<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010)

3

Syllabus

cruelty  vary  widely  from  place  to  place.    Hunting  is  unlawful  in  the
District of Columbia, for example, but there is an enormous national
market for hunting-related depictions, greatly exceeding the demand
for  crush  videos  or  animal  fighting  depictions.    Because  the  statute
allows  each  jurisdiction  to  export its laws to  the rest of the country,
§48(a) applies to any magazine or video depicting lawful hunting that
is sold in the Nation’s Capital.  Those seeking to comply with the law
face  a  bewildering  maze  of  regulations  from  at  least  56  separate  ju-
risdictions.  Pp. 11–15.

(3) Limiting §48’s reach to crush videos and depictions of animal
fighting  or  other  extreme  cruelty,  as  the  Government  suggests,  re-
quires  an  unrealistically  broad  reading  of  the  statute’s  exceptions
clause.  The statute only exempts material with “serious” value, and
“serious” must be taken seriously.  The excepted speech must also fall
within one of §48(b)’s enumerated categories.  Much speech does not.
For example, most hunting depictions are not obviously instructional
in  nature.    The  exceptions  clause  simply  has  no  adequate  reading
that results in the statute’s banning only the depictions the Govern-
ment would like to ban.

Although the language of §48(b) is drawn from the Court’s deci-
sion  in  Miller v.  California, 413  U. S.  15,  the  exceptions  clause  does
not  answer  every  First  Amendment  objection.    Under  Miller,  “seri-
ous” value shields depictions of sex from regulation as obscenity.  But
Miller  did  not  determine  that  serious  value  could  be  used  as  a  gen-
eral precondition to protecting other types of speech in the first place.
Even “ ‘wholly neutral futilities . . . come under the protection of free
speech.’ ”  Cohen  v.  California,  403  U. S.  15,  25.    The  First  Amend-
ment  presumptively  extends  to  many  forms  of  speech  that  do  not
qualify  for  §48(b)’s  serious-value  exception,  but  nonetheless  fall
within §48(c)’s broad reach.  Pp. 15–17.

(4) Despite the Government’s assurance that it will apply §48 to
reach only “extreme” cruelty, this Court will not uphold an unconsti-
tutional  statute  merely  because  the  Government  promises  to  use  it
responsibly.    Nor  can  the  Court  construe  this  statutory  language  to
avoid  constitutional  doubt.    A  limiting  construction  can  be  imposed
only  if  the  statute  “is  ‘readily  susceptible’  to  such  a  construction,”
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 884.  To read
§48  as  the  Government  desires  requires  rewriting,  not  just  reinter-
pretation.  Pp. 18–19.

(5) This  construction  of  §48  decides  the  constitutional  question.
The  Government  makes  no  effort  to  defend  §48  as  applied  beyond
crush videos and depictions of animal fighting.  It argues that those
particular  depictions  are  intrinsically  related  to  criminal  conduct  or
are  analogous  to  obscenity  (if  not  themselves  obscene),  and  that  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It outlines the arguments and reasoning behind a legal case concerning the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the depiction of animal cruelty.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
32

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

936 F. 3d 740, 769 (CA8 2019) (Kelly, J., concurring in part
and  dissenting  in  part).  To  allow  a  business  open  to  the
public  to  define  the  expressive  quality  of  its  goods  or  ser-
vices to exclude a protected group would nullify public ac-
commodations laws.  It would mean that a large retail store
could sell “passport photos for white people.”

The  majority  protests  that  Smith  will  gladly  sell  her
goods and services to anyone, including same-sex couples.
Ante, at 2, 17.  She just will not sell websites for same-sex
weddings.  Apparently, a gay or lesbian couple might buy a
wedding website for their straight friends.  This logic would
be amusing if it were not so embarrassing.12  I suppose the
Heart of Atlanta Motel could have argued that Black people
may still rent rooms for their white friends.  Smith answers
that she will sell other websites for gay or lesbian clients.
But then she, like Ollie McClung, who would serve Black
people take-out but not table service, discriminates against
LGBT  people  by  offering  them  a  limited  menu.13    This  is
plain to see, for all who do not look the other way.

The majority, however, analogizes this case to Hurley and
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640 (2000).  The
law schools in FAIR likewise relied on Hurley and Dale to
argue  that  the  Solomon  Amendment  violated  their  free-
speech  rights.  FAIR  confirmed,  however,  that  a  neutral
regulation  of  conduct  imposes  an  incidental  burden  on
speech when the regulation grants a right of equal access

——————

12 The majority tacitly acknowledges the absurdity.  At the start of its
opinion,  it  explains  that  Smith  “decided  to  expand  her  offerings  to  in-
clude services for couples seeking websites for their weddings.”  Ante, at 1
(emphasis added).

13 What is “ ‘embarrassing’ ” about this reasoning is not, as the Court
claims, the “distinction between status and message.”  Ante, at 18, n. 3.
It is petitioners’ contrivance, embraced by the Court, that a prohibition
on status-based discrimination can be avoided by asserting that a group
can always buy services on behalf of others, or else that the group can
access  a  “separate  but  equal”  subset  of  the  services  made  available  to
everyone else.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in the case of 32 Creative LLC v. Elenis. It argues against the majority opinion and provides legal reasoning and examples.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC.

Opinion of the Court

exclusive rights it awards can sometimes stand in the way
of others exercising their own creative powers.  See gener-
ally Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151,
156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219 (1954).

Macaulay  once  said  that  the  principle  of  copyright  is  a
“tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writ-
ers.”  T. Macaulay, Speeches on Copyright 25 (E. Miller ed.
1913).  Congress, weighing advantages and disadvantages,
will  determine  the  more  specific  nature  of  the  tax,  its
boundaries and conditions, the existence of exceptions and
exemptions, all by exercising its own constitutional power
to write a copyright statute.

Four provisions of the current Copyright Act are of par-
ticular relevance in this case.  First, a definitional provision
sets forth three basic conditions for obtaining a copyright.
There must be a “wor[k] of authorship,” that work must be
“original,” and the work must be “fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression.”  17 U. S. C. §102(a); see also Feist Pub-
lications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340,
345 (1991) (explaining that copyright requires some origi-
nal “creative spark” and therefore does not reach the facts
that a particular expression describes).

Second, the statute lists certain kinds of works that cop-
yright can protect.  They include “literary,” “musical,” “dra-
matic,”  “motion  pictur[e ],”  “architectural,”  and  certain
other  works.  §102(a).    In  1980,  Congress  expanded  the
reach of the Copyright Act to include computer programs.
And it defined “computer program” as “ ‘a set of statements
or  instructions  to  be  used  directly  or  indirectly  in  a  com-
puter in order to bring about a certain result.’ ”  §10, 94 Stat.
3028 (codified at 17 U. S. C. §101).

Third, the statute sets forth limitations on the works that
can  be  copyrighted,  including  works  that  the  definitional
provisions  might  otherwise  include.  It  says,  for  example,
that copyright protection cannot be extended to “any idea,
procedure,  process,  system,  method  of  operation,  concept,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

the  legion  of  amici  supporting  petitioners  ever  cited  the
case.  And it presumably explains why not one of the three
judges writing below ever cited the case either.  Given that
one  purpose  of  the  standing  requirement  is  “ ‘to  assure
that  concrete  adverseness  which  sharpens  the  presenta-
tion of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination,’ ” ante, at 13–14 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U. S.  186,  204  (1962)),  it  is  ironic  that  the  Court  today
adopts  a  new  theory  of  Article  III  standing  for  States
without the benefit of briefing or argument on the point.1

II

It is not at all clear how the Court’s “special solicitude”
for  Massachusetts  plays  out  in  the  standing  analysis,
except  as  an  implicit  concession  that  petitioners  cannot
establish standing on traditional terms.  But the status of
Massachusetts as a State cannot compensate for petition-
ers’  failure  to  demonstrate  injury  in  fact,  causation,  and
redressability.

