<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

21

ALITO, J., dissenting

without creating any property right.3

Carpenter’s  argument  is  particularly  hard  to  swallow
because nothing in the Telecommunications Act precludes
cell  service  providers  from  charging  customers  a  fee  for
accessing cell-site records.  See ante, at 12–13 (KENNEDY,
J.,  dissenting).  It  would  be  very  strange  if  the  owner  of
records  were  required  to  pay  in  order  to  inspect  his  own

——————

3 See,  e.g.,  Freedom  of  Information  Act,  5  U. S. C.  §552(a)  (“Each
agency  shall  make  available  to  the  public  information  as  follows  . . .”);
Privacy  Act,  5  U. S. C.  §552a(d)(1)  (“Each  agency  that  maintains  a
system  of  records  shall  . . .  upon  request  by  any  individual  to  gain
access  to  his  record  or  to  any  information  pertaining  to  him  which  is
contained in the system, permit him and upon his request, a person of
his  own  choosing  to  accompany  him,  to  review  the  record  and  have  a
copy made of all or any portion thereof . . .”); Fair Credit Reporting Act,
15  U. S. C.  §1681j(a)(1)(A)  (“All  consumer  reporting  agencies  . . .  shall
make all disclosures pursuant to section 1681g of this title once during
any 12-month period upon request of the consumer and without charge
to  the  consumer”);  Right  to  Financial  Privacy  Act  of  1978,  12  U. S. C.
§3404(c) (“The customer has the right . . . to obtain a copy of the record
which the financial institution shall keep of all instances in which the
customer’s  record  is  disclosed  to  a  Government  authority  pursuant  to
this  section,  including  the  identity  of  the  Government  authority  to
which  such  disclosure  is  made”);  Government  in  the  Sunshine  Act,  5
U. S. C.  §552b(f )(2)  (“Copies  of  such  transcript,  or  minutes,  or  a  tran-
scription of such recording disclosing the identity of each speaker, shall
be furnished to any person at the actual cost of duplication or transcrip-
tion”);  Cable  Act,  47  U. S. C.  §551(d)  (“A  cable  subscriber  shall  be
provided access to all personally identifiable information regarding that
subscriber  which  is  collected  and  maintained  by  a  cable  operator”);
Family  Educational  Rights  and  Privacy  Act  of  1974,  20  U. S. C.
§1232g(a)(1)(A)  (“No  funds  shall  be  made  available  under  any  applica-
ble program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy
of  denying,  or  which  effectively  prevents,  the  parents  of  students  who
are  or  have  been  in  attendance  at  a  school  of  such  agency  or  at  such
institution,  as  the  case  may  be,  the  right  to  inspect  and  review  the
education  records  of  their  children. . . .  Each  educational  agency  or
institution shall establish appropriate procedures for the granting of a
request by parents for access to the education records of their children
within a reasonable period of time, but in no case more than forty-five
days after the request has been made”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It includes citations, legal jargon, and arguments presented by a Justice.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013)

1

KAGAN, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 11–697
_________________

SUPAP KIRTSAENG, DBA BLUECHRISTINE99,

PETITIONER v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[March 19, 2013]

 JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  joins,

concurring.

I  concur  fully  in  the  Court’s  opinion.  Neither  the  text
nor  the  history  of  17  U. S. C.  §109(a)  supports  removing
first-sale  protection  from  every  copy  of  a  protected  work
manufactured abroad.  See ante, at 8–16, 28–31.  I recog-
nize,  however,  that  the  combination  of  today’s  decision
and  Quality  King  Distributors,  Inc.  v.  L’anza  Research
Int’l,  Inc.,  523  U. S.  135  (1998),  constricts  the  scope  of
§602(a)(1)’s  ban  on  unauthorized  importation.    I  write  to
suggest that any problems associated with that limitation
come not from our reading of §109(a) here, but from Qual-
ity King’s holding that §109(a) limits §602(a)(1).

As the Court explains, the first-sale doctrine has played
an  integral  part  in  American  copyright  law  for  over  a
century.  See  ante,  at  17–19;  Bobbs-Merrill  Co.  v.  Straus,
210 U. S. 339 (1908).  No codification of the doctrine prior
to  1976  even  arguably  limited  its  application  to  copies
made in the United States.  See ante, at 12.  And nothing
in  the  text  or  history  of  §109(a)—the  Copyright  Act  of
1976’s first-sale provision—suggests that Congress meant
to  enact  the  new,  geographical  restriction  John  Wiley
proposes, which at once would deprive American consum-
ers of important rights and encourage copyright holders to
manufacture abroad.  See ante, at 8–16, 28–31.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Kagan. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS

Opinion of the Court

hours,  or  other  working  conditions.”  49  Stat.  449,  29
U. S. C. §151.  Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’
rights “to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted ac-
tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection.”  §157.  Section 8, in turn, prohibits
employers and unions from engaging in certain “unfair la-
bor  practice[s],”  such  as  interfering  with  employees’  exer-
cise of their §7 rights.  §§158(a), (b).

To enforce the NLRA, Congress created the National La-
bor Relations Board.  The Board is authorized “to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice” that
“affect[s] commerce.”  §160(a).  Its authority kicks in when
a person files a charge with the agency alleging that an un-
fair labor practice is afoot.  29 CFR §101.2 (2021).  Agency
staff  investigate  the  charge,  and  if  it  “appears  to  have
merit,” the agency issues a complaint against the offending
party.  §§101.4, 101.8.  After taking evidence and conduct-
ing a hearing, the Board makes the final call.  29 U. S. C.
§§160(b), (c); see also 29 CFR §§101.10–101.12.  If it deter-
mines that a party has engaged in an unfair labor practice,
the Board orders it to “cease and desist” from that practice.
29 U. S. C. §160(c).  The Board may seek enforcement of its
order in a federal court of appeals.  §160(e).  And a party
aggrieved  by  the  order  may  ask  the  court  to  set  it  aside.
§160(f ).

B
Sometimes  a  party  to  a  labor  dispute  goes  directly  to  a
court—raising the specter that state law will say one thing
about the conduct underlying the dispute while the NLRA
says  another.  It  is  a  bedrock  rule,  of  course, that  federal
law preempts state law when the two conflict.  U. S. Const.,
Art. VI,  cl. 2.    Preemption  under  the  NLRA  is  unusual,
though,  because  our  precedent  maintains  that  the  NLRA
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). It delves into the Act's provisions, enforcement mechanisms, and the interplay between federal and state law in labor disputes.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014)

13

Opinion of the Court

meaning of the term “wages” in §3401.  The better reading
is  that  Congress  determined  that,  whatever  position  the
IRS  took  with  respect  to  certain  categories  of  severance
payments, the problem with withholding should be solved
by  treating  all  severance  payments  as  wages  requiring
withholding.

The necessary conclusion is that  §3402(o) does not nar-
row the term “wages” under FICA to exempt all severance
payments.  This  reasoning  is  consistent  with  Rowan,  a
previous decision interpreting FICA.  In Rowan, the Court
held  that  Treasury  Regulations  interpreting  “wages”un-
der  FICA  to  include  the  value  of  meals  and  lodging  were
invalid.  The  Government  conceded,  for  income-tax  pur-
poses,  that  the  taxpayer  in  Rowan  was  correct  to  exempt
the value of the meals and lodging in computing the wages
properly  withheld  under  §3402.    452  U. S.,  at  250–251.
But  it  argued,  nevertheless,  that  the  value  of  the  meals
and  lodging  was  taxable  as  wages  under  FICA,  pursuant
to Treasury Regulations.  The Rowan Court observed that
the  definition  of  wages  under  FICA  was  in  substance  the
same  as  for  purposes  of  withholding.  Id.,  at  255.    The
Court  read  that  similarity  to  be  “strong  evidence  that
Congress  intended  ‘wages’  to  mean  the  same  thing  under
FICA . . .  and  income-tax  withholding.”    Ibid.    To  support
that  conclusion,  the  Court  noted  a  “congressional  concern
for ‘the interest of simplicity and ease of administration.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting S. Rep.  No. 1631, 77th Cong.,  2d Sess., 165
(1942)).  Because “Congress intended . . . to coordinate the
income-tax  withholding  system  with  FICA”  in  order  “to
promote simplicity and ease of administration,” the Court
held  that  it  would  be  “extraordinary”  for  Congress  to
intend  the  definitions  of  “wages”  to  vary  between  FICA
and income-tax withholding.  452 U. S., at 257.

The specific holding of Rowan—that regulations govern-
ing  meals  and  lodging  were  invalid—has  little  or  no
bearing  on  the  issue  confronting  us  here.    What  is  of  im-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the interpretation of "wages" in a tax context. It delves into legal precedent (Rowan) and statutory interpretation, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

7

GORSUCH, J., concurring

similar conclusions in case after case.2

With the passage of time, this Court has come to admit
discomfort with the Insular Cases.  See Reid v. Covert, 354
U. S.  1,  14  (1957)  (plurality  opinion);  Financial  Oversight
and Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC,
590 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 21–22).  But in-
stead of confronting their errors directly, this Court has de-
vised  a  workaround.    Employing  the  specious  logic  of  the
Insular Cases, the Court has proceeded to declare “funda-
mental”—and  thus  applicable  even  to  “unincorporated”
Territories—more  and  more  of  the  Constitution’s  guaran-
tees.  See S. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty:  In-
dians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Or-
igins  of  Plenary  Power  Over  Foreign  Affairs,  81  Texas  L.
Rev. 1, 241–243 (2002) (collecting cases).

