<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

27

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

A
Answering  the  question  whether  Harvard’s  and  UNC’s
policies survive strict scrutiny under settled law is straight-
forward,  both  because  of  the  procedural  posture  of  these
cases  and  because  of  the  narrow  scope  of  the  issues  pre-
sented  by  petitioner  Students  for  Fair  Admissions,  Inc.
(SFFA).22

These cases arrived at this Court after two lengthy trials.
Harvard and UNC introduced dozens of fact witnesses, ex-
pert  testimony,  and  documentary  evidence  in  support  of
their  admissions  programs.  Brief  for  Petitioner  20,  40.
SFFA, by contrast, did not introduce a single fact witness
and relied on the testimony of two experts.  Ibid.

After making detailed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the District Courts entered judgment in favor of Har-
vard and UNC.  See 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 133–206 (Mass.
2019)  (Harvard  I );  567  F. Supp. 3d  580,  588–667  (MDNC
2021)  (UNC).  The  First  Circuit  affirmed  in  the  Harvard
case,  finding  “no  error”  in  the  District  Court’s  thorough
opinion.  980 F. 3d 157, 204 (2020) (Harvard II ).  SFFA then
filed petitions for a writ of certiorari in both cases, which
the Court granted.  595 U. S. ___ (2022).23

The  Court  granted  certiorari  on  three  questions:  (1)
whether  the  Court  should  overrule  Bakke,  Grutter,  and

——————
strategic litigation choice, and in our adversarial system, it is not up to
this Court to come up with “wrongs to right” on behalf of litigants.  Id., at
244 (internal quotation marks omitted).

22 SFFA is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization founded after this Court’s
decision in Fisher I, 570 U. S. 297 (2013).  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
20–1199, p. 10.  Its original board of directors had three self-appointed
members:  Edward  Blum,  Abigail  Fisher  (the  plaintiff  in  Fisher),  and
Richard Fisher.  See ibid.

23 Bypassing  the  Fourth  Circuit’s  opportunity  to  review  the  District
Court’s  opinion  in  the  UNC  case,  SFFA  sought  certiorari  before  judg-
ment, urging that, “[p]aired with Harvard,” the UNC case would “allow
the Court to resolve the ongoing validity of race-based admissions under
both Title VI and the Constitution.”  Pet. for Cert. in No. 21–707, p. 27.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor in a case regarding affirmative action at Harvard and UNC.  It provides context about the procedural history of the case and the specific questions before the Court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 20–1199 and 21–707
_________________

20–1199

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF
HARVARD COLLEGE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC.,
PETITIONER
v.
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL.

21–707

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[June 29, 2023]

 JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  with  whom  JUSTICE  KAGAN  and

JUSTICE JACKSON join,* dissenting.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment enshrines a guarantee of racial equality.  The Court
long  ago  concluded  that  this  guarantee  can  be  enforced
through race-conscious means in a society that is not, and
has never been, colorblind.  In Brown v. Board of Education,
347  U. S.  483  (1954),  the  Court  recognized  the  constitu-
tional necessity of racially integrated schools in light of the

——————

*JUSTICE JACKSON did not participate in the consideration or decision
of the case in No. 20–1199 and joins this opinion only as it applies to the
case in No. 21–707.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a Supreme Court dissenting opinion. It includes case citations, the names of the justices, and the text of the dissent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

Nearly  60  years  ago,  the  people  of  Puerto  Rico  “em-
bark[ed] on [a] project of constitutional self-governance” af-
ter entering into a compact with the Federal Government.
Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip
op., at 3).  At the conclusion of that endeavor, the people of
Puerto  Rico  established,  and  the  United  States  Congress
recognized, a “republican form of government” “pursuant to
a constitution of [the Puerto Rican population’s] own adop-
tion.”  Act of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, §§1, 2, 64 Stat. 319; see
also Act of July 3, 1952, 66 Stat. 327.  One would think the
Puerto Rican home rule that resulted from that mutual en-
terprise might affect whether officers later installed by the
Federal  Government  are  properly  considered  officers  of
Puerto Rico rather than “Officers of the United States” sub-
ject to the Appointments Clause.  U. S. Const., Art. II, §2,
cl. 2.  Yet the parties do not address that weighty issue or
any  attendant  questions  it  raises.    I  thus  do  not  resolve
those matters here and instead concur in the judgment.

I nevertheless write to explain why these unexplored is-
sues  may  well  call  into  doubt  the  Court’s  conclusion  that
the members of the Financial Oversight and Management
Board for Puerto Rico are territorial officers not subject to
the “significant structural safeguards” embodied in the Ap-
pointments  Clause.  Edmond  v.  United  States,  520  U. S.
651,  659  (1997).  Puerto  Rico’s  compact  with  the  Federal
Government  and  its  republican  form  of  government  may
not  alter  its  status  as  a  Territory.  But  territorial  status
should not be wielded as a talismanic opt out of prior con-
gressional commitments or constitutional constraints.

I
A
Puerto  Rico  became  a  Territory  of  the  United  States  in
1898,  pursuant  to  a  treaty  concluding  the  Spanish-
American  War.  After  a  series  of  temporary  military  gov-
erning measures, Congress passed the Foraker Act of 1900,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal status of Puerto Rico and the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON

THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of THOMAS, J.

authority and duty to enforce other statutes and regulations
. . . that could be triggered by a violation of S. B. 8.”  Com-
plaint  ¶107.   This “conclusory statemen[t],” paired with  a
bare  “ ‘legal  conclusion,’ ”  cannot  survive  a  motion  to  dis-
miss.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678 (2009).

*

  *

  *
  I  would  instruct  the  District  Court  to  dismiss  this  case
against  all  respondents,  including  the  four  licensing  offi-
cials,  because  petitioners  may  not  avail  themselves  of the
exception  to  sovereign  immunity  recognized  in  Ex parte
Young.  I join the Court’s opinion in all other respects and
respectfully dissent only from Part II–C.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in the case of WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON. It contains legal arguments, citations, and specific instructions to the court.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
154

SMITH  v.  SPISAK

Opinion of the Court

conform himself ” to the law’s requirements.  8 id., at 2428–
2429,  2430–2441  (July  16,  1983).  Dr.  Kurt  Bertschinger,  a
psychiatrist, testiﬁed that Spisak suffered from a schizotypal
personality disorder and that “mental illness does impair his
reason to the extent that he has substantial inability to know
wrongfulness,  or  substantial  inability  to  refrain.”  Id.,  at
2552–2556.  Dr. Markey, whose testimony had been stricken
at the guilt phase, again testiﬁed  and agreed with the other
experts’  diagnoses.  Id.,  at  2692–2693,  2712–2713  (July  18,
1983).

In  light  of  this  background  and  for  the  following  reasons,
we do not ﬁnd that the assumed deﬁciencies in defense coun
sel’s  closing  argument  raise  “a  reasonable  probability  that,”
but  for  the  deﬁcient  closing,  “the  result  of  the  proceeding
would  have  been  different.”  Strickland,  466  U. S.,  at  694.
We therefore cannot ﬁnd the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision
rejecting  Spisak’s  ineffective-assistance-of-counsel  claim  to
be  an  “unreasonable  application”  of  the  law  “clearly  estab
lished” in Strickland.  § 2254(d)(1).

First,  since  the  sentencing  phase  took  place  immediately
following  the  conclusion  of  the  guilt  phase,  the  jurors  had
fresh in their minds the government’s evidence regarding the
killings—which included photographs of the dead bodies, im
ages that formed the basis of defense counsel’s vivid descrip
tions  of  the  crimes—as  well  as  Spisak’s  boastful  and  unre
pentant  confessions  and  his  threats  to  commit  further  acts
of violence.  We therefore do not see how a less descriptive
closing  argument  with  fewer  disparaging  comments  about
Spisak could have made a signiﬁcant difference.