When  the  Court  actually  applies  the  three-part  test,  it
focuses,  as  did  the  dissent  below,  see  415  F.  3d  50,  64

——————

1 The Court seems to think we do not recognize that Tennessee Copper
is a case about parens patriae standing, ante, at 17, n. 17, but we have
no doubt about that.  The point is that nothing in our cases (or Hart &
Wechsler) suggests that the prudential requirements for parens patriae
standing, see Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F. 3d 192,
199, n. (CADC 2002) (observing that “parens patriae is merely a species
of  prudential  standing”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)),  can
somehow substitute for, or alter the content of, the “irreducible consti-
tutional  minimum”  requirements  of  injury  in  fact,  causation,  and
redressability  under  Article  III.    Lujan  v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504
U. S. 555, 560 (1992).
  Georgia  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  324  U. S.  439  (1945),  is  not  to  the
contrary.  As the caption makes clear enough, the fact that a State may
assert rights under a federal statute as parens patriae in no way refutes
our clear ruling that “[a] State does not have standing as parens patriae
to bring an action against the Federal Government.”  Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592, 610, n. 16 (1982).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Massachusetts v. EPA. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding standing in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

him as attorney general.  On January 20, Governor Beshear
appointed a new secretary for Health and Family Services,
and the new secretary, represented by lawyers from the at-
torney  general’s  office,  continued  the  defense  of  the  chal-
lenged law.  On January 28, one day before the appeal was
argued, Attorney General Cameron also entered an appear-
ance as counsel for the secretary.  Id., at 82–83.
  On June 2, 2020, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the District Court’s judgment.  EMW Women’s Sur-
gical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 960 F. 3d 785, 790–812.
In  dissent,  Judge  Bush  argued  that  the  plaintiffs  lacked
third-party standing and criticized the majority for refusing
to wait for our decision on that issue in June Medical Ser-
vices L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___ (2020).  Within a week
after the panel’s decision, the secretary informed the attor-
ney general’s office that he would not file a petition for re-
hearing en banc or a petition for a writ of certiorari, App.
153, 161, but the secretary agreed not to oppose the attor-
ney general if he moved to intervene for the purpose of seek-
ing  further  review.    Id.,  at  153–154.    Two  days  later,  the
attorney general moved to withdraw as counsel for the sec-
retary and to intervene as a party on behalf of the Common-
wealth.  Id., at 152.  The secretary did not oppose that mo-
tion, but respondents did.  Id., at 170–172.  Five days later,
and within the 14-day deadline for an existing party to seek
rehearing, the attorney general tendered a petition for re-
hearing  en  banc.    Id.,  at  210–227;  Fed.  Rules  App.  Proc.
35(c) and 40(a)(1).
  By the same divided vote as before, the panel denied the
attorney general’s motion to intervene, citing Circuit prec-
edent under which intervention on appeal is judged by es-
sentially  the  same  standard  as  intervention  in  district
court.  See Blount-Hill v. Zelman, 636 F. 3d 278, 283 (CA6
2011).    Applying  that  standard,  the  panel  majority  held,
first, that the attorney general’s motion was untimely be-
cause  it  was  not  filed  until  years  of  litigation  had  passed
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of the Opinion of the Court. It contains legal citations, case names, and a detailed discussion of legal arguments and proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

ans.  It arose in the nature of things to meet a vital need:
ensuring  that  children  are  conceived  by  a  mother  and
father  committed  to  raising  them  in  the  stable  conditions
of  a  lifelong  relationship.    See  G.  Quale,  A  History  of
Marriage  Systems  2  (1988);  cf.  M.  Cicero,  De  Officiis  57
(W.  Miller  transl.  1913)  (“For  since  the  reproductive  in-
stinct  is  by  nature’s  gift  the  common  possession  of  all
living  creatures,  the  first  bond  of  union  is  that  between
husband  and  wife;  the  next,  that  between  parents  and
children;  then  we  find  one  home,  with  everything  in
common.”).

The premises supporting this concept of marriage are so
fundamental  that  they  rarely  require  articulation.    The
human race must procreate to survive.  Procreation occurs
through  sexual  relations  between  a  man  and  a  woman.
When  sexual  relations  result  in  the  conception  of  a  child,
that  child’s  prospects  are  generally  better  if  the  mother
and father stay together rather than going their separate
ways.  Therefore,  for  the  good  of  children  and  society,
sexual relations that can lead to procreation should occur
only between a man and a woman committed to a lasting
bond.

Society  has  recognized  that  bond  as  marriage.    And  by
bestowing  a  respected  status  and  material  benefits  on
married  couples,  society  encourages  men  and  women  to
conduct  sexual  relations  within  marriage  rather  than
without.  As  one  prominent  scholar  put  it,  “Marriage  is  a
socially arranged solution for the problem of getting people
to stay together and care for children that the mere desire
for  children,  and  the  sex  that  makes  children  possible,
does  not  solve.”    J.  Q.  Wilson,  The  Marriage  Problem  41
(2002).

This  singular  understanding  of  marriage  has  prevailed
in the United States throughout our history.  The majority
accepts  that  at  “the  time  of  the  Nation’s  founding  [mar-
riage] was understood to be a voluntary contract between
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or dissenting judgment, specifically focusing on the historical and societal understanding of marriage. It presents arguments and cites sources to support its viewpoint.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of KENNEDY, J.

and accountable to, the electorate.

It is still another possibility that, in the careful exercise
of  its  expertise  in  the  field  of  foreign  affairs,  Congress
might  conclude  that  neutral  judicial  safeguards  may  not
be  ensured  in  every  country;  and  so,  as  a  reciprocal  mat-
ter, it could determine that liability of foreign corporations
under  the  ATS  should  be  subject  to  some  limitations  or
preconditions.  Congress  might  deem  this  more  careful
course to be the best way to encourage American corpora-
tions  to  undertake  the  extensive  investments  and  foreign
operations  that  can  be  an  important  beginning  point  for
creating  the  infrastructures  that  allow  human  rights,  as
well  as  judicial  safeguards,  to  emerge.    These  delicate
judgments, involving a balance that it is the prerogative of
the  political  branches  to  make,  especially  in  the  field  of
foreign  affairs,  would,  once  again,  also  be  entitled  to  spe-
cial  respect,  especially  because  those  careful  distinctions
might  themselves  advance  the  Rule  of  Law.  All  this  un-
derscores  the  important  separation-of-powers  concerns
that  require  the  Judiciary  to  refrain  from  making  these
kinds of decisions under the ATS.  The political branches,
moreover,  surely  are  better  positioned  than  the  Judiciary
to  determine  if  corporate  liability  would,  or  would  not,
create  special  risks  of  disrupting  good  relations  with  for-
eign governments.

Finally,  Congress  might  find  that  corporate  liability
should  be  limited  to  cases  where  a  corporation’s  manage-
ment was actively complicit in the crime.  Cf. ALI, Model
Penal  Code  §2.07(1)(c)  (1985)  (a  corporation  may  be  held
criminally liable where “the commission of the offense was
authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly
tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial
agent acting on behalf of the corporation within the scope
of his office or employment”).  Again, the political branches
are  better  equipped  to  make  the  preliminary  findings
and  consequent  conclusions  that  should  inform  this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the potential for limitations on corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).  It delves into policy considerations and separation of powers arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

859

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–10874.  Turner  v.  Jackson  Park  Hospital  et  al.
C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.
Appx.  879.

No.  08–10875.  Moore  v.  Housing  Authority  of  the  City
of  Los  Angeles,  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d  App.  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10876.  McNulty  v.  Penney  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  305  Fed.  Appx.  212.

No.  08–10877.  Vargas  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  560  F.  3d  45.

No.  08–10878.  Walton  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  741.

No.  08–10879.  Trotter  v.  Harrison,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  618.

No.  08–10880.  Miller  v.  Palmer,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10881.  Rivers  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  904.

No.  08–10882.  Miller  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  9th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  262  S. W.  3d  877.

No. 08–10883.  Diaz-Pineda v.  United States.  C. A. 5th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  314  Fed.  Appx.  713.

No.  08–10884.  Waivio  v.  Advocate  Health  Care  Network

et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10887.  Adkins  v.  Six,  Attorney  General  of  Kan
sas.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320
Fed.  Appx.  850.

No.  08–10888.  Blue  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  682.

No.  08–10889.  Billups  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  370.

No.  08–10892.  GwanJun  Kim  v.  Wernette  et  al.  Ct.  App.

Mich.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, courts, and relevant dates.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

THOMAS, J., dissenting

our abortion jurisprudence remains in a state of utter en-
tropy.  Since the Court decided Roe, Members of this Court
have decried the unworkability of our abortion case law and
repeatedly called for course corrections of varying degrees.
See, e.g., 410 U. S., at 171–178 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 221–223 (1973) (White, J., dis-
senting);  Akron  v.  Akron  Center  for  Reproductive  Health,
Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 452–466 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 785–797 (1986) (White, J., dis-
senting); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S.
490, 532–537 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring  in  judgment);  Casey,  505  U. S.,  at  944–966
(Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part); id., at 979–1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part);  Stenberg,  530
U. S.,  at  953–956  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting);  id.,  at  980–983
(THOMAS, J., dissenting); Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S.,
at ___–___ (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 5–11).  In
Casey, the majority claimed to clarify this “jurisprudence of
doubt,” 505 U. S., at 844, but our decisions in the decades
since then have only demonstrated the folly of that asser-
tion, see Stenberg, 530 U. S., at 953–956 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing);  id.,  at  960–979  (Kennedy,  J.,  dissenting);  Whole
Woman’s Health, supra, at ___–___ (THOMAS, J., dissenting)
(slip op., at 5–11).  They serve as further evidence that this
Court’s  abortion  jurisprudence  has  failed  to  deliver  the
“ ‘principled and intelligible’ ” development of the law that
stare  decisis  purports  to  secure.  Ante,  at  3  (opinion  of
ROBERTS, C. J.) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254,
265 (1986)).