That solution is no solution.  It leaves the Insular Cases
on the books.  Lower courts continue to feel constrained to
apply their terms.  See, e.g., Fitisemanu v. United States, 1
F. 4th 862, 873 (CA10 2021); Tuaua v. United States, 788
F. 3d  300,  306–307  (CADC  2015).   And  the  fictions  of  the
Insular Cases on which this workaround depends are just
that.  What provision of the Constitution could any judge
rightly declare less than fundamental?  On what basis could
any judge profess the right to draw distinctions between in-
corporated and unincorporated Territories, terms nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution and which in the past have
turned on bigotry?  There are no good answers to these bad
questions.
——————

2 See, e.g., Springville v. Thomas, 166 U. S. 707, 708–709 (1897) (Sev-
enth  Amendment  jury-unanimity  requirement  applied  in  Utah  Terri-
tory); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 137 (1879) (Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment applied in Utah Territory);
Reynolds  v.  United  States,  98  U. S.  145,  154,  158,  162  (1879)  (Sixth
Amendment  jury-trial  and  confrontation  rights  and  First  Amendment
free-exercise right applied in Utah Territory); see also Cross v. Harrison,
16 How. 164, 193, 197–198 (1854) (domestic law, including the Tax Uni-
formity Clause, applied in California).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It delves into the legal history and implications of the Insular Cases, arguing against their continued relevance and impact.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

792

FARAGHER v. BOCA RATON

Opinion of the Court

visory employee was not otherwise obvious, ibid., and al-
though we cautioned that “common-law principles may not
be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII,” we cited
the Restatement §§ 219–237 with general approval.

Ibid.

We then proceeded to reject two limitations on employer
liability, while establishing the rule that some limitation was
intended. We held that neither the existence of a company
grievance procedure nor the absence of actual notice of the
harassment on the part of upper management would be dis-
positive of such a claim; while either might be relevant to
the liability, neither would result automatically in employer
immunity.
Ibid. Conversely, we held that Title VII placed
some limit on employer responsibility for the creation of a
discriminatory environment by a supervisor, and we held
that Title VII does not make employers “always automati-
cally liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors,”
ibid., contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, which
had held that “an employer is strictly liable for a hostile envi-
ronment created by a supervisor’s sexual advances, even
though the employer neither knew nor reasonably could have
known of the alleged misconduct,” id., at 69–70.

Meritor’s statement of the law is the foundation on which
we build today. Neither party before us has urged us to
depart from our customary adherence to stare decisis in stat-
utory interpretation, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U. S. 164, 172–173 (1989) (stare decisis has “special force” in
statutory interpretation). And the force of precedent here
is enhanced by Congress’s amendment to the liability provi-
sions of Title VII since the Meritor decision, without provid-
ing any modiﬁcation of our holding. Civil Rights Act of
1991, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072, 42 U. S. C. § 1981a; see Keene
Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 212 (1993) (applying
the “presumption that Congress was aware of [prior] judicial
interpretations and,
in effect, adopted them”). See also
infra, at 804, n. 4.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a portion of a court's decision. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U74

[09-06-00 17:54:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 51 (1998)

55

Opinion of the Court

Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States brought this action for the costs of
cleaning up industrial waste generated by a chemical plant.
The issue before us, under the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 94 Stat. 2767, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 9601 et
seq., is whether a parent corporation that actively partici-
pated in, and exercised control over, the operations of a sub-
sidiary may, without more, be held liable as an operator of a
polluting facility owned or operated by the subsidiary. We
answer no, unless the corporate veil may be pierced. But a
corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised
control over, the operations of the facility itself may be held
directly liable in its own right as an operator of the facility.

I

In 1980, CERCLA was enacted in response to the serious
environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.
See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U. S. 355, 358–359 (1986).
“As
its name implies, CERCLA is a comprehensive statute that
grants the President broad power to command government
agencies and private parties to clean up hazardous waste
sites.” Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809, 814
the
(1994).
United States may, for instance, use the “Hazardous Sub-
stance Superfund” to ﬁnance cleanup efforts, see 42 U. S. C.
§§ 9601(11), 9604; 26 U. S. C. § 9507, which it may then replen-
ish by suits brought under § 107 of the Act against, among
others, “any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility.”
42
U. S. C. § 9607(a)(2). So, those actually “responsible for any
damage, environmental harm, or injury from chemical poi-

it satisﬁes certain statutory conditions,

If

Robert L. Graham; for the United States Business & Industrial Council
by David G. Palmer; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by
Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Thomas R. Mounteer.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal terminology.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC.

Opinion of the Court

reasons.

Consider, for example, two businesses that sell furniture
online.  The first stocks a few items of inventory in a small
warehouse  in  North  Sioux  City,  South  Dakota.    The  sec
ond  uses  a  major  warehouse  just  across  the  border  in
South Sioux City, Nebraska, and maintains a sophisticated
website with a virtual showroom accessible in every State,
including  South  Dakota.    By  reason  of  its  physical  pres
ence, the first business must collect and remit a tax on all
of  its  sales  to  customers  from  South  Dakota,  even  those
sales  that  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  warehouse.   See
National  Geographic,  430  U. S.,  at  561;  Scripto,  Inc.,  362
U. S., at 211–212.  But, under Quill, the second, hypothet
ical seller cannot be subject to the same tax for the sales of
the  same  items  made  through  a  pervasive  Internet  pres
ence.  This distinction simply makes no sense.  So long as
a state law avoids “any effect forbidden by the Commerce
Clause,”  Complete  Auto,  430  U. S.,  at  285,  courts  should
not rely on anachronistic formalisms to invalidate it.  The
basic principles of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurispru
dence  are  grounded  in  functional,  marketplace  dynamics;
and  States  can  and  should  consider  those  realities  in
enacting and enforcing their tax laws.

B
The  Quill  Court  itself  acknowledged  that  the  physical
presence rule is “artificial at its edges.” 504 U. S., at 315.
That was an understatement when Quill was decided; and
when the day-to-day functions of  marketing  and distribu
tion  in  the  modern  economy  are  considered,  it  is  all  the
more evident that the physical presence rule is artificial in
its entirety.

Modern  e-commerce  does  not  align  analytically  with  a
test that relies on the sort of physical presence defined in
Quill.
In  a  footnote,  Quill  rejected  the  argument  that
“title  to  ‘a  few  floppy  diskettes’  present  in  a  State”  was
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the Quill case and its relevance to modern e-commerce.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C.

KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment

motion to intervene was not an end-run around the timely-
appeal rule.  And with that issue out of the way, this is a
textbook  case  for  intervention.    The  Sixth  Circuit  should
have allowed the attorney general to step into the litigation
to defend the challenged law.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or case excerpt. It contains legal arguments and references to a specific case (Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

things,  that  the  State’s  intended  use  of  midazolam  would
violate  the  Eighth  Amendment  because,  unlike  sodium
thiopental  or  pentobarbital,  the  drug  “is  incapable  of
producing  a  state  of  unawareness  that  will  be  reliably
maintained  after  either  of  the  other  two  pain-producing
drugs . . . is injected.”  Amended Complaint ¶101.

The  District  Court  held  a  3-day  evidentiary  hearing,  at
which  petitioners  relied  principally  on  the  testimony  of
two experts: Dr. David Lubarsky, an anesthesiologist, and
Dr.  Larry  Sasich,  a  doctor  of  pharmacy.    The  State,  in
turn, based its case on the testimony of Dr. Roswell Evans,
also a doctor of pharmacy.

To  a  great  extent,  the  experts’  testimony  overlapped.
All three experts agreed that midazolam is from a class of
sedative  drugs  known  as  benzodiazepines  (a  class  that
includes  Valium  and  Xanax),  and  that  it  has  no  analge
sic—or pain-relieving—effects.  App. 205 (Lubarsky), 260–
261 (Sasich), 311 (Evans).  They further agreed that while
midazolam can be used to render someone unconscious, it
is not approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA)
for  use  as, and  is  not  in  fact  used  as,  a  “sole drug  to  pro
duce  and  maintain  anesthesia  in  surgical  proceedings.”
Id., at 307, 327 (Evans); see id., at 171 (Lubarsky); id., at
262  (Sasich).    Finally,  all  three  experts  recognized  that
midazolam is subject to a ceiling effect, which means that
there  is  a  point  at  which  increasing  the  dose  of  the  drug
does  not  result  in  any  greater  effect.
Id.,  at  172
(Lubarsky), 243 (Sasich), 331 (Evans).

