<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

27

KAGAN, J., dissenting

with this Court’s First Amendment law.  Abood provided a
workable  standard  for  courts  to  apply.  And  Abood  has
generated  enormous  reliance  interests.  The  majority  has
overruled  Abood  for  no  exceptional  or  special  reason,  but
because it never liked the decision.  It has overruled Abood
because it wanted to.

Because,  that  is,  it  wanted  to  pick  the  winning  side  in
what  should  be—and  until  now,  has  been—an  energetic
policy debate.  Some state and local governments (and the
constituents they serve) think that stable unions promote
healthy labor relations and thereby improve the provision
of  services  to  the  public.    Other  state  and  local  govern-
ments (and their constituents) think, to the contrary, that
strong  unions  impose  excessive  costs  and  impair  those
services.  Americans  have  debated  the  pros  and  cons  for
many  decades—in  large  part,  by  deciding  whether  to  use
fair-share  arrangements.  Yesterday,  22  States  were  on
one  side,  28  on  the  other  (ignoring  a  couple  of  in-
betweeners).  Today,  that  healthy—that  democratic—
debate  ends.  The  majority  has  adjudged  who  should
prevail.  Indeed,  the  majority  is  bursting  with  pride  over
what  it  has  accomplished:  Now  those  22  States,  it  crows,
“can  follow  the  model  of  the  federal  government  and  28
other States.”  Ante, at 47, n. 27.

And maybe most alarming, the majority has chosen the
winners  by  turning  the  First  Amendment  into  a  sword,
and  using  it  against  workaday  economic  and  regulatory
policy.  Today  is  not  the  first  time  the  Court  has  wielded
the First Amendment in such an aggressive way.  See, e.g.,
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra,
ante,  p.  ___  (invalidating  a  law  requiring  medical  and
counseling  facilities  to  provide  relevant  information  to
users);  Sorrell  v.  IMS  Health  Inc.,  564  U. S.  552  (2011)
(striking  down  a  law  that  restricted  pharmacies  from
selling various data).  And it threatens not to be the last.
Speech  is  everywhere—a  part  of  every  human  activity
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision, citing precedent and concerns about the implications for labor relations and the First Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
GORSUCH, J., concurring

recounted  above.  See,  e.g.,  397  F. Supp. 3d,  at  146  (“if  at
some  point  in  the  admissions  process  it  appears  that  a
group  is  notably  underrepresented  or  has  suffered  a  dra-
matic  drop  off  relative  to  the  prior  year,  the  [committee]
may decide to give additional attention to applications from
students within that group”); cf. ante, at 31–32, n. 7 (opin-
ion for the Court).

C

Throughout  this  litigation,  the  parties  have  spent  less

time contesting these facts than debating other matters.

For example, the parties debate how much of a role race
plays in admissions at Harvard and UNC.  Both schools in-
sist that they consider race as just one of many factors when
making admissions decisions in their self-described “holis-
tic” review of each applicant.  SFFA responds with trial ev-
idence showing that, whatever label the universities use to
describe  their  processes,  they  intentionally  consult  race
and, by design, their race-based tips and plusses benefit ap-
plicants of certain groups to the detriment of others.  See
Brief for Petitioner 20–35, 40–45.

The parties also debate the reasons both schools consult
race.  SFFA  observes  that,  in  the  1920s,  Harvard  began
moving  away  from  “test  scores”  and  toward  “plac[ing]
greater emphasis on character, fitness, and other subjective
criteria.”  Id., at 12–13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Harvard made this move, SFFA asserts, because President
A.  Lawrence  Lowell  and  other  university  leaders  had  be-
come “alarmed by the growing number of Jewish students
who were testing in,” and they sought some way to cap the
number  of  Jewish  students  without  “ ‘stat[ing]  frankly’ ”
that they were “ ‘directly excluding all [Jews] beyond a cer-
tain percentage.’ ”  Id., at 12; see also 3 App. in No. 20–1199,
pp. 1131–1133.  SFFA contends that Harvard’s current “ho-
listic”  approach  to  admissions  works  similarly  to  disguise
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific facts and evidence presented in the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

11

Opinion of the Court

the Court’s general approach to recognizing implied dam-
ages  remedies,  it  is  possible  that  the  analysis  in  the
Court’s  three  Bivens  cases  might  have  been  different  if
they  were  decided  today.    To  be  sure,  no  congressional
enactment  has  disapproved  of  these  decisions.    And  it
must  be  understood  that  this  opinion  is  not  intended  to
cast doubt on the continued force, or even the necessity, of
Bivens in the search-and-seizure context in which it arose.
Bivens  does  vindicate  the  Constitution  by  allowing  some
redress  for  injuries,  and  it  provides  instruction  and  guid-
ance  to  federal  law  enforcement  officers  going  forward.
The  settled  law  of  Bivens  in  this  common  and  recurrent
sphere  of  law  enforcement,  and  the  undoubted  reliance
upon  it  as  a  fixed  principle  in  the  law,  are  powerful  rea-
sons to retain it in that sphere.

Given  the  notable  change  in  the  Court’s  approach  to
recognizing  implied  causes  of  action,  however,  the  Court
has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a
“disfavored”  judicial  activity.
Iqbal,  556  U. S.,  at  675.
This  is  in  accord  with  the  Court’s  observation  that  it  has
“consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context
or  new  category  of  defendants.”  Correctional  Services
Corp.  v.  Malesko,  534  U. S.  61,  68  (2001).    Indeed,  the
Court has refused to do so for the past 30 years.

For  example,  the  Court  declined  to  create  an  implied
damages  remedy  in  the  following  cases:  a  First  Amend-
ment  suit  against  a  federal  employer,  Bush  v.  Lucas,  462
U. S.  367,  390  (1983);  a  race-discrimination  suit  against
military  officers,  Chappell  v.  Wallace,  462  U. S.  296,  297,
304–305  (1983);  a  substantive  due  process  suit  against
military  officers,  United  States  v.  Stanley,  483  U. S.  669,
671–672,  683–684  (1987);  a  procedural  due  process  suit
against Social Security officials, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487
U. S.  412,  414  (1988);  a  procedural  due  process  suit
against a federal agency for wrongful termination, FDIC v.
Meyer,  510  U. S.  471,  473–474  (1994);  an  Eighth  Amend-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the precedent of the Bivens case and its application in modern times. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it's not a table of contents, introductory paragraph, or other non-sequential text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxvii

Page
916
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lowell; Windham v.
939
Lu v. Christiani
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
939
Lu v. Harshbarger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965
Lucas v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919
Luman v. Dorsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
961
Luna-Herrera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910
Luna-Madellaga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
936
Lundahl, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Lyon Metal Products, Inc. v. California Bd. of Equalization . . . . .
959
Lyons v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952
M.; North Lawrence Community School Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
953
Ma v. Goetsch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
926
Machinists v. National Labor Relations Bd.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960
MacKall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
Madrid v. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Maher v. Long Island Univ.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
902
Malone v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951
Malpeso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
Mann v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Comm’n . . . . . . .
956
Mann v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Marin General Hospital; Barrier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
Markland v. Floyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marquez v. Florida Dept. of Corrections
Marsh v. Dallas Independent School Dist.
955
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marshall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,972
956
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marshall; Madrid v.
919
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marshall; Valenzuela Rodriguez v.
913
Martin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Martinez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
903
Martinez v. Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946
Martinez v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
Martinez v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956
Martinez; Munoz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960
Marutz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maryland; Booth v.
935
Maryland Dept. of Public Safety & Correctional Services; Amos v.
952
Mary M.; North Lawrence Community School Corp. v.
. . . . . . . .
971
Mason-Neubarth v. Dameron Hospital Assn.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Massachusetts; Garrity v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
919
Massachusetts Bar Counsel; Eisenhauer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Matrix Communications Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.
953
Maurice, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,966
951
Mausolf v. Babbitt

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

5

ALITO, J., concurring
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

to  elements,  and  the  “except  as  authorized”  introductory
phrase in §841(a)(1) is plainly not an element.