THE CHIEF JUSTICE advocates for a Burkean approach to
the  law  that  favors  adherence  to  “ ‘the  general  bank  and
capital  of  nations  and  of  ages.’ ”    Ante,  at  3  (quoting  3  E.
Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 110 (1790)).
But such adherence to precedent was conspicuously absent
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. Dissenting opinions are part of the legal reasoning and content of a case and are suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to  notify  the  Reporter  of
Decisions,  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  Washington,  D. C.  20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 21–454
_________________

MICHAEL SACKETT, ET UX., PETITIONERS v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[May 25, 2023]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
This  case  concerns  a  nagging  question  about  the  outer
reaches of the Clean Water Act (CWA), the principal federal
law regulating water pollution in the United States.1  By all
accounts, the Act has been a great success.  Before its en-
actment  in  1972,  many  of  the  Nation’s  rivers,  lakes,  and
streams were severely polluted, and existing federal legis-
lation had proved to be inadequate.  Today, many formerly
fetid bodies of water are safe for the use and enjoyment of
the people of this country.

There is, however, an unfortunate footnote to this success
story: the outer boundaries of the Act’s geographical reach
have been uncertain from the start.  The Act applies to “the
waters  of  the  United  States,”  but  what  does  that  phrase
mean?  Does  the  term  encompass  any  backyard  that  is
soggy  enough  for  some  minimum  period  of  time?    Does  it
reach “mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie pot-
holes, wet meadows, [or] playa lakes?”2  How about ditches,
swimming pools, and puddles?
——————

1 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U. S. C. §1251 et seq.
2 40 CFR §230.3(s)(3) (2008).
  </content>
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This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case information, and the introduction to the opinion itself.
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16

BROWN v. PLATA

ALITO, J., dissenting

in  California  has  led  to  decreased  crime,  it  is  entirely
possible  that  a  decrease  in  imprisonment  will  have  the
opposite effect.

Commenting  on  the  testimony  of  an  expert  who  stated
that he could not be certain about the effect of the massive
prisoner  discharge  on  public  safety,  the  three-judge  court
complained  that  “[s]uch  equivocal  testimony  is  not  help-
ful.”  Id.,  at  247a.    But  testimony  pointing  out  the  diffi-
culty of assessing the consequences of this drastic remedy
would have been valued by a careful court duly mindful of
the overriding need to guard public safety.

The  three-judge  court  acknowledged  that  it  “ha[d]  not
evaluated  the  public  safety  impact  of  each  individual
element”  of  the  population  reduction  plan  it  ordered  the
State  to  implement.  App.  to  Juris.  Statement  3a.  The
majority  argues  that  the  three-judge  court  nevertheless
gave substantial weight to public safety because its order
left  “details  of  implementation  to  the  State’s  discretion.”
Ante,  at  41.  Yet  the  State  had  told  the  three-judge  court
that,  after  studying  possible  population  reduction  meas-
ures,  it  concluded  that  “reducing  the  prison  population  to
137.5%  within  a  two-year  period  cannot  be  accomplished
without unacceptably compromising public safety.”  Juris.
App. 317a.  The State found that public safety required a
5-year  period  in  which  to  achieve  the  ordered  reduction.
Ibid.

Thus,  the  three-judge  court  approved  a  population
reduction plan that neither it nor the State found could be
implemented without unacceptable harm to public safety.
And  this  Court  now  holds  that  the  three-judge  court  dis-
charged  its  obligation  to  “give  substantial  weight  to  any
adverse impact on public safety,” §3626(a)(1)(A), by defer-
ring to officials who did not believe the reduction could be

——————

rence?  100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 765, 801 (2010) (citing research

on this issue).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Brown v. Plata. It discusses the court's decision regarding prison overcrowding and the potential impact on public safety.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

33

GORSUCH, J., concurring

now  weak.”  Kagama,  118  U. S.,  at  384–385.    Of  course,
nothing  of  the  sort  follows  from  “a  reasoned  analysis  de-
rived from the text [or] history . . . of the United States Con-
stitution.”  Clinton  2002,  at  163.  Instead,  the  plenary-
power  idea  “constituted  an  unprincipled  assertion  of  raw
federal  authority.”  Ibid.  It  rested  on  nothing  more  than
judicial claims about putative constitutional purposes that
aligned with contemporary policy preferences.

Nor was anachronistic language the only consequence of
this  Court’s  abandonment  of  the  Constitution’s  original
meaning.  During what has been called the “high plenary
power era of U. S. Indian law,” this Court sometimes took
the  word  “plenary”  pretty  literally.    S.  Cleveland,  Powers
Inherent in Sovereignty:  Indians, Aliens, Territories, and
the  Nineteenth  Century  Origins  of  Plenary  Power  Over
Foreign Affairs, 81 Texas L. Rev. 1, 62 (2002) (Cleveland).
It assumed that Congress possesses a “virtually unlimited
authority to regulate [T]ribes” in every respect.  M. Steele,
Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in In-
dian Affairs, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 666, 670 (2016); see Cleve-
land  62–74.  Perhaps  most  notably,  the  Court  even  sug-
gested that Congress’s “plenary authority” might allow
it to “limit, modify, or eliminate the powers of local self-
government which the [T]ribes otherwise possess.”  Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 56–57 (1978).  It is
an  “inconceivable”  suggestion  for  anyone  who  takes  the
Constitution’s  original  meaning  seriously.  Worcester,  6
Pet., at 554.

The Court’s atextual and ahistorical plenary-power move
did not just serve to expand the scope of federal power over
the Tribes.  It also had predictable downstream effects on
the relationship between States and Tribes.  As Congress
assumed  new  power  to  intrude  on  tribal  sovereignty,  the
Constitution’s  “concomitant  jurisdictional  limit  on  the
reach of state law” began to wane.  McClanahan, 411 U. S.,
at 171.  It is not hard to draw a through-line between these
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the historical context and legal arguments surrounding the concept of "plenary power" as it relates to federal authority over Native American tribes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
6

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

compelling  need  to  search  because  alcohol—the  nearly
conclusive evidence of a serious crime—is dissipating from
the  bloodstream.  The  need  is  no  less  compelling  because
the  police  might  be  able  to  acquire  second-best  evidence
some other way.1

B
For  exigent  circumstances  to  justify  a  warrantless
search,  however,  there  must  also  be  “no  time  to  secure  a
warrant.”    Tyler,  436  U. S.,  at  509;  see  Schmerber,  384
U. S., at 771 (warrantless search legal when “there was no
time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant”).  In
this  respect,  obtaining  a  blood  sample  from  a  suspected
drunk  driver  differs  from  other  exigent  circumstances
cases.

Importantly,  there  is  typically  delay  between  the  mo-
ment a drunk driver is stopped and the time his blood can
be  drawn.    Drunk  drivers  often  end  up  in  an  emergency
room, but they are not usually pulled over in front of one.
In  most  exigent  circumstances  situations,  police  are  just
outside the door to a home.  Inside, evidence is about to be
destroyed,  a  person  is  about  to  be  injured,  or  a  fire  has
broken  out.    Police  can  enter  promptly  and  must  do  so  to
respond effectively to the emergency.  But when police pull
a  person  over  on  suspicion  of  drinking  and  driving,  they
cannot  test  his  blood  right  away.2   There  is  a  time-

——————

1 And  that  second-best  evidence  may  prove  useless.    When  experts
have  worked  backwards  to  identify  a  defendant’s  BAC  at  the  time  he
was  driving,  defense  attorneys  have  objected  to  that  evidence,  courts
have at times rejected it, and juries may be suspicious of it.  See, e.g., 1
D. Nichols & F. Whited, Drinking/Driving Litigation §2:9, pp. 2–130 to
2–137  (2d  ed.  2006)  (noting  counsel  objections  to  such  evidence);  State
v.  Eighth  Judicial  District  Court,  127  Nev.  ___,  267  P. 3d  777  (2011)
(affirming rejection of such evidence); L. Taylor & S. Oberman, Drunk
Driving  Defense  §6.03  (7th  ed.  2010)  (describing  ways  to  undermine
such evidence before a jury).

2 This  case  involves  medical  personnel  drawing  blood  at  a  medical
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the opinion of the Chief Justice. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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  <content>
8  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C.