The  experts’  opinions  diverged,  however,  on  the  crucial
questions of how this ceiling effect operates, and whether
it  will  prevent  midazolam  from  keeping  a  condemned
inmate  unconscious  when  the  second  and  third  lethal
injection  drugs  are  administered.  Dr.  Lubarsky  testified
that  while  benzodiazepines  such  as  midazolam  may,  like
barbiturate  drugs  such  as  sodium  thiopental  and  pento
barbital,  induce  unconsciousness  by  inhibiting  neuron
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case. It contains legal jargon, citations, and expert testimony related to a legal issue.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document - Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of the Court

“guest room[s] or patient room[s] of a hospital,” or “to any
telephone number assigned to a paging service [or] cellular
telephone service” without the “prior express consent of the
called party.”  47 U. S. C. §227(b)(1)(A).2  The TCPA creates
a private right of action for persons to sue to enjoin unlaw-
ful uses of autodialers and to recover up to $1,500 per vio-
lation or three times the plaintiffs’ actual monetary losses.
§227(b)(3).

B
Petitioner Facebook, Inc., maintains a social media plat-
form  with  an  optional  security  feature  that  sends  users
“login notification” text messages when an attempt is made
to access their Facebook account from an unknown device
or browser.  If necessary, the user can then log into Face-
book and take action to secure the account.  To opt in to this
service, the user must provide and verify a cell phone num-
ber to which Facebook can send messages.

In 2014, respondent Noah Duguid received several login-
notification text messages from Facebook, alerting him that
someone had attempted to access the Facebook account as-
sociated with his phone number from an unknown browser.
But Duguid has never had a Facebook account and never
gave Facebook his phone number.3  Unable to stop the no-
tifications, Duguid brought a putative class action against
Facebook.  He alleged that Facebook violated the TCPA by
maintaining  a  database  that  stored  phone  numbers  and
programming  its  equipment  to  send  automated  text  mes-
sages  to  those  numbers  each  time  the  associated  account
was accessed by an unrecognized device or web browser.
——————

2 Neither  party  disputes  that  the  TCPA’s  prohibition  also  extends  to
sending unsolicited text messages.  See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,
577 U. S. 153, 156 (2016).  We therefore assume that it does without con-
sidering or resolving that issue.

3 As Facebook explains, it is possible that Duguid was assigned a recy-
cled cell phone number that previously belonged to a Facebook user who
opted to receive login notifications.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites legal precedent and discusses the interpretation of a specific law (the TCPA).
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
22

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE

Opinion of the Court

IV

Appellees  and  the  dissent  propose  a  number  of  “tests”
for  evaluating  partisan  gerrymandering  claims,  but  none
meets  the need  for  a limited  and precise  standard  that  is
judicially discernible and manageable.  And none provides
a solid grounding for judges to take the extraordinary step
of  reallocating  power  and  influence  between  political
parties.

A
The  Common  Cause  District  Court  concluded  that  all
but  one  of  the  districts  in  North  Carolina’s  2016  Plan
violated  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  by  intentionally
diluting  the  voting  strength  of  Democrats.    318  F. Supp.
3d, at 923.  In reaching that result the court first required
the  plaintiffs  to  prove  “that  a  legislative  mapdrawer’s
predominant  purpose  in  drawing  the  lines  of  a  particular
district  was  to  ‘subordinate  adherents  of  one  political
party  and  entrench  a  rival  party  in  power.’ ”  Id.,  at  865
(quoting Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting  Comm’n,  576  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2015)  (slip  op.,
at  1)).    The  District  Court  next  required  a  showing  “that
the dilution of the votes of supporters of a disfavored party
in a particular district—by virtue of cracking or packing—
is  likely  to  persist  in  subsequent  elections  such  that  an
elected  representative  from  the  favored  party  in  the  dis-
trict  will  not  feel  a  need  to  be  responsive  to  constituents
who  support  the  disfavored  party.”  318  F. Supp.  3d,  at
867.  Finally, after a prima facie showing of partisan vote
dilution,  the  District  Court  shifted  the  burden  to  the  de-
fendants  to  prove  that  the  discriminatory  effects  are  “at-
tributable  to  a  legitimate  state  interest  or  other  neutral
explanation.”  Id., at 868.

The  District  Court’s  “predominant  intent”  prong  is
borrowed  from  the  racial  gerrymandering  context.    In
racial  gerrymandering  cases,  we  rely  on  a  “predominant
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the court's evaluation of partisan gerrymandering claims. The language is formal and legalistic, indicating it's part of the main body of the text and not a preliminary or supplementary element.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

Opinion of BREYER, J.

applied  less  strict  standards  when  reviewing  speech  re-
strictions  embodied  in  government  regulatory  programs.
This  Court,  for  example,  has  applied  a  “rational  basis”
standard  for  reviewing  those  restrictions  when  they  have
only indirect impacts on speech.  See Glickman v. Wileman
Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U. S. 457, 469–470, 477 (1997).
And  it  has  applied  a  mid-level  standard  of  review—often
termed “intermediate scrutiny”—when the government di-
rectly  restricts  protected  commercial  speech.  See  Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y.,
447 U. S. 557, 561–564 (1980).

This account of well-established principles at the core of
the First Amendment demonstrates the problem with the
plurality’s approach.  To reflexively treat all content-based
distinctions as subject to strict scrutiny regardless of con-
text or practical effect is to engage in an analysis unteth-
ered  from  the  First  Amendment’s  objectives.  And  in  this
case, strict scrutiny is inappropriate.  Recall that the excep-
tion  at  issue  here  concerns  debt  collection—specifically  a
method  for  collecting  government-owned  or  -backed  debt.
Regulation of debt collection does not fall on the first side of
the democratic equation.  It has next to nothing to do with
the free marketplace of ideas or the transmission of the peo-
ple’s  thoughts  and  will  to  the  government.  It  has  every-
thing to do with the second side of the equation, that is, with
government  response  to  the  public  will  through  ordinary
commercial regulation.  To apply the strictest level of scru-
tiny  to  the economically  based  exemption  here  is  thus  re-
markable.

I  recognize  that  the  underlying  cell  phone  robocall  re-
striction  primarily  concerns  a  means  of  communication.
And that fact, as I discuss below, triggers some heightened
scrutiny,  reflected  in  an  intermediate  scrutiny  standard.
Strict  scrutiny  and  its  strong  presumption  of  unconstitu-
tionality, however, have no place here.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the opinion of Justice Breyer. It discusses the legal standard of review for content-based restrictions on speech, applying it to a case involving debt collection and robocalls.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

have been raised by the State in an enforcement proceed-
ing.  Iskanian’s secondary rule prohibits parties from con-
tracting  around  this  joinder  device  because  it  invalidates
agreements to arbitrate only “individual PAGA claims for
Labor Code violations that an employee suffered,” 59 Cal.
4th, at 383, 327 P. 3d, at 149.

This prohibition on contractual division of PAGA actions
into constituent claims unduly circumscribes the freedom of
parties to determine “the issues subject to arbitration” and
“the  rules  by  which  they  will  arbitrate,” Lamps  Plus,  587
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7), and does so in a way that vio-
lates the fundamental principle that “arbitration is a mat-
ter of consent,” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684.  The most
basic corollary of the principle that arbitration is a matter
of  consent  is  that  “a  party  can  be  forced  to  arbitrate  only
those issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitra-
tion,”  First  Options  of  Chicago,  Inc.  v.  Kaplan,  514  U. S.
938, 945 (1995).  This means that parties cannot be coerced
into arbitrating a claim, issue, or dispute “absent an affirm-
ative ‘contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed
to do so.’ ”  Lamps Plus, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (quot-
ing  Stolt-Nielsen,  559  U. S.,  at  684);  see  also  Concepcion,
563 U. S., at 347–348.

For that reason, state law cannot condition the enforcea-
bility  of  an  arbitration  agreement  on  the  availability  of  a
procedural mechanism that would permit a party to expand
the scope of the arbitration by introducing claims that the
parties  did  not  jointly  agree  to  arbitrate.    Rules  of  claim
joinder can function in precisely that way.  Modern civil pro-
cedure  dispenses  with  the  formalities  of  the  common-law
approach  to  claim  joinder  in  favor  of  almost-unqualified
joinder.  Wright & Miller §1581.  Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 18(a), which permits a party to “join, as independent
or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an
opposing party,” is typical of the modern approach.  But the
FAA  licenses  contracting  parties  to  depart  from  standard
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a court case. It discusses the enforceability of arbitration agreements and the impact of state laws on claim joinder in arbitration proceedings.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019)

11

THOMAS, J., dissenting

his  damaging  testimony  from  the  record.    Nor  can  a  de-
fendant waive his right to a jury trial, and then later claim
prejudice when his attorney declines to seek a mistrial on
the ground  that the judge found him guilty.  In the same
way, Garza was not prejudiced by his attorney’s refusal to
file an appeal challenging his sentence, a right that he had
expressly  waived.  The  lack  of  prejudice  is  especially  pro-
nounced  in this  case,  as Garza’s instruction to appeal did
not  acknowledge  that  he  wanted  to  challenge  or  rescind
the plea agreements.