Similarly fresh in the jurors’ minds was the three defense
experts’ testimony  that Spisak  suffered from  mental illness.
The  jury  had  heard  the  experts  explain  the  speciﬁc  facts
upon which they had based their conclusions, as well as what
they had learned of his family background and his struggles
with  gender  identity.  And  the  jury  had  heard  the  experts
draw connections between his mental illness and the crimes.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the part discussing the defendant's mental state and the effectiveness of his defense counsel. It contains legal arguments, citations, and expert testimony, all of which are relevant to the case and suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA

Opinion of the Court

viously explained that “the function” of the 1948 recodifica-
tion “was generally limited to that of consolidation and cod-
ification.”  Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U. S. 454, 474 (1975) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  This Court does not infer
that Congress, “in revising and consolidating the laws, in-
tended to change their policy, unless such an intention be
clearly  expressed.”    Id.,  at  470  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).

For  many  reasons,  then,  we  cannot  conclude  that  Con-
gress,  by  recodifying  the  entire  Federal  Criminal  Code  in
1948,  silently  ratified  a  few  sentences  of  dicta  from  Wil-
liams.  The reenactment canon does not apply in this case.
Third,  Castro-Huerta  contends  that  the  Court  has  re-
peated the 1946 Williams dicta on several subsequent occa-
sions.  But the Court’s dicta, even if repeated, does not con-
stitute  precedent  and  does  not  alter  the  plain  text  of  the
General Crimes Act, which was the law passed by Congress
and signed by the President.  See National Collegiate Ath-
letic Assn. v. Alston, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at
21).3

——————

3 In  addition  to  citing  Williams  and  later  cases,  Castro-Huerta  also
cites the earlier 1913 decision in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243.
According  to Castro-Huerta,  Donnelly determined  that  States  may  not
exercise jurisdiction in Indian country over crimes by or against Indians.
Castro-Huerta is wrong.  In Donnelly, the Court simply concluded that
although  States  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  crimes  committed  by
non-Indians against non-Indians in Indian country, States do not have
similarly “undivided authority” over crimes committed by or against In-
dians  in  Indian  country.  Id.,  at  271–272  (emphasis  added).    In  other
words,  the  Federal  Government  also  maintains  jurisdiction  under  the
General Crimes Act over crimes by or against Indians in Indian country
because of the Federal Government’s interest in protecting and defend-
ing  tribes.  See  ibid.  (citing  United  States  v.  Kagama,  118  U.  S.  375
(1886)).  Donnelly did not address the distinct question we confront here:
whether  States  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  with  the  Federal  Govern-
ment  over  non-Indians  who  commit  crimes  against  Indians  in  Indian
country.  If anything, Donnelly’s rejection of the argument that the State
had  “undivided”  authority,  without  the  Court’s  saying  more,  suggests
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the case of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to jurisdiction in Indian country.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

175

Breyer, J., dissenting

the more dangerous remedy? For the following reasons,
I think not.

First, the statute’s language does not restrict the FDA’s
remedial powers in this way. The FDCA permits the FDA
to regulate a “combination product”—i. e., a “device” (such
as a cigarette) that contains a “drug” (such as nicotine)—
under its “device” provisions.
21 U. S. C. § 353(g)(1). And
the FDCA’s “device” provisions explicitly grant the FDA
wide remedial discretion. For example, where the FDA
cannot “otherwise” obtain “reasonable assurance” of a de-
vice’s “safety and effectiveness,” the agency may restrict by
regulation a product’s “sale, distribution, or use” upon
. conditions as the Secretary may prescribe.”
“such .
§ 360j(e)(1) (emphasis added). And the statutory section
that most clearly addresses the FDA’s power to ban (entitled
“Banned devices”) says that, where a device presents “an
unreasonable and substantial risk of illness or injury,” the
Secretary “may”—not must—“initiate a proceeding . . . to
make such device a banned device.” § 360f(a) (emphasis
added).

.

The Court points to other statutory subsections which it
believes require the FDA to ban a drug or device entirely,
even where an outright ban risks more harm than other reg-
ulatory responses. See ante, at 135–136. But the cited
It is true, as the majority con-
provisions do no such thing.
tends, that “the FDCA requires the FDA to place all de-
vices” in “one of three classiﬁcations” and that Class III de-
vices require “premarket approval.” Ante, at 136. But it
is not the case that the FDA must place cigarettes in Class
III because tobacco itself “presents a potential unreasonable
risk of illness or injury.”
In fact,
Class III applies only where regulation cannot otherwise
“provide reasonable assurance of .
. safety.” §§ 360c(a)
(1)(A), (B) (placing a device in Class I or Class II when regu-
lation can provide that assurance). Thus, the statute plainly
allows the FDA to consider the relative, overall “safety” of

21 U. S. C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).

.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments, citations, and analysis of a statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Per Curiam

is  the  relief  that  the  plaintiffs  actually  requested  in  their
preliminary injunction motions.  The District Court on its
own ordered yet an additional extension, which would allow
voters to mail their ballots after election day, which is ex-
traordinary  relief  and  would  fundamentally  alter  the  na-
ture  of  the  election  by  allowing  voting  for  six  additional
days after the election.

Therefore,  subject  to  any  further  alterations  that  the
State may make to state law, in order to be counted in this
election  a  voter’s  absentee  ballot  must  be  either  (i)  post-
marked by election day, April 7, 2020, and received by April
13, 2020, at 4:00 p.m., or (ii) hand-delivered as provided un-
der state law by April 7, 2020, at 8:00 p.m.

The  Court’s  decision  on  the  narrow  question  before  the
Court should not be viewed as expressing an opinion on the
broader question of whether to hold the election, or whether
other  reforms  or  modifications  in  election  procedures  in
light of COVID–19 are appropriate.  That point cannot be
stressed enough.

The  stay  is  granted  pending  final  disposition of  the  ap-
peal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit and the timely filing and disposition of a petition for
a writ of certiorari.  Should the petition for a writ of certio-
rari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically.  In
the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the
stay  shall  terminate  upon  the  sending  down  of  the  judg-
ment of this Court.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or court ruling, specifically regarding an election-related case. It contains legal jargon and discusses procedural matters.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

15

Opinion of the Court

The heirs also rely on other statutes aimed at promoting
restitution to the victims of the Holocaust.  The Acts include
the Holocaust Victims Redress Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 15; the
Holocaust  Expropriated  Art  Recovery  Act  of  2016  (HEAR
Act),  130  Stat.  1524;  and  the  Justice  for  Uncompensated
Survivors Today (JUST) Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115–171, 132
Stat.  1288.    These  laws,  the  heirs  suggest,  demonstrate
Congress’s  desire  for  American  courts  to  hear  disputes
about Holocaust-era property claims.

The statutes do promote restitution for the victims of the
Holocaust,  but  they  generally  encourage  redressing  those
injuries outside of public court systems.  The HEAR Act, for
example, states that “the use of alternative dispute resolu-
tion” mechanisms will “yield just and fair resolutions in a
more  efficient  and  predictable  manner”  than  litigation  in
court.  §2(8),  130  Stat.  1525.  Germany  has  adopted  just
such an alternative mechanism, the Advisory Commission,
and the heirs availed themselves of that opportunity to re-
solve  their  claims.  Ibid.    See  also  Brief  for  Petitioners  5
(“[T]he German government has provided roughly $100 bil-
lion (in today’s dollars) to compensate Holocaust survivors
and other victims of the Nazi era.”).

These laws do not speak to sovereign immunity.  That is
the province of the FSIA, which provides the carefully con-
structed  framework  necessary  for  addressing  an  issue  of
such international concern.  The heirs have not shown that
the  FSIA  allows  them  to  bring  their  claims  against  Ger-
many.  We cannot permit them to bypass its design.

IV
We hold that the phrase “rights in property taken in vio-
lation of international law,” as used in the FSIA’s expropri-
ation exception, refers to violations of the international law
of expropriation and thereby incorporates the domestic tak-
ings rule.

We do not address Germany’s argument that the District
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses legal arguments related to property claims and sovereign immunity, referencing specific statutes and legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNICOLORS, INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P.

Opinion of the Court

of registration is valid

“regardless of whether the certificate contains any in-
accurate information, unless—
  “(A) the inaccurate information was included on the
application  for  copyright  registration  with  knowledge
that it was inaccurate; and
  “(B)  the  inaccuracy  of  the  information,  if  known,
would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse
registration.”  §411(b)(1) (emphasis added).

