<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011)

1

BREYER, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 09–751
_________________

ALBERT SNYDER, PETITIONER v. FRED W.

PHELPS, SR., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[March 2, 2011]

JUSTICE BREYER, concurring.
I agree with the Court and join its opinion.  That opin-
ion  restricts  its  analysis  here  to  the  matter  raised  in  the
petition for certiorari, namely, Westboro’s picketing activ-
ity.  The  opinion  does  not  examine  in  depth  the  effect  of
television  broadcasting.    Nor  does  it  say  anything  about
Internet  postings.
The  Court  holds  that  the  First
Amendment  protects  the  picketing  that  occurred  here,
primarily  because  the  picketing  addressed  matters  of
“public concern.”

While I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the pick-
eting addressed matters of public concern, I do not believe
that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point.
A  State  can  sometimes  regulate  picketing,  even  picketing
on  matters  of  public  concern.    See  Frisby  v.  Schultz,  487
U. S.  474  (1988).  Moreover,  suppose  that  A  were  physi-
cally  to  assault  B,  knowing  that  the  assault  (being  news-
worthy)  would  provide  A  with  an  opportunity  to  transmit
to the public his views on a matter of public concern.  The
constitutionally  protected  nature  of  the  end  would  not
shield  A’s  use  of  unlawful,  unprotected  means.    And  in
some  circumstances  the  use  of  certain  words  as  means
would  be  similarly  unprotected.  See  Chaplinsky  v.  New
Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942) (“fighting words”).

The dissent recognizes that the means used here consist
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Breyer in the case of Snyder v. Phelps. Legal opinions are generally suitable for indexing as they contain valuable textual information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
ORDERS

1055

558 U. S.

November 30, 2009

No.  09–6712.  Brower  v.  McNeil,  Secretary,  Florida  De
partment  of  Corrections.  C.  A.  11th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
No.  09–6718.  Leonard  v.  Iowa.  Ct.  App.  Iowa.  Certiorari

denied.  Reported  below:  771  N. W.  2d  651.

No.  09–6723.  Trimble  v.  Ohio.  Sup.  Ct.  Ohio.  Certiorari
denied.  Reported  below:  122  Ohio  St.  3d  297,  911  N.  E.  2d  242.
No.  09–6726.  Walker  v.  McCann  et  al.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6729.  Daly  v.  California.  Ct.  App.  Cal.,  6th  App.

Dist.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09– 6734.  Wilson  v.  Hauck,  Administrator,  Edna
Mahan  Correctional  Facility  for  Women,  et  al.  C.  A.  3d
Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No.  09–6740.  Mabe  v.  Illinois.  App.  Ct.  Ill.,  1st  Dist.  Cer
tiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  385  Ill.  App.  3d  1130,  970  N.  E.
2d  129.

No.  09–6751.  Culbero  v.  New  York.  App.  Div.,  Sup.  Ct.
N.  Y.,  1st  Jud.  Dept.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  57
App.  Div.  3d  316,  869  N. Y.  S.  2d  78.

No.  09–6752.  Davis  v.  Correctional  Medical  Systems
et  al.  C.  A.  3d  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:  334
Fed.  Appx.  519.

No. 09–6754.  Parker v.  Board of Supervisors, University
of  Louisiana-Lafayette.  C.  A.  5th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.
Reported  below:  335  Fed.  Appx.  465.

No.  09–6771.  Groves  v.  Shinseki,  Secretary  of  Veterans
Affairs.  C.  A.  Fed.  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
324  Fed.  Appx.  898.

No.  09–6788.  Cardenas  Negrete  v.  Holder,  Attorney

General.  C.  A.  9th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.

No. 09–6794.  Oguagha v.  Cravener.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Certio

rari  denied.  Reported  below:  323  Fed.  Appx.  378.

No.  09–6797.  Hartman  v.  Virginia  Department  of  Cor
rections.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  Certiorari  denied.  Reported  below:
317  Fed.  Appx.  364.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court orders, specifically denials of certiorari. It lacks sequential narrative text and is more of a legal document summary than the body of a book.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document Summary</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
1108

OCTOBER TERM, 2009

January 11, 2010

558 U. S.

Court,  it  is  ordered  that  his  name  be  stricken  from  the  roll  of
attorneys  admitted  to  the  practice  of  law  before  this  Court.  The
rule  to  show  cause,  issued  on  November  30,  2009  [ante,  p.  1043],
is  discharged.

No.  09M59.  Clark  v.  Burtt,  Warden;
No. 09M60.  Filbrandt v. Michigan Department of Human

Services;  and

No.  09M61.  Polk  v.  Dunckle  et  al.  Motions  to  direct  the
Clerk  to  ﬁle  petitions  for  writs  of  certiorari  out  of  time  denied.
No.  09M62.  P.  S.  et  al.  v.  Franklin  County  Children
Services.  Motion  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  with
out  an  afﬁdavit  of  indigency  executed  by  petitioner  granted.
No.  08–1301.  Carr  v.  United  States.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.

[Cer
tiorari  granted,  557  U. S.  965.]  Motion  of  petitioner  to  dispense
with  printing  the  joint  appendix  granted.

No.  08–1457.  New  Process  Steel,  L.  P.  v.  National  Labor
Relations  Board.  C.  A.  7th  Cir.
[Certiorari  granted,  ante,
p.  989.]  Motion  of  petitioner  to  dispense  with  printing  the  joint
appendix  granted.

No.  09–158.  Magwood  v.  Patterson,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A.
[Certiorari  granted,  ante,  p.  1023.]  Motions  of  peti
11th  Cir.
tioner  to  dispense  with  printing  the  joint  appendix,  for  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis,  and  for  appointment  of  counsel
granted.  Jeffrey  L.  Fisher,  Esq.,  of  Stanford,  Cal.,  is  appointed
to  serve  as  counsel  for  petitioner  in  this  case.

No.  09–233.  Triple-S  Management  Corp.  et  al.  v.  Munici

pal  Revenue  Collection  Center.  Sup.  Ct.  P.  R.;  and

No.  09–525.  Janus  Capital  Group,  Inc., et  al.  v.  First  De
rivative  Traders.  C.  A.  4th  Cir.  The  Solicitor  General  is
invited  to  ﬁle  briefs  in  these  cases  expressing  the  views  of  the
United  States.

No. 09–6233.  In re Cluck.  Motion of petitioner for reconsid
eration  of  order  denying  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis
[ante,  p.  813]  denied.

No.  09–6234.  Cluck  v.  Washington.  Sup.  Ct.  Wash.  Mo
tion  of  petitioner  for  reconsideration  of  order  denying  leave  to
proceed  in  forma  pauperis  [ante,  p.  984]  denied.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions, likely from a legal journal or docket. It's not sequential narrative text and focuses on legal proceedings rather than a story or informative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
14

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES

Opinion of the Court

IV

By authorizing a union to collect fees from nonmembers
and permitting the use of an opt-out system for the collec-
tion  of  fees  levied  to  cover  nonchargeable  expenses,  our
prior  decisions  approach,  if  they  do  not  cross,  the  limit  of
what the First Amendment can tolerate.  The SEIU, how-
ever, asks us to go farther.  It asks us to approve a proce-
dure  under  which  (a)  a  special  assessment  billed  for  use
in  electoral  campaigns  was  assessed  without  providing  a
new  opportunity  for  nonmembers  to  decide  whether  they
wished  to  contribute  to  this  effort  and  (b)  nonmembers
who  previously  opted  out  were  nevertheless  required  to
pay  more  than  half  of  the  special  assessment  even
though  the  union  had  said  that  the  purpose  of  the  fund
was  to  mount  a  political  campaign  and  that  it  would  not
be used for ordinary union expenses.  This aggressive use
of  power  by  the  SEIU  to  collect  fees  from  nonmembers  is
indefensible.