C
There  is  no  persuasive  reason  to  depart  from  an  ordi-
nary  Strickland  analysis  in  cases  involving  an  attorney’s
decision  to  honor  his  client’s  agreement  to  waive  his  ap-
peal  rights.  Garza  contends  that  it  is  unfair  to  require
pro se  defendants  to  identify  the  issues  they  would  have
raised  on  appeal.    But  pro se  defendants  always  bear  the
burden  of  showing  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel;  I  see
no  reason  why  this  kind  of  ineffective-assistance  claim
should  be  any  different.    Regardless,  Garza’s  fairness
argument rings hollow because Garza has been represented
by  counsel  at  every  stage  of  this  collateral  litigation  and
has  yet  to  articulate  a  single  nonfrivolous,  nonwaived
issue that he would have raised on appeal.  His inability to
identify  any  issues  that  he  preserved  simply  underscores
the fact that he waived them all.

The Court’s rule may be easy to “administ[er],” ante, at
13, but it undermines the finality of criminal judgments—
a primary purpose of plea agreements—and disadvantages
the public by allowing defendants to relitigate issues that
they  waived  in  exchange  for  substantial  benefits.  The
Court’s  rule  also  burdens  the  appellate  courts  that  must
address  the  new,  meritless  appeals  authorized  by  today’s
decision.  And,  ironically,  the  Court’s  rule  may  prejudice
the  defendants  it  is  designed  to  help,  as  prosecutors  may
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case Garza v. Idaho. It contains legal arguments and analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

which  the  parties  have  had  an  adequate  opportunity  to
litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata
to enforce repose.’ ” University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U. S.
788,  797–798  (1986)  (quoting  United  States  v.  Utah
Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U. S. 394, 422 (1966)); see also
Hayfield  Northern  R.  Co.  v.  Chicago  &  North  Western
Transp. Co., 467 U. S. 622, 636, n. 15 (1984) (noting Utah
Construction); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S.
461, 484–485, n. 26 (1982) (characterizing Utah Construc-
tion’s  discussion  of  administrative  preclusion  as  a  hold-
ing);  Restatement  (Second)  of  Judgments  §83(1),  at  266
(explaining that, with some limits, “a valid and final adju-
dicative  determination  by  an  administrative  tribunal  has
the same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to
the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a
court”).

Although  apparently  accepting  Astoria  and  Utah  Con-
struction,1  Hargis  argues  that  we  should  not  read  the
Lanham Act (or, presumably, many other federal statutes)
as authorizing issue preclusion.  Otherwise, Hargis warns,
the  Court  would  have  to  confront  “ ‘grave  and  doubtful
questions’  as  to  the  Lanham  Act’s  consistency  with  the
Seventh  Amendment  and  Article  III  of  the  Constitution.”
Brief  for  Respondent  38  (quoting  United  States  ex rel.
Attorney  General  v.  Delaware  &  Hudson  Co.,  213  U. S.
366, 408 (1909)).  We are not persuaded.

At  the  outset,  we  note  that  Hargis  does  not  argue  that
giving issue preclusive effect to the TTAB’s decision would
be  unconstitutional.  Instead,  Hargis  contends  only  that

——————

1 See  Brief  for  Respondent  28  (acknowledging  that  administrative
“[p]reclusion’s  status  as  part  of  the  common-law  backdrop  means  that
courts  may  presume  its  application”  absent  contrary  indication  from
Congress)  (citing  Astoria  501  U. S.,  at  110);  Brief  for  Respondent  34
(explaining that Utah Construction determined that “an administrative
board’s factfinding . . .  could . . .  have preclusive effect in an Article III
suit raising damages claims over which the board had no jurisdiction”).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically discussing the application of res judicata and issue preclusion in the context of trademark law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022)

17

BREYER, J., dissenting

hand,  have  an  interest  in  teaching  a  curriculum  that  ad-
vances the tenets of their religion.  And the schools are of
course  entitled  to  teach  subjects  in  the  way  that  best  re-
flects  their  religious  beliefs.    But  the  State  may  disagree
with the particular manner in which the schools have de-
cided that these subjects should be taught.

This is a situation ripe for conflict, as it forces Maine into
the position of evaluating the adequacy or appropriateness
of the schools’ religiously inspired curriculum.  Maine does
not want this role.  As one legislator explained, one of the
reasons  for  the  nonsectarian  requirement  was  that
“[g]overnment officials cannot, and should not, review the
religious teachings of religious schools.”  Ibid.  Another leg-
islator cautioned that the State would be unable to “recon-
cile” the curriculum of “private religious schools who teach
religion in the classroom” with Maine “standards . . . that
do not include any sort of religion in them.”  Id., at 102.

Nor do the schools want Maine in this role.  Bangor Chris-
tian  asserted  that  it  would  only  consider  accepting  public
funds if it “did not have to make any changes in how it op-
erates.”  Id., at 90.  Temple Academy similarly stated that
it would only accept state money if it had “in writing that
the school would not have to alter its admissions standards,
hiring standards, or curriculum.”  Id., at 99.  The nonsec-
tarian requirement ensures that Maine is not pitted against
private religious schools in these battles over curriculum or
operations, thereby avoiding the social strife resulting from
this  state-versus-religion  confrontation.  By  invalidating
the nonsectarian requirement, the majority today subjects
the State, the schools, and the people of Maine to social con-
flict of a kind that they, and the Religion Clauses, sought to
prevent.

I  emphasize  the  problems  that  may  arise  out  of  today’s
decision because they reinforce my belief that the Religion
Clauses do not require Maine to pay for a religious educa-
tion simply because, in some rural areas, the State will help
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the implications of a decision regarding religious schools and state funding.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

WONG  v.  BELMONTES

Per Curiam

See  also  ibid.  (discussing  expert’s  federal  habeas  testimony
on  importance  of  expert  testimony).  But  the  body  of  miti
gating  evidence  the  Ninth  Circuit  would  have  required
Schick to present was neither complex nor technical.  It re
quired only that the jury make logical connections of the kind
a  layperson  is  well  equipped  to  make.  The  jury  simply  did
not  need  expert  testimony  to  understand  the  “humanizing”
evidence;  it  could  use  its  common  sense  or  own  sense  of
mercy.

What  is  more,  expert  testimony  discussing  Belmontes’
mental  state,  seeking  to  explain  his  behavior,  or  putting  it
in some favorable context would have exposed Belmontes to
the Howard evidence.  See Darden v.  Wainwright, 477 U. S.
168, 186 (1986) (“Any attempt to portray petitioner as a non
violent  man  would  have  opened  the  door  for  the  State  to
rebut with evidence of petitioner’s prior convictions. . . . Sim
ilarly,  if  defense  counsel  had  attempted  to  put  on  evidence
that petitioner was a family man, they would have been faced
with  his  admission  at  trial  that,  although  still  married,  he
was spending the weekend furlough with a girlfriend”).

If, for example, an expert had testiﬁed that Belmontes had
a “ ‘high likelihood of a . . . nonviolent adjustment to a prison
setting,’ ” as Belmontes suggested an expert might, see Brief
for  Appellant  in  No.  01–99018  (CA9),  p.  34,  the  question
would  have  immediately  arisen:  “What  was  his  propensity
toward  violence  to  begin  with?  Does  evidence  of  another
murder alter your view?”  Expert testimony explaining why
the  jury  should  feel  sympathy,  as  opposed  simply  to  facts
that  might  elicit  that  response,  would  have  led  to  a  similar
rejoinder:  “Is  such  sympathy  equally  appropriate  for  some
one  who  committed  a  second  murder?”  Any  of  this  testi
mony  from  an  expert’s  perspective  would  have  made  the
Howard evidence fair game.

Many of Belmontes’ other arguments fail for the same rea
son.  He argues that the jury should have been told that he
suffered an “extended bout with rheumatic fever,” which led
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion or court transcript discussing the case of Wong v. Belmonts. It delves into the arguments regarding the admissibility of certain evidence and the potential impact of expert testimony.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Court Transcript</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

19

Opinion of the Court

Native village or regional or village corporation,” 25 U. S. C.
§5304(e)).  On this reading, the way to tell whether a tribe,
band, nation, or other organized group or community is an
“Indian tribe” is to ask whether it is federally recognized,
but the way to tell whether an Alaska Native village or cor-
poration is an “Indian tribe” is to ask whether it is “defined
in  or  established  pursuant  to”  ANCSA.  Ibid.    Otherwise,
despite being prominently “includ[ed]” in the “Indian tribe”
definition, ibid., all ANCs would be excluded by a federal-
recognition  requirement  there  is  no  reasonable  prospect
they could ever satisfy.

Respondents object (and the dissent agrees) that this con-
struction  “produces  grammatical  incoherence.”    Brief  for
Respondents Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation
et al.  16;  post,  at  4–5.    They  point  out  that  a  modifying
clause  at  the  end  of  a  list  (like  the  recognized-as-eligible
clause)  often  applies  to  every  item  in  the  list.  See,  e.g.,
Jama  v.  Immigration  and  Customs  Enforcement,  543
U. S.  335,  344,  n. 4  (2005).    The  so-called  series-qualifier
canon can be a helpful interpretive tool, and it supports the
idea that the recognized-as-eligible clause applies to every
type of entity listed in the “Indian tribe” definition, includ-
ing ANCs.  Given that the entities in the Alaska clause are
the closest in proximity to the recognized-as-eligible clause,
that canon arguably applies with particular force here.