“The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is en-
trusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal
crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.”  Liparota v.
United States, 471 U. S. 419, 424 (1985).  See also Dixon v.
United States, 548 U. S. 1, 7 (2006).  But authorization to
dispense or distribute a controlled substance lacks the most
basic features of an element of an offense.  For one thing, it
is black-letter law that an indictment must allege “the ele-
ments of the offense charged.”  Hamling v. United States,
418 U. S. 87, 117 (1974).  So if lack of authorization were an
element,  it  would  be  necessary  to  allege  that  in  every
§841(a)(1) indictment.  But §885 says that it is not “neces-
sary for the United States to negative any exemption or ex-
ception set forth in [the relevant subchapter] in any . . . in-
dictment.”  Beyond that, the prosecution bears the burden
of  producing  evidence  with  respect  to  every  element  of  a
crime.  Patterson, 432 U. S., at 215.  But §885(a)(1) also pro-
vides that “the burden of going forward with the evidence
with  respect  to  any  such  exemption  or  exception  shall  be
upon  the  person  claiming  its  benefit.”    It  could  hardly  be

——————
States,  471  U. S.  419,  424  (1985);  see  also  United  States  v.  Davis,  588
U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 5) (“Only the people’s elected represent-
atives in the legislature are authorized to ‘make an act a crime’ ” (quoting
United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812))).  The mens rea canon
is legitimate when it is used to determine what elements Congress in-
tended  to  include  in  the  definition  of  an  offense.    See,  e.g.,  Staples  v.
United  States,  511  U. S.  600,  605  (1994)  (explaining  that  the  canon  is
founded  on  an  inference  of  congressional  intent).  But  applying  that
canon to override the intentions of Congress would be inconsistent with
the Constitution’s separation of powers.  Federal courts have no consti-
tutional authority to re-write the statutes Congress has passed based on
judicial views about what constitutes “sound” or “just” criminal law.  Cf.
X-Citement Video, 513 U. S., at 80–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
our mens rea canon precedents for “convert[ing a] rule of interpretation
into a rule of law” binding on Congress).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 597 U.S. ____ (2022).  It delves into the legal interpretation of  §841(a)(1) and related statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

45

THOMAS, J., concurring

broadly,  universities’  discriminatory  policies  burden  mil-
lions of applicants who are not responsible for the racial dis-
crimination  that  sullied  our  Nation’s  past.  That  is  why,
“[i]n  the  absence  of  special  circumstances,  the  remedy  for
de jure  segregation  ordinarily  should  not  include  educa-
tional  programs  for  students  who  were  not  in  school  (or
even alive) during the period of segregation.”  Jenkins, 515
U. S.,  at  137  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring).  Today’s  17-year-
olds, after all, did not live through the Jim Crow era, enact
or enforce segregation laws, or take any action to oppress or
enslave the victims of the past.  Whatever their skin color,
today’s youth simply are not responsible for instituting the
segregation of the 20th century, and they do not shoulder
the moral debts of their ancestors.  Our Nation should not
punish today’s youth for the sins of the past.

IV
Far from advancing the cause of improved race relations
in our Nation, affirmative action highlights our racial dif-
ferences with pernicious effect.  In fact, recent history re-
veals  a  disturbing  pattern:  Affirmative  action  policies  ap-
pear  to  have  prolonged  the  asserted  need  for  racial
discrimination.  Parties  and  amici  in  these  cases  report
that, in the nearly 50 years since Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, ra-
cial progress on campuses adopting affirmative action ad-
missions policies has stagnated, including making no mean-
ingful progress toward a colorblind goal since Grutter.  See
ante, at 21–22.  Rather, the legacy of Grutter appears to be
ever increasing and strident demands for yet more racially
oriented solutions.

A
It has become clear that sorting by race does not stop at
the admissions office.  In his Grutter opinion, Justice Scalia
criticized universities for “talk[ing] of multiculturalism and
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the arguments against affirmative action in university admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

prepared  to  recognize  as  reasonable,”  official  intrusion  into  that
sphere  generally  qualifies  as  a  search  and  requires  a  warrant  sup-
ported by probable cause.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (in-
ternal  quotation  marks  and  alterations  omitted).    The  analysis  re-
garding  which  expectations  of  privacy  are  entitled  to  protection  is
informed  by  historical  understandings  “of  what  was  deemed  an  un-
reasonable  search  and  seizure  when  [the  Fourth  Amendment]  was
adopted.”  Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149.  These Found-
ing-era understandings continue to inform this Court when applying
the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools.  See, e.g.,
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27.  Pp. 4–7.

(b) The  digital  data  at  issue—personal  location  information
maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing prec-
edents but lies at the intersection of two lines of cases.  One set ad-
dresses a person’s expectation of privacy in his physical location and
movements.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400 (five Jus-
tices concluding that privacy concerns would be raised by GPS track-
ing).  The other addresses  a person’s expectation of privacy in infor-
mation voluntarily turned over to third parties.  See United States v.
Miller,  425  U. S.  435  (no  expectation  of  privacy  in  financial  records
held by a bank), and Smith, 442 U. S. 735 (no expectation of privacy
in records of dialed telephone numbers conveyed to telephone compa-
ny).  Pp. 7–10.

(c) Tracking  a  person’s  past  movements  through  CSLI  partakes
of many of the qualities of GPS monitoring considered in Jones—it is
detailed,  encyclopedic,  and  effortlessly  compiled.    At  the  same  time,
however,  the  fact  that  the  individual  continuously  reveals  his  loca-
tion  to  his  wireless  carrier  implicates  the  third-party  principle  of
Smith and  Miller.    Given  the  unique  nature  of  cell-site  records,  this
Court declines to extend Smith and Miller to cover them.  Pp. 10–18.
(1) A  majority  of  the  Court  has  already  recognized  that  indi-
viduals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their
physical  movements.    Allowing  government  access  to  cell-site  rec-
ords—which “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of life,’ ” Riley v.
California, 573 U. S. ___, ___—contravenes that expectation.  In fact,
historical cell-site records present even greater privacy concerns than
the  GPS  monitoring considered  in Jones: They give  the Government
near perfect surveillance and allow it to travel back in time to retrace
a  person’s  whereabouts,  subject  only  to  the  five-year  retention  poli-
cies  of  most  wireless  carriers.    The  Government  contends  that  CSLI
data is less precise than GPS information, but it thought the data ac-
curate  enough  here  to  highlight  it  during  closing  argument  in  Car-
penter’s trial.  At any rate, the rule the Court adopts “must take ac-
count  of  more  sophisticated  systems  that  are  already  in  use  or  in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, specifically discussing the Carpenter v. United States case and its implications for privacy rights related to cell-site location information (CSLI).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

1

KAGAN, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 18–422, 18–726
_________________

18–422

ROBERT A. RUCHO, ET AL., APPELLANTS
v.
COMMON CAUSE, ET AL.; AND

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

18–726

LINDA H. LAMONE, ET AL., APPELLANTS
v.
O. JOHN BENISEK, ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

 [June 27, 2019]

 JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG,
join,

JUSTICE  BREYER,  and  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR
dissenting.

For  the  first  time  ever,  this  Court  refuses  to  remedy  a
constitutional  violation  because  it  thinks  the  task  beyond
judicial capabilities.

And not just any constitutional violation.  The partisan
gerrymanders in these cases deprived citizens of the most
fundamental  of  their  constitutional  rights:  the  rights  to
participate  equally  in  the  political  process,  to  join  with
others  to  advance  political  beliefs,  and  to  choose  their
political  representatives.    In  so  doing,  the  partisan  gerry-
manders  here  debased  and  dishonored  our  democracy,
turning  upside-down  the  core  American  idea  that  all
governmental  power  derives  from  the  people.  These  ger-
rymanders  enabled  politicians  to  entrench  themselves  in
office as against voters’ preferences.  They promoted parti-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It sets the stage for the argument and identifies the key issue (partisan gerrymandering).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

107

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered the main body text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

TURNER v. ROGERS

Syllabus

tion,” Turner’s imprisonment for up to 12 months, is “in its duration
too  short  to  be  fully  litigated”  through  the  state  courts  (and  arrive
here) prior to its “expiration.”  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U. S. 765, 774.  And there is a more than “reasonable” likelihood
that  Turner  will  again  be  “subjected  to  the  same  action”  because  he
has  frequently  failed  to  make  his  support  payments,  has  been  the
subject  of  several  civil  contempt  proceedings,  has  been  imprisoned
several  times,  and  is,  once  again,  the  subject  of  civil  contempt  pro-
ceedings for failure to pay.  DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, and
St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41, distinguished.  Pp. 5–7.

2. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not auto-
matically  require  the  State  to  provide  counsel  at  civil  contempt  pro-
ceedings to an indigent noncustodial parent who is subject to a child
support order, even if that individual faces incarceration.  In particu-
lar, that Clause does not require that counsel be provided where the
opposing parent or other custodian is not represented by counsel and
the  State  provides  alternative  procedural  safeguards  equivalent  to
adequate notice of the importance of the ability to pay, a fair oppor-
tunity  to  present,  and  to  dispute,  relevant  information,  and  express
court findings as to the supporting parent’s ability to comply with the
support order. Pp.  7–16.

(a) This  Court’s  precedents  provide  no  definitive  answer  to  the
question  whether  counsel  must  be  provided.    The  Sixth Amendment
grants an indigent criminal  defendant the right to counsel, see, e.g.,
United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 696, but does not govern civil
cases.  Civil  and  criminal  contempt  differ.    A  court  may  not  impose
punishment “in a civil contempt proceeding when it is clearly estab-
lished that the alleged contemnor is unable to comply with the terms
of  the  order.”  Hicks  v.  Feiock,  485  U. S.  624,  638,  n. 9.    And  once  a
civil  contemnor  complies  with  the  underlying  order,  he  is  purged  of
the contempt and is free.  Id., at 633.  The Due Process Clause allows
a State to provide fewer procedural protections in civil contempt pro-
ceedings than in a criminal case.  Id., at 637–641.  Cases directly con-
cerning a right to counsel in civil cases have found a presumption of
such a right “only” in cases involving incarceration, but have not held
that a right to counsel exists in all such cases.  See In re Gault, 387
U. S.  1;  Vitek  v.  Jones,  445  U. S.  480;  and  Lassiter  v.  Department  of
Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18.  Pp. 7–10.

(b) Because  a  contempt  proceeding  to  compel  support  payments
is civil, the question whether the “specific dictates of due process” re-
quire appointed counsel is determined by examining the “distinct fac-
tors”  this  Court  has  used  to  decide  what  specific  safeguards  are
needed  to  make  a  civil  proceeding  fundamentally  fair.    Mathews  v.
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335.  As relevant here those factors include
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi summarize the legal issues and holdings of a case, and are not typically considered the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

296

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Opinion of O’Connor, J.

48. Here, Erie’s ordinance is on its face a content-neutral
restriction on conduct. Even if the city thought that nude
dancing at clubs like Kandyland constituted a particularly
problematic instance of public nudity, the regulation is still
properly evaluated as a content-neutral restriction because
the interest in combating the secondary effects associated
with those clubs is unrelated to the suppression of the erotic
message conveyed by nude dancing.

We conclude that Erie’s asserted interest in combating the
negative secondary effects associated with adult entertain-
ment establishments like Kandyland is unrelated to the sup-
pression of the erotic message conveyed by nude dancing.
The ordinance prohibiting public nudity is therefore valid if
it satisﬁes the four-factor test from O’Brien for evaluating
restrictions on symbolic speech.

IV

Applying that standard here, we conclude that Erie’s ordi-
nance is justiﬁed under O’Brien. The ﬁrst factor of the
O’Brien test is whether the government regulation is within
the constitutional power of the government to enact. Here,
Erie’s efforts to protect public health and safety are clearly
within the city’s police powers. The second factor is
whether the regulation furthers an important or substantial
government interest. The asserted interests of regulating
conduct through a public nudity ban and of combating the
harmful secondary effects associated with nude dancing are
undeniably important. And in terms of demonstrating that
such secondary effects pose a threat, the city need not “con-
duct new studies or produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities” to demonstrate the prob-
lem of secondary effects, “so long as whatever evidence the
city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the
problem that the city addresses.” Renton v. Playtime The-
atres, Inc., supra, at 51–52. Because the nude dancing at
Kandyland is of the same character as the adult entertain-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the case of Erie v. Pap's A.M. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a public nudity ordinance and its application to adult entertainment establishments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1459
_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JUSTIN
EUGENE TAYLOR

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 21, 2022]

JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting.

  As JUSTICE THOMAS clearly shows, the offense for which
respondent Justin Taylor was convicted constituted a “vio-
lent felony” in the ordinary sense of the term.  Taylor and
an accomplice met with Martin Silvester for the ostensible
purpose of selling him marijuana, but unbeknownst to Sil-
vester, Taylor and his accomplice did not intend to complete
the  sale.    Instead,  they  had  agreed  to  threaten  Silvester
with  a  9-millimeter  pistol  and  demand  that  he  hand  over
his money.  When Silvester refused to comply with their de-
mand, Taylor’s accomplice shot Silvester, and he died the
next day.  Taylor was convicted of using and carrying a fire-
arm  during,  and  in  relation  to,  a  crime  of  violence,  18
U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(A).  That conviction was based on a pred-
icate act of attempted robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act,
18 U. S. C. §1951(a).

The Court holds that this violent (and, indeed, deadly) of-
fense did not constitute a “crime of violence” under the tech-
nical definition of that term in §924(c)(3)(A).  I agree with
JUSTICE  THOMAS  that  our  cases  involving  §924(c)(3)(A)
have veered off into fantasy land.1  But if the Court is going

——————

1 The major reason for this excursion was the adoption and spread of
the  so-called  categorical  approach.    Although  the  Court  originally
adopted the “categorical approach” in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S.
575 (1990), for other reasons, the major impetus for the expansion of that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito.  Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain the actual legal reasoning and arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

clix

Williams v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
844,

856,858,861,865,870,895,899,905,908,920,928,929,936,961,976,
1036,1058,1147

1122

Williams v. Virginia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Williams v. William Beaumont Hospital  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  870,1065

905

Williams v. Wolfenbarger  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
875

Williamsburg Regional Hospital; Moore v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
877

Williams Controls, Inc. v. Cuesta  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
810

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.
1003

Willis v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1025,1139

Wills v. Potter
834

Wilson v. Belleque  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

Wilson; Blalock v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
847

Wilson v. Caldwell  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Wilson v. Curiel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1010

Wilson; Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v.  . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  884,1139

Wilson; Gruff v.
847

Wilson v. Guthria  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Wilson v. Hauck  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Wilson v. Haws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
894

Wilson; Heinemann v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  846,1065

Wilson v. Simpson
902

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wilson v. Smith
955

Wilson v. Spencer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909

Wilson v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897,

Wilson v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
899,908,919,927,975,1003,1060,1083,1117,1132,1134

Wilson; Watts v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1155

Windrix v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
929

Wingo v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1156

Winnett v. Saline County Jail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Winns, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
814

Winns v. U. S. District Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
872

Winstead v. New Jersey  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
967

Wion v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1116

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wirsing v. United States
926

Wisconsin v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1145

Wisconsin; Jacobs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
851

Wisconsin; Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
860

Wisconsin; McClaren v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

886

Wisconsin; Voigt v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Wisconsin; Wolf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wise v. Floyd  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1033,1141

871

Witham v. Christian County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

391

Scalia, J., concurring

In passing, the dissent also claims that the Court’s concep
tion of corruption is unhistorical.  The Framers “would have
been appalled,”  it says,  by the evidence  of corruption  in the
congressional  ﬁndings  supporting  the  Bipartisan  Campaign
Reform  Act  of  2002.  Post,  at  451–452.  For  this  proposi
tion, the dissent cites a law-review article arguing that “cor
ruption” was originally understood to include “moral decay”
and  even  actions  taken  by  citizens  in  pursuit  of  private
rather  than  public  ends.  Teachout,  The  Anti-Corruption
Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 373, 378 (2009).  It is hard
to see how this has anything to do with what sort of corrup
tion  can  be  combated  by  restrictions  on  political  speech.
Moreover,  if  speech  can  be  prohibited  because,  in  the  view
of  the  Government,  it  leads  to  “moral  decay”  or  does  not
serve  “public  ends,”  then  there  is  no  limit  to  the  Govern
ment’s censorship power.

