<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

17

Opinion of the Court

be met—or even that they are necessarily important—in all
other cases.

Take the question of the title “minister.”  Simply giving
an employee the title of “minister” is not enough to justify
the exception.  And by the same token, since many religious
traditions do not use the title “minister,” it cannot be a nec-
essary  requirement.  Requiring  the  use  of  the  title  would
constitute impermissible discrimination, and this problem
cannot  be  solved  simply  by  including  positions  that  are
thought  to  be  the  counterparts  of  a  “minister,”  such  as
priests,  nuns,  rabbis, and  imams.    See  Brief  for  Respond-
ents 21.  Nuns are not the same as Protestant ministers.  A
brief  submitted  by  Jewish  organizations  makes  the  point
that  “Judaism  has  many  ‘ministers,’ ”  that  is,  “the  term
‘minister’  encompasses  an  extensive  breadth  of  religious
functionaries in Judaism.”11  For Muslims, “an inquiry into
whether imams or other leaders bear a title equivalent to
‘minister’ can present a troubling choice between denying a
central pillar of Islam—i.e., the equality of all believers—
and
exception
protections.”12

of  ministerial

risking

loss

If titles were all-important, courts would have to decide
which titles count and which do not, and it is hard to see
how that could be done without looking behind the titles to
what the positions actually entail.  Moreover, attaching too
much significance to titles would risk privileging religious
traditions with formal organizational structures over those
that are less formal.

For related reasons, the academic requirements of a po-
sition may show that the church in question regards the po-
sition as having an important responsibility in elucidating
or teaching the tenets of the faith.  Presumably the purpose

——————

11 Brief for Colpa et al. as Amici Curiae i, 3 (quotation modified).
12 Brief for Asma T. Uddin as Amicus Curiae 2.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the term "minister" in the context of religious employment law. It delves into the complexities of defining ministerial roles and the potential for discrimination based on titles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

germent  finding”);  68  Fed.  52929  (2003)  (“[N]o  Adminis-
trator has made a finding under any of the CAA’s regula-
tory  provisions  that  CO2  meets  the  applicable  statutory
criteria for regulation”).

The  question  thus  arises:  Does  anything  require  the
Administrator  to  make  a  “judgment”  whenever  a  petition
for rulemaking is filed?  Without citation of the statute or
any  other  authority,  the  Court  says  yes.    Why  is  that  so?
When  Congress  wishes  to  make  private  action  force  an
agency’s  hand,  it  knows  how  to  do  so.    See,  e.g.,  Brock  v.
Pierce  County,  476  U. S.  253,  254–255  (1986)  (discussing
the  Comprehensive  Employment  and  Training  Act
(CETA), 92 Stat. 1926, 29 U. S. C. §816(b) (1976 ed., Supp.
V),  which  “provide[d]  that  the  Secretary  of  Labor  ‘shall’
issue  a  final  determination  as  to  the  misuse  of  CETA
funds by a grant recipient within 120 days after receiving
a complaint alleging such misuse”).  Where does the CAA
say  that  the  EPA  Administrator  is  required  to  come  to  a
decision  on  this  question  whenever  a  rulemaking  petition
is  filed?  The  Court  points  to  no  such  provision  because
none exists.

Instead,  the  Court  invents  a  multiple-choice  question
that the EPA Administrator must answer when a petition
for  rulemaking  is  filed.  The  Administrator  must  exercise
his judgment in one of three ways: (a) by concluding that
the  pollutant  does  cause,  or  contribute  to,  air  pollution
that  endangers  public  welfare  (in  which  case  EPA  is  re-
quired  to  regulate);  (b)  by  concluding  that  the  pollutant
does  not  cause,  or  contribute  to,  air  pollution  that  endan-
gers  public  welfare  (in  which  case  EPA  is  not  required  to
regulate);  or  (c)  by  “provid[ing]  some  reasonable  explana-
tion  as  to why  it  cannot  or  will not  exercise  its  discretion
to  determine  whether”  greenhouse  gases  endanger  public
welfare, ante, at 30, (in which case EPA is not required to
regulate).

I  am  willing  to  assume,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Massachusetts v. EPA. It delves into the interpretation of the Clean Air Act and the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN

50

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Thomas, J., dissenting

to the public, 42 U. S. C. § 1395i–3(g)(5)(A), and posted on
the Health Care Finance Authority’s Internet website,
Reply Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 20.13 Such negative pub-
licity, which occurs before the nursing home may avail itself
of administrative or judicial review via § 1395cc(h), is likely
to result in substantial reputational harm. See Gardner v.
Toilet Goods Assn., Inc., 387 U. S. 167, 172 (1967) (“Respond-
ents note the importance of public good will in their indus-
try, and not without reason fear the disastrous impact of
an announcement that their cosmetics have been seized as
‘adulterated’ ”).

I recount these allegations of hardship to respondent’s
members not because they inform any case-by-case applica-
tion of the presumption in favor of preenforcement review,
but rather because such concerns motivate the presumption
in a general sense. A case-by-case inquiry into hardship is
accommodated instead by ripeness doctrine, which “evalu-
ate[s] both the ﬁtness of the issues for judicial decision and
the hardship to the parties of withholding court consid-
eration.” Abbott Laboratories, 387 U. S., at 149 (emphasis
I read our cases to establish just this sort of analy-
added).
sis: (1) in light of the presumption, construe an ambiguous
statute in favor of preenforcement review; (2) apply ripe-
ness doctrine to determine whether the suit should be
in Abbott Laboratories and its two
entertained. Thus,
companion cases, we construed an ambiguous statute to
permit preenforcement review, see id., at 148; Gardner v.
Toilet Goods Assn., supra, at 168; Toilet Goods Assn., Inc.
v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 158, 160 (1967), but we then proceeded
to hold that only the suits in the ﬁrst two of these cases were

13 While the Secretary represents, Reply Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 20,
and the Court accepts, ante, at 22, that a deﬁcient nursing home may
post a response on the website, respondent’s amici American Health Care
Association et al. assert that the website does not accommodate provider
comments, but only lists the date a facility has corrected a deﬁciency, Brief
for American Health Care Association et al. as Amici Curiae 18.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas in the case of Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. It contains legal arguments, citations to statutes and previous cases, and demonstrates a structured flow of thought characteristic of legal writing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 13–1034
_________________

MOONES MELLOULI, PETITIONER v. LORETTA E.

LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 1, 2015]

 JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to decide how immigration judges
should  apply  a  deportation  (removal)  provision,  defined
with  reference  to  federal  drug  laws,  to  an  alien  convicted
of a state drug-paraphernalia misdemeanor.

Lawful  permanent  resident  Moones  Mellouli,  in  2010,
pleaded  guilty  to  a  misdemeanor  offense  under  Kansas
law,  the  possession  of  drug  paraphernalia  to  “store,  con-
tain,  conceal,  inject,  ingest,  inhale  or  otherwise  introduce
a  controlled  substance  into  the  human  body.”  Kan.  Stat.
Ann.  §21–5709(b)(2)  (2013  Cum.  Supp.).    The  sole  “para-
phernalia”  Mellouli  was  charged  with  possessing  was  a
sock  in  which  he  had  placed  four  orange  tablets.    The
criminal  charge  and  plea  agreement  did  not  identify  the
controlled  substance  involved,  but  Mellouli  had  acknowl-
edged, prior to the charge and plea, that the tablets were
Adderall.  Mellouli was sentenced to a suspended term of
359 days and 12 months’ probation.

In  February  2012,  several  months  after  Mellouli  suc-
cessfully  completed  probation,  Immigration  and  Customs
Enforcement  officers  arrested  him  as  deportable  under  8
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citation information, the title of the case, and the introductory paragraph of the opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
30

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

coup  to  hold  onto  power?  Immune.  Takes  a  bribe  in  ex-
change for a pardon?  Immune.  Immune, immune, immune.
Let the President violate the law, let him exploit the trap-
pings of his office for personal gain, let him use his official
power for evil ends.  Because if he knew that he may one
day face liability for breaking the law, he might not be as
bold and fearless as we would like him to be.  That is the
majority’s message today.

Even if these nightmare scenarios never play out, and I
pray they never do, the damage has been done.  The rela-
tionship  between  the  President  and  the  people  he  serves
has shifted irrevocably.  In every use of official power, the
President is now a king above the law.

