<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

Utah was still a Territory because “the right of trial by jury
in  suits  at  common  law  appl[ied]  to  the  Territories  of  the
United States.”  Id., at 346.  The Court then stated that this
right “made it impossible to deprive him of his liberty ex-
cept by [a] unanimous verdict.”  Id., at 355; see also id., at
351, 353.

The  Court  has  repeatedly  reaffirmed  the  Sixth  Amend-
ment’s unanimity requirement.  In Patton v. United States,
281  U. S.  276  (1930),  the  Court  stated  that  the  Sixth
Amendment protects the right “that the verdict should be
unanimous,”  id.,  at  288.  In  Andres  v.  United  States,  333
U. S.  740  (1948),  the  Court  repeated  that  “[u]nanimity  in
jury verdicts is required” by the Sixth Amendment, id., at
748.  And in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), five
Justices agreed that “the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
trial by jury embraces a guarantee that the verdict of the
jury must be unanimous,” id., at 414 (Stewart, J., joined by
Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); see also Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U. S. 356, 371 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)
(explaining views in Apodaca and its companion case); id.,
at 382–383 (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall,
JJ., dissenting) (same).  We have accepted this interpreta-
tion of the Sixth Amendment in recent cases.  See Southern
Union  Co.  v.  United  States,  567  U. S.  343,  356  (2012);
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U. S. 296, 301 (2004); Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 477 (2000).

B

The question then becomes whether these decisions are
entitled  to  stare  decisis  effect.  As  I  have  previously  ex-
plained, “the Court’s typical formulation of the stare decisis
standard does not comport with our judicial duty under Ar-
ticle  III  because  it  elevates  demonstrably  erroneous  deci-
sions—meaning decisions outside the realm of permissible
interpretation—over the text of the Constitution and other
duly  enacted  federal  law.”    Gamble  v.  United  States,  587
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Ramos v. Louisiana. It cites previous legal precedents and discusses the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U84

[09-06-00 20:39:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

222

AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.
v. CENTRAL OFFICE TELEPHONE, INC.
Opinion of the Court

“extend to any person any privileges or facilities in such
communication, or employ or enforce any classiﬁcations, reg-
ulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as speci-
ﬁed in such schedule.” These provisions are modeled after
similar provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) and
share its goal of preventing unreasonable and discriminatory
charges. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 229–230 (1994).
Accordingly, the century-old “ﬁled rate doctrine” associated
with the ICA tariff provisions applies to the Communications
Act as well. See id., at 229–231; Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Co. v. Hall, 453 U. S. 571, 577 (1981); cf. United States Nav.
In Louis-
Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 284 U. S. 474, 481 (1932).
ville & Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97 (1915),
we described the basic contours of the ﬁled rate doctrine
under the ICA:

“Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the
carrier duly ﬁled is the only lawful charge. Deviation
from it is not permitted upon any pretext. Shippers
and travelers are charged with notice of it, and they as
well as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is found
by the Commission to be unreasonable.
Ignorance or
misquotation of rates is not an excuse for paying or
charging either less or more than the rate ﬁled. This
rule is undeniably strict and it obviously may work
hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy
which has been adopted by Congress in the regulation
interstate commerce in order to prevent unjust
of
discrimination.”

Thus, even if a carrier intentionally misrepresents its rate
and a customer relies on the misrepresentation, the carrier
cannot be held to the promised rate if it conﬂicts with the
published tariff. Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227
U. S. 639, 653 (1913).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the "filed rate doctrine" in the context of telecommunications. It contains legal citations and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

13

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting

Garner,  Reading  Law  174  (2012)  (no  provision  “should
needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to du-
plicate another provision or to have no consequence” (bold-
face deleted)).4

The Tribe’s preferred interpretation is especially doubtful
given the history of the Restoration Act.  The key roadblock
to  the  Tribe  obtaining  federal  trust  status  was  a  concern
that it would permit gambling.  The Tribe obtained federal
trust status only after striking a deal on this issue.  See Ys-
leta del Sur Pueblo, 220 F. Supp. 2d, at 677.  It would make
little  sense  for  Congress  to  have  enacted  §107(a)’s  limita-
tions on gaming merely to duplicate the rules already set
forth in §105(f ).  And it would make even less sense for Con-
gress to have done so while simultaneously indicating that
it was enacting the gaming prohibition “in accordance with
the tribe’s request,” §107(a), 101 Stat. 668–669, that it ban
on tribal lands “all gaming, gambling, lottery, or bingo, as
defined by the laws and administrative regulations of the
State  of  Texas”—full  stop,  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  123  (em-
phasis added).

What’s  more,  the  Tribe’s  interpretation  of  §107—em-
braced by the Court today—leads to a bizarre result: Viola-
tions of Texas’s criminal gaming prohibitions receive more
lenient treatment than all other violations of Texas’s crim-
inal  laws.  Under  §105(f ),  Texas  may  directly  enforce  in
state  court  all  of  its  laws  that  are  “criminal/prohibitory.”
But under §107(c), Texas may enforce its gaming laws only
through federal-court injunctions.  This diminished enforce-
ment  authority  would  make  sense  if  the  full  breadth  of

——————

4 In response, the Court focuses on the different treatment of Texas’s
gaming laws under §§107(b) and (c).  See ante, at 12, n. 1.  But the Court
does not dispute that under its reading of the Restoration Act, §107(a)
readopted the substantive Cabazon Band standard already required by
§105(f ),  even  though  §105(f )  comes  just  a  few  sentences  earlier  in  the
statute  and  uses  distinct  language  not  present  in  §107(a)  to  expressly
adopt the Public Law 280 framework.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It cites legal precedents and analyzes the text of a specific law (the Restoration Act).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MAHANOY AREA SCHOOL DIST. v. B. L.

Opinion of the Court

school’s varsity cheerleading squad and for right fielder on
a private softball team.  She did not make the varsity cheer-
leading team or get her preferred softball position, but she
was offered a spot on the cheerleading squad’s junior var-
sity  team.    B. L.  did  not  accept  the  coach’s  decision  with
good  grace,  particularly  because  the  squad  coaches  had
placed an entering freshman on the varsity team.

That weekend, B. L. and a friend visited the Cocoa Hut,
a local convenience store.  There, B. L. used her smartphone
to post two photos on Snapchat, a social media application
that allows users to post photos and videos that disappear
after  a  set period  of  time.    B. L. posted  the  images  to  her
Snapchat  “story,”  a  feature  of  the  application  that  allows
any person in the user’s “friend” group (B. L. had about 250
“friends”) to view the images for a 24 hour period.

The  first  image  B. L.  posted  showed  B.  L.  and  a  friend
with middle fingers raised; it bore the caption: “Fuck school
fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.”  App. 20.  The sec-
ond image was blank but for a caption, which read: “Love
how me and [another student] get told we need a year of jv
before we make varsity but tha[t] doesn’t matter to anyone
else?”  The caption also contained an upside-down smiley-
face emoji.  Id., at 21.

B. L.’s Snapchat “friends” included other Mahanoy Area
High School students, some of whom also belonged to the
cheerleading squad.  At least one of them, using a separate
cellphone,  took  pictures  of  B.  L.’s  posts  and  shared  them
with other members of the cheerleading squad.  One of the
students  who  received  these  photos  showed  them  to  her
mother (who was a cheerleading squad coach), and the im-
ages  spread.  That  week,  several  cheerleaders  and  other
students approached the cheerleading coaches “visibly up-
set” about B. L.’s posts.  Id., at 83–84.  Questions about the
posts persisted during an Algebra class taught by one of the
two coaches.  Id., at 83.

After discussing the matter with the school principal, the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case summary, likely from a court opinion. It sets the scene, introduces the parties involved (B.L. and Mahanoy Area School District), and describes the events leading up to the legal dispute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Summary</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U88

[09-06-00 16:44:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 308 (1998)

317

Thomas, J., dissenting

law-abiding citizens. Federal
law uses this state ﬁnding
of dangerousness in forbidding petitioner to have any guns.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Afﬁrmed.

Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia and Jus-

tice Souter join, dissenting.

The only limitation that Massachusetts law imposed on
petitioner’s possession of ﬁrearms was that he could not
carry handguns outside his home or business. See ante,
at 311.
In my view, Massachusetts law did not “expressly
provid[e]” that petitioner “may not . . . possess . . . ﬁrearms,”
18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(20), and thus petitioner cannot be sen-
tenced as an armed career criminal under § 924(e). Because
the Court holds to the contrary, I respectfully dissent.

.

.

§ 921(a)(20).

. ﬁrearms.”