As the Court reiterated earlier this Term, however, the
series-qualifier canon gives way when it would yield a “con-
textually implausible outcome.”  Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid,
592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 9); see also id., at ___
(ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1) (noting
that “[c]anons are useful tools, but it is important to keep
their limitations in mind.  This may be especially true with
respect to . . . the ‘series-qualifier’ canon”).  The most gram-
matical reading of a sentence in a vacuum does not always
produce the best reading in context.  See, e.g., Sturgeon, 577
U. S., at 438 (“Statutory language ‘cannot be construed in a
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the definition of "Indian tribe" in the context of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA).  It delves into statutory interpretation, referencing legal precedents and canons of construction.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

3

ALITO, J., dissenting

A

The order in this case was the functional equivalent of a
subpoena  for  documents,  and  there  is  no  evidence  that
these writs were regarded as “searches” at the time of the
founding.  Subpoenas  duces  tecum  and  other  forms  of
compulsory  document  production  were  well  known  to  the
founding  generation.    Blackstone  dated  the  first  writ  of
subpoena  to  the  reign  of  King  Richard  II  in  the  late  14th
century,  and  by  the  end  of  the  15th  century,  the  use  of
such  writs  had  “become  the  daily  practice  of  the  [Chan-
cery] court.”  3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England 53 (G. Tucker ed. 1803) (Blackstone).  Over the
next 200 years, subpoenas would grow in prominence and
power  in  tandem  with  the  Court  of  Chancery,  and  by  the
end  of  Charles  II’s  reign  in  1685,  two  important  innova-
tions had occurred.

First, the Court of Chancery developed a new species of
subpoena.  Until  this  point,  subpoenas  had  been  used
largely  to  compel  attendance  and  oral  testimony  from
witnesses;  these  subpoenas  correspond  to  today’s  subpoe-
nas  ad  testificandum.    But  the  Court  of  Chancery  also
improvised  a  new  version  of  the  writ  that  tacked  onto  a
regular subpoena an order compelling the witness to bring
certain  items  with  him.  By  issuing  these  so-called  sub-
poenas  duces  tecum,  the  Court  of  Chancery  could  compel
the production of papers, books, and other forms of physi-
cal evidence, whether from the parties to the case or from
third  parties.    Such  subpoenas  were  sufficiently  common-
place by 1623 that a leading treatise on the practice of law
could refer in passing to the fee for a “Sub pœna of Ducas
tecum” (seven shillings and two pence) without needing to
elaborate further.  T. Powell, The Attourneys Academy 79
(1623).  Subpoenas  duces  tecum  would  swell  in  use  over
the next century as the rules for their application became
ever  more  developed  and  definite.    See,  e.g.,  1  G.  Jacob,
The  Compleat  Chancery-Practiser  290  (1730)  (“The  Sub-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court. It contains legal citations, arguments, and historical context related to subpoenas.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

3

Opinion of the Court

district court.  In that suit, she sought an injunction to pre-
vent the State from forcing her to create wedding websites
celebrating marriages that defy her beliefs.  App. 303–305.
To secure relief, Ms. Smith first had to establish her stand-
ing  to  sue.   That  required  her  to  show  “a  credible  threat”
existed that Colorado would, in fact, seek to compel speech
from her that she did not wish to produce.  Susan B. An-
thony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 159 (2014).

Toward that end, Ms. Smith began by directing the court
to the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA).  That law
defines a “public accommodation” broadly to include almost
every public-facing business in the State.  Colo. Rev. Stat.
§24–34–601(1) (2022).  In what some call its “Accommoda-
tion  Clause,”  the  law  prohibits  a  public  accommodation
from denying “the full and equal enjoyment” of its goods and
services to any customer based on his race, creed, disability,
sexual  orientation,  or  other  statutorily  enumerated  trait.
§24–34–601(2)(a).  Either state officials or private citizens
may bring actions to enforce the law.  §§24–34–306, 24–34–
602(1).  And a variety of penalties can follow.  Courts can
order fines up to $500 per violation.  §24–34–602(1)(a).  The
Colorado Commission on Civil Rights can issue cease-and-
desist orders, §24–34–306(9), and require violators to take
various other “affirmative action[s].”  §24–34–605; §24–34–
306(9).  In  the  past,  these  have  included  participation  in
mandatory educational programs and the submission of on-
going compliance reports to state officials.  See Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U. S.
___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 8).1

——————

1 In  addition  to  the  Accommodation  Clause,  CADA  contains  a  “Com-
munication  Clause”  that  prohibits  a  public  accommodation  from  “pub-
lish[ing] . . . any written . . . communication” indicating that a person will
be  denied  “the  full  and  equal  enjoyment”  of  services  or  that  he  will  be
“unwelcome, objectionable, unacceptable, or undesirable” based on a pro-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and legal statutes, indicating it's part of a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

88

PORTUONDO v. AGARD

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

*

*

*

In the end, we are left with a prosecutorial practice that
burdens the constitutional rights of defendants, that cannot
be justiﬁed by reference to the trial’s aim of sorting guilty
defendants from innocent ones, and that is not supported by
our case law. The restriction that the Court of Appeals
placed on generic accusations of tailoring is both moderate
and warranted. That court declared it permissible for the
prosecutor to comment on “what the defendant testiﬁed to
regarding pertinent events”—“the ﬁt between the testimony
of the defendant and other witnesses.” 159 F. 3d, at 99.
What is impermissible, the Second Circuit held, is simply and
only a summation “bolstering . . . the prosecution witnesses’
credibility vis-a-vis the defendant’s based solely on the de-
fendant’s exercise of a constitutional right to be present dur-
ing the trial.”
I would afﬁrm that sound judgment
and therefore dissent from the Court’s disposition.

Ibid.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a snippet of legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It contains legal arguments and citations, indicating it is part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
6

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
Syllabus

quotation marks omitted).  The second risk is that race would be used
not as a plus, but as a negative—to discriminate against those racial
groups that were not the beneficiaries of the race-based preference.  A
university’s use of race, accordingly, could not occur in a manner that
“unduly harm[ed] nonminority applicants.”  Id., at 341.

To manage these concerns, Grutter imposed one final limit on race-
based admissions programs: At some point, the Court held, they must
end.  Id., at 342.  Recognizing that “[e]nshrining a permanent justifi-
cation for racial preferences would offend” the Constitution’s unambig-
uous guarantee of equal protection, the Court expressed its expecta-
tion that, in 25 years, “the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.”  Id., at 343.  Pp. 19–
21.

(e) Twenty  years  have  passed  since  Grutter,  with  no  end  to  race-
based college admissions in sight.  But the Court has permitted race-
based  college  admissions  only  within  the  confines  of  narrow  re-
strictions: such admissions programs must comply with strict scrutiny,
may  never  use  race  as  a  stereotype  or  negative,  and  must—at  some
point—end.  Respondents’ admissions systems fail each of these crite-
ria  and  must  therefore  be  invalidated  under  the  Equal  Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pp. 21–34.

(1) Respondents  fail  to  operate  their  race-based  admissions  pro-
grams in a manner that is “sufficiently measurable to permit judicial
[review]”  under  the  rubric  of  strict  scrutiny.    Fisher  v.  University  of
Tex. at Austin, 579 U. S. 365, 381.  First, the interests that respondents
view as compelling cannot be subjected to meaningful judicial review.
Those  interests  include  training  future  leaders,  acquiring  new
knowledge based on diverse outlooks, promoting a robust marketplace
of ideas, and preparing engaged and productive citizens.  While these
are commendable goals, they are not sufficiently coherent for purposes
of strict scrutiny.  It is unclear how courts are supposed to measure
any  of  these  goals,  or  if  they  could,  to  know  when  they  have  been
reached so that racial preferences can end.  The elusiveness of respond-
ents’ asserted goals is further illustrated by comparing them to recog-
nized compelling interests.  For example, courts can discern whether
the temporary racial segregation of inmates will prevent harm to those
in the prison, see Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 512–513, but
the question whether a particular mix of minority students produces
“engaged and productive citizens” or effectively “train[s] future lead-
ers” is standardless.

Second, respondents’ admissions programs fail to articulate a mean-
ingful connection between the means they employ and the goals they
pursue.  To achieve the educational benefits of diversity, respondents
measure the racial composition of their classes using racial categories
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a Supreme Court syllabus. It discusses the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College and analyzes the Court's reasoning regarding race-based college admissions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020)

5

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment

jury subpoena as appropriate.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation and the beginning of a judicial opinion.  Legal citations and introductory sections of opinions are generally not considered the primary content meant for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021)

73

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

Indeed, even if more substantial reliance could be shown,
Smith’s dubious standing would weigh against giving this
factor  too  much  weight.    Smith  has  been  embattled  since
the day it was decided, and calls for its reexamination have
intensified in recent years.  See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584
U. S., at ___ (GORSUCH, J., joined by ALITO, J., concurring)
(slip  op.,  at  1);  Kennedy,  586  U. S.,  at  ___–___  (ALITO,  J.,
joined by THOMAS, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., concur-
ring in denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 5–6); City of Boerne
521  U. S.,  at  566    (BREYER,  J.,  dissenting)  (“[T]he  Court
should  direct  the  parties  to  brief  the  question  whether
[Smith]  was  correctly  decided”);  id.,  at  565  (O’Connor,  J.,
joined by BREYER, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is essential for the
Court  to  reconsider  its  holding  in  Smith”);  Lukumi,  508
U. S., at 559 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (“[I]n a case presenting the issue, the Court
should reexamine the rule Smith declared”).  Thus, parties
have  long  been  on  notice  that  the  decision  might  soon  be
reconsidered.  See Janus, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 45).