The important point for our purposes is that a certificate of
registration is valid even though it contains inaccurate in-
formation,  as
lacked
long  as  the  copyright  holder
“knowledge that it was inaccurate.”  §411(b)(1)(A).
  The question before us concerns the scope of the phrase
“with knowledge that it was inaccurate.”  The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit believed that a copyright holder
cannot benefit from the safe harbor and save its copyright
registration from invalidation if its lack of knowledge stems
from a failure to understand the law rather than a failure
to understand the facts.  In our view, however, §411(b) does
not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of
fact.  Lack of knowledge of either fact or law can excuse an
inaccuracy in a copyright registration.  We therefore vacate
the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding.

I
  The  petitioner  here, Unicolors,  owns  copyrights  in  vari-
ous  fabric  designs.    App.  50–51.    It  sued  the  respondent,
H&M  Hennes  &  Mauritz,  L.P.  (H&M),  for  copyright  in-
fringement.    959  F. 3d  1194,  1195  (CA9  2020).    The  jury
found in Unicolors’ favor, but H&M asked the trial court to
grant  it  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.    Id.,  at  1196–1197.
H&M argued, among other things, that Unicolors’ registra-
tion  certificate  was  invalid  (and  that  therefore  Unicolors
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing copyright law and the validity of registration certificates. It contains legal jargon and cites case law, indicating it's not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

449

Opinion of Stevens, J.

byist  testiﬁes  that  these  organizations  use  issue  ad
vocacy  as  a  means  to  inﬂuence  various  Members  of
Congress.

“The Findings also demonstrate that Members of Con
gress  seek  to  have  corporations  and  unions  run  these
advertisements  on  their  behalf.  The  Findings  show
that  Members  suggest  that  corporations  or  individuals
make donations to interest groups with the understand
ing  that  the  money  contributed  to  these  groups  will
assist  the  Member  in  a  campaign.  After  the  elec
tion,  these  organizations  often  seek  credit  for  their
support. . . . Finally, a  large majority of Americans (80%)
are  of  the  view  that  corporations  and  other  organiza
tions  that  engage  in  electioneering  communications,
which  beneﬁt  speciﬁc  elected  ofﬁcials,  receive  special
consideration  from  those  ofﬁcials  when  matters  arise
that  affect  these  corporations  and  organizations.”  Id.,
at 623–624 (citations and footnote omitted).

Many  of  the  relationships  of  dependency  found  by  Judge
Kollar-Kotelly  seemed  to  have  a  quid  pro  quo  basis,  but
other  arrangements  were  more  subtle.  Her  analysis  shows
the great difﬁculty in delimiting the precise scope of the quid
pro  quo  category,  as  well  as  the  adverse  consequences  that
all such arrangements may have.  There are threats of cor
ruption that are far more destructive to a democratic society
than the odd bribe.  Yet the majority’s understanding of cor
ruption  would  leave  lawmakers  impotent  to  address  all  but
the most discrete abuses.

Our  “undue  inﬂuence”  cases  have  allowed  the  American
people  to  cast  a  wider  net  through  legislative  experiments
designed  to  ensure,  to  some  minimal  extent,  “that  ofﬁce
holders will decide issues . . . on the  merits or the  desires of
their  constituencies,”  and  not  “according  to  the  wishes  of
those  who  have  made  large  ﬁnancial  contributions”—or  ex
penditures—“valued  by  the  ofﬁceholder.”  McConnell,  540
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the concept of undue influence in politics and cites previous legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U35

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 89 (2000)

115

Opinion of the Court

“failure of a component or control system,” “ﬁre, ﬂood, or
other incident that affects the vessel’s seaworthiness,” and
“spills of oil”), regardless of where in the world they might
have occurred. A vessel operator is required by the state
regulation to make a detailed report to the State on each
incident, listing the date, location, and weather conditions.
The report must also list the government agencies to whom
the event was reported and must contain a “brief analysis of
any known causes” and a “description of measures taken to
prevent a reoccurrence.” WAC § 317–21–130.

The State contends that its requirement is not pre-empted
because it is similar to federal requirements. This is an in-
It is not always a sufﬁcient
correct statement of the law.
answer to a claim of pre-emption to say that state rules sup-
plement, or even mirror, federal requirements. The Court
observed this principle when Commerce Clause doctrine was
beginning to take shape, holding in Sinnot v. Davenport, 22
How. 227 (1859), that Alabama could not require vessel own-
ers to provide certain information as a condition of operating
in state waters even though federal law also required the
owner of the vessel “to furnish, under oath, . . . all the infor-
mation required by this State law.”
Id., at 242. The appro-
priate inquiry still remains whether the purposes and objec-
tives of the federal statutes, including the intent to establish
a workable, uniform system, are consistent with concurrent
state regulation. On this point, Justice Holmes’ later obser-
vation is relevant: “When Congress has taken the particular
subject-matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposi-
tion, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it
attempts to go farther than Congress has seen ﬁt to go.”
Charleston & Western Carolina R. Co. v. Varnville Furni-
ture Co., 237 U. S. 597, 604 (1915).

We hold that Congress intended that the Coast Guard reg-
ulations be the sole source of a vessel’s reporting obligations
with respect to the matters covered by the challenged state
statute. Under 46 U. S. C. § 6101, the Coast Guard “shall
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, likely from a court opinion. It discusses the preemption of state regulations by federal regulations regarding vessel reporting requirements.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 236 (1998)

247

Opinion of the Court

satisfy this threshold jurisdictional requirement, respondent
Fitzgerald argued, “the District Court’s order was not an
appealable ‘case’ properly ‘in’ the Court of Appeals within
the meaning of § 1254.”
457 U. S., at 742. Turning aside
this argument, we ruled “petitioner did present a ‘serious
and unsettled’ and therefore appealable question to the
Court of Appeals.
It follow[ed] that the case was ‘in’ the
Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our
Id., at 743. We elaborated: “There
certiorari jurisdiction.”
can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a
court of appeals’ decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
. . . .
If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from
review by this Court.”
Id., at 743, n. 23; see also United
States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 692 (1974) (holding appeal of
District Court’s denial of motion to quash subpoena duces
tecum was in the Court of Appeals for purposes of § 1254(1)).
We have shown no doubts about our jurisdiction to review
dismissals by the Courts of Appeals for failure to ﬁle a timely
notice of appeal under § 1254(1). The ﬁling of a proper
notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Torres v.
Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 315 (1988); United
States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 224 (1960); Advisory Com-
mittee’s Notes on Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3, 28 U. S. C. App.,
p. 589. The failure to satisfy this jurisdictional prerequisite
has not kept the case from entering the Court of Appeals,
however. We have reviewed these dismissals often and
without insisting the petitioner satisfy the requirements for
an extraordinary writ and without suggesting our lack of
jurisdiction to do so. E. g., Houston v. Lack, 487 U. S. 266
(1988); Torres, supra; Fallen v. United States, 378 U. S. 139
(1964); United States v. Robinson, supra; Leishman v. Asso-
ciated Wholesale Elec. Co., 318 U. S. 203 (1943).

We have also held that § 1254(1) permits us to review deni-
als of motions for leave to intervene in the Court of Appeals
in proceedings to review the decision of an administra-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the Court's jurisdiction to review decisions of lower courts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

7

ALITO, J., concurring

Our  answer  to  the  second  question  was  also  perfectly
clear.  If an employer has a religious objection to the use of
a covered contraceptive, and if the employer has a sincere
religious belief that compliance with the mandate makes it
complicit in that conduct, then RFRA requires that the be-
lief be honored.  Id., at 724–725.  We noted that the objec-
tion raised by the employers in Hobby Lobby “implicate[d]
a difficult and important question of religion and moral phi-
losophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong
for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but
that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission
of an immoral act by another.”  Id., at 724.  We noted that
different individuals have different beliefs on this question,
but we were clear that “federal courts have no business ad-
dressing . . . whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA
case is reasonable.”  Ibid.  Instead, the “function” of a court
is  “ ‘narrow’ ”:  “ ‘to  determine’  whether  the  line  drawn  re-
flects ‘an honest conviction.’ ”  Id., at 725 (quoting Thomas
v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U. S.
707, 716 (1981)).

Applying this holding to the Little Sisters yields an obvi-
ous answer.  It is undisputed that the Little Sisters have a
sincere religious objection to the use of contraceptives and
that they also have a sincere religious belief that utilizing
the accommodation would make them complicit in this con-
duct.  As in Hobby Lobby, “it is not for us to say that their
religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.”  573 U. S.,
at 725.