Petitioner’s prior Massachusetts convictions qualify as
violent felonies for purposes of § 924(e) only if the “resto-
ration of [his] civil rights” by operation of Massachusetts
law “expressly provide[d] that [petitioner] may not .
.
possess .
In 1994, Massachu-
setts law did not expressly provide that petitioner could not
possess ﬁrearms. To the contrary: Petitioner was permit-
ted by Massachusetts law to possess shotguns, riﬂes, and
handguns. See ante, at 311; Mass. Gen. Laws §§ 140:123,
Indeed, Massachusetts provided
140:129B, 140:129C (1996).
petitioner with a ﬁrearm identiﬁcation card that enabled him
to possess such ﬁrearms.* The only restriction Massachu-
setts law placed on petitioner’s possession of ﬁrearms was
that he could not carry handguns outside his home or busi-
ness. See § 269:10(A). By prohibiting petitioner from pos-

*Petitioner was “entitled to” a ﬁrearm identiﬁcation card ﬁve years
after his release from prison. See Mass. Gen. Laws § 140:129B (1996); see
also Commonwealth v. Landry, 6 Mass. App. 404, 406, 376 N. E. 2d 1243,
1245 (1978) (ﬁrearm identiﬁcation card can be obtained as a “matter of
right”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 308 (1998).  It contains legal arguments and citations, which are not suitable for general indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

of the elements of common-law malicious prosecution, and
a  plaintiff  suing  for  common-law  malicious  prosecution
need not prove any of the elements required to establish an
unreasonable seizure.

Start  with  the  elements  of  an  unreasonable-seizure
claim.  Such a claim does not require proof that there was a
“prosecution”—i.e.,  a  criminal  proceeding  that  is  initiated
by the filing of charges in the form of a criminal complaint,
information, or indictment—while a malicious-prosecution
claim obviously requires a prosecution.  See, e.g., 1 F. Hilli-
ard, The Law of Torts or Private  Wrongs §2, pp. 413–414
(1866) (Hilliard) (“The general principle is laid down, that
an  action  lies  for  maliciously  causing  one  to  be  indicted,
whereby  he  is  damnified,  either  in  person,  reputation,  or
property”  (emphasis  added));  Cooley  180  (“[I]t  is  a  duty
which every man owes to every other not to institute pro-
ceedings maliciously, which he has no good reason to believe
are  justified  by  the  facts  and  the  law”  (emphasis  added));
M. Newell, Law of Malicious Prosecution, False Imprison-
ment, and Abuse of Process §1, p. 3 (1892) (Newell) (same);
see also W. Prosser, Law of Torts 860 (1941) (“The interest
in freedom from unjustifiable litigation is protected by an
action for malicious prosecution” (boldface deleted and em-
phasis added)).  A person who is arrested without probable
cause may have a viable unreasonable-seizure claim even if
he or she is released before any charges are filed.

An  unreasonable-seizure  claim  also  does  not  require
“malice.”  The Court has “almost uniformly rejected invita-
tions  to  probe  subjective  intent”  in  Fourth  Amendment
cases.  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 737 (2011).  If a
law enforcement officer makes an arrest without probable
cause, the arrest is unreasonable and therefore unconstitu-
tional even if the officer harbors no ill will for the arrestee.
Likewise, if an officer makes an arrest with probable cause,
there is no Fourth Amendment violation regardless of the
“actual  motivations  of  the  individual  officers  involved.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the elements of common-law malicious prosecution and unreasonable seizure, highlighting the differences between the two.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
20

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

strong with regard to officials who are granted some degree
of civil immunity because of their duties.  It is in those cases
where the public can see that officials exercising power un-
der public trust remain on equal footing with their fellow
citizens under the criminal law.  See, e.g., O’Shea v. Little-
ton, 414 U. S. 488, 503 (1974) (“[W]e have never held that
the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or ex-
ecutive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization
of  otherwise  criminal  deprivations  of  constitutional
rights”); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U. S. 24, 31 (1980) (“[J]udi-
cial  immunity  was  not  designed  to  insulate  the  judiciary
from  all  aspects  of  public  accountability.  Judges  are  im-
mune from §1983 damages actions, but they are subject to
criminal  prosecutions  as  are  other  citizens”);  Imbler  v.
Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 428–429 (1976) (“We emphasize
that the [civil] immunity of prosecutors . . . does not leave
the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that
which occurs.  This Court has never suggested that the pol-
icy considerations which compel civil immunity for certain
governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of
the criminal law.  Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil
immunity for centuries, could be punished criminally”).

The public interest in the federal criminal prosecution of
a former President alleged to have used the powers of his
office to commit crimes may be greater still.  “[T]he Presi-
dent . . . represent[s] all the voters in the Nation,” and his
powers are given by the people under our Constitution.  An-
derson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 795 (1983).  When Pres-
idents use the powers of their office for personal gain or as
part of a criminal scheme, every person in the country has
an interest in that criminal prosecution.  The majority over-
looks that paramount interest entirely.

Finally, the question of federal criminal immunity for a
former President “involves a countervailing Article II con-
sideration  absent  in  Fitzgerald”:  recognizing  such  an  im-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It discusses the topic of criminal immunity for former Presidents. The language and structure are consistent with legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

7

Opinion of the Court

interest  in  securing  diversity’s  benefits,  although  a  per-
missible  objective,  is  complex.  “It  is  not  an  interest  in
simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of
the  student  body  is  in  effect  guaranteed  to  be  members
of  selected  ethnic  groups,  with  the  remaining  percentage
an undifferentiated aggregation of students.  The diversity
that  furthers  a  compelling  state  interest  encompasses  a
far  broader  array  of  qualifications  and  characteristics  of
which  racial  or  ethnic  origin  is  but  a  single  though  im-
portant  element.”  Bakke,  438  U. S.,  at  315  (separate
opinion).

In  Gratz,  539  U. S.  244,  and  Grutter,  supra,  the  Court

endorsed  the  precepts  stated  by  Justice  Powell.    In  Grut
ter, the Court reaffirmed his conclusion that obtaining the
educational benefits of “student body diversity is a compel-
ling  state  interest  that  can  justify  the  use  of  race  in  uni-
versity admissions.”  Id., at 325.

As  Gratz  and  Grutter  observed,  however,  this  follows
only  if  a  clear  precondition  is  met:  The  particular  admis-
sions  process  used  for  this  objective  is  subject  to  judicial
review.  Race may not be considered unless the admissions
process can withstand strict scrutiny.  “Nothing in Justice
Powell’s  opinion  in  Bakke  signaled  that  a  university  may
employ  whatever  means  it  desires  to  achieve  the  stated
goal  of  diversity  without  regard  to  the  limits  imposed  by
our strict scrutiny analysis.”  Gratz, supra, at 275.  “To be
narrowly  tailored,  a  race-conscious  admissions  program
cannot use a quota system,” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 334, but
instead must “remain flexible enough to ensure that each
applicant  is  evaluated  as  an  individual  and  not  in  a  way
that  makes  an  applicant’s  race  or  ethnicity  the  defining
feature of his or her application,” id., at 337.  Strict scru-
tiny requires the university to demonstrate with clarity that
its “purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible
and  substantial,  and  that  its  use  of  the  classification  is
necessary  . . .  to  the  accomplishment  of  its  purpose.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from the Supreme Court. It discusses the legal precedent surrounding affirmative action in university admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
58

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix A to opinion of ALITO, J.

Empson>

2sex \“\ vt –ED/–ING/–ES 1: to determine the sex of (an organic
being) <it is difficult to ~ the animals at a distance—E. A.
Hooton>—compare AUTOSEXING 2 a: to increase the sex-
ual  appeal  or  attraction  of—usu.  used  with  up  <titles
must be ~ed up to attract 56 million customers—Time>
b: to arouse the sexual instincts or desires of—usu. used
with up <watching you ~ing up that bar kitten—Oakley
Hall>

9 Oxford English Dictionary 577–578 (1933):

  Sex (seks), sb. Also 6–7 sexe, (6 seex, 7 pl. sexe, 8 poss.
sexe’s).  [ad. L. sexus (u-stem), whence also F. sexe (12th c.),
Sp., Pg. sexo, It. sesso. Latin had also a form secus neut. (in-
declinable).]
  1.  Either  of  the  two  divisions  of  organic  beings  distin-
guished as male and female respectively; the males or the
females (of a species, etc., esp. of the human race) viewed
collectively.