*

*

*

The majority’s single-minded fixation on the President’s
need for boldness and dispatch ignores the countervailing
need  for  accountability  and  restraint.  The  Framers  were
not so single-minded.  In the Federalist Papers, after “en-
deavor[ing]  to  show”  that  the  Executive  designed  by  the
Constitution “combines . . . all the requisites to energy,” Al-
exander  Hamilton  asked  a  separate,  equally  important
question: “Does it also combine the requisites to safety, in a
republican sense, a due dependence on the people, a due re-
sponsibility?”  The Federalist No. 77, p. 507 (J. Harvard Li-
brary ed. 2009).  The answer then was yes,  based in part
upon  the  President’s  vulnerability  to  “prosecution  in  the
common course of law.”  Ibid.  The answer after today is no.
Never in the history of our Republic has a President had
reason to believe that he would be immune from criminal
prosecution if he used the trappings of his office to violate
the  criminal  law.    Moving  forward,  however,  all  former
Presidents will be cloaked in such immunity.  If the occu-
pant of that office misuses official power for personal gain,
the criminal law that the rest of us must abide will not pro-
vide a backstop.

With fear for our democracy, I dissent.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It expresses strong views on a legal case and the implications for presidential power.  This is likely a core part of the legal document and thus suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

Opinion of the Court

failing to pay her taxes.  States and localities have long im-
posed “reasonable conditions” on property ownership.  Tex-
aco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516, 526 (1982).  In Minnesota,
one of those conditions is paying property taxes.  By neglect-
ing this reasonable condition, the County argues, the owner
can  be  considered  to  have  abandoned  her  property  and  is
therefore  not  entitled  to  any  compensation  for  its  taking.
See Minn. Stat. §282.08.

The County portrays this as just another example in the
long tradition of States taking title to abandoned property.
We upheld one such statutory scheme in Texaco.  There, In-
diana law dictated that a mineral interest automatically re-
verted to the owner of the land if not used for 20 years.  454
U. S.,  at  518.  Use  included  excavating  minerals,  renting
out  the  right  to  excavate,  paying  taxes,  or  simply  filing  a
“statement of claim with the local recorder of deeds.”  Id.,
at 519.  Owners who lost their mineral interests challenged
the statute as unconstitutional.  We held that the statute
did not violate the Takings Clause because the State “has
the power to condition the permanent retention of [a] prop-
erty right on the performance of reasonable conditions that
indicate  a  present  intention  to  retain  the  interest.”  Id.,  at
526 (emphasis added).  Indiana reasonably “treat[ed] a min-
eral interest that ha[d] not been used for 20 years and for
which no statement of claim ha[d] been filed as abandoned.”
Id., at 530.  There was thus no taking, for “after abandon-
ment, the former owner retain[ed] no interest for which he
may claim compensation.”  Ibid.

The County suggests that here, too, Tyler constructively
abandoned her property by failing to comply with a reason-
able condition imposed by the State.  But the County cites
no case suggesting that failing to pay property taxes is itself
sufficient  for  abandonment.  Cf.  Krueger  v.  Market,  124
Minn.  393,  397,  145  N. W.  30,  32  (1914)  (owner  did  not
abandon property despite failing to pay taxes for 30 years).
Abandonment requires the “surrender or relinquishment or
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the concept of property abandonment in the context of unpaid taxes. It cites legal precedents and analyzes the arguments presented by both sides.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

330

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Stevens, J., dissenting

yet there was nudity.”
Id., at 42. The same lawmaker then
disfavorably compared the nude swimming incident to the
activities that occur in “some of these clubs” that exist
Ibid.15
in Erie—clubs that would be covered by the law.
Though such comments could be consistent with an interest
in a general prohibition of nudity, the complete absence of
commentary on that broader interest, and the councilmem-
bers’ exclusive focus on adult entertainment, is evidence of
In my view, we need not strain to ﬁnd
the ordinance’s aim.
consistency with more general purposes when the most natu-
ral reading of the record reﬂects a near obsessive preoccupa-
tion with a single target of the law.16

The text of Erie’s ordinance is also signiﬁcantly different
from the law upheld in Barnes.
In Barnes, the statute de-
ﬁned “nudity” as “the showing of the human male or female

15 Other members said their focus was on “bottle clubs,” and the like,
App. 43, and attempted to downplay the effect of the ordinance by ac-
knowledging that “the girls can wear thongs or a G-string and little pas-
ties that are smaller than a diamond.”
Ibid. Echoing that focus, another
member stated that “[t]here still will be adult entertainment in this town,
only it will be in a little different form.”

Id., at 47.

16 The plurality dismisses this evidence, declaring that it “will not strike
down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit
motive.” Ante, at 292 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 382–
383 (1968); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 47–48 (1986)).
First, it is worth pointing out that this doctrinaire formulation of O’Brien’s
cautionary statement is overbroad. See generally L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 12–5, pp. 819–820 (2d ed. 1988). Moreover, O’Brien
itself said only that we would not strike down a law “on the assumption
that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted,”
391 U. S., at 383 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted), and
that statement was due to our recognition that it is a “hazardous matter”
to determine the actual intent of a body as large as Congress “on the basis
of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about [a law],” id., at
384. Yet neither consideration is present here. We need not base our
inquiry on an “assumption,” nor must we infer the collective intent of a
large body based on the statements of a few, for we have in the record the
actual statements of all the city councilmembers who voted in favor of
the ordinance.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and references to other cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GEORGIA v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.

Syllabus

public domain.  The District Court sided with the Commission, holding
that  the  annotations  were  eligible  for  copyright  protection  because
they had not been enacted into law.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
rejecting the Commission’s copyright assertion under the government
edicts doctrine.

Held: The  OCGA  annotations  are  ineligible  for  copyright  protection.

Pp. 5–18.

(a) The  government  edicts  doctrine  developed  from  a  trio  of  19th-
century cases.  In Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, the Court held that no
reporter can have a copyright in the Court’s opinions and that the Jus-
tices cannot confer such a right on any reporter.  In Banks v. Manches-
ter, 128 U. S. 244, the Court held that judges could not assert copyright
in “whatever work they perform in their capacity as judges”—be it “the
opinion or decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or the
head note.”  Id., at 253.  Finally, in Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617,
the Court reiterated that an official reporter cannot hold a copyright
interest in opinions created by judges.  But, confronting an issue not
addressed in Wheaton or Banks, the Court upheld the reporter’s copy-
right interest in several explanatory materials that the reporter had
created himself because they came from an author who had no author-
ity to speak with the force of law.

The  animating  principle  behind  the  government  edicts  doctrine  is
that no one can own the law.  The doctrine gives effect to that principle
in  the  copyright  context  through  construction  of  the  statutory  term
“author.”  For purposes of the Copyright Act, judges cannot be the “au-
thor[s]” of “whatever work they perform in their capacity” as lawmak-
ers.  Banks, 128 U. S., at 253.  Because legislators, like judges, have
the  authority  to  make  law,  it  follows  that  they,  too,  cannot  be  “au-
thors.”    And,  as  with  judges,  the  doctrine  applies  to  whatever  work
legislators perform in their capacity as legislators, including explana-
tory and procedural materials they create in the discharge of their leg-
islative duties.  Pp. 5–9.

(b) Applying  that  framework,  Georgia’s  annotations  are  not  copy-
rightable.  First, the author of the annotations qualifies as a legislator.
Under the Copyright Act, the sole “author” of the annotations is the
Commission,  17  U. S. C.  §201(b),  which  functions  as  an  arm  of  the
Georgia Legislature in producing the annotations.  Second, the Com-
mission creates the annotations in the discharge of its legislative du-
ties.  Pp. 9–11.

(c) Georgia argues that excluding the OCGA annotations from copy-
right protection conflicts with the text of the Copyright Act.  First, it
notes that §101 lists “annotations” among the kinds of works eligible
for copyright protection.  That provision, however, refers only to “an-
notations  . . .  which  . . .  represent  an  original  work  of  authorship.”
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a syllabus from a legal case, specifically the Supreme Court case *Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.* Syllabi are summaries of legal cases and are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the primary content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO

GORSUCH, J., concurring

circumstances, we may not shelter in place when the Con-
stitution is under attack.  Things never go well when we do.