A
First,  we  see  no  justification  for  the  union’s  failure  to
provide a fresh Hudson notice.  Hudson rests on the prin-
ciple  that  nonmembers  should  not  be  required  to  fund  a
union’s political and ideological projects unless they choose
to do so after having “a fair opportunity” to assess the im-
pact  of  paying  for  nonchargeable  union  activities.    475
U. S., at 303.  Giving employees only one opportunity per
year to make this choice is tolerable if employees are able
at  the  time  in  question  to  make  an  informed  choice.    But

——————

U. S.  347,  363  (1976)  (government  means  must  be  ‘least  restrictive
of freedom of belief and association’); Kusper v.  Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51,
58–59 (1973) (‘[E]ven when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may
not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected
liberty’); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (‘Precision of reg-
ulation  must  be  the  touchstone’  in  the  First  Amendment  context).”
Hudson, 475 U. S., at 303, n. 11.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically the Supreme Court case Knox v. Service Employees. It contains legal arguments and citations, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:32] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

li

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nagy v. Goldstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nagy v. Lappin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nagy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Namey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nam Nhat Ngo v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nario Soto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nashville; Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nasim v. Meisner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nathan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nathan’s Famous Operating Corp.; Samuel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Data Corp.; Lane v.
National Foreign Trade Council; Natsios v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Labor Relations Bd.; Calkins v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Labor Relations Bd.; Cecil v.
National Labor Relations Bd.; Indio Grocery Outlet v. . . . . . . . . .
National Park Service; Accuracy in Media, Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Naugle v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Navarro v. Poole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Navarro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Neal; Gardner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nebraska; Frank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nebraska; Ryan v.
Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nelson; Diehl v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nelson v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nelson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nero; Bell v.
Network Solutions, Inc.; Watts v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nevada; Beeson v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nevada; Geary v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nevada; Guesman v.
Nevada; McDowell v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nevada; Meeks v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nevada Dept. of Human Resources, Welfare Division; Chenard v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Hampshire; Davidson v.
New Hampshire Dept. of Revenue; Caterpillar Inc. v.
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Jersey; Apprendi v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Jersey; Cancassi v.
New Jersey State Police; Motley v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Newland; Varfes v.
Newman; Hopkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Mexico; Gonzales v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Orleans Public Facility Management, Inc.; Chaney v. . . . . . .

Page
1084
1084,1096
1106
1123
1061
1121
1052
1075
1123
1128
1023,1125
1002
1098
1066
1098
1111
1002
1093
1093
1094
1079
1115
1100
460
1074
1011
1109
1057
1088
1026
1090
1069
1132
1057
1026
1073
1021
1002
1028
1087
1020
1084
1025
1027
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents listing cases. It is not the actual content of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

21

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

of these tools remain available to localities seeking to ad-
dress homelessness within constitutional bounds.

B
The scope of this dispute is narrow.  Respondents do not
challenge the City’s “restrictions on the use of tents or other
camping gear,” “encampment clearances,” “time and place
restrictions on sleeping outside,” or “the imposition of fines
or jail time on homeless people who decline accessible shel-
ter options.”  Brief for Respondents 18.

That means the majority does not need to answer most of
the hypotheticals it poses.  The City’s hypotheticals, echoed
throughout  the  majority  opinion,  concern  “violent  crime,
drug overdoses, disease, fires, and hazardous waste.”  Brief
for Petitioner 47.  For the most part, these concerns are not
implicated in this case.  The District Court’s injunction, for
example, permits the City to prohibit “littering, public uri-
nation or defecation, obstruction of roadways, possession or
distribution of illicit substances, harassment, or violence.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 200a.  The majority’s framing of the
problem as one involving drugs, diseases, and fires instead
of one involving people trying to keep warm outside with a
blanket  just  provides  the  Court  with  cover  to  permit  the
criminalization of homeless people.

The  majority  also  overstates  the  line-drawing  problems
that  a  baseline  Eighth  Amendment  standard  presents.
Consider  the  “unavoidable”  “difficult  questions”  that  dis-
combobulate the majority.  Ante, at 32–33.  Courts answer
such factual questions every day.  For example, the major-
ity asks: “What does it mean to be ‘involuntarily’ homeless
with ‘no place to go’?”  Ibid.  Martin’s answer was clear: It
is when “ ‘there is a greater number of homeless individuals
in [a city] than the number of available beds [in shelters,]’ ”
not including “individuals who do have access to adequate
temporary  shelter,  whether  because  they  have  the  means
to pay for it or because it is realistically available to them
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the legal arguments surrounding the criminalization of homelessness and the scope of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 321 (1998)

329

Opinion of the Court

The United States argues, however, that the forfeiture of
currency under § 982(a)(1) “also serves important remedial
purposes.” Brief for United States 20. The Government
asserts that it has “an overriding sovereign interest in con-
trolling what property leaves and enters the country.”
Ibid.
It claims that full forfeiture of unreported currency supports
that interest by serving to “dete[r] illicit movements of cash”
and aiding in providing the Government with “valuable in-
formation to investigate and detect criminal activities associ-
ated with that cash.”
Id., at 21. Deterrence, however, has
traditionally been viewed as a goal of punishment, and
forfeiture of the currency here does not serve the remedial
purpose of compensating the Government for a loss. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 1293 (6th ed. 1990) (“[R]emedial ac-
tion” is one “brought to obtain compensation or indemnity”);
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U. S.
232 (1972) (per curiam) (monetary penalty provides “a rea-
sonable form of liquidated damages,” id., at 237, to the
Government and is thus a “remedial” sanction because it
compensates Government for lost revenues). Although the
Government has asserted a loss of information regarding the
amount of currency leaving the country, that loss would not
be remedied by the Government’s conﬁscation of respond-
ent’s $357,144.4

The United States also argues that the forfeiture man-
dated by § 982(a)(1) is constitutional because it falls within a
class of historic forfeitures of property tainted by crime.
See Brief for United States 16 (citing, inter alia, The Pal-

4 We do not suggest that merely because the forfeiture of respondent’s
currency in this case would not serve a remedial purpose, other forfeitures
may be classiﬁed as nonpunitive (and thus not “ﬁnes”) if they serve some
remedial purpose as well as being punishment for an offense. Even if the
Government were correct in claiming that the forfeiture of respondent’s
currency is remedial in some way, the forfeiture would still be punitive in
part.
(The Government concedes as much.) This is sufﬁcient to bring
the forfeiture within the purview of the Excessive Fines Clause. See
Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 621–622 (1993).
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal text, specifically the Opinion of the Court from a Supreme Court case. It discusses the constitutionality of currency forfeiture under a specific statute.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020)

1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 18–1334, 18–1475, 18–1496, 18–1514 and 18–1521
_________________

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT
BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, PETITIONER
v.
AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL.

18–1334

AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
18–1475

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, ET AL.

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS
OF ALL TITLE III DEBTORS OTHER
THAN COFINA, PETITIONER
v.
AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL.

18–1496

18–1514

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL.

18–1521

UNIÓN DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA
ELÉCTRICA Y RIEGO, INC., PETITIONER
v.
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT
BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

[June 1, 2020]

  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring in the judgment.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal case citation and the introduction to a Supreme Court opinion. It is not the main body of the text and likely provides context and case information.
  </thinking>
  <category>Case Citation and Introduction</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010)

15

Opinion of the Court

the need to consider the invention as a whole, rather than
“dissect[ing]  the  claims  into  old  and  new  elements  and
then . . . ignor[ing] the presence of the old elements in the
analysis.”  Id.,  at  188.  Finally,  the  Court  concluded  that
because  the  claim  was  not  “an  attempt  to  patent  a
mathematical  formula,  but  rather  [was]  an  industrial
process  for  the  molding  of  rubber  products,”  it  fell  within
§101’s patentable subject matter.  Id., at 192–193.

In  light  of  these  precedents,  it  is  clear  that  petitioners’
application is not a patentable “process.”  Claims 1 and 4
in  petitioners’  application  explain  the  basic  concept  of
hedging,  or  protecting  against  risk:  “Hedging  is  a  funda-
mental  economic  practice  long  prevalent  in  our  system  of
commerce  and  taught  in  any  introductory  finance  class.”
545  F. 3d,  at  1013  (Rader,  J.,  dissenting);  see,  e.g.,  D.
Chorafas,  Introduction  to  Derivative  Financial  Instru-
ments  75–94  (2008);  C.  Stickney,  R.  Weil,  K.  Schipper,  &
J. Francis, Financial Accounting: An Introduction to Con-
cepts,  Methods,  and  Uses  581–582  (13th  ed.  2010);  S.
Ross,  R.  Westerfield,  &  B.  Jordan,  Fundamentals  of  Cor-
porate  Finance  743–744  (8th  ed.  2008).  The  concept  of
hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathemati-
cal  formula  in  claim  4,  is  an  unpatentable  abstract  idea,
just  like  the  algorithms  at  issue  in  Benson  and  Flook.
Allowing  petitioners  to  patent  risk  hedging  would  pre-
empt  use  of  this  approach  in  all  fields,  and  would  effec-
tively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.

