eldred, the Court upheld the Cop-
yright Term Extension Act (CTEA), which extended, by 20 years, the
terms  of  existing  copyrights.    The  text  of  the  Copyright  Clause,  the
Court observed, contains no “command that a time prescription, once
set, becomes forever ‘fixed’ or ‘inalterable,’ ” and the Court declined to
infer  any  such  command.    537  U. S.,  at  199.    The  construction  peti-
tioners tender here is similarly infirm.  The terms afforded works re-
stored by §514 are no less “limited” than those the CTEA lengthened.
Nor  had  the  “limited  Tim[e]”  already  passed  for  the  works  at  issue
here—many  of  them  works formerly  denied  any  U. S.  copyright  pro-
tection—for a period of exclusivity must begin before it may end.  Pe-
titioners  also  urge  that  the  Government’s  position  would  allow  Con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, outlining the background and issues of the case *Golan v. Holder*.  It is not the actual content of the book being discussed, but rather a summary of the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 21–86 and 21–1239
_________________

21–86

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC., PETITIONER
v.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
MICHELLE COCHRAN

21–1239

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[April 14, 2023]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring in judgment.
I agree with the Court that Michelle Cochran and Axon
Enterprise  are  entitled  to  their  day  in  court.   But  to  my
mind the reason why has nothing to do with the “Thunder
Basin factors.”  Ante, at 8.  Instead, it follows directly from
28 U. S. C. §1331.

I

The  Constitution  vests in  Congress  the  power to  create
and  organize  lower  federal  courts.  See  Art. I,  §8,  cl. 9;
Art. III, §1; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U. S. 441, 449 (1850).  Exer-
cising that power, for the  last  150 years  Congress  has  af-
forded  lower  federal  courts  jurisdiction  to  hear  civil  dis-
putes arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States.  Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, §1, 18 Stat. 470; see
also Act of Dec. 1, 1980, 94 Stat. 2369 (eliminating amount-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

BOND v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

saying”  applies  to  legislation  just  as  it  does  to  everyday
life.

Among  the  background  principles  of  construction  that
our cases have recognized are those grounded in the rela-
tionship between the Federal Government and the States
under  our  Constitution.    It  has  long  been  settled,  for  ex-
ample,  that  we  presume  federal  statutes  do  not  abrogate
state  sovereign  immunity,  Atascadero  State  Hospital  v.
Scanlon,  473  U. S.  234,  243  (1985),  impose  obligations  on
the  States  pursuant  to  section  5  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment,  Pennhurst  State  School  and  Hospital  v.
Halderman,  451  U. S.  1,  16–17  (1981),  or  preempt  state
law,  Rice  v.  Santa  Fe  Elevator  Corp.,  331  U. S.  218,  230
(1947).

Closely related to these is the well-established principle
that “ ‘it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain
of  Congress’  intent  before  finding  that  federal  law  over-
rides’ ”  the  “usual  constitutional  balance  of  federal  and
state  powers.”    Gregory  v.  Ashcroft,  501  U. S.  452,  460
(1991)  (quoting  Atascadero,  supra,  at  243).
  To  quote
Frankfurter  again,  if  the  Federal  Government  would
“ ‘radically  readjust[ ]  the  balance  of  state  and  national
authority, those charged with the duty of legislating [must
be] reasonably explicit’ ” about it.  BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corporation,  511  U. S.  531,  544  (1994)  (quoting  Some
Reflections,  supra,  at  539–540;  second  alteration  in  origi-
nal).  Or  as  explained  by  Justice  Marshall,  when  legisla-
tion “affect[s] the federal balance, the requirement of clear
statement  assures  that  the  legislature  has  in  fact  faced,
and  intended  to  bring  into  issue,  the  critical  matters  in-
volved in the judicial decision.”  Bass, supra, at 349.