*
That  leaves  my  colleagues  to  their  second  line  of  argu-
ment.  Maybe precedent does not support the Governor’s ac-
tions.  Maybe  those  actions  do  violate  the  Constitution.
But, they say, we should stay our hand all the same.  Even
if the churches and synagogues before us have been subject
to unconstitutional restrictions for months, it is no matter
because, just the other day, the Governor changed his color
code for Brooklyn and Queens where the plaintiffs are lo-
cated.  Now those regions are “yellow zones” and the chal-
lenged restrictions on worship associated with “orange” and
“red zones” do not apply.  So, the reasoning goes, we should
send the plaintiffs home with an invitation to return later
if need be.

To my mind, this reply only advances the case for inter-
vention.  It has taken weeks for the plaintiffs to work their
way through the judicial system and bring their case to us.
During all this time, they were subject to unconstitutional
restrictions.  Now, just as this Court was preparing to act
on  their  applications,  the  Governor  loosened  his  re-
strictions,  all  while  continuing  to  assert  the  power  to
tighten them again anytime as conditions warrant.  So if we
dismissed  this  case,  nothing  would  prevent  the  Governor
from reinstating the challenged restrictions tomorrow.  And
by the time a new challenge might work its way to us, he
could  just  change  them  again.  The  Governor  has  fought
this case at every step of the way.  To turn away religious
leaders bringing meritorious claims just because the Gov-
ernor decided to hit the “off ” switch in the shadow of our
review would be, in my view, just another sacrifice of fun-
damental rights in the name of judicial modesty.

Even our dissenting colleagues do not suggest this case is
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch in the case of Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo. It delves into the legal arguments and reasoning behind the decision, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U90

[09-15-00 14:33:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

362

PENNSYLVANIA BD. OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE v. SCOTT
Opinion of the Court

search were aware of respondent’s parole status, 548 Pa., at
428–432, 698 A. 2d, at 37–38. The court reasoned that, in
the absence of the rule, illegal searches would be undeterred
when ofﬁcers know that the subjects of their searches are
parolees and that illegally obtained evidence can be intro-
Ibid.
duced at parole hearings.

We granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule applies to parole revocation
proceedings.

522 U. S. 992 (1997).3

II

We have emphasized repeatedly that the government’s use
of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
does not itself violate the Constitution. See, e. g., United
States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 906 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428
U. S. 465, 482, 486 (1976). Rather, a Fourth Amendment
violation is “ ‘fully accomplished’ ” by the illegal search or
seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding can “ ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s
rights which he has already suffered.’ ” United States v.
Leon, supra, at 906 (quoting Stone v. Powell, supra, at 540

3 We also invited the parties to brief the question whether a search of a
parolee’s residence must be based on reasonable suspicion where the pa-
rolee has consented to searches as a condition of parole. Respondent ar-
gues that we lack jurisdiction to decide this question in this case because
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, as a matter of Pennsylvania law,
that respondent’s consent to warrantless searches as a condition of his
state parole did not constitute consent to searches that are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner and its amici contend that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion was at least ambiguous as to
whether it relied on state or federal law to determine the extent of re-
spondent’s consent, and that we therefore have jurisdiction under Michi-
gan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983). We need not parse the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision in an attempt to discern its intent, however,
because it is clear that we have jurisdiction to determine whether the
exclusionary rule applies to state parole revocation proceedings, and our
decision on that issue is sufﬁcient to decide the case. We therefore
express no opinion regarding the constitutionality of the search.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically from the case Pennsylvania BD. OF PROBATION AND PAROLE v. SCOTT. It contains legal citations, arguments, and analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

3

Opinion of the Court

parties’ antitrust dispute to arbitration.  Archer and White
objected, arguing that the dispute was not subject to arbi-
tration  because  Archer  and  White’s  complaint  sought
injunctive relief, at least in part.  According to Archer and
White, the parties’ contract barred arbitration of disputes
when the plaintiff sought injunctive relief, even if only in
part.

The  question  then  became:  Who  decides  whether  the
antitrust  dispute  is  subject  to  arbitration?    The  rules  of
the American Arbitration Association provide that arbitra-
tors  have  the  power  to  resolve  arbitrability  questions.
Schein contended that the contract’s express incorporation
of the American Arbitration Association’s rules meant that
an  arbitrator—not  the  court—had  to  decide  whether  the
arbitration  agreement  applied  to  this  particular  dispute.
Archer  and  White  responded  that  in  cases  where  the
defendant’s  argument  for  arbitration  is  wholly  ground-
less—as Archer and White argued was the case here—the
District Court itself may resolve the threshold question of
arbitrability.

Relying  on  Fifth  Circuit  precedent,  the  District  Court
agreed  with  Archer  and  White  about  the  existence  of  a
“wholly  groundless”  exception,  and  ruled  that  Schein’s
argument  for  arbitration  was  wholly  groundless.  The
District  Court therefore denied Schein’s motion to compel
arbitration.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

In  light  of  disagreement  in  the  Courts  of  Appeals  over
whether  the  “wholly  groundless”  exception  is  consistent
with  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act,  we  granted  certiorari,
585  U. S.  ___  (2018).    Compare  878  F. 3d  488  (CA5  2017)
(case  below);  Simply  Wireless,  Inc.  v.  T-Mobile  US,  Inc.,
877  F. 3d  522  (CA4  2017);  Douglas  v.  Regions  Bank,  757
F. 3d 460 (CA5 2014); Turi v. Main Street Adoption Servs.,
LLP,  633  F. 3d  496  (CA6  2011);  Qualcomm,  Inc.  v.  Nokia
Corp., 466 F. 3d 1366 (CA Fed. 2006), with Belnap v. Iasis
Healthcare,  844  F. 3d  1272  (CA10  2017);  Jones  v.  Waffle
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be an excerpt from a legal opinion, specifically the beginning of the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the parties involved in a dispute, the nature of the dispute (antitrust), and the question of whether the dispute should be settled through arbitration.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

Opinion of the Court

wants to create such a system going forward, Congress of
course may do so.

In sum, the Marietta Plan does not “differentiate in the
benefits it provides” to those with end-stage renal disease
and those without end-stage renal disease.

B
DaVita  also  contends  that  a  plan  that  provides  limited
coverage for outpatient dialysis impermissibly “take[s] into
account” the Medicare eligibility of plan participants with
end-stage renal disease in violation of the statute.  To reit-
erate, that statutory provision states that a plan “may not
take into account that an individual is entitled to or eligible
for” Medicare.  42 U. S. C. §1395y(b)(1)(C)(i); see also §426–
1.  For example, a plan may not terminate coverage, limit
coverage, or charge higher premiums for an individual who
has Medicare coverage due to end-stage renal disease.  See
42 CFR §§411.108(a)(3), (5)−(6).

As already discussed, the Marietta Plan’s terms, includ-
ing its terms of coverage for outpatient dialysis, are uniform
for all individuals.  Because the Plan provides the same out-
patient dialysis benefits to all Plan participants, whether or
not a participant is entitled to or eligible for Medicare, the
Plan cannot be said to “take into account” whether its par-
ticipants are entitled to or eligible for Medicare.

*

*

*
Because the Marietta Plan’s terms as relevant here apply
uniformly to all covered individuals, the Plan does not “dif-
ferentiate  in  the  benefits  it  provides”  to  individuals  with
end-stage renal disease or “take into account” whether an
individual is entitled to or eligible for Medicare.  We there-
fore reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit and remand the case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court, specifically the Opinion of the Court section. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

524

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

footnotes in Justice Chase’s opinion, he listed examples of
various Acts of Parliament illustrating each of the four cate-
gories. See 3 Dall., at 389, nn. *, †, ‡, (cid:1).13 Each of these
examples is exactly the same as the ones Wooddeson himself
used in his treatise. See 2 Wooddeson 629 (case of the Earl
of Strafford); id., at 634 (case of Sir John Fenwick); id., at
638 (banishments of Lord Clarendon and of Bishop Atter-
bury); id., at 639 (Coventry Act).

