<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK

THOMAS, J., dissenting

State  court.”  New  York  ex  rel.  Rosevale  Realty  Co.  v.
Kleinert, 268 U. S. 646, 650 (1925).

Despite this long tradition, our more recent cases say it
is  “unsettled”  whether  the  proper-presentation  require-
ment is a jurisdictional bar or merely a prudential consid-
eration.  E.g., Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486
U. S. 71, 79 (1988).  But the Court has never explained why
it abandoned a centuries-old limit on our jurisdiction.  Two
cases in the mid-20th century unsettled the doctrine with
little  justification.    First,  in  Terminiello  v.  Chicago,  337
U. S.  1  (1949),  the  petitioner  raised  a  First  Amendment
challenge  to  a  city  ordinance  in  state  court,  but  failed  to
challenge the jury instruction interpreting that ordinance
either  below  or  in  this  Court.    The  Court  sidestepped  the
proper-presentation  requirement  by  reading  the  jury  in-
struction as a “construction of the ordinance . . . as binding
on us as though the precise words had been written into the
ordinance.”  Id., at 4.  Later, in Vachon v. New Hampshire,
414  U. S.  478  (1974)  (per curiam),  the  Court  deviated  yet
further from the jurisdictional understanding of the proper-
presentation rule.  For the first time, and in an unreasoned
footnote, the Court explicitly forgave a petitioner’s failure
to present a federal claim to the state court.  See id., at 479,
n. 3.  Other  than  Terminiello,  the  Court  cited  three  cases
that  reviewed  claims  from  federal  court,  see  414  U. S.,  at
483  (Rehnquist,  J.,  dissenting),  where  the  requirement  to
present a federal claim has never been jurisdictional, see,
e.g., Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S. 257, 259 (1987) (per cu-
riam).

Since  Vachon,  the  Court  has  not  explained  why  the  re-
quirement to present a federal claim in state court is pru-
dential rather than jurisdictional.  Instead, we have repeat-
edly ducked the issue.  See Howell, 543 U. S., at 445–446
(collecting  cases).    I  see  no  reason  to  prolong  this  Court’s
ambivalence.  The  proper-presentation  requirement  ap-
pears in the only statute that grants this Court jurisdiction
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Hemphill v. New York. It discusses the "proper-presentation" requirement in federal court jurisdiction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

Syllabus

anomaly of offended observer standing, and the gaping hole it tore in
standing  doctrine  in the courts of appeals should now begin to close.
Abandoning  offended  observer  standing  will  mean  only  a  return  to
the  usual  demands  of  Article  III,  requiring  a  real  controversy  with
real impact on real persons to make a federal case out of it.  Pp. 9–11.

  ALITO,  J.,  announced  the  judgment  of  the  Court  and  delivered  the
opinion  of  the  Court  with  respect  to  Parts  I,  II–B,  II–C, III, and IV , in
which  ROBERTS,  C. J.,  and  BREYER,  KAGAN,  and  KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined,
and  an  opinion  with respect to Parts II–A and II–D, in which ROBERTS,
C. J.,  and  BREYER  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.   BREYER, J., filed a con-
curring  opinion,  in  which  KAGAN,  J., joined.  KAVANAUGH, J., filed a con-
curring  opinion.    KAGAN,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring in part.  THOM-
AS,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment.    GORSUCH,  J.,  filed
an  opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment,  in  which  THOMAS,  J.,  joined.
GINSBURG,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  SOTOMAYOR,  J.,
joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi typically summarize the case and the court's decision, and are not considered part of the main body of the legal opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2  MANHATTAN COMMUNITY ACCESS CORP. v. HALLECK

Opinion of the Court

of editorial discretion over the speech and speakers on the
public access channels.
  Under the state-action doctrine as it has been articulated
and  applied  by  our  precedents,  we  conclude  that  opera-
tion  of  public  access  channels  on  a  cable  system  is  not  a
traditional, exclusive public function.  Moreover, a private
entity such as MNN who opens its property for speech by
others  is  not  transformed  by  that  fact  alone  into  a  state
actor.  In operating the public access channels, MNN is a
private actor, not a state actor, and MNN therefore is not
subject  to  First  Amendment  constraints  on  its  editorial
discretion.    We  reverse  in  relevant  part  the  judgment  of
the  Second  Circuit,  and  we  remand  the  case  for  further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I
A
  Since  the  1970s,  public  access  channels  have  been  a
regular feature on cable television systems throughout the
United  States.    In  the  1970s,  Federal  Communications
Commission  regulations  required  certain  cable  operators
to  set  aside  channels  on  their  cable  systems  for  public
access.    In  1979,  however,  this  Court  ruled  that  the  FCC
lacked  statutory  authority  to  impose  that  mandate.    See
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689 (1979).  A few
years later, Congress passed and President Reagan signed
the  Cable  Communications  Policy  Act  of  1984.    98  Stat.
2779.  The Act authorized state and local governments to
require cable operators to set aside channels on their cable
systems for public access.  47 U. S. C. §531(b).
  The  New  York  State  Public  Service  Commission  regu-
lates  cable  franchising  in  New  York  State  and  requires
cable operators in the State to set aside channels on their
cable  systems  for  public  access.    16  N. Y.  Codes,  Rules  &
Regs.  §§895.1(f),  895.4(b)  (2018).    State  law  requires  that
use  of  the  public  access  channels  be  free  of  charge  and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" from a case. Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain factual information and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

7

Opinion of the Court

recipe  in  hand,  the  robot  then  moves  to  your  kitchen  and
gives it to a cook to prepare the dish.  This example mirrors
the  API’s  task-related  organizational  system.    Through
your simple command, the robot locates the right recipe and
hands  it  off  to  the  cook.  In  the  same  way,  typing  in  a
method  call  prompts  the  API  to  locate  the  correct  imple-
menting  code  and  hand  it  off  to  your  computer.    And  im-
portantly,  to  select  the  dish  that  you  want  for  your  meal,
you do not need to know the recipe’s contents, just as a pro-
grammer  using  an  API  does  not  need  to  learn  the  imple-
menting code.  In both situations, learning the simple com-
mand is enough.

Now let us consider the example that the District Court
used  to  explain  the  precise  technology  here.  Id.,  at  980–
981.  A programmer wishes, as part of her program, to de-
termine which of two integers is the larger.  To do so in the
Java language, she will first write java.lang.  Those words
(which we have put in bold type) refer to the “package” (or
by analogy to the file cabinet).  She will then write Math.
That word refers to the “class” (or by analogy to the drawer).
She will then write max.  That word refers to the “method”
(or by analogy to the recipe).  She will then make two pa-
rentheses (
).  And, in between the parentheses she will
put two integers, say 4 and 6, that she wishes to compare.
The whole expression—the method call—will look like this:
“java.lang.Math.max(4,  6).”  The  use  of  this  expression
will, by means of the API, call up a task-implementing pro-
gram that will determine the higher number.

In  writing  this  program,  the  programmer  will  use  the
very symbols we have placed in bold in the precise order we
have placed them.  But the symbols by themselves do noth-
ing.  She must also use software that connects the symbols
to the equivalent of file cabinets, drawers, and files.  The
API  is  that  software.  It  includes  both  the  declaring  code
that  links  each  part  of  the  method  call  to  the  particular
task-implementing  program,  and  the  implementing  code
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, likely from a Supreme Court opinion. It uses legal terminology and discusses a specific case. The content is sequential and provides an explanation of a concept related to the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012)

29

Opinion of the Court

Section 514, we add, does not impose a blanket prohibi-
tion on public access.  Petitioners protest that fair use and
the  idea/expression  dichotomy  “are  plainly  inadequate  to
protect the speech and expression rights that Section 514
took  from  petitioners,  or  . . .  the  public”—that  is,  “the
unrestricted  right  to  perform,  copy,  teach  and  distribute
the entire work, for any reason.”  Brief for Petitioners 46–
47.
“Playing  a  few  bars  of  a  Shostakovich  symphony,”
petitioners  observe,  “is  no  substitute  for  performing  the
entire work.”  Id., at 47.34

But Congress has not put petitioners in this bind.  The
question  here,  as  in  Eldred,  is  whether  would-be  users
must  pay  for  their  desired  use  of the  author’s  expression,
or  else  limit  their  exploitation  to  “fair  use”  of  that  work.
Prokofiev’s  Peter  and  the  Wolf  could  once  be  performed
free  of  charge;  after  §514  the  right  to  perform  it  must  be
obtained  in  the  marketplace.    This  is  the  same  market-
place,  of  course,  that  exists  for  the  music  of  Prokofiev’s
U. S. contemporaries: works of Copland and Bernstein, for
example, that enjoy copyright protection, but nevertheless
appear regularly in the programs of U. S. concertgoers.