The  dissent  says  that  when  the  Framers  “constitutional
ized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was
the  free  speech  of  individual  Americans  that  they  had  in
mind.”  Post, at 428.  That is no doubt true.  All the provi
sions  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  set  forth  the  rights  of  individual

press” to mean, not everyone’s right to speak or publish, but rather every
one’s  right  to  speak  or  the  institutional  press’s  right  to  publish.  No  one
thought  that  is  what  it  meant.  Patriot  Noah  Webster’s  1828  dictionary
contains, under the word “press,” the following entry:

“Liberty of the press, in civil policy, is the free right of publishing books,
pamphlets or papers without previous restraint; or the unrestrained right
which every citizen enjoys of publishing his thoughts and opinions, subject
only  to  punishment  for  publishing  what  is  pernicious  to  morals  or  to  the
peace  of  the  state.”  2  American  Dictionary  of  the  English  Language
(1828) (reprinted 1970).

As the Court’s opinion describes, ante, at 352, our jurisprudence agrees

with Noah Webster and contradicts the dissent.

“The liberty of the press is not conﬁned to newspapers and periodicals.
It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaﬂets. . . . The press in its histori
cal connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a ve
hicle of information and opinion.”  Lovell v.  City of Grifﬁn, 303 U. S. 444,
452 (1938).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Scalia in a case decided by the Supreme Court. It delves into the interpretation of the First Amendment and the concept of "corruption" in the context of campaign finance.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

After the Tribe filed a petition for certiorari, this Court
called  for  the  views  of  the  Solicitor  General.   The  United
States argued that the Fifth Circuit’s understanding of the
Restoration Act took a wrong turn in Ysleta I and urged us
to correct the error.  See Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 1.  Ultimately, we agreed to take up
this case to consider that question.  595 U. S. ___ (2021).

II
A
Before us, the parties offer two very different accounts of
the Restoration Act.  The State, in its only argument in sup-
port of regulatory jurisdiction over the Tribe’s gaming ac-
tivities, reads the Act as effectively subjecting the Tribe to
the entire body of Texas gaming laws and regulations, just
as the Fifth Circuit held in Ysleta I.  The Tribe understands
the Act to bar it from offering only those gaming activities
the  State  fully  prohibits.    Consistent  with  Cabazon,  the
Tribe submits, if Texas merely regulates a game like bingo,
it may offer that game—and it may do so subject only to the
limits found in federal law and its own law, not state law.

To resolve the parties’ disagreement, we turn to § 107 of
the  Restoration  Act,  where  Congress  directly  addressed
gaming on the Tribe’s lands and said this:

“SEC. 107.  GAMING ACTIVITIES.
(a)  IN GENERAL.—All  gaming  activities  which  are  prohib-
ited by the laws of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited
on the reservation and on lands of the tribe.  Any violation
of the prohibition provided in this subsection shall be sub-
ject to the same civil and criminal penalties that are pro-
vided by the laws of the State of Texas.  The provisions of
this  subsection  are  enacted  in  accordance  with  the  tribe’s
request in Tribal Resolution No. T.C.–02–86 which was ap-
proved and certified on March 12, 1986.

(b) NO STATE REGULATORY JURISDICTION.—Nothing in this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically dealing with the Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas case. It discusses the Restoration Act and its implications for tribal gaming activities. The text is sequential and provides context for the legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

The  desegregation  cases  that  followed  Brown  confirm
that  the  ultimate  goal  of  that  seminal  decision  was  to
achieve a system of integrated schools that ensured racial
equality of opportunity, not to impose a formalistic rule of
race-blindness.  In  Green  v.  School  Bd.  of  New  Kent  Cty.,
391 U. S. 430 (1968), for example, the Court held that the
New Kent County School Board’s “freedom of choice” plan,
which allegedly allowed “every student, regardless of race,
. . . ‘freely’ [to] choose the school he [would] attend,” was in-
sufficient to effectuate “the command of [Brown].”  Id., at
437,  441–442.  That  command,  the  Court  explained,  was
that schools dismantle “well-entrenched dual systems” and
transition “to a unitary, nonracial system of public educa-
tion.”  Id., at 435–436.  That the board “opened the doors of
the  former  ‘white’  school  to  [Black]  children  and  the
[‘Black’] school to white children” on a race-blind basis was
not enough.  Id., at 437.  Passively eliminating race classi-
fications did not suffice when de facto segregation persisted.
Id.,  at  440–442  (noting  that  85%  of  Black  children  in  the
school system were still attending an all-Black school).  In-
stead, the board was “clearly charged with the affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert
to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch.”  Id., at 437–438.  Affirmative
steps, this Court held, are constitutionally necessary when
mere formal neutrality cannot achieve Brown’s promise of
racial equality.  See Green, 391 U. S., at 440–442; see also
North  Carolina  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Swann,  402  U. S.  43,  45–46
(1971)  (holding  that  North  Carolina  statute  that  forbade
the use of race in school busing “exploits an apparently neu-
tral  form  to  control  school  assignment  plans  by  directing
that  they  be  ‘colorblind’;  that  requirement,  against  the
background of segregation, would render illusory the prom-
ise  of  Brown”);  Dayton  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Brinkman,  443  U. S.
526, 538 (1979) (school board “had to do more than abandon
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the history of desegregation cases and the Court's interpretation of Brown v. Board of Education.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

BREYER, J., dissenting

The Act requires these medical professionals to disclose
information  about  the  possibility  of  abortion  (including
potential financial help) that is as likely helpful to grant-
ing  “informed  consent”  as  is  information  about  the  possi-
bility of adoption and childbirth (including potential finan-
cial  help).  That  is  why  I  find  it  impossible  to  drive  any
meaningful legal wedge between the law, as interpreted in
Casey, and the law as it should be applied in this case.  If
the  law  in  Casey  regulated  speech  “only  ‘as  part  of  the
practice of medicine,’ ” ante, at 11 (quoting Casey, supra, at
884), so too here.

The majority contends  that the  disclosure here is unre-
lated  to  a  “medical  procedure,”  unlike  that  in  Casey,  and
so the State has no reason to inform a woman about alter-
natives  to  childbirth  (or,  presumably,  the  health  risks  of
childbirth).  Ante,  at  11.    Really?  No  one  doubts  that
choosing an abortion is a medical procedure that involves
certain health risks.  See Whole Woman’s Health v. Heller-
stedt, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 30) (identifying
the  mortality  rate  in  Texas  as  1  in  120,000  to  144,000
abortions).  But  the  same  is  true  of  carrying  a  child  to
term  and  giving  birth.  That  is  why  prenatal  care  often
involves  testing  for  anemia,  infections,  measles,  chicken
pox, genetic disorders, diabetes, pneumonia, urinary tract
infections, preeclampsia, and hosts of other medical condi-
tions.  Childbirth itself, directly or through  pain manage-
ment,  risks  harms  of  various  kinds,  some  connected  with
caesarean  or  surgery-related  deliveries,  some  related  to
more  ordinary  methods  of  delivery.  Indeed,  nationwide
“childbirth is 14 times more likely than abortion to result
in” the woman’s death.  Ibid.  Health considerations do not
favor  disclosure  of  alternatives  and  risks  associated  with
the latter but not those associated with the former.

In  any  case,  informed  consent  principles  apply  more
broadly  than  only  to  discrete  “medical  procedures.”  Pre-
scription  drug  labels  warn  patients  of  risks  even  though
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding informed consent in the context of abortion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

184

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Breyer, J., dissenting

In addition, at least one post-1938 statute reveals quite a
different congressional intent than the majority infers. See
note following 21 U. S. C. § 321 (1994 ed., Supp. III) (FDA
Modernization Act of 1997) (law “shall [not] be construed to
affect the question of whether the [FDA] has any authority
to regulate any tobacco product,” and “[s]uch authority, if
any, shall be exercised under the [FDCA] as in effect on the
day before the date of [this] enactment”). Consequently, it
appears that the only interpretation that can reconcile all of
the subsequent statutes is the inference that Congress did
not intend, either explicitly or implicitly, for its later laws to
answer the question of the scope of the FDA’s jurisdictional
authority. See 143 Cong. Rec. S8860 (Sept. 5, 1997) (the
Modernization Act will “not interfere or substantially nega-
tively affect any of the FDA tobacco authority”).