Calder’s four categories, which embraced Wooddeson’s
in turn, soon embraced by contempo-
Joseph Story, for example, in writing on the

formulation, were,
rary scholars.
Ex Post Facto Clause, stated:

“The general interpretation has been, and is, . . . that
the prohibition reaches every law, whereby an act is
declared a crime, and made punishable as such, when
it was not a crime, when done; or whereby the act, if
a crime, is aggravated in enormity, or punishment; or
whereby different, or less evidence, is required to con-
vict an offender, than was required, when the act was
committed.”
3 Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States § 1339, p. 212 (1833).

James Kent concurred in this understanding of the Clause:

“[T]he words ex post facto laws were technical expres-
sions, and meant every law that made an act done be-
fore the passing of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal; or which aggravated a crime, and

legal proof ” created when only one witness was available but “a statute
then lately made requiring two witnesses” had been in effect); id., at
638 (describing “acts of parliament, which principally affect the punish-
ment, making therein some innovation, or creating some forfeiture or dis-
ability, not incurred in the ordinary course of law”); id., at 639 (referring
to instances where “the legislature . . . imposed a sentence more severe
than could have been awarded by the inferior courts”). Cf. n. 9, supra.
13 The instances cited were the case of the Earl of Strafford, the case
of Sir John Fenwick, the banishments of Lord Clarendon and of Bishop
Atterbury, and the Coventry Act.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Ex Post Facto Clause. It cites legal precedents and provides textual analysis.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14  MANHATTAN COMMUNITY ACCESS CORP. v. HALLECK

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

mental  property  interest  here,  ante,  at  14–15,  does  not
hold  up.    The  majority  focuses  on  the  fact  that  “[b]oth
Time  Warner  and  MNN  are  private  entities”;  that  Time
Warner “owns its cable network, which contains the public
access  channels”;  and  that  “MNN  operates  those  public
access  channels  with  its  own  facilities  and  equipment.”
Ante,  at  14;  see  also  ante,  at  15.    Those  considerations
cannot  resolve  this  case.    The  issue  is  not  who  owns  the
cable network or that MNN uses its own property to oper-
ate the channels.  The key question, rather, is whether the
channels  themselves  are  purely  private  property.    An
advertiser  may  not  own  a  billboard,  but  that  does  not
mean  that  its  long-term  lease  is  not  a  property  interest.
See supra, at 8.
  The majority also says that “[n]othing in the record here
suggests  that  a  government  . . .  owns  or  leases  either  the
cable system or the public access channels at issue here.”
Ante, at 14.  But the cable system itself is irrelevant, and,
as explained above, the details of the exchange that yielded
Time  Warner’s  cable  franchise  suggest  a  governmental
property interest in the channels.  See supra, at 6–9.
  The  majority  observes  that  “the  franchise  agreements
expressly  place  the  public  access  channels  ‘under  the
jurisdiction’ of MNN,” ante, at 14, but that language sim-
ply describes the City’s appointment of MNN to administer
the  channels.    The  majority  also  chides  respondents  for
failing  to  “alleg[e]  in  their  complaint  that  the  City  has  a
property  interest  in  the  channels,”  ibid.,  but,  fairly  read,
respondents’  complaint  includes  such  an  assertion.10    In

——————

10 Respondents  alleged  that  the  City  “created  an  electronic  public
forum” and “delegat[ed] control of that forum to” MNN.  App. 17.  They
further  alleged  that  “[a]lmost  all  cable  franchise  agreements  require
cable operators—as a condition for easements to use the public rights-
of-way—to dedicate some channels for programming by the public,” id.,
at  20,  invoked  the  state  regulations  requiring  the  designation  of  a
channel  here,  id.,  at  21,  and  then  alleged  that  the  City’s  franchise
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into the legal arguments surrounding property rights related to public access channels.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 524REP Unit: $UBV [07-17-00 18:41:58] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

xv

Page
925
Deep Sea Research, Inc.; California v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
938
Deer Park Independent School Dist. v. Harris County App. Dist.
944
Defense Logistics Agency; Diaconu v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Dehler v. Schotten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
942
De La Cruz v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
932
Delancy v. Crabtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.; Monterey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
977
DeLoach v. General Dynamics Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919,972
962
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Demore; Dolenc v.
Department of Air Force; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
927
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908,969
Department of Air Force; Ricketts v.
951
Department of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Commerce v. U. S. House of Representatives . . . .
978
Department of Interior; Federal Employees v. . . . . . . . . . . . 903,950,977
Department of Interior; FLRA v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,950,977
908
Depree v. Library of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904
DePrins v. Van Damme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
911
DesAnges v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
968
Deteresa v. American Broadcasting Cos.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
915
DeVaney; Thriftway Marketing Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
Dever v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
958
Devery v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
969
DeWig v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972
DeYoung v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
944
Diaconu v. Defense Logistics Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
934
Dias v. Bogins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
947
Dickey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
914
Dillon; Doyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DiMartini v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
916
Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title

of director.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Discon, Inc.; NYNEX Corp. v.
Dismuke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
District Court. See U. S. District Court.
District Court of Appeal of Fla., Fifth Dist.; Cuthbert v. . . . . . . .
District Court of Tex., Harris County; Walkoviak v. . . . . . . . . . . .
District Judge. See U. S. District Judge.
District Lodge. For labor union, see name of trade.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
District of Columbia Bd. of Elections; Malone v.
Dixon v. Stewart
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dixon v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dixon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D & M Contracting Co. v. First Union National Bank . . . . . . . . .
Doakes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

976
919

963
969

902
971
956
929
963
939
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

19

ALITO, J., concurring

is provided by a grandfathered plan that does not pay for
contraceptives or a woman who works for a small business
that may not provide any health insurance at all.

*

*

*
I would hold not only that it was appropriate for the De-
partments  to  consider  RFRA,  but  also  that  the  Depart-
ments  were  required  by  RFRA  to  create  the  religious  ex-
emption (or something very close to it).  I would bring the
Little Sisters’ legal odyssey to an end.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Alito. It contains legal arguments and references to specific cases and legislation (RFRA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017)

33

Opinion of the Court

given above, the Court answers that question in the nega-
tive  as  to  the  detention  policy  claims.  As  to  the  prisoner
abuse  claim,  because  the  briefs  have  not  concentrated  on
that  issue,  the  Court  remands  to  allow  the  Court  of  Ap-
peals to consider the claim in light of the Bivens analysis
set forth above.

The  question  with  respect  to  the  §1985(3)  claim  is
whether a reasonable officer in petitioners’ position would
have known the alleged conduct was an unlawful conspir-
acy.  For the reasons given above, the Court answers that
question, too, in the negative.

The  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  is  reversed  as  to
all  of  the  claims  except  the  prisoner  abuse  claim  against
Warden  Hasty.  The  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals
with  respect  to  that  claim  is  vacated,  and  that  case  is
remanded for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  JUSTICE  KAGAN,  and  JUSTICE
GORSUCH  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of
these cases.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the concluding section. It summarizes the court's rulings on various claims and provides instructions for further proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Conclusion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1081

558 U. S.

December 7, 2009

No. 09–7120.  Lambert v.  Michigan.  Ct. App. Mich.  Certio

rari  denied.

No.  09–7129.  Cruz  v.  Lawler,  Superintendent,  State
Correctional  Institution  at  Huntingdon,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7135.  Dyke  v.  Clarke,  Commissioner,  Massachu
setts  Department  of  Correction.  C.  A.  1st  Cir.  Certio
rari  denied.

No.  09–7139.  Scriber  v.  Koppel,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.  4th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  329  Fed.  Appx.  461.

No.  09–7150.  Rector  v.  Georgia.  Sup.  Ct.  Ga.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  285  Ga.  714,  681  S.  E.  2d  157.

No.  09–7151.  Swisher  v.  Wakefield  et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7152.  Slade  v.  Pennsylvania.  Super.  Ct.  Pa.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  964  A.  2d  446.

No.  09–7194.  Hanson  v.  Oklahoma.  Ct.  Crim.  App.  Okla.

Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  206  P.  3d  1020.

No.  09–7196.  Fuller  v.  Kentucky.  Sup.  Ct.  Ky.  Certio

rari  denied.

No. 09–7205.  Bledsoe v.  Bruce, Warden, et al.  C. A. 10th

Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  569  F.  3d  1223.

No.  09–7209.  Patten  v.  Fleming,  Chief  Judge,  United
States District Court for the Southern District of Geor
gia,  et  al.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–7212.  Kirkpatrick  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  2d  Dist.
Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  389  Ill.  App.  3d  1151,  976
N.  E.  2d  1211.