Petitioners’ remaining claims are broad examples of how
hedging  can  be  used  in  commodities  and  energy  markets.
Flook  established  that  limiting  an  abstract  idea  to  one
field  of  use  or  adding  token  postsolution  components  did
not make the concept patentable.  That is exactly what the
remaining  claims  in  petitioners’  application  do.  These
claims  attempt  to  patent  the  use  of  the  abstract  idea  of
hedging  risk  in  the  energy  market  and  then  instruct  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the patentability of a hedging process. It delves into legal precedents and arguments related to abstract ideas and their patentability.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023)

43

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

the Members of this majority pay lip service to respondents’
“commendable” and “worthy” racial diversity goals, ante, at
23–24, they make a clear value judgment today: Racial in-
tegration in higher education is not sufficiently important
to  them.
“Today,  the  proclivities  of  individuals  rule.”
Dobbs, 597 U. S., at ___ (dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 6).
The majority offers no response to any of this.  Instead, it
attacks a straw man, arguing that the Court’s cases recog-
nize that remedying the effects of “societal discrimination”
does not constitute a compelling interest.  Ante, at 34–35.
Yet  as  the  majority  acknowledges,  while  Bakke  rejected
that interest as insufficiently compelling, it upheld a lim-
ited use of race in college admissions to promote the educa-
tional benefits that flow from diversity.  438 U. S., at 311–
315.  It is that narrower interest, which the Court has reaf-
firmed numerous times since Bakke and as recently as 2016
in Fisher II, see supra, at 14–15, that the Court overrules
today.

B
The Court’s precedents authorizing a limited use of race
in  college  admissions  are  not  just  workable—they  have
been working.  Lower courts have consistently applied them
without  issue,  as  exemplified  by  the  opinions  below  and
SFFA’s and the Court’s inability to identify any split of au-
thority.  Today, the Court replaces this settled framework
with  a  set  of  novel  restraints  that  create  troubling  equal
protection  problems  and  share  one  common  purpose:  to
make it impossible to use race in a holistic way in college
admissions, where it is much needed.

1
The  Court  argues  that  Harvard’s  and  UNC’s  programs
must end because they unfairly disadvantage some racial
groups.  According  to  the  Court,  college  admissions  are  a
“zero-sum” game and respondents’ use of race unfairly “ad-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It argues against the majority's decision and provides legal reasoning and context.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
72

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix C to opinion of ALITO, J.

  22 U. S. C. §2755 (Discrimination Prohibited if
Based  on  Race,  Religion,  National  Origin,  or
Sex)

  22  U. S. C.  §3901(b)(2)  (Foreign  Service;  Con-

gressional Findings and Objectives)

  22 U. S. C. §3905(b)(1) (Foreign Service; Person-

nel Actions)

  22 U. S. C. §4102(11)(A) (Foreign Service; Defi-

nitions)

  22 U. S. C. §4115(b)(4) (Foreign Service; Unfair

Labor Practices)

  22 U. S. C. §6401(a)(3) (International Religious

Freedom; Findings; Policy)

  22 U. S. C. §8303(c)(2) (Office of Volunteers for

Prosperity)

  23  U. S. C.  §140(a)  (Federal-Aid  Highways;

Nondiscrimination)

  23 U. S. C. §324 (Highways; Prohibition of Dis-

crimination on the Basis of Sex)

  25 U. S. C. §4223(d)(2) (Housing Assistance for

Native Hawaiians)

  26 U. S. C. §7471(a)(6)(A) (Tax Court; Employ-

ees)
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of legal citations, likely from a legal document.  It is not sequential text and does not appear to be part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents or Legal Citations</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015)

11

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

from  too  much  association  with  him.  The  Federalist  No.
73, at 446; see also Hamburger, supra, at 508–512.

The  Framers  also  created  structural  protections  in  the
Constitution to free judges from external influences.  They
provided,  for  example,  that  judges  should  “hold  their
Offices during good Behaviour” and receive “a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance  in  Office.”  Art. III,  §1.    Hamilton  noted  that  such
unequivocal  language  had  been  shown  necessary  by  the
experience of the States, where similar state constitutional
protections  for  judges  had  not  been  “sufficiently  definite
to  preclude  legislative  evasions”  of  the  separation  of  the
judicial  power.  The  Federalist  No.  79,  at  472.    Because
“power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over
his will,” he argued that Article III’s structural protections
would help ensure that judges fulfilled their constitutional
role.  Ibid. (emphasis deleted).

The  Framers  made  the  opposite  choice  for  legislators
and the Executive.  Instead of insulating them from exter-
nal  pressures,  the  Constitution  tied  them  to  those  pres-
sures.  It provided for election of Members of the House of
Representatives  every  two  years,  Art. I,  §2,  cl.  1;  and
selection of Members of the Senate every six years, Art. I,
§3, cl. 1.  It also provided for the President to be subject to
election every four years.  Art. II, §1, cl. 1.  “The President
is [thus] directly dependent on the people, and since there
is only one President, he is responsible.  The people know
whom  to  blame  . . . .”    See  Morrison  v.  Olson,  487  U. S.
654, 729 (1988) (SCALIA, J., dissenting).  To preserve that
accountability,  we  have  held  that  executive  officers  must
be subject to removal by the President to ensure account-
ability  within  the  Executive  Branch.  See  Free  Enterprise
Fund  v.  Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Bd.,  561
U. S.  477,  495  (2010);  see  also  Morrison,  supra,  at  709
(opinion of SCALIA, J.) (“It is not for us to determine, and
we  have  never  presumed  to  determine,  how  much  of  the
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. It discusses the Framers' intent in structuring the Constitution to provide judges with independence from external pressures while tying legislators and the Executive to those pressures.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18

VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

from

“information”

otherwise  law-abiding  citizens  are  criminals.  Take  the
workplace.  Employers commonly state that computers and
electronic devices can be used only for business purposes.
So on the Government’s reading of the statute, an employee
who  sends  a  personal  e-mail  or  reads  the  news  using  her
work computer has violated the CFAA.  Or consider the In-
ternet.  Many  websites,  services,  and  databases—which
provide
“protected  computer[s],”
§1030(a)(2)(C)—authorize  a  user’s  access  only  upon  his
agreement to follow specified terms of service.  If the “ex-
ceeds  authorized  access”  clause  encompasses  violations  of
circumstance-based access restrictions on employers’ com-
puters, it is difficult to see why it would not also encompass
violations of such restrictions on website providers’ comput-
ers.  And indeed, numerous amici explain why the Govern-
ment’s  reading  of  subsection  (a)(2)  would  do  just  that—
criminalize everything from embellishing an online-dating
profile  to  using  a  pseudonym  on  Facebook.    See  Brief  for
Orin  Kerr  as  Amicus  Curiae  10–11;  Brief  for  Technology
Companies  as  Amici  Curiae  6,  n. 3,  11;  see  also  Brief  for
Reporters  Committee  for  Freedom  of  the  Press  et al.  as
Amici Curiae 10–13 (journalism activity); Brief for Kyratso
Karahalios et al. as Amici Curiae 11–17 (online civil-rights
testing and research).

In response to these points, the Government posits that
other terms in the statute—specifically “authorization” and
“use”—“may  well”  serve  to  cabin  its  prosecutorial  power.
Brief for United States 35; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 38, 40, 58
(“instrumental”  use;  “individualized”  and  “fairly  specific”
authorization).  Yet the Government stops far short of en-
dorsing  such  limitations.  Cf.  Brief  for  United  States  37
(concept of “authorization” “may not logically apply”); id., at
38 (“ ‘use’ ” might be read in a more “limited” fashion, even
though  it  “often  has  a  broader  definition”);  see  also,  e.g.,
post, at 11–12 (mens rea requirement “might” preclude lia-
bility in some cases).  Nor does it cite any prior instance in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). It delves into the interpretation of the statute and its potential implications.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

189

Breyer, J., dissenting

needed to prove objective intent—even without an express
claim—had been found. The emerging scientiﬁc consensus
about tobacco’s adverse, chemically induced, health effects
may have convinced the agency that it should spend its re-
sources on this important regulatory effort. As for the
change of administrations, I agree with then-Justice Rehn-
quist’s statement in a different case, where he wrote:

“The agency’s changed view . . . seems to be related to
the election of a new President of a different political
party.
It is readily apparent that the responsible mem-
bers of one administration may consider public resist-
ance and uncertainties to be more important than do
their counterparts in a previous administration. A
change in administration brought about by the people
casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an
executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and beneﬁts
of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency
remains within the bounds established by Congress, it
is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate
priorities in light of the philosophy of the administra-
tion.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 59
(1983) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

V

One might nonetheless claim that, even if my interpreta-
tion of the FDCA and later statutes gets the words right, it
lacks a sense of their “music.” See Helvering v. Gregory, 69
F. 2d 809, 810–811 (CA2 1934) (L. Hand, J.) (“[T]he meaning
of a [statute] may be more than that of the separate words,
as a melody is more than the notes . . .”). Such a claim
might rest on either of two grounds.