The majority’s historical perspective also appears to be
shaped by language in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act (FCLAA), 79 Stat. 282, 15 U. S. C. § 1331
et seq. See ante, at 148–149. The FCLAA requires manu-
facturers to place on cigarette packages, etc., health warn-
ings such as the following:

“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking
Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And
May Complicate Pregnancy.” 15 U. S. C. § 1333(a).

The FCLAA has an express pre-emption provision which
says that “[n]o statement relating to smoking and health,
other than the statement required by [this Act], shall be re-
quired on any cigarette package.” § 1334(a). This pre-
emption clause plainly prohibits the FDA from requiring on
“any cigarette package” any other “statement relating to
smoking and health,” but no one contends that the FDA has
failed to abide by this prohibition. See, e. g., 61 Fed. Reg.
44399 (1996) (describing the other regulatory prescriptions).
Rather, the question is whether the FCLAA’s pre-emption
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to specific statutes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

Opinion of the Court

“objective honest-effort standard.”  Brief for United States
16–17; cf. post, at 13 (concurrence arguing that doctors can
defend  against  a  §841  prosecution  by  proving  that  they
have “act[ed] in subjective good faith in prescribing drugs”).
That is to say, once a defendant meets his or her burden of
production, the Government can convict “by proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] did not even make
an  objectively  reasonable  attempt  to  ascertain  and  act
within  the  bounds  of  professional  medicine.”    Brief  for
United States 16.

We  are  not  convinced.   For  one  thing,  §841,  like  many
criminal statutes, uses the familiar mens rea words “know-
ingly or intentionally.”  It nowhere uses words such as “good
faith,” “objectively,” “reasonable,” or “honest effort.”

For another, the Government’s standard would turn a de-
fendant’s criminal liability on the mental state of a hypo-
thetical “reasonable” doctor, not on the mental state of the
defendant himself or herself.  Cf. id., at 24 (Government ar-
guing that “a physician can violate Section 841(a) when he
makes  no  objectively  reasonable  attempt  to  conform  his
conduct to something that his fellow doctors would view as
medical care” (emphasis added)).

We have rejected analogous suggestions in other criminal
contexts.  In Elonis, for example, we considered the mental
state applicable to a statute that criminalized threatening
communications but contained no explicit mens rea require-
ment.  575 U. S., at 732.  The Government argued that the
statute required proof that a reasonable person would find
the communications threatening.  Id., at 738–739.  But, we
said, “[h]aving liability turn on whether a ‘reasonable per-
son’ regards the communication as a threat—regardless of
what the defendant thinks—reduces culpability on the all-
important element of the crime to negligence.”  Id., at 738
(some internal quotation marks omitted).  “[A]nd,” we em-
phasized, “we ‘have long been reluctant to infer that a neg-
ligence standard was intended in criminal statutes.’ ”  Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the interpretation of a criminal statute (likely §841) and the required mens rea (guilty mind) for a conviction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

SMITH v. ARIZONA

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

that basis evidence is not admitted for its truth and so in-
structs the jury, where does the Court discern a Confronta-
tion Clause problem?

The only possible explanation is that the Court believes
that juries are incapable of following such an  instruction,
but that conclusion is inconsistent with commonplace trial
practice  and  with  a  whole  string  of  our  decisions.    It  is  a
routine  matter  for  trial  judges  to  instruct  juries  that  evi-
dence  is  admitted  for  only  a  limited  purpose.    This  Court
acknowledged as much in United States v. Abel, 469 U. S.
45 (1984), when it noted that “there is no rule of evidence
which provides that testimony admissible for one purpose
and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby rendered
inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case.”  Id., at 56.  In
such instances, courts use limiting instructions.  See Fed.
Rule  Evid.  105;  1  R.  Mosteller  et al.,  McCormick  on  Evi-
dence §59, pp. 481–483 (8th ed. 2020).

And  this  Court  has  repeatedly  upheld  that  practice—
even  in  “situations  with  potentially  life-and-death  stakes
for  defendants”  and  even  with  respect  to  statements  that
are “some of the most compelling evidence of guilt available
to a jury,” Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 646–647
(2023).  These  decisions  “credi[t]  jurors  by  refusing  to  as-
sume that they are either ‘too ignorant to comprehend, or
were too unmindful of their duty to respect, instructions’ of
the court.”  Id., at 647.  Indeed, we have described the as-
sumption  “ ‘that  juries  will  follow  the  instructions  given
them by the trial judge’ ” as “ ‘crucial’ ” to “the system of trial
by  jury.”  Marshall  v.  Lonberger,  459  U. S.  422,  438,  n. 6
(1983)  (quoting  Parker  v.  Randolph,  442  U. S.  62,  73
(1979)); accord, Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 324–325,
n. 9 (1985).

A  brief  survey  of  prior  decisions  shows  how  firmly  this
Court has adhered to that practice.  In Harris v. New York,
401  U. S.  222  (1971),  the  Court  held  that  statements  ob-
tained from a defendant in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of *Smith v. Arizona*. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the Confrontation Clause and the admissibility of evidence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE

Syllabus

may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote.”  §21083(a)(4)(A)
(emphasis added).
  Respondents  contend  that  Ohio’s  process  for  removing  voters  on
change-of-residence grounds violates this federal law.  The Ohio pro-
cess at issue relies on the failure to vote for two years as a rough way
of identifying voters who may have moved.  It sends these nonvoters
a  preaddressed,  postage  prepaid  return  card,  asking  them  to  verify
that they still reside at the same address.  Voters who do not return
the card and fail to vote in any election for four more years are pre-
sumed to have moved and are removed from the rolls.

Held:  The  process  that  Ohio  uses  to  remove  voters  on  change-of-
residence grounds does not violate the Failure-to-Vote Clause or any
other part of the NVRA.  Pp. 8–21.

(a) Ohio’s  law  does  not  violate  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause.    Pp. 8–

16.

(1) Ohio’s  removal  process  follows  subsection  (d)  to  the  letter:  It
does  not  remove  a  registrant  on  change-of-residence  grounds  unless
the  registrant  is  sent  and  fails  to  mail  back  a  return  card  and  then
fails to vote for an additional four years.  See §20507(d)(1)(B).  Pp. 8–
9.

(2) Nonetheless,  respondents  argue  that  Ohio’s  process  violates
subsection (b)’s Failure-to-Vote Clause by using a person’s failure to
vote  twice  over:  once  as  the  trigger  for  sending  return  cards  and
again  as  one  of  the  two  requirements  for  removal.    But  Congress
could  not  have  meant  for  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause  to  cannibalize
subsection (d) in that way.  Instead, the Failure-to-Vote Clause, both
as originally enacted in the NVRA and as amended by HAVA, simply
forbids the use of nonvoting as the sole criterion for removing a regis-
trant, and Ohio does not use it that way.  The phrase “by reason of”
in  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause  denotes  some  form  of  causation,  see
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167, 176, and in con-
text sole causation is the only type of causation that harmonizes the
Failure-to-Vote Clause and subsection (d).  Any other reading would
mean that a State that follows subsection (d) nevertheless can violate
the Failure-to-Vote Clause.  When Congress enacted HAVA, it made
this  point  explicit  by  adding  to  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause  an  expla-
nation of how the clause is to be read, i.e., in a way that does not con-
tradict subsection (d).  Pp. 9–12.

(3) Respondents’  and  the  dissent’s  alternative  reading  is  incon-
sistent with both the text of the Failure-to-Vote Clause and the clari-
fication  of  its  meaning  in  §21083(a)(4).    Among  other  things,  their
reading  would  make  HAVA’s  new  language  worse  than  redundant,
since  no  sensible  person  would  read  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause  as
prohibiting  what  subsections  (c)  and  (d)  expressly  allow.    Nor  does
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically the syllabus of a Supreme Court case.  It summarizes the case, the arguments, and the court's holding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017)

3

Opinion of the Court

for  service  of  documents  from  other  countries.”  Schlunk,
supra,  at  698.    When  a  central  authority  receives  an  ap
propriate request, it must serve the documents or arrange
for  their  service,  Art.  5,  and  then  provide  a  certificate  of
service, Art. 6.