Opinion of the Court

not  abolish  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  States,  which  re-
tained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.’ ”  Murphy v.
National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018)
(slip op., at 14) (quoting The Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961)).  Paramount among the States’ retained
sovereign powers is the power to enact and enforce any laws
that do not conflict with federal law.  See U. S. Const., Art.
VI, §2.  Therefore, a State “clearly has a legitimate interest
in the continued enforceability of its own statutes,” Maine
v.  Taylor,  477  U. S.  131,  137  (1986),  and  a  federal  court
must “respect . . . the place of the States in our federal sys-
tem,”  Arizonans  for  Official  English  v.  Arizona,  520  U. S.
43, 75 (1997).  This means that a State’s opportunity to de-
fend its laws in federal court should not be lightly cut off.
  Respect for state sovereignty must also take into account
the authority of a State to structure its executive branch in
a way that empowers multiple officials to defend its sover-
eign interests in federal court.  See Virginia House of Dele-
gates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at
5).  In this case, although the secretary for Health and Fam-
ily  Services  apparently  enjoyed  the  authority  under  state
law to defend the constitutionality of HB 454, the secretary
shared that authority with the attorney general.  See Ky.
Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §15.020;  see  also  Commonwealth  ex  rel.
Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S. W. 2d 865, 868 (Ky. 1974) (“There
is no question as to the right of the Attorney General to ap-
pear  and  be  heard  in  a  suit  brought  by  someone  else  in
which  the  constitutionality  of  a  statute  is  involved”).    In-
deed, it is the attorney general who is deemed Kentucky’s
“chief law officer” with the authority to represent the Com-
monwealth “in all cases.”  Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§15.020(1),
(3).
  The importance of ensuring that States have a fair oppor-
tunity to defend their laws in federal court has been recog-
nized  by  Congress.    Under  28  U. S. C.  §2403(b),  when  a
state law “affecting the public interest is drawn in question”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, discussing the importance of state sovereignty and a state's right to defend its laws in federal court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2006

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MASSACHUSETTS ET AL. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PRO
-
TECTION AGENCY ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 05–1120.  Argued November 29, 2006—Decided April 2, 2007

Based  on  respected  scientific  opinion  that  a  well-documented  rise  in
global temperatures and attendant climatological and environmental
changes have resulted from a significant increase in the atmospheric
concentration of “greenhouse gases,” a group of private organizations
petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to begin regu-
lating the emissions of four such gases, including carbon dioxide, un-
der  §202(a)(1)  of  the  Clean  Air  Act,  which  requires  that  the  EPA
“shall  by  regulation  prescribe  . . .  standards  applicable  to  the  emis-
sion of any air pollutant from any class . . . of new motor vehicles . . .
which  in  [the  EPA  Administrator’s]  judgment  cause[s],  or  contrib-
ute[s]  to,  air  pollution  . . .  reasonably  . . .  anticipated  to  endanger
public  health  or  welfare,”  42  U. S. C.  §7521(a)(1).    The  Act  defines
“air pollutant” to include “any air pollution agent . . . , including any
physical,  chemical  . . .  substance  . . .  emitted  into  . . .  the  ambient
air.”    §7602(g).    EPA  ultimately  denied  the  petition,  reasoning  that
(1)  the  Act  does  not  authorize  it  to  issue  mandatory  regulations  to
address global climate change, and (2) even if it had the authority to
set greenhouse gas emission standards, it would have been unwise to
do  so  at  that  time  because  a  causal  link  between  greenhouse  gases
and  the  increase  in  global  surface  air  temperatures  was  not  un-
equivocally  established.    The  agency  further  characterized  any  EPA
regulation of motor-vehicle emissions as a piecemeal approach to cli-
mate change that would conflict with the  President’s comprehensive
approach  involving  additional  support  for  technological  innovation,
the  creation  of  nonregulatory  programs  to  encourage  voluntary  pri-
vate-sector  reductions  in  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  and  further  re-
search  on  climate  change,  and  might  hamper  the  President’s  ability
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus for a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
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  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

I

In order to understand the nature of Parker state-action
immunity,  it  is  helpful  to  recall  the  constitutional  land-
scape  in  1890  when  the  Sherman  Act  was  enacted.    At
that time, this Court and Congress had an understanding
of the scope of federal and state power that is very differ-
ent  from  our  understanding  today.  The  States  were  un-
derstood  to  possess  the  exclusive  authority  to  regulate
“their purely internal affairs.”  Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S.
100,  122  (1890).    In  exercising  their  police  power  in  this
area, the States had long enacted measures, such as price
controls and licensing requirements, that had the effect of
restraining trade.3

The  Sherman  Act  was  enacted  pursuant  to  Congress’
power to regulate interstate commerce, and in passing the
Act,  Congress  wanted  to  exercise  that  power  “to  the  ut-
most  extent.”  United  States  v.  South-Eastern  Underwrit-
ers  Assn.,  322  U. S.  533,  558  (1944).    But  in  1890,  the
understanding  of  the  commerce  power  was  far  more  lim-
ited than it is today.  See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S.
1, 17–18 (1888).  As a result, the Act did not pose a threat
to traditional state regulatory activity.

By 1943, when Parker was decided, however, the situa-
tion had changed dramatically.  This Court had held that
the commerce power permitted  Congress to regulate even
local  activity  if  it  “exerts  a  substantial  economic  effect  on
interstate commerce.”  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111,
125  (1942).  This  meant  that  Congress  could  regulate
many  of  the  matters  that  had  once  been  thought  to  fall
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the States.  The new
interpretation  of  the  commerce  power  brought  about  an
expansion  of  the  reach  of  the  Sherman  Act.  See  Hospital

——————

3 See  Handler,  The  Current  Attack  on  the  Parker  v.  Brown  State

Action Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 4–6 (1976) (collecting cases).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 574 U.S. ____ (2015). It provides historical context and legal analysis related to the Sherman Act and state-action immunity.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
MSPP / Newsletter / Newsletter #28 (Fall 2001)

succeed, she wrote, "It takes a very strong heart and an individual well entrenched in the
community. . . ." (MS to Gamble, Nov. 26, 1939, and MS to Robert Seibels, Feb. 12,

1940 [MSM S17:514, 891].)

Sanger reiterated the need for black ministers to head up the project in a letter to

Clarence Gamble in Dec. 1939, arguing that: "We do not want word to go out that we

want to exterminate the Negro population and the minister is the man who can straighten

out that idea if it ever occurs to any of their more rebellious members." This passage has

been repeatedly extracted by Sanger's detractors as evidence that she led a calculated

effort to reduce the black population against their will. From African-American activist

Angela Davis on the left to conservative commentator Dinesh D'Souza on the right, this

statement alone has condemned Sanger to a perpetual waltz with Hitler and the KKK.

Davis quoted the incendiary passage in her 1983 Women, Race and Class, claiming that

the Negro Project "confirmed the ideological victory of the racism associated with

eugenic ideas." D'Souza used the quote to buttress erroneous claims that Sanger called

blacks "human weeds" and a "menace to civilization" in his best-selling 1995 book The

End of Racism. The argument that Sanger co-opted black clergy and community leaders

to exterminate their own race not only gives Sanger unwarranted credit as a remarkably

cunning manipulator, but also suggests that African-Americans were passive receptors

of birth control reform, incapable of making their own decisions about family size; and

that black leaders were ignorant and gullible.

In the end, Sanger's plan for an educational campaign to precede the demonstration

project lost out to the white medical and public relations men running the new

Federation. They were particularly swayed by Robert Seibels (1890-1955), chairman of

the Committee on Maternal Welfare of the South Carolina Medical Association, who was

chosen by the BCFA to direct a Negro demonstration project in that state. Seibels

distrusted Sanger and her loyal crew of field workers, calling them "dried-up female

fanatics" who had the gall to tell doctors what to do. Robert E. Seibels to Frederick C.

Holden, Jan. 28, 1939, Sophia Smith Collection, Records of PPFA.) He saw no need for

prerequisite education and propaganda and advised incorporating birth control services

for blacks into a general public health program. The BCFA then dismissed the notion of

building a community-based, black-staffed demonstration clinic that could become

permanent, and instead set in motion a plan that closely resembled the vaccination and

VD caravans that swept in and out of the region.

Lasker's money was used to set up demonstration projects between 1940 and 1942 in

several rural South Carolina counties, under Seibels's direction, and in urban Nashville,

TN under the auspices of the Nashville City Health Department. In South Carolina, the

BCFA hired two African-American nurses to make house calls and meet with women in

groups at schools and community centers to encourage them to visit a clinic, but

contraceptives were dispensed by white doctors only. In Nashville, demonstration clinics

were opened at the Bethlehem Center, a black settlement house, and later at Fisk

University, and black nurses were eventually employed with some success there as well.

The Federation immediately claimed that the Negro Project had exceeded its
expectations and even persuaded Life Magazine to carry a photo spread of the

demonstration clinics in South Carolina in May 1940. But relatively few women, (only
about 3,000) visited the demonstration clinics to receive contraceptive instruction. And

among those that did, the dropout rates were high as many women would not return to
white doctors for follow-up exams, though the black nurses in both Nashville and South

Carolina met with greater success. In 1942 the Federation ended funding for the
demonstration clinics claiming to have developed "workable procedures" for providing
contraception to African-Americans in both rural and urban communities; but no other
clinics appear to have opened as a result of the Project. ("Better Health for 13,000,000,"
PPFA Report, April 16, 1943, Rose Papers; John Overton, "A Birth Control Service
Among Urban Negroes," Human Fertility, Aug. 1942, 97-101.)