First, one might claim that, despite the FDA’s legal right
to change its mind, its original statements played a critical
part in the enactment of the later statutes and now should
play a critical part in their interpretation. But the FDA’s
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, specifically a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer. It contains legal arguments, citations, and references to previous cases.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019)

7

Opinion of the Court

company  town.    See  Terry  v.  Adams,  345  U. S.  461,  468–
470  (1953)  (elections);  Marsh  v.  Alabama,  326  U. S.  501,
505–509  (1946)  (company  town);  Smith  v.  Allwright,  321
U. S.  649,  662–666  (1944)  (elections);  Nixon  v.  Condon,
286  U. S.  73,  84–89  (1932)  (elections).1    The  Court  has
ruled that a variety of functions do not fall into that cate-
gory,  including,  for  example:  running  sports  associations
and leagues, administering insurance payments, operating
nursing  homes,  providing  special  education,  representing
indigent  criminal  defendants,  resolving  private  disputes,
and  supplying  electricity.    See  American  Mfrs.  Mut.  Ins.
Co.  v.  Sullivan,  526  U. S.  40,  55–57  (1999)  (insurance
payments);  National  Collegiate  Athletic  Assn.  v.  Tar-
kanian,  488  U. S.  179,  197,  n. 18  (1988)  (college  sports);
San  Francisco  Arts  &  Athletics,  Inc.  v.  United  States
Olympic  Comm.,  483  U. S.  522,  544–545  (1987)  (amateur
sports);  Blum,  457  U. S.,  at  1011–1012  (nursing  home);
Rendell-Baker,  457  U. S.,  at  842  (special  education);  Polk
County  v.  Dodson,  454  U. S.  312,  318–319  (1981)  (public
defender);  Flagg  Bros.,  436  U. S.,  at  157–163  (private
dispute  resolution);  Jackson,  419  U. S.,  at  352–354  (elec-
tric service).
  The relevant function in this case is operation of public
access  channels  on  a  cable  system.    That  function  has
not  traditionally  and  exclusively  been  performed  by
government.
  Since the 1970s, when public access channels became a
regular feature on cable systems, a variety of private and
public actors have operated public access channels, includ-

——————

1 Relatedly, this Court has recognized that a private entity may, un-
der  certain  circumstances,  be  deemed  a  state  actor  when  the  govern-
ment  has  outsourced  one  of  its  constitutional  obligations  to  a  private
entity.    In  West  v.  Atkins,  for  example,  the  State  was  constitutionally
obligated  to  provide  medical  care  to  prison  inmates.    487  U. S.  42,  56
(1988).  That scenario is not present here because the government has
no such obligation to operate public access channels.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically citing case law and discussing the concept of state action. It is sequential text and likely part of the main body of the document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
18  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
THOMAS, J., concurring

“apart, for  the use of loyal refugees and freedmen,” aban-
doned,  confiscated,  or  purchased  lands,  and  assigning  “to
every  male  citizen,  whether  refugee  or  freedman,  . . .  not
more than forty acres of such land.”  Ch. 90, §§2, 4, 13 Stat.
507.  The 1866 Freedmen’s Bureau Act then expanded upon
the prior year’s law, authorizing the Bureau to care for all
loyal  refugees  and  freedmen.  Ch.  200,  14  Stat.  173–174.
Importantly,  however,  the  Acts  applied  to  freedmen  (and
refugees), a formally race-neutral category, not blacks writ
large.  And,  because  “not  all  blacks  in  the  United  States
were former slaves,” “ ‘freedman’ ” was a decidedly under-
inclusive  proxy  for  race.  M.  Rappaport,  Originalism  and
the Colorblind Constitution, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 71, 98
(2013)  (Rappaport).  Moreover,  the  Freedmen’s  Bureau
served  newly  freed  slaves  alongside  white  refugees.    P.
Moreno, Racial Classifications and Reconstruction Legisla-
tion, 61 J. So. Hist. 271, 276–277 (1995); R. Barnett & E.
Bernick, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 119 (2021).  And, advocates of the law explicitly dis-
claimed any view rooted in modern conceptions of antisub-
ordination.  To  the  contrary,  they  explicitly  clarified  that
the equality sought by the law was not one in which all men
shall be “six feet high”; rather, it strove to ensure that freed-
men enjoy “equal rights before the law” such that “each man
shall have the right to pursue in his own way life, liberty,
and happiness.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 322,
342.

Several additional federal laws cited by respondents ap-
pear to classify based on race, rather than previous condi-
tion of servitude.  For example, an 1866 law adopted special
rules and procedures for the payment of “colored” service-
men in the Union Army to agents who helped them secure
bounties, pensions, and other payments that they were due.
14 Stat. 367–368.  At the time, however, Congress believed
that many “black servicemen were significantly overpaying
for these agents’ services in part because [the servicemen]
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal text, specifically a concurring opinion from the Supreme Court case Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College. It discusses historical legal precedents related to race and equality, focusing on legislation from the Reconstruction era.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Case Analysis</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524IND

Unit: $UBV [08-21-00 18:45:40] PGT: INDBV (Bound Volume)

1314

INDEX

RETIREES’ HEALTH CARE BENEFITS. See Constitutional Law, II,

1; IX, 1.

RETRIALS ON PRIOR CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS. See Constitu-

tional Law, I.

RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT. See Constitutional Law, VII.

SCHOOLS’ LIABILITY FOR TEACHER-STUDENT SEXUAL HAR-

ASSMENT. See Education Amendments Act of 1972.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. See Constitutional Law, VIII.

SELF-INCRIMINATION. See Constitutional Law, VII.

SENTENCING. See Constitutional Law, I; Criminal Law, 3.

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS. See Jurisdiction, 1.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT. See Civil Rights Act of 1964; Education

Amendments of 1972.

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT.

Disability beneﬁts—Appeal of a remand order.—A Social Security dis-
ability claimant seeking court reversal of an agency decision denying bene-
ﬁts may appeal a district court order remanding case to agency for further
proceedings. Forney v. Apfel, p. 266.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. See Jurisdiction, 2.

STANDING TO SUE.

1. Line Item Veto Act.—Appellees, who claim to have been injured
when provisions of duly enacted laws were canceled pursuant to Act, have
standing to challenge Act’s constitutionality. Clinton v. City of New
York, p. 417.

2. Voters—Federal Election Commission’s political committee deci-
sion.—Respondent voters have standing to challenge FEC’s decision that
an organization is not a political committee subject to Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 disclosure requirements regarding its membership,
contributions, and expenditures; case is remanded for FEC to decide issue
under its new regulations. Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, p. 11.

STATE TAXES. See Taxes.

SUBPOENAS. See Attorney-Client Privilege.

SUPREME COURT. See also Jurisdiction, 3.

Term statistics, p. 1303.

SURVIVAL ACTION FOR DAMAGES. See Maritime Law.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is an index from a legal document. It lists topics and corresponding sections within the document.  Indexes are not meant to be read sequentially and provide no narrative content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Date/Time: 11-02-00 08:45:59
Job: 529RUL

Unit: U3EV

Pagination Table: RULES1

RULES OF EVIDENCE

1195

those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based
on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determina-
tion of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientiﬁc, technical,
or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

Rule 702. Testimony by experts.

If scientiﬁc, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualiﬁed as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tes-
tify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1)
the testimony is based upon sufﬁcient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.

Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts.

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an ex-
pert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived
by or made known to the expert at or before the hear-
ing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular ﬁeld in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence
in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts
or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed
to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference un-
less the court determines that their probative value in assist-
ing the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.

Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant

immaterial.

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even

though the declarant is available as a witness:

.

.

.

.

.

(6) Records of regularly conducted activ ity.—A
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of legal rules, specifically the Rules of Evidence. It includes rule numbers, titles, and the text of the rules themselves.
  </thinking>
  <category>Rules of Evidence</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US2

Unit: $U97

[09-06-00 19:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 666 (1998)

679

Opinion of the Court

administering the state law.”
201 U. S., at 69. The state
law, which addresses prosecutions brought by the State, sug-
gested the rule that the Saline Bank Court applied to the
case before it; the law provided that “no disclosure made by
any party defendant to such suit in equity, and no books or
papers exhibited by him in answer to the bill, or under the
order of the Court, shall be used as evidence against him in
any . . . prosecution under this law,” quoted in 1 Pet., at 104.
Saline Bank, then, may have turned on a reading of state
statutory law. Cf. McNaughton, Self-Incrimination Under
Foreign Law, 45 Va. L. Rev. 1299, 1305–1306 (1959) (suggest-
ing that Saline Bank represents “an application not of the
privilege against self-incrimination . . . but of the principle
that equity will not aid a forfeiture”). But see Ballmann,
supra, at 195 (Holmes, J.) (suggesting that Saline Bank is a
Fifth Amendment case, though this view was soon repudi-
ated by the Court in Hale, as just noted).