Before  we  joined  Berne,  domestic  works  and  some  for-
eign works were protected under U. S. statutes and bilat-
eral  international  agreements,  while  other  foreign  works
were available at an artificially low (because royalty-free)

——————

public.  See URAA Joint Hearing 3 (statement of Rep. Hughes); id., at
121 (app. to statement of Lehman, Commerce Dept.); id., at 141 (state-
ment of Shapiro, USTR); id., at 145 (statement of Christopher Schroe-
der, DOJ).  The reliance-party protections supplied by §514, see supra,
at  10–11,  were  meant  to  address  such  concerns.    See  URAA  Joint
Hearing 148–149 (prepared statement of Schroeder).

34 Because Shostakovich was a pre-1973 Russian composer, his works
were  not  protected  in  the  United  States.    See  U. S.  Copyright  Office,
Circular No. 38A: The International Copyright Relations of the United
States 9, 11, n. 2 (2010) (copyright relations between the Soviet Union
and the United States date to 1973).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing copyright law and the impact of Section 514. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific musical works.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U74

[09-06-00 17:54:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

52

UNITED STATES v. BESTFOODS

Syllabus

subsidiary’s actions in operating a polluting facility.
It is a general
principle of corporate law that a parent corporation (so-called because
of control through ownership of another corporation’s stock) is not liable
for the acts of its subsidiaries. CERCLA does not purport to reject
this bedrock principle, and the Government has indeed made no claim
that a corporate parent is liable as an owner or an operator under
§ 107(a)(2) simply because its subsidiary owns or operates a polluting
facility. But there is an equally fundamental principle of corporate law,
applicable to the parent-subsidiary relationship as well as generally, that
the corporate veil may be pierced and the shareholder held liable for
the corporation’s conduct when, inter alia, the corporate form would
otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most
notably fraud, on the shareholder’s behalf. CERCLA does not purport
to rewrite this well-settled rule, either, and against this venerable
common-law backdrop, the congressional silence is audible. Cf. Ed-
monds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266–267.
CERCLA’s failure to speak to a matter as fundamental as the liability
implications of corporate ownership demands application of the rule
that, to abrogate a common-law principle, a statute must speak directly
to the question addressed by the common law. United States v. Texas,
507 U. S. 529, 534. Pp. 61–64.

2. A corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised con-
trol over, the operations of its subsidiary’s facility may be held directly
liable in its own right under § 107(a)(2) as an operator of the facility.
Pp. 64–73.

(a) Derivative liability aside, CERCLA does not bar a parent cor-
poration from direct liability for its own actions. Under the plain lan-
guage of § 107(a)(2), any person who operates a polluting facility is di-
rectly liable for the costs of cleaning up the pollution, and this is so even
if that person is the parent corporation of the facility’s owner. Because
the statute does not deﬁne the term “operate,” however, it is difﬁcult to
deﬁne actions sufﬁcient to constitute direct parental “operation.”
In
the organizational sense obviously intended by CERCLA, to “operate”
a facility ordinarily means to direct the workings of, manage, or conduct
the affairs of the facility. To sharpen the deﬁnition for purposes of
CERCLA’s concern with environmental contamination, an operator
must manage, direct, or conduct operations speciﬁcally related to the
leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance
with environmental regulations. Pp. 64–67.

(b) The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected the direct liability analysis
of the District Court, which mistakenly focused on the relationship be-
tween parent and subsidiary, and premised liability on little more than
CPC’s ownership of Ott II and its majority control over Ott II’s board
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal document, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court syllabus. It discusses the legal principles surrounding corporate liability under CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007)

21

Opinion of the Court

that any realistic possibility exists that the relief petition-
ers seek would mitigate global climate change and remedy
their  injuries.  That  is  especially  so  because  predicted
increases  in  greenhouse  gas  emissions  from  developing
nations,  particularly  China  and  India,  are  likely  to  offset
any marginal domestic decrease.

But EPA overstates its case.  Its argument rests on the
erroneous  assumption  that  a  small  incremental  step,
because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a fed-
eral  judicial  forum.  Yet  accepting  that  premise  would
doom most challenges to regulatory action.  Agencies, like
legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in
one  fell  regulatory  swoop.    See  Williamson  v.  Lee  Optical
of  Okla.,  Inc.,  348  U. S.  483,  489  (1955)  (“[A]  reform  may
take  one  step  at  a  time,  addressing  itself  to  the  phase  of
the  problem  which  seems  most  acute  to  the  legislative
mind”).  They  instead  whittle  away  at  them  over  time,
refining their preferred approach as circumstances change
and as they develop a more-nuanced understanding of how
best to proceed.  Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194,
202 (1947) (“Some principles must await their own devel-
opment, while others must be adjusted to meet particular,
unforeseeable  situations”).    That  a  first  step  might  be
tentative does not by itself support the notion that federal
courts  lack  jurisdiction  to  determine  whether  that  step
conforms to law.

And reducing domestic automobile emissions is hardly a
tentative  step.  Even  leaving  aside  the  other  greenhouse
gases,  the  United  States  transportation  sector  emits  an
enormous  quantity  of  carbon  dioxide  into  the  atmos-
phere—according  to  the  MacCracken  affidavit,  more  than
1.7 billion metric tons in 1999 alone.  ¶30, Stdg. App. 219.
That  accounts  for  more  than  6%  of  worldwide  carbon
dioxide emissions.  Id., at 232 (Oppenheimer Decl. ¶3); see
also  MacCracken  Decl.  ¶31,  at  220.    To  put  this  in  per-
spective:  Considering  just  emissions  from  the  transporta-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Massachusetts v. EPA*. It contains legal arguments and cites to other legal documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
64

BEARD  v.  KINDLER

Kennedy, J., concurring

asserting  their  federal  rights,  have  in  good  faith  complied
with  existing  state  procedural  law.  “Novelty  in  procedural
requirements  cannot  be  permitted  to  thwart  review  in  this
Court  applied  for  by  those  who,  in  justiﬁed  reliance  upon
prior decisions,  seek vindication in  state courts of  their fed
eral  constitutional  rights.”  NAACP  v.  Alabama  ex  rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 457–458 (1958).  We have also been
mindful  of  the  danger  that  novel  state  procedural  require
ments will be imposed for the purpose of evading compliance
with  a  federal  standard.  See,  e. g., NAACP  v.  Alabama  ex
rel. Flowers, 377 U. S. 288, 293–302 (1964).

Neither  of  these  concerns  applies  here.  First,  no  one
could  seriously  entertain  the  notion  that  Kindler  acted  in
“justiﬁed  reliance”  when  he  ﬂed  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of
the  Pennsylvania  courts.  Even  if  a  hypothetical  escapee
studiously examined the case law before making an informed
decision that ﬂight was worth it, that is not the reliance the
law should be required to consider.  There is no justiﬁcation
for  an  unlawful  escape,  which  “operates  as  an  affront  to  the
dignity  of  [a]  court’s  proceedings.”  Ortega-Rodriguez  v.
United  States,  507  U. S.  234,  246  (1993).  And  if  some  prior
court rulings allowed a former escapee to reinstate forfeited
claims, there is no convincing reason to say a future escapee
is entitled to similar treatment.  Nor is there any indication
that the  Supreme Court of Pennsylvania  adopted its forfeit
ure  rule  out  of  any  hostility  toward  legitimate  constitu
tional claims.

It is most doubtful that, in light of its underlying purposes,
the adequate state ground doctrine ought to prevent a State
from adopting, and enforcing, a sensible rule that the escaped
felon  forfeits  any  pending  postverdict  motions.  The  law  is
entitled  to  protect  the  regularity  and  predictability  of  its
own  processes,  and  its  own  interest  in  the  prompt  adjudica
tion  of  disputed  issues,  by  imposing  a  rule  of  waiver  quite
without  regard  to  some  notion  of  express  or  constructive
reliance  by  the  one  who  escapes.  And  if  that  principle  had
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kennedy in the case of Beard v. Kinder. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the forfeiture of post-verdict motions by escaped felons.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U48

[09-26-01 10:25:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 446 (2000)

453

Opinion of the Court

ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correct-
ing their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas
cases.”
501 U. S., at 732. We again considered the inter-
play between exhaustion and procedural default last Term in
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838 (1999), concluding that
the latter doctrine was necessary to “ ‘protect the integrity’
of the federal exhaustion rule.”
Id., at 848 (quoting id., at
853 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The purposes of the exhaus-
tion requirement, we said, would be utterly defeated if the
prisoner were able to obtain federal habeas review simply
by “ ‘letting the time run’ ” so that state remedies were no
longer available.
Id., at 848. Those purposes would be no
less frustrated were we to allow federal review to a prisoner
who had presented his claim to the state court, but in such a
manner that the state court could not, consistent with its
own procedural rules, have entertained it.
In such circum-
stances, though the prisoner would have “concededly ex-
hausted his state remedies,” it could hardly be said that, as
comity and federalism require, the State had been given a
“fair ‘opportunity to pass upon [his claims].’ ”
Id., at 854
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Darr v.
Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 204 (1950)).