In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals
adopted the reasoning of a prior Third Circuit decision hold-

——————
476 U. S. 693 (1986).  See post, at 18–19 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.) (relying
on Bowen to conclude that accommodation was unnecessary).  In Bowen,
the objecting individuals were not faced with penalties or “coerced by the
Governmen[t] into violating their religious beliefs.”  Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, 449 (1988).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 591 U.S. ____ (2020). It delves into the legal arguments surrounding religious objections to contraceptive coverage.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

33

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

ence of a comparable need elsewhere.  See Tr. of Oral Arg.
61–62 (suggesting that proof of egregious episodes of racial
discrimination in covered jurisdictions would not suffice to
carry the day for the VRA, unless such episodes are shown
to  be  absent  elsewhere).    I  am  aware  of  no  precedent  for
imposing such a double burden on defenders of legislation.

C
The Court has time and again declined to upset legisla
tion  of  this  genre  unless  there  was  no  or  almost  no  evi
dence of unconstitutional action by States.  See, e.g., City
of  Boerne  v.  Flores,  521  U. S.  507,  530  (1997)  (legislative
record “mention[ed] no episodes [of the kind the legislation
aimed to check] occurring in the past 40 years”).  No such
claim  can  be  made  about  the  congressional  record  for  the
2006  VRA  reauthorization.  Given  a  record  replete  with
examples  of  denial  or  abridgment  of  a  paramount  federal
right,  the  Court  should  have  left  the  matter  where  it
belongs: in Congress’ bailiwick.

Instead,  the  Court  strikes  §4(b)’s  coverage  provision
because, in its view, the provision is not based on “current
conditions.”  Ante,  at  17.  It  discounts,  however,  that  one
such  condition  was  the  preclearance  remedy  in  place  in
the  covered  jurisdictions,  a  remedy  Congress  designed
both to catch discrimination before it causes harm, and to
guard  against  return  to  old  ways.    2006  Reauthorization
§2(b)(3), (9).  Volumes of evidence supported Congress’ de
termination  that  the  prospect  of  retrogression  was  real.
Throwing  out  preclearance  when  it  has  worked  and  is
continuing  to  work  to  stop  discriminatory  changes  is  like
throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you
are not getting wet.

But, the Court insists, the coverage formula is no good;
it is based on “decades-old data and eradicated practices.”
Ante, at 18.  Even if the legislative record shows, as engag
ing  with  it  would  reveal,  that  the  formula  accurately
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's decision to strike down a provision of the Voting Rights Act. The language is legalistic and discusses precedents, legislative history, and the evidence presented to Congress.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022)

1

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 21A375 (21–1086) and 21A376 (21–1087)
_________________

JOHN H. MERRILL, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF
STATE, ET AL.
v.
EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL.

21A375 (21–1086)

JOHN H. MERRILL, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF
STATE, ET AL.
v.
MARCUS CASTER, ET AL.

21A376 (21–1087)

ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

 [February 7, 2022]

  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, dissenting from grant of appli-
cations for stays.
  I  respectfully  dissent  from  the  stays  granted  in  these
cases because, in my view, the District Court properly ap-
plied existing law in an extensive opinion with no apparent
errors for our correction.  The governing standard for vote
dilution claims under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is
set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986), which
requires “the minority group . . . to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute
a majority in a single-member district.”  Id., at 50.  The Dis-
trict  Court  reviewed  the  submissions  of  the  plaintiffs’  ex-
perts  and  explained  at  length  the  factbound  bases  for  its
conclusion that the plaintiffs had made that showing.  See
post, at 3–4 (KAGAN, J., dissenting).
  But while the District Court cannot be faulted for its ap-
plication  of  Gingles,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  Gingles  and  its
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  It cites relevant case law and outlines the legal reasoning behind the dissent.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

203, 207–208, but the crime in question must still present
‘important’ ”—risk  of
a  “ ‘serious’ ”—a  “ ‘significant’  or
physical  injury  to  be  deemed  a  violent  felony,  Begay  v.
United  States,  553  U. S.  137,  156  (2008)  (ALITO,  J.,  dis-
senting); accord, Chambers v. United States, 555 U. S. 122,
128 (2009).

To  qualify  as  serious,  the  risk  of  injury  generally  must
be  closely  related  to  the  offense  itself.    Our  precedents
provide  useful  examples  of  the  close  relationship  that
must exist between the conduct of the offense and the risk
presented.  In  Sykes  v.  United  States,  564  U. S.  1  (2011),
for instance, we held that the offense of intentional vehicu-
lar flight constitutes a violent felony because that conduct
always triggers a dangerous confrontation, id., at ___ (slip
op.,  at  8).  As  we  explained,  vehicular  flights  “by  defini-
tional  necessity  occur  when  police  are  present”  and  are
done  “in  defiance  of  their  instructions  . . .  with  a  vehicle
that can be used in a way to cause serious potential risk of
physical  injury  to  another.”  Ibid.    In  James,  we  likewise
held  that  attempted  burglary  offenses  “requir[ing]  an
overt  act  directed  toward  the  entry  of  a  structure”  are
violent  felonies  because  the  underlying  conduct  often
results  in  a  dangerous  confrontation.    550  U. S.,  at  204,
206.  But  we  distinguished  those  crimes  from  “the  more
attenuated  conduct  encompassed  by”  attempt  offenses
“that  c[an]  be  satisfied  by  preparatory  conduct  that  does
not  pose  the  same  risk  of  violent  confrontation,”  such  as
“ ‘possessing burglary tools.’ ”  Id., at 205, 206, and n. 4.  At
some  point,  in  other  words,  the  risk  of  injury  from  the
crime  may  be  too  attenuated  for  the  conviction  to  fall
within  the  residual  clause,  such  as  when  an  additional,
voluntary  act  (e.g.,  the  use  of  burglary  tools  to  enter  a
structure) is necessary to bring about the risk of physical
injury to another.

In  light  of  the  elements  of  and  reported  convictions  for
the  unlawful  possession  of  a  short-barreled  shotgun,  this
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 576 U.S. ____ (2015). It delves into the legal definition of a "violent felony" and uses previous case law as examples.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

TRUMP v. HAWAII

Syllabus

it  could  have  chosen  language  directed  to  that  end.    Common  sense
and historical practice confirm that §1152(a)(1)(A) does not limit the
President’s  delegated  authority  under  §1182(f).    Presidents  have  re-
peatedly  exercised  their  authority  to  suspend  entry  on  the  basis  of
nationality.    And  on  plaintiffs’  reading,  the  President  would  not  be
permitted to suspend entry from particular foreign states in response
to an epidemic, or even if the United States were on the brink of war.
Pp. 20–24.

3. Plaintiffs  have  not  demonstrated  a  likelihood  of  success  on  the
merits  of  their  claim  that  the  Proclamation  violates  the  Establish-
ment Clause.  Pp. 24–38.

(a) The  individual  plaintiffs  have  Article  III  standing  to  chal-
lenge  the  exclusion  of  their  relatives  under  the  Establishment
Clause.  A person’s interest in being united with his relatives is suffi-
ciently concrete and particularized to form the basis of an Article III
injury in fact.  Cf., e.g., Kerry v. Din, 576 U. S. ___, ___.  Pp. 24–26.

(b) Plaintiffs allege that the primary purpose of the Proclamation
was religious animus and that the President’s stated concerns about
vetting protocols and national security were but pretexts for discrim-
inating  against  Muslims.  At  the  heart  of  their  case  is  a  series  of
statements  by  the  President  and  his  advisers  both  during  the  cam-
paign and since the President assumed office.  The issue, however, is
not whether to denounce the President’s  statements,  but the signifi-
cance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neu-
tral  on  its  face,  addressing  a  matter  within  the  core  of  executive  re-
sponsibility.    In  doing  so,  the  Court  must  consider  not  only  the
statements  of  a  particular  President,  but  also  the  authority  of  the
Presidency itself.  Pp. 26–29.