Where Saline Bank is laconic, Ballmann is equivocal.
While Ballmann speciﬁcally argued only the danger of in-
criminating himself under state law as his basis for invoking
the privilege in a federal proceeding, and we upheld his claim
of privilege, our opinion indicates that we concluded that
Ballmann might have had a fear of incrimination under fed-
eral law as well as under state law. While we did suggest,
contrary to the Murdock rule, that Ballmann might have
been able to invoke the privilege based on a fear of state
prosecution, the opinion says only that “[o]ne way or the
other [due to the risk of incrimination under federal or state
law] we are of opinion that Ballmann could not be required
to produce his cash book if he set up that it would tend to
criminate him.” 200 U. S., at 195–196. At its equivocal
worst, Ballmann reigned for only two months. Hale v.
Henkel explained that “the only danger to be considered is
one arising within the same jurisdiction and under the same
sovereignty,” 201 U. S., at 69, and Ballmann and Saline
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion excerpt, likely from a Supreme Court case. It contains legal citations, discusses legal precedents (Saline Bank and Ballmann), and analyzes legal principles related to self-incrimination.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion Excerpt</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN

862

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Syllabus

bar a defense that compliance with a federal standard automatically ex-
empts a defendant from state law, whether the Federal Government
meant that standard to be an absolute, or a minimum, requirement.
This interpretation does not conﬂict with the purpose of the saving pro-
vision, for it preserves actions that seek to establish greater safety than
the minimum safety achieved by a federal regulation intended to pro-
vide a ﬂoor. Moreover, this Court has repeatedly declined to give
broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful
regulatory scheme established by federal law, a concern applicable here.
The pre-emption provision and the saving provision, read together, re-
ﬂect a neutral policy, not a specially favorable or unfavorable one,
toward the application of ordinary conﬂict pre-emption. The pre-
emption provision itself favors pre-emption of state tort suits, while the
saving clause disfavors pre-emption at least some of the time. How-
ever, there is nothing in any natural reading of the two provisions that
would favor one policy over the other where a jury-imposed safety
standard actually conﬂicts with a federal safety standard. Pp. 869–874.
(c) This lawsuit actually conﬂicts with FMVSS 208 and the Act itself.
DOT saw FMVSS 208 not as a minimum standard, but as a way to
provide a manufacturer with a range of choices among different passive
restraint systems that would be gradually introduced, thereby lowering
costs, overcoming technical safety problems, encouraging technological
development, and winning widespread consumer acceptance—all of
which would promote FMVSS 208’s safety objectives. The standard’s
history helps explain why and how DOT sought these objectives. DOT
began instituting passive restraint requirements in 1970, but it always
permitted passive restraint options. Public resistance to an ignition
interlock device that in effect forced occupants to buckle up their manual
belts inﬂuenced DOT’s subsequent initiatives. The 1984 version of
FMVSS 208 reﬂected several signiﬁcant considerations regarding the
effectiveness of manual seatbelts and the likelihood that passengers
would leave their manual seatbelts unbuckled, the advantages and dis-
advantages of passive restraints, and the public’s resistance to the in-
stallation or use of then-available passive restraint devices. Most im-
portantly,
it deliberately sought variety, rejecting an “all airbag”
standard because perceived or real safety concerns threatened a back-
lash more easily overcome with a mix of several different devices. A
mix would also help develop data on comparative effectiveness, allow
the industry time to overcome safety problems and high production
costs associated with airbags, and facilitate the development of alter-
native, cheaper, and safer passive restraint systems, thereby building
public conﬁdence necessary to avoid an interlock-type ﬁasco. The
1984 standard also deliberately sought to gradually phase in passive
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal case excerpt, specifically the syllabus section. It discusses legal arguments and interpretations related to federal safety standards and their impact on state law.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Case Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021)

3

Opinion of the Court

the sanctity of human life.”  Brief for Petitioner Law Cen-
ter 4.  Since 2001, each petitioner has renewed its registra-
tion and has filed a copy of its Form 990 with the Attorney
General, as required by Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, §301.  Out
of concern for their donors’ anonymity, however, the peti-
tioners have declined to file their Schedule Bs (or have filed
only redacted versions) with the State.

For many years, the petitioners’ reluctance to turn over
donor information presented no problem because the Attor-
ney  General  was  not  particularly  zealous  about  collecting
Schedule  Bs.  That  changed  in  2010,  when  the  California
Department  of  Justice  “ramped  up  its  efforts  to  enforce
charities’ Schedule B obligations, sending thousands of de-
ficiency letters to charities that had not complied with the
Schedule B requirement.”  Americans for Prosperity Foun-
dation  v.  Becerra,  903  F. 3d  1000,  1006  (CA9  2018).    The
Law Center and the Foundation received deficiency letters
in 2012 and 2013, respectively.  When they continued to re-
sist  disclosing  their  contributors’  identities,  the  Attorney
General threatened to suspend their registrations and fine
their directors and officers.

The petitioners each responded by filing suit in the Cen-
tral District of California.  In their complaints, they alleged
that the Attorney General had violated their First Amend-
ment rights and the rights of their donors.  The petitioners
alleged  that  disclosure  of  their  Schedule  Bs  would  make
their  donors  less  likely  to  contribute  and  would  subject
them to the risk of reprisals.  Both organizations challenged
the  disclosure  requirement  on  its  face  and  as  applied  to
them.

In each case, the District Court granted preliminary in-
junctive  relief  prohibiting  the  Attorney  General  from  col-
lecting their Schedule B information.  Americans for Pros-
perity  Foundation  v.  Harris,  2015  WL  769778  (CD  Cal.,
Feb. 23, 2015); App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–255, pp. 90a–
96a.  The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded.  Americans
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically from the Supreme Court of the United States. It includes citations, case names, and legal arguments.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023)

7

THOMAS, J., dissenting

the decidedly nonneutral benchmark of proportional alloca-
tion of political power based on race.

A
  As we have long recognized, “the very concept of vote di-
lution implies—and, indeed, necessitates—the existence of
an  ‘undiluted’  practice  against  which  the  fact  of  dilution
may be measured.”  Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520
U. S. 471, 480 (1997).  In a challenge to a districting plan, a
court must be able to compare a State’s enacted plan with
“a  hypothetical,  undiluted  plan,”  ibid.,  ascertained  by  an
“objective  and  workable  standard.”    Holder,  512  U. S.,  at
881  (plurality  opinion);  see  also  id.,  at  887  (opinion  of
O’Connor,  J.)  (noting  the  “general  agreement”  on  this
point).
  To be sure, it is no easy task to identify an objective, “un-
diluted”  benchmark  against  which  to  judge  a  districting
plan.  As we recently held in the analogous context of par-
tisan gerrymandering, “federal courts are not equipped to
apportion political power as a matter of fairness.”  Rucho v.
Common Cause, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 17).
Yet §2 vote-dilution cases require nothing less.  If §2 pro-
hibited only intentional racial discrimination, there would
be no difficulty in finding a clear and workable rule of deci-
sion.  But the “results test” that Congress wrote into §2 to
supersede  Mobile  v.  Bolden,  446  U. S.  55  (1980),  eschews
intent as the criterion of liability.  See Bossier Parish School
Bd., 520 U. S., at 482.  Accordingly, a §2 vote-dilution claim
does not simply “as[k] . . . for the elimination of a racial clas-
sification.”  Rucho, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21).  It asks,
instead,  “for  a  fair  share  of  political  power  and  influence,
with all the justiciability conundrums that entails.”  Ibid.
Nevertheless,  if  §2  applies  to  single-member  districts,  we
must accept that some “objective and workable standard for
choosing a reasonable benchmark” exists; otherwise, single-
member  districts  “cannot  be  challenged  as  dilutive  under
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case 599 U.S. ____ (2023).  It delves into the legal concept of vote dilution and the challenges of establishing an objective benchmark for evaluating districting plans under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

23

BARRETT, J., dissenting

It remains applicants’ burden to show that the FIP’s alleged
dependence on the covered States likely was an “important”
problem that EPA “entirely failed to consider.”  State Farm,
463 U. S., at 43.  And that is on top of their burden to over-
come §7607(d)(7)(B)’s procedural bar and the lack of “signif-
icant,” specific comments raising this issue.  §7607(d)(6)(B).
  Finally,  I  would  exercise  our  discretion  to  consider
§7607(d)(8)’s  harmless-error  rule.   Even  putting  aside the
expedited  briefing  schedule  and  the  limited  discussion  of
the Court’s theory in applicants’ briefs, applicants bear the
burden in seeking emergency relief to show a likelihood of
success  on  the  merits.    In  other  words,  we  must  predict
whether applicants will overcome every barrier to relief at
the end of the day, after full merits briefing and argument
in  the  lower  courts  and,  potentially,  again  in  this  Court.
Section  7607(d)(8)’s  harmless-error  rule  is  one  such  im-
portant obstacle, and EPA has already signaled that it will
raise it as litigation progresses.  See Denial 35, n. 38 (argu-
ing that any failure to more fully explain “how the Rule is
not interdependent” is harmless error under §7607(d)(8)).  I
see no reason not to consider it now.