Submitting a request to a central authority is not, how
ever, the only method of service approved by the Conven
tion.  For  example,  Article  8  permits  service  through
diplomatic  and  consular  agents;  Article  11  provides  that
any  two  states  can  agree  to  methods  of  service  not  other
wise  specified  in  the  Convention;  and  Article  19  clarifies
that the Convention does not preempt any internal laws of
its  signatories  that  permit  service  from  abroad  via  meth
ods not otherwise allowed by the Convention.

At issue in this case is Article 10 of the Convention, the

English text of which reads as follows:

“Provided  the  State  of  destination  does  not  object,

the present Convention shall not interfere with—

“(a)  the  freedom  to  send  judicial  documents,  by

postal channels, directly to persons abroad,

“(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other
competent persons of the State of  origin to effect ser
vice of judicial documents directly through the judicial
officers,  officials  or  other  competent  persons  of  the
State of destination,

“(c)  the  freedom  of  any  person  interested  in  a  judi
cial  proceeding  to  effect  service  of  judicial  documents
directly through the judicial officers, officials or other
competent  persons  of  the  State  of  destination.”    20
U. S. T., at 363.

Articles  10(b)  and  10(c),  by  their  plain  terms,  address
additional  methods  of  service  that  are  permitted  by  the
Convention  (unless  the  receiving  state  objects).  By  con
trast,  Article  10(a)  does  not  expressly  refer  to  “service.”
The  question  in  this  case  is  whether,  despite  this  textual
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing Article 10 of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters.  It delves into the interpretation of the article and its implications for service of documents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Syllabus

law”  to  incorporate  any  international  norm,  including  international
human rights law, rather than merely the international law of expro-
priation.  The text of the FSIA’s expropriation exception, however, sup-
ports Germany’s reading.  The exception places repeated emphasis on
property  and  property-related  rights,  while  injuries  and  acts  associ-
ated with violations of human rights law, such as genocide, are notably
lacking—a remarkable omission if the provision was intended to pro-
vide relief for atrocities such as the Holocaust.  A statutory phrase con-
cerning property rights most sensibly references the international law
governing property rights, rather than the law of genocide.  The heirs’
position  would  arguably  force  courts  themselves  to  violate  interna-
tional law not only by ignoring the domestic takings rule, but also by
derogating international law’s preservation of sovereign immunity for
violations of human rights law.  Germany’s interpretation of the ex-
ception is also more consistent with the FSIA’s express goal of codify-
ing the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, 28 U. S. C. §1602, un-
der which immunity extends to a sovereign’s public, but not private,
acts.  It would destroy the Act’s distinction between private and public
acts were the Court to subject all manner of sovereign public acts to
judicial scrutiny under the FSIA by transforming the expropriation ex-
ception into an all-purpose jurisdictional hook for adjudicating human
rights violations.  Pp. 8–12.

(3) Other FSIA provisions confirm Germany’s position.  The heirs’
approach  would  circumvent  the  reticulated  boundaries  Congress
placed  in  the  FSIA  with  regard  to  bringing  claims  asserting  human
rights violations.  One FSIA exception, for example, provides jurisdic-
tion over claims “in which money damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property,”
but only where the relevant conduct “occurr[ed] in the United States.”
§1605(a)(5).  And the FSIA’s terrorism exception eliminates sovereign
immunity for state sponsors of terrorism, but only for certain human
rights claims, brought by certain victims, against certain defendants.
§§1605A(a),(h).  Such restrictions would be of little consequence if hu-
man rights abuses could be packaged as violations of property rights
and thereby brought within the expropriation exception.  Pp. 12–13.

(b) The heirs’ counterarguments cannot overcome the text, context,
and history of the expropriation exception.  They claim that the 2016
Foreign  Cultural  Exchange  Jurisdictional  Immunity  Clarification
Act—which amends the FSIA to explain that participation in specified
“art exhibition activities” does not qualify as “commercial activity” un-
der  the  expropriation  exception,    §1605(h)—demonstrates  that  Con-
gress anticipated that Nazi-era claims could be adjudicated under the
exception.  Congress’s effort to preserve sovereign immunity in a nar-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal argument or excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and its application to claims related to Nazi-era property. It delves into the interpretation of the expropriation exception within the FSIA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Argument/Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
38

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER

STEVENS, J., dissenting

firelock”  and  other  specified  weaponry.35  Ibid.    The  stat
ute  is  significant,  for  it  confirmed  the  way  those  in  the
founding  generation  viewed  firearm  ownership:  as  a  duty
linked  to  military  service.  The  statute  they  enacted,
however, “was virtually ignored for more than a century,”
and was finally repealed in 1901.  See Perpich, 496 U. S.,
at 341.

The postratification history of the Second Amendment is
strikingly  similar.    The  Amendment  played  little  role  in
any legislative debate about the civilian use of firearms for
most of the 19th century, and it made few appearances in
the decisions of this Court.  Two 19th-century cases, how
ever, bear mentioning.

In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876), the
Court  sustained  a  challenge  to  respondents’  convictions
under  the  Enforcement  Act  of  1870  for  conspiring  to  de
prive any individual of “ ‘any right or privilege granted or
secured  to  him  by  the  constitution  or  laws  of  the  United
States.’ ”   Id., at 548.  The Court wrote, as to counts 2 and
10 of respondents’ indictment:

“The right there specified is that of ‘bearing arms for a
lawful  purpose.’  This  is  not  a  right  granted  by  the
Constitution.  Neither is it in any manner dependent
on  that  instrument  for  its  existence.  The  second
amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but
this,  as  has  been  seen,  means  no  more  than  that  it
shall not be infringed by Congress.  This is one of the
amendments  that  has  no  other  effect  than  to  restrict
the powers of the national government.”  Id., at 553.

——————

35 The  additional  specified  weaponry  included:  “a  sufficient  bayonet
and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box therein
to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his
musket  or  firelock,  each  cartridge  to  contain  a  proper  quantity  of
powder and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-
horn,  twenty  balls  suited  to  the  bore  of  his  rifle  and  a  quarter  of  a
pound of powder.”  1 Stat. 271.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Stevens in the case District of Columbia v. Heller. It discusses the history and interpretation of the Second Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N

GORSUCH, J., concurring

then  the  bakers’  objection  in  Mr.  Jack’s  case  must  be
“inextricably  tied”  to  one  as  well.  For  just  as  cakes  cele-
brating  same-sex  weddings  are  (usually)  requested  by
persons of a particular sexual orientation, so too are cakes
expressing  religious  opposition  to  same-sex  weddings
(usually)  requested  by  persons  of  particular  religious
faiths.  In both cases the bakers’ objection would (usually)
result  in  turning  down  customers  who  bear  a  protected
characteristic.    In  the  end,  the  Commission’s  decisions
simply  reduce  to  this:  it  presumed  that  Mr.  Phillip  har-
bored an intent to discriminate against a protected class in
light  of  the  foreseeable  effects  of  his  conduct,  but  it  de-
clined to presume the same intent in Mr. Jack’s case even
though  the  effects  of  the  bakers’  conduct  were  just  as
foreseeable.    Underscoring  the  double  standard,  a  state
appellate  court  said  that  “no  such  showing”  of  actual
“animus”—or  intent  to  discriminate  against  persons  in  a
protected  class—was  even  required  in  Mr.  Phillips’s  case.
370 P. 3d, at 282.

The  Commission  cannot  have  it  both  ways.  The  Com-
mission  cannot  slide  up  and  down  the  mens  rea  scale,
picking a mental state standard to suit its tastes depend-
ing  on  its  sympathies.    Either  actual  proof  of  intent  to
discriminate  on  the  basis  of  membership  in  a  protected
class  is  required  (as  the  Commission  held  in  Mr.  Jack’s
case), or it is sufficient to “presume” such intent from the
knowing  failure  to  serve  someone  in  a  protected  class  (as
the Commission held in Mr. Phillips’s case).  Perhaps the
Commission  could  have  chosen  either  course  as  an  initial
matter.  But  the  one  thing  it  can’t  do  is  apply  a  more
generous  legal  test  to  secular  objections  than  religious
ones.  See  Church  of  Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  508  U. S.,  at
543–544.  That  is  anything  but  the  neutral  treatment  of
religion.