To hold, as we do, that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim asserted as cause for the procedural default of an-
other claim can itself be procedurally defaulted is not to say
that that procedural default may not itself be excused if
the prisoner can satisfy the cause-and-prejudice standard
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit may
with respect to that claim.
well conclude on remand that respondent can meet that
standard in this case (although we should note that respond-
ent has not argued that he can, preferring instead to argue
that he does not have to). Or it may conclude, as did the
District Court, that Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B)
does not constitute an adequate procedural ground to bar
federal habeas review of the ineffective-assistance claim.
We express no view as to these issues, or on the question
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text from a Supreme Court opinion. It discusses procedural default in habeas corpus cases and the interplay between exhaustion of state remedies and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MISSISSIPPI v. TENNESSEE

Opinion of the Court

Following  motions  practice,  discovery,  and  a  five-day  evi-
dentiary hearing, the Special Master issued a report recom-
mending that we dismiss Mississippi’s complaint, but with
leave  to  amend.  He  first  determined  that  the  Middle
Claiborne Aquifer is an interstate water resource.  He found
that the aquifer is a “single hydrogeological unit,” that Ten-
nessee’s pumping affects groundwater beneath Mississippi,
and  that  prior  to  such  pumping,  “groundwater  flowed  be-
tween Mississippi and Tennessee”—a fact Mississippi “does
not dispute.”  Report of Special Master 15–24.

The Special Master then concluded that, because the aq-
uifer is an interstate water resource, equitable apportion-
ment is the appropriate remedy.  He recognized that equi-
table apportionment “stands alone as the federal common-
law principle for disputes over interstate water,” id., at 31,
and  saw  “no  compelling  reason  to  chart  a  new  path  for
groundwater  resources,”  id.,  at  26.  Because  Mississippi’s
complaint did not seek  equitable apportionment, the Spe-
cial  Master  recommends  that  we  dismiss  it.    But  he  also
recommends  that  we  grant  Mississippi  leave  to  file  an
amended  complaint  seeking  equitable  apportionment,
though the State has not yet sought such leave.

Mississippi  and  Tennessee  both  filed  exceptions  to  the
Special Master’s report.  Mississippi objects to the Special
Master’s recommendation that we dismiss the suit.  It ar-
gues that the Special Master erred in finding the water in
the  Middle  Claiborne  Aquifer  subject  to  equitable  appor-
tionment.  Tennessee  objects  only  to  the  Special  Master’s
recommendation that we grant Mississippi leave to amend
its complaint.

We “conduct an independent review of the record, and as-
sume the ultimate responsibility for deciding all matters.”
Kansas  v.  Nebraska,  574  U. S.  445,  453  (2015)  (internal
quotation  marks  omitted).    Based  on  that  review,  we  dis-
miss Mississippi’s complaint and decline to grant leave to
amend.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the beginning of the opinion in the case of Mississippi v. Tennessee.  It discusses the Special Master's report and the arguments of both parties.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

15

BARRETT, J., dissenting

D. J. M. v. Hannibal Public School Dist. No. 60, 647 F. 3d
754, 758 (CA8 2011);  Lovell v. Poway Unified School Dis-
trict,  90  F. 3d  367,  369,  372–373  (CA9  1996)  (similar);
Haughwout v. Tordenti, 332 Conn. 559, 561–562, 211 A. 3d
1, 3–4 (2019) (similar).  True threats can also be expressed
by a parent, a teacher, or an employee in another context
altogether.  See, e.g., Taveras, 342 Conn., at 567–569, 578,
271 A. 3d, at 126–128, 133 (parent); Smith v. New York City
Dept. of Ed., 109 App. Div. 3d 701, 702–703, 972 N. Y. S. 2d
221, 222 (2013) (teacher); Diggs v. St. Louis, 613 S. W. 3d
858, 862, 864 (Mo. App. 2020) (correctional officer).

Barring some reason why the speech receives lesser con-
stitutional  protection,  e.g.,  Mahanoy  Area  School  Dist.  v.
B. L.,  594  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2021)  (slip  op.,  at  4–5),  the
Court’s new rule applies to all of these situations.  That can
make all the difference in some cases.  A delusional speaker
may  lack  awareness  of  the  threatening  nature  of  her
speech; a devious speaker may strategically disclaim such
awareness; and a lucky speaker may leave behind no evi-
dence of mental state for the government to use against her.
The Court’s decision thus sweeps much further than it lets
on.

*

*

*
The bottom line is this: Counterman communicated true
threats, which, “everyone agrees, lie outside the bounds of
the First  Amendment’s protection.”  Ante, at  4.  He  knew
what the words meant.  Those threats caused the victim to
fear  for  her  life,  and  they  “upended  her  daily  existence.”
Ante, at 2.  Nonetheless, the Court concludes that Counter-
man can prevail on a First Amendment defense.  Nothing
in the Constitution compels that result.  I respectfully dis-
sent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It cites other legal cases and analyzes the Court's decision in Counterman v. Colorado.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U72

[09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

34

FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. AKINS

Scalia, J., dissenting

The Richardson opinion treated that as fairly included
within the taxpayer-standing question, or at least as plainly
indistinguishable from it:

“The respondent’s claim is that without detailed infor-
mation on CIA expenditures—and hence its activities—
he cannot intelligently follow the actions of Congress or
the Executive, nor can he properly fulﬁll his obliga-
tions as a member of the electorate in voting for candi-
dates seeking national ofﬁce.

“This is surely the kind of a generalized grievance
described in both Frothingham and Flast since the im-
pact on him is plainly undifferentiated and common to
Id., at 176–177 (citations
all members of the public.”
and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

If Richardson left voter standing unaffected, one must mar-
vel at the unaccustomed ineptitude of the American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation, which litigated Richardson, in
not immediately reﬁling with an explicit voter-standing alle-
gation. Fairly read, and applying a fair understanding of its
important purposes, Richardson is indistinguishable from
the present case.

The Court’s opinion asserts that our language disapprov-
ing generalized grievances “invariably appears in cases
where the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also
of an abstract and indeﬁnite nature.” Ante, at 23.
“Often,”
the Court says, “the fact that an interest is abstract and
the fact that it is widely shared go hand in hand. But their
association is not invariable, and where a harm is concrete,
though widely shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact.’ ”
Ante, at 24.
If that is so—if concrete generalized grievances
(like concrete particularized grievances) are OK, and ab-
stract generalized grievances (like abstract particularized
grievances) are bad—one must wonder why we ever devel-
oped the superﬂuous distinction between generalized and
particularized grievances at all. But of course the Court is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia. It discusses the concept of "voter standing" in the context of a legal case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT1

[10-09-01 14:49:25] PGT: ORD1PP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1027

529 U. S.

March 20, 2000

No. 99–7882. King v. Moore, Secretary, Florida Depart-

ment of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7893. Hall v. United States; and
No. 99–7897. Hall v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 171 F. 3d 1133.

No. 99–7930. Macemon v. Morgan, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 202 F. 3d 274.

No. 99–7934.

Jackson v. Johnson, Director, Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 641.

No. 99–7942. Barnes v. Keane, Superintendent, Sing Sing

Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–7949. Strouth v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 999 S. W. 2d 759.

No. 99–7954. Robedeaux v. Gibson, Warden. C. A. 10th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 478.

No. 99–7956. McCallum v. Moore, Secretary, Florida De-
partment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 194 F. 3d 1323.

No. 99–7976. Foster v. Gibson, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 182 F. 3d 1177.

No. 99–7995. Mackay v. Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 217 F. 3d 856.

No. 99–8014. Kirksey v. United States; and
No. 99–8159. Hall v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 200 F. 3d 820.

No. 99–8037. Bumgardner v. Norris, Director, Arkansas
Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 99–8055. Kemper v. Dormire, Superintendent, Jef-
ferson City Correctional Center, et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 250.

No. 99–8079. Chaney v. New Orleans Public Facility
Management, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 179 F. 3d 164.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names, courts, and dates. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1122

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

No.  09–7267.  Teagle  v.  DiGuglielmo,  Superintendent,
State  Correctional  Institution  at  Graterford,  et  al.
C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  336  Fed.
Appx.  209.

No.  09–7268.  Parker  v.  Allen,  Commissioner,  Alabama
Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Reported  below:  565  F.  3d  1258.

No. 09–7270.  Rust v.  Sandor, Warden.  C. A. 9th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  346  Fed.  Appx.  163.