1382 WYCLIF Gen. vi. 19 Of alle thingis hauynge sowle of ony flehs, two thow shalt brynge

into the ark, that maal sex and femaal lyuen with thee. 1532 MORE Confut. Tindale II. 152, I

had as leue he bare them both a bare cheryte, as wyth the frayle feminyne sexe fall to far in

loue. 1559 ALYMER Harborowe E 4 b, Neither of them debarred the heires female .. as though

it had ben .. vnnatural for that sexe to gouern. 1576 GASCOIGNE  Philomene xcviii, I speake

against my sex. a 1586 SIDNEY  Arcadia II. (1912) 158 The sexe of womankind of all other is

most bound to have regardfull eie to mens judgements. 1600 NASHE Summer’s Last Will F 3

b, A woman they imagine her to be, Because that sexe keepes nothing close they heare. 1615

CROOKE  Body of Man 274 If wee respect the .. conformation of both the Sexes, the Male is

sooner perfected .. in the wombe. 1634 SIR T. HERBERT  Trav. 19 Both sexe goe naked. 1667

MILTON P. L. IX, 822 To add what wants In Femal Sex. 1671—Samson 774 It was a weakness

In me, but incident to all our sex. 1679 DRYDEN Troilus & Cr. I. ii, A strange dissembling sex

we women are. 1711 ADDISON Spect. No. 10 ¶ 6 Their Amusements .. are more adapted to the

Sex  than to  the  Species.  1730  SWIFT  Let.  to  Mrs.  Whiteway  28  Dec.,  You  have  neither  the

scrawl nor the spelling of your sex. 1742 GRAY  Propertius II. 73 She .. Condemns her fickle

Sexe’s fond Mistake. 1763 G. WILLIAMS in Jesse Selwyn & Contemp. (1843) I. 265 It would
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dictionary definition of the word "sex" from the Oxford English Dictionary.
  </thinking>
  <category>Dictionary Definition</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO

BARRETT, J., dissenting

as there is an important difference between Counterman’s
knowledge of what his words meant and his knowledge of
how they would be perceived.  Though the Court conflates
the two, our obscenity cases have repeatedly refused to re-
quire the latter as a matter of constitutional law.  Hamling,
418 U. S., at 120–123; Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29,
41–42 (1896).  So obscenity doctrine does not help Counter-
man.

The Court leans hardest on defamation law, but its argu-
ment depends on a single, cherry-picked strand of the doc-
trine.  Yes, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan requires public
figures and public officials to show “actual malice” on a def-
amation  claim,  and  we  have  defined  “actual  malice”  as
“knowledge that [the statement] was false” or “reckless dis-
regard of whether it was false or not.”  376 U. S. 254, 279–
280 (1964).  But that is not the full story.  A private person
need  only  satisfy  an  objective  standard  to  recover  actual
damages for defamation.  Gertz v.  Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U. S.  323,  347–350  (1974).    And  if  the  defamatory  speech
does not involve a matter of public concern, she may recover
punitive  damages  with  the  same  showing.    Dun  &  Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749, 760–
761 (1985) (plurality opinion).  We have justified that dis-
tinction on the ground that public-figure defamation claims
may deter “would-be critics of official conduct . . . from voic-
ing their criticism,” which would “dampe[n] the vigor and
limit the variety of public debate.”  Sullivan, 376 U. S., at
279.  Not  only  that,  but  “the  state  interest  in  protecting”
public figures is weaker, since they tend to  “enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective communi-
cation and hence have a more realistic opportunity to coun-
teract  false  statements.”  Gertz,  418  U. S.,  at  344.  So,
despite what the Court says, Sullivan does not stand for the
broad proposition that the First Amendment “demand[s] a
subjective mental-state requirement.”  Ante, at 6.  Instead,
it simply raises the bar for borderline unprotected speech
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Counterman v. Colorado. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding the case, referencing prior Supreme Court decisions and legal doctrines.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

23

THOMAS, J., concurring

all  racial  classifications  to  the  strictest  of  scrutiny.”  Jen-
kins,  515  U. S.,  at  121  (THOMAS, J.,  concurring);  see  also
ante, at 15, n. 4 (emphasizing the consequences of an insuf-
ficiently  searching  inquiry).    And,  in  case  after  case,  we
have  employed  strict  scrutiny  vigorously  to  reject  various
forms  of  racial  discrimination  as  unconstitutional.  See
Fisher  I,  570  U. S.,  at  317–318  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring).
The  Court  today  rightly  upholds  that  tradition  and
acknowledges  the  consequences  that  have  flowed  from
Grutter’s contrary approach.

Three aspects of today’s decision warrant comment: First,
to satisfy strict scrutiny, universities must be able to estab-
lish an actual link between racial discrimination and edu-
cational benefits.  Second, those engaged in racial discrimi-
nation  do  not  deserve  deference  with  respect  to  their
reasons for discriminating.  Third, attempts to remedy past
governmental discrimination must be closely tailored to ad-
dress that particular past governmental discrimination.

A
To satisfy strict scrutiny, universities must be able to es-
tablish a compelling reason to racially discriminate.  Grut-
ter recognized “only one” interest sufficiently compelling to
justify  race-conscious  admissions  programs:  the  “educa-
tional benefits of a diverse student body.”  539 U. S., at 328,

——————
(2003) (“We have explained that discrimination that violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment committed by an insti-
tution that accepts federal funds also constitutes a violation of Title VI”);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 287 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (“Title VI . . . proscribe[s] only those racial classifications that
would violate the Equal Protection Clause”).  As JUSTICE GORSUCH points
out, the language of Title VI makes no allowance for racial considerations
in university admissions.  See post, at 2–3 (concurring opinion).  Though
I continue to adhere to my view in Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S.
___, ___–___ (2020) (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1–54), I agree with
JUSTICE GORSUCH’s concurrence in this case.  The plain text of Title VI
reinforces the colorblind view of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding affirmative action in university admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

3

Syllabus

that  significantly  alters  the  agency’s  prior  interpretation  effectively
amends the underlying regulation.  That assertion conflicts with the
ordinary meaning of the words “amend” and “interpret,” and it is im-
possible to reconcile with the longstanding recognition that interpre-
tive  rules  do  not  have  the  force  and  effect  of  law.    MBA’s  theory  is
particularly odd in light of the limitations of the Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine, which applies only when an agency has previously adopted
an interpretation of its regulation.  MBA fails to explain why its ar-
gument  regarding  revised  interpretations  should  not  also  extend  to
the  agency’s  first  interpretation.    Christensen  v.  Harris  County,  529
U. S. 576, and Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U. S. 87,
distinguished.  Pp. 9–12.

(2) MBA also contends that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine re-
inforces the APA’s goal of procedural fairness.  But the APA already
provides  recourse  to  regulated  entities  from  agency  decisions  that
skirt  notice-and-comment  provisions  by  placing  a  variety  of  con-
straints on agency decisionmaking, e.g., the arbitrary and capricious
standard.    In  addition,  Congress  may  include  safe-harbor  provisions
in legislation to shelter regulated entities from liability when they re-
ly on previous agency interpretations.  See, e.g., 29 U. S. C. §§259(a),
(b)(1).  Pp. 12–13.

(3) MBA  has  waived  its  argument  that  the  2010  Administra-
tor’s  Interpretation  should  be  classified  as  a  legislative  rule.    From
the beginning, this suit has been litigated on the understanding that
the  Administrator’s  Interpretation  is  an  interpretive  rule.    Neither
the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed this argument
below, and MBA did not raise it here in opposing certiorari.  P. 14.

720 F. 3d 966, reversed.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in
which ALITO, J., joined except for Part III–B.  ALITO, J., filed an opinion
concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  the  judgment.    SCALIA,  J.,  and
THOMAS, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. It outlines the arguments and holdings of the case, but does not contain the full text of the opinion. Syllabi are generally not considered suitable for indexing as they are summaries rather than the primary content of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
12  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

U. S.  Brown  Reargument  Brief  65  (citation  omitted).    For
example, the Pennsylvania debate suggests that the Four-
teenth Amendment was understood to make the law “what
justice  is  represented  to  be,  blind”  to  the  “color  of  [one’s]
skin.”  App. to Pa. Leg. Record XLVIII (1867) (Rep. Mann).
The most commonly held view today—consistent with the
rationale repeatedly invoked during the congressional de-
bates, see, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2458–
2469—is that the Amendment was designed to remove any
doubts  regarding  Congress’  authority  to  enact  the  Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and to establish a nondiscrimination rule
that could not be repealed by future Congresses.  See, e.g.,
J.  Harrison,  Reconstructing  the  Privileges  or  Immunities
Clause,  101  Yale  L. J.  1385,  1388  (1992)  (noting  that  the
“primary  purpose”  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  “was  to
mandate  certain  rules  of  racial  equality,  especially  those
contained in Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866”).2  The
Amendment’s phrasing supports this view, and there does
not appear to have been any argument to the contrary pre-
dating Brown.