No.  09–7224.  Clark  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Cer

tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  273.

No.  09–7241.  Macias  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  Sup.  Ct.  Fla.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  18  So.  3d  1038.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, likely from a legal database. It includes case numbers, citations, and brief descriptions of the actions taken.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Orders</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

SNYDER v. PHELPS

Syllabus

ments  were  entitled  to  First  Amendment  protection  because  those
statements  were  on  matters  of  public  concern,  were  not  provably
false, and were expressed solely through hyperbolic rhetoric.

Held: The First Amendment shields Westboro from tort liability for its

picketing in this case.  Pp. 5–15.

(a) The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment can serve as a
defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of
emotional  distress.  Hustler  Magazine,  Inc.  v.  Falwell,  485  U. S.  46,
50-51.  Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro li-
able for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is
of  public  or  private  concern,  as  determined  by  all  the  circumstances
of the case.  “[S]peech on public issues occupies the ‘ “highest rung of
the hierarchy of First Amendment values” ’ and is entitled to special
protection.”  Connick  v.  Myers,  461  U. S.  138,  145.    Although  the
boundaries  of  what  constitutes  speech  on  matters  of  public  concern
are not well defined, this Court has said that speech is of public con-
cern when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of po-
litical, social, or other concern to the community,” id., at 146, or when
it  “is  a  subject  of  general  interest  and  of  value  and  concern  to  the
public,” San Diego v. Roe, 543 U. S. 77, 83–84.  A statement’s argua-
bly  “inappropriate  or  controversial  character  . . .  is  irrelevant  to  the
question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.”  Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 387.  Pp. 5–7.

To  determine  whether  speech  is  of  public  or  private  concern,  this
Court  must  independently  examine  the  “ ‘content,  form,  and  con-
text,’ ”  of  the  speech  “ ‘as  revealed  by  the  whole  record.’ ”    Dun  &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749, 761.   In
considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it
is necessary to evaluate all aspects of the speech.  Pp. 7–8.

The  “content”  of  Westboro’s  signs  plainly  relates  to  public,  rather
than private, matters.  The placards highlighted issues of public im-
port—the  political  and  moral  conduct  of  the  United  States  and  its
citizens,  the  fate  of  the  Nation,  homosexuality  in  the  military,  and
scandals  involving  the  Catholic  clergy—and  Westboro  conveyed  its
views on those issues in a manner designed to reach as broad a public
audience as possible.  Even if a few of the signs were viewed as con-
taining  messages  related  to  a  particular  individual,  that  would  not
change  the  fact  that  the  dominant  theme  of  Westboro’s  demonstra-
tion spoke to broader public issues.  P. 8.

The “context” of the speech—its connection with Matthew Snyder’s
funeral—cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro’s speech.
The signs reflected Westboro’s condemnation of much in modern soci-
ety, and it cannot be argued that Westboro’s use of speech on public
issues  was  in  any  way  contrived  to  insulate  a  personal  attack  on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case syllabus, specifically focusing on the Supreme Court case Snyder v. Phelps. It outlines the legal arguments and the court's decision regarding free speech rights.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Syllabus)</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U76

[09-06-00 18:29:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN

96

HOPKINS v. REEVES

Opinion of the Court

106 Neb. 395, 184 N. W. 68 (1921); Morgan v. State, 51 Neb.
If a Nebraska trial
672, 695, 71 N. W. 788, 794–795 (1897).
court gives instructions on those offenses, and the defendant
is convicted only of second-degree murder or manslaughter,
that conviction must be reversed on appeal. See Thompson
v. State, supra, at 396, 184 N. W., at 68. Thus, as a matter
of law, Nebraska prosecutors cannot obtain convictions for
second-degree murder or manslaughter in a felony-murder
trial.

Beck is therefore distinguishable from this case in two crit-
ical respects. The Alabama statute prohibited instructions
on offenses that state law clearly recognized as lesser in-
cluded offenses of the charged crime, and it did so only in
capital cases. Alabama thus erected an “artiﬁcial barrier”
that restricted its juries to a choice between conviction for
a capital offense and acquittal. Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 20 (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992,
1007 (1983)). Here, by contrast, the Nebraska trial court
did not deny respondent instructions on any existing lesser
included offense of felony murder; it merely declined to give
instructions on crimes that are not lesser included offenses.
In so doing, the trial court did not create an “artiﬁcial bar-
rier” for the jury; nor did it treat capital cases differently
from noncapital cases.
it simply followed the
Instead,
Nebraska Supreme Court’s interpretation of the relevant
offenses under state law.

By ignoring these distinctions, the Court of Appeals lim-
ited state sovereignty in a manner more severe than the rule
in Beck. Almost all States, including Nebraska, provide in-
structions only on those offenses that have been deemed to
constitute lesser included offenses of the charged crime.
See n. 5, supra.6 We have never suggested that the Consti-

6 In determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense of a
particular crime, the States have adopted a variety of approaches. See,
e. g., State v. Berlin, 133 Wash. 2d 541, 550–551, 947 P. 2d 700, 704–705
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a Supreme Court opinion. It contains legal citations, discusses legal precedent, and analyzes the application of law to a specific case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CHIAVERINI ET AL. v. CITY OF NAPOLEON, OHIO, ET
AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–50.  Argued April 15, 2024—Decided June 20, 2024

This case involves a dispute between petitioner Jascha Chiaverini and
police officers from Napoleon, Ohio.  The officers charged Chiaverini,
a jewelry store owner, with three crimes: receiving stolen property, a
misdemeanor; dealing in precious metals without a license, also a mis-
demeanor; and money laundering, a felony.  After obtaining a warrant,
the police arrested Chiaverini and detained him for three days.  But
county prosecutors later dropped the case.  Chiaverini, believing that
his arrest and detention were unjustified, then sued the officers, alleg-
ing  what  is  known  as  a  Fourth  Amendment  malicious-prosecution
claim under 42 U. S. C. §1983.  To prevail on this claim, he had to show
that the officers brought criminal charges against him without proba-
ble cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure of his person.  The Dis-
trict Court, however, granted summary judgment to the officers, and
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.  The Court of Ap-
peals  held  that  Chiaverini’s  prosecution  was  supported  by  probable
cause.  In holding this, the court did not address whether the officers
had probable cause to bring the money-laundering charge.  In its view,
there  was  clearly  probable  cause  to  charge  Chiaverini  with  the  two
misdemeanors.  And so long as one charge was supported by probable
cause,  it  thought,  a  malicious-prosecution  claim  based  on  any  other
charge must fail.

Held: The presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal pro-
ceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-
prosecution  claim  relating  to  another,  baseless  charge.    The  parties,
and the United States as amicus curiae, all agree with this conclusion,
which follows from both the Fourth Amendment and traditional com-
mon-law practice.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text. They are generally not suitable for indexing as they provide a high-level overview rather than the actual content of the decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

292 GEBSER v. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

regulations, however, does not establish the requisite actual
notice and deliberate indifference. And in any event, the
failure to promulgate a grievance procedure does not itself
constitute “discrimination” under Title IX. Of course, the
Department of Education could enforce the requirement ad-
ministratively: Agencies generally have authority to promul-
gate and enforce requirements that effectuate the statute’s
nondiscrimination mandate, 20 U. S. C. § 1682, even if those
requirements do not purport to represent a deﬁnition of dis-
crimination under the statute. E. g., Grove City, 465 U. S.,
at 574–575 (permitting administrative enforcement of regu-
lation requiring college to execute an “Assurance of Compli-
ance” with Title IX). We have never held, however, that
the implied private right of action under Title IX allows
recovery in damages for violation of those sorts of adminis-
trative requirements.