No. 09–7272.  Stephens v.  Branker, Warden.  C. A. 4th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  570  F.  3d  198.

No. 09–7277.  Epps v.  Wagner et al.  C. A. 4th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  133.

No. 09–7278.  Camillo v.  Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
345  Fed.  Appx.  576.

No.  09–7279.  Christensen  v.  Nevada.  Sup.  Ct.  Nev.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–7280.  Farnsworth  v.  McNeil  et  al.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7283.  Martin  v.  Luoma,  Warden.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–7284.  St. Amant v.  Louisiana.  Sup. Ct. La.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  17  So.  3d  376.

No.  09–7286.  Rosser  v.  Scribner,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7287.  Stewart  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  1st

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7291.  Williams  v.  Virginia  et  al.  Sup.  Ct.  Va.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7292.  Valenzuela  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  3d

App.  Dist.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, names of parties involved, the court that heard the case, and whether certiorari was granted or denied.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–222
_________________

GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. ARKANSAS TEACHER
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2021]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring in part and dissenting

in part.

I  agree  with  the  Court’s  answers  to  the  questions  pre-
sented, and I accordingly join Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B of
the Court’s opinion.  Under Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S.
224 (1988), securities plaintiffs may demonstrate reliance
by invoking the rebuttable presumption that investors rely
on any misrepresentations reflected in a security’s market
price.  Id., at 241–247.  The Basic presumption is particu-
larly useful to class-action plaintiffs who, without the pre-
sumption, ordinarily could not demonstrate that questions
common  to  the  class  predominate  over  individual  ones.
Ante,  at  3–4.    Defendants,  for  their  part,  may  rebut  the
Basic presumption by demonstrating that the alleged mis-
representations  did  not  in  fact  affect  the  security’s  price.
Ante, at 3.  So-called “price impact” may be disproved with
a variety of evidence, alone or in combination.  As the Court
holds today, one potentially relevant piece of evidence may
be the “generic nature” of the misrepresentation.  Ante, at
6–8.

I do not, however, join the Court’s judgment to vacate and
remand because I believe the Second Circuit “properly con-
sidered the generic nature of Goldman’s alleged misrepre-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor.  It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2019)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 18–328
_________________

KEVIN C. ROTKISKE, PETITIONER v.
PAUL KLEMM, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[December 10, 2019]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) author-
izes private civil actions against debt collectors who engage
in  certain  prohibited  practices.    91  Stat.  881,  15  U. S. C.
§1692k(a).  An  action  under  the  FDCPA  may  be  brought
“within  one  year  from  the  date  on  which  the  violation  oc-
curs.”  §1692k(d).  This case requires us to determine when
the  FDCPA’s  limitations  period  begins  to  run.    We  hold
that,  absent  the  application  of  an  equitable  doctrine,  the
statute of limitations in §1692k(d) begins to run on the date
on which the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, not the date
on which the violation is discovered.

I
A
In 1977, Congress enacted the FDCPA “to eliminate abu-
sive  debt  collection  practices  by  debt  collectors,  to  insure
that  those  debt  collectors  who  refrain  from  using  abusive
debt  collection  practices  are  not  competitively  disadvan-
taged, and to promote consistent State action to protect con-
sumers  against  debt  collection  abuses.”    §1692(e).    The
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the name of the case, the date of the opinion, and the introductory portion of the opinion itself. This is suitable content for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C.

Syllabus

case.  United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 394.  Because
the attorney general’s need to intervene did not arise until the secre-
tary  ceased  defending  the  state  law,  the  timeliness  of  his  motion
should be assessed in relation to that point in time.  NAACP v. New
York, 413 U. S. 345, distinguished.  Pp. 10–12.

(3) The panel’s finding that granting intervention would prejudice
respondents  was  similarly  flawed.    While  the  attorney  general’s  re-
hearing petition pressed an issue (third-party standing) not raised in
the secretary’s appellate briefs, allowing intervention would not have
necessitated resolution of that issue.   See, e.g.,  McDonald, 432 U. S.,
at 394.  Moreover, respondents’ loss of its claimed expectations around
election of a  Governor  with a  history  of  declining  to  defend  abortion
restrictions is not cognizable as unfair prejudice in the sense relevant
here.  Pp. 12–13.

831 Fed. Appx. 748, reversed and remanded.

  ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and THOMAS, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  THOMAS,
J., filed a concurring opinion.  KAGAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment, in which BREYER, J., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court decision.  It is not the main body of the legal text and is not suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxxix

Page

Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See name or

title of superintendent.

. . . . . . . . . .

Superior Court of Cal., San Diego County; Brown v.
941
Supreme Court of Colo.; Smith v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954,970
Sust v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
962
Sutherlin v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Swain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Sweetwater County School Dist. No. 1; Brockman v.
. . . . . . . . . .
933
Swidler & Berlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
399
Swinick v. Rosen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Swinney v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Swint v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Tacoma; Rendish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952
907
Tal-Mason v. Redd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tataii v. Cayetano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,969
966
Taub, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,968
Taylor; Falkenberry v.
960
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taylor v. United States
952
TCW Special Credits; Barandiaran v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
976
Teague v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Teamsters v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Temple Univ.; Sarkar v.
956
Tennard v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
907
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tennessee; Bates v.
931
Tennessee; Booher v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tennessee; Cash v.
941
Tennessee; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
959
Tennessee; Lyons v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
Tennessee; Mann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Tennessee; McDonald v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Terhune; Murillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Territory. See name of Territory.
Terry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932,940
911
Texas; Angel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
Texas; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
930
Texas; Estep v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910
Texas; Knupp v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
925
Texas v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Texas; Panetti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Texas; Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Texas; Richard v.
974
Texas; Ruiz Camacho v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Texas; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely from a legal document. It lists case names and corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

protection  principle  and  resolved  the  debate:    The  Court
declared  that  race-based  affirmative  action  in  higher
education could continue for another generation, and only
for  another  generation,  at
least  absent  something
unexpected.  Grutter, 539 U. S., at 343.  As I have explained,
the Court’s pronouncement of a 25-year period—as both an
extension  of  and  an  outer  limit  to  race-based  affirmative
action  in  higher  education—formed  an  important  part  of
the carefully constructed Grutter decision.  I would abide by
that  temporal  limit  rather  than  discarding  it,  as  today’s
dissents would do.

To be clear, although progress has been made since Bakke
and  Grutter,  racial  discrimination  still  occurs  and  the
effects  of  past  racial  discrimination  still  persist.    Federal
and  state  civil  rights  laws  serve  to  deter  and  provide
remedies  for  current  acts  of  racial  discrimination.  And
governments  and  universities  still  “can,  of  course,  act  to
undo the effects of past discrimination in many permissible
ways that do not involve classification by race.”  Croson, 488
U. S., at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see id., at 509 (plurality opinion
of O’Connor, J.) (“the city has at its disposal a whole array
of race-neutral devices to increase the accessibility of city
contracting  opportunities  to  small  entrepreneurs  of  all
races”);  ante,  at  39–40;  Brief  for  Petitioner  80–86;  Reply
Brief in No. 20–1199, pp. 25–26; Reply Brief in No. 21–707,
pp. 23–26.

In sum, the Court’s opinion today is consistent with and
follows from the Court’s equal protection precedents, and I
join the Court’s opinion in full.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the Court's previous rulings on affirmative action and Justice Kavanaugh's stance on the issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U37

[09-26-01 08:37:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN

200

CORTEZ BYRD CHIPS, INC. v. BILL HARBERT
CONSTR. CO.
Opinion of the Court

more pronounced due to the courts’ general inhospitality to
forum selection clauses, see The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U. S. 1, 9–10 (1972). Hence, even if an arbitration
agreement expressly permitted action to be brought in the
district in which arbitration had been conducted, the agree-
ment would probably prove to be vain. The enactment of
the special venue provisions in the FAA thus had an obvi-
ously liberalizing effect, undiminished by any suggestion,
textual or otherwise, that Congress meant simultaneously to
foreclose a suit where the defendant resided. Such a conse-
quence would have been as inexplicable in 1925 as it would
be passing strange 75 years later. The most convenient
forum for a defendant is normally the forum of residence,
and it would take a very powerful reason ever to suggest
that Congress would have meant to eliminate that venue for
postarbitration disputes.