(c) The admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a “funda-
mental  sovereign  attribute  exercised  by  the  Government’s  political
departments  largely  immune  from  judicial  control.”  Fiallo  v.  Bell,
430  U. S.  787,  792.    Although  foreign  nationals  seeking  admission
have no constitutional right to entry, this Court has engaged in a cir-
cumscribed  judicial  inquiry  when  the  denial  of  a  visa  allegedly  bur-
dens  the  constitutional  rights  of  a  U. S.  citizen.    That  review  is  lim-
ited  to  whether  the  Executive  gives  a  “facially  legitimate  and  bona
fide” reason for its action, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 769,
but the Court need not define the precise contours of that narrow in-
quiry  in  this  case.  For  today’s  purposes,  the  Court  assumes  that  it
may look behind the face of the Proclamation to the extent of apply-
ing  rational  basis  review,  i.e.,  whether  the  entry  policy  is  plausibly
related  to  the  Government’s  stated  objective  to  protect  the  country
and improve vetting processes.  Plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence may be
considered, but the policy will be upheld so long as it can reasonably
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case, outlining the arguments and holdings of the court. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they are summaries and not the primary content of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

HERRERA v. WYOMING

ALITO, J., dissenting

is  conclusive.”    Arizona  v.  California,  460  U. S.  605,  619
(1983).  “The  idea  is  straightforward:  Once  a  court  has
decided  an  issue,  it  is forever  settled  as  between  the  par-
ties,  thereby  protecting  against  the  expense  and  vexation
attending multiple lawsuits, conserving judicial resources,
and fostering reliance on judicial action by minimizing the
possibility  of  inconsistent  verdicts.”    B&B  Hardware,  Inc.
v.  Hargis  Industries,  Inc.,  575  U. S.  138,  ___  (2015)  (slip
op.,  at  8)  (internal  quotation  marks,  citation,  and  altera-
tions  omitted).  Succinctly  put,  “a  losing  litigant  deserves
no  rematch  after  a  defeat  fairly  suffered.”  Astoria  Fed.
Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 107 (1991).

Under  federal  issue-preclusion  principles,4  “once  an
issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in
subsequent  suits  based  on  a  different  cause  of  action
involving  a  party  to  the  prior  litigation.”    Montana  v.
United  States,  440  U. S.  147,  153  (1979).    That  standard
for issue preclusion is met here.

In Repsis, the central issue—and the question on which
the  Crow  Tribe  sought  a  declaratory  judgment—was
whether members of the Tribe “have an unrestricted right
to hunt and fish on Big Horn National Forest lands.”  866
F. Supp.,  at  521.  The  Tenth  Circuit’s  judgment  settled
that question by holding that “the Tribe and its members
are  subject  to  the  game  laws  of  Wyoming.”  73  F. 3d,  at
994.  In this case, Herrera asserts the same hunting right
that  was  actually  litigated  and  decided  against  his  Tribe
in  Repsis.    He  does  not  suggest  that  either  the  Federal
District  Court  or  the  Tenth  Circuit  lacked  jurisdiction  to

——————

4 The preclusive effect of the judgment of a federal court is governed
by federal law, regardless of whether that judgment’s preclusive effect
is  later  asserted  in  a  state  or  federal  forum.  Taylor  v.  Sturgell,  553
U. S. 880, 892 (2008).  This means that the preclusive effect of Repsis,
decided  by  a  federal  court,  is  governed  by  federal  law,  not  Wyoming
law, even though preclusion was asserted in a Wyoming court.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Herrera v. Wyoming. It discusses the legal principles of issue preclusion and applies them to the facts of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

371

Opinion of the Court

that the same experts who had testiﬁed on the State’s behalf
at trial believed that Williams, if kept in a “structured envi-
ronment,” would not pose a future danger to society.
Id.,
at 313–314.

Counsel’s failure to discover and present this and other
signiﬁcant mitigating evidence was “below the range ex-
pected of reasonable, professional competent assistance of
counsel.”
Id., at 424. Counsel’s performance thus “did not
measure up to the standard required under the holding of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), and [if it
had,] there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
sentencing phase would have been different.”
Id., at 429.
Judge Ingram therefore recommended that Williams be
granted a rehearing on the sentencing phase of his trial.

The Virginia Supreme Court did not accept that recom-
mendation. Williams v. Warden, 254 Va. 16, 487 S. E. 2d
194 (1997). Although it assumed, without deciding, that
trial counsel had been ineffective, id., at 23–26, 487 S. E. 2d,
at 198, 200, it disagreed with the trial judge’s conclusion that
Williams had suffered sufﬁcient prejudice to warrant relief.
Treating the prejudice inquiry as a mixed question of law
and fact, the Virginia Supreme Court accepted the factual
determination that available evidence in mitigation had not
been presented at the trial, but held that the trial judge had
misapplied the law in two respects. First, relying on our
decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364 (1993), the
court held that it was wrong for the trial judge to rely “ ‘on
mere outcome determination’ ” when assessing prejudice, 254
Va., at 23, 487 S. E. 2d, at 198 (quoting Lockhart, 506 U. S.,
at 369). Second, it construed the trial judge’s opinion as
having “adopted a per se approach” that would establish
prejudice whenever any mitigating evidence was omitted.
254 Va., at 26, 487 S. E. 2d, at 200.

The court then reviewed the prosecution evidence sup-
porting the “future dangerousness” aggravating circum-
stance, reciting Williams’ criminal history, including the sev-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  It discusses the trial and sentencing of a defendant named Williams, focusing on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
lxxxii

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Page

1126

Kirkland; Vasquez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
878

Kirkland v. Wayne County  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Kirkpatrick v. Illinois  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Kirk Sauer Community Development of Wilkes-Barre; Fessler v.
1080

Kirnon v. Klopotoski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
892

Kiser v. Tennessee  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1028

Kitchen v. Michigan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
890

Kittrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kiyemba v. Obama  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  969,1145

968

Klat, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1148

Klein; Bullock v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
956

Klopotoski; Conn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1080

Klopotoski; Kirnon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Klopotoski; Straw v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1018

Knibbs v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1096

Knight v. Belleque  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Knight v. Chicago Tribune Co.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950

Knight; Gross v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
970

Knight; J. W. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

Knight v. Kaminski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Knight v. McNeil
1021

Knight; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Knight v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  871,1018,1033

929

Knighton v. United States
Knight Ridder; Forte v.
1025

Knowles; Davis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  998,1140

999

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Knowles; Mendez v.
1079

Knowles v. Province  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1119

Knowles; Thomas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913

Knowles; Thorward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
871

Knowles; Townsend v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1011

Knox v. New York  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
889

Knox; Van Lilly v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
879

Kodrin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1032

Kollar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1026

Koloay v. Holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1112

Koninklijke Boskalis Westminster v. Compania Naviera Joanna . .
1149

Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
960

Konsavich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1114

Konteh; Brown v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
827

Koon; Faltas v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905

Koon v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1008

Kopp v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Koppel; Scriber v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents for a legal case collection.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

Opinion of the Court

No.  102–38,  Art.  2,  p. 5  (1992).    The  Senate  unanimously
ratified the treaty.

Some  five  years  later—after  the  IPCC  issued  a  second
comprehensive  report  in  1995  concluding  that  “[t]he  bal-
ance  of  evidence  suggests  there  is  a  discernible  human
influence  on  global  climate”14—the  UNFCCC  signatories
met in Kyoto, Japan, and adopted a protocol that assigned
mandatory  targets  for  industrialized  nations  to  reduce
greenhouse  gas  emissions.    Because  those  targets  did  not
apply to developing and heavily polluting nations such as
China and India, the Senate unanimously passed a resolu-
tion expressing its sense that the United States should not
enter  into  the  Kyoto Protocol.  See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong.,
1st Sess. (July 25, 1997) (as passed).  President  Clinton  did
not submit the protocol to the Senate for ratification.

II
On  October  20,  1999,  a  group  of  19  private  organiza-
tions15 filed a rulemaking petition asking EPA to regulate
“greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under
§202  of  the  Clean  Air  Act.”  App.  5.  Petitioners  main-
tained  that  1998  was  the  “warmest  year  on  record”;  that
carbon  dioxide,  methane,  nitrous  oxide,  and  hydrofluoro-
carbons are “heat trapping greenhouse gases”; that green-

——————

countries,  including  China  and  India.    They  could  choose  to  become
Annex I countries when sufficiently developed.