V

The number of reported cases involving sexual harassment
of students in schools conﬁrms that harassment unfortu-
nately is an all too common aspect of the educational experi-
ence. No one questions that a student suffers extraordinary
harm when subjected to sexual harassment and abuse by a
teacher, and that the teacher’s conduct is reprehensible and
undermines the basic purposes of the educational system.
The issue in this case, however, is whether the independent
misconduct of a teacher is attributable to the school district
that employs him under a speciﬁc federal statute designed
primarily to prevent recipients of federal ﬁnancial assistance
from using the funds in a discriminatory manner. Our deci-
sion does not affect any right of recovery that an individual
may have against a school district as a matter of state law
or against the teacher in his individual capacity under state
law or under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Until Congress speaks di-
rectly on the subject, however, we will not hold a school
district liable in damages under Title IX for a teacher’s
sexual harassment of a student absent actual notice and de-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from a court case. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U79

[09-08-00 13:44:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 125 (1998)

133

Opinion of the Court

make for this statute to penalize one who walks with a gun
in a bag to the site of a drug sale, but to ignore a similar
individual who, like defendant Gray-Santana, travels to a
similar site with a similar gun in a similar bag, but instead
of walking, drives there with the gun in his car? How per-
suasive is a punishment that is without effect until a drug
dealer who has brought his gun to a sale (indeed has it avail-
able for use) actually takes it from the trunk (or unlocks the
It is difﬁcult to say that,
glove compartment) of his car?
considered as a class, those who prepare, say, to sell drugs
by placing guns in their cars are less dangerous, or less de-
serving of punishment, than those who carry handguns on
their person.

We have found no signiﬁcant indication elsewhere in the
legislative history of any more narrowly focused relevant
purpose. We have found an instance in which a legislator
referred to the statute as applicable when an individual “has
a ﬁrearm on his person,” ibid. (Rep. Meskill); an instance in
which a legislator speaks of “a criminal who takes a gun in
his hand,” id., at 22239 (Rep. Pucinski); and a reference in
the Senate Report to a “gun carried in a pocket,” S. Rep.
No. 98–225, p. 314, n. 10 (1983); see also 114 Cong. Rec. 21788,
21789 (1968) (references to gun “carrying” without more).
But in these instances no one purports to deﬁne the scope of
the term “carries”; and the examples of guns carried on the
person are not used to illustrate the reach of the term “car-
ries” but to illustrate, or to criticize, a different aspect of
the statute.

Regardless, in other instances, legislators suggest that the
word “carries” has a broader scope. One legislator indicates
that the statute responds in part to the concerns of law en-
forcement personnel, who had urged that “carrying short
ﬁrearms in motor vehicles be classiﬁed as carrying such
weapons concealed.”
Id., at 22242 (Rep. May). Another
criticizes a version of the proposed statute by suggesting it
might apply to drunken driving, and gives as an example a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a case.  It discusses the interpretation of a statute related to carrying firearms.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Opinion of the Court

the Court approved a federal statute that, among other pro-
visions,  tolled  state  statutes  of  limitations  in  state  courts
for suits against soldiers while they were in service of the
Union.  The  Court  described  Congress’  authority  as
“carr[ying] with it inherently the power” to “remedy” state
efforts to frustrate national aims; objections sounding in or-
dinary federalism principles were “untenable.”  Id., at 507.
In the early 20th century, the Court again rejected state-
sovereignty  objections  in  this  area,  this  time  to  the  draft.
See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S., at 381.  We wrote
that Congress’ authority to raise armies could not be quali-
fied  or  restricted  by  the  States  because  the  Constitution
“manifestly intended to give . . . all” such power to the Fed-
eral Government and “leave none to the States.”  Ibid.

Modern examples illustrate the same structural point.  In
United States v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 644–649 (1961), this
Court rejected a State’s Tenth Amendment challenge to a
federal law providing that, when certain veterans die with-
out  heirs,  their  property  distributes  to  veterans’  facilities
rather  than  escheating  to  the  State.    Even  though  estate
and property law are areas “normally left to the States,” the
Court  explained  that  those  background  assumptions  are
displaced when it comes to Congress’ “constitutional powers
to raise armies and navies.”  Id., at 648–649.  When, years
later, the Court adopted a broader view of state sovereignty
under the Tenth Amendment, the Court was careful to clar-
ify  that  “[n]othing  we  say  in  this  opinion  addresses  the
scope of Congress’ authority under its war power.”  National
League  of  Cities  v.  Usery,  426  U. S.  833,  854–855,  n.  18
(1976), overruled on other grounds, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528 (1985).

Nor  is  the  Federal  Government’s  power  limited  to  the
“context of an actual war,” as we held more recently in Per-
pich  v.  Department  of  Defense,  496  U. S.  334,  349  (1990).
After the Governors of California and Maine refused to al-
low  their  States’  National  Guard  members  to  be  sent  on
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion discussing the scope of Congress' war powers. It provides historical context and cites relevant Supreme Court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

1

Opinion of ALITO, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 13–1041 and 13–1052
_________________

THOMAS E. PEREZ, SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION ET AL.

13–1041

13–1052

JEROME NICKOLS, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[March 9, 2015]

JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment.

I  join  the  opinion  of  the  Court  except  for  Part  III–B.    I
agree that the doctrine of Paralyzed Veterans of America v.
D.  C.  Arena  L.  P.,  117  F.  3d  579  (CADC  1997),  is  incom-
patible with the Administrative Procedure Act.  The crea-
tion  of  that  doctrine  may  have  been  prompted  by  an  un-
derstandable  concern  about  the  aggrandizement  of  the
power  of  administrative  agencies  as  a  result  of  the  com-
bined  effect  of  (1) the  effective  delegation  to  agencies  by
Congress  of  huge  swaths  of  lawmaking  authority,  (2) the
exploitation  by  agencies  of  the  uncertain  boundary  be-
tween  legislative  and  interpretive  rules,  and  (3) this
Court’s cases holding that courts  must ordinarily defer to
an  agency’s  interpretation  of  its  own  ambiguous  regula-
tions.  See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S.
410 (1945).  I do not dismiss these concerns, but the Para-
lyzed Veterans doctrine is not a viable cure for these prob-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes citation information, the names of the parties involved, and the name of the Justice writing the opinion. This type of content is generally suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

UNITED STATES v. PALOMAR-SANTIAGO

Opinion of the Court

prior removal order was premised on a conviction that was
later found not to be a removable offense.  The Court holds
that the statute does not permit such an exception.

I
A
Foreign  nationals  may  be  removed  from  the  United
States  if  they  are  convicted  of  an  “aggravated  felony.”    8
U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Among the offenses that qualify
as aggravated felonies are “crime[s] of violence . . . for which
the  term  of  imprisonment  [is]  at  least  one  year.”
§1101(a)(43)(F).  The term “crime of violence” includes “an
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or prop-
erty of another.”  18 U. S. C. §16(a).

Noncitizens  facing  removal  generally  receive  a  hearing
before  an  immigration  judge.    Noncitizens  can  proffer  de-
fenses at that hearing, including that the conviction identi-
fied in the charging document is not a removable offense.  If
unsuccessful, they may appeal to the Board of Immigration
See  8  U. S. C.  §1229a(c)(5);  8  CFR
Appeals  (BIA).
§§1003.1(b),  (d)(3),  1240.15  (2021).    If  unsuccessful  again,
they can seek review of the BIA’s decision before a federal
court of appeals.  See 8 U. S. C. §§1101(a)(47), 1252.

Once a noncitizen is removed, it is a crime to  return to
the  United  States  without  authorization.    §1326(a).    The
statute criminalizing unlawful reentry did not originally al-
low  defendants  to  raise  the  invalidity  of  their  underlying
removal orders as an affirmative defense.  This Court later
held, however, that the statute “does not comport with the
constitutional requirement of due process” insofar as it “im-
pose[s] a criminal penalty for reentry after any deportation,
regardless of how violative of the rights of the [noncitizen]
the deportation proceeding may have been.”  United States
v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U. S. 828, 837 (1987).  “[A]t a mini-
mum,”  “a  collateral  challenge  to  the  use  of  a  deportation
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" in a case titled "UNITED STATES v. PALOMAR-SANTIAGO".  It discusses the legal basis for removal of foreign nationals from the United States and the implications of a prior removal order being based on a conviction later deemed not removable.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BERGER ET AL. v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–248.  Argued March 21, 2022—Decided June 23, 2022

In  2018,  North  Carolina  amended  its  Constitution  to  provide  that
“[v]oters offering to vote in person shall present photographic identifi-
cation.”  Art. VI, §2(4).  To implement the constitutional mandate, the
General Assembly approved S. B. 824.  The Governor vetoed the bill,
the General Assembly overrode the veto, and S. B. 824 went into effect.
The state conference of the NAACP then sued the Governor and mem-
bers of the State Board of Elections (collectively, Board), a state agency
whose members are both appointed and removable by the Governor.
The NAACP alleged that S. B. 824 offends the Federal Constitution.
The Board was defended by the State’s attorney general, who, like the
Governor, is an independently elected official.  The attorney general at
the time was a former state senator who voted against an earlier voter-
ID law and filed a declaration in support of a legal challenge against
it.  The speaker of the State House of Representatives and president
pro  tempore  of  the  State  Senate  (hereinafter,  legislative  leaders)
moved  to  intervene,  arguing  that,  without  their  participation,  im-
portant state interests would not be adequately represented in light of
the  Governor’s  opposition  to  S. B.  824,  the  Board’s  allegiance  to  the
Governor and its tepid defense of S. B. 824 in parallel state-court pro-
ceedings, and the attorney general’s opposition to earlier voter-ID ef-
forts.