*

*
Smith was wrongly decided.  As long as it remains on the
books, it threatens a fundamental freedom.  And while prec-
edent should not lightly be cast aside, the Court’s error in
Smith should now be corrected.

*

VI
A
If Smith is overruled, what legal standard should be ap-
plied in this case?  The answer that comes most readily to
mind is the standard that Smith replaced: A law that im-
poses a substantial burden on religious exercise can be sus-
tained only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.

Whether this test should be rephrased or supplemented
with specific rules is a question that need not be resolved
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It discusses the case of Smith and argues for its overruling.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018)

13

KAGAN, J., dissenting

First  Amendment  cases  toward  the  regulation  of  public
employees’  speech.  That  attitude  is  one  of  respect—even
solicitude—for  the  government’s  prerogatives  as  an  em-
ployer.  So long as the government is acting as an employ-
er—rather  than  exploiting  the  employment  relationship
for other ends—it has a wide berth, comparable to that of
a  private  employer.  And  when  the  regulated  expression
concerns  the  terms  and  conditions  of  employment—the
very  stuff  of  the  employment  relationship—the  govern-
ment  really  cannot  lose.  There,  managerial  interests  are
obvious and strong.  And so government employees are . . .
just  employees,  even  though  they  work  for  the  govern-
ment.  Except  that  today  the  government  does  lose,  in  a
first for the law.  Now, the government can constitutionally
adopt  all  policies  regulating  core  workplace  speech  in
pursuit of managerial goals—save this single one.

2
The  majority  claims  it  is  not  making  a  special  and  un-
justified  exception.  It  offers  two  main  reasons  for  declin-
ing to apply here our usual deferential approach, as exem-
plified  in  Pickering,  to  the  regulation  of  public  employee
speech.  First,  the  majority  says,  this  case  involves  a
“blanket” policy rather than an individualized employment
decision, so Pickering  is a “painful fit.”   Ante,  at 23.  Sec-
ond,  the  majority  asserts,  the  regulation  here  involves
compelling rather than restricting speech, so the pain gets
sharper still.  See ante, at 24–25.  And finally, the majority
claims  that  even  under  the  solicitous  Pickering  standard,
the  government  should  lose,  because  the  speech  here
involves  a  matter  of  public  concern  and  the  government’s
managerial  interests  do  not  justify  its  regulation.    See
ante, at 27–31.  The majority goes wrong at every turn.

First,  this  Court  has  applied  the  same  basic  approach
whether  a  public  employee  challenges  a  general  policy  or
an  individualized  decision.  Even  the  majority  must  con-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Kagan. It discusses the legal precedent of Pickering and how it applies to the regulation of public employee speech.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

5

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment

United  States  v.  Mead  Corp.,  533  U. S.  218,  243  (2001)
(SCALIA, J., dissenting).  I am unaware of any such history
justifying  deference  to  agency  interpretations  of  its  own
regulations.  And  there  are  weighty  reasons  to  deny  a
lawgiver  the  power  to  write  ambiguous  laws  and  then  be
the  judge  of  what  the  ambiguity  means.    See  Decker  v.
Northwest  Environmental  Defense  Center,  568  U. S.  ___,
___–___ (2013) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (slip op., at 1–7).  I would therefore restore the
balance  originally  struck  by  the  APA  with  respect  to  an
agency’s  interpretation  of  its  own  regulations,  not  by
rewriting  the  Act  in  order  to  make  up  for  Auer,  but  by
abandoning  Auer  and  applying  the  Act  as  written.    The
agency  is  free  to  interpret  its  own  regulations  with  or
without notice and comment; but courts will decide—with
no deference to the agency—whether that interpretation is
correct.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Scalia. It cites other legal cases and discusses legal principles.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4  MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

See United States v. Bormes, 568 U. S. 6, 12.  Nor does the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act bar petitioners’ Tucker Act suit.  In contrast to
Bowen  v.  Massachusetts,  487  U. S.  879,  a  Medicaid  case  where  the
State sued the HHS Secretary under the Administrative Procedure Act
in  district  court,  petitioners  here  seek  not  prospective,  nonmonetary
relief to clarify future obligations but specific sums already calculated,
past due, and designed to compensate for completed labors.  The Risk
Corridors  statute  and  Tucker  Act  allow  them  that  remedy.    And  be-
cause  the  Risk  Corridors  program  expired  years  ago,  this  litigation
presents no special concern, as Bowen did, about managing a complex
ongoing  relationship  or  tracking  ever-changing  accounting  sheets.
Pp. 26–30.

No.  18–1023  and  No.  18–1028  (second  judgment),  729  Fed.  Appx.  939;
No. 18–1028 (first judgment), 892 F. 3d 1311; No. 18–1038, 892 F. 3d
1184, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, and in
which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined as to all but Part III–C.  ALITO,
J., filed a dissenting opinion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a syllabus from a Supreme Court case. Syllabi typically summarize the legal arguments and holdings of a case and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

MOYLE v. UNITED STATES

BARRETT, J., concurring

they believe that “abortion is the stabilizing treatment nec-
essary to resolve” a pregnant woman’s emergency medical
condition,  they  “must  provide  that  treatment.”  Id.,  at  1
(italics and emphasis deleted).  Any contrary state law, the
guidance continues, is “preempted.”  Ibid. (italics and em-
phasis deleted).

Idaho’s Defense of Life Act criminalizes the performance
of most abortions.  Idaho Code Ann. §18–622 (Supp. 2023).
As  originally  enacted,  the  Act  allowed  accused  physicians
to raise an affirmative defense that “the abortion was nec-
essary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman.”  §18–
622(2)(a)(i).  Soon before the Act was set to take effect, the
United States sued Idaho, seeking to enjoin Idaho’s law “to
the extent it conflicts with EMTALA.”  1 App. 5.  EMTALA,
the  United  States  argued,  requires  physicians  to  perform
abortions  under  certain  circumstances  that  Idaho’s  Act
would forbid.

After holding an evidentiary hearing, the District Court
identified a conflict and granted a preliminary injunction.
623 F. Supp. 3d 1096 (Idaho 2022).  The court based its con-
clusion on three key assumptions: (1) The Act prohibits the
termination  of  ectopic  pregnancies;  (2)  the  pregnant
woman’s death must be objectively “imminent” or “certain”
before  a  physician  can  perform  an  abortion;  and  (3)  the
“necessary to prevent death” exception is only an affirma-
tive  defense.  Id.,  at  1109–1114.    The  Government’s  wit-
nesses,  whose  testimony  the  court  credited,  made  similar
assumptions.  Id., at 1104–1105.  They claimed that the Act
might prohibit abortions as treatment for conditions includ-
ing severe heart failure, pre-eclampsia, preterm premature
rupture of the membranes (PPROM), sepsis, and placental
abruption, because a physician could not know, “with cer-
tainty,” that an abortion is necessary to save the mother’s
life in those circumstances.  See, e.g., 1 App. 30–38.  They
also assumed that the Act only permitted abortions where
death was “imminent.”  See, e.g., 2 id., at 608.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically a concurring opinion from a judge named Barrett. It discusses the conflict between Idaho's abortion law and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). The text provides legal arguments and cites relevant statutes and case law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

IANCU v. BRUNETTI

Opinion of BREYER, J.