14 IPCC, Climate Change 1995, The Science of Climate Change, p. 4.
15 Alliance for Sustainable Communities; Applied Power Technologies,
Inc.; Bio Fuels America; The California Solar Energy Industries Assn.;
Clements  Environmental  Corp.;  Environmental  Advocates;  Environ-
mental  and  Energy  Study  Institute;  Friends  of  the  Earth;  Full  Circle
Energy  Project,  Inc.;  The  Green  Party  of  Rhode  Island;  Greenpeace
USA;  International  Center  for  Technology  Assessment;  Network  for
Environmental  and  Economic  Responsibility  of  the  United  Church  of
Christ;  New  Jersey  Environmental  Watch;  New  Mexico  Solar  Energy
Assn.;  Oregon  Environmental  Council;  Public  Citizen;  Solar  Energy
Industries Assn.; The SUN DAY Campaign.  See App. 7–11.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Massachusetts v. EPA case. It discusses the history of international climate agreements and a petition filed with the EPA.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

9

Opinion of the Court

chemical  alteration  does  not  change  the  information-
transmitting  quality  of  the  DNA.  See  id.,  at  1330  (“The
claimed  isolated  DNA  molecules  are  distinct  from  their
natural  existence  as  portions  of  larger  entities,  and  their
informational content is irrelevant to that fact.  We recog-
nize  that  biologists  may  think  of  molecules  in  terms  of
their uses, but genes are in fact materials having a chemi-
cal nature”).  Accordingly, he rejected petitioners’ argument
that  isolated  DNA  was  ineligible  for  patent  protection
as a product of nature.

Judge  Moore  concurred  in  part  but  did  not  rely  exclu-
sively on Judge Lourie’s conclusion that chemically break-
ing  covalent  bonds  was  sufficient  to  render  isolated  DNA
patent  eligible.  Id.,  at  1341  (“To  the  extent  the  majority
rests  its  conclusion  on  the  chemical  differences  between
[naturally  occurring]  and  isolated  DNA  (breaking  the
covalent  bonds),  I  cannot  agree  that  this  is  sufficient  to
hold  that  the  claims  to  human  genes  are  directed  to  pa-
tentable  subject  matter”).    Instead,  Judge  Moore  also
relied on the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s
(PTO)  practice  of  granting  such  patents  and  on  the  reli-
ance  interests  of  patent  holders.  Id.,  at  1343.    However,
she  acknowledged  that  her  vote  might  have  come  out
differently if she “were deciding this case on a blank can-
vas.”  Ibid.

Finally,  Judge  Bryson  concurred  in  part  and  dissented
in  part,  concluding  that  isolated  DNA  is  not  patent  eli-
gible.  As an initial matter, he emphasized that the break-
ing of chemical bonds was not dispositive: “[T]here is no magic
to a chemical bond that requires us to recognize a new prod-
uct  when  a  chemical  bond  is  created  or  broken.”    Id.,
at 1351.  Instead, he relied on the fact that “[t]he nucleo-
tide  sequences  of  the  claimed  molecules  are  the  same  as
the  nucleotide  sequences  found  in  naturally  occurring
human genes.”  Id., at 1355.  Judge Bryson then concluded
that  genetic  “structural  similarity  dwarfs  the  significance
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion discussing the patentability of isolated DNA. It delves into the arguments and reasoning of different judges, citing specific passages from their opinions. This type of content is highly relevant and suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
936

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10813.  Williams  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Breyer  took  no  part  in  the  consid
eration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.
Appx.  687.

No.  08–10817.  Craig  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  10th  Cir.

Certiorari  before  judgment  denied.

No.  08–10823.  Huezo  v.  United States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consider
ation  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  546  F.  3d  174.

No.  08–10860.  Cruz  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consider
ation  or  decision  of  this  petition.

No.  08–10861.  Shishkin  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  309
Fed.  Appx.  520.

No.  08–10891.  Jorgensen  v.  Sony  BMG  Music  Entertain
ment.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.  Re
ported  below:  310  Fed.  Appx.  419.

No.  08–10902.  Palmer  v.  Ercole,  Superintendent,  Green
Haven  Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  de
nied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or
decision  of  this  petition.

No.  08–10910.  Hayes  v.  Conway,  Superintendent,  Attica
Correctional  Facility.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision
of  this  petition.

No.  08–10959.  Guerrero  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Justice  Sotomayor  took  no  part  in  the
consideration  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  322
Fed.  Appx.  72.

No.  08–10971.  Carr  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  2d  Cir.  Cer
tiorari denied.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consider
ation  or  decision  of  this  petition.  Reported  below:  557  F.  3d  93.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions from a legal document. It's not sequential narrative text and likely a table of contents or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v.
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC.

Opinion of the Court

the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

I

A

Genes  form  the  basis  for  hereditary  traits  in  living
organisms.  See  generally  Association  for  Molecular  Pa-
thology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 702
F. Supp.  2d  181,  192–211  (SDNY  2010).    The  human  ge-
nome  consists  of  approximately  22,000  genes  packed  into
23  pairs  of  chromosomes.  Each  gene  is  encoded  as  DNA,
which  takes  the  shape  of  the  familiar  “double  helix”
that  Doctors  James  Watson  and  Francis  Crick  first  de-
scribed  in  1953.    Each  “cross-bar”  in  the  DNA  helix  con-
sists  of  two  chemically  joined  nucleotides.    The  possible
nucleotides are adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and
guanine  (G),  each  of  which  binds  naturally  with  another
nucleotide: A pairs with T; C pairs with G.  The nucleotide
cross-bars  are  chemically  connected  to  a  sugar-phosphate
backbone  that  forms  the  outside  framework  of  the  DNA
helix.  Sequences  of  DNA  nucleotides  contain  the  infor-
mation  necessary  to  create  strings  of  amino  acids,  which
in turn are used in the body to build proteins.  Only some
DNA  nucleotides,  however,  code  for  amino  acids;  these
nucleotides are known as “exons.”  Nucleotides that do not
code for amino acids, in contrast, are known as “introns.”

Creation  of  proteins  from  DNA  involves  two  principal
steps,  known  as  transcription  and  translation.    In  tran-
scription,  the  bonds  between  DNA  nucleotides  separate,
and  the  DNA  helix  unwinds  into  two  single  strands.  A
single strand is used as a template to create a complemen-
tary ribonucleic acid (RNA) strand.  The nucleotides on the
DNA  strand  pair  naturally  with  their  counterparts,  with
the exception that RNA uses the nucleotide base uracil (U)
instead  of  thymine  (T).  Transcription  results  in  a  single
strand  RNA  molecule,  known  as  pre-RNA,  whose  nucleo-
tides form an inverse image of the DNA strand from which
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion discussing the basics of genetics and DNA. It provides factual information about genes, DNA structure, and the processes of transcription and translation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Introductory/Background Information</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
CTY. v. TALEVSKI
Syllabus

plicitly, by creating “a ‘comprehensive enforcement scheme that is in-
compatible with individual enforcement under §1983,” ibid.  Here, the
Court  finds  evidence  of  neither.    The  FNHRA  establishes  a  detailed
administrative  scheme  for  inspections  of  nursing  facilities,  see
§1396r(g),  and  authorizes  governments  to  sanction  and  correct  non-
compliant facilities, see §1396r(h).  But the statute lacks any indicia of
congressional  intent  to  preclude  §1983  enforcement,  such  as  an  ex-
press private judicial right of action or any other provision that might
signify that intent.  HHC focuses on comprehensiveness of FNHRA’s
enforcement mechanisms, but implicit preclusion is shown only by a
“ ‘comprehensive  enforcement  scheme  that  is  incompatible  with  indi-
vidual  enforcement  under  §1983.’ ”    Fitzgerald  v.  Barnstable  School
Comm., 555 U. S. 246, 252 (emphasis added).  The Court’s prior cases
finding  implicit  preclusion  involved  statutes  where  private  enforce-
ment under §1983 would have thwarted Congress’s scheme by circum-
venting the statutes’ presuit procedures, or by giving plaintiffs access
to  tangible  benefits  otherwise  unavailable  under  the  statutes  con-
strued.  HHC  has  identified  no  equivalent  sign  of  incompatibility  in
the  FNHRA,  which  lacks  a  private  judicial  right  of  action,  a  private
federal  administrative  remedy,  or  any  “carefu[l]”  congressional  “tai-
lor[ing],” Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 255, that §1983 actions would “dis-
tort,”  Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 127.  Finally, the Court re-
jects any speculation that because Congress knew most nursing homes
are private entities not subject to suit under §1983, the FNHRA’s re-
medial  scheme  “necessarily  reflects  Congress’s  judgment  that  these
administrative  enforcement  mechanisms  appropriately  protect  the
rights the statute confers,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
31.  The  focus  in  the  implicit-preclusion  inquiry  remains  whether
something in the FNHRA has foreclosed §1983’s “genera[l]” availabil-
ity as “a remedy for the vindication of rights secured by federal stat-
utes.” Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 284.  The Court sees no such sign, much
less  a  license  for  the  Court  to  construct  and  impute  to  Congress  an
intent that the FNHRA does not embody.  Pp. 17–23.