The District Court applied a presumption that the legislative lead-
ers’ interests would be adequately represented by the Governor, Board,
and the attorney general and denied their motion to intervene.  Unsat-
isfied with the Board’s defense following the denial of their motion, the
legislative leaders sought to lodge an amicus brief and accompanying
materials, but the District Court refused to consider them, struck them
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the actual legal reasoning. They are meant to provide a concise overview of the case for readers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
42

GLOSSIP v. GROSS

BREYER, J., dissenting
Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J.

APPENDICES

A

Death Sentences Imposed 1977–2014
  </content>
  <thinking>
The content appears to be a heading and the start of a table or list. This is likely part of an appendix and not the main body text of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Appendix</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

lxxv

Zepeda-Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zharn v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zimbovsky v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . .
Zinsmeyer Trusts Partnership v. PaineWebber Group, Inc.
Zlaket; Peabody v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zoglauer v. Zoglauer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zulpo-Dane; Aldridge v.

Page
1080
1105
1125,1128
1020
1074
1025
1066
1132
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases reported, which is typically found at the beginning of a legal publication. It is not the main body of the text and is not meant to be read sequentially.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

17

Opinion of the Court

instant  dispute,  therefore,  with  the  limited-public-forum
decisions as our guide.

B
As  earlier  pointed  out,  supra,  at  1,  12–13,  we  do  not

write on a blank slate; we have three times before consid
ered  clashes  between  public  universities  and  student
groups  seeking  official  recognition  or  its  attendant  bene
fits.  First,  in  Healy,  a  state  college  denied  school  affilia
tion to a student group that wished to form a local chapter
of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).  408 U. S., at
170.  Characterizing SDS’s mission as violent and disrup
tive, and finding the organization’s philosophy repugnant,
the college completely banned the SDS chapter from cam
pus;  in  its  effort  to  sever  all  channels  of  communication
between students and the group,  university  officials went
so far as to disband a meeting of SDS members in a cam
pus  coffee  shop.    Id.,  at  174–176.    The  college,  we  noted,
could  require  “that  a  group  seeking  official  recognition
affirm  in  advance  its  willingness  to  adhere  to  reasonable
campus  law,”  including  “reasonable  standards  respecting
conduct.”  Id., at 193.  But a public educational institution
exceeds constitutional bounds, we held, when it “restrict[s]
speech  or  association  simply  because  it  finds  the  views
expressed by [a] group to be abhorrent.”  Id., at 187–188.15

——————

15 The  dissent  relies  heavily  on  Healy,  post,  at  13–17,  but  its  other
wise exhaustive account of the case elides the very fact the Healy Court
identified  as  dispositive:  The  president  of  the  college  explicitly  denied
the student group official recognition because of the group’s viewpoint.
See 408 U. S, at 187 (“The mere disagreement of the President with the
group’s  philosophy  affords  no  reason  to  deny  it  recognition.”).    In  this
case,  in  contrast,  Hastings  denied  CLS  recognition  not  because  the
school  wanted  to  silence  the  “viewpoint  that  CLS  sought  to  express
through  its  membership  requirements,”  post,  at  17,  n. 2,  but  because
CLS,  insisting  on  preferential  treatment,  declined  to  comply  with  the
open-access  policy  applicable  to  all  RSOs,  see  R. A. V.  v.  St.  Paul,  505
U. S. 377, 390 (1992) (“Where the [State] does not target conduct on the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and delves into legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN

Syllabus

rejected their argument regarding the scope of the HEROES Act’s pro-
cedural  exemptions,  but  nevertheless  vacated  the  Plan  as  substan-
tively unauthorized.  This Court granted certiorari before judgment to
consider this case alongside Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22–506, which pre-
sents a similar challenge to the Plan.

Held: Because respondents fail to establish that any injury they suffer
from not having their loans forgiven is fairly traceable to the Plan, they
lack Article III standing, so the Court has no jurisdiction to address
their procedural claim.  Pp. 6–15.

(a)  “This  case  begins  and  ends  with  standing.”  Carney  v.  Adams,
592  U. S.  ___,  ___.    The  Court’s  authority  under  the  Constitution  is
limited  to  resolving  “Cases”  or  “Controversies.”    Art. III,  §2.    The
Court’s  jurisprudence  has  “established  that  the  irreducible  constitu-
tional minimum of standing contains three elements” that a plaintiff
must  plead  and—ultimately—prove.    Lujan  v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife,
504 U. S. 555, 560.  Those elements are: (1) a “concrete and particular-
ized” injury that is (2) “fairly traceable” to the challenged action of the
defendant and (3) “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision.”  Id.,
at 560–561 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).  But
where,  as  here,  the  plaintiff  alleges  that  she  has  been  deprived  of  a
procedural  right  to  protect  her  concrete  interest,  she  need  not  show
that observing the contested procedure would necessarily lead to a dif-
ferent substantive result.  Id., at 572, n. 7.  Pp. 6–8.

(b) As  articulated  in  this  Court,  respondents’  claim  and  theory  of
standing  are  twofold:  First,  because  the  HEROES  Act  does  not  sub-
stantively  authorize  the  Plan,  the  Secretary  was  obligated  to  follow
typical negotiated-rulemaking and notice-and-comment requirements.
Second, if the Secretary had observed those procedures, respondents
might have used those opportunities to convince him not only that pro-
ceeding under the HEROES Act is unlawful, but also that he should
instead adopt a different loan-forgiveness program under the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (HEA), and to make that program more gener-
ous to respondents than the Plan.  Respondents assert there is at least
a chance that this series of events will come to pass now if this Court
vacates the Plan.  Pp. 8–9.

(c) Respondents’  standing  claim  most  clearly  fails  on  traceability:
They cannot show that their purported injury of not receiving loan re-
lief under the HEA is fairly traceable to the Department’s (allegedly
unlawful) decision to grant loan relief under the HEROES Act.  Pp. 9–
15.

(1) Significantly,  respondents  are  not  claiming  that  they  are  in-
jured by not being sufficiently included among the Plan’s beneficiaries:
They think the Plan is substantively unlawful and instead seek debt
forgiveness under the HEA.  But a decision regarding the lawfulness
  </content>
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Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010)

437

Opinion of Stevens, J.