——————

229(c)(2): “Conduct prohibited by [section 229(a)] is within the jurisdic-
tion  of  the  United  States  if  the  prohibited  conduct  . . .  takes  place
outside  of  the  United  States  and  is  committed  by  a  national  of  the
United States.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case BOND v. UNITED STATES. It discusses the relationship between federal and state powers and the interpretation of a specific law (section 229).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

21

Opinion of the Court

C
We  conclude  by  addressing  the  respondents’  argument
(which the dissent does not join) that even if States agreed
in the plan of the Convention to condemnation suits by Fed-
eral  Government  delegatees,  the  NGA  does  not  authorize
such  suits  with  the  requisite  clarity.  The  Third  Circuit
adopted  this  position  below,  concluding  that  §717f(h)  did
not use the “unmistakably clear” language necessary to del-
egate the Federal Government’s ability to sue nonconsent-
ing States.  938 F. 3d, at 111 (quoting Blatchford, 501 U. S.,
at 786); 938 F. 3d, at 111 (“If Congress had intended to del-
egate  the  federal  government’s  exemption  from  sovereign
immunity,  it  would  certainly  have  spoken  much  more
clearly.”).  The respondents renew their contention before
this Court.  See Brief for Respondent NCJF 24–31; Brief for
Respondent  New  Jersey  et al.  31–39.    They  note  that  we
have required “unequivocal textual evidence” when deter-
mining whether a State has expressly consented to suit, or
when  evaluating  whether  Congress  has  validly  abrogated
state  sovereign  immunity  under  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment.  Id., at 32 (citing Sossamon, 563 U. S., at 291; Hibbs,
538 U. S., at 726).  And they argue that this requirement
should apply with equal force in the context of private con-
demnation actions against nonconsenting States.

The respondents are certainly correct that a clear state-
ment is required to subject States to suit in the waiver and
abrogation contexts.  But they have again misconstrued the
issue in this case as whether the United States can delegate
its ability to sue States.  The issue is instead whether the
United  States  can  delegate  its  eminent  domain  power  to
private  parties.  Regardless  whether  the  Federal  Govern-
ment must speak with unmistakable clarity when delegat-
ing  its  freestanding  exemption  from  state  sovereign  im-
munity  (assuming  such  a  delegation  is  even  permissible,
see  Blatchford,  501  U. S.,  at  785),  there  is  no  similar  re-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the issue of eminent domain and whether the federal government can delegate this power to private parties.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of court opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

ALITO, J., dissenting

weigh  the  costs  and  benefits.23  All  these  charges  are
overblown.

First, it is quite unfair to criticize Justice White for not
engaging in a detailed discussion of the original meaning of
the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right since he had already
done that just two years before in his opinion for the Court
in Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 92–100 (1970).  In Wil-
liams, after examining that history, he concluded that the
Sixth Amendment did not incorporate every feature of the
common-law  right  (a  conclusion  that  the  majority,  by  the
way,  does  not  dispute).    And  in  Apodaca,  he  built  on  the
analysis in Williams.  Accordingly, there was no need to re-
peat what had been said before.

Second, it is similarly unfair to criticize Justice White for
not discussing the prior decisions that commented on jury
unanimity.  None  of  those  decisions  went  beyond  saying
that this was a feature of the common-law right or cursorily
stating that unanimity was required.24  And as noted, Wil-
liams had already held that the Sixth Amendment did not
preserve all aspects of the common-law right.

Third, the failure of Justice White (and Justice Powell) to
take into account the supposedly racist origins of the Loui-
siana and Oregon laws should not be counted as a defect for
the reasons already discussed.  See supra, at 4–5.

Fourth, it is hard to know what to make of the function-
alist charge.  One Member of the majority explicitly disa-
vows this criticism, see ante, at 2 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concur-
ring in part), and it is most unlikely that all the Justices in
the majority are ready to label all functionalist decisions as
poorly reasoned.  Most of the landmark criminal procedure
decisions  from  roughly  Apodaca’s  time  fall  into  that  cate-
gory.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 654 (1961) (Fourth
Amendment);  Miranda  v.  Arizona,  384  U. S.  436,  444

——————

23 Ante, at 13.
24 See, e.g., Andres, 333 U. S., at 748; Thompson, 170 U. S., at 351.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and references to other justices.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

11

GORSUCH, J., concurring

Smith, it must be applied in a manner that treats religion
with  neutral  respect.    That  means  the  government  must
apply  the  same  level  of  generality  across  cases—and  that
did not happen here.