The virtue of the liberalizing nonrestrictive view of the
provisions for venue in the district of arbitration is conﬁrmed
by another obviously liberalizing venue provision of the Act,
which in § 9 authorizes a binding agreement selecting a
forum for conﬁrming an arbitration award. Since any forum
selection agreement must coexist with §§ 10 and 11, one
needs to ask how they would work together if §§ 10 and 11
meant that an order vacating or modifying an arbitration
award could be obtained only in the district where the award
was made. The consequence would be that a proceeding to
conﬁrm the award begun in a forum previously selected by
agreement of the parties (but outside the district of the arbi-
tration) would need to be held in abeyance if the responding
party objected. The objecting party would then have to re-
turn to the district of the arbitration to begin a separate

as restrictive views of personal jurisdiction meant that it was often difﬁ-
cult to sue a defendant outside the district of his residence. Cf. Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring that a
defendant have minimum contacts with a forum to be subject to its
judgment).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Federal Arbitration Act and venue provisions. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

15

BREYER, J., dissenting

Nash’s cases because they do not appear to have sought ju-
dicial review at all.  See Brief for Respondents 13; App. 122–
126.

Second, the Court characterizes New York’s proper cause
standard as substantively “demanding.”  Ante, at 3.  But,
again,  the  Court  has  before  it  no  evidentiary  record  to
demonstrate how the standard has actually been applied.
How “demanding” is the proper cause standard in practice?
Does that answer differ from county to county?  How many
license applications are granted and denied each year?  At
the  pleading  stage,  we  do  not  know  the  answers  to  these
and other important questions, so the Court’s characteriza-
tion of New York’s law may very well be wrong.

In support of its assertion that the law is “demanding,”
the Court cites only to cases originating in New York City.
Ibid.  (citing  In  re  Martinek,  294  App.  Div.  2d  221,  743
N. Y. S. 2d 80 (2002) (New York County, i.e., Manhattan);
In  re  Kaplan,  249  App.  Div.  2d  199,  673  N. Y. S.  2d  66
(1998)  (same);  In  re  Klenosky,  75  App.  Div.  2d  793,  428
N. Y. S. 2d 256 (same); In re Bernstein, 85 App. Div. 2d 574,
445 N. Y. S. 2d 716 (1981) (Bronx County)).  But cases from
New  York  City  may  not  accurately  represent  how  the
proper cause standard is applied in other parts of the State,
including in Rensselaer County where petitioners reside.

To the contrary, amici tell us that New York’s licensing
regime is purposefully flexible: It allows counties and cities
to  respond  to  the  particular  needs  and  challenges  of  each
area.  See  Brief  for  American  Bar  Association  as  Amicus
Curiae 12; Brief for City of New York as Amicus Curiae 20–
29.  Amici  suggest  that  some  areas  may  interpret  words
such  as  “proper  cause”  or  “special  need”  more  or  less
strictly, depending upon each area’s unique circumstances.
See ibid.  New York City, for example, reports that it “has
applied  the  [proper  cause]  requirement  relatively  rigor-
ously”  because  its  densely  populated  urban  areas  pose  a
heightened risk of gun violence.  Brief for City of New York
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's characterization of New York's proper cause standard for gun licenses. The text focuses on legal arguments and cites specific cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1242

RULES  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT

TIME REQUIREMENTS—Continued

Rule

—Briefs on merits.................................................  25.1–25.6, 30.3

—Certiﬁed questions, briefs on merits.............  19.5

—Certiorari, petitions for writ of......................  13, 30.2, 30.3

—Jurisdictional statements ................................  18.3, 30.2, 30.3

—Motions to dismiss or to afﬁrm appeal .........  18.6

—Rehearing, petitions for.................................  30.3, 44.1, 44.2, 44.4

—Requests for divided argument  ....................  28.4

—Responses to motions .......................................  21.4

—Word limits, application to exceed.................  33.1(d)

TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD—See also Records

Cost ..................................................................................  43.3

TRANSLATIONS

Foreign-language material in record  .......................  31

UNITED STATES

Amicus curiae ...............................................................  37.4
Briefs, cover color .........................................................  33.1(e)
Costs allowed for or against  ......................................  43.5
Service

—On federal agency, ofﬁcer, or employee ........  29.4(a)
—On Solicitor General .........................................  29.4(a), (b)

UNITED STATES REPORTS

Publication of Court’s opinions...................................  41

VETERANS

Suits by  ..........................................................................  40.1

WAIVER

Brief in opposition, right to ﬁle  ................................  15.5
Costs allowed for or against United States ............  43.5
Motion to dismiss appeal or afﬁrm, right to ﬁle .....  18.7

WRITS

Certiorari ........................................................................  10–16

Common-law certiorari ................................................  20.6

Extraordinary ................................................................  20

Habeas corpus................................................................  20.4

Mandamus.......................................................................  20.3

Prohibition ......................................................................  20.3
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically the Rules of the Supreme Court. It lists various rules with corresponding references.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Rules</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO

Per Curiam

entities, contend that these restrictions violate the Free Ex-
ercise Clause of the First Amendment, and they ask us to
enjoin enforcement of the restrictions while they pursue ap-
pellate  review.  Citing  a  variety  of  remarks  made  by  the
Governor, Agudath Israel argues that the Governor specif-
ically targeted the Orthodox Jewish community and gerry-
mandered the boundaries of red and orange zones to ensure
that heavily Orthodox areas were included.  Both the Dio-
cese and Agudath Israel maintain that the regulations treat
houses of worship much more harshly than comparable sec-
ular facilities.  And they tell us without contradiction that
they  have  complied  with  all  public  health  guidance,  have
implemented additional precautionary measures, and have
operated at 25% or 33% capacity for months without a sin-
gle outbreak.

The applicants have clearly established their entitlement
to relief pending appellate review.  They have shown that
their  First  Amendment  claims  are  likely  to  prevail,  that
denying  them  relief  would  lead  to  irreparable  injury,  and
that granting relief would not harm the public interest.  See
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S.
7,  20  (2008).    Because  of  the  need  to  issue  an  order
promptly, we provide only a brief summary of the reasons
why immediate relief is essential.

Likelihood of success on the merits.  The applicants have
made a strong showing that the challenged restrictions vi-
olate “the minimum requirement of neutrality” to religion.
Church  of  Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508  U. S.
520, 533 (1993).  As noted by the dissent in the court below,
statements  made  in  connection  with  the  challenged  rules
can  be  viewed  as  targeting  the  “ ‘ultra-Orthodox  [Jewish]
community.’ ”  ___  F. 3d  ___,  ___,  2020  WL  6750495,  *5
(CA2, Nov. 9, 2020) (Park, J., dissenting).  But even if we
put those comments aside, the regulations cannot be viewed
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a court opinion. It discusses a case involving religious restrictions and the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document/Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

13

Opinion of the Court

ity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U. S. 204, 209 (2002) (internal
quotation  marks  omitted).  The  presence  of  §262(l)(9)(C),
coupled  with  the  absence  of  any  other  textually  specified
remedies, indicates that Congress did not intend sponsors
to  have  access  to  injunctive  relief,  at  least  as  a  matter  of
federal law, to enforce the disclosure requirement.

Statutory  context  further  confirms  that  Congress  did
not authorize courts to enforce §262(l)(2)(A) by injunction.
Section 262(l)(1)(H) provides that “the court shall consider
immediate  injunctive  relief  to  be  an  appropriate  and  nec-
essary remedy for any violation or threatened violation” of
the  rules  governing  the  confidentiality  of  information
disclosed  under  §262(l).  We  assume  that  Congress  acted
intentionally  when  it  provided  an  injunctive  remedy  for
breach  of  the  confidentiality  requirements  but  not  for
breach  of  §262(l)(2)(A)’s  disclosure  requirement.  Cf.
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 572 (1979)
(“[W]hen  Congress  wished  to  provide  a  private  damage
remedy,  it  knew  how  to  do  so  and  did  so  expressly”).2
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit properly declined to grant
an injunction under federal law.