The  trademark  statute  cannot  easily  be  described  as  a
regulation of “government speech,” either.  Tam, 582 U. S.,
at ___–___ (slip op., at 12–18).  The Government, however,
may be loosely associated with the mark because it regis-
ters the mark and confers certain benefits upon the owner.
What about the concept of a “public forum”?  Trademark
registration has little in common with a traditional public
forum, as the register of trademarks is not a public park, a
street, or a similar forum for public debate.  See Perry Ed.
Assn.  v.  Perry  Local  Educators’  Assn.,  460  U. S.  37,  45
(1983).  But one can find some vague resemblance between
trademark registration and what this Court refers to as a
“limited  public  forum”  created  by  the  government  for
private speech.  See post, at 15 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.);
Christian  Legal  Soc.  Chapter  of  Univ.  of  Cal.,  Hastings
College  of  Law  v.  Martinez,  561  U. S.  661,  679,  n. 11
(2010).  The  trademark  registration  system  also  bears
some resemblance to cases involving government subsidies
for  private  speech,  as  such  programs—like  trademark
registration—may grant a benefit to some forms of speech
without prohibiting other forms of speech.  See post, at 15
(opinion  of SOTOMAYOR, J.);  Legal  Services  Corporation  v.
Velazquez, 531 U. S. 533, 543–544 (2001) (noting that the
First Amendment rules applicable to limited public forums
may be “instruc[tive]” “when the government establishes a
subsidy for specified ends”).

agree  with

discrimination,”

As  for  the  concepts  of  “viewpoint  discrimination”  and
“content
JUSTICE
I
SOTOMAYOR  that  the  boundaries  between  them  may  be
difficult to discern.  Post, at 10; see Rosenberger v. Rector
and  Visitors  of  Univ.  of  Va.,  515  U. S.  819,  831  (1995)
(“[T]he  distinction  is  not  a  precise  one”).  Even  so,  it  is
hard  to  see  how  a  statute  prohibiting  the  registration  of
only  highly  vulgar  or  obscene  words  discriminates  based
on “viewpoint.”  Of course, such words often evoke power-
ful  emotions.    Standing  by  themselves,  however,  these
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically discussing the application of trademark law and First Amendment considerations. It delves into concepts like "government speech," "public forum," and "viewpoint discrimination."
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

409

Opinion of the Court

such “extension of legal principle” cases should be treated
under § 2254(d)(1). For now it is sufﬁcient to hold that when
a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this
Court to the facts of a prisoner’s case, a federal court apply-
ing § 2254(d)(1) may conclude that the state-court decision
falls within that provision’s “unreasonable application”
clause.

B

There remains the task of deﬁning what exactly qualiﬁes
as an “unreasonable application” of law under § 2254(d)(1).
The Fourth Circuit held in Green that a state-court decision
involves an “unreasonable application of . . . clearly estab-
lished Federal law” only if the state court has applied federal
law “in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is
unreasonable.”
143 F. 3d, at 870. The placement of this ad-
ditional overlay on the “unreasonable application” clause was
It is difﬁcult to fault the Fourth Circuit for
erroneous.
using this language given the fact that we have employed
nearly identical terminology to describe the related inquiry
undertaken by federal courts in applying the nonretroactiv-
ity rule of Teague. For example, in Lambrix v. Singletary,
520 U. S. 518 (1997), we stated that a new rule is not dictated
by precedent unless it would be “apparent to all reasonable
In Graham v. Col-
jurists.”
lins, 506 U. S. 461 (1993), another nonretroactivity case, we
employed similar language, stating that we could not say
“that all reasonable jurists would have deemed themselves
Id., at 477
compelled to accept Graham’s claim in 1984.”
(emphasis added).

Id., at 528 (emphasis added).

Deﬁning an “unreasonable application” by reference to a
“reasonable jurist,” however, is of little assistance to the
courts that must apply § 2254(d)(1) and, in fact, may be mis-
leading. Stated simply, a federal habeas court making the
“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the
state court’s application of clearly established federal law
was objectively unreasonable. The federal habeas court
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a portion of a legal opinion, specifically the Opinion of the Court. It discusses the interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) in the context of federal habeas corpus review.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
2

FDA v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring

competence, and expertise to assess public health.”  South
Bay United  Pentecostal  Church  v.  Newsom,  590  U. S.  ___,
___ (2020) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in denial of applica-
tion  for  injunctive  relief) (slip  op.,  at  2).    In  light  of those
considerations,  I do  not  see  a sufficient  basis here for  the
District Court to compel the FDA to alter the regimen for
medical abortion.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Roberts in the case FDA v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS.  It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
24

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA

KAGAN, J., dissenting

industry  overwhelmingly  supports  EPA  in  this  case.    See
Brief  for  Power  Company  Respondents  2–3.  In  the  regu-
lated  parties’  view,  the  rule  aimed  to  achieve  what  most
power companies also want: substantial reductions in car-
bon dioxide emissions accomplished in a cost-effective way
while maintaining a reliable electricity market.  See id., at
26–27, 38, 41–42.

The  majority  thus  pivots  to  the  massive  consequences
generation shifting could produce—but that claim fares just
as poorly.  On EPA’s view of its own authority, the majority
worries, some future rule might “forc[e] coal plants to ‘shift’
away virtually all of their generation—i.e., to cease making
power altogether.”  Ante, at 24.  But looking at the text of
Section 111(d) might here come in handy.  For the statute
imposes,  as  already  shown,  a  set  of  constraints—particu-
larly  involving  costs  and  energy  needs—that  would  pre-
clude so extreme a regulation.  See Brief for United States
41–42 (conceding the point); supra, at 7.  And if the majority
thinks those constraints do not really constrain, then it has
a much bigger problem.  For “traditional” technological con-
trols, of the kind the majority approves, can have equally
dramatic effects.  Ante, at 23.  Take, for example, the “fuel-
switching” regulation the majority mentions.  Ibid.  Such a
rule does just what you might think: It requires a plant to
burn  a  different  kind  of  fuel—say,  natural  gas  instead  of
coal.  So it too can significantly “restructur[e] the Nation’s
overall mix of electricity generation.”  Ante, at 16.  Or take
an even more technological-sounding approach: the use of
carbon-capture  equipment.    Order  the  installation  of  that
equipment,  the  Trump  administration  concluded,  and  the
“exorbitant” costs “would almost certainly force the closure”
of all affected “coal-fired power plants.”  84 Fed. Reg. 32548.
——————
$32–$54  billion  in  benefits  by  2030);  see  also  EPA,  Regulatory  Impact
Analysis  for  the  Clean  Power  Plan  Final Rule  6–35  (2015)  (estimating
that by 2030 jobs gained from the Plan would be some two or three times
greater than jobs lost).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal document, specifically a dissenting opinion. It contains legal arguments and references to specific regulations and court cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022)

73

Opinion of the Court

more  than  130  amicus  briefs  filed  in  this  case  that  advo-
cated its approach.  The concurrence would do exactly what
it criticizes Roe for doing: pulling “out of thin air” a test that
“[n]o party or amicus asked the Court to adopt.”  Post, at 3.

2

The concurrence’s most fundamental defect is its failure
to offer any principled basis for its approach.  The concur-
rence would “discar[d]” “the rule from Roe and Casey that a
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy extends up to the
point  that  the  fetus  is  regarded  as  ‘viable’  outside  the
womb.”  Post, at 2.  But this rule was a critical component
of the holdings in Roe and Casey, and stare decisis is “a doc-
trine of preservation, not transformation,” Citizens United
v.  Federal  Election  Comm’n,  558  U. S.  310,  384  (2010)
(ROBERTS,  C. J.,  concurring).    Therefore,  a  new  rule  that
discards the viability rule cannot be defended on stare deci-
sis grounds.

The concurrence concedes that its approach would “not be
available” if “the rationale of Roe and Casey were inextrica-
bly entangled with and dependent upon the viability stand-
ard.”  Post, at 7.  But the concurrence asserts that the via-
bility  line  is  separable  from  the  constitutional  right  they
recognized,  and  can  therefore  be  “discarded”  without  dis-
turbing any past precedent.  Post, at 7–8.  That is simply
incorrect.

Roe’s  trimester  rule  was  expressly  tied  to  viability,  see
410 U. S., at 163–164, and viability played a critical role in
For  example,  in  Planned
later  abortion  decisions.
Parenthood  of  Central  Mo.  v.  Danforth,  428  U. S.  52,  the
Court reiterated  Roe’s rule that a “State may regulate an
abortion to protect the life of the fetus and even may pro-
scribe abortion” at “the stage subsequent to viability.”  428
U. S., at 61 (emphasis added).  The Court then rejected a
challenge to Missouri’s definition of viability, holding that
the State’s definition was consistent with Roe’s.  428 U. S.,
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites previous cases and legal precedents, indicating it is part of a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
10

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI

THOMAS, J., dissenting

included  “disarm[ing]  all  factious  and  seditious  spirits.”
Id., at 538 (Nov. 1, 1662).  For example, following “turbu-
lency and difficulties” arising from the Conventicles Act of
1670, which forbade religious nonconformists from assem-
bling, the lord mayor of London pressed that “a special war-
rant or commission [was] necessary” empowering commis-
sioners  to  “resist,  fight,  kill,  and  execute  such  rebels.”
Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Domestic  Series,  1670,  p.  236
(May  25,  1670)  (M.  Green  ed.  1895)  (emphasis  deleted).
King  Charles  II  ordered  the  lord  mayor  “to  make  strict
search  in  the  city  and  precincts  for  dangerous  and  disaf-
fected persons, seize and secure them and their arms, and
detain them in custody till our further pleasure.”  Id., at 237
(May 26, 1670).