However, the "Division of Negro Service," a department created at the BCFA initially to

oversee the Negro Project, did implement some of the educational goals Sanger

http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sanger/articles/bc_or_race_control.php
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be an excerpt from an article analyzing Margaret Sanger's "Negro Project." It discusses the project's goals, controversies, and implementation.  It provides historical context and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Historical Analysis/Commentary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

BARRETT, J., dissenting

Our  decision  in  Black  illustrates  the  point.  There,  the
Court considered a Virginia law that prohibited cross burn-
ing “ ‘with the intent of intimidating any person or group of
persons.’ ”  538 U. S., at 348.  Notably, the statute included
a presumption: “ ‘Any such burning of a cross shall be prima
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate.’ ”  Ibid.  After three
men were convicted under the statute, they challenged it as
facially  unconstitutional.  We  upheld  the  general  prohibi-
tion  on  cross  burning,  concluding  that  the  First  Amend-
ment  allows  the  government  to  ban  “a  particular  type  of
threat.”  Id., at 362–363.  A plurality then went on to ad-
dress the statutory presumption.  While cross burning “may
mean that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscrib-
able  intimidation,”  the  plurality  reasoned,  the  act  is  not
monolithic.  Id., at 365.  Cross burning could be directed “at
an  individual”  or  “at  a  group  of  like-minded  believers”;  it
could be done “on a neighbor’s lawn” or “at a public rally”;
it could be done with the property owner’s “permission” or
without it.  Id., at 366.  The presumption “blur[red] the line”
between these different situations and “ignore[d] all of the
contextual  factors  that  are  necessary  to  decide  whether  a
particular cross burning” was covered by the statute or not.4

——————
surrounding events; (2) the medium or platform through which the state-
ment was communicated, including any distinctive conventions or archi-
tectural features; (3) the manner in which the statement was conveyed
(e.g., anonymously or not, privately or publicly); (4) the relationship be-
tween the speaker and recipient(s); and (5) the subjective reaction of the
statement’s intended or foreseeable recipient(s).”  People in the Interest
of R. D., 464 P. 3d 717, 721–722 (Colo. 2020).

4 As  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  emphasizes,  ante,  at  10,  n. 4,  the  plurality
said that context informs “whether a particular cross burning is intended
to intimidate,” 538 U. S., at 367 (emphasis added).  But this was a refer-
ence to the statutory requirements for a conviction, not the constitutional
requirements—the Virginia statute covered only threats made “ ‘with the
intent of intimidating any person or group of persons.’ ”  Id., at 348.  At
no point did the Court hold that the First Amendment demands specific
intent; on the contrary, it recognized that a statement made “with the
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death” is “a type of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Barrett. It cites a previous case (Black) and analyzes its implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
GORSUCH, J., concurring

the  lower  courts’  findings  recounted  above  about  how  the
universities intentionally give tips to students of some races
and not others.  See supra, at 8–12, 16–17.  Put to the side
telling  evidence  that  came  out  in  discovery.8  Ignore,  too,
our many precedents holding that it does not matter how a
defendant “label[s]” its practices, Bostock, 590 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 14); that intentional discrimination between in-
dividuals  is  unlawful  whether  “motivated  by  a  wish  to
achieve classwide equality” or any other purpose, id., at ___
(slip op., at 13); and that “the absence of a malevolent mo-
tive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a
neutral policy with a [merely] discriminatory effect,” John-
son Controls, 499 U. S., at 199.  Consider just the dissents
in these cases.  From start to finish and over the course of
nearly 100 pages, they defend the universities’ purposeful
discrimination between applicants based on race.  “[N]eu-
trality,” they insist, is not enough.  Post, at 12, 68 (opinion
of SOTOMAYOR, J.); cf. post, at 21 (opinion of JACKSON, J.).
“[T]he use of race,” they stress, “is critical.”  Post, at 59–60
(opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); see id., at 2, 33, 39, 43–45; cf.
post, at 2, 26 (opinion of JACKSON, J.).  Plainly, Harvard and
UNC  choose  to  treat  some  students  worse  than  others  in
part because of race.  To suggest otherwise—or to cling to
the fact that the schools do not always say the quiet part
aloud—is to deny reality.9

——————

8 Messages among UNC admissions officers included statements such
as  these:    “[P]erfect  2400  SAT  All  5  on  AP  one  B  in  11th  [grade].”
“Brown?!”  “Heck  no.  Asian.”    “Of  course.    Still  impressive.”;  “If  it[’]s
brown and above a 1300 [SAT] put them in for [the] merit/Excel [schol-
arship].”;  “I  just  opened  a  brown  girl  who’s  an  810  [SAT].”;  “I’m  going
through  this  trouble  because  this  is  a  bi-racial  (black/white)  male.”;
“[S]tellar academics for a Native Amer[ican]/African Amer[ican] kid.”  3
App. in No. 21–707, pp. 1242–1251.

9 Left with no reply on the statute or its application to the facts, the
principal dissent suggests that it violates “principles of party presenta-
tion” and abandons “judicial restraint” even to look at the text of Title VI.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It argues against the universities' use of race in admissions and cites evidence and precedents to support its position.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6  GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC. v. ARKANSAS TEACHER

RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Opinion of the Court

certification order.  879 F. 3d 474 (2018).  The Second Cir-
cuit held that Goldman, as the defendant, bears the burden
of persuasion to prove a lack of price impact by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.  But it concluded that the District
Court erred by holding Goldman to a higher burden of proof
and by refusing to consider some of Goldman’s price impact
evidence.

On remand, the District Court certified the class again,
finding that Goldman’s expert testimony failed to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that its alleged misrep-
resentations had no price impact.  The Second Circuit again
authorized a Rule 23(f ) appeal and this time affirmed in a
divided decision.  955 F. 3d 254 (2020).  As relevant here,
the Court of Appeals held that the District Court’s price im-
pact determination was not an abuse of discretion.  In dis-
sent, Judge Sullivan concluded that “the generic quality of
Goldman’s alleged misstatements, coupled with” Goldman’s
expert  testimony,  compelled  the  conclusion  that  Goldman
proved a lack of price impact.  Id., at 278–279.
We granted certiorari.  592 U. S. ___ (2020).

II
Goldman argues that the Second Circuit erred in two re-
spects:  first,  by  concluding  that  the  generic  nature  of  al-
leged  misrepresentations  is  irrelevant  to  the  price  impact
question; and second, by placing the burden of persuasion
on  Goldman  to  prove  a  lack  of  price  impact.    We  address
these arguments in turn.

A
1
On  the  first  question—whether  the  generic  nature  of  a
misrepresentation is relevant to price impact—the parties’
dispute has largely evaporated.  Plaintiffs now concede that
the  generic  nature  of  an  alleged  misrepresentation  often
will be important evidence of price impact because, as a rule
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the introduction to the Supreme Court case Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System. It sets the context for the case, outlining the lower court proceedings and the arguments presented by both parties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result
of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and
subsurface ocean temperatures to rise.  Temperatures are,
in fact, rising.”  NRC Report 1.

On September 8, 2003, EPA entered an order denying the
rulemaking petition.  68 Fed. Reg. 52922.  The agency gave
two reasons for its decision: (1) that contrary to the opin-
ions of its former general counsels, the Clean Air Act does
not  authorize  EPA  to  issue  mandatory  regulations  to
address  global  climate  change,  see  id.,  at  52925–52929;
and  (2)  that  even  if  the  agency  had  the  authority  to  set
greenhouse gas emission standards, it would be unwise to
do so at this time, id., at 52929–52931.

In  concluding  that  it  lacked  statutory  authority  over
greenhouse  gases,  EPA  observed  that  Congress  “was  well
aware  of  the  global  climate  change  issue  when  it  last
comprehensively  amended  the  [Clean  Air  Act]  in  1990,”
yet  it  declined  to  adopt  a  proposed  amendment  establish-
ing binding emissions limitations.  Id., at 52926.  Congress
instead  chose  to  authorize  further  investigation  into  cli-
Ibid.  (citing  §§103(g)  and  602(e)  of  the
mate  change.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 104 Stat. 2652, 2703,
42  U. S. C.  §§7403(g)(1)  and  7671a(e)).    EPA  further  rea-
soned that Congress’ “specially tailored solutions to global
atmospheric issues,” 68 Fed. Reg. 52926—in particular, its
1990  enactment  of  a  comprehensive  scheme  to  regulate
pollutants that depleted the ozone layer, see Title VI, 104
Stat.  2649,  42  U. S. C.  §§7671–7671q—counseled  against
reading  the  general  authorization  of  §202(a)(1)  to  confer
regulatory authority over greenhouse gases.