Consistent  with  the  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1866’s  aim,  the
Amendment  definitively  overruled  Chief  Justice  Taney’s
opinion in Dred Scott that blacks “were not regarded as a
portion  of  the  people  or  citizens  of  the  Government”  and
“had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”
19 How., at 407, 411.  And, like the 1866 Act, the Amend-
ment  also  clarified  that  American  citizenship  conferred
——————

2 There is “some support” in the history of enactment for at least “four
interpretations  of  the  first  section  of  the  proposed  amendment,  and  in
particular  of  its  Privileges  [or]  Immunities  Clause:  it  would  authorize
Congress to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV;
it  would  forbid  discrimination  between  citizens  with  respect  to  funda-
mental  rights;  it  would  establish  a  set  of  basic  rights  that  all  citizens
must enjoy; and it would make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.”
D.  Currie,  The  Reconstruction  Congress,  75  U.  Chi.  L. Rev.  383,  406
(2008) (citing sources).  Notably, those four interpretations are all color-
blind.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses the Fourteenth Amendment and its interpretation regarding racial equality.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22  AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

nations are confidentially reported to California’s Charita-
ble Trusts Section.12

In fact, research shows that the vast majority of donors
prefer to publicize their charitable contributions.  See Dren-
nan, Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable Nam-
ing Rights, 80 U. Cin. L. Rev. 45, 50 (2011) (“Research re-
veals  that  anonymous  largesse  from  the  wealthy  has
become rare”); Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the
Law  of  Gifts  and  Gratuitous  Promises,  1997  Wis.  L.  Rev.
567, 574, n. 17 (“[C]haritable gifts are rarely made anony-
mously”).  One  study  found  that  anonymous  gifting  ac-
counted  for  less  than  1%  of  all  donations  to  Yale  Law
School, Harvard Law School, and Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity.  Glazer & Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Char-
ity, 86 Am. Econ. Rev. 1019, 1021 (1996).  Symptomatic of
this trend is the explosion in charitable naming rights since
the mid-1990s.  Drennan, 80 U. Cin. L. Rev., at 50, 55.  As
one author has recounted, “every nook and cranny of [pub-
lic]  buildings”  is  now  “tagged  by  some  wealthy,  generous
and  obviously  not  publicity-shy  donor.”    Isherwood,  The
Graffiti  of  the  Philanthropic  Class,  N. Y.  Times,  Dec.  2,
2007.

Of course, it is always possible that an organization is in-
herently  controversial  or  for  an  apparently  innocuous  or-
ganization to explode into controversy.  The answer, how-
ever, is to ensure that confidentiality measures are sound
or, in the case of public disclosures, to require a procedure
for  governments  to  address  requests  for  exemptions  in  a
timely manner.  It is not to hamper all government law en-
forcement efforts by forbidding confidential disclosures en
masse.

——————

12 See California Dept. of Justice, Office of Atty. Gen., Charity Regis-
tration Reports (June 15, 2021), https://oag.ca.gov/charities/reports#crr;
Santa  Barbara  County  Horticultural  Society
(June  15,  2021),
https://www.sbchs.org.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a legal case, specifically focusing on the issue of charitable donation confidentiality. It delves into research and arguments surrounding donor preferences and the implications of public disclosure.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

li

Page

1094

Finfrock v. Crist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Finfrock v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Finger Lakes Developmental Disabilities Service; Greene v.  . .  886,1066

816

Finker v. Weber  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1044

Finnerty, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
860

Finney v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
824

Finstad v.  Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation
Fiore v. Lindsay  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1097

First Correctional Medical Services; Dennis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  834,1086

First Correctional Medical Services; Shabazz v.  . . . . . . . . . . . .  834,1086

1108

First Derivative Traders; Janus Capital Group, Inc. v.  . . . . . . . . .
1012

First Resolution Management Corp.; Avery v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
845

Fischer; Bermudez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1057

Fischer; Chavis v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915

Fischer; Felder v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1156

Fischer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1100

Fischer; Warren v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
804

Fisher; Asemani v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
823

Fisher v. Colorado
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45

Fisher; Michigan v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1007

Fisher v. Penn Trafﬁc Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
818

Fisher v. VanLoveren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
874

520 South Mich. Ave. Associates, Ltd.; Shannon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . .
923

Flagler v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
873

Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund Inc. v.  TXU Corp.
890

Flanders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fleck v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1018

Flecker; Simmons v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  803,1045

881

Fleet Bank; Farash v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
996

Fleitas v. Florida  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
814

Fleming, In re
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1081

Fleming; Patten v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
843

Fleming v. Rapelje  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1052

Flick v. Kentucky  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1020

Flipping v. Reilly  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
890

Flood v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
885

Flora v. Sheets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
860

Flores v. Adams  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Flores v. Thaler  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1094

Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1015,1129

1085

Flores Carreto v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
974

Flores-De-Jesus v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
829

Flores-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1131

Flores-Sotelo v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
48  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

attuned to reality.  No one is fooled.

Further, the Court’s demand that a student’s discussion
of  racial  self-identification  be  tied  to  individual  qualities,
such  as  “courage,”  “leadership,”  “unique  ability,”  and  “de-
termination,” only serves to perpetuate the false narrative
that  Harvard  and  UNC  currently  provide  “preferences  on
the basis of race alone.”  Ante, at 28–29, 39; see also ante,
at  28,  n. 6  (claiming  without  support  that  “race  alone  . . .
explains the admissions decisions for hundreds if not thou-
sands  of  applicants”).  The  Court’s  precedents  already  re-
quire  that  universities  take  race  into  account  holistically,
in a limited way, and based on the type of “individualized”
and “flexible” assessment that the Court purports to favor.
Grutter,  539  U. S.,  at  334;  see  Brief  for  Students  and
Alumni of Harvard College as Amici Curiae 15–17 (Harvard
College  Brief )  (describing  how  the  dozens  of  application
files in the record “uniformly show that, in line with Har-
vard’s ‘whole-person’ admissions philosophy, Harvard’s ad-
missions officers engage in a highly nuanced assessment of
each applicant’s background and qualifications”).  After ex-
tensive discovery and two lengthy trials, neither SFFA nor
the majority can point to a single example of an underrepre-
sented  racial  minority  who  was  admitted  to  Harvard  or
UNC on the basis of “race alone.”

In the end, the Court merely imposes its preferred college
application format on the Nation, not acting as a court of
law applying precedent but taking on the role of college ad-
ministrators  to  decide  what  is  better  for  society.  The
Court’s course reflects its inability to recognize that racial
identity informs some students’ viewpoints and experiences
in  unique  ways.    The  Court  goes  as  far  as  to  claim  that
Bakke’s recognition that Black Americans can offer differ-
ent  perspectives  than  white  people  amounts  to  a  “stereo-
type.”  Ante, at 29.

It is not a stereotype to acknowledge the basic truth that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal dissenting opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It delves into the Court's reasoning and the dissenting Justice's counterarguments regarding affirmative action in college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

15

Opinion of the Court

operate  without  §5000A(a).  See  §§6055(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II),
(c)(1) (requiring certification as to whether the beneficiary’s
plan qualifies for cost-sharing or premium tax credits under
§36B);  §§6056(b)(2)(B),  (c)(1)  (requiring  certification  as  to
whether  the  plan  qualifies  as  an  “eligible  employer-spon-
sored  plan”  that  satisfies  §4980H’s  employer  mandate).
These provisions refer to §5000A only to pick up a different
subsection’s  definition  of  “minimum  essential  coverage.”
See  26  U. S. C.  §§6055(e),  6056(b)(2)(B)  (incorporating
§5000A(f)’s definition of “minimum essential coverage”).  To
show that the minimum essential coverage requirement is
unconstitutional would not show that enforcement of any of
these other provisions violates the Constitution.  The state
plaintiffs do not claim the contrary.  The Government’s con-
duct  in  question  is  therefore  not  “fairly  traceable”  to  en-
forcement of the “allegedly unlawful” provision of which the
plaintiffs complain—§5000A(a).  Allen, 468 U. S., at 751.