There is another problem with sliding up the generality
scale: it risks denying constitutional protection to religious
beliefs  that  draw  distinctions  more  specific  than  the  gov-
ernment’s  preferred  level  of  description.    To  some,  all
wedding  cakes may appear indistinguishable.  But  to Mr.
Phillips that is not the case—his faith teaches him other-
wise.  And  his  religious  beliefs  are  entitled  to  no  less
respectful  treatment  than  the  bakers’  secular  beliefs  in
Mr.  Jack’s  case.    This  Court  has  explained  these  same
points  “[r]epeatedly  and  in  many  different  contexts”  over
many  years.  Smith,  494  U. S.  at  887.    For  example,  in
Thomas a faithful Jehovah’s Witness and steel mill worker
agreed  to  help  manufacture  sheet  steel  he  knew  might
find its way into armaments, but he was unwilling to work
on a fabrication line producing tank turrets.  450 U. S., at
711.  Of course, the line Mr. Thomas drew wasn’t the same
many others would draw and it wasn’t even the same line
many other members of the same faith would draw.  Even
so, the Court didn’t try to suggest that making steel is just
making  steel.    Or  that  to  offend  his  religion  the  steel
needed  to  be  of  a  particular  kind  or  shape.    Instead,  it
recognized  that  Mr.  Thomas  alone  was  entitled  to  define
the  nature  of  his  religious  commitments—and  that  those
commitments,  as  defined  by  the  faithful  adherent,  not  a
bureaucrat  or  judge,  are  entitled  to  protection  under  the
First Amendment.  Id., at 714–716; see also United States
v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 254–255 (1982); Smith, supra, at 887
(collecting  authorities).  It  is  no  more  appropriate  for  the
United  States  Supreme  Court  to  tell  Mr.  Phillips  that  a
wedding cake is just like any other—without regard to the
religious  significance  his  faith  may  attach  to  it—than  it
would  be  for  the  Court  to  suggest  that  for  all  persons
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in a Supreme Court case. It discusses the application of the Smith v. Employment Division case and the importance of respecting religious beliefs, even if they are specific or differ from societal norms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

1030

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

March 20, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–8189. Ortega v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8190. Christian v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 663.

No. 99–8194. Dove v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 901.

No. 99–8198. Davenport v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 F. 3d 1120.

No. 99–8199. Harrison v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 187 F. 3d 632.

No. 99–8202. Villa v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certio-

rari denied. Reported below: 201 F. 3d 433.

No. 99–8204. Dusenbery v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 244.

No. 99–8205. Hernandez-Miranda v. United States. C. A.

11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–8211. Gracia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 99–8214. Sydnor v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 188.

No. 99–8216. Simpson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1321.

No. 99–8219. Adkins v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 1112.

No. 99–8221. Emerson v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 430 Mass. 378, 719
N. E. 2d 494.

No. 99–8223. Zepeda-Aguirre v. United States. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F. 3d 1334.

No. 99–8226. Wallace v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 744 So. 2d 459.

No. 99–8227. Torres v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190 F. 3d 542.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document's table of contents or case summaries.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC

Opinion of the Court

cines became, one might say, victims of their own success.
They  had  been  so  effective  in  preventing  infectious  dis-
eases  that  the  public  became  much  less  alarmed  at  the
threat  of  those  diseases,4  and  much  more  concerned  with
the risk of injury from the vaccines themselves.5

Much  of  the  concern  centered  around  vaccines  against
diphtheria,  tetanus,  and  pertussis  (DTP),  which  were
blamed  for  children’s  disabilities  and  developmental  de-
lays.  This led to a massive increase in vaccine-related tort
litigation.  Whereas  between  1978  and  1981  only  nine
product-liability suits were filed against DTP manufactur-
ers, by the mid-1980’s the suits numbered more than 200
each  year.6    This  destabilized  the  DTP  vaccine  market,
causing two of the three domestic manufacturers to with-
draw; and the remaining manufacturer, Lederle Laborato-
ries, estimated that its potential tort liability exceeded its
annual sales by a factor of 200.7  Vaccine shortages arose
when Lederle had production problems in 1984.8

Despite  the  large  number  of  suits,  there  were  many
complaints  that  obtaining  compensation  for  legitimate
vaccine-inflicted  injuries  was  too  costly  and  difficult.9  A

——————

4 See  Mortimer,  Immunization  Against  Infectious  Disease,  200  Sci-

ence 902, 906 (1978).