III
  Given the emergency posture of this litigation, my views
on  the  merits  of  the  failure-to-explain  objection  and  the
application  of  the  Clean  Air  Act’s  procedural  bar  and
harmless-error rule are tentative.  But even a tentative ad-
verse  conclusion  can  undermine  applicants’  likelihood  of
success.    And  applicants,  to  prevail,  must  run  the  table;
they face the daunting task of surmounting all of these sig-
nificant obstacles.  They are unlikely to succeed.
  The Court, seizing on a barely briefed failure-to-explain
theory, grants relief anyway.  It enjoins the Good Neighbor
Plan’s enforcement against any state or industry applicant
pending review in the D. C. Circuit and any petition for cer-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court Justice. It delves into legal arguments, cites relevant case law (State Farm), and discusses procedural aspects of the case.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion/Dissenting Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
TABLE  OF  CASES  REPORTED

xiii

Page

824

Asher v. Chase Bank USA, N. A.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
997

Ashipa v. Ohio  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
882

Askew v. Ayres
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Asociacion de Emp. del Estado Libre Asoc. de P. R. v. Monteagudo
Aspen Creek Estates, Ltd. v. Brookhaven  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
820

Asset Acceptance, LLC; Gonzalez v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  912,1086

937

Associate Justice, App. Div., Supreme Court of N. Y.; Maddox v.
1136

Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
991

AstenJohnson, Inc.; American Ins. Co. v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
826

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aster v. Aster
Astrue; Carmona v.
1096

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Astrue; Peace v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  941,1141

987

Astrue v. Ratliff  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1014

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Astrue; Seaman v.
1014

Astrue; Stafford v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136

Athens Disposal Co. v. Franco  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Athens Services v. Franco
834

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atienza Wagan v. Alameida
1014

Atkins v. Vadlamudi  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1117

Atlantic City Police Dept.; Lemons v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
858

ATM Vancom of Las Vegas; Smith v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
948

AT&T Inc.; Martini v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
801

Attorney General; Afanwi v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1047

Attorney General; Arguelles-Olivares v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
816

Attorney General; Barry v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
918

Attorney General; Batavichus v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General; Beltran Lozano v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1049

Attorney General; Calderon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
904

1091

Attorney General; Carachuri-Rosendo v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1055

Attorney General; Cardenas Negrete v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
946

Attorney General; Castel v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149

Attorney General; Ciptanagara v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1043

Attorney General; Cohen v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
965

Attorney General; Colon v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
821

Attorney General; Connection Distributing Co. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
1074

Attorney General; de Johnson v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
913

Attorney General; Diallo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
817

Attorney General; Eman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1153

Attorney General; Felix v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1110

Attorney General; Gomis v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
995

Attorney General; Gumbs v.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
988

Attorney General v. Humanitarian Law Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
988

Attorney General; Humanitarian Law Project v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
822

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General; Hung Lin Wu v.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of contents, listing cases and their corresponding page numbers. It is not the actual content of the book.
  </thinking>
  <category>table of contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
16  AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

there was a serious concern that hiring authorities would
punish  teachers  for  their  organizational  affiliations.    See
364 U. S., at 486.  By contrast, the Court in no way suggests
that California officials will use Schedule B information to
retaliate against any organization’s donors.  If California’s
reporting  requirement  imposes  any  burden  at  all,  it  is  at
most a very slight one.

B
1
Given the modesty of the First Amendment burden, Cal-
ifornia may justify its Schedule B requirement with a cor-
respondingly  modest  showing  that  the  means  achieve  its
ends.  See Reed, 561 U. S., at 201.  California easily meets
this standard.

California collects Schedule Bs to facilitate supervision of
charities that operate in the State.  As the Court acknowl-
edges, this is undoubtedly a significant governmental inter-
est.  See ante, at 12–13.  In the United States, responsibility
for  overseeing  charities  has  historically  been  vested  in
States’ attorneys general, who are tasked with prosecuting
charitable  fraud,  self-dealing,  and  misappropriation  of
charitable funds.  Effective policing is critical to maintain-
ing public confidence in, and continued giving to, charitable
organizations.  California’s interest in exercising such over-
sight is especially compelling given the size of its charitable
sector.  Nearly a quarter of the country’s charitable assets
are  held  by  charities  registered  in  California.    Brief  for
Scholars of the Law of Non-Profit Organizations as Amici
Curiae 10; see ibid. (“As of June 2018, charities registered
in  California  reported  $295  billion  in  annual  income  and
net assets of $851 billion”).

The  Schedule  B  reporting  requirement  is  properly  tai-
lored  to  further  California’s  efforts  to  police  charitable
fraud.  See Reed, 561 U. S., at 198–199 (noting that disclo-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court case *Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta*.  It discusses the First Amendment implications of California's Schedule B reporting requirement for charities.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
529US1

Unit: $U38

[09-26-01 08:44:27] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 205 (2000)

209

Opinion of the Court

II

The Lanham Act provides for the registration of trade-
marks, which it deﬁnes in § 45 to include “any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof [used or in-
tended to be used] to identify and distinguish [a producer’s]
goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods . . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 1127.
Registration of a mark under § 2 of the Lanham Act, 15
U. S. C. § 1052, enables the owner to sue an infringer under
§ 32, 15 U. S. C. § 1114; it also entitles the owner to a pre-
sumption that its mark is valid, see § 7(b), 15 U. S. C.
§ 1057(b), and ordinarily renders the registered mark incon-
testable after ﬁve years of continuous use, see § 15, 15
U. S. C. § 1065.
In addition to protecting registered marks,
the Lanham Act, in § 43(a), gives a producer a cause of action
for the use by any person of “any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof . . . which . . . is likely
to cause confusion . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or ap-
proval of his or her goods . . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a).
It is
the latter provision that is at issue in this case.

The breadth of the deﬁnition of marks registrable under
§ 2, and of the confusion-producing elements recited as ac-
tionable by § 43(a), has been held to embrace not just word
marks, such as “Nike,” and symbol marks, such as Nike’s
“swoosh” symbol, but also “trade dress”—a category that
originally included only the packaging, or “dressing,” of a
product, but in recent years has been expanded by many
Courts of Appeals to encompass the design of a product.
See, e. g., Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Sangiacomo
N. A., Ltd., 187 F. 3d 363 (CA4 1999) (bedroom furniture);
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F. 3d 996 (CA2 1995)
(sweaters); Stuart Hall Co., Inc. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F. 3d 780
(CA8 1995) (notebooks). These courts have assumed, often
without discussion, that trade dress constitutes a “symbol”
or “device” for purposes of the relevant sections, and we con-
“Since human beings might use as a ‘symbol’
clude likewise.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. It cites legal statutes and discusses legal precedents.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
94

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY

ALITO, J., dissenting
Appendix D to opinion of ALITO, J.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal citation, likely part of a court document. Legal citations are not typically considered suitable for indexing as they are not the main content of a document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Citation</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

21

GORSUCH, J., concurring

12  (emphasis  added).  But  the  dissent’s  approach  to  our
precedents is like a picky child at the dinner table.  It se-
lects  only  a  small  handful  while  leaving  much  else  un-
touched.  To start, the dissent lingers briefly on  Murray’s
Lessee—but  not  long  enough  to  explain  the  opinion’s  con-
ception of Article III, due process, or the extended historical
inquiry that led the Court to conclude the collection of rev-
enue concerned a public right.  See post, at 9–10; supra, at
8, 10–14.