The state plaintiffs complain of other pocketbook injuries.
They say, for example, that, in order to avoid a “substantial
tax penalty,” they will have to “offer their full-time employ-
ees (and qualified dependents) minimum essential coverage
under an eligible employer-sponsored plan.”  Brief for Re-
spondent/Cross-Petitioner  States  23  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted).    They  say  that  the  Act’s  insistence  that
they “expand Medicaid eligibility” has led to “increas[ed] . . .
Medicaid  expenditures.”    Ibid.    And  they  argue  that  “the
[Act]’s vast and complex rules and regulations” will require
additional  expenditures.  Id.,  at  22–23  (citing  App.  152–
153, 174, 190–191).  They seem to argue that they will have
to pay more to expand coverage for employees who work 30–
39 hours per week, see App. 174, and for those who become
too old to remain in foster care, see id., at 152–153.

Again,  the  problem  for  the  state  plaintiffs  is  that  these
other  provisions  also  operate  independently  of  §5000A(a).
See 26 U. S. C. §4980H(a) (establishing an employer man-
date);  §4980H(c)(4)  (establishing  employee  eligibility  for
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the constitutionality of a specific provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the arguments made by the state plaintiffs challenging it.  The text is sequential and part of a larger legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
Opinion of the Court

CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS  delivered  the  opinion  of  the

Court, except as to Part IV.

In the summer of 2012, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (DHS) announced an immigration program known as
Deferred  Action  for  Childhood  Arrivals,  or  DACA.    That
program  allows  certain  unauthorized  aliens  who  entered
the  United  States  as  children  to  apply  for  a  two-year  for-
bearance  of  removal.  Those  granted  such  relief  are  also
eligible for work authorization and various federal benefits.
Some  700,000  aliens  have  availed  themselves  of  this
opportunity.

Five  years  later,  the  Attorney  General  advised  DHS  to
rescind DACA, based on his conclusion that it was unlaw-
ful.  The Department’s Acting Secretary issued a memoran-
dum terminating the program on that basis.  The termina-
tion  was  challenged  by  affected  individuals  and  third
parties  who  alleged,  among  other  things,  that  the  Acting
Secretary  had  violated  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act
(APA)  by  failing  to  adequately  address  important  factors
bearing  on  her  decision.  For  the  reasons  that  follow,  we
conclude that the Acting Secretary did violate the APA, and
that the rescission must be vacated.

I
A

In June 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued
a memorandum announcing an immigration relief program
for “certain young people who were brought to this country
as  children.”  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  in  No.  18–587,  p.  97a
(App. to Pet. for Cert.).  Known as DACA, the program ap-
plies to childhood arrivals who were under age 31 in 2012;
have continuously resided here since 2007; are current stu-
dents,  have  completed  high  school,  or  are  honorably  dis-
charged  veterans;  have  not  been  convicted  of  any  serious
crimes;  and  do  not  threaten  national  security  or  public
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court. It sets the context for the case, outlining the DACA program and the legal challenges surrounding its rescission.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES

THOMAS, J., dissenting

vacy,”  the  Katz  test  misconstrues  virtually  every  one  of
these words.

A
The  Katz  test  distorts  the  original  meaning  of
“searc[h]”—the  word  in  the  Fourth  Amendment  that  it
purports to define, see ante, at 5; Smith, supra.  Under the
Katz  test,  the  government  conducts  a  search  anytime  it
violates  someone’s  “reasonable  expectation  of  privacy.”
That is not a normal definition of the word “search.”

At  the  founding,  “search”  did  not  mean  a  violation  of
someone’s  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy.   The  word
was  probably  not  a  term  of  art,  as  it  does  not  appear  in
legal dictionaries from the era.  And its ordinary meaning
was the same as it is today: “ ‘[t]o look over or through for
the  purpose  of  finding  something;  to  explore;  to  examine
by inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search
the wood for a thief.’ ”  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27,
32, n. 1 (2001) (quoting N. Webster, An American Diction
ary  of  the  English  Language  66  (1828)  (reprint  6th  ed.
1989));  accord,  2  S.  Johnson,  A  Dictionary  of  the  English
Language  (5th  ed.  1773)  (“Inquiry  by  looking  into  every
suspected  place”);  N.  Bailey,  An  Universal  Etymological
English  Dictionary  (22d  ed.  1770)  (“a  seeking  after,  a
looking  for,  &c.”);  2  J.  Ash,  The  New  and  Complete  Dic
tionary  of  the  English  Language  (2d  ed.  1795)  (“An  en
quiry,  an  examination,  the  act  of  seeking,  an  enquiry  by
looking into every suspected place; a quest; a pursuit”); T.
Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language
(6th ed. 1796) (similar).  The word “search” was not asso
ciated  with  “reasonable  expectation  of  privacy”  until  Jus
tice  Harlan  coined  that  phrase  in  1967.    The  phrase  “ex
pectation(s)  of  privacy”  does  not  appear  in  the  pre-Katz
federal  or  state  case  reporters,  the  papers  of  prominent
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and the concept of "search" as defined by the Katz test.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Judgment</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

7

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

discussion  of  the  proposed  Treaty  Power  occurred,  see
Bradley  410;  Golove,  Treaty-Making  and  the  Nation,  98
Mich. L. Rev. 1075, 1141–1142 (2000) (hereinafter Golove).
There, Anti-Federalists leveled the charge that the Treaty
Power  gave  the  Federal  Government  excessive  power.
See,  e.g.,  3  Debates  on  the  Federal  Constitution  509  (J.
Elliot  2d  ed.  1876)  (hereinafter  Elliot’s  Debates)  (G.  Ma-
son)  (“The  President  and  Senate  can  make  any  treaty
whatsoever”);  id.,  at  513  (P.  Henry)  (“To  me  this  power
appears  still  destructive;  for  they  can  make  any  treaty”).
But  Madison  insisted  that  just  “because  this  power  is
given to Congress,” it did not follow that the Treaty Power
was “absolute and unlimited.”  Id., at 514.  The President
and  the  Senate  lacked  the  power  “to  dismember  the  em-
pire,”  for  example,  because  “[t]he  exercise  of  the  power
must be consistent with the object of the delegation.”  Ibid.
“The object of treaties,” in Madison’s oft-repeated formula-
tion, “is the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations,
and is external.”  Ibid.

Although  Alexander  Hamilton  undoubtedly  believed
that the Treaty Power was broad within its proper sphere,
see infra, at 8, the view he expressed in essays during the
New York ratification campaign is entirely consistent with
Madison’s.  After noting that the Treaty Power was one of
the  “most  unexceptionable  parts”  of  the  proposed  Consti-
tution, Hamilton distinguished the Treaty Power from the
legislative  power  “to  prescribe  rules  for  the  regulation  of
the society” and from the executive power to “execut[e] . . .
the laws.”  The Federalist No. 75, at 503–504.  “The power
of  making  treaties,”  he  concluded,  “is  plainly  neither  the
one  nor  the  other.”  Id.,  at  504.  Rather,  Hamilton  ex-
plained  that  treaties  “are  not  rules  prescribed  by  the
sovereign  to  the  subject,  but  agreements  between  sover-
eign and sovereign.”  Id., at 504–505.  That description is
difficult  to  square  with  a  view  of  the  Treaty  Power  that
would  allow  the  Federal  Government  to  prescribe  rules
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case 572 U.S. ____ (2014). It delves into the historical context and interpretation of the Treaty Power granted to the Federal Government.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
8

SNYDER v. PHELPS

Opinion of the Court

form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is neces-
sary  to  evaluate  all  the  circumstances  of  the  speech,  in-
cluding what was said, where it was said, and how it was
said.

The  “content”  of  Westboro’s  signs  plainly  relates  to
broad  issues  of  interest  to  society  at  large,  rather  than
matters  of  “purely  private  concern.”    Dun  &  Bradstreet,
supra,  at  759.  The  placards  read  “God  Hates  the
USA/Thank  God  for  9/11,”  “America  is  Doomed,”  “Don’t
Pray  for  the  USA,”  “Thank  God  for  IEDs,”  “Fag  Troops,”
“Semper Fi Fags,” “God Hates Fags,” “Maryland Taliban,”
“Fags Doom Nations,” “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” “Thank
God  for  Dead  Soldiers,”  “Pope  in  Hell,”  “Priests  Rape
Boys,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates You.”  App.
3781–3787.  While  these  messages  may  fall  short  of
refined  social  or  political  commentary,  the  issues  they
highlight—the  political  and  moral  conduct  of  the  United
States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexual-
ity  in  the  military,  and  scandals  involving  the  Catholic
clergy—are matters of public import.  The signs certainly
convey  Westboro’s  position  on  those  issues,  in  a  manner
designed,  unlike  the  private  speech  in  Dun  &  Bradstreet,
to reach as broad a public audience as possible.  And even
if  a  few  of  the  signs—such  as  “You’re  Going  to  Hell”  and
“God  Hates  You”—were  viewed  as  containing  messages
related  to  Matthew  Snyder  or  the  Snyders  specifically,
that would not change the fact that the overall thrust and
dominant  theme  of  Westboro’s  demonstration  spoke  to
broader public issues.