5 See  National  Vaccine  Advisory  Committee,  A  Comprehensive  Re-
view  of  Federal  Vaccine  Safety  Programs  and  Public  Health  Activities
2–3  (Dec.  2008)  (hereinafter  NVAC),  http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/nvac/
documents/vaccine-safety-review.pdf  (as  visited  Feb.  18,  2011,  and
available in Clerk of Court’s case file).

6 See Sing & Willian, Supplying Vaccines: An Overview of the Market
and Regulatory Context, in Supplying Vaccines: An Economic Analysis
of Critical Issues 45, 51–52 (M. Pauly, C. Robinson, S. Sepe, M. Sing, &
M. William eds. 1996).

7 See id., at 52.
8 See  Centers  for  Disease  Control,  Diptheria-Tetanus-Pertussis  Vac-
cine  Shortage,  33  Morbidity  and  Mortality  Weekly  Report  695–696
(Dec. 14, 1984).

9 See Apolinsky & Van Detta, Rethinking Liability for Vaccine Injury,
19  Cornell J.  L. & Pub. Pol’y 537,  550–551 (2010); T.  Burke, Lawyers,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the history of vaccine-related litigation and its impact on the market. It provides context and background information relevant to the case at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Case Background</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U61

[11-02-00 07:34:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN

852

JONES v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Courts of Appeals have di-
vided both on the question whether § 844(i) applies to build-
ings not used for commercial purposes,2 and on the constitu-
tionality of such an application.3 We granted certiorari, 528
U. S. 1002 (1999), and framed as the question presented:

“Whether, in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S.
549 (1995), and the interpretive rule that constitution-
ally doubtful constructions should be avoided, see Ed-
ward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Build-
ing & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988),
18 U. S. C. § 844(i) applies to the arson of a private resi-
dence; and if so, whether its application to the private
residence in the present case is constitutional.”

Satisﬁed that § 844(i) does not reach an owner-occupied resi-
dence that is not used for any commercial purpose, we re-
verse the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

II

Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) as part of Title XI of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91–452,
§ 1102, 84 Stat. 952, “because of the need ‘to curb the use,
transportation, and possession of explosives.’ ” Russell v.

2 Compare United States v. Gaydos, 108 F. 3d 505 (CA3 1997) (vacant,
uninhabitable house formerly rented not covered by statute), United
States v. Denalli, 73 F. 3d 328 (CA11) (owner-occupied residence not cov-
ered), modiﬁed on other grounds, 90 F. 3d 444 (1996) (per curiam), United
States v. Mennuti, 639 F. 2d 107 (CA2 1981) (same), with United States v.
Ryan, 41 F. 3d 361 (CA8 1994) (en banc) (vacant former commercial prop-
erty covered), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1082 (1995), United States v. Ramey,
24 F. 3d 602 (CA4 1994) (owner-occupied residence covered), cert. denied,
514 U. S. 1103 (1995), and United States v. Stillwell, 900 F. 2d 1104 (CA7)
(same), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 838 (1990).

3 Compare United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F. 3d 522 (CA9 1995)
(application to owner-occupied residence unconstitutional), with 178 F. 3d
479 (CA7 1999) (decision below), and Ramey, 24 F. 3d, at 602 (application
constitutional).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the beginning of the Opinion of the Court in the case of Jones v. United States. It includes citations to legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of a specific statute (18 U.S.C. § 844(i)).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

979

524 U. S.

September 18, 22, 25, 1998

tion for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to The
Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Cer-
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would
tiorari denied.
grant the application for stay of execution. Reported below: 149
F. 3d 1170.

No. 98–6021 (A–238). Stewart v. Virginia et al. Sup. Ct.
Va. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre-
sented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied.