B
The  Federal  Circuit  rejected  Amgen’s  request  for  an
injunction under state law for two reasons.  First, it inter-
preted California’s unfair competition law not to provide a
remedy when the underlying statute specifies an “expressly
. . .  exclusive”  remedy.    794  F. 3d,  at  1360  (citing  Cal.
——————

2 In holding that §262(l)(9)(C) represents the exclusive remedy for an
applicant’s  failure  to  provide  its  application  and  manufacturing  infor-
mation, we express no view on whether a district court could take into
account  an  applicant’s  violation  of  §262(l)(2)(A)  (or  any  other  BPCIA
procedural  requirement)  in  deciding  whether  to  grant  a  preliminary
injunction  under  35  U. S. C.  §271(e)(4)(B)  or  §283  against  marketing
the biosimilar.  See Winter v.  Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
555  U. S.  7,  20  (2008)  (court  should  consider  “balance  of  equities”  in
deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of a statute and its implications for injunctive relief. It contains legal citations and arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

13

KAGAN, J., dissenting

the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the polit-
ical processes leading to nomination or election in the
State  or  political  subdivision  are  not  equally  open  to
participation  by  members  of  [a  given  race]  in  that
[those]  members  have  less  opportunity  than  other
members of the electorate to participate in the political
process  and  to  elect  representatives  of  their  choice.”
§10301(b).3

Those provisions have a great many words, and I address
them  further  below.    But  their  essential  import  is  plain:
Courts are to strike down voting rules that contribute to a
racial  disparity  in  the  opportunity  to  vote,  taking  all  the
relevant circumstances into account.
  The first thing to note about Section 2 is how far its pro-
hibitory language sweeps.  The provision bars any “voting
qualification,”  any  “prerequisite to  voting,”  or any  “stand-
ard,  practice,  or  procedure”  that  “results  in  a  denial  or
abridgement of the right” to “vote on account of race.”  The
overlapping  list  of  covered  state  actions  makes  clear  that
Section  2  extends  to  every  kind  of  voting  or  election  rule.
Congress carved out nothing pertaining to “voter qualifica-
tions  or  the  manner  in  which  elections  are  conducted.”
Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 922 (1994) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring in judgment).  So, for example, the provision “covers
all manner of registration requirements, the practices sur-
rounding registration,” the “locations of polling places, the
times polls are open, the use of paper ballots as opposed to
voting  machines,  and  other  similar  aspects  of  the  voting
process that might be manipulated to deny any citizen the
right to cast a ballot and have it properly counted.”  Ibid.
All those rules and more come within the statute—so long
as they result in a race-based “denial or abridgement” of the

——————

3 A final sentence, not at issue here, specifies that the voting right pro-
vided does not entitle minority citizens to proportional representation in
electoral offices.  See infra, at 19, n. 6.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and its implications for voting rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

Opinion of the Court

interlocutory  appeal,  but  not

that appeal, Congress need not say anything about a stay.
At least absent contrary indications, the background Griggs
principle  already  requires  an  automatic  stay  of  district
court  proceedings  that  relate  to  any  aspect  of  the  case
involved in the appeal.  By contrast, when Congress wants
to
to  authorize  an
automatically stay district court proceedings pending that
appeal, Congress typically says so.  Since the creation of the
modern  courts  of  appeals  system  in  1891,  Congress  has
enacted multiple statutory “non-stay” provisions.6  Indeed,
Congress  enacted  a  “non-stay”  provision  the  day  before
enacting §16(a) in 1988.  See 102 Stat. 4120 (“Neither the
application for, nor the granting of, an appeal . . . shall stay
proceedings in the Court of Veterans Appeals”).

In  short,  the  Griggs  rule  requires  that  a  district  court
stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on the
question of arbitrability is ongoing.

III

To  overcome  the  Griggs  principle,  Bielski  advances  five

main arguments.  None is persuasive.

First,  Bielski  contends  that  an  automatic  stay  would
encourage  frivolous  appeals  that  would  improperly  delay
district court proceedings.  To begin with, Bielski has not
established  that  frivolous  appeals  frequently  occur  in  the
Circuits  that  have  long  applied  the  Griggs  principle  in

——————

6 Act of Apr. 3, 1926, ch. 102, 44 Stat. 233–234; Act of Feb. 28, 1927,
ch. 228, id., at 1261; Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85–919, 72 Stat. 1770;
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, §125, 96 Stat. 37, 28 U. S. C.
§1292(d)(3);  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986,  §1558,  100  Stat.  2757–2758,  26
U. S. C. §7482(a)(2)(A); Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, 102 Stat. 4120, as
amended,  38  U. S. C.  §7292(b)(1);  Bankruptcy  Abuse  Prevention  and
Consumer  Protection  Act  of  2005,  119  Stat.  203,  28  U. S. C.
§158(d)(2)(D);  Puerto  Rico  Oversight,  Management,  and  Economic
Stability  Act,  §306,  130  Stat.  582,  48  U. S. C.  §2166(e)(6);  see  also
Judiciary Act of 1891, §7, 26 Stat. 828; Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 803, 31
Stat. 660–661; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(f ).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it is part of the actual content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

OHIO v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

provals soon seemed to vindicate at least some of the com-
menters’ concerns.  Two circuits issued stays of EPA’s SIP
denials for four States.  See Order in No. 23–60069 (CA5,
May 1, 2023) (Texas and Louisiana); Order in No. 23–1320
(CA8,  May  25,  2023)  (Arkansas);  Order  in  No.  23–1719
(CA8, May 26, 2023) (Missouri).
  Despite  those  comments  and  developments,  the  agency
proceeded to issue its final FIP.  88 Fed. Reg. 36654 (2023).5
In  response  to  the  problem  commenters  raised,  EPA
adopted a severability provision stating that, should any ju-
risdiction  drop  out,  its  rule  would  “continue  to  be  imple-
mented  as  to  any remaining  jurisdictions.”    Id.,  at  36693.
But in doing so, EPA did not address whether or why the
same  emissions-control  measures  it  mandated  would  con-
tinue  to  further  the  FIP’s  stated  purpose  of  maximizing
cost-effective  air-quality  improvement  if  fewer  States  re-
mained in the plan.

D
  After EPA issued its final FIP, litigation over the agency’s
SIP disapprovals continued.  One court after another issued
one  stay  after  another.6    Each  new  stay  meant  another

——————

5 The final FIP covered 23 States.  88 Fed. Reg. 36654, 36656 (2023).
That plan included Pennsylvania and Virginia, but EPA declined to cover
Tennessee  or  Wyoming  at  the  time, even  though  it  had  announced  its
intention  to  disapprove  those  States’  SIPs.   Ibid.;  see  also  supra,  at  4,
and nn. 1–2.  EPA has since proposed a plan for Tennessee and several
other States.  89 Fed. Reg. 12666 (2024).

6 See,  e.g.,  Order  in  No.  23–60069  (CA5,  June  8,  2023)  (Mississippi);
Order  in  No.  23–682  (CA9,  July  3,  2023)  (Nevada);  Order  in
No.  23–1776  (CA8,  July  5,  2023)  (Minnesota);  Order  in  No.  23–3216
(CA6, July 25, 2023) (Kentucky); Order in No. 23–9520 etc. (CA10, July
27, 2023) (Utah and Oklahoma); Order in No. 23–11173 (CA11, Aug. 17,
2023)  (Alabama);  see  also  Order  in  No.  23–1418  (CA4,  Aug.  10,  2023)
(West Virginia, pending oral argument on preliminary motions to stay
and to transfer); Order in No. 23–1418 (CA4, Jan. 10, 2024) (West Vir-
ginia, after oral argument and pending merits review of petition).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the part discussing the EPA's actions and the subsequent legal challenges. It contains legal citations, references to regulations, and a narrative of events.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

297

Opinion of O’Connor, J.

ment at issue in Renton, Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U. S. 50 (1976), and California v. LaRue, 409 U. S.
109 (1972), it was reasonable for Erie to conclude that such
nude dancing was likely to produce the same secondary ef-
fects. And Erie could reasonably rely on the evidentiary
foundation set forth in Renton and American Mini Theatres
to the effect that secondary effects are caused by the pres-
ence of even one adult entertainment establishment in a
given neighborhood. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., supra, at 51–52 (indicating that reliance on a judicial
opinion that describes the evidentiary basis is sufﬁcient).
In
fact, Erie expressly relied on Barnes and its discussion of
including its reference to Renton and
secondary effects,
American Mini Theatres. Even in cases addressing regu-
lations that strike closer to the core of First Amendment
values, we have accepted a state or local government’s rea-
sonable belief that the experience of other jurisdictions
is relevant to the problem it is addressing. See Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 393, n. 6
(2000). Regardless of whether Justice Souter now wishes
to disavow his opinion in Barnes on this point, see post, at
316–317 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part),
the evidentiary standard described in Renton controls here,
and Erie meets that standard.

In any event, Erie also relied on its own ﬁndings. The
preamble to the ordinance states that “the Council of the
City of Erie has, at various times over more than a century,
expressed its ﬁndings that certain lewd, immoral activities
carried on in public places for proﬁt are highly detrimental
to the public health, safety and welfare, and lead to the de-
basement of both women and men, promote violence, public
intoxication, prostitution and other serious criminal activ-
ity.” Pet. for Cert. 6a (emphasis added). The city council
members, familiar with commercial downtown Erie, are the
individuals who would likely have had ﬁrsthand knowledge
of what took place at and around nude dancing establish-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 277 (2000). It discusses the reasoning behind a local ordinance regulating adult entertainment establishments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC.

Opinion of the Court
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

a  statute,  we  give  “full  effect”  to  the  Constitution  and  to
whatever portions of the statute are “not repugnant” to the
Constitution, effectively severing the unconstitutional por-
tion of the statute.  Bank of Hamilton v. Lessee of Dudley, 2
Pet.  492,  526  (1829)  (Marshall,  C. J.).    This  principle  ex-
plains our “normal rule that partial, rather than facial, in-
validation is the required course.”  Brockett v. Spokane Ar-
cades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 504 (1985).