6 F. 4th 713, affirmed.

JACKSON,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ.,
joined.  GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion.  BARRETT, J., filed a con-
curring opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion.  ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS,
J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, summarizing the court's decision. It is not the actual content of the book and is more of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
34

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE

Opinion of the Court

the  reach  of  its  competence.    But  we  have  no  commission
to allocate political power and influence in the absence of a
constitutional  directive  or  legal  standards  to  guide  us  in
the  exercise  of  such  authority.    “It  is  emphatically  the
province  and  duty  of  the  judicial  department  to  say  what
the  law  is.”  Marbury  v.  Madison,  1  Cranch,  at  177.    In
this rare circumstance, that means our duty is to say “this
is not law.”

The  judgments  of  the  United  States  District  Court  for
the  Middle  District  of  North  Carolina  and  the  United
States  District  Court  for  the  District  of  Maryland  are
vacated,  and  the  cases  are  remanded  with  instructions  to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It contains legal reasoning and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

909

558  U. S.

October  5,  2009

No.  09–5539.  Robinson  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  325  Fed.  Appx.  290.

No.  09–5540.  Sinclair  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  328  Fed.  Appx.  880.

No.  09–5541.  Seaman  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  602.

No.  09–5543.  Jones  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5544.  Flowers  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–5545.  Gharb  v.  Unitronics  (1989)  (R”G)  Ltd.  et  al.
C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  318  Fed.
Appx.  902.

No.  09–5548.  Marr  v.  Worthy,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  6th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5549.  Johnson  v.  Kelly,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  320  Fed.  Appx.  166.

No.  09–5551.  Wilson  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–5552.  Tatum v.  United States.  C. A. Armed Forces.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  67  M.  J.  371.

No.  09–5554.  Boone  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  324  Fed.  Appx.  272.

No.  09–5555.  Abdullah  v.  Brewer,  Governor  of  Arizona,

et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5557.  Argueta-Lopez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  265.

No. 09–5558.  Williams v.  McNeil, Secretary, Florida De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It contains case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions. This type of information is generally not considered suitable for indexing as it's not the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012)

1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–545
_________________

LAWRENCE GOLAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ERIC H.
HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[January 18, 2012]

 JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  joins,

dissenting.

In order “[t]o promote the Progress of Science” (by which
term  the  Founders  meant  “learning”  or  “knowledge”),
the  Constitution’s  Copyright  Clause  grants  Congress  the
power  to  “secur[e]  for  limited  Times  to  Authors  . . .  the
exclusive  Right  to  their  . . .  Writings.”    Art. I,  §8,  cl. 8.
This  “exclusive  Right”  allows  its  holder  to  charge  a  fee  to
those who wish to use a copyrighted work, and the ability
to charge that fee encourages the production of new mate
rial.  In this sense, a copyright is, in Macaulay’s words, a
“tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writ
ers”—a bounty designed to encourage new production.  As
the  Court  said  in  Eldred,  “ ‘[t]he  economic  philosophy
behind  the  [Copyright]  [C]lause  . . .  is  the  conviction  that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors.’ ”  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186,
212,  n. 18  (2003)  (quoting  Mazer  v.  Stein,  347  U. S.  201,
219  (1954)).    See  T.  Macaulay,  Speeches  on  Copyright  25
(E.  Miller  ed.  1913);  E.  Walterscheid,  The  Nature  of  the
Intellectual  Property  Clause:  A  Study  in  Historical  Per
spective 125–126 (2002) (hereinafter Walterscheid).

The  statute  before  us,  however,  does  not  encourage
anyone  to  produce  a  single  new  work.    By  definition,  it
bestows monetary rewards only on owners of old works—
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Breyer. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 05–1120
_________________

MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[April 2, 2007]

 JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
A  well-documented  rise  in  global  temperatures  has
coincided  with  a  significant  increase  in  the  concentration
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.  Respected scientists
believe the two trends are related.  For when carbon diox-
ide is released into the atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling
of  a  greenhouse,  trapping  solar  energy  and  retarding  the
escape  of  reflected  heat.
It  is  therefore  a  species—the
most important species—of a “greenhouse gas.”

Calling  global  warming  “the  most  pressing  environ-
mental  challenge  of  our  time,”1  a  group  of  States,2  local
governments,3  and  private  organizations,4  alleged  in  a

——————

1 Pet. for Cert. 22.
2 California,  Connecticut,  Illinois,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  New  Jersey,

New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
3 District of Columbia, American Samoa, New York City, and Baltimore.
4 Center  for  Biological  Diversity,  Center  for  Food  Safety,  Conserva-
tion  Law  Foundation,  Environmental  Advocates,  Environmental
Defense,  Friends  of  the  Earth,  Greenpeace,  International  Center  for
Technology  Assessment,  National  Environmental  Trust,  Natural
Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists,
and U. S. Public Interest Research Group.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
838

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No. 08–10375.  Humphrey v.  Florida.  Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  979  So.  2d  283.

No.  08–10376.  Hernandez  v.  Ollison,  Warden,  et  al.
C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.
Appx.  52.

No.  08–10378.  Graham  v.  Washington,  Warden,  et  al.
C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  281  Fed.
Appx.  221.

No.  08–10379.  Trevino  v.  Evans,  Warden.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  311  Fed.  Appx.  970.

No.  08–10382.  Lutz  v.  Obama,  President  of  the  United

States,  et  al.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10387.  Simon  v.  Texas.  Ct.  App.  Tex.,  14th  Dist.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10393.  Allen  v.  Belcher.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  08–10396.  McDaniel  v.  Texas.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Tex.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10397.  Davis  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10398.  Hardy  v.  Bennett  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  317  Fed.  Appx.  362.

No.  08–10399.  Hayes  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  2d  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 08–10402.  Franco v.  California.  Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10403.  Gaskin  v.  Kelly,  Superintendent,  Missis
sippi  State  Penitentiary.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10404.  Fultz  v.  State  Farm  Mutual  Automobile
Insurance  Co.  Sup.  Ct.  Del.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported
below:  966  A.  2d  347.

No.  08–10405.  Ford  v.  Polk,  Warden.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It is not sequential text and does not contain the actual content of the cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
912

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  09–5594.  Van  Myers  v.  Ennis  Independent  School
District.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
321  Fed.  Appx.  375.

No.  09–5596.  Hudson  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  338  Fed.  Appx.  555.

No. 09–5600.  Hamer v.  United States.  C. A. 6th Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  319  Fed.  Appx.  366.

No.  09–5601.  Gonzalez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  618.

No. 09–5602.  French v.  United States.  C. A. 3d Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.

No.  09–5603.  Hernandez  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5604.  Green  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5605.  Gonzalez  v.  Asset  Acceptance,  LLC,  et  al.
C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  308  Fed.
Appx.  429.

No.  09–5607.  Robinson  v.  South  Carolina  Department  of
Public  Safety  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Re
ported  below:  326  Fed.  Appx.  188.

No.  09–5608.  Santiago  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  562  F.  3d  411.

No.  09– 5609.  Robinson  v.  Jackson,  Superintendent,
Brown  Creek  Correctional  Institution.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  315  Fed.  Appx.  493.

No. 09–5611.  Mauldin v.  United States Probation Office.