Certiorari Denied

September 22, 1998

No. 98–5650 (A–233). Castillo v. Johnson, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of
death, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the
Justice Stevens and Jus-
Court, denied. Certiorari denied.
tice Ginsburg would grant the application for stay of execution.
Reported below: 141 F. 3d 218.

September 25, 1998

Dismissal Under Rule 46

No. 98–5823. Hamilton v. Roe, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th

Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 46.

Miscellaneous Order

No. A–234 (O. T. 1998). City of Grenada, Mississippi, et al.
v. Hubbard et al. D. C. N. D. Miss. Application for stay pend-
ing appeal, presented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to
the Court, denied.

Certiorari Denied

No. 98–6114 (A–251). Roberts v. Moore, Director, South
Carolina Department of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct. S. C.
Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented
to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 332 S. C. 488, 505 S. E. 2d
593.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a list of court orders related to death penalty cases. It includes case numbers, dates, and brief descriptions of the actions taken by the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxxix

Page
Judge, Supreme Court of N. Y., N. Y. County; Wells v.  . . . . . . .  866,1020

994
Justice v. King  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1134
Juvenile Female v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
J. W. v. Knight
945
Kafka v. Bridgewater  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833
Kaiser v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011
Kalil, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
851
Kamara v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147
Kamienski; Ricci v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003
Kaminski; Knight v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
844
Kamps v. Miller-Stout
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1147
Kane; Unus v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972
Kannrine; Cooper v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972
Kannrine; Muhammad v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Kansas; Flynn v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999
Kansas; Snow v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kansas City School Dist.; Bables v.
1028
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kansas City Star; Millen v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  966,1046

1129

Kansas State Bd. of Indigent Defense Services; Davis v.  . . . . . . .
1149

Kappos; Shinnecock Smoke Shop v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878

Karagiannopoulos v. Lowell  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kares v. Eniex  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Karim-Panahi v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1034,1141

Karnofel v. Beck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1106

Karnofel v. Girard Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  802,1045

Karr v. Arizona
1127

Kast; Antonsson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  952,1066

1145

Kastner v. Martin & Drought, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1061

Kattaria v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Katz v. Mabus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1093

Kaufman v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Kavali v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969

Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . .
965

Kaye, P. C.; Uzamere v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1125

Kazoun v. Kazoun  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1075

KBR Technical Services, Inc.; Rogers v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
KCH Acquisition, Inc. v. Indiana
1147

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
KDJM–FM; Mitchell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  871,1101

1004

Keen v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

Keenan v. Pyle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Keener v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1129

Keith v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kelchner; Bronson v.
855

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Keleta v. United States

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

HENRY SCHEIN, INC. v. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

groundless.”    The  question  presented  in  this  case  is
whether  the  “wholly  groundless”  exception  is  consistent
with  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act.    We  conclude  that  it  is
not.  The Act does not contain a “wholly groundless” excep-
tion,  and  we  are  not  at  liberty  to  rewrite  the  statute
passed  by  Congress  and  signed  by  the  President.    When
the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability question to
an arbitrator, the courts must respect the parties’ decision
as  embodied  in  the  contract.    We  vacate  the  contrary
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I
  Archer  and  White  is  a  small  business  that  distributes
dental  equipment.    Archer  and  White  entered  into  a  con-
tract with Pelton and Crane, a dental equipment manufac-
turer,  to  distribute  Pelton  and  Crane’s  equipment.    The
relationship  eventually  soured.    As  relevant  here,  Archer
and  White  sued  Pelton  and  Crane’s  successor-in-interest
and  Henry  Schein,  Inc.  (collectively,  Schein)  in  Federal
District  Court  in  Texas.    Archer  and  White’s  complaint
alleged  violations  of  federal  and  state  antitrust  law,  and
sought both money damages and injunctive relief.
  The relevant contract between the parties provided:

  “Disputes.    This  Agreement  shall  be  governed  by
the laws of the State of North Carolina.  Any dispute
arising under or related to this Agreement (except for
actions  seeking  injunctive  relief  and  disputes  related
to  trademarks,  trade  secrets,  or  other  intellectual
property of [Schein]), shall be resolved by binding ar-
bitration  in  accordance  with  the  arbitration  rules  of
the  American  Arbitration  Association  [(AAA)].    The
place of arbitration shall be in Charlotte, North Caro-
lina.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a.