The  real  explanation  for  the  Commission’s  discrimina-
tion soon comes clear, too—and it does anything but help
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding a case involving a baker's refusal to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC.

Opinion of GORSUCH, J.

as  here,  administrative  patent  judges  (APJs)—sit  on  a
panel to decide whether to cancel a patent.  §6(c).  After the
three-member  panel  issues  its  decision,  a  party  may  seek
rehearing  from  another  three-member  panel.  Ibid.    But
only a PTAB panel—and no other official within the Execu-
tive  Branch—may  grant  rehearing.    Ibid.   If  that  fails,  a
losing party’s only recourse is to seek judicial review in the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reviews the
PTAB’s  factual  findings  under  the  deferential  substantial
evidence  standard  of  review.  See  §319;  Oil  States,  584
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4).

Under this statutory arrangement, APJs are executive of-
ficers accountable to no one else in the Executive Branch.
A panel of bureaucrats wields unreviewable power to take
vested  property  rights.    This  design  may  hold  its  ad-
vantages for some.  Often enough, the Director of the Patent
and Trademark Office and the President may be happy to
wash their hands of these decisions.  But by breaking the
chain of dependence, the statutory scheme denies individu-
als the right to be subjected only to lawful exercises of ex-
ecutive power that can ultimately be controlled by a Presi-
dent  accountable  to  “the  supreme  body,  namely, . . .  the
people.”

*

The real question here concerns what to do about it.  In
Part III of its opinion, the Court invokes severability doc-
trine.  Ante, at 19–22.  It “sever[s]” Congress’s statutory di-
rection that PTAB decisions may not be reviewed by the Di-
rector of the Patent Office—in that way reconnecting APJs
to the chain of command and subjecting their decisions to a
superior who is, in turn, ultimately accountable to the Pres-
ident.  See ibid.

I don’t question that we might proceed this way in some
cases.  Faced with an application of a statute that violates
the Constitution, a court might look to the text of the law in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case *Arthrex, Inc. v. United States*. It delves into the structure of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and its potential constitutional implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Syllabus

that a defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical
force.  But while many who commit the crime of attempted Hobbs Act
robbery do use, attempt to  use, or threaten to use force, the govern-
ment’s problem is that no element of attempted Hobbs Act robbery re-
quires the government to prove such facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
The government maintains that anyone who takes a substantial step
toward completing Hobbs Act robbery always or categorically poses a
“threatened  use”  of  force  because  the  word  “threat”  can  be  used  to
speak of an abstract risk.  The government submits that the elements
clause uses the term to require only an objective, if uncommunicated,
threat  to  community  peace  and  order.    But  when  Congress  uses  the
word “threat” in such an abstract and predictive (rather than commu-
nicative) sense, it usually makes its point plain.  The textual clues in
the statute point in the opposite direction of the government’s reading.
Moreover, the government’s view of the elements clause would have it
effectively  replicate  the  work  formerly  performed  by  the  residual
clause.  Under usual rules of statutory interpretation, the Court does
not lightly assume Congress adopts two separate clauses in the same
law to perform the same work.  See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 839, n. 14.  Pp. 7–10.

(3) The government’s final theory accepts that a conviction under
the elements clause requires a communicated threat of force and con-
tends that most attempted Hobbs Act robbery prosecutions involve ex-
actly that.  But whatever this argument proves, the theory cannot be
squared with the statute’s terms.  Congress in the elements clause did
not mandate an empirical inquiry into how crimes are usually commit-
ted, let alone impose a burden on the defendant to present proof about
the government’s own prosecutorial habits.  Attempted Hobbs Act rob-
bery does not categorically require proof of the elements § 924(c)(3)(A)
demands.  That ends the inquiry, and nothing in Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U. S. 183, suggests otherwise.  Pp. 10–13.

979 F. 3d 203, affirmed.

GORSUCH,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ.,
joined.  THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus. It summarizes the case and the Court's reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion - Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xlix

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

Evans; Van Dang v.
1096

Evans; Van Swait v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  908,1155

946

Everson v. Liberty Mut. Assurance Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
971

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evertson v. United States
1013

Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. American Express Co.  . . . . . . . . . . .
954

Ewing v. Bergeron  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Ewing; Schreiner v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
897

Experian; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1074

Expert Care Nursing Service, Inc.; Dasisa v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934

Exxon Mobil Corp.; Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F. v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
882

F. v. Riverside County Dept. of Public Social Services  . . . . . . .  835,1038

1136

Falchenberg v. New York State Dept. of Ed.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1025

Falcone; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
921

Falkner v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1157

Falls v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1054

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Falso v. Ablest Stafﬁng Services
933

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Falso v. United States
827

Faltas v. Koon
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Family Dollar Stores, Inc. v. Morgan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc.; Morris v.
948

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  973,1140

Fan v. Roe
841

Fanfan v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1145

Fannie Mae; Norton v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Farash v. Fleet Bank  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
881

Farias-Gonzalez v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
833

811

Farley, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
884

Farmer v. Maryland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1122

Farnsworth v. McNeil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
893

Farra v. Carlton  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Farris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
848

Farris v. Whaley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  943,1046

994

Farwell; Roper v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1077

Fastov v. Christie’s International PLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

Fayall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
910

Fearon v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
891

Febles v. Rider  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Federal Aviation Administration; Adams v.
992

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Federal Aviation Administration; Blum v.
967

Federal Aviation Administration; Corredor v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

Federal Aviation Administration; Delaware County v.  . . . . . . . . .
1044

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Federal Aviation Administration; Rex v.
Federal Aviation Administration; Rockland County v.
1149

. . . . . . . . .
Federal Bureau of Investigation; Saqib v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  982,1103
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
26

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

KAGAN, J., dissenting

cial Congress knew to hold the responsibility for adminis-
tering  the  Government’s  student-loan  portfolio  and  pro-
grams.  See  §1082.    Student  loans  are  in  the  Secretary’s
wheelhouse.  And so too, Congress decided, relief from those
loan obligations in case of emergency.  That delegation was
the entire point of the HEROES  Act.  Indeed, the statute
accomplishes nothing else.

The majority is therefore wrong to say that the “indica-
tors  from  our  previous  major  questions  cases  are  present
here.”  Ante,  at  23  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
Compare  the  HEROES  Act  to  other  statutes  containing
broad delegations that the same majority has found to raise
major-questions problems.  Last Term, for example, the ma-
jority thought the trouble with the Clean Power Plan lay in
the  EPA’s  use  of  a  “long-extant”  and  “ancillary”  provision
addressed to other matters.  West Virginia, 597 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 20).  Before that, the majority invalidated the
CDC’s  eviction  moratorium  because  the  agency  had  as-
serted  authority  far  outside  its  “particular  domain.”    Ala-
bama Assn. of Realtors, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).  I
thought both those decisions wrong.  But assume the oppo-
site; there is, even on that view, nothing like those circum-
stances here.  (Or, to quote the majority quoting me, those
“case[s are] distinguishable from this one.”  Ante, at 23.)  In
this  case,  the  Secretary  responsible  for  carrying  out  the
student-loan programs forgave student loans in a national
emergency  under  the  core  provision  of  a  recently  enacted
statute  empowering  him  to  provide  student-loan  relief  in
national  emergencies.3    Today’s  decision  thus  moves  the

——————

3 The  nature  of  the  delegation  here  poses  a  particular  challenge  for
JUSTICE  BARRETT,  given  her  distinctive  understanding  of  the  major-
questions  doctrine.    In  her  thoughtful  concurrence,  she  notes  the  “im-
portance of context when a court interprets a delegation to an adminis-
trative agency.”  Ante, at 2 (emphasis in original).  I agree, and have said
so; there are, indeed, some significant overlaps between my and JUSTICE
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Kagan in the case of Biden v. Nebraska. It discusses the HEROES Act and the Secretary of Education's authority to provide student loan relief.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

11

Opinion of the Court

Court’s analysis in Hobby Lobby extends, for the purposes
of analyzing a substantial burden, to the burdens that an
entity faces when it religiously opposes participating in the
[self-certification] accommodation process.”  Id., at 47800.
They thus “conclude[d] that it [was] appropriate to expand
the exemption to other . . . organizations with sincerely held
religious beliefs opposed to contraceptive coverage.”  Id., at
47802; see also id., at 47810–47811.