Apart  from  the  content  of  Westboro’s  signs,  Snyder
contends  that  the  “context”  of  the  speech—its  connection
with  his  son’s  funeral—makes  the  speech  a  matter  of
private  rather  than  public  concern.    The  fact  that  West-
boro  spoke  in  connection  with  a  funeral,  however,  cannot
by  itself  transform  the  nature  of  Westboro’s  speech.
Westboro’s signs, displayed on public land next to a public
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt discussing the context and content of a protest. It delves into the First Amendment implications of the protest's message and its location near a funeral.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xxxix

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Jones; Lewis v.
Jones v. Lincoln Electric Co.
Jones v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jones v. Waremart Foods, Inc.
Jones; Wilson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jordan v. Haunani-Henry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Joseph v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Joytime Distributors & Amusement Co. v. South Carolina . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Judge, Circuit Court of Miss., Wilkinson Cty.; Clay v.
Judge, Court of Common Pleas of Pa., Erie Cty.; Bierley v.
. .
. . . .
Judge, Florida Circuit Court, 9th Judicial Circuit; Ellison v.
Judge, Superior Court of D. C.; Corey v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Judge, 337th Dist. Ct., Harris Cty. v. Tex. Comm’n on Jud. Conduct
Junior v. West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Justice, Appellate Court of Ill., Fourth Dist.; Wronke v.
. . . . . . .
Kalan v. Bockhorst, Ehrlich & Kaminskee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kaluna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kanazeh v. Lockheed Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“Kandyland”; Erie v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kansas; Burk v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kansas v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kansas City v. Harmon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kansas City Area Transportation Authority; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . .
Kansas Public Employees Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Koger Assoc.
Kansas State Univ. v. Innes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kapaev v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kaplan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kavalaris, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kavanagh; Tunstall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Keane; Barnes v.
Kearney; Saunders v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Keeler Die Cast v. Automobile Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kee Mann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kellum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kemna; Curtis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kemna; Middleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kemnitz v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kemper v. Dormire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kennedy; Chandler v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kent; Colacurcio v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kent City School Dist.; Rettig v.
Kentucky; Mills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kentucky; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kerley; Leone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page
1025
1067
848,1029,1041,1060,1065,1137
1110
1114
1059
1105
1087
1132
1050,1107
1074
1006
1020
1069
1101
1033
1056
1024
277
1058
1015
1038
1033
1004
1037
1081
1022
1088
1008,1084
1027
1063
1018
1011
1080
1071
1097
1040
1027
1101
1053
1023,1105
1083
1075
1076

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, listing case names and their corresponding page numbers. It is a structural element of a legal document and not the main body text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20A169
_________________

ALABAMA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, ET AL. v.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY

[June 29, 2021]

  The  application  to  vacate  stay  presented  to  THE  CHIEF
JUSTICE and by him referred to the Court is denied.
  JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE ALITO, JUSTICE GORSUCH, and
JUSTICE BARRETT would grant the application.
  JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
  I  agree  with  the  District  Court  and  the  applicants  that
the  Centers  for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention  exceeded
its  existing  statutory  authority  by  issuing  a  nationwide
eviction moratorium.  See Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324 (2014).  Because the CDC plans to
end  the moratorium in only  a few weeks,  on  July  31, and
because those few weeks will allow for additional and more
orderly  distribution  of  the  congressionally  appropriated
rental assistance funds, I vote at this time to deny the ap-
plication to vacate the District Court’s stay of its order.  See
Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hospital Medical & Surgi-
cal  Ins.  Plan,  501  U. S.  1301,  1305  (1991)  (Scalia,  J.,  in
chambers)  (stay  depends  in  part  on  balance  of  equities);
Coleman  v.  Paccar  Inc.,  424  U. S.  1301,  1304  (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., in chambers).  In my view, clear and specific
congressional authorization (via new legislation) would be
necessary for the CDC to extend the moratorium past July
31.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Alabama Association of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Services.  It discusses legal arguments and the court's decision regarding an eviction moratorium.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document, Supreme Court Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U94

[09-11-00 13:26:39] PAGES PGT: OPLG

Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

519

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

lifetime health beneﬁts meant that Eastern “had every rea-
son to anticipate that it might be called upon to bear some
of the ﬁnancial burden that this expectation engendered.”
Id., at 161. Finally, in assessing the nature of the chal-
lenged governmental action, the court determined that the
Coal Act does not result in the physical invasion or perma-
nent appropriation of Eastern’s property, but merely “ad-
justs the beneﬁts and burdens of economic life to promote
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omit-
the common good.”
ted). The court also noted that the premiums are disbursed
to the privately operated Combined Fund, not to a govern-
ment entity. For those reasons, the court concluded, “there
is no basis whatever for [Eastern’s] claim that the [Coal Act]
transgresses the Takings Clause.”

Ibid.

Other Courts of Appeals have also upheld the Coal Act
against constitutional challenges.4
In view of the impor-
tance of the issues raised in this case, we granted certiorari.
522 U. S. 931 (1997).

III

We begin with a threshold jurisdictional question, raised
in the federal respondent’s answer to Eastern’s complaint:
Whether petitioner’s takings claim was properly ﬁled in Fed-
eral District Court rather than the United States Court of
Federal Claims. See App. (CA1) 40. Although the Com-
missioner no longer challenges the Court’s adjudication of
this action, see Brief for Federal Respondent 38–39, n. 30, it
is appropriate that we clarify the basis of our jurisdiction
over petitioner’s claims.

4 See, e. g., Holland v. Keenan Trucking Co., 102 F. 3d 736, 739–742 (CA4
1996); Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90 F. 3d 688, 693–695 (CA3
1996); In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F. 3d 516, 521–526 (CA6 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U. S. 1055 (1997); Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F. 3d 1114,
1121–1130 (CA7), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 808 (1996); In re Chateaugay
Corp., 53 F. 3d 478, 486–496 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. LTV Steel Co. v.
Shalala, 516 U. S. 913 (1995).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the Supreme Court case 524 U.S. 498 (1998). It contains legal citations, case names, and discusses legal arguments and precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

CARNEY v. ADAMS

Syllabus

and  does  not  show  standing.    Hollingsworth  v.  Perry,  570  U. S.  693,
706.  Pp. 4–5.

(b) Adams has not shown the necessary “injury in fact.”  To establish
that he will suffer a concrete, particularized, and imminent injury be-
yond  a  generalized  grievance,  Adams  must  at  least  show  that  he  is
likely to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future,
if he were not barred because of political affiliation.  He can show this
only if he is “ ‘able and ready’ ” to apply.  See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U. S. 244, 262.  Adams’ only supporting evidence is two statements he
made that he wanted to be, and would apply to be, a judge on any of
Delaware’s five courts.  Those statements must be considered in the
context of the record.  Pp. 5–9.

(c) The record evidence fails to show that, at the time he commenced
the lawsuit, Adams was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship in
the  reasonably  foreseeable  future.    First,  Adams’  statements  stand
alone, without any other supporting evidence, like efforts to determine
possible judicial openings or other such preparations.  Second, the con-
text suggests an abstract, generalized grievance, not an actual desire
to become a judge.  For example, Adams did not apply for numerous
existing judicial vacancies while he was a registered Democrat and el-
igible for those vacancies.  He then read a law review article arguing
that Delaware’s judicial eligibility requirements unconstitutionally ex-
cluded independents, changed his political affiliation to independent,
and filed this lawsuit shortly thereafter.  Third, a holding that Adams’
few words of general intent were sufficient to show an “injury in fact”
would significantly weaken the longstanding legal doctrine preventing
this Court from providing advisory opinions.  Finally, precedent sup-
ports the conclusion that an injury in fact requires an intent that is
concrete.  See, e.g., Lujan, supra.  And arguably similar cases in which
standing was found all contained more evidence that the plaintiff was
“able and ready” than Adams has provided.  See, e.g., Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200.  Pp. 9–13.