Arthrex asks us to hold the entire regime of inter partes
review unconstitutional.  In its view, any more tailored dec-
laration  of  unconstitutionality  would  necessitate  a  policy
decision best left to Congress in the first instance.  Because
the good cannot be separated from the bad, Arthrex contin-
ues, the appropriate remedy is to order outright dismissal
of the proceeding below.  The partial dissent, similarly for-
swearing the need to do anything beyond “identifying the
constitutional violation,” would grant full relief to Arthrex.
Post, at 5–6 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).

In our view, however, the structure of the PTO and the
governing constitutional principles chart a clear course: De-
cisions by APJs must be subject to review by the Director.
Congress vested the Director with the “powers and duties”
of the PTO, 35 U. S. C. §3(a)(1), tasked him with supervis-
ing APJs, §3(a)(2)(A), and placed the PTAB “in” the PTO,
§6(a).  A  single  officer  has  superintended  the  activities  of
the  PTO  since  the  Commissioner  of  Patents  assumed  the
role of “chief officer” of the Patent Office in 1836.  §1, 5 Stat.
117–118.  The  Commissioner  long  oversaw  examiners-in-
chief, see 12 Stat. 246–247, just as the Director today has
the responsibility to oversee APJs.  While shielding the ul-
timate  decisions  of  the  200-plus  APJs  from  review,  Con-
gress also provided the Director means of control over the
institution and conduct of inter partes review.  35 U. S. C.
§§314(a),  316(a).    In  every  respect  save  the  insulation  of
their  decisions  from  review  within  the  Executive  Branch,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the constitutionality of a specific process within the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

15

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

tives  in  1866  confronted  a  dispute  about  who  should  be
seated  as  the  Congressman  from  the  Fifth  District  of
Michigan.  At  a  popular  convention,  Michigan  voters  had
amended the State Constitution to require votes to be cast
within a resident’s township or ward.  The Michigan Leg-
islature, however, passed a law permitting soldiers to vote
in  alternative  locations.  If  only  the  local  votes  counted,
one  candidate  (Baldwin)  would  win;  if  the  outside  votes
were included, the other candidate (Trowbridge) would be
entitled to the seat.  See Baldwin v. Trowbridge, 2 Bartlett
Contested  Election  Cases,  H. R.  Misc.  Doc.  No.  152,  41st
Cong., 2d Sess., 46–47 (1866).

The  House  Elections  Committee  explained  that  the
Elections  Clause  conferred  power  on  “the  Legislature”  of
Michigan  to  prescribe  election  regulations.
“But,”  the
Committee  asked,  “what  is  meant  by  ‘the  legislature?’
Does  it  mean  the  legislative  power  of  the  State,  which
would  include  a  convention  authorized  to  prescribe  fun-
damental  law;  or  does  it  mean  the  legislature  eo  nomine,
as  known  in  the  political  history  of  the  country?”    Id.,  at
47.  The  Committee  decided,  and  the  full  House  agreed,
that  “the  Legislature”  in  the  Elections  Clause  was  the
“legislature  eo  nomine”—the  legislature  by  that  name,  a
representative body.  Ibid.  That conclusion followed both
from  the  known  meaning  of  “the  Legislature”  at  the  time
of the framing and the many other uses of the word in the
Constitution that would not be compatible with a popular
convention.  Thus, “[w]here there is a conflict of authority
between  the  constitution  and  legislature  of  a  State  in
regard to fixing place of elections, the power of the legisla-
ture is paramount.”  Id., at 46; see California Democratic
Party  v.  Jones,  530  U. S.  567,  603,  and  n.  11  (2000)  (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (relying on Baldwin for its conclusion
that “the Elections Clause’s specific reference to ‘the Legis-
lature’ is not so broad as to encompass the general ‘legisla-
tive power of this State’ ”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

parcels.  Contrary to the Court’s portrayal, this is not a sce-
nario in which Congress allowed a tribe to “continue to ex-
ercise governmental functions over land” that it “no longer
own[ed]  communally.”  Ante,  at  11.   From  top  to  bottom,
these  statutes,  which  divested  the  Tribes  and  the  United
States of their interests while displacing tribal governance,
“strongly  suggest[ ]  that  Congress  meant  to  divest”  the
lands of reservation status.  Solem, 465 U. S., at 470.

Finally, having stripped the Creek Nation of its laws, its
powers of self-governance, and its land, Congress incorpo-
rated the Nation’s members into a new political community.
Congress made “every Indian” in the Oklahoma territory a
citizen of the United States in 1901—decades before confer-
ring citizenship on all native born Indians elsewhere in the
country.  Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 868, 31 Stat. 1447.  In the
Oklahoma  Enabling  Act  of  1906—the  gateway  to  state-
hood—Congress confirmed that members of the Five Tribes
would participate in equal measure alongside non-Indians
in the choice regarding statehood.  The Act gave Indians the
right to vote on delegates to a constitutional convention and
ultimately on the state constitution that the delegates pro-
posed.  §§2, 4, 34 Stat. 268, 271.  Fifteen members of the
Five Tribes were elected as convention delegates, many of
them  served  on  significant  committees,  and  a  member  of
the Chickasaw Nation even served as president of the con-
vention.  See Brief for Seventeen Oklahoma District Attor-
neys et al. as Amici Curiae 9–13.

The Enabling Act also ensured that Indians and non-In-
dians would be subject to uniform laws and courts.  It re-
placed Arkansas law, which had applied to all persons “ir-
respective of race,” 1897 Act, 30 Stat. 83, with the laws of
the adjacent Oklahoma Territory until the new state legis-
lature  provided  otherwise.  Enabling  Act  §§2,  13,  21,  34
Stat.  268–269,  275,  277–278;  see  Jefferson  v.  Fink,  247
U. S. 288, 294 (1918).  All of the pending cases in the terri-
torial courts arising under federal law were transferred to
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA. It contains legal arguments and references to statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024)

3

Syllabus

than one shot “by a single function of the trigger,” it would not do so
“automatically.”  Section 5845(b) specifies the precise action that must
“automatically” cause a weapon to fire “more than one shot”—a “single
function of the trigger.”  If something more than a “single function of
the trigger” is required to fire multiple shots, the weapon does not sat-
isfy the statutory definition.  Firing multiple shots using a semiauto-
matic rifle with a bump stock requires more than a single function of
the trigger.  A shooter must maintain forward pressure on the rifle’s
front grip with his nontrigger hand.  Without this ongoing manual in-
put,  a  semiautomatic  rifle  with  a  bump  stock  will  not  fire  multiple
shots.
   ATF counters that machineguns also require continuous manual in-
put from a shooter: The shooter must both engage the trigger and keep
it pressed down to continue shooting.  ATF argues there is no mean-
ingful difference between holding down the trigger of a traditional ma-
chinegun and maintaining forward pressure on the front grip of a sem-
iautomatic  rifle  with  a  bump  stock.    This  argument  ignores  that
Congress defined a machinegun by what happens “automatically” “by
a single function of the trigger.”  Simply pressing and holding the trig-
ger down on a fully automatic rifle is not manual input in addition to
a trigger’s function.  By contrast, pushing forward on the front grip of
a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock is not part of func-
tioning the trigger.
   Moreover, a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock is indistinguish-
able from the Ithaca Model 37 shotgun, a weapon the ATF concedes
cannot  fire  multiple  shots  “automatically.”    ATF  responds  that  a
shooter  is  less  physically  involved  with  operating  a  bump-stock
equipped  rifle  than operating  the  Model  37.    It explains that  once  a
shooter pulls the rifle’s trigger a single time, the bump stock harnesses
the  firearm’s  recoil  energy  in  a  continuous  back-and-forth  cycle  that
allows the shooter to attain continuous firing.  But, even if one aspect
of a weapon’s operation could be seen as “automatic,” that would not
mean the weapon “shoots . . . automatically more than one shot . . . by
a single function of the trigger.”  §5845(b) (emphasis added).  Pp. 14–
17.

(d) Abandoning the text, ATF attempts to shore up its position by
relying on the presumption against ineffectiveness.  That presumption
weighs  against  interpretations  of  a  statute  that  would  “rende[r]  the
law in a great measure nugatory, and enable offenders to elude its pro-
visions in the most easy manner.”  The Emily, 9 Wheat. 381, 389.  In
ATF’s view, Congress “restricted machineguns because they eliminate
the manual movements that a shooter would otherwise need to make
in order to fire continuously” at a high rate of fire, as bump stocks do.
Brief for Petitioners 40.  So, ATF reasons, concluding that bump stocks
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal argument, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court brief. It discusses the legal definition of a machine gun and whether bump stocks should be classified as such.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Court Brief Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

SACKETT v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

States” is so “broad and unqualified” that, if viewed in iso-
lation,  it  would  extend  to  all  water  in  the  United  States.
Brief for Respondents 32.  The EPA thus turns to the “sig-
nificant nexus” test in order to reduce the clash between its
understanding of “the waters of the United States” and the
term  defined  by  that  phrase,  i.e.,  “navigable  waters.”  As
discussed, however, the meaning of “waters” is more limited
than the EPA believes.  See supra, at 14.  And, in any event,
the CWA never mentions the “significant nexus” test, so the
EPA has no statutory basis to impose it.  See Rapanos, 547
U. S., at 755–756 (plurality opinion).