The second IFR created a similar “moral exemption” for
employers—including  nonprofits  and  for-profits  with  no
publicly  traded  components—with  “sincerely  held  moral”
objections  to  providing  some  or  all  forms  of  contraceptive
coverage.  Id., at 47850, 47861–47862.  Citing congressional
enactments,  precedents  from  this  Court,  agency  practice,
and state laws that provided for conscience protections, id.,
at 47844–47847, the Departments invoked their authority
under the ACA to create this exemption, id., at 47844.  The
Departments  requested  post-promulgation  comments  on
both IFRs.  Id., at 47813, 47854.

E
Within a week of the 2017 IFRs’ promulgation, the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania filed an action seeking declar-
atory and injunctive relief.  Among other claims, it alleged
that the IFRs were procedurally and substantively invalid
under the APA.  The District Court held that the Common-
wealth was likely to succeed on both claims and granted a
preliminary nationwide injunction against the IFRs.  The
Federal Government appealed.

While that appeal was pending, the Departments issued
rules  finalizing  the  2017  IFRs.    See  83  Fed.  Reg.  57536
(2018);  83  Fed.  Reg.  57592,  codified  at  45  CFR  pt.  147
(2018).  Though the final rules left the exemptions largely
intact, they also responded to post-promulgation comments,
explaining their reasons for neither narrowing nor expand-
ing  the  exemptions  beyond  what  was  provided  for  in  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing case law and regulations. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding religious exemptions from contraceptive coverage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

41

THOMAS, J., concurring

and  universities,  the  systematic  mismatching  of  minority
students begun at the top can mean that such students are
generally overmatched throughout all levels of higher edu-
cation.”  T. Sowell, Race and Culture 176–177 (1994).8

These policies may harm even those who succeed academ-
ically.  I have long believed that large racial preferences in
college  admissions  “stamp  [blacks  and  Hispanics]  with  a
badge of inferiority.” Adarand, 515 U. S., at 241 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.).  They thus “tain[t] the accomplishments of all
those who are admitted as a result of racial discrimination”
as well as “all those who are the same race as those admit-
ted as a result of racial discrimination” because “no one can
distinguish those students from the ones whose race played
a role in their admission.”  Fisher I, 570 U. S., at 333 (opin-
ion  of  THOMAS,  J.).  Consequently,  “[w]hen  blacks”  and,
now, Hispanics “take positions in the highest places of gov-
ernment, industry, or academia, it is an open question . . .
whether  their  skin  color  played  a  part  in  their  advance-
ment.”  Grutter, 539 U. S., at 373 (THOMAS, J., concurring).
“The question itself is the stigma—because either racial dis-
crimination did play a role, in which case the person may
be  deemed  ‘otherwise  unqualified,’  or  it  did  not,  in  which
case asking the question itself unfairly marks those . . . who
would succeed without discrimination.”  Ibid.

——————

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR rejects this mismatch theory as “debunked long
ago,” citing an amicus brief.  Post, at 56.  But, in 2016,  the Journal of
Economic Literature published a review of mismatch literature—coau-
thored by a critic and a defender of affirmative action—which concluded
that the evidence for mismatch was “fairly convincing.”  P. Arcidiacono
& M. Lovenheim, Affirmative Action and the Quality-Fit Tradeoff, 54 J.
Econ. Lit. 3, 20 (Arcidiacono & Lovenheim).  And, of course, if universi-
ties wish to refute the mismatch theory, they need only release the data
necessary to test its accuracy.  See Brief for Richard Sander as Amicus
Curiae  16–19  (noting  that  universities  have  been  unwilling  to  provide
the  necessary  data  concerning  student  admissions  and  outcomes);  ac-
cord, Arcidiacono & Lovenheim 20 (“Our hope is that better datasets soon
will become available”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It contains legal citations, arguments, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

13

Opinion of the Court

We  have  applied  this  background  principle  when  con-
struing  federal  statutes  that  touched  on  several  areas  of
traditional state responsibility.  See Gregory, supra, at 460
(qualifications for state officers); BFP, supra, at 544 (titles
to  real  estate);  Solid  Waste  Agency  of  Northern  Cook  Cty.
v.  Army  Corps  of  Engineers,  531  U. S.  159,  174  (2001)
(land  and  water  use).  Perhaps  the  clearest  example  of
traditional  state  authority  is  the  punishment  of  local
criminal  activity.  United  States  v.  Morrison,  529  U. S.
598,  618  (2000).  Thus,  “we  will  not  be  quick  to  assume
that  Congress  has  meant  to  effect  a  significant  change  in
the  sensitive  relation  between  federal  and  state  criminal
jurisdiction.”  Bass, 404 U. S., at 349.

from

felon

In  Bass,  we  interpreted  a  statute  that  prohibited  any
convicted
“ ‘receiv[ing],  possess[ing],  or
transport[ing] in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any
firearm.’ ”    Id.,  at  337.   The  Government  argued  that  the
statute  barred  felons  from  possessing  all  firearms  and
that  it  was  not  necessary  to  demonstrate  a  connection  to
interstate  commerce.    We  rejected  that  reading,  which
would  “render[ ]  traditionally  local  criminal  conduct  a
matter  for  federal  enforcement  and  would  also  involve  a
substantial  extension  of  federal  police  resources.”    Id.,  at
350.  We  instead  read  the  statute  more  narrowly  to  re-
quire proof of a connection to interstate commerce in every
case,  thereby  “preserv[ing]  as  an  element  of  all  the  of-
fenses  a  requirement  suited  to  federal  criminal  jurisdic-
tion alone.”  Id., at 351.
  Similarly,  in  Jones  v.  United  States,  529  U. S.  848,  850
(2000),  we  confronted  the  question  whether  the  federal
arson statute, which prohibited burning “ ‘any . . . property
used  in  interstate  or  foreign  commerce  or  in  any  activity
affecting  interstate  or  foreign  commerce,’ ”  reached  an
owner-occupied private residence.  Once again we rejected
the Government’s “expansive interpretation,” under which
“hardly  a  building  in  the  land  would  fall  outside  the  fed-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the interpretation of federal statutes related to criminal jurisdiction. It cites previous cases and uses legal terminology, indicating its suitability for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 624 (1998)

663

Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.

.

that “[i]n assessing the reasonableness of petitioner’s actions,
. are of special
the views of public health authorities .
weight and authority.” Ante, at 650. Those views are, of
course, entitled to a presumption of validity when the actions
of those authorities themselves are challenged in court, and
even in disputes between private parties where Congress
has committed that dispute to adjudication by a public health
authority. But in litigation between private parties origi-
nating in the federal courts, I am aware of no provision of
law or judicial practice that would require or permit courts
to give some scientiﬁc views more credence than others sim-
ply because they have been endorsed by a politically ap-
pointed public health authority (such as the Surgeon Gen-
eral).
In litigation of this latter sort, which is what we face
here, the credentials of the scientists employed by the public
health authority, and the soundness of their studies, must
stand on their own. The Court cites no authority for its
limitation upon the courts’ truth-ﬁnding function, except the
statement in School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U. S.,
at 288, that in making ﬁndings regarding the risk of conta-
gion under the Rehabilitation Act, “courts normally should
defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health
ofﬁcials.” But there is appended to that dictum the follow-
ing footnote, which makes it very clear that the Court was
urging respect for medical judgment, and not necessarily
respect for “ofﬁcial” medical judgment over “private” medi-
cal judgment: “This case does not present, and we do not
address, the question whether courts should also defer to the
reasonable medical judgments of private physicians on which
an employer has relied.”

Id., at 288, n. 18.

Applying these principles here, it is clear to me that peti-
tioner has presented more than enough evidence to avoid
summary judgment on the “direct threat” question.
In June
1994, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention pub-
lished a study identifying seven instances of possible trans-
mission of HIV from patients to dental workers. See ante,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist in a case involving HIV transmission. It contains legal arguments, citations to previous cases, and discussion of scientific studies.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>