922 F. 3d. 166, vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except BARRETT, J., who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a legal case syllabus, outlining the arguments and holdings of the Supreme Court in the case of Carney v. Adams.  It is not the actual content of the case itself, but rather a summary for informational purposes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
984

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

November 2, 2009

558 U. S.

No.  08–11023.  Wheeler  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida
Department  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Motion
of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and
certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–5377.  Piggie  v.  Robertson  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–5437.  Crutcher  v.  United  States  District  Court
for  the  District  of  Nevada.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Motion  of  peti
tioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certio
rari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–5577.  Richardson  v.  Johnson,  Director,  Virginia
Department  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Motion  of  peti
tioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certio
rari dismissed.  See this Court’s Rule 39.8.  Reported below: 324
Fed.  Appx.  209.

No.  09–5591.  Tibbs  v.  Thaler,  Director,  Texas  Depart
ment  of Criminal  Justice,  Correctional Institutions  Divi
sion.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed
in  forma  pauperis  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this
Court’s  Rule  39.8.

No.  09–6192.  Harrell  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  As
petitioner  has  repeatedly  abused  this  Court’s  process,  the  Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal mat
ters  from  petitioner  unless  the  docketing  fee  required  by  Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1.  See  Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  Court  of  Appeals,  506
U. S.  1  (1992)  (per  curiam).  Justice  Stevens  dissents.  See
id.,  at  4,  and  cases  cited  therein.

No. 09–6228.  Jackson v.  Province, Warden.  C. A. 10th Cir.
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.  Re
ported  below:  341  Fed.  Appx.  377.

No.  09–6234.  Cluck  v.  Washington.  Sup.  Ct.  Wash.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  denied,
and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of case summaries from a legal document, likely the Supreme Court's docket. It contains case numbers, court origins, and brief descriptions of motions and rulings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529ORD Unit: $PT2

[10-09-01 14:50:48] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

1068

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

April 17, 2000

529 U. S.

No. 99–1354. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 1238.

No. 99–1358. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. MEC Import Han-
delsgesellschaft GmbH. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 198 F. 3d 245.

No. 99–1360. Mellon v. Cassidy. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 192 F. 3d 131.

No. 99–1362. Killino et al. v. Riverside School District
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191
F. 3d 445.

No. 99–1363. Carr v. Gates Health Care Plan. C. A. 7th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 195 F. 3d 292.

No. 99–1372. Gold v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 F. 3d 460.
No. 99–1375. McEnroy v. St. Meinrad School of Theology
et al. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713
N. E. 2d 334.

No. 99–1376. Seddio v. Michaels. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist.

Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1377. Hutchinson, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estates of Hutchinson et al., De-
ceased v. Spanierman et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 190 F. 3d 815.

No. 99–1390. Hayden v. Arkansas. C. A. 8th Cir. Certio-

rari denied.

No. 99–1391. Packard v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 198 F. 3d 234.

No. 99–1392. Tambolleo v. Maine State Harness Racing

Commission et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.

No. 99–1394. Smith v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied. Reported below: 196 F. 3d 774.

No. 99–1404. Moore v. City of Calumet City. App. Ct. Ill.,

1st Dist. Certiorari denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases, likely from a legal database or journal. It includes case numbers, names, court origins, and dates. This type of information is not the primary content meant to be read and understood by the general public.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Case Index</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
848

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009

October  5,  2009

558  U. S.

No.  08–10682.  Williams  v.  Bitner  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  307  Fed.  Appx.  609.

No. 08–10683.  Brown v. McQuiggin, Warden.  C. A. 6th Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10684.  Brown  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  08–10686.  Brown  v.  Gutierrez  et  al.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  590.

No.  08–10687.  Bethel  v.  City  of  Daphne,  Alabama.  Sup.

Ct.  Ala.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10689.  Rodriguez-Zamot  v.  United  States.  C.  A.

1st  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10690.  Shumye  v.  Felleke.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 08–10691.  Ruvalcaba v.  Brown, Attorney General of

California.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10692.  Rodriguez  v.  Mallinckrodt,  Inc.  C.  A.  8th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  316  Fed.  Appx.  527.

No.  08–10693.  Candia  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10695.  Rouse  v.  Kentucky.  Ct.  App.  Ky.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  08–10696.  Martin  v.  Cate,  Secretary,  California  De
partment of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al.  C.  A.
9th Cir.  Certiorari denied.  Reported below: 315 Fed. Appx. 644.

No.  08–10697.  Lay  v.  Gansler,  Attorney  General  of

Maryland,  et  al.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  08–10698.  Brown  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  8th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  828.

No.  08–10700.  Farris  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  312  Fed.  Appx.  598.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks sequential narrative text and is more akin to a legal docket or index.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

9

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

well-intentioned effort did not resolve the abortion debate.
The national division has not ended.  In recent years, a sig-
nificant  number  of  States  have  enacted  abortion  re-
strictions that directly conflict with Roe.  Those laws cannot
be dismissed as political stunts or as outlier laws.  Those
numerous state laws collectively represent the sincere and
deeply held views of tens of millions of Americans who con-
tinue to fervently believe that allowing abortions up to 24
weeks is far too radical and far too extreme, and does not
sufficiently  account  for  what  Roe  itself  recognized  as  the
State’s “important and legitimate interest” in protecting fe-
tal life.  410 U. S., at 162.  In this case, moreover, a majority
of the States—26 in all—ask the Court to overrule Roe and
return the abortion issue to the States.
  In short, Casey’s stare decisis analysis rested in part on a
predictive judgment about the future development of state
laws and of the people’s views on the abortion issue.  But
that predictive judgment has not borne out.  As the Court
today explains, the experience over the last 30 years con-
flicts with Casey’s predictive judgment and therefore under-
mines Casey’s precedential force.5

In any event, although Casey is relevant to the stare de-
cisis analysis, the question of whether to overrule Roe can-
not be dictated by Casey alone.  To illustrate that stare de-
cisis point, consider an example.  Suppose that in 1924 this
Court had expressly reaffirmed Plessy v. Ferguson and up-
held the States’ authority to segregate people on the basis
of race.  Would the Court in Brown some 30 years later in
——————

5 To be clear, public opposition to a prior decision is not a basis for over-
ruling (or reaffirming) that decision.  Rather, the question of whether to
overrule  a  precedent  must  be  analyzed  under  this  Court’s  traditional
stare decisis factors.  The only point here is that Casey adopted a special
stare decisis principle with respect to Roe based on the idea of resolving
the national controversy and ending the national division over abortion.
The continued and significant opposition to Roe, as reflected in the laws
and positions of numerous States, is relevant to assessing Casey on its
own terms.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kavanaugh in a case related to abortion. It discusses the history of abortion law, the arguments for and against overturning Roe v. Wade, and the relevance of stare decisis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

25

GORSUCH, J., concurring

stands as an outlier in our jurisprudence—with no appar-
ent support in original meaning, at odds with prior prece-
dent,  and  inconsistent  with  later  precedent  as  well.  See
ante, at 25, n. 4; Part III–B, supra.  Meanwhile, the Court’s
alternative construction of Altas Roofing fits far more com-
fortably  with  all  those  legal  sources.    In  that  respect,  the
majority’s approach is of a piece with Granfinanciera’s sim-
ilar  approach  25  years  ago.  And,  more  broadly,  it  is  of  a
piece with our usual practice of construing “loose language”
found in a prior judicial opinion in a way that better con-
forms  it  to  the  mainstream  of  our  precedents.    Groff  v.
DeJoy,  600  U. S.  447,  474  (2023)  (SOTOMAYOR, J.,  concur-
ring).  As  the  dissenters  have  previously  acknowledged,
that course is neither unusual nor at odds with stare decisis.
See id., at 474–475; see also Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S.
118, 141 (2022) (“We neither expect nor hope that our suc-
cessors  will  comb  these  pages  for  stray  comments  and
stretch them beyond their context—all to justify an outcome
inconsistent with this Court’s reasoning and judgments”).

Were there any doubt about the propriety of the Court’s
treatment of Atlas Roofing, consider one more feature of the
alternative the dissent proposes.  In defending the broadest
possible construction of Atlas Roofing’s public rights discus-
sion, the dissent necessarily endorses that decision’s excep-
tionally narrow conception of the Seventh Amendment.  See
post, at 6.  After all, as public rights expand, so too the jury-
trial right must contract.  Yet Atlas Roofing’s discussion of
the  jury-trial  right,  no  less  than  its  discussion  of  public
rights,  is  difficult  to  square  with  precedent  and  original
meaning.