The 19th century behind it (for it does not trouble with
the founding era), the dissent turns to Oceanic Steam Nav.
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (1909).  Drawing on that
decision,  the  dissent  contends  that  “Congress  [has]  rou-
tinely  ‘impose[d]  appropriate  obligations’ ”  by  statute  and
given  “ ‘executive  officers  the  power  to  enforce’ ”  them
“ ‘without  the  necessity  of  invoking  the  judicial  power.’ ”
Post, at 11 (quoting Stranahan, 214 U. S., at 339).  Notably
absent from the dissent’s account, however, is the decision’s
discussion of Congress’s long-recognized and extensive au-
thority over the field of immigration, the area of law at issue
there.  See id., at 339.  Unmentioned, too, is Stranahan’s
explanation  that  what  links  immigration  to  other  public
rights  like  “tariff[s],  . . .  internal  revenue,  taxation,”  and
“foreign  commerce”  is  that,  “ ‘from  the  beginning[,]  Con-
gress has exercised a plenary power’ ” over them “because
they all relate to subjects peculiarly within the authority of
the legislative department.”  Id., at 334, 339.

Really, one has to wonder:  If the public rights exception
is as broad and unqualified as the dissent asserts, why did
our predecessors bother to discuss history or Congress’s pe-
culiar powers when it comes to revenue and immigration?
Why didn’t the Court simply announce the rule the dissent
would have us announce today:  that our Constitution does
not stand in the way of “agency adjudications of statutory
claims . . . brought by the Government in its sovereign ca-
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a concurring opinion from Justice Gorsuch. It cites legal precedents and engages in legal analysis, making it suitable for indexing.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
4

CARNEY v. ADAMS

Opinion of the Court

Governor Carney then filed a petition for a writ of certio-
rari.  He asked us to consider, first, whether the major party
requirement is constitutional and, then, if it is not, whether
it is severable from the bare majority requirement.  Pet. for
Cert. i.  We granted his petition but asked that the parties
first  address  the  question  whether  Adams  has  demon-
strated Article III standing to bring this lawsuit.

II
A
This case begins and ends with standing.  The Constitu-
tion grants Article III courts the power to decide “Cases” or
“Controversies.”  Art. III, §2.  We have long understood that
constitutional phrase to require that a case embody a gen-
uine, live dispute between adverse parties, thereby prevent-
ing the federal courts from issuing advisory opinions.  See
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 96–97 (1968); Coleman v. Mil-
ler,  307  U. S.  433,  460  (1939)  (opinion  of  Frankfurter,  J.)
(“[I]t was not for courts to pass upon . . . abstract, intellec-
tual problems but only if a concrete, living contest between
adversaries  called  for  the  arbitrament  of  law”).  The  doc-
trine of standing implements this requirement by insisting
that a litigant “prove  that he has suffered a  concrete and
particularized  injury  that  is  fairly  traceable  to  the  chal-
lenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial  decision.”  Hollingsworth  v.  Perry,  570  U. S.  693,
704  (2013);  Lujan  v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504  U. S.  555,
560–561 (1992).

Two aspects of standing doctrine are relevant here.  First,
standing  requires  an  “ ‘injury  in  fact’ ”  that  must  be  “con-
crete and particularized,” as well as “ ‘actual or imminent.’ ”
Id., at 560.  It cannot be “ ‘ “conjectural or hypothetical.” ’ ”
Ibid.    Second,  a  grievance  that  amounts  to  nothing  more
than an abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s inter-
est in the proper application of the law does not count as an
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be the beginning of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" section. It discusses the concept of standing in legal cases and its relevance to the case at hand.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 156 (1998)

171

Opinion of the Court

1987–1 Cum. Bull. 18; and (2) the Federal Government pro-
hibits for-proﬁt corporations from holding funds in NOW ac-
counts if the interest is paid to the corporation, but permits
corporate funds to be held in NOW accounts if the interest
is paid to the TEAJF, see Federal Reserve’s IOLTA Letter.
In other words, the State does nothing to create value; the
value is created by respondents’ funds. The Federal Gov-
ernment, through the structuring of its banking and taxation
regulations, imposes costs on this value if private citizens
attempt to exercise control over it. Waiver of these costs
if the property is remitted to the State hardly constitutes
“government-created value.”

In any event, we rejected a similar “government-created
value” argument in Webb’s. There, the State of Florida
argued that since the clerk’s authority to invest deposited
funds was a statutorily created right, any interest income
449 U. S.,
generated by the funds was not private property.
at 163. We rejected this argument, explaining that “the
State’s having mandated the accrual of interest does not
mean the State or its designate is entitled to assume own-
Id., at 162.
ership of the interest.”
This would be a different case if the interest income gen-
erated by IOLTA accounts was transferred to the State as
payment “for services rendered” by the State.
Id., at 157.
Our holding does not prohibit a State from imposing reason-
able fees it incurs in generating and allocating interest in-
come. See id., at 162; cf. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493
U. S. 52, 60 (1989) (upholding the imposition of a “reasonable
‘user fee’ ” on those utilizing the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal). But here the State does not,
indeed cannot,
argue that its conﬁscation of respondents’ interest income
amounts to a fee for services performed. Unlike in Webb’s,
where the State safeguarded and invested the deposited
funds, funds held in IOLTA accounts are managed entirely
by banks and private attorneys.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a section of a legal opinion, specifically the "Opinion of the Court" portion. It discusses legal arguments related to interest income generated from IOLTA (Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts) accounts.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER  TERM,  2014

1

Syllabus

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF DENTAL

EXAMINERS v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13–534.  Argued October 14, 2014—Decided February 25, 2015

North Carolina’s Dental Practice Act (Act) provides that the North Car-
olina State Board of Dental Examiners (Board) is “the agency of the
State  for  the  regulation  of  the  practice  of  dentistry.”    The  Board’s
principal duty is to create, administer, and enforce a licensing system
for dentists; and six of its eight members must be licensed, practicing
dentists.

The  Act  does  not  specify  that  teeth  whitening  is  “the  practice  of
dentistry.”  Nonetheless, after dentists complained to the Board that
nondentists  were  charging  lower  prices  for  such  services  than  den-
tists did, the Board issued at least 47 official cease-and-desist letters
to  nondentist  teeth  whitening  service  providers  and  product  manu-
facturers, often warning that the unlicensed practice of dentistry is a
crime.  This and other related Board actions led nondentists to cease
offering teeth whitening services in North Carolina.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed an administrative com-
plaint,  alleging  that  the  Board’s  concerted  action  to  exclude
nondentists  from  the  market  for  teeth  whitening  services  in  North
Carolina constituted an anticompetitive and unfair method of compe-
tition under the Federal Trade Commission Act.  An Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) denied the Board’s motion to dismiss on the ground
of state-action immunity.  The FTC sustained that ruling, reasoning
that  even  if  the  Board  had  acted  pursuant  to  a  clearly  articulated
state  policy  to  displace  competition,  the  Board  must  be  actively  su-
pervised  by  the  State  to  claim  immunity,  which  it  was  not.    After  a
hearing  on  the  merits,  the  ALJ  determined  that  the  Board  had  un-
reasonably  restrained  trade  in  violation  of  antitrust  law.    The  FTC
again sustained the ALJ, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the FTC in
  </content>
  <thinking>
This text appears to be the syllabus of a Supreme Court case. Syllabi are summaries of the court's opinions and are not considered part of the main body of the legal text.
  </thinking>
  <category>Syllabus</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024)

29

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting

¶10(d).  Instead, it worries that a prosecution for this con-
duct might make it harder for the President to use the Vice
President “to advance [his] agenda in Congress.”  Ante, at
24.  Such  a  prosecution,  according  to  the  majority,  “may
well hinder the President’s ability to perform his constitu-
tional functions.”  Ibid.  Whether a prosecution for this con-
duct  warrants  immunity  should  have  been  an  easy  ques-
tion,  but  the  majority  turns  it  into  a  debatable  one.
Remarkably, the majority goes further and declines to deny
immunity  even  for  the  allegations  that  Trump  organized
fraudulent  elector  slates,  pressured  States  to  subvert  the
legitimate  election  results,  and  exploited  violence  at  the
Capitol to influence the certification proceedings.  It is not
conceivable  that  a  prosecution  for  these  alleged  efforts  to
overturn a Presidential election, whether labeled official or
unofficial under the majority’s test, would pose any “ ‘dan-
gers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Ex-
ecutive Branch,’ ” ante, at 14, and the majority could have
said as much.  Instead, it perseverates on a threshold ques-
tion that should be immaterial.