History repeated itself a few decades later.  In 1701, King
William  III  declared  that  “great  quantities  of  arms,  and
other provisions of war” had been discovered in the hands
of “papists and other disaffected persons, who disown [the]
government,” and that such persons had begun to assemble
“in great numbers . . . in the cities of London and Westmin-
ster.”  Calendar William III 233.  He ordered the lord mayor
of London and the justices of the peace to “secur[e] the gov-
ernment”  by  disarming  “any  persons  whom  they  judge[d]
dangerous,” including “any papist, or reputed papist.”  Id.,
at 233–234 (emphasis deleted).  Similar disarmaments tar-
geting  “Papists  and  Non-jurors  dangerous  to  the  peace  of
the  kingdom”  continued  into  the  1700s.    Privy  Council  to
the  Earl  of  Carlisle  (July  30,  1714),  in  Historical  Manu-
scripts Comm’n, Manuscripts of the Earl of Westmoreland
et al.  10th  Report,  Appx.,  Pt.  4,  p.  343  (1885).    As  before,
disarmament was designed to stifle “wicked conspirac[ies],”
such as “raising a Rebellion in this Kingdom in favour of a
Popish Pretender.”  Lord Lonsdale to Deputy Lieutenants
of  Cumberland  (May  20,  1722),  in  Historical  Manuscripts
Commission, Manuscripts of the Earl of Carlisle, 15th Re-
port, Appx., Pt. 6, pp. 39–40 (1897).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It cites historical examples of disarming individuals deemed "dangerous" or "disaffected" by the government.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Text/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
50  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

With the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the peo-
ple of our Nation proclaimed that the law may not sort citi-
zens based on race.  It is this principle that the Framers of
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  adopted  in  the  wake  of  the
Civil War to fulfill the promise of equality under the law.
And  it  is  this  principle  that  has  guaranteed  a  Nation  of
equal  citizens  the  privileges  or  immunities  of  citizenship
and the equal protection of the laws.  To now dismiss it as
“two-dimensional  flatness,”  post,  at  25  (JACKSON,  J.,  dis-
senting),  is  to  abdicate  a  sacred  trust  to  ensure  that  our
“honored dead . . . shall not have died in vain.”  A. Lincoln,
Gettysburg Address (1863).
  Yet, JUSTICE JACKSON  would replace the second Found-
ers’ vision with an organizing principle based on race.  In
fact, on her view, almost all of life’s outcomes may be un-
hesitatingly ascribed to race.  Post, at 24–26.  This is so, she
writes, because of statistical disparities among different ra-
cial groups. See post, at 11–14.  Even if some whites have a
lower household net worth than some blacks, what matters
to  JUSTICE  JACKSON  is  that  the  average  white  household
has more wealth than the average black household.  Post,
at 11.

This lore is not and has never been true.  Even in the seg-
regated  South  where  I  grew  up,  individuals  were  not  the
sum of their skin color.  Then as now, not all disparities are
based on race; not all people are racist; and not all differ-
ences  between  individuals  are  ascribable  to  race.    Put
simply, “the fate of abstract categories of wealth statistics
is not the same as the fate of a given set of flesh-and-blood
human beings.”  T. Sowell, Wealth, Poverty and Politics 333
(2016).  Worse still, JUSTICE JACKSON uses her broad obser-
vations about statistical relationships between race and se-
lect measures of health, wealth, and well-being to label all
blacks as victims.  Her desire to do so is unfathomable to
me.  I  cannot  deny  the  great  accomplishments  of  black
Americans,  including  those  who  succeeded  despite  long
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Thomas in the case of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It delves into the Fourteenth Amendment, racial equality, and critiques Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting

soundness of UNC’s holistic admissions approach existed),
the Court indulges those who either do not know our Na-
tion’s history or long to repeat it.  Simply put, the race-blind
admissions  stance  the  Court  mandates  from  this  day  for-
ward  is  unmoored  from  critical  real-life  circumstances.
Thus, the Court’s meddling not only arrests the noble gen-
erational  project  that  America’s  universities  are  attempt-
ing, it also launches, in effect, a dismally misinformed soci-
ological experiment.

Time  will  reveal  the  results.  Yet  the  Court’s  own  mis-
steps are now both eternally memorialized and excruciat-
ingly plain.  For one thing—based, apparently, on nothing
more than Justice Powell’s initial say so—it drastically dis-
counts  the  primary  reason  that  the  racial-diversity  objec-
tives it excoriates are needed, consigning race-related his-
torical  happenings  to  the  Court’s  own  analytical  dustbin.
Also, by latching onto arbitrary timelines and professing in-
security  about  missing  metrics,  the  Court  sidesteps  unre-
futed proof of the compelling benefits of holistic admissions
programs that factor in race (hard to do, for there is plenty),
simply proceeding as if no such evidence exists.  Then, ulti-
mately,  the  Court  surges  to  vindicate  equality,  but  Don
Quixote  style—pitifully  perceiving  itself  as  the  sole  van-
guard of legal high ground when, in reality, its perspective
is not constitutionally compelled and will hamper the best
judgments of our world-class educational institutions about
who  they  need  to  bring  onto  their  campuses  right  now  to
benefit every American, no matter their race.105
——————

105 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR has fully explained why the majority’s analysis
is legally erroneous and how UNC’s holistic review program is entirely
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.  My goal here has been to
highlight the interests at stake and to show that holistic admissions pro-
grams that factor in race are warranted, just, and universally beneficial.
All told, the Court’s myopic misunderstanding of what the Constitution
permits will impede what experts and evidence tell us is required (as a
matter of social science) to solve for pernicious race-based inequities that
are themselves rooted in the persistent denial of equal protection.  “[T]he
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority opinion's stance on race-conscious admissions in higher education.  The language is formal and legalistic, characteristic of judicial opinions.
  </thinking>
  <category>Judicial Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
cxl

TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

Sullivan; Plummer v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sullivan v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sullivan v.  University of Tex. Health Science Center at Houston
Suluki v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summage v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sumner v. Davis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sunarto v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sungwook Kim v. Holder  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada; Sampson v.
Superintendent of penal or correctional institution.  See name or

title of superintendent.

Page

1105

960

970

929

1156

1096

821

945

1025

. . . . . 947,970,1086

Superior Court of Cal., Alameda County; Del Castello v.  . . . . .  899,1102

Superior Court of Cal., Alameda County; DeOcampo v.  . . . . . . . .
1115

Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Genevier v.  . . . . .  967,1075

856

Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County; Tarkington v.  . . . . .
1031

Superior Court of Cal., Orange County; Hung Nguyen v.  . . . . . . .
997

Superior Court of Cal., Sacramento County; Ansel v.  . . . . . . . . . .
820

. . . . . . .
Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco County; Chung v.
Superior Court of Cal., Sonoma County; Halliwell v.
899

Superior Drive Source; Darty v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
864

Supershuttle International Corp.; Baziruwiha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Supreme Court of Mich.; Fieger v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Supreme Court of N. J.; White v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  916,1066

Supreme Court of Ohio; Howard v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1087,1146

Supreme Court of S. C.; Fieger v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1076

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  890,1159

Supreme Court of Tex.; Gordon v.
1085

Suriel v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Surratt v. United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1003

Suthers; McDaniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
951

943

Sutley, In re  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Suttle v. Bartow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
861

972

Sutton v. Corrections Corporation of America  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sutton; Lachira v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  897,1139

1121

Sutton v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1132

Swain v. Bartleson  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
803

Swain v. Small  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
870

Swanson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1152

Swarthout; Chavez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
972

Sweatt; Harris v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sweed v. Lnu  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1105

1088

Swendra v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Swift v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  842,1038

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  837,1064

Swift v. Stanford
857

Swilley; Reed v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

15

ALITO, J., dissenting

equivalent” standard and favor the test just described.  The
Court  has  required  a  clear  statement  of  congressional  in-
tent  when  an  administrative  agency  seeks  to  interpret  a
statute in a way that entails “a significant impingement of
the States’ traditional and primary power over land and wa-
ter use,” Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army
Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 174 (2001) (SWANCC ),
and when it adopts a new and expanded interpretation of a
statute, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302
(2014) (UARG).  The same rules should apply here where
what  is  at  issue  is  a  new  theory  propounded  by  private
plaintiffs.

First,  the  Court’s  “functional  equivalent”  test  unques-
tionably impinges on the States’ traditional authority.  In
SWANCC, the Court struck down the Army Corps of Engi-
neers’ “Migratory Bird Rule” as inconsistent with the Clean
Water Act because the rule effectively displaced state au-
thority over land and water use.  In this case, the federalism
interest is even stronger because the Clean Water Act itself
assigns non-point-source-pollution regulation to the States
and explicitly recognizes and protects the state role in envi-
ronmental protection.  33 U. S. C. §1251(b).  The “functional
equivalent” standard expands federal point source regula-
tion  at  the  expense  of  state  non-point  source  regulation.
And as a practical matter, States would be saddled with the
costs of increased NPDES permitting (because States gen-
erally award permits in place of the EPA), while exercising
diminished  control  over  non-point  source  pollution  within
their territory.  See Brief for State of West Virginia et al. as
Amici Curiae 27–34.

Second, the Court’s test offends the clear-statement rule
recognized  in  UARG  by  expanding  the  authority  of  the
EPA.  Congress must speak clearly if it “wishes to assign to
an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political signifi-
cance.’ ”    573  U. S.,  at  324  (quoting  FDA  v.  Brown  &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 160 (2000)).  In
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion. It discusses legal precedent and argues against the majority opinion's "functional equivalent" test.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>