C.  A.  6th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–5613.  Araujo-Contreras  v.  United  States.  C.  A.
5th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 325 Fed. Appx. 332.

No.  09–5614.  Pleaze  v.  Kerestes,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional  Institution  at  Mahanoy,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  168.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal publication. It includes case numbers, parties involved, and circuit court information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Summaries</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019)

21

Opinion of the Court

tial  in  proportion  to  its  number  of  supporters.  As  we
stated unanimously in Gill, “this  Court is not responsible
for  vindicating  generalized  partisan  preferences.  The
Court’s constitutionally prescribed role is to  vindicate the
individual  rights  of  the  people  appearing  before  it.”    585
U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  21).  See  also  Bandemer,  478
U. S.,  at  150  (opinion  of  O’Connor,  J.)  (“[T]he  Court  has
not  accepted  the  argument  that  an  ‘asserted  entitlement
to  group  representation’  . . .  can  be  traced  to  the  one  per-
son,  one  vote  principle.”  (quoting  Bolden,  446  U. S.,  at
77)).*

Nor  do  our  racial  gerrymandering  cases  provide  an
appropriate standard for assessing partisan gerrymander-
ing.  “[N]othing  in  our  case  law  compels  the  conclusion
that  racial  and  political  gerrymanders  are  subject  to  pre-
cisely the same constitutional scrutiny.  In fact, our coun-
try’s long and persistent history of racial discrimination in
voting—as  well  as  our  Fourteenth  Amendment  jurispru-
dence, which always has reserved the strictest scrutiny for
discrimination on the basis of race—would seem to compel
the  opposite  conclusion.”  Shaw  I,  509  U. S.,  at  650  (cita-
tion  omitted).  Unlike  partisan  gerrymandering  claims,  a
racial gerrymandering claim does not ask for a fair share
of political power and  influence, with all the justiciability
conundrums that entails.  It asks instead for the elimina-
tion of a racial classification.  A partisan gerrymandering
claim cannot ask for the elimination of partisanship.

——————

* The dissent’s observation that the Framers viewed political parties
“with  deep  suspicion,  as  fomenters  of  factionalism  and  symptoms  of
disease in the body politic” post, at 9, n. 1 (opinion of KAGAN, J.) (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  and  alteration  omitted),  is  exactly  right.    Its
inference  from  that  fact  is  exactly  wrong.    The  Framers  would  have
been  amazed  at  a  constitutional  theory  that  guarantees  a  certain
degree of representation to political parties.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the legal standards for evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

9

Opinion of the Court

complex filed an indictment charging seven defendants as-
sociated with President Nixon and naming Nixon as an un-
indicted co-conspirator.  As the case moved toward trial, the
Special Prosecutor secured a subpoena duces tecum direct-
ing Nixon to produce, among other things, tape recordings
of  Oval  Office  meetings.  Nixon  moved  to  quash  the  sub-
poena, claiming that the Constitution provides an absolute
privilege  of  confidentiality  to  all  presidential  communica-
tions.  This Court rejected that argument in United States
v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), a decision we later described
as “unequivocally and emphatically endors[ing] Marshall’s”
holding that Presidents are subject to subpoena.  Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 704 (1997).

The Nixon Court readily acknowledged the importance of
preserving the confidentiality of communications “between
high Government officials and those who advise and assist
them.”  418 U. S., at 705.  “Human experience,” the Court
explained,  “teaches  that  those  who  expect  public  dissemi-
nation of their remarks may well temper candor with a con-
cern for appearances and for their own interests to the det-
Ibid.
riment
Confidentiality thus promoted the “public interest in can-
did, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presiden-
tial decisionmaking.”  Id., at 708.

the  decisionmaking  process.”

of

But, like Marshall two centuries prior, the Court recog-
nized  the  countervailing  interests  at  stake.  Invoking  the
common  law  maxim  that  “the  public  has  a  right  to  every
man’s evidence,” the Court observed that the public interest
in fair and accurate judicial proceedings is at its height in
the criminal setting, where our common commitment to jus-
tice  demands  that  “guilt  shall  not  escape”  nor  “innocence
suffer.”  Id., at 709 (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted).  Because  these  dual  aims  would  be  “defeated  if
judgments”  were  “founded  on  a  partial  or  speculative
presentation of the facts,” the Nixon Court recognized that
it  was  “imperative”  that  “compulsory  process  be  available
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically referencing the case of United States v. Nixon. It delves into legal precedent and arguments surrounding presidential confidentiality and the public's right to evidence.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.

ALITO, J., concurring

says or writes at all times of day and throughout the calen-
dar year.  See ante, at 7.14  Any such argument would run
headlong into the fundamental principle that a State “may
not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech even if he
has no entitlement to that benefit.”15  Agency for Int’l Devel-
opment v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc., 570 U. S. 205,
214 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  While the
in-school  restrictions  discussed  above  are  essential  to  the
operation of a public school system, any argument in favor
of expansive regulation of off-premises speech must contend
with this fundamental free-speech principle.

——————

14 There is no basis for concluding that the original public meaning of
the free-speech right protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
was  understood  by  Congress  or  the  legislatures  that  ratified  those
Amendments as permitting a public school to punish a wide swath of off-
premises student speech.  Compare post, at 2–4 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
At  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  First  Amendment,  public  education
was virtually unknown, and the Amendment did not apply to the States.
And as for the Fourteenth Amendment, research has found only one pre-
1868 case involving a public school’s regulation of a student’s off-prem-
ises speech.  In Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859), an 11-year-old boy,
while  driving  his  father’s  cow  by  the  home  of  his  teacher,  called  the
teacher “Old Jack Seaver” in the presence of other students.  Id., at 115
(emphasis deleted).  The next day, the teacher “whipped him with a small
rawhide.”  Ibid.  In a tort suit against the teacher for assault and battery,
the Supreme Court of Vermont reversed the lower court’s judgment for
the teacher but opined that the teacher had the authority to punish the
student’s speech because of its effect on the operation of the school.  Id.,
at 120–121, 125.  This decision is of negligible value for present purposes.
It does not appear that any claim was raised under the state constitu-
tional provision protecting freedom of speech.  And even if flinty Vermont
parents  at  the  time  in  question  could  be  understood  to  have  implicitly
delegated to the teacher the authority to whip their son for his off-prem-
ises speech, the same inference is wholly unrealistic today.

15 Here,  the  Pennsylvania  Constitution  required  that  B. L.  and  all
other students be offered “a thorough and efficient system of public edu-
cation.” Art. III, §14.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito in the case of Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B.L. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding free speech rights of students, particularly off-campus speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

vi

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

Page
903
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee; Reno v. . . . . . . .
American Broadcasting Cos.; Deteresa v.
968
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.; Buckley v. . . . . . 949,975
945
American Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Trostel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
981
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
952
American Medical Assn. v. Practice Mgmt. Information Corp.
. . .
936
American Medical Security, Inc.; Larsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Ofﬁce Telephone
937
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
America Online, Inc.; Zeran v.
949
Ameritech Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n . . . . . . . . .
935
Amos v. Maryland Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Servs.
966
Amsterdam Video, Inc. v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
AMTRAK; Lebron v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
Anchorage Ed. Assn. v. Patterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918
Anderson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
982
Anderson v. Roe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Anderson Corp.; Clark v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
963
Andrade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
Angel v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
973
Angelo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Angelone; Eaton v.
978
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Angelone; Stewart v.
916
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anheuser-Busch, Inc.; Teamsters v.
926
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Apfel; Arneson v.
958
Apfel; Booker v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
498
Apfel; Eastern Enterprises v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
266
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Apfel; Forney v.
943
Apfel; Kerekes v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
935
Apker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Arizona; Carrillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
933
Arizona; Follett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
912
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arizona; Gretzler v.
906
Arizona; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
909
Arkansas; Brown v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Armenis v. Cramer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
937
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Armstrong; Wilson v.
926
Arneson v. Apfel
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
905
Arroyo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
954
Arshal v. Dalton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Ashmus; Calderon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
917
. . . . .
Ashton v. Grievance Comm., 2d & 11th Jud. Dists. of N. Y.
Association. For labor union, see name of trade.
Association for Local Telecom. Services v. Iowa Utilities Bd. . . . .
Atkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

949
911
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, which is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>