The corporate/individual distinction was not questioned by
the Court’s disposition, in 1986, of a challenge to the expendi
ture  restriction  as  applied  to  a  distinctive  type  of  nonproﬁt
corporation.  In MCFL, 479 U. S. 238, we stated again “that
‘the special characteristics of the corporate structure require
particularly careful regulation,’ ” id., at 256 (quoting NRWC,
459  U. S.,  at  209–210),  and  again  we  acknowledged  that  the
Government  has  a  legitimate  interest  in  “regulat[ing]  the
substantial  aggregations  of  wealth  amassed  by  the  special
advantages which go with the corporate form,” 479 U. S., at
257 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Those aggregations
can distort the “free trade in ideas” crucial to candidate elec
tions,  ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  at  the  ex
pense  of  members  or  shareholders  who  may  disagree  with
the object of the expenditures,  id., at 260.  What the Court
held by a 5-to-4 vote was that a limited class of corporations
must be allowed to use their general treasury funds for inde
pendent  expenditures,  because  Congress’  interests  in  pro
tecting shareholders and “restrict[ing] ‘the inﬂuence of polit
ical war chests funneled through the corporate form,’ ” id., at
257 (quoting FEC v.  National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 501 (1985) (NCPAC)), did not apply to
corporations  that  were  structurally  insulated  from  those
concerns.61

It  is  worth  remembering  for  present  purposes  that  the
four  MCFL  dissenters,  led  by  Chief  Justice  Rehnquist,
thought  the  Court  was  carrying  the  First  Amendment  too

61 Speciﬁcally,  these  corporations  had  to  meet  three  conditions.  First,
they  had  to  be  formed  “for  the  express  purpose  of  promoting  political
ideas,” so that their resources reﬂected political support rather than com
mercial  success.  MCFL,  479  U. S.,  at  264.  Next,  they  had  to  have  no
shareholders,  so  that  “persons  connected  with  the  organization  will  have
no  economic  disincentive  for  disassociating  with  it  if  they  disagree  with
its political  activity.”  Ibid.  Finally, they could  not be “established  by a
business corporation or a labor union,” nor “accept contributions from such
entities,” lest they “serv[e] as conduits for the type of direct spending that
creates a threat to the political marketplace.”  Ibid.
  </content>
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  </thinking>
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  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

29

Opinion of the Court

scope  of  the  protection  applicable  to  the  Federal  Govern-
ment and States is pegged to the public understanding of
the right when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791.  See,
e.g.,  Crawford  v.  Washington,  541  U. S.  36,  42–50  (2004)
(Sixth Amendment); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U. S. 164, 168–
169 (2008) (Fourth Amendment); Nevada Comm’n on Eth-
ics  v.  Carrigan,  564  U. S.  117,  122–125  (2011)  (First
Amendment).

We also acknowledge that there is an ongoing scholarly
debate on whether courts should primarily rely on the pre-
vailing understanding of an individual right when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified in 1868 when defining its
scope (as well as the scope of the right against the Federal
Government).  See, e.g., A. Amar, The Bill of Rights: Crea-
tion and Reconstruction xiv, 223, 243 (1998); K. Lash, Re-
Speaking the Bill of Rights: A New Doctrine of Incorpora-
tion (Jan. 15, 2021) (manuscript, at 2), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3766917 (“When the peo-
ple  adopted  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  into  existence,
they readopted the original Bill of Rights, and did so in a
manner  that  invested  those  original  1791  texts  with  new
1868 meanings”).  We need not address this issue today be-
cause, as we explain below, the public understanding of the
right to keep and bear arms in both 1791 and 1868 was, for
all relevant purposes, the same with respect to public carry.

*

*

*

With  these  principles  in  mind,  we  turn  to  respondents’
historical  evidence.  Throughout  modern  Anglo-American
history, the right to keep and bear arms in public has tra-
ditionally been subject to well-defined restrictions govern-
ing the intent for which one could carry arms, the manner
of carry, or the exceptional circumstances under which one
could  not  carry  arms.    But  apart  from  a  handful  of  late-
19th-century jurisdictions, the historical record compiled by
respondents  does  not  demonstrate  a  tradition  of  broadly
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the historical understanding of the right to bear arms. It cites legal precedents and engages in legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
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  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

1

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20A136 (20–746)
_________________

SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH,
ET AL., v. GAVIN NEWSOM, GOVERNOR OF
CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

[February 5, 2021]

  The application for injunctive relief presented to JUSTICE
KAGAN and by her referred to the Court is granted in part.
Respondents  are  enjoined  from  enforcing  the  Blueprint’s
Tier  1  prohibition  on  indoor  worship  services  against  the
applicants pending disposition of the petition for a writ of
certiorari.  The application is denied with respect to the per-
centage  capacity  limitations,  and  respondents  are  not  en-
joined  from  imposing  a  25%  capacity  limitation  on  indoor
worship services in Tier 1.  The application is denied with
respect  to the prohibition  on  singing  and  chanting  during
indoor services.  This order is without prejudice to the ap-
plicants presenting new evidence to the District Court that
the  State  is  not  applying  the  percentage  capacity  limita-
tions or the prohibition on singing and chanting in a gener-
ally  applicable  manner.    Should  the  petition  for  a  writ  of
certiorari  be  denied,  this  order  shall  terminate  automati-
cally.    In  the  event  the  petition  for  a  writ  of  certiorari  is
granted, the order shall terminate upon the sending down
of the judgment of this Court.
  JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE GORSUCH would grant the
application in full.
  JUSTICE ALITO would grant the application with respect
to all of the capacity restrictions on indoor worship services
and  the  prohibition  against  indoor  singing  and  chanting,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States.  It includes case citations, the names of the justices, and a summary of the court's decision.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
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<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
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  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

27

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as
punishment for some offense.”  United States v. Bajakajian,
524 U. S. 321, 328 (1998) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  “The  touchstone  of  the  constitutional  inquiry  under
the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportional-
ity: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relation-
ship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to pun-
ish.”  Id., at 334.

The District Court in this case concluded that the fines
here serve “no remedial purpose” but rather are “intended
to  deter  homeless  individuals  from  residing  in  Grants
Pass.”  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  189a.    Because  it  concluded
that the fines are punitive, it went on to determine that the
fines are “ ‘grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the of-
fense’ ”  and  thus  excessive.    Ibid.  The  Ninth  Circuit  de-
clined to consider this holding because the City presented
“no  meaningful  argument  on  appeal  regarding  the  exces-
sive fines issue.”  72 F. 4th, at 895.  On remand, the Ninth
Circuit is free to consider whether the City forfeited its ap-
peal  on  this  ground  and,  if  not,  whether  this  issue  has
merit.

C
Finally,  the  Court  does  not  decide  whether  the  Ordi-
nances violate the Due Process Clause.  “The Due Process
Clauses  of  the  Fifth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  ensure
that officials may not displace certain rules associated with
criminal liability that are ‘so old and venerable,’ ‘ “so rooted
in  the  traditions  and  conscience  of  our  people[,]  as  to  be
ranked as fundamental.” ’ ”  Ante, at 15 (quoting Kahler v.
Kansas, 589 U. S. 271, 279 (2020)).  The majority notes that
due process arguments in Robinson “may have made some
sense.”  Ante, at 19.  On that score, I agree.  “[H]istorically,
crimes in England and this country have usually required
proof  of  some  act  (or  actus  reus)  undertaken  with  some
measure of volition (mens rea).”  Ibid.  “This view ‘took deep
  </content>
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This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Sotomayor. It cites previous cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
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529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

42

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Thomas, J., dissenting

point that Ringer did not decide. The majority opinion can
therefore claim no support from its asserted “consistency
with the holdings of earlier cases such as Ringer.” Ante,
at 19. Ringer simply does not constitute a holding on the
meaning of § 1395ii; or if it does, the majority has engaged
in the very practice it condemns—a sub silentio overruling
(of Webster v. Fall, supra).

Moreover, the majority’s criticism of my approach as de-
claring a sub silentio overruling is just as well directed at
itself, for Ringer is no less overruled by the majority’s view
of Michigan Academy than by my own. According to the
majority, the Michigan Academy “exception” to § 1395ii ap-
plies where the aggrieved party “can obtain no review at all
unless it can obtain judicial review in a § 1331 action.” Ante,
at 20. Consider how this test would apply to Freeman
Ringer, one of the four plaintiffs in Ringer. Ringer sought
to challenge the Secretary’s policy proscribing reimburse-
ment for a certain type of surgery (a Part A beneﬁts issue),
invoking general federal-question jurisdiction. He had no
concrete reimbursement claim to present, for he did not
possess the ﬁnancial means to pay for the surgery up front
and await reimbursement. Nor, apparently, could he obtain
private ﬁnancing for the surgery. See Ringer, 466 U. S., at
620; id., at 637, n. 24 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (“Ringer would like nothing
more than to give the Secretary [the] opportunity [to rule
on a concrete claim for reimbursement]”); Brief for Petition-
It seems to me that Ringer is the paradig-
ers 42–43, n. 23.
matic example of a party who “can obtain no review at all
unless [he] can obtain judicial review in a § 1331 action,”
ante, at 20, such that he plainly would qualify for the Michi-
gan Academy exception to § 1395ii as described by the
majority.

The majority purports to reafﬁrm Ringer in toto, but it
does so only by revising that case to hold that Ringer, not-
withstanding his own inability to obtain judicial review with-
  </content>
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This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It references prior cases and legal arguments, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
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