After Archer and White sued, Schein invoked the Federal
Arbitration  Act  and  asked  the  District  Court  to  refer  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to a case about arbitration. It sets the context for the legal dispute and outlines the key issue the court will address.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Introduction</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxxiv

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

841

Rodriguez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
982

Rodriguez v. Ercole  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rodriguez v. Evans
848

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rodriguez v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.
Rodriguez v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole  . . . . . . . .
922

Rodriguez v. Quality Engineering Products  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  812,1026

843

Rodriguez v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rodriguez v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  946,958,969

991

Rodriguez v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
853

Rodriguez-Duberney v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1133

Rodriguez-Laguna v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
857

Rodriguez-Marrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1034

Rodriguez-Mendiola v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

Rodriguez-Montelvo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
976

Rodriguez-Orozco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902

Rodriguez Pinero v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Rodriguez-Zamot v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Roe; Fan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  973,1140

1000

Roe; Peterson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933

Roe v. Waterbury  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rogers; Burnes v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

1075

Rogers v. KBR Technical Services, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rogers v. Thaler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  839,906,1139

Rogers v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962

Rohden v. Texas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Rojas-Barrera v. Wengler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  863,1086

1120

Rojem v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969

Rollins v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

Rollness v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
834

Romandetta v. Cate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Romeo; New York v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1082

Romero v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1084

Romero v. U. S. Parole Comm’n  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
887

Romero-Facio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Rone v. Michigan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ronwin v. Bayer Corp.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  921,1039

854

Rooks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
830

Roper; Barnett v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
994

Roper v. Farwell
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
840

Roper; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1051

Roper; Shelton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

Roper; Taylor v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

Rosa v. McNeil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

able expectation of privacy in it.  Smith, supra, at 744.  But
assumption  of  risk  doctrine  developed  in  tort  law.    It
generally  applies  when  “by  contract  or  otherwise  [one]
expressly  agrees  to  accept  a  risk  of  harm”  or  impliedly
does  so  by  “manifest[ing]  his  willingness  to  accept”  that
risk  and  thereby  “take[s]  his  chances  as  to  harm  which
may  result  from  it.”  Restatement  (Second)  of  Torts
§§496B,  496C(1),  and  Comment  b  (1965);  see  also  1  D.
Dobbs, P. Hayden, & E. Bublick, Law of Torts §§235–236,
pp. 841–850 (2d ed. 2017).  That rationale has little play in
this context.  Suppose I entrust a friend with a letter and
he  promises  to  keep  it  secret  until  he  delivers  it  to  an
intended  recipient.  In  what  sense  have  I  agreed  to  bear
the risk that he will turn around, break his promise, and
spill  its  contents  to  someone  else?    More  confusing  still,
what  have  I  done  to  “manifest  my  willingness  to  accept”
the  risk  that  the  government  will  pry  the  document  from
my friend and read it without his consent?

One  possible  answer  concerns  knowledge.    I  know  that
my  friend  might  break  his  promise,  or  that  the  govern-
ment might have some reason to search the papers in his
possession.    But  knowing  about  a  risk  doesn’t  mean  you
assume responsibility for it.  Whenever you walk down the
sidewalk  you  know  a  car  may  negligently  or  recklessly
veer off and hit you, but that hardly means you accept the
consequences  and  absolve  the  driver  of  any  damage  he
may  do  to  you.    Epstein,  Privacy  and  the  Third  Hand:
Lessons  From  the  Common  Law  of  Reasonable  Expecta-
tions,  24  Berkeley  Tech.  L. J.  1199,  1204  (2009);  see  W.
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton
on Law of Torts 490 (5th ed. 1984).

Some  have  suggested  the  third  party  doctrine  is  better
understood  to  rest  on  consent  than  assumption  of  risk.
“So long as a person knows that they are disclosing infor-
mation to a third party,” the argument goes, “their choice
to do so is voluntary and the consent valid.”  Kerr, supra,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments regarding privacy and the third-party doctrine.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.

THOMAS, J., dissenting

to provide photo identification to verify that the customer
is eligible to use the credit card”).