Recall that, from the start, the Seventh Amendment was
understood to protect that right “not merely” in suits recog-
nized at common law, but in “all suits which are” of legal,
as  opposed  to  “equity  [or]  admiralty[,]  jurisdiction.”    Par-
sons, 3 Pet., at 447 (emphasis added); see Part II–B, supra.
This Court repeated that understanding of the Amendment
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It delves into legal arguments, citing precedents like *Atlas Roofing* and *Granfinanciera*, and discusses the interpretation of the Seventh Amendment.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

GORSUCH, J., concurring

then . . . enforce its guarantees only to the extent they serve
(in the courts’ views) those underlying values.”  Ibid.  Pro-
ceeding that way, we have warned, risks handing judges a
license  to  turn  “the  guarantee  of  confrontation”  into  “no
guarantee at all.”  Ibid.  As there, so too here:  Courts must
proceed  with  care  in  making  comparisons  to  historic  fire-
arms regulations, or else they risk gaming away an individ-
ual right the people expressly preserved for themselves in
the Constitution’s text.

Proceeding with this well in mind today, the Court rightly
holds that Mr. Rahimi’s facial challenge to §922(g)(8) can-
not  succeed.  It  cannot  because,  through  surety  laws  and
restrictions  on  “going  armed,”  the  people  in  this  country
have understood from the start that the government may
disarm an individual temporarily after a “judicial determi-
natio[n]” that he “likely would threaten or ha[s] threatened
another with a weapon.”  Ante, at 14.  And, at least in some
cases, the statute before us works in the same way and does
so for the same reasons:  It permits a court to disarm a per-
son only if, after notice and hearing, it finds that he “repre-
sents  a  credible  threat  to  the  physical  safety”  of  others.
§§922(g)(8)(A), (g)(8)(C)(i).  A court, too, may disarm an in-
dividual only for so long as its order is in effect.  §922(g)(8).
In short, in at least some applications, the challenged law
does  not  diminish  any  aspect  of  the  right  the  Second
Amendment  was  originally  understood  to  protect.  See
Bruen, 597 U. S., at 24.

I appreciate that one of our colleagues sees things differ-
ently.  Post, at 6–7 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).  But if reason-
able minds can disagree whether §922(g)(8) is analogous to
past practices originally understood to fall outside the Sec-
ond Amendment’s scope, we at least agree that is the only
proper  question  a  court  may  ask.  Post,  at  5.  Discerning
what the original meaning of the Constitution requires in
this or that case may sometimes be difficult.  Asking that
question,  however,  at  least  keeps  judges  in  their  proper
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of United States v. Rahimi. It delves into the interpretation of the Second Amendment and its application to a specific firearm regulation.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

3

Opinion of the Court

This case concerns one such exception to finality: At any
time, a veteran may ask the Board or regional office to re-
vise a final benefits decision on grounds of “clear and un-
mistakable  error.”    §5109A  (regional  office);  §7111  (the
Board);  38  CFR  §§3.105,  20.1400–20.1411  (2021).  This
form  of  collateral  review  was  first  adopted  by  regulation
roughly 100 years ago.  Since at least 1928, the VA and its
predecessor agencies have allowed revision of an otherwise
final decision when “obviously warranted by a clear and un-
mistakable  error.”    Veterans’  Bureau  Reg.  No.  187,  pt.  1,
§7155  (1928);  see  38  CFR  §3.105(a)  (Cum.  Supp.  1963)
(“Previous determinations . . . will be accepted as correct in
the  absence  of  clear  and  unmistakable  error”).  In  1997,
Congress codified this form of review in the statute we in-
terpret today.  111 Stat. 2271.

B
Kevin George joined the Marine Corps in 1975 after ex-
periencing multiple schizophrenic episodes.  He did not ini-
tially  disclose  that  history,  and  a  medical  examination
noted no mental disorders at the time he entered service.
But less than a week into training, George had another ep-
isode and was hospitalized.  A few months later, the Navy’s
Central  Physical  Evaluation  Board  found  that  his  schizo-
phrenia made him unfit for duty and was not aggravated by
service.  App. to Brief for Petitioner 12a–15a.  George was
then medically discharged.

Later  that  year,  George  applied  for  veterans’  disability
benefits based on his schizophrenia.  A VA regional office
denied  his  claim  after  concluding  that  his  condition  pre-
dated  his  military  service  and  was  not  aggravated  by  it.
The Board agreed and denied George’s appeal in 1977.  In
so ruling, neither the regional office nor the Board expressly
discussed the VA’s burden of proof under the presumption
of sound condition.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It cites a case and provides background information about the legal precedent surrounding veterans' disability benefits.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

83

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and part of a court opinion.  Legal citations and introductory material are generally not considered the main body text suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

Syllabus

Appeals’  brief  discussion  of  this  disparity  of  treatment  does  not  an-
swer Phillips’ concern that the State’s practice was to disfavor the re-
ligious basis of his objection.  Pp. 12–16.

(c) For these reasons, the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ case
violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws
or  regulations  on  hostility  to  a  religion  or  religious  viewpoint.    The
government,  consistent  with  the  Constitution’s  guarantee  of  free  ex-
ercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious be-
liefs  of  affected  citizens  and  cannot  act  in  a  manner  that  passes
judgment  upon  or  presupposes  the  illegitimacy  of  religious  beliefs
and  practices.  Church  of  Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508
U. S.  520.  Factors  relevant  to  the  assessment  of  governmental  neu-
trality include “the historical background of the decision under chal-
lenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official
policy  in  question,  and  the  legislative  or  administrative  history,  in-
cluding  contemporaneous  statements  made  by  members  of  the  deci-
sionmaking  body.”  Id.,  at  540.  In  view  of  these  factors,  the  record
here  demonstrates  that  the  Commission’s  consideration  of  Phillips’
case was neither tolerant nor respectful of his religious beliefs.  The
Commission gave “every appearance,” id., at 545, of adjudicating his
religious  objection  based  on  a  negative  normative  “evaluation  of  the
particular justification” for his objection and the religious grounds for
it, id., at 537, but government has no role in expressing or even sug-
gesting  whether  the  religious  ground  for  Phillips’  conscience-based
objection is legitimate or illegitimate.  The inference here is thus that
Phillips’  religious  objection  was  not  considered  with  the  neutrality
required by the Free Exercise Clause.  The State’s interest could have
been  weighed  against  Phillips’  sincere  religious  objections  in  a  way
consistent with the requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly
observed.  But the official expressions of hostility to religion in some
of  the  commissioners’  comments  were  inconsistent  with  that  re-
quirement, and the Commission’s disparate consideration of Phillips’
case  compared  to  the  cases  of  the  other  bakers  suggests  the  same.
Pp. 16–18.

370 P. 3d 272, reversed.

KENNEDY, J., delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS,
C. J., and BREYER, ALITO, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  KAGAN, J.,
filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in  which  BREYER,  J.,  joined.    GORSUCH,  J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
GORSUCH, J., joined.  GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the syllabus. It summarizes the court's decision and reasoning.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 12–398
_________________

ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY,

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MYRIAD

GENETICS, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[June 13, 2013]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent  Myriad  Genetics,  Inc.  (Myriad),  discovered
the  precise  location  and  sequence  of  two  human  genes,
mutations of which can substantially increase the risks of
breast  and  ovarian  cancer.    Myriad  obtained  a  number
of  patents  based  upon  its  discovery.    This  case  involves
claims  from  three  of  them  and  requires  us  to  resolve
whether a naturally occurring segment of deoxyribonucleic
acid  (DNA)  is  patent  eligible  under  35  U. S. C.  §101  by
virtue of its isolation from the rest of the human genome.
We  also  address  the  patent  eligibility  of  synthetically
created DNA known as complementary DNA (cDNA), which
contains  the  same  protein-coding  information  found  in
a  segment  of  natural  DNA  but  omits  portions  within  the
DNA  segment  that  do  not  code  for  proteins.    For  the  rea-
sons  that  follow,  we  hold  that  a  naturally  occurring  DNA
segment  is  a  product  of  nature  and  not  patent  eligible
merely  because  it  has  been  isolated,  but  that  cDNA  is
patent  eligible  because  it  is  not  naturally  occurring.    We,
therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory portion of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

Kan., 372 U. S. 84, 91–92 (1963) (defining the pre-empted
field  in  light  of  the  “objective[s]”  of  the  Act).  Neither
party, however, has asked us to overrule these longstand-
ing  precedents  or  “to  overcome  the  presumption  of  stare
decisis that attaches to” them.  Kurns v. Railroad Friction
Products  Corp.,  565  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2012)  (slip  op.,  at  7).
And  even  under  these  precedents,  the  challenged  state
antitrust  laws  fall  outside  the  pre-empted  field.    Because
the  Court  today  avoids  extending  its  earlier  questionable
precedents, I concur in its judgment and join all but Part
I–A of its opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion. It cites previous legal cases and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>