EPA  stated  that  it  was  “urged  on  in  this  view”  by  this
Court’s  decision  in  FDA  v.  Brown  &  Williamson  Tobacco
Corp.,  529  U. S.  120  (2000).    In  that  case,  relying  on  “to-
bacco[’s]  unique  political  history,”  id.,  at  159,  we  invali-
dated  the  Food  and  Drug  Administration’s  reliance  on  its
general authority to regulate drugs as a basis for asserting
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in the case of Massachusetts v. EPA. It discusses the EPA's denial of a rulemaking petition related to greenhouse gas emissions and the legal reasoning behind that decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. VAELLO MADERO

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

came in the form of programs administered and funded by
States and supplemented with matching federal funds.  See
S. Rep. No. 92–1230, pp. 383–384.  One of those programs
was known as Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD).
Under AABD, the States and Territories set their own in-
come and asset limits for individual participation and de-
termined their own benefit amounts.  See Brief for Public
Benefits Scholars as Amici Curiae 27.  The Federal Govern-
ment paid 75% of the benefits and 50% of the administra-
tive costs, subject to a statutory cap on total expenditures.
See Congressional Research Service, W. Morton, Cash As-
sistance for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled in Puerto Rico 12
(2016).

To  provide  a  uniform,  guaranteed  minimum  income  for
the neediest adults, Congress established the SSI program
in 1972.  In creating the SSI program, Congress “displaced
the States.”  Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 38
(1981).  Rather  than  dispensing  money  through  block
grants to the States, SSI provides monthly cash benefits di-
rectly to qualifying low-income individuals who are over 65
years old, blind, or disabled.  The Federal Government sets
uniform qualifications for eligibility and fully funds the pro-
gram through mandatory appropriations from the general
fund of the United States Treasury.  See 42 U. S. C. §1381
et  seq.  Unlike  AABD  benefits,  SSI  benefits  do  not  vary
based on the specific State or Territory that a beneficiary is
located in, as long as the beneficiary is otherwise eligible.1
In sum, SSI created a fully nationalized assistance program
with federal administration, federal determination of eligi-
bility, and financed entirely from federal funds.

When Congress created SSI, it made the program availa-
ble only to “resident[s] of the United States,” and it defined

——————

1 The amount of benefits SSI pays to eligible recipients can vary, de-
pending, for instance, on whether the recipient has an “eligible spouse.”
42 U. S. C. §1382(b).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *United States v. Vaello Madero*. It discusses the history and structure of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, contrasting it with a previous program, Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

Puerto  Rico  itself  nor  subject  to  the  strictures  of  the  Ap-
pointments  Clause.  I  am  skeptical  that  the  Constitution
countenances  this  freewheeling  exercise  of  control  over  a
population  that  the  Federal  Government  has  explicitly
agreed  to  recognize  as  operating  under  a  government  of
their own choosing, pursuant to a constitution of their own
choosing.  Surely  our  Founders,  having  labored  to  attain
such recognition of self-determination, would not view that
same recognition with respect to Puerto Rico as a mere act
of  grace.    Nevertheless,  because  these  issues  are  not
properly  presented  in  these  cases,  I  reluctantly  concur  in
the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U83

[09-06-00 20:30:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 206 (1998)

211

Opinion of the Court

Petitioners argue that the words “eligibility” and “participa-
tion” imply voluntariness on the part of an applicant who
seeks a beneﬁt from the State, and thus do not connote pris-
oners who are being held against their will. This is wrong
on two counts: First, because the words do not connote vol-
untariness. See, e. g., Webster’s New International Diction-
ary 831 (2d ed. 1949) (“eligible”: “Fitted or qualiﬁed to be
chosen or elected; legally or morally suitable; as, an eligible
candidate”); id., at 1782 (“participate”: “To have a share in
common with others; to partake; share, as in a debate”).
While “eligible” individuals “participate” voluntarily in many
programs, services, and activities, there are others for which
they are “eligible” in which “participation” is mandatory. A
drug addict convicted of drug possession, for example, might,
as part of his sentence, be required to “participate” in a drug
treatment program for which only addicts are “eligible.”
And secondly, even if the words did connote voluntariness, it
would still not be true that all prison “services,” “programs,”
and “activities” are excluded from the ADA because partici-
pation in them is not voluntary. The prison law library, for
example, is a service (and the use of it an activity), which
prisoners are free to take or leave. Cf. Gabel v. Lynaugh,
835 F. 2d 124, 125, n. 1 (CA5 1988) (per curiam) (“pro se civil
rights litigation has become a recreational activity for state
In the very case at hand, the governing law
prisoners”).
makes it clear that participation in the Boot Camp program
is voluntary. See Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 61, § 1126(a) (Purdon
Supp. 1998) (“An eligible inmate may make an application to
the motivational boot camp selection committee for permis-
sion to participate in the motivational boot camp program”);
§ 1126(c) (“[c]onditio[n]” of “participa[tion]” is that applicant
“agree to be bound by” certain “terms and conditions”).

Finally, petitioners point out that the statute’s statement
of ﬁndings and purpose, 42 U. S. C. § 12101, does not mention
prisons and prisoners. That is perhaps questionable, since
the provision’s reference to discrimination “in such critical
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to prisoners.  The language and citations suggest a legal context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010)

19

Opinion of the Court

ing Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S.
383,  397  (1988);  omission  in  original),  for  doing  so  would
constitute  a  “serious  invasion  of  the  legislative  domain,”
United  States  v.  Treasury  Employees,  513  U. S.  454,  479,
n. 26 (1995), and sharply diminish Congress’s “incentive to
draft  a  narrowly  tailored  law  in  the  first  place,”  Osborne,
495 U. S., at 121.  To read §48 as the Government desires
requires rewriting, not just reinterpretation.

*

*

*
Our construction of §48 decides the constitutional ques-
tion; the Government makes no effort to defend the consti-
tutionality  of  §48  as  applied  beyond  crush  videos  and
depictions of animal fighting.  It argues that those particu-
lar depictions are intrinsically related to criminal conduct
or  are  analogous  to  obscenity  (if  not  themselves  obscene),
and  that  the  ban  on  such  speech  is  narrowly  tailored  to
reinforce  restrictions  on  the  underlying  conduct,  prevent
additional crime arising from the depictions, or safeguard
public  mores.  But  the  Government  nowhere  attempts  to
extend  these  arguments  to  depictions  of  any  other  activi-
ties—depictions  that  are  presumptively  protected  by  the
First Amendment but that remain subject to the criminal
sanctions of §48.

Nor  does  the  Government  seriously  contest  that  the
presumptively impermissible applications of §48 (properly
construed) far outnumber any permissible ones.  However
“growing” and “lucrative” the markets for crush videos and
dogfighting  depictions  might  be,  see  Brief  for  United
States 43, 46 (internal quotation marks omitted), they are
dwarfed by the market for other depictions, such as hunt-
ing magazines and videos, that we have determined to be
within  the  scope  of  §48.    See  supra,  at  13–14.  We  there-
fore need not and do not decide whether a statute limited
to  crush  videos  or  other  depictions  of  extreme  animal
cruelty would be constitutional.  We hold only that §48 is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the interpretation of a specific statute (likely §48) and its constitutionality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
842

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10504.  Hawkins  v.  California  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  694.

No.  08–10505.  Fields  v.  Berry  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10506.  Garrett  v.  Mississippi.  Sup.  Ct.  Miss.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10509.  Gaylor  v.  Gerry,  Warden.  Super.  Ct.  N.  H.,

Merrimack  County.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10510.  Harper  v.  Southern  Star  Concrete.  C.  A.

5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10511.  Raihala  v.  Whitbeck  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10512.  Swift  v.  Mississippi.  Ct.  App.  Miss.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  3  So.  3d  1108.

No.  08–10514.  Bunn  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10515.  Burruel  v.  Spurgeon.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  08–10518.  Bright  v.  O’Flaherty  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  309  Fed.  Appx.  701.

No.  08–10519.  Doan  v.  Carter,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  548  F.  3d  449.

No.  08–10523.  Small  v.  Connecticut.  Sup.  Ct.  Conn.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  290  Conn.  128,  962  A.  2d  80.

No.  08–10525.  Abraham  v.  Delaware.  Sup.  Ct.  Del.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  968  A.  2d  491.

No.  08–10526.  Brannon  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  521.

No.  08–10529.  Husser  v.  Dexter,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08 –10532.  Rivera,  aka  Nochez-Rivera  v.  United
States.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 311
Fed.  Appx.  698.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH v. HETRONIC INT’L, INC.

JACKSON, J., concurring

to  cause  confusion,  or  to  cause  mistake,  or  to  deceive.’ ”
B&B  Hardware,  Inc.  v.  Hargis  Industries,  Inc.,  575  U. S.
138, 144 (2015).

Critically,  the  Act  defines  “ ‘use  in  commerce’ ”  as  “the
bona  fide  use  of  a  mark  in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade.”
§1127.  And, in light of the core source-identifying function
of marks, Congress’s statutory scheme embodies a distinc-
tion between trademark uses (use of a symbol or equivalent
“ ‘to  identify  or  brand  [a  defendant’s]  goods  or  services’ ”)
and  “ ‘non-trademark  uses’ ”  (use  of  a  symbol—even  the
same one—“ in a ‘non-source-identifying way’ ”).  Jack Dan-
iel’s,  599  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  13).    This  all  points  to
something key about what it means to use a trademark in
the sense Congress prohibited—i.e., in a way likely to com-
mit  the  “cardinal  sin”  of  “confus[ing]  consumers  about
source.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).

Simply  put,  a  “use  in  commerce”  does  not  cease  at  the
place the mark is first affixed, or where the item to which
it is affixed is first sold.  Rather, it can occur wherever the
mark serves its source-identifying function.  So, even after
a trademark begins to be “use[d] in commerce” (say, when
goods on which it is placed are sold), that trademark is also
“use[d] in commerce” wherever and whenever those goods
are  in  commerce,  because  as  long  as  they  are,  the  trade-
mark “identif[ies] and distinguish[es] . . . the source of the
goods.”  §1127.  Such a use is not free-floating; the trade-
mark is being used by the “person” who put that trademark
on the goods “to identify and distinguish” them in commerce
and “indicate the[ir] source.”  Ibid.  This is the “use in com-
merce” to which §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1) refer.

Because it is “use in commerce”—as Congress has defined
it—that “provides the dividing line between foreign and do-
mestic  applications  of ”  these  provisions,  ante,  at  14,  the
permissible-domestic-application
inquiry  ought  to  be
straightforward.  If a marked good is in domestic commerce,
and the mark is serving a source-identifying function in the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from a case involving trademarks. It delves into the legal definition and application of "use in commerce" in trademark law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

lxxv

Page

891

Iswed v. Booker  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Ivanova v. Michigan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Ivanova-Warner v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Ivy v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1158

Iwasaki; Maldonado v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Jabe; Williams v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1113

Jablonski; Novak v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
813

Jackson, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
846

Jackson v. Almager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
846

Jackson v. Benton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Jackson; Borthwell v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Jackson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1151

Jackson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  911,1105

Jackson v. Minnesota
836

Jackson; Moorer v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

Jackson; Papierz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
984

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson v. Province
1142

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson; Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v.
912

Jackson; Robinson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1137

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson; Sheehan v.
1022

Jackson v. Shinseki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . .  828,857,887,915,960,1061,1062,1156

859

Jackson Park Hospital; Turner v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
856

Jacobs v. Cate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
851

Jacobs v. Wisconsin
Jacquemain v. United States
1116

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jadhav; United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  875,1065

1114

Jafari v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jaffe v. US Airways, Inc.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  806,1022

866

Jakaj v. Michigan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
825

Jallali v. Nova Southeastern Univ., Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
James v. Harris County
882

James v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944

James v. Oklahoma  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
James v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  918,962,1099,1131

1032

Jamison v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
852

Jannuzzi v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1108

Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders  . . . . . . . . .
881

Jao v. Holder
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907

Jaquez v. Sandor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1056

Jardine v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
865

Jarrard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

Jarrell v. Haines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929

Jarrett v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

19

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

“it is impossible to believe that when . . . the Executive De-
partment of this Nation created the [various] reservations”
in the arid Southwest it was “unaware that . . . water from
the [Colorado R]iver would be essential to the life of the In-
dian people and to the animals they hunted and the crops
they raised.”  Arizona I, 373 U. S., at 598–599.  Nor does the
United  States  dispute  any  of  this.    To  the  contrary,  it
acknowledges  that  the  Navajo’s  water  rights  very  well
“may . . . include some portion of the mainstream of the Col-
orado” that runs adjacent to their reservation.  Tr. of Oral
Arg. 33.

For  our  purposes  today,  that  leaves  just  one  question:
Can the Tribe state a legally cognizable claim for relief ask-
ing  the  United  States  to  assess  what  water  rights  they
have?  Not even the federal government seriously disputes
that  it  acts  “as  a  fiduciary”  of  the  Tribes  with  respect  to
tribal waters it manages.  Arizona II, 460 U. S., at 627–628.
Indeed,  when  it  comes  to  the  Navajo,  the  United  States
freely admits that it holds certain water rights for the Tribe
“in trust.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.  And of course, that must be
so given that the United States exercises pervasive control
over much water in the area, including in the adjacent Col-
orado River.  See Arizona I, 373 U. S., at 564–565.

Those observations suffice to resolve today’s dispute.  As
we have seen, that exact coupling—a fiduciary relationship
to a specific group and complete managerial control over the
property of that group—gives rise to a duty to account.  See
supra, at 16–17.  The United States, we know, must act in
a  “legally  [a]dequate”  way  when  it  comes  to  the  Navajo’s
water  it  holds  in  trust.    Arizona  II,  460  U. S.,  at  627.    It
follows, as the United States concedes, that the federal gov-
ernment  could  not  “legally”  dam  off  the  water  flowing  to
their  Reservation,  as  doing  so  would  “interfere  with  [the
Tribe’s] exercise of their” water rights.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 13.
Implicit  in  that  concession  is  another.    Because  Winters
rights belong to the Navajo themselves, the United States
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding water rights of the Navajo Nation.  The language and structure are characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

9

GORSUCH, J., concurring

the State’s “belief that an Indian reservation is an unsuita-
ble environment for a child.”  Ibid.  So it was that some In-
dian families, “forced onto reservations at gunpoint,” were
later “told that they live[d] in a place unfit for raising their
children.”  Id., at 3–4.

Aggravating matters, these separations were frequently
“carried out without due process of law.”  Id., at 4.  Children
and their parents rarely had counsel.  Ibid.  For that mat-
ter, few cases saw the inside of a courtroom.  Welfare de-
partments knew that they could threaten to withhold ben-
efit payments if Indian parents did not surrender custody.
Id., at 4–5.  Nor were threats always necessary.  After all
the Tribes had suffered at the government’s hands, many
parents simply believed they had no power to resist.  Ibid.
One interviewed mother “wept that she did not dare protest
the taking of her children for fear of going to jail.”  Id., at 7.
For those Indian parents who did resist, “simple abduction”
remained an option.  Id., at 5.  Parents were, for instance,
sometimes tricked into signing forms that they believed au-
thorized only a brief removal of their children.  Ibid.  Only
later would they discover that the forms purported to sur-
render full custody.  Ibid.

Like  the  boarding  school  system  that  preceded  it,  this
new  program  of  removal  had  often-disastrous  conse-
quences.  “Because the family is the most fundamental eco-
nomic, educational, and health-care unit” in society, these
“assaults on Indian families” contributed to the precarious
conditions that Indian parents and children already faced.
Id., at 7–8.  Many parents came to “feel hopeless, powerless,
and unworthy”—further feeding the cycle of removal.  Id.,
at  8.  For  many  children,  separation  from  their  families
caused “severe distress” that “interfere[d] with their physi-
cal, mental, and social growth and development.”  Ibid.  It
appears, too, that Indian children were “significantly more
likely”  to  experience  “physical,  sexual,  [and]  emotional”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It discusses the historical context of the removal of Native American children from their families and the negative consequences of this practice.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
DEATH  OF  MR.  O’CONNOR

Supreme Court of the United States

MONDAY,  NOVEMBER  16,  2009

Present:  Chief  Justice  Roberts,  Justice  Scalia,
Justice  Kennedy,  Justice  Thomas,  Justice  Ginsburg,
Justice Alito, and Justice Sotomayor.

The Chief Justice said:

It is my sad duty to announce the death on November 11th
of John Jay O’Connor III.  John Jay O’Connor was the hus
band of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.  He was a member of
the Bar of this Court.

On  behalf  of  the  Court  and  Retired  Justice  Souter,
I  extend  profound  sympathy  to  Justice  O’Connor  and  her
family.

It will be recorded on the Court’s minutes that the recess
this  Court  takes  today  will  be  in  honor  of  John  Jay  O’Con
nor III.

v
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a formal announcement of the death of John Jay O'Connor III, the husband of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, from the Supreme Court of the United States. It is not the main body of a legal document or a piece of text meant to be read and understood in the context of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Announcement</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529BV$REG1

09-20-01 14:04:38

PGT (cid:127) USRULES

SUPREME COURT BUILDING REGULATIONS

1203

September 23, 1994
NOTICE
Pursuant to the authority and responsibility of the Mar-
shal of the Supreme Court of the United States as set out in
40 U. S. C. § 13l, and with the approval of the Chief Justice
of the United States, the following Regulation, entitled Reg-
ulation Three, is hereby prescribed. The Regulation and
copies of this notice shall be posted in the Supreme Court
building and made available for public inspection.