JUSTICE  ALITO  makes  a  compelling  case  that  Arizona’s
interpretation  is  superior  to  respondents’.    See  post,  at
6–10  (dissenting  opinion).  At  a  minimum,  however,  the
interpretations  advanced  by  Arizona  and  respondents  are
both  plausible.  See  677  F. 3d,  at  439  (Kozinski,  C.J.,
concurring)  (weighing  the  arguments).  The  competing
interpretations of §1973gg–4(a)(1) raise significant consti-
tutional  issues  concerning  Congress’  power  to  decide  who
may  vote  in  federal  elections.    Accordingly,  resolution  of
this  case  requires  a  better  understanding  of  the  relevant
constitutional provisions.

II

A

The  Voter  Qualifications  Clause,  U. S.  Const.,  Art.  I,
§2,  cl. 1,  provides  that  “the  Electors  in  each  State  shall
have  the  Qualifications  requisite  for  Electors  of  the  most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature” in elections for
the  federal  House  of  Representatives.    The  Seventeenth
Amendment, which provides for direct election of Senators,
contains  an  identical  clause.  That  language  is  suscep-
tible  of  only  one  interpretation:  States  have  the  author-
ity “to control who may vote in congressional elections” so
long as they do not “establish special requirements that do
not  apply  in  elections  for  the  state  legislature.”    U. S.
Term  Limits,  Inc.  v.  Thornton,  514  U. S.  779,  864–865
(1995)  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting);  see  also  The  Federalist
No.  57,  p.  349  (C.  Rossiter  ed.  2003)  (J.  Madison)  (“The
electors  . . .  are  to  be  the  same  who  exercise  the  right  in
every  State  of  electing  the  corresponding  branch  of  the
legislature of the State”).  Congress has no role in setting
voter  qualifications,  or  determining  whether  they  are
satisfied,  aside  from  the  powers  conferred  by  the  Four-
teenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into constitutional arguments regarding voter qualifications and the interpretation of a specific law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 139 (2010)

149

Opinion of the Court

eral law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States” in Mills.  28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1).

We  add that  the Court  of  Appeals found  the jury  instruc
tions  unconstitutional  for  an  additional  reason,  that  the  in
structions “require[d] the jury to unanimously reject a death
sentence  before  considering  other  sentencing  alternatives.”
465  F.  3d,  at  709  (citing  Mapes  v.  Coyle,  171  F.  3d  408,  416–
417  (CA6  1999)).  We  have  not,  however,  previously  held
jury  instructions  unconstitutional  for  this  reason.  Mills
says nothing about the matter.  Neither the parties nor the
courts  below  referred  to  Beck  v.  Alabama,  447  U. S.  625
(1980), or identiﬁed any other precedent from this Court set
ting  forth  this  rule.  Cf.  Jones  v.  United  States,  527  U. S.
373,  379–384  (1999)  (rejecting  an  arguably  analogous  claim).
But see post, at 158–160 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring  in  judgment).  Whatever  the  legal  merits  of  the
rule  or  the  underlying  verdict  forms  in  this  case  were  we
to  consider  them  on  direct  appeal,  the  jury  instructions  at
Spisak’s trial  were not contrary  to “clearly  established Fed
eral law.”  28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1).

III

Spisak’s second claim is that his counsel’s closing argument
at  the  sentencing  phase  of  his  trial  was  so  inadequate  as
to  violate  the  Sixth  Amendment.  To  prevail,  Spisak  must
show both that “counsel’s representation fell below an objec
tive  standard  of  reasonableness,”  Strickland,  466  U. S.,  at
688, and that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s  unprofessional  errors,  the  result  of  the  proceeding
would have been different,” id., at 694.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that Spisak’s claim was “not
well-taken  on  the  basis  of  our  review  of  the  record.”  State
v.  Spisak,  36  Ohio  St.  3d,  at  82,  521  N.  E.  2d,  at  802  (citing,
inter  alia,  Strickland,  supra).  The  District  Court  con
cluded  that  counsel  did  a  constitutionally  adequate  job  and
that  “[t]here  simply  is  not  a  reasonable  probability  that,  ab
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