Looking  beyond  the  fate  of  this  particular  prosecution,
the  long-term  consequences  of  today’s  decision  are  stark.
The  Court  effectively  creates  a  law-free  zone  around  the
President, upsetting the status quo that has existed since
the  Founding.  This  new  official-acts  immunity  now  “lies
about like a loaded weapon” for any President that wishes
to place his own interests, his own political survival, or his
own financial gain, above the interests of the Nation.  Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).  The President of the United States is the
most  powerful  person  in  the  country,  and  possibly  the
world.  When he uses his official powers in any way, under
the  majority’s  reasoning,  he  now  will  be  insulated  from
criminal prosecution.  Orders the Navy’s Seal Team 6 to as-
sassinate a political rival?  Immune.  Organizes a military
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a dissenting opinion from a Supreme Court case. It delves into legal arguments and interpretations, making it suitable for indexing as part of a legal document.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Document (Dissenting Opinion)</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013)

31

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

evils  which  have  subsequently  appeared.”    383  U. S.,  at
328–329 (emphasis added).

Katzenbach,  the  Court  acknowledges,  “rejected  the
notion that the [equal sovereignty] principle operate[s] as
a bar on differential treatment outside [the] context [of the
admission of new States].”  Ante, at 11 (citing 383 U. S., at
328–329)  (emphasis  omitted).  But  the  Court  clouds  that
once clear understanding by citing dictum from Northwest
Austin  to  convey  that  the  principle  of  equal  sovereignty
“remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent dispar
ate treatment of States.”  Ante, at  11 (citing 557 U. S., at
203).  See  also  ante,  at  23  (relying  on  Northwest  Austin’s
“emphasis  on  [the]  significance”  of  the  equal-sovereignty
If  the  Court  is  suggesting  that  dictum  in
principle).
Northwest  Austin  silently  overruled  Katzenbach’s  limita
tion of the equal sovereignty doctrine to “the admission of
new  States,”  the  suggestion  is  untenable.  Northwest
Austin  cited  Katzenbach’s  holding  in  the  course  of  declin-
ing to decide whether the VRA was constitutional or even
what  standard  of  review  applied  to  the  question.    557
U. S., at 203–204.  In today’s decision, the Court ratchets
up what was pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing
breadth  to  the  equal  sovereignty  principle  in  flat  contra
diction  of  Katzenbach.  The  Court  does  so  with  nary  an
explanation  of  why  it  finds  Katzenbach  wrong,  let  alone
any  discussion  of  whether  stare  decisis  nonetheless  coun
sels  adherence  to  Katzenbach’s  ruling  on  the limited  “sig
nificance” of the equal sovereignty principle.

Today’s  unprecedented  extension  of  the  equal  sover
eignty principle outside its proper domain—the admission
of new States—is capable of much mischief.  Federal statutes
that  treat  States  disparately  are  hardly  novelties.    See,
e.g.,  28  U. S. C.  §3704  (no  State  may  operate  or  permit  a
sports-related  gambling  scheme,  unless  that  State  con
ducted  such  a  scheme  “at  any  time  during  the  period
beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990”);
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a legal opinion, specifically a dissenting opinion from Justice Ginsburg. It cites previous cases and legal statutes, indicating it is part of a legal argument.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>


<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
28

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN

Opinion of the Court

the maps they produce yield different benchmark results?
How are courts to decide?
  Alabama  does  not  say;  it  offers  no  rule  or  standard  for
determining which of these choices are better than others.
Nothing in §2 provides an answer either.  In 1982, the com-
puterized  mapmaking  software  that  Alabama  contends
plaintiffs must use to demonstrate an (unspecified) level of
deviation did not even exist.  See, e.g., J. Chen & N. Steph-
anopoulos,  The  Race-Blind  Future  of  Voting  Rights,  130
Yale  L. J.  862,  881–882  (2021)  (Chen  &  Stephanopoulos).
And neither the text of §2 nor the fraught debate that pro-
duced  it  suggests  that  “equal  access”  to  the  fundamental
right of voting turns on computer simulations that are tech-
nically complicated, expensive to produce, and available to
“[o]nly a small cadre of university researchers [that] have
the resources and expertise to run” them.  Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 28 (citing Chen & Stephanopoulos
882–884).8
  One  final  point  bears  mentioning.    Throughout  these
cases, Alabama has repeatedly emphasized that HB1 can-
not have violated §2 because none of plaintiffs’ two million
odd maps contained more than one majority-minority dis-
trict.  See, e.g., Brief for Alabama 1, 23, 30, 31, 54–56, 70,
79.  The point is that two million is a very big number and
that  sheer  volume  matters.    But  as  elsewhere,  Alabama
misconceives the math project that it expects courts to over-
see.  A brief submitted by three computational redistricting
experts  explains  that  the  number  of  possible  districting
maps in Alabama is at least in the “trillion trillions.”  Re-
districting  Brief  6,  n. 7.    Another  publication  reports  that

——————

8 None of this is to suggest that algorithmic mapmaking is categorically
irrelevant in voting rights cases.  Instead, we note only that, in light of
the  difficulties  discussed  above,  courts  should  exercise  caution  before
treating  results  produced  by  algorithms  as  all  but  dispositive  of  a  §2
claim.    And  in  evaluating  algorithmic  evidence  more  generally  in  this
context, courts should be attentive to the concerns we have discussed.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be part of a legal opinion, specifically discussing the use of algorithms in redistricting and the Voting Rights Act. It delves into the complexities of using algorithmic maps and the challenges courts face in evaluating them.
  </thinking>
  <category>Legal Opinion</category>
  <should_index>true</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
524ORD Unit: $PT2

[08-17-00 11:04:56] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

943

524 U. S.

June 22, 1998

No. 97–8852. Ortiz v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 701 So. 2d 922.

No. 97–8859. Beverly v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga

County. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8865. Hooper v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 947 P. 2d 1090.

No. 97–8868. Flores v. Garcia, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 131 F. 3d 146.

No. 97–8873. Hunter v. South Carolina et al. C. A. 4th

Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 129 F. 3d 1259.

No. 97–8874. Dreher v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App.
Div. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 302 N. J. Super. 408,
695 A. 2d 672.

No. 97–8883. Kerekes v. Apfel, Commissioner of Social
Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
133 F. 3d 927.

No. 97–8904. Trobaugh v. Iowa. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 577 N. W. 2d 850.

No. 97–8915. Payne v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 706 So. 2d 305.

No. 97–8920. Wilkerson v. Tutt et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-

tiorari denied.

No. 97–8923. Miner v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist.

Certiorari denied. Reported below: 957 S. W. 2d 332.

No. 97–8932. Barbir v. White, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.

Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8935. Buck v. Boeing Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari

denied. Reported below: 133 F. 3d 925.

No. 97–8936. Byrd v. Gillis, Superintendent, State Cor-
rectional Institution at Coal Township, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.

No. 97–8943. Harold v. Singletary, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari de-
nied. Reported below: 704 So. 2d 520.
  </content>
  <thinking>
This appears to be a list of court cases and their dispositions (certiorari denied). It lacks the narrative flow and contextual information typical of a book's main content.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Cases or Court Docket</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>
<instruction>Determine true or false if the following content is suitable and should be indexed.</instruction>
<suitable>
  <content>
Job: 529REP Unit: $UBV [08-17-01 15:19:31] PGT: TCRBV (Bound Volume)

xxxiv

TABLE OF CASES REPORTED

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hobbs; Evans v.
Hoddevik; Arctic Alaska Fisheries Corp. v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hogue v. Ayers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ho Lee v. Ramirez-Palmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holguin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holloman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holloway v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holmes v. Daybrook Fisheries, Inc.
Holmes v. Department of Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holmes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Holt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Honey; Distelrath v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Honeywell International, Inc.; Tomeo v.
Hook v. United States
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hooks; Cox v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hopkins v. Newman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hopper v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hopper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Horn, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Horn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hornsby v. Evans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Horsley v. Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Horton v. Norfolk Southern R. Co.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Housing Authority of New Orleans; Bremer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Housing Authority of Pittsburgh; Mistick PBT v. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Howard v. New York Times Co.
Howe v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Howell v. Helman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Howland v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hubbard; Randon v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hudson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hudson v. Lamartiniere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Huertas Barbosa v. Alejandro Buitrago Hospital
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Huggins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hughes v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hughes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hukill v. Auto Care, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hunt v. Cromartie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hustler Magazine; Springer v.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hutchinson v. Spanierman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hutson v. Fanello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hyche v. Christensen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hydreclaim Corp. v. Process Control Corp.

Page
1111
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1097
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1069
1002
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1100
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1083
1082
1116
1084
1130
1103
1014
1029
1026
1007
1111
1114
1018
1033
1021
1062
1125
1125
1075
1074
1128
1112
1025
1022
1116
1014,1035
1037
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1007
1037
  </content>
  <thinking>
This is a table of cases, likely found at the beginning of a legal document. It lists cases alphabetically with corresponding page numbers.
  </thinking>
  <category>Table of Contents</category>
  <should_index>false</should_index>
</suitable>