REGULATION THREE

(A) Except as authorized by the Marshal, it shall be un-
lawful for any person, within the Supreme Court building or
upon the Supreme Court grounds, to carry or have readily
available to the person, any:

(1) “ﬁrearm, ” as that term is deﬁned in Title 18

U. S. C. § 921(3);

(2) “explosive or incendiary device,” as those terms
are deﬁned by 18 U. S. C. § 844( j) and 18 U. S. C.
§ 232(5); or

(3) “dangerous weapon,” as that term is deﬁned in
40 U. S. C. § 193m(3), or District of Columbia Code
§§ 9–128(3) and 22–3214.

(B) Ofﬁcers of the Supreme Court Police shall also have
the authority to deny entry to, or to expel from, the Supreme
Court building or grounds any person who is carrying or has
readily available any object, article, or other item which may
pose a danger to Court property or the safety of the Justices,
Court employees, guests, or the general public.

(C) This Regulation is promulgated pursuant to 40 U. S. C.
§§ 13n and 13l, and any person failing to comply with this
Regulation shall be prosecuted under 40 U. S. C. § 13m.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal regulation, specifically regarding prohibited items within the Supreme Court building. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Regulation</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

noted that “[t]he drug would never be used and has never
been used as a sole anesthetic to give anesthesia during a
surgery,” id., at 223, and asserted that “the drug was not
approved  by  the  FDA  as  a  sole  anesthetic  because  after
the  use  of  fairly  large  doses  that  were  sufficient  to  reach
the  ceiling  effect  and  produce  induction  of  unconscious
ness,  the  patients  responded  to  the  surgery,”  id.,  at  219.
Thus,  Dr.  Lubarsky  may  not  have  been  able  to  identify
whether this effect would be reached at 40, 50, or 60 milli
grams  or  some  higher  threshold,  but  he  could  specify
that  at  no  level  would  midazolam  reliably  keep  an  in-
mate  unconscious  once  the  second  and  third  drugs  were
delivered.5

These assertions were amply supported by the evidence
of the manner in which midazolam is and can be used.  All
three experts agreed that midazolam is utilized as the sole
sedative  only  in  minor  procedures.    Dr.  Evans,  for  exam
ple,  acknowledged  that  while  midazolam  may  be  used  as
the  sole  drug  in  some  procedures  that  are  not  “terribly
invasive,”  even  then  “you  would  [generally]  see  it  used  in
combination with a narcotic.”  Id., at 307.  And though, as
the  Court  observes,  Dr.  Sasich  believed  midazolam  could
be  “used  for  medical  procedures  like  colonoscopies  and
gastroscopies,”  ante,  at  21,  he  insisted  that  these  proce
dures were not necessarily painful, and that it would be a

——————

5 The Court claims that the District Court could have properly disre
garded  Dr.  Lubarsky’s  testimony  because  he  asserted  that  a  protocol
with  sodium  thiopental  would  “ ‘produce  egregious  harm  and  suffer
ing.’ ”  Ante,  at  24,  n. 6  (quoting  App.  227).    But  Dr.  Lubarsky  did  not
testify  that,  like  midazolam,  sodium  thiopental  would  not  render  an
inmate fully insensate even if properly administered; rather, he simply
observed  that  he  had  previously  contended  that  protocols  using  that
drug were ineffective.  See  App. 227.  He was presumably referring to
an article he coauthored that found many condemned inmates were not
being successfully delivered the dose of sodium thiopental necessary  to
fully  anesthetize  them.  See  Baze,  553  U. S.,  at  67  (ALITO, J.,  concur
ring) (discussing this study).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and expert testimony.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

873

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–11132.  Grant v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal., 4th  App.

Dist.,  Div.  1.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11133.  Ingram  v.  Vazquez,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11134.  Hyche  v.  Chandler,  Warden.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  299  Fed.  Appx.  583.

No.  08–11135.  Ellis  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  564  F.  3d  370.

No. 08–11136.  Davis v.  Jones, Warden.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  306  Fed.  Appx.  232.

No.  08–11137.  Nelson  v.  United  States  (two  judgments).

C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11138.  Davis  v.  Oregon.  Sup.  Ct.  Ore.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  345  Ore.  551,  201  P.  3d  185.

No. 08–11139.  Winnett v. Saline County Jail et al.  C. A.

8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–11140.  Williams v.  Salazar, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11141.  Thomas  v.  St.  Louis  Board  of  Police  Com
missioners et al.  C. A. 8th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported
below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  449.

No. 08–11142.  Burke v.  United  States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  125.

No.  09–2.  Flaherty  &  Crumrine  Preferred  Income
Fund  Inc.  et  al.  v.  TXU  Corp.  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  200.

No.  09–4.  Ejikeme  v.  Violet  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  944.

No.  09–5.  Freeman  v.  Norfolk  Southern  Corp.  et  al.
C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.
Appx.  918.

No.  09–6.  Young  et  al.  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  553  F.  3d  1035.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court case orders, including case numbers, citations, and disposition. It is not sequential narrative text and is likely not meant to be read as a continuous story.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SHOOP v. TWYFORD

Opinion of the Court

killed Franks out of revenge.  A jury convicted Twyford of
aggravated  murder,  kidnapping,  robbery,  and  other
charges, and he was sentenced to death.  The Ohio appel-
late  courts  affirmed  his  conviction  and  sentence,  State  v.
Twyford,  94  Ohio  St.  3d  340,  763  N. E.  2d  122,  and  this
Court denied certiorari, 537 U. S. 917 (2002).

Twyford  then  sought  postconviction  relief  in  Ohio  state
court.  Relevant here, he claimed that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to present evidence of a head injury
Twyford sustained as a teenager during a suicide attempt.
That injury, Twyford argued, left him “unable to make ra-
tional and voluntary choices.”  State v. Twyford, 2001 WL
301411, *10 (Ohio App. 7th, Mar. 19, 2001).  The Ohio trial
court and Court of Appeals rejected this claim on the mer-
its, concluding that “a finding of ineffective assistance can-
not be based upon the trial counsel’s choice of one compet-
ing  psychological  explanation  over  another.”  Id.,  at  *13.
The  Court  of  Appeals  noted  that  Twyford’s  counsel  had
called  a  psychologist  who  testified  in  support  of  a  com-
pletely different theory: that Twyford’s “commission of the
murder  was  his  way  of  protecting  the  alleged  rape  victim
from  the  same  type  of  abusive  behavior  [he]  had  experi-
enced when he was young.”  Ibid.  Unlike the head injury
theory,  this  one explained  Twyford’s  seemingly  deliberate
and rational actions: planning a fake hunting trip as a ruse
to lure Franks to a remote location, dismembering his body,
and disposing of it in such a way as would conceal his iden-
tity.  This  theory  was  also  consistent  with  Twyford’s  own
written confession, which described his plan in detail.  The
Ohio Supreme Court denied review.  State v.  Twyford, 95
Ohio St. 3d 1436, 2002-Ohio-2084, 766 N. E. 2d 1002 (Ta-
ble).

In 2003, Twyford filed a petition in federal court for ha-
beas relief, from which this case stems.  Despite the passing
of  two  decades,  relatively  little  has  happened.   The  State
moved in 2008 to dismiss many of Twyford’s claims on the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It includes information about the case, the charges, the defendant's arguments, and the lower court rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

DR. A v. HOCHUL

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

Roman  Catholic  Diocese,  592  U. S.,  at  ___  (GORSUCH,  J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 5).  But as days gave way to weeks
and weeks to months, this Court came to recognize that the
Constitution is not to be put away in challenging times, and
we  stopped  tolerating  discrimination  against  religious ex-
ercises.  Tandon, 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1).  Finally,
churches and synagogues and mosques reopened on equal
footing with secular institutions.

Still, it seems the old lessons are hard ones.  Six weeks
ago,  this  Court  refused  relief  in  a  case  involving  Maine’s
healthcare workers.  Mills, 595 U. S. ___.  Today, the Court
repeats  the  mistake  by  turning  away  New  York’s  doctors
and nurses.  We do all this even though the State’s execu-
tive decree clearly interferes with the free exercise of reli-
gion—and  does so seemingly based on nothing more than
fear and anger at those who harbor unpopular religious be-
liefs.  We allow the State to insist on the dismissal of thou-
sands of medical workers—the very same individuals New
York has depended on and praised for their service on the
pandemic’s front lines over the last 21 months.  To add in-
sult to injury, we allow the State to deny these individuals
unemployment benefits too.  One can only hope today’s rul-
ing will not be the final chapter in this grim story.  Cases
like  this  one  may  serve  as  cautionary  tales  for  those  who
follow.  But how many more reminders do we need that “the
Constitution is not to be obeyed or disobeyed as the circum-
stances of a particular crisis . . . may suggest”?  Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 384 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses legal precedents and argues against the majority opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>