2

Second,  the  EPA’s  interpretation  gives  rise  to  serious
vagueness  concerns  in  light  of  the  CWA’s  criminal  penal-
ties.  Due process requires Congress to define penal statutes
“ ‘with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can un-
derstand  what  conduct  is  prohibited’ ”  and  “ ‘in  a  manner
that  does  not  encourage  arbitrary  and  discriminatory  en-
forcement.’ ”  McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576
(2016)  (quoting  Skilling  v.  United  States,  561  U. S.  358,
402–403 (2010)).  Yet the meaning of “waters of the United
States” under the EPA’s interpretation remains “hopelessly
indeterminate.”  Sackett, 566 U. S., at 133 (ALITO, J., con-
curring); accord, Hawkes Co., 578 U. S., at 602 (opinion of
Kennedy, J.).

The EPA contends that the only thing preventing it from
interpreting “waters of the United States” to “conceivably
cover  literally  every  body  of  water  in  the  country”  is  the
significant-nexus test.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 70–71; accord, Brief
for Respondents 32.  But the boundary between a “signifi-
cant” and an insignificant nexus is far from clear.  And to
add to the uncertainty, the test introduces another vague
concept—“similarly  situated”  waters—and  then  assesses
the  aggregate  effect  of  that  group  based  on  a  variety  of
open-ended factors that evolve as scientific understandings
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the "waters of the United States" definition within the Clean Water Act. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

871

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  08–11096.  Knight  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  1314.

No.  08–11097.  Lovett  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–11098.  Witham  v.  Christian  County,  Missouri,
et  al.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  286
Fed.  Appx.  960.

No.  08–11099.  Mondragon-Santiago  v.  United  States.
C. A. 5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 564 F. 3d 357.
No.  08–11100.  Wallace  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  384  Ill.  App.  3d  1091,  973
N.  E.  2d  1089.

No.  08–11101.  Plumlee  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  210.

No.  08–11102.  Townsend  v.  Knowles,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  1200.

No.  08–11103.  Bouman  v.  Robinson  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  523.

No.  08–11104.  Vaughn  v.  Runnels,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11106.  Carrillo  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11108.  Choiniere  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  517  F.  3d  967.

No.  08–11109.  Sealed  Petitioner  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–11110.  Gunter  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  6th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  551  F.  3d  472.

No.  08–11111.  Nelson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  321  Fed.  Appx.  904.

No. 08–11112.  Mitchell v. KDJM–FM et al.  C. A. 10th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.  Appx.  676.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions. It is not sequential narrative text and likely represents a legal document summary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N

Opinion of the Court

quired  to  follow  federally  prescribed  procedures  for  redis
tricting  unless  “the  legislature”  of  the  State  drew  district
lines.  E.g., Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 170, 12 Stat. 572; Act
of Jan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, §4, 31 Stat. 734.  In drafting the
1911 Act, Congress focused on the fact that several States
had  supplemented  the  representative  legislature  mode  of
lawmaking  with  a  direct  lawmaking  role  for  the  people,
through  the  processes  of  initiative  (positive  legislation  by
the electorate) and referendum (approval or disapproval of
legislation  by  the  electorate).    47  Cong.  Rec.  3508  (state
ment of Sen. Burton); see supra, at 3–5.  To accommodate
that  development,  the  1911  Act  eliminated  the  statutory
reference  to  redistricting  by  the  state  “legislature”  and
instead directed that, if a State’s apportionment of Repre
sentatives  increased,  the  State  should  use  the  Act’s  de
fault procedures for redistricting “until such State shall be
redistricted  in  the  manner  provided  by  the  laws  thereof.”
Ch. 5, §4, 37 Stat. 14 (emphasis added).19

Some  Members  of  Congress  questioned  whether  the
language  change  was  needed.
In  their  view,  existing
apportionment  legislation  (referring  to  redistricting  by  a
State’s “legislature”) “suffic[ed] to allow, whatever the law
of  the  State  may  be,  the  people  of  that  State  to  control
[redistricting].”    47  Cong.  Rec.  3507  (statement  of  Sen.

——————

19 The 1911 Act also required States to comply with certain federally
prescribed  districting  rules—namely,  that  Representatives  be  elected
“by  districts  composed  of  a  contiguous  and  compact  territory,  and
containing  as  nearly  as  practicable  an  equal  number  of  inhabitants,”
and  that  the  districts  “be  equal  to  the  number  of  Representatives  to
which [the] State may be entitled in Congress, no district electing more
than one Representative.”  Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, §§3–4, 37 Stat. 14.
When  a  State’s  apportionment  of  Representatives  remained  constant,
the  Act  directed  the  State  to  continue  using  its  pre-existing  districts
“until  [the]  State  shall  be  redistricted  as  herein  prescribed.”    See  §4,
ibid.  The 1911 Act did not address redistricting in the event a State’s
apportionment  of  Representatives  decreased,  likely  because  no  State
faced a decrease following the 1910 census.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n. It discusses the history and interpretation of federal law regarding redistricting.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES v. BETHUNE-HILL

Syllabus

The  State  itself  had  standing  to  press  this  appeal,  see  Diamond  v.
Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62, and could have designated agents to do so,
Hollingsworth,  570  U. S.,  at 710.    However,  the  State  did  not  desig-
nate  the  House  to  represent  its  interests  here.    Under  Virginia  law,
authority  and  responsibility for  representing  the  State’s interests in
civil  litigation  rest  exclusively  with  the  State’s  Attorney  General.
Virginia state courts permitted the House to intervene to defend leg-
islation  in  Vesilind  v.  Virginia  State  Bd.  of  Elections,  295  Va.  427,
813 S. E. 2d 739, but the House’s participation in Vesilind occurred in
the same defensive posture as did the House’s participation in earlier
phases of this case, when the House did not need to establish stand-
ing.  Moreover, the House pointed to nothing in the Vesilind litigation
suggesting  that  the  Virginia  courts  understood  the  House  to be  rep-
resenting the interests of the State itself.  Karcher v. May, 484 U. S.
72,  distinguished.    Throughout  this  litigation,  the  House  has  pur-
ported to represent only its own interests.  The House thus lacks au-
thority  to  displace  Virginia’s  Attorney  General  as  the  State’s  repre-
sentative.  Pp. 4–7.

(c) The House also lacks standing to pursue this appeal in its own
right.  This Court has never held that a judicial decision invalidating
a  state  law  as  unconstitutional  inflicts  a  discrete,  cognizable  injury
on each organ  of  government  that  participated  in  the  law’s  passage.
Virginia’s  Constitution  allocates  redistricting  authority  to  the  “Gen-
eral Assembly,” of which the House constitutes only a part.  That fact
distinguishes this case from Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona In-
dependent  Redistricting  Comm’n,  576  U. S.  ___,  where  Arizona’s
House  and  Senate—acting  together—had  standing  to  challenge  the
constitutionality  of  a  referendum  that  gave  redistricting  authority
exclusively to an independent commission.  The Arizona referendum
was also assailed on the ground that it permanently deprived the leg-
islative  plaintiffs  of  their  role  in  the  redistricting  process,  while  the
order  challenged  here  does  not  alter  the  General  Assembly’s  domi-
nant initiating and ongoing redistricting role.  Coleman v. Miller, 307
U. S.  433,  also  does  not  aid  the  House  here,  where  the  issue  is  the
constitutionality  of  a  concededly  enacted  redistricting  plan,  not  the
results of a legislative chamber’s poll or the validity of any counted or
uncounted  vote.    Redrawing  district  lines  indeed  may  affect  the
chamber’s  membership,  but  the  House  as  an  institution  has  no  cog-
nizable  interest  in  the  identity  of  its  members.    The  House  has  no
prerogative  to  select  its  own  members.    It  is  a  representative  body
composed of members chosen by the people.  Changes in its member-
ship brought about by the voting public thus inflict no cognizable in-
jury  on  the  House.    Sixty-seventh  Minnesota  State  Senate  v.  Beens,
406 U. S. 187, distinguished.  Nor does a court order causing legisla-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal syllabus, summarizing the arguments and holdings of a Supreme Court case. It is not the actual content of a book and is likely not meant to be